

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

176

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2a memo	to President from Rostow re: CIAP confidential <i>open 1-26-89 NLS 87-198</i> 1 p	07/15/66	A
#12a memo <i>open 2/10/98</i>	to Dean Rusk re: statement made by British PM confidential <i>Exempt NLS 87-193 exempt NLS 98-246</i> 1 p	07/13/66	A
#13 memo	to President from Rostow re: Saudi Arabia secret <i>Exempt NLS 87-200 Sanitized 2-18-93 duplicate 152</i> <i>open 10-19-99 NLS 98-343</i> 1 p	07/14/66	A
#13a memo	to WWR from Hal Saunders secret <i>open 3-17-89 NLS 87-200</i> 1 p	07/13/66	A
#14 memo	to President from Rostow re: aviation agreement with Canadians confidential <i>Sanitized 7-21-89 NLS 87-196</i> 1 p	07/14/66	A
#18a memo	to President from Prime Minister Wilson Secret <i>Exempt NLS 50-245</i> <i>Open 6/24/00 NLS 98-166</i> 2 p	07/15/66	A
#21a cable	Saigon 879 <i>more info released 8-4-88 NLS 87-195</i> Secret <i>Sanitized 3-10-88 NLS 86-55</i> <i>[Dup. in DIARY BACKUP- 7/18/66] Sanitized 10-19-99 NLS 98-342</i> 7 p	07/13/66	A
#22a report	re: Cambodia confidential <i>open 7-21-89 NLS 87-196</i> 2 p	07/13/66	A
#24 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 3-17-89 NLS 87-193</i> 1 p	07/13/66	A
#25 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 7-21-89 NLS 87-196</i> 1 p	07/13/66	A
#25a List	subjects for discussion between President and PM confidential <i>open 7-21-89 NLS 87-196</i> 1 p	undated	A
#27 memo	to President from Rostow confidential 1 p	07/13/66	A
#30 memo	to President from Rostow <i>Sanitized 3-28-97 NLS 96-288</i> top secret - 1 p	07/13/66	A
#30a report	re: China <i>exempt 2-22-99 NLS 96-289</i> top secret - <i>exempt per RAC 5/03</i> 1 p	07/13/66	A
#36 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 7-21-89 NLS 87-196</i> 1 p	07/13/66	A
#37a report	preparations for Proposed Inter-American Summit Meeting Secret <i>NLS 84-153 8-18-86</i> 6 p	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President
Rostow, Vol. 8 July 1-15, 1966
Box 9R

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

286

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#38 memo	to President from Rostow re: Argentine confidential <i>open 1-26-89 NLS 87-198</i>	1 p 07/13/66	A
#39 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 10-19-99</i> confidential <i>Exempt NLS 87-198 NLS 98-343</i>	1 p 07/13/66	A
#39a letter	to Marvin Watson from J. Edgar Hoover confidential <i>open 9-22-88 NLS 88-53</i>	2 p 07/12/66	A
#42a memo	to President from Rostow re: report of mission to SEA, India & Pakistan secret <i>open 3-17-89 NLS 87-200</i>	2 p 07/12/66	A
#44 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 3-17-89 NLS 87-193</i> secret	1 p 07/12/66	A
#44a memo	to Rostow from Ben Read re: POL Strikes secret <i>open 8-4-88 NLS 87-195</i>	2 p 07/11/66	A
#45 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 7-21-89 NLS 87-196</i>	1 p 07/12/66	A
#46 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 3-17-89 NLS 87-193</i> secret	1 p 07/12/66	A
#47 memo	to President from WWR re: Nepal secret <i>open 3-17-89 NLS 87-200</i>	1 p 07/12/66	A
#47e report	re: Nepal secret <i>open 8-4-89 NLS 88-160</i>	4 p undated	A
#49 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 11/25/96 NLS 94-290</i> confidential <i>Exempt NLS 87-198</i>	1 p 07/12/66	A
#54 letter	to LT. GEN J. A. Ankrah from LBJ possible classified info	1 p 07/12/66	A
#52 memo	to Sec. Def from LBJ top secret - Exempt NLS 87-192 <i>sanitized 1-29-01 NLS 98-356</i>	1 p 07/12/66	A
#52a memo	to Chairman US AEC from LBJ top secret - Exempt NLS 87-192 <i>sanitized 1-29-01 NLS 98-356</i>	1 p 07/12/66	A
#52b memo	to President from Rostow top secret - Exempt NLS 87-192 <i>sanitized 1-29-01 NLS 98-356</i>	2 p 07/11/66	A
#52c memo	to Rostow from C. E. Johnson <i>sanitized 1-29-01 NLS 98-356</i> top secret - Exempt NLS 87-192	1 p 07/01/66	xy A

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376

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#53 memo	to SecDef & Chairman, AEC from LBJ <i>open 7/21/98</i> secret <i>Exempt NLS 87-192</i> 1 p	07/12/66	A
#53a memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 1-29-01</i> secret <i>Exempt NLS 87-192</i> 2 p	07/11/66	A
#54 memo	to President re: reply to letter from Gen. Ankras possible classified info <i>open 10-19-99 NLS 98-343</i> <i>conf. per NLS 87-196</i> 1 p	07/08/66	A
#54b letter	to Pres. Johnson from Gen. Ankras <i>Exempt NLS 87-196</i> possible classified info <i>open 7/21/98</i> 2 p	06/13/66	A
#59 memo	to President from Rostow top secret <i>open 3-17-89 NLS 87-193</i> 1 p	07/11/66	A
#59a memo	to President from Maxwell Taylor top secret <i>open 3-17-89 NLS 87-193</i> 2 p	07/11/66	A
#61a cable	text of Rome 153 top secret <i>open 12-9-92 NLS 91-437</i> 1 p	07/10/66	A
#64 memo	to President from W. W. Rostow <i>open 8-25-94 NLS 93-176 appeal</i> secret <i>Exempt NLS 87-198</i> <i>Exempt NLS 93-176</i> 1 p	07/11/66	A
#67 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 7-21-89 NLS 87-196</i> 1 p	07/11/66	A
#68 memo	to President from WWR re: East Pakistan's food problems secret <i>open 3-17-89 NLS 87-200</i> 1 p	07/11/66	A
#68a cable	Karachi 221 secret <i>open 9-9-87 NLS 87-197</i> 1 p	undated	A
#69 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 3-17-89 NLS 87-193</i> secret 1 p	07/10/66	A
#69a cable	Saigon 643 secret <i>open 8-4-88 NLS 87-195</i> 3 p	07/10/66	A
#72 memo	to President from W. W. Rostow re: Argentine confidential <i>open 1-26-89 NLS 87-198</i> 1 p	07/09/66	A
#74 cable	to President from Bromley Smith re: Goldberg's conversation with Pope in Rome top secret <i>downgraded to secret per NLS 87-193</i> <i>open 7/21/98</i> 3 p	07/08/66	A
#75 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 7/21/98</i> secret <i>Exempt NLS 87-193</i> 2 p	07/09/66	A

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476

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#76 cable	to President from Rostow Secret open 3-17-89 NLJ 87-193	1 p 07/09/66	A
#76a memo	to President from Rostow open 12-9-92 NLJ 91-437 secret	1 p 07/09/66	A
#78a memcon	Conversation with Amb. Dobrynin " secret Exempt NLJ 87-196	2 p 07/08/66	A
#80 memo	to President from Rostow secret open 3-17-89 NLJ 87-193	1 p 07/08/66	A#XXXXXXXXXX
#80a memo	to President from Maxwell Taylor secret open 3-17-89 NLJ 87-193	1 p 06/13/66	A
#80b memo	to Sec. Rusk from W. W. Rostow secret open 3-17-89 NLJ 87-193	1 p 04/28/66	A
#80d memo	to President from Maxwell Taylor secret open 3-17-89 NLJ 87-193	4 p 04/27/66	A
#81 memo	for Deputy Sec of Def from W. W. Rostow secret - sanitized 9-5-89 NLJ 87-192 open 8/30/02 NLJ 98-341	1 p 07/08/66	A
#81a memo	to President from W. W. Rostow secret - sanitized 9-5-89 NLJ 87-192 open 8/30/02 NLJ 98-341	1 p 07/05/66	A
#81b memo	to President from Cyrus Vance open 10-20-99 secret sanitized 11-3-89 NLJ 87-191 NLJ 98-340	2 p 06/09/66	A
#81c report	re: military sanitized 10-20-99 NLJ 98-340 secret sanitized 11-3-89 NLJ 87-191	2 p undated	A
#83 memo	from Bill Moyers from to President confidential open 1-26-89 NLJ 87-198	1 p 07/07/66	A
#84 memo	to President from Bromley Smith open 7/21/98 secret Exempt NLJ 87-193	2 p 07/07/66	A
#85 memo	to President from Rostow confidential open 3-17-89 NLJ 87-193	2 p 07/07/66	A
#86 memo	to President from Rostow Secret Exempt NLJ 87-193	2 p 07/07/66	A
#87 memo	to President from Bator confidential open 7-21-89 NLJ 87-196	1 p 07/06/66	A

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Rostow, Vol. 8 July 1-15, 1966
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576

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#88 memo	to President from Francis Bator secret open 7-21-89 NLJ 87-196 2 p	07/06/66	A
#88b memo	to President from Henry Fowler confidential open 7-30-92 NLJ 90-244 3 p	06/30/66	A
#88c report	re: debt and long term investments confidential open 7-30-92 NLJ 90-244 1 p	06/01/66	A
#89a memo	to President from Rostow secret open 7-21-89 NLJ 87-196 1 p	07/05/66	A
#89b memo	to President from George Ball secret sanitized 6-5-89 NLJ 87-196 OPEN 2-10-98 NLJ 98-172 4 p	07/01/66	A
#90 memo	to President from W. W. Rostow secret - sanitized 9-5-89 NLJ 87-192 1 p sanitized 8/30/02 NLT 98-341 more info released	07/05/66	A
#90a memo	to President from Cyrus Vance secret - Exempt NLJ 87-191 sanitized 11-22-96 NLJ 92-295 2 p sanitized 8/30/02 NLT 98-341 more info released NLJ 92-295 Appeal	06/11/66	A
#90b memo	to President from Cyrus Vance secret - Exempt NLJ 87-191 sanitized 11-22-96 NLJ 92-295 2 p sanitized 8/30/02 NLT 98-341 more info released NLJ 92-295 Appeal	06/15/66	A
#90c memo	to President from Cyrus Vance secret - Exempt NLJ 87-191 sanitized 11-22-96 NLJ 92-295 2 p sanitized 8/30/02 NLT 98-341 more info released NLJ 92-295 Appeal	06/27/66	A
#90d memo	to Deputy Sec. Dept. of Def. from W. W. Rostow secret - sanitized 9-5-89 NLJ 87-192 1 p sanitized 8/30/02 NLT 98-341 more info released	07/08/66	A
#90e memo	to Deputy Sec. Dept. of Def. from W. W. Rostow secret - sanitized 9-5-89 NLJ 87-192 1 p sanitized 8/30/02 NLT 98-341 more info released	07/08/66	A
#90f memo	to Deputy Sec. Dept. of Def. from W. W. Rostow secret - sanitized 9-5-89 NLJ 87-192 1 p same sanitization 8/30/02 NLT 98-341	07/08/66	A
#92 memo	to President from W. W. Rostow top secret open 3-17-89 NLJ 87-193 1 p	07/05/66	A
#95 memo	to President from Francis Bator confidential open 7-21-89 NLJ 87-196 1 p	07/05/66	A
#98 memo	to President from Walt Rostow secret Exempt NLJ 87-196 2 p	07/01/66	A
#98a letter	to Pres. Johnson from L. B. Pearson possible classified info Confidential per NLJ 87-196 OPEN 2-1-00 NLJ 98-343 2 p	undated	A
FILE LOCATION	NLJ 87-196 NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President Rostow, vol. 8 July 1-15, 19 66 Box 9R		

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676

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#99 memo	to President re: Panama from Rostow confidential <i>open 12-7-89 NLS 87-204</i>	2 p 07/01/66	A
#99a bio-sketch	Diogenes de la Rosa <i>open 10-19-99</i> secret <i>Exempt NLS 87-203 NLS 98-342</i>	3 p undated	A
#100 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 10-19-99</i> secret <i>Exempt NLS 87-196 NLS 98-343</i>	1 p 07/01/66	A
#100b cable	to President from Prime Minister Secret <i>exempt NLS 90-245</i> <i>open 5/1/00 NLS 98-343</i>	8 p 07/01/66	A
#101 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 7-21-89 NLS 87-196</i>	1 p 07/01/66	A
#101a cable	Canberra 36 for President from SecState secret <i>sanitized 6-5-89 NLS 87-199</i>	2 p 07/01/66	A
#102a cable	Paris 9273 <i>open 10-19-99 NLS 98-342</i> secret <i>Exempt NLS 87-195</i>	3 p 06/30/66	A
#54 letter	LB to Gen. Ankrut per <i>open 7-21-89 NLS 87-196</i>	1 7-12-66	A

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(54)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, July 15, 1966
8:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is a short version of the statement I made at your request to the Leadership meeting the other day. I am sending it, at his request, to Congressman Mahon. He plans to use it -- without attribution -- in a speech early next week. I thought you might like to read it.

Walt R.

Let's get a speech
in the time for
the speech

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

1a

Looking back over the last three years, it is clear that what we stand for in the world -- the enterprises to which we have put our hand -- have gained ground substantially as against the Communist position.

Look at the Soviet Union.

Their overall rate of economic growth has been less than ours. They have discovered they cannot continue to grow rapidly simply by concentrating on heavy industry: producing more and more steel for more and more steel plants. As Khrushchev once put it: you can't eat steel. They are struggling to make the beginnings of a modern consumer economy of the kind enjoyed already in Western Europe and Japan as well as here in the United States. But they find they must undo a good deal of what they have done since 1917, if they are to go forward.

In agriculture, despite very heavy expenditures of capital, the collective system remains inefficient.

The Communists present a strange picture to the world, claiming to be the wave of the future but competing against one another for Free World food surpluses. This year, Communist countries had to buy 22 million tons of grain from the Free World.

In foreign policy, the Soviet Union has never recovered from the Cuba missile crisis. Nevertheless Moscow has continued to try to exploit the instability which is inevitable in these revolutionary times in Latin America, in Africa, in Asia. In all these regions the Soviet adventures in subversion have not prospered.

- Cuba is an expensive dead end, costing Moscow about \$300 million net each year;

- the subversive efforts in Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru and, above all, in the Dominican Republic, failed;

- in Africa the ultra-nationalist friends Moscow cultivated have not prospered: Nkrumah is gone from the scene; and so is Ben Bella.

Within the world Communist movement the power of nationalism has taken hold in one form in Communist China, in other forms in Eastern Europe. In Eastern Europe the people feel instinctively that the future lies with more national independence and more human liberty rather than within a monolithic Communist system run from Moscow.

Where the Soviet Union has done best, it has begun to behave more like a nation state and less like a regime intent on world conquest:

- in certain measures of liberalization inside the Soviet Union;
- in helping encourage peace on the Indian subcontinent;
- in entering into more normal trade and cultural arrangements with the non-Communist world.

The government in Moscow is even now beginning slowly to accept the fact that its people want private automobiles and decent homes and privacy and travel.

Let us be clear. There is nothing that has happened over these three years which justifies us in believing that if the West is weak and fragmented and fails to maintain integrated defenses, Soviet ambitions will ^{not} again be inflamed and the Free World endangered. But we have also demonstrated in these three years under the leadership of President Johnson that our kind of system is better, and that aggressive adventures initiated from Moscow can be frustrated if we and our friends are vigilant and strong and have the will to defend what we stand for.

Much the same is true for Communist China.

Although there has been some economic recovery in Communist China, it is one of the few underdeveloped nations of the world which is producing less now than it did seven years ago -- at the peak of the great leap forward. Its investment rate has been radically cut back. Its heavy industry has much idle capacity. They cannot find jobs for their technicians and college graduates. 30% of the grain eaten in the coastal cities of China must come from the surpluses of the non-Communist world. They have neglected agriculture and drag the heavy anchor of collectivization in a hungry country.

Every day events on the mainland are demonstrating that Communism commands less effective methods for developing an underdeveloped nation *than* ~~in~~ the methods of the Free World -- and this despite a ruthless police dictatorship.

In foreign policy, Communist China has suffered one setback after another over these three years:

-- in East Africa;

-- in its failure to mobilize at the Algiers Conference the young nationalist nations;

-- in its effort to exploit the tragic war between India and Pakistan;

-- in the turning of Indonesia against the Chinese-inspired Communist threat.

Even in the world Communist movement its extreme doctrines of aggression and violence have not prospered.

Now Communist China is in the midst of a great uproar. Obviously there is a struggle for power. But behind that struggle for power is a debate about where China should go in the face of its failures at home and abroad.

Should it continue with a distorted and ineffective development program or should it turn with all its energies to growing food for its massive population?

Should it continue with aggression and the encouragement of aggression or accept a proper but limited role in Asia and the world, and learn to get on with its neighbors?

As in the case of the Soviet Union, there is no cause for complacency about Communist China. But behind the defense of Vietnam by the South Vietnamese, our forces, and our fighting allies, a new Asia is being born: full of vitality, independence, confidence in the future, and a will to work together. As the President suggested in his great speech on July 12, some day, surely, mainland China must find a peaceful relation to that new Asia and to the rest of the world.

We are and should be conscious of our errors and frustrations in foreign policy. And in our free land we can always be assured that errors -- real or imagined -- will be called to public attention.

But standing back from the scene and looking over these years, we should be proud of what we, working with other free men, have done in Latin America, in Africa, in Asia, in Europe. We know the unsolved problems and the difficulties; but we should also know the most important fact of all:

that in these years the cause of freedom -- led by the United States -- has gained; the forces of tyranny and aggression have weakened.

This is a time for confidence -- for staying the course -- for getting on with unfinished business -- not for changing our policy or weakening our faith.

###

2

Friday, July 15, 1966 -- 4:45 p. m

Mr. President:

I had this prepared for your 6:30 p. m. appointment with Sol Linowitz.

I gathered at lunch that you may be considering him for some other post and will be looking for a CIAP member who commands Spanish.

Sec. Rusk, to whom I spoke after lunch, still wants him for CIAP, Spanish or no. You may wish to have a word with him.

In any case, here it is.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING, CANCELLED PER E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983.
BY DCM ON 8-16-86

WWRostow:rlm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

22
Friday, July 15, 1966 - 4:25pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with Sol Linowitz

You will be seeing Sol Linowitz to persuade him to accept the job of United States member on the Inter-American Committee on Alliance for Progress (CIAP).

The selling points are:

1. The key role played by CIAP in coordinating and promoting the Alliance for Progress. A statement of specific functions is at Tab A.
2. CIAP is entering a new, exciting stage as the Alliance gains momentum and the OAS summit meeting proposed for November-December opens up new vistas and unleashes new energies.
3. The high-level (cabinet rank) composition of CIAP. The list of members is at Tab B.
4. The job carries the personal rank of Ambassador. (The salary will probably range from \$25,500 to \$27,500).
5. The intention to offer Mr. Linowitz the Ambassadorship to the Council of the OAS when Ambassador Bunker is given other responsibilities.

The mechanics for naming the United States member is for you to address a letter to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council notifying the Council of my resignation and naming Mr. Linowitz.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments
Tabs A & B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-198
By inf, NARA, Date 1-20-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CIAP FUNCTIONS

Within the overall responsibility for coordinating and promoting the multilateral aspects of the Alliance for Progress (AFP), the CIAP is charged with these specific tasks:

1. To study problems related to the AFP, resolving them or suggesting solutions to competent authorities -- i.e., broad policy formulation authority.
2. To conduct a continuing review of national and regional plans of the AFP -- i.e., the country review cycle which permits CIAP to examine plans and performance and to propose amounts and types of resources which individual countries need to meet their AFP objectives.
3. To make annual estimates of the needs for financing Latin American development and calculate the amounts of internal and external resources available.
4. To help countries obtain external assistance.
5. To prepare and present proposals for distribution of multilateral funds among countries.
6. To coordinate all AFP efforts requiring multilateral action -- e.g., economic integration, regional economic and social development, trade.
7. To administer the Technical Assistance Fund (\$6-7 million annually).

CIAP MEMBERSHIP

Roberto Campos	-	Minister of Development - Brazil (represents Brazil, Ecuador and Haiti)
Gonzalez Alsina	-	Minister of Agriculture - Paraguay (represents Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay)
Hector Hurtado	-	Director, Central Coordinating and Planning Office - Venezuela (represents Colombia, Chile, Venezuela)
Rodrigo Gomez	-	President, Central Bank of Mexico (represents Mexico, Panama and Dominican Republic)
Bernal Jimenez	-	ex-Minister of Finance - Costa Rica (represents 5 Central American states)
Roque Carranza*	-	Chief, National Planning Office - Argentina (represents Argentina and Peru)
Walt Rostow	-	Special Assistant to the President - United States (represents United States)

* - Just resigned.

Wednesday, June 15, 1966
10:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

I have the attached letter from Bus Wheeler, asking if you would be prepared to speak to the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces on their opening day, August 19th.

Should you wish to do it, we have a pretty good speech in the sermon barrel which I prepared for a National War College occasion when I was over at State (attached). - *draft of 2/25/66*
The letter notes you have until July 15th to reply.

W. W. Rostow

Accept tentatively _____

Hold it ✓

Regret _____

Cy Morgan



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

10 June 1966

Dear Walt:

Vice Admiral Lee, Commandant of the National War College, has queried me as to the possibility of President Johnson addressing the combined classes of the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces on their opening day, 19 August 1966. You may recall that the President did speak at the opening of the two colleges two years ago. It may be that he will find it useful and convenient to use the same platform again this year.

Admiral Lee states that he needs a definite reply by 15 July in order that he and General Schomburg may firm up their opening day ceremony.

Please let me know as soon as possible if the President is interested.

Sincerely,

EARLE G. WHEELER

Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

July 15, 1966

Dear Dean:

I understand you are leaving for Aspen tomorrow.

This is just a note to wish you a very pleasant holiday and to thank you for your great contribution over the past four months.

In the days ahead our policy will reflect your papers. It was a great comfort and reinforcement for me to have you with us at this critical stage of Atlantic policy.

Once again the country is in your debt. I am most grateful.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Dean Acheson
Harewood Farm
Sandy Spring, Maryland

4a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1966

Mr. President:

After four months of work, Mr. Acheson has finished his NATO assignment and is leaving tomorrow for a holiday. I think he would much appreciate a short note from you. He has worked hard and bravely. And, whatever one's views about European policy, there is no question that he has made considerable contribution.

A draft note for your approval and signature is attached.

FMB

Francis M. Bator

I've edited it a bit and
support the suggestion
which George Ball
also made to me
Walt

5
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May I recommend your concurrence to the attached message of condolences to Philippines President Marcos on the death of the two Filipino student nurses in Chicago.

Walt Rostow

OK
LBJ
(ret'd 7/16/66)

Mr. Rostow
gave to BKS

Dear Mr. President:

It was with a profound sense of sadness that I read this morning of the tragic deaths in Chicago of two nursing students from your nation and the almost miraculous escape of a third young Filipino lady. You can rest assured that our police officials will leave no stone unturned until the perpetrator of this hideous crime is brought to justice.

As you know, my daughter Luci is a nursing student and I have always had the highest admiration for this profession and for the young ladies who dedicate themselves to the healing of the sick. It seems particularly cruel that such a crime should take place among young people who had dedicated themselves to the cause of humanity.

I should like to extend to the parents and relatives of Miss Merlita Gargullo and Miss Valentina Pasion my heartfelt condolences as well as those of the American people.

Sincerely,

6

Thursday, July 14, 1966 at 9:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Pound, the Dollar and What We Want from Harold Wilson

Secretary Fowler meets with the European Finance Ministers in The Hague on July 25-26. He needs instruction before then -- and especially for his meeting with Callaghan -- on our basic bargaining position vis-a-vis Harold Wilson on money, the UK role East of Suez, etc.

We now have a clearer picture of Callaghan's thinking. He has become increasingly pessimistic about the basic British balance of payments problem -- quite apart from short-term pressure from the speculators. He believes he has only two alternatives: (1) cut UK foreign exchange spending on overseas defense -- perhaps in Germany, but largely East of Suez (where the drain is running at about \$200 million per year); or (2) get private British holders of U.S. securities to sell off substantial chunks of their holdings. Such sales would show up as an increase in our payments deficit, and could amount to anywhere from a few hundred million dollars to a billion or even more.

On our side, Fowler thinks that we are in a very poor position to press Wilson to take the internal measures without which the \$2.80 pound may not survive the year -- or even the summer. At least, we are in a poor position as long as we keep telling them that:

- they must remain in full force East of Suez;
- they must keep the full British Army on the Rhine;
- we won't really help them with their offset problem vis-a-vis the Germans (their present arrangement is much more limited than ours);
and
- devaluation is unthinkable.

As you know, Joë would like us to say to the British that (1) we will not put up any more money to support the pound, and (2) they must not under any circumstances devalue. If Wilson gives us a choice: pull out of East of Suez or risk a devaluation, Fowler would have us choose pull out. In any event, he thinks -- and I agree -- that we need a thorough review of our priorities and our general bargaining position vis-a-vis the UK. Since German offset is involved, this would also involve a look at financial (and therefore political) relations with the Germans.

On priorities vis-a-vis London, you should know that George Ball and Dean Acheson are leaning in the Fowler direction -- but for different reasons:

in their judgment, the UK East of Suez position hinders its taking the plunge into Europe. I have no recent sense for the thinking of the Secretaries of State and Defense. As you know, a few months ago they felt that a continued substantial British presence East of Suez was politically absolutely assential.

You will want to hear the arguments of all your advisers in person. This is simply a preliminary memo to ask your approval of the following procedure: (1) a preliminary meeting under Joe Fowler's chairmanship (with Rusk, Ball, McNamara, Rostow, Acheson, etc.); (2) a paper for you spelling out the choices; (3) a full meeting with you during the early part of next week.

Joe concurs in this procedure though he would prefer to have you chair even the first meeting. I suspect it would be a more economical use of your time to wait until we have done the preliminary work. But we will have to move fast. Fowler leaves for Europe next Wednesday.

George Ball also agrees with this procedure.

If you approve, Walt and I will set this up.

Francis M. Bator

Approve procedure, including meeting with President next week ✓

No

Speak to me

FMB:djw
7/14/66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, July 14, 1966 -- 6:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

On present plans Bruce will be here July 25 thru 31.

Wilson gets back from Moscow July 19th. We may want Bruce's read-out.

The questions are:

Is July 25 return early enough? _____

As soon after Wilson's return
as he can get Wilson's report? ☒ _____

7/15/66

As soon as possible? _____

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCG NARS, Date 8-16-86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense

The President would be grateful if you could bring along to lunch tomorrow, Friday, July 15, 1966, your suggested reply to this letter from Mike Mansfield.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Letter July 14, 1966
to the President
from Mike Mansfield

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1982
By DCH NARS, Date 8-16-86

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday,
July 14, 1966 -- 5:55 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith the proposed agenda for
tomorrow's lunch with Sec. Rusk and
Sec. McNamara.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

CONFIDENTIAL

AGENDA

Meeting With the President

1:00 p. m. , July 15, 1966

1. NATO-Nuclear Issue in Relation to Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara.

Coming visits of Wilson and Erhard as well as Sec. McNamara's trip to Bonn make clarity in this matter urgent.

2. Viet Nam. Sec. Rusk

Planning for and organization of negotiating track. Appointment of a senior full-time figure is urgent.

3. U. S. Prisoners of War in Hanoi. Sec. Rusk

4. Other Business

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By DCI NARS, Date 8-18-86

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, July 14, 1966
11:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a proposed reply to
Senator Yarborough.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

L

July 14, 1966
Thursday - 10:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

I spoke to Dr. Cain about altitude. He conferred with Dr. Willis Hurst and reports back as follows:

1. There is a problem for anyone in going from sea level to 8600 feet.
2. There is, however, no reason for you not to go if you wish to.
3. Your Mexico experience is reassuring.
4. He strongly recommends, however, little walking, no long staircases, maximum travel by auto.
5. He is informing Dr. Burkley of our conversation in confidence.
6. I am having a security check made on the city without revealing purpose.

Walt Rostow

Blm

Thurs., J 14, 1966
9:30 a.m.

top 12

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Wilson's effort to make amends
for Healey's serious error in Parliament
on British arm sales to the U. S. in
relation to Vietnam.

cc Bill Moyers
Leahue

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12a
13 July, 1966

I have been asked to bring to your attention a statement made yesterday, 12 July, in the House of Commons by the Prime Minister on the subject of the supply of arms to the United States in relation to Vietnam.

2. You may perhaps have noticed that my Government were pressed quite hard on this matter by the Opposition during the debate on Vietnam in the House of Commons on 7 July, but that the Prime Minister made no reference to it in his winding up speech.

3. He preferred instead to deal with the subject yesterday and you may like to know for your own information that the Parliamentary Question which he was answering was "inspired" - that is to say, that the Member of Parliament concerned was asked privately by the Government to put it down.

4. I enclose the text of the Question and Answer. I know how concerned you were that nothing should be said on the public record which would further complicate the situation on this front and I hope that you will feel that the reply given by the Prime Minister is cast in such a way as to avoid this.

The Honorable Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority UK Guidelines

By gwl, NARA, Date 2-10-98

UNCLASSIFIED

Mr. William Hamling (Woolwich West) "to ask the Prime Minister, whether he will make a further statement on Her Majesty's Government's policy about arms exports to the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, with particular reference to Vietnam".

Answer: "Her Majesty's Government do not place any restrictions or conditions, for example as to future use or destination, on any arms sold to the United States of America. That is the position once we have agreed to make a sale.

But obviously, when our American friends are considering what they want to buy from us, and when we are considering whether a sale should be made, our position as Geneva co-chairmen must be taken into account, And since this is well-known to the United States Administration, I do not foresee any practical difficulties in pursuing our normal arms sales arrangements with an ally. Nor do I foresee any difficulties in our dealings with Australia and New Zealand where there is no change in traditional arrangements."

~~SECRET~~

July 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will be interested to know that King Faisal since his return to Saudi Arabia has told a number of people that he considered his visit here a "complete success." He has spoken glowingly both publicly and among his own advisers of his meeting with you and reiterated that his main reason for coming was to become personally acquainted. He deeply appreciated our hospitality and easily shrugged off his brush with Mayor Lindsay. Ambassador Elts reports that the visit boosted the King's spirits and has decidedly enhanced his prestige at home.

One of the most interesting indications that you really got through to him was his explanation to the British Ambassador after his return of your views on civil rights, education and Vietnam. He even took the British to task gently for criticizing any aspect of your Vietnam policy. The King's eagerness and ability to expound at some length on your policies indicates that everything you said registered loud and clear.

The problem now--as always with these visits--is how to capitalize on the momentum we have generated. You have established a rapport with him that will be helpful for some time to come. But there will also be misunderstandings as we urge Faisal to give a little to get Nasser's troops out of Yemen. However, we are already moving ahead on two fronts:

1. We are renewing our efforts to persuade him to give a fair look at Nasser's latest offer on Yemen. We are not overly optimistic that anything new will come of this, but we do feel the King is in a specially receptive mood as a result of his talks with you and Secretary Rusk.

2. Ambassador Elts has offered to pick up his discussions with the Saudi Government on how we might continue the exchange of views on communist penetration in the Mid-East, and the King has jumped at this. Our chief goal is, by working with his people, to bring him to a more realistic view of what Communism is.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-343
By CLB, NARA Date 9-28-99

~~SECRET~~

132

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1966

~~SECRET~~

WWR:

By

up

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-200
NARA, Date 3-15-89

There's some virtue in cementing the President's interest in his visitors. If we have to call on his Faisal experience as South Arabia gets hotter over the next couple of years, we want him to engage willingly. Attached is part of the process of keeping his interest alive.

Hal Saunders

Mr Rostow
A good idea - OK to initial

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, July 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Canadian-Soviet Air Transport Agreement

Now we have a good idea why the Soviets took the initiative in dropping the onward rights provision from their aviation agreement with the Canadians:

- The agreement contemplated onward rights from Moscow to South Asia with the possibility of rights from Moscow to Tokyo via Siberia at some future time if the Soviets granted the Siberia route to another country. The Tokyo route is what the Canadians really wanted.
- Averell Harriman in his two trips to Ottawa pressed the Canadians hard on whether the Russians were not out-horse-trading them on onward rights since the Soviet Montreal to Havana flights were to commence immediately upon signature.
- The Canadian negotiators then insisted with the Russians on setting a date (October 1967) for both parties to exercise onward rights, mentioning Canada's intention to use the Siberia route.
- It would seem that the overflying of Siberia was more than the Soviets were prepared to grant for onward rights to Cuba.

Our intervention with the Canadians has paid off.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-27-98

cc - Bill Moyers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Joint Communique on the Holt Visit

Attached is a proposed joint communique covering your talks with Prime Minister Holt.

It would be issued at the conclusion of today's lunch.

The Australians and State have cleared this.

 Rostow

Att.

Approve Text _____

Will discuss with Holt _____

See Me _____

15a

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER HOLT
13 JULY 1966

At the invitation of President Johnson, the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Right Honourable Harold E. Holt, has returned to Washington to continue the discussions which they held on subjects of mutual interest on June 29.

The President expressed his sincere appreciation for the Prime Minister's willingness to alter his travel arrangements to make their meeting possible.

The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed the determination of their two Governments to assist the Republic of Viet Nam and its people in their efforts to repel the armed aggression mounted against the Republic of Viet Nam by the regime in Hanoi, and expressed full confidence that those efforts will be successful. They expressed again the desire of both Governments that the fighting in South Viet Nam be brought to an end as soon as possible through negotiation of an honorable peace, welcomed the initiative of the Prime Minister of India appealing to the Government of the USSR to reconvene a meeting of the Geneva powers and reaffirmed their readiness to take part in this or other negotiations whenever the Hanoi regime indicates a willingness to do so. President Johnson reviewed for the Prime Minister military developments in Viet Nam during the past two weeks. The Prime Minister expressed appreciation for this review of recent events.

The Prime Minister discussed with the President his recent visit to London.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the political, economic and social progress and development which has occurred in Free Asia in recent years, most particularly in the first half of 1966, and agreed that these developments are of the greatest significance for the future of Asia, the Pacific area, and the world. The President and the Prime Minister noted that among these developments has been the healing of old quarrels between nations of the region, the recent establishment of the Asian and Pacific Council, the imminent formal inauguration of the Asian Development Bank in which both the United States and Australia are participating, and concrete steps toward the development of the Mekong Basin. The President and the Prime Minister described these events and the growing sense of regional identity in Asia and the Pacific area as most encouraging for the possibility of future peace and peaceful progress in the region. They expressed their belief that these developments have in no small measure been made possible by the shield of security provided to the region by the determination of the gallant people of Viet Nam and those assisting them to repel Communist aggression.

The President and the Prime Minister noted with satisfaction the steady strengthening in the ties linking their two countries, particularly the flow of trade and investment, cooperation in exploring the mysteries of space, and common efforts in a broad range of other scientific projects.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that there exist opportunities for further great undertakings in the peaceful development of Asia, and these opportunities will be greatly expanded when peace returns to the region.

7/14/66

Dear Eduardo:

I have heard the moving story of how many people in your country and mine worked together so that you could come to Boston for a delicate heart operation. I understand that the operation has been successful and you are now on the mend. I wish you a full and speedy recovery so that you and your mother can return home soon.

Sincerely,

LBJ

Master Eduardo Espinal Munoz
c/o Boston Children's Hospital
Medical Center
Boston, Massachusetts

LBJ/WGB:mmm
July 13, 1966

cc Bandler

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, July 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Heart Operation for Dominican Boy

You will be interested in a moving story in which our Embassy and military forces in the DR and the Boston Children's Hospital Medical Center worked together to save the life of a little Dominican boy.

The story begins in late May when the boy's mother, a housewife of modest means from Santiago, wrote you asking for help. Her son Eduardo, age 6, suffered from a serious heart condition requiring delicate surgery in the U.S. The mother's letter was referred to the Embassy. The Embassy Public Affairs Officer contacted friends in Boston to inquire whether the Boston medical community would help. They agreed to do so without charge.

The Air Force flew the boy and his mother to Fort Bragg. With money raised from citizens in Santiago and our forces in Santo Domingo, they travelled on to Boston. The operation was performed on June 30 and has been successful. Dr. Gross tells us that Eduardo is progressing nicely and should be released early next week.

I recommend that you send a letter to little Eduardo and Dr. Robert E. Gross, the chief surgeon in the case. Suggested drafts are attached. You and Mrs. Johnson may also wish to send him a toy.

Walt Rostow

Attachments

16b

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1966

NOTE FOR BROMLEY SMITH

Brom -

The only background on the little Dominican boy in Boston is the attached cable and a telephone call that I made to the chief surgeon, Dr. Gross, yesterday afternoon, to check on his progress.

Dr. Gross told me that he was doing very well and expected to discharge him within the next week.


WGB

Attachment

Santo Domingo's 41, 7/7/66.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

16c

BYTOR
BOWDLER
BOWMAN
BUDGET
JESSUP
JOHNSON
JORDEN
KEENE
KUMER
MOYERS
TAYLOR
WRIGGINS

42

UNCLASSIFIED

Action

P

Info

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USIA

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RSR

NNNESB166VV SDA082
RR RUEHC
DE RUESSD 493S 1881540
ZNR UUUUU
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FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS SANTO DOMINGO 41

JULY 7

JOINT STATE/USIA MESSAGE

SUBJECT: HEART OPERATION FOR DOMINICAN BOY

1. EMBASSY AND USFORDOMREP ASSISTED IN ARRANGING FOR DOMINICAN BOY TO BE FLOWN TO BOSTON FOR HEART OPERATION WHICH PROBABLY SAVED HIS LIFE. FACTS FOLLOW:

2. IN LATE MAY, 1966, AUSTRIA ANTONIA ESPINAL MUNOZ, 37, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS, HOUSEWIFE OF MODEST MEANS, WROTE PRESIDENT JOHNSON REQUESTING HELP FOR SON, EDUARDO ISMAEL, 6,

PAGE TWO RUESSD 493S UNCLAS

WHO SUFFERED FROM SERIOUS HEART CONDITION REQUIRING DELICATE SURGERY IN U.S. WHITE HOUSE FORWARDED LETTER TO EMBASSY. PAO CONTACTED FRIEND, JAMES JACOBS, CAMBRIDGE, MASS., DESCRIBING CASE AND INQUIRING WHETHER BOSTON MEDICAL COMMUNITY COULD HELP. JACOBS, AMATEUR RADIO OPERATOR WHO IN PAST HAS HELPED OTHER LATIN AMERICANS IN CRITICAL NEED OF U.S. MEDICAL TREATMENT, WAS PROMISED FREE CARE FOR EDUARDO BY BOSTON PHYSICIANS, INCLUDING SURGEON ROBERT E. GROSS, AND OFFICIALS OF CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER THERE.

3. ON JUNE 26, U.S. AIR FORCE FLEW CHILD AND MOTHER FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FORT BRAGG, N.C., WHERE THEY TRANSFERRED TO COMMERCIAL AIRLINES FOR LAST PART OF JOURNEY. MOTHER PREVIOUSLY HAD COLLECTED \$170 FROM CITIZENS OF SANTIAGO AND WAS GIVEN ADDITIONAL \$216 FOR EXPENSES BY OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN OF U.S. ARMY'S 16TH GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP IN SANTO DOMINGO. BOSTON NEWSPAPERS AND ASSOCIATED PRESS PICKED UP STORY AND GAVE SYMPATHETIC TREATMENT.

1966 JUL 7 PM 12 03

05047

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-2- SANTO DOMINGO 41, JULY 7

4. CHILD NOW REPORTED IN GOOD CONDITION AND RECUPERATING
NICELY AFTER OPERATION JUNE 30. IF DEPARTMENT PERCEIVES NO

PAGE THREE RUESSD 493S UNCLAS
OBJECTION, PROPOSE WHITE HOUSE CONSIDER PRESIDENTIAL GET-WELL
NOTE TO EDUARDO AND CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO SURGEONS AND
STAFF OF CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL FOR SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE TO
HUMANITARIAN PLEA FROM LATIN AMERICAN NEIGHBORS. CRIMMINS
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

17
Friday, July 14, 1966
11:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a proposed reply to
Senator Yarborough.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Dear Ralph:

I was gratified to read your letter of June 29 to the editor of THE TEXAS OBSERVER, explaining your view on Viet Nam.

It is good to know that you support both aspects of our policy: that we fight against aggression in Viet Nam while searching for an honorable peace through negotiation.

As I have made clear, we have no intention of invading Cambodia, North Viet Nam, or mainland China. I was interested in and shall remember your observation on the Korean negotiations.

But mainly I just wanted to say how much it meant to see your clearheaded views expressed on this difficult and complex problem where it is so easy to confuse rather than to enlighten our people.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Ralph W. Yarborough
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWRostow:rlm

Friday,
July 13, 1966 -- 5:05 pm.

Mr. President:

Herewith Wilson's proposed
scenario in Moscow.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCB NARS, Date 8-16-86

~~SECRET~~

18a
Friday, July 15, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON (Zulu, July 15, 66)

Before I leave for Moscow, I wanted you to know how I expect to handle my talks with Kosygin on two of the major topics that seem bound to come up.

First, Vietnam. As I have told David Bruce, I believe that my purpose must be to make absolutely clear to the Russians my firm belief that you mean business and intend to continue applying hard military pressure, however long it takes.

As David knows, I have very little hope that the Russians can be brought to take more positive action because of the diplomatic strait-jacket in which their rivalry with the Chinese within the Communist world compresses them. But I am likewise convinced that they are thoroughly worried at the limitations this imposes on the conduct of their foreign policy: and even more at what must seem to them the real danger that excessive Chinese intransigence could drag them into a confrontation with yourselves. They cannot want to find themselves again in a Cuban situation, at one removed, so to speak. The more convinced they are of your determination, the more I believe we can hope to exploit their apprehensions.

It is against this general background that I propose, as I have told David Bruce, to raise with them the question of the treatment by Hanoi of your prisoners of war, pointing out that, quite apart from the ethics of this matter, maltreatment of your prisoners is bound to increase the legitimate indignation and resolution of the American people: it is therefore much in their own interest to ensure that Hanoi does not depart from the principles of the Geneva Convention.

Secondly, disarmament. David has communicated to me the strong feeling within your Administration that it would be premature and even harmful for me to raise in Moscow the questions of a comprehensive test ban or of non-proliferation. It would be unrealistic, I believe, to think that when disarmament comes up (as seems inevitable) the Russians will not themselves raise these topics in one form or another. And if I detect any indication on their part of an advance towards constructive negotiation, it would equally clearly be wrong for me not to probe this cautiously to see whether it is purely tactical or has some real substance to it. But you can rest assured that my purpose will not be to enter into a negotiation and even less to compromise in any way our existing positions on either of these aspects of the problem. I was encouraged to learn from what Bruce has told me that you are actively considering possible courses of action in these fields. I shall look forward to discussing them with you when we meet

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 98-165

By ct, NARA Date 6-23-00

~~SECRET~~

and to giving you an account then of whatever may be said to me by the Russians.

As I see it, I have two essential purposes in this trip. First, to persuade the Russians that neither they nor anyone else should base their calculations on a misconception of your own courage and convictions; and that it is therefore profoundly to their interest to work more vigorously for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. Secondly, that if they think they can drive a wedge between you and me, they are sadly mistaken. The value to them of the British connection with the Vietnam situation lies essentially in our firm belief in the inviolability of the Atlantic relationship.

Friday, July 13, 1966 -- 6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contact

Jack Sutherland, U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, was in to ask if I would answer a set of questions on why Marxism had failed. I told him I would talk with Bill Moyers to see if this was a useful exercise. I then spent the rest of the half hour explaining what lay behind your speech on Asia. I tried to discourage him from identifying me with the speech. I pointed out that the speech was a culmination of thoughts which could be traced to your May 1961 report on your visit to Asia, as well as more recently to your Baltimore speech in April 1965.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR PRIME MINISTER HOLT

5:30 p.m., Wednesday, July 13, 1966

1. Holt's talks with Wilson: Viet Nam; East of Suez; Moscow trip.

He had four hours with Wilson.

2. Viet Nam Developments since last visit.

You may wish to show him Lodge's weekly cable.

3. Progress of POL offensive and world reactions.

4. Raise with him Cambodian Dam Proposal.

Just sent up.

5. Australian Election Prospects.

You may have covered it last time.

W. W. Rostow

21.
July 13, 1966
Wednesday - 4:45 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Lodge's weekly report.

You may wish to let Holt glance
through it at 5:30.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET Attachment~~

SAIGON 879

Wednesday, July 13, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 879)

21a
SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-342
By CB, NARA Date 9-28-99

Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. Course of the War

The U. S. military have perfected tactics of ambushing the ambushers. Last week the First Division sent an American unit down a road in Binh Long near Cambodia; the Viet Cong, lying in ambush, attacked it; and then the Americans came in with more forces, troops, artillery, helicopters, etc., and decimated the Viet Cong. An American who flew over the area in a helicopter said, "There were bodies all over the place."

I can't help thinking this could be a tremendously important development, since it does two things, both of which are of fundamental importance:

A. It means that you find the enemy in a massed state instead of spread around like bread crumbs through the countryside.

B. It means that when you deter the enemy, you have tried at least to open up the road. And if he gets wise to these tactics and stops making ambushes, then you have also tended to open up the road.

Roads are fundamental and have been one of our toughest obstacles. If roads are opened up and used, it is wonderful for troops, for civilian morale, for commerce, and it takes the pressure off the air forces which would otherwise have to airlift. For example, 1,000 Korean troops have just moved west from Qui Nhon along Highway 1 and into position in the neighborhood of Pleiku. They go there by road.

Opening roads also has tremendous significance to the press, and thus to public opinion. If you could now drive from here to Dalat, or from here to Cap St. Jacques, with no fear of Viet Cong roadblocks or ambushes, publication of the fact would create excellent publicity at home.

We have now ambushed the ambushers several times, and it looks as though we have the technique. The ARVN have done it a little. I recognize that one possibility is that the Viet Cong, in abandoning ambushes, may decide to blow more bridges and increase mining.

For the ninth consecutive week, the Viet Cong have lost more than 1,000 men, killed or captured -- losses which would surely cause concern in a free democratic society.

MACV estimates the population under protection of the Government has increased by 2.1 percent to 54.2 percent of South Vietnam's total population, as of May 31 -- a slight forward motion over a five month period. For the same period, population under Viet Cong control fell by 1.2 percent to 21.5 percent of the total population. The remainder are under no one's total control. Perhaps of greatest interest is that these gains happened in spite of the four month political crisis.

I believe the Navy has established some kind of a record in rapidly developing a new type of boat. In September, they decided they needed a special boat to patrol the huge rivers -- the Mekong and the Bassac -- in the Delta. By December, they had it -- a 31-foot fiberglass boat with two water jet diesel engines. The Navy's plans for this very watery region inspire confidence, as does the entire American military performance. In fact, everyone -- from Bob McNamara on down -- can take pride in it.

General Westmoreland has figures showing that while the Viet Cong are still tough, there is quite a difference in their behavior as between June, 1965, and June, 1966. The total number of Viet Cong incidents involving attacks, and sabotage is less in June 1966 than it was in June 1965. But incidents of terrorism are up -- from 1,850 in June 1965 to 2,470 in June 1966. We have long surmised that as the military part of the war got worse for them, they would turn more and more to terrorism. This gives emphasis to the effort we are making on revolutionary development, which includes Regional Forces, Popular Forces, political action teams, and the police, notably the police Field Forces.

For the same months, the number of Viet Cong killed has gone from 2,530 to 4,658, captured from 255 to 732; defectors from 748 to 887, and weapons lost from 725 to 3,710.

On the Government of Vietnam side, the killed went from 1,100 to 10,070; the missing from 1,230 to 209, and the weapons lost from 2,280 to 832.

B. New Rand Data

I have just talked to Dr. Leon Goure of the Rand Corporation who had just finished his conclusions based on 150 interviews of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army captives and defectors during the first six months. Highlights are:

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army morale are adversely affected by intensified Government of Vietnam/United States military operations, which have had a bad effect on manpower and food supply, have impeded infiltration of troops from the North and have caused loss of popular support and confidence in victory. Interviewers mention recruiting problems and desertions. Viet Cong recruiting more teenagers, with 16 percent of the defectors being between 12 and 16 years old.

Regarding food, some units report reductions in food rations due to less food grown by Viet Cong units (which have to move all the time), destruction of Viet Cong food storages, and broken transportation lines. Scant rations are adversely affecting morale.

Regarding personnel, older officers are becoming war weary, disillusioned; younger ones are inexperienced and easily confused. Many infiltrating soldiers are draftees with little training. U.S. air strikes force troops to travel south entirely on foot, carrying all weapons, including heavy ones and some ammunition. Most spent up to a month marching in North Vietnam before reaching Laos, frequently devoting three months to the total trip. Many arrive in the South exhausted, hungry, with malaria, beri-beri, and other diseases.

Regarding the psychological factor, greatest Viet Cong defeat appears to be increasing loss of popular support. About one million villagers have already left the Viet Cong in contested areas, thus depriving the Viet Cong of security, manpower, supplies, labor, and tax revenue -- the Communist water in which the Viet Cong fish are supposed to swim has, in these villages, gone dry. Anti-American propaganda not working, due to U.S. gifts and economic assistance to villages, for which villages apparently are often grateful, as they are for the security which the U.S. provides in some areas.

Regarding morale, Viet Cong no longer predict early victory; clearly hope to exploit domestic and foreign opposition to war in the U.S. to bring about early U.S. withdrawal or political collapse of the Government of Vietnam. These are their two big hopes. Viet Cong predictions of protracted war are designed to reassure the "hardcore" Communists and frighten the U.S., but they actually frighten and discourage many Viet Cong soldiers and villagers. Most interviewers say Government of Vietnam/United States will win the war because of superiority in heavy weapons and the Viet Cong's waning popular support. Even the hardcore Communists increasingly say the outcome is uncertain. None any longer predict Viet Cong victory.

While all the Rand indicators are favorable, the Viet Cong still has lots of fight left in him and we must restrain our optimism.

C. Chieu Hoi

The encouraging trends of the past few weeks continued, in terms of both the numbers of defectors and of their rank in the Viet Cong hierarchy. The number of defectors from July 2-9 was 339, an increase of 26 over the previous week. Included among them were 1 company leader, 5 platoon leaders, 5 squad leaders, and 5 assistant squad leaders.

So far this year (through July 8) there have been 10,178 defectors to the Government. During the same period last year, there were only 4,178. The entire calendar year 1965 saw 11,124 defectors, so we are going at about double the rate of 1965, despite the political troubles from March through June which adversely affected this program.

In addition to those who have defected to the side of the Government, there are untold numbers who just slip away and quietly return to their villages or show up as simple refugees. Although some thus act more overtly than others, all such actions entail risk of Viet Cong reprisal. Thus the Communists must be losing many more people than these numbered defectors.

D. A Good Diplomatic Start

The "confidential observations" to Mrs. Gandhi in DepTel 4535 are wise and farsighted and, I believe are the way to move in order to get a true peace.

I refer in particular to the statement that the reunification of both parts of Vietnam "would be determined by each part by its own free decision" and to our assumption that Mrs. Gandhi "had in mind including the forces from North Vietnam which have been sent into South Vietnam."

I especially wish to commend the idea in paragraph 3B that a "cessation of hostilities" and "hostile movements" and "actions on all sidesneeds to be carefully worked out, perhaps as a first order of business at a conference or at some other form of discussion."

This concept shows that we have indeed profited from the lessons of history, notably from mistakes made in the past. If any kind of durable result is to be achieved, it must be on this kind of a sound foundation or else we are building our house on sand, our efforts will amount to nothing and the war will go on.

I also admire the instructions which I received for my meeting with Lewandowski last Saturday.

If indeed such events as these are opening phases, they are of the greatest importance. It is rather like a sailboat race in which you cannot possibly win if

you don't get over the starting line in the right way. Our messages to Mrs. Gandhi and our instructions to me get us up to the starting line in a good position.

3.40(X1)

I call your attention to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Indian Consul General in Hanoi as saying "all Democratic Republic of Vietnam circles feel the war cannot last six months maximum as the present war and defense alert is breaking the nerves of the fighting forces. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam is now considering negotiations but is concerned on how best to save face. If the negotiation terms involve Democratic Republic of Vietnam prestige, there is no alternative but to continue fighting."

An Indian's report of diplomatic conversations must always be discounted, but it is interesting nonetheless.

Sainteny's statement, reported in Delhi 540, that Hanoi is prepared to accept an independent South Vietnam Government for "10, 20 or even 30 years" coincides exactly with Lewandowski's report to me.

E. Political

The decision to retire (or to dismiss) the five generals involved in the recent insubordination in the First Corps, I believe, does reflect the sincere conviction of the board of 20 generals that high-ranking officials cannot be allowed to be thus disloyal to the Government without being punished. But it also reflects to some extent the traditional policy out here of hitting a man and jumping on him when he is really down. I guess that General Co considers Thi to be his mortal enemy, and took advantage of Thi's having been defeated to try to get him out of his way altogether.

The decision also throws light on Ky's relationship with the military. He is definitely not a free agent, and the description of him in some newspapers as a military dictator is simply fantastic. For one thing, this government, although improving somewhat, is far too weak and ineffective to deserve the name of dictatorship; for another thing, Ky feels himself constantly under the need to maneuver to keep the generals together -- in which I think he is right. When I pointed out the political implications of retiring Thi, it was clear that he had not thought of it before. But when he met with the board of 20 generals, he pointed out the political implications to them, with the result, he says, that they did not insist on court martials, which would have dragged on and made more trouble.

As far as public opinion is concerned, prices continue to be the chief preoccupation of the Vietnamese. Interest in the elections has run second. This last has so far not been aroused because of ignorance about the purpose of the elections, complicated filing and electoral procedures, and a "what difference will it make?" attitude.

The fact that Government of Vietnam efforts to publicize elections have until now quite properly been directed at prospective candidates and not at the general public has been a major factor. The Government is now shifting its emphasis to arousing voter interest, and we will be discreetly helping behind the scenes. We want to be careful to avoid any charges that this is an American-run election.

Relatively large numbers of candidates have filed for the elections to be held September 11, many of them prominent. In the city of Saigon, 39 lists totalling over 200 candidates have been filed for a total of 16 seats. Even in Danang, a "struggle" stronghold, 7 lists have been filed for the 2 seats available there. Preliminary figures show that over 700 candidates have filed for the 108 seats in the Constituent Assembly. There undoubtedly will be some reduction as the candidates complete the procedural requirements for formal designation as candidates.

F. Economic

Retail prices in Saigon, as the experts tell me they expected, moved up sharply again in the week ending July 5 -- notably as regards pork, with secondary increases in other meats and fish. Rice, charcoal and firewood rose more moderately. Vegetables were stable. The USAID retail price index showed prices 10 percent above a week ago and 32 percent above a month ago. Imported commodity prices rose again, spectacularly for round bars, wire rods, and cement; moderately for most other commodities. Wheat flour was steady and sugar actually declined. The median price increase over the past month for U.S.-financed imports has been about 40 percent.

Dollars rose, 17 piasters to 205 and Military Payment Certificates 4 piasters to 122 as general price levels moved up. Gold, however, after rising substantially fell back to its June 27 price of 313 piasters per 35th ounce, reportedly because of an influx of smuggled gold from abroad. Although the Government of Vietnam is still selling gold through banks, dealers prefer to avoid the registration requirements and taxes connected with it. In Hong Kong, the piaster-dollar cross rate was up to 5 to 169.

Price rises in rice have been more restrained than for other commodities, probably due to continuing sales of American rice at 9 to 9.5 piasters per kil (depending on the sales outlet). This, I think, has been a really successful program. During June, the wholesale price of No. 1/25 percent broken rose only from Vietnamese \$1,005 to Vietnamese \$1,035.

Deliveries of rice from the Delta to Saigon in June amounted to slightly over 30,000 metric tons, about 75 percent of the 1961-65 average for this month, and the lowest level of June deliveries since 1958. Adequate stocks (amounting to about 80,000 tons) remain in the city largely because of continuing imports. While rice deliveries from the Delta have not been good, they are better, seasonally adjusted, than in the first four months of 1966. There is some indication that provincial traders have decided that further radical increases in price cannot be expected, and are, therefore, beginning to unload their stocks.

A decree naming Vietnamese Brig. Gen. Pham Dang Lan as new Director General of the Saigon port is the first step in the military takeover of the port. The transition has been, will be -- and, for face-saving reasons should be -- gradual. As phase 1 becomes operational, MACV will assume responsibility for the discharge and movement to its first destination of all tax free cargo. During phase 1, the commercial (CIP) operation is not affected but will be closely observed to determine bottlenecks and the type of corrective action needed.

I have high hopes that military operation will drastically reduce the congestion and thus be a big glow at inflation.

LODGE

22

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, July 13, 1966
4:40 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

After much scurrying about, we have a good bilateral proposition for you to raise with Holt: that Australia take the lead in offering \$10 million for the Prek Thnot Dam in Cambodia, either via Prince Sihanouk or U Thant.

The case is attached.

If you raise it with Holt, I am sure you would wish to give him time to think it over. But it is a natural for us to work on together, given his access to Sihanouk and our problems.

Walt
W. M. Rostow

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

22a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1966

SUBJECT: Prek Thnot Dam in Cambodia

Problem:

~~Progress~~ on the Mekong River development program is being ~~seriously~~ ~~impeded~~ by the current uncertain attitude towards the program by Cambodia and the ~~low level of Cambodia's~~ participation in Mekong Committee activities. This is the judgment of Tex Goldschmidt at the U. N. and of Eugene Black.

Proposal:

That Prime Minister Holt be persuaded to make an immediate offer to Prince Sihanouk, or to U Thant, of \$10 million in the form of a very low interest loan, (payable over a three-year period) against the estimated \$25 million foreign exchange cost of the Prek Thnot Dam in Cambodia. PM Holt should be told that the United States would be prepared to contribute \$5 million to the project in the form of a very low interest loan and to support U Thant's efforts to raise the balance from other friendly countries. Holt should be told that Australia would need to play the leading role in this project as we did on the Nam Ngum Dam in Laos. He should be told that given the present state of our relations with Cambodia that we believe it would be counterproductive for the United States to take the lead with the project.

Background:

In accordance with priorities established by the Mekong Committee, the Japanese undertook a feasibility survey of the Prek Thnot project and reported in December 1962 that the Prek Thnot project is "One of the most suitable projects worthy of development among many of the projects in the Lower Mekong Basin". At the request of Cambodia and the Mekong Committee, Australia agreed in January 1964, as part of its Colombo Plan program, to have its Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Authority prepare construction drawings and bidding specifications for the dam and power plant; this work was completed during 1965.

At the request of Cambodia and the Committee, Israel undertook to prepare detailed feasibility investigations for the irrigation part of the project. The principal findings of the Israel team, all of which are reported to be favorable, were communicated to Cambodia and the Mekong Committee in October 1965.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-196

By ing NARA, Date 7-17-89~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

At their meetings last March, Mekong Committee and ECAFE designated 1966 as "Cambodia Year" and resolved to move forward with the Prek Thnot project in Cambodia. (Tab A). This was done in an effort to enlist Cambodia's active support for the Mekong program. There was the feeling in the Mekong Committee that it was necessary for the next major project to be in Cambodia since Laos and Thailand have already received major benefits from the Mekong program. A description of the Prek Thnot project along with an estimate of its cost is attached as Tab B.

Pursuant to the decision of the Mekong Committee to move forward with the Prek Thnot project, the U N and the Mekong Committee have attempted to raise the financing for the project. They have not yet been successful. With the next meeting of the Mekong Committee tentatively scheduled for September 7-12, 1966 in Phnom Penh, Tex Goldschmidt of the U N staff says that they are very much on the spot in New York and in the Mekong Committee since there has been no progress on the "Cambodia Year" list of priority projects.

For some months we have been waiting for the Japanese to make an attractive offer to finance the Prek Thnot project. However, when Robert Barnett, STATE/FE, raised the question of Japanese support for the Prek Thnot project twice with the Japanese officials during the Japanese-US economic talks held earlier this month, he received no indication that the Japanese were planning to take the lead in financing the project.

Justification:

The UN, the Mekong Committee and Mr. Black all feel that it is imperative to the continued success of the Mekong program that the priority Prek Thnot project in Cambodia be implemented.

Since it does not appear likely that the Japanese will take the lead with the Prek Thnot project, and it may well be counterproductive for the U. S. to offer to do so, it is logical that we ask the Australians to take the lead with the project. The Australians did the engineering design work on the project and so they are familiar with it, they are active in the regional affairs of the Far East and are concerned that regionalism in the area succeeds, and they have shown a continued interest in the Mekong program.

Furthermore, given the President's great interest in the Mekong program combined with his special interest in doing something constructive in Cambodia, it seems likely that he would want to, through some mutually advantageous arrangement with the Australians, persuade them to take the lead with the Prek Thnot project.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR PARTICIPANTS ONLY
ECAFE/157
1 April 1966
ORIGINAL : ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE FAR EAST

Twenty-second session
22 March - 4 April 1966
New Delhi, India

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON MEKONG COMMITTEE PRIORITY PROJECTS
(Proposed jointly by the Delegations of Laos and Thailand)

The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East,

Highly commending the Mekong Committee (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and the Republic of Viet-Nam) for its determined effort, in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, to develop the water resources and related resources of the Lower Mekong Basin for the benefit of all the people of the basin without distinction as to nationality, religion, or politics,

Further commending the Committee for the impressive advances achieved, as described in the Committee's Annual Report for 1965 to the Commission, in data collection, basin planning, mainstream project planning, tributary projects, navigation improvement, and ancillary projects including experimental and demonstration farms, minerals surveys, power market projections, and industrial planning,

Congratulating the Committee upon the vigorous advance from the pre-investment phase to the phase of implementation of three of its tributary projects: the Nam Pung, opened in Thailand in November 1965; the Nam Pong, opened in Thailand in March 1966; and the Nam Ngum in Laos, for which funds during the past year have been arranged, for which the World Bank is to administer finance and construction, and which is to provide power internationally,

Recording its gratification at the cooperation which many ECAFE governments (Australia, China, France, India, Iran, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States), a number of other governments (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Norway, and Sweden), many other United Nations agencies (the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, WMO, IAEA, and the World Bank), and other organizations have been able to extend to the Mekong Committee and projects sponsored by the Mekong Committee in the four Mekong Committee countries:

Notes that the Committee has unanimously decided, with reference to 1966 investment and construction priorities, to seek the implementation of projects in the two Lower Mekong countries in which no major projects sponsored by it have yet been constructed, to concentrate its effort in 1966 on Cambodia and to regard 1966 as "Cambodia Year", and also to attach top priority to a number of its projects in Viet-Nam (as listed in the memorandum of 24 March 1966 from the Executive Secretary of ECAFE to the Heads of Delegations^{1/}),

Expresses pleasure in the assurances it has received that the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Executive Secretary of ECAFE will continue to extend their good offices in assisting the Committee to achieve its objectives, and

Invites all ECAFE member countries, and all other friendly governments who though not members of ECAFE nevertheless desire to cooperate with the Mekong Committee, to take appropriate steps to consider possible ways and means of ensuring full, effective, and early implementation of these priority investment and construction projects of the Mekong Committee.

<u>1/</u> <u>Country</u>	<u>Project</u>	(\$ million)		<u>Total</u>
		<u>Foreign</u> <u>Currency</u>	<u>Local</u> <u>Currency</u>	
CAMBODIA	Prek Thnot project: reservoir dam, diversion dam, and 15,000 hectares brought under irrigation	15	10	25
	Prek Thnot Hydro-electric installation	5	-	5
	Phnom Penh electric power distribution system	5	-	5
	Battambang Project: Kantu dam and 23,000 hectares of irrigation	10	10.4	20.4
	Sub Total for Cambodia	25	20.4	55.4
VIET-NAM	My Thuan Bridge	10.4	5.6	16.0
	✓ Tug & Barge Construction	1.0	1.0	2.0
	Drayling Hydro-Electric Project	1.4	1.4	2.8
	Darlac Irrigation Project	.145	.205	.350
	Krong Buk Irrigation Project	1.8	2.1	3.9
	Eak-Mat experimentation and demonstration farm	.56	.8	1.36
	Upper Se San First Phase	5.7	6.0	11.7
	Sub Total for Viet-Nam	21.005	17.105	38.110
GRAND TOTAL.....		56.005	37.505	93.510

TAB B

PREK THNOT DAM

COST

(\$ MILLION)

	<u>Foreign Currency</u>	<u>Local Currency</u>	<u>Total</u>
Prek Thnot project: reservoir dam, diversion dam, and 15,000 hectares brought under irrigation	15	10	25
Prek Thnot Hydro-electric installation	5	-	5
Phnom Penh electric power distribution system	<u>5</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>5</u>
Total	25	10	35

Prek Thnot Dam and Power Station

[Summarised from a Design Report prepared by
the Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Authority]

THIS PAPER DEALS WITH THE MAIN DESIGN FEATURES of the Prek Thnot Dam and Power Station. The Prek Thnot Project in Cambodia is a multi-purpose development of the Lower Prek Thnot, a tributary of the Mekong River, to provide for irrigation, power generation, and flood control. The overall project layout and proposals were established in 1962 by the Investigation Team organized by the Government of Japan for examining the feasibility of the development. Subsequently, further investigations have been made by the Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Authority, and detailed designs and technical specifications have been prepared to conform in general to the overall dimensions and layout of the earlier proposals. An important change made relates to the spillway, which is now designed to pass a flood with an inflow peak of $12,000 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$ instead of the earlier estimate of $6,000 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

Prek Thnot Dam consists of the Main Dam across the Prek Thnot together with a series of smaller dams connecting a number of low hills. To the south of the river these are designated South Dam 1, 2, 3 and 4 while North Dam 1 is located to the north of the river. The spillway is located between South Dams 1 and 2. The full supply level is elevation 58.5 m. The total length of the embankments is about 10 km. and the maximum height is 28.5 m. with the crest at elevation 63.25 m. The reservoir will have a net storage capacity of 980 million cubic metres between El. 58.5 and 50.0 m.

An ungated chute spillway is proposed with a crest length of approximately 400 m. and a nominally unlined discharge channel 2,000 metres long. The Power Station is located at the downstream toe of the Main Dam and contains two generating units each of 9,000 kilowatts capacity, which will feed the Cambodian interconnected electrical system. The Main Irrigation Outlet is located at the northern end of the power station. Two Auxiliary Irrigation Outlets are provided at higher levels, one through South Dam 2 and the other through the northern end of the Main Dam.

GEOLOGY

The dam foundation rock is generally volcanic tuff but shale beds extend across the dam site at several locations, in particular at the north end of the Main Dam. The strike of the shale beds is generally north west-south east. Slightly to moderately weathered rock generally occurs at depths of 3 to 4 metres, except within 300 metres of the river where the rock is overlain by fine alluvial soil and sound rock is up to 11 metres below the surface. The weathering varies in detail, but a typical weathering profile is:—

- From 0.0 to 0.2 m. Topsoil, with some organic matter.
- From 0.2 to 1.0 m. Lateritic soil frequently containing potentially swelling clays, grading into completely weathered rock.
- From 1.0 to 3.0 m. Completely to moderately weathered bedrock frequently containing potentially swelling clays, and calcareous modules.
- Below 3.0 m. Highly to slightly weathered bedrock.

POWER STATION

The power station is located on the northern bank of the Prek Thnot, approximately 200 m. from the river, partly within the toe of the dam with a retaining wall between the dam and power station and is sited to take advantage of the foundation conditions as shown by the exploration.

Problems of stability during operation of the turbines have been minimised by making the power conduits as short as possible and by adopting an appropriate diameter. The former, which obviates the necessity for relief valves and surge tanks was achieved by adopting a rockfill embankment section with steep faces in the vicinity of the power station and by siting the intake towers so that they are partly contained in the embankment.

The access and assembly bay is at elevation 44.00 m. The floor of the tailwater channel is at elevation 35.00 m. The turbines are to produce rated output

at a net head of 18.00 m. Under normal tailwater conditions, the corresponding water level in the reservoir is elevation 57.00 m. which is slightly above the expected average level. With the adjustable blade kaplan type turbine, output is only slightly reduced for lower reservoir levels while, at full supply level, the maximum turbine output will be within the overload capacity of the generator. A decrease in the net head for rated output would result in an increase in the cost of electrical and mechanical equipment. Each turbine-generator is capable of being dismantled while the other unit is in operation.

The power station will have a concrete substructure. The superstructure will cover the entire generating equipment as this results in a cheaper travelling crane and provides better conditions for erection and maintenance of the turbine-generator units. The volume of concrete in the station is estimated to be 10,000 cubic metres.

POWER INTAKES AND CONDUITS

The intake works for the power station consist of two reinforced concrete conduits under the dam embankment, each with a separate intake tower and each supplying a separate turbine. Access is provided from the crest of the dam to the intake towers. Each conduit is 4.50 m. internal diameter. This size was determined from an economic comparison of conduit diameters ranging from 4.0 m. to 6.0 m.

The intake sill level is at elevation 48.5 m. with a vertical bellmouth shaft connecting to each conduit. A cylinder gate was adopted for the guard gate as it did not require a separate shaft within the dam. These gates are not required to regulate flow. Each gate is operated by a single hydraulic cylinder hoist located on the hoist deck.

Bulkhead gates will be installed between the cylinder gate and the trashracks, so that the cylinder gate can be inspected and maintained. These bulkhead gates are supported from a monorail which connects the two intake structures so that the same gates can be used for both intakes. The power conduits are steel lined similarly to the irrigation conduits. The conduit invert level is fixed at elevation 32.75 m. by the setting of the turbines. The conduits are designed for the same external load as the irrigation conduit and an internal pressure of 1.6 times the static pressure with the reservoir at maximum water level. However, the internal pressure is relatively low and the thickness of steel liners is governed by the minimum practical thickness required for handling. Concrete seep rings are cast on the sections of conduit within the impervious core, to prevent leakage along the conduits.

OUTLET WORKS

The main irrigation outlet is located immediately to the north of the power station. It comprises an intake tower, a 2.4 m. diameter conduit under the

dam embankment, terminating in a valve chamber and a stilling basin. It will discharge $51 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$ with the reservoir at the minimum operating level (elevation 50.0m.) The intake tower has its sill at elevation 48.5 m. in order to provide some dead storage for silt. A 1.80 m. square opening has been provided through the base of the tower to permit river diversion, on completion of which this opening will be permanently plugged. The conduit is a reinforced concrete section with an internal steel lining from the upstream face of the impervious zone of the dam embankment to its outlet downstream. The invert level of the conduit suits river diversion requirements, the invert at the downstream end being placed at the same level as the invert of the tailrace channel (elevation 35.0 m.) and sloping to elevation 36.0 m. at the upstream end. The site investigations indicate that at these levels the conduit will rest on sound rock with the top half projecting into the dam embankment. Because of possible differential settlement across the conduit, it is designed for an overburden pressure 1.8 times the normal overburden pressure of the rockfill.


A bulkhead gate is provided at the intake of the irrigation conduit to permit dewatering for maintenance of the outlet works. Two identical high-pressure slide gates, each having a water passage approximately $1.9 \text{ m.} \times 2.4 \text{ m.}$, are located at the downstream end of the conduit. The downstream gate is used to regulate the flow and the upstream one as a guard gate.

Two auxiliary irrigation outlets are provided to supply water to the proposed higher level irrigation areas. These are located at elevation 50.0 m, in South Dam 2 and at the northern end of the Main Dam, and consist of horizontal box type intake and a conduit under the dam with two valves, a butterfly guard valve and a hollow jet regulating valve, at the downstream end. Each outlet can release $4 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$ with the reservoir at elevation 54.0 m.

SPILLWAY

Early investigations were concentrated on a side channel spillway for an inflow flood of $6,000 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$. For the greater flood peak and the greater crest length required, geological explorations indicated that excavations would create unstable condition, and the materials excavated would not be suitable as rockfill. Investigations were therefore directed at locating the spillway at Phnom Tralach near South Dam 1 where investigations indicated that the excavated materials would be suitable for rockfill and earthfill zones of the dam.

The spillway adopted is an ungated chute with a crest length of approximately 400 m. The crest is shaped in plan so as to increase its length without increasing the total spillway width. The economic comparison between gated spillway and ungated spillway indicated that the latter would enable considerable



saving in cost, and will also provide safety against maloperation. The crest of the spillway is a free overfall ogee type, 400 m. long, at elevation 58.5 m. with the approach channel at elevation 57.0 m. The concrete crest structure terminates on the downstream side at elevation 53.0 m. approximately and is designed so the jet lands sufficiently far from the structure to prevent under-cutting by erosion of the foundation. The training walls on each side of the spillway are extended downstream of the crest to protect the embankments from possible erosion damage when the spillway is in operation. The spillway design has been checked by hydraulic model studies.

The discharge channel tapers from a maximum width of 220 m. at the crest to a width of 80 m. at a point 200 m. downstream. Hydraulic model studies show that velocities in this length of channel can be as high as $13\text{m}^3/\text{s}$ for the maximum discharge. Concrete lining is not proposed as geological exploration indicates that in this section the downstream end will be excavated about 5 m. into slightly weathered or fresh rock. However, isolated weak seams and other local defects in the rock will be cleaned out and backfilled with concrete.

Downstream from the tapered section the channel is nearly horizontal and the water velocity decreases to approximately $6\text{m}^3/\text{s}$ at 1,000 metres downstream and further reduces as it approaches the existing river channel. The channel is designed to carry the 1 in 100

year spillway discharge and greater flows will overtop its banks. However, when this occurs the Prek Thnot itself will also have overtopped its banks and thus flooding adjacent to the river should not be increased.

DAM EMBANKMENT

Embankment section

Initial studies confirmed that a fill type embankment will be more economical than a concrete section. Three embankment sections are proposed to suit the varying embankment heights and locally occurring material. A description of these sections, namely, an earthfill, a rockfill and a composite earth and rockfill section is given below:

(a) Earthfill Embankment (Section A). A homogeneous earthfill section with protection on both faces is constructed where the general natural surface level is above elevation 56.00 m. The section has a downstream drainage blanket which is omitted when the foundation level is above elevation 58.00 m, as it is not then required for seepage control. A homogeneous earth embankment has the advantage that deep foundation excavation is not required and that earth material is generally close to the embankment site. However, as compared with a rockfill embankment, flat slopes are required due to the lower strength of the soil.

(b) Rockfill embankment (Section B). This embank-

ment consists of a relatively thin earth core supported on either side by stabilizing rockfill zones with filter zones interposed. It is used for the main dam in the vicinity of the Prek Thnot, where the height of the dam is greatest and where the final closure of the dam will be made. The thinner impervious core allow rapid construction and the steep face slopes reduce the length of the power and irrigation conduits. This embankment section is close to the rockfill sources at the spillway and quarry site. Excavations to a rock foundation is necessary under the rockfill zones so that the outer slopes of the rockfill may be as steep as practicable and not be limited by the strength of the foundation.

(c) Composite embankment (Section C). This embankment consists of an impervious zone supported on the upstream side by rockfill and on the downstream side by earthfill material. This will be used for the central section of South Dam 2 and for those portions of the Main Dam adjacent to the central rockfill section.

An economic comparison showed the composite section to be more favourable than the homogeneous section except in sections of the embankment further from the rock sources. The composite section also appeared to be more economic than the rockfill section for embankments of intermediate height. However, an alternative proposal in the technical specification allows for the rockfill section to replace the composite section if tendered prices show this to be more economic.

Foundation Treatment

The permeability of the surface clays is low and for Embankment Section A only nominal foundation stripping (approximately 0.5 m.) is required. A central cut-off 3 m. wide will, however, be taken about 1 m. into the impermeable foundation layer to protect against animal or termite holes and shrinkage cracks.

Beneath the rockfill zones the foundations is excavated to slightly to moderately weathered rock. Under the impervious core in the rockfill embankment (Section B) the foundation will be taken down to groutable rock and will be at least as deep as the adjacent rockfill.

Where necessary for the composite embankment (Section C) the foundation of the upstream half of Zone 1 is excavated to groutable rock to provide a positive cut-off. Elsewhere the foundation will be excavated to material of sufficient shear strength (approximately 1 to 2 m.)

Direct measurements of the permeability of the dam foundations have not been made. Diamond drill holes have been water tested in the quarry and spillway areas and the results generally show that the fresh rock is tightly jointed, indicating that the grouting requirement should be small. A grout is incorporated below the impervious core of the rockfill embankment and where required below the upstream part of the impervious core of the composite

embankment. The depth of the grout curtain holes will be two thirds the height of the dam. Some blanket grouting may also be required with depths not greater than 6 m. For the earthfill and lower height composite embankments a cut-off will be taken down to impermeable material and grouting should not be necessary. Grouting is also proposed under the spillway crest structure.

Embankment Stability

The stability of embankment section was evaluated by May's Modified Swedish Slip Circle Analysis using a computer programme. The stability was studied for the steady seepage, drawdown, end of construction, and initial filling conditions. A factor of safety of 1.50 has been used as a lower limit for the steady seepage condition and 1.25 has been used for temporary critical conditions, which requirements are satisfied by the proposed sections. In addition, the sections have a factor of safety in excess of 1.0 under the unlikely condition of complete loss of cohesion. The following effective stress strength parameters were adopted:—

Earthfill and weathered

foundation, cohesion 0.2 Kg/Sq. cm saturated
5.0 Kg/Sq. cm unsaturated
Friction angle 15°

Rockfill, friction angle 40°

Other pervious fill, friction angle 35°

RIVER DIVERSION

It is expected that all work on the dam embankment, spillway and power conduits, except for the closure section in the main river channel, will be carried out with the Prek Thnot flowing in its natural channel. This closure section would be about 100 m. wide at the base, with the embankments sloped back each side at approximately 1 vertical to 4 horizontal. Construction of the closure section should be carried out during the dry season and while it is being constructed the Prek Thnot would be diverted by a low coffer dam into the irrigation outlet conduit through an opening in the base of the intake tower.

CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS

The dam foundations, the spillway and areas upstream of the dam site were investigated as sources of earthfill materials. In all areas investigated the soils are variable in properties and at the time of the exploration, their moisture content was generally below optimum. The upper layer of soil is generally lateritic and more plastic than the completely weathered bedrock below. Soils which swell when they absorb water occur throughout the area. Exploration was by hand-dug test pits and some auger holes and approximately 300 samples were taken and tested. Classification tests carried out on all samples were gradation, Atterberg limits and compaction. Selected samples were used for consolidation

(Continued on page 114)

Prek Thnot Irrigation Project

THE PLANNING OF THE IRRIGATION PROJECT AT Prek-Thnot in the South of Cambodia, was carried out by Tahal (Water Planning) Ltd, Consulting Engineers, together with Water Resources Development (International) Ltd, who were responsible for the agricultural planning and economic feasibility studies. Both these organizations undertook the work involved in the project at the request of the Government of Israel.

The purpose of the Prek-Thnot Irrigation Project is to utilize the water of the Prek-Thnot River, now flowing unused into the Mekong River, for the irrigation of an area of 70,000 hectares net. The heart of this area lies only 30 kms from Phnom Penh, capital of Cambodia, and at its closest point is 10 kms from the capital. The total area at present under cultivation in Cambodia is estimated at about 2.0 million hectares, of which only a relatively small portion is under irrigation.

The aims of the project are two-fold:

1. To increase the yield of paddy-rice through the introduction of rational irrigation practices. Rice cultivation in Cambodia is at present entirely dependent on the vagaries of precipitation during the growing season and the consequences of a dry year are disastrous for the individual farmer and for the country as a whole. Dependable supplies of irrigation water would ensure good yields even in a dry year.
2. To promote the cultivation of various kinds of vegetables or other cash crops which require to be irrigated during the dry season. The relative proximity of the area to Phnom-Penh should ensure a good marketing centre for the produce of the area. It is expected that the availability of water in the dry season will induce increasing numbers of farmers to cultivate various kinds of vegetables. One of the objects of the experimental farm now being set up in the project area by Water Resources Development (International) Ltd, is to promote the diversification of agricultural crops by cultivation of vegetables and other cash crops.

It is anticipated that the impact of the project on the agricultural development of Cambodia will be considerable and out of all proportion to the relative

size of the project area, which represents 3.5% of the total cultivated area of Cambodia.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

The irrigation project will utilize the storage capacity of the reservoir to be formed behind the earth dam at present under construction on the Prek-Thnot River; this reservoir will hold 1,120 million cubic metres (MCM) of water, will provide full regulation of the river flow and will make water available to the project area in accordance with irrigation demand. The dam is also intended for the generation of electric power.

Water will be released from the reservoir through the power plant or through a special emergency outlet in the event of a power plant shut-down. Since the fundamental assumption is that the release of water will be governed by the irrigation demand, only part of the power production will be primary power; the bulk will be secondary power.

Water released from the storage reservoir will flow along the river bed to a diversion dam at a distance of 12 kms. The purpose of the diversion dam is to raise the water to the level of the two main canals for conveyance of irrigation water.

Two separate head regulators, one on each river bank, will control the flow in the two main canals, which together with branch canals and a number of laterals, are the basic components of the irrigation system. Tertiary canals have not been planned, although estimates were made for the cost of these canals and these estimates have been included in the cost estimate of the project. Cross regulators on main and lateral canals have been provided at strategic points to maintain the water at the required levels.

Irrigation projects require that full provision be made for field drainage, for the conveyance of storm run-off and excess irrigation waters; these provisions have been included in the plans for the Prek-Thnot project. The system of drainage canals has been designed on the basis of the data at present available and costs calculated, though the information available cannot be considered adequate for such design. The main drain alignments generally follow the layout of the lateral irrigation canals in order to adhere to the natural drainage pattern of the project area.

WATER SOURCE

On the basis of 60-year climatic records and the conclusions reached by the Japanese Prek-Thnot Investigation Team, and presented in the Feasibility Report published by the Team, it is estimated that the total quantity of water available for storage from the Prek-Thnot River in an average year will reach 1,113 MCM.

After deducting water losses from the storage reservoir, the amount of water that will be available at the diversion dam in an average year should reach 953 MCM.

It has been assumed that in a moderately dry year the inflow into the reservoir will be reduced by about 12%, with a net inflow (i.e. the gross inflow minus losses) in these years of 840 MCM. However, it is estimated that the quantity of water to be supplied in such moderately dry years should be increased by about 8.5% in comparison with an average year, (after taking into account months in which precipitation exceeds the irrigation requirements), if an equal yield is to be produced. Thus, 1,035 MCM of water will be required. The storage volume of the reservoir will be sufficient to meet a deficiency of inflow of about 200 MCM for each one of two successive moderately dry years of this type, if part of the water stored below the power outlet is also used. This figure takes into account the silt storage factor.

CANAL DESIGN

The Lacey* formulae were used for the design of the irrigation canal sections and the gradients.

These formulae have been evolved on the basis of considerable experience in the design, construction and operation of irrigation canals in India and Pakistan and are particularly applicable to long established alluvial rivers flowing through unconsolidated alluvium of their own deposition, their dominant flow occurring over periods of time sufficiently long to effect the rehabilitation of their channels to full dimensions.

The formulae derived by Lacey are based on the mean grain character of the alluvial material composing the bed and banks and use a silt factor "f" which is a function of the median particle diameter. These formulae have been found to be in substantial agreement with data from rivers in India and the USA and have been used in the design of open channel irrigation systems in India and the Middle East.

From the results of laboratory analyses of soil samples taken from the project area, it was assumed

that the silt factor "f" in the Lacey formulae can be taken to equal unity, and the value of this factor will probably vary only a little from this magnitude. This assumption is considered to be sufficiently accurate for preliminary design. However, the value of this factor should be checked by additional soil investigations after the final pegging out of the canal alignment in the field.

No data on losses from irrigation canal systems in Cambodia are available. The results of the soil survey in the Prek-Thnot area show that the profile from 0 to 1.5 m depth varies from clay to sandy loam with thin layers of sand in some areas. On the basis of past experience, it is considered that a conservative average value of the coefficient of permeability k would be about 1.0×10^{-4} cm/sec. Allowing for seepage and evaporation, total conveyance losses will reach 1 CMS for 450,000 sq m or 2.24 CMS per one million square metres of canal wetted perimeter area. This figure is comparable to that of 2.5 CMS per million sq m used in alluvial plain irrigation in India and the Middle East, where considerably more experimental data concerning seepage, etc., are available.

Lining of canals will in all probability be required for only a relatively small percentage of the total canal length. The exact amount required can be determined only after additional soil investigations have been carried out along the canal alignments pegged out in the field. For the purposes of cost estimated, it was assumed that about 10% of the canal length will require lining, and the outlay for this work was included in the cost estimate of the project.

Drain sections have been designed on the basis of the Manning formula using a value of $n=0.030$, with a fixed relation of water depth to bed width of $h=B$ for drains down to 2.00 m depth, and $h=1.75 B^{1/3}$ for depths exceeding 2.00 m.

The design of drainage system has been based principally on a canal capacity of 0.5 CMS per 1,000 ha required for agricultural drainage. Further, these canals have been designed to convey the excess rainfall not retained in the paddies, in addition to the flow from agricultural drainage. Deep and narrow drain channel cross-sections have been designed to allow for somewhat higher velocities; this will prevent excessive weed propagation and also reduce the loss of agricultural land. A number of water courses, fed from catchment areas outside the project zone, cross the project area. These water courses have been designed to convey the storm run-off from these areas.

WATER REQUIREMENTS

The data available in Cambodia on water duty were compared with data from other rice-growing countries. A water duty at the farm outlets of 1520 mm of irrigation water per growing season, including all

* Lacey, G. *Uniform water conveyance in alluvial material*. Proc. ASCE, 87, No. HY1, Jan. 1961: 187-194. Contribution to a discussion on resistance to flow in alluvial channels, Simons D. B. and Richardson E.V. Proc. ASCE, 86, No. HY5, May 1960: 73-99.

TABLE I

WATER DISCHARGE AT HEADWORKS

1. Paddy—70,000 ha in wet season (Net)

Month	Rainfall	Effective Rainfall	Effective Rainfall	Water Requirements	Supplement (Net)	Gross Water Requirement at Diversion Dam	Required Discharge at Diversion Dam	Right Bank Main Canal Total Discharge	Left Bank Main Canal Total Discharge	Total Discharge at Diversion Dam	Total Quantity of Water
	mm	%	mm	mm	mm	mm	CMS/1000 ha	CMS Net	CMS Net	CMS	MCM per mo.
May	134	85	114	160	46	56.86	0.219	7.54	7.59	15.13	39.217
June	155	85	132	350	218	269.45	1.040	35.79	36.05	71.84	186.209
July	155	85	132	400	268	331.25	1.278	44.00	44.30	88.30	228.795
August	160	85	136	320	184	227.42	0.877	30.18	30.40	60.58	157.023
September	224	85	190	200	10	12.36	0.048	1.65	1.66	3.31	8.580
October	260	85	(221) 90*	90	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
			794	1,520	726	897.34					Total 619.824

2. Paddy—22,000 ha in dry season (Net)

November	127	90	114	160	46	56.86	0.219	2.38	2.38	4.76	12.338
December	46	90	41	350	309	381.92	1.473	15.98	15.98	31.96	82.840
January	8	90	7	400	393	485.75	1.874	20.33	20.33	10.66	105.391
February	10	90	9	320	311	384.40	1.483	16.09	16.09	32.18	83.411
March	41	90	37	200	163	201.47	0.777	8.43	8.43	16.86	43.701
April	77	90	69	90	21	25.96	0.100	1.085	1.085	2.17	5.625
			277	1,520	1,243	1,536.36					333.306

GRAND TOTAL 953.130

* Effective rainfall is 221 mm; of this only 90 mm are utilized and 131 mm are wasted.

farm losses, was adopted on the basis of an assumed farm irrigation efficiency of 70%.

Monthly irrigation water requirements were computed by subtracting the effective rainfall during the month from the monthly water duty. On the basis of experimental data gathered in Cambodia and the neighbouring countries and the usual practice in the region, the effective rain was taken as 90% of the rainfall during the dry season and 85% during the wet season. The highest monthly water requirement was computed for the month of July, and amounted to 268 mm or 1,035 CMS per 1,000 hectares at the farm outlets.

Taking into account the canal losses, as given above, the maximum discharge required will be 1.17 CMS at the lateral headworks, and 1.28 CMS per 1,000 hectares at the main canal headworks.

IRRIGABLE AREA

The project area was investigated in the field, and was later studied on topographical maps to the scale 1:20,000 prepared by "Le Service Géographique

de F.A.R.K." It was decided to exclude from the proposed irrigation scheme all the jungle area lying on the right bank of the river and a large part of the jungle area on the left bank because of the difficult topographical conditions in these areas. However, some 8,000 hectares of jungle on the left bank are considered suitable for irrigation and have therefore been included in the scheme.

The area commanded by the two irrigation canals totals about 97,200 hectares. After deducting 11,000 hectares of land considered unsuitable for irrigation, a gross irrigable area of about 86,200 hectares is obtained. Of this about 20% must be deducted for roads, dykes, etc., leaving an area of some 70,000 hectares as the net irrigable area for the cultivation of paddy-rice during the wet season.

In a normal year, irrigation of this area during the wet season will require 620 MCM of water out of a total of 953 MCM available at the main canal headworks; this leaves 333 MCM available for irrigation during the dry season. Thus, a second crop of paddy-rice could be grown in the dry season on

(Continued on page 114)

PREK THNOT IRRIGATION PROJECT

about 22,000 hectares. However, it is anticipated that cultivation will gradually switch over paddy-rice to other crops, such as vegetables, other cash crops and green manure crops. As the water requirements of these crops are considerably lower than those of paddy-rice, it will be possible to cultivate a larger area than that cultivated under paddy-rice. No definite cropping pattern is proposed at the present time, before trials have been conducted at the experimental station now being set up.

The area under cultivation in the dry season may then vary from 22,000 hectares, if paddy-rice is grown up to almost the whole of the project area, if groundnuts or some other crop are cultivated. The actual area cultivated will probably lie somewhere between these two figures.

There is an additional area of some 15,000 hectares lying between the main dam and the diversion dam which is being considered for irrigation by water to be diverted from the storage reservoir. As long as paddy-rice is grown this would reduce the dry season irrigation in the main area accordingly. On the other hand should rice growing be completely discontinued in this area in the future, sufficient water could be made available for both areas for wet and dry seasons irrigation, bringing the total irrigated area to 85,000 hectares.

COST ESTIMATE

The construction cost of the irrigation system has been estimated at 21,670,000 U.S. dollars and 305,900,000 riels making an equivalent total of 30,410,000 dollars. This figure does not include the cost of the storage dam, or any part thereof. It is understood that final plans are being drawn up for the construction of the diversion dam; however, as the new design was not yet available, the cost estimates were based on the preliminary design prepared by the Japanese Team. The figure of \$960,000 re-

presenting the cost of the diversion dam in the cost estimate of the project will have to be revised to correspond to the new design as soon as this is completed.

It is assumed that canal excavation, which is a major item in the construction of the project, will be executed by mechanical equipment, although it is possible that the Cambodian Government will recommend the extensive use of manual labour. Rough estimates show that the overall construction cost would be only slightly affected by such a change.

Assuming the use of mechanical equipment, it is estimated that the irrigation and drainage systems can be completed in six dry seasons. The cost of mapping has been estimated at \$590,000 and the sum required for land acquisition at \$2,000,000. This brings the total cost of the project to \$33,000,000.

BENEFICIAL EFFECTS OF THE PROJECT

In order to evaluate the benefits that will have to be derived from the project, a cropping pattern of rice-groundnuts was tentatively assumed, although it is quite evident that other crop rotation patterns may also be adopted. The cultivation of rice during the wet season and of groundnuts during the dry season is considered as an acceptable cropping pattern, and as such it was adopted for estimating purposes.

An extensive study has been made in order to estimate the probable benefits and costs per hectare of cultivated land. A rice yield of 2.25 tons and groundnuts yield of 2.00 tons per hectare have been assumed though these yields may be considered as conservative. Cultivation costs include seeds, fertilizers, water, labour, taxes, interest on loans, etc. A detailed computation shows that on the basis of this conservative assumption a net profit of \$99 per hectare can reasonably be expected.

PREK THNOT DAM AND POWER STATION

tion, swelling, specific gravity, triaxial compression, electro-chemical and minerological tests.

The river channels of the Prek Thnot and Stung Tong Hong were explored for sources of filter material and concrete sand. No gravels suitable for Zone 2A were found but there is sufficient sand suitable for protection of the downstream face of the dam (Zone 2B) and for concrete sand.

A large part of the rockfill, coarse concrete aggregate and Zone 2A filter requirement will come from the spillway excavation in the vicinity of the crest structure. The balance will be obtained from Quarry Site No. 1 at Phnom Oeung Khmoeung. Alternative quarry sites were briefly investigated in the vicinity of the northern and southern embankments.

Wednesday, July 13, 1966 - 4:15 p.m.

John Watson

Mr. President

Passengers for tonight:

- Averell Harriman accepts with pleasure.
- George Ball regrets due to a commitment he cannot break.
- Secretary Rusk would like Ambassador Thompson to come along.
- Prime Minister Holt would like Sir John Bunting, his Aide, to come along.

Unless I hear to the contrary, I will assume Thompson and Bunting are okay.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Wednesday,
July 13, 1966 -- 2:45 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Presidential Determination on Military Assistance
to Laos

Attached is a memorandum from Budget Director Schultze on the
above subject.

It recommends that you sign the proposed determination (attached)
in which you determine that it is "important to the security of the
United States" to furnish military assistance to Laos without
regard to certain requirements of the Foreign Assistance Act.
The amount is \$50 million during FY 1967.

I concur and recommend that you sign the determination.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-193
By hig NARA, Date 3-14-89

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, July 13, 1966 - 2:45 p.m.

*John Wilson
ex Mayor
Katie*

25

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is the list of subjects suggested by the British (through Pat Dean) for discussion between you and Prime Minister Wilson on the 29th. It is a tour of the horizon.

I made two preliminary points:

-- The agenda should be simplified as follows:

1. Europe, Items a - d;
2. The Middle East, Item e;
3. Africa, Items f - h;
4. Asia, Items i - m;
5. Latin America, Item n.

-- More important, we shall have to isolate precisely what it is the Prime Minister would wish to raise under each of these headings so that the final agenda is not a vague shopping list.

The Ambassador will be working over this list with the Department of State and keep us informed.

I still find it hard to believe the pound will not arise.

Ambassador Dean will be returning for consultation with the Prime Minister after Wilson comes back from Moscow July 19th. The exact date of Dean's return is not yet fixed. He has been helpful on Vietnam, communicating to London candidly and sympathetically our views.

He is extremely anxious to see you and to get your views directly before he talks with the Prime Minister.

I recommend that you see Ambassador Dean before his return to London.

Set up meeting with Dean _____

Hold him off _____

See me _____

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

By ij

87-196
NARA, Date 7-17-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUGGESTED LIST OF SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

- (a) NATO and EAST/WEST RELATIONS
- (b) Disarmament (including NATO nuclear sharing: non-proliferation: guarantees to India)
- (c) European Economic Community
- (d) Kennedy Round
- (e) Future of Arabia (including South Arabia and the Gulf and relations with the U.A.R.)
- (f) Rhodesia
- (g) South-West Africa
- (h) Aid to Africa (in relation to the President's statement)
- (i) India and Pakistan
- (j) Vietnam and Cambodia
- (k) Follow-up of quadripartite talks in Canberra
- (l) Asian Development Bank
- (m) Implications of the Vietnam War on arms sales
- (n) Latin America (including Guatemala/British Honduras)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-196
By mg NARA, Date 7-17-89

Wednesday,
July 13, 1966 -- 1:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

I thought you might like to
look at my proposed reply to Jim
Burns.

You will note on page 2 that
I followed through on a suggestion you
made.

Please feel free to treat it
as a draft even though it is signed.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 13, 1966
Wednesday, 12:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dates for the Marcos State Visit

Following up on his conversation with Secretary Rusk in Manila, President Marcos has now asked that the Washington portion of his State Visit be scheduled for September 10-15.

Since Ne Win of Burma will be leaving town at mid-day September 10, State suggests that Marcos delay his Washington stay until either September 13-16 or, preferably, September 18-21.

These dates are offered in order to meet Marcos' desire to address both a Joint Session of Congress and the United Nations General Assembly. (The Joint Session decision will obviously depend on Congress' mid-September schedule; Rusk is in touch with the leadership.)

State asks that you approve both the alternative dates presented above. In order to get the word to Bill Blair before he sees Marcos tomorrow, we need your decision today, if possible.

W. W. Rostow

Approve Both Dates ✓

Approve Only September 13-16 ✓ *prefer*

Approve Only September 18-21 ✓

Disapprove _____

See Me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-196
By sig NARA, Date 7-17-89

WWR
WJJ
JCT, Jr
BKS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B

Wednesday, July 13, 1966
11:55 a. m.

Mr. President:

Here is Ed Hamilton's report
to me on how Ed Korry's task force is
shaping up its recommendations.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1966

WWR

SUBJECT: Progress Report on African Initiatives

As you know, the key to the action program announced in the President's speech is the report of Ed Korry's task force. Korry says he will have the report for us early next week. As of yesterday, he was beating the recommendations into shape, but had quite a lot left to do. But the fundamental recommendations are clear. I would summarize them as follows:

1. U.S. policy and aid activities in Africa are severely hampered and dissipated by the sheer number of independent bilateral activities. Duplication, overlapping, inability and unwillingness of donors to work together, etc., have confused issues and diluted aid benefits. Thus, Korry's basic conclusion -- which he has discussed at length with George Woods -- is that the U.S. and other donors should put the great bulk of their African chips behind the World Bank. Specifically:
 - The Bank should create a standing group on Africa, with general responsibility for planning and organizing the financing of transport, communication, and power projects. This could be an adaptation of the existing Bank consultative groups on Nigeria and Tunisia. Its first job would be to bring some order to the rash of existing and projected feasibility studies in this area.
 - The Bank should set up a Rural Research and Development Institute for Africa as a central organ for studying agricultural problems, developing projects, organizing financing, and generally dealing with the overwhelming African problem -- agricultural backwardness.
 - The Bank should create a special fund for Africa, either by earmarking part of the IDA replenishment (as you know, Woods is pushing for a quadrupling of the IDA), or through a private arrangement with the donors that a certain percentage of IDA money would go to Africa.
2. In our bilateral programs, AID should pay relatively more attention to the functional problems of sub-regions (e.g. post-primary education, dry land agriculture, etc.), and relatively less to individual programs in each country.

3. In addition, Korry will have some things to say about the rules which govern AID, the major issues of U.S. commercial policy toward Africa (commodity agreements, trade preferences, etc.), and the various proposals to expand U.S. private investment in the region. This is not his professional cup of tea, and it looks now as though he will confine himself to passing statements on most of these subjects, with perhaps a stronger pitch on the restrictions which our balance of payments program puts on AID operations.

The key to the suggestions involving the World Bank is getting the other major donors -- France, Germany, U.S., Belgium, the African Development Bank, the UN Economic Commission for Africa, and the UN Development Program -- to agree to use the Bank as the central funnel of aid and source of leverage on local economic policy. There are three basic problems to be dealt with:

- (1) The tendency of donors to flounder around independently -- applying different economic criteria, refusing to accept each others feasibility studies, etc.,
- (2) The resulting tendency of the Africans to play the donors off against one another, and
- (3) The extreme scarcity of reasonable projects and African capacity to develop them.

In my view, the Bank is the most competent organization to take on these problems and Korry's is not a bad blueprint. Chances of the French joining the crowd are not particularly good, but even a union of everybody else would be a great step forward. The critical element will be getting Woods out in front with our clear backing, but his clear leadership. Involvement of the President will almost certainly be required and it will probably cost us a large increase in contributions to IDA (though no new appropriations until FY 1969).

The recommendation on bilateral programs is the fuzziest of Korry's points, primarily because he has not really made up his mind where he wants to draw the bilateral-multilateral line. His position may reduce to a simple repetition of the new emphasis on health, education and agriculture. I have been pushing him to go further and identify priority areas within sectors (e.g. what kind of agriculture, what level of education, etc.), to set the stage for multi-country programs which make administrative and economic sense and promote a basis for political regionalism. He seems to be moving in this direction.

If he does a thorough job, we will have a basis for leveraging AID out of its current rut. (None of this denies the fundamental proposition of AID country programming that there are basic differences in cultures, economies, and political traditions which should be reflected in AID policy. It does reflect a belief that in Africa the similarities between four or five countries are frequently greater than the differences, and that a common approach often better serves our political objectives than disparate individual ones.)

I have told Korry that^{you} -- and perhaps eventually the President -- will want to meet with him after you have read the report. He will, of course, stay in town as long as he is needed. If the report is on time, I would suggest a Rostow-Korry session the middle of next week, for which I will furnish you a suggested action timetable.

Beyond the Korry exercise, AID is pushing ahead with other things the President referred to -- measles/smallpox eradication, communications satellite ground stations, and centers of excellence in higher education -- as well as the usual run of projects (e. g., last week's Finchaa Dam, our largest project -- and the largest dam -- in Ethiopia. I can give you specific reports on those fronts ~~where~~ whenever you like.



Ed Hamilton

Wednesday,
July 13, 1966 -- 11:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

This Indian account of
Sainteny's impressions of Hanoi is
tolerably interesting.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, July 13, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BOWLES (New Delhi, 540)

Monday evening, July 11, I called first on President Radhakrishnan and then on Foreign Secretary C. S. Jha to clarify U. S. reaction to Mrs. Gandhi's proposal and to find out what news, if any, they had received from the U. S. S. R., Hanoi, and other interested sources.

My talk with the President was routine and not particularly informative. I stressed points (raised in reference telegram) on which Mrs. Gandhi apparently chose to be vague, again spelling out our position as I have done on previous occasions. I then asked him if he had any reaction from Moscow and Hanoi. The President stated he had no information and doubted that he would until he sees Mrs. Gandhi on Sunday. He remarked that Nasser had not referred to her proposal on Vietnam and had deliberately sought to avoid discussion. The President explained this on grounds of (a) Nasser's egotism and consequent assumption that Mrs. Gandhi should go to him for advice, and (b) Nasser's lingering conviction that somehow he can reach an understanding with China.

My discussion with C. S. Jha and K. M. Kannampilly, Joint Secretary in MEA who recently returned from a tour around southeast Asia, was much more productive. Jha had just completed a long discussion with Jean Sainteny, DeGaulle's Special Emissary, who had arrived Monday morning after a week's visit to Hanoi. He described Sainteny as astute, objective and experienced in Vietnam affairs. He added that Sainteny was highly respected by DeGaulle, who on several occasions during Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Paris in March had referred to him as the man he trusted most in regard to this difficult area. Jha reported his discussions with Sainteny in the following terms:

A. Rather to the surprise of Government of India officials, Sainteny had shown no signs of an anti-U. S. attitude and indeed on several questions appeared sympathetic to tactical military and political problems which the U. S. has encountered. For instance, in the course of his conversations, Sainteny had stressed:

1. The the Americans have not exaggerated the amount of North Vietnamese men and supplies moving across the border;
2. That American bombing of oil tanks had been extremely accurate with very little loss of life to civilians;

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED	
State 10-18-78	
By RCH per 1P	NARS, Date 8-17-86

3. That from his own knowledge the North Vietnamese charge that the U. S. has bombed the docks of Haiphong was false, and

4. That the U. S. was correct in stating the North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam had begun as early as 1955.

B. Sainteny described the North Vietnamese as deeply committed to their cause and with a fierce determination to avoid defeat or appearances of defeat. Many parts of Hanoi are being evacuated, trenches are being dug and an all-out effort is being made to mobilize all available human and material sources.

C. Although Ho Chi Minh is still the most important single figure in the Government the major decisions grow out of a consensus among a half dozen key people.

D. If the Hanoi Government were wholly free to act on its own, Sainteny believes that it would cautiously proceed to negotiate a settlement. The North Vietnamese stressed in their conversations with him that they are prepared to accept an independent South Vietnamese Government for "10, 20 or even 30 years."

E. However, Chinese influence in Hanoi is strong and the Chinese have no desire for peace. Indeed the present situation fits Chinese political interests perfectly and they are anxious to prolong it. (Note: Jha commented that, although Sainteny's report that the Chinese are now the dominant political-military influence in Hanoi does not fit India's information from other sources, he is so deeply impressed with Sainteny personally that he is reluctantly inclined to accept his judgment.)

F. Because of geographic factors, the Soviet Union is at an extreme political disadvantage. It is far easier, Sainteny said, for us to cross the Pacific to get to Vietnam than it is for Soviets to get there through China.

The Hanoi Government expressed to Sainteny its deep fear that the U. S. would bomb the dams on the Red River which would result in heavy loss of life and devastating damage to crops. However, there was no indication that this or any other action the U. S. might take would drive the Hanoi Government to the negotiating table. Sainteny felt that this could be accomplished only by another prolonged pause in the bombing with no appearance of conditions. He was pessimistic largely because he recognized that the U. S. would find it difficult to accept such a proposition.

With this latter point in mind, Jha asked if I thought the U. S. would consider another pause in the bombing similar to one last December, particularly if India, U. S. S. R., France and other nations after due study became genuinely convinced that it would lead to a settlement. I replied that our action last December had

been based in large measure on assurances from Poles and others that unilateral move by the U.S. would produce an affirmative response from Hanoi. This response had not been forthcoming and it might be difficult for the U.S. to go through the same procedure all over again unless we had a clear assurance that the Hanoi Government was prepared within a reasonable period to take reciprocal steps.

Jha suggested that we might state that we were halting the bombing on the assumption that the infiltration would cease. We could then check by aerial photography and other intelligence to see if Hanoi Government responded. If it did not, we could present the evidence to the world and go back to our present program.

Jha then suggested that with Laotian cooperation, the U.S. might physically occupy substantial sections of the Ho Chi Minh trail. Our bombing he argued had not stopped the flow of equipment; on the contrary, it had increased. Why then should we not put a solid block in the way of infiltration in the form of U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. I replied that I did not know the terrain and was in no position to judge the feasibility of such a proposal.

Jha stated that there had been no reaction as yet from either the U.S.S.R. and Hanoi in regard to Mrs. Gandhi's proposal. The one small encouraging factor had been that the North Vietnamese envoy had seemed pleased when he was told of Mrs. Gandhi's proposal. However, in view of China's strong presence in North Vietnam, he felt that Chou en Lai's negative statement was profoundly discouraging.

BOWLES

Wednesday,
July 13, 1966 -- 11:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-288
By Ct, NARA Date 3-2-97

1.5
(b+c)

I forward this [redacted]
[redacted] mainly for amusement -- a
Soviet [redacted] worried about a U.S. -
China rapprochement.

It belongs in the department
of: Everyone's Got His Worries.

W. W. Rostow

1.5(b+c)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]
([redacted])

WWRostow:rln

Friday, July 13, 1966
6:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

This is just for fun.

Sometimes a man outside gets the mush
out of his mouth and says it just right --
this time at the expense of the Canadian
position on Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

UNCLASSIFIED

July 15, 1966

FROM OTTAWA (78)

1. Toronto Telegram Columnist, Lubor J. Zink, in CBC Radio news commentary July 13, stated:
2. "The only thing that has emerged from the Commons' so-called debate of our policy and role in the Vietnam conflict is that Canada has no policy but pretends to have an important role. Let me say at once that this role, as outlined in the almost empty House, is a fake. It cannot be anything else, because it stems from a make-believe assessment of the situation in Vietnam which not one of our MP's knows first hand.
3. "The struggle in Southeast Asia is the latest manifestation of the Communist relentless attempt to conquer the world -- an attempt that started in earnest with Stalin's grab of half of Europe.
4. "When this initial thrust was checked by NATO, the Communists tried to advance in the Far East. Their attack in Korea ran into another road block of collective defense.
5. "Throughout that period of open Communist aggression, Canada had a clear-cut foreign policy which was understood and fully backed by the nation.
6. "Moscow realized that the crude method of expansion was defeating its purpose by unifying the Free World. So the Kremlin, which also began to understand the risks of the nuclear age, switched emphasis on the stratagem of peaceful coexistence which seeks to destroy parliamentary democracy through subversion, sabotage and psychological warfare.
7. "Khrushchev miscalculated the speed of the corrosive process when he tested it with nuclear blackmail in the Cuban confrontation. However, Ottawa was one of the Western capitals which had already lost its bearing during that crisis, although the bulk of the nation was still sound.
8. "Since then, confused by its unprincipled politicians and by left-wing opinion moulders, Canada has been softened and misled by the delusion of a genuine East-West detente.

9. "Red China, which denounces the sophisticated Soviet method of patient subversion as betrayal of Marxist world revolution, resorted to indirect aggression under the guise of 'liberation wars end.' Vietnam is the pilot project of this expansion by proxy. If successful in Vietnam, it would be applied to the rest of Southeast Asia, to Africa and Latin America.

10. "Hence the war in Vietnam has to be regarded as a crucial test of the Free World's ability to nip this enormous danger in the bud. Since Hanoi and Peking have contemptuously rejected all attempts to negotiate peace, there is no alternative to fighting it out.

11. "Instead of supporting the American-led effort to stem the new tide of Communist aggression which ultimately threatens our own security and freedom, External Affairs Minister Martin fabricates excuses for fence-sitting. Canada, he says, has a unique role to play in quiet diplomacy which no other nation in the world can perform.

12. "This is nonsense. There is no lack of communication between the belligerents. And if and when Hanoi comes to the conference table, it won't be because a retired Canadian diplomat has talked Chinese to Ho Chi Minh, but because the Communists have been persuaded by the force of arms that they cannot win. It is sheer hypocrisy to maintain that there is no military solution to the war and that old Mr. Ronning can somehow succeed where U Thant, the Pope, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers and countless others have failed.

13. "The Ronning missions are a clever substitute for the discredited justification of Ottawa's fence-sitting on account of our membership on the dead International Control Commission. They are a cheap, gutless excuse for doing nothing.

14. "Those Canadians who haven't yet lost their sense of direction in this Communist exploited confusion, should be ashamed of the spineless performance of our politicians. And they should ponder Senator Robert Kennedy's Calgary quote of Dante's words: 'The hottest place in hell is reserved for those who in the time of crisis preserve their neutrality.'"

BUTTERWORTH

Wednesday, July 13, 1966 -- 11:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

Unless you rule to the contrary, I believe Ambassador Bunker should proceed to Europe, as scheduled, to brief the North Atlantic Council on the Dominican Republic rather than attend the lunch for Bolivian President-elect Barrientos on July 20.

W. W. Rostow

Let him go /

Hold for Barrientos lunch

See me

WWRostow:rla

Wednesday, July 13, 1966 -- 10:50 a. m.

Mr. President:

You suggested that Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara join you at 12:15 p. m. tomorrow, July 14.

There is an important NSC meeting on Southwest Africa at 12:00 noon -- important because the International Court of Justice is apparently planning to hand down its decision on July 15, and you should hear discussion of its implications and guide the town before that decision becomes public.

Lunch itself, tomorrow, is taken up, of course, with Prime Minister Holt.

I have checked with Marv who tells me that 6:00 p. m., Thursday, July 14, is open.

W. W. Rostow

Set up Rusk-McNamara for 6:00 p. m., Thursday, July 14 _____

Hold meeting over until Friday _____

See me _____

Wednesday
July 13, 1966 -- 10:40 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith three items that may be helpful in your talk with Drew Pearson at 11:00 a. m. today.

1. Highlights of non-military effort in North Viet Nam.
2. Bill Jorden's factual memorandum of June 24 on "Elements of Progress in Asia."
3. Singapore Prime Minister Lee's famous statement in support of our "buying time" for Asians to organize themselves.

I don't know how susceptible Pearson is to good sense on Asia; but I thought you might want to have all three of these items.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-attachment

WWRostow:rlh

Wednesday, July 13, 1966
8:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

With respect to the draft statement I prepared yesterday on the espionage cases, I believe you would wish our best lawyer to look at it if you plan to use it. The third sentence might prejudice his trial.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

35a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1966

Mr. Rostow:

The Czech matter will be released
to the Press by the State Depart-
ment at 2:30 this afternoon.

BKS
BKS

Tuesday, July 12, 1966
3:05 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here is a possible draft statement for
your use when the two cases break.

By using the phrase "public service"
I hoped to make it broad enough to make some
of the careless or naive boys on the Hill draw up
short.

That phrase also avoids any suggestion
of a vigilante appeal.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

In the past few days two cases of Communist espionage have come to public attention. One was an effort to penetrate the Department of State with an electronic listening device, which was frustrated by the patriotism of an American citizen and the skill of the F. B. I. The other was the tragic case of an American officer who, through some twist of character, was prepared to risk the security of his nation for money.

I wish to bring these cases to the attention of all who bear public responsibility. They demonstrate that there are still those who do not wish us well; who are straining every resource at their command -- probing at every weakness of character -- prepared to exploit every act of carelessness or naivete -- to damage our nation's security.

These cases are no cause for alarm or histeria. Our security services are professional and efficient. All but a very few of those in public service are alert, discreet, and patriotic beyond temptation.

Nevertheless, the day has not yet come when those in public service can afford anything short of the highest standards of vigilance and self-discipline.

36
File

Wed., July 13, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

To short-circuit political pressure on the refugee question, Secretary Rusk plans to say tomorrow that he has directed that a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State be appointed for Refugee Affairs. His function will be to coordinate throughout the Government action on refugee matters. There has been pressure from various voluntary groups for:

- an Assistant Secretary of State;
- a Special Assistant to the President.

I agree that Sect. Rusk's proposal is better and more practical than either.

Bill Crockett is discussing this right now with Charlie Schultze.

W. W. Rostow

Inform Sect. Rusk that his formula is acceptable ✓

Go for a Special Assistant to the President

Go for an Assistant Secretary of State

See me

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-196
By lif NARA, Date 7-17-89

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, July 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Preparations for OAS Summit Meeting

The attached report describes where we stand in our preparations for the summit meeting and gives a tentative schedule for action in the remaining four months.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12556, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCH NARS, Date 8-16-86

~~SECRET~~

Status of Preparations
for the
Proposed Inter-American Summit Meeting


Since the President's April 15 speech preparations have proceeded along three tracks: (1) exploring and culling ideas on the agenda from many sources inside and outside the U. S. Government, (2) preliminary consultations with Latin American leaders and (3) initial staff work on potential agenda items.

Internal Preparations

Ideas have been sought within the United States from academic and foundation leaders, the Business Council for Latin America, the Labor Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance, and government officials concerned with Latin America.

From these consultations this general strategy has evolved:

- The basic political objective of the meeting would be to achieve agreement within the hemisphere on long term goals, i. e., where the Hemisphere should be, for example, by the year 2000.
- The Latin Americans would develop specific guidelines for an integration treaty, which would contemplate eventual participation by the United States and other Western Hemisphere countries not now OAS members.



- The United States would agree to facilitate integration by a substantial contribution to an Integration Fund. We would participate with the Latins in the administration of the Fund. The Inter-American Bank might be the financial agent for the Fund but the Fund Governors would retain control so that the Fund could be used as leverage to obtain performance on integration.
- Within the broad integration framework, we would deal with multinational projects, and place more emphasis on education and agriculture as key elements in integration.
- The multinational projects in the short run might include closing the Darien Gap, building portions of the Carretera Marginal, establishing a Latin American Comsat; in the longer term those projects included in the Rostow Frontiers of Latin America paper.
- Additional emphasis on education might cover two or three regional centers of excellence in science, technology and agriculture, 100 Alliance for Progress professorships, a hemisphere-wide scholarship fund patterned on the Lincoln-Juarez Fund, an Inter-American Peace Corps to focus on primary education.
- Additional emphasis on agriculture would peg U.S. assistance for agricultural credit, training and school development to Latin American commitment to divert more resources to agriculture, make their Agricultural Ministries more effective, and place more local resources into training, extension, marketing and research.
- As a related issue, but as a major contribution to development, we would try to get the Latins to do something to reduce their military establishments (E.g., Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru to scrap their expensive and obsolete cruisers) and put these savings into educational projects which we might match.

- In the trade and investment area consideration is being given to how MFN concessions for developing countries which might emerge from the Kennedy Round talks can be worked into the LA summit. Possible action on the investment side includes a multilateral investment guarantee agreement and a code for private investment.

Intensive staff work is being done on the components of this strategy. Outside consultants are working on the subjects dealing with economic integration and intensified mutual assistance and self-help. Drafts of papers should be completed by the end of this month for inter-departmental review and approval by higher authority.

Consultations with the Latin Americans

Formal consultations with Latin American leaders were initiated by the President's personal message to Latin American Chiefs of State delivered in June. In addition, Assistant Secretary Gordon has discussed the Summit with many Latin American leaders, both official and private, in extensive travels in Latin America since April. He is now on a trip to Central American countries.

The general reaction among Latin Americans to the Summit meeting has been favorable, provided that it is well prepared and promises significant, substantive results. This is exactly our position.

Evidence of leadership regarding the Summit among Latin Americans has been shown by President-elect Carlos Lleras of Colombia, Presidents Frei of Chile and Leoni of Venezuela, and Brazilian Minister for Planning Roberto Campos. President-elect Lleras has discussed the Summit with the Presidents of Venezuela, Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Panama during a recent trip to these five countries and has arranged a post-inaugural meeting in Bogota on August 14 to continue discussions. At the same time he has kept close contact with us through our Ambassador in Bogota. His ideas on agenda and approach seem close to ours at this stage.

Site and Date

Lima, Peru and Vina del Mar, Chile are the leading candidates for the site. Both Peru and Chile are lobbying for the meeting, the latter more aggressively. The United States is not taking a position on the site, except to say that it would prefer that it be in Latin America.

There is general agreement that the end of November or beginning of December would be the most logical time for the meeting, provided that the Foreign Ministers Meeting scheduled for late August takes place on time and there are not other snags in preparations.

Decisions on site, date and the general outline of the agenda are expected to be taken at the Foreign Ministers meeting. An inter-governmental working group will probably then be established to prepare for the summit meeting in greater detail.

Tentative Schedule

- May - Internal preparations begun with consultations inside the government and with the academic and foundation community.
- June - Consultation on agenda, date and site started with the Latin Americans.
- July - By the end of the month drafts of papers will be completed and ready for inter-departmental review.
- August- First two weeks devoted to putting final touches on our summit proposals, obtaining the President's approval, and consulting with the Congress.
- Around mid-August send a team to Latin America to explain our proposals.

-- End of August the OAS Charter Amendment Conference is scheduled to meet. This meeting of Foreign Ministers will be used to reach agreement on the date, site and agenda for the Summit and to establish a working group which would make final preparations for the Summit meeting.

November - Summit Meeting.
-December

Ed Hamilton
called SS
& cleared 7/14

July 13, 1966

Mr. President:

The following, for your approval, is a draft message to General deGaulle for Bastille Day. It is as cordial -- and as formal -- as his July 4 message to you.

"On behalf of the people of the United States, I take pleasure in extending to your Excellency, and to the people of France, warm greetings and felicitations on the national holiday of the French Republic. Our two peoples have long shared a deep friendship based on mutual respect and devotion to liberty and the rights of man. Please accept my very best wishes and those of the American people."

15/ F. M. B.

Francis M. Bator

Approved ✓

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

OK
4

Boulder to work

38

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, July 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Argentine Recognition

Secretary Rusk proposes to recognize the Onganía Government on Thursday, July 14, at noon.

The text of the announcement to be issued by State is at Tab A.

The timing and text of the statement are satisfactory. Practically all the Western European and Commonwealth countries have recognized. About half of Latin American countries have done so.

We have carried out extensive consultation with the OAS members as called for by the Rio Resolution. The Onganía Government has been responsive to the OAS recognition criteria up to a point and we do not expect them to be more obliging for a while. Linc Gordon has explained to the leadership of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees where we stand.

In our statement on recognition, we want to be matter-of-fact and avoid judgments. The proposed text does this.

I recommend approval of the timing for recognition and the press statement.

*15/ Bromley Smith
for W. W. Rostow who has not seen.*

Approve July 14 timing ☒

Approve statement ☒

Speak to me ☐

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*7/14/66
Boulder to work out
new timing*

*announced noon
7/15/66*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-198
By sig, NARA, Date 1-20-89

DRAFT PRESS RELEASE
(for release on July 14, 1966)

The Charge d'Affaires ad Interim at Buenos Aires delivered a note at noon today formally recognizing the Argentine Government. The text of the note is as follows:

"The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Argentine Republic and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Ministry's note No. 539 of June 30, 1966, by which the Embassy was informed that Lieutenant General Juan Carlos Onganía had assumed the presidency of the Argentine nation on June 29, 1966.

"In thanking the Ministry for this information, the Embassy wishes to reciprocate the Ministry's desire to maintain good and traditional relations between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic.

"The Embassy takes this opportunity to express to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship the assurances of its highest consideration."

The United States Government has consulted with the other members of the OAS in accordance with Resolution XXVI approved at the Rio Conference in November 1965. Almost all of the other members of the OAS

have indicated their intention to maintain relations with Argentina.

Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Haiti, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay

have already extended recognition.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - July 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Dominican Senate Resolution on IAPF Withdrawal

I have checked with Crimmins and Bunker on the resolution described in Director Hoover's letter.

Crimmins reports that the resolution has been referred to the Foreign Relations Committee where it presently rests. The Committee is made up of 2 PR (Balaguer) Party and 1 PRD (Bosch) Party members. The PRD man is a moderate. The PRD Secretary for International Affairs told the Embassy that the resolution represents the personal action of Senator Castro and was presented without the approval of the PRD Executive Committee. Nothing further has been heard of the resolution since it went to Committee. Crimmins is checking to see where it stands and whether any action on our part to keep it bottled up in Committee is necessary. We should have his report by late today or tomorrow morning.

Bunker commented that, given Balaguer's respect for the IAPF and his desire that it not be hasty in leaving, he could not see the PR Party endorsing such a resolution.

I will send you Crimmins' report as soon as received.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-343
By CB, NARA Date 9-18-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

39a

July 12, 1966

BY LIAISON

*Walt -
Get number to
give us full
report on this
at once -*

(u)

Honorable Marvin Watson
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Watson:

My representative in Santo Domingo has furnished me with the following information regarding a possible action by the Dominican Government regarding the withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) and I thought it might be of interest to the President.

The Dominican press reported on July 5, 1966, that the Dominican Senate had assigned to the Foreign Relations Committee the task of studying a bill which, if passed, will condemn the "foreign intervention" in the Dominican Republic. In addition, it will give the IAPF 25 days to get out of the Dominican Republic. The bill would also declare IAPF members "personae non gratae" and condemn the resolution of the Organization of American States which created the IAPF.

This Foreign Relations Committee, which is composed of one member of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), the political party of deposed Dominican President Juan Bosch, and two members of the Reformist Party, the political party of Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer, will submit its recommendations to the Dominican Senate. This bill according to the above-mentioned press account was written by Dominican Senator Pablo Rafael Casimiro Castro from Pedernales Province.

On July 7, 1966, a source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that Casimiro Castro, the current PRD Senator from Pedernales Province, was also a Senator from the Province during the Bosch government. He related that Casimiro Castro had been a "constant thorn" in the side of the Alcoa Corporation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group I

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ

88-53

By ing, NARA, Date 9-19-88


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Honorable Marvin Watson

On June 28, 1965, a United States businessman and official of the Alcoa Exploration Company in the Dominican Republic advised that Casimiro Castro had made radio and newspaper attacks against the Alcoa Company stating that it should be nationalized. He described Casimiro Castro as having been a Senator in the "constitutionalist" government and as a very anti-American individual who was politically ambitious.

On June 5, 1965, Radio Santo Domingo reported that Casimiro Castro spoke before a meeting of constitutionalists in Independencia Park who were present at a demonstration held in support of the former government of Colonel Francisco Caamano Deno. Casimiro Castro in his speech stated that victory was in "our" hands and then the "damned Yankees" came. He related that we are not their enemies, "but the policy of the Johnson government is insane and against the best interests of the American continent." He went on to state that the North American people are not to blame for the fraud their government is perpetrating on them.

Sincerely yours,



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, July 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: New Dominican Ambassador

Balaguer has named Garcia Godoy as his Ambassador to Washington.

We have the request for agreement and are taking fast action on it.

W. W. Rostow

cc - Bill Moyers

**SUGGESTED TOAST FOR THE PRESIDENT'S USE
AT THE DINNER ABOARD THE SEQUOIA**

7/13/66 41
+P

Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Secretary, Your Excellencies:


It is our good fortune to have with us today the distinguished Prime Minister of Australia, the Right Honorable Harold E. Holt. We had the pleasure of his presence here in Washington with us only two weeks ago. We are delighted to welcome him again.

I consider it highly appropriate that this group be here together this evening because I believe that the presence here of distinguished representatives from many states of the world together with the Prime Minister symbolizes the interdependence of nations -- whether they are those of Europe, the Western Hemisphere, or the Pacific. Surely events of the past 50 years have demonstrated that the problems of any one of these areas has the greatest significance and importance to the people and nations of other areas. Two world wars have proven it. And the term "world" war is both significant and accurate. The second war was obviously so, with major theatres in Europe, the Pacific, and North Africa. It may be less apparent -- but certainly different only in degree and not in kind -- that this was true 50 years ago as well as 25. Our distinguished visitor pointed out to me only two weeks ago that Australia, as far removed geographically from Europe as it is possible to be on this globe, provided troops and suffered heavy casualties in the European fighting of half a century ago. The United States, over the objection of a sizeable number of its citizens,

who at that time considered "European quarrels" not business of ours, was also drawn in. Small but strategically important engagements took place in the Pacific area and in the Indian Ocean which had political and social consequences of the greatest significance. The lesson is there to see. It is vital that none of us forget it.

We all have much in common. Europe in a sense is the cradle of modern civilization. My nation, as well as the Prime Minister's, took its initial shape as a modern nation from its European heritage, although our separate locations and circumstances have led us to some unique experiences not shared by the people of the Old World. I believe, Mr. Prime Minister, that it could accurately be said that your nation, too, shares this blend of the common bond and the unique experience, as does Canada, whose Ambassador is here with us tonight. Whatever our history, certainly we will share the common responsibility to strive for the building of a world free from war and oppression -- a world in which the individual man, of whatever nationality or physical location on this globe, can be best served by the institutions of government in attaining his highest aspiration for peace and progress.

John Donne said: "No man is an island unto himself." With due apologies to Australia and the United Kingdom, among others, the same is true of nations. The fight of the smallest of us for its national identity must be the concern of us all. This concern for the rights of man is the essence of our European heritage. Gentlemen, we in the United States have much to thank your great nations for.



Mr. Prime Minister, I had the honor not two weeks ago to offer a toast to you. I will have that same pleasure tomorrow. Let me therefore tonight, with your permission, reverse the normal protocol arrangements. In view of our common debt to our European heritage and in recognition of the great role Europe can and must play in the building of a world of peace with justice, may I ask you, Sir, to join me in a toast to the great nations of Europe.

###

Be sure to give it to both of them
since it's been leaked in the Security Council

LBJ/mjdr
Jul 12, 1966
4:15 p

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, July 12, 1966
3:35 p.m.

*Rec'd
5/5/67*

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have analyzed the report of your mission to Southeast Asia, India and Pakistan of May 23, 1961 (Secret version) with care.

Quite objectively, what emerges is this:

1. You told President Kennedy that the battle against Communism must be joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination to achieve success there -- or the United States must inevitably surrender the Pacific and take up our defenses on our own shores.
2. The struggle was far from lost in Southeast Asia and it was by no means inevitable that it be lost.
3. There is no alternative to United States leadership in Southeast Asia.
4. SEATO was for the long pull an unsatisfactory basis for organizing the defense of the Asian mainland. We would have to look to a new alliance structure in the future; but you also foreshadowed your Baltimore speech by indicating that the future organization of Asia required increased attention to programs of social justice, housing, land reform, etc.
5. You stated that our assistance to Asia, economic and military, must be part of a mutual effort, rooted in self-help.
6. Again foreshadowing your view as President, you stated that the greatest danger in Southeast Asia ultimately arose from hunger, ignorance, poverty, and disease.
7. You supported a program with neutral India which would cement our friendship with that country in such a way as to "endure beyond any transition of power in India."

In all of this you presented a view in 1961 which was:

- wholly consistent with the view we now have with the benefit of hindsight;
- wholly consistent with the policies you pursued as President.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-200
By *sig* NARA, Date 3-15-87

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7/12/66

The only aspect of your report which might be debated is (page 5, para. 5): "Asian leaders -- at this time -- do not want American troops involved in Southeast Asia other than on training missions." But you went on to say: "This does not minimize or disregard the probability that open attack would bring calls for U. S. combat troops. But the present probability of open attack seems scant..." What was not envisaged in your report -- and there is no reason why it should have been envisaged -- was the half-way house we now confront; that is, massive infiltration, including more than three North Vietnamese divisions, facing us with something in between "open attack" and conventional guerrilla warfare.

I suggest two possible uses of this interesting document:

- a. with certain minor excisions, letting U. S. News & World Report publish the text;
- b. letting Bill White have it for extensive quotation.

As an historian, I know how rare it is to have reports written at a particular moment under particular circumstances hold up with the passage of time. Quite objectively, you can look back on this report with great pride.

Walt Rostow

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~~SECRET~~

May 23, 1961

MEMORANDUM

TO: The President

FROM: The Vice President

SUBJECT: Mission to Southeast Asia, India and Pakistan

The mission undertaken May 9, 1961, at your request, was informative and illuminating far beyond my expectations. Unusual candor -- as well as unusual length -- marked exchanges in each country. Each leader visited welcomed and sought to take full advantage of my presence as a means of transmitting to you their strongly held personal views on many matters.


The purpose of this memorandum is to convey such of my own impressions and evaluations as seem most pertinent to decisions now under your consideration. It would be unrealistic to assume that such limited visits afford a basis for detailed substantive policy judgments. It would be equally unrealistic not to recognize that the circumstances and timing of this mission elicited a depth and substance of expression not normally present in exchanges through usual channels. My purpose is to offer perspective -- not, I wish to emphasize, to propose details of policy.

The Impact of Laos

There is no mistaking the deep -- and long lasting -- impact of recent developments in Laos.

Country to country, the degree differs but Laos has created doubt and concern about intentions of the United States throughout Southeast Asia. No amount of success at Geneva can, of itself, erase this. The independent Asians do not wish to have their own status resolved in like manner in Geneva.

Leaders



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- 2 -

Leaders such as Diem, Chiang, Sarit and Ayub more or less accept that we are making "the best of a bad bargain" at Geneva. Their charity extends no farther.

The Impact of the Mission

Beyond question, your judgment about the timing of our mission was correct. Each leader -- except Nehru -- publicly congratulated you on the "timing" of this mission. Chiang said -- and all others privately concurred -- that the mission had the effect of "stabilizing" the situation in the Southeast Asian nations.

What happened, I believe, was this: the leaders visited want -- as long as they can -- to remain as friends or allies of the United States. The public, or, more precisely, the political, reaction to Laos had drastically weakened the ability to maintain any strongly pro-US orientation. Neutralism in Thailand, collapse in Vietnam, anti-American election demagoguery in the Philippines were all developing prior to our visit. The show of strength and sincerity -- partly because you had sent the Vice President and partly, to a greater extent than you may believe, because you had sent your sister -- gave the friendly leaders something to "hang their hats on" for a while longer.

Our mission arrested the decline of confidence in the United States. It did not -- in my judgment -- restore any confidence already lost. The leaders were as explicit, as courteous and courtly as men could be in making it clear that deeds must follow words -- soon.

We didn't buy time -- we were given it.

If these men I saw at your request were bankers, I would know -- without bothering to ask -- that there would be no further extensions on my note.

The purpose

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- 3 -

The Purpose of Joint Communiques

Starting with President Diem at Saigon, it was my conclusion that the interests of the United States would be served -- and protected -- by the issuance of joint communiques. My purpose was this: to attach the signature and the name of each of the leaders to a joint public statement embodying their acceptance of an agreement with the details of your letters which I delivered in your behalf. Without such statements in writing, it was clear that the United States would be victimized later by self-serving statements that you -- and the Administration -- had offered "nothing" or "too little," etc.

As you recognized, the joint communiques followed item by item the statements in your letters. In most instances, where substantive pledges and policies were involved, the communiques were cleared through Washington before issuance. The extensive, important and almost unprecedented communique with Nehru largely reflects the high regard the Indian Government holds for Ambassador Galbraith.

I should make these two points clear: assurances I gave were those you sent me to convey, and no commitments were asked and none were given beyond those authorized in your letters. In some instances, for various reasons, I did not express all the commitments or proposals authorized in the State position papers.

The Importance of Follow-Through

I cannot stress too strongly the extreme importance of following up this mission with other measures, other actions, and other efforts. At the moment -- because of Laos -- these nations are hypersensitive to the possibility of American hypocrisy toward Asia. Considering the Vienna talks with Khrushchev -- which, to the Asian mind, emphasize Western rather than Asian concerns -- and considering the negative line of various domestic American editorials about this mission, I strongly believe it is of first importance that this trip bear fruit immediately.

Personal Conclusions

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- 4 -

Personal Conclusions from the Mission

I took to Southeast Asia some basic convictions about the problems faced there. I have come away from the mission there -- and to India and Pakistan -- with many of those convictions sharpened and deepened by what I saw and learned. I have also reached certain other conclusions which I believe may be of value as guidance for those responsible in formulating policies.

These conclusions are as follows:

1. ~~The battle against Communism must be joined in Southeast Asia~~ with strength and determination to achieve success there -- or ~~the United States, inevitably, must surrender the Pacific and take up our defenses on our own shores.~~ Asian Communism is compromised and contained by the maintenance of free nations on the subcontinent. Without this inhibitory influence, the island outposts -- Philippines, Japan, Taiwan -- have no security and the vast Pacific becomes a Red Sea.
2. ~~The struggle is far from lost in Southeast Asia and it is by no means inevitable that it must be lost.~~ In each country it is possible to build a sound structure capable of withstanding and turning the Communist surge. The will to resist -- while now the target of subversive attack -- is there. The key to what is done by Asians in defense of Southeast Asian freedom is confidence in the United States.
3. ~~There is no alternative to United States leadership in Southeast Asia.~~ Leadership in individual countries -- or the regional leadership and cooperation so appealing to Asians -- rests on the knowledge and faith in United States power, will and understanding.
4. ~~SEATO is not now and probably never will be the answer because of British and French unwillingness to support decisive action.~~ Asian distrust of the British and French is outspoken. Success at Geneva would prolong SEATO's role. Failure at Geneva would terminate SEATO's meaningfulness. In the latter event, we must be ready with a new approach to collective security in the area.

We should

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- 5 -

~~We should consider an alliance of all the free nations of the Pacific and Asia who are willing to join forces in defense of their freedom.~~ Such an organization should:

- a) ~~have a clear-cut command authority~~
- b) ~~also devote attention to measures and programs of social justice, housing, land reform, etc.~~

5. ~~Asian leaders -- at this time -- do not want American troops involved in Southeast Asia other than on training missions.~~ American combat troop involvement is not only not required, it is not desirable. Possibly Americans -- fail to appreciate fully the subtlety that recently-colonial peoples would not look with favor upon governments which invited or accepted the return this soon of Western troops. To the extent that fear of ground troop involvement dominates our political responses to Asia in Congress or elsewhere, it seems most desirable to me to allay those paralyzing fears in confidence, on the strength of the individual statements made by leaders consulted on this trip. ~~This does not minimize or disregard the probability that open attack would bring calls for U. S. combat troops.~~ But the present probability of open attack seems scant, and we might gain much needed flexibility in our policies if the spectre of combat troop commitment could be lessened domestically.
6. Any help -- economic as well as military -- we give less developed nations to secure and maintain their freedom must be a part of a ~~mutual effort.~~ These nations cannot be saved by United States help alone. To the extent the Southeast Asian nations are prepared to take the necessary measures to make our aid effective, we can be -- and must be -- unstinting in our assistance. It would be useful to enunciate more clearly than we have -- for the guidance of these young and unsophisticated nations -- what we expect or require of them.
7. In large measure, ~~the greatest danger Southeast Asia offers to nations like the United States is not the momentary threat of Communism itself, rather that danger stems from hunger, ignorance, poverty and disease.~~ We must -- whatever strategies we evolve -- keep these enemies the point of our attack, and make imaginative use of our scientific and technological capability in such enterprises.

Vietnam

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- 6 -

8. Vietnam and Thailand are the immediate and most important -- trouble spots, critical to the U. S. These areas require the attention of our very best talents -- under the very closest Washington direction -- on matters economic, military and political.

~~The basic decision in Southeast Asia is here. We must decide whether to help these countries to the best of our ability or throw in the towel in the area and pull back our defenses to San Francisco and the "Fortress America" concept.~~ More important, we would say to the world in this case that we don't live up to treaties and don't stand by our friends. This is not my concept. I recommend that we move forward promptly with a major effort to help these countries defend themselves. I consider the key here is to get our best MAAG people to control, plan, direct and exact results from our military aid program. In Vietnam and Thailand, we must move forward together.

a. In Vietnam, Diem is a complex figure beset by many problems. He has admirable qualities, but he is remote from the people, is surrounded by persons less admirable and capable than he. The country can be saved -- if we move quickly and wisely. We must decide whether to support Diem -- or let Vietnam fall. We must have coordination of purpose in our country team, diplomatic and military. The Saigon Embassy, USIS, MAAG and related operations leave much to be desired. They should be brought up to maximum efficiency. The most important thing is imaginative, creative, American management of our military aid program. The Vietnamese and our MAAG estimate that \$50 million of U. S. military and economic assistance will be needed if we decide to support Vietnam. This is the best information available to us at the present time and if it is confirmed by the best Washington military judgment it should be supported. Since you proposed and Diem agreed to a joint economic mission, it should be appointed and proceed forthwith.

b. In Thailand, the Thais and our own MAAG estimate probably as much is needed as in Vietnam -- about \$50 million of military and economic assistance. Again, should our best military judgment concur, I believe we should support such a program. Sarit is more strongly and staunchly pro-Western than many of his people. He is and must be deeply concerned at the consequence to his country of a communist-controlled Laos. If Sarit is to stand firm against neutralism, he must have -- soon -- concrete evidence to show his people of United States military and economic support. He believes that his armed forces should be increased to 150,000. His Defense Minister is coming to Washington to discuss aid matters.

9. The

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- 7 -

9. The Republic of China on Taiwan was a pleasant surprise to me. I had been long aware of the criticisms against Chiang Kai-shek and his government and cognizant of the deep emotional American feelings in some quarters against him. I know these feelings influence our US policy.

Whatever the cause, a progressive attitude is emerging there. Our conversations with Chiang and Mme. Chiang were dominated by discussions of measures of social progress, to my unexpected but gratified surprise. As with the Republic of Germany in Western Europe, so I believe we might profitably and wisely encourage the Republic of China in Asia to export talents, skills, and resources to other Asian lands to assist in programs of progress.

10. I was assured that there were no problems for the U.S. in the Philippines. There is a great reservoir of good feeling toward America among Filipinos, with many of the usual Latin qualifications. But a widespread belief that corruption exists is sapping the effectiveness of the government. Remoteness of the leadership from the people seems a problem.

11. India could well be the subject of an entire report. Nehru, during our visit, was clearly "neutral" in favor of the West. This Administration is highly regarded and well received in India. Only part of this flows out of hope or expectation of aid. Mainly, there is an intellectual affinity, or an affinity of spirit. ~~This, in my judgment, should be exploited not with the hope of drawing India into our sphere which might be as unnecessary as it would be improbable -- but, chiefly with the hope of cementing under Nehru an India-U. S. friendship which would endure beyond any transition of power in India~~

12. President Ayub in Pakistan is the singularly most impressive and, in his way, responsible head of state encountered on the trip. He is seasoned as a leader where others are not; confident, straightforward and I would judge, dependable. He is frank about his belief, offensive as it is to us, that the forms of representative government would only open his country to Communist take-over at this time. Nonetheless, Ayub understands -- and is in agreement with -- the aims of eradicating poverty, ignorance and disease. We can have great influence and -- because of his administrative organization -- achieve dramatic success by supporting Pakistan's needs. Our military should see how to improve the effectiveness and achieve modernization of Pakistan's army. Ayub is wisely aware of Pakistan's strategic position, wants to make his forces more modern, and wants to resolve the Kashmir dispute to

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release

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- 8 -

release Indian and Pakistani troops to deter the Chinese rather than each other. He spells out the fact that U. S. leadership rests on our own self-confidence and confidence we permit Asians to have in us.

To recapitulate, these are the main impressions I have brought back from my trip.

~~The fundamental decision required of the United States -- and time is of the greatest importance -- is whether we are to attempt to meet the challenge of Communist expansion now in Southeast Asia by a major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the area or throw in the towel.~~ This decision must be made in a full realization of the very heavy and continuing costs involved in terms of money, of effort and of United States prestige. It must be made with the knowledge that at some point we may be faced with the further decision of whether we commit major United States forces to the area or cut our losses and withdraw should our other efforts fail. We must remain master in this decision. What we do in Southeast Asia should be part of a rational program to meet the threat we face in the region as a whole. It should include a clear-cut pattern of specific contributions to be expected by each partner according to his ability and resources. I recommend we proceed with a clear-cut and strong program of action.

I believe that the mission -- as you conceived it -- was a success. I am grateful to the many who labored to make it so.

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, July 12, 1966
3:05 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here is a possible draft statement for your use when the two cases break.

By using the phrase "public service" I hoped to make it broad enough to make some of the careless or naive boys on the Hill draw up short.

That phrase also avoids any suggestion of a vigilante appeal.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

In the past few days two cases of Communist espionage have come to public attention. One was an effort to penetrate the Department of State with an electronic listening device, which was frustrated by the patriotism of an American citizen and the skill of the F. B. I. The other was the tragic case of an American officer who, through some twist of character, was prepared to risk the security of his nation for money.

I wish to bring these cases to the attention of all who bear public responsibility. They demonstrate that there are still those who do not wish us well; who are straining every resource at their command -- probing at every weakness of character -- prepared to exploit every act of carelessness or naivete -- to damage our nation's security.

These cases are no cause for alarm or hysteria. Our security services are professional and efficient. All but a very few of those in public service are alert, discreet, and patriotic beyond temptation.

Nevertheless, the day has not yet come when those in public service can afford anything short of the highest standards of vigilance and self-discipline.

~~SECRET~~

44
Tuesday, July 12, 1966
2:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

The bombing score card now looks like this:

Support (or understanding)----- 29

Mild criticism (with some understanding)---- 11

Unqualified criticism (non-Communist)----- 11

Unqualified criticism (Communist)----- 14

No official reaction----- 21

86*

* Includes U Thant and the Vatican

In short, from our point of view, in the non-Communist world there were only 11 unqualified critics.

Those closest to danger were all with us: Australia, Taiwan, Laos, New Zealand, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand -- whatever their race or color or politics.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-193
By ing, NAKA, Date 3-14-89



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

July 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Official Reactions to POL strikes;
Final Report

Reports or indications of official reaction to the POL strikes were received from 84 countries, and the UN and the Vatican. The information was taken from press and radio reports, statements to US diplomatic representatives (both voluntary and in response to our explanation of the rationale behind our actions), and comments from our missions. A final summary of these reactions reveals the following:

Officials of 29 countries expressed support or understanding of the strikes. Generally unqualified approval was received from 18 countries, while approval accompanied by expressions of concern or reservations came from 11. Ghana and the Vatican, following initial reactions of disapproval, have since indicated their understanding and support of the US action.

Criticism of the bombings came from 36 sources. Strong or unqualified disapproval was expressed by 11 non-Communist and 14 Communist countries. Criticism tempered by some understanding of our position was received from 11 nations.

Reports indicating no official comment or reaction came from 21 nations, including 14 Latin American countries.

The Communist countries included in the final survey are: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Red China, Cuba, East Germany, Hungary, North Korea, North Viet Nam, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Romania, USSR, and Yugoslavia.

A final Free World line-up by region is shown on the enclosed chart.

TRShave
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:
As stated

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-195
By *mg*, NARA, Date 7-27-88

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 JUL 12 AM 11 43

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<u>SUPPORT</u>		<u>CONDEMN</u>		<u>NO COMMENT</u>	
<u>Strong</u>	<u>Qualified</u>	<u>Strong</u>	<u>Qualified</u>		
<hr/>					
AF					
Liberia	Ghana	Algeria	Zambia	Libya	
Malagasy	Uganda	Mali			
S. Africa					
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EUR					
Germany	Netherlands	Finland	Belgium	Norway	
Italy	Vatican	France	Canada	Austria	
Portugal		Sweden	Denmark		
			UK		
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FE					
Australia	Japan	Cambodia	Burma		
China (GRC)	Indonesia		Malaysia		
Laos			Singapore		
New Zealand					
Philippines					
S. Korea					
SVN					
Thailand					
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ARA					
Costa Rica	Nicaragua			Argentina	Ecuador
El Salvador	Panama			Bolivia	Guatemala
Peru	Uruguay		Guyana	Brazil	Haiti
				Chile	Honduras
				Colombia	Jamaica
				Dominican	Mexico
				Republic	Paraguay
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NEA					
Lebanon	Israel	Afghanistan	UAR	Iran	
	Yemen	Ceylon		Pakistan	
		India		Saudi Arabia	
		Nepal			
		Syria			
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Other			UN SYG		

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Tuesday, July 12, 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Czech Espionage Attempt Against the Department of State

The State Department expects to release to the press this week the details of an effort by the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Washington to penetrate the State Department to obtain information illegally and to install an electronic listening device in the office of the Director of Eastern European Affairs.

The espionage attempt began in late 1961 and is an outstanding example of the use by the FBI of a State Department employee of Czech background as a double agent.

The FBI, CIA, and State Department all agree that public exposure of this attempt at penetration is desirable at this time, not only as an example of FBI success in preventing espionage, but also as a deterrent to others who might be undertaking espionage in the U. S.

The State Department will call in the Czech Ambassador and tell him that the Czech Embassy official, Mr. Jiri Opatrny, must leave immediately. A second Czech official, implicated in the case in 1963, is now at the UN but we have no legal grounds for requesting his departure since we have no knowledge that he is engaged in improper activities in New York, where he has been since June of this year. The Czechs may decide to withdraw him on their own, however.

The State Department believes that now is a good time to surface this matter in view of the fact that U. S. Ambassador Horsey will be leaving Prague at the end of July and his replacement, Ambassador Beam, does not take over until the middle of August. There are no major negotiations now under way with the Czechs which might be affected and there are no matters before Congress at the moment on which the disclosure is expected to have a significant bearing.

The FBI has written a fascinating account of the five-year Czech espionage activity. If you wish to read this, we will send it to you.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-196
By WJ NARA, Date 2-17-89

July 12, 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will be meeting Australian Prime Minister Holt tomorrow (Wednesday at 5:30 p.m. in your office).

The Prime Minister will be on his way home from a meeting in Britain with Prime Minister Wilson.

You may want to review Viet-Nam developments since your last meeting, e. g. reaction to POL bombing.

Holt will doubtless volunteer a report on his talks with Wilson.

You may want to ask him about:

(1) Wilson's current thinking on Viet-Nam and his coming trip to Moscow;

(2) The British Prime Minister's present attitude toward the UK role "East of Suez." Unless it was covered in your previous talk with Holt, you may want to ask him about the prospects for the coming Australian election (probably in November).

Will you want to meet privately with Holt or should Secretary Rusk and I stand by? Any others you wish present?

Will see Holt alone _____
Have Rusk stand by _____
Rostow _____
Australian Ambassador _____
Others _____

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-193
By sig NARA, Date 3-14-89

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

July 12, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Completing Military Assistance to Nepal

Your signature is required by Section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act to permit Bill Gaud to transfer during FY 1967 the fourth and final major slice of our low-key military assistance to Nepal, with whom we do not have a Military Assistance Agreement. You have signed similar determinations for this program in previous years.

Sandwiched between India and China, Nepal has wanted some direct outside help to demonstrate its independence from India and to stimulate greater Indian efforts on its behalf. No military assistance agreement was signed in order to avoid arousing public anxieties in India and possibly provoking the Chinese to mount further pressure on the Nepalese -- hence the need for your specific determination and authorization in this case.

This is a parallel program, with the British and ourselves putting up \$2 million each. This \$825,000 is the last large allocation and will be spent for communications and transportation equipment, medical materiel and spares. The money can be accommodated within the MAP budgeting total for FY 1967. There may be a small follow-on for continued training next year.

I recommend you sign the Determination and Authorization. Charlie Schultze concurs.

Walt R.~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-200
By *sig* NARA, Date 3-15-89

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~~SECRET~~
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 5-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 15 YEARS

JUL 9 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Determination and Authorization Permitting the Continuation of Military Assistance to Nepal

In 1964, the United States and the United Kingdom each agreed to provide military assistance totaling about \$2 million to Nepal over several years. Attached is a proposed determination for \$825,000 which authorizes the fourth and final increment of the U.S. program. Also attached are a memorandum and a background annex prepared by the AID Administrator which contain the rationale and details of the Nepal military assistance program.

We do not have a military assistance agreement with Nepal, as required by section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act, because we do not want Nepal's neighbors to attach undue importance to this limited assistance program. By signing the proposed memorandum to the Agency for International Development you will determine that it is important to the security of the United States to furnish military assistance to Nepal without regard to the requirements of section 506(a) of the Act.

The amount proposed in this determination can be accommodated within the MAP budgetary total for FY 1967.

I recommend you sign the attached determination. Mr. Rostow concurs.

Charles L. Schultze

Attachments

Charles L. Schultze
Director

Group 4		DECLASSIFIED
By	DCW	NARS, Date 8-16-86

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

JUN 30 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Determination and Authorization to furnish
Military Assistance to Nepal

I recommend that you make the necessary determination and authorization under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to permit the use of up to \$825,000 in FY 1967 for grants of defense articles to Nepal without regard to the fact that the U.S. has no military assistance agreement with Nepal, as required by the Act.

The Departments of State and of Defense concur in this recommendation.

As indicated in my memorandum of June 10, 1964, a total of \$2 million is envisaged for the United States Military Assistance Program to Nepal through the end of FY 1969. The British have agreed to provide a like amount. In prior years you have authorized \$1.4 million of defense articles, of which \$1.1 million was programmed. By signing the proposed determination you will be authorizing \$825,000 of defense articles in a total MAP program of \$899,085 in FY 1967. Since this amount has already been included in the FY 1967 Military Assistance Program, there will be no effect on FY 1967 budgetary totals.

We continue to believe that we should not seek to negotiate a military assistance agreement because it would attach undue importance to the limited assistance provided.

I recommend that you sign the attached memorandum.

David E. Bell

David E. Bell

Attachments:

Background Annex
Proposed Determination

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

DECLASSIFIED	
Group 4	
By <i>DCW</i>	NARS, Date <i>8-16-86</i>

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Background Annex

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

Part I. Justification of Military Assistance

NJ 88-160
By inf NARA, Date 7-10-89

A. Security Situation

Nepal shares a 500 mile border with Communist China. Although official Chinese-Nepalese relations are cordial the Nepalese have become increasingly aware of the ChiCom threat to Nepalese independence. India has primary responsibility for the defense of Nepal. A fundamental element of U.S. policy toward Nepal has been to strengthen Indo-Nepalese security cooperation as an essential factor in the containment of Chinese expansion into South Asia.

India recognizes her primary responsibility for supporting Nepal's defense against China, and has stated publicly that an attack on Nepal would be considered to be an attack on India. India has also been Nepal's principal source of military equipment. After the Chinese attack on India, however, India's limited military resources were strained and were devoted primarily to filling her own military requirements. A decline in the supply of Indian equipment to Nepal resulted.

B. Nepalese Request for U.S./U.K. Military Assistance

In the fall of 1963 Tulsi Giri, Chairman of Nepal's Council of Minister's requested U.S. military assistance during talks with President Kennedy and other Administration officials. Giri made a similar request to the British. Giri's requests were made in the context of the above-mentioned decline of military supply from India and also in terms of a reluctance on the part of Nepal to depend solely on India for military equipment. After study of the request the U.S. and U.K. Governments agreed to initiate limited military assistance programs for Nepal--each of the two countries to provide aid worth about \$2 million. These decisions were based on a need to supply certain items of equipment which could not be supplied by India. In addition it was hoped that a limited U.S./U.K. entry into military assistance to Nepal could serve as a catalyst to increased confidence and cooperation between India and Nepal on military security matters. The U.S. and U.K. programs were tailored to increase the internal security capability of the Nepalese Army in dealing with potential Chinese-inspired threats to the internal security of Nepal. We accepted the assumption that in the event of overt Chinese aggression against Nepal, the country could be defended only by the entry of Indian forces and that readiness for this contingency could only be worked out between India and Nepal.

In conveying our decision to provide limited military assistance, the U.S. and U.K. made it clear to Nepal and to India that in

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- 2 -

initiating a limited program we were not assuming India's responsibilities for assisting in the defense of Nepal. We also stressed our belief in the importance of close Indo-Nepalese cooperation in the security field.

The initial shipment of U.S. military aid to Nepal arrived in September 1964 and British aid began arriving in April of 1965.

C. Nature of U.S. MAP

The overall U.S. program is confined basically to training and to communications, transportation and medical equipment. The FY 1964 MAP approved by the President in Presidential Determination No. 64-17, dated 26 June 1964, in the amount of \$500,000, initiated the \$2,000,000 Nepal program. The FY 1965 MAP, approved in the Presidential Determination No. 65-5, dated November 4, 1964, added an additional \$500,000 but only \$200,000 was actually programmed. The FY 1966 MAP, approved in Presidential Determination No. 66-4, dated December 4, 1965, authorized \$400,000 for a total of \$1,100,000 of defense articles furnished to Nepal. Defense articles to be provided to Nepal under the FY 1967 program are as follows:

<u>Category of Items</u>	<u>\$ Value (Estimated)</u>
Communications Equipment	116,380
Transportation Equipment	330,638
Medical Materiel	109,943
Secondary Items and Spare Parts	177,989
PCH&T	90,050
TOTAL:	<u>\$825,000</u>

In addition, the FY 1967 Nepal program includes \$74,085 of defense services, for a total FY 1967 program amounting to \$899,085.

D. U.K. Military Assistance

The British are providing training, infantry weapons and ammunition and STOL aircraft. They hope to complete their agreed program in FY 1966.

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- 3 -

Part II. Legal Requirement and Reason for Determination

Section 506(a) of the Act provides that, in addition to such other provisions as the President may require, no defense articles shall be furnished to any country on a grant basis unless it shall have agreed that:

- (1) It will not, without the consent of the President:
 - (a) Permit any use of such articles by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of that country,
 - (b) Transfer, or permit any officer, employee, or agent of that country to transfer such articles by gift, sale, or otherwise, or
 - (c) Use or permit the use of such articles for purposes other than those for which furnished;
- (2) It will maintain the security of such articles and will provide substantially the same degree of security protection afforded to such articles by the United States Government;
- (3) It will, as the President may require, permit continuous observation and review by, and furnish necessary information to, representatives of the U.S. Government with regard to the use of such articles; and
- (4) Unless the President consents to other disposition, it will return to the U.S. Government for such use or disposition as the President considers in the best interest of the U.S. such articles which are no longer needed for the purposes for which furnished.

No such agreement has been concluded with the Government of Nepal and, for the following reasons, none is recommended at this time.

It is important that U.S. military assistance to Nepal be played in as low key as possible so that it will be properly interpreted by the Nepalese and the Indians and also by the Chinese Communists as a limited assistance program rather than a major commitment. The conclusion of a normal bilateral agreement embodying all of the assurances required by section 506(a) of the Act would attach undue importance to the limited assistance intended. The scope involved in such a bilateral agreement could create false impressions resulting in (1) increased ChiCom pressures on Nepal; (2) possible Indian interpretation that the U.S. was attempting to undercut, rather than buttress, their position in Nepal, or relieve them of their Nepalese security obligations; and (3) Nepalese grant aid expectations far beyond the small amount of U.S. assistance intended.

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- 4 -

For these reasons, it is believed desirable from a national security standpoint to continue to provide for the limited assistance involved in FY 1965 on the basis of existing understandings in lieu of a formal bilateral agreement. Under section 614(a), the President may authorize in each fiscal year the use of funds made available under the Act without regard to the requirements of section 506(a) of the Act when he determines, as presently proposed, that such authorization is important to the security of the United States.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1966

Presidential Determination
No. 67-2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: Determination and authorization under Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, permitting the furnishing of military assistance to Nepal without regard to the requirements of Section 506(a) of the Act

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of June 30, 1966, I hereby:

(1) determine, pursuant to Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), that authorization of the use of up to \$825,000 of funds available in FY 1967 under the Act for purposes of furnishing defense articles as grant military assistance to Nepal without regard to the requirements of Section 506(a) of the Act is important to the security of the United States; and

(2) authorize, pursuant to Section 614(a) of the Act, the use of up to \$825,000 of such funds for this purpose without regard to the specified requirements of the Act.

You are requested on my behalf to give notice of these actions, pursuant to Section 634(d) of the Act, to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

15/LBS

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED	
By <i>Group 4</i>	NARS, Date <i>8-16-86</i>

Tuesday, July 12, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Message to Bolivian President-elect
Rene Barrientos

State recommends that you send the attached message to President Barrientos congratulating him on his recent electoral victory.

I concur. In tone and content it is what the situation calls for.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove

Speak to me .

Attachment

SUGGESTED MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS
TO BOLIVIAN PRESIDENT-ELECT RENE BARRIENTOS

**His Excellency
Rene Barrientos Ortuno
President-elect of Republic of Bolivia
c/o Presidential Palace
La Paz**

**My warmest congratulations on your decisive victory in the recent
elections. I look forward greatly to seeing you next week.**

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, July 12, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Visit of Guyana Prime Minister Burnham

In approving the informal visit of Prime Minister Burnham for July 21, you did not indicate whether you authorized the official eight-day tour of the U.S. recommended by State. The tour does not involve you in additional ceremonies.

The Canadians are giving Burnham a junket and he has indicated a strong desire that we do the same. Since it is important to build up his position in Guyana in relation to Cheddi Jagan and reinforce our influence with him, the tour is a worthwhile investment.

W. W. Rostow

Approve tour _____

Disapprove tour _____

Speak to me _____.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-290
By cb, NARA Date 10-16-96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 12, 1966

Profile 50

Dear Cabot:

I should like you, General Westmoreland, and Ambassador Porter to know how greatly I appreciate the backgrounding you are doing in Saigon.


One can see and feel their constructive impact on the press and television reports now coming from Saigon.

I know it is a burden for you all, in the midst of your other pressing duties. I realize also that you cannot yourself conduct these briefings every day. But I would hope there would be a daily backgrounder by a senior official, addressed, in particular, to the wire services and representatives of the television networks.

As you well understand, our objective should be no more and no less than to tell our story with candor. If we don't do it, the accounts of our enemies pre-empt the news.

Would you be good enough to make this letter of thanks available to General Westmoreland and Ambassador Porter.

Sincerely,



The Honorable
Henry Cabot Lodge
United States Ambassador
Embassy of the United States
Saigon

LBJ:WWRostow:rlh

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, July 11, 1966
9:25 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the letter to Cabot
Lodge you outlined on the phone from
the Ranch.

Walt. Rostow