

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1066

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 Memo	to the President re: Dominican Election secret <i>open 1-19-89 NLJ 86-287</i>	1 p	05/26/66 A
#1a cable	text of Santo Domingo 2537 secret <i>open 3-16-88 NLJ 86-290</i>	6 p	05/25/66 A
#2 memo	to the President re: Iran confidential <i>open 1-19-89 NLJ 86-287</i>	1 p	05/26/66 A
#2a letter	LBJ to Pahlavi possible classified into "	1 p	05/27/66 A
#2b letter	to LBJ from Pahlavi possible classified for info "	2 p	04/25/66 A
#4a message	to LBJ from Prime Minister Wilson confidential <i>open 2/10/98</i>	3 p	05/26/66 A
#7 memo	to the President from WWR secret <i>open 8-21-86</i>	1 p	05/25/66 A
#7a cable	for Bohlen from the Secretary secret <i>open 3-16-88 NLJ 86-290</i>	5 p	05/23/66 A
#9 memo	to the President re NSC meeting schedules confidential <i>open 10-11-88 NLJ 86-288</i>	2 p	05/25/66 A
#10a cable	text of Saigon 4952 secret <i>open 3-16-88 NLJ 86-290</i>	5 p	05/25/66 A
#14 memo	to the President re: Guantanamo Naval Base confidential <i>open 1-19-89 NLJ 86-287</i>	2 p	05/25/66 A
#17 memo	to the President re: Dominican Situation secret <i>sanitized 6-29-89 NLJ 87-94</i>	2 p	05/24/66 A
#20 memo	to the President re: Latin American secret <i>open 1-19-89 NLJ 86-287</i>	2 p	05/24/66 A
#22 memo	to the President re: Food AID confidential <i>open 10-11-88 NLJ 86-288</i>	1 p	05/24/66 A
#22a memo	to the President from Rusk re: World Food Problem confidential <i>open 4-17-87 NLJ 86-290</i>	2 p	05/16/66 A
#23 memo	to the President re: Chinese secret <i>open 10-11-88 NLJ 86-288</i>	1 p	05/23/66 A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, [REDACTED]
 Memos to the President - Walt Rostow, vol. 3
 5.16-26, 1966

RESTRICTION CODES

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#23a memo	National Security Action Memo No. 347 secret <i>open 10-11-88 NLJ 86-288</i> 1 p	undated	A
#23b report	Directive No. 1/6 <i>Sanitized 6/13/00 NLJ 98-321; same sanc per RAC 3/04</i> secret <i>Example NLJ 88-48</i> 2 p	undated	A
#23c memo	National Security Action Memorandum No. 176 secret <i>open 7/21/98</i> 1 p	08/01/62	A
#23d memo	National Security Action Memorandum No. 176 secret <i>open 10-11-88 NLJ 86-288</i> 1 p	undated	A
#26 memo	to the President from Bator re: Cocoa Conference confidential <i>open 1-19-89 NLJ 86-287</i> 1 p	05/23/66	A
#26a memo	to the President re: Cocoa Conference confidential <i>open 3-16-88 NLJ 86-290</i> 2 p	05/21/66	A
#27 memo	to the President from WWR re: Iran secret <i>open 1-19-89 NLJ 86-287</i> 1 p	05/23/66	A
#27a cable	text of Tehran 1572 secret <i>open 3-16-88 NLJ 86-290</i> 3 p	05/23/66	A
#29 memo	to the President re: Mexico confidential <i>open 8-29-86</i> 1 p	05/23/66	A
#31 memo	to the President re: Rhodesia confidential <i>open 1-19-89 NLJ 86-287</i> 1 p	05/23/66	A
#31a letter	to the President of Zambia from LBJ confidential <i>open 1-19-89 NLJ 86-287</i> 1 p	undated	A
#31b cable	text of Lusaka 1707 confidential 2 p	05/18/66	A
#32a cable	text of Saigon 4887 secret <i>open 3-16-88 NLJ 86-290</i> 1 p	05/23/66	A
#33 memo	to President re: Israel <i>Sanitized 10-12-99 NLJ 98-322; same sanc per RAC 9/01</i> secret <i>Sanitized 11-12-92 NLJ 91-108</i> 1 p <i>Downgraded to Secret per NLJ 91-108</i>	05/23/66	A
#36 memo	to the President re: Israel secret <i>open 1-19-89 NLJ 86-287</i> 3 p	05/21/66	A
#36a report	re: Israel <i>Sanitized 1-19-89 NLJ 86-287 open 7/2/98</i> secret 2 p	05/19/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, ~~REDACTED~~
 Memos to the President - Walt Rostow, vol. 3
 5/16-26/1966

Box 1

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#38 memo	Open 11-30-95 NLJ 92-397 to the President re: Canada Exempt NLJ 86-288 secret, sanitized 5-16-90 NLJ 90-67 1p	05/21/66	A
#38a memo	to the President re: Strategic Air Command secret Open 12-26-89 NLJ 88-58 1 p	05/16/66	A
#38b report	re: SAC Airborne " " secret 2 p	undated	A
#38c map	re: SAC Airborne " " secret 1 p	undated	A
#38d memo	to SecDEF re SAC Airborne Exempt NLJ 86-288 secret Open 5-16-90 NLJ 90-67 1 p	undated	A
#38e memo	to Rostow from Bowman re: SAC Exempt NLJ 86-288 secret Open 5-16-90 NLJ 90-67 1 p	05/20/66	A
#38f memo	to SECDEF xxxxx re: SAC secret Open 7/21/98 1 p	undated	A
#39 memo	to the President re: Israel & Africa sanitized 1-20-93 NLJ 91-109 top secret sanitized 10-12-99 NLJ 98-322 1 p Downgraded per NLJ 91-109	05/21/66	A
#43a memo	to the President re: Vietnam confidential Open 10-11-88 NLJ 86-288 1 p	05/21/66	A
#43c cable	Guidance for 130th meeting confidential Open 3-16-88 NLJ 86-290 9 p	undated	A
#45 memo	to the President re: Iran sanitized 11-28-88 NLJ 86-289 secret Downgraded per NLJ 86-289 1 p same same per PAC 9/01	05/21/66	A
#45a memo	to the President re: Iran secret Open 4-17-87 NLJ 86-290 1 p	undated	A
#45b report	re: Iran secret Open 2-5-93 NLJ 91-543 secret sanitized 4-17-87 NLJ 86-290 6 p	undated	A
#47 memo	to the President re: Vietnam secret Open 10-11-88 NLJ 86-288 1 p	05/21/66	A
#48a memo	to the President re: Israel Open 9-9-96 NLJ 96-345 confidential sanitized 1-19-89 NLJ 86-289 1 p	05/21/66	A
#48b letter	to the President from Arthur Goldberg confidential Open 4-17-87 NLJ 86-290 5 p	05/19/66	A

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 Memos for the President - Walt Rostow, Vol. 3
 May 16-26, 1966

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION	
#50 memo	to the President re: France top secret <i>open 11-28-88 NLS 86-285</i>	1 p	05/20/66	A
#50a cable	text of USUN NY 4964 secret <i>open 4-17-87 NLS 86-290</i>	1 p	05/20/66	A
#51a memo	to the president re: China top secret <i>Open 7-5-90 NLS 89-68</i>	1 p	05/20/66	A
#53a letter	to Prime Minister Wilson secret <i>Open 10-11-88 NLS 86-288</i>	6 p	undated	A
#55a memo	to President re: OAU secret <i>open 1-19-89 NLS 86-287</i>	1 p	05/20/66	A
#55b report	re: OAU ambassadors secret <i>q open 8-21-86</i>	8 p	05/20/66	A
#57a memo	to the President from Prime Minister Wilson Secret (dup. in WHCF, CO92 Box 8) <i>Open NLT 98-170 4-28-99</i>	1 p	05/20/66	A
#58a letter	to the President from Indira Gandhi possible classified info <i>Open NLT 98-320 3-25-99</i>	4 p	05/12/66	A
#59 letter	to President Marcos from Pres. Johnson possible classified into <i>Open 10-11-88 NLS 86-288</i>	1 p	05/20/66	A
#60b letter	to Amb. Bowles from Pres. Johnson Confidential <i>open 1-19-89 NLS 86-287</i>	2 pp	05/20/66	A
#62a memo*	to the President from George Ball secret <i>Open 2-29-88 NLS 86-277</i>	1 p	05/19/66	A
#62b letter	draft letter to PM Wilson secret <i>Open 10-11-88 NLS 86-288</i>	2 p	undated	A
#62c letter	to President from PM Wilson confidential <i>OPEN NLT 98-170 4-28-99</i>	4 p	03/29/66	A
#63 memo	to President re: Mexico confidential <i>open 8-21-86</i>	1 p	05/19/66	A
#63a cable*	Mexico 2439 confidential <i>open 8-21-86</i>	1 p	05/18/66	A
#64 memo	to President re: U. K. <i>sanitized 1-19-89 NLS 86-287</i> confidential <i>Open 7-14-95 NLS 93-236</i>	1 p	05/18/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, [REDACTED]
 Memos for the President - Walt Rostow, vol. 3
 May 16 - 26, 1966

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#67a memo	for the record re: Italy Secret <i>Open 10-11-88 NLS 86-288</i> 2 p	05/18/66	A
#70a memo	Briefing Memorandum confidential <i>Open 3-16-88 NLS 86-290</i> 1 p	undated	A
#71 memo	to the President re: NATO Secret <i>Open 10-11-88 NLS 86-288</i> 3 p	05/18/66	A
#72a memo	to the President re: NATO Secret <i>Open 10-11-88 NLS 86-288</i> 7 p	05/18/66	A
#72d memo	to the Secretary from Dean Acheson Secret <i>Open 3-16-88 NLS 86-290</i> 1 p	05/13/66	A
#72e report	re: France <i>Open 7-14-94 NLS 94-166</i> secret <i>Exempt NLS 86-290</i> 6 p <i>[Duplicate of #296, NSF, NSAM 345, Box 8]</i>	undated	A
#72g memo	to Rostow re: France secret <i>Open 3-16-88 NLS 86-290</i> 1 p	05/06/66	A
#72h report	re: France Secret <i>Open 3-16-88 NLS 86-290</i> 10 p	04/26/66	A
#75 memo	to the President from Rostow re: Dominican Republic confidential <i>Open 1-19-89 NLS 86-287</i> 1 p	05/17/66	A
#75a memo	for the files re: Dominican Republic confidential <i>Open 1-19-89 NLS 86-287</i> 2 p	05/16/66	A
#77 memo	to the President from Walt Rostow re: United Nations Secret <i>Open NLS 86-289</i> <i>Exempt NLS 86-289</i> 1 p <i>3-25-99</i>	05/17/66	A
#77a memo	to the President re: China top secret <i>Open NLS 87-112 11-10-98</i> 4 p <i>Exempt NLS 88-54</i>	05/14/66	A
#78 cable	for Porter from the Secretary re: Vietnam top secret <i>Downgraded to "Conf" per NLS 88-54</i> 2 p <i>Sanitized NLS 9-13-89 98-319</i> <i>can be sani per PAC 8/01</i>	05/16/66	A
#79 memo	to the President from Rostow re: Ceylon confidential <i>Open 1-19-89 NLS 86-287</i> 1 p	05/16/66	A
#79a letter	suggested reply to PM Senanayake possible classified info 1 p	undated	A
#80 memo	to the President re: NATO confidential <i>Open 10-11-88 NLS 86-288</i> 1 p	05/16/66	A

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 Memos to the President - Walt Rostow, vol. 3
 May 16-26, 1966

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#81 memo	to the President from WWR re: Thailand secret <i>Open 10-11-88 NLS 86-288</i> 1 p	05/16/66	A
#81a cable	text of Bangkok 2464 <i>open 7/21/98</i> Secret 2 p	05/16/66	A
#83 memo	to the President from Rostow re: PM Wilson secret <i>Open 2/10/98</i> 1 p	05/16/66	A
#83a letter	to Walt Rostow from David Bruce Secret <i>Open NLS 98-319 9-13-99</i> XXX 3 p	05/11/66	A
#86a report	from Gen. Westmoreland re: Hawaii 1529 top secret <i>opened 11/8/88 per DPMemo 1/5/95</i> 2 pp	05/16/66	A
#88 memo	to the President from Rostow re: South America confidential <i>open 1-9-89 NLS 86-287</i> 1 p	05/16/66	A

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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S

~~SECRET - LIMDIS~~

Thursday, May 26, 1966 -- 3:10 p.m.

Rec'd
3:16 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Election Roundup

The latest Bunker-Crimmins estimate of the election outlook is attached.

They believe that Balaguer's chances have improved during the past three weeks, but they are not confident enough about the gains to predict his victory.

W. Rostow

Attachment

Embassy Santo Domingo
estimate.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-287
By sig, NARA, Date 1-10-89

~~SECRET - LIMDIS~~

MESSAGE FROM EMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO NO. 2537, MAY 25, 1966

~~SECRET - LIMDIS~~

Subject: Election Estimate

1. Since Embassy's previous analysis, three trends have altered the complexion of the election campaign, boosting Balaguer's chances but leaving the outcome still not clearly predictable: renewed vigor and confidence of the PR campaign; all but a formal collapse of Bonnelly's MIN everywhere except possibly Cibao, with fragments gravitating to Balaguer without conditions; and failure of Bosch to neutralize the communism issue or to cleanse from the PRD the taint of involvement in swelling campaign violence.

2. In late April, Balaguer's PR party acquired its second wind in the campaign. Since then, with renewed confidence and reported infusion of new funds, Balaguer has waged adept and aggressive campaign, striking at Bosch and the PRD most successfully on issues of communism and violence. In improving his public relations effort, Balaguer has broadcast at different times on two national networks. Since early May he has received near maximum exposure through a series of at least thrice-weekly radio talks, has stepped up his campaign tours and is usually received by impressive crowds turned out by the local PR organizations.

Small parties allied with the PR are also making intensive use of the radio, the country's key political medium. A great number of PR vehicles working through the countryside, expensively printed posters and literature, and airborne Balaguer streamers all attest to the PR's generous financial sources. Balaguer's personal appearances throughout the Republic (in "saturation" style of the US candidates) psychologically is uplifting to backers and is impressive to uncommitted voters. By contrast, Bosch's avoidance of personal contact with the public has cost his campaign some zest.

3. In the past four weeks, Balaguer has fixed and held public attention on alleged PRD control of the Sugar Corporation (CAD) and government offices, gaining widespread acceptance of that charge that CAD employees are subject to political pressures and campaign levies and that at least some CEDULA and civil registry personnel are illegally equipping ineligible with voting documents. Though the PG has not taken any extensive

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-290

By ing, NARA, Date 3-10-88

corrective action, the effect has been to put the PRD on the defensive and even to cause some important PRD friends (such as Listin Diario) to insist that the PG take steps to dispel all suspicions of the political misuse of CAD resources.

4. As the campaign reaches its peak, the PR has now pushed communism to the forefront of its issues. Attacks of this sort/^{are} increasingly leveled by a battery of Balaguer supporters, including Lora, who has come to the forefront as the PR's hatchet man, thus freeing Balaguer from some of the onus for mudslinging.

Communism as an issue appears still of more concern to most of the electorate than Trujillismo, though the PRD leaders are now hitting frequently and forcefully on Balaguer's Trujillo connections (and Bosch has subtly introduced it in several speeches). The Bishop's pastoral letter, intended to proclaim the church's election neutrality, provided ammunition for some (including priests, according to Bosch) to spread the notion that even the church considers Bosch unsafe. Subsequent clarification by church leaders has not fully erased the misinterpretation.

5. The PRD campaign since our last analysis has continued to mount in intensity, and appears well-directed and adequately financed. PRD operatives in the interior have stepped up their efforts to turn out a maximum of Bosch-inclined city voters and counter Balaguer's head start in the rural areas (while some of the PR organizers, sensing victory, show signs of complacency).

At the top of the PRD, however, the past three weeks of the campaign has been less spectacular. It is difficult to judge the effect on voter confidence of Bosch's refusal to campaign in person, or his statements that he does not want the presidency, but it could hardly be encouraging to hard-pressed local leaders. Much of his radio time since our last analysis was spent on the PRD program. Though some discussion of roads, dams and irrigation projects is needed, his subjects inherently lack drama and newsworthiness and have allowed public attention to swing to the more sensational comments of Balaguer and his allies.

Moreover, while Balaguer in person is making specific promises which are appealing to local audiences and to key sectors (though are not necessarily sound, economically), Bosch's economic speeches hold out the depressing prospect of austerity, sacrifice and hard work on the long road to recovery.

6. At this particularly crucial time, Bosch has lost his campaign initiative, particularly on the issues of communism, violence and the CAD. He may have planned to stake his recovery of initiative on his major gambit of threatened withdrawal, but his move at this point seems to have had its low and possibly even an adverse political yield. His withdrawal threat has lost its edge with excessive use.

Growing public suspicion that the PRD and its sympathizers are responsible for much of the current campaign violence has undercut the credibility of Bosch's protests, has weakened the PRD stance as the meek and the persecuted party, and has sowed doubt that all of the isolated police-military actions against the PRD are unprovoked. At the same time, many Dominicans have a latent anti-military strain and Bosch's accusations may have touched this nerve at this important juncture.

7. The PR has emerged from it all with a strengthened claim to be the party of peace and order -- but with an image as heirs of Trujillo also more firmly fixed in the people's minds. As an adjunct to the communism issue, Balaguer has pressed his claims that the PR stands for order and popular confidence in contrast to the climate of chaos and fear that accompanies the PRD.

The PRD members' sacking of the MIN offices in Bani and the 14th of June attack on the PR caravan in La Romana have opportunely underscored Balaguer's claims and sorely embarrassed Bosch at the moment he sought to re-establish the PRD image as the victim of police-military-PR Party oppression.

8. Bonnelly's faltering campaign now is largely restricted to Cibao, but even there is not vigorous. The MIN Party denials of rumors of a deal have retained nominal support of a cluster of small parties that launched Bonnelly, though cracks in his alliance are apparent. He has all but announced a shift to Balaguer and other MIN leaders are striving to get into Balaguer's camp -- with conditions, if possible, and without them, if necessary -- before what remains of organization moves en masse without them.

Discouraged by the long wait, some MIN committees have broken up, and others are moribund. Though the public has tended to overrate MIN strength, the drift of MIN backers to Balaguer brings his campaign a psychological lift and sudden last-minute swing of the group of parties behind the PR/^{which} if handled adroitly could help reinforce the trend to Balaguer

by creating the impression among the politically imperceptive of a massive pro-Balaguer mobilization at a critical moment in the campaign.

9. Our last analysis remains valid in concluding that **the large bloc of silent swing voters may well decide the winner.** Many of these of course will cast their vote not on the merits of the candidates or on the issues, but in the hope of joining the winner. It is difficult to gauge the effect of recent weeks' campaign interplay on the uncommitted bloc who may vote on the issues. It must be supposed, however, that the prospect of order and stability remains highly persuasive consideration and Bosch's failure to acquit himself on issues of communism and violence have weakened him, notwithstanding his repudiation of the 14th of June support. For this reason, we believe that Balaguer has gained in influence, perhaps transitory, in the uncommitted bloc.

10. Election machinery has no deficiencies likely to affect the results significantly. There is **evidence that lagging Cedula issuance could operate against Balaguer -- who again asked this week that Cedula requirement be dropped -- by reducing the rural and female turnout.** On the other hand, multiplicity of ballots and similarity of colors could result in some voting against the PRD and the PRSC by mistake.

11. Our overall impression from this vantage point is that in the past three weeks, **Balaguer has gained a momentum that, if retained, could put him over.** The PRD is still campaigning with strength and confidence, but the loss of initiative at the top level has slowed what showed signs of becoming^{an} accelerating bandwagon. With little more than one week remaining, Bosch has used what he may have considered a big trump card, without successfully regaining his campaign initiative or developing a new issue. The result is discernible, even though faint, that there is a trend toward Balaguer among the visible electorate.

The PRD is responding with an increased expression of confidence and is displaying no defeatism that might hasten the migration to Balaguer. In fact, Bosch's failure to follow a hard-hitting line consistently (e. g. , his return, after his dramatic withdrawal bit, to important but unexciting issues of economic and social reform) is one of the current major puzzles of the campaign.

We are unable to decide whether Bosch, on the basis of his own judgments (which must be afforded a healthy respect) has concluded he has little to fear, or whether he is doing little more than going through

a minimum of motions to acquit his responsibilities to the party. At the same time, it is possible that he is lying low in preparation for a final-week burst of activity.

In this regard, some Reformista Party **leaders uneasily are wondering what dramatic last-minute surprise Bosch may have up his sleeve.** Leaving aside such speculation, major questions remain whether recent trend toward Balaguer is more apparent than real and whether -- assuming important appearances -- Balaguer will be able to transform it into a victory in the brief time remaining, where a mistake or an accidental bad break can heavily damage either side.

12. Our earlier generalizations about areas and sectors of Bosch and Balaguer support remain basically valid, but with conditions. Balaguer retains popularity among rural voters, but Embassy officers touring the interior find sturdy pockets of Bosch's rural strength in some provinces. Where PRD organization is diligent and effective, **indications are that Balaguer's earlier rural lead has in places been overcome.** Similarly, **some probes have revealed areas of Balaguer strength in and around cities,** including some poorer neighborhoods of Santo Domingo. Sugar areas still lean toward Bosch, but not monolithically. Among salaried mill workers, Bosch has a heavy lead; but among cane cutters and colonos (small cane farmers) Balaguer has significant strength.

13. A rundown by area shows **Balaguer with a perceptible lead in southwestern and extreme eastern provinces.** Bosch retains a lead in the national district and sugar provinces of La Romana and San Pedro de Macoris, though his lead could be reduced by strong Balaguer trend in the back country. However, **in remaining two-thirds of the country, including populous Cibao, trends at this point are hard to establish and prediction would be little more than a guess.** During recent visits to the northwest, Cibao and northeastern provinces, Embassy officers had the impression of a slight Bosch edge, but Balaguer has drawn extremely well in appearances in those areas and a **very important silent campesino vote** there defies evaluation. In this last regard, caution is advisable in assuming that the silent vote is usually pro-Balaguer. In areas in which the military, police and patron are dominant influences, Bosch backers are inclined to keep their peace.

14. Taking into account all of the above factors, and admittedly unscientific soundings by the Embassy, at this point in the campaign we now conclude **very hesitantly that Balaguer has become the man to beat,** principally because

he has apparently gained the initiative, a matter of great importance with respect to influencing the large and decisive uncommitted bloc of voters.

Events between now and June 1 may well change the picture. As we have seen, breaks of the race and invigorated Reformista campaign have closed the gap. But as the tight, hard-fought race heads toward the finish, the inherent organizational superiority of the PRD and Bosch's undeniable color and charisma are still advantages that Balaguer has yet to prove he has fully overcome.

15. Ambassador Bunker concurs.

Crimmins

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, May 26, 1966

2:00 p. m.

*Rec'd
6:23 p*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Shah has written you about his recent contribution of one day's military budget equivalent (\$700,000) to the UNESCO literacy program. He would like to see a special UNESCO fund for illiteracy and asks that we consider contributing.

We want to congratulate him on his initiative. We can now also assure him that we are doing our share. Monday, we confirmed before the UNESCO Executive Board meeting that we would increase our pledge for the next two years (\$19 million, 30% of UNESCO's regular budget). We will also be contributing another \$40 to UNESCO-sponsored projects through the UN Development Program. That is about all we can do, though we do not want to reject the Shah's suggestion outright.

We feel UNESCO is now tackling illiteracy in the right way, lining up a series of pilot projects aimed at groups who can contribute most immediately to their countries' development. So the Shah's contribution and any others he inspires will be well spent.

We also need every opportunity we can find to show we respect his leadership to pave the way for suggesting occasionally that his own development program would be better off if he did not spend so much on arms. We will deliver this message to him during his trip to Eastern Europe next week since a little reminder of your respect may count for a lot as he listens to bargain rates on arms.

Attached for signature if you approve.

W. J. Walsh
Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-287

By *Lip*, NARA, Date 1-10-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2a

May 27, 1966

Your Imperial Majesty:

Iran's contribution of \$700,000 to UNESCO's program against illiteracy, which you wrote me about, strikes me as a particularly generous offer, coming on top of Iran's own splendid achievements in this sphere. We in the United States are very much aware of Iran's special efforts in the form of your own Literacy Corps. Secretary Rusk, in his opening address at the recent CENTO Ministerial Meeting in Ankara, had occasion to single out the Literacy Corps for special praise, along with its companion Health Corps and Development Corps.

Through support of steadily expanding UNESCO literacy activities, as well as through bilateral programs, we work with you in vigorously promoting literacy throughout the world. Your Majesty's initiatives in this field, including your sponsorship of the World Congress for the Eradication of Illiteracy in Tehran last fall, have dramatized for people everywhere the challenge and the opportunity of this field.

I am also greatly encouraged when nations facing problems such as this draw from their own experience and begin pressing the worldwide effort against them. Your leadership will be an inspiration.

Sincerely,



His Imperial Majesty
Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi
Shahanshah of Iran
Tehran

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-287
By sig, NARA, Date 1-10-89

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 6/26/66



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-287
By ig, NARA, Date 1-10-89

Excellency,

As you may recall **the** World Congress on the Eradication of Illiteracy, the **idea** of which I had the honour to propose to Your Excellency in my message of October 19, 1964, was held in **Tehran** from September 8 to 19, 1965, under the auspices of **UNESCO**.

The Congress, among other recommendations, declared that illiteracy is a worldwide problem the solution of which depends on the close cooperation of all nations. The Congress also expressed its belief that governments **should allocate** larger resources to the elimination of illiteracy in the world.

At the opening session of the Congress, I stated that one of the possible sources of finance would be the allocation of a portion of military budgets to this purpose. I also indicated **that** we, on our part, in creating the Literacy Corps, had **already** done so on the national level and were prepared **to extend** the same **principle** on an international level, for the benefit of **all** peoples suffering from the scourge of illiteracy throughout the world.

With the commencement of the new Iranian year and the approval by Parliament of our annual budget, I have the honour to announce that, pursuant to the **recommendations** of the Tehran Congress, I have decided to place at the disposal of UNESCO the equivalent of one full day's military budget of Iran **for** the purpose of **helping** the campaign against illiteracy in the world. This represents a sum of about \$700,000 which is set aside from the Iranian military budget for the year 1345 (1966-67).

Indeed the eradication of this painful social problem at the international level requires more time and greater resources than the modest contribution of my government. Yet let us hope that this decision, which

for a developing country like mine represents a real sacrifice, will be followed by many other countries, thus, perhaps, enabling UNESCO to create a special fund for the successful implementation of this very fruitful task.

This is a worthy goal to realize. It is one of liberating two fifths of humanity from ignorance and opening the way towards new horizons of enlightenment and economic and social development.

That is why I take the liberty of making an urgent appeal to Your Excellency to consider the possibility of contributing to the realization of this great humanitarian objective.

I am fully convinced that our concerted efforts in supporting the UNESCO activities in this field would constitute a historic step on the way towards the progress and happiness of humanity at large.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency the assurances of my profound esteem and sincere friendship.

MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI



Marble Palace, 5 Ordibehesht 1345
(25 April, 1966)

H.E. MR. LYNDON B. JOHNSON

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Pres file 3

Thursday, May 26, 1966 -- 11:20 a. m.

Mr. President:

Also at tonight's OAU reception will be Simon Kapwepwe, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zambia. He is reputed to be a good fellow.

You might tell him:

- a. You are sympathetic with Zambia's problem, as your letter to Kaunda made clear;
- b. You hope he will be patient in this crisis while we work out long-run alternative transport routes.

W. W. R.

cc: U. S. Haynes

WWRostow:rln

Mr. President:
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3a

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Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zambia.

He is reputed to be a good fellow.

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W W R

7 4
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, May 26, 1966
10:25 a. m.

*Rec'd
10:25
5-26-66*

Mr. President:

You will be interested in the
attached account of Wilson's talks
with Erhard.

Walt
W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines & UK Guidelines
By W, NARA, Date 2-10-98

Thursday, May 26, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON

Before giving you the promised account of my talks with Erhard, I should just like to say, without going into the question of nuclear hardware, how much I agree with what you said in your message of the 21st on the need to maintain the closest unity of action with the Germans during the difficult period ahead.

As I said in my message yesterday, our talks with the Chancellor went very well indeed, as I think the communique (which you will have seen) brings out pretty clearly. Indeed, I believe it is not an exaggeration to say that they represent something of a high-point in our relations with Germany. I had two private talks with Erhard, when we spoke to each other with complete frankness and found a most encouraging community of approach to the essential problems. The same spirit characterized our more formal meetings. Although I had to take a pretty tough line with him about the foreign exchange costs of our troops in Germany, the atmosphere remained entirely cordial, and I think the Chancellor has gone home sincerely concerned to help find a solution to this problem. I left him in no doubt that, for us, it is a crucial one and that we meant what we said in the Defense Review White Paper. As you will have seen, we have agreed that our Ministers will get together soon to study this again.

We have also agreed that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should go to Bonn to talk about liquidity problems. Here again, I felt a heartening degree of mutual understanding with the Chancellor.

What he and I spoke of most to each other, and what dominated the whole of our talks, ^{was} of course, the series of problems that concern us in the Alliance. It seemed to me that there was virtually total agreement between us, both that the first priority is to resolve the crisis imposed on us by General DeGaulle: and on the way in which this should be tackled. I also detected a growing awareness on the Chancellor's part that the Alliance should be organized for political progress, as well as for military defense, and that we cannot afford to allow DeGaulle to pose successfully as the only champion in the West of detente and peaceful settlement of East-West problems -- including, most vital of all, the German problem. I was greatly impressed by Erhard's robust attitude on the whole French problem. His attitude, despite the strong political pressures he faces from those German politicians who put the French Alliance above their

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATO loyalties, is just as firm as that of your own Government and ours. As you will know, he agreed the paper which had emerged from George Thomson's talks in Washington with only the most minor drafting amendments and will cooperate in the proposed meeting in Paris next week.

As I told you, nuclear sharing was not mentioned between Erhard and myself. This was not for lack of any opportunity on his part. But frankly, I think we both felt that, at the present juncture in the Alliance relations with France, this was really a secondary issue. Schroder, of course, raised it with Michael Stewart, but in an entirely sensible and sober way. He spoke of it as a long-term problem which would have to be settled, in his view, through some integrated collective weapons system in addition to consultation; and he asked us at least to keep the options open. Michael Stewart agreed that we should keep an open mind about a solution of the problem. But he reminded Schroder of the continuing link between the nuclear question and disarmament and non-proliferation; while we could certainly not give the Russians a veto on our arrangements in NATO, we had to bear likely Russian reactions in mind in making our own decision.

In the communique we have confined ourselves to agreeing on the importance of continuing the studies of the nuclear organization of the Alliance.

I am sure you will agree that it is wise to leave it there for the time being. I know the importance which you attach to an understanding on this matter between the Germans and ourselves and this has been much in my mind. I trust that when the time comes for further discussion, we shall have found that the differences between us all are less than has sometimes been imagined.

We also had a useful short exchange about our own future relations with the EEC. The Chancellor made it clear that he did not think there was any real likelihood of an effective negotiation for British entry at present, even supposing that this could be done with due regard to our essential interests. But we were able to make clear our continued willingness to enter into such a negotiation if the opportunity presented itself, and I was encouraged by the evident anxiety of the Chancellor to see us and other EFTA countries in an expanded Common Market on satisfactory terms. I felt that we were thinking along very similar lines.

To sum up, I genuinely believe that the unity of purpose and the unity in action of the Alliance will have been strengthened by this meeting, and I am encouraged by the virtual identity of approach which our three Governments, which are after all key members of NATO, are taking to the present crisis in the Alliance: and to the wider problems of Britain's relationship with Continental Europe and to the continuation of the vital link across the Atlantic, between

yourselves and all of us in Western Europe. As I see it, our purpose now must be not only to re-adjust at the particular points where General DeGaulle has made his thrusts, but also, as we have agreed between us, to make a comprehensive reorganization across the board. Our purpose here (and I believe that you, the Chancellor and I are all agreed on this) must surely be to maximise our military efficiency and to do so as economically as possible; but also, and just as important, to put us in the best political posture for improving East-West relations.

I have indeed read with attention your speech on the occasion of the Polish Millenium, and should like to say, if I may, how admirably I think you expressed our common purposes.

I much look forward to the further thoughts on these matters which you promised in your message.

5

May 26, 1966

Dear Ambassador Brown:

I have your thoughtful letter of May 11 concerning the inauguration of the rural electrification project in Zambrano.

The project shows how the Alliance for Progress can reach down into the grass roots to help the farmer and his family achieve a better and more dignified way of life.

Please convey to the Executive Committee of the Rural Electric Cooperative No. One my pride and gratitude for their scroll.

Sincerely,



**The Honorable Aaron S. Brown
American Ambassador
Managua, Nicaragua**

LBJ:WGB:WWR:rlh

4

Wednesday, May 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Ambassador Brown in Nicaragua

Ambassador Aaron Brown has sent you the attached letter describing an AID project in Nicaragua which in a small, but meaningful, fashion has brought a better way of life to humble people in a rural area of that country.

It is a project in which you were personally involved. Two years ago, you and Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa signed the AID loan agreement which made it possible. The executive committee of the rural electric cooperation -- the first in Nicaragua -- have sent you a scroll via Ambassador Brown expressing their gratitude.

You may wish to send Ambassador Brown a reply along the lines of the attached draft.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

MEMORANDUM

✓ *to p 2*
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

cc: Moyers

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 25, 1966
5:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


Herewith the draft talking points for Bohlen to raise with Couve, and for Cleveland to inform and discuss with the North Atlantic Council.

1. With minor modifications, the text is identical to the Aide Memoire.
2. One could argue that there are a few points of repetition; but these are essentially minor and, if altered, would not change the import or impact of the draft.
3. The State Department has fully met your point that this matter should be conveyed to the French Government at a lower diplomatic level than an Aide-Memoire.
4. That change in procedure diminishes but does not remove the near certainty of publication or other leakage, nor the likelihood that it will be reported as "another tough U. S. note to de Gaulle."
5. I know of no way to avoid this, however, if we are to put our legal position into the historical record in the wake of de Gaulle's unilateral decisions.
6. It would be possible to make these points in a much shorter note; but that would:
 - a) not reduce substantially the noise level; and
 - b) raise hell over at State, where all, including Sect. Rusk, feel strongly about the clarity of the historical record.
7. I recommend, therefore, that you approve the State draft.
8. Since Bob McNamara is ready, in fact, to start moving, there is a certain urgency in the clearance of this cable.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____



OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~
Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy PARIS
INFO: AmEmbassy LONDON
AmEmbassy BONN

PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-290

FOR BOHLEN FROM THE SECRETARY

By 48, NARA, Date 3-10-88

You should request appointment to see Couve ASAP and make to him following points orally, leaving with him a memorandum incorporating these points in full for the record. Memorandum would be one prepared locally and would not be published.

Points you should make are as follows:

1. You have been instructed to acknowledge French Aide-Memoire of April 22 proposing that US and France begin to discuss the QTE practical measures UNQTE that should be taken concerning our bilateral agreements referred to in French Aide-Memoires of March 10 and March 29.
2. You should state that US is prepared, as it said in its Aide-Memoire of April 12, to discuss any matter raised by GOF, subject, of course, to consultation with our Allies. You should state we find Paris an entirely appropriate place for discussion, but in order to prepare properly, US must request further enlightenment on precise proposals which GOF wishes discussed.
3. We understand that the subject matter of proposed discussions are five agreements which US and GOF entered into in furtherance of obligations we assumed under NAT. [We have noted GOF intention to remain a party to this treaty, Article 3 of which contains undertaking that QTE in order more effectively to achieve the objectives of the treaty, the parties separately

Drafted by: EUR:RPM:RISpiers 5/23/66 Tel. Ext. 4307 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Retyped in U

The Secretary

EUR - Mr. Schaetzel U - Mr. Ball
White House -

S/S - Mr. Thompson
S - Mr. Acheson

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~~SECRET~~

Classification

[and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack UNQTE. Agreements entered into in exercise of US and French sovereignty will permit US to install, have access to and from, and man and use ^{certain} ~~xxx~~ facilities in France, such as a pipeline, system of communications, storage depots, airfields, military headquarters and hospitals. All these facilities and their use are for purpose of enabling US to fulfill effectively its treaty duty to come to aid of a European ally or allies subject to armed attack. (US has been assured that GOF intends to fulfill this treaty duty and believes that it wishes US to continue to do likewise.)

4. GOF has stated, however, that its agreements with US are incompatible with its desire to resume full exercise of its sovereignty in French territory. You have been instructed to make unmistakably clear that French sovereignty over French land and air has never been questioned by US. Indeed US has not failed in past and is now pledged by treaty to defend French sovereignty over French territory against armed attack. Very facilities in question, installed at express ~~xxx~~ invitation and by permission of GOF, are an earnest of that pledge.

5. US seeks info on what GOF proposes to discuss under description QTE practical measures that should be taken concerning the bilateral agreements UNQTE. US has expressed its willingness to discuss any changes in agreements which GOF desires and arrangements for their termination if necessary. US is prepared to discuss the use of facilities established in accordance with the agreements in time of peace or conflict as French Aide-Memoire of March 29 suggests. US has gone further and expressed its willingness to evacuate French territory, if this be the desire of the GOF, as soon as [this can be done without prejudice to allied security, But a proper respect for

international

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Classification

international agreements precludes acceptance of a unilateral denunciation of them.

6. Specific questions which arise under bilateral agreements are:

A. US Military Headquarters Agreement of June 17, 1953 authorizes installation and operation of headquarters of US European Command near St. Germain-en-Laye. By its terms agreement continues in force for life of the NAT unless sooner terminated by mutual consent. Inasmuch as GOF has denounced Protocol on Status of International Military Headquarters, to take effect April 1, 1967, it is intention of USG to move headquarters of its European Command, which is closely linked to SHAPE, as soon as a suitable location can be found and arrangements made. US will, therefore, be prepared to discuss QTE practical measures UNQTE for this move at an appropriate time; meanwhile it asks to be informed what QTE practical measures UNQTE GOF wishes to discuss.

USG is also prepared to discuss with GOF the latter's proposals re Military Headquarters Agreement. Is it the desire of GOF that US agree to its termination?

B. Under Pipeline Agreement of June 30, 1953, an oil pipeline has been laid at US expense across French territory from Donges to Metz and is operated by a French company for joint use by France and US in peacetime, and by SACEUR in time of war. What changes in agreement are desired by GOF? Does GOF object to flow of oil in pipeline across French territory for the use of US forces in Germany? Does GOF object to the present operation of the pipeline?

C. Chateauroux Agreement of February 27, 1951 establishes an air depot at Deols and La Martinerie for the supply of US air forces in Europe. Air Bases Agreement of Oct. 4, 1952 authorizes construction and use of certain airfields in France for US air Force missions in furtherance of common defense plans. These agreements by their terms continue in force for duration of the NAT unless previously terminated by mutual agreement.

Both

~~SECRET~~

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Classification

Both ~~XXX~~ Chateauroux Agreement and Air Bases Agreement require French approval before flights may be made from these bases which are not in furtherance of NAT missions or in support of US forces in Europe. Under these agreements operational command of US facilities is accorded to US officers while French authorities continue to exercise territorial command of region of facilities. In addition, US and France have concluded Overflight Agreement, dated December 21, 1964 which regulates flights by US aircraft in and over France.

It is present intention of US in view of attitude of GOF to remove the air squadrons and supporting forces from these bases as soon as practicable after consultation with its Allies.

US will also be prepared to discuss agreements themselves. Does GOF request the US to agree to termination of these agreements and evacuation of bases and depots? Are these facilities among those referred to in the French Aide-Memoire of March 29 as facilities QTE on which the two governments could reach mutual agreement in the event of a conflict in which both countries would participate under the Atlantic Alliance UNQTE? If so, does phrase QTE a conflict in which both countries would participate UNQTE preclude use of such facilities in the event that France should not participate in a conflict arising from an armed attack against a Party to the NAT?

D. System of Communications Agreement of December 8, 1958 authorizes network of depots and other facilities for supply of US Army in Europe. Under this agreement, as pointed out in US Aide-Memoire of April 12, GOF may propose review or modification and, if not satisfied with response, may give notice of termination in due course. US is prepared to discuss with GOF any proposals which it may have for review or modification

of

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of the agreement, and asks the same questions as in the preceding para.

Since USG is entirely willing to discuss bilateral agreements and practical matters in relation thereto, it earnestly hopes that GOF will aid in preparation for these early discussions by clarifying its position as requested.

FOR USRO. Cleveland should coordinate with Bohlen so that he can make arrangements to advise Fourteen of this demarche just prior to Bohlen meeting with Couve. Cleveland should stress that purpose of this step is both to try to elicit clarifications on questions we are putting to French and to counter increasing ^{on} propaganda that we are dragging our feet on QTE negotiations UNQTE and/making any reply to last French Aide-Memoire.

GP 3.

End.

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Wednesday
May 25, 1966 - 1:25
PM

Mr. President:

One of Bill Jorden's staff put this
montage together on the theme:
How to be an Ambassador.

I thought it might lighten the day
a little.

W. W. R.

Pa
HE TO BE AN AMBASSADOR

WHILE THE NEWSPAPERS ARE SAYING:

Civil Crisis Grows in South Vietnam

U.S. Seeking Crisis Alternatives

Pullout in Vietnam
Possible, Rivers Claims

Buddhists
Hint Turn
To Vietcong

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR SAID:

Lodge Returns

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge returned to Saigon Friday from consultations in Washington with President Johnson and a stopover in Seoul for talks with South Korean leaders. "It feels fine to be back in this beautiful country to which I am so attached," the smiling Ambassador said. "I like it here."

EROX FROM QUICK COPY

MORANDUM

6

By Jim Jones 9
5/26

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, May 25, 1966

1:15 P.M.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-288

By NR, NARA, Date 10-5-88

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am informed that you wish to schedule regular NSC meetings at two-week intervals.

I have taken stock with Brom Smith, George Ball, and Bob McNamara -- and reviewed my own knowledge and experience of NSC workings on and off since 1947.

We believe you will still wish to use formal NSC meetings from time to time as you have in the past; i. e., for the presentation of recommendations on major problems like Viet Nam and NATO.

But the following appear the conditions for making a regular NSCA series a success.

-- We must not pretend the NSC meetings are the occasion when you will actually be making your major foreign policy decisions.

-- On the other hand, we must avoid creating a paper mill that would produce unimportant or uninteresting briefings for you.

There are two areas for successful regular NSC meetings, within these limits:

1. Well staffed presentation of issues which will, in the fairly near future, be coming to you for decision and on which your principal advisers should exchange views in a preliminary, informal way, against the background of a paper defining carefully and precisely the elements in the problem.

2. Intelligence briefings based on information not to be found in either the New York Times or in the normal flow of intelligence (this might include briefings on new technical developments of far-reaching implication).

With respect to the first type of subject, a good example is the Indian nuclear question. I would like to suggest this as the subject for a meeting of the NSC late next week (or the following, if you do not wish both a Cabinet and NSC session in the next week).

The problem is complex. It has been well staffed out at the planning level. There is no agreed view in the town as to whether we can do anything -- or what it is we can and should do.

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

The subject is hot because the third Chinese Communist nuclear explosion has increased the pressure in India to go for a nuclear device. Chet Bowles has sent us a cable outlining the alternatives.

I would propose that the meeting consider what alternatives are open to us and their implications. The end product of the meeting, aside from a common look at the problem, would be your instruction as to next steps in policy. It would not be a final decision.

Another subject might be the Israel de-salting project.

I also propose that we go to work immediately to produce for you a list of other such important, foreseeable problems, plus possible intelligence problems; submit that list to you; and, on the basis of your reaction, set in motion systematic staff work in the town on the basis of a schedule looking, say, four or five sessions ahead.

Only on the basis of such a reliable schedule can we assure that the staff work will be serious and worthy of your attention at an NSC meeting.

One implication is that, within the limits of your schedule, we must try very hard to be regular about these meetings. This is desirable because Council members can plan their advance schedules so as to avoid conflicts or absences from Washington on the regular Council meeting day.

Walt Rostow

BKS
Bromley Smith

1. The Indian nuclear subject is OK for an NSC meeting next week ✓

the week after

The Israel de-salting project is better good also

See me

2. Prepare a schedule of other possible subjects for submission to me ✓

See me

3. In principle, could we think in terms of every other Thursday,
beginning June 2 ✓ beginning June 9 ✓

See me

Wed. May 25, 1966
12:00 noon

10

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is Ambassador Lodge at his best.

There is a good deal to be said for the approach he suggests for a fireside chat.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~

10a

Wednesday, May 25, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 4952)

We are in such a fast-moving situation here that I had just about decided not to send you a weekly telegram at all. On the other hand, I wrote what follows and thought it might interest you in the hopes that you would make allowances for the turmoil we are in.

A. Crisis

The following is an effort to put things here in proportion:

The troubles centering on Danang and Hue seem to be stabilizing with regard to the former city with fair prospects of reestablishing Government authority in the second, although not without considerable uproar. Contrary to the press portrayals which I have seen, the rest of the country has been relatively quiet. The Buddhist-inspired demonstrations in Saigon have not yet assumed political importance.

I try to be alert to opportunities to bring the Government and the "strugglers" together by talks, and General Westmoreland has, in fact, talked with General Thi, with no apparent result. The "strugglers," in characteristic Southeast Asian fashion, having apparently been unsuccessful, seem now to be turning toward fanaticism. They evidently realize that the most influential segments of the U. S. press take all their fanatic actions -- riots, stone throwings, fires, signs telling Americans to go home, and self-immolation -- at face value, however cynical these same journalists may be about the U. S. Government. But if we assume that the Government establishes its sway in Hue and Danang and then maintains order in Saigon and the rest of the country, the following could be in prospect during the next few months:

B. Military

General Westmoreland and his Vietnamese colleagues may well inflict heavy losses on the North Vietnamese Army and the big units of the Viet Cong. He is extremely alert to the possibilities.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-290
By rip, NARA, Date 3-10-88

We have put it out to the press, but they have apparently taken no interest in the fact that throughout this period of crisis, combat troops of the First Vietnamese Division in the Hue area have not behaved badly. I refer particularly to the Second Battalion of the First Regiment, and the Second Troop (Company) of the Seventh Cavalry Squadron, an Armored Personnel Carrier unit. The logistic and headquarters troops which have been demoralized by the Buddhists chaplains, have behaved badly, but that does not justify the unmitigated gloom of recent days.

As far as chaplains are concerned, the Government has put out an order that they shall cease and desist from talking politics and engaging in political activity. If they disobey the order, they are to be transferred. The Government is talking about abolishing the Chaplains' Corps, but I do not believe this will happen. There are about 70 Buddhist and 60 Catholic chaplains in the Vietnamese Army today.

C. Casualties

The following has been prepared by the staff regarding casualties:

"While U.S. casualties have exceeded those of the Government of Vietnam for 9 of the past 16 weeks, not counting this week (U.S. figures are incomplete), in only two of those weeks have more Americans than Vietnamese soldiers been killed, and in those two weeks the total killed was very low compared to normal weeks. One reason why our casualties have been higher than Vietnamese is that we are much more thorough in counting wounded, with even small scratches being included in the totals, while the Vietnamese only include those who have to leave their units to be treated. We count all the "band-aid" cases; they count only the "hospital" ones. Over the long term, Vietnamese casualties have far exceeded our own.

"For instance, since the beginning of August 1965, when our forces began heavy involvement in combat, the Vietnamese have suffered 29,973 casualties, including 8,151 killed, while our soldiers have had 16,267 casualties, including 2,574 killed. When one compares the loss of life on the Vietnamese side to South Vietnam's total population of about 15 million, including the Viet Cong, their suffering is seen to be far greater proportionately than ours. Roughly speaking, for each family in the U.S. which lost a son in the fighting in Vietnam in 1965, there were 200 families in Vietnam who suffered such a loss. And this leaves aside all those who suffered the loss of loved ones who were not soldiers through Viet Cong terrorism or by being caught in the cross-fires of this war. Thus there can be little doubt that the Vietnamese are carrying the major burden of suffering in this struggle, in both absolute terms and proportionate to our respective situations."

D. Elections

The elections which should take place in September, assuming that this rickety Government can hold together, may finally produce something which we can support on the basis that it represents the popular will, although it could be denounced as null and void by the Army or the Buddhists or by some other group. By no stretch of the imagination could it end the political uproar which can be expected to go on as long as Vietnam evolves into a modern nation-state. But it might establish a "standard to which the wise and honest may repair" -- in short, something to show them where north is. This is a good thing to do -- even if they don't always steer straight course.

E. Revolutionary Development

As regards revolutionary development, Porter reports that 90 more teams are now being inserted into the villages and hamlets and that these should be followed about September 1 by 100 more. This infusion of personnel is concurrent with the insertion of the first police field force units who will work in the areas between the villages and hamlets, thus complementing the work of the revolutionary development teams inside those places. Together with the self-help programs, which are now functioning on a wide scale, it appears that by mid-September, we may, with luck, have some interesting progress to report. This is all brand new and highly creative. In fact, if it actually happens, it would not be too much to say that nothing more imaginative than this would be going on in the entire field of government.

F. U.S. Opinion

I have been mulling over the state of American opinion as I observed it when I was at home. I have also been reading the recent Gallup Polls. As I commented in my telegram 4880, I am quite certain that the number of those who want us to leave Vietnam because of current "internal squabbling" does not reflect deep conviction but a superficial impulse based on inadequate information.

In fact, I think one television fireside chat by you personally -- with all your intelligence and compassion -- could tip that figure over in one evening. I am thinking of a speech, the general tenor of which would be: "We are involved in a vital struggle of great difficulty and complexity on which much depends. I need your help."

I am sure you would get much help from the very people in the Gallup Poll who said we ought to leave Vietnam -- as soon as they understood what you want them to support.

You and the Administration have done big things in educating public opinion. When I consider the degree of information today compared to what it was a year or two years ago, I applaud. But there is still more to be done -- and only you can do certain parts of it. Of course, I am glad to help in any way I can.

Your own statement to the press about Vietnam was excellent in tone and substance.

G. Vietnamese Notes

Chieu Hoi returnees are up from the April slump but below the average during February and March. There was an increase in the number of veterans which were returned.

The newspapers Dan Chung and Thoi Su Mien Nam take issue with Fulbright's brothel statement and write that though thankful for American help, we don't have to tolerate such inconsiderate remarks by a politician like Mr. Fulbright -- remarks that no self-respecting Vietnamese can forget. Many papers carried the wire story that Senator Fulbright "regrets" his statement.

H. Economic

Retail prices in Saigon continued to rise, especially foodstuffs. The index is up 5 percent from a month ago. These price increases are evidently due to not only the political unrest but also to rumors of devaluation of the currency.

The Saigon free market rate for U.S. currency and gold rose to an all-time high.

On May 19, General Ky and Porter signed a memorandum of understanding concerning the use of counterpart funds. This agreement should give us control over the use of part of these funds and increase our ability to exert badly needed influence.

One disturbing note is that the Saigon Special Court sentenced to death an iron and steel importer of Chinese origin whom it convicted of selling above official prices. If the sentence is carried out, it would have a seriously adverse affect on the business climate, which is greatly affected by the Chinese merchants. I plan to urge the Government of Vietnam to grant clemency in this case.

~~SECRET~~

-5-

The Minister of Economy has announced that the Government of Vietnam will make sure that sufficient personnel are available to operate the port 18 hours a day. This decision should help alleviate the problems we have had in moving cargoes through the port.

LODGE

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 25, 1966, 9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

I have no pretensions whatsoever to being an expert on domestic politics.

With that caveat I nevertheless suggest it will be necessary -- and perhaps wise politics -- to fight a major battle to save foreign aid this year. The battle would have two parts:

-- whatever can and should be done with the Congressional Leadership, individuals, etc.;

-- a mobilization of public opinion leadership in the country to help us maintain this essential tool of foreign policy.

I hold this view for these reasons:

1. The aid money available to us remains the most powerful single lever available to maintain our influence and to strengthen the forces of political moderation in Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

2. The continuity of your initiatives in the Baltimore speech; your Mexican trip; and your initiative tomorrow on Africa depends on at least holding the line in aid money.

3. It might be helpful politically to be fighting a major political battle before the public on an issue other than Vietnam in the weeks and months ahead. On this matter we ought to be able to mobilize a considerable part of the liberal community and isolate Fulbright, Morse and Lippmann.

As a foreign policy aide, I have no doubt of the importance of maintaining the level of our appropriations. But, I repeat, my observations on the means and politics on this are strictly amateur; although, having worked with Eric Johnston in early 1958 to mobilize the business, labor, intellectual, religious, etc., leaders of the country, I know the job can be done.

W. W. R.

cc: Bill Moyers
Bob Kintner

Wednesday, May 25, 1966
8:25 a. m.

Mr. President:

Since the Vice President is not going
to Tunisia

--- is there any name on this list
you would wish us to pursue?

--- is there any other name you would
suggest?

W. W. Rostow

13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WEEKLY LUNCHEON

May 25, 1966, 1:00 P.M.

Tentative Agenda

1. Vietnam: Situation Report and Next Steps
Secretary Rusk - Secretary McNamara
2. Vietnam Supplementary Appropriation
Secretary McNamara
3. Negotiations with the French
Report by Secretary McNamara
4. Ecuador: Situation Report
Secretary Rusk
5. Norway - Visit by King Olaf in 1967
Secretary Rusk
6. Japan - Plans for U.S. -Japan Cabinet Meeting in June
Secretary Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCA NARS, Date 11-26-84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, May 25, 1966

To Pres
9:22 AM

14

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Incidents at the Guantanamo Naval Base

In the past four days there have been two reported incidents of Cuban penetration of the Guantanamo Base perimeter. They are reminiscent of a rash (7) of such incidents last March.

Night of May 21-22

A Marine sentry at about 7:00 p.m. observed an armed Cuban soldier on the Base side of the fence. The sentry reports that he challenged him and fired a warning shot which the intruder ignored. A second shot wounded him. It is not clear whether the Cuban was on the Base side of the fence when this shot was fired. The Cuban soldier involved in the incident was probably the one which the Cuban Government alleges was killed by the Marines while at his post on the Cuban side of the fence.

Night of May 23-24

At about midnight a Marine patrol sighted six armed Cuban soldiers in the salt flats area inside the Base perimeter. The Cubans reportedly fired four rounds at the Marines and fled over the fence. The Marines fired back with seven rounds. Our men were not hit. We have no report on the Cubans. But there is no evidence that they were hit.

Relation to Refugee Flights

At present there is no indication that these incidents are in any way related to the Cuban suspension of refugee flights last Friday. The suspension was deliberate. But the reasons are not yet clear. Administrative delays in shifting from Category "A" refugees (immediate family members) to Category "B" (all others wishing to come) is not a sufficient explanation.

Since the airlift started last December 1, almost 22,000 Cuban refugees in the "A" Category have arrived. The Cuban Government claims that there are no more persons in this particular group who wish to come. We know otherwise -- HEW has close to 50,000 Category "A" applications.

We told the Cubans last week that we are prepared to start with Category "B" refugees, so that the record is clear that any delay -- or suspension -- is not our doing.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-287

By ing, NARA, Date 1-10-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

There are several as yet inconclusive indicators that the Cubans would like to close down the airlift if they could find a means to shift the onus on us. State is alive to this and will not get mouse-trapped.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wed., May 25, 1966

25

Mr. President:

Herewith a redraft of your letter to Senator Fulbright. It represents the combined suggestions of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

The bracketed paragraph Secretary McNamara suggests might be better deleted to "improve the general tone, since it might be interpreted as enforced unity."

Nobody asked me, but the three short paragraphs in parentheses towards the end are my contribution.

W. W. R.

to ~~the~~ 15
4-24-69
attached
is cy of
P ltr as
sent

Dear Bill:

I appreciated your thoughtful, explanatory letter, relating to your discussion of "Arrogance of Power" by the United States.

I realize that expressions can be taken out of context, and that interpreters of your remarks may draw a different meaning than you meant from your own words. You made this point, of course, in your recent talk at the National Press Club.

I would agree with you that we can all learn from the past. But I wonder whether the important difference between the situations you cite and the situation of the Free World today is that the course we are pursuing is one based on common agreement on the need to help individual countries protect themselves against aggression.

You and I do agree that we both have the objective of a return to peace and the security of our country. But surely we can also agree that, if there is to be peace for the United States, there must be a reasonably stable and organized peace in the rest of the world. We are called upon to bring our power to bear only in a very small minority of the quarrels and crises which erupt elsewhere. But in some cases, the United States, both a peace-loving and a powerful country, has solemn commitments which we entered into as a part of the process of building an enduring peace. I must take these obligations with the utmost seriousness if our own country is to have a chance for the peace and security which we earnestly want. Beyond these problems of security, I think you and I could agree that we must take our share

in the urgent tasks of economic and social advancement among the developing nations and use our influence with tact and discretion in support of political freedom.

I believe the American people recognize the limitations of our country's power. But I believe that they recognize, as well, that a very damaging limitation to all that we stand for as a nation would be implied in any self-seeking withdrawal into the illusory comfort of indifference and isolation.

[In this connection, I am not sure whom you have in mind when you refer to some of my advisers. Your implication appears to be that there are important officials in my Administration who differ fundamentally from my own views on foreign policy. There are, of course, always differences of nuance and emphasis; but I believe that my top diplomatic, military, and economic advisers are more united in their judgment of the course this Administration should pursue than has been the case in most other Administrations with which I have been familiar over the last thirty-five years.]

(The simple truth, Bill, is this: modern weapons and communications have made this planet a small political community. Everything significant that happens anywhere in the world -- even in Peiping -- is a living part of our domestic life. Everything significant we say or do or fail to do enters immediately into the life of nations everywhere.

I can tell you that, for a President of our country at this stage of history, this is not text-book abstraction. It is a daily working fact.

I believe, therefore, that with all the difficulty, frustration, and pain, there is only one way to go: to work with others to make this community which technology has created a community at peace.)

I appreciate the courteous and friendly manner in which you approached my reference to Zephyr's note. The story seemed to me appropriate to the occasion.

Sincerely,

156
CONGRESSIONAL

May 27, 1966

Dear Bill:

I appreciated the thoughtful letter you sent following our exchange at the Diplomatic Reception.

You are certainly right in saying that statements can be taken out of context and interpreters can draw a different meaning than you meant from your words. It's happened to me!

My hope is that we do learn from the past -- including the recent past. Your analogies of nations in history which were drunk with their own importance are vivid. I also believe there are some very pertinent recent analogies which are applicable, too -- and the most significant, as far as I am concerned, is the analogy of what happens when ambitious and aggressive powers are freely permitted in areas where the peace of the world is delicately balanced, to use direct or indirect force against smaller and weaker states in their path.

We are not called upon to bring our power to bear in every one of the quarrels and crises which erupt in the world. I think we are called upon, by the very nature of things, to act when there is a threat to the larger security. When we also have a commitment entered into as a part of the peace-building efforts of the past, action is even more clearly necessary.

RECEIVED
JUN 1 1966
CENTRAL FILES

Checked by Kardes

I know how you feel about such commitments, but from where I sit it is not an easy thing to take an indifferent attitude toward them, especially -- as I have already mentioned -- if there is also involved the broader issue of how inaction would affect the overall balance of security in the world.

I also feel strongly, as I hope you realize, about the right of small nations to develop their own political processes without interference from a belligerent nation. And belligerence is no less a reality when it involves the external support of insurgency than it is when it involves armies moving across national boundaries.

South Vietnam, in my opinion, is moving toward a government that will reflect the traditions and values of its people. I do not believe it could do so if we were not willing to contest the effort of others to take it over arbitrarily by force.

These are my views, Bill. They are not textbook abstractions but daily working convictions. In this connection, I am not sure whom you have in mind when you refer to some of my advisers. There are, of course, always differences of nuance and emphasis; but I believe my top diplomatic, military, and economic advisers are more in harmony on the course this Administration is pursuing than has been the case in most other administrations with which I have been familiar over the last thirty-five years. I would be derelict to the people who elected me to this Office if I let anyone else substitute their judgements for mine. I listen to everyone I can, but I must take the responsibility for deciding the policy -- not my "advisers."

I appreciate the courteous and friendly manner in which you approached my reference to Zephyr's note. While I have seen the leaks from the other end of the avenue about my "slighting" you at social occasions or other irrelevant matters, I cannot believe that our differences of policy have erased the friendship we have shared so long. I have a fondness for Betty and you that is real. I am sorry that careless people have appeared to paint another picture.

Sincerely,



The Honorable
J. W. Fulbright
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:BM:cw - 2

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, May 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Ambassador Brown in Nicaragua

Ambassador Aaron Brown has sent you the attached letter describing an AID project in Nicaragua which in a small, but meaningful, fashion has brought a better way of life to humble people in a rural area of that country.

It is a project in which you were personally involved. Two years ago, you and Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa signed the AID loan agreement which made it possible. The executive committee of the rural electric cooperation -- the first in Nicaragua -- have sent you a scroll via Ambassador Brown expressing their gratitude.

You may wish to send Ambassador Brown a reply along the lines of the attached draft.


W. W. Rostow

Attachments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 25, 1966

S Brom -

I leave it to you and Walt whether the attached is of sufficient interest to forward to the President.

State tells me that the scroll arrived in its present banged-up condition because of faulty packaging by the Embassy.

WGB

LA Retype
letter for
President

Mr. Rostow

The President's interest in rural electrification makes me think he would like to see the attached

BK-5

SANTIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-322
By CB, NARA Date 9-24-99

P. Racton's Copy
To Pres

17

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

Tuesday, May 24, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Situation

These are the essential elements of my review of the Dominican electoral picture with State [REDACTED] yesterday:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

1. Election Prospects

As of mid-May the Country Team considered that Balaguer continues to hold a slight edge over Bosch. Voter turn-out and the silent vote loom as the determining factors. Their analysis is attached. [REDACTED] during the past ten days the pro-Balaguer trend has continued upward, with Bosch's fortunes declining. Bunker and the Country Team will submit a fresh estimate by tomorrow.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED] the Provisional Government is far behind in the issuance of identity cards which are required to establish eligibility at the polls. This could affect the turn-out and Balaguer's chances. Bunker has been asked to determine how big a problem this is and what steps should be taken to remedy the situation.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Otherwise, Garcia Godoy has been performing well in his campaign to arouse voter interest.

2. OAS Observation of Elections

The OAS has put together a first-class team of observers. Thirty-seven persons have so far accepted invitations, and two more are pending. All OAS countries, except Haiti, are represented.

The other components of the OAS presence -- Bunker's Ad hoc Committee, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, and the Technical Electoral Commission -- will be at, or close to, full strength in Santo Domingo by this Wednesday.

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~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

-2-

The OAS Secretariat has also increased its staff in the DR [REDACTED] their press team which has the important task of projecting and interpreting the OAS observation role to the sizeable international press corps which is expected. We have discussed this [REDACTED] with OAS Assistant Secretary General Sanders [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

3. Observation by Pro-Bosch Groups

Pro-Bosch sympathizers in the US -- Norman Thomas and several Puerto Rican businessmen -- are recruiting persons in the US and Puerto Rico to serve as "private" observers in the DR. [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

4. [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

5. Contingency Planning for the Post Electoral Period

State was asked to revise a contingency paper for the post-electoral period to cover a victory by either Bosch or Balaguer. Many of the courses of action would be the same under either. But there are important differences which should be reflected, e.g., Bosch's attitude toward the Armed Forces and Balaguer's on labor. The paper will be submitted to you for approval as soon as completed.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

cc - Bill Moyers

Tues. , May 24, 1966
2:00 pm

to P
18

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

George Ball and I took stock with Dave Bell on the situation of the aid authorization bill.

We have until Thursday to try to reverse the vote in the Foreign Relations committee.

The most we think we can get is a renewed 5-year authorization for the Alliance for Progress and development lending, but that is not certain.

1. This afternoon George Ball will sound out Bill Fulbright on what the tolerances are and the possibilities of moving individual members back on the track.

2. Between now and Thursday, Ball and Secretary Rusk will go to work on the individual members to see if the longer term Alliance for Progress and development loan authorizations can be salvaged.

Do you have further guidance or instruction?

W. W. Rostow

Tuesday, May 24, 1966

Mr. President:

Ambassador Lodge thinks more attention should be given to answering those who argue that we should get out of Vietnam unless there is an end to "internal squabbling."

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

Sargan 4880

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-287

By ing, NARA, Date 1-10-89

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

Tuesday, May 24, 1966 -- 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

With respect to the materials Marv Watson left, my quick conclusions are:

I

From the Frankel, Pincus and Kraslow stories last November, it is evident that they were given access to the testimony. It is not possible to determine whether access was in the form of a careful briefing of the contents of transcript or permission to read it. Neither is it possible to determine who provided the access -- the Chairman, Committee members, or the staff.

In a conversation between Kraslow and Bowdler last November, Kraslow allowed that his information had come from sources on the Hill, but he declined to elaborate on the source and the form.

What is clear is that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did not exercise its responsibility to make its own ground rules stick: "The Chairman... The record of the hearings will not be published until after a sufficient number of years to make it only of historical interest, if then, and only then on order of the Committee."

II

The text of the questioning reveals that the Chairman did not browbeat the witnesses. (It is quite possible that the impact sought by the Chairman was via leakage, and he did not wish the revealed record to show obvious hostility.)

III

Fulbright's speeches suggest the following comments:

1. They are a systematic attack from different angles on current U. S. foreign policy.
2. The angles of attack vary greatly, but include:
 - bad advice to the President (Dominican Republic);

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET -- SENSITIVE~~

-2-

-- a failure to align ourselves with the true leaders of the Latin American social revolution -- DR and Latin America in general;

-- we are "paranoid about communism" and fail to recognize the changes which have taken place in communism (Viet Nam);

-- we are untrue to the best in our own heritage; e. g., Adlai Stevenson versus Teddy Roosevelt and General MacArthur.

3. Taking it all in all, the conclusion is quite simple from the full range of his speechmaking: He is unwilling to acknowledge that the role of force is a legitimate element in U. S. foreign policy.

On the other hand, he is unwilling in public to acknowledge the consequences for the U. S. and the Free World of not using force.

Therefore, he has to pretend that, whether it is the Dominican Republic or Viet Nam, there was an answer which would have preserved vital U. S. interests if force had not been used. This is impossible to prove. Thus, when it comes to specific cases, he walks away from making that assertion.

He simply implies it and criticizes us.

W. W. Rostow

SENSITIVE

Tuesday, May 24, 1966, 7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Would you be willing to have a meeting with the members of my NSC staff:

They have been working at full blast, in good heart, and quietly.

It would be, of course, greatly strengthening to their morale. It would also be an opportunity for you directly to confirm your desire that they not merely conduct their normal operations but use their positions as a means of stimulating and helping formulate new ideas in the field of foreign policy.

W. W. Rostow

Yes ☒

No ☐

Meet in Situation Room as surprise ☒

Meet elsewhere ☐

See me ☐

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, May 24, 1966, 9:20 a.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: OECD Meeting on Food Aid

At Tab A is a request from Secretary Rusk that you authorize State to invite the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD to hold its July Ministerial meeting in Washington. The DAC is the principal coordinator of Free World aid. At our insistence, the July meeting will focus on the world food problem, and give us a chance to needle the Europeans to lend more of a hand. (The Secretary also believes that such a meeting in Washington would help improve our image in countries worried about Vietnam.)

Unlike the more elaborate proposal which you turned down last month, this would not involve a commitment to a Presidential speech (the Vice President or the Secretary would do it), and we would not propose a panel of wise men.

FM3
Francis M. Bator

Attachment

Approve ✓

Disapprove

Speak to me

*I support this proposal
well*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-288
By inf, NARA, Date 10-5-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1438
22a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 16, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: World Food Problem

Recommendation:

I recommend that the United States invite the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD to hold its July Ministerial meeting in Washington.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

There is no precedent which would require that you address the meeting; the Vice President or I could do this.

The meeting -- wherever held -- will focus on the World Food Problem, dramatizing its seriousness, advancing coordinated efforts by other major donors to deal with it, and establishing international doctrine about the essential need for the developing countries to take self-help steps to increase their own agricultural productivity. The agenda will also include the annual report of the DAC Chairman and consideration of the debt problems of the developing countries.

Holding a meeting of major aid donors in Washington would more clearly demonstrate United States leadership and initiative in dealing with the world food problem. Our objectives would be to:

a) move us forward in dealing with one of the most important problems we will have to face in the next decade;

b) improve the U.S. "image" in countries now concerned over the war in Vietnam;

c) provide a basis and a rationale for reviving public and parliamentary support for foreign aid both here and in Europe;

d) create a rallying point for cooperative action, and thus for strengthening the bonds of the Western community at a time of crisis; and,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 86-290
By ing, NARA, Date 4-13-87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

e) give us a much better opportunity to stimulate and focus widespread public and international attention on the problem than would be the case at a relatively routine meeting in Paris.

We can expect some objections in the DAC, particularly from the French, to the idea of holding the meeting outside of Paris. But we find it hard to believe that they would try to insist that the DAC turn down the invitation from the United States, especially since some DAC representatives favor holding DAC meetings in other capitals.

George Woods has expressed reservations⁺ to Dave Bell about a Washington meeting, but, at Dave's urging, promised to keep an open mind on the matter of his own attendance.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

MR PRESIDENT:

* WOODS IS NOT AGAINST — HE WAS
CONCERNED ABOUT GETTING ^{ENOUGH} HIGH LEVEL
EUROPEANS TO WASHINGTON. RUSK DOES NOT
THINK THAT WILL BE A PROBLEM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To Pres~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 23, 1966 — 6:10 pm

Mr. President:

Press leaks leading to speculative newspapers stories caused serious problems following the recent Chinese Communist nuclear test.

If you approve, I will send out the underlying memorandum which reminds everyone that all classified information about Chinese and French nuclear tests, as well as Soviet tests, is to be handled in a special and highly restricted way.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-288By ig, NARA, Date 10-5-88

23a

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-288

By ing, NARA, Date 10-5-88

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 347

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Office of Emergency Planning
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Director of the Office of Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Release of Public Information Concerning Soviet,
French and Communist Chinese Nuclear Tests

The President has directed that all recipients of classified intelligence information regarding Soviet, French and Communist Chinese nuclear tests take all feasible steps to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the information. Such action is essential to safeguard intelligence sources and methods used in obtaining this information and to minimize speculation concerning the significance of data obtained from such tests.

No public release of information relating to the occurrence of foreign nuclear weapons tests will be made except as specifically authorized by the President. Public announcement authorized by the President will be made by the Atomic Energy Commission, unless otherwise directed by the President.

W. W. Rostow

Note: NSAM No. 176 of August 1, 1962 has been incorporated into this NSAM.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

23b

~~SECRET~~

DCID No. 1/6
(New Series)

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/6¹

CONTROL OF INITIAL INFORMATION REGARDING
FOREIGN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS²

(Effective 5 August 1959)

Pursuant to provisions of NSCIDs No. 1 and No. 3, and for the purpose of protecting the intelligence sources and methods used and assuring the availability of a maximum amount of significant technical intelligence data, the following controls are established on the dissemination of information on the detection of foreign nuclear explosions.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

1.

[REDACTED] Evidence of foreign nuclear explosions from other sources will be reported by the member of the United States Intelligence Board (hereafter referred to as the "Intelligence Board") receiving the information to the Chairman of JAEIC.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

2.

3.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

4. When evidence of a foreign nuclear explosion is received, the Chairman of JAEIC will inform the individual members of the Committee. JAEIC will then prepare a complete statement summarizing all information available. This complete statement may be used by the individual members of JAEIC to notify the Intelligence Board members of their respective agencies. Further dissemination of information on the event shall be determined by the respective Intelligence Board members. Dissemination of this information from the Intelligence Board members directly to the indicated personnel will be accomplished when appropriate as follows:

a. Director of Central Intelligence:

The President
The Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
The Chairman, Joint Committee of Congress on Atomic Energy
The Chairman of the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board

b. Joint Staff Member:

The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman of the JCS
Director of the Joint Staff

¹This Directive supersedes DCID No. 1/6, effective 6 May 1958, which in turn had superseded DCID No. 11/1 of 17 July 1958.

²For the purpose of this directive, "foreign nuclear explosions" means nuclear explosions by foreign countries other than Great Britain.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-321

By CB, NARA Date 6-8-00

~~SECRET~~

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy
Chairman, Military Liaison Committee

- c. State Department Member:
 - Secretary of State
 - Under Secretary of State
- d. Army Member:
 - Secretary of the Army
 - Chief of Staff
- e. Navy Member:
 - Secretary of the Navy
 - Chief of Naval Operations
- f. Air Force Member:
 - Secretary of the Air Force
 - Chief of Staff
- g. Atomic Energy Commission Member:
 - Chairman and Commissioners of the AEC
 - General Manager
 - Director, Division of Military Application
- h. Federal Bureau of Investigation Member:
 - The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

5. JAEIC will simultaneously prepare a statement which protects intelligence sources and methods and which is suitable for immediate dissemination by means of normal intelligence channels and publications. When requested or appropriate, JAEIC will prepare information on Soviet nuclear tests suitable for release through established intelligence channels to selected foreign governments. Release of such information requires Intelligence Board approval in accordance with paragraph 4d, NSCID 1. This should not be construed to restrict the exchange of information with the UK and Canada who are cooperating in the detection program.

6. No public release of information relating to the occurrence of foreign nuclear weapons tests will be made, except as directed by the President or the National Security Council.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC's NSAM 1-518-31-95

By ju, NARA, Date 5-21-98

~~SECRET~~

August 1, 1962

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 176

TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Attorney General
Secretary of Commerce
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
Director of Central Intelligence
Director of Office of Emergency Planning
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Director, United States Information Agency
Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Director of the Office of Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Release of Public Information Concerning Soviet
Nuclear Tests

The President has directed that all recipients of classified intelligence information regarding Soviet nuclear tests take all feasible steps to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the information. Such action is essential to safeguard intelligence sources and methods used in obtaining this information.

No public release of information relating to the occurrence of foreign nuclear weapons tests will be made except as specifically authorized by the President. Public announcement authorized by the President will be made by the Atomic Energy Commission, unless otherwise directed by the President.

McGeorge Bundy

cc: Military Representative to
the President

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT 5/20/66

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-288
By ig, NARA, Date 10-5-88

23d

Retype

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. ~~176 (REVISED)~~

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Office of Emergency Planning
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Administrator, National Aeronautics & Space Administration
The Director of the Office of Science and Technology

Communist
SUBJECT: Release of Public Information Concerning Soviet, French
and Red Chinese Nuclear Tests

The President has directed that all recipients of classified intelligence information regarding Soviet, *Communist* French and Red Chinese nuclear tests take all feasible steps to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the information. Such action is essential to safeguard intelligence sources and methods used in obtaining this information and to minimize ~~irresponsible~~ speculation concerning the significance of data obtained from such tests.

No public release of information relating to the occurrence of foreign nuclear weapons tests will be made except as specifically authorized by the President. Public announcement authorized by the President will be made by the Atomic Energy Commission, unless otherwise directed by the President.

~~cc: Military Aide to the President~~

W. W. Rostow

Note: NSAM No. 176 of August 1, 1962 has been incorporated into

~~SECRET~~

this NSAM.

Monday, May 23, 1966
7:30 pm

24

MR. PRESIDENT:

The underlying memorandum from Secretary Rusk concerning Chinese representation in the UN is for discussion at the meeting with Ambassador Goldberg and Under Secretary Ball scheduled for noon tomorrow, Tuesday.

W. W. Rostow

Monday, May 23, 1966 -- 7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

The Vice President is willing to adjust his schedule, including a visit with his mother on Memorial Day, to go to Tunisia for the June 1 celebration.

He would be unable, however, to take part in the Civil Rights conference scheduled for June 1-2. Bill Moyers and I were not sure that you had this domestic event in mind when you suggested the Vice President's name. Therefore,

the Vice President should go to Tunisia _____

the Vice President should attend the Civil Rights Conference _____

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, May 23, 1966, 7:00 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: International Cocoa Conference

Attached is an information memo from Tom Mann reporting on a conference (opening today in New York) to negotiate an International Cocoa Agreement. Like the agreements we have now for coffee and some other commodities, this would attempt to stabilize prices and bring supply into balance with demand. (The present outlook is for excess production and steady price decline. This could frustrate our aid objectives in Nigeria and Brazil -- and do serious damage to Ghana.)

The U.S. role in the conference will be critical. We are the largest single importer, accounting for 1/3 of the world market.

The negotiating prospects are poor. The producers want the moon, the consumers are divided, and our industry people would prefer no agreement at all. We will try to get something that (1) makes economic sense, and (2) would be tolerated by our industry. But it will be far short of what the producing countries hope for. Tom thinks that, in the end, it may be in our interest to sweeten the bargain with a \$10 million loan to the proposed stabilization fund. (France, UK, Netherlands, and Germany, are apparently prepared to put in some money if we are.)

This is only to warn you of a problem which may produce some newspaper copy in the next couple of weeks. State understands that all U.S. positions are ad referendum. We will come back to you when decisions are required.

Tom and his people have discussed all this with the relevant people on the Hill. Reactions have been non-committal.

Francis M. Bator

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 86-287
By ing, NARA, Date 1-10-87

1513
26a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: International Cocoa Conference

The United States is participating in another Conference beginning May 23 in an effort to negotiate an international cocoa agreement. Discussions and negotiations toward an agreement have been taking place off and on for the past ten years in various UN forums. The pressure comes mostly from Ghana, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast and Cameroon who account for 75% of world exports and whose economic development and political stability are bound up with cocoa. Brazil, the major producer in Latin America, also wants an agreement.

Since the U. S. accounts for one-third of world cocoa consumption, our participation is essential to any agreement. Our negotiating position, however, is complicated by two conflicting forces:

a) The producers seek more from an agreement than we believe is either necessary or feasible. Unfortunately some consuming countries, led by France, are willing to go much further than we to satisfy them. We would wish to avoid being isolated at the conference or blamed for its failure;

b) We want to work out something that could be acceptable to our cocoa industry. The industry is unenthusiastic in principle about any commodity agreement and it would oppose an agreement of the type which the producing countries, with the support of some European consumers, want. Their representatives will continue to work closely with us during the negotiations. We would have great difficulty with Congressional approval of an international agreement if the industry were opposed.

Among other specific problems, the U. S. may face a financial issue at the Conference. We expect to be asked whether the U. S. would make or guarantee a short-term loan of perhaps \$10 million to the cocoa organization so that it could begin operations before it accumulated its own funds. France, the Netherlands, the UK and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-290
By inf, NARA, Date 3-10-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Germany have already said they would consider such loans if all consuming countries participate. We have yet taken no position on this issue but will be under considerable pressure to do so.

We informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Finance Committee of our participation at the conference and had informal discussions with Senators Smathers, Talmadge, and Carlson. We also discussed the negotiations with Chairman Mills and Congressman Curtis of the House Ways and Means Committee. They were all interested in the conference but expressed no firm view favoring or opposing an agreement pending a better idea of its content.

We will keep in close touch with the Congress and your staff as the negotiations go along.



Thomas C. Mann
Under Secretary for
Economic Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 23, 1966, 6:00 p.m.

27

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Iran Military Purchase Loan: Information

Attached is a cable from Armin Meyer, objecting to the State-Defense Iranian package.

Setting aside rhetoric he had two pleas:

1. Getting Deliveries on Schedule. Because of long delivery lead times, he wants more funds at the beginning and smaller amounts toward the end of the five-year period. DoD insists on equal slices for budgetary reasons, but in reply to his cable has agreed to make a special effort to speed deliveries.
2. Eliminating the Strait Jacket. Because of the Shah's growing sense of confidence and independence, Meyer objects to insisting that the Shah must agree to revising our 1964 Memorandum of Understanding to include consulting with us prior to making purchases of military equipment from third countries. Anticipating this problem, we put an paragraph in our memorandum to you, providing that you would review each tranche of the loan in the light of Iran's economic position. This gave the flexibility required to meet Meyer's point; that is, our commitment is a target figure, subject to regular review; but he doesn't have to ask us every time he wants to buy equipment somewhere else. We have agreed, therefore, to eliminate this part of Meyer's instructions, though we shall tell the Iranians we expect such purchases will be part of the annual military/economic review agreed to by the Shah in 1964 and a regular cooperative exercise since then.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-287
By sig, NARA, Date 1-10-87

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 23, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM TEHRAN (1572)

For the President from Ambassador Meyer

Iran and U. S.

The problem of U. S. military sales to Iran which I was privileged to discuss with you on May 13 has reached a critical juncture. A package proposal has been formulated by our associates in Washington. It is to be presented to the Shah as soon as your approval has been obtained.

While considerably more restricted than is compatible with protection of our interests, the package proposal reflects careful attention and an effort to be as forthcoming as Washington circumstances and the U. S.'s view as to Iran's capabilities permit. As your Ambassador to this country, I am nonetheless concerned that we are about to alienate the Shah and his country with whom we have had a long and mutually beneficial friendship. My concern is of sufficient depth to warrant taking a few minutes of your valuable time to request relatively small modifications which may be able to reduce adverse repercussions to manageable proportion.

My week in Washington made clear the antipathy which exists both in our legislative and executive branches to military programs, particularly following the Indo-Pak debacle last fall. This is fully understandable. But it makes very difficult the maintenance of healthy relationships with true friends like Iran with whom we have a long-standing military relationship. Due to massive Soviet arms shipments to this region, the vulnerability of Iran (like Israel) has sharply increased. The Shah six months ago became so concerned he obtained authorization from his Parliament for an additional \$200,000,000 borrowing authority to build up his air and naval defenses. His purpose is to deter aggressive action against Iran's vulnerable oil producing areas or to cope with such aggression if it takes place. Deeply impressed by the Vietnam situation, the Shah believes such self-reliance is in U. S. as well as Iran's interest. A seven-man team of U. S. military experts under Brig. Gen. Peterson assessed the situation in March. In a report (which the Shah has in his possession) Peterson confirmed that a threat truly exists and recommended a rational program for augmentation within the \$200,000,000 added ceiling. Thus, the judgment that early measures should be taken is not only the Shah's but our own.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-290
By ig, NARA, Date 3-10-88

A main concern in Washington is the effect of military expenditures on Iran's economic development. At present, Iran is thriving. With his profound sense of mission, the Shah is making Iran a show-case of modernization in this part of the world (8-10 percent growth rate, utilization of 75 percent of the \$500,000,000 annual oil income for development purposes, land reform, literacy corps, etc.) The problem is he may bite off more than he can chew. It is the Embassy's view, however, that as in the past, major projects (and their financing) will stretch out over a considerably longer period than planned. While we, of course, regret any diversion of Iran's resources to military expenditures, we are convinced favorable economic factors are such that Iran can meet the financial burdens of a military program along lines envisaged in the Peterson Report without courting disaster. In any case, economic difficulties are more apt to be forestalled if we at this Embassy are enabled (by adequate responsiveness to the Peterson recommendations) to maintain a healthy dialogue with the Shah and his Government.

This brings me to my greatest concern with the proposed package. The underlying assumption appears to be that the U.S. Government can compel the Shah to obtain only such equipment as we decide he can have. This is altogether unrealistic in 1966. Time and again over the past few months the Shah has said, privately and publicly, that Iran is its own master. He has made this clear (again in a lengthy talk with us yesterday) specifically as far as arms purchasing is concerned. I do not foresee the possibility of attaining his agreement to a documentary amendment, as presently proposed, requiring him to consult with us "on the magnitude and terms of major purchases outside this arrangement." It is true he will only with greatest reluctance give up the benefits of a package proposal but he will in my view balk at being put in a strait jacket. Even if it proved possible to obtain his concurrence, rancor would be deep and he would inevitably violate this injunction. Then we would be faced with a showdown in our total relationship here.

Instead of a "Papa knows best" attitude, excessive manipulation of which is in my view to a considerable extent responsible for anti-Americanism in this part of the world, I believe we would get much further by treating the Shah like an adult. In our 1964 Memorandum of Understanding we already have provisions similar to the one proposed. We can refer to them if necessary. In any case, I feel strongly that in the realm of human affairs one gets farther by reasoning together than by coercion.

I will, of course, try my best to sell whatever final package you authorize. It would have been helpful to have a concessional interest rate, particularly to induce a favorable climate for installation of augmented special U.S. intelligence facilities. That apparently is not possible. What should be possible, however, in addition to "favorable prices," which you mentioned to the Shah in your letter of April 11, are the following two proposals:

A. On-schedule deliveries. According to the proposed package, the \$200,000,000 credit will be phased in \$50,000,000 tranches over four years. The problem is that there is usually a two or three year delay in delivery after credit funds are arranged. It would be important to be able to assure the Shah:

1. While funding is being held at \$50,000,000 per annum level because we want to assist Iran in keeping its debt burden manageable,

2. Delivery of equipment will nevertheless hold to the phased five-year schedule set forth in the Peterson military survey report (in effect this means in most cases funding would be delayed until just prior to delivery dates).

If such telescoping of leadtimes is not possible, it is recommended as an alternative that the FY 67 new credit tranche be increased to \$200,000,000 by advancing the final \$50,000,000 tranche (FY 70) to FY 67.

B. Elimination of the strait jacket. If we hope to retain our military cooperation with Iran, including discouraging the Shah's purchasing elsewhere, we are more likely to do so (although complete control is unlikely) by informal consultations as we go along, based on provisions which already exist in the 1964 Memorandum, than if we try to coerce him by further documentation in effect requiring him to seek our permission before he can purchase elsewhere.

Certainly treating the Shah like an adult is the best long-range policy if we are to continue to play a role in Iran's moving ahead and if we wish to maintain our rather extensive assets here of significant importance to our national security.

Pres file

Monday, May 23, 1966, 5:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: State Department Senior Seminar Graduation (Between June 6 and June 11, at your Choice)

You sent back to me Jim Symington's attached memorandum and asked me to review it and "make something substantial" out of the occasion.

Brom Smith and I hit a pretty dry creek when we went back to State, as the attached papers indicate.

Now I suggest the following, as part of the campaign to defeat the "tired blood" image of our Administration:

1. We assemble not merely the graduates and their families (about 50 souls) but also congressmen and senators from their places of birth, since they are pretty well spread about the country -- a good thing to dramatize.

2. Secretary Rusk, rather than you, pass out the diplomas, since the precedent of diploma-passing might come back to haunt you with other Government schools. On the other hand, if you wanted to emphasize that Foreign Service Officers work for you, your handing them the diplomas on this particular occasion would be one way to do it -@ and we could resist pleas for repeating the performance.

3. You make a short talk with the following themes:

- Your responsibility in foreign policy makes the members of the Foreign Service your personal agents;
- Note the presence of four military members of the Seminar and emphasize the close comradeship and mutual understanding which is required and which has developed in recent years as the result of the character of our problems overseas;
- Then the major theme: This is a time in history when those inside and outside the Government must generate and put into effect new ideas and initiatives. Despite the

dangers in Southeast Asia and elsewhere the world is changing and changing for the better. This is a period of opportunity. We have a responsibility to encourage and strengthen the forces of moderation and peace and to intensify the struggle against poverty, ignorance, and disease.

- Ideas are needed across the whole front of our foreign relations: to help find the way to an honorable peace in Southeast Asia; to carry forward the Alliance for Progress as well as regional development in Africa and Asia; to give new vitality to NATO; to build bridges to nations under Communist rule; to bring armaments under control.
- That is why on May 16 you asked all members of the Cabinet to generate new foreign policy ideas and make them available to Secretary Rusk; that is why Secretary Rusk has announced the new program of systematic consultation with experts outside the Government in all major foreign policy fields; that is why your personal staff is in contact daily with men and women all over the country.
- A foreign service officer must be not a passive instrument of our foreign policy but an alert and creative analyst of the world scene, capable of suggesting new directions and initiatives in the nation's foreign policy.

4. The theme would be appropriate because by then you would have: launched your Hemispheric Initiatives in Mexico; launched your African initiative; made your Polish speech and carried it forward via Secretary Rusk in Brussels; and most important of all, Secretary Rusk will have announced the new system of consultant relationships in the Department of State, if we can force the pace a little over there.

W. W. R.

Invite congressmen. Yes ☒ No ☐
Secretary Rusk to pass out diplomas ☐
I will pass out diplomas ☒
Theme for talk okay ☒
Scrap and start again ☐
See me ☐



7899

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

May 18, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

In response to Mr. Bromley Smith's request, there are attached suggested talking points for use by the President if he decides to receive the graduates of the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy in early June.


A group photograph with the President would be useful to all the individuals concerned. The four military Members of the Seminar would be in uniform. One of the Foreign Service Officers is a lady. The group might interest TV. The breakdown by places of birth is as follows: Iowa - 1, Rhode Island - 2, Washington, D.C. - 1, Ohio - 1, Pennsylvania - 1, Arkansas - 1, California - 1, Massachusetts - 3, Michigan - 1, New York - 1, Georgia - 1, Alabama - 1, Montana - 2, Minnesota - 2, New Jersey - 2, Tennessee - 1.

If the President should be able to spare the additional seconds required, it would be a special honor if each of the Members could be photographed individually receiving his diploma from the President. These photographs would be treasured by the Members and be useful in their posts of assignment, both at home and abroad.

The attachment is set up as a series of points, with the thought that some of these could be picked up ad lib by the President. If the President should wish a text to read for later release to the press, this could be readily put together from the attachment.

Also -

Also attached are several illustrated brochures describing the Seminar, a fact sheet, biographic information regarding the Members and an outline of the course.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Suggested Talking Points.
2. Brochures (2)
3. Fact Sheet (1)
4. Biographic Summaries (1)
5. Outline and Description (1)

1461
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SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

1. I am pleased to receive the Members of the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy who have been studying foreign and domestic problems for the past ten months in the most advanced course offered by the U.S. Government.

2. Each President of the U.S. has a special interest in the American Foreign Service. For it is in many ways our first line of defense. It provides our eyes and ears all over the globe, and I take a special and personal pride in it. The excellence of the talented men and women, who devote their lives to advancing American interests abroad, has caused me to appoint many to Ambassadorial posts - more than any of my predecessors as the record will show. I support the Foreign Service and appreciate its loyalty.

3. I also wish to say that the fact the twelve Senior Foreign Service Officers in this Seminar have been studying with an

equal number of senior officers representing the armed services, the Defense Department, USIA, CIA and the Bureau of the Budget is as it should be. Our foreign relations and responsibilities range over the entire Government and officers moving on to greater responsibilities both at home and abroad should have a deep appreciation of this important fact. Inter-service training of the type offered in the Senior Seminar achieves this.

4. There is no question in my mind that you and your colleagues are in a very real sense my personal representatives abroad. I know that my administration and my policies are judged in large part by the way you explain and justify them. You also do much to project this nation's image abroad and work to advance our national dream of a world free from hunger, ignorance, fear and despotism.

5. I am particularly glad to know that in addition to foreign problems, you members of the Seminar traveled all over this country to observe and hear the views of citizens. I am confident that you were renewed and refreshed by the opportunity to observe closely our great national base - our people, our prosperity and the problems which we are surmounting. As my representatives in foreign countries, I want you to have a full awareness of the latest developments in the nation. You will then speak for me in the full knowledge of what the U.S. stands for today.

6. As you prepare to return to positions of responsibility, I want to emphasize that the opportunities we all face in the foreign affairs field are nearly unlimited. New and old problems surround us and cry out for new ideas and new solutions. I hope you will be able to put to work the time you have spent away from day-to-day tasks to help us find new approaches to our problems.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

telephoned me to
S/S 5/24/66
rlw
29

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, May 23, 1966 -- 3:40 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Participation in the Transfer of Chamizal to Mexico

The State Department recommends that you participate with President Diaz Ordaz in the ceremony transferring the Chamizal territory to Mexico.

~~They suggest September 25, 1967 as an appropriate date.~~

The Chamizal treaty provides that the Joint Commission will set the date of the actual transfer. Commissioner Friedkin ~~expects to have the relocation of persons and property completed by August of this year.~~ He will then be in a position to reach agreement with the Mexicans on the date of transfer.

September 25, 1967 would be an appropriate time for the ceremony because:

- It is the anniversary of your meeting with President Lopez Mateos in 1964 at El Paso in a ceremony symbolic of the transfer.
- by this date we expect to have the Chamizal Memorial Park and the Chamizal Memorial Highway projects under way. Dedication of these projects, to be built in the United States with federal funds, should form part of the ceremony. ~~(It is to your advantage to be able to show to El Paso benefits to be derived from the Chamizal transaction at the same time that the city loses some of its territory.)~~

~~The Mexicans may want a date earlier than September 1967. On the other hand, they may be satisfied with a public announcement in August of when the transfer will take place.~~ Commissioner Friedkin will relay the Mexican Commissioner's wishes to us and await our guidance on the position he should take.

DECLASSIFIED
State 11-22-78 (#94)
Set for 158 8-21-86

Walt. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, May 23, 1966
11:25 AM

Mr. President:

Ambassador Tuthill is scheduled to see you at 11:30, accompanied by Assistant Secretary Gordon. This is a courtesy call of our new Ambassador which will strengthen his hand in Rio and convey to the Brazilians the importance you attach to our relations with Brazil.

No substantive matters will be raised by the Ambassador and none need be raised by you unless you so desire.

W. W. Rostow

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

31

called
SS
5/23
to
clear
message
112

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Saturday~~ Monday
May 23, 1966
~~2:00 p.m.~~ 11:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

State recommends sending President Kaunda the attached reply to his message of 18 May.

He asked us to consider additional airlift and improvement of surface routes to help get supplies in and copper out because he is about to provoke a showdown with the Rhodesians over the railroad that now carries them.

Zambia just is not ready for a showdown like that, and we want to slow him down. Your message is designed to make him think twice.

Walt. Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

See me ☐

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-287

By *inf*, NARA, Date 1-10-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-287
By ijg, NARA, Date 1-10-89

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of May 18 describing the problems Zambia faces because of its dependence on transportation routes through Southern Rhodesia. As you know, the United States has long recognized Zambia's desire to develop new transportation routes and has actively cooperated with the Government of Zambia in a number of ways to assist in such development.

The specific projects listed in your letter may well play an important role in the development of new transportation routes. I think you would agree, however, that they are of a highly technical nature and we would have to study them carefully before commenting on their practicability. I have ordered that an expeditious review be made and will communicate further with you on the matter through my Ambassador in Lusaka just as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, Mr. President, until alternative routes are able to handle the burden, I would urge you not to take any precipitate action which could lead to a cutting off of existing transport routes through Rhodesia. Until Zambia is better prepared than at present to withstand the consequences, such action would create transportation difficulties which Zambia's friends with the best will in the world would be unable to overcome in time to be of real help to Zambia.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 18, 1966

FROM LUSAKA (1707)

1. Following letter from President Kaunda to President Johnson delivered to Embassy noon today.
2. "The matter about which I am writing to you concerns both the security of my country and the ending of the rebel regime in Rhodesia.
3. "As you will be aware, up until the end of last year over 97 percent of my country's imports, by bulk, came from or through Rhodesia. Seldom has a country been so dependent upon a single line of communication.
4. "The situation has always been a matter of concern to myself and my people. When the rebellion occurred in Rhodesia, it became a matter of crisis. The maintenance of our economic strength, the progress of our development, even the security of our economy could be placed in jeopardy by a single act of an illegal and hostile regime.
5. "Similarly my own country's capacity to take part in any action to restore legality in Rhodesia -- whether through a policy of sanctions or through participation in the preparations for a military action -- was severely limited by our dependence upon the railway line running through Rhodesian territory.
6. "Consequently my Government, assisted by your Government, has recently done everything possible to investigate and then expand all possible alternative routes for our trade. One consequence was the oil airlift. Another has been the series of intensive studies often conducted -- as they had to be -- with the assistance of friendly governments.
7. "Now Mr. President, there have been new developments about which I would like to acquaint you and also seek your help. First of all, we have been progressively cutting down our trade links with Rhodesia as a way of participating in what has now become an international blockade against Rhodesia. In this process one of the things we did was to keep in Zambia all funds accruing from Rhodesia railways activities within Zambia. This has meant there was less and less money to spend on Rhodesia railways in Rhodesia.
8. "The rebel regime in Rhodesia is now desperate and is demanding that we pay in advance for the exportation of copper. As I have said already, with your help a number of things have been done but it is obvious to me

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-287

By sig, NARA, Date 1-10-87~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

that if we say no to Smith's demands his reactions will force us to fall upon some emergency measures to meet the challenge of exporting our copper and bringing in our essential imports.

9. "I am therefore wondering whether you could, Mr. President, in spite of your many preoccupations kindly consider:

(a) The possibility of helping us to airlift copper to Dar es Salaam as a stopgap measure;

(b) Helping us with barges sufficiently strong to ferry heavy duty vehicles across Lake Malawi;

(c) Helping us with the construction of a totally new road of about 180 miles from Deep Bay in Malawi to a point on the Great North Road in Zambia;

(d) Helping us with the reconstruction of the Mtwara/Mamba Bay Road all of which lies in Tanzania.

10. "If operated on a strictly emergency level I would hope that this whole road would finish in under three months. This, of course, would mean heavy road construction machinery moving in to do the 516 miles of expanding road between Mtwara and Mamba Bay, while the ferry and barges were being moved to Lake Malawi. This would also mean a new road being constructed between Deep Bay and Mlowi following up the South Lukulu River up to the border of Zambia and Malawi and then hitting the Great North Road at a place called Matumbo, 40 miles south of the Chinsali District. All this should help us a great deal.

11. I end, Mr. President, believing that you will come to the aid of my country which is suffering through no fault of its own and also because of being a land-locked country. Yours sincerely, Kenneth Kaunda"

32
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, May 23, 1966

MR. PRESIDENT:

Looks better -- in fact and attitude.

Wish Bill Moyers or I could help draft
that speech!

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

~~SECRET~~ ~~EXDIS~~

May 23, 1966

SAIGON 4887

1. I called on Prime Minister Ky today. He said he had just been talking with his representatives in Danang and that it was true that the "struggle" people were coming out of the Tinh Hoi pagoda and were turning themselves in. He intended to give them amnesty and he was planning a Berlin airlift type operation to bring food and medication in for the people. I told him there was a ship in the harbor with rice and said that we would help in every way that we could. He said he might ask us for planes to fly in the food and the medication.

2. He said that the erstwhile mayor of Danang, Mr. Man, was now in prison.

3. I said that he had achieved a considerable military-police type victory, that he now had to win a real political victory, and that the meeting on tomorrow offered a great opportunity. He agreed. He said he was giving it a great deal of thought and that he wished to make it into an occasion where he could explain everything he had tried to do, not in the spirit of a "call to arms" at all but in the spirit of restoring national unity and of stressing the fact that he wanted to hold elections, and that the elections would be for everybody. He said there would be representation from Hue/Danang. I cited Churchill's dictum: "In victory, magnanimity."

4. I cited a report that an American had shot a regional force soldier in front of the Vien Hoa Dao pagoda, and if this was true, I regretted it deeply. Ky said kind of this was inevitable and should not distress me, and that he had directed the commanding officer of the regional forces to take the body and return it to the man's family, and stop the Bonzes from making a big funeral demonstration with the body inside the pagoda.

LODGE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 86-290
By ij, NARA, Date 3-10-88

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, May 23, 1966, 9:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Telephone Call Today to Feinberg

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

We are committed to a telephone call to Abe Feinberg about three matters:

1. [REDACTED]

2. The Haifa loan. Dave Bell by noon today will be recommending that we use the "left over" money to support an additional Israeli project (the power plant at Tel Aviv, of which \$10 million will in any case be financed by ExIm but we would put in \$6 million of AID money). I recommend that I tell Feinberg on this item that we will shortly be suggesting to the Israeli Government a responsive way to meet their request.

3. Desalting. We now have in our hands memoranda from State and Hornig. State suggests an approach which, while initially bilateral with Israel, would involve the strategy later to include the UAR in desalting enterprises. There are many unanswered questions which cannot and ought not be settled today. I recommend that I tell Feinberg that we have decided in principle to appoint a U.S. coordinator to explore with the Israelis the technical and economic aspects of the desalting projects; and we shall be in touch with them shortly about the name of our man and terms of reference.

You should note that State's concept would involve at some appropriate time the U.S. coordinator on this project dealing not only with Israel but with the UAR. This is a concept you will wish to examine. There is no need to tell Feinberg about this today.

One of the reasons for a bit of vagueness in reply to Feinberg today relates to the timing of an announcement of Harriman (or someone else) as the coordinator. We have just announced the Israeli aircraft. We may want to save the announcement of the coordinator for a later time this year.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, May 23, 1966
9:05 a. m.

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk recommends that we agree to pledge an increase in our contribution to the UN Children's Fund of \$1 million a year for three years on a matching basis. The U. S. contribution would rise to a maximum of \$15 million in the third year.

This memorandum responds to your request to Charley Schultze that the proposal be studied and staffed by State.

W. W. Rostow

ATTACHMENT

1479
34a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

May 19, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Income Target for UNICEF

Recommendation:

It is recommended that you authorize the Department of State to instruct the U.S. Delegation to the Executive Board of the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) to support a target of \$50 million to be set for 1969.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

Discussion:

The Bureau of the Budget advised us that you wanted more information concerning the proposal by Henry R. Labouisse, Executive Director of UNICEF, that the Executive Board approve a target of \$50 million to be reached in 1969. This would include \$38 million from member government and \$12 million from private sources (sales of greeting cards and calendars, donations). Since the United States puts up \$2 to match each \$3 contributed by other governments, acceptance of the target would require the United States to be prepared over a three-year period to increase its contribution to UNICEF from the present level of \$12 million to \$15 million. An increase of about \$1 million a year in the U.S. contribution reflects a reasonable rate of growth in a program whose objectives are clearly in line with the U.S. national interest and for which there is widespread popular support. In fact, this is the kind of sensible, moderate expansion for an undeniably beneficial purpose which we have been trying to work out in international organizations generally, as contrasted with unsound mushroom growth.

UNICEF was established at the end of World War II and has always been headed by an American - first by the late Maurice Pate and now by Henry Labouisse, former Administrator of AID and most recently our Ambassador to Greece. In recent years there has been a drastic increase in UNICEF aid in Africa and Asia, with a concomitant decline of aid in Europe. Allocations for education and basic maternal and child health services have increased substantially, while allocations for disease control (still the largest program element) have declined. The Executive Board is about to consider a proposal to extend UNICEF assistance to governments requesting such support in the field of family planning.

Last year UNICEF was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize - a reflection of the high esteem in which UNICEF is held throughout the world.

Over the years the United States has received considerable international credit for its generous support of UNICEF. The United States has repeatedly stated in the Executive Board that it is prepared to increase its contribution to UNICEF on a 40% matching basis if other governments will do the same. Failure by the United States to support the target would appear to be a weakening of U.S. support. It would, moreover, be difficult to justify to the large segment of the American public that actively supports UNICEF. Finally, failure to endorse the target would be construed by many as a slap at Henry Labouisse, who became Executive Director only a year ago and who initiated the target suggestion in the framework of his first annual report. In this connection it may also be worth noting that the United States supported last year a similar proposal by Paul Hoffman to raise the target for the UN Development Program from \$150 million to \$200 million a year.

Preliminary discussion of the proposed target in the Administrative Budget Committee of the Executive Board indicates that the majority of the Board will probably support the target proposed. It is our view that the establishment of the target will encourage other governments and national UNICEF committees to intensify their fund-raising efforts.

-3-

In view of the foregoing, we recommend your approval for U.S. support for the UNICEF target.

Ambassador Goldberg concurs in this recommendation.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Dean Rusk". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Dean" and last name "Rusk" clearly distinguishable.

Dean Rusk

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 MAY 19 PM 4 51

A

346

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

May 12, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: UNICEF fund-raising target

The UNICEF Executive Board is meeting at Addis Ababa. They will act on a proposal to establish a \$50 million fund-raising target for 1969. At the present time there is no target. The United States contributes \$2 for every \$3 contributed by other Governments. Out of a \$33 million budget we now contribute \$12 million.

If we agree to the \$50 million goal, our contribution would rise to \$15 million. We would continue to make our contribution on the basis of \$2 for every \$3 put up by other Governments; therefore, we would contribute the full \$15 million only if other Governments also raised their contributions.

The American Delegation intends to support the new \$50 million target on a "low key" basis.

The question is -- do you wish to have a White House announcement that the United States will support an increased target for UNICEF? As you know, UNICEF is heavily engaged in the fields of education, health care, and disease control among children. It has won a Nobel Peace prize for its work.

Charles L. Schultze

Charles L. Schultze
Director . .

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 23, 1966

Dear Frank:

I am greatly in your debt for the lucid summary of the conclusions at which you arrived on your recent visit to Europe and the seven recommendations you made. I shall not only think about them myself but make sure that they are carefully examined within the Government.

I am pleased to hear you have had an opportunity to discuss your views with the Secretary of State.

As for your conclusions, I share them in substantial measure.

You may have been abroad when I talked on the occasion of the Polish Millennium. I attach, therefore, a copy of my remarks. I sought to link the maintenance of an integrated NATO defense to three constructive directions of policy which, I believe, we share with the Europeans: intensified cooperation across the Atlantic; continued loyalty to the concept of a united Europe; and a forthcoming position with respect to East-West initiatives.

You should know that we have been undertaking, at my direction, intensified and systematic staff work in the Government designed to develop concrete proposals.

I agree with your view that our policy with respect to France should be wholly correct. I do not regard us as fighting General de Gaulle but working with others to maintain the kind of integrated defense and coordinated constructive policy in which the rest of us believe.

I shall consider carefully your suggestion about communicating with de Gaulle.


I can assure you also that we and our allies are, indeed, determined to use the occasion of the relocation of NATO to streamline and modernize its structure.

Frank Church
Ct
(Ed has filed
under
France-NATO)

-2-

With respect to the nuclear matters you raise, I can assure you also that they are being given my intense personal attention. It is, of course, extremely difficult for Germany once and for all to deny itself a collective role in the nuclear field when both Britain and France claim the right to national nuclear armories and China is emerging on the world scene as a nuclear power. Nevertheless, the problem of nuclear proliferation -- in all its aspects -- is one of the truly great issues on the international agenda.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Dwight D. Eisenhower", with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

The Honorable Frank Church
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Juanita:

Re this ltr to Sen. Church -- Pres. told Bob Fleming to get Bill Moyers to read it before sending.

Bob Fleming says Bill Moyers already has seen the draft..to go ahead and send it.

Bob Fleming/yb
5/21/66
4:00p

Mr. Rostow:

The President asks that you prepare a reply to this letter as soon as possible.. either tonight or in the morning.

FYI--Ambassador Bruce, Secy. McNamara, Secy. Rusk, Francis Bator -- and 2 copies for the President have been made....and sent. --via President's instructions to Bator.

vicky mcc.
5/19/66
8:27p

*Rec'd
5-21-66
1:55p*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1966
Saturday, 1:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here is a proposed reply to Senator Church.

I checked it with Secretary Rusk, in the light of his conversation with Church.

He concurs.

W.W.R.

May 21, 1966 -- 11:30 am. 356

Mr. Gordon, S/S, telephoned to say the Secretary has seen the proposed reply to Church and concurs. No change necessary.

LN

J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK., CHAIRMAN

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

May 19, 1966

CARL MARCY, CHIEF OF STAFF
DARRELL ST. CLAIRE, CLERK

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

A few days ago, I returned from my trip to Europe, in the course of which I talked with President deGaulle, Prime Minister Wilson, Chancellor Erhard, and some forty other cabinet officers, opposition leaders, and political observers in Belgium, France, Great Britain and West Germany. In addition, I spent two days talking with delegates to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva.

I hasten these conclusions and recommendations to you, so soon after my return, in light of the fact that decisions are undoubtedly now being reached in preparation for the NATO ministerial meeting scheduled to begin in Brussels on June 6. I am also preparing memoranda of all my conversations and will, of course, transmit these to you -- and to the State Department -- as soon as they have been completed.

My conclusions are as follows:

(1) In Western European eyes, the post-war period is over. Western Europe has fully regained its vitality. A Soviet armed attack is regarded as increasingly improbable. Western Europeans long for a thaw in the Cold War and sense that the time may now be opportune for a gradual relaxation of tension between the two halves of Europe, a process which could lead eventually to a general settlement, ending the present unnatural partition of Europe.

(2) There is an uneasiness that the United States is unaware of this changing sentiment in Europe and is not moving with the times, but remains wedded to the old status quo. In particular,

May 19, 1966

church

Europeans would welcome our placing less emphasis upon NATO's role as a fort, and more emphasis upon its use as a forum for reaching agreement on Western initiatives directed toward the normalization of relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

(3) To the degree that President deGaulle has plumbed the European desire to reach eastward, and to the extent that he has appealed to the dignity, pride and independent spirit of Europeans, he is not isolated either in France or in Europe. In this sense, it seems likely that much of what is called "Gaullism" will outlive deGaulle. Although Europeans, including the French, still want to remain beneath the American nuclear umbrella, there is a restiveness about what is sometimes described as the American hegemony over Western Europe. The defiance of deGaulle has thus engendered both apprehension and admiration.

(4) At the governmental level, outside France, deGaulle's preemptory conduct toward the Alliance is deeply resented. Much concern is expressed that his defection may stiffen, rather than soften, Russian intransigence. Moreover, there is general skepticism that France, lacking the needed size and weight in the power equation, can possibly engage the Soviet Union in meaningful negotiations. As one observer put it: "France has the objective but not the means, while the United States has the means but not the objective."

(5) A diplomatic glacier now separates the United States from France. Communication between the two governments has dangerously broken down. If a useful dialogue is to commence again, humility must somehow prevail over pride. Overtures will have to come, so it would seem, from the highest level.

(6) There is no enthusiasm in Western Europe for a "hardware solution" to the nuclear sharing problem in NATO. On the contrary, I was told repeatedly that the United States had been ill-advised in pushing the MLF so aggressively. Support for this proposal, even in Germany, is confined to certain "strategists" in the Foreign and Defense Ministries at Bonn. Far from demanding nuclear weapons, the German people are said to be either disinterested or opposed. In the other countries I visited, the residue of anti-German feeling is more pronounced than I had expected, particularly in Great Britain. Yielding to the Germans greater access to our nuclear arsenal would undoubtedly impose an added strain on the alliance. A consultative solution to nuclear sharing, along the lines of the McNamara Committee, would appear to be the best answer.

May 19, 1966

(7) At Geneva there is grave misgiving that if the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference produces no results, after three years running, further negotiations there will be broken off and the United Nations will assign the disarmament problem to a much less satisfactory forum. Most of the countries represented at Geneva seem to feel that such a set-back would imperil whatever chance there may be for agreement on two treaties of far-reaching importance: a non-proliferation treaty and a comprehensive test ban agreement.

As you know, the impasse on a non-proliferation treaty results from the Russian unwillingness to accept the so-called "European Clause" in the American draft, which would allow for the creation of a European nuclear force sometime in the future, to which West Germany could conceivably belong. While this may conform to the American "grand design" for Western Europe, I found little evidence that Europeans either want such a force, or think it feasible to create one for many years to come. This has given rise to a suspicion in Geneva that the United States is not really serious about consummating a non-proliferation treaty at this time; otherwise, it is felt, we would not be mortgaging present prospects for the sake of a highly problematical development, which, at best, lays way off in an uncertain future.

(8) As for the comprehensive test ban treaty, Europeans are insufficiently aware of the political problem we face in securing Senate ratification of a ban on underground tests which is not accompanied by the right to make on-site inspections. Consequently, they tend to construe our reluctance to accept a small risk for a big gain as indicative of the dominance of military influence over American policy.

(9) While the British have decided to enter the Common Market when the time is right, the decision betrays elements of equivocation. The debate goes on with respect to collateral matters, the need to strengthen sterling by first overcoming the adverse balance-of-payments, disgruntlement over the supra-national features of the Market, and fears that British entry will end her "special relationship" with the United States or curtail her role in the world at large. Given such lingering doubts, Britain will make no further move, at least until the Government is certain that the French will not again exercise a veto.

May 19, 1966

(10) There is concern that European business is in danger of being consumed by a voracious American economy -- that Europe will end up being dissolved like a lump of sugar in the American cup of tea. As cause for alarm, Europeans point to the "brain drain," the disparity between research and development funds in the United States and Europe, and the widening American technological superiority in such growth industries as electronics, aircraft, and space. "We shall be reduced," a renowned economist lamented to me, "to the same subordination to the United States as ancient Greece bore toward Imperial Rome. Unless the trend can somehow be reversed, we are destined to become a continent of hotel-keepers, store clerks, salesmen, and tourist guides."

(11) A settlement of the German problem does not yet seem to be in sight. It is generally recognized that German reunification will come, if at all, at the end of the process of reconciliation between Western and Eastern Europe, when the climate of confidence has grown strong enough to permit the rejoining of Germany within the framework of a new all-European security arrangement, guaranteed both by the Soviet Union and the United States. This sequence is not seriously disputed, even by the Germans themselves.

My recommendations, submitted for your consideration, are as follows:

(1) With respect to France, I believe we should act with firmness plus correctness. I gather it is your feeling, too, that bad manners don't make for good diplomacy. We must avoid over-reacting to deGaulle. In no case, should we disparage the grandeur of France or impugn her motives. Most of all, we should avoid the temptation of mixing in French politics. Any American attempt to reach the French electorate by going over, under, or around deGaulle, will surely backfire.

(2) It is crucial that effective communication be restored with deGaulle. If you feel that a personal meeting with him is premature, I would recommend that you consider the appointment of a special emissary, who would stand in the same kind of relationship to you as Harry Hopkins stood in relation to President Roosevelt, when he acted as a link between the White House and Number 10 Downing Street. Such an emissary would, of course, have to possess the stature and experience of an Averell Harriman. His purpose would be to reopen a dialogue to the point where a personal meeting between

May 19, 1966

you and the French President would seem likely to bear fruit. In this connection, Prime Minister Wilson told me that British-French relations had improved considerably after he had met with deGaulle for six hours, discussing only those issues on which agreement was possible.

(3) If the NATO structure is to be salvaged without France, the old architects must come up with new plans or new architects must be engaged. Clearly, SHAPE should be moved to a Benelux site, and streamlined, its bulk trimmed back in adjustment to the diminished danger. The European role in SHAPE should be sharply upgraded. Since the headquarters exists for the defense of Europe, I would urge that the time is ripe for a European General to serve as SACEUR, under a command arrangement which would leave control of our nuclear weapons in your hands. Other steps might include moving the Military Committee for NATO out of the Pentagon and relocating it in Europe in close proximity to SHAPE and the North Atlantic Council. I also recommend that you give consideration to the establishment of a "hot-line" communications system, linking together the heads of the NATO Governments, for immediate consultation in case of emergency.

(4) Another objective in the revision of NATO is to make the alliance outward-looking in the pursuit of peace. Here, it is deGaulle who has seized the initiative. Our response to his challenge should be to resist the destructive effect of his separatism, while adopting the constructive aspects of his quest eastward. It is the United States, not France, which possesses the weight and the power to take meaningful action in the field of East-West relations. You, yourself, have spoken of the need for "building bridges" with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. DeGaulle's decisions make it more urgent that we assume our natural position of leadership in this endeavor.

(5) With regard to European economic integration, the Common Market seems to have weathered its way to success. The United States should continue to press, on a pragmatic basis, for the extension of the Common Market. It would benefit from British membership which would bring in most of the other EFTA countries, provide a healthy counter-balance to West Germany's economic strength, and incline the Common Market to look outward rather than inward.


May 19, 1966

(6) As for Geneva, I recommend that immediate attention be given to pumping life back into these moribund negotiations. A decision should no longer be delayed on the question of nuclear sharing with West Germany. If a consultative solution is settled upon, then the way may be open to yet reach agreement with the Soviet Union on a non-proliferation treaty. I strongly recommend this course as attuned to our highest national interests. But time is fast running out.

(7) Respecting a comprehensive test ban, I recommend that you give personal attention to the "threshold" compromises which have been suggested. These would limit the ban on underground tests to explosions above an agreed size, which could be detected by seismic devices without the necessity for on-site inspections. It is possible that this may prove an area for enlargement of the treaty to correspond with the advances that have been made in detection techniques.

Finally, Mr. President, let me say that I returned from Europe strongly persuaded that American policy must be brought into line with the changing realities of the European scene. For Europe is of such vital importance to the United States that the stakes there call for your personal direction of those decisions which must soon be made.

Sincerely,


Frank Church

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(32)
notified Saunders
+ W. Sullivan 2/3/66
rln 36

Saturday, May 21, 1966
4:05 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 86-287
By isp, NARA, Date 1-10-89

Apart from Abe Feinberg's requests which I am working on separately, I have been canvassing new things we might do in Israel and have come up with an illustrative program for showing steady momentum.

The policy problem we have to work around is that Israel's outstanding economic performance raises it far above the level where AID normally pulls out. For instance, its per capita GNP of \$1250 is 70% of the UK's, 90% of Holland's, equal to Austria's, 130% of Italy's and 200% of Greece's. Dave Bell recommended last fall that we make no concessional loans this year. You approved a slower transition to hard terms by giving Israel half its loan money (\$20 million) from the Ex-Im Bank and half in AID loans. But we do have important AID reasons for continuing that downward trend. So anything we do should capitalize more on imagination than on large sums of AID money.

Building on plans already in the works, we come up with a US-Israeli program like this over the next few months:

--Our sale of tactical aircraft is being announced 20 May. This will probably stand out as the major US-Israeli event of 1966, though we will not want to crow about it because we do not want to invite any more Arab reaction than is inevitable.

--We will shortly be taking the next step on the desalting project.

--Chief Justice and Mrs. Warren will be going to Israel to attend the dedication of the Kennedy Forest on 4 July and probably the inauguration of the Truman Peace Center. President and Mrs. Truman have been invited for the latter. Both of these events will be an opportunity for a message from you, if you wish.

--It might also be possible at the Truman Center inauguration to endow a professorship or set of fellowships, perhaps in the name of a non-controversial Israeli figure like Martin Buber. (We would have to investigate further to learn what might suit best and how we would pay.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

--President Shazar will be visiting Brazil in July and you have approved a private visit here. With King Faisal coming in June, this would also help redress the balance quickly.

In addition, we might put HEW to work on several gestures like the following to be spaced out over later months at appropriate occasions:

--When your International Education Bill has passed and Secretary Gardner has his Institute of Educational Cooperation set up, we might finance several prestigious chairs at US universities for leading Israeli scholars on a rotational basis.

--Establish a scientific or medical institute in Israel to concentrate on training public health careerists from the less developed countries.

--Stimulate a partnership between a US medical school and the Hebrew University-Hadassah Hospital medical school.

--Funds might be made available through current NIH programs for research at an Israeli hospital in disease control.

--Help Hadassah Hospital more. The Israeli community is pressing hard on this. Hadassah would qualify as an American-sponsored institution for help under Section 214 of the Foreign Assistance Act. While this permits using our stock of Israeli currency, it does require AID to grant appropriated dollars to buy the currency from Treasury. AID wants to stay out of the grant business, and other institutions which we have pushed into taking dollar repayable loans instead of grants might be irritated. We would have to sort out these problems with Ambassador Barbour and AID.

--Allow Israel to bid on AID contracts for purchase of potash. AID has limited the list of eligible sources of off-shore procurement to nations which are less developed and where we have large development programs. The Israelis would like to be on that list.

The basic question is whether projects like these really do us any good.

On the one hand, you can argue that the Israelis will take all they can get and still ask for more. Our record over the years has been impressive (see attached). This year's aid total will be the highest since FY 1958. Yet they are still pushing for more. Will small imaginative programs do us any good? Or will they just raise an already unjustifiably (by AID criteria) high aid level and overly compromise Dave Bell's worldwide standards?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

On the other hand, if we want to continue shifting Israel to harder terms, projects like these may cushion the blow.

My question at this stage is whether you judge the things on my illustrative list as useful. If so, I will get the departments down to work on details.

W. C. Rostow Rostow

✓
This is the right approach _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 93-13

By [signature], NARA, Date 6-3-98

May 19, 1966

~~SECRET~~

HOW WE HAVE HELPED ISRAEL

1. US aid through FY 66 will total \$1.1 billion in public grants, loans and credits on concessionary terms. (This year \$52 million in economic aid and around \$40 million for this year's slice of the tank and plane sales-- the highest yearly total since FY 58.)

--During peak years before FY 62 our aid averaged consistently among the highest annual per capita rates in the world (\$28).

--It far surpassed aid to individual Near Eastern Arab states both in annual average and in absolute totals.

--The result of this, other aid and Israel's own efforts has been one of the highest growth rates in the world (10-11%) and a per capita GNP of \$1250 (70% of the UK's, 90% of Holland's, equal to Austria's, 130% of Italy's, 200% of Greece's).

2. The composition of economic aid since 1961 has changed because of Israel's decreasing need and continuing aid from other sources. We ended budget support in FY 61 and development grants in FY 62. Despite these moves dictated by Congressionally endorsed AID policy, we have still found ways FY 62 through FY 66 to put in a total of \$304 million. This has far exceeded what could be justified under normal AID economic criteria, and each year a special Presidential decision has been required.

3. Military aid. Despite our standing policy not to become a major arms supplier in the Middle East, we:

--Agreed in 1962 to sell the Israelis 5 batteries of HAWK missiles (total about \$21.5 million on 10 years credit at about 3%). These missiles have now been delivered and are becoming operational.

--Arranged in 1965 to sell 210 tanks (\$34 million). This deal included 110 M 48 A2C's and 100 M 48 A1's with kits for upgunning these and the 40 M 48 A1's earlier received from Germany with our help.

--Expect to announce on 20 May sale of tactical aircraft (estimated \$72.1 million).

--Provided communications and electronics equipment (\$5 million); artillery, guns and ammunition (\$2.2 million); other equipment and training (\$2.1 million). This includes 100 106 mm. recoilless rifles, 236 75 mm. guns.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

--Have allowed commercial purchase of other equipment.

4. We have just completed a technological study of a desalting-power plant and are actively studying next steps we and the Israeli government can take to push this project ahead. We are far from a decision, but this could run \$100 million and up.

5. On the diplomatic front, preservation of Israel is one of our three top objectives in the Middle East.

--President Kennedy on 8 May 1963 publicly committed the US to support the integrity of states in the Near East and to oppose aggression in any form. On 30 October 1963 he wrote to Prime Minister Eshkol specifically affirming US capability and preparedness to safeguard Israel.

--President Johnson translated those promises into specifics when he made the following points to Eshkol, 1 June 1964: support the Johnston Plan on Jordan waters; help Israel get tanks; continuous concern for Israeli security; help with desalting as much as feasible. We've made good on all these counts, including a comprehensive and intimate exchange of views and intelligence estimates on Arab capabilities.

--We give full diplomatic and financial support for the elaborate peace-keeping machinery on Israel's borders.

6. Support for over a million Arab refugees at a cost of over \$350 million has helped Israel.

7. We do a great deal to enhance Israel's technological edge over the Arabs--currently at a yearly level of \$5 million, supporting scientific research in Israel.

8. Our education and cultural exchange program involves hundreds of Americans and Israelis visiting back and forth.

9. Indirectly, our aid to Jordan has been an important assist to Israel, since our goal has been to keep a moderate buffer on Israel's longest border. Prime Minister Eshkol and Foreign Minister Meir admit Israeli interest in our continued support for Jordan. That aid has amounted to about \$520 million through FY 65.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1966
Saturday, 4:15 p.m.

37
In approval
Requester, telephone
to PK S by S/S

Mr. President:

The following message of condolence to former Prime Minister Macmillan is for your approval:

Mrs. Johnson and I were distressed to learn of the death of your beloved wife. Our heartfelt sympathy goes out to you in this sad moment.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Walt. R.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

S/S informed
6:10 pm
5/21/66

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, May 21, 1966 -- 3:35 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Strategic Air Command Airborne
Alert Program for FY 1967

Attached for your approval is the Defense Department request for authority to continue the Strategic Air Command alert flights and to renew the agreement with Canada for overflight.

The number of actual flights will be reduced from 12 to 4 per day in order to lower costs. The planned 4 flights per day will be funded out of normal training money.

Operations on the route over Spain will not be resumed until authorized by the Spanish Government and will then be routed over the Straits of Gibraltar. The agreement with Canada will continue to provide for a maximum of 28 flights per day thus permitting an increased show of force in case it is necessary during periods of tension such as the Cuban crisis.

The advantage of airborne alert flights is that they put a certain number of aircraft closer to target with more accurate delivery capability than the missile force. They also further reduce the possibility of a surprise disarming attack against the United States.

The State Department concurs. Authorization memorandum is attached for your signature, if you approve.

W. Rostow
W. ROSTOW

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-397
By cb, NARA, Date 10-6-95

~~SECRET~~

1442
38a



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

16 MAY 1966

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-58

By ing NARA, Date 12-7-89

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Strategic Air Command Airborne Alert Indoctrination
Program for FY 1967

Attached is the projected schedule of the Strategic Air Command Airborne Alert Indoctrination Program for FY 1967. This program is a continuation of the FY 1966 program which received Presidential approval as noted in a memorandum from Mr. McGeorge Bundy, dated May 27, 1965.

The concept of operations envisions an exercise schedule of four aircraft sorties per day utilizing the same routes as those currently in use. These routes are outlined on charts previously submitted to President Kennedy under cover of Mr. Gilpatric's memorandum of May 31, 1962. It should be noted that the level of activity for FY 1967 has been reduced from 12 to 4 sorties per day. Actual operations on the southern route will be contingent upon removal of the temporary suspension currently in effect.

I recommend Presidential approval of the continuation of the SAC Airborne Alert Indoctrination Program for FY 1967, as outlined in the attached schedule.

Continuation of the program will require diplomatic steps to obtain renewal (semi-annually) of the Canadian authorization for SAC overflights. I therefore request Presidential authorization to make appropriate arrangements through the Department of State with the Canadian Government for renewal of the current authorization for a maximum of 28 daily SAC overflights on the approved routes, as is currently authorized through 30 June 1966.

This memorandum is concurred in by the Department of State.

C. Vance

Sec Def Cont At. X-

3003

Attachment

~~SECRET~~



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~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

SAC Airborne Alert Indoctrination Program

FY-1967

First Quarter (1 July - 30 September)

1 July - 15 August

<u>Base/Unit</u>	<u>Daily Sorties</u>	<u>Route</u>
Dyess/96 BW	1	N
Travis/5 BW	1	W
Wright-Patterson/17 BW	1	S
Westover/99 BW	1	S

16 August - 30 September

Altus/11 BW	1	N
Walker/6 BW	1	W
Kincheloe/449 BW	1	S
Dow/397 BW	1	S

Second Quarter (1 October - 31 December)

1 October - 15 November

<u>Base/Unit</u>	<u>Daily Sorties</u>	<u>Route</u>
Blytheville/97 BW	1	N
Mather/320 BW	1	W
Wurtsmith/379 BW	1	S
Plattsburgh/380 BW	1	S

16 November - 31 December

Carswell/7 BW	1	N
Beale/456 BW	1	W
Homestead/19 BW	1	S
Seymour-Johnson/68 BW	1	S

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NUJ 88-58

By ing **NARA. Date 12-7-89**

Enclosure

Sec Def Cont Nr. X - 3 0 9 3

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2642

~~SECRET~~

Third Quarter (1 January - 31 March)

1 January - 14 February

<u>Base/Unit</u>	<u>Daily Sorties</u>	<u>Route</u>
Columbus/454 BW	1	N
Walker/6 BW	1	W
Ramey/72 BW	1	S
Robins/465 BW	1	S

15 February - 31 March

Carswell/7 BW	1	N
Travis/5 BW	1	W
KI Sawyer/410 BW	1	S
Guffiss/416 BW	1	S


Fourth Quarters (1 April - 30 June)

1 April - 15 May

<u>Base/Unit</u>	<u>Daily Sorties</u>	<u>Route</u>
Clinton-Sherman/70 BW	1	N
Grand Forks/319 BW	1	W
KI Sawyer/410 BW	1	S
Wright-Patterson/17 BW	1	S

16 May - 30 June

Barksdale/2 BW	1	N
Minot/450 BW	1	W
Loring/42 BW	1	S
Plattsburgh/380 BW	1	S

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NJ 88-58
 By ing NARA. Date 12-7-89

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Strategic Air Command Airborne
Alert Indoctrination Program for
Fiscal Year 1967

The Airborne Alert Indoctrination Program is authorized through Fiscal Year 1967 to include up to 28 daily overflights of Canadian territory. Arrangements to renew authorization by the Canadian Government should be undertaken through the Department of State.

LBJ:RB:mmm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 90-67
By ijg NARA. Date 5-10-90

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20 May 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Attached is a possible memorandum for the President explaining the DOD request for approval of the SAC Alert Program and forwarding an authorization for his signature. (Alternately, you could sign the authorization yourself after Presidential approval on the memo).

The DOD memo refers to charts of the alert routes which were forwarded on May 31, 1962. I have checked with Central Files and with your office but have been unable to find these charts. They were evidently sent to the Archives. I have requested another set from DOD and you may wish to hold this up until the charts are available.


R. C. BOWMAN

*Chart now
attached to
DOD memo
RCB*

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-67
By mg NARA. Date 5-10-90

~~SECRET~~

38f
~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Strategic Air Command Airborne
Alert Indoctrination Program for
Fiscal Year 1967

The Airborne Alert Indoctrination Program is authorized through Fiscal Year 1967 to include up to 28 daily overflights of Canadian territory. Arrangements to renew authorization by the Canadian Government should be undertaken through the Department of State.

LBJ:RB:mm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines (JNL 92-397)
By fn, NARA, Date 5-21-98

~~SECRET~~

Ch. 107

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, May 21, 1966, 3:00 p.m.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)-25Yrs
(C)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We could meet Feinberg's request to increase [REDACTED]
support for Israeli technical assistance programs [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
EO 12958
3.4(b)(6)-25Yrs
(C)

2. Use of excess Israeli pounds set aside for US uses. This would require a Presidential waiver (rarely used) because our PL 480 agreements under law have set these funds aside for US, not Israeli, use. Israeli-use proceeds from our PL 480 sales are fully programmed. Even using the waiver would cost dollars because we can lend all available US-held pounds for repayment in dollars. So every available Israeli pound can eventually be turned into a balance of payments asset.

3. Make a straight \$2.5 million AID loan as in indirect subsidy. AID could use part of the remainder of the Haifa loan project Feinberg spoke about, but this would further compromise Dave Bell's worldwide aid criteria.

So there is no easy way to [REDACTED] to avoid paying for this with appropriated or balance of payments dollars. Israel is not an excess-currency country in the same sense as India. In fact, we [REDACTED] to keep US uses down to keep it an excess country because of advantages that brings.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
EO 12958
3.4(b)(6)-25Yrs
(C)

Since we cannot save dollars by using pounds, the cleanest way would be to tell CIA to do it, if you feel our interests warrant the dollar expenditure.

In any case, I think I ought to tell Feinberg we will work on this

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
S
EO 12958
3.4(b)(6)-25Yrs
S
(C)

W. W. Rostow

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

S/S informed OK
May 21
4:35
BLCg

Saturday, May 21, 1966, 3:00 p.m.

329

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Presidential Message on Guyanan Independence

State transmits a request from the British Guiana Information Office asking that you provide a message for publication in a 4-page section of The New York Times on Guyana's independence day -- May 26, 1966. The special pages will include messages from Prime Minister Burnham and the Governor General, who represents the Queen.

State recommends that you send the attached message. I concur.

 W. J. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove

Attachment

LBJ

DRAFT MESSAGE

I am happy to express through this means a personal greeting on the occasion of Guyana Independence Day.

Our delegation in Georgetown will convey officially our best wishes to the new nation which today undertakes full responsibility as an independent member of the Commonwealth.

We congratulate the people and the Government of Guyana on this historic event and extend our best wishes for continued happiness and prosperity. Joining with friends in the hemisphere and around the world in the words of the new national anthem, we salute Guyana, "one land of six peoples, united and free".

Lyndon B. Johnson

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1966
Saturday, 3:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter From the Mexican Foreign Minister

The Mexican Embassy yesterday delivered to State the attached letter to you from Foreign Minister Carrillo Flores expressing gratitude for your hospitality during his recent visit to the Ranch. Its more than that, Mr. President: worth reading to the end.

Walt R.

Attachment

Mexico, D. F., May 12, 1966.

My dear Mr. President and friend:

Fanny, Lupe and I want to express to Lady Bird and to you our deep gratitude for all your kindness during our recent and delightful stay at the LBJ Ranch. Your invitation, so spontaneous, so amiable, so becoming to your character and way of being, has been understood in Mexico not only as an exceptional gesture toward a family that had the opportunity of enjoying your friendship for six years in Washington. Also as an indication of your feelings to a people who received you so warmly last month.

I have conveyed your greetings to President Diaz Ordaz who asked me to reciprocate them.

I am very happy indeed with the favorable comments of the american press about your picture. It will reveal to my countrymen, when they see it, as I hope they will do soon, how your affection for Mexico is very old, since in Cotula you taught children of our blood.

The problems your country and you as her leader confront are many, some appalling. For me it was an unforgettable experience to have shared for almost two days your family life, and to be able to appreciate that "terrible solitude of the Presidency" about which I have read so much. I reiterate my wishes that with your intelligence,

your unexhaustible


His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

- 2 -

your unexhaustible energy, your courage, your typically american honesty, you continue tackling those problems, not only for the good of your people but for humanity at large.

We must hope that the world of our grandchildren — one of whom unknowingly traveled through the green land of the LBJ Ranch — be a little less troubled than the one in which you and I have lived. This without denying that to face difficulties has a fascination when our efforts are presided by a tranquil soul. "Happiness is a deliberate business and hope but a happy form of anguish".

We all send to you, to Lady Bird and the girls our most affectionate greetings.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Antonio Carrillo Flores', with a stylized, flowing script.

P.S.

Lupe and the baby send you their love.

42
Mr. R

The President had the attached with
him over the weekend at David

but the operators have no record of
his having called the Amb.

mjdr
May 23

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, May 21, 1966 -- 2:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

It would be a nice gesture if you would telephone Amb. Fenoaltea today. He is returning to Italy tomorrow.

You might ask him to convey to Prime Minister Moro your high regards; perhaps also suggesting:

-- your confidence that this NATO crisis can be overcome, if we all stay together;

-- your understanding of special Italian concerns, as conveyed to you by Secretary Rusk and Rostow.

-- your hope that the Ambassador will bring back any thinking Moro may have about how to pursue our constructive purposes in this crisis.

Nothing you could do right this moment would do more good in our relations with Italy. It would (a) strengthen Fenoaltea's hand in the Italian government, since he is passionately pro-U. S. and pro-NATO; and (b) indicate that we are not leaving the Italians out in right field.

Walt Rostow

"I want to take this with n
when I leave today."

LBJ/yb
5/21/66
3:20p

① 43
Ygm

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, May 21, 1966 -- 2:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

As requested, here are the draft instructions for Amb. Gronouski's talks with the Chinese Communists next Wednesday. The three points which you wished to examine and clear before Gronouski's departure are marked; that is,

1. Our desire for a peaceful solution in Viet Nam; (p. 4) .
2. Our willingness to suspend air attacks on North Viet Nam if infiltration stops and is monitored by mutually accepted observers; *and terrorism* (p. 4).
3. Our active interest in engaging in disarmament discussions with the Chinese Communists. (pp. 7-8).

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

Walt Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-288
By *ig*, NARA, Date 10-5-88

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5/23/66 43a
S/S - Ben Reed
notified of
approval with
changed wording,
by Mr. Rostow.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON


May 21, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Draft Cable: Warsaw Instructions
for Ambassador Gronouski

Enclosed is a proposed telegram of instructions
for Ambassador Gronouski's talk with the Chinese
Communists on May 25.

The telegram has been approved by the Secretary
and cleared as indicated. The Secretary has asked
that the President be shown the full text for his
approval.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

• Telegram

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

TELEGRAM Department of State

COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

43c

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy WARSAW PRIORITY

Info

INFO: Amconsul HONG KONG

Amembassy TAIPEI

Amembassy SAIGON

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-290

By sig, NARA, Date 3-10-88

LIMDIS

Guidance for 130th Meeting, May 25, 1966.

1. Wang is scheduled to open. We anticipate that he will make bitter attack on U.S. for May 12 plane incident. Chicom's have charged that shooting down of Chinese plane over Yunnan was deliberate, planned war provocation. Wang's statement will probably echo May 13 Liberation Army Daily editorial which stated "while flagrantly extending the war of aggression in Vietnam, US imperialism has openly declared that China is its chief enemy and clamored that 'there exists the danger of war with China'. It was at this very moment that US air pirates intruded into China's airspace and made a surprise attack on Chinese aircraft. This was by no means an isolated or accidental case but a well planned act of the Johnson Administration--in attempt to extend further war of aggression against Vietnam to China.... Nefarious US imperialism is the biggest scoundrel of our times and an arch-enemy of the Chinese people."

2. Wang probably will also list US acts of "aggression" against mainland China including: occupation of Taiwan, "several hundred" intrusions into China's territorial airspace and waters, and strafing attacks on Chinese

Drafted by:

FE:ACA:DDean:mfn

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

Classification:

ACA - Mr. Jacobson
FE/VN - Mr. Roberts
Defense - Mr. Barber
ACDA - Mr. Beam

S/S -
FE-Mr. Bundy
IO- Mr. Sisco

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

L/FE - Mr. Aldrich
White House -

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FORM 6-63 DS-322

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

fishing boats. He may repeat Chicom allegations that U.S. intensifying war in Vietnam and bent on spreading flames of war to China. It is likely Wang will refer to recent 4 points Chou En-lai gave in interview with Dawn (China will not provoke war, China means what it says, China is prepared, a war will have no boundaries). See FBIS 90, May 10.

3. Wang may raise air attacks on Chicom Economic and Cultural Delegation quarters in Khang Kay on March 24. He may attempt justify Chicom shoot-down of US A3B near Luichow Peninsula on April 12 and claim A3B's flight as additional evidence U.S. hostile intent. Considering recent nuclear test, also possible Wang may raise Chicom's 1964 draft agreed announcement on meeting heads of states to discuss complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. (See record 123rd meeting.) Similar proposal repeated in Sino-Albanian communique of May 14.

4. FYI: Following response has been cleared with Ambassador Gronouski. Suggest Harding prepare translation based on this text. You will be informed of any changes. End FYI.

5. Mr. Ambassador, in response to your charges concerning an intrusion of your border on May 12 by U.S. aircraft and the subsequent shooting down of one of your aircraft there appears to be considerable confusion about what actually did occur. We did have aircraft in the NW sector of NVN on that date. Our pilots claim, however, that they at all times remained south of the Red River. They state they were attacked by an unidentified aircraft and returned its fire. They saw it explode but saw no parachute. We have checked carefully with our pilots and with the careful navigational equipment that was available on the American

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Classification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

aircraft involved; these accounts concur that the US aircraft were at all times over DRV territory. We repeat that American pilots have explicit instructions to avoid flying into your air space. If the evidence available to us should have been in error, we would of course have regretted this intrusion into your territory.

6. Reverting to the case of Captain Smith's flight in the Hainan area, we repeat that this was a case of mischance and navigational error.

7. As to the A3B aircraft on April 12, it too was far off course because of navigational errors when it was attacked by your pilots. Nonetheless, we understand that this plane was not over Chinese territorial waters when it was shot down. We would like to know if there were any survivors.

8. I am deeply disturbed by these incidents on both sides because misinterpretation of the motives behind these incidents by either side could lead to a further increase in tensions. I should like to repeat what I said in our last meeting.

We have no hostile intent towards your government ~~or~~ your people. President Johnson has said that we seek the end of no regime and our Secretary of State has recently said we do not intend to provoke war. We have acted with restraint and care in the past and we are doing so today. FYI: Ambassador Gronouski is fully briefed on details May 12 air incident. End FYI.

9. Mr. Ambassador, by this time it should be clear that we intend to live up to our commitments to the Government of SVN. We are prepared to continue our present action as long as it is required to convince Hanoi and the Viet Cong that their ^{take-over} efforts to ~~take over~~ SVN by force, terror and infiltration will not succeed. / At

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES
BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO THE TELEGRAPH BRANCHPage 4 of telegram to Ambassy WARSAW~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

the same time we are equally and sincerely prepared to seek a peaceful solution. We have stated time and again that our objective in ~~South~~ South Vietnam is a condition of peace in which the South Vietnamese people can be free to choose their own future without outside coercion or force. We seek neither territory nor bases, economic domination or military alliance in Vietnam. There are many roads towards a peaceful solution. We are willing at any time to engage in discussions or negotiations leading towards peace, without conditions. Alternately we are willing to undertake a reciprocal dampening down of the war. We will respond if others are prepared to reduce their use of force. Specifically, we are willing to suspend or even cease our air attacks on North Vietnam if Hanoi gives clear evidence that it is prepared to take reciprocal action, for example with respect to its infiltration of military personnel and equipment into South Vietnam and its military activity in South Vietnam. Such evidence and suspension of the bombing could be determined by mutually acceptable observers.

10. It seems clear to me that Hanoi will eventually realize that a military victory is not possible. The DRV may hope to wait until the military position is reversed, but this will not occur. As Hanoi continues to send more reinforcements south we will be compelled to reinforce the GVN. Over a period of time the VC and DRV forces will face further losses and defeats. The DRV, eventually, will realize that it could avoid all this bloodshed and destruction by evidencing willingness to engage in negotiations leading to a peaceful solution.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

11. Mr. Ambassador, I have noted that NCNA has commented on Secretary Rusk's statement of March 16 before the House Subcommittee on the Far East. NCNA said that "all talks about 'improving relations' and 'avoidance' of a state of ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ hostility are a sham. The People's Daily of April 6 said that the hints of "goodwill" dropped by the US are obviously part of its counter-revolutionary dual policy, an attempt to undermine the Chinese people's fighting determination and reduce their combat-readiness...The evidence is increasingly clear that the U.S. imperialists are preparing to impose war on the Chinese people." Similarly Observer in the March 29 People's Daily said that "these blasts of good will set off by Washington at a time when U.S. imperialism is working more energetically than ever to concentrate its aggression on China, are indeed absurd and ridiculous." ...All such expressions as a flexible policy, 'without isolation,' and 'more contact' are only pretenses for intensifying the U.S. containment of China."

12. Mr. Ambassador, I regret that your government seems to reject all our proposals for easing tensions. Judging from what your side says it appears that you choose to believe that U.S. does not seek a better mutual understanding. Despite our statements to contrary you say that U.S. only wants war with China. As I have tried to indicate, such a conclusion is not warranted by the facts.

13. There may be other reasons, both internal and external, why you wish to avoid a better relationship. Mr. Ambassador, we are willing to try to reach some mutual agreement on peaceful solutions of such critical problems as Vietnam but your side has rejected all such moves. We would like to work towards a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

reduction of tensions and a better understanding but your side rejects our efforts. We have explained our intentions towards your country but your side rejects our statements because you claim we are not sincere. You say we must prove our sincerity by actual deeds, by accepting, in fact, your own solutions. Mr. Ambassador, your side has its own convictions. So do we. In the interests of peace we are willing to search ~~XXX~~ for a just solution. Are you willing to do the same? Mr. Ambassador, I intend to continue my efforts to convince you that my government seeks a just and lasting peace. We stand ready to fulfill the commitments we have made concerning travel contacts and visits, joint investigations, and discussions concerning peaceful solutions of the problems confronting us in the Far East.

14. I would like to draw your attention to the remarks I made at our 128th meeting on December 15, 1965. At that time I said that "peace and stability in the Far East is as much in your interest as it is in ours...It would permit the withdrawal of U.S. forces. If we could be assured of peace throughout the Far East and the whole Pacific, our fleets and our bases would no longer be necessary."

15. There are a few additional matters I should like to raise. At our last meeting, I told you that I would ask for a further report on your charges that the Chinese Consulate in Phong Sally was attacked. I am informed that we have no additional information concerning this incident.

Mr. Ambassador,

16. / I have noted with considerable interest Premier Chou En-lai's statement of

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3 May 10 in which he said that China must conduct nuclear tests to develop nuclear weapons, because, although China had proposed a non-first use agreement to the United States, we had rejected the proposal. Mr. Ambassador, does this statement indicate that your government would consider an agreement to ban nuclear tests if it were linked to a non-first use agreement? This is an important point and I would like to ask you to seek clarification from your government. Perhaps you could let me know about this matter at your earliest convenience. While we believe that any disarmament agreement must be a rounded one which covers all types of forces and weapons, we are interested in any serious proposal that would contribute to disarmament. We are willing to explore disarmament issues with your government either here at Warsaw or elsewhere. In this connection, I would like to comment on Premier Chou En-lai's statements about the World Disarmament Conference in his April 10 interview with a Pakistani reporter for Dawn. He said that "a world disarmament conference in the present circumstances will yield no useful, practical results and will only provide U.S. imperialism with a smoke-screen of peace under which it will freely expand its war of aggression against Vietnam." You may recall my ~~XXX~~ earlier comments about the proposed World Disarmament Conference. Last December I told you that we had our doubts about the effectiveness of a World Disarmament Conference because we believe it to be an unwieldy body that could make little positive contribution to disarmament. Nevertheless, I indicated to you that we were prepared to discuss the prospects for such a conference with you in a small exploratory group. We hope that Premier Chou's statement does not imply that your government believes that such

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Page 8 of telegram to Ambassador WARSAW~~CONFIDENTIAL~~*Classification*

an exploratory group for a World Disarmament Congress would not be able to make progress towards meaningful disarmament.

17. FYI Request you send following letter to Ambassador Wang after 130th meeting:

QUOTE The Government of the United States has expressed its willingness to participate in an exploratory group to prepare a possible World Disarmament Conference. We note that your Government has also called for a meeting of all heads of State to discuss disarmament. The Government of the United States would like to learn the views of the Government of the People's Republic of China with regard to its possible participation in an exploratory group to examine questions relating to convening a World Disarmament Conference or disarmament talks on some other basis. UNQUOTE Ambassador Gronouski will sign letter END FYI

18. Mr. Ambassador, I have been requested by some of the families of the American prisoners in China to raise their cases with you once more. At our last meeting you informed me that it was your country's practice to grant time off for good behavior. I hope this regulation can be applied to our prisoners and I would appreciate any information you can give me concerning their cases.

19. Lately I have been receiving an increasing number of letters addressed to me from serious-minded Americans who have a great interest in establishing communication with individuals or organizations in China. They do not know the appropriate addresses or what ministry or organization they should write. Would it be possible for me to send these letters to you for the requested information?

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FORM GS-322A
CONTINUATION SHEET
10-20-50

CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES
BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO THE TELEGRAPH BRANCH

Page 9 of telegram to Amembassy WARSAW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

20. It is our turn to propose date of next meeting. Suggest August 17.

QP-3.

End

44
May 21, 1966
Saturday, 1:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

This letter to you from Andy
Borg was referred to me for draft
reply. Here it is.

W. W. R.

May 24, 1966

Dear Commander Borg:

I have received many letters since becoming President. Few have been as clear, thoughtful, and helpful as yours of May 17.

Through every line I could feel the depth of the patriotism which led you to write me.

I understand well that the conflict in South Viet Nam is confusing for many of our people. There are two reasons.

First, the external aggression does not take the form of organized divisions marching across frontiers, as was the case in Korea. It takes the form of men and equipment coming down on foot or on trucks through the jungle trails of Laos and by other routes. The aggression is just as real and just as dangerous for the freedom and independence of the people of South Viet Nam as was the attack on South Korea in June of 1950. But what our people see -- and the citizens of other countries around the world -- looks, on the surface, much more like a civil war than external aggression.

There is a second source of confusion. The people of South Viet Nam are now at a stage in their history where they are trying to form, for the first time, a constitutional and representative government. The country has deep in its history strong regional feelings as well as religious groupings which have sometimes been in conflict. As they seek to set up a constitutional system, these differences come to the fore and create turbulence.

These two sources of confusion are, of course, systematically exploited in their propaganda by the Communists.

You ask two earnest and proper questions: Who is our real enemy? Is our military establishment powerful enough to defeat all our enemies?

Our enemies in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, are those who use the method of aggression to try to expand their power and influence. If aggression can be deterred or defeated I am confident that the methods of freedom will triumph peacefully over the methods of Communism.

Right now our enemy is the aggression organized and supplied from Hanoi, backed and encouraged by others. A few years ago it was the aggressive attempt to throttle West Berlin and place missiles in Cuba.

As for our military establishment, I am sure it is powerful enough to defeat our enemies, whomever they may be. The danger now is not, strictly speaking, a military danger, so long as our military strength and the cohesion of our alliances are maintained.

I know of no time in our history when our military men have performed with greater skill and courage than our forces fighting in Viet Nam. They entered combat in a difficult climate, against a thoroughly professional enemy, in an unfamiliar kind of war. From the first days of combat they demonstrated their superiority.

Elsewhere in the world also our military forces are capable of dealing with aggression, should it be undertaken.

Our problem in Viet Nam is a problem of understanding what the aggressors are trying to do and having the stubborn persistence and patience to see it through. They know that they cannot defeat our forces in the field, fighting alongside the Vietnamese, Koreans, Australians, and New Zealanders.

Their hope is that our people will not be able to stand the strains of this difficult engagement and that at some stage we will give up and withdraw.

It will be essential, of course, that the Vietnamese keep their own differences within bounds as they take their first steps towards constitutional government.

I have noted and I shall consider further your suggestions about bringing to bear distinguished men from outside the Government to examine and make recommendations about our foreign policy. We are undertaking steps in this direction which, I trust, will commend themselves to you when they are announced.

Again let me thank you for taking the trouble to share your thoughts with me in these difficult times.

Sincerely,

LBJ

Mr. Andy Borg
Commander-in-Chief
Veterans of Foreign Wars
V. F. W. Building
Kansas City, Missouri

LBJ:WWR:mm

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rec'd
5-19-66
3 pm

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**VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS
OF THE UNITED STATES**
FOUNDED 1899

ANDY BORG
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF



NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
V. F. W. BUILDING
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

May 17, 1966

no zip code

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The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I write to you today out of a sense of obligation and a deep feeling that our nation is entering one of its most critical periods in history. You are known to be receptive to the observations and recommendations of your fellow citizens and it is out of my sincere desire to offer service that I humbly make the suggestions that follow.

In my capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, I have had the opportunity this year to travel hundreds of thousands of miles and speak with thousands of American citizens from all walks of life. It is my observation, Mr. President, that the American people are daily becoming more baffled and confused. With contradictory statements being made by individuals in authority, a paralysis of the will is spreading and I don't think it is overstating the case to say that the people are slipping into a national neurosis about our foreign policy. The two questions uppermost in their minds are: (1.) Who is the real enemy of the United States and freedom loving people everywhere? and: (2.) Is our military establishment powerful enough to defeat all of our enemies, whomsoever?

The reason that these questions are being raised, as I am certain you understand, is that a small but vocal minority of influential citizens is using its influence to sow discord and confusion. Under our system of government I recognize the right of that group to speak, although it

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is my personal belief and the belief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars that when American soldiers are being killed, it is too late for academic policy discussions.

I know that you are keenly aware, Mr. President, that the American people have offered up themselves and their sons over and over again, risking death to defeat their country's enemies. They are doing so now, but as they go into battle they are hearing men in high places reiterate that they are shooting at the wrong foe. Our own military and governmental leaders are being compared with war criminals of the past.

Considering their record of sacrifice, I believe the American people deserve to be told who the enemy is and what is required to defeat him. They have built this mighty military force and they have the right to know it if it is sufficient to preserve their nation's security, what it is to be used for and whom it is to be used against.

I suggest, Mr. President, that you impanel a blue ribbon committee of distinguished American citizens to study our foreign policy. Give them access to all documents, classified and unclassified, that they may require to make a thorough analysis. This must be a searching review that is both non-partisan and non-political and must concern the present political, economic and military posture. More specifically, some of the questions they should answer are:

1. Are we at war with North Vietnam and Red China, or are we at war with Communism? This answer must be clearly defined. If Vietnam is merely the powder keg in the overall struggle against Communism, I am certain the people of this country will understand the need to carry on. On the other hand, if our government now feels that the central struggle has now been reduced to Red China, then the American people should also be told this. There is an urgent need that the people of the United States be told exactly what our national goals are.

2. Are the economic conditions in the United States such that we can continue to sustain our fighting forces in the field and our other economic commitments around the world?

3. Having answered these questions, is our military establishment adequate to achieve our goals or are we overextended? What modifications or extensions should be made to insure that it is fully adequate?


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4. Finally, has our system of world alliances become outmoded?

It has been suggested recently that a distinguished citizens' committee be appointed to investigate our policy in Red China. In my view this would be worse than futile. Such discussions would only confound the national confusion by an artificial isolation of one part of a larger problem. How can we know what our policy should be toward China when we are not even certain of our national goals?

In closing, Mr. President, let me assure you that you have the full support of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States during these trying days. Nothing here should be construed to mean we have in any way altered our policy calling for total victory in Vietnam. We shall continue to lend our full support to those proud men wearing the uniform of our nation, but we sincerely believe that if you are to maintain the confidence of so many of our citizens here at home, the time has come for a redefinition of our national goals and policy, and of our state of readiness in meeting the challenges of present and future.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Andy Borg". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

Andy Borg
Commander-in-Chief

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-322
By CB, NARA Date 9-24-99

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, May 21, 1966
1:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara recommend you approve \$200 million in new arms sales to Iran, which Ambassador Meyer will discuss with the Shah this week. This would extend our 1964 agreement through FY 1970, raising the total arms credit to \$400 million. State proposed bunching these sales in the early years but gave in to McNamara's plan for \$50 million a year FY 67 - FY 70. They finally agreed that our Military Assistance budget is too tight to cover the 4% interest rate Meyer asked for and propose sticking to the market rate (now 5.5%), except for one last sale under the 1964 agreement.

Most of us believe the Shah is foolish to spend his money this way. AID forecasts a rapidly growing balance of payments deficit if he pushes both development and heavy arms purchases too hard. His oil revenues will not rise as sharply as he hopes, and AID fears he will end up asking us to bail him out of a foreign exchange bind just when we are phasing out of economic aid.

But since he is determined to buy arms somewhere, the best we can do is to lean on the brakes. His parliament appropriated \$200 million last fall, and only by sending a survey team have we delayed him this long.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>
25Yrs
EO 12958
3.4(b)(6)>
25Yrs
(C)

Anyway, if we cannot dissuade him, no point in losing a good sale.

While on balance this package makes sense, we want to be flexible in case Iran's economy sags. We want Meyer to keep a close eye on the economics and not tie you too firmly to a long-range commitment, thereby losing the leverage of a short leash.

So I recommend you approve but authorize me to read back to State this indication of your feelings: "The President is deeply concerned over Iran's worrisome economic prospects. He wants each slice of this new program submitted to him for approval only after searching review of Iran's economic position. He regards the new \$200 million as a planning figure subject to annual review. He asks that Ambassador Meyer tell the Shah of this concern, while reassuring him of the President's full respect for his judgment." Charlie Schultze concurs. Attached is a rather legalistic justification.

Approve ✓
See me

~~TOP SECRET~~

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45a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Approval of New Military Credit Sales Commitment
to Iran

We recommend your approval of a commitment under which the United States will provide to the Government of Iran not to exceed \$200 million of new credit for the purchase of US military equipment during FY 1967-70.

The attached "Presidential Approval of Foreign Assistance Commitment to Iran," which sets forth the required findings, determinations, and supporting rationale, is considered an integral part of this recommendation and of your decision thereon.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Robert S. McNamara

Robert S. McNamara

Approved W.S.

Disapproved _____

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-290

By ig, NARA, Date 4-13-87

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TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

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PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL OF
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE COMMITMENT
TO IRAN

Presidential Approval of a commitment that the United States will provide not to exceed \$200 million in military credit sales assistance during FY 1967-70 to the Government of Iran as part of Iran's overall military equipment modernization program.

It is determined that in support of United States security objectives and in order to strengthen Iran's defensive capabilities through the modernization of its armed forces and to assist Iran in its transition from a grant aid to a self-sufficient country, the United States will provide military credit sales assistance not to exceed \$200 million during FY 1967-70 which is to be repayable over the ten-year period FY 1967-76 with interest averaging between 5 and 6 percent on the unpaid balance. These credits are subject to the availability of funds.

Justification

National Security Council Action 1550, as approved by the President on May 8, 1956, directs that no promise or commitment involving future performance or future expenditures of United States funds for foreign assistance would be made or implied except on specific determination by the Executive Branch covering the following points. The basic determinations with respect to these points are set forth under the appropriate

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-343
By ju, NARA, Date 2-1-93

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headings in NSC 1550 Determination No. 65-1, approved July 3, 1964.

Additional data follow.

1. That the commitment is in accord with approved policy

The present program of military assistance for Iran is based on a Memorandum of Understanding of July 4, 1964, covering the FY 1965-69 period. This Memorandum commits the U.S. to extend additional grant military assistance during FY 1967-69, at a cost not to exceed \$83 million; and to assure credits during FY 1965-69 of not to exceed \$200 million repayable by FY 1974, at an average interest rate of between 4 and 5 percent per annum. Pursuant to this Memorandum, Iran undertook to make purchases of military equipment, material, and services with an estimated value of \$250 million, including cash purchases of \$50 million principally for spare parts.

The Shah of Iran has become increasingly concerned over possible threats to Iran from the South. He believes the danger of overt Soviet aggression against Iran has receded in recent years. In an atmosphere of growing prosperity and substantial economic development, he has tended to concentrate on the vulnerability of the wealth-producing oil installations of the South, particularly in view of his fear the United Kingdom will eventually reduce its defense commitments in the Persian Gulf. At the Shah's request, the United States in February 1966, sent a military survey

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team to assess the threat to Iran and to recommend the kind of military equipment needed to meet it. The team concluded that legitimate military requirements exist if Iran is to develop a credible air and naval defense posture, with particular reference to the Persian Gulf area. The team's findings, in a sanitized version, have been delivered to the Iranian defense establishment.

The Shah is clearly determined to purchase additional military equipment to meet what he considers Iran's minimum needs. Steadily increasing oil revenues will make it possible for him to do so--regardless of what the United States may do in this situation.

We have a valuable political relationship with Iran, one which has served our purposes well in the Middle East, in the United Nations, and in Vietnam. Now that Iran is less financially dependent on us and feels more self-reliant in its relations with the rest of the world, it is more difficult to maintain the present advantages of that relationship. Our strategic interests and our present and potential needs for special facilities dictate that we make every effort to preserve the special character of the relationship. Failing to provide, on good terms, a substantial part of what the Shah feels to be legitimate military needs will induce a predictable erosion of that relationship. Beyond that, the prospect for any increase in our intelligence collecting facilities would be substantially reduced.

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There are obstacles, however, to formulating a program which would be totally satisfactory to the Shah and which would also serve our purposes in creating a favorable climate for an expansion of special facilities in Iran. First, there is the genuine budgetary constraint which limits U.S. ability to respond to the Shah's requests. Second, there are serious hazards to Iran's economy in taking on the added financial burden of a substantial military build-up; if planned development projects get underway in the next few years on top of a heavy military burden, there might be a serious foreign exchange shortage.

Nevertheless, judging from past experience, Iran will not be able to mount all the development projects now in the five-year plan. If true, this will release some resources to pay for additional military purchases. Beyond this is the political fact that the Shah is determined to acquire modern military equipment, and will buy in Western Europe or elsewhere, probably on less advantageous terms, if the U.S. is unwilling to sell.

In connection with the contemplated arrangement, the Government of Iran will be asked to agree to keep the Government of the United States currently informed on its military purchases from third countries and to limit its total military purchases from abroad during the FY 1965-70 period to \$470 million (including \$200 million of credit and \$50 million for

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cash under the 1964 MU, and \$200 million of new credit plus \$20 million for cash under this new agreement). Therefore, the U.S. credit commitment will be reduced to the extent that Iran purchases from third countries. The \$200 million of new credit will be provided, subject to availability of funds, in annual increments of \$50 million in FY 1967, 68, 69 and 70. Credit on this scale and on this timetable represents the minimum required to maintain Iran's close cooperation with the U.S. and to indicate a continued appreciation of Iran's security needs.

2. That funds have been approved by the Congress or that there is an Executive determination to request additional appropriations

It is determined that:

A. Credits will be assured during U.S. FY 1967-70 from available private and government financial institutions;* or, subject to the availability of funds, from funds made available under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, in amounts which, including the credits referred to below, do not exceed a total of \$200 million and are consistent with the foreign exchange and other limitations of the Iranian economy. Negotiations with available private and government financial institutions to obtain such credits will be conducted by the Government of Iran in cooperation with the Government of the United States. These credits

* Assumes sale of notes under Department of Defense authority to sell evidences of indebtedness.

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will be repayable over the ten-year period U.S. FY 1967-1976 at interest rates averaging between 5 and 6 percent on unpaid balance.

B. Credits of up to \$50 million will be assured within ninety days of the signing of an implementing Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States and the Government of Iran.

3. That the country is likely to utilize the assistance effectively

The Department of Defense currently proposes negotiating an extension of the present FY 1965-69 five-year agreement for an additional two years--FY 1970-71--in order that the benefits which accrue from such multi-year planning may be continued. On this basis we consider that the equipment provided for under grant aid, military credit assistance sales, and cash sales will be properly utilized.

4. Probable time span over which such assistance may have to be provided

It is planned that the military equipment, material, and services procured under this credit will be delivered by the end of FY 1972.

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