

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, June 7
~~Monday, June 6, 1966~~
~~4:15 p.m.~~ 10:00 am

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Senegal's Ambassador Diop (Acting Dean of the African diplomatic corps) has written (Tab A) to thank you for the OAU reception and to praise your speech.

Attached (Tab B) is a bread-and-butter reply acknowledging his thoughtful gesture. There is nothing of substance in this exchange. It is merely an exercise in good public relations directed at a continent which tends to feel ignored.

For signature.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-100
By inf, NARA, Date 1-23-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: ~~W. W. Rostow~~

June 8, 1966

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you for your kind letter expressing your appreciation and that of the other Ambassadors from member nations of the Organization of African Unity for the reception at the White House commemorating the third anniversary of that organization. Your letter is a warm testimony to the identity of aspirations which exist between the peoples of African nations and those of the United States.

It was a great pleasure for me to be able to join with you and your colleagues on that occasion, and I am most grateful for your generous comments concerning my remarks at the reception. May I also thank you for your own special part in this memorable occasion.

Sincerely,

15/

His Excellency
Ousmane Soce Diop
Ambassador of Senegal
Embassy of the Republic of Senegal
2112 Wyoming Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

cc: W. W. Rostow

Pres file~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, June 7, 1966 -- 9:45 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Abe Feinberg is back. He reports:

1. Averell Harriman would be a thoroughly acceptable U. S. representative to work on the desalting project. The Israelis urged that he be made a Presidential appointee rather than working out of the State Department. Mr. Feinberg wished to know when you would make an announcement. I said we were studying the substance of the problem rather carefully to establish lucid terms of reference. I made no commitment as to timing.

2. He said the Israeli government was glad that we were sympathetic about using the "left over" \$6 million for other projects. Awaiting your response to the attached (which went up on May 27, and has not come down), I was non-committal.

3. Mr. Feinberg said he would wish to get in touch with you shortly.

You may wish to decide whether you accept Dave Bell's recommendation, attached, in which I concur.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By gn, NARA, Date 5-21-98

~~SECRET~~

WW Rostow:rlm

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Tuesday, June 7, 1966

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-99

By inf NARA, Date 5-10-90

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: State Department Foreign Policy Briefings on the Hill

Vietnam

Ambassador Goldberg met yesterday in an off-the-record luncheon, with Senators Moss, Fulbright, McGovern, Hartke, Clark, Church, Boggs, Ribicoff, Cooper, Young, Kennedy, Bayh, McCarthy, Nelson and Harris to brief them on the current situation in Vietnam. Ambassador Goldberg brought to their attention the numerous peace initiatives we have made through U.N. channels over the past months and in particular the generally affirmative response of the United States to the proposal of the Secretary General of August 16, 1965 (which we have never surfaced) at which time the Secretary General called for "a return to the essentials of the Geneva Agreement."

Ambassador Goldberg also filled in the Senators on the support the U.S. gave to an ICC initiative by Canada while the bombing pause was still on in early January of 1966 and which is still intrain.

The response of the Senators to this recounting of private diplomatic initiatives and steps taken by the U.S. was excellent and some surprise was expressed that the U.S. had been as forthcoming as it was in these areas. Particular interest was manifested by the Senators in the various U.S. formulations regarding possible Viet Cong participation in any future peace accord. There was also great interest in the upcoming elections in South Vietnam, and the Electoral Laws being enacted.

A number of the Senators were critical of the intention of the Electoral Committee to exclude "neutralists" from the elections.

Finally, there was widespread gratitude expressed for this kind of private off-the-record detailed exposition of the steps taken by the U.S. to bring about peaceful negotiations.

NATO

Acting Secretary Ball met with the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday for two and one-half hours to discuss NATO problems. He spent the greater

~~SECRET~~

part of the time on the broader and longer term aspects of how Europe and the Atlantic community should be organized in order to deter aggression, maintain its security and be in the best position to work toward an eventual and meaningful detente between East and West.

The meeting was attended by 12 Senators (Fulbright, Sparkman, Lausche, Symington, McCarthy, Church, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Case and Senator Saltonstall visiting from the Armed Services Committee).

The general atmosphere was friendly and constructive although Senators Church and Clark showed considerable friendship for the Lippman Line.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, June 6, 1966
5:10 p.m.

1. *sup*
2. *Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Twice last month Kenya's President Jomo Kenyatta wrote to you (Tabs A and B) seeking US support for Kenya's budget over a 3-4 year period.

In his May 13 letter, Kenyatta cites his government's efforts to build a multi-racial society and describes Kenya's foreign assistance needs. He specifically requests budgetary support (\$3-\$5 million per year).

In this connection, two weeks ago Kenyatta dispatched his Finance and Agricultural Ministers to the US to plead his case. (You met the Ministers briefly at the OAU reception.) In friendly meetings with Secretary Rusk and Dave Bell, they were told, among other things, that (a) AID is under a Congressional prohibition against providing budgetary assistance, and (b) notwithstanding this prohibition, the present US balance of payments position would not permit us to comply with the Kenyan request. However, the Secretary did promise to explore other forms of AID assistance which might help release local Kenyan funds for budgetary purposes.

Your proposed reply (Tab C) picks up the Rusk-Bell theme and, in warm terms, informs Kenyatta that representatives of AID will shortly arrive in Kenya to pursue this matter further.

For signature.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-100

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ By if NARA, Date 1-23-89

cc: W. W. Rostow
LBJ:UH:em

Dear Mr. President:

Ministers Gichuru and McKenzie were in Washington last week and I was able to meet with them for a few minutes to hear directly of your hopes and your immediate needs. We discussed their meetings with Mr. Ball, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and with Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. No doubt they have already told you of our own meeting.

It was particularly gratifying to me that they were able to be present in the White House on the occasion of our tribute to the Organization of African Unity. We attach great importance to this body and to the promise of wise and statesmanlike leadership which it holds out to all the independent countries in Africa.

Ambassador Attwood and others have kept me informed of developments in Kenya. We especially admire your efforts to build a multi-racial society where prejudice and bitterness will be swept away by free men working together as equals. Kenya serves as a good example for all those countries of the world where racial or ethnic minorities are to be found.

With respect to your request for budgetary assistance, I am certain that our position has been explained to you. I deeply regret that the exact method which you have suggested is not feasible. However, there may be other ways in which we can help and I have instructed our Agency for International Development to explore at once with members of your government the ways and means available to us. In this connection, AID representatives will soon be coming to Nairobi to further pursue the conversations begun with your Ministers here.

Sincerely,

151 LBJ

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-100

By wig, NARA, Date 1-23-89

His Excellency
Jomo Kenyatta
President of the Republic of Kenya
Nairobi

cc: W. W. Easton LBJ:UH:em

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 6, 1966
Monday, 1:00 p.m.

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SS informed
Jordan informal

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Loan to Korea: \$18.6 Million for
Diesel Locomotives

The attached request that you approve a \$18.6 million loan to Korea for the purchase of 62 diesel locomotives presents no problems.

This loan will be used solely to finance the purchase of U.S. goods and services (Fowler and Schultze are aboard). It represents a solid delivery on your \$150 million commitment to President Park during his 1965 State Visit. It comes at a time when the Koreans have doubled their Vietnam troop commitment.

This is a sound and timely boost to Korea's orderly development. I recommend approval.

W. W. Rostow

Att:
BOB Request

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-8
By WJ, NARA, Date 4-23-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: WWR ✓
WJ
JCT

BB FORM
NO. 38

ROUTE SLIP

(Fold Here)

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

44a

DATE 6/3/66

TO: Mr. Walt W. Rostow

FROM: Richard W. Richardson

Rich

REMARKS: Attached for the President's
signature is a memo on a loan to Korea
for a hydro-electric project. Fowler
has initialed the memo.

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1966 JUN 3 PM 3 11

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44-8

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MAY 28 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Loan to Korea for diesel locomotives (\$18.6 million)

This \$18.6 million loan will complete a modernization program for the government-owned Korean National Railroad. The full \$36 million of this AID-financed program is being used to effect a transition from steam to diesel locomotives. The new diesels will cost only about one third as much as the old steamers, and AID expects that the new ones will pay for themselves in five or six years.

Given the kind of high quality self-help we have been getting out of the Koreans in recent years--in this case, important improvements in the financial management of the railroads--I think this loan represents a good investment for Korea and for us.

The railroad system is the best developed element in Korea's transport sector. Serious bottlenecks exist in both highway and marine transport, and commercial air transport is still in its infancy. This loan will strengthen the railroads so they can bear a growing load while other parts of the transport sector are improved over a longer period of time. The World Bank and AID are cooperating fully in the overall effort.

To date we have authorized \$42.9 million of the \$150 million commitment you made to President Park a year ago. This loan will bring the total above \$60 million. AID hopes to reach \$75-80 million by the end of June. Reaching that level of loan authorizations will clearly indicate U.S. support for the tough economic and political steps that the Park government has taken in the past year--including the decision to double Korea's troop support in Vietnam.

This loan will be used solely to finance the purchase of U.S. goods and services and thus will have minimum adverse impact on the U.S. balance of payments. Secretary Fowler concurs in this opinion.

I recommend that you authorize Dave Bell to approve this loan.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

91-8

Attachment By mf, NARA, Date 4-23-91

Approved ✓

Disapproved _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ROSTOW'S OFFICE

Y. J. X. G. 1612

NOV 8 1960
E.O. 12812 Sec. 3.4
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1966 JUN 3 PM 3 11

TOGETHER: 1810-1815

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1. The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of the results of the study conducted by the research team. The study was designed to investigate the effects of the proposed intervention on the target population. The results indicate that the intervention had a significant positive impact on the outcome variable, as measured by the standardized test scores. The findings suggest that the intervention is effective in improving the performance of the target population, and that the results are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The study was limited by the small sample size and the lack of a control group, which may have affected the generalizability of the findings. Further research is needed to confirm the results and to explore the underlying mechanisms of the intervention's effectiveness. The research team is grateful to the funding agency for their support and to the participants for their contribution to the study.

[illegible][illegible]

REF ID: A66100

MAYNISTON 52' D.C.

BOKEAD OF THE BODCEL

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

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44c

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MAY 17 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: New Project Approval - Third Diesel Locomotive Project
Loan for Korea

I recommend that you authorize me to proceed with a loan of \$18,600,000 to Korea for diesel locomotives to be purchased in the United States. The Departments of State and the Treasury concur.

The proceeds of this loan will be made available to the Korean National Railroad (KNR), a wholly-government-owned agency. The KNR will use the loan proceeds to add 62 diesel-electric locomotives to KNR's present fleet, acquire shop equipment and wrecking cranes to support and maintain that fleet, and technical services in support of the project. The loan will enable the KNR to retire 163 obsolete steam locomotives.

The project is a logical extension of A.I.D.'s continuing support to Korea's railroad system, particularly the dieselization of the KNR.

Early authorization of the loan is urgent. President Park, as you know, has maintained a strong personal interest in the pace of authorizations under the \$150 million development loan commitment made in your communique with him a year ago. On December 31, 1965, the total of loans made under the commitment was \$41,260,000. Through the end of April, we have added only \$1,650,000. We hope to have authorized a total of \$75-80 million under the commitment by June 30; this loan is an essential part of our plan.

Approval of this loan now would be responsive to the difficult step President Park took in February in deciding to send 20,000 additional Korean combat troops to Vietnam at our urging. Significantly, the

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-9

By ing NARA. Date 4-3-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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Korean Government, in its contacts with us concerning the loan application, has stressed the additional burden which the movements of troops and military supplies have placed on the railroad system.

The locomotives included in this project, together with the present fleet, will be adequate to handle the estimated traffic requirements through 1967. They are needed promptly if the KNR is to provide the transportation services essential to Korea's economic growth and military security over the next few years.

The World Bank is financing a comprehensive survey of Korea's transport needs including an analysis of all types of transportation. We have discussed this project in detail with the survey team. While its analysis is not yet completed, we are convinced, based on the team's preliminary judgment, that this project is an essential part of Korea's foreseeable transportation requirements.

Self-help measures in the loan are aimed at sounder financial management of the KNR and a greater proportion of self-financing of future railroad investment requirements. These measures include a needed revaluation of assets, an audit, and preparation of a 10-year development program.

The proceeds of the loan are tied entirely to procurement of U.S. goods and services and thus will finance American exports. Spare parts requirements will provide additional exports for U.S. firms in later years.

Recommendation: That you authorize me to approve this loan.

David E. Bell

David E. Bell

44d

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


June 6, 1966

Note for Mr. Rostow

S

This Korean loan is clean and simple (no Balance of Payments problem).

There is a degree of urgency since Budget held it two weeks, Treasury another week, Park feels unloved, and AID apoplectic.



James C. Thomson, Jr.

June 6, 1966
Monday, 4:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

You saw the last Rand study
on Viet Cong morale, dated
April 28, 1966. Herewith are
"advance impressions" of data
being processed during May.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 9, 1966

Report to Larry Henderson, Jr. from Leon Goure, Rand Corporation.

Supplementary notes to "Some Informal Notes on the "Viet Cong Morale Study," 28 April 1966. It is important to make clear to the Secretary that the previous notes and the content of this teletype are not summaries of a completed research or analysis but are advanced impressions of an analysis to be undertaken.

1. U.S. Troops

Interviewees who have been in contact with U.S. combat forces in rural areas uniformly comment favorably on their behavior, helpfulness and good treatment of civilians and captives. The villagers also appear to welcome protracted presence of U.S. troops in villages, because of improved security and additional economic benefits. The only criticism which was expressed is the practice of U.S. forces to arrest many of the villagers as suspects since subsequently the Government of South Vietnam is slow in processing and releasing them. The interviews do not indicate that the increased deployment of U.S. combat forces in Vietnam has intensified anti-American or anti-foreigner sentiments among the villagers or that it has in a significant way reinforced the effectiveness of Viet Cong anti-imperialist propaganda and appeals. Although some Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers have expressed a preference for fighting Americans rather than Vietnamese, such sentiments are not mentioned by those who have fought against U.S. troops. On the contrary many express fear of the U.S. forces and mention large Viet Cong losses in encounters with them.

2. Popular Support of the Viet Cong

Several well informed Viet Cong cadres report that the Viet Cong plan to intensify their land reform and land distribution program in 1966, with confiscation of land from richer landlords without compensation. One purpose of this program is said to be an attempt to regain popular support for the Viet Cong, which had noticeably declined in 1965. It was said that the Viet Cong are finding their earlier anti-American and anti-Government of South Vietnam appeals less effective than a few years ago since the Government of South Vietnam and the U.S. hold out to the villagers increased prospects of security and economic assistance. Consequently an intensified Viet Cong drive for land reform would seek to tie the poor villagers more closely to the Viet Cong and to turn their hostility against the rich land owners who will be identified with the Government of South Vietnam.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 88-56
By ing, NARA, Date 4-13-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The great majority of interviewed Viet Cong captives and defectors mention continuing and growing decline in voluntary villager support of the Viet Cong. Several sources mentioned that in some Viet Cong areas popular support of the Viet Cong had dropped from 70 percent to 30 percent of the population. Increasing instances are mentioned when the villagers refuse to follow Viet Cong orders to leave their village when threatened by a South Vietnamese or U.S. sweep. While the interviews continue to speak of the importance of the Southern Delta as a major source of Viet Cong food for troops in Central Vietnam, the refugee movement and decline in productivity in the Delta appear to be facing the Viet Cong with increasing financial and supply problems. Several interviewees who served in local and main forces in the Delta report extensive reductions in the pay of the troops -- for example from 135 piasters per month to 75 piasters in one case and 60 to 30 piasters in another.

Many interviewees state that the Viet Cong have been drafting large numbers of villagers for four to six months duty as porters for ammunition and food supplies. This draft is very unpopular as the porters must work far from home, supply their own food and risk attacks. Meanwhile guerrillas and local force soldiers are told to prepare for duty with main forces mainly in the Highlands, which leads many of them to desert or defect. Several Viet Cong cadres mentioned that as a consequence of intensified air activities, the Viet Cong have been forced to reduce the length of the training given to main force recruits and that consequently these recruits are not as well trained as in the past.

The interviews indicate that the civilian cadres in Viet Cong villages face increasing problems in controlling the villagers. In addition to widespread dissatisfaction among the villagers with the Viet Cong draft, high taxes, restrictions on trade and movement, and greater resorts to threats and punishment by the cadre, fear of air and artillery attacks leads the villagers to refuse to attend indoctrination meetings or to remain in the village when Viet Cong troops camp there. According to several interviewees who had operated in areas undergoing pacification by the Government of South Vietnam, the reestablishment of South Vietnamese controls and the expansion of the area policed by the South Vietnamese Army has had a major adverse effect on the morale of Viet Cong cadres in the area and on their performance. Many were said to be unwilling to run the greater risks required by their continued work in the pacified areas. These areas also became a focal point for refugees from surrounding Viet Cong controlled villages and thus serve to encourage farmers to leave these villages.

①
THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WASHINGTON

June 6, 1966

Monday, 1:00 p.m.

46

6/9/66
BOB took
originals
(Eddie has
copy in file)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Loan to Korea: \$18.6 Million for
Diesel Locomotives V

The attached request that you approve a \$18.6 million loan to Korea for the purchase of 62 diesel locomotives presents no problems.

This loan will be used solely to finance the purchase of U.S. goods and services (Fowler and Schultze are aboard). It represents a solid delivery on your \$150 million commitment to President Park during his 1965 State Visit. It comes at a time when the Koreans have doubled their Vietnam troop commitment.

This is a sound and timely boost to Korea's orderly development. Recommend approval.

Walt Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-100

By inf, NARA, Date 1-23-89

Att:

BOB Request

S/S informed
Jordan informed

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

F

VIA LDX

TO: SS For dispatch

~~SECRET~~

6/4/66

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY RUSK FROM THE PRESIDENT

Most grateful for your cheerful and interesting report on trips to Finland and Norway. A number of heartening events did take place last week.

But right now I do not have very cheerful news. Those approving my conduct of the Presidency has fallen to 46%. Those who believe it was a mistake to send troops to fight in Vietnam have risen from 25% in March to 36%. Only 49% now believe it was not a mistake.

I hope you have a good deal of time to see Wilson and talk of things to come.

We have our work cut out for us on your return.

Best of luck with Brussels. Keep the family of fourteen together.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-99
By ing NARA. Date 5-10-90

47a

RECEIVED
WHCAEEA841
OO WTE 12
DE WTE 877

1966 JUN 3 22 40

FROM: BROMLEY SMITH
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66338~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLYTHE FOLLOWING IS FROM SECRETARY RUSK IN OSLO EYES ONLY
FOR THE PRESIDENT.

I MUST CONFESS A LIFT IN SPIRIT FROM (A) THE EXTRAORDINARY SUCCESS OF THE SOFT LANDING ON THE MOON, (B) THE DOMINICAN ELECTIONS, AND (C) INDICATIONS OF CONTINUING PROGRESS ON THE INTERNAL POLITICAL FRONT IN VIET NAM. I KNOW THESE MUST HAVE CHEERED YOU AS WELL. THE SURVEYOR SUCCESS MADE A DEEP IMPRESSION OVER HERE AND I HAVE BEEN SWAMPED WITH CONGRATULATIONS WHICH CLEARLY REFLECT A GENUINE SATISFACTION OVER OUR SUCCESS.

THE VISIT TO FINLAND PROVED TO BE A PROFITABLE UNDERTAKING. I HAD SOME STRAIGHTFORWARD TALKS WITH KEKKONEN ABOUT VIET NAM IN AN ATTEMPT TO PREPARE HIM FOR KOSYGIN'S VISIT BEGINNING JUNE 13. I EMPHASIZED THAT FINLAND'S OWN ABILITY TO BE INDEPENDENT AND REASONABLY SAFE WAS NOT UNCONNECTED WITH THE EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT THE US HAS MADE TO INDUCE PRUDENCE AND MODERATION IN MOSCOW AND TO GIVE IMPORTANCE TO THE RIGHT OF SOUTH VIET NAM TO LIVE UNMOLESTED FROM THE NORTH. I EMPHASIZED STRONGLY OUR UNPARALLELED EFFORTS TO GET SOMEBODY TO TALK TO US ABOUT SOMETHING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND I WENT THROUGH IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL THE SCENARIO ABOUT BOMBING PAUSES. I URGED UPON HIM THE VIEW THAT A CORRECT POSITION FOR A NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY WAS TO UPHOLD THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS OF 1954 AND 1962 AND THE IDEA OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. I THINK KEKKONEN WAS IMPRESSED BY THE COMBINATION OF OUR DETERMINATION TO RESIST AGGRESSION AND OUR DESIRE FOR AN IMMEDIATE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT THINK THERE WAS ANY INITIATIVE WHICH FINLAND COULD TAKE WHEN ONE OF THE OTHER PARTIES WAS SO UNRESPONSIVE TO NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS OF SOME SIGNIFICANCE THAT FINLAND DENIED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PERMISSION TO ADDRESS A MEETING IN HELSINKI WHILE I WAS THERE. THE GENERAL REACTION OF THE FINNISH PUBLIC TO MY COMINGS AND GOINGS SEEMED TO BE ENTIRELY FRIENDLY DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF SOME HUNGER STRIKERS IN ANOTHER PART OF TOWN.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-21-98

HERE IN NORWAY I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES HAD TAKEN FAR MORE PRECAUTIONS THAN THE SITUATION REQUIRED. BECAUSE THE "SOLIDARITY" DEMONSTRATORS HAD GOTTEN SOME ADVANCE PUBLICITY, CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS OF OTHERS TURNED OUT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT I WAS WELCOME. ALTHOUGH I DID NOT GO NEAR THE SITE OF THE DEMONSTRATION WITH HOSTILE BANNERS, FRIENDLY GROUPS BEARING FRIENDLY BANNERS SOUGHT ME OUT IN OTHER PLACES AND EXPRESSED THEIR GOOD WILL.

THE TALKS WITH THE GOVERNMENT WENT VERY WELL AND I TRIED TO GIVE THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER AMMUNITION ON VIET NAM WHICH THEY COULD USE AGAINST THE MORE EXTREME ELEMENTS. THEY WERE SURPRISED BY THE EXTENT OF OUR EFFORT TO FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND I AM CONVINCED WE MUST FIND STILL BETTER WAYS OF LETTING THE REST OF THE WORLD KNOW HOW DILIGENTLY, HOW OFTEN AND WITH WHAT FLEXIBILITY WE HAVE TRIED TO GET TALKS GOING WITH ANYBODY ON THE OTHER SIDE.

IN A BRIEF PRIVATE TALK WITH KING OLAF, I SOUNDED HIM OUT ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A STATE VISIT IN 1967. HE WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE OF YOUR THOUGHTFULNESS AND OBVIOUSLY RELISHED THE IDEA. HOWEVER HE MUST DISCUSS IT DISCREETLY WITH HIS GOVERNMENT AND WE AGREED WE WOULD KEEP IT ENTIRELY PRIVATE UNTIL A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT DATE COULD BE AGREED UPON AND ANNOUNCED. I MUST SAY THE KING WAS WHOLLY IN YOUR CORNER ON THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES WE FACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND NATO.

RUSK

DTG: 032201Z JUNE 1966

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, June 3, 1966 at 6:15 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Attached NSAM

As you know, we have had some problems, inside and outside the Executive Branch, about when A.I.D. program loans and loans to cover "local costs" are appropriate. The attached NSAM would set up a small inter-agency committee, chaired by the Budget Bureau (and including Treasury, State, A.I.D., CEA and the White House) to develop and recommend to you sensible ground rules. If we come up with clear cut results, it could even be of some help on the Hill.

I have checked the text of the attached draft NSAM with all the principals concerned. Both Joe Fowler and Dave Bell are pleased, as are the rest, with this way of tackling the problem.

If you approve, Walt will sign the attached NSAM and we will get to work.


Francis M. Bator 

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NSAM _____

FOR: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 Administrator, Agency for International Development
 Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors
 Director, Bureau of the Budget

The President wishes to receive coordinated advice and recommendations concerning the proper use of (1) program loans, and (2) loans to finance "local costs" in our foreign assistance programs.

The report should evaluate the economic and political merits of both kinds of loans in terms of:

- major U.S. assistance objectives, by categories of aided countries;
- the costs and consequences for other U.S. interests, particularly the balance of payments.

It should propose criteria which could be used to establish a presumption as to the appropriate mix of program and project assistance in particular country situations. It should also provide guidelines for the use of local cost financing.

It is requested that you nominate a representative for a sub-cabinet level working group which will be responsible for carrying out this study. The Bureau of the Budget has accepted responsibility for the chairmanship of the working group.

The White House staff member responsible will be Mr. Francis Bator.

It is hoped that the report can be received at the White House by July 15.

W. W. Rostow

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

49

Friday, June 3, 1966; 4:00 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Nuclear Agreement with Germany and Italy

This is an interim report on the two military nuclear agreements Secretary Rusk raised with you at lunch on Monday. You will recall he would like to negotiate agreements:


- to sell Germany a small research reactor (made by General Dynamics) for radiation testing of non-nuclear military equipment (tanks, electronic gear, etc.)
- to sell Italy nuclear fuel for their proposed reactor for use in a naval auxiliary surface ship.

Before sending the papers to you, I ran a check on the Joint Committee. We had some indication that they would be ~~most~~ unhappy with the Italian agreement. Chet Holifield and his Staff Director, John Conway, told me that:

- the German agreement would cause no trouble with the Committee (though it might cause us a major propaganda headache);
- the Italian agreement would produce a major row on the Hill. The Italians say they want a nuclear-powered freighter. But Holifield and apparently also Senator Anderson--as well as Admiral Rickover--are convinced that Rome is really after a test bed for a nuclear submarine and will soon be after us for submarine technology. We have tried to meet this problem by language which makes it clear that we are not committed to provide anything more than fuel. But that isn't enough to satisfy. Holifield. Conway said that the only way to go ahead without serious trouble with the Committee would be for you to ask Anderson, Holifield and a few others to come over for a private session, and explain to them that we need this card with the Italians on the NA TO front. (Even that would be tough -- Holifield specifically rejected this argument.)

In light of this, George Ball has decided to wait at least until next week -- and perhaps until the Secretary gets back -- before asking you for a decision.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-171
By is, NARA Date 3-27-99


Francis M. Bator

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-99

By ing NARA, Date 5-10-90*Pres file*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, June 3, 1966 -- 9:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

I talked with Doug Dillon. I confined my question to: when, in the normal course of business, would you be in France or elsewhere in Europe?

His reply: June 23-25, Paris
 June 26-28, seeing his vineyards in the Bordeaux area
 from then until well into July: Holland; England (for
 visit with Bruce and speech at Ditchley); Scotland
 till end of July or early August.

De Gaulle goes to Moscow June 20 and returns to Paris July 1.

Our choices are:

Ask Dillon to go early _____

Ask Dillon to see de Gaulle after Moscow _____

Wait and see what transpires in Moscow _____

My reflection is this: To get Dillon to Paris would require us to have him change his schedule; to inform the French Government and find out if de Gaulle were willing to see him before he went to Moscow; and to mobilize a talking script for him. It is possible de Gaulle would not wish to see a major American figure before going to Moscow; and, if he did and it became known -- as it probably would -- we would be appearing over-anxious about what he might do in Moscow.

From a strict foreign policy point of view I think it would be wiser not to mount the Dillon mission under these circumstances. On the other hand, I understand fully the desirability of having such an effort in the record for Church and company.

Only you can make the calculus.

W. W. Rostow

Submit a working scenario for getting Dillon to de Gaulle before he goes to Moscow _____

Hold the operation for the time being _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, June 3, 1966 -- 8:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

I believe you should consider going to Notre Dame this Sunday, June 5 and giving at a great Catholic institution in the heart of the nation, a short speech. The theme would be reconciliation. (I know Ted Hesburgh still hopes you will come.)

It would be, in effect, your Gettysburg Address of the Cold War.

You would draw back from the day-to-day struggles and tensions and underline that this is a time when three enormous complex processes of reconciliation are under way:

- the reconciliation of the races
- the reconciliation of the religions
- the reconciliation of the ideologies

The time is right for the following reasons:

1. In the past week you have picked up very considerable momentum on a number of fronts: in the race problem at home; the DR; Viet Nam, including your Memorial Day speech; the African speech; Scotty Reston's story this morning; etc. This is the moment to drive home your larger and more hopeful vision of the world and your mission.

2. I have a feeling -- it is no more than that -- that this is a moment of thought and reflection in Hanoi. The VC have virtually stood down in the last few days; they have invited an ICC meeting to take place in Hanoi; they must be profoundly uneasy about what is going on inside Communist China; they must be as impressed as the Directorate in Saigon with your Memorial Day commitment to see it through.

It would do no harm, from your position of gathering strength, to appeal directly to them to end the killing.

Walt Rostow

Approve _____
Disapprove _____
Begin drafting _____

6/4/66

Mr. Rostow,

By phone from the Ranch, the President
rejects this one. (our original memo will
be coming back by pouch)

F 52
S

172

(for Vicki McCammon)

Pres file

Friday, June 3, 1966

Mr. President:

You have been invited to speak on Friday morning, June 17, or at the banquet session that night, on the occasion of the 20th Annual Assembly of the United World Federalists at the Sheraton Park Hotel.

If you want a chance to speak on foreign policy at that time, this would be a suitable occasion. I talked to Bob Kintner who described your lively speaking schedule in June. He thinks you ought to know of this option. I agree.

W. W. Rostow

Accept _____

Reject ☒ _____

By phone from Rostow, the
Pres. rejects this one.
Per Washi McCann 5/14/66

Pres file

Thursday
June 2, 1966 -- 7:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to read this technical
assessment of the election.

W. W. Rostow

Santo Domingo 2618

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

53a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NJ 87-97
By ing, NARA, Date 8-4-97

Thursday, June 2, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Santo Domingo, 2618)

Last night a Dominican Revolutionary Party delegation composed of Messrs. Homero Hernandez, Pedro Casals Victoria and Rafeal Cabrera called on the Committee on Order to "formally" lodge a complaint that military and police in various parts of the country were attempting to make off with ballot boxes before votes could be counted by mesa personnel. Casals said the first report of this activity had come from Antonio Guzman in Santiago and that checking through party sources indicated practice might be widespread. Hernandez asserted that military and police were intent on committing fraud by substituting ballot boxes before votes were counted. He warned that the result could be complete "annulment" of the elections.

I was able to explain to these rather excited gentlemen that Garcia Godoy had already taken steps to assure the return of ballot boxes to polling places in those few isolated instances in which security forces had taken boxes to municipal electoral boards on instructions from the central electoral board that security forces were to accompany presidents of mesas when they took the boxes to municipal boards. I subsequently talked again with Garcia Godoy and found that he had personally assured Guzman the matter was in hand, to the latter's apparent complete satisfaction.

The foregoing was the only serious accusation of electoral wrongdoing brought to the Committee's attention. The conviction that the elections were free and honest seems to be virtually unanimous among observers, newsmen and other interested foreigners. Lowenstein of Thomas Group called on me last night to congratulate the Committee on the success of its efforts to help bring about genuinely democratic elections in the Dominican Republic.

He found nothing to criticize in the electoral process and claimed that he and Thomas had elicited a commitment from Bosch to respect the results, whatever the outcome. Mayobre, for his part, told Duenas this morning that he thought the elections were exemplary.

On the basis of evidence now available, my colleagues and I do not believe any possible charges of serious fraud can be sustained. All indications are that elections were, in fact, clean. Testimony on this point is available

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

from a large number of foreigners of various political hues and the Committee intends to emphasize that fact in a report to the 10th Meeting of Foreign Ministers later today.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 2, 1966
4:45 p.m.

Retd
6/9/66

Mr. President

Subject: Dominican Elections

The latest election totals are:

Total votes cast: 566,805

Balaguer -- 319,907 - 56%

Bosch -- 230,355 - 41%

Bonnelly -- 16,543 - 3%

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-94

By inf NARA. Date 6-12-89~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

55

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 2, 1966
2:30 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT

Ambassador Bunker saw Garcia Godoy at 11:45 this morning.

He gave him your message of congratulations on the elections. Garcia Godoy was extremely pleased.

Bunker again asked him about speeding up release of the election results. Garcia Godoy replied that this was strictly in the hands of the Electoral Tribunal.

Garcia Godoy said that he had spoken six times with the Tribunal President, Angel Liz, pointing out to him that failure to release the results as received was bringing criticism on the Provisional Government and causing public unrest.

During the course of these talks, he learned that Angel Liz was trying to tally and carry the election results with two adding machines. Garcia Godoy has now sent over additional machines and personnel to speed up the process. All the results are supposed to be made known before the day is out.

/s/
W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-98
By ing NARA, Date 9-1-89

cc - Bill Moyers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 2, 1966
3:10 p.m.

Pres file 56

MR. PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Elections

The latest CIA tabulation based on 546,626 votes (or 42% of an estimated 1.3 million votes) is as follows:

Balaguer	- 306,080	- 55.9%
Bosch	- 231,188	- 42.29%.

18
W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 93-180 ISCAP Appeal
By ics, NARA Date 4-16-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc - Bill Moyers

t.p 52

Thurs., June 2, 1966
10:30 am

MR. PRESIDENT:

The Embassy reports that with 1/3 of the vote in (unofficial tabulation) Balaguer has 57% and Bosch has 41%. The PR (Balaguer) party claims that it has won in 23 out of 27 provinces, and that it now has a margin of 100,000 votes, which they expect will increase to 200,000 when all the votes are counted.

WWR

cc. Moyers
Kintner

Thursday, June 2, 1966
9:30 a.m.

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Dominican Elections

The official results continue to be fragmentary. The Embassy is inclined to believe that the General Electoral Board deliberately held up release of the tallies during the course of the night. The reasons for doing so are not clear. Perhaps it was to get a fix on the outcome and make the release during daytime hours when the Provisional Government is in a better position to deal with any possible disturbances.

Both of the Santo Domingo morning dailies give Balaguer a substantial edge. The figures they carry are:

<u>Caribe</u>	-	Balaguer -	165,442
		Bosch -	126,128
<u>Listin</u>	-	Balaguer -	148,412
		Bosch -	113,963

On the basis of all the information we have, there are grounds for solid optimism. It looks as if Bosch did as well as the May poll indicated in the capitol and that Balaguer did much better outside of Santo Domingo than the poll showed he would. A tentative projection of the results which we now have would indicate that Balaguer may receive as much as 57% of the vote (I stress that this is only a most tentative projection).

The OAS Ad Hoc Commission, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and Garcia Godoy have already come out with public statements praising the manner in which the election was conducted. An OAS observer from Bolivia, who had toured the interior, commented that he had never seen a more tranquil election, "even quieter than in England."

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

cc: Bill Moyers
Mr. Kintner

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-98
By rip NARA, Date 9-1-89

June 2, 1966
Thursday, 3:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

On balance, I think a Wilson visit is a good idea. But it must be publicly focused on NATO and other matters, not Viet-Nam.

W. W. Rostow

cy Noyes

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

Thursday, June 2, 1966

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BRUCE (London, 5767)

I have reported separately today to Acting Secretary Ball ^{attached} re the presentation made by Colonel Rogers to the Prime Minister this morning on the bombing.

After the conclusion of that episode, the Prime Minister asked me to communicate to you his feeling that it would be useful if he could have a short meeting with you during part of one day in Washington. It had been about six months since he last saw you, and there were many things he would like to discuss. The difficulty from his standpoint would be timing.

His concern in respect to timing, if you agreed to such a visit, would be to avoid speculation whether his trip was in connection with whatever decision you make about bombing. Assuming you reach that decision shortly, a visit by him, unless it were say ten days in advance of such action, might be construed as a last-minute plea for you to abandon the project. If bombing took place, his journey, unless made say ten days afterward, might be interpreted in Britain as representing a summons from you to rake him over the coals for not having supported you in this respect.

Leaving that particular question aside, from the standpoint of his own political engagements, the best period for him would be in the month of June, excluding June 6, 7, and 8, when Pompidou will be here from Paris.

Comment: I think the Prime Minister guesses the bombing will be ordered, regardless of his views. In that case, I think he is so much a prisoner of his own past statements that he will say (and I think it important he have our assent to do so) he was advised in advance of the operation.

He will probably wish to discuss the Rhodesian situation, its impact as well as that of the shipping strike on the U.K. balance of payments, expose his domestic preoccupations, agree a common policy on NATO, talk about his military budget, especially in the light of a probably slackening or ending of Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation, and what he may do about the Rhine Army if the Germans do not pay the entire offset bill, etc.

I think the pros of a meeting, so obviously desired by him, outweigh the cons, though proper timing is essential. If it does take place, I would suggest

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority NLS 93-234

By Julipp NARA. Date 2-10-98

that it be unofficial so far as that be practicable, and the Prime Minister, which would be his own inclination, bring with him only a few close personal advisers -- this would be conducive to an informal atmosphere.

~~I would like to be wrong about Harold Wilson's posture in the bombing~~
~~affair, but do not believe he will go along. Nevertheless, in other policies of~~
~~vital interest to us, I think he will be steadfast, and would be encouraged by direct~~
contact with you.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Thursday, June 2, 1966

FROM AMBASSADOR BRUCE

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR ACTING SECRETARY (London, 5768)

The Prime Minister, his two private secretaries, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Burke Trend, and myself attended the briefing by Colonel Rogers at 10 Downing Street this morning. Rogers made a superlative presentation.

After Rogers left, I stayed behind with the British group. The Prime Minister said he understood the military arguments for our possible action, but was gravely concerned over what he believes will be unfavorable political repercussions in Britain and worldwide. In any event, he wanted to express no conclusions this morning, but would further reflect on the matter. I expect him to communicate directly with the President.

My own estimate is that, if such bombing takes place, the Prime Minister will disassociate himself from endorsement of it, but will reassert his general support of U.S. policy in Vietnam. I base this upon the consistency of his previous remarks on the subject, such as, for example, the following reply, quoted in Hansard on February 8, 1966, to a question in the House of Commons: Quote. We have made it clear in Washington that we could not support any extension of the bombing against North Vietnam by stages to Hanoi and Haiphong. The House knows this and the United States Government knows it. Unquote. This reservation has for long been his stock in trade for fending off left wing attacks.

BRUCE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-101

By isp, NARA, Date 8-4-87~~SECRET~~

Pres file ⁶⁰
Data 6/9/66

Thursday, June 2, 1966 -- 12:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

The Embassy in DR report that as of 12:20 p. m. the incomplete and unofficial -- but reliable -- tabulations indicate that out of a total of 420,522 votes, the candidates line up as follows:

Balaguer	239,082	56%
Bosch	169,682	40%
Bonnelly	11,758	3%

The Embassy also report several scattered incidents by leftist elements in protest of what now appears to be a Balaguer victory. The Embassy observe that these are not worrisome at the present time and they do not attach great importance to them. Nevertheless, they bear watching.

W. W. Rostow

WGBowdler:rla

in - Arthur 61

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 2, 1966
10:55 AM

Mr. President:

Ambassador Lodge was greatly encouraged by his most recent talk with General Ky.

1. Ky said he would handle Hue situation so as not to undo his unwritten agreement with the Buddhist leaders in Saigon.

2. Ky spelled out his plans for expanding the military directorate and creating an interim Government.

3. Ky has agreed to an anti-inflation program including devaluation, increasing imports and turning over port facilities to the military.

Bromley Smith

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-96

By up, NARA, Date 12-19-88

Deborah Mrs. Roberts
10:58

~~SECRET~~

61a

Thursday, June 2, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Saigon, 5215)

I called on General Ky on Thursday, June 2, pursuant to the Department's instruction.

After thanking him for informing me so promptly on the talks between the Government and the Buddhists, I asked him where his understanding stood at the present time. He said that although a communique had been put out last night, there was no written understanding -- nor would there be. He hoped there was a verbal "entente" but he wanted it to be available for all groups to join and not just for the Buddhists.

As regards the situation in Hue, he made it clear that he planned to handle it in a way which would in no way affect or undo the things he is trying to settle with the Buddhist Institute. General Lam (who had arrived in Saigon that morning) had planned to send troops of the First Division to seize the radio station. Lam had sent Col. Tuan to command the armored regiment. At the last moment, Tuan had talked to General Nhuan, and had discovered to his consternation that Nhuan had told Tri Quang of the Government plans. Thus the Government had lost surprise completely.

Therefore, General Lam was being given a choice between two alternatives:

A. Khoa and the Government of Vietnam were in effective control north and south of Hue where there were VNQDD and PAT units, all of whom were eager to come into Hue and fight. The strategy would be to keep Khoa outside and to move one or two battalions of the First Division in to restore order. This plan involved relieving the Division Commander.

B. The second solution was to keep Nhuan as Commander of First Division for operations against the Viet Cong outside of Hue, then to give Khoa the two other battalions.

Lam was authorized to decide between the two plans.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NUJ 87-95

By isp, NARA, Date 8-4-87

Ky said that Walt had been very helpful. As regards Dinh and Thi, Ky said that Thi realized the danger, and had tried to hold the strugglers back. If unsuccessful, he will leave. Ky had given up hope of getting anything done with Dinh. He expected Thi to move out of Hue and come to Dalat. Maybe later, Thi would come to Saigon, and meet with the other generals and discuss his own future.

Ky said that Lam was already campaigning, that leaflets were being distributed concerning the cost of living. The broad strategy was, first, to restore order and seize the radio station and secondly to eliminate Communist agents by regular fine tooth comb police procedures. Ky made it clear that nothing would be done which would in any way interfere with Buddha's Birthday. All these things are being planned for sometime after that. He said that the conduct of the military men had been very good in all the recent operations. He agreed that nothing he does in Hue should be considered a reprisal for action against U.S. property.

As regards the Institute Buddhists, Thich Tien Hoa had said, "I must recognize the goodwill of the Government and that the attack on Thien Minh was not a Government act." Phap Tri had written to ask that the Government protect the Institute Buddhist lives. The result was that the Government was now able to send troops to the pagodas. Phap Tri had asked specifically that the Ky Vien Tu pagoda be guarded. They were going to send police there and to the Vien Hoa Dao. The Government of Vietnam would now go as invited guests. He thought this was a step forward.

Neither Ky nor Thieu could possibly tell whether or not the Institute Buddhists were going to relent in their hard-driving and reckless campaign to get power. Ky said there was a tremendous difference between 1963 and now, and that today most Buddhists condemn the Institute.

Ky then discussed his plans for an interim government for the future. He drew a rectangle up at the top of a sheet of paper in which he put the words, Armed Forces Council, 30 members. Directly under that, he had another rectangle, Directorate, consisting of ten military, ten civilians. Under that were two boxes, one right and one left. In the left-hand box was the Government of Vietnam, in the right-hand box was a "civil-military committee" which he defined as a temporary parliament to advise and monitor the Government of Vietnam. This would be divided into sub-committees of 20 members each, half military, half civil, one on Economics, one on Politics, one on Social, and one in Education.

The ten civilian members of the Directorate to consist of four representatives of the major religions, three of the different regions, and three from occupational groups, intellectuals, labor, etc. No names yet. One thing was certain, they would not be "militants" -- evidently older men without ambition.

The intention was that this would be the provisional government until a permanent National Assembly had been chosen under the new Constitution.

I remarked that there were then three different milestones.

One was when the delegates to the Constitutional Convention had been elected.

Second was when the Constitution was finally promulgated.

And third was when elections were held under the Constitution.

I felt that changes were possible at any time, saying that, for example, after the delegates had been chosen in September, if General Ky wanted to have someone else as Prime Minister, that would be a time in which that could be done. He seemed a little surprised, but agreed.

He pointed out that all the military is standing together. I rather believe this is true, and that it is largely because of the successful campaign to restore the authority of the Government in Danang.

At this point, Ky mentioned that he was considering studying the Korean Constitution to see if the Korean statutes could be of value to Vietnam in the formulation of its own Constitution later this year. He asked me whether I thought this would be of value. I replied in the affirmative and he then asked me for my thoughts on the substance of a Vietnamese Constitution. I replied that I could advise him, unofficially, and as a friend that I personally saw great value in having a strong executive provided for, guaranteed in the Constitution. Otherwise, I pointed out, factional differences, regionalism, intimidation by assassination and external aggression could shake and destroy the Government of Vietnam. I also pointed out that the President of Vietnam should have the Constitutional power to prorogue the legislature in the event that this body became intimidated by assassination threats.

Then, to my surprise, he said: "I would like to bring up the subject of inflation." He said he had been talking to Mladek of the IMF, who had convinced him that he should adopt a policy of devaluation, of increasing imports, of "improving the port facilities," and raising salaries. Mladek had told him that there was a maximum risk that the enunciation of policy of devaluation would overthrow the Government. To this Ky had said he was ready, "If the solution will save the country, I am ready to go down." Mladek had said: "I have helped 40 countries combat inflation and this is the first time a Chief of Government has said this to me." Ky said he needed our help, and he hoped that I could come in "very soon." He was planning to put this into effect with just one month of preparation.

I asked him what he had in mind with his reference to "port facilities." He said, "I want the military to do it, and to do it quick."

After meeting with Ky, he invited me to have lunch with members of the Directorate. Present were Generals Ky, Thieu, Quang, Tri, Co, Vien, (Security Minister), Vien (Chief of Staff), Lam and Khang. Most of the conversation was in Vietnamese and while I could not understand what they were saying, they were all obviously in very good humor and appeared to be on the best of terms. Much laughter.

LODGE

Pres file

Thursday, June 2, 1966
9:10 a. m.

Mr. President;

As you requested, I am sending along
copies of a boiled down and sanitized
version of the Alternatives paper which
Bill Jorden prepared.

W. W. Rostow

ALTERNATIVE I

Withdraw from Viet-nam

Advantages

1. End U.S. casualties and the material costs of war.
2. Halt criticism at home and abroad of U.S. actions in Viet-nam.
3. Ease worries about Viet-nam producing World War III.
4. Eliminate an irritant in U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and E. Europe.
5. Possibly permit better relations with Hanoi and Peking.
6. Make Peking clearly responsible for any failure to achieve peace in Southeast Asia.

Disadvantages

1. Probably turn 14 million Vietnamese over to Communist control.
2. Insure Chinese Communist domination of S.E. Asia and probably destroy SEATO.
3. Create a major crisis of confidence in all the friendly nations of Asia.
4. Weaken U.S. prestige and the credibility of our support throughout the world.
5. Encourage Chinese Communists and similarly inclined elements in all Communist parties, in their support of violence and subversion.
6. Demonstrate free world inability to cope with "wars of national liberation" and encourage Communist to use this technique elsewhere.
7. Stimulate a move toward isolationism in the United States.
8. The first "lost war" in U.S. history.

ALTERNATIVE II

Withdrawal to Enclaves

As a prelude to total withdrawal, this alternative would encompass all the advantages and disadvantages of Alternative I. In addition:

Advantages

1. Provide a somewhat better short-range bargaining position than Alternative I.
2. Save a small measure of prestige by demonstrating we cannot be defeated militarily.
3. Give the South Vietnamese and other friends a little time to make their own "deals" with the Communists.
4. Eliminate charge that U. S. is too involved in Vietnam or that it is "an American war."
5. Reduce risk of any expansion of the war.

Disadvantages

1. Militarily more difficult and more costly than Alternative I.
2. Put a probably unbearable burden on the South Vietnamese armed forces and deal an irrevocable blow to Vietnamese morale.
3. Might well lead Hanoi to attempt all-out "Dien Bien Phu" efforts against each enclave.
4. Turn most of the countryside over to the Viet Cong.
5. Eliminate a major U. S. military advantage, i. e. superior mobility.
6. Permit the Viet Cong to vastly expand their political, terrorist and sabotage efforts.
7. Adversely affect morale of U. S. troops forced to go on defensive.

ALTERNATIVE III

Follow Present Course

Advantages

1. Present course has put Allies on offensive and prevented Viet Cong military success.
2. Maximum help to Viet-nam without a U.S. takeover.
3. Reassures allies everywhere of our determination to do what must be done to meet aggression.
4. Has won support of most of our friends in Asia, who want to see Communist aggression defeated.
5. Has convinced most Vietnamese they can win their struggle to be their own masters.
6. Implements principle of using only the amount of force necessary.
7. Minimizes possibility of Communist escalation.
8. Supportable without total mobilization or major reduction in commitments in other areas.
9. Limits war by not threatening invasion of North or destruction of Hanoi regime.
10. In time, if we persist, it will permit us to achieve our principle objectives.

Disadvantages

1. Prompts charges that we are doing too little -- or too much.
2. Large U.S. involvement has disrupted Vietnamese economy, promoted inflation, and increased tensions with Vietnamese people.
3. Air attacks on North Viet-nam have not stopped infiltration or induced Hanoi to negotiate.
4. Represents domestic political disadvantages to Administration.
5. Implementation of strategy so gradual that other side may doubt our perseverance and willingness to increase pressure.
6. Commits us to a possibly long and costly struggle.
7. Creates danger of "war weariness" among Americans and Vietnamese.
8. Measured pace may increase military costs of actions taken later rather than sooner.

ALTERNATIVE IV

Major escalation: huge ground force, large expansion of air assault, etc.

Advantages

1. Increase chance of quick solution.
2. Forcibly demonstrate U.S. determination to throw back aggression with all the power necessary.
3. Increase pressure on North Vietnam to abandon force.
4. Raise confidence and morale of South Vietnamese and of Lao, Thai and other neighbors.
5. Long-term costs might be less than under Alternative III.

Disadvantages

1. Sharply raise cost of Vietnam effort - in men, money, casualties.
2. Risk alienating increasing numbers of Vietnamese who would feel we were "taking over".
3. Raise chances of Chinese Communist involvement as North Vietnamese desperation increased.
4. Raise fears everywhere we were risking World War III.
5. Increased domestic and foreign criticism.
6. Deepen already serious problems of inflation and social tension in South Vietnam.
7. Raise pressure on Soviets and others to boost aid to Hanoi.

22 e

ALTERNATIVE V

Maximum non-nuclear effort, North and South

All the advantages and disadvantages of Alternative IV would apply, but in even higher degree. In addition:

Advantages

1. Hanoi regime facing threat to its own survival, would be unable to continue any significant support to Viet Cong.
2. Open possibility for elimination of communist control in the North and for unification of Viet-nam.
3. If successful, would deal a serious, perhaps fatal, blow to Chinese Communist prestige.

Disadvantages

1. High probability of war with Communist China.
2. Alienate world opinion.
3. Soviet intervention might become a real possibility.
4. Would encourage Communist to settle internal differences.
5. Raise risk of nuclear war.
6. Necessitate total mobilization, raise all costs, and force reduction of constructive programs at home and abroad.

June 2, 1966

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

In accordance with Section 123a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to me by letter dated May 27, 1966, a proposed "Amendment to the Agreement for Cooperation on the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy Between the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland," and a proposed "Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Power Applications of Atomic Energy Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland," and has recommended that I approve the proposed Amendment and the proposed new Agreement, determine, with respect to each of them, that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize the execution of each.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 123b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and upon the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission, I hereby:

(a) Approve the proposed Amendment and the proposed new Agreement and determine that their performance will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States of America;

(b) Authorize the execution of the proposed Amendment and the proposed new Agreement on behalf of the Government of the United States of America by appropriate authorities of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,

LBJ

LBJ:CEJ:feg
The Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit by Nicaraguan President Schick

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-98

By ing NARA, Date 9-1-89

On May 10 you agreed to receive President Schick when he transits the United States on his way back to Nicaragua from Europe. The appointment has been set for noon on June 9. We had planned an informal meeting in your office.

Ambassador Sevilla Sacasa is unhappy with this treatment and is pushing hard for ceremonies equivalent to that of an informal working visit. This includes:

1. Received by the Vice President at the airport.
2. Met by you at the White House.
3. Military honors.
4. Luncheon by you at the White House.

You could compromise by confining the ceremonial attention to:

1. The Vice President meeting him at the airport.
2. You meeting him at the White House.
3. Honor guard positioned on the south driveway.

The considerations weighing in your decision are:

1. The invitation was extended only because President Schick happened to be transiting the U. S. on his way to and from Europe.
2. He will be the first Latin American Chief of State to be received by you in the White House. While President Schick has been friendly and helpful on Vietnam and the Dominican Republic and scored notable achievements under the Alliance for Progress Nicaragua does not enjoy a democratic image in the hemisphere.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

3. There is not much mileage for you in wide publicity of a meeting with the President of Nicaragua -- and you may be criticized for having him as your first Latin American visitor if it is accompanied by too much pomp and ceremony.

4. Ambassador Sevilla Sacasa will be highly disappointed if his President does not receive the ceremonial attention of an informal visit. His cooperation as Dean of the Corps is important to Jim Symington and you.

I would like to know your wishes on the treatment to be accorded.

W. W. Rostow

Prefer only informal visit in
my office as originally planned _____

Prefer full informal working
visit treatment _____

Prefer the compromise
ceremonial attention _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

65
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 1, 1966 - 11:45 AM

~~May~~ 31, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Two Agreements with the United Kingdom Relating to the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

The Atomic Energy Commission, with the concurrence of the Department of State, recommends that you approve two proposed agreements with the UK, as follows:

1. Amendment to the Agreement for Cooperation on the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy Between the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This agreement is in effect an extension for ten years of the existing agreement with the UK which was signed June 15, 1955. The principal objective of this document is to provide for the transfer of an additional 2,000 kilograms of U-235 for fueling reactors in the UK's civil research and development program. The agreement will carry the same safeguards provisions as the original agreement, which stated that no material, equipment or devices transferred under the agreement will be utilized for military purposes.

2. Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Power Applications of Atomic Energy Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This is an entirely new agreement which will provide for the supply of up to 8,000 kilograms of U-235 for use in the UK's civil nuclear power program during the ten year term of the agreement. There are certain technical features of the new agreement consistent with recent changes in the Atomic Energy Act, but the important difference between the new agreement and the old agreement that is being extended is in the provision that the International Atomic Energy Agency will be requested to assume responsibility for applying safeguards to the materials transferred under the agreement. This is an important new development resulting from long and strenuous negotiations with the UK. It is also a feature that the Joint Committee has strongly urged us to include in all new agreements and which practice we have been following on all new agreements except that it was somewhat difficult to apply to the UK. The problem was solved when it was agreed that we would not insist on IAEA safeguards on the UK research and development program and the UK accepted our requirement that IAEA safeguards would be applied to the materials supplied for their power program.

The timetable with respect to the approval by you and hearings before the Joint Committee is extremely tight. Chet Holifield, Chairman of the Joint Committee, has assured the AEC that if the agreements are submitted early this week the Committee would endeavor to hold hearings this week. * Failing that, the Committee calendar would not permit hearings until the week of June 13. This would pose a problem for us in connection with an initiative that we wish to take at the ENDC shortly after it resumes in Geneva on June 14. ACDA is anxious to table a revised version of Article III, which is the safeguards article, of their draft non-proliferation treaty. We have worked out a plan with the British by which we can sign the agreements with them and be in a position to move at Geneva promptly as soon as we have passed the Congressional hurdle.

The reason this new treaty with the UK has an important bearing on our initiative at Geneva is that we are trying to draft a stronger version of Article III which would be satisfactory to both the nuclear and non-nuclear powers. The non-nuclear powers, of course, prefer a provision which goes as far as possible in the direction of requiring safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities, those of the nuclear powers as well as those of the non-nuclear powers. The UK feels that the application of safeguards should not apply to the peaceful nuclear activities of the nuclear powers.

When we were consulting with the Canadians recently, there was developed a compromise version of Article III which would make safeguards mandatory on the indigenous peaceful nuclear programs of only the non-nuclear powers, but would provide for mandatory safeguards on all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, whether to nuclear or non-nuclear powers. There is a good chance that the UK will accept this approach as long as we use the two forms of agreements presented herewith, the net effect of which is to apply IAEA safeguards only on the material we are transferring to them for power production purposes.

I recommend that you approve these draft agreements at your earliest convenience. If you agree, there is presented herewith a letter to Dr. Seaborg for your signature.


W. W. Rostow

☒ Approved
☐ Disapproved
☐ See me

*Note: Holifield and Anderson have given State informal assurances of their support of the two agreements.

[Handwritten mark]

DRAFT LETTER FOR POSSIBLE
USE BY THE PRESIDENT IN
RESPONDING TO DR. GLENN T. SEABORG

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

In accordance with Section 123a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to me a proposed "Amendment to the Agreement for Cooperation on the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy Between the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland," and a proposed "Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Power Applications of Atomic Energy Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland," and has recommended that I approve the proposed Amendment and the proposed new Agreement, determine, with respect to each of them, that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize the execution of each.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 123b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and upon the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission, I hereby:

- a. Approve the proposed Amendment and the proposed new Agreement and determine that their performance will not constitute an

unreasonable risk to the common defense and security
of the United States of America;

- b. Authorize the execution of the proposed Amendment and
the proposed new Agreement on behalf of the Government
of the United States of America by appropriate authorities
of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C.



66

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

MAY 27 1956

Dear Mr. President:

The Atomic Energy Commission recommends that you approve (1) the enclosed "Amendment to the Agreement for Cooperation on the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland" and (2) the enclosed "Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Power Applications of Atomic Energy Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland," determine, with respect to each of them, that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize the execution of each. The Department of State supports the Commission's recommendation.

The proposed Amendment which has been negotiated by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, would extend for a period of ten years the existing Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom which was signed on June 15, 1955. The principal objective of the Amendment is to provide for the transfer of an additional 2,000 kilograms of U-235 from the United States for fueling reactors in the United Kingdom's civil research and development program. It is expected that the United Kingdom will desire 93% enrichment for much of its uranium requirements under this Amendment.

Materials, equipment and devices transferred pursuant to the extended Agreement will continue to be subject to the guarantees in Article IX of the original Agreement that no such material, equipment, or devices will be utilized for military purposes.

The proposed new Agreement for Civil Power Applications which has been negotiated by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, would provide for the supply of up to 8,000 kilograms of U-235 for use in the United Kingdom's civil nuclear power program during the ten year term of the Agreement. The United Kingdom estimates that it will need this material to help meet its requirements for fueling its 8,000 megawatt nuclear power program which is planned for startup in the 1970-1975 period.

Article I of the proposed Agreement provides that Restricted Data shall not be communicated under the Agreement. Article IV contains a provision to assure comparability of domestic and foreign prices for United States enriched uranium and enrichment services. The same Article would permit the transfer to the United Kingdom of material enriched to more than 20% in the isotope U-235 when there is a technical or economic requirement for such a transfer. Article IV also contains the usual provision for "toll" enrichment of United Kingdom uranium in United States' facilities after December 31, 1968. Article VI reflects the recent changes in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 permitting private ownership of special nuclear material by enabling private parties in the United States and the United Kingdom to be parties to arrangements for the transfer of special nuclear material. Previously, such transfers were confined to Governments.

The new Agreement contains our usual statutory guarantees that no material, equipment or devices transferred pursuant to the Agreement will be used for military purposes. It also provides that the International Atomic Energy Agency will be requested to assume responsibility for applying safeguards to the materials transferred under the Agreement. Either party may terminate the Agreement in the event that the parties do not reach agreement on the application of IAEA safeguards.

Following your determination, approval, and authorization, the proposed Amendment and new Agreement will be formally executed by appropriate authorities of the Government of the

Mr. President

- 3 -

United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In compliance with Section 123c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Amendment and the new Agreement, together with your approval and determination, will then be submitted to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Respectfully yours,

Chairman

The President
The White House

Enclosures:

1. Proposed Amendment to the Agreement for Cooperation on the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
2. Proposed Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Power Applications of Atomic Energy Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

AMENDMENT TO AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION
ON THE CIVIL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

The Government of the United States of America (including the United States Atomic Energy Commission) and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, on its own behalf and on behalf of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority;

Desiring to amend further and to extend the term of the Agreement for Cooperation on the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy (hereinafter referred to as the "Agreement for Cooperation") signed between them at Washington on June 15, 1955, as amended by the Notes signed October 20, 1955, and November 3, 1955, as amended by the Agreement signed at Washington on June 13, 1956, as modified by the Agreement signed at Washington on July 3, 1958, as amended by the Agreement signed at Washington on June 5, 1963, as amended by the Agreement signed at Washington on June 29, 1964, and as amended by the Agreement signed at Washington on July 15, 1965;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Article IV, Paragraph (d), of the Agreement for Cooperation, as amended, is modified by changing "400", which appears before the word "kilograms" in the first sentence thereof, to read "2400".

ARTICLE II

Article XI of the Agreement for Cooperation, as amended, is modified by changing the word "eleven", which appears before the word "years" at the end thereof, to read "twenty-one".

ARTICLE III

This Amendment, which shall be regarded as an integral part of the Agreement for Cooperation, shall enter into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for the entry into force of this Amendment and shall remain in force for the period of the Agreement for Cooperation, as hereby amended.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Amendment.

DONE at Washington this day of 1966, in two original texts.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:



J.P.T. - John P. Trevithick
Deputy Officer-in-Charge
Atomic Energy Affairs
International Scientific
and Technological Affairs
Department of State



W.L.Y. - William L. Yeomans
Assistant Director for
Program Development
and Liaison
Division of International
Affairs
U. S. Atomic Energy
Commission

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND:



R.S.F. - Richard S. Faber
First Secretary
British Embassy

AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION IN THE CIVIL POWER
APPLICATIONS OF ATOMIC ENERGY BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

The Government of the United States of America including the United States Atomic Energy Commission (hereinafter referred to as the United States) and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, on its own behalf and on behalf of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (hereinafter referred to as the United Kingdom);

Desiring to engage in cooperation in furthering the use of atomic energy in civil power applications;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Scope of Agreement

A. Subject to the availability of personnel and material, and the applicable laws, directives, regulations and license requirements in force in their respective countries, the Parties shall assist each other, as hereinafter described, in furthering the use of atomic energy in civil power applications, including merchant marine propulsion. It is the intent of the Parties that such assistance shall be rendered on a reciprocal basis.

B. Restricted Data shall not be communicated under this Agreement, and no material shall be transferred and no service shall be furnished under this Agreement if the transfer of such material or the furnishing of such service involves the communication of Restricted Data.

C. This Agreement shall not require the exchange of any information which the Parties are not permitted to communicate because the information is privately owned or has been received from another Government.

ARTICLE II

Exchange of Information

The Parties shall exchange general information in the development of atomic energy in civil power applications. Detailed information and applied information in this field shall be exchanged to such an extent and under such terms and conditions as may be agreed.

ARTICLE III

Responsibility of Receiving Party

The application or use of any information (including design drawings and specifications) or material exchanged or transferred

under this Agreement shall be the responsibility of the Party receiving it, and the other Party does not warrant the accuracy or completeness of such information and does not warrant the suitability of such information or material for any particular use or application.

ARTICLE IV

Materials for Civil Power Applications

A. The Commission is prepared to sell to the United Kingdom, on terms and conditions to be agreed, such quantities as may be agreed of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 for fueling reactors in the United Kingdom civil nuclear power programs (including programs for merchant marine propulsion).

B. The Commission is also prepared to enter into contracts for the producing or enriching, or both, after December 31, 1968, in facilities owned by the Commission, of special nuclear material for the account of the United Kingdom, for the uses specified in paragraph A of this Article to such extent and subject to such terms and conditions as may be established by the Commission.

C. With regard to the transactions provided for in this Article it is understood that:

- (1) contracts specifying quantities, enrichments, delivery schedules and other terms and conditions of supply or service will be executed on a timely basis between the Commission and the Authority;
- (2) prices for enriched uranium sold or for services performed, and the advance notice required for delivery, will be those in effect at the time of delivery for users in the United States. The Commission may agree to supply enriched uranium

or form enrichment services on shorter notice, subject to assessment of such surcharge to the usual base price as the Commission may consider reasonable to cover abnormal production costs incurred by the Commission by reason of such shorter notice.

D. The enriched uranium supplied hereunder may contain up to twenty percent (20%) in the isotope U-235. The Commission, however, may make available a portion of the enriched uranium supplied hereunder as material containing more than 20% in the isotope U-235 when there is a technical or economic justification for such a transfer.

E. It is agreed that, should the total quantity of enriched uranium which the Commission has agreed to provide pursuant to this and other Agreements for Cooperation reach the maximum quantity of enriched uranium which the Commission has available for such purposes, and should the United Kingdom not have executed contracts covering the adjusted net quantity specified in Article V, the Commission may request, upon reasonable notice, that the United Kingdom execute contracts for all or any part of such enriched uranium as is not then under contract. It is understood that, should the United Kingdom not execute contracts in accordance with a request by the Commission hereunder, the Commission shall be relieved of all obligations to the United Kingdom with respect to the enriched uranium for which contracts have been so requested.

ARTICLE V

Quantity of Material Available for Transfers

The adjusted net quantity of U-235 in enriched uranium transferred from the United States to the United Kingdom under Article IV and Article VI during the period of this Agreement for

Cooperation shall not exceed 8000 kilograms in the aggregate. The following method of computation shall be used in calculating transfers, within the said ceiling quantity of 8000 kilograms of U-235, made under said Articles:

From:

- (1) The quantity of U-235 contained in enriched uranium transferred under said Articles, minus
- (2) The quantity of U-235 contained in an equal quantity of uranium of normal isotopic assay,

Subtract:

- (3) The aggregate of the quantities of U-235 contained in recoverable uranium of United States origin either transferred to the United States or to any other nation or group of nations with the approval of the United States pursuant to this Agreement, minus
- (4) The quantity of U-235 contained in an equal quantity of uranium of normal isotopic assay.

ARTICLE VI

Cooperation Between Persons Under the Jurisdiction of the Parties

With respect to the subject matter of this Agreement, it is understood that arrangements may be made between either Party or authorized persons under its jurisdiction and authorized persons under the jurisdiction of the other for the transfer of materials, including special nuclear material, and for the performance of services. Such arrangements shall be subject to the limitations in Articles I and V and to the policies of the Parties with regard to transactions involving the authorized persons referred to in the preceding sentence.

ARTICLE VII

Application of Safeguards

A. The United States and the United Kingdom, recognizing the desirability of making use of the facilities and services of the International Atomic Energy Agency, agree that the Agency will be requested to assume responsibility for applying safeguards to materials transferred under this Agreement.

B. In the event the Parties do not reach a mutually satisfactory agreement on the terms of the trilateral arrangement envisaged in paragraph A of this Article, either Party may, by notification, terminate this Agreement. In the event of termination by either Party, the United Kingdom shall, at the request of the United States, return to the United States all special nuclear material received pursuant to this Agreement and still in its possession or in the possession of persons under its jurisdiction. The United States will compensate the United Kingdom for its interest in such material so returned at the Commission's schedule of prices then in effect domestically.

ARTICLE VIII

Guarantees

The Parties guarantee that:

A. No material transferred pursuant to this Agreement shall be used for atomic weapons or for research on or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purpose.

B. No material transferred pursuant to this Agreement shall be transferred to any unauthorized person or beyond the jurisdiction of the Party receiving it without the written consent of the Party to this Agreement from which or by permission of which it was received. Such consent will not be given on behalf of the United

States unless the transfer in respect of which it is requested is within the scope of an agreement for cooperation made in accordance with Section 123 of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

C. No special nuclear material produced through the use of any material transferred pursuant to this Agreement shall be used for atomic weapons or for research on or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purpose, or shall be transferred beyond the jurisdiction of the Party in whose jurisdiction it is produced without the written consent of the other Party.

D. Their respective undertakings set forth in Article VII with regard to safeguards shall be maintained.

ARTICLE IX
Definitions

For the purpose of this Agreement:

"The Authority" means the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority.

"The Commission" means the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

"Person" means any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, government agency or government corporation other than the Commission and the Authority.

"Restricted Data" means all data concerning: (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from the category of Restricted Data by the appropriate authority.

"Special nuclear material" means (1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which the Commission and the Authority determine to be special nuclear material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing.

ARTICLE X

Entry Into Force

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for the entry into force of the Agreement and shall remain in force for a period of ten years.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Washington this day of 1966, in two original texts.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:



J.P.T. - John P. Trevithick
Deputy Officer-in-Charge
Atomic Energy Affairs
International Scientific
and Technological Affairs
Department of State



W.L.Y. - William L. Yeomans
Assistant Director for
Program Development
and Liaison
Division of International
Affairs
U. S. Atomic Energy
Commission

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND:



R.S.F. - Richard S. Faber
First Secretary
British Embassy

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Pres file 69~~SECRET -- SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, June 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Admiral Raborn's View of Compromise on CIA
Watchdog Committee

Admiral Raborn wants you to know of his very strong opposition to a compromise proposal to create a sub-committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to receive any information it requests from the Director of Central Intelligence. He believes the effectiveness of the Central Intelligence Agency will be badly hurt if the new sub-committee is authorized to get deeply into CIA's business.

Admiral Raborn wanted you to know his views because he has learned that Senator Mansfield will be seeking an appointment with you to talk about the "compromise" proposal.

Admiral Raborn has heard that Senator Mansfield wants to avoid a floor fight on the CIA "watchdog" issue and, therefore, is ready to recommend to you acceptance of the compromise.

Senator Russell opposes the new suggestion because he shares Admiral Raborn's view that Fulbright's group wants not only information, but also knowledge of sources and methods used by CIA.

Admiral Raborn said that recently he agreed to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the situation in 44 countries. However, Senator Fulbright was uninterested and insisted on being told the source of information and the methods used by CIA. When Admiral Raborn said that he was unable to make such information available, Senator Fulbright said, in effect, the Director was refusing to testify before his Committee.

Admiral Raborn understands that Fulbright is very unhappy that full information is given to Clark Clifford's Committee and doesn't understand why his Committee members should not be given the same treatment as the members of your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Walt
W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 88-161

By *sig* NARA, Date *6-26-89*~~SECRET -- SENSITIVE~~

Pres file~~SECRET~~

June 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possible Visit of Prime Minister Bazzaz to the United States as suggested by Robert Anderson and Marlin Sandlin

Discreet discussion with the State Department elicits the following:

1. The Department is reviewing Ambassador Strong's recommendation that Prime Minister Bazzaz be invited. They agree that a visit will strengthen his westward leanings in the economic sphere.
2. P.M. Bazzaz saw the Vice President last year in Washington, but it was a last-minute, helter skelter visit at the time of the UN General Assembly. State would therefore like to make a more formal visit this time, if he comes. But they are reluctant to press for an official visit because there are so many others from the Near East who want to come and your time should be protected. There are also complex reasons of inter-Arab politics which justify our holding back.
3. We have indicated to them that there are some "business reasons" which would make it useful for him to come on some kind of a visit, although we do not want to add this to the President's schedule. They are therefore reviewing their priorities and will be in touch with us.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-100
By sig, NARA, Date 1-23-89

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To Follow 70a

5/14/66

To: Howard Wriggins

From: W. W Rostow

Please follow with extreme discretion.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3:40 pm. Friday
May 13, 1966

FOR Walt Rostow
FROM Joe Califano

Califano

Would you please pick up the suggestion in the second paragraph of the attached memorandum with State. As Sandlin explained it to me, the Prime Minister of Iraq could come here without involving the President because he is not the head of state. Please let me know how this progresses so I can keep Sandlin informed.

The information about sulphur in Iraq is extremely sensitive and Sandlin and Anderson asked that we handle it on a strict need-to-know basis. I assured them we would.

Attachs.

706
LN - please copy to:

H W

Please follow
with extreme
discretion

✓

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

8:15 pm. Thursday
May 12, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Joe Califano

Marlin Sandlin dropped by this afternoon to personally deliver the attached letter which reports a major sulphur discovery in Iraq. Sandlin and Bob Anderson wanted you to know about it. Sandlin said that the Russians have also tried to exploit this discovery but that the Prime Minister of Iraq wants to stay neutral with a "Western" tinge, especially with respect to hard currency and technical know-how.

Sandlin also said the Prime Minister would like to visit the U.S. in the near future. I will ask Rostow to explore this with the State Department.

Kosygin has invited the Prime Minister of Iraq to visit him in Moscow and he will probably go.

Attach.

ROBERT B. ANDERSON
ONE ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

May 10, 1966

My dear Mr. President,

Marlin Sandlin and I are writing this memorandum jointly.

We have through the Ambassador, informed the State Department in general about our project but we thought you should know about it because of the size and significance of the proposed development.

I have recently been in Iraq and have had with me the Chief Engineer of the Pan American Sulphur Company. We have now determined that the sulphur resources of Iraq are larger than the combined reserves of sulphur in both the United States and Mexico. They are certainly larger than anything ever discovered before. We have made definite proposals to the government of Iraq to develop these sulphur reserves together with phosphate reserves on a joint basis between Pan American Sulphur Company, a 50% ownership by the Government of Iraq and Robert B. Anderson.

We both believe that in view of the fact that both sulphur and phosphate are indispensable ingredients to fertilizers that it is exceedingly important nationally that these reserves be under the management of and participated in by American companies.

You know better than we the food problem of the future and what fertilizers are going to mean in supplying the food supplies of a world in which the population is expanding so rapidly.

We are keeping our Ambassador, Mr. Stone, fully informed and we will keep the Department of State informed as well. We simply wanted you to know of this major discovery and its importance.


We should like for you to also know that this sulphur deposit is so large that the people who control it are probably going to have a major voice in the world price for sulphur and, of course, unless it is handled properly it could be so utilized as to prove a serious impediment.

I should like to conclude by saying that I have recently had talks with the Prime Minister of Iraq and he expresses the belief that his country should be politically neutral but economically associated with the West. He made it very clear to me that he hoped that at some time he may be invited to visit the United States. I have passed this information on to the Department of State through Tom Mann.

We are, with great respect,

Sincerely yours,


Robert B. Anderson


Marlin Sandlin

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Pres. file

Wednesday, June 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Republic: Election Situation Report

At 4:30 p.m., Ambassador Bunker reported that the election was proceeding in a calm atmosphere. He said that the turnout in Santo Domingo seems to be unusually high, with a large percentage of women.

Reports which he is receiving from the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the OAS observers indicate that the electoral process is moving satisfactorily in the provincial urban and rural areas. Here the turnout is also large, with noticeably high feminine participation.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Bill Moyers

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, June 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Provisional President Garcia Godoy

Assuming that the elections in the Dominican Republic continue to go well, a message of congratulations from you to Garcia Godoy would be in order.

Ambassador Bunker strongly recommends that you authorize him to deliver such a message.

I attach a suggested text for your consideration. Ambassador Bunker would deliver it orally.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

See me ____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-98
By hig NARA, Date 9-1-89

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT GARCIA GODOY

Few Presidents have had a more complicated task than the one you have successfully accomplished today.

You have led the Dominican people from the ^{turbulence} ~~ferocity~~ of civil strife to the tranquility of free elections. There can be no greater tribute.

On behalf of the United States Government and people I express sincere admiration for your wisdom, courage and tenacity.

AGENDA

Meeting with the President

10:00 a. m. , June 1, 1966

*President
Dean Acheson
George Ball
Mr Rostow*

1. Strengthening the Alliance
2. East-West Initiatives

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, May 31, 1966 at 5 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Tory Leader Edward Heath at 12:30 p.m.
Wednesday, June 1.

Heath will be eager to hear your views on:

- Vietnam
- NATO/France (your general attitude)

In turn, you might wish to ask him:

- how he sees Britain's relations with Europe. (As you know, he is a leader of the movement to get the UK to join the EEC. He led the UK negotiating team in '62 - '63.)
- how we should manage the NATO problem and deGaulle.
- the UK economic situation.

At Tab A is a briefing paper from State.

At Tab B is a biographic sketch of Heath. (He will be accompanied by James Prior, his Parliamentary Private Secretary, a member of the House.)


Francis M. Bator

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

Edward Heath, leader of the British Conservative Party, will be visiting Washington for a week beginning May 29. He will be accompanied by James Prior, his Parliamentary Private Secretary, who is also a member of the House of Commons. Mr. Heath while in Washington will be seeing, in addition to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, Under Secretary Ball, William McChesney Martin, George Meany, and others. He will speak at the National Press Club on June 3 and will appear on "Meet the Press" on June 5.

Because of the importance of Britain's relations with the United States, a visit to Washington has become a "must" for leaders of the opposition as well as for British Prime Ministers. Heath had originally planned to come to Washington last fall and again in March of this year but circumstances forced him to change his plans.

Mr. Heath will probably wish to discuss the following subjects with the President:

1. Vietnam

The Conservative Party, as a party, has staunchly defended the American position in Vietnam. Heath himself has visited Vietnam to make an on-the-spot appraisal. There are elements in the Conservative Party which are not so sound on this issue and, generally, the British are gloomy as to the prospects. Heath would benefit from getting a direct impression of the President's determination and conviction that a just solution will be achieved.

2. Britain and Europe

One of the main planks in the Conservative Party platform for the March 31 election, and the one which was advanced with the greatest enthusiasm, was the call for Britain to enter the Common Market. Heath, who conducted the previous

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-101
By inf NARA. Date 3-9-90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

abortive negotiations for British entry into the EEC, is convinced that Britain's economic salvation lies in its close association with Europe.

3. Britain and the United States

There were some muted overtones of anti-Americanism in the Conservative Party campaign in the last election. These arose in large measure from the fears of some Britons of becoming overly dependent on the United States. Heath will probably wish to tell the President that closer ties between Britain and Europe would not mean any weakening of the bonds with the United States but rather a more healthy relationship between Europe and the United States.

4. Britain and the World

The Conservatives have traditionally been world-minded, but in opposition there are signs that the party is divided on the issue of whether or not Britain can and should attempt to maintain a far-flung system of foreign commitments. The President may wish to explain to Heath why it is important to us that Britain continue to play an important role in the world effort.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres. Jole

Rec'd 6/1/66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, May 31, 1966 -- 7:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

I have checked all available sources. No one in Washington believes there is any substance to the NEWSWEEK rumor. It may well be the Soviet Embassy using NEWSWEEK to keep the peace pot simmering. Here are the facts as we have them.

Our ambassador in Bucharest, talking for three hours on May 27 with Deputy Prime Minister Bodnaras who headed the Rumanian delegation, learned nothing to substantiate this. Bodnaras stated that negotiations to end the war were not discussed because of North Vietnamese sensitivities. But Rumanian impressions were that Hanoi's prerequisites for initiating talks were:

1. Unconditional cessation of bombing North Viet Nam;
2. No further escalation in U. S. military presence in the South;
3. U. S. to undertake direct contact with the NLFSVN.

This, of course, is the same inflexible attitude followed by Hanoi with other recent visitors.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By W, NARA, Date 5-26-98

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, May 31, 1966
7:15 p. m.

*Pres. file
Rtd 6/1/66*

Mr. President:

The marked passages in this somewhat long-winded cable suggest some of the possibilities and possible problems in the DR starting June 2.

W. W. Rostow

Santa Domingo 2583 ~~Secret~~

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

76a

Tuesday, May 31, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM SANTO DOMINGO (2583)

Bosch's stated reasons for his recent threat to withdraw from the elections as well as talk, by some elements of military and far right, of killing Bosch or otherwise preventing him from taking office should he be elected and, by some Bosch supporters, of renewing the revolution if Balaguer wins, warrant a brief look at the immediate post-electoral situation in terms of prospects for acceptance of the elected government by the losing side and for its installation on July 1.

As the Department is aware, the situation is fraught with uncertainty, and the psychology of elements on both sides lends itself to a certain amount of concern, particularly in the event -- as still seems likely -- of a close vote.

A number of circumstances could of course upset the present electoral panorama. For the purposes of this analysis, however, we assume the present situation will hold until June 1. We also assume that the Inter-American Peace Force will still have a presence in the country for the July 1 inauguration of the new government. As reported previously, Garcia Godoy has undertaken an effort with the presidential candidates to attempt to provide the government elected June 1 with the maximum possible support from the opposition parties.

The danger to the government-elect exists from Communists and the left (including Bosch) should Balaguer win; and from center right, far right and military -- with the possible exception of Balaguer and those political and military segments that may remain loyal and responsive to him -- should Bosch win.

Within this almost all-inclusive spectrum, there are many elements (not necessarily coordinated) which appear committed on one side to redress the situation should Bosch lose or, on the other, prevent him from taking office should he win. While Dominicans are prone to constant braggadocio and exaggeration, the fact remains both the right (in 1963) and left (in 1965) made good their talk for and against Bosch and passions are not less aroused now.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-97

By inf, NARA, Date 8-4-87

Should Balaguer win, the determining factor in the initial acceptance or rejection of election results is likely to be the personal attitude of Bosch towards these results. Should Bosch win, Balaguer will have a strong, but not necessarily decisive role in ensuring acceptance of his election. The lunatic fringe on the right and its allies in the military would probably pose a more immediate danger to Bosch than the fanatics on the left would pose to Balaguer, unless Bosch decided to pull out all stops to overturn what he has indicated he might consider an "illegal" election.

Balaguer is publicly committed to support and cooperate with Bosch Government. He has also publicly stated he would not support a move to overthrow a constitutional regime. Top PR officials assured the Embassy a few days ago that Balaguer would actively oppose an effort by right and/or military to sabotage the election results.

Even if he should do this, however, the question of how effective he would be is another matter. His influence with some of the PR's disparate elements, not to mention fair-weather allies he has picked up during the campaign, could be expected to drop sharply if he loses. Balaguer would probably retain most of his hard-core military support, but he probably could not effectively control irresponsible military elements and would probably be unable to prevent a determined effort by the military as a whole, the major restraint on which would in the final analysis be the Inter-American Peace Force, as it has been in past year.

Concerning the bulk of the military, however, we lean towards a belief (perhaps "hope" is a better word) that the "new" military attitude reflected in Minister of Defense Perez y Perez public statement that the military will "respect and support" whatever government is elected would reinforce and be reinforced by what has been a growing reluctance among the military to become further identified with regressive forces by moving against another constitutional regime.

Barring rashness by Bosch (Garcia Godoy's recent talk with Bosch gives some hope that Bosch realizes the need for tact and caution in dealing with the military) and/or his followers or accidents over which Bosch may have no real control, we would expect the military establishment to cooperate with the Provisional Government in maintaining a climate suitable for the inauguration of a Bosch Government.

Without broad military support the right could not mount a successful effort to prevent Bosch's inauguration. Right-wing activists, however, with possible support of some individual military elements, and egged on from behind by ultras (e. g. Imbert, Wessin) are capable of mounting a campaign of terror and sabotage aimed primarily at creating an atmosphere with which to convince Bosch and his top aides of the personal dangers of taking office or of their inability to remain in office if inaugurated.

We would not expect this effort to succeed unless a number of Bosch's top aides were killed. (We do not rule out the possibility of a successful assassination attempt on Bosch, but consider it unlikely on the assumption he would remain in his house until inauguration, by which time the immediate danger would hopefully have been brought under control.)

Should Balaguer win, the apparent attitude of Bosch and, especially, many of his followers that it is impossible for the PRD to lose the election except through fraud is cause for some concern. It is extremely difficult to determine whether their talk goes beyond a campaign tactic. There has developed throughout the left what may be a dangerous mystique regarding the elections, along the following lines:

People made clear their choice in the April Revolution. If elections are free, they will ratify their choice. But Interventionists and their native allies, having thwarted the people's will once, cannot afford being exposed to the world by the people's repudiation through victory at the polls.

Thus, while people cannot lose elections, they can be prevented from winning. Should this happen, the resultant government will not be legal, and people will have no responsibility towards it but would rather have an obligation to work against it and again attempt to redress the series of wrongs begun in September 1963.

Bosch himself has fostered this argument publicly, particularly in his May 17 and 19 speeches threatening withdrawal from the elections and putting himself back in the race. In the first instance, referring sarcastically to the U.S. press commentary that Balaguer was then gaining ground, Bosch said, "In certain circles in the U.S. there is need to justify beforehand plans... that Balaguerismo will win elections through terror and that the election will be acclaimed throughout the world as free, clean and democratic."

On May 19th Bosch said, "If Democracy is not born of completely free and clean elections, it will be illegal and will have no security whatsoever." The Bosch remarks were magnified on the 19th by fiery PRSC Secretary General Caonabo Javier, who told a PRSC audience in San Cristobal that "People will seek their own method of struggle, which in the final analysis will be armed revolution, if the Yankees continue a campaign of terror to prevent Constitutionalists from participating in elections."

Also to be considered in the context of the above expressions is a reported Bosch remark to AP correspondent Berrellez that "People will not accept (defeat), do you not know they are all armed?" Notwithstanding ulterior motives, Bosch may have had in making such a remark to a U.S. newsman, it is illustrative of much so far subterranean commentary that has come to our attention.

On the other hand, there have been private indications from Bosch that he would accept defeat. The PRD Vice Presidential candidate told the Charge in Santiago recently that Bosch would respect the election results, although he said he had not consulted Bosch on the matter. Mayobre told Ambassador Bunker and the Charge last Wednesday that after pressing Bosch in a recent conversation, the latter, after first refusing to acknowledge the possibility of defeat, finally stated he would accept the loss to Balaguer. Garcia Godoy told the Ad Hoc Committee last week that he had come away from a private conversation with Bosch on May 22 with at least the hope Bosch would swallow defeat for the good of the country. The President said Bosch spoke highly of Balaguer and professed to recognize the nation's chances for stability depend largely on peaceful accommodation between the winner and loser.

It must be recognized that Bosch's reluctance publicly to state his willingness to accept defeat is clearly attributable in part to his understandable desire to avoid prejudicing the mystique of the impossibility of defeat. Should Bosch lose, the key to his post-electoral attitude will, then, presumably be his personal judgment as to whether the elections have or have not been free and clean.

Bosch, as usual, has left all his options open. He might well decide on discretion and grudging acceptance of a Balaguer victory. If his oft repeated desire not to be President is genuine, he would almost certainly do this. In any case, in view of Bosch's apparently genuine aversion to the PRD's engaging in violence, and if there is no serious questioning of election validity by foreign observers, it seems unlikely that Bosch would risk international opprobrium by repudiation of the elections.

However, Bosch's attitude toward violence embraces both abhorring it and resorting to it for what he considers good cause (restore Constitutionality, prevent fraud, self defense). Moreover, as Balaguer would in defeat lose much of his grip on disparate forces he now controls, so would Bosch to a large degree lose what even now seems be his weakening hold on Extremists -- if he ever has had any real control over them. The 14th June in particular, smarting from his blunt and reiterated rejection of its support, could not be expected to hold still at a Bosch command after elections (Fafa Taveras told a Detroit news reporter that if Balaguer wins "there will be war.")

Both the 14th and MPD of late have seemed going out of their way to embarrass Bosch, both with incidents such as firing on a Balaguer caravan and by presence in distinctive uniforms around PRD national headquarters downtown.

These and other extreme "constitutionalist" groups might assume their active days would be numbered under a Balaguer regime and react to a PR victory with no necessarily coordinated rampage which could do considerable, though perhaps not critical damage.

On balance, the major immediate danger regardless of who wins would seem to come from undisciplined (in the sense they are essentially independent from either Bosch's or Balaguer's control) segments who may well decide to take matters into their own hands. An additional danger would lie in the possibility that, even if prompt and effective action were taken against what could be an immediate outbreak of terrorism after the election results are known, "controlled" elements on either side (i.e., Labor on the left, Military on the right) might be stimulated or provoked by excesses of extremists.

Weighing heavily against the success of a major move by either side to overturn election results, however, is the attitude of the population at large. People give convincing signs they are satiated with the unrest of the past 13 months and appear much more likely actively to repudiate than passively submit to any effort to destroy what appears generally to be considered the country's last chance for return to ordered existence under whatever constitutional regime is elected on June 1. An awareness of this could well be the most effective factor working for acceptance of the election results in the immediate post election period and peaceful installation of an elected government on July 1.

This analysis has not dealt with the longer-term prospects of the months immediately following the inauguration.

This message was written before the Balaguer "withdrawal" of May 28. We have as yet received no evidence to suggest that Balaguer's move and attendant events have significantly affected the substance of the message.

In a radio speech explaining the PR withdrawal, Balaguer stated flatly that the PR would not support a government that resulted from elections in which PR did not participate because of reasons outlined in its withdrawal statement. However, the PR is now officially back in the race and, although Balaguer has not publicly renewed his pledge to support the government emanating from free elections, 2nd Vice President Quirilio Vitorio told the Embassy on the evening of May 29 that the pledge has been reinstated.

Crimmins

May 31, 56 -- 4:10 p. m. 77

Mr. Rostow,

S/S (State) duty officer telephoned to say
memo to Sec State and U. A. Johnson has been
approved.

LN

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Pres file 77a

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, May 30, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Targets, North Vietnam

You should know that State and Defense have agreed to include 7 targets in the current strike program even though they are slightly off to the side of routes authorized for interdiction. These 7 targets are along the edge of the restricted circles around Hanoi and Haiphong:

Two small POL storage sites near Dao Quan. These are part of the system of small storage facilities which North Vietnam hopes to use to disperse POL supplies. ~~No civilian casualties are expected.~~

Small POL site near Thai Nguyen. ~~DoD predicts one civilian casualty.~~

POL site 10 miles north of Haiphong. This is a new dispersal site which could be of considerable importance, though exact capacity is unknown. ~~No civilian casualties are expected.~~

Thon Nieu POL Tank Fabrication Plant. This is the source of POL tanks being used to disperse POL. The Defense Department estimates ~~only 2 civilian casualties since this area would receive early warning from its radar system.~~

Thai Nguyen Truck Park. This is a truck park two miles off the approved interdiction route. ~~Two civilian casualties are predicted.~~

Thai Nguyen Vehicle Repair Facility. Located in same area as the truck park. ~~No civilian casualties are predicted.~~

Walt Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-55

~~TOP SECRET~~

By *WJ*, NARA, Date *12-9-91*

Tuesday, May 31, 1966
3:30 PM

Pres file 78

Mr. President:

The attached memorandum from Secretary Nitze makes clear that the AP has over written a routine security reminder sent to Navy personnel following a serviceman's unsuccessful attempt to sell classified information to the Soviets.

Clark Clifford's group is investigating the incident.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET - LIMDIS~~

Tuesday, May 31, 1966 1:15 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Inter-American Summit Meeting

Secretary Rusk is ready to begin consultations with the Latin American Governments on the timing, site and agenda for the proposed Summit meeting. Latin American reaction to the meeting has been favorable provided it has substance.

He proposes to start the consultation process with an oral message from you to the Latin American Chiefs of State conveyed through our Ambassadors.

The message which Secretary Rusk proposes is at Tab A. It will be incorporated in a circular instruction (Tab B) giving our Ambassadors specific guidance on how to make the approach.

I recommend that you approve the proposed message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove

See me .

Attachments
 Tabs A and B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-98
By rip NARA, Date 9-1-89

~~SECRET - LIMDIS~~

cc Moyen
 Wickham

79a

~~SECRET-LIMDIS~~

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

President Johnson is pleased at the initiative which has come from Latin America for a meeting of Chiefs of State and at the indications of interest in it from all OAS countries. For his part, he looks forward to the meeting with intense interest, and believes that it can and should be of great significance to our hemisphere. He believes that we should work toward holding this meeting before the end of this year and that we should dedicate ourselves to seeking out new paths of progress for our countries and for our relations with each other which, achieved through mutual effort under the cooperative concept of the Alliance for Progress, will greatly benefit not only our own generation but also generations to come. To this end we should now begin careful preparations for a meeting at which agreement will be reached on concrete actions having constructive meaning for the peoples of this hemisphere for many years. He will greatly value the views of the Latin American Chiefs of State during this period on what major subjects can most usefully be addressed at the meeting. He looks forward with great anticipation to being with the Latin American Chiefs of State at the meeting and working together with them under common ideals in the attempt to achieve our common objective of more rapid progress toward the realization of the aspirations of our peoples.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-98
By ing NARA, Date 9-1-89

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By gml/g, NARA, Date 6-11-98

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PRIORITY

WGB
79-6

ASUNCION, BOGOTA, BUENOS AIRES, CARACAS, GUATEMALA,
LA PAZ, LIMA, MANAGUA, MEXICO, MONTEVIDEO, PANAMA,
PORT-AU-PRINCE, ~~PORT-OF-SPAIN~~, QUITO, RIO DE JANEIRO,
SAN JOSE, SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, SANTO DOMINGO,
TEGUCIGALPA

INFO: GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, OTTAWA, PORT-OF-SPAIN
Department of State

The Proposed Inter-American Summit Meeting

FOR THE AMBASSADOR TO LONDON

1. Knowledge of the contents of this airgram should be held closely to a minimum number of people within the Embassy, and its substance should be discussed only with a limited number of carefully selected leaders of the country to which you are accredited.
2. Latin American countries have reacted favorably to President Illia's proposal made in March, and endorsed on April 15 in Mexico City by President Johnson, that there be a new meeting at the highest level to examine our common problems and give the Alliance for Progress increased momentum. OAS Secretary General Mora's consultations under a resolution adopted at the March IA-ECOSOC meeting in Buenos Aires and our own soundings have encountered positive reactions, provided that the meeting produces significant substantive initiatives. In addition, prospects now seem good for agreement on OAS charter changes at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers in the Third Special Inter-American Conference in Buenos Aires, probably in August. On the assumption that the meeting of Foreign Ministers will take place successfully and as scheduled, the pre-conditions for the beginning of careful preparations for the summit have therefore been met.
3. Consequently, you should begin to explore the ideas of the Government to which you are accredited on the timing, site and agenda for the summit. You should commence this process by

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RMSayre
ARA:SDEaton:mk 5/23/66

ARA - Mr. Sayre

S/S

ARA - Robert M. Sayre

White House - Mr. Bowdler

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transmitting to the head of the Government to which you are accredited the substance of the following message from President Johnson:

President Johnson is pleased at the initiative which has come from Latin America for a meeting of Chiefs of State and at the indications of interest in it from all OAS countries. For his part, he looks forward to the meeting with intense interest, and believes that it can and should be of great significance to our hemisphere. He believes that we should work toward holding this meeting before the end of this year and that we should dedicate ourselves to seeking out new paths of progress for our countries and for our relations with each other which, achieved through mutual effort under the cooperative concept of the Alliance for Progress, will greatly benefit not only our own generation but also generations to come. To this end we should now begin careful preparations for a meeting at which agreement will be reached on concrete actions having constructive meaning for the peoples of this hemisphere for many years. He will greatly value the views of the Latin American Chiefs of State during this period on what major subjects can most usefully be addressed at the meeting. He looks forward with great anticipation to being with the Latin American Chiefs of State at the meeting and working together with them under common ideals in the attempt to achieve our common objective of more rapid progress toward the realization of the aspirations of our peoples.

4. The U.S. position on site, timing and agenda for the meeting follows for your background and use as appropriate in your

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discussions with the Government to which you are accredited:

a. Site. The U.S. does not plan to take any initiative on the site of the summit meeting. We believe that the Foreign Ministers should discuss this when they meet in Buenos Aires in August. Our preference is for a site in one of the Latin American countries.

FYI. Chile has offered Vina del Mar, Uruguay has proposed Punta del Este but only after Uruguay's elections on November 27, and Argentina and Costa Rica indicated an interest in hosting the meeting. The Brazilians have indicated to us that they would be reluctant to attend a meeting in either Chile or Argentina and have stated that they would not go to a meeting in Venezuela. End FYI

b. Timing. Between September 15 and December 15, with the latter part of this period being more likely in view of the time needed for preparations and the elections being held in the countries which are potential sites. Municipal elections will be held in Peru on November 13 and general elections will be held in Uruguay on November 27. If the meeting is to be in one of these two countries, it presumably should come after these elections. You should therefore indicate a U.S. preference for around December 1 in your talks. You should also indicate that you would expect the meeting to last three or four days to give adequate time for exchanges of views among the Chiefs of State.

c. Agenda. We are intensively studying possible agenda items. We think they should be few in number but major in significance. You should place your emphasis in your talks at this time on eliciting the ideas of your Latin colleagues. Among the agenda items which we think would represent important and constructive initiatives are: (1) new impulses to the Alliance for Progress especially in agriculture and education; (2) a real commitment to take concrete steps to achieve rapid progress on Latin American economic integration; (3) some arrangement among the larger South American countries on arms limitation, this might take the form of ratios among them on

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navies and air forces or their agreement not to acquire or maintain certain ~~major~~ items (for example cruisers) or both.

FYI. We assume that the Latins would want to discuss trade matters. We are studying intensively what we might do in this field but at the moment we do not want to suggest even tentatively any form of agenda item because it might raise undue speculation as to what we might be willing to do. End FYI

The recommendations coming out of a summit meeting on any of these subjects must, of course, have the wholehearted support of the Latins because the burden of giving specific meaning to the principles which they reflect will fall primarily on them.

5. There will necessarily be some variations from country to country in the manner of presentation of the information in paragraphs three and four above, depending on particular circumstances in each country. Specifically:

a. The first presentation should be to President Illia of Argentina because he was the initiator of the summit idea. Other presentations can follow immediately after Illia has been approached. Ambassador Martin should therefore inform all other addressee posts as soon as he has seen Illia.

b. The presentation made to President Lopez Mateos of Mexico should, of course, take into account the fact that President Johnson's first response to Illia's proposal was made in Mexico.

c. The presentation to President Leoni of Venezuela should take into account the special interest he has shown in the meeting and include the statements that President Johnson has welcomed his comments, and agrees entirely with his view that there must be careful advance planning leading to concrete and significant results.

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d. Those Chiefs of State or other individuals who show promise of exercising Latin leadership at the summit meeting along lines which we would think constructive should be discreetly encouraged in a way which will not weaken their own sense of initiative. This group probably will include Presidents Frei and Belaunde and perhaps President-elect Carlos Lleras and Brazilian Minister of Planning Roberto Campos on economic integration.

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