

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1810

| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION | |
|-----------------------|--|----------------|---------------------|--------------|
| #1 memo | to President from Rostow re: Vietnam secret <i>open 12-7-89 NLS 87-204</i> | 1 p | 07/31/66 | A |
| #1a memo | to spec. asst to Pres. from Deputy Dir. for Plans secret <i>sanitized 6-1-88 NLS 87-194</i> <i>sanitized 1-20-00 NLS 87-396</i> | 1 p | 07/30/66 | A |
| #1b report | CSDB 312/02199-66 " " " secret <i>sanitized 6-1-88 NLS 87-194</i> | 6 p | 07/30/66 | A |
| #2 cable | to President from Rostow re: Vietnam top secret <i>open 1-9-90 NLS 87-205</i> | 2 p | 07/30/66 | A |
| #3 memo | to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 1-26-89 NLS 87-198</i> | 1 p | 07/30/66 | A |
| #5 memo | to President from Rostow re: Pres. Shazar's visit <i>open 7/28/98</i> secret <i>sanitized 3-17-89 NLS 87-200</i> | 2 p | 07/30/66 | A |
| #5a memo | to President from Dean Rusk re: visit of Pres. Shazar secret <i>open 7-25-88 NLS 87-199</i> | 1 p | 07/29/66 | A |
| #5b report | talking paper re: Shazar visit confidential <i>open 7-25-88 NLS 87-199</i> | 2 p | undated | A |
| #6 memo | to President from Rostow re: PM Holyoake possible classified info <i>open 1-9-90</i> <i>NLS 87-205</i> | 1 p | 07/30/66 | A |
| #6a letter | to PM Holyoake from Pres. Johnson possible classified info " | 2 p | undated | A |
| #8 memo | duplicate #6 <i>open 7/28/98</i> | | | |
| #9 letter | to PM Holyoake from Pres. Johnson <i>open 7/28/98</i> possible classified info | 2 p | 08/01/66 | A |
| #10 message | from PM of New Zealand to Pres. of US secret | 3 p | 07/25/66 | A |
| #11 memo | to President from Rostow re: Colombia <i>open 7/28/98</i> confidential | 1 p | 07/30/66 | A |
| #12 memo | to President from Rostow re: Pres. Shazar's visit <i>open 7/28/98</i> secret | 2 p | 07/30/66 | A |
| #12a memo | to President from Dean Rusk re: Pres. Shazar visit <i>open 7/28/98</i> secret | 1 p | 07/29/66 | A |

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President
Walt Rostow, vol. 9 July 16-31, 1966
Box 9

RESTRICTION CODES

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|------------------|--|---|--------------|
| #12b report | talking paper for meeting with Shazar confidential | <i>Entire page open 7/28/78</i> 2 p undated | A |
| #13 memo | to President from Rostow re: Diaz Ordaz confidential <i>Exempt NLJ 87-198</i> | 2 p 07/30/66 | A |
| #13a letter | to President Ordaz from Pres. Johnson <i>Exempt NLJ 87-198</i> possible classified info <i>Confidential</i> | 1 p 08/01/66 | A |
| #13b letter | to Pres Johnson from Pres. Ordaz <i>Exempt NLJ 87-198</i> possible classified info <i>Confidential</i> | 3 p 07/26/66 | A |
| #15 memo | to President from Rostow re: Iran secret <i>open 3-17-89 NLJ 87-200</i> | 1 p 07/29/66 | A |
| #15a memo | to President from Amb. Meyer re: Iran secret <i>open 3-17-89 NLJ 87-200</i> | 1 p 07/28/66 | A |
| #17 memo | to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 3-17-89 NLJ 87-200</i> | 1 p 07/29/66 | A |
| #18 memo | to President from Rostow re: meeting with PM Wilson secret [sanitized 8/20/79] <i>OPEN 3-26-98 STATE GUIDELINES</i> | 2 p 07/29/66 | A |
| #19a memo | to President from Rostow re: King Hassan confidential <i>open 3-17-89 NLJ 87-200</i> | 1 p 07/30/66 | A |
| #19b letter | to President from King Hassan possible classified info | 5 x 1 p undated | A |
| #19c memo | to President from Rostow confidential | 1 p 07/30/66 | A |
| #19d letter | duplicate #19b | | |
| #20 memo | to President from Rostow re: Vietnam top secret <i>open 1-9-90 NLJ 87-205</i> | 1 p 07/29/66 | A |
| #20b cable | deptel to US Mission Geneva top secret <i>open 2-6-92 NLJ 91-438</i> | 5 p 07/27/66 | A |
| #21 memo | National Security Action Memo No. 354 confidential <i>open 9-5-89 NLJ 87-202</i> | 2 p 07/29/66 | A |
| #21a report | military report " confidential | 3 p undated | A |

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| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|------------------|--|---|--------------|
| #22 memo | to President from Rostow re: meeting with PM Wilson secret [sanitized 8/20/79] <i>open 3-22-91 NLS 90-245</i> 2 p | 07/29/66 | A |
| #23 memo | to President from Rostow re: Vietnam <i>open 7/28/98</i> top secret 1 p | 07/29/66 | A |
| #23a cable | from State to US Mission in Geneva <i>sanitized 9-1-88 NLS 88-54</i> top secret <i>Downgraded to "Conf"</i> 4 p <i>(open NLS 91-438; 4/17/92)</i> | 07/29/66 | A |
| #24 memo | to President from Rostow re: King Hassan <i>open 7/28/98</i> confidential 1 p | 07/29/66 | A |
| #24a letter | to Pres. Johnson from King Hassan <i>open 7/28/98</i> possible classified info 5 p | undated | A |
| #26b letter | to Pres. Mendez from Pres. Johnson <i>open 1-26-89 NLS 87-198</i> possible classified info 1 p | 07/28/66 | A |
| #28 memo | to President from Bator re: Wilson visit secret [sanitized 8/20/79] <i>sanitized 3-22-91 6 p NLS 90-245</i> | 07/28/66 | A |
| #28b memo | to President from Bator re: PM Wilson secret <i>Exempt NLS 87-202</i> 2 p | "07/28/66" | "A" |
| #28c memo | to President from Dean Rusk re: visit of PM Wilson secret [sanitized 8/14/78] <i>sanitized 4/5/89 NLS 87-199</i> 7 p | <i>OPEN NLS 28-208 4-25-99</i> 07/27/66 | A |
| #30 letter | to President from Pres. Mendez <i>open 7/28/98</i> possible classified info 1 p | 07/28/66 | A |
| #33 memo | to President from Rostow re: India and Pakistan confidential <i>open 3-17-89 NLS 87-200</i> 1 p | 07/28/66 | A |
| #33b memo | to SecState and SecAgr. from Rostow confidential <i>Open 3-17-89 NLS 87-200</i> 1 p | 08/01/66 | A |
| #34 memo | to President from Rostow re: Erhard secret <i>Exempt NLS 87-204</i> 1 p <i>sanitized 6/13/01 NLS 98-238</i> | 07/28/66 | A |
| #34a cable | text of TDCS 314/08841-66 <i>exempt per RAC 5/03</i> secret <i>Exempt NLS 87-194</i> 2 p | 07/12/66 | A |
| #34b cable | text of TDCS 314/08842-66 secret <i>exempt per RAC 5/03</i> 2 p | 07/12/66 | A |
| #35a cable | text of TDCS 314/09256-66 <i>sanitized 6-1-88 NLS 87-194</i> confidential [sanitized 8/8/77] 3 p | <i>sanitized 1-20-00 NLS 98-596</i> 07/25/66 | A |

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| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|---|--|--------------|-------------|
| #36 memo | to President from Rostow re: visit to Latin America secret <i>open 1-26-89 NLJ 87-198</i> | 2 p 07/27/66 | A |
| #36a report | scenario for visit to Latin America secret <i>open 1-26-89 NLJ 87-198</i> | 4 p undated | A |
| #38a cable | text of Saigon 2041 secret <i>open 8-4-88 NLJ 87-195</i> | 6 p 07/27/66 | A |
| #39a report | re: Pakistan. <i>Exempt NLJ 87-201</i> secret <i>Open NLJ 98-397 4-29-99</i> | 43 p undated | A |
| #40 memo [Supp #67, Syria, vol. Box 156] | to President from WWR re: Syria <i>Exempt 9-13-07 NLJ/RAC 06-6 (18-67)</i> secret <i>Exempt NLJ 87-200</i> <i>Exempt 6/13/01, NS 98-398</i> | 1 p 07/27/66 | A |
| #43 memo | to President from Bator re: meeting with Amb. Bruce secret <i>open 9-5-89 NLJ 87-202</i> | 2 p 07/26/66 | A |
| #48 memo | to President from Rostow re: Colombia <i>open 7/28/98</i> secret <i>Exempt NLJ 87-198</i> | 1 p 07/26/66 | A |
| #57 memo | to President from Bator re: meeting with Amb. McGhee confidential <i>open 9-5-89 NLJ 87-202</i> | 1 p 07/26/66 | A |
| #59 memo | to President from Rostow re: Pres. Branco <i>open 7/28/98</i> confidential <i>Exempt NLJ 87-198</i> | 1 p 07/25/66 | A |
| #59a letter | to President from Pres. Branco <i>open 10-20-99</i> confidential <i>Exempt NLJ 87-198</i> <i>NLJ 98-395</i> | 2 p 07/21/66 | A |
| #59b letter | to Pres. Branco from Pres. Johnson possible classified info <i>open 1-26-89 NLJ 87-198</i> | 1 p 06/23/66 | A |
| #60 memo | to President from WWR re: Amb. Locke secret <i>open 3-17-89 NLJ 87-200</i> | 2 p 07/25/66 | A |
| #60a memo | to Rostow from Ben. Read re: re: Pakistan secret <i>Exempt NLJ 87-201</i> <i>open NLJ 98-397 4-29-99</i> | 2 p 07/25/66 | A |
| #60b memo | to President from Rusk and McNamara re: India & Pakistan secret <i>Exempt NLJ 87-201</i> " " " " 8 p | undated | A |
| #60c report RE | re: India and Pakistan secret <i>Exempt NLJ 87-201</i> " " " " 14 p | undated | A |
| #60d memo | amb. Locke's comments... secret <i>Exempt NLJ 87-201</i> " " " " 4 p | 07/25/66 | A |

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| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|------------------|---|--------------|--------------|
| #60e cable | text of New Delhi 553 secret <i>Exempt NLS 87-201</i> | 4 p 07/25/66 | A |
| #61 memo | to President from WWR re: Afghanistan confidential <i>open 3-17-89 NLS 87-200</i> | 1 p 07/25/66 | A |
| #62 memo | to President from Rostow re: Vietnam secret <i>open 1-9-90 NLS 87-205</i> | 1 p 07/25/66 | A |
| #62a letter | to Pope Paul VI from Pres. Johnson secret <i>open 1-9-90 NLS 87-205</i> | 2 p 07/07/66 | A |
| #63 memo | to President from WWR re: Afghanistan <i>open 7/28/98</i> confidential | 1 p 07/25/66 | A |
| #64 memo | to President from Rostow re: Panama secret <i>open 12-7-89 NLS 87-204</i> | 3 p 07/25/66 | A |
| #64a agenda | suggested agenda for Panama visit " secret | 3 p undated | A |
| #65a memo | to President from Lincoln Gordon re: Colombia confidential <i>open 6-5-89 NLS 87-199</i> | 3 p 07/25/66 | A |
| #66a cable | text of Hong Kong 509 sanitized 8-4-88 NLS 87-195 secret [sanitized 11/16/81] <i>sanitized 7/21/00 NUS 98-397</i> | 3 p 07/25/66 | A |
| #67a memo | to President from Gen. Goodpaster <i>open 7/28/98</i> secret | 1 p 07/25/66 | A |
| #67b memo | for record re: telephone conversation with Gen. Eisenhower secret | 2 p 07/25/66 | A |
| #69a memo | to President from George Ball re: SW Africa secret <i>open 6-5-89 NLS 87-199</i> | 1 p 07/23/66 | A |
| #70 memo | to President from Rostow re: Vietnam secret <i>open 1-9-90 NLS 87-205</i> | 1 p 07/25/66 | A |
| #70a cable | text of Saigon 1786 secret <i>open 8-4-88 NLS 87-195</i> | 1 p 07/25/66 | A |
| #70b cable | text of Saigon 1848 secret <i>open 8-4-88 NLS 87-195</i> | 1 p 07/25/66 | A |
| #74a memo | to President from George McGhee re: Germany confidential <i>open 6-5-89 NLS 87-199</i> | 3 p 07/23/66 | A |

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|------------------|---|--------------|-------------|
| #71a memo | to President from Bator re: Belgium secret <i>Open 9-5-89 NLJ 87-202</i> | 1 p 07/20/66 | A |
| #72 memo | to President from Rostow secret | 2 p 07/25/66 | A |
| #73 memo | to President from WWR re: Nasser speech confidential <i>Open 3-17-89 NLJ 87-200</i> | 1 p 07/23/66 | A |
| #77 memo | to President from Rostow re: Latin America visit secret <i>Open 1-26-89 NLJ 87-198</i> | 1 p 07/22/66 | A |
| #78 memo | to President from Rostow re: Panama confidential <i>Open 12-7-89 NLJ 87-204</i> | 2 p 07/22/66 | A |
| #79 memo | to President from Rostow re: Vietnam secret <i>Open 1-9-90 NLJ 87-205</i> | 1 p 07/22/66 | A |
| #81 memo | to President from Rostow re: Prime Minister Burnham confidential <i>Open 1-26-89 NLJ 87-198</i> | 1 p 07/22/66 | A |
| #81a report | talking points <i>Open 7/28/98</i> confidential <i>Exempt NLJ 87-198</i> | 2 p undated | A |
| #83a memo | for Amb. Kohler in Moscow (347) confidential <i>Open 7-25-88 NLJ 87-199</i> | 1 p 07/22/66 | A |
| #84a cable | text of Saigon 1631 secret <i>Open 8-4-88 NLJ 87-195</i> | 3 p 07/22/66 | A |
| #85a cable | text of Saigon 1633 <i>Open 7/28/98</i> secret <i>Exempt NLJ 87-195</i> | 3 p 07/22/66 | A |
| #88 memo | to President from Rostow re: Madagascar possible classified info <i>Open 9-5-89 NLJ 87-202</i> | 1 p 07/22/66 | A |
| #89a memo | for Amb. Kohler in Moscow (347) <i>Open 7/28/98</i> confidential | 1 p 07/22/66 | A |
| #93b bio sketch | PM Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham of Guyana confidential <i>Open NLJ 98-397 4-29-99</i> | 2 p undated | A |
| #93 memo | to president from Rostow re: appt. with PM Burnham confidential | 1 p 07/22/66 | A |
| #93a report | talking points confidential <i>Open 9-25-89 NLJ 88-204</i> | 2 p undated | A |

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|------------------|--|-------------------------|--------------|
| #94 memo | to President from Rostow re: Madagascar <i>open 7/28/98</i> possible classified info | 1 p 07/22/66 | A |
| #99 memo | to President from Rostow <i>open 1-9-90 NLJ 87-205</i> confidential <i>open 1-9-90 NLJ 87-205</i> | 1 p 07/21/66 | A |
| #102 memo | to President from Rostow re: Bulgaria <i>open 7/28/98</i> confidential <i>Exempt NLJ 87-202</i> | 2 p 07/21/66 | A |
| #104 memo | to President from Rostow re: Thailand <i>open 7/28/98</i> Confidential | 1 p 07/21/66 | A |
| #107a cable | text of Paris 983 confidential <i>open 7-25-88 NLJ 87-199</i> | 2 p 07/20/66 | A |
| #108a cable | re: USSR/Vietnam/USA/China secret <i>Exempt NLJ 87-194 Jani NLJ 019-009-2</i> | 07/20/66 | A |
| #109a memo | to Bromley Smith from N. Davis confidential <i>open 9-5-89 NLJ 87-202</i> | 1 p 07/21/66 | A |
| #110 memo | to President from Rostow re: reconnaissance secret <i>open 12-7-89 NLJ 87-204</i> | 1 p 07/21/66 | A |
| #110a memo | National Security Action Memorandum " secret | 1 p 07/21/66 | A |
| #118 letter | to Shah of Iran from Pres. Johnson secret <i>open 3-17-89 NLJ 87-200</i> | 4 p 07/20/66 | A |
| #118a memo | to President from Rostow re: Iran secret <i>open 3-17-89 NLJ 87-200</i> | 3 p 07/19/66 | A |
| #118b memo | to President from Rusk secret <i>open 6-2-89 NLJ 87-199</i> | 1 p 07/19/66 | A |
| #118c letter | suggested letter to Shah of Iran secret <i>open 6-2-89 NLJ 87-199</i> | 4 p undated | A |
| #121 memo | to President from Rostow secret <i>Exempt NLJ 87-202 open 7-14-95 NLJ 93-236</i> | 2 p 07/20/66 | A |
| #123 memo | to President from Rostow re: visit of PM Burnham confidential <i>Exempt NLJ 87-198 open 11/05/96</i> | 1 p 07/20/66 | A |
| #123a bio sketch | PM Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham of Guyana <i>open 10/05</i> confidential <i>Exempt NLJ 87-203</i> | 2 p undated | A |

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|------------------|---|--------------------------------|--------------|
| #123b bio sketch | Atty Gen. of Guyana confidential Exempt NLS 87-203 <i>open 7/28/98</i> | undated <i>1 p</i> | A |
| #123c bio sketch | Personal Political Asst. to PM of Guyana confidential Exempt NLS 87-203 <i>open 7/28/98</i> | undated <i>1 p</i> | A |
| #123d report | suggested talking points confidential Exempt NLS 87-198 <i>open 7/28/98</i> | 07/21/66 <i>2 p</i> | A |
| #128 memo | to President from Rostow confidential <i>Open 1-9-90 NLS 87-205</i> | 07/20/66 <i>1 p</i> | A |
| #128a memo | to President from Bator re: Soviet-US Exchange Program possible classified info <i>open 7/28/98</i> | 07/19/66 <i>2 p</i> | A |
| #128b memo | to President from Dean Rusk re: exchange Program confidential <i>Open 6-5-89 NLS 87-199</i> | 07/19/66 <i>3 p</i> | A |
| #131a memo | to Rostow from Douglas MacArthur II confidential <i>Open 7-25-88 NLS 87-199</i> | 07/19/66 <i>1 p</i> | A |
| #134 memo | to President from Rostow re: PM Wilson secret Exempt NLS 87-202 <i>open 7/28/98</i> | 07/20/66 <i>1 p</i> | A |
| #134a memo | to President from PM Wilson secret Exempt NLS 87-202 <i>OPEN 3-26-98</i> | 07/20/66 <i>1 p</i> | A |
| #135 memo | to President from Rostow re: foreign aid bill confidential <i>Open 1-26-89 NLS 87-198</i> | 07/19/66 <i>2 p</i> | A |
| #136 memo | to President from Rostow re: King Hassan secret Exempt NLS 87-200 <i>Sen. Tru. 575/01 NLS 96-398</i> | 07/19/66 <i>2 p</i> | A |
| #137 memo | to President from Rostow re: USSR confidential <i>Open 9-5-89 NLS 87-202</i> | 07/19/66 <i>1 p</i> | A |
| #137b memo | to President from Bator re: Soviet-US Exchange Program possible classified info Exempt NLS 87-202 <i>open 7/28/98</i> | 07/19/66 <i>2 p</i> | A |
| #137c memo | to President from Dean Rusk re: US-Soviet civil air agreement confidential <i>Open 7-25-88 NLS 87-199</i> | 07/15/66 <i>2 p</i> | A |
| #139 memo | to President from Rostow re: King Hassan secret | 07/19/66 <i>2 p</i> | A |
| #140a memo | to President from Rostow re: Barrientos Lunch confidential Exempt NLS 87-198 <i>open 9-10-90 NLS 95-320</i> | 07/19/66 <i>1 p</i> | A |

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| #140b report | Sanitized 10-20-89 NLS 48-395 talking points Secretized 9-10-96 NLS 95-320 confidential Exempt NLS 87-198 | 2 p undated | A |
| #140d report | bio sketch Rene Barrientos Ortuno Exempt 8-97 NLS 95-218 open 7/28/98 confidential Exempt NLS 87-203 | 2 p undated | A |
| #141 memo | to President from Rostow confidential Open 9-5-89 NLS 87-202 | 1 p 07/19/66 | A |
| #141a memo | to Walt Rostow from W. Averell Harriman open 7/28/98 confidential Sanitized 6-5-89 NLS 87-199 | 1 p 07/18/66 | A |
| #141b cable | re: Cambodia open 7/28/98 possible classified info | 1 p 07/18/66 | A |
| #142 letter | to President from Leoni from Pres. Johnson open possible classified info Exempt NLS 87-198 | 2 p 07/19/66 | A |
| #143 memo | to President from Rostow re: Barrientos lunch confidential | 1 p 07/19/66 | A |
| #143a report | re: talking points with Barrientos confidential | 2 p undated | A |
| #143c bio sketch | of Rene Barrientos Ortuno open 7/28/98 confidential | 2 p undated | A |
| #144 memo | to President from WWR re: Mrs. Gandhi confidential Open 3-17-89 NLS 87-200 | 1 p 07/19/66 | A |
| #145 memo | to President from Bromley Smith re: Warsaw confidential Open 9-5-89 NLS 87-202 | 1 p 07/19/66 | A |
| #146b letter | to President from Chester Bowles Secret | 4 p 07/05/66 | A |
| #147a message | to President from PM Wilson secret Exempt NLS 90-245 OPEN 3-26-98 UK/STATE GUIDELINES | 2 p 07/19/66 | A |
| #149b cable | Deptel to Dakar confidential Open 9-5-89 NLS 87-202 | 1 p 07/13/66 | A |
| #149c memo | to Walt Rostow from Ben Read confidential Open 7-25-88 NLS 87-199 | 2 p 07/13/66 | A |
| #155 memo | to President from Rostow re: NATO OPEN 3-26-98 secret Exempt NLS 87-202 STATE GUIDELINES | 2 p 07/18/66 | A |

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| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|------------------|--|-------------------------|--------------|
| #156 memo | to President from Rostow re: Dominican Republic confidential <i>Exempt NLJ 87-198</i> <i>open 7/28/98</i> | 1 p 07/18/66 | A |
| #159 memo | to President from Rostow re: Panama secret <i>Open 12-7-89 NLJ 87-204</i> | 1 p 07/18/66 | A |
| #162c message | from Embassy London #739 confidential <i>Open 7-25-88 NLJ 87-199</i> | 1 p 07/15/66 | A |
| #163 memo | to President from Rostow [duplicate #155] secret <i>open 7/28/98</i> | 2 p 7/18/66 | A |
| #166a memo | re: Gen. Barrientos secret <i>Exempt NLJ 019-009-2 (2/02)</i> | 2 p undated | A |
| #167a memo | re: Japan <i>Open NLJ 98-397 4-29-99</i> secret <i>Exempt NLJ 87-199</i> | 2 p 07/12/66 | A |
| #168 memo | to President from Rostow re: Vietnam <i>open 12-9-92 NLJ 91-437</i> confidential <i>Exempt NLJ 87-205</i> | 2 p 07/16/66 | A |
| #169a memo | to President from Amb. Thompson secret <i>Open 7-25-88 NLJ 87-199</i> | 4 p 07/15/66 | A |
| #170a memo | to Walt Rostow from Ben Read re: Asia secret <i>Open 7-25-88 NLJ 87-199</i> | 1 p 07/15/66 | A |
| #173 memo | to President from Rostow top secret <i>Sanitized 10/25/02 NLJ 98-398</i> | 1 p 07/16/66 | A |
| #173a memo | to President from Rostow top secret <i>Sanitized 10/25/02 NLJ 98-398</i> | 2 p 07/05/66 | A |
| #174 memo | to President from Rostow re: Colombia confidential <i>Open 1-26-89 NLJ 87-198</i> | 1 p 07/16/66 | A |
| #175a letter | to Walt Rostow from Captain Behrens <i>open 7/28/98</i> confidential <i>Exempt NLJ 87-199</i> | 2 p 07/15/66 | A |

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President
Walt Rostow, vol. 9 July 16 - 31, 1966
Box 9

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN DISSEM

Sunday, July 31, 1966 -- 1:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

This interview with Mai Van Bo in Paris by a left wing journalist, indicates a position somewhat different than the classic four points of Hanoi, but still unsatisfactory because they ask us to take certain de-escalating actions without indication of what they would then do -- even negotiate. The station and headquarters comment at the end may be significant: he may have been overheard and known it. On the whole, I would still rate this a propaganda, rather than a negotiating, position designed to persuade others -- and perhaps us -- to take some of the heat off of them on a unilateral basis.

W. W. Rostow

CSDB-312/02199-66

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 89-204
By lig - NARA, Date 11-20-89

WWRostow:rln

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EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

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1a

30 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Special Assistant to the President.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SUBJECT : [REDACTED] comments on War in Vietnam,
Negotiations, Elections, and American Prisoners

This report is being disseminated to you, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Secretary of State.

Desmond FitzGerald
Deputy Director for Plans

Enclosure: [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-396
By is, NARA Date 1-20-00

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

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16
1-8

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Special Report

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

COUNTRY [REDACTED] Vietnam [REDACTED]

DATE OF
INFO. [REDACTED]

DATE 30 July 1966

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SUBJECT

[REDACTED] Comments on War in Vietnam, Negotiations, Elections,
and American Prisoners.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

2. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

3. Question: Has Hanoi's position toward negotiations changed? Is Hanoi still ready to negotiate even before the departure of American troops?

Answer: You must understand our objective and then in the context of our objective, everything else becomes clear. Our objective has been and remains exactly the same: Independence of the South and later on reunification through a yet undecided process. This is our only objective. We are not interested in defeating the Americans per se, or pursuing world strategies-- just independence and reunification. Thus, that which can lead to negotiations

EO 12958
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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-396
By is, NARA Date 1-20-00



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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

and to peace can only be one thing: That the Americans renounce . . . renounce their aggressive policy, their war. [REDACTED] repeated and emphasized the word renounce). This renouncement can be proven by several concrete steps: (1) stopping the bombing of the North; (2) stopping the sending of new troops to the South; (3) stopping engaging in new battles in the South. [REDACTED] repeated these three points several times using his fingers and making clear that nothing else was demanded as "proof" of the United States' renouncing its aggressive attitude). Then he added a fourth step: Recognition of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFV). [REDACTED] that at the present time the Americans are doing quite the opposite of "renouncing". They proclaim that they want military victory. They bomb more, send more troops, and wage more battles. That is the opposite of "renouncing". Once they start doing the opposite of what they are doing now, we will know that they mean to "renounce" and then peace and negotiations will become possible.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

4. Question: Should the Americans choose to maintain the Geneva agreements and hold elections in South Vietnam, are you too willing to respect the agreements and hold elections, allowing International Observers to participate? [REDACTED] did not like this question; he hesitated before giving a carefully considered reply).

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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Answer: It is clear that elections in the South can only be meaningful--elections are never perfect but at least they can be significant--after the departure of foreign troops. Elections in an occupied country can have no meaning at all. Only after all American troops are removed from the South can elections in the South mean anything and be acceptable.

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5. Question: Should the American troops depart from Vietnam but leave a puppet regime in Saigon, could the NLFSV make a coalition regime with such a Saigon regime and then promote elections.

Answer: Theoretically yes, but in fact, between us, no. It is a purely hypothetical question. A regime in the South, without an American military presence would not last a week. All the Saigon regimes have been maintained by the Americans. If the Americans leave, such a Saigon regime can be overthrown by the NLFSV in a few days simply by popular manifestations. [REDACTED] emphasized manifestations. EO 12958 as opposed to armed force). The essential fact to remember is 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs that the people in the South back the NLFSV. Of course the (C) NLFSV is free to do as it pleases. In any case, as we see it, elections in the South can only take place and be significant after the South has become independent. Then the NLFSV will approach the problem of reunification in its own good time and by its own methods. We are not against any suggestion. If the NLFSV suggests elections as a means of reunification, we will not say no a priori. There is no hurry. Eventually we shall be reunited because we are one people that has been artificially cut in two. Phases for reunification are: (1) Independence in the South and departure of US troops; (2) Elections in the South; and (3) Reunification through elections or other methods. Later there will be elections in the North and when and how to hold them is a one hundred per cent Vietnamese internal problem.

6. Question: What do you think about the elections that the Americans are promoting in the South?

Answer: The NLFSV will certainly treat the elections as they deserve to be treated, as fakes; their lack of significance will be exposed.

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7. Question: Has the bombing of oil depots near Haiphong/Hanoi meant a fundamental change in the war?

Answer: No, just a higher degree of seriousness. There is no telling what may come, but so far the nature of the war has not changed and we still consider it as an aerial war of destruction. [REDACTED] very seriously considered this question and the reply. His answer indicated that he did not consider these acts to be a fundamental change.)

EO 12958
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8. Question: Are you considering sending your army to the South across the "Border"?

Answer: No, not at all. Not now. Many things of course can happen. There are more than a million Chinese, Soviet, Cuban, Bulgarian, etc. volunteers ready to come. We have a large potential reserve of soldiers which we have not drawn upon as yet. As long as we feel we do not need them, we will not call upon them. We are quite capable of inflicting serious damages and defeats on the Americans. The NLFSV has killed forty thousand Americans. We have shot down more than twelve thousand planes (sic). The American "Special War" in 1965 failed completely. They then changed it into the "Local War". We have already won the first phase of the "Local War" by making it fail to attain its objective during the dry season. It was aiming at breaking up the NLFSV's forces into small guerrilla forces. It has failed. One U. S. Division, the First Infantry Division, has lost nineteen battalions. Even if the Americans send one million men they cannot win.

9. Question: What do you think will happen if the U. S. prisoners get killed?

Answer: How can you suggest such a thing, how can you? I read that story in the paper, that we might send the prisoners into a target area for the Americans to kill their own men. [REDACTED] said I had not read that story and did not have anything like that in mind, but simply wondered whether the Americans could not accidentally

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kill the prisoners, wherever they were stationed). Of course that can happen, but the danger they risk is the danger everybody risks in North Vietnam. With regard to these prisoners let me say this: (1) The American leaders - President Johnson, Defense Secretary McNamara, and Secretary of State Rusk - are war criminals who fit exactly the Nuremberg Trial definition; they destroy our population and country without a declaration of war. (2) The pilots are executors and participants in these war crimes and therefore accountable to the Vietnamese Nation. (3) The trials will take place whenever the Hanoi Government feels that the time has come. [REDACTED] indicated several times that there was no hurry). (4) They meanwhile are treated humanely and according to the human traditions of the Vietnamese people. Our people over the last thousand years have neither humiliated nor hurt enemies who have surrendered their weapons. [REDACTED] repeated these four points three times). Johnson has used the issue of the prisoners to regroup American public opinion which had abandoned him somewhat, to distract world public opinion from the latest escalation, and to justify further escalation of the war.

EO 12958
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10. Question: Is there any chance of exchanging the American prisoners against the nineteen captured North Vietnamese sea pilots?

Answer: I do not know if the Americans really captured nineteen North Vietnamese sea pilots; I have no information about that. But I can tell you that if the Americans think in terms of exchanging their pilots against NLFSV prisoners in the South, they are entirely wrong. The NLFSV prisoners are prisoners in the conflict between the USA and NLFSV. The U.S. pilots in the North are in a totally different bracket. It is our duty to protect them until their trial. You can be sure that we are putting them in a safer place than most people, for we must protect these fallen enemies and they will be as safe as can be humanly predicted.

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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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11. Question: Will President De Gaulle's visit to Cambodia be an occasion for contacts concerning possible negotiations?

Answer: You see, there is little chance of negotiations at this time with the American escalation. It is not enough to talk, there must be a context, a circumstance. Objective circumstances right now do not favor negotiations. The Americans want to win the war, so there is little that De Gaulle can do. Of course--and don't quote me on this--De Gaulle can perhaps contribute a little bit to change the circumstances. He is going to Cambodia not because Prince Sihanouk invited him, but because he is concerned with the possibility of the U. S. expanding the war to Laos and Cambodia. The Americans have three plans: To intensify the bombing of the North; to send more troops to the South; to enlarge the war by taking it to Laos and Cambodia. De Gaulle goes to Phnom Penh to tell the Americans in his fashion: "I am here; 'you stay off'." We will always take a positive attitude toward De Gaulle's or anybody else's efforts to promote peace and negotiations.

[REDACTED]

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Headquarters' Comment: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is possible that [REDACTED] was in a position to overhear the conversation and this may have influenced [REDACTED] comments.

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DE WTE 1273

1966 JUL 30 16 55

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66536

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-205
By ing NARA, Date 1-3-90

~~TOP SECRET~~

SATURDAY, JULY 30, 1966
11:20 A.M.

MR. PRESIDENT:

SEC. RUSK DESIRES THAT YOU SEE AND APPROVE THESE DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS COVERING GROUND OPERATIONS IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE IN VIET NAM, BEFORE THEY ARE SENT OUT. I BELIEVE THEY BOTH PROTECT OUR INTERESTS AND ARE CAUTIOUS ON THE RIGHT POINTS.

W.W. ROSTOW

TO: AMEMBASSY SAIGON JCS
FROM: SECSTATE

SUBJECT: DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF GROUND UNITS IN DMZ
SOUTH OF DEMARCATION LINE.

REF: JCS 7184/2023192 (PASEP)

1. USG HAS TODAY APPROVED FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUBJECT MILITARY OPERATIONS ON WHICH JCS SENDING IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS:

A. WITH REFERENCE TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF JCS 7184/2023192, GROUND OPERATIONS AGAINST VC/NVA FORCES INFILTRATING INTO SVN ACROSS THE DMZ OR OPERATING FROM THE DMZ WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE PLACE SOUTH OF THE DMZ TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PRACTICABLE. HOWEVER, US/FWMAF FORCES ARE AUTHORIZED TO MANEUVER IN THE DMZ SOUTH OF THE DEMARCATION LINE WHILE IN CONTACT WITH VC/NVA FORCES OR WHEN SUCH ENGAGEMENT IS IMMINENT, AS NECESSARY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE US/FWMAF FORCES. JCS WILL BE IMMEDIATELY INFORMED OF SUCH ACTIONS.

B. US/FWMAF FORCES WILL NOT ADVANCE NORTH OF THE DEMARCATION LINE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND WILL WITHDRAW SOUTH OF THE DMZ WHEN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY IS BROKEN.

2. IN AMPLIFICATION OF ABOVE THIS AUTHORITY IS ESTABLISHED SOLELY TO PROVIDE FOR DEFENSE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM AND US/FWMAF FORCES. IT WILL BE APPLIED SOLELY IN SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST CLEARLY DEFINED, SIGNIFICANT ENEMY MILITARY ACTIVITY IN DMZ SOUTH OF DEMARCATION LINE POSING A THREAT TO FRIENDLY FORCES AND WILL NOT BE APPLIED TOWARD WIDENING CONFLICT INTO OR NORTH OF THE DMZ.

3. REQUEST YOUR VIEWS AS TO WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE SIMILAR AUTHORITY FOR RVNAF SINCE GVN HAS PROTESTED TO ICC. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT RVNAF MAY BE LESS CAREFUL ABOUT RESPECTING DEMARCATION LINE. ON OTHER HAND, BELIEVE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO WITHHOLD AUTHORITY FOR RVNAF UNITS SIMILAR TO THAT BEING GRANTED US/FWMAF UNITS. MOREOVER, QUESTION DESIRABILITY OF HAVING ONLY US/FWMAF UNITS MANEUVERING IN DMZ. OBVIOUSLY IT COULD CREATE DIFFICULTY FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH GVN IF OUR OWN ACTIONS AND AUTHORITY BECAME PUBLIC, AND THEY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE. DOES MISSION BELIEVE DEFENSIVE MANEUVERING OF RVNAF UNITS CAN BE CONTROLLED SUFFICIENTLY IN LIGHT OF THEIR PRESENT AND PROBABLE DEPLOYMENTS IN THE AREA AND THE PROBABLE DEGREE OF AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON THEIR ACTIONS? IN THIS CONNECTION, WE RECALL THAT GENERAL THI TOOK HIS FORCES INTO THE DMZ ON ONE EARLIER OCCASION; HOWEVER, OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT RVNAF FORCES IN AREA ARE NOW COOPERATING MUCH MORE FULLY AND THAT THIS DANGER MAY NOT BE GREAT.

4. WE NOTE COMMENT IN PARAGRAPH TWO OF SAIGON'S 1462 AND APPRECIATE DIFFICULTY OF DETERMINING LINE OF DEMARCATION OF WESTERN SECTION OF DMZ. IT IS OBVIOUSLY OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE THAT ANY ACTION WE MAY TAKE IN DMZ NOT REPEAT NOT BE CONSTRUED AS ANYTHING OTHER THAN SELFDEFENSE OR AS INDICATING ANY INTENTIONS TO EXTEND GROUND ACTION INTO NORTH VIET-NAM.

GP-2

DTG: 301612Z JULY 66

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday - July 30, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Availability of Professor Carlson for the Ambassadorship to Colombia

Last week you asked me to determine whether Professor Reynold E. Carlson would be available to replace Covey Oliver in Bogota and, if so, to let you see him (Tab A).

Professor Carlson indicates that he would be interested in the assignment and that his employers would give him leave of absence.

He will be in town next Tuesday or Wednesday, August 2 and 3.

Jim Jones tells me that you have 11:30 a.m. open both days. If you will indicate a preference, we will set up the appointment.

W. W. Rostow

Prefer Tuesday, August 2 ____.

Prefer Wednesday, August 3 ____.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-198

By lig, NARA, Date 1-20-89

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWR 7/16/66 memo
for the President.

4

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
Saturday

July 30, 1966 -- 11:20 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: State Visit of President Sunay of
Turkey in early December

Earlier you agreed to welcome President
Sunay during the first two weeks in December.

We now suggest Monday, Tuesday and
Wednesday, December 6, 7 and 8, as planning
dates which we will now communicate to the
Turks if you approve.

Walt R.

Approved _____

See me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *DCAT* NARS, Date *8-17-86*

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, July 30, 1966 -- 11:30 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: President Shazar's Visit, Tuesday, August 2.

As you know, President Shazar's visit is largely ceremonial. I have, therefore, cut the briefing materials to a minimum.

However, you will want to read Secretary Rusk's memo (attached).

I also recommend highly the red tabs in the briefing book (D-2, D-3, D-4). They represent the first result of an effort to get State and AID to present statistical material in an useable, mature way. They spell out graphically how well we have done by Israel -- a point you may want to use domestically this fall in private meetings.

Shazar will wish to tell you about his Latin American trip, but has no business to transact. Therefore, we suggest a general exchange of views striking the theme that US-Israeli relations have never been better and have reached a new level of maturity. Israel is now a going concern, and our relationship has become one of equals who can talk out their differences "on top of the table" (as you told Eban) -- instead of one where they feel sleight-of-hand is necessary to win their point.

Playing that theme will reinforce your suggestion to Eban last February that he try to stop Israel's friends from pressuring you via the newspapers and their Congressmen. We made a big step during our aircraft negotiations in keeping the issue in channels. We'd like to preserve that quiet approach to make Bunker's job easier. It also would help protect you from some of the back-door pressures they have used in the past.

You may wish to tell Shazar in confidence that you have decided to appoint Bunker, but hold up announcement. Bunker needs some rest and then some time to do his preliminary homework. You might preserve Bunker's maneuverability by saying that -- while you are still excited by the hope desalting offers -- you realize, after painstaking personal review of the subject, that there are many unresolved questions.

Shazar is not the man to press on Viet Nam, and Israel has strong argument for not wanting to get involved. But, as you told Eban, Israel would rightly be the first to be frightened if the U. S. were to "cut and run in Viet Nam." You might give him your reasons for wanting Free World

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-2-

help there. It would strengthen our hand generally to remind the Israelis that on this issue, which is very important to us, they may see their interests differently from ours, but they share fully an interest that U.S. commitments remain credible to one and all.

I will have brief talking points for you before you see Shazar at noon on Tuesday, August 2.

W. W. Rostow

2628
5a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 29, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Informal Visit of President Zalman
Shazar of Israel

I enclose a talking paper for your use when President Shazar calls on you at noon, on Tuesday, August 2.

President Shazar is on his way back to Israel after state visits to Chile, Uruguay and Brazil. At your invitation, he is coming to Washington August 2 from New York where he arrived on July 28. He is being given the protocol courtesies usually extended to a friendly Chief of State on an informal visit, and he and Mrs. Shazar will stay at Blair House.

The presidency of Israel is largely ceremonial. However, President Shazar commands wide respect in the world Jewish community both because of his office and his personal stature. He has long been associated with Zionist activities and was one of the founders of the Histadrut labor federation and the ruling MAPAI (socialist, Zionist, labor) party of Israel.

President Shazar is shy and unassuming. We have been told by the Israeli Embassy that, although he may volunteer some impressions of his recent visit to Latin America, Mr. Shazar does not plan to raise specific matters of substance during his call on you. We see the meeting as an occasion for you to reaffirm our close friendship with Israel and our continued support of Israel's independence and integrity.

Assistant Secretary Raymond A. Hare, Ambassador Walworth Barbour, and Mr. Harrison Symmes, Country Director for Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, will accompany President Shazar's party from the airport to the White House.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 87-199
By *up*, NARA, Date 7-8-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING PAPER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH ISRAELI PRESIDENT ZALMAN SHAZAR

The Presidency of Israel is a largely ceremonial office. President Shazar himself is much less a politician than a Zionist ideologist and intellectual. His only cabinet-level experience was as Minister of Education. He spent most of his career as a journalist and publicist, and he has been active in the Histadrut labor federation and in world Zionist organizations. You met President Shazar when he represented Israel at President Kennedy's funeral.

It is unlikely President Shazar will raise specific matters of substance with you. After thanking you for our economic and military assistance to Israel, he will probably give you some impressions of his recent visits to Latin America and his visit earlier this year to Nepal. Your meeting with him is thus an opportunity for reaffirming our close ties with Israel and our positive support for Israel's independence and integrity along the following lines:

President Shazar's visit to Washington is a visible sign of our close and friendly ties. It serves to remind us that relations between our two countries have never been better. You are personally gratified that these relations have prospered during your own Administration. They have reached a new plane of maturity. We see eye to eye with Israel on most things. Where we differ we are able to discuss our differences in a frank and friendly spirit.

The major reason for this happy state of relations is Israel's own steady and heartening progress toward self-sufficiency.

Today, after nearly two decades of independence, Israel's influence in world affairs belies its small size and newly independent status. The voice of Israel is respected in world councils. Israel is sharing its experience and is helping others to build their nations. The President's visit to our own hemisphere demonstrates Israel's growing ties with the developing nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The Israeli economy is blooming, and in many important respects Israel is a developed country. Israel has made dramatic progress toward paying its own way and present healthy trends are expected to continue in the years ahead.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-199
By *inf*, NARA, Date 7-8-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals
not automatically declassified

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

We are proud to have had a hand in Israel's renaissance. We desire for Israel the same security and well-being we desire for ourselves. Actions we have taken show our intentions to help safeguard the security of Israel and to assist the Israeli economy to flourish.

To sell tanks and aircraft to Israel was a difficult decision. We want to promote peace, not to sell arms, in the Near East. We do not intend to become a major arms salesman there. Yet, we recognized that a country's defense must be credible. The fundamental stability of the area must be preserved.

Again this year we have provided generous economic assistance to Israel, despite the increasing difficulty of justifying special aid under the standards set up by our foreign aid laws. As it turns out the total assistance we have given Israel this year is the largest we have ever provided for Israel. This was a special year, and we do not expect it to set a new standard for our aid. In fact, we hope that our aid level will cease to be a measure of our relationship.

In summary, our relations rest today on a higher and a stabler platform. In an insecure world Israel is secure. Israelis and Americans, both official and unofficial, are in constant frank and friendly contact with one another.

We must use this present platform of good feeling and security to build for the future. It can form a base for our efforts to bring about a just and lasting peace in the area. While we recognize the delicacy of any move to promote long-term Arab-Israeli accommodation, we fear failure to think about this leaves only a very troubled picture of the future. This is not the time for either of us to be satisfied with the situation or to cease searching for solutions.

If the prophetic vision that we share is to be fulfilled we on earth must help. On our side while constantly bearing in mind the safeguarding of the present we shall not forget the vision of peace and stability for the future.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6

Saturday, July 30, 1966 -- 10:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

I recommend you sign the attached letter to Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand, drafted by State Dept. There is also attached a copy of the Prime Minister's letter to you of July 25 which reaffirms the support of his government for our policies in Viet Nam, while noting considerations that enter into maintaining domestic New Zealand confidence in his policy of support.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-205
By WJ NARA, Date 1-3-90

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

6a

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have read with great interest your kind letter to me of July 25 which was passed by Ambassador Laking to the Secretary of State. I am pleased that you have given me such a frank and enlightening picture of the current state of feeling both in your government and among the New Zealand public concerning Viet Nam.

It is a continuing source of comfort and encouragement to me personally, to our government, and to the American people to know that the Government and people of New Zealand share our conviction of the great importance of the task facing the free world in Viet Nam, and that New Zealand also is both devoting military resources to help meet the armed threat and is sharing in other efforts to promote social and economic construction.

There can be no doubt that those of us who share these convictions and are backing them up with action, will, through carefully measured steps, secure the right for South Viet Nam to remain a free and independent state.

We do not wish to endanger any regime, nor is it our intention to inflict hardships on the civilian population of North Viet Nam. Our targets are military, whose elimination will reduce the capacity of the Communist forces to infiltrate into South Viet Nam.

I very much appreciate this opportunity to exchange views with you and I will value your advice and further observations regarding developments in Viet Nam which concern us both. I agree in the desirability of close and timely exchanges of information and assessments and you may be assured that the close communications that

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-205
By ing NARA, Date 1-3-90

presently exist on the military, diplomatic and government level between our two countries will be energetically continued by us.

The Secretary of State has given me a complete review of his conversations with you in Canberra, and I will look forward to a continuation of our close relationship in the difficult period that we have before us.

Sincerely,

The Right Honorable
Keith J. Holyoake
Prime Minister of New Zealand
Wellington

July 30, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: President's letter to Congressman Teague

We need the President's signature on the attached letter to Congressman Teague as soon as possible. The Philippine panel arrives on Monday, and this letter will constitute Congressman Teague's terms of reference for the Washington discussions.

My draft memo to the President is self-explanatory, but there is one point I should flag for your attention: the last three words on the first page of the President's reply -- "appropriate for handling" -- continue to cause much pain at the Department of State. Bill Bundy and particularly his desk people would prefer "appropriate for recommendation" since the items in question (re-examination of certain of the controversial "omnibus claims") have already been "handled" during the Manila discussions, and the only action precluded in the President's earlier letter to Marcos was recommendation on these items which are not directly relevant to veterans benefits. I argued this matter with Schultze's people, but they claim that he is adamant. Bill Bundy and I would both prefer a switch from "handling" to "recommendation," but this would require a call from you to Schultze -- and the point remains somewhat marginal.

James Thomson, Jr.

Att.

Sunday, July 31, 1966 -- 1:10 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Response to Congressman Teague Regarding Philippine Veterans Benefits

Congressman Teague has reported on the Manila discussions earlier this month between Philippine and American Panels regarding veterans benefits. State and the Veterans Administration now ask that you sign the attached draft reply to Teague's report. Your letter will constitute Teague's terms of reference for the Washington discussions of the two Panels which will commence on Monday.

The two Panels made fine progress which should help improve the atmosphere of the Marcos visit in September. Teague's proposals will probably cost about \$15 million a year, and he is introducing the necessary enabling legislation.

The attached letter has Charlie Schultze's approval, and Schultze also asks that you sign a further letter (attached) to Secretary Rusk in which you direct that State and Treasury prepare arrangements for your approval that will minimize or offset the balance of payments impact of these proposals.

W. W. Rostow

Atts.

2637
76

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

JUL 29 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Response to Chairman Teague on Philippine Veterans claims

Attached for your signature is a proposed reply to Congressman Teague, expressing your support of his proposals to resolve the question of benefits for Philippine veterans. His proposals will probably cost about \$15 million a year, and he is prepared to introduce the necessary enabling legislation.

The Administrator of Veterans Affairs reports that the proposed reply would be agreeable to Chairman Teague. The Department of State also concurs in the reply.

State and Treasury agree with me that it is desirable to try to work out some arrangement with the Philippine Government to avoid an adverse impact on our balance of payments resulting from the claims settlement. Accordingly, I also recommend that you sign the attached letter to the Secretary of State.

(signed) Charles L. Schultze
Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachment

1966 JUL 30 AM 10 25

EXECUTIVE OFFICE
RECEIVED

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 1, 1966

Congressman
Dear Mr. League:

I read with interest your letter concerning the Manila meetings of the Joint United States-Republic of Philippines Commission for the Study of Philippine Veterans Problems. It was most gratifying to learn that the meetings were conducted in an atmosphere of cordiality and friendliness.

I desired primarily to find some equitable means of resolving certain inequities and inadequacies that had developed with respect to veterans' benefits of the Philippine veterans who had fought with the Armed Forces of the United States in World War II. The extension of hospital care, the granting of educational assistance to children of dead or disabled veterans and an increase in the peso-dollar ratio are specified by you as having merit and calling, I would gather, for firm action recommendations by the American members of the Panel, which in turn would be accompanied by enabling legislation in the Congress. I assure you of Administration support for legislation to cover these matters, although I know you are well aware of our difficult budgetary situation, and I would hope that we could end up well below the \$50 million figure which you cited in your letter.

Although I am hopeful that we can achieve a satisfactory settlement of these matters in the area of veterans' benefits, I do want to minimize the adverse effect upon our overall balance of payments resulting from the settlement. Accordingly, I am asking the Secretaries of State and Treasury to prepare for my consideration on appropriate basis for separate discussions with the Philippine Government on this aspect. However, it would be appropriate for you to indicate to the Members of the Philippine Panel my concern and intention to have these separate discussions.

I understand further that the Philippine Panel in the course of your discussions in Manila presented material and position papers related to claims against the United States that would not fall directly under the heading of veterans' benefits and thus are not appropriate for handling

by the veterans' panel. While I am glad that the United States Panel has heard the Philippine Panel fully on these matters, I suggest that, in your continuing discussions with the Philippine Panel in August, you point out the propriety of referring these matters to the United States and Philippine Governments for consideration as to whether any further action is required.

Sincerely,

/s/ h BJ

Honorable Olin E. Teague
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 1, 1966

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am pleased to know that the meetings of the Joint United States-Republic of the Philippines Commission on Philippine Veterans Problems have been harmonious and cordial.

I am concerned that we minimize the adverse effect upon the balance of payment of any final settlement of veterans' claims. I appreciate that this question cannot be handled within the framework of the Joint Commission and will require separate discussions with the Philippine Government. I understand that arrangements to minimize or offset the balance of payments impact are feasible, and I would like you and the Secretary of the Treasury to prepare for my consideration appropriate possibilities and a recommended course of action.

Sincerely,

/s/ LBJ

Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

8
Saturday, July 30, 1966 -- 10:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

I recommend you sign the attached letter to Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand, drafted by State Dept. There is also attached a copy of the Prime Minister's letter to you of July 25 which reaffirms the support of his government for our policies in Viet Nam, while noting considerations that enter into maintaining domestic New Zealand confidence in his policy of support.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-8-98

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have read with great interest your kind letter to me of July 25 which was passed by Ambassador Laking to the Secretary of State. I am pleased that you have given me such a frank and enlightening picture of the current state of feeling both in your government and among the New Zealand public concerning Viet Nam.

It is a continuing source of comfort and encouragement to me personally, to our government, and to the American people to know that the Government and people of New Zealand share our conviction of the great importance of the task facing the free world in Viet Nam, and that New Zealand also is both devoting military resources to help meet the armed threat and is sharing in other efforts to promote social and economic construction.

There can be no doubt that those of us who share these convictions and are backing them up with action, will, through carefully measured steps, secure the right for South Viet Nam to remain a free and independent state.

We do not wish to endanger any regime, nor is it our intention to inflict hardships on the civilian population of North Viet Nam. Our targets are military, whose elimination will reduce the capacity of the Communist forces to infiltrate into South Viet Nam.

I very much appreciate this opportunity to exchange views with you and I will value your advice and further observations regarding developments in Viet Nam which concern us both. I agree in the desirability of close and timely exchanges of information and assessments and you may be assured that the close communications that

presently exist on the military, diplomatic and government level between our two countries will be energetically continued by us.

The Secretary of State has given me a complete review of his conversations with you in Canberra, and I will look forward to a continuation of our close relationship in the difficult period that we have before us.

Sincerely,

/s/

The Right Honorable
Keith J. Holyoake
Prime Minister of New Zealand
Wellington

LBJ:State:DWR:hg:rln

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-395
By js, NARA Date 1-26-00

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, DATED
25 JULY 1966

My recent meeting in Canberra with Secretary Rusk enabled me to have frank discussions over the whole range of problems relating to Vietnam. You will be aware from those discussions, and from the public statements which I have made from time to time in recent weeks, that there is no great disparity in our approach to this most difficult issue.

It is in the light of this identity of view, therefore, that I am taking this opportunity to acquaint you with certain difficulties which I feel may face the New Zealand Government should the present nature of the conflict in Vietnam change markedly - particularly if there were a major enlargement of military measures against the north which might be represented as posing a threat to civilian populations.

Lest this appear to suggest some element of reservation, let me say, at once, that I am in no sense critical of the decisions taken by your Administration. I fully share your view that while our objective is a political settlement in Vietnam the obduracy of the Communist side has made it necessary to embark upon a measured increase of actions directed against the North Vietnamese in order to persuade them of the desirability of either entering into negotiations or abandoning their military intervention in South Vietnam.

I am, however, deeply conscious, as I know you are, of the need to retain public confidence and to maintain a

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/united

united national approach in carrying out this policy. I have unbounded admiration for the patient and calm manner in which you have placed the issues involved before the American public. For my part I have endeavoured to do the same in New Zealand and I believe that I can say that there is in this country solid support for United States policies and actions.

My apprehensions, however, relate not to the present situation but to the circumstances which may arise should the measures at present being undertaken fail to have the effect upon North Vietnamese attitudes for which we all hope. Considering the very great sacrifices which the American people are making on behalf of South Vietnam (and indeed on behalf of all of us) it might seem for many a natural reaction to call for a resort to even more extensive measures in order to secure North Vietnam's compliance.

My own difficulties, however, are likely to be of a different nature. The prospect of a marked escalation of the war, particularly if this were to embrace non-military targets, would certainly cause widespread apprehension here. The much smaller role of New Zealand, compared with the enormous efforts being made by the United States, inevitably, I suppose, imposes a difference of perspective. But I should think that those in this country who would favour more drastic action against North Vietnam are a very small minority indeed in comparison with those who would favour keeping operations at about the present level. Whatever my personal convictions, and those of the New Zealand Government, I fear that I would have some difficulty in guiding public opinion - particularly as this is an

~~SECRET~~ /election

election year - should your Administration feel obliged to authorise measures which might be felt likely to change radically the nature of the conflict. I am, of course, fully aware that you are confronted with issues involving the most difficult and unenviable problems of political and military judgement. I have every confidence in your determination to take full account of all possible consequences which could result from additional measures against North Vietnam which may be under discussion. I am equally confident of your wish to insure against inflicting unnecessary suffering upon the civilian population of North Vietnam.

New Zealand, I might say, regards itself as a loyal, if small, ally of the United States. We in the Government are anxious to do what we can to support you in your handling of this most complex problem, not only because of our natural feelings of kinship with your country but also because on this critical issue we fully share your objectives. For my own part I should feel more confident of being able to guide public response here if I were given adequate time to consider, and perhaps discuss with you, steps which your Administration may contemplate taking in the difficult months ahead. You have shown me great courtesy in the past in informing me of measures which you have proposed to take and I should welcome a continuation and extension of that practice.

I know that you will accept my comments as an expression of the frankness which, happily, characterises a relationship as close as that which pertains between your country and mine.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday - July 30, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Availability of Professor Carlson for the Ambassadorship to Colombia

Last week you asked me to determine whether Professor Reynold E. Carlson would be available to replace Covey Oliver in Bogota and, if so, to let you see him (Tab A).

Professor Carlson indicates that he would be interested in the assignment and that his employers would give him leave of absence.

He will be in town next Tuesday or Wednesday, August 2 and 3.

Jim Jones tells me that you have 11:30 a.m. open both days. If you will indicate a preference, we will set up the appointment.

W. W. Rostow

Prefer Tuesday, August 2 ____.

Prefer Wednesday, August 3 ____.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-9-98

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWR 7/16/66 memo
for the President.

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, July 30, 1966 -- 11:30 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: President Shazar's Visit, Tuesday, August 2.

As you know, President Shazar's visit is largely ceremonial. I have, therefore, cut the briefing materials to a minimum.

However, you will want to read Secretary Rusk's memo (attached).

I also recommend highly the red tabs in the briefing book (D-2, D-3, D-4). They represent the first result of an effort to get State and AID to present statistical material in an useable, mature way. They spell out graphically how well we have done by Israel -- a point you may want to use domestically this fall in private meetings.

Shazar will wish to tell you about his Latin American trip, but has no business to transact. Therefore, we suggest a general exchange of views striking the theme that US-Israeli relations have never been better and have reached a new level of maturity. Israel is now a going concern, and our relationship has become one of equals who can talk out their differences "on top of the table" (as you told Eban) -- instead of one where they feel sleight-of-hand is necessary to win their point.

Playing that theme will reinforce your suggestion to Eban last February that he try to stop Israel's friends from pressuring you via the newspapers and their Congressmen. We made a big step during our aircraft negotiations in keeping the issue in channels. We'd like to preserve that quiet approach to make Bunker's job easier. It also would help protect you from some of the back-door pressures they have used in the past.

You may wish to tell Shazar in confidence that you have decided to appoint Bunker, but hold up announcement. Bunker needs some rest and then some time to do his preliminary homework. You might preserve Bunker's maneuverability by saying that -- while you are still excited by the hope desalting offers -- you realize, after painstaking personal review of the subject, that there are many unresolved questions.

Shazar is not the man to press on Viet Nam, and Israel has strong argument for not wanting to get involved. But, as you told Eban, Israel would rightly be the first to be frightened if the U. S. were to "cut and run in Viet Nam." You might give him your reasons for wanting Free World

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-2-

help there. It would strengthen our hand generally to remind the Israelis that on this issue, which is very important to us, they may see their interests differently from ours, but they share fully an interest that U. S. commitments remain credible to one and all.

I will have brief talking points for you before you see Shazar at noon on Tuesday, August 2.

W. W. Rostow

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12a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

July 29, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Informal Visit of President Zalman
Shazar of Israel

I enclose a talking paper for your use when President Shazar calls on you at noon, on Tuesday, August 2.

President Shazar is on his way back to Israel after state visits to Chile, Uruguay and Brazil. At your invitation, he is coming to Washington August 2 from New York where he arrived on July 28. He is being given the protocol courtesies usually extended to a friendly Chief of State on an informal visit, and he and Mrs. Shazar will stay at Blair House.

The presidency of Israel is largely ceremonial. However, President Shazar commands wide respect in the world Jewish community both because of his office and his personal stature. He has long been associated with Zionist activities and was one of the founders of the Histadrut labor federation and the ruling MAPAI (socialist, Zionist, labor) party of Israel.

President Shazar is shy and unassuming. We have been told by the Israeli Embassy that, although he may volunteer some impressions of his recent visit to Latin America, Mr. Shazar does not plan to raise specific matters of substance during his call on you. We see the meeting as an occasion for you to reaffirm our close friendship with Israel and our continued support of Israel's independence and integrity.

Assistant Secretary Raymond A. Hare, Ambassador Walworth Barbour, and Mr. Harrison Symmes, Country Director for Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, will accompany President Shazar's party from the airport to the White House.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5.

State Dept. Guidelines

By fw, NARA, Date 7-9-98

~~SECRET~~
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

CONFIDENTIAL

TALKING PAPER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH ISRAELI PRESIDENT ZALMAN SHAZAR

The Presidency of Israel is a largely ceremonial office. President Shazar himself is much less a politician than a Zionist ideologist and intellectual. His only cabinet-level experience was as Minister of Education. He spent most of his career as a journalist and publicist, and he has been active in the Histadrut labor federation and in world Zionist organizations. You met President Shazar when he represented Israel at President Kennedy's funeral.

It is unlikely President Shazar will raise specific matters of substance with you. After thanking you for our economic and military assistance to Israel, he will probably give you some impressions of his recent visits to Latin America and his visit earlier this year to Nepal. Your meeting with him is thus an opportunity for reaffirming our close ties with Israel and our positive support for Israel's independence and integrity along the following lines:

President Shazar's visit to Washington is a visible sign of our close and friendly ties. It serves to remind us that relations between our two countries have never been better. You are personally gratified that these relations have prospered during your own Administration. They have reached a new plane of maturity. We see eye to eye with Israel on most things. Where we differ we are able to discuss our differences in a frank and friendly spirit.

The major reason for this happy state of relations is Israel's own steady and heartening progress toward self-sufficiency.

Today, after nearly two decades of independence, Israel's influence in world affairs belies its small size and newly independent status. The voice of Israel is respected in world councils. Israel is sharing its experience and is helping others to build their nations. The President's visit to our own hemisphere demonstrates Israel's growing ties with the developing nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The Israeli economy is blooming, and in many important respects Israel is a developed country. Israel has made dramatic progress toward paying its own way and present healthy trends are expected to continue in the years ahead.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 7-9-98

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals
not automatically declassified

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

We are proud to have had a hand in Israel's renaissance. We desire for Israel the same security and well-being we desire for ourselves. Actions we have taken show our intentions to help safeguard the security of Israel and to assist the Israeli economy to flourish.

To sell tanks and aircraft to Israel was a difficult decision. We want to promote peace, not to sell arms, in the Near East. We do not intend to become a major arms salesman there. Yet, we recognized that a country's defense must be credible. The fundamental stability of the area must be preserved.

Again this year we have provided generous economic assistance to Israel, despite the increasing difficulty of justifying special aid under the standards set up by our foreign aid laws. As it turns out the total assistance we have given Israel this year is the largest we have ever provided for Israel. This was a special year, and we do not expect it to set a new standard for our aid. In fact, we hope that our aid level will cease to be a measure of our relationship.

In summary, our relations rest today on a higher and a stabler platform. In an insecure world Israel is secure. Israelis and Americans, both official and unofficial, are in constant frank and friendly contact with one another.

We must use this present platform of good feeling and security to build for the future. It can form a base for our efforts to bring about a just and lasting peace in the area. While we recognize the delicacy of any move to promote long-term Arab-Israeli accommodation, we fear failure to think about this leaves only a very troubled picture of the future. This is not the time for either of us to be satisfied with the situation or to cease searching for solutions.

If the prophetic vision that we share is to be fulfilled we on earth must help. On our side while constantly bearing in mind the safeguarding of the present we shall not forget the vision of peace and stability for the future.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday - July 30, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from President Diaz Ordaz Concerning Cotton
Textile Imports

President Diaz Ordaz has written you (Tab B) expressing concern over our intention to impose restrictions on Mexican cotton textiles.

Imports of textiles is governed by a Long Term Agreement (LTA) under which all suppliers, except Mexico, have accepted import controls. Because Mexico is free from such controls, Mexican cotton imports have risen from 6 million square yards in 1964 to 57 million during the first five months of 1966. Vietnam requirements now make it easy for us to absorb the Mexican imports. Looking to a time when these requirements decrease, the industry sees its position threatened and has brought strong pressure on Commerce to place Mexico under the LTA controls.

Earlier this month we held talks with the Mexicans in an effort to get them to accept voluntary controls. We were not successful. It was following these talks that President Diaz Ordaz wrote to you asking that U.S. restraints on Mexican cotton imports be deferred for several months if we do not reach agreement on voluntary controls during a second round of talks to begin August 15.

The Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee met this week to consider the President's request. The Committee unanimously recommended against granting the deferral but agreed:

1. that we should accept the Mexican invitation to resume negotiations in Mexico City promptly.
2. that we advise the Mexicans that if the new talks do not result in agreement, we are planning to take restraining action in August.

This position represents a softening of Commerce's stand which was an immediate imposition of restrictions.

Unanimous recommendations of the Cabinet Committee on issues of this nature are generally put into effect without referral to you. In this

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-2-

particular case if the talks fail, you may want to review the question of import restrictions before they are applied because of your personal relations with President Diaz Ordaz and the sulphur problem. There is some reason to believe that the Mexicans will not be forthcoming on sulphur until they see what they can get on cotton textiles.

In the meantime, you should reply to President Diaz Ordaz's letter. The suggested draft at Tab A reflects the views of State, Commerce and other interested agencies. It does not commit you to anything beyond urging solution through the forthcoming talks.

I recommend that you sign it and indicate whether, if the talks fail, you wish to review the application of import restrictions before they are put into effect.

W. W. Rostow

Wish to review application
of import restrictions

✓

Do not want to review

yes

Speak to me

Attachments
Tab A & B

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jm, NARA, Date 7-9-98

August 1, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

I have your letter of July 21 and appreciate your having written me about our trade problem on cotton textiles. I also regret that the recent conversations in Washington did not make progress. But I am pleased that the talks will be resumed in Mexico City soon.

You will understand that the United States has to find ways of meeting the problems created for our industry by excessive cotton textile imports. Under existing international cotton arrangements, the United States has concluded agreements with a number of countries limiting cotton imports into this country. I am particularly desirous that our two governments make every effort to reach a similar agreement which meets the basic needs of our respective positions. You will agree with me that it would be unfortunate for either government to arrive at the conclusion that the problem can only be resolved by its own action. I would like to avoid this.

As I have mentioned to you on previous occasions, I place great importance on continuation and growth of neighborly relations in trade and in other fields between Mexico and the United States. I hope that the Mexico City talks will result in a mutually satisfactory formula.

Sincerely,

/s/ LBJ

His Excellency
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz
President of the United Mexican States
Mexico, D. F.

LBJ/WGB:mm - 8/1/66

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TRANSLATION OF

LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ OF
MEXICO, DATED JULY 26, 1966

"His Excellency Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By gn, NARA, Date 7-9-98

I wish to express the concern of my Government for the course which have taken the conversations between the Delegation headed by our Ambassador in Washington, and officials of the Department of State, with respect to the possibility of entering into an agreement between our two countries for the exportation of Mexican textile products.

The Mexican authorities, as well as the Mexican industrialists, believe that the requirements set forth in the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, now in force, are not meant to enable the United States to set unilaterally the volume of imports from Mexico, using a formula which would reduce them to a very small amount, and departing from the criterion that you and I established in April last, to seek an increase in the legitimate trade in products originating in both countries.

It is true that our exports have increased appreciably in the last year as a consequence of the increased needs of the United States market. These exports, however, have not created any problem to the United States textile industry. On the contrary, they have enabled it to fulfill

such needs, inasmuch as our exports do not go directly to the consumer. They are composed of semi-manufactures.

We do not consider, either, that equity reasons prevail in this case, inasmuch as Mexico, both because of its imports of textiles and machinery from the United States and because of the fact that it is the most important buyer of American goods in Latin America, finds itself in a situation which is not comparable to that of any of the other countries which export textiles to the United States. Our exports simply have corrected, even if temporarily, the conditions which existed up to 1964, inclusive, when our textile imports surpassed several times the volume and value of our exports.

Finally, I am afraid that in case that a unilateral quota be set for our exports, at a much lower level than that now prevailing, Mexican industrialists would insist, with reason, that Mexico also limit its textile imports from the United States.

In view of the foregoing, I believe that the most prudent course to follow, in case an agreement cannot be reached, would be to examine anew the situation, some months from now, since the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, under GATT, will expire in a little over a year.

I wish to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest
and distinguished consideration and personal esteem.

Gustavo Diaz Ordaz
President of the United Mexican States."

Saturday, July 30, 1966
11:20 a. m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk desires that you see and approve these draft instructions covering ground operations in the demilitarized zone in Viet Nam, before they are sent out. I believe they both protect our interests and are cautious on the right points.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCM NARS, Date 8-17-86

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Friday, July 29, 1966 --

Mr. President:

Herewith a final call for help from our Ambassador to Iran. The Iranians threaten to buy some Soviet military equipment from the Soviet Union unless we alter the prices and terms we have offered.

I have checked with Secretary Rusk and with Secretary McNamara. Sec. Rusk believes we should not try to impose this extra \$30 million military aid burden on the Department of Defense and that, on balance, it might be good for us to see some slight loosening in our ties to the Shah. He has always been a little uneasy about our commitments to him.

Secretary McNamara believes that we should stand on our present position; although he is willing to consider helping marginally if his military aid is fully restored. But basically he does not wish to give in to the Shah's "blackmail."

I have a feeling that, whatever we do, the Shah is likely to buy some Soviet equipment because it would be good for him domestically, indicating that he is not wholly "subservient" to the U. S. and "normalizing" his relations with the USSR.

As Ambassador Meyer points out, there are certain risks in our present position. The Shah might behave irrationally and get in much deeper with the Soviets than we now calculate. On the other hand, he is asking to be treated like a grown up. Your letter to him was in a mature mood of partnership. I agree, therefore, that we should stand on our present position.

It seems to me possible -- but not sure -- that if we stand on your letter and do not go rushing in with an additional "carrot," the Iranians may come back to us with a specific proposition which we might look at.

Let the situation rest as it is _____
Put on agenda for Tuesday lunch _____
Organize a further "carrot" _____
See me _____

~~SECRET~~ Tehran 451, July 28, 1966

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

W. W. Rostow **DECLASSIFIED**

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-200
By ug, NARA, Date 3-15-89

~~SECRET -- EXDIS~~

July 28, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR MEYER

1. Before Shah gets inextricably involved in arms deal with Russians, I believe we should make one last effort to avoid what will be triumph for Soviet policy in Mideast and serious setback for our interests in this area.
2. Your July 20 letter to Shah made clear serious consequences which Soviet-Iran arms deal will have on American relations with Iran. This was important. Deeply believe, however, this effective stick requires matching carrot.
3. Certainly Shah's readiness to turn to Soviets is exasperating. Fifteen years ago before oil debacle in Iran, Ambassador Henry Grady observed that it is erroneous to think Persians will not cut off their noses to spite their face. They did so then. They are on brink of doing so again.
4. From many quarters I hear that only hope of avoiding excessive Iranian military involvement with Soviets is indication from US Government of better prices and terms. I have forwarded specific suggestions in previous message. The prices and terms proposed should not be beyond US Government's competence.
EMBTTEL 37P
5. As indicated previously, Shah is publicly exposed on this issue and we cannot guarantee that he will not buy at least some small items from Soviets. At same time, we can guarantee that without some new move by US Government within next few days, significant Iran-Soviet arms deal will occur.
6. We have little to lose and much to gain by such gesture. It could provide Shah with rationale for restricting any transaction with Soviets to small things like antiaircraft guns. Furthermore, he will never be able to argue he was forced to accept Soviet offers because of US Government's inflexibility. If, despite our good will, he makes significant military purchases from Soviets, we will remain free to withdraw our revised offer.
7. Knowing how heavily beset you and our colleagues are with the problem of Viet Nam, I regret having to bring this matter to your personal attention. However, there is so much at stake, not the least of which are our strategic installations in this country, duty compels this appeal for your personal attention.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ

87-200

NARA, Date 3-15-89

~~SECRET -- EXDIS~~ By *ing*

Friday - July 29, 1966 - 1:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Farewell Message to Prime Minister Burnham

Prime Minister Burnham is returning to Guyana tomorrow morning.

State recommends that you send him the attached departure message. I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message ____

Disapprove ____.

Attachment

PROPOSED MESSAGE OF FAREWELL TO PRIME MINISTER BURNHAM

Your Excellency:

On your departure from the United States, I wish to tell you again what great pleasure we had from your visit. I particularly welcomed this opportunity to become personally acquainted with you. I am confident that Guyana, under your leadership, will make rapid strides forward. In your efforts you will continue to have our best wishes and sympathetic support.

I thank you again for having honored us and wish you and the members of your party Godspeed and a safe journey home.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

**His Excellency
Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham
Prime Minister of Guyana
c/o Chief of Protocol of the United States
Commodore Perry Hotel
Austin, Texas**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, July 29, 1966 --

Mr. President:

Abe Feinberg says:

- Bunker is ok with his clients;
- He urges that we announce soon;
- He asks also: "Where is the \$6 million loan?"
I replied: "Be patient."
- Bunker tells me Sec. Rusk mentioned this as a possible assignment; and that he likes the idea. He should like to keep his status as Ambassador in this task.

I recommend that, if you approve Bunker, we not appoint him at the time of the Israeli President's visit -- but a few weeks after. The principle is to space out our pro-Israeli gestures between now and November.

W. W. Rostow

Bunker is OK _____

Plan to appoint immediately _____

Plan to appoint later _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-200
By WJ NARA, Date 3-15-89

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

Friday, July 29, 1966 -- 7:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

A final observation before your 11:00 a.m. meeting with the Prime Minister.

I would like to underline and strengthen one point made in the briefing materials sent up to you, for two reasons:

- your speaking to it personally could influence Wilson in the right direction;
- your making the point now could strengthen later your case for keeping a certain distance from Wilson -- if you so desired -- in case he doesn't perform.

The point is Wilson's policy towards Europe.

The original State paper was too blunt and strong. The present formulation is too weak.

I suggest a line something like this:

We understand that de Gaulle is likely to oppose British entrance into the Common Market. And we understand Wilson's desire not to put his nation in the position of a petitioner.

But it is our assessment that the whole atmosphere in Europe would be stabilized if the Continentals concluded that Britain was determined, in the end, to work closely with Europe and to enter the Common Market at the first realistic opportunity. The Europeans are accepting many situations in the short run because they do not believe de Gaulle is immortal. A good deal hinges on what they expect to happen after de Gaulle passes from the scene.

People live as much by what they expect in the future as by what is happening now.

It is, of course, for Wilson to decide; but it is our judgment that the common interest would be served by a series of British statements and actions which signalled to the Continental Europeans persuasively that Britain had decided to move towards Europe.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By fw, NARA, Date 3-26-98~~SECRET~~

We see no incompatibility between such moves and the maintenance of the UK position east of Suez.

Walt. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

19
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ July 29, 1966

WWR:

Here's the memo you asked
for to cover King Hassan's letter.

I've talked with State about
making the most of the President's
response.



Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCU NARS, Date 8-17-86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

19a

Saturday
July 30, 1966
11:00 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a subtle letter from Moroccan King Hassan, which his Finance Minister delivered to me yesterday. The FM is here to discuss his economic program and to talk to potential private investors.

Hassan is reinforcing his request for help against his drought--Morocco has lost about 50% of its cereals production this year. However, he does not come right out and ask. He relates his own agricultural program to your Food for Freedom message and your efforts to focus world-wide attention on the food problem. Only at the end of his letter does he describe briefly his own shortages.

We have already responded in several ways. On the emergency front, we sent Dick Reuter to Morocco (he was in Europe anyway) as your personal representative to look at the problem, both long and short range. We agreed to send 200,000 tons of wheat and to review the situation again in the fall when requirements are clearer. Our own tight supply will keep us from coming close to the 1.2 million tons the Moroccans think they need. But the Canadians and French are also helping, and we may be able to get close to 500,000 tons as the year goes on.

On the development front, we have two research teams there now--one from TVA--to lay out longer term projects to improve Morocco's land and fertilizer use. The IBRD and the Germans are helping too. The Moroccan program is not quite so well-defined as Hassan suggests, but there's a good chance to do a sound job there. These efforts are in line with Korrry's recommendations.

The Moroccans are reasonably satisfied with our response. I think Hassan just wanted to break the ice with you by highlighting a mutual interest in the food problem and showing he is a serious-minded fellow ready to help himself. He is looking forward to seeing you when he comes to the UN late this fall.

We will use your reply to let you weigh in on the substance of our program. I have asked State for a draft and for suggestions on timing.

Walt Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-200

By *ij* NARA, Date 3-15-89



196
NOT OFFICIAL TRANSLATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By W, NARA, Date 7-9-98

Mister President,

We had the pleasure of reading the statement on Food For Freedom which you made to the Congress of the United States. We wish to extend our sincere congratulations to Your Excellency for the noble and lofty thoughts embodied in that message.

The problem described by Your Excellency is of paramount importance for the whole world, for the threat of hunger, actual for some people and virtual for others, is assuming universal proportions either in its short or long-term consequences.

You have brought out, Mister President, with realism and lucidity the impact of this process in all fields, and we are convinced that both the Congress and the people of the United States, on the one hand, and the leaders of a great many countries as well as world opinion, on the other hand, are fully aware of the meaning of this state of affairs and of its repercussions, and value your message in the circumstances which the world is experiencing.

So far as We are concerned We are happy to state that our concern about this problem is identical with yours.

In the international field, the appraisal of existing availabilities and resources and of potentialities in the near future justifies a deep anxiety about the ever-increasing imbalance between population growth and production.

In a world which wisely endeavors to overrun its manifold limits and as far as possible to overcome its differences, the frontier between prosperity and want will inevitably remain the source of never-ending trouble and conflict.

Your Excellency knows that Our activity within the international community has always and constantly been aimed at strengthening the factors of stability and balance and at fostering genuine solidarity among Nations, so that, acting together, they can eliminate all the miseries that still threaten mankind.

.../...



Therefore, Our most devout wish is to see the whole world feel itself bound up with your appeal.

But We also feel that, however important international action against hunger may be, the salvation of the countries which are chronically menaced or occasionally distressed, depends, first and foremost, on their own efforts, that is on their determination to give priority to improving and modernizing their means of production in the agricultural sector.

Morocco is neither wholly nor always sheltered from those risks. It is fairly often submitted, due to the irregular climatic conditions which characterize its geographic position, to hazards which may periodically jeopardize its general development, since agriculture is the mainstay of its economy.

Within these limits, the progress achieved, especially in the social and educational fields, does not dispel the anxiety about the dangerous break between the growth of population and the increase in production.

Now, as We are convinced of the necessity - everywhere - of a general effort at the national level to bridge those gaps, so We think, as Your Excellency does, that a good harvest is not only a godsend but also the result of the skill and endeavor of man. Our people are fully aware of this and have resolutely embarked upon this course. This determination is the mainspring of Our Three-Year Plan now under way and is illustrated by the priority accorded to the agricultural sector in Our program of economic development.

In that sector, We have set some well-defined objectives for Ourselves, namely :

- rational utilization of our water resources with a view to extending irrigated areas and providing efficiently for their equipment and development. Three important dam projects are now under study.
- improvement of agricultural conditions with a view to increasing systematically grain production. To this end, Our Government have set out a pluri-annual program which provides for many concerted measures tending to :

.../...



- the genetic improvement of seeds ,
 - the maximum and efficient use of fertilizers ,
 - the progressive improvement of farm implements used by the less advanced category of farmers ,
 - the provision of technical officers responsible for the dissemination among those farmers of most suitable and efficient farming techniques .
- the establishment of industrial units for the processing of agricultural produce in order to meet the needs of local consumers by national production , to diversify production , to raise the income of farmers and create new jobs for rural manpower .
- the training of staff . While Our natural resources lead us to be reasonably optimistic Our effort is handicapped by the lack of technical staff which compels us to adjust Our programs to the size of the available technical staff . The training of technical personnel ranks second in the order of priorities listed in the Three-Year Plan and an Under Secretariat of State , responsible for Staff Training , has been established under Our Minister of Development .

The full achievement of these objectives entails important contributions from the investment budget . For the three-year period covered by Our Development Plan direct expenditures amounting to \$ 170 million have been earmarked for that purpose . But to ensure the fullest efficiency of this purely agricultural program , it is imperative that policies , which also involve high expenditures , should be carried out in other sectors . The Ministry of Public Works contributes \$ 22 million destined to the construction of transport facilities and roads in order to make easier the access to farm units and the marketing of produce . Other rural development schemes will cost \$ 7 million . Our people have accepted meritorious sacrifices in order to raise capital from their own resources which , supplemented by assistance from friendly countries and loans from international agencies , will enable us to start the implementation of the first stages of this far-reaching program .

However , the results which We are entitled to expect from Our determination and endeavors are not always guaranteed . Our action is not protected against the vagaries of the climate which

.../...



feature our geographic situation and the general shape of the territory of Our country. An uneven distribution of rainfall results in floods which often affect some areas in Morocco while sometimes in others a serious draught prevails, as it is unfortunately the case this year.

In a country where the bulk of the population derives its living from agriculture, the consequences of such a situation must necessarily be the first object of Our concern. The Government are devoting their energies to taking stock of the agricultural production which has declined and to estimating the needs of domestic consumption, the fulfilment of which is seriously threatened.

Actually, against an overall annual consumption of 32 million quintals and an average production of 29 million quintals in a normal year, the present availabilities do not exceed 16 million quintals which results in a considerable gap of 16 million quintals, worth about \$ 110 million.

In spite of the domestic measures that have been taken and the emergency purchases already made, the cereal needs which have to be imperatively met still stand at 13 million quintals of which 8 million of soft wheat for the milling industry and one million of barley to be used as seeds.

Your envoy, M. REUTER, who is in charge of the American Food For Peace Program, had the opportunity, during his recent visit to Morocco, to appraise the whole extent of this alarming situation.

We have entrusted Dr LARAQUI, Our Ambassador accredited to Your Excellency with the task of making the situation clear to your Government. His Excellency, Mr Henry TASCA, your Ambassador in Rabat has been kept informed of all the aspects of the problem by Our Ministers directly concerned and We Ourselves had the opportunity of taking up the matter with Mr PALMER, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, when he paid a visit to Us last June.

Our Minister of Finance, M. Mamoun TAHIRI, whom We entrusted with the task of delivering this message to Your Excellency

.../...



is in a position to make a presentation of the other features of the situation both to you personally and to the members of the members of the United States Government to whom you will kindly refer him.

Accept, Mister President, with Our sentiments of deep friendship, the expression of Our Very High Consideration.

Done at Our Royal Palace in Rabat,
on the twenty-third of July
nineteen hundred and sixty six

YOUR GOOD FRIEND HASSAN II

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

19c

Saturday
July 30, 1966
11:00 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a subtle letter from Moroccan King Hassan, which his Finance Minister delivered to me yesterday. The FM is here to discuss his economic program and to talk to potential private investors.

Hassan is reinforcing his request for help against his drought--Morocco has lost about 50% of its cereals production this year. However, he does not come right out and ask. He relates his own agricultural program to your Food for Freedom message and your efforts to focus world-wide attention on the food problem. Only at the end of his letter does he describe briefly his own shortages.

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We will use your reply to let you weigh in on the substance of our program. I have asked State for a draft and for suggestions on timing.

Walt Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *ju*, NARA, Date 7-7-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19d



NOT OFFICIAL TRANSLATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-1-98

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.../...



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.../...



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Accept, Mister President, with Our sentiments of deep friendship, the expression of Our Very High Consideration.

Done at Our Royal Palace in Rabat,
on the twenty-third of July
nineteen hundred and sixty six

YOUR GOOD FRIEND HASSAN II

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, July 29, 1966 --

Mr. President:

I thought you ought to see this draft cable to Goldberg because it raises the question of what we demand of Hanoi if we stop bombing. I have marked the critical passages, the most important in red.

On the whole I think you should approve this probe. It protects our position that if we stop bombing:

- a. They must do something equivalent to abate hostilities; and
- b. That abatement must be capable of "observation."

The danger here is not so much in this formulation but that we might not be tough enough about what they do and about its verifiability, should anything come of it. Therefore, I recommend that the cable be cleared.

W. W. Rostow

Clear cable _____

Alter as indicated _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 87-205
By lip NARA, Date 1-3-90

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

2615

200

July 28, 1966

FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow ←
The White House

Secretary Rusk asked that
this be sent to you for your
clearance.

ms

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

206 2615

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: US MISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

Info

STATE
EKDIS
FOR GOLDBERG

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-438

By WJ NARA, Date 2-5-92

Dept has given most serious study to ICRC proposal (Urtel 466)
We commend you for handling discussion with great delicacy. We endorse fully your view that proposal must be handled with great care and that ICRC channel may offer possible fresh avenue to probe Hanoi's present intentions.

Onus for any rejection of proposal should rest on Hanoi and not on US. Our willingness to continue to probe possibilities of peace talks through this channel should help our position both internationally and domestically. Note verbale which we providing you is drafted on assumption that at some point, if proposal is not accepted by Hanoi, it might be advantageous to have it surfaced publicly. We fully agree, however, that for the time being this should be treated as a matter of utmost sensitivity.

XX

| | |
|--|---|
| Drafted by <u>98</u> <u>8-7-73</u> 666 IO:JJS:SCO:WBB:Buffum:rga FE - Mr. Bundy (draft) SCA - Mr. Heymann | Tel. Ext. 5244 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <u>DR</u> The Secretary |
| Gov. Harriman (Draft) <u>98</u> Mr. Rostow - White House TOP SECRET Classification | |

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

General posture we wish to strike is appearance ~~sh~~ of being forthcoming without giving up any points of principle. In particular, we wish assure our response fully accords with frequently stated US readiness engage in unconditional discussions which might help terminate conflict in Viet Nam. We assume ICRC suggestion for broad conference on all humanitarian problems, based on resolution X, would logically involve discussion of ways to end conflict.

Recent reports of Hanoi mood and intentions are contradictory but merit further study. On one hand, Hanoi has recently moved one additional division to SVN. On other hand, there appears to be some difference between Hanoi and Peking on continuing validity of Geneva Agreements. Also noteworthy is timing of Hanoi's statement that foreign volunteers not now needed, coming as it does on heels of Bucharest Declaration. In short, these recent moves might presage some willingness on Hanoi's part to decelerate present trend of escalation, and we of ~~ex~~ course would be interested in probing meanings of these moves in very private and quiet manner.

Following is text note verbale you may give Gonard:

The US Government has studied carefully the note verbale given to Ambassador Goldberg by Samuel Gonard, President of the ICRC, suggesting that a conference be held under the auspices of the ICRC which would not be limited solely to the study of humanitarian problems

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

arising out of the application of the Geneva Conventions as such, "but that its scope should be extended to include also the study of those problems arising out of the methods employed in the conduct of military operations." Consistent with its position that it is prepared to engage in unconditional discussions, the US would be ready also to discuss all humanitarian problems "over and beyond the strict application of the Geneva Conventions" as suggested by the ICRC.

The ICRC has asked whether the US would be willing to take now certain measures susceptible of facilitating the convening of such a conference. The US looks sympathetically on this request. The ICRC can state unequivocally to the government at Hanoi, that it is satisfied the US is ready to engage in discussions on an abatement of the Viet Nam conflict and would be willing to accept a reduction of hostilities on a reciprocal basis, either prior to or during a conference.

In addition to delivering the above note, you should make the following points orally to Gonard:

1. You should stress that when the US speaks of reduced military activities on a reciprocal basis, we are obviously including bombing of the North as one of the elements. While US cannot agree to a formal bombing pause except as part of a ~~reciprocal~~ ^{reciprocal} reduction of hostilities

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

Accepted by Hanoi, you may reaffirm to Gonard that if he decides to pursue matter personally in Hanoi he need have no fear for his safety as far as US bombing concerned. You may add that if his efforts succeed in bringing about a meeting of the type he envisages, we would be prepared to consider sympathetically steps to facilitate such discussions.

Moreover, *we would be prepared to consider indications* ~~you should make clear to Gonard that we are not rpt~~ *of an informal nature* ~~not necessarily seeking a formal undertaking~~ by Hanoi as to what it would do on its side by way of a reduction of hostilities; *and* ~~we would be prepared to~~ consider carefully indications ~~of an informal nature~~ that Hanoi was in fact reducing its infiltration or other operations, recognizing always that we would have to observe carefully whether such a reduction was in fact taking place and being continued.

FYI: We had recent indication from Sainteny report that some Hanoi leaders recognized that they would have to do something on their side if we were ever to consider suspending or ceasing bombing. However, we have always recognized the difficulty they might face in saying something for the record as to what they would do or were doing. END FYI

2. We remain concerned that ICRC initiative not rpt not result

in effort to trade off safety of POWs for cessation of bombings of

~~TOP SECRET~~
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Classification

North Viet Nam. Should we continue discussions on wider issues as outlined by Gonard, we would feel free to discuss all aspects of military activities, including Viet Cong terrorism in South -- not just bombing of North.

3. We continue to believe that first step would be for Gonard to go to Hanoi. As you have told him, depending on reaction he receives there, further consideration could be given to question of whether Viet Cong participation in conference is an important element.

END

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

Chron
21

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 29, 1966

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 354

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: U. S. Cooperation with the European Launcher
Development Organization (ELDO)

The President has noted the memorandum of July 24, 1966, from the Department of State transmitting the conclusion of the Ad Hoc Committee of the National Aeronautics and Space Council that it is a matter of urgency that we clarify and define our policy with respect to the development of the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) and the extent of U. S. cooperation with ELDO's present and future programs.

The President concurs in the overall statement of policy that it is in the U. S. interest to encourage the continued development of ELDO through U. S. cooperation. He further approves the recommendation that in the event that ELDO desires cooperation with the U. S. the Department of State in consultation with NASA, the Department of Defense and other responsible agencies, may make the above policy known to the members of ELDO and to take such specific action in cooperation with the other interested agencies as may be necessary to carry out this policy.

The President has also noted that the Department of State with the assistance and agreement of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee of the National Aeronautics and Space Council has prepared a detailed

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-202
By sig NARA, Date 8-29-89

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- 2 -

statement defining the nature and extent of U. S. cooperation with ELDO which the U. S. Government is now prepared to extend. He concurs in the desirability of such interdepartmental program development and requests that this statement be continuously reviewed by the responsible agencies to ensure that it is current and responsive in terms of developing circumstances.

W W Rostow

W. W. Rostow

cc: Executive Secretary, National
Aeronautics & Space Council
Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology
Special Assistant to the President
for Telecommunications
Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

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Policy Concerning US Cooperation with the
European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO)

It should be made known that the US stands prepared to offer cooperation and assistance to ELDO, which would contribute to the desirability from the European point of view of the continuation of ELDO.

A. Conditions underlying cooperation - In view of existing policies concerning US assistance in the development of foreign communications satellite capabilities and the non-proliferation of ballistic missile delivery capabilities as stated in NSAMs 338 and 294, it is understood that in responding to requests for cooperation by ELDO, US cooperation would be selective and subject to government-to-government agreement that launcher vehicles, components and technology would not be used for:

1. Advancement of communication satellite capability other than (a) to permit participation in the US National Defense Communication Satellite System; or (b) in connection with the Single Global Commercial Communication Satellite System in accordance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and Special Agreement of August 20, 1964.

2. Advancement of nuclear missile delivery capabilities of one or more member countries.

3. Transmittal or transferral to non-ELDO countries without US authorization.

B. Areas of US cooperation and assistance -

1. General assistance applicable to both short and long range ELDO projects, as follows:

a. Training - Participation by ELDO nominees in NASA seminars for technical management

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S&T Cont. No. 1216

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- 2 -

training in such subjects as PERT and Companion Cost System, Reliability and Quality Assurance in Specific Systems, Testing and Checkout, Systems Compatibility, Incentive Contracting.

b. Facilitating export licenses for ELDO requirements, including an extension of the ELDO export certification process (originally adopted for UDMH) to cover the procurement of other launch vehicle and ground support equipment hardware. (A device to give ELDO items priority and access beyond European national vehicle programs.)

c. Use of NASA test facilities.

d. Designation within NASA of a technical office specifically to serve in an expediting and assisting role for ELDO.

2. Short range assistance in the proposed reconfiguration of ELDO-A.

a. Make available on a case by case basis, subject to export control approval, Atlas Standard Launch Vehicle (SLV) technology additional to that already provided under past export control actions.

b. Technical advice and assistance in such areas as:

(1) Multi-stage vehicle integration.

(2) Stage separation

(3) Range organization, lay-out, and equipment as related to the ELDO vehicle.

(4) Synchronous orbit injection techniques.

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- 3 -

c. Procurement of unclassified flight hardware in the US including such items as the Miniature Integrating Gyro (MIG) strapped-down "guidance" (auto-pilot) package used on the Scout vehicle. Comparable hardware has already been exported to Japan.

3. Long range assistance in the development of follow-up ELDO projects using high-energy cryogenic upper stages (e.g. ELDO-B).

a. Access to related US experience and technology as available in the Atlas-Centaur system through technical documentation and contacts.

b. Bring ELDO technical personnel into intimate touch with problems of systems design, integration, and program management of a high-energy upper such as the Centaur.

c. Consideration of joint use of a high-energy upper stage developed in Europe.

C. Supplementary action - To supplement ELDO-A launch services the US will sell Scout, Thor, and Atlas vehicles and launch services for scientific and applications satellites to Western European and other countries as deemed appropriate and consistent with A above.

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NLJ 90-245

By inf NARA, Date 3-15-91

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Friday, July 29, 1966 -- 7:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

A final observation before your 11:00 a. m. meeting with the Prime Minister.

I would like to underline and strengthen one point made in the briefing materials sent up to you, for two reasons:

- your speaking to it personally could influence Wilson in the right direction;
- your making the point now could strengthen later your case for keeping a certain distance from Wilson -- if you so desired -- in case he doesn't perform.

The point is Wilson's policy towards Europe.

The original State paper was too blunt and strong. The present formulation is too weak.

I suggest a line something like this:

We understand that de Gaulle is likely to oppose British entrance into the Common Market. And we understand Wilson's desire not to put his nation in the position of a petitioner.

But it is our assessment that the whole atmosphere in Europe would be stabilized if the Continentals concluded that Britain was determined, in the end, to work closely with Europe and to enter the Common Market at the first realistic opportunity. The Europeans are accepting many situations in the short run because they do not believe de Gaulle is immortal. A good deal hinges on what they expect to happen after de Gaulle passes from the scene.

People live as much by what they expect in the future as by what is happening now.

It is, of course, for Wilson to decide; but it is our judgment that the common interest would be served by a series of British statements and actions which signalled to the Continental Europeans persuasively that Britain had decided to move towards Europe.

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-2-

We see no incompatibility between such moves and the maintenance of the UK position east of Suez.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, July 29, 1966 --

Mr. President:

I thought you ought to see this draft cable to Goldberg because it raises the question of what we demand of Hanoi if we stop bombing. I have marked the critical passages, the most important in red.

On the whole I think you should approve this probe. It protects our position that if we stop bombing:

- a. They must do something equivalent to abate hostilities; and
- b. That abatement must be capable of "observation."

The danger here is not so much in this formulation but that we might not be tough enough about what they do and about its verifiability, should anything come of it. Therefore, I recommend that the cable be cleared.

W. W. Rostow

Clear cable _____

Alter as indicated _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-9-98

WWRostow:rln

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-438
By plp, NARA, Date 4/21/92

23a

July 29, 1966

TEXT OF DRAFT CABLE FROM STATE TO US MISSION IN GENEVA
FOR GOLDBERG

The Department has given most serious study to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) proposal. We commend you for handling the discussion with great delicacy. We endorse fully your view that the proposal must be handled with great care and that the ICRC channel may offer possible fresh avenue to probe Hanoi's present intentions.

Onus for any rejection of proposal should rest on Hanoi and not on U. S. Our willingness to continue to probe possibilities of peace talks through this channel should help our position both internationally and domestically. Note verbale which we are providing you is drafted on assumption that at some point, if the proposal is not accepted by Hanoi, it might be advantageous to have it surfaced publicly. We fully agree, however, that for the time being this should be treated as a matter of utmost sensitivity.

General posture we wish to strike is appearance of being forthcoming without giving up any points of principle. In particular, we wish to assure our response fully accords with frequently stated U. S. readiness engage in unconditional discussions which might help terminate conflict in Viet Nam. We assume ICRC suggestion for broad conference on all humanitarian problems, based on resolution X, would logically involve discussion of ways to end conflict.

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- 2 -

Recent reports of Hanoi mood and intentions are contradictory but merit further study. On one hand, Hanoi has recently moved one additional division to South Viet Nam. On the other hand, there appears to be some difference between Hanoi and Peking on the continuing validity of Geneva Agreements. Also noteworthy is timing of Hanoi's statement that foreign volunteers not now needed, coming as it does on heels of Bucharest Declaration. In short, these recent moves might presage some willingness on Hanoi's part to decelerate present trend of escalation, and we of course would be interested in proving meanings of these moves in a very private and quiet manner.

Following is text note verbale you may give Gonard:

The U. S. Government has studied carefully the note verbale given to Ambassador Goldberg by Samuel Gonard, President of the ICRC, suggesting that a conference be held under the auspices of the ICRC which would not be limited solely to the study of humanitarian problems arising out of the application of the Geneva Conventions as such, "but that its scope should be extended to include also the study of those problems arising out of the methods employed in the conduct of military operations." Consistent with its position that it is prepared to engage in unconditional discussions, the U. S. would be ready also to discuss all humanitarian problems "over and beyond the strict application of the Geneva Conventions" as suggested by the ICRC.

The ICRC has asked whether the U. S. would be willing to take now certain measures susceptible of facilitating the convening of such a conference. The U. S. looks sympathetically on this request. The ICRC can state

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- 3 -

unequivocally to the government at Hanoi, that it is satisfied the U. S. is ready to engage in discussions on an abatement of the Viet Nam conflict and would be willing to accept a reduction of hostilities on a reciprocal basis, either prior to or during a conference.

In addition to delivering the above note, you should make the following points orally to Gonard:

1. You should stress that when the U. S. speaks of reduced military activities on a reciprocal basis, we are obviously including bombing of the North as one of the elements. While the U. S. cannot agree to a formal bombing pause except as part of a reciprocal reduction of hostilities accepted by Hanoi, you may reaffirm to Gonard that if he decides to pursue the matter personally in Hanoi he need have no fear for his safety as far as U. S. bombing concerned. You may add that if his efforts succeed in bringing about a meeting of the type he envisages, we would be prepared to consider sympathetically steps to facilitate such discussions.

Moreover, you should make clear to Gonard that we are not necessarily seeking a formal undertaking by Hanoi as to what it would do on its side by way of a reduction of hostilities; we would be prepared to consider carefully indications of an informal nature that Hanoi was in fact reducing its infiltration or other operations, recognizing always that we would have to observe carefully whether such a reduction was in fact taking place and being continued. FYI: We had recent indication from Sainteny report that some Hanoi leaders

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- 4 -

recognized that they would have to do something on their side if we were ever to consider suspending or ceasing bombing. However, we have always recognized the difficulty they might face in saying something for the record as to what they would do or were doing. END FYI

2. We remain concerned that the ICRC initiative not result in effort to trade off safety of Prisoners of War for cessation of bombings of North Viet Nam. Should we continue discussions on wider issues as outlined by Gonard, we would feel free to discuss all aspects of military activities, including Viet Cong terrorism in South -- not just bombing of North.

3. We continue to believe that first step would be for Gonard to go to Hanoi. As you have told him; depending on reaction he receives there, further consideration could be given to question of whether Viet Cong participation in conference is an important element.

END

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July 29, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a subtle letter from Moroccan King Hassan, which his Finance Minister delivered to me yesterday. The FM is here to discuss his economic program and to talk to potential private investors.

Hassan is reinforcing his request for help against his drought--Morocco has lost about 50% of its cereals production this year. However, he does not come right out and ask. He relates his own agricultural program to your Food for Freedom message and your efforts to focus world-wide attention on the food problem. Only at the end of his letter does he describe briefly his own shortages.

We have already responded in several ways. On the emergency front, we sent Dick Reuter to Morocco (he was in Europe anyway) as your personal representative to look at the problem, both long and short range. We agreed to send 200,000 tons of wheat and to review the situation again in the fall when requirements are clearer. Our own tight supply will keep us from coming close to the 1.2 million tons the Moroccans think they need. But the Canadians and French are also helping, and we may be able to get close to 500,000 tons as the year goes on.

On the development front, we have two research teams there now--one from TVA--to lay out longer term projects to improve Morocco's land and fertilizer use. The IBRD and the Germans are helping too. The Moroccan program is not quite so well-defined as Hassan suggests, but there's a good chance to do a sound job there. These efforts are in line with Korrry's recommendations.

The Moroccans are reasonably satisfied with our response. I think Hassan just wanted to break the ice with you by highlighting a mutual interest in the food problem and showing he is a serious-minded fellow ready to help himself. He is looking forward to seeing you when he comes to the UN late this fall.

We will use your reply to let you weigh in on the substance of our program. I have asked State for a draft and for suggestions on timing.

/s/ Walt
W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 7-9-98~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



24a
NOT OFFICIAL TRANSLATION

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 7-9-98

Mister President,

We had the pleasure of reading the statement on Food For Freedom which you made to the Congress of the United States. We wish to extend our sincere congratulations to Your Excellency for the noble and lofty thoughts embodied in that message.

The problem described by Your Excellency is of paramount importance for the whole world, for the threat of hunger, actual for some people and virtual for others, is assuming universal proportions either in its short or long-term consequences.

You have brought out, Mister President, with realism and lucidity the impact of this process in all fields, and we are convinced that both the Congress and the people of the United States, on the one hand, and the leaders of a great many countries as well as world opinion, on the other hand, are fully aware of the meaning of this state of affairs and of its repercussions, and value your message in the circumstances which the world is experiencing.

So far as We are concerned We are happy to state that our concern about this problem is identical with yours.

In the international field, the appraisal of existing availabilities and ressources and of potentialities in the near future justifies a deep anxiety about the ever-increasing imbalance between population growth and production.

In a world which wisely endeavors to overrun its manifold limits and as far as possible to overcome its differences, the frontier between prosperity and want will inevitably remain the source of never-ending trouble and conflict.

Your Excellency knows that Our activity within the international community has always and constantly been aimed at strenghtening the factors of stability and balance and at fostering genuine solidarity among Nations, so that, acting together, they can eliminate all the miseries that still threaten mankind.

.../...



Therefore, Our most devout wish is to see the whole world feel itself bound up with your appeal.

But We also feel that, however important international action against hunger may be, the salvation of the countries which are chronically menaced or occasionally distressed, depends, first and foremost, on their own efforts, that is on their determination to give priority to improving and modernizing their means of production in the agricultural sector.

Morocco is neither wholly nor always sheltered from those risks. It is fairly often submitted, due to the irregular climatic conditions which characterize its geographic position, to hazards which may periodically jeopardize its general development, since agriculture is the mainstay of its economy.

Within these limits, the progress achieved, especially in the social and educational fields, does not dispel the anxiety about the dangerous break between the growth of population and the increase in production.

Now, as We are convinced of the necessity - everywhere - of a general effort at the national level to bridge those gaps, so We think, as Your Excellency does, that a good harvest is not only a godsend but also the result of the skill and endeavor of man. Our people are fully aware of this and have resolutely embarked upon this course. This determination is the mainspring of Our Three-Year Plan now under way and is illustrated by the priority accorded to the agricultural sector in Our program of economic development.

In that sector, We have set some well-defined objectives for Ourselves, namely :

- rational utilization of our water resources with a view to extending irrigated areas and providing efficiently for their equipment and development. Three important dam projects are now under study.
- improvement of agricultural conditions with a view to increasing systematically grain production. To this end, Our Government have set out a pluri-annual program which provides for many concerted measures tending to :

.../...



- the genetic improvement of seeds,
 - the maximum and efficient use of fertilizers,
 - the progressive improvement of farm implements used by the less advanced category of farmers,
 - the provision of technical officers responsible for the dissemination among those farmers of most suitable and efficient farming techniques.
- the establishment of industrial units for the processing of agricultural produce in order to meet the needs of local consumers by national production, to diversify production, to raise the income of farmers and create new jobs for rural manpower.
- the training of staff. While Our natural resources lead us to be reasonably optimistic Our effort is handicapped by the lack of technical staff which compels us to adjust Our programs to the size of the available technical staff. The training of technical personnel ranks second in the order of priorities listed in the Three-Year Plan and an Under Secretariat of State, responsible for Staff Training, has been established under Our Minister of Development.

The full achievement of these objectives entails important contributions from the investment budget. For the three-year period covered by Our Development Plan direct expenditures amounting to \$ 170 million have been earmarked for that purpose. But to ensure the fullest efficiency of this purely agricultural program, it is imperative that policies, which also involve high expenditures, should be carried out in other sectors. The Ministry of Public Works contributes \$ 22 million destined to the construction of transport facilities and roads in order to make easier the access to farm units and the marketing of produce. Other rural development schemes will cost \$ 7 million. Our people have accepted meritorious sacrifices in order to raise capital from their own resources which, supplemented by assistance from friendly countries and loans from international agencies, will enable us to start the implementation of the first stages of this far-reaching program.

However, the results which We are entitled to expect from Our determination and endeavors are not always guaranteed. Our action is not protected against the vagaries of the climate which

.../...



feature our geographic situation and the general shape of the territory of Our country. An uneven distribution of rainfall results in floods which often affect some areas in Morocco while sometimes in others a serious draught prevails, as it is unfortunately the case this year.

In a country where the bulk of the population derives its living from agriculture, the consequences of such a situation must necessarily be the first object of Our concern. The Government are devoting their energies to taking stock of the agricultural production which has declined and to estimating the needs of domestic consumption, the fulfilment of which is seriously threatened.

Actually, against an overall annual consumption of 32 million quintals and an average production of 29 million quintals in a normal year, the present availabilities do not exceed 16 million quintals which results in a considerable gap of 16 million quintals, worth about \$ 110 million.

In spite of the domestic measures that have been taken and the emergency purchases already made, the cereal needs which have to be imperatively met still stand at 13 million quintals of which 8 million of soft wheat for the milling industry and one million of barley to be used as seeds.

Your envoy, M. REUTER, who is in charge of the American Food For Peace Program, had the opportunity, during his recent visit to Morocco, to appraise the whole extent of this alarming situation.

We have entrusted Dr LARAQUI, Our Ambassador accredited to Your Excellency with the task of making the situation clear to your Government. His Excellency, Mr Henry TASCA, your Ambassador in Rabat has been kept informed of all the aspects of the problem by Our Ministers directly concerned and We Ourself had the opportunity of taking up the matter with Mr PALMER, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, when he paid a visit to Us last June.

Our Minister of Finance, M. Mamoun TAHIRI, whom We entrusted with the task of delivering this message to Your Excellency

.../...



is in a position to make a presentation of the other features of the situation both to you personally and to the members of the members of the United States Government to whom you will kindly refer him.

Accept, Mister President, with Our sentiments of deep friendship, the expression of Our Very High Consideration.

Done at Our Royal Palace in Rabat,
on the twenty-third of July
nineteen hundred and sixty six

YOUR GOOD FRIEND HASSAN II

Thursday, July 28, 1966
1:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

I hate to do this; but I guess it is one of the things I am paid to do.

As the attached cry from the wilderness from Covey Oliver indicates, we really do need to know who shall head and who shall make up the delegation to Colombia. Here are the decisions that are required: will you indicate who will head the delegation and may we then proceed with the rest of the delegation as indicated on the attached.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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INAUGURAL PLANS

O

OPR

OB

1. IF WE DO NOT SOON GET OUT INVITATIONS FOR DINNER THAT WE PROPOSE DELEGATION HOST EVENING AUGUST 8 WE SHALL NOT BE ABLE TO GET MANY PEOPLE WE THINK WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US TO HAVE PRESENT.

RSR

2. HENCE PLAN ISSUE INVITATIONS ON JULY 29 TO SOME 30 KEY PERSONALITIES, SOMEWHAT TAKING CHANCES ON MISSING A FEW OF POSSIBLE SPECIAL INTEREST TO SOME MEMBERS OF DELEGATION.

OLIVER

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U. S. DELEGATION TO COLOMBIAN INAUGURAL

Chairman of Delegation (select one)

- The Vice President _____
- The Chief Justice _____
- Secretary Rusk _____
- *Secretary Gardner _____.

State Department Members (both should be named)

- *Assistant Secretary Gordon ✓
- *Ambassador Oliver ✓.

Congressional Representation (one Senator and one Congressman, one from each party).

Senate:

- Senator Morse (D-Ore.) _____
- Senator Sparkman (D-Ala.) _____
- Senator Aiken (R-Vt.) ✓
- Senator Kuchel (R-Calif.) ✓
- *Senator Paul Douglas (D-Ill.) ✓
- Senator Montoya (D-N.M.) ✓.

House:

- Congressman Armistead Selden (D-Ala.) ✓
- Congressman Dante Fascell (D-Fla.) ✓
- *Congressman Bradford Morse (R-Mass.) ✓
- Congressman Jeffrey Cohelan (D-Calif.) _____
- Congresswoman Julia Hansen (D-Wash.) _____
- Congressman Silvio Conte (R-Mass.) _____.

Public Members (select three)

George Meany - AFL-CIO

*A. Philip Randolph - AFL-CIO

*Eugene Ormandy - Philadelphia Orchestra

Leonard Bernstein - N.Y. Philharmonic

Samuel Eliot Morrison - Harvard Professor

*John F. Gallagher - Vice President for
International Operations of Sears, Roebuck

26
President signed and presented to
Mr. Adair during visit

12:54/12:58p

~~XXXXXX~~ 28Jul66
in oval office.

mjdr

26a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 28, 1966
Thursday - 12:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

It would strengthen our hand in general and Chuck Adair's in particular if he were able to take back a letter like this from you to President Robles. You may want to have a word with Ambassador Adair when he comes upstairs in a little while.

Walt Rostow

Attachment

July 28, 1966

Dear Mr. President:


It is a great pleasure for me to send warm personal greetings to you through Ambassador Adair.

During his visit to Washington, we have had an opportunity to discuss the relations between our two countries. He will be conveying to you my thoughts on a number of subjects, including additional ways in which we might cooperate with you in your efforts to promote economic and social development in Panama.

At the same time, I want you to know that it is always a pleasure to hear from you directly. I hope that you will not hesitate to write me at any time.

As we proceed with preparations for a meeting of American Presidents, I would welcome hearing from you of what initiatives might be discussed to give the Alliance for Progress increased momentum and otherwise strengthen the projects for economic and social progress in our Hemisphere.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Marco A. Robles Mendez
President of the Republic of Panama
Panama City.

LBJ/WGB:mm
July 28, 1966

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-198
By up, NARA, Date 1-20-89

Thursday, July 28, 1966 at

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Organization of Harold Wilson Visit

1. 11 A.M. Session During your session with the Prime Minister, Walt and I, and Walter Stoessel from State* will stand by in the Cabinet Room with the Prime Minister's advisers (Ambassador Dean, Secretary of the Cabinet Sir Burke Trend, the two senior members of Wilson's staff, and one senior official from the Foreign Office).

Question: Do you wish Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Fowler and Ball to be available in case you and the PM decide to join us? On the British side there will be no one of Cabinet rank, and hence it would be awkward to have three American Cabinet Officers standing by for the full two hours. One possibility would be for Rusk, et al, to be available on 10 minutes notice. Another would be for them to come to the White House at 12 or 12:15, by which time you and the PM are likely to have finished your private conversation.

Have Rusk, McNamara, Fowler and Ball come to Cabinet Rm. at _____ o'clock.

Make sure they are available on 10 minutes notice _____

They should come in time for lunch at 1 P.M. _____

Speak to me _____

2. After Lunch Session with Advisers In case you should decide to have an after lunch session in the Cabinet Room with advisers, we will have the following people available: Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Fowler; Ball, Stoessel and McNaughton, plus Rostow and Bator.

Approve _____

Add/Subtract _____

Speak to me _____

Francis M. Bator

FMB:djw

* and John Mc Naughton

28a



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, July 28, 1966

Mr Rosten

28

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Harold Wilson Visit, July 29, 1966

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 88-208
By js, NARA Date 4-25-99

Schedule

- .. 11-12 A.M. alone (with staffs standing by in Cabinet Room);
- .. Noon-1 P.M. in Cabinet Room with Messrs. Rusk, McNamara, Fowler, Ball, et al;
- .. 1 P.M. - lunch with 44 guests;
- .. 3 P.M. possible continuation of meeting with advisers in Cabinet Room.

Following the December 1965 precedent, we plan no communique.

Subjects Besides Vietnam, and Wilson reports on his Moscow trip and on Rhodesia, there is really only one subject: How Wilson -- having swallowed some bitter stop-gap medicine -- plans to play his hand over the next 2-3 years, at home and abroad; and how we play our hand to protect our interests. The discussion will break down into three inter-connected topics:

1. His economic base: how he plans to get from here to 1970; and how this ties in with,
2. the British role East of Suez;
3. the British role in Europe (movement toward Common Market, and policy vis-a-vis Germany involving money, the BAOR, nuclear arrangements, etc.)

What Wilson Probably Wants Out of Visit

- To reconfirm, in public and private, the LBJ-Wilson friendship, post-"disassociation".
- An indication of respect for his tough economic measures.

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- A chance to explain to you how he plans to manage Britain's affairs at home and abroad over the next three years, and the meaning of his economics for what he can and cannot do overseas.
- Initiation of further U. S. - U. K. consultation on defense arrangements East of Suez and in Europe.
- We do not believe that he will ask for direct support for the pound in the near term, or even for a contingent commitment of support.

What We Want from Wilson

- Support instead of trouble on Vietnam.
- Avoidance of anything that will look like a pull-out from East of Suez -- whatever they do should follow close consultation between McNamara and Healy.
- In trimming the BAOR, they should maintain combat capability and avoid the appearance of a withdrawal.
- A forthcoming German policy, which goes beyond "more money or no troops".
- A forthcoming posture vis-a-vis the European Community
(-- this does not prejudge their tactics in joining the Common Market).
- On NATO nuclear arrangements, that they support the McNamara formula: consultation-with-hardware-on-the-agenda, and not try to force the Germans publicly to swear off hardware forever.
(This does ~~not~~ raise a question about our tactics on the proliferation treaty.)

The rest of this memorandum contains a brief discussion of what Wilson might say, and you might wish to say, on each of the three major topics: his economics, East of Suez, Europe. At Tab A is a brief summary of possible talking points. At Tab B is the State Department scope paper with the more important passages marked.

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Topic I - The UK Economic Problem

On the immediate problem (will the speculators remain quiet during the next few weeks, before the UK program really bites?) there is not much for you and the PM to talk about. We do not think Wilson will press you about what we would do in case of another speculative avalanche. If the question does come up, you will wish to use the ambiguous Fowler formula: "No unilateral U. S. help."

On the longer-term question -- how he plans to get from next winter to where he wants to be in 1970 -- you will wish to hear him out; it is central to our interest in a vigorous UK playing an active role East of Suez and in Europe. By early '67 he will be presiding over a stagnant economy with high unemployment, lots of excess capacity, low investment -- and a balance of payments close to equilibrium. Question: How will he (1) revive total demand; (2) assure that investment will rise to some 25% of GNP, and go into the right things, thereby accelerating productivity and exports; and, at the same time, (3) keep enough slack in the labor market to make his incomes policy work, and (4) keep his balance of payments from again going sour.

He will probably say he can pull it off (1) if the speculators stay off his back; (2) if he can carry out his plans to save money on defense East of Suez and in Germany; and (3) if during '68-'70 he can get international help in rolling over the remaining \$1.4 billion of IMF debt (if all goes well, they will pay off the \$1 billion they owe next year.)

You might say (before you go on to East of Suez and Germany) that, on the IMF debt, he should talk to Fowler when the time comes. (If you want to cheer him up, you might say that some of your advisers do not think it will be difficult to manage a roll over of the \$1.4 billion as long as in other respects the UK balance of payments is in order.)

(He might also say that there is a more general liquidity problem; that the present rules of the game are too hard on the two reserve currencies; that with the Continentals dragging their feet in the Group of Ten negotiations, it will take too long before we get relief from that source. He has a point, but you will only want to say that (1) Fowler will keep pushing this hard -- we don't intend to give in to the Continentals; (2) there is no need yet for more drastic steps, e. g., the formation of a Dollar-Sterling area, isolating the European Community; (3) if all the important Europeans turn out to be impossible over the next year or two, we might have to see what steps to take.)

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You might then pick up his point about saving foreign exchange and resources on defense and go on to:

Topic II - Britain East of Suez

Our latest report on their intentions is from Healey via Bob McNamara. They assume that "confrontation in Malaysia" is ended; in any event they plan to withdraw some 15-20 thousand men from the Far East by April '68, leaving 50 thousand in the theatre. But unless there is another sterling crisis the British "do not intend to give up their world role to reduce forces in the Far East to where they cannot fulfill their commitments."

You will wish to avoid going into detail on this, but simply say that:

- (1) You understand the need for saving both domestic and balance of payments money.
- (2) You hope they will not do anything which will look like a pull-out from the Far East.
- (3) In the near term, anything done should follow close consultation between McNamara and Healey. Over time, we should work out with the Australians a sensible strategy, force levels, etc., to deal with the Far Eastern problem post-Vietnam.
- (4) You may want to add that McNamara may be in a position to assure that the Far Eastern foreign exchange burden on the UK is not excessive.

Topic III - Britain's Role in Europe
(Germany, Common Market, NATO)

1. UK-German Relations (and U. S. -German Relations)

The UK view of Germany is that (1) the Germans are not paying their way in defense and aid (it is true); (2) they should give up their ideas on nuclear sharing. Like many Americans in and out of the Congress, London doesn't quite realize that (1) and (2) do not add up to a policy. With a weak German Government, deeply anxious about the German role in the world and under covert attack from the French, a major problem of U. S. and UK foreign policy is to find the basis for a decent political bargain with Germany.

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Tomorrow's meeting is not the occasion for finding a formula. But it would be useful if you told Wilson that:

- (1) We have to be very careful about the Germans;
- (2) Trimming the BAOR a little may be O. K., if there is no appreciable reduction in combat capability, and if we avoid any impression that NATO is falling apart -- it must be done gradually and slowly; the cosmetics are vital;
- (3) Both they and we might explore with the Germans some variants to a 100% weapons offset. (As you know, some of us have been thinking about some kind of a payments union which would give the Germans the option of buying long-term IOUs as an alternative to buying weapons. McNamara and Fowler didn't like this, but now that it is clear that a 100% weapons offset after June 1967 is not in the cards, we shall have to take another look.)
- (4) On NATO nuclear arrangements, we want to stay with the McNamara formula (beefing up consultation, with possible hardware-in-the-future one item on the consultative agenda.) We must not try to make the Germans publicly swear off forever in order to try to buy a deal from the Russians in Geneva. (This is a point you should make hard only if you have made up your mind on the subject. Rusk, Ball, Rostow would vote this way; Foster, and I think Moyers, the other. I myself would vote to keep the issue open a little longer. If you haven't made up your mind, you might want to take a last reading of McNamara's and Rusk's views.)
- (5) On nuclear arrangements, it might also make sense to have some tripartite (US -UK-FRG) discussions during the autumn.

2. Britain's Own Nuclear Role

We do not believe that Wilson would be prepared at this stage to give up his submarines. But you might gently draw him out on his present attitude about the possibility of his moving away from an independent nuclear role. The further he is willing to move, the better for us, and your drawing him out is the best way of getting a map of his intentions. (All your advisers agree that any British step in this direction will help us with the German problem. If he were prepared really to sink or sell his submarines, the German nuclear problem would be solved. And we could then have a real go at the Russians on non-proliferation.)

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3. UK and the Common Market

Wilson's position is that they will move as soon as it is clear that the French will let them in, and as soon as they can work out workable terms on agriculture, the Commonwealth, etc. It is clear that Wilson believes that, for the time being, the French veto is an absolute barrier, and that it would be political suicide to go begging for admission. However, between the Ball strategy of taking the plunge (i. e., announcing that they are ready to sign on the dotted line), and the present British posture, there is a lot of room. You might wish to sound out the Prime Minister what his thinking is, and suggest, in very general terms, that it is hard to imagine a responsible and healthy Europe without Britain playing a leading role. If the atmosphere is right you might even indicate that it is the view of many of your advisers that there ought to be clear and frequent indications from London, aimed at the Europeans, that, over the long-term, it is the firm intention of Britain to join.

At Tab A is a brief summary of possible talking points.

At Tab B is the State Department scope paper, with the more important passages marked.

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Francis M. Bator

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED ²⁸⁻⁸

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-208

By us, NARA Date 4-25-99

Thursday, July 28, 1966, at 7:00 p. m.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Summary Talking Points for your Conversation with Prime Minister Wilson, 11 A. M., Friday, July 29, 1966

The UK Economic Problem

- We admire his political courage for taking the bitter but necessary medicine;
- Your advisers convinced that, as a stopgap, these measures will take the inflation out of the economy and fix the balance of payments;
- How does he plan to revive the economy next spring, and get on a track of stable growth, stable prices and balance of payments equilibrium? No one has quite solved that problem.

On East of Suez

- You understand the need for saving both domestic and balance of payments money;
- However, you hope they will not do anything which will look like a pull-out from the Far East;
- In the near term, anything done should follow close consultation between McNamara and Healy;
- Over time, we should work out with the Australians a sensible strategy, force levels, etc., to deal with the Far Eastern problem post-Vietnam.

Europe: UK-German Relations

- We have to be very careful about the Germans (weak government, under covert attack from the French, etc.)
- Trimming the BAOR a little may be O. K., if there is no appreciable reduction in combat capability and if we avoid any impression that NATO is falling apart; must be done gradually and slowly; the cosmetics are vital;
- On NATO nuclear arrangements, we want to stay with the McNamara formula: consultation, with possible hardware on the agenda. (You will wish to emphasize or de-emphasize the hardware part of this, depending on your own thinking about the proliferation treaty.)
- On nuclear arrangements, it might make sense to have some tripartite U. S. -UK-FRG discussions during the autumn.

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Europe: Britain's own nuclear role

- You might recall the various positions he has taken in the past and draw him out on his own present attitude about the possibility of his moving away from an independent nuclear role. (There are more gentle ways of getting at this, if you prefer.)

Europe: UK and the Common Market

- You might suggest that we find it hard to imagine a responsible and healthy Europe without Britain playing a leading role.

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Francis M. Bator

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 27, 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit of Prime Minister Wilson
July 29, 1966Wilson Besieged

Times are hard for Prime Minister Wilson. Before the March 31 election when he had a tiny majority in the House of Commons, he managed to create an impression of political skill and dexterity to the applause of his friends and grudging respect from his enemies. Now with a large majority, he hardly appears the same man. Events seem to have become his master and he is rushing from one fire to another without ever really putting any of them out.

Wilson is now fighting back, seeking to regain the initiative. It would be a mistake to count him out at this early stage or to underestimate his ability to stage a comeback. His honeymoon with the British electorate, his own party, and other nations of the world is, on the other hand, obviously over.

The problems facing Wilson are numerous. Most of them are difficult to solve; some may even be insolvable. Given their magnitude, any British Prime Minister is likely to look bad on occasion. What counts is the will to take difficult decisions and the determination to see them through. Wilson seems to have this will and determination in most cases but he is a man badly in need of friendly counsel.

DECLASSIFIED**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6****NLJ 98-209****By is, NARA Date 4-25-99**~~SECRET~~

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ROSTOW'S OFFICE

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British Economic Situation

The most difficult problem is economic. It transcends all others and has a strong influence on British decisions in all areas within the sphere of Government activity. The Labor Government has either been in the midst of a balance of payments crisis or on the verge of one since it took office in October, 1964. The problem, as it has been since World War II, is that when the British economy expands, imports go up faster than exports. Wilson sought to avoid the stop-and-go tactics of his predecessors, the slowing down of the economy to right the balance of payments situation. In the end, he has now been forced to take what are considered the most severe deflationary measures of any post-war British Government.

The world has adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Bankers and others have been impressed with the UK decision to take large amounts of money out of the economy by additional taxes and cuts in spending. But there are doubts as to whether the wage-price freeze can be made effective.

The Prime Minister will tell you that his Government will see to it that the politically painful deflationary measures produce the desired effect of eliminating the balance of payments gap. Solutions to the all important question of confidence, which has so far eluded the Labor Government, will come. He will also want to tell you what plans he has to put the British economy back in motion on a sounder basis.

East of Suez

The British are aware of divisions of opinion in the U.S. Government regarding the desirability of their continuing to maintain a role East of Suez. They are

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convinced that you want them to play this role and are basing their actions on this assumption. Some cuts in overseas expenditures are probably inevitable. Wilson probably hopes to make these without abandoning any major commitments and the details of the £100 million of cuts in overseas defense and aid expenditures were deliberately omitted in his statement to the Commons. Wilson will want assurances from you that his assumption is correct. He probably also would like to know if the U.S. is prepared to help in this matter. The British have already asked us to pay half the cost of building an air strip on Aldabra Island in the Indian Ocean which is designed to replace in part the base they will give up in Aden.

Vietnam

The UK is strongly opposed to any direct British involvement in Vietnam. Most of the British people are on the whole sympathetic to what we are trying to do there. They fear, however, that they may be dragged into the war either through escalation or as a result of American pressure. They also doubt that the U.S. can win.

Wilson has recently made some concessions to his left wing on this issue, notably in his "dissociation" statement and the fiasco in the House of Commons over the sale of arms to the U.S. and Australia for use in Vietnam. We believe Wilson realizes that his policy of political support for the U.S. in Vietnam has been undercut by these concessions and is now taking steps to make amends.

Wilson will want to tell you of his recent talks with Soviet leaders and of the difficulties they have in helping bring about negotiations. He will want to hear from you again that the U.S. is determined to stick it out and will want to exchange ideas with you on how to bring the problem to the conference table.

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Rhodesia

The Wilson Government is now engaged in talks with the Smith Government to see if there is a basis for a negotiated settlement. The British position is not strong and we fear that Wilson may be tempted to make a settlement which could not plausibly be presented to the rest of the world as guaranteeing a reasonably rapid transition to majority rule.

The problem is that the British do not have the resources to force a more acceptable arrangement and beset with a host of other problems, may be losing the will to fight on. You may wish to ask Wilson for a frank assessment of how he sees this problem developing.

BAOR

The British have long been disturbed that they have not been getting more from Germany in the way of offsets to cover the foreign exchange expenses of the BAOR. Presently, their offset agreement with the Germans covers only about 50 percent of the foreign exchange costs of the BAOR. The Wilson Government has been taking an increasingly tough line on this issue and is now on record as stating that it will cut its forces to a point where the offset agreement does cover its expenditures in foreign exchange.

The Germans are sympathetic to the British problem but do not have much room for maneuver. They have always had trouble finding enough to buy in Britain. They have resisted the British suggestion of direct budgetary support for British army costs as a reversion to occupation days. It is difficult to see how they can significantly improve on their present performance unless new approaches are discovered.

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The British in the past have asked for our support with Germany on the offset agreement. Wilson will probably again ask for your support. You may wish to tell him that we are sympathetic and are prepared to do what we can insofar as is consistent with our own similar problems. You may wish to add that we share the British conviction that the Germans should do more in carrying the free world burden.

Common Market

The Wilson Government has let it be known to all who wish to hear that the British want to enter the Common Market. Wilson and his advisers probably feel that no matter what Britain now does on the economic side, the de Gaulle political veto still applies and thus that Britain has no choice but to wait until France changes its policy. Wilson probably believes that it would be a major blunder to go begging for membership and be rebuffed by the French.

Public opinion in favor of British entry into the Common Market has risen markedly in recent years. Many knowledgeable Britons are now convinced that the only way their country can ever overcome its economic difficulties is through entry into the Market.

Nuclear Matters

Wilson's attitude on a "hardware" solution to the nuclear problem in NATO has been steadily hardening. He is more inclined than we are to accept at face value the Soviet contention that closer German involvement with nuclear weapons in NATO is a block to any progress on a non-proliferation agreement. He has said he accepts the validity of our contention that the Germans must be made to feel they are equal in value to the other members of the Western Alliance. He prefers a "consultative" arrangement

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rather than "hardware" solutions as a means to achieve such equality in the nuclear field. The British underscored this attitude at the McNamara Committee meeting earlier this week when Healey moved the deletion of a paragraph in the Agreed Minute that would have made explicit reference to such an arrangement. At the same time, Wilson has not foreclosed the possibility of a collective nuclear force arrangement, nor has he withdrawn the ANF proposals.

The British see the continuing development of the McNamara Committee as the solution to the nuclear problem of the Alliance, although they have some differences with us about how the Committee might be organized. They seek to consult with us and to share in the decision-making process. They hope that the Germans will be satisfied with this as well. Certainly Wilson would prefer this problem be left dormant at the moment, although it is conceivable he would be prepared for meaningful negotiations with the Germans if the Germans for their part show greater ability and willingness to cooperate on other matters.

The British nuclear deterrent has so far escaped the economy axe. The reason is simple. The nuclear deterrent is the most important of the great power symbols still in British possession. Although Wilson is committed to give it up, he has so far shown no disposition to do so.

In response to NSAM 345, Secretary McNamara and I have proposed early tripartite talks on the nuclear question among the U.S., British and German Foreign and Defense Ministers to narrow differences and, if possible, determine a program each will support. You may wish to refer to the suggestions for tripartite discussions of the nuclear question in your letter of May 21 to Wilson and indicate that with the completion of some internal U.S. policy consideration of this matter, such discussions would seem to be timely. These talks would be conducted primarily by the Foreign Ministers of the UK, the FRG, and the U.S. in connection with other meetings which bring them together.

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The scope of the proposed discussions should be defined broadly as covering the range of possibilities set forth in our response to NSAM 345, and would of course be conducted on the basis of the directives which you may prepare on this subject.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

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Thursday, July 28, 1966 -- 5:55 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Holmes Alexander came to see me today. He raised the question of whether or not it would be better for the U. S. to have price and wage control and otherwise to require more general sacrifice because of the war in Viet Nam. After explaining why, at its present level, the war did not now require price and wage control, calling up the reserves, etc., I went on to discuss why it was difficult for some Americans to understand this war as opposed to the Korean war. I traced the history of the conflict and Communist efforts to portray it as a civil war. I then outlined our policy and provided him with public quotable materials to suggest that Hanoi was counting on the inability of the U. S. to sustain a protracted war. He seemed quite interested.

Robert G. Spivak, Potomac News Associates, called on me today. He had nothing in particular to ask me except for some help in finding biographical materials on Mao Tse-tung. He indicated his bafflement with the recent behavior and statements of Fulbright.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

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July 28, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

It is a great pleasure for me to send warm personal greetings to you through Ambassador Adair.

During his visit to Washington, we have had an opportunity to discuss the relations between our two countries. He will be conveying to you my thoughts on a number of subjects, including additional ways in which we might cooperate with you in your efforts to promote economic and social development in Panama.

At the same time, I want you to know that it is always a pleasure to hear from you directly. I hope that you will not hesitate to write me at any time.

As we proceed with preparations for a meeting of American Presidents, I would welcome hearing from you of what initiatives might be discussed to give the Alliance for Progress increased momentum and otherwise strengthen the projects for economic and social progress in our Hemisphere.

Sincerely,

/s/

LBJ

His Excellency
Marco A. Robles Mendez
President of the Republic of Panama
Panama City.

LBJ/WGB:mm
July 28, 1966

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By W, NARA, Date 7-9-98

July 28, 1966
Thursday - 12:30 p.m.

Shirley Marvin Watson

Mr. President:

It would strengthen our hand in general and Chuck Adair's in particular if he were able to take back a letter like this from you to President Robles. You may want to have a word with Ambassador Adair when he comes upstairs in a little while.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Thursday, July 28, 1966 -- 10:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

I asked Denis Greenhill, an advance party for Wilson's visit, what difference in basic assessment lies behind Wilson's posture on Viet Nam. His reply was, I believe, candid.

1. He said: Just as the Conservative government in 1961-62 was very jumpy about the Berlin crisis, so the Wilson government fears confrontation in Viet Nam. In both cases they leaned to diminishing the confrontation and looking for a "political" solution.

2. He said that we were proved right on the Berlin crisis in 1961-62 although the British kept dragging their feet.

I wondered aloud what the British government would have had us do about the Cuba missile crisis. He said: "Thank God you didn't ask." In this he was joined by John Killick, a British Embassy colleague.

In short, we are up against an attitude of mind which, in effect, prefers that we take losses in the free world rather than the risks of sharp confrontation.

I believe this to be an accurate assessment.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Thursday, July 28, 1966 -- 11:15 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts -- Wednesday, July 27, 1966

Rowland Evans came in at Bill Moyers' suggestion to discuss Bill Fulbright's position on your Asia speech, made on the floor of the Senate. Since he had been at dinner where Fulbright and I had exchanged views, he was both puzzled and somewhat outraged that Fulbright had referred to me on the Senate floor on the basis of a private conversation. I briefed him fully on what our exchanges had been. I urged him to confine his discussion to Fulbright's view versus the view of Asia taken in your Asia policy speech. I pointed out it would be inappropriate to continue a debate between a Senator and a White House aide. He promised firmly that he would leave me out of his story in this matter.

Carroll Kilpatrick, Washington Post, came in to talk about the Wilson visit. I said that we would be listening to Wilson. We had no fixed positions of our own. Secretary McNamara was just back; Fowler and Ball would be returning on Thursday, July 28; and we still did not know just how the British unions would cooperate with Wilson's program.

R. H. Shackford, Scripps-Howard Newspapers, telephoned to ask me to speak at a lunch meeting with the Overseas Writers. After checking with Bill Moyers, I accepted for an off-the-record session on Friday, August 5.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday,
July 28, 1966-- 6:40 pm~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached are Secretary Freeman's recommendations for our next PL-480 programs in India and Pakistan. Soundings by my staff indicate that Agriculture has not taken State or AID views into account in making these recommendations. I understand there are several unanswered questions of timing and quantities we ought to have their thoughts on.

I will not bother you with details, but this will give you a sense of the work that still needs doing:

--We need State's views on timing our next Indian agreement to take account of Indian elections in early 1967. We do not have to sign a new agreement until September.

--We need a better fix on India's requirements when the monsoon is farther along. Since our supplies are tight, committing too much in an early agreement would reduce our flexibility later in the year.

--We may want to move on rice before a September wheat deal because the need is more pressing.

--We have to move sooner in Pakistan, but Secretary Freeman's numbers are about 20% lower than our AID mission's. We ought to have our mission's latest estimates before we decide.

I recommend we ask Secretaries Rusk and Freeman to send you a joint State/AID/Agriculture recommendation.

I make this specific recommendation for a general reason: As our food surpluses diminish, the debate in the town about how to handle PL 480 will get tougher. We need to force coordination before recommendations like this arrive here for your decision.

Approve
See me

Walt Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 87-200
By *ig* NARA, Date 3-15-89



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

July 27, 1966

MEMORANDUM

To: The President
The White House

From: Orville L. Freeman *OLF*
Secretary of Agriculture

Subject: New P.L. 480 Agreements with Pakistan and India

The following is called to your attention for review, evaluation and instruction. The recommendations made are tight and frugal. They balance our tight supply situation and yet meet the commitments made earlier this year. In my judgment we should move promptly and forward negotiating instructions for the Indians have as I reported on my return from the sub-Continent (memorandum report dated July 19 to the President) have lived up to the commitments made to us at Rome and later when Subramaniam and the Prime Minister met with the President. This is not to say that they will meet all the targets set but they are taking all the actions agreed on and are trying real hard and investing resources and manpower as agreed.

The Pakistan situation is not quite so clear but President Ayub Khan was most cordial and has I think "earned" encouragement and limited commitment of our resources (nonetheless far short of what they ask).

I. Pakistan

Length of Agreement

The Government of Pakistan has asked for a P.L. 480 agreement covering all of fiscal year 1967. We recommend that the agreement be limited to the first 6 months of FY 1967, leaving the last 6 months to be negotiated early in 1967.

Foodgrains

The Government of Pakistan has officially requested 2.4 million tons of wheat for FY 1967. The Department estimates the total food grain import deficit at 1.5 million tons and recommends a P.L. 480 agreement for this year of 1.155 million tons of which 830,000 tons would be wheat and 325,000 tons would be coarse grains. This would leave some 350,000 tons to be made up by grain imports from other sources.

2--The President

Of the 830,000 tons of wheat, 300,000 tons were committed under the May 26 agreement and 100,000 tons are included in the interim amendment to that agreement now being negotiated at the request of President Ayub Khan. This leaves an additional 430,000 tons of wheat to be shipped the remainder of FY 1967. We recommend that 200,000 tons of wheat and 200,000 tons of coarse grains be made available for the first half of this fiscal year. This would leave 230,000 tons of wheat and 125,000 tons of coarse grains for the second half of the current fiscal year.

Vegetable Oil

The Pakistanis have requested 200,000 tons of vegetable oil for this fiscal year. Some 20,000 tons from an earlier agreement are now being shipped. We recommend that not more than 30,000 additional tons be made available for the first half of FY 1967 with a final decision on the exact quantity withheld until our supply position and domestic prices have clarified.

Cotton

The Pakistanis have requested 15,000 bales of cotton for FY 1967. We recommend it be made available during the first half of the current fiscal year, letting them move it as they see fit.

Tobacco

Two million pounds of tobacco have been requested. We recommend that the entire quantity be made available during the first half of this fiscal year.

Tallow

The Pakistanis requested 50,000 tons of tallow. Tallow is no longer available under Title I.

Nonfat dry milk

The GOP has been informed that nonfat dry milk is no longer available under Title I. It should be possible to make available some nonfat dry milk under Title II or Title III. We will attempt to do so in modest quantities adequate to meet planned programs directed to child nutrition.

3--The President

II. India

Foodgrains

USDA currently estimates India's total import requirement for foodgrains at 9 million tons for FY 1967, excluding rice. India's P.L. 480 wheat quota this fiscal year tentatively determined in light of the current tight supply situation is 5 million tons. The remaining 4 million tons would be made up of 2.3 million tons of coarse grains under P.L. 480 and 1.7 million tons of wheat from other sources.

Of the 5 million tons of P.L. 480 wheat tentatively budgeted, 2.75 million tons has already been committed during fiscal '66 for delivery in fiscal '67. This leaves 2.25 for the remainder of this fiscal year (second half).

Coarse grains already made available under P.L. 480 for arrival in FY 1967 total 900,000 tons leaving nearly 1.4 million tons yet to be programmed in FY 1967. As things now stand wheat imports are concentrated in the early part of this fiscal year leaving a disproportionately large share of coarse grains for import in the second half. We recommend that the 2 million tons of additional grain which is understood to be a commitment (on our part) for this FY be made available. We recommend, however, that only 1.2 million tons of this be wheat and that .8 million tons be coarse grains. Even with this high ratio of coarse grains in the 2 million tons we will still have made available nearly 4 million tons or four-fifths of India's FY 1967 wheat quota during the first half of FY 1967, leaving only 1 million tons for the last half. This is cutting it quite short for the second half of the fiscal year, but the monsoon looks favorable now and if Subramaniam does as well as he predicted to me (subject to the "Rain God" as he put it) they should be all right. The Indians will likely protest the volume of coarse grain but it can be done if they try hard.

Vegetable Oils

Some 35,000 tons of vegetable oils were made available under the May 27 agreement. Only 15,000 tons have been purchased thus far. An amendment for an additional 33,000 tons is now under consideration. We propose to go slow on this until our supply situation becomes clearer.

4--The President

Tobacco

Two million pounds of tobacco were made available under the May 27 agreement. Very little has been taken thus far.

Cotton

Some 700,000 bales of cotton, nearly a 2-year supply at recent import levels, were made available under the May 27 agreement. No additional cotton is needed at this time.

Nonfat dry milk

Nonfat dry milk is being made available under Title II. India's supplies of nonfat dry milk seem to be adequate due largely to small shipments from some 12 donor countries.

Rice

India is anxious for rice to help meet the Communist political threat in Bengal and Karela. The devaluation decision is giving lots of trouble. Rice is in tight supply. We have strong demands from Africa, Philippines, Pakistan and other countries. Vietnam commands first priority and we are planning carefully so that adequate supply will be available. I hesitate to single India out for rice at this time but because the grain package we are offering is a tough one, cut back in amount and very heavy on coarse grains, I think it would be very helpful to sweeten it just a bit with 25,000 tons of rice. We will then sell India commercially 25,000 tons of rice at maximum CCC credit terms. We have adequate rice to make this small amount available now. In my best judgment it is a prudent action to take at this time.

Action

Proceed with negotiating instructions as outlined _____

I wish to discuss this further _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Agriculture

At the conclusion of the July 19 National Security Council meeting on world food problems, the President asked the Secretary of State to develop interdepartmental recommendations on the next steps in the war on hunger, including studies necessary to prepare us to deal with the problems ahead. He suggested that this work be done by the Departments of State and Agriculture, AID, and the Bureau of the Budget working together.

It is the President's understanding that new PL 480 agreements for Pakistan and India are now moving toward decision. He has asked that a joint State/AID/Agriculture recommendation be sent to him promptly on the PL 480 India and Pakistan programs and that additional recommendations covering other PL 480 countries follow shortly.

These recommendations should take into account all aspects of our relations with the countries involved.

Because it appears that the U. S. supply situation will not permit us to meet fully the requests for PL 480 commodities, it is important that allotments worldwide be taken into account in presenting recommendations on individual country programs.

13/
W. W. Rostow

Information copy to:
Administrator, AID
Director, Bureau of the Budget

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-200
By ing NARA, Date 3-15-89

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-398
By cb, NARA Date 10-10-00

~~SECRET~~ -- NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Thursday, July 28, 1966 -- 10:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

3.4(b)(1),(6)

[REDACTED]

1. Both Strauss and Barzel are out to remove him, soon or late.

2. Strauss is trying to push Erhard and Schroeder into a Moscow trip in which they will fail. He then would like to see Germany look to "Europe" -- which means France, essentially -- for greater nuclear status.

3. Barzel, on the other hand, looks to inflaming the German unity issue and using Erhard's inability to make progress as a way of forcing him out. He, too, looks to a reduction in U. S. -German relations and an intensification of Germany's relations with the French.

3.4(b)(1),(6)

[REDACTED]

In my view, neither Strauss nor Barzel would, in fact, radically reduce the U. S. -German connection. But they do suggest the rise of assertive nationalism in Germany already evident in the way they are handling the offset issue.

3.4(b)(1),(6)

[REDACTED] the background of rising strength in the Social Democratic opposition to the Erhard coalition.

3.4(b)(1),(6)

We shall, of course, take readings on Erhard's political position closer to the time of his visit. These [REDACTED] are an interim picture of the kind of trouble he has in his own political family.

W. W. Rostow

3.4(b)(1)

Attachments

[REDACTED]

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~ -- NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Thursday, July 28, 1966 -- 11:10 a. m.

Mr. President:

It may be that, looking back, the crisis inside Communist China will be viewed by historians as the most significant event now taking place on the world scene. Obviously it is extremely hard to follow in detail.


The attached intelligence cable presents the crisis as a final stand of Mao and the Old Guard seeking to suppress forces for change inside the Communist party. It implies that these forces will, in time, assert themselves.

Something like this analysis would be accepted by most of those who have followed the evolution of mainland China since 1949. What no one knows -- and experts argue over -- is how long it will take for this strong, pragmatic opposition to assert itself and what will happen in the meantime.

The latter is what matters most to us from day to day. Nevertheless, I thought you might like to read this interesting assessment.

W. W. Rostow

TDCS-314/09256-66



WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

35a

July 25, 1966

TEXT OF CIA INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

Subject: Mao's Opposition

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-396

By is, NARA Date 1-20-00

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Source: [REDACTED]

This is a [REDACTED] of the current situation. It is not an official judgment by this Agency or any component. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Prepared for internal use as a guide to the operational environment, this commentary is disseminated in the belief that it may be useful to other agencies in assessing the situation for their own purposes.

SUMMARY: Mao's opposition is widespread and continuing. It is characterized by the Party as "more insidious and cunning" than any previous anti-party clique. The opposition is found in artists of all types, Politburo members, Party senior propagandists, military personnel and university presidents. However, functional non-political offices, such as Party Economic and Foreign Affairs Departments seem to be outside the purge. As Mao again attempts to force his Party and his people to accept the discipline of Maoism, the effort may be too much for both and the Chinese may quietly walk away from his leadership.

As the purge widens throughout China there is need to examine just who has been caught opposing today's Roi Soleil. It is certainly a mixed bag -- historians, playwrights, movie directors, Politburo members, virtually all of the Party's senior propagandists, military personalities and university presidents. Mao and Lin have recognized the universality of the opposition, indeed, have perhaps created it in part. So many are involved that one wonders at first just who remains loyal and who is pressing the attack against the bourgeois royalists, the revisionists, and all the members of the black gang of the three-family village and the four-family store.

Certain vital Communist Party entities have as yet been above reproach: the public security apparatus, the Communist Party staff offices of Agriculture and Forestry, Finance and Trade, Industry and Communications, as well as Foreign Affairs -- all appear to have escaped open criticism. It almost seems that the functional non-political offices are outside the purge and that those under censure are the offices which are involved in the ideology of Communism and the extension of Communist Party control.

The party now characterizes its opposition as "more insidious and cunning than the two previous anti-party cliques which have been crushed." These are

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C) 2 -

the men who "reached out to grab at power in the party, the Army, and the government to usurp the leadership so as to restore capitalism." These charges are extremely serious; the problem lies in whether they are genuine or false. In the past the Communists have been pretty literal and we would guess that these charges should be taken seriously as a clear reflection of the intentions of the opposition.

Assuming these charges are in earnest we must answer another question: To whom do they specifically apply?

There has been an opposition faction in China since the Communist assumption of power in 1949. After Mao embarked on the communes and the Great Leap Forward and these two efforts failed badly, criticism grew to a high point in 1962. From 1959 to 1962, by Mao's own admission, the "heavy national calamities and the sabotage of the Soviet revisionists" so weakened China that a major purge to contain this criticism was not possible. Actually this is partly an excuse, since Mao forced the demarche with the Soviets leading to the removal of the technicians; still, there can be no doubt that the Soviet departure hurt China. The intellectuals now under heavy attack did use this period of party weakness to advance ideas which, when read, literally refuted Maoism. This is why Wu Han and Teng T'o were able to print their satires and why the party did not act against them.

In late 1962 Mao felt strong enough to begin the rectification he knew was necessary -- the socialist education campaign. This developed throughout 1963 and led to the direct attack on Yang Hsien Chen, the leading theoretician of the higher party school, whose dialectic arguments directly opposed those of Mao and were applied by the opposition to buttress agreements for private plots, free markets, and increase in small enterprises. All of this was anathema to Mao, but not necessarily to a number of party leaders who were beginning to move away from Mao's leadership and his theories. As senior party members defied Mao, many lesser individuals used this shelter to produce anti-Maoist novels, essays and motion pictures.

By 1965 the rectification movement was faltering badly. The socialist education movement was by then being carried forward in the nationwide four clearances effort. Probably no disciplinary movement of the party was so thoroughly honored in the breach as the four clearances. By the fall of 1965 the party was no longer in direct control of the people. The opposition within the party had continued to mature and Mao found it necessary to begin a broad attack on his critics in November 1965. The first battle of the socialist cultural revolution took place in Shanghai when the municipal committee denounced the historian Wu Han and the fight with the Peking

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

-3- (C)

Municipal Committee began.

Therefore, we can answer our question. The opposition lay in the leadership of the Peking Municipal Committee, P'eng Chen and his subordinates, the propaganda department of the party, which allowed the development of the intellectual opposition, and the many party members who felt that the relaxation of Maoist Doctrine presaged a more adaptable Communism. This opposition is not dead despite the three months socialist cultural revolution purge. Mao is attempting a cleansing of the entire country of such anti-Maoist thought. He has not abandoned his intent to lead world Communism, but he realizes he must fully re-establish Maoism in China and regain control of the drifting party apparatus.

It is doubtful that a dynasty built on the sand of Maoist philosophy will take a century to fall; once begun, a decade would seem too long. The great socialist cultural revolution now unmasks "freaks and monsters" each week. As the list of purgees grows, it is a reasonable speculation that there will be more. Mao is worried about his revolution for it is clearly failing. If there is, medically, a disease definable as political paranoia, it has settled on the sometime resident of the small but now unlovely quarters overlooking Nan Hai, Peking's most exquisite lake. "Who knows whither the golden crane went, leaving but a shrine for pilgrims?" If there is any answer for the old man, it is also found in Chinese poetry -- "A cup of wine under the trees; I drink alone for no friend is near."

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - [REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 87-198
By inf, NARA, Date 1-20-87

36~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

Wednesday - July 27, 1966 - 10:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Scenario for Your Working Visit to Latin America

Linc Gordon and I have prepared the attached scenario for your working visit to Latin America. It carries a map showing the new route for the trip.

The scenario is in two parts:

- Preparations and public build-up for the trip prior to departure.
- Schedule for the trip itself.

The trip is built around two basic themes:

- Acceleration of the Alliance for Progress, especially in agriculture and education.
- New impetus to economic integration, through multinational projects and opening of inner frontiers of South America.

The program of activities for the trip is designed to:

- Allow adequate time for substantive discussions with other Presidents.
- Permit you to become personally associated with on-going Alliance for Progress projects with human impact.
- Carry you to some important inner frontier areas in the South American heartland to identify you with this bold new development concept.

The scenario is necessarily a rough estimate and needs further checking and refinement. One basic factor we need to know is whether you plan to take Mrs. Johnson with you.

Linc and I both think that the trip as outlined will carry strong public impact and be productive in preparing the climate for, and content of,

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

-2-

the OAS summit. We recommend your approval and await your instructions before proceeding with detailed planning.

W. W. Rostow

O. K. , proceed with
detailed planning _____

Mrs. Johnson will go _____
will not go _____.

Speak to me, _____.

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-198

By ing, NARA, Date 1-20-87

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

Copy # 5 of 5.

Scenario for Working Visit to Latin America

- Central Themes:
1. Acceleration of the Alliance for Progress, especially in agriculture and education.
 2. New Impetus to Economic Integration, through multinational projects and opening of inner frontiers of South America.

PART I - PREPARATIONS

Friday,
July 29

- Complete staff work on approach to Panamanian Government concerning:
 - Closing of Darien Gap.
 - Panama Development Authority.

Monday,
August 1

- Instruct Ambassador in Panama, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Brazil and Venezuela of President's desire to make short working visit and elicit invitations. Include in instruction type of Presidential activity contemplated in each country and final communique themes.
- Based on replies, prepare detailed itinerary and get W.H. Communications and Secret Service to work.
- Inform non-itinerary ARA posts of Presidential trip, with guidance on how to handle with local officials and press.

Thursday,
August 4

- Announce Presidential trip simultaneously in Washington and all Latin American capitals included in trip.
- Moyers and Rostow background on trip.

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

Monday,
August 15 -

- a.m. - IDB President Felipe Herrera invites President to signing ceremony for Alliance for Progress loans and to lunch. Loans might include:
- Brazil - \$15 million - ~~rural~~ potable water.
 - Colombia - \$ 9.7 million - agrarian reform.
 - Bolivia - \$ 1.0 million -- Industrial Bank.
 - CABEI - \$ 3.0 million -- Central American integration.
 - Colombia - \$ 1.0 million -- University of The Andes.
- President Herrera would also release Lillienthal Report on multinational projects in support of economic integration.
- p.m. - President meets with principal advisers to review preparations for the OAS summit.
- Moyers, Gordon background press on session.

Tuesday,
August 16 - Evening boat ride with Latin American Ambassadors.

Wednesday,
August 17 - President gives major Latin American policy speech at AFP ceremony.
(Possible sites: Base of Simon Bolivar Statue (18th & Va. Ave., in front of Interior Dept.)
PanAmerican Sanitary Organization Hq.
(23rd & Va. Ave. in back of the State Department).
(Another possibility is to address conference of businessmen from all OAS countries meeting in Panama. We are checking details of conference.)

PART II - ITINERARY

Thursday,
August 18

- President departs for Panama.
(Would have to be advanced by one day if Panama chosen as site for major address.)
- Meets with President Robles in afternoon and visits urban relocation center and school with him.
- Makes short visit to Zone in evening.
- Has working dinner with President Robles and advisers.
- Overnights in Panama City.

Friday,
August 19

- a.m. - Overflies Panama leg of Darien Gap with President Robles, with possible stop at Palo de las Letras on Panama-Colombia border through which road will pass.
- Returns Panama City and issues joint communique.
(Themes: support for urban development, Development Authority and Darien Gap.)
- p.m. - Flies to Bogota for 2-3 hour session with President Lleras at National Palace.
- Issues joint communique.
(Themes: summit ideas, especially integration, and Darien Gap.)
- Flies on to Lima where he will overnight.

Saturday,
August 20 -

- a.m. - Flies with President Belaunde to Tarapoto conferring en route on summit and Inner Frontiers Projects.
- p.m. - Dedicates (or visits) Alliance for Progress project in or around Lima.
- ~~Overnights again in Lima.~~
- Issues joint communique.
(Themes: Summit ideas, Carretera Marginal and Indian village development.)
- Flies to Arica, Chile and overnights.

Sunday,
August 21

- a.m. - Breakfast and morning working session with President Frei.
- Issues joint communique.
(Themes: Economic integration, disarmament, Frei visit to Washington in November.)
- p.m. - Flies to Brasilia overflying Andes, Gran Chaco and Mato Grosso. (Lunch on aircraft.)
- Late afternoon working session with President Castello Branco.
- Tours principal government buildings and has dinner with President Castello Branco.
- Overnights in Brasilia.

Monday,
August 22

- a. m. - Flies with President Castello Branco to Crato in Northeast Brazil -- new agricultural and small industry center in frontier area.
- Issues final communique.
 (Themes: Summit ideas, increased food production, opening of inner frontiers.)
- p. m. - Departs for Venezuela, flying over Amazon and Guayana industrial complex in Venezuela.
- Overnights at Macuto (stays at Macuto-Sheraton Hotel) on coast where President Leoni has house.

Tuesday,
August 23

- a. m. - Working session with President Leoni.
- Trip to agrarian reform area with President Leoni for visit and lunch with agrarian reform leaders and selected campesinos.
- Issues final communique.
 (Themes: Summit ideas, agrarian reform, democracy and development.)
- p. m. - Departs for Washington.

Distance and Flight Time

| | | |
|--|------------|------------|
| Washington to Panama | 2240 miles | 5:00 hours |
| (Panama to Palo de las Letras and return) | 350 " | ? |
| Panama to Bogota | 405 " | 1:10 " |
| Bogota to Lima | 1173 " | 2:50 " |
| (Lima to Tarapoto and return) | 800 " | ? |
| Lima to Arica | 590 " | 1:30 " |
| Arica to Brasilia | 1130 " | 2:55 " |
| Brasilia to Crato | 741 " | ? |
| Crato to Caracas | 2217 " | ? |
| Caracas to Washington | 1840 " | 4:50 " |
| | <hr/> | |
| Totals | 11486 | |

? = flight time depends on type of aircraft used

CONFIDENTIALJuly 27, 1966 -- 6:25 p. m.
Wednesday

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dates for Visit by Korean Prime Minister

In mid-May, on the recommendation of Secretary Rusk, you approved in principle an invitation to Korean Prime Minister Chong to visit Washington in the early autumn.

Although State had previously hoped for a mid-September date, that month is now heavily booked, given the Ne Win and Marcos visits. Unless you are willing to set aside any time in October, we should now inform the Koreans of our willingness to receive their Prime Minister in late November or December.

What is your preference?

W. W. Rostow

October ✓Late November ✓December ✓

Specific Date? _____

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By DCAT NARS, Date 8-11-86

cc: WWR ✓
BKS
WWJ
JCT, Jr.

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday - July 27, 1966 - 3:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for Ambassador Adair

Ambassador Adair leaves for Panama tomorrow night.

You met him yesterday at the Panama review meeting, but he has never had an appointment with you for a brief chat and picture-taking.

Jim Jones tells me that your schedule for today and tomorrow is full but there might be a chance to squeeze him in between appointments if you agree.

Chuck Adair is on one of our diplomatic front-lines in Panama and this personal contact with you will mean a great deal to him and help him in the important negotiations with President Robles on the Darien Gap and the Development Authority.

I recommend that you grant the appointment if we can do it without disrupting your schedule.

W. W. Rostow

Approve



Prefer doing
it another time

_____.

July 27, 1966
Wednesday - 6:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Lodge's weekly cable.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET Attachment~~

~~SECRET NO DIS~~

July 27, 1966

TEXT OF AMBASSADOR LODGE'S WEEKLY TELEGRAM (Saigon 2041)

I thought your argument on your trip through Indiana was extremely effective. Your remarks about the Communists having bombed the Embassy were much appreciated here.

Elections

A preliminary analysis of the candidates running in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area and First Corps (that is 43 of the 108 seats being contested) shows that of 328 candidates, only 30 are active military. Another 34 are civil servants. The largest category is businessmen, with 69 candidates. Fifty-seven teachers, 23 provincial and city councilors, and 13 farmers are running. While there may be some government sponsored candidates who do not appear in the military and civil servant categories, there is no sign of the government's entering a large number of its own hand-picked candidates.

Two traditional parties, Vietnam Nationalist and Dai Viet, are strong in the First Corps. But in Saigon, slates tend to be built around prominent individuals, and party affiliation is distinctly secondary. Except for Dr. Phan Quang Dan's alliance, the National Democratic Bloc, no party or group in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area is supporting more than one list.

Local election control boards were scheduled to complete screening of candidates on July 22. Preliminary reports indicate that few slates were eliminated. In First Corps, two or three were apparently rejected because of connections with the "struggle," which was a conspiracy to overthrow government authority by violence -- not a bona fide political movement. Communist or police records and incomplete documentation have caused the control councils to eliminate some others. In the Saigon-Gia Dinh areas, no prominent politicians were struck from the lists; the slates headed by Phan Khac Suu, Dan Van Sung, and La Thanh Nghe were all approved. Suu and Sung had been stricken for technical reasons, and I spoke to Ky about them.

There are reports that the Viet Cong intend to make a major effort to interfere with the election. Some candidates in Saigon have told us of threats. Authorities in First Corps have told us that they expect the Communists to try to repeat past tactics such as attacking polling places, intimidating voters, and stealing voter registration cards. Perhaps the first instance of Communist terror directed against the election was the July 16 attack on the Vietnam Nationalist Party Headquarters in Quang Tin Province.

~~SECRET NO DIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-195
By ing, NARA, Date 7-27-88

Popular attention is not yet focused on the election. Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office field representatives speak of ignorance and apathy, with the cost of living and terrorism still the big worries. The Government is trying to publicize voter registration and is producing a "how-to-vote" film.

Elections are an Opportunity

To try to hold elections in the middle of a war, in this underdeveloped country and with no real experience of democracy on a national scale, is difficult, complicated, unprecedented and dangerous. We must expect turbulence. Very few countries -- developed or otherwise -- hold elections in war time. Neither the British nor the French did during World War II.

But in spite of these considerations, I believe that holding elections in Vietnam at about this time had to be tried. The heart of this war, after all, is political, and the elections, while a danger, are also an opportunity for our side to look clean, to make it clear that cheating in Vietnam is really on the way out. It is no exaggeration to say that if our side looks clean, this can change the course of the war.

This is because the Communists, while brutal, imperialistic, ruthless, unscrupulous, crafty and cruel, appear puritanical by insisting that corruption exists on our side only. One rarely hears of a corrupt Communist -- at least while he is with their organization, but their abandonment of their own movement and its values when they defect or are captured cast strong doubt on their supposed internal morality. Nonetheless they are widely believed to be incorruptible.

I have put Lansdale onto the job of helping to bring about this big psychological victory. This is what he did in the Philippines, admittedly an easier problem than this because of their island status. Another asset which should stand him in good stead is the excellent relationship which he has developed with General Thang, whom Ky has had the good sense to put in charge of the administration of the election laws. I hope that all this will work together.

I have suggested to Lansdale that he draft a brief statement of guidance for Thang to publish under his own name, listing the essential points: free speech for all candidates; travel in their districts, as far as the war permits; no intimidation of candidates or of voters during the campaign and on election day; watchers at the polls; and a count of the ballots in the presence of all the watchers. After Thang has issued this statement, I would then put it out to all the Americans in Vietnam as guidelines for them to follow in their relationship with the Vietnamese.

I have also asked Landale to interest himself in the growth of national parties. They expect there will be about 700 candidates for about 100 seats. Will there be any organization that seeks to endorse candidates in every one of the 100 odd districts?

Course of the War

Keyes Beech of the Chicago Daily News is the most senior and most experienced daily newspaperman in Vietnam, and one who has many times expressed his disgust at the journalism which is practiced here. He also has in the past criticized what he thought was the U. S. role in the '63 coup. He recently came in for backgrounding and, after we finished talking, volunteered the statement that obviously the situation in Vietnam is "much, much better." When I asked him what he meant by that, he said it was "much better than it was a year ago." Then after a short pause, he said it was "much better than it was when you and I first started talking three years ago." Finally, he said that it's the best it's ever been.

He thinks roughly: that we are winning militarily, politically and economically; and that once Hanoi is convinced we have learned how to overcome subversion, terrorism and criminal violence generally, they will stop -- provided we continue to maintain momentum militarily, politically and economically. He does not anticipate Chicom intervention or escalation into World War III, or a demand by the American public to bring the boys home. He does not think any publicized trips, such as those of Ronning or Sainteny or Wilson or Gandhi, will accomplish anything, but that there will be a secret understanding and a quiet fade-out.

Beech has a house in Tokyo and travels all through the East. He says a new tide is running which makes the old fashioned anti-Americanism obsolete. People like Bhutto in Pakistan, who saw a career in trying to be a junior Krishna Menon, are out of step with the times. In none of the countries bordering China is there a move toward Communism. Although the U. S. has been clumsy and made mistakes, there is no doubt that our policies are beginning to bear fruit.

Beech says that once a place has felt the touch of the American bulldozer it is never the same again. The reason for the phenomenal growth in Korea is because during the American stay there, we trained many young men in handling the modern machinery which spells development of the country -- that is bulldozers, trucks, airplanes, electrical equipment of all kinds. This is one of the things we leave behind us, which starts to grow after we have gone. He thinks that the progress in South Korea today is so great and dynamic and is having such a magnetic effect on North Korea that it may eventually unify the North and the South.

Comment: In Vietnam, we are doing the same thing -- training young men in handling modern equipment. This is one reason why our decision to construct a big trade school in Saigon is valuable, and why we insist our

contractors do on-the-job training. It helps to train the Vietnamese to develop their own resources; it will be giving them an educational institution and training which they really want (as compared with university educational facilities about which there is a great deal of doubt in my mind), and it is enormously popular.

Pacification

I hate to say this, but I cannot see that any really big and significant headway is being made on pacification. I talked with a very dependable man last night who had just been in Long An, which is the Province immediately south of Saigon, and on which I used to concentrate in my first year here and he said the situation there is just about what it was three years ago.

The reason is easy to find. It is that the South Vietnamese Government will not give pacification the proper priority. I get reports which I am investigating that the South Vietnamese Army is not fitted to handle it -- or else does not want to, or both. I am told that the present kind of war has become a way of life with the Army and that the American logistic support is making it even more so. Apparently they won't want to change anything.

We are surely better organized on the American side than ever before and the Vietnamese have an organization headed by General Thang which is potentially better than they have ever had before. But General Thang is not being given the tools to do the job, particularly in the form of military means to protect the process of pacification. Everything should be geared to that.

What distresses me about this is that I believe our successes in military and other fields make this a particularly good time for a really effective body blow at the village guerrilla, and at terrorism, and subversion and criminal violence generally. Such a body blow would, I believe, very seriously diminish all recruiting into the Viet Cong, which depends overwhelmingly on terror. If you can stop recruits from going into the Viet Cong, you are crippling it just as surely as if you defeat it in battle.

Also I believe that Hanoi will regard their proficiency at terrorism as their ace in the hole -- their way to start all over again, even though they are defeated militarily, politically and economically.

Casualties, Military and Civilian

American military casualties this week were 108 killed and 478 wounded. Seven were listed as captured or missing. The Communists lost 1,272 killed and 120 captured as compared with the previous week's total of 1,200 killed and 116 captured.

In a typical attack on civilians, the Viet Cong raided a refugee re-settlement village near Quang Tin Province Headquarters. They killed three refugees, wounded eleven, and left 145 homeless when they burned 11 buildings. The total number of civilians killed this week by the Viet Cong was 33, including one hamlet chief; 66 others were wounded.

Economic

This week, for the first time since devaluation, the U. S. AID retail price index was down two percent -- probably due mostly to an increase in the official price of live hogs in Saigon. It is hoped that this will increase pork supplies by encouraging growers to send more hogs to market. The price of pork in Saigon fell ten percent or more following the announcement of the official increase. Imported commodity prices also dropped in most instances, breaking rises which had been continuous since before devaluation. Our rice sales seem to be helping hold the line in that respect. We are endeavoring to produce a rational rice policy for Government acceptance and I will have more to report on this.

Port improvement surveys for Danang, Ba Ngoi and Nha Trang have been completed and designs are in the final stages. A contract between the Navy and designers of port construction (World Wide Consultants) was signed last week.

US AID cargo continued to move out of the port at an ever-increasing rate and, I am assured by General Breakfield of US AID, that this rate shows definite improvement over the past three weeks. General Pham Dang Lan, new port director, has formed a series of sub-committees to study port problems and recommend solutions by July 27. The 4th Transportation Corps (which is taking over supervision and control of the Port of Saigon) and Vietnamese customs officials have been meeting to work out ground rules of customs administration by the Government within and under Army and U. S. Military control.

Psychological Progress

From July 16 to July 22, 322 returnees entered Chieu Hoi Centers. This is an increase over the 256 reported last week, but still below the 339 which came in during the week of July 2. The total number of returnees this year now stands at 10,754. For the same period last year, January through July, the total was 4,686. The total for all of 1965 was 11,124. If the present rate continues, the number of returnees this year may equal in eight months the total for all of 1965. Daily average this year is 52.9 as compared with 30.4 for 1965.

The successful youth project in Saigon's District VIII is now being extended to District VI. As in the first project, selected youth leaders will take over the government of the District as well as the organization of a comprehensive program of civil improvements. Other youth activities include 73 work camps set up in July, with participation by 5,000 students.

U. S. Congressional Candidates

Two candidates for Congress were here last week, one Republican and one Democrat -- Robert Taft of Cincinnati, Ohio, and Clive DuVal of McLean, Virginia. Very confidentially, both appeared well impressed by our effort here and thought that they had learned much which they had not known before. Mr. Taft left a note of thanks, saying:

"Your staff has been extraordinarily helpful in every way as has the establishment at the Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office. This has enabled me to get maximum coverage in the shortest period of time. The experience has been an exciting and interesting one. The extent and necessity of the effort here is not sufficiently understood and my own views have been fortified so that they can be better expressed. If I can be of service in any way that can help the picture here, please call on me."

July 27, 1966
Wednesday - 8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gene Locke's statement of his view of our objectives in Pakistan. You will wish to see it before you have further conversations with him, as he leaves to take up his post.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

~~SECRET~~

Our objectives in Pakistan are:

1. To keep India and Pakistan from fighting,
2. To keep Pakistan from becoming dependent upon or allied with Red China, and
3. To keep Pakistan's increasing relations with Russia from reaching a point injurious to the United States

To accomplish these objectives it is first necessary that we adopt an even-handed approach toward Pakistan and India. By this I mean that we should adopt the philosophy that the friendship of both countries is important, and that we will not take action in one without considering the effect of that action in the other -- nor will we sacrifice one to gain advantages in the other. I do not mean that we should give either a veto over our relationship with the other.

There are some who disagree with an even-handed approach and who would favor India as a counterbalance to China in Asia. They would do this to the extent of arming India and not Pakistan. Should this philosophy ever prevail, it will become impossible for us to accomplish the above objectives. The belief by some leading Pakistanis that this is the philosophy of the United States is perhaps the greatest obstacle to the accomplishment of the above objectives.

It is my own view that the philosophy of favoring India would not only lose Pakistan, but would be the greatest threat to our foreign policy in India as well. India is admittedly more important than Pakistan symbolically, in the arena of world opinion, and in the context of numbers of people. It is not, however, a counterbalance to Red China militarily. The Himalaya Mountains are the principal barrier to Red China in this part of the world; and a Pakistan dependent upon Red China, so that Red China's dominant influences and policies would penetrate south of the Himalayas, would be the greatest of threats to India, not only by way of influence and penetration, but militarily as well.

In this

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-397
By us, NARA Date 4-29-99

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

In this connection -- and in determining the effect of our actions in one country on the policies of the other -- it is necessary to differentiate between what countries say and what they do. Far more importance should be given to the effect of a policy on future action by another nation -- made probable from the point of view of the national interest of that nation -- than upon the impact of that policy on our "popularity" in that nation, as evidenced by planned demonstrations, press criticism, and criticism in the legislative halls of the nation.

The greatest threat to the fulfillment of our objectives today is that Pakistan considers India to be its greatest enemy and has a feeling of insecurity militarily vis-a-vis India.

Pakistan's military equipment is presently of U.S. make, except for certain new equipment recently received from China. Pakistan's permanent military security depends on obtaining newer and more modern equipment to replace obsolete U.S. equipment, plus spare parts for up to date U.S. equipment. Pakistan's interim military security depends on obtaining spare parts for its U.S. equipment while it is attempting to obtain new equipment.

The danger to the United States is that Pakistan will obtain all new military equipment from China, thus becoming militarily dependent upon China. President Ayub does not wish to do this, and will not do it if he has an acceptable alternative. He will do it, however, if his only alternative is a continuance of his military insecurity. China, in my opinion, can and will if asked, supply this equipment even if it means denying equipment to its own military establishment. This view is based not only on the strategic importance of a base south of the Himalayas and the overall importance to China of Pakistan as an ally, but also on concrete information about planes already furnished Pakistan by China. I do not mean to imply that this will necessarily follow if we withhold spare parts, but I believe the danger of its happening exists.

It is of critical importance to us that Pakistan not become militarily dependent on China. To accomplish this we should: (1) sell spare parts for U.S. equipment to both India and Pakistan to give "interim" security; (2) help find sources in the Free World for new equipment

necessary

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

necessary to permanent security; and (3) prevent an arms race between India and Pakistan, talks between them on military limitation being the first step.

In helping Pakistan with spares and new sources, we should have some understanding with Pakistan about limiting its Chinese source of supply and coming to an arms limitation understanding with India.

It is not to our disadvantage for Pakistan to buy limited arms from Russia, but Russia should not become the major source of Pakistan military supply. Too much Russian equipment would have an impact on our facilities problem, as well as disturb the balance of Pakistan's military supply relationship with all countries.

The principal problem at present between India and Pakistan is that of Kashmir. Many feel this problem is insoluble. It is my feeling that we will never have real peace in South Asia until it is settled; therefore, it is incumbent upon us to try to find a solution.

I believe the best avenue for solution is secret talks between single representatives of each country who have the absolute confidence of their respective national leaders. A precedent for this suggestion is the Trieste Settlement. These representatives should be without known expression of bias against the other country, without great political ambition, if possible with some experience in bilateral negotiation such as in connection with the Indus Water Dispute. They could each be Ambassadors to the same country, or could each have a World Bank connection, or could have some other acceptable cover. Our respective ambassadors to India and Pakistan could keep up with negotiations through the respective chiefs of state of the two countries.

The United States government has such an interest in this settlement that at the proper time, if the effort promises success, we, or the World Bank, or some other third party, should do whatever is necessary to bring it about. Probably no third party action is indicated until the countries themselves, through secret negotiations, are closer together. Once a solution has been found, efforts should be made to

have it

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-

have it announced in a manner most politically palatable to both countries -- possibly, for example, by Sheikh Abdullah, the only acknowledged political leader of Kashmir with broad support. The exact method of announcement can be determined later -- when a solution is reached.

The Kashmir issue is only one issue to be discussed between India and Pakistan. Others are arms limitation, cooperation on the Bhramaputra-Ganges-waterways, and elimination of irritants such as the ban on river, air and rail traffic. These talks, except for arms limitation talks which should be secretly held, should be known publicly to be in process. Ayub's political necessity requires that Kashmir be included in any publicly known discussions, but lack of progress on Kashmir in public meetings should not prevent progress in other directions when both chiefs of state know that secret meetings on Kashmir will progress simultaneously.

Economic development of both India and Pakistan is important to preserve stability of government and to prevent the chaos which invites Communism. This is the purpose of our AID program to both countries. An arms race between the countries will, of course, greatly reduce the effectiveness of our AID program, and we should do what we can to prevent it.

Eugene M. Locke
American Ambassador

July 26, 1966

~~SECRET~~

1 memo
2 Pres. file

Wednesday
July 27, 1966 -- 2:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

I share Secretary Rusk's view that a talk with Ambassador Sullivan would be interesting. He is one of the brightest of the younger FSO's. But not a must.

W. W. Rostow

Bring him in _____

Hold him off _____

WWRostow:rln

2563 4/a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 26, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment for
Ambassador William H. Sullivan

Recommendation:

I recommend that you receive Ambassador William H. Sullivan, who will be in Washington August 8 through August 11 prior to his return to Laos.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Background:

I believe it would be desirable for you to discuss with Ambassador Sullivan future policies regarding the political situation and military operations in Laos as they relate to developments in Vietnam.

Ambassador Sullivan plans to be in Washington from August 8 to August 11, before returning to Laos. He is now on home leave. He can, of course, come to Washington to see you anytime during his stay in the United States.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

I'm sure you would find this interesting.
DR

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 27, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May I recommend your concurrence to this proposed message of condolences to Laos King Savang Vatthana on the death of his half-brother and former ambassador to the United States Prince Khampan.

Walt. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

42a

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

TO

HIS MAJESTY KING SRI SAVANG VATTHANA

Your Majesty:

I am saddened to hear of the unexpected death of a distinguished member of the Royal Family of Laos. His Royal Highness Tiao Khampan was a respected and familiar figure for many years in Washington as your representative to the United States. Please accept my sincere sympathy for your personal grief.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, July 26, 1966, 9:20 p.m.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Bruce,
Wednesday, July 27, 11:30 a.m.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-202

By sig NARA, Date 8-29-89

Apart from anything Ambassador Bruce might wish to add concerning our general position vis-a-vis Harold Wilson (East of Suez, BAQR, etc.), ~~you might wish to get his personal views about George Ball's strategy (stripped of the proposition that Britain should get out of East of Suez.)~~

You will recall, ~~George would have you urge the Prime Minister to:~~

1. ~~Announce right off that he will sign the Treaty of Rome, without further ifs and buts (--and to take his chances on the French going along, and on working out any troubles with agriculture, the Commonwealth, and sterling balances, from the inside.)~~

2. ~~Announce that he will carry out his campaign pledge to take Britain out of the strategic nuclear business. (George's solution would involve either the U.S. buying the four British submarines, or the formation of a European or Atlantic joint force.)~~

As our part of the bargain, ~~we would offer to help Wilson strike a deal with the Continentals on the funding of sterling liabilities.~~ Further, we might have to face the consequences of a "managed" British devaluation to bring British prices in line with the Continent.

~~You might well receive formal recommendations along these lines from the Secretary of State. (The Secretary has sent a memorandum with proposals as above to Bob McNamara, for the latter's comment.) Walt and I will give you both our views when the Secretary's paper comes over. Let me only say now, that I think George's vision of Europe, and of Britain's role, is right -- as a set of objectives. However, I doubt if Harold Wilson will consider the package workable as a matter of near term political tactics. But before making up your mind, you will wish to read the Secretary's paper, and perhaps to have another discussion with him, McNamara, et al. And on Friday, at the start at least, you might wish simply to probe Wilson's view of the matter.~~

~~One further comment about David Bruce's views on Britain. For what it is worth, this economist's judgment is that Bruce is too gloomy about Britain's~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

economic prospects over the next several years. I do not believe that, in the absence of an early move into Europe, the situation is hopeless. The medicine of last Wednesday is only a necessary stopgap. But in its Five Year Plan of last autumn, and in some of the undramatic steps it has taken in the direction of structural reform, the British Government has -- for the first time since 1950 -- faced up to the UK's economic problems taken as a whole. And it has committed itself to a comprehensive program designed to deal with them. The politics of pulling it off will continue to be tough. But the fiscal and monetary instruments available to a modern government -- if it operates with skill and energy -- are very powerful, and can overcome many of the difficulties of the past fifteen years. A crucial part of the operation will involve increasing investment from 18% to about 25% of GNP, and then operating with a little more slack in the labor market so as to make the new incomes policy work marginally better than it works on the Continent. ~~This does not require a social revolution, or a fundamental change in the values of the British working or middle class -- or entry into Europe. It does require a tough government, with a healthy majority, willing to govern.~~

None of this is to argue that British entry into Europe is unimportant. I think it is most important in terms of the future shape of European politics. George is dead right that a Europe without Britain is not likely to play a responsible world role. (Nor, in my judgment, is a Europe with a Britain in, but after she has by surgery cast off all its East of Suez responsibilities. A little England going into Europe is likely to favor a policy of little Europe once she is in.)



Francis M. Bator

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Tuesday - July 26, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Message to the U.S.-Mexican Sister Cities Association

The Third Annual Conference of the United States - Mexican Sister Cities Association meets in Puebla, Mexico on August 18 - 25. Over 1900 delegates representing 35 sister cities in each of the two countries are expected to attend. The Sister Cities Program is part of the People-to-People Program initiated during President Eisenhower's Administration.

President Eisenhower is expected to send a telegram of greeting. State recommends that you send the attached message.

I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message

✓

Prefer not to send
the message

Attachment

Suggested Greetings
from the President
to Third Annual Conference, Mexican-United States Sister City Association,
Puebla, August 18 - 25, 1966

Sr. Jose' Rodriguez Pacheco
President
International Convention of Sister Cities
Puebla, Mexico

As honorary chairman of the People-to-People Program and in view of my long and abiding interest in furthering understanding and goodwill between the peoples of Mexico and the United States, I extend warmest greetings to the Third Annual Conference of the Mexican-United States Sister City Association.

I also congratulate the City of Puebla for acting as host for this friendly gathering of representatives of our cities.

As you go forward with your important programs, I ask all of you never to forget that only through understanding the needs and aspirations common to all the peoples of the world can we hope to achieve that basis of understanding so necessary in our ceaseless quest for peace in our troubled world. My best wishes are with you in your work.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Tuesday - July 26, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message from Salvadorean President Rivera.

President Rivera of El Salvador has sent you a message at Tab B expressing appreciation for our assistance following the May, 1965 earthquake and informing you that the first school constructed with the relief funds is to be named the "Lyndon B. Johnson School". Linc Gordon participated in the dedication ceremonies on July 19.

State recommends that you send President Rivera the suggested reply at Tab A. I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message ☒

Disapprove message ☐

Speak to me ☐.

Attachment

Tab A & B.

SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL REPLY TO MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
RIVERA OF EL SALVADOR
OF JULY 19

I greatly appreciate your message informing me of the inauguration on July 19 of the first school to be constructed under the program in which our Governments are cooperating to relieve the suffering caused by the 1965 earthquake. I am highly honored that the school is to bear my name and that Assistant Secretary Gordon was able to participate in the inaugural ceremonies. The Government and people of the United States welcomed the opportunity to assist El Salvador in its emergency. It is gratifying that our joint efforts will redound to the benefit of future generations.

Lyndon B. Johnson

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT RIVERA OF EL SALVADOR, DATED
JULY 18, 1966 TO THE PRESIDENT

"In sincere recognition of the generous cooperation given by you and your government in solving the serious problems faced by El Salvador following the earthquake of May 3, 1965, and in order that it may be justly appreciated by Salvadoran children and future generations, I take pleasure in informing you that the first school constructed through the gift of the United States Government will be named the Lyndon B. Johnson School. The opening of the School will be celebrated on July 19 next at the time of Assistant Secretary Gordon's visit to El Salvador. I avail myself of the opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my high consideration and personal esteem. "

Tuesday, July 26, 1966 -- 6:45 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Charles Murphy, FORTUNE, telephoned yesterday, Monday, July 25. He said he wants to do a story on the activities of Soviet trawlers. To do this he needs the cooperation of the Government. He said he would submit to the Government anything he published, for security clearance. I told him that I could not speak on behalf of the Government in this matter, but I would get in touch with my colleagues. I then informed Cy Vance and Paul Nitze, as well as Dick Helms, that Murphy was on the trail of this story. I left it there.

George Packard, NEWSWEEK, came in yesterday, Monday, July 25, to round out materials he is collecting for a NEWSWEEK story on the President's foreign policy advisers. I told him how our operation was conducted here and answered questions about tennis, the pictures in my office, and my weight.

Dinner, Monday night, July 25, with Charles Bartlett, Stewart Alsop, Henry Brandon, Adelbert de Segonzac, Edward Weintal, Philip Geyelin, Peter Lisagor, Robert Lucas. This affair went on from 7:45 p. m. to midnight. The main lines of questioning were:

1. The Wilson visit. I stonewalled and said we would be interested in hearing the Prime Minister's plans and prospects.
2. Viet Nam and Asia policy. I laid out the reasoning behind the Asia speech. It was clear that they were tolerably impressed with what is going on in free Asia in economic development and regional cooperation. They said why don't we talk more about it. I asked them why they didn't write more about it. This may have been useful.
3. The President's working methods and approach to foreign policy. I explained the wide range of creative initiatives you have launched in foreign policy, going back to the Baltimore speech through the Mexican speech, bridge building, the Africa speech, getting India and Pakistan back on the track, etc.

In reply to some questions about President Kennedy, I pointed out that the fate of President Kennedy's initiatives in both foreign and domestic policy, from wage guidelines to the Alliance for Progress to his decisions on Southeast Asia, depended on what the Johnson Administration accomplished. I allowed myself observations that most discussions of the two Presidencies were superficial. Some of my observations on this seemed new to them.

Rod MacLeish, Westinghouse Broadcasting -- TV, came in today, Tuesday, July 26, mainly to share thoughts about Wilson's crisis and the deeper crisis in Great Britain, lacking as it does a vision of what it should and can achieve in the world. He has just returned from many years living and working there.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Tuesday - July 26, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Submission to Senate of Inter-American Convention on Facilitation of International Waterborne Transportation (Convention of Mar del Plata)

State recommends that you send the attached message to the Senate asking for advice and consent to ratification of the Mar del Plata Convention on Facilitation of International Waterborne Transportation. Commerce, Maritime and Customs concur.

The convention has been signed by the United States and 10 other countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.

Its purpose is to facilitate and expedite the movement of waterborne commerce between ports in the Americas by simplifying, reducing and making as uniform as possible the documentary requirements and procedures for entry and departure of ships, their cargoes, passengers and crews.

The convention is strongly supported by the Pacific American Steamship Association, the American Merchant Marine Institute, the American Association of Port Authorities and the National Facilitation Committee on which all interested Government agencies, as well as numerous shipping and port associations, are represented.

State advises that substantial Congressional support for this convention can reasonably be expected.

Harry McPherson reviewed the message before going on leave and said it was satisfactory with him.

I recommend that you sign the message.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

Tuesday - July 26, 1966 -

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

- ACTION

SUBJECT: Working Visit to Latin America
- Delegation to Colombian Inaugural

Linc Gordon and Bill Bowdler are working on a detailed scenario for the working visit to Latin America, including preparations for the trip. I will submit this tomorrow.

If you have decided not to attend the Lleras inaugural, we should let the Colombian Government know who will head the delegation. You still have my memorandum on the delegation with the list of alternative candidates. I am attaching another copy.

After consulting Linc Gordon, I have decided not to go to Bogota. I am so informing President-elect Lleras, suggesting Linc as a replacement on the workshop.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By W, NARA, Date 7-9-98

cc - Bill Moyers

SECRET - EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Limited Official Use

Monday, July 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

Through: Bill Moyers

SUBJECT: U.S. Delegation to Colombian Inaugural

The inauguration of President-elect Carlos Lleras Restrepo is on August 7. We have been asked to send a special delegation. The Foreign Minister has sent a telegram inviting you to attend (Tab A).

This would be an excellent opportunity for another trip to Latin America. But State thinks it would set a bad precedent for you to attend an inaugural. The wedding and the altitude of Bogota (8659 ft.) also counsel against your going. At Tab B is a suggested reply to the Colombian Foreign Minister declining the invitation.

Concerning the U.S. delegation, I enclose (Tab C) a suggested list with several alternatives. Mike Manatos and Henry Wilson have listed the Senators and Congressmen in their order of preference. I have placed asterisks on my choices. Bill Moyers will indicate his preferences. There is a place after each name for you to check your selections.

W. A. R. Rostow

Attachments

Tabs A, B, C.

Limited Official Use

CABLE FROM COLOMBIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, BOGOTA, COLOMBIA,
2102 - JULY 6, 1966

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

In the name of the Government, I am pleased to invite you to attend the ceremonies transmitting Presidential authority to Dr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo on 7 August. President-elect hopes that you can come for the purpose of exchanging ideas. Program will be sent to you shortly. I reiterate assurances of highest consideration.

/signed/ Castor Jaramillo Arrubla
Minister of Foreign Relations.

48c

Dear Mr. Minister:

Thank you for the high honor of inviting me to the inauguration of President-elect Carlos Lleras Restrepo.

Nothing would give me greater pleasure than to take part in this historic ceremony. I regret that the wedding of my daughter will prevent me from attending. I have asked (to be filled in) to head the United States delegation.

Please convey warm regards to President Valencia and President-elect Lleras, as well as my personal regrets in not being able to join them in Bogota on August 7.

Sincerely,

His Excellency

Castor Jaramillo Arrubla

Minister of Foreign Relations of Colombia

Bogota.

LBJ/WGB:mm

Chairman of Delegation (select one)

The Vice President _____
The Chief Justice _____
Secretary Rusk _____
*Secretary Gardner _____.

State Department Members (both should be named)

*Assistant Secretary Gordon _____
*Ambassador Oliver _____.

Congressional Representation (one Senator and one Congressman,
one from each party).

Senate:

Senator Morse (D-Ore.) _____
Senator Sparkman (D-Ala.) _____
Senator Aiken (R-Vt.) _____
Senator Kuchel (R-Calif.) _____
*Senator Paul Douglas (D-Ill.) _____
Senator Montoya (D-N.M.) _____.

House:

Congressman Armistead Selden (D-Ala.) _____
Congressman Dante Fascell (D-Fla.) _____
*Congressman Bradford Morse (R-Mass.) _____
Congressman Jeffrey Cohelan (D-Calif.) _____
Congresswoman Julia Hansen (D-Wash.) _____
Congressman Silvio Conte (R-Mass.) _____.

Public Members (select three)

| | |
|---|--------|
| George Meany - AFL-CIO | _____ |
| *A. Philip Randolph - AFL-CIO | _____ |
| *Eugene Ormandy - Philadelphia Orchestra | _____ |
| Leonard Bernstein - N.Y. Philharmonic | _____ |
| Samuel Eliot Morrison - Harvard Professor | _____ |
| *John F. Gallagher - Vice President for International Operations of Sears, Roebuck | _____. |

Tuesday - July 26, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message from Salvadorean President Rivera.

President Rivera of El Salvador has sent you a message at Tab B expressing appreciation for our assistance following the May, 1965 earthquake and informing you that the first school constructed with the relief funds is to be named the "Lyndon B. Johnson School". Linc Gordon participated in the dedication ceremonies on July 19.

State recommends that you send President Rivera the suggested reply at Tab A. I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message _____

Disapprove message _____

Speak to me ____.

Attachment

Tab A & B.

SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL REPLY TO MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
RIVERA OF EL SALVADOR
OF JULY 19

I greatly appreciate your message informing me of the inauguration on July 19 of the first school to be constructed under the program in which our Governments are cooperating to relieve the suffering caused by the 1965 earthquake. I am highly honored that the school is to bear my name and that Assistant Secretary Gordon was able to participate in the inaugural ceremonies. The Government and people of the United States welcomed the opportunity to assist El Salvador in its emergency. It is gratifying that our joint efforts will redound to the benefit of future generations.

Lyndon B. Johnson

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT RIVERA OF EL SALVADOR, DATED
JULY 18, 1966 TO THE PRESIDENT

"In sincere recognition of the generous cooperation given by you and your government in solving the serious problems faced by El Salvador following the earthquake of May 3, 1965, and in order that it may be justly appreciated by Salvadoran children and future generations, I take pleasure in informing you that the first school constructed through the gift of the United States Government will be named the Lyndon B. Johnson School. The opening of the School will be celebrated on July 19 next at the time of Assistant Secretary Gordon's visit to El Salvador. I avail myself of the opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my high consideration and personal esteem. "

Tuesday - July 26, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Message to the U.S. - Mexican Sister Cities Association

The Third Annual Conference of the United States - Mexican Sister Cities Association meets in Puebla, Mexico on August 18 - 25. Over 1900 delegates representing 35 sister cities in each of the two countries are expected to attend. The Sister Cities Program is part of the People-to-People Program initiated during President Eisenhower's Administration.

President Eisenhower is expected to send a telegram of greeting. State recommends that you send the attached message.

I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message ☐

Prefer not to send
the message ☐

Attachment

Suggested Greetings
from the President

to Third Annual Conference, Mexican-United States Sister City Association,
Puebla, August 18 - 25, 1966

Sr. Jose Rodriguez Pacheco
President
International Convention of Sister Cities
Puebla, Mexico

As honorary chairman of the People-to-People Program and in view of my long and abiding interest in furthering understanding and goodwill between the peoples of Mexico and the United States, I extend warmest greetings to the Third Annual Conference of the Mexican-United States Sister City Association.

I also congratulate the City of Puebla for acting as host for this friendly gathering of representatives of our cities.

As you go forward with your important programs, I ask all of you never to forget that only through understanding the needs and aspirations common to all the peoples of the world can we hope to achieve that basis of understanding so necessary in our ceaseless quest for peace in our troubled world. My best wishes are with you in your work.

Lyndon B. Johnson