

Thursday, July 21, 1966
7:00 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment with Ambassador Reischauer

Ambassador Reischauer, who is scheduled to see you at 6:30 p. m. Friday, July 22, returned to Washington from Tokyo in order to talk to Secretary Rusk and to you.

In addition to personal matters, he may also wish to discuss:

1. The current status of relations between Japan and the U. S. ;
2. The Ryukyus problem;
3. The results of the recent Joint Committee meeting in Japan between members of the United States and Japanese Cabinets.

W. W. Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, July 21, 1966 - 10:10 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment of Minister to Bulgaria

Under Secretary Ball recommended three candidates for the vacant post of Minister to Bulgaria. Only these two are now available:

1. John M. McSweeney, Class One Foreign Service Officer, who is presently the Deputy Chief of Mission of our Embassy in Brussels. (Biography Attached)
2. Malcolm Toon, Class One Foreign Service Officer, who is now Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs in the State Department. (Biography Attached)

John Macy added two names:

1. Abraham M. Rosenthal, with the New York Times since 1944 with assignments at the United Nations, in India, Poland, Japan and Switzerland. City Editor of the New York Times for the past three years. A native of Ontario, Canada, age 44, a naturalized U. S. citizen, Pulitzer Prize winner in 1960.
2. John T. Caldwell, Chancellor, North Carolina State College, a native of Mississippi, age 54, BS from Mississippi State, MA from Duke, PhD from Princeton. Previously President of the University of Arkansas, Educational Consultant for the Ford Foundation in Pakistan.

There are strong reasons why we should send a trained, Russian-speaking, career officer to Bulgaria at this time.

Our last Minister was recalled some months ago after a very short stay because of an unfortunate traffic accident which Secretary Rusk felt would effect his usefulness in Sofia. In addition, we may have to proceed more slowly in backward Bulgaria than in some

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-9-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

other Eastern European countries in trying to improve our relations. The appointment of a high-key non-career person is thus not required at this time.

I join in recommending either of the two career officers. I think you would be wise to take McSweeney, who is State's first choice.

I do not recommend Rosenthal and I do not think Caldwell's qualifications outweigh my preference for a career candidate.

W. W. Rostow

✓ OK to nominate McSweeney

 OK to nominate Toon

 Initiate security checks on Rosenthal and Caldwell

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1966
Thursday - 3:10

Mr. President:

A good day, if it holds.

Walt
W. Rostow

UPI-110

(VIET INFLATION)

SAIGON--AMERICAN AID MISSION SPOKESMEN REPORTED TODAY THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE DEVALUATION OF VIETNAMESE CURRENCY ON JUNE 18 THE COST OF LIVING INDEX IN SAIGON HAS TAKEN A DOWNWARD TURN.

OFFICIALS HAD BEEN GROWING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER A BOOMING WAGE-PRICE SPIRAL AND RAMPANT INFLATION. THEY HAILED TODAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT AS A SIGN THAT THE VIETNAMESE ECONOMY WAS BECOMING MORE STABLE.

ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL U.S. AID MISSION'S COST OF LIVING INDEX FOOD PRICES WERE DOWN 5 PER CENT THIS WEEK AND NON-FOOD ITEMS DROPPED 2 PER CENT.

OVER-ALL THE PRICE INDEX WAS DOWN 2 PER CENT.

7/21--RH231PED

July 21, 1966 - 10:30 AM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Thai Ambassador

You will be seeing Thai Ambassador Sukich Nimmanheminda in your office at noon today.

He will deliver a letter from Prime Minister Thanom fully supporting your decision to strike POL targets. This answers your message to Thanom of June 23.

Key sentence in Thanom's letter:

"The free people of Asia have had their courage greatly strengthened by the knowledge that communist aggression has been and will be met by the strongest forces in the world and consequently they have now become convinced that the communist way of life will not be the way of the future."

You will want to:

(1) Ask the Ambassador to convey your thanks to Prime Minister Thanom for this expression of support;

(2) Express appreciation to the Ambassador for Thailand's firm public support of our policy in Viet-Nam, for its actions in Viet-Nam, and for the use of Thai bases which has been of tremendous help in our common efforts.

You might refer specifically to several recent strong statements of backing by Foreign Minister Thanat (e.g. at the SEATO conference and at the Asian and Pacific Council meeting in Seoul).

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-9-98

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


Thursday, July 21, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You may wish to know that Secretary Rusk is planning to reply to the Soviet note protesting U.S. bombings in Haiphong.

The purpose would be to make public our rebuttal of the Soviet charges.

W. W. Rostow


____ Approved for delivery and
make public

____ See me

Thursday, July 21, 1966 -- 7:25 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Roscoe and Geoffrey Drummond came in to ask how they should reply to the charge: The Administration talks about all the governments to which it has spoken; that is a fake. The problem is to speak to Hanoi. I told them that on the record in the last six months there have been serious probes in Hanoi by Poland, Rumania, Canada, and France. Without being specific, I indicated, on an off-the-record basis, that we have had even more direct contacts. I emphasized that the problem was not a lack of channels or communication, but a lack of will by Hanoi to end the war.

James Deakin, St. Louis Post Dispatch, came in to ask some questions in connection with an article he is doing on me for his paper. He particularly wanted to probe my connection with the Asia speech to the American Alumni group. I explained that that speech was a natural outgrowth of your report on Asia in May 1961 and your Baltimore speech of April 1965. The major influence on it was, in my view, the course of events in Asia over the past year, notably the increasing evidence of Asian confidence that we would see through the war in Viet Nam and their willingness to begin to work together on a regional basis.

O. Roy Chalk came in to ask if we had any missions for him to do in Yugoslavia. I said that I would be interested in any observations he might have to make after his return on the recent political changes.

Richard Dudman, St. Louis Post Dispatch, telephoned to check on a quotation attributed to me, supposedly made by me in private conversations: that in Viet Nam the U. S. should follow a Dominican policy in the South and a Rotterdam policy in the North. I told him, through my secretary, that this is 100% wrong; I have never believed in any war in bombing civilians areas; even the Dominican notion is incorrect.

Dudman telephoned couple of days later to say statement had been attributed to Adam Rostow, not me Rostow.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Thursday, July 21, 1966
7:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

I think you would like to read this cable describing a remarkable presentation by Ambassador Bunker to the North Atlantic Council on events in the Dominican Republic.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Paris 983

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCB NARS, Date 8-17-86

WWRostow:rlm

107a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 20, 1966

FROM PARIS (983)

SUBJECT: Ambassador Bunker Addresses North Atlantic Council on
Events in Dominican Republic

Ambassador Bunker made a highly effective presentation in the North Atlantic Council today on the successful conclusion of Inter-American efforts in the Dominican Republic. The presentation was followed by a number of laudatory and appreciative comments, both in the Council and outside, which, we believe, demonstrate the value of our continuing practice of making a special effort to inform the Council on significant events, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, which are all too often little understood in Europe.

After providing chronology and analysis of significant events of the Dominican crisis, Ambassador Bunker set forth the following conclusions:

There was wide discontent with the Reid-Cabral government and resentment at its efforts to perpetuate itself, with the result that its overthrow was popular;

There was a split in the armed forces, growing resentment of its political role, and general corruption within the armed forces and police;

Bosch and the PRD had lost a large measure of popularity deriving from Bosch's failure to return during the revolution, compounded by concern over extreme left-wing support given the PRB;

The majority of Dominicans sought economic and political stability and felt these goals were better secured by electing Balaguer;

The outcome dampened Castro's effort to extend his influence in the Western Hemisphere;

The roles of the Inter-American Peace Force and the Ad Hoc Committee were indispensable in limiting the warfare and in holding of elections.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-199
By 128, NARA, Date 7-8-88

In answering questions by De Staercke (Belgium) on the links between the OAS and the UN, Ambassador Bunker described the UN Resolutions of 14 and 22 May and the on-scene observation and reporting to the UN Secretary General of events in the Dominican Republic.

Cleveland added a short "editorial comment." The striking fact, he said, was that this was not, as some people had thought and said at the time, just "another landing of Marines," in the Caribbean. Life-saving action was quickly converted into international peacekeeping force, whose politics were handled by an international mediation team. Cleveland noted that Ambassador Bunker's effectiveness (a part of the DR story the latter had omitted to mention) was partly due to his own well-known qualities as a diplomat, but also partly due to his status as an "international person." Thus Dominican peace (still of course precarious) was achieved in international framework.

Millard (UK), thanking Ambassador Bunker, expressed the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government with the result of efforts in the Dominican Republic. The Government was especially pleased to note the working majority produced by the election and that progress was being made by the Dominican Government with U.S. support. In introductory remarks to his presentation on disarmament, Lord Chalfont (UK) voiced his personal appreciation and that of Her Majesty's Government for Ambassador Bunker's successful efforts in the settlement of the crisis.

Bissonnette (Canada), noting modesty with which Ambassador Bunker had spoken, stated that his authorities had followed events closely and felt that Ambassador Bunker deserved great credit for skill and determination which he had displayed in helping arrive at settlement.

Secretary Brosio noted important role played by the OAS and the Inter-American Peacekeeping Force, remarking that this showed that firmness coupled with legality was often the best course to follow. He praised the successful outcome of what had appeared a desperate situation and expressed his personal admiration for Ambassador Bunker's skill and patience in a difficult role.

At conclusion of meeting, Borch (Denmark) approached the U.S. Regional Organization officer to say that he had found Ambassador Bunker very "impressive." De Staercke told Cleveland that the presentation was the sort of thing we should do more often. There was, for example, much misunderstanding about the Alliance for Progress, which many Europeans erroneously believed was not very successful. He thought, and we agree, that this would constitute a good subject for a future presentation in the North Atlantic Council.

CLEVELAND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 21, 1966
Thursday, 12:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

This intelligence report on the Soviet attitude and predictions about our prisoners and also on their general attitude on the war in Vietnam, is worth reading. It sounds like a purposeful quiet communication to balance some of their public statements. The message is summarized at the bottom of page 1.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

July 20, 1966

108a

CIA INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

Country: USSR/Vietnam/USA/China

Date of [REDACTED] 25X1
Intelligence:

Subject: Comments of two Soviet officials on (1) treatment of USA
fliers captured in Vietnam; (2) Bloc volunteers to Vietnam;
and (3) Soviet position on peace negotiations in Vietnam.

Acquisition: [REDACTED] 25X1

Source:

25X1X

25X1A

(SUMMARY: Two Soviet officials [REDACTED] indicated independently their belief that captured American fliers in North Vietnam will not be executed. They intimated that their government had or would stress this view with Ho Chi Minh. One Soviet believes that there will be a public trial and that the fliers will be sentenced to prison. The two Soviets do not believe volunteers from the USSR or other countries will be sent into the Vietnam war, as this would mean another war like that in Korea. Both Soviets stated that the USSR does not wish to become involved in the war, and that the USSR can take no action unless requested by the North Vietnam government.)

SANITIZED

Authority NLT 019-009-2-10
By [Signature], NARA, Date 12-11-01

In response to a direct question posed by source concerning his opinion of the situation in Vietnam, the first Soviet official replied that he did not think that "it was too bad." Source expressed surprise and stated that in his own opinion it couldn't be worse at the moment with the North Vietnamese threatening to execute captured U.S. fliers and the Warsaw Pact members threatening to send volunteers. The Soviet responded that in his opinion the fliers would not be executed, and that "there was not a single remark about them in Ho Chi Minh's speech, which is very significant." Further, he believed Ho Chi Minh was too intelligent a man and clever a politician to ever make such a mistake. He stated further that "perhaps we also helped to convince him. This is the kind of good offices assistance we can and are rendering."

In conversation apropos of the captured fliers the second Soviet official stated that he excluded "categorically" that they will be executed. "I would exclude completely this extremity. It would be a most horrible mistake. There was possibly this intention on the part of some Chinese extremists. You know well there is a strong pro-Chinese element in Hanoi. However, I do not believe Ho Chi Minh ever thought seriously about this possibility and he certainly is able to manage the situation. His speech was firm proof of this. He did not make any remarks about the prisoners and therefore, I do not believe anything will happen to them. Ho Chi Minh is not an extremist. He is a good politician and knows the consequences this wrong step would have. He would lose sympathy all over the world if he does something like this. I can be certain in this case. I cannot exclude that we (the USSR) would participate in his deliberations on this question and we certainly could not agree with such an action and we certainly would tell him so. Don't forget that if we cannot do everything [redacted] comment: that is, bring the North Vietnamese to the conference table) we can still say a word at the right moment. However, I do believe there will be a public trial. You know, a kind of public show trial. In my opinion they will be sentenced for years to prison, perhaps sent to work in the oil depots. However, no one will be executed. This is my strong belief. I cannot see how Hanoi could now skip everything when it has started to talk about war criminals. This could be regarded as weakness. Therefore, something must happen but probably nothing more than a show trial and no one will be executed."

As to volunteers, the first Soviet official said, "we are not sending them in now, and we do not want to do so. I do not believe there will be volunteers at all. Volunteers would mean a new Korea. We do not want a new Korean war. If we wanted to send volunteers to Vietnam we could have done so in the past. But we did not because we did not want to start a new Korean war."

25X1A

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

- 3 -

The second Soviet official made statements similar to those of the first Soviet official to the effect that the USSR does not want to turn Vietnam into another Korea. He stated that he did not believe that the USSR "or anyone else" would send volunteers to Vietnam "now or in the future." When source reminded him that the Warsaw Pact countries recently passed a resolution in Bucharest calling for volunteers this official said, "Okay, so there was a resolution. I was not there, however, in my belief the Soviets were not very happy about it. We had to make a gesture to show common interest and sympathy about the furthering development in Vietnam as well as to warn that we cannot remain indifferent if the situation continues. But believe me, if there had been a real decision to interfere in the war, the resolution would have been different. I can assure you we do not want war. We do not want to get involved in a stupid adventure such as that war. We have showed this and we have said it openly and frankly and continue to do so. Our people do not want war. We have had enough of war. It would not be easy to get volunteers, I mean real volunteers. No one wants to go to fight today. If you cannot get real volunteers you must organize them and this is very dangerous. You get involved more deeply, exactly what we do not want. Therefore, I do not believe there will be any volunteers."

To source's additional query whether he thought China would send volunteers, the second Soviet official said: "You have seen the Chinese statements. They promise help, backing. However, not a single word about sending volunteers. The Chinese extremists would like to involve us in a war with the U.S., however, they are very careful not to provoke the USA against themselves. At least, not until now. I do not know whether they will change their minds later because their tactics fail [REDACTED] 25X1
comment: to bring about a USSR/USA confrontation in Vietnam), however, I do not believe this would happen [REDACTED] comment: sending volunteers). 25X1
They must realize what would happen to them if they did."

Asked by source about the possibility of negotiations over Vietnam right now, the first Soviet official said that at this time "both Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Wilson came. We repeated again the conditions [REDACTED] comment: 25X1
the North Vietnam terms for peace negotiations). The Soviet Union could do something about it. It is up to Hanoi to decide what it considers acceptable terms for negotiations and what it does not. This was our answer. One must deal with them and not us. We are not involved in this terrible war and do not want to be involved in it in the future. This in our position."

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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Source also asked the second Soviet official about prospects for negotiation in Vietnam, and he replied: "I do not know. I do not believe negotiations are possible right now but I also do not believe that there will be a big war. We cannot do anything about negotiations. You are over-estimating our possibilities. This is not up to us to decide. We said this clearly many times already."

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Thursday, July 21, 1966
7:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an early example of the way we are learning how to follow up on foreign affairs items in the Congressional Record. It will take us a little time to make the system taut and efficient; but we have started. This is one of the jobs I have in mind for the young foreign service officer I wish to take aboard, if you agree.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 21, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH

SUBJECT: Congressman Sykes' Urging that Spain be
Admitted to NATO and the EEC

You asked me to check whether State is responding to Congressman Sykes' urging that Spain be admitted to NATO and the EEC (Congressional Record, July 19, 1966, p.15491).

While we would ultimately favor Spanish membership in NATO and the EEC--particularly in light of recent French actions--the opposition from Iceland, the Scandinavian countries, and others is such that it is not practical to push it at this time. The Director of Spanish Affairs in the Department and/or Ambassador Torbert of Congressional Relations expect to call on Congressman Sykes today or tomorrow to explain the situation.

Rostow
to note

N. Davis

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-202
By inf NARA, Date 8-29-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

July 21, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Highest National Priority Designation for
Reconnaissance Drone Programs

In the attached memorandum, Cy Vance requests that two special reconnaissance drone programs, WHITE HAWK and LIGHTNING BUG, be added to the list of highest national priority programs in order to obtain a DX industrial priority rating. LIGHTNING BUG drones are now being successfully employed in North Vietnam, and WHITE HAWK drones will provide an improved future capability.

This request has been approved by the Bureau of the Budget.

I recommend that you approve this action. In keeping with previous procedure, the attached NSAM will inform the agencies that have programs in the highest national priority list or are otherwise concerned that this action has been taken.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments:
Tab A - Vance memo 7/13
Tab B - NSAM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-204
By ing NARA, Date 11-20-89

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

SMKeeny:jb:7-21-66
bcc: SMK file and chron
NSC files (2)
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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO.

TO: The Vice President
 The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Commerce
 Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
 Administrator, National Aeronautics and
 Space Agency
 Director, Central Intelligence Agency
 Director, Bureau of the Budget
 Director, Office of Emergency Planning

SUBJECT: Assignment of Highest National Priority Designation
 for Projects WHITE HAWK and LIGHTNING BUG

In response to the recommendation by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the President, under authority granted by the Defense Production Act of 1950, today established the special reconnaissance drone programs, WHITE HAWK and LIGHTNING BUG, as being in the highest national priority category.

W. W. Rostow

SMKeeny:jb:7-21-66
bcc: SMK file and chron
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-204
Rv mg NARA, Date 11-20-89

Thursday, July 21, 1966 -- 11:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Linc Gordon telephoned to correct information given you yesterday. In response to your question re per capita income of Guyana, someone told you it is \$60.00 per year. Actually the best figure is \$291.00 per year, which make it about average for Latin America as a whole.

W. W. Rostow

rln

Thursday, July 21, 1966
6:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a report on the
security situation in Colombia
which I had prepared with maximum
discretion.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

112a

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
The White House

Walt:

Herewith two copies of a memorandum prepared by the Colombian Desk concerning the security situation to be anticipated at the time of the inauguration of Carlos Lleras Restrepo.

Please let me know if there is anything more we can do in this regard.

Desmond FitzGerald

21 July 1966

(DATE)

DECLASSIFIED TO BE AN
ANTI-COMMUNISM MEMORANDUM
FOR INTERNAL SECURITY
NOTATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY Dut ON 8-17-86

~~SECRET~~

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Wednesday, July 20, 1966 - 11:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

In connection with the attached, Doug MacArthur called me this morning.

He said that Bryce Harlow, an aide in President Eisenhower's time, called to suggest the following:

You may wish to have in General Eisenhower and Senator Dirksen to discuss the problem of aid legislation. The opposition to your Vietnam policy is, in MacArthur's view, your principal obstacle to getting the support you need. He suggests you ask bluntly for help from the Republicans who support you on Vietnam.

MacArthur pointed out that the Eisenhower administration never hesitated to mobilize Democratic support for aid legislation -- including your own powerful leadership in the Senate and President Truman on the outside -- when President Eisenhower was in trouble with his conservatives.

MacArthur who is fighting the battle on the Hill says that it is almost impossible because there is no Democratic leadership up there pulling the possible votes together. He gets individual commitments but they wander away since neither Senator Mansfield nor Senator Fulbright is trying to help much.

He thinks, therefore, that Dirksen and the Republicans must be brought to line if possible.

W. W. Rostow

Att in Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCAT NARS, Date 8-17-86

~~SECRET~~

Limited Official Use

Wednesday - July 20, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Inauguration of New Submarine Cable Linking Venezuela
with the United States

On July 11 you agreed to participate in a telephone call with Venezuelan President Leoni inaugurating a new submarine cable linking Venezuela with the United States.

President Leoni has suggested August 3 at 11:00 a.m. as a convenient time for the call. Jim Jones tells me your calendar is open.

I recommend that you:

1. Approve the date and time suggested so that we can proceed with preparations.
2. Authorize use of the Fish Room for the installation of equipment as you did two years ago with the inaugural call over the Trans-Pacific cable to Japan.

W. W. Rostow

Date

Approve August 3, 11:00 a.m. ✓
Prefer another time
Speak to me .

Place

Authorize use of Fish Room
Prefer another room
Speak to me .

Limited Official Use

cc - Colonel Albright - W.H. Communications.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, July 20, 1966
9:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

Bill Jorden has produced, at my suggestion, this basic fact sheet to deal with the Mansfield-type questioning of the SVN elections.

If you find it helpful, you might suggest to whom we ought to send it.

Also attached is what I regard as an excellent draft resolution bill telephoned to Houston for the conference there.

Hopefully it will be passed on Friday.

Walt Rostow

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

116
14

Wednesday, July 20, 1966 -- 1:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

As my young Japanese friend, Kei Wakazumi, left he said, with some emotion: "I shall never let you or your country down. This was one of the great experiences of my life."

Your meeting him was not only gracious but, I believe, useful.

Walt Rostow

Pres file

July 20, 1966
Wednesday - 3:00 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Lodge's new weekly telegram. What he says about the elections might interest you for the press conference this afternoon.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

- ① m l
- ② ~~P. J.~~ →
- ③ Econ. -
- ④ —

Palto elections

 *Here!*
— *Jordan*

Pres file

July 20, 1966

~~SECRET~~

Your Imperial Majesty:

I have followed closely Ambassador Meyer's reports of his recent conversations with you. He has told me of your concern over Iran's defense requirements, and I want to share with you my own views on the developing situation before us. Candor between friends is essential to mutual understanding and my views are offered in that vein.

The total relationship between the United States and Iran, and particularly our cooperation in military matters, has been cordial and it has met the interests of both our countries. The U.S. for its part sincerely hopes that circumstances will permit this to continue in full effectiveness.

For we share a common view of certain basic problems. Thus we both understand that, while the immediate threat of Soviet military aggression has receded, indirect pressures continue and the Soviet aim of communizing Iran remains the same. I know clandestine radio broadcasts remind you daily of this long-range threat. You have shown your understanding of Communist aims by sending an Iranian team to Vietnam, and I am strengthened by this demonstration of your faith in our purpose there.

We also share the realization that the Middle East is undergoing rapid change. The unfolding situation, particularly in the areas south of Iran, demands our close watchfulness, as it embodies both potential opportunity and potential danger. At a time when the United States is heavily engaged in the defense of freedom in Asia, we are no less interested in continued stability in the Persian Gulf area. We welcome your determination to help maintain that stability. As responsible leaders, we share the

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-200

By ing NARA, Date 3-15-89

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awareness that our task is to make inevitable change as orderly and constructive as possible.

It was thus against a background of continuing comradeship between our two nations in facing together a complex and dangerous international environment and of concern for Iran's security that we have offered an additional \$200 million credit for the purchase of military equipment. We have been seeking by all means to develop fair and reasonable terms. We are also urgently working further on the particular questions of price and delivery dates for two squadrons of F-4 aircraft.

Our resources are, of course, burdened by the defense of free world interests in Vietnam. And they are limited, for military assistance purposes, by the Congress. Nevertheless, it remains our intent to respond to your security needs; and I believe we have done so.

You should have no doubt of our desire to help Iran. But you should also understand that if Iran were to enter into an arms arrangement with the Soviet Union or with other Communist countries, this would confront us with serious problems in carrying forward our military assistance.

While you may see short-term advantages to such a step, I see major long-term disadvantages, both political and technical.

First, I cannot believe that any of us will profit by the Soviets' coming any closer to the Persian Gulf than they already are. I would not guess that they regard it as in their interest that the stability of this area be increased.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

Second, it would confuse our Congress and our people concerning Iran's intentions. I cannot predict precisely what the reaction here would be; but it would certainly be unfavorable to the interests which we share in strengthening Iran's defenses.

Third, on the technical side, I am certain you can appreciate our intent to protect sensitive American equipment from compromise by Soviet military technicians.

Our purpose in aiding Iran has been to preserve and strengthen your country's independence. We are proud to have contributed to the gathering political and economic strength of Iran under your wise and skillful leadership. If Iran should turn to the Communist nations for arms, we will not be so shortsighted as to turn from our close relationship. But I do fear the impairment of our military assistance program.

Therefore, I hope that you will look only to Free World sources of arms in meeting your security requirements.

You will, of course, weigh this matter in the light of Iran's basic interests as you see them. I did, however, want you to receive my views personally and with that complete candor our partnership requires and deserves.

I look forward to going more deeply into this and other problems of common concern when it becomes possible for us to meet. I will also very much want to hear directly from you more about the heartening economic and social progress Iran has made under your skillful leadership. Unfortunately, with our coming elections, I doubt we can manage to get together in the next several months. Perhaps early in the new year we could find a mutually agreeable

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

time for direct discussion. In the meantime, I wanted to share with you now -- in the spirit of the partnership I feel -- the problems which might arise.

Sincerely,

(S)

LBJ

His Imperial Majesty
Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi
Shahanshah of Iran
Tehran

LBJ:WWR:HW:lw

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

July 19, 1966 - 6:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We are down to the wire in our arms negotiations with the Shah. He still feels that the \$200 million package we offered does not include all the air defense he needs; and he has approached the USSR for surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns. We included both our HAWK missile and some AA guns in our package, but Soviet prices are lower.

Part of the Shah's move is traditional Persian bargaining. But there are other elements:

--He feels neglected and taken for granted; and he rightly sees these negotiations as a way to gain attention.

--He genuinely fears that the UAR and Iraq have designs on his oil-producing southern provinces. Our cutting off Ayub's military aid last fall left him suspicious that we would do the same to him in a fight with local non-Communist enemies.

--He sees short-run domestic political advantage in showing he is not a U.S. puppet.

We are trying through both formal and informal channels to dissuade him from buying Soviet equipment. If he wishes to diversify his sources of hardware, Western Europe would make more sense and be acceptable to us.

Defense says security would prevent our selling advanced equipment if Soviet technicians come to Iran.

Congress would also give us a hard time if another ally turns to Communist arms supply, although the problem arises in good part because military aid funds are too low.

Most important, while the Shah's reform program is going well, Iran is far from out of the woods politically. We wish to avoid his inviting the Soviets into Iran to meddle in what may still be a turbulent process of evolution.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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NJ 87-200

By ing NARA, Date 3-15-89

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- 2 -

On balance, we would rather not see the Shah buy equipment on the scale he contemplates. Though oil revenues are good, we fear he is overreaching his ability to repay in the years ahead without cutting into development. We have set up an annual joint review to keep the military-economic balance firmly before the Shah.

But the fact is that he believes the Arab threat is urgent; and he believes security comes first. With the British pulling out of South Arabia and retrenching in the Persian Gulf, I'm not sure he isn't right. He is dead earnest when he says he will buy this hardware somewhere if we refuse to sell it. Soviet equipment is the cheapest, though Soviet missiles are poor in quality, at least when manned by North Vietnamese.

Our choices now are to:

--Tell him that we have gone the limit and that if he buys Soviet hardware he will jeopardize our continued military aid. Chances are that he would go ahead anyway if only to underline his independence, and we would have to make up our minds to adjust to an increasingly neutralist Iran.

--Offer one more concession in substituting 32 rehabilitated F-4C aircraft for the 12 new F-4D's in our initial offer. Secretary McNamara could take these out of our inventory in late 1968 and pass them on at second-hand prices, so the cost to us would be the difference between that price and our cost of replacing those planes with newer models for our own inventory.

I share the judgment of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara that we should make this final offer.

We would still try to keep the Shah within the total credit ceiling you approved, but we would have to absorb about \$30 million in additional costs to the USAF via our FY 1967 supplemental. This would round out our effort to meet his most legitimate air defense and other needs at good prices.

Secretary Rusk also recommends you send the Shah a letter.

I have thus far resisted involving you directly in the bargaining which has been going on. But now that we are about to make our final move, I think a letter is a good idea. Part of our trouble is the Shah's familiar feeling that he is cut off from you. This letter would show that you fully

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- 3 -

understand his real worries and have personally tried--within the limits of your problems--to accommodate him.

Attached is for your signature, if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

1186

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

July 19, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested letter to the Shah of Iran

Recommendation:

That you approve the enclosed suggested letter from you to the Shah of Iran.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The Shah has informed us that he has asked the Soviet Union whether it would be interested in supplying arms, especially anti-aircraft equipment and SAMs, to Iran. We are hopeful that a letter from you will help to dissuade the Shah from entering into a military relationship with the USSR. Ambassador Meyer and I have already conveyed to the Shah and Ambassador Khosrovani our concerns.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-159
By *ig* NARA, Date 5-12-89

Enclosure:

Suggested letter to the Shah of Iran.

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

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EXDIS

SUGGESTED LETTER TO THE SHAH OF IRAN

Your Imperial Majesty:

I have followed closely Ambassador Meyer's reports of his recent conversations with you and note your wish for an opportunity to talk over your military procurement problems with me. I share that wish. But as an opportunity for us to meet is not immediately in the cards, I am writing to let you know the problems that would be created for us should Iran enter into a military arrangement with the Soviet Union or other Communist countries.

The military relationship which has been established between the United States and Iran has been mutually advantageous. For my part, I am anxious that it continue.

We share a common view of the world. You, I know, are deeply aware of the long-range threat from your neighbor to the north. It is daily revealed in clandestine radio broadcasts.

You have demonstrated your concern over Communist aims by sending an Iranian medical team to Viet Nam. I am gratified by that demonstration of your faith in our purpose there.

Because of our sincere interest in Iran's security and independence, we continue to make serious efforts to help you strengthen Iran's military forces. We have offered an additional \$200 million credit on concessionary terms for the purchase of military equipment. We are looking urgently into the questions of prices and delivery dates for two squadrons of F-4 aircraft.

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals
not automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-199
By sig NARA, Date 5-12-89

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You should have no doubt of our desire to be helpful to Iran in the military field. Our resources are, of course, not unlimited. They are burdened by the defense of Free World interests in Viet Nam. In addition I am determined that America's military expenditures should not slow down efforts to create greater opportunities and a better life for the American people.

You should know, however, that Iran's entering into an arms arrangement with the Soviet Union or other Communist countries would cause us serious problems in carrying forward our military assistance program to Iran. While you may see short-term advantages to such a step, I see major long-term disadvantages. These are both political and technical.

The Middle East is undergoing rapid change. Our job as leaders who believe in orderly change is to make it as constructive as possible. My people are studying closely the problems of the changing situation in the area south of Iran. I have discussed them with King Faisal and would like to discuss them with you. But however you and we approach these problems, I can not believe that any of us will profit by the Soviets' coming any closer to that scene than they already are.

Neither the American people nor the Congress would understand Iranian agreement to the introduction of Soviet ^{military} equipment or personnel into Iran. Soviet dedication to the eventual communization of Iran is well known in this country. I can not predict precisely what the reaction would be but it would certainly be unfavorable in nature.

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EXDIS

-3-

On the technical side, I am certain you can appreciate our intention to protect sensitive American equipment from Soviet military technicians. In addition, we find it difficult to understand why Iran should be considering the purchase of Soviet surface-to-air missiles which have proved so ineffective in Viet Nam.

Our consistent purpose in aiding Iran has been to preserve and strengthen your country's independence. We are proud to have been of help in contributing to the great progress toward political and economic strength which Iran has made under your wise and skillful leadership. If Iran should turn to the Communist bloc for arms, we will not be so shortsighted as to turn from our close relationship. But I fear the impairment of our military assistance program. Therefore, I hope that you will look only to Free World sources.

You will weigh this matter in the light of Iran's basic interests. I did, however, want you to be aware of my personal concern in addition to that already conveyed to you by Ambassador Meyer and by Secretary Rusk through Ambassador Khosrovani. I have appreciated the opportunity to mention my concerns frankly to you. The problems are, however, too complex to discuss by letter alone, and I would like to discuss them with you personally at some point, perhaps early next year. Candor between friends is essential, and my views are offered in that vein.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

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EXDIS

~~SECRET~~
EXDIS

-4-

His Imperial Majesty
Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi,
Shahanshah of Iran,
Tehran.

~~SECRET~~
EXDIS

Wednesday, July 20, 1966
7:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached, for your approval, is a formal message to the Poles on the occasion of their July 22 holiday.

The text is cordial enough, but somewhat cooler than in the past, to reflect their recent bad manners in Warsaw and here.

Francis M. Bator

Approved /
Disapproved
Speak to me

NDavis/vmr

REF: ⁷¹¹³ ~~REC~~ Log 88

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT OF POLAND

On the occasion of the National Day of the Polish People's Republic, I extend the cordial greetings and best wishes of the people of the United States of America to the people of Poland.

Pres. file

Wednesday, July 20, 1966
9:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

Bill Jorden has produced, at my suggestion, this basic fact sheet to deal with the Mansfield-type questioning of the SVN elections.

If you find it helpful, you might suggest to whom we ought to send it.

Also attached is what I regard as an excellent draft resolution bill telephoned to Houston for the conference there.

Hopefully it will be passed on Friday.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE ELECTION OF
A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

Basic Facts

Purpose: to elect a National Constituent Assembly which will draft
a new constitution for Viet-Nam.

Date: September 11, 1966.

Number of delegates: 117, including nine seats reserved for
montagnard tribes and four for Vietnamese of Cambodian descent.

Number of districts: 52.

Number of candidates: preliminary reports (July 17) indicate some
700 candidates have filed, 135 of them in Saigon.

Basis of delegate numbers: one for each 50,000 registered voters.

Electoral districts: Provinces and municipalities plus three
districts in Saigon and two in Gia Dinh province.

Delegates per district: one each in 20 provinces; two each in 13
provinces; three or more in each of nine provinces; total of
ten from Gia Dinh; total of 16 from Saigon; two from Da Nang;
one each from four other cities.

Voter qualifications: 18 years old; possess valid voter registra-
tion card; not have been deprived of civil rights for past crimes
or through other judicial proceedings.

Candidate qualifications:

- native-born Vietnamese; or, resumed Vietnamese nationality for three years; or, adopted Vietnamese nationality for five years.
- 25 years old.
- enjoy all civil rights.
- residence in Viet-Nam for at least 1 year.
- complied with military draft regulations.
- no criminal record (minor offenses excepted).
- not deprived of civil rights by court action.
- not mentally retarded.
- not bankrupt.
- not a civil servant or military man dismissed for disciplinary reasons.
- not one who has "directly or indirectly worked for the Communists and pro-communist neutralists," and not "neutralists whose actions are advantageous to the communists."

Supervision of elections including determination of voters' and candidates' qualifications: By local and national election boards, chaired respectively by local judge and presiding justice of Supreme Court.

Deposit: Each candidate required to deposit 10,000 pieasters (less than \$100) which is refunded unless candidate gets less than 5 per cent of vote in his district.

Campaign expenses: To be borne by Government; based on number of voters and number of candidates in district; same for all candidates in a given district.

Exclusions: Civil servants, military men, police officers and the like are generally excluded from running as candidates in areas where they now are or recently have been in positions of authority.

Method of voting: Secret ballot; voter gets ballots for all candidates or lists of candidates; puts ballot of candidate or of list of his choice in envelope; destroys other ballots; deposits envelope in ballot box.

Time of campaign: To begin no sooner than 16 days before the election and to end at noon, September 10.

Time of election: From 7 a.m. to 4 p.m., September 11.

Observation: Representatives of each candidate or list permitted to act as observers at all polling stations in the district; no restrictions on press coverage.

Counting: To be done publicly at end of voting; candidates' representatives may observe and participate.

Determination of winners: In single-delegate districts, winner is candidate with largest number of votes; in multiple-delegate districts, seats will be allotted to each list according to the proportion of votes obtained.

Complaints: To be submitted to Electoral Committee by September 14.

Results: To be announced officially on September 15.

Questions and Answers:

1. Question: Is the Government of Viet-Nam opposed to elections at this time?

Answer: No. On the contrary, the proposal to prepare a new constitution was first made by the Government last January, before the political turmoil of recent months. The present electoral plan, worked out largely by non-governmental leaders is consistent with the plan originally advanced by Prime Minister Ky. The Government has stated publicly its support for the planned election. It has promulgated election laws, and procedures under the laws are being carried out.

2. Question: Is the Government of Viet-Nam trying to use the elections to retain military control?

Answer: There is no evidence of this. The purpose of the election is to select delegates who will help write a new constitution. Early reports indicate that no large number of military men have declared their candidacy for election to the Assembly. Moreover, military men who are candidates are prohibited from running in areas where they

now exert command or have been in positions of command less than six months prior to the election. The Government can submit proposals to the Assembly but the latter is not required to accept them.

Incidentally, the Government recently expanded civilian participation in the administration, even before the elections. Ten civilian members have been added to the national directorate, including some prominent nationalists who have been active in government bodies in recent years.

On July 5, a Peoples-Army Council of 79 members was established to advise the Government and provide a link between the GVN and the people. Three-fourths of the members (59) are civilians.

A cabinet revision was announced on July 13 which added several able civilians to the administration. The present government thus appears sincere in its efforts to nurture political evolution toward constitutional rule and broader civilian participation.

3. Question: Doesn't the Government control the screening of candidates?

Answer: No. The screening of candidates to determine that they fulfill the electoral law requirements is a matter for the Electoral Council in each district. This Council is

chaired by the principal judge in the district. Members are: two members of the elected city or provincial council drawn by lot; three voters representatives drawn from a list of local persons not candidates; only one representative of the city or provincial government.

Appeals from the local councils' findings can be filed with a National Electoral Council. This is chaired by the presiding judge of the Supreme Court and is composed of: Chairman of the state council or a judge selected by him; the dean of the lawyers corps or a lawyer appointed by him; five representatives of the military-civilian council; one representative of the Interior Ministry.

4. Question: Why can't the Viet Cong and their supporters vote?

Doesn't this exclude many citizens from the election?

Answer: There are no restrictions on Viet Cong voting except those that apply to all Vietnamese. They must be 18 years old, have a valid voter registration card and not have been deprived of civil rights as a result of past crimes or other reasons.

5. Question: How can you have a fair and meaningful election if "neutralists" and Communists cannot stand as candidates?

Answer: First, in a Vietnamese context, "neutralist" has a meaning different from our usual meaning of the word. This limitation is spelled out as meaning "those who have directly or indirectly worked for the communists and pro-communist neutralists, or neutralists whose actions are advantageous to the communists."

Determination of whether a candidate meets this criterion is left with the local electoral board, with appeals to the national board possible. As we understand it, this does not exclude those Vietnamese who believe that, once their country is free from outside aggression and enjoys peace and security, South Viet-Nam should follow a course of non-alignment.

It would exclude the Viet Cong and those who have worked for them. In that sense it is similar to electoral limitations in other countries that have suffered from Communist aggression -- Korea, Greece, the Philippines, and Malaysia.

The limitation reflects the widespread opinion in South Viet-Nam that immediate neutralization and the withdrawal of American and allied forces would be the prelude to Communist takeover. The recommendation for inclusion of this limitation was made by the broadly representative

civilian Electoral Law Drafting Committee by a vote of 23 to 1. This in turn followed the expressed consensus of the National Political Congress of April 12-14 regarding communists and neutralists in the Constituent Assembly. It is similar in spirit to the restrictions imposed on wartime collaborationists by the French Consultative Assembly in 1944.

6. Question: Why have the powers of the Constituent Assembly been so restricted?

Answer: The Government of Viet-Nam regards the proposed body as being just what its names implies -- a Constituent Assembly that would prepare a constitution.

The Electoral Law Drafting Committee itself rejected two proposals that would have given the Assembly broader powers -- one, to appoint an interim government in the pre-constitution period; two, the right to vote confidence or no-confidence in the existing government.

The ELDC did recommend that the Assembly have legislative powers. This was rejected by the Government which felt that the Assembly should concentrate on its primary business -- preparing a new basic charter for Viet-Nam.

It is now foreseen that national political institutions will be established under the new constitution in 1967.

7. Question: Isn't the Government in Saigon trying to delay creation of a popularly-elected Government?

Answer: We see no evidence of this. The Government has moved faster in setting up the Constituent Assembly than many of its Vietnamese critics thought wise, slower perhaps than some of its critics desired. But it has moved firmly and actively. It has supported the popular demand for a new constitution that reflects Vietnamese desires and attitudes. It has supported the idea of establishing at an early date the institutions provided for by the new constitution.

8. Question: Is the Government trying to limit the vote and control the results?

Answer: There is no evidence of this. The Government in Saigon is developing plans in support of the election. It has distributed widely copies of the election decree and is explaining the purpose and importance of the elections and the regulations governing voting procedures and candidates.

Through radio, TV and other media, the Government is urging that all eligible citizens vote and that they support candidates of their choice by attending party meetings, rallies, etc. It is our understanding that the Government

intends to encourage the widest possible turnout of voters and to report the election results as quickly as they become available throughout the country.

During the election campaign as well as during the balloting and counting of the votes, candidates will be able to have their own representatives participate in the election campaign committee and in the counting of the ballots.

9. Question: Would it be useful to have foreign observers witness the September elections?

Answer: All nations are understandably sensitive about outside suggestions that foreigners be invited to observe their internal political processes.

Nevertheless, the Vietnamese Government has felt that such observation would be welcome. Accordingly, the Vietnamese Government asked the UN Secretary General in early June to arrange to send observers to Viet-Nam for the September election. The U. S. Government welcomed this initiative. In the absence of a favorable response from the Secretary General, any additional efforts to provide for observers will be a matter for the Vietnamese Government.

There is, however, built-in machinery for close

observation of the election by foreigners. This is the large diplomatic corps resident in Saigon and the huge foreign press corps of between 350 and 400 men and women who will provide intensive and extensive coverage of the election.

A RESOLUTION

WE, the undersigned members of the _____, meeting together in the city of Houston, Texas on this 19th day of July, 1966, do present and petition the President of the United States as follows:

WHEREAS, the independence, security and right to self determination of the people of South Vietnam are threatened by external aggression designed to place them under Communist control;

WHEREAS, this aggression of terror and sabotage, of stealth, subversion and armed attack was conceived and is sustained by North Vietnam in the guise of a so-called "war of liberation";

WHEREAS, the United States is committed to the principle that the Communist world should not be permitted to overturn the arrangements built since the second world war to mark the outer limits of expansion by force;

WHEREAS, three American presidents have carried forward this commitment to the South Vietnamese people;

WHEREAS, the struggle against North Vietnam's aggression is intertwined with our own security and its outcome can profoundly affect the nature of the world;

WHEREAS, the young men of America, brave in deed and sacrifice, are serving with United States armed forces in Vietnam so that we, our children and other peoples of the world can continue to enjoy the blessings and opportunities of free societies;

WHEREAS, the United States, in the midst of conflict, is aiding the Vietnamese to build a nation to overcome the threats of hunger/
~~ignorance~~ and disease and ^{to} be responsive to popular aspirations; and

WHEREAS, the United States continues to exhaust all efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement despite consistent rebuff of these peaceful overtures by the Communist powers;

Now, therefore, be it

RESOLVED: That we, recognizing the indomitable courage, valiant efforts and sacrifices of our fighting men in Vietnam, request that you, Mr. President, convey the profound gratitude of the undersigned to the military forces of this country in Vietnam for their dedicated service; and be it further

RESOLVED: That we fully endorse your policies, Mr. President, of firmness mixed with measured restraint and the unflagging pursuit of a peaceful settlement, in order to ward off Communist aggression and secure the independence of South Vietnam.

SIGNED:

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121
Wednesday, July 20, 1966 - 6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ambassador Patrick Dean's call on you at 11:00 a.m.
tomorrow, Thursday July 21st

I suggest the main purpose of Pat Dean's call on you should be for you to suggest that it would be most helpful for Prime Minister Wilson, on the 29th, to present to you:

1. A candid account of how he proposes to deal with the British economy over the next several years, including problems of debt repayment, avoidance of long-run stagnation, export promotion, etc.

2. How, in the light of this economic policy, he proposes to deal with Britain's role in the world:

- East of Suez;
- British forces in Germany;
- political relations with Germany;
- wider approaches to Europe.

Wilson's decisions of today have transformed the setting of your meeting of the 29th. He has bit the bullet in a manly way. His actions may affect our interests adversely in the security field; and we will feel some effects of the British deflation on our exports -- both directly and indirectly.

Nevertheless, if he can hold his country together and follow through, we have the chance, at last, to deal with a Britain which can make its commitments stick, even if they are modest, and which will not have an annual sterling crisis.

It will take time to work out what is involved for us and for our other allies.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-344

By CB, NARA, Date 6-7-95

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We may even wish to have a very high-level US-UK-German meeting in the months ahead.

But Dean should understand and transmit to Wilson that on the 29th you are looking forward to getting a candid account of how he sees his problems and prospects at home and abroad; and that this should be the central focus of your day with Wilson.

A frank understanding between you and Wilson is fundamental to the future course of our policy.

W. W. Rostow

cy Batn
Wilson / J. Jones
Meyer
Kistner

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Limited Official Use

Wednesday - July 20, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Inauguration of New Submarine Cable Linking Venezuela
with the United States

On July 11 you agreed to participate in a telephone call with Venezuelan President Leoni inaugurating a new submarine cable linking Venezuela with the United States.

President Leoni has suggested August 3 at 11:00 a.m. as a convenient time for the call. Jim Jones tells me your calendar is open.

I recommend that you:

1. Approve the date and time suggested so that we can proceed with preparations.
2. Authorize use of the Fish Room for the installation of equipment as you did two years ago with the inaugural call over the Trans-Pacific cable to Japan.

W. W. Rostow

Date

Approve August 3, 11:00 a.m.	___
Prefer another time	___
Speak to me	___.

Place

Authorize use of Fish Room	___
Prefer another room	___
Speak to me	___.

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cc - Colonel Albright - W.H. Communications.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, July 20, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Visit of Guyana Prime Minister Burnham

The purpose of Prime Minister Burnham's visit is to give him the opportunity to establish personal relationship with you and other high U. S. officials, to bolster his position in Guyana, and to strengthen our influence.

Burnham heads a coalition government formed in December 1964. His Negro PCN party and D'Agular's mostly white UF party together won almost 53% of the electorate. The East Indian PPP party, led by Marxist, Castro-loving Cheddi Jagan, won 45.8%. Burnham has done a highly commendable job in taking the country to independence (May 26, 1966), alleviating racial tensions stemming from political rivalry and getting an economic development program underway. What now most concerns him -- and us -- is to increase his political base sufficiently to win a clear majority over Jagan in the 1968 elections.

Burnham will be in Washington 2 days and then make a tour of the West for 8 days. Your participation is limited to receiving him with military honors on the south lawn and hosting a luncheon tomorrow. A scenario for your participation is at Tab A.

Burnham is accompanied by his Attorney General, S. S. Ramphal, and his personal political advisor, Hugh Cholmondeley (pronounced Chumley). Their biographic sketches are at Tab B.

They will have substantive discussions in State and AID but no working session with you is contemplated. At Tab C is a talking points paper covering matters which he is likely to raise with you during the luncheon and points which you may wish to make.

The welcoming statement and luncheon toast which you have approved are at Tab D.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-290
By CB, NARA Date 10-16-96

Attachments

Tabs A, B, C, D.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Biographic Sketch

Prime Minister Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham of Guyana

Burnham is an intelligent, well-educated leader and, at 43, is in his prime years. He is a popular criminal attorney who has developed into a highly-skilled politician.

He was a brilliant student at the University of London (B.A. and LL.B. with honors). In 1950 he returned to British Guiana and joined Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP) which at that time contained most of the nationalistic elements in favor of independence. He split from the PPP in 1955, partly because it was under the influence of Communism and later founded the People's National Congress (PNC), which gained the support of almost all Africans. As a result of the proportional electoral system used in the election of December 7, 1964, the PNC and the United Force party formed a coalition government and succeeded the Jagan regime.

Burnham is an able, ambitious political leader motivated by a raging desire to be successful as "the founder of the nation". He loves the political game and hugely enjoys being the top man. Because he has so much more ability than most of his associates, he dominates the party and the government. He has no rival, actual or potential, in either. Articulate and clever in the use of words, he is probably the most erudite and capable speaker in Guyana. He has much empathy for the underdog and a genuine concern for the plight of the little man. Although he enjoys good living, he does not really care for money, shows no desire to acquire a fortune, and apparently is not corrupt.

Burnham has an inferiority complex which has racial aspects. This trait is not usually apparent. It reportedly stems from failure to be treated with equality while a student in the U.K. He has a distinct anti-British bias and is deeply conscious of being colored but rarely shows it. He is capable of taking an indirect slight as a challenge to equality and will react accordingly. It is this inferiority complex which causes him to have such an extreme fear of being viewed as a U.S. "puppet".

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLT 98-397
By ipjw NARA, Date 10/28/05

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Burnham places great value on personal relationships and friendships and sometimes that factor will weigh more with him than the merits of the case. He tends to divide all people into two categories - those who are for him and all others. He can be considerably influenced if advice comes from someone he trusts or a friend, especially if that person represents power.

He would like to be known by top U.S. officials as a smooth, capable political operator who can get things done and is deserving of respect. He will be deeply impressed by any complimentary remarks from high officials regarding his record or the manner in which he has coped with a difficult situation. Given his complexes, the manner and trappings with which he is received will be regarded as especially significant by him.

He admires the tactical and public relations ability of American political leaders. He believes they have unique expertise in this field, and he has adopted in the last six months many devices common to the American political scene - sometimes at U.S. suggestion. These include the concept of "consultative democracy" or projecting an image of tolerance, responsibility, and moderation by conferring with all groups in the community, including those in the opposition; the weekly press conference with any question permitted and carried live to the nation; meet-the-people tours to the countryside; working breakfasts, sometimes with the leaders of non-supporting groups; and periodic reports to the nation.

Mrs. Burnham, and their three daughters, are living in Trinidad, for the Prime Minister seems fully occupied with politics.

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Biographic Sketch

Attorney General Shridath Surendranath Ramphal of Guyana

Ramphal was born on October 3, 1928, in New Amsterdam, British Guiana, of Indian parents. His father was a high-ranking civil servant during an era when it was unusual for Indians to work their way up to important jobs in the government. Ramphal attended King's College, London, and then obtained an L.L.B. from Gray's Inn in 1951. He received his L.L.M. degree from London University in 1952. During this period he met and married an English nurse (first name: Lois) born in 1927. They have three children and the entire family visited the U.S. on holiday in 1960.

The Ramphals returned to British Guiana, and he became Solicitor General. In 1961 he went to Jamaica, which was the headquarters of the West Indies Federation, to be Assistant Attorney General to that organization. After the Federation was dissolved, he went to Harvard on a Guggenheim Fellowship, and then settled in Jamaica where he established a lucrative law practice. He was appointed Attorney General on April 10, 1965.

As Attorney General, Ramphal has been a tower of strength to Prime Minister Burnham. He successfully presented the government's case to the International Commission of Jurists during the investigation on racial imbalances in the public service. Virtually single-handedly he drafted the constitution which was accepted at the London Independence Conference. He serves as Minister of State for External Affairs, thus relieving the Prime Minister of the burdens of the External Affairs portfolio. He is highly literate, extremely personable, and has close relations with British and American contacts. The most influential Indian in the Cabinet, Ramphal enjoys the complete confidence of the Prime Minister, and plays a key role in governmental decisions.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By W, NARA, Date 7-9-98

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Biographic Sketch

Hugh Martin Emanuel Cholmondeley
Personal Political Assistant to the Prime Minister of Guyana

1. H. M. E. Cholmondeley (Chumley) is the personal political adviser to Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana. Burnham has known Cholmondeley all his life and trusts the older man implicitly.
2. Cholmondeley was born of Negro parents at Henrietta, Essequibo, on December 8, 1910. He was educated at Teachers Training Center in Georgetown where he earned a Class 1 Teacher's Certificate. He taught at a succession of Anglican schools until he retired in 1960 at the age of fifty. Shortly thereafter he assumed his present role.
3. Cholmondeley has no political ambitions for himself and refused a proffered ministerial appointment following the 1964 elections. In his present job he handles any number of problems and sees a constant flow of people. He accompanied the Prime Minister to the London Independence Conference held in November 1965 and recently traveled to New York to make arrangements for the Guyanese Mission to the United Nations. He is a down-to-earth, practical sort of man of mature, balanced judgment, and he demonstrates considerable political acumen. He possesses a quiet natural dignity which instills confidence.
4. Cholmondeley is pro-American. He is married to a gracious and cultured woman, the former May Edna Frazer, and they have two sons and a daughter. His two sons have been educated at American universities. Cholmondeley has a heart ailment and is slightly hard of hearing. He is not a joiner and does not belong to any clubs but he does enjoy reading and amateur carpentry. In personal appearance Cholmondeley is neat and well-groomed, of average height with a carefully trimmed mustache.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-9-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-9-98

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VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER BURNHAM
OF GUYANA

July 21, 1966

Suggested Talking Points

Points Prime Minister Burnham is Likely to Raise

1. Economic Assistance - -

He will probably express appreciation for U.S. aid (about \$10 million per year for the past two years). He is not likely to ask for more direct U.S. aid but urge that we assist through a consultative group to be organized by the World Bank.

You may want to say that we intend to continue our support, the amount and channel to be used being subject to a series of factors which the two governments will wish to examine periodically.

2. Immigration Policy - -

He may describe his intentions to import negroes from the Caribbean islands to open up the interior of Guyana -- and to increase the ranks of his Negro party.

You may want to stress the importance of racial groups working together rather than one trying to dominate the other. (We have not encouraged him in this idea.)

3. Caribbean Economic Integration - -

He may describe his interest in Caribbean economic integration (Guyana has joined Barbados and Antigua in a Caribbean Free Trade Area now in a formative stage) and ask that we support it.

You may explain that we have been cautious in not getting out in front publicly on Caribbean integration but are pleased that he and other Caribbean leaders are thinking in regional terms.

4. OAS Membership --

He may ask whether we want Guyana to join the OAS and whether we would use our influence with Venezuela not to block membership because of the border dispute. (Venezuela takes the position that as long as the boundary controversy is under study, Guyana is not eligible for OAS membership).

You might reply that we would welcome Guyana in the OAS. We are aware of the Venezuela feeling that the border issue should be resolved before supporting admission. If you desire to apply for membership, we are prepared to take the matter up with the Venezuelans.

Points You May Wish to Raise

If time permits you may wish to --

1. Congratulations on Independence. Congratulate the Prime Minister on having led his nation to independence.

2. Praise of Progress Made. Express satisfaction with the economic and social progress Guyana is making under his leadership.

You might mention the steps being taken to build a new university in Georgetown and his road building program.

3. Racial Tensions. Encourage him to continue to do all that he can to ease racial tensions and promote national cohesion.

Wednesday, July 20, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Our Commitment Performance in FY 1966 Under the
Alliance for Progress

You will be interested in the attached table showing our commitment performance in FY 1966 in three areas of special interest to you.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

LATIN AMERICA
NEW INITIATIVES - FY 1966
TARGET v. ACTUAL PERFORMANCE

	TARGET	ACTION			
	(Congressional Presentation)	TC	DL	Program Loan Counterpart ^{1/}	Total
Agriculture	101.547	19.197	70.900	37.000	127.097
Education	40.432	27.132	5.300	32.000	64.432
Health	13.685	8.565	16.125	18.000	26.460
	<u>155.664</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u>234.219</u>
TOTAL	155.664				234.219

^{1/} - This represents uses of counterpart funds generated by Program loans in Brazil, Chile and Colombia. This local currency is used (1) to meet the local cost requirements of AID grant and dollar loan projects; (2) to supplement government budgetary allocations in host country development projects, i. e., malaria control programs; expanded water and sewerage facilities; supervised agricultural credit to small farmers; school construction.

Wednesday, July 20, 1966 -- 6:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS

General Moyshe Dayan, of Israel, came in on Saturday, July 16, 1966, to be briefed on our view of Viet Nam, before his impending trip to that country as a correspondent. Fresh from Paris, he focused on two questions:

- Are we really ready to get out of Viet Nam if the war stops?
- Are we really ready to accept inside Viet Nam the political results of free elections?

I reassured him on both points.

At Mrs. Katharine Graham's dinner, Tuesday night, July 19, 1966, were Mary McGrory, Perigrine Worsthorpe and General Dayan, as well as Bob McNamara. The central focus of discussion was the British crisis and the difficulty in getting a nation to make economic sacrifices if it did not have a large and persuasive vision of its role on the world scene.

Henry Brandon, The Sunday Times of London, came in today to discuss the British crisis and the visit of Prime Minister Wilson. I told him that we were not clear as to what would be discussed; but we realized that extremely important decisions had been taken today whose implications were worth discussing.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Wednesday, July 20, 1966
6:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith George McGhee
reassures you--as I did--that what
he said in Germany lay well within
the bounds of your policy.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

July 20, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

Apropos of our discussion today on the German offset arrangement and the continued presence of American troops in Europe in the event of a Soviet withdrawal, I am attaching those portions of my speech in Tutzing, Germany, on July 14 which dealt with these questions. Both were approved by the Department in advance. I believe that you will observe that the statement on troop withdrawals bears little relationship to the Washington Post article reporting it to which you referred. I hope that you will find my remarks on the offset a firm statement of our position.

I am at your disposition on the other matters we discussed.

Faithfully yours,

George C. McGhee

Enclosure:

Excerpts from speech.

The President

The White House

Excerpts From Speech By American Ambassador to Germany
George C. McGhee before the Evangelische Akademie, Tutzing,
Germany, July 14, 1966.

I. Troop Withdrawals

Recently, too, there has been speculation that the United States would automatically withdraw divisions from Germany in the event Soviet divisions are taken out of East Germany. In the first place there has been -- to my knowledge -- no confirmation of Soviet intentions to withdraw. On the contrary, available evidence indicates that the firepower of Soviet troops in East Germany is stronger than ever.

Even if Soviet troop withdrawals did in fact take place, the reaction of the West would not necessarily involve automatic complementary withdrawals. Moving forces 700 miles back to the Soviet Union is scarcely comparable to returning our forces to the continental United States. Naturally, however, if a major withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany were to take place, the alliance would have to consider the new situation thereby created.

II. Offset

It is embarrassing to have to talk to friends about money matters, but occasionally one must. A great deal is being said in the German press today about the offset agreement between the Federal Republic and the United States. Some people, I believe, think that this agreement calls on the Federal Government to pay the cost of stationing American troops here. In fact this is not the case. It is the American taxpayer who each year pays the two billion dollars required to support the Seventh Army in Germany.-- almost half the amount of the German defense budget.

We keep the Seventh Army here not just in Germany's defense, but because we recognize that our defense is inseparable from that of Germany and Europe. On the other hand, in spite of our favorable trade balance, we have in recent years run a consistent balance of payments deficit largely due to our defense and aid expenditures abroad. Our foreign exchange deficit is of course quite small in comparison to our gross

national product of 730 billion dollars. It has, however, subjected us to much criticism -- even from our friends -- and we are determined to balance our international accounts. We had thought that we would be able to do so this year; however, we find that the Viet Nam war is costing us in foreign exchange about one billion dollars. We are, as a result, obliged to continue to make every possible effort to stop our other foreign exchange drains.

It costs us, in terms of actual expenditures in Germany, the Deutsche Mark equivalent of 675 million dollars a year to maintain our forces here. For a common enterprise such as NATO, we believe the principle should hold that no country should profit -- as far as foreign exchange receipts are concerned -- from the military expenditures of other nations in the common interest. The Federal Government has in effect followed this principle in recent years, through its willingness to counterbalance the foreign exchange cost of our forces here.

During the period of the build-up of German NATO forces, the Federal Republic found no difficulty in purchasing from us military equipment equal to our foreign exchange expenses in Germany. For the past year, however, the German Ministry of Defense has not been able to establish requirements for purchases up to the full amount of the offset.

Germany still has until July 1, 1967, to complete the payments offset for the current two-year period, and we have every confidence that she will do so.

In obtaining arms from us, Germany receives advantages -- from our research and development, from the low unit cost resulting from our large-scale production and from standardization. This does result in some loss in orders to German industry. However, with no unemployment and most German factories booked to capacity, German firms would in most cases appear to be better off concentrating on non-military products -- with export potential and a future. German industry is, moreover, gaining greatly in other ways through our military cooperation. Much technical know-how is obtained through co-production in Germany between German and American firms -- of fighter aircraft, helicopters and, shortly, the main battle tank.

We believe that the basis for our military cooperation in recent years has been a sound one for both of us. We have confidence that Germans will, as a vital part of this cooperation, continue to understand our foreign exchange problem -- and will not wish to profit in foreign exchange from our military presence here. We are always willing to listen to any suggestions the German Government has to make in this connection.

Wednesday, July 20, 1966
4:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

Joe Fowler wants your quick clearance for the reference to your support for his endeavors in the Group of Ten, in the attached letter to his colleagues.

The marked passage on page 1 is extremely general and reflects your existing policy.

May I tell Deming it is okay?

W. W. Rostow

Approved ✓

Disapproved

WWRostow:rln

127a



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

July 20, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Secretary Deming believes it would be a useful preliminary to the meeting of the Ministers and Governors of the Group of Ten next Monday in The Hague for me to transmit the attached letter.

I have taken the liberty in the second paragraph (which is the only one you need to read) of attributing to you some sentiments which I believe reflect the various conversations we have had about pressing the international liquidity negotiations.

I have asked Walt Rostow to clear this with you so that we can get these out by courier in time to be effective before the meeting next Monday.

Henry H. Fowler
Henry H. Fowler

Attachment

Dear Mr. Minister:

I am looking forward with great pleasure to a second visit to the Netherlands and to participating in the meeting of the Ministers and Governors of the Group of Ten under your Chairmanship on July 25, 1966. At that meeting we will have an opportunity to review and assess the progress that we have made since our discussions together in The Hague at the beginning of last September as well as in Washington at the time of the 1965 Annual Meeting of the Fund. We will have to take decisions of historic significance regarding the next phase of our work on improvement of the international monetary system and on contingency planning for future reserve creation.

Since the United States attaches the highest importance to the decisions that confront us, I thought it might be useful to share with you some of my views on these matters. I have had an opportunity to review these questions recently with the President, who told me that he believes the work we are doing is vital to the continued prosperity of the Free World economy and that he considers it essential that we move forward in an effective way to the second phase of international negotiations.

Last September, we talked about the need for contingency planning and the necessary procedural arrangements to accomplish this objective. The ideas we discussed then were subsequently embodied in the Ministers and Governors Communiqué of September 28, 1965 which provided for a first phase in which the Deputies would seek basic agreement among the Group of Ten countries and then a second phase of broader consideration of the questions that affect the world economy as a whole.

I have closely followed the work of the Deputies in their efforts to reach agreement on basic points and have read their very useful and helpful report. I was gratified that they had reached a wide measure of agreement, set forth in the "Conclusions."

With respect to the three questions still open, I fully share the view that the provisions on holding and use should be given further study within the Group of Ten in the coming months ahead as well as in the broader forum. It is also my feeling that final decisions cannot be made on the questions of decision-making and scope and form of participation except in the context of an agreement on a specific overall reserve creation plan. I hope you will agree with my view that the negotiation of such a final plan should be completed during the second stage.

A number of proposals have been made for the organization of a second stage including our own suggestion for a Fund Governors Advisory Committee on Reserve Creation. In a recent letter to the Managing Director of the Fund, Dr. Emminger, has outlined a proposal under which the Deputies and Executive Directors would, while continuing their respective examinations of deliberate reserve creation, seek a consensus of views through a series of joint meetings held at regular intervals. Under procedures that could be worked out between the Chairman of the Deputies and the Managing Director, the Deputies and Executive Directors, through these joint meetings, could prepare a report to the Board of Governors of the Fund with tentative recommended resolutions for action to be submitted prior to the 1967 Annual Meeting, with a view to preparing for the final enactment of a contingency plan. This proposal, in our view, could provide a satisfactory basis for proceeding in the second stage. As we move further along in the second stage, it may be necessary to consider the formation of a committee of Governors for the purpose of considering the joint report of the Deputies and Executive Directors in order to resolve any remaining issues and prepare a specific resolution for the consideration of the full Board of Governors. Arrangements along these lines could be set forth in the Ministerial Communique to be issued after our meeting in The Hague.

You will undoubtedly remember that last September in The Hague I said that unless the need for a second stage is recognized and announced, we could expect preparations for international monetary reform by other groups. I think we are faced with the same situation today. Other members of the Fund, as well as the financial world in general, expect a meaningful second stage in which their views can be heard. Now that the Deputies have completed their exhaustive discussions and their report has shown a real measure of agreement on basic considerations, the Ministers of the Ten are in a position to endorse this progress by taking the initiative in moving from

- 3 -

this first stage to the next phase.

I hope that you will support a clear exposition of the arrangements for a meaningful second stage in the Ministerial Statement. It is only in this way that the Group will continue to exercise the leadership that is consistent with its responsibilities for the monetary system.

Sincerely yours,

Henry H. Fowler

His Excellency
Anne Vondeling
Minister of Finance
22 Kneuterdijk
The Hague,
The Netherlands

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, July 20, 1966 - 10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk wishes you to know that he interprets his conversation at lunch yesterday -- and his guidance from you -- as empowering him to proceed with Option 1, page 2.

Bill Moyers, Nat Davis, and Francis Bator -- as well as Foy Kohler -- lean to the more complex and apparently milder Option 2.

The critical argument put forward by State for Option 1 is that it "would be difficult to enforce a selective cut-back against various pressures from interest groups in the United States."

On balance, I think Option 2 would give us more flexibility; but would not press it on you too strongly because:

-- your Secretary of State is on the firing line on this and feels strongly;

-- we here do not bear the operational burden of dealing with the various pressure groups involved in the exchange agreements.

From your point of view both forms of suspension -- if it comes to that -- will create some noise in the U.S. and Western press -- Option 2 a little less.

What is important is that you take a look at the two options and either confirm Secretary Rusk's understanding or let him know you'd rather have him try Option 2.

W. W. Rostow

Confirm Option 1 _____

Prefer Option 2 _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-205
By ing NARA, Date 1-3-90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 7-9-98

July 19, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Soviet-US Exchange Program

At lunch today Secretary Rusk may discuss the possible cancellation of our hand tools exhibit in the USSR. The Russians have been dragging their feet on visas for exhibit personnel, and giving us the run-around on arrangements. They may wish to punish us on Vietnam and to protect themselves from the danger of "collaboration" with the U.S. Cancellation of the hand tools exhibit would be a clear violation of the exchange agreement.

Kohler proposes he tell Gromyko we have concluded from the Russians' actions on the track meet and exhibit that they are not prepared to carry out exchanges which "attract public attention." Therefore,

-- we view performing arts and sports exchanges as suspended;

-- we shall negotiate attendance at scientific congresses on a case-by-case basis; and

if there are more Soviet violations, we reserve the right to reexamine our obligation further.

(Kohler cautions against declaring the whole agreement invalid because it would 1) probably cause the Soviets to cut off Amerika magazine (which is covered by the agreement) and 2) risk Soviet resumption of VOA jamming.)

The people at State think Kohler's proposal does not punish the Soviets enough. They believe

-- a suspension of performing arts exchanges would actually buttress the Russians' public stand of "non-collaboration" with us.

-- it would leave technical exchanges intact, and these are the ones the Soviets have most interest in.

-- we would have trouble enforcing a case-by-case negotiation of attendance at scientific congresses because of pressures from the

American scientific community.

Instead, State proposes a suspension of all new activities -- more sweeping, and also more risky than Kohler's proposal.

If Secretary Rusk should raise this question at lunch, you may want to ask:

a) At what level we are pressing the Soviets on hand tools (visas, etc.) before we tell them we are retaliating. (I am not wure Kholer or Thompson has yet intervened strongly.)

b) How serious are our losses if we make a soft reply -- by accepting Kohler's formula?

c) What is the Secretary's evaluation of the effect on your peace posture at home and in Europe if we suspend all new activities under the exchange program?

d) Are we sure the Soviets have no come-back which would obscure their clear violation of the agreement?

e) Can we hold the level of retaliation at "new activities," or do we risk counter-retaliation against the sections of the agreement we want to preserve -- such as Amerika magazine?

f) How much would the partial suspension of the Soviet-US agreement affect bridge-building elsewhere in Eastern Europe?

FMB_{ms}.

Francis M. Bator

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Cy. Bator
File

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 19, 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Soviet Blockage of United States
Exhibit under Exchanges Program.

Recommendation

That you approve the action proposed in alternative
(1) discussed below.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion

*President approved at luncheon meeting, July 19.
S/S informed per WWR
BFS*

The current Exchanges Agreement with the Soviet Union, signed March 19, provides for a reciprocal exchange of two specified exhibits. The first United States exhibit, "Hand Tools - USA", is scheduled to open in the Soviet Union August 1. Although preliminary discussions in Moscow had led, by the end of June, to full oral agreement on exhibit sites and dates, the Soviets have since refrained from either signing the formal contract for the exhibit or issuing visas to exhibit personnel.

Given recent cancellation of Soviet participation in two athletic events scheduled for later this month (although some other activities have continued on schedule) as well as the mounting Soviet propaganda campaign following the POL bombings at Haiphong and Hanoi, it is entirely possible that the Soviets will not permit the United States exhibit to open in the present period. This would constitute failure to comply with an explicit provision of the Exchanges Agreement in sufficient time to permit completion of the exhibit in 1966.

Failure to respond effectively to the Soviet move would have a very serious effect on the integrity of the Exchanges Agreement so recently concluded and would imply acceptance of the Soviet contention that United States actions in Vietnam justify Soviet actions against the

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-199
By ing NARA, Date 5-12-89

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- 2 -

Exchanges Agreement. At the same time, I believe that our response should neither be so categorical as to prevent easy revival of a normal exchanges program upon later Soviet compliance nor so sweeping as to affect other activities in which we have an interest.

Either of the following responses would, I believe, be suitable:

1. We would inform the Soviet Government that their failure to comply in a timely manner with an important provision of the Exchanges Agreement has the effect of a suspension of the agreement on their part. We will, consequently, suspend new activities for which it provides until such time as the Soviet Government resumes compliance with the agreement.

2. We would inform the Soviet Government, as in (1) above, that we consider the agreement to be suspended by them as a consequence of their action. We would, however, not suspend all activities but would inform them that we will engage in exchange activities only on an ad hoc basis as our interests dictate. This would affect exchanges of high priority to the Soviets, such as those in science and technology. It would be understood that we would largely curtail exchanges activities, in order that the substantive effect of our action would be sufficient to press the Soviets to resume compliance with the agreement.

I believe that the first alternative is more suitable, particularly against the background of last year's cancellation of the tour of the musical "Hello, Dolly!" and the recent exchanges agreement negotiations. Suspension of all new exchanges activities would make clear to the Soviets that we will not implement an agreement which they abuse to suit their political purposes.

The second alternative, carried through forcefully, might be effective in putting pressure on the Soviets for compliance with the agreement. However, it would be difficult to enforce a selective cut-back against various pressures from interest groups in the United States.

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- 3 -

Unless the Soviets move affirmatively by about July 20 to permit our exhibit to open, we will be faced with a de facto blockage of a timely opening. Depending upon how the situation develops, it may be useful for Ambassador Kohler to put the Soviet Government on notice as to the consequences of their preventing the exhibit from opening.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, July 20, 1966 -- 1:10 pm

Mr. President:

As the attached sections from George McGhee's speech indicate (see marked passages), he was completely within the bounds of policy in what he said.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

-3-

III

These threats are, moreover, very different from those that nations have known in the past. Modern technology has put at the disposal of mankind fearful weapons capable of destroying civilization. The same technology has given rise to entirely new ways of applying pressure in international affairs. These range from outright aggression to subtle subversive threats aimed at undermining the will of the defenders. This state of affairs imposes the need for constant readiness on our part to deter aggression in all of its various forms.

You have heard it said that NATO's success is solely attributable to the United States nuclear deterrent -- that the NATO organization itself plays only an ancillary role. Quite to the contrary, it is my contention that the United States nuclear deterrent alone cannot prevent war in Europe. The security Europe enjoys today is due primarily, I believe, to the defense organization of the alliance -- the NATO. It is this organization, binding together all of the members of the alliance, that deters aggression by making our common defense "credible" to our opponent.

I do not pretend that the NATO institutions are perfect. Surely many improvements can be made. Indeed, some of these, as a result of the recent Brussels meeting of the North Atlantic Council, are now under consideration. I believe, however, that the basic concepts underlying the NATO are sound -- that they have over the years proved their value. The best evidence of this is the simple fact that the Atlantic area remains intact.

Of the many concepts underlying the NATO, that of most critical importance is the maintenance of an integrated command structure -- both in peacetime and in war -- symbolized at the top by the Supreme Allied Commander. It is this principle which is at stake in the present NATO crisis. In considering the current situation, the NATO countries must not only weigh the intrinsic military value of troops. They must also determine whether or not the troops concerned are in a position to undertake a military role consistent with the requirements for an alliance capable of defending Europe and the Atlantic area.

If the principle of integrated command over forces committed to the common defense were to be generally abandoned, there would be no assurance that a successful defense of Europe could be made.

As the Secretary of State pointed out in a speech last November, our forces operate in the heart of Europe -- many thousands of miles from home. They are -- de facto -- integrated in Europe. We must, therefore, the Secretary said, be sure that we and our allies can act effectively together, that there is prior planning and that all of the necessary relationships between our forces are established in advance.

IV

This is, moreover, related to another matter of great importance, that of the continued presence of United States forces in Europe. I have been in Germany over three years now. I would estimate that there has, during that period, been some flux in the German press and public opinion about American troop withdrawals on an average of at least once a month.

In fact, however, our troop levels have not been reduced, and we have no plans to do so in the future. In order to reassure our German friends, high American officials have -- sometimes it seems to me almost every hour on the hour -- been forced to repeat that our troops will stay here in Germany as long as they are needed and wanted in the common defense. There is no trick about this. We mean what we say. I honestly believe that our German friends could save themselves much anguish -- if they would believe us on this point.

It is true that occasional adjustments arising out of minor reorganizations and the obsolescence of weapons have, from time to time, led to small withdrawals; however, these have been compensated for by increased effectiveness. We have recently made public all of the available facts about a temporary "draw down", the peak of which has now passed, of about 15,000 out of our 225,000 troops. This represents merely a "slippage" in filling vacancies created by transfers out of Germany. This "draw down" was never greater than six percent of our forces, which still leaves our divisions almost double the size of those of other NATO countries. The "draw down" will, moreover, be fully compensated for by the end of the year.

Recently, too, there has been speculation that the United States would automatically withdraw divisions from Germany in the event Soviet divisions are taken out of East Germany. In the first place there has been -- to my knowledge -- no confirmation of Soviet intentions to withdraw. On the contrary, available evidence indicates that the firepower of Soviet troops in East Germany is stronger than ever.

Even if Soviet troop withdrawals did in fact take place, the reaction of the West would not necessarily involve automatic complementary withdrawals. Moving forces 700 miles back to the Soviet Union is scarcely comparable to returning our forces to the continental United States. Naturally, however, if a major withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany were to take place, the alliance would have to consider the new situation thereby created.

V

It is embarrassing to have to talk to friends about money matters, but occasionally one must. A great deal is being said in the German press today about the offset agreement between the Federal Republic and the United States. Some people, I believe, think that this agreement calls on the Federal Government to pay the cost of stationing American troops here. In fact this is not the case. It is the American taxpayer who each year pays the two billion dollars required to support the Seventh Army in Germany -- almost half the amount of the German defense budget.

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to our defense and aid expenditures abroad. Our foreign exchange deficit is of course quite small in comparison to our gross national product of 730 billion dollars. It has, however, subjected us to much criticism -- even from our friends -- and we are determined to balance our international accounts. We had thought that we would be able to do so this year; however, we find that the Viet Nam war is costing us in foreign exchange about one billion dollars. We are, as a result, obliged to continue to make every possible effort to stop our other foreign exchange drains.

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Germany still has until July 1, 1967, to complete the payments offset for the current two-year period, and we have every confidence that she will do so.

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We believe that the basis for our military cooperation in recent years has been a sound one for both of us. We have confidence that Germans will, as a vital part of this cooperation, continue to understand our foreign exchange problem -- and will not wish to profit in foreign exchange from our military presence here. We are always willing to listen to any suggestions the German Government has to make in this connection.

July 20, 1966

PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT

We welcome the constructive statement of the South Vietnamese government made on the 20th anniversary of the 1954 Geneva Accords.

We share their view that the American forces should leave Viet Nam when the North Vietnamese units are withdrawn and terrorist and military actions have ceased.

We also share their view that the objective of our struggle against aggression is to permit the people of South Viet Nam freely to decide their fate on the basis of democratic principles and without external interference.

Wednesday, July 20, 1966 -- 1:20pm

Mr. President:

You asked me to try to get to the bottom of Sen. Fulbright's request for a report on Arkansas VA grant or loan applications in relation to the foreign aid debate.

Doug MacArthur reports that he can only guess it related to "high" VA interest rates versus "low" foreign aid interest rates.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCH NARS, Date 8-17-86

WWRostow:rlh

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 19, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT R. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Senator Fulbright's Request to the Veterans
Administration Regarding Arkansas Applications
for Grants or Loans

With reference to the attached White House memorandum of July 15, 1966, discreet inquiry has failed to reveal the purpose of Senator Fulbright's request to the Veterans Administration regarding Arkansas applications for grants or loans. However, if his request is in fact related to the AID Bill Senate debate, he may have in mind making some point about "high" interest rates charged on loans for veterans who have made such great sacrifices as contrasted with the "low" interest rates we charge on AID loans. If he were so inclined, he could probably tie in the veterans' angle with Vietnam in a sense derogatory to what we are doing there.

I have discussed the above, which is necessarily speculative, with Dave Bell, who does not see any angle other than that of interest rates.

Douglas MacArthur II

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-199
By sig, NARA, Date 7-8-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b²) (u) 1316
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1966
6:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

The attached was addressed to Bill
Driver of Veterans Administration
from Senator Fulbright. I think
you will find the content of Senator
Fulbright's inquiry of interest.

Marvin

*Roston
get to McArthur
for comment*
C

Addressed to William Driver from Senator Fulbright

I urgently need a report from you regarding Arkansas applications for grants or loans, for whatever purpose, pending before your agency as of June 30, 1966, or some other convenient current date. Please send me a list of such applications showing:

1. Name and location of the applicant,
2. Purpose of the requested grant and/or loan,
3. The amount requested by the applicant, with separate totals for grants and loans.

This information is needed for use during debate on foreign aid legislation scheduled to begin in the Senate on Monday, July 18.

As affects VA -- they have no idea why they should have any affect on this at all. As far as VA is concerned they should only have a couple of loans maybe, direct loans, which would be rural loans which they couldn't get through regular normal means. We're talking about maybe 30-40,000 dollars on the outside. So apparently this is something that he is sending to every agency in Washington and I just wanted him to have it for informational purposes.

Wednesday, July 20, 1966 -- 1:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

As my young Japanese friend, Kei Wakazumi, left he said, with some emotion: "I shall never let you or your country down. This was one of the great experiences of my life."

Your meeting him was not only gracious but, I believe, useful.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, July 20, 1966
6:30 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

At your 11 o'clock meeting Ambassador McGhee is expected to raise the following suggestions:

1. The domestic political situation in Germany following Erhard's defeat in the North Rhine-Westphalia elections of July 10;
2. The offset problem which Ambassador McGhee thinks is the major irritant in U.S.-German relations;
3. The NATO problem, particularly as it affects Germany.

For W. W. Rostow
Brouley Smith

Do you wish anyone else to be present at the meeting?

Rusk _____

Rostow _____

No one _____

Wednesday, July 20, 1966
11:10 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Prime Minister Wilson's message to you about his economic package.

It sounds tough enough to buy some time.

But we have our work cut out for us to try to develop a package which would:

- Hold Britain to the minimum essential positions east of Suez;
- Hold the BAOR in Germany;
- Give Germany enough, perhaps via the nuclear issue, so that Bonn is willing to offset BAOR foreign exchange costs and work with Britain and us closely across the board.

Such a package is being designed and will shortly be coming forward.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-9-98

Secret

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, July 20, 1966

FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON

TO THE PRESIDENT

In my message to you last night, I purposely said nothing about our current economic problems because I was going straight into a full discussion with the Cabinet, on the basis of the very drastic studies made to give effect to my statement of last Thursday.

My colleagues and I have now examined these in detail and I shall be making a further statement about them in the House this afternoon. So I now write to let you know how I see the basic issues and how we propose to tackle them. I need not trouble you with the details. John Stevens will go over these with Francis Bator.

We all realize the basic problem that confronts us, namely that our spending and our costs must be brought under control: and that this will mean some real suffering for both the public and the private sectors. To do the trick, the package of measures which I am announcing must have -- and will have -- a very hard disinflationary impact. In particular, we have decided on a total standstill for the next six months on prices and incomes and on a further six months period of very severe restraint in that field. Of course, no one in Britain will like these measures, especially the wage freeze. But I am convinced that public opinion here now accepts the need for drastic sacrifice and that, in this mood, it will rise to the challenge.

But if we are to ask the British public to cooperate willingly over the sacrifices essential to put our economy to rights, they must equally be satisfied that they are not being asked to carry a disproportionate share of the general cost of Western defense. We cannot, in imposing these measures at home, avoid also reducing our Government expenditure overseas, civil and military and including defense expenditure in Germany as well as elsewhere. But I am telling Parliament that any cut of this nature should not affect the basic lines of foreign policy on which the defense review was founded. This means that they must be consistent with our international commitments and with our common policy in defense of Western interests throughout the world. I hope we can discuss the problem together in this spirit when we meet next week.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority UK Guidelines
By pw, NARA. Date 3-26-98~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - July 19, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Javits Amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill

Senator Javits has introduced a mischievous amendment to the AID bill (Tab A) requiring suspension of all assistance to any OAS government which came into power by unconstitutional means unless you find such action contrary to the national security interest.

The Javits amendment is mischievous because --

- It transforms the character of the Alliance for Progress from a multilateral program to a program subject to unilateral U. S. decision based on internal political factors.
- It sets you up as the sole judge of whether a coup in Latin America is good or bad and whether our aid should flow or not.
- It may stir up another hue and cry in Latin America equal to the reaction last fall to the Selden Resolution.
- It could poison -- if not kill -- the present good climate for the OAS summit meeting.

For the past two days State has been trying to get Senator Javits to modify his amendment to the point where the Administration can live with it. Yesterday the Senator accepted a "compromise" formula suggested by State (Tab B). The "compromise" formula in my judgment is not a good one because it is open to most of the same objections to the original Javits version.

It is academic anyway because Javits today switched back to the substance of his original proposal.

The time has come to move energetically against the Javits amendment. Among the things we might do are --

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-198
By inf, NARA, Date 1-20-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

- Ask David Rockefeller to call Javits to request that he either withdraw or radically amend his proposal.
- Marshall our forces in the Senate to kill the amendment on the Floor.
- Come out publicly against it and induce the Latin Americans to raise a hue and cry with a view to putting added pressure for Senate defeat.
- As a last resort insure that the House opposes the amendment until the Senate conferees back down.

Bill Moyers and I recommend that you ask Larry O'Brien to take to the field against the amendment.

/s/
W. W. Rostow

Approve O'Brien working
against the amendment _____

Prefer to follow another
course, speak to me _____

Attachments

Javits Amendment to AID Bill - Tab A.

State's "Compromise" Formula to Amendment - Tab B.

already
lowey

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JAVITS AMENDMENT

No assistance shall be furnished under this Act to any member state of the Organization of American States, the government of which heretofore has entered or hereafter enters into power by the unconstitutional overthrow of a freely-elected democratic government which has been acting in accordance with its constitutional mandate, if after consultation among the members of the Organization of American States, the President finds that such government does not intend to take appropriate steps within a reasonable time for the restoration of constitutional government, the holding of free elections and the application of human and civil rights and liberties until (1) the President is satisfied that such government intends to take such appropriate steps, or (2) the President has determined that the furnishing of such assistance is essential to the national interest of the United States, and reports to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and to the Speaker of the House within 30 days accordingly.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-398
By cb, NARA Date 10-20-00

Mr. Rostow

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Pres file

~~SECRET~~

July 19, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Moroccan King Hassan plans to come to the UN General Assembly in late November or early December and has asked whether he could drop down to see you. The normal procedure if you see a head of state visiting the UN is just to have him for lunch and an hour's talk. We have told our ambassadors to discourage these visitors from expecting to see you, and we do not have any reason to expect any heavy influx this fall.

I think this would be a good way to handle Hassan since we are not ready to invite him for another official visit. He has angled for a meeting ever since you took office, and we have stalled him off each time. During his 1963 state visit, President Kennedy made a special effort to get close to him [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] Hassan wants to feel equally close to you.

My first inclination was to discourage this because you tentatively have two visitors each in November and December. He might not even come to the UN if he were not sure of seeing you at the same time. However, an hour's talk and a lunch might save you a more formal visit next year. He is one of the moderate Arab-Africans we want to support. He has been good on Vietnam and moderate on Israel. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] He has closed out Soviet military aid (though he probably will make a long-deferred Moscow visit early this fall).

3.4(b)(1)

A larger reason for seeing him is that this, coupled with Bourguiba's visit early next year, will give you a good crack at troublesome North Africa. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya are a natural grouping for economic cooperation. Oil, natural gas and minerals in the Sahara are ripe for common exploitation. One thing holds them back--Algeria. While Boumedienne is less menacing than Ben Bella was, neither Bourguiba nor Hassan trusts him with his Soviet-equipped army, and we are fighting to keep out of an arms race there. We want to encourage these countries to work together, and Ambassador Korry will be giving you some suggestions in a couple of days in reporting on your African program. This would give you a chance to weigh in.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

I recommend you authorize Ambassador Tasca to tell the King you would hope to see him if he comes to the UN. But we would tell Tasca to explain your especially heavy schedule this fall and ask to defer making definite plans until later.

W. W. Rostow

Approve having Hassan, schedule permitting _____

Too busy _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~

137

Tuesday, July 19, 1966
1:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a note from Francis Bator on the possible Soviet cancellation of our Hand Tools Exhibit in the USSR. Sec. Rusk will raise this matter at lunch today.

Also attached is Sec. Rusk's recommendation that you authorize the Department of State to inform the Soviet government that we would be willing to conclude the US-Soviet Civil Air Agreement in November or December of this year. This also may come up at lunch.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-202
By sig. NARA, Date 8-29-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 19, 1966

Urgent(for today's luncheon meeting)

WWR --

I showed a rough draft of this to Francis (who was leaving his office for a series of meetings), and he is in general agreement. He told me to initial it for him.

You may wish to send this to the President or handle it orally -- perhaps ask the questions yourself.

N. Davis



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By pw, NARA, Date 7-9-98

July 19, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Soviet-US Exchange Program

At lunch today Secretary Rusk may discuss the possible cancellation of our hand tools exhibit in the USSR. The Russians have been dragging their feet on visas for exhibit personnel, and giving us the run-around on arrangements. They may wish to punish us on Vietnam and to protect themselves from the danger of "collaboration" with the U.S. Cancellation of the hand tools exhibit would be a clear violation of the exchange agreement.

Kohler proposes he tell Gromyko we have concluded from the Russians' actions on the track meet and exhibit that they are not prepared to carry out exchanges which "attract public attention." Therefore,

-- we view performing arts and sports exchanges as suspended;

-- we shall negotiate attendance at scientific congresses on a case-by-case basis; and

if there are more Soviet violations, we reserve the right to reexamine our obligation further.

(Kohler cautions against declaring the whole agreement invalid because it would 1) probably cause the Soviets to cut off Amerika magazine (which is covered by the agreement) and 2) risk Soviet resumption of VOA jamming.)

The people at State think Kohler's proposal does not punish the Soviets enough. They believe

-- a suspension of performing arts exchanges would actually buttress the Russians' public stand of "non-collaboration" with us.

-- it would leave technical exchanges intact, and these are the ones the Soviets have most interest in.

-- we would have trouble enforcing a case-by-case negotiation of attendance at scientific congresses because of pressures from the

American scientific community.

Instead, State proposes a suspension of all new activities -- more sweeping, and also more risky than Kohler's proposal.

If Secretary Rusk should raise this question at lunch, you may want to ask:

a) At what level we are pressing the Soviets on hand tools (visas, etc.) before we tell them we are retaliating. (I am not sure Kohler or Thompson has yet intervened strongly.)

b) How serious are our losses if we make a soft reply -- by accepting Kohler's formula?

c) What is the Secretary's evaluation of the effect on your peace posture at home and in Europe if we suspend all new activities under the exchange program?

d) Are we sure the Soviets have no come-back which would obscure their clear violation of the agreement?

e) Can we hold the level of retaliation at "new activities," or do we risk counter-retaliation against the sections of the agreement we want to preserve -- such as Amerika magazine?

f) How much would the partial suspension of the Soviet-US agreement affect bridge-building elsewhere in Eastern Europe?

FMB_{ms}

Francis M. Bator

2397
137c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: U.S.-Soviet Civil Air Agreement

Recommendation:

I recommend that you authorize the Department of State to inform the Soviet Government that we would be willing to conclude the U.S.-Soviet Civil Air Agreement in November or December of this year.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

In discussions about U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations, Soviet officials have sharply criticized us for talking about our desire to improve bilateral relations without being willing to take the steps which would make such an improvement possible. They cite the Consular Convention and the Civil Air Agreement as examples.

When we signed the Consular Convention in 1964, we decided that its ratification should precede conclusion of the Civil Air Agreement, which was initialled in 1961 but not signed because of developments in Berlin. This allocation of priorities is now unrealistic. The Consular Convention is now before the Senate, but it is unlikely that the Senate will approve it in the foreseeable future. It is similarly unlikely that the Senate will act on our East-West trade legislation this year. In general, therefore, our bilateral relations will have in coming months what Brezhnev has called "a tendency toward freezing."

We must find some way to give positive content to our repeated professions that we desire an improvement in bilateral relations.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 87-199
By lig, NARA, Date 7-8-88

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-2-

Probably the only feasible proposal which we can make at this time which the Soviets will recognize as significant is conclusion of the Air Agreement. We negotiated this Agreement in 1961 because we believed that it would promote our efforts to develop contacts between Soviet citizens and Americans. Weekly Aeroflot flights to New York would remove a major barrier to increased Soviet tourism to the U.S. -- the problem of foreign exchange. Many West European countries have had civil air agreements with the U.S.S.R. for some time. Japan has just concluded one. The Canadians will complete negotiations in the near future.

The advantages of signing a Civil Air Agreement are the same now as they were in 1961. We believe that the Soviet Government also continues to be keenly interested in concluding such an Agreement and in beginning air service.

We believe that even though the Consular Convention is not ratified, the Civil Air Agreement should be signed in November or December of this year, so that Pan American and Aeroflot can begin reciprocal flights in the spring of 1967.



Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, July 19, 1966 -- 5:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

I had no contacts with the press today.

W. W. Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 19, 1966

~~Confidential~~

Routing

1. Mr. Kintner ^K - for review of toast (Tab C)
2. Mr. Rostow ^{CR} - for approval and signature.
~~I am removing toast as unsatisfactory~~
now revised + potentially good W
3. Mr. Jones - to add guest list (Tab D)
and forward to the President.

WGBowdler

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCS NARS, Late 8-17-86

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

140a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - July 19, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Barrientos Lunch

President-elect Barrientos is coming to Washington in a private capacity to address the International Platform Association on July 22. He will have limited official substantive conversations with State and Department of Defense while here, but none are contemplated with you.

During the course of the luncheon he may raise several current issues in United States-Bolivian relations. Guidance for your response -- together with points you might raise -- are at Tab A. He understands English better than he speaks it. An interpreter will be on hand.

You will find Barrientos rather youthful, vigorous and outgoing. He is a staunch friend of the U.S. He is proud of his Indian heritage and deeply interested in the plight of the Indian population. A biographic sketch is at Tab B.

Suggested points for a toast are at Tab C.

The guest list is at Tab D.

W. A. R.
W. A. R. Rostow

Attachments -

Talking points	-	Tab A
Biographic sketch	-	Tab B
Points for toast	-	Tab C
Guest list	-	Tab D.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 95-320
By *ip*, NARA, Date 4-5-96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~TALKING POINTS

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-395
By cb, NARA Date 9-29-99

Points Barrientos is Likely to Raise1. Economic Assistance:

He may express interest in increased amounts of economic assistance (Bolivia has received close to \$450 million since 1952 -- see attached table for breakdown).

You might congratulate him that Bolivia during the last two years has shifted use of foreign aid from budget support to economic development, and indicate that we expect to continue our AID program but not for budget support.

2. Tin Sales:

He may say that GSA sales of tin from our stockpile have a depressing effect on world tin prices and request that we stop selling when the world price falls below \$1.75.

You might explain -- as our Embassy has done repeatedly -- that we cannot support a floor for tin as sales follow, rather than lead, the market and must be responsive to domestic needs as well as foreign policy considerations.

3. Tin Smelter

He may ask for help in building a tin smelter -- a national goal for many years.

You might point out that under our AID program we continue to study the tin smelting problem but have still not found a process for economic smelting of Bolivian ores in Bolivia.

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
-2-

4. Military Assistance

He may mention Bolivia's need for more grant aid to modernize the 15,000-man Army and Air Force.

You may reply that, according to our estimates under current U. S. policy, our present military aid is sufficient to meet Bolivia's internal defense requirements.

5.



3.4(b)(1), (6)

Points You May Wish to Raise

1. His Election: Congratulate him on his victory and indicate that his margin gives him an opportunity to place competent and dedicated men in his reform cabinet. Also note his decision to invite OAS observers.
2. OAS and UN Support : Express our appreciation for Bolivia's continued support in the two bodies, particularly on OAS peace-keeping in the DR.
3. Progress Under the Alliance: Note satisfaction with Bolivia's efforts under the Alliance, e. g. . broad agrarian reform program, encouragement of free enterprise, efforts to modernize and make profitable the nationalized tin mines, and broad program to bring the Indian into the mainstream of national economic and political life.

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B O L I V I A

U.S. Assistance 1952-1966

TOTAL - \$433.2 millionLoans - \$107.2 million.

Highway development
Nationalized tin mines (COMIBOL)
Intermediate credit institutions.

Grants - \$218.0 million.

Budget support - \$111.7 million.
Technical assistance - \$ 60.3 million.
Development National Petroleum
Agency - \$ 10.0 million.
Support agricultural development
(Bolivian Department Corp.) - \$ 36.0 million.

PL 480 - \$ 76.0 million.

Voluntary Agency Food Distrib-
ution Program
Local currency generations for
development of Santa Cruz
area, and nationalized tin
mines.

MAP - \$ 16.0 million.Social Progress Trust Fund (IDB) - \$ 16.0 million.

Colonization
Housing
University education.

CONFIDENTIAL

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

President-elect Rene Barrientos Ortuno

President-elect Rene BARRIENTOS Ortuno is proud of his native Bolivian origin. His mother was an Indian; his father of Spanish descent. He spoke Quechua (a native Indian tongue) before Spanish. This kind of background has remained important to the president-elect, for he feels it has enabled him to understand the plight of the Indian and humble folk of Bolivia, an asset which redounds to his benefit in obtaining political support.

Barrientos' career has led him far from his native province of Cochabamba. As an officer in the Bolivian Air Force, he trained in the United States during 1944-45 at the Moore Army Airfield, Mission, Texas, and at Randolph Field, Texas. He has also served his government in Washington, D. C. As General in command of the Air Force, his interest in politics grew rapidly. In November, 1964, he co-led the overthrow of former President Paz after Paz had altered the constitution to permit himself a third term, and after accepting Barrientos as his Vice-President. Since then he served, until about six months ago, first as President, then as co-President of the military junta with the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, General Alfredo Ovando. It was during this period that his energy, ambition and charisma made him the hero of the day and the President-elect at the age of 47.

His announced policies are to continue the social and economic measures which were begun in the early revolutionary years of the Paz administration. He is dedicated to his people and to finding practical solutions to their severe and acute problems. He enjoys mixing with the masses, talking to miners, and has been in part successful in convincing them to follow his program rather than the communists who had made significant gains in the mining communities. A good friend of the United States, he wholeheartedly endorses the goals of the Alliance for Progress which he incorporated into his campaign talks, especially directed to the Indians. He erected Alliance for Progress posters in Bolivian Schools in Quechua, adding the ancient motto, "Do not lie; do not steal; and do not be lazy."

He is not a desk man. He is impatient with paper work and involved details. He is at his best "out on the hustings." Therefore, for his administration to prosper he must surround himself with the best administrative talent he can find. Much will depend upon his choice of cabinet ministers.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 7-9-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

The President-elect's attitude toward the military in politics is a bit paradoxical for he strongly urges young officers to concentrate on becoming good officers and to disassociate themselves from political groups. He has told many to think of and work for Bolivia's needs over ten-year periods, not ten-month intervals.

He opposes the extreme positions of conservatives and communists; but he cannot be characterized as a deep political thinker. He has a liberal and humanitarian orientation as well as a penchant for prompt and proper performance, efficiency and discipline.

The problems which Bolivia faces are formidable, and although Barrientos appears to understand them and seems prepared to deal with them, he will need the strong support of a capable and qualified cabinet.

General Barrientos is married to the former Rosemary Galindo and has five small children.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VISIT OF PRESIDENT-ELECT BARRIENTOS
OF BOLIVIA

July 20, 1966

Suggested Points for Toast

Mr. President-elect, you and the distinguished members of your party honor us by this visit. "Bienvenidos a esta casa".

We followed the recent elections in Bolivia with keen interest. We took special note of your decision to invite the OAS to send observers. We share the satisfaction and pride of all Bolivians in this triumph of the democratic process.

We are pleased with Bolivia's support for the Alliance for Progress and what is being done to make it a reality for Bolivians in all walks of life. I am particularly gratified by your personal interest in the welfare of the Indian population.

There are two visions for the great Andean area where the Indian populations are concentrated.

The communist vision is to convert the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of South America -- to transform the area and its people into a redoubt of subversion, insurrection and conquest by force and violence.

Our vision is to open up the heartland of the continent as a new frontier for the Alliance for Progress -- to harness the rivers, to pierce the mountains, to build the highways, and to open new farm lands by working together in peace and freedom, ~~and to permit those who have long lived in the high lands to fashion for themselves a modern and~~ Bolivia stands at the crossroads of such an endeavor. *productive life!*

You are not a stranger in our land but an old friend and trusted partner.

I know you won your pilot wings the hard way, training at Moore and Randolph Fields in Texas. I understand that those wings have also been of service to you in politics, ~~on one occasion being the margin of difference between you and a bullet fired by a political opponent.~~ I would like to think, therefore, that Texas is in part responsible for our pleasure in having you in our midst today.

I ask you to raise your glasses in his honor and join me in wishing him well as he soon assumes responsibility for guiding the destinies of the Bolivian people.

- permitting you to go among your people at the controls of your own plane.

*Working with your country -
and its neighbors -
We are playing our part
in helping*

Tuesday, July 19, 1966
9:05 a. m.

Mr. President:

Averell has gotten a nibble on the Cambodian line and it looks as though he will be going there in September.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-202
By inf NARA, Date 8-29-89

~~Confidential~~

WWRostow:rln

14.2
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

PERSONAL - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 18, 1966


MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WALT W. ROSTOW

The White House

You will see from **the** attached message from the Australian Embassy at Phnom Penh that Prince Sihanouk has reacted favorably to my letter.

In a personal conversation the Prince has suggested I might come in September after DeGaulle's visit and prior to the Prince's vacation in France.

The President may be interested in this. As you know, he asked that we undertake to get in touch with Sihanouk.

W. Averell  Harriman

cc: Mr. Bill Moyers

PERSONAL - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By W, NARA, Date 7-9-98

114

CANBERRA

18 JULY 66 (1435)

18 JULY 66 (0945)

RESTRICTED PRIORITY

425

WASHINGTON 114 (CANBERRA PLS PASS)

AMERICAN CAMBODIAN RELATIONS

MY TELEGRAM 422 TO CANBERRA (111 TO WASHINGTON).

2. AT NATIONAL CONGRESS THIS MORNING 18TH JULY
PRINCE SIHANOUK ANNOUNCED THAT MR HARRIMAN WOULD BE COMING
TO CAMBODIA FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM AND THAT HE WOULD
BE VERY WELCOME.

PLEASE ADVISE STATE DEPARTMENT.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-9-98

HE MIN RE/RL PR/CB DR/P'A AJSS

I.4573

142
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-9-98

July 19, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

When Ambassador Bernbaum was here, we talked about both events in Venezuela and the relations between our two countries.

I was most encouraged by his report of the excellent economic, social, and political progress which Venezuela is making under your leadership.

He told me as well that, although there are matters of mutual interest which remain to be discussed or negotiated between our Governments, he is confident that these matters will be treated with cordiality and mutual understanding as befits two nations which have enjoyed traditionally friendly and constructive relations over the years.

I was particularly gratified by his account of the personal interest which you took in arranging for Venezuela's generous donation of rice for refugees in South Vietnam. This is a humanitarian act in the highest tradition of international cooperation, and one of which Venezuela may indeed be proud. Your contribution will do much to ameliorate the hunger and suffering of the innocent victims of the Communist aggression in South Vietnam.

In addition to these topics, Ambassador Bernbaum also informed me of your views regarding the possibility of holding a meeting of American Presidents later this year. I value these opinions greatly since they represent the views of a Government which is in the forefront of political and economic democracy in Latin America and the Alliance for Progress effort. I have followed closely Venezuela's pioneering efforts in industry, rural, and urban development.

I share your judgment that if the meeting is to be worthwhile, it will require careful preparation with a view to achieving concrete results. In this regard, our Chargé recently communicated to you through your Minister of Foreign Affairs my own deep interest in such a meeting.

- 2 -

One purpose of this letter is to assure you that I would welcome having from you personally any specific suggestions or recommendations regarding the meeting, and especially concerning proposals which you and your Government believe should be considered. I believe that a full exchange of ideas among all of us in the Hemisphere will be an essential element in preparing for a successful conference.

Please accept my warmest best wishes for the continued prosperity and happiness of the Venezuelan people, and for you personally.

Sincerely,

151
LBJ

His Excellency
Raul Leoni
President of Venezuela
Caracas

LBJ: WGB:WWR:mmm

Monday, July 18, 1966 - 3:20 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Venezuelan President Leoni

In line with your interest in developing a dialogue by correspondence with selected chiefs of state, we have prepared the attached letter to President Leoni for your consideration. Linc Gordon has reviewed it.

To date in Latin America you have sent letters to President Castello Branco of Brazil and President Illia of Argentina. We are thinking of letters to Belaunde in Peru, Mendez Montenegro in Guatemala and Lleras Restrepo in Colombia.

Leoni is one of the key figures in the new generation of democratic, reform-minded Latin American leaders. Venezuela is helpful to us on hemisphere and world issues. The only problem of any consequence in our relations is the Venezuelan oil imports question, and this continues under friendly discussion. The reference in the third paragraph to "matters of mutual interest which remain to be discussed or negotiated" is to this subject.

W. W. Rostow

143

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - July 19, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Barrientos Lunch

President-elect Barrientos is coming to Washington in a private capacity to address the International Platform Association on July 22. He will have limited official substantive conversations with State and Department of Defense while here, but none are contemplated with you.

During the course of the luncheon he may raise several current issues in United States-Bolivian relations. Guidance for your response -- together with points you might raise -- are at Tab A. He understands English better than he speaks it. An interpreter will be on hand.

You will find Barrientos rather youthful, vigorous and outgoing. He is a staunch friend of the U. S. He is proud of his Indian heritage and deeply interested in the plight of the Indian population. A biographic sketch is at Tab B.

Suggested points for a toast are at Tab C.

The guest list is at Tab D.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments -

Talking points	- Tab A
Biographic sketch	- Tab B
Points for toast	- Tab C
Guest list	- Tab D.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-9-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BOLIVIA

U.S. Assistance 1952-1966

TOTAL - \$433.2 millionLoans - \$107.2 million.

Highway development
 Nationalized tin mines (COMIBOL)
 Intermediate credit institutions.

Grants - \$218.0 million.

Budget support - \$111.7 million.
 Technical assistance - \$ 60.3 million.
 Development National Petroleum
 Agency - \$ 10.0 million.
 Support agricultural development -
 (Bolivian Department Corp.) \$ 36.0 million.

PL 480 - \$ 76.0 million.

Voluntary Agency Food Distrib-
 ution Program
 Local currency generations for
 development of Santa Cruz
 area, and nationalized tin
 mines.

MAP - \$ 16.0 million.Social Progress Trust Fund (IDB) - \$ 16.0 million.

Colonization
 Housing
 University education.

Tab B 113c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 7-9-98

President-elect Rene Barrientos Ortuno

President-elect Rene BARRIENTOS Ortuno is proud of his native Bolivian origin. His mother was an Indian; his father of Spanish descent. He spoke Quechua (a native Indian tongue) before Spanish. This kind of background has remained important to the president-elect, for he feels it has enabled him to understand the plight of the Indian and humble folk of Bolivia, an asset which redounds to his benefit in obtaining political support.

Barrientos' career has led him far from his native province of Cochabamba. As an officer in the Bolivian Air Force, he trained in the United States during 1944-45 at the Moore Army Airfield, Mission, Texas, and at Randolph Field, Texas. He has also served his government in Washington, D. C. As General in command of the Air Force, his interest in politics grew rapidly. In November, 1964, he co-led the overthrow of former President Paz after Paz had altered the constitution to permit himself a third term, and after accepting Barrientos as his Vice-President. Since then he served, until about six months ago, first as President, then as co-President of the military junta with the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, General Alfredo Ovando. It was during this period that his energy, ambition and charisma made him the hero of the day and the President-elect at the age of 47.

His announced policies are to continue the social and economic measures which were begun in the early revolutionary years of the Paz administration. He is dedicated to his people and to finding practical solutions to their severe and acute problems. He enjoys mixing with the masses, talking to miners, and has been in part successful in convincing them to follow his program rather than the communists who had made significant gains in the mining communities. A good friend of the United States, he wholeheartedly endorses the goals of the Alliance for Progress which he incorporated into his campaign talks, especially directed to the Indians. He erected Alliance for Progress posters in Bolivian Schools in Quechua, adding the ancient motto, "Do not lie; do not steal; and do not be lazy."

He is not a desk man. He is impatient with paper work and involved details. He is at his best "out on the hustings." Therefore, for his administration to prosper he must surround himself with the best administrative talent he can find. Much will depend upon his choice of cabinet ministers.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

The President-elect's attitude toward the military in politics is a bit paradoxical for he strongly urges young officers to concentrate on becoming good officers and to disassociate themselves from political groups. He has told many to think of and work for Bolivia's needs over ten-year periods, not ten-month intervals.

He opposes the extreme positions of conservatives and communists; but he cannot be characterized as a deep political thinker. He has a liberal and humanitarian orientation as well as a penchant for prompt and proper performance, efficiency and discipline.

The problems which Bolivia faces are formidable, and although Barrientos appears to understand them and seems prepared to deal with them, he will need the strong support of a capable and qualified cabinet.

General Barrientos is married to the former Rosemary Galindo and has five small children.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VISIT OF PRESIDENT-ELECT BARRIENTOS
OF BOLIVIA

July 20, 1966

Suggested Points for Toast

Mr. President-elect, you and the distinguished members of your party honor us by this visit. "Bienvenidos a esta casa".

We followed the recent elections in Bolivia with keen interest. We took special note of your decision to invite the OAS to send observers. We share the satisfaction and pride of all Bolivians in this triumph of the democratic process.

We are pleased with Bolivia's support for the Alliance for Progress and what is being done to make it a reality for Bolivians in all walks of life. I am particularly gratified by your personal interest in the welfare of the Indian population.

There are two visions for the great Andean area where the Indian populations are concentrated.

The communist vision is to convert the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of South America -- to transform the area and its people into a redoubt of subversion, insurrection and conquest by force and violence.

Our vision is to open up the heartland of the continent as a new frontier for the Alliance for Progress -- to harness the rivers, to pierce the mountains, to build the highways, and to open new farm lands by working together in peace and freedom.

Bolivia stands at the crossroads of such an endeavor.

You are not a stranger in our land but an old friend and trusted partner.

I know you won your pilot wings the hard way, training at Moore and Randolph Fields in Texas. I understand that those wings have also been of service to you in politics, on one occasion being the margin of difference between you and a bullet fired by a political opponent. I would like to think, therefore, that Texas is in part responsible for our pleasure in having you in our midst today.

I ask you to raise your glasses in his honor and join me in wishing him well as he soon assumes responsibility for guiding the destinies of the Bolivian people.

TAB D
BLANK

**Presidential guest list for Barrientos Visit - Luncheon
July 20, 1966 is maintained by Bess Abell without
any distribution of copies.**

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-200

By ig NARA, Date 3-15-89~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 19, 1966 - 7:35pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: An appropriate U. S. reaction to Mrs. Gandhi's
action in Moscow

All hands are agreed that it was a great mistake for her to appear to agree with the substance of Moscow's line against us. Chet Bowles has written her a scorching personal letter. The Secretary has sent out a very strong cable and has also talked turkey to their Minister, P.K. Banerjee here.

Our preliminary impression is that the staff she had with her in Moscow was not sufficiently sharp to make the distinction between Soviet propaganda verbiage, which they do not take seriously, and Soviet policy statements, which they do. She no doubt wanted very much to get the Soviets to pressure Hanoi, and she may have felt constrained to go along with them on the communique in the hope that this would draw them along to encourage talks. As we gain a clearer understanding of what really happened, we shall keep you informed.

Our response: While our response has been very strong in private, we have correctly avoided expressing any serious annoyance in public. Any public criticism by leaders of the Administration will only strengthen the hand of her Leftist critics who charge her with being subservient to the United States. It will make it harder for her to climb back off her limb.

If there is to be a comment, we could properly point out in a low key that before going to Moscow, she made what we took to be a serious proposal that the fighting in Vietnam be brought to an end by first inducing the Russians and the British to call a Geneva conference. We welcomed this suggestion and sought clarification of certain points from her government. The substance of the Moscow communique suggests a change in the Indian position, but as yet we do not have a clarification. It does appear as if Moscow was not willing to take the initiative she proposed.

The State Department is sending over press guidance for the press conference tomorrow.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, July 19, 1966 - 2PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Demonstrators Attack our Embassy in Warsaw

Ambassador Gronouski reports that a crowd estimated at 500 or more, including 30 uniformed soldiers, gathered in front of the Chancery chanting "fascists," and "criminal Johnson." They carried placards bearing such slogans as "hands off Vietnam," "American go home -- freedom for Vietnam." Police stood idly by when about 50 of the demonstrators broke through the front gate of the Chancery and leisurely smashed the windows. Many windows were broken on the first three floors of the Embassy building.

Uniformed officers and men were seen ripping up pavement blocks which were used to smash windows.

Photographers on the Embassy grounds methodically filmed the demonstrators' activities.

After two phone calls, police reinforcements finally arrived and pushed the crowd out of the Embassy grounds.

Embassy officers lodged strong oral protests to Foreign Ministry officials during the course of the demonstration. A written protest and a statement of damages is being sent to the Foreign Ministry.

Bromley Smith

Bromley Smith

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-202
By *128* NARA, Date *8-29-89*

July 19, 1966

Dear Chet:


Your letter of July 5th got to me today.

I am grateful for your report and your general assessment of the situation and prospects in India.

I note your concern about the connection between supplying lethal military spares to Pakistan and Mrs. Gandhi's political situation. I can assure you that we will bear this aspect of the problem in mind when the matter comes up for decision.

I enjoyed your most interesting statement on July 4th.

Sincerely,



The Honorable
Chester Bowles
United States Ambassador
New Delhi

LBJ:WWR:mm

Monday, July 18, 1966
1:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the quick acknowledgment
of Chet Bowles' letter you requested
this morning.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

146-b

New Delhi, India

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-397
By ias, NARA Date 4-29-99

~~SECRET~~

July 5, 1966

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

I think all of us, and you in particular, have solid reason for satisfaction with developments in the Subcontinent. The purpose of this letter is to comment briefly on developments in India, and to offer my views on one or two still worrisome matters.

Both foreign and domestic observers agree that Mrs. Gandhi's leadership is proving more creative, realistic and decisive than anything India has had since Nehru in the early 1950's.

This should be especially gratifying for us because in almost every instance the thrust of her decisions is in the direction which we have been urging.

Moreover, I believe that the confidence that Mrs. Gandhi has developed in her own capacity and in her relationship with you personally during her visit to Washington has been a key factor in launching her on this affirmative and promising course of action.

If we have a reasonably good monsoon (and it seems to be off to a good start) and if an adequate amount of foreign exchange is made available by the Consortium members we should see an impressive surge of economic growth here within the next twelve months.

Indeed some upward trend in economic activity should be apparent before the national elections now less than eight months away, and if the prices of basic commodities can be held in check Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress Party should come through decisively. This would give India five years to translate what at best is now considered an uncertain developmental experiment into a broadly accepted national economic policy which, with a reasonable measure of good luck, could make India self-sufficient within the next 12 to 15 years.

~~SECRET~~

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At the moment I can foresee only two developments which might block or reverse India's forward movement: one, failure to secure the necessary continuing flow of foreign exchange to support the new liberalization effort and, two, an effective challenge to Mrs. Gandhi's leadership within the Congress Party between now and the elections.

On the latter point, Mrs. Gandhi's performance which we find so gratifying is now generating extremely heavy, although still manageable, political opposition. As you know from your own experience, each important political decision leaves in its wake a number of deeply disgruntled individuals who failed to get their way.

Mrs. Gandhi, in moving ahead forcefully on a number of fronts ranging from devaluation to the division of the Punjab, has overridden many important political interests. Among these is the formidable Congress President Kamaraj who bitterly opposed devaluation because of the political risks in an election year.

Right now the greatest danger to her and to her program lies in the possibility that these old guard political leaders plus the anti-Pakistan "right" will join with the well organized and financed communist and fellow travellers of the left on some issue which could bring about her downfall.

This, frankly, is one of two reasons why I and my associates are so concerned about the possibility that we may resume the shipment of lethal military equipment to Pakistan. If such shipments are resumed, Mrs. Gandhi would be forced by political pressures to adopt a strongly anti-American stance and in so doing would, of course, create a sharply adverse reaction in our Congress and in our press.

This is the best we could expect. At worst Mrs. Gandhi would be swept aside by those who already claim that she is an American stooge. (Even now for example most well informed Indians are convinced that India devalued only at our insistence.)

However logical it may appear in Washington or Karachi to supply at least lethal military spares to Pakistan, the Pakistani infiltration of last August followed by the attack of the U.S.-trained and equipped Pakistan Army has left deep wounds here and for some time at least no amount of effort on our part will persuade the Indians that such a move, even remotely, serves India's interests.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The second reason why we believe that the resumption of lethal shipments to Pakistan would be a mistake is its adverse effect on Pakistan-India relations. Under present circumstances I am convinced that with firm and sensitive pressure on our part the Indian Government will continue to look for ways to ease its differences with Pakistan. This is what Mrs. Gandhi genuinely desires and gradually she is bringing her colleagues into line.

However, the resumption of lethal U.S. military supplies to Pakistan would make any easing of tensions a political impossibility. It would destroy prospects of an accord on the relative size of the two nations' military establishments and eliminate any hope for a new, more tolerable relationship between the Indian Government and the Kashmiris that could help defuse the overall situation.

I disagree with those who assert that we must choose between Pakistan and India. Such a choice overlooks the vital importance of both nations to a stable Asia. However, I do believe that we must decide whether we are going to shape our policy toward India and Pakistan solely in the narrow terms of the Subcontinent or in the context of our larger all-Asian objectives.

On the basis of my long personal and official experience in this part of the world I strongly urge the latter approach. Indeed, I feel that our costly dilemma in Viet-Nam is in large measure the result of the failure of earlier Administrations to create a coherent and realistic Asian strategy, especially during the 1950's when we had far greater flexibility.

With a solid economic and political breakthrough here in India now possible we may have the basis for the first time of a new approach, not simply to the Subcontinent but to Asia as a whole.

The challenge to our diplomacy is to strengthen India's economy and to free Indian leaders from their senseless conflict with Pakistan so that they can play the major constructive role in Asian affairs of which I believe they ultimately may be capable.

Forgive me if I have covered some old ground, but from a distance of 10,000 miles it is difficult to judge what is in people's minds at home.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

With my warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

P.S. Your Fourth of July statement made a great hit at our celebration last night. I am enclosing a copy of my own.

~~SECRET~~

July 19, 1966
Tuesday - 4:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Wilson's candid, negative report on Moscow; although, understandably, he seeks a little comfort at the end.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

~~SECRET~~

147a
July 19, 1966

To The President from Prime Minister Wilson

Before I went to Moscow I told the House of Commons that I could already hear the gibes that would greet my return: and that this in no way affected my belief in the value of meeting the Soviet leaders face to face and trying to bring them to a sense of their responsibilities. As the editorialists lick their pens to describe the failure of the mission, I am returning more convinced than ever that the sort of unsensational relationship that is growing up between Kosygin and myself has real -- if still largely potential -- value.

There is at present no give whatever in the Soviet position (public or private) over Vietnam. Kosygin was quiet (and at all times courteous and friendly) but bitter and tough. He casts you as the bloodthirsty villain of the piece and his purpose is clearly to work for your increasing isolation and friendlessness with world opinion. In a sense, this personalized attack gave me the perfect opportunity to hit back at the outset, and to say in the clearest possible terms how dangerously I thought he was misjudging both you yourself personally and the temper and resolution of the American people. I returned to this theme throughout our talks and it was practically the last thing I said to him as he drove me to the airport this morning.

We had a three-hour formal meeting in the Kremlin yesterday morning and over two hours privately together in the late afternoon. On at least three separate occasions his attitude gave me the opening I needed to press him to intervene with Hanoi over your captured airmen, which I did with vigour. I wish I could report any sign of success. But I am afraid he took a totally unhelpful and indeed contemptuous line about them. It was disheartening to listen to.

If that were all, it might deem fair to accept the superficial judgments in the press. But our long talk alone, while totally unproductive of change in the Soviet attitude, was I believe one of the frankest exchanges Kosygin has yet had with any Western leader. He told me that I could as he put it give you my impressions of his views (while insisting that I must not appear in any way to be involving him in some kind of negotiation with you over Vietnam): and I look forward to doing so on the 29th. In particular he had some interesting and revealing things to say about China. Indeed here, quite clearly, lies the root cause of his problems, coupled with his continuing misconception about your own position. I may have done something to shake him on that. But his obvious sense of frustration

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Authority UK Guidelines, State Guidelines.

By pu, NARA. Date 3-26-98

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2.

stems, I am sure, from the fear that, on the one hand, any Soviet pressure on Hanoi might only drive the North Vietnamese further into the arms of Peking: but, on the other hand, that if Russia is forced, as he said, to remain on the sidelines, the Chinese may do something foolish which could get him into a confrontation with you. In short, he is at present a reluctant micawber. I have left him in no doubt that nothing is going to turn up from me, in terms of a withdrawal of British support from your policies: but that if, at any time, he needs my help or co-operation in getting a negotiation under way, I too, like Dean, will fly anywhere to meet him, at the drop of a hat.

Disarmament was barely mentioned. And on European security, after the standard rigmarole about Germany, he admitted privately that there would have to be careful preparation before any conference, for which he saw no immediate urgency.

On the whole, therefore, a pretty negative balance sheet at present, with no practical dividend to declare. But the time will come, and I feel even surer of this after my visit than I did before, when he will want to make an opening: and when it does, we may both be glad that some of the way has been paved in this fashion.

~~SECRET~~

Briefing Book for NSC Meeting July 19, 1966 -- 11:30 AM

Mr. President:

Papers for the NSC discussion of the World Food Problem:

- 1. A suggested Order of Business (Tab A)**
- 2. Summary of Discussion Paper (Tab B)**
- 3. Discussion Paper prepared by AID Administrator Bell (Tab C)**
- 4. Memorandum from Secretary Rusk on how he plans to get the aid donor countries behind our attack on world hunger (Tab D)**
- 5. List of Invitees (Tab E)**

W. W. Rostow

1. memo
2. memo file 149

Monday, July 18, 1966 - 1:45 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Date of Visit of President Senghor of Senegal

In accordance with an approved schedule of proposed visits, the State Department last May invited President Senghor of Senegal to make a state visit here during July.

It was not possible to work out a mutually acceptable date during July and the visit was postponed.

President Senghor now plans to visit Canada in September. He could come to Washington for an informal visit on September 28/29 - a weekday stopover involving a minimum of your time.

Such an informal visit would take care of an earlier invitation for a state visit. It would also repay Senghor for his hospitality to you when you visited Dakar as Vice President.

Senghor is revered in Africa for his early efforts toward African independence and remains one of the most influential statesmen in French-speaking Africa. His moderating voice is often heard in African and international councils and he has on several occasions expressed his understanding and support of our policy in Vietnam.

I believe, as does the State Department, that the best way to handle this situation is to ask Senghor to make an overnight stopover here on September 28/29 which would include one substantive meeting with you and possibly a luncheon.

President Senghor would see other officials here and would be invited while transiting the U. S., to spend several days visiting places of interest as the guest of the U. S. Government.

I recommend you approve the suggested date.

W. W. Rostow

✓ O. K. to invite for September 28/29

 See me

MEMORANDUM

149a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 16, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

At Tab A, for your approval, is a telegram inviting President Senghor for an informal visit to Washington on September 28-29.

State supports the visit strongly (Tab B). As you know, the proposal fell through for a visit by Senghor in July. He is a good friend and this is the only African visit so far planned for 1966. It will not take much of your time. While the invitation is not a "must", I suggest you do it.

W. Rostow
W. Rostow

Attachments.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

1496

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy DAKAR

Info

Embassy requested deliver following message to President Senghor:

QUOTE: Dear Mr. President:

I am delighted to learn that September 28 and 29, following your visit to Canada, would be a convenient time for you to stop in Washington for an informal visit. It would be a particular pleasure for me to welcome you at that time. I sincerely hope your schedule will permit you to spend several days visiting other parts of the United States as well so that the American people will be able to join me in reciprocating the warm hospitality you extended when I represented the United States in Dakar on the first anniversary of Senegal's independence in 1961.

With warm good wishes,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

END QUOTE.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-202

By ing NARA, Date 8-29-89

Drafted by: 7/13/66

AFNW:RHPelletreau:cyl

Tel. Ext.

4831

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

AF - Ambassador Trimble

Clearances:

AFNW - Amb. McIlvaine RM

S/CPR - Mr. Carter (draft) EP

S/S

White House

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322



10843

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1966

2347

B

149c

1. Hamilton
2. Fed.~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT S. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Invitation to President Senghor of Senegal to make an informal visit to Washington, September 28 and 29.

It is recommended that you approve the enclosed telegram extending an official invitation to President Senghor to visit Washington September 28 and 29.

You will recall that we had extended an invitation to President Senghor of Senegal for a State visit in July. Unfortunately it was not possible to work out a mutually convenient time and the visit had to be postponed.

When Ambassador Mercer Cook made his farewell call, President Senghor mentioned that his visit to Canada was scheduled for September 19-28 and asked if an informal visit to Washington could be arranged just before or just after the Canadian trip. He indicated he would prefer Wednesday-Thursday, September 28-29 which accords with our own preference to have a Washington stopover occur on a weekday.

In addition to being a world renowned poet and philosopher, Senghor is one of the most influential statesmen in French-speaking Africa. His moderating voice is often heard in African and international councils and he has on several occasions expressed his understanding and support of our policy in Vietnam.

Furthermore, of course, he received President Johnson in Dakar when the latter was Vice-President and, as things stand now, he is the only African Chief of State we have invited whose visit is likely to materialize this year.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-199


By ing, NARA, Date 7-8-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

An informal visit is contemplated. It would include one substantive meeting with President Johnson, as well as meetings with the Secretary and other officials and perhaps an official luncheon. If he wishes, President Senghor and his party could then spend several days visiting places of interest in the United States as guests of the U.S. Government. An informal visit of this sort would be most acceptable to President Senghor.

Since he will be transiting the U.S. and we had previously invited him, I strongly recommend that you approve the sort of visit proposed.



Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

1. Suggested telegram to Dakar

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, ^{July}~~April~~ 18, 1966 -- 1:55 p. m.

Mr. President:

I now plan to get the family off for vacation on Martha's Vineyard for two weeks from about August 13 to August 27.

I should like to spend as much of that time as is feasible with them.

I would not go, of course, if a major international crisis were on; and I would remain on call. The question is: May I budget in principle for leave in that period?

W. A. Rostow

Stay home _____

Make it a week _____

Okay in principle for both weeks
but let's see at the time OK ✓

See me _____

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

Monday, July 18, 1966
1:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the agenda for tomorrow's lunch as organized this morning.

The way the ticker's moving this morning, I don't see how we'll be able to avoid talking a little about the pound.

A session with you on the British financial crisis is now contemplated for Tuesday or Wednesday, subject to your wishes.

W. W. Rostow

D 7 1 1 1 1 1
E.O. 12 33, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1933
By DC 68 NARS, Date 8-17-86

WWRostow:rla

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Agenda for Lunch Meeting

Tuesday, July 19, 1966

1. **July 18 Meetings with Joint Atomic Energy Committee and Democratic Policy Committee.** Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara will report.

2. **Peace Feelers.** Sec. Rusk

Organization of State Dept. to follow up (Harriman).

3. **Forthcoming Meeting in Paris of Special Defense Ministers Committee.**
Sec. McNamara

Confirmation of instructions to Sec. McNamara, as earlier agreed, including using this Committee for further discussion of hardware issue in the Alliance.

4. **Non-Proliferation.** Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara

Changes, if any, in U.S. treaty language. Prospects of Soviet acceptance. Effects on Alliance.

5. **U. S. Public Posture in Response to Possibility of Reduction of Soviet Forces in East Germany.** Sec. McNamara

6. **Viet Nam.** Sec. Rusk has some issues to raise, unspecified.

7. **Soviet Relations.** Sec. Rusk

a. Possible cancellation U. S. hand tools exhibit in Moscow.

b. **Civil Air Agreement.**

I will be sending up Secretary Rusk's recommendation during the day.

8. **Other.**

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By DCU NARS, Date 8-17-86

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, July 18, 1966 - 3:20 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Venezuelan President Leoni

In line with your interest in developing a dialogue by correspondence with selected chiefs of state, we have prepared the attached letter to President Leoni for your consideration. Linc Gordon has reviewed it.

To date in Latin America you have sent letters to President Castello Branco of Brazil and President Illia of Argentina. We are thinking of letters to Belaunde in Peru, Mendez Montenegro in Guatemala and Lleras Restrepo in Colombia.

Leoni is one of the key figures in the new generation of democratic, reform-minded Latin American leaders. Venezuela is helpful to us on hemisphere and world issues. The only problem of any consequence in our relations is the Venezuelan oil imports question, and this continues under friendly discussion. The reference in the third paragraph to "matters of mutual interest which remain to be discussed or negotiated" is to this subject.

W. W. Rostow

Monday, July 18, 1966
1:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the quick acknowledgment
of Chet Bowles' letter you requested
this morning.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

July 18, 1966
Monday, 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk recommends
that you see the Thai Ambassador
and receive Prime Minister Thanom's
letter of support for our air strikes
against POL.

I agree this would be desirable.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 18, 1966 - 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, and Fowler held the line and bought us some time at the Democratic Policy Committee session this afternoon.

They made clear that if the German offset holds and the British hold to their military purchase agreements, despite the trouble with the pound, that we shall lose relatively little in foreign exchange due to our European commitments.

I say they bought time because the questioning then turned to the following deeper matters:

- the failure of the Germans and others to maintain forces that match their NATO commitments;
- the failure of the Europeans to support us in Viet-Nam;
- the wisdom, in any case, of bringing some of our European forces back home;
- the question of how we shall solve, Europe or no, our balance of payments problem.

After the session the three Secretaries and I met informally together. The question was this: how can we bring bargaining leverage to bear on the Europeans so that they meet their commitments to us and to each other without forcing a crisis which would endanger the security of Europe and ourselves?

Various possibilities were discussed; but it was agreed that somehow we shall have to force an occasion in which the Finance, Defense, and Foreign Ministers look at the issues involved in the same room at the same time and come to agreed commitments. This is particularly true of the German Government.

I myself feel -- and I so stated -- that if the measures taken on Wednesday by Wilson are sufficient to buy some time for the pound, we must organize this kind of meeting soon and try to get a balanced package which meets the legitimate essential interest of all three countries. I feel that if we go on as we are with piecemeal negotiations we run the grave

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By yw, NARA, Date 3-26-98

~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

risk of a crisis which could unhinge:

- the security structure of the Far East;
- the security structure of Europe;
- the international monetary system.

W. W. Rostow

*Cy Morgan
Kintan*

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - July 18, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Dominican Senate Resolution on IAPF Withdrawal

Last week you asked about the draft resolution introduced in the Dominican Senate condemning foreign intervention, giving the IAPF 25 days to get out, declaring the IAPF members "personae non gratae" and condemning the OAS resolution creating the IAPF. I gave you a status report, indicating that Ambassador Crimmins was checking to see where the resolution stood and what action he might take to keep it bottled up in Committee.

Ambassador Crimmins reported that the Senate last Thursday voted a mild substitute, reflecting Balaguer's decision to go for a watered-down version rather than pressing for defeat of the resolution.

The whereas clauses of the resolution factually trace the background to the withdrawal question from the Institutional Act to the OAS decision on June 24, specifying the 90-day period for departure of the IAPF.

The operative part reads:

"Based on the above and on our patriotic conviction to watch over the faithful compliance of total withdrawal of the IAPF within a period no greater than 90 days, as agreed by the OAS Ad hoc Committee and the Provisional Government, reserving for ourselves the right, in case of non-compliance, to demand the immediate withdrawal of the IAPF through the appropriate legal channel; and second, to condemn any interference by a foreign country in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic."

The second portion is the only unfortunate part. In the Latin American context it represents minimum lip service to the principle of non-intervention and national pride. It also counterbalances the Senate's recognition that the IAPF had a right to remain until the expiration of the 90 day period.

Crimmins reports that the PRD Senators complained that the resolution was too mild and recognized the right of the IAPF to continue in the DR. The resolution has received virtually no publicity, and the issue is off the Senate docket.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

W. W. Rostow

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By W, NARA, Date 7-9-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 18, 1966
Monday - 3:20 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith a reply to Miss Ornacker
who was at the Ranch and wishes
to help Vietnamese orphans.

W. W. Rostow

EXECUTIVE

7P13-2/Supra 157a

WZ1

LG/Austin

CO312

PP5/Johnson, Luci

PP5/Truitt, Pat

FG 105-4

PR18

JUL 21 1966

Dear Miss Ornacker:

It was a great pleasure to have you at the Ranch recently, and I know how much Luci and Pat enjoyed your visit. I am not able to return to Texas as often as I would like, but, when I do, it is always good for Luci's friends to be with us.

I share your deep concern and Mr. Sullivan's for preparing the future leaders of Vietnam in the workings of democracy. It is the young people of Vietnam, including those who have suffered most by being orphaned in childhood, who one day will carry forward the building of their nation, after the aggression has been defeated. Your compassion demonstrates that they will have the support of the American people along this exacting road.

An orphanage in Austin for young Vietnamese is an appealing proposal. I have looked into its desirability. My advisers conclude that, even with the social dislocations that have occurred in Vietnam, it is not wise to uproot orphans from their culture and familiar surroundings for upbringing outside their own country. A prolonged stay in America, from early age onward, is likely to make difficult their return to the life of their homeland.

In carrying forward your work in behalf of Vietnamese orphans, you may wish to consider giving your support to one or more of the private voluntary agencies in America which are actively at work to improve orphanage facilities in Vietnam. For example, you might find interesting a plan now under way by the good people of Birmingham, Alabama, either to adopt or build a new orphanage in Vietnam as a city-wide project.

WOAL-TV

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RECEIVED
JUL 21 1966
CENTRAL FILES

I have asked the Agency for International Development to advise you of the work of the voluntary agencies and to explore possible courses of action with you and my other friends in Austin.

The Vietnamese, I know, are sustained in their prolonged fight to remain independent and to build their own lives by the knowledge that they can count on such selfless assistance as you are prepared to offer them.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,



Miss Jeanne Ornacker
314 Rittiman Road
San Antonio, Texas

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 18, 1966 - 7:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Department of State Consults University Professors
on Indo-Pakistani Difficulties

On July 14 Ambassador Locke met with a group of U. S. scholars on South Asia called together by the Bureau of South Asian Affairs. They met in Ambassador Hare's office for more than two hours with Ambassadors Locke and Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary Handley, and senior departmental officials concerned with India and Pakistan. The professors were:

1. Norman Brown of the University of Pennsylvania
2. Wayne Wilcox of Columbia University
3. Richard Park, of the University of Pittsburgh and University of Michigan
4. Charles Burton Marshall, of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research.

The discussion illuminated many dark corners of this complicated puzzle. Most of the Department's people were surprised and pleased at the clarity and depth of understanding these scholars demonstrated.

Gene Locke reported to Howard Wriggins how much he had profited from the discussion.

The meeting was an outgrowth of your instruction to the Department to develop closer consultative relations with outsiders with specialized knowledge.

On July 15, Ambassador Locke also met with Elmore Jackson, formerly of the Department's UN staff, James Ludlow of the Department, and Howard Wriggins. All three have labored long on the Kashmir problem at various times, and the background discussion was also helpful.

Walt R.

CONFIDENTIAL IN DEAN/ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED UNDER E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1993.

CONFIDENTIAL

BY DCW ON 8-17-86

Monday, July 18, 1966
2:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

We had this estimate specially prepared, reflecting our concern with Panama.

You may wish to read the conclusions on page 1.

We shall have a meeting late this week with Linc Gordon, Fleming, Irwin, etc. to chart a course designed to head off trouble if at all possible.

W. W. Rostow

SNIE 84-66
14 July 1966

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WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-204
By ing NARA, Date 11-20-89

Monday, July 18, 1966 -- 6:25 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

No press contacts today.

W. W. Rostow

WWR

July 18, 1966
Monday - 3:20 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith a reply to Miss Ornacker
who was at the Ranch and wishes
to help Vietnamese orphans.

W. W. Rostow

Monday, July 18, 1966
1:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the agenda for tomorrow's lunch as organized this morning.

The way the ticker's moving this morning, I don't see how we'll be able to avoid talking a little about the pound.

A session with you on the British financial crisis is now contemplated for Tuesday or Wednesday, subject to your wishes.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By DCU NARS, Date 8-17-86

WWRostow:rlm

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Agenda for Lunch Meeting

Tuesday, July 19, 1966

1. **July 18 Meetings with Joint Atomic Energy Committee and Democratic Policy Committee.** Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara will report.

2. **Peace Feelers.** Sec. Rusk

Organization of State Dept. to follow up (Harriman).

3. **Forthcoming Meeting in Paris of Special Defense Ministers Committee.**
Sec. McNamara

Confirmation of instructions to Sec. McNamara, as earlier agreed, including using this Committee for further discussion of hardware issue in the Alliance.

4. **Non-Proliferation.** Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara

Changes, if any, in U.S. treaty language. Prospects of Soviet acceptance. Effects on Alliance.

5. **U. S. Public Posture in Response to Possibility of Reduction of Soviet Forces in East Germany.** Sec. McNamara

6. **Viet Nam.** Sec. Rusk has some issues to raise, unspecified.

7. **Soviet Relations.** Sec. Rusk

a. Possible cancellation U. S. hand tools exhibit in Moscow.

b. **Civil Air Agreement.**

I will be sending up Secretary Rusk's recommendation during the day.

8. **Other.**

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(b)
White House, Wash. D.C. 20503
By DCW NARS, Date 8-17-86

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

July 18, 1966 - Monday, 12:05 pm

Mr. President -

You will be interested in the attached message from Embassy London reporting that Col. Caamano has decided to stay on in London instead of returning to Santo Domingo.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#739

162C

MESSAGE FROM EMBASSY LONDON DATED JULY 15, 1966

1. Dominican Counsellor Cabral told an Embassy Officer that Caamano has changed his plans and will not be returning to the Dominican Republic in July, but now plans to remain in London for another four or five months. Cabral stated that the Dominican Embassy staff here currently is looking for a house to rent for Caamano and his family, inasmuch as Caamano wants to move from his present small Knights-bridge apartment to larger quarters now that he will be remaining in London longer than he anticipated.
2. Cabral believes there are various reasons for Caamano's change in plans, but that the determining factor was a recent visit to London during the first week in July of Caamano's father, retired General Rafael Caamano, who reportedly persuaded Col. Caamano that his return to the Dominican Republic at this time would be detrimental to both Caamano's own future and to his country's best interests.

BRUCE.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-199
By if, NARA, Date 7-8-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

Monday, July 18, 1966 - 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, and Fowler held the line and bought us some time at the Democratic Policy Committee session this afternoon.

They made clear that if the German offset holds and the British hold to their military purchase agreements, despite the trouble with the pound, that we shall lose relatively little in foreign exchange due to our European commitments.

I say they bought time because the questioning then turned to the following deeper matters:

- the failure of the Germans and others to maintain forces that match their NATO commitments;
- the failure of the Europeans to support us in Viet-Nam;
- the wisdom, in any case, of bringing some of our European forces back home;
- the question of how we shall solve, Europe or no, our balance of payments problem.

After the session the three Secretaries and I met informally together. The question was this: how can we bring bargaining leverage to bear on the Europeans so that they meet their commitments to us and to each other without forcing a crisis which would endanger the security of Europe and ourselves?

Various possibilities were discussed; but it was agreed that somehow we shall have to force an occasion in which the Finance, Defense, and Foreign Ministers look at the issues involved in the same room at the same time and come to agreed commitments. This is particularly true of the German Government.

I myself feel -- and I so stated -- that if the measures taken on Wednesday by Wilson are sufficient to buy some time for the pound, we must organize this kind of meeting soon and try to get a balanced package which meets the legitimate essential interest of all three countries. I feel that if we go on as we are with piecemeal negotiations we run the grave

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SECRET

- 2 -

risk of a crisis which could unhinge:

- the security structure of the Far East;
- the security structure of Europe;
- the international monetary system.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

Sat., July 16 1966
11:00 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith full text of Ho's speech.

W. W. R.

top 164

(Siblin
as copy)

Sat., July 16, 1967
9:50 p.m.

165
op

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is to explain why General Barrientos
may say thank you when you have lunch
with him next Wednesday, the 20th.

via Watson

W. W. R.

SECRET-EYES ONLY attachment

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Jessup

DATE: 14 July 1966

FROM : Mr. Broe

SUBJECT: General Rene Barrientos

lunching with LBJ 20 July Wednesday

Attached is the memorandum I discussed with you for
your use in briefing Walt Rostow.

Sat., July 16, 1943
9:45 p.m.

GP 162

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Henry Owen summarizes Japanese thoughts about the nuclear question, as revealed in his recent planning talks in Tokyo.

The third point is worth your notice (see page 2) in connection with the Wilson visit.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

9log 2353)

167a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-397
By us, NARA Date 4-29-99

~~SECRET~~

July 12, 1966

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Japanese Attitudes on Non-Proliferation

In recent US-Japanese policy planning talks in Tokyo, Japanese Foreign Office officials (at the Deputy Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary level) provided some insight into Japanese attitudes on non-proliferation.

This recollection of their personal and informal remarks has been checked with a member of the US delegation who was present and took notes.

1. The Japanese said they were not contemplating a national nuclear program, but, if India went nuclear, pressures in Japan for such a program would mount rapidly.

The Japanese thought it would be the height of folly for a country as burdened by economic problems as India to go nuclear. We urged them to share this view with the Indians and they seemed to think well of this.

2. The Japanese indicated that it would be difficult for them to sign a non-proliferation treaty unless some "compensation" narrowed the gap between the nuclear and the non-nuclear powers. This compensation might be either progress in disarmament, which involved sacrifices by the nuclear powers, or a greater say by non-nuclear powers in the use of nuclear weapons.^{1/}

^{1/}The Japanese included among the kinds of disarmament which would meet their need a threshold or comprehensive test ban. Their position was thus milder than that of Trivedi, the Indian delegate to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, who told the US, UK, and Soviet delegates on July 5 that India would not sign a non-proliferation treaty unless it were accompanied by a cut-off of weapons production.

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Failing this, the Japanese said that they would object to being formally consigned to "second class status." They spoke with feeling on this point, and said that we should make more of an effort to understand the viewpoint of key nuclear capable countries on this matter.

3. Japan's position in this respect would be eased, they indicated, if one of the existing middle rank nuclear powers, notably the UK, were to get out of the national nuclear business, via a collective force or otherwise.

They could accept a situation in which only the US and USSR had nuclear weapons, but once other middle rank powers (UK, France) entered the field their position became more difficult.

Their immediate concern in the nuclear field, it was clear, was not so much in meeting the Chinese threat as in narrowing the gap between Japan and other free world countries -- countries which they considered no more prestigious than themselves and to whom they were unwilling, therefore, to grant pride of place in matters nuclear.

Henry Owen

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

163.
EP
Saturday, July 16, 1966

9:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is the kind of memo a cautious aide who wanted to maintain his reputation would not write, because I could be proved wrong in a matter of days, if not hours. Nevertheless, this is my thought.

Assume that Hanoi is about to enter negotiations. If so, they decided before we bombed oil and now face the problem in a context where they have been weakened; we have been relatively strengthened; but worst of all, we look to the world more confident than in the recent past and operating from a position of increased strength.

Under those circumstances it would be natural for them to ask themselves, "How can we improve our bargaining position?"

They might then ask the question, "What do the Americans fear?"

Their answers might be:

1. A big war involving the Russians;
2. A long war;
3. The killing of their prisoners;
4. A war with China.

So far as China is concerned, it seems to me quite possible that Ho did in fact go to Peking; but there he was told he had to stay in the war on his own. They would have no part of negotiations. Peking then proceeded to complicate Ho's life by announcing this to the world.

Hanoi was left, therefore, with what the Russians (and Eastern Europe) were willing to do by way of hardening their position verbally and with the threat of volunteers; with pressure on us through prisoners; and with partial mobilization as a way of showing us their determination to go on with the war if their terms are not met.

What I am saying is that the moves made recently in Hanoi and by the Warsaw Pact countries could be designed for either one of the following purposes:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-437
By 48, NARA, Date 12-2-92

- to strengthen Hanoi to face a further protracted period of conflict; or
- to strengthen Hanoi's position in a negotiation.

Which it is we shall soon know.

But what struck me was that the noises about negotiation are not necessarily inconsistent with the set of moves that have been made in recent days by Moscow and Hanoi, including Ho's statement as we know it as of this hour.

W. W. Rostow

URGENT
WITH HO

168a

TOKYO (UPI)--HERE IS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE WORDS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH AS MONITORED SUNDAY BY THE JAPANESE BROADCASTING CORP:

"THE UNITED STATES FANATICALLY HAS BEEN BOMBING HANOI AND HAIPHONG AND STEPPING UP THE WAR IN SOUTH VIET NAM.

"NORTH VIET NAM WILL NEVER SURRENDER AND WILL GIVE ALL OUT SUPPORT TO COMRADES IN SOUTH VIET NAM.

"THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE PARLIAMENT DECLARED A PARTIAL MOBILIZATION OF RESERVE OFFICERS AND REAR GUARD FORCES IN NORTH VIET NAM.

"THE WAR WILL CONTINUE ON FOR MANY YEARS. SOME CITIES MAY BE DESTROYED. BUT WE WILL NEVER SURRENDER.

"WE WILL FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM. WE WILL WIN AND RECONSTRUCT OUR COUNTRY.

"VIET NAM PEACE TALKS ARE OUT OF THE QUESTION.

"NORTH VIET NAM IS CONFIDENT THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS OF THE WORLD WILL RENDER FURTHER ASSISTANCE UNTIL THE FINAL VICTORY OF NORTH VIET NAM."

VV843PED

6P 169

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, July 16, 1966
3:45 P.M.

Mr. President:

Herewith Tommy Thompson's analysis
of the Soviet attitude toward Vietnam
against the background of the general
position of frustration confronting
Moscow.

W. Rostow

Attachment

*Moyers
Reviews*

169a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-195
By inf, NARA, Date 7-8-88

July 15, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The Soviet leadership is suffering from a deep sense of frustration faced, as they are, with a number of intractable problems. One of the most serious is their economic situation. Their agricultural problem is particularly difficult and they plan to invest some fifteen billion dollars a year over the next five years in this sector, the greater part of which will be a direct charge on the State budget. Their contract with the Canadians for nine million tons of grain over the next three years shows that they realize that even these enormous investments will not bring about a quick solution of their agricultural problem. At the same time, they have realized that their present system of industrial management is unsatisfactory and they are groping around for solutions and have cautiously embarked on a series of reforms. It is clear that their resources are inadequate to meet the goals they have set for themselves as long as they maintain their present level of military and space expenditures. Yet they do not feel able to cut back on their military expenditures because of their deep suspicion of us and the difficulty of a weak and divided leadership to carry out a cutback even if they should decide that this was advisable. Yet despite their heavy expenditures on arms they have at best a stalemate with us and are still in a position of relative inferiority. Their economic problems are compounded by their insistence upon the primacy of the Communist Party which constantly interferes in production decisions. Their need for decentralization and greater delegation of authority is evident but they have been unable to bring themselves to take serious steps in this direction for fear of undermining their own power base.

The role of the Party also exacerbates other internal problems, particularly the attitude of Soviet youth who no longer accept the outmoded dogma. The people as a whole demand a higher standard of living, and while they have yielded to this pressure by a

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- 2 -

decision to increase radically their automobile production, they are unable to satisfy the basic needs of the population. This could be accomplished only by a severe cutback in military expenditures.

After all of their sacrifices to establish Communism in their own country and spread it abroad, they find themselves locked in a bitter struggle for leadership of the Communist world with Communist China and engaged in a two-front cold war. They are having difficulty keeping their East European allies in line and their hopes for the growth of the Communist movement in Western Europe and in the third world have largely been thwarted. Since the ideology does not permit them to blame the system, whenever there is a failure heads must roll and it is therefore understandable that the leadership is worried.

Apart from these and other specific problems, there is the role which ideology plays in all Soviet Communist actions. This ideology is outdated almost to the point of absurdity and yet it is the basis on which they hold power. This causes two sets of problems. The first is that it causes them in many cases to make a false analysis of a given situation and the second is that it often bars them from working out a rational solution to a given problem or at least places limits upon their freedom of action.

For example, to them Cuba was a case of American "monopoly capital" keeping in power a corrupt dictator in order that they could exploit the Cuban people. They can always find some facts to support their analysis of such situations. The Dominican affair fitted in with their picture of the powerful United States using force to oppose the aspirations of the masses. It is perhaps easier to understand the distorted picture which the Soviet leaders have of the world when we recognize our own tendency to oversimplify and to gloss over some of the weaknesses of our own case. The attempts on their part to bring some rationality into the ideology has been vigorously challenged by the Chinese Communists.

Against this background, the Viet-Nameese affair is particularly galling to the Soviet leadership. They stand to lose by it in almost any outcome and they want neither the United States nor China to come out on top. With their ideological background,

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- 3 -

their view is the reverse of ours. They are concerned that if we win we will be encouraged to use force to suppress what they consider popular movements wherever they develop. This would undermine their conviction that Communism is an inevitable phase of history. Khrushchev once remarked that if Communism did not demonstrate its superiority and sweep the world, his life would have had no meaning. Although a real believer, Khrushchev was far more pragmatic than the present leaders who are much more orthodox in their outlook. The Viet-Nameese affair has also added to the difficulties for the leadership to resolve some of the problems mentioned above. It has made more difficult any cutback in military expenditure or agreement on disarmament, has caused a deterioration in relations with the United States and has affected trade relations and the possibility of obtaining foreign credits. Moreover, with the bitter struggle going on in the Communist world, it is particularly hard for them to be exposed as a paper tiger and unable to do more for a socialist country which they consider to be under attack by an aggressor.

I believe the Soviets recognize that we behaved reasonably well in carrying out the Laos agreement and I do not believe that they are responsible for what happened there, although they could have done more to support the settlement. In Viet-Nam, however, they point to the mere numbers of the Viet Cong and the staunchness of their struggle as evidence that we are, in effect, helping to crush a popular movement. Although this would in any event give them a serious problem they make a great distinction between what we do in North Viet-Nam and what we do in the South. I believe that we can take almost any action in the South without serious risk of Soviet involvement. I doubt that they will take any radical action as a result of our bombing of the POL and interpret their cancellation of the visit of their track team as evidence that their reaction will be limited probably to some increase in the supply of military equipment. I believe, however, that any dramatic step-up in our action against North Viet-Nam could bring us into an area of real danger. This would be particularly true of action to blockade or mine North Viet-Nameese harbors because of the parallel with Cuba and the direct confrontation which this would involve. The Soviets have a strong inferiority complex which causes them to overreact whenever they think their prestige is involved.

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- 4 -

The foregoing is an attempt to explain Soviet actions but, of course, not to justify or condone them. Whatever the outcome of Viet-Nam, I am afraid it will take considerable time for us to get back on the path we were following in our relations with the Soviet Union when this affair began. In any event, we must always be aware that while an important evolution was taking place in the Soviet Union, which over time might have led to real co-existence, the Soviet leaders, as contrasted with the people, are dedicated to a dogma that is implacably hostile to us.

Llewellyn E. Thompson
Llewellyn E. Thompson

~~SECRET~~

to P 170

(Sit Rm
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encls)

July 16, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reaction to your July 12 speech on Asia

You may be interested in the attached country-by-country summaries of official and press reaction to your Asia speech. 20 countries are covered in these reports from our posts.

There has been wide coverage around the world. The reaction has been generally good, with the obvious exceptions of North Viet-Nam, Communist China, Yugoslavia.

Many posts had not reported by the time this summary was compiled. I will keep you informed of later reports.

W. W. Rostow

Att.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

11017 ~~SECRET~~

July 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reaction to the President's July 12 Speech
on Asia

There are enclosed summaries of official and press reaction, arranged by country in alphabetical order, from 20 sources.

Indications of strong official approval have been received from 3 sources (New Zealand, Malaysia, and the Brazilian Ambassador to the U.S.). Qualified approval has been reported from 3 countries (Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands).

Strong unfavorable reaction has been reported from North Viet-Nam; qualified disapproval has been received from Burma.

In addition, 11 posts have reported no official reaction to date.

Press reaction has been varied, ranging from favorable (Uruguay, the Philippines, Taiwan) and mixed (Belgium) to unfavorable (Pakistan, Yugoslavia, and Red China).

B. H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

Summaries of official
and press reactions.

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-195
By *sig*, NARA, Date 7-8-88

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 JUL 16 AM 9 25

to P
171

Saturday, July 16, 1966
11:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visits of Foreign Chiefs of State and Heads of Government

During lunch yesterday -- as you were properly criticizing our failure to get some order in the house with respect to visitors -- steps were being taken.

Brom Smith reports a highly useful meeting in the Fish Room -- which we set up -- of all those who have responsibility for the planning of visits to Washington of chiefs of state and heads of government. Those present included: Mrs. Carpenter, Mrs. Abell, Mr. Watson, Mr. Fleming, Major Robinson (for Colonel Cross), Herb Gordon (for the Secretary of State's office), and Jim Symington and several of his staff.

The meeting reviewed existing procedures and agreed on numerous changes. A clearer division of responsibility was also agreed upon.

The role of my office will be limited to obtaining your approval of each visit and the timing of the visit plus the supervision of the substantive material to be provided to you at the time of the visit. My office will continue to give advice to other offices dealing with other aspects of the visit, e.g., sending to Mrs. Abell suggested names for her consideration in drawing up luncheon and dinner guest lists for your approval.

One new proposal was accepted which I think will do much to improve the staffing of these visits. About a month before the arrival of a chief of state or head of government I will hold a meeting in the Situation Room of those on the White House staff, Protocol, and the State Department who will have a part in planning the protocol as well as the policy aspects of the visit. At that time, we will discuss:

- why the visitor is coming;
- what we expect to achieve from the visit; and
- exchange ideas and suggestions as to ways in which we can be helpful to you in making the visit a success.

The first such meeting will be held next week to coordinate the planning for the August 2 visit of President Shazar of Israel.

I am encouraged by the progress which was made yesterday, and believe that we are on the way to licking the major inadequacies in the way the visits are arranged, planned, and carried out.

W. W. Rostow

Sat., July 16, 19
12:15 p.m.

to J 172

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a memorandum of conversation
with General Eisenhower, in which
Dick Helms, as well as Andy Goodpaster,
participated.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~

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172a



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

15 July 1966


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. Attached is a Memorandum for Record of my meeting with General Eisenhower at Gettysburg this morning. Richard Helms went up with me, in order that I might introduce him to General Eisenhower and enable him to initiate periodic meetings which would give General Eisenhower a general, world-wide, intelligence report.

2. General Eisenhower had no particular comments or suggestions concerning the course of the war. His general reaction to the present pattern of military operations, and the continuing military buildup was highly favorable. He offered the information, as I concluded my part of the discussion with him, that he has prepared an article on the draft, which will run in an early issue of the Reader's Digest, in which he supports the use of a lottery method for the draft system itself, combined with a system of universal military training.


A. J. GOODPASTER
Lt General, U.S.A.

Attachment



SECRET

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172b



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

15 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with General Eisenhower, 15 July 1966

1. I met with General Eisenhower for two hours at his office in Gettysburg this morning. Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, was also present.

2. I reported first in general terms on my meeting with the Governors' Conference in Los Angeles a week ago. I told him that I had informed the Governors of his support for the President's decisions for the conduct of the war in Viet-Nam, and specifically of his support for the decision to bomb the POL facilities, including the storage facilities at Hanoi and Haiphong. I told him that with no more than two exceptions, the Governors, in the discussion period and in their actions, had indicated support for the conduct of the war. I also told him that the Governors had expressed appreciation for the report on the progress of the military operations, and for the information I gave them concerning General Eisenhower's support for the President's decisions.

3. I then reviewed the development of the situation in South Viet-Nam. On the political side, particularly as it affects military operations, progress is going forward toward the election in September and the development of a constitution. A good deal of the heat seems to have gone out of the effort of the Buddhist militants against the government. Also Ky has apparently successfully made some changes in his government, bringing in one able civilian and making other modifications that should strengthen the operation - notably giving General Thang wider authority in the pacification field.

4. On the military side, I reported that operations continue to go well, with the initiative being exercised by General Westmoreland and the SVN JGS. He has been able to maintain effective spoiling attacks against all concentrations that the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese have so attempted.

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MLE MR 77-148 #3	
By <i>WLA</i>	NARS, Date 8-17-86

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~~SECRET~~

5. Our military buildup continues. Elements of the 4th Division are on the way, and the Division should close in September. Also, we will be getting a second ROK division in South Viet-Nam. As a result, the preponderance of military power that we have achieved should continue to be maintained.

6. In the third field - the "other war" - progress is slow, but the actions that have been taken show signs of promise. In the priority area, there has been progress in improving security, opening roads, establishing the functions of government, and making economic progress. A recent report from Ambassador Lodge indicates a further small increase in the number of South Vietnamese under government control.

7. With regard to North Viet-Nam, the most significant operation recently has been that against POL. I showed him an up-to-date chart which indicates that some 65 percent of the total capacity has now been destroyed, and nearly 90 percent total has been attacked. I told him that orders and plans have now been issued by CINCPAC and his subordinate commanders which will result in going after the POL as a complete system, and giving it very high priority, and a high proportion of effort. Within a few days we expect to see the results of this comprehensive program. In the meantime, armed reconnaissance against the major "route packages" and attacks on bridges and railroads go forward.

8. I showed him the six themes sent by Walt Rostow to the Secretaries of State and Defense which are to be elaborated and driven home systematically in speeches and statements by members of the Departments of State and Defense on Viet-Nam. He indicated that he thought this was a sound and worthwhile line of effort.

9. General Eisenhower said he had no specific suggestions or comments to offer concerning the conduct of the war. He is still concerned about the inflow of military materiel into Haiphong. Also, he is concerned about the amount of operational information which is appearing in the press, including for example discussion concerning the tactics we are using (successfully) against the SAMs.

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10. He said he has written an article on the subject of the draft for an early issue of the Reader's Digest. In it he will come out in favor of a lottery system combined with a system of one-year universal military training.

6.
A. J. GOODPASTER
Lt General, U.S.A.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday, July 16, 1966

*(papers for 173
1 o'clock
mtg 7/16 -
BKS hand
carried
to Watson)*

3.4(b)(1) ~~TOP SECRET~~ - []

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Deployment of A-12 Aircraft (OXCART)

The meeting scheduled for 1 p.m. today will give you a chance to hear the views of the principals on the deployment to the Pacific theater of the A-12 aircraft.

We have invited Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, CIA Director Helms, and General Taylor.

I am attaching my earlier memorandum to you on this subject which summarizes the situation as I see it.

One aspect of the problem which merits discussion concerns what U. S. position we would take if and when the use of OXCART over China became public knowledge, e. g., in the event of a U-2 type incident.

Your choices would appear to be:

- to deploy OXCART now;
- to deploy it September 1; or
- to hold off for the time being.

Walt Rostow

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-398
By *Sj*, NARA, Date 9/13/02

~~TOP SECRET~~ - []

3.4(b)(1)

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

173a

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~ - [REDACTED]

Tuesday, July 5, 1966
11:00 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Deployment of A-12 Aircraft (OXCART)

3.4(b)(1)

1. The deployment of the A-12 aircraft [REDACTED] to the Pacific Theatre (specifically Kadena Air Base in Okinawa) for purposes of photography of priority targets in Southeast Asia and China has been the subject of intense discussion in the 303 Committee since late last year.

2. The aircraft has been ready for deployment since 5 January with a 21-day lead time required.

3. The following differences of view exist; and for this reason the matter is brought to you for decision at this time.

4. The Director of Central Intelligence recommends deployment of this system commencing 15 July 1966 for China coverage and that it be held in readiness for use over North Vietnam if required. This recommendation is based on the belief that current satellite and U-2 photography do not provide the coverage necessary to warn of possible Chinese involvement in Vietnam, but that present assets are sufficient to meet our needs in North Vietnam. [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1),(6)

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also conclude that this system is needed for China coverage but that presently committed assets can meet our needs in North Vietnam.

6. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board recommends that, from a strictly intelligence standpoint, gaps and deficiencies exist in the coverage of both North Vietnam and South China to the extent that this system should be deployed at the present time.

7. General Maxwell D. Taylor has examined this problem and recommends setting a date for deployment about 1 September.

8. Both the Department of State and Messrs. McNamara and Vance are opposed to deployment at this time.

9. The Department of State reasons as follows: Maximum use of existing facilities, satellite photography, U-2's [REDACTED] and the use of improved drones plus SIGINT will provide an intelligence sample adequate to forewarn of any major Chinese move to intervene in North Vietnam. If present assets indicate something unusual in South China or North Vietnam, the system can be deployed on an urgent basis. State also believes that

3.4(b)(1),(6)

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-398

By Sj, NARA, Date 11-3-02

~~TOP SECRET~~ - [REDACTED]

(page 1 of 2 pages)

3.4(b)(1)

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7/5/66

present NSA capabilities should detect Chinese Communist division level movements into the NVN border region or major shifts of units already there.

10. Messrs. McNamara and Vance disagree with the JCS view. They feel the risks inherent in immediate deployment, if widely known, are not commensurate with the understood limitations in present coverage. Their concern is with possible Chinese reactions upon learning of this deployment and with other reactions, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1), (u)

11. Substantial studies have been made in depth on present coverage of targets versus requirements; [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1), (u)

[REDACTED] emergency base landing rights in friendly countries; and UN reaction to possible loss of such a plane over China. The one aspect upon which no final conclusions have been drawn is the actual posture of the U. S. government in the event of a U-2 type incident.

12. This is a delicately balanced issue. I recommend that you hear argument directly from the principals. The record should show that you took personal cognizance of the case made by the intelligence community even if, in the end, you decide to hold deployment for the time being. (FYI: My own feeling is that these remarkable aircraft and crews should be held for a time of relatively overt engagement with Communist China, so long as other forms of intelligence can track the movement of Chinese divisions and aircraft towards Southeast Asia. That is the point on which a meeting ought to satisfy you.)

Walt RostowSet up meeting ✓

Deploy OXCART now _____

Deploy OXCART September 1 _____

See me _____

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 87-198

By sig, NARA, Date 1-20-89~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, July 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Replacement for Covey Oliver in Colombia

Colombia is a key, democratic country. We have helped pull them out of an economic nose-dive with a timely program loan this year. It is important to keep Colombia economically healthy and well disposed toward us.

The new President -- Carlos Lleras Restrepo -- is an astute politician and a scholar. Economics is his forte, learned in the classroom; business and government. He likes and respects Americans. He is congenial with people on his intellectual level.

These factors have a bearing on the selection of our Ambassador.

The slates submitted by Secretary Rusk and John Macy coincide in two names:

- | | | |
|---------------------|---|---|
| Clare H. Timberlake | - | a career FSO with considerable experience in Latin America. |
| Reynold E. Carlson | - | Professor of Economics and Director of the Graduate Program of Economic Development at Vanderbilt. He has specialized in Latin American development problems. |

Both men are in their 50's. Both are accomplished in their respective fields. Timberlake is a pro who will give a solid performance. Carlson has not had diplomatic experience although he has worked in Brazil for the Ford Foundation. Because of his interest and expertise in Latin American economic development, he would probably be more congenial to President Lleras.

The selection is very much of a toss-up. I lean toward Carlson.

W. W. Rostow

Approve Timberlake _____

Approve Carlson and determine if he is available. ✓

Saturday, July 16, 1966
9:30 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here's a man volunteering for a job; and damned if he doesn't deserve serious consideration.

His name is Bill Behrens. He is a pioneer nuclear submariner with a brilliant operational record. The job is Deputy Director of CIA.

I got him into the Planning Council and from the word "go" he was a joy to have around: quietly tough, effective, liked by everyone.

He's done more than any single man to get the fish protein project broken out of the bureaucracy (I started him on a non-military task). He was a major spark plug behind the Oceanography speech. But he's worked effectively on a very wide range of political-military projects.

In nominating him for the Planning Council Paul Nitze said he was sending the best the Navy had in his generation; and he was just about right.

He'd be a fine mate for Dick Helms.

You'd have to jump him a few slots; but he's ready for Admiral anyway.

I haven't followed this appointment; you may have made up your mind.

If you haven't, you may want him checked out by Bob McNamara and may even wish to meet him.

W. W. Rostow

cc Macy

175a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

WASHINGTON

~~PERSONAL-CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 15, 1966

Dear Walt,

I thought the President's Asia speech this week was a first-rate talk for all concerned. It followed lines you have favored for some time, I know. Also, it was a pleasure to me to help on the Oceanography speech, which I felt was a good charge to us all to make much needed progress in this area.

My purpose in writing today is to respectfully submit my unsolicited views on the appointment of a new Deputy Director for Central Intelligence. This new appointment most probably will be a military officer, and, as a highly interested military officer watching from a somewhat detached position on the Policy Planning Council, I have formed some definite conclusions on the type of man the Agency needs at this time.

If a decision already has been made on this appointment, please don't bother further with this letter. If not, however, I think a new Deputy Director--in view of some of the special circumstances obtaining at this time--should approximate most of the following qualifications:

(1) He should be relatively young, not an officer in his late fifties tending to militaristic inflexibility and unconsciously exercising unneeded command prerogatives, but one in his forties who will provide intelligent, clear-eyed, fresh appraisals and who will work well with Mr. Helms, his professional superior. This would put him at the two-star level--even if a "spot" promotion were required for the position. Such an appointment would have appeal to the pundits, among other merits, especially after Admiral Raborn's tour.

(2) He should have a good understanding of international affairs--realizing our hemispheric and global responsibilities without being imperialistic--and preferably should have some experience outside Defense working with the Department of State, the AEC, the White House Staff, and other important agencies.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By W, NARA, Date 7-9-98

~~PERSONAL-CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(3) He should know counter-insurgency, mobility of forces, the discreet use of military power, and modern amphibious warfare including carrier-based air strength.

(4) He should know the principles of SIOP targeting, be familiar with modern nuclear missiles and our strategic deterrent, and could use a strong nuclear background for appreciating developments in a nuclear-proliferating world.

(5) He should have a record of accomplishment in administration, particularly in new fields; and he should have at least moderate experience with the intelligence community.

(6) Most importantly, he should be broad-gauged, not a stereotyped military officer concentrating on yesterday's factors and inherently opposed to tomorrow's more liberal or humanitarian solutions. He must bring vigor and good personal qualities which will inspire his civilian counter-parts with his appreciation of their personal needs as well as the Agencies' requirements.

I'd like to do the job.

Very sincerely,

William W. Behrens, Jr.
Captain, U.S. Navy

The Honorable
Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to
the President
The White House