

Pres file

51

July 12, 1966

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

In accordance with Section 123a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to me a proposed superseding "Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Sweden" and has recommended that I approve the proposed Agreement, determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution.

Pursuant to the provisions of 123b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and upon the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission, I hereby:

- (a) Approve the proposed Agreement, and determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States of America;
- (b) Authorize the execution of the proposed Agreement on behalf of the Government of the United States of America by appropriate authorities of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,

/s/
LBJ

The Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington

LBJ:CEJ:feg

July 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Agreement with the Government of Sweden Concerning
Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy**

The Atomic Energy Commission, with the concurrence of the Department of State, recommends that you approve the proposed Agreement between the United States and Sweden which will supersede the present Agreement signed in 1956. The new Agreement would have a term of 30 years. The primary reasons for entering into a new Agreement are:

- (a) To provide the framework for assuring the long-term supply of enriched uranium fuel required for the projected Swedish nuclear power program.
- (b) To implement provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which were added by recent amendments, permitting the performance of uranium enrichment services by the Commission and the private ownership of special nuclear material.

The new Agreement also provides that the International Atomic Energy Agency will be promptly requested to assume responsibility for applying safeguards to materials and facilities subject to safeguards under the Agreement.

I recommend that you approve this proposed Agreement. If you agree, there is presented herewith a letter to Dr. Seaborg for your signature.

W. W. Rostow

☒ Approved
☐ Disapproved
☐ See me

July 12, 1966


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52
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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-356
By cb, NARA Date 1-23-01

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: FY 1968 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

I approve the proposed Nuclear Weapons Stockpile for the end of FY 1968 submitted to me by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission on June 6, 1966.



I have directed the Atomic Energy Commission to produce and retire those quantities of atomic weapons and atomic weapons parts necessary to achieve and maintain the approved FY 1968 stockpile. I have also directed the production of the additional weapons required for quality assurance and reliability testing.

I authorize you, in coordination with the Atomic Energy Commission, to make such changes in the total stockpile not to exceed $\pm 10\%$ of the specifically stated numbers of nuclear warhead elements to be produced and retired in FY 1967 and FY 1968, as may be necessary to adjust production schedules to meet AEC material availabilities or production capability. I further authorize you to make minor changes ($\pm 10\%$) in strategic, tactical, air defense or anti-submarine warfare warhead totals that may be required because of adjusted delivery assets or changes in military requirements. Any changes indicative of a major shift in defense policy or AEC production capability will be submitted for my approval.

/s/

LBJ

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July 12, 1966

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
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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-356
By cb, NARA Date 1-23-01

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN,
U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

SUBJECT: FY 1968 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

I approve the proposed Nuclear Weapons Stockpile for the end of FY 1968 submitted to me by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission on June 6, 1966.

6.1(a)



I direct the production and retirement of those quantities of atomic weapons and atomic weapons parts necessary to achieve and maintain the approved FY 1968 stockpile. I also direct the production of the additional weapons required for quality assurance and reliability testing.

I authorize such minor variations, not to exceed + 10% from the specifically stated numbers of atomic weapons to be produced and retired in FY 1967 and FY 1968, as the Atomic Energy Commission may determine to be necessary because of changes in the available supply of special nuclear material or the Atomic Energy Commission production capability, for quality assurance or as otherwise mutually agreed to by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense as a result of changed military requirements. Any changes indicative of a major shift in defense policy or Atomic Energy Commission production capability will be submitted for my specific approval.

/s/

LBJ:CEJ:feg

LBJ

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Monday, July 11, 1966 -- 10:15 a.m

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. Defense and AEC resubmit for your approval the proposed FY 1968 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, and certain related adjustments to the FY 1967 Stockpile as previously approved by you on April 19, 1965. The requirements set forth are consistent with the long-range Defense forecast (through 1974) of weapons and special nuclear materials presented in your current Budget.

2. The stockpile proposal was first submitted to you last January and it was returned to Defense to obtain formal JCS concurrence (although the JCS had previously concurred informally in the proposal). The JCS looked again at certain of the figures and some minor changes have resulted in the new submittal, largely resulting from a decision to stretch out the retirement of certain tactical and strategic bombs that are becoming obsolete and the retirement of the NIKE HERCULES warheads.

b.1(a)

At the same time, however, we are getting a more modern stockpile better tailored to specified military missions.

4. The recommended stockpile is within the projected availability of special nuclear materials, and the number of new weapons is within AEC capability to produce.

b.1(a)

On the basis of present estimates, however, there will be enough plutonium available by the end of FY 1967 to meet the firm Defense special nuclear requirements through 1974, not including the above possible additional requirements.

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- 2 -

5. The Bureau of the Budget has reviewed this proposal. BOB believes that some obsolete weapons should be retired on a faster schedule than is now being proposed. It does not recommend that you disapprove this stockpile action, but BOB will make this a budget issue for discussion with Defense this Fall.

(b.1(a))

6. I recommend that you approve the proposed stockpile and sign the attached memoranda to Defense and AEC.

W. W. Rostow

☒ Approved
☐ Disapproved
☐ See me

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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

July 1, 1966

52c
SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-356
By cb, NARA Date 1-23-01

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

Walt --

This FY 1968 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile proposal has been ill-starred. When it came in in January, Mac looked at it but got away before we could get the Bureau of the Budget analysis and paper work completed. Bob Komer sent the package to the President in March recommending approval. It is not clear whether the President or Joe Califano looked at it, but we were requested to return the package to the Pentagon to get Secretary McNamara's signature on it and also to obtain the formal concurrence of the Joint Chiefs. This was done about the middle of March and ever since Cy Vance and General Wheeler have been in negotiation, characterized more by its heat than its light.

The new proposal does not carry the Secretary's signature (it is also signed by Vance), and it is my recommendation, as well as Keeny's, that we should not at this time press for a McNamara signature.

6.1(a)

I would not be surprised to see this matter disposed of next Fall in connection with the Secretary's budget memorandum projecting weapons requirements through 1975.

Keeny and I have both gone over this package and recommend that it be sent forward to the President.

Charles E. Johnson

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Pres file

July 12, 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

The National Nuclear Test Program transmitted by your joint letter of February 25, 1966, has been reviewed by the Executive Office staff. I wish to confirm that it is most important that we retain a test readiness posture and maintain an active plan to resume testing should it be necessary.

I note that the Program is sufficiently broad in scope as to provide maximum flexibility of response in the event we should have need to resume testing in any of the environments now prohibited by the limited test ban treaty. This approach is sound, and its flexibility should continue to characterize our planning.

The Program should be periodically reviewed to insure that it takes into account the advances made in our underground test program and the other research and development work at the laboratories and within the Department of the Defense. Periodically this Program needs updating and any significant changes that occur in the Program should be brought to my attention.

/s/

LBJ

LBJ:CEJ:feg

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, 64-68, vol. 11, item 140

By jd, NARA, Date 6-2-98

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53a
Pres file

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Monday, July 11, 1966 -- 10:25 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: National Nuclear Test Program

Secretary McNamara and Chairman Seaborg, with the assistance of the Secretary of State and Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, have submitted an updated and revised National Nuclear Test Program. This is a planning document setting forth, to the best of our knowledge and ability at the moment, the scope of nuclear tests to be readied to be conducted in the presently prohibited environments -- the atmosphere, outer space and under water -- if the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is abrogated and it is decided that we must proceed with testing in these environments.

The principal change in this revised program over that noted in May 1965, has been a provision for high altitude tests of hot x-ray weapons considered to have great potential importance for ICBM defense. Although much development in this direction can be done with underground testing, optimal testing of megaton-size hot x-ray weapons and the determination of their outputs and effectiveness can be performed only at high altitudes.

The program continues to focus on maintaining our ability to resume testing within the time limits contained in the safeguards assurances made to the Congress in connection with the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Exercises were conducted during the past year to test this readiness and the results were considered excellent.

The nature of the action requested is that you note the existence of the program and underline the importance of keeping this planning on a current basis.

My staff and the Bureau of the Budget staff have carefully screened the program and a number of changes resulting from this staffing have now been reflected in the program document. Most of the changes were editorial in nature, designed to remove any ambiguities and to clarify the Government's policy and program.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-356
By cb, NARA Date 1-23-01

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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

- 2 -

I recommend that you sign the attached memorandum to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

W. W. Rostow

☒ Approved
☐ Disapproved
☐ See me

~~SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA~~

7/12/66

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am profoundly grateful for your recent letter and your other gestures of good will. The warm and generous spirit they reflect is a great comfort to me. Close relations between us and between our two countries can only strengthen the cause of freedom in Africa and the world.

Your vigorous and effective efforts to revive the Ghanaian economy are most impressive. I am told that your Economic Mission made a splendid impression here, due in large part to the sound economic policies already outlined by the National Liberation Council. My experts share your confidence that the program of economic reforms you are now working out with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund will provide a solid basis for a sound combination of stability and growth. I want you to know that we support you in these efforts.

I was also deeply gratified by your kind words about my remarks on the third anniversary of the Organization of African Unity. Some of the actions I suggested on that occasion are already underway and others are under active study. I understand that negotiations are now in progress with your own Government to include Ghana in the program to eradicate measles and smallpox in West Africa. I was also pleased to authorize our AID Mission in Accra to talk with your people about exploring the feasibility of a telecommunications system linking your capital with Lagos, Cotonou, Lome, and possibly Abidjan. I hope that success in these enterprises will lead to many more programs of regional cooperation for the common economic good. I would be delighted to have your thoughts and suggestions concerning these and any other promising projects of a similar character.

It is a great pleasure, Mr. Chairman, to exchange views and ideas with you. I hope that we can remain in close personal touch. As you press forward with measures to advance social and economic development, you may be certain that you have my personal best wishes and the continuing sympathy and support of the United States.

Sincerely,

151
LBJ

His Excellency
Lieutenant General J. A. Ankrah
Chairman, National Liberation Council
of the Republic of Ghana
Accra

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-196
By 118 NARA, Date 2-17-89

EKHamilton/vmr 7/8/66 2:00 pm

Rostow 54-a

Sent 7/9/66
If there is a pouch,
to be sent to Ranch

July 8, 1966 - 7:15pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to letter from General Ankrah of Ghana

At Tab A, for your signature, is a proposed reply to General Ankrah's June 13 letter (Tab B) reporting on economic progress in Ghana and complimenting your OAU speech. State dragged a bit on the reply -- it reached my desk only today -- but Ankrah greatly values personal signals from you, and won't mind the delay. We are enjoying a real honeymoon with him and post-Nkrumah Ghana (you may want to glance at the telegram at Tab C).

The reply: (1) encourages the Ankrah Government's efforts to clear away the economic and financial wreckage left by Nkrumah, (2) thanks the General for his comments on your speech, (3) notes that some of the actions you suggested are underway -- two involving Ghana, and (4) gives regionalism a push, encouraging Ankrah to come forward with his ideas. The reply also refers obliquely -- "other gestures of good will" -- to Ankrah's recent gift of Soviet anti-aircraft guns and ammunition of the type being used against us in Viet Nam. Ankrah wants to keep this quiet, but our Ambassador reports that he would also like an acknowledgement over your signature. He will get the reference and it shouldn't excite attention if it leaks.

W. W. Rostow

EKHamilton/vmr

Ref: NSC Log^s Nos. 2095, 2105, 2222 and 2243

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-343
By CB, NARA Date 9-28-99

13th June, 1966. 542

Mr. President,

In my first letter to you soon after the change of government in Ghana, I promised to keep you informed from time to time of our efforts to revive our economy. As you already know, a Ghana Economic Mission recently visited Washington for the negotiation of a stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund. At the same time the Mission undertook fruitful discussions with representatives of the U.S. Government and the A.I.D. Much of the success achieved by our Economic Mission could be attributed to the invaluable assistance it received from these contacts.

The National Liberation Council is much appreciative of the help which your officials accorded our Economic Mission and more so for their sympathetic understanding of our economic and social problems. We have also been encouraged by the willingness of your government to maintain continuous contact with us and to consider favourably our future requests for economic assistance. I wish to express my personal gratitude to you, Mr. President, for this laudable gesture and to assure you that the National Liberation Council will resolutely pursue its policy of economic reforms with the help and co-operation of friendly countries.

I should also like to take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation and that of the Council for the statesmanlike pronouncements you made to the African envoys at the White House on 26th May to mark the third anniversary of the Organisation of African Unity. We are in full agreement with the noble sentiments which testify to your genuine interest in African problems. The National Liberation Council, guided by these time-honoured principles, will continue to work for the progress of Ghana within the wider context of inter-African co-operation. It is only within this framework and under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity that the African States will be able to tackle their intractable economic and social problems.

It is for this reason that the National Liberation Council feels that the four-point programme enunciated in your address strikes the right note. Moreover, your offer to co-operate with the African States to help build a modern Africa is warmly welcome. You may be interested to know that since coming to power my Government has taken

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 5-27-98

/2....

HONOURABLE LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

concrete steps to establish closer economic contacts with Togo, the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta. Following this we hope to liberalise our trade relations with them, and to achieve that the means of communications will have to be improved. Since we shall definitely need external aid for these projects, I have instructed my officials to initiate exploratory talks with your representatives in Accra. My Government is further anxious to participate in any future schemes, including the use of satellites, to modernise communications network in Africa.

The Economic Commission for Africa is actively helping countries in this part of Africa to plan certain aspects of their economic modernisation, especially in the field of industrial development, on a co-operative basis. The Government of Ghana would like to explore in due course the possibility of securing the assistance of the United States in the implementation of those projects which may be assigned to Ghana.

I would like to remark that we are also giving considerable attention to the improvement of the health and educational needs of our people because of their effect on increased productivity. We are therefore encouraged by your assurance of the intention of your Government to increase the number of trained Africans and to provide more assistance in other fields of social development.

Mr. President, your message of hope and assurance has inspired us with a new vision and the prospect of further constructive and fruitful co-operation between the United States and the new nations of Africa. We shall continue to draw inspiration from those democratic and liberal ideas which have built your country into a great and prosperous nation. I wish once again to thank you on behalf of the National Liberation Council and on my own behalf for the tremendous interest which you and your administration have so far shown in our efforts to rebuild our country. We have no reason to doubt that this interest will grow from strength to strength to our mutual benefit.

Accept, Mr. President, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration and esteem.



(LT.-GENERAL J.A. ANKRAH, O.O.V., M.C.)

Text of Cable from Ambassador Williams re General Ankrah

1. Fourth July this year was occasion for heartwarming display Ghanaian affection for U.S. and of appreciation USG support since coup. In meeting I had with Ankrah yesterday, General said NLC simply unable to thank U.S. adequately for all we had done and are doing for people Ghana. He remarked that our timely and magnanimous help put number other countries to shame and had prompted them be more responsive.
2. Evidence of NLC warm feeling toward USG was unprecedented turnout of all five available members NLC at our official reception. They arrived early and stayed late and obviously enjoyed celebrating our 190th birthday with us.
3. Press pulled out all stops. In addition supplements in all three dailies, newspapers carried special front page articles and editorials and published text Ankrah's congratulatory message for July Fourth to President Johnson. Ghana TIMES probably best summed up mood by saying there "no doubt that people of Ghana like people of U.S., and many people in U.S. like Ghanaians. On this basis the two Governments can always work for mutual good of their peoples."

(Ref: ACCRA 022 dtd July 5, 1966)

*Pres file*CONFIDENTIAL

July 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pressure is building up for followup on the recommendations of the White House Conference on International Cooperation. Senator Clark spoke on the floor, and the House delegation to the Conference has reported to the Speaker urging vigorous implementation of Conference recommendations. Important private citizens, greatly enthused by the conference, are beginning to ask whether anything will come of it. Dick Gardner will keep the issue alive with a book on the Conference this fall.

Our problem is to lay the Conference to rest decently. We do not want to perpetuate it. On the other hand, it would be a bad mistake to ignore the Conference recommendations completely. Too many influential citizens invested too much time, thought and energy. Ignoring their work would unnecessarily antagonize some of our best foreign policy constituents. Besides, there are some good ideas (maybe as many as 200 big and small) among the recommendations, and we might as well take some credit for them.

As I see it, there are three ways to handle this problem, making the most of the sensible Conference recommendations and scrapping the useless ones:

Course #1: Decentralize implementation to the agencies. State Department recommends (attached) that you direct: (1) the Government departments and agencies concerned to implement those ICY recommendations which are in the national interest; (2) the ICY cabinet committee chairman to send each private sector chairman a copy of the progress report (attached); and (3) each Government committee chairman to inform his private sector counterpart that he will be available for further consultations as desired.

This would push implementation of recommendations down into the departments and in effect, bury the Conference without further ceremony. In my view, this would unnecessarily give the private people who participated in the Conference--people who are basically sympathetic with your foreign policy aims--a cause to say we are deaf to new ideas.

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DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDING
NOT HAVE SECURITY
IMPORTANCE, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY *JCH* ON *8-16-86*

CONFIDENTIAL

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Course #2: Centralize and spotlight implementation under White House supervision. Enthusiasts like Senator Clark would like you to appoint a small secretariat in the White House or in the Vice President's Office to push the Conference recommendations through the bureaucracy. They would also like to set up a group of leaders from the citizens' committees to provide a channel of continuing communication.

I do not recommend that approach either. It would go too far in perpetuating the Conference machinery. It could produce too much publicity and pressure for some of the recommendations on which we are not prepared to act.

Course #3: A Compromise. The course I favor (Budget Bureau and Doug Cater agree) is for you to assign an in-house committee headed by Charles Schultze to review the Conference recommendations in the context of preparing your FY 1968 budget and legislative program. You might even assign one of the summer task forces this responsibility, though it is mostly an in-house job since the outsiders have already had their say. We would set this up with a simple memo to department and agency heads (draft attached) asking their cooperation. Then we could put out just enough of a press release to show we are not letting these ideas die.

My idea of the committee would be to include the Budget Director (providing the staff work), Joe Califano (in connection with the legislative program), myself and maybe one non-government participant we could trust (to give the outsiders testimony that we have given their ideas a fair shake). This would be mostly dressing up for public consumption work Budget would be doing anyway in the normal budget process. We would just give a little special attention to programs recommended by the Conference so we could produce a good box-score next January.

I think this is the least we can do. Burying this show as State recommends risks a bad political backfire. Handling it this way would give an appearance of honest White House attention without perpetuating the Conference or associating you any further with its unpalatable recommendations. There are enough good recommendations that I think we could put together a pretty good story for you in January about how many you have incorporated in your program. By good public relations, we could create a glowing picture of your new efforts to tap good minds everywhere.

I see this as complementing our new effort to increase State Department use of consultants. It is a one-shot deal to screen out good ideas from one of the biggest bank of "consultants" we have ever put to

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- 3 -

work. We will not reassemble that group, so there is no conflict with our new program. However, the image of giving their ideas full hearing would nicely complement announcement of your new program to tap the best private thinking on a permanent (and less cumbersome) basis.

There are other advantages in forcing the bureaucracy to follow through on the conference recommendations and on the private contacts they established during the conference. One of the big bottlenecks as we begin adding an international dimension to the Great Society will be to get the traditionally domestic departments like HEW, Interior, and Justice to think in international terms too. If we can perpetuate their contacts with internationally minded private experts and make them think about international programs, we will begin bringing them along into the foreign field. This would not distort any existing or planned programs for expanding use of consultants. It would just underscore their importance.

W. W. Rostow

Approve your compromise (Course #3) _____

--Prefer anonymous committee of advisers _____

--Prefer task force _____

Approve State's approach (Course #1) _____

See me _____

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL/DRAFT

by DCA on 8-16-86

July 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Follow-up on the work of The White House Conference on International Cooperation

We in the United States set aside the year 1965 as International Cooperation Year (ICY) to be spent in search of new ways of cooperation among nations. To encourage that search, I called the White House Conference on International Cooperation, which met in Washington November 28 to December 1. That conference built on months of preparatory work by the ICY Cabinet Committee, which I had earlier formed, and the National Citizens' Commission. At the conference itself some 5,000 Americans took part in discussions of the reports of 30 panels of the National Citizens' Commission.

Now we in the government are well advanced in following up many of these recommendations. In fact, a number of them are already before the Congress. Others are headed that way or are under review for other forms of implementation. A few we have found unworkable now. But all have enjoyed the constructive review which the Secretary of State, the Vice President and I promised.

To finish that review, I am appointing a task force (White House Committee) this summer to oversee the final analysis in the context of preparing the FY 1968 Budget and legislative program. The Director, Bureau of the Budget, will serve as Chairman. He will be assisted by

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- 2 -

my Special Assistants Mr. Rostow and Mr. Califano and a private individual who was active in the work of the Conference. When they have finished, the Director, Bureau of the Budget will give me a final report. Meanwhile, I request that the Secretary of State, as Chairman of the ICY Cabinet Committee, send to the National Citizens' Commission and each Chairman of a Citizens' Panel an appropriate letter enclosing a progress report to be put in final form in cooperation with the Bureau of the Budget on the recommendations as of this time.

An equally important product of the Conference were the new channels of cooperation opened between experts in and out of government. I am determined that our government in its normal course of business continue to take advantage of the best thinking among our citizens. Therefore, I request that each of you within your area of responsibility instruct each Government Panel Chairman in your department or agency to arrange further consultation as appropriate with his citizen counterpart. I will ask the task force (White House Committee) to report on the degree to which it has been possible to make this sort of contact a continuing and useful part of your regular business.

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, July 11, 1966
6:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a considerably shortened and improved version of a speech on the "new winds in Asia" for possible delivery tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

56a

Draft #3

President's Speech

American Alumni Association

July 12, 1966

White Sulphur Springs

Words: 1850

The world is engaged in a race between education and disaster. The fate of all mankind depends to an important degree on the outcome of that race.

It is a special privilege to be with you tonight, because each of you has dedicated himself to helping education win that contest. We can seek no more important victory -- here at home, or in the world of which we are a part.

At home, we are engaged in a massive effort to improve the quality of American life. We are at war against poverty -- against unemployment -- against racial prejudice -- against disease and sickness -- against the decay of our cities -- against the pollution of our air and water.

And when we look at other parts of the world, we see similar battles being fought -- in Asia, in Africa, in Latin America. We see on every hand the struggle for improvement, the drive for independence, the frantic race between education and disaster.

I would like to talk with you tonight about one part of that world -- about Asia -- and about the many-sided battle that is being waged there.

I want to talk to you about what we are doing there -- and about what we hope to see accomplished -- about our deeds and about our dreams. And let us consider, too, the actions and the aspirations of our Asian friends. For they are doing much. They too are dreaming dreams -- and working to make them real.

In Viet-Nam, we are fighting against aggression. Together with the courageous Vietnamese and other allies, we are proving that the use of force to conquer others is a losing game. We shall persist in this effort to give the South Vietnamese a chance to be their own masters and to build their own way of life. And we are confident that our efforts will be successful.

We are deeply proud of our brave, skillful and compassionate men who are fighting this cruel and demanding war. And we shall back them to the hilt. What must be done will be done to help them achieve success.

Behind our determined defense of Viet-Nam, a vital Free Asia is taking shape. I will return to this in a moment.

In South Viet-Nam itself, a ^{new} vibrant society is being born. New programs for economic development are moving ahead. Important strides are being taken in the direction of constitutional and democratic government. *The task will be hard. It may be long. But the direction is right.*

Our long-range goal -- as it is the goal of all thoughtful men -- is peace in all of Asia. If we stand firm in Viet-Nam and demonstrate there that efforts at military conquest solve no problems, we believe there is a reasonable prospect for a relatively tranquil era ahead. If we back away from our present commitment there, we can foresee only deepening trouble, instability and probably wider war ahead.

Finally, we look forward to the only war that is really worth fighting -- the war against poverty, against disease, against ignorance. We look forward to the day when our energy and our resources can be used to help provide men with more food and with a fair prospect of peaceful and constructive development.

At the end of World War II, we had faith in the future of Europe -- and we backed that faith with all the aid and compassion we could muster. Our faith today in Asia is just as great.

Let me reaffirm that faith to you -- and to all Americans -- tonight. We are not fighting a losing or futile battle

in Viet-Nam. We are fighting a war of persistence -- and time is on our side. Communism is not the wave of the future of Asia. Freedom is the wave of the future: freedom and progress and social justice. We know it. The leaders of Free Asia know it. And there is evidence that the Communist leaders are beginning to realize it too.

Our economic and social assistance to Viet-Nam began in 1954. In the past 12 years, we have spent more than \$2 billion for non-military aid to the people of South Viet-Nam. And despite every effort by the Viet Cong and the Government in Hanoi to frustrate their efforts, the people of South Viet-Nam have made heartening gains -- in farming and fishing, in health and in education. To cite only one of many indicators -- in the field of education -- primary and secondary school enrollment has increased five-fold in the past decade, we have provided seven million textbooks, and U.S. -supported programs in the hamlets are now graduating 2,500 instructors a year in Vietnamese hamlets.

Our confidence is not limited to South Viet-Nam. Throughout Free Asia, new winds are blowing that few could have foreseen even a few short years ago. To every American who visits that part of the world, those winds become more apparent every day.

Secretary of State Rusk has just returned from a trip through the Far East. And he has given us a full report on the

heartening movement toward Asian regional cooperation which has been taking place. He tells me that the 1966 session of the Joint Japan-United States Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs was the most successful in the five-year history of those useful cabinet-level consultations.

One thing was clear from these talks in Japan -- the interests of our two countries are no longer exclusively, or even primarily, bilateral. We and our Japanese partners play different roles in the Asian environment we share, where there are now gratifying initiatives toward regional cooperation. Our objectives are the same, however. We share concern for restored peace and the improved welfare of peoples throughout the area.

The past year has been a bad time for pessimists on Asia. Look at some of the things that have happened:

-- Japan and Korea have settled long-standing differences and established normal relations, holding promise for closer cooperation;

-- one country after another has achieved economic growth that would have been considered wild optimism only a few years ago;

-- Indonesia turned away from the brink of absorption into Peking's orbit and is restoring relations with her closest neighbors;

-- Communist China's policy of aggression by proxy has failed;

-- Asian leaders have moved vigorously to initiate or strengthen means of regional consultation and cooperation.

Among the latter are such things as the Asian Development Bank, the Mekong Development Committee, and the Asian and Pacific Council.

In only a little more than a year since I pledged American support for cooperative development efforts in Southeast Asia, a promising start has been made by the Asians themselves.

For we recognize -- and our Asian friends recognize -- that the work that lies ahead can only be approached with Asian leadership, Asian planning, and Asian work. We can help -- indeed, we must help. But that help must be extended in support of the things our Asian friends want, and organize, and accomplish themselves.

A very perceptive and able Asian statesman, Pote Sarasin, the Thai Minister of National Development, recently remarked that the new atmosphere of cooperative activity in Asia may have "marked the beginning of the end of the general belief that Southeast Asia is a region of diversity that could never be formed into a united front."

And another Asian, the executive secretary of the UN's Economic Council for Asia and the Far East, has termed the new spirit we see emerging as "a voyage of discovery, or perhaps 'rediscovery' of Asia after centuries of intellectual, spiritual and economic isolation from one another."

This is the Asia -- and this is the spirit -- that is taking shape behind our defense of South Viet-Nam. To provide time and opportunity for that free Asia to find its own way is an important purpose of our policies.

Because we have been firm -- and because we have committed ourselves to the defense of one small country -- others in the same threatened area have taken new heart. They have come to realize that they have an alternative to the destruction of their nationhood or accepting satellite status in Communist China's orbit. Because of the American role, they see the real possibility of achieving a Pacific balance within which the small nations in Asia can survive.

It was this thought that prompted the foreign minister of Singapore a few months ago to remark that if the nations of the world could learn to build a truly world civilization in the Pacific through cooperation and peaceful competition, then, as Theodore Roosevelt

once said, "this may be the greatest of all human eras -- the Pacific era."

As a Pacific power, we have a major stake in helping achieve that outcome.

It is a goal worthy of our dreams -- and of the deeds of brave men.

We will do our part.

Limited Official Use

Monday, July 11, 1966 - 10:45 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Inauguration of New Submarine Cable Linking Venezuela with the United States

A new submarine cable linking Venezuela with the United States, via the Virgin Islands, will enter into operation during the first week of August.

President Leoni has indicated an interest in inaugurating the new service with a Presidential telephone conversation.

As a gesture of cordiality and goodwill, your agreeing to do so would be marginally useful. The conversation could include a brief exchange of greetings, both personal and in the name of the people of each country, with appropriate references to progress of modern communications which strengthens hemispheric ties, and thus the Alliance for Progress. President Leoni does not speak English, so translation would be required.

The cable has been constructed by A. T. & T. Venezuela's participation in the Venezuela-Virgin Island portion has been financed by IBRD. The remainder is being privately financed.

I cannot recommend this as an important piece of business. It is a minor matter. The question is simply: do you wish to take the time for the gesture?

W. W. Rostow

Will participate
in inaugural call ✓

Prefer not to
participate

Limited Official Use

Monday, July 11, 1966
6:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a considerably shortened and improved version of a speech on the "new winds in Asia" for possible delivery tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, July 11, 1966
5:45 p.m.

tp 59

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith another memo to you by Gen. Taylor on negotiations, emphasizing the need to prepare ourselves to hold fast on four major points.

These points have been made to State (Alex Johnson) by Gen. Taylor.

Gen. Taylor and I have been going into the negotiating question quite deeply to assure we are prepared should we find ourselves suddenly in a negotiating situation. Much staff work has been done; but there are some critical gaps.

I propose, therefore:

- to formulate promptly these gaps in the form of key unanswered questions, consulting with Gen. Taylor;
- put these questions to State and Defense.

When staff work is further forward and Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have had a chance to look into the matter, you might wish to review planning in this field.

Alternatively, you may wish an early meeting, on the basis of papers already prepared.

W. W. Rostow

Refine staff work and schedule meeting later _____

Arrange early meeting _____

See me _____

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-193
By sig NARA, Date 3-14-89

July 11, 1966

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-193

By Log NARA, Date 3-14-89

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Preparations for a "Cessation of Hostilities" in Viet-Nam

In commenting on Mrs. Ghandi's statement of July 7, our government spokesman included the following sentence: "A cessation of hostilities both in North and South Viet-Nam could be the first order of business of a reconvened Geneva Conference." This, of course, is not new prose but I would like to raise the question whether, as a government, we are in agreement as to what it means or implies.

As I understand it, it means that we will negotiate a cessation of hostilities (which the newspapers call a "cease fire" but is more properly an "armistice") in advance or as a part of negotiations aimed at a final settlement in South Viet-Nam. Since it took over two years to negotiate an armistice in Korea, I think it very timely for us to make sure that we are not about to get into an equally frustrating and unsatisfactory exercise.

I am aware that considerable work has been done and is being done in the State Department at the planning level in anticipation of a possible cessation of hostilities. I have recently seen quite a good draft on this subject which undertakes to define terms and proposes a way to use our most valuable negotiating blue chips. I would hope that this paper or one like it would get to you shortly because I am constantly fearful that a Communist proposal will catch us by surprise. Any day we may be presented with an offer to "stop bombing and start talking".

An analysis of the possible course of events in the negotiation of a cessation of hostilities reminds us that, before we are successful, we are likely to be faced with many difficult situations, particularly in winning and retaining public support in the face of the sharp criticism of allies, neutrals and segments of the U.S. public, evoked by the unpopular positions which we shall be obliged to maintain. Throughout the negotiations, unless we are willing to sacrifice vital interests, we will have to establish and maintain an unyielding position on points like the following:

a. The U.S. will not stop bombing or pay any other price for the privilege of participation in negotiations with the Communists.

b. The U.S. will not tolerate another prolonged Panmunjon-type negotiation. The negotiations will have to demonstrate sincerity and obtain tangible results within a reasonable time after their initiation.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

c. If it is impossible to get a system of international supervision of the execution of agreements reached, the U.S. will reserve the right to decide whether violations have occurred and to take appropriate action.

d. The Government of South Viet-Nam will have the right of circulation throughout all of South Viet-Nam during a cessation of hostilities and will have the obligation to protect its citizens and to maintain law and order.

Obviously, the maintenance of these positions will subject us to Communist attack and will cause acute unhappiness in many international and domestic quarters. Thus far, I have the feeling that we have not prepared the domestic and international public for our attitude on these points. Not only have we not laid the ground work to justify our attitude on these matters, but in some cases in the past we have used misleading language which invites misinterpretation. An example is statement No. 14 of the U.S. Official Position which reads: "We have said publicly and privately that we would stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a step toward peace." We need to clear up what we really mean by such a statement or run the risk of being charged with double-dealing or at least of misleading the hopes of the many nations who feel involved in the situation in South Viet-Nam.

As time may be running short, I would recommend that you urge State to propose to you at once a plan for negotiating a cessation of hostilities in advance or as a part of the negotiation for a final settlement and that the plan suggest ways and means for winning domestic and international understanding for the unpopular positions which we will inevitably be obliged to take and hold throughout the negotiations.

Maxwell D. Taylor
Maxwell D. Taylor

~~TOP SECRET~~

EROX FROM QUICK COPY

Monday, July 11, 1966
4:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Andy Goodpaster reports the following suggestion from General Eisenhower: that we follow up on your press conference statement, which contrasted our care in Hanoi/Haiphong with VC attacks on civilians, by underlining regularly:

- the Viet Cong reliance on the murder and kidnapping of civilians; and
- without in any way equating ourselves with the Viet Cong, contrasting this with our care about civilian casualties.

W. W. R.

Monday, July 11, 1966 -- 1:35 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a message to you from the Pope, in the wake of your letter to him delivered by Amb. Goldberg.

In the attached cable, Goldberg says the Pope's reply reflects a "more favorable understanding and support of U. S. policy on Vietnam than that reflected in articles in the Vatican press and in position prepared by Vatican staff prior to Ambassador Goldberg's visit."

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment
Rome 153

WWRostow:rln

61a

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 10, 1966

FROM THE POPE TO THE PRESIDENT (Rome 153)

"We are indeed grateful, Mr. President, for your kind letter, a copy of which Mr. Arthur Goldberg, your Ambassador to the United Nations, consigned to us during the audience which we had the pleasure of according him yesterday.

"It was a source of gratification for us to know of your many efforts to obtain an honorable solution at the peace table, and we sincerely regret that these efforts have ~~not found~~ a favorable response on the part of those who are involved in the conflict.

"While the recent increase of military activity has caused us great sorrow, we are consoled that you have given specific directions that every precaution be taken to protect lives and non-military property.

"Despite all the sacrifices made and sufferings endured, peace is not with us. We are saddened that conditions have not improved and that peace remains as elusive as ever. It is our thought, that in the spirit of the gospel, peace will be attained by good will, generosity and understanding, and we would urge you and your people to be magnanimous in this difficult time.

"We trust that those in diplomatic circles will make every attempt to bring about conditions which could lead to negotiations and ultimately to the peace which is so intensely desired by all men.

"We shall continue to pray that Almighty God will bless the efforts of those who sincerely seek peace, and that harmony and true brotherhood, with its resultant collaboration, will be established. We invoke upon you, Mr. President, and your nation God's blessing of peace and prosperity.

From the Vatican, July 9, 1966, Paulus PP VI"

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-437
By 40, NARA, Date 12-2-92

Limited Official Use

Monday, July 11, 1966 - 10:45 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Inauguration of New Submarine Cable Linking Venezuela with the United States

A new submarine cable linking Venezuela with the United States, via the Virgin Islands, will enter into operation during the first week of August.

President Leoni has indicated an interest in inaugurating the new service with a Presidential telephone conversation.

As a gesture of cordiality and goodwill, your agreeing to do so would be marginally useful. The conversation could include a brief exchange of greetings, both personal and in the name of the people of each country, with appropriate references to progress of modern communications which strengthens hemispheric ties, and thus the Alliance for Progress. President Leoni does not speak English, so translation would be required.

The cable has been constructed by A. T. & T. Venezuela's participation in the Venezuela-Virgin Island portion has been financed by IBRD. The remainder is being privately financed.

I cannot recommend this as an important piece of business. It is a minor matter. The question is simply: do you wish to take the time for the gesture?

W. W. Rostow

Will participate
in inaugural call _____

Prefer not to
participate _____

Limited Official Use

Monday, July 11, 1966
9:25 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the letter to Cabot
Lodge you outlined on the phone from
the Ranch.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Balaguer's First Appointments

Director Hoover has furnished security reports on 35 of Balaguer's first appointments. These cover the Cabinet and sub-Cabinet, the Supreme Court and some of the key independent agencies such as State Properties, Industrial Development, Immigration, Communications and Airport Administration.

Security-wise the Cabinet looks good. The report on Minister of Interior and Police Ramon Castillo contains references to past pro-Castro sympathies. He is a rather erratic fellow who is now well right of center and working closely with our Embassy in Santo Domingo.

Balaguer made a clean sweep of the Supreme Court. You will recall that under Garcia Godoy some highly undesirable elements got into the judiciary. The FBI has no derogatory information on the new group. The Attorney General is also given a clean bill. We can expect the new Supreme Court to clean house further down the ranks of the judiciary.

The heads of independent agencies, with one exception, present no problems. The Director General of State Properties is said by one source to have been a member of the Communist Party. The charge does not seem to be supported by other sources. Both Garcia Godoy and Balaguer regard him as honest, trustworthy and a capable administrator.

From a security standpoint, the appointments represent quite an improvement from Garcia Godoy's choices ten months ago which had us so worried.

/s/ Walt
W. W. Rostow

cc: Marvin Watson
Bill Moyers

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-176 appeal
By *inf*, NARA, Date 8-25-94

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 11, 1966

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the P has
signed off
on this says BKS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

- ACTION

Through: Harry McPherson

SUBJECT: Second Annual Report of Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic
Canal Study Commission

The Interoceanic Canal Study Commission has completed its second annual report (Tab B).

The report shows substantial progress on the special studies being made by the Commission on the national and international implications of a sea-level canal. The Commission has not advanced as far as it would have liked in the on-site surveys of possible canal routes because of delays in negotiating agreements with Colombia and Panama. These agreements are now in hand and the surveying work underway, although full operations cannot start until January 1967 when the next dry season begins. The Commission concludes that it will need more time and money than originally authorized to complete its study. It will submit recommendations for amendment as soon as it has a better fix on its needs.

A suggested transmittal letter for your approval is at Tab A.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

only copy from B
sent to Pres.

Approve letter
of transmittal _____

Disapprove letter _____.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I hereby transmit the second annual report of the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission. The report covers the period July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966.

The first report described the planning phase of the Commission's investigations. During the last 12 months the Commission has moved into the execution stage. The engineering survey of a possible sea-level canal route in Panama has begun. The surveying of the route in Colombia will start this fall. The route near the border of Nicaragua and Costa Rica is being mapped. With the beginning of the next dry season -- in January 1967 -- the surveying will move into full operation in both Panama and Colombia. The Commission has also made substantial progress on the special studies covering the broad national and international implications of a sea-level canal.

After a year's work, the Commission has reached the conclusion that it will probably need more time and resources to complete its assignment than is contemplated in the present authorizing legislation.

As soon as the Commission determines what its minimum additional requirements will be, I will recommend legislation to the Congress amending Public Law 88-609.

The sea-level canal investigations continue to be of great importance to the United States. The Commission is now well along with its commitment. I take great pleasure in receiving and forwarding the report of their progress to date.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agreement with the Government of Sweden Concerning
Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy

The Atomic Energy Commission, with the concurrence of the Department of State, recommends that you approve the proposed Agreement between the United States and Sweden which will supersede the present Agreement signed in 1956. The new Agreement would have a term of 30 years. The primary reasons for entering into a new Agreement are:

- (a) To provide the framework for assuring the long-term supply of enriched uranium fuel required for the projected Swedish nuclear power program.
- (b) To implement provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which were added by recent amendments, permitting the performance of uranium enrichment services by the Commission and the private ownership of special nuclear material.

The new Agreement also provides that the International Atomic Energy Agency will be promptly requested to assume responsibility for applying safeguards to materials and facilities subject to safeguards under the Agreement.

I recommend that you approve this proposed Agreement. If you agree, there is presented herewith a letter to Dr. Seaborg for your signature.

Walt Rostow

___ Approved

___ Disapproved

___ See me

66a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

In accordance with Section 123a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to me a proposed superseding "Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Sweden" and has recommended that I approve the proposed Agreement, determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution.

Pursuant to the provisions of 123b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and upon the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission, I hereby:

- (a) Approve the proposed Agreement, and determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States of America;
- (b) Authorize the execution of the proposed Agreement on behalf of the Government of the United States of America by appropriate authorities of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, July 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Canadian - USSR Air Transport Agreement

The Canadians and Soviets signed the air transport agreement today. The agreement contains no reference to onward rights. The provision was deleted at the request of the Soviets. Why, we do not know.

In a side exchange of letters, initiated by the Soviets, they agreed to hold additional discussions on transit rights to third countries at a time acceptable to both parties. We have no indication yet on the timing for these talks.

It appears that the Soviets, rather than the Canadians, helped us out of the onward rights to Cuba problem, unless there is some deal here which does not meet the eye.

State is taking a careful look at the sudden turn of events and will recommend what we should do next.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-196
By sig NARA, Date 7-17-89

cc - Bill Moyers
Francis Bator

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

July 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message from Secretary Freeman on East Pakistan's Food Problems

Attached is an interesting message from Secretary Freeman.

The Pakistanis are having problems with food prices in East Pakistan. Drought has cut production about 5% and there is a price push because food stocks are lower than usual at this time of year, the opposition is badgering the Government, and the administration has not handled what stocks it has on hand to best advantage. Ayub has brought the price pressure to Freeman's attention, and they have discussed the possibility of diverting to East Pakistan several ships waiting to unload at Indian ports.

Our specialists in Agriculture are hard at work reviewing the figures to see what East Pakistan's real needs are. They are also looking into the logistical problems of diverting ships from Indian to East Pakistani ports. State is for it as a helpful political gesture.

Freeman would like to explore the matter further, which is fine. He also asks authority to make a prompt announcement of whatever agreement he reaches after discussions with the Indians. In our view this is premature. The politics of Indo-Pak relations are so tricky that nothing must be said until we are sure it is feasible; and if they can work it out, it may be better to have the Indians and the Pakistanis make their own announcement, without our being publicly engaged. State has therefore told him to explore the matter, but to make no public announcement until further clarification.

W. W. R.

Attached: copy of Karachi 221

HW:llw

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-200
By liq NARA, Date 3-15-89

~~SECRET~~

68a

~~SECRET EYES ONLY EXDIS~~

From Amembassy Karachi 221

To White House Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-197

By ing, NARA, Date 9-1-87

EYES ONLY THE PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

1. Visit with President Ayub this date (July 11) -- conveyed your personal regards. Warm response and request to be remembered to his good friend President Johnson and Mrs. Johnson.
2. Had useful discussion Pakistan agriculture development progress and plan and proposals for a new PL 480 agreement. Informed Ayub in detail of new and tighter U. S. supply position now surplus eliminated.
3. Pakistan currently faces difficult food situation in East Pakistan caused partly by floods and drought and partly internal economics and politics. Possible that we can help them considerably by rerouting some wheat currently waiting to be unloaded in India without actually increasing the total amount to be made available to Pakistan this year and without interrupting supply to India. Ayub very appreciative this possibility. Appears that the GOI will be receptive. Believe this induced cooperation between Pakistan and India to combat common enemy hunger will be important initial step in reconciliation of two countries. Unless advised to contrary, I propose to examine this possibility further and make a tentative announcement as soon as possible. Such announcement plus reiteration of early shipments under current interim agreement will help settle down current bullish market and sharp price increases in East Pakistan.

~~SECRET~~

SENT 69
12:53 P.M.

~~SECRET~~

July 10, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM W. W. ROSTOW

I commend this thoughtful cable of Lodge's to you.

It fits another idea we developed yesterday in a meeting with Leonhart and the Viet Nam economists:

-- We should begin now designing with the Vietnamese a postwar Viet Nam development plan;

-- We should think of weaving South Viet Nam on the economic, as well as the political, side into the group of ten that met at Seoul.

In short,
A We should be preparing to get Viet Nam firmly anchored in the institutions of free Asia now.

The resistance in Saigon to our old idea of working on postwar development is now overcome. Announcement of work on a postwar development plan would be heartening and give us a practical base for linking Saigon and free Asia. A We may wish to discuss these matters at the Tuesday lunch, if you decide to have one.

(repeat Saigon 643)

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-193
By *ig* NARA, Date 3-14-89

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CMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA 32
RUALOS/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 19
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY XIENTIANE 37
RUHPAG/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON TWO
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BT
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 643

JULY 10.

EXDIS

1. A SPATE OF PUBLIC ACTIVITY INVOLVING PROPOSALS AND CONTACTS RELATED TO A SO-CALLED NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF VIET-NAM SEEMS ON US. DEGAULLE, U THANT, MADAME GANDHI, PRIME MINISTER WILSON, AND OTHERS SEEM TO BE MANEUVERING IN AND AROUND THE PROBLEM.
2. OUR POSITION OF WELCOMING INITIATIVES TO BRING ABOUT DISCUSSIONS OR NEGOTIATIONS LEAVES US IN A GOOD POSITION IN COM-

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-195
By up, NARA, Date 7-27-88

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~~PAGE 2 RUMJIR 643 SECRET~~

PARISON WITH THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND PEKING. THAT INTRANSIGENCE ALSO ALLOWS US TO PROCEED WITH AND DEFEND INTERNATIONALLY OUR MILITARY EFFORT IN SOUTH VIET-NAM AND OUR BOMBING OF NORTH VIET-NAM.

3. MEANWHILE, OUR MILITARY SUCCESSES IN THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH PROVIDE A COMBINATION OF PRESSURE ON HANOI AND THE PROSPECT OF A STRONGER POSITION ON THE GROUND. OUR CIVIL PROGRAMS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM BECOME BETTER INTEGRATED AND THEIR BENEFICIAL RESULTS WILL BE MORE APPARENT. FINALLY, THE QUIETING OF THE INTERNAL POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND THE BEGINNING STEPS IN A MORE NORMAL POLITICAL EVOLUTION IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR SOME MEASURE OF INTERNAL STABILITY AND REDUCE THE UNCERTAINTIES THAT HAVE PLAGUED THE CHANCES FOR SURVIVAL OF EACH GOVERNMENT SINCE THE FALL OF DIEM.

4. WHETHER OR NOT HANOI (WITH SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN URGING) IS PREPARED OR PREPARING FOR NEGOTIATIONS, THERE ARE CERTAIN STEPS WHICH WE NEED TO CONSIDER AT THIS TIME. THESE INVOLVE THE NEED FOR THOROUGH CONSULTATION WITH THE GVN, AND WITH OUR TROOP CONTRIBUTING ALLIES.

5. IF THE PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS IMPROVE, OR EVEN IF THE

~~PAGE 3 RUMJIR 643 SECRET~~

TALK OF NEGOTIATIONS AT HIGH LEVELS GATHERS FORCE, THE NEED FOR AVOIDING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES AMONG THE ALLIES BECOMES EVEN GREATER.

6. AS THE POSITION OF THE GVN IMPROVES AND AS THE POSSIBILITY OF VICTORY BECOMES RELEVANT, WE MAY FIND ATTITUDES GROWING IN SOUTH VIET-NAM WHICH MAY PRODUCE DIFFERENCES IN REGARD TO POLICIES TOWARD HANOI AND THE VIET CONG. WE SHOULD TRY TO AVOID SITUATIONS IN WHICH U.S. POLICY DECLARATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS ARE MADE WITH INSUFFICIENT TIME FOR CONSULTATION IN SAIGON. MOREOVER, AS OUR ALLIES (IN PARTICULAR KOREA BUT ALSO THE PHILLIPINES AND THAILAND) SEE THEIR OWN ROLE INCREASING THEY WILL WISH THEIR DESIRES TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

7. AN INTENSIVE DISCUSSION WITH OUR TROOP-CONTRIBUTING ALLIES ON THE TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT MAY SOON BE IN ORDER. WE SHOULD BEING⁶ BILATERALLY WITH PARTICULAR CONCENTRATION ON THE GVN, AND PERHAPS, AFTER CAREFUL INDIVIDUAL PREPARATIONS, FOLLOW-UP IN A WIDER FORUM INVOLVING BOTH THE GVN AND THE TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES (U.S., KOREA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, THAILAND AND PHILLIPINES).

~~PAGE 4 RUMJIR 643 SECRET~~

8. WE PROPOSE AN EARLY, FULL AND FRANK EXCHANGE WITH THE GVN BY QUIET TALKS IN SAIGON BETWEEN THE AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL THIEU, PRIME MINISTER KY AND FOREIGN MINISTER DO. VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THESE THREE. THE AGENDA SHOULD CENTER ON THE PROBLEM OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE APPROACHES TO NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE POSSIBLE TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT.

9. IF THIS SUGGESTION IS VIEWED FAVORABLY BY THE DEPARTMENT, WE WISH TO PRESENT OUR COMMENTS ON A POSSIBLE AGENDA. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, NEED SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FROM THE DEPARTMENT ON POSITIONS TO BE TAKEN.

10. CONCERNING CONSULTATION WITH TROOP-CONTRIBUTING⁶ ALLIES, WE RECALL THE SECRETARY HAD SUCH A THOUGHT¹ RECENTLY. WE BELIEVE THAT THOROUGH BILATERAL CONSULTATION IS SUFFICIENT FOR THE TIME BEING, AND THE SECRETARY'S RECENT TRIP TO THE SEATO MEETING⁶ AND ELSEWHERE IS ONE STEP. CONTINUATION OF INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON AND IN THE DIFFERENT CAPTIALS CONCERNED ALSO MEETS THE NEED. AT SUCH TIME AS WE HAVE REACHED CLEAR UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE GVN AND OUR ALLIES ON THE TERMS OF SETTLEMENT, WE MIGHT CONSIDER CONVENING⁶ A MEETING AT EITHER A MINISTERIAL OR

~~PAGE 5 RUMJIR 643 SECRET~~

AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL. WE KNOW THAT TRAN VAN DO FAVORS SUCH A MEETING. IN HIS MIND THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS SHOULD COVER BOTH MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PLANS AND PROSPECTS.

11. DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS REQUESTED.

GP-2. LODGE
BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

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Robert

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1966 JUL 10 16 52

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OO WTE10
DE WTE 1187

FROM: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM (BROWN)
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: WH60327

UNCLASSIFIED

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LYNDA BIRD:

HERE ARE EXCEPTS FROM TWO ARTICLES FROM THE GERMAN PRESS
(BOTH FROM "RHEINISCHE POST," DUESSELDORF) THAT I WANTED YOU
TO SEE. QUOTE

1) UNDER THE HEADLINE "LYNDA INVITED TO PARTY," THE REPORT
DESCRIBES HER APPEARANCE AS PLEASANT AND SAYS THAT IN REALITY
SHE LOOKS EVEN BETTER THAN IN MANY PICTURES. THE MOST STRIKING
THING ABOUT HER IS THAT SHE DOES NOT SHOW OFF, THAT SHE ACTS
LIKE OTHER GIRLS FROM ANY CITY AND LIKE THE DAUGHTER OF ANY
UPRIGHT FATHER.

2) "LYNDA DISCOVERS COLOGNE"
LYNDA BIRD JOHNSON HAS APPARENTLY SET OUT TO CORRECT THE
DISTORTED IMAGE WE HAVE OF AMERICAN TOURISTS. THE FIRST
STOPOVER ON HER BRIEF TOUR THROUGH GERMANY WAS COLOGNE. AND
COLOGNE IS ONE OF THE FOUR CLINCHES ON WHICH THE AMERICAN
IMAGE OF GERMANY IS FORMED, THE OTHER THREE BEING MUNICH,
THE HOFBRAEUHAUS THERE AND THE LORELEI ON THE RHINE. BUT LYNDA
HAS HIGHER ASPIRATIONS. SHE CERTAINLY DOES NOT INSPECT HISTORIC
SITES FOR PUBLICITY PURPOSES. WHAT SHE ACCOMPLISHED IN
COLOGNE WAS A JOB FOR A HEAVY WORKER. SHE INSPECTED THE
DIONYSUS MOSAIC, THE CATHEDRAL, AND THE ROMAN-GERMANIC MUSEUM
WHERE SHE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE ROMAN GLASS
COLLECTION. THEN SHE DESCENDED TO THE PRETORIUM BELOW THE
CITY HALL TO INSPECT THE REMAINS OF UBIAN AND ROMAN WALLS.

BUT EVEN LYNDA, THAT SERIOUS STUDENT OF HISTORY, DID NOT
IGNORE PRESENT-DAY ACHIEVEMENTS. SHE BOUGHT SOME 4711 EAU DE
COLOGNE, DID SOME SHOPPING, AND HAD LUNCH IN COLOGNE, WITH
MRS. MCGHEE ACTING AS GUIDE. THE YOUNG LADY, WHO IS SO MUCH
INTERESTED IN ARTS AND LETTERS, WAS GUARDED BY FOUR
DETECTIVES.

THIS WILL CERTAINLY NOT REMAIN LYNDA'S LAST TRIP IN GERMANY.
SHE WILL MOST LIKELY GO TO TRIER TO INSPECT THE PORTA NIGRA.
WHAT A MARKED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS GIRL FROM TEXAS AND THE
ORDINARY ARMY OF TEENS AND TWEENS! UNQUOTE
CALHOUN

100 10/1627Z JULY 1966

Saturday, July 9, 1966 -- 1:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contact

Jess Cook, TIME, telephoned to clear up certain points about my service in the OSS and the Army. He asked for a quote re my temperate optimism. I gave him following statement:

Since becoming involved in work in the government in the summer of 1941, I have been, on balance, a temperate optimist about most of the military and foreign policy enterprises in which our country has been engaged. This has proved, at this point in the history of our country, a realistic position. I have generally found that a temperate optimism proves more realistic for an American at this stage of history than a sophisticated pessimism.

W. W. Rostow

rln

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

⁷²
sent by wire
to Ranch
7/9/66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, July 9, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Argentine Situation

The Ongania Government is not expected to make a helpful public statement over the weekend on respect for human rights, peaceful settlement of border disputes and eventual elections.

The Argentine Foreign Minister late yesterday sent word to the Embassy that

- the question of elections is difficult and requires careful study and precise definition.
- there is no problem on human rights and peaceful settlement and this will be made clear "in forthcoming actions and statements" (no time indicated).
- he fully understands that the U.S. is not laying down conditions for recognition.
- he regrets that our suggestion for a public statement now could not be adopted.

In the absence of a public statement, we will put off recognition until sometime next week. More than half of the Latin American countries are with us in holding up on recognition. Those who have recognized are: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.

WWR
W. W. Rostow

cc - Bill Moyers

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-198
By mf, NARA, Date 1-20-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 9, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

I suggest that the President reply to Covey Oliver along the lines of the attached draft.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Dear Covey:

I am sorry that my schedule did not permit me to see you when you were here at the end of June. I look forward to your visit in September.

We are working on the delegation to the Lleras inaugural. I regret that I will not be able to accept the Colombian Government's kind invitation. But you may be sure that a strong delegation will be going.

Sincerely,

The Honorable
Covey T. Oliver
American Ambassador
United States Embassy
Bogota, Colombia

LBJ/WGB:mmm
July 9, 1966

~~TOP SECRET~~

74

EEB164
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1162

SENT
WHCA

Sent Ranch
9:18 p.m.
Friday, July 8, 1966

FROM: BROMLEY SMITH
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66496

1966 JUL 9 01 18

~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM: BROMLEY SMITH
TO; THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *gn*, NARA, Date 5-27-98

FOLLOWING IS AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S REPORT TO YOU OF HIS CONVERSATION TODAY WITH THE POPE IN ROME.

1. QUOTE PLEASE TELL PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO CONTINUE HIS POLICY WITH PATIENCE AND MAGNANIMITY AS HE HAS DONE, UNQUOTE, HIS HOLINESS STRESSED, DURING HOUR'S AUDIENCE IN WHICH AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG, ACCOMPANIED BY ASYISTANT SECRETARY SISCO, LEFT WITH THE POPE LETTER OF THE PRESIDENT AND EXPLAINED FULLY THE RATIONALE FOR OUR RECENT ACTIONS IN VIETNAM AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FIRM DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT EVERY AVENUE TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

2. IN A WARM AND VERY CORDIAL AUDIENCE, AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG INFORMED THE POPE OF THE STEPS TAKEN BY THE US TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION SINCE HIS LAST VISIT AT CHRISTMAS-TIME, EXPLAINED THE CATEGORIC REJECTIONS OF OUR PEACE EFFORTS FROM THE OTHER SIDE, AND REASONS WHY IT BECAME NECESSARY FOR THE US TO BOMB THE POL TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM.

3. AT THE OUTSET HIS HOLINESS SAID IT IS UNEXPLAINABLE THAT HANOI REFUSES TO NEGOTIATE AND THAT HE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHY PUBLIC OPINION DOES NOT PRESS COMMUNISTS HARDER TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. HE NOTED IN PARTICULAR OUR EFFORTS TO AVOID POPULATED AREAS IN THE BOMBINGS. HE DEPLORED THE EFFORTS OF THE COMMUNISTS TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY ARE THE AGGRIEVED AND ARE THE VICTIMS OF AGGRESSION.

4. THE POPE SAID HIS PRIMARY PURPOSE IN THE WORLD IS EDUCATION, EDUCATION FOR PEACE, AND THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN VIETNAM. AS AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG EXPLAINED THE NEED TO BOMB THE POL TARGETS TO MEET THE INCREASED INFILTRATION AND THE STEPPED-UP AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH, THE POPE SAID, "TERRIBLE, TERRIBLE (REFERRING TO THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION)", AND THEN ASKED WHERE HANOI GOT ITS EQUIPMENT. HE CHARACTERIZED THE SOURCES OF EQUIPMENT FROM THE USSR AND OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND CHINA AS INEXHAUSTIBLE AND SAID THE PRESENCE OF OVER FORTY THOUSAND CHINESE LOGISTIC TROOPS IN THE NORTH WAS VERY DANGEROUS. AFTER AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG DESCRIBED OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, INCLUDING DIRECT CONTACT WITH HANOI, THE POPE SAID THE FAILURE TO ACHIEVE PEACE IS TRAGIC.

5. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG INFORMED HIS HOLINESS THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD CONTINUE TO USE EVERY POSSIBLE MEANS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG ALLUDED TO SIGNS OF SOME POLITICAL DIVISION WITHIN HANOI, STRESSING HOWEVER THAT THOSE IN HANOI WHO MIGHT WANT TO MOVE TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE WERE ONLY A MINORITY VOICE, WHEREAS THE MAJORITY WERE STILL UNDER CHINESE INFLUENCE. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG ALSO STRESSED THAT OUR OBJECTIVE IS LIMITED, IT IS NOT THE EXTINCTION OF THE NORTH BUT RATHER TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION SO THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE CAN LIVE WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM THE OUTSIDE.

6. MUCH OF THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO BE MORE HELPFUL. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT FOUND IT POSSIBLE TO TAKE STEPS TO MOVE THE VIETNAM PROBLEM TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE, THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE TALKED PEACE BUT HAVE NOT ACTED FOR PEACE. THE POPE RECALLED HIS CONVERSATION WITH GROMYKO, WHO HE SAID HAD INFORMED HIM THAT THE SOVIETS SUPPORTED THE PAPAL APPEAL MADE AT THE UN BY HIS HOLINESS, THAT THE USSR WAS READY TO COLLABORATE FOR PEACE, AND THAT IT WANTED THE POPE TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THE POPE SAID, GROMYKO MADE CLEAR THE SOVIET VIEW THAT THE AMERICANS MUST STOP THEIR AGGRESSION. THE POPE TOLD GROMYKO THAT HE INTENDED TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION BUT IT WAS ALSO UP TO THE SOVIETS TO DO SOMETHING TOWARDS THIS END.

7. THE POPE READ THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WITH CARE, RECALLING WITH GREAT AND OBVIOUS SINCERITY PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S WORDS "ALWAYS READY" TO NEGOTIATE.

8. THE POPE THEN ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO US AND OPPORTUNE FOR HIM TO PRESS THE USSR ONCE AGAIN EVEN THOUGH THE HOLY SEE HAD LITTLE CREDIT WITH THEM. HE WANTED TO PASS ON TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN ITALY THE CONTENTS OF AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S ASSURANCES AND TO TELL HIM THAT HE HAD RECEIVED THE FULLEST ASSURANCES OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON THAT WE WANT THE WAR IN ALL ITS MANIFESTATIONS TO STOP AND WE ARE READY TO NEGOTIATE FOR PEACE AS SOON AS THE AGGRESSION STOPS.

9. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER CLEARLY INDICATED THAT THE POPE'S PURSUIT OF PEACE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE WELCOME. TO ASSURE THERE WOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING AS TO OUR POSITION, AND IN VIEW OF THE FACT THE POPE HAD REFERRED WITH INTEREST TO A NUMBER OF AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S SPEECHES, AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG LEFT WITH HIM A COPY OF HIS CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY SPEECH INDICATING IN PARTICULAR THAT OUR POSITION WAS STATED SUCCINCTLY IN TWO POINTS: (A) THAT WE WISH THE WAR TO STOP (ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY); AND (B) THAT WE STRONGLY FAVOR THE RECONVENING OF A GENEVA CONFERENCE TO REAFFIRM AND REVITALIZE THE GENEVA ACCORDS AS A BASIS FOR PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG ALSO AGAIN STRESSED OUR LIMITED OBJECTIVES AND THE POPE PARTICULARLY READ WITH GREAT CARE THE PARAGRAPH IN OUR LETTER OF JUNE 30 TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH DESCRIBES SUCCINCTLY OUR LIMITED OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM AND WHICH IN ESSENCE QUOTES SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S STATEMENT AT HIS RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE.

10. THE POPE SAID HE WOULD COMMUNICATE THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS TO THE SOVIETS AND REITERATED ONCE AGAIN HIS VIEW THAT ONE SIDE WANTS PEACE, THE OTHER SIDE DOES NOT, AND YET IT CLAIMS TO BE THE VICTIM OF AGGRESSION.

11. THE POPE SAID THE KEY IS CHINA AND ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY WAY TO GET AT THE CHINESE LEADERS. THE HOLY SEE HAD MADE ATTEMPT AFTER ATTEMPT AND EVERY DOOR HAD BEEN CLOSED, AND IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH PEKING. PEKING EVEN REFUSED TO SEND A BISHOP TO THE MEETINGS OF THE ECUMENICAL COUNCIL. THE HOLY SEE HAD ALSO SOUGHT TO MAKE CONTACT THROUGH ITS REPRESENTATIVES IN CAIRO AND PARIS WITHOUT SUCCESS. THE POPE SAID IF CHINA EVER DECIDES TO ENTER THE PEACEFUL COMMUNITY, THE PROBLEM WOULD SOLVE ITSELF. HE URGED US TO USE OUR CONTACT WITH THEM IN WARSAW WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY. THE CHURCH IS PREPARED TO HELP IN WARSAW IN ANY WAY IT CAN. AT THE SAME TIME, HE REITERATED SOFTLY BUT CLEARLY THAT, AS HE HAD INDICATED IN HIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPEECH, HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE CHINA IN THE UN.

12. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG SAID WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO BRING AN END TO THE WAR, BUT THEY HAVE FAILED TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE BECAUSE COMMUNIST CHINA WOULD ACCUSE THEM OF SELLING OUT. WE BELIEVE THAT IF THE SOVIET UNION THREW ITS WEIGHT ON BEHALF OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, IT WOULD STRENGTHEN RATHER THAN WEAKEN ITS POSITION IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG STRESSED THAT IN ANY GENEVA CONFERENCE THE CHICOMS WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE AN IMPORTANT PARTICIPANT.

13. AS THE DISCUSSION CLOSED THE POPE THANKED AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG WARMLY FOR GIVING EXPRESSION TO THE NOBLE THOUGHTS OF THE U.S. AT THE SAME TIME HE SAID HE RECOMMENDED TO US TO TRY TO AVOID USELESS DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY AND LIFE. HE SAID HE WAS STRENGTHENED AND ENCOURAGED BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S VISIT. IN CLOSING AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO MENTION THE PLIGHT OF THE REFUGEES IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND OUR DESIRE THAT THE CHURCH DO EVERYTHING THAT IT CAN TO HELP ALLEVIATE THE PLIGHT OF THESE PEOPLE.

14. THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSION THE POPE EXPRESSED BOTH SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POLICY AND HIS FIRM RESOLVE TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. MONS MARCINKUS, AMERICAN PRIEST FROM CHICAGO ON THE PAPAL STAFF, INTERPRETED THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION. HE LATER STRESSED THAT WHEN THE POPE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE CHICOMS IN UN HE MEANT IT IN CONTEXT OF PAPAL GA SPEECH; I.E., WHEN CHICOMS MERIT SUCH MEMBERSHIP.

DTG: 090010Z JULY 1966

M

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~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

1966 JUL 9 19 32

EEB173
OO VTE16
DE VTE 1177

FROM: W.V. ROSTOV
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66505

~~SECRET~~

JULY 9, 1966

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: W. V. ROSTOV

HERE IS STATE DEPARTMENT TABULATION OF FREE WORLD OFFICIAL
REACTION TO HANOI/HAIPHONG POL BOMBING. OF 61 REPORTING,
ONLY 15 DISAPPROVE, INCLUDING THE SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS
CASES OF BRITAIN AND INDIA. NOT BAD.

FULL
APPROVAL

QUALIFIED SUPPORT
("UNDERSTANDING")

(15)

(12)

AUSTRALIA
NEW ZEALAND
S. KOREA
PHILIPPINES
R. OF CHINA
THAILAND
LAOS
S. VIETNAM
INDONESIA
(MALIK)
W. GERMANY
LIBERIA
S. AFRICA
MALAGASY
EL SALVADOR
COSTA RICA

JAPAN
MALAYSIA
BELGIUM
ITALY
NETHERLANDS
PORTUGAL
LEBANON
YEMEN
UGANDA
BRAZIL
CANADA
PERU

1966 JUL 9 PM 3:36
SATURDAY

DISAPPROVAL**(15)****BURMA****UK****DENMARK****SWEDEN****FRANCE****FINLAND****INDIA****AFGHANISTAN****CEYLON****NEPAL****SYRIA****ALGERIA****MALI****GHANA****UAR****NON-COMMITTAL****(19)****SINGAPORE****NORWAY****PAKISTAN****IRAN****ISRAEL****BOLIVIA****CHILE****DOMINICAN REP.****EQUADOR****GUATEMALA****HAITI****JAMAICA****MEXICO****NICARAGUA****PARAGUAY****TRINIDAD****URUGUAY****VENEZUELA****AUSTRIA****TOTAL: 61**

NOT INCLUDED IN THE 61 REACTIONS ABOVE ARE THE UN (U THANT) AND THE VATICAN, WHO EXPRESSED "REGRET AND ANXIETY."

THE PATTERN IS ABOUT WHAT WE SHOULD HAVE EXPECTED. WE GOT STRONGEST SUPPORT FROM OUR FAR EASTERN ALLIES, BUT RATHER LITTLE FROM EUROPE. THE NEUTRALS, NON-ALIGNED, AND "SOCIALIST" STATES CONDEMNED, WHILE THERE WAS LITTLE REACTION FROM AFRICA. THE LATIN AMERICANS BY AND LARGE "ABSTAINED."

DTG : 091856 JUL 1966

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SENT
WHCA

1966 JUL 9 15 09

1966 JUL 9 AM 11:14

SATURDAY

EB
EEB169
OO VTE10
DE VTE 1168

FROM: V. V. ROSTOV
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66500

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-193
By lip NARA, Date 3-14-89

~~SECRET~~

JULY 9, 1966

FROM: V. V. ROSTOV
TO: THE PRESIDENT

AMBASSADOR LODGE REPORTS HE CARRIED OUT YOUR SUGGESTION AND IS HOPEFUL THAT THE MURPHY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE WILL RETURN TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN TELLING THE STORY OF OUR ACTIONS IN VIETNAM.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE

JULY 09

1. THE MURPHY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE LEFT FOR WASHINGTON THIS AFTERNOON. I SPENT LAST NIGHT WITH THEM, AND, LUCKILY, THERE WERE A NUMBER WHO ASKED ME WHAT THEY COULD DO TO HELP. I SAID THAT THEY WERE IN A TREMENDOUSLY IMPORTANT POSITION TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE WHEN THEY GOT BACK TO WASHINGTON IN TELLING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE STORY OF ALL THAT WE ARE DOING HERE.
2. CONGRESSMAN MURPHY SAYS THEY EXPECT TO GET TWO HOURS IN THE HOUSE ON TUESDAY AFTERNOON, JULY 12, WHEN A NUMBER OF THEM EXPECT TO DO JUST EXACTLY THIS. HE SAID THAT EVERYBODY, REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC, SEEMED WELL IMPRESSED, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF CONGRESSMAN KEITH OF MASSACHUSETTS.
3. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THEM MAKE A SPEECH NOT ONLY ON THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE BUT ALSO TAKE SOME WELL PUBLICIZED SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS BACK IN THEIR OWN STATES. THERE HAS BEEN A HAPPY COMBINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN THAT THESE CONGRESSMEN ARE ALL VETERANS; THEY LIKED WHAT THEY SAW, THEY CAME AT A GOOD TIME; AND THEY HAVE THE CAPACITY TO COMMUNICATE TO OTHERS.

DTG 09/1438Z JULY 1966

~~SECRET~~

76a

~~SECRET~~

July 9, 1966

FROM: W. W. Rostow

TO: The President

Take

Ambassador Lodge reports he carried out your suggestion and is hopeful that the Murphy Congressional Committee will return to ~~being~~ an active role in telling the story of our actions in Vietnam.

(Relay attached).

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-437
By 10, NARA, Date 12-2-92

Friday, July 8, 1966 -- 7:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Robert Kleiman, Editorial Board, New York Times, came in to discuss de Gaulle's round-the-world trip and whether he would see the President. I said we had no official word of General de Gaulle's movements and no approach suggesting a meeting of the two heads of state.

Jess Cook, TIME, and James Mahan, TIME photographer. Jess Cook came in in connection with a TIME story apparently being written about me. His questions:

-- Why did President Johnson choose me for this job?

I said I didn't know; but I enjoy the job greatly, explaining that the combination of seeing it through in Viet Nam while attempting to maintain momentum in a great many creative initiatives sponsored by the President in every corner of the world -- at a time of both danger and opportunity -- was a policy I greatly respected and to which I hoped to contribute.

-- He said various people thought I was "over optimistic."

Was I?

I said I was, indeed, a temperate optimist; but I had found that this was a realistic position for an American at this stage of history, on the basis of the 25 years I had been in and out of government since the summer of 1941. I cited a number of occasions since that time when the intelligent and sophisticated pessimist turned out to be less realistic than the temperate optimist. For example, about the battle for the Atlantic, 1941-43; the possibility of winning daylight air supremacy over Germany, 1943-44; the possibility of a revival of Western Europe, 1946-50; the possibility of economic growth and political constitutionalism in Korea, 1961-63; the long-term prospects for the Alliance for Progress.

I took it that Cook was generally postured to write a critical, rather than a helpful, article from his tone.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Friday, July 8, 1966 -- 7:00pm

Mr. President:

You may be interested in this memorandum of conversation with Dobrynin. The most interesting point is his advice that we cut out intermediaries and talk directly with Hanoi.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

78a
July 8, 1966

Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin at Lunch,
Friday, July 8, 1966, 1:15 p.m.

1. Viet Nam

Ambassador Dobrynin asked if we really thought that bombing the oil targets would hasten negotiations. I said that on balance I thought they would; but in any case, we owed it to our forces to cut down their capacity to bring in supplies. He said that you could not have negotiations with bombing. I said then the key question became what they were prepared to do if we stopped bombing the North. He asked in this connection whether there was anything in the report from London that we had offered the Chinese Communists a "token withdrawal" of U. S. forces. I said I knew of no such offer.

After this familiar fencing, he turned to his real point, which was: Why do you use intermediaries? Why don't you talk directly with Hanoi and the NLF? With respect to the latter I called his attention to the passage in the Vietnamese Declaration at Honolulu which called on the Viet Cong to stop fighting and make a modern democratic nation. He said that Moscow had the impression the views of Hanoi and the NLF were not always identical.

2. Non-Proliferation Agreement

He asked what substance there was in the President's comments on new language in the non-proliferation agreement. In particular he wished to know if we were prepared to sign a treaty which would prevent a collective force. I said that I knew of no such change in our position. He said there would, then, not be a non-proliferation agreement. We then went over old ground on why we wanted to keep open the collective option. He agreed there was a sharp distinction between a lack of immediate pressure for a collective hardware solution and for closing out that option by treaty.

3. Cambodia

I asked why the Soviet Union opposed a positive response to Sihanouk on strengthening the ICC for Cambodia. Like a good debater, he began by recalling that it was not very long ago that the Soviet Union was supporting a Cambodia conference and we were out to lunch. Under further prodding he said that there are two reasons he knew for the Soviet position:

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-437

By id, NARA, Date 12-2-92

July 8, 1966

-- the Chinese Communists were opposed;

-- the Viet Nam war was "in a different stage" than when the Soviet Union proposed a Cambodian conference.

He also added that sometimes Sihanouk told us one thing and the Soviet Union another. He would have to get back to Moscow before he could see the full file on Cambodia. In March, when he was last in Moscow and studied the Cambodia file, he found them unwilling to talk to Americans. He said that perhaps things had changed.

4. Bilateral Relations

He said that he understood very well where the consular agreement, the air agreement, and East/West trade were. He asked if there were any proposals that I had for improving bilateral U. S. /Soviet relations. I said their greatest contribution could be to meet their commitments as Co-Chairmen under the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords and get the Viet Nam war settled. I pressed him hard on Soviet responsibility for the Laos corridor. He responded that this was a very difficult problem for Moscow and their influence was limited.

W. W. Rostow

202 7/5/66 79
Is the rest area possible
to R. ... - if there is
a junction

Limited Official Use

Friday, July 8, 1966 - 7:00pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Gemini 9 Photo of Peru

Photographs taken by Gemini 9 revealed a mountain lake in a remote area of Peru not shown on maps.

Fearing that the lake might be formed by a dam of debris from an avalanche which might break and endanger towns further down the valley, we made the photos available to the Peruvian Government. Their check reveals that the lake is an old, well established one which does not figure on most existing maps. It represents no danger to the population.

The Peruvians are providing information to correct map deficiencies. President Belaunde has expressed great appreciation for this further evidence of U.S. - Peruvian cooperation.

The exercise shows how our space program can help our relations with other countries.

W. W. Rostow

Limited Official Use

Pre file

Friday, July 8, 1966 -- 3:05 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith a proper caution of General Taylor's about the conditions under which we agreed to suspend the bombing of North Viet Nam. I don't believe the passage he quotes was, in fact, dangerous to our interests. On the other hand, he is absolutely right that, as we come closer to negotiation, we treat this matter with the greatest care and precision.

I shall be watching the issue closely should it arise.

W. W. Rostow

General Taylor's memorandum June 13, 1966 to the President
"Conditions for the Suspension of Air Attacks on North Viet-Nam"

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-193
By 40 NARA, Date 3-14-89

~~SECRET~~

June 13, 1966

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-193

By if NARA, Date 3-14-89~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Conditions for the Suspension of Air Attacks on North Viet-Nam

Shortly before Ambassador Lodge's visit, I prepared for you the attached memorandum which discusses the need to determine the best way to play our negotiation blue chips once we get to a conference table on the subject of South Viet-Nam.

My memorandum includes the point that the big chip represented by a suspension or cessation of our bombing should be played very carefully and preferably for a cessation of Viet Cong incidents and military operations since these activities are visible and subject to verification. To swap bombing for the promise of a cessation of infiltration seemed risky because of the difficulty of verifying compliance.

To my knowledge, there has been no subsequent discussion of the blue chips issue but I note that a position has apparently been taken on our bombing which deserves comment. I find in Deptel 1231 to Tehran (repeated Bucharest, Belgrade, Saigon, Moscow, Warsaw and Hong Kong) the following language:

"Specifically, we are willing to suspend or even cease our air attacks on North Viet-Nam if Hanoi gives clear evidence that it is prepared to take reciprocal action, for example with respect to its infiltration of military personnel and equipment into South Viet-Nam and its military activity and terrorism in South Viet-Nam. Such evidence and suspension of the bombing could be determined by mutually acceptable observers."

While a tougher position may be intended, this language can be read as offering to trade a suspension or a cessation of bombing merely for evidence of readiness on the part of Hanoi to take certain reciprocal actions. Even though the likelihood of its acceptance is very low, this seems to me to be ambiguous language in which to couch our proposition.

This incident reemphasizes the need for a clear understanding of how we will play our blue chips before one slips inadvertently through our fingers.

Attachment

Maxwell D. Taylor

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 28, 1966

To Secretary Rusk

Mr. Secretary:

As you see, the President wishes the Department to consider the issue taken up in General Taylor's paper and the further question of a public statement.

One critical specific question raised by General Taylor is this: do you trade a cessation of bombing in the north for a cessation of infiltration or for an end to terrorism in the south. It hinges substantially on whether a cessation of infiltration could be monitored.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ Attachments

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ

87-193

By

ig

NARA, Date 3-14-89

~~SECRET~~

Rec'd
4-27-66
5:40p

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80c

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wed., April 27, 1966

MR. PRESIDENT:

I urged General Taylor to put his interesting assessment of the blue chips on paper.

There has been considerable work on this in the State Department; but I agree we should get greater clarity when Lodge is home.

May I pass this paper to Bill Bundy and urge they be prepared to present their views during Lodge discussions?

Pass to W. Bundy ☒

Hold ☐

See me ☐

~~SECRET~~ attachment

Send also to Sec. Rusk

I think we should have public statement if all agree —

L

April 27, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Assessment and Use of Negotiation Blue Chips

While favoring all efforts to open discussions on Viet-Nam with the Communist leadership, I have always been afraid of certain pitfalls which will beset the path of negotiations. For example, there is the danger that, from all the public discussion of our desire for negotiations, our people will assume that the initiation of negotiations is the advent of peace and will expect a cessation of all hostilities as soon as talks begin. You will remember that, during the long negotiations at Panmunjom, we remained on a passive defensive to avoid casualties with peace just around the corner, while the enemy attacked us at will and probably inflicted more U.S. and allied casualties than would have been lost had we retained the military initiative.

One of the reasons that the Panmunjom negotiations dragged was that our adversary had no incentive to come to a prompt settlement. If we are to avoid this pitfall under present conditions, it will be essential to bring the Communists to the peace table this time convinced of the need for a prompt, negotiated settlement and, furthermore, to keep the military pressure on them until a settlement is reached.

Another pitfall is one which is always an imminent danger. Any day, Hanoi may indicate a willingness to negotiate provided we stop permanently our bombing attacks against the north. In this case, our Government would be under great pressure at home and abroad to accept this precondition whereas to do so would seriously prejudice the success of subsequent negotiations.

A somewhat similar pitfall is the appealing quality of a "cease-fire" to all peace-lovers and the attraction of a slogan such as: "Stop shooting and start talking." Some of our best friends indulge in this kind of language and need to be put straight as to the significance of a cease-fire in a situation of guerrilla war such as we have in South Viet-Nam.

Obviously under such conditions, a cease-fire can not mean literally a cessation of the use of fire-arms by both sides. The principal activities of the Viet Cong--sabotage, terrorism, propaganda, impressment of recruits, collection of taxes, infiltration from the north, etc.--do not depend on the use of fire-arms and could go on to the great advantage of the guerrillas if the government forces were deprived of the use of their weapons. While

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-193
By lig NARA, Date 3-14-89

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-2-

it might be possible to agree to a cessation of military activities by formed bodies of Viet Cong and by government units, we can never accept an unqualified cease-fire which would prevent the use of weapons by the forces of law and order and allow Viet Cong depredations to go unchecked and unpunished.

To avoid such pitfalls, we need to consider what we will want from the Communist side and what they will want from us in the course of negotiating a cease-fire or a final settlement. What are our negotiating assets, what is their value, and how should they be employed? As I see them, the following are the blue chips in our pile representing what Hanoi would or could like from us and what we might consider giving under certain conditions:

- a. Cessation of bombing in North Viet-Nam.
- b. Cessation of military operations against Viet Cong units.
- c. Cessation of increase of U.S. forces in South Viet-Nam.
- d. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet-Nam.
- e. Amnesty and civic rights for Viet Cong.
- f. Economic aid to North Viet-Nam.

The Viet Cong/Hanoi have a similar stack of chips representing actions we would like from them.

- a. Cessation of Viet Cong incidents in South Viet-Nam.
- b. Cessation of guerrilla military operations.
- c. Cessation of further infiltration of men and supplies from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam.
- d. Withdrawal of infiltrated North Vietnamese Army units and cadres.
- e. Dissolution or repatriation of Viet Cong.

~~SECRET~~

If these are the chips, how should we play ours to get theirs at minimum cost? Our big chips are a and d, the cessation of bombing and the withdrawal of U.S. forces; their big ones are c and e, the stopping of infiltration and dissolution of the Viet Cong. We might consider trading even, our a and d for their c and e except for the fact that all will require a certain amount of verification and inspection except our bombing which is an overt, visible fact. Even if Hanoi would accept inspection, infiltration is so elusive that I would doubt the feasibility of an effective detection system. Troop withdrawals, on the other hand, are comparatively easy to check. Hence, I would be inclined to accept as an absolute minimum a cessation of Viet Cong incidents and military operations (Hanoi a and b) which are readily verifiable in exchange for the stopping of our bombing and of offensive military operations against Viet Cong units (our a and b). If Viet Cong performance under the agreement were less than perfect, we can resume our activities on a scale related to the volume of enemy action. This is not a particularly good deal since we give up one of our big chips, bombing, and get neither of Hanoi's two big ones. However, it would achieve a cease-fire under conditions which are subject to verification and, on the whole, acceptable. We would not have surrendered the right to use our weapons in protection of the civil population outside of Viet Cong-controlled territory.

After a cease-fire on the foregoing basis, we should seek the necessary additional agreements for a final settlement, undertaking to stop increasing U.S. forces (our c) for a cessation of infiltration (Hanoi c) and, thereafter, to withdraw our forces (our d) in phase with a similar, inspected withdrawal of infiltrated North Vietnamese Army units and cadres (Hanoi d). The final step (and perhaps the most important) would be to obtain the dissolution or repatriation of the remaining Viet Cong (Hanoi e) in exchange for some combination of our e (amnesty and civic rights for the Viet Cong) and f (economic aid to North Viet-Nam). The latter is an overall "sweetener" which can be used to facilitate any step in the negotiations.

Such a tabulation of negotiating blue chips and their purchasing power emphasizes the folly of giving up any one in advance as a pre-condition for negotiations. Thus, if we gave up bombing in order to start discussions, we would not have the coins necessary to pay for all the concessions required for a satisfactory terminal settlement. My estimate of assets and values may be challenged, but I feel that it is important for us to go through some such exercise and make up our collective minds as to the value of our holdings and how to play them. We need such an analysis to guide our own thoughts and actions and possibly for communication to some of the third parties who, from time to time, try to get

~~SECRET~~

-4-

negotiations started. Some day we may be embarrassed if some country like India should express the view to Hanoi that the Americans would probably stop their bombing to get discussions started and then have Hanoi pick up the proposal as a formal offer. To prepare our own people as well as to guide our friends, we need to make public explanation of some of the points discussed above. Particularly, we need to make clear that, to the Communists, the negotiating table is simply an extension of the battlefield and the start of negotiations does not mean by any means that peace is at hand.

I would suggest that a discussion of the foregoing matters be put on the agenda of the meetings with Cabot Lodge when he returns next month.

Maxwell D. Taylor

~~SECRET~~

Pres. file

~~SECRET~~~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

July 8, 1966

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE****SUBJECT: Program of Cooperation to Replace HONEST JOHN
with LANCE in non-U.S. NATO Forces**

The above program of cooperation referred to in your memorandum for the President of June 9, 1966, has been reviewed in light of the standards and requirements of NSAM 197, and on the basis of the justifications stated in your memorandum.

It has been noted that this program has been concurred in by the Department of State and Atomic Energy Commission with the explicit understanding that this program of cooperation does not imply any commitment on the part of the U. S. for dispersal of nuclear warheads to NATO Europe in excess of the FY 1966 year-end dispersal authorization as approved by NSAM 334. It is further understood that as it appears necessary during planning or implementation of this program to depart significantly from the standing operating procedures now applicable to HONEST JOHN, or to modify standards of safety, security, custody and control now in force with respect to nuclear weapons in support of non-U.S. forces, this will be brought to the attention of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission and will be submitted for Presidential review as appropriate.

This is to record approval "in principle" of the proposed program.

(signed) W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-341

By SJ, NARA, Date 8-15-02

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-192

By 28, NARA, Date 3-18-88

~~SECRET~~~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

July 5, 1966 - 7:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

National Security Action Memorandum No. 197, dated October 23, 1962, requires the Department of Defense to secure Presidential approval before talks can be initiated with our allies relating to the possible provision to them of a new nuclear weapons system. This was intended to prevent misunderstandings from arising concerning the extent of any U. S. commitments for the supply of such systems.

The Department of Defense, with the support of the Atomic Energy Commission and Department of State, has recommended that you approve the proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss with our NATO allies the eventual replacement of all HONEST JOHN units with LANCE. This is directed toward Germany, but it will affect the other allies as well. SACEUR would work out a program for the orderly and spaced replacement of the HONEST JOHN units.

As you know, LANCE is a second generation, dual-capable weapon delivery system possessing greater range, mobility, dependability, accuracy, ease of handling and air transportability than HONEST JOHN. We will equip our own troops with LANCE and SACEUR wants all NATO forces ultimately to be equipped with this up-to-date weapon.

I recommend your approval of this proposed program of cooperation because it will have marked advantages for us. If you approve the Defense recommendation, I will sign the attached memorandum recording approval "in principle" of the program.

Walt
W. W. Rostow☐ Approved☐ Disapproved☐ See me

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-341
By SJ NARA, Date 8/5/02

~~SECRET-FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~



~~SECRET~~

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

1807
816

9 JUN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Program of Cooperation to Replace HONEST JOHN with
LANCE in non-U.S. NATO Forces

The U.S. plans to modernize its artillery forces by replacing part of the HONEST JOHN rocket system with the LANCE missile system. The same reasons which support modernization of U.S. forces will support modernization of non-U.S. NATO forces. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have endorsed the concept of replacing the HONEST JOHN with LANCE throughout NATO. Additionally, concurrent modernization of non-U.S. forces will achieve the following benefits:

- a. Demonstrate continued support of the Alliance
- b. Standardize delivery systems within the Alliance
- c. Simplify logistic support

The Minister of Defense, Germany, in particular, has expressed interest in obtaining information on LANCE in connection with planning for replacement of HONEST JOHN which is becoming obsolescent. Discussions with Chief, MAAG, Bonn, indicate that German interest in LANCE will continue if information can be released soon that will permit adequate study and provide sufficient support for appropriation requests. It is anticipated that other NATO Allies will express similar interest in a program to replace HONEST JOHN with LANCE.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate that a proposed program of cooperation cannot be developed in detail prior to December 1966. However, the purpose of this program is to provide a unit-for-unit, launcher-for-launcher replacement for HONEST JOHN with the possibility of a lesser replacement factor because of the longer range of LANCE. Also, the number of LANCE nuclear warheads dispersed to NATO Europe to support this program would be equal to or less than the number of HONEST JOHN warheads now authorized for dispersal to NATO Europe under NSAM 334. Therefore, since

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Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

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DOES NOT APPLY

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-340

By CB, NARA Date 9-27-99

~~SECRET~~

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no essentially new capability is at issue, and in view of the urgency expressed by Chief, MAAG, Bonn, the Joint Chiefs have recommended that data now available be used to support a request for Presidential approval in principle.

The program of cooperation outlined in the attachment is based upon details of the U. S. Army LANCE Program. It has been assumed that only those non-U. S. NATO countries which now have an HONEST JOHN nuclear capability will accept a LANCE nuclear program of cooperation. Also, since this program would involve direct replacement of HONEST JOHN with LANCE, current NATO standing operating procedures concerned with safety, security, custody and control for LANCE will be essentially the same as those now in effect for HONEST JOHN, with standards no less strict than those currently applied to nuclear weapons in support of non-U. S. NATO forces.

Approval of the program would permit a direct response to specific questions raised by MOD Germany and to similar queries anticipated from other Allies. It would also allow SACEUR to work out the details of a NATO program for the orderly replacement of HONEST JOHN. Accordingly, I recommend that you approve in principle the program of cooperation described in the attachment for the replacement of HONEST JOHN with LANCE in non-U. S. NATO forces, with the understanding that no increase in U. S. personnel will be required for its implementation.

The Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission concur in the proposed program with the explicit understanding that it does not imply a commitment on the part of the United States for dispersal of nuclear warheads to NATO Europe in excess of the end FY 1966 dispersal authorization approved by NSAM 334. Further, if it appears necessary during planning or implementation of this program to depart significantly from the standing operating procedures now applicable to HONEST JOHN, or to modify standards of safety, security, custody and control now in force with respect to nuclear weapons in support of non-U. S. forces, this will be brought to the attention of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission and will be submitted for Presidential review as appropriate.

Cyrus Vance

~~SECRET~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

Attachment

Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination
Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-340
By CB, NARA Date 9-27-99

8/c

PROGRAM OF COOPERATION TO PROVIDE FOR MODERNIZATION
OF NON-US NATO GROUND DELIVERY FORCES BY REPLACING
HONEST JOHN WITH LANCE

PROGRAM OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this program is to provide for the replacement of HONEST JOHN with LANCE missiles in non-U.S. NATO artillery forces. LANCE will fulfill a requirement for an all-weather, dual-capable delivery system under the direct control of the local ground commander and will surpass HONEST JOHN in accuracy, range, mobility, air transportability, and ease of handling.

RELATIONSHIP TO CURRENT PLANS

1.5(d)
3.4(b)(6)

LANCE is currently in the engineering development phase. The U.S. plans for an initial procurement of six battalions and 2,000 missiles, beginning in FY 1967. Presidential approval in principle would allow USCINCEUR to discuss LANCE with our NATO Allies and to plan the details of a modernization program involving the replacement of HONEST JOHN. In implementing that portion of the program now identified with [REDACTED] due consideration would have to be given, of course, to [REDACTED] attitude toward NATO and her relationship to the remainder of the Alliance.

FORCE GOALS AND WEAPONS DISPERSALS

A reasonable upper limit to the change in force goals would be based on the replacement of HONEST JOHN units by LANCE on a one-for-one basis. Because of the greater range of LANCE, some lesser replacement factor may result, perhaps 0.6 to 0.8. The decision which will be made on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a program of cooperation with the 155mm Howitzer (nuclear round) may influence recommendations regarding force goals for LANCE.

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Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

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TIME REQUIRED TO ATTAIN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

U.S. units may attain an operational capability by FY 1968 and, since LANCE is a replacement system, a non-U.S. capability might be attainable three to four years after Presidential approval in principle is received.

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

Replacement of the HONEST JOHN with LANCE is to be accomplished without increase in personnel requirements.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Normally, operational control of U.S. custodial detachments will pass to NATO command when an Order for Reinforced Alert (ORA) is given. Operational control by a NATO commander has no effect on custody of U.S. nuclear weapons and provides no authority for weapon employment. USCINCEUR will retain control of the nuclear weapons through U.S. custodial detachments until proper authority directs release of the weapons to NATO.

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Section 141b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

Roscoe

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OO WTE10
DE WTE 1160

1966 JUL 8 23 45

FROM: BATOR
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: WH60320

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM BATOR
TO THE PRESIDENT

THE FOLLOWING, FOR YOUR APPROVAL, IS A DRAFT REPLY
TO GERMAN PRESIDENT LUEBKE'S VERY NICE JULY 4 MESSAGE -- YOU
WILL RECALL LUEBKE'S STRONG EXPRESSION OF SOLIDARITY ON
VIETNAM.

QUOTE

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

MY HEARTFELT THANKS FOR YOUR INDEPENDENCE DAY MESSAGE.
I WAS DEEPLY TOUCHED BY YOUR EXPRESSION OF GOOD WILL AND
FRIENDSHIP. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL LONG REMEMBER YOUR
COUNTRY'S SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF FREEDOM
IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND YOUR CONTINUING ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM. I JOIN YOU IN THE
HOPE THAT WE SHALL SOON BE ABLE TO TURN OUR STRENGTH
AND TREASURE ENTIRELY TO THE WORKS OF PEACE. WITH WARM
PERSONAL REGARDS, AND VERY BEST WISHES TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

UNQUOTE

7/9/66
President approved with
addition of phrase "my
daughter has reported how
graciously your people have
received her."

DTG: 082332Z JULY 1966

GPS 210

Rostow
83

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1966 JUL 7 22 22

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-198
By mg, NARA, Date 1-20-89

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DE WTE 1139

FROM BILL MOYERS
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP66483

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JULY 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM BILL MOYERS

PUERTO RICO CELEBRATES ITS COMMONWEALTH DAY ON JULY 25.
THIS IS ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT OCCASIONS FOR THE
PEOPLE OF PUERTO RICO. THERE ARE TREMENDOUS CROWDS,
COLORFUL FIESTA EVENTS AND NUMEROUS INSPIRATIONAL SPEECHES
IN THE CENTRAL PLAZAS.

LAST YEAR SECRETARY UDALL MADE A MEMORABLE ADDRESS THERE
ON THE COMMONWEALTH IDEA. HE WAS WELL RECEIVED IN EVERY
WAY.

HARRY MCPHERSON AND I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT YOU GO TO
SAN JUAN FOR AN APPEARANCE AND SPEECH. WE SEE THE FOLLOWING
ADVANTAGES IN THE TRIP:

1. IT WOULD BE AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR YOU TO MAKE A
MAJOR LATIN AMERICAN ADDRESS.
2. PUERTO RICO IS NEAR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. THIS WOULD
BE A VERY GOOD MEANS OF CONGRATULATING THE NEW GOVERNMENT.
3. YOU'RE VERY POPULAR AMONG THE PUERTO RICAN PEOPLE.
4. THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ADVANTAGES TO THE TRIP -
IN NEW YORK AND OTHER U.S. CENTERS OF PUERTO RICAN POPULATION.
5. THE PUERTO RICAN LEGISLATURE VOTED 88-1 IN FAVOR OF
OUR VIETNAM POLICIES.
6. THE ROWE COMMISSION STUDY WILL BE FORTHCOMING SOON.
THE PRESIDENT COULD SPEAK OF THE COMMONWEALTH APPROACH
WHICH IS SURE TO BE SUPPORTED BY A MAJORITY OF THE COMMISSION.
7. THIS TRIP WOULD RECEIVE ENORMOUS PUBLIC VISIBILITY.

APPROVE -----

DISAPPROVE -----

BILL MOYERS

DTG: 072156Z JULY 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By W, NARA, Date 5-27-98

Rostow 84

SENT
4:33 P.M.

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OO WTE10
DE WTE 1133

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WHCA

FROM: BROMLEY SMITH
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66480

1966 JUL 7 20 33

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: GOLDBERG'S REQUEST FOR LETTER TO THE POPE

AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG HAS ASKED FOR A LETTER FROM YOU TO THE POPE WHICH HE COULD DELIVER TOMORROW WHEN HE CALLS ON THE POPE TO DISCUSS OUR RECENT ACTIONS IN VIETNAM. HE INTENDS TO SAY PUBLICLY THAT HE IS NOT ENGAGED IN A NEW PEACE EFFORT, BUT HIS PURPOSE IN SEEING THE POPE IS TO TELL HIM ABOUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM.

GEORGE BALL POINTS OUT THAT YOU HAVE NOT TRANSMITTED LETTERS TO THE POPE ON THE OCCASION OF AMBASSADOR LODGE'S VISITS, AND IN PRINCIPLE IT MAY BE BETTER TO RESERVE LETTERS FOR OCCASIONS WHEN YOU HAVE A SUBSTITUTE MESSAGE THAT YOU WISH TO CONVEY.

HE HAS, HOWEVER, SUBMITTED THE FOLLOWING DRAFT MESSAGE IF YOU FEEL IT IS DESIREABLE TO SEND ONE.

IF YOU PREFER NOT TO SEND A FORMAL COMMUNICATION, WE COULD ASK AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG TO TRANSMIT AN ORAL MESSAGE TO THE POPE ALONG THE LINES OF THE DRAFT.

SEND PROPOSED DRAFT TO GOLDBERG FOR DELIVERY AS A LETTER-----

SEND DRAFT FOR USE BY GOLDBERG IN MAKING ORAL MESSAGE-----

PREFER GOLDBERG NOT DELIVER PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM ME-----

BEGIN TEXT PROPOSED:

YOUR HOLINESS:

YOU HAVE, I KNOW, BEEN FOLLOWING WITH PRAYERFUL CONCERN THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN VIETNAM AND THE EFFORTS WE HAVE BEEN MAKING TO BRING TO AN END THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS THE TRAGIC HOSTILITIES THERE.

I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE HAVE EXPLORED EVERY AVENUE, RESPONDED TO EVERY OFFER, AND FOLLOWED EVERY LEAD THAT HELD OUT ANY HOPE THAT THIS TRAGIC CONFLICT MIGHT BE SETTLED AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE. OUR EFFORTS HAVE SO FAR BEEN IN VAIN.

THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE HAVE, INSTEAD, BEEN SUBJECTED TO INTENSIFIED INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH, AND I HAVE THEREFORE HAD TO MAKE PAINFUL DECISIONS TO COUNTER THIS BY INTENSIFIED AIR STRIKES. THE STEPS WE CHOSE WERE CAREFULLY LIMITED, AND I HAVE SEEN TO IT THAT EVERY PRECAUTION WAS TAKEN TO KEEP TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM THE DAMAGE TO CIVILLIANS AND TO NON-MILITARY PROPERTY. I WANT PERSONALLY TO ASSURE YOU THAT THESE STEPS WERE TAKEN ONLY AFTER THE MOST SEARCHING REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF ALL OF THE FACTORS INVOLVED AND ONLY AFTER DETERMINING THAT SUCH ACTION WAS REQUIRED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

YOU ARE FULLY AWARE OF MY DESIRE TO END THE CONFLICT IN VIETNAM AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. I CAN ONLY HOPE THAT THE LEADERS IN HANOI ARE BEGINNING TO REALIZE THAT THEIR AGGRESSION CANNOT SUCCEED.

AT THE SAME TIME, LET ME REAFFIRM THE DETERMINATION I EXPRESSED TO YOU IN MY LETTER OF DECEMBER 29 THAT I WILL NEVER CEASE MY EXERTIONS UNTIL AN HONORABLE PEACE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN THAT TROUBLED PART OF THE WORLD. I SHALL CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITHOUT CONDITIONS. AS AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG, WHO WILL DELIVER THIS LETTER TO YOU, TOLD THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ON JUNE 30, WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION EITHER THROUGH RECONVENING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OR IN SOME OTHER FORUM.

I DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR OWN EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE TO VIETNAM. WE SHARE THIS GOAL, WHICH MUST BE THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF ALL MEN OF GOOD WILL.

DTG : 071946Z JULY 1966

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT
6:21 P.M. 85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~(en route Los Angeles/Washington
7 July 1966)~~

To the President from Rostow

Reflections on Omaha and Los Angeles

What struck me about the Governors was their honest eagerness to hear the facts and to hear what we think and why.

It is clear that even these mature and able men have not gotten a clear picture of all the elements in our policy and how they fit together.

It is also clear, talking with people out here, that your Omaha speech was a personal breakthrough, against the background of your decision to go for POL.

I recommend, therefore, that we organize a campaign to drive home each of the themes of the Omaha speech:

-- We are fighting aggression; we are confident (not optimistic: we don't want to promise too much, too soon); we shall persist; we shall succeed.

-- We are proud of our skillful, brave, compassionate men fighting in Viet Nam; and we shall back them to the hilt.

-- There is a vital Free Asia emerging behind our defense of Viet Nam. (~~Several governors came up afterwards to tell me this was new, exciting, hopeful.~~)

-- There is a vital, modern South Viet Nam emerging. (The Honolulu program is slowly gaining credibility. We don't want to over-sell it; but I found by talking about how Korea emerged after 1961 I could make them see why it was possible.)

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-193

NARA, Date 3-14-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By rip

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7/7/66

-- Peace. Why we believe that there is a fair prospect of a relatively tranquil era ahead if we see it through in Viet Nam, but only trouble and more war if we bug out.

-- Food and Development. This is the real war for all to fight.

(At some stage you should consider a statement like that I got into President Eisenhower's April 1953 speech after Stalin's death: you are prepared to recommend to the Congress that we put a proportion of what we save in military expenditures, when the war in Viet Nam ends, into increased development assistance. This would put extra pressure from developing nations on Hanoi and Peiping).

These six Omaha themes must be repeated until every newspaper in the country knows them; every knowledgeable citizen; every commentator.

Repetition is the heart of both politics and teaching.

You should consider a series of talks in which you refer briefly to them all and then elaborate one of them at length.

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara should do the same.

And all our other foreign policy spokesmen should follow suit.

You may wish to send a memorandum to this effect to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

In short, I believe the POL bombing and Omaha have caught the nation's attention. Our people sense new determination; new ideas; new hope.

Now, in a quite systematic way, we must drive the lesson home.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7/8/66 - John Jacobson
telephoned Mr Rostow
OK

~~SECRET~~

July 7, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM W. W. ROSTOW

Mrs. Gandhi has come forward today with a proposal for a reconvened Geneva conference. This is incompletely reported on FBIS ticker 72. The British have welcomed it. The Indians in Delhi have urged us not to embrace it too promptly. It is clearly a negotiating document which leans excessively towards Hanoi and Moscow.

Specifically: (1) It calls for "an immediate end of the bombing in North Viet Nam" but this would be only "closely followed" by an end to infiltration and other hostile actions in the South. (2) It assumes a single neutral Viet Nam, without attention to the right of the people of South Viet Nam for self-determination. (3) It does not mention the Geneva Agreement of 1962.

George Ball is sending a message to Bruce for Michael Stewart and the Prime Minister telling them we regard Mrs. Gandhi's proposal as booby-trapped and not to be embraced without full discussion with us. We will be formulating carefully for your consideration a detailed reply to be communicated to the Indians through diplomatic channels, ^{perhaps} ~~perhaps~~ tomorrow.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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In the meanwhile, we ask your clearance for the following statement we might make at the press briefing tomorrow at the State Department in response to questions about our reaction to Mrs. Gandhi's proposal. It broadly welcomes the initiative but keeps our powder dry. (I must say our POL bombing is activating the doves nicely.)

Proposed statement: "The United States Government welcomes all initiatives that might lead to an honorable peace in Viet Nam. We have long supported the reconvening of the Geneva Conference to bring about a settlement on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. That settlement should assure to the people of South Viet Nam the right to determine their own future without outside interference. A cessation of hostilities in both North and South Viet Nam could be the first order of business of such a conference."

~~SECRET~~

Rostow
(60) 87

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1966 JUL 6 21 55

EEA927
00 WTE10
DE WTE 1113

FROM: BATOR
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66468

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOLLOWING UP ON YOUR JUNE 23 MEETING ON EUROPEAN POLICY WITH RUSK, ACHESON, ET AL, WE HAVE WORKED OUT A DRAFT NSAM DESIGNED TO STIMULATE STAFF WORK ON BRIDGE-BUILDING FOR SUBMISSION TO YOU. THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS AGREED WITH GEORGE BALL AND DEAN ACHESON. IT WOULD BE ADDRESSED TO FOWLER, MCNAMARA, KATZENBACH, FREEMAN, CONNOR, WIRTZ, GARDNER, HERTER, GAUD, SCHULTZE, ACKLEY, HORNIG, AND LINDER.

DRAFT NSAM: QUOTE THE PRESIDENT HAS INSTRUCTED THAT--IN CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES--WE ACTIVELY DEVELOP AREAS OF PEACEFUL COOPERATION WITH THE NATIONS OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION. HE HAS ASKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO EXAMINE AND PROPOSE TO HIM SPECIFIC ACTIONS THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT TAKE. THESE ACTIONS WILL BE DESIGNED TO HELP CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DIVISION OF GERMANY AND OF EUROPE WILL BECOME POSSIBLE.

IN ADDITION TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST EACH ACTION, THE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT SHOULD PROPOSE APPROPRIATE STEPS FOR IMPLEMENTATION, CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION, AND THE LIKE.

THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED THAT YOU GIVE YOUR STRONG PERSONAL SUPPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN CARRYING OUT THIS ASSIGNMENT. UNQUOTE

THIS WOULD PUT SOME LIFE IN THE EXERCISE, AND HELP BREAK DOWN BUREAUCRATIC RESISTANCE AT MIDDLE LEVELS. IT IS LIKELY, OF COURSE, THAT THE FACT OF SUCH AN INSTRUCTION WOULD LEAK. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD CAUSE ANY HARM. IN FACT, IT WOULD GIVE US PROTECTION AGAINST PEOPLE WHO SAY THAT WE ARE NOT SERIOUS ABOUT BRIDGE-BUILDING. IT MIGHT EVEN BECOME USEFUL, AT THE RIGHT TIME, AS A BASIS FOR SOME BACKGROUNDING.

IF YOU APPROVE, IT WILL BE SENT OUT OVER WALT'S SIGNATURE.

DTG: 062131Z JULY 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-196
By *mg* NARA, Date 7-17-89

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~LWA~~ 88
Sent to Ranch by
Louch - July 6
BKS

~~SECRET - VERY SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, July 6, 1966 at

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Balance of Payments

At Tab A is a complicated memorandum from the Secretary of the Treasury reporting on actions to limit the 1966 payments deficit. We have been unexpectedly successful in arranging for about \$1.5 billion of debt prepayments and long-term investment by foreign governments. About \$600 million of this took place during the first half of '66. \$900 million will be the gain during the 2nd half.

There are a number of points you should note:

1. The so-called "long-term investment" -- accounting for \$1.35 of the \$1.5 billion -- involves a switch by foreign central banks from holdings of liquid dollars to longer-term dollar securities. This is useful cosmetics; increases in foreign holdings of long-term securities do not count as part of our deficit. But it is a one-time gain. We cannot count on another \$1 plus billion next year.

2. I do not believe that the \$1.5 billion gain is likely to reduce our 1966 deficit, on a liquidity basis, much below \$1.5 - \$2 billion (the 1965 rate was \$1.3 billion; 1964 was \$2.8 billion). Dollar spending in Vietnam, and, more important, the deterioration in our trade account (due to the still rapid expansion in the economy), will more than offset the gain.

However, we will be able to give you a much clearer picture of the prospects when we get preliminary results for the second quarter in mid-July.

3. I do not believe -- and Fowler and your other economic advisers agree -- that the situation calls for further drastic action. (It would take drastic steps sharply to reduce the deficit.) A serious run on gold during the rest of this year is most unlikely. And even if it should happen -- after November -- we would come out of it in better shape than we are in now. The truth is, that the present rules of the international money game are stacked against us. If the Europeans force a crisis, our economic strength and real bargaining leverage would soon become very clear to all concerned.

4. The only pre-November danger is a run on sterling. With a strong UK reserve position, and the strike settled, I think it an even money bet that there will be no massive run during the summer. But it is certainly no better than an even bet. After a couple of good weeks, they are now beginning to lose money again.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-196

~~SECRET - VERY SENSITIVE~~

By mg NARA, Date 7-17-89

5. If they can hold out until the autumn, their tough tax increase -- which goes into effect in September -- will take some of the pressure off the economy, holding down imports and releasing resources for export. But meanwhile, they are having a terrible time holding down wage rates and prices. This is not surprising, with unemployment at less than 1.5%.

6. Wilson's calculation is that, as long as total demand keeps pulling on capacity, business investment will keep expanding. If they can get investment up from 18% of GNP to about 25%, they will be able to increase productivity (and potential output) much faster than during the past fifteen years. (They are working hard to get investment into industries with the greatest technological and export potential.)

7. The risk Wilson takes is that the pressure of demand on capacity -- which is needed to encourage the high rate of investment -- will cause prices to get even more out of line. If so, devaluation will become increasingly hard to avoid.

8. Some of your advisers would consider a British devaluation a near disaster. I, myself, am increasingly convinced that -- if it comes after November -- it might offer us a unique chance to force a change in the rules of the game on gold. But these are preliminary as well as heretical thoughts. In the meanwhile, Deming, Okun, Solomon and I are working to bring our contingency plans of last summer up to date. We will be in good shape to spell out for you the choices, well before any real trouble.



Francis M. Bator

88a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 6, 1966

FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH

Brom:

Attached is a copy of Tab A
to my memo to the President
on Balance of Payments, which
I brought over to you around noon
today.

Francis M. Bator



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

88b
JUN 30 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Action to cut balance of payments deficit in 1966

This memorandum summarizes actions taken since our May 11 decision to reduce our balance of payments deficit by

-- obtaining prepayment of official debt owed to the United States; and

-- persuading foreign officials to convert dollars held in liquid form into longer term investments here.

In my memorandum of May 10th, I estimated that debt prepayments and long-term investments might produce balance of payments savings of about \$500 million, or more than half the \$800 million savings resulting from measures unanimously recommended by the Cabinet Committee. (The other \$300 million was to come from reductions in the balance of payments costs of our military effort.) We expected to obtain these savings from mid-May through the end of the year. Long-term investments by the World Bank and Brazil and an advanced military payment by the Italians had already reduced our first quarter deficit by \$165 million. Further long-term investments by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank had the effect of reducing the deficit by approximately \$270 million in April and the first part of May.

We have moved vigorously on a number of fronts since our May 11 meeting:

-- Key Embassies were informed of possible approaches to central banks and were requested to give evaluations of potentials in their countries. The first result was a \$47 million long-term investment by Thailand.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 90-244

27-40, NARA, Date 7-28-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-- On his last two trips to Western Europe for meetings of the Deputies of the Group of Ten, Under Secretary Deming discussed debt prepayments with a number of countries. As a result, Italy has agreed to prepay \$123 million of Export-Import Bank loans. Under Secretary Deming will hold further conversations in Europe this summer, and I expect to visit with the Finance Ministers of France and the Netherlands at the meeting of the Ministers and Governors of the Group of Ten at the Hague in July.

-- In May Assistant Secretary Trued held discussions with financial officials in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines -- countries which benefit from our expenditures in Southeast Asia. These discussions led to Japanese agreement for assistance to us of \$300 million as an absolute minimum, with a potential further gain -- assuming Japanese balance of payments do not reverse in highly unexpected fashion -- of another \$200 million. Cooperation was promised by the other three countries, and we estimate \$50-\$100 million assistance from the three combined.

-- Discussions have been held with officials of Mexico and Venezuela. Mexican officials have agreed to invest \$80 million long-term and \$50 million is likely from Venezuela.

-- Mr. Harold Linder has just returned from a trip to Europe which had as its objective the sale of Export-Import Bank participations in Spain, Switzerland, and Sweden. It is too soon to be sure but receipts of up to \$100 million appear possible.

-- A Treasury-State team will visit key Middle East Countries later this summer to obtain long-term investments from the central banks in question. Preliminary exploration by our Embassies suggests the possibility of obtaining another \$100 - \$150 million.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Now, where does all this leave us?

Instead of the \$500 million we hoped to obtain, I believe we can now expect \$1.1 billion from debt prepayments and long-term investments, combined, for the period from mid-May to the end of the year. Of this, a little more than \$150 million will fall in the last six-seven weeks of the second quarter and \$900 million plus will fall in the second half. These figures, summarized in the attached table, do not take into account any European debt prepayments other than from Italy or any sale of Export-Import Bank participations.

In my May 10 memorandum, I stated that the Cabinet Committee had agreed on measures that would produce savings of about \$800 million and that "if successfully implemented" these would "bring the 1966 deficit back to \$1.6 billion, assuming no underlying deterioration from the deficit rate in the first quarter." The memo added: "Unfortunately there is reason to believe such deterioration may be taking place."

It is too early to tell whether the additional \$600 million from prepayments and investments will be adequate to offset the continuing deterioration caused primarily by our poor trade figures or whether the 1966 deficit will be higher than the \$1.6 billion figure mentioned above.

I will have a much clearer picture when preliminary second-quarter results are in hand in mid-July. I plan to call a meeting of the Cabinet Committee at that time to review the situation in detail.

Henry H. Fowler
Henry H. Fowler

88c

CONFIDENTIAL

June 1, 1966

DEBT PREPAYMENTS AND
LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS (LTI)

<u>First Quarter</u>	<u>Millions of Dollars</u>	
World Bank (LTI)	71	
Inter-American Development Bank (LTI)	--	
Brazil (LTI)	50	
Italy (Advance military payment)	40	
	<u>161</u>	
 <u>Second Quarter</u>		
World Bank (LTI)	190	
Inter-American Development Bank (LTI)	80	
Mexico (LTI, Long-term swap)	60	
Japan (LTI)	50	
Thailand (LTI)	47	
Korea (LTI)	<u>10</u>	
Second Quarter Total	437	
 TOTAL FIRST HALF 1966		598
 <u>Second Half</u>		
<u>Scheduled</u>		
Japan (LTI, Other)	250	
Italy (Debt prepayment)	123	
Mexico (LTI)	20	
	<u>393</u>	
 <u>Likely</u>		
Japan (LTI)	200	
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Israel	100 - 150	
Korea, Taiwan, Philippines (LTI)	50 - 100	
Venezuela (LTI)	50	
Vietnam (LTI)	50	
Thailand (LTI)	25	
	<u>475 - 575</u>	
 Total Second Half Scheduled and Likely		918
 Total from mid-May through end of year		\$1,100
 Total for all 1966		\$1,516

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 90-244
By lip NARA Date 7-28-92

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7/2

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Mr. Rostow

Jim Thomson will
inform Berger that
President chose
middle counsel as marked

BK 5

noted

✓

1. *sup*
2. *Pres file*

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Tuesday, July 5, 1966 -- 9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Here State argues that we should not push the Black visit to Cambodia now, but leave it for his planned trip in the fall (para. 7).

They prefer to let the Congressional delegation carry the mail on this round (para. 10).

In the meanwhile, we can see where Chet Bowles gets with the Cambodian Ambassador in New Delhi and we and the British get with Moscow on widening the ICC.

I recommend that we see what kind of response Chet gets before pushing the Black visit at the end of July.

W. W. Rostow

Proceed to see if Black visit is now acceptable _____

Report what Bowles gets and seek later instruction _____ ✓

Hold Black till fall and develop recommendations
for instructing Congressional delegation _____

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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By

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NARA, Date

7-17-89

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-172
By us, NARA Date 3-13-99

July 1, 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possible Visit by Mr. Eugene Black to
Cambodia

HOW IT MIGHT BE ARRANGED

1. The proposed visit might be arranged directly or indirectly. The direct approach would be to inquire, either through the Australian Ambassador in Phnom Penh or through the Cambodian Ambassador in New Delhi, whether Prince Sihanouk would receive Mr. Black as your emissary. An indirect approach might be to have Mr. Black visit Cambodia for discussion of the Prek Thnot Dam Project. He could at the same time go to Saigon for discussion of the My Tuan Bridge Project. Both of these are Mekong Committee schemes recently endorsed by ECAFE for solicitation of funds. It would probably be best to sound out Sihanouk through ECAFE channels (Mr. Narasimhan) if the latter approach is adopted. (A prior decision in principle for U.S. participation in the funding of these projects would be required.)

CONCURRENT ACTION NOW UNDER WAY

2. In addition to the matters mentioned in my memorandum of June 29, we have since taken two new steps designed to encourage the apparently favorably-developing Cambodian attitude. First we have instructed Ambassador Bowles to make direct contact with Cambodian Ambassador Nong Kimmy

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

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-2-

in New Delhi. Nong Kimny was a long-time Cambodian Ambassador in Washington and is close to Sihanouk. Bowles is to explain to Nong Kimny all that we have done to support the Cambodian proposal for expansion of the ICC and to solicit his views as to what further we can do to support them on this.

3. Secondly, the British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, at Secretary Rusk's urging, is communicating anew with the Soviet Geneva Co-Chairman, in effect seeking to get Soviet reconsideration of its rejection of the ICC expansion proposal and inviting the Soviet Co-Chairman to meet with him in Geneva (or another place) to consider this matter as well as the more general question of an international conference on Cambodia, which Sihanouk has long desired.

4. Thirdly, Ambassador Thompson is following up on the ICC matter with Dobrynin tomorrow.

CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING A POSSIBLE VISIT BY MR. BLACK

5. The evidence of a developing shift in Sihanouk's position to a more neutral stance is now unmistakable. This is evident from his speech of June 18, with which I believe you are familiar. It is also borne out by a readiness to push for expansion of the ICC not only with us and the British but also with the Communist side, including the Chinese. Another indicator is the positive reaction he has given to Thai proposals for the sending of a UN Secretary General representative to the area. Finally, there is sensitive evidence that Sihanouk is making direct moves to restore diplomatic relations with Thailand. We think these moves reflect Sihanouk's fear that the war might spill over into Cambodia, and very likely that he is beginning to doubt his earlier judgment that the Viet Cong were certain to succeed.

6. We very much feel that, as in the case of Indonesia, we should act with great caution with regard to this evolving situation, being especially careful to avoid

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-3-

actions or statements which Sihanouk might consider as pushing him too far or too fast. We do not judge that he is at the point, or anywhere near it, where he is prepared to take important risks with regard to his relations with the Chinese, in particular, and Hanoi. This is borne out by the anti-American tirade which he delivered on June 20, apparently to balance his statement of the 18th. Sample excerpt:

"The acts of the Johnson/McNamara group, if compared with those of the bellicose German war-mongers during World War II, are more savage and inhuman. Actually these acts are unique and are the most cruel and savage acts that one has ever witnessed in world history."

7. I know you attach considerable importance to Mr. Black's trip to the area this fall, in connection with your program for Southeast Asia. We hope at that time that he might be able to visit Cambodia. If Sihanouk should refuse to agree to a visit by Mr. Black now, and make a public issue of it, on top of his last turn down of a Black visit in April, it would probably rule out a possible Black visit in the fall.

8. If the visit involves a move to restore diplomatic relations, it is virtually certain that we shall be confronted with an immediate demand that we accept Sihanouk's prior conditions which include an acceptance of his present frontiers with Vietnam and Thailand, as he defines them; a "guarantee" against future violations of his border; and the payment of indemnities for past violations. There is no reason to believe on past performance that these demands are negotiable, and a failure to meet them could well leave our relations with Cambodia in a worse state than they were before the visit. Acceptance of them, on the other hand, would gravely damage our relations with the Thai and Vietnamese who have, after all, supported us down the line over the years.

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-4-

9. It seems to me that we now have a situation in which Sihanouk seems to be trying to extricate himself from a predicament which is in part of his own making. We should make sure that all the doors are kept open so that he can get out, but avoid any overt action which might cause him to pull back or even slam the door in our face.

10. A ready opening, through which you can send a message to Sihanouk, should soon be available. The Cambodians have now replied to the latest message of the Vice President indicating readiness to receive a Congressional delegation as soon as they can free themselves, presumably after Congress adjourns. Barring some new development, I believe that this would be better timing for a special communication from you to the Prince. It would also, in our view, be a better vehicle because we would avoid the inevitable suggestion of aid involved in a Black visit -- which Sihanouk could all too easily play publicly as an effort to buy him off.

/s/ George W. Ball

Acting Secretary

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RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 JUL 2 AM 11 42

*via pouch to Lant 9C
7/6/66*

~~SECRET~~
~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

*July 5, 1966 - 7:00 pm
~~June 30, 1966~~*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorizations [redacted]
[redacted]

b.1(a)

The Department of Defense, with the concurrence of the Department of State and Atomic Energy Commission, has requested authority to disperse modern [redacted]

b.1(a)

squadrons. The squadrons have been re-equipped with F-104G's and modern weapons will improve their effectiveness while permitting us to actually reduce the number of weapons dispersed.

[redacted] we are replacing [redacted]
[redacted]

b.1(a)

If you approve, I will sign the three attached memoranda to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

W. W. Rostow

☒ Approved
☐ Disapproved
☐ See me

~~SECRET-FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-341
By SJ NARA, Date 8-15-02



~~SECRET~~

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

1852
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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 92-295 Appeal/WH Guidelines
By cb, NARA Date 7-23-97

11 JUN 1966
6-17-99

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1.5(a)(d) SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Weapons to Support the []
F-104G [] Strike Program

1.5(a)(d) I refer to my memorandum for the President of March 18, 1966, which requested Presidential authorization for the dispersal to [] Air Force [] F-104G Strike Squadron at [] This memorandum mentioned that the [] Strike Squadron with a [] F-84F capability, located at [] would stand down for conversion to F-104G aircraft when the [] Squadron assumed a nuclear role.

1.5(a)(d) Your memorandum for the Deputy Secretary, Department of Defense, of March 23, 1966 approved the dispersal of nuclear weapons for the [] Squadron, and this squadron is now operational in a nuclear role. The [] Squadron is presently undergoing F-104G conversion and is scheduled to attain a nuclear delivery capability with 18 F-104G aircraft during October 1966. [] communications to [] are operational and all the necessary custodial and security arrangements at [] to support this F-104G capability are in being. Accordingly, 1.5(a)(d) authority to disperse [] additional nuclear weapons, []

is required to support this delivery force. [] nuclear weapons dispersed in support of an existing F-84F strike squadron will be withdrawn when the [] Squadron assumes a nuclear role, making a new total of [] nuclear weapons dispersed in support of the [] Air Force.

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~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination
Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DND DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

See Def Cont Nr. X - 3 69 6

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~~SECRET~~

2

1.5(a)(d) The nuclear weapon dispersal authority for [] contained in NSAM 334 provides for the dispersal of [] nuclear weapons for the support of two [] Air Force F-84F squadrons. NSAM 334 also authorizes, for planning purposes only, the eventual dispersal of [] modern nuclear weapons for the support of two [] F-104G squadrons. [] and [] weapons were identified in Appendix B of NSAM 334 as replacements for the []. It is now planned to utilize [] weapons also as a replacement for the [] so that [] weapons can be used interchangeably in supporting the [] forces. The specific type of weapons to be furnished at any one time will depend upon target requirements, weapon availability, and logistics aspects. Therefore, operational flexibility within the above listed types of nuclear weapons is considered necessary.

1.5(a)(d) Accordingly, it is requested that authority be granted for the dispersal to [] nuclear weapons for the support of the [] F-104G [] Strike Squadron. The yields of these weapons are within the limitations contained in NSAM 143 and the weapons are included in the PAL installation program in accordance with NSAM 140. Approval of this request will not require any increase in the area totals of nuclear weapons proposed for dispersal to [] in FY 66 over those reflected in NSAM 334.

The Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission have concurred in this requested dispersal action.

C. Vance

~~SECRET~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination
Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954



~~SECRET~~

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 92-295 Appeal
By cb, NARA Date 7-3-97
6-17-99

15 JUN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Warheads to Support NATO Forces
of the Federal Republic of Germany

1.5(a)(d)
National Security Action Memorandum No. 334 (NSAM 334) approved for planning purposes the dispersal to West Germany of [] NIKE HERCULES nuclear warheads to support air defense forces of the Federal Republic of Germany. USCINCEUR now has authority to disperse a total of [] warheads to support German NIKE HERCULES units which are operational or are expected to become operational during FY 1966.

1.5(a)(d)
The Department of Defense now desires to disperse additional NIKE HERCULES nuclear warheads to support the [] FRG Battalion located at [] Germany, which is expected to become operational in September 1966. The additional dispersals are consistent with U.S. plans for nuclear warhead support of non-U.S. NATO delivery systems as they become operational pursuant to current NATO force goals.

1.5(a)(d)
Accordingly, authority is requested for the dispersal of [] additional [] NIKE HERCULES warheads to the Federal Republic of Germany to support German NATO air defense units.

The weapons for which dispersal authority is requested are all programmed for permissive link installation in accordance with NSAM 160 and the current PAL schedule. Installation of permissive links will be completed before the weapons are dispersed. [] communications to the U.S. custodial detachment will be operational prior to weapon dispersal and all other requirements for custodial facilities, personnel, security and communications are programmed to support this dispersal.

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Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination
Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

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REGRADING: UDD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

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Approval of this request will not require any increase in the area total of nuclear weapons dispersed to West Germany over those reflected in NSAM 334.

The Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission concur in this request for dispersal action.

Cyril Vance

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~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination
Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954



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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 92-295 Appeal
By ck, NARA Date 7-23-97
6-17-99

27 JUN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1.5(a)(d)
SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Weapons to Support the []
F-104G [] Strike Program

1.5(a)(d)
I refer to your memorandum for the Deputy Secretary, Department of Defense of July 28, 1965, which conveyed Presidential authority to disperse [] nuclear weapons for the support of the [] Fighter Bomber Squadron. A second [] strike squadron will soon be operationally ready and authority to disperse additional nuclear weapons to support it is now required.

1.5(a)(d)
The [] Fighter Bomber Squadron, co-located at [] with the [] Squadron, is scheduled to assume an operational capability with 18 F-104G aircraft during October 1966. [] 1.5(a)
communications to [] are already operational. Other necessary custodial and security arrangements at [] to support the F-104G capability are also in being. Accordingly, dispersal authority for - [] nuclear weapons - [] is required for support of this delivery force.

1.5(a)(d)
The nuclear weapon dispersal authority for the [] contained in NSAM 334 provides for the dispersal of [] nuclear weapons for the support of two [] Air Force F-84F squadrons. NSAM 334 also authorizes, for planning purposes only, the eventual dispersal of [] modern nuclear weapons for the support of two [] F-104G squadrons. This authority contemplates the withdrawal of nuclear weapons support from an F-84F squadron as an F-104G squadron becomes operational. [] weapons were identified in Appendix B of NSAM 334 as replacements for the [] It is now planned to utilize [] weapons also as a replacement for the [] so that []

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Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination

Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

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REGRADING. D. C. DIR 5200.10
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1.5(a)(d)

[] weapons can be used interchangeably in supporting the [] forces. The specific type of weapons to be furnished at any one time will depend upon target requirements, weapon availability, and logistics aspects. Therefore, operational flexibility within the above listed types of nuclear weapons is considered necessary.

1.5(a)(d)

The referenced memorandum reduced the dispersal authorization for two [] strike squadrons from [] weapons to [] weapons. Therefore, approval of this request will reduce the weapons dispersed for two [] Air Force strike squadrons from a total of [] weapons to [] weapons.

Accordingly, it is requested that authority be granted for the dispersal to the [] nuclear weapons for the support of the [] Fighter-Bomber Squadron. The yields of these weapons are within the limitations contained in NSAM 143 and the weapons are included in the PAL installation program in accordance with NSAM 160. Approval of this request will not require any increase in the area totals of nuclear weapons proposed for dispersal to the [] in FY 66 over those reflected in NSAM 334.

The Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission have concurred in this requested dispersal action.

Cyrus Vance

~~SECRET~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination
Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

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~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

July 8, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Weapons to Support [redacted]

6.1(a)

Reference is made to your memorandum for the President of
June 11, 1966, requesting that authority be granted for the dispersal

[redacted]

6.1(a)

It was noted that
the Department of State and Atomic Energy Commission have
concurred in this requested dispersal action.

The requested authority has been approved with the understanding
that all weapons to be dispersed under this authority are program-
med for permissive link installation in accordance with NSAM 160
and the yields of these weapons are within the limits of NSAM 143.
It is further understood that this approval will not require any
increase in the area totals of nuclear weapons proposed for dispersal
[redacted] in FY 1966 over those reflected in NSAM 334.

6.1(a)

(Signed) W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-341
By SJ NARA, Date 8/5/02

~~SECRET~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

July 8, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Warheads to Support NATO
Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany

Reference is made to your memorandum for the President of
June 15, 1966, requesting that authority be granted for the dispersal

[REDACTED]

b.1 (a)

It was noted that the Department of State and the Atomic Energy
Commission concur in the requested dispersal.

The requested authority has been approved with the understanding
that all weapons to be dispersed under this authority are program-
med for permissive link installation in accordance with NSAM 160
and the current PAL schedule, and that U. S. unilateral communica-
tions to the U. S. custodial detachments will be operational prior
to the dispersal of these additional weapons. It is further noted
that this approval will not require any increase in the area total of

[REDACTED]

b.1 (a)

(signed) W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-341
By SJ NARA, Date 8-15-02

90f

SECRET
FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA

July 8, 1966

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Weapons to Support the

[REDACTED]

b.1(a)

Reference is made to your memorandum for the President of June 27, 1966, requesting that authority be granted for the dispersal

[REDACTED]

b.1(a)

[REDACTED] Fighter-Bomber Squadron assigned to NATO. It was noted that the Department of State and Atomic Energy Commission have concurred in this requested dispersal action.

The requested authority has been approved with the understanding that all weapons to be dispersed under this authority are programmed for permissive link installation in accordance with NSAM 160 and the yields of these weapons are within the limits of NSAM 143. It is further understood that this approval will not require any increase in the area totals of nuclear weapons proposed for dispersal

[REDACTED] in FY 1966 over those reflected in NSAM 334.

b.1(a)

(signed) W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow

SECRET-FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-341
By SJ, NARA, Date 8/5/02

Tuesday, July 5, 1966 -- 8:20 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Secretary of State has recommended that you approve a message to the Senate for the purpose of transmitting to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification the international telecommunication convention, with a final protocol, signed at Montreux on November 12, 1965.

The recommendation of the Secretary of State has been reviewed by Mr. James O'Connell who states that he finds that the text of the subject convention agrees in all essential particulars with the U. S. position at the conference and, therefore, he concurs in the recommendation of the Secretary of State.

I recommend that you sign the letter of transmittal.

W. W. Rostow

Document to Mr. Higgins 7/8

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 5, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM W. W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: State of the POL Offensive North Viet Nam.

Targets containing about 86% of known POL storage capacity in North Viet Nam have been hit. The latest estimate of storage capacity actually destroyed is 57%. A new Rolling Thunder target list is now being prepared to get at the rest of known capacity. The latest photographs of Hanoi and Haiphong are being reviewed to determine whether re-attack is justified. The whole intelligence community is alert to tracking the counter moves Hanoi will make to compensate for oil lost and to establish new routes of supply and storage less vulnerable to concentrated air attack. Secretary McNamara is personally monitoring all this.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

87-193

By

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NARA, Date

3-14-89

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, July 5, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Barefoot Sanders

SUBJECT: Lawfulness of Our Course in Vietnam

Edward H. Kuhn, President of the American Bar Association, has forwarded a comprehensive legal analysis substantiating our assistance to the Vietnamese. The authors, all legal scholars, are Professors Myres S. McDougal (Yale), John Norton Moore (University of Virginia) and James L. Westwood (University of South Carolina).

They develop the point at length that, since the Republic of Vietnam has requested international aid against outside aggression there is no question that the U.S. and other nations responding are lawfully acting pursuant to the right of self defense recognized under customary international law and the UN charter. They also underscore that the executive-congressional action taken is fully in accord with our constitutional processes.

As you know, a group of lawyers has propagated the view that we are illegally intervening in a civil war and exceeding executive powers without a congressional declaration of war. This study effectively demolishes their arguments.

The analysis is not an official ABA document, but the ABA did go on record in supporting the legality of our position earlier this year. Morrie Leibman was active in both instances.

I have acknowledged Edward Kuhn's transmittal, and I have the full text of the study in the event you wish to see it.

W. W. Rostow

Tuesday, July 5, 1966
9:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

If your schedule permits, this social occasion would be one way to reinforce the food theme of your Omaha speech.

W. W. Rostow

High-Level Meeting of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD in Washington, July 20-21

WWRostow:rln

1. susp
2. Pres file

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President disapproved
via Jacobsen via July 7
S/S informed July 7
BKS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1966

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: High-Level Meeting of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD
in Washington, July 20-21

Recommendation:

I recommend that you agree to be host at a White House reception on the evening of July 21 for all participants in the DAC meeting, Congressmen involved in aid and agriculture matters, appropriate members of the press and other public figures.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

You authorized Secretary Rusk, on behalf of the United States Government, to invite the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD to hold its annual High-Level Meeting in Washington.

At this meeting we hope to dramatize the seriousness of the world food problem, advance coordinated efforts by the aid donor countries to deal with it, and establish international doctrine about the essential need for the developing countries to take self-help steps to increase their own agricultural productivity. The agenda of the two-day meeting will include discussion of the annual report of the Chairman of the DAC on the aid efforts and policies of the 15 member countries during 1965 and on general problems of development assistance.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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-2-

The Secretary will be the Chairman of the United States Delegation and Secretary Freeman and AID Administrator Bell will be co-Vice Chairmen. George Woods plans to attend the meeting and speak as does Dr. Sen, the Secretary General of the FAO, and Mr. Kristensen, the Secretary General of the OECD. We expect Ministers concerned with aid and in some cases agricultural matters from the other 14 DAC countries to attend.

The DAC countries together provide about \$10 billion annually or about 90% of all assistance to the developing world. The proposed White House reception will provide an opportunity for very useful informal exchange of views on aid and the world food problem between U.S. Congressional leaders and high officials from the other major aid-giving countries which annually provide about \$4.7 billion in public assistance and private investment to the developing nations.


Acting Secretary

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FROM: FRANCIS BATOR
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66454

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JULY 5, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BATOR

STATE AND GEORGE MCGHEE RECOMMEND AUGUST 24-25 FOR
ERHARD WORKING VISIT. (FOLLOWING YOUR INSTRUCTIONS, WE
TOLD ERHARD EARLIER THAT SOMETIME DURING AUGUST 20-25
WOULD BE CONVENIENT.)

IF YOU APPROVE, MCGHEE WILL FIRM UP DATE WITH CHANCELLOR.

DTG: 05/2157Z JULY 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-196
By up NARA, Date 7-17-89

Friday, July 1966
5:15 pm

7/1
in pouch 96

MR. PRESIDENT:

You may wish to read this relatively hopeful Viet Nam assessment in the London Economist. They have not always been our friend in this matter.

W. W. R.

Article from the June 25, 1966 Issue of The Economist

Another Year in Vietnam

The past year came to the brink of disaster. Things are a bit brighter now.

June has seen two anniversaries in Vietnam pass almost unnoticed. It was in June last year that American troops first took the offensive against the Vietcong and it was then that Marshal Ky took over power in Saigon. The best that can be said for most of the year since then is that the war has not been lost. So what will President Johnson do now? And what will he want his allies to do? Mr. Wilson will need his answers and his suggestions ready when he goes to Washington to see the President in the second half of July.

On June 18th Mr. Johnson hinted at an intensification of the war against "aggression from the north." In practice this seems to mean beginning the long-planned strikes against North Vietnamese oil storage tanks, especially those on the outskirts of Haiphong. These are vulnerable targets, since most of North Vietnam's oil imports -- apart from a dribble from China -- must pass through the Haiphong storage area. But the amount of oil needed by North Vietnam is small (101,300 metric tons were imported from Russia in 1964, plus an unspecified quantity from Rumania). It is notoriously difficult to deprive states of the minimum of oil necessary to survival. What more can be done to speed the end of the Vietcong insurgency and cut off the aid reaching it from North Vietnam along the Ho Chi Minh trail?

The "pursue and destroy" operations in the south are doing pretty well. More and more guerrilla units are being brought into action, and their bases are being penetrated. Lord Walston, the British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, even made a guess this week after visiting South Vietnam that major military operations could be over by this time next year. That is optimistic. There is a lot of fighting and some hard thinking to be done before anyone dare say the corner has been turned. North Vietnamese troops and supplies are still flowing down the trail. Above all, the Americans' handling of the tactical problem still shows an important weakness.

If American forces are to consolidate their successes, they will have to start reoccupying villages through which they are now only making sweeps. It is essential not only to clear ares of the Vietcong, but also to bring them under regular civil administration. At present only three provinces are scheduled for clearance this year. To come to an end of guerrilla activity a more "structural" approach to counter-insurgency will be required. This means a pattern of operations designed to deprive the Vietcong of

at least one of the vital commodities (rice, medical supplies, ammunition) which they need to keep the field. So far "pursue and destroy" has meant trying to do everything at once. Its effect on the morale of the Vietcong has been considerable. But some important tasks -- like building up police forces and breaking the Vietcong organization in Saigon -- have been neglected.

As the flow of North Vietnamese to replace Vietcong losses in the south continues, the American command will also have to consider whether it is enough simply to bomb the Ho Chi Minh trail. A more economical way of cutting it would be a Chindit-style operation in central Laos to lay ambushes and destroy rice caches. This would mean using American troops, not just mountain tribesmen officered by Americans. It would be a delicate business. But it would be worth while if it slowed the flow of supplies and lowered the enthusiasm of the Tonkinese conscripts who are being sent south into the teeth of American fire-power.

Militarily the Americans now hold the initiative. And politically the situation has taken a clearer shape in the last three weeks. The Buddhist campaign against Marshal Ky is punctured, at any rate for the moment. Da Nang and Hue are in government hands; and on June 20th Thich Tri Quang, the government's leading opponent, was arrested and removed to Saigon. The decree fixing September 11th as the election date for a constituent assembly was published the same day. The last two months' confusion has not stopped most of South Vietnam's army from fighting the communists. Given the record of South Vietnamese politics, this improvement may be only temporary; but an improvement it is. It comes at a time when signs of the damage done to North Vietnam's distribution system by American bombing are at last beginning to appear in the shape of rice shortages in some provinces and gluts in others.

For the moment North Vietnam still seems to be pinning its faith to a collapse of the American will to fight. It rejected this week another offer of negotiations. But President Johnson seems to have reconciled himself to the loss of popularity the war has caused him. He has repeated that the United States will carry through its policy to the end, which means an acceptance by the communists that they cannot take power in the south by force of arms. The defeat of more North Vietnamese regiments in the central highlands will probably be required before the conviction dawns in Hanoi that confrontation with a global power is a losing game.

So the Vietnamese barometer has risen in recent weeks. But even if it goes on rising, the United States will still be faced with the prospect of storms in other parts of southeast Asia; and it will still be disinclined to

face them alone. When Mr. Wilson reaches Washington he is likely to find that the moment for another "initiative" on Vietnam has gone by and that it is President Johnson who will be doing the asking. Covetous eyes are being cast on the jungle-trained British troops who by late July may no longer be needed in Borneo to hold off the Indonesians. The Americans realise that there is no hope of getting even a token British force to Vietnam itself. But it is thought that such a force might be sent to support the 20,000 Americans in Thailand, a Seato ally which has two insurgencies on its hands: infiltrators from Laos in the north-east and the remains of the old Chinese-Malayan insurgency among the Moslem minority in the south.

President Johnson has the right to ask for British support in south-east Asia, and it is easier for Mr. Wilson to offer support now that American policy is beginning to look more successful than it did three months ago. But Mr. Wilson also has the right to have his domestic difficulties considered. He has gone far enough down the line with President Johnson to be allowed to judge just how much further he can go. The Seato treaty pledges each member in case of aggression against another member to "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." It is just those constitutional processes that would make it hard for the British government to agree to a request to send troops to Thailand. That brief visit by those Hunter squadrons in 1963 is no precedent for sending infantrymen now. A police mission -- or advisers on counter-insurgency or trucks and arms -- would be another matter. The British should show willing; and this is the sort of help they are in a position to send.

When the President and Prime Minister meet in Washington they will be able to look a little beyond the immediate situation in Vietnam. The fact that they will be able to do so shows the improvement that has taken place there over the last few weeks. If Thailand is discussed, it will be discussed because it looks as if it may, after all, be possible to hold a line in south-east Asia. And who could have talked confidently of holding lines even six months ago?

Friday, July 1, 1966 -- 5:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Wednesday, June 29, 1966

Jack Sutherland and Les Tanger, U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, called on me in connection with a story they are working on about the fate of Marxism in the modern world. I talked to them about the origins of the weaknesses in Marxism historically and their relevance to Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Communist China.

Tom Lambert, Los Angeles Times, came in to talk briefly about our launching of the oil offensive. Nothing of particular interest.

David Secrest, BUSINESSWEEK, came in to talk in general about the relationship of Viet Nam to the emergence of a vital, regionally organized free Asia along the lines of the President's recent statements.

Friday, July 1, 1966

Pete Lisagor, Chicago Daily News, talked about the President's speech at Omaha. I underlined certain of the ideas in it relating to the development of free Asia; the possibilities of an era of peace if we see Viet Nam through; and the food-population problem.

Jack Leacacos, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), discussed what kinds of peace initiatives we might launch now that we have begun to attack oil. He proposed that we make an open political offer more explicit than any in the past to Hanoi. I said that I suspected Hanoi would prefer secret to public negotiation.

Chalmers Roberts, The Washington Post, came in to inquire whether, as the headline in today's (July 1) Washington NEWS states, our recent statements and actions indicate unlimited war. I pointed out that our position on negotiations remains what it has been; that we are simply undertaking a somewhat different method than in the past for attacking the infiltration base against South Viet Nam. I said that what we had said and done in no way implied future escalation.

Henry Brandon, London Sunday Times, inquired as to whether Wilson's recent statements had damaged his position with the President. I said obviously we would have preferred unambiguous support from the British Prime Minister. Moreover, we are conscious that Britain is a signatory of the SEATO treaty and a co-chairman of the 1962 Accords designed to prevent infiltration via Laos into South Viet Nam. On the other hand, we noted that the Prime Minister continues to support us in general in Viet Nam and to place the blame on Hanoi for failure to achieve a peaceful end to the war.

William S. White telephoned to ask how we felt about Wilson's position. I explained that we didn't like the phrasing of his statement about the bombing of the oil installations; that he felt that that statement was necessary to maintain his position of general support for us in Viet Nam. On the whole, I thought it unwise for us to suggest publicly that we were greatly disturbed because that would keep the issue alive in the press when it might otherwise die down. For his own information, however, I told him I didn't like it one little bit.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

July 1, 1966

FROM WALT ROSTOW

TO THE PRESIDENT

Prime Minister Pearson in a message to you reargues the Canadian view of their proposed Civil Air Agreement with the Soviets. He believes that if Canada did not now go ahead with the agreement, the Russians would conclude that we had forced Canada against its will to turn down the agreement. He offers, however, to have his officials discuss the agreement with us further if you so desire.

We indeed do wish to talk further about the agreement. Acting Secretary Ball proposes a way of dealing with the problem which would have the effect of postponing indefinitely the actual operation of a Moscow-Montreal-Havana route.

This involves asking the Canadians to insist that Soviet rights to operate beyond Montreal and Canadian rights to operate beyond Moscow would not be spelled out in the present agreement but would be left for future agreement. If the Canadians say it is too late to suggest amending proposed agreement, we would propose a Canadian-Soviet exchange of notes stating that Soviets would not be permitted to fly beyond Montreal until Canadians were ready to fly beyond Moscow. This would delay Montreal-Havana route indefinitely or as long as we could persuade Canadians not to exercise their rights beyond Moscow which we understand are not now really commercially attractive to the Canadians.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept: Guidelines
By JD, NARA, Date 5-27-98

98
Randy

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Following for your approval is a draft reply which would start further discussions with the Canadians.

Begin draft reply:

I have just received your message giving the reasons why you feel you should go ahead with a proposed civil air agreement with the USSR which includes transit rights beyond Montreal to Havana.

~~Although~~ I differ with your assessment of the situation, ~~and~~ ^{however} frankly, I am disappointed by your reply, I appreciate your offer to have our officials discuss the matter further. I am asking the Acting Secretary of State to arrange such discussions immediately.

Sincerely,

End draft reply.

_____ Approve

_____ Disapprove

(Relay text only of attached letter)

~~SECRET~~

98a
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF JUNE 14 ABOUT OUR PROPOSED CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S.S.R. THAT WOULD INCLUDE TRANSIT RIGHTS BEYOND MONTREAL TO HAVANA FOR AEROFLOT.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-343

LET ME SAY AT ONCE THAT I WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS AND THE FRANKNESS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE EXPRESSED THEM. IT WAS, IN FACT, IN ORDER TO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS THAT WE INFORMED YOUR PEOPLE ON JUNE 2 OF THE PROPOSAL WHICH HAD BEEN MADE BY THE DELEGATION OF THE SOVIET UNION THEN IN OTTAWA, EXPLAINING THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS DECISIONS WERE NECESSARILY IMMINENT. AFTER A LAPSE OF SOME DAYS DURING WHICH SOME COMMENTS WERE RECEIVED FROM YOUR OFFICIALS, PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT WAS REACHED WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I AM GRATEFUL NOW TO HAVE THE BENEFIT OF YOUR OWN VIEWS.

By id, NARA Date 1-26-01

I FULLY APPRECIATE THE HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY WHICH RESTS ON YOUR GOVERNMENT IN DEALING WITH SO MANY PRESSING WORLD PROBLEMS AND I AM NATURALLY ANXIOUS NOT TO ADD TO THOSE PROBLEMS IN ANY WAY. I AM SURE THAT YOU ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THIS COUNTRY HAS TO EXERCISE ITS OWN BEST JUDGMENT ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AFFECTING CANADA AND TO REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF ITS CITIZENS AS BEST IT CAN. IN ASSESSING THE PROPOSAL FOR AN AIR LINK BETWEEN MOSCOW AND MONTREAL, THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT ENDEAVoured TO WEIGH CAREFULLY AND CONSCIENTIOUSLY THE VARIOUS DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED. THESE CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDE, OF COURSE, OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE UNITED STATES; AND ALSO WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE HEMISPHERE.

I SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE MAIN ELEMENT IN THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT IS THE SERVICE FOR TRAVELLERS BETWEEN MONTREAL AND MOSCOW. THE CAPACITY TO BE FLOWN IS TO BE CLOSELY RELATED TO THE TRAFFIC TO BE CARRIED BETWEEN THOSE TWO POINTS. ORDINARY PASSENGER TRAFFIC CAN BE EXPECTED TO OCCUPY MOST OF THE AVAILABLE SPACE ON THE AIRCRAFT. THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW OPERATING AN OCEAN PASSENGER LINER SERVICE TO MONTREAL IS EVIDENCE OF THE EXPECTATION THAT A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WILL BE MOVING BACK AND FORTH. THE OCCURRENCE OF EXPO '67 IN MONTREAL NEXT YEAR WILL FURTHER STIMULATE THESE MOVEMENTS. I HAVE NO DOUBT YOU WILL AGREE THAT SUCH EXCHANGES BETWEEN CANADA AND THE SOVIET UNION, AS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, REPRESENT A NATURAL AND BENEFICIAL DEVELOPMENT.

THE EXTENSION OF THE SERVICE BY THE CANADIAN AND SOVIET CARRIERS ONWARDS BEYOND MOSCOW AND MONTREAL TO ASIA AND HAVANA RESPECTIVELY IS WHOLLY SUBORDINATE TO THE AIR SERVICE BETWEEN MONTREAL AND MOSCOW. THE PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF ROUTES IS OBVIOUSLY ATTRACTIVE TO CANADA IN TERMS OF AIR ECONOMICS. THE PERMISSION TO FLY LIMITED CAPACITY BEYOND MONTREAL TO CUBA, IN TRANSIT AND WITHOUT STOPOVER RIGHTS, DID NOT SEEM TO THE CANADIAN AUTHORITIES, ON THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THEM, TO INCREASE ANY SECURITY RISKS TO THIS HEMISPHERE. THERE ARE ALREADY A NUMBER OF SEA AND AIR LINKS BETWEEN CUBA AND EASTERN EUROPE (INCLUDING A DIRECT SOVIET AIR SERVICE BETWEEN MURMANSK AND HAVANA), AND BETWEEN CUBA AND CERTAIN OTHER POINTS IN THE HEMISPHERE AND WESTERN EUROPE. IT ALSO DID NOT APPEAR THAT THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT WOULD AFFECT THE DECISIONS OF AIRLINES OF OTHER FRIENDLY FLAGS ABOUT INSTITUTING SERVICES OF THEIR OWN TO HAVANA SINCE THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY CANADIAN AIR SERVICE TO CUBA.

IN BRIEF, MR. PRESIDENT, THE ASSESSMENT BY THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT WAS INTENDED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES IN THIS HEMISPHERE AND ELSEWHERE, THE REASONABLE DEVELOPMENT OF CANADA'S RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CANADIAN TRAVELLING PUBLIC AND OF CANADIAN AIRLINES. IT SEEMED TO US THAT ON BALANCE THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT WAS A SENSIBLE ONE AND ONE WHICH DID NOT IGNORE CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS MUST NOW BE AWARE OF THE ATTRACTIONS OF THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT FROM A CANADIAN VIEWPOINT. ANY FAILURE TO PROCEED WITH IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, OR EVEN IMPOSSIBLE, TO EXPLAIN WITHOUT CREATING THE IMPRESSION THAT CANADA HAD ALTERED ITS DECISION AGAINST ITS OWN BEST JUDGMENT. SUCH AN IMPRESSION WOULD BE OPEN TO MALICIOUS INTERPRETATIONS WHICH COULD HARDLY AVOID DAMAGING THE IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES IN CANADA AND ABROAD; AS INDEED WOULD BE THEIR PURPOSE.

IT THEREFORE SEEMS TO ME IMPORTANT TO CONCLUDE THE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT DELAY. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I SHALL BE HAPPY TO HAVE THE MATTER DISCUSSED FURTHER AS A MATTER OF URGENCY WITH YOUR OFFICIALS IF YOU SO DESIRE.

YOURS SINCERELY,

(SGD) L.B. PEARSON

UNQUOTE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, July 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Where We Stand on Panama

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-204

By uf NARA, Date 11-21-89

There have been the following developments on Panama since we discussed the problem last week:

1. The negotiations have been resumed.

Ambassadors Anderson and Irwin met with Panamanian Foreign Minister Eleta last Monday. Eleta formally presented the Panamanian proposals on the new treaty for the present Canal, the base rights and status of forces agreement and the sea level canal treaty.

Anderson and Eleta agreed that the negotiators should begin drafting treaty language jointly, using the two drafts. Once they have gone as far as possible in reaching agreement, Eleta and Anderson will meet to examine the drafts and areas of disagreement. Working level negotiations began last Wednesday.

A comparison of the U.S. and Panamanian drafts of the three treaties shows that the major issues will be the ones we anticipated: (1) Canal tolls and compensation to Panama, (2) joint administration of the Canal in which we have the final say, (3) the court system applicable to U.S. Canal employees, and (4) defense arrangements, particularly use of military bases for hemispheric security.

2. We are moving on the economic front.

I have suggested to Linc Gordon that we send a first-rate team to Panama to expedite the formulation of an economic development plan designed to remedy some of Panama's more serious economic and social deficiencies and dovetail with our negotiating position on the treaties. Meanwhile, AID/State has approved a \$3 million loan for urban self-help cooperative housing and slum clearance. Recent troubles have centered in such areas.

3. The report of the Inter-oceanic Canal Commission shows progress.

The Commission is putting the final touches on its second annual report to you. The report shows substantial progress in the study

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

program. Field operations have been delayed because of the time it has taken to negotiate site survey agreements with Panama and Colombia. The agreement with Panama was signed last February and the one with Colombia is about to be completed. The surveying of canal routes, started in Panama during the past dry season, will get under way in earnest in both countries when the next season begins in January. The Commission concludes that it will not be able to complete its work by the 1968 deadline provided in the authorizing legislation. It will submit recommendations to you for amending the act before January 1967.

4. Panamanians are concerned about the adequacy of their national guard and want additional help.

The Panamanians have 4300 men in their National Guard. Five hundred recruits were added last year on the understanding that we would pick up the tab for salaries and allowances during FY 1966 and the Panamanians thereafter.

The recent Colon riots raised doubts in the Robles Government whether the National Guard could cope with serious violence in two or more places at the same time. (At my request the intelligence community will have an estimate on this problem by July 15.) Eleta asked Anderson whether we could continue to support the 500 men added last year, plus a thousand new recruits. Anderson replied that he would check. Linc Gordon is examining the economic feasibility and political advisability of our subsidizing the National Guard in this direct fashion. Bob Anderson may speak to you about it.

You expressed concern about reports that one of the Panamanian negotiators may be a Communist. I assume you are referring to Diogenes de la Rosa. On June 22, Congressman Flood attacked de la Rosa on the floor of the House (Tab B). State has furnished us with the biographic sketch at Tab A. From this I deduce that in his youth he was enamored of Marxism and leftist causes, but has moved away from extremism as he matured -- a not unusual pattern among Latin American intellectuals as in the case of his friend Romulo Betancourt. His attitude towards us seems to have travelled the same path of antagonism toward increased cooperation.

W. W. Rostow

cc - Bill Moyers
Attachments

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Diogenes de la ROSA - Member of Panamanian Treaty Negotiating Team

Background

Diogenes de la Rosa, was appointed Panamanian Special Ambassador to the United States and a member of the Panamanian canal treaty negotiating team by President Marco Robles in November 1964. De la Rosa, who has a brilliant mind and is a prolific writer on political and economic issues, is a very controversial, enigmatic figure. He is a self-confessed student of Marxism and in his youth he was frequently associated with leftist causes and movements; he was a leader of a Communist-backed Panama City tenants strike in 1925; in 1935 he helped to found the Panamanian Socialist Party and became a party leader. Throughout the 1930's and early 1940's de la Rosa was involved in various movements and organizations which were often influenced and sometimes dominated by Panamanian communists. But he has never been positively identified as a member of Panamanian communist party. In addition to his participation in leftist movements he has also, however, been associated with various moderate political groups and was an advisor in the formation of several moderate Panamanian political parties.

De la Rosa's intellectual brilliance and political acumen have long been recognized in Panama. He has been an influential journalist and writer, and he has served several Panamanian Presidents as an advisor and a speech writer. De la Rosa is also a noted figure throughout the Central American and Caribbean area and has served as an advisor to former Presidents Jose Figueres of Costa Rica, Oscar Osorio of El Salvador, Juan Jose Arevalo of Guatemala and Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela. His friendship and association with Betancourt has been particularly close. During a brief political exile in Venezuela in 1948, de la Rosa was employed by the Venezuelan Government through the influence of Betancourt. In 1959 he was appointed Panamanian Ambassador to Venezuela, serving in that position until 1964. There is strong evidence that his influence in

Venezuela

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-342
By cb, NARA Date 9-28-99

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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Venezuela far surpassed that of a normal foreign Ambassador, and he is reported to have served President Betancourt in an advisory capacity on economic and social problems.

Attitude Toward U.S.

There have been contradictions in de la Rosa's attitude toward the United States. He was a leading opponent of the U.S. Defense Base Agreement in 1947 and led the defeat of the agreement in the Panamanian National Assembly. He also shares the resentment of many other Panamanian nationalists over the alleged mistreatment of Panama by the United States with regard to the Panama Canal. He has not, however, publicly displayed anti-Americanism in recent years. He is reported to have said privately that while he disagreed with much of U.S. policy in Latin America and Panama, he is a friend of the United States. During his time in Washington he has frequently offered suggestions to United States officials for the improvement of this country's cultural programs in Latin America.

Panamanian Foreign Minister Fernando Eleta explained de la Rosa's appointment to Panama's treaty negotiating team to the U.S. Embassy by stating that he himself respected and trusted de la Rosa in spite of his past association with leftist causes. Eleta also said that the Panamanian Government needed an individual of de la Rosa's reputation and stature on the negotiating team to help gain the support of nationalist and leftist elements in Panama for the new canal treaties.

Although de la Rosa presents the Panamanian treaty aspirations firmly and candidly, he has been exceedingly cooperative and responsible thus far in the negotiations. De la Rosa, perhaps more than any other Panamanian official connected with the negotiations, has shown an understanding of the difficulty of resolving the treaty issues and of the political, military and economic requirements of the U.S. After the September 1965 Joint Presidential Statement on the negotiations, he led the Panamanian Government's defense of its negotiating policy

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against opposition attacks in the National Assembly. With a dispassionate clarity novel in Panamanian political debate, de la Rosa publicly set forth certain realities which he argued Panamanians must face. In essence, he asserted that regardless of Panamanian views, the U.S. presence in the Canal Zone is established by treaty and that changes desired by Panama can only be obtained through patient negotiations. His other public statements on the treaty negotiations have counseled Panamanian patience and understanding of the needs of the United States with regard to the Panamanian Canal. He has said that Panama must prepare itself to assume in a mature and responsible manner the burdens of participation in the Canal enterprise and that the country must embark on economic and social reforms to enable it to use increased canal revenues to the greatest advantage of all Panamanians.

During the time that de la Rosa has been in Washington working on the treaty negotiations, he has also been consulted by the Foreign Minister with regard to other matters, particularly in connection with the Dominican Republic crisis. There is strong reason to believe that he was an important factor in insuring Panamanian support in the OAS for the U.S. position.

De la Rosa was born in Panama in 1904 of poor parents. He was educated in the Panamanian public school system; although his formal education is limited, he is exceptionally well-read and is self-educated.

~~SECRET~~

CHIEF PANAMANIAN TREATY NEGOTIATOR: "AN ACKNOWLEDGED MARXIST INTELLECTUAL"

(Mr. FLOOD (at the request of Mr. TUNNEY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, since the acquiescence by the executive branch of our Government to radical demands by Panama to renegotiate the 1903 Canal Treaty, many thoughtful citizens of the United States have wondered why Panama, which has been benefited so greatly by the Panama Canal, should seek a new treaty.

The explanations offered are varied and many of them questionable. Two of the most often repeated objections to the present treaty are its "sovereignty" and "perpetuity" provisions, which have been used by Panamanian politicians to inflame the Panamanian people to a high degree of emotionalism.

In this connection, these politicians never point out that the "perpetuity" feature applies with equal force to the United States, and that as long as our country retains the powers of sovereignty over the Canal Zone, the independence of the Republic of Panama is guaranteed.

The chief of the Panama team in the current diplomatic negotiations is Dr. Diogenes de la Rosa, an "acknowledged Marxist intellectual and long-term socialist." He has frankly stated that the task for Panama after finishing the negotiations is "to remake the state from within, revise its institutions and rectify its method of conducting public affairs." He then emphasizes that if this is not done, "any benefits from the negotiations would lose all significance."

The meaning of such pronouncement is obvious. The canal is to become the source of still more extensive benefits for Panama, and this can be done only by revenue from greatly increased transit tolls or by further taxation of the American people.

Unfortunately, the shipping industry of the United States has not been alert to what has been transpiring on the

isthmus, no one in the Senate has spoken out in defense of our country's interests, and the taxpayers of our Nation are not organized.

A recent article from Panama City, Republic of Panama, by Ralph Skinner, a longtime resident of the isthmus and distinguished correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, gives new light on the subject of why Panama seeks a new treaty and is commended for reading by every Member of the Congress.

The indicated article follows:

WHY PANAMA SEEKS NEW PACT

(By Ralph K. Skinner, Special correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor)

PANAMA CITY.—It is important that Panama come to an agreement with the United States on a canal treaty, says Dr. Diogenes de la Rosa, chief Panamanian treaty negotiator.

An even more important job for Panama, he says, is "to reconstruct our national life from bottom to top, economically, socially, and politically." He has been addressing various groups throughout the country, briefing them on the larger meaning of the upcoming treaty and its potential for transforming the whole future of Panama.

Dr. de la Rosa said: "The first task, after treaty negotiations are finished, is for the people of Panama to remake the state from within, revise its institutions, and rectify its method of conducting public affairs. If this is not done, any benefits from the negotiations would lose all significance."

The Panama intellectual says that he is chiefly aiming criticism at the groups here who control commerce and industry and use their political power to safeguard vested interests and to rotate selected officials.

Dr. de la Rosa accused these groups of callous exclusion of the laborer, farmer, and humble artisan, as well as the emerging middle class, from participation in national planning, policymaking, and opportunity.

AN OFFENSIVE NOTE

As an acknowledged Marxist intellectual and long-term socialist, as one who has tried to improve labor codes in several Latin-American countries, this is offensive to Dr. de la Rosa's philosophy and his sense of what is good for Panama and its citizens.

Asked if he expects much support in these radical changes from the government, he replied: "Any fair or honest Panamanian of whatever position or background must recognize that we cannot go along as we have for the past 60 years, if we have in mind the interest of our country."

Asked about leadership in these needed reforms, the Panamanian negotiator said: "There does not exist in Panama at this moment any political party able to do this task. Existing parties belong to a past which is dead and must be buried. No political party here is organized in terms of reference to our very real national problems. Political parties talk the language of failure, suspicion, and jealousy. What is needed is clear language to express and find solutions to the problems we are confronting now."

He added: "When I think in terms of reforms, I think of a national movement rather than political parties. We need a new national conscience to face the future."

The negotiator termed "unpredictable" the length of time to develop this national movement. He said: "When and if the people understand, they will react rapidly. There are many groups who do not wish the people to understand, to protect their own interests. For example, most newspapers won't help because it would be against their interests, but there are presently some other media which would help."

Regarding leadership for this national movement, Dr. de la Rosa confirmed that presently there exist no leaders of this capability, but he expressed confidence that the national reform will create and produce its own leaders. He said this has been a historical fact on many occasions in many countries.

~~SECRET~~ (to the Ranch)

7/1/66

top 100

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

Herewith Wilson's apologia plus a request that you clear him for a peace mission to Kosygin.

We will wish to think about this hard in the light of other matters and make sure what he says is just right, if we let him go ahead.

(quote attached)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-343
By cb, NARA Date 9-8-99

1000

URGENT -- TO SECRETARY McNAMARA FROM ROSTOW

As soon as you have read following message from Wilson, call me.

1006

~~SECRET~~

Good copy

PMUK 001/1
OW 02.10 ZULU JULY 1, 1966
FROM PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT
SECRET
T 236
MESSAGE BEGINS

NATURALLY MY THOUGHTS HAVE BEEN VERY MUCH WITH YOU DURING THESE PAST TWO EXCEPTIONALLY DIFFICULT DAYS AND EVEN AT THIS DISTANCE I AM ABLE TO HAVE SOME VIEW OF ALL THAT YOU HAVE BEEN GOING THROUGH. INDEED, IN THE SOMEWHAT ROUGH EXCHANGES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS WHICH FOLLOWED MY STATEMENT YESTERDAY, WEDNESDAY, TO PARLIAMENT, I MADE A POINT OF SAYING SOMETHING OF WHAT I KNEW YOU HAD GONE THROUGH AND THE AGONIES OF DECISION YOU HAD HAD TO FACE OVER THESE MANY MONTHS.

I KNOW THINGS WILL BE MADE NO EASIER FOR YOU, ANY MORE THAN THEY ARE FOR ME WITH MY INFINITELY SMALLER BURDEN IN THESE MATTERS, BY THE KNOWLEDGE THAT MANY OF YOUR CRITICS, WHETHER IN CONGRESS, THE PRESS OR THE PUBLIC, LIKE MINE, ARE AND HAVE BEEN MORE VOCIFEROUS IN THEIR CRITICISM THAN FERTILE IN PROVIDING ANY CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVE. IN ANOTHER CONTEXT IN PARLIAMENT THIS WEEK, WHEN I WAS BEING ATTACKED OVER MY OWN DECISION TO ROUGH IT UP WITH THE COMMUNISTS ON THE SEAMENS STRIKE, I HAD TO TELL SOME OF MY OWN LEFTWING THAT I DID NOT RESENT THEIR INDULGING IN THE LUXURY OF NEGATIVE CRITICISM, BUT THAT SOME OF US HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND HAVE TO GOVERN. THIS IS I AM SURE WHAT ABOVE ALL OTHER THINGS YOU MUST BE FEELING.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-343
By is, NARA Date 4-27-00

I KNOW IT IS THE MORE DIFFICULT FOR YOU THAT, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, TODAY THE SITUATION REMAINS AS YOU EXPLAINED IT TO ME LAST DECEMBER THAT YOUR CRITICS ARE ALMOST EQUALLY DIVIDED INTO THOSE WHO WANT YOU TO DO A GREAT DEAL MORE AND THOSE WHO WANT YOU TO DO A GREAT DEAL LESS. ON BOTH SIDES THERE ARE THOSE WHO GO TO IMPOSSIBLE EXTREMES OF DEMANDING EITHER OUT AND OUT WAR OR OUT AND OUT SURRENDER. IN FACT, MANY OF OUR MORE MODERATE BRITISH CRITICS ARE GRADUALLY BEING MANOEUVRED INTO TAKING THEIR STAND WITH EXTREMISTS WHOSE VIEWS AS PUT FORWARD THEY WOULD PROBABLY, IF CHALLENGED, REPUDIATE. THE FACT THAT THE BRITISH PEOPLE ARE PHYSICALLY REMOTE FROM THE PROBLEM AND, IN PARTICULAR, ARE NOT SUFFERING THE TRAGEDY OF THE LOSSES WHICH YOUR PEOPLE ARE SUFFERING SERVES TO INCREASE THE LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF MY FULL SUPPORT FOR YOUR BASIC POLICY.

~~SECRET~~

I KNOW THAT YOU MUST FEEL THAT SOME ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS OF OURS IN THE PAST FEW DAYS HAVE NOT BEEN HELPFUL. AND THERE ARE NO DOUBT IN BOTH COUNTRIES THOSE READY TO EXPLOIT THOSE ACTIONS FOR THE SAKE OF SOWING DISCORD BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS OR OF PUSHING THE TWO OF US FURTHER APART, YOU IN ONE DIRECTION ME IN ANOTHER, FROM THE POSITION WE HAVE JOINTLY HELD AND STILL HOLD. I AM BEING PRESSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE LOGIC OF DISAGREEING WITH THIS PARTICULAR OPERATION WOULD BE A TOTAL DENUNCIATION OF THE WHOLE OF YOUR VIETNAM POLICY. THIS I HAVE FIRMLY REJECTED, NOT ONLY BECAUSE I DISTRUST THE MOTIVES OF THOSE WHO PUT THIS ARGUMENT FORWARD, BUT BECAUSE THEIR ARGUMENT ITSELF IS BALLS. I KNOW ONLY TOO WELL THE DIFFERENT MOTIVES AMONG MY OWN CRITICS, VARYING FROM DISAPPOINTMENT AT NOT HAVING BEEN GIVEN OFFICE TO CONFUSED INTERNATIONAL LOYALTIES, WHICH GENERATE THE USUAL DOUBLE-STANDARD MYOPIA TOWARDS ANY ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES, AS COMPARED WITH THOSE TO WHOM THEY ARE ALWAYS MORE TOLERANT. THESE MOTIVES MAY ALSO OPERATE WITH YOUR CRITICS, BUT YOU WILL KNOW THAT BETTER THAN I CAN.

BUT ALSO AMONG THE CRITICS OF BOTH OF US ARE VERY MANY REALLY DECENT PEOPLE, MOST OF THEM INCAPABLE OF FORMULATING AN ALTERNATIVE POLICY BUT BEWILDERED AS TO WHERE WE ARE GOING, AND WHAT THE OUTCOME WILL BE. SOME BUT NOT ALL BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY POSSIBLE RESULT WILL BE ESCALATION AND A THIRD WORLD WAR. WHAT DISTURBS BOTH OF US I KNOW, IS THAT AMONG THESE PEOPLE ARE SOME OF THE BEST AND MOST PROGRESSIVE MEMBERS OF THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES. AND INDEED AMONG THAT ESTABLISHMENT THERE IS A WIDER MALAISE ABOUT THE WHOLE SITUATION, EVEN IF THIS IS NOT EXPRESSED IN CRITICAL OR VOCAL TERMS. AND THOSE WHO THINK OR SAY THESE THINGS WILL NEVER UNDERSTAND EITHER OF US UNLESS THEY REALISE THAT YOU AND I ALSO BELONG TO THIS SAME GROUP AND SHARE THEIR MALAISE AND ANXIETY. THE DIFFERENCE, OF COURSE, IS THAT, WHEREAS THEY CAN GO AWAY AND RETURN TO THEIR OWN DAY TO DAY PURSUITS, THOSE OF US WHO HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF GOVERNMENT CANNOT, WHATEVER OUR FEELINGS, ESCAPE FROM THE NECESSITIES OF DECISION. THIS IS WHAT GOVERNMENT MEANS. WHATEVER DIFFERENCES WE MAY HAVE HAD ON ONE OR TWO OF THESE RECENT PROBLEMS, I AM BOUND TO TELL YOU, AFTER THE DEEPEST HEART SEARCHING, THAT I CANNOT SEE THAT THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN YOUR BASIC POSITION THAT I COULD URGE ON YOU. THAT POSITION I SOUGHT TO DEFINE ON WEDNESDAY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, IN THE FOLLOWING WORDS:-

THE UNITED STATES ARE RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO ASSIST THE MILLIONS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE, WHO HAVE NO WISH TO LIVE UNDER COMMUNIST DOMINATION, UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ABANDON THEIR ATTEMPT TO GAIN CONTROL OF SOUTH VIETNAM BY FORCE AND ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS FOR UNCONDITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE REPEATEDLY BEEN PUT FORWARD BY THE UNITED STATES.

INDEED, IF THERE WERE A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE POLICY, I KNOW THAT YOU, WITH ALL THE AGONIZED CONSIDERATION THAT YOU HAVE GIVEN TO THIS PROBLEM, WOULD HAVE REACHED IT MORE QUICKLY THAN I. AND I WANT YOU TO REALISE THAT WHERE WE HAVE DIFFERED IN DETAIL - BUT NEVER IN BASIC POLICY - AND HAVE HAD TO EXPRESS A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW, WHILE WE RECOGNISE THAT THIS CAN ONLY ADD TO YOUR DIFFICULTIES (AND ESPECIALLY THIS TIME BE MORE THAN A LITTLE HURTFUL), WE BELIEVE THAT WHAT WE HAVE DONE IS RIGHT AND NECESSARY. I MUST BE QUITE FRANK IN SAYING THAT THIS IS THE PRICE I HAVE TO PAY FOR BEING ABLE TO HOLD THE LINE IN OUR OWN COUNTRY WHERE THE PUBLIC REACTION IS VERY WIDESPREAD EVEN IF, AS I HAVE SAID, IT STEMS FROM WIDELY DIFFERING MOTIVES.

BUT I INTEND TO GO ON HOLDING THE POSITION.
TODAY, THURSDAY, WE HAD BY FAR THE ROUGHEST OUTBURST
FROM A LARGE SECTION OF MY OWN PARTY IN THE HOUSE.
SINCE IT AROSE ON A DISCUSSION WITH THE LEADER
OF THE HOUSE ON THE IMMEDIATE PROCEDURE AND TIMETABLE,
I COULD NOT MYSELF INTERVENE DIRECTLY IN THE EXCHANGES.
BUT IN ADDITION TO OUR OWN PEOPLE, AND OF COURSE
THE TWELVE STRONG LIBERAL PARTY, THE CONSERVATIVES
WERE TO MY MIND IN THE MOST CYNICAL MANNER TRYING TO
EXPLOIT THE DIFFICULTIES AND TRYING TO CREATE A
SITUATION WHICH WOULD MAKE IT HARDER FOR US,
IN THE LIGHT OF THE ATTITUDE OF OUR BACKBENCHERS, TO
MAINTAIN THE LINE OF OUR OWN SUPPORT. AS A POLITICIAN
I CAN OF COURSE UNDERSTAND THEIR MOTIVES, EVEN IF, ON SO
GRAVE AN ISSUE, I EQUALLY DESPISE THEM. AGAIN THERE
MAY BE SOME IN YOUR COUNTRY ABOUT WHOM YOU FEEL THE
SAME, FOR AMBITION DOES NOT ALWAYS EXPRESS ITSELF
IN CONSTRUCTIVE STATESMANSHIP.

~~SECRET~~

IN ALL THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I AM EXTREMELY PLEASED
THAT WE WERE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE BEFORE THIS WEEKS EVENTS
THAT WE SHALL BE MEETING NEXT MONTH AND I ALSO THINK THAT
WE WERE WISE IN AGREEING THAT THERE MUST BE SOME CLEAR
BLUE SKY BETWEEN THIS WEEKS EVENTS AND OUR
PROJECTED MEETING.

I LOSE NO OPPORTUNITY - I MUST HAVE SAID IT A HUNDRED TIMES IN THE HOUSE, AND AT LEAST A DOZEN TIMES THIS WEEK- OF SAYING THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVERY ACTION IN THIS WAR LIES WITH THOSE WHO REFUSE TO COME TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE. THE ENEMIES OF NEGOTIATION ARE THE ENEMIES OF PEACE. AND TIME AND TIME AGAIN I HAVE PINPOINTED THEM. THIS IS WHY I SO WARMLY WELCOMED THE PHRASE WHICH DEAN RUSK USED TO ME AND WHICH I GOT HIS PERMISSION TO QUOTE WHEN HE PROCLAIMED HIS WILLINGNESS TO GO TO GENEVA AT A DROP OF THE HAT, IF THERE WERE ANYONE THERE TO MEET HIM, AND EQUALLY I WELCOMED THE REAFFIRMATION YESTERDAY OF THIS ATTITUDE BY SECRETARY MACNAMARA.

EQUALLY I KNOW THESE MOST RECENT ACTIONS WERE TAKEN ONLY AFTER A FINAL EFFORT TO SEE WHETHER THE LATEST LINE INTO HANOI, THE RONNING MISSION, PRODUCED ANY GREATER WILLINGNESS TO TALK, WHICH IT MANIFESTLY DID NOT.

NATURALLY I HAVE BEEN WONDERING WHETHER THERE WAS ANY FURTHER INITIATIVE I COULD TAKE. THERE IS ONE, AS YOU KNOW, WHICH I DISCUSSED WITH DEAN RUSK. BUT I WANTED TO MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT I WOULD NOT CONTEMPLATE TAKING ANY STEPS TOWARDS IT UNLESS I THOUGHT IT HAD YOUR AGREEMENT, NOT GRUDGING OR RELUCTANT AGREEMENT, BUT WHOLEHEARTED FEELING THAT IT WAS RIGHT AND THAT IT WOULD NOT ADD TO YOUR DIFFICULTIES. THIS IS THE POSSIBILITY AT THIS MOMENT OF TRYING TO SEE WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING I CAN DO PERSONALLY WITH KOSYGIN WHOSE POSITION ON VIETNAM I DESCRIBED TO YOU ON MY RETURN FROM MOSCOW IN FEBRUARY.

IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT WEDNESDAYS EVENTS WOULD PRODUCE EXPLOSIVE STATEMENTS FROM THE RUSSIANS AND FROM THEIR SATELLITES, EAST AND WEST. I WOULD BE DOUBTFUL WHETHER IT WOULD PRODUCE MORE THAN THAT. AS ALWAYS, THE RUSSIANS WHO I AM CONVINCED DESPERATELY WANT TO SEE THE END TO THIS VIETNAMESE WAR, HAVE TO ACT IN A COMPETITIVE SITUATION WITHIN THE COMMUNIST WORLD. MY HOPE, AND I TRUST I AM NOT TOO OPTIMISTIC, IS THAT THE EVENTS OF LAST WEDNESDAY MAY YET HAVE AN OPPOSITE AND MORE POSITIVE EFFECT IN UNDERLINING THE URGENCY OF THE VIETNAMESE SITUATION AND IN EMPHASISING THE FACT THAT ACTION MIGHT BE TAKEN, BY FOR EXAMPLE THE CHINESE, WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE SITUATION GETTING OUT OF HAND. I AM COUNTING HERE LESS ON THE PUBLIC POSITION THE RUSSIANS HAVE TO TAKE THAN ON WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE THEIR INNATE REALISM AND THEIR DESIRE TO KEEP SOME CONTROL OVER THE SITUATION AND NOT BE CARRIED INTO ESCALATION BY OTHER LESS REALISTIC AND RESPONSIBLE FORCES WITHIN THE COMMUNIST CAMP.

~~SECRET~~

AS YOU KNOW, IF I WANTED REASONABLE COVER FOR A QUICK VISIT TO MOSCOW, IT LIES TO HAND WITH THE OPENING NEXT WEEK OF THE BRITISH TRADE FAIR IN MOSCOW. I HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ANGLO-SOVIET TRADE FOR THE LAST TWENTY YEARS FROM MY EARLIER MINISTERIAL DAYS AND INDEED AS AN OPPOSITION LEADER VISITED THE LAST BRITISH TRADE FAIR IN MOSCOW FIVE YEARS AGO. NATURALLY I WOULD ONLY THINK OF GOING AND SPENDING SEVERAL HOURS TOURING THOSE FETID MARQUEES IN SIZZLING HEAT IF I WERE CERTAIN OF MEETING KOSYGIN FOR AN HOUR OR TWO TO DISCUSS OTHER MATTERS. AS I SAID TO YOU IN AN EARLIER MESSAGE, I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO HAVE VISITED WASHINGTON BEFORE CONTEMPLATING SUCH A VISIT, BUT THE TRADE FAIR ENDS ON JULY 25 AND I MAY NOT HAVE BEEN TO WASHINGTON BY THAT TIME. IN ANY CASE, THE WRONG IMPRESSION MIGHT BE GAINED IF, IMMEDIATELY AFTER LEAVING WASHINGTON, MY SHIRT TAILS WERE SEEN FLYING NOT ONLY OVER THE ATLANTIC BUT OVER THE PRIPET MARSHES AS WELL.

WHAT I HAVE IN MIND, IF I FELT IT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO YOU, WAS THAT I SHOULD GO BEFORE MY WASHINGTON VISIT, OSTENSIBLY FOR THE TRADE FAIR BUT IN FACT TO DISCUSS WITH KOSYGIN ALL ASPECTS OF SOUTH EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS, NOT ONLY VIETNAM BUT THE NEW INITIATIVE SUGGESTED BY SIHANOUK IN HIS LETTER TO THE TWO CO-CHAIRMEN, ACTION ON WHICH I KNOW TO BE VERY MUCH IN THE MINDS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AS THE NEXT STEP. IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY, IF WE FAILED AT LEAST TO TRY TO USE THIS CAMBODIAN OFFER AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO WINKLE THE RUSSIANS OUT OF THEIR SHELL. SO FAR AS VIETNAM IS CONCERNED I WANT TO DISCUSS VERY FRANKLY WITH KOSYGIN WHETHER THERE IS ANY POINT IN MOVING TOWARDS AN INITIATIVE TO RECALL THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND IN ANY CASE TO STIFFEN HIM IN WHAT I AM SURE IS HIS DESIRE, NAMELY TO EXERT THE MAXIMUM PRESSURE IN HANOI FOR A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE.

I THINK THIS MIGHT BE USEFUL. . IN MY VIEW IT IS A GAMBLE WHERE THE ODDS ARE PRETTY LONG AGAINST IMMEDIATE SUCCESS. BUT, SO FAR AS I CAN SEE, IT IS A GAMBLE WHICH, IF IT FAILS, WILL COST NOTHING TO THE WESTERN POSITION. INDEED FAILURE, AS IN THE CASE OF THE FAILURE OF PREVIOUS PEACE INITIATIVES, WILL STRENGTHEN OUR POSITION IN OTHER COUNTRIES AND WITH OUR OWN PUBLIC OPINION I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT FAILURE COULD POSSIBLY DO ANY HARM TO THE WESTERN CAUSE OR TO YOU PERSONALLY. INDEED, IT MIGHT GIVE USEFUL FURTHER PROOF, IF THAT WERE NEEDED, OF WHERE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONTINUED FIGHTING LIES. IT MIGHT INVOLVE SOME RISKS FOR ME IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND I CAN ALREADY HEAR IN ADVANCE THE GIBES FROM THE OPPOSITION. BUT I HAVE HANDLED THEM BEFORE AND CAN DO SO AGAIN.

~~SECRET~~

HOWEVER, WHATEVER THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ODDS AND THE STAKES IN THE GAMBLE I HAVE SUGGESTED, THERE IS ONE PRICE I AM NOT PREPARED TO PAY AND THAT IS TO GO FORWARD WITH SUCH AN INITIATIVE UNLESS I FEEL THAT YOU WERE AGREEABLE AND THAT IT WAS NOT GOING TO MAKE YOUR ALREADY AGONISING TASK MORE DIFFICULT.

ON OTHER ISSUES, DOMESTIC AND OVERSEAS, ESPECIALLY IN THE RHODESIAN AND THE VIETNAM CONTEXT, I HAVE QUOTED WHAT WAS, I THINK, THE LAST WORD, AS SAID BY ONE OF YOUR PRESIDENTIAL PREDECESSORS. I HAVE NO DOUBT YOU HAVE USED IT, AS I HAVE, AND THAT YOU FEEL WITH ME THAT LINCOLN WAS RIGHT WHEN HE SAID (AND I HAVE HIS WORDS IN A FRAMED PLAQUE ON MY WALL)

IF I WERE TRYING TO READ, MUCH LESS ANSWER ALL THE ATTACKS MADE ON ME, THIS SHOP MIGHT WELL BE CLOSED FOR ANY OTHER BUSINESS. I DO THE BEST I KNOW HOW, THE VERY BEST I CAN: AND I MEAN TO KEEP ON DOING IT TO THE END. IF THE END BRINGS ME OUT ALL RIGHT, WHAT IS SAID AGAINST ME WILL NOT AMOUNT TO ANYTHING. IF THE END BRINGS ME OUT ALL WRONG, TEN ANGELS SWEARING I WAS RIGHT WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE.

MESSAGE ENDS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ (to the Ranch)

7/1/66

101
top

FOR THE PRESIDENT, FROM ROSTOW

Herewith Secretary Rusk's SEATO report.

My reaction is that we must explain to Wilson the importance of staying in Asia in Britain's own interest; and if, as is likely, they still pull back, begin patiently to go to work to build an Asian security structure without them.

(quote attached)

(canberra 36
secto 68)

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By lig NARA, Date 7-17-89

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By ju, NARA, Date 5-27-98

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FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 3 FROM CANBERRA
DATED JULY 1.

QUOTE

CANBERRA 36 JULY 1

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SECTO 68

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING SECRETARY FROM
THE SECRETARY

AS I PREPARE TO DEPART AUSTRALIA FOR MANILA, TAIPEI AND
JAPAN, I CAN REPORT GENERAL SATISFACTION ABOUT THE WAY OUR MEETINGS
THIS WEEK HAVE GONE. THE SEATO COMMUNIQUE WAS A VERY
STRONG DECLARATION AND DESIGNATED FOR THE FIRST TIME THE
AGGRESSION IN VIET NAM AS AN ARMED ATTACK. THIS IS
SIGNIFICANT UNDER ARTICLE 4 PARA ONE OF THE SEATO TREATY.
THERE WAS, OF COURSE, LARGE PUBLIC INTEREST HERE IN THE
STRIKES ON HANOI AND HAIPHONG BUT GENERAL UNDERSTANDING AND
SUPPORT. ONE GROUP OF FIFTEEN DEMONSTRATORS TURNED UP ON
THREE OR FOUR DIFFERENT OCCASIONS AND WE BECAME QUITE FAMILIAR
WITH EACH OTHER. I WAS ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH THE SUPPORT
FROM AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES.

AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND WE WERE QUITE DISAPPOINTED IN THE
RAPIDLY SOFTENING POSITION OF GREAT BRITAIN ON SOUTHEAST ASIAN
QUESTIONS. ALL THREE OF US AGREED THAT WE SHOULD WORK
HARD ON THE BRITISH SEPARATELY AND PRIVATELY TO TRY TO
TURN THEM AROUND. BUT IF I HAD TO REPORT FRANKLY ON MY
PRESENT UNDERSTANDING OF BRITISH ATTITUDE, IT WOULD BE THAT
THEY HAVE NOT THE SLIGHTEST INTENTION OF JOINING IN

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

ANY MILITARY EFFORT ANYWHERE NORTH OF MALAYSIA AND THAT, WITH THE END OF CONFRONTATION, THEY WOULD BE GLAD TO BE INVITED OUT OF MALAYSIA AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. MICHAEL STEWART, IN REFERENCE TO BRITISH INTEREST IN EVENTUAL BASES IN AUSTRALIA, WAS MOST UNSATISFACTORY IN RESPONDING TO PERSISTENT QUESTIONS AS TO WHAT MISSIONS SUCH FORCES WOULD CARRY OUT. ABOUT THE ONLY THING ON WHICH HE SPOKE WITH CONFIDENCE WAS THAT THEY WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST IN THE DEFENSE OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND IF THESE COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS WERE SUBJECTED TO ATTACK. WE POINTED OUT THAT THAT WAS A MOST REMOTE CONTINGENCY AND THAT WHAT IS NEEDED IS ASSISTANCE NOW WHERE THE GREAT ISSUES OF WAR AND PEACE ARE JOINED, NAMELY IN VIET NAM AND THAILAND. I NOW UNDERSTAND MORE FULLY THAN BEFORE WHAT THEY MEANT WHEN, DURING MY VISIT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER RECENTLY, THEY SAID QTE LET'S NOT REVIVE SEATO UNQTE.

I UNDERSTAND THAT PRESIDENT MARCOS MAY PRESS ME VERY HARD ON THE WAR CLAIMS ISSUES ON WHICH WE HAVE REPEATEDLY SAID THE WE CANNOT PROVIDE ANY SATISFACTION. I AM DISTURBED BY INDICATION THAT HE MAY LINK THIS QUESTION WITH WHETHER OR NOT HE PAYS YOU A VISIT. THIS IS THE SAME KIND OF DISCOURTESY WHICH MACAPAGAL PULLED ON PRESIDENT KENNEDY. UNLESS I HEAR TO THE CONTRARY, I WOULD URGE HIM VERY STRONGLY NOT TO GET THE QUESTION OF CLAIMS MIXED UP WITH A COURTEOUS AND FRINDLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO PRESIDENTS. UF GE REPEATS THE BUSINESS OF PLAYING THIS ONE FOR INTERNAL POLITICS AT THE EXPENSE OF OUR OWN PRESIDENT, THE REACTION IN CONGRESS AND IN OUR PUBLIC OPINION COULD BE VERY COSTLY TO HIM. I'LL DO MY BEST ON THIS ONE.

I KNOW YOU ARE RELIEVED BY THE SUPERB PROFESSIONAL JOB DONE BY OUR FLYERS ON HANOI AND HAIPHONG. I MUST SAY THAT THEIR EXCELLENT JOB HAS MADE OUR PROBLEM OF ANY POSSIBLE AFTERMATH MUCH LESS AND ONCE AGAIN EARNS MY COMPLETE ADMIRATION.

VIRGINIA AND I SINCERELY HOPE THAT YOU AND LADY BIRD WILL BE ABLE TO GET SOME REST OVER THE JULY FOURTH PERIOD.
SIGNED RUSK

UNQUOTE BALL
BT

NNNN, ACK ***** MATEY *****

~~SECRET~~

NO DIS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7/1/66

102
to Nancy

~~SECRET~~ (to the Ranch)

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

Mr. President:

I believe you will wish to read this
further straw in the wind from French sources.

(quote attached)

D CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Dot NARS, Date 8-16-86

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~~SECRET~~ JUNE 30

EXDIS

DEPT REPT AS DESIRED

SUBJ: HANOI CROSSROAD

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-342
By Cb, NARA Date 9-28-99

1. DURING JUNE 29 MEETING WITH EMBOFFS, QUAI'S ASIAN DIRECTOR MANANC'H (PROTECT) WAS PARTICULARLY FORTHCOMING. DRAWING EXTENSIVELY ON HIGHLY CLASSIFIED TELEGRAMS FROM FRENCH EMBASSIES IN CAPITALS INVOLVED, MANAC'H DISCUSSED FOLLOWING THREE SUBJECTS: (A) REPORT OF HO CHI MINH'S SECOND TRIP TO PEKING; (B) CAMBODIA; AND (C) CHOU EN-LAI'S VISIT TO BUCHAREST, THE THRUST OF ALL OF

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WHICH INDICATED PRESSURES FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SE ASIA INCREASING. IN ADDITION HE BRIEFLY TOUCHED ON SANTENY'S TRIP AND DE GAULLE'S ITINERARY TO PACIFIC TESTING SITES. THIS MESSAGE DEALS WITH FRENCH INTERPRETATION OF HO'S SECOND TRIP TO PEKING.

2. IN REPLY TO QUESTION WHAT HE THOUGHT ABOUT PRESS REPORTS THAT HO CHI MINH MAY BE IN PEKING AGAIN, MANAC'H, READING FROM TELEGRAM DATED JUNE 27 FROM DE QUIRIELLE, FRENCH REP HANOI, GAVE CREDENCE TO THIS NEWS. WHILE DE QUIRIELLE IS NOT CERTAIN THAT SUCH TRIP ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE, HE REPORTS AT LENGTH THAT DIPLOMAZ C CORPS HANOI IS NEVERTHELESS SPECULATING ON REASONS HO WOULD MAKE SECOND TRIP TO PEKING IN LESS THAN SIX WEEKS. QUIRIELLE CONCLUDES THAT IF IT CONFIRMED THAT HO WENT TO PEKING AGAIN, MOST PLAUSIBLE REASON WOULD BE TO INFORM CHICOM LEADERSHIP THAT US PRESSURE IS SUCH THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE AND NFL CANNOT KEEP UP STRUGGLE INDEFINITELY. IF THIS INTERPRETATION ACCURATE, AND MANAC'H STRESSED BOTH SPECULATIVE CH

FACTER OF REPORT AND HIS CONFIDENCE IN QUIRIELLE'S JUDGMENT AND SOURCES, HO CHI MINH MAY BE GOING TO PEKING TO REMIND CHICOMS THAT LATTER HAD ALWAYS CONSIDERED VITNAM TO BE PROBLEM TO BE SETTLED

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BY VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES AND TIME MAY COME WHEN VIETNAMESE MAY HAVE TO DO JUST THAT. MANAC'H ADDED THAT FRENCH HAVE ALWAYS STRESSED STRONG NATIONALISTIC CHARACTER OF NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP AND NORTH VIETNAMESE MAY CONSIDER PEKING'S CONCERN WITH ITS OWN SUCCESSION PROBLEM TO BE OPPOTUNE MOMENT TO ASSERT HANOI'S INDEPENDENCE FROM PEKING. QUIRIELLE REPORTS THAT DURING LAST TWO WEEKS MEMBERS DIPLOMATIC CORPS HANOI BEGINNING TO BELIEVE THAT NORTH VIETNAMEESE ARE REALLY HURTING FROM US

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~~For File~~
Mr. President
I believe you will
wish to read this
further stream in
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ATRIAL PONDINGS. HE WRITES THAT PEOPLE IN NORTH VIETNAM ARE BEGINNING TO SHOW FATIGUE AS RESULT BOMBINGS, HARVEST PROSPECTS ARE POOR BECAUSE DAMAGE DONE TO IRRIGATION DIKES AND TRANSPORTATION NETWORK MAY BE BREAKING DOWN. LANG SON RAILROAD HAS BEEN HEAVILY HIT AND WILL BE OUT OF COMMISSION FOR AT LEAST ONE MONTH. FURTHERMORE, NORTH VIETNAMESE CAN ONLY EXHORT PEOPLE TO NEW SACRIFICES BY CITING PAST VICTORIES BUT CANNOT POINT TO ANY RECENT SUCCESSES. IDEA IS MAKING HEADWAY IN HANOI THAT THEY "CAN'T FIGHT BOMBS WITH SLOGANS." ALSO LITTLE HEARD OF "FIGHTING 5, 10, 20 YEARS, IF NECESSARY."

3. QUIRIELLE FURTHER REPORTS THAT POLITBUREAU MET IN HANOI LAST WEEK AT WHICH TIME MEMBERS IN FAVOR NEGOTIATIONS SPOKE

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UP TO DEFEND THEIR VIEW.

4. MANAC'H STRESSED THAT FRENCH REPORTS FROM HANOI GAVE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION TO NORTH VIETNAMESE REACTION TO RONNING MISSION THAN THAT GIVEN IN WESTERN PRESS. ACCORDING QUIRIELLE, NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION HAS NOT RPT NOT HARDENED AS REPORTED IN PRESS. ON CONTRARY NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE UNDER IMPRESSION THAT US POSITION HAS HARDENED. IN TALK WITH CERTAIN DIPLOMATIC REPS HANOI, NORTH VIETNAMESE ALSO MAKING IT KNOWN THAT THEY DO NOT CONSIDER DOOR TO BE CLOSED TO AMBASSADOR RONNING FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION IF HE WISHES TO RETURN HANOI. MANAC'H SAID THAT PERSONALLY HE ALSO THOUGHT US LATELY GIVING IMPRESSION OF BEING LESS INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATIONS AND TRYING FOR KOREAN TYPE OF SOLUTION. HE EXPLAINED THAT THIS IMPRESSION MAY BE DUE TO FACT THAT US LEADERS HAVE NOT RECENTLY REITERATED US WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE. EMBOFFS ASSURED MANAC'H THAT US DESIRE FOR EARLIEST NEGOTIATIONS WITH NO CONDITIONS ASKED REMAINS AS FIRM AS EVER.

5. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, MANAC'H SAID THAT HANOI REPRESENTATIVE BO "APPEARS MORE SOLEMN NOW" AND SAINTENY ARRIVES HANOI JULY 1 "IF AIRFIELD STILL LEFT."

6 RE NEWSPAPER REPORTS THAT AN IMPORTANT NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION HAS GONE TO MOSCOW, MANAC'H OPINED THEY MAY BE REFERRING

~~PAGE 4 REFNCR 1693 SECRET~~
TO LE DUC THO'S VISIT, WHO STOPPED MOSCOW ON HIS WAY BACK TO HANOI FROM PRAGUE.

~~7. MANAC'H POINTED OUT THAT DE QUIRIELLE SPECULATION ON REASONS FOR HQ'S TRIP TO PEKING ANTI-D~~

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~~1-8-8583, 3-4-98, 5-889, &. HE DID NOT CARE TO COMMENT IN DEPTH ON HOW THESE RAIDS MIGHT AFFECT SITUATION EXCEPT TO STATE PERSONAL VIEW THAT EVEN IF HANOI DESTROYED IT WOULD NOT FORCE NORTH VIETNAM TO CAPITULATE OR HASTEN DAY WHEN NORTH VIETNAMESE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE~~

~~1-828583, 3-4, 98, 5-839, & HE DID NOT CARE TO COMMENT
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WILLING TO NEGOTIATE~~

7. MANAC'H POINTED OUT THAT DE QUIRIELLE SPECULATION ON REASONS FOR HO'S TRIP TO PEKING ANTI-DES US BOMBING OF PETROWHUM FACILITIES NEAR HANOI AND HAIPHONG. HE DID NOT CARE TO COMMENT IN DEPTH ON HOW THESE RAIDS MIGHT AFFECT SITUATION EXCEPT TO STATE PERSONAL VIEW THAT EVEN IF HANOI DESTROYED IT WOULD NOT FORCE NORTH VIETNAM TO CAPITULATE OR HASTEN DAY WHEN NORTH VIETNAMESE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE. NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD MERELY MOVE CAPITAL INTO THE BUSH JUST LIKE SOUPHANOUVONG HAD DONE IN LAOS. PRESENT POSITION REMAINS THAT BEST WAY TO MOVE NORTH VIETNAMESE TOWARD EARLY NEGOTIATIONS IS FOR US TO ANNOUNCE WILLINGNESS TO STOP BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM UNCONDITIONALLY. THIS MANAC'H FELT WOULD SPLIT SOVIETS FURTHER FROM PEKING AND STRENGTHEN PRO-NEGOTIATION ELEMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAMESE POLITBUREAU, TWO FORCES NEEDED TO BRING PRESENT NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP TO CONFERENCE TABLE.

COMMENT: EMB CONSIDERS ALSO NOTEWORTHY (A) FACT THAT MANAC'H PROVIDED THIS INFORMATION SINCE HE GENERALLY LESS FORTHCOMING RE EVENTS IN VIETNAM FAVORABLE TO US POSITION THAN JURGENSEN AND (B) APPARENT ABSENCE IN QUIRIELLE'S FOUR PAGE TELEGRAM OF ANY SPECULATION THAT HO MIGHT BE IN CHINA TO DEMAND STEPPING UP OF ASSISTANCE.

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