

Tuesday, July 26, 1966 - 8:00 p.m.

Shirley Marvin Watson

Mr. President:

Gene Locke and I had a good talk this evening. He would, however, like to have a final chat with you before he goes back to Pakistan.

Among other things, I think it would be wise for you to see him tomorrow because I have a note on my desk saying that AP and Finney of the New York Times will be running stories that we have made a decision to resume the sale of lethal arms to Pakistan. The handling of this question -- delicate in any case -- will be complicated by these stories if they come out.

I recommend, therefore, that you see Ambassador Locke tomorrow if at all possible.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Limited Official Use

Monday, July 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

Through: Bill Moyers

SUBJECT: U.S. Delegation to Colombian Inaugural

The inauguration of President-elect Carlos Lleras Restrepo is on August 7. We have been asked to send a special delegation. The Foreign Minister has sent a telegram inviting you to attend (Tab A).

This would be an excellent opportunity for another trip to Latin America. But State thinks it would set a bad precedent for you to attend an inaugural. The wedding and the altitude of Bogota (8659 ft.) also counsel against your going. At Tab B is a suggested reply to the Colombian Foreign Minister declining the invitation.

Concerning the U.S. delegation, I enclose (Tab C) a suggested list with several alternatives. Mike Manatos and Henry Wilson have listed the Senators and Congressmen in their order of preference. I have placed asterisks on my choices. Bill Moyers will indicate his preferences. There is a place after each name for you to check your selections.

Walt Rostow

Attachments

Tabs A, B, C.

Limited Official Use

CABLE FROM COLOMBIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, BOGOTA, COLOMBIA,
2102 - JULY 6, 1966

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

In the name of the Government, I am pleased to invite you to attend the ceremonies transmitting Presidential authority to Dr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo on 7 August. President-elect hopes that you can come for the purpose of exchanging ideas. Program will be sent to you shortly. I reiterate assurances of highest consideration.

/signed/ Castor Jaramillo Arrubla
Minister of Foreign Relations.

Dear Mr. Minister:

Thank you for the high honor of inviting me to the inauguration of President-elect Carlos Lleras Restrepo.

Nothing would give me greater pleasure than to take part in this historic ceremony. I regret that the wedding of my daughter will prevent me from attending. I have asked (to be filled in) to head the United States delegation.

Please convey warm regards to President Valencia and President-elect Lleras, as well as my personal regrets in not being able to join them in Bogota on August 7.

Sincerely,

His Excellency

Castor Jaramillo Arrubla

Minister of Foreign Relations of Colombia

Bogota.

LBJ/WGB:mm

Chairman of Delegation (select one)

The Vice President _____

The Chief Justice _____

Secretary Rusk _____

*Secretary Gardner _____.

State Department Members (both should be named)

*Assistant Secretary Gordon _____

*Ambassador Oliver _____.

Congressional Representation (one Senator and one Congressman,
one from each party).

Senate:

Senator Morse (D-Ore.) _____

Senator Sparkman (D-Ala.) _____

Senator Aiken (R-Vt.) _____

Senator Kuchel (R-Calif.) _____

*Senator Paul Douglas (D-Ill.) _____

Senator Montoya (D-N.M.) _____.

House:

Congressman Armistead Selden (D-Ala.) _____

Congressman Dante Fascell (D-Fla.) _____

*Congressman Bradford Morse (R-Mass.) _____

Congressman Jeffrey Cohelan (D-Calif.) _____

Congresswoman Julia Hansen (D-Wash.) _____

Congressman Silvio Conte (R-Mass.) _____.

Public Members (select three)

George Meany - AFL-CIO _____

*A. Philip Randolph - AFL-CIO _____

*Eugene Ormandy - Philadelphia Orchestra _____

Leonard Bernstein - N. Y. Philharmonic _____

Samuel Eliot Morrison - Harvard Professor _____

*John F. Gallagher - Vice President for
International Operations of Sears, Roebuck _____.

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Senator Kuchel (R-Calif.) _____

*Senator Paul Douglas (D-Ill.) _____

Senator Montoya (D-N.M.) _____.

House:

Congressman Armistead Selden (D-Ala.) _____

Congressman Dante Fascell (D-Fla.) _____

*Congressman Bradford Morse (R-Mass.) _____

Congressman Jeffrey Cohelan (D-Calif.) _____

Congresswoman Julia Hansen (D-Wash.) _____

Congressman Silvio Conte (R-Mass.) _____.

Public Members (select three)

| | |
|---|--------|
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| *A. Philip Randolph - AFL-CIO | _____ |
| *Eugene Ormandy - Philadelphia Orchestra | _____ |
| Leonard Bernstein - N. Y. Philharmonic | _____ |
| Samuel Eliot Morrison - Harvard Professor | _____ |
| *John F. Gallagher - Vice President for International Operations of Sears, Roebuck | _____. |

Shirley Jones

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT AGENDA

Lunch Meeting, Tuesday, July 26, 1966

1. Viet Nam Bombing Targets. Sec. Rusk

Sec. Rusk will urge, for various reasons, that we diminish bombing in the northeast quadrant of North Viet Nam.

2. Costa e Silva (Presidential candidate, Brazil). Sec. Rusk

3. Other.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCH NARS, Date 8-17-86

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCR NARS, Date 8-17-86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, July 26, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I agree with the recommendation by Dr. Seaborg and Dr. Hornig that the 1966 Fermi Award be given to three German scientists, Otto Hahn, Lise Meitner and Fritz Strassmann, the original discoverers of nuclear fission.

In view of the fact that we do not know whether the scientists would accept the award or because of their age would be able to come to the United States to receive it from you, I recommend that you not agree to present the awards personally until more is known about what would be involved. The awards could be given to the scientists by someone other than you if this later appears to be wise.

W. W. Rostow

BKS
OK
55a

Monday, July 25, 1966
1:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a letter to you from Dr. Glenn Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, recommending your approval of the 1966 Fermi Award to Drs. Otto Hahn, Lise Meitner and Fritz Strassmann, the original discoverers of nuclear fission. Because this is the first time that other than American scientists have been recommended for the Award, I have solicited the views of the Department of State. State concurs in the AEC's recommendation but suggests that confirmation be sought that the three scientists will accept the award before any public announcement is made.

Mr. Macy, Dr. Seaborg and I have discussed the possibility that after these awards you might want to discontinue your personal involvement in the Fermi Award, in view of the many other similar demands made on you, the fact that this award is limited to only one field of science (unlike the National Medal of Science), and the probable lack of appropriate recipients in the future. A joint recommendation on this score will be made to you in the future. In the meanwhile, it would appear that the selection of these distinguished foreign scientists would be a fitting climax to the annual presentation of the Award.

Accordingly, I recommend strongly that you approve the AEC recommendation that the Award be given to Drs. Hahn, Meitner and Strassman, and that the AEC be instructed to work with the State Department and my office concerning the timing and circumstances of the actual presentation of the Award.

15/11. A.
Donald F. Hornig

Attachments:

Letter to President from Seaborg
Memo from Read, State Dept.

Approve AEC Recommendation
Instruct AEC to work with State Dept.
and Dr. Hornig on Details

Yes _____ No _____

Yes _____ No _____

CC: Mr. Walt Rostow
with attachments



10895

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 22, 1966

2501
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: AEC: Proposed Fermi Award for 1966

In his letter to the Secretary of July 12, 1966, Dr. Hornig has asked for the Department's views on the Atomic Energy Commission's proposal to divide the Fermi Award for 1966 among the distinguished scientists, Drs. Hahn, Meitner and Strassmann.

The Department agrees that these three scientists are eminently qualified under the criteria established for the Fermi Award and concurs in the AEC's recommendation. Prior to any public announcement, the Department believes that inquiries should be made to confirm that the three scientists will accept the award. The Department would be happy to assist the AEC make such inquiries if desired.

Should the President approve the AEC's recommendation, the Department would appreciate the opportunity to confer with Dr. Hornig and with the AEC, somewhat closer to the actual event, on the timing and circumstances of presentation, including any press releases, since this will be the first time that other than American citizens will have been recipients of the Fermi Award.

for *Lang C. Williamson*
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

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55c

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

July 5, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

The Atomic Energy Commission is pleased to recommend your approval of the 1966 Enrico Fermi Award of \$50,000, equally divided, to Drs. Otto Hahn, Lise Meitner, and Fritz Strassmann for the discovery of fission of heavy nuclei and for their extensive experimental studies which led to this discovery.

The Commission's recommendation results from the careful review of nominations by its General Advisory Committee, and in a real sense represents an endorsement of the long-established consensus of the scientific community on the significance of the independent and collaborative contributions of Drs. Hahn, Meitner, and Strassmann. It is the Commission's considered opinion that the formal recognition of these distinguished scientists for their unique contributions would constitute an honor not only to them but also to the United States in the world community. It would represent the first Enrico Fermi Award to foreign scientists and could be expected to enhance still further the value and significance of the Award.

The Enrico Fermi Award is granted under the authorization of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 157 b(3), and is based on an award to Dr. Enrico Fermi on November 16, 1954, in recognition of his "contributions to the basic neutron physics and the achievement of the controlled nuclear reaction". The Fermi Award was officially established on April 18, 1956, when the Commission determined that the award would be made:

EST Cont. No. 1115

- a. For outstanding scientific or technical achievements related to the development, use, or control of nuclear energy;
- b. On an international basis;
- c. To an individual, or to several individuals, for separate or cooperative achievements.


Since the establishment of the award in 1956, it has been granted as follows:

1956 - Dr. John von Neumann
1957 - Dr. E. O. Lawrence
1958 - Dr. Eugene P. Wigner
1959 - Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg
1961 - Dr. Hans A. Bethe
1962 - Dr. Edward Teller
1963 - Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer
1964 - Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover

No awards were granted in 1960 and 1965. All of the recipients received \$50,000 except Dr. Fermi and Admiral Rickover, who received \$25,000. In 1964, the Commission determined that within the limitation that the total of all individual awards granted in any one year should not exceed \$50,000, the monetary award to any one individual should be limited to \$25,000 as awarded Dr. Fermi in 1954.

Biographical data on Drs. Hahn, Meitner, and Strassmann are enclosed.

Respectfully yours,


Glenn T. Seaborg

The President
The White House

Enclosures:
Biographical Data

The President

Date

DEC 10 1964

PROFESSOR OTTO HAHN

Professor Otto Hahn was born at Frankfurt-on-Main, Germany, on March 8, 1879. He studied chemistry in Munich and Marburg and in 1901 received a doctor's degree for a thesis on organic chemistry. After a few years of assistantship at Marburg, he spent a year in Sir William Ramsay's laboratory in London. His investigation of the radioactive decomposition of thorium resulted in the discovery of radiothorium as one of the new elements of the thorium series, to which he later (1907) added mesothorium as a predecessor. The year before, he discovered radioactinium during work in Rutherford's laboratory in Montreal. The mysteries of actinium, the radioactive element which is chemically similar to one of the rare-earth elements, lanthanum, attracted him again after he returned to scientific research from the war in 1918. Together with Lise Meitner, he found in a new isotope, protactinium-231, the mother-substance of the complex actinium series. This research was carried out at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry in Berlin-Dahlem, of which Hahn became Director in 1928.

On January 6, 1939, there appeared Hahn and Strassman's first publication of "experiments which contradict all previous results of nuclear physics". The nucleus of uranium was split into two parts, into two elements which were far removed, in the system of elements, from uranium. He soon found that there were many pairs of fission products and thus a host of debris in the form of other elements arose from the fission of the heavy nucleus.

Professor Hahn was able to continue scientific work during the war years in Germany, and in 1944 he was awarded the Nobel Prize in chemistry for the discovery of the fission of heavy nuclei. In April 1946 he became President of the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft of the Western zones - the highest position in German science.

Professor Hahn has also served as President of the Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science and is an honorary member of numerous German and foreign scientific societies.

Professor Hahn presently resides at Goettingen, Bunsenstrasse 10, West Germany. He is 87 years old.

PROFESSOR LISE MEITNER

Professor Meitner was born in Vienna on November 7, 1878, and has been one of the pioneers in the study of radioactivity. Her first paper, published in 1906, demonstrated the scattering of X-rays, the phenomenon which later led Rutherford to discover the atomic nucleus. In 1907 she went to the University of Berlin to conduct theoretical studies under Max Planck and began her 30-year collaboration with Otto Hahn. In 1917 Professor Meitner was entrusted with the organization of a Department of Radioactivity at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute. A number of radioactive isotopes were discovered by Lise Meitner and her associates, e.g., AcC'' , ThC'' , and protactinium, the last one (in 1918 together with Otto Hahn). The emission of the so-called Auger electrons was first described and correctly interpreted by her, and in 1925 she showed that the beta lines were emitted after and not before the radioactive transformation (a question that was under debate at the time).

For several years around 1930 she worked with her own students on purely physical questions, e.g., the heat generated in beta decay, confirming that the continuous energy spectrum of the primary electrons was not due to secondary energy losses; and the anomalous absorption of gamma rays in heavy elements, later found to be caused by pair production. She was also the first to observe pair production by gamma rays in a cloud chamber. Her work with neutrons began in 1932 with disintegration experiments of light nuclei and continued later with heavy elements. It culminated in the experiments on irradiation of uranium and thorium with neutrons.

In 1935, she persuaded Professor Hahn to join her in the study of the neutron-induced activity of uranium, discovered by Fermi and ascribed by him to transuranium elements. In 1938, she showed in the course of these experiments that the 25-minute uranium must be due to resonance capture in U-238. Radium-like isotopes were also found among the products of neutron irradiation of uranium.

Before the "mystery" of these isotopes was solved, Lise Meitner was, for political reasons, forced to leave Germany (in 1938). She then settled in Stockholm and started work at the Nobel Institute for Physics. Her

work with O. R. Frisch in 1939, explaining the fission process in heavy elements in terms of instability against deformation, played a most important role for later theoretical investigations and was described in a letter written on January 16, 1939, and published shortly thereafter, in which she and Frisch correctly surmised that the radioactive products were a consequence of the disintegration of the uranium by neutrons, which was termed by them a "fission process". They also correctly stated the expected energy release, about 200 Mev, and that each fragment would "give rise to a chain of disintegrations".

Professor Meitner continued her work with investigations of the nature of various fission products, the problems of asymmetric fission, and various problems of gamma-spectroscopy. In 1950, shortly after the creation of the shell model, she pointed out the applicability of this model for various fission problems and in an article in 1952 she discussed interesting relationships between thermal fission, fast fission and similar nuclear processes and the shell model especially, in connection with magic number elements.

Although it was Joliot, Halban and Kowarski who predicted the possibility of a chain reaction and proved that more neutrons are generated in the fission process than are absorbed, it was Lise Meitner, by her initiation of the vital experiments in Berlin, and by her correct interpretation of the chemical results obtained by Hahn and Strassmann, who first demonstrated the possibility of gaining nuclear energy from atomic fission.

Professor Meitner presently resides at 16 Highsett Hills Road, Cambridge, England. She will be 88 years old in November 1966.

PROFESSOR FRITZ STRASSMANN

Professor Fritz Strassmann was born at Boppard on the Rhine on February 22, 1902. He studied chemistry at the Hannover Institute of Technology and was then appointed as an Assistant at the Institute for Physical Chemistry at Hannover.

He was later appointed as Head of the Chemistry Department at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute where he worked with Otto Hahn and Lise Meitner in the experiments that led to the discovery of the fission of uranium and opened the paths to the practical use of nuclear energy and the Atomic Age. He was Professor Hahn's collaborator in the fundamental experimental work which identified barium and other radioactive isotopes as the products of the neutron irradiation of uranium.

Professor Strassmann was made a member of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society for these achievements. In 1946 he was appointed Professor of Inorganic and Nuclear Chemistry and Director of the Chemical Institute at the University of Mainz and in 1953 was appointed Director of the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry.

Professor Strassmann is presently Direktor des Instituts für Anorganische Chemie und Kern-chemie der Universität Mainz, Mainz (West Germany), Joh.-Joachim-Becher-Weg 24.

Tuesday - July 26, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Submission to Senate of Inter-American Convention on Facilitation of International Waterborne Transportation (Convention of Mar del Plata)

State recommends that you send the attached message to the Senate asking for advice and consent to ratification of the Mar del Plata Convention on Facilitation of International Waterborne Transportation. Commerce, Maritime and Customs concur.

The convention has been signed by the United States and 10 other countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.

Its purpose is to facilitate and expedite the movement of waterborne commerce between ports in the Americas by simplifying, reducing and making as uniform as possible the documentary requirements and procedures for entry and departure of ships, their cargoes, passengers and crews.

The convention is strongly supported by the Pacific American Steamship Association, the American Merchant Marine Institute, the American Association of Port Authorities and the National Facilitation Committee on which all interested Government agencies, as well as numerous shipping and port associations, are represented.

State advises that substantial Congressional support for this convention can reasonably be expected.

Harry McPherson reviewed the message before going on leave and said it was satisfactory with him.

I recommend that you sign the message.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

July 26, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador McGhee,
Wednesday, July 27, 12:30 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-202
By ing NARA. Date 8-29-87

You may have other plans for your meeting with George McGhee. But if there is time, and depending on what you covered last week, you might find it interesting to get his views on:

1. The state of German politics, following Erhard's recent bad election. (Might Erhard be overthrown during the next year or two? What is the shape of the likely alternative government? Who are the "comers" and what are their politics? What are the issues? What would be the best of the likely outcomes, from our point of view? The worst?)

2. How should the above affect our strategy and tactics vis-a-vis the Germans this summer and autumn on:

- offset and force levels;
- nuclear arrangements;
- NATO issues, especially French troops in Germany (--should we force Erhard to be tough vis-a-vis de Gaulle?)
- East-West policy.

3. What might be the shape of a possible U.S.-UK-FRG bargain involving force levels, offset, etc.? (I am sure that George's notions about offset, as spelled out in his memo (Tab A), will not satisfy McNamara and Fowler.

Francis M. Bator

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FMB:mst

Tuesday, July 26, 1966 at 5:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Publication of President Eisenhower's Reply to General deGaulle's 1958 Letter Proposing a U.S. -UK-French Directorate.

In a letter at Tab A, Senator Jackson asks Secretary Rusk to declassify President Eisenhower's reply to the famous 1958 deGaulle letter proposing a U.S. -UK-French 'Directorate'. The Senator wants to publish the Eisenhower reply as part of the record of his hearings on NATO.

State recommends that we agree. Bohlen would give the French advance warning. (We would, not release deGaulle's letter, but would leave it up to the French Government.)

I think this would be a useful way to set the record straight . Too many people still believe that President Eisenhower never replied. And I see no traps. The text of the reply -- while it is bearish on a directorate -- suggests that as early as 1958, the U.S. Government was prepared to discuss with France proposals for NATO reform.

I asked Andy Goodpaster to check with General Eisenhower. Andy reports that the General has no objection. (He does not think that we should publish the deGaulle letter without the explicit permission of the French Government.)

The Eisenhower reply in question is at Tab B. The incoming deGaulle letter which we would not publish is at Tab C.

Francis M. Bator

Go ahead ✓

No

Speak to me

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. says
- Pres file
27
Monday - July 25, 1966 -

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Brazilian President Castello Branco

President Castello Branco has written to you (Tab A) in response to your letter of June 23 (Tab B) inviting him to write you about the OAS summit meeting or other matters of common interest.

Surprisingly, he has little of a substantive nature to say, particularly with respect to the OAS summit meeting. His remarks about support for Vietnam and the wisdom of our action in the Dominican Republic are welcome. He seems to be on the defensive with his apologia for the Argentine coup and early Brazilian recognition.

I recommend that you wait two or three weeks before resuming the dialogue. By that time we should have some concrete things to say about the content for the summit. In the meantime, we can get word to Castello Branco through Ambassador Tuthill that you have his letter and will be writing again in the near future.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tabs A, B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-15-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

J. A. H. 592

Letter to the President from President Castello Branco of Brazil
of July 21 1966

Dear Mr. President:

In acknowledging receipt of the letter delivered to me by Ambassador John Tuthill, I thank you for its cordial terms and wish to express the satisfaction with which I received its bearer in an initial contact that reaffirmed my hopes for the continuance of Ambassador Lincoln Gordon's excellent work on behalf of the strengthening of the traditional ties of friendship between our two countries. I fully share with you the disposition to maintain a direct dialogue whenever necessary in order to examine, with the frankness that has featured our relations, any subjects whatsoever of interest to our countries. For this very reason, I am taking advantage of this opportunity to mention to you some viewpoints which I wish to make known to you.

One of these pertains to the development of the crisis in Vietnam, in regard to which I recognize the continued validity and pertinence of the American policy. Our solidarity with the United States in face of the Vietnamese problem is complete, and if we have not arrived at the point of being physically present in Southeast Asia even in a symbolic manner, it is because internal reasons which will not have escaped your attention lead me to consider it inconvenient if not counterproductive. It is gratifying to me however to emphasize that this circumstance does not prevent us from manifesting our solidarity with the valiant people of South Vietnam through the donation of medical supplies and food intended to mitigate the sufferings of the populations of the war-torn area.

As to the proposed meeting of the Presidents of the Republics on this Hemisphere, I am ready to participate in such a meeting with hopes that it will initiate an era of more fruitful cooperation between our countries and impart a greater impulse to the ideals embodied in the Alliance for Progress. As Buenos Aires appears to be out of the question as the possible seat for the meeting, I would be inclined toward the choice of Lima without however expressing any marked preference in the matter, so much so that if a city less distant from Washington would suit your convenience better I would gladly accept the selection of San Jose, Costa Rica.

Although I am not unaware of your justified concern over the recent occurrences in Argentina, it seems to me that if the question is viewed from the broader context of the correlation between cause and effect,

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-395

By CB, NARA Date 9-29-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

the adoption of measures having an exceptional character will appear to have been aimed at frustrating a disintegrating extremist assault, preserving conditions that will enable the country to revitalize within the near future the political institutions capable of assuring the complete functioning of the democratic regime. As Ambassador Tuthill was opportunely informed, this consideration which led Brazil not to delay recognition of the new Argentine Government, in order to avoid burdening it with additional difficulties, corresponded to our interest in enabling the sister Republic in the south to consolidate its position within the continental ambit while its national institutions are being returned to normal.

Finally, with reference to the recent inauguration of President Joaquin Balaguer in the Dominican Republic, I wish to congratulate you on that auspicious event insofar as it evidenced the wisdom of the attitude taken by the United States and by Brazil in the face of the Dominican crisis and betokened the economic and social recovery of that Caribbean nation. The harmony of our joint action and the valuable experience of the Inter-American Peace Force demonstrated the viability of an effective system of continental cooperation as well as that of the constitution of a permanent continental force capable of achieving the aims of such a system and thus precluding on our Hemisphere another successful attempt by subversive ideologies repellent to the American community.

Accept, my dear Mr. President, my cordial salutations together with the renewed expression of my esteem.

/signed/ Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

+ 10 596

June 23, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

It is a great pleasure for me to send warm personal greetings to you through my new Ambassador to Brazil, John Tuthill. He will continue the fine work of his distinguished predecessor, Lincoln Gordon, who did so much to strengthen the ties between our two countries during his long tenure in Rio de Janeiro.

Ambassador Tuthill will be conveying to you my thoughts on a number of subjects. At the same time, I want you to know that it is always a pleasure to hear from you directly. I hope that you will not hesitate to write me at any time.

As we proceed with preparations for a meeting of American Presidents, I would welcome hearing from you on what additional initiatives might be discussed to give the Alliance for Progress increased momentum and otherwise strengthen the projects for economic and social progress in our hemisphere.

I look forward to meeting and talking with you when the summit conference is held.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Humberto Castello Branco
President of the Republic
of the United States of Brazil
Rio de Janeiro.

LBJ/WGB:mm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-198
By ig, NARA, Date 1-20-89

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

16-4
5-

LOIS
60

~~SECRET~~

July 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your interview with Ambassador Locke, Tuesday,
July 26, 11 a.m.

He has learned fast, is well briefed and enthusiastic. He has impressed all the pros with his quickness of wit and intelligence. This will be an opportunity to hear his views before policy decisions are required.

There are two policy issues he may want to explore with you:

Spares for Pakistan: State and Defense, with his help have been developing an agreed recommendation to you on this. It is not yet entirely complete. I recommend you withhold judgment until Secretaries Rusk and McNamara provide you with their agreed advice.

Their recommendation will probably attempt to put this narrow problem within the much larger and more important issue of getting both India and Pakistan together to agree on limiting their defense outlays. (The draft paper being studied by the two Secretaries is attached at Tab A.) It proposes that we explore with Ayub how he will limit his relationship with China and enter serious talks to reach agreed arms limitations with India, while we study with him the problem of spares and possible free world, third country sources of indispensable military equipment. Simultaneously, Chet Bowles would make clear we are above all seeking to get the two countries to agree on an arms limitation and to restrain the Pak-Chicom relationship. But to do this we have to explore with Pakistan their need for spares.

Ambassador Locke generally agrees with the draft recommendation, but hopes we can be more forthcoming than this proposal, in order to maximize the chances of improving our position in Pakistan and to limit that of Communist China. (A note from his is attached at Tab B.)

Ambassador Bowles believes we shouldn't even broach the subject, since it will cause Mrs. Gandhi political trouble at home and undermine our position in India. (Attached is Ambassador Bowles' cabled reaction, Tab C.)

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This is knotty, but an agreed recommendation should come to you by the end of the week.

In regard to Kashmir, Ambassador Locke feels strongly we should not rest content until a settlement has been reached between India and Pakistan. The first step is to encourage both President Ayub and Prime Minister Gandhi to appoint trusted representatives to some third capital where they can quietly pursue a settlement, without hurry and without publicity. This is a properly low-key approach.

We are interested in promoting such a process. We hope for a Kashmir settlement eventually. This will take time; and we do not consider it in our interest to get in the middle of this dispute unless both parties show a substantial interest in reaching an agreement.

As to his job, every Ambassador to Pakistan faces inevitable frustrations, since we cannot support Pakistan against India the way the Pakistanis insistently desire us to do. Ambassador Locke will not escape these frustrations. We will help him all we can -- within the scope of our broader interests on the Subcontinent as a whole.


W.W.R.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

July 25, 1966

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Ambassador Eugene M. Locke's Call
on the President

Ambassador Locke will be seeing the President Tuesday, July 26, at 11:00 a.m. The Ambassador is leaving Dallas July 28 and expects to arrive in Pakistan about August 10, after stopovers in Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Bangkok. He hopes to meet with Ambassador Bowles (who will be enroute from New Delhi to visit Vietnam) in Hong Kong.

During his consultations, Ambassador Locke has discussed our relations with Pakistan in detail with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and with Messrs. Helms, Marks, Bell, and Gaud.

Specifically, he has played a major role in:

(1) working out an approach to the facilities problem which is responsive to President Ayub's political needs but protects our intelligence interests;

(2) discussions aimed at devising the most effective U.S. role in encouraging Indian-Pakistani attempts to find a solution to their problems, including that of Kashmir; (In this connection he followed the President's suggestion of consulting all persons with experience on Kashmir, including several academic experts on South Asian affairs.); and

(3) the efforts by the Departments of State and Defense to evolve a U.S. military supply policy for India and Pakistan. Relevant to the last point, we enclose (at Tab A) a copy of a draft memorandum to the President on which State and Defense are now working. The memorandum concludes that further exploration is required in

New Delhi

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New Delhi and Rawalpindi before we make any new decisions regarding the future of U.S. military supply policy in the subcontinent. To that end we propose to seek the President's approval to authorize Ambassadors Locke and Bowles to initiate frank, exploratory discussions with Pakistan and India to seek an understanding on arms limitations and determine whether and how a policy of selling lethal spares might contribute to this end and also limit Communist influence in both countries. The memorandum envisages that these explorations would be completed in time to reach a firm decision on future policy no later than November 1, 1966. Meanwhile, we would continue to limit our policy to cash and credit sales of non-lethal items.

Ambassador Locke supports the draft. His comments are attached at Tab B.

Ambassador Bowles' comments on the draft have been requested and will be taken into account before a final paper is sent to the President by the Secretaries of State and Defense, which we hope will be possible within the next week.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab A - Draft Memorandum
to the President
- Tab B - Ambassador Locke's Comments
on the Memorandum to the
President

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Supply Policy for India and Pakistan

Our decision to proceed with economic aid deals for India and Pakistan has resulted in a measurable improvement in our relations with both countries. It has also given us renewed leverage to influence their policies. We continue to believe that over the long run economic aid is the key to stability in the subcontinent.

Certain recent developments in Pakistan and India have also been helpful:

In Pakistan, President Ayub has dropped Foreign Minister Bhutto and Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed, long irritants in US-Pakistani and Pakistani-Indian relations. Ayub appears increasingly conscious of the dangers inherent in Pakistan's relationship with China. His attitude toward India is relatively moderate; he apparently accepts that there can be no immediate solution of Kashmir.

In India, Mrs. Gandhi's Government is implementing painful economic reforms and is avoiding provocative words or actions vis-a-vis Pakistan. New Delhi also seems aware of the need to devise a formula for resumption of a dialogue with Pakistan which will permit at least the appearance of motion on the Kashmir issue.

Nevertheless

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Nevertheless, the political and military equilibrium in South Asia remains fragile. Mrs. Gandhi faces an election next February. President Ayub must keep his military happy. Both countries are intensely concerned about their security; they are continuing their quest for war materiel and thereby edging toward a new arms race. The virtually inevitable result of an upward arms spiral would be further deterioration in relations between the two countries, further opportunities for the spread of Communist influence in both, and further diversion of their resources from economic development.

If our objectives in the subcontinent are to be achieved, an arms race must be prevented. There is an overriding need for an Indo-Pak understanding on arms limitation, and to achieve this we may at an appropriate time have to take a direct role in an arms control effort. We are already seeking, in the context of our economic aid, to get a downward trend in defense spending. In any event, we must determine what our own military supply policy toward both countries is to be for the near-term future. Several things are clear:

(1) resumption of large-scale military aid (grant or sale) to either country is undesirable and infeasible; (2) the former US-Pakistan alliance relationship, which aimed at deterring direct Communist aggression from the north, is a casualty of historical change, and our whole political-military relationship, including the question of

our special

our special facilities, needs redefinition; (3) the limited level of military supplies we might be willing to offer is unlikely to provide any significant leverage; and (4) in the absence of an understanding on arms limitation, any US military assistance could prove additive to existing sources of supply available to both sides.

Our purpose is to find ways in which we can contribute to the legitimate security needs of both countries in a manner which enhances our influence and serves our strategic interests. To accomplish this, some degree of US participation in the supply of arms to India and Pakistan is probably a continuing necessity. But a US military supply policy must be shaped in accordance with (a) its impact on an arms race, (b) its effect on the degree of Communist influence in either country, and (c) the net political loss or gain to us in the subcontinent.

The issues are complicated, while the range of acceptable alternatives appears very limited (a fuller assessment of these is set forth for your consideration at Tab A). The two most likely alternatives each involves small-scale military sales. The first is to continue the present policy of cash and credit sale of non-lethal items, while quietly lifting the inhibitions we now impose upon military supply from other Western countries, and while also seeking to persuade Pakistan to turn to such other Western sources for both immediate spare parts

and longer-term

and longer-term modernization; the second course is to broaden the present policy to include the sale of spare parts for all equipment of US origin without regard to lethality, while simultaneously taking the same corollary actions described under the first alternative.

Although the precise facts regarding Pakistan's need for U.S. spares are unclear, Pakistan has already been able to purchase some spares from European arms merchants at high prices. As for the future, if European governments are willing to sell and we give them permission, Pakistan could purchase spares for most of its U.S. equipment but not for such important items as its B-57's and F-104's; it probably would still have to pay higher prices than it would for purchases from us. (During the last several years of our grant aid program to Pakistan, spares were programmed at about \$8 million per year.)

The case for lethal spares rests on the theses that: (a) U.S. sales will make it easier for Pakistan to extend the life of its U.S. equipment at low cost; (b) this will gain time for us to persuade Pakistan to avoid dependence on Chinese or Soviet sources of supply for new equipment and to assist Pakistan to find alternate Free World sources of supply while the U.S. phases out of supplying new equipment; (c) Ayub needs assurance of support for his U.S. equipment during its useful life in order to resist pressure for increased reliance on Chinese equipment; (d) U.S. sales of spares would improve our relationship with Ayub and his military leaders; and (e) provision of spares would relieve

the anxiety

the anxiety of other U.S. allies (Iran, Turkey) who have been disturbed by our cutting off Pakistan's military supplies.

The case against lethal spares rests primarily upon the effect of our sales to Pakistan on our relationship with India. India would regard this action as increasing the military strength of Pakistan, which India sees as cooperating with Communist China against it. This would seriously damage Indian confidence and trust in U.S. policy at a time when the Indian leadership has put its political future at serious risk by accepting U.S. conditions on economic aid.

In addition, the case against lethal spares rests on the following: (a) through its purchases of spare parts from Western sources, Pakistan already appears to be substantially restoring the operational readiness of some of its U.S. equipment; (b) while provision of lethal spares would improve the Pak sense of security against India, it would not by itself result in fundamental changes in the Pak-Chinese relationship; (c) lethal spares to Pakistan could give the public impression that the U.S. is sharing with China the arms support of Pakistan against India, and (d) lethal spares for India would contribute only marginally to Indian military capability.

On the basis of our present knowledge, we cannot regard the arguments for either case as conclusive. We accordingly believe that further explorations are required in New Delhi and Rawalpindi before

we take

we take new decisions regarding the future of U.S. military assistance policy to the subcontinent. We believe the measurable improvement in our relations with both countries, arising out of the recent economic aid deals, makes this a propitious time for such explorations.

Recommendations:

In light of the above, we recommend that you approve the following actions relative to future U.S. military assistance policy in Pakistan and India:

1. Ambassador Locke should, immediately upon his return to Pakistan, stress again the urgency with which we view the need for an Indo-Pak understanding on arms limitation. Within that framework, he should explore with President Ayub on what basis Pakistan could undertake (a) to clarify its arms deals with Communist China; (b) to put definite limits on its military supply relationship with Peiping; (c) to clarify its intentions with respect to possible arms procurement from the USSR; and (d) to make a genuine effort to work out an understanding on arms limitation with India. The Ambassador should indicate that, depending on what Pakistan can do on these issues, the U.S. would in turn be prepared (1) to press the Indians to move toward an arms understanding with Pakistan, (2) to discuss with Pakistan its legitimate military requirements and how they might be met, including a readiness to sell such spare parts for U.S. equipment as could not

be obtained

be obtained satisfactorily from other Western sources (US sales of spares would not exceed \$8 million annually, which was approximately the cost of the spare parts component of our MAP program during its last few years.), (3) to help in arranging for the procurement of other spares from Western Europe, the Commonwealth, Japan, and other non-Communist sources, and (4) over the longer term, to help in arranging for the procurement of justifiable new equipment from these same non-US sources. In making these representations, the Ambassador should clearly imply that the magnitude and kind of future US economic aid is related to progress on these questions.

2. Ambassador Bowles should once again stress to Mrs. Gandhi the great importance we attach to the Indian role in the strategic containment of China. Within that framework, he should restate the urgency with which we view the need to limit Chinese influence in Pakistan and the corollary need for an Indo-Pak understanding on arms limitation. He should seek to persuade India to accept the reality that Pakistan, as a sovereign nation, is going to maintain a respectable military posture and that, accordingly, the practical question is not whether the Paks will obtain arms, but in what quantities and from whom. He should disclose the nature and purpose of our concurrent efforts with Pakistan on the matter of arms limitation, including the contingent offer to sell US spares. He should emphasize the importance of an Indo-Pak understanding on this vital matter, should explore what India

may be.

may be prepared to do to achieve it, and should offer to sell US spares. In making these representations, the Ambassador should clearly imply that the magnitude and kind of future US economic aid to India is related to progress on arms control.

3. We should review the results of these parallel and concurrent probes prior to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting in September, in order that we may determine how best to use that gathering as a further opportunity to advance the objective of an Indo-Pak arms understanding (e.g., by enlisting Prime Minister Wilson's assistance). At that time we should also consider enlisting other intermediaries to hold private conversations with each country with the aim of working toward at least a tacit understanding on an acceptable relationship between Indo-Pakistani military budgets and force levels. Whatever the outcome of these efforts, we should place ourselves in a position to reach a firm decision on future U.S. military assistance policy toward the subcontinent not later than November 1, 1966.

4. In the meantime, U.S. military assistance to both India and Pakistan should continue to be limited to the cash and credit sale of non-lethal items.

Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense

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SUBJECT: An Analysis of U.S. Military Supply Policy for India and Pakistan

I. THE PROBLEM

The India-Pakistan war is ended; the military forces have been disengaged. Although tensions remain high, both sides continue to think in terms of controlling them by talking and neither seriously contemplates a resumption of hostilities. Under these conditions the U.S. and other Free World countries have resumed economic aid. Yet, both India and Pakistan are rebuilding their military organizations, India by securing new equipment from the Soviets and buying spares for its British equipment from the UK; Pakistan by securing new equipment from the Chinese Communists and buying spares for its U.S. equipment from European arms dealers at high prices; and both by increasing the size of their armed forces. There are already elements of an arms race on the subcontinent and if we do not act now to quell it, we may not have the option to do so in the future.

Under these circumstances, we are faced with a number of policy questions. Should we change our present military supply policy of selling only non-lethal military equipment? How should we change that policy? What would we gain from a change and what would we lose? How should we use other influence we have principally through economic aid, to quell the arms race? These are the questions which this paper examines.

II. U.S. Security Objectives in the Subcontinent

A. Major Elements Affecting U.S. Policy

The legacy of Indo-Pak hostility and conflict dating from the partition of the subcontinent continues to constitute the greatest single barrier to effective use of resources for development, to an effective defense against Communist encroachment, and to the achievement of our objectives in South Asia. The range of contentious issues between the parties (manifested by, but not confined to, Kashmir) are so fundamental, however, that it is not reasonable to expect their resolution, at least over the short term.

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The principal external threat to South Asia today comes from Communist China and a major U.S. policy objective in the region is to counter this. While there also exists a long-term threat of Soviet penetration, our substantial presence on the subcontinent serves to keep Soviet influence within tolerable bounds. Moreover, we share with the Soviet Union a short-term aim: to limit Chinese Communist influence in Pakistan and India. The direct Soviet military threat to Pakistan has receded; therefore, the old rationale for military aid to Pakistan no longer applies.

India is, actually and potentially, of far greater strategic weight than Pakistan, and thus of greater importance to the United States. This is true for the obvious power reasons of physical size, location, population, and resources, but here is also another dimension to the matter. Since 1949, the U.S. and most of Asia have looked on the Indian and Chinese developments as a competition between basically different political and economic systems. U.S. hopes for establishing, throughout Asia, political and economic systems roughly compatible with its own have thus seemed to rest on Indian success in the contest-- or at least on the avoidance of an Indian failure.

Nevertheless, we have important interests in Pakistan:

- (1) Pakistan in its own right is a large and important Muslim nation with a great potential, being overshadowed on the Asian mainland only by China and India;
- (2) what happens in Pakistan can have a major effect on our interests in India; a Pakistan closely aligned with Communist China, and dedicated to disrupting India instead of cooperating with it, could make India's problem of security against China almost unmanageable;
- (3) we have important intelligence installations in Pakistan;
- (4) the country is a showcase of free enterprise economic development relatively unencumbered by doctrinaire planning ideas; and
- (5) an atmosphere of continued conflict between India and Pakistan could frustrate our prime objectives on the subcontinent of stability and economic growth.

Our basic, near-term security aims in the subcontinent are thus to stabilize Indo-Pak relations, damp down an incipient arms race, assure the Indian will and capability to defend itself against ChiCom attack, arrest the growth of ChiCom influence in Pakistan, and at the same time avoid the entangling role of

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significant arms supplier to both sides in a situation still characterized by tension, hostility, and the absence of genuine reconciliation. The situation in the subcontinent is extremely complicated and fragile, and many hopes raised in Tashkent have evaporated. Nevertheless both sides continue to express their willingness to resume talks on their common problems.

Stated specifically our immediate security objectives are:

1. With respect to Pakistan:

a. To achieve a downward trend in Pak military expenditures (including the foreign exchange component), preferably in the context of an Indo-Pak arms understanding;

b. To hold the supply of Chinese military equipment to a reasonable portion of total Pak arms, and if possible to reduce that portion;

c. To assure that Pakistan has non-Chinese military supply options;

d. To avoid becoming a major supplier of arms to Pakistan, in the absence of a genuine political reconciliation or settlement with India;

e. To maintain sufficient US influence to assure continued cooperation of Pakistan with Free World interests; e.g., the special facilities in Pakistan and to preserve at least nominal Pak adherence to CENTO and SEATO.

2. With respect to India:

a. To achieve a downward trend in military expenditures (including the foreign exchange component), preferably in the context of an Indo-Pak arms understanding;

b. To promote the Indian will and capability to defend successfully against a range of Chinese military pressures on India and the border states of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan;

c. To avoid becoming a major arms supplier to India, in the absence of genuine political reconciliation or settlement with Pakistan.

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In moving toward these objectives, our military assistance to the subcontinent necessarily constitutes a subordinate element of US policy, for any capacity to influence the policies of Pakistan and India lies primarily in the potential of our economic aid programs. In present and foreseeable circumstances, adequate leverage is not obtainable from US military aid to either country.

III. The Problem of an Indo-Pak Military Balance

There is an overriding need for at least a tacit Indo-Pak understanding on arms limitation, in order to prevent a serious arms race and the consequent diminution of prospects for economic development in both countries. This is the essential first step to the creation of a stability that will assure that economic assistance is not wasted; such an understanding would also make it easier for the US to resume military supply to both countries, because it would provide a finite framework into which military aid from all sources would fit.

The Indo-Pak ratios of military expenditures and force levels have fluctuated within a moderate span since 1962. At that date, the ratio of forces was about 3 to 1 (550,000 vs. 179,000 men) and the ratio of expenditure was 4.8 to 1 (\$1.03 billion vs. \$216 million). Following the ChiCom attack, India substantially enlarged and strengthened its forces, while Pakistan remained at the 1962 level. By 1965 this brought the ratio of forces to 4.9 to 1 (925,000 vs. 189,000 men) and the ratio of expenditure to 6 to 1 (\$1.8 billion vs. \$295 million). Since the September war, the Pak rearmament effort has shifted the force level ratio to about 4.4 to 1 (942,000 vs. 212,000 men) and the FY 66 expenditure ratio to about 4 to 1 (\$1.9 billion vs. \$525 million).

There are perhaps two basic elements of an understanding on arms limitation. They are: (1) an agreement by each side to limit its defense expenditures (including the foreign exchange component of the defense budget) preferably to a certain absolute figure for specified period of years; and (2) agreement between them to maintain a certain ratio of total military personnel plus selected key equipment indicators (like tanks and tactical aircraft). The attempt to agree on a fixed percentage of GNP for defense expenditures is subject to the disadvantage that countries grow at different rates; also it is difficult to agree on the component elements of GNP.

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The obstacles in the way of an arms limitation agreement between the two countries are formidable, but the importance of at least a tacit understanding requires that serious and continuing efforts be made. Pakistan has indicated that it would welcome such an agreement, but there is evidence that it would not accept less than a 1 to 3 ratio on expenditures and forces; moreover, it is doubtful whether the Paks will agree prior to a Kashmir settlement, for an agreement would clearly limit the Pak military capability to pressure India for a change of the status in Kashmir. India has also said it would welcome an agreement on arms limitation, but primarily with regard to those forces which India maintains to meet the Pak threat. India holds that such an agreement could not logically apply to the forces which India must deploy against the Chinese threat.

Nevertheless, an agreement on arms limitation would be of such overriding importance to our interests that we believe we should use our influence to try to bring such an agreement about. We could do this in a number of alternative ways: --We could use our bilateral economic discussions to maintain pressure on each country to bring about a downward trend in defense spending in both countries, seeking in the process a de facto ratio of military budgetary expenditures, to include the foreign exchange component, which neither might be likely to accept in negotiations but which each might tacitly accept in practice. This could ultimately lead to a ratio of forces. We would thus avoid confronting India and Pakistan with the task of seeking such a difficult formal agreement by in effect being an informal intermediary. We are already started on this course, but the prospects are not good for getting effective de facto ratios in time to ease our military supply policy problems.

-- We could urge India and Pakistan to get into early negotiations on arms limitation and, if such negotiations take place, support them by continuing our economic pressures for reductions in defense spending. This would directly seize India and Pakistan with the problem, increase the dangers in the event of failure, but produce a much more useful product in the event of success.

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Because both sides might publicly balk at a specific agreement which might seem to limit their sovereignty, a tacit understanding achieved with the help of a third party may be possible if it is found that both parties attach genuine importance to arms limitation and need help in accomplishing it. The World Bank has substantial equities in the subcontinent and entree to the fiscal and economic leadership groups in both countries, which would give it a generally restraining influence on defense versus economic expenditures. However, it would be inhibited in conducting what are largely political negotiations. The British Government is a possibility. A third alternative is the USG, which could initiate explorations by designating a high level emissary to work toward an understanding. Any talks on this delicate subject would have to start from the present actual situation, and progress would be slow and imprecisely measurable. It should be recognized that the present ratio of both expenditures and force levels is about 4 to 1.

IV. US military Assistance Alternatives

Despite the dim prospects for an early India-Pakistan agreement on arms limitation, our broad interests in both countries warrant a continuing examination of our military assistance policy to the subcontinent, the military aid policies of other major suppliers (USSR, China and UK) and various alternative possibilities. Various alternatives are considered below.

A. Large-Scale Assistance (Grant or Sales).

1. Pakistan.

There is agreement that, in the absence of an Indo-Pak reconciliation sufficient to lay the basis for a unified defense of the subcontinent, resumption of large-scale military aid to Pakistan (grant or sales) is not in the US interest. When the program started in 1954, its purpose was primarily to provide deterrence and defense against the Soviet and Chinese threat from the north. In the twelve intervening years basic changes have taken place. The Soviet direct military threat has receded; the deterioration in Sino-Indian relations has improved Sino-Pak relations; Pakistan has become a marginal supporter of the CENTO and SEATO treaties, especially since the beginning of US military

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aid to India in 1962. Therefore, the old rationale for military aid to Pakistan is no longer viable; any large-scale resumption would be seen by the parties concerned as an effort directed against India; it would imply major mutual US-Pak security interests when in fact these are becoming increasingly limited; and it would put the US in the position in the eyes of many of sharing with China the military support of Pakistan against India--a position that would undercut and confuse our strategic posture in Asia.

2. India.

US military assistance has never been more than a small portion of India's total military effort, although it was of crucial importance in strengthening India's ground forces and air transport units in the 1962 crisis. It reached a maximum of \$105 million (combined grant and credit) in FY 65 in relation to a total Indian military budget of \$1.8 billion plus a significant inflow of equipment from the UK, the USSR, and other third country sources.

In view of our basic aim to avoid a waste of economic resources and to damp down an incipient arms race, we have no wish to introduce a large quantity of US arms into India. This judgment accepts the adverse fact of the Soviets becoming the primary arms supplier, at least for the near-term. We accept this disadvantage because, in the absence of an agreed ceiling on Indian military expenditures, we think it probable that large-scale US arms deliveries at this point would not offset the Soviet supply, but would be additive to the Indian total, thereby straining India's economic resources and contributing to an arms race.

Finally, we consider that large-scale US military assistance to India is not necessary to counter the present and near-term Chinese conventional threat to South Asia. In relation to that threat, Indian capabilities have shown a marked qualitative and quantitative improvement since 1962.

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B. Provision of Selective "Defensive" Items (Grant or Sale).

A variant to the foregoing would be to grant or sell selected "defensive" lethal items (e.g., surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank weapons, interceptor aircraft) to India and Pakistan. It is at least arguable that such an extension of our current non-lethal policy would enable us to assuage Pakistan's deep sense of insecurity without jeopardizing our relations with India, for we could argue that such items would strengthen Pakistan's defensive posture without increasing the Pak threat to India.

As a practical matter, however, it is extremely difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive equipment; any combat action involves concurrent offensive and defensive actions and SAM's, for example, might be used by the attacker to protect supply depots against counter air strikes by the defender. Basically, the Indians would see no real distinction between such types of equipment.

C. Smaller-Scale Assistance (Cash and Credit Sales).

1. Alternative Possibilities.

There appear to be alternative possibilities for near-term military assistance on a smaller scale.

The first would be cash and credit sale of spare parts for all items of US origin now in inventory, without regard to lethality and for a transitional period. This policy would be addressed primarily to meeting problems in Pakistan, as it would be of small attraction or benefit to India. Its purposes would be to buy time and additional leverage (a) to moderate total Pak military spending, (b) to hold the Chinese supply of equipment to a reasonable portion of the total, and (c) to turn the Paks toward major reliance on other Western (non-US) arms suppliers (Europe, Commonwealth, Japan) for their longer-term modernization requirements.

The second would be to maintain the present policy (cash and credit sale of non-lethal items) relying chiefly on the influence our investment in economic development gives us

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to moderate Indo-Pak military spending, to stabilize Indo-Pak relations, and to achieve the other purposes enumerated in the paragraph above.

Both policies aim at avoiding a major US role in arms supply to the subcontinent and at turning Pakistan toward other Western sources to meet its modernization requirements. The essential difference between them relates to the question of the need for, and the efficacy of, a transitional period of US lethal supply.

We do not know precisely to what extent Pakistan has been able since September 1965 to locate and purchase essential spares for its US supplied lethal equipment. It is estimated, however, that Pakistan would probably require about \$5 million annually in such spares if it were to maintain its present postwar inventory of US supplied lethal equipment at a normal, peacetime usage rate. This figure allows for no buildup of reserves nor does it make allowance for depleted stocks. The figure can be broken down as follows: \$4.1 million in combat air spares, \$0.3 million for tanks and APC spares, \$0.115 million for naval spares and \$0.4 million for spares for light infantry mortar, artillery, and other weapons. (The U.S. programmed a total of \$8.3 and 8.2 million for maintenance spares of all types, lethal and non-lethal, in FY 64 and 65 MAP respectively.)

2. Arguments in Favor of a Lethal Spares Policy.

On behalf of this policy it is argued that Pakistan has no immediate alternative to Chinese supply, and will therefore become dependent on China unless the US acts to assist Pakistan to restore its equipment of US origin to operational readiness; that the chief hope of Pak restraint in respect to Chinese supply is a temporary US policy of lethal spares that would reassure Ayub of support for his existing US equipment during its useful life; that the time and reassurance thus purchased would be used to persuade Pakistan that it should turn to other Western (non-US) sources for its longer-term modernization requirements.

It is further argued that a US policy of lethal spares would help Ayub politically by giving him at least a partial counter to pressures from both his armed forces and the radical

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nationalists for increased reliance on Chinese supply; that it would be a tangible measure of US awareness of Pakistan's security problem and our unwillingness to bow to Indian pressures; and that it would provide a "breathing space" that might lead to more careful Pak consideration of the dangers that flow from falling into a position of dependence on the Chinese. Offering to sell spares might also strengthen our hand in trying to get the Paks to cut back on their defense spending and particularly to consider with India some kind of understanding on arms limitation.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in particular have voiced the strong view that a policy permitting the sale of spare parts for US-supplied equipment "without regard to lethality" is imperative to (a) minimize the Pak-Chinese military supply relationship, (b) hold down Pak defense expenditures, (c) maintain a constructive element of US influence over the Pak military buildup, and (d) relieve the anxiety of other US allies (e.g., Iran and Turkey) who have been disturbed by our cutting off Pakistan's military supplies.

3. Arguments against a Lethal Spares Policy.

The case against lethal spares rests primarily upon the effect of our sales to Pakistan on our relationship with India. A policy of selling lethal items, even spares, to Pakistan would produce a sharp, negative effect in India. Ambassador Bowles has repeatedly expressed the conviction "that the one thing the framework of Indo-American relations cannot now support is resumption of supply of US lethal equipment, including spare parts, to Pakistan." He argues that such a move would throw away all of the confidence and understanding gained by Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Washington, and would undercut her trust of US policy, on the basis of which she has taken politically courageous decisions with respect to devaluation, agriculture, and population control. It would strengthen the hand of Indian nationalists and of the radical left which insist that US policy cannot be trusted to support basic Indian interests. Renewed deliveries of lethal spares could be seen to represent a return to the U.S. policy of arming both countries before there had been any firm political reconciliation. Finally, such a course would be regarded by India as associating the US with China in increasing the strength of Pakistan, a country which India believes is cooperating with China against it.

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The official Indian reaction to a policy of lethal spares might be mitigated to the extent we consult the GOI in advance and are able to reassure India that the step does not signal a US policy of trying to equate Pakistan to India, but is a limited, transitional measure aimed at limiting the Pak-Chicom relationship and is thus in India's interest. But this preparation is likely to do little or nothing to mute the public reaction in the volatile atmosphere of an election year. At minimum, US supply of lethal military spares to Pakistan could create a situation making it difficult for the GOI to reduce its military expenditures.

The arguments against a lethal spares policy involve several additional considerations: (a) whether Pakistan any longer needs US lethal spares to restore or maintain reasonable operational readiness and a respectable deterrent posture, (b) whether such a policy would achieve the purposes its advocates have in mind, and (c) whether in any event the policy would, on balance, serve US interests.

The following factors bear on the question of Pakistan's intrinsic military need for US lethal spares.

a. Aircraft. Pakistan's inventory now includes 85 F-86, 10 F-104A/B, and 20 B-57 aircraft, all provided by US MAP. Several months ago Iran purchased 90 Canadian-built F-86 Sabres from Germany. We now have reports that at least 12 of these aircraft have been ferried to Pakistan and we assume that most or all of the remainder will be available to the Paks as needed. Such a transfer would appear to provide effective replacement of the US-supplied F-86 aircraft on a one-for-one basis.

F-86 spares are available in several countries including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and Germany. It is probable that Pakistan has been able to purchase these in reasonable quantity, although at a high price.

The arrival in Pakistan of from 40 to 75 Chinese MIG-19's appears to compensate for the presumed reduction in capability of the 10 F-104A's (the Paks have encountered difficulty in purchasing F-104 spares). It is estimated that a total of 100

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or more Chinese MIG-19's will eventually be delivered. Recent reports that four IL-28's may have been delivered as the possible forerunner of one squadron (perhaps 12 aircraft) indicate an offset to the 20 US-supplied B-57's.

b. Tanks. Pak tank losses in the September War were approximately 200-250 tanks. These are believed to have been offset in part by Chinese tank deliveries, which to date are estimated at between 150-200. In addition, spare parts for US-made M-47 and M-48 tanks (of which Pakistan now has about 400) are available in several countries including Turkey, Iran, and Germany and some have probably reached Pakistan despite the requirement for prior US approval.

As Germany and France continue their production of new tanks (the German Leopard to be made available to other NATO countries as well), an increasing number of M-47/48 tanks will become excess to their needs. The FRG inventory of M-47/48's is 2655, and the European NATO total is 6500.

c. Artillery. There are confirmed reports that China has delivered the equivalent of 3 regiments of artillery for the Pak Army (200 122mm towed howitzers have been received, and another 125 are expected). Pakistan may also be acquiring 105mm and 155mm artillery from West Germany via Iran.

It thus appears that the Paks are progressively restoring their 1965 operational capability through recourse to both Chinese and Western sources. It is therefore not self-evident that an interim US policy of lethal spare parts sales is necessary to bring the Pak armed forces to reasonable operational readiness; on the contrary, such a policy could contribute to a total Pak military strength and capability substantially above the level prevailing last September; in the absence of a clear and enforceable limit on total forces and spending, delivery of US lethal spares could prove additive to the Chinese deliveries, and probably to those of other countries as well. Such a result would work directly against our hopes to put a ceiling on military spending and force levels in the subcontinent.

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At the same time, a policy of interim lethal spares for Pakistan would in itself not result in fundamental changes in the Pak-Chicom relationship. Moreover, having used US fears that they would "go Chinese" to induce a restoration of US arms aid, the Paks might use the same tactic in reverse on the Chinese. In any event Pakistan is clearly determined to maintain an independent position and to assure a diversity of arms sources.

Therefore, to be successful from the standpoint of US interests, a policy of selling lethal spares would depend on prior assurances from Ayub that he would make a genuine effort to work out an understanding on arms limitation with India, that he would be prepared to limit his Chinese and Soviet supply relationships, and that he would use the period of relief afforded by US spares to reorient major Pak military procurement toward Western sources. The difficulty is that these necessary preconditions cannot probably be obtained through the modest leverage alone afforded by a program of lethal spares; they would depend more on the Pak reading of its basic interest and the importance of continuation of the US relationship and of economic aid to that interest.

4. Arguments For and Against a Continuation of the Present Non-Lethal Policy.

Supporters of the present policy believe that, in a subcontinental situation still characterized by tension, hostility, and the absence of political agreement, it is not in the US interest to become a supplier of lethal arms to either side. While maintaining a channel to the two military establishments through the present limited form of military supply, they would rely chiefly on economic aid leverage to moderate military spending in both countries and to move Pakistan toward Western (non-US) sources. Within this framework, they would work toward a slightly more liberal definition of "non-lethal" and would make a concerted effort to expedite deliveries.

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The Indian reaction to the present policy has been, and would probably continue to be, generally favorable. The policy would give them continued access to US defense production support and other non-lethal items needed to complement their continuing flow of lethal military hardware from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the UK; and it would enable the GOI to avoid the disruptive reaction of Indian public opinion arising from direct shipment of US lethal items to Pakistan.

This policy has, however, clear limitations in Pakistan. It does not recognize Pakistan's security problem or provide the relief needed to limit the Pak-Chicom military supply relationship, and it cannot be expected, in and of itself, to restore close relations with the Pak political and military leadership. A slow erosion of US-Pak relations would probably continue.

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AMBASSADOR LOCKE'S COMMENTS ON THE
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I have worked with the State and Defense Departments in developing a joint paper on U.S. military supply policy for India and Pakistan.

I do not agree with every statement in the paper; but I do agree with its conclusion that:

- (i) we sell lethal spare parts to India and Pakistan for cash, and
- (ii) we help Pakistan meet from non-U.S. Western sources her reasonable requirements for military defense modernization, if Pakistan
 - (i) will in good faith seek to come to an understanding with India about arms limitation,
 - (ii) will limit her military equipment procurement from Red China, and
 - (iii) will not acquire a disproportionate part of military equipment from Russia.

If Pakistan agrees to the above, I think it absolutely essential that we sell Pakistan spare parts and help her find modern equipment in Western Europe, regardless of what Indian leaders say the Indian reaction will be.

In analyzing this problem, we should bear in mind two self-evident truths:

- (i) By failing to act we make a decision.
- (ii) In making a decision, we should be more concerned with its effect on what nations do than on what nations say.

Insofar as

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
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By is, NARA Date 4-29-99

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Insofar as Pakistan is concerned, our decision will affect what she does.

If we do not recognize Pakistan's military defense problem -- particularly as related to spare parts -- it will have the following effects:

1. She will consider the United States is ready to sacrifice her in favor of India. Many of her leaders, including her Air Marshall, believe this now. This will help dictate her actions, not only toward the United States, but toward other nations.

2. President Ayub will be weakened. He has been the man who has resisted moving too close to China, who has fired his pro-Chinese Foreign Minister, who has held the lid on members of his Armed Forces who favor complete military dependence on Red China.

3. Pakistan will move closer to China. The degree of movement cannot be fully predicted. At its worst, it could mean a move toward complete military dependence. Ayub would oppose this, but some of his military would favor it. If it was the only alternative to military nakedness vis-a-vis India, all would accept it. In my opinion, China could and would encourage it, even to the extent of taking equipment from its own armed forces to achieve it. This is based on the importance to China of a dependent ally south of the Himalaya Mountains, plus intelligence that (i) China has furnished Pakistan with 4 IL-28's, which could come only from her own air forces and (ii) China has furnished Pakistan with numerous MIG-19's, which is a superior plane to that she has ever furnished any other nation, including North Korea, North Vietnam and Indonesia. Should China have a dependent ally south of the Himalaya Mountains, this would be the worst possible thing that could happen from the Indian point of view.

Insofar as India is concerned, our decision will affect what she says, but, if properly handled, will have relatively little effect on what she does.

If we sell

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If we sell spare parts to both countries for cash, India will not like it, because Pakistan has more equipment that can use those parts than India. This will result in anti-U.S. statements in the Indian press, the Indian Parliament, and by Indian leaders -- perhaps even in demonstrations. This is not uncommon, however, even when we are exemplary in our attitude toward India, as evidenced by the recent statement of Mrs. Gandhi in Moscow, coming on the heels of a \$900 million aid program for India. The virulence of the effect can probably be minimized (i) by the facts that the sales are for cash, to both countries, and limited to a relatively small amount (\$8 million) and (ii) by acquainting the leadership in advance with the fact that this is really in India's interest, as Pakistan will get equipment from somewhere, and it is better for her to get it from us than from China.

The possible adverse effects to be considered in India in terms of acts not words are: (1) the effect on the Congress Party in the impending election, (2) the effect on Mrs. Gandhi's position, and (3) the effect on India's willingness to negotiate with Pakistan on Kashmir, arms reduction, and other matters.

I do not presume to have great knowledge of India. I believe, however, that while the effect on the Congress Party and Mrs. Gandhi will be adverse, it should not materially affect the elections -- particularly as the sale of spare parts would be an act of the U.S., not of Mrs. Gandhi. Although Mrs. Gandhi is associated in Indian minds as a friend of the U.S., the things she herself has done at U.S. suggestion which are necessary but politically unpopular should be of greater significance in the election than the U.S. sale of spare parts. She may eventually rise or fall on the basis of how U.S. suggestions, especially those on economic policies, work out -- but it is unlikely that she will do so on the spare parts issue. Likewise, India will be governed in talks with Pakistan by the realities of the issues between them and not by whether or not the U.S. sells spare parts.

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So far as India's basic underlying actions are concerned, they should not be affected. Her greatest threat is from China. The United States is the only nation she might count on militarily in a showdown with China. Russia is not at this time willing to risk a war within the Communist World. The sale of spare parts to Pakistan will not change these realities.

By this I do not mean Russia is not important to India. She is for a variety of reasons, and India will continue to balance her relations between the U.S. and Russia. This balancing act will continue, however, regardless of our action or failure to act with respect to spare parts.

It has been suggested that to take this action at this time might be construed in India as punitive action resulting from Mrs. Gandhi's statement in Moscow, and that this would be bad. I am not sure that it is bad for the Indians to get the idea they cannot act against our interests with impunity and get away with it.

It has also been suggested that our timing would be better if we sold spares after, rather than before, Russia furnished equipment to Pakistan. I agree, but do not believe this consideration sufficiently important to change our plans as outlined in the memorandum.

The time for accomplishing the objectives of the joint paper is now. Ayub cannot delay his defense planning until after the Indian election in February. From the Indian point of view, if action is not to be delayed until after the election, the sooner it is taken the better.

July 25, 1966

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July 25, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BOWLES
(New Delhi 553)

1. While this mission has on several previous occasions outlined its deep concern over effects here in India of USG again bolstering Pakistan's military position vis-a-vis India by supplying Paks with lethal weapons we welcome opportunity offered by ref tel to express our views in present changing political context.
2. Although I earnestly wish I could report otherwise, I must say very frankly that under existing conditions we could not contain the adverse reaction which would result both within and outside Indian government if USG should agree directly to provide spare parts to strengthen Pakistani air force and/or other elements of their military establishment.
3. This is the view of the mission and it is also my personal view. Indeed I have already extensively explored the implications of such an action on a discreet personal basis with four key members of the government two of the most respected members of the Indian press and observers of the Indian scene in whose judgment I have confidence. The reaction was both intense and unanimous. It is important that we understand why.
4. Ever since Secretary Dulles decided in late 1953 to provide arms to Pakistan which could only be used against India this one issue has seriously clouded our relations with this critically important democratic, non-Communist Asian nation. The deep nationalistic feeling of fear and resentment which was created in India by the Dulles decision was cushioned somewhat by President Eisenhower's firm reassurances on several occasions including February 24, 1954 when he said that our military aid to Pakistan was not directed against India and that if it was misused against India in aggression, he would immediately undertake appropriate action to thwart such aggression. It was further relieved by repeated personal assurances of Ambassadors Bunker, Galbraith and myself, and by prompt United States support of India against China in 1962.
5. However when the Paks sent 5,000 infiltrators into the Kashmir Valley last August (as our intelligence had clearly indicated they would) and when this was followed on September 1 by an attack by a U. S. equipped armored unit of almost division strength against Chhamb and the Indian communications lines into Kashmir, all the old fears returned with a rush. We avoided irretrievable damage to U. S. -India relations only by President

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-397

By iso, NARA Date 4-27-99

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- 2 -

Johnson's prompt decision to cut off the flow of spare parts and ammunition to Pakistan (as well as to India) and by my personal assurances to GOI leaders and to the Indian press that I was confident that the USG would not repeat Dulles' mistake.

6. If following this experience, which is still vivid in the mind of every Indian, we again undertake to supply lethal military equipment to Pakistan which by its own clear statements intends to use it solely against India, the adverse effect on our relations with India will be profound. The fact that we would be indirectly cooperating with China (which both the U. S. and India regard as their primary enemy) in strengthening the Pakistani armed forces against India would render our action all the more incomprehensible to GOI and Indian public.

7. Action of U. S. Senate last week in deeply slashing fiscal 1967 development loan authorization which would hit Indian development plans very hard, plus Secretary Freeman's announcement here in India that we do not intend to use permissive language of new food for freedom legislation to provide India with a further rupee breathing space before we require dollars in payment for our wheat are already creating deep concern here.

8. If we now agree to provide spare parts to activate Pakistani fighter planes and other lethal equipment, we can anticipate following reactions:

(a) A violent protest by extreme left which would be supported by most of the Indian political spectrum all the way to the extreme right. The strong pro-U. S. moderates now in the Cabinet would be completely silenced.

(b) Mrs. Gandhi, with the national election only six months away, is already under heavy fire from a wide range of political elements both outside and within the Congress party (a) for her allegedly "made-in-America" economic policies and (b) for the Moscow communique which was widely criticized as unbalanced by most of the Indian press and by many key members of her own party. Under these circumstances a U. S. program to strengthen the Pakistan armed forces would force her to protect her political rear by actions and statements which would be bound to have adverse repercussions in the U. S. In the process the Indian government and public would further lose confidence in its relations with the U. S. and would be pushed closer to the Soviet Union.

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(c) In our opinion improved relations between India and Pakistan are crucially important to U. S. interests not only to assure the peace of the Subcontinent but to enable democratic India to play a more effective and forthright role in containing Communist China in Asia. If America is to develop in the next five to ten years a comprehensive Asian strategy to counterbalance China an economically viable India which is at peace with her neighbors is essential. Whatever hope there may be now for easing Pak-Indian tensions, for achieving some understanding on an arms ceiling, and for a fresh realistic Indian approach to its own relations with Kashmir would be set back indefinitely by the proposed action.

(d) The Indian public, which by and large is strongly pro-U. S. and which in view of the prodigious efforts of the Leftists is surprisingly moderate in regard to Vietnam, would lose faith in U. S. intentions, friendship and reliability. (As evidence of the present favorable mood: although the universities are now back in session and there is unusual public frustration throughout Delhi the Communists after three weeks of well publicized preparation were able to muster only 1200 anti-Vietnam demonstrators in front of USIS last week; many of these had been transported in buses from nearby villages with promises of a free dinner. Even in normally turbulent Calcutta with its tens of thousands of college students and restless transients, Communist-organized mass demonstration which was expected to bring out 100,000 people drew less than 3000.)

(e) The India military, which is still strongly anti-Communist, would again feel let down by a country which they would prefer above all others to support.

(f) Despite the strong opposition to any compromise in India's dispute with China, there is no doubt that the Krishna Menon group which favors some kind of rapprochement would be greatly strengthened.

9. Although in Washington's view this may all add up to a bad case of over-reaction to a relatively small matter, it must be understood that right now India is in a deeply frustrated mood; that the Gandhi government is under strong attack; that first post-Nehru national elections are only six months away and that we are dealing with a visceral issue involving India's sense of national security which logical argument cannot penetrate.

Anyone who reasons that because the USG is now giving India large quantities of food and acting as the major contributor of economic assistance India can be forced to take this decision in its stride profoundly and dangerously misunderstands psychological situation we now face in India.

10. In view of the heavy political and military pressures under which we are operating in Vietnam, what many observers believe to be the increasing danger of direct Chinese involvement, the depth of Indian anti-Chinese feeling, the fact that India next to China is the world's largest source of military manpower, and the long distance which India under Mrs. Gandhi has come toward our views on economic development, it would seem to be a serious mistake to resume a policy which originated in a wholly different setting twelve years ago, which has already proved extremely costly in terms of our relations with India and which in the current political setting would cause fundamental damage which could not easily be repaired.

11. India could prove critically helpful to us if China in fact moves militarily into the conflict in Southeast Asia; covertly India inclines in this direction and should be encouraged, rather than discouraged.

12. The very real disadvantages outlined above would be balanced only by what Rawalpindi's 336 of May 26 so cogently described as highly questionable advantages in Pakistan. Conclusion of Rawalpindi mission in its 336 still sounds logical to us - quote "the resumption by the U. S. of spare parts deliveries to Pakistan would reduce Pak military costs but not be likely to have significant military effects or psychological impact. unquote

13. We therefore urge and recommend that a decision be reached by the USG that unless the Paks agree to adopt a clear anti-Chinese military stance in the defense of the Subcontinent, we can give them no more lethal military equipment. It would be far wiser in our opinion to discontinue all military equipment to both nations than to place ourselves in the position of helping the Chinese to arm Pakistan against India.

14. If this recommendation is unacceptable, I strongly urge at the very least that we postpone any action, commitment or comment whether direct or indirect regarding U. S. lethal military supplies to Pakistan until after the critically important Indian elections in February. In the meantime we will do all that we can to dampen down any repercussions here from U. S. approved third country military sales to Pakistan.

Bowles

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

61

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Informal Working Visit of Prime Minister
Maiwandwal of Afghanistan

You will recall that several months ago you agreed to an informal working visit for the Prime Minister of Afghanistan sometime in November of this year.

A few weeks ago the Prime Minister proposed a meeting in Washington for late October to fit with a visit he is making to Western Europe. We indicated that the election would make this date impossible.

We now propose a one or two-day visit during the period November 21-23. If you approve, we can firm up the arrangements here and the Prime Minister can fix his own plans. Thanksgiving is November 24.

Walter R.

Approve _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-200

By *ing* NARA, Date 3-15-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 25, 1966

Mr. President:

You sent a message about Vietnam to the Pope for delivery by Ambassador Goldberg who was then in Rome. Because of the shortage of time, this message was sent by cable.

The Pope's assistant has asked for a signed original text in order to make the Papal records complete.

I recommend that you sign the attached letter which is identical with the text sent July 7.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-205
By lif NARA, Date 1-3-90

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62a
July 7, 1966

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Your Holiness:

You have, I know, been following with prayerful concern the course of events in Vietnam and the efforts we have been making to bring to an end through peaceful means the tragic hostilities there.

I want to assure you that we have explored every avenue, responded to every offer, and followed every lead that held out any hope that this tragic conflict might be settled at the conference table. Our efforts have so far been in vain.

The South Vietnamese have, instead, been subjected to intensified infiltration from the North, and I have therefore had to make painful decisions to counter this by intensified air strikes. The steps we chose were carefully limited, and I have seen to it that every precaution was taken to keep to an absolute minimum the damage to civilians and to non-military property. I want personally to assure you that these steps were taken only after the most searching review and assessment of all of the factors involved and only after determining that such action was required by the circumstances.

You are fully aware of my desire to end the conflict in Vietnam as quickly as possible. I can only hope that the leaders in Hanoi are beginning to realize that their aggression cannot succeed.

At the same time, let me reaffirm the determination I expressed to you in my letter of December 29 that I will never cease my exertions until an honorable peace has been achieved in that troubled part of the world. I shall continue the search for a negotiated settlement without conditions. As Ambassador Goldberg, who will deliver this letter to you, told the members of the United Nations Security Council on June 30, we will continue to press for a peaceful solution either through reconvening the Geneva Conference or in some other forum.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-205
By inf NARA, Date 1-30-90

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- 2 -

I deeply appreciate your own efforts to bring peace to Vietnam.
We share this goal, which must be the ultimate goal of all men
of good will.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Holiness
Pope Paul VI
Vatican City
Rome

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Informal Working Visit of Prime Minister
Maiwandwal of Afghanistan

You will recall that several months ago you agreed to an informal working visit for the Prime Minister of Afghanistan sometime in November of this year.

A few weeks ago the Prime Minister proposed a meeting in Washington for late October to fit with a visit he is making to Western Europe. We indicated that the election would make this date impossible.

We now propose a one or two-day visit during the period November 21-23. If you approve, we can firm up the arrangements here and the Prime Minister can fix his own plans. Thanksgiving is November 24.

W. W. R.

Approve how about Chile in Nov

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By JP, NARA, Date 7-9-98

~~SECRET~~

Monday - July 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Guidance for Panama Review Meeting: Tuesday, July 26,
6:00 p.m.

The purpose of the meeting is to review the Panama situation and determine the adequacy of our existing and contemplated programs. These programs are designed to shore up the Robles Government, improve the security situation and foster a climate in Panama more propitious to public acceptance of compromise solutions to basic issues in the canal treaties being negotiated. A briefing memorandum from Secretary Rusk is at Tab C.

Attending the meeting will be:

Secretary Rusk
Bill Gaud
Cy Vance
Dick Helms
Linc Gordon
Ambassadors Anderson and Irwin
Ambassador Adair, Governor Fleming and General Porter
(the three principals from Panama)
Ed Clark (in charge of Panamanian affairs at State).

THE SITUATION

The Special Intelligence Estimate prepared by USIB (Tab B) on prospects for stability in Panama over the next 6-12 months reaches these conclusions:

- Discontent - based particularly on high unemployment and poor housing - continues to grow.
- Criticism of the Robles Government's handling of the canal negotiations will probably increase after October 1 when the National Assembly reconvenes.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-204
By rip NARA, Date 11-20-89

- New civil disturbances are probable over the next 6-12 months.
- The government can handle local, short-term disturbances but not prolonged and widespread civil disorder.
- The Communists have the capability to intensify and broaden such disturbances but not to overthrow the government or gain major influence in the likely successful regime of Arnulfo Arias.

A THREE-POINT PROGRAM

Based on this estimate, State-AID have developed a three-point program for assisting the Robles Government over the short and longer terms:

- A \$52.7 million economic aid package for FY 1967 focused to a large extent on unemployment and housing.
- A new Development Authority -- separate from Panamanian politics, graft and inefficiency -- designed to plan and carry out major, long-term development, using domestic resources, canal revenues and foreign borrowing. The closing of the Darien Gap could be made to fit into this plan. The principal hurdle is to obtain Panamanian acceptance of the Authority.
- A grant of \$1.5 million to pay through FY 1967 the salaries of a 500-man addition to the National Guard made in 1965 and the recruitment of a new 500-man contingent.

The foregoing program raises certain basic issues -- set forth in the Annotated Agenda at Tab A -- which should be examined in our discussions tomorrow. Subject to conclusions reached about these issues, I recommend that you:

- Endorse the program in principle.
- Direct State, AID and BOB to work out the specifics, and request
- Request that they keep you informed on the progress of implementation.

The Development Authority-Darien Gap aspects tie directly into your projected trip and the staff work on these should be completed immediately.

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THE NEGOTIATING POSITION

Ambassadors Anderson and Irwin will report on the status of the treaty negotiations. In brief, the Panamanians have taken a harder bargaining stance than we had anticipated. This is, in part, a reflection of Robles' weak domestic position. Undertain of public support for compromise solutions to key issues on the treaties, he has opted for an unrealistically high, nationalistic position. It is too early to tell how much give there is in it. Our negotiators expect to have a better fix by mid-September when the first review of the respective positions has been completed. An suggested Annotated Agenda for the meeting is at Tab A.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tabs A, B & C.

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Tab A.

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Suggested Agenda

1. Review of the Security Situation

Tab A

- Ask Dick Helms to make the initial presentation and Ambassador Adair and Governor Fleming to comment.
- Probe the conclusion in the SNIE that the Communists are not likely to ride to a position of power or significant influence on the coattails of mass civil disturbance led by Arnulfo Arias -- i. e., Dominican style.

2. Quick Impact Aid Program for FY 1967

Tab B

- Ask Ambassador Adair to describe the purpose and content of the program which is a Country Team presentation.
- Issues which it poses arise from the proposed sizeable increase over the amount budgeted for FY 1967, i. e., from \$11.1 to \$52.7 million:
 - Can Panama absorb an almost five-fold increase in assistance?
 - What priority is Panama to receive in the allocation of Supporting Assistance funds, in view of Vietnam requirements and the possibility of a Congressional cut in the SA request?

3. Grant Aid for the National Guard

Tab C

- Ask Linc Gordon to make the presentation and Ambassador Adair and Governor Fleming to comment.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-204
By sig NARA, Date 11-20-89

- Basic issue is whether the U.S. should continue subsidizing the National Guard to increase its capability and run the risk of adverse political impact or discontinue such assistance? The IRG considers that the assistance should be maintained, minimizing the risk by making the \$1.5 million available as Supporting Assistance. This is a sensible approach.

4. New Development Authority

Tab D.

- Ask Linc Gordon to make the presentation. Jack Irwin, Governor Fleming and I would welcome an opportunity to comment.
- There is general agreement now that we should make a strong bid to the Panamanians to establish such an Authority. The problem is Panamanian willingness to agree on an entity with sufficient competent people from the outside to make it work. Their acceptance may be influenced by assurances that we will help financially over the next several years.
- Issue is whether specific assurances can be given to Panama that expanded financial and technical resources will be made available to the Authority to help carry out the development program.
- I recommend that you direct Linc Gordon to complete a plan promptly, check it with you, and then approach the Panamanians without delay.

5. Closing the Darien Gap

- Secretary Rusk is sending you a separate memorandum on this, which may arrive in time for the meeting.
- If it has not arrived, inquire about its status and indicate your desire to have it right away. (I have reviewed it in draft.)

~~SECRET~~

-3-

6. Treaty Negotiations

Tab E

- Ask Ambassador Anderson to report on the status of the negotiations and the general prospects.
- At this stage the issue is to press on rapidly with the negotiations in order to determine the possibility of reaching compromise solutions to basic issues.

~~SECRET~~

1. copy
2. Pres. file

Monday, July 25, 1966
7:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Linc Gordon's reply
to your question about Colombia.

After he wrote this memorandum,
I handed to him the four-day working-
trip plan for his urgent staffing. You
will be hearing from him.

W. W. Rostow

EYES ONLY
~~CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCB NARS, Date 8-17-86

65a

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 25, 1966

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL~~

ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Possible Attendance at
Presidential Inauguration in
Bogota, Colombia

1. You asked me last Friday to think of "all the reasons why you should not" attend the ceremonies for the inauguration of Carlos LLERAS Restrepo as President of Colombia on Sunday, August 7. You also instructed me not to discuss the matter with anyone else. I have acted accordingly, and recommend that you NOT ATTEND. The reasons are as follows:
2. Altitude. Bogota is 8,660 feet above sea level. This may create medical objections to your visit.
3. Security. Although the guerrilla activities have been greatly reduced in recent years, there is still a substantial amount of rural violence and occasional urban terrorist acts in Bogota. Two bombs have been exploded in the U. S. Consulate there during the past two weeks. There are some reports of plans for violent disruption of the inaugural proceedings. Although the risks are not large, you will recall that Bogota was the scene of the violent mob action during the 1948 OAS Conference (when General Marshall was leading our delegation) which killed several thousand people. You would want advice from Mr. Helms on the security situation and prospects.
4. Disruption of Inaugural Program. Your visit would be a major event, creating ceremonial and protocol complications when a harried Colombia staff will be hard put to do a satisfactory job on the inaugural program itself. Both outgoing President Valencia and incoming President Lleras

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-199

By mg NARA Date 5-12-89

EYES ONLY
~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

would obviously want to spare no effort to provide a magnificent welcome, but it would be hard for them to do so. The situation might be compared with a last-minute decision by the Pope to attend a Presidential inauguration in Washington when the old and new Presidents were of different parties. Moreover, the portion of the ceremonies involving President Valencia take place on Saturday, August 6, when you could not be present because of the White House wedding.

5. Possible Offense to other Presidents. At one time, the Colombians were planning to invite several Presidents to the inauguration: Frei of Chile, Belaunde of Peru, Leoni of Venezuela, Yerovi of Ecuador, and Illia of Argentina. Even before the coup in Argentina, they had abandoned that idea on the ground that adequate time for Presidential discussions could not be found during the inaugural ceremonies. They are now planning a five-country "Little Summit" meeting in Bogota on August 14. Against this background, a Colombian invitation to you might be resented by the other Presidents. They might also feel that it was an effort on your part to push your ideas concerning the expected "Big Summit" inter-American meeting (still hoped for December), before the "Little Summit" group had a chance to discuss the questions among themselves.

6. Complications in Selection of Other Countries for Your Tour. The only South American countries visited by President Kennedy were Colombia and Venezuela. Your visit to Bogota would therefore be the second U.S. Presidential visit there within four years. Brazil has long considered itself as "owed" a visit, for which detailed plans were made twice during the Kennedy Administration, but postponed for overriding reasons.

Before the Argentine coup, I felt that any tour by you to South America should include at least Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and possibly Uruguay, in order to avoid undesirable jealousies. Chile and Peru are now engaged in a friendly but vigorous rivalry to be selected as the site for the December summit meeting. Our preference is for Lima, but we are still using indirect influence to secure a consensus for it. For you to

EYES ONLY
~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY
~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

visit either Peru or Chile but not both would be undesirable, and might prejudice agreement on the Summit Meeting location. You also have made a tentative invitation to Frei to come to Washington. For you to either visit Chile or Peru, but not Brazil would insult our staunchest South American ally. Brazil, however, is in the throes of the Presidential succession and Congressional election campaigns, which makes undesirable a visit there before late November. In the face of the Argentine coup, you should certainly not visit Buenos Aires at this time, but a visit to one or more neighbors of Argentina would rub salt on the wounds. Uruguay is also in the midst of a campaign for national elections to be held in late November.

7. Conclusion. Although a South American tour could be of great value in our Hemisphere relations, it would be better timed after the Summit Meeting. Assuming that it takes place in Lima in December, you could visit two or three other countries on the way home (including Guyana), and plan a second trip for some time in 1967. I so recommend.


Lincoln Gordon

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

EYES ONLY
~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Thru Jim Jones**Pres file*~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 25, 1966 -- 7:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

I attach two papers on Communist China which I commend to you:

1. A cable from Ed Rice in Hong Kong, who is getting a little worried about the noises coming from Peking and about their possible larger intervention in the war.

Our own experts in Washington are less nervous, and it may be that what Ed Rice fears is an enlargement of our bombing around Hanoi-Haiphong.

Nevertheless, I felt you should read this warning from one of our senior experts.

I should add, from my own knowledge of him, that he was always against bombing in the North.

2. A well-written and interesting memorandum from the CIA on the crisis in China, which I have had summarized.

Both of the above bear on one of the questions Secretary Rusk will raise at lunch tomorrow, Tuesday, July 26.

| |
|-----------------------------------|
| DECLASSIFIED |
| State 12-29-77 : NSC 3-2-79 |
| by DCH per 150 NARS, Date 8-17-86 |

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

July 25, 1966

66a

TEXT OF CABLE FROM THE AMERICAN COUNSEL, HONGKONG (509)

SANITIZED

SUBJECT: U. S. Strategy in Vietnam and possible Chinese Communist Intervention

The manner in which Foreign Minister Chen Yi made [REDACTED] (A, 3) [REDACTED] remark that increased bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong or U. S. attack on North Vietnam would bring China into the war, if atmospherics were accurately conveyed to the Embassy in Paris, might suggest Chen was expressing professed opinion about decisions yet to be finally taken by Chicom leadership, rather than revealing ones already reached. The July 22 warning by Chief of State Liu Shao-Chi against further U. S. escalation, reiterating July 18 statement that China is the rear area of the Vietnamese people, contains a new formulation, pledging Chinese to engage with Vietnamese in dealing U. S. such joint blows, at any time and in any place, as the two parties may deem necessary.

Liu's statement thereby suggests that new decisions have been reached by Chicom leadership in consequence of U. S. raids on POL stores in Hanoi-Haiphong area, and perhaps in context Ho Chi Minh's recent visit to China. I would join the French in speculating that Ho Chi Minh's partial mobilization order was one result of that visit, and intransigent language which accompanied it suggests Chicoms conveyed to him promise of additional important support. We cannot be sure that this is so, or know what additional support may have been promised, but some indication of Chinese pledges had to be made public -- as it was by Liu -- if they were either to be fully credible to the North Vietnamese Government or of deterrent or warning value vis-a-vis ourselves.

The foregoing would offer inadequate foundation for concluding the Chinese have decided, for instance, to enter the war if we increase our bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, as Chen Yi seemed to be predicting. On the other hand, it would give no comfort to one advancing the opposite thesis. Rather it seemed to me to ring a warning bell, advising us we have reached a point in the hostilities against North Vietnam where we should stop and assess the situation. The following comments are addressed to considerations which seem to me should be taken into account in such assessment. Some of them may seem outside my sphere of responsibility, narrowly defined, but this is a matter in which affairs of China, the U. S. and Vietnam are inextricably mingled.

When the possibility of bombing POL stores was discussed at Baguio Chiefs of Mission meeting last March, I felt that this, by advancing bombings close to Hanoi and Haiphong, would bring the U. S. close to the point where

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-195

By sig, NARA, Date 7-27-88

Chicoms would feel compelled to take some overt and important measures " of counteraction. However, I was not convinced it would evoke such reaction and I recognized that POL stores were tempting targets. I accordingly did not express the opinion that such action would involve unacceptable risks (and I hope further events may not prove me wrong). However, I felt then and I continue now strongly to feel that still further escalation of bombings, whether in terms of geographic scope or target systems, would carry unacceptable risks of a more dangerous Chicom involvement.

[REDACTED] Chen Yi set forth one version of the Chinese formulation we have heard so often -- the expressed conviction that continued bombing would catch the U. S. in a vicious circle of frustration leading us to invade North Vietnam and attack China. I do not accept the inevitability of the conclusion in this formulation, but I am convinced that efforts to bring victory by air attacks on the North would not only prove indecisive [REDACTED] but would also involve us in a vicious circle of frustration and escalation which would be highly likely to result in Sino-U. S. hostilities. It would be dangerous to assume we could carry measures against North Vietnam to the point where we could break the will of its regime without Communist China's intervening as it might deem necessary to support the regime -- just as a far weaker China intervened to save that of North Korea.

(A, 3)

(A, 5)

Elements of the American press like to portray this vicious circle of frustration and escalation as fatalistically imbreakable because, inter alia, of considerations of national consensus and elections in November (excerpt from Philip Geyelin's Wall Street Journal article carried in July 22 USIS wireless file provides one example). I cannot believe this presents the true picture. We in Hong Kong briefed a quarter of the Congress within the past year and told many of them that the task of defeating struggle of sort Chicoms preach and Viet Cong practice is long-term proposition which cannot end until the South Vietnamese Government succeeds in bringing populace of South Vietnam back under its administration. I can recall only one who at first argued that quick victory was necessary to domestic political reasons, and do not believe any of them would prefer our following course leading to a national disaster to losing his seat in November. It also seems to me much press talk of consensus, based on opinion polls, is phoney: who would not answer "yes" to question whether we should take stronger measures in order to bring war to speedier and successful conclusion, and "no" to question of whether we should take stronger measures which threatened to bring on war with Communist China? In the U. S. the people may be sovereign, but the question of obeying their voice, when so distorted, brings to mind Sun Tze's aphorism that there are some commands of the sovereign which must be disobeyed.

From the standpoint of our non-involvement in war with China, judged from the vantage point of this observation post, it would appear desirable to de-escalate our attacks on northern parts of North Vietnam. Insofar as POL targets are concerned, remaining or new ones will be less tempting once the storage tanks have been destroyed and other non-bulk stores are dispersed. Attacking other targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area is not worth the costs and risks. Instead we might shift the weight of aerial operations against North Vietnam to the areas further south through which pass most of the roads to Laos and South Vietnam.

A shift in course for a government or a ship always requires effort and involves strain but always is justified when pursuing the previous course ceases to be advantageous and poses dangers of shipwreck. The shift which from here looks called for is in the direction of a long stretch ahead with no harbor clearly in sight, but that should not surprise or dismay us, the President having warned we must persist in a war which may last a long time -- so much as that he had ceased speculating a long time ago on how long it might endure. And I do not think we can prove to our enemies our resolve to persist except by persisting, whereas escalation can signal impatience.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-397

By cb, NARA Date 7-17-00

66a

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

July 25, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM THE AMERICAN COUNSEL, HONGKONG (509)

SUBJECT: U. S. Strategy in Vietnam and possible Chinese Communist Intervention

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~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

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Monday, July 25, 1966


SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The underlying memorandum summarizes the current situation in Communist China following the eight months of turmoil and confusion. The major conclusions are:

1. Mao is now in effective control of the Chinese Communist Party and of the policies of the Peking regime.
2. The long standing stability of the Chinese leadership has been shaken.
3. The chance of a peaceful and orderly succession to the aging Mao appears greatly lessened.
4. Support for the regime will weaken further as Peking tries to substitute exhortation for material incentives.
5. Effective political leadership or economic management will be difficult in the present atmosphere of confusion and apprehension.
6. Most observers agree that the radical turn taken in internal affairs will not spread to foreign policy.
7. The internal crisis serves to reduce the chance of Chinese intervention in Vietnam.
8. It highly unlikely that Peking will soften its anti-Soviet line.

W. W. Rostow



SECRET

Monday, July 25, 1966
7:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Andy Goodpaster's
report of a telephone conversation with
General Eisenhower about our prisoners
of war in North Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

2531

672



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

25 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. At Mr. McNamara's request (following his talk with you), I talked with General Eisenhower on Saturday by telephone concerning the problem of our men who are held as prisoners of war in North Vietnam. The results of the conversation are attached.

2. In general, the actions being taken by the Administration are exactly what he would recommend. He believes we should take a strong military action (extending the bombing) in case they should kill one or more of our people. Regarding his final point - need for study of response to the difficult situation if they should sentence our people to long prison terms - I have fed this question into the interdepartmental working group now studying the whole matter.


A. J. GOODPASTER
Lt General, USA

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By W4/jw, NARA, Date 7-9-98

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

25 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Telephone Conversation with
General Eisenhower

1. In response to a call from Mr. McNamara, I talked by phone with General Eisenhower on Saturday morning concerning the problem of our prisoners of war in North Vietnam. Discussion covered his views on the problem, as well as his recent remarks to the press on the subject.

2. I told him the President had indicated, through Mr. McNamara, that he is deeply concerned regarding our prisoners in North Vietnam, and that he would very much appreciate receiving any thoughts on the matter that General Eisenhower might have.

3. General Eisenhower said that he had been asked for comment on this matter by the press and that he had, in effect, "ducked" the question. He said that he does not keep up with the situation in detail on a day-by-day basis as would be required in order to reach views as to specific action. He added that if at any time he had suggestions to make, he would give his remarks to the President. Finally, when asked what he would have done on the matter had it come up when he was in the White House, he said he would have taken strong action of some kind, but was unable to specify just what it would be.

4. To my request for any views on ideas he might have to pass on to the President, he said first of all that he would recommend pushing hard in order to accomplish anything possible on exchange of prisoners. I told him that major efforts are under way, and outlined the specific actions being taken. He said next that, in case action were taken against our prisoners, he would not retaliate against their prisoners that we hold. First, we know that they do not care much about the lives of their own people. Also, they know that we prize our men more highly than they prize theirs. Finally, such behavior is not in


~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By WH/jw, NARA, Date 7-9-98

~~SECRET~~

our character. He does believe that if they should execute any of our men they hold, we should make a very heavy strike against airfields, oil, and every other target that has military value, while avoiding their population centers, and avoiding any attack on population as such. Concurrently, means should be found to let them know that we will strike them hard and will continue to do so because of the action they have taken. He said that a particularly difficult question would arise in case they were to try our men and give them jail sentences, for example, of 10 years or so. He said he did not have a specific suggestion to make in this regard, but felt this problem should be very specifically studied in order to be prepared in case they should take this action.

5. In general, he seemed to find the course of action being followed entirely sensible and sound, and of course wants his views and actions to be helpful in any possible way.


A. J. GOODPASTER
Lt General, USA

~~SECRET~~

Monday - July 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico

The American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico will hold its annual dinner on August 1. The occasion marks the beginning of its fiftieth year. Secretary Connor is scheduled to be the guest speaker.

The Executive Vice President of the Chamber has inquired from State whether you would send a congratulatory message via Ambassador Freeman to the Chamber as you did last year.

I recommend that you send the message. A suggested text is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

*It's all right
LBJ - mjdr
5:35 pm 7/25/66*

672

**PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO AMERICAN CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE IN MEXICO**

I extend heartiest congratulations to the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico for completing forty-nine years of service to Mexican-American trade and understanding. The reward for your efforts and those of your colleagues is the knowledge that your organization has played an important part in stimulating mutually beneficial commercial relations between our two countries, and has contributed so much toward the development of friendship between Mexican and American businessmen. I am very pleased that Secretary Connor can be with you today, and I wish you and your colleagues every success during your fiftieth anniversary year, 1966-67.

Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States

Monday - July 25, 1966

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W. W. Rostow

Attachment

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Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States



11179

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 22, 1966


2504
68dMEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Telegram from the President to the
American Chamber of Commerce of
Mexico

In response to a request of July 11, 1966 from the Executive Vice President of the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico, the Department recommends that a congratulatory telegram be sent from the President via Ambassador Freeman in Mexico to the Chamber. The occasion is the Chamber's annual dinner to be held August 1, 1966. A similar message was sent last year.

Secretary of Commerce John T. Connor, who will be present in Mexico for the inauguration of the official exhibit sponsored by his Department, is scheduled to be the guest speaker at the dinner.

The American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico, which is celebrating the beginning of its fiftieth year, has worked closely with the Embassy and with the Departments of State and Commerce to promote U.S. commercial and economic interests.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

1. Suggested telegram.
2. Copy of letter from American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico.

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 JUL 23 AM 10 32

PROPOSED MESSAGE

I wish to extend congratulations to the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico for completing forty-nine years of service to Mexican-American trade and understanding. The reward for your efforts and those of your colleagues is the knowledge that your organization has played an important part in stimulating mutually beneficial commercial relations between our two countries, and has contributed much toward the development of understanding and friendship between Mexican and American businessmen. I am very pleased that Secretary Connor can be with you today, and I wish you and your colleagues every success during your fiftieth anniversary year, 1966-67.

Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States

UNCLASSIFIED

Amembassy MEXICO

FOR AMBASSADOR FREEMAN

Please deliver following message from President Johnson to Michael S. Hazzard, President of the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico, on occasion of anniversary dinner on August 1: QTE. I wish to extend congratulations to the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico for completing forty-nine years of service to Mexican-American trade and understanding. The reward for your efforts and those of your colleagues is the knowledge that your organization has played an important part in stimulating mutually beneficial commercial relations between our two countries, and has contributed much toward the development of understanding and friendship between Mexican and American businessmen. I am very pleased that Secretary Connor can be with you today, and I wish you and your colleagues every success during your fiftieth anniversary year, 1966-67. Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States. UNQTE. The White House does not plan ~~XXX~~ to release, but has no objection if Mr. Hazzard wishes to do so.

END



AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF MEXICO

LUCERNA 78

MEXICO 6, D. F.

TEL. 35-96-53

APDO. POSTAL 82 BIS

Al R. Wichtrich
Executive Vice President

July 11, 1966

Mr. Eugene ^{PA} Braderman
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Commercial
Affairs and Business Activities
Bureau of Economic Affairs
U. S. Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Gene:

I did not think I would be calling on your office for help so soon. However, the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico is having its annual dinner on August 1, 1966, at 8:00 p. m., and our guest speaker will be the Hon. John T. Connor, Secretary of Commerce. We feel this provides an excellent opportunity for a message from President Johnson to U. S. businessmen in Mexico.

Last year, a similar telegram was received from President Johnson to outgoing President William J. Underwood, and this was handled through Jay Cerf. However, I feel your office is better suited to handle the following request: We would like to have a telegram addressed to Michael S. Hazzard, President of the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico, along the following lines:

"Congratulations on a successful 49th year for the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico. I know that your personal efforts and those of your colleagues are well rewarded with the knowledge that your organization plays a vital role in developing trade between our two great countries and maintaining an unprecedented atmosphere of understanding and friendliness between the Mexican and American businessmen in your community. The role of American businessmen overseas has long been recognized as highly significant and important, and we want to do everything possible

to maintain an open-door policy with the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico. Congratulations on your selection of Secretary John T. Connor as guest speaker. I wish you and your colleagues greatest success during your 50th anniversary for 1966-67. Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States."

Last year, the mechanics were as follows: The telegram was sent to the American Embassy, in care of the Ambassador, and at the annual dinner Ambassador Freeman read it and added a few remarks. As you know, we enjoy a close relation with Ambassador Freeman and his staff and perhaps this item could be included in the telegram.

Please let me know if it is possible to have such a telegram handled in the above indicated manner.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to be the letters 'Al'.

ARW:frm

Monday, July 25, 1966
5:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith how State proposes
to handle the South West Africa
problem after the International
Court zigged when we thought
they would zag.

It seems sensible.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~-attachment

WWRostow:rlh

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 23, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: South West Africa

You will recall that at the National Security Council meeting on July 14, we had a full discussion regarding the ~~ICJ decision on South West Africa~~, and based on the assumption that the Court would rule against South Africa, it was agreed that a special Task Force should do a priority study and make recommendations regarding the U.S. position. ~~Circumstances, of course, have changed~~ by the unexpected nature of the Court's judgment. Therefore, the priorities that we had in mind at the July 14 meeting have been somewhat altered.


In the first instance, ~~we will have to develop quickly our overall strategy and tactics for handling this matter either at the annual General Assembly in September, or at a special session of the Assembly or in the Security Council meeting which may be called sometime before then. This we will do through normal channels in concert with Ambassador Goldberg.~~

The Court's decision, of course, does not alter the need for a fundamental review of our contingency planning since ~~a number of the questions confronting us are much the same regardless of the fact that the Court refused to rule on the merits of the case. Our Interdepartmental Regional Group on Africa offers an appropriate forum and its members have already been asked to undertake such a review.~~

Assistant Secretaries ~~Palmer and Sisco will concert~~ in the handling of follow-up to the Court's judgment both inside and outside the UN.


George W. Ball
Under Secretary

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-199
By  NARA, Date 5-12-89

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 25, 1966 - 3:30 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-205

By up NARA, Date 1-3-90

Mr. President:

This is the first explicit suggestion from Saigon that Ky might run for President of South Viet-Nam in the 1967 election.

This should be no surprise: Ky's Directorate has been studying the evolution of South Korea after 1961. There Park took off his soldier suit and became a politician, barely winning a quite honest election in 1963. He has since grown remarkably in his job.

The Quayle polls showed Ky quite strong when they were taken late in 1965: 92% of the people were familiar with Ky; 34% liked him "very much"; 43% liked him "only a little"; only 5% "disliked" him. Only two other men in South Viet-Nam were close, in terms of being known and "liked": the moderate Buddhist leader Tam Chau and our old friend Tri Quang.

Since then he has gained stature by his showdown in Hue and Danang; but he will lose because of devaluation and inflation, unless we really get that rice, pork, etc., in there.

I'm sure we shouldn't hook ourselves to Ky; but I believe we should keep our mind open to the possibility that he may emerge as a logical candidate, if he handles himself well over the next 6-9 months.

The critical question, in my view, is whether or not in the months after the Constituent Assembly meets, the South Vietnamese can form a big national political party. The party should have military support but reach far out into every region, religious and racial group. If Ky and the Directorate can form such a party and Ky can lead it, his candidacy might make sense.

A party law in the Constitution, forcing the small fragmented parties to come together in bigger units, would be helpful. Such an article was written into the Korean Constitution.

In the meanwhile, quarrels and jealousies inside the Directorate are our greatest concern: a sample is the attached bitter comment on Ky by his Foreign Minister.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment (Excerpt - paras 7-10 of Saigon 1848)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - LIMDIS~~

70a

July 25, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Saigon 1786)

This is a quick reply to your 14059 which we will answer in greater detail later.

Merely wish to refer in this telegram to the next to the last sentence in paragraph 8 in which the hope is expressed that Ky should repeat his past statements about willingness to hand over the power to a duly constituted civilian government just as soon as it exists.

This implies that Ky will not be a candidate for President and if we make this statement to him it will immediately suggest to him that we support someone for President and do not want him.

I would like to know whether the Department has someone in mind as a candidate for President under the new Constitution and if so who it is. Also are we sure that we definitely do not want Ky to become a candidate for President under the new Constitution?

Looked at from here, it seems imprudent to rule Ky out as early as this -- just as it would seem imprudent to commit ourselves to anyone as early as this.

When I look into the future, I visualize the adoption of a Constitution which provides for a strong U.S. type President. Frankly I see no one who is as ready to fill this job and who is ready to run as Prime Minister Ky, with all his shortcomings. I suppose that General Don would be a possibility. I omit General Thieu, who has the qualifications, but belongs to what is very much a controversial group. I omit Big Minh who is in Bangkok, who probably would not be allowed back, and if he was, he would probably be too lazy to put on a real campaign. There may be one or two civilians, but they all look pretty hazy just now.

LODGE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-195
By hig, NARA, Date 7-27-88

~~SECRET - LIMDIS~~

~~SECRET~~

706

July 25, 1966

EXCERPT FROM CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Saigon 1848)

Foreign Minister Tran Van Do said that Mrs. Ky's trip to the U. S. was also the opening gun in Ky's campaign for President and that, in Do's opinion the trip would be very bad politics at home. He was sure it would create great jealousy among the other generals' wives. Thieu, who was much shrewder than Ky, was always careful never to allow his wife to get out in front on anything because of the jealousy it created.

He said that anybody could beat Ky. Although he had done some good work and had some good qualities, he was inescapably connected in peoples' minds with devaluation and with inflation and that he literally had nobody with him. There was only one man who would get any work out of him and that was Bui Diem -- which is why the other generals wanted to take Bui Diem away. If Bui Diem were removed, Do said, Ky would be like a man with both his arms and legs cut off.

Do qualified his prediction of Ky's defeat by saying that "if there were a plebiscite," meaning that "if there were a popular vote." By this he meant that the Constituent Assembly might take onto itself the job of electing a President, and, in that case, Ky's defeat would not be as certain. But in any kind of a popular contest, even Thieu, although a Catholic, could beat Ky. In that case, Thieu's Catholicism would be very much in the shadow and would not be thought of whereas Ky's identification with hard times would remain. Even though Ky was technically a Buddhist, his strong measures against the Buddhists would rise to plague him. Ky was very sure of himself.

In reading the above, note should probably be taken of Do's understandable bitterness at Ky.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-195

By ig, NARA, Date 7-27-88

~~SECRET~~

July 25, 1966

Your Majesty:

I am delighted to learn from Secretary Rusk and Colonel Glenn of your interest in seeing the launching of one of our manned space flights. Launchings are scheduled under our Gemini program for September 8 and October 31 -- although, as I am sure you will understand, all dates are subject to the weather and technical readiness. An Apollo launching will take place in mid-November.

Arrangements would be made for Your Majesty to witness whichever launching is most convenient for you from Cape Kennedy. You could follow the progress of the flight from the Houston Space Control Center.

It would also be a great pleasure for me if we could meet once again in Washington during such a visit. Unfortunately, I have prior commitments for the period around September 8, but I hope our respective schedules after October 31, or at the time of the November launching, would make this possible. I would not, however, wish to discourage you from coming to the United States for the September 8 launching if that is more convenient.

Ambassador Knight will be ready to provide any information you might need.

With my very best wishes,

Sincerely,

/s/

LBJ

His Majesty
Baudouin I
King of the Belgians
Brussels

LBJ:State:ND:hbb

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

71a

~~SECRET-LIMDIS~~

July 20, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Baudouin Visit to Cape Kennedy

At Tab A, Secretary Rusk recommends that you

-- invite Belgian King Baudouin to witness a manned space launching on September 6 or October 31 or in November;

-- have a short meeting with him if he comes for the October 31 or November launching.

This would be a good thing to do, given sturdy Belgian support for NATO and the King's unifying role in that ethnically divided country.

At Tab B, for your signature, is a letter of invitation for both the launching and a short visit at the White House.

Alternately at Tab C, is a letter inviting him only to the launching.

Bul

Francis M. Bator

*OK
wait*

O.K., for launching and meeting ✓ (Tab B)

O.K., for launching alone (Tab C)

No

See me

~~SECRET-LIMDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-202
By rip NARA. Date 8-29-89

*Return to
n Davis / nsc
when signed*

Your Majesty:

I am delighted to learn from Secretary Rusk and Colonel Glenn of your interest in seeing the launching of one of our manned space flights. Launchings are scheduled under our Gemini program for September 8 and October 31-- although, as I am sure you will understand, all dates are subject to the weather and technical readiness. An Apollo launching will take place in mid-November.

Arrangements would be made for Your Majesty to witness whichever launching is most convenient for you from Cape Kennedy. You could follow the progress of the flight from the Houston Space Control Center.

Ambassador Knight will be ready to provide any information you might need.

With my very best wishes,

Sincerely,

His Majesty
Baudouin I
King of the Belgians
Brussels

LBJ:State:ND:hbb

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 25, 1966 - 1000 am

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-202

By ing NARA, Date 8-29-89

Shree Watson

Mr. President:

Here are the "see me" items which await your guidance:

1. Negotiations for Israel de-salting initiative:

Bunker _____

Talk to Feinberg about Bunker _____

Hold _____

2. The Israel \$6 million loan transfer from earlier appropriations:

Now _____

Hold for closer to November _____

3. Bryce Harlow-Doug MacArthur suggestion that we try to enlist General Eisenhower and Senator Dirksen to help in foreign aid battle.

4. Should I accept President-elect Lleras' invitation to join in the "development thinkers' workshop" on August 8, the day after his Inaugural?

5. Any reaction to the outline of the 4-day Latin American working trip in August?

6. Linc Gordon and Ralph Dungan are anxious to confirm the dates (November 13-19) for the Frei visit, already agreed in principle last May. (Dungan writes as of July 18 that a "full-fledged state visit" is not essential.)

Explore Nov. 13-19 _____

Hold _____

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

7. Frank Church et al statement of U.S. airmen held in Hanoi.

8. Cross-Watson memo on use of Honey Fitz for stag luncheon
September 9 for General Ne Win to be hosted by a Cabinet officer.

You may well judge that any or all of these can wait. But I did wish you to know what matters, great and small, were in that special folder.

W. W. Rostow

Set an appointment thru Marv Watson to go over these _____

Continue to hold _____

Cy: Watson
Moyers

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 23, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Today's headlines make Nasser's speech sound a lot nastier than it was. It was quite low-key and mostly devoted to domestic and Arab affairs. The papers completely miss the point that we have managed to say "no" to his PL 480 request for the time being -- the line you approved last month -- without driving him off the deep end.

In effect, he accepted our offer to sell on CCC credit. (In fact, he has had a mission here for the past week lining up banks to underwrite the deal.) He blamed policy disagreements for the lapse of our PL 480 agreement and made the usual noises about not knuckling under to pressure. But he was very careful to allude only to news agencies and Congress -- not to the Administration -- as parties to the disagreement. His tone was more-in-sorrow-than-in-anger, and he took some pains to explain the terms of past food deals to prepare his people for cutting back on other imports to buy food.

The other major foreign policy point was his refusal to attend the Arab summit meeting scheduled for September. This caps the steady breakdown of two years of Arab detente and the regrouping of moderates and radicals we talked about during Faisal's visit. On balance, this will probably make our job in the Near East harder. Even though it will weaken the United Arab Command and reduce its threat to Israel, both U.S. and Israeli interests require us to keep a foot in all Arab doors. With the Near East more sharply divided, it will be tougher again to avoid being forced into taking sides as the Soviets would like to see.

He mentioned Vietnam only as the most serious obstacle to improving relations among all nations. He said our bombing affects the possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement. He reiterated his own attachment to non-alignment.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-200
By ing NARA, Date 3-15-89

Saturday, July 23, 1966
9:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith George McGhee's
account of his useful discussion on
the Hill of U. S. forces in Germany
and the offset issue.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Rec'd 7/23/66

742

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Discussion with Senators on the US
Troop Level in Germany -- Offset Issue

In accordance with your request, I met with the following Senators to discuss the US troop level-Offset issue, with the following results:

1. Senator Hickenlooper - Senator Hickenlooper expressed no particular concern over the Offset arrangement. He does not advocate any changes in US force levels in Germany. In his opinion there is not a great deal of interest in the Congress on this issue. The Republican Senators have in general not raised the issue so as not to appear to be exploiting it for political purposes.

2. Senator Dirksen - Senator Dirksen appears to be in full agreement with US policy on troop levels in Germany. He appears to understand fully the importance of our continuing to maintain a strong position in Europe. He expressed no concern over the Offset.

3. Senator Aiken - Senator Aiken expressed no concern over existing policy on troop levels or the Offset. Although he listened to what I had to say, he made no significant comments.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

87-199

By ing

NARA, Date

5-15-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

4. Senator Fulbright - Senator Fulbright expressed no disagreement with American policy toward maintenance of American forces in Germany. In his view the criticism which has arisen, which is largely on the Democratic side, is an indirect result of the Administration's policy toward South Viet Nam.

5. Senator Symington - Senator Symington continues to have strong feelings that American forces in Europe should be reduced. Although he still bases this largely on the effect on our balance of payments, he shifts, when it is pointed out we have not lost foreign exchange in Germany under the Offset Agreement, to the broader position that we cannot afford all of the military expenditures we are now making in Viet Nam and elsewhere around the world. We will run out of money.

6. Meeting with the Senate Majority Policy Committee under the Chairmanship of Senator Mansfield, at which the following Senators were present: Senator Russell, Senator Long, Senator Symington, Senator Pastore, Senator Hart, Senator Hill, Senator Muskie, and Senator Inouye.

The principal points raised by the group in a hard-hitting one and one-half hour session were as follows:

a. Since we cannot defend Europe in a conventional war, our 7th Army serves only as a trip wire to assure our nuclear involvement. This could as well be done by two divisions as by five.

b. If there is danger in Europe, the other European states should be willing to meet their commitments to NATO. If they do not, we should scale ours down accordingly.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

c. There is little likelihood of war. In the event one comes it will not come in Europe, but through some sneak attack against our bases.

d. The presence of our forces prevents an agreement between Germany and France on the one hand, and Western Europe and the Soviet Union on the other. We should retire and let them work out their problems.

e. Skepticism was expressed that the Germans would fulfill their present Offset Agreement. There was considerable criticism of the fact that Germany has not fulfilled its full NATO obligation, that its twelve divisions are not at full strength and that its equipment is not up to NATO standards.

f. The suggestion was made that savings could be effected through a shortening of the tour of duty in Germany, and leaving dependents at home.

Comment

I attempted to give a balanced presentation of US policy on the troop level-Offset question, controverting and explaining the various issues raised by the Senators where this appeared to be called for. There was no evidence, however, that those who appeared most determined to seek a reduction in US force levels, Senator Mansfield and Senator Symington, were persuaded. My presentation may have had some impression on the others.

G... C. M. Gh...

George C. McGhee
United States Ambassador to Germany

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 23, 1966
Saturday - 12:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

The punch line in these two telegrams doesn't come until the last sentence of Lodge's attached reply to Secretary Rusk.

At 4:30 a.m. Sunday, our time, Lodge will be meeting with the Italian and the Pole. I shall keep in touch.

I did think you would be interested in Lodge's rather wise observation on "playing it cool."

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-NODIS-Attachment~~

To Saigon (13554)
Saigon (1695)

July 23, 1966
Saturday - 9:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

After ~~my~~ giving Bill Jorden my version of your guidance, here is the draft speech he has made available to Mike Manatos for use in the Senate. I thought you would like to glance through it.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Bill Moyers

Dictated by Wm Jordan 762

DRAFT, July 22, 1966

A REPLY TO SENATOR FULBRIGHT

I have read with shock and amazement the statement of Senator Fulbright on President Johnson's recent speech on Asia and the U. S. role there.

I can only wonder whether the good Senator has really read the President's speech.

I don't see much similarity between what the President said and what the Senator is attacking.

The Senator has sounded an alarm against our making an irrevocable new commitment in Asia.

But the President said nothing -- not one word -- about expanding our commitments.

The Senator attacked the idea of "applying the 'Great Society' to Asia."

The President didn't say a word about extending the Great Society to Asia.

Now the President did say that the United States was determined to meet our obligations in Asia.

Does Senator Fulbright think we should not do so?

And the good Senator knows full well what those obligations are -- or he should know -- because he supported them.

We have an obligation to Korea. Fulbright supported it.

We have an obligation to Japan. Fulbright supported it.

We have an obligation to the Philippines. Fulbright supported it.

We have obligations to the SEATO Treaty and to ANZUS.

Senator Fulbright backed them.

The President said we have obligations in Asia -- and that we would live up to them.

He didn't say anything about expanding obligations.

Senator Fulbright hits out angrily at something that is not there.

Or does he think we should walk away from our obligations?

He knows what those obligations are. He voted for them.

Then the Senator talks about an American policy in Asia that is "virtually unlimited in what it purports to accomplish and unilateral in its execution."

If there is anything that comes through loud and clear to anyone who heard or who reads the President's words, it is:

that the road ahead in the Pacific is going to be long and hard; and

that the vital element in the future of Asia is what the Asians are doing -- and will do -- for themselves.

The President cited a number of heartening things that have been done by Asian peoples and governments. He mentioned several of

the important multilateral efforts that are being made to achieve progress and to realize hopes. And he said we must help.

Is that unilateral? Is that really a new doctrine?

I cannot for the life of me understand what the Senator from Arkansas is talking about. He must have read another speech -- or a newspaper column. He didn't listen very carefully to the President.

And one wonders what kind of Asia Senator Fulbright has in mind.

Looking back, one would have thought that the kind of Asia that is taking shape before our eyes -- the kind of Asia that the President talked about -- is the kind of Asia that Senator Fulbright wanted. It certainly is the kind of Asia he used to want.

He has talked of the desirability of multilateral approaches to problems of economic development. But when they take shape, he seems to walk away.

When the President spoke last year of cooperative development of the Mekong Valley, Senator Fulbright gave his hearty approval.

Now that the Mekong Development Program is more than a vague hope, he seems to be walking away.

He gave his support to the Asian Development Bank -- which the President mentioned. Is the Senator now going to walk away?

He once was almost the only advocate among Congressional leaders for expanding aid commitments beyond one year.

But when the President and the Administration offer what he wants, he walks away.

What does Senator Fulbright really want?

And will he still want it tomorrow -- or next week?

Time and time again, he has advocated -- and voted for -- measures.

But when things don't work out just as he had hoped -- when the road gets a little rough -- he turns his back.

It has reached the point where he appears to be looking under the bed for phantoms -- and attacking them whether they are there or not.

He has proved adept at criticising. He is an expert at finding fault.

But what does he want? What does he advocate? What does he propose? And will he stick to it?

What kind of an Asia does the Senator see? And what role should the United States play in the Pacific?

Surely he does not want us to abandon the pledges of help that have given our Asian friends hope.

And surely he, too, looks forward to the day when the Pacific powers, large and small, rich and poor, have reconciled their differences.

Which of these would he not do. Which would he abandon.

Yet these are precisely the things the President spoke of in his recent speech.

It was an appraisal of the present and a vision of the future.

But the thing that justified the vision was the successes that are taking place.

Great things are happening in Asia -- new hopes are being born, new actions are being taken -- by Asians, for Asians.

The President has seen these things. He has said that this great country of ours must cooperate with these actions and with these hopes.

I think the majority of Americans are beginning to see this same vision -- and to understand the role that we can play in this great and promising adventure.

But Senator Fulbright seems to be walking away -- away from the visions, away from the hope, away from our part in the Pacific world of tomorrow.

He has become so preoccupied with his fear of what may happen that he cannot see what is happening.

He opposes what we are trying to do in Viet-Nam. And so he cannot see behind the shield of that action to what our friends in the Pacific are doing.

He is unhappy. He is against.

He is the great dissenter of this time.

But what is he for?

What does Senator Fulbright really want?

Is he going to come forward with something new -- and bold -- and imaginative? Or is he just going to hold another hearing?

It is so easy to deplore -- and so hard to do.

The President's way is the hard way.

The way of the critic is easy.

Which way is Senator Fulbright going to move?

Maybe that was why I was so shocked to read his statement today.

Because it seems he has moved far down the road -- down the easy road.

But it is going to be a lonely road, I fear. For the American people know that we are a power in Europe -- and we are a power in the Pacific -- and we are a power in the world.

The question is not whether we are not -- but rather what we do with that power.

It is whether we use it wisely.

It is whether we use in just causes.

It is whether we use it in cooperation with our friends -- in pursuit of mutual goals. Or whether we act alone.

The President has made it quite clear what he thinks we should and must do. And that is the hallmark of leadership.

~~SECRET -- EYES ONLY~~

77
77
Friday, July 22, 1966 -- 3:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Working Visit to Latin America

The following three attachments trace the dimensions of the trip in broad terms. Further refinements will be necessary:

Scenario covering a 4-day working visit to Latin America -- Tab A

Map tracing the suggested route -- Tab B

Mileage and flight time between stops -- Tab C

The staff work required to give to the visit the indicated substance appears possible:

-- Publication at or before your August 17 speech of a sanitized version of our study on the inner frontiers of South America.

-- Completion of interim studies giving us a tentative estimate of cost of closing the Darien Gap by completing the Panama highway.

-- Formulation of a short-term impact aid package for Panama, plus agreement in the U. S. government to go for Panama Development Authority. The problem here being to gain Panamanian acceptance.

-- Staff work on Summit conference will be sufficient to give us fairly firm talking points on the Summit when you meet the Latin American presidents.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 87-198
By ig, NARA, Date 1-20-89

~~SECRET -- EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DA NARS, Date 8-17-86

*res file
noted by
Jmep 2/26/87 77a*

Scenario for Working Visit to Latin America

Wednesday - 5th Anniversary of Charter of Punta del Este.
August 17

- a.m. - Speech on Latin America. during which President would announce working visit to LA.
- p.m. - Boat ride with LA Ambassadors.

Thursday -
August 18

- a.m. - Departs for Panama.
- p.m. - Meets with President Robles - they announce intentions to cooperate in Development Authority and closing of Darien Gap.

Overnight in Panama City.

Friday -
August 19

- a.m. - Overflies Darien Gap enroute to Bogota (with possible stop at Chepo, where Inter-American Highway now ends, or Palo de las Letras on Panama-Colombian border through which road will pass before moving across Atrato swamp.)
- p.m. - Meets with President Lleras in Bogota for two-three hours to discuss summit and closing of Darien Gap.

Flies on to Lima where he will overnight.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

**Saturday -
August 20**

- a. m. - Confers with President Belaunde.
- p. m. - Leaves for Brasilia overflying Carretera Marginal enroute.

Overnights in Brasilia.

**Sunday -
August 21**

- a. m. - Meets with President Castello Branco.
Departs for Caracas.
- p. m. - Meets with President Leoni; then departs for
Washington.

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

Distance and Flight Time

| | | |
|--|---|-------------------------|
| Washington to Panama | - | 2240 miles -- 5:00 hrs. |
| Panama to Bogota | - | 405 miles -- 1:10 hrs. |
| Bogota to Lima | - | 1173 miles -- 2:50 hrs. |
| Lima to Brasilia via Eastern Andean Slope | - | 2300 miles -- 5 hrs. |
| Brasilia to Caracas | - | 2000 miles -- 4:35 hrs. |
| Caracas to Washington | - | 1840 miles -- 4:15 hrs. |

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING, CANCELLED PER E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1993.

BY DCM ON 8-17-86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - July 22, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Meeting to Review Panama Situation

Next Tuesday, July 26, would be a good time to have a review of the Panama situation --

- A National Intelligence Estimate on prospects for the next 6-12 months has been completed.
- The Latin American IRG met yesterday and drew up plans for helping Panama improve its internal security capabilities and move forward on immediate impact and longer term economic development.
- Bob Anderson and Jack Irwin are available.
- Governor Fleming, General Porter, and Ambassador Adair are in town for a Panama Canal Company meeting.
- Linc Gordon is just back from a trip to Central America,
- Secretary Resor is also available.

Such a meeting would --

- bring you up-to-date on the Canal negotiations and the situation in Panama.
- allow you to quiz the principals on how they are doing in their respective areas and to stress the importance of pressing vigorously all programs which will improve the security situation in Panama and pave the way for acceptance of the treaties.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-204
Rv ing NARA, Date 11-20-87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Jim Jones tells me that your schedule is open after 6:00 p.m. on Tuesday, July 26,

I recommend that you have the meeting.

W. W. Rostow

Approve meeting
for Tuesday,
July 26, at 6:00 p.m. ☒ .

Approve meeting at
a different time ☐ .

Prefer no meeting;
give me a briefing
paper ☐ .

Speak to me ☐ .

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, July 22, 1966 -- 4:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

The attached cable from Bohlen on Sainteny is somewhat rambling; but it is, nevertheless, worth reading.

I would agree that our best chance for making negotiating progress is through very secret talks with Hanoi. This was, as you may recall, Dobrynin's final advice to me in my last talk with him.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Paris 1022

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-205
By ing NARA, Date 1-3-90

WWRostow:rlh

Friday, July 22, 1966 -- 7:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Joseph Stern, Baltimore Sun, telephoned to ask whether Fulbright referred to my views accurately in his speech today on Asia. I gave him nothing on the record or for attribution. I told him, however, that your Asia speech in no way extended our existing military or economic aid commitments. What it did do was to recognize and articulate the possibilities of an Asia emerging with economic and social momentum, a will to work together, which might, with our continued support, establish a peaceful equilibrium with mainland China -- once mainland China settled down.

Peregrine Worsthorne, Deputy Editor of the Sunday Telegraph, London, came in to talk about the Wilson visit. I told him we would be interested in hearing the Prime Minister's evaluation of his situation and prospects as well as his plans at home and abroad. He then made a case for Britain joining Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the U. S. in a new union. I made no comment beyond that it seemed interesting but not what most British leaders were now thinking.

Marianne Means, King Features, came in to discuss the political process in Viet Nam. I filled her full of material, including Bill Jorden's fact sheet on the elections.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - July 22, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Your 5:00 O'Clock Appointment with Prime Minister Burnham

Prime Minister Burnham asked for the appointment with you. He will be accompanied by the Guyanese Ambassador, Sir John Carter, Linc Gordon and Ambassador Delmar Carlson.

We understand that he is likely to raise one or more of six topics. The paper at Tab A gives what he is expected to say on each and what I recommend you reply.

A biography of the Prime Minister is at Tab B.

The Prime Minister has sent you the message at Tab C, expressing congratulations over the success of GEMINI 10. I recommend that you warmly acknowledge this message.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tabs A, B, C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 87-198
By ijf, NARA, Date 1-20-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

81a
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By SW, NARA, Date 7-9-98

1. Guyana Membership in the OAS

Prime Minister Burnham is expected to tell you that Guyana, together with the other independent countries of the Caribbean and Canada, will jointly study the possibilities of entering the OAS, but that no decision has yet been made regarding an application for membership.

I suggest that you say that we would welcome an entry of all of these states into the OAS as soon as they see their way clear to make application.

2. Boundary Dispute with Venezuela

He will probably explain Guyana's unwillingness to cede any territory claimed by Venezuela and inquire what our position is with respect to the boundary dispute.

You may wish to say that you are pleased that Guyana and Venezuela have agreed to set up a joint commission to study ways of resolving the dispute. We hope that these efforts will be successful. We are in no way involved and are not supporting either side.

3. U. S. Assistance

The Prime Minister will probably ask how much aid he can expect to receive from the U. S. and whether or not the existing program can be speeded up.

You may wish to tell him that he can expect continuing U. S. support but that the level of our assistance is dependent upon the number of useful projects which the U. S. and Guyana can jointly develop, as well as Guyana's capacity to absorb additional assistance. We are fully aware of his needs and will be as helpful as we can.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. Guyana Rice

He may ask if the United States can purchase Guyanese rice. They anticipate that the fall crop may produce up to 50,000 tons for sale on the world market.

You may wish to say that the U.S., as a rice exporting country, can not purchase Guyanese rice. Although Vietnam needs rice, the rice being purchased is on the world market at world market prices. Guyana rice can be purchased at world market prices, but we understand this will not contribute to a resolution of the rice problem so long as the farmers are being paid more than the rice brings at world market prices.

5. New Lands for Agriculture

The Prime Minister will probably ask for U.S. support for a project to drain new lands for agricultural development.

You may say that we want to help stimulate agricultural diversification and would be glad to study land projects which envisage using the land for crops other than sugar and rice, but we doubt whether additional land should be devoted to these crops.

6. Hydroelectric Projects

He may ask for U.S. assistance to develop Guyanese hydroelectric power.

You may wish to say that we will be glad to study the results of the UN survey when completed, but that we cannot at this stage make any determination on what our role in the project might be.

1966 JUL 22 AM 12 32

WA007 PD

WASHINGTON DC 21 1023P EDT

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS REQUESTED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU AND THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE HIS HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS ON THE MOST
RECENT SUCCESS OF THE GEMINI 10 MISSION AND
THE SAFE RETURN OF THE ASTRONAUTS

JOHN CARTER AMBASSADOR OF GUYANA.

81c

~~SECRET~~

PROGRAM OF COOPERATION TO PROVIDE FOR MODERNIZATION
OF NON-US NATO GROUND DELIVERY FORCES BY REPLACING
HONEST JOHN WITH LANCE

PROGRAM OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this program is to provide for the replacement of HONEST JOHN with LANCE missiles in non-U.S. NATO artillery forces. LANCE will fulfill a requirement for an all-weather, dual-capable delivery system under the direct control of the local ground commander and will surpass HONEST JOHN in accuracy, range, mobility, air transportability, and ease of handling.

RELATIONSHIP TO CURRENT PLANS

LANCE is currently in the engineering development phase. The U.S. plans for an initial procurement of six battalions and 2,000 missiles, beginning in FY 1967. Presidential approval in principle would allow USCINCEUR to discuss LANCE with our NATO Allies and to plan the details of a modernization program involving the replacement of HONEST JOHN. In implementing that portion of the program now identified with France, due consideration would have to be given, of course, to France's attitude toward NATO and her relationship to the remainder of the Alliance.

FORCE GOALS AND WEAPONS DISPERSALS

A reasonable upper limit to the change in force goals would be based on the replacement of HONEST JOHN units by LANCE on a one-for-one basis. Because of the greater range of LANCE, some lesser replacement factor may result, perhaps 0.6 to 0.8. The decision which will be made on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a program of cooperation with the 155mm Howitzer (nuclear round) may influence recommendations regarding force goals for LANCE.

~~SECRET~~

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA

Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination
Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

Sec Def Cont Nr. X - 8 62 8

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-51

By LULB NARA, Date 05-27-2014

~~SECRET~~

2

TIME REQUIRED TO ATTAIN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

U.S. units may attain an operational capability by FY 1968 and, since LANCE is a replacement system, a non-U.S. capability might be attainable three to four years after Presidential approval in principle is received.

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

Replacement of the HONEST JOHN with LANCE is to be accomplished without increase in personnel requirements.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Normally, operational control of U.S. custodial detachments will pass to NATO command when an Order for Reinforced Alert (ORA) is given. Operational control by a NATO commander has no effect on custody of U.S. nuclear weapons and provides no authority for weapon employment. USCINCEUR will retain control of the nuclear weapons through U.S. custodial detachments until proper authority directs release of the weapons to NATO.

~~SECRET~~

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA

Handle as Restricted Data in accordance with dissemination
Section 141b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

Friday, July 22, 1966 -- 4:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Gaud's answers to your questions about foreign aid.

The table shows our world-wide economic assistance \$135 million higher in fiscal 1966 than in fiscal 1965 despite a rather sharp fall in PL 480 expenditures. The reason for the relative decline in PL 480 expenditures is simply that we have been making our PL 480 agreements on a month-by-month basis with India; and expenditures in the early months of the year were relatively low.

Taking this into account, economic assistance expenditures other than PL 480 were up \$400 million in fiscal 1966 over fiscal 1965.

The other items are self-explanatory.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

2485
82a
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

July 22, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

SUBJECT: Foreign Aid

Here are the answers to the questions you asked me this morning.

The Linowitz Committee

In my view this Committee has never been effective. It has inspired a few newspaper articles over the years and some of its members have occasionally talked to individual members of the Congress about our problems. But the Committee has never had any real visibility or effectiveness.


Public Witnesses

Attached is a list of the public witnesses who have testified in favor of the Aid bill during the current session of Congress. The Foreign Affairs Committee list is considerably longer than the Foreign Relations Committee list because the former encourages public witnesses to a much greater extent than does the latter.

The Volume of Aid During FY 1966.

Also attached is a tabulation of commitments and disbursements over the last half-dozen fiscal years.

I hope this will give you the information you need.


William S. Gaud
Deputy Administrator

Encs.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

July 22, 1966

PUBLIC WITNESSES TESTIFYING IN FAVOR OF THE FY '67 AID PROGRAM

BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE:

Mrs. Virginia Gray, Citizens Committee for UNICEF
Bernard Confer, Lutheran World Relief
Mrs. Donald Brown, National Council of Jewish Women
Frank L. Goffio, CARE
James MacCracken, National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA
James F. Doherty, AFL-CIO
William C. Doherty, Jr., American Institute for Free Labor Development
Reverend Edward E. Swanstrom, Catholic Relief Services for American
Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc.
Robert H. Cory, Jr., Friends Committee on National Legislation
Dwight D. Townsend, Cooperative League of the United States
John T. Caldwell, Chancellor, National Association of State Universities
and Land-Grant Colleges, Chancellor, North Carolina State University
John H. Eberly, Church of the Brethren
John O. Teeter, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Mr. Gilbert Rohde, President of Wisconsin Farmers Union, for
National Farmers Union
Mr. Reuben Johnson, National Farmers Union
Mrs. A. G. Patterson, National Chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relief of the National Council of Catholic Women
J. Orrin Shipe, Managing Director, CUNA International, Inc.
Rex Baker, Jr., National League of Insured Savings Associations
Mrs. Mortimer Jacobson, Hadassah

BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE:

John T. Caldwell, Chairman, International Affairs Committee,
National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges
Stephen G. Cary, Associate Executive Secretary,
American Friends Service Committee (testimony was pro-economic aid;
anti-AID in Vietnam)
John K. Galbraith, Harvard University
Mrs. Margaret F. Stone, Chairman, Citizens Committee for UNICEF
John O. Teeter, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Jerry Voorhis, Executive Director, Cooperative League of USA

United States Foreign Assistance FY 1961-1966

(\$ million)
Commitments

| | Foreign Assistance Economic World-wide | PL 480 World-wide | X-M Bank World-wide | Economic Assistance Subtotal World-wide | MAP World-wide | Foreign Assistance Grand Total World-wide |
|----------------|--|----------------------|------------------------|---|-------------------|---|
| FY 1961 | 2012 | 1228 | 876 | 4116 | 1787 | 5903 |
| FY 1962 | 2735 | 1550 | 396 | 4681 | 1585 | 6266 |
| FY 1963 | 2424 | 1714 | 455 | 4593 | 1443 | 6036 |
| FY 1964 | 2178 | 1751 | 531 | 4460 | 1189 | 5649 |
| FY 1965 | 2127 | 1527 | 772 | 4426 | 1175 | 5601 |
| FY 1966 (est.) | 2600 | 1460 | 900 | 4960 | 1584 | 6544 |

Expenditures

| | | | | | | |
|----------------|------|------|-----|------|------|------|
| FY 1961 | 1795 | 1356 | 512 | 3663 | 1466 | 5129 |
| FY 1962 | 1836 | 1495 | 905 | 4236 | 1405 | 5641 |
| FY 1963 | 2043 | 1619 | 524 | 4186 | 1767 | 5953 |
| FY 1964 | 1997 | 1591 | 420 | 4008 | 1533 | 5541 |
| FY 1965 | 2041 | 1714 | 386 | 4141 | 1273 | 5414 |
| FY 1966 (est.) | 2131 | 1450 | 695 | 4276 | 945 | 5221 |

Note: 1966 expenditure data has been compiled from incomplete records. Actual reports from Treasury and Commerce on a basis completely consistent with 1961-1965 will not be available for several months.

July 22, 1966

July 22, 1966
Friday, 5:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

The attached cable has just come in. It appears that the world is full of surprises: the Russians are about to issue visas for the famous Hand Tools Exhibit.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

83

83a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 22, 1966

FROM AMBASSADOR KOHLER IN MOSCOW (347)

A Soviet Foreign Office official told one of my officers at the Polish reception tonight that a decision has been made to issue visas and in general to go ahead with the "Hand Tools" Exhibit.

Earlier in the day, he had said we would be hearing during the day but amended this at the reception to say Soviet officials would be in touch with us tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 87-199

By sig NARA, Date 7-8-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

84

Friday, July 22, 1966
4:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this
conversation between Amb. Lodge
and Ky.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 1631
~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCM NARS, Date 8-17-86

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

July 22, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Saigon 1631)

I called on Ky at 11:00 a.m. on Friday, July 22.

As soon as I came in, he began by saying that he had been in the extreme northern part of Viet-Nam yesterday, and he felt that Vietnamese and Americans now fighting there had arrived "just in time." He agreed with my guess that Hanoi had planned a double barreled retaliation for the bombings of June 29: a military surprise in the extreme north and sabotage-terrorism in Saigon. The Vietnamese-American reaction had, he thought, surprised Hanoi.

In a speculative discussion of what Hanoi was thinking, he made the same analysis which I have made to Washington: that Hanoi sees itself defeated militarily; politically in Saigon; and economically with the anti-inflation and port decongestion measures. But it still thinks it can triumph in the field of criminal violence, i.e., terrorism and subversion via the village guerrilla. Hanoi, Ky believes, is waiting to see if revolutionary development will succeed. They believe it will not, and that Americans, regardless of military, political and economic success, will tire and leave, and then Hanoi, still possessing its tool of criminal, subversive, terroristic warfare can start all over again. It is not, Ky said, a stupid theory. When, therefore, General Thang's program really gets rolling, Hanoi will realize the jig is up -- and not before. This does not diminish the importance of winning the three other wars (of which bombing North Viet-Nam is a crucial part).

Continuing to talk before I had even raised the purpose of my visit, Prime Minister Ky spoke about the Province of Go Cong, where the local authorities had stopped the transportation of lobster and fish to Saigon. He looked into it and found that they had been bribed by black marketeers, and, he was sure, by the French.

Turning to the Buddhist self-immolation last night, Ky had had the would-be self-immolator talk in response to questions, with the conversation being taken down on a tape recorder. The man had said that he had not given a thought to self-immolation and that suddenly he had felt strange (Ky indicated that he had been drugged). Then the man said he had lit a cigarette and "was set on fire." Ky plans to give all this to the press. The man evidently was neither a religious fanatic nor a mental defective, but had been used.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-195
By lig, NARA, Date 7-27-88

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

I then brought up the purpose of my visit, which was to call his attention to the fact that two candidates' lists in Saigon had been disqualified on the basis of technicalities. The first was led by Phan Khac Suu, and had been disqualified because one of the candidates had not produced an "extrait de casier judiciaire," (which I translate as a legal document certifying that the subject has no criminal record). The other was headed by Dang Van Sung. I hazarded the guess that maybe the Prime Minister did not realize these disqualifications had been made - undoubtedly in good conscience -- but that the political effect would be considerable given the prominence of the two men.

Ky knew all about both cases, and that the law was, strictly speaking, against both persons. He said, however, he had "done a favor" for Phan Khac Suu and had arranged to have him put on the list. He realized this could create a precedent which would plague him, but in view of Phan Khac Suu's prominence, he thought he should do it.

As regards Dang Van Sung, he said that he had no co-signers -- no team mates -- and was alone on his list. Sung was unable to find anybody to team up with him, even after he had been given two or three days to do so. He has, therefore, agreed to withdraw his candidacy.

I stressed the importance of these elections in terms of U.S. opinion, of which Ky was well aware -- also the effect on world opinion. I told him our leading television and press men would be here.

He said that the generals had had a meeting concerning the elections, and had agreed that it had to be organized honestly, that the world was going to watch, and that they were not going to emulate the procedure of the late President Diem, who had moved troops into an area to supply more votes as needed. General Thang had been put in charge of the elections to be sure that they would be free and honest.

I then read him paraphrase of Polad Francis' wire No. 029, which in paragraph 12 describes a scene in Tam Ky on July 16 of what might be the first anti-election action taken by Communists. On that date the Viet Cong attacked the Vietnamese Nationalist Party headquarters, killing a number of party members. They were clearly after the party leadership. As a result of the attack, the leading Vietnamese Nationalist Party candidate, Phan Thong, lost both his legs, but has sent word from the hospital to the province chief that he would not be counted out and intends to run.

Ky knew all about this, and said that General Lam had told him about it.

I asked Prime Minister Ky what was planned in connection with Regional Forces and Popular Forces. I said they were badly needed to protect the pacification process and were frequently diverted by Division and Corps Commanders. We believe that they should be under the primary control of General Thang.

In reply, Ky said the Generals had agreed to reorganize the Regional Forces, putting them under the direct control of the Province Chief, and, he said, General Thang now has control of the Province Chiefs. He evidently regards this as a big forward step.

I then adverted to the importance of not being stampeded by pressure for wage increases, which I said simply stimulate merchants to raise their prices, and in turn stimulates further demands for higher wages. I assured him that we on the U.S. side were doing everything that we could, and hoped the Government of Vietnam would pay close attention to this, and try to keep wage pressures dampened.

Ky agreed and said that on certain items, prices have started to go down. He had heard an unconfirmed report that the Banque de L'Indochine in Laos was selling gold. He was sure that both the French and the Viet Cong needed piasters badly, having in mind the plans they have for sabotaging the elections.

As I was about to leave, he talked to me in a very informal and personal way about his belief that the time had come to establish a rallying point ("centre de ralliement") in North Vietnam for what he believed were many fervent anti-Government elements in North Vietnam. The knowledge that there was a rallying point might, if all else was well organized, bring about an uprising. He made it absolutely clear that he was definitely not advocating an amphibious landing. He was talking about a parachute drop of "a battalion -- about 400 men," all Vietnamese, no Americans, at a point which he knows of south of the 19th parallel, in the western part of the area, in the mountains. North Vietnam is narrow at that point. The men would be thus close to the sea. They could be supplied at night by planes. There are now so many planes flying around at night that this would not attract attention. They could conduct sabotage operations, terrorism, and help political uprisings. Life would not be anything like as dangerous for them as the life of the Viet Cong is here now. He said that Vietnam has the finest soldiers in the world for this kind of duty.

LODGE

July 22, 1966
Friday, 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Given our interest in the shifting position of Cambodia, I thought you might like to read this report from Robert Shaplen to Governor Harriman.

It is nice to read a cable written by a professional writer.

It gives a good feel for what is making Sihanouk move; and presents a good case for moving, but not too fast.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

~~SECRET~~

854
July 22, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Saigon 1633)

Robert Shaplen requested Porter pass the following to Governor Harriman:

"My visit to Cambodia was a success, I think, both as regards the special mission you asked me to undertake and with respect to improving the atmosphere of relations between our two countries. Details on the mission I will give to Frank Sieverts. All that can be done for the moment has been done, though it must be emphasized that our chances of getting anywhere have simply risen from virtually zero to perhaps fifteen or twenty percent. The prisoner situation in North Vietnam obviously won't help.

"As to the matter of your trip, it is apparent that Sihanouk indeed wants you to come or he would not have announced the 'news' that you were coming in front of the Sangkum. There are no secrets in Cambodia, least of all with Sihanouk, and I think he wanted to make the announcement as a further demonstration that, while still a friend of China's, he is beginning to look the other way again too and remains a staunch believer in total neutrality. The whole tone of my visit, including reactions of other Cambodians, etc., as well as Sihanouk, was one of both high cordiality and hope that the Americans will 'soon be back.' Cyclo drivers, restaurant girls as well as men like Jean Barre, Editor of Realite Cambodges, all say this. Nevertheless, there is a strong reason to go slow, and this is the counsel of all top ambassadors and other representatives I saw, Australian, French, British, West German, etc. A mistake in pursuing this desirable objective might send Sihanouk skittering off in another direction, as he has done before. He remains a supreme realist but even so a highly sensitive man; his whole attitude in the last few months has been one of withdrawal -- his film making, an alleged rest cure as a result of doctors advice to take it easy on politics, is more a calculated scheme to sit back and watch things develop. There is no doubt that the general reaction, as expressed in left wing editorials, is one of growing awareness that China and not we may be the real paper tigers, and that consequently Cambodia must face up to American intentions to remain in the area -- the choice, not a happy one, as Tep Chhieu Kheng wrote, being an American dominated 'sea' in which neutral states will have to float alone. Going slow does not, in my estimation, mean that you should not respond quickly to Sihanouk's desire to see you. I do not know if he will follow up your letter with a direct response -- I was told this was probable. In any event, he did make the public announcement, though when I left Phnom Penh yesterday, the twenty-first, it had not yet been printed in AKP, the press summary. But the announcement went over the radio as Sihanouk was speaking. I don't know if UPI or AFP picked it up.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority NLS 93-131
By gml/isp NARA. Date 7-9-98

"The suggested date of early September was based on events. Sihanouk is not definitely leaving for France in mid-September or so but the chances seem likely that he will go thereabouts. It seemed doubtful in Phnom Penh that Ho Chi Minh would come there during De Gaulle's visit or that De Gaulle would go to Hanoi, though both rumors were going around. This naturally might affect your tentative plans. In any event, I think Sihanouk wants to see you soon as one of his best American friends and to talk over our relationship. He himself is in no hurry to reopen an Embassy of ours in Cambodia, but he is certainly looking ahead to it. The formal statement he is seeking first is now, as I said before, more of a formality than anything else, but he wants it -- 'That the United States should recognize our existing borders and that they should put an end to all military action against our country, and that they should grant us reasonable compensation for the damage suffered during past aggression.' The above quotes are from the answers to my submitted questions. Preceding the conditions, a paragraph of reply read, 'Yes, we hope to renew normal relations with the United States and we appreciate the support they have given to our request to enlarge the International Control Commission in Cambodia. I would remind you of the conditions we have laid down for a reconciliation with your country.' Following the phrases about conditions was the concluding paragraph of the answer, 'Once these conditions are filled, normal relations will be automatically renewed. I would here point out that the USSR, in a government announcement, has just officially recognized our independence, neutrality and territorial integrity. Why should not the United States, who have no major interest in Cambodia, do likewise.' Sihanouk, of course, must know that the Russian move was a time-gaining hedge to avoid answering the ICC request, but it enabled him even so to make his point. Having made the demands more strongly earlier for some declaration from us, he cannot backtrack now. Our British friends in Phnom Penh pointed out to me that it took nine months for them to improve relations and get back their Embassy -- in September. Both Argod, the French Ambassador, and the French number two man urged slowness, but also a warm and quick response to any invitation to come visit Sihanouk.

"Ambassador Deschamps has done a first rate job representing us, undoubtedly better than we could probably have done for ourselves under the circumstances. He is leaving for France on vacation after the De Gaulle visit, and possibly yours. He will be in Paris about the end of September. Whether or not you come that soon, I would strongly urge that Deschamps be invited to return to Cambodia, where he will be another year at least, via Washington, so that you and others can have some long talks with him. I happen to know that he would most welcome such an invitation, and I think

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

we would find this a most rewarding updating and background education because no Westerner I met knows more about the country or is more respected by Sihanouk and other Cambodians.

"I will be in Saigon until the thirtieth of July and will then be in Hong Kong all of August, reachable via the Consulate, if you want me to add to any of this analysis. I've enjoyed doing what I did and hope that some good comes out of it."

If Governor Harriman wishes further details or explanations on any part of foregoing, Shaplen is prepared to discuss with Porter.

LODGE

~~SECRET~~

Friday, July 22, 1966 - 7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Bob Bowie was the most famous "dove" of the Eisenhower Administration in the sense that he had the courage to argue:

- against simple reliance on nuclear weapons and to support a build-up of conventional forces;
- for serious work on arms control;
- for expanded foreign aid.

To his credit Foster Dulles kept him close because he was prepared to express, within the family, clear strong views even when they were not generally popular.

He has supported in the past the MLF, but he is not fixed or rigid on Atlantic nuclear matters.

He does continue to believe that this country could be endangered if Europe were to fall apart and the Atlantic connection were weakened or broken.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

86a

15

~~NOMINATION OF ROBERT R. BOWIE~~
TO HIGH STATE DEPARTMENT POST

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an editorial published in the Boston Globe, on July 9, 1966, entitled "A Brinkman to Washington."

The editorial has reference to the current nomination of Robert R. Bowie to a high position in the State Department, an appointment with which I am not in accord.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Boston Globe, July 9, 1966]

A BRINKMAN TO WASHINGTON

President Lyndon B. Johnson on Tuesday named a Harvard faculty member to a high State Department post, but it was not a nomination to please followers of the Kennedy line on foreign affairs.

The nominee is Robert R. Bowie, a professor of international relations and currently director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs.

Reports from Washington are that there will be a battle in the Senate over his confirmation. There ought to be.

Mr. Bowie will be returning to the State Department as counselor. In 1953 he became director of policy planning under then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and three years later was promoted to Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning. He traveled widely with Secretary Dulles and was closely associated with his policy of massive nuclear deterrence and brinkmanship.

Since then, as a frequent consultant to the State Department, he helped originate the proposal for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) including West Germany, and has suggested that it might operate without an American veto. The proposal, fortunately, is now comatose.

Mr. Bowie, then, is a dedicated hard-liner. His nomination is fresh evidence of the new and harsher foreign policy evolving in Washington. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee ought to ask some probing questions about it.

To
Return
for comment
C

July 22, 1966

Dear Congressman Stratton:

I have taken careful note of the findings of your subcommittee which recently visited Viet-Nam at the direction of the House Committee on Armed Services. They impress me as realistic and perceptive, as well as being a succinct appraisal of both the opportunities and problems faced by that troubled land in its determination to remain free of Communist control.

I was particularly gratified by your confirmation of the high morale and dedicated service of American boys who are serving our country there. We owe to all of them our profound appreciation for their brave deeds and sacrifices. I believe the stress you give to this and the findings generally of your subcommittee are a great public service to our nation.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

/s/

LBJ

Honorable Samuel S. Stratton
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:DWR:pas

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1966

S Note for Mr. Bromley Smith

Congressman Stratton's subcommittee report on Vietnam is very helpful and per your earlier guideline I have drafted the attached for recommended Presidential signature.



D. W. Ropa

✓ Brom:

I have seen. Looks good.

Wf

Mr. Rostow: OK to sign
memo. Letter goes through
H. Wilson to the President

July 21, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May I recommend this letter to Congressman Samuel Stratton for your signature. His subcommittee findings on Vietnam are highly constructive and useful, I attach a copy of the report for your information.

W. W. Rostow

87c


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 25, 1966

9 Note for Mr. Bromley Smith

A further reply to Congressman Stratton might be in order from Bob Komer once the subcommittee's formal report is available. A check with Stratton's office today revealed that the report will not be available for another week or 10 days. You might return this to me if you consider it desirable for me to draft something for Komer after the formal report is in hand.

OK

9 
D. W. Ropa

or Rostow
or, if report really
helpful, the President
BKS

Mr. Rapa

Is there a gain
in a further reply
by Rostow - or the President?

If so, please draft

Brown

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, July 22, 1966; 5:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a get-well message to President Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar). Tsiranana is very pro-U. S. --especially on Viet Nam. He has been in bed for about a month, officially suffering from fatigue, but we hear that he has actually had a stroke. He would certainly appreciate a note from you.

Walt Rostow

Approved ☒
Disapproved ☐
Speak to me ☐

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 87-202
By ing NARA, Date 8-29-89

82a

Suggested Message to President Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic

Dear Mr. President:

I was most distressed to learn of your illness. My best wishes for a rapid and complete recovery.

I treasure the memory of your visit to Washington, Mr. President, and the warm friendship between us which resulted. My warmest thoughts and hopes are with you in this difficult time.

July 22, 1966
Friday, 5:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

The attached cable has just come in. It appears that the world is full of surprises: the Russians are about to issue visas for the famous Hand Tools Exhibit.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 22, 1966

FROM AMBASSADOR KOHLER IN MOSCOW (347)

A Soviet Foreign Office official told one of my officers at the Polish reception tonight that a decision has been made to issue visas and in general to go ahead with the "Hand Tools" Exhibit.

Earlier in the day, he had said we would be hearing during the day but amended this at the reception to say Soviet officials would be in touch with us tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By gw, NARA, Date 7-9-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 22, 1966
Friday, 6:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

These proposals of George McGhee's are worth staffing out.

Francis will be working on them with the departments; and I shall follow closely.

W. W. Rostow

90a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed US Negotiating Position for a
New Offset Agreement with Germany.

This memorandum is submitted at the request of the President.

Problem:

US interests have over the years been well served by our policy with respect to the stationing of US troops in Europe in peacetime. Without sacrifice of these interests we must reexamine our position in order to take into account the following developments:

- (a) The strong pressures in the Congress, particularly on the part of the Senate Majority Policy Committee, for some reduction of American troop strength in Germany,
- (b) The strong current reaction in Germany by the press, public and the Bundestag against a continuation of the Offset Agreement in its present form,
- (c) The increasing difficulty on the part of the German MOD in finding US equipment to purchase under the Offset which fits their military plans and capabilities,
- (d) The large and increasing overhang of prepayments against arms purchases which the Germans have already made to the US Treasury and which are politically dangerous in Germany,
- (e) The political weakness of Chancellor Erhard, which has been accentuated by CDU losses in the recent North-Rhine Westphalian elections, and
- (f) The necessity for removing the Offset as a source of friction between the US and Germany in the future, through some arrangement satisfactory to both.

Proposal:

1. That the DOD proceed with plans which have been under consideration to reduce administrative, logistical and back-up

personnel in the 7th Army, insofar as this can be done without reduction in actual combat potential. The actual figure would, of course, have to be determined by the DOD. A reduction of 33,000 such personnel for example, a figure which I understand has been discussed within the DOD in this connection, would if expenses are pro rata save approximately \$100 million annually under the Offset. Such a decrease should, if made, be represented as reflecting no change in US policy toward Germany or NATO, but as a result of a request to us by the German Government to save them as much as possible under the Offset, through reduction in US personnel where this can be done without loss in immediate combat capability. It would have to be recognized that there would inevitably result a certain deterioration in sustained combat capability. NATO should, of course, be informed.

2. If as I anticipate it is demanded by the Germans, we should also be willing to agree to a modest scale-down in the actual amount of the Offset insofar as it can be justified by the following rationale. The Germans, suprisingly, have never made the obvious case that the net of our foreign exchange loss in our military expenditures in Germany is not the same as their net gain. Everything we purchase in Germany has a foreign exchange component. It would take a more precise analysis than is available to know what this amount is, however, I would estimate it to be at least 15-18 percent. Assuming costs presently are \$700 million, (up from the previous \$675 million) and are as a result of actions under (1) reduced to \$600 million, there would be justification for a scale-down of another \$100 million, leaving \$500 million. We could, I believe, justify this to the Congress.

3. Part of the unpopularity of the Offset in Germany results from our appearing to be forcing the Germans to buy arms they do not need. The Chancellor has already stated that he hopes to include space expenditures. However, other expenditures for which additionality could be established as clearly as for arms, would be purchases in the US for German foreign aid programs, particularly bulk food purchases, and German raw material stock pile purchases out of the American stock pile. Although the aggregate of these expenditures would likely not be great, our acquiescence to them could be considered a political victory for Erhard. For the present purpose, it is assumed that such purchases will aggregate only \$50 million a year--leaving \$450 million still to be met.

4. It is understood to be generally accepted that German military purchases from us of a recurrent or continuing nature, involving training, expendable supplies, replacements, etc., aggregate approximately \$350 million a year. Subtracting this leaves only \$100 million.

5. It would appear to be relatively easy for the Government to be able to identify new equipment purchases of at least \$100 million a year during the next two years, which would solve our problem. It must be kept in mind, however, that the Germans will start the new Offset period (orders during calendar years 1967 and 1968) with a large overhang both of orders and prepayments. It will, therefore, be necessary to work these orders off before large additional purchases can be made. I believe, however, that this can be done to the extent of \$100 million.

Recommendations:

1. This analysis is made on a personal basis with information at hand. I recommend that the Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury have their respective Departments staff it thoroughly in connection with recommendations they will make as to a US negotiating position, for final decision by the President before the visit of Chancellor Erhard scheduled for September 26-27.

2. If decision is made to adopt proposal one, I recommend that I be permitted to so indicate to Minister von Hassel and Chancellor Erhard prior to the Chancellor's visit.

3. We should in the meantime avoid any public discussion of the Offset which would indicate any lack of confidences in German fulfillment of the present agreement, which they continue to assure us they will do and which they are in a position to do, or in German willingness to negotiate a suitable new agreement.

4. We should where necessary in our private discussions with the Germans continue to make very clear, as we have in the past, that our ability to keep troops in Germany will depend on the conclusion of a satisfactory Offset agreement. We should, however, avoid any automatic proportionate linkage of payments with troop levels, or anything that could be considered a threat of withdrawal.

G. C. McGhee

George C. McGhee
U.S. Ambassador to Germany

July 22, 1966
Friday, 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Given our interest in the shifting position of Cambodia, I thought you might like to read this report from Robert Shaplen to Governor Harriman.

It is nice to read a cable written by a professional writer.

It gives a good feel for what is making Sihanouk move; and presents a good case for moving, but not too fast.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

(Sargis 1633)

Friday, July 22, 1966 - 7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Bob Bowie was the most famous "dove" of the Eisenhower Administration in the sense that he had the courage to argue:

- against simple reliance on nuclear weapons
and to support a build-up of conventional forces;
- for serious work on arms control;
- for expanded foreign aid.

To his credit Foster Dulles kept him close because he was prepared to express, within the family, clear strong views even when they were not generally popular.

He has supported in the past the MLF, but he is not fixed or rigid on Atlantic nuclear matters.

He does continue to believe that this country could be endangered if Europe were to fall apart and the Atlantic connection were weakened or broken.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - July 22, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Your 5:00 O'Clock Appointment with Prime Minister
Burnham

Prime Minister Burnham asked for the appointment with you. He will be accompanied by the Guyanese Ambassador, Sir John Carter, Linc Gordon and Ambassador Delmar Carlson.

We understand that he is likely to raise one or more of six topics. The paper at Tab A gives what he is expected to say on each and what I recommend you reply.

A biography of the Prime Minister is at Tab B.

The Prime Minister has sent you the message at Tab C, expressing congratulations over the success of GEMINI 10. I recommend that you warmly acknowledge this message.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tabs A, B, C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-9-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-204

By inf NARA, Date 9-6-89

1. Guyana Membership in the OAS

Prime Minister Burnham is expected to tell you that Guyana, together with the other independent countries of the Caribbean and Canada, will jointly study the possibilities of entering the OAS, but that no decision has yet been made regarding an application for membership.

I suggest that you say that we would welcome an entry of all of these states into the OAS as soon as they see their way clear to make application.

2. Boundary Dispute with Venezuela

He will probably explain Guyana's unwillingness to cede any territory claimed by Venezuela and inquire what our position is with respect to the boundary dispute.

You may wish to say that you are pleased that Guyana and Venezuela have agreed to set up a joint commission to study ways of resolving the dispute. We hope that these efforts will be successful. We are in no way involved and are not supporting either side.

3. U. S. Assistance

The Prime Minister will probably ask how much aid he can expect to receive from the U. S. and whether or not the existing program can be speeded up.

You may wish to tell him that he can expect continuing U. S. support but that the level of our assistance is dependent upon the number of useful projects which the U. S. and Guyana can jointly develop, as well as Guyana's capacity to absorb additional assistance. We are fully aware of his needs and will be as helpful as we can.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. Guyana Rice

He may ask if the United States can purchase Guyanese rice. They anticipate that the fall crop may produce up to 50,000 tons for sale on the world market.

You may wish to say that the U.S., as a rice exporting country, can not purchase Guyanese rice. Although Vietnam needs rice, the rice being purchased is on the world market at world market prices. Guyana rice can be purchased at world market prices, but we understand this will not contribute to a resolution of the rice problem so long as the farmers are being paid more than the rice brings at world market prices.

5. New Lands for Agriculture

The Prime Minister will probably ask for U.S. support for a project to drain new lands for agricultural development.

You may say that we want to help stimulate agricultural diversification and would be glad to study land projects which envisage using the land for crops other than sugar and rice, but we doubt whether additional land should be devoted to these crops.

6. Hydroelectric Projects

He may ask for U.S. assistance to develop Guyanese hydroelectric power.

You may wish to say that we will be glad to study the results of the UN survey when completed, but that we cannot at this stage make any determination on what our role in the project might be.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

tab B 936

Biographic Sketch

Prime Minister Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham of Guyana

Burnham is an intelligent, well-educated leader and, at 43, is in his prime years. He is a popular criminal attorney who has developed into a highly-skilled politician.

He was a brilliant student at the University of London (B.A. and LL.B. with honors). In 1950 he returned to British Guiana and joined Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP) which at that time contained most of the nationalistic elements in favor of independence. He split from the PPP in 1955, partly because it was under the influence of Communism and later founded the People's National Congress (PNC), which gained the support of almost all Africans. As a result of the proportional electoral system used in the election of December 7, 1964, the PNC and the United Force party formed a coalition government and succeeded the Jagan regime.

Burnham is an able, ambitious political leader motivated by a raging desire to be successful as "the founder of the nation". He loves the political game and hugely enjoys being the top man. Because he has so much more ability than most of his associates, he dominates the party and the government. He has no rival, actual or potential, in either. Articulate and clever in the use of words, he is probably the most erudite and capable speaker in Guyana. He has much empathy for the underdog and a genuine concern for the plight of the little man. Although he enjoys good living, he does not really care for money, shows no desire to acquire a fortune, and apparently is not corrupt.

Burnham has an inferiority complex which has racial aspects. This trait is not usually apparent. It reportedly stems from failure to be treated with equality while a student in the U.K. He has a distinct anti-British bias and is deeply conscious of being colored but rarely shows it. He is capable of taking an indirect slight as a challenge to equality and will react accordingly. It is this inferiority complex which causes him to have such an extreme fear of being viewed as a U.S. "puppet".

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-397

By iss, NARA Date 4-29-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Burnham places great value on personal relationships and friendships and sometimes that factor will weigh more with him than the merits of the case. He tends to divide all people into two categories - those who are for him and all others. He can be considerably influenced if advice comes from someone he trusts or a friend, especially if that person represents power.

He would like to be known by top U.S. officials as a smooth, capable political operator who can get things done and is deserving of respect. He will be deeply impressed by any complimentary remarks from high officials regarding his record or the manner in which he has coped with a difficult situation. Given his complexes, the manner and trappings with which he is received will be regarded as especially significant by him.

He admires the tactical and public relations ability of American political leaders. He believes they have unique expertise in this field, and he has adopted in the last six months many devices common to the American political scene - sometimes at U.S. suggestion. These include the concept of "consultative democracy" or projecting an image of tolerance, responsibility, and moderation by conferring with all groups in the community, including those in the opposition; the weekly press conference with any question permitted and carried live to the nation; meet-the-people tours to the countryside; working breakfasts, sometimes with the leaders of non-supporting groups; and periodic reports to the nation.

Mrs. Burnham, and their three daughters, are living in Trinidad, for the Prime Minister seems fully occupied with politics.

Job B
936

JUL 22 AM 12 32

WA007 PD

WASHINGTON DC 21 1023P EDT

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS REQUESTED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU AND THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE HIS HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS ON THE MOST
RECENT SUCCESS OF THE GEMINI 10 MISSION AND
THE SAFE RETURN OF THE ASTRONAUTS

JOHN CARTER AMBASSADOR OF GUYANA.

Friday, July 22, 1966; 5:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a get-well message to President Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar). Tsiranana is very pro-U. S. --especially on Viet Nam. He has been in bed for about a month, officially suffering from fatigue, but we hear that he has actually had a stroke. He would certainly appreciate a note from you.

Walt W. Rostow

Approved ☒

Disapproved ☐

Speak to me ☐

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-9-98

E. K. Hamilton/vmr

Ref: NSC 2481

Suggested Message to President Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic

Dear Mr. President:

I was most distressed to learn of your illness.

Please accept my best wishes for a rapid and complete recovery.

I treasure the memory of your visit to Washington, Mr. President, and the warm friendship between us which resulted. My warmest thoughts and hopes are with you in this difficult time.

July 22, 1966

Dear Ralph:


I was gratified to read your letter of June 29 to the editor of THE TEXAS OBSERVER, explaining your view on Viet Nam.

It is good to know that you support both aspects of our policy: that we fight against aggression in Viet Nam while searching for an honorable peace through negotiation.

I was interested in and shall remember your observation on the Korean negotiations.

But mainly I just wanted to say how much it meant to see your clearheaded views expressed on this difficult and complex problem where it is so easy to confuse rather than to enlighten our people.

Sincerely,



The Honorable
Ralph W. Yarborough
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

LBJ: WWR: vm

July 22, 1966

Dear Ralph:

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Sincerely,



The Honorable
Ralph W. Yarborough
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

LBJ: WWR: vm

Limited Official Use

Friday - July 22, 1966

Mr. President:

Covey Oliver informed us on July 15 (see attached cable) that no chiefs of state are scheduled to attend the Lleras inauguration.

WWR

Attachment

Bogota's 232, July 15, 1966.

98a

Limited Official Use

MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR OLIVER IN BOGOTA, JULY 15, 1966
(number 232)

Subject: In auguration of Carlos Lleras.

1. The Secretary General of the Presidency informs the Embassy there are no Chiefs of State scheduled to attend the Lleras inauguration on August 7 (but certain Presidents are still expected a week later.)
2. The Israeli Ambassador states the Minister of Social Welfare will be heading his delegation.

Limited Official Use

July 21, 1966 - 10:30 AM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Thai Ambassador

You will be seeing Thai Ambassador Sukich Nimmmanheminda in your office at noon today.

He will deliver a letter from Prime Minister Thanom fully supporting your decision to strike POL targets. This answers your message to Thanom of June 23.

Key sentence in Thanom's letter:

"The free people of Asia have had their courage greatly strengthened by the knowledge that communist aggression has been and will be met by the strongest forces in the world and consequently they have now become convinced that the communist way of life will not be the way of the future."

You will want to:

(1) Ask the Ambassador to convey your thanks to Prime Minister Thanom for this expression of support;

(2) Express appreciation to the Ambassador for Thailand's firm public support of our policy in Viet-Nam, for its actions in Viet-Nam, and for the use of Thai bases which has been of tremendous help in our common efforts.

You might refer specifically to several recent strong statements of backing by Foreign Minister Thanat (e.g. at the SEATO conference and at the Asian and Pacific Council meeting in Seoul).

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-205
By ig NARA, Date 1-3-90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, July 21, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment of New Staff Assistant

After looking over the field, I have decided that Richard M. Moose, a 34-year old Foreign Service Officer, is best suited to help me carry out the many follow-up chores which fall into my lap.

Moose is completing a year on the Hill under the Congressional Fellowship Program. He plans to resign from the Foreign Service to accept a position as administrative assistant to a Congressman but has indicated to me that he would be delighted to join my staff.

I have become convinced that my office can operate more efficiently if we have a junior officer who will be able and willing to help us in keeping track of papers and chasing reports, letters and memoranda to ensure that they arrive here promptly, and acting as a general staff assistant.

Moose has an excellent record in the Foreign Service, has experience and the feel for congressional relations, and in the Department of State had not only experience in substantive areas, but thorough training in staff procedures in the Secretary of State's Executive Secretariat.

I would like to hire him as a GS-15 on the National Security Council payroll. He would be available early next month.

/s/ Walt
W.W. Rostow

☒ Hire him

☐ See me

*P.S. He's one of the
brightest F.S.O.'s
in the service
W*