

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1765

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2a cable	text of Ottawa 1722 <i>open 10-12-99 NLJ 98-332</i> Secret Exempt NLJ 87-129	1 p 06/20/66	A
#2b report	re: POW's <i>open 10-12-99 NLJ 98-332</i> secret Exempt NLJ 87-129	2 p 06/20/66	A
#6 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 2-2-89 NLJ 87-131</i>	1 p 06/20/66	A
#6a report	re: King Faisal's Visit confidential "	1 p undated	A
#7a cable	translations of telegram to President from Pres. Schick possible classified info <i>open 2-3-89 NLJ 87-130</i>	1 p 06/11/66	A
#12 memo	to President from Rostow re: Marcos Visit secret <i>open 2-2-89 NLJ 87-131</i>	1 p 06/18/66	A
#15 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 2-3-89 NLJ 87-130</i>	1 p 06/18/66	A
#15a memo	to President from Anthony Solomon re: Dominican Republic confidential <i>sanitized 3-2-89 NLJ 87-129</i> sanitized more released 12-3-93 NLJ 92-434	7 p 06/17/66	A
#18 memo	to President from Rostow re: Egypt secret <i>open 2-2-89 NLJ 87-131</i>	2 p 06/18/66	A
#18a memo	to President from Rusk re: UAR PL 480 Request secret <i>open 3-2-89 NLJ 87-129</i>	3 p 06/16/66	A
#19 memo	to President from Rostow re: consultation with Sen. Fulbright confidential <i>open 2-3-89 NLJ 87-130</i>	1 p 06/18/66	A
#23 memo	to President from Rostow re: Wilson Visit top secret <i>open 12-23-88 NLJ 87-126</i>	2 p 06/17/66	A
#23a memo	to President from Rostow re: cables from PM Wilson top secret <i>open 12-23-88 NLJ 87-126</i>	1 p 06/13/66	A
#23b cable	to PM [Wilson] from President top secret <i>open 12-23-88 NLJ 87-126</i>	2 p 06/13/66	A
#23c cable	to PM [Wilson] from President Exempt NLJ 87-126 <i>open 7/21/98</i> top secret Reclassified to Secret per NLJ 87-126	2 p 06/13/66	A
#23e cable	to PM from President top secret <i>open 12-23-88 NLJ 87-126</i>	4 p 06/14/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President
Rostow, vol. 6, June 11-20, 1966
Box 8R

RESTRICTION CODES

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285

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#23g XXXX cable	to President from Prime Minister <i>open 7/21/98</i> top secret 1 p	06/15/66	A
#23i cable	to Rostow from Palliser re: joint announcement <i>open 10/11/91</i> secret STATE LTR 12-15-77 1 p	06/16/66	A
#26b letter	to Chancellor Erhard from Pres. Johnson possible classified info <i>open 2-2-89 NLJ 87-131</i> 1 p	undated	A
#27a memo	to President from Rostow re: Canal Zone Governor <i>open 7/21/98</i> confidential <i>Exempt NLJ 87-130</i> 2 p	06/16/66	A & C
#29a cable	text of Ottawa 1691 <i>open 3-2-89 NLJ 87-129</i> secret 1 p	undated	A
#30 memo	to President from Rostow re: Dominican Republic confidential <i>open 2-3-89 NLJ 87-130</i> 1 p	06/16/66	A
#32 memo	to President from Rostow re: Vietnam secret <i>open 2-2-89 NLJ 87-131</i> 1 p	06/16/66	A
#32a memo	to Rostow from Dir. Research and Reports <i>sanitized 10-22-92 NLJ 92-329</i> <i>sanitized per RAC 5/03 - more released</i> top secret 1 p	06/15/66	A
#31a memo	to President from Wm. Gaud & Lincoln Gordon re: Dom. Rep. confidential <i>open 3-2-90 NLJ 87-128</i> 5 p	06/16/66	A
#33 memo	to President from Rostow re: Middle East <i>open 10-12-99 NLJ 98-333</i> secret <i>sanitized 2-2-89 NLJ 87-131</i> 1 p	06/16/66	A
#33a memo	to President from Charles Schultze re: Jordan Secret <i>open 6-22-88 NLJ 87-127</i> 2 p	06/14/66	A
#33b memo	to President from George Ball re: Jordan secret <i>open 3-2-88 NLJ 87-129</i> 1 p	06/10/66	A
#33c memo	to President from David Bell re: Jordan secret <i>open 4-13-87</i> 3 p	05/14/66	A
#33d report	re: Jordan secret <i>open 4-13-87</i> 4 p	05/66	A
#33e letter	draft letter to PM of Jordan confidential <i>open 3-2-90 NLJ 87-128</i> 5 p	05/66	A
#33f report	re: Jordan confidential <i>open 3-2-90 NLJ 87-128</i> 1 p	undated	A

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385

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#35 letter	to President Arturo Illia from Pres. Johnson possible classified info <i>open 2-3-89 NLJ 87-130</i> 2 p	06/16/66	A
#37a cable	from PM Wilson to Pres. Johnson top secret <i>open 7/21/98</i> 1 p	06/15/66	A
#41 memo	to President from Rostow re: Vietnam secret <i>sanitized 2-2-89 NLJ 87-131</i> <i>open 4-1-94 NLJ 92-505</i> 1 p	06/15/66	A
#41a cable	Text of Saigon 5546 <i>sanitized 3-2-89 NLJ 87-129</i> secret <i>open 10-12-99 NLJ 98-332</i> 4 p	06/15/66	A
#44a XXXX message	from Amb. Mein in Guatemala <i>sanitized 10-12-99 NLJ 98-332</i> secret <i>sanitized 9-9-87 NLJ 87-129</i> 1 p	undated	A
#45 memo	to President from Rostow re: Dom. Rep. <i>open 10-12-99 NLJ 98-333</i> confidential <i>Exempt NLJ 87-130</i> 1 p	06/15/66	A
#47a letter	to Joe Palmer from N. Ade Martins possible classified info <i>open 3-2-89 NLJ 87-129</i> 1 p	05/27/66	A
#53b memo	to President from David Bell re: Ethiopia confidential <i>open 3-2-90 NLJ 87-128</i> 3 p	05/17/66	A
#55a memo	to President from Rostow and Bator re: Austrian speech confidential <i>open 2-2-89 NLJ 87-131</i> 3 p	06/14/66	A
#55e memo	to President from Bator re: speech to Austrian Delegation secret <i>open 2-2-89 NLJ 87-131</i> 4 p	06/11/66	A
#56 memo	to President from Rostow possible classified info 1 p	06/14/66	A
#57 memo	to President from Rostow confidential 1 p	06/14/66	A
#57a letter	to Prime Minister Pearson from Pres. Johnson confidential <i>open 10-12-99 NLJ 98-333</i> 2 p	06/14/66	A
#57b memo	to President from Dean Rusk confidential <i>open 3-2-89 NLJ 87-129</i> 2 p	06/13/66	A
#57e letter	proposed letter to PM Pearson possible classified info <i>open 2-2-89 NLJ 87-131</i> 3 p	undated	A
#63 memo	to President from Rostow re: Israel and UAR <i>open 10-3-94 NLJ 91-212</i> secret <i>sanitized 2-2-89 NLJ 87-131</i> 2 p	06/14/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#63a report	summary of Desalting Papers secret open 2-2-89 NLS 87-131 2 p	06/06/66	A
#70a letter	to Prime Minister from President Exempt NLS 87-126 top secret downgraded to secret per NLS 87-126 4 p	OPEN 10/11/91 06/13/66	DUPLICATE OF 23E A
#74 memo	to President from Rostow re: France Secret open 2-2-89 NLS 87-131 1 p	06/13/66	A
#74a cable	text of Paris 8672 secret open 3-2-89 NLS 87-129 3 p	06/13/66	A
#75 memo	to President from Rostow sanitized 2-2-89 NLS 87-131 secret open 6-10-95 NLS 93-126 1 p	06/13/66	A
#76a letter	to President Arturo Illia from Pres. Johnson possible classified info open 2-3-89 NLS 87-130 2 p	06/13/66	A
#81 memo	to President from W. G. Bowdler re: Guatemala secret sanitized 2-3-89 NLS 87-130 sanitized 1 p san per BAC - more released 12/3/09	06/13/66	A
#81b message	for Amb. Mein re: Guatemala open 2-3-89 NLS 87-130 secret 1 p	undated	A
#82 memo [dup #2a, Subj. File, "Nuc. Weapons, Italy vol. 1," Box 34]	to President from Rostow secret - Exempt NLS 87-130 1 p sanitized 1-29-01 NLS 98-330 same sanitization 12-10-08 NLS 06-3 (#2a)	06/11/66	A
#82a memo [dup #2a, as above]	to President from Rostow same sanitization 12-10-08 NLS 06-3 (#2a) secret - sanitized 1-29-01 NLS 98-330 1 p	06/10/66-	A
#82b memo [dup #2, as above]	to Deputy Sec. Dept. of Defense from Rostow same sanitization 12-10-08 NLS 06-3 (#2) secret - sanitized 1-29-01 NLS 98-330 1 p	06/13/66	A
#82c memo [dup #2c, Subj. File, "Nuc. Weapons Italy vol. 1, Box 34]	to President from Cyrus Vance same sanitization 12-10-08 NLS 06-4 and NLS 98-331 secret sanitized 10-12-99 NLS 98-331 2 p	06/08/66	A
#83 memo	to President from Rostow open 7/2/98 Confidential re: Freeman's report on his Mexican trip confidential Exempt NLS 87-130 1 p	06/11/66	A
#83a memo	to President from Freeman re: Mexican trip open 5-7-87 NLS 87-132 possible classified info 4 p	06/08/66	A
#84 memo	to President from Rostow re: Mrs. Gandhi confidential open 2-2-89 NLS 87-131 4 p	06/11/66	A
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#84a memo	to President from David Bell re: India confidential <i>open 4-13-87</i>	4 p 06/10/66	A
#84b memo	to President from Charles Schultze confidential <i>open 6-22-88 NLJ 87-127</i>	2 p 06/11/66	A
#85a memo	re: Policy Planning secret <i>open 4-18-90 NLJ 90-66</i>	2 p 06/10/66	A
#87a memo	to President from Bator re: speech to Austrian Delegation secret <i>open 2-2-89 NLJ 87-131</i>	4 p 06/11/66	A

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Monday, June 20, 1966; 5:45 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Possible Meeting with Senator Church

As you know, Church's preoccupation is with policy toward deGaulle-- specifically, that the Administration is alienating France and losing leadership in Europe by (1) over-reacting to deGaulle's thrusts, and (2) failing to provide for the evolution of NATO in response to changes in the climate of European opinion. A copy of the letter he sent to you after his return from his European tour is at Tab A.

You might begin with the same sort of review of the European situation which you gave the European correspondents last Thursday (copy of our briefing memorandum at Tab B). Church should particularly appreciate (1) the Administration's constructive approach to progressive change in NATO and other common institutions, (2) the calmness and civility of your attitude toward deGaulle, and (3) your repeated efforts to widen political and economic windows to the East -- as evidenced by your speeches to the Poles and Austrians.

Beyond these generalities, you may wish to discuss the following specific issues with the Senator:

1. Further steps to improve the East-West atmosphere and demonstrate U.S. receptiveness to European change. You may wish to talk with him -- on the basis of strict confidence -- about the proposals now before you -- an East-West Institute for Management Administration, Export-Import Bank credit guarantees for the countries of Eastern Europe which are not yet eligible for them, and OECD working associations with Eastern Europe (copy of explanatory memorandum at Tab C).
2. Timing of Major European Policy Speech -- There is general agreement among your advisors that you should make such a speech; the question is when it will do the most good. State will probably favor Labor Day (not too soon after deGaulle's return from Moscow nor during the August holidays in Europe). Church may have insights and will be flattered to have been asked.
3. Ways of Accelerating the Kennedy Round -- Church may have ideas on this area which would be helpful for us. More important, he may have a feel for the legislative prospects in the Senate if -- as looks likely -- we have to go for a renewal of the TEA or other major trade legislation next year.
4. The Legislative Prospects for the AID Bill -- Church generally has good instincts in this area, but isn't much interested. It might be of marginal help on the Floor if the evils of (1) the mandatory rise in AID interest rates from 2-1/2 to 3%, (2) the ten-country limitation development loans outside Latin America and (3) the forty-country limitation on supporting assistance are pointed out and explained.

June 20, 1966
Monday, 5:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the first readouts on the
Ronning trip:

1. Martin, without revealing any substance, is trying to keep us hemmed in on the grounds that the channel is "still open."
2. On U.S. prisoners in North Vietnam, Hanoi ~~seems~~ somewhat more legalistic than bloodthirsty.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ Attachments

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

2a
June 20, 1966

FROM OTTAWA (1722)

1. The Deputy Chief of Mission and Kreisberg saw Foreign Minister Martin this morning. Ronning has now arrived in Ottawa but has not discussed his trip with Martin and Martin declined comment on the substance of Ronning Mission until he had had an opportunity to fully discuss it with Ronning first. It was agreed that a meeting between Ronning and Kreisberg would be arranged if possible for later today or tomorrow morning.
2. Martin said his primary reason for wanting to see Kreisberg first was to emphasize his grave concern that any escalation in military action in Vietnam by the U.S. in the immediate future would jeopardize Canadian good faith with Hanoi and make it appear the U.S. used Ronning as a means of obtaining negative readout on negotiations which would justify escalation.
3. Martin repeated several times that the Ronning channel to Hanoi definitely is still open and Canadians hoped the U.S. would take no move which would close it.
4. Martin expressed concern at press stories claiming that the Ronning Mission was unsuccessful. He hoped the U.S. would avoid any public comment reflecting on the outcome of Ronning trip.
5. Kreisberg told Martin he was unable to comment on U.S. operational military plans but strongly doubted significant escalation such as blockading of Haiphong or bombing of civilian populations was under consideration.
6. The results of Ronning Mission relating to Prisoners of War is being sent to the Department by separate telegram.

SCOTT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-332

By CB, NARA Date 9-27-99

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

~~SECRET~~ -- EXDIS

June 20, 1966

TO SEC STATE FROM SCOTT, OTTAWA

We have just received following text of report on Ronning mission re POWs. If we can get any elaboration, will forward by separate telegram.

"Operation Smallbridge -- Treatment of Prisoners as by June 16 was apparent we would be having only one more formal session with DRVN on the main issue, which should not be complicated by the prisoner of war question, Ronning raised the latter during a visit made on Vice Foreign Minister Thach on our initiative, and spoke along the lines of paragraph 4 of the enclosure to your letter of May 20.

"Thach replied as follows: 'The consistent position of our government is that American pilots who carried out bombing of North Vietnam are considered as criminal to a high degree. They will be punished according to the law of DRVN. As to the treatment given them, we give them humane treatment. These American pilots came here and sowed destruction on medical establishments, schools, hospitals, populated areas, irrigation works; they dropped phosphorous bombs. Their crimes must be punished. This has nothing to do with the ICRC. We have repeatedly made known this position and it has been made known to the Americans through many intermediaries. Americans have requested a number of countries to raise this question with us. We have made known our position to them. Pilots are treated very humanely, although they have committed great crimes. But once they are in our hands we assure them good treatment. However, they must be punished.'

"Ronning responded as follows: 'It will be appreciated that you give this assurance of good treatment. If, in the course of time, arrangements could be made through your own Red Cross for letters and parcels -- families would be greatly comforted if they could exchange letters.' Thach: 'So far this question of letters and parcels has been dealt with by tribunals (courts). The regulations require this, there are regulations covering the sending of letters.' Ronning: 'And to receive the query.' Thach: 'I believe so.' Ronning: 'And the address -- should they be addressed to the Tribunal?' Thach: 'I will let you know later. I emphasize again our policy in general is one of humane treatment for the pilots.'

"This morning at the airport, Le Tan of the Foreign Ministry North American Dept. gave Ronning, as promised, the address for prisoners of war mail: Camp for U. S. A. Pilots Captured in Democratic Republic of Vietnam, c/o General Post Office, Hanoi, DRVN.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 98-332

~~SECRET~~By CB, NARA Date 9-27-99

~~SECRET~~

From Scott, Ottawa

-2-

"To Ronning's question whether parcels as well as letters could be sent, Le Tan said this was still not certain, but he would let us know; we then questioned him as to the point of mailing. He replied that while the DRVN does not have a postal agreement with the USA it has with many countries. He could not confirm whether this is the case for France (we know it used to be so), but undertook to give us this information also. We then suggested Vientiane, noting that of course its only connection with Hanoi is by ICSC courier aircraft, and then sounded him out on the possibility of the Canadian Delegation address being used. I emphasized that I had no indication of my government thinking of this, but in practical terms such letters c/o the Commissioner could travel from Saigon with our normal shipments. He knew of no objection from DRVN point of view off-hand, but promised to check, and I said I would do the same with you.

"In the past two days there has been a movement afoot in Hanoi to organize meetings to discuss what should be done with the pilots, and one of this morning's newspapers carried headline 'People Demand Punishment of Criminals.' It is possible that an 'example' will be made of some of the pilots, but I am inclined to the hopeful thought that, despite the hate-filled anti-American atmosphere, the DRVN may be content simply to satisfy their legal processes with more moderate sentences.

"I asked Maclellan to give Swank in Vientiane the Hanoi address."

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 20, 1966
5:00 p. m.

John M. Kirtland

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft reply to General
Lauris Norstad.

W. W. Rostow

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, June 20, 1966, 1:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting on NATO and Constructive
Initiatives in Europe

Secretary Rusk has asked for a working meeting with
you (with McNamara, Ball, Acheson, et al) on NATO and
constructive initiatives in Europe. The Secretary has proposed
Thursday. Jim Jones tells me that, if you approve, 1:15 p.m.
looks clear.


Francis M. Bator 

Approve Thursday, 1:15 p.m. ☒

Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐

Monday, June 20, 19
1:00 p. m.

5
P

MR. PRESIDENT

Just so you don't think that it's
just me -- and now Scotty Reston --
who has developed some temperate
optimism about Asia, I commend to
you the attached U. S. News & World
Report article.

W. W. Rostow

WHERE U. S. STANDS IN ASIA

—A FIRST-HAND REPORT

Is the tide running against the U. S. all through Asia?

What is Vietnam doing to America's standing? Is Red China the "wave of the future"?

Robert P. Martin, an Associate Director of the International Staff of "U. S. News & World Report," has spent more than a quarter of a century as a newsman in Asia. He knows the people and most of their leaders.

Mr. Martin has just completed another of his wide-ranging tours of Asia. In this interview by colleagues on the magazine's news staff, he reports on significant changes of the past year that go far beyond Vietnam.



In Asia, "we have some very definite gains—gains you can measure"

Q You've just made another wide swing through Asia, around the rim of Red China. What is your over-all impression of that part of the world now?

A I'm much more optimistic about the future of Asia than I was when I left there a year ago.

When you go into a country you think to yourself: "Well, they still have the same problems as always—too many people, not enough food, disorganized governments, unable to govern themselves."

But then, as you move from country to country, you find a pattern developing in Asia. There have been a number of improvements. Take Thailand as just one example: There's been tremendous economic growth there, and people are much more conscious of their Government. They're working very closely with the United States, too.

Q Are there any signs of developing co-operation among the Asian countries?

A There's a lot more interest in this now than there was a few years ago. Asians are beginning to realize a lot can be gained from regional co-operation.

Just the other day, on June 14, representatives of nine Asian and Pacific governments, many of them Foreign Ministers, met in Seoul, Korea. They weren't talking in terms of a military alliance, or even of an anti-Communist organization. What they were talking about was the need for closer economic, political and cultural relations among the non-Communist Asian countries.

India wasn't represented. Neither was Indonesia. But it was a start toward regional understanding and co-operation—something that has been missing in Asia.

Q Does your optimism about Asia extend to South Vietnam, too?

A I'm a little bit more optimistic, in my own measurement of the situation, than I was when I left Washington last winter. As you know, I've been in Vietnam many times during all the years of war—since 1953 until now. I'd say I'm a tiny bit more optimistic—or, rather, less pessimistic—than I was.

Q Why?

A There are a good many reasons. One is the situation in the Mekong Delta, where a majority of the people live. The Vietnamese Army has been doing very, very well there for months and months. There are now areas in the Delta that you can drive through safely in the daytime. A year ago, you couldn't drive anywhere outside of Saigon.

Q When you say you're optimistic, do you mean you're optimistic about not losing the war, or do you mean there's a chance of winning it?

A I'd say that there is a chance—a very good chance—that Communist North Vietnam will become convinced—within, say, the next two years—that they cannot win, and there will be a drop-off in their effort.

I don't think even now they think they can win, militarily. But they believe that the United States can be forced to withdraw. They think we're going to throw in the sponge and quit.

When they become convinced that the Americans are not

... "We now have the initiative everywhere in Vietnam"

going to pull out, and convinced that the war cannot be won by them the way it's being fought, then I think there is a very good chance that they will voluntarily slacken off their effort.

Q How can they be convinced?

A It's a cumulative effect—in the North, for instance, the constant churning up of highways and bridges. Even though, admittedly, they're rebuilt the next day or the next week, that takes a tremendous amount of manpower.

Remember, North Vietnam does not have inexhaustible resources. There's a limit to what they can expend.

Here's an example: There was an action recently where we overran a Communist installation. There weren't many casualties on either side, because very little contact was made. But we wiped out a fantastic amount of stores that we uncovered—rice, medical supplies, ammunition, two or three hospitals, sheet metal. This, to me, is more important than going out in battalion strength and clobbering them by taking our own casualties.

Every time we wipe out one of these base areas we really are cutting into the muscle of their fighting forces.

Incidentally, you have to remember that, in general, we now have the initiative everywhere in Vietnam—on the ground, and, of course, we have total control of the air.

The North Vietnamese have their problems—probably as many as we have—or more. The North Vietnamese, when he moves South, is no more welcome to the South Vietnamese than the Americans are. He's an outsider, and the villagers don't like outsiders. It is very difficult for the Northerners to go into a village and organize a resistance.

And I go back to my first point: North Vietnam does not have inexhaustible resources. I'm not going to be surprised if, at some point, Hanoi decides that the war isn't worth the price, and pulls back.

SAIGON'S TANGLED POLITICS—

Q What about the political situation?

A Here I hesitate to make predictions. The ruling power obviously is going to continue to be the military, but, if they give other elements the feeling of being able to participate in the Government, it will relieve a lot of pressure.

Q Do you mean pressure from the Buddhists?

A The Buddhists are much more badly split than I would have thought possible. Even in a place like Hue, you'll find at least three different groups of Buddhists.

One group is very anti-Communist, wants the Americans to stay, wants to get on with the war.

A second group says, in effect: "We don't like Saigon. We'd rather have a separatist Government up here, and maybe we can make some kind of arrangements with the Viet Cong so that they'll leave us alone."

The third group, which I'm inclined to believe includes Tri Quang, is very definitely pro-Viet Cong.

Q Is Tri Quang a Communist?

A No, I don't think he's a Communist, but he certainly is leaning more and more in that direction, and he is perfectly willing to take advantage of everything that he thinks the Viet Cong can do for him. They even made some of the banners used in Buddhist demonstrations.

Q How serious are these anti-American demonstrations that we hear so much about?

A It seems to me that many of the stories and a large number of the headlines in the papers here at home are misleading. You read about "political turmoil" and "mob vio-

lence" and "bloodletting" in the streets of Saigon—but it just simply is not true.

They have big demonstrations, sure, and a few stones get thrown by these young delinquents who have been recruited by the Buddhists—and some of them are paid to demonstrate—but you can travel through vast areas of Saigon and never see any excitement at all.


Q Do you get any clear impression, traveling around Asia, as to how much influence the Chinese Communists have over this whole operation in Vietnam?

A It's very clear from the propaganda you read that North Vietnam is following exactly the same line Peiping is following—that this is a "war of national liberation" and that the Communists are trying to "liberate" the South from the "imperialists"—meaning the U. S.

If there were any real division between North Vietnam and China, I think you could spot it very quickly in the propaganda.

Q Is there a feeling that China might jump into the war?

A No, not at all. I found that feeling nowhere in Asia.



—UPI Photo

In the Mekong Delta, "where a majority of the people live, there are now areas you can drive through safely in daytime"

They would not jump in unless the United States actually invaded North Vietnam.

Q Then why does everybody seem to be afraid of China?

A By our standards, China is not a military power at all. But she is big, has a lot of people. And she has a history of dominating Asia—not necessarily conquering it, but dominating it.

Most people do fear Chinese aggression and aggrandizement.

Q Do the Asians regard Communist China as "the wave of the future"?

A No—not at all.

That's a very significant change. There was a time when they did. I would say from 1955 to 1959 most Asians thought the Chinese Communists had the answer to the problems of fast industrialization, of the intensive mobilization of manpower, of discipline at home.

The Chinese ideas were admired all over Asia during that period. The Indians used to say: "Boy, if we could only organize ourselves the way the Chinese have, we'd lick our problems."

Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia and Sukarno of Indonesia would visit Peiping and come home and say: "We've got to pull our country together and really make it work, the

... "Our image in Asia is better now than 10 years ago"

way the Chinese Communists are doing." But you don't hear that any more. It's all changed.

Q What caused the turn?

A Many factors. I'd say the Vietnamese war is one—the refusal or inability of the Chinese to prevent North Vietnam from being bombed.

Then there was the inability of the Chinese to support successfully a Communist uprising in Indonesia.

Another factor is that the new countries of Africa have rejected China. The Asians know that.

They also know that China is going through great convulsions at home right now. They're mostly political, but there are other troubles. Industry is getting a little better, but not much. Living standards may be a little better than they were in 1960, '61 and '62, but they're not as good as they were prior to the Japanese invasion in 1937.

Relative to its population growth, China may even be dropping back a bit. The Communists no longer show any example of rapid industrialization to awe the rest of Asia. The Chinese themselves don't even bring this up any more.

Take India: I'd say that India, right now, is far less afraid of China than it was four years ago, when China first invaded it.

Q Why is that?

A Emotionally, because the Indians did so well in that short, hot war with Pakistan. It restored their confidence in their military.

Another thing is an almost built-in feeling on the part of the Indians—which may or may not be right—that the United States will come to their support if the Chinese start anything.

The United States has been very important in this changed attitude toward China. The way the U. S. stood up to Communist power in Vietnam has been very important—that, plus the setbacks the Chinese have suffered all around the world.

What occurred in Indonesia really raised morale throughout Asia. People now realize that Communism isn't necessarily the wave of the future. And I think that what happened in Indonesia might never have happened if it hadn't been for the firm U. S. stand in Vietnam.

IGNORING CHINA'S A-BOMB—

Q What about China's A-bomb—doesn't that scare people?

A It hasn't had the effect I thought it would. I thought there would be a tremendous political fallout when the Chinese exploded their first bomb, but now nobody seems to care.

I don't know whether it's because atomic weapons have not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or whether it's because everybody just sort of figures, "Well, the Chinese were bound to get the bomb sooner or later, so why worry about it?"

Q Is this disillusionment with Red China a gain for the U. S., or aren't the two related? Do we have any real friends in Asia?

A I suppose in diplomacy you never have friends.

Q Not diplomacy—among the people. Are they friendly to the United States?

A Oh, yes! The Americans have a tremendous reservoir of good will and understanding among the Asians. We're not as bad as we're often painted by reports from there.

They're still suspicious of whites, of Western exploitation, but the white man as an individual is accepted. I'm sure

that Americans have a greater reservoir of good feeling than the Chinese have.

Despite the things that we're accused of, despite the bombing of North Vietnam, I think in general our image in Asia is better now than it was 10 years ago.

You know, anti-American actions can be stirred up anywhere. But, in the long haul, it really doesn't mean very much.

We have some very definite gains—gains you can measure.

We've got a definite plus in Indonesia. We're not going to end up playing the dominant role there, but on this trip it was fascinating to find Indonesians willing to talk to you instead of spitting at you. There have been a large number of applications made at the American Embassy there by Indonesians who want to come to this country to study.

I think a great deal of this false anti-Americanism that was built up under Sukarno is going to fade away very fast, provided the Government out there gets busy and does something for the people.

On the other hand, if it just coasts and does nothing to help people realize their aspirations, then there's going to be trouble. Like most Asians, the Indonesians would like to have a bit more to eat, they'd like a few more clothes to wear, and they want a better educational system.

Q What does Indonesia need, above all?

A Technicians. I don't mean just a matter of somebody to run a factory. They have to have more of their own technical people within their administrative structure. They need people who can make a bureaucracy function.

They can get guidance from outside, I suppose, but this business of getting technically trained people is something the Indonesians have to do for themselves.

Q What are the Indonesians going to do about Sukarno?

A They're going to keep him just about the way he is—rather isolated, not making a lot of public speeches. They will keep him as a sort of father image, as a symbol of unity. But I don't think he's going to remain President for life.

Q You said there were several gains for U.S. in Asia—

A Yes. Take India, as an example: Just recently Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has made two very courageous decisions: first, the devaluation of the rupee; second, a contract with an American oil company to build a 37-million-dollar fertilizer factory.

Both of these were opposed by the socialist politicians within the Congress Party, and it took a lot of courage on her part. Why did she do it? I think that she has made up her mind that India has to work with the United States, does have to work with the West, and has to slow down on socialist planning so as to allow the private sector—Indian as well as foreign—a chance to work.

I say that this is a plus for the United States in the sense that it brings a greater rationale to India's economy—to her economic development.

HOW JAPAN IS CHANGING—

Q Where does Japan fit into the whole Asian picture? Is there a chance Japan will take on more responsibilities in that part of the world?

A Not until there is peace. Japan is not going to take over the policing of any area of Asia.

Economically, I think they're moving away from their old concept of, "We give aid only when it helps build our commercial exports," and so on. There seems to be an increasing trend inside Japan toward foreign investment and providing capital equipment that will help the country to


... "I will not be surprised if Hanoi decides to call it quits"

which it goes, rather than just increase Japan's trade. For instance, in agricultural research they've gone into India, established model farms, and tried to show the Indians how they can increase agricultural output. They've put in some light industry. They've been training Indian technicians.

I think, though, that Indonesia is the place that the Japanese really want to get into, and they're willing to do it in a way that will help Indonesia, not just Japan.

Q Getting closer to the war, you started to say something earlier about Thailand—

A The Thai are working closely with us. They realize that, to a great extent, their survival depends upon what happens in Vietnam. They're backing us in Vietnam to the extent of permitting military activity from their territory against the Communists in Vietnam. Very few countries would be willing to do that. A good many of our air raids against North Vietnam are mounted from Thai bases. A



—Pix Photo

Ho Chi Minh and his people feel the strain of war, "have as many problems as we—probably more"

smaller number of the raids against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos come from Thailand.

Without the backup bases in Thailand, we wouldn't be able to rescue shot-down pilots in North Vietnam. Many of the rescues are made by helicopters that hop from Thailand into Laos and then into North Vietnam, pick up the downed pilot and bring him out. We couldn't do this from South Vietnam.

We have a sizable air force in Thailand—fighter bombers, primarily. There also are about 20,000 U.S. servicemen there—Air Force, Engineers, and so on—no combat-infantry units that I know of.

Q Is Laos helping us at all?

A Absolutely. Considering the size of their armed forces, they're doing a great job against the Pathet Lao Communists, and they're holding the part of Laos that we have to have.

They don't have the military strength on the ground to be able to overrun the Ho Chi Minh Trail, because it is guarded by North Vietnamese, and the North Vietnamese have too much muscle in there for the Laotians to do very much.

Q What about Cambodia?

A Prince Sihanouk is helping the Communists, not us. I think it goes to a basic feeling on his part—a feeling that the Vietnamese Communists are going to win, and he wants to be on the winning side.

Cambodia's sales of rice to the Viet Cong were obviously a political decision taken by Sihanouk to help the Communists. He's trying to adjust to a Communist victory before it actually happens.

There's a Communist military build-up inside Cambodia. Some of our best-informed generals in Vietnam believe that there are five or six regiments of North Vietnamese troops inside Cambodia.

Q Could the U. S. go in and blow them up?

A Sure.

Q Why don't we?

A I guess we don't want another war in that part of the world right now. One at a time probably is enough.

Q Did you get to Singapore this trip?

A Yes. Singapore struck me as being prosperous, forward-looking. If it can ever get a return of trade with Indonesia, it is really going to move ahead. They have probably the best public housing program in all of Asia. They're getting new industries. There's a lot of Taiwan capital and Hong Kong capital going into Singapore—mostly into light industries.

Q Is Malaysia moving into big development?

A Oh, yes. Malaysia should, if it's left free of interference from outside, be one of the faster-developing countries in Southeast Asia. They've got tremendous natural resources.

The country has problems, of course, such as the hostility between the Malays and the Chinese who live there. People in the Borneo states, Sabah and Sarawak, also feel they are not being given a fair break on self-rule, or a fair share of development funds.

Once this so-called "confrontation" with Indonesia ends—remember, it hasn't officially ended yet—Malaysia should be able to move ahead with good stride.

"CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC"—

Q Over all, then, you're not too depressed about the outlook in Asia—

A Let's say I'm cautiously optimistic about the changes out there from a year or so ago.

Of course, there are unhappy situations—I mentioned Cambodia as one example.

And take Burma: I found Rangoon badly run down from what it has been. Burma is a curious country. It seems to want to isolate itself from everybody—from the West, from the Soviet Union. I mean, isolate themselves politically. They do want trade. But, otherwise, they're trying to quarantine themselves from the quarrels of the world.

Discounting those few exceptions, however, I am not downhearted about trends in Asia—not even about the war in Vietnam, although I know it is a very frustrating and annoying situation for many Americans, to put it mildly.

But I really mean it when I say the North Vietnam Communists have as many problems in that war as we have.

They probably have more, because the war effort isn't the strain on us that it is on them. It is much more costly for them.

That is why I say that I will not be surprised if, at some point in the future, the Communists in Hanoi become convinced that we mean to stay in there for as long as it takes, and they'll just decide to call it quits for the time being.

Mr. Rostow 6

Delivered to Jim Jones about 6:30 by Ned Sanders

~~SECRET~~

June 20, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Our goal with Faisal is to persuade him not to break with Nasser and split the Middle East. We also want him to feel you are his friend without thinking he has a blank check to pick a fight with Nasser. Suggested talking points:

1. You would like to outline your views on the Middle East and then hear his. You will be frank and hope he will.

--You assume Nasser is Faisal's most immediate concern. You have problems with him too. You are discouraged with trying to get closer to him, but you want to keep the door open.

--You share his concern over Communist penetration, and you know how Moscow exploits local nationalists like Nasser.

--Our goal is to keep Moscow from splitting the Middle East into radical and moderate camps. Slamming the door on Nasser would help only the Soviets. A Yemen settlement would thwart them.

--Economic and social progress is the best check on Communism. You are making our own reform programs the base for a worldwide attack on poverty, illiteracy and disease.

2. You would like to hear Faisal's views--on the widening Middle East split, Yemen mediation, and social and economic progress.

3. You would like to hear how Faisal plans to fill the gap the British will leave in South Arabia and the Persian Gulf. (I hope you can get Faisal excited about cooperating with his moderate neighbors, either through the World Bank, the UN, or an Arab Development Bank. You can cite how we push the Asian Development Bank, Mekong Valley development, the Ganges-Brahmaputra River projects.)

4. You want to reiterate our support for Saudi Arabia's integrity. If he asks exactly what we would do if Nasser attacked him, your best answer is that we do not think either of us should be committed in advance to any specific course. But we will not let Saudia Arabia get swallowed up.

For flavor, I am attaching a short summary by our Ambassador, Herman Eilts. You might also want to review State's fuller talking points.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-131

By ing, NARA, Date 1-31-89

~~SECRET~~

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

King Faisal's Visit

The King is reserved and modest, but proud. A devout Muslim and conservative, he has much natural wisdom. He believes in evolutionary progress. He is sensitive with an occasional streak of stubbornness. He is pro-American and a great admirer of the President. He has long wanted to meet the President. Now, with the moment at hand, he is slightly apprehensive that he may be rebuffed or be unable adequately to convey his concerns. These are the growth of Communism in the Near East, Nasser (whom he equates with Communism), Yemen, and the security of Saudi Arabia. We share a considerable community of interest on all these points, but do not entirely see them as the King does.

In talks with him, it may be helpful to know that he reacts positively to warmth, candor and confidence. A good way to get him to unbend is to ask his views. He usually gives them frankly, even in dissent. Where he agrees, his word is his bond.

Somewhat greater flexibility on Yemen would be helpful on his part. The President may wish to ask him about the Kuwaiti mediation effort, and impress on him our interest in an honorable settlement for all. He has moved ahead on internal reform, but should be encouraged to do more. The subject is sensitive. A good approach would be for the President to tell him of our own efforts in areas of social reform, such as civil rights, etc., then casually ask him how his program is progressing. He, too, has his domestic obstacles, and sympathetic appreciation of them will show our continued interest and spur him on.

Above all, the King is a good friend. He would like to be reassured that his friendship is appreciated. Our ability to continue to influence him constructively in the months ahead, including in matters where we reap tangible benefits, will depend in part on whether we can make him feel that, despite certain differences of emphasis, our friendship for Saudi Arabia is real, that we appreciate his problems and, that he can count on us to give appropriate help to try to solve them.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-131
By ing, NARA, Date 1-31-89

swsf

Monday, June 20, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from President Schick

President Schick has sent you a telegram expressing appreciation for your hospitality (Tab A).

A brief acknowledgement is in order. A suggested message to be delivered through Ambassador Brown is at Tab B.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

7a

Official Translation of Telegram to the President from President Schick
of Nicaragua in Miami Beach, Florida, June 11, 1966

The President,

The White House.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-130
By ig, NARA, Date 2-1-89

Upon leaving your great country to return to mine after a trip of study, friendship, and good will through several countries in three continents, allow me to express again my gratitude for the many courtesies which Your Excellency and the gracious Mrs. Johnson extended to my party and to me during our unforgettable visit to Washington. I consider it an honor to have been the guest of your government, and it is my hope that the personal friendship with Your Excellency so happily begun at a historic moment in our hemisphere will long endure. I am firmly convinced that our meeting will strengthen the traditional ties between our two countries in a genuine spirit of ideological and political solidarity.

I avail myself of this opportunity to assure Your Excellency again of the constant support by the people and the Government of Nicaragua of the common cause of democracy and peace which the United States defends as the leader of the free world.

On such a propitious occasion, I express wishes for the increasing prosperity of the American people and I beg Your Excellency to accept, with my sincere and cordial greeting, the assurance of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

Rene Schick, President of Nicaragua

**SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SCHICK
OF NICARAGUA**

His Excellency

Dr. Rene Schick Gutierrez

President of the Republic of Nicaragua

Managua.

Thank you for your message. I agree that our meeting strengthened the close and friendly relations between our two countries. It was a pleasure to know you personally, and I wish you every success as you continue your efforts to bring a larger measure of progress and prosperity to the Nicaraguan people.

Lyndon B. Johnson

June 20, 1966

Dear Dr. Wexler:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing satisfaction with our efforts to sustain peace in the Middle East. Decisions on arms sales are among the most difficult we have to make. We would all be better off if none of this were necessary.

Sincerely,

/s/

LBJ

Dr. William A. Wexler
President, B'nai B'rith
1640 Rhode Island Avenue, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20036

LBJ:WHW:lw

susp.

Saturday, June 18, 1966
10:50 a. m.

Mr. President:

Attached is a draft letter for
your signature, to Dr. Wexler,
President of B'nai B'rith.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

June 11, 1966

To Mr. Wriggins

For draft reply for the President's
signature, with covering memo
for Rostow to initial.

Bromley Smith

Ltr from Dr. William A. Wexler
to the President, dated 6/2/66
re sale of military aircraft to Israel.

9

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 20, 1966

Dear Ken:

Thank you for sending along the full text of your Commencement Address of June 11 at Rhode Island College.

The fact is that we know with certainty the extent to which a great many governments are counting on us to defeat the aggression against South Viet Nam. There is a much wider appreciation than your talk would suggest that the security of many nations in the world depends on our achieving an honorable peace based on the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords. It is a quite different thing for these governments to say this as bluntly in public as they do in private. And it is still another matter for them to put forces into the engagement.

As I said in my talk on Memorial Day, it is not difficult to understand why here and abroad there is some confusion about Viet Nam. The external character of the aggression is concealed as much as possible; and, simultaneously with the war, the people of South Viet Nam are taking their first steps on the difficult road to constitutional government.

Nevertheless, I am sure that, if you were now working day after day within the government, you would see from hard evidence that what I say is true: a great many governments in Asia and elsewhere understand fully that their security would be in danger if we were to fail to frustrate the purposeful aggression of Hanoi against South Viet Nam.

I am also a little puzzled by your cryptic comment about our support of democracy in Viet Nam. The Vietnamese made clear at Honolulu that they were not asking our support for an individual. Their portion of the Declaration stated: "We are a government -- indeed a generation. . . ." On my return to the United States, I echoed that view: we are supporting a government and a revolutionary generation.


As a student of developing nations, you will understand better than most that transition to constitutional government in a country like South Viet Nam does not take place overnight and that it is not easy. Between 1961 and the present, we have seen great progress in this direction in South Korea. It may be more difficult in South Viet Nam. But I do believe that the Directorate, now expanded with civilians, is in deadly earnest in trying to make that transition in South Viet Nam.

I expect there will be further political ferment, as is inevitable in the circumstances. But I would wish you to know that their effort and the effort of the representative group which has been drafting rules for the election of the constituent assembly have my respect.

I believe if you were in a position to follow this process as carefully as I must, you would come to the same conclusion.

Again, many thanks, as always, for taking the trouble to make your thoughts available to me.

Sincerely,



P.S. And did I misread your admonition
to just talking about Viet Nam and
The Honorable John Kenneth Galbraith
Harvard University
Cambridge,
Massachusetts

discuss the forces of the great Society?
Then why don't we?
==

(cc: Bill Hoyer.)

10

68

Monday, June 20, 1966
12:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith proposed draft reply to Ken
Galbraith.

I tried to make it responsive and firm
without losing him wholly.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

June 20, 1966

Dear Ken:

Thank you for sending along the full text of your Commencement Address of June 11 at Rhode Island College.

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I believe if you were in a position to follow this process as carefully as I must, you would come to the same conclusion.

Again, many thanks, as always, for taking the trouble to make your thoughts available to me.

Sincerely,

LBJ

The Honorable John Kenneth Galbraith
Harvard University
Cambridge,
Massachusetts

LBJ:WWR:mz

Pres file

Sunday, June 19, 1966
7:35 p. m.

Mr. President:

I did a first draft early this afternoon.

Abe and Clark have gone over it carefully. I have incorporated their suggestions and am sending this second draft out to them for another crack. They will report their further suggestions tomorrow morning.

They both believe the time has come for you to make such a speech.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, June 18, 1966 -- 11:00 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Timing of the Marcos Visit

Now that the Philippine bill for aid to Vietnam has been enacted, we need your guidance on the timing of a state visit by President Marcos.

In State's view the two best dates would be late August (August 30 through September 1 in Washington) or next January. (The autumn is ruled out because of Marcos' strong desire to address a joint session of Congress.)

Because of the problems any Philippine President faces in coming to the U. S. -- the need to return home with tangible results -- State and Bill Blair would somewhat prefer the January date. By that time we will have a clearer picture of Philippine needs for economic aid, and we could probably be more forthcoming on some thorny bilateral issues (notably civil air). In addition, a late August visit would come just before the scheduled Ne Win visit (September 8-9).

On the other hand, there are obvious advantages in bringing to Washington this summer an articulate Asian leader who supports us in Vietnam.

Have you a strong preference?

W. W. Rostow

August ✓
January _____
See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-131
By ig, NARA, Date 1-31-89

JCT:WWR:rln

~~SECRET~~

[Handwritten signature]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, June 18, 1966 -- 3:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

I gather indirectly that you have either set aside the idea of a gift of books for King Faisal or disapproved certain of those chosen by Mr. Goldman.

I have before me a copy of Mr. Goldman's memorandum to you of June 17.

Setting aside the fact that the list contains the names of three of our great supporters -- J. K. Galbraith, A. Schlesinger, Jr., and Ted Sorensen -- the books chosen seem to me well balanced, representative, and a distinct contribution to the new University of Riyadh. In fact, there is no harm in including Ken's Great Crash and Schlesinger on Jackson.

You may also wish to know that these have been rounded up with the cooperation of publishers who were approached in confidence and responded promptly. Some sent their books by air mail.

We may have some embarrassment -- and, even, press stories -- if we now cancel the whole enterprise and send back the books.

I am attaching the list of books without the benefit of Mr. Goldman's memorandum. I would suggest you take one last look at the list before we abandon the enterprise.

W. W. Rostow

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING, CANCELLED F.R.E.O. 12355, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 16, 1983.

Forget it _____

Go forward with the book-list as amended _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY DCat ON 8-29-85

June 18, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR

Robert Kintner and Walt Rostow

Here is the memo to which I referred on the phone about the gift of books for King Faisal.

The state of things, as I understand it, is this: The President previously approved the book gift. He has now told Juanita that he disapproves it.

Most of the books have been called in from publishers and some are physically here. The publishers were approached in confidence but I doubt whether all of them will keep the confidence if the project is abandoned.

I would appreciate getting the final decision as soon as possible.



Eric F. Goldman

Attachment

Friday, June 17, 1966
6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

This memorandum concerns the suggested list of books to be presented by you to King Faisal. The total list is attached.

The list consists of two parts:

Part A. Books of U. S. history or biography. These books have been selected by me in consultation with three distinguished and sensible historians -- Professors John Morton Blum, of Yale; David Donald, of Johns Hopkins; and Richard Morris, of Columbia. I send this section (pp. 1-7 of the list) to you with the thought that you might want to take a look at it, or at least pass on one group of books which it includes.

That group concerns books involved with President Kennedy. There are four on the list:

John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash, 1929

John F. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson

Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy

The Galbraith book is on the list because he is an outstanding American writer and is well known in the Near East, and because this particular book is an excellent study of the crash of 1929. However, the volume could probably be omitted without criticism because Galbraith is an economist and not essentially a historian or biographer.

President Kennedy's book, Profiles in Courage, is included for the obvious reasons that it is by him and it is a Pulitzer Prize winner in biography.

With respect to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., I have assumed that he should be represented on the list because he is a leading American historian. Since the principle of the list is to have each author represented by only one book (except in the case of three books that are reference tools), the question then took the form: Should Schlesinger be represented by his Age of Jackson or his Thousand Days about the Kennedy Administration, both of which won a Pulitzer Prize?

To answer that, I had to adopt another premise: That the Kennedy Administration should be represented by one book about it, which means either Schlesinger or Sorenson.

My resolution of the situation was to have Schlesinger represented by his Age of Jackson and the Kennedy Administration covered by Sorenson, which in any event is the more sober and factual of the Schlesinger-Sorenson pair about the Kennedy years.

Part B. This part of the list concerns books on Near Eastern affairs by U. S. scholars. It has been prepared by Professor William Polk, a Near Eastern expert at the University of Chicago, and it is being checked by Roger Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs. I am assured by Mr. Davies that when he is finished, this list will present no problems and I do not believe that you need take time to look at it.

I also want to call your attention to another book on the list: George Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950. A book of Kennan is included because he is almost as well known abroad as a historian as he is as a diplomat and I believe the omission would be noticed. The book chosen does not comment on anything after 1950.

The Press Release. There is a possible question about the nature of the press release concerning the gifts to King Faisal.

My suggestion is that the release should not only state that the books are being given but should also include a list of the books. I believe that this would arouse considerable added interest, underline your interest in education and scholarship, and help bring you full and deserved credit for this unusual gift. Moreover, to withhold the list might raise quite unnecessary questions.

Eric F. Goldman

(Please go to Page 3)

Total list approved as it is _____

List approved with the additions or
omissions indicated _____

Press release to include list of books _____

Press release not to include list of books _____

Saturday, June 18, 1966
3:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

CIA has done this study on French involvement in Viet Nam. They haven't come up with much solid proof of direct support of the Viet Cong.

I've asked Dick Helms to dig deeper.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment
SC No. 02692/66
Copy No. 2

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15
Pres file
Saturday, June 18, 1966 -- 1:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this excellent memorandum of Tony Solomon's on the Dominican Republic.

From what I know, I personally support his concrete ideas on pages 5-7 for next steps in economic development.

I would only add that it would be useful to weave together the World Bank, Inter-American Bank, IMF and AID, increasingly as a team to give the external assistance in the DR, Alliance for Progress, rather than simply bilateral coloration. CIAP could be helpful in this respect.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-130
By ing, NARA, Date 2-1-89

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1937
15a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 17, 1966

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

You asked me for my personal evaluation of:

(1) past and recent events in the Dominican Republic as compared to our national interest objectives and

(2) where we go from here.

I.

What We Have Done

Since April 1965 we have pursued four central objectives in United States policy toward the Dominican Republic.

First Objective. With the outbreak and spread of violence in Santo Domingo in April, 1965, the United States acted to protect the lives of U. S. citizens and to evacuate those wishing to depart. The U. S. also gave protection to and evacuated the nationals of other countries.

Evaluation. Some 6,500 men, women and children from 46 different countries were evacuated without loss of life.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-332
By CB, NARA Date 9-27-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Second Objective. With the complete breakdown of all governmental authority, including the rebel Molina Urena regime, and the filling of the power vacuum by extremists dominated by trained Communists, the U. S. acted to prevent the takeover of the Dominican Republic by these extremist groups. In accomplishing this objective it was the policy of the U. S. first, to preserve the opportunity for the OAS to function and, second, to work within the framework of the OAS to permit the Dominican people to exercise self-determination.

Evaluation. The OAS, through collective action approved by the Tenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers, established the first Inter-American Peace Force (approved May 6 and organized May 23) and established, on June 2, the "Ad Hoc Committee for the Restoration of Democratic Order in the Dominican Republic".

The U. S. forces, and subsequently the IAPF forces, stopped the increasing chaos and bloodshed, primarily by separating contending forces with the "Line of Communication". This action and the work of the Ad Hoc Committee in helping the Dominicans to establish a provisional government frustrated the efforts of the Communists to seize control of the Dominican Republic by force. (At the same time this objective was being accomplished, the U. S. and the OAS did not permit control of the Dominican Republic to fall into the hands of the military or rightist groups.)

Third Objective. With the re-establishment of relative stability under Provisional Government, the U. S., within the OAS framework, worked to help bring about free and fair elections through which the will of the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

Dominican people could be expressed.

Evaluation. On June 1 elections were held and judged by competent OAS and private observers to be free and fair. Results now available show Joaquin Balaguer receiving 57.07% and Juan Bosch 39.17% of the vote. (Bonnelly received 3.41%.)

U. S. intelligence indicated in March 1965 and in the months prior to the June 1966 election that Joaquin Balaguer was overwhelmingly the choice of the Dominican people for President. This intelligence plus the decisive results of the election are conclusive evidence that the timely action of the United States permitted rather than frustrated democratic expression of the will of the Dominican people.

Fourth Objective. Beginning in the second week of the revolt, the U. S. had as a corollary objective keeping the Dominican economy afloat and preventing widespread hunger and hardship.

Evaluation. The small sector of Santo Domingo under rebel control represented the financial and commercial heart of the Dominican Republic and included the banks, major governmental offices, and important private commercial institutions. While the revolt caused an economic suspension in the Dominican Republic, the U. S., by helping to organize and finance basic civic services and by enabling the banks to open branches outside the rebel area, prevented the suspension from drifting into economic collapse. Outside of the capital city, there was a minimum disruption of economic patterns.

Hunger and extreme hardship were avoided by a large scale feeding and relief program organized by the U. S. within days after the revolt. By utilizing U. S. forces

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- 4 -

on the Line of Communication as one of the means to distribute food, the U. S. not only increased the rapidity of distribution but also dissipated much of the hostility toward the presence of U. S. troops.

During the 13-month period between the revolt and the elections the U. S. distributed directly and through voluntary agencies over \$16 million in food (final figures are not available). In other assistance, the U.S. obligated over \$118 million (excluding U. S. military expenditures) mostly used to keep the economy and the government sector afloat. About \$57 million of this was nominally administered through the OAS.

II

Where We Go From Here

You already have memoranda from Lincoln Gordon and Ellsworth Bunker which deal with the probable size of the aid program needed for next year and with the difficult question of the timing of a devaluation of the Dominican peso. Not having the operational responsibilities of Link and Ellsworth, I should like to offer some views from a different perspective without giving detailed action recommendations.

Internal Security. Central to the question of political stability in the Dominican Republic is the capability of the Dominican police and military to maintain security once the Inter-American Peace Force is withdrawn (presumably within 90 days of the July 1 inauguration). While the decisive election of Balaguer has taken some of the steam out of the extreme left, the Communists, after

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- 5 -

their baptism of fire, are better organized for violence (as opposed to political action) than ever before. They and the "tigres" still have large quantities of arms obtained during the revolt.

It is therefore a first order of business to assure that the Dominican security forces are properly equipped, trained and led. As our military forces are being withdrawn, consideration might be given to quietly leaving behind certain equipment, especially soft goods and riot control materiel, which we might find politically difficult to supply to the Dominicans at a later date.

Secondly, the Dominican Military must be modernized, professionalized and taken out of politics. The integrity of the military must not be undermined but at the same time, and important to its capability to maintain security, the military must improve its image in the eyes of the Dominican people who aspire to a reduction in both its size and role. It should be dissuaded from seeking vengeance against Bosch's PRD and other antagonists and it should be oriented away from politics and "golpista" tendencies. Over a period of time, the armed forces should be substantially reduced in number, consequently reducing the tremendous drain it represents in the Government budget.

"Sense of Progress". It is important to the maintenance of stability for the Dominican people to have a "sense of progress". They must feel that there is a year to year improvement in their economic life and believe that their children's lives will be better than their own. Given the best of circumstances, only relatively meager gains in the Dominican living standard can be achieved in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- 6 -

the next few years. Therefore, this psychological "sense of progress" can only be achieved in ways that are in addition to important but long-run economic development objectives. (The long-run objectives which can be realistically achieved in the Dominican Republic are mainly self-sufficiency in food; export competitiveness in cash crops such as sugar, fresh vegetables and produce; food processing for consumption and export; and tourism.)

Even Balaguer's economic orthodoxy probably will not overcome the apprehensions of Dominican and foreign investors to the point where private sector investment will provide the immediate economic push needed. Therefore a sense of progress will depend largely on government attitudes and projects.

As a first step, Balaguer should organize his government to reflect the urgency of the economic job to be done. He should name an economic "czar", responsible only to him and with ample powers to overcome political and bureaucratic obstacles. Julian Perez, the head of Balaguer's Economic Commission, may be the right man.

As in Mexico, rapid land distribution could be a major element in creating a sense of progress. Large properties held over from the Trujillo days are available and their distribution, with clear titles, should be begun. Some of the past Mexican mistakes should be avoided such as communal ownership, distribution of non-viable parcels and failure to provide for the other elements such as credit, roads, etc., which make agrarian reform meaningful.

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
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- 7 -

The AID Mission should not be over expanded with "technical assistance" employees. We should operate to a larger extent through contracts with action-oriented organizations on highly visible regional projects. For immediate action we have the Yuma Valley project and in the longer run, there are the World Bank's regional projects for the Yaqui Valley.

Special emphasis should be given to the use of our resources in technical and vocational education so that Dominicans now filling menial jobs can feel that their children will be able to move a notch higher in the economic and social scale.

Finally, in creating a sense of progress it is essential to avoid creating unreasonable expectations, which if frustrated, could contribute to another round of violence.


Anthony M. Solomon
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Economic Affairs

Saturday
June 18, 1966 -- 12:00 noon

Mr. President:

Paragraphs 1 and 5 of this conversation with the head of the Argentine National Bank may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

Memo of Conversation with Felix Elizalde
Tuesday, June 14, 1966.

WWRostow:rln

Saturday, June 18, 1966
11:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a recommendation from
Secretary Rusk that you resume
ambassadorial trips on the Potomac.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

1936
17a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Buffet Dinners for Diplomatic
Corps aboard Sequoia

Recommendation:

I recommend that you resume the custom of entertaining Ambassadors aboard the Sequoia. The yacht would depart about 6:30 p.m. and return around 9:30 p.m.; cocktails and a buffet dinner would be served aboard. Ambassadors would be invited in groups of 30.

I suggest that the first trip be scheduled for Tuesday, July 26, for Ambassadors from the European area.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

*move
up
couple of
weeks*

Background:

At your initiation, such dinners were held last year, and the impact was considered to be most beneficial.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

1. sup file
2. Pm file

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, June 18, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Egyptians asked us in March to negotiate a new one-year \$150 million PL 480 agreement. Our present six-month deal runs out this month.

Nasser badly needs this food--and on heavily concessional terms if he can get them. His supplies will run out in October. Allowing time to ship, he must buy somewhere by early August. His economy is in worse shape than ever--reserves are all but exhausted.

Despite Nasser's need, Secretary Rusk recommends we not sign a new Title I-IV agreement now. Instead, he proposes we offer to sell (probably \$50 million) on CCC credit terms slightly better than those the UAR can get commercially from our competitors. We do not want to refuse to supply desperately needed food (our wheat was 60-70% of the supply in the cities last year). Besides, we want our farmers to make the sale since it is on fairly hard terms. Congress will be a lot more tolerant of CCC than of PL 480.

We do not want to give Nasser a flat "No." That is not necessary, and his violent reaction could cause us a lot of trouble. Instead, the Secretary would like to leave the door open to Title I-IV later. He would also continue Title III (\$8-9 million in school lunches), the AID technical assistance program (\$2 million) and the projects we support with our excess local currency.

We recommend this line with some regret. We still think it is worth trying to get closer to Nasser and to avoid splitting the Middle East into US and Soviet camps. But Nasser has left us little choice. He has almost dared us publicly not to renew our agreement. He has lambasted us on Vietnam. He continues to stir things up in Yemen and South Arabia. In general, he has not picked you up on the suggestion you made to Sadat last winter to discuss our differences quietly and build a more constructive relationship.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-131

By sig, NARA, Date 1-31-89

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- 2 -

We are not quite sure what he is up to. Our guess is that he is worried about his political base. For the first time, he has discovered plots among his junior officers and a serious assassination plot among the educated young men he thought he could count on. His stalemate in Yemen has alienated the military. So he is caught between the moderates who know the UAR must retrench to move ahead economically and his old-timers who talk a good revolution but have no idea how to develop a modern economy.

Taking the Secretary's line is taking a calculated risk. Nasser may react violently, but we think he is expecting this kind of answer so should be braced for it. Our unreadiness to agree on PL 480 now could hurt the moderate prime minister, who is pushing a sensible economic program. If he fell, his successor would probably be pro-Soviet and less sensible economically. It is equally possible, however, that mounting economic pressures will force Nasser to lean more heavily than ever on his Prime Minister as the only hope of pulling the UAR out of its economic mess.

I recommend you approve Secretary Rusk's line.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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~~SECRET~~

EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

June 16, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: U. A. R. PL-480 Request

Recommendation:

That you approve the following response to the request received in mid-March from the United Arab Republic for additional PL-480 assistance:

1. We are unable to conclude a new PL-480 agreement at the present time for reasons which have been previously discussed. (These include in particular the U.A.R.'s Yemen policy, U.A.R. participation in the Afro-Asian Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organization, Nasser's attacks on our Vietnam policy and U.A.R. distortions of our relations with Saudi Arabia.) We will, however, keep the request under consideration and will so state if queried publicly.

2. We are prepared to sell the U.A.R. essential food on liberal CCC terms to help alleviate the U.A.R.'s serious food problem. (We estimate the probable value of such sales at about \$50 million. Terms would be those granted in recent CCC sales to the U.A.R.--i.e., three years credit with one-third due after one year.)

3. We are prepared to renew our Title III PL-480 program for feeding school children for FY 67.

4. We are also prepared to continue A.I.D. technical assistance programs, local currency lending in support of the U.A.R. developmental budget, and investment guarantees and Cooley loans for eligible private enterprise activities in the U.A.R.

5. We continue to hope and to work for an improvement in the political climate which will permit increased U.S.-U.A.R. economic cooperation including PL-480 in the future.

DECLASSIFIED

EO 12356, Sec 3.4

Authority NLS 87-129

By mg, NARA, Date 3-1-89

~~SECRET~~

Group 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
Not automatically declassified.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Discussion:

We long ago concluded that the preservation of working relationships with the U.A.R. is fundamental to the maintenance of a satisfactory relationship with the area as a whole. Our interests in the Near East are interrelated. Experience has shown that when we are in a situation of direct confrontation with Cairo, those interests suffer. We are now at a point where recent policy differences with the U.A.R. over area problems and public criticisms of the United States in the U.A.R. have caused a slump in our relations.

Our ability to provide food to the U.A.R. has in recent years constituted the principal strand of our relations. The U.A.R. need for wheat is great: current U.A.R. availabilities, domestic and imported, will carry the country through only until about October. Foreign exchange resources are at a new low. Although nothing has changed the desirability of maintaining our basic relationship with the U.A.R., the public posture taken by Nasser on our policy differences makes it questionable whether we should, or, given Congressional attitudes, could at this time respond affirmatively to his request. No response or a negative response to the latest PL-480 request will almost certainly provoke the confrontation we seek to avoid. Yet a positive response would not only fly in the face of domestic opinion and political realities, but would also deprive us of the opportunity to impress upon Nasser how seriously we view our policy differences with him and his criticisms of us.

Despite recent adverse developments in U.S.-U.A.R. relations, our long-term interests dictate that we must stay in the game. Because of these developments we should lower the ante for the time being without, however, foreclosing the future. The strategy proposed in our recommendations may accomplish this, but it is a calculated risk,

since Nasser

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-3-

since Nasser will expect a more generous response and may turn down our offer. We believe also that it will be more acceptable to those members of the Congress who would oppose PL-480 assistance to the U.A.R. at this time.

The recommendations reflect the consensus of the Interdepartmental Regional Group for NEA and also have the concurrence of Ambassador Battle in Cairo.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

19

Saturday, June 18, 1966 -- 10:45 a.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Friday, June 17, 1966~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Consultation with Senator Fulbright

Linc Gordon, Ellsworth Bunker, Bill Bowdler and I met with Senator Fulbright this afternoon to get his views on an additional \$25 million of supporting assistance for the Dominican Republic.

The Senator strongly counselled against amendment of the budget request at this stage because both the House and Senate Committees had completed their actions on the authorization bill. He said that to reopen consideration in Committee now would lead to complications and delays which should be avoided.

Senator Fulbright favored either waiting for a supplemental later this year or working for full restoration of the \$47 million cut made by the Senate Committee in supporting assistance with the understanding that by reprogramming the \$761 million requested for this category, the amount earmarked for the Dominican Republic could be increased by \$25 million. He expressed a preference for the latter course and thought that the matter could be resolved in conference. He asked for a letter from Secretary Rusk explaining the need for the additional funds.

We also took the opportunity to mention your intention to nominate John Crimmins as Ambassador to the Dominican Republic. He expressed approval of Crimmins for the job and said that he would be glad to include him in the hearings scheduled for next Tuesday.

W. W. Rostow

Press reconsideration in Committee _____

Wait for supplemental _____

Work for full restoration of the \$47 million cut _____

cc - Bill Moyers

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-130

By ig, NARA, Date 2-1-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, June 18, 1966
10:50 a. m.

Cham
Pres. file

Mr. President:

Attached is a draft letter for
your signature, to Dr. Wexler,
President of B'nai B'rith.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, June 17, 1966
8:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Without comment I pass this
recommendation for my successor.

W. *Walt* Rostow

1935
21a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Selection of Henry D. Owen to be
Chairman of the Policy Planning
Council

I recommend for your approval that Henry D. Owen,
now Acting Counselor of the Department of State and
Acting Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, be
selected to be Chairman of the Policy Planning Council.

This will involve separating the positions of
Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman
of the Policy Planning Council, as they were prior
to 1961. If you approve this recommendation, I will
have further recommendations for filling the
Counselor position, which requires Presidential
appointment and Senate confirmation, at a later date.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Enclosure:

Biographic data

HENRY DAVID OWEN

Member of Policy Planning Staff and Policy Planning Council since March 1, 1955

Born: New York City, New York
August 26, 1920

Family: Married Hertha Stockreiter
March 1956, one child

Education: School in Switzerland; Birch Wathen graduate; Harvard U., A.B., 1941

Previous Experience: 1941-42: Economist, Office of Price Administration
1942-46: Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Experience in State Department: 1946-55: Economist, Intelligence Research
1955-62: Member of the Policy Planning Staff
1962-66: Deputy Counselor and Vice-Chairman, Policy Planning Council
Since April 1, 1966: Acting Counselor and Chairman, Policy Planning Council

Present Grade: GS-18

Miscellaneous: Received Meritorious Service Award, 1962.

M. Postow
22

Friday, June 17, 1966
7:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Presentation by Mayor of Skopje (3:00 p.m. Saturday)
June 18, 1966

Purpose: For you to accept from Mayor Popov of Skopje a
parchment charter thanking the US for the aid we gave after their
1963 earthquake.

Mayor Popov will speak in Serbo-Croatian for one or two minutes.
Ambassador Micunovic will then translate.

A draft Presidential reply is at Tab A.

Mayor Popov (47) was elected President of the City Assembly in
1963. He is an economist, and was earlier Minister of Industry in
the Macedonian Republic (of Yugoslavia).

Nat Davis, who just joined the NSC staff -- he was our Minister in
Bulgaria -- will be there to chaperone Popov and company. Since
John Leddy is still recuperating, Acting Assistant Secretary
Walter Stoessel will be coming from State.

Francis M. Bator

cc: ~~W. W. Rostow~~
Francis Bator

It is a great pleasure to accept this charter encased in the carved walnut of Macedonia. Even more, it is a pleasure for me to have this expression of thanks for the help the American people gave to Skopje after the earthquake in 1963.

We were happy to give assistance to Skopje immediately after the disaster by sending an army field hospital, and by erecting more than 250 buildings for earthquake victims.

In a more lasting way, we also are pleased that we can participate, through Secretary Freeman's offer, in the urban plan for the new Skopje, in the new water system for the city and in building the President Kennedy Boulevard.

These works will long serve as reminders of the ~~ties of~~ friendship between the Yugoslav and American peoples.

Thank you for your beautiful gift and for coming.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-126

By ef, NARA, Date 12-22-88~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, June 17, 1966 -- 3:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here, so far as I know, are the facts about the Wilson visit.

On Monday, June 13, at 5:00 p. m. I sent up to you Secretary Rusk's proposed two cables. (Tab A)

You then made clear your dissatisfaction; and at 7:30 p. m. I sent up the redraft (Tab B) which you okayed. As you will note, page 4, you altered "mid" to "mid 'or late' July."

We dispatched that message on the 15th of June.

Later on the 15th Wilson was back with us (Tab C) accepting "your suggestion that we should meet in mid or late July."

As I was about to send it up at 5:40 p. m. you conveyed to me your deep and serious reservations about the visit as a whole. You concluded, however, by observing reflectively that it would be difficult for us to turn down Wilson, having just agreed to Erhard.

After your call, I immediately called Secretary Rusk and told him in detail why you were having grave second thoughts about the visit. I urged him to talk to you directly.

On the morning of June 16th I received down from you the Prime Minister's message of June 15 (Tab D) marked as follows "OK if Rusk and you think necessary."

It seemed clear to me that you had come to this conclusion after your telephone conversation with me, which I had repeated to Secretary Rusk.

I informed Secretary Rusk of the language you had noted on the memorandum.

Secretary Rusk said he thought it wise to go ahead with the visit because of the Erhard commitment. He also thought it important to make the announcement as soon as possible before the week end so it would not be connected with decisions which might be made this week end.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

I agreed.

At State Department suggestion I then notified the Prime Minister's Secretary, over our private wire, that it was okay to proceed. Language was agreed between the British and ourselves for joint announcement at 11:00 a.m. our time, Friday, June 17. (Tab E)

On the afternoon of Thursday, June 16, you informed the foreign correspondents that Erhard and Wilson would be coming over here "in a few weeks."

As of last night I thought we were all together.

I should like to underline that I fully communicated on the evening of June 15 to Secretary Rusk that you had grave reservations about the visit; and proceeded on the morning of June 16 only on the basis of what I thought to be your unambiguous okay if we both thought it necessary to proceed, which we did because, essentially, of the Erhard visit.

As things stand, I take it to be our task to make bloody clear to the British Embassy in Washington and the British government in London that (1) the visit must be very carefully prepared; (2) the Prime Minister, whatever his pressures at home, should not come unless what he says here in public and in private reinforces your position on Viet Nam; (3) if this is impossible for him, he must find an excuse for the visit not to take place.

W. W. Rostow

Should I communicate the position in the last paragraph to Secretary Rusk _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, June 13, 1966
5 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Secretary Rusk's proposed two cables from you to Prime Minister Wilson.

1. He tells me that he did not have your full domestic calendar in front of him. There may be other domestic commitments which bear upon the appropriate date for a visit.

2. If mid-July appears possible for you, I believe there is mutual advantage in having an announcement made soon.

3. I found Secretary Rusk's suggestions as to how a statement in the House of Commons might best be managed most helpful.

Walt Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

President did not like cables - redrafted

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-126
By 48, NARA, Date 12-22-88

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

236

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LONDON

Info

NODIS

PERSONAL TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Dean Rusk has given me a full account of his talk with you the other day. I was especially interested in what you had to say about Rhodesia and the Maritime strike. You have my best wishes in bringing both of these troublesome matters to an early conclusion. I shall be sending you a brief separate message on Viet-Nam.

I would be glad to see you at our mutual convenience and I am quite sure that we have many things on our plate which we could usefully discuss. The timing is somewhat complicated. You and I agree that there should be a good deal of ~~the~~ blue sky between your visit and possible action in Viet-Nam. That alone would suggest that the month of June is out, as we now look at the calendar of events. When we get into July, I shall expect to be away for almost a full week surrounding July 4th, during which I shall be going to California for our Governors Conference. You have Pompidou's visit on July 6-8 and your possible visit to Moscow on July 9-10. I have just suggested to President Senghor that he come here

Drafted by:

S:DRusk:jmr

6/13/66

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-126

By ig, NARA, Date 12-22-88

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

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PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

July 11-13.

It appears, therefore, anything before mid-July is blocked by our respective calendars. Perhaps all we can say now is that we have agreed that a talk would be useful and that we expect it to be held in mid-July, leaving the precise dates open for further determination. In response to questions as to why you are coming, perhaps we both should simply say that we have felt occasional talks to be worthwhile and that a number of matters of mutual interest could be usefully discussed, and that mid-July appears to be a mutually convenient time.

I must say that I see some advantage in letting it be known soon that you will be coming in mid-July in order not to connect your visit with any of the special subjects we have been talking about.

Cordially yours,

END.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

23c
FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LONDON

Info:

NODIS

PERSONAL TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Dean Rusk has told me of his private talk with you about the problem of POL in Haiphong and Hanoi. Specific orders have not yet been issued but I would be less than frank if I did not say that I see no way of avoiding such action, given the continuing buildup of North Vietnamese forces in South Viet-Nam and the absence of any indication of a serious interest in peace. We expect serious fighting during the Monsoon season, the first engagements of which have undoubtedly come to your attention.

I do hope that you will do your best to maintain solidarity with us on Viet-Nam despite what you have said in the House of Commons and elsewhere about Haiphong and Hanoi. Perhaps you could combine a number of points which would keep the matter in perspective and make it clear that any misgiving you have is limited to attacks on civilian centers, which is not in our mind.

Dean spoke to you of a possible combination, ⁱⁿ and any statements which you make, of the following elements:

Drafted by:

S:DRusk:jmr 6/13/66

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

Declassified to: Secret

NLS 87-126

By: JWB, NARA, Date 12-22-88

~~TOP SECRET~~

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PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

FORM 8-63 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED

Classification

Authority FRUS, 64-68, vol. IV, item 156; + State Dept. guidelines

By: JWB, NARA, Date 5-26-98

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

(1) You were informed of the possibility that such an action would, in our minds, become necessary.

(2) You expressed your own views to us in accordance with statements which you have already made in the House of Commons.

(3) The particular step taken by US forces was directed specifically to POL storage and not against civilian centers or installations.

(4) Since Britain does not have troops engaged in the fighting, it is not easy for Britain to determine the particular military action which may be necessary under different circumstances.

(5) It is a great pity that Hanoi and ^{Peking}~~Peking~~ have been so unresponsive to unprecedented efforts by the US and others to bring this problem from the battlefield to the conference table.

(6) Britain is satisfied that US forces have no designs against civilian populations and are taking every possible precaution to avoid civilian casualties.

(7) Britain as a member of SEATO fully understands and supports the determination of its fellow SEATO members to insure the safety and the self-determination of South Viet-Nam.

In other words, if you feel that it is essential for you to let it be known that you must disassociate yourself from this particular military action, I would hope that you could at the same time affirm your broad support for the effort in Viet-Nam and your understanding that it is Hanoi which is blocking the path to peace.

END.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, June 13, 1966
7:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a redraft of the message to Wilson for your approval or revision. It has been worked up by Sec. Rusk and me in the light of your instructions.

W. Rostow Rostow

OK
L

~~TOP SECRET~~

HAND → AS EXD 11
23e

~~TO THE PRIME MINISTER
FROM THE PRESIDENT~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~PERSONAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

14
June 13, 1966 By ing, NARA, Date 12-22-88

~~DRAFT~~ PERSONAL TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

Dean Rusk has told me of his private talk with you about the problem of POL in Haiphong and Hanoi. Specific orders have not yet been issued but I see no way of avoiding such action, given the expansion of the illegal corridor through Laos, the continuing buildup of North Vietnamese forces in South Viet Nam, the growing abuse of Cambodian neutrality, and the absence of any indication in Hanoi of a serious interest in peace.

We expect costly fighting during the Monsoon season, the first engagements of which have undoubtedly come to your attention. I must do what I can to reduce our casualties at the hands of those who are moving in from the north.

SENT
WHCA

14 17 35
I deeply hope that you will find a way to maintain solidarity with us on Viet Nam despite what you have said in the House of Commons about Haiphong and Hanoi. We are not talking about an air assault on civilian centers but a specific attack on POL installations with a direct relevance to the fighting in the south. I hope that you can give further thought to your own interests and commitments in Southeast Asia under the SEATO Treaty. Dean tells me that, in his talk with you and your colleagues, several references were made to the "revival of SEATO." South Viet Nam and five signatories of SEATO are not talking about a revival but are committing troops to repel an armed attack from the north. Nor do I believe that your role as co-chairman means that Britain should stand

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~PERSONAL~~

HANDLED AS EXD 11

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

aside; the other co-chairman is furnishing large quantities of sophisticated arms and other assistance to North Viet Nam and is, therefore, an active partner in the effort to take over South Viet Nam by force.

I know that you have some problems about Viet Nam, as do I. But I believe that it is sound for us to base our policy on the simple principles of the Geneva Accords and the SEATO Treaty, and on the assumption that North Viet Nam will not be permitted to seize South Viet Nam. Since we are determined about the latter point, much of the present criticism will come right at the end of the day.

I gather Dean spoke to you of the possible combination of points which would put a different cast upon disassociation by you from a decision to strike the POL. Quite frankly, I earnestly hope that you will not find it necessary to speak in terms of disassociation. But it would be important to us if you could include the following elements:

1. You were informed of the possibility that such an action would, in our minds, become necessary.
2. You expressed your own views to us in accordance with statements which you have already made in the House of Commons.
3. The particular step taken by U.S. forces was directed specifically to POL storage and not against civilian centers or installations.
4. Since Britain does not have troops engaged in the fighting, it is

not easy or appropriate for Britain to determine the particular military

HANDLED AS EXD13

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~~~PERSONAL~~

HANDLED AS EXD15

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

action which may be necessary under different circumstances.

5. It is a great pity that Hanoi and Peiping have been so unresponsive to unprecedented efforts by the U. S. and others to bring this problem from the battlefield to the conference table.

6. Britain is satisfied that U. S. forces have no designs against civilian populations and are taking every possible precaution to avoid civilian casualties.

7. Britain as a member of SEATO fully understands and supports the determination of its fellow SEATO members to insure the safety and the self-determination of South Viet Nam.

I would hope that you could in this context affirm your support for the effort in Viet Nam and your understanding that it is Hanoi which is blocking the path to peace.

The timing of a visit to Washington is somewhat complicated. You and I agree that there should be a good deal of blue sky between your visit and possible action in Viet Nam. That alone would suggest that the month of June is out, as we now look at the calendar of events. When we get into July, I shall expect to be away for almost a full week surrounding July 4th, ~~during which I shall be going to California for our Governors Conference.~~ You have Pompidou's visit on July 6-8 and your possible visit to Moscow on July 9-10. I have just suggested to President

Senghor that he come here July 11-13.

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLED AS EXD15

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLED AS EXDIS

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-4-

It appears, therefore, anything before mid-July is blocked by our respective calendars.

If you feel a talk at that time is essential, we can say now that we expect it to be held in mid ^{or late} July, leaving the precise dates open for further determination. In response to questions as to why you are coming, perhaps we both should simply say that we have felt occasional talks to be worth while and that a number of matters of mutual interest could be usefully discussed, and that mid-July appears to be a mutually convenient time.

I was much interested in what Dean told me of your talks about Rhodesia and the maritime strike. You have my best wishes in bringing both of these troublesome matters to an early conclusion.

~~END~~ #

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLED AS EXDIS

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 15, 1966

FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON FOR THE PRESIDENT

Many thanks for your message of June 14. I am grateful for your frankness and I think that each of us now fully understands the others position about the bombing of the oil installations.

This exchange however reinforces my view that we should try to have a short meeting. The SEATO problem will of course be central to the talks which Dean Rusk and Michael Stewart will be having later this month in Canberra. But there are a number of things, including whatever may emerge from those talks, which you and I should usefully discuss soon.

I shall not now be going to Moscow on July 9-10. I could, if you thought fit, aim to see you after a later trip to Moscow, but I think that from the point of view of both our interests it would be better for us to have had a good talk before I decide on a Moscow visit.

I should, therefore, like to accept your suggestion that we should meet in mid or late July.

This leaves the timing of the announcement. I think you agree that for both of us it is politically desirable not only that there should be plenty of blue sky between the bombing and my visit, but that the announcement of the visit should be made as far in advance of the bombing as possible. This being so, can we agree now to announce, preferably before this weekend, that we have decided to meet in mid or late July, taking the line in response to questions which you suggested in your message?

*OK Rusk & you think
if necessary*

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jm*, NARA, Date *5-26-98*

(k)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 15, 1966
Wednesday, 5:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Wilson replies, accepting mid or late
July for visit. He wants our agreement
to announce, preferably before this
weekend. K

I shall convey to Secretary Rusk
your views as just given to me over
the phone.

Walt Rostow

~~TOP SECRET Attachment~~

~~SECRET~~

June 16, 1966

FROM WALT ROSTOW TO MICHAEL PALLISER, Private Secretary
to Prime Minister Wilson

The President accepts proposal in last sentence of Prime Minister's message of June 15; that is, announcement before this week end of meeting mid or late July. Would 11:00 a.m. Friday, June 17, Washington time be acceptable for joint announcement?

I'm having fun. Are you?

DECLASSIFIED	
State 5-25-78	
By <u>David L. W.</u>	NARS, Date <u>8-17-86</u>

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

23

RECEIVED
WHCA

1966 JUN 16 23 00

FROM: MICHAEL PALLISER

TO : WALT ROSTOW

~~SECRET~~

JUNE 16 1966

MANY THANKS. WE AGREE TO JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT AT 11.00 AM
FRIDAY JUNE 17 WASHINGTON TIME.
SUGGEST FOLLOWING TEXT

BEGINS

THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
(VICE VERSA IN YOUR CASE) HAVE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL
FOR THEM TO MEET AGAIN FOR ONE OF THEIR PERIODICAL EXCHANGES
OF VIEWS ON WORLD PROBLEMS. THIS MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE
IN WASHINGTON IN SECOND HALF OF JULY. THE EXACT DATE WILL BE
ANNOUNCED IN DUE COURSE.

ENDS

ANSWER TO YOUR LAST QUESTION IS YES, AND GREATLY
LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE LTR. 1-2-15-77
By 50W, NARA, Date 10-21-90

Friday, June 17, 1966
2:35 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

The reason we don't have an Ambassador for Guinea has nothing whatsoever to do with Carl Rowan's article. We had one candidate, Davis, a first-class Negro sociologist at CCNY; but the climate was too difficult for his health.

State Department has sent over the name of a first-class man, Robert McIlvaine. But the appointment has been held up as we sought to get a better balance between outside and inside men. In short:

1. Carl Rowan is quite wrong in explaining why there is no Ambassador in Guinea.
2. Our problem is the back-and-forth between State and the White House, which has left a number of appointments hanging in the air.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file

Friday, June 17, 1966 -- 1:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

I would give Carl Rowan these very simple messages:

1. Viet Nam. The fundamental problem is the transit of Laos by Hanoi in violation of the 1962 Geneva Accords. The Soviet Union not only signed the Accords but assumed special responsibilities to prevent that violation by Hanoi, as co-chairman. He should be told never to let any Soviet or Eastern European figure get off that fish-hook.
2. Our purposes in Viet Nam are limited but they should know that the President and his whole government are absolutely determined to see it through. He should carry with him all the polls and primary results to drive this lesson home.
3. Beyond Viet Nam we are not merely willing but eager to go as far and as fast toward constructive relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as they are willing to go. He should carry copies of your Polish Millenium speech and leave it everywhere.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Friday, June 17, 1966; 10:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

At Tab A the Secretary recommends that you sign a ceremonial message to Chancellor Erhard (draft is at Tab B). It commemorates German Unity Day (today, June 17). The message will be read at the New York celebration (where Barzel and Javits will speak today at 4:00) and should be delivered to Erhard this morning, our time.

You will note that the message publicly confirms that you and Erhard will meet this summer. This is your first public statement to this effect -- Erhard has mentioned his plans to come here in at least one speech. I see no problem in this.

I apologize for the rush. We got this only this morning.

Francis M. Bator

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

26
msg
sent SS 6/17/66
on LDX 1 PM

111
26a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Message to Chancellor Erhard
on the Day of German Unity

Recommendations:

1. That you sign the enclosed message to Chancellor Erhard to be sent on the occasion of the Day of German Unity.

2. That you authorize the enclosed message to be read at the Day of German Unity celebration in New York where Senator Javits and CDU Parliamentary Leader, Dr. Rainer Barzel, will be the speakers.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

June 17, 1953 was the date of the popular uprising against the Communists in East Berlin and East Germany and June 17 is now celebrated in the Federal Republic and Berlin as the Day of German Unity. A message from you at this time could serve the two-fold purpose of acknowledging the Day of German Unity (as has been done for the past thirteen years) and expressing your satisfaction at Chancellor Erhard's forthcoming visit. In delivering the message to the Chancellor we would inform him that there would be no objection to its publication.


Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Message to Chancellor Erhard.

26-6

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO CHANCELLOR ERHARD

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I want to tell you how much I look forward to seeing you this summer. Your last visit provided me with a most useful picture of your views on our common problems. Our frequent meetings are a solid reflection of how harmoniously and closely our Governments continue to work together.

Let me stress to you on this Day of German Unity our continued determination to work for German reunification in peace and freedom. The tragic division of Germany must be healed if there is to be a just and lasting peace.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Dr. Ludwig Erhard
Chancellor of the Federal Republic
of Germany
Bonn

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-131
By ing, NARA, Date 1-31-89

Pro file

June 17, 1966

TO: Mr. John Macy

You may wish to comment.

W. W. Rostow

*Raul Castro, candidate
for Sov Canal zone*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 16, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Raul Castro as Candidate for Canal Zone Governor

Information on Raul Castro's qualifications to handle the Canal Zone Governorship is scant. We have pieced together the following assessment -- focused on the principal requirements for the job -- from a variety of reports and conversations with persons who have had some contact with him.

1. Executive Managerial Skill

It is not necessary for the Governor to be an engineer (his deputy -- Corps of Engineers officer -- can handle the technical aspects of operating the Canal) but he does need executive and managerial skills.

Castro is a lawyer by training. He has worked as a Foreign Service clerk, taught school, practiced law, and served as an Arizona Supreme Court judge. His only executive experience is the 20 months he has spent as Ambassador to El Salvador.

State Department evaluations of his performance show that he got off to a poor start but has steadily improved in his management of the Embassy. But I cannot give him high marks on this requirement.

2. Relationship with our Military

Ability to work effectively with our extensive military establishment in the Zone is essential to the Governorship. His personal data sheet shows that he was a member of the Arizona National Guard while in college. But there is no record of any other military service, or working relationship with our Defense establishment. From 1941-46 he was a Foreign Service clerk. His attitude toward the military is not known, but Jack Vaughn notes that he has effectively healed rifts between military and civilian members of the country team. There is no firm basis for rating him on this qualification, but he would probably score well in this category.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 7, NARA, Date 5-28-98

3. Relationship with the "Zonians"

Winning the confidence and cooperation of the Americans residing in the Zone is another key element of the job. We can anticipate that the ultra-conservative Zonians may be suspicious of a civilian Governor of Latin American origin.

The record of his ability to work effectively with disparate groups is good. His legal and political background should help him in dealing with the Zonians. With tact and by working closely with General Porter he should be able to overcome their suspicions. I would give him high marks on this requirement.

4. Relations with the Panamanians

This is the primary responsibility of Ambassador Adair, but the Governor plays an important supporting role.

The Panamanians should be pleased to have a Spanish-speaking civilian Governor. The appointment would also sit well with the rest of Latin America. State Department evaluations (i.e., Jack Vaughn's personal assessment) indicate that Castro got off to a shaky start with the Salvadoreans because of his over-aggressiveness and a tendency to dictate rather than persuade, but that these deficiencies have been corrected. On the basis of the lessons learned in El Salvador, I would expect him to get along well with the Panamanians.

Conclusion

Raul Castro would probably do a competent job, but he falls short of a strong candidate for a sensitive and difficult job.

W. W. Rostow

cc - Marvin Watson

t.p. 28

Thursday, June 16, 1966

5:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Analysis of Senator Mansfield's Comments on Viet Nam
Policy Alternatives

The main thrust of Senator Mansfield's position can be summarized in four propositions:

(1) He rules out withdrawal (I), major escalation (IV), and maximum non-nuclear effort (V);

(2) He would stay with our present course (III) if it were "a stable and fixed course of set dimensions;"

(3) But the present course is rather one of "rapidly expanding U. S. involvement" which will soon be "indistinguishable from Alternative IV;"

(4) "It would not be farfetched" to conclude that our best course would be "one which limits the military involvement as far as possible while placing the emphasis on seeking negotiations. "

He does not say so, but the Senator's list of "advantages" and "disadvantages" indicates strongly that he favors an "enclave" strategy. (See particularly Advantage #1 under Alternative II and Disadvantage #5 under Alternative III.)

It seems to me there are two gut questions here:

(1) Do we want a settlement that is going to leave South Viet Nam independent or do we just want to get out with as much as we can salvage?

(2) If we want meaningful negotiations, which course is more likely to convince Hanoi of our seriousness of purpose; that is, are we trying to convince them they can't win, or are we trying to make it so costly they will call off the aggression?

If we just want to arrange our withdrawal from the scene, then obviously we can "hunker up like a jackass in a hailstorm." We would then get about the kind of settlement we could have had if we had negotiated from the Pusan Perimeter in 1950.

But we would be kidding ourselves if we thought that this kind of posture would really (as the Senator's "advantages" suggest) "provide a believable U. S. bargaining position for negotiations. "

One can "nit-pick" the Senator's advantages and disadvantages (e. g. , the manpower increase in a year has been closer to five-fold than to ten-fold; to say we are "running faster to stay where we are" ignores the significant military changes of the past 18 months; etc.). But this doesn't get us very far.

The main questions, it seems to me, are:

(1) Why are we in Viet Nam at all? (Surely not the narrow goals that the Senator implies.)

(2) Do we want Viet Nam to be independent and at peace or do we simply want to get out?

(3) Which course offers the best hope that the Communists will abandon aggression in Viet Nam (and elsewhere) and either negotiate or simply fade away?

You may wish to talk about these critical issues with the Senator.

If you prefer a written memorandum, a draft is attached.

W. W. Rostow

DRAFT

28a

MEMORANDUM FOR SENATOR MANSFIELD

SUBJECT: Comment on Viet-Nam Policy Alternatives

I am grateful for your thoughtful memorandum of June 13 in which you commented on the policy alternatives in Viet-Nam. I was also interested in the lists of advantages and disadvantages which you attached. I would agree with most of the estimates on those lists; I would have to disagree sharply with some. But any such list -- yours or the one I gave you -- can be "nit-picked" indefinitely.

I would like to comment on some of the more fundamental questions raised in your memorandum and implicit in the lists of advantages and disadvantages.

Most fundamental is the question of why we are in Viet-Nam at all. You touch on this when you speak (in Advantage #1, Alternative II) of a concentration of U. S. forces in selected areas (enclaves) as being "more commensurate with U. S. interests on the Asian mainland."

What are those interests? I believe that they are deep and real. We are not in Viet-Nam merely to support this or that government. We are not there solely to give the Vietnamese people a chance to be independent and free from terror, though the fate of 15,000,000 people is important to us.

We are in Viet-Nam for most of the same reasons we were in the Pacific and in Europe during World War II. We have the same reason we had in Korea in 1950. We are doing what most of our major policies and actions have been directed to over the past 25 years -- to prevent the success of aggression and to help build a world in which nations, small and large, can live in peace and make their own way.

We made our NATO and SEATO commitments to assure that result. Now their credibility is being tested. At stake is the bone structure of peace throughout the world.

Twenty-five years ago, the leaders in Germany and Japan had a very different view of the world. The men in Moscow who triggered the Korean War had a different view 16 years ago. And the men in Hanoi and Peking have a view very different from ours today.

We can get out of Viet-Nam. We can get out tomorrow. Or next week, or next month. But what happens then? What does that do to Hanoi's view and Peking's? What does it do to the attitude of others around the world -- first to Viet-Nam's neighbors, to India, to Japan, to others? What happens to their estimate of what American support is worth?

What happens to the estimate in Berlin? In Israel?

Do we, by such a course, move closer to peace -- or closer to disaster?

I know in my heart what the answer is.

The next question is whether the course we now follow is more likely to bring the Communists to a peaceful settlement than would a move into a

few selected areas along the Viet-Nam coast. Now, I suppose we could pull back and the regime in Hanoi might then be "generous" enough to discuss terms for our orderly withdrawal. But I do not think we should delude ourselves about the outcome -- and what it would mean for Viet-Nam, or for us.

We would get about the same kind of settlement we could probably have had in Korea if we had negotiated from the Pusan perimeter in 1950. They might have agreed to let us move out without shooting at us. But Korea would have been a Communist state. And there is no doubt that the Viet Cong would take over Viet-Nam.

We know what would then happen to the Catholics, the Buddhists, and every other non-Communist group, because we saw it happen in 1954-56.

Our present course is not an open-ended commitment to steadily increasing forces and exercise of power. It is measured by the needs we face and by the actions of our enemy. It can and will be changed as the situation alters.

I cannot agree that we are just "running faster to stay where we are" militarily. The situation on the ground has changed markedly over the past 18 months. Then, in January 1965, the men in Hanoi had every reason to hope they were on the verge of victory. Now, the situation is very different. Now, I think they are beginning to realize that they are not going to win on the ground. So the efforts and the sacrifices of the past year have had significant results.

The Communists still hope that internal political developments in the

South may open some doors for them. They are probably watching us very closely here to see how we react and whether or not we are a divided people.

Once they become convinced that we are not weak; that we are not impatient; that we are not going to falter; that they cannot win; that the cost to them of their continued aggression is rising; that their bargaining position at a conference is getting weaker every day -- then peace will come, whether at the negotiating table or not. And when that day comes, we shall be a good deal closer than we now are to a shining goal -- a world of peace, of safety and of promise for people everywhere.

LBJ

Thurs., June 1 1966
4:00 p.m.

29

JP

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is Averell's report on his lunch
with Pearson. Evidently the "Old
Crocodile" enjoyed himself.

W. W. R.

(Ottawa 1691)

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN (Ottawa 1691)

I delivered the President's letter to Prime Minister Pearson when I saw him alone before lunch. He tried to brush the air agreement off as being just another commercial agreement which had little political significance. He underlined its great value to Canada in developing round the world air service. I pointed out quite bluntly that the Soviet Union had tried to use Cuba as a base for nuclear missiles against the United States and Latin America. Having failed in that as a result of the confrontation in October 1962 the Soviet Union was now using Cuba as a base for subversive action against Latin American countries. The meetings in Havana in November 1964 and January 1966 openly advocated violent revolution in all Latin America and specifically in certain countries where the so-called liberation movements were already active, including Venezuela, Colombia and Peru. I said that the Latin American countries would undoubtedly confirm our view that breaking down the agreement of all of our NATO partners as well as African countries in denying Soviet transit rights would meet with most unfavorable reaction not only in the United States but in Latin American countries. I underlined the President's personal concern that a close ally such as Canada would contemplate such an act.

The Prime Minister asked me what the President had in mind in the last sentence of his letter, "I hope that before we take this critical step we have an opportunity to review it fully together." I replied that if an agreement was not reached today to abandon the onward rights for the Soviet Union from Montreal to Havana we might arrange for detailed talks on an official level but if necessary I felt certain the President would want to talk to him personally in order to impress upon the Prime Minister the critical importance that the President placed on this matter. In conclusion, he said he would put the matter up to his Cabinet.

The discussion at lunch covered the Prime Minister's speech in Springfield, NATO, and other matters reported by separate telegram. The Prime Minister and Martin left lunch at 2:15 in order to attend a meeting in the House of Commons but Martin has asked me to come to his office at 3:30 where I will have an opportunity to discuss matters further.

On the way from the airport to Ottawa I had the opportunity to talk to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs Marcel Cadieux and told him bluntly that we would consider that in proposed Soviet air agreement the Canadians would in fact be aiding and abetting an enemy that is attempting to subvert Latin American nations.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 87-129

By ing NARA, Date 3-1-89

Pres 30

Ret'd from
Pres 6/17/66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 16, 1966 - 4 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Economic Report on the Dominican Republic

Attached is the State/AID report on the Dominican economic picture which you requested.

It is signed by Linc Gordon and Bill Gaud. Ellsworth Bunker has reviewed it and finds it in line with his thinking.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment - teepee

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-130
By inf, NARA, Date 2-1-89

cc - Bill Moyers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1664 31

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 16, 1966 - 4 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Economic Report on the Dominican Republic

Attached is the State/AID report on the Dominican economic picture which you requested.

It is signed by Linc Gordon and Bill Gaud. Ellsworth Bunker has reviewed it and finds it in line with his thinking.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCW NARS, Date 8-16-86

cc - Bill Moyers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 16, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Dominican Republic: Economic
Discussions with Dr. Balaguer

Ambassador Bunker and Charge John Crimmins initiated discussions with President-elect Balaguer June 7. They posed some of the principal economic problems facing his government. Dr. Balaguer's comments on his intentions and plans were spare, general and vague, giving the impression that he was looking to us rather passively for guidance. He viewed his two principal tasks as correcting the country's difficult financial and budget situation and increasing production and productive capacity. Ambassador Bunker and Mr. Crimmins stressed the need for Dominican initiative to request an International Monetary Fund advisory mission for assistance in handling debt repayment, balance of payments, and fiscal problems.

Dr. Balaguer has appointed a group of economic advisers which has had numerous meetings with the AID and Embassy staff on specific economic and development problems. Our country team has expressed its concern that the economic group is composed partly of former Trujillo supporters and conservatives who have little or no understanding of the country's economic and social problems. None of the members knows what role, if any, they will play in the new government (no cabinet members have yet been named). The economic philosophy of the majority of the group seems to be authoritarian and restrictive, with an expressed preference for such measures as a one-year ban on strikes, a wage freeze, and a general policy of austerity. The U. S. staff believe they are making progress in educating the economic group and in bringing about a more progressive attitude, and have reached general accord with the group on some of the economic development priorities. We assume that the group will be dissolved when the cabinet has been named and that much of the educational work may have to be re-done.

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By

[Signature]

NARA. Date

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- 2 -

The joint discussions have been concentrated on (1) a review of basic financial and budgetary problems, (2) eliciting Balaguer team views on reform and development plans, and (3) an explanation of the current U. S. assistance program.

(1) The group has not yet come to grips with the urgent Dominican balance-of-payments problem, but it is gathering data from the Central Bank and may be expected to do so within a few days. The U. S. team will continue to press the commission to have the Central Bank request an IMF advisory mission.

(2) The Balaguer team's reform and development priorities include (a) the reform of the government sugar corporation to make it a non-political, professionally managed, more efficient organization; (b) the gradual disposition of some state-owned commercial enterprises through the sale of shares to the public or the remuneration of the workers with equity holdings; (c) low-cost housing for the rural population; and (d) construction of the Tavera and Valdesia dams. Agrarian reform, agricultural production and public works are under consideration but the commission has not expressed any definite opinions.

(3) Present U. S. programs of direct financial support, development loans, and technical assistance have been explained in detail. Stress was placed on the priority needs for agricultural production, industrial development, community development, education, reorganization of the administrative structure, and mobilization of larger tax resources by the Dominican Government.

Discussion of the development needs and priorities is continuing. If the talks proceed satisfactorily, we expect the U. S. team to identify the following areas for possible further U. S. financial or technical assistance:

(1) Yuna Valley Development. This is an agricultural project which could result in a rapid increase in food production under the supervision of an experienced area development consulting firm headed by David Lillienthal.

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(3)

(2) Land Settlement. The AID Mission is preparing a plan for the settlement of 20,000 families on state-owned land.

(3) Valdesia Dam. Preliminary studies have been made for a dam to be located near San Cristobal which would provide irrigation as well as potable water for Santo Domingo in the first phase and electric power at a later stage which could be deferred for several years. This project is politically dear to the new government.

The IBRD is proceeding with the study of the development of the two major valleys (Yaque) and we would expect the Bank to take an active role in development lending. The IDB has made a number of loans, including potable water, housing, and cattle improvement, and is now interested in making new loans.

We expect the government to take serious self-help measures consistent with political reality in the Dominican Republic. President-elect Balaguer and his economic group have already expressed their intent to take measures to solve the budget and financial problem, improve the sugar corporation, and divest the government of some of its commercial enterprises. These steps and others, including the settlement of official debts to U. S. suppliers, will be elements in the negotiation of FY-1967 loans.

Failing a dramatic reversal in the trend of the world sugar price, the Dominican Republic could well run a \$70 million balance-of-payments deficit during the next twelve months. In the same period government revenues are not expected to be sufficient to cover more than minimum operating budget expenses. There is a clear necessity for government investment activities to stimulate the economy and the need for external assistance for investment may be as much as \$50 million.

It is our judgment, shared by IMF and IBRD experts, that the Dominican peso requires devaluation. Although this is politically explosive and is bound to encounter stubborn resistance by the government, it is, nonetheless, an essential self-help measure to reduce consumption imports,

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- 4 -

stimulate new exports, eliminate budget and sugar corporation deficits, and provide additional resources for the private sector. The country team has expressed the view that devaluation should be deferred until early in 1967, when they believe that the need for it will be so obvious that it can no longer be resisted by the Dominican authorities. The decision on when and how to raise this problem with Dr. Balaguer is still under review. We are seeking, meanwhile, to arrange for the IMF to take the lead in presenting the devaluation issue to the Dominicans. Nonetheless, if the Fund does not do so, we intend to raise the issue directly at the most appropriate time.

Provision of U. S. Aid Resources

It is our intention to change the basis of our aid to the Dominican Republic as rapidly as possible from emergency budget and balance-of-payments support to long-run development assistance related to self-help and fully in line with the Alliance for Progress. Some transitional special support will still be required for a few months, the length of time and the amounts depending upon the timing of peso devaluation and other self-help actions.

The country team has been authorized to plan an assistance program on the following basis:

\$15 million supporting assistance remaining from FY-1966 supplemental appropriation

\$25 million supporting assistance in FY-1967

\$25 million in development loans in FY-1967

\$ 5 million technical assistance grants in FY-1967

\$70 million TOTAL

The above figures are in accord with the presentations made to the Congress. The country team believes that \$10 to \$25 million more in supporting assistance may be required

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- 5 -

from the Contingency Fund in FY-1967. The worldwide Contingency Fund request in the current Congressional Presentation amounts to \$75 million.

William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud
Acting

Lincoln Gordon

Lincoln Gordon
Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS - NINA

Monday, June 27, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM SECRETARY RUSK (Canberra, SECTO 20)

Eyes only for the President

I want to be sure that you understand that my own view is that timing of operation is now related to weather and strictly military aspects on the question of leaks. I am not interested in further delays on account of political factors which have been thoroughly considered and taken into account.

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NLJ 88-54
By sig, NARA, Date 11-18-88

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS - NINA

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cc: 32
Thursday, June 16, 1966

12:06 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

At your instruction I had Ambassador Goldberg in yesterday to talk about Vietnam and the POL targets.

I marched carefully through all the considerations: the expansion of the Laos corridor; the expansion of the truck pool and oil imports; the irrationality of chasing individual trucks up and down the countryside with supersonic jets; what we owe our men on the ground; what we owe our skilled airmen; what we owe our country to use our power efficiently.

I pointed out (which is true) that a systematic attack on oil would almost certainly kill fewer North Vietnamese civilians than generalized harassment.

Incidentally, the recent attached study shows that we may have killed in the first year of bombing the North three to four thousand civilians.

He replied that he was worried about confrontation with the Russians, and he did not believe bombing was efficient.

I then went over the Russian commitments and responsibilities under the Geneva Accords of 1962 to prevent the transit of Laos; and pointed out that in the past, bombing had only been efficient when it was concentrated on a clean cut through a system. This is what is proposed with respect to oil.

He ended on the theme that it was necessary for the President to have advice from all directions, without that advice getting into the press; he recognized that there was only one man in the Government under our Constitution who had the responsibility for decisions; and implied, at least, that he would be a good soldier.

I made arrangements at the end to see him again on less controversial matters: Africa, China policy, etc. I shall try to stay close to him.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-131

By ing, NARA, Date 1-31-89

(SCNo. 08437/66 - log 1890

An Appraisal of the Effects of the First Year of Bombing in North Vietnam)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

32a

15 JUN 1966

A Declassification/Release Instructions on File

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House

SUBJECT : An Appraisal of the Effects of the First Year
of Bombing in North Vietnam

1. The attached report represents a comprehensive research effort by this Agency and DIA on the effects of Rolling Thunder attack against North Vietnam in 1965, and will, I believe, be of interest to you.



2. Although the Rolling Thunder program flew many thousands of attack sorties against military and economic targets, the resultant damage was relatively light, in good measure reflecting the restricted nature of the air campaign. North Vietnam reacted vigorously to restore transport facilities essential to maintaining the flow of supplies to the insurgency in South Vietnam. The toll in human casualties, based on fragmentary sample data, is estimated to have been between 11,700 and 14,800, divided about equally between dead and wounded, with a somewhat higher percentage of military as compared to civilian casualties.

3. The major effect of the attack has been to force Hanoi to cope with disruption to normal economic activity and to divert manpower in significant numbers to war supporting activities. North Vietnam may now require 200,000 full-time workers (or about 10 percent of the non-agriculture labor force) for tasks associated with dispersal and emergency repair and maintenance, and the part-time work of another 100,000.

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ-141-020-020/1
By pc, NARA, Date 10-23-09

Bill Morell
WILLIAM N. MORELL, JR.
Director
Research and Reports

Attachment:
SC No. 08437/66 (Subject Report)



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MORI

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Thursday, June 16, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Dave Bell, George Ball and Charles Schultze recommend we go ahead with this year's budget support grant (\$21.4 million) for Jordan. None of us likes budget support, but there is a clear political case for keeping Israel's longest and most vulnerable flank out of Nasser's hands.

We have succeeded in getting out of straight budget support everywhere except in Vietnam (\$500 million), Korea (steadily falling but still \$50 million in FY 67 plans), Laos (\$20 million) and Jordan. But in each case there's important political justification. In Jordan, an 8% annual growth rate raises hopes that Jordan is moving toward ability to pay its own way.

As you told Israeli Foreign Minister Eban in February, we would rather not subsidize Jordan, nor sell tanks and jets to Arabs. But after painful consideration, we see no other way to keep Soviet-backed radical Arabs off Israel's softest flank.

So far our policy has worked. Hussein resisted heavy Arab pressure to take MIG's. He has privately agreed to keep his armor off the west bank of the Jordan where Israel would be hard-pressed to defend. He has squelched fanatical Arabs raiding across Israel's borders. He has resisted heavy pressure from his military--whose support keeps him in power--to retaliate when Israel has attacked Jordanian villages harboring those raiders.

Secretary Fowler does not approve this grant because of the balance of payments drain (50% is not tied to US procurement). I recommend you read Charlie Schultze's excellent memo (attached), which spells out the compromise he has negotiated with Bell. This is the best he feels we can do to meet Secretary Fowler's legitimate concerns.

I recommend you approve the Bell/Ball/Schultze program. We will continue reducing the payments drain, but cutting back too quickly would undermine Hussein. The kind of deal we have with him may be cheap at the price. Few other events would be as likely to tempt a pre-emptive Israeli attack and trigger a major Mid-East fracas as the threat of a Nasserist takeover in Jordan. We cannot afford to get caught in a mess like that, especially while we are pushing ahead in Vietnam.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-333

By cb, NARA Date 9-24-99

Walt Rostow

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JUN 14 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Authorization to provide \$21.4 million budget support grant for Jordan

The attached memorandum from Dave Bell requests your authorization to provide \$21.4 million in budget support to Jordan for the nine-month period April 1 to December 31, 1966. Also attached is a memorandum from Acting Secretary Ball recommending that you approve this request.

This is primarily a political grant. Ball points out that a moderate and stable government in Jordan, which shares the longest border with Israel, is an important element in maintaining the precarious political balance in the Middle East. To support King Hussein, we have been subsidizing a substantial proportion of Jordan's budget since 1957.

Not only are we getting political returns for our investment, but the economic picture is also moderately encouraging. Economic improvements have made possible a slight decline in our budget support in recent years, from \$37 million in 1962 to an annual rate of \$30 million this year, and increased use of development lending. Because of Jordan's sensitive political and commercial situation, our budget support has always been untied. This has had an adverse impact on our balance of payments, since Jordan imports mainly from Europe and the Middle East.

Although there is room for questioning whether we would be willing to provide aid to Jordan on economic grounds alone, we can get the desired political benefits at lower budgetary and balance of payments costs than in the past. Dave Bell and I agree

- (1) that we should plan on a cut on the order of \$5 million in the annual level of budget support for Jordan's next fiscal year.
- (2) that we will tie 50% of this year's budget support and all development loans to purchases from the U.S. This is only a start, since it covers roughly what the Jordanians are buying from the U.S. anyway. But it establishes an important principle, gives the Jordanians experience with tying procedures, and opens the door to tighter tying in the future.

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By lig, NARA, Date 6-16-88

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(3) that we should increase the tied proportion to 75% next year.

Secretary Fowler wants 100% tying right now. He will not give his approval without this.

While I am sympathetic with Fowler's position, I agree with Ball that it cannot be done in one step. It would mean an immediate doubling of Jordan's imports from the U.S. It would sharply increase the cost of goods to the many small Palestinian merchants whose political support the King needs. And it would require elaborate administrative procedures which the Jordanians probably could not handle without practice.

Recommendation

If you feel that political considerations justify budget support to Jordan, I recommend that you authorize the \$21.4 million grant, on the following understandings:

- that the Jordanians will be alerted to the prospect of a substantial reduction--at least \$5 million a year--in budget support starting next January,
- that 50% of this year's budget support will be tied, and
- that we inform the Jordanians of our intention to increase the tied proportion to at least 75% next year.

I believe this is the cheapest and best way to support Jordan this year.



Charles E. Schultze
Director

Attachments

Approve with conditions stipulated above _____

Disapprove _____

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

JUN 10 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Supporting Assistance to Jordan for the
Period April 1, 1966 to December 31, 1966

Recommendation:

That you approve the memorandum submitted to you by the A.I.D. Administrator requesting authorization to advise the Government of Jordan of the level of U. S. budget support for the Jordanian transitional fiscal year from April 1, 1966 through December 31, 1966.

Background:

Secretary Fowler is quite right in insisting that we adjust our budget support program to Jordan so as to reduce its adverse effect on our balance of payments. I believe, however, that the proposal of the A.I.D. Administrator goes as far in this direction as is feasible at the present time. Mr. Bell's memorandum points out that the adverse balance of payments effect of the Jordan program has been substantially reduced in recent years and will be still further reduced next year. To go further at this time would simply mean that some of our intended aid could not be used. This would impair our effort to maintain stability in Jordan, and such stability remains an important element in our efforts to maintain peace between Israel and the surrounding Arab states.

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NJ 87-129
By ing NARA, Date 3-1-87

Langewiesche
Acting Secretary

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

MAY 14 1966

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Authorization to Advise the Government of Jordan of the Level of United States Budget Support for the Jordanian Transitional Fiscal Year (April 1, 1966 to December 31, 1966)

Proposed Action

I am requesting your approval of our intent to notify the Government of Jordan (GOJ) that, subject to the availability of funds and continued GOJ adherence to essential self-help measures, the United States is prepared to provide up to \$21.4 million for budget support during the period April 1, 1966 through December 31, 1966. (This is a transitional fiscal year, pending adoption of a new GOJ Fiscal Year to begin hereafter on January 1.)

Of the proposed sum, \$4 million is available from already approved FY 1966 funding. The remainder (\$17.4 million) is subject to appropriation and availability of FY 1967 funds.

The United States and the United Kingdom have jointly supplied budget support to Jordan, United States support beginning in FY 1957. The proposed total of combined United States/United Kingdom budget support is established annually, following a joint review of the status of the Jordanian economy. A total of \$25.04 million is proposed for the transitional period April 1, 1966 to December 31, 1966. This continues the downward trend of external assistance based on Jordan's successful application of self-help measures. The United Kingdom has officially notified the GOJ of its intended contribution of \$3.64 million.

We have previously provided budget support entirely as a cash grant. It is now proposed that 50% will be provided as a cash grant and the remaining 50% will be tied so as to reflect the effect of our aid to Jordan more accurately on our gold budget. ANNEX A provides detailed data on this proposed action and the justification therefor. ANNEX B is a proposed draft letter from the American Ambassador to the Prime Minister. It makes clear that the funds are to be released on a monthly basis and are subject to Congressional appropriation, the availability of funds, and Jordanian adherence to agreed self-help criteria. It also notes our intent to make sharper

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Declassified 12 years after date of origin.

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Authority Group 4
By aw, NARA Date 4-13-87

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Memorandum for the President

-2-

cuts in budget support in ensuing years than has been the case in the past. (We currently contemplate a cut in the order of \$5 million rather than the \$2 million cut characteristic of past annual reductions.)

United States Interest

The preservation of a stable Government in Jordan is essential to United States interests throughout the Middle East, in that it acts as a deterrent to an outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities. Any sudden alteration in Jordan's status could lead to concurrent Israeli and Arab moves into Jordanian territory.

Self-Help Actions

The United States has always insisted on self-help measures including adherence to limits on the growth of recurring civilian expenditures, restriction of military spending, increases in domestic revenues, and adherence to policies designed to ensure maximum return on investment. As a result, the Jordanian economy has been growing at the encouraging rate of approximately 8% annually. Domestic revenues have increased at an average rate of 12% annually and now cover about two-thirds of total budget expenditures as compared to approximately one-half only five years ago. This has been the result of improved tax legislation, better collection procedures, introduction of higher rates on upper bracket incomes, elimination of deductions previously allowed and increases in customs and excise taxes.

A strong Budget Bureau has pursued sound budgetary procedures. The GOJ is also addressing itself to the management side of government operations with a view to eliminating inefficiency, duplication, and waste.

The present Government is dedicated to development and, by the selection of projects, is pursuing a policy designed to increase foreign exchange earnings and domestic revenues. On occasion, the GOJ has undertaken capital projects of lower priority. On the whole, however, the record has been satisfactory.

Growth in the Jordanian economy has already permitted a partial shift in United States support from grants to loans for development, based on GOJ agreement to clearly defined premises for such lending.

Jordan, which a few years ago was considered as unable ever to support itself, is now making progress towards the time when it should be able to pay its own way without external grants. Jordan's

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Memorandum for the President -3-

domestic revenues have increased from 46.4% of budget revenues in 1959 to 70.2% in 1966. The draft letter to the Prime Minister (ANNEX B) notes our belief that a deeper cut in United States budget support assistance can be made in the next fiscal year.

Balance of Payments Considerations

The change from the past practice of 100% untied cash grant budget support to the proposed 50% tied procedure will better reflect the actual effect of our assistance on our balance of payments position. We will also continue to use every encouragement to get Jordan to increase its commercial imports from the United States. The past record has been acceptable and the Prime Minister has given written assurance that his Government will continue to make every effort to maximize procurement from the United States, thus further assisting our balance of payments position. The local cost portion of development loans has also been tied, thus providing additional pressure to buy in the United States.

Recommendation

That you approve our notifying the Government of Jordan that, subject to the availability of funds, Congressional appropriation action, and continued GOJ adherence to agreed self-help measures, it is the intent of the United States to provide up to \$21.4 million in budget support during the period April 1, 1966 to December 31, 1966.

David E. Bell
David E. Bell

Attachments:

- ANNEX A, Budget Support for Jordan
- ANNEX B, Draft Letter to His Excellency, Wasfi Tell,
Prime Minister of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
- ANNEX C, Summary Charts Showing:
 - 1. United States Aid to Jordan, FYs 1965, 1966, 1967
 - 2. Trend of Budget Support, Domestic Revenues and Expenditures for the GOJ Budget
 - 3. United States Share in Total Jordan Imports, 1959 to 1965

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ANNEX A
Memorandum for the President
Budget Support for Jordan
May 1966

BUDGET SUPPORT FOR JORDAN

The United States has supplied budget support to Jordan since FY 1957. The United Kingdom, which also provides budget support, has already announced its decision to provide \$3.64 million in Jordan's transitional fiscal year.

The combined United States/United Kingdom proposed contribution is determined annually, based on findings made in a joint review of the status of the Jordanian economy. The combined proposed contribution for the period April 1, 1966 to December 31, 1966 (\$25.04 million) continues the downward trend of budget support based on Jordan's successful application of self-help measures. As recorded in ANNEX C, United States budget support payments have dropped from \$40.4 million in Jordanian Fiscal Year (JFY) 1960/61 to \$32 million in JFY 1965/66. The United States portion, as proposed, is \$1.2 million less than the amount provided in the comparable period in 1965, a reduction of approximately 5%. The United Kingdom cut is approximately in the same proportion.

Jordan has, on two occasions, received windfall payments which have resulted in substantial budget surpluses. In JFY 1962/63 and JFY 1964/65 revenues from the TAPLINE settlement and a Kuwait budget loan provided \$10.5 million and \$14 million respectively. Deficits in JFY 1963/64 and JFY 1965/66, however, have absorbed or are expected to absorb about \$12 million of these windfalls. In accordance with the American Ambassador's letter of March 18, 1965 to the Jordanian Prime Minister, the GOJ has agreed to use a substantial portion of the amount remaining in the Kuwait budget loan for development purposes.

The United States/United Kingdom policy is designed simultaneously to foster growth in the Jordanian economy while promoting budget austerity and the wise allocation of resources. It is our intent to inform the GOJ now of the possibility of larger reductions in United States budget support from our Fiscal Year 1968 onward. We believe the Jordanian economy will continue to improve and it is wise to make clear at this time our intent to make deeper cuts in succeeding years. This is recorded in ANNEX B, the proposed letter from the Ambassador to the Prime Minister. (We currently

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Budget Support for Jordan

- 2 -

ANNEX A

contemplate a cut in the order of \$5 million in JFY 1967 rather than the \$2 million which has been characteristic of recent annual reductions.) As recorded in ANNEX C, United States budget support as a percentage of total Jordanian budget financing has dropped from 48.3% in JFY 1960/61 to 28.8% in JFY 1965/66, with a further estimated drop in the JFY transitional period to 25.5%, while Jordan's domestic revenues have increased from 46.4% of budget revenues to 70.2% in the same period.

It is necessary at this time to determine the proposed level of our budget support payments. The GOJ fiscal year began April 1st. We have customarily given notification of our intent prior to the start of each fiscal year to permit orderly budget planning.

Transfers will be made on a monthly basis and subject to satisfactory self-help performance, including adherence to limits on the growth of recurring civilian expenditures, restriction of military spending to agreed levels, increases in domestic revenues, and adherence to policies designed to ensure maximum return on investment with a minimum requirement for external assistance.

United States Interest

Budget Support has been and for some time will be essential in support of United States objectives; namely, the preservation of a stable, moderate, relatively pro-Western Government, which, in contrast to other Governments around it with their strong bias for Arab revolutionary socialism, believes in evolutionary social change and private enterprise. Such a Government is essential to the stability of the Middle East and acts as a deterrent to an outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities, as any sudden alteration in Jordan's status could lead to concurrent Israeli and Arab moves into Jordanian territory.

Self-Help Actions

The Jordanian economy has been growing at the encouraging rate of approximately 8% annually. Domestic revenues have increased at an average rate of 12% annually, nearly doubling between 1959 and 1965 and now cover about two-thirds of total budget expenditures as compared to approximately one-half only five years ago. Jordan is making progress towards the time when it should be able to pay its own way without external grants to cover budget deficits.

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Budget Support for Jordan

- 3 -

ANNEX A

Recent measures to increase revenue include: a new income tax law, new regulations to improve collection of income taxes, introduction of higher rates on upper bracket incomes, elimination of certain deductions previously allowed, increases in customs duties on 70 items, in excise taxes on cigarettes by more than 50% and on petroleum products by an average of 27%. As a result, revenues in the first half of the current Jordanian fiscal year increased by 16.5% above the same period in the preceding fiscal year.

United States support is in process of shifting from grants to loans and we have GOJ concurrence to the following clearly defined premises for development lending; (1) limiting the growth of recurring civilian expenditures; (2) holding military spending close to existing levels except for those costs financed from other Arab sources; (3) increasing domestic revenues by introducing new taxes and improving collection procedures; (4) establishing priorities for development projects; and (5) completing thoroughgoing economic and technical feasibility studies on projects determined to be of priority.

Balance of Payments Considerations

Previously untied cash grant budget support payments adversely affected our balance of payments position. We therefore used every encouragement to get Jordan to increase its commercial and governmental imports from the United States. The record was good. As budget support declined, Jordanian imports from the United States went up, both in total value and in percentage of total imports. Purely commercial imports rose from approximately 8% in 1959/60 to approximately 11.5% of Jordan's total imports in 1964/65. ANNEX C provides data on the rise in the amount of American imports and the United States share in total Jordanian imports.

The Prime Minister has given written assurance that his Government will continue to make every effort to maximize procurement from the United States.

We believe, however, that the seriousness of the U.S. balance of payments problem presently is such as to justify tying at least 50% of our proposed budget support for JFY 1966. This will more accurately reflect the real effect of aid to Jordan on our payments position.

In addition, direct balance of payments savings will be recorded in action being taken simultaneously; namely, reduction in technical assistance funds previously programmed for the purchase of dinars to support

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Budget Support for Jordan

- 4 -

ANNEX A

project activities. The Draft Letter to the Prime Minister (ANNEX B) notes our intent to make such reductions. Dollars required to purchase dinars for local cost financing have dropped from \$2.7 million in FY 1965 to an estimated \$0.6 million in FY 1967, a direct balance of payments saving of \$2.1 million. Also, we have applied utilization of the Special Letter of Credit "de minimis" procedure to cover any local currency costs of development loans authorized during JFY 1966.

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ANNEX B
 Memorandum for the President
 Budget Support for Jordan
 May 1966

DRAFT LETTER TO HIS EXCELLENCY, WASFI TELL
 PRIME MINISTER OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

Excellency:

My Government has authorized me to set forth, in order to assist you in your planning, our present intentions with respect to budget support assistance during the period April 1, 1966 through December 31, 1966.

The budget support level from the United States for Jordan's fiscal year ending March 31, 1966 was \$32 million. Because of differences in our fiscal years, we have provided this in monthly installments which are smaller in the first three months of your fiscal year (the last three months of the U.S. fiscal year) than in subsequent months.

It is our present plan to provide budget support for your new fiscal year beginning April 1, 1966 at the rate of \$30 million for a twelve-month period, with monthly payments geared to past practice. The actual provision of payments between July and December, 1966 are dependent on United States Congressional action for the United States fiscal year July 1, 1966 through June 30, 1967, as well as on a continued observance of the principles governing our aid which we have discussed before.

On these understandings, the tentative plan for our disbursements to the Government of Jordan during your next fiscal year is as follows:

<u>Month</u>	Jordan Fiscal Year April 1 - December 31, 1966 (Millions of Dollars)
April	1.3
May	1.4
June	1.3
July	2.9
August	2.9
September	2.9
October	2.9
November	2.9
December	2.9

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 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NLJ 87-128
 By 7 NARA. Date 3-1-90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Draft Letter to the
Prime Minister

- 2 -

ANNEX B

As your Excellency realizes, it is unique in American aid policy to provide cash grants for budget support. It has therefore been our hope that as the economy of Jordan progressed we could achieve progressive reductions in the level of our budget support. The above figures reflect the implementation of this approach. We also appreciate that the principle of increasing independence from external budget support is a cardinal objective of Jordan's development plan. In recognition of these joint objectives, and in the light of favorable economic projections for the future, we believe that in planning for your calendar year 1967 budget and subsequent budgets that you should anticipate a more rapid decrease in cash budget support coupled, of course, with a continuing availability of development loan funds.

We have also over the recent past funded what are termed "other costs" of technical assistance projects from grant funds, which is likewise contrary to customary aid policy. While some such support costs of specific technical assistance projects will continue to be made available during the United States fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, from PL 480 and technical assistance funds, it is our hope and expectation that once these funds are exhausted, the strictly dinar costs related to technical assistance projects will be provided from the Jordanian budget.

These two changes in our approach to the financial support of Jordan have been made possible by our mutual aim of achieving the most rapid possible financial independence for Jordan and by the continued favorable economic progress of the country and the sound fiscal measures which your Government has been pursuing. We believe that even greater progress can be made in the future. To achieve this will require, in the opinion of my Government, a continued observance of some of the premises for our aid which you and representatives of our Governments have discussed in the past, the highlights of which I would like to review.

1. We believe that your Government's record during the past year in a continuing effort to obtain increased revenues has been excellent. Further improvement in collection and careful consideration of new sources would appear essential to a continuation of this record. The recent decision to establish a standing committee on revenues appears to be a most constructive step.

2. In addition to the effort to increase revenues, there needs to be continuing restraint on recurring expenditures. Last year, the Government of Jordan apparently did not keep fully within the guideline criterion of a five percent increase in recurring civilian expenditures. My Government considers that this guideline must be observed if a greater

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Draft Letter to the
Prime Minister

- 3 -

ANNEX B

flow of resources toward capital investment for development is to be achieved. Some increase in services would appear possible within this limitation and to the extent even greater efficiency can be achieved, greater increases in services can be realized. In this connection, we recommend that continued emphasis be placed on improved administration, and we are pleased that our public administration assistance has been useful in supporting your efforts to achieve greater efficiency of operation.

3. One of our joint objectives for several years has been to hold the line on defense and public security expenditures. As you will recall, my Government agreed with the greatest reluctance to an increase in your regular defense budget to a level of JD 19,165,000 for a full twelve-month period. We hope that you will continue to review this matter in an effort to achieve all possible economies and certainly that no further increase in these costs will be necessary during the coming fiscal year. Likewise, we hope that further economies can be effected in public security expenditures.

4. In the past, representatives of our Governments have discussed several policies which are important to a sound development program aimed at a maximum rate of growth without undue burden on future Government and foreign exchange budgets. We know from previous discussions that your Government does not intend to use borrowed funds for budget support. In addition, we know it is your intention to select capital projects whether for financing from the budget or from foreign loans which are for priority purposes, outlined in the Seven-Year Plan. For major projects, the preparation of feasibility studies by recognized authorities is essential. In our judgment, loans should be guaranteed by the Government only when project revenues will clearly finance the payments. We know that your Government plans to seek concessional rates for all development projects in the public sector and to accept commercial rates only when concessional rates are not available, and then only if the project is a revenue-producing one which will pay off the loan without recourse to the budget. We believe that to avoid building up foreign debt unnecessarily, your Government will wish to turn to internal budget and market sources for the funding of the local costs of projects.

5. As you are aware, the United States provides more in aid to Jordan than Jordan spends on commercial imports from the United States. In this respect, Jordan stands almost alone among aid recipients. We welcome your recent determination to take administrative steps to assure that Government agencies are obtaining a maximum portion of their imports

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Draft Letter to the
Prime Minister

- 4 -

ANNEX B

from the United States. We welcome every action which your Government can take to help minimize adverse pressures on the balance of payments position of the United States.

We believe, however, that this can most effectively be done during JFY 1966 by utilization of the Special Letter of Credit "de minimis" procedure for 50% of the proposed level of budget support and for the local cost portion of Development Lending. My Government will be pleased to send experienced personnel to confer with representatives of your Government to discuss the establishment of the Special Letter of Credit, "de minimis" procedure. I am certain it can be worked out in a manner which will be mutually beneficial to our two countries.

Excellency, the economic progress Jordan has achieved in recent years, and particularly in the past year, is impressive by any standards. My Government is pleased to have been a partner in this effort. I welcome this opportunity to convey to your Government our plans for the coming year and wish your Government every success in its efforts to maintain and surpass the excellent record of progress in fiscal management and development.

Sincerely yours,

American Charge d'Affaires

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ANNEX C
Memorandum for the President
Budget Support for Jordan
May 1966

SUMMARY
UNITED STATES AID TO JORDAN
(\$000)

	FY 1965 Actual	FY 1966 Estimate	FY 1967 Estimate
Supporting Assistance	33,000	32,000	30,000
Technical Cooperation	5,963	4,000	3,600
Development Loans	1,640	13,000	11,500
Military Assistance:			
Grants	4,385	4,103	3,508
Credit Sales	-	15,000	-
PL 480:			
Title I	-	1,400 <u>b/</u>	<u>c/</u>
Title III (Programmed)	1,154 <u>a/</u>	1,770 <u>a/</u>	1,770 <u>a/</u>

a/ CCC Value

b/ Market Value

c/ Will be considered, if crop conditions should
result in harvests lower than consumption
requirements

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 4-Downgraded at 3-year intervals
Declassified 12 years after date of origin

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4
By Dcho, NARA, Date 4-13-87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Budget Support for Jordan

- 2 -

ANNEX C

TREND OF BUDGET SUPPORT, DOMESTIC
REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR THE JORDAN BUDGET 1/
(Jordan Fiscal Years)
(\$ Million)

Jordan Fiscal Year	Budget Support		GOJ Domestic Revenues	Total Revenues	Total Expenditures	Surplus or Deficit
	U.S.	U.K.				
1960/61	40.4	5.6	38.8	84.8	83.7	+ 1.1
1961/62	39.5	6.5	41.1	87.1	83.8	+ 3.3
1962/63	37.1	4.2	59.1	100.4	90.8	+ 9.6 2/
1963/64	35.0	4.2	54.3	93.5	101.8	- 8.3
1964/65	34.1	4.2	81.3	119.6	108.5	+11.1 3/
1965/66 (est.)	32.0	3.9	71.4	107.3	110.9	- 3.6
1966 4/ (9mo.)	21.4	3.6	58.9	83.9	83.9	0

1/ Excludes expenditures financed from foreign loans and grants for development.

2/ Revenues include one-time TAPLINE adjustment of \$10,472,000 most of which available for 1963/64 deficit.

3/ Domestic revenues include one-time currency board profits of \$6,230,000 and \$14 million Kuwait budget support loan of which a significant portion is earmarked by agreement with the U.S. for development. Part of surplus is available for 1965/66 estimated deficit.

4/ Projected level for transitional JFY April 1, 1966 - December 31, 1966.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 3-Downgraded at 12-year intervals
Not automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-128
By 48 NARA. Date 3-1-90

~~SECRET~~

Budget Support for Jordan

ANNEX C

UNITED STATES SHARE IN TOTAL JORDAN IMPORTS, 1959 to 1965
(\$000)

	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
<u>Commercial</u>							
Total Commercial Imports ^{1/}	110,118	117,418	109,676	121,666	134,604	133,339 ^{2/}	140,428
Commercial Imports from U.S. ^{1/}	8,291	11,404	11,934	15,327	11,642	15,750 ^{2/}	15,711
U.S. Share of Commercial Imports	7.5%	9.7%	10.9%	12.6%	8.6%	11.8%	11.2%
<u>Commercial and Military</u>							
Military Assistance Sales U.S. to Jordan	-	-	-	574	333	10,853 ^{3/}	28,560 ^{4/}
Total Commercial Imports including M.A.S.	110,118	117,418	109,676	122,240	134,938	144,192	168,988
Commercial Imports from U.S. including M.A.S.	8,291	11,404	11,934	15,901	11,976	26,603	44,271
U.S. Share of Grand Total	7.5%	9.7%	10.9%	13.0%	8.9%	18.4%	26.2%

^{1/} Excludes PL 480 shipments.^{2/} Excludes Ford Truck purchase of \$9 million.^{3/} Includes Ford Truck purchase of \$9 million.^{4/} This is part of an M.A.S. order amounting to \$45,186,400; the remainder will be paid for during future years.~~SECRET~~Group 4-Downgraded at 3-year intervals.
Declassified 12 years after date of origin.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4

By DLA, NARA, Date 4-13-87


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1966

Mr. President:

At Tab A is a message of thanks to (Tab B)
Ambassador Soko of Zambia for his telegram^a
expressing sympathy for the victims of
hurricane Alma and the Kansas tornadoes.

The message also notes that Soko is
leaving Washington and pats him on the
back for a job well done. (He has been
very level-headed and helpful in the
Rhodesian problem.)


Edward K. Hamilton
wwr

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR SOKO OF ZAMBIA

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I am very grateful for your kind telegram expressing sympathy for the victims of hurricane Alma and the tornadoes in Kansas. On behalf of the thousands who suffered, thank you for your thoughtfulness and compassion.

I understand that you are soon to complete your tour of duty in our country. I want you to know that we have valued your wisdom and your friendship. Mrs. Johnson joins me in wishing you and Mrs. Soko a pleasant journey home and much happiness in the years ahead.

Lyndon B. Johnson

White House
Washington

1965 JUN 10 PM 1 24

WA025 PD

RB WASHINGTON DC 10 1221P EDT

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

REGRET LOSS OF LIFE AND DESTRUCTION CAUSED BY HURRICANE ALMA
IN FLORIDA AND TORNADOES IN KANSAS STOP I HOPE AND PRAY THAT
THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED WILL BE COMFORTED BY THE FACT THAT
OUR HEARTS AND PRAYERS ARE WITH THEM IN THEIR DISTRESS AND
THAT THE PLACES THAT HAVE BEEN DEVASTATED WILL SOON BE RESTORED
TO NORMAL

AMBASSADOR SOKO ZAMBIAN EMBASSY.

June 16, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

I have your letter concerning the forthcoming Latin American Conference of Ministers of Education and Ministers Responsible for Economic Planning. I am happy to have this opportunity to write you about this and other matters of mutual interest.

The field of education has been an area of prime interest to me since the years when I taught school in rural Texas. I know from personal experience what education means for the fulfillment of the individual and the working of a healthy democratic society. From your long experience as a doctor, you will have made the same observations.

I have recommended to our Congress that new initiatives be developed in the field of international education as a major component of our collaboration with the countries of this hemisphere, and also of other regions, toward the ideals of freedom, social justice, and peace. The intent of the proposed International Education Act of 1966 now before the Congress is to strengthen our capacity for this enduring purpose.

I am also fully in accord with the importance you attach to the Conference of Ministers of Education and Ministers Responsible for Economic Planning in Latin America. I regret that the pressure of work will not permit Secretary Gardner to head the United States delegation to the conference, but a strong United States delegation will be coming.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-130
By sig, NARA, Date 2-1-89

I know that you are facing some tough economic problems. I too have my share of them as we in the United States deal with various strains put on our economy by our commitment to the struggle against aggression in Vietnam and our determination to continue assisting the developing nations. Recently some of your economic advisers were in Washington for talks on trade and other economic matters of mutual interest. I understand that this initial round was helpful and that it will be followed by further conversations in Buenos Aires. I hope that you will feel free to write me about these and other issues on which you think an exchange of views would serve to strengthen ties between our two countries. Secretary Rusk and Walt Rostow have told me of their good talks with you about the longer future of relations within the hemisphere and the relations of our hemisphere to other parts of the world community.

Ambassador Martin informed me that Mrs. Illia was coming to the United States for medical attention. Mrs. Johnson joins me in wishing her a speedy recovery.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Dr. Arturo Illia
President of the Argentine Nation
Buenos Aires

LBJ/ WGB:WWR:mm

Pres

Sent up thru 16th

Wednesday, June 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to President Illia

We have had to revise the letter to President Illia which you had already signed because Ambassador Martin conveyed to President Illia in writing the oral message on the OAS summit meeting which you approved last week for use in approaches to all the Chiefs of State in Latin America.

The summit paragraphs have been deleted in the attached new draft. Otherwise the letter is the same except for a reference to Mrs. Illia being hospitalized in Houston.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Cy Moyer
Kutner

*Pres file***CONFIDENTIAL**

Wednesday, June 15, 1966
5:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

Sol Linowitz has left for Europe and will be back July 4. Bill Moyers tells me that he sounded, as he was leaving, as if he would be prepared to take the job.

Should we send him a message indicating our interest? _____

Await his return before getting in touch with him and bringing him in? _____

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

DETERMINED TO BE A CONFIDENTIAL
MARKING, CONFIDENTIAL, 1983,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983.
BY DCA ON 8-29-85

June 15, 1966
Wednesday, 5:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Wilson replies, accepting mid or late July for visit. He wants our agreement to announce, preferably before this weekend.

I shall convey to Secretary Rusk your views as just given to me over the phone.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ Attachment

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 15, 1966

FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON FOR THE PRESIDENT

Many thanks for your message of June 14. I am grateful for your frankness and I think that each of us now fully understands the others position about the bombing of the oil installations.

This exchange however reinforces my view that we should try to have a short meeting. The SEATO problem will of course be central to the talks which Dean Rusk and Michael Stewart will be having later this month in Canberra. But there are a number of things, including whatever may emerge from those talks, which you and I should usefully discuss soon.

I shall not now be going to Moscow on July 9-10. I could, if you thought fit, aim to see you after a later trip to Moscow, but I think that from the point of view of both our interests it would be better for us to have had a good talk before I decide on a Moscow visit.

I should, therefore, like to accept your suggestion that we should meet in mid or late July.

This leaves the timing of the announcement. I think you agree that for both of us it is politically desirable not only that there should be plenty of blue sky between the bombing and my visit, but that the announcement of the visit should be made as far in advance of the bombing as possible. This being so, can we agree now to announce, preferably before this weekend, that we have decided to meet in mid or late July, taking the line in response to questions which you suggested in your message?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By JD, NARA, Date 5-26-98

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 15, 1966
Wednesday, 5:15 p.m.

orig to Bator
6/16/66

Mr. President:

This was in the pipeline before you issued the edict today to Secretary Rusk and me to cut down on boy schuts, etc. Francis wants me to add that he didn't want you to think he was bringing in any more of his Eastern European friends -- it was simply a suggestion from Secretary Rusk.

As for me, I think it is worth ten minutes if we can hold it to ten minutes.

W. W. Rostow

Francis -

Now you organize it
So it really only takes 10 minutes!!
wwr

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL
USE ONLYJune 15, 1966
Wednesday/12:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In the attached Secretary Rusk asks that you receive the Mayor of Skopje, Yugoslavia sometime between now and next Monday. He would present a parchment charter thanking the U.S. for the aid we gave after their 1963 earthquake. (The Skopje Assembly passed a resolution of thanks almost two years ago--this is the first chance they have had to present it).

The Secretary points out that some people on the Hill (particularly Cooley and Poage) have criticized the Yugoslavs for failing to thank us adequately in public. If your calendar permits, a short (10 minute) ceremony with Orville Freeman and a few Congressmen present--publicized by the Yugoslav Embassy here--would solve the problem.

As you know, the Yugoslavs did not turn us down last evening.

FMB
Francis M. Bator

Set up ceremony ✓

No _____

See me _____

4856
386

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for Mayor of Skopje,
Yugoslavia to Present Memorial Charter

Recommendation

I recommend that, if convenient, you receive Mayor Popov and Yugoslav Ambassador Micunovic for a brief ceremony with appropriate publicity sometime between June 13-20. If you agree to the ceremony, I also recommend that Secretary Freeman, Congressmen Cooley and Poage and perhaps other interested members of the Congress be invited to attend.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion

Yugoslav Ambassador Micunovic called on Chief of Protocol Symington on June 10 regarding the visit to Washington June 13-20 of Mr. Blagoje Popov, Mayor of the City of Skopje. Mr. Popov is coming to the United States on a two-month leader exchange program.

Mr. Popov is bringing with him a parchment charter with a special Macedonian wood cover from the Skopje City Assembly which is addressed to you and thanks the people and Government of the United States for their aid to Skopje after the 1963 earthquake which leveled that city. Photographs of the charter and the walnut wooden cover are enclosed, together with a Pro Memoria from the Ambassador. Ambassador Micunovic indicated that the Yugoslav Government would be pleased if Mayor Popov and he could present the charter to you while Mr. Popov is in Washington.

Some members of the Congress, particularly of the House Agriculture Committee, have been critical of US relief and reconstruction efforts in Skopje and have referred to the failure of the Yugoslavs to show sufficient appreciation for American assistance to Skopje. Among these are Congressmen Cooley and Poage, who visited Skopje after the earthquake. Secretary Freeman visited Skopje in 1963 and offered \$50 million worth of US-use dinars to the city. The Yugoslavs accepted and the money has been programmed.

A ceremony with suitable publicity would serve to underline the growing ties of friendship between the two countries. The effect on domestic public opinion and on the Congress of this expression of thanks for the generous response of the American people to the Skopje disaster would undoubtedly be favorable.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Photographs of charter and wooden cover.
2. Pro Memoria from Yugoslav Embassy.

cc: Bill Moyers, Jile
Kintner
McPherson
California
Cater 39
Baker

Wednesday, June 15, 1966
5:10 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Among your aides, I have perhaps the least claim to give you political advice.

Nevertheless, I wish to put to you this idea for the election period we are now entering.

We need a central theme; and we need to stick to it day after day, week after week, month after month.

The theme should be capable of concrete illustration both at home and abroad. It must be rooted in fact and not rhetoric.

My proposed theme is: We are on the way to solving great national and international problems; we are making progress; let's stick together and see it through.

The theme could be made to apply equally to:

- race relations;
- the reconciliation of full employment with price stability;
- the struggle against poverty;
- urban problems;
- Vietnam;
- the Alliance for Progress;
- the NATO crisis;
- the process of change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union;
- even China.

Once the theme has been chosen, we could organize quite easily a mass of factual data to back it and get it out to our candidates.

You could plan ahead one major presentation after another, illustrating the theme both at home and abroad.

If the NATO readjustment shakes down tolerably well after de Gaulle's Moscow trip, you might go to Europe in September and present that theme not only in relation to European affairs but also in relation to world affairs in general -- projecting your vision of "a rising tide of good sense and moderation." That would give it maximum playback at home.

Excellent - get going
L

W. W. Rostow

Pres file

Wednesday, June 15, 1966
2:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

As a matter of courtesy, I pass along this evidently sincere and well-meant letter from Richard Kearney. No response is required.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

June 2, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

Due to the absence of Len Meeker, I had the pleasure of attending your meeting with the Assistant Secretaries of State on May 31.

At the close of the meeting when you asked for further comments I was tempted to thank you for my nomination to be United States Member of the International Law Commission of the United Nations. The lateness of the hour and the fatigued appearance of some of my colleagues decided me against raising what might appear to be a somewhat personal matter.

However, I do wish to express my thanks for your trust and confidence which the nomination implies. Strengthening international law is an essential element in bringing about a world in which international differences are settled by peaceful means, and the International Law Commission is one of the key mechanisms in developing international law on a world-wide basis. I will do my best to ensure that the contribution of the United States to the Commission's work in the next few years is substantial and enduring.

Faithfully yours,

Richard D. Kearney
Deputy Legal Adviser

The President,
The White House.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE LEGAL ADVISER

1682
406

June 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW,
THE WHITE HOUSE

Dear Walt,

I would appreciate very much if
you would pass on to the President
the enclosed letter of thanks for my
nomination as the United States Member
of the International Law Commission.



Richard D. Kearney
Deputy Legal Adviser

Enclosure.

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 JUN 3 AM 9 52

Pres file

Wednesday, June 15, 1966
2:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Lodge's weekly telegram covers:

-- some really ugly French operations in Viet Nam which we have suspected but apparently Lodge now has solid information;

-- forward movement on the election process despite the unresolved situation at Hue;

-- battle statistics on a big week;

-- a quite sharp rise in defectors;

-- the beginnings of forward movement on the Komer-Porter program.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 5546

~~SECRET~~ -- NODIS

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJL 92-505
By jw, NARA, Date 4-1-94

4/a

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

Wednesday, June 15, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 5546)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. French Troublemaking

The CIA has unconfirmed reports that the French have given ten million piasters to Buddhists in Hue and Danang and the same sum to Buddhists in Saigon to support the "struggle" movement, the money having been brought to Vietnam by an unidentified French professor.

This is believable for several reasons. First, the French Consul recently made some solemn remarks about the deep significance of the "struggle" movement as a possible "third force." Then the French, during their rule here, gave more attention to fomenting strife among groups of Vietnamese than they did to almost anything else, and, therefore, have both the will and the technique. Also, French policy under the present French Government is aimed at making as much trouble for the U.S. as possible.

Recently there was a well-authenticated report that the French Ambassador in Seoul had spoken to the Korean Government in a way so as to discourage the sending of Korean troops to Vietnam.

What the French do to us in Vietnam, where young Americans are in combat, must surely be put in a different category from their disagreement with our views about NATO and the crude way in which DeGaulle, referring to the two "hegemonies," puts us in the same category with Communist China. In Korea, they actively tried to prevent our troops getting help and in this latest report actively tried to contribute to the danger and the trouble for our young men. This makes them actually more devious, though happily less powerful, than our Communist adversaries.

I believe the time is surely coming when the present French Government will disappear and be looked upon as a bad dream, and that the things that make for the greatness of French culture and French civilization will once again be reflected in the conduct of their Government. But if it leaks out -- as it surely will -- that when our young men were in combat in Vietnam the French Government actively did everything they could to make life hard for us, it will vastly complicate the task of those who, like me, believe in good relations with France.

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-332
By cb, NARA Date 9-27-99

For the future of Franco-American relations, therefore, as well as for the purpose of giving maximum support to our own troops, I recommend that at a high level, either in Washington or Paris, the French be told of our knowledge of these two episodes in the hopes that the anti-Americanism of the present French Government can be somewhat mitigated.

B. Busy Days for the Government of Vietnam

Between now and Sunday, much activity is planned. June 19, which is the First Anniversary of the Ky Government, has been declared Armed Forces Day, with extensive military ceremonies and with Prime Minister Ky planning to make a speech, calling for unity and, we hear, being conciliatory towards his opponents.

Ky may also try to "settle" the Hue problem by finally establishing Government authority in that city.

His is expected to promulgate the recommendations of the Electoral Commission and affirm the program for elections on September 11.

Finally, the anti-inflation recommendations, including devaluation, are expected to be announced on Saturday, the 18th.

The Government seems to have regained the initiative, at least for the moment, in its collision with the Buddhist Institute. The new Directorate -- its membership increased by ten civilians -- this week met with members of the Election Law Drafting Committee and discussed the draft stature. Out of these discussions of the draft, came the change to use a list voting system instead of permitting candidates to run individually and also the striking out of a proviso that the Constituent Assembly have general legislative powers instead of being merely a Constitutional Convention which will go home after drafting a Constitution. The Assembly can still transform itself later in accordance with the provisions of whatever Constitution it might produce.

Because it is not practicable in Vietnam today to have a primary followed by an election or to have an election followed by a run-off, some arrangement must be made to decide how the names of candidates go on the ballot. In districts which are to have more than one representative, (which is about 25 out of a total of 52 districts) it is planned to make bullet voting impossible. The voter must note for a team of two or a team of three candidates depending on whether he is in a two-man or a three-man district. The commendable purpose of the idea is to stimulate political organizations and the banding together of individual interests. It also appears as though it would tend to prevent Buddhist sweeps in Hue and Danang, and, perhaps, would offer some protection against crypto-Communist candidates.

Tri Quang has threatened a Buddhist Institute boycott of the election and this has been re-echoed by the Institute in Saigon. This threat may turn out not to be important.

Some fifty thousand Catholics paraded through the Saigon streets on June 12 in a well-disciplined show of force. There were no violent incidents of any sort and the main themes of the demonstration were anti-Communism and gratitude to Vietnam's Allies for the help they were providing. As usual, because it was orderly and successful, this demonstration got a fraction of the press attention lavished on some unruly group one/one hundredth of its size.

C. Military

Viet Cong activity increased during the past week, notably in Kontum, a rugged highland province at the junction of the Laos and Cambodia frontiers. Elements of the 101st Airborne had been carrying out an operation in the area. They were attacked in the small hours of June 7 and there were heavy contacts with the enemy over the next three days. We had lost 31 Americans in these engagements by the end of the week. The heroism displayed by our forces -- notably that of Captain Carpenter -- was extraordinary. The incomplete toll of enemy losses: 393 dead and five captives.

Allied forces as a whole killed 1240 Viet Cong during the week and took 166 captives. They also captured 22 crew-served weapons and 413 small arms. Friendly forces lost 229 killed in action (including 72 Americans, 151 Vietnamese, 3 Australians, and 3 Koreans), 783 wounded (including 441 U.S., 328 Vietnamese, 5 Australians, and 9 Koreans), and 34 missing (4 U.S. and 30 Vietnamese). We lost no crew-served weapons, but did lose 91 small arms. Regarding the wounded figure, General Westmoreland says that, on the average, half of our wounded are treated and returned to duty and do not require evacuation for treatment out of Vietnam. The Vietnamese "wounded" figure includes only men who are in the hospital.

D. Chieu Hoi

The number of Chieu Hoi defectors rose slightly during the week. A total of 354 returnees came in. The average is still far below the weekly totals of February and March, -- it contains no report for the First Corps -- but the quality of defectors remained higher than in that earlier period.

E. Economic

Discussions with the Vietnamese to carry out the IMF proposals for economic reforms are progressing. Ky seems determined to go through with these measures

so long as the U. S. gives him assurances of adequate support to finance needed imports -- which AID is doing. We are pressing the Government of Vietnam to move quickly.

I sent Bob Komer last week my recommendations for solving the port problem. We here believe that the U. S. must, in effect, take over port operations, and establish a trucking operation that would move goods away from the port area to holding areas -- and to auction, if they are not picked up quickly by the importers. MACV and USAID are working well together. If the Government of Vietnam accepts this plan, we should be out of the woods on the port problem in six months. This would be a God-send.

F. U. S. Influence

We have been hampered because USAID has not had access to piaster funds to carry out at its discretion needed by unforeseen emergency programs. Ever since my arrival here it has seemed ironic that the United States, which generates millions of piasters by its import program, should find itself unable to spend piasters here and there as our judgment dictates, thus denying us legitimate influence. For us to make sure that our purposes are shared is not "colonialism." We thus have had a quite unbelievable situation in which the Vietnamese do not ask us for favors because, having turned everything over to them, as regards existing programs, we have in effect nothing to give.

For several months we have tried to get direct control of some piaster funds so that we would be able to move expeditiously to meet problems as they arise, including the funding of emergency construction projects such as additional port warehouses; hiring trucks to help clear the port; and helping with medical and refugee activities. After several discussions with the Prime Minister and Cabinet we have now obtained Vietnamese agreement to use one billion piasters. Four hundred and eighty-five million piasters of this amount, or the equivalent of about 6.6 million dollars, was deposited last week to the USAID account. We are moving immediately to make use of these funds and are already utilizing 90 million piaster to build essential port warehouses.

Our help should never be taken for granted. It is wholesome that the Vietnamese should know that an American signature is often necessary.

LODGE

Wednesday, June 15, 1966
10:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

The fact that Hanoi censorship cleared this dispatch for publication in the outside world may repeat may have some significance. As you know, Polish, Canadian, and other diplomats in Hanoi have, for some time, been reporting a change of "tone."

It is obviously of the greatest importance that we not at this critical stage become over-optimistic, let down, or expect any negotiations to be easy, should they come. Nevertheless, this is a change or the beginnings of change.

Aside from the casualty rate in the South, which must be discouraging, and the cumulative weight of the bombing in the North, I tend to believe that the trouble inside Communist China may be working our way. I am by no means prepared to be optimistic in the short-run yet; on the other hand, these bits and pieces should be noted.

W. W. Rostow

Cy: Mogen
Kintman

UNCLASSIFIED

June 14, 1966

FROM PARIS (8745)

1. Department's attention invited to the June 13th Agence France Presse (AFP) item from Jean Raffaeli, AFP correspondent in Hanoi, reporting that there may be indications in Hanoi that North Vietnamese leaders are more favorably disposed to finding a peaceful solution to the Vietnam conflict. This report has also been given coverage on June 14 on the state-controlled radio. Following is an informal translation of the complete text:

2. Begin translation: A new sentiment has emerged in Hanoi during the last few days where certain signs give rise to a trend of optimism and permit hope that a movement toward peace might start in Vietnam even before the end of this year. This optimism is still fragile and nobody talks about peace in Hanoi without caution. However, in well-informed circles it has been said that Vietnamese leaders believe now that the idea of a peaceful solution to conflict is in the process of ripening and that this solution would to a large extent take into account conditions which the North Vietnamese would advance.

3. This hope for a peace opening which had not been expected so soon is shared by diplomatic circles in Hanoi. It is essentially based on the following factors:

A. It is now known and confirmed by sources close to the government in Hanoi that all allies of North Vietnam, with the exception of China, ardently desire a rapid end to the war.

B. Eighteen months ago Peking violently attacked Soviet leaders who had suggested that China should help Americans to withdraw from Vietnam by finding a formula which would permit the Americans to save face. According to a reliable source, the government in Hanoi is today ready "to help the Americans to withdraw without losing face."

C. The North Vietnamese now consider themselves in a position of strength and can therefore seek peace without losing face. This strength is based on the conviction that the country is able to endure American bombings regardless of intensity, on the belief that the Viet Cong are stronger than ever, that the Americans are suffering losses in the South and finally on the certainty that the political crisis in Saigon can only get worse.

D. A visit in the near future of French Envoy Jean Sainteny, who is a personal friend of Ho Chi Minh, might be an occasion for a "peace opening." A comment attributed to Prime Minister Pham Van Dong on

UNCLASSIFIED

the Sainteny visit has made the rounds of embassies in Hanoi. Pham Van Dong is reported to have stated in the presence of a diplomat from a Socialist country that Vietnam, like France, is a "partisan of neutralization" but he reportedly added that things are "not ripe yet." At the same time one hears a great deal in Hanoi about a North Vietnamese delegate who reportedly established contact in May with French Government circles in order to discuss a "neutralist" solution for Vietnam.

4. Foreign observers in Hanoi do not believe, however, that North Vietnam can immediately or even rapidly take the initiative on a peace demarche, nevertheless, they are struck by a change in atmosphere in the North Vietnamese Capital. They know that something is in the process of slowly ripening and that this might be condition for a peace which has been sought for so long. End Translation.

Wednesday, June 15, 1966
10:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

I have the attached letter from Bus Wheeler, asking if you would be prepared to speak to the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces on their opening day, August 19th.

Should you wish to do it, we have a pretty good speech in the sermon barrel which I prepared for a National War College occasion when I was over at State (attached). The letter notes you have until July 15th to reply. - draft of 2/25/66

W. W. Rostow

Accept tentatively _____

Hold it _____

Regret _____



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

10 June 1966

Dear Walt:

Vice Admiral Lee, Commandant of the National War College, has queried me as to the possibility of President Johnson addressing the combined classes of the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces on their opening day, 19 August 1966. You may recall that the President did speak at the opening of the two colleges two years ago. It may be that he will find it useful and convenient to use the same platform again this year.

Admiral Lee states that he needs a definite reply by 15 July in order that he and General Schomburg may firm up their opening day ceremony.

Please let me know as soon as possible if the President is interested.

Sincerely,

EARLE G. WHEELER

Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Wednesday, June 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Security Situation in Guatemala

Ambassador Mein has sent the attached report on the security situation in response to our query.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

cc: Rogers
Kentner

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCM NARS, Date 8-29-85

cc - Bill Moyers

~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

MESSAGE RECEIVED ON JUNE 15, 1966 FROM AMBASSADOR
MEIN IN GUATEMALA

1. The state of siege which was decreed on May 10 and expired on June 10 has been extended for 30 days and presumably will be in effect during the inauguration period. The decree was directed at Communist Party (PGT) and its guerrilla-terrorist arm (FAR) as well as extreme right-ists. Although one hears rumors that the latter are still plotting to avoid Mendez Montenegro's assuming power, nothing is expected of them and they pose no serious security threat. The PGT/FAR continue their activities but, except for three kidnappings, one of which took place since the state of siege was decreed, and the ambush of a patrol in the northern area of the country during the last month, they seem to be primarily concerned now in avoiding an encounter with security forces who have captured at least two of their members in the last few days. We do have reports that the PGT/FAR may be planning some action during the inauguration period, but we have no specifics. In view of the Government of Guatemala's effectiveness in protective security, as demonstrated over the election and transition period, we have no reason to believe that the Government of Guatemala security forces would not be able to handle the situation.
2. The Government is taking all necessary security precautions. As a security measure, the Government of Guatemala and the PR have decided to hold the inauguration ceremony in the Congress rather than a large gymnasium, where it had been originally scheduled. We are in close touch with the security forces and have had no indication from them that they expect any trouble.
3. We have no reason to expect any anti-U. S. disturbances or demonstrations. Neither our policy toward Guatemala nor our position and role during the elections has been made an issue by the PGT/FAR. They supported the PR and Mendez Montenegro in the elections and, although they have since withdrawn their support, presumably still want a change in Government. There have been no threats against Americans. We have information that the PGT/FAR has discussed but discarded the idea of any action against Americans. An alleged kidnapping threat against the German Ambassador and me came, in my opinion, from extreme rightists and in retrospect appears to have been part of the psychological warfare, rather than a serious threat to actually kidnap either of us.
4. We are watching the situation closely and should there be any basis for a change in the above assessment, we will, of course, report it immediately. At this time, however, we have nothing beyond the reports referred to in paragraph 2 to indicate any possible disturbances during the inauguration period.

3-4(b)(1)

5.

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

Pres file~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 15, 1966 - Wednesday

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment with Ellsworth Bunker

You have agreed to receive Ellsworth Bunker at 5:30 p.m. tomorrow. Linc Gordon will accompany him.

The purpose of the visit is to report on key aspects of our Dominican relations. Ellsworth will be bringing the State/AID paper which you requested on our economic program for the Balaguer Government. This is the most important item of business.

Other points which we should cover are:

1. Withdrawal of the IAPF - timing, method and attitude of Garcia Godoy, Balaguer and Bosch; security implications.
2. Prospects for political stability - the nature of Balaguer's majority; how Bosch views his role; likely tactics of the Communists and extreme left; what we should do -- beyond economic assistance -- to bolster Balaguer.
3. Reorganization of the Armed Forces - Balaguer's attitude and plans; changes in the high command; our ideas for the pace and extent of reorganization; how well our police and special force training program is going.
4. United States Representation in the DR - who should be the United States Ambassador -- Charge John Crimmins who had done an excellent job or someone else? Who should be the special delegate to Balaguer's inauguration -- the Vice President, the Chief Justice, Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Goldberg? (Balaguer will be making comparisons with your attendance of Bosch's inaugural.)

DECLASSIFIED**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6****NLJ 98-333**

W. W. Rostow

By cb, **NARA Date** 9-24-99

cc: Bill Moyers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memo for record:

6/15/66 46

Sent Mr. Bowdler the signed ltr to Shlaudeman (he is going to give it to Amb. Bunker to give to S.) Bowdler said Shlaudeman has gone to West Coast for vacation, so would not be able to join Bunker for mtg with Pres (tentatively set up for June 16 5:30 pm). As for inscribed photo, Bowdler to call Juanita to explain that Shlaudeman would not be coming (at which time she thought they could give him the picture), so perhaps they could do something about it in the meantime.

M2

June 15, 1966

46

Memo for Record:

Juanita Roberts said picture was available for President to inscribe; he chose (evidently) not to inscribe. Juanita suggested that perhaps when Shlaudeman comes in, a picture can be given him then. Juanita kept the picture.

LN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, June 14, 1966, 4:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Commendation for Harry Shlaudeman

One of the unsung heroes of our handling of the Dominican situation is Foreign Service Officer Harry Shlaudeman.

Because of his unusual knowledge about the Dominican Republic and his diplomatic skill, he was selected to accompany John Bartlow Martin on his mission. They went to the Dominican Republic on April 30 last year. Harry has remained there almost continuously, providing indispensable backstopping to Mac Bundy and Ellsworth Bunker. He has returned to Washington with Bunker on this trip.

You may want to give special recognition to Harry Shlaudeman's great contribution. Ellsworth Bunker strongly recommends it.

You might:

1. Invite him to accompany Bunker on one of his visits, or
 2. Send him a letter, and perhaps an inscribed photograph.
- A suggested letter and inscription are attached.

OK.

OK

Any other suggestions

L

Walt Rostow

6/15
Told Bredler
sent him
orig. of Shl.
letter.
Told him
about
picture
He is to
call
Jeanita
about
it

Attachments

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

Dear Harry:

June 15, 1966

Ellsworth Bunker has told me of your exceptional contribution to the success of his efforts in the Dominican Republic during the past year. I am also aware how much you helped John Martin and Mac Bundy in their missions.

I convey to you and Mrs. Shlaudeman my gratitude and my pride in having such an outstanding officer in our Foreign Service.

Sincerely,

/s/ LBJ

Mr. Harry W. Shlaudeman
United States Foreign Service Officer
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

LBJ/WGB:BKS:tjs

Suggested Presidential Inscription

To Harry Shlaudeman,

With sincere appreciation and best wishes.

Pm fi

June 14, 1966
Tuesday, 5:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

This note to Joe Palmer from
the Ambassador of Nigeria on your
African speech may interest you.
Obviously your quotation of his
letter to the New York Times was
a ten-strike.

Rtd
6/15/66

W. W. Rostow

By Moyers
Kintner



N. Ade Martins

ny to A71 47a
Embassy of Nigeria
Washington, D.C.

27th May, 1966.

Mr. Joe Palmer, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

My Dear Joe.

A radio commentator said this morning that African diplomats listened to the President's speech yesterday with "deep solemnity". That was, I think an understatement of the feeling when we listened yesterday to so perceptive and so eloquent an assessment of the basic problems which underlie my continent's relations with the outside world and particularly with the United States of America.

The President's statesmanlike moderation lent conviction to words which constitute an unambiguous commitment to the cause of African-American friendship.

Please accept this as an expression of my earnest thanks for the rare privilege of being among so select an audience on so memorable an occasion.

I have (frequently and with admiration) quoted the President but have never dared to hope that he would one day retaliate!

By the way, my letter to the Times was somewhat excised at the request of the Editor for reasons of space allocation. I enclose a copy of the original letter.

Yours Sincerely,
N. Ade Martins

N. Ade Martins.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

87-129

By *inf*

NARA, Date 3-1-89

Encl.

NC/S/15

The Editor,
The New York Times,
Times Square,
New York, N. Y. 10036.

12th May, 1966.

Sir,

There is in these troubled and testing times an entirely praiseworthy preoccupation among thoughtful people everywhere with what can be described as a contagious fever of human wickedness and folly. The world is so full of disorder stupidity and injustice that the quest for some magic formula which will help to arrest the downward slide towards an unavoidable abyss has become almost frantic. It requires an unusual serenity of mind to look at mankind's bewildering tangle of problems and see them "steady and whole."

As an African, therefore, I did not expect Mr. Drew Middleton to come back from my continent radiant with glad tidings. But my last visit there was recent enough for me to feel that his picture of the current state of affairs, although utterly free from malice, is a trifle overdrawn. If I venture to take issue with him on one or two points, it is solely in the hope that what I say will comfort some of his readers who may be striving to preserve a measure of faith in the future of Africa.

The necessary process of house-cleaning undertaken in the wake of the collapse of outmoded regimes has tended to give the impression that corruption in public office is like the giraffe both native and peculiar to Africa. Our ill wishers have been delighted to see us engaged in what they interpret as a parade of our own shame. They have also tried to multiply the cast of villainous characters by suggesting that the solicitations of bribes is a vice which has infected every level of African society. There has been reference to the habit, in Nigeria, of "dashing" persons from whom favours have been received or are sought. But the

word has its origin in a practice as harmless as "tipping" in the West and came into general use during an Era when Europeans blessed with artificially inflated incomes were fond of displaying their ability to confer patronage. There is also an echo here of the ancient and perfectly honourable African custom of welcoming a stranger with a gift of value commensurate with his known or estimated rank and relying on him to reciprocate in the fulness of time as a seal of friendship. Thus the "dash" like so many things, becomes pernicious only when it is deviously misused.

What is significant in Africa today is not so much the presence of corruption (for where on this perfect globe can its faint odour not be detected?) so much as the sense of outrage which that presence has spontaneously aroused. If Africans can demonstrate so marked a resentment of corruption they cannot all be incurably corruptible themselves.

Another word which has of late come to be used almost exclusively in a pejorative context is "tribalism". No Nigerian will dispute the massive harm that can be done by unbridled rivalry between the tribes. (There is ample historical evidence of that from the long, bloody and senseless feud between the tribes of York and Lancaster during The War of Roses). The old imperial maxim of "divide and rule" has now taken on for us, as we well realise, the suicidal meaning of "divide and destroy." But we do not argue from this melancholy premise that the old tribal system is an obsolete and contaminated relic of a barbarious past.

Tribal grouping happened in logical sequence in the development of society. Beyond the individual there is the family. Beyond the family there is the clan, then the tribe, the nation and finally humanity. It is where tribal loyalty becomes so ossified as to impede development of a concept of unity on a national basis, that a painful surgery is called for to remove the root cause of the malady that inhibits the healthy

growth towards the humanity concept. This we in Africa have recognised and have set out to correct without the help of those pundits who now see this defect with intuitive hindsight and lofty disdain.

Mr. Middleton is perfectly right in emphasising the telescope speed at which history is rushing on in Africa. In his fourth article which appears in today's issue of the Times however he states:

"The painfully slow development of nationhood and national power among the Black African states is turning an African issue into a world issue."

In the context of repetitious experience in Europe and of less than a decade of self rule, I would see development of nationhood in Black Africa as alarmingly swift. My fear is that more out of haste than malice, the world may be presented with an enlarged picture of a snap-shot taken through a telescopic lens which was not quite in focus at exposure time. If I may jump to a more manageable metaphor what matters most about new nations is not that they have growing pains but that they are in fact growing.

Africa has had less than ten years to prove that her nations are fit to be members of a thermo-nuclear comity. Please allow her another telescoped decade.

I have the honour to be

Your Obedient Servant

N. ADE MARTINS
AMBASSADOR OF NIGERIA.

RECEIVED 11/11/66
MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
LONDON


47c

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 28, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW
The White House

I think you will be interested in the attached copy of a letter which I have received from Ambassador Martins of Nigeria and which I think well summarizes the reactions I have been receiving from other African Ambassadors. It has occurred to me that the President might also be interested.


Joseph Palmer 2nd

Enclosure:

May 27, 1966 letter from
Ambassador N. Ade Martins.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, June 14, 1966, 5:25 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Farewell Call by Ambassador Ritchie

Canadian Ambassador Ritchie, who has been here since May 1962, has been assigned as Ambassador to NATO. He has just asked for a farewell appointment with you some time during the next three days (June 15, 16, 17).

If your calendar permits, this would be a good thing to do. It need take only a few minutes.



Francis M. Bator

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

*He needs his back
stiffened a bit.
Walt*

Tuesday, June 14, 1966, 5:00 p.m.

*Info from
Pm
6/15/66*

Mr. President:

Fenoaltea, the Italian Ambassador, called to give me his evaluation of the Italian Municipal elections in which six million people voted.

1. The Christian Democrats regained strength from the Right, especially the extreme Right.
2. The Social Democrats (Saragat's party) also did well.
3. The Socialists (Nenni) did well despite the split in their party. They feared an erosion to the Left which did not occur.
4. The Communists lost ground a little. This was especially important because they hoped to become the single biggest party in Rome, having come within 18,000 votes of the Christian Democrats last time. The margin this time was 100,000.

In short, the moderate center parties gained at the expense of the extreme Left and the extreme Right. The tendency toward polarization was reversed. This was a success for Moro's coalition -- and for us all.

W. W. Rostow

Tuesday, June 14, 1966 -- 4:45 p. m.

Mr. President

As the attached makes clear, State recommends that you see Ambassador Walter P. McCaughy before he takes up his post on Taiwan.

Amb. McCaughy will be here between today, June 14 and Friday, June 24.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

*Pres will not see McCaughy
Mr. Rostow will see him
S/S notified*

WWRostow:rlh

1817
50a

JUN 10 1966

**MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE**

**Subject: Request for Appointment with
You for Ambassador Walter P.
McConaughy**

Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy wishes to call on you at a convenient time after Tuesday, June 14 and before Friday, June 24. The Ambassador will be in Washington between those dates preparatory to taking up his assignment as Ambassador to the Republic of China. The Ambassador will also be available to others in the White House who may wish to see him in connection with his new assignment and recommendations for such other calls would be appreciated. A biographic sketch of the Ambassador is enclosed.

/s/ HERBERT B. THOMPSON

**Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary**

Enclosure:

As stated.

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 JUN 10 PM 6 07

WALTER P. McCONAUGHY, AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Ambassador McConaughy was born in Alabama on September 11, 1908, and was graduated from Birmingham-Southern College in 1928. He did graduate work at Duke University. After doing some teaching at the high school and college level, he entered the Foreign Service in 1930. He has served in many posts -- chiefly in the Far East, but including several in Latin America. He is a graduate of the National War College. During recent years, he has served as: Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (1952-1957); Ambassador to Burma (1957-1959); Ambassador to Korea (1959-1961); Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (1961); Ambassador to Pakistan (1962-1966); and Special Representative of the President to President CHIANG Kai-shek's inauguration, May 20, 1966. He attained the rank of Career Minister in August 1960.

Ambassador McConaughy is married and he and his wife have two daughters.

June 9, 1966

Pres. file 51

June 14, 1966
Tuesday, 4:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

This report is worth a glance.
It reports the first beginnings of
successful aid on a self-help basis
in Laos.

*Rel'd
6/15*

W. W. Rostow

*Cy Moyer
Kirtan*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

June 2, 1966

FROM VIENTIANE (A-1247)

FOR BELL AND POATS FROM MENDENHALL

1. After traveling extensively to provinces in all parts of Laos during the past two months, I am convinced we have found effective means of getting our aid down to the people. This is particularly striking accomplishment in Laos, where in the past so much of our aid has been siphoned off at the top.

2. Village cluster activities represent one of the effective means of getting aid to the people. It enables us to concentrate resources rather than scatter them ineffectively. It also involves assignment of Americans right down to the village level for establishment of close contact with local authorities and people. The agriculture program, with its stress on small self-help irrigation dams and improved seeds, is also proving an effective device of getting to the people. Education, Village Health and Small Access Roads programs also serve the same purpose.

3. On a trip last week, Chao Khoueng (Provincial Governor) of Saravane expressed great pleasure to me over what has been undertaken in his province during the past several months. In addition to village schools and dispensaries, Lao Director of Agriculture and I outlined to him during our visit procedures for supplying agricultural credit for farmers buying water buffalo for plowing to replace those lost in an epidemic a few months ago. If this proposal for up to 300 buffalo works as planned, it will be the first instance of agricultural credit in Lao history. These actions led the Chao Khoueng to exclaim enthusiastically to us that now we have found a means of getting aid down to the villagers.

4. Attitudinal changes of villagers toward the government are, of course, harder to measure. While a certain amount of force account construction has been undertaken in the accelerated Sedone Valley Development Program, we are generally putting maximum and increasing emphasis on self-help, because this is the best proof of whether villagers really want the projects being carried out. Most village schools and dispensaries are now built on this basis. Irrigation dams are done virtually completely on a self-help basis, with USAID furnishing the concrete, reinforcing rods and supervision and the villagers furnishing sand, gravel and labor for dams and for digging canals. We even plan to try to move to some extent in this direction in towns, where self-help is harder to organize and may have to be done differently from ways pursued in the villages.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

5. A further indication of success in the rural program is demands we are receiving from villagers outside clusters for help. We are confronted with various requests for extending boundaries of cluster areas and for creation of clusters in additional areas. We are also faced with many demands for irrigation and water conservation dams from many parts of the country where the people are aware of the self-help element we require. We are responding to these requests wherever our resources permit, without falling back into the earlier scatteration approach where we were overextended.

6. We are also seeking every opportunity to identify the program in the countryside with the Lao Government at all levels. Proposals and projects must come up to us through Lao channels. Whenever I travel, I take officials from the central government with me if they are available to go. In the provinces, I always travel with the Chao Khoueng.

7. The Chao Khouengs, in fact, play a major role in the political effectiveness of the program. Where there is an able, energetic Chao Khoueng willing to bestir himself to get out to the villages, it is much easier to identify the program in the villagers' minds with the Government. We have such Chao Khouengs in Saravane, Sayaboury, Wapikhamthong, Borikhane and Luang Prabang, as well as several other provinces. We still hit an occasional vegetable, however, like the Chao Khoueng of Sedone.

8. We and appropriate Lao Government officials are also aware of the importance of the economic effectiveness of the program. The Mission has good relations with Chao Somsavath, Lao Director of Agriculture, who is vigorously pushing the agricultural program, which is the key to economic progress. We travel frequently with him and are impressed with his concepts, approach, sense of organization, drive and ability to get across to provincial officials.

9. With success in getting to the people, we can largely ignore the minor static that sometimes emanates from certain Vientiane circles about the aid program. It arises primarily from our tightening of leaky faucets in USIP and the Invisibles programs. The best course for dealing with these noises is just to let them play themselves out.

10. Certain members of the National Assembly particularly like to act as self-appointed gadflies on the aid program. It would be easy to over-react to these proddings of National Assembly members. However, to place

these views in proper perspective, it is perhaps worth mentioning that the National Assembly has done about three things since election a year ago: (a) increase salaries of its members, (b) demand first class rather than tourist passage in international air travel for deputies, (c) push USAID to provide jeeps for each Deputy under USIP.

11. ~~Because of National Assembly criticisms at the last session, we have gotten up a brochure describing the aid program in detail and laying out projects, province by province.~~ Not unexpectedly, it is being nitpicked by some chronic complainers. Although former President of the National Assembly Phoui Sananikone told us before publication that the Lao translation was in the best classical Lao, some of the younger critics are deriding it saying that the Lao is such that they cannot understand it. It may well be, of course, that these French-educated Deputies cannot really understand Lao very well. ~~We are, therefore, putting out a French edition of the brochure.~~

12. In view of indications, especially from the provinces, that we are generally on the right track in getting our aid down to the people, we shall push along as rapidly as we can in both social and economic development and in identifying the Lao Government with our program and our program with the Government.

~~XXXXXX~~ Tuesday, June 14, 1966
4:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Commendation for Harry Shlaudeman

One of the unsung heroes of our handling of the Dominican situation is Foreign Service Officer Harry Shlaudeman.

Because of his unusual knowledge about the Dominican Republic and his diplomatic skill, he was selected to accompany John Bartlow Martin on his mission. They went to the Dominican Republic on April 30 last year. Harry has remained there almost continuously, providing indispensable backstopping to Mac Bundy and Ellsworth Bunker. He has returned to Washington with Bunker on this trip.

You may want to give special recognition to Harry Shlaudeman's great contribution. Ellsworth Bunker strongly recommends it.

You might:

1. Invite him to accompany Bunker on one of his visits, or
2. Send him a letter, and perhaps an inscribed photograph.
A suggested letter and inscription are attached.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

*To Pres**ret'd 6/15/66
approved**gave to Helina
to call Jay Brown
12F X22414*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tues., June 14, 1966
3:00 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a loan for Ethiopia, which has the backing of State and AID; the acquiescence of Secretary Fowler and Schultze. As you know, our direct security interests in Ethiopia are substantial, as are our political stakes in a moderate, friendly government. I support the Bell/Schultze recommendation.

W. Rostow
W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 4

53a
DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JUN 4 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Hydroelectric Project Loan for Ethiopia

AID requests your approval to negotiate a \$21.7 million loan for a 100,000 kilowatt hydroelectric project in Ethiopia. The loan will finance U. S. dollar costs of engineering, equipment and construction of a dam on the Finchaa River. The principal local contractor will be the Ethiopian Electric Light and Power Company which will cover \$6.1 million of local costs. Principal and interest will be repaid in U. S. dollars by the Ethiopian Government.

In both economic and political terms, I think this is a worth-while project. We have a serious political stake in Ethiopia as a moderately pro-western state with a good record of political stability and considerable influence in the African world. ~~This project may be our only new capital involvement in Ethiopia this year, and it concentrates U. S. efforts in a way which makes excellent economic sense.~~ The market demand for power in Ethiopia is large and growing, the rate structure is sensible, and the power authority is capable of handling the new facility. Concessional rates of 2 1/2% are justified considering Ethiopia's external finances. There should be no difficulty for Ethiopia to repay the loan over its 40-year term.

The Ethiopian program is one of the oldest U. S. assistance efforts in Africa--dating back to 1951. However, Ethiopia continues to labor under some fundamental economic handicaps. Government administration of development is also still hampered by conflict between the conservative, ruling family and older officials and the growing number of energetic, educated young officials. But there is progress. The Emperor is beginning to show awareness of the need for effective development policies and the Ethiopian Government has been increasing its self-help efforts.

~~Because this loan is tied to the procurement of U. S. goods, it will have only a minimal effect on the U. S. balance of payments. Secretary Fowler concurs in this judgment.~~

I recommend you authorize Dave Bell to enter into negotiations for this loan.

Charles L. Schultze

Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachment

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

approved for H.H.F. per R.H.

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 4	DECLASSIFIED
By <i>R.H.</i>	NARS, Date <i>8-29-85</i>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON

MAY 17 1966

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: New Project Approval - Finchaa Hydroelectric Project in Ethiopia

I recommend that you authorize me to proceed with a development loan of \$21.7 million to the Ethiopian Electric Light and Power Authority (EELPA) for the Finchaa Hydroelectric Project. The loan will cover the U.S. costs of engineering, equipment, and construction of a dam and associated hydroelectric facilities designed to help meet the expanding demand for electric power in Ethiopia. The Departments of State and the Treasury concur.

Additional electric power is needed to electrify greater areas of the country and to serve a growing number of small industries in Ethiopia. As part of the rapid expansion of EELPA's facilities which has included an IBRD loan of \$23.5 million in 1964, the project will provide the additional power necessary to satisfy demands projected through 1978. By supplying a reliable and sufficient source of electric power to Ethiopia's major industries, at reasonable rates, the project will have a significant impact on the economic development of the country.

The total cost of the project is just under \$28 million, of which approximately \$22 million is required in U.S. dollars, and the remainder in local currency. A.I.D. proposes to finance the U.S. costs of the project, and EELPA will finance all non-U.S. costs.

The Finchaa hydroelectric project is an outgrowth of several years of U.S.-Ethiopian cooperation in the development of the resources of the Blue Nile River Basin. In 1957, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) started a major study of the development of the area. The study was completed in October 1964, at a total cost of \$4.5 million. At the time of the State Visit of His Majesty Haile Selassie I in the fall of 1963, the Finchaa project was discussed with the Minister of Finance. The USBR study had progressed by that time to the point that we knew that a major recommendation would be the construction of the Finchaa Dam. During discussions with the Minister,

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-128

By *ip* NARA. Date 3-1-90

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

A.I.D. agreed to conduct a full feasibility study of the Finchaa project upon completion of the USBR study. A.I.D. further agreed to consider the project for financing, subject to the satisfactory conclusion of this study. These agreements were confirmed by A.I.D.'s letter of October 1, 1963 to the Minister upon his departure, which expressed A.I.D.'s willingness to "assist with detailed preliminary engineering... actual project design and cost estimates, a cadastral survey of the area..., a study of power demand, and an overall cost/benefit analysis," and "to consider a loan for the project" if the results of such further studies were favorable.

The USBR report, published in October 1964, identified the Finchaa project as the next priority for electric power development in Ethiopia. The full feasibility study was therefore undertaken as had been agreed with the Minister of Finance. This detailed study, completed in January 1966, concluded that the project as conceived was technically and financially sound, and that it would make a significant contribution to the economic development of Ethiopia.

The Government of Ethiopia has followed in recent years policies generally consistent with U.S. objectives. It is in the U.S. interest to ensure, to the extent possible, the continuance of a moderate pro-western government with considerable influence in African affairs. The Emperor, Haile Selassie I, has become an important and effective senior statesman in Africa. Ethiopia's influence in African affairs has been enhanced by the location in Addis Ababa of headquarters for two major Africa-wide organizations: the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the Organization of African Unity.

It is A.I.D.'s view that Ethiopia's continuing leadership within Africa can be assured only if a reasonable rate of economic progress is evident internally. It is broadly for this reason that the U.S. is supporting in Ethiopia a fairly considerable level of technical, military, and capital assistance.

An additional factor affecting our interest in Ethiopia is our desire to retain the use of the facilities at Kagnew Station.

The entire amount of the loan will be for U. S. procurement of goods and services. Therefore, the loan will have no adverse effect on the U.S. balance of payments, except for the possibility that a small amount might be spent for personal items by U.S. contractor personnel in Ethiopia or en route between the U.S. and Ethiopia. This sum will, however, be of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

negligible magnitude since all living expenses of U.S. contractor personnel in Ethiopia will be borne by the borrower as part of its contribution to the project.

Recommendation: That you authorize me to approve this loan.

David E. Bell
David E. Bell

Tuesday, June 14, 1966 7:16 p

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Latin American Press Reaction to the Dominican Election

You will be interested in the attached summary prepared by USIA of Latin American news media treatment of the elections in the Dominican Republic.

It could hardly be more favorable.

W. W. Rostow

Leak to press _____

Leak for Congressional Record _____

No gloating: clam up _____

Attachment

**cc: Bill Moyers
Bob Kintner**

USIA-INS/AL
Current Brief
June 14, 1966

LATIN AMERICAN MEDIA REACTION TO THE DR ELECTION

Summary:

Latin American media reaction to the results of the Dominican election has been copious and overwhelmingly favorable. The freedom and honesty of the election were commended in all countries except Cuba, and with very few dissenting voices.

Balaguer's victory was interpreted as the expression of the Dominican people's desire for peace and order, and as a rebuff to extremism and communism. A number of commentators pointed out that communism has never been able to come to power through elections. Bosch's defeat was ascribed to various factors. Several editorials suggested that Bosch was not as popular today as the world had been led to believe by the noise of a few extremists. Others posited such reasons for his defeat as his failure to campaign throughout the country, and his lack of courage in refusing to leave his house, and, earlier, to return to the Dominican Republic to lead the 1965 revolution. Also given as reasons for his defeat were his failure, when President, to keep his campaign promises (particularly to the peasants), and to control the far left.

Some newspapers saw the election results as a vindication of US action, and OAS supervision. If the IAPF was mentioned, most commentators favored its withdrawal, although acknowledging its influence in assuring peaceful elections.

Almost all media emphasized that the results of the elections must be respected by the opposition, for the good of the country. Some editorials were pessimistic of the future, but most, while envisaging some unrest, were optimistic. Many editorials mentioned the unquestionable mandate given Balaguer by his large margin of victory.

Around much of the media comment there was an atmosphere which might be characterized as a sigh of relief.

Significant Quotes:

The Peruvian press welcomed the election results. La Prensa (moderately conservative), June 5, concluded, "the people put their votes and hopes in favor of a moderate element of reform." On the same day, La Cronica (conservative) called Bosch a "useful imbecile" and claimed the elections "buried unmourned all charges concerning US intervention and indicated they were false." El Correo (independent), June 5, asserted that the people "had chosen between an invitation to stability and an invitation to adventurism" and said it was not logical to allege fraud in the case of a process watched over by impartial observers and guaranteed by the OAS.

In Mexico one dissenting voice in Novedades (moderately conservative), June 4, claimed that the election was rigged, but on the previous day a Novedades editorial called the elections "a rehabilitation of the popular will and sovereignty," and on June 9 the same newspaper called it "a victory for order." Mexico's English-language News, June 4, said that "the very fact that the island republic was an electoral goldfish bowl gives an odd ring to any charge of fraud appreciable enough to affect Balaguer's wide margin." El Sol de Mexico (conservative) foresaw that "the Reds will not resign themselves to losing. It should not be forgotten that Communists have never attained power via the polls." Mexico's Marxist El Dia carried an article on June 10 which attributed the results of the elections to the "vacillations and contradictions" of candidate Bosch. The daily called the elections "pseudo-democratic."

Santiago, Chile's most influential newspapers acclaimed the honesty and orderliness of the election. El Mercurio (right-of-center) said "the activities of revolutionaries concentrated in a section of the capital city made the continent believe that the Dominican people desired Bosch's return to power, but, in the serenity of an election controlled by impartial elements and supervised by observers from all the American Republics, the contrary was proved and the verdict of the polls was categorical." El Diario Ilustrado (conservative) stated that the elections "took place with the greatest freedom and correctness. The Dominican Republic has taken a decisive step in its political development."

Bogota's El Tiempo (moderately liberal) in a June 3 article said, "the US action was inevitable. It may have to be repeated in the future, hopefully not by the US but by all Latin American democracies." El Espectador (liberal), June 3, also stated that as a result of the elections "a restructuring of the OAS was made evident."

Costa Rica's La Republica (liberal) on June 6 called the elections "clean, peaceful and an expression of the Dominican people's free will. The only people who are not satisfied, obviously, are the Communists who hate the polling booth as the devil hates the cross." On the same day, its compatriot La Nacion (conservative) said the elections were "a triumph of democracy" and added, "the sovereign will of the people, freely and honestly expressed through the medium of suffrage, must be respected."

Buenos Aires' La Prensa (conservative) on June 3 declared that communism "has suffered a decisive defeat. Communism can overthrow governments but it cannot win elections. The Dominican people have chosen freely; the OAS forces will be withdrawn leaving them /Dominican people/ to enjoy their sovereignty."

The Managua daily La Prensa (liberal) on June 7 stressed that the elections were "honest and clean" and that the Dominican people had voted "for peace and tranquility." In discussing Juan Bosch, the newspaper said that "we have to recognize that a friend of ours lost and we have to say that /Bosch/ has to know how to lose. All of them /observers to the elections/ considered the elections to be clean and honest."

Principal Uruguayan newspapers confirmed the "purity and normality" of the Dominican elections. El Plata (nationalist) of Montevideo stressed on June 6 that the "propaganda campaigns of Moscow and Peking were so strident that almost the entire world believed that Juan Bosch was assured of victory. Now the farce has been uncovered...." Montevideo's El Debate (frequently anti-US) called the elections "a victory for serenity" and the afternoon Los Vecinos (left-of-center) noted that the elections came off "normally and without incidents. Now it is necessary that the results be respected."

To Venezuelan observers on the scene, the elections were "honest and clean." The Venezuelan press on June 6 rejected the allegation that fraud had been committed. El Universal (conservative) noted that the "election results indicated conclusively the victory of Joaquín Balaguer." The English-language Daily Journal stressed that "the opinion of foreign observers is that this election was fair and clean. Since it was a repudiation of the left, there will probably be a reaction from that quarter." On June 3 the same newspaper predicted that "Santo Domingo will join Venezuela as an enduring democracy."

Current Brazilian press play on the election results did not question the validity of the elections or outcome. The opposition press in Rio stressed the theme that the elections were guaranteed by Brazilian troops in the Dominican Republic.

The Panamanian afternoon El Mundo (conservative) on June 6 noted that international Communist propaganda on learning of Balaguer's victory "tried to give the impression that it was strictly a North American imperialist maneuver, and this interpretation is simply not true."

Guatemala's El Imparcial (moderately liberal), June 6, interpreted the elections as a support by the "Dominican people for the principles of democracy and nationalism, as well as a natural rejection of violence. The Organization of American States should feel pleased that the 'Dominican problem' has reached this phase."

San Salvador's La Prensa Gráfica (moderately conservative), June 6, praised the elections as proof of the strength of democratic ideals in the Dominican Republic, which "has taken a firm step towards incorporating itself into the democratic life. No one can honestly say that the Dominican people have not expressed their will plainly."

Tegucigalpa's El Nacional (nationalist party organ), June 6, discussed the violence and political instability that existed in the DR last year and said the results of the election now should be a source of "civic pride" for all Dominicans. El Cronista (independent, liberal), June 6, also of Honduras stressed that the victory of Balaguer's party is a "fact." The presence of OAS observers, the IAPF and other unofficial observers indicate that the elections were "democratic."

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1966

Walt -

USIA has completed a short survey of Latin American reaction to the Dominican elections. The results are attached.

In line with the President's "no gloating" edict, I doubt that he would want us to make the USIA report into an item for the Congressional Record.

WGB

WGB

Mr. Rostow

Couldnt source Congressman

Do?

BICS