

May 21, 1966  
Saturday, 1:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here is a proposed reply to  
Senator Church.

I checked it with Secretary  
Rusk, in the light of his conversation  
with Church.

He concurs.

W.W.R.

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Saturday, May 21, 1966, 8:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

(This is my summary editing as of 0630 a.m. State Situation Report. W.W.R.)

There were few encouraging developments overnight as the crisis moves towards a climax.

In Danang, heavy exchanges of fire between GVN and struggle force troops led to VNAF bombing of the latter. Apparently inaccurate fire hit the new III MAF command post under construction nearby. During the shooting, the Danang airbase and MAF CP were both subjected to mortar fire, possibly from struggle forces. About 13 US servicemen were injured. The NMCC reports that MACV has begun to evacuate its planes from the airbase.

The GVN has airlifted another airborne battalion as reinforcements.

In Hue, the struggle force appeared to be marking time.

Tri Quang continues to make his pitch for US aid.

General Thi told Corcoran he still sees no point in meeting with Ky, but kept the door open for later resumption of command of I Corps.

In Saigon, the scheduled Buddhist Institute rally is taking place amid "isolated acts of violence" on the part of both Buddhists and security forces. Though there has been no serious trouble up to now, the Embassy cautions some might still take place.

The GVN has announced the convocation next Monday of a "National Peoples-Armed Forces Congress" to provide a sounding board for the Directorates' explanations of their Danang action.

There is talk of a coup headed by Don, encouraged by the Buddhists; and talk of a pre-emptive counter-coup mounted by Ky; but nothing solid.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

86-288

By sig, NARA, Date 10-5-88~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

48  
May 21

Cy minus signature  
& letter head sent State  
S/S for urgent reaction  
to refugee suggestion

BKS

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

48a  
**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 95-345**  
**By CG, NARA Date 8-1-96**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 21, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Ambassador Goldberg has sent you a very imaginative proposal for tackling the Palestine refugee problem.

His idea is to persuade Israel to announce unilaterally that it will allow any refugees to return to Israel who want to, subject only to annual quotas and security screening. This would be a bow to the Arab claim that the refugees have a "right" to return. Israel would offer compensation to those who wanted to settle elsewhere. While this might not work, Israel would at least have made a move to break the current impasse.

Our preliminary reaction is that, even though there are some good new ideas here, the Israelis would not buy this. They feel they have to put upper limits on the number of refugees coming back into Israel for security reasons. If they were sure the Arabs would reject the idea, they might consider it to make political points. However, they feel that the present situation is tolerable and time is gradually eroding the problem.

There are clearly fresh winds blowing in the Israeli Government and greater willingness to think about a long-term Arab-Israeli accommodation. We do want to guard against pushing these new thinkers too far too fast because their hard line cohorts will be all too ready to jump them. So we would want to work out any such initiative very thoroughly before proposing it to them.

I think we ought to give State the outlines of Goldberg's plan to staff out in detail. If you approve, I will send it over without attribution.

*1/ hurry it up*  
Send it to State ✓

See me \_\_\_\_\_

*Wait* Rostow

*Also report to him report on his opinion idea*  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Mr. Rostow  
called Amb. Goldberg  
in NY Sat PM 5/21/66*

*I thank Goldberg*  
*L*



482



THE REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS

May 19, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NO DIS

Dear Mr. President:

I have been giving considerable thought to your request for suggestions on how progress might be made toward settling some of the problems in the Middle East.

There are, of course, a number of strongly opposed cross-currents in the Middle East - conflicts between Arab nationalism and some of Europe's (and our) economic interests, conflicts between traditional and radical Arab forces which continue to be acute and to distort the reactions of Arab leaders to other problems, persistent attempts by the Soviet Union to make inroads in the area, currently most pronounced in Syria, and the still poverty-stricken plight of most of the people in such a harsh environment. So I think it is only realistic to expect a further protracted period of disturbances in which we will have to continue to play a fireman's role, trying to keep any particular outbreak from getting out of hand.

But overlying all these problems in intensity continues to be the Arab-Israeli conflict. This issue bedevils our relations in the area and interacts with almost all our other relationships. A principal stumbling block to an Arab-Israel settlement has always been the Palestine refugee problem. It is a very human problem, still full of anguish, and used as a powerful weapon of political disturbance, as the recent formation of the so-called Palestine Liberation Organization demonstrates. If you could find a way to pull the political sting out of it, even without hope of solving the problem as a whole, you would have made a real contribution.

The President,  
The White House.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NY 86-290  
By sig, NARA, Date 4-13-87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

You may know that the United Nations' Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), of which we are a member, made a genuine effort to solve the problem in 1961 after President Kennedy had opened the way by personal letters to the heads of states. It appointed Joe Johnson, the President of Carnegie Endowment, as a special representative and sent him to talk to all the governments in the area. He produced the most comprehensive plan yet devised; it involved giving the refugees a choice of repatriation to Israel or compensation for lost property and a resettlement payment, accompanied by provisions to protect Israel against inundation, notably agreement that Israel had the last word on which refugees could return. Unfortunately it was turned down at the last minute first by Israel and subsequently by the Arabs, in circumstances such that the plan itself is probably not revivable although many of the specific proposals might be salvagable.

We made another quiet effort ourselves in 1963. At that time we held parallel United States talks with the Arabs and Israelis, but primarily with Israel, in an effort to ascertain if agreement was possible. The effort was subsequently abandoned on our assessment that the maximum Israeli terms would not approach the minimum terms and conditions of the Arabs and that a "total solution" to which all parties were "agreeable" could not be negotiated.

The fate of the Johnson plan had previously testified to the same conclusion and I would estimate the situation to be the same today. Perhaps there is, however, a way not involving an Arab-Israel "agreement" by which we could get some movement on this problem and make it easier to manage in the future. This would be through a unilateral move on the part of Israel, and I think this might be worth exploring.

The basic Arab position on the issue is that the refugees have the "right" to repatriation by their own choice. They support this position by referring to a General Assembly Resolution (194, paragraph 11). The basic Israeli position rejects this Resolution but asserts

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

instead that Israel is prepared to accept a small number of refugees (not precisely defined even to us), primarily relatives of Arabs remaining in Israel, and that it must have full control over who and how many may enter.

It seems to me that while these positions are not fully reconcilable now any more than they were in 1961 or 1963, an Israeli offer of repatriation starting from the point of refugee "choice" but with final Israeli power of decision, coupled with a new compensation offer for those choosing not to return, could help to break the political stalemate and help erode the problem more rapidly than otherwise would be the case.

Accordingly I would suggest that we might approach Israel with a proposal for a unilateral initiative along lines of this sort:

(1) Israel would announce its acceptance of the concept that refugee choice should be the primary factor upon which repatriation of Arab refugees to Israel should be based.

(2) It would say that accordingly it intended to offer repatriation opportunities to those who chose to come back subject to annual quotas based on absorptive capacities and subject to individual security considerations.

(3) It would announce its intention to start this process with a two-year pilot project under which a fixed number of applicants for repatriation (about 15,000) would be processed and admitted each year and that it would then extend the program with modifications based on experience.

(4) For those who chose not to be repatriated, it would offer to participate in a PCC-run compensation program for property holdings, and it would urge the PCC to look into possibilities of helping in resettlement of those who wished to settle in Arab states or elsewhere.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-4-

(5) It would welcome the cooperation of the PCC in the repatriation program, and especially in the process of preparing applications and conciliating any differences which arise between the refugees and Israel in carrying out the programs.

(6) Israel would not put any upper limits on the number of refugees it would admit.

(7) It would not make its offer contingent on Arab agreement. It would be a straight unilateral gesture which would be carried out to the degree feasible whether there was Arab governmental cooperation or not.

In response to such an initiative we would:

(1) Welcome this Israeli move and say we hope it will lead toward a solution.

(2) Say we applaud Israel's recognition of the principle of refugee choice and recognize its right to make individual decisions on security grounds and to determine a reasonable number it can absorb annually. (However, we should have in mind Israel's absorbing gradually 150,000-200,000 refugees.)

(3) Offer to contribute generously to a United Nations compensation fund and cooperate in any role the PCC might usefully play.

(4) Offer an annual resettlement quota in the United States of a reasonable number for Arab refugees who may wish to move here, and publicly urge others to make such opportunities available as well.

Such a program might well be turned down in its totality by the Arabs and we would not thereafter want to push it at a political cost. Our support for it initially would in itself cost us some political capital in the area. But the Israelis would in the process have made a bona fide offer which would generally be seen as consistent with United Nations resolutions, and which would have a good chance of easing the political

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
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-5-

situation vis-a-vis the Arabs, at least in the long run. Israel, for its part, would have to contribute to the process in principle by accepting refugee choice, agreeing to a PCC role, and by not putting a final figure on the number it would repatriate. Israel's protection would lie in our recognition of its right to make the final decision on which and how many refugees it would ultimately repatriate. The PCC role would be necessary to demonstrate that the offer is genuine enough to be put to an impartial test.

I have no particular views on the timing of such an approach, and you would want to have it staffed out in the Department. The compensation costs, even spread out over some years, could be considerable, if the program should turn out to work at full steam. If and when you are prepared to move in such a direction I will be glad to give you any assistance you may deem useful.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Arthur J. Goldberg", with a long, sweeping flourish extending from the bottom right.

Arthur J. Goldberg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday, May 20, 1966; 6:00 pm

(Sent to Pres 5/21/66)

49  
S/S informed  
as revised

May 21 BIC

Mr. President:

Attached is a pleasant birthday message to President Tito. He will be 74 next Wednesday (May 25).

FMB

Francis M. Bator

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐



MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO TITO

On behalf of the people of the United States, I extend cordial greetings and warm congratulations to you and Madame Broz on the occasion of your 74th birthday.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

50  
5/21/66 - 4:55pm  
Mr Rostow telephoned  
Sec Rusk may from  
President.  
als

56

~~TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY~~

Friday, May 20, 1966 -- 5:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Amb. Goldberg asked me to pass to you only the following information. He has also reported to Secretary Rusk.

He was approached again by Seydoux in New York. Seydoux knew that he had been scheduled to go next week to make a speech at a UNESCO meeting in Paris. Seydoux said that Alphand indicated that General de Gaulle would be glad to see him.

Seydoux added personally that he believed that it was necessary to open a line of communication with you. Amb. Goldberg had decided earlier that he would not go at this time to Paris, using the Rhodesian debate as an excuse. He is doing nothing about this second contact. But he did wish you to be informed.

We chatted briefly about the danger of a leak of any such contact for our preparations for the Brussels NATO meeting.

Walt ✓

Walt Rostow

P.S. The attached cable just came in. (USUN 4964)

all Rusk + all interested parties need but  
I prefer to do my own planning  
on conferences with De Gaulle -  
A

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-289

By up, NARA, Date 11-23-88

~~TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY~~

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

May 20, 1966

FROM USUN NEW YORK 4964

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

Ref: USUN 4760

In reviewing subject of reference telegram with the Secretary, he suggested I might in further conversations with Seydoux intimate that if de Gaulle were planning trip either to UN or to French Canada this might provide appropriate occasion to see the President who, as Moyers stated to press, would be delighted to see de Gaulle if he should come to UN.

In accordance with this suggestion of the Secretary, I informally communicated this thought without attribution other than my own to Seydoux at a social gathering.

Today Seydoux sought me out following adjournment of Security Council meeting on Rhodesia and again said he had heard from Alphand that both Alphand and he were very anxious that a direct channel of communication be opened between President and de Gaulle.

Seydoux had heard I might be in Paris to address UNESCO meeting next week and asked for confirmation. I told him I had cancelled UNESCO meeting because of other commitments here and I was not planning a Paris trip in near future. Seydoux expressed personal conviction that had I been in Paris for UNESCO, de Gaulle would undoubtedly want to see me and might have something worthwhile to say. I emphasized again I had no mandate to deal with NATO affairs and was not an authorized channel of communication.

Goldberg

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 86-290  
By inf, NARA, Date 4-13-87

~~SECRET~~

Rec'd  
5:20.66  
6:00P

28

51

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

5:50 PM  
Friday  
May 20, 1966

17

Mr. President:

Here is Clark Clifford's preliminary report to you on the disputed shootdown of a Chinese Communist plane last May 12.

Walt Rostow



~~TOP SECRET~~

51a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

May 20, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There follows a preliminary report with reference to your request of May 16, that I review and report to you on significant aspects of the engagement on May 12, of U. S. aircraft and MIGs which resulted in the Chinese Communist claim that one of its MIG 17s was shot down in South China by U. S. combat aircraft.

I have reviewed all the intelligence and operational reports which have been provided to the White House Situation Room on this matter. In addition, I have examined reports and assessments generated by various elements of the Executive Branch including the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Military Command Center of the Pentagon and the Defense Intelligence Agency. These reports are conflicting and incomplete. The information at the Washington level does not prove conclusively whether the shootdown occurred in North Vietnam or in South China. The information at hand tends to indicate, however, that in the course of the engagement some U. S. aircraft may have made a shallow penetration into CHICOM air space.

Recognizing that the information at the Washington level is incomplete, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has dispatched an investigative team to Saigon to make a thorough inquiry concerning all aspects of this matter, including debriefings of combat crews and examination of many technical details. Hopefully, on its return sometime next week the investigative team will be able to provide answers to important questions which are still unresolved, thereby clearing up the conflicts in the several reports which have been made to the White House.


I will make a further report to you following review of the data now being developed by the JCS investigative team in Saigon.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

By ing NARA. Date 7-2-90



Clark M. Clifford  
Chairman

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

52  
S/S informed  
OK May 21

May 20, 1966

Friday - 5:30 p.m.

(Sent to Pres 5/21/66)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

One member of the five-man council which serves as chief of state in the Sudan died. We would like to send the following condolence message from you:

"I have learned with deep regret of the passing away of Sayyed Abdullahi el Fadl el Mahdi. Please accept my sincere condolences at the loss of your distinguished colleague and express my sympathy to his bereaved family at this trying time."

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



*To Pres*  
*5/20/66*

Friday, May 20, 1966  
5:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

The State Department has, I believe,  
tried faithfully and well to make the three  
points you wished made in the Wilson letter.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

53a

DRAFT LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER WILSON:

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

NLJ 86-288  
By ing, NARA, Date 10-5-88

I have given further thought and study to the problems posed for us by General de Gaulle's decisions and I hope to send you my thoughts on these matters in the near future. Meanwhile, Dean Rusk and George Ball have had a good visit with George Thomson and I think we are in basic agreement as to how to proceed.

As you may have noted in my talk on the occasion of the Polish Millennium, I also share your view that we should actively explore possibilities for the East from our Atlantic base.

I know Chancellor Erhard will be visiting you next week, and your talks can be very important. Taking account of the comments in your letter of March 29, I would like to make several points that may be relevant to those talks.

The heart of the matter is this: So long as France and Germany were working closely together to build an integrated Europe there was some assurance of stability in German policy and attitudes. Now that France is no longer taking part in this joint effort--and, indeed, placing heavy pressure on German political life--there is grave danger that the Germans will

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

over time feel that they have been cast adrift. A growing sense of uncertainty and insecurity on their part could lead to a fragmentation of European and Atlantic relations which would be tragic for all of us.

On our part, we cannot risk the danger of a rudderless Germany in the heart of Europe.

On the other hand, an exclusive bilateral relation between the United States and Germany offers many disadvantages.

I believe, therefore, that it is imperative for our three countries to stay as close as possible to each other. On that basis Europe and the Atlantic world can be rallied.

Such a relationship will be healthy and lasting only if it is based on the concept of German equality with the other major European countries. We have seen before an attempt to keep Germany in second class status. It failed then and it would fail again.

In this circumstance, we should make a special effort to maintain the closest unity of action with the Germans during the coming months of tension.

I am sure, therefore, that it would not serve our common interests now to try to press the Chancellor to accept a nuclear solution that he might consider at variance with the concept of equality.

-2a-

As you know, the United States did not invent the nuclear issue. We have simply tried to respond to concerns expressed by others.

~~SECRET~~

-3-

These concerns first became evident when, in December, 1957, the NATO Heads of Government agreed that missiles of strategic range should be placed at the disposal of SACEUR.

Both your Government and mine saw serious disadvantages in national land-based deployment of these missiles. That is why the proposal for a joint sea-based force was first developed. The British Government stated in December, 1962, that they would "use their best endeavours" in closest consultation with our NATO allies to develop a multilateral sea-based force.

In December, 1964, you put forward the alternative proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force. I agreed that this should be fairly and fully discussed among the interested countries. We used our best efforts to guide German thinking along this line. A year later Chancellor Erhard gave me a memorandum reflecting German views which went a long way to meet your proposals.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-

Against this background, it seems important that we not leave the Germans under the impression that we have shifted our views just when they were moving towards us or that we do not take the Chancellor's proposal seriously.

I do not mean at all that I am wedded to any particular solution to this problem. We are doing staff work over the whole range of options. We should not foreclose any of them. I hope this will also be your view and that none of our three Governments will freeze its position until we all discuss this question more fully.

It seems to me that what is at stake in all of this is a political question of the deepest moment: Germany's relations with the West. In the context of the present crisis, the pressures on the Germans it has already generated, and the likelihood that those pressures will increase as French diplomatic maneuvers add further confusion, we must all keep together.

In the long pull, I am sure that the one best hope of stability and peace lies in the inclusion of Germany in a larger European unity, in which any latent nationalistic drives can be submerged. I am sure, also, that you and your

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-5-

country hold the key to this possibility and that you can play a role of great leadership in Europe. When all is said and done, no one has come up with a better formula than that of European unity and Atlantic partnership, and I doubt that anyone will.

Sincerely,

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1966

54  
5/21/66  
Mr Rostow  
notified S/S  
Mr Bruce

MEMORANDUM FOR

WALT ROSTOW

We are tentatively scheduling the attached Austrian delegation for 11:30<sup>AM</sup>, Wednesday June 15. I would appreciate your contacting the appropriate persons and let me know if this time and date is acceptable.



James R. Jones

Enclosure

on schedule for 12:30 6/15/66  
Baton in charge

57 (u) 54a  
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, May 19, 1966 -- 8:05 p.m.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Marvin Watson

A leading Austrian weekly wishes to sponsor a visit to Washington in June by a group of fifteen influential Austrian citizens to express gratitude to you and the American people for aid which we have given Austria since the war. If you were to receive them, the group would bring as a gift a saddle from the Spanish Riding School in Vienna.

Our Embassy in Vienna and the European Bureau in the State Department recommend that you receive the group, precisely because it is a private effort and not an Austrian Government gesture. The visit would receive wide publicity in Austria in view of the prominence of the members of the group.

It is not necessary that you accept this proposal; but I agree that there is considerable psychological value in the exercise.

Should you accept, the session might be a short, small presentation.

Or, you might wish to have a larger group and make a short statement on our European policy, including its East-West aspects.

Walt  
W. R.

1. Set up short, small presentation \_\_\_\_\_
2. Set up presentation, with Congressional and other guests, and possible Presidential policy statement \_\_\_\_\_ ✓
3. Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_
4. Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

11:30  
Wed.  
June 15

55  
Mr. President:

The State Department draft of a proposed talk to African Ambassadors is too long; too intricate, etc. I spoke to Rostow about this and he said what he wanted was to get your agreement in principle and he would then rewrite it.

Kintner

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

MEMORANDUM

By

NJ

86-287

NARA, Date

1-10-89

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

55a  
Mr. President - State Dept  
C. ft of address seems  
long to me and needs editing  
by Meyer. K-5/20  
Friday., May 20, 1966

3:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a draft of remarks which State suggests you make at your Thursday, May 26, reception for the Ambassadors of the 36-member Organization of African Unity (OAU). (May 25 is the OAU's third anniversary.) We have revised the remarks for style and agree with the substance.

Your remarks at the reception would (a) get across to Africans, who tend to feel ignored, your personal interest in their welfare, (b) kick off a new US policy initiative in accord with your instruction to us.

The proposed approach is as follows:

Part I states those principles of the OAU Charter which we share in common with the Africans;

Part II cites the developmental progress in Africa to which the US has made a substantial contribution;

Part III holds out the promise of expanded U.S. assistance in the areas of regional economic development, education, health, and satellite communications;

Part IV announces that the US has begun studies of a new multi-national approach to aid for Africa and will shortly be consulting with African and other governments, as well as with international agencies.

I have the agreement of the Bureau of the Budget to this initiative.

If you approve, USIA will make a color film of the entire reception (most of the African Ambassadors will be in colorful national dress) for African consumption.

( Approve ☒ Disapprove ☐ See me ☐ )

Following your launching of this revitalized US initiative in Africa, State will be systematically enlisting the ideas and support of the various African governments as well as the governments of the UK; France, Belgium, Italy, West Germany, Canada, The Netherlands, Japan and Israel, among others, in this new multi-national cooperative aid effort. In addition, similar contacts will be made with the World Bank, African Development Bank, the UN's Economic Commission for Africa, the Economic Community of Eastern Africa and other African regional groupings.

We established that serious staff work on this project could only be effectively done -- here in the government, with consultants, and abroad -- after a kick-off of this kind. It gives you a powerful political initiative, with time in hand to figure out what it will cost and who will pay.

Remarks approved ☒ Remarks disapproved ☐


See me ☐

Walt  
W.W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

SECRET



(May 20, 1966)

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT TO OAU AMBASSADORS

I

My abiding interest in peaceful and cooperative relations among the nations of the world has led me to ask you to join me in commemorating the founding of the Organization of African Unity. Its Charter was signed just three years ago by the heads of the governments which you Ambassadors represent. It is a document worthy of the historic occasion it marked.

The Charter declares that, "It is the inalienable right of all people to control their destiny" that, "freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives... of the African peoples," and it pledges "to harness the natural and human resources of /your/ peoples..."

These are aspirations all men of good will can understand and support.

These principles are embedded in the hearts of Americans as they are in the hearts of Africans.

We know what these words mean. To us -- and to you -- they are not abstractions. They are a living part of our experience as men and nations.

Freedom means self-determination; independence; strong democratic institutions; and government by the consent of the governed.

Whether nations are five years old or 190 years old the task of building and improving democratic institutions never ends: the task of combining freedom with responsibility, liberty with order -- and applying these principles, day after day, to new problems.

From the deep wells of our own experience, we Americans know that human rights are indivisible. Equality and dignity are the birthright



of every one of our citizens.

Like the United States, certain important regions of Africa stand before the challenge of building multi-racial societies loyal to these universal principles.

A nation's foreign policy is rooted in its life at home. Therefore, these same principles guide our policies overseas. The beliefs which underlie our goal of a Great Society in the United States determine our stand on issues of world importance.

We cannot permit the restriction of human rights at home. Therefore, we cannot approve policies abroad which are based on the rule of small minorities or on the notion that men are unequal before the law.

## II.

We are equally committed to the proposition that freedom requires ever-widening economic and social opportunity for the individual human being. We have acted on this proposition at home and in every continent.

Our aid and food programs, our private endeavors, and our thirty-seven hundred Peace Corps volunteers testify that we have applied this principle in our relations with the nations and peoples of Africa.

I know the formidable tasks Africa faces in fulfilling its aspirations -- in absorbing rapidly what modern science and technology provides to enrich human life. Much has been accomplished in the years since independence came to many members of your organization. The progress

you are making is proof of what can be done when freedom and determination are joined with self-help and outside assistance.

I have been particularly heartened by one aspect of the African scene: the momentum of regional cooperation.

- The OAU itself, with several important successes in settling disputes within the region;
- The vitality of the Economic Commission for Africa and its practical, serious approach to development problems;
- The establishment of the African Development Bank;
- The emergence of sub-regional associations such as the Economic Community of Eastern Africa.

It is a major lesson of our common experience in this generation that most nation-states are too small, acting alone, to assure the welfare of their people. In Europe, Latin America, and Asia strong movements of regional association are under way. I am proud that the United States has actively supported them all.

We look to a world community of strong partners; and strength requires intense regional cooperation if the possibilities of modern technology and communications are to be effectively exploited on behalf of the people.

### III.

I should like to make clear to you today that we are anxious to do what we can -- and what the African governments would wish us to do --

to enlarge our support for African economic development in general and African regionalism in particular.

We are prepared, along with others, to play a larger part in the adventure of African modernization.

Growth in Africa must, of course, follow the inspiration of African peoples and must stem from the leadership of African governments. Assistance from outside of Africa, however, can provide a critical margin of resources to accelerate Africa's efforts to achieve its goals.

Such assistance, fortunately, is already under way. In the last five years, aid from all external sources has amounted to almost \$8 billion, of which the United States bilaterally has extended approximately \$2 billion.

But none of us can be content when we measure what is being done against what could be done.

It is, therefore, my strong desire that the United States play an increasingly effective role in responding to Africa's needs and potentialities. For example: --

African nations have indicated their wish to strengthen their regional economic activities. The United States has been helping in this effort. We have collaborated with the OAU in regional programs to eliminate rinderpest; we have helped equip an East African organization to cope with outbreaks of the dreaded desert locust; we have financed buildings and equipment and given technical assistance to the regional University of

East Africa; we have helped with regional industrial studies in central and west Africa sponsored by the Economic Commission for Africa.

But we want to do much more. Therefore, the United States has offered the African Development Bank technical assistance for its organization and staffing, funds to finance surveys of project possibilities, and loan funds for capital projects. In addition, we are ready to assist the regional economic communities in East Africa and other parts of the continent through technical assistance and through financing of capital projects which will help to integrate the various economic regions.

The African nations have emphasized the need to increase their trained manpower. To help meet this need, the United States has been devoting a large part of its aid funds for Africa to strengthening education. This year, for example, we are assisting in the development and staffing of 24 African colleges and universities; we are financing graduate and undergraduate training for over 2,000 African students in the United States in cooperation with American universities; we are assisting some 40 secondary and vocational training institutions in Africa; and we are assisting 21 teacher training institutions while also providing more than 3,500 teachers, mostly through the Peace Corps.

We hope to expand this effort in the field of education in a number of ways. Two which may be of particular interest are: helping to develop certain of the African universities to become regional centers of training

and professional excellence in particular fields, and supporting an African Student Program to provide an opportunity, through scholarships or in other forms, for deserving students to attend African universities. These efforts would be directed at overcoming the disillusionment and frustration of the many qualified students in Africa who are presently unable to achieve a higher education.

African nations seek to curb the inroads of disease. To help in disease eradication, the United States has taken an active part in advancing the practice of preventive medicine within certain African nations and in training the middle-level medical personnel so urgently needed to staff the growing African public health services.

New developments in medical technology, particularly in vaccines and in immunization methods, open the way to a more rapid and massive assault on some of the major endemic diseases of Africa. To help Africa reap the benefits of these advances, I announced last November a concerted program of measles control and smallpox eradication to be undertaken in 19 West African countries with over 100 million people. We will press forward with this program to bring measles and smallpox under control in that whole area within five to six years, and we are ready when circumstances permit to explore other health campaigns and programs in Africa.

African nations want to develop effective telecommunications systems. Already the United States has financed nine capital projects for construction of telecommunications links and facilities, and has provided technical assistance

to communication services in a number of countries. We are now undertaking surveys looking to the widening of Africa's telecommunications network.

A striking opportunity for further advance in this field is afforded by the communication satellites located in outer space. For Africa to make effective use of this opportunity, ground stations must be established at selected locations bridging the continent. These ground stations will provide the essential links between the satellite and the conventional telecommunications networks in the countries served. The United States is prepared to assist in the establishment of such stations in Africa. In addition we are ready to examine the need for additional ground links to enable Africa to secure the greatest benefit from satellite communications.

The immediate actions I have just mentioned, merely illustrate some of the opportunities we see for cooperative effort to help modern Africa to emerge. Other possibilities also deserve urgent attention.

For example, Africa's agricultural production does not fully meet the nutritional needs of its fast growing population. Africa's farmers and businessmen could benefit more widely from weather information obtained from meteorological satellites.

Africa's hydroelectric potential remains limited for lack of dams and regional power grids.

Africa's great distances require more modern road, rail and air links. Potentially, the great lakes and rivers of Africa provide an enormous internal transport network.



African territories which are only now developing self-government or independence may need special help in training their people and in strengthening their institutions.

IV.

In order that these and other ways to respond to African needs may be further explored, I have instructed the American government to review our own development policies and programs in Africa. We will wish, as soon as we can, to discuss new cooperative approaches and ideas with African and other governments, as well as with international bodies. Africa's needs are great and its problems are diverse. No single source of assistance is sufficient to fulfill the continent's many-sided development requirements.

For my part, I can assure you that the United States is prepared to respond in any way that will be genuinely helpful: from the private American citizen to a combination of many nations, from a bilateral effort with a single African country to schemes of regional dimensions.

But most of all, we wish to respond in ways that will be guided by the vision of Africa itself, so that the principles we share -- the principles which underlie the OAU Charter -- come to life in conformity with the culture and aspirations of the African peoples.

###

Friday, May 20, 1966 -- 10:45 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Alexis Johnson called to tell me that Averell Harriman cannot go to Tunisia on June 1 to celebrate the tenth anniversary of their independence. He asked if we had a candidate, preferably someone high in the Government; for example, Secretary Udall or Secretary Connor.

Tunisia, as you know, is probably the most explicitly pro-Western country in Africa and pro-U. S. It would be appropriate for us to send someone of stature and distinction. Here are some possibilities:

Amb. Goldberg \_\_\_\_\_

Mr. Justice Warren \_\_\_\_\_

Mr. Justice Fortas \_\_\_\_\_

David Bell \_\_\_\_\_

McGeorge Bundy \_\_\_\_\_

A distinguished Senator \_\_\_\_\_

W. W. Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1966  
Friday, 8:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Wilson is beginning "to allow himself to hope that he may be able to bring off the Rhodesian negotiation."

A reference to this message might be included in your message before the Erhard visit.

*W. R.*

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 20, 1966

1

To The President from Prime Minister Wilson

I should like you to know that we shall be making an announcement at 5:00 P.M. London time today (1:00 P.M. Washington) that the talks between the British and Rhodesian officials will be adjourned to enable both sides to report back to their principals. We shall also announce that the talks will resume shortly but shall not at this stage announce the date or place of resumption. For your own private information the date is likely to be about Whitsun (May 29) and the place Salisbury. If possible at Government House, if not at some neutral place like the University.

The officials have had some nine meetings all told and the general impression we have received is that although the Rhodesians have certainly not come to Canossa and have not abandoned rebellion as a fall back position, they are genuinely looking for a way out and would now like to negotiate the independence they so foolishly seized last November. They have told us that they accept that independence, if granted, must come within the ambit of our six principles. Indeed, they have shown particular interest in our sixth principle, which envisages protection for the European minority after majority rule. This suggests that Smith, at any rate, has accepted the inevitability of African assumption of power and is now looking for adequate safeguards to guarantee the security of Europeans when that day arrives. Another promising line of thought to emerge was the idea that the Westminster type of constitution. With its all or nothing characteristics may not really be the answer to Rhodesia's practical problems. There might be scope for useful discussion on these lines, for one of the advantages of an alternative system would be to give the Africans some power now, immediately, and to enable the Europeans to retain some power after majority rule.

There are still a lot of hurdles ahead, in particular the question of the return to the rule of law. But I am not unhopeful. We have not abandoned our stand of principle of last November. But our ideas, which then fell on deaf ears, are now finding better receptivity. Sanctions are clearly working, inexorably, if slowly, and Smith will be negotiating against a deteriorating economy.

But our basic aim is reconciliation, not punishment. To secure a just and decent future for all races in Rhodesia must be a major British interest and, I would have thought, a major free world interest too. I am beginning to allow myself to hope that we may be able to bring it off.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

Authority NLS 98-170

By isa, NARA, Date 4-28-99

~~SECRET~~

May 20, 1966  
Friday, 8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

You have another pen pal; and a rather gracious one. There are three operational warnings in this:

1. The fuss being made by academics (apart from politics) about the Indo-U.S. Foundation;
2. Her concern about the slide of Pakistani policy from the Tashkent declaration (we believe the Paks are fermenting trouble among certain Indian tribes near Assam);
3. The effect of the latest Chinese Communist explosion in expanding the pressure on the Indian Government to produce a nuclear device.

In due time and after reflection and discussion, you may wish to reply in a similar warm, personal, but serious, vein.

W. W. R.

cc: Meyer  
Kintner





DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By NS, NARA, Date 5-21-98

58a  
प्रधान मंत्री भवन

PRIME MINISTER'S HOUSE  
NEW DELHI

May 12, 1966.

Dear Mr. President,

More than a month has gone by since I had the pleasure of visiting your great country and enjoying the warm hospitality with which you received me. I am writing to you today not because I have any specific problem to put to you but because I feel that an occasional letter at a personal level might be a useful way of sharing thoughts about matters of common concern.

One of the things which had impressed me most was your complete understanding of what I would call the political side of aid as distinct from its economic aspects. The reluctance with which aid-giving countries view the prospect of finding large sums of money to help developing countries on the road to progress is understood by everyone. What is not so easily or widely appreciated is the reluctance and sometimes even resentment with which aid is accepted by the recipient. Ever since my return, I have been asked searching questions in Parliament and by the Press to discover whether I have been pressurised by you or the World Bank to do things against our better judgement. I do not mind this. Indeed, I welcome it because in part the questioning reflects the spirit of self-respect and dignity which survives in our people inspite of the many problems of poverty. This is a source of strength to me.

However in part these questions are prompted by political factors of a different nature. With elections not many months ahead, every political party is anxious to take up positions which are critical of the party in power, and even within my party, there is the usual struggle for nomination which is a phenomenon which you understand far more than I do. My critics have specially chosen the Indo-U.S. Foundation as the spring-board for a personal attack on me, even though the basic idea had been agreed long before I came to office. Such criticism, inspired on personal or party motivation, does not worry me. What has distressed me a little is that

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-320

By NS, NARA Date 3-25-99





many people in academic life with no political motives have also expressed some apprehensions. I am hoping to meet them personally with my Education Minister in the next few days. I should like to give the fullest consideration to their viewpoint and to allay their anxieties as far as possible. It is only after this meeting has taken place that detailed discussions on the draft will start with your Embassy here. I hope that in these talks, there will be fullest understanding of our problems.

You will doubtless want to hear a little about the food situation in India in which you have taken a personal interest. The reporting in the press, both in India and abroad, tends to be exaggerated one way or the other. On the one hand, an impression is given in some sections of the foreign press that there is no great shortage and we are giving an exaggerated picture. On the other hand, constant allegations are made in Parliament and elsewhere of starvation deaths. The actual position is somewhere in between the two extreme views. There is an acute shortage of foodgrains, because of the complete failure of the monsoon last year. There are also certain areas, mostly in the States of Maharashtra, Gujarat, Mysore and Orissa, which have always been scarcity pockets. Their plight this year is undoubtedly precarious. The timely movement of imports under PL-480 as well as from other sources has averted a calamity. We have begun relief works to give employment to the people in the scarcity areas. I recently returned from a tour of a district in the State of Maharashtra where conditions were distressing. I was heartened to see the energetic measures, both short-term and long-term, taken by the State Government and local farmers. Tomorrow, I am visiting some areas in the State of Orissa to see for myself what more can be done to provide relief. One of the most difficult things to combat is the shortage of drinking water in areas which have poor communications. In our Fourth Five-Year Plan we have to pay special attention to the problem of water supply in the remote rural areas.

The reports which we have from Pakistan are far from encouraging. The entire trend of publicity through the press and radio, the part which Pakistan



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is playing in fermenting trouble in the hill tracts on our Eastern borders, the kind of rapport that it has established with China - all these indicate a complete negation of the spirit underlying the Tashkent Declaration. But perhaps you know much more about the true state of affairs in Pakistan than we do, since our diplomats have limited opportunity to acquire information about what goes on in Pakistan for obvious reasons.

The latest explosion in China of a nuclear device is a matter of deep concern for us. There has been a growing demand in this country for developing a nuclear device of our own. We have stood firmly against this. But each fresh report of China's activity in this regard strengthens this demand and attracts new adherents to it.

Mr. Asoka Mehta, our Minister for Planning, returned from the United States on Sunday, the 8th morning, and the same evening, he gave me an account of the talks he had with the World Bank and Members of your Administration, as well as of the two meetings he had with you. He told me of your kind words about me and also of the deep human sympathy with which you viewed the problems of this sub-continent and the efforts we are making to lift nearly 500 million people out of poverty, ignorance and disease. I came away from the United States convinced of your friendly support and cooperation in our endeavour. I am glad you could find time to see Mr. Mehta and that you gave him an indication of your support for our Plan.

I have little doubt that Mr. Mehta is also going to be criticized and attacked for what he has done or what he is supposed to have done. Controversy is the spice of democratic life. I hope that American journalists who may not be used to our hot food and hot climate will not use too many hot words in their despatches to the U.S. Press!

What a thoughtful gesture it was to send me the pen with which you signed one of the many



प्रधान मंत्री भवन  
PRIME MINISTER'S HOUSE  
NEW DELHI

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documents which reflect your friendship for my country.

With kind personal regards to you and Mrs. Johnson,

Yours sincerely,

*Indira Gandhi*

(Indira Gandhi)

His Excellency  
Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson,  
President of the United States of America,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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
May 20, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

I have learned with deep gratification that the Congress of the Philippines has enacted the important measure, which you sponsored, to give additional help to Free Viet Nam. In these difficult times, it is a source of the greatest satisfaction to the American people, and to me personally, to know that Filipinos and Americans will again stand shoulder to shoulder -- together with their Vietnamese comrades-in-arms -- in defending freedom and in building a better world.

I want the people of the Philippines, and you, Mr. President, their eminent leader, to know that we in the United States regard the action of the Philippine Congress as one of high statesmanship. It is a courageous response to a neighbor's call for help; and it demonstrates anew the high principles and the willing acceptance of responsibility in resisting aggression, for which the Philippines is justly renowned.

Sincerely,



His Excellency  
Ferdinand E. Marcos  
President of the Republic  
of the Philippines  
Manila

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 86-288  
By mg, NARA, Date 10-5-88

"See if Rostow will show this to Gene Locke."

LBJ/vm  
10:45 am  
5/20/66

*was shown to Amt Locke  
5/19/66*

60a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Thurs., May 19, 1966

MR. PRESIDENT:

At your request, here is my suggested  
reply to Chet Bowles, of which State  
approves.

As you will see, it is an effort to use the  
occasion of this letter to make him face  
up to his responsibility to keep before  
the Indians two key questions:

- military expenditures;
- normalizing relations with Pakistan.

He has a bad case of localitis which, in  
fact, serves neither India's interests  
nor ours.

*W. A. Rostow*  
W. A. Rostow



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 20, 1966

60-b

Dear Chet:

I am grateful for your firsthand report of May 5th on the situation in India. I am pleased that Mrs. Gandhi seems to have enjoyed her visit here and sensed our authentic interest and understanding of her problems.

It is good that she has shown the courage to carry forward her economic program in the face of pressures from the Left and Right.

We shall be doing all we can to back the IBRD plan, within the limits of the resources Congress finally grants. As you know, we shall not have an easy time with AID legislation this year.

I am impressed with what Mehta said -- and with what you say -- about the potentialities for an economic upsurge in India in the years ahead.

I would underline for you two problems with which your letter did not deal.

First, the question of military expenditures. George Woods will undertake to assess the military expenditures of India and Pakistan and try to get them moving downward. Neither country can afford to go on spending so much either of its own resources or its foreign exchange for defense. In both countries the issue is politically sensitive; and we cannot expect radical reductions immediately. But if we are to generate the resources they need to accelerate economic and social development, we cannot be complacent about this issue.

Whether Indian and Pakistani political leaders can afford to reduce military expenditures depends, in turn, on progress in the normalisation of their relations. In this connection, I pointed out to Mehta the responsibility borne by the larger country in this kind of tense bilateral problem. I told him how hard we have had to work to make it possible for Mexico

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 86-287

By ing, NARA, Date 1-10-89

to live with us in an atmosphere of inner confidence and self-respect. India has a parallel responsibility.

I do not believe that India can become "an indigenous Asian counterweight to China" unless India regards it as part of its own responsibility to work actively towards the normalization of its relations with Pakistan.

Far too much of India's diplomatic energies and military resources will be focussed on the Pak problem for it to emerge as a major constructive force unless the subcontinent as a whole is peaceful.

I understand that this transformation cannot be brought about in days or months. I also understand Mrs. Gandhi's election problems. Nevertheless, India cannot safely be passive with respect to its commitments at Tashkent.

Only those on the spot can work out what the next steps might be; but you should understand that nothing would ease our problems more in getting the resources necessary for Indian development than a forthcoming Indian position with respect to normalization of relations with Pakistan.

Among the next steps, I would urge you to take up with the Indian Government the possibility of their assuming the initiative in mounting a second Ministerial meeting.

Our next Ambassador to Pakistan, the distinguished lawyer and businessman Eugene Locke, will be working under similar instructions in Rawalpindi.

Again, Chet, let me thank you for your report and for the great work you are doing in a critical region.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Chester Bowles  
American Ambassador  
New Delhi

LBJ:WWR:mz

J. Pres

Thursday, May 19, 1966 - 8:05pm

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Marvin Watson

A leading Austrian weekly wishes to sponsor a visit to Washington in June by a group of fifteen influential Austrian citizens to express gratitude to you and the American people for aid which we have given Austria since the war. If you were to receive them, the group would bring as a gift a saddle from the Spanish Riding School in Vienna.

Our Embassy in Vienna and the European Bureau in the State Department recommend that you receive the group, precisely because it is a private effort and not an Austrian Government gesture. The visit would receive wide publicity in Austria in view of the prominence of the members of the group.

It is not necessary that you accept this proposal; but I agree that there is considerable psychological value in the exercise.

Should you accept, the session might be a short, small presentation.

Or, you might wish to have a larger group and make a short statement on our European policy, including its East-West aspects.

W. W. R.

1. Set up short, small presentation \_\_\_\_\_
2. Set up presentation, with Congressional and other guests, and possible Presidential policy statement \_\_\_\_\_
3. Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_
4. Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

to P 62

Thurs., May 19, 1966  
4:30 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

George Ball has sent over this draft reply to Wilson's letter to you of March 29.

I told him:

-- you would probably wish to consider it before responding;

-- I hoped he would not introduce the matter until we had run through the negotiating agenda, to which he agreed.

I believe a letter to Wilson from you before Erhard arrives would be appropriate.

We will have some modifications in this draft for you to consider tonight.

W. W. Rostow



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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 86-277  
By inf, NARA, Date 2-25-88

~~SECRET~~

May 19, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Answer to Wilson Letter

There are some grounds for uneasiness about the Wilson-Erhard meeting, which begins Monday.

a. The Germans are feeling exposed, and will be especially sensitive to new shocks.

b. In his March 29 letter, Wilson outlined certain moves which could seriously intensify German concerns such as: reducing forces in Europe; and pressing Erhard to accept a nuclear solution more to British than German taste.

Wilson might conceivably interpret US silence, in the face of these proposals, as a green light to urge them on Erhard. It is important, therefore, that he understand our view that:

a. This is not the time for further major cuts in European defenses, given German sensitivities on this point.

b. This is the wrong time to try to crowd the Germans on the nuclear issue, especially for a discriminatory solution. This should be discussed, at some future time, trilaterally between the US, UK, and FRG. In the meantime, we hope that all sides will avoid freezing their positions.

Attached is a short letter making these points, which I recommend now be sent to Wilson.

George W. Ball

Attachment:

Draft Letter to Wilson

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~~SECRET~~

DRAFT LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER WILSON

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have given further thought and study to the problems posed for us by General de Gaulle's activities, and I hope to send you my thoughts on these matters in the near future. Meanwhile, Dean Rusk and George Ball have had a good visit with George Thomson, and I think we are in basic agreement as to how to proceed.

I know Chancellor Erhard will be visiting you next week and your talks can be very important. Taking account of the comments in your letter of March 29, I would like to make several points that may be relevant to those talks.

I feel as you do that our Alliance must make it a major aim to create conditions in which the division of Germany and Europe can be healed. As I see it, progress toward such genuine detente depends on a continued German commitment to pursue its national aims within the broad framework of European unity and Atlantic partnership.

This suggests to me that we should have in mind two key guidelines in handling the current crisis:

First, we should be careful to take no steps that would impair the German sense of security by weakening our allied defenses in Europe. In spite of the competing requirements of Viet-Nam, we are doing our best to continue this policy.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 86-288  
By ijg, NARA, Date 10-5-88

Second, if there is ever to be permanent stability in the heart of Europe, the Federal Republic must not be left with any sense of discrimination or second-class status. Thus, I do not believe it would serve our common interests now to press the Chancellor to accept a nuclear solution that he might consider at variance with the concept of equality. We have been giving further thought to this question and taking a hard look at how it can best be handled. Until the issue can be fully discussed between your Government and mine and the Federal Republic, I earnestly hope that all sides will avoid freezing positions.

There will, I am sure, be a chance before long for our three Governments to discuss more fully these and the other issues raised in your letter.

I shall be very much interested in knowing your further reflections after you have had your visit with Chancellor Erhard.

Sincerely,



620c

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 98-17D**  
**By us, NARA Date 4-28-99**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 29, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON

I promised to send you some further thoughts on the problems which General de Gaulle's latest moves present for us all.

I see that you have been giving a great deal of personal consideration to these problems with your top advisers and I very much hope that they will continue to take Patrick Dean fully into their confidence. But none of this is a substitute for the sort of plain speaking between you and me which friendship and common interest permits. I know you will reciprocate.

I start from the proposition that NATO is vital to the safety of Britain and that it must therefore continue. I believe this to be so for a number of reasons:

First, because it commits the United States to the defence of Europe;

Secondly, because it provides a tolerable context in which not only Britain, but most of Europe as well, have been able to accept Western German rearmament;

And thirdly, because it is only an integrated and interdependent alliance which can provide a credible deterrent against attack from the East and an effective resistance if attack should come.

I also start from the proposition that the General's 19th century nationalism, his anti-American motivation and above all his bull in a china shop tactics are certainly dangerous to the alliance and possibly malevolently so. But I think it would be wrong to conclude from all this that all the General's thoughts are wrong-headed, his assessments of the way the world is moving completely wide of the mark and that everything he is trying to do is totally unacceptable to us all.

To begin with, the General seems to be acting on the basis that he regards Europe twenty years after the end of the war as being tolerably safe from military attack from the Soviet Union. This is partly because NATO exists to repel such an attack and he can operate with relative impunity under the American nuclear umbrella which is presumably why he denounces the organisation rather than the alliance as such. It is also because in his

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view the Soviet Union has changed and is still changing in character and because therefore the very nature of the threat from Russia has altered and the intensity of the military threat diminished. For example, he would say that the main centre of conflict has shifted to Asia, although he is unwilling to draw the natural conclusion that NATO cannot confine its attention to the Atlantic area alone and he remains determined not to become embroiled in the containment of communism in Southeast Asia. The General goes on from his premises to argue that since the dangers have lessened we should go over to what one might call peaceful attack and seek to promote a detente with the Soviet Union at the expense of the United States presence in Europe. Although we cannot be sure that the threat would remain dormant if NATO no longer existed to contain it, there is some attraction in both these propositions. We have armed, not merely to be able to resist attack if it should come, but so that we can parley with confidence. Where I disagree with him, and this is fundamental, is in his apparent belief that you can talk with the Russians from a position of weakness and disarray.

I regard the General's action therefore both as a threat and as an opportunity. Of course we must maintain the cohesion of the alliance, but we must guard against over compensating for the French defection to an extent which would make any further progress with the Soviet Union more difficult of accomplishment or in a way which puts France beyond the pale. I see no reason why the fact that we have, and are likely to continue to have, difficulty with the Communists in the third world should prevent us from recognising that things are reasonably stable in Europe and the Atlantic area at present and that we may be able to profit from this to do some of the things that we all want to do: For example, to slim the vast military headquarters apparatus in Europe and possibly to streamline the actual level of our forces deployed on the continent, and above all to reach fairer arrangements about the problem of foreign exchange costs which plagues us both: to turn our allies' attention to some of the problems which you and I face in the Indo-Pacific area, as Bob McNamara tried to do last December: and from this base of a reconstituted alliance to see whether we can carry the present state of detente further, perhaps by pressing the Russians to accept something like an up to date version of the 1959 Western Peace Plan or in other ways. It remains to be seen whether the Russians would be ready to respond. Indeed, their present mood may be that de Gaulle's action has given them something of a breakthrough and his visit to Moscow may give them further encouragement. But all this is something which I believe we should consider carefully together, to see whether despite the French attitude progress can be made.

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I recognise, as you do, that the position of Federal Germany is crucial in all this. My view is that, while it remains as essential as ever to keep Germany integrated in the Western Community in the framework of the 1954 Agreements, the opportunity which now exists for all of us to re-examine the structure and purposes of NATO also provides an opportunity for Germany to re-assess her legitimate national objectives. All of us, as loyal allies, recognise the Federal Republic as the sole authority to speak for Germany as a whole: we refuse to recognise the Soviet Zone as an independent state and we support Germany's claim for reunification in peace and freedom. This is indeed an essential element in any lasting settlement with Russia. But the Germans themselves will be the first to recognise that they should shape their present policies always with a view to the ultimate achievement of reunification. This is why it seems to me that we should work now for a solution of the NATO nuclear problem which will meet the German need for a share in the consultative and decision-making process without prejudicing her other ambitions. As I see it, this rules out what is normally called a hardware solution. It would seem to point to something like the establishment of a permanent body of restricted membership within NATO, with consultative functions over the whole Western strategic deterrent and some executive functions over the American and British strategic nuclear forces assigned to NATO. This would in fact contain many of the elements of our ANF proposals, including the assignment to NATO for as long as NATO lasts of our strategic forces and an equivalent number of yours, together with the association of non-nuclear powers in the deployment, targeting and management of these forces, subject always of course to your and our veto, and in consultation on the world-wide policy for the deterrent. Whether we can persuade the Germans of this is, of course, another matter. I shall certainly have a go at Erhard over it when he comes here at the end of May and cultivate the idea that it is only by working for a gradual process of detente with the East that we shall come to reunification in the end. I am encouraged to some extent by the latest German peace initiative in the context of the 23rd Party Congress: I thought when I saw it that here was a helpful statement by Germany of Germany's problems.

These are the considerations which have led me to the broad conclusions which I have already conveyed to you, namely:

1. The General's action both poses a threat and offers an opportunity.
2. The continuation of the alliance is vital but the present provides an excellent opportunity for a radical examination of its structure, force levels and financial arrangements.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

3. Germany should be encouraged to look for the ultimate satisfaction of her own interests in peaceful reunification and to adapt her short-term policies in NATO accordingly.
4. In bringing the structure and institutions of our alliance up to date, we should always keep our eyes on the importance of an eventual detente with the East.

This, as I said at the start, is only my background thinking. In working out our specific policies, I am sure that we must work, as I said on my return from Moscow, from a position four square within the Western alliance, and especially on the basis of full agreement between the two of us and also with Germany.


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



*To Pres***CONFIDENTIAL****Thursday, May 19, 1966 -- 10:45 a.m.****MR. PRESIDENT:**

Tom Mann says this cable clears the Mexican skirts on sulphur.

Unless there are other questions in your mind, a signal to Secretary Freeman to talk soon on cotton is in order.

**W. W. Rostow****Attachment****Mexico 2439, May 18, 1966****CONFIDENTIAL**

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*87  
Action~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

002

SS

Rostow

Info

RR 0000  
DE RUESMO 457 138 2210  
ZNY CCCCC  
R 182201Z

FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2439  
STATE GRNC  
BT

1966 MAY 18 PM 6 41  
16603~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 18

E X D I S

1. I CALLED ON CORONA DEL ROSAL LAST EVENING AT HIS REQUEST TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON SULPHUR PROBLEM. HE INDICATED ~~HE HAD DISCUSSED PROBLEM WITH PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ AND WANTED TO ASSURE ME THAT GOM WILL FULFILL THE PRESIDENT'S PROMISE TO ASSIST IN INCREASING THE EXPORT PERMITS FOR SULPHUR. HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT THERE IS NO EMERGENCY AT PRESENT TIME SINCE PAN AMERICAN SULPHUR COMPANY HAS EXPORT LICENSES FOR 830,000 TONS IN HAND.~~

PAGE 2 RUESMO 457 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. CORONA DEL ROSAL REPORTED THAT HE WILL BE LEAVING ON TRIP WITH PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ AND THAT HE WILL CALL ME REGARDING SULPHUR PROBLEM AFTER JUNE 1.

3. I TOOK ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE TO THE SECRETARY OF PATRIMONY THAT USG WOULD APPRECIATE EXPORT PERMITS FOR THIS CALENDAR YEAR EQUAL TO THOSE FOR LAST CALENDAR YEAR, OR 1.55 MILLION TONS.

4. CORONA DEL ROSAL WAS MOST COOPERATIVE AND VERY WARM IN HIS RECEPTION AND IN HIS DISCUSSION. I WILL GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM AFTER JUNE 1 IF HE DOES NOT CALL ME BEFORE THAT TIME.

FREEMAN

DECLASSIFIED  
State 11-14-79 (#950)  
By DCI/peniss NARS, Date 8-21-86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

64

*rec'd  
5-18-66  
7pm*  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, May 18, 1966, 6:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Re: Attached suggestion of Congressman Fraser for a U.S. statement supporting the U.K. on Rhodesia.

We have a gentleman's agreement with the U.K. not to comment on the Rhodesian situation while the current talks are going on in London.

When Harold Wilson feels that a restatement of American support for the U.K. in the Rhodesian crisis would be helpful, I am confident you will hear from him.

Meanwhile, restatements of the U.S. position of support had best be limited to our representatives at the current UN Security Council meeting on Rhodesia.

*Walt  
Graham  
R  
Walt R.*

*Doc  
10:10 AM*

*19 May, 1966  
7*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 94-344  
By CB, NARA, Date 6-7-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

May 17, 1966

5:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Congressman Donald Fraser (D-Minnesota), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, has just returned from an African Affairs Conference in London. He has a suggestion which I thought warranted passing on. He believes that the President should at this time issue a short and strong statement supporting Great Britain on Southern Rhodesia. He suggests that the President say that the fundamental policy of the United States is to support the right of people to self-determination without oppression, and that this is the same principle we are following in Viet Nam. In other words, support of Great Britain in Southern Rhodesia offers us a dramatic opportunity to demonstrate its similarity to Viet Nam which, according to Fraser, will gain support for our policies from liberal groups here and uncommitted nations abroad.



Sherwin J. Markman

*To Pres*

Wednesday, May 18, 1966 -- 5:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

The attached is what I suggested to Sec. McNamara, at his request.

If he didn't use it, maybe we can.

W. W. Rostow

*Ref is Memo to Sec McNamara  
May 2, 1966*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

May 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY McNAMARA

You asked me to consider what themes you might project in your talk later in the month in Canada.

There are two which strike me as appropriate: (a) the central object of U.S. military policy is to create an environment of stability in a nuclear age; and (b) this requires as never before that military policy be the servant of political purposes and be woven intimately into civil policy.

The argument could be developed over the whole spectrum of our military stance:

1. Our second strike capability and its stabilizing role.
2. Our continued support for an integrated NATO defense -- linking our total nuclear capability to the defense of Europe and removing the temptation for a revival of nuclear blackmail, etc.
3. Our continued emphasis on the need for highly mobile conventional as well as nuclear forces so that options are available to us in case of intended or unintended limited conflict in the NATO area (including the flanks) -- as well as in other continents.
4. Despite its violence and difficulties, our commitment to see it through in Vietnam is essentially a stabilizing factor in the world. Should we fail, the world would become much less -- not more -- stable with the fate of Southeast Asia and the flank of the Indian subcontinent immediately endangered, and the Chinese Communist doctrine of "wars of national liberation" vindicated for application everywhere.
5. Our "preventive medicine" approach to subversion and guerrilla warfare in Thailand, Africa, and Latin America.
6. Our serious military interest in arms control measures that are secure and evenly balanced.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

At every point, the effort to use military power to create an environment of stability requires the most intimate collaboration with political authorities.

-- A rational nuclear deterrent system is a global, not a national venture.

-- NATO is -- and will become increasingly -- a network of partnership in planning, financing, operations, R and D, and production.

-- Our mobile conventional forces can only play their part in a framework of stable alliances which must be nurtured and adjusted with the passage of time and changing circumstances.

-- Vietnam is not merely a military test; but, as the President said at his recent press conference, a test of our durability; our understanding of the political process in a new, young country; a test of our creative capacity.

-- In "preventive medicine" the military must work with the civil authorities as a junior partner -- in civic action, etc. The main task is economic, social, and political development plus modern police work.

-- In arms control, the real military interest in finding formulae of increased security for all must find its expression through complex diplomacy.

This is how we intend that military policy make it possible for history, politics, and economic progress work their way forward in a nuclear age without the tragic disruption of nuclear war -- or any war, if possible.

W. W. Rostow

Cy to: Bill Moyers  
Bob Kintner

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

K-5/18/66

Wednesday, May 18, 1955 -- 2:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Our commitment to the Mexicans that Orville Freeman would discuss ~~cotton policy~~ was quite explicit. The Mexicans also got the impression that he would do it soon. They have been pressing us on a date. The best early time would be en route to a cotton meeting in Lima, about June 12.

Despite conversations with Secretary Rusk, Tom Mann, Linc Gordon, and me, Orville apparently takes the view that since you haven't mentioned it to him, there is no hurry. The foreign affairs side of your house would be grateful if, in the course of conversation on something else, you could indicate that you rather hoped he would get with the Mexicans soon. There is no policy problem here, since Orville is quite interested in talking about the possibilities of an international cotton agreement.

W. A. Rostow

I want to see what the Mexicans  
do on Sulfur exports to US -  
Therefore see me -

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

67

2

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wed., May 18, 1966  
2:00 pm

7

Mr. President:

This memo of conversation may  
interest you.

He's right on his first point:  
we do tend to take the Italians  
too much for granted.

*Agree*  
*Walt* R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

~~SECRET~~

67a  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 86-288  
By wg, NARA, Date 10-5-88

May 18, 1966

# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Ambassador Fenoaltea called on me today to ask our views on the NATO crisis before he returned to Rome.

I marched him through the essential elements of the President's Polish-American speech.

He then raised the following matters:

1. Speaking as a partisan of NATO and the United States and a partisan of moderate political forces in Italy, he urged very strongly that we not slide into a tripartite directorate of U.S., UK and Bonn. Leaving Italy out is dangerous to our common interests. It strengthens both the extreme right in Italy and the extreme left, undercutting the bases for moderate politics. We must never forget that Italy is there and should be treated as a senior partner along with Britain and Germany.

2. His second point was that if and when the U.S. changes course on a major issue, it is extremely important that the Italian Government be informed in advance. When a change is made (for example the MLF) the best friends of the United States are left out on a limb, having fought a tough political battle at home.

He cited as another example a possible change on China policy.

He then zeroed in on newspaper stories that the President was taking a different position than the State Department in dealing with DeGaulle. He wanted to know if the President was softer on DeGaulle than the State Department and possibly interested in going the route of Senator Church and Senator Fulbright.

I replied that the President was deeply and personally engaged in NATO problems; we are a united Government under a strong President; and Secretary Rusk and the Department of State were the authentic voices of the President's policies.

~~SECRET~~




~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

He remarked wistfully that it is impossible in Italy to be left of the New York Times; for example, on Viet Nam.

3. He ended by stating his appreciation for the Polish-American speech which he felt was a lucid and constructive framework for dealing with East-West relations.

 W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Met  
5-18-66  
8 pm

(56)

(W)

68

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1966

Wednesday, 1:15 pm

Mr. President:

All problems connected with this enter-  
prise have been resolved except:  
Do you approve Secretary Robert  
Weaver as Chairman?

Walt Rostow

✓ W. W. R.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

68a

Mr. Rostow

The Pres had an opportunity  
to read this in his night reading  
but as you can see --- he made  
no notes. Perhaps he talked with  
you about it so I'll not hold it here  
for him to see again. Jim Jones of  
Marvin Watson's office called this  
morning asking about the Pres's  
action on this saying he is getting  
calls from State about it.

WJR  
5-16-66

MEMORANDUM

12  
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Limited Official Use

Friday, May 13, 1966

686  
175/14/66

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Delegation to Guyanese Independence ceremonies

I recommend your approval of the following delegation to the Guyanese independence ceremonies:

Secretary Robert Weaver - Chairman

Assistant Secretary Lincoln Gordon - Vice-Chairman

J. M. P. Anderson - Austin, Texas

Frank McCallister - Chairman of Labor-Economics Department,  
Roosevelt University, Chicago

William C. Doherty, Sr. - Past-President of National Association  
of Letter Carriers, and former Ambassador to Jamaica.

Delmar R. Carlson - U.S. Ambassador-designate to Guyana.

Joseph Bierne - AFL-CIO

Jack Valenti earlier cleared with you the names of Gordon, Anderson and McCallister and they have accepted. Three others suggested at that time (George Meany, Lena Horne and Clarence Dillard, Jr.) declined.

I have included Secretary Weaver because it is important that we send a Cabinet-level officer, and the fact that he is a Negro will appeal to Premier Burnham. The Guyanese will make comparisons with Jamaica and Trinidad. You went to the Jamaican, and AID Administrator Fowler Hamilton to the Trinidadian ceremony.

William Doherty puts a labor man on the delegation. Congressman "Doc" Morgan and Senator Brewster have urged that he be included.

W. W. Stewart

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

See me ☐.

Limited Official Use

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday  
May 18, 1966 -- 1:08 p.m.

Mr. President:

I forward herewith Dean Acheson's letter to you suggesting that Charles W. Joiner, Associate Dean of the Law School of the University of Michigan, be considered in connection with vacancies open on the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

W. J. Rostow

RECEIVED  
W. MARVIN WATSON

1966 MAY 18 PM 3 28

DEAN ACHESON

May 18, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with vacancies open on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, may I call your attention to the name of the Associate Dean of the Law School of the University of Michigan, Charles W. Joiner. He is fully qualified for a position on the bench.

As Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference's Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, I have worked closely with Dean Joiner for six and one-half years, and have come to know well his understanding and appreciation of the judicial system of the United States from the lower courts through the Supreme Court. In a committee of outstanding lawyers, law teachers and judges, he has shown impressive comprehension of the problems and how the rules can and should be improved. Beyond the technical qualifications amply demonstrated in the Committee, he has high qualities of legal scholarship, enlightened judgment, and unimpeachable character. As a colleague and friend he is considerate, courteous, a good companion, and aware that he has not the divine quality of infallibility.

I take the liberty of enclosing a copy of a letter which has been written to the Attorney General by a group of his colleagues at the University of Michigan, which seems to me to give you a true evaluation of the man.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure:

Letter to Attorney  
General

The President  
The White House

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN  
LAW SCHOOL

LEGAL RESEARCH BUILDING  
ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN 48104

May 5, 1966

The Honorable Nicholas deB. Katzenbach  
Attorney General of the United States  
Department of Justice Building  
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Over the years this country has benefited immeasurably from the presence on the appellate bench of a sprinkling of judges whose attitudes and capacities were shaped by an earlier experience in the academic branch of the legal profession. To a former academic colleague we assume we need not argue the point. The tradition represented by names such as Clark and Swan, Goodrich and Magruder, Shaefer and Traynor, to mention only a few, is a formidable one indeed. The contributions such men have made to the quality of adjudication is impressive; but even more so is their contribution to an ever evolving system of law. The purpose of this letter is to persuade you that the United States Court of Appeals for our own circuit, the Sixth, is in line for and would be greatly advantaged by the addition to its membership of one who would serve that same great tradition. We have such a person in mind whom we would respectfully request that you propose to the President to fill one of the existing vacancies on that court. Our qualifications to make such a suggestion are these: that we are all professors of law at the University of Michigan, and one of us is in addition the academic vice president of that institution; that we have all known this man intimately, as teacher and as colleague, for twenty years; and that though we are evenly divided between the two major parties, we are in this instance of a single mind.

The man whose name we propose is Charles W. Joiner, Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Michigan Law School.

Dean Joiner was born in Iowa in 1916, took his A.B. (1937) and J.D. (1939) degrees from the University of Iowa, and practiced in Des Moines with the firm of Miller, Huebner and Miller from 1939 to 1947, with time off to serve as an Air Force officer and B-29 pilot during World War II. Since 1947 he has been a member of the faculty at the Law School of the University of Michigan,



and since 1960 has also served as Associate Dean.

At the National level, Dean Joiner ~~is a member of the United States Judicial Conference~~, has served on the Supreme Court's fifteen member Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the United States Judicial Conference since 1959, and is also currently serving on that Court's fifteen member Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence. He is a Commissioner on Uniform State Laws, and chairman of two committees of the Conference of Commissioners, both of which Committees are concerned with judicial procedures. For five years (1959-64) he was chairman of the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Evidence Rules for the Federal Courts, and for six years (1953-56; 1960-62) chairman of its Special Committee on Recognition and Regulation of Specialization in Law Practice. For three years he was a member of the advisory board of the ABA Journal, and he continues to serve on various committees and sections of the Association concerned with diverse aspects of judicial administration and professional ethics. For two years he was chairman of the publication committee of the American Judicature Society, and since 1962 he has been a member of that Society's board of directors. As you know, that Society is primarily concerned with improvement of judicial administration. He also serves on the advisory boards of two major independent studies, one relating to federal tax procedures, the other being a comparative study of the administration of justice.

He has been equally active, and extremely effective, in promoting the more progressive efforts of professional groups seeking to improve state law and its administration. For twelve years (1952-64) he was chairman of the Michigan State Bar Committee on Civil Procedures; for six years he served as chairman of the Joint Committee on Michigan Procedural Revision, constituted jointly by the Michigan Supreme Court, the Michigan Legislature, and the Michigan State Bar; he was Co-Director of Research and Drafting for the Michigan Constitutional Convention (1961-62); he currently serves as Commissioner of the Michigan State Bar, having been elected to that position by the membership; he is on the Drafting Committee for Revision of the Criminal Code of Michigan, and is a member of the State Bar's Committees on Legislative Policy, Legislative Drafting, and Court Reorganization.

Dean Joiner has been quick to defend the vital institutions of the American legal system. He was one of the "Committee of 100" which, on two separate occasions, published statements in defense of the United States Supreme Court when it was subjected to extremist criticism. In the first such instance, when the

Court was under heavy attack because of its desegregation decision, he served on the steering committee for that group, and helped put the finishing touches on its public statement. More recently he joined in publicly condemning the efforts to restrict the powers of the Court by constitutional amendment, and on a separate occasion attacked those restrictions in a speech delivered before the National Municipal League. He is the author of a book (Civil Justice and the Jury: 1962), the dominant theme of which is a defense of the jury system.

At the same time he is no believer in the status quo as such. A glance at his record will quickly demonstrate that here is a man whose consuming professional interest has been the improvement of the law and of judicial procedures. To this we also can personally testify, for his advocacy of reform rings continuously in our ears. His efforts have always been constructive in orientation, but as the years have passed in which he has become even more deeply seized by his law reform mission, he has also become increasingly liberal and progressive in his basic views. Deeply committed to constitutionalism when basic values such as the civil liberties of the individual are at stake, he is at the same time a strong believer in the proposition that government is a continuing experiment, and that the people at any time are entitled, through the legislative process, to identify those ways in which government can best respond to their changing needs. This belief is founded on an abiding faith in people and their ability to govern themselves. His defense of the jury against the erosions of modern trends toward specialized adjudication procedures and reliance on expertise may seem paradoxical when placed alongside his efforts to steer the Constitutional Convention away from a provision for de novo judicial review of decisions of the new Michigan Civil Rights Commission, but he has no difficulty reconciling the two stands. While he has great faith in that popular participation in judicial administration of the law which the jury represents, he sees no reason why an agency of the people entrusted with the active promotion of individual rights should be less fully equipped to perform its mission than are agencies entrusted with administrative, regulatory and adjudicative functions in other areas. He was also acting entirely in character when he approved the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions because he felt the failure of the legislatures to reapportion themselves had resulted in a distortion of representative democracy, and yet, as research director for the Michigan Constitutional Convention, strongly resisted efforts to hamper the legislature with picayune constitutional limitations.

Another reflection of his basic liberalism is found in his developing concern for the less fortunate elements of modern

society. He actively supported efforts of the State Bar to establish legal aid clinics in rural areas of the state which were unable to develop such services for themselves. He interceded with the Washtenaw County Bar (Ann Arbor) in an attempt to persuade that body to accept on the board of directors of its legal aid society additional representatives of the disadvantaged class which it expects to serve, in order to bring about agreement between the Bar and the local chapter of the Office of Economic Opportunity so that the legal aid work might go forward with the assistance of that office. He is also largely responsible for the development and implementation at the Law School of a special program of financial and academic (tutorial) assistance for Negro students, designed to enable the Law School to serve the needs of the Negro community more effectively than it has in the past.

Charles Joiner is a Republican, but the foregoing recital of his works and his attitudes will indicate to you why we, of both parties, believe that in his case the party label is irrelevant. He is above all a progressive and highly competent lawyer and legal scholar. We shall miss him on this faculty most grievously if you and the President should elect to accept our suggestion; but we are most sensitive to the ever increasing importance of the work done by the Courts of Appeal, and we are confident that the appointment we propose would rebound to the very great benefit of the Court in the Sixth Circuit. There are few law professors in this country, if any, who are more widely known and more highly respected by the bar and the bench of the nation than is Charles Joiner. His appointment, we believe, would be widely applauded by both groups.

Respectfully yours,

*Luke K. Cooperrider*

Luke K. Cooperrider

*Paul G. Kauper*

Paul G. Kauper

*George E. Palmer*

George E. Palmer

*William J. Pierce*

William J. Pierce

*Russell A. Smith*

Russell A. Smith

*Allan F. Smith*

Allan F. Smith

*Richard V. Wellman*

Richard V. Wellman

*L. Hart Wright*

L. Hart Wright

A bibliography of Dean Joiner's writings is also enclosed.

c.c. U.S. Senator Phillip A. Hart

## Biographical Sketch

Charles W. Joiner, Associate Dean and Professor of Law  
The University of Michigan Law School  
Acting Dean, September, 1965, to July 1, 1966

University of Iowa, Iowa City

A. B., 1937

J. D., 1939

Military: First Lieutenant, U. S. Air Force, 1942-45

Military Honors: Battle Star-Air Offensive against Japan-1945  
Battle Star-Eastern Mandates Campaign-1945

Law Practice: Admitted to Iowa Bar, 1939  
Admitted to Michigan Bar, 1947

Miller, Huebner & Miller, Des Moines, Iowa  
1939 to 1947

Teaching: Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan  
1947-1950  
Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan  
1950-53  
Professor of Law, University of Michigan  
1953-to date  
Associate Dean, University of Michigan Law School  
1960-to date  
Acting Dean, University of Michigan Law School  
September, 1965, to July 1, 1966

## University of Michigan Activities:

Central Sesquicentennial Committee-Chairman  
1963 to date  
Public Relations, Senate Advisory Committee, 1959 to date  
Audio-Visual Education Center Executive Committee  
1952 to date  
Broadcasting Committee, 1959 to date  
Michigan Historical Collections Executive Committee  
1963 to date  
Subcommittee on Faculty Club, Senate Advisory  
Committee, 1958 to date

University of Michigan Activities (continued)

Executive Committee of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education (joint venture of the University of Michigan Law School, Wayne State University Law School, and the State Bar of Michigan), 1959 to date

Professional and Bar Associations:

State Bar of Michigan, 1947  
Michigan State Bar Foundation, 1960  
Iowa State Bar Association, 1939  
American Bar Association, 1946  
American Bar Foundation, 1960  
American Law Institute, 1948  
American Judicature Society, 1948  
Scribes, 1954- (President, 1963-64)  
Michigan Association of the Professions, 1961  
Washtenaw County Bar Association, 1947

Presidencies and Chairmanships:

Scribes, a national organization of legal writers,  
President, 1963-64  
Special Committee on Uniform Evidence Rules for  
Federal Courts of ABA, 1957- (Chairman, 1959-64)  
Special Committee on Recognition and Regulation of  
Specialization in Law Practice, 1952-56 (Chairman  
1953-56; 1960-62) American Bar Association  
Publication Committee of American Judicature Society  
Chairman, 1961-62  
Continuing Legal Education Committee of Association of  
American Law Schools, Chairman 1961-62  
Committee on Civil Procedure of State Bar of Michigan  
Chairman, 1956-64  
Joint Committee on Michigan Procedural Revision of the  
State Bar of Michigan, Legislature and Supreme Court,  
Chairman, 1956-62  
Audio-Visual Aids Round Table, Association of American  
Law Schools, Chairman 1962-64  
Special Committee on Uniform Act Relating to Appeals in  
Federal Diversity Cases, National Conference of Com-  
missioners on Uniform State Law, Chairman 1965-  
Chairman Life Members, U. S. Sixth Circuit Judicial Conference  
1966-

Chairmanships (continued)

Civil Procedure Round Table, Association of American Law Schools  
Chairman, 1961-63  
Committee on Uniformity of Judicial Decisions -National Conference  
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1964 to date

Memberships:

Board of Commissioners, Michigan State Bar 1964-67  
Standing Committee on Professional Ethics, ABA, 1961-67  
Committee on Lawyer Placement Information Service, ABA  
1961-62  
Committee on Materials for Teaching Judicial Administration  
ABA, 1961 to date  
Committee on Metropolitan Court Survey of Section on Judicial  
Administration, ABA, 1959-62  
Advisory Board of the ABA Journal, 1961-64  
Board of Governors of American Law Student Association  
of ABA, 1949 to date  
Committee on Federal Tax Procedure, American Bar Foundation  
1961 to date  
Joint Committee for Effective Administration of Justice ABA  
and cooperating organizations, 1961-64  
Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education ABA-ALI  
1949-1963  
Section of General Practice-Policies and Projects Committee ABA  
1963 to date  
Drafting Committee for Revision of Criminal Code, Michigan State Bar  
1964 to date  
Legislative Policy Committee, Michigan State Bar, 1965 to date  
Board of Advisors of the Comparative Study of the Administration  
of Justice, 1962 to date  
Board of Directors, American Judicature Society, 1962 to date  
Civil Procedure Committee of the Judicial Conference of Michigan  
1956 to date  
Committee on Education, Michigan Association of the Professions  
1963 to date  
Legislative Drafting Committee, Michigan State Bar - 1965 to date  
Joint Committee on Court Reorganization, Michigan State Bar 1965 to date



Civic Positions and Appointments:

City:

Alderman, Ann Arbor City Council, 1955-59  
Ann Arbor City Citizen's Council, Charter  
Review Committee 1959-1961

State:

Board of Commissioners - Michigan State Bar  
1964-1967  
Member, Michigan Board of Commissioners on  
Uniform State Laws, 1963 to date  
Associate Director, Constitutional Convention  
Preparatory Commission of Michigan, 1961  
Co-Director of Research and Drafting, Michigan  
Constitutional Convention, 1961-1962

National:

Member, United States Judicial Conference  
Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, 1965-1969  
Member, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the  
United States Judicial Conference, 1959 to date  
Chairman Life Members, U. S. Sixth Circuit Judicial  
Conference, 1966 -

**Publications.**

**Books and Pamphlets**

**Civil Justice and the Jury, 1962. Prentice-Hall, Inc. 200+pp.**

**Trials and Appeals, 1957. Prentice Hall, Inc. 594 pp.**

**Jurisdiction and Judgments, 1953. Prentice-Hall, Inc. 718  
(co-authored with William W. Blume)**

**Introduction to Civil Procedure, 1949. Overbeck Co. 947 pp.  
(co-authored with William W. Blume and E. B. Stason)**

**Report of the Joint Committee on Michigan Procedural  
Revision State Bar of Michigan, 3 vols: I-32 pp; II, 539  
pp.; III, 380 pp. [A report of the Committee, created  
by the Legislature, the Supreme Court and the State  
Bar of Michigan, which was the basis upon which the  
Legislature enacted the new Judicature Act and the  
Court promulgated the new Court Rules effective January  
1, 1963.]**

**Pleading a Product's Liability Case, 1961. The University of  
Michigan. 50 pp. litho.**

**The Michigan Constitution and the Judiciary, 1961. Lansing:  
Constitutional Convention Preparatory Commission, vi + 30 pp.**

**Impeachment and Removal in Michigan, 1961. Lansing: Consti-  
tutional Convention Preparatory Commission, 10 pp.  
(with Jon DeWitt.)**

**Memorandum Concerning Article XVI of the Michigan Constitution,  
1961. Lansing: Constitutional Convention Preparatory Com-  
mission, 11 pp. (with Jon DeWitt)**

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*To Watson 3:08 pm 70*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, May 18, 1966, 12:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached, for your session with John Gronouski (Wednesday, May 18, at 5:30 p.m.), is a State briefing memorandum summarizing the principal issues between us and the Poles. None of them is at a critical stage, and Gronouski will be able to give you a firsthand report.



Francis M. Bator

Attachment

*OK w/*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Briefing Memorandum

1. U.S.-Polish Relations: In spite of a continuing Polish desire for closer relations with the West and a long-term rise in U.S.-Polish cultural and trade relations, several factors currently impede the development of bilateral relations. Polish-Americans and their representatives in Congress have been irritated by the denial of visas to Church dignitaries, including the Pope and 15 American bishops, to Millennial religious observances in Poland during the first week in May. The Poles have protested the damaging of a Polish ship during an American bombing raid on Cam Pha, North Viet-Nam on April 20. The use of physical force by Polish secret police against our military attaches in Poland led to PNG action against a Polish military attache here on May 4, to which the Poles responded on May 13 by PNG-ing three of our attaches in Warsaw. We are considering our next move.
2. Building Bridges: Ambassador Gronouski may seek your evaluation of the prospects for building new bridges to Poland and Eastern Europe in an atmosphere affected by events in Viet-Nam. The events listed in Paragraph 1. and the problematical future of the East-West Trade Bill are cases in point.
3. Export-Import Bank Credits: The Department has under consideration the problem of EXIM export credit guarantees to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria, which do not at present enjoy this facility for the purchase of U.S. industrial exports. Ambassador Gronouski (as well as our other Chiefs of Mission) have expressed strong support for this idea.
4. Use of U.S.-Owned Polish Currency: Ambassador Gronouski has had two informal conversations with Polish Minister of Foreign Trade Witold Trampczynski. These discussions have tended to focus on various possibilities for dealing with the \$40 million "hump" in Poland's schedule of repayments to the United States (amounting to more than \$500 million) which occurs in 1967.
5. Oder-Neisse Boundary: Ambassador Gronouski may wish to discuss the subject of Poland's western frontier in the light of the recent dialogue between Polish and German churchmen and increased discussion of the topic in Germany in connection with reunification.
6. China Talks: Gronouski meets Wang on May 25. We anticipate that the Chinese Communists will launch a strong protest concerning the charge that American planes shot down a Chinese aircraft over mainland China. We plan to ask the Chinese if Chou En Lai's statement that, because of the U.S. refusal to sign a non-first use agreement, China was forced to continue nuclear tests implies that China would be willing to suspend testing in return for such a non-first use agreement.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 86-290  
By ijf, NARA, Date 3-10-88

Walt:

This should go to Marvin, with a copy  
to Jim Jones.

It is more for the sake of form than  
substance -- neither the President nor  
Gronouski will need any prompting.



FMB



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, May 18, 1966

NATO

71

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is about tomorrow's 6:00 p.m. meeting on NATO.

You ought to know:

-- Acheson is sensitive about a big meeting. And although he is working like a great soldier, since our NSAM, there are some ruffled feathers to smooth.

-- Francis Bator is sensitive about his old struggles with State. He feels State might be happier if he is not there. He is our man on Europe. He should be there. Francis is working -- and I am encouraging him to work -- more congenially with State.

Once clear Presidential guidance is given, the town can be pulled together fine.

Unless I hear to the contrary, I will assume Francis should come to the meeting.

\* \* \*

I shall not distribute a formal agenda, but you may wish to guide the meeting along the following lines:

1. Thank Acheson for his work on what you know is a tough and critical problem. De Gaulle is trying to gut us; but we have to hold the club together and move forward. You are aware of the difficulty of dealing with the French and the amount of hard laborious work he has done and organized.

2. You know the response to NSAM 345 will be along soon; and, therefore, this meeting will be devoted to the negotiating issue.

3. You might then put the following series of questions (all of which Francis and I tried to answer in our memo to you). The first three may take a little time, but they will give State its day in court.

-- What are our objectives in this crisis?

-- What is DeGaulle after?

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NIJ 86-288  
By 48, NARA, Date 10-5-88  
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

No distribution made.

May 18, 1966

- What should our negotiating stance be?
- What is the next step in negotiating about French troops in Germany?
- Is the Aide Memoire the best way to put our questions to the French?

4. You might then give your guidance on negotiation. Page 7 of our memorandum (attached) has our suggestions for what they may be worth.

5. Budget for another meeting soon on NSAM 345.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~

1. In our public position you want to minimize any suggestion of a direct Washington/Paris confrontation.
2. If public exposition of our differences is required, it should be in terms of an integrated military alliance versus bilateralism or fragmentation of the West.
3. You do not wish the U. S. to be in a position of begging anything of the French.
4. We should proceed with the Allies to plan the prompt movement of people and equipment out of France.
5. On French troops in Germany, you wish us to be exactly as sturdy as Erhard, but we should not push him into positions that are costly in terms of his domestic politics unless he is pressured by his Gaullists into positions which would endanger the security of our troops, or the integrity of NATO command arrangements.
6. With respect to Allied overflights and French access to Allied communications and intelligence, we should indicate our hope that both can be maintained; but our planning should be based on the possibility that we shall have to operate without overflights; we should make clear to the French that we regard these two as an inextricable package.
7. With respect to the NATO oil pipeline, we should plan for a capability sufficient to help defend Western Europe without reliance on the French, while seeing what we can negotiate after de Gaulle's return from Moscow.
8. Without public acknowledgment, our plans and actions should convey that we are moving to maintain an effective collective defense without France, while trying to make fair and even-handed arrangements to keep France in a close working relationship with the Alliance.

Our willingness to do without the French -- and our actions which indicate our preparedness to do without them -- constitute our best negotiating cards, given de Gaulle's sensitivity to "isolation"; but in fact as well as in posture there is enough ambiguity in de Gaulle's commitment so that it would be imprudent to be dependent on France, during his time, in a period of crisis or conflict.

~~SECRET~~

72  
JFK to P  
via F. Bates

NOTE

Wednesday  
May 18, 1966 -- 10:00 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I regret this memorandum is so long;  
but the NATO issues have backed up in the  
pipeline and we wished to give you:

- the flavor of thought in the town;
- our own reflections;
- the materials for the first of  
several meetings that will be  
required.

W. W. Rostow

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

72a  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 86-288  
By ig, NARA, Date 10-5-88

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 18, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NATO

NATO is the next big item on the foreign policy agenda:

- Erhard will be seeing Wilson on May 23, and we should decide whether you should reply to Wilson's long letter before then;
- On June 6-8, NATO foreign ministers will be meeting as a group for the first time since de Gaulle made his move. We have been working with Thomson on a draft joint statement you should see before it becomes final. In the meantime,
- Bob McNamara will be sending you his recommendations on relocation of NATO and U. S. facilities in a few days.
- On French troops in Germany (the hottest near-term political issue), the U.S. -UK-German working group in Bonn has circulated to the Fourteen its report on how we should negotiate. It suggests a fairly tough initial line, and we shall have to decide what fallback position to take and when, in the light of a French reply which will come soon.
- On other defense arrangements with France (overflights, the oil pipeline, wartime re-entry) we have a draft Aide Memoire which we have held at State's request until we could get your guidance on the general negotiating position.
- Under Dean Acheson's chairmanship, State and Defense have been working hard on the nuclear issue, and on constructive proposals for the Alliance, in response to NSAM 345. The nuclear part of the package will be ready at the end of the week.
- You should consider a major speech on European policy before de Gaulle goes to Moscow (June 20). Many Europeans (including Lecanuet) have suggested its wisdom at this stage.

How we play our hand during the next several weeks will not only help determine the future shape of the Alliance, but will seriously affect German and European politics, and might even affect our own.

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-2-

5/18/66

We will need Presidential guidance specifically on: (1) our negotiating position on French troops in Germany, (2) whether to send another Aide Memoire on defense arrangements to the French, and (3) our overall negotiating stance.

There is a further reason for early Presidential involvement. Some of your advisers -- notably Acheson and Ball -- are a bit shellshocked from newspaper stories suggesting that they are at odds with you. This is bad business for us and makes the Europeans, particularly the Germans, uneasy. Your giving them a day in court, and then your personal guidance, should permit us to be -- and appear to be -- a united and purposeful government.

#### Procedure

At Tab A is a tight, crisp memo by Dean Acheson which Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have agreed should serve as a basis for discussion with you. It covers all the major issues, but does not attempt to lay out negotiating strategy or tactics. After reading it -- you will wish to read it in full -- and perhaps an in-house session with the two of us, we recommend an early extended meeting with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Ball, Acheson, et al. (One topic for discussion would be the draft Aide Memoire at Tab B)

\* \* \*

The rest of this memo contains our thoughts on what might be the agenda for such a meeting: (1) U. S. objectives in the NATO crisis; (2) de Gaulle's objectives; (3) our public position vis-a-vis de Gaulle; (4) our negotiating position on French troops in Germany; (5) whether to send an Aide Memoire or communicate our response in some other way; and (6) general negotiating instructions.

#### 1. U. S. Objectives

There is little disagreement on essential U. S. interests. We must try to:

- maintain an effective integrated deterrent, providing for the security of U. S. and Allied forces in Europe;

- maintain solidarity among the Fourteen. (This requires that our position vis-a-vis the French appear to the others as reasonable on its merits, while generating sufficient realism and determination among the Fourteen to face the expensive problem posed for us by de Gaulle's high-handed and disruptive decisions. It also requires that we continue to make clear our commitment to an evolving constructive NATO, which can serve as a base for a policy of bridge-building to the East.)

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5/18/66

-- minimize the strain on German politics by (1) helping Erhard resolve the French troops issue along lines most acceptable in terms of long-run German politics, and (2) by making generally clear that they can count on U.S. support when they want to be firm, and on U.S. understanding for any efforts to keep the Franco-German rift to a minimum;

-- impose a price on de Gaulle, while leaving an empty chair for France. (Punishing de Gaulle verbally is not serious or useful business. But it is essential for our security -- and for the negotiation -- that we be (and appear to be) capable of mounting an effective integrated deterrent without France. He remains, despite his stance, politically vulnerable in his domestic politics to isolation from the rest of the West.)

## 2. What de Gaulle is after

How he actually will play his hand we don't know. He evidently wants maximum freedom of action and yet appear to the French people to have the protection of the Alliance. Much depends on what he gets or doesn't get in Moscow, and on the unity of the Fourteen. His operational goals in relation to NATO are probably somewhere on a spectrum bounded by:

- (a) a neutralist position: with French troops out of Germany; France out of NATO; and no special defense arrangements with the U.S. or other Allies; and
- (b) a diluted NATO: where France keeps her troops in Germany; maintains her membership in NATO planning groups and early warning network; permits allied overflights; and NAC remains in Paris.

During his Moscow trip, it is a fair bet that he will try to get the Russians to hold out just enough of a promise of movement toward German unity to bedevil German political life without cutting the ground from under Ulbricht. If the Russians don't play, he is more likely to opt for a diluted NATO and against a neutralist position.

What is clear, irrespective of what happens in Moscow, is that as a negotiator he will go to great lengths to be in a position of granting favors and not asking them.

## 3. The importance of how we look

The safest bet is that except on overflights, the French will be unreasonable and negotiations will be unsuccessful. The issue which is not addressed in the Acheson memo is what posture we strike in testing de Gaulle's intentions.

5/18/66

Here there is a difference of emphasis among your advisers:

-- Sect. Rusk, Ball, and Acheson believe that we must, both in public and private, talk about the serious consequences of de Gaulle's unilateral decisions, and to take a fairly hard line. Their reasons are: this is an expensive, difficult business he has imposed on us, and if we fudge over what he has done, the European (and perhaps U.S.) public, parliaments, and Congress will not put up the resources to maintain an integrated deterrent. The Italians and Danes, for example, might slide away towards detached positions; and the Germans might move towards bilateralism vis-a-vis both Paris and Washington.

-- Sect. McNamara doesn't want to argue with de Gaulle much, but simply get on with the job of building an integrated, streamlined deterrent without France, negotiating in the quietest way possible.

-- Bator has (in Rostow's view, correctly) emphasized for some time the need for us to take positions which (1) do not get beyond what Erhard can manage in domestic politics, and which (2) do not unduly strain political life in other NATO countries. He wants to be sure that, if de Gaulle will not accept those minimum conditions which we and the Germans must really insist upon, it will be clear to the world that de Gaulle alone is responsible for the breakdown -- that the monkey is on his back.

The State Department has tended to take positions a bit harder than those we could live with and let others water them down in negotiation.

The other way to play it is to state positions closer to the minimum; hold to them; and avoid the charge of being unreasonable with de Gaulle.

The State Department should be heard attentively, because they are on the firing line. But Rostow's net view (in which Bator concurs) is:

-- We probably will not be able to avoid some public discussion of de Gaulle's position, given Church, Fulbright, etc.; but that discussion and statements of our differences should be precise and temperate.

-- The key to the negotiation is action to put NATO in a position where it can live and operate with or without France.

-- We are strong enough to state moderate positions and hold to them in negotiations with both France and our Allies.

The balance here is so delicate that each key issue must be looked at separately.

4. French troops in Germany -- how we negotiate

As you know, until now the French troops (2-1/3 divisions and some air units) have been committed to NATO command in time of crisis. De Gaulle has said that this commitment will end on July 1. The Germans maintain that de-commitment destroys the legal basis for keeping French troops on German soil. Whatever the legal case, French presence without a new agreement is unacceptable as a matter of German politics -- it would smell of occupation.

The Germans -- with our full support -- have told the French that their troops are welcome to stay "provided a new agreement is reached regarding their mission and their commitment to SACEUR command in time of conflict." This condition is subject to several interpretations -- the key is what we mean by "commitment" and whether we really mean SACEUR command (as opposed to some face-saving, common but two-hat command arrangement).

The joint U. S. /UK/German negotiating paper (which is now in the hands of the Fourteen) takes a tough initial line -- insisting that the French publicly undertake a commitment to assign these troops to NATO when those members of the Alliance with troops in Germany agree that a state of emergency exists. He is thus asked to give up a veto which he now holds as a full member of NATO and to undertake a commitment formally tougher than, for example, ours. On the other hand, the question is posed because of the unilateral actions he has taken.

Nobody thinks de Gaulle will agree to this; it is meant as an opening tactic from which we are willing to retreat. The question is how and when. (The "when" is critical because it was agreed between McCloy and the Germans in Bonn that a new German-French agreement must be under negotiation by July 1, or the French must begin withdrawing their troops.)

The outlines of a reasonable fall-back position are fairly clear. We would ask de Gaulle to commit France:

- (1) to a meaningful military mission for the two divisions;
- (2) to join in peacetime planning and joint maneuvers;
- (3) to place her forces under common command in time of crisis;
- (4) to reaffirm Article V of the Treaty (the mutual security provision) without any qualification.

The ball is now in the French court. Our intelligence indicates that de Gaulle will ignore our maximum conditions and inform the Germans he will remove his troops by July 1, 1967. He will try to blame the Germans -- and us -- for not making an agreement, and strengthen rising domestic pressures on Erhard to soften his line.

Whatever he does, we must avoid being subject to the charge that we presented impossible conditions to the French and that de Gaulle's negative response is justified. It must be understood that our initial offer is just that. The operational questions are:

- whether we let a confrontation build in this matter between now and July 1; or
- whether we indicate to the French that we could live with something short of the initial proposal;
- and, if so, by what route we put on the record that our proposal was not a final proposal, and that it is de Gaulle (and not the Germans, U.S., UK) who is being unreasonable.

Operationally, we must await the French reply and then consult closely with the Germans and others.

5. Whether to send the Aide Memoire

The Aide Memoire is a formal list of sharply stated specific questions and legal positions having to do with overflights, wartime re-entry, use of our oil pipeline across France, etc. The issue is not whether these questions get asked, but how -- whether we ask them in a formal Aide Memoire, which will be in the papers the next day, or through private Rusk/Lucet or Bohlen/Couve conversations based on an informal list of questions.

The status of these defense issues varies. On overflights, we may be able to strike a straightforward bargain: overflights in return for continued French access to NATO air defense information and air space. The pipeline issue is tougher (and is discussed in detail in the Aide Memoire). However we handle it, we will probably want to make our own separate alternative arrangements. The question of access to French facilities in wartime is also cloudy, but probably worth trying to negotiate. (In each case -- and whatever bargain we strike -- our military planning will have to be hedged for the possibility that the French will not perform.)

The issue of whether to send the Aide Memoire comes down to whether we want another public show of our legal position or a quiet clarification -- knowing throughout that we are unlikely to be satisfied whichever tack we take. The two of us would vote for the quiet approach; but before making up your mind, you should hear the case for the Aide Memoire from Sect. Rusk, Ball, and Acheson.

6. General negotiating instructions

After going through these papers and hearing the arguments, you will wish to give marching orders on our general negotiating position.

We would suggest that, in a Rusk/McNamara, et al, meeting, you make clear that:

(1) in our public position you want to minimize any suggestion of a direct Washington/Paris confrontation;

(2) if public exposition of our differences is required, it should be in terms of an integrated military alliance versus bilateralism or fragmentation of the West;

(3) you do not wish the U.S. to be in a position of begging anything of the French;

(4) we should proceed with the Allies to plan the prompt movement of people and equipment out of France;

(5) on French troops in Germany, you wish us to be exactly as sturdy as Erhard, but we should not push him into positions that are costly in terms of his domestic politics unless he is pressured by his Gaullists into positions which would endanger the security of our troops, or the integrity of NATO command arrangements;

(6) with respect to Allied overflights and French access to Allied communications and intelligence, we should indicate our hope that both can be maintained; but our planning should be based on the possibility that we shall have to operate without overflights; we should make clear to the French that we regard these two as an inextricable package;

(7) with respect to the NATO oil pipeline, we should plan for a capability sufficient to help defend Western Europe without reliance on the French, while seeing what we can negotiate after de Gaulle's return from Moscow;


(8) without public acknowledgment, our plans and actions should convey that we are moving to maintain an effective collective defense without France, while trying to make fair and even-handed arrangements to keep France in a close working relationship with the Alliance.

Our willingness to do without the French -- and our actions which indicate our preparedness to do without them -- constitute our best negotiating cards, given de Gaulle's sensitivity to "isolation"; but in fact as well as in posture there is enough ambiguity in de Gaulle's commitment so that it would be imprudent to be dependent on France, during his time, in a period of crisis or conflict.

W. Rostow

Francis M. Bator

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72c

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

At the suggestion of Mr. Rostow, Mr. Acheson prepared a memorandum on the issues which might be raised in negotiations with France over NATO. The Secretary of Defense and I have been over this and agreed that it furnishes a good basis for a meeting with you to receive further guidance. Pending matters include the draft Aide Mémoire which I submitted for your consideration, and the probable French reply next week to the Germans regarding French troops in Germany.

May we have a meeting with you?

Respectfully yours,



Dean Rusk

The President,  
The White House.

1401  
22d

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

May 13, 1966


MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Dear Dean:

A month or more ago I sent you a paper dealing with methods of approach to problems presented by the French demands on NATO and priorities among them. You sent this to the President for his information.

In the weeks which have gone by many things have become clearer and, perhaps, a paper may be timely on subjects to be discussed with the French by NATO as an organization and by the USG bilaterally.

If you wish to discuss this paper with me, or the President with both of us, your guidance would be most appreciated.



Dean Acheson

Attachment

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 86-290  
By if, NARA, Date 3-10-88

~~SECRET~~

BROAD LINES OF APPROACH TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS WITH  
FRANCE IN NATO CRISIS

In approaching any negotiation it is important to understand clearly the relationship of the parties. Are they seeking a common object and sparring for compatible individual advantage -- as in a horse trade? If so, bargaining is the avenue to agreement. If, however, one has taken a position from which it will not recede, and from which it cannot be forced to recede, there is small room for negotiation.

In the past weeks the French government has been at pains to demonstrate the latter is its attitude towards NATO. It will not discuss its decisions that French troops must be withdrawn from commitment to NATO command and French officers from service in NATO commands. Similarly its demands that all NATO and U.S. command headquarters and all U.S. troops, facilities and supplies must be withdrawn from France are not subject to negotiation. All that can be discussed are "practical measures" for carrying out these decisions, a deadline for which the French government has arbitrarily set. Even the French Ministry of Defense admits that so far as NATO facilities and headquarters are concerned these dates cannot be met.

The USG has responded that its troops and facilities will be withdrawn from French territory as soon as this can be done without prejudice to military security. There are no negotiations required about withdrawal.

The USG has offered to negotiate the amendment or cancellation of the agreements under which the facilities were established. It has not been thought compatible with the dignity of the USG to accept unilateral cancellation of agreements made for the life of NATO. Nor has acceptance of unilateral cancellation seemed appropriate when the GOF simultaneously offered to discuss new agreements about reentry into France in time of war. The French government

has not

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**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**

**NEJ 94-166**

By inf, NARA, Date 6-17-94

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- 2 -

has not answered the offer to negotiate the agreements. The draft aide-memoire submitted by you to the President seeks to make the record clear on this important point, without haggling about our withdrawal.

#### What Can Be Negotiated and Its Importance

The impressive fact is how little of any real importance is open to negotiation in the France-NATO crisis.

The indisputable fact is that France wants everything French out of NATO, and everything NATO -- especially everything American -- out of France. This, if one may say so, poses a rather clear cut issue.

In the political field it is paralleled by another equally clear cut difference. As was made clear to Senator Church in Paris recently, the French government wants a European settlement by Europeans, i.e., by "the underlying reality of Europe ... Russia in Eastern Europe and France, England and to a lesser extent Italy in Western Europe ... the other countries of Europe were so much dust ...." The agreement would seek a "reunited Germany without nuclear arms and the withdrawal of foreign forces from such a Germany, including, of course, military forces of the United States." To most Western Europeans simple mathematics makes this appear as Soviet domination of Europe. Our allies have not seen this issue of policy as a misunderstanding which can be talked out. The parties are not separated by details. They are poles apart.

The NATO Fourteen, to be sure, have matters which must be talked out with the French; but they are of relatively minor importance. How insistent will the French be in pushing a hurried evacuation of NATO establishments? In limiting NATO overflights? In pinching off the flow of oil across France? Is it in the interest

of NATO

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- 3 -

of NATO to cloak the withdrawal of France from the Alliance? How valuable is French liaison with the NATO commands; and how much reliance can be placed on an agreement to use French facilities in time of conflict?

The matters which stand out from the mechanics of leaving France are:

- 1) The presence of French troops in Germany.
- 2) Allied overflights through French air space.
- 3) Continued transportation of oil across France.
- 4) Reentry rights into facilities in France in case of war.

There is also a matter which concerns chiefly the United States -- the termination of valid bilateral agreements.

1) The presence of French troops in Germany

The presence of all foreign troops in Germany is governed by a series of agreements of 1954, one of which requires their being committed to NATO command in case of conflict. The French government has given notice of the cancellation of this commitment so far as their forces are concerned (two and one-third divisions and some air units) on July 1st.

Both the Germans and the other allies have seen the issues raised here by the French as primarily political rather than military. The Germans have accordingly informed the French, with the unanimous concurrence of the other thirteen allies, that the continued presence of

French

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- 4 -

French troops in Germany would be welcomed provided a new agreement was reached regarding their mission and their commitment to SACEUR command in time of conflict. To make this specific the note proposed that the transfer of command take place when all other troops in Germany should have come under SACEUR's command. This proposal was to resolve the ambiguity introduced by the French interpretation of the NAT as committing them to defend against "unprovoked" attack. Both French and German positions may be negotiable.

Despite dialectical form the heart of the allied position is that unless troops in Germany are unequivocally there on a joint allied defense mission under the treaty, their status reverts to occupation forces in what General de Gaulle described to Senator Church as a defeated and divided country. The divisive effect of such a result is a net loss to the Alliance.

On the basis of current intelligence, the GOF is discussing this week whether or not to negotiate this matter. Apparently it would wish in any event to withdraw the troops after the February-March French elections. It may decide to do so during the summer.

## 2) Allied overflights through French air space

The right to conduct military overflights in France is of very substantial importance to us and the Alliance. Without the use of French air space NATO air communications between Northern Europe and the Mediterranean area are possible only by following a long and wasteful route over the Atlantic. The right to continue training flights over France is equally important, since air space over Germany, the UK and the Benelux countries is not as suited for such flights because of traffic congestion and recurrent bad weather. Aware of this, the French have reduced overflight agreements with the U.S. and other NATO countries to a month-to-month basis.

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French need to overfly other NATO countries and to have access to information from the early warning system should provide the Alliance with strong bargaining position in negotiating continued overflight rights. Without such information and overflight rights the Force de Frappe would lose whatever credibility it now has.

However, reports of General de Gaulle's discussion of this matter indicate he rules out the possibility of a Soviet attack on Europe, and hence regards of little immediate value French access to air defense information and foreign air space. Nevertheless, the situation itself puts some pressure on the GOF. To take an extreme position would be inconsistent with that of an ally. It would suggest more neutrality or hostility. This together with the keener appreciation of the situation held by the French military may maintain tolerable overflight rights.

3) Continued transportation of oil across France

The last French aide-memoire, while contemplating ending the flow of oil across France through our pipeline to U.S. forces in Germany, indicated some realization of the high-handedness of this action. It suggested France might not insist upon terminating use in one year. This action is so outrageous as to warrant a rather full and public exploration of the grounds put forward as justification for it and a claim for just compensation for the nationalization of the facility. The aide-memoire recently forwarded to the President lays the foundation for this.

4) Reentry rights into facilities in France  
in case of war

The GOF has offered to discuss this subject with the interesting qualification that it cover only situations in which both nations are at war. Since the only wars concerned are those which involve action under Article 5

of the NAT,

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of the NAT, the qualification indicates awareness of the possibility that the U.S. might be at war in Europe when France might not be. This qualification ought to be plumbed to see how firmly it is held and what it may mean.


If significance is attached to it, the value of reentry rights obtainable is much diminished. One would certainly not be justified in placing much reliance on them in planning for the security of our large forces in Germany. Nevertheless, they would be worth negotiating to have a framework of agreement regarding, and possibly custodial forces maintaining, some facilities which another French government might make really useful.

The exercise of negotiating the agreement, therefore, could well be worthwhile, as was the negotiation of the Austrian State Treaty. One can never tell when a document of this sort can come in handy. The United States would not be justified in making any concessions of importance to get it.

Dean Acheson

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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Tab B


May 6, 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable  
Walt W. Rostow,  
Special Assistant  
to the President.

I am enclosing a draft aide-memoire that we would hope to deliver to the French Government in the near future. It has been cleared by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, by Mr. Acheson and by me.

I would very much appreciate it if you could transmit this to the President at the Ranch.

  
George W. Ball

Enclosure:

As Stated.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 86-290  
By inf, NARA, Date 3-10-88

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4/26/66

DRAFT AIDE-MEMOIRE

The Government of the United States acknowledges receipt of the aide-memoire of the Government of France dated April 22, 1966 proposing that the two governments begin at once to discuss the practical measures that should be taken concerning the bilateral agreements between the United States and France, referred to in the French aide-memoire of March 10 and March 29, and further that these discussions take place in the city of Paris.

The United States Government is prepared, as it stated in its aide-memoire of April 12, 1966 to discuss any matter raised by the Government of France, subject, of course, to consultations with all our Allies. It finds Paris an entirely appropriate and convenient place for discussion. In order, however, to prepare for discussion, the United States Government must request further enlightenment on the precise proposals which the Government of France wishes to discuss.

The United States

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 86-290  
By ijg, NARA, Date 3-10-88

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The United States Government understands that the subject matter of the proposed discussions are five agreements entered into by the United States and France in furtherance of obligations, assumed by them under the North Atlantic Treaty, to come to the aid of any of the Parties which might be subject to an armed attack. The United States Government notes that the Government of France has stated its intention to remain a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 3 of which contains the undertaking that "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of the Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." The agreements entered into by the United States and France in the exercise of their sovereign will permit the United States to install, have access to and from, and

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man and use certain facilities in France, such as a pipeline, system of communications, storage depots, air fields, military headquarters and hospitals. All these facilities and their use are for the purpose of enabling the United States to fulfill effectively its Treaty duty to come to the aid of a European Ally or Allies subject to armed attack. The United States Government has been assured that the Government of France intends to fulfill this Treaty duty and believes that it wishes the United States to continue to do likewise.

The French Government has stated, however, that its agreements with the United States are incompatible with its desire to resume the full exercise of its sovereignty in French territory. It must be made unmistakably clear that French sovereignty over French land and air has never been questioned by the United States. Indeed, the United States has not failed in the past and is now pledged by

Treaty

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Treaty to defend French sovereignty over French territory against armed attack. The very facilities in question, installed at the express invitation and by permission of the French Government, are an earnest of that pledge.

The United States seeks enlightenment on what the Government of France proposes to discuss, under the description "practical measures that should be taken concerning the bilateral agreements". The United States has expressed its willingness to discuss any changes in the agreements which the Government of France desires and arrangements for their termination if necessary. It is prepared to discuss the use of facilities established in accordance with the agreements in time of peace or conflict as the French aide-memoire of March 29 suggests. It has gone further and expressed its willingness to evacuate French territory, if this be the desire of the Government of France, as soon as this can be done without prejudice to Allied security. But a proper respect for international agreements precludes

acceptance

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acceptance of a unilateral denunciation of them.

Specific questions arise under the bilateral agreements, as follows:

1. The United States Military Headquarters Agreement of June 17, 1953 authorizes the installation and operation of the headquarters of the United States European Command near St. Germain-en-Laye. By its terms the agreement continues in force for the life of the North Atlantic Treaty unless sooner terminated by mutual consent. Inasmuch as the Government of France has denounced the Protocol on the Status of the International Military Headquarters, to take effect April 1, 1967, it is the intention of the United States Government to move the headquarters of its European Command, which is closely linked to SHAPE, as soon as a suitable location can be found and arrangements made. The United States will, therefore, be prepared to discuss "practical measures" for this move at an appropriate time;

meanwhile

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meanwhile it asks to be informed what "practical measures" the French Government wishes to discuss.

The Government of the United States is also prepared to discuss with the French Government the latter's proposals regarding the United States Military Headquarters Agreement. Is it the desire of the French Government that the United States agree to its termination?

2. Under the Pipeline Agreement of June 30, 1953, an oil pipeline has been laid at United States expense across French territory from Donges to Metz and is operated by a French company for joint use by France and the United States in peacetime, and by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in time of war. What changes in the agreement are desired by the Government of France? Does the French Government object to the flow of oil in the pipeline across French territory for the use of United States forces in Germany? Does the French Government object to the present operation of the pipeline?

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3. The Chateauroux Agreement of February 27, 1951 establishes an air depot at Deols and La Martinerie for the supply of United States air forces in Europe. The Air Bases Agreement of October 4, 1952 authorizes the construction and use of certain air fields in France for United States Air Force missions in furtherance of common defense plans. These agreements by their terms continue in force for the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty unless previously terminated by mutual agreement.

Both the Chateauroux Agreement and the Air Bases Agreement require French approval before flights may be made from these bases which are not in furtherance of North Atlantic Treaty missions or in support of United States forces in Europe. Under

these agreements operational command of United States facilities is accorded to United States officers while

French

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French authorities continue to exercise territorial command of the region of the facilities. In addition, the United States and France have concluded an Overflight Agreement, dated December 21, 1964 which regulates flights by United States aircraft in and over France.

It is the present intention of the United States in view of the attitude of the French Government to remove the air squadrons and supporting forces from these bases as soon as practicable after consultation with its Allies.

The United States will also be prepared to discuss the agreements themselves. Does the French Government request the United States to agree to the termination of these agreements and the evacuation of the bases and depots? Are these facilities among those referred to in the French aide-memoire of March 29 as facilities "on which the two governments could reach mutual agreement in the event of a conflict in which both countries would participate under the Atlantic Alliance"?

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Alliance"? If so, does the phrase "a conflict in which both countries would participate" preclude use of such facilities in the event that France should not participate in a conflict arising from an armed attack against a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty?

5. The System of Communications Agreement of December 8, 1958 authorizes a network of depots and other facilities for the supply of the United States Army in Europe. Under this agreement, as pointed out in the United States aide-memoire of April 12, the French Government may propose review or modification and, if not satisfied with the response, may give notice of termination in due course. The United States is prepared to discuss with the French Government any proposals which it may have for the review or modification of the agreement, and asks the same questions as in the preceding paragraph.

Since the United States Government is entirely willing to discuss the bilateral agreements and practical

matters

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matters in relation thereto, it earnestly hopes that the Government of France will aid in preparation for these early discussions by clarifying its position as requested.

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*To Pres*

Tuesday, May 17, 1966 - 6:30 pm

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Letter from President Diaz Ordaz**

President Diaz Ordaz has sent you the attached acknowledgement of your letter of April 16. No reply is necessary.

*W. W. Rostow*  
W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Letter to President from President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico dated  
April 26, 1966

Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson  
President of the United States of America  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President and Good Friend:

I was very pleased to read your letter of April 16.

The warmth with which our people received you, your charming wife, your daughters, and the distinguished members of your entourage unquestionably was a reflection of Mexican hospitality and the desire of our peoples to reach widening understanding, so that our geographical proximity may lead to lasting friendship.

I sincerely believe, Mr. President, that no occasion could have been more propitious to strengthen feelings of solidarity than the happy coincidence of your visit and the commemoration of the 101st anniversary of the death of Abraham Lincoln, the evocation of whom rekindled our admiration for that enlightened champion of human rights.

Mrs. Diaz Ordaz, my children, and I were greatly honored by the presence of the Johnson family in our home and I am certain that Mauricio, in particular, will retain a lively remembrance of his friends from the United States.

Accept, Mr. President, for yourself, Mrs. Johnson, and your daughters, our most cordial regards and the expression of our sincere and lasting esteem.

[signature] G. Diaz Ordaz

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DCU NARS, Date 11-26-81

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, May 17, 1966 -- 3:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Formal Invitation to General Ne Win to Visit  
Washington

For your signature is a letter to General Ne Win confirming  
his acceptance of September 8 - 10 for the Washington part  
of his state visit.

 W. A. Rostow

Attachment

RECEIVED  
W. MARVIN WATSON

1966 MAY 17 PM 3 28



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


May 17, 1966

Dear General Ne Win:

I am delighted to learn from Ambassador Byroade that September 8-10 will be a convenient time for you and Mrs. Ne Win to visit Washington, and I hope that you will find it possible at that time also to visit other places in the United States which would be of interest to you. You can be assured of a most cordial welcome by the American people.

Mrs. Johnson and I look forward to this opportunity to meet you and Mrs. Ne Win personally and to reaffirm the bonds of friendship which have traditionally existed between our two countries.

Sincerely,



His Excellency  
General Ne Win  
Chairman of the Revolutionary  
Council of the Union of Burma  
Rangoon

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DCA NARS, Date 1-26-84



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, May 17, 1966 - 1:05 pm

To Pres 75

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bosch Threatens to Pull the PRD Out of the Elections

The attached memorandum covering a series of telephone calls with Ambassador Bunker late last night and early this morning describe Bosch's latest threat to take himself and the PRD Party out of the elections.

If this were to happen, the elections would no longer be meaningful, but we would have to go through with them.

Inter-American Human Rights Commission Chairman Bianchi has already talked to Bosch in an effort to get him to remain in the race. So did one of Garcia Godoy's advisers. Ellsworth Bunker and John Crimmins are planning to see him during the course of the day. We cannot put ourselves in the position of pleading with Bosch to stay in the race. But it will be useful -- and good for the record -- if Ellsworth goes over with Bosch the implications of his move and reassures him of fullest OAS cooperation in the holding of free elections.

Bosch has taken this step because of the alleged harrassment of the PRD by the Army. Bunker and the Embassy report that they have no information which would substantiate this type of action by either the Armed Forces or the police. Garcia Godoy's explanation that Bosch is fearful of defeat at the polls and of inability to govern should he win is probably closer to the truth.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 86-287  
By ig, NARA, Date 1-10-89

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May 16 and May 17, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

SUBJECT: Dominican Republic

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-287

By sp, NARA, Date 1-10-89

Bunker's Call at 9:35 p.m. May 16

Bunker called at 9:35 p.m. to report that Bosch was threatening to pull out of the race. He said that Inter-American Human Rights Commission Chairman Bianchi had visited Bosch during the afternoon. Bosch told him that in view of the Army's harassment of the PRD, it was futile to continue with the elections and he was resigning. Bianchi told Bosch that this was "absurd" and "catastrophic" and asked him what would happen after his resignation. Bosch, with a shrug of the shoulders, replied that the revolution would resume and he would be the first victim. Bianchi told Bunker Bosch was not in an agitated state of mind and seemed to be quite calm and matter-of-fact throughout the conversation.

Bianchi told Bunker that as he was going into Bosch's house, former Constitutionalist leader Jottin Cury was leaving. In their brief exchange, Cury complained about harassment of the PRD by the Armed Forces, including the police and laid all the blame on the United States. Bianchi observed that in his conversation with Bosch, Bosch had complained only about the Army and not the police. Bosch specifically referred to the good job which police Chief Morrillo was doing.

Bunker stated that he and Charge Crimmins were going to see Garcia Godoy at 10:00 p.m. (Washington time) to discuss Bosch's contemplated action. Bunker commented that the Embassy had no reports bearing out Bosch's contention of harassment by the Army against the PRD. Bunker said that for the record it might be advisable for him and Crimmins to call on Bosch tomorrow, but he first wanted to obtain Garcia Godoy's views.

Bunker's Call at 11:50 p.m. May 16

Bunker called again to report on his conversation with Garcia Godoy. Garcia Godoy told him that he had much the same report about Bosch's intentions from Chan Aquino who had gone to see Bosch after word had reached the Palace that Bosch was planning to quit. Garcia Godoy attributed Bosch's reported decision to indications that the PRD was losing ground to Balaguer's PR Party and to the fact that, if elected,

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Bosch is fearful that he would not be allowed to govern. Garcia Godoy was doubtful that much could be accomplished by a visit by Bunker to Bosch, although he raised no objections. He pointed out that the PRD Executive Committee was still in session and it would be advisable to wait until their decision is known.

Bunker's Call at 12:30 a.m., May 17.

Bunker reported that the PRD Executive Committee had talked Bosch into a 48-hour postponement of his decision to quit. At the Committee session, it was agreed that on May 17 Bosch would give the Provisional Government an ultimatum of 48 hours to guarantee protection to the PRD and guarantee free elections. If within this period the Provisional Government did not comply, then Bosch and the PRD would withdraw from the election campaign.

Bunker said that he had not made up his mind whether to call on Bosch on May 17, but would reach a decision in the morning. Before acting on it he would check with Washington to make sure that it was agreeable up here that he should do so. Bunker again said that the call on Bosch, if made, would be more for the record than anything else. He indicated that he did not want to appear to be begging that Bosch remain in the race, nor did he want to play into Bosch's hands by placing himself in a position where Bosch would try to obtain assurances that the United States would back him.

Bunker's Call at 9:00 a.m., May 17

Bunker reported that PRD Secretary General Martinez Francisco had confirmed that the PRD Executive Committee had decided to call for a "48-hour cessation of political activity" during which the Provisional Government would be asked to take "corrective action" to stop harassment of the PRD. If the Provisional Government failed to take the necessary action, then the PRD would pull out from the race. Bunker reported that the PRSC Party (Social Christians) would probably also announce that they were joining the PRD in the ultimatum.

William G. Bowdler

cc - Mr. Rostow  
Mr. Bill Moyers  
Mr. Linc Gordon  
Mr. Hayes Redmon  
Mr. Bill Broe

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 17, 1966  
Tuesday, 11:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Prime Minister Wilson unburdened himself in his talk with Senator Church. His comments on UK entrance into the Common Market confirm the other information I sent along yesterday. It will make him a bit soft on the French these days.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment - London 5440

cc: Moya  
Kutson



~~THE WHITE HOUSE~~  
~~WASHINGTON~~

~~Tuesday, May 17, 1966, 10:00 a.m. ☐~~

This recommendation from Secretary Rusk is something of a landmark since it recommends to you that we begin to shift off our present policy toward Communist China in the UN, starting with talks in Taipei.

I have the following thoughts, aside from underlining the need for the highest degree of security:

1. On the domestic scene it would be helpful if General Eisenhower could be brought aboard at some appropriate stage. I believe he warned President Kennedy that this was the only issue in foreign policy where he might take out after him. If the facts were laid before him by Secretary Rusk, and you put the issue to him, it seems to me possible that -- as in the case of birth control -- he might shift his position.

2. We are putting a heavy burden on a new ambassador to ask McConaughy to take up this question with the Chinese on Formosa immediately after his arrival. In traditional oriental style, a shadow may lie across his term as ambassador, as a bringer of bad news. It may be wise to let Averell start the conversation. At least the question ought to be put to Secretary Rusk.

3. It may be wise to caution the Canadians hard against a leak, since we plan to tell them of our Taipei probe.

4. Before approving finally the Taipei probe, you may wish to have a final session walking around the problem.

Set up a meeting

Let it go

**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

**NLJ** 98-320

By ics, NARA Date 3-25-99

Miss Roberts 10:48 am

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON~~TOP SECRET~~

May 14, 1966

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Need for New Tactics on  
Chinese RepresentationRecommendation

As you requested, Ambassador Goldberg and I have reviewed the problem of Chinese Representation at the next United Nations General Assembly to see whether the onus can be shifted more clearly to the Chinese Communists for their exclusion.

There appears to be little prospect that our traditional position will be sustained by the forthcoming General Assembly. In the last Assembly there was a tie vote, and the question whether a two-thirds majority is required was sustained by a very small margin. The two principal alternatives which have been discussed in the General Assembly, as an alternative to our traditional position, have been (a) a resolution expelling Taipei and seating Peking and (b) a resolution inviting Peking to take a seat while retaining Taipei as a member. The second alternative would almost certainly not be accepted by Peking and would be far preferable from the point of view of the United States.

We recommend that you authorize us to discuss these tactical problems with the Republic of China in Taipei in an attempt to get them to stand steady, rather than withdraw from the UN, if parties other than the United States develop a "two Chinas" tactic at the 21st General Assembly along the lines indicated in the discussion below.

Similarly, we should discuss the tactics with certain other countries, in the first instance with Canada and Japan.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

**DECLASSIFIED****E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6****NLJ 97-112****By is, NARA Date 11-10-98**~~TOP SECRET~~



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### Discussion

Both Ambassador Goldberg and I conclude that relying on our previous tactics on Chinese Representation involves an unacceptable risk of defeat and expenditure of U.S. influence. As you know, in the past our approach has consisted of obtaining Assembly agreement that any change in Chinese Representation requires a two-thirds majority and defeating resolutions calling for the replacement of Chinese Nationalists by the Chinese Communists. A number of our friends, such as the Canadians, are no longer prepared to go along with this approach. If we do not now devise new tactics, we might see the next Assembly evict the GRC and invite the Chinese Communists to occupy the Chinese seat in all UN organs. The international and domestic repercussions of such a development would be strongly adverse to us.

In canvassing the alternatives, we concluded that one course with the fewest risks involves a "two-Chinas" approach, and that we should not oppose such a course if others raise it. The objective would be to reaffirm that the GRC has a right to representation in the UN, while opening the possibility for the Chinese Communists likewise to be seated. We would seek to confine this proposition in the first instance to the General Assembly, leaving the question of China's Security Council seat in abeyance until Peking is actually in the Assembly.

If unexpectedly Peking were to make a complete reversal and decide to take a seat in the Assembly along with the Republic of China, the Chinese seat in the Security Council would be at once at issue. While there would be great difficulty in retaining Chinese Nationalist representation in the Security Council, it might be possible to avoid seating the Communists pending a study of the whole question of permanent membership in the Council.

Both Peking and the Republic of China will vigorously resist any two-Chinas solution. Our first problem, therefore, will be to convince the GRC that our shift in tactics is

required

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required to avoid total defeat and is designed to assure them continuing representation in the United Nations. We would add that if they accepted the two-Chinas outcome, there is every present prospect, although without complete certainty, that Peking would not take a seat in the Assembly.

Domestic opinion in this country would be more receptive today than formerly to such a shift in our policy. A Gallup Poll taken last month indicates that 56% of those questioned would favor Red China's admission to the UN if this would improve relations between us. The recent Congressional debate also indicates a moderation of sentiment on this subject, as does the general reaction to the steps we have taken offering the opportunity for increased contacts if the Chinese Communists desire them.

Our plan would be to have Ambassador McConaughy, shortly after he arrives, take up the question with the Chinese, inform them of our decision to shift our policy as the best way to protect the position of the Republic of China in the Assembly, and explain to the Chinese that the best way to continue to exclude Red China would be for the Republic of China to hold on to its seat in the Assembly. In addition, we would ask Governor Harriman some time in June to make a supplementary approach along the same lines. I intend to be in Taipei in early July and I could do any follow-up work necessary to tie this down.

Ambassador Goldberg and Assistant Secretary Sisco will be in Ottawa on May 16 to have a full day's discussion on UN matters. The Canadians are very anxious to be "unleashed" on this question, and the Pearson statement of the other day, for all practical purposes, puts the Canadians publicly in favor of a two-Chinas solution. Ambassador Goldberg and I are agreed that we should hold off the Canadians from launching a new tactic until we have had fuller discussions with the Chinese in Taipei. However, the indications are that the Canadian ideas are already reasonably well developed. Rather

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than run the risk of the Canadians developing a new tactic inconsistent with our objectives, Ambassador Goldberg and I are agreed that he should indicate great interest on our part to consult fully with the Canadians on the details of a new strategy on the understanding no new move will be launched by them pending our discussions in Taipei in June.

Congressional consultations would await further exploration with Taipei.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

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sent on 3470  
 Mr Rostow said  
 Mr Watson cleared  
 with Pres 5/16/66  
 + notified S/S.

PERSONAL FOR PORTER FROM THE SECRETARY

3.4(b)(1)

Your 4652 [ ] on political moves being prepared by

Thi, Dinh and others indicate great urgency maximum effort on our part to grapple with question of solidarity. Believe following steps should be taken as quickly as possible:

1. You should see General Ky and press him for Directorate's plans for achieving solidarity. What is he doing to insure that General Lam continues in full support of government? What support can be given to Province Chief Khoa? What can be done to salvage Dinh? What can be done to pull General Ehl away from course of action which could even lead to some sort of deal with Viet Cong?
2. You should use whatever resources are available to establish direct contact with General Lam to emphasize importance of Second Division solidarity with government; similarly with General Dinh. You should also arrange for someone like Wilson to have a far-ranging and penetrating discussion with Thi. If in such conversations the issue appears to be Thieu and Ky, we should emphasize that announced plans for moving

S:DRusk:ark 5/13/68

S - The Secretary

G - Mr. Johnson  
 FE - Mr. Bundy  
 S/S -

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SANITIZED  
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
 NLJ 98-319

By cb, NARA Date 8-25-99

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to a constitutional government removes that issue and that the South Vietnamese should not tear themselves to pieces over the question of how many months a particular government remains in office after it has committed itself to procedures which would result in a new government. Point should also be emphasized that central issue is whether South Vietnamese are going to have their own country to quarrel about or whether Viet Cong and Hanoi will take that country away from them. It is incomprehensible to us that personal rivalries among individuals or temporary differences on political matters should be allowed to paralyze South Viet-Nam in the face of a common enemy.

3. I once again emphasize that the ability of the U.S. to assist South Viet-Nam to turn back aggression from the north depends crucially upon the solidarity of the South Vietnamese on this issue. We must find some way to emphasize privately to all of these leaders, regardless of their differences among themselves, that the American people are becoming fed up with the games they are playing while the American people are being asked to sustain such major burdens to assure that they have a country to quarrel about.

4. We greatly appreciate the job you're doing and your detailed reporting.

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Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telegraph Branch

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*[Handwritten signature]*

May 16, 1966

TO: Mr. Marvin Watson

Mr. Rostow has a copy of the attached telegram. Sec. Rusk wanted him to clear it with the President tonight. Mr. Rostow thinks if the President can look at it before dinner, that would be good. Otherwise Mr. Rostow will clear it with the President tonight at the dinner.

L. Nivens  
Secretary to Mr. Rostow

✓  
*sent in 3470 NODIS to Saigon*

## LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM

1. Sent by: DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
2. TO: WH  
(Msg. No.) 433

3. Transmitted by: W. Bachstetter  
Date & Time: MAY 16 PM 7 25

4. Received by: W. DeLoach  
Date & Time: 16 May 66 1934

5. Description: Draft NODIS cable to ~~QXXX~~ Amembassy SAIGON

6. Clsfn & Controls: TOP SECRET

7. No. of Pgs. 2 8. Precedence IMMED 9. Validated by: F. Kelley

10. Deliver to: Mr. Bromley Smith  
The White House  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

For: Clearance X  
Information X  
Per Request \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_



## MEMORANDUM

13

79

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 16, 1966 -- 7:05 p. m.

10:10  
7:40

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Ceylonese Prime Minister Senanayake has written you outlining his own economic progress and urging you to support his request for \$100 million in aid this year. Potential aid donors meet later this week under World Bank auspices to consider this request.

Ceylon has surprised us by accepting a tough International Monetary Fund stabilization program. If Senanayake goes through with it, we are optimistic that Ceylon can show significant progress over the next 3-4 years.

However, we doubt donors will come through with much more than \$50 million (US maybe \$15 million as last year, half food) at the Bank meeting. That will keep the pressure on, and we can still consider a little more early next year if performance justifies.

The suggested reply attached for your approval applauds his efforts so far and lays the groundwork for his getting only about half the aid he wants, though the door is left open for further help beyond the next six months if their self-help efforts are sustained.

*Walt*  
W. Rostow

Approved ✓

See me \_\_\_\_\_

*Saunders & State informed*  
*5/17/66*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 86-287  
By inf, NARA, Date 1-10-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

79a

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of May 6. I recall with pleasure our talk while you were in Washington recently, and am glad that you had the opportunity to exchange views with others in this Government as well.

I appreciate your providing me with your assessment of some of the problems inherited by your Government, as well as some of your accomplishments since taking office a little over a year ago. We are aware of the many difficulties that still lie ahead for you, and are encouraged by the steps that you are taking to meet them.

We look forward to participating in the World Bank meeting in London on May 19, and to discussing Ceylon's requirements and performance with the other donor countries. Subject of course to the overriding authority of the U. S. Congress, we want to do our part to help carry out whatever plans are made at this meeting.

With every good wish for your continued good health, and for the success of your Government,

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Dudley Senanayake,  
Prime Minister,  
Colombo.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 86-287  
By ing, NARA, Date 1-10-89

MEMORANDUM

15  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, May 16, 1966, 7:00 p.m.

80  
5  
Leid 7:40?

Mr. President

Ambassador Bruce is anxious to see you; and with a whole range of NATO and other problems coming up, involving the British, I think it is a good idea. He is available

all day Tuesday \_\_\_\_\_

Wednesday P.M. ☒ \_\_\_\_\_

all day Thursday ☒ \_\_\_\_\_

If you approve, which time would be most convenient to you?

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Walt R.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 86-288  
By ig, NARA, Date 10-5-88

11:30 Thursday 19th

Cy next in June 5/17

S/S asked to inform Bruce

Brian refused 5/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

81  
17

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 16, 1966  
6:35 P.M., Monday

Mr. President:

This is an interesting cable from  
Thanat in Thailand. Amidst our  
day-to-day difficulties with the  
political situation in Vietnam I  
thought, in particular, you would find his  
comments in para. 4 and the first part  
of para. 5 of some comfort.

W. R.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-288

By ing, NARA, Date 10-5-88

~~SECRET~~



81a

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec 3.3  
State Dept. Guidelines

~~SECRET~~

By pn, NARA, Date 5-21-98

Copy of BANGKOK 2464 16 May 1966

1. During my call on Thanat last evening prior to my departure for consultations, he listed the following as salient points of Thai reactions to current state of affairs in South Vietnam and Laos.
2. He said he had just heard of new intimations of trouble in Danang and Hue. I said I had not received such reports. Thanat said he felt odds about even whether there would be further Buddhist street demonstrations in reaction to recent press statements of Ky. He said Thai reports from Saigon and from Ceylon, where Thich Tam Chau is attending World Buddhist Sangha, indicated a bit of uneasiness that in the last massive resort to the streets, things had gotten almost beyond the power of Tri Quang clique to control. He believed that future maneuvering, which was bound to continue, might be more cautious. He said that Thai believed the Buddhists had no wish to create anarchy, but were vitally conceived to have a greater voice -- the principal voice, if they could manage it -- in creation of new government. Rightly or wrongly, he thought, the Buddhists believed they had been denied voice and influence proportionate to their numbers. He believed that if the pace of progress toward new government could be maintained, subsequent events would unfold all right. The primary danger, he thought, might be over-identification of Americans with one or other of the contending factions to the extent that a violent reaction of frustration might arise from the faction not so favored.
3. He realized it was easy to give advice, but not so easy to follow it. He said he also realized the necessity for American leaders to speak out to put things in proper perspective to the domestic audience in the U. S. Nevertheless, he hoped this could be kept to a minimum.
4. Thanat said it had been his observation that Americans tended to demand a scenario, outlining logically each successive move leading to a pre-determined desired objective. Attempting to apply this technique to Vietnamese political evolution would not be useful, since Vietnamese failure to follow exact script led some Americans to feeling of hopelessness, frustration, and defeatism. Thanat thought life generally defied such precise future projections, and that life in Asia made such an undertaking impossible. Yet, he said, it was still possible, at least for an Asian, to measure with some accuracy a progression of attitudes, of feelings, of general direction of movement in the evolution of a climate of opinion. In this sense, he said it appeared to Thai that we were in very good shape indeed in South Vietnam.
5. On the political side, he said that Thai had concluded it is extremely unlikely that any government emerging in South Vietnam, or its successor, or its successor's successor would ask Americans to leave. He said this assumption is based on further assessment that American leaders are tough enough not to be pushed into heavy-handed political intervention by domestic



~~SECRET~~

Copy of Bangkok 2464

-2-

5/16/66

political considerations. He said he also assumed we would exert every effort to avoid repetition of the incident in Saigon where panic of American MP's resulted in indiscriminate killing of several South Vietnamese. He asked if I followed regularly the outpouring of propaganda from Radio Free Thai, Radio Peiping and Hanoi, and recently from Moscow. I said I did. He asked whether summaries of this material was made for top level in Washington and whether it was read. I said it was, and I was sure it was followed closely. Then, Thanat said, he did not have to stress that this incident had provided for the first time some credibility for white-yellow overtones of this propaganda outpouring.

6. On the military side, Thanat said it seems to him (garbled), we had been amazingly successful in view of the massive intervention of regular North Vietnamese army units to reinforce the Viet Cong. The success of Westmoreland in denying redoubt areas and destruction of ammunition and food reserves would make an extensive monsoon campaign difficult, if not impossible, without a massive supply effort through Cambodia, through Laos corridor, and by sea. He assumed we would exert massive effort to impede such reinforcements. This would compress the Communists in Laos and Northeastern Cambodia and would probably greatly intensify the insurgent effort in Northeast Thailand. These factors raised gravest issues for Thai security, he said, and he wished me to inform the Secretary that he wished to go into them in some detail when next they met at Canberra.

7. Thanat concluded by saying a principal reason he had fought so hard to get open announcement of Thai participation, even though this obviously greatly increased Thai vulnerability, was to support President Johnson by making clear the complete and irreversible commitment of the Thai. It was this argument, he said, which had finally brought the Prime Minister around. I asked if this also removed the most difficult restrictions on public comment of our permission to use Thai bases. He said, not yet but perhaps soon.

Martin.

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

16 ✓ 82  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

May 16, 1966  
Monday, 6:30 P.M.

Rec'd  
7:40

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk has asked me to serve at the CIAP for the meetings scheduled May 21-23, Saturday through Monday. He and I agree that we must find a successor soon; but it would be bad for our policy if there were no U.S. member in this rather tender moment in the Alliance for Progress.

If you agree, I shall manage somehow to attend most of the meetings and keep an eye on the shop.

W.A.F. R.

✓  
Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Stay home \_\_\_\_\_

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

14  
30  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Mon., May 16, 1966

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

3:15 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

David Bruce sent me these notes of a meeting with Prime Minister Wilson.

As you see, he asked for no circulation, and will explain why when he is here.

I thought you ought to note:

- how much de Gaulle's anti-Germanism, getting into the Common Market, and detente with Moscow really tempts him;
- his nuclear line;
- his position on "installations at Hanoi or Haiphong," with which we shall have to deal.

It shall go no further.

W. H. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By           , NARA, Date 2-10-98

83a

2-1

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON

May 11, 1966

~~SECRET~~

Dear Walt:

I am enclosing to you <sup>the</sup> only copy of a memorandum I made after a long talk with the Prime Minister this morning. I hope it may be useful to you, and I can develop some of the points involved, if you wish, when I am there next week.

In regard to the visits to Hong Kong of American vessels, especially the impending one of the nuclear powered aircraft carrier Enterprise, I think the Prime Minister, when the final decision is put up to him--which it has not yet been--will certainly in the first instance wish to refuse. The Navy people here have been exercising all the pressures they can within the British Naval establishment, but this is primarily a political matter, regarding which the Prime Minister is especially sensitive.

I do not think any circulation should be given to this memorandum, for reasons I will explain to you when I see you. I have sent it only to you.

Very sincerely yours,

*David*

David Bruce

The Honorable  
Walt W. Rostow,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-319  
By CB, NARA Date 8-25-99

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

May 11, 1966 - Wednesday

I went to see the Prime Minister this morning. He said he had several matters I might wish to bear in mind in connection with talks I might have with the President.

1. He had not decided whether the more favorable attitude toward Great Britain ascribed to General de Gaulle sprung from a change in the General's tactics, or represented a real feeling that Great Britain was a proper subject for inclusion in a European grouping. He thought it possible the General, since he was more strongly anti-American than anti-British, might in time wish to offer the British admittance to the Common Market on condition they would then join him in opposition to what the General considered the present domination of Nato by the United States. Wilson said he had made it abundantly clear in the past to the General that he regarded the close ties of his country with us as being of overriding importance. In respect to the Common Market, he thought that if Britain could enter it without any political conditions, such as those he had speculated about, it would probably be advisable to do so, although he would continue to insist on some of the terms previously stipulated by the Labour Party as necessary. He mentioned, in connection with the deal apparently just concluded by the Common Market countries over agriculture, that this would make entry by the UK additionally difficult.

2. In view of the General's now seemingly constant contempt for the Germans and his references to them as a conquered people, he thinks the atmosphere in Europe of the Six has become increasingly unsatisfactory.

3. Referring to his private conversations, some time ago, with Kosygin, he believes the Russians are adamant against signing any non-proliferation treaty or indeed expanding the test ban, unless the Germans are prohibited from acquiring nuclear hardware. He did not know whether, if McNamara Committee membership satisfied the Germans, this would not



~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

be enough to placate the Russians on the subject of nuclear sharing, but was inclined to think there was a good chance of its doing so. He also thought it probably was inopportune for the West to reach a decision on nuclear sharing until we had straightened out our Nato difficulties.

4. He attaches great importance to the current Rhodesian negotiations. The initiative had come from Smith. He feels that the economic and financial situation in Rhodesia is steadily deteriorating, and that sanctions have had a real effect on the economy. Although he does not anticipate a solution being reached during the present round of discussions, he wants to keep the talks going, with the hope of later finding a compromise tolerable to each side. He thinks Smith is the best instrument to this end, and if he is repudiated by his right wing and forced out of office it would cause such a ferment in Rhodesia, where Smith continues to be the most popular politician with the white population, that an agreement between Smith and the British Government <sup>might</sup> ~~could probably~~ be made despite strong objections from a stubborn minority.

5. I spoke to him about the demand made by us for the nuclear powered aircraft carrier Enterprise to visit Hong Kong in the near future. I said I expected this matter to be discussed by Paul Nitze, when he comes here next week, with the British Naval authorities. The Prime Minister said he was familiar with the difficulties in the past resulting from American leave ships and other vessels using the Hong Kong Harbor, and that the Enterprise scheduling would cause him great difficulties.

6. Regarding Vietnam, he thought from what he had heard our military campaign was doing well, but that Marshall Ky seemed unnecessarily given to foolish utterances. If the United States were to bomb installations at Hanoi or Haiphong, the British Government, as he had told the President, and as he had announced in the House of Commons, could not support such action on the part of the United States.

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 16, 1966  
1:50 pm

to P 84

MR. PRESIDENT:

In your meeting with the Portuguese Ambassador at 2:00 this afternoon, he will be told beforehand:

- a) it is brief;
- b) you will have no substantive comment.

You may wish to confine yourself in response to saying we hope the Rhodesian issue can be settled by negotiation in ways acceptable to all parties-- if you wish to say anything beyond -- thanks.

W. W. Rostow



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Meeting with the President on Viet Nam

Monday, May 16, 1966, 12:15 pm

AGENDA

1. Current Situation (Sect. Rusk)
  - preventing civil war
2. Political Policy (Sect. Rusk)
  - a) Election and constitutional problems
  - b) Organizational proposals
3. Economic Policy (Mr. Komer)
  - a) Eliminating supply bottlenecks
  - b) Monetary policy
  - c) Negotiating strategy
  - d) Expansion of Pacification Effort  
and Manpower problems
  - e) Land reform

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DCH NARS, Date 11-26-84

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED  
W. MARVIN WATSON

1966 MAY 16 AM 9 13

to P

Mon., May 16, 1966  
10:00 am

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here's Westy's reply to: "Who's ducking whom."

His answer: mainly the VC ducking the ARVN  
and us.

Bob McNamara and CINCPAC rate the political  
element higher.

All hands agree that proof will come if and when  
the VC launch a monsoon offensive.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP~~ SECRET attachment

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, May 16, 1966

FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND: *Hawaii 1529*

The overriding factor involved in the level of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces activities has been the apparent enemy strategy of avoiding combat. Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army attacks, ambushes and incidents have shown a marked decrease over the past few months. Preparations for a monsoon offensive as well as avoidance of any actions which might reverse the trend of political unrest, particularly in the northern First Corps Zone may be the reasons for reduction of enemy activity.

With the above in mind, the following are my views with respect to your comments and questions:

A. Those of a combat nature:

1. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces reporting system gives a distorted impression of battalion size operations. In each Corps Tactical Zone, company size operations are totalled and divided by three to arrive at a number of battalion size operations. This includes Rural Forces, Popular Forces, CIDG, Vietnamese and Marine units. As a result of territorial defense responsibilities, it is the exception rather than the rule for Army of Vietnam and Rural Force battalions to conduct battalion size operations. Most Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces killed in action are the result of enemy initiated attacks and incidents. Hence, the decrease in the number killed in action is the result of the lessening in enemy activity rather than any falling off in the number of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces battalion size operations.

2. Although it is demonstrable that Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces units have always been less aggressive than U.S. units, I believe that the present reduced Army of Vietnam contact results primarily from enemy avoidance of combat coupled in lesser degree with decreased tempo of activity brought on by unseasonably early monsoon rains.

B. Non-combat factors:

1. There have been machinations by certain Buddhist chaplains which could grow into serious proportions. At this time, it is limited primarily to the First Army of Vietnam

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356 Sec 3.3  
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988  
By *rg* NARA Date *11/8/85*



Division. We are watching this development carefully. General Vien has informed me that the Joint Groups Staff and Directorate have the problem under surveillance.

2. The thesis that the First Corps is in a sense now detached from the rest of South Vietnam appears to overstate the case. Despite struggle movement leanings, the First Army of Vietnam Division has carried out its programmed operations in a reliable manner. The Second Army of Vietnam Division presently is unaffected by the political unrest in Hue and Danang. Admittedly, General Dinh's progress in bringing his entire corps back to the support of the Government of Vietnam has been slower than desired. However, he has stated from the outset of this appointment that it was his intention to move slowly and carefully. I believe he has been reasonably successful.

With respect to your question to me:

A. What is my interpretation of the low level of Army of Vietnam activity over the past two weeks? Our records indicate that there has been only a slight decrease in the number of operations. The marked decrease in results I attribute to enemy avoidance of contact for the reasons cited above.

B. Is Army of Vietnam operational activity below the norm? There has been no pronounced downward trend. Although Army of Vietnam battalion sized operations have shown a slight decrease, small unit operations have increased somewhat.

ab C. If so, what in my judgment are the causes? The salient cause that affects Army of Vietnam as well as U.S./Free World forces is inability to find and fix an enemy who is intent at the moment on avoiding contact. The early arrival of the monsoon season has complicated the problem.

D. If so, what can we do about it? We can and will continue our efforts to increase Army of Vietnam effectiveness and participation at all levels in coordinated operations with U.S./Free World forces.

Monday, May 16, 1966 -- 9:55 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara -- with my support -- suggest we keep the formal part of the 12:15 p. m. Viet Nam meeting today relatively short, giving you time to talk with a small group (Rusk, McNamara, Lodge, Bill Moyers and myself) before Lodge leaves.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, May 16, 1966 -- 9:35 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You were good enough on Sunday morning to urge me to fight for more of your time on foreign policy.

I have been -- and shall remain -- anxious not to take your time except when there are:

- issues worthy of your attention; and
- well prepared materials.

As a result of your initiatives, I have been working with the town and we shall, in the days ahead, be bringing to you problems and possibilities in:

- NATO (the negotiating issue plus a constructive package);
- Africa (perhaps an important initiative on May 26);
- Latin America (my report on South American frontiers, plus other Latin American issues);
- A formal kick-off of our plan for outside consultants in each major bureau of State.

And there will be others.

In short, we are determined not to let the day-to-day tasks and crises keep us from fulfilling your injunction to generate new ideas and initiatives. But the proof of the pudding will be what actually emerges.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-287

By mg, NARA, Date 1-10-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~