

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Monday - August 8, 1966 - 12:00 noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Appointment for Ambassador Jones

Our Ambassador to Peru, John Wesley Jones, returns to Lima on Thursday. Tomorrow is his last day in Washington.

He has never had an appointment with you, and State suggests that you receive him.

There is no outstanding business requiring an appointment. But there are three matters which you may find useful to discuss with him:

- President Belaunde's intentions and plans for resolving the International Petroleum Company case.
- His development plans for Peru.
- Peru as the site for the OAS summit meeting.

Jim Jones tells me that the visit could be worked in tomorrow, should you wish to see the Ambassador.

W. W. Rostow

Want to see him,  
appointment o. k. \_\_\_\_\_

Prefer no appoint-  
ment \_\_\_\_\_

cc - Jim Jones

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~~SECRET~~

Saturday, Aug. 6, 1966 - 12:00 noon

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Statutory Determination for FY-1967 on the Production  
and Transfer of Special Nuclear Materials

In the attached letter, Glenn Seaborg requests that you approve the production by the AEC in FY-1967 of specific quantities of special nuclear materials and the transfer by the AEC to the DOD of certain quantities of special nuclear materials and non-nuclear components of atomic weapons.. This is an annual statutory determination which is required under Sections 41 and 91 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This action simply confirms activities which have already been approved in connection with the FY-1967 budget. The Bureau of the Budget has reviewed the request and agrees that it does not raise any new issues.

I recommend that you sign the attached memorandum approving the AEC request.

W. W. Rostow

Atts.

SMKeeny:jb:8-5-66  
bcc: SMK file and chron  
NSC (2)  
CEJohnson

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 88-18  
By lif NARA, Date 8-8-89

~~SECRET~~

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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

8/9/66

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN,  
U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

SUBJECT: FY 1967 Production of Special Nuclear  
Materials and Atomic Weapons

The recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission  
contained in your letter dated June 23, 1966, are approved;  
and the Atomic Energy Commission is hereby directed to  
take the actions necessary to implement the recommend-  
ations.

151  
209

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 88-18  
By inf NARA, Date 8-8-89

LBJ:CEJ:feg

*Copy Keesy & Johnson*

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

Saturday, August 6, 1966

MR. PRESIDENT:

As requested, herewith the CIA response to your two questions of this morning conveyed to me by Bill Moyers.

W. W. R.





CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

This is the memorandum from the Central Intelligence Agency requested by Mr. Rostow this morning.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

R. J. Smith  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Moscow, by its protest of 5 August alleging that US aircraft strafed a Soviet merchant ship in Haiphong harbor, displays a growing uncertainty and apprehension concerning US policy. Its protest is carefully worded, however, so that it does not imply that the strafing was deliberate, and the note itself does not appear to signal a change in Moscow's present policy of limiting Soviet risks in the conflict.

On the contrary, recent signs of Soviet attitudes toward the US seem to underscore Moscow's desire to continue to deal with the US on practical questions of interest and importance despite the strains of Vietnam. This attitude was evident in Premier Kosygin's address to the Supreme Soviet on the day following the "strafing" incident.

Kosygin blamed the US for the strain in Soviet-American relations, but said the Soviet government did "not believe that Soviet-American relations cannot be different from what they are now." He stated that although "aggressive moods obviously predominate in Washington at the present stage, we know that there are other, sounder tendencies there, too. The strengthening of these tendencies will be received with due understanding on our part." The Soviet premier pointed out that despite the "exceedingly tense" international situation caused by the war, measures such as a nonproliferation treaty could still be dealt with.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-401  
By is, NARA Date 2-14-00

TCS No. 5747/66  
Copy #1

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In recent days, the USSR has demonstrated its desire to make progress on other matters. The US Embassy in Moscow noted the cooperative spirit displayed by the Soviets toward the US in discussions which ended on 30 July concerning the conservation and use of fishery resources. Much the same spirit and a general lack of polemics was evident on the part of the Soviets in the outer space treaty negotiations in Geneva.

On Vietnam, the Soviets have been attempting recently to persuade third parties to urge restraint on the US. Soviet ambassadors have made demarches to Free World countries (e.g., Sweden and Denmark) warning of the gravity of the situation. The intensely emotional position that Brezhnev took on the subject during UN Secretary General U Thant's visit to Moscow also may have been calculated to create pressure on the US from other quarters to ease military pressure on Hanoi. These tactics reveal not only Moscow's concern over US policy in Vietnam, but a continuing frustration over its inability thus far to influence the course of events there.

The Soviet note charges that US aircraft "strafed the moorings of Haiphong port" on 2 August and "in this connection, large caliber bullets" hit the Soviet vessel Medyn, endangering the lives of the crew. Although this ship, a large-hatch dry cargo vessel carrying POL in drums, is known to have been in Haiphong harbor at the time of the US air strike against the Haiphong POL storage site, its exact position cannot be established. Nor can it be established that the vessel actually was hit by US ordnance. Pilots of the strike aircraft reported all bombs were dropped in the target area and that no foreign shipping was involved. Strike aircraft were armed with guns, but did not use them. Flak-suppression aircraft which accompanied the strike aircraft were not armed with guns or other ordnance which would fit the description of "large caliber bullets."

TCS No. 5747/66  
Copy #1

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to p 49

rights to be  
attached  
by Lib. Am

Saturday, August 6, 1966

MR. PRESIDENT:

As requested, herewith the State Department  
response to your two questions of this morning  
conveyed to me by Bill Moyers.

W. W. R.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

August 6, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt Rostow,  
The White House

Re: Your request this morning to George Ball for INR comments.

Attached is a paper in which we look at Soviet policy over the last week or so in some detail.

In a nutshell, the Kosygin speech, Supreme Soviet declaration and protest note on Haiphong use some tough talk. But we can see no qualitative change in the Soviet policy lines already evident for some time: aid, probably increasing in quantity, to North Vietnam; diplomatic and propaganda pressure to get us to desist or at least to deter us from escalating; no initiative toward a peaceful settlement unless and until Hanoi gives the green light; nevertheless keep in touch with us on issues such as outer space and nonproliferation and on selected bilateral problems such as fisheries.

The Soviets seem to be confident that they can continue along these tracks with some profit, though we think some of their recent tough talk reflects worry over our further plans in Vietnam. Curiously enough, they also seem worried about US-Chinese Communist collusion, though their recent emphasis on this is in large part intended to rebut Chinese charges against them.

The troublesome thing about how Brezhnev and Kosygin have handled themselves is that they do not seem to have thought much beyond current profit to the time when their willingness to hitch their cart to Hanoi's horse may lead them into a direct confrontation with us that can no longer be glossed over, like their present involvement in some of Hanoi's air defense. Perhaps the time has come to get that message across more clearly.

*Tom Hughes*  
Thomas L. Hughes~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 88-17  
By up, NARA, Date 2-2-89

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH*I. Intelligence 49-b*  
*Note* 494

August 6, 1966

TO : Mr. Walt W. Rostow, The White House  
FROM : Thomas L. Hughes *TH*  
SUBJECT: Temperature Check on the State of US-Soviet Relations

This paper addresses the question of whether Kosygin's speech on August 3 and other developments of the last week mark significant hardening in the Soviet attitude toward the US. Obviously, Moscow has been throwing more brickbats than bouquets in our direction. But, as we see it, the overall Soviet attitude has not changed markedly in the past week. Recent Soviet moves have been a rather kaleidoscopic mix. Here is how we read them:

Kosygin's Attack on China

We found Kosygin's attack on the Chinese the most noteworthy aspect of his speech. His charge that Peking was aiding American policy in Vietnam seems likely to provoke a Chinese reply and sharpen the public polemics between Moscow and Peking. (Peking has, of course, been saying the same thing about the Soviets.) Beyond that, we suspect that Kosygin's remarks -- which had been foreshadowed both in Soviet propaganda and in the private conversations of some Soviet officials in recent months -- represent a genuine concern that there may be dealings between the US and the Chinese Communists behind Moscow's back. In particular, the Soviets would have been struck by our dialogue with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw about a possible combination agreement on a test-ban and non-first-use of nuclear weapons;

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-399

By CB, NARA Date 9-29-99~~SECRET/NOFORN~~



SECRET/NOFORN

the Soviets had for two decades sought without success an American commitment on non-use. But if Moscow's suspicions go so far as to include the possibility that US and CPR may have dealings on Vietnam, there is no indication that these suspicions will have any practical consequence in terms of Soviet willingness to do anything to get negotiations on Vietnam started.

Vietnam

In general, as regards Vietnam, we think the Soviets are now worried about three things: (1) our plans concerning the demilitarized zone and the 17th parallel, (2) our further plans concerning Haiphong -- will we mine the harbor and confront the Soviets with the need to decide about their shipping, and (3) how well will the Soviet-supplied air defense system in North Vietnam hold up. For the moment, we think Soviet policy is a combination of continued aid to the North with diplomatic and propaganda strong-arm tactics designed to inhibit us. The past week has provided further illustrations of the second of these two complementary approaches, while the first has continued apace. Nothing the Soviets have said or done indicates a change in their immobilism so far as moving toward a settlement is concerned.

On aid to Vietnam, Kosygin reasserted Moscow's intention to help the Vietnamese to drive the Americans out, but he did not materially add to the Soviet commitment. His phrase that Moscow would do "all in its power" was a change from previous references to "all that is necessary", but it was coupled with the observation that the USSR did not have a common border with the DRV, and by implication it might suggest that Moscow's "power" to help was subject to Chinese restriction and the uncertainties of the searanes. His statement about helping the Vietnamese to victory "as soon as possible" was not altogether novel -- Shelepin said much the same thing in a June 2 speech when the theme of "victory" over the US began appearing in Soviet leadership

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statements. In any case, Soviet aid to Hanoi continues, and the Soviets seem to be more deeply involved in the North Vietnamese air defense system.

The Soviet note of August 5 charging American interference with Soviet shipping to Vietnam was sharper than the one of July 9. The difference was, however, in the acerbity of insult rather than in the substance of what Moscow says it intends to do about the subject. Given the circumstances of Soviet concern that the US may contemplate mining Haiphong harbor (the number of Soviet merchant ships going there increased slightly in July), we would read the increased stridency as a logical continuation, rather than as a new departure, in Soviet efforts to defer us. Incidentally, the Soviets do not appear so far to have published the full text of the note, but a summary which did not include all of the offensive language, notably the word "criminal".

The Declaration on Vietnam adopted by the Supreme Soviet on August 3 was a bit stronger in its rhetoric than the one which that body adopted on December 9, 1965. The Soviets have already been busy on the diplomatic front (e.g. in Scandinavia) with efforts to mount pressures against us. The new declaration may, like the Warsaw Pact declaration, serve as a vehicle for a further round robin of Soviet diplomatic approaches designed to embarrass the US and to encourage opposition to American policy in Vietnam, in part we suspect with an eye to the UN General Assembly meeting next month.

Treatment of the subjects of volunteers and prisoners has been toned down. The Soviets may have thought that Hanoi had made a psychological error on the prisoner issue, but it nevertheless has taken its cue from Hanoi -- first by beating the drums for a trial and now by dropping the theme of the guilt of US pilots. Kosygin did not mention the qualified promise of volunteers made in the Warsaw Pact declaration of July 6, though it was mentioned in the new



declaration adopted by the Supreme Soviet on the day he spoke. Meanwhile, we have had indications that some of the Eastern European countries have collected names of possible volunteers, but no evidence of any plans to send them to Vietnam. The offer of volunteers remains subject to a Vietnamese request and Hanoi has indicated that none are needed.

Negotiations and Threats on Other Issues

Kosygin took an ambivalent position on the relation of Vietnam to other international issues. He indicated that the Vietnam crisis creates a poor atmosphere for disarmament, but on the specific topics of nonproliferation and a comprehensive test ban he said that it would be possible to go ahead despite Vietnam. Kosygin thus reiterated -- at a higher level than it had been stated before -- the proposition that Moscow did not make cessation of American action in Vietnam a precondition to a nonproliferation agreement. In Geneva, the Soviets give evidence of wishing to keep the subject alive.

Moscow agreed during the week to a bilateral settlement of fishing problems with us. And while Soviet performance under the new agreement remains to be tested, Moscow in this instance did follow its own economic interests in concluding an agreement, to which it subordinated its concern about Vietnam.

The outer space negotiations which just recessed in Geneva represent a somewhat ambiguous case. The rather remarkable progress in the negotiations suggests Soviet interest in coming to terms despite Vietnam. Nevertheless, because of Vietnam they may have been reluctant to move too quickly. At the same time, Moscow may be stalling in hopes of obtaining US concessions in the remaining issues -- in particular on the principle of inspection which underlies the American proposal on "open access" -- when the negotiations resume in New York.

On Berlin we had reports indicating that the East Germans had been deliberately trying to pressure the West Berlin Senat by floating rumors of impending harassment related to Vietnam. In the past week, these rumors seem to have tapered off.

Soviet Attitude Toward the US Administration

Finally, Kosygin on August 3 returned to the notion of a conflict between the good and bad forces in American political life which he had broached in a speech on June 8. He clearly sought to show that the bad forces now predominate and that as long as they do US-Soviet relations are bound to be bad. Brezhnev said much the same thing earlier this year. But Kosygin stopped short of attacking the President by name (as, except for one lapse by Brezhnev, have all speeches by Soviet leaders for a year), and he avoided suggesting that the Kremlin would have no further dealings with this Administration on the precedent of Khrushchev's refusal to deal with President Eisenhower after the U-2 incident in 1960. Kosygin, as he had done with Governor Harriman a year ago, held out the hope of better relations if "sound" tendencies reassert themselves in Washington. No doubt the Soviets hope to influence US decisions with the promise that detente would ensue in US-Soviet relations once the US had ceased its "aggression."

to P 50

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ref. were  
att to orig)

Saturday, August 6, 1966 - 1:00 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You will wish to read the attached cable from Gronouski in which he requests authority to ask the Poles to try again to bring Hanoi to the conference table. Secretary Rusk, Harriman and others will be considering this matter.

The heart of the Gronouski proposal is that we accept Hanoi's four points "in principle" with a rather elaborate "interpretation" of what we are accepting; stop bombing the North; indicate our intention to withdraw troops from Viet-Nam once peace is restored; and accept the Liberation Front as a party to any conference.

My first reaction is:

- 1) the Gronouski proposal would, if adopted as stated, do irreparable damage to our relations with the GVN and to our position in South Viet Nam;
- 2) it will be absolutely vital to discuss this with Ky and get their full agreement, if we are to proceed;
- 3) even raising the proposal as outlined would create a serious crisis of confidence with the South Vietnamese who could only read it as a sign of serious wavering on our part;
- 4) we would surely need more than "assurances from the Poles that Hanoi will respond by stopping its military movements from North Viet Nam to South Viet Nam" if we stopped bombing;
- 5) this proposal would do more to boost Viet Cong and Liberation Front morale -- which considerable evidence suggests is sagging-- than almost anything I can think of.

In short, as formulated, this proposal is full of booby traps and we will wish to give it the closest scrutiny before acting.

We may, however, wish to go back to the Poles with a counter-proposal.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines \* NLJ 88-30  
By ju, NARA, Date 7-10-98

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

Saturday, August 6, 1966

FOR PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY (Warsaw 298)

I propose I be authorized to request the Poles again to try to bring North Vietnam to the conference table based on a new U.S. approach outlined below.

Background: This proposal is stimulated by Foreign Officer Director General Michalowski's restatement on July 25 of an earlier suggestion that there is hope for progress if we find a way to accept "in principle" Hanoi's Four Points and in this context stop the bombing of North Vietnam, indicate the intention to ultimately withdraw troops from Vietnam, and accept the Liberation Front as one party at the conference table.

Michalowski believes that statements already made by U.S. leaders provide a basis for formulating an approach which would save North Vietnam face and provide a possible opening for talks. He feels that we should address ourselves directly to Hanoi's Four Points and the question of Liberation Front representation. He stressed that we have already taken a position consistent with the principles of the Four Points. He said that generally worded acceptance of the principles of the Four Points would be sufficient and that we could interpret these principles as we wished once we got to the conference table.

Point 3 of Hanoi's Four Points, which the U.S. finds most difficult to accept, provides that the South Vietnamese people settle their own internal affairs in accordance with the Liberation Front program. However, the Point could be accepted "in principle" if interpreted in terms of the Liberation Front program outlined in Ho Chi Minh's January 24 letter: "To achieve independence, democracy, peace and neutrality for South Vietnam and to achieve peaceful unification of the fatherland." This formulation corresponds "in principle" to the Secretary's February 18 Senate hearing statement that "we are not asking that the Government of South Vietnam ally itself with us or be in any way beholden to us. We wish only that the people of South Vietnam should have the right and opportunity to determine their future in freedom without coercion or threat." Points 1, 9, 10, and 11 of our Fourteen Points also correspond "in principle" to Ho's formulation of the Liberation Front program, as does paragraph 3 of Goldberg's January 4 letter to the U.N. Secretary General.

As pointed out by the Secretary in the February 18 Senate hearing statement, the other three of Hanoi's Four Points create no problem of U.S. acceptance.

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

On two occasions, Michalowski has brushed aside my concern over Hanoi's demand that the Liberation Front must be the sole representative of South Vietnam by noting that this was not part of Hanoi's Four Points.

Point 13 of our Fourteen Points in the President's statement that the Viet Cong "being represented and having their views represented" is not an insurmountable problem. Interpreting "being represented" as offering the Liberation Front a seat at the conference table admittedly might run the risk of implying our acceptance of the Liberation Front claim to represent the South Vietnamese people. The risk would be minimized, however, by restating our view that the Liberation Front was created by Hanoi and is responsive to and representative of Hanoi and not the South Vietnamese people; therefore, we see no logic for its inclusion at the conference table. However, if either the Government of North Vietnam or of South Vietnam insists as a condition for entering negotiations that a non-governmental party be seated at the conference table, and if the Government of North Vietnam chooses to designate the Liberation Front for this role, we will interpose no objection.

Proposal: I recommend that I be authorized to tell Foreign Minister Rapacki that we have given serious consideration to Michalowski's July 25 suggestions, are responsive to them, and request that the Poles, on the basis of the modification and restatement of our position along the lines suggested by Michalowski, renew their effort to bring Hanoi to a peace conference.

I would tell Rapacki that we are prepared to end the bombing in North Vietnam and cease the buildup of our forces in South Vietnam as soon as we have assurances from the Poles that Hanoi will respond by stopping its military movements from North Vietnam to South Vietnam and is willing to negotiate a cease fire in South Vietnam.

I would indicate, along the lines above, our acceptance of the Liberation Front at the conference table.

I would then request the Poles to convey to Hanoi that in our view the positive aspects of the principles expressed in Hanoi's Four Points do not differ significantly from the points made repeatedly by the President, Secretary and others. Therefore, leaving aside polemics in Hanoi's presentation, we believe these principles offer a satisfactory basis for initiating negotiations.

I would say the U. S. Government takes this opportunity to restate, within the framework of the positive principles contained in Hanoi's Four Points, its intentions and objectives to which it has consistently subscribed:

A. The basic rights of Vietnamese people to peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity must be observed by all parties. We are prepared to support the restoration of provisions of the Geneva Agreements, and to withdraw our troops and dismantle military bases once there is compliance with Accords by all parties. Nor do we expect or require military alliance with a free South Vietnam.

B. As long as Vietnam remains divided, military provisions of the Geneva Agreements should be respected and assured through effective international controls.

C. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people without outside interference, taking into account the program of their Government and all organized groups in South Vietnam whose aims are independence, democracy, peace and neutrality.

D. Peaceful reunification of Vietnam should be settled by the Vietnamese people without foreign interference but with proper international safeguards and full participation of peaceful groups in a process that does not rely on force or subversion.

Comment: I can offer no guarantee that Michalowski was speaking with full authority and in good faith in making his suggestions or that he will be able to follow through on them. However, as a Southeast Asia specialist who enjoys Foreign Minister Rapacki's confidence, he was the Special Emissary to Hanoi to deliver the President's message after the Harriman mission last December. Also, the Poles must gain the concurrence of the U.S.S.R. before acting on what we are proposing here.

On balance, it seems to me we have nothing to lose and much to gain by charging the Poles with responsibility for creating an opening for talks with North Vietnam. They are in a good position to make the case to the U.S.S.R. as well as to Hanoi. Furthermore, I believe our proposal has merit in its own right regardless of the ultimate response of the Poles. It is consistent with what we have said before, and perhaps our actions to date have created a situation where North Vietnam is ready to accept our offer to talk. If this worthwhile offer is rejected, we can demonstrate unequivocally who is guilty of not wanting to settle the Vietnam conflict by peaceful means.

14-Point Statement of the Government's Terms for Peaceful  
Settlement in Vietnam

1. The Geneva agreements of 1954-1962 could provide an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia.
2. The United States would welcome an international conference on Southeast Asia "or any part of it."
3. The United States is willing to have negotiations "without preconditions" as called for by 17 neutral nations.
4. The United States is willing to enter "unconditional discussion as President Johnson has described it.
5. Cessation of hostilities can be the first order of business at the conference table or can be preliminary to the conference.
6. Hanoi's four points can be discussed at the conference along with other points the other side might want to discuss.
7. The United States seeks no bases in Southeast Asia.
8. The United States seeks "no continuing American presence in South Vietnam."
9. The United States is in favor of free elections in South Vietnam.
10. Reunification of North and South Vietnam should be "settled by free decision of the peoples concerned."
11. The nations of Southeast Asia can be nonaligned or neutral as far as the United States is concerned.
12. The United States would much prefer to use its resources for economic and social development of Southeast Asia and is prepared to contribute at least \$1 billion toward that objective, as Mr. Johnson has stated.
13. On the question of the Vietcong, Mr. Johnson has said their views could be represented at the conference table.
14. The United States could stop its bombing if the other side would "tell what would happen" as a result.



V. THE FOUR POINTS

(1) Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people--peace, independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must withdraw from South Vietnam U.S. troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, and cancel its military alliance with South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam and completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV.

(2) Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam must be strictly respected. The two zones must refrain from entering into any military alliance with foreign countries and there must be no foreign military bases, troops, or military personnel in their respective territory.

(3) The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the NFLSV without any foreign interference.

(4) The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 88-48  
By ij, NARA, Date 8-5-88



Hanoi's Four Points:

- (1) Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of both halves of Vietnam, with U.S. withdrawal (timing unspecified);
- (2) Observance of the military provisions of the Geneva Accords against outside interference;
- (3) Acceptance of the "NLF program" as the basis for the internal political settlement of the South;
- (4) Reunification to be worked out between the two Vietnams (no mention of elections)

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

**SECRET**  
**FILE COPY**

RECEIVED  
JUL 26 1966

3:46 PM '66

— BOYD  
— BUDGET  
— HAYNES  
— JESSUP  
— JOHNSON

— KEENE  
— KOMER  
— TATUM  
— WAGGONER

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Action

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Info

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JULY 26.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By W, NARA, Date 7-10-18

1. CALLED ON FONOFF DIR GEN MICHALOWSKI YESTERDAY AFTERNOON EXPRESSING OUR SERIOUS CONCERN OVER NVN USE OF DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND HANDED HIM COPY OF SVN NOTE TO ICC (SAIGON 1771).

2. MICHALOWSKI REFUSED TO ACCEPT NOTE SAYING:

A. POLISH GOVT HAS ACCESS TO NOTE THROUGH ITS ICC MEMBERSHIP;

B. SVN GOVT HAS PROPER CHANNELS TO GET MESSAGE TO ICC;

C. POLISH GOVT HAS NO ROLE AS SUCH, NOT EVEN MEMBER OF GENEVA ACCORD.

3. MICHALOWSKI EMPHASIZED AS HE HAS BEFORE THAT ICC IS NOT ABLE TO ACT IN THIS WAR BECAUSE U.S. HAS ALWAYS CONTENDED,

PAGE 2 RUDKRW 185 ~~SECRET~~  
WHEN NVN ASKED FOR INTERCESSION AGAINST CLAIMED U.S. VIOLATION OF GENEVA ACCORD IN ITS BOMBING OF NVN AND PRESENCE OF U.S. TROOPS IN VN, THAT ICC HAS NO JURISDICTION.

4. I POINTED OUT THAT OUR GOVT'S SERIOUS CONCERN OVER VIOLATION OF DEMILITARIZED ZONE BY NVN WAS BASIS FOR OUR CONVEYING THE NOTE TO HIM. HE SAID THAT HE HAS NOTED OUR CONCERN AND WILL BRING IT TO HIS GOVT'S ATTENTION BUT ASKED THAT I NOT REPEAT NOT PRESS HIM TO TAKE THE NOTE.

5. HE THEN STATED THAT POLISH GOVT TOOK SERIOUSLY OUR REQUEST TO INTERCEDE WITH HANOI ON POW QUESTION, THAT THEY HAD BEEN

**SECRET**

NOTE: HANDLE AS LIM DIS per S/S-O

~~SECRET~~

-2- WARSAW 185, JULY 26

RESPONSIVE TO OUR REQUEST, AND THAT THEY HAD TAKEN UP MATTER SERIOUSLY AND WERE NOW REASONABLY SURE THAT TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT OF PRISONERS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT OCCUR. WHILE NOT TOLD SPECIFICALLY WHERE OR AT WHAT LEVEL MATTER DISCUSSED, FROM TONE OF PRESENTATION AND ASSURANCE WITH WHICH HE SPOKE, I JUDGE THEY WERE IN CONTACT WITH HIGH LEVEL HANOI OFFICIALS.

6. MICHALOWSKI CAUTIONED THAT HIGH PRESSURE U.S. CAMPAIGN ON POW ISSUE COULD BOOMERANG IF CONTINUED, AND ADVISED THAT WE SHOULD NOW LET "SLEEPING DOGS LIE."

7. IN GENERAL CONVERSATION ON HOW TO GET HANOI TO CONFERENCE

PAGE 3 RUDKRW 185 ~~SECRET~~

TABLE, MICHALOWSKI AGAIN SUGGESTED THAT WE ACCEPT "IN PRINCIPLE" HANOI'S FOUR POINTS, AND IN THIS CONTEXT STOP BOMBING, INDICATE INTENTION TO ULTIMATELY WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM VN, AND ACCEPT LIBERATION FRONT AS ONE PARTY AT CONFERENCE TABLE. HE BRUSHED ASIDE HANOI'S INSISTENCE ON LIBERATION FRONT AS "SOLE" REPRESENTATIVE OF SVN AS NOT PART OF FOUR POINTS.

GP-3.

GRONOUSKI  
BT

~~SECRET~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

JUL 29 8 59 AM '66

JUL 28 7 17 PM '66

87-S

Origin

SAH

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy WARSAW  
INFO: Amembassy SAIGON  
USUN

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 7-10-98

~~ENTER~~  
~~BOWLER~~  
~~BOGARD~~  
~~BUDGET~~  
~~JESSUP~~  
~~JOHNSON~~  
~~LOREN~~  
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✓ P

State 17437

FOR AMBASSADOR GRONOUSKI FROM HARRIMAN

REF: Warsaw's 185

1. Your talk with Michalowski on July 25 (reftel) was extremely interesting. When you next see him it might be instructive to probe a bit further into his reasons for indicating that Hanoi's insistence on Liberation Front as Quote sole Unquote representative of SVN need not be taken seriously. As you know, it is this point, dealing with acceptance of NLF and its insuperable difficulty program, that causes us ~~trouble~~ when considering Hanoi's four points.

2. Re Michalowski's other comments in para 7 of reftel, we have often stated that US has no intention to leave troops in SVN longer than necessary to resist Hanoi's efforts to take over SVN by force. We have also made clear that reduction in level of hostilities, including bombing, was possible if matched by

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

S/AH:MStearns:ml 7/28/66

7543

S/AH - W. Averell Harriman

Clearances:

EUR - Mr. Stoessel

FE - Mr. Bundy

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

reciprocal action by other side.

END

17437

RUSK

SECRET

Saturday, August 6, 1966  
12:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

In view of the meeting of Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara with the Democratic Policy Committee, I assume no reply to this letter of Senator Mansfield is required. But I wanted to make sure this is your judgment.

W. W. Rostow

No reply required ☒

Draft reply ☐

See me ☐

WWRostow:rlh

United States Senate  
Office of the Majority Leader  
Washington, D.C.

July 14, 1966

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

During a Democratic Policy Committee meeting on yesterday, the question of the size of the U.S. military contingent in Western Europe was raised by one of the members present. The matter was brought up as it related to gold outflow and balance of payments difficulties. However, it became a subject of specific discussion in which many members participated. There is attached a list of principal points which were made during the discussion.

In response to a request for an expression of the wishes of the Committee, it was suggested and agreed that I should communicate to you, as the unanimous judgment of the Committee,\* the following:

1. There should be a "substantial" reduction of U.S. forces stationed in Western Europe;
2. Unless tangible and significant steps are taken promptly in this direction by the Executive Branch, it should be anticipated that the Senate, by a sense resolution or in some other fashion may be expected to try to stimulate a reduction of U.S. forces in Western Europe.

May I add, as a personal observation, that the expression of concern in the Committee was very pronounced, particularly as the

---

\* The following Senators concurred in this unanimous judgment: Brewster, Hart, Hill, Mansfield, Inouye, Long (La.), Magnuson, Muskie, Pastore, Russell (Ga.) and Symington. Senators Smathers and Hayden were not present and were not subsequently available for comment. The Vice President, who was at the luncheon briefly, had departed before the discussion developed spontaneously and, therefore, had no knowledge that the question would come up.

The President

- 2 -

July 14, 1966

question of troops in Europe is involved in difficulties pertaining to gold outflow and balance of payments. The expression was wholly spontaneous and was clearly precipitated by a desire to be constructive and helpful to you.

Respectfully,

*Mike Mansfield*



POINTS RAISED DURING DISCUSSION OF U.S. FORCES  
IN WESTERN EUROPE AT  
MAJORITY POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING, JULY 13, 1966, 12:30 P.M.

1. President Eisenhower has urged a reduction in U. S. forces in Europe.
2. One or two U. S. divisions in Europe would be just as persuasive in indicating our resolve and intentions as five divisions.
3. The European nations have not met their troop pledges to NATO, and it is unwarranted for us to remain wedded to ours.
4. Some European nations (including Spain, France and Germany) are building gold and dollar holdings at a great rate and the danger is real that there will be a loss of U. S. influence through a collapse of U. S. international financial power.  
*Belgium, The Netherlands,*
5. The commitment of five divisions was made years ago in circumstances very different from those which prevail today, particularly with respect to Russia and Eastern Europe.
6. Our capacity to move divisions across the ocean by air has increased immensely and, therefore, the tactical need to station U. S. forces on the ground in Europe has diminished.
7. The Armed Services have been urged to do so, but have not followed the Marine Corps practice of assignment abroad for twelve months without dependents, with the result that the garrisoning of the European installations includes the maintenance abroad of hundreds of thousands of dependents, which is both very costly and dollar-draining.
8. It was stated that the United States has almost one million military personnel (including dependents) stationed in Europe.

to P 52

Saturday, Aug. 6, 1966  
11:00 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You may wish to read this interview between  
Prime Minister Thanom and Nixon.

The Thais (and Amb. Martin) use the occasion  
to lean on us for the full \$70 million in MAP.

State and Defense are still negotiating on the  
latter. It will be coming over to you fairly  
soon.

W.W.R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Bangkok 1498 8/5/66)

cc: Moyles  
Rustine

SANITIZED

52a

1. I accompanied former Vice President Nixon this morning on call on Prime Minister Thanom. Also present were Pote Sarasin and Lt. Gen. Swaeng, Sec. Gen. of Government House. After normal pleasantries, Nixon said he had been much impressed to read in Karachi papers a full account of Foreign Minister Thanat's call on Asian nations to assume responsibility for their own destiny. Nixon said he had been particularly intrigued by that suggestion that Asians might take some separate initiative to bring the Vietnamese conflict closer to a solution. He asked the Prime Minister if he could say what lay back of this constructive action.

2. Thanom was unusually concise and lucid in his reply, a result perhaps aided by Pote's translation. The Prime Minister said there were several aspects of Thai assessment. The primary one was the national interest of Thailand, which felt itself now nakedly and dangerously exposed. He said Thailand had had the same choice as Cambodia. Thailand could have chosen the course of accommodation. It could have remained uninvolved as had other SEATO nations. He had been pushed to follow such courses. Had he done so, perhaps the United States would have remained as solicitous of Thailand as it was of Cambodia and Pakistan. On the contrary, Thai had elected to follow a course consistent both with national honor and national interest. They had carried out Thai obligations under SEATO. They had cooperated fully with the United States, acceding promptly to every request the US had made of them. In so doing they fully realized that the full wrath of the Communist powers might be quickly brought to bear on them, and that while we could withdraw, the Thai could not. Nevertheless, it had been Thai pilots in Lao uniforms who had first engaged the advancing Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops in Laos and checked them. It had been Thai artillery at Muong Soui that had checked the advance at the Plaine des Jarres.

3.4(b)  
(1), (b)

He had made every effort to provide space for our air units even at cost to efficiency and training of Royal Thai Air Force.

3. For domestic reasons he had tried to keep this cooperation as quiet as possible, although Radio Hanoi, Radio Peking, and Radio Free Thai poured out hours of vilification of him personally and Thai Government every day. The Soviet Government had protested. The Chinese and North Vietnamese regimes had announced that Thai would be directly made to pay for this running dog cooperation with the Americans. The Thai had documentary evidence that timetable originally designed for subversion of Thailand had been accelerated as a direct consequence of their assistance to

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-399

By cb, NARA Date 9-29-99

the US Government. Now helicopter flights into Thailand, coming very low to avoid radar detection, were bringing back Thai and some North Vietnamese at a worrisome rate. (He was apparently referring to previously reported unexplained radar tracks observed in northeast).

4. Thai fully intended to cope with this with their own personnel, he said, but requests for material assistance in equipment made to Vice President Humphrey, and on which they had counted, had not been forthcoming. As a matter of fact, MAP deliveries were agonizingly slow, and the Thai had not been able, with the exception of last year, to plan with any certainty on what would be received or when. He said he was not complaining about this, but was trying to give a complete answer to Mr. Nixon's question.

5. Thanom said he was fully supporting President Johnson and had written him a letter giving his complete support of his decision to bomb POL installations in Hanoi. He said it was President Johnson whose last trip to Thailand had given effect to an adequate MAP aid level for the first time, but it had been so reduced and distorted in subsequent years that the Thai had never been able to carry out the modernization of Thai armed forces which had been planned and which would have been so useful now had they been able to carry out the plans President Johnson had approved when he was Vice President.

6. Thanom said his conscience was clear, that while American contributions had been very much greater quantitatively, in relative terms the Thai had committed their very existence as a nation to support our common objectives.

7. Thanom said it did not seem to Thai that Soviets and British had much interest in what happened in Asia, and with the forthcoming de Gaulle trip, possibilities of French mischief were apparent. It was decided, therefore, ~~that~~ with the stakes for Thailand so high, it was time to get a focus on other possibilities. Therefore, he had approved Thanat's idea.

8. Nixon returned to the question of aid, asking what the Thai would do if aid requested was not forthcoming. I intervened and said that if the Prime Minister had been referring to the helicopters mentioned to Vice President Humphrey, I was happy to be able to inform him that the remaining 15 of the 25 requested had just been delivered at Nakom Pathon. I pointed out that immediately after this request had been made, the US had taken 10 helicopters from South Vietnam and made them available to the Thai in the northeast, even though these were desperately needed in South Vietnam.

I said on the other requests made at that time I was happy that a great many of the items had been made available, and I hoped to have a list for him early next week. I said perhaps, since these items had come in at different times, a complete tabulation had not been made for him by the Royal Thai Army. On the question of general MAP level, I pointed out that Congress had not yet completed action, and it would have been very difficult to give a figure as we had done last year until we knew how much money would be in the final appropriation bill. I told the Prime Minister that I could assure him that the final decision would be made only after consideration at the highest levels in Washington, and I was personally confident that ways would be found to permit the continuance of the remarkable progress made last year by the Royal Thai Armed Forces.

9. Nixon returned to the subject, asking how many American troops were in the country and whether the Thai thought this was too much. Thanom said about thirty thousand Americans were present. Whether they were too much was a relative question. The Thai welcomed troops actually engaged against our common enemy to the extent they could accommodate them. These were USAF forces. Thanom said there was criticism, of course, primarily from Commie radio, but some from Thai people. He said the number of incidents had been amazingly low.

10. Nixon asked what impact increased subversion pressure had put on the Thai budget. Pote Sarasin replied that increased expenditures for defense services would increase the budget deficit the next fiscal year to more than 4 billion Baht out of tentative budget of a bit more than 18 billion, but they were determined to find some way to avoid inflationary pressures, even if they had to scale back part of investment in economic and social infrastructure programs which they were very reluctant to do.

Comment: Needless to say, I reiterate my hope that we can come as close as we possibly can to the full program of \$70 millions recommended by the commander of the U. S. military mission, Thailand, and endorsed by CINCPAC and the JCS.

MARTIN

~~SECRET~~



Friday, August 5, 1966 -- 7:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

This morning I appeared briefly on TODAY show. The questions raised were: the nature of my job; whether your Alumni Council speech extended our commitments in Asia; Asian regional vitality; and Viet Nam.

At lunch I spoke off the record to the Overseas Writers club. After outlining our broad strategy on the world scene, as we entered the second postwar generation, I answered questions which focused almost excessively around Viet Nam.

Edward Weintal, NEWSWEEK, came in to see me. He was interested in our assessment of Moscow's view of U.S. public opinion. Members of Wilson's party had spoken to him about Kosygin's view that your Viet Nam policy did not have national support. He made an interesting suggestion: that you might try to communicate directly with Kosygin, conveying to him your commitment to see it through in Viet Nam and the importance of Moscow not miscalculating. Weintal said he was going to talk to Fulbright and urge Fulbright to take some responsibility to persuade the Russians of this fact. Since Weintal believes it was a great mistake for us to make the commitment we did in Viet Nam, I take his suggestion in good faith. I, of course, made no comment or commitment beyond saying it was interesting, and I thanked him.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

8/5/64

Dear Mr. President:

I know your schedule is heavily burdened during the first year of your administration, but I wish you to know with what personal satisfaction I would welcome you if you could find time to visit Washington from September 14 through 16.

The reports of our Ambassador, as well as of my colleagues who have had the privilege of calling on you, have permitted me to follow closely how you have taken hold of the reins of government and the policies you have so responsibly and clearly set forth to guide your country.

I look forward to welcoming you as a partner in the adventure of Asian development and as a brother-in-arms.

Sincerely,



His Excellency  
Ferdinand E. Marcos  
President of the Republic  
of the Philippines  
Manila

LBJ:WJJ:WWR:mz

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 88-33  
By ing NARA. Date 5-15-89

August 3, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

President Marcos of the Philippines has now agreed to September 14 through 16 as the Washington dates for his visit. May I recommend your signature to this formalized invitation for transmittal to him.

Announcement <sup>of</sup> the visit is planned for Aug. 8

W. W. Rostow



CONFIDENTIAL

Friday  
August 5, 1966 - 6:30pm

Mr. President:

Here is Ambassador Goldberg's  
report on his negotiations on  
the Celestial Bodies Treaty.

His optimism appears justified,  
*although fingers should remain  
crossed until signed, sealed,  
delivered.*

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

Geneva #676

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12858, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By Delt NARS, Date 8-17-86

55a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, August 5, 1966

For President Johnson and Secretary Rusk from Goldberg (Geneva, 676)

As you know, the Outer Space Committee has recessed Space Treaty negotiations which will be reconvened in New York before or early during the forthcoming General Assembly. In addition to detailed reports which the delegation has made concerning the negotiations, I wish to make the following comments:

On the whole, we can regard the negotiations to date as reflecting great credit upon the United States, for the following reasons:

1. Negotiations came about as a result of initiative taken by the President on May 7, in calling for negotiations looking to a treaty. This was initially resisted by Soviets who finally had to go along under the pressure of world opinion. This fact recognized and emphasized during the course of negotiations here in Geneva.

2. The attitude of the U.S. delegation in accordance with Department instructions has been forthcoming and this too has resulted in very favorable claim on world opinion both diplomatically and in the world press. Intelligence reports confirmed that it is the shared opinion among the delegations irrespective of ideology that Soviets have been placed at a disadvantage by reason of forthcoming and conciliatory attitude of the U.S. delegation.

3. In final statements by delegates winding up this phase of deliberations, only Hungary and Bulgaria fully supported Soviet reservations which for time being blocked a treaty. It is interesting that statements by Poland and Romania did not expressly support key Soviet reservation on equal access and reporting. Unless the Soviets remain unwilling because of Vietnam to conclude an agreement in General Assembly, I see no reason why a final treaty text cannot be speedily concluded once the Committee reconvenes in New York.

My own analysis of Soviet actions here is that Morozov, the Soviet representative, was acting under instructions not to make a final agreement in Geneva but to reserve a few points as a delaying maneuver. It is my impression that Soviets were unwilling because of concern about Chinese criticism to make it appear that they were agreeing with us too readily on an international treaty of this importance. An alternative explanation is

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-399

By CB, NARA Date 9-29-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

that Soviet delegation at Geneva was concerned about the possibility of a government shake-up and desired to confirm their instructions in Moscow personally before making final agreement. Although present government was confirmed by supreme Soviet during last stages of our negotiations in Geneva, Morozov in private conversation with me several times referred to the necessity of consulting with "new" government.

Whatever the cause, it will be very difficult for the Soviets in the light of the great support the U. S. received in the Committee among other delegations including all non-aligned countries to block an acceptable treaty draft at General Assembly.

Finally, I want to convey to the Department the excellent cooperation I received from all members of the U. S. delegation, particularly Meeker, Reis, Helman (State Department); Thacher (USUN); Sohler (NASA); Graybeal (ACTA); Moroncow (ACTA); and Captian Cole (DOD).

They were a superb and hardworking team and contributed greatly to the progress we made in Geneva.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, August 5, 1966  
3:30 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

At our request the Intelligence community has produced this paper on "Current Chinese Communist Intentions in the Vietnam Situation."

As the conclusion (pages 1-2) indicates, it is believed:

-- The Chinese have not changed their basic policy because of the recent air strikes;

-- They may move some infantry troops into North Vietnam as a precautionary step against the contingency of an invasion by us.

W. W. Rostow

SNIE 13-66, 4 August 1966

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 88-161  
By ij NARA, Date 6-27-89

Thursday, August 4, 1966  
10:20 a. m.

Mr. President:

I suppose you saw Howard K. Smith's  
show. I didn't; but read it this morning.

July 16, 1966  
If by any chance you didn't see it,  
it is just about the best statement on Viet  
Nam I've ever read.

W. W. Rostow

8/5/66  
Marie Delmer said  
Pres. was sending this  
to Bill Moyers.

WWRostow:rlh



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 4, 1966

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Message to Jordanian King Hussein

August 11 marks the anniversary of Hussein's ascension to the throne. A short message from you, like one you sent last year, is an easy way to show our continuing concern. As a courtesy gesture, it should not cause us any trouble elsewhere in the area.

We are in pretty good shape in Jordan now as a result of our aircraft sale. However, we will have to keep on gradually cutting back our economic aid. So keeping alive his sense of your personal interest is worth a little effort.

If you approve, we would send the following:

"On the anniversary of your ascension to the throne of Jordan, I once again take great pleasure in conveying to you my personal greetings and the best wishes of the American people for the increasing prosperity of your country. The United States values highly its association with Jordan and looks forward to continued close and cordial relations between our two nations. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson"

State recommends you approve and I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 7-15-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, August 4, 1966 -- 5:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Ray Scherer, NBC News, came in to lunch today. We discussed arrangements for my appearance on TODAY show tomorrow morning, Friday, August 5.

John Cauley, Kansas City Star, came in today to get information for use in a "profile" he is doing on me.

W. W. Rostow

rln



Thursday, August 4, 1966  
7:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

On June 15 you asked me to hold a decision as to whether you would respond to the invitation of General Wheeler to address the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces on their opening day, August 19.

They have now come to a point where it would be most helpful if you could let them know if you had definitely decided against such an address or whether you were still prepared to consider speaking on that occasion.

W. W. Rostow

Regret \_\_\_\_\_

Accept \_\_\_\_\_

Accept tentatively but  
prepare a back-up speaker \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rln

30 P 61

Thurs., August 4, 1966  
4:45 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I recommend your approval of this birthday message by telegram to the Prime Minister of Thailand. While a departure from the normal procedure of conveying such greetings primarily to Heads of State, I believe it is warranted by the special and valuable support of the Thai government for our efforts in Vietnam and Laos and for our larger regional policy objectives.

Prime Minister Thanom has shared in formulating the enlightened views that you noted yesterday in Foreign Minister Thanat's speech. His birthday is an important national event, and your greetings would have a favorable and lasting impression on the Thai leadership.

W. W. Rostow

☒ Approved

☐ Prefer not to make exceptions

cc: Moyers  
KinTues

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

61a

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

On behalf of the Government and people of the United States,  
I take great personal pleasure in extending congratulations on your  
fifty-fifth birthday.

There has recently become evident in Asia a new spirit, based  
on a growing realization that a firm stand against aggression in Asia  
can and will succeed, and that there is now great promise that the  
free nations of the area can look forward to national and regional  
development in continued freedom. With your inspired leadership,  
Thailand has made a great contribution to the creation of this new spirit.  
I look forward to a continued close relationship with you as we go ahead  
with the task of bringing to fruition the promise of peace and development  
for the peoples of Asia.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 88-33  
By ijg NARA. Date 5-15-89

+ tra 62

Thursday, August 4, 1966  
5:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's recommended letter from you to Prime Minister Sato. It seems to me to strike exactly the right note without committing us excessively to any particular proposal. I recommend you approve its dispatch.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 90148 NARA, Date 1/17/96

Walt  
OK  
after your  
check with  
Amb Reischauer  
W

WWRostow:rlm



~~SECRET~~

(8/4/66)

62a

Draft cable To: AmEmbassy Tokyo Info: Amembassy Bangkok and Saigon

Request that you deliver following letter from the President to

Prime Minister Sato:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-90  
By ig, NARA Date 8-31-96

I have noted, as I am sure you also have, the very interesting speech made by the Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman in Bangkok on August 3. The Foreign Minister's suggestion that the nations of Asia take their destiny into their own hands and that those nations in Asia which have been in the forefront in promoting constructive undertakings for peace and progress take the lead in establishing a Peace for Asia Committee to seek to hold a conference in Asia which would include all of the principals in the war in Viet-Nam seems to me to be very constructive. Although the Foreign Minister did not discuss this proposal with us and we therefore do not know exactly how he would hope to implement it, I would hope that your Government would find it possible to give him encouragement and advice on how this effort might be made to move forward. Even if the Communist powers initially reject any such proposal, I do not think you should underestimate the powerful influence on them of seeing those countries in Asia truly interested in that continent's security and progress move together in an effort to restore peace to the area.

For such an effort to be successful it must of course be truly an Asian effort and there can be no truly Asian effort without the participation and leadership of your great nation. I am sure I need not tell you that the United States seeks nothing for itself in Asia and if Japan, Thailand and

~~SECRET~~

-2-

other like-minded nations can themselves find a way, working with the Vietnamese, to restore and maintain a just peace in the area. It will be most sincerely welcomed by the United States.

I have written to you frankly in order to give you the full benefit of my own thinking as befits the close relationship between our two countries, and I would welcome your own thoughts in the same spirit.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson "

Bangkok should in its discretion confidentially inform Foreign Minister of this effort on our part to encourage Japanese to take up his proposal.

Saigon should inform Prime Minister or Foreign Minister in general terms of action we have taken to support Thai Foreign Minister's proposal.

END.

~~SECRET~~



F  
S

Wednesday,  
August 3, 1966 -- 11:30 am

Mr. President:

General Eisenhower's interest in  
travel later in the year should be  
noted.

W. W. Rostow



2665  
63a

~~SECRET~~



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

2 August 1966

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. I visited General Eisenhower at Walter Reed Hospital yesterday. My main purpose was to make a personal call and see how he was getting along. He was doing quite well, and in fact, expects to leave the hospital tomorrow.

2. I thought you might be interested in his comments indicating that he is turning over in his mind the possibility that he might be able to make a trip to a number of foreign countries of special interest to him toward the end of this year. I sounded a mild note of caution by commenting that his physical condition would have to be taken into account before consideration of such an arduous venture could go very far.

*A. J. Goodpaster*  
A. J. GOODPASTER  
Lt General, USA

Attachment

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

~~SECRET~~

104 ON 8-17-86



THE JOINT STAFF

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

2 August 1966

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with General Eisenhower, 1 August 1966

1. I met with General Eisenhower for approximately 45 minutes at Walter Reed Hospital, Monday afternoon, 1 August 1966. My primary purpose was to pay a personal call and to see how he was progressing.

2. With respect to the latter point, he is getting along quite well. He said he was planning to leave the hospital on Wednesday, 3 August. His problem was that he was having rather acute heartburn after dinner in the evening and then later during the night, and was having some angina pains at the latter times. The diet, schedule, and medication he has received have apparently had an excellent effect. He seemed quite keen and vigorous, in good spirits and interested in events when I saw him.

3. I reviewed very briefly the progress of affairs in South Vietnam--military, economic, political (preparation for the elections) and in rural reconstruction or "pacification". On the military side, operations continue to go well. Economically, the devaluation is apparently beginning to take hold and reduce the rate of inflation. The preparations for election seem promising. Discussion with him brought out that if there is a good turnout in September, this could be quite effective in demonstrating that the Viet Cong are really a small terroristic minority rather than a major dissatisfied segment of the society. Pacification continues to go slowly, although ground work is being laid that should have a good payoff later.

4. I reviewed the air operations against North Viet Nam, noting particularly that a systematic effort is being conducted against the POL and that thus far it has been accomplished while successfully avoiding any substantial noncombatant losses. At the same time as the POL effort,


~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 85-280  
By us/inf, NARA, Date 9-6-88

~~SECRET~~

armed reconnaissance operations continue against lines of communication, with substantial effect. With regard to the prisoner of war question, it appears that the North Vietnamese government has backed away for the present, probably as a result of seeing the intense and strong reaction within the United States and elsewhere in the world that their initial threats created.

5. As our talk came to an end, General Eisenhower said he had been giving some thought while he was in the hospital to the possibility of making a trip to some foreign countries toward the end of this year. He commented that the President had told him on one or more occasions that if he (General Eisenhower) ever decided that he wanted to make a foreign trip, the President would provide an aircraft for him. As General Eisenhower talked about such a trip, he mentioned the possibility of seeing General De Gaulle in France (for personal and unofficial talks, since he believed De Gaulle would not discuss official matters with anyone without an official portfolio). He then said he would think of visiting a country or two in Black Africa, together with Ethiopia or Kenya on the Eastern side. He next spoke of seeing Ayub in Pakistan and Mrs. Gandhi in India. He said he would like to spend two or three days in South Viet Nam simply to get the feeling of the country and of the operations there. Also, he would want to visit Australia and New Zealand, which he has never visited. He would then come home by way of Tahiti and Hawaii. At one point he alluded to the possibility of also visiting South Africa. I told him that any such trip would of course be a very fine thing in many ways but that prior to its even being seriously considered, the question of his physical condition and ability to stand such a schedule would have to be carefully weighed by the medical people. (It was apparent to me that, to a degree, he was thinking that his last chance to make such a trip might be approaching, i.e., that he would have to do it before too long, or his physical condition would not permit it.)

  
A. J. GOODPASTER  
Lt General, USA

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

6P  
64  
Wednesday, August 3, 1966  
12:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Secretary Rusk left with me some days ago the underlying memorandum which discusses a new arms control initiative consisting of a proposal to extend the present Limited Test Ban Treaty to cover verifiable underground tests.

His memorandum makes no recommendation. It is a summary of the major issues which must be considered in reaching a decision.

The JCS oppose on the grounds that the Treaty would inhibit or render most costly certain underground tests. Sect. McNamara opposes because the battle with JCS and the Hill would use up more capital than the Treaty is worth.

It had been our hope that this paper could go to you accompanied by a recommendation on non-proliferation in general, so that you might review the issue as a whole. No clear agreed recommendation is yet in sight.

Under these circumstances, I asked Sect. Rusk for guidance as to how he wished the memorandum dealt with. Given the pressure from ACDA that you be apprised of the Limited Test Ban issue, Sect. Rusk yesterday asked that his memorandum be sent to you for evening reading. The long documents referred to in the memorandum I have not attached. They are, of course, available.

I recommend that action on this be held up until we can assemble and review systematically all the possible arms control initiatives open to us.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-178  
By is, NARA Date 9-17-97

~~TOP SECRET~~



*Th. J. Jones*1. *susp*2. *Pres file*

August 3, 1966

~~SECRET~~

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: UAR Ambassador's Request to See You

Ambassador Kamel is just back from Cairo with renewed word of Nasser's desire to improve US-UAR relations. He also has an inscribed photo of Nasser he would like to give you.

Secretary Rusk recommends that you see him (attached), and I agree.

Our main goal with Nasser is to keep the lines of communication open. Our experimental efforts at getting closer to him over the past five years have shown us the limits of our leverage. But they have also shown that Nasser does want to keep his lines open to the West.

Talking is one of the few things we can do right now. We bought a few months by making available \$50 million in wheat on CCC terms instead of renewing our PL 480 agreement. We are not likely to do much more this fall. But we have stopped short of the confrontation we seemed headed for last spring. So it is worth keeping the talk going in hopes of quieting things down for awhile.

A talk with Kamel would be a logical next step in the process you began by your February session with Sadat. His exchanges with both you and Secretary Rusk were extraordinarily frank but cordial. Even though Nasser let slip the chance to build on Sadat's good visit here, I believe those talks improved understanding.

In that spirit, you told Sadat "When your government has something to say to us, you just tell Ambassador Kamel to put on his hat and come on down here. Let's not talk about it in public." I think it would be wise to let them pick up that invitation.

If you approve, I will have State give us a solid brief since this will probably be your one message for Nasser in the next few months.

Approve ☒ \_\_\_\_\_  
See me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 88-33  
By ing NARA, Date 5-15-88

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 1, 1966

11775

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request of Ambassador Kamel of the  
United Arab Republic to Call on You.

Recommendation:

That you receive Dr. Mostafa Kamel, Ambassador of  
the United Arab Republic, for a brief call.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

Ambassador Kamel returned to Washington from  
Cairo on June 23 after a lengthy period of consultation  
there during which he saw President Nasser. He has a  
signed photograph of President Nasser which he wishes  
to present to you. (Ambassador Battle reports that  
Nasser has placed your autographed photograph on his  
mantle.) He also wishes to convey President Nasser's  
desire to work with us to improve relations between  
our two countries. He will also doubtless stress  
the need for continuing "cooperation" (i.e., food  
assistance) from the United States to the United Arab  
Republic.

The United Arab Republic is going through one of  
its periodic re-examinations of its relations with the  
United States and seems to want to avoid an expanded  
confrontation with us. The Egyptians have accepted

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 3: downgraded at 12 year  
intervals; not automatically  
decontrolled

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-29

By lif, NARA, Date 7-27-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

our offer of CCC credit for wheat in lieu of further sales under Title I of P.L. 480 with relatively good grace as a "transitory measure." We welcome the six-month respite the CCC transaction gives us and still wish to keep the door open between us and Egypt. Your receiving Ambassador Kamel will contribute to this process.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Wednesday,  
August 3, 1966 -- 4:05pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Lodge's weekly cable.

It's interesting to see the  
rising proportion of attention to  
politics.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 2564

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 14, 1983  
By DCA NARS, Date 8-17-86

66a

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

Wednesday, August 3, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 2564)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. Who for President?

The men at the top of the Government of Vietnam believe that the timetable for political evolution in Vietnam is about as follows:

- A. September 11: election of members ("Deputies") to a Constitutional Convention ("Constituent Assembly");
- B. Drafting of Constitution;
- C. End of November or early December: promulgation of Constitution;
- D. Late February or early March: elections under the new Constitution for President and Legislature;
- E. April: New Government under the Constitution is installed.

The election, therefore, is between six and seven months off and at present only two potential candidates are evident -- Ky and Thieu.

All of the above assumes that the Constituent Assembly -- conscious of being the only popularly elected national entity in Vietnam -- does not decide to be a European-type, general purpose Parliament and elect the Chief Executive this autumn.

Ky's recent press announcement means, therefore, that he plans to stay in office until the new Government is installed under the new Constitution -- or for about nine months. It is unquestionably not the last word as far as he is concerned.

I believe the announcement is helpful as regards the elections in September, since it will tend to diminish the suspicion abroad that he is trying to rig them for his own benefit. It should take some spotlight and attention away from the elections and the less spotlight, the better. It will also probably give some

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

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NLJ 98-399

By cb, NARA Date 9-29-99

premature exposure to Thieu, which Thieu will not like.

This, therefore, seems like an appropriate time to make an evaluation of Ky, since you may wish to make a decision at some time in the future in which your opinion of him is a factor.

In making an evaluation of what Ky means to the United States, I think it is fair to say that the unfavorable things about Ky are on the surface and are immediately visible as follows:

A. The most unfavorable is his way of saying things in public to the press which are understandably embarrassing to us. He does not do this because he wants to embarrass us, and he is sorry when he does so; but he just does not think in terms of what the American public will think about what he says. When he gets a question about how one is "definitely" to guarantee peace in Southeast Asia, he focuses on the word "definitely" and makes the kind of a reply which he would make if he were having a very private conversation with me. He is unaware that the press will never concentrate on the refinements of phraseology but is looking for a headline and will, therefore, say that he favors invading the North when what he means to say is that if you are "definitely" to guarantee peace, you will have to eliminate the threat of aggression from the North. It is difficult for him to understand that when one is talking for publication, one cannot use the shadings and details which focuses when talking with fellow experts. Also, he talks without enough prior thought and the press knows how to jostle and needle him.

B. He is basically and instinctively interested in action and deeds and does not concentrate on words in the way that an American official does. A part of this is his difficulty in thinking a political problem through.

C. Another defect is his tendency to act when he has lost his temper, which he did, I believe, in the case of the relief of General Thi.

On the plus side, I would say:

A. He is completely honest financially and wishes he could go further than he has been able to go in getting rid of corruption.

B. He is courageous and stubborn, which is why the Tri Quang maneuvers against him failed.

C. He is skillful in his use of force -- troops and police.

D. He is a patriot in the simple, direct meaning of the word -- that is, he wants to establish Vietnam as a modern nation state; he regards it as his duty not to countenance alienation of its territory; he regards it as simple duty to try to reestablish the authority of the Government in those places.

E. He has learned a lesson from his observations of the late President Diem's administration and is determined not to react violently or to over-react, as Diem did in Hue in the spring of 1963. He has gained in political maturity.

F. He is also determined to avoid Diem's practice of bulldozing the elections by bringing in large numbers of soldiers to vote at the last minute and by similar tactics.

G. He is a grower. Although not a reader of long papers, he is also a very real learner. When I produce talking papers on very complex subjects such as devaluation or operation of the port, and give him a copy while I read my copy aloud paragraph and paragraph, he absorbs what I say. This is unquestionably a method which he likes and which enables him to reach conclusions. Once he reaches them, he will try to carry them out even though they may damage him politically.

H. His attitude towards public policy in Vietnam is genuinely socially conscious. He wants to be generous, liberal, and treat the public well.

I. Deep in his heart, he likes the United States, is profoundly grateful for what we are doing, and tries hard to do what we would like. He has never expressed resentment to me on the occasions when we have made policy announcements without consulting the Government of Vietnam, and he is genuinely sorry when he says something to the press which embarrasses us.

Herewith some cases where he followed our advice:

A. Last week he allowed General Thi to go to the United States without first finishing the two months' sentence ordered by the Military Board of Investigation.

B. In late July, he agreed to postpone Mrs. Ky's visit to the United States.

C. In late June, he acquiesced in our plan for the virtual take-over of the port of Saigon and agreed to the retention of Tran Van Do as Foreign Minister, despite strong pressure to take over the portfolio himself.

D. In mid-June, he accepted our recommendations concerning the hard economic reforms which we felt must be taken to save the country from a disastrous economic situation. The shock-waves from these measures are still being felt throughout the economy.

E. In early June he finally accepted our contention that his proposed trip to Seoul for the ASPAC Conference would be ill-advised and consented to cancel the trip.

F. At about the same time, I suggested that he cause the draft election law to be modified so as to eliminate the troublesome form of words which specifically banned "neutralists" from running as candidates. He was able to convince his colleagues in the Directorate of the wisdom of this suggestion.

G. In early June he reversed the decision taken by his subordinates governing the frequency of Pan American flights into Vietnam. When one recalls that his former Chief of State in the Air Force is now director of the nation's airline and participated in the making of the decision which Ky reversed, one can estimate the probable expense of this act in terms of personal loyalties.

H. Last Christmas when we decided to try and extend the cease-fire, Ambassador Porter flew to Dalat on Christmas Day and obtained Ky's concurrence, despite the fact that the proposal probably had little attraction for him.

There is a great deal to be said for General Thieu. He is older, less impulsive, and has more of a "head for government" than any of the rest of them. He really seems to enjoy talking about the Constitution, the powers of the Executive, the value of having a Senate, etc. He is certainly one of the craftiest men in this country, if not the most, and if he were President, he would do a good job. His political drawback is that he is widely advertised as being the darling of the clergy. Understand that this is completely untrue and the clergy who come from Tonkin in North Vietnam do not like him, but, as so often happens in politics, this tag has been unfairly attached to him and is a handicap -- how much of a handicap no one knows. When the political crisis which began March 10 was going strong, the Buddhists always denounced Thieu louder than anyone else. He was the one who had to go, even if nobody else did.

It is strange but true that no one in the Embassy or in the Embassy circle of acquaintances can suggest the name of anyone else, military or civilian. A civilian who is old and sick might be all right to be the kind of President who simply had ceremonial functions. But if one thing is certain about the forth-

coming Constitution, it is that the Presidency will have strong executive powers and this means that he must have energy and drive. We know from bitter experience how difficult it is to get things done here even if the head man is energetic. With an apathetic president, the resultant government would resemble a jellyfish.

#### B. Elections

About six hundred candidates will contest for the 108 seats to be filled by direct election. On the basis of the partial results now available, the 420 candidates running in the First Corps, Fourth Corps, Saigon and Gai Dinh (the province around Saigon) can be classified as follows: business and professional men account for approximately one hundred of the candidates, next come teachers and professors (approximately 70), city/province council members (about 60), civil servants (about 60), military (about 40), remainder are miscellaneous.

There is little identifiable affiliation with political parties outside of the First Corps, where approximately one-third of the candidates have recognizable connections with the VNQDD and some others with the Dai Viet parties. (These are the two nationalist parties which were formed clandestinely in the French period.)

In the Fourth Corps, there are quite a few Hoa Hao candidates, but they are almost equalled by candidates who are either Catholics, Theravada Buddhists (Cambodian origin) or Buddhists of the general run. From our preliminary observations country-wide, it does not today appear that religion will be a major factor in this election.

#### C. Pacification-Revolutionary Development

Pursuant to what I said about urgency of pacification in my last weekly telegram, I conferred with General Westmoreland about the Vietnamese Regular Army -- the ARVN -- contributing more to pacification. He agrees on the urgent desirability of hitting pacification hard at this time when other things are going quite well.

He has a team in MACV which is a) examining the size and composition of ARVN. Also in June 1966 he "placed a freeze" on activating any more ARVN combat units pending a review of the experiences which they have had since January 1, which should be finished on September 15.

The team b) is also examining the ultimate roles, missions and composition of all Vietnamese military, paramilitary and police forces.

These studies may be a basis for recommendations for revamping ARVN. General Westmoreland expects to submit a proposal to the Mission Council on this whole matter.

On June 14, 1966, General Westmoreland requested authority to provide some direct U.S. subsidy to the ARVN post exchange/commissary system -- something which would go a long way towards revitalizing ARVN morale. Westmoreland proposed to do this initially in the Third Corps as an element of his "buddy system" wherein the U.S. First Division provides support for the Fifth ARVN Division and the U.S. 25th Division does likewise for the ARVN 25th. This pairing off of U.S. and Government of Vietnam units is now in effect and the post exchange/commissary assistance would thus be in effect an extension of an existing program. I believe this is a good idea and deserves support.

I went to the Delta to observe, first, how the U.S. Navy is progressing with its effort to break the Viet Cong's strength on the lower reaches of the Mekong -- and then see how the Vietnamese were taking advantage of whatever opportunity U.S. activities were creating. Small, fast patrol boats, teamed with helicopters, are seeking out and destroying Viet Cong hideouts, tax collection stations, and other enemy redoubts. I was much impressed.

Yesterday I sent an Embassy Vietnamese Language Officer into those provinces affected by this operation so as to gauge what steps the Vietnamese are taking to capitalize on this program, the aim of which is to extend Government of Vietnam influence. He estimates that Viet Cong taxation efforts and river movement have undoubtedly been hindered by the operation. Nevertheless, the major rivers of Vinh Binh province are not as yet much more secure now than they were when the operation began in May, and Viet Cong strength in the province has not yet been materially diminished. We have not had enough time.

U.S. advisers say that the province chief and district chiefs recognize the potential value of the operation and have cooperated with the Navy. The province chief has given the Navy complete freedom of movement; district chiefs have learned to take advantage of the helicopters operating with each patrol boat, and Government of Vietnam artillery units support the boats.

The province chief has agreed to construct a number of outposts along the main river banks to act as checkpoints for traffic on canals leading into the rivers and to support the patrol boats. U.S. advisers on the spot say that



Vinh Binh province does not have enough Regional Force and Popular Force troops to move into areas along the rivers controlled by the Viet Cong. Viet Cong strength in these areas is still formidable. ARVN's Ninth Division, which operates in Vinh Binh, might be able to do more than it has up to now, although we would need to know more in order to pass judgment. In short, this is a promising project, but more time and closer coordination are needed.

Ambassador Porter reports that after some initial problems, particularly regarding desertions, the newly-trained 59-man Revolutionary Development Cadre Teams are beginning to take hold. In several provinces around Saigon, deserters are now returning to their teams. We are also taking measures to improve the quality of Cadre leadership and to instruct provincial officials on the Cadres' activities -- two ways in which the program has been deficient.

Deployment of the police field force is proceeding satisfactorily with 13 companies now in the field. The Viet Cong have issued instructions in the area around Saigon that the police field forces are a serious obstacle to their plans and are to be attacked vigorously.

On the purely deployment side, project agreements are being prepared with the Government of Vietnam to provide full support and funds for our two important developmental areas, An Giang and Districts 6, 7, and 8 in Saigon. The Saigon Districts' project is being run by a group of dynamic youth leaders and is a particularly heartening step forward. It is one of the best ways to prevent boys from becoming material for the Viet Cong.

Port improvements are speeding up logistic support for Revolutionary Development. An inter-agency group for 1967 Revolutionary Development planning has been established. This will not only place both ourselves and the Government of Vietnam on a much more solid footing for 1967, but will also help build up the partnership spirit between our two countries. The decision to put elections under General Thang, Minister of Revolutionary Development, may slow us on the Revolutionary Development front during the next five or six weeks but in view of his honesty and integrity we think it is in the best interest of the country.

#### D. Psychological

According to what appears to be a dependable source, as reported in a CIA report of July 31, the leadership of the Cao Dai religion has decided to support the Government of Vietnam, asking at the same time that their support not be publicized because of fear of Viet Cong reprisals.

Even though this support is on a semi-covert basis, it is significant because the Cao Dai are known for cold-blooded shrewdness in making their judgments and for being well informed. Their decision is believed to be due to the improved security situation of the Third Corps brought about by numerous Viet Cong defeats through U.S. troop operations. The Cao Dai thus believe that the Allied/Government of Vietnam side is winning and they want to be with the winner.

The number of Chieu Hoi returnees for the period 23 to 29 July was 261, down from 322 the previous week, bringing the total for the four-week period 2 to 29 July to 1,178. The total number of returnees for calendar year 1966 to date is now 11,017, substantially equal to the 11,124 registered for all of calendar year 1965. The daily average for 1966 has been just over 52, as compared to 30.5 for 1965.

#### E. Military

During last week's fighting near the demilitarized zone, General Westmoreland reports that on three separate occasions, troops of the North Vietnamese Division threw down their arms and ran. He says that this is the first time on record that this kind of behavior had occurred.

He understands that the North Vietnamese came into the demilitarized zone because we had made the route through Laos too dangerous. They had hoped the route through the demilitarized zone would be safer and also that the political turmoil which had begun in March would continue.

He showed me the notebook of a squad leader in the 324 North Vietnamese Army Division, in which some of the entries are as follows:

"The Americans plan to turn South Vietnam into a neo-colonialist base;" "In the U.S., opposition to the war is steadily growing;" "The U.S. war machine creates additional difficulties for the revolution, but the U.S. itself is having problems at home and abroad and cannot make full use of its war potential."

Symptomatic of the problems which beset him and his fellows are the following remarks about his own side: "...there is a lack of solidarity between Cadre and soldiers which must be corrected;" "Mobility is still unsatisfactory, leadership is deficient, weapons and equipment are frequently lost or damaged."

#### F. Casualties, Military and Civilian

The total military casualty figures for the past week are as follows:

Friendly forces lost 264 killed-in-action (including 52 U.S.); 783 wounded -in-action (including 336 U.S.); 33 missing-in-action (including 3 U.S.). Ranged against these figures were Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army losses numbering 1,153 killed-in-action and 89 captured. In Operation HASTINGS in the demilitarized zone, there have been a total of 764 North Vietnamese soldiers killed-in-action against 125 of our own dead since the operation began on July 5.

The pattern of terror against local officials which obtained for the last several months since the lunar year appears unchanged. So far we only have reports from one Corps area for July but these figures virtually match the ones for June. In the Fourth Corps this past month, thirteen local officials were assassinated, six abducted and four were wounded. This compares with respective totals of fourteen, nine and seven for June. There are no dependable totals for civilian casualties as a whole due to Viet Cong action. As the tempo of the war increased last February (after Tet) this form of terrorism declined. It is obvious, however, that the Viet Cong have not abandoned it. It is a technique which our side has not yet overcome.

#### G. Economic

In the early part of last week, there was a rise in retail prices. Prices of imported commodities were either stable or slightly lower. Those most important indicators -- the price of dollars and gold on the black market -- dropped. There is modest cause for optimism that the price spirals set off by the economic reforms in June may be levelling off.

LODGE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, August 3, 1966

to P 67  
Herbertson  
cc: Moyers  
Kutner  
Keeny

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Last week you approved Dr. Seaborg's recommendation that the 1966 Fermi Award prize be given to three German scientists. You decided to await further information before deciding whether you personally wanted to present the awards to the three scientists.

Having learned that the three scientists will accept the award, we are now ready to make public announcement.

W. A. Rostow

\_\_\_\_\_ Ask Bill Moyers to announce  
it here

\_\_\_\_\_ Dr. Seaborg should announce  
at AEC

67a

18

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, July 26, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I agree with the recommendation by Dr. Seaborg and Dr. Hornig <sup>K</sup> that the 1966 Fermi Award be given to three German scientists, Otto Hahn, Lise Meitner and Fritz Strassmann, the original discoverers of nuclear fission.

In view of the fact that we do not know whether the scientists would accept the award or, because of their age, would be able to come to the United States to receive it from you, I ~~recom-~~ mend that you not agree to present the awards personally until more is known about what would be involved. The awards could be given to the scientists by someone other than you if this later appears to be wise.

W. Rostow

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OK.  
Jellon thru  
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Wednesday, August 3, 1966 --

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Jack Sutherland and Robert Haeger, U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, came in to see me yesterday, Tuesday, August 2. They want me to do a U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT interview. I told them I thought I was getting excessive publicity; but I would be glad to do it if you and Bill Moyers thought it a good idea. They will see Bill.

I also gave them, on a completely unattributable basis, some reflections on why communism is doing badly as a system for organizing societies in the Soviet Union and in Communist China.

Joseph Kraft came in yesterday, August 2, to discuss the various constructive enterprises going forward in the town and especially our relations with outside consultants. I briefed him on the work going forward on Africa, Latin American summit, East-West initiatives, etc. We also got into the relationship between Western European unity and East-West initiatives; Viet Nam; and the economic problems of remaining near full employment without inflation.

Hugh Sidey, TIME magazine, came in today. George Christian joined in a discussion which was almost wholly devoted to the state of the track in Viet Nam in all its dimensions: the war in the south; the bombing of the north; political position in the south; economic position in the south; and Hanoi's view of the U. S. ability to sweat it out.

W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow:rln

~~W. W. Rostow~~



69

Wednesday, August 3, 1966  
5:15 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the text of a proposal of Thanat that may become famous. I have marked on page 3 the operational proposal; namely, that a "Peace for Asia committee composed of interested nations of the area might attempt to hold a conference, this time not in Geneva, but somewhere in Asia, where all the principals in the war in Vietnam will be invited to participate to thrash out the existing difficulties with a view to ending the present conflict."

I make the full text available to you, however, so that you can get a feel for the gathering strength in Asia of a determination, as Thanat says, "to regulate our lives" and "shape our destiny." The proposal is clearly aimed against the Russians, French and British -- not against us.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (Bangkok 1325, Aug. 3, 1966)

cc Moyers  
Kintner

Copy of Bangkok 1325, August 3, 1966

69a

1. Thanat's closing speech at the public formal opening of the ASA (Association of Southeast Asia) Ministerial Conference this morning caused quite a stir with assembled chiefs of diplomatic missions scurrying for copies of the text as if they were cub reporters. Leading the queue were the Japanese and Soviet Ambassadors and the French and British Charges d'Affaires.

2. Noting the ASA hiatus of three years, Thanat said that regrettable as such a delay may have been, it was nevertheless a matter of satisfaction that these difficulties had been overcome by the members of the organization themselves using the facilities available within it, not having to resort to the help of outsiders. Using this as a lead-in to his real subject, he went on to say: "This is how it should be. Indeed, we in this part of the world should learn to resolve ourselves the problems of our region, for the peace and well-being of our nations and our own area are the primary objects of our concern. No one else will ever feel the deep and abiding interest as we do. If anything, outsiders may be inclined to take advantage of us or perhaps to seek to realize selfish gains at our detriment and expense. Therefore, now more than ever, we should strive to prevent such harmful interferences and devise ways and means to negate the possibilities for those who are far away to come and meddle in our own affairs with the ultimate purposes of serving their individual ends. We will accept and welcome only the well-intentioned outsiders whose genuinely disinterested cooperation and services contribute to our freedom and progress. But we should categorically reject dubious suggestions and solutions which do not conform to our national or regional interests and requirements. We should particularly bear in mind that the days of outside foreign powers working together in concert to direct or to impose their views and proposals in regard to our nations' affairs are now gone and we are not prepared to recognize to them any mandate to regulate our lives or to shape our destiny."

3. Thanat then recognized that if there was to be an assumption of responsibility for guiding and directing their own affairs, it was incumbent upon the Asian nations to "be up to our task and duty. We should in particular strengthen our national structures and the basis of our cooperation to make our nations fully equipped to deal with the complex and delicate situations facing us in our modern life."

4. Thanat pointed out that the three ASA nations were serving not only their individual national interests but also the wider interests of the entire region. He implied that the persistence in keeping ASA alive "has in actual fact served to pave the way for larger and more extensive cooperation as evidenced by the success of the Asian and Pacific Council meeting in Seoul, the capital city of Korea, last June in which all our three nations participated."

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 88-29  
By ig, NARA, Date 7-27-88

(Bangkok 1325, Aug. 1966)

Therefore, our gathering today will not be aimed at serving the limited interests of our association, but by and large those of the broader Asian and Pacific community as well. There can be little doubt that any achievement we may succeed in bringing about in the course of our present session will also redound to the credit and advantage of the larger organization."

5. Thanat then got down to the heart of the matter. Assuming Malaysian and Philippine growing concern over hostilities in South Vietnam and Laos, he pointed out that economic and social achievements coming from ASA would be meaningless if the nations of the region were engulfed by war, and he then posed the question of Asian responsibility in the following terms:

"And yet in spite of these serious and very real threats, what have we, Asian nations, done to ward off the grim spectre of aggression and war? So far we have relied on outside power to save us from being submerged under the waves of aggression and we seem to have abdicated our responsibility for peace-keeping and let it be borne by one insular and another continental European nation which in fact did not seem to have carried out their duties and obligations as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference to our satisfaction and in the best interests of the Asian nations. The East European Co-Chairman in particular has consistently refused to cooperate with his colleague from Western Europe in re-convening the Geneva Conference to explore ways and means of resolving the situation in Vietnam by negotiations and reaching a peaceful settlement of the present conflict. The only reason advanced for the refusal was that one or two of the participants, North Vietnam and perhaps Communist China also are opposed to such a conference. To many of us and no doubt to the rest of the world, this is an inadmissible position which one can take only at the risk of shirking one's own duties and obligations which are incumbent upon an impartial Co-Chairman."

"Whatever distaste one may feel facing such a show of partisanship, there is no other way of obviating the difficulty. Nevertheless this hopeless circumstance makes Southeast Asia's dependency on distant nations which give preponderance only to their ideblogical or not so altruistic interests appear wholly incongruous. We, therefore, venture to pose the question whether the time has not arrived for us, the nations of Asia, to take our destiny into our own hands instead of letting others from far away mould it for us at their whims and pleasure. In my humble opinion, our nations which have been in the forefront for promoting constructive undertakings for peace and progress in our part of the world might wish to take advantage of this meeting, in addition to our regular work of developing regional economic cooperation, for exchanges of views and ideas on how best we can contribute and enlist the assistance and support of other countries of the area, such as Japan and Indonesia as well as those nations which evince interest



(Bangkok 1325, Aug. 5, 1966)

in establishing and restoring peace in Asia through negotiations and pacific settlement. If the nations of Asia are as dedicated to peace as they profess to be, the solution to Asia's problems can be found right in the region instead of seeking it in far-away lands or by leaving it to the care and discretion of other less interested parties. After due preparations have been completed, a "Peace for Asia" committee composed of interested nations of the area might attempt to hold a conference, this time not in Geneva, but somewhere in Asia, where all the principals in the war in Vietnam will be invited to participate to thrash out the existing difficulties with a view to ending the present conflict. If there is no undue obstruction and intransigence, this novel experiment should be able to function. It will then be the first time in history that the peoples of this region take full charge and responsibility of their affairs. "

6. Thanat's statement was made in the presence of the Prime Minister, of the Deputy Prime Minister Prince Wan, of Minister of National Development Pote Sarasin, and of other high-ranking Thai officials indicating that Thanat was enunciating a governmentally approved position.

MARTIN

Wednesday - August 3, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Message of Condolence to the New Nicaraguan President

The Nicaraguan Congress today selected Dr. Lorenzo Guerrero from among the three Vice Presidents to succeed President Schick.

A message of condolence from you to the new President is in order. A suggested draft is attached --

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_.

The funeral for President Schick will take place Friday morning.

It would be desirable for you to send a personal representative for the occasion. I suggest --

Governor Carl Sanders \_\_\_\_\_

Governor William Guy \_\_\_\_\_

Jack Valenti \_\_\_\_\_.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

cc - Bill Moyers

SUGGESTED MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO PRESIDENT GUERRERO  
OF NICARAGUA

On behalf of the United States Government and people I extend deepest condolences to you and the Nicaraguan people over the death of President Schick, who so ably contributed to the progress of his country.

As you assume the heavy new responsibilities placed on you today, I wish you every success. I look forward to a continuation of the close cooperation between our two countries established with the late President.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON



~~Mr. Bator~~  
71

Tuesday, August 2, 1966 , 11:35 am

Mr. President:

Attached for your approval,  
is a routine birthday message to  
Prince Franz-Joseph II, Chief of  
State of Liechtenstein.

Francis M. Bator

Attachment  
As Stated.

71a

Your Highness:

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending you our  
congratulations and warm best wishes on the occasion  
of your birthday.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, August 2, 1966

5:30 PM

GP 72  
Bill Moyers

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached latest report on Viet Cong motivation and morale, January - June 1966, is important both as an intelligence document and as a basis for action. Not included in the report is the following estimate which I am having refined in Saigon and will present to you in about a week:

-- When Rand first began to interview the VC, 65% of those who defected or whom we captured believed that the VC would win; 25% felt the GVN would win; 10% were uncertain.

-- The present figures are: 20% now believe the VC will win; 60% believe the GVN will win; 20% are uncertain.

The rise in those uncertain reflects, in itself, an important fact. The number of hard core Communist defectors has increased. These men find it difficult to go beyond a statement other than "uncertainty" about victory.

What this report shows is a progressive decline in the morale and the fighting capacity of the VC. As you said at lunch yesterday to the newspaper men, no one can tell you when this progressive decline will lead to the breaking up of units or to the ending of the war. But the process under way among the VC is clear.

The operational implication, in my view, is that we must now persuade the government in Saigon to mount a campaign which effectively appeals to the VC and the North Vietnamese troops along the following lines:

1. All Vietnamese should now rally to stop the killing and end the war.
2. The Americans will go home as soon as peace is assured.
3. It is time for all Vietnamese to turn to economic and social development of their country.

I have put Bill Jorden to work this morning with State to produce an operational scenario which would hammer away at these three simple themes.

Two final observations. We must get a team in Saigon to work now on a post-war Vietnamese development plan. One aspect of that plan should be

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NIJ 88-33

By ing NARA, Date 5-15-89

cc: Moyers  
~~Ki~~

the constructive post-war use of Camranh Base. Apparently nothing makes Vietnamese more skeptical that we will ever leave than our willingness to construct that marvelous installation. We ought now to encourage thought and planning as to how it might be used in the future development of the country. Second, all the interrogators (Vietnamese and U. S.) are convinced that if the VC fail this time in the South they -- and the whole country -- will be swept by a mood of wanting no further violence and killing. They are close to having had enough. As Goure put it, they will be like the Spanish after the civil war -- prepared to take even a bad government rather than to risk civil war again. We have seen that mood also in the Dominican Republic and earlier in the 1920's in Mexico after their bloody revolution. I cite this to illustrate the need of getting the government in Saigon to shift from talk about invading the North to a policy of appealing for peace, order, and progress in the South.

It may be that you would like to hear directly from Goure his reflections on the evidence which now, as you can see, includes not only interrogations but a mass of captured documents which bear on morale. He will be here a few more days.

It is, of course, extremely important that we not overestimate these trends and develop excessive optimism; but it is equally important that we look at them soberly and, especially, mount the kind of political as well as military operations which will accelerate them.

W. W. R.

Bring Goure in \_\_\_\_\_ (I spent an hour with him today)

Not necessary \_\_\_\_\_

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This item has been authenticated.

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

The RAND Corporation

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SOME FINDINGS OF THE VIET CONG MOTIVATION AND MORALE STUDY,  
JANUARY-JUNE 1966: A BRIEFING TO THE  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (U)


Leon Gouré

1 August 1966



In late 1964, the VC began to shift from a guerrilla strategy to what they called a "mobile warfare" strategy, i.e., a strategy based on the use of large regular units, regiments, or even divisions. This shift, as the VC leadership explained in a high-level COSVN (Central Office of South Vietnam) document issued in March 1966, was in accordance with the "fixed steps" regulating revolutionary warfare. The document stated that guerrilla warfare "can only wear down the enemy little by little," but that total victory was impossible without destroying large elements of the enemy's forces.

The shift to a "mobile warfare" strategy occasioned many basic changes in VC policies because, as the captured COSVN document noted, "mobile warfare requires a very large expenditure of human forces, ammunition, food, etc." To meet these requirements, the VC had to resort to forced conscriptions and NVA infiltration, to rely on weapons and ammunition brought from the outside, to increase taxes and the labor draft, and to expand their cadre structure. Initially, the VC justified their "mobile warfare" strategy by expectations of winning major successes or even a final victory in 1965. Their failure to do so has in recent months increasingly forced them, while persisting in their "mobile warfare" strategy, to speak of being prepared to fight a protracted war of several decades.



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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES. THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

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The ability of the VC and, to a lesser extent, of the NVA to continue the present strategy for a protracted time will depend on many factors including morale, combat capabilities, supplies, and popular support.

The RAND interview program of VC and NVA captives and defectors, jointly sponsored by ISA and ARPA, does not by itself provide sufficient data to evaluate all aspects of the VC and NVA capabilities or even to serve as an accurate measure of how the war is going. The information developed by the approximately 800 in-depth interviews completed to date can, however, shed light on some VC and NVA reactions to developments and problems, which in turn may have a bearing on the ability of the VC to prosecute their "mobile warfare" strategy. My discussion is limited to selected VC problems, based on an analysis of 150 interviews completed since my last presentation in January, that appear to have assumed more significance in the past six months. ~~Roughly half captives, half defectors, the interviewed group was selected to include a high percentage of cadres (45 percent),~~ including officers up to the rank of Main Force battalion commander. Approximately 40 were NVA cadres and rank and file.

Where possible, captured VC documents were used to verify interview statements. In addition, one of our team members has analyzed what we believe to be a fairly representative sample of over 4200 biographical data cards of defectors who had surrendered to the GVN between July 1965 and April 1966.

~~Salient among the VC problems that we have noted are the effects of intensified combat and large losses on the attitude and behavior of VC and NVA soldiers, recruit~~

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~~ing and replacement difficulties, changes in the attitude and behavior of the cadre, food shortages, defections and desertions, and a marked deterioration in popular support.~~

Some of these have been noted in our earlier reports but have apparently become more pronounced and significant in recent months.

From a military standpoint, the VC ~~"mobile warfare"~~ ~~strategy has not to date~~ been able to overcome the growing ~~GVN/U.S. strength.~~ The COSVN document acknowledged this spring that: "Our [VC] capability to completely annihilate an enemy element is still poor. During the phase conducted this year we failed to dominate the battlefield. . . ." ~~While many interviewees claimed that their units had been frequently victorious in the past, they increasingly mentioned having suffered defeat and heavy losses.~~ According to them, the shift of the initiative to GVN and U.S. forces and the intensification of ground and air operations has further increased the strain on VC and NVA soldiers and frequently disrupted their concentrations, plans, training, food collecting, and other activities. ~~Many interviewees report growing fear of combat, discouragement, malingering, desertions, and defections among the troops.~~ The high rate of sickness, especially among NVA troops in the highlands, which ~~was said to incapacitate 20 to 30 percent of the men in some units~~ at any given time, was reported to cause growing worries and even fear among the soldiers. Other interviewees, however, while admitting to some loss of "fighting spirit" in their units, said that ~~the majority of the soldiers still fought well.~~ Some attributed the tenacious defense put up by VC

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and NVA troops, when fighting in prepared positions, to their fear of being driven from their trenches and suffering heavy casualties by being exposed, unprotected to air and artillery attacks.

Recent captured VC documents, many of them high-level papers, express concern over the effects of intensified GVN and U.S. attacks and growing hardships on the troops. They complain that ~~in combat "the troops are defensive, negative and hesitant,"~~ that they show a "lack of self-confidence, fear of sacrifice, combat reluctance, discouragement, sluggishness, . . . desire for peace, exclusive preoccupation with agricultural production due to food shortage . . . [and that] some of the men try to avoid combat [or] desert." The COSVN document also reported that ~~"in some areas the individuals' combat capability has been seriously lowered."~~

Despite these complaints, the available data indicate that ~~VC and NVA discipline and controls, especially among Main Force units,~~ are still largely effective and that their combat capability is still very considerable. By contrast, Local Force and guerrilla soldiers appear less able to bear the growing pressures and difficulties and also have better opportunities than Main Force soldiers to defect or desert home.

Although exposed to growing pressures, the enemy is very skillful at trying to reduce their effectiveness. The VC are very quick at identifying set patterns in GVN and American tactics, operations, movements, attacks or weapon employment and take advantage of them to avoid attacks or to reduce their effectiveness. The VC also

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make good use of their extensive intelligence network and intercepts of GVN and U.S. radio communications to give them warning of attacks or to facilitate their own operations.

To maintain and expand their regular forces in support of the "mobile warfare" strategy, ~~the VC have been forced to draft great numbers of reluctant villagers as~~ well as transfer increasing numbers of Local Force and guerrilla soldiers to Main Force units. Although regular VC units are estimated to have increased in number, recent interviewees report more frequently than before ~~serious and growing problems in recruiting new soldiers, and in~~ replacing the large losses. In many instances, units were said to be understrength, sometimes by as much as 30 to 40 percent. For example, an assistant company commander from Zone D told us: "Not only my unit, but almost all other units of the Main Force were short of men. A company is supposed to have 120 men, but the average number of men in a company is now about 80 men." Some NVA interviewees claimed that ~~only 70 percent of their units losses had been replaced, often by poorly trained VC draftees.~~ The frequent transfer of men from Local Force and guerrilla units to the Main Force tends to keep them understrength and to degrade their combat capabilities. The VC are trying to keep up the strength of their Main Force units even at the cost of weakening other elements of their forces and their control over the population. ~~Among transferred soldiers, many desert or defect because they fear more intensive combat and do not want to leave their home areas.~~ Some captured documents also mention difficulties

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in meeting recruiting quotas and in finding sufficient replacements.

One consequence of the intensive VC draft has been to ~~force the VC to draft some women for service with guer-~~  
~~rillas as well as more youths under 17 years of age.~~ Many interviewees reported that the average age of the men in their Main and Local Force units was declining because of difficulties in drafting sufficient men in the prime 18 to 30 age group. ~~VC cadres continued to complain about the~~  
~~poor morale and high rate of desertions among the draftees~~ and some NVA interviewees claimed that their units found VC replacements to be too poorly motivated and trained to be used in combat. Nevertheless, ~~it is evident that the~~  
~~VC are still able to control and, to some extent, motivate~~  
~~many draftees.~~

The effectiveness of the VC organization and the quality of the cadres are vital if the VC are to continue in their current level of military effort. At present ~~the~~  
~~VC cadre structure appears to be largely unimpaired, but~~  
~~there are signs of deterioration in the behavior of some~~  
~~elements of the cadre,~~ especially the veterans, and also some weakening in VC controls. The interviews mention shortages of experienced cadres in some VC organizations and units, and growing war weariness, fear of combat, and disillusionment with career prospects among others. Some VC documents also mention shortages of cadres and complain that those with long service in the VC are "demoralized and oversecurity conscious." In some cases, special "health strengthening" allowances were reportedly paid to cadres "due to shortage of personnel and their poor phys-

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ical condition." The VC have been promoting younger men with shorter time in the VC to cadre positions. While these are said to be enthusiastic and loyal, both interviews and captured documents indicate that they tend to be inexperienced, become confused by new problems, and frequently make mistakes or antagonize the population. Their promotion tends to be resented by older cadres and veterans.

~~The analysis of defector biographical cards appears to show growing defections among the cadre. Thus the cards for January to April 1966 show that 23 percent of the Main Force defectors and 32 percent of the Local Force defectors were cadres.~~ In the latter case, this represented a ~~5 percent increase~~ over the last five months of 1965. Among the cadres we interviewed were many Party members with 15 to 20 years of service in the VC. And for this period, 50 percent of the Main Force cadre defectors and 58 percent of those from the Local Force had over three years of service.

Although earlier interviewees often complained about the inadequacy of VC food rations, the recent ones indicate that both ~~VC and NVA forces have been plagued by food shortages,~~ especially in the food deficient areas where many of their forces operate. Interviewees mentioned ~~in~~ ~~creasing difficulties in food procurement, disruption of supply lines, and some reported reductions in their units' scant rations and pay.~~ The interviewees attributed the deterioration of the VC economic base to: ~~(1) the decline in agricultural output in VC-controlled villages~~ because so many villagers had left for GVN areas or had been

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drafted, while those who remained were discouraged by high taxes and growing insecurity; (2) ~~reductions in food grown by VC units~~ and organizations because of more frequent moves and fighting, and herbicide spray attacks; (3) ~~the destruction of many food storage areas and disruption of the logistic system by GVN/U.S. ground sweeps as well as air and artillery bombardment;~~ (4) ~~the growing shortage of civilian laborers~~ for transporting food and other supplies.

Food deficiencies apparently have a major adverse effect on VC and NVA troop morale and operations. For example the interviewed captive Main Force battalion commander acknowledged that new lower basic rations of 450 grams of rice for units while not in operation "could not fill the stomach." ~~A majority of NVA interviewees complained that they had been hungry a great deal of the time~~ and said that many had exchanged their spare clothes for food with the Montagnards. An NVA company political officer who infiltrated in March 1966 reported that because of GVN/U.S. operations in the Kontum area, the soldiers temporarily received only 300 grams of rice per day and were forced to steal food from the villagers. ~~The great sensitivity of troops to even small reductions in rations~~ was described by the interviewed battalion commander who said, concerning a reduction of the rice rations by 100-125 grams: "It did affect [the soldiers] a great deal. It was not all right when rations were reduced [from 2.5 cans] to 2 cans of rice. Shortage of food would weaken the fighters' health and thus they could not go on fighting. Their morale would also be affected because they lost confidence in the Front [VC]."

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Interviews and captured documents indicate that ~~food shortages have forced the postponement or curtailment of some VC operations~~, and that units experiencing difficulties in food supply tend to avoid combat. Aside from the destruction of supply dumps, the data suggest that in many areas the availability of civilian laborers for food transport may be the critical element of the VC logistic system, and potentially a very vulnerable one to GVN and U.S. pressures.

~~The NVA forces in South Vietnam are increasingly bearing the main burden of fighting U.S. forces.~~ They differ from the VC in that they are not a native force, do not depend to the same extent on the civilian population in the South nor participate in its control, and do not fight for personal gains or benefits but to support a revolution in the South. Furthermore, ~~they are essentially a conventionally trained and organized force with none of the VC's experience in guerrilla warfare.~~

The NVA interviewees reveal some decline in the quality and training of the more recent infiltrators. Recently ~~infiltrated units have a higher proportion of newly drafted soldiers than earlier ones, some with as little as two months training.~~ The troops appear to receive little jungle warfare training and because of the air attacks on North Vietnam have no training in larger unit operations.. The physical and health standards for selection of infiltrators have been considerably lowered so that ~~some of the men sent South are in fact unsuited for combat service.~~

NVA interviewees increasingly mention that many sol-

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diers did not like being sent South and that some deserted when they learned about their units' assignment. In many cases, ~~5 to 10 men were said to have deserted from each company in the North,~~ including some cadres and Party members, while others sought to be exempted. ~~The majority, however, felt that they had no choice but to obey their government.~~

~~All interviewed NVA soldiers, including those who infiltrated in March of this year, had made the entire trip on foot and had carried all their weapons, including heavy ones, as well as some ammunition. Because of the disruption of rail and truck traffic in the North by U.S. air strikes, the troops spent from 20 to 30 days marching through North Vietnam, mainly at night, before crossing into Laos, thereby prolonging considerably the trip and adding to its hardships. Most reported having suffered on the trip from fatigue, inadequate rations, and a high rate of malaria, so that in many cases the units spent several months recuperating before being sent into combat.~~

Although many NVA interviewees complained of unexpected hardships, heavy losses, and fear of dying far from home, ~~few seemed to think that they had any choice but to go on fighting. They could not desert home and feared that if they surrendered, they would never be able to return North or that they would be killed by GVN or U.S. forces,~~ as their cadres kept telling them.

~~Concerning U.S. forces, the interviewees agree that their presence has greatly changed the nature of the war and its intensity and deprived the VC of an early victory.~~ Interviewees who have met U.S. troops in combat were im-

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pressed by their fire power, and ~~some said the soldiers~~  
~~were afraid to fight U.S. troops.~~ The great majority  
reported that contrary to VC propaganda ~~they had been well~~  
~~treated by U.S. soldiers.~~ Few had heard any information  
other than from VC or Hanoi sources on U.S. aims in Viet-  
nam, and ~~many appeared to have sincerely believed that the~~  
~~United States intends to colonize Vietnam and to keep its~~  
~~troops permanently there.~~ A number of them reported in-  
stances where villagers who had received gifts of food,  
fertilizer, etc., from Americans had refused to heed VC  
propaganda about American aggression and that others had  
been glad to be pacified and secured by U.S. troops. Some  
complained, however, of the practice of U.S. troops during  
sweep operations of arresting many villagers as suspects,  
while ~~others blamed the prolongation of the war and the~~  
~~continuing misery of the population on the Americans.~~

Defections to the GVN and desertions home among VC  
and NVA troops are important factors in the ability of the  
VC to fight a protracted war on the present scale. ~~In~~  
~~February 1966,~~ following an extensive psywar campaign and  
also as a result of intensive GVN and U.S. combat opera-  
tions, ~~the number of defectors reached an all-time high~~  
~~of over 2200 in February.~~ Thereafter, partly as a result  
of political unrest, especially in I Corps, ~~the number of~~  
~~defectors declined to about 1300 in June.~~ (Total 8525  
defectors for January-June 1966.) The available data  
indicate, however, that desertions home among VC troops,  
especially Local Force soldiers, continue to greatly ex-  
ceed defections. Captured documents also express concern  
over the inroads made by the GVN defector programs among

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the VC troops and civilians, especially where these were exposed to severe attacks and suffered considerable losses. Tight controls and the isolation of the units in the jungle inhibit defections among Main Force soldiers and NVA troops in the highlands. Defections tend to be higher in the delta areas where the troops come in closer contact with the civilian population and can more easily surrender to GVN civilian authorities.

In 1965 and the first half of 1966, the number of defectors considerably exceeded the number of VC captured. However, defections from VC regular forces are still relatively low (approximately 15 percent, according to the analysis of defector biographical cards) although they seem to have increased somewhat over the past year, especially among the Local Forces. While the defections from Main Force units are as yet too small to have a significant effect on their combat capability, the more numerous defections by Local Force soldiers and guerrillas represent a loss of trained manpower that could have been transferred to the Main Force.

The principal deterrent to defection continues to be fear of mistreatment or death at the hand of the GVN and Americans. The interviewees indicated that little or nothing is known among the VC and NVA troops about the treatment of defectors and captives by U.S. forces.

The VC have always viewed popular support as essential to their operations, growth, and success. Therefore, one of the most significant defeats suffered by the VC has been the increasing loss of this support and the departure of large numbers of villagers from VC to GVN controlled areas.

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~~areas.~~ Both interviewees and captured documents show that this loss has important adverse effects on VC morale, security, manpower, food resources, and expectations of war outcome. Recent interviews not only increasingly blame recruiting, transport difficulties, and food shortages on declining popular support but more of them tended to see in this one of the main causes of the eventual defeat of the VC.

~~Villagers are not only becoming discouraged by high VC taxes, but the increasing VC labor draft now forces a growing number of them, both men and women, to work for the VC far from home, without pay, and at the great risk to themselves. Declining income in the rural areas and mounting insecurity are often blamed by the villagers on the VC, and the former is a major motive for desertions and defections by VC soldiers. The villagers tend increasingly to lose faith in VC promises, propaganda, and victory and are becoming frightened by VC threats of fighting a protracted war.~~

Since the VC tend to see the progress made in the war not only in terms of military successes but also in terms of gains in population control, the loss of approximately a million refugees constitutes a severe blow to them. As one Local Force assistant company commander and political officer said: "The defectors and refugees have flocked to the towns and have left the VC behind with all the idle land, the empty houses, and problems of manpower shortage." ~~In fact the refugees constitute not only a severe loss of resources for the VC but also a potential major pacification and psywar gain for the GVN.~~

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The VC shift from predicting an early termination of the war to assertions that it could continue for several decades if necessary suggests that the VC have no expectations of winning the war militarily but are hoping that the United States would become weary and discouraged and would eventually give up the struggle and withdraw. However, the threat of a protracted war appears actually to be designed to reassure those who have become depressed by recent VC and NVA reverses and to frighten the United States. It also frightens enemy soldiers who feel that they would not survive such a war. VC persistence in the "mobile warfare" strategy suggests that in fact the VC are not at present organizing for a protracted war but still hope to achieve sufficient military successes to force an early U.S. withdrawal as a consequence of mounting domestic and foreign public pressure on the U.S. Government.

The VC appear to be in a dilemma. The present trends and problems confronting them and their loss of the initiative to U.S. and GVN forces make it increasingly difficult for them to persist in their "mobile warfare" strategy. However, the interviewees and captured documents indicate that so far the VC and Hanoi leaderships do not think that they can or should revert to guerrilla warfare. They appear to fear that the breakup of the large regular units would weaken their combat capabilities and control over their soldiers. This would make them ineffective against the large GVN/U.S. forces, could cause serious demoralization among VC troops and cadres, and allow the GVN to pacify large areas. The interviewed Main Force battalion commander said: " . . . guerrilla warfare can only make

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trouble. It could not be used to destroy enemy forces. Thus, I am sure that the Front will never go back to guerrilla warfare. The Front will continue mobile warfare anyway." While the NVA can fight independently of the VC, its efforts would make little sense if the VC movement were to become largely inoperative. Furthermore, the NVA would probably not be suitable for guerrilla warfare, while its withdrawal could cause major discouragement among the VC.

Our survey of recent interviewees shows that the VC face problems which offer opportunities for exploitation. In this connection, we offer the following suggestions:

1. The VC are very operation analysis oriented, as indicated earlier in this briefing. We should, therefore, redouble our efforts to vary the patterns and tactics of air and ground operations, so as to make our attacks still more effective.
2. Further, improvements in radio security seem needed to reduce VC advance knowledge of GVN/U.S. operations and to degrade VC battlefield intelligence.
3. During sweep operations by U.S. troops, efforts should be made to avoid large-scale arrests and especially rearrests of civilians as suspects. Such arrests appear seldom to yield significant captures of VC personnel but do provide the VC with effective anti-American propaganda among the villagers.
4. Programs designed to exploit the VC's dependence on civilian support by increasing the flow of refugees from critical areas should be considered. They could deny the VC important sources of food, manpower, labor

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and revenue, deprive them of porters, and reduce the security of VC bases and units. This could also have a considerable effect on VC morale and on their expectations of victory. However, while the refugees are a ~~major gain for the GVN and potentially could be a great asset, lasting benefits will only accrue if extensive improvements are made in the present refugee program.~~ It would appear desirable that the United States increase its support of and direct active participation in the refugee program.

5. Additional psywar programs are needed to:

~~(a) Explain the U.S. presence and aims in Vietnam to the rural population and to the VC as well as NVA troops.~~ It would seem desirable to place more stress in GVN and U.S. propaganda on the desire to reestablish peace as soon as possible and on promises to withdraw U.S. forces once the war is ended and South Vietnam's independence is assured.

~~(b) More efforts are needed to reassure potential VC and NVA defectors about the treatment they will receive by the GVN.~~ In addition to greater specificity in describing the GVN defector program, the appeals should clearly and emphatically spell out the rationale why the GVN would not, in its own interest, wish to mistreat or kill defectors. ~~Potential NVA defectors might be offered a free choice between an immediate return home, repatriation at the end of the war, or assistance in resettling in the South.~~

(c) In view of the considerable evidence that the willingness of cadres to defect is often influenced by career considerations and prospects, more cadres may be

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encouraged to defect if they were offered an opportunity to serve the GVN in cadre positions. In addition, this could help relieve present shortages of cadres in selected and carefully supervised GVN programs.

(d) ~~Psywar~~ programs should be designed to exploit the fear of VC and NVA soldiers of the protracted war which is now being discussed by enemy propagandists. Such programs could stress the implications of such a war for the soldiers and their families and place the major blame for the prolongation of the people's misery on the enemy's leadership.

The evidence in our interviews seems to indicate that the VC's "mobile warfare" strategy contains many and growing contradictory requirements that the VC are finding increasingly difficult to resolve. As their difficulties increase, if they are frustrated in their hopes for an early U.S. withdrawal, the enemy's leadership may come to recognize that it is facing a military as well as political defeat.

When this time may come is difficult to predict. To date the effective isolation and control over the armed units, the <sup>and</sup> skillful indoctrination of the troops, the ability of VC and NVA units to withdraw from action to recuperate from losses and rebuild their forces, the failure of the GVN and United States to retake and effectively control major areas now held by the VC, and the continued hope that the United States may soon become discouraged or that the GVN may collapse all help to preserve the VC military organization and its combat capability. If the present difficulties continue and become more pronounced,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-18-

however, they may result in a significant weakening of the VC organization and considerably degrade the effectiveness and capabilities of VC and NVA forces. More effective exploitation of the many VC vulnerabilities may help accelerate this process.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ju, NARA, Date 7-15-98

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

Tuesday, August 2, 1966 -- 5:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

I attach two intelligence reports (29 July and 2 August) concerning indications of the possibility that some Chinese Communist ground force elements may have moved into North Viet Nam. The evidence is not conclusive; and at this stage there is certainly no cause for alarm.

On the other hand, I have asked Clark Clifford quietly to make an assessment of whether our various intelligence collection agencies are making a maximum effort to acquire intelligence on such Chinese Communist ground force movements.

In this connection, the issue of deploying OXCART to Okinawa again arises. By the end of the week you will receive from your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board a strong recommendation that we deploy OXCART to Okinawa without deciding actually to use this instrument.

You may recall that when we had our meeting on Saturday, July 16, it was agreed that we would examine the matter promptly should we get evidence of CHICOM ground force movements.

I shall be sounding out State and Defense as to whether their views with respect to OXCART deployment have been changed by recent intelligence.

You may wish to get directly and privately Clark Clifford's view from the special perspective of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board which has played a special role in the development of OXCART.

The issue of CHICOM fighting forces entering North Viet Nam is so important in itself -- and politically -- that I am anxious for you to be on top of it at all points.

Therefore, I recommend a second meeting on OXCART early next week after your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has filed its report to you. By that time we should also have an assessment of whether any improvements in intelligence collecting methods is required and, possibly, a firmer fix on what the CHICOMS are, in fact, up to.

Approve OXCART meeting for  
early next week ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

WW Rostow:rln

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~



Communications Between Chinese Military Units in North Vietnam and China

Recent operator conversations between Hqs, Kunming Military Region (MR), and an unidentified Chinese Communist terminal, possibly an AAA unit, in the Yen Bai area of northwestern North Vietnam made the first known references to Chinese Communist ground tactical units in communications serving Chinese forces in North Vietnam.

On 23 July, the terminal in North Vietnam, while talking to the Kunming MR, referred to the 13th Army and on the 25th to its 37th and 38th Infantry Divisions. On 27 July, an operator in the Yen Bai area established contact with what appeared to be an element of the 41st Infantry Division of the 14th Army; this contact is, however, particularly tenuous. If confirmed, it would be the first direct communications link between Chinese Communist forces in North Vietnam and ground tactical units in China.

A single communications contact and a few references to units do not permit meaningful analysis, but speculative possibilities would include:

- (1) That units now in North Vietnam require additional lanes of communication for their traffic.
- (2) That a rotation of AAA units in North Vietnam is about to occur.
- (3) That additional elements of the newly discovered suspect headquarters of Chinese forces in North Vietnam may be moving to North Vietnam through the area of the 37th and 38th Infantry Divisions.
- (4) That additional AAA units are being formed in China to be moved into North Vietnam.
- (5) That Chinese ground combat units may become directly involved in North Vietnam.

29 Jul 66.

DIA Intelligence Summary

(Continued)

Page F-9

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NEJ.141.020.023/2  
By jc, NARA, Date 10/23/09



The first of these possibilities is strengthened by the ever-increasing sophistication of communications serving Chinese forces in North Vietnam since they began in June 1964.

The second possibility would present a communications pattern not displayed during the February 1966 deployment of the Chinese Air Force's 103d AAA Division into northeastern North Vietnam or the current AAA-associated unit into the Yen Bai area.

The third would follow a previous pattern in that some Chinese units that have deployed to North Vietnam have had other units establish communications for them before they entered North Vietnam.

The fourth has not been indicated by COMINT but is possible in view of the increasing amounts of AAA in North Vietnam.

A review of available photographs of the Kunming MR suggests that some of the infantry divisions may be short of their normal complement of AAA weapons. The pictures were, however, taken over a period of months and do not allow a valid total count of the AAA weapons there. No COMINT is available to indicate that any Chinese Army AAA is or has deployed to North Vietnam.

The fifth possibility has also not been indicated in previous communications patterns. The location of the 41st Infantry Division close to the Burmese border suggests that it is not likely to become involved in North Vietnam, whereas the 37th and 38th have access to the Kunming-Hanoi rail line.  
(TOP SECRET TRINE)

736

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

2 August 1966

Chinese Communist Ground Force Element Possibly in North Vietnam

An unidentified subordinate of Communist China's 13th or 14th Army has been tentatively identified in North Vietnam. There is no evidence as to whether an infantry unit or a support element is involved.

Limited radio direction finding indicates that a unit in the northwestern section of North Vietnam is probably an element of the 41st Infantry Division of the 14th Army or the 37th Infantry Division of the 13th Army. An element of one of these divisions has been in direct contact since 27 July with an unidentified, possibly AAA-associated, Chinese unit in the Yen Bai area.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLS-141.070.023/2  
By jc, NARA, Date 10-23-09

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*m. Postow*  
74

Wednesday, August 3, 1966 at 12:30 pm

Mr. President:

Attached for your approval is a friendly draft message thanking President Saragat for his telegram of congratulations on Gemini 10. (I did not jazz it up more because State sent a similar message to Prime Minister Moro. We do not want Moro to feel that we love Saragat more.)

Saragat's telegram is at Tab A.

(m)

Francis M. Bator

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT SARAGAT

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your good message about the flight of Gemini 10. The American people greatly appreciate your congratulations and those of the Italian people. I know the astronauts and others who made this flight possible were very pleased by your kind words.

With my very best wishes,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

July 22, 1966

The President

The White House

The new American success in space is a confirmation of the very high level attained by science and technology in your Country and brings all of mankind closer to that peaceful conquest of space in which the United States sustains such an outstanding role. Also on behalf of the Italian people I wish to extend my congratulations to all those who have cooperated in this venture, and in particular to the daring and capable cosmonauts who carried it out.

Giuseppe Saragat

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, August 3, 1966 at 12:45 PM

Mr. President:

At Tab A, for your approval, is a friendly draft message to Italian Prime Minister Moro. The message ~~thanks Moro for his efforts to bring pressure on Hanoi on behalf of our prisoners of war~~

At Tab B, Secretary Rusk recommends such a message to Moro. I fully agree with him.



Francis M. Bator

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_



75a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER MORO

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I was deeply gratified to learn through Ambassador Fenoaltea of your letters to the Prime Ministers of Canada, India and Poland asking for their intervention with the North Vietnamese Government to prevent United States prisoners of war being placed on trial.

We are most grateful to you for this effort and very much hope that it will help dissuade Hanoi from taking such wanton action.

Aside from considerations of humanity and international law, such action by the North Vietnamese Government against these prisoners would greatly complicate the continuing efforts of this and other governments to achieve a negotiated peace in Viet-Nam.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3,4  
NLJ 88-33  
By isp NARA, Date 5-15-89

2662  
756

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Italian Prime Minister Moro's Messages of  
July 19 to the Prime Ministers of Canada,  
India and Poland

Recommendation

That you send a personal message to Prime Minister Moro of Italy expressing your appreciation for his messages to the Prime Ministers of Canada, India and Poland urging their intervention with Hanoi to prevent United States prisoners of war in North Viet-Nam being tried as "war criminals".

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion

On July 19 Prime Minister Moro sent identical appeals to the Prime Ministers of Canada, India and Poland asking for their intervention with North Vietnamese authorities to prevent trials of United States prisoners of war as "war criminals". The following approximate version of Moro's message was given to our Embassy in Rome by an Italian Foreign Ministry official:

"The Italian Government regards with very serious preoccupation the news from international sources relative to the apparent intention of the North Vietnamese Government to bring to trial and probably to sentence United States prisoners of war. Apart from juridical considerations concerning the applicability of the Geneva Convention, the preoccupations of my Government are dictated both by human compassion for the prisoners' fate and by the importance of not introducing a new element of perturbation in a situation already so grave as to demand the most careful and responsible consideration.

I am sure

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 7-10-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

I am sure that your Excellency will understand the spirit which inspires my demarche and that, in view of the responsibility you have through the International Control Commission for Viet-Nam, you will accept my plea to do your best with the North Viet-Nam Government to avert further complications."

The Foreign Office official stated that President Saragat had been partly responsible for the Moro messages. A Presidential message would encourage both Moro and Saragat in their sympathetic understanding for United States policies in Viet-Nam at a time when Foreign Minister Fanfani's position is less helpful.

Enclosed for your consideration is a suggested message to Moro.



Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Draft message.

CONFIDENTIAL

Wed., Aug 3, 1966  
3:00 p.m.

76

MR. PRESIDENT:

We often forget there is a significant --  
secondary -- war going on in Laos.

Here is an interesting account of  
recent operations.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Vientiane 641)

Copy of Vientiane 641, Aug. 3, 1966

SANITIZED

CR

76a

Subject: Effectiveness of USAF operations in Northern Laos.

1. I believe action and information addressees will find of more than routine interest the following recapitulation of the contribution of USAF air operations to ground actions in Northern Laos from April 1966 to present.

2. Enemy strength in Northern Laos (provinces of Houa Khong, Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, Houa Phan, and Phong Saly) has increased spectacularly over the past year from a total of 39 battalions as of 1 July 1965, to 63 battalions as of 1 July 1966.

A. On 1 July 1965 we estimate there were (1) One North Vietnamese battalion; (2) 15 Pathet Lao battalions with North Vietnamese advisers; and (3) 23 North Vietnamese/Pathet Lao battalions (battalions with attached North Vietnamese units of company size).

B. On 1 July 1966 we estimate there were (1) 13 North Vietnamese infantry battalions; (2) 10 North Vietnamese engineer troop battalions; (3) 15 Pathet Lao battalions with North Vietnamese advisers; and (4) 25 Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese battalions.

3. This large build-up of North Vietnamese troops began last fall and culminated in the largest North Vietnamese offensive yet seen in Northern Laos. The offensive began in November 1965 and succeeded in taking a number of long-existing sites from friendly forces in Houa Phan (Sam Neua) province as well as sites recently regained by Vang Pao. Friendly forces did not panic, fought series of bitter actions against North Vietnamese units, and moved to new bases north and west of enemy forces in order to be so placed as to put continuing pressure on enemy flanks. Enemy intention was apparently to establish a secure Line of Communication along Route 6 to the Plain of Jars with the ultimate objective of being in a position to resume offensive at the start of the next dry season (October 1966).

3.4(b)  
(1) 4. In April 1966 an integrated close air support system was introduced. Additional forward air controllers were stationed in the area; A-1-E's were used as airborne forward control; approximately 32 jet sorties were scheduled daily; and close collaboration was established between General Vang Pao's headquarters, 7th AF at Udorn, [redacted] to provide detailed and timely intelligence on enemy movements and on enemy logistics<sup>CV</sup> Routes 6 and 7.

5. Marriage of excellent intelligence [redacted] and superb performance by 7th AF units enabled outnumbered friendly units not only to contain enemy offensive but to mount a counter offensive which has now regained 90% of the area lost from November 1965 to April 1966. Laotian Air Force T-28's also made considerable contribution to this effort. Enemy troop strength is still

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-399

By cb, NARA Date 9-29-99

(Vientiane 641, Aug. 3, 1966)

greater than friendly troop strength, but high casualties inflicted on enemy units, plus severe shortage of supplies brought about by airstrikes on enemy logistical system, lowered morale of both North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao units. Loss of morale and lack of supplies have enabled friendly elements to gain and hold the initiative.

6. Enemy casualties in Northern Laos from November 1965 until June 1966 in a total of 952 ground clashes have been 1,359 killed and 783 wounded; friendly losses for this period have been 517 killed and 673 wounded. During May/June alone, in 348 clashes the enemy lost 556 killed and 134 wounded. Although these figures reflect combined North Vietnamese/Pathet Lao casualties, they were predominantly North Vietnamese regular troops and were the result of a grinding guerrilla campaign of ambushes, small unit actions, etc. In addition, from November 1965 until June 1966 the enemy lost, by conservative estimate (predominantly from ground observers) some 4300 killed and 700 wounded from USAF and Laotian Air Force air strikes.

7. Apart from their in-country significance, operations in Northern Laos have thus made an important contribution to allied military effort in Vietnam by engaging a substantial portion of North Vietnamese forces cited in paragraph 2B above, in costly operations outside the main theatre of operation in South Vietnam. The single most important factor rendering these operations costly to the enemy has been USAF tactical support. Recommend CINCPAC extend our appreciation and congratulations to commands concerned through appropriately classified channels.

Swank



Tuesday - August 2, 1966

Mr. President:

You will be seeing Reynold Carlson at 11:30 tomorrow morning to look him over before deciding to name him to succeed Covey Oliver in Bogota.

John Macy's memorandum -- attached -- seeks your approval for requesting agreement.

Your advisers -- Secretary Rusk, Macy, Gordon and myself -- are unanimous in their support of Carlson.

If after seeing Carlson you decide to go with him, I suggest that you so indicate on John Macy's memo to you.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 1, 1966  
Monday--10:00 a.m.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reynold Carlson as a Possibility for  
Ambassador to Colombia

Covey Oliver has been Ambassador to Colombia since May, 1964. You have approved his leaving the post around August 1. I recommend that you consider Reynold Carlson as a replacement.

This is his profile:

---

- He is 53. Born in Chicago.
  - Fluent in both Spanish and Portuguese.
  - He received his bachelor's and master's degrees from Northwestern University and his Ph.D. from Harvard.
  - In World War II, he served as an Air Force lieutenant.
  - He taught at Johns Hopkins before and after World War II. Has also taught for almost a decade in Tennessee at Vanderbilt. His latest assignment with them (1958 to 1963) was Director of the Graduate Program of Economic Development.
  - Carlson is an outstanding development economist with wide experience in Latin America with the World Bank, AID, and the Ford Foundation.
  - For the past year, has been Associate Director of the Ford Foundation's Latin American programs.
-

Secretary Rusk and Linc Gordon both approve Carlson. Linc knows him personally. In my judgment, Carlson is the best candidate we have been able to develop for Colombia in the past three months.

  
John W. Macy, Jr.

Attachment  
Biographic Sketch

Approved for agreement \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Discuss with me \_\_\_\_\_

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

CARLSON, Reynold E(rland)  
 Age 53 (Born September 7, 1912,  
 in Chicago, Illinois)

Home:

PRESENT POSITION

Associate Director, Latin American Program, Ford Foundation  
 New York City

EDUCATION

1936 B.S., Northwestern  
 1937 A.M., Northwestern  
 1946 Ph.D., Harvard

PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE

1940-48 Assistant professor, Johns Hopkins  
 1949-53 Associate professor of economics, Vanderbilt  
 1950-53 Director, Institute for Brazilian Studies  
 1953-58 Senior economist, World Bank  
 1958-63 Professor of economics and Director of the  
 Graduate Program of Economic Development, Vanderbilt  
 1964-now Ford Foundation  
 1964-65 Representative in Brazil, Rio de Janeiro  
 1965-now Associate Director, Latin American Program

MILITARY DATA

1942-45 Lt., USAAF

ALSO

1942 Senior economic officer, Price Administration  
 1946-48 Economic affairs officer, UN  
 1948 Consultant, Economic Commission for Latin America  
 1959-61 Consultant, Ford Foundation

Member, Economic Association

Author of several articles relating to his field of economics

SOURCE: American Men of Science, 1962 and the Ford Foundation Directory  
 July 20, 1966--ljh

Tues., August 2, 1964  
6:05 p. m.

ch 78  
to P

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is the list of potential  
peace initiatives which Secretary Rusk  
mentioned at lunch today.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET-NO DIS~~ attachment

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET - NO DIS~~

178a

Potential Peace Initiatives

I. Leads Currently Being Followed Up

- A. Sainteny Mission - Ambassador Bohlen has been asked to probe Sainteny further on North Vietnamese statements to him: 1) that Hanoi's quid pro quo for a halt in U.S. bombing might take the form of a cessation of infiltration, and 2) that once a South Vietnamese Government had been formed and after a suitable period of time (e.g., 5 years) the North and South might enter negotiations for reunification as envisaged by the Geneva Accords. We have Embassy Paris' comments on the first point but Sainteny's own interpretation on both points awaits his return to Paris toward the end of the month.
- B. Indian Initiatives - Mr. Bundy has told Banerjee here that if a third party should as much as give us a message from Hanoi telling us to watch Hanoi's actions, and if we should see anything such as reduced infiltration, we would perhaps react.
- C. Thanat Suggestion - While pointing out some of the practical obstacles involved, we are not discouraging Thanat from exploring with the Japanese his suggestion that they invite the North and South Vietnamese, Free World troop-contributing countries, Communist Chinese and possibly the Soviets to a conference to explore possibilities for a peaceful settlement.
- D. ICRC-Goldberg Discussions - We have awaiting final approval a reply to the ICRC informing it that, while military considerations prevent us from initiating a unilateral bombing pause to encourage Hanoi to enter into POW discussions, we would be receptive to any sign of a reciprocal de-escalatory move on Hanoi's part to create a favorable climate for POW discussions. We presume the ICRC will convey this to Hanoi.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-399

By CB, NARA Date 9-29-99

~~TOP SECRET - NO DIS~~

~~SECRET~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



- E. Swank Contact - Although the North Vietnamese Charge in Vientiane has returned Swank's note requesting a further meeting to discuss the nineteen North Vietnamese prisoners in our hands, he has not returned either Swank's original note requesting discussions on POW treatment or a follow-up note on the nineteen prisoners delivered in an unsealed envelope by an embassy chauffeur. We should consider whether we wish Swank to make a further attempt to arrange a conversation. Bearing on this are: 1) the still slightly open contact in Vientiane, 2) Hanoi's withdrawal from its threat to try American pilots as war criminals, and 3) Joseph Kraft's article in the August 1 Washington Post quoting North Vietnamese source in Paris as saying that NVN would prefer that the U.S. hold North Vietnamese prisoners to ensure humanitarian treatment. All these suggest a possible opening which should be further explored assuming a channel can be found.
- F. 19 PT Boat Prisoners - At our request, the Australians have approached the Cambodians to find out whether the Cambodians would be receptive to repatriating any of the 19 PT boat POW's through Cambodian territory.
- G. Tran Van Tuyen-Kissinger Conversation - In a recent conversation with Kissinger, Tuyen, lawyer and former Deputy Prime Minister under Quat, explored the possibilities of contacts with the V.C. We should decide, after talking with Kissinger, whether or not we should seek to encourage such contacts.
- H. Local Vietnamese-Cambodian Contacts - There have been reports recently of regular contacts between local Vietnamese and Cambodian officials to discuss common border problems, including V.C. use of Cambodian territory.
- I. Marinotti Approach - Paul Hoffman has been informed by an Italian, Marinotti, whom he knows and respects that the Soviets have asked Marinotti to try to arrange

for an influential, respected U.S. businessman to go to Moscow for off-the-record conversations on Viet-Nam. We are following this up.

- J. CAS Contact with Phan van Huyen - Huyen, one of the Viet-Namess expelled by the GVN to North Viet-Nam last year, is seeking a contact with U.S. as an "intermediary of North Viet-Nam." We have agreed to the contact via CIA, but it has not yet taken place.

## II. Potential Initiatives Worth Further Study

- A. Warsaw Pact Communique - A message to Warsaw Pact nations discussing the charges in the recent communique but then noting that both they and the U.S. appeared to favor a return to the Geneva Agreements and indicating a willingness to explore how a return to the Geneva Agreements might be brought about.
- B. "Rump Geneva Conference" - reconvened, probably under U.K. initiative in its capacity as co-chairman, a 1954 Geneva Conference with those members willing to come and explore what more initiatives are to be taken to move toward a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam.
- C. Johnson-Kosygin Correspondence - A letter from the President to Kosygin responding in measured terms to the latter's vituperative comments to Prime Minister Wilson about the President. Such a letter could among other things, address itself to recent Soviet statements of disbelief that the U.S. would ever give up its bases in South Viet-Nam.
- D. ICC Role - Renewed ICC initiative to get parties to the conflict together to discuss prospects for a peaceful settlement.
1. The recent ICC announcement of its intention to investigate NVN and SVN complaints about each other's violations of the DMZ might provide a basis for a new ICC initiative.
  2. In keeping with its responsibilities in Cambodia, the ICC might take an initiative to patrol Cambodia's

borders and territory to deter its use for infiltration, supply and refuge. Perhaps the Indians and Canadians with RKG agreement could take their own initiatives in this regard without full ICC agreement, acting on the basis of the need to keep themselves informed about the situation.

E. GVN Initiatives

1. The Acheson Plan should be reviewed regarding the prospects for GVN initiatives on amnesty for V.C., reconciliation of the South Vietnamese population and invitation to the V.C. to vote in elections. Thought should also be given to the application of some or all of these initiatives first in a pilot area of SVN, e.g., IV Corps or I Corps.
2. Once the SVN Constituent Assembly has been convened, it might, with GVN agreement, issue a statement of policy regarding peaceful settlement and calling for a reconciliation of the divided South Vietnamese population so that the constitutionally-based government to be formed can represent all of the people of South Viet-Nam.

F. Bombing Pause - The question of another bombing pause should be kept in mind should there ever be any genuine indication from Hanoi that such a pause would lead to a reciprocal act by Hanoi.

G. Johnson-DeGaulle Correspondence - The President may wish to try to open a dialogue with DeGaulle on Viet-Nam following DeGaulle's trip to the Far East.

H. Rangon Contact - This has not been used since the North Vietnamese closed it at the resumption of bombing in January, but should be kept in mind.

I. Congressional Resolution - A resolution might be adopted by the U.S. Congress setting forth U.S. aims in Viet-Nam and this might be communicated to parliaments, assemblies, etc. of other countries (directly or possibly through the TPU) calling on them to use their influence to promote a peaceful settlement.

Tues., Aug<sup>st</sup> 2, 1966  
6:00 p.m.

to P 79

MR. PRESIDENT:

Secretary Rusk left this information memorandum on recognition of the Argentine Government for your evening reading.

W. W. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

80

August 2, 1966

WWR:

You may want to send the attached up before the President's dinner tonight. I am attaching an extra copy in case you want to ship it over to Bess Abell for Mrs. Johnson.

cy to  
Bess  
5:45 8/2/66  
42

Hal  
Hal Saunders

LN - Yes

URGENT



## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Tues. August 2, 1966 - 5:30 pm

SUBJECT: Topics for Dinner Conversation with President and Mrs. Shazar

--President Shazar might like to discuss the unique role of organized labor in Israel and to hear about your problems with American labor. Although he is more Zionist and publicist than labor leader or politician, he has spent much of his life working with the Histadrut (Israeli labor federation) and MAPAI (labor party).

--Mrs. Shazar has shared her husband's interest in labor. She directed cultural and educational affairs for Histadrut and helped found the Working Mothers Association.

--President Shazar is also deeply interested in education. As Minister of Education, he introduced compulsory general education in Israel. We understand he formed strong impressions of educational developments in Latin America during his trip there. Israel's main educational problem is how to take the children of immigrants from many diverse cultures and educate them as Israelis.

--Both President and Mrs. Shazar have been journalists. He edited the daily paper of the labor federation for 25 years, and she edited an affiliated monthly women's magazine.

--Mrs. Shazar is a militant advocate of women's rights. She has helped publicize the work of Israeli women writers. Women have played a role in building Israel probably unique in the world.

--As a lifelong philosopher of Zionism, President Shazar might like to talk about the nature of the tie between Israel and Jewish communities in other nations. He may have noted The Washington Post editorial this morning: "In the past there has been a tendency among some Zionists to insist that by virtue of its existence Israel must have a special claim on the hearts of American Jews. It is to the realistic political interest of both countries that a more mature relationship evolve whereby the two are linked by friendship and mutual respect rather than by appeals to divided loyalty."

--Israel has cooperative programs with NASA in preparing various sampling surfaces for cosmic dust collection both for sounding rockets and spacecraft. Dr. Uri Shafrir, acting Director of Tel-Aviv University's Institute of Planetary Sciences, was a guest experimenter for the Gemini 9 cosmic dust experiment. Special surface coatings have also been developed by the Hebrew University's National Physical Laboratory of Israel, for use by NASA on an orbiting solar observatory spacecraft.

cc: to Beas Abell for First Lady



--Israel's national space effort includes research on sounding rocket payloads for measuring atmospheric wind, temperature and pressure, and ozone above the atmosphere. A general purpose rocket is being developed by the Minister of Defense for experiments, and research has been undertaken on solid rocket propellants. A station has also been constructed to receive photographs directly from the U. S. weather satellites, and is expected to be operational by late this summer.

--Other US-Israeli scientific ties are equally close:

--In 1965 the U. S. provided Israel with a 5 megawatt swimming pool type nuclear research reactor near Tel-Aviv which is used for research training and the production of isotopes.

--Some 13 U. S. Government agencies are currently supporting 274 scientific research projects in Israel, at an annual cost of \$8,300,000, over 90% of which is U. S. -owned local currency.

--Israel has undertaken extensive research in solar energy conversion. Dr. Harry Tabor of the Israeli National Physical Laboratory has designed a solar water heating system which is commonly used in Israel homes.

W. W. Rostow

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE      Tuesday - August 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT      -      ACTION

SUBJECT: Your Telephone Conversation with President Leoni

You agreed to inaugurate the new telephone cable between the United States and Venezuela by speaking with President Leoni at 11:00 a.m. tomorrow.

A scenario paper is at Tab A. It contains the statement which President Leoni will make and a suggested response by you.

I recommend that the following persons be invited for the occasion:

Ambassador Tejera Paris  
Assistant Secretary Gordon  
FCC Chairman Hyde  
IT&T Chairman Gineen  
AT&T Chairman Kappel  
AT&T Vice President (overseas operations] Wingert.

IT&T built the equipment. AT&T will operate the service.

A suggested press release is at Tab B.

W. W. Rostow

Approve list of invitees \_\_\_\_

Approve scenario \_\_\_\_

Approve press statement \_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_.

Attachments

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

## SCENARIO FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

Time: 11:00 a. m. , Wednesday, August 3.

Place: Fish Room.

Guests: Ambassador Tejera Paris  
Assistant Secretary Gordon  
~~FRC~~ Chairman Hyde  
IT&T Chairman Gineen  
AT&T Chairman Kappel  
AT&T Vice President Wingert.

Format: (simultaneous interpretation will be provided).

1. You and President Leoni will exchange personal greetings.
2. President Leoni will read message.
3. You will respond with your message.

# REMARKS BY PRESIDENT LEONI

"I welcome the opportunity to greet you through this direct telephone service that we now use for the first time. In this manner, Venezuela joins the huge communications system by which, with the progress made by science and technology in establishing such an efficient manner of communications, people and nations become closer.

This submarine cable, which today offers us the facility to talk, will stimulate and make more fruitful for both nations the cultural, economic, and political exchange which each day grows stronger between Venezuela and the United States, particularly, our economic activities which are so intense. This service will enable us now to communicate with countries outside of our hemisphere with which Venezuela also maintains close ties. It is a great pleasure for me, Mr. President, to hold this brief conversation which I hope to resume personally during the forthcoming conference of American Presidents. I take this opportunity to express my best wishes for your happiness and that of the people of the United States. "

## SUGGESTED REPLY

Thank you, Mr. President. It is a great pleasure to speak with you. The underseas cable to Venezuela dramatizes the great community of interest between North and South America, in general, and between the United States and Venezuela, in particular. Moreover, it represents an important step forward in improving global communications.

For years our two peoples worked together in political, cultural and economic pursuits. We have added a new dimension to our endeavors by undertaking the Alliance for Progress. In all these enterprises, we share an abiding concern for the freedom and dignity of man and for world peace. Now, as this cable opens a new era of improved communications between our countries, we can look forward to even closer friendships and associations between Americans and Venezuelans.

I offer my heartiest congratulations to you, Mr. President, and to your countrymen on this significant occasion. I look forward to meeting you personally in the near future.

DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

At 11:00 a.m. this morning President Raul Leoni of Venezuela and President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States exchanged personal telephone messages in formal ceremonies inaugurating the first submarine cable communications link between the two countries.

The 500-mile system, built at a cost of six and one-half million dollars, was completed July 7. From Marquetia, the port city of Caracas, it runs through the Virgin Islands to Miami, Florida, to link Venezuela telephonically with the United States and the world.

The submarine cable system was constructed by the American Telephone and Cable Company under contract with the Venezuelan Telephone Company, both of which will operate and administer it. The cable and repeater equipment was built by the International Telephone and Telegraph Company.

The system originally will provide for 33 separate communications channels between Venezuela and the United States but has an ultimate capacity of 150 channels. The cable will provide fast, non-interference communication between the two countries, previously served only by radio.



The new cable opens a new era of improved communication between the United States and Venezuela. As noted by the two Presidents, better communications means more fruitful exchange and closer ties between the American and Venezuelan people.

CONFIDENTIAL

August 2, 1966

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Rockefeller and Shazar Last Night


Governor Rockefeller at last night's New York dinner for President Shazar called for new US initiatives to bring Arabs and Israelis together. The New York Times says Rockefeller hopes you will launch this effort with Shazar today.

In the talking points paper I sent you, I suggested you ask Shazar how we can work together to improve relations in the Middle East. I still think this is a good idea. However, I intend this to draw out his views-- not because we have anything specific to propose.

The Israelis themselves proposed to us here last week a plan for taking another crack at the refugee problem. At first glance, it looks like a non-starter because the Israeli opposition to taking back any of the displaced Arabs is stronger than ever. Nevertheless their plan gives us something concrete to work on.

However, Shazar as a purely ceremonial head of state is not the man to discuss this with in detail. So Governor Rockefeller's tactics (as reported in the Times) are off base. But there's no harm in letting the Israelis know at every opportunity that we can't live forever with a stalemate.

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

# Governor, Hailing Shazar, Urges Mideast Peace

By HENRY RAYMONT

Governor Rockefeller called on the Johnson Administration last night to mobilize its influence for "fresh, new initiatives" that would lead Israel and the Arab countries to end their hostilities.

The Governor appealed for "a true and lasting peace" in the Middle East at a dinner at the Plaza Hotel honoring President Zalman Shazar of Israel.

Warning the Administration against allowing its concern with the Vietnam war to overshadow tensions in other areas, Mr. Rockefeller said:

"America must not let its vital and active commitment to freedom in other parts of the world obscure the dangers to the peace of the Middle East. The United States should and must exercise its full moral force within the United Nations to bring Arab and Jew together in lasting peace."

## Comes After U.N. Vote

The plea for peace came only a few hours after the United Nations Security Council voted down a resolution that would have condemned Israel for a recent retaliatory raid on Syria, the latest of numerous violent incidents that have kept the area in turmoil since Israel's independence in 1948.

In his speech, the Governor did not make any concrete proposal for getting the two sides together. But sources close to Mr. Rockefeller disclosed afterward that the Governor hoped President Johnson would use his influence within the United Nations to lead Israel and the Arab Governments to the conference table for peace talks.

Such a plan could conceivably be initiated when President Johnson receives President Shazar at the White House at noon today. The Israeli leader was invited to Washington as part of a seven-day visit to the United States. He is en route home after a five-week tour of South America.

Mr. Shazar referred to his prospective meeting with President Johnson during his address last night. He spoke after Governor Rockefeller.

"Tomorrow I shall have the great pleasure of meeting with the President of the United States," he said. "I look forward to this opportunity to tell him how much we in Israel appreciate his leadership for the progress and independence of small nations."

President Shazar, who is 78



President Zalman Shazar with U Thant yesterday at U.N.

years old, also spoke warmly of the efforts of the Jewish community in America, the largest in the world, in support of Israel.

Addressing Governor Rockefeller and 700 Jewish leaders and many of New York's top political figures, President Shazar said:

"You here and the community we have created in Israel are the two forces which, in effective partnership, have made possible the resurrection of the Jewish people after the Nazi holocaust. Together we have endeavored not only to give the Jewish people a new lease on life, but to assure it

of security and dignity for the future."

In an apparent allusion to anti-Zionist organizations that have condemned the attachment of Jews to Israel, the President demanded that Jews be allowed the freedom "to express their attachment to their people and to create in accordance with their tradition and their historic experience and needs."

Last night's dinner marked the end of President Shazar's official program here. He leaves for Washington at 10 A.M. today. The dinner was sponsored by the United Jewish Appeal, the American agency aiding immigrants to Israel and refu-

gees and distressed Jews overseas.

Max M. Fisher of Detroit, national chairman of the U.J.A., spoke briefly. He said that the organization had helped Israel to receive more than a million immigrants and pledged continuing aid "in the great tasks still ahead."

After welcoming Mr. Shazar with "Shalom," the traditional Hebrew greeting, Governor Rockefeller voiced confidence that Israel would continue to take refugees from other parts of the world despite "a sea of deep hostility" surrounding her. Then, turning to President Shazar, he added:

"But I would also like to see fresh, new initiatives emerge from Washington in pursuit of a true and lasting peace for your troubled corner of the world."

Among the guests were New York's two Senators, Jacob K. Javits, Republican, and Robert F. Kennedy, Democrat; State Controller Arthur Leavitt; State Attorney General Louis Lefkowitz and the New York City Council President, Frank D. O'Connor.

President Shazar had lunch at United Nations headquarters yesterday as the guest of the Secretary General, U Thant. Others at the luncheon were the ambassadors of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay.

Representatives of the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, who are sponsoring the Security Council resolution with Jordan and Mali, canceled at the last moment, although they had previously accepted Mr. Thant's invitation.

A scheduled meeting between the Israeli leader and officials of the American Jewish Committee was postponed until Thursday, when Mr. Shazar will be here on his way to Jerusalem.

Mr. Rostow

83

*orig to Rostow  
8/2*

*aug 1*  
~~July 30, 1966~~

*7:15*

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You approved in principle our setting up a small in-house committee to oversee final review of the recommendations of the White House Conference on International Cooperation during preparation of the FY 1968 budget and legislative program.

To wrap up the mechanics, the attached memo *to Rostow* is for your signature. I am also attaching an innocuous press release to take credit for this move. *T&B*.

Charles Schultze has agreed to chair this group and to provide the staff work. We will probably only need to meet a couple of times since Budget will manage this as part of its regular fall work. Joe Califano will sit in to relate this as needed to the legislative program, and I will keep an eye out for any ideas we can use. We would like to ask Ray Nasher to sit with us as the one outsider. He worked with us as Executive Director of the Conference last fall and is safe. He is worth including because he is respected by the citizens' committees and will testify more credibly than we can that their ideas have had a fair hearing.

W. W. Rostow

Bill Moyers concurs.

DETERMINED TO BE A MATTER OF  
MARKING, CANCELLED 10/1/86  
SER. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 16, 1983.  
BY *DCW* ON *8-17-86*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



to P  
8/1/65

August 1, 1966

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF  
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES**

**SUBJECT: Follow-up on the work of The White House  
Conference on International Cooperation**

We in the United States set aside the year 1965 as International Cooperation Year (ICY) to be spent in search of new ways of cooperation among nations. To encourage that search, I called the White House Conference on International Cooperation, which met in Washington November 28 to December 1. That Conference was built on months of preparatory work by the ICY Cabinet Committee, which I had earlier formed, and the National Citizens' Commission. At the Conference itself some 5,000 Americans took part in discussing the reports of 30 panels of the National Citizens' Commission.

Now we in the government are well advanced in following up many of these recommendations. In fact, a number of them are already before the Congress. Others are headed that way or are under review for other forms of implementation. A few we have found unworkable now. But all must enjoy the constructive review which the Secretary of State, the Vice President and I promised.

To finish that review, I am appointing a White House committee this summer to oversee the final analysis in the context of preparing the FY 1968 Budget and legislative program. The Director, Bureau of the Budget, will serve as Chairman. He will be assisted by my Special Assistants, Mr. Rostow and Mr. Califano, and a private individual who was active in the work of the Conference. I ask you all to cooperate fully with them.

When the committee has finished its review, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, will give me a final report. Meanwhile, I have asked it to send to the National Citizens' Commission and each Chairman of a Citizens' Panel an appropriate letter outlining its plans for the review.

Equally important products of the Conference were the new channels of cooperation opened between experts in and out of government. I am determined that our government in its normal course of business continue to take advantage of the best thinking among our citizens. Therefore, I request each of you to encourage each Government Committee Chairman in your department or agency to carry on whatever contact with his citizen counterpart helpfully enlarges the scope of our own thinking. I am also asking the White House committee to report on the degree to which it has been possible to make this sort of contact a continuing and useful part of your regular business.

15/LBJ

LBJ:HHS:mz 8/1/66



PROPOSED PRESS RELEASE

The President today set up a White House committee to oversee final review of the recommendations of the White House Conference on International Cooperation.

The Conference, held in Washington November 28 to December 1, 1965, produced some 410 recommendations. More than 5,000 citizens participated in the Conference.

Following the Conference, the departments and agencies reviewed those recommendations, and many have already been carried out. Now the President has asked a group of his top personal advisers to oversee a final review in connection with preparation of the Fiscal Year 1968 budget and legislative program. This committee will be chaired by Budget Director Charles Schultze and include Special Assistants Walt W. Rostow and Joseph A. Califano Jr.

Mr. Raymond D. Nasher of Dallas, Texas, will also serve on this committee. He served as Executive Director of the Conference.

Monday, August 1, 1966 -- 6:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

I wish there were some way to do this without bothering you on details; but --

Dante Fascell can't go to Colombia. Linc Gordon would like to invite Jeffrey Cohelan. Yes \_\_\_\_\_; No. ☒.

The others on the House list were: Congressman Armistead Selden \_\_\_\_\_  
Congresswoman Julia Hansen ☒  
*any of these* Congressman Silvio Conte ☒

Philip Randolph can't go; and we haven't heard from George Meany. On the public members list we recommended John F. Gallagher, Vice President for International Operations of Sears, Roebuck. Yes \_\_\_\_\_; No \_\_\_\_\_

The others on the list were: Eugene Ormandy <sup>②</sup> \_\_\_\_\_  
Leonard Bernstein \_\_\_\_\_  
Samuel Eliot Morrison \_\_\_\_\_

*Eric Leinsdorf ①*

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Monday, August 1, 1966  
12:00 noon

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Gaud's account  
of the problems we faced in the  
Senate-House conference on the  
Foreign Aid bills.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. O'Brien  
Mr. Bill Moyers  
Mr. Henry Wilson  
Mr. Manatos  
Mr. Bator

WWRostow:rlh

2638  
85a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

JUL 30 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Senate-House Conference on Foreign Aid Bills

We believe the Conference will start during the week of August 8. Lord knows when it will end.

The Senate Conferees are Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Hickenlooper, Aiken and Carlson. The House Conferees will be appointed next week.

The House passed a single bill, whereas the Senate passed separate bills for economic and military aid. This in itself creates a difficult issue, although it does not affect the substance of the program.

All the major substantive issues are the result of Senate action. The toughest to resolve are likely to be:

- The limitation on the number of countries that can receive Development Loans (10), Technical Assistance (40) and Military Assistance (40).
- The requirement that 15% of Development Loan funds may be used only by transfer to the world bank family.
- The length of the authorization (The House authorized Development Loans and the Alliance for five years, the rest of the program for two years. The Senate authorized the Alliance for two years, everything else for one year).

The Senate bill has many other bothersome features -- too many to go into here. Most serious are:




- The increase in the minimum interest rates on Development Loans and Alliance Loans from 1% to 2% during the ten year grace period, and from 2-1/2% to 3% thereafter (these increases will probably also apply to Food for Freedom loan terms).
- A \$55 million combined ceiling on Military Assistance grants and sales of defense articles to Latin America.
- Money cuts. Especially troublesome are those in Supporting Assistance (\$89 million) and the refusal to let us use up to \$5 million of Supporting Assistance funds to administer our present program in Vietnam.

One other item deserves mention: a floor amendment sponsored by Bob Kennedy which would create a Foreign Aid Planning Committee to review the aid program and report its findings and recommendations to the President and the Congress by September 1, 1967.

This is an improved version of last year's Fulbright-Morse proposal, which was dropped in Conference. It still has some objectionable features. For example, the membership of the Committee is heavily weighted in favor of Congress: 4 members of the Foreign Relations Committee appointed by the Vice President, 4 members of the Foreign Affairs Committee appointed by the Speaker, and 4 members appointed by the President from private life (former executives of A. I. D. are ineligible for membership on the Committee).

Ultimately this proposal may provide a basis for a compromise, i. e., authorize the program for two years and go along with a Foreign Aid Planning Committee. However, we would oppose the amendment in the early stages of the Conference. The program was reviewed last fall at your direction.

We expect Doc Morgan to be with us on all the major issues. But he has a heavy load to carry. I expect to talk to him this coming week. We will also be working with the other Conferees in cooperation with your staff, the Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Fowler, and others.



William S. Gaud  
Acting Administrator

RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 JUL 30 PM 12 06



Monday, August 1, 1966  
6:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

This letter came down without  
drafting guidance.

The letter seemed candid and  
his intentions so much in our  
interest that I drafted this brief  
reply for your signature.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Reply to Rabbi Seymour J. Cohen's letter July 28, 1966

WWRostow:rla


August 1, 1966

Dear Rabbi Cohen:

I do wish to thank you for your warm and gracious letter of July 28, upon your return from Israel.

It is good that those you met sense our concern, our respect, and our support.

Sincerely,



Rabbi Seymour J. Cohen  
President  
Synagogue Council of America  
235 Fifth Avenue  
New York, New York

LBJ:WWR:rlh

Monday, August 1, 1966  
4:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft reply to Senator  
Mansfield's letter to you of July 27.  
I thought it best not to get you involved  
in either affirming or debating his  
distinction between the U. S. as an  
"Asian" as opposed to a "Pacific"  
power.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

August 1, 1966

Dear Mike:

I was greatly strengthened by your good letter of July 27.

You correctly judge that my American Alumni Council speech on July 12 did not extend our commitments in Asia.

As I said, we must stand by our existing commitments; defeat aggression and make it unprofitable; encourage the Asians to organize themselves in mutual support; and look to the time when the leaders on the Chinese mainland are prepared to live at peace with their neighbors.

I suggested that "the untold story of 1966" is the progress made by the governments and peoples of Free Asia in beginning to come together. To the extent that they continue progressively to do this and shape their own future in their own way, there is a decent hope that the burden we bear in that part of the world will diminish, rather than increase, with the passage of time.

As you perceived, this view goes back a long way in my mind: to my trip to Asia in 1961 and my Baltimore speech of 1965.

We must, of course, recognize that the achievement of this goal depends on our seeing our way through to an honorable peace in Viet Nam which would bring to a halt the Communist efforts to take over Thailand and Laos as well as South Viet Nam.

I am greatly in your debt, Mike, for your thoughtful re-reading of what I said and for your wise reflections on a major problem of the nation.

Sincerely,

LBJ

Honorable Mike Mansfield  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWR:mz

E 200.7

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United States Senate  
Office of the Majority Leader  
Washington, D.C.

July 27, 1966

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

After my colloquy with Bill Fulbright on the Senate Floor the other day, I went back and re-read your West Virginia speech. Frankly, I did not understand why such strong exception had been taken to your remarks, especially in view of the emphasis which, as I recalled, you had placed on a constructive peace in Asia.

A second reading, I think, has helped to clarify the misapprehension. In any event, I pass on to you my reactions for whatever they may be worth.

In my judgment, there is a world of difference between thinking of the United States as a Pacific power and as an Asian power. The two concepts are distinct even though they may overlap somewhat along the littoral of the Asian mainland. As a Pacific power, we would have a primary concern in whatever happens in the Pacific ocean and should be prepared to assume in that area all necessary security responsibilities, unilateral, bilateral or whatever. But being a Pacific power does not call for a heavy and permanent military involvement on the Asian mainland. Historically, in fact, we have rejected such involvement. As a Pacific power, of course, we would still join with other nations in all sorts of constructive, social and economic endeavors in Asia, but we would not necessarily accept and, much less, seek heavy and permanent military responsibilities on the Asian mainland.

If we see ourselves as an Asian power, on the other hand, we would have a primary concern and involvement in all that transpires on the continent from Pakistan to the Soviet Maritime provinces. As necessary, we would accept unilateral and permanent military responsibility on the Asian continent.

We are clearly a Pacific power even as we are an Atlantic power, but we are not and, in my judgment, ought not to aspire to be an Asian power any more than we ought to think of ourselves, basically, as a European power. The difference between the two, in my judgment, is not merely a matter of semantics; it is quite fundamental. It has nothing to do with isolationism or internationalism. Rather, it has to do, among other things, with vital U.S. interests, sensibly appraised and very carefully delimited. It has to do with the practical reach of U.S. military power into the Asian mainland. It has to do with the limits of constructive United States influence on the Asian mainland in the light

Rec'd by  
Mansfield  
7-27-66 6:30 pm

(2)  
NR 7/27/66

July 27, 1966

of the harsh realities of that continent. Finally, it has to do with the apportionment, to Asia, of a sensible share of the total U.S. resources which are available for constructive social and economic efforts abroad, in view of needs elsewhere in the world and at home.

In my judgment, every precaution should be taken to avoid obscuring the distinction between the terms Pacific power and Asian power or, to put it another way, between the Pacific Ocean and the Asian mainland. As you know only too well, today's generalizations are, too often, tomorrow's sanction for the expansion of the permanent bureaucratic commitment in the conduct of American foreign policy. This danger is particularly acute in the Orient, which, it seems to me, invites both obscurity of concept and excess of commitment.

If we follow that siren song, however, and thereby project ourselves into presumptuous unilateral responsibilities on the Asian mainland, we may very well weaken this nation, not only as a Pacific power and a world-wide power, but even in our capacity to be constructive, on a multilateral basis, on the Asian mainland.

My interpretation of your statement is that your policies conceive of the United States as a Pacific power rather than an Asian power in the same sense that we are basically an Atlantic power rather than a European power. If that is correct, it does not follow that we must tie ourselves down in Asia in any permanent military sense which might well be the case if we did not distinguish, in concept of policy between the Pacific ocean and the Asian mainland.

I do not see that the reference in your speech to our role in a constructive peace in Asia means that you have abolished this distinction. Rather, I interpret those parts of the statement as a re-emphasis of your view that the meeting of social and economic needs in Asia is of paramount importance. That view, as I recall, you brought back from your trip to Asia in 1961 and the speech makes it clear that you not only retain this concept but also that you have been trying to put it into practical operation through such multilateral undertakings as the Asian Development Bank and the Mekong Development project, both of which hold out a great hope for that part of the world.

Respectfully,

*Mike Mansfield*



Monday, August 1, 1966 -- 5:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I recommend your approval of these messages to the President and Prime Minister of Singapore marking the August 9 anniversary of Singapore's first year of independence.

State urges this exception to the practice of your communicating such messages only to Heads of State, since Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew holds real power as Head of Government and, being sensitive, might take offense if he were not to receive a message.

Lee's views parallel those you expressed in your July 12 address on Asian policy, and the message to him is an investment in improving our relations with the Singapore Government.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

*approved*

Monday, August 1, 1966 -- 7:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

On Saturday, July 30, 1966, I had a most important press contact: the White House staff played tennis against the Press Club. It was a draw: 3 matches to 3.

On Monday, August 1, 1966, William S. White came in to lunch, on a purely personal matter. No business whatsoever was conducted.

Carl Rowan came in today, Monday, August 1, to talk about his impressions of Russia. He had little to add to the cable reports of his trip, except that beneath the level of the government the people he met are very much worried about the Chinese Communists. He then asked how and when we thought our policy might bring the war in Viet Nam to an end. I marched through the five factors, indicating that on all of them we were making some progress but could make no prediction as to when Hanoi would be willing to negotiate or otherwise bring about an honorable peace.

Rowan said he was going to talk on television about bringing our troops home from Europe. I pointed out that we had an offset agreement working with Germany; we would be saving on balance of payments by getting out of France. We were very anxious to separate the balance of payments problem from any changes in the structure of our NATO forces. In this context, I said that when all the potentialities of new military technology were examined, we might get agreement by all the allies on certain changes, notably due to longer legged fighter aircraft and the air transport revolution.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

to P  
via H. G. G. 92  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 88-19  
By ing, NARA, Date 12-10-91

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mon. August 1, 1966 - 6:45 p.m.

SUBJECT: Talking Points for President Shazar--at noon Tuesday

1. You understand Shazar was warmly received in Latin America and hope that his reception here will provide a fitting climax.

2. You would like to hear Shazar's impressions of economic development in Latin America--especially the Alliance for Progress if he saw it in action.

3. As you see them, US-Israeli relations have never been better. We agree on most things and have learned to discuss our differences straightforwardly.

--Israel's own progress is the main reason for this happy state. Shazar's Latin American trip demonstrates Israel's growing world stature. At home, Israel's economy is booming.

--We are proud to have helped. Arms sales and economic aid (the highest ever this year) have shown our intention to safeguard Israel's security.

--Aid funds are increasingly tight. You hope Israel will not make the aid level a measure of our relationship.

4. You would like to hear Shazar's views on how we might use our sound relationship as a base for bringing about a lasting peace in the Mid-East. Talking about long-term Arab-Israeli accommodation is a touchy subject--but crucial.

5. Confidentially, you have decided to appoint Bunker as our man on desalting. But you want to hold off announcing this to give Bunker rest and time to do his homework.

6. You might explain your reasons for pushing ahead in VietNam and the importance you attach to Free World countries helping there.

Shazar wants to make a brief friendly statement to the press after he leaves your office but will ask whether you mind. I see no problem. The more satisfied he sounds, the better.

~~SECRET~~

W. Rostow

cc: Bill H. G. G.  
10/1/66



Monday, August 1, 1966  
5:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will, I believe wish to read  
this soldierly account of how General  
Westmoreland dealt with the dangerous  
and rather imaginative thrust across  
the DMZ.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~, MAC 6548

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DCA NARS, Date 8-17-86

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

9/10  
Monday, August 1, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND (MAC, 6548)

On Thursday, the 28th, I visited Operation HASTINGS/Lam Son 289. This combined operation has been highly successful, served the purpose of spoiling the planned attack by the 324B Division, and has now virtually petered out. Some of my observations on the situation may be of interest.

During April we received our first indication that another division was moving from North Vietnam to the South. At that time, my feeling was that it would probably move through the Laos Panhandle to reinforce North Vietnamese troops already positioned in or near the Central Highlands of the Second Corps area. This deployment was consistent with my estimate of Hanoi's strategy.


In mid-May, night air reconnaissance first noted considerable truck traffic moving south towards the DMZ on highways 1A and 101. On the 1st of June we received indications that elements of the Division were moving across the DMZ. I believe that the enemy's initial plans for deployment of this Division were changed because of the successful Tiger Hound operation and in consideration of the political turmoil in the First Corps.

On the 10th of June it became clear that major elements of the 324B Division had moved into Quang Tri province. By the 13th our intelligence had crystallized to the point where a decision could be made to execute contingency plans that had been developed several months ago for offensive operations in the northern First Corps.

On the 15th, Operation HASTINGS/Lam Son 289 was launched following B-52 strikes which were initiated on the 13th. Participating in the operation were major elements of the Marine 3d Division, five battalions of the Vietnamese General Reserve, and battalions of two regiments of the 1st Vietnamese Division.

There are indications that some of the initial B-52 strikes hit one or more control headquarters of the enemy. Despite this, the enemy initially fought tenaciously. I had suspected that he would attempt new tactical innovations based on his experience in fighting the U.S. troops, and one such tactic became evident at the outset. The enemy had secured most of the likely landing zones in the area with the result that several helicopter landings had to be aborted because of enemy fire and 14 of 18 patrols that were inserted had to be extracted because of enemy pressure. It was, therefore, necessary to place extensive artillery and air strikes on landing zones before they could be safely used.

SECRET



The enemy had prepared in the rugged hills of north central Quang Tri province a base of division size. His line of communications consisted of two main routes across the DMZ. Stockpiles of supplies had been pre-positioned in and north of the DMZ in the heavy jungle but in areas that could be supported by truck transportation.

The Seventh Air Force has been, for a number of weeks, concentrating strikes in the extended battle area north of the DMZ. However, this interdiction program was intensified by initiation of Operation TALLY HO. This air campaign, which will continue indefinitely, has had significant results in destroying transportation and supplies that had been stockpiled to support the planned offensive. Large supply areas are being targeted for B-52 strikes since they are dispersed and well hidden in the jungle, thereby requiring saturation bombing.

Meanwhile, nine reconnaissance teams have been introduced into Laos along the Quang Tri border. Thus far these teams have discovered what was expected, namely, a major infiltration route from Laos through a valley that crosses the border approximately 10 kilometers south of the DMZ, and a logistic complex approximately 7 kilometers south of Highway 9. Tactical air has been brought in and several large secondary explosions have occurred following strikes on buildings. B-52 strikes will be required to neutralize these supply areas.

I feel that the enemy had planned to over-run friendly positions and district towns in the hills of Quang Tri, isolate Dong Ha and Quang Tri and exploit his success by an offensive from Laos against friendly positions and installations along Highway 9 in western Quang Tri. The enemy has been successful in interdicting Highway 1 and railroad between Danang and Dong Ha by destroying a number of bridges and mining the railroad at several points.

The 324B Division has been dispersed and apparently demoralized. It is no longer an effective fighting force and will require some time to reconstitute itself. Although there are enemy elements remaining in Quang Tri province, there is evidence that a number of troops have moved back across the DMZ. It is significant that on at least three occasions, North Vietnamese troops broke and ran while being engaged by U.S. Marines.

This operation was well planned and executed by the Third Marine and its subordinate elements, effectively supported by Navy support activity, Danang. The coordination and cooperation between Brig. General English, Walt's Task Force Commander, and Colonel Troung, Commander, First Vietnamese Division, has been noteworthy. Their command posts have been co-located. The fire support provided by artillery, air elements and B-52's has been extremely effective



~~SECRET~~

-3-

We are now preparing a detailed defense plan to prevent further intrusion by the enemy in large numbers across the DMZ. My staff has been studying this project in coordination with the Third Marine, and forces will be appropriately positioned for this mission before the beginning of the north east monsoon season. I will report further my approach to this problem.

~~SECRET~~

Monday, August 1, 1966  
12:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is  
a routine congratulatory message to  
President Keita of Mali on the birth of  
his daughter (Saturday, July 30).

Walt W. Rostow

Approved ✓ LDR'd to state 8/2/66  
Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_  
Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

EKHamilton/vmr

Ref: NSC 2639

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KEITA OF MALI

Dear Mr. President:

The birth of your daughter is joyous news indeed.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in extending warmest congratulations  
and best wishes to you and Mrs. Keita.

Lyndon B. Johnson

*Pres. file*

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12:30 p. m.

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Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

EKHamilton/vmr

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Dear Mr. President:

The birth of your daughter is joyous news indeed.  
Mrs. Johnson joins me in extending warmest congratulations  
and best wishes to you and Mrs. Keita.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Monday - August 1, 1966 - 4:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Head of Delegation to Colombian Inaugural

Governor Goddard of Arizona is willing to head the delegation to the Lleras inaugural (Saturday-Monday, August 6-8) but is concerned about cancelling appointments related to his primary campaign. He says that a cable from you requesting that he take the assignment would help him with his appointments problem.

Invitations of this nature are generally made by Jim Symington in your name. He and I do not believe that this exception would establish a bad precedent.

I understand from Hayes Redmon and Governor Bryant that the Governor is one of our boys and that the trip to Colombia, plus a cable from you asking him to go, would be of help to him in his campaign.

I recommend that you approve the attached message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message \_\_\_\_\_

Prefer not to send \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_.

Attachment



SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO GOVERNOR GODDARD OF ARIZONA

Governor Sam Goddard  
State House  
Phoenix, Arizona

The Colombian Government has invited the U.S. to send a special delegation to the inauguration of President-elect Carlos Lleras Restrepo on Sunday, August 7. I would like you to be my special representative and head the United States delegation which will include members of both Houses of Congress, officials of the Department of State and public members. I hope that you can accept this important assignment.

Lyndon B. Johnson

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 1, 1966


Dear Mr. President:

I have your letter of July 21 and appreciate your having written me about our trade problem on cotton textiles. I also regret that the recent conversations in Washington did not make progress. But I am pleased that the talks will be resumed in Mexico City soon.

You will understand that the United States has to find ways of meeting the problems created for our industry by excessive cotton textile imports. Under existing international cotton arrangements, the United States has concluded agreements with a number of countries limiting cotton imports into this country. I am particularly desirous that our two governments make every effort to reach a similar agreement which meets the basic needs of our respective positions. You will agree with me that it would be unfortunate for either government to arrive at the conclusion that the problem can only be resolved by its own action. I would like to avoid this.

As I have mentioned to you on previous occasions, I place great importance on continuation and growth of neighborly relations in trade and in other fields between Mexico and the United States. I hope that the Mexico City talks will result in a mutually satisfactory formula.

Sincerely,



His Excellency  
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz  
President of the United Mexican States  
Mexico, D. F.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 88-34  
By ig, NARA, Date 1-20-89

*Cgs Sender, Bure, McPherson / units - C.F. 8/3*