

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

189

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	to President from Lodge re: Vietnam secret <i>open 8-7-87 NLJ 87-95</i>	2 p 06/10/66	A
#2 message	to President from PM Wilson top secret <i>open 7/21/98</i>	1 p 06/10/66	A
#2b message	to President from PM Wilson top secret <i>OPEN 2-11-98 NLJ 88-171</i> <i>(dup of #4b - Files of W. Wilson Visit, Box 12)</i>	2 p 06/10/66	A
#4a cable	text of Rawalpindi 762 <i>Sent 7/12/66 MS 98-326</i> secret	2 p 06/10/66	A
#5a cable	Paris 8631 <i>open 8-7-87 NLJ 87-101</i> possible classified info	1 p 06/09/66	A
#6 memo	to President from Rostow re: East-West policy secret <i>open 5-15-90 NLJ 87-99</i>	2 p 06/10/66	A
#7 memo	to President from W. W. Rostow " secret	1 p 06/10/66	A
#8a cable	text of Vientiane cable from Sullivan <i>open 7/21/98</i> secret <i>Paritized 8-7-87 NLJ 87-95</i>	1 p 06/09/66	A
#9 memo	to President from Rostow re: Vietnam xxx secret <i>open 12-22-88 NLJ 87-96</i>	1 p 06/10/66	A
#12a memo	to President from Dean Rusk secret <i>open 3-19-90 NLJ 87-101</i>	2 p 05/27/66	A
#12b letter	to PM Salazar from Pres. Johnson possible classified info <i>open 5-15-90 NLJ 87-99</i>	2 p 06/10/66	A
#12c letter	to President Johnson from PM of Portugal possible classified info <i>open 10-12-99 NLJ 98-326</i>	1 p 05/11/66	A
#13 memo	to SecDef from Pres. Johnson <i>open 7/21/98</i> secret	1 p 06/10/66	A
#15 memo	to President from WWR re: King Faisal confidential <i>open 01/24/89 NLJ 87-100</i>	2 p 06/09/66	A
#16 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 5-15-90 NLJ 87-99</i>	1 p 06/09/66	A
#17 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 12-22-88 NLJ 87-96</i>	1 p 06/09/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President
Walt Rostow, vol. 5, May 27 - June 10, 1966
Box 8

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#19a cable	text of Secto 94 re: Germany sanitized 3-14-90 NLS 87-101 secret open 7/21/98 2 p	06/09/66	A
#20 memo	to President from Rostow re: Cuba secret Exempt NLS 87-99 open 7/21/98 1 p	06/09/66	A
#21 memo	to President from Rostow secret open 01/24/89 NLS 97-100 1 p	06/09/66	A
#21a N3 memo	National Security Action Memo No. 351 secret open 01/24/89 NLS 87-100 2 p	undated	A
#22 memo	to President from Rostow re: Schick Visit confidential open 9-7-89 NLS 87-98 1 p	06/08/66	A
#23 memo	to President from Rostow secret open 5-15-90 NLS 87-99 1 p	06/08/66	A
#23a memo	xxx to President from Cyrus Vance secret open 8-13-98 NLS 98-324 1 p	05/30/66	A
#23c memo	to President from Rostow open 7/21/98 secret sanitized 5-15-90 NLS 87-99 1 p	05/21/66	A
#23d memo	to President from Cyrus Vance open 12-26-89 NLS 88-58 secret 1 p	05/16/66	A
#23e report	SAC Program secret " 1 p	05/06/66 undated	A
#23f map	re: Airborne secret " 1 p	undated	A
#23g memo	to SecDef from Pres. Johnson open 7/21/98 secret 1 p	06/10/66	A
#24 memo	to President from Rostow confidential open 5-15-90 NLS 87-99 1 p	06/08/66	A
#26b report	re: Indonesia OPEN 9-14-99 NLS 98-325 Secret [sanitized 12-10-79] 6 p	undated	A
#27 memo	to President from Rostow re: Saigon 5379 Secret open 12-22-88 NLS 87-96 1 p	06/08/66	A
#27a cable	text of Saigon 5379 duplicate of #72, NSFCF, VN, sanitized 2-25-94 NLS 93-472 secret Exempt NLS 87-95 NDATS, Vol 3(A) 2 p	06/08/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#31 memo	to President from Rostow top secret <i>open 12-12-91 NLS 88-55</i>	1 p 06/08/66	A
#31a cable	text of Secto 87 <i>Exempt NLS 88-54</i> top secret <i>open 9-14-99 NLS 98-325</i>	1 p 06/08/66	A
#32 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 12-22-88 NLS 87-96</i>	1 p 06/08/66	A
#33 memo	to President from Rostow re: Argentina confidential <i>open 9-7-89 NLS 87-98</i>	2 p 06/08/66	A
#33a letter	to President Illia from Pres. Johnson possible classified into <i>open 9-7-89 NLS 87-98</i>	2 p undated	A
#33b letter	to President Johnson from Pres. Illia possible classified info <i>open 7/21/98</i>	2 p 03/66	A
#35 memo	to President from Rostow top secret <i>sanitized 11-4-99 NLS 98-328</i>	1 p 06/07/66 xxxxxx	A
#35a memo	to Rostow from Clifford <i>sanitized 10-30-99</i> top secret <i>Exempt NLS 89-42 NLS 98-329</i> <i>open 10/23/09</i>	1 p undated	A
#35b memo	to President from Clifford <i>sanitized 10-30-99</i> top secret <i>Exempt NLS 89-42 NLS 98-329</i> <i>open 10/23/09</i>	1 p 06/03/66	A
#35c report	military report <i>sanitized 10-30-99 NLS 98-329</i> top secret <i>Exempt NLS 89-42</i> <i>open 10/23/09</i>	2 p 05/12/66	A
#38 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 9-7-89 NLS 87-98</i>	1 p 06/07/66	A
#38a cable	from Amb. Bunker in Santo Domingo confidential <i>open 7/21/98</i> <i>sanitized 8-7-87 NLS 87-97</i>	2 p 06/06/66	A
#40 memo	to President from Rostow re: Senegal Amb. Diop confidential <i>open 01/24/89 NLS 87-100</i>	1 p 06/07/66	A
#41 memo	to President from Rostow re: Abe Feinberg secret [sanitized 3/13/79] <i>open 7/21/98</i>	1 p 06/07/66	A
#42 memo	to President from Rostow re: Foreign Policy Briefings Secret <i>open 5-15-90 NLS 87-99</i>	2 p 06/07/66xx	A
#43 memo	to President from Rostow re: Kenya confidential <i>open 01/24/89 NLS 87-100</i>	1 p 06/06/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#43a letter	to President Kenyatta from Pres Johnson possible classified info <i>open 01/24/89 NLS 87-1001 p</i>	undated	A
#44 memo	to President from Rostow re: Korea confidential <i>open 4-26-91 NLS 91-8 1 p</i>	06/06/66	A
#44b memo	to President re: Korea <i>open 4-26-91 NLS 91-8 1 p</i>	05/28/66	A
#44c memo	to President from David Bell confidential <i>open 4-5-91 NLS 91-9 2 p</i>	05/17/66	A
#45a report	re: Vietnam confidential <i>open 4-18-88 NLS 88-56 2 p</i>	05/09/66	A
#46 memo	to President from Rostow re: Korea confidential <i>open 01/24/89 NLS 87-100 1 p</i>	06/06/66	A
#47 memo cable	for Sec Rusk from President Johnson secret <i>sanitized 3-19-90 NLS 87-101 1 p</i>	<i>open 5-15-90 NLS 87-99</i> 06/04/66	A
#47a cable	to President from Sec. Rusk in Oslo secret	06/03/66	A
#49 memo	for President from Bator secret <i>Example NLS 87-99 OPEN NLS 98-171 3-29-99 1 p</i>	06/03/66	A
#50 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>Open 5-15-90 NLS 87-99 1 p</i>	06/03/66	A
#53a cable	text of Santo Domingo 2618 confidential <i>open 8-7-87 NLS 87-97 2 p</i>	06/02/66	A
#54 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 6-29-89 NLS 87-94 1 p</i>	06/02/66	A
#55 memo	to President from Rostow re: Garcia Godoy confidential <i>open 9-7-89 NLS 87-98 1 p</i>	06/02/66	A
#56 memo <i>Aug #96, NSF, CF, D.R., 16, Box 46</i>	to President from Rostow re: Dominican Elections confidential <i>open 5-5-97 NLS 93-180 1 p</i>	06/02/66	A
#58 memo	to President from Rostow re: Dominican Elections secret <i>open 9-7-89 NLS 87-98 1 p</i>	06/02/66	A
#59a cable	Text of London 5767 secret <i>sanitized 3-19-90 NLS 87-101 2 p</i>	06/02/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#59b cable	text of London 5768 secret <i>open 8-7-87 NLJ 87-101</i>	1 p 06/02/66	A
#61 memo	to President from Bromley Smith secret <i>open 12-22-88 NLJ 87-96</i>	1 p 06/02/66	A
#61a cable	text of Saigon 5215 secret <i>open 8-7-87 NLJ 87-95</i>	4 p 06/02/66	A
#64 memo	to President from Rostow re: Visit by Nicaraguan Pres. Schick confidential <i>Open 9-7-89 NLJ 87-98</i>	2 p 06/02/66	A
#69 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>Open 7-21-89 NLJ 88-161</i>	1 p 06/01/66	A
#70 memo	to President from WWR re: possible visit of PM Bazzaz secret <i>open 01/24/89 NLJ 87-100</i>	1 p 06/01/66	A
72 memo	to President from Rostow re: re: Dominican Republic confidential <i>Open 9-7-89 NLJ 87-98</i>	1 p 06/01/66	A
#74a memo	briefing memo confidential <i>Open 3-19-90 NLJ 87-101</i>	2 p undated	A
#74b bio sketch	Edward Richard George Heath <i>Exempt 4-14-80</i> confidential <i>Exempt NLJ 88-48 NLJ 98-327</i> 2 p <i>(dup. in diary backup, 6/11/06) exempt 12/01 - NLJ 019-0087-3</i>	05/66	A
#75 memo	to President from Rostow <i>sanitized 12-22-88 NLJ 87-96</i> confidential <i>Open 7/21/98</i>	1 p 05/31/66	A
#76a cable	text of Santo Domingo 2583 Secret <i>open 8-7-87 NLJ 87-97</i>	5 p 05/31/66	A
#77a memo	to President from Rostow re: North Vietnam top secret <i>open 12-12-91 NLJ 88-55</i>	1 p 05/30/66	A
#78a memo	to Bromley Smith from Paul Nitze Secret	1 p 05/31/66	A & C
#79 memo	to President from Rostow re: Inter-American summit meeting secret <i>Open 9-7-89 NLJ 87-98</i>	1 p 05/31/66	A
#79a message	suggested message from Pres. Johnson to Inter-American summit meeting Secret <i>Open 9-7-89 NLJ 87-98</i>	1 p undated	A
#79b cable	re: proposed Inter-American Summit Meeting Secret <i>sanitized 8-7-87 NLJ 87-97</i>	5 p 05/23/66	A

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80 memo	to President from Rostow re: Warsaw confidential <i>Open 5-15-90 NLS 87-99</i>	05/31/66	A
82 memo	to President from Rostow " confidential	1 p 05/31/66	A
83a memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>Open 12-22-88 NLS 87-96</i>	1 p 05/27/66	A
83b report	re: Vietnam " Secret	2 p undated	A
83c report	re: Vietnam " secret	2 p undated	A
83d report	re: Vietnam " Secret	3 p undated	A
83e report	re: Vietnam " secret	1 p undated	A
83f report	re: Vietnam " secret	1 p undated	A
84 memo	to President from Rostow re: Dominican Republic Secret <i>Open 7/21/98 Exempt NLS 87-94</i>	1 p 05/31/66	A
86 memo	to President from Rostow re: Dominican Republic secret <i>Open 9-7-89 NLS 87-98</i>	1 p 05/31/66	A
86a memo	to President from Dean Rusk secret <i>Open 10-7-88 NLS 87-97</i>	2 p 05/30/66	A
86b message	suggested message to President of Dom. Rep. secret <i>Open 9-7-89 NLS 87-98</i>	1 p undated	A
86c report	negotiating paper for talks with Pres. elect secret <i>Open 5-17-94 NLS 92-434 appeal</i>	4 p undated	A
87 memo	to President from Rostow re: Arab refugee problem confidential <i>Open 11-12-92 NLS 91-108 Exempt NLS 87-102</i>	1 p 05/31/66	A
87a memo	to President from Dean Rusk re: Arab refugee problem confidential <i>Open 9-14-99 Exempt NLS 87-101 Exempt NLS 91-110</i>	1 p 05/30/66	A NLS 98-325
87b letter	to President Johnson from Arthur Goldberg confidential <i>Open 9-14-99 Exempt NLS 87-101</i>	5 p 05/19/66	A

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NA FORM 1429 (6-85)

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1709

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#87c memo	to WWR from Hal Saunders <i>open 11-12-92 NLS 91-108</i> confidential <i>Exempt NLS 87-100</i>	1 p	05/31/66 A
#91 memo	to President from Rostow re: desalting projects secret <i>open 01/24/89 NLS 87-100</i>	6 p	05/30/66 A
#91a memo	to President from Dean Rusk re: desalting projects <i>open 9-14-99 NLS 98-325</i> secret <i>sanitized 3-19-90 NLS 87-101</i>	2 p	05/21/66 A
#91b memo	to President from Dean Rusk re: desalting projects secret <i>open 3-19-90 NLS 87-101</i>	4 p	05/21/66 A
#91e report	staff study on Israeli and United Arab Republic Desalting Projects <i>open 9-14-99</i> Secret <i>sanitized 8-7-87 NLS 87-101</i>	6 p	undated A NLS 98-325
#92a cable	text of Saigon 5124 secret <i>open 8-7-87 NLS 87-95</i>	2 p	05/30/66 A
#95 memo	to President from Rostow re: visit of King Faisal confidential <i>Exempt NLS 87-100</i> <i>open 10-12-95 NLS 98-326</i> <i>sanitized 11-12-92 NLS 91-108</i>	1 p	05/30/66 A
#97 memo	to President from Rostow re: North Vietnam <i>open 7/2/98</i> top secret	1 p	05/30/66 A
#98 memo	to President from Rostow re: Ryukyus Islands secret <i>open 01/24/89 NLS 87-100</i>	2 p	05/30/66 A
#100 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 5-15-90 NLS 87-99</i>	1 p	05/29/66 A
#101a letter	to Mrs. Gandhi from Pres. Johnson possible classified into <i>open 01/24/89</i> <i>NLS 87-100</i>	5 p	05/30/66 A
#102 memo	to President from Rostow re: Guantanamo secret <i>open 9-7-89 NLS 87-98</i>	1 p	05/28/66 A
#103b memo	to President from Dean Rusk re: King Olav V confidential <i>open 3-19-90 NLS 87-101</i>	2 p	05/23/66 A
#104 memo dup #32 [R. 15, Box 46]	to President from Rostow <i>sanitized 6-29-89 NLS 87-94</i> <i>sanitized 6-27-94</i> secret <i>more info released 1-20-94 NLS 93-432</i> <i>more info released 5-5-97 NLS 93-180</i> <i>ISCAI added; 11-12-92 NLS 91-108</i>	1 p	05/28/66 A NLS 93-180
#106 memo	to President from Rostow re: Pakistan top secret <i>Exempt 4-4-89 NLS 98-328</i> <i>Exempt 12/01 NLS 019-008-1-3</i>	2 p	05/27/66 A
#106a memo	National Security Action Memo No. top secret <i>sanitized 11-4-99 NLS 98-328</i>	1 p	undated A

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8709

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#108 memo	to President from Rostow re: Pres. Garcia Godoy confidential <i>Exempt NLS 87-98</i> <i>open 7/21/98</i> 1 p	05/27/66	A
#109a memo	to President from Rostow re: UN confidential <i>open 5-15-90 NLS 87-99</i> 1 p	05/27/66	A
#110 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 12-22-88 NLS 87-96</i> 1 p	05/27/66	A
#110a report	re: Vietnam secret 2 p	undated	A
#110b report	re: Vietnam secret 2 p	undated	A
#110c report	re: Vietnam secret 3 p	undated	A
#110d report	re: Vietnam secret 1 p	undated	A
#110e report	re: Vietnam secret 1 p	undated	A
#112a memo	to President from Rostow re: South America confidential <i>open 9-7-89 NLS 87-98</i> 4 p	05/27/66	A
#112b memo	National Security Action Memo No. confidential <i>open 9-7-89 NLS 87-98</i> 2 p	undated	A
#113 memo	to President from WWR <i>open 7/21/98</i> 2 p	05/27/66	C
#115 memo	to President from Rostow re: Sec McNamara visit to Vietnam secret <i>open 12-22-88 NLS 87-96</i> 1 p	05/27/66	A
#115a cable	text of Saigon 5024 secret <i>open 8-7-87 NLS 87-95</i> 2 p	05/27/66	A
#116 memo	to President from WWR re: satellite photography top secret <i>open 12-12-91 NLS 88-55</i> 2 p	05/27/66	A
#117 memo	duplicate #116 <i>open 7-26-94 NLS 88-55</i>		
#118 memo	to President from Rostow re: Dominican situation confidential 1 p <i>open 9-7-89 NLS 87-98</i>	05/27/66	A

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#118a cable	from Amb. Bunker text of Santo Domingo 2550 confidential <i>Exempt NLJ 87-97</i>	05/26/66	A
#119a memo cable	for PM from President Secret <i>Open 5-15-90 NLJ 87-99</i>	05/27/66	A

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June 10, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE

Herewith some advice which I hope may be helpful.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-95
By ing, NARA, Date 8-4-87

Although everything that we get is wispy and inconclusive, I do feel that in Hanoi today there is a greater linking of the idea of talking than there has been at any time since I started following North Vietnamese matters in the autumn of 1963. (Since that time, I have talked with all of the Indians, Canadians, and Poles about their visits to Hanoi, and also with many Vietnamese who have contacts in North Vietnam.)

My guess is that in Hanoi they are weighing the question of whether our punishment of them by air bombardment is more of an injury to them than what they do by their methods in South Vietnam is a gain for them. The decision on whether to bring the war to an end could thus be becoming a very close thing in their minds.

Under these circumstances, the question of North Vietnamese loss of face must become crucial to any American who is anxious for the war to end, since this question of North Vietnamese loss of face might be the decisive factor in their thinking. If they could end the war in a fuzzy way, without, as it were, being caught, without getting publicity or without looking undignified, they might very well pass the word that they would start fading out if we began to stop the bombing.

But if we put them up against the wall or if we have speeches by prominent people talking about the need to negotiate, this could decide them to let things go on as they have been.

I believe that the leaders in Hanoi can never afford to look undignified or to lose face, and they can never do anything which confirms newspaper stories that they are looking for peace. A newspaper story is literally enough, I am convinced, to stop any move toward "fading out." If this war ends, and the end of the war without North Vietnamese victory can be pinned on Hanoi leaders, it is the finish of their lives as Communist officials. Continuing the war is a cheap price in their minds to pay for their staying in power.

This means that we Americans must be silent. If we talk and attract attention, they will not go ahead with any ending of the war. But they can get a number of obscure contacts with apparently inconclusive, complicated talks going on more or less simultaneously in Hanoi or in Saigon, or in Phnom Penh or at Embassies in various foreign countries, then it might be possible for them to get the word through in all but one of the talks. The rest of the talks would mean nothing.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2.

In this very strange conflict, we have many times seen individual situations in which we win but must not crow about it. On Wednesday, I reported the success which we seem to be having in Binh Thuan. If, however, we publish to the world that we are having a great time in Binh Thuan, and we bring in the journalists and the photographers and the TV men, then the Viet Cong or North Vietnam will make a point of starting the trouble up again, and will pay a heavy price to do it, which, in turn, will exact a heavy price from us, and will mean that the people who have been successful in Binh Thuan will not be as able to consolidate their gain -- which they can do, if a little time goes by before our side starts putting out victory announcements.

If this theorizing is true, then it marks a real change in the psychology in Hanoi. Up until now, it appeared inadvisable for us publicly to urge peace negotiations for a totally different reason, to wit: they would take it as a sign of weakness, and this would thereby make them think that they could win, and would harden their determination to continue the war.

But if my present guesswork is correct, then they no longer think that we are weak. On the contrary, they are genuinely disturbed by the vigor of our bombing, and genuinely would like to end the war. Thus, public talk by us about peace is inadvisable not because it persuades Hanoi to continue the war, but because it shows Hanoi officials that we are indiscreet and that they would lose face and thus lose their positions of individual power.

The situation therefore calls for silence and action, the action to consist of steady bombing on the one hand, and a discreet willingness to get into very secret talks on the other.

For the immediate future, this means silence on the Ronning visit until it has clearly failed to turn up anything.

We might also be studying ways of measuring the cessation of our air bombardment on the one hand and equivalent amounts of North Vietnamese personnel withdrawal -- or entry into Chieu Hoi camps -- on the other. It might be useful to have answers to the question of how many fewer bombing raids equals how many withdrawn North Vietnamese and Viet Cong personnel.

I have not mentioned the Government of South Vietnam in this telegram which would still regard exhortations for negotiations as a sign of weakness and would still get distressed and discouraged at the idea that we are proposing negotiations without consulting with them.

LODGE

~~SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

Friday, June 10, 1966
6:05 PM

Mr. President:

These two messages from Prime Minister Wilson respond to the points made by Secretary Rusk.

I have sent a copy of each cable to Secretary Rusk so that he will be in a position to discuss with you the timing of Prime Minister Wilson's visit.

Bromley Smith

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DC4 NARS, Date 8-16-86

~~TOP SECRET~~

PERSONAL

June 10, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON

Dean spoke to me today about the Hanoi/Haiphong operation. I gather that, though you have still taken no final decision to bomb the oil targets, the balance of probability is that you will do so within the next ten days. Dean tells me that you understand why we must publicly disassociate ourselves and you know that it will not affect our general support. But if you decide on the bombing, I don't see how this can fail to affect the prospects for reconvening a Cambodia Conference or of suggesting a meeting at Geneva for those who wish to come -- two ideas that Dean mentioned to me today. But I will say no more on this, beyond saying how much you have my personal sympathy in finding yourself confronted with such a choice.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju/mg, NARA, Date 6-11-98

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

~~TOP SECRET~~

NLJ 98-171

PERSONAL

By is, NARA Date 3-27-99

June 10, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON

Dean will have told you of the useful talk we had today. I wish we could help you with a few helicopters in Thailand and we shall of course, as I promised him, look carefully at this. But I honestly believe that to act as you suggest would involve us in very serious political difficulties here over our Vietnam policy. I don't think that it would really be worth risking this for the sake of the relatively marginal support for the Thais that Dean's proposal would represent.

On the other hand I think both Dean and I were equally taken with the idea I mentioned to him of my trying soon to have a further talk with Kosygin and Brezhnev. This is not of course designed to take the wind out of De Gaulle's sails (though if that were a by-product so much the better) but because I believe we have a common interest in doing what we can to keep the Russians in play. The time will come when they feel the need to talk turkey: and it is only by regular probing that we may hope to exploit that moment when it comes. In any case, there may well be some ideas (whether those that Dean mentioned to me or any others we can jointly think up) which it would be useful to try on them.

Dean tells me that you share my feeling that we should now aim to have another talk (which need take very little of our time and could be simply over lunch). On the whole, I should much prefer this to be before I go to Moscow so that I am fully up to date on your thinking when I talk to the Russians. But, of course, I shall fully understand if the timing makes this difficult for you. In that case, I could come over after my return from Moscow and would at least be able to give you a firsthand account of their views.

I am sure it is right for us not to meet too near the bombing. I should not wish to come before it. It would be a political mistake for both of us if people could say that I was making a trans-Atlantic dash, with my shirt-tails flying, to put pressure on you. Against this background I wonder if I might aim to fly over for not more than a day right at the end of this month or at the beginning of next. The British Trade Fair in Moscow, which will provide the cover for seeing Brezhnev and Kosygin, opens on July 8 and I could get there over the weekend of July 9/10. But if this timing does not suit, then I think we should aim at a post-Moscow exchange, in which case I could come over, say, on July 15. Any of these dates would satisfactorily avoid any clash with De Gaulle's Soviet trip (June 20 - July 2) and Pompidou's visit to me (July 6-8).

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

PERSONAL

If these ideas make sense to you, I think we should not delay in saying something publicly. As Dean will have told you, I have a tricky Parliamentary Party meeting on June 15 (though it is causing me no loss of sleep) and I think there is some slight advantage in letting it be known that we are to meet before rather than after this, simply because an announcement after may get a bit close to your own D-Day. What I should like, if you agree, is for us to announce simultaneously on June 13 or 14 that we have agreed, in the light of my useful talk with Dean Rusk, to have a further brief meeting, as we like to do at fairly regular intervals: and that this will probably take place at the end of June or early in July.

Meanwhile I am checking on what is known of the Russian leaders' likely movements around July 8-10. If they look like being in Moscow, I will probably announce towards the end of next week my intention to pay a short visit to the British Trade Fair.

I enormously look forward to another talk with you. I was glad to learn from Dean that you find our exchanges and messages useful. I most certainly do. But, as we both know, the spoken word and the probe still have the edge over the written word. So I do hope we can manage to meet soon.

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

To Pres 3/

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Friday, June 10, 1966 - 5:05 pm
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

You asked for a short paper
on the "candor" issue. The attached
memo on the subject describes the problem
as well as anything I have seen.

W. H. Rostow

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Candor on Viet-Nam

Most of the statements and editorials that raise the "candor" issue are vague, generalized and lacking in specifics. Yesterday's statement by Senator Dirksen is typical. He said the Administration had been neither "candid" nor "consistently credible" in its statements on Viet-Nam. He did not document his charge -- nor do most of the critics.

The most detailed, specific and effective treatment of this matter that I know of was a recent speech by Senator James Pearson (Kansas) which is attached.

He makes the following points:

Shortages inevitably occur in any war. The American people accept this, unless there is gross or inept mismanagement. Yet the Government's first reaction to any claims of shortages is to categorically deny any shortages whatsoever. He quotes McNamara as branding such charges as "baloney."

Fast, intolerant reactions by the Administration only further alienate the critics and raise new doubts among Administration supporters.

Many people are confused about the reasons for our being in Viet-Nam and our objectives. The Administration's usual answer is that there is no reason for confusion. This is no answer.

He cites the Bobby Kennedy statement regarding negotiating with the Viet Cong. The Administration was variously reported as being "in agreement," "in complete disagreement" and "very close" to the Kennedy position.

Pearson says Administration handling of Viet-Nam has been afflicted with three major weaknesses:

(1) It is "unhealthily obsessed with a notion that it is always right and never wrong;"

(2) It has "an overpowering urge to be 'all things to all people all the time';" is more concerned with nullifying foreign and domestic criticism than with conducting policy in a way it believes will achieve its aims;

(3) It is adverse to "long-range planning" and is predisposed to "Playing things by ear."

Pearson says the reason we are in Viet-Nam is really very simple: the VC constitute a form of aggressive, expansionist communism which if unchecked might take over Southeast Asia or all of Asia; our resistance is consistent with two decades of policy and action.

But we fuzz the issue with a lot of unconvincing and confusing arguments: "defending freedom and democracy, " living up to our commitments to SEATO; honoring our commitment to the Government of South Viet-Nam (which government?), etc.

We say we will "negotiate anywhere at any time without reservations." But we won't negotiate with the Viet Cong. There are good reasons for the latter, but it is not consistent with the former.

Similarly, we will negotiate without preconditions, but we have turned down several "feelers" because they "were not worthy of consideration."

The "peace offensive" looked like a staged affair to damp criticism more than an effort to find a solution. If we had been doing the proper things diplomatically, it was not necessary; if we had not been, then "jet diplomacy" would convince no one.

The Honolulu conference had noble goals. But it was widely believed that "the impetus for the conference was the growing criticism of the administration's conduct in Viet-Nam rather than a logical extension of its long-range policy."

"The most glowing example of the lack of credibility is to be found in the depressing record of the administration from time to time telling the American people that we would not perform a certain act, but then later initiating that very act."

He mentions: no commitment of major U.S. forces, no attack on North Viet-Nam, etc.

He charges we have hailed each change in government in South Viet-Nam as a "good change;" each new leader as better than his predecessor.

Pearson says McNamara's statement that the Ky-Buddhist rivalry is healthy was "naive and ridiculous and an example of the fantastic contortions the Administration has had to go through to try to justify and explain the internal situation in Viet-Nam."

B'W

William J. Jorden

The riots that have occurred are calculated to produce the reports that have been written and the reaction in the U.S. which follows with Pavlovian predictability.

The rioters know exactly what they are doing and why. These anti-American demonstrations are about as spontaneous as demonstrations at the Republican National Convention—and just about as indicative of real public sentiment.

They can be turned on and off again like a garden hose. The same American who might get lynched at the Viet Cong Dao pagoda today might be received with impeccable courtesy a couple of days or even a couple of hours later.

The same gang of young hoodlums who chased Americans around a few weeks ago burning cars and generally raising hell eagerly received this reporter at their headquarters a few days ago to smoke his cigarettes and discuss their future plans.

This sort of tactical anti-Americanism is not really expected to intimidate Americans in Saigon.

Its first purpose is to bring pressure on the American mission to stop the crackdown on dissident Buddhist elements in the north.

And beyond that it is designed to get the U.S. government and public so fed up with the whole problem of Viet Nam that a general handwashing impulse will become irresistible.

It is hard to exaggerate the limited scope of these disturbances up to now.

The truly remarkable—indeed almost unaccountable—fact about Saigon today is the utter impunity with which Americans wander around the city night and day.

Unless he's deliberately looking for trouble—as reporters sometimes must—an American could be completely unaware of any of the unpleasantness that he might expect to find in almost any other town.

He might get his pockets picked. He might possibly be held up in a dark alley. He might even, if he happened to be very unlucky, get himself blown up in Viet Cong operation or zapped by friendly American bullets.

But the chances of this are almost as remote as the chances of being run down by a car while crossing Connecticut Avenue at tea time.

The mysterious fact is that in a city presumably swarming with dyed in the wool Viet Cong, almost none of these extremely vulnerable Americans here gets hurt.

No one is very sure why this is so. One common and plausible theory is that the Viet Cong make a very good thing out of Americans in Saigon financially.

The Viet Cong, it is widely believed, have the controlling interest in the aspects of Saigon's cultural life recently mentioned by Sen. J. W. Fulbright.

And if through indiscriminate rough stuff these establishments were shut down or put off limits to any American servicemen, the one who would be really put out would be Victor Charlie, the Viet Cong sympathizer, himself.

It may be that what seems like a sort of conspiracy of security may not last forever. For the time being, however, Americans here sleep a little bit better at night because of it.

And their dreams are not very much disturbed by staged convulsions at the other end of town.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, if there be no further morning business, I ask unanimous consent that morning business be terminated.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there further morning business?

ness? If not, morning business is concluded.

THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ADMINISTRATION ON VIETNAM

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, Webster's dictionary defines the word credibility as "the quality or state of being believed." Increasingly of late the Johnson administration has been drawing critical fire for its lack of credibility, and the phrase "credibility gap" has come into an extensive use.

In part, this can be attributed to the normal functioning of partisan politics intensified by the competition of an election year. Thus, charges about the existence of a credibility gap are frequently raised by the administration's partisan opponents. But although the working of political partisanship has intensified the debate, it is not the basic source of the criticism. Increasing numbers of prominent spokesmen within the President's own party openly deplore the gap between words and deeds. Indeed, in several areas, it is Democratic criticism which has been the sharpest. In addition, a growing number of newspaper editors and columnists have registered concern over the fact that the administration's official words of the moment and its subsequent actions are all too often strangers.

Mr. President, the credibility of those who hold in their hands the power to affect the lives of all Americans and millions of people around the world is a precious and fragile thing. The task of constructing and maintaining it is difficult, demanding, and never ending.

A government's credibility cannot be assured by simple and frequent incantations of "believe us."

It is born not of a single deed but comes into being out of a long series of matched words and actions. Likewise, the erosion of a government's credibility occurs slowly and after a long series of mismatched words and deeds, of nuclear goals, and confusing and contradictory methods.

Mr. President, the borderline between public faith and public distrust is not clearly marked. But once it is crossed, the capacity of the government, however worthy or honorable its intentions, to govern effectively may be permanently damaged.

In a democratic and diverse society no administration can design a set of policies acceptable to all, and political disagreement is inevitable. But loss of faith in a government's credibility involves much more than differences of political opinion. The erosion of credibility not only intensifies the criticism of those who are politically opposed to its policies but erodes the stabilizing support of those who would otherwise agree. Thus, a policy, or a set of policies, may be emasculated, not because they are wrong or because too many people oppose the objective sought but because too many examples of lack of candor on the part of the Government generate disillusionment and public enthusiasm is replaced by public apathy.

The concept of policymaking by con-

sensus has been widely attributed to the President, and has now become a household word. If this is another term for majority rule then it is nothing more than a truism. The practice of consensus politics is the essence of democracy.

But in a democracy, the manner in which consensus is achieved is as important as the consensus itself. And in achieving consensus there is no better standard than the President's own oft-stated principle, "let us reason together." But the enunciation of a principle does not make it a reality. Taking the record of the past 2½ years as a whole the administration has more often than not sought to build consensus by public confusion, rather than public reasoning. This political strategy has often been successful in securing enactment of the administration's program. But the total effect of this strategy has also served to dilute the prestige of the Presidential office and to erode the public's faith in the credibility of the administration.

This strategy of consensus by confusion is most despaired by the administration's partisan opponents. Whatever else may be said of the President, all recognize him as a masterful political tactician. Mr. Johnson is a past master of throwing his potential opponents off balance so as to better pave the way for the acceptance of his proposals, and he has practiced this strategy with supreme skill.

But, Mr. President, there is a difference between political shrewdness and political cynicism. There is a thin line between legitimate rough and tumble partisan politics and illegitimate public deception. And there is a growing impression that the line has been crossed too often.

During the past 2½ years there has been a growing number of episodes which serve to raise doubts as to the credibility of the Johnson administration's conduct in domestic affairs. Without question, however, the credibility gap charge has been applied most often and most tellingly to the administration's handling of its Vietnam policy.

In recent weeks attention has been focused on whether or not our forces in Vietnam are suffering from shortages of war materials. Mr. President, if we know anything about past military build-ups of the type that have occurred in Vietnam we know that certain shortages will almost inevitably occur. The American people recognize this and if the shortages which occur do not reflect gross and inept mismanagement this would be accepted as one of the harsh facts of war, which at best is organized confusion.

But what has been the administration's response to disclosures first by the public press and then by congressional investigating committees, that shortages have in fact developed in Vietnam? Typically the administration's first reaction was to categorically deny that any shortages whatsoever existed. The Secretary of Defense branded any suggestion of shortages as pure "baloney." Whether or not these shortages have seriously hampered our military effort there or caused a greater loss of life among American

troops than would otherwise be the case is not yet clear and may never be clear.

However, Mr. President, the most revealing and disturbing aspect of this episode has been the administration's overreaction to its critics. The administration, assuming a posture that admits to no mistakes, has dogmatically and militantly denied the existence of shortages and has tried to discredit those who reported their existence. This type of intolerant and bellicose reaction only serves to further alienate the critics and to raise new doubts among the administration's supporters as to its overall credibility.

The episode of military shortages is only one of the more recent examples of confusion surrounding this country's involvement in Vietnam. But as it comes after a long series of inconsistent and contradictory statements about our policy in Vietnam, it has taken on added significance.

During the past 2 years the American public, in response to the questions of opinion pollsters, has given overwhelming support to the President. However, in the past few months public opinion polls have registered a growing sense of frustration and agony over Vietnam. And within the past few weeks several polls indicate that less than a majority of the people express satisfaction with the administration's handling of the Vietnam situation.

The record shows that the American people genuinely want to support the President. But it also shows that the public is finding it increasingly difficult to do so. The cause of this erosion of support is a growing confusion as to why we are in Vietnam, what are our objectives there, and what methods are to be used in achieving those objectives.

Mr. President, the administration says that there is no basis for this confusion, and argues that if there is confusion, it is due to the ill-founded and ill-tempered blusterings of a few articulate but misguided critics. But the matter cannot be dismissed this easily. Widespread public confusion does exist, and it is due to the actions of the administration itself.

In this respect a recent statement by Carl T. Rowan, a former official of the Johnson administration, is significant and revealing. He stated:

I left the government five months ago thinking I knew what United States' policy in Vietnam was. Today I haven't the remotest idea.

Mr. Rowan made this statement in a column in which he was trying to decipher the meaning of a flurry of official and unofficial statements by administration spokesmen in response to the suggestion by the able and distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] that the United States might consider negotiating with the Vietcong. The administration was variously reported as being in agreement with Senator KENNEDY, in complete disagreement, and "very close" to Senator KENNEDY's proposals. This display of an administration frantically trying to cover all bets serves as a vivid illustration of the fact that if we do have a clear and consistent policy in Vietnam, one cannot discover it

by listening to the words of the administration purporting to describing and explaining it.

Mr. President, in regard to its development and handling of the Vietnam policy the administration has been afflicted by three weaknesses. First, the administration is unhealthily obsessed with a notion that it is always right and never wrong, or at least that it should so try to present itself as to appear to be beyond error. But this type of strategy inevitably breeds distrust, because no man and no government is immune from the human frailty of miscalculation and misadjustment.

The mark of a great leader is not that he never makes mistakes but that when he does he is strong enough to recognize these mistakes and, therefore, adjust his actions accordingly. This is particularly vital in the conduct of foreign policy, for much more is at stake than the personal reputation of one man or one administration.

A second weakness in the handling of the Vietnam policy is the administration's overpowering urge to be "all things to all people at all times." Thus, the administration is often more concerned with saying and doing those things which will nullify domestic and international criticism of its policy rather than conducting that policy in the way that it believes it is best designed to achieve the objectives sought. But in a long drawn out and complex situation such as Vietnam this continual effort to be all all things to all people ultimately presents the danger that the word of the administration will have little meaning or value to anyone.

The third basic weakness is the administration's aversion to long-range planning and its predisposition to "playing things by ear." Now it may be that somewhere within the bowels of Government there exists a long-range plan complete with contingency programs to take account of unexpected events. But if such a plan exists, it has been carefully concealed.

Thus, Mr. President, while it is easy to determine where we have been in Vietnam it has always been virtually impossible to guess where we might be in the future. This vagueness of direction creates the impression that we are simply reacting to events in Vietnam rather than controlling those events. Daily the impression grows that we are helpless victims of a situation that we cannot control; that we, the most powerful nation in the world, cannot determine our own destiny.

The administration continually proclaims that its Vietnam policy is clear, consistent and well defined and that those who do not understand it are simply ignorant of the record. But although the administration says that confusion should not exist and desperately wishes that it would not exist, confusion grows both at home and abroad.

It is a confusion born of inconsistent and contradictory explanations, of vaguely expressed goals and unclear means, and of sweeping proclamations pregnant with glittering generalities but empty of concrete meaning. After a

prolonged exposure to this type of record, the American public and the world at large find it ever more difficult to believe what the administration says at any given time and are increasingly uneasy about what the administration may say and do at any given time in the future.

Mr. President, the erosion of the administration's credibility began long before the military shortages episode or the contorted reactions to recent proposals that the United States consider negotiating with the Vietcong. Indeed the seeds of doubt and confusion can be found even in the administration's explanation of why we are in Vietnam.

The reason we are there is really quite simple. The administration is convinced that the Vietcong constitute a form of aggressive, expansionist communism, which if left unchecked might mean that all of southeast Asia and possibly the entire Asian community will come under a Communist rule directed and controlled from Peking. Thus, our commitment in Vietnam can be seen as a logical extension of a nearly two decades old foreign policy principle which aims at the containment of totalitarian communism.

Mr. President, much of the questioning of our Vietnam policy comes from those who doubt that this is a genuine example of expansionist communism. Criticism is also registered by those who may accept the argument that this is an example of expansionist communism but who disagree with the strategy we are employing to halt its spread. Most of these critics accept the containment principle but argue either that it is unnecessary to invoke it in this particular situation or that we are employing the wrong techniques to achieve it. There are also a few critics who suggest that the containment principle, used so effectively in Europe and the Middle East, simply cannot be applied to Asia.

But the exploration of these arguments is not the purpose of these remarks. For the purpose of this discussion, I accept that the Vietcong movement in South Vietnam is an example of expansionist communism and that it is in our national interest to take reasonable steps to prevent its growth. If this be true, there is no question that the majority of the American people would support our effort in Vietnam.

But how, in fact, does the administration explain our position in Vietnam? Unfortunately, it almost never uses the simple and clear language of the containment policy and the defense of our national interest. Instead, it talks in grandiose generalities which seem to have little relationship to the reality of the situation in southeast Asia. For example, it talks about defending freedom and democracy. These are admirable objectives to be sure, but who among us now believes that there is any meaningful freedom and democracy in southeast Asia to be defended.

The administration talks about honoring commitments. It often implies that we are bound by the SEATO Treaty. But if that be so, then none of the other members of the organization seem to believe it to be the case. Apparently, the

administration does not either, as is evident by the fact that it has never really consulted with the members of the organization in regard to our Vietnam policy.

Mr. President, the administration talks most often about a commitment to the nation of South Vietnam as if we had entered into some solemn and binding agreement with the Government and the people. In this respect, President Johnson frequently implies that whether we like it or not President Eisenhower made a commitment to Vietnam which we are honorbound to observe. In point of fact, the so-called Eisenhower commitment is nothing more than a letter to the Diem government offering economic aid and technical assistance with the conditional provision that the Diem government begin to institute extensive social, economic and political reforms.

Being fully aware of the niceties of diplomacy and the necessities of politics, one can appreciate why the administration cannot always simply and directly say that we are in Vietnam because we believe it to be in our national interest. But continual harping on the notion of honoring commitments no one understands, ultimately destroys public confidence in our position there.

Too often the administration justifies our position in terms of narrow legalisms. This not only obscures our basic reasons for being there, but also raises doubts that the administration itself is convinced that we are, in fact, fighting a form of expansionist, imperialistic communism.

Mr. President, reduced to its simplest and most meaningful terms our objective is to prevent the spread of totalitarian communism to South Vietnam and into the rest of southeast Asia. Prior to 1965, this objective was sought primarily by the use of technical advice and economic aid aimed at the internal strengthening of South Vietnam so that it could better prevent a Communist takeover. Increasingly of late, however, we have committed vast military forces in an effort to achieve that objective.

The administration says that our objectives are limited; to guarantee an independent and peaceful South Vietnam. And, I believe that our objectives are, in fact, really limited. But simple declarations do not prove it or convince our adversaries or our potential allies. If we are really willing, as I believe we are, to settle for a truly independent South Vietnam, one that is neither controlled nor dependent upon the United States or Hanoi, Moscow, or Peking, we must do more than simply mouth the words. Our adversaries and those around the world who are inherently suspicious of our intentions need more than vague verbal declarations.

The administration has declared our objectives to be limited but its words and actions have given rise to considerable doubt and suspicion as to the precise limits of those objectives. The picture has been particularly confused by the administration's words and actions regarding a settlement that would satisfy those objectives.

The administration has said that we would be willing to negotiate anywhere

at any time without prior reservations or conditions. But at the same time that we issue such unconditional statements, we also assert that we will not negotiate directly with the Vietcong. Now it may be that there are sound reasons for refusing to negotiate with the Vietcong. Certainly it would be foolhardy for the United States to agree to negotiate only with the Vietcong as Hanoi and Peking continually demand.

But the tragic thing, Mr. President, is that if our position is really sound it has been lost to world opinion by the inevitable loss of faith in the credibility of a government which loudly proclaims with one mouth that it will negotiate without prior reservations and then quietly asserts with another mouth that it will actually negotiate only under prescribed conditions.

Moreover, the practice of escalating our military commitment in Vietnam at the very same time we announce anew our desire for a settlement only serves to increase doubts among friend and foe alike as to the precise nature of our intentions, even though those intentions may in fact be entirely honorable and our objectives truly limited.

The credibility of the administration was further weakened by the disclosure that we may have rejected several "peace feelers" from the Communists. It might well have been the case that these feelers were not worthy of serious consideration, that they did not provide a reasonable basis for negotiation. But again, as so often in the past, the administration was discredited in the eyes of many not necessarily because its position was unsound, but because it acknowledged those contacts only after documentation in the public press made it impossible to deny their existence.

Against the background of ringing declarations to explore all possible avenues for a peaceful settlement the disclosure that the administration had rejected these feelers added fuel to the growing doubts and criticism about our Vietnam policy.

Mr. President, when our changed position in Vietnam became evident in late 1964 and early 1965, it brought forth the first serious public questioning and debate of our policy. The administration sought not to clarify that debate but to prevent it. Ultimately the questioning and criticism could not be prevented. The administration then adopted a strategy of attempting to nullify each fresh wave of criticism by seeming to agree with the demands of the critics. But this only served to bring confusion and more questioning of the Government's credibility.

Two recent examples are illustrative. As doubts, at home and abroad, as to the sincerity of our desire for a peaceful settlement continued to grow in late 1965 the administration staged a massive peace offensive during January of 1966. The bombing of North Vietnam was temporarily halted and top administration officials and ambassadors were sent scurrying around the world, all proclaiming that the United States really did want a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. Ambassador Harriman went

to Poland, Yugoslavia, and India. McGeorge Bundy went to Ottawa. Arthur Goldberg visited the Vatican, Rome, Paris and London. Vice President HUBERT HUMPHREY made a country-hopping tour in the Far East. Ambassador Kohler conferred with the Soviet officials in Moscow. G. Mennen Williams talked to leaders of several African nations, and Thomas C. Mann did the same in Mexico City.

It was indeed a Texas-sized peace offensive. And while the administration was obviously sincere in hoping that this display might actually serve as a catalyst for the beginnings of realistic negotiations, it was generally apparent that this was a staged affair, political display aimed more at nullifying the mounting criticism challenging the sincerity of our offer for negotiation rather than a careful calculated effort to secure a peaceful settlement.

If in fact, Mr. President, we had been making the proper efforts in exploring all possible diplomatic channels, then such a spectacular display was unnecessary. If we had not been doing these things, then this display of jet diplomacy would convince no one, friend or foe.

Another example of this type of administration strategy was the calling of the recent Honolulu conference. The peace offensive had failed, the bombing in North Vietnam had been resumed, and the internal political situation in South Vietnam showed no improvement. Increasingly, criticism was being directed at the failure of the United States to bring about any of the desperately needed economic, social, and political reforms in South Vietnam which all observers, including our top military leadership, recognize as being absolutely necessary to any genuine solution in South Vietnam. Thus, the President and an impressive number of top Government officials flew off to a hastily convened conference in Honolulu with Premier Ky and other members of his government. After a few hectic days at the conference table, the Honolulu declaration was issued with great fanfare.

The administration has hailed the Honolulu declaration as a historic document and has bitterly complained that the public press and congressional critics had failed to give it the recognition and praise that it deserves. In point of fact, American public and world reaction to the conference was precisely what it deserved. Again, while no one would argue that the goals announced by the conference were not genuinely desirable, all recognized that the impetus for the conference was the growing criticism of the administration's conduct in Vietnam rather than a logical extension of its long-range policy. There is depressingly little evidence that we are ready or capable, even at this late date, of instituting the programs of aid and reform that would be needed to achieve the goals so proudly proclaimed.

Mr. President, it is no wonder, then, that the American people and the world in general are confused about our policy in Vietnam. Our basic reasons for being in Vietnam have never been adequately explained. The objectives we seek there

have never been clearly delineated. And the administration's zigzagging and contorted efforts to answer every critic simultaneously have beclouded our entire involvement.

But none of these has so eroded the American public's faith in the administration's credibility as has the yawning gap between what we have said would be necessary to achieve our objectives there and what we have actually done there. It is here that we find the essence of the credibility gap.

The most glowing example of the lack of credibility is to be found in the depressing record of the administration from time to time telling the American people that we would not perform a certain act, but then later initiating that very act. And in so doing on each occasion the administration has proclaimed that the performance of that particular action would solve the situation in Vietnam. But, in reality, as the American people have seen, the situation remains the same or grows worse. And as the administration's promises for a solution continue to flow, the public's faith that a solution will really be achieved continues to wane.

In 1964 President Johnson frequently and fervently proclaimed that our objectives in Vietnam would be achieved without the commitment of major American military forces and loss of American lives. Millions of American people voted for Mr. Johnson in November 1964, because they agreed with this declaration of policy. But our position in Vietnam today bears no resemblance to that of 1964 or to the President's declaration of what it would be. President Johnson said we would not commit American lives, and that we would not extend the war to North Vietnam, and that the major effort against the Communists in South Vietnam would have to be carried by the South Vietnamese themselves. But today we bomb North Vietnam around the clock and in recent weeks more Americans have died on the battlefield than South Vietnamese.

Our military commitment and effort in Vietnam has been increased in a series of graduated moves. Each step of the escalation has occurred after the administration had proclaimed that such steps would be unnecessary and undesirable. However, when the administration felt that conditions forced it to abandon its former position, it has stated, or at least implied, that each additional extension in the military commitment would solve the problem. The decision to bomb North Vietnam was at least implicitly justified on the basis that cutting supply lines would isolate the Vietcong and allow the South Vietnamese Army to defeat its adversary. But today more men and more equipment flow from North Vietnam into the south than ever before.

If the administration knew that the act they denied would take place would be performed, then it is an act of misrepresentation to the American people and a display of callous cynicism. If the administration thought that the performance of that given action would solve the problem in South Vietnam then

the record can only show that the administration has continued to compound misjudgment with misjudgment.

Likewise, on the political scene each change in the Saigon government has been heralded by the administration as the one which would at last bring true stability to South Vietnam. But none of this has come to pass. And the present Government to which the President has given his personal endorsement has not only failed to achieve stability but has so acted to increase internal tensions and conflicts among the South Vietnamese. Mr. McNamara's statement that the present conflict between the Buddhists and the Ky regime is a healthy sign, is naive and ridiculous and an example of the fantastic contortions which the administration has had to go through to try to justify and explain the internal situation in Vietnam, which cannot be anything else but a severe indictment of our lack of vision and leadership in that troubled land.

In September of 1964 President Johnson proclaimed:

We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys . . . I want to be very cautious and careful and use it as a last resort when I start dropping bombs around that are likely to involve American boys in a war in Asia with 700 million Chinese . . . so we are not going north and we are not going south; we are going to continue to try to get them (the South Vietnamese) to save their own freedom with their own men.

Mr. President, the American people are mature and wise enough to recognize that in a complex situation like Vietnam things do not always happen as we would like them to, or as we expect them to. But constant repetition of proclamations to the effect that a particular action will not take place, followed by ringing declarations, when this very act occurs, that this, finally, is the action that will provide the solution is destroying the public faith and is feeding the growing belief that this administration neither knows what it wants in Vietnam nor how to achieve it.

The record of the past can only create anxiety and fear of the future.

Mr. President, one hears a great deal about the agony of Vietnam, and it is indeed America's most agonizingly difficult and complex foreign involvement of the 20th century.

One of the greatest tragedies of this experience is that although America's intentions there are basically honorable and our objectives truly limited, we have conducted ourselves in such a way that ever larger numbers of people, both at home and abroad, find it impossible to believe the sincerity of our actions there.

Throughout the noncommunist world there is a great reservoir of support for this country's dedicated opposition to the expansion of communism. Thus, although internal political conditions may make it impossible for many foreign leaders, particularly in Asia, to openly identify with the United States, most of them at least share in the general objective of containing communism in Asia.

At home the overwhelming majority of the American people support the containment policy, and most believe that a

takeover by the Communists in South Vietnam would be a discouraging defeat for the United States and against the long-range interests of the free world. Thus, the American people, at heart, genuinely want to support the administration's policy in Vietnam.

Mr. President, no one of the numerous examples of mismatched words and deeds, which have been reviewed here, has been enough to destroy faith in the credibility of the administration's Vietnam policy. But the ever accumulating list of inconsistencies, contradictions, vague explanations, and persistent refusal to acknowledge even minor mistakes inevitably sows the seeds of doubt, disillusionment and apathy. The result is that eventually even candid statements and forthright explanations become suspect.

Thus, Mr. President, even though the administration's basic intentions and goals may be sound and worthy, the policy which it pursues may fall, not because it is basically wrong, but because its conduct of that policy has been so shoddy that even those who believe in its ultimate rightness refuse the administration their positive and energetic support out of disillusionment and despair.

RECESS

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Thereupon (at 10 o'clock and 43 minutes a.m.) the Senate took a recess subject to the call of the Chair.

The Senate reassembled at 12:39 p.m., when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. HART in the chair).

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 13712) to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to extend its protection to additional employees, to raise the minimum wage, and for other purposes, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

HOUSE BILL REFERRED

The bill (H.R. 13712) to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to extend its protection to additional employees, to raise the minimum wage, and for other purposes, was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

PERSONAL STATEMENT

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, it is a matter of regret to me that my duties as chairman of the mediation panel in the airline machinist dispute have occupied me all morning and have prevented my being here earlier to speak.

I very much appreciate the indulgence of the Senate and the Senate staff which enables me to speak at this time on sev-

Pres file 4

Friday, June 10, 1966 -- 4:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Our new boy seems to be in
business full blast and in good form.

W. W. Rostow

Rawalpindi 762

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Qcd NARS, Date 12-27-84

~~SECRET~~

Friday, June 10, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM LOCKE (Rawalpindi, 762)

I had a very good meeting late Thursday with Shoaib. Deputy Chief of Mission Cargo and Deputy Director of AID Bee were present with me. We covered the same points covered with Ayub. Ayub had already spoken to Shoaib after his meeting with me. Ayub's report to Shoaib apparently was identical to my reports to you. Shoaib told me Ayub was favorably impressed with the meeting. (At dinner later on, Shoaib said that Ayub had telephoned him immediately after my meeting with Shoaib for a report on that session.)

On relations with India, Shoaib stressed that the Government of Pakistan strongly desires peace. While Ayub's political problem limits what he can do publicly, he can and will move on the diplomatic front. Shoaib reported that immediately after my meeting with Ayub, Ayub called his High Commissioner to India and instructed him to take steps to move forward on high level talks with India. In addition, Shoaib stated he will devote two full pages on his budget speech to the need for peace on the Subcontinent.

With regard to technical facilities, Ayub reported to Shoaib he had offered the two alternatives reported by me in Rawalpindi's 753. (These alternatives were:

3.4(6)(1)
(6)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>2!
(C)

I believe our present negotiations are generally within the framework of his alternative two and Shoaib agrees.

I believe we should study the facilities question as follows:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

3.4(6)(1)
(6)

(A)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

(B) With regard to alternative two, we should study how to revise our proposed agreement to meet Ayub's concept without changing the substance to our disadvantage. It is desirable that I be able to take a position with Ayub as having accepted a general concept of his proposition, if we cannot physically work out the preferred alternative. I believe our present draft is generally within Ayub's alternative two, but tactically believe we should cast in a form equally favorable to us, but apparently designed to meet Ayub's alternative.

Re import liberalization, Shoaib said he will make strong statement in his budget speech, but he wanted to make it clear that much more than \$70 million of aid is required to liberalize. The consequences of suspension of liberalization, once reinstituted, would be serious. The Government of Pakistan will make a final decision on the scope of the July 15 Liberalization Announcement following the Consortium Meeting. While Shoaib recognizes the U.S. can make no firm commitment on the second \$70 million until after Congress enacts aid legislation, he still needed "some kind of understanding" from the U.S. Administration on the second \$70 million. I replied the U.S. is prepared to go forward with the second \$70 million provided the Government of Pakistan's performance on the other matters discussed with President Ayub continues good. Shoaib also stated his view that before the end of FY 67, more than \$140 million commodity aid would be required from the U.S. to sustain liberalization. The Government of Pakistan delegation will wish to discuss these matters with U.S. officials at the Consortium Meeting.

On seized cargoes, Shoaib confirmed Ayub's willingness to negotiate the amount of compensation for consumed cargoes. Shoaib added that he had succeeded in obtaining Ayub's agreement to this position just prior to my meeting with the President. Shoaib thought there would be no problem about compensation, but he did note that there were normally losses for pilferage, etc., which should be covered by insurance and he did not think the Government of Pakistan should be responsible for these.

As regards his budget speech, Shoaib agreed fully to the need to keep statements on U.S. aid general (Deptel 617 to Rawalpindi) but thought it necessary to mention the steel mill. He is willing to confine his remarks to the formulation proposed in reference telegram or something less.

I also mentioned to Shoaib our growing concern over U.S. wheat supply and warned that this could affect our ability to respond to Pakistan requests.

I plan to discuss the facilities matter in depth on my return to Washington. Results of recommended studies (A) and (B) will be necessary to this discussion. I believe no further negotiation should take place until then, unless Pakistanis themselves take the initiative. I plan to see Ayub again before leaving.

*Pres file**F.B.
for action
urgent* | *4 to B2m
6/15/66*

Friday, June 10, 1966 - 4:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

This is the Cleveland-Paul Martin conversation to which I just referred. I have marked the key sentence; but it is worth reading as a whole.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 8631

~~SECRET~~

*Walt -
Let's get Ottawa
making assessment
L*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By Dat NARS, Date 12-27-84

WWRostow:rlh

5a

SUBJECT: Conversation with Canadian Foreign Minister

1. During 15-minute wait at Brussels airport for our respective airplanes, Paul Martin called me aside to discuss results of ministerial meeting. He said the main burden seemed now to be on permanent council, and that he expected Charles Ritchie to be in Paris by July 1 to participate in the work this summer.

2. Martin said he was very relieved that the momentary break between the Fourteen and France (re negotiating procedures on French forces in the Federal Republic of Germany) had been patched over. He gave the Secretary main credit for "saving the day."

3. On moving North Atlantic Council out of Paris, Martin seemed to be assuming that the Council will now eventually be relocated. He commented that there seemed to be a number of possible buildings in Brussels. When I asked how he thought Permanent Representatives might proceed, as instructed by the Ministers, to investigate "alternative sites," Martin and Cadieux both said the only live option is Brussels, and that search would presumably concentrate there.

4. In a philosophical mood, Martin said he had been surprised by the strength of the sentiment among the Fourteen for relocation of NAC. He said on the basis of advanced consultations, he had assumed that most of the Governments would be reluctant or opposed. But when Italians and Danes "caved," he had not wanted to stand out alone. But he was very glad that the decision had not been taken immediately, since he had what he considered hard information that Couve would have not been willing to attend the Ministerial Council at all if the Fourteen had decided on June 6 to relocate NAC right away.

5. Comment: We know of no other evidence to support the notion that the French are prepared to make a big political issue of keeping the Council in Paris or that Couve had threatened any such boycott. Martin told me on Tuesday evening that he had strongly urged Couve to tell the Ministers that France very much wanted NAC to stay. Instead, Couve produced a formula designed to be all things to all Ministers: If the Fourteen want NAC to stay in Paris, the French would be glad to continue to serve as host. If the Fourteen would like to move the political headquarters elsewhere, France could only wish the new host well.

6. I would judge from our airport conversation that Martin is no longer in a fighting mood about the NAC relocation issue. Numerous conversations with members of the Canadian delegation in Brussels this week indicate that Martin's personal position on this issue went well beyond what his staff considers to be necessary even from the standpoint of domestic politics in Canada. It would be helpful to have Embassy Ottawa's assessment on the basis of post-mortem discussions with returning delegation.

CLEVELAND

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-101

By ing, NARA, Date 8-4-87

b p 6

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 87-99

By ijf, NARA, Date 5-10-90

~~SECRET~~

Friday, June 10, 1966, 1:15 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I should like to elaborate a little on Francis Bator's observations on NATO in relation to East-West policy, at the bottom of page 1 and the top of page 2 of his memorandum of June 9.

Nothing is more difficult to conduct successfully than a retreat. To keep NATO vital under French pressure, Soviet military passivity towards the West, increasing interest in East/West affairs will be hard, absorbing work. All the other things we wish to do and ought to do depend on it. Therefore, while NATO as a military instrument may, in public terms, not occupy the center of the stage, I do not agree that for us in government it can be "a less engrossing preoccupation."

Moreover, several of the things that we wish to do within NATO are not related to defense against the Russians so much as to binding the Atlantic closer together: for example, the buildup of a permanent nuclear consultative group from the present Defense Secretary's committee; development of a Military Payments Union; etc. These are critically important political issues for the West and very much a part of NATO. We must be deeply engrossed in them if our total policy is to be successful.

Finally, on East/West matters we wish to do as much as it is sensible to do, but we must always remember that the limit on what we can do is largely set by changing attitudes in Moscow and Moscow's commitment to keep East Germany tightly as a satellite. It is the plug in their whole security and ideological system. That system is changing; but we have no evidence other than that it will change slowly and that Moscow is not now ready for "neutralization" and all that.

Therefore, our policy should consist in encouraging "environmental" changes through German and U.S. and other initiatives; and careful contingency planning against the day -- which could be late or soon -- when larger moves to settle the Central European question become possible.

In the meanwhile, we must maintain momentum in the Atlantic connection and in support for Western European unity.

I was much struck that two quite different men within two days told me, for example, that the critical thing we need to do now is to find a way for you to reassure the Germans that we are not losing interest in

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Europe and looking towards a pull-out. NATO and the U.S. connection with Europe remains the rock on which all else we do is founded. (The two men were Jay Lovestone and Erhard's adviser Rudolph Wildenmann.) In exploring to the East, we must not be casual about maintaining and strengthening the Western base.

My credentials in urging this caution are fairly good. I never believed that Stalin's satellite empire would hold up historically, and just after the war, at the worst of Stalin's time, I helped set up the Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva because of that faith. The situation is moving well in the East. The possibilities of that movement, however, could be damaged or destroyed if we became casual about NATO, the Atlantic connection as a whole, and the unity of Western Europe.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Friday, June 10, 1966
1:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached is Francis Bator's excellent covering memorandum to the equally excellent State-Defense paper in response to the second part of NSAM 345.

1. I am sending forward, separately, some observations on Francis' comment at the bottom of page 1 and the top of page 2.
2. The Rose Garden statement to the Austrians on the 15th is an excellent moment for some concrete bridge-building proposals, as Francis suggests. It comes before De Gaulle's Moscow trip. I do urge, however, that you personally run down the full list of proposals in Annex A and guide us as to which you believe would be politically easiest for you to take so that the staff work done in the wake of this paper can be geared to your own sense of priorities.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-99
By LiJ NARA, Date 5-10-90

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. President:

This account of Souvanna
and the King of Laos in
Moscow will interest you —
notably paras. 6 and 7,
which have a ring
of credibility.

WCB

tp 8
6/10/66
1:20

Copy of VIENTIANE 006, June 9, 1966

1. I called on Souvanna and the King separately this morning to obtain their impressions of recent royal visit to Soviet Union. Their impressions differ slightly and are reported below in general outline.

2. Souvanna said that, although there had been more sightseeing than serious exchanges of view, they nevertheless had been able to get some points across. He said that they were accompanied on the entire trip by Zhukov, Secretary General of the Foreign Office, and former Ambassador to China. He described him as well-informed and obviously sent along to talk substance.

3. He said their conversations had been quite specific, concerning detailed accusations by the Pathet Lao, etc., and they in turn had been specific with respect to North Vietnamese actions, etc. He said the King had been quite forceful in presenting the Laotian viewpoint.

4. However, despite these details, Souvanna had no, repeat no, impression of Soviet policy precision. He said he felt the Soviets were engaged in study of their policy towards Laos, and it was probably being reviewed with Soviet Ambassador Kirnassovsky, who is remaining in Moscow until the end of the month. He expected that when Kirnassovsky returned he would bring more precision with him.

5. The King, on the other hand, told me he considered Soviet policy was already quite precise. He said he had held long private talk with Podgorny without the presence of Souvanna. He pointed out delicately that, since this was a conversation between two Chiefs of State, it was "privileged" and he could not give me details. However, he would like to make one observation.

6. He said he had read President Johnson's Memorial Day speech and was struck by the fact that what the President said coincided with what Podgorny said in two important particulars: (a) desire not, repeat not, to enlarge the war, and (b) desire to avoid damage to other US/USSR relations. He considered these perhaps the two most important points.

7. He then said that, if he were to draw the balance of his impressions of Soviet policy with respect to United States policy in Southeast Asia, he would advise the President to "just keep doing exactly what you are doing now," and U.S. will obtain its objectives. He felt that Hanoi was becoming disillusioned with Peking and that the two major points of coincidence of U.S. and Soviet policy would fix the pattern of a settlement in Southeast Asia.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By fw, NARA, Date 5-21-98

SULLIVAN

~~SECRET~~

June 10, 1966
Friday, 10:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Here Lodge assesses the changing
mood in Hanoi and the need for:

- action not talk about our progress;
- cutting down exhortations to negotiate.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ ~~NO DIS~~ Attachment - Saigon 5437

cy: Moyn
Kutner

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-96
By imp, NARA, Date 12-19-88

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t P 10

Friday, June 10, 1966
10:25 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I've checked the origins of the meeting of the Vice President, members of the Senate, and Secretary Rusk scheduled for next Wednesday (June 15). I am informed it arose directly from your instruction at the last Cabinet meeting that the Vice President work with AID and members of the relevant committees in support of our aid legislation.

The subject of the meeting will be the aid legislation.

Accompanying Secretary Rusk will be Bill Gaud, in Dave Bell's absence.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Bill Moyers
Mr. Kutner

Pres. file 11

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, June 10, 1966 -- 9:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

Abe Feinberg, who would be pleased to see you if you had time, made two points in a friendly talk yesterday.

1. He is ready to mount a systematic campaign to inform the Jewish community in America of what you have done for Israel. He would like to be assured that there are no diplomatic objections. I said that if he stuck with those things we have done which are in the public domain, I saw no serious problem. I will check further.

2. He has undertaken on his own a campaign within the Jewish community on Viet Nam. The theme is as follows: The whole fate of Israel depends on the credibility of U. S. commitments. If the U. S. were to fail to meet its commitments in Viet Nam, what good would its commitments be to Israel?

I think this is a first-rate approach and I told him so.

W. W. Rostow

Go ahead and encourage Feinberg to inform the Jewish community of what we have done for Israel? _____

Set up an appointment _____

See me _____

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING, CANCELLED PER E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY Dut ON 12-27-84

WWRostow:rlh

CONFIDENTIAL

Rostow 12
To Pres

Friday, June 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Prime Minister Salazar on Rhodesia

At Tab A is a memorandum from Secretary Rusk recommending that you sign the proposed reply to Portuguese Minister Salazar at Tab B. Salazar's letter is at Tab C.

The draft reply is fully cleared around the Government. We held it up at State's request so that the British could look at it -- they approve. Essentially, the letter is (a) a courteous rejection of Salazar's suggestion that southern Africa is a white man's preserve and that any public declaration of the need for majority rule is counter-productive, and (b) further indication that we support the British efforts in Rhodesia.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 27, 1966

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-101

By lig NARA. Date 3-9-90

~~SECRET~~ 8 AM 9 23

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Response to Prime Minister Salazar's
Letter

Recommendation:

I recommend that you sign the enclosed reply to Portuguese Prime Minister Salazar's letter, dated May 11 and delivered to you by the Portuguese Ambassador, May 17.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

In his letter to you, Prime Minister Salazar urged that you use your influence with the British Government to ensure that the talks in London between the British and representatives of the Southern Rhodesian regime will lead to peaceful results and avoid an outbreak of a disastrous future. Dr. Salazar advanced a proposition that southern Africa, including Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, is different from the rest of Africa in that it is a multiracial Africa where the white man has settled and worked for generations. While stating he had no objection to the American position of government by the express consent of the governed, he argued that this objective could be achieved only by a slow process without fixed dates or previous declarations.

Your proposed reply is designed to reaffirm to the Prime Minister our support for British efforts to bring about a restoration of constitutional government in Southern Rhodesia and our continued conviction that government by the consent of the governed should be applied to all of southern Africa if the forces of moderation are to prevail. Your letter also rebuts the

~~SECRET~~

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-2-

Portuguese notion that any public declaration of intent in this direction jeopardizes achievement of the objectives. On the contrary, we have previously informed the Portuguese that we believe such a public declaration would do much to relieve pressures from the extreme forces in Africa.

The letter attempts to state these objectives and arguments in a manner which will not alienate the Portuguese, even though we are not in complete accord on the means used to achieve the objective of a peaceful resolution of the problems in southern Africa.

Dean Rusk

~~George Ball~~

Enclosure:

Reply to Prime Minister
Salazar's Letter

~~SECRET~~

Postow

126

June 10, 1966

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I was pleased to receive your thoughtful letter of May 11 on the grave problem of peace in southern Africa. Our two countries have enjoyed friendly and fruitful relations since the founding of the United States. We are proud of that history and of our present cooperation in the Atlantic Alliance which we both helped create.

I have carefully reflected on your views and was particularly gratified to note that we are in agreement on the principle of government by express consent of the governed. If this principle had been genuinely accepted and applied in Southern Rhodesia, we might not be confronted with the dangerous situation of which you have written. Even now, I am confident that prompt application of this principle would lead to peaceful reconciliation of divergent interests and make possible a transition to majority government with adequate protection for all minorities.

Please understand, Mr. Prime Minister, that I do not minimize the difficulties involved in the Rhodesian situation. But I have faith that if all those in authority in southern Africa would strive to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect by word and deed, the forces of peace and progress could triumph over those of violence and destruction. I also believe public declarations of intention and concrete evidence of application would enhance, not jeopardize, achievement of this objective.

We have supported the British Government in its efforts peacefully to restore constitutional rule in Rhodesia because we believe that eventual majority rule is essential to the political stability of the area. We have been encouraged by the resumption of talks looking toward a peaceful solution, and we have cautioned against untimely action in the United Nations or elsewhere which would prejudice the successful outcome of these talks.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-79
By NARA. Date 5-10-90

I was pleased to learn from you that there is a desire in Salisbury that the conversations prove successful and that you have been counselling moderation. With patience and strength and with the support of responsible men everywhere, I am convinced that just and lasting solutions can be found to the problems of southern Africa.

I welcome this opportunity to exchange views with you and will always be pleased to receive your thoughts on subjects of interest to our two countries.

Sincerely,

(S)

LBJ

His Excellency
Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar
President of the Council of Ministers
of Portugal
Lisbon

EKHamilton/vmr 6/10

Presidencia do Conselho

Translation

Lisbon, May 11th, 1966

Mr. President,

Excellency,

I have hesitated to trouble Your Excellency, as I know that you are naturally busy with grave problems. But the apprehension that a fresh crisis may develop makes me send this message with a view to underlining, for your kind attention, a problem which can likewise assume the gravest proportions and to which the United States would not be able to remain indifferent. I refer to the question of Rhodesia, on which I shall take the liberty to make some observations.

Even within the orientation applied to Africa in the last decade, we have to consider that the Rhodesian problem is not a normal case of decolonisation, similar to the others, and one that

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-326
By cl, NARA Date 9-27-99

Presidência do Conselho

should or could be solved along the same lines. Rhodesia is situated in a region of Africa which has nothing in common with the rest of the continent: it is a multiracial Africa, where the white man settled down and has been working for generations; it is an Africa where work, stability and progress have attained levels as in no other region of the continent; finally, it is an Africa which is still free from communist infiltration and which offers a solid barrier against it. And this Africa which includes the Portuguese Provinces of Angola and Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa is a vast area, almost as vast as the United States itself.

I believe I know the ideological principles on which the American position is based: government by express consent of the governed or government by majority. It will not be we, the Portuguese, who have created a multiracial society and have for centuries been defending the idea of human rights and racial equality, who will object to that ideological position. But what I wish to underline, for Your Excellency's consideration, is precisely the fact that, in Africa today, there is not a single country whose government can be said to have the express consent of the governed and be based on the will of the majority. This, among others, has

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Presidencia do Conselho

been one of the effects of decolonisation, in the way it has been practised. It seems therefore that what is in question in the case of Rhodesia is not the fact of the government being that of a minority but the fact that the minority is white. We ourselves, within our conception, do not approve of a system which may obstruct and impede access to the government and to the administration of competent and qualified persons found among the negroes. But we believe that this objective must be attained by a slow process, without fixed dates, without previous declarations, without external pressures, because otherwise events are precipitated which lead to the ruin of the work already done and very often to chaos. It is what can happen in Rhodesia, if it is insisted that everything be sacrificed to a supposed majority government. As for ourselves, we think that the Rhodesian whites are also Africans, and the best of them, and that the natural sociological evolution will itself lead them in time to integrate the negro majority in the government and in the administration.

It is alleged, on the other hand, that African countries are exerting pressure for the use of force against Rhodesia. We agree that African leaders in the United Nations have in fact counselled violence. But our knowledge of the situation in Africa

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Presidência do Conselho

enables us to tell Your Excellency that the speakers in the United Nations do not reflect the true sentiments of their respective countries. These are above all thirsting for order in their own structures; they are conscious of the very grave dangers into which they can run; and they know that they do not possess the military nor the economic means for the violent attitudes they preach but of which they would be the first victims. I believe that with a little good will it would be possible for the great Western powers little by little to bring these aspects to light, and to use the necessary firmness to make the African countries realize that not all that they wish is permissible and above all that they cannot run the interests of the international society at their discretion.

I have said above that the Africa where Rhodesia is situated is different from the rest of Africa south of the Equator and that it presents entirely different problems and political situations. That is the Africa that can be defined as extending from the Rovuma and the Congo rivers to the Cape of Good Hope. If in that Africa, which already today encloses independent countries of negro structure but which in various aspects has common interests involving all, a vast convulsion should be provoked or permitted, the losses will be catastrophic not only for the peoples of that

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Presidência do Conselho

area but for the entire West. We would then have to face a very serious military crisis affecting the defence of the south Atlantic and the access to the Indian Ocean; we would have on our hands a crisis in international trade adversely affecting the big Western markets; and we would have an economic crisis of vast proportions which could affect the pound and the dollar, the two exchange currencies of the West. On the other hand, it could be the beginning of a period of guerrillas of unforeseeable duration, before which the adversaries of the West are not likely to remain inactive. And, when at last the situation would be brought under control, those obtaining that result, even if they be Western powers, would be marching on ruins and some generations would be indispensable to place the economy and the administration again at the present level and that too at the cost of many lives and at great expense. It is indeed necessary, Mr. President, not to lose sight of the fact that the area of Africa in question is the most developed, the most progressive, the most prosperous - and this in respect of the entire population and not only of the five million whites who have been living there for many generations. All this may be saved for the West and for Africa itself or all may be lost, depending on whether emotion or political reason is allowed to

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Presidencia do Conselho

prevail and on whether the latter is able to distinguish between immediate interests and permanent objectives. In this context, the President of the United States can play an historic part by offsetting a new crisis of vast proportions.

Talks have begun in London and we must consider them as inspired on both sides by the best of intentions. We believe we know that there is a desire, on the part of the Government of Salisbury, that the conversations prove successful and, to the extent we have access to the Rhodesian leaders, we have counselled moderation. But we are not in a position to say a word in London, where it seems to be feared that a favourable reaction to the immediate independence of Rhodesia may reflect disastrously on Commonwealth relations. This means that only the Government of the United States is in a position to say such a word with success so that the talks and negotiations which have begun may lead to the peaceful results which all desire and so avoid the outbreak of a disastrous future. Portugal has in this matter interests and points of view which do not exactly coincide with those of any of the parties involved in the conflict, be it Great Britain, Rhodesia or the African countries, and therefore we believe that we view the problem with some impartiality; and our legitimacy to express an opinion

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Presidência do Conselho

on it is derived from the fact that we can be affected - and we have been already, very unfavourably - for motives which cannot be imputed to us and which public opinion, both here and in our overseas Provinces - is at a loss to understand and does not accept.

I ask Your Excellency to excuse me for the time I have taken and I convey to you, Mr. President, the expression of my highest consideration.

Sd./ António de Oliveira Salazar

Prime Minister of Portugal

by to Bowne 13
6/10

~~SECRET~~

6/10/66

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**SUBJECT: Strategic Air Command Airborne
Alert Indoctrination Program for
Fiscal Year 1967**

The Airborne Alert Indoctrination Program is authorized through Fiscal Year 1967 to include up to 28 daily overflights of Canadian territory. Arrangements to renew authorization by the Canadian Government should be undertaken through the Department of State.

lj

LBJ:RB:mm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95 State Dept. Guidelines (and NLS 92-397)
By *pw*, NARA, Date *5-21-98*

~~SECRET~~

14
~~16~~

Thursday, June 9, 1966
6 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

It is my objective assessment that Secretary Rusk did an absolutely first-rate job in Brussels -- he held, in your phrase, the "family of fourteen" together despite the stubborn sogginess of the Canadians; he sustained a note of complete courtesy toward the French, making the issue "what is good for NATO" rather than "what will hurt de Gaulle." It was a harder job than might appear.

If you agree, you may wish:

- telephone him in London and say so
- send him a cable, draft attached (Tab A)
- have him over for a drink and say so when he returns

W. W. Rostow

*Pres. saw Rusk when Rusk returned
(McNamara + WWR were included)*

(6/9/66)

14a

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO SECRETARY RUSK - LITERALLY EYES ONLY

I want to pause, Dean, in the midst of everything else that concerns us, and tell you how greatly I admire the job you did in Brussels. It looks to me as though you did hold the "family of fourteen" together with just the right tone and the right relation to the French.

The great jobs in diplomacy are usually quiet and don't get applause. But you have mine -- and my thanks.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Thurs., June 9, 1966
8 p. m.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-100

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Gift for Faisal, a second look

By inf, NARA, Date 1-23-89

Finding the right gift for the desert King has posed a problem! Our Arab experts all tell me that a watch would not be distinctive enough, for the King is peculiarly fond of giving watches to everyone, including vice-consuls, visiting engineers, and Aramco and airlines employees.

I would therefore propose, instead of an Accutron watch, the following:

(a) As a personal gift: a large, 12" by 8" by 6" sterling silver cigar box, suitably inscribed, as a personal gift from you. Bess Abell, Protocol, and those who know Faisal believe this to be highly acceptable. It could sit in his reception room, or wherever he meets visitors, to remind him -- and the visitors -- of his talks with you.

(b) As a human gift to his people: a careful selection of books as a basic starter for the library at the new University of Riyadh, Faisal's pet university. One half of the books would be on American history, selected by Eric Goldman (he is game and ready to go). The other half would be the works of American scholars on the Middle East. These books would demonstrate how seriously U. S. scholars take the Middle East and show how deeply some Americans understand the Arab world from which he comes. We have a Middle Eastern scholar at the University of Chicago lined up to prepare this list, which would also be vetted by the Arab specialists in the State Department. We could prepare an engraved silver plaque to be attached to some distinctive set, like Sandburg's 4-volume work on Lincoln, designating this as part of a gift from you to Faisal for the University of Riyadh.

In this way you will be able to make a distinctive and original gift to the Saudi people, in a way all our Arab specialists agree will please the King. It will also demonstrate your own concern for ideas,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

for learning and for education.

We need your approval before this can be put in train.

Approve ✓

Disapprove

See me

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 9, 1966, 11:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Bill Moyers, Bob McNamara, and I agree we should take a hard look at possible big initiatives in peace with Secretary Rusk when he returns; notably:

- a non-proliferation agreement;
- the release of photos.

At the NSC meeting today there will be considerable talk of non-proliferation.

We all think you should not go too far in committing yourself yet; and that for the time being work should go forward in a small group.

W. W. Rostow

Cy: Moyer
Hinton

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-79
By sig NARA. Date 5-10-90

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

June 9, 1966
Thursday, 11:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

This weekly report of Lodge is
worth reading through to the end.

It has much more good news than
bad.

You may wish to have Bill or me
leak the items on the favorable price turn
and success in Binh Thuan (p. 4).

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 5378

cy - Nguyen
Hien

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 87-96
By sig, NARA, Date 12-19-88

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 9, 1966
10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft statement for you to make to President Schick at 1:00, upon his arrival.

Also attached is the draft I did for the Senior Seminar. It was somewhat modified as it moved upward. I don't know whether you will judge it more useable. But here it is.

W. W. Rostow

VISIT OF PRESIDENT SCHICK
OF NICARAGUA

June 9, 1966

Mr. President:

I welcome you to Washington on behalf of the United States Government and people.

Our two countries share many ties and interests. One of the strongest stands before us: your Ambassador and the beloved Dean of our Diplomatic Corps, Dr. Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa.

It is always good when the heads of governments come together. Each of us, I know, faces great challenges. We, for example, are engaged in a great battle to eliminate the last elements of racial discrimination of our society; to improve our educational system which, in every society, is the ultimate basis for responsible citizenship, as well as for economic growth and social progress; to improve the health of our young and our old; to keep our land beautiful in the face of an industrial civilization which threatens the landscape, the air, and the water. I know that you, too, in your country face similar problems as your people strive to create a truly modern Nicaragua and to play their part as citizens of Central America, Latin America, and the Hemisphere.

I have been especially pleased to observe Nicaragua's loyal collaboration in the Central American Common Market effort and I congratulate you, along with your Central American neighbors, on the amazing progress that has been made toward full economic integration. Your visit coincides closely with the fifth anniversary of the Common Market endeavor which was so happily marked last week.

Our two countries share common objectives on the world scene as well as in the Hemisphere. I look forward to a continuation of the strong effort that is carrying us forward to our mutual goals.

D R A F T

6/4/66

MEMBERS OF THE SENIOR SEMINAR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

I am delighted to greet the members of the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy at the end of their year's study and to present them their diplomas.

This Seminar prepares you to assume the highest posts of responsibility in your service. Many of our ambassadors and senior officials are graduates. I have been able personally to judge the high standards they set.

It is right that there are among you senior officers of the four armed services and representatives from five other government departments.

Their presence reflects the revolution in foreign affairs which has occurred in the past generation.

Foreign policy is no longer a matter of two-way communications between foreign offices. We live in an intensely interdependent world. The security and the livelihood of all peoples are inter-twined. That is why almost every major branch of our government is deeply involved in foreign policy. And that is why we need a new teamwork among you.

One of the finest achievements in government of recent years is the remarkable degree of understanding and harmony among the departments and agencies in the field of foreign policy -- an understanding and harmony symbolized by the unique working relations of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

I am heartened every day by this comradeship which cuts across interdepartmental and agency lines and is reflected today by this Seminar and its graduates. It is an essential requirement of our national security.

The tie between the President and the Foreign Service of the United States should always be close. This tie flows directly from the Constitution which places on the President the direct responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations. But it also results from the fact that the Foreign Service, like the President, belongs to no one department of government. It serves the whole of the government as its name suggests: The Foreign Service of the United States.

The particular strength of the Senior Seminar is this: it provides a year of thought, reflection, and study to some of the most talented members of the foreign affairs community of the government. This chance to look backwards and forwards -- and all around -- has never been more essential than at the present time.

We stand at a moment of history, balanced between great dangers and great opportunities.

The dangers are clear enough -- in Southeast Asia and in other areas where the combination of human misery and nationalist or ideological ambitions threaten peace and order. A great deal of our effort must be devoted to preventing forces of aggression from asserting themselves, or dealing with them when they do.

But there is -- I deeply believe -- a rising tide of good sense in the world and a growing determination to get on with constructive tasks.

-- That is why we are hard at work with our Latin American friends, seeking ways to accelerate the Alliance for Progress.

-- That is why we are hard at work with our friends in Africa to find ways of accelerating that continent's economic and social development.

-- That is why, in the whole arc from Tehran to Tokyo and Seoul, we are working with the governments and peoples of free Asia as they demonstrate not merely a determination to carry forward their development, but also an increasing sense of regional cohesion.

-- That is why, as we face the reorganization of NATO, we are not merely concerned about the relocation of troops and of headquarters, but with new constructive initiatives in the Atlantic and in East-West relations.

-- That is why every day we are at work in this government -- despite all the frustrations of the past twenty years -- to find ways of moving forward in the field of arms control and avoiding the proliferation of national nuclear capabilities.

This has a special meaning for you who are graduating today.

Those who bear an operating responsibility in foreign policy cannot be content merely to handle today's problems with efficiency and discipline. They must every day ask each in his own field: What can we do that we are not doing to tip the balance in favor of order, progress, and peace?

What can we start doing now which will make the future better for our nation and for people everywhere?

I ask those questions every morning and every night.

And I look to you and your colleagues for answers.

I should like to say a special word about the women of the Foreign Service.

First, the Foreign Service Officers who are women. There are over 300 of them extending in rank from junior Foreign Service Officers to Ambassadors. I salute in the group before me Miss Mary Olmsted, whose work in the economic section in New Delhi was of high order.

But I also wish to speak of the outstanding work of the wives of our Foreign Service Officers, a number of whom are in the Rose Garden with us today. These devoted and able Americans have engaged in ~~every conceivable~~ ^{a wide range of} constructive activity overseas -- teaching English, running clinics and nurseries; promoting handicrafts; creating joint schools for their own and local children; and perhaps above all, showing to our foreign friends typical American homes and American family life.

Our Foreign Service Officers and their wives and children are on exhibit every day at over 280 posts in every continent and climate of the world, as living examples of our culture and our heritage.

In the Foreign Service we need -- and we get -- two servants of the nation for every one we appoint. My special greetings -- and my gratitude -- go to them.

It now gives me great pleasure to present the diplomas and to congratulate each of you on the successful completion of your studies in the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy.

I want each of you to know that you -- and the services you represent -- have my confidence and my trust.

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Pres file

Thursday
June 9, 1966 - 9:25 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Secretary Rusk's report
on the gut issue of French troops
in Germany.

W. W. Rostow

SECTO 94
~~SECRET~~ -- NODIS

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Dut NARS, Date 8-29-85

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

Thursday, June 9, 1966

For the President, Acting Secretary, and Secretary McNamara from the Secretary
(Secto 94)

Subject: French Forces in Germany

The Delegation is reporting several successive chapters in the story of negotiations among the Fourteen and with Couve de Murville on arrangements for negotiating the issue of French forces in Germany. The significant developments are these:

1. The Fourteen stuck together past the point of breaking with the French on a fundamental issue of substance, disguised as an issue of procedure.
2. After Couve had tested their ability to stay together, and found they really were prepared to break on the issue of NATO cooperation and command arrangements for the French forces in Germany, Couve retreated to the extent necessary to get a procedural agreement at this conference. This object lesson in dealing with French diplomacy is similar to the lesson learned from the Common Market negotiations of last winter.
3. In the process, Schroeder made what I believe is the flattest and least equivocal statement of the limits of German interest in an arrangement with the French on their troops in Germany. The essence of the matter as Schroeder sees it is that if German troops must be integrated into NATO, the French troops have to have some formal relationship to the NATO system, else the discrimination against Germany on its own soil is just too big for any German Government to swallow.
4. Paul Martin of Canada continues to be the most difficult of my colleagues on all dealings with the French. On the issue of moving NAC out of Paris, he urged Couve to make clear in the Ministerial Council that France wants NAC to stay in Paris. (Couve did not go as far in doing so as Martin wanted him to.) On the French forces in Germany, Martin again showed signs of being more royalist than the king. Although Martin has sporadic support from Danes, Italians, and even Belgians, the issues with those others are probably well within our negotiating range. Martin's view is a very special case, with which the professionals in his own delegation seem unhappy. This may require some special bilateral attention in the weeks to come.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 5-26-98

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

5. At this point, my guess is that we will only be able to get a satisfactory arrangement on French troops in Germany by playing a very tough diplomatic game, keeping the Fourteen tied together through intimate and continuous consultation, and making it very clear that we (together with the Germans and the British) are prepared to face the prospect that the French might end by pulling their forces out of Germany. This is not because we ourselves want this result; but the issue is not one on which the French should be enabled to break up NATO. Much additional evidence has come out of this meeting that France is seeking a position which will permit her to stand aside in a crisis.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 9, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Canadian-Soviet Air Agreement for Onward Rights to Cuba

You should be aware of the fact that our Canadian friends are negotiating a civil aviation agreement with the Soviets which gives them a technical refueling stop at Montreal for their Moscow-Havana service. This is the first significant breach in our program of aviation isolation of Cuba since the missile crisis.

There is no objection to the Moscow-Montreal service, but onward rights present a serious problem for our policy for both Cuba and Aeroflot. Ability of Aeroflot to refuel in Montreal would permit the Soviet TU-114 planes to operate to full capacity, which is now impossible on the Havana run because the installation of fuel tanks in the passenger cabin reduces the passenger capacity from 220 to 50.

If the Canadians allow onward rights, it could have these effects:

1. Enhance Soviet-Cuban subversive capabilities by facilitating a greater flow of travel between Havana and Moscow.
2. Increase the difficulty in dissuading other carriers from instituting a Havana service. Several Western airlines are interested in re-suming scheduled services to Cuba and we have been successful in countering these desires.
3. Undermine our policy of keeping Aeroflot out of Latin America. We so far have successfully countered Soviet attempts to obtain limited rights in third countries for onward service not only to Cuba, but also to several Latin American countries.
4. If Canada, as a NATO country, were to grant such rights to Aeroflot, it would be a blow to our whole Cuban policy by implying a degree of permanence to the Soviet presence in Cuba and enhancement of respectability of the Castro regime.

State has instructed Ambassador Butterworth to approach Canadian authorities at a high level in an effort to dissuade them from granting the Soviets onward rights from Montreal to Havana.

Lets follow this and send
L

Walt
W. W. Rostow

cc: Bill Moyers

~~SECRET~~
Communicated instruction to Geo Ball
6:55 pm 13 June 1966 WWR

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 9, 1966

21

Mr. President:

For your approval.

This National Security Action Memorandum instructs the Secretary of State to produce by July 15 specific recommendations for your consideration as to how to deal with the Indian nuclear weapons problem. The NSAM reflects the discussion in this morning's Council meeting.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-100

By ing, NARA, Date 1-23-89

Approved ✓ 6/10/66
Disapproved —

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-100

By inf, NARA, Date 1-23-89~~SECRET~~NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 351

TO: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem

At the meeting of the National Security Council on June 9, 1966, the President noted the increased urgency of dealing with the Indian nuclear weapons problem following the third Chinese Communist nuclear test. He has directed the Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and heads of other departments and agencies, as appropriate, to study in greater depth the following interrelated issues, emerging from the National Security Council review of the Indian nuclear weapons question:

- a. The extent to which it might be in the U.S. interest to use our economic leverage more explicitly to discourage an Indian national nuclear program.
- b. The effect which various arms control agreements might have on Indian nuclear intentions, and what price the U.S. should be prepared to pay for such agreements.
- c. How far it is in the U.S. interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action might take, and what the optimum timing might be.
- d. Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need to be pursued.

The study should balance the price of each of these suggested courses of action against the damage resulting from India's choosing the independent nuclear path. For the purpose of this study, no change in our present position on a non-proliferation treaty should be assumed.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

The study should result in specific recommendations to the President as to measures which the U.S., in its own interest, should take to delay or prevent India's choosing that path.

The President requests that the first report of recommendations for his attention be presented to him no later than July 15, 1966.

W. W. Rostow

Information copies:
Secretary of Defense
Director, ACDA

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, June 8, 1966 - 7:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Schick Visit

The following papers have been prepared for your use in connection with the Schick visit:

1. Scenario covering your participation - Tab A.
2. Suggested toast for the luncheon - Tab B.
3. Talking points for your conversation with President Schick - Tab C.
4. Biographic sketches of the President and Foreign Minister. - Tab D.

The suggested toast has been reviewed by Bob Kintner and Bill Moyers. They join me in strongly recommending against your exchanging statements of greeting during the arrival ceremony.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-98
By isp NARA, Date 9-1-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SCENARIO FOR THE ARRIVAL OF PRESIDENT SCHICK

1:00 P. M. President Schick arrives at the White House Diplomatic entrance where he will be met by the President and Mrs. Johnson.

The two Presidents walk to the platform on the South Lawn.

Following military honors, including a 21-gun salute and the playing of National Anthems, the two Presidents troop the Military Guard and then return to the platform.

The two Presidents exchange greetings on the platform.

The two Presidents then go into the Diplomatic Reception Room for a Receiving Line.

1:30 P. M. Stag Luncheon in the State Dining Room.

NOTE: President Johnson and President Schick will exchange gifts following the Luncheon and they may also have a private meeting at this time.

VISIT OF PRESIDENT SCHICK
OF NICARAGUA

June 9 - 10, 1966

ARRIVAL STATEMENT

I welcome you to Washington on behalf of the United States Government and people.

You are not a stranger in this town, having served your country with distinction for many years before the Organization of American States and in the Embassy of your country.

You return at a time when the ties between our countries have been further strengthened under your leadership as President of Nicaragua.

Nicaragua has made remarkable progress during your administration. You have achieved substantial gains in economic development and taken significant steps in the social fields. You have labored hard and well for the freedom and welfare of the Nicaraguan people.

I have been especially pleased to observe Nicaragua's loyal collaboration in the Central American Common Market effort and I congratulate you, along with your Central American neighbors, on the amazing progress that has been made toward full economic integration. Your visit coincides closely with the fifth anniversary of the Common Market endeavor which was so happily marked last week.

Our two countries share common objectives on the world scene as well as in the hemisphere, and I look forward to a continuation of the strong effort that is carrying us forward to our mutual goals.

VISIT OF PRESIDENT SCHICK
OF NICARAGUA

June 9 - 10, 1966

TOAST OF THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President, you and the distinguished members of your party come to Washington as friends and collaborators.

We have been impressed by your achievements in bringing new levels of stability and prosperity to your nation.

We share the pride of Nicaragua and your sister republics in the great strides made within the Central American Common Market. Together you are blazing important trails in the quest for Latin American economic integration.

We are mindful of the support which you have given to the common cause of the free world in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.

You have done your country great honor by your important visits to mutual friends in Europe and the Near East.

It is a genuine pleasure to have you again in our midst -- in this house. As you say in Spanish "Esta en su casa".

I ask you to raise your glasses with me in honor of President Schick of the Republic of Nicaragua, whose country and whose people are represented here today by our friend President Schick.

Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-99
By if NARA, Date 5-10-90

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 8, 1966 -- 6:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Rationale for Reduction in Airborne Alert.

Cy Vance argues in the attached memorandum that the situation has changed since 1961, when, as an emergency measure, we introduced a capability to fly one-eighth of our B-52's on continuous alert if required:

-- We now have more Minutemen and Polaris second-strike weapons;

-- We have greater confidence in our warning systems and our ability to get our ground alert aircraft airborne within warning time.

Therefore, the case for a phase-out of the airborne alert at a saving of \$123 million.

The proposal before you was agreed by the JCS after negotiation. The JCS were willing to cut the program from 12 to 6 B-52 airborne alert sorties per day. Secretary McNamara was willing to cut out the airborne alert completely now. Four sorties per day was the compromise.

I recommend that we accept this compromise for the present; but that in the coming budget cycle we make a fresh analysis of relative U. S. -USSR strategic capabilities and see whether a phase-out remains justified. Intelligence indicates continued expansion of Soviet ICBM capabilities and some continued ABM and associated activities which bear watching.

As you may recall, you signed the approval for the Airborne Alert Indoctrination Program the last time round.

W. W. Rostow

Go ahead now but review during the coming budget cycle ✓

Hold _____
See me _____

~~SECRET~~ WW Rostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

23a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

30 May 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In my memorandum of 16 May 1966 requesting Presidential authorization to make appropriate arrangements through the Department of State with the Canadian Government for renewal of current authorization for daily SAC overflights on the approved routes, I pointed out that our present concept of operations envisions an exercise schedule in FY 67 of 4 B-52 aircraft sorties per day. You asked whether the reduction from 12 to 4 B-52 airborne alert sorties per day was a safe and prudent action.

In 1961 we introduced as an emergency measure a capability to fly one-eighth of the B-52 force on continuous airborne alert for 12 months if required by a national emergency. As part of this program, we have been keeping 12 B-52's airborne at all times. This temporary emergency measure is no longer necessary. Circumstances today are greatly different from 1961. Today well-protected missiles in silos and submarines are our principal strategic retaliatory force. In addition, we have greater confidence in our warning systems and our ability to get our ground alert aircraft (50% of the total force) airborne within the warning time. Therefore, we intend to phase out the airborne alert and gradually over the next few years consume the extra stocks (valued at \$123 million) previously maintained for this purpose.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-324
By ics, NARA Date 8-3-98

Cyril Vance

100-100000-100000
100-100000-100000
100-100000-100000
100-100000-100000

~~SECRET~~

100-100000-100000-3394

As per instructions -- to be held
for completion of background work.

Jake Jacobsen
5/21/66
5:45p

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, May 21, 1966 -- 3:35 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Strategic Air Command Airborne
Alert Program for FY 1967

Attached for your approval is the Defense Department request for authority to continue the Strategic Air Command alert flights and to renew the agreement with Canada for overflight.

The number of actual flights will be reduced from 12 to 4 per day in order to lower costs. The planned 4 flights per day will be funded out of normal training money.

Operations on the route over Spain will not be resumed until authorized by the Spanish Government and will then be routed over the Straits of Gibraltar. The agreement with Canada will continue to provide for a maximum of 28 flights per day thus permitting an increased show of force in case it is necessary during periods of tension such as the Cuban crisis.

The advantage of airborne alert flights is that they put a certain number of aircraft closer to target with more accurate delivery capability than the missile force. They also further reduce the possibility of a surprise disarming attack against the United States.

The State Department concurs. Authorization memorandum is attached for your signature, if you approve.

W. Rostow
W. ROSTOW

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 92-397
By gpc, NARA, Date 5-21-98

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

1442
236

16 MAY 1966

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 88-58
By ing NARA, Date 12-7-89

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Strategic Air Command Airborne Alert Indoctrination
Program for FY 1967

Attached is the projected schedule of the Strategic Air Command Airborne Alert Indoctrination Program for FY 1967. This program is a continuation of the FY 1966 program which received Presidential approval as noted in a memorandum from Mr. McGeorge Bundy, dated May 27, 1965.

The concept of operations envisions an exercise schedule of four aircraft sorties per day utilizing the same routes as those currently in use. These routes are outlined on charts previously submitted to President Kennedy under cover of Mr. Gilpatric's memorandum of May 31, 1962. It should be noted that the level of activity for FY 1967 has been reduced from 12 to 4 sorties per day. Actual operations on the southern route will be contingent upon removal of the temporary suspension currently in effect.

I recommend Presidential approval of the continuation of the SAC Airborne Alert Indoctrination Program for FY 1967, as outlined in the attached schedule.

Continuation of the program will require diplomatic steps to obtain renewal (semi-annually) of the Canadian authorization for SAC overflights. I therefore request Presidential authorization to make appropriate arrangements through the Department of State with the Canadian Government for renewal of the current authorization for a maximum of 28 daily SAC overflights on the approved routes, as is currently authorized through 30 June 1966.

This memorandum is concurred in by the Department of State.

C. Vance

Sec Def Cont Nr. X- 3003

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
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ENCLOSURE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-58

By inf NARA. Date 12-7-89

SAC Airborne Alert Indoctrination Program

FY-1967

First Quarter (1 July - 30 September)

1 July - 15 August

<u>Base/Unit</u>	<u>Daily Sorties</u>	<u>Route</u>
Dyess/96 BW	1	N
Travis/5 BW	1	W
Wright-Patterson/17 BW	1	S
Westover/99 BW	1	S

16 August - 30 September

Altus/11 BW	1	N
Walker/6 BW	1	W
Kincheloe/449 BW	1	S
Dow/397 BW	1	S

Second Quarter (1 October - 31 December)

1 October - 15 November

<u>Base/Unit</u>	<u>Daily Sorties</u>	<u>Route</u>
Blytheville/97 BW	1	N
Mather/320 BW	1	W
Wurtsmith/379 BW	1	S
Plattsburgh/380 BW	1	S

16 November - 31 December

Carswell/7 BW	1	N
Beale/456 BW	1	W
Homestead/19 BW	1	S
Seymour-Johnson/68 BW	1	S

Enclosure

Sec Def Cont Nr. X - 3 0 9 3


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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 88-58
By ing NARA. Date 12-7-89

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~


June 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Strategic Air Command Airborne
Alert Indoctrination Program for
Fiscal Year 1967

The Airborne Alert Indoctrination Program is authorized through Fiscal Year 1967 to include up to 28 daily overflights of Canadian territory. Arrangements to renew authorization by the Canadian Government should be undertaken through the Department of State.



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines (and NLS 92-397)
By ju, NARA, Date 5-21-98

~~SECRET~~

Pres file
RJA
6/9/66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, June 8, 1966 -- 5:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

This note of conversation with Jay Lovestone may interest you.

Two items I did not put into this memorandum of conversation, since it will circulate, are: (1) Lovestone reports that Adenauer told him that de Gaulle would be prepared to come to the U. S. if you wished to see him here; (2) Lovestone believes a trip by you to Europe in September or October could have a highly favorable effect on the November election here.

Lovestone also reported some interesting observations from trade unionists in Asia and Africa in support of our Viet Nam policy. I asked him to put them on paper.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-99
By ing NARA. Date 5-10-90

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 8, 1966 — 3:40 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to President Marcos
for Philippine Independence
Day (June 12)

The State Department proposes that you send President Marcos a somewhat longer message than usual this year in honor of the 20th anniversary of Philippine Independence, June 12th.

I attach the Department's suggested language, which would be sent out by cable.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove

See me

**Draft Message to President Marcos for Philippine Independence Day
(June 12)**

On behalf of all Americans, it gives me special pleasure to send warmest congratulations to you and to the Filipino people as you celebrate the 20th anniversary of Philippine independence.

We sense and share the deep feelings of pride and achievement that must suffuse the men and women of your many islands, joined now for twenty years as a free and united nation.

Over these two decades since the flag of independence rose on the Luneta, the Philippines has taken its place as one of the world's foremost democracies. It has not only made great progress in meeting the aspirations of Filipinos; it has also faithfully discharged its responsibilities in the defense of the principles which our two countries hold central to the welfare of mankind.

On this day of national renewal and reaffirmation, Mr. President, the United States salutes you and all your countrymen.

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

cc Bill Moyers 26
to p
Wednesday, June 8, 1966
2:35 p. m.
Rita 6/9/66

MR. PRESIDENT:

State is anxious that you read the attached paper on Indonesia.

It's an excellent summary of the evolution of Indonesia and our policy since October 1 of last year.

The operational point is this (see pp. 4-6): if they get Sukarno out soon, we may well face the following aid issues:

- Further emergency aid (P. L. 480).
- Multilateral debt rescheduling.
- Basic long term assistance (mainly European, Japanese, multilateral, but perhaps some U. S. bilateral).
- Conceivably, some very small military assistance for training and civic action.

Forward planning on this has been remarkably good, even to keeping key Congressional leaders informed. Thus far, they have been sympathetic.

The town wished you to be informed.

No decision required, unless you wish to give guidance.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Moyers
Kintner

DECLASSIFIED	
State	3-8-79
By	DC/H per IP
NARS, Date	8-17-86

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 8, 1966
2:35 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

~~State is anxious that you read the attached paper on Indonesia.~~

It's an excellent summary of the evolution of Indonesia and our policy since October 1 of last year.

~~The operational point is this (see pp. 4-6): if they get Sukarno out soon, we may well face the following aid issues:~~


- ~~-- Further emergency aid (P.L. 480).~~
- ~~-- Multilateral debt rescheduling.~~
- ~~-- Basic long term assistance (mainly European, Japanese, multilateral, but perhaps some U. S. bilateral).~~
- ~~-- Conceivably, some very small military assistance for training and civic action.~~

Forward planning on this has been remarkably good, ~~even to keeping key Congressional leaders informed. Thus far, they have been sympathetic.~~

~~The town wished you to be informed.~~

~~No decision required, unless you wish to give guidance.~~

W. A. Rostow



SECRET

264

~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 6 pages. No. 1 of 10 copies, Series A.

INDONESIA

Background

1. Last October 1 the Indonesian Communist Party associated itself with elements of the armed forces to stage a take-over of the Indonesian Government which was promptly suppressed by the Army. Between October 1 and the middle of March of this year the Communist Party was virtually eliminated as an effective political organization, perhaps as many as 300,000 Indonesians were killed -- the great bulk of whom we believe were in fact associated with the Communist apparatus. Political power gradually shifted from President Sukarno and his Palace clique toward the Army, the Muslim political parties, and anti-Communist students.
2. In February and March Sukarno attempted to seize full power again, was unable to do so, and was forced to accept a new cabinet which was controlled by the Army and by political moderates. By the end of March there was a new government dedicated to economic and social reform, most of Sukarno's foreign policy had been publicly challenged or was being ignored, and the triumvirate of General Suharto, the Sultan of Jogjakarta and Adam Malik took effective, though not yet complete, power.

Present Situation - Domestic

3. ~~In the past two months the new leaders have moved with surprising speed to consolidate their power and to start on the long process of putting together the almost totally shattered Indonesian economy. The Communists seem to be effectively out of power, but Sukarno remains as a President still having the capacity to limit and interfere with the activities of government. The government has, despite this, instituted new export incentive programs, started to funnel Indonesia's export earnings through the Central Bank, and succeeded in at least slowing down price inflation of rice and certain other basic commodities. The economy is still in a chaotic condition, and the leadership feel that unless they can succeed in providing adequate food and clothing to the population their efforts to develop a rational political system cannot succeed.~~

Present Situation - Foreign

4. ~~Although still limited by the continued presence of Sukarno, the new government has made very substantial changes in foreign~~

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-325

By CL, NARA Date 8-26-99

policy: It has announced to its own people that it intends to ~~re-join the United Nations~~ and other international organizations at some time in the fairly near future. It has entered into a preliminary agreement seriously intended ~~to end confrontation with Malaysia and Singapore.~~ It has attempted to ~~restore normal working relations with all western countries and with Japan,~~ has started to close out its mischief-making presence in Africa, and has virtually broken relations with Communist China. In Bangkok last week, Indonesian representatives joined in ~~expressions of interest in a loose-jointed grouping of Southeast Asian states to include initially Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia.~~

5. The new regime has completely ~~put an end to anti-American expressions in Indonesia.~~ Although it continues publicly critical of our Viet-Nam policy, Malik has privately expressed some understanding of our position, and there have been some reciprocal propaganda attacks between North Viet-Nam and Indonesia. In another aspect significant to the U.S., the regime has ~~decided against further efforts to take over American petroleum company facilities which produce and export crude oil,~~ and seems to be negotiating in good faith ~~for the purchase of the one remaining American refinery (STANVAC).~~

Probable Future Developments

6. The leaders' ~~intentions are to continue to whittle away at Sukarno,~~ using as a next step the mechanism of the "People's Parliament", which is due to meet for about three weeks starting in mid-June. The leaders intend to use this session to remove Sukarno's life-time tenure on the presidency, to remove his special powers so that he will become the figurehead, to secure formal approval of a settlement with Malaysia, and in general to put the country's up to now rather nominal legislative process firmly behind the new leadership. Having accomplished these things, hopefully by mid-July, the intention is to install a new working cabinet free of the last of Sukarno's henchmen, and then to move full scale into economic rehabilitation. Other basic decisions such as the dates for re-joining international organizations will probably be deferred until this time.

7. Despite its apparent willingness to cease its aggressive policies in the area -- which the new regime recognizes as essential to external assistance among other factors -- ~~we should not expect the new leaders to be anything but intensely nationalistic, non-aligned, and "Afro-Asian" in their orientation.~~ Nonetheless, the contrast between these policies and those of Sukarno, or those that would have been pursued by the totally Communist-oriented regime that appeared to be in prospect, is dramatic.

~~SECRET~~

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All in all, the change in Indonesia's policies has been a major "break" in the Southeast Asian situation, and a vivid example to many other nations of nationalist forces rising to beat back a Communist threat.

U.S. Interest and Objectives

8. Our traditional interest in Indonesia has been to keep the country out of the hands of Communists and out of the potential control of Communist China. As the Sukarno regime moved more and more under Communist and Chinese influence prior to October 1965, the United States inevitably became the number one officially pronounced enemy of the Sukarno regime, and was billed as the only threat to Indonesia's national security because of the presence of American forces in the Philippines, the South China Sea, Viet-Nam, and Thailand. The marked pro-Communist trend in Indonesia -- accelerated in mid-1963 -- undoubtedly rested in part on the conclusion that the U.S. was losing ground in Southeast Asia. Conversely, although the U.S. had no direct part whatever in the anti-Communist takeover that began in October, unquestionably the fact that we were standing firm in Viet-Nam reinforced the courage of the anti-Communist leaders; to put it differently, without our evident determination, they would have been very much less likely to have acted.

9. Our basic interest in Indonesia still derives from its tremendous size, its population of more than 100,000,000, its location between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and between Australia and the mainland, as well as from its potential usefulness as a productive and influential state which could serve as a unifying and constructive force in the area. Our objective should be to help as we can in the development of a responsible, moderate and economic-minded regime. Only such a regime can prevent the resurgence of some form of extremism and, over time, play a useful part in the area.

U.S. Actions to Date

10. Until late March, ~~our major policy on developments in Indonesia was silence.~~ The anti-Communist leaders wanted no cheers from us. ~~This policy remains generally sound,~~ particularly in the light of the wholesale killings that have accompanied the transition (even though it is perfectly clear that a Communist takeover would have been at least as bloody). Nonetheless, we have recently been quietly pointing out that we take a favorable view of the new regime and have also been noting that its succession would have been less likely without our continued firmness in Viet-Nam and in the area. We should continue to applaud and claim credit only to this extremely limited extent.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

11. While continuing this public position, ~~we have throughout made it privately clear that we are ready at the right time to begin making limited material contributions to help the new leaders get established.~~ Our AID programs had been entirely terminated in Indonesia, but we have (in mid-April) agreed to ~~sell them 50,000 tons of rice under PL 480 Title IV (dollar repayment) on terms of 4 7/8 per cent interest with five years repayment.~~ We are now beginning action on a ~~Title IV sale of 75,000 bales of cotton on more generous terms, 3 1/2 per cent interest with 15 years repayment.~~ We have quietly made it known ~~we will support their efforts to reenter international organizations, and that we will participate in multilateral efforts to reschedule their debt at an appropriate time.~~ We have encouraged other free world countries to extend emergency assistance to Indonesia in order to help the new regime establish itself in the period before the questions of debt rescheduling, stabilization and development can be dealt with.

Future U.S. Actions

12. ~~If the new leadership succeeds in effectively removing power from Sukarno during the next month, it will then turn its efforts toward the economy.~~ There are a number of points at which U.S. assistance will be needed.

a. Further Emergency Aid. There will be a probable need for further short-term assistance to keep the economy going prior to multilateral decisions on long-term problems. Our role in this can be played by further transactions under Public Law 480. While we have been providing assistance under Title IV on concessional terms, we should plan to switch to Title I (local currency repayment) if the political situation stabilizes, in order not to add further to Indonesia's already overwhelming foreign exchange debt.

b. Multilateral Debt Rescheduling. Indonesia has a foreign debt of more than \$2.5 billion. Approximately \$170 million of this is owed to us, and about \$1 billion to the Soviet Union, mostly military. Debt servicing requirements this year may amount to about \$450 million, which is more than probable gross foreign exchange earnings for the same period. Since Indonesia is already in default on both private and government accounts, rescheduling is obviously necessary. We have been in close touch with Indonesia's free world creditors, have made it clear that we regard it as essential that rescheduling be multilateral, and that we would like to see some other country, such as Japan, or an international organization, play the leading role in organizing the rescheduling exercise. The Sultan

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of Jogjakarta and various of his and Malik's representatives have recently visited Japan and obtained a commitment for credits of \$30 million as emergency aid. The Sultan plans to visit Western European countries in July. Other representatives plan to visit the USSR and EE countries. It now seems probable that the Indonesians will be ready for formal multilateral consideration of the debt in late July or August. The probable Indonesian proposal will be along the lines of a five-year moratorium -- which among other things defers such knotty issues as the priority status of military as compared to economic debts. We should be prepared to participate, and to agree to rather generous terms provided we do so in a framework taking account of interests of all creditors.

c. Basic long-term assistance. Beyond emergency aid and debt rescheduling, ~~Indonesia is going to need both technical assistance and further credits if the country is going to get back on its feet.~~ However successful their performance in restoring integrity to the Central Bank, cutting government deficit financing and promoting production and exports, it is quite likely that by the fall of this year the ability of the new government to preserve its authority will depend upon access to substantial foreign credits to rehabilitate both industry and agriculture, as well as to restore the badly damaged communications and transportation systems. Much of this needed credit can be obtained from Japan, from Western Europe, and very probably from such international organizations as the IMF, the IBRD, and (later) the Asian Development Bank. We have already made it clear that we expect long-term assistance to be on a multilateral basis, and the willingness of other sources to contribute substantially will be affected by the U.S. contribution. Hence, we believe we should be prepared to pledge significant amounts, and the need for such pledges may arise sometime in the fall if the constructive trend in Indonesia continues at its present pace. Hence, ~~it is conceivable that we will need substantial 1967 AID funds, both for direct assistance and for channeling through the Asian Development Bank.~~ The debt situation will foreclose the Export-Import Bank as a source of additional assistance, and our only other channel would appear to be additional PL-480 commodities on concessional terms amounting to assistance.

d. With respect to military assistance, ~~the Indonesian Army is excessively large and amply equipped for internal security.~~ We should ~~not consider resuming any military assistance programs except for a possible small-scale~~

~~SECRET~~

6

training effort largely for the sake of personal ties with key military figures of the future. There is the additional possibility of civic action projects, on which the Indonesians are already tentatively approaching us for technical help in the development of the resources of the underpopulated outer islands. This kind of project might make sense in the total picture, for limited MAP and AID funding.

U.S. Government Organization With Respect to Indonesia

13. Up to this point, the Indonesian problem has been effectively handled on a normal inter-agency basis. Moreover, we have kept in touch with key leaders of Congress, who appear to understand the situation and its possible implications. The fact that any major assistance would be on a multilateral basis would have particular appeal in many Congressional quarters.

14. Nonetheless, in view of the impending dimensions of the problem in the next six months, it now appears wise to initiate more extensive consultations with the Congress, and it may be wise to designate a specific group within the Executive Branch -- perhaps as a subcommittee of the Senior Interdepartmental Group -- to keep the problem under very close review.

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Wednesday
June 8, 1966 -- 1:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

This report from the Canadian ICC
member gives us:

1. Ronning's movements more precisely.
2. Evidence that the bombing hurts the
North -- but not enough.
3. One man's judgment on the need
for secrecy and saving Hanoi's face.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 5379

~~SECRET NO DIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-96

By ig, NARA, Date 12-19-88

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

Wednesday, June 8, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Saigon, 5379)

Moore, the Canadian member of the ICC, called to say that Ronning was expected to arrive Sunday, June 12, and intended to see me Monday at 4:00 p.m., also call on the Government of Vietnam, and would leave Saigon Tuesday, June 14, to Hanoi in an ICC plane. While in Hanoi, he expected to see the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister and then leave June 18 for Vientiane, and leave Southeast Asia via Bangkok.

Moore then launched into a long talk full of miscellaneous items about what he has picked up in North Vietnam, as follows:

The North Vietnamese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs had told Moore that the La Pira peace feeler had been genuine, but the Hanoi regime had had to denounce it when the leak came.

Moore was very emphatic on the danger of leaks, and, in fact, on the whole danger of talking a great deal and having a lot of publicity about peace feelers. He said that Hanoi has "played ball" as regards keeping quiet on the first Ronning trip, and he believed they would do so this time.

In particular, he deplored a U.S. statement which he said was made by McCloskey on June 3, which gave in public almost exactly what the substance was of what the Canadians were planning to say in private. This in itself, he said, could make it impossible to accomplish anything. If the North Vietnamese should want to agree to come back again for another talk, the fact that such a possibility had been mentioned would "cramp their style."

Moore said he saw only routine commission people on his last visit, adding that they were intelligent and well-informed and gave the line as it came down to them from on top. They were still insisting on the Four Points and on unconditional stopping of U.S. bombing. Evidently, he said, Hanoi bitterly resents the U.S. introducing a new bargaining counter by bombing the North and insisted it first be removed so that the only bargaining counter would be their aggression on the ground in South Vietnam.

On tangible effects of the bombing, Moore believed that North Vietnam had suffered economically. The damage to communications is repairable, he

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-325
By CB, NARA Date 8-26-99

said, because of their large supply of man power. But the railway between Hanoi and Haiphong is still broken, although the road is working. There is, however, a dislocation of normal distribution channels. They have meatless days, there is an egg shortage; in Hanoi only one steam generator is working apart from the private generators which belong to specific factories. In the countryside, there is a lack of water and of electricity. A North Vietnamese Liaison Officer with the ICC, whose family lives 30 kilometers out of Hanoi, told Moore that "At home, there is no water and no light." Moore did not know why there was the absence of water, whether it was due to the failure of pumping equipment or to broken water mains.

Moore surmised that all this offset the satisfaction which they derive from what they read about the disturbances in South Vietnam. They were not, he said, being allowed to forget that the "crunch was still on." There was the bombing, there were the heavy casualties among the North Vietnamese troops in the South, and there were defections. This all added up.

He noted that the North Vietnamese "were not jubilant, but interested" about the troubles in the South. He discerned no wish to ally themselves too closely with the struggle elements in South Vietnam, although obviously they wanted Communist professionals to take advantage of it. There were a marked exaggeration of the anti-American aspect of the disorders in South Vietnam.

In short, he thought there was "an incentive to find a way out without loss of face, providing you Americans swallow a pretty big pill." The bombing was hurting, but had not really got them down.

Moore returned to the importance of loss of face. He believed that this could be a decisive factor as to whether productive talks are held or not. After the Hanoi authorities have weighed all the pros and cons, all their sufferings and all their victories, the deciding straw that would break the camel's back could be whether they thought they would lose face. He said, "I hope you Americans are not escalating to a new face offensive." He realized the need to talk peace for the sake of home opinion in the United States -- as it is necessary to do it for home opinion in Canada -- but he is absolutely convinced that if we talk about peace, it makes it impossible for Hanoi to come to any meeting. We should, therefore, "play it as quietly as possible." The one thing they can't do is to "look like they are giving in to public pressure."

LODGE

28
Pres file

Wednesday, June 8, 1966 - 12:15 pm

Rts
4/9/66

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Latin American Reaction to the Dominican Elections

USIA reports that the Dominican elections have received heavy news play throughout the Hemisphere.

The reporting for the most part is balanced and generally favorable to Balaguer. The honesty of the elections comes through clearly.

Editorials stress two major themes: (1) that the elections were free and expressed the will of the people, and (2) that a vote for Balaguer was a vote for peace and reconstruction.

1s/W alt
W. W. Rostow

Pres file

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday, June 8, 1966 -- 12:00 noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with George Woods, 5:30 p. m. today.

I talked with George Woods yesterday about the issues he might wish to raise with you. As a result, here is an agenda that meets, I believe, your interests and his.

1. IBRD Plans

- a. Agriculture and chemical fertilizers.
- b. Africa -- potentialities for helping carry forward her recent initiative.
- c. Next steps India-Pakistan

2. Development Policy in General.

George Woods has some ideas about the appropriate future scale of development assistance.

Note: I don't believe George Woods will raise it, but you should know that we have just worked it out between Joe Fowler, George Woods, and Senator Dirksen that the World Bank should continue to have access to the New York bond market. It is now firmly nailed down that the World Bank operations do not (repeat not) constitute a drain on our balance of payments position.

W. W. Rostow

cc: F. Bator

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED	
State 5-15-78 NSC 11-22-78	
By <i>DAH</i> per <i>18</i>	NARS, Date 8-17-86

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 8, 1966, 10:50 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for German Majority Leader Rainer Barzel

State -- and Speaker McCormack -- recommend that you have a short meeting with Barzel on June 16. Barzel is the Deputy Chairman of Erhard's party, the Floor Leader in the Bundestag, and a strong candidate to be the next Chancellor. He is young, able, energetic and a skillful politician. On policy he is pro-U.S. and pro-NATO, but concerned to salvage as much as possible in Germany's relations with France.

If your schedule is not too tight, I think it would be useful for you to see him.

Francis M. Bator

Set up meeting _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

I agree
✓

top 31

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 8, 1966
10:20 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

In this message to Sect. McNamara, Sect. Rusk is more clear than in his message to you.

He is firmly for postponement until we know the result of Ronning's mission.

His grounds, as we suspected: our attacks would be judged to have "sabotaged" the mission.

Your choice is:

- a) to accept his judgment and postpone.
- b) overrule his judgment and go now.
- c) send a message like this:

"I understand your anxiety that we not appear to sabotage the Ronning mission.

"On the other hand, it is quite possible the odds on Ronning's receiving an affirmative response will be improved if Hanoi knows its oil supply is no longer in sanctuary.

"Before deciding on postponement, therefore, I wish your assessment of the feasibility of postponing Ronning's probe until after our operation has been launched and the wisdom of such a postponement."

W. W. Rostow

(cc: Bill Moyers)

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 88-55
By up, NARA, Date 12-9-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

310
Wednesday, June 8, 1966

FOR SECRETARY MCNAMARA FROM SECRETARY RUSK (Secto 87)

Reference your telegram on Ronning, you may have seen my telegram to the President. I am deeply disturbed by general international revulsion, and perhaps a great deal at home, if it becomes known that we took an action which sabotaged the Ronning mission to which we had given our agreement. I recognize agony of this problem for all concerned. We could make arrangements to get an immediate report from Ronning. If he has a negative report, as we expect, that provides a firmer base for the action we contemplate and would make a difference to people like Wilson and Pearson. If, on the other hand, he learns that there is any serious breakthrough toward peace, the President would surely want to know of that before an action which would knock such a possibility off the tracks. I strongly recommend, therefore, against ninth or tenth. I regret this because of my maximum desire to support you and your colleagues in your tough job.

#####

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-325

By cb, NARA Date 8-26-99

Wednesday, June 8, 1966
9:00 a. m.

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have talked with Bob McNamara -- in fact, double-talked -- because he is in New York. His view is:

1. He would prefer to go on the POL targets immediately.
2. On the other hand, if, as appears to be the case, Secretary Rusk wishes the attack postponed until his return, Secretary Rusk's request should be honored unless you personally decide that we should go immediately.
3. He believes the only way to send the message to Ho Chi Minh is to act. A formal warning has the danger on the one hand of sounding like a threat, and on the other of sounding like indecision and weakness.
4. From my own experience, Communists react best to actions rather than words.

In short, if we are to accept Secretary Rusk's request for postponement ~~until~~ ^{until} his return, we must also accept postponement for about two weeks. I regard this as unfortunate, but not necessarily a disaster.

5. Before deciding finally, you may wish to put the question of a two-week postponement directly to Secretary Rusk.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-96
By lf, NARA, Date 12-19-88

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

cc Bill Moyers only

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, June 8, 1966

Pres file 33

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Argentine President Illia

The Argentines are hosting the Latin American Conference of Ministers of Education and Ministers Responsible for Economic Planning. This is an important meeting designed to focus on the role of education in economic development. UNESCO and ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America) are the sponsors. We participate as full members.

President Illia has written you asking that you send Secretary Gardner (Tab B). State recommends that he attend for at least the first two or three days for these reasons:


1. The Latin Americans attach importance to the meeting and are sending Cabinet-level representatives.
2. It provides an excellent opportunity for Secretary Gardner to get across to his Latin American Ministerial counterparts your new initiative in international education.
3. President Illia is passing through another season of military plotting against him and a favorable response from you now will bolster his position.

Secretary Gardner is reluctant to go because of the heavy workload of MEDICARE, the legislative program and other pressing domestic business. But he is prepared to accept your preference.

The importance of the conference and the Argentine domestic angle persuade me that Secretary Gardner should go for a few days.

If you decide that Secretary Gardner should attend, I recommend that you sign the reply to President Illia at Tab A.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

We have prepared the letter to respond to President Illia's specific request and -- in line with your desire to open a dialogue with Chiefs of States in other regions -- to invite him to write you about matters of common interest -- particularly the Latin American summit meeting.

W. Rostow

Prefer that he go;
have signed letter _____

Prefer that he not go;
prepare another letter _____

Speak to me _____.

Attachments

Tabs A and B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

I have your letter concerning the forthcoming Latin American Conference of Ministers of Education and Ministers Responsible for Economic Planning. I am happy to have this opportunity to write you about this and other matters of mutual interest.

The field of education has been an area of prime interest to me since the years when I taught school in rural Texas. I know from personal experience what education means for the fulfillment of the individual and the working of a healthy democratic society. From your long experience as a doctor, you will have made the same observations.

I have recommended to our Congress that new initiatives be developed in the field of international education as a major component of our collaboration with the countries of this hemisphere, and also of other regions, toward the ideals of freedom, social justice, and peace. The intent of the proposed International Education Act of 1966 now before the Congress is to strengthen our capacity for this enduring purpose.

I am also fully in accord with the importance you attach to the Conference of Ministers of Education and Ministers Responsible for Economic Planning in Latin America. I am pleased to inform you that Secretary Gardner will head the United States Delegation to the Conference, although his schedule will not permit him to remain for the entire meeting.

I want to take this opportunity to comment on your proposal for a meeting of Presidents. I welcome this initiative. You will have seen the statement I made

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-98
By inf NARA, Date 9-1-89

regarding it in my address in Mexico City last April. Ambassador Martin will have conveyed to you in recent days some of our preliminary thinking on preparations for such a meeting.

Several of our sister governments have endorsed your view and mine that to be truly meaningful such a meeting should produce substantial results. I would welcome hearing from you directly on what additional initiatives might be discussed to give the Alliance for Progress increased momentum and otherwise strengthen the projects for economic and social progress under democratic institutions in our hemisphere.

I know that you are facing some tough economic problems. I too have my share of them as we in the United States deal with various strains put on our economy by our commitment to the struggle for freedom in Vietnam and our determination to continue assisting the developing nations. Recently some of your economic advisers were in Washington for talks on trade and other economic matters of mutual interest. I understand that this initial round was helpful and that it will be followed by further conversations in Buenos Aires. I hope that you will feel free to write me about these and other issues on which you think an exchange of views would serve to strengthen ties between our two countries.

I look forward to meeting and talking with you when the summit conference is held.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Dr. Arturo Illia
President of the Argentine Nation
Buenos Aires.

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 5-2-98

PRESIDENT OF THE ARGENTINA NATION

Buenos Aires, March 1966

Mr. President;

I have the honor to inform you that UNESCO, together with CEPAL and the cooperation of the Argentine National Committee for UNESCO will hold the Latin American Conference of Ministers of Education and Ministers charged with Economic Planning in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, from the 20th to the 30th of June 1966, in Buenos Aires.

My Government is giving this Meeting all the support and importance it requires, thus interpreting the wishes of the States who, in the region in which the last General Conference of UNESCO was held, voted to carry it out, and, conscious also of the honor that it means to the Argentine Nation to act as host to the representatives of its neighboring countries, Ministers of Education and spokesmen of the people so dear to our warmest feelings.

It is for this reason that, cognizant of the quality and importance of the subjects to be discussed, as well as of the repercussions that will be felt in the American sphere, I am writing to you, Mr. President, to express my hope that you may convey to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare the significance of his presence at this Conference and the sympathy with which Argentina will welcome him as a guest of honor and high ranking representative of the culture of his people.

I believe, Mr. President, that the educational problems of our America should be approached with a realistic and total outlook and that all our governments, whose constant concern is the

The Honorable
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America
Washington

raising of the standard of living of its people, will find in this Conference as much a critical study of what has already been accomplished as new and renewed roads that will bring about the improvement of our educational systems and, as a consequence, that of an authentic and loyal democracy.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration and personal regard.

Sgd. A. Illia

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, June 7, 1966, 2:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Title of the Perkins Committee on Foreign Aid

The General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs (Jim Perkins, Eugene Black, Arthur Watson, etc., -- full list of members at Tab A) is printing letterhead stationery. The question has arisen whether they can bill themselves as the "President's" Committee. Dave Bell is willing to turn them down, but he would rather say yes -- if you do not object. Perkins is a little sensitive about their status as advisors to you as well as to Secretary Rusk, Bell, et al.

Use of your title would please the Committee and may marginally increase their value (they already work much harder than most advisory groups). On the other hand, it would add to the semi-official status of their reports, and probably increase the pressure for meetings with you once or twice a year.

On balance, I agree with Dave that it is worth letting them go ahead.

FS

Francis M. Bator

Approve use of "President's" ☒

Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐

34a

GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Dr. James A. Perkins, Chairman, President, Cornell University

Mr. Dwayne O. Andreas, Chairman, Executive Committee, National City Bank of Minneapolis

Mr. Joseph A. Beirne, President, Communications Workers of America

Mr. Eugene R. Black, Special Presidential Advisor for SE Asian Economic and Social Development

Mrs. Everett N. Case, Chairman, Board of Trustees, Skidmore College

Dr. Luther H. Foster, President, Tuskegee Institute

Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, former President of the American Red Cross

Dr. J. George Harrar, President, The Rockefeller Foundation

Mr. William R. Hewlett, President, Hewlett-Packard Company

Mr. Sol M. Linowitz, Chairman of the Board, Xerox Corporation

Prof. Edward S. Mason, Lamont University Professor, Harvard University

Mr. George Meany, President, AFL-CIO

Dr. Franklin D. Murphy, Chancellor, University of California at LA

Dr. Samuel M. Nabrit, President, Texas Southern University

Mr. David Rockefeller, President, Chase Manhattan Bank

Mr. Arthur K. Watson, President, IBM World Trade Corporation

Mr. William J. Zellerbach, President, Zellerbach Paper Company

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-328
By CB, NARA Date 10-14-99

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, June 7, 1966. 2:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Clark Clifford submits his final report on the Chinese Communist border incident resulting in the shoot-down of an attacking MIG 17 last May 12. Clifford has strongly underlined to me the importance of not revealing that he (and this report) are the source of the recommendation.

If you agree, I will communicate Clifford's recommendation to Secretary McNamara for consideration and implementation. The report will be given no distribution.

Clifford's exhaustive review of the incident has been of real value and already has resulted in tightening up existing procedures. You may wish to thank him for this special effort for us at a time when he has had to husband his working time.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

See me _____

By Moyers

~~TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

 - File F100 file

~~TOP SECRET~~

1743
35a
~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE W. W. ROSTOW

I would appreciate your passing to the President the enclosed self-explanatory memorandum.

In view of your interest in the subject I am attaching a copy of the memorandum for your files.


Clark M. Clifford

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 105.141.020.019/1
By je, NARA, Date 10-23-09

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 JUN 7 PM 2 58

1743

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Arg-WWRH
XR cy-Mayer

June 3, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your request there is submitted herewith a report on the results of my review of the May 12 incident which led to the claim of the Chinese Communist Government that one of its MIG 17s was shot down in South China by U. S. combat aircraft.

Clark M. Clifford

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NLS. 141.020.019/1*
By *je*, NARA, Date *10/23/09*

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ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 JUN 7 PM 2 58

U. S. Shootdown of Chinese Communist (Chicom) MIG 17 on May 12, 1966

The following conclusions and recommendations are based on an exhaustive review of all operational and intelligence information available on the subject, including a report of investigation made in Southeast Asia by a team assembled for that purpose at the direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Conclusions:

1. On May 12 Chicom MIGs made an aggressive attack on a U. S. air mission. The U. S. mission consisted of one RB 66 and three F-4C aircraft. The RB 66 was on an electronics countermeasures and electronics intelligence mission flown in support of U. S. armed reconnaissance operations over North Vietnam. The three F-4Cs participated in the mission to provide cover and protection for the RB 66.

2. In the course of the U. S. mission a shallow penetration of Chicom air space occurred (less than 25 nautical miles).

3. One Chicom MIG was shot down by one of the U. S. F-4Cs in the vicinity of the Chicom/North Vietnamese border. It cannot be definitely established on which side of the border the MIG fell, but it is more likely that it fell on the North Vietnamese side rather than on the Chicom side.

4. It is my opinion that the U. S. aircraft involved entered areas north of those prescribed in their planned mission due to navigational errors and to the failure of the established "border warning" alert system.

5. Such navigational errors can be reduced substantially. However, it is not possible to guarantee against further intrusions of Chicom air space, if similar aggressive attacks are made on U. S. aircraft operating in close proximity to the Chicom/NVN border.

6. In addition to reducing navigational errors, it is also possible to provide a greatly improved electronics system for following the flight of our planes, and for providing them with warning notification of a possible border violation. This would substantially reduce the likelihood of such violations.

7. For a number of days following the incident, conflicting reports were submitted to policy levels in Washington. These appear to be due to (a) the absence of adequate operational data which should have been at hand, and (b) the tendency on the part of some evaluators in Washington to place undue dependence on the statements of U. S. operational personnel, while discounting unduly signals intelligence data derived from Chicom/NVN tracking of the aircraft involved in the event.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

8. Approval of the recommendations made by the JCS investigative team should (a) reduce the likelihood of a recurrence of this kind, and (b) enable intelligence and command-control personnel in Washington to provide timely and accurate information to policy levels should similar incidents occur. It would appear that the recommendations made by the JCS investigative team are all within the current capabilities of the Department of Defense.

Recommendations: It is recommended that:

1. The Department of Defense establish an effective system for positive flight-following of U. S. aircraft operating over NVN and the Tonkin Gulf, in order to (a) minimize the possibility of navigational errors, and (b) reduce significantly the probability of border violations. In achieving an effective system the Department of Defense should consider the remedial actions recommended by the JCS investigative team.

2. Following establishment of such a system, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Military Command Center should jointly review and report periodically to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the effectiveness of the means established for the purpose of providing timely information and evaluations to policy levels concerning military intelligence/combat operations of the type involved in the May 12 incident.

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6-7-66
12:20P
MEMORANDUM

(72)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Tuesday, June 7, 1966 - 11:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Invitation to Garcia Godoy

I believe it would be a good gesture to invite Garcia Godoy to Washington for a private visit at an appropriate date after he turns over the government to Balaguer on July 1. Ellsworth Bunker and Linc Gordon concur.

Garcia Godoy may consider a trip here impolitic for several months. But he would appreciate knowing that the welcome mat is out.

If you approve the visit, Ellsworth could extend the invitation before returning to Washington this weekend.

Walt Rostow

Approve invitation ____.

Prefer no invitation ____.

Let's discuss further ____.

cc: Mr. Bill Moyers
Mr. Jim Jones

Hoed
ted
6/8/66
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tues., June 7, 1966
7:20 pm

Mr. President:

You may be interested in this speech
of the Vice President to be given
tomorrow, a copy of which was sent
to my office.

W. W. R.

REMARKS

VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT HUMPHREY

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

WEST POINT, NEW YORK

JUNE 8, 1966

Gentlemen, I salute you. You have completed four years of rigorous training -- of mind, of body, and of spirit. You have done well.

But I congratulate you even more on what lies ahead -- for the lives of service to your country and to your fellowmen which you begin here today.

The demands on you will be great -- greater than on any previous generation of the "Long Gray Line" that has passed proudly through this great institution.

Never before has your country been so deeply linked with every part of a rapidly shrinking and changing world.

Never before has the power available to men been so awesome.

Yet never before have men everywhere been so aware that power alone cannot solve their most urgent problems nor satisfy their deepest needs.

You are soldiers. There will be times when your courage, your coolness, and your command of the military arts will be required in full measure.

But you will have to be more -- much more -- than fighting men.

You will have to be builders.

You will have to be diplomats and psychologists, engineers and politicians, advisers, educators, and friends.

For, in the years ahead, the peace and security of the human family will be threatened by aggressions far more subtle than those of armed regiments moving across national frontiers.

World peace and security will be threatened by propaganda, subversion and agitation . . . by economic warfare . . . by assassination of honest and able leaders . . . as well as by the naked use of armed force.

World peace and security will be threatened, above all, by the very existence, for two-thirds of mankind, of conditions of hunger, disease and ignorance.

We must learn that the simple solutions of times past will not meet the present-day challenges, and new forms of aggression, we face.

Our "doves" must learn that there are times when power must be used. They must learn that there is no substitute for force in the face of a determined enemy who resorts to terror, subversion and aggression, whether concealed or open.

Our "hawks" must learn that military power is not enough. They must learn, indeed, that it can be wholly unavailing if not accompanied by political effort and by the credible promise to ordinary people of a better life.

And all of us must learn to adapt our military planning and actions to the new conditions of subversive warfare -- the so-called wars of national liberation.

We must learn to meet and defeat our enemy on all, not just one, of the battlefields. We must use the techniques of politics, of economic development, of information and social advancement -- and of coordinating all these efforts in a rational and effective total effort.

We are linked to all parts of a complex and changing world. I want to turn now to one part -- but a most important part -- of that world. It is a part of the world that I know is much on your minds. I speak of Asia, and of America's role there.

In this Spring of 1964, we urgently need perspective on Asia -- on its history and the history of our relationship. That perspective can give us guidelines for wise choices -- and a solid base for realistic hopes.

I believe the ingredients of perspective can be found in the answers to three questions. Who and what is Asia? How did we get involved with Asia? And, finally, can we achieve sensible goals in Asia?

...

Who and what is Asia?

Asia means people -- more than half of mankind.

Asia means civilizations -- venerable, inventive, artistic, and deeply rooted cultures.

Asia means religions -- the great compassionate religious and ethical systems of Hinduism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity.

Asia means problems -- the age-old afflictions of poverty, illiteracy, disease, exploitation, and oppression.

And in the modern era -- the past hundred years or so -- Asia means revolution.

It was a revolution that was long in coming but inevitable once West met East with full force.

Revolution is seldom peaceful, never easy. For Asia the period of Western impact -- and the transformation it produced -- has been often turbulent, bitter, and humiliating.

Take three major ingredients of modern Western history -- the spectacular rise of nationalism, capitalism, and science. Bring them to bear on proud older cultures, either through direct colonial rule -- as in India, in Indonesia, or Indo-China -- or through enclaves and spheres of influence -- as in China.

Little wonder the effect would be disruptive on Asian societies, as well as sometimes constructive. Little wonder that the results would engender resistance and resentment among Asian peoples toward the Westerner, as well as curiosity and sometimes friendship.

And little wonder that the history of Asia in the modern era is the history of Asia's response to the West, an unfolding revolutionary process of which the end is by no means in sight.

It is a process that seeks first to expel the foreign colonial master, and has largely succeeded in doing so.

But independence is only a fragile beginning, not an end.

With independence comes the struggle for nationhood in the full sense of the word -- the struggle to create national unity out of religious and linguistic and even geographic fragmentation . . . the struggle to create national power.

In order to maintain stability within and to deter and resist any would-be aggressors without . . . and the struggle to create both wealth and justice, to create a society of expanding opportunities and hope.

The revolutionary process is turbulent and fraught with dangers. It contains the danger of unbridled competing nationalisms; the lure of false prophets and demagogues; the temptation of illusory short-cuts that lead to new tyranny; the passions aroused by unfulfilled expectations.

Nearly fifty years ago a new specific danger was first added to this process. The doctrines of Marx and Lenin -- offered as an explanation of Asia's past, a plan of action for Asia's present, and a blueprint for Asia's future.

Though always a tiny minority, the agents of Marxism-Leninism were able to parts of wartime and post-war Asia to ride the tide of nationalism and anti-colonialism.

With perseverance and discipline, they produced an impact far beyond their numbers.

Today we see in mainland China the tragic result of one Asian revolution that lost its way -- a revolution captured by a disciplined Communist minority.

The high price of that tragedy is, for the people of China, a life of isolation in the world's most rigidly totalitarian state, and, for the people of Asia, a profoundly disturbing neighbor.

Today we see in the Indo-China peninsula the tragic result of another Asian revolution that lost its way. The people of Vietnam, who have lived with violence for a quarter of a century, not only find half their country ceded to a Communist minority regime in Hanoi. At the same time they also face a determined effort by that regime to force South Vietnam under Communist rule.

• • •

I come to my second question: How did we get involved with Asia?

The question may sound naive. Yet I frequently hear the statement from those who should know better that "America has no business in Asia."

In part this view stems from frustration in the face of Asia's complexity. How much easier to withdraw and let nature take its course.

But in part this view also stems from a misreading of history.

We are all in some degree both heirs and captives of history. And our involvement in Asia is no recent aberration but rather a rooted fact of history.

In one sense, of course, America is simply a something funny that happened to Columbus on his way to Asia.

In a deeper sense, we are and have been a Pacific power from the days of New England's clipper ships in the late 18th century.

Our traders and entrepreneurs soon were joined by our missionaries -- not simply evangelists, but doctors and nurses, teachers, engineers and agricultural specialists.

By the mid-19th century American ships had opened up Japan, and American citizens were leading participants in what became the greatest export of people and technology ever attempted from one civilization to another -- much of it focused on China.

In the process, we became catalytic agents of transformation. In the process, too, we became unwilling participants in Asian history, and in revolution.

America's role in Asia today is a direct product of the century that preceded World War II and of the war itself.

For with the end of that war, the responsibilities of victory imposed on us a stabilizing role in Japan and Korea.

And with the beginning of the Cold War, the Communist victory in China, and the outbreak of the Korean War, American power was the only shield available to fragile and newly independent nations in non-Communist Asia.

This was not a role we had sought. This was not the peace for which we yearned.

Nor is it a role we seek to perpetuate today. But the peace still eludes us. For there are those in Asia who still pursue their objectives by aggression and subversion. And there are others who ask our help in meeting this threat.

...

I come to my final question: Can we achieve sensible goals in Asia?

What, in simplest form are these goals?

First, we seek to assist free nations, willing to help themselves, in their deterrence of and resistance to all forms of aggression.

Second, we seek to assist free nations, willing to help themselves, in the great tasks of nation-building. We must lead other rich nations in the war on poverty, ignorance and disease in Asia.

Third, we seek to strengthen the forces of regional cooperation on the basis of Asian initiatives.

And finally, we seek and will continue to seek to build bridges, to keep open the doors of communication, to the Communist states of Asia, and in particular Communist China -- just as we have to the Soviet Union and the Communist states of Eastern Europe.

The isolation of the Asian Communist states -- however caused -- breeds unreality, delusions, and miscalculation.

Efforts to break that isolation may, for the time being,
provoke denunciation and hostility. But we shall persevere
and explore means of communication and exchanges, looking
to the day when the leaders of Asian communism -- as their
former colleagues in Europe -- will come to recognize the
self-destructiveness and wastefulness of their present bellicose
policies.

Prudence and reason, not the slogans of the past,
will guide us as we try to reduce the unacceptable risks of
ignorance and misunderstanding in a thermonuclear age.

Let me underline what we do not seek. We do not
seek alignment, except from those who choose it. We do
not seek economic privilege. We do not seek territory or
military bases. We do not seek to dominate or to conquer.

Our objectives are best served by one result in Asia:
The emergence of nations dedicated to their own national
independence, to the well-being of their people, and to the
pursuit of peace.

I return now to my question: Can these objectives be achieved?

My answer is yes. But much depends on our actions as a nation, and on the understanding that prompts those actions.

In the struggle for a peaceful, strong, and developing free Asia, our assets in the region are great.

In Japan, at one end of Asia's arc, we have a staunch friend, a highly developed nation, our second trading partner, an immense potential force for the development of Asia.

On the South Asian subcontinent, at the other end, we have close friends in India, the world's largest democracy, and in Pakistan. Both nations are dedicated to independence and bravely embarked on programs of development.

And in the Southwest Pacific, completing the triangle, are our friends in Australia and New Zealand who share our commitment to the future of Asia.

Elsewhere -- in Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia -- we find nations committed in differing fashions to independence and development. We respect their commitment, and we respect their differences. We applaud their leadership.

But what of the states of former French Indo-China?

There, of course, is the present focal point of war and revolution in Asia. And there we are tested as never before. We face a situation of external aggression and subversion against a post-colonial nation that has never had the breathing space to develop its politics or its economy.

In South Vietnam, both defense and development -- the war against the aggressor and the war against despair -- are fused as never before. Vietnam challenges our courage, our ingenuity, and our ability to persevere.

If we can succeed there -- if we can help sustain an independent South Vietnam, free to determine its own future -- then our prospects, and the prospects for free men throughout Asia, will be bright indeed.

We know this. Our friends and allies know it. And our adversaries know it. That is why one small country looms so large today on everyone's map of Asia.

But Asia will not disappear with a Vietnam settlement.

Nor will our objectives and responsibilities in Asia disappear.

The peace and development of Asia will be high on our national agenda for the rest of this century.

So will our relations with the nations of Asia -- including our relations with mainland China.

President Johnson's address at Johns Hopkins University last year was an historic formulation of American purposes in Asia.

In that speech he said that our commitment to South Vietnam was firm, that our quest for peace would be unremitting, and that our continuing concern with the welfare of the peoples of Southeast Asia could be tested by Asians ready to initiate cooperative ventures of peaceful development. The President pledged 1 billion dollars to projects that might be developed.

In that speech, too, President Johnson envisaged participation by North Vietnam in constructive social and economic arrangements once Hanoi had decided to stop the shooting. And last February, he again appealed to the "men of the north" to stop aggression and to join in helping fulfill the unsatisfied wants of the people of the region.

Termination of war alone would be a major contribution to the process of accelerated social and economic development in Asia.

But there are other basic problems which face most of the countries in the area.

In Asia, incomes are low. Population growth is high. There is a shortage of capital. The need for investment is almost limitless. There is excessive dependence on a limited number of products for foreign exchange earnings.

These problems demand the attention of countries in the area as well as countries outside which are able to help.

But there is promising ferment in free Asia today -- ferment that can lead to higher standards of performance on the part of individual countries and a greater sense of community among them.

War is always cruel. But the war in Vietnam should not obscure for us the fact that behind the smoke and uproar is the testing of an issue vital to all of Asia, and indeed the world.

Can Independent, non-Communist states not only survive, but grow and flourish in face of Communist pressure?

In that confrontation, a review of free Asia's achievements should give us solid ground for hope.

Consider South Korea, where exports have increased by 500 per cent in the past three years. Consider Taiwan, which has been transformed from an aid-receiving to an aid-giving country and enjoys a rate of economic growth higher than even that of Japan. Consider Malaysia and Thailand, where ambitious development plans are being launched. Yes, consider Indonesia, where new leaders are determined to see that potentially rich country resume a responsible place in the world community.

All of these developments are striking evidence that, notwithstanding Communist boasts that they represent the wave of the future, the real achievements taking place within Asia have occurred in areas that rely upon independence, competition, and respect for national integrity as the bases for genuine and enduring social and economic progress.

As we Americans strive to deal with the immense problems -- and the promise -- of a vibrant, modernizing interdependent Asia in the years ahead, we will be called upon to show special qualities of mind and spirit and understanding as a nation.

We will have to learn far more about Asian history and Asian cultures than any of us now know. We need more than nodding acquaintance with the key critical issues that absorb the attention of Asians.

We will have to learn to speak and read Asian languages.

We will have to become more sensitive to the differences among Asian nations as well as their similarities.

We should also be sensitive to the pride, dignity and nationalism of Asian peoples and nations. Like most people, Asians prefer to rule themselves badly than to be well ruled by some foreigner. The same goes for advice and initiatives. Otherwise good ideas inevitably lose some of their appeal if carried through Asia in clearly foreign wrappings.

Asians prefer Asian initiatives, proposed by Asians. So do we.

Finally, we must learn to suppress our national enthusiasm for quick solutions.

Asia's problems are extraordinarily complex and intractable; they will be with us for a long time to come, and we should force ourselves to practice some traditional Asian patience.

It is patience -- and perspective -- that we will need in the years ahead.

For I have no doubt that we will meet, in Asia as in the rest of the world, time and again with disappointment, disillusionment, ingratitude and frustration.

Yet we must not be deterred.

It is our good fortune to be free citizens of the most prosperous and powerful nation in the history of the earth.

It is the prosperous who can most afford compassion and humility.

It is the powerful who can most afford patience and perspective.

Let us, then, not pursue policies -- or judge ourselves -- in consonance with the passion of the moment.

Let us pursue those courses of which, in the judgment of history, it can be said: "These were the paths taken by wise men."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~- LIMDIS~~

Tuesday, June 7, 1966 - 11:00 a.m.

Pres file

Rita 4/9/66

38

Mr. President:

Removal of IAPF.

Yesterday Ellsworth Bunker spoke to Balaguer about removal of the IAPF.

Balaguer is not eager to see the IAPF leave until he has his security problems in hand:

Ellsworth's report is attached.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Bill Moyers

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-98
By mg NARA, Date 9-1-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~- LIMDIS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-21-98

REPORT FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER IN SANTO DOMINGO, JUNE 6, 1966
(Embassy's 2661)

1. The OAS Committee called on Balaguer this afternoon to discuss the problem of IAPF withdrawal. We explained the status of a pending resolution calling for consultations and a report to the Tenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers (MFM), but suggested that this step might be bypassed through an agreement reached now on the date the withdrawal is to begin. A new resolution could then be introduced requesting Tenth MFM concurrence. We further explained that the actual process of withdrawal could be extended over a period of 90 days or more if the new President so desired.
2. As we expected, Balaguer's response indicated a reluctance to see the IAPF depart before his Government is solidly established. It was his view that withdrawal should be tied to solution of the major security problems through reintegration of the Dominican Armed Forces and disarming of the civilian population. His comment that the new government could well profit from credit for bringing about the removal of the IAPF left little doubt that political considerations are also a factor. In conclusion, Balaguer suggested that a token withdrawal might commence five days after his inauguration, with timing of additional moves to depend on development of the Dominican situation.
3. We made it clear that the OAS Committee and the Tenth MFM would give his views every consideration, but pointed out that the Provisional President had publicly called for withdrawal before July 1. In addition, international pressures and interests of countries with contingents here dictate withdrawal at the earliest date that conditions permit. Balaguer seemed to understand these points and said he would consult with Garcia Godoy in an effort to arrive at an agreed-upon formula for subsequent discussion with the Committee.
4. Comment: I believe we may have to exert some pressure to persuade Balaguer to face up realistically to the IAPF problem. Reintegration, or at least the breaking up of the 27th of February ("Constitutionalist") Camp, may be appropriate pre-condition for final withdrawal. (As I reminded Balaguer, Garcia Godoy still has hopes in this regard.

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During a visit to the 27th of February Camp yesterday, he reportedly renewed his pledge to reintegrate.) However, waiting for disarmament of the civilian population, which could take years, is obviously out of the question. My view remains that the IAPF should be out of the Dominican Republic by the end of September at the latest, unless serious breakdown of the internal security occurs. My colleagues are in accord with this position, and we do not intend to allow any prolonged stalling on Balaguer's part.

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June 7, 1966
Tuesday, 10:45 a.m.

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Via Marvin Watson

Mr. President:

Attached is a "talking points" paper for your meeting today (4:00 P.M.) with John Marshall, Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand.

A short biographic sketch of Mr. Marshall is also attached for your information.

This will be a courtesy call and it is our understanding that Mr. Marshall does not plan to raise matters of detail or substance.

W. W. Rostow

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