

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

November 12, 2003

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 1 of 2

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
012	memo	Rostow to LBJ re: China [Sanitized 1/24/01 NLJ 98-407] <i>MORE INFO RELEASED NLJ/RAC 04.132</i>	TS	1	09/14/66	A
012a	report	re: China [Sanitized 1/24/01 NLJ 98-407] <i>SAME SANITIZATION NLJ/RAC 04.132</i>	TS	1	09/14/66	A
028d	report	re: nuclear test [Sanitized 2/4/92 NLJ 88-156] <i>More info released 4-30-04 NW 98-409</i>	S	1	09/12/66	A
031	memo	Rostow to LBJ re: Vietnam [Sanitized 3/8/00 NLJ 98-411] [Dup. #96, NSF, Country File, Vietnam vol 58]	S	1	09/10/66	A
031a	cable	TDCS 314/11167-66 [Sanitized 2/23/00 NLJ 98-410] [Dup. #96a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam vol. 58]	S	3	09/06/66	A
040	memo	Rostow to LBJ re: Erhard [Sanitized 12/18/01 NLJ/RAC 01-50]	S	1	09/10/66	A
040a	memo	to LBJ re: Germany [Sanitized 12/18/01 NLJ/RAC 01-50]	S	2	09/10/66	A
045	memo	Rostow to LBJ [Sanitized 3/8/00 NLJ 98-411]	TS	1	09/09/66	A

Collection Title National Security File, Memos to the President


Folder Title "Walt Rostow, vol. 12, September 1-14, 1966"

Box Number 10

Restriction Codes

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Initials

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
064	memo	Rostow to LBJ re: South Africa [Sanitized 3/8/00 NLJ 98-411] [Dup. #47a, NSF, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. 12, bx 78; #9c, NSF, Files of Edward Hamilton, "South Africa"] SAME SANITIZATION 1.21.05 NLJ 04.239	S	1	09/07/66	A
064a	cable	Capetown 304 [Sanitized 11/24/03 NLJ 98-408] [Dup. #9d, NSF, Files of Edward Hamilton, "South Africa"; #30, 47c, NSF, Country File, South Africa, Vol. 2, bx 78]	S	2	09/07/66	A
066b	memo	Griffith Johnson to Alexis Johnson [Exempt NLJ 88-153]	C	3	10/04/63	A
070	memo	Rostow to LBJ [Exempt NLJ 9-88-161]	S	1	09/07/66	A
070a	cable	Cape Town 304 [Sanitized 9/1/88 NLJ 88-153]	S	2	09/07/66	A
082	memo	Rostow to LBJ [Sanitized 3/8/00 NLJ 98-411]	S	1	09/05/66	A
082c	cable	Saigon 8240 open 7-27-04 NLJ 98-408	S	1	09/05/66	
095a	report	re: Thailand <i>exempt per RAC 5/03</i> [Exempt 2/23/00 NLJ 98-410] [Dup. #101a, this file]	S	2	09/01/66	A
101a	cable	Text of Saigon 4969 [Sanitized 11/24/01 NLJ 98-408] [Dup. #95a, this file]	S	2	09/01/66	A

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	to President from Rostow re: President Marcos secret <i>open 8-29-86</i>	1 p 09/14/66	A
#2a cable	text of Tel Aviv 930 confidential <i>open 9-1-88 NLJ 88-153</i>	3 p 09/14/66	A
#7 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 3/12/83</i>	1 p 09/14/66	C
#8a cable	text of Saigon 5970 secret <i>open 8-12-88 NLJ 88-152</i>	7 p 09/14/66	A
#10 memo	to President from Rostow re: Philippines secret <i>open 3-27-90 NLJ 89-64</i>	1 p 09/14/66	A
#10a report	re: Philippines secret "	1 p undated	A
#10b report	re: Philippines secret "	1 p undated	A
#10c report	re: Philippines secret "	1 p undated	A
#10d report	re: Philippines secret <i>open 2-20-90 NLJ 88-157</i>	1 p undated	A
#12 memo	to President from Rostow re: China top secret - <i>sanitized 1-24-01 NLJ 48-407 (same)</i> sanitized 7-5-90 NLJ 89-68	1 p 09/14/66	A
#12a report	re: China top secret - <i>sanitized 1-24-01 NLJ 98-407</i>	1 p 09/14/66	A
#13 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 2-4-92 NLJ 88-156</i>	1 p 09/13/66	A
#14b memo	to President from Sec. Commerce confidential <i>open 7/30/98</i> [sanitized 2/1/83]	3 p 09/07/66	A
#15 memo	to President from Rostow re: Pres. Marcos secret <i>open 7/30/98</i> sanitized 2-20-90 NLJ 89-157	3 p 09/13/66	A
#16b cable	from Amb. Blair re: Pres. Marcos secret <i>open 7-1-88 NLJ 88-153</i> [sanitized 10/28/82]	1 p 09/13/66	A
#19 memo	to President from Rostow re: Colombia confidential <i>open 2-4-92 NLJ 88-156</i>	2 p 09/13/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President
Walt Rostow, vol. 12, September 1 - 14, 1966
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#19a memo	to President from Rostow re: Colombia confidential <i>open 2-4-92 NLJ 88-156</i>	2 p 09/13/66	A
#19d memo	re: Colombia confidential <i>open 9-1-88 NLJ 88-153</i>	3 p undated	A
#19h report	re: Colombia confidential	2 p undated	A
#21 memo	to President from WWR re: Pakistan <i>open 7/30/98</i> confidential <i>sanitized 2-4-92 NLJ 88-156</i>	2 p 09/12/66	A
#23a cable	text of Rangoon 386 <i>open 7/30/98</i> confidential <i>sanitized 2-4-92 NLJ 88-152</i>	2 p 09/12/66	A
#24 memo	to President from Rostow re: Vietnam confidential (Dep. of #68, NSF, Country file, Vietnam, Vol. 58)	<i>open 2-20-90 NLJ 88-157</i> 1 p 09/12/66	A
#24a cable	Seoul 1325 confidential <i>open 8-12-88 NLJ 88-152</i>	1 p 09/12/66	A
#24b cable	Deptel 44822 to all diplomatic posts confidential <i>xx open 8-12-88 NLJ 88-152</i>	2 p 09/11/66	A
#24c cable	Deptel 44822 to all diplomatic posts confidential <i>open 8-12-88 NLJ 88-152</i>	1 p 09/12/66	A
#24f cable	Deptel to Saigon confidential <i>open 8-12-88 NLJ 88-152</i>	1 p 09/12/66	A
#26 memo	to President from Rostow re: Marcos Visit <i>open 7/30/98</i> secret <i>sanitized 2-20-90 NLJ 88-157</i>	8 p 09/12/66	A
#28a memo	to Pres. from Rostow re: suggested luncheon agenda top secret <i>open 5-9-89 NLJ 88-68</i>	2 p 09/12/66	A
#28b report	re: Rolling Thunder top secret <i>open 5-9-89 NLJ 88-68</i>	1 p 09/12/66	A
#28c memo	to President from Bator <i>sanitized 3-27-90 NLJ 89-67</i> secret <i>sanitized 1-27-92 NLJ 88-19 open 7/30/98</i>	1 p 09/13/66	A
#28d report	re: nuclear test secret <i>sanitized 2-4-92 NLJ 88-156</i>	1 p 09/12/66	A
#28e report	re: nuclear powered ship <i>open 2-4-92 NLJ 88-156</i> secret	1 p 09/12/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#29 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 2-4-92 NLS 88-156</i> secret	1 p 09/12/66	A
#29a letter	to Rostow from Pat Dean secret <i>dup of #1349, NSF, CF, UK, Vol 9, Bx 210</i>	1 p 09/12/66	A
#29b address	summary of Prime Minister's Address to Commonwealth... secret <i>dup of #1349, NSF, CF, UK, Vol 9, Bx 210</i>	4 p undated	A
#29c report	document circulated to Commonwealth Prime Ministers secret	4 p undated	A
#30 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 7/30/98</i> confidential	2 p 09/10/66	A
#30a memo	to President from George Ball confidential <i>open 9-1-88 NLS 88-153</i>	2 p 09/10/66	A
#31 memo	to XXXXXXXX President from Rostow, re: Vietnam secret <i>(dup. of #96, NSF, County, File, Vietnam, Vol. 58) Sanitized 3-8-00 NLS 98-411</i>	1 p 09/10/66	A
#31a cable	TDCS 314/11167-66 <i>Example NLS 88-59</i> Sanitized 2-23-00 NLS 98-410 Secret <i>(dup. of #46a, NSF, County, File, Vietnam, Vol. 58)</i>	3 p 09/06/66	A
#32 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 2-4-92 NLS 88-156</i> confidential	2 p 09/10/66	A
#32a memo	to President from George Ball confidential <i>open 9-1-88 NLS 88-153</i>	2 p 09/10/66	A
#33a XXXXXX memo	to President from Bator <i>open 2-4-92 NLS 88-156</i> secret	1 p 09/10/66	A
#33b memo	to Rostow from Ben Read <i>Sanitized 3-19-93 NLS 93-403</i> secret <i>Example NLS 88-153</i>	1 p 08/30/66	A
#33c letter	to Paul Martin from Dean Rusk <i>Sanitized 3-19-93 NLS 93-403</i> Secret <i>Example NLS 88-153 open 8-2-94 NLS 93-397</i>	2 p undated	A
#33d letter	to Dean Rusk from Paul Martin secret <i>Example NLS 88-153 Example NLS 93-397</i>	1 p 08/10/66	A
#34 memo	to President from Rostow re: USSR <i>open 2-4-92 NLS 88-156</i> secret	1 p 09/10/66	A
#35 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 2-20-90 NLS 88-157</i>	1 p 09/10/66	A

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Walt Rostow, vol. 12 September 1 - 14, 1966
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#35a cable	text of Bangkok 3130 secret <i>open 11-24-03 NLJ 98-408</i> secret <i>Exempt NLJ 88-152</i>	2 p 09/09/66	A
#36a memo	to President from Bator re: Canada secret <i>open NLJ 88-153</i>	1 p 09/10/66	A
#36b memo	to Rostow from Ben Read re: Canada secret <i>open 11-24-03 NLJ 98-408</i>	1 p 08/30/66	A
#36c letter	to Paul Martin from Dean Rusk secret <i>open 8-2-94 NLJ 93-357</i>	2 p undated	A
#36d letter	to Dean Rusk from Paul Martin secret <i>open 11-24-03 NLJ 98-408</i>	1 p 08/10/66	A
#37 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 7/30/98</i> secret	1 p 09/10/66	A
#38 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 7/30/98</i> secret <i>Exempt NLJ 88-157</i>	1 p 09/10/66	A
#38a memo	to McNamara and Rostow from WWB possible classified info <i>Exempt NLJ 88-157</i>	1 p undated	A
#38b memo <i>open 11-24-03 NLJ 98-408</i>	memcon with Gen. Ne Win secret <i>Exempt NLJ 88-157</i>	1 p 09/09/66	A
#40 memo	to President from Rostow re: Erhard secret <i>sanitized 3-8-00 NLJ 98-411</i> <i>same san'd 12/18/01 NLJ/RAC 01-50</i>	1 p 09/10/66	A
#40a memo	to President from Rostow re: Germany secret <i>Sanitized 2-23-00 NLJ 98-410</i> <i>same san'd 12/18/01 NLJ/RAC 01-50</i>	2 p 09/10/66	A
#41a cable	text of Rangoon 381 <i>open 7/30/98</i> confidential <i>sanitized 8-16-89 NLJ 88-161</i>	1 p 09/10/66	A
#45 memo	to President from Rostow top secret <i>Sanitized 3-8-00 NLJ 98-411</i>	1 p 09/09/66	A
#48 memo	to President from Rostow re: India <i>sanitized 9/6/69</i> <i>open 7/30/98</i> confidential	1 p 09/08/66	A
#50a letter	to President from Minister Lilienfeld <i>open 7/30/98</i> possible classified info	2 p 09/07/66	A
#51a memo	to President from Bator re: nuclear sharing secret <i>open 2-4-92 NLJ 88-156</i>	2 p 09/07/66	A

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#50b cable	Deptel for Amb. McGhee from Acting Sec. <i>open 9-1-88 NLJ 88-153</i> secret [sanitized NLJ 84-16]	2 p 09/08/66	A
#54a cable	text of Saigon 5604 secret <i>open 8-12-88 NLJ 88-152</i>	2 p 09/09/66	A
#55 memo	to President from Rostow <i>Exempt NLJ 88-159 open 7/30/98</i> confidential	1 p 09/09/66	A
#56 memo	to President from Rostow re: Dom. Rep. confidential <i>open 2-4-92 NLJ 88-156</i>	1 p 09/09/66	A
#56a memo	to President from Ellsworth Bunker re: Dom. Rep. <i>open 7/30/98</i> confidential <i>sanitized 2-4-92 NLJ 88-157</i>	5 p 09/09/66	A
#56b memo	to President from Rostow re: Vietnam <i>open 7/30/98</i> confidential <i>sanitized 2-20-90 NLJ 88-157</i>	1 p 09/08/66	A
#57 memo	to President from Bator re: Germany secret <i>open 2-4-92 NLJ 88-156</i>	1 p 09/08/66	A
#57a cable	text of London 1924 <i>sanitized 9-1-88 NLJ 88-153</i> secret <i>sanitized 4-20-94 NLJ 93-240</i>	3 p 09/07/66	A
#58 memo	to President from Rostow <i>Exempt NLJ 88-159 open 7/30/98</i> possible classified info <i>confidential</i>	1 p 09/08/66	A
#59 memo	to President from Rostow re: Burma confidential <i>open 2-20-90 NLJ 88-157</i>	1 p 09/08/66	A
#64 memo	to President from Rostow re: South Africa <i>sanitized 1-27-92 NLJ 88-19</i> secret <i>sanitized 3-27-90 NLJ 89-64</i>	1 p 09/07/66	A
#64a cable	Capetown 304 <i>sanitized 2-3-89 NLJ 88-17</i> secret <i>90, NSF Contr. re: Africa, Un. & South, Vol 2, Box 78 + # 90, NSF, Filing Edward Hamilton, "South Africa"</i>	2 p 09/07/66	A
#65 memo	to President from Rostow re: USSR secret <i>open 2-4-92 NLJ 88-156</i>	1 p 09/07/66	A
#66 memo	to President from Rostow re: USSR confidential	2 p 09/03/66	A
#66a memo	to Sec. Def from Maxwell Taylor re: Civil Air Agreement with USSR (U) confidential <i>open 7/30/98</i>	2 p 10/3/63	A
#66b memo	to Alexis Johnson from Griffith Johnson <i>Exempt NLJ 88-153</i> confidential	3 p 10/04/63	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#66c memo	to President from Dean Rusk re: US-Soviet Civil Air Agreement confidential <i>open 3-2-90 NLJ 88-153</i> 2 p	07/15/66	A
#67 memo	to President from Rostow re: USSR confidential <i>open 2-4-92 NLJ 88-156</i> 1 p	09/01/66	A
#68 memo	to Rostow from Ben Read re: US-Soviet Civil Air Agreement secret <i>open 9-1-88 NLJ 88-153</i> 3 p	08/31/66	A
#69a cable	text of Saigon 5433 secret <i>open 8-12-88 NLJ 88-152</i> 6 p	09/07/66	A
#70 memo	to President from Rostow <i>Exempt NLJ 88-161</i> Secret <i>ALL 64 above</i> 1 p	09/07/66	A
#70a cable	Cape Town 304 <i>sanitized 9-1-88 NLJ 88-153</i> secret <i>ALL 64 above</i> 2 p	09/07/66	A
#71 memo	to President from Rostow re: Marcos Visit <i>open 1-27-92 NLJ 88-19</i> secret <i>sanitized 3-27-90 NLJ 89-64</i> 5 p	09/07/66	A
#74 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 2-4-92 NLJ 88-156</i> confidential <i>DUPE IN FILES OF W.W. ROSTOW, BOX 15 "NON-VIETNAM, JULY-SEPT 1966" Doc #13</i> 2 p	09/06/66	A
#75 memo	to President from Rostow re: Nasser's daughter confidential <i>open 2-4-92 NLJ 88-156</i> 1 p	09/06/66	A
#75a memo	to President from Dean Rusk re: Nasser's dtr. confidential <i>open 9-1-88 NLJ 88-153</i> 1 p	09/02/66	A
#75c cable	Deptel 33577 to Cairo confidential <i>open 4-19-88</i> 1 p	08/23/66	A
#76a letter	to Walt Rostow from Amb. McGhee possible classified info <i>open 4-19-88</i> 2 p	09/01/66	A
#77 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 2-4-92 NLJ 88-156</i> confidential 1 p	09/06/66	A
#78 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 3-27-90 NLJ 89-64</i> 1 p	09/05/66	A
#79 memo	to President from Rostow top secret 1 p	09/05/66	A
#82a cable	to Saigon 5433 top secret 1 p	09/03/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#82 memo	to President from Rostow <i>sanitized 3-8-80 NLS 98-411</i> top secret <i>Exempt NLS 88-55</i> 1 p	09/05/66	A
#82a cable	<i>converted to secret per NLS 88-55</i> text of Saigon 41139 top secret <i>open 2-3-89 NLS 88-17</i> 1 p	09/03/66	A
#82b cable	text of Saigon 5245 " " top secret 1 p	09/05/66	A
#82c cable	text of Saigon 5246 <i>sanitized 2-3-89 NLS 88-17</i> top secret <i>converted to secret per NLS 88-17</i> 1 p	09/05/66	A
#82d cable	text of Saigon 5229 secret <i>open 2-3-89 NLS 88-17</i> 1 p	09/04/66	A
#82e cable	text of Warsaw 523 <i>open 11-24-83 NLS 98-408</i> confidential <i>Exempt NLS 88-153</i> 6 p	09/05/66	A
#84 memo	to President from Rostow top secret <i>open 12-12-91 NLS 88-55</i> 1 p	09/04/66	A
#84a memo	to Sec. Rusk from Rostow re: USSR <i>NLS 92-34</i> top secret <i>Exempt NLS 88-68 open 4-11-94</i> 5 p	09/03/66	A
#86 memo	to President from Rostow <i>Exempt NLS 88-157</i> confidential <i>open 7/30/98</i> 1 p	09/05/66	A
#86a report	re: Burma <i>open 7/30/98</i> confidential <i>sanitized 8-12-88 NLS 88-152</i> 3 p	8/26/66	A
#88 letter	to President from Branco from Pres. Johnson confidential <i>open 2-4-92 NLS 88-156</i> 3 p	09/03/66	A
#89 memo	to President from Rostow re: USSR confidential <i>open 11-22-91 NLS 88-169</i> 2 p	09/03/66	A
#94 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 2-4-92 NLS 88-156</i> 1 p	09/02/66	A
#95a report	re: Thailand <i>exempt 2-23-80 NLS 98-410</i> secret (<i>dup. of #10/a, Memo to the President, Rostow, Vol. 12</i>) 2 p	09/01/66	A
#97 memo	to President from Rostow re: Non-proliferation treaty top secret <i>Exempt NLS 88-68</i> 3 p	09/02/66	A
#98a letter	to PM Holt from Pres. Johnson <i>Exempt NLS 88-157</i> secret <i>open 7/30/98</i> 3 p	09/02/66	A

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#98b letter	to Pres. Johnson from PM Holt confidential Exempt NLJ 88-154 <i>open 11-4-99 NLJ 98-407</i>	3 p 08/16/66	A
#99 memo	to President from Rostow re: DeGaulle's speech confidential (dup. of #104, NSR County file, Vietnam Vol 58) <i>open 2-20-90 NLJ 88-154</i>	1 p 09/02/66	A
#99a cable	text of Saigon 5090 confidential <i>open 8-12-88 NLJ 88-152</i>	1 p 09/02/66	A
#101a cable	text of Saigon 4969 (dup of #95a, MTP, Rostow, Vol. 12) secret Exempt NLJ 88-152 Exempt 2-23-00 NLJ 98-410 <i>Sanit NLJ 09-010 2/11/02 same sanitization 11-2403 NLJ 98-408</i>	2 p 09/01/66	A
#102 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 2-4-92 NLJ 88-156</i>	1 p 09/01/66	A
#102a memo	to President from Dean Rusk confidential <i>open 6-8-89 NLJ 88-153</i>	2 p 07/15/66	A
#102b memo	to Rostow from Ben Read secret <i>open 9-1-88 NLJ 88-153</i>	3 p 08/31/66	A
#105b cable	to President from Prime Minister secret <i>open 7/30/98</i>	1 p 09/01/66	A
#106 memo	to President from Rostow re: Philippines secret Exempt NLJ 88-67 <i>open 1-27-92 NLJ 88-19</i>	2 p 09/01/66	A
#106a memo	to President from Dean Rusk re: Philippines secret <i>open 8-23-90 NLJ 88-17</i>	3 p 08/29/66	A
#106b memo	to President from Cyrus Vance re: Philippines Secret Exempt NLJ 88-67 <i>open 7/30/98</i>	2 p 08/25/66	A
#106c report	re: Philippines <i>open 7/30/98</i> secret Exempt NLJ 88-67	1 p undated	A
#106d letter	to President Johnson from Gen. Decker secret Exempt NLJ 88-67 <i>open 7/30/98</i>	3 p 08/22/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President
Walt Rostow, vol. 12 September 1 - 14, 1966
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~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, Sept. 14, 1966
8:45 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Your second meeting with President Marcos,
5 p.m. Thursday

It is clear that you got through a tremendous amount of essential business with President Marcos at your first meeting today, Wednesday. I do not know, of course, how much time you had for general discussion of your perspective and his on Asia and the world.

I suspect that the most important single thing you can do on this visit is to ask his advice about Asia and to request him to present to you candidly his vision of the future of Asia. I say this not merely because of what we know of the man from reports, but from the rather remarkable statement he made in response to your welcome and his toast at the State Department lunch. On the latter occasion he spoke wonderfully well of his desire, while maintaining his ties to the U. S., of reaching back into the Asian foundations of Philippine life and developing on this basis a role in a new Asia.

fore
There I suggest that you tell him:

1. of the excitement and encouragement you have derived from the spirit of the new Asia which has developed remarkably in the past year;
2. the U. S. does not intend to leave Asia but, as you said at Lancaster, Ohio, you look for the regions of the world to take a larger hand in their own destiny in the future, as they can develop together and solve their own problems in their own way. You assume President Marcos shares this vision.
3. Above all, you have looked forward to his visit to hear directly from him his own vision of the future of Asia; the role of the Philippines in Asia; and his advice to you about what we should do and not do with respect to Asia.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED	
NLS 85-299	
By DAD	NAKS, Date 8-29-86

2

Wednesday
September 14, 1966
7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read the
attached cable from Amb. Barbour
reporting on Gen. Dayan's preliminary
impressions of the situation in Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

Tel Aviv 930
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12855, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1982
By Det NARS, Date 8-18-86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2a

Wednesday, September 14, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BARBOUR (Tel Aviv, 930)

Over a small dinner at my residence on September 11 with Embassy officials and Maariv publisher Dissentchik in attendance, General Dayan gave his preliminary impressions of the situation in Vietnam as follows (comments in confidence pending publication of his articles, book, etc.):

A. The Viet Cong no longer represent any real threat of defeating U.S. forces. They are getting horribly beaten in almost every engagement despite the fact they continue to seem eager to give battle. North Vietnamese leaders will have to make a decision soon whether to continue the present course or withdraw large parts of their forces to North Vietnam, regroup, and limit themselves to guerilla spoiling operations in the South. This decision is likely to be made following the September 11 South Vietnamese elections and the November elections in the U.S. Continuation of present course would mean literal suicide of the entire Viet Cong armed force. Withdrawal to guerilla status would mean at least temporary abandonment of the aim of winning South Vietnam by force, though it would also continue to result in lack of normalization of that country which would in effect prevent complete achievement of U.S. and Allied goals. Dayan thought there would be no need to maintain large numbers of U.S. troops in the country if Viet Cong reorganized for guerilla struggle.

B. Dayan acknowledged his clear understanding of the nature of the Viet Cong aggression in the South and of the need for U.S. to draw a line and stand against that aggression. He expressed his conviction that the South Vietnamese would never opt for the Viet Cong -- if only because of better economic conditions as a result of U.S. economic aid.

C. Dayan's only serious criticism of the U.S. effort, of which he said he spoke to U.S. officials in Vietnam, is the attempt to do too much for local Government of Vietnam administration. He was a bit vague and difficult to pin down on this point, but seemed to have in mind not only the presence of U.S. advisers in all Saigon ministries in effect controlling the decisions and purse strings but also efforts of foreign specialists and doctors around the country. This is based on the grounds

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-153

By mg, NARA, Date 8-25-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

that having everything done for them (albeit better than they could do it), undercut self-confidence of the South Vietnamese and did not force them to participate whole-heartedly enough in their own salvation. Dayan stayed wedded to this opinion despite counter-arguments. He felt the U. S. Army could carry on the war effectively even if completely divorced from local administration, politics, and development effort. On the other hand, forcing the local administrators to do the best they can, even if this is not particularly good, seemed to him the only way to involve the majority Government of Vietnam and people in the war effort. He thought tight administration in any case a rarity in Asia, citing Thai and Burmese examples, as he saw them.

D. Dayan made it clear he is not impressed by the capabilities of ARVN, particularly in fighting highly-motivated, well-trained Viet Cong foes. He said ARVN would "collapse in a fortnight" if forced to stand alone.

E. While de-emphasizing his role as observer of the political scene in South Vietnam, he did opine that the September 11 election was a wise and necessary procedure whatever the outcome or turnout, simply to demonstrate the desire of the Ky Government to get started with the formation of a democratic state.

F. Dayan avoided any comment on Israel-Vietnam relations or the feelings of the Vietnamese toward the Israelis except to say he imagined Premier Ky had not invited him for a personal interview (which Dayan on his part did not request) because of the absence of diplomatic relations between the two governments.

Dayan said he was sorry he had to make precipitate return to Israel, which he explained vaguely as "being called back because of the Herut business, etc.," He plans to write apologies to General Johnson and still hopes circumstances will permit a visit to Washington two months hence or so. (Comment: While internal political situation probably is part of the explanation for the direct return -- the first person to tell me of Dayan returning was RAFI Party's Shimon Peres -- it is likely pressures on him to write something for publication also was mounting.)

Dayan indicated there was much interest in publishing his final product. Two photographers covered, one black-and-white and one color, latter taking 600 color shots. Life magazine is dickering, the Washington Post and Star are also interested. Paris Match and London

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

Daily Telegraph editors are coming to Tel Aviv to talk with him.

Dayan confirmed he had asked for a North Vietnam visa. Maariv, September 12, states his application has been rejected.

A letter of appreciation was written to me by Dayan on September 7 enclosed in the airgram which follows.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - September 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Independence Day Message to Mexico

Mexico celebrates its 150th Anniversary on Friday, September 16.
More than the routine message of congratulations is in order.

I recommend that you approve the attached suggested message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐.

*9/15/66 - after approval by Pres., Bowdler
added paragraph - agreed with
Juanita Roberts*

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT OF MEXICO

His Excellency
C. Gustavo Diaz Ordaz
President of Mexico
Presidencia
Los Pinos
Mexico, D. F.

On the 156th anniversary of the historic and memorable events at Dolores Hidalgo, I extend my own special greeting and that of the people of the United States for the prosperity and well-being of the Mexican nation and people.

Lyndon B. Johnson

UNCLASSIFIED

Ambassy MEXICO CITY

STATE

1. FYI. Following message will be sent direct via commercial channels to President, September 16.

QUOTE On the 156th anniversary of the historic and memorable events at Dolores Hidalgo, I extend my own special greeting and that of the people of the United States for the prosperity and well-being of the Mexican nation and people.

QUOTE Mrs. Johnson and I remember with deep satisfaction and pleasure our visit with you and your wife in April. But even more, this visit symbolized the affection and friendship between our two peoples and our resolve to strengthen and broaden our efforts to achieve our common purposes. It is with that resolve in mind that on this anniversary of your national independence, I send my best wishes for continued good relations between our nations. LYNDON B. JOHNSON UNQUOTE.

2. Department will release upon confirmation of receipt unless objection perceived.

END

ARA/RMSayre:pat 9/14/66 7971

James W. Symington
Chief of Protocol

ARAXXMEYXEHYEH

S/S-C - Mrs. Denham
ARA/MEX - Mr. Taylor

S/S

WHITE HOUSE CONCURRENCE NOT NECESSARY
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Wednesday
September 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Farewell Telegram to Chairman
Ne Win

For your approval, there is attached a farewell telegram to Chairman Ne Win. It would be delivered to him upon his departure from Hawaii on September 18.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Note revisions _____

W. W. Rostow
4
using
2. Pres file

FAREWELL TELEGRAM

Dear General Ne Win and Madame Ne Win:

As you depart the United States you carry with you our personal regard and esteem as well as our sincere best wishes for Burma and the Burmese people. Your visit has reaffirmed and strengthened the bonds of friendship and cooperation between our two countries. Our discussions, I feel, brought about a deeper mutual understanding of the problems each of us faces in our search for the common goal of a peaceful and stable world and a richer and fuller life for peoples everywhere.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in bidding you and Madame Ne Win a very fond farewell both on our own behalf and that of all of the American people. It has been a privilege and a great pleasure to have you here, and we hope that you will return again soon.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Rostow
5

September 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Amendment of Great Lakes Fisheries Convention

At Tab A is a recommendation from Secretary Rusk that you ask Senate advice and consent to amend the 1954 US-Canadian Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries. The substance is minor and routine --to increase the number of commissioners on each side from three to four. The Canadians are ready to go ahead.

Fishing people on Lakes Erie and Ontario are pressing to have the Commission pay more attention to their area. They want to add a Commissioner from the Eastern Lakes. Presently, the two public members are from Michigan and Wisconsin.

MacArthur reports strong Congressional support and anticipates no opposition. The Commissioners are paid their expenses but no salary.

If you approve, we need your signature at the arrow on page 2, Tab B.

Francis M. Bator

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

6

Wednesday
September 14, 1966
5:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

You asked us to keep an eye out for items about North Viet Nam and mainland China. Here is a credible despatch from Hanoi from Agence France Presse which usually follows the French government line. In this case it did not, since the general French line is that our bombing in the north is not having any effect.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Report by Jean Raffaelli, Agence France Presse, from Hanoi, September 13, 1966

North Viet Nam is hungry. Over the past few weeks an acute food shortage hit the cities and, to a lesser extent, the countryside. Rice flavored with ersatz salt, a scrap or two of meat, a banana and some tea -- this, both afternoon and evening, day after day, is the diet of the citizens of Hanoi.

The food squeeze has been brought on by two related factors:

1. A sharp increase in the numbers of troops and antiaircraft units who have moved into the countryside, usually living off the land. This had reduced local consumption and also cut down shipments from the country to the cities.
2. U. S. air raids, which have disrupted road and rail transportation and destroyed much of the means of transport -- trucks, boats, and trains.

In Hanoi today there is practically no fish, no milk, and no flour. Fish from the numerous rivers and canals are eaten by the peasants and the soldiers. As for fish from the sea, even the inhabitants of the port city of Haiphong find it unobtainable. All catches are promptly shipped to the Haiphong fish conservation center for shipment to other Communist countries.

The monthly rice ration of just under 12.5 kilograms of rice per person is usually delivered on schedule -- students receive 15 kilograms, and soldiers receive 20 kilograms. The meat ration is theoretically 10 ounces of beef or pork per month, but often only half of this can be obtained. Vegetables are rare and though locally raised chickens, ducks, and eggs can be found, they are extremely expensive on the free market. Slightly over two pounds of chicken or 30 eggs, for example, cost 4 dong (about \$1.60 U. S.) -- in a country where the average monthly salary is 40 to 50 dongs (\$16.00 to \$20.00).

To meet these shortages most of the population of Hanoi and other urban centers now takes its meals in collectively operated canteens, where prices are reasonable and supplies are better. Ration cards of the members are turned over to the canteens. Meanwhile, practically all of the little soup kitchens and restaurants that once dotted these centers have now disappeared.

But hunger is not new to Viet Nam. Except for certain classes, in the past this country has always been hungry. In the north, particularly, there has been a chronic shortage of rice. Its rice-growing Red River Delta covers only one-tenth of the area of the country.

The food aid received from the Communist countries, particularly People's China, would, in fact, be sufficient to make up for the north's deficit were it not for two factors: (1) the need to supply a war-ready army; (2) the need to send rice supplies, in 12-pound containers carried on the shoulder, to Viet Cong troops fighting in South Viet Nam.

However, the fact that Hanoi is still shipping canned fish and duck to the Communist countries and Hong Kong indicates that hunger here, even if it becomes more acute, will not be considered a priority problem.

2 1 7
PERSONAL and ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, September 14, 1966 -4:05pm

Mr. President:

You asked me to get my brother's assessment on Oscar Cox. He says Oscar is a good man for whom he has a great deal of affection. Moreover, he is competent and imaginative. He is, however, a man for "small operations" rather than "big operations."

He hopes Oscar might have a chance to return to Government before his career is over (he is now 61), but Gene recommends a medium-size embassy rather than a position on the seventh floor.

W. W. Rostow

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING, CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY DCA ON 8-18-86

WWRostow:rlh

PERSONAL and ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday
September 14, 1966
12:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Lodge's evaluation of
the election -- much like ours, but
very interesting reading.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 5970 -- ~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Dust NARS, Date 8-18-86

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Wednesday, September 14, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 5970)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. Elections

Looking back at the election on last Sunday, the following can be said:

The Viet Cong went all out, both by violent deed and violent word.

By deed; There were 166 Viet Cong deeds -- acts of terrorism just before and including the election day. This was about nine times the level of activity four days before the election and fifteen times the level of activity on an average day in August. Government of Vietnam casualties from 6:00 p.m. September 10 to 6:00 p.m. September 11 are estimated at nineteen killed and one hundred twenty wounded. The Viet Cong casualties are estimated at eighteen killed, three wounded, and fifteen captured.

The Government losses were small considering the all-out campaign of the Viet Cong because the Government of Vietnam on its side went all-out, too. It was high tide both ways. The Ky Government once again showed its talent in using force and handling troops and police effectively.

By word: Then the Viet Cong by words made the issue, pumped it up, and unrestrainedly boasted about their certain success.

In quite a miraculous way, the Government of Vietnam suddenly seemed to grasp the technique of effective publicity. Certainly the posters, bill boards, radio, television, and dragon dances were skillfully designed to work up interest and to do so in an honest and attractive way.

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 88-152
By ig, NARA, Date 7-27-88

All of this was observed by more than five hundred journalists, diplomatic observers, and Japanese and Korean Parliamentary groups. In particular, the Vietnamese people were watching intently. The election was, therefore, as clean as such a thing can be.

Big political defeat: It, therefore, must be set down that, the vote on September 11 was an immense vote of "no confidence" in the Viet Cong. They asked for it, and they got it. It is very big -- on a par in importance with the departure of nearly 1,000,000 Vietnamese refugees from the North in 1954 rather than live under a Communist regime.

The vote also indicates that the Government is capable of influencing and providing security for more people than we had thought. We have consistently used the figure of 54 percent, which is up three percent from what it was a year ago, as indicating the percentage of people living under secure conditions -- with something over 20 percent under complete Viet Cong domination. Four-fifths of the 5,288,512 registered voters went to the polls on Sunday. The vote must reflect a base of at least ten million people if you add in the children and members of the population who didn't vote. This makes the number of people who were living under secure conditions on that day nearer 65 percent than 54 percent.

An interesting feature was the marked willingness of people to talk. Never in my service here have I had so many reports come to my desk describing Viet Cong intentions and plans as were told to our people throughout the country by Vietnamese.

I also believe that relatively stable prices helped the Government in its very successful efforts to arouse public interest in the elections.

U.S. troops acted as a shield and prevented large units of the Viet Cong and the Army of North Vietnam from interfering in the elections. Had we not been here, there could have been no elections. But, then, had we not come in when we did last year, there probably would be no Vietnam either.

For us on our side to destroy the redoubts, divide the main force units, and keep them off balance while the Vietnamese on their

side do the face to face, elbow to elbow, work of population security is the ideal division of labor. What we have so often talked about actually happened last Sunday -- and it worked.

In Saigon, there were no Americans on the streets, and the Vietnamese had their own city to themselves. This was good all around -- especially for us who thus could not be accused of interference in elections. We kept our hand from showing all over the country. My orders to keep it a Vietnamese show and keep away from overt support were followed with great efficiency by all elements of this Mission.

We have heard no evidence of fraud in any of the fifty-two election districts. Several candidates known to be favored by the local authorities were defeated. Only twenty military men were elected, a fact that has stopped the rumor that the Government planned to pack the Convention with military delegates.

The Vietnamese people showed amazing courage in the face of record-breaking attempts at terror. Embassy officers observed heavy voting at four Saigon polling stations which were grenaded on election eve. An eyewitness reported that in Tra Vinh the population trooped to the polls even while the area was under Viet Cong mortar fire. Only one polling area in the entire country suspended operations for security reasons.

The elections also showed the weakness of the militant Institute Buddhists, confirming a long-standing suspicion of mine and, I hope, destroying a myth which some journalists have promoted. In addition to the September 6 press conference which I reported last week, the Institute militants tried several times to launch anti-election demonstrations and strikes. There was no popular response, and the handful of monks involved were quickly dispersed in every case.

Catholic opposition did not materialize. Nothing was heard from Father Hoang Quynh's Front of All Religions for three weeks before the elections, the Catholic Citizens Bloc never made good on its threat to call for a boycott of the election. On the contrary, Catholic citizens and candidates were very active in the campaign. And thirty Catholic candidates were elected. (This compares with thirty-four candidates who are listed under the broad label of "Buddhists.")

Cynics claim that most people went to the polls simply to avoid future difficulties with the authorities and that the Vietnamese people fear they will be required to show cancelled voting cards whenever they come into contact with officialdom. No doubt this is part of the explanation. But if 80.8 percent of the registered voters went to the polls simply because the Government of Vietnam pushed them into it, it at least shows that the Government of Vietnam has some authority and standing with the great majority of the population. And adherence by the population to the Government is what this political-military war is about. I believe it is nearer the truth to say that the average Vietnamese voter realized that the election was a major contest between the Viet Cong and free Vietnamese. Both sides impressed this fact on him. He made his choice.

The Government of Vietnam not only conducted a most aggressive information campaign and handled military, police, and civil authorities to insure security with great skill; Ky showed political cleverness in his move to spike the Buddhist Institute's guns by sending them a conciliatory letter on election eve and encouraging the People's Army Council to try to mediate Institute-Government of Vietnam differences. He and other Government leaders made a series of well-timed statements and public appearances designed to arouse general enthusiasm for the elections. We, of course, had been quietly counseling these things on Ky and some of his principal advisors.

The Convention is truly representative. Regional differences are very important to the Vietnamese, and the Southerners often complain that they are not sufficiently represented in the Government. There are forty-four Southerners in the Convention. Twenty-seven successful candidates come from North Vietnam, five from North-Central Vietnam, and twenty-three from Central Vietnam. There are four ethnic Cambodian representatives, eight Montagnard tribesmen, and four Chinese. The Convention also includes all major Vietnamese religions. We know of thirty-four Buddhist, ten Hoa Hao, thirty Catholic, five Cao Dai, and seven Confucianists among the successful candidates. The others are not clearly identified by religion but probably include people who practice ancestor worship, or are nominal Buddhists or animists. The Convention will include twenty-three teachers, twenty-two businessmen, twenty military, eighteen civil servants, eight lawyers, five doctors, and seven farmers. Twenty-three members have had valuable experience in provincial or municipal councils. The Convention

will also benefit by the experience of such leading political figures as former Chief of State Phan Khac Suu, Saigon City Council President La Thanh Nghe, newspaper publisher Dr. Dang Van Sung, and prominent politician Dr. Phan Quang Dan.

The Vietnamese have taken the first step toward stable, democratic Government. They still have a long, long way to go. But what we saw on September 11 is reason for confidence.

B. Pacification

On September 20, elements of the U.S. 25th Division will start pacification of Long An province. This has been a long-standing dream of mine going back to 1963. At that time Long An was the only province in Vietnam which stretched from Cambodia across to the South China Sea. It has since been divided, but is still important. It is only eight miles south of the Saigon city limits and heavily populated. It will be the biggest test which U.S. troops will have had in fighting against guerrillas under urban conditions -- a different thing from the war of movement in the unpopulated, high plateau.

I have always suspected that the Viet Cong have some of their toughest and ablest officers in Long An because it is so close to Saigon and has always been such a depressing place for us and, I imagine, an inspiring place for them. In pacifying Long An, we will have to depend on very effective police-type measures, a precinct by precinct comb out, and, because it is so thickly settled, we will not be able to use our huge artillery capacity and our air power as we would normally do in open country. A long time ago, General Westmoreland and I agreed that this would be a great thing to do but we have never been strong enough to take it on. Now General Weyand has done so well in Hau Nghia to the west of Saigon that we are all encouraged that he can slip to the south of Saigon where the challenge is much greater. If he does, it should impress Ho Chi Minh. We are going to watch this operation very close to see what lessons we learn for further operations in heavily populated areas.

C. Economic

Prices edged up on imported items this week, but the Saigon Retail Index was down two percent over last week and six percent

over a month ago. The main reason for the decline in the Retail Index was an increase in rice and pork deliveries in Saigon. Dollars dropped very slightly, from 167 last week to 166 this week.

D. Military

Although they attempted to avoid contact with Allied forces and concentrated on terror and small unit actions against the elections, the Viet Cong lost over 1,000 killed in action during the reporting period. The 1,166 Viet Cong killed in action this week compares with 885 for last week. All other military indices were favorable.

E. Reaction to De Gaulle's Phnom Penh Speech

Prime Minister Ky publicly castigated De Gaulle, and the Vietnamese press generally attacked the French President for his September Phnom Penh remarks. The De Gaulle speech was widely interpreted as a cynical attempt to re-establish French influence in Asia at the expense of Vietnamese freedom.

On September 8 two prominent French businessmen in Saigon were arrested on charges of financially aiding organizations which were trying to sabotage the elections. Ky said publicly that the money involved amounted to 50 million piasters and that if investigation showed the two men to be guilty, they will be expelled and their businesses nationalized. Many in the French community regard the arrests as a response to the De Gaulle September 1 speech.

F. Americans and Vietnamese Killed

Final totals of Vietnamese civilians killed and wounded as a result of Viet Cong action during the period September 4 through 10 are not yet available. However, incomplete figures available to us now indicate that at least thirty-four civilians were killed and thirty-three wounded. If we add the 174 Vietnamese military killed during that period to the thirty-four Vietnamese civilians, the total Vietnamese killed by the Viet Cong is 208. This compares with the 50 Americans killed in the same period.

I have just obtained figures of Viet Cong killed in action and captured in the months February to August inclusive. During that

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

-7-

period the ARVN killed 17,692 Viet Cong, and the U.S. killed 15,187. The ARVN captured 2,399 Viet Cong, and the U.S. captured 1,521. Free world forces killed 2,135 and captured 236.

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Rostow

9

September 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: President Gursel's Death

Former Turkish President Gursel finally died last night after six months in a coma.

Since you paid your own personal respects at his departure aboard your plane in March, you might want to phone Ambassador Menemencioglu some time today to follow up by expressing your final condolences. (He will be at the Turkish Embassy most of the time between 11:30 a.m. and 5:45 p.m.)

We have sent the attached messages to President Sunay and ex-President Gursel's family which you approved last spring when he first became ill.

W. W. Rostow

9a

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION: Amembassy ANKARA

LIMDIS

Please deliver following message to President Sunay
from President Johnson:

QUOTE: Excellency:

I extend to you and to the government and people of Turkey my
condolences and those of my fellow Americans on the tragic passing
of President Gemal Gursel.

We had hoped that, when he came to us for medical attention, we
could look forward to his return to his country in restored vigor and
health. This fervent wish was not destined to be fulfilled but I want
to assure you ~~that~~ his passing was among sincere friends who had
long come to respect his ideals and accomplishments.

The close ties of friendship existing between our two countries
make us feel deeply Turkey's loss of a wise and valiant leader.

Our hearts are with you in your sorrow.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION: Amembassy ANKARA

LIMDIS

Please deliver following message from President Johnson to

Mrs. Gursel:

QUOTE: Dear Mrs. Gursel:

Mrs. Johnson and I extend our heartfelt sympathy on the passing of your distinguished husband. The memory of his lifetime as a soldier and statesman in the service of the highest ideals will be a legacy of inspiration to us all. We in America share your bereavement in the loss of this great and good man. You can be assured that our thoughts and prayers were always with him in his illness and that they are now with you in your grief.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

P 200W 10
September 14, 1986

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Additional Proposals for U.S. -Philippine Cooperation

The "new ideas" which you may want to raise with President Marcos are covered in the attachments to this memo.

They are:

1. Space Cooperation
2. , Typhoon Damage Control
3. Economic Development Planning
4. Center for Counter-Insurgency and Democratic Development

They have been approved by all departments concerned.

If you decide to raise any or all of these, appropriate language for inclusion in the Joint Communique is provided. We shall have to wait, of course, for the Philippine reaction.

W. W. Rostow

Atts.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-64
By inf NARA, Date 2-2-90

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Space Cooperation

Background:

NASA finds more disadvantages than advantages right now in suggesting Philippine participation in our astronaut program.

As an alternative, they propose increased participation in satellite, sounding rocket and ground-based research and application programs.

Jim Webb is out of town but his Associate Deputy Administrator, Willis Shapley, approves this proposal. So does State (Mr. Bundy).

Recommendation:

You could tell President Marcos of our desire to encourage Filipino participation in space-associated programs.

If Marcos shows interest, you could offer NASA cooperation in developing a program.

You could invite Marcos to send a team of Filipino scientists and engineers to come to the U. S. to visit space facilities. NASA would act as host and would help develop a program, including arrangements for training young scientists under NASA-sponsored fellowships.

NOTE: The Philippines are working on a ground monitoring station for weather satellites. You might encourage them to push this and ask Marcos if he needs additional technical assistance.

Proposed Paragraph for Communique:

The two Presidents discussed recent developments in space technology. President Marcos expressed his desire to encourage greater training of Philippine scientists and engineers in this field. President Johnson reaffirmed the desire of the United States to encourage other nations to participate in the peaceful exploration of space, and offered assistance to the Philippines in this field. It was agreed that a team of Filipino scientists would come to the United States at an early date to visit United States space installations and discuss with specialists of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) those areas in which the United States could be most helpful.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 89-64

By ijg NARA. Date 2-2-90

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Typhoon Damage Control

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-64
By mg NARA. Date 2-2-90

Background:

Typhoons cause \$500 million worth of damage annually in the Far East -- \$17 million in the Philippines. ECAFE and the World Meteorological Organization are developing a regional program. Anything done in the Philippines should fit into this regional approach.

It would be desirable to establish a joint U.S. -Philippine typhoon damage control center. (State (Mr. Bundy) and AID (Mr. Poats) agree.

Recommendation:

That you advise President Marcos of our interest in supporting ECAFE/WMO regional planning as well as a joint U.S. -Philippine typhoon damage control center program as part of that regional plan.

If he expresses interest, you might propose:

1. a meteorological training program in the U.S. for selected Filipinos;
2. formation of a joint U.S. -Philippine Commission to study specific projects for typhoon damage control in the Philippines;
3. a typhoon modification experiment in the Philippines area -- including qualified Philippine civilian and military technicians;
4. to send a U.S. meteorological team to Manila to complete recommendations for a joint program.

Proposed Paragraph for Communique:

The considerable economic losses suffered annually in the Far East from typhoons was discussed by the two Presidents, who agreed that the regional initiatives undertaken by ECAFE and WMO to improve technical capabilities for typhoon damage control deserved full support. President Johnson offered the services of a United States meteorological team to develop a joint program of typhoon damage control in the Philippine area in concert with regional planning, and President Marcos agreed to the desirability of such a program.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~SUBJECT: Economic Development Planning

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-64

By ij NARA. Date 2-2-90Background:

A critical need in the Philippines is for a rational approach to the country's development process. A national development institute, on the model of Thailand's National Institute of Development Administration, could be proposed.

There is an institute at the University of the Philippines, also the Graduate School of Public Administration. President Marcos has set up a small development group in his executive offices.

Recommendation:

You might express the conviction that development planning can succeed only if it is systematized. Noting the above, you might ask Marcos if he has considered combining the three or if a new institute would be useful.

If he expresses interest, you could offer our help in developing a systematic institutional approach.

You could offer to send a U.S. technical advisory team of governmental and private experts.

Proposed Paragraph for Communique:

The two Presidents recognized that orderly economic development required the full organization and utilization of available management talent. President Marcos described the measures he has taken to systematize economic development planning and indicated he would welcome additional United States technical assistance in this field. President Johnson agreed to make available a technical advisory team composed of both governmental and private experts for this purpose.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Center for Counter Insurgency and Democratic Development

Background:

Insurgency is not confined to Viet-Nam. The Philippines are beginning to have new troubles with the HUKs. Thailand, Malaysia and others have problems. There is need to establish a center -- perhaps something like Fort Bragg -- to conduct research and develop techniques for countering subversion and promoting democratic political and social development. A multi-national character would be desirable in the long run. A start could be made in the Philippines with our assistance. Our goal would be ^{to} stress Philippine and Asian leadership in the project, but start with the Filipinos. State (Mr. Bundy) and Defense (Sec. McNamara) concur.

Recommendation:

Citing the above, you could ask Marcos whether such a Center would not be useful.

If he is receptive, you could stress our interest in seeing such a center develop through Filipino leadership, with our support.

You might suggest setting up a joint group of military men and other qualified personnel to look into planning, staffing and other details.

Proposed Paragraph for Communique:

In further discussing the threat of Communist subversion and insurgency to free nations in Southeast Asia, the two Presidents recognized that it would be highly desirable to establish a focal point for the free nations of Southeast Asia to share and profit from their common experiences in countering insurgency and developing representative institutions. They saw the need for uniquely Asian concepts and methods to improve the ability of Asian nations to meet the continuing Communist threats to their security. President Marcos and President Johnson agreed to establish a joint team of specialists to consider the feasibility of establishing such a center in the Philippines, to be multi-national in scope and composition.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 88-157

By sig NARA. Date 2-12-90

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Wednesday, September 14, 1966 --10:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

The German Embassy called to say Erhard now wishes to arrive on Saturday, September 24, rather than Sunday, September 25, for two reasons: to give him a chance to rest and adjust to the time shift; and perhaps to do a little sightseeing with his wife and daughter.

The German Embassy is anxious that the presence in Washington on Sunday of the Chancellor not be an embarrassment to you whether you are in town or out of town on that day.

They suggested that if you thought it awkward, the Chancellor might stay at Williamsburg, rather than at Blair House, the extra day.

Neither John Leddy nor I believes there is any real problem in the Chancellor's having an extra quiet day here; but I welcome your guidance. The German Embassy would like our reaction by the end of the day.

W. W. Rostow

Let him come and stay at Blair House _____

Let him come but spend extra day at Williamsburg _____

Discourage early arrival _____

Keep open possibility of completely informal chat on Sunday
if I am in town _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rln

12

Wednesday,
September 14, 1966
11:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

This hard piece of intelligence
gives you the flavor of the struggle
now going on inside China.

W. W. Rostow

State Dept Intelligence Report of clash between Chicom Party
Committee and Red Guards at colleges.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.3
(b)(1)

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-132
By ind, NARA, Date 10-15-04

3.3(b)(1)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Wednesday, September 14, 1966

The following is a State Department Intelligence Report of a clash between Chicom Party Committee and Red Guards at colleges.

3.3
(b)(1)

[redacted] the students and staff members of various Communist Chinese institutes of higher education in Urumchi, Sinkiang, [redacted] reported the Sinkiang Party Committee's side of a clash which it had had with the recently formed juvenile gangs known as the Red Guards.

According to the account, a group of Red Guards, falsely claiming to speak for thirty-four academic institutions in China, attended a rally in Urumchi on September 2 to celebrate Mao Tse-tung's August 31 meeting with Red Guards and "revolutionary" teachers and students in Peking. After the rally some of the Red Guards went to a Party Committee office, and demanded a copy of the speech given at the rally by Committee First Secretary Wang En-mao. They attacked Wang as a "black gang element."

3.3
(b)(1)

Late on September 3 Red Guards broke into the Committee's building and demanded that Wang be turned over to them. When frustrated in this demand, they conducted a sit-down and fasting demonstration in front of the building. On September 4 more than twenty of the Guards broke into the building's living quarters and beat up thirteen Army officers and men who were there. [redacted] these Red Guard demonstrations aroused "violent opposition" on the part of the masses.

Note: This report is the most authoritative to date on clashes between the Red Guards and the party apparatus supported by elements of the general public. The regime has publicly condemned such resistance to the Red Guards while acknowledging their excesses. Wang En-mao is probably in trouble for resisting the Red Guards' attack, but the Red Guards might also be in for punishment if they in fact attacked the Army personnel as reported. The Army, in the person of Defense Minister Lin Piao who was recently elevated to the regime's number two position, appears to have enhanced its prestige and is not an appropriate object for Red Guard attacks.

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-132
By is, NARA, Date 10-15-04

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 13, 1966

~~1. copy~~
2. Pres file

13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Chairman Seaborg has requested your approval, pursuant to the White House directive of April 24, 1964, of his plans for travel to Europe and the Near East during the period September 15 to September 29. As you know, he is attending the IAEA meeting as head of our delegation and is also making the presentation of the 1966 Enrico Fermi Award to this year's recipients -- Professor Otto Hahn, Professor Lise Meitner, and Professor Fritz Strassman -- in Vienna while the Conference is in session.

Chairman Seaborg intends to visit several countries before and after the meeting. The list includes Greece, Israel, Finland, Sweden and Ireland.

Secretary Rusk has reviewed the Chairman's plans and offers no objection thereto, but the State Department has suggested that in view of Ambassador Bunker's imminent assignment as your representative to review the proposed Israeli Nuclear Desalting Program, Chairman Seaborg be advised that he should turn off discussion of this program with the Israelis in deference to Ambassador Bunker's responsibility.

If you approve these travel plans, I will sign the attached note to Chairman Seaborg and will advise him orally of the need for circumspection with respect to the Israeli program.

*not promote or say
anything inconsistent*

W. W. Rostow

Approved ✓

Disapproved

See me

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 88-156
By ij, NARA, Date 1-27-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN,
U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION**

The President has approved the travel plans you proposed in your September 1, 1966 letter.

W. W. Rostow

136

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

September 1, 1966

Dear Chuck:

I am enclosing a letter from Dr. Seaborg to the President outlining his and the Commissioners' travel plans for this fall. It is my understanding that these generally are handled through your office.

Cordially,



Arnold R. Fritsch
Special Assistant
to the Chairman

Mr. Charles Johnson
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Send George
checking state affairs.
9/6

13c

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C., 20545

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

September 1, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the White House memorandum of April 24, 1964, I am submitting for your approval my plans for travel to Europe and the Near East this fall. The period of travel involved would be from about September 15 to September 29.

The Tenth General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency is being held in Vienna, Austria, beginning September 21. Because it is the tenth anniversary meeting of the General Conference, special emphasis is being given to this year's meeting. This is particularly appropriate now because increasing attention is being given to the IAEA's growing and important role in the establishment of a safeguards and inspection system for the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

As in past years, I assume that I shall have the honor of serving as the U. S. Representative to the IAEA. In addition, the Atomic Energy Commission, with the concurrence of the Department of State, is making arrangements for the presentation of the 1966 Enrico Fermi Award to this year's recipients - Professor Otto Hahn, Professor Lise Meitner, and Professor Fritz Strassman - in Vienna during the Conference.


Prior to and after the meeting, it is my plan to visit several countries from which I have had long-standing invitations. It is my hope to visit and discuss the atomic energy programs in Greece,

Israel, Finland, and Sweden. I also plan to participate in the opening of the United States' Atoms-at-Work Exhibit in Dublin, Ireland, on September 28.

I believe it important that some of my fellow Commissioners also attend portions of the Tenth General Conference of the IAEA. In making our plans, we shall assure that a Commissioner and the General Manager or his deputy are in Washington throughout the period involved.

The approval of these proposed travel plans is respectfully requested. In accordance with your directive, I am also providing Secretary Rusk with a copy of this letter.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Glenn T. Seaborg", written in a cursive style.

Glenn T. Seaborg

The President
The White House

cc: Secretary Rusk

Tuesday, September 13, 1966 -- 12:30 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Philippine Requirement for Shippers' Export Declaration:
Raised by Secretary Connor

This matter is under discussion now between State Department and Commerce Department, on the one hand, and the Philippine Finance Ministry people, on the other.

We have explained that our regulations prohibit furnishing export declarations of this kind. We have agreed to supply them in isolated cases where the evidence that smuggling has occurred is convincing, but not on a blanket basis.

We have secured a one-month lifting of this requirement. We hope to negotiate it out.

State is doubtful that it will be raised at the Marcos level.

If it is, you may wish to note that our regulations make compliance impossible. But you will have State and Commerce look into the matter further.

W. W. Rostow

Walt Rostow

14a

K

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 8, 1966
4:30 p.m., Thursday

MR. PRESIDENT:

Secretary Connor's weekly report,
as marked re the Philippines. I
have given a copy to Walt Rostow.

K
Robert E. Kintner

Attachment



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230

September 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT: Weekly Briefing Report

BEGIN ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U. S. Exports to the Philippines Drastically Affected by New Regulations

The Philippine Government has just put into effect a new regulation which, if not rescinded, will drastically affect U. S. exports to the Philippines. Under the new regulation, Philippine Consulates all over the world will require, in addition to the other documentation previously specified, a certified shipper's export declaration before issuing consular invoices. Goods not covered by such an invoice presumably will be impounded by Philippine authorities when they arrive. Since it is contrary to U. S. regulations for American suppliers to furnish certified copies of their export declarations for this purpose, U. S. exporters are faced with a dilemma. A number of complaints have already been received from traders in U. S. cities where Philippine Consulates have put the new regulation into effect.

Last year, when the Philippine Government imposed a similar requirement, the United States pointed out that American suppliers could not comply, and the requirement was lifted. It is thus difficult to understand why the Philippine Government has again adopted this requirement, knowing that U. S. suppliers are still unable to comply. The timing seems particularly inopportune, coming as it does on the eve of the visit by President Marcos.

Our Ambassador has, on Washington's instruction, taken up this matter with Philippine Foreign Secretary Ramos. The latter recognized the problem and promised to investigate. Secretary Ramos gave no assurance, however, that the new requirement would be lifted. Further actions to emphasize to the Government of the Philippines the urgency which the U. S. Government attaches to a quick solution of this problem are now being considered by Commerce and State.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Commerce Guideline 3-21-76

By gn, NARA, Date 7-13-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

License Issued for Export of Cessna Aircraft to South Africa

~~The Department of Commerce on August 30 issued a validated export license to the Cessna Aircraft Company authorizing the export to South Africa of nine Cessna Model 441 aircraft with accessory equipment valued at \$1.6 million. This favorable action followed consultations with the Department of State, and was taken only after satisfactory assurances were received from Cessna that the conditions of sale would preclude military end use. The aircraft are to be purchased by Cessna's distributor in the Republic of South Africa and will be registered under normal civilian registry and flown by commercially licensed pilots.~~

The British and French were apprised of the U. S. intention to approve the export of the Cessna aircraft. Such advance notification was deemed advisable in the light of U. S. representations made to the U. K. regarding the proposed sale of the British Beagle aircraft to the South African Air Force. The proposed British action came in the wake of the denial by Commerce on March 3, 1966, of an export license to Cessna for the sale of eight aircraft to the Government of South Africa. The earlier Cessna application was denied because the aircraft were to be under South African Air Force pilots. It was determined that the export of the planes under such conditions would not be consistent with the U. S. embargo on arms and military equipment to South Africa and the United Nations Security Council resolutions on the export of arms to South Africa. In the case of France, the Department of Commerce, after consultation with the Department of State, has blocked the use of U. S. origin engines and parts in fan jet Falcon aircraft which were to be sold to the South African Air Force by the French firm, Avions Marcel Dassault.

Regarding the approval of Cessna's most recent export license application, the U. S. Embassy in South Africa reports that the conditions of sale and use may not be acceptable to the South African Government, in which case the sale would not materialize.

END CONFIDENTIAL
BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

Retail Sales

Advance data on retail sales for the first 27 days of August indicate a moderate gain of 1.2%. Over the year, retail sales surged upward in the first quarter, dipped significantly in April and May and then rebounded 4% in June. There was a 1% gain in July.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

The seasonally adjusted but incomplete data for August show that durable goods, bolstered by a gain of 2.3% in automobile sales, went up 1.8%; nondurables were up 0.9%.

Lumber sales advanced 2.8% but furniture sales declined slightly. On the nondurable side, clothing sales advanced 8%, general merchandise 0.5%, and gasoline 1.5%; spending in eating and drinking establishments registered a 2.7% increase but food sales were down by 0.5%.

Alan S. Boyd

Acting Secretary of Commerce

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 13, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting on the Marcos Visit

You are scheduled to meet at 1:00 p.m. today with Rusk, McNamara, Gaud and others on final plans for the Marcos visit.

The Agenda is attached.

In your opening remarks, you may wish to underline your deep interest in the Philippines, our special relationship, wartime association, and the importance you place on having good relations with a man like Marcos who is pro-American and among the most promising of young Asian leaders. Note that he has taken considerable political risk in backing us in Viet-Nam. He is one of the men who is going to set the tone in Asia in coming years and with whom it is important to have effective and close working relations.

You might then call on Secretary Rusk to give an outline of the visit -- our major objectives and Marcos' goals as we see them.

Then move on to the Main Problems:

(1) Military Assistance (especially Engineer Battalions)

Rusk and McNamara should be asked for their views.

Background: Marcos wants equipment for 10 engineer battalions for civic action purposes. We have agreed to equip 3. We are ready to equip 2 more. You have agreed to equip all 10 -- if Marcos pushes hard and makes this a major item of business. State backs supplying 10. Defense opposes more than 5. Main problem: if we go to 10, as you have indicated you would be willing to do, would the remaining 5 battalions be funded by Defense or by AID?

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

MAP has been running at about \$22 million a year. It is projected at that level for the next several years. Marcos is asking for an increase -- particularly for a "defense support" program of ports, roads and airports.

(2) Economic Assistance

Gaud can give a run-down on current developments and things we can discuss with Marcos.

Background: The Philippines' record is terrible. They have not used much aid offered in the past. They are weak on project development and planning. Taxes are not collected. Smuggling robs Treasury of more than \$100 million a year in revenue.

Marcos wants to do better, has moved on smuggling and tax collection. His advance Economic Team submitted a shopping list for his 4-year program (economic aid and defense support) with a price tag of about \$400 million.

We are trying to help, particularly on project preparation. We are pushing for formation of a Consultative Group under the World Bank and also pressing the Philippines for continuing internal reform.

We are prepared to negotiate out an aid package that could run to \$35.5 million (\$20 million in PL-480 sales under Title IV).

(3) Veterans Claims and Benefits

Rusk and McNamara might be asked for a status report.

Background: You are familiar with this one. The Joint Panel reported on benefits. Legislation has passed the House and is now in the Senate on two items (orphans and hospitals). Estimated cost is \$17 million the first year. Benefits will continue for 30-plus years (until last claimant dies) and total cost is estimated at about \$425 million.

On claims, we find two have an equitable base. We estimate cost at about \$42 million (unpaid pay and allowances for 100,000 guerrillas -- \$39 million; refund of erroneous deductions -- \$2.7 million). Defense has the money. No legislation required. We must ask Marcos to drop other claims. He will find this politically difficult.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

(4) Rusk-Ramos Agreement

Rusk can explain. McNamara may have comments.

Background: This will formalize the Bohlen-Serrano Understanding of 1959. We will reduce basetenure from 99 years to 25 years. We will consult with Filipinos on any non-SEATO or non-Mutual security use of Phil bases, including basing of missiles.

(5) Other bases problems

McNamara should be asked to discuss.

Background: You are familiar with the B-52 problem. Marcos will want any new bases we contemplate to be labelled "SEATO Bases."

(6) Trade and Investment

Rusk and Gaud can discuss.

Background: Retail Trade Nationalization is not being pushed now and American companies appear content to let this one rest in the courts as at present. Laurel-Langley expires in 1974. There is pressure in the Philippines for relaxation of the "parity clause" before then. We want to see no change until 1974. Marcos will want to begin preliminary talks on a new agreement. We can go along on an exploratory basis, with formal joint talks to follow, perhaps in a few years.

(7) Communique

Ask Rusk for the latest.

Background: We thought we were well ahead on this. The Philippines came up with a new version last night. It includes a number of blanks for the dollar amounts to be filled in! Question is where do we go from here.

Summing up - - I would ask Gaud, McNamara and Rusk for a run-down on things that must be decided or done before Marcos arrival.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

~~SECRET~~

150

~~SECRET~~

September 13, 1966


MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUSK
SECRETARY McNAMARA
DIRECTOR GAUD

SUBJECT: Meeting on the Marcos Visit

The President will chair a meeting at 1:00 p. m. today on planning for the visit of Philippine President Marcos.

The agenda, including items on which you may be asked to speak, follows:

1. Opening Remarks (the President)
2. Goals of the Visit (Sec. Rusk)
3. Main Problems
 - a. Military Assistance (especially Engineer Bns.) (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)
 - b. Economic assistance (Dir. Gaud)
 - c. Veterans Claims and Benefits (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)
 - d. Rusk-Ramos Agreement (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)
 - e. Bases Problem, including future uses (Sec. McNamara)
 - f. Trade and Investment Problems (Sec. Rusk and Mr. Gaud)
4. Actions needed before Marcos' arrival:
 - a. Economic (Mr. Gaud)
 - b. Military (Sec. McNamara)
 - c. Overall (Sec. Rusk)



W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Tues., Sept. 13, 1966
11:55 pm

16

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bill Jorden is pleased with Marcos' reaction to our compromise formula on the ten battalions.

The visit looks easier already.

W. W. Rostow

16a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMO FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject: Philippine Engineer Bns. and Claims

Marcos has bought our compromise on support for the Battalions!!

He is "extremely pleased" according to Blair.


As you know, our formula was five right now and readiness to consider five more next year. So our estimate was right—and State was wrong.

Blair also reports that Marcos is happy with our proposed language on Veterans benefits/ Marcos says he is "getting more than he hoped for."

So score two big points. for our side.

The President may want to know about the above before the 1 P.M. meeting.

Bill
WJJ



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

168

Roston

9-2

~~SECRET~~

Action

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Info

PP RUEHC

DE RUHLHQ 1354 2552211

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USIA FROM AMBASSADOR BLAIR

/NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

ICA

AID

RSR

1. I TOLD PRESIDENT MARCOS THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON IS PREPARED TO ANNOUNCE IN COMMUNIQUE THAT U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL SUPPORT FIVE ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS AND THAT FOR THE REMAINING FIVE BATTALIONS WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER FUNDING EQUIPMENT IN FY 68 AND THAT WE WOULD EXPRESS GENERAL UNDERTAKING OF FUTURE SUPPORT IN THE COMMUNIQUE.

2. MARCOS WAS EXTREMELY PLEASED. HE SAID HE WAS VERY HAPPY TO HEAR THIS AND THAT OF COURSE HE UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEM WITH RNRNC TO OUR REQUIREMENTS IN VIETNAM.

GP-3.

BLAIR

BT

010290

1966 SEP 13 AM 12 55

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 88-153

By ag, NARA, Date 8-25-88

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

16c

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Action

~~SECRET~~

FE-6

Info

SS-15 NNNNVV EUA486DAG141

G-2 PP RUEHC

DE RUHLHQ 1357 2552211

L-3 ZNY SSSSS

H-2 P 122220Z SEP 68

FM CINCPAC

NSC-10 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

SCA-2 INFO RUMJMA/AMEMB MANILA

SCS-2 BT

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~~SECRET~~
FROM AMBASSADOR BLAIR

VA-1

INR-5


RSR-1

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010240

1966 SEP 12 PM 10 30

IGAVE PRESIDENT MARCOS THE LATEST COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ON VETERANS WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN GIVEN TO FOREIGN SECRETARY RAMOS. MARCOS SAID HE HAD RECEIVED THE LANGUAGE WHICH MADE HIM HAPPY AND ADDED THAT HE WAS GETTING MORE THAN HE HAD HOPED FOR. GP-4.
BT



~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, September 13, 1966 -- 8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

I spent three hours last evening at dinner with Jim Perkins' Foreign Aid Committee.

Gene Black asked me to drive home with him so he could give me his views on the Committee's future.

I conclude as follows:

The best way to run the meeting today at 12:00 noon would be with a very simple agenda as follows:

1. Let Jim Perkins report for the Committee on its 15 months of work.
2. Let Perkins and other members of the Committee make any recommendations they may have about aid policy.
3. Inform them of your own feelings and problems concerning the future of foreign aid.
4. Ask them if they would be willing to make a report to you in two months on how best to proceed to fulfill your objectives in the face of the evident limitations on foreign aid imposed by Congressional and public attitudes; balance of payments; Viet Nam; etc.

* * *

Gene Black emphasized strongly to me, on the way home, points I could also perceive myself:

- You now have about as good an Advisory Committee as can be rounded up.
- It has educated itself most seriously with a lot of briefing and study in the field.
- It is strongly motivated to help you (with ideas and public support) get enlarged resources to back your play on the Summit conference in Latin America; Asian development; African development; and in India-Pakistan.
- They are now at a stage when they want to be used hard or disbanded.

My vote (and Gene Black's) is that they be used; but the point of the meeting is for you to listen to them; assess them; and decide whether you want them to do a job or not. There would be no hard feelings if you wished to thank and dismiss them.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Tuesday
September 13, 1966
6:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to see this
message from General Thieu.

W. W. Rostow

Sept. 13, 1966

Copy of telegram

From: Republic of Vietnam, Saigon

To: His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America
Washington, D. C.

I was deeply moved by the warm message you sent me through Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. The people of Vietnam have indicated their admirable courage by turning out massively to vote to elect a constituent assembly, thus challenging openly the Viet Cong's threats. The high number of voters has also demonstrated to the world opinion that the Communists have never controlled a large part of the population of Vietnam, much less its hearts and its minds. The Government of Vietnam is pleased and greatly encouraged by this show of confidence from the Vietnamese people. It is determined now more than ever to carry on the task it has repeatedly emphasized upon, of achieving a truly representative government dedicated to the democratic way of life and genuinely responsive to the needs of the common man. Because the Government of the United States of America has constantly, effectively and selflessly assisted the Republic of Vietnam in its struggle to preserve its independence, I have a great pleasure to take this opportunity to renew to the American people and to the American Government my deepest appreciation.

General Nguyen Van Thieu
Chairman, National Leadership Committee
Republic of Vietnam, Saigon

Tuesday, September 13, 1966 -- 6:20 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

I talked by telephone today with Marquis Childs, Carl Rowan,
Roscoe Drummond and ~~William S. White~~ about the Viet Nam election.

↗
erov - did not talk with white

W. W. Rostow

rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday-September 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with Dr. Lleras

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-156

By ijg, NARA, Date 1-27-92

Purpose of Visit

Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo has informed us that the purpose of his visit is to explain the Choco Valley Development Project on behalf of President Lleras.

He will be accompanied, in Linc Gordon's absence, by Bob Sayre and Ambassador-designate Carlson.

Description of Project

The Hudson Institute of New York has done a preliminary feasibility study which will serve as the basis for Dr. Lleras' presentation.

The principal elements of the project are: (see maps at Tab A)

1. Dam up the Atrato and San Juan rivers to create two large inland lakes, the waters of which would be used to generate some 3.3 million kilowatts for use in Colombia and Panama. The Pan American Highway, closing the Darien Gap, would presumably pass over the northern dam.
2. Join the two lakes with the Atlantic and Pacific by canals which will enable ocean-going vessels to move close to the Colombian industrial complex in the adjoining Cauca Valley and provide an alternate inter-oceanic route for vessels up to 20,000 tons.
3. Open up this inner frontier of Colombia for exploitation of mineral, petroleum and forest resources.

Financial Considerations

The Hudson Institute cost estimates for all elements of the project run around \$700 million. It can, however, be done in segments, with the cost-benefit ratio for each segment being favorable, according to Hudson. The cost estimates at this stage are oversimplified and need further refinement.

Dr. Lleras will presumably indicate what priority the Colombian Government assigns the project. President Lleras is understood to have prepared a total investment budget of approximately only \$100 million for all development projects next year. We have no indications how the Choco project stands in relation to other priorities in Colombia's economic development plans and domestic and foreign exchange requirements.

A briefing paper prepared by State giving more details is at Tab B.

Recommended Position

The project is promising. It appears technically feasible and parts, if not all, of it economically justifiable. But more work needs to go into feasibility studies before we have a clear picture of the project's implications.

I understand that Dr. Lleras does not expect a specific response from you regarding the proposal.

I recommend that you take this line:

1. You are deeply interested in efforts to develop the inner frontiers of South America since hemispheric development over the next 2-3 decades lies in this direction.
2. You referred to this new focus in your August 17 Alliance speech and are pleased that President Lleras is also taking this long range look.
3. Given the preliminary nature of the study of the project, what is needed is further analysis of technical and economic aspects and an indication of how the project relates to other Colombian development priorities.
4. You are interested in knowing whether President Lleras intends to consult the World Bank, given the Bank's role in electric power development and as the leader of the Consultative Group (of international lending agencies -- Bank, IMF, AID) for Colombia.

Attachment - Tab A, maps.
Tab B, State briefing paper.
cc - Bill Moyers

W. W. Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WASHINGTON

Tuesday-September 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with Dr. Lleras

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-156

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Dr. Lleras will presumably indicate what priority the Colombian Government assigns the project. President Lleras is understood to have prepared a total investment budget of approximately only \$100 million for all development projects next year. We have no indications how the Choco project stands in relation to other priorities in Colombia's economic development plans and domestic and foreign exchange requirements.

A briefing paper prepared by State giving more details is at Tab B.

Recommended Position

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3. Given the preliminary nature of the study of the project, what is needed is further analysis of technical and economic aspects and an indication of how the project relates to other Colombian development priorities.
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W. W. Rostow

Attachment - Tab A, maps.

Tab B, State briefing paper.





FIGURE 2

COLOMBIA

HI-735-RR MC



OCEANO PACIFICO

SCALE (Km)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19-d

MEMORANDUM

Proposed San Juan-Atrato Waterway

President Carlos Lleras Restrepo has asked former President Alberto Lleras Camargo to see President Johnson on a matter of "transcendental continental importance." The Colombian Embassy here and our Embassy in Bogota have reported that the purpose of Alberto Lleras' call is to inform President Johnson of the proposed San Juan-Atrato Waterway project.

1. The Proposal - A preliminary feasibility study, prepared by the Hudson Institute of New York for the Government of Colombia, calls for an interoceanic waterway 252 miles long connecting the Atlantic and the Pacific by means of lakes formed by damming the Atrato and San Juan Rivers, connecting canals, and locks. (See Attachment A for maps.) The key element in the proposal is the production of hydroelectric power, which the preliminary study indicates would be sufficiently profitable to finance the rest of the plan over a 20-year period, even if outside financing is unavailable. The Hudson Institute reports that the plan is susceptible to easy, economically self-sufficient stages, and, that in any event, the government plans to proceed with a hydroelectric project on the southern end of the San Juan River. According to Hudson's representative, studies for the San Juan project reportedly showed it to be considerably more economical than earlier plans for an IBRD-financed plant nearby (\$150 vs \$250 per KW); and therefore the Government of Colombia plans to cancel the latter. Hudson's cost estimate of between \$500 and \$700 million for the total project includes canal locks smaller than those of the Panama Canal or up to 20,000 metric tons, the size of Colombia's largest merchant ships.

Other projects mentioned by Hudson as growing out of the waterway plan include development of government-owned land and mineral deposits in the Choco, petroleum exploration and development prior to the dredging process, stimulation of export industry development for the inland cities of Medellin and Manizales, an industrialized fishing program, an industri-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
declassified after 12 years

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-153

By ing, NARA, Date 8-25-88

alized timber and pulp program, tourism, and attracting population away from the presently-overcrowded urban centers. (See Attachment B for Hudson's description of subsidiary projects.)

The report states that the proposed waterway is not intended to substitute for a proposed new sea-level canal and that it would not interfere with either the possible Atrato-Truando route or the proposed Pan American Highway route.

2. Department of State Comments - Judgments of the project as against other priorities in Colombia's economic development or its domestic and foreign exchange financing requirements have not yet been developed. It should also be noted that President Lleras has submitted an investment budget of approximately only \$100 million for all development projects next year. The impact of such large-scale local currency expenditure on the economy, in addition to other development projects, should, in particular, be evaluated.

Hudson's cost estimates are oversimplified and omit specific reference to such normal costs as contingencies and cost of interest and insurance during the construction period. It may well be that the total project of hydro-electric power and navigation is feasible, but will require cost calculations refining the rule of thumb estimates employed in the present report. (See Attachment C for comments on the cost estimates.)

Former President Alberto Lleras Camargo reportedly does not expect a specific response regarding the proposal. Alberto Lleras, who is a public member of the Board of Directors of Hudson Institute, is a strong supporter of the proposal. However, we do not know the extent to which the new President, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, or his leading ministers, would regard this proposal as of highest Colombian priority.

We have previously looked to the World Bank for the development of major electric power projects in Colombia. To the best of our knowledge, the San Juan-Atrato Waterway proposal has not yet been discussed with the World Bank.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3.

3. Recommendations - The Department of State recommends that:

President Johnson sympathetically receive former President Lleras, but in view of the preliminary status of the project, not indicate his approval or disapproval. President Johnson may wish to indicate to former President Lleras the need for further analysis, particularly with respect to priority and financing.


It may also be useful to ask former President Lleras if preliminary consultation with the World Bank would be appropriate, given the role of the Bank in electric power and as leader of the Consultative Group for Colombia.

Attachments

- A. Maps of Colombia and Choco Lake Region.
- B. The Hudson Institute's Description of Ten Elements of the Choco Project.
- C. Economic Aspects of Choco Projects in Colombia.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COLOMBIA






FIGURE 2

HI-735-RR

1

I - THE CHOCO CONCEPT

The concept of the Chocó Development Project* proposed by the Hudson Institute to the Republic of Colombia is that of a single, comprehensive program stimulating the economy of the nation as a whole and including the following ten basic project elements:

1. Construction of an interoceanic passage through the central valley of the Chocó by damming the Atrato and San Juan Rivers to an elevation 30 meters above sea level, interconnection of the two large lakes thus formed by a navigation canal in the area of the Isthmus of San Pablo and the addition of locks and approach canals to provide access to the lakes from the Atlantic and Pacific (as outlined on Figure 1). Such a passage would serve 20,000-ton ocean-going vessels similar or equal to the largest vessels of the Flota Mercante Gran Colombiana.
2. Development of hydroelectric resources consisting of two major power plants located on the San Juan and Atrato Rivers at the dam sites converting the large rainfall of the Chocó into electrical energy. The initial electricity installed would be 2,000,000 kilowatts with provisions for expansion to 3,300,000 kilowatts, and would be connected to the planned Bogotá-Medellín-Cali central system.

*This concept resulted from a series of exploratory trips to the Chocó sponsored by Hudson Institute in June and July 1965. The idea was conceived and developed by Messrs. Marcello de Leva and Robert B. Panero of the Institute. The initial evaluation of the project resulted in a contract with the Ministry of Public Works of Colombia for coordination of long-range planning studies of which this report is the first.

3. The stimulation of export industry development by the construction of a seaport on the interoceanic passage for Medellín and Manizales about two hours from those cities, and the construction of a high-speed highway connecting the Cauca Valley at a point midway between Medellín and Manizales to the seaport.
4. Development of land in the Chocó to appreciate the new lake coast formed by the Atrato and San Juan lakes. This coast will be well drained, readily accessible foothill land, 30 meters above sea level with navigation rights to the Atlantic, the Pacific and to the central seaport connecting to the Cauca Valley. Appreciation of this land would benefit Colombia directly as the area is currently National Reserve and, thus, not subject to real estate speculation.
5. Development of Chocó mineral deposits consisting of general exploration and exploitation of existing commercial minerals such as copper, lead, zinc, gold, platinum and bauxite as a function of the accessibility provided by the interoceanic passage and the connecting highway to the Cauca for transport of heavy equipment to the Chocó and egress to interior and foreign markets for all production.
6. Petroleum exploration and development based on the statistical probability of finding petroleum products in faulted sedimentary basins such as the Chocó and the increased ease

and reduced costs of exploration and exploitation resulting from the construction of the interoceanic passage.

7. An industrialized timber and pulp program to clear, process and market timber products initially removed from the area to be flooded by the lakes and, secondly, from other areas rendered accessible by the formation of the lakes.
8. An industrialized fishing program to develop the lakes formed by the Atrato and San Juan dams as large-scale fresh water breeding grounds for commercially marketable fish products such as food, cattle feed and fertilizer for internal consumption and export.
9. A tourist development program along the currently deserted Chocó Pacific coast whose beautiful beaches and superior climate should attract tourists who would be initially interested in developments in the Chocó.* Simplified access to the Chocó Pacific coast results from construction of the interoceanic passage.
10. A program to maximize the utility of the Chocó Development Project to Colombia and enhance national prestige through international advertising and publicity to attract desired immigration from overcrowded areas of Colombia and from selected foreign countries. This should also permit the project to attract and develop a cadre of trained, enthusiastic, driving "development administrators" who will assure the

*Similar to tourist increases during construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway.

permanent success of the Chocó project and who will be able to carry out other "duplicates"* in the future based on their Chocó experience.

Each of the above ten elements has been evaluated by Hudson Institute in preliminary fashion and results seem to indicate general technical feasibility, over-all economic viability and possibilities of general stimulation and transformation of the Colombian economy. In addition, it would appear that this program can be financed, executed at high speed over a ten-year period,** and repaid by the electrical benefits of the project alone.

The following text discusses the project in summary form. What will become clear are some of the interrelationships of the elements listed above and some other implications of the project. As will be noted, the project is seemingly advantageous enough to warrant full consideration of the alternatives available and thorough appraisal of the variety of opportunities offered.

*Similar possibilities exist in the Caquetá, Vichada, Orinoco and Guajira areas.

**Construction speed is a function of the number of dredges used on the project to a much larger degree than is usual. The project can, of course, be carried out over a twenty-year period and can probably not be done faster than eight years.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attachment C

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF CHOCO PROJECTS IN COLOMBIA

The preliminary Hudson Institute report of August 1966 concerning the proposed Choco projects does not furnish a basis from which an unqualified determination of economic feasibility may be made. The project costs are not fully stated, and the economic benefits are inferred by general rules of thumb which may not be relevant in this case.

1. Revised Construction Costs

The report does not state whether the project cost figures, as given, include the normal additive cost items. These items include: a contingency allowance; allowance for cost of interest during construction (a period taken to be about eight years); and cost of insurance during construction. Since the costs of engineering and supervision have been presented as an additive item, it is reasonable to infer that the other factor costs (those to be calculated from the construction cost subtotal) have not been included.

Considering only the costs of providing hydroelectric equipment, dams, and transmission lines, and allowing for contingencies at 10%, and cost of interest at 6% averaged over an 8 year construction period, the nominal construction costs for the two alternative projects are estimated as follows based upon the information in the preliminary report:

2 million KW capacity	-	total cost, \$478 million
3.3 million KW capacity	-	total cost, \$698 million

Using the approach of the report's text, the cost of the hydroelectric power would be \$292 per installed KW, in the first phase of construction, and \$212 per KW for the expanded system (at a capacity of 3.3 million KW).

2. Technical Aspects of the Economic Analysis

For meaningful analysis of alternative projects in developing countries, the opportunity cost of capital should be employed. (The opportunity cost refers to the potential return on capital, if it were invested in alternative projects.) The opportunity cost of capital in Colombia is probably of the order of nine or ten percent. However, the Hudson Institute report appears to use a rule-of-thumb benefit figure derived from U.S. experience of four to five percent of cost of capital which would not be applicable to Colombia.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 4

Downgraded at 3-year intervals.
Declassified 12 years after date of origin.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 88-153
By ig, NARA, Date 8-25-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2.

As stated by the report's author, the Choco Lakes scheme is basically a "real estate project." That is, with some investment in dam and channel facilities to flood about 8,000 square kilometers of land, it creates higher land values on the adjacent unflooded lands. It would be relevant to know what the potential loss would be, in terms of the unrealized agricultural potential, of the lands proposed to be flooded.

The report states that there are other benefits, such as access to mining areas, which could lead to removal of 50,000 ounces of gold and 25,000 ounces of platinum per year. The source and meaning of such estimates of the placer mining potential is not known.

The possible incremental benefits from navigation are indeterminate because of: 1) the potential construction of a second Isthmian Canal and 2) the questionable assumption in the report that half of the present traffic using the Panama Canal would shift to the Choco route.

3. Summary

The analysis of the project's cost factors and potential capitalized value per installed KW is incomplete.

Assuming that the project is technically feasible, although this has not been fully explored in the Hudson Institute report of August 1966 or elsewhere, it is not yet possible to make a judgment as to its economic desirability. Moreover, the project has not been discussed within the framework of Colombia's priority needs and its limited resources.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday
September 12, 1966
2:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Senator Kuchel's remarks may
interest you.

His "political Dien Bien Phu"
phrase is pretty good!

W. W. Rostow

FROM THE OFFICE OF
U.S. SENATOR THOMAS H. KUCHEL
315 SENATE OFFICE BUILDING

204
RELEASE
(FOR INTENDED DELIVERY
SEPTEMBER 12, 1966)

The following remarks are by U. S. Senator Thomas H. Kuchel of California regarding the election in Viet Nam:

VIET NAM'S WAGER ON DEMOCRACY

MR. KUCHEL: Mr. President, there has been a great deal said in this chamber about American actions in Southeast Asia. There has been too little said about the brave people of South Viet Nam.

On Sunday the citizens of that country went to the polls to elect a constituent assembly which would decide how their republic is to be governed. To prevent them from conducting this basic sacrament of democracy, the Communist Viet Cong intensified their campaign of terror, striking at villages, at military outposts, and deep into the capital of Saigon. They sought to frighten the innocent Vietnamese into staying away from the polls. To date this savagery has left 19 dead and 120 wounded. In the Mekong delta alone, 52 incidents of terror were reported on election day. Over 140 were counted throughout the country.

Despite this brutal campaign of intimidation, over 4 million people went to the polls -- a turnout of better than 75% of the registered voters, and a rate of ballot participation far higher than anyone had dared to hope. This is an extraordinary demonstration by a poor and humble people of their courageous devotion to the cause of self-government.

The world does not yet know what decision the voters will produce. But it does know that the people of Viet Nam

have given the lie to the Communist argument that the Viet Cong and their terror represent the wave of the future. They have also shown that there are weapons more potent than raw force.

In Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, we have recently witnessed the triumph of the democratic system of elections over Communist violence and terror. The instruments of democracy are the strongest weapons available to man. They are a match for subversion, conspiracy, tyranny and terror. We sometimes fail to appreciate the true measure of their power.

The Viet Cong may well have suffered their Dien Bien Phu -- at the polls!

At every reasonable opportunity, the instrument of suffrage, and of public debate and public expression, should all be used as this experiment in democracy gains strength.

If man is to achieve his dream of Peace on Earth, his words and his will must overcome the fist and the dagger. Albert Camus wrote that "henceforth the sole honor will be to hold obstinately to the tremendous wager which will finally decide if words are stronger than bullets."

Yesterday's action by the Vietnamese people strengthens our faith that the wager is being won.

-----X-----

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 12, 1966 -- 5:25 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for your farewell meeting with G. Ahmed, retiring Pakistan Ambassador, at 5:30 p.m. Tuesday, September 13

He is leaving after three years here. His successor, Agha Hilaly, High Commissioner in London, is expected about October 1.

You will want to give him a friendly send-off, ask him to carry your best personal greetings to President Ayub. You may also want to use the occasion to summarize your view of the main points in our relationship with Pakistan. These could be put as follows:

A. Where we are with Pakistan:

1. We are pleased that relations are improving, confidence is returning;
2. we believe Gene Locke's warm reception reflects Ayub's desire to improve relations, as it strengthens our intention to do what we can;
3. we are asking less of each other for the future, but perhaps can respect each other all the more for that;
4. we continue to admire Pakistan's development effort (which owes a debt to G. Ahmed's earlier efforts in the Economic Ministry).

B. Where do we go from here?

Much will depend on developments in two different but related aspects of the subcontinent:

1. Pakistan's relations with China -- We continue to be concerned over the present and future extent of this relationship. China poses a substantial long-run problem to us and other Asian countries; it aims its most direct attacks against us; it eggs on North Vietnam with encouragement and supplies.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By JD, NARA, Date 7-13-98

We know President Ayub is aware of our continuing concern.

2. Indo-Pakistan relations:

(a) We are pleased that military talks will start soon, and we hope they make progress. Until these talks were agreed to, we were pessimistic, since so little progress was being made ^{by} either side in seeking to promote mutual confidence.

(b) We hope both will find ways to adjust differences on all outstanding issues, including Kashmir. No progress is possible without compromise on both sides.

(c) We can't force a settlement on either, but ask a continuing commitment to peace by both.

(d) We ask nothing of either country we do not expect of the other.

(e) We understand Pakistan's security problems, but what we can do to help depends heavily on Pakistan's own efforts to lower tension and demonstrate by tangible measures its intentions on arms limitation and resolution of Indo-Pak differences.

(f) Regarding the sale of spares, our policy continues under review. Any decision will have to be taken within the context of improving Indo-Pakistan relations and sustaining the security of both India and Pakistan.

C. On Vietnam:

1. Election demonstrates falsity of Viet Cong's claim to represent the people.

2. We hope Ayub will continue to understand complexities and our search for an honorable settlement to protect the interest of the people of South Vietnam. — *and, indeed, the interest of all Free Asians.*

W. W. R.

Monday - September 12, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for ex-Ambassador Covey T. Oliver

When Ambassador Covey Oliver was in Washington last June, you were unable to receive him. You wrote him -- copy of the letter is attached -- expressing regret and saying that you looked forward to seeing him in September when he returned to the United States.

He is now back and requests an appointment. The purpose is to report to you personally on his two years of stewardship in Colombia.

If you will authorize the appointment, I will work out a suitable time with Marvin Watson.

W. W. Rostow

Approve appointment ✓.

Prefer no appointment .

Speak to me .

Attachment

cc - Jim Jones

200

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


July 12, 1966

Dear Covey:

I am sorry that my schedule did not permit me to see you when you were here at the end of June. I look forward to your visit in September.

We are working on the delegation to the Lleras inaugural. I regret that I will not be able to accept the Colombian Government's kind invitation. But you may be sure that a strong delegation will be going.

Sincerely,



The Honorable
Covey T. Oliver
American Ambassador
United States Embassy
Bogota, Colombia

Monday,
September 12, 1966
5:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

This further report from
Rangoon on the Ne Win visit may
interest you.

W. W. Rostow

Rangoon 386

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Gatekeeper, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCB NARS, Date 8-18-86

CONFIDENTIAL

WWRostow:rlh

Copy of RANGOON 386, Sept. 12, 1966

1. One of the most frequent themes touched on in press reporting here of the Ne Win visit has been the President's personalized and warm attention to Ne Win. This has come through time and again (White House greeting ceremony, White House stroll, President's two long private discussions with Ne Win, Blair House reception) but most of all by the "intimate family style dinner" given by the President.

2. Considering that Ne Win's prime objective was to meet the President and have an opportunity to talk personally with him, it is apparent that White House attention has paid off handsomely with Ne Win and the Burmese press. This has also been quickly noted by the Foreign Office which has expressed its pleasure with the way trip was handled, and particularly our sensitive reaction to Ne Win personality.

3. This aspect similarly has caught the eye of the foreign diplomatic corps in Rangoon, leading Free World members of which have been congratulating us, particularly on our response to Burmese and Ne Win's sensibilities. An unexpected and unusual tribute came last night from the French Ambassador here. After commending the trip in warm terms, he told me he thought the impact and White House handling of the visit coming after de Gaulle's statements, would go a long way towards offsetting criticism of U. S. attitude toward neutrals. He went on to congratulate Ambassador Byroade's patient and low key diplomacy resulting in a successful visit.

4. The reaction of Communist bloc representatives here was less spontaneous, other than the Polish Ambassador and Yugoslav Charge, both of whom have acknowledged the visit as ably staged. We assume the Russians and Chinese are left suspicious as to what the President and Ne Win talked about in two unusually long meetings, and what McNamara found important enough "to take some notes" at the Blair House reception. Burmese correspondent Fbgiep told me that he had indications from the Chinese that that family-style dinner at the White House, plus other opportunities for the two leaders to be together, has caught them here off guard and left them unhappy. We believe this to be true, and expect that following his return, Ne Win may have to make appropriate gestures to China as part of his careful balancing act. Although this could happen, it does not diminish the impact of this trip.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By JP, NARA, Date 7-13-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Copy of RANGOON 386, Sept. 12, 1966

5. The Rostow briefing for the press on the communique has also come through effectively. Summing up of visit in terms of two leaders getting to know each other through "unusually candid, friendly discussions" on give-and-take basis has put a nice final touch on a successful trip, which we all realize only too well could have gone otherwise.

RANARD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 12, 1966 -- 6:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Pursuant to your instructions of this morning, and after talking with Bill Moyers, I decided the best way to do my informal briefing was by telephone. It turned out that a good many journalists were out of town or inaccessible; i. e., Reston, Rowan, Childs, White.

I did, however, talk at some length with Tom Lambert, John Steele, Peter Lisagor, Joe Kraft, and Stewart Alsop. It turned out to be quite important in the case of Steele, since TIME is doing a major story this week on the elections; and in the case of Lisagor who will be doing a broadcast for the BBC.

Despite some questions about government pressure to vote, I found them honestly impressed with the election results. Kraft said he was "astonished."

I spoke to Bill Bundy who dispatched a circular cable to Asian capitals suggesting comments. The attached from Seoul indicates the Koreans at least took off on their own.

As the ticker indicates, Saigon has been active, including the statements of Thieu and Ky.

I talked at length with Leonard Marks and took other steps to make sure that VOA broadcasts were on the right beam. A report of today's USIA activity on this issue is attached.

At 11:00 a. m. the Vietnamese Ambassador in Washington had a good on-the-record press conference.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 88-157
By WJR NARA, Date 2-12-90

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INR VIETNAMESE ELECTIONS

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1. ROKG ON OWN INITIATIVE ISSUED STATEMENT ON ELECTION RESULTS WHICH CARRIED IN SEVERAL AFTERNOON SEOUL PAPERS SEPT 12. UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION PRESS STORY FOLLOWS.

2. QUOTE. MPI HONG CHONG-CHOL, ROKG SPOKESMAN, REFERRING TO HIGH VOTING RATE IN VN ELECTIONS DESPITE PERSISTENT VC OBSTRUCTION TACTICS, EMPHASIZED INNER QUOTE ~~THIS IS EVIDENCE THAT FREE VN IS GRADUALLY RESTORING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL STABILITY, AND THAT DEMOCRATIC CONSCIOUSNESS OF~~

PAGE 2 RUALOS 075E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~VN PEOPLE HAS RISEN. END~~ INNER QUOTE. UNQUOTE.

3. ROKG-CONTROLLED SEOUL SINMUN ADDED FOLLOWING PARA. QUOTE. HONG ALSO SAID INNER QUOTE ~~THIS IS VICTORY FOR FREE WILL OF VN PEOPLE WHO LOVE FREEDOM AND PEACE RATHER THAN TERROR AND DESTRUCTION, AND WHO ACCEPT CONSTITUTIONAL, CIVIL GOVT. IT IS VERY ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT WHICH WILL LEAD TO EARLY VICTORY IN VN WAR~~ END INNER QUOTE. UNQUOTE.

4. GP-3. NEWMAN

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 88-152

By ig, NARA, Date 7-27-88

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ITGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION: CIRCULAR TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS PLUS
USUN, CINCPAC FOR POLAD, HONG KONG

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STATE 44822

SEP 11 10 03 AM '66

REF: State 43566

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 88-152
By ing, NARA, Date 7-27-88

Subject: Vietnamese Elections

1. Although forecasting is difficult, particularly on percentage of electorate who will vote, present indications are that South Vietnamese elections September 11 will show satisfactory level of participation despite all-out Viet Cong effort to sabotage. In any event, elections will constitute important step in process of establishing more permanent and broadly based governmental institutions.
2. We believe elections will provide good opportunity for discreetly stimulating governmental and/or other leaders in various countries to comment publicly on this encouraging development. We recognize that some who otherwise would be favorably inclined may feel that any comment on elections would constitute "interference" in internal affairs of SVN. This reluctance may be overcome if it is pointed out that this is election for constituent assembly which will draft a constitution, and not a competition between

Drafted by: FE/P:OArmstrong:rg	Tel. Ext. 5378	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:	FE/P - O. V. Armstrong
Clearances:			
FE - Mr. Unger (draft)	EUR - Mr. McAuliffe (subst)		
P/VN - Mr. Kaplan (draft)	NEA - Mr. Handley (subst)		
FE/VN - Mr. Miller (draft)	AF - Mr. Sherwood (subst)		
White House - Mr. Moyers (subst)	ARA - Mr. Brown (subst)		
	S/S - Mr. Grey		

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opposing political parties nor an election of a government,

3. In some countries an effort along these lines would obviously be fruitless or counter-productive, and we leave to each Embassy's discretion to decide whether it is possible to stimulate favorable comment. We hope, however, that leaders in most of the countries which have contributed in some form to South Vietnamese effort, as well as other favorably disposed countries in all areas, will be willing to comment publicly on his heartening development.

4. Since pattern and outcome of elections can affect approach taken by Embassies, you should defer action until receipt of Dept's go-ahead message.

GP-3.

Acting

BALL

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OFFICE OF POLICY AND RESEARCH RESEARCH SERVICE

September 12, 1966

INITIAL MEDIA REACTIONS TO
THE SAIGON ELECTIONS

IOP/R

September 12, 1966

INITIAL MEDIA REACTIONS TO THE SAIGON ELECTIONS

(The following analysis is based on initial reports.
Relatively little comment is yet available.)

First non-Communist reactions to Sunday's elections in South Vietnam were favorable headlines and expressions of agreeable surprise at the massive voter turnout, which media called an apparent victory for the Saigon government. The majority of commentators who spoke of a victory called it one against Communism, rather than for democracy. Some said it was the Vietnamese people who had won, and not the present government. It was generally considered that U.S. policy had sustained a vote of confidence.

Communist media continued to shout fraud, and alleged that the people of South Vietnam remained cool to the voting in spite of government "terrorization."

Western Europe: British, German, and French papers signaled a victory over Communism and its sabotage campaign.

British papers commented variously. The London Times' correspondent in Saigon said the election was "unquestionably a victory" as a test of government control "over that portion of the population which it claims to control, and as a test of administrative efficiency." The Daily Express saw "a crucial moral victory" for Ky and the Americans, in spite of Viet Cong killings "in an eleventh-hour campaign of violence."

The Mirror said: "Four million South Vietnamese today defied bombs and threats to go to the polls. And they chalked up a significant anti-Communist victory." The pro-Labor Sun made it "a major victory over the Communists."

The Daily Mail's Saigon correspondent spoke of "a success for Premier Ky and an organizational triumph for the political police." The government wanted a heavy vote as proof of public confidence. It achieved this by a mixture of propaganda, patriotic appeals and sheer blackmail" the paper added.

A first extended British editorial, in the conservative Daily Telegraph, said that what had been achieved was that "the first move is made towards recreating civilian rule, in the hope that a fresh and vigorous impulse can be given to government business in Vietnam."

German comment saw a success over the Communists but no public endorsement of Ky. Center-oriented General-Anzeiger of Bonn stated flatly: "We hope that Premier Ky... will not be so stupid as to announce that he has received a clearly democratic blessing by the people. Nevertheless the Communists are disturbed... Of course, yesterday's elections were not free in our sense. Intimidation was practiced not only by Communists." Independent Die Welt of Hamburg said the elections showed "that confidence in government protection was greater than fear of Viet Cong revenge... a great psychological success whose significance cannot be overestimated." The vote further showed that the influence of militant Buddhism "is ridiculously small," and that "the power of the Communist national liberation front has been broken." However, "the elections had virtually nothing to do with the question of whether South Vietnam's way will lead to democracy."

French papers appeared to be impressed with the result. Anti-Gaullist Aurore said: "The South Vietnamese government has handsomely won its bet... Those who went to the polls fundamentally demonstrated -- not that they blindly support all the initiatives of the Saigon government -- that when called upon to choose, they chose the camp of freedom."

Figaro said the Administration attached great importance to the election and U.S. faith in Ky had been strengthened. The paper saw a peace hope in that the people "have dealt a blow to Hanoi by not deserting the polls," and "Washington at least would like to believe" that this might help North Vietnam's leaders realize "the futility of their obstinacy and the dangers inherent in their stubbornness."

Independent Combat quipped: "The bride looked too beautiful," since the vote count exceeded all hopes. The paper noted that no candidate had fallen victim to Viet Cong assault.

Latin America: The only available comment was from Buenos Aires, where headlines stressed 1) a defeat for Viet Cong terror and 2) a big stride toward democratization. Samples: "Large Turnout Gives Ky Political Victory" (La Prensa), "Major Step to Establishment of Civilian Government" (Clarín), and "High Percentage of Voters. Viet Cong Threat Failed" (El Mundo). The first editorial, in the small English-language Herald, said: "This election was no victory for General Ky. It was a victory for the Vietnamese people.... The aim was, after all, a first step toward getting rid of General Ky and his military government."

Far East: Commentators in Hong Kong, Australia, and Saigon greeted the election result as a defeat for Communism and evidence that the people of South Vietnam want to follow it up with other constructive steps.

Hong Kong's South China Morning Post said: "There will be widespread admiration for the way in which so many of the 5.5 million voters braved Viet Cong terror squads to visit polling stations, particularly in rural areas where the insurgents exercise varying degrees of control.... The widespread hope is that the people of Vietnam can one day elect a government of their own choosing."

The Sydney Morning Herald wrote: "This represents an important moral victory for the anti-Communist forces," and "shows that the Vietnamese people are neither as cynical nor as distrustful of the government as they have been represented.... The real test will come when the newly elected constituent assembly gets down to work."

Japanese papers gave top play to correspondent reports from Saigon that the Ky government was able to maintain its prestige because of the large turnout of voters, despite Viet Cong acts of terrorism. Yomiuri and Tokyo Shimbun carried stories by Washington correspondents to the effect that officials here welcomed and expressed satisfaction over the high vote.

In Saigon, Chinese-language Ah Chau Van Quoc called the election "a milestone in the building of democracy and in the creation of a new Vietnamese society in which freedom and happiness will prevail."

Near East-South Asia: Indian papers front-paged election stories before full results were in, reporting that two million had gone to the polls. The Times of India said that "sizeable though the vote was, it was far below official expectations."

Tehran's Monday papers reported how the South Vietnamese had gone to vote in spite of terrorists. Israeli's liberal Hayom termed the election "an operation which succeeded much more than predicted by foreign correspondents... a most successful operation."

Communist Media: Moscow TASS said the electors were "brought to the so-called polling stations actually at pistol point." It said Mr. Rostow, in calling the election a victory for the entire free world, "does not realize how ridiculous" his words sound. Moscow radio said police burst into homes and dragged people to the polling stations.

Hanoi said the "election farce" took place "in an atmosphere of horrible terrorization." The Viet Cong radio said the people "had remained cool to the voting, after which the "U.S. - Thieu-Ky clique" announced fictitious results.

Potomac Cable No. 206 -- SOUTH VIETNAMESE ELECTIONS

(Sent 9/12/66 via Wireless File)

Four out of every five registered South Vietnamese voters cast ballots in the September 11 election. They went to the polls in defiance of Viet Cong threats and terror. Their successful conduct of the free election of a constituent assembly, which will draft a constitution for South Viet-Nam, showed that:

(1) The South Vietnamese people are determined to press forward toward constitutional rule and representative government. The September 11 election, which the Viet Cong sought to crush, was a test of that determination. Its successful outcome was an important step toward establishment of a truly representative South Vietnamese political community.

(2) The South Vietnamese people repudiated every Viet Cong claim to speak for them. The South Vietnamese voice, under Viet Cong orders to be still, spoke loud and clear on this point.

(3) The Viet Cong claim to control 80 per cent of the South Vietnamese people is patently false. Clearly Viet Cong intimidation failed to stop four-fifths of the South Vietnamese who registered.

The political process underway in South Viet-Nam is part of a larger, revolutionary program of national construction with major economic and social components. Amid the hardships and hazards of war and terrorism, the South Vietnamese people are advancing resolutely toward the peaceful, progressive goals of their popular revolution. Their defense against aggression and subversion from North Viet-Nam merits the support of all who cherish peace and freedom. At stake in Viet-Nam is the survival and continued development

of a small nation which threatens no neighbor, asserts no territorial ambitions, and wants only what all peoples want: the secure right to build a nation in peace, and in freedom from coercion.

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Being sent out now - 1895 12/12

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CABLE TO

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Classification

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Origin: ACTION: CIRCULAR (ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS PLUS
USUN, CINCPAC FOR POLAD, HONG KONG)
Priority: STATE

Ref: State Circular 44822

Subject: Vietnam Elections

1. There continues to be high-level interest in stimulating favorable comment on South Vietnamese elections, particularly from Asian nations. Except where effort would be fruitless, posts should now seek opportunity to discuss quietly at appropriate level the possibility of favorable official comment.
2. Separate telegram will give summary of election results and talking points which can be used for above approach and other purposes.
3. Please report promptly results of approaches.

END

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-152

By ig, NARA, Date 7-27-88

Drafted by

FE/P:QVArmatrong:eb

Tel. No.

9/12/66

Telegraphic transcription and

Classification approved by

FE - Mr. Unger

Checked by

P/VN - Mr. Kaplan (subs.)

FE/VN - Mr. Miller (subs.)

AF/P - Mr. Martin (subs.)

ARA/P - Mr. Wallace (subs.)

EUR/P - Mr. Olson (subs.)

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NEA - Mr. Brown (subs.)

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ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE
INFO: CINCPAC

Info

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

Regarding Saigon's 5731, we leave to your judgment as to whether you personally wish to background press on elections. However, we ^{urge} ~~request~~ that other senior Mission officers ~~initiate~~ ^{senior} backgrounding press on elections to maximum extent. We also hope that GVN officials will be doing same thing and suggest you have Zorthian lay this on with GVN. State's 44786 provides some pertinent guidance.

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END

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-152

By 10, NARA, Date 7-27-88

Printed by
FE/VN:RDM/ller:aoa 9/12/66

Tel. No.
4535

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by

FE - Leonard Unger

FE/P-Mr. Armstrong *GA*

P-Mr. Kaplan *(S.A.)*

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday

September 12, 1966 -- 1:40 p.m.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: New Ideas for U.S. - Philippine Cooperation

You asked Bill Jorden to come up with some new ideas that might be raised with President Marcos. You asked him to staff out further the six ideas he submitted. He has done so.


The attached memo and attachments cover the ground -- including background and recommendations.

In sum, four of the ideas have possibilities; two are non-starters. You will want to consider these in light of the total package of assistance and cooperation that State, AID and Defense are now working up.

~~I am sending copies of the attached memo to State, AID and Defense so these matters can be considered at the meeting tomorrow on the Marcos visit.~~

W. alt Rostow

Att.



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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 12, 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: New Ideas for U.S. - Philippine Cooperation

In response to a request from the President, I submitted some ideas for new forms of U.S. - Philippine cooperation -- ideas the President might want to take up with Marcos during the latter's visit.

The President expressed interest and asked me to staff out further. Don Ropa and I have done so -- consulting with State, AID, NASA, and other interested agencies.

I am attaching separate papers -- including recommendations -- on the six ideas.

To sum up my conclusions:

(1) Filipino Astronaut:


NASA has been trying to find ways to bring foreign nationals into our astronaut program. They see more disadvantages than advantages right now. Among the former are: resentment of other nations; trouble in finding a qualified candidate; let-down if man chosen flunked out, etc.

As an alternative, they propose Philippine participation in satellite, sounding rocket, and ground-based research and applications programs. This would start with a visit of Filipino scientists to NASA.

Recommendation:

~~The President tell Marcos of our desire to encourage Filipino participation in space-associated programs.~~

~~If Marcos shows interest, the President could offer NASA cooperation in developing a program.~~



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He could invite Marcos to send a team of Filipino scientists and engineers to come to the U. S. to visit our space facilities. NASA would act as host and would help develop a program, including arrangements for training of young scientists under NASA-sponsored fellowships.

Note the Philippines have plans for a ground monitoring station for weather satellites. The President might encourage them to press forward and possibly ask if Marcos needs additional technical assistance.

(2) Typhoon Damage Control:

A small joint program is feasible, provided it meshes with regional plans being developed by ECAFE and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

Recommendation:

The President would advise Marcos of our interest in supporting regional planning in this field under ECAFE/WMO. He could also express interest in a joint U.S. - Philippine typhoon damage control center program.

Specifically, he might propose: (a) a small meteorological training program in the U. S. for selected Filipinos; (b) establishment of a U. S. - Philippine commission to study specific projects; (c) offer to conduct a typhoon modification experiment in the Philippines area in the next year; (d) send a U.S. meteorological team to Manila to make more detailed recommendations.

(3) Regional Military Defense College:

There is an obvious need for a center in Southeast Asia to conduct research and to develop new techniques in the field of countering subversion and promoting democratic political and social development. Ultimately, this could become multinational. At the outset, we should consider plans for a Filipino center -- with them in front and us helping.

Recommendation:

The President could remind Marcos of the Philippine initiative for a SEATO-regional military staff college in 1956. Recall that we opened joint talks with them in 1958, but nothing came of it. Indicate

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our interest in reopening discussions keyed to the present nature of the Communist threat.

If Marcos was receptive, the President could state his interest in seeing such a Center evolve through Filipino and Asian leadership, with our support.

He could propose a joint panel of Filipinos and Americans to study this proposal and recommend a course of action. Suggest that it be a Filipino-directed enterprise at the outset, with the question of a tie-in with SEATO to be deferred until it was a going concern.

(4) Regional Development Institute:

ECAFE has plans underway for this kind of institute, aiming for a link-up with the Asian Development Bank. The critical need in the Philippines is for a rational approach to their own development process. A national development institute, on the model of Thailand's National Institute of Development Administration, might be proposed.

Recommendation:

The President might express our conviction that development planning can succeed only if it is systematized. He could offer our help in developing such a systematic institutional approach.

If Marcos were interested, the President might suggest the possibility of our support in developing a new institute or in combining existing programs at the University of the Philippines and in Marcos' executive office, where he has set up a small development group.

If Marcos welcomes help, offer to send a U.S. technical advisory team composed of governmental and foundation experts.

(5) Manila-Tarlac Highway:

This is a non-starter. We gave the Philippines a highway loan in 1959 -- and got 17 miles of road built. We need better Filipino performance -- and a well worked out road development plan -- before trying to move on this.

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(6) Bridge over the Pasig:

~~Too low a priority~~ item to draw on scarce Filipino resources at this time. The main traffic problem, as I understand it, concerns rights-of-way, bridge approaches and squatters at key crossings.

Conclusion:

The President might want to raise one or more of the first four items.

In a sense, these would be dessert which should be looked at in light of what State, AID, Defense and others produce in the form of a main course. If the latter is substantial, we may want to hold off on the above.

State (Bundy) and AID (Poats) are aware of the general content of the above.

Bill Jorden
William J Jorden

Atts.

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PHILIPPINE PARTICIPATION IN OUR
SPACE PROGRAM

The opening of our astronaut training program to foreign nationals would strikingly symbolize U.S. policy of engaging the participation of other nations in the exploration of space. NASA finds, however, these factors inhibiting a foreign astronaut training program at this time:

1. Difficulty of avoiding the resentment of those countries not invited to participate.
2. The necessarily stringent selection requirements.
3. Relatively limited flight opportunities and training facilities in our program.
4. Contingency that an invited country might be unable to produce an acceptable nominee.
5. Political-psychological problems if a nominee fails to complete training successfully.
6. Practical value of training if this could not be put to later use in a nominee's country.

This suggests the inadvisability of inviting the participation of a Filipino astronaut candidate. ~~There are, however, other opportunities available for Philippine participation in space programming which can be tailored to Philippine interest and resources. These include a ground station capable of direct reception of weather satellite cloud photography and a variety of NASA-sponsored fellowship opportunities for training~~

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~~young scientists and engineers in techniques of space exploration.~~

Suggested Approach

That you advise Marcos of our desire to encourage other nations to participate in the peaceful exploration of space, especially the Philippines, and ~~offer the cooperation of NASA in developing a tailored~~
~~program.~~ If Marcos is responsive ~~you might invite him to send a team~~
~~of Filipino scientists and engineers to visit our space facilities to become~~
~~acquainted in detail with available opportunities.~~

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TYPHOON DAMAGE CONTROL CENTER

Damage from typhoons in the Far East is estimated at \$500 million annually. The Philippines suffer approximately \$17 million of this, 0.45 percent of their gross national product. ECAFE and WMO have found regional inadequacies in weather observation, radar coverage, telecommunications, flood forecasting and warning, and in meteorological observation stations. ~~They have entered strong recommendations for improving technical capabilities and are now programming regional activities with an initial funding magnitude of \$10-15 million annually.~~

One ECAFE/WMO recommendation calls for strengthening existing meteorological observation stations. Consistent with this it is highly desirable to ~~establish a joint U.S.-Philippine typhoon damage control program to improve Philippine facilities to mesh with regional ECAFE/WMO planning.~~ An effective program would reduce Philippine economic losses and minimize typhoon damage to U.S. installations, ships and aircraft in the Philippine area. This would provide valuable augmentation to the weather forecast and typhoon warning center we maintain on Guam.

Suggested Approach

That you ~~advise Marcos of our interest in supporting the ECAFE/WMO regional planning as well as a joint U.S.-Philippine typhoon damage control center program as a contribution to regional programming. Specifically, you might propose:~~

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1. A ~~meteorological training program~~ in the U.S. at our expense for selected Filipinos.
2. The formation of a ~~U.S.-Philippine Commission~~ to study specific projects for typhoon damage control in the Philippine area.
3. One or more ~~typhoon modification experiments~~ in the Philippine area, which include qualified Philippine civilian and military technicians, before year's end.
4. That a ~~U.S. meteorological team~~ travel to Manila to complete recommendations for a joint program.

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REGIONAL MILITARY DEFENSE COLLEGE

The Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia are three areas where resurgent or incipient insurgency is of current concern in Southeast Asia. Beyond our bilateral support for the containment of these threats before they approach Vietnam proportions, there is an evident need to establish a center, similar to Fort Bragg, to develop advanced Asian techniques in democratic development and countering subversion. The Center could draw on the mass of experience and study accumulated to date in coping with Communist subversion and insurgency and develop uniquely Asian concepts and methods for improving their abilities to meet these continuing threats. A multi-national character, stressing participation by Southeast Asian states presently or potentially threatened by Communist subversion and/or insurgency, would be the ultimate objective. ~~Initially, the Center could be developed as a joint U.S.-Philippine project, with the U.S. supporting Filipino and Asian leadership, direction and liaison with SEATO.~~

In 1956 the Philippines proposed that SEATO establish a regional military staff college. We agreed in 1958 to explore, as a joint project, a Pacific Defense College. Subsequent negotiations were inconclusive since the Philippine Government was unable to insure adequate financial support on a bilateral basis. We have more recently considered

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establishing, under our direction, a similar school at the Armed Forces Staff College level either in Hawaii or Okinawa, but this is not at present an active proposal.

Suggested Approach

That you remind Marcos of the Philippine initiative of 1956 and our subsequent joint exploration of a regional defense school, and indicate our interest in reopening discussions keyed to the present nature of the Communist threat.

If Marcos is receptive you might stress our interest in seeing such a Center evolve through Filipino and Asian leadership along with our support, and that the question of a SEATO tie-in could be deferred until the Center was in being.

It probably would be advisable to leave consideration of details of plant, funding, staffing, and related matters to a joint panel commissioned to recommend a course of action.

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SECRETREGIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE

Examination of current and planned institutional activities for coordinating economic development in Southeast Asia under ECAFE sponsorship, notably the existing Asian Institute for Economic Development and Planning and expectations for the Asian Development Bank, indicates the inadvisability of promoting another regional development body. However, the problems of development in the Philippines suggest the pressing need for better management of their development process.

~~The problem~~ is not the lack of planning ability, or Filipino experts in economics, management, public administration, engineering or agronomy to implement it. Rather, ~~it is to put the knowledge that exists into action.~~ This is deemed ~~a good moment~~ to dramatize and symbolize Marcos' new rational approach to the hard realities of development by ~~supporting the establishment of an Institute for Development Studies (possibly in the University of the Philippines) along lines of the successful National Institute of Development Administration in Thailand (NIDA).~~ This could provide the focal point for development research, scholarship and training in the Philippines and be the instrument through which new kinds of technical assistance in development administration from IBRD, the U.S., Ford Foundation and others might be channeled.

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Two institutions now exist within the University of the Philippines whose curricula or faculties, if combined, would approximate the NIDA. These are the Graduate School of Public Administration and the Institute of Economic Development and Research. ~~Marcos has also established a development group within his executive office, but it suffers from vague charter, responsibilities and authority.~~

Suggested Approach

You might ~~express our firm conviction that rational development planning can only succeed if it is systematized, and~~ that we are interested in helping him develop such a systematic institutional approach if he wishes this assistance.

~~The possibilities of merging the three bodies cited above or the inception of a new development institution might be mentioned among options available.~~

~~If Marcos does welcome assistance, this again might be handled best through a U.S. technical advisory team composed of both government and foundation experts.~~

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MANILA-TARLAC SUPERHIGHWAY

Development Loan Fund plans for FY 1967 included the construction of approximately 17 miles of four-lane divided highway, with appropriate interchange facilities, as an alternate route to the north from Manila and the first segment of a 58 mile highway to Tarlac.

Progress in the first section has been unsatisfactory. The Filipinos failed to meet their financial commitments, and the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads reports serious management problems in their Philippine counterpart organization. A major deficiency in Philippine road planning, symbolic of the country's overall problems, is the inability of the Philippine Department of Public Works to manage, program and plan for road building. This is compounded by proliferated and duplicated effort among several Philippine agencies involved in road building.

It has been proposed that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers assume the burden of completing the Manila-Tarlac highway.

Recommendation

That you not take any new initiative with Marcos on this project. The problem and challenge remain the improvement of Filipino technical and management capacity. Intercession by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

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would not advance that improvement. Marcos has indicated as well that he might employ his expanded army engineer battalion capacity on this highway.

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JOHNSON-MARCOS HIGHWAY BRIDGE

There are presently eight bridges across the Pasig River where Manila is situated; five were reconstructed after the second world war with U.S. funds. One of these, an old Bailey bridge called the Nagtahan, had collapsed, but it is now being slowly reconstructed with U.S. funds.

Experts on the scene from the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads indicate that the real problems in traffic crossing the river concern the need for approaches and acquisition of right of way. The presence of squatters remains a perennial problem.

It had been suggested that the Bailey bridge be replaced with a modern highway bridge to symbolize U.S. -Philippine friendship as exemplified by the coterminous presidencies of you and Marcos.

Recommendation

That you not consider raising the proposal with Marcos at this time. Ultimately, replacement of the Bailey bridge would be desirable. The main traffic problem at present relates to approaches and right of way. There are as well other higher priority claims on limited Philippine resources.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-13-98

September 12, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Marcos Visit

Attached is the briefing book for the Marcos visit.

You will find it particularly useful to read:

Scope Paper -- Tab I. B.

Rusk Briefing Memo - Tab I. C.

Suggestions on dealing with Filipinos and Topics of
Conversation - Tab I. D.

Among the Background Papers, you may find it useful to look at:

Philippine Internal Situation	Tab A. 1
Philippine External Relations (underlined portions)	Tab A. 2
Philippine Economic Situation	Tab B. 1
Economic Assistance	Tab B. 2
Future Commercial Relations	Tab B. 4
Philippine Regional Participation	Tab B. 7
U. S. -Philippine Defense Relations	Tab C. 1
Military Assistance Programs	Tab C. 2
Veterans Benefits and Claims	Tab D.

Your welcoming statement and toast for the State Dinner are
being rewritten.

- - - - -

This will be one of the most interesting and probably most
complicated visits of this year.

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Marcos is strongly pro-American. But he is also fiercely pro-Philippines. He has backed our position in Viet-Nam at considerable political risk. His foremost goal here is going to be to secure tangible evidence of U. S. support for his leadership and domestic goals. He has been under the gun from domestic critics. He wants to take home:

- (1) Concrete achievements in the matter of veterans' benefits and claims;
- (2) pledges of increased U.S. economic and military assistance;

He wants help; but he does not want to appear to be asking for our favors or as having been bought off by the U. S.

Main Items of Business

(1) Viet-Nam

Marcos is ready to give public support to the U. S. position. He will want a fairly full and frank review of the situation as seen from our vantage point.

He may ask: if we are likely to want increased operations from Philippine bases; whether we can increase military procurement in his country.

You could:

give him a completely frank appraisal of the situation;

in connection with peace efforts, express appreciation for his efforts through ASA to promote an Asian peace conference (he is sensitive about the publicity Thanat has had on this);

tell him we will do nothing about increased operations from the Philippines without consulting him;

note the recent opening of a Procurement Information Office in Manila which should be a help to Filipino businessmen.

(2) Regional Cooperation in Asia

Marcos is active in ASA, Asian and Pacific Council, Asian Development Bank (headquarters will be in Manila).

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He may ask: status of your offer of \$1 billion for Southeast Asia development.

You could tell him: Gene Black will be going out in October and will want to discuss details of regional development with Marcos.

(3) Military Assistance

Marcos wants equipment for 10 engineer battalions for use in civic action projects. You are familiar with this problem and have approved giving him this equipment if he makes this an item of urgent business -- as is likely.

On other MAP problems, Marcos thinks the Philippines are not getting their share and that much equipment has been out-of-date. Fact is, the Philippines have not made effective use of much they have received.

Marcos will ask about increased MAP.

He may ask if we can renegotiate the MA Agreement of 1953.

You could:

Discuss the 10 battalion problem.

Tell him we have met his request for 6 Swiftcraft for anti-smuggling and for M-14 rifles and other equipment. We gave him a squadron of F-5's.

We will study the problem of renegotiating the MAP agreement.

(4) Economic Assistance

Philippine economy is in bad shape -- 4% growth of GNP in past five years, 3.2% population growth.

HUK guerrillas are getting more active -- taking advantage of local discontent.

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Marcos has been moving -- on anti-smuggling, tax collections, administrative improvements in Government. Remaining tasks are enormous.

The past Philippine record has been bad. They have not used much of the help offered -- by World Bank, Ex-Im, AID, etc.

Marcos will probably ask for U.S. support for his rural development program, particularly in 10 major rice-producing areas.

For political reasons, he will want to be able to mention dollar amounts for loans we may be ready to consider.

You could:

recognize the problems he faces; admire the efforts he has made;

applaud his emphasis on rural development and tell him we are ready to support sound projects in the 10-Province Program;

we are ready to open talks immediately on PL-480 (Title IV) sale of cotton, feed grains and tobacco (will generate pesos for use in his programs);

if ~~he~~ wants, and will take initiative, we will support arrangements with World Bank and others for closer multilateral consultation and assistance to the Philippines.

(5) Veterans Benefits and Claims

You know the background on this. Legislation on benefits (orphans assistance and hospitalization) has passed the House; may pass the Senate in time for the visit. Estimated cost: \$17 million the first year; may total up to \$425 over next 30 years or so.

On claims, we are ready to pay two. Estimated cost: up to \$42 million. We want Marcos to drop the other five claims. He will find this hard.

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We have the money in hand (special fund in Defense). We have made offset arrangements to minimize balance of payments problem.

Marcos will probably:

make a plea for long-deferred justice for Phil veterans;
tell you how difficult it will be politically for him to drop five claims.

You could:

tell him we can pay these two without Congressional appropriation; explain that chances for such appropriation are non-existent;

explain our panel found the five claims do not merit further study;

we don't know how much these claims will come to but our present estimate is they will be more than \$30 million and as much as \$40 million.

(6) Bases and Defense Relations

We have been working with the Phils on revision of the 1947 bases agreement; things are moving ahead.

Rusk and Ramos will exchange notes formalizing the 1959 Understanding which will: (a) cut our base tenure to 25 years (from 99); commit us to consult the Phils on any non-Philippine or non-SEATO use of our bases, and on setting up long-range missiles there.

We will reaffirm our mutual security policy.

Marcos may:

ask if we are interested in any new bases; say he would want to call them "SEATO Bases;"

You could:

tell him we will talk with him if we need any new installations;

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~~SECRET~~

hope that our bases talks will proceed smoothly and will eliminate any irritants caused by the presence of bases;

note the Rusk-Ramos agreement with approval.

(7) Trade and Investment Problems

Economic nationalism is rising in the Philippines. Main problem is the Retail Trade Nationalization Law. But it is not now being enforced against American companies.

There is much agitation to abrogate the "parity clause" in Laurel-Langley Trade Agreement (gives U.S. investors equal rights with Filipinos in natural resources and public utilities until 1974). We do not seek renewal of this clause after 1974.

We favor negotiation of a new Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation to go into effect in 1974.

Marcos may ask:

would we agree to joint committee beginning work now to develop a new trade treaty?

would we accept abrogation of "parity?"

You could:

tell him we want to work together to maintain and expand trade;

an increased flow of legitimate and worthwhile investment would help his development program;

we are ready to start informal talks aimed at later formal negotiations of a new trade treaty;

we expect Laurel-Langley to run to 1974; on "parity," our concern is proper safeguards for the rights of Americans who invested in the Philippines in good faith in the past.

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(8) Special Fund for Education

This is a \$28 million war damage fund. We reached agreement with the Marcos Government in April on disbursement procedures. We are limited by the terms of the original legislation. So far, the Philippines have advanced no official project proposals. We want to use the fund in the next three years.

Marcos may ask:

can we use the fund to support the new National Cultural Center (a pet project of Mrs. Marcos)? They need \$3 million for this (of \$9 million total cost)?

can we release the fund -- or a large part of it -- for a permanent trust fund with the interest used for educational projects?

You could state:

we will be happy to support use of the fund for the Cultural Center;

we would like to disburse the fund in two or three years, but we will give his proposal further study.

(9) Civil Air

They are unwilling to accept a Bermuda-type agreement. We have refused a Manila-Tokyo-San Francisco route for PAL.

If Marcos asks about civil air, you might tell him if they will accept a Bermuda agreement (unlimited frequencies for U. S. carriers), we will give on the route problem. Informal talks could begin immediately, if he is interested.

The items above are the main problems we see coming up during the visit.

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There will be a good deal of hard bargaining, back and forth.

But in my judgement, there are two key factors which provide the backdrop for the Marcos visit.

One, it is clear from reports from Manila that Marcos has really put his political neck on the block in backing our Viet-Nam position and in sending military forces there. But he did it.

The least we can do is recognize this fact and take actions that will make his position at home as strong as possible.

Second, Marcos is a sensitive, patriotic and sentimental man. He is also strongly pro-American. A private and personal expression of interest and support from the President of the United States will outweigh many other things. If he feels your personal concern with his problems, those problems are going to be easier to face.

In short, he should leave Washington knowing he has a true friend, a loyal friend in the White House.

I am sure he will.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, September 12, 1966

3:20 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on UN Strategy

The next National Security Council meeting is scheduled for 11:00 A.M. Thursday, September 15, to discuss the major issues which will come up at the 21st General Assembly meeting beginning in New York later this month.

At your luncheon on Tuesday with Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk you will have discussed two issues which will not be on the NSC agenda, namely China's UN representation and the possibility of your addressing the UN.

Secretary Rusk will not be present at the NSC meeting. He is scheduled to make a speech in Big Bend, South Dakota, on Thursday. Ambassador Goldberg will present a discussion paper which we will send you Wednesday evening.

The following list of invitees is recommended for your approval:

Members

The Vice President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
OEP Director Bryant

Statutory Advisers

CIA Director Helms
JCS Chairman Wheeler

Other Officials Regularly Invited to NSC

Secretary Fowler
USIA Director Marks
Under Secretary Ball
Deputy Defense Secretary Vance
UN Ambassador Goldberg

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 14, 1993
By DCM NARS, Date 8-18-86

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Officials to be Invited to this Meeting

ACDA Director Foster
NASA Administrator Webb
Assistant Secretary of State for UN Affairs,
Joseph J. Sisco
Assistant Secretary of Defense, John T. McNaughton

White House

Walt Rostow
Bill Moyers
Bob Kintner

George Christian
Bromley Smith

W. W. Rostow

Approved as listed ✓

Note Changes _____

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mon., Sept. 12, 1966
7:15 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Partially due to Sect. Rusk's absence
last week, this agenda is of unusual
importance -- as well as rather long.

Walt R.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

12 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested Luncheon Agenda, September 13, 1:30 P.M.

1. The Rusk-Gromyko Conversations in New York - Secretary Rusk
Secretary Rusk will list the subjects which he proposes to discuss with Gromyko next week including non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the offer to sign the civil air agreement with the USSR and Vietnam. Secretary McNamara has a particular interest in the non-proliferation issue. The question of our nuclear position for the Erhard visit is related to this matter.
2. Chinese Representation in the UN - Secretary Rusk
Secretary Rusk is expected to request your approval of an instruction which would direct our UN mission to try to prevent any vote in the UN on this question until late November. In effect, this would defer a decision until the situation in New York is better known.
3. Presidential Appearance at the UN - Secretary Rusk
Secretary Rusk will discuss the pros and cons of your making a speech at the UN and ask for your decision.
State has done a first draft of which we do not think too highly; but Secretary Rusk has not conveyed his views or sent over his own draft.
4. NSC Meeting on UN Issues - Walt Rostow
To note that the NSC meeting on Thursday will not discuss either the Chinese representation issue or the proposed President's speech at the UN.
5. Vietnam - Secretary McNamara
 - a. Bombing of North Vietnam.
JCS is recommending additional targets;
State is resisting on the grounds of escalatory

~~TOP SECRET~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-68

By inf NARA, Date 5-5-89

signals and the Rusk-Gromyko talks;
 Secretary McNamara wishes a freeze at
 approximately the present level, with perhaps
 a few additional targets. (See Tab A)

- b. Reorganization of pacification effort in South Vietnam.
 Secretary McNamara's actions in light of
 last Tuesday's lunch discussion.

6. German Offset Issue - Secretary McNamara

As the briefing memorandum indicates we are in the middle of an effort to find new middle ground here in the light of difficult German and U.K. positions. A resolution must await Erhard. This should be an interim discussion. (See Tab B)

7. Next Steps toward NATO Nuclear Committee - Secretary McNamara

Secretary McNamara wishes to discuss the position he is to take at the forthcoming NATO Defense Ministers Meeting, with respect to pushing for a permanent Committee at the December Ministerial Meeting.

8. Cabriolet - Nuclear Cratering Experiment

Now that the pasture season is ending in the Southwest, should we proceed with this Ploughshare shot?

Summary of Issues (See Tab C)

9. Nuclear Fuel for Italy - Secretary Rusk

This nuclear agreement is for civil merchant ship use, but is made difficult because, for administrative reasons, the Italians must work through their Navy.

Summary of issues (See Tab D)

W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

12 September 1966

SUBJECT: Discussion of ROLLING THUNDER 52

Secretary Rusk's advisors (Alexis Johnson, Ambassador Thompson, and Bill Bundy) have asked him to oppose the following three targets recommended by the JCS for ROLLING THUNDER 52:

- a. JCS Target 19 - Yen Vien Railroad Yard. The target is five miles NE of Hanoi and close to a populated area. It is the junction of the Hanoi-China rail line.
- b. Unnumbered Target - Hanoi SAM storage area--two miles NE of Hanoi and near numerous schools and hospitals. It is closer to Hanoi than the POL storage site bombed previously.
- c. JCS Target 51.1 - Ha Gia POL storage (formerly Phuc Yen POL storage). It is four miles from the Phuc Yen air field. Ambassador Thompson thinks the Soviet s will conclude that the strike on this POL storage area is but a prelude to the strike against the nearby air base. He believes repeated strikes will be necessary to knock out the storage capacity. He thinks this will not be a good backdrop for the Rusk-Gromyko talks in New York.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 88-68
By ms NARA, Date 5-5-89

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Monday, September 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Offset Problem - Possible Topic for Lunch
Tomorrow (Tuesday, September 13)

Secretary McNamara may raise our current offset agreement with the Germans, which runs through June 1967. Last Saturday, Erhard admitted to McGhee for the first time that they will not be able to fulfill this agreement; he said to McGhee that the "stability of Germany" was at stake. Our guess is that he will ask you for a stretch-out. Bob is worried that we will not be tough enough with him. Ball -- and I think Secretary Rusk -- will argue that Erhard is really on the ropes, and we must give him some relief. (As you know, the question of offset after June 30, '67, is under study by McCloy and the rest of us.)

The Figures Our present two-year agreement calls for total German payments of about \$1.4 billion. During the first year they made payments of only \$267 million. Through advance deposits they will probably reach a total of \$687 million by December 30, '66. That will leave \$705 million to be paid in the six months ending June 30, 1967. Given their proposed defense budget, we don't think they will be able to manage more than \$200-300 million of this \$705 million.

Recommendation You will probably not want to make a decision tomorrow on what to say to Erhard on this. You might suggest that Rusk and McNamara get together with Fowler and give you the choices. (I will get to work with Deming, McNaughton and Leddy.)

Francis M. Bator

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By W, NARA, Date 7-13-98

~~SECRET~~

28d

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PROJECT CABRIOLET

The AEC has asked for authorization to conduct ~~Project Cabriolet~~ on or about December 1st of this year. Project Cabriolet, a nuclear cratering experiment with a yield of 2.7 KT [REDACTED] is the next in the series of cratering tests that the AEC has planned to study the technical feasibility of such nuclear excavation projects as the construction of a sea-level canal.

6.2(a)

[REDACTED]

6.2(a)

A decision to cancel or further postpone ~~Project Cabriolet~~ would seriously interfere with our nuclear excavation program. The test, which is probably as clean a test as we can expect to conduct in the next few years, is the next step in the development of our technical understanding of nuclear excavation. It will be necessary to conduct it by about December in order to permit the follow-on experiments, planned by the AEC in support of the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission program, to proceed on schedule. With regard to the present negotiations with Panama, the continued delay of this test could weaken the credibility of our nuclear option for a sea-level canal at other than the present site. Finally, the wording of the Limited Test Ban is not precise and it can be argued that the small amount of radioactivity involved, which is in fact substantially smaller than that vented from at least one Soviet test to date, is not precluded by a liberal interpretation of the Treaty.

This project was originally reviewed by the Underground Test Committee in March of this year at which time its conduct was opposed by DOD and ACDA. State asked that the decision be deferred to avoid interfering with our informal approach to the Soviets on the possibility of a cooperative project in this area. These discussions with the Soviets, however, have not led to any actual proposals.

The AEC has, therefore, resubmitted the proposal for reconsideration by State, DOD, and ACDA.

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9/12/66

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 98-409
By SJ, NARA, Date 3-23-04

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~FUEL FOR ITALIAN NUCLEAR POWERED SURFACE SHIP

The Italian government would like to conclude a military bilateral agreement with the United States to permit Italy to purchase enriched uranium U-235 for use as fuel in an Italian nuclear powered surface ship. The agreement would relate only to the purchase of nuclear fuel since the Italians plan to construct the ship and reactor themselves and are not asking for any U.S. technical assistance or information in connection with the project.

This proposal is strongly endorsed by State, DOD, and AEC on the grounds that it would be helpful in our Italian and NATO relations. It is agreed within the government that the proposal does not present any direct security problems.

ACDA opposes the proposal, however, on the grounds that it would establish an undesirable precedent since it would be our first military bilateral with a non-nuclear weapons state.

The proposal presents a serious problem with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Senator Anderson and Congressman Holifield, apparently on the advice of Admiral Rickover, are convinced that Italy is really interested in the project as a test bed for a nuclear submarine and that the Italians will soon be back to get submarine technology from us.

As a result of discussions with the Joint Committee in August, State has drafted new language to rule out this possibility. Although the Joint Committee staff believes the new language may be acceptable to the Committee, they advise that it will be necessary to have new hearings for Senator Anderson who has very strong feelings on the subject. Senator Anderson is not scheduled to return to Washington until after the November elections.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 88-156
By lig, NARA, Date 1-27-92

9/12/66

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Monday, September 12, 1966
7:30 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pat Dean has been instructed to transmit to you the attached summary of Harold Wilson's address to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers on the Rhodesia question. The package also contains the British aide memoire which was circulated to Commonwealth Prime Ministers.

The summary of Wilson's speech is worth your time to read. Basically, he said that:

- The Commonwealth countries have been fully informed of British movements on Rhodesia. The most recent negotiations with Smith have not been carried on behind their backs.
- The use of force in Rhodesia would be dangerous and self-defeating.
- Economic sanctions have not succeeded as expected, but they have not failed, either. They will be increasingly effective in the future.
- The U.K. is absolutely committed to the proposition that any solution to the Rhodesian problem must have the support of all Rhodesians. Wilson did not say that this necessarily means immediate majority rule, but he did say that it means that if the Rhodesian electorate will approve no other arrangement.

The aide memoire sets out once again in clear and unequivocal terms British determination to hold the line against all temptations to "sell out."

W. W. Rostow

*(Mike to make copy of
attachment for our files)*

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 88-156
By 208, NARA, Date 1-27-92



29a
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

~~SECRET~~

12 September, 1966

Dear Walt,

I expect that you have been informed of the contacts which have taken place during the past week between this Embassy and the Department of State as the problem of Rhodesia has developed at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. Michael Stewart spoke most recently to George Ball on Saturday evening, 10 September.

I am now instructed to send to you for the personal information of the President the enclosed summary of Mr. Wilson's remarks to the Commonwealth Conference today and the enclosed text of a document which has been circulated to the Conference.

I am sending copies of these two documents as instructed to the Department of State also for the personal information of the Secretary of State and George Ball.

*Yours Sincerely
P. Dean.*

Professor W.W. Rostow,
Special Assistant to the President,
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority UK Guidelines
By fw NARA. Date 3-26-98

~~SECRET~~

296

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-408
By us NARA, Date 9-24-03

SUMMARY OF PRIME MINISTER'S ADDRESS TO
COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS ON SEPTEMBER 12

The Prime Minister said that the Commonwealth had a duty to ensure that their principles are not compromised or tarnished. It was united in determination to bring the illegal regime in Rhodesia to an end, and to see that the final settlement recognised and gave effect to the basic principles of non-racialism and democratic rule on which the Commonwealth was based. Rhodesia was a British problem but of concern to the world and particularly the Commonwealth.

The Prime Minister denied that the Commonwealth had been kept in ignorance of the negotiations with the Rhodesian Government before last November and about the informal talks which have taken place between officials during the last few months. The written and oral exchanges between the two governments had been published in the Blue Book last November. The "talks about talks" were not in any sense negotiations and had been conducted strictly on the basis which he had described to the House of Commons.

Force

Although force would not constitute an international war or invasion, in practical terms it could very well mean a bloody conflict, to the extent of which, in time and in area, no man could set limits. There was a danger of setting the whole of Central and Southern Africa ablaze and so destroying forever the hope of a multi-racial society in Rhodesia, and prejudicing the security and viability of Zambia.

Sanctions

Hopes that sanctions would work quickly and effectively had not been realised. They had not yet succeeded, but they / had not

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had not failed. They would have an increasing effect, particularly in regard to the next Rhodesian tobacco crop. But we all wished to move faster, not least in order to spare lasting damage to Rhodesia's economy and her whole population. (Hopes for a quick oil cut-off had been frustrated by supplies from two countries, but the Prime Minister noticed that several other speakers recognised what would be involved in Britain, but not only for Britain, if the enforcement of the sanctions policy were to involve an economic war with the whole of Southern Africa.)

The Six Principles

The Prime Minister recounted the history of negotiations up to I.D.I. "We rejected and will always reject forms of words and constitutional devices which would leave the power to dictate the pace of African advancement in the hands of a minority". He said that the "talks about talks" had been concerned not only with how the principles could be implemented but also with the re-establishment in Rhodesia of constitutional government, and thus with whom negotiations would take place subsequently. We could never negotiate with the illegal regime.

The overriding principle was the fifth "It means that, before there can be any question of Rhodesia's attaining independence, the British Parliament must be satisfied that any proposed settlement - whatever it may be - has been explained to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, is clearly understood by them and is acceptable to them. The British Parliament must be satisfied that this test has been made and they must be satisfied about the way in which it has been / conducted

conducted. And, if they are not so satisfied, they will not grant independence. I think that, if you will consider the implications of this, you will feel that it ought to satisfy the doubts which have been voiced round this table. In particular, if the people of Rhodesia as a whole accept an independence settlement which does not comprise majority rule at the outset, but guarantees steady progress towards it, they will be able to say so. But equally, if they feel that any arrangement falling short of independence before majority rule is unacceptable, they will be free to say that too: and their verdict on that issue will be decisive. There will therefore be no independence before majority rule, if the people of Rhodesia as a whole are shown to be opposed that

The opinion of the Rhodesian people as a whole, as I have said, obviously includes the preponderant group within the Rhodesian people. Many of my colleagues round this table are convinced that the Africans of Rhodesia will never agree to a settlement which involves independence before majority rule, if their opinion is fairly and objectively ascertained, as we are determined it shall be. If they are right, then there is no more to argue about. What we are saying is that the Rhodesian people as a whole must thus decide. This is vital in any settlement of the country's future. Let me repeat, once again, the British Government's assurance that if the application of the fifth principle shows that the people of Rhodesia as a whole reject a settlement which provides for independence before majority rule, there will be no independence before majority rule."

/ The speech

The speech concluded on the lines of a document circulated to Commonwealth Prime Ministers after the Prime Minister's speech (text annexed).

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-408
By us, NARA, Date 9-24-03

29c

Following is text of document circulated to Commonwealth Prime Ministers:

We start by repeating the determination of the British Government to bring the illegal regime in Rhodesia to an end at the earliest possible moment.

2. We propose that, on the ending of the rebellion, the Governor should form a broad-based Government, representative of all races in Rhodesia, and that the armed forces and police would be responsible to the Governor. During this interim period, special provision would have to be made to ensure the security of the Kariba Dam and installations.

3. After the return to legality and the establishment of a constitutional Government, the British Government would intend to negotiate with that Government proposals for a constitutional settlement which would be submitted to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. It will be necessary prior to, and during, this test of Rhodesian public opinion that free political expression be permitted, and that the political leaders be released from detention so that they can engage in political activities, provided that they give assurances that these activities will be peaceful, lawful and democratic.

4. Independence will be granted to Rhodesia only on a basis which the British Government and Parliament are satisfied has the clear consent of the people of Rhodesia as a whole and will not be imposed without that consent. Clearly the means by which their views are ascertained must be - and be seen to be - free and fair. We attach the greatest importance to this. In this connection, as I will explain later, we are particularly anxious to consider how far the Commonwealth or Representatives of the Commonwealth might be associated with this process.

/5. The British ..

~~SECRET~~

5. The British Government will insist that any new constitution must be in conformity with the six principles, with safeguards to ensure that they are respected. We are prepared to put forward a variety of proposals to secure this objective. We shall be prepared for example to list the amendments necessary to the 1961 Constitution: and to specify the external guarantees that will be required to ensure beyond all doubt and by more than purely verbal guarantees, that all the principles, including especially the principle relating to majority rule are implemented effectively and irreversibly. We shall, however, be prepared to consider tackling the problem in a different way, for example by seeing whether we can give expression to the six principles by some entirely new constitution designed from scratch. If this were done I should like to ask my colleagues around this table to reflect on the possibility of drawing in some way on the store of wisdom, constitutional expertise and practical experience of the Commonwealth.

6. The British Government propose to acquaint the Governor of our stand on the whole issue as I have just described it, and to consult him on how it can best be conveyed to all sections of Rhodesian opinion. It will also be made clear to him that, if in the light of the British Government's statement of policy, the rebellion is not brought to an end and the illegal regime fail to indicate their willingness to give way to a broadly based Government responsible to the Governor, then more drastic action will be required to pursue our purposes. At the same time, all proposals made before i.d.i. with particular reference to any which could have envisaged proceeding to independence in advance of majority rule, would be withdrawn and the Rhodesian regime could have no assurance that further discussion could be resumed, quite apart from our continuing insistence on the fifth principle.

7. In these circumstances, and given an assurance that we shall

/have...

have the backing and support of Commonwealth Representatives at the United Nations in the proposals we are making, the British Government will be prepared to agree, during the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly, to appropriate mandatory sanctions under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, in the form of Security Council resolutions, providing for comprehensive sanctions against selected Rhodesian exports, and perhaps at a somewhat later stage further limited mandatory action to make the oil control more effective. Speeches of a number of my colleagues last week have shown that there is a general understanding of the risk of mandatory sanctions escalating into a general economic war covering the whole of Central and Southern Africa. For the reasons I have already explained, Her Majesty's Government would not be prepared to contemplate this. Perhaps we could go into this more fully in restricted session. This is what Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are prepared to do. I have a further proposal. I hope that we have now made clear beyond all argument our recognition that while Rhodesia is a British responsibility it is a matter of wider Commonwealth concern. I want to go further and invoke all the assistance which it is in the power of the Commonwealth to give us. I should like to suggest that this meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers appoints a Committee of Heads of Government, with whom we can consult in dealing with the Rhodesian problem over these coming months. I would hope that at the appropriate moment this Commission would visit Rhodesia under the aegis of the British Government and the Governor, and while there make contact with all sections of public opinion in the country. Their views would be made available to all Commonwealth Heads of Government and the account /of their ...

of their continuing activities will, I hope, be available to us when next we meet to discuss Rhodesia. But I would hope also that this informal group of Commonwealth Heads of Government might be appropriately associated with the testing of Rhodesian opinion in accordance with the fifth principle, whether by the appointment of observers of any test that may be necessitated, or if, as has been previously suggested a Royal Commission is appointed, by making suggestions to the British Government about possible Commissioners for recommendation to The Queen. The informal group might also have a role to play in connection with the suggestion I have made about a possible new alternative constitution.

8. Further, since we have all agreed that a more complete cut-off of trade with Rhodesia by Zambia would be one of the most effective additional sanctions within our power to suggest, I repeat what I said on Tuesday that the Commonwealth should now produce a comprehensive scheme, backed by real practical shipments, to assist Zambia in meeting the consequences of that cut-off. While it must be for Zambia to indicate the areas in which assistance is needed, as I said on Tuesday I would feel after our lengthy bilateral discussions that the two areas where help is most needed are in an air lift and in the provision of the vehicles and other equipment needed for surface transport. I recognise the problem for smaller countries and for less developed countries. But in this great Commonwealth effort to secure a great Commonwealth objective, I offer you the socialist principle; "From each according to his means: to each according to his needs" and the need here is the need of Zambia for the great contribution that Zambia can make to our common objective.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday - September 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for Colombian Ex-President Alberto Lleras Camargo

The attached memorandum from Acting Secretary Ball recommends that you receive Colombian ex-President Alberto Lleras Camargo at a convenient time next week.

Dr. Lleras has come to Washington on a special mission for Colombian President Carlos Lleras Restrepo. President Lleras requests that you receive him.

We understand that the mission is to inform you of a project to develop the Choco Valley of Colombia across which the Pan American Highway closing the Darien Gap will run.

The Choco Valley Development Project has been researched by the Hudson Institute of New York for the Colombian Government. The principal elements of the project are:

1. Dam up two rivers to create two large inland lakes, the waters of which would be used to generate some 3.3 million kilowatts for use in Colombia and Panama.
2. Join the two lakes with the Atlantic and Pacific by canals which will enable ocean-going vessels to move close to the Colombian industrial complex in the adjoining Cauca Valley and provide an alternate inter-oceanic route for vessels up to 20,000 tons.
3. Open up this inner frontier of Colombia for exploitation of mineral, petroleum and forest resources.

The project is attractive. On the basis of the Hudson Institute studies, it appears to be technically feasible and economically justifiable. The price tag for all elements of the project runs around \$700 million, but it can be done in segments, with the cost-benefit ratio for each segment being favorable.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~By ju, NARA, Date 7-13-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

The subject matter covers one of the inner frontiers of South America in which you have expressed interest. The appointment has been requested by President Carlos Lleras and he has sent an outstanding Latin American statesman to convey his views. I strongly recommend that you grant the appointment. As soon as State has talked to Dr. Lleras and determined more precisely what he will say to you, we will send you a substantive briefing memorandum.

Jim Jones tells us that you have 1:00 p.m. on Wednesday, September 13, open.

W. W. Rostow

Approve appointment
for 1:00 p.m.,

Wednesday, September 13

☒

Prefer not receive him

☐

Speak to me

☐

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 10, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENTSubject: Appointment for Ex-President of
Colombia Alberto Lleras CamargoRecommendation:

I suggest that you receive ex-President Alberto Lleras Camargo during the week of September 12.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Background:

An appointment with you has been requested by President Carlos Lleras of Colombia to receive former President Alberto Lleras Camargo. Ex-President Lleras Camargo has been named a special emissary for this visit and will be arriving in New York September 10. Although we have not yet received the official notice of topic, the main reason for the appointment, according to our understanding here and in Bogota, is to discuss a large development project, the proposed San Juan-Atrato waterway in the Choco region of Colombia.

I recommend that you receive ex-President Alberto Lleras Camargo in the week of September 12. This would honor the request of President Carlos Lleras, an emerging leader of hemispheric economic integration and hear out ex-President Lleras, an outstanding Latin American statesman; President Lleras has described the matter for discussion with you as having "transcendental hemispheric importance."

A detailed paper will follow on the proposed San Juan-Atrato waterway in the Choco region of Colombia, giving

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GROUP 3Downgraded at 12 year intervals
not automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 88-153

By ig, NARA, Date 8-25-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

results of our investigation of its status and recommendations.

Frederic Ball
Acting Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APR 26 10 11 15

RECEIVED
HISTORICAL OFFICE

RECEIVED
RUSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 SEP 10 PM 1 14

Saturday
September 10, 1966
2:00 p.m..

Mr. President:

I believe you have seen summaries of
the attached report [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] in
North Viet Nam. It resulted directly
from a CIA effort.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The source is, I believe, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and this should be understood.
Nevertheless, some of it rings true,
notably Hanoi's thought about negotiations.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

W. W. Rostow

TDCS 314/1167-66 ---~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-411
By is, NARA Date 3-3-00

WWRostow:rlm

312

EO
12958
1.5(c)-1
0Yrs
EO
12958
3.4(b)(1)
>25Yrs

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

a. General morale and repair of damage. General morale is still high; American bombing has created a sense of unity and defiance among the people. The whole population is involved in the war and has been successfully mobilized to mitigate the effects of the bombing. Gangs of workers, students and children are responsible for selected installations and roads and their duty is to repair any damaged stretch of road, railway or bridge as soon as possible. Such gangs often work through the night and often insist on continuing work even when a raid is in progress. [REDACTED] personally witnessed a damaged section of railway track which was restored within one hour of the raid ending.

EO 12958
1.5(c)-10Yrs
EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
rs
(C)

b. Evacuation. According to a statement made by the Mayor of Hanoi in latter half of August 1966, approximately fifty percent of the population of Hanoi and fifty percent of its industry has been evacuated. However, Hanoi is still far from a "ghost town" and many people still receive permission to visit the capital to see relatives or to shop, and at evening the city is full of pedestrians and cyclists. The evacuated University of Hanoi has been functioning for nearly a year in the jungle 150 kilometers north of Hanoi, with a total of 4,000 students and 400 teachers who have built their own huts and raise their own vegetables and livestock. The University is self-supporting for all food except rice, which is supplied by the government. Rice rations in North Viet Nam vary between 13.5 and 23.5 Kilograms per month and the students get the maximum ration. The professors claim the University is functioning better than it had in Hanoi with better academic results.

c. Casualties caused by the bombing. According to the strongly pro-Peking editor of "Nhan Dan", the Lao Dong Party Daily, by the end of May over 10,000 civilian deaths had been caused since the start of American bombing. During first raid on oil installations, only a few civilians were killed. During the second raid the number of civilian deaths was "in the dozens."

d. American captives. There is no intention of trying the captured U. S. pilots as war criminals. This was stated by the Secretary General of the World Federation of Trade Unions and the correspondent of Pravda, following an interview they had together with Ho Chi Minh. They had both formed the opinion that Hanoi wished to make a deal similar to that concluded by Castro, under which the pilots would be exchanged for equipment and supplies.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-410

By is, NARA Date 2-15-00

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

EO 12958

1.5(c)<10Yrs

e. Ho Chi Minh's position and policy: the possibility of negotiations.

EO 12958

3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

(C)

(1) Basing his statements on many interviews with political leaders, senior officials and other [REDACTED] said that Ho Chi Minh and his supporters within the leadership wanted to negotiate, but could not because of pressure exerted on them by China and the pro-Peking faction within the Lao Dong Party. [REDACTED] after private talks with Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong and General Giap, had said that he had come to the same conclusion.

EO 12958

1.5(c)<10Yrs

EO 12958

3.4(b)(1)>25

Yrs

(C)

(2) [REDACTED] had a great admiration for Ho Chi Minh, whom he described as still being in control of the country and of the Politbureau and Central Committee; his personal prestige was still very high, but was subject to increasing challenge by the pro-Peking faction led by Truong Chin and Le Duan. Whereas Ho was a very able and realistic leader (he was educated in Europe and rose within the French Communist Party), his opponents were "stupid, narrow men bent on self destruction if necessary," and "just like their counterparts in Peking."

(3) The North Vietnamese were hanging on until the dry season when they expected a major offensive by U. S. forces in South Viet Nam. They felt that if they could hold this offensive and inflict a defeat on U. S. forces, the news would affect the results of the November elections in America. If possible, the North Vietnamese would negotiate after these elections had weakened President Johnson's position. However, if the Viet Cong failed to hold the American dry season offensive, there would only be a chance of negotiations if Peking allowed it, or if Hanoi became convinced that the war had definitely begun to go against North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong.

(4) Ho Chi Minh and the leaders [REDACTED] were of the opinion that a military solution in Viet Nam was no longer possible -- that a deadlock existed in South Viet Nam with the Viet Cong supreme in the jungle and the rice paddies where conditions, even the snakes and mosquitos, favored them, and the Americans virtually unassailable in the towns and on the roads, where they could bring to bear their superior technical resources. This being so, Ho Chi Minh wanted a political solution. However, Ho and his fellow leaders had no great hopes of a favorable result to any negotiations in the short term. All Hanoi could hope for was a return to the status quo. Ho Chi Minh himself had told [REDACTED] that reunification of the country was still a distant pipe dream and that, even if an agreement was made providing for the Americans' withdrawal, the Viet Cong still had a long way to go before they could take over the country.

EO 12958

1.5(c)<10Yrs

EO 12958

3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

(C)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

f. Anti-Ky government demonstrations. Senior officials had expressed dismay that the anti-Ky government demonstrations by Buddhists and others last spring in Saigon, Hue, Danang had not only been anti-Ky and anti-American but anti-Communist as well. This was one of the reasons for the Viet Cong decision to smash the elections in South Viet Nam.

EO 12958 1.5(c)<10Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

g. Chinese policy.

(1) [REDACTED] admitted that it was impossible to say whether the Chinese would permit any negotiations to take place. It was possible that Hanoi could take the initiative, but it would be in defiance of China. Any settlement in Viet Nam would be a major defeat for the Chinese who badly wanted the war to continue. The Chinese aim was to get the war to spread, bringing in the whole of Indochina and possibly Thailand (although the ability of the Thailand patriotic front to achieve any large-scale uprising was doubtful) which would drown the Americans in a series of "people's wars," weakening them until such time as China has strengthened herself to take over the fight. But at present China was "willing to fight to the last Vietnamese, to the last Indochinese." With the emergence of Lin Piao in China, the "war party" had won. This would give greater support and influence to the pro-Peking, anti-negotiation faction within the Lao Dong party. It had rendered the possibility of Hanoi deciding to negotiate even more remote.

(2) It was doubtful if even Hanoi could show any real independence of China for historic, strategic and geographical reasons. "Both North Korea and Mongolia have been able to assert their independence because they both have a common border with the USSR, but North Viet Nam cannot." It was also doubtful whether increased Soviet aid could create greater independence of action in Hanoi. Kosygin's speech after the Warsaw Pact meeting in which he pledged the help of volunteers and equipment, in fact meant pilots and MIG fighters. But what use are they -- North Viet Nam only has one airfield? To achieve anything, the planes would have to use airfields in South China. And then we are back to China again." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is of course incorrect that North Viet Nam has only one airfield.)

EO 12958 1.5(c)<10Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday - September 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for Colombian Ex-President Alberto Lleras Camargo

The attached memorandum from Acting Secretary Ball recommends that you receive Colombian ex-President Alberto Lleras Camargo at a convenient time next week.

Dr. Lleras has come to Washington on a special mission for Colombian President Carlos Lleras Restrepo. President Lleras requests that you receive him.

We understand that the mission is to inform you of a project to develop the Choco Valley of Colombia across which the Pan American Highway closing the Darien Gap will run.

The Choco Valley Development Project has been researched by the Hudson Institute of New York for the Colombian Government. The principal elements of the project are:

1. Dam up two rivers to create two large inland lakes, the waters of which would be used to generate some 3.3 million kilowatts for use in Colombia and Panama.
2. Join the two lakes with the Atlantic and Pacific by canals which will enable ocean-going vessels to move close to the Colombian industrial complex in the adjoining Cauca Valley and provide an alternate inter-oceanic route for vessels up to 20,000 tons.
3. Open up this inner frontier of Colombia for exploitation of mineral, petroleum and forest resources.

The project is attractive. On the basis of the Hudson Institute studies, it appears to be technically feasible and economically justifiable. The price tag for all elements of the project runs around \$700 million, but it can be done in segments, with the cost-benefit ratio for each segment being favorable.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

88-156

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~By WJP, NARA, Date 1-27-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

The subject matter covers one of the inner frontiers of South America in which you have expressed interest. The appointment has been requested by President Carlos Lleras and he has sent an outstanding Latin American statesman to convey his views. I strongly recommend that you grant the appointment. As soon as State has talked to Dr. Lleras and determined more precisely what he will say to you, we will send you a substantive briefing memorandum.

Jim Jones tells us that you have 1:00 p.m. on Wednesday, September 13, open.

W. W. Rostow

Approve appointment
for 1:00 p.m.,
Wednesday, September 13 _____

Prefer not receive him _____

Speak to me _____

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3257
32a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 10, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for Ex-President of
Colombia Alberto Lleras Camargo

Recommendation:

I suggest that you receive ex-President Alberto Lleras Camargo during the week of September 12.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Background:

An appointment with you has been requested by President Carlos Lleras of Colombia to receive former President Alberto Lleras Camargo. Ex-President Lleras Camargo has been named a special emissary for this visit and will be arriving in New York September 10. Although we have not yet received the official notice of topic, the main reason for the appointment, according to our understanding here and in Bogota, is to discuss a large development project, the proposed San Juan-Atrato waterway in the Choco region of Colombia.

I recommend that you receive ex-President Alberto Lleras Camargo in the week of September 12. This would honor the request of President Carlos Lleras, an emerging leader of hemispheric economic integration and hear out ex-President Lleras, an outstanding Latin American statesman; President Lleras has described the matter for discussion with you as having "transcendental hemispheric importance."

A detailed paper will follow on the proposed San Juan-Atrato waterway in the Choco region of Colombia, giving

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

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not automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-153

By inf, NARA, Date 8-25-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

results of our investigation of its status and recommendations.

Frederic Ball
Acting Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED 10 17 15

RECEIVED
OFFICE

Saturday
September 10, 1966
8:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

You will note in Sec. Rusk's
draft letter several reasonable
alternatives to a noisy confrontation
on this matter.

W. W. Rostow

Subject: Law of the Sea and Canadian Fishing Zones
(F. Bator memo, 9/10/66 w/Dean Rusk-
Paul Martin exchange of corres.)

~~SECRET~~

*9/13/66 = reid
message Pres. approved
& which was ^{sent} ended up in
State & was destroyed*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCAT NARS, Date 8-18-86

WWRostow:rlh

Mr. Rostow
33a

~~SECRET~~

September 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Law of the Sea and Canadian Fishing Zones

As you know, the Canadians are threatening unilaterally to close off the Gulf of St. Lawrence and other adjacent waters. (Martin's letter to Secretary Rusk is at Tab A.) Secretary Rusk wants to send back a very tough letter (at Tab B) making it clear we shall protest publicly, initiate action under international law and test the Canadians' jurisdiction. Our lawyers say we are on sure ground.

Rusk and Butterworth believe we have to tell Martin we mean business. Our Canadian experts at State believe that we have a better than even chance to get the Canadians to back off.

There is a strong case for the tough Rusk letter even if it does not stop the Canadians. We shall have given them fair warning.

The Secretary wanted you to see his proposed letter before sending it. If you have doubts about it, you may wish to discuss it with Ball, McNamara and Rostow at your 12:00 meeting.

Francis M. Bator

Letter approved _____

Speak to me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 88-156
By 120, NARA, Date 1-27-92

~~SECRET~~



13141

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1966

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-408

By us, NARA, Date 7-24-03MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Letter from the Secretary to the
Canadian Foreign Minister on the
Law of the Sea

The Secretary has asked me to forward to the White House for approval the attached letter from him to Canadian Foreign Minister Paul Martin on the Law of the Sea in response to Martin's August 10 letter to the Secretary which is also attached.

We understand that at the President's August 21 Campobello meeting with Prime Minister Pearson, Pearson raised the subject and after some discussion he agreed to look into the possibility of a joint friendly suit before the International Court of Justice. The proposed response seeks to take account of this development and also suggests once again an additional course of action which might meet legitimate Canadian needs. In addition, in an effort to deter Martin, the letter also indicates the vigorous and public response we would have to make in the event he proceeds unilaterally. Our hope is that he will be persuaded that the embarrassment of a public dispute with us, in which our case appears unassailable, would be greater than the domestic political embarrassment he has said his government will suffer if he takes no action.

BHR
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Proposed letter to Mr. Martin.
2. Letter from Mr. Martin of August 10.

~~SECRET~~

Excluded from automatic downgrading

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-397
By ing, NARA, Date 8-1-94

Dear Paul:

I regret my absence from Washington delayed for a time a reply to your letter of August 10 on the Law of the Sea. In the meantime, I understand, the matter was raised by Prime Minister Pearson with President Johnson during their August 21 Campobello meeting.

I agree completely with you that this is a matter of great importance. We have again thoroughly reviewed your proposal in the light of international law, the general interests of the Free World as we see them, and our own fishing interests. We have concluded that we cannot accept, even tacitly, the establishment of the waters in question as Canadian fishing seas.

Therefore, I want to state again our willingness to give vigorous support to a Canadian effort to establish a fisheries conservation regime in the waters of concern to you.

During his meeting with the President, the Prime Minister indicated he wanted to look into our suggestion of a friendly suit between the two countries, prior to any action by your Government, before the International Court of Justice. Should a less public proceeding seem desirable to Canada, we would also be willing to engage in a suitable arbitration.

The Honorable
Paul Martin, P.C., Q.C.,
Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

~~SECRET~~

I would very much regret it if your Government were unable to see its way clear to pursuing any of the alternatives we have suggested and were to proceed with the action your letter contemplates. I do not know precisely how we would be obliged to respond to the assertion of your claim that certain portions of the high seas have become internal Canadian waters. It seems clear, however, that we would be forced to protest it directly and publicly, to avail ourselves of the legal remedies open to us, and to instruct our vessels and aircraft to disregard it. If such a situation were to develop, we should, of course, be faced with detailed inquiries from the Congress and from our press to which we would be obliged to respond. Among the aspects of the matter which it seems to me inevitably would thus become a matter of public record would be that we had made clear our strong opposition prior to the introduction of your legislation in the House of Commons and that we had suggested means by which in our judgment the problem could be resolved equitably.

This subject, like others that have troubled us in the past, will eventually be, no matter what the outcome, a part of history. In the meantime, I trust that the officials of both countries will do all possible to ensure that it does not adversely affect any of the other myriad subjects that concern our two countries.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk



33d

The Secretary of State for External Affairs
Canada

~~SECRET~~

Ottawa, August 10, 1966

Dear Dean,

You will recall that at our meeting of July 22 last, I informed you of the importance and urgency which the Canadian Government attaches to an early solution of the long standing negotiations we have had with the United States Government concerning implementation of our legislation respecting Canadian territorial waters and fishing zones. I do hope that you will be able in the near future to give us a reply which, in the light of the nature of our proposals which were as you know based on suggestions made informally by officials of your Department, will allow us to go ahead with our plans in a manner that will be satisfactory to all concerned.

As I mentioned to you, the Canadian Government is of the view that if our two Governments cannot come to an understanding on the basis of this approach, we will have to proceed, starting on the East coast, with closing the various bodies of water off our coasts as internal waters. I know that you appreciate how very important the matter is both to the Canadian Government and to the Canadian people and that the Government must with a minimum of delay take action to implement its policy in this field.

In view of our forthcoming Parliamentary session, my colleagues and I would be most grateful to you if you would give this matter your urgent consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Paul Martin

The Honourable Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-408
By 100 NARA, Date 9-24-03

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, September 10, 1966 -- 10:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Civil Air Agreement With USSR.

My earlier memorandum describing JCS objections to a civil air agreement and the Department of State's rebuttal are at Tab A. Secretary McNamara and Acting Secretary Ball come at noon ^{today} for one more look at this question.

Secretary Rusk supports the agreement as a significant step we can now take to demonstrate our desire to improve bilateral relations (Tab B). Secretary McNamara also favors the agreement. Amb. Kohler has been consulted and he recommends going ahead (although he thinks the chances for Soviet approval are only about fifty-fifty, and after some delay).

The decision before you is whether we shall now quietly sound out key Congressional leaders. If no strong objections are surfaced, Secretary Rusk would again touch base with you and then privately sound out Gromyko as to whether Moscow is ready to sign.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-156By ing, NARA, Date 1-27-92

NDavis:WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

Saturday
September 10, 1966
2:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

This cable indicates the Asian peace initiative is still alive in Asian minds.

On page 2 the passages about Japanese leadership in Asia; the U. S. election; and Thanat's advice against any further "pauses" will interest you.

W. W. Rostow

Bangkok 3130, Sept 9, 1966 -- ~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-157

By mg NARA. Date 2-12-90

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

35a

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR MARTIN (BANGKOK 3130) Sept 9, 1966

SUBJECT: Thanat's Peace Initiative

In a call on Thanat this morning, I made the presentation suggested. Thanat was obviously very pleased and asked that I convey his appreciation to the Secretary and Mr. Bundy for the quiet support and understanding they had given his efforts.

He said that on his visit to Indonesia he thought he had made considerable progress. Suharto, he said, had expressed himself as categorically in favor of proceeding. He said that his presentation to the Parliament had been extremely well received. Malik's reaction he described as a bit more refrained, although he said the statement issued was better than he expected. He said he thought Malik was thoroughly in favor of the idea, but thought that Indonesian support might be more useful if Indonesian open reaction were somewhat less than total endorsement.

Thanat reported Malik as saying that he thought it might be useful if the Indonesians made a separate quiet approach to North Vietnam and perhaps through North Korea to North Vietnam. Thanat said that he had encouraged Malik to do so and said further to Malik that he was not only quite willing to step aside, but thought that it would be better if Indonesia and possibly Japan could assume the leadership role in the future.

Thanat said he told Malik he was seeking no personal credit for himself or for Thailand, but he was interested only in the end result and that he and the Thai Government would support any initiative that might contribute to the achievement of that goal. He therefore was prepared to have Japan or Indonesia or both provide the venue and issue the call for any subsequent conference which might be convened.

Thanat said that Malik had undertaken to exert pressure on Mrs. Ghandi and Saran Singh on his forthcoming visit to New Delhi. Thanat said Malik hoped to get the Indians to move to a position of more active support of the basic concept. He further said that, although the first Indian response had not really been forthcoming, a subsequent response just received indicated a much more forthcoming position and indicated that Malik's intervention might well have been successful. Thanat instructed Sompong to make a copy of this latest note available to us and we will cable it after its receipt. Thanat suggested that when Malik visited Washington he might be encouraged to exert further pressure on the Indians and to have Indonesia take a more forthcoming and positive position of leadership.

Thanat agreed that the Japanese open espousal was particularly significant.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-408
By iso, NARA, Date 9-24-03

He confirmed, what I had previously reported as a personal conclusion, that one of his objectives had been to have a public Asian call for a Japanese assumption of political leadership. Thanat thought the Japanese response really marked the beginning of a new pattern of effective political power in the Pacific which he hoped would be beneficial. He also expressed the hope that the Indians might be similarly motivated to realize that their influence would not amount to very much as long as they maintained what he described as their schizophrenic attempt "to carry water on every projection of their anatomy." He did not anticipate for the foreseeable future that the Indians could be brought to play a constructive role. He added that he had told Malik that the Thai would have no objection if they could get India to act with Indonesia and Japan as a sponsor for a conference, if this would assist in getting the Indians committed.

Thanat said that he had no illusions that the Communists would react favorably any time soon. He thought there would be no reaction at all until after the American elections when the evidence of support for President Johnson's policies, which he anticipated the elections would demonstrate, might put them in a more receptive frame of mind. He said he hoped we were not thinking of any further "pauses." I said that so far as I was aware, we were not.

In reference to the Filipinos and Malaysians, Thanat said that he did not anticipate any lack of support from Malaysia. Although he had expected The Tunku to be unhappy at the inevitable confusion of "ASA" with the peace initiative, he felt this would not militate against full Malaysian participation.

With regard to the Filipinos, Thanat said he expected no great difficulty although, if there were a call to be issued for a conference, he would not expect the Filipinos to join him in taking a back bench in order to give the lead to the Japanese, Indonesians, and possibly the Indians.

Thanat said that he felt the initiative was still alive, that he probably would refer to it in his UN address, and he hoped that during his trip he might have a forum in Japan where he might reiterate the call for Japanese leadership. He said he would continue to be grateful for ^{any} additional suggestions or comments he might have and looked forward to discussing this further with Bundy and the Secretary when he visited the States.

Martin.

Saturday
September 10, 1966
8:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

You will note in Sec. Rusk's
draft letter several reasonable
alternatives to a noisy confrontation
on this matter.

W. W. Rostow

Subject: Law of the Sea and Canadian Fishing Zones
(F. Bator memo, 9/10/66 w/Dean Rusk-
Paul Martin exchange of corres.)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By DCH NARS, Date 8-18-86

WWRostow:rlh

SECRET

September 10, 1966

Mr. Rostow
36a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 88-156
By JP/JP NARA, Date 6/19/92

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Law of the Sea and Canadian Fishing Zones

As you know, the Canadians are threatening unilaterally to close off the Gulf of St. Lawrence and other adjacent waters. (Martin's letter to Secretary Rusk is at Tab A.) Secretary Rusk wants to send back a very tough letter (at Tab B) making it clear we shall protest publicly, initiate action under international law and test the Canadians' jurisdiction. Our lawyers say we are on sure ground.

Rusk and Butterworth believe we have to tell Martin we mean business. Our Canadian experts at State believe that we have a better than even chance to get the Canadians to back off.

There is a strong case for the tough Rusk letter even if it does not stop the Canadians. We shall have given them fair warning.

The Secretary wanted you to see his proposed letter before sending it. If you have doubts about it, you may wish to discuss it with Ball, McNamara and Rostow at your 12:00 meeting.

Francis M. Bator

Letter approved _____

Speak to me _____

SECRET



13141

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1966

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter from the Secretary to the
Canadian Foreign Minister on the
Law of the Sea

The Secretary has asked me to forward to the White House for approval the attached letter from him to Canadian Foreign Minister Paul Martin on the Law of the Sea in response to Martin's August 10 letter to the Secretary which is also attached.

We understand that at the President's August 21 Campobello meeting with Prime Minister Pearson, Pearson raised the subject and after some discussion he agreed to look into the possibility of a joint friendly suit before the International Court of Justice. The proposed response seeks to take account of this development and also suggests once again an additional course of action which might meet legitimate Canadian needs. In addition, in an effort to deter Martin, the letter also indicates the vigorous and public response we would have to make in the event he proceeds unilaterally. Our hope is that he will be persuaded that the embarrassment of a public dispute with us, in which our case appears unassailable, would be greater than the domestic political embarrassment he has said his government will suffer if he takes no action.

DAR

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Proposed letter to Mr. Martin.
2. Letter from Mr. Martin of August 10.

~~SECRET~~

Excluded from automatic downgrading

3/33

366

Bates

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-408
By no, NARA, Date 9-24-03

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-397
By ing, NARA, Date 8-1-94

Dear Paul:

I regret my absence from Washington delayed for a time a reply to your letter of August 10 on the Law of the Sea. In the meantime, I understand, the matter was raised by Prime Minister Pearson with President Johnson during their August 21 Campobello meeting.

I agree completely with you that this is a matter of great importance. We have again thoroughly reviewed your proposal in the light of international law, the general interests of the Free World as we see them, and our own fishing interests. We have concluded that we cannot accept, even tacitly, the establishment of the waters in question as Canadian fishing seas.

Therefore, I want to state again our willingness to give vigorous support to a Canadian effort to establish a fisheries conservation regime in the waters of concern to you.

During his meeting with the President, the Prime Minister indicated he wanted to look into our suggestion of a friendly suit between the two countries, prior to any action by your Government, before the International Court of Justice. Should a less public proceeding seem desirable to Canada, we would also be willing to engage in a suitable arbitration.

The Honorable

Paul Martin, P.C., Q.C.,
Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

~~SECRET~~

I would very much regret it if your Government were unable to see its way clear to pursuing any of the alternatives we have suggested and were to proceed with the action your letter contemplates. I do not know precisely how we would be obliged to respond to the assertion of your claim that certain portions of the high seas have become internal Canadian waters. It seems clear, however, that we would be forced to protest it directly and publicly, to avail ourselves of the legal remedies open to us, and to instruct our vessels and aircraft to disregard it. If such a situation were to develop, we should, of course, be faced with detailed inquiries from the Congress and from our press to which we would be obliged to respond. Among the aspects of the matter which it seems to me inevitably would thus become a matter of public record would be that we had made clear our strong opposition prior to the introduction of your legislation in the House of Commons and that we had suggested means by which in our judgment the problem could be resolved equitably.

This subject, like others that have troubled us in the past, will eventually be, no matter what the outcome, a part of history. In the meantime, I trust that the officials of both countries will do all possible to ensure that it does not adversely affect any of the other myriad subjects that concern our two countries.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk



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The Secretary of State for External Affairs
Canada

~~SECRET~~

Ottawa, August 10, 1966

Dear Dean,

You will recall that at our meeting of July 22 last, I informed you of the importance and urgency which the Canadian Government attaches to an early solution of the long standing negotiations we have had with the United States Government concerning implementation of our legislation respecting Canadian territorial waters and fishing zones. I do hope that you will be able in the near future to give us a reply which, in the light of the nature of our proposals which were as you know based on suggestions made informally by officials of your Department, will allow us to go ahead with our plans in a manner that will be satisfactory to all concerned.

As I mentioned to you, the Canadian Government is of the view that if our two Governments cannot come to an understanding on the basis of this approach, we will have to proceed, starting on the East coast, with closing the various bodies of water off our coasts as internal waters. I know that you appreciate how very important the matter is both to the Canadian Government and to the Canadian people and that the Government must with a minimum of delay take action to implement its policy in this field.

In view of our forthcoming Parliamentary session, my colleagues and I would be most grateful to you if you would give this matter your urgent consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Paul Martin

The Honourable Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-406
By us, NARA, Date 9-24-03

~~SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

Saturday
September 10, 1966 -- 3:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

These are Bill Bundy's notes on your conversation with General Ne Win. I discussed your concern with a leak -- a concern which Bill Bundy fully shares.

Our joint recommendation is that if you okay this summary for the record, we will make sure that it is read by Sec. Rusk; one copy will be filed, with greatest security, in the State Department; one copy, in the White House; and there will be no further distribution whatsoever.

The reason is this: All those who need to know in this government will know the essentials of your conversation once Sec. Rusk is informed.

W. W. Rostow

Procedure approved _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-13-98

~~SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

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W. W. Rostow

Procedure approved _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By fw, NARA, Date 7-13-98

~~SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY PERSONAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Mr. McNamara
Mr. Rostow

Here are rough notes of the key Ne Win talks, as we have them so far. Would like quick notes of last night, also any place where last night indicated some possible error in what we have. Walt will want to check what I have dictated off what the President told him and me on separate occasions.

Hank Byroade stresses that Ne Win was literally putting his life on the line to be so frank. This must not be quoted, or even hinted at in any way that could cause it to be attributed to Ne Win.

Distribution will be handled by [initials]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *fw* NARA, Date *7-13-98*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

September 9, 1966

Memorandum of Private Conversations with
General Ne Win

(This memorandum has been prepared for distribution on a strictly limited and need-to-know basis. Ne Win gave his views in utmost confidence, and any disclosure or attribution to him could be extremely embarrassing.)

1. Conversation with the President, September 8.

Highlights were:

a. Communist Chinese Leadership. Ne Win stated emphatically that Lin Piao is really a very sick man, and that in his judgment Lin Piao is simply being used (presumably by Mao) and is not really a power factor or likely to assume power. Ne Win based this health judgment on people who had seen Lin Piao recently. Ne Win thought that the real coming power in the struggle for succession was Teng Hsiao-ping, whom he thought to be really powerful and ideologically strong and tough.

b. The internal situation and power struggle in Communist China was a deadly serious matter, and made sharp changes in the regime (and by implication its policy) probable "early rather than late" and in any case in much less than the 5 - 10 years that might have been supposed earlier.

c. In response to the President's summary of his two-pronged stance on Vietnam as outlined at his press conference that same day, Ne Win said that if he were to convey these views to the Communist Chinese as the President's honest private views, the Communist Chinese would think that he, Ne Win, had sold out to the Americans -- but, secondly and more important, they would misunderstand and regard this summary of the President's position as soft. In essence, Ne Win was saying that the Communist Chinese understand only strength.

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-408
By us NARA, Date 7-24-03

Saturday
September 10, 1966
8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Bill Gaud handed me this yesterday
for transmission to you. The table was
prepared at your request.

W. W. Rostow

Table: FY 67 Foreign Assistance Program
(in millions of dollars)
September 8, 1966

September 8, 1966

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FY 67 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
(in millions of dollars)

	(1) <u>President's Appropriation Request</u>	(2) <u>Authorization Bill Conference Cuts Below the President's Approp- riation Request</u>	(3) <u>Cuts by Passman Subcommittee</u>	(4) <u>Resulting Figures</u>
Development Loans	665	-	75	590
Technical Cooperation/ Development Grants	231	21	10	200
Alliance for Progress	543	-	35	508
Supporting Assistance	747	32	25	690
Administrative Costs	57	1.5	1.5	54
All Other Economic	226	-	-	226
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Total Economic	2,469	54.5	146.5	2,268
Military Assistance	917	42	50.0	825
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
TOTAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY	3,386	96.5	196.5	3,093

NOTE: I have been unable to get exact Passman cuts--I believe the figures in Columns 3 and 4 are approximately correct. The cuts that hurt the least are in Development Loans and the Alliance for Progress. I understand the Passman Subcommittee retained the Section 205 (World Bank Transfers) prohibition in the Appropriation Act but included language (which I believe is subject to a point of order) permitting us to use the full amount of appropriated Development Loan funds in our regular program.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

W.S.G.

39a

Saturday
September 10, 1966 -- 2 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here is a report on Erhard's current posture. It notes that he may be a somewhat "tougher bargainer in his coming talks with President Johnson than has been the case in the past" and he may raise more directly the matter of a "hardware solution" to the nuclear problem.

The latter jibes with the attached memorandum of conversation I had yesterday with Georg von Lilenfeld.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

and Memcon dtd 9/9/66

3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-50
By SJ, NARA, Date 11/30/01

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, September 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

[REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1),
3.4(b)(6)

The chances for establishing diplomatic relations between Bonn and Bucharest have gone up sharply recently as a result of Minister of Economics Schmuecker's visit to Bucharest. A majority [REDACTED] [REDACTED] now believes some form of diplomatic relations will be established in the near future, possibly when Rumanian Foreign Minister Manescu visits Bonn.

3.4(b)(1),
3.4(b)(6)

[REDACTED] Manescu has been invited to visit West Germany, but no definite dates have been announced. Although the [REDACTED] comments should be viewed in the light of his belief that the Hallstein Doctrine may have outlived its real value, he has not previously taken such a firm position on this matter.)

3.4(b)(1),
3.4(b)(6)

The West German Foreign Office is coming increasingly to believe that Paris and Bonn will find a final solution which will permit French troops to remain in West Germany. It is widely felt in the Foreign Office that Minister Schroeder's hard "legalistic" position was essentially tactical and that Schroeder will not stand in the way of a compromise even if it falls short of his earlier demands.

[REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

Somewhat ironically, Chancellor Erhard will probably gain both political stature and respect as a result of the recent difficulties in Bonn. The current dispute with the Generals will not lead to any real weakening of civilian control, and Minister of Defense Von Hassel is likely to stay on. The crisis will, however, trigger some necessary reforms which will satisfy legitimate military grievances.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-50
By SL, NARA, Date 11-30-01

Erhard will probably be a somewhat tougher bargainer in his coming talks with President Johnson than has been the case in the past. In part this would be the result of Erhard's increasing confidence that he can hang on as Chancellor and belief that some more concrete results are necessary at this time. It would also reflect increasing pressure from his top advisors to be firm on certain critical issues, e.g. offset agreements.

Certain advisors are also advising Erhard to press for progress on the nuclear control problem, and to raise more directly the matter of a "hardware solution." Erhard, however, as most people in West Germany, has given up the "hardware" approach as a real solution. It is unlikely, therefore, that he would press this matter firmly. Instead he will probably use such an argument for whatever tactical advantage there is in it to gain what he feels is the minimum and legitimate claim of West Germany, i.e., participation in alliance nuclear planning and targetting.

3.4(b)(1),
3.4(b)(6)

3.4(b)(1)

Saturday
September 10, 1966
10:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

This report from Rangoon on
the press playback of Ne Win's visit
here could not be more heartening.

W. W. Rostow

Rangoon 381

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, September 10, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM EMBASSY RANGOON (No. 381)

Both in coverage and content, the press play we are receiving on the Ne Win visit is extraordinary. This is exemplified by today's press which saw both the WPD and the Guardian giving over most of their front page to reports of Ne Win's activities in Washington yesterday. The vernacular press duplicated, with some newspapers exceeding this proportion.

The themes of the visit we wanted to see emphasized, i.e., U. S. peace efforts coupled with respect for Burma's neutrality have come through far better than we could have possibly imagined in the Burmese press. Focused around the President's warm and personalized treatment of Ne Win, this has contributed heavily to favorable press handling. The Burmese in turn obviously feel they are getting their main points across to us equally well which is undoubtedly the reason why the occasion is being afforded both sides with optimum reward.

In coverage and favorable comment, press play exceeds that given to the only other two Ne Win visits which could possibly compare, - USSR and China.

The press treatment, even at this early stage, indicates the visit is being seen here as "an unqualified success" as characterized by this morning's Guardian. Both Foreign Office Permanent Secretary U Tun Shein and Division Chief U Aung Myat Kyaw told the Charge last evening and this morning they thought the visit was going "very well indeed" and we have every reason to believe this modestly reflects the Burmese Government view.

The communique is being broadcast today and will be carried in tomorrow's press which should give us at least one more day of full treatment.

We have hit the jackpot.

Ranard

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By gw, NARA, Date 7-13-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, September 10, 1966 -- 3:20 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Jess Cook, TIME, came in in connection with an article being developed for the next issue of TIME magazine. He showed me their draft which is a case for our maintaining major U. S. military forces on the mainland of Asia even after a Viet Nam settlement. He asked how would we meet that argument in the light of our stated willingness to withdraw our forces from Viet Nam. I pointed out that the maintenance of our commitments under the SEATO Treaty on the mainland of Asia need not necessarily involve keeping divisions on the land in Southeast Asia. That commitment depended upon the credibility of our ability to defend Southeast Asia should aggression be resumed. That credibility in turn would depend on our seeing it through in Viet Nam; on the availability of forces in the area or accessible to the area; and on the continued confidence of those on the Asian mainland in our will to deal with aggression. I underlined the differences between the situation in Central Europe and Korea, on the one hand, and the position in Southeast Asia, on the other.

Cissy Morrissey, LIFE, came in for background on the Marcos visit. I told her something about the general significance of the visit and the preparations being made. This is in connection with a special LIFE story being developed.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Saturday, September 10, 1966 -- 2:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

With respect to the leak to Reston, George Ball reports the following:

-- He does not know who leaked the information to Reston.

-- On Thursday morning Reston called him; indicated a rather full knowledge of the message. George Ball decided not to deny the existence of the message and corrected one substantial error of misinterpretation.

He said, in short, that the leak was not a deliberate action by himself or those responsible for policy in the State Department, and he did not know the source of the leak.

W. W. Rostow

Friday, September 9, 1966
9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Prime Minister Wilson asked that his recent speech at the Trade Union Congress conference be brought to your attention.

He says all the right things with great courage. The question, as Cecil King kept saying this morning, is whether he can make it stick.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln



44a

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

7 September, 1966.

Dear Wact,

Michael Palliser has written to me from No.10 Downing Street to say that the Prime Minister would be grateful if I would have the enclosed copy of his speech delivered to the President. I am therefore sending you it and would be grateful if you would bring it to Mr. Johnson's attention.

Yours sincerely
Michael

(Michael Stewart)

Professor W.W. Rostow,
Special Assistant to the President,
White House,
Washington, D.C.

THIS TEXT IS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PRESS IN ADVANCE ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF CHECKING AGAINST DELIVERY. . THERE CAN BE NO GUARANTEE THAT IT WILL BE ADHERED TO AND IT SHOULD NOT BE USED WITHOUT CHECKING.

(Time of delivery approximately 3.00 p.m.)

Speech by the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson,
O.B.E., M.P., at the T.U.C. Conference, held in the
Opera House, Blackpool, on Monday, September 5, 1966.

.....

The reason why I sought the privilege of addressing Congress was to enable me to set out the facts of our economic situation as the Government sees them.

Before doing this I would like to join in all that has been said in expressing deep regret that George Woodcock is not able to be with us today and expressing the warmest hopes for his speedy recovery.

No one will underrate the importance of your debates this week. Not just on one issue which has dominated the headlines, but on all the wider aspects of the nation's economy. For what you will be debating is not only our future economic progress but the future of our country itself, the maintenance of full employment, the achievement of rising standards for our people, our ability to play the part we all want to play in raising the standards of peoples living at a much lower standard of life than our own; our strength and influence in the counsels of the nations.

I frequently receive letters and resolutions from Unions affiliated to Congress, asking, often demanding, that Britain's influence, Britain's weight be thrown behind some great issue in world affairs. But let us be clear that that influence, that weight, the power to intervene, perhaps decisively, the power to lead, all these depend not only on our moral strength, they depend on our material strength, our economic power and vigour, our ability to stand on our own feet. As I said to Congress here in Blackpool two years ago on the eve of the 1964 Election, in the last resort no one will listen to a nation in pawn.

Our balance of payments problem was an index of a deeper malaise, of 15 years in which we have not finally come to terms with the end of our imperial posture, in which we have willed ends far beyond the means we are prepared to make available by our industrial effort. We pass resolutions calling, and rightly calling for more and more aid to developing countries for a war on world hunger: we resist the efforts that are necessary to produce the munitions for that war. We are in danger of turning inwards on ourselves in pursuit of a leisure we have not earned, of being debased by the philosophy of the never-had-it-so-good society, which withholds the resources needed to care for others in our midst who have never had it good at all.

And there is a deeper element in the malaise, in this worship of false gods - the development on an organised basis of the gamblers' economy, which at its least harmful leads to loafing round betting shops, at its worst is one step away, if that, from syndicalised crime. When this summer we produced our measures to deal with the emergency, the attack on the seamer side of gambling was an essential corollary - and this is to follow when the legislative proposals are brought forward by the Government after the relevant discussions.

The immediate and urgent test of our economic will and resolve is our ability to balance our overseas payments.

When I was here two years ago, a month before this Government was called to office, Britain was running a severe, almost a record deficit on our

overseas payments and, when the final figures for the year were known, the country was in the red to the tune of £769 million over the year, and this after exercising the option to defer the payments due, interest and capital repayment on the North American loan, an option to be called on only in exceptional circumstances.

That was the challenge from which we started. The prior task of your Government from taking office two years ago has been to close this gap, to strengthen the pound, to get into surplus, and to pay for the indebtedness we had to incur to cover the deficit we inherited. To this task all else has been subordinated. We have not allowed short-term considerations of electoral popularity to deter us from what we have believed to be right for Britain, even though for a long time we were operating with a miniscule majority, with an inevitable Election ahead. Indeed, I believe that it was precisely because the British people saw that we were prepared to take any measures that were necessary, regardless of their electoral effects, that they gave us a more decisive mandate in March. This mandate we are using, and will continue to use in fair weather and in foul, till we get the country right and sound and prosperous. There will be no letting up in the severity of the Government's economic measures until we are paying our way and seen to be paying our way. And this means that the Government must govern.

Today I am going to give you the facts, and some of them are sombre. This Congress will not flinch from them. But at a time when so many abroad, and some at home are only too ready, whatever their motives, to sell Britain short, I feel it right to put the facts in their real perspective, the achievements and successes, the trends that are going in the right direction, as well as the dangers, the so far unrealised conditions of success and the categorical imperatives for Britain's industry, for this Trade Union Movement, and for the British people as a whole. First the balance of payments. The 1964 deficit of £769 millions was cut last year to considerably less than half that figure (again exercising the loan deferment option). The value of our exports was 7 per cent above 1964: our imports, partly restrained by the import charge, only 1 per cent up: our trading account showed an improvement over the year of £270 millions and the capital account, thanks mainly to some very tough and politically highly controversial measures including taxation, improved by £145 millions.

By the early months of this year we could fairly look forward to the achievement of our target of being in balance in the latter part of the year. In the first five months of the year, before the figures were distorted by the strike in the shipping industry, our exports were 9 per cent above the same period of 1965. This was nearly double the average rate of increase for the past 10 years.

But imports remained stubbornly high and by the summer the red light was flashing. The most serious cause was the rise in import costs, particularly through high prices for copper and other basic materials, caused partly by the high level of activity in America as a result of the Vietnam war, partly by strikes abroad, and by the effects of events in Rhodesia. That level of prices represented an addition to our import bill at an annual rate of over £100 million.

But it was not only import prices, outside our control; the volume of imports of manufactured goods, held down last year, was rising ominously. Rising incomes not backed by productivity led to higher imports of consumer goods. Capital goods too. Our manufacturers were bringing in modern and sophisticated types of capital equipment from abroad, where not long ago we led the world. This can be changed and must be changed. In some of the most competitive markets in the world our exports have been rising sharply this year - in the United States for example, where they increased by 23 per cent last year and by 32 per cent in the first half of this over the same period last year. We can be competitive when we try. The important thing is that we stay competitive and that is the reason for the urgency of the prices and incomes policy.

But it was not only imports. On capital account there was a worsening through purely fortuitous reasons. Current and capital account together: it became clear our position was worsening and, at a time when world exchange markets were disturbed by the Euro-dollar squeeze, caused by America's response to her own difficulties when interest rates were rising, when traders and financiers sold sterling to meet that squeeze, this led to financial movements which went far beyond the actual worsening in our balance of payments. At a time when the two great reserve currencies, dollar and sterling, were both under pressure, we were bound to bear the brunt of the attack.

In the grave situation we faced we had, as we had warned, to take urgent action. We had to operate rapidly on our exports and imports. We had to lighten the load on the economy. We tightened up the regulations for hire purchase, increased taxation by the regulator and the surtax surcharge in addition to the Selective Employment Tax whose main effect is only now to be felt. Bank Rate was raised and the monetary squeeze tightened. We took additional powers to restrain building. Houses, factories, schools and hospitals and development area buildings were specially exempted. We cut back, too on public expenditure; on investment both in the nationalised industries and in local government. We speeded up the measures we had announced for a massive reduction of overseas Government expenditure involving a major redeployment of our forces now overseas. We called for a standstill in prices and incomes - wages, salaries and dividends - for a period of six months, and, for the first time it is prices as well as incomes, to be followed by a further six months' period of severe restraint.

These measures were necessary to ensure that we are paying our way at the earliest possible moment. On the basis of the most recent estimates, though no estimates of this kind can be hard and firm, the measures taken should lead to a swing from deficit to a substantial surplus over the next twelve months, quite apart from the effects of the welcome reduction which has recently taken place in import prices.

Our measures have been severe, tough: they have administered a shock, as they were meant to, to the economy and the whole British people. They involve compulsion as well as a call for voluntary action. For, as Nye Bevan reminded us, in the last speech he ever made in the House of Commons, one of the defects of our post-war democracy has been that it has not yet proved that it can voluntarily save itself, from drift, decline and disaster, by imposing the necessary disciplines in time. And where voluntary action failed to work in time, we have had to impose the disciplines of Governmental and legislative action. For too many years we had the ineffectiveness of Government by peroration: we have taken action.

I know it was with a heavy heart that our friends in the Trade Union movement and more widely in industry heard that measures of this kind had become necessary. They asked whether it was a return to the old days of stop-go-stop, where long periods of stagnation, even of short time working and unemployment, long periods of disincentive to industrial development and modernisation would be followed with a brief period of feverish boom, the very nature of which plunged us into further payments crises and a return to restrictions.

Certainly the measures we have taken, though they are necessary to relieve over-heating in large parts of British industry, and though they are necessary for securing a shake out and redeployment of labour, particularly into our export and basic industries, these measures do not, of themselves, provide any lasting solution. They provide one of the conditions for a solution, but our success will depend on the extent to which we can make use of the opportunities we have created for ourselves. For over a period of years, and this was the main theme of my speech to Congress two years ago, economic strength and independence can be secured not by monetary measures, however essential, but by strengthening the industrial base, modernising and streamlining industry to a peak of efficiency, changing industrial attitudes - on both sides - and at the same time securing an effective

redployment of the economy away from the soft-centre industries to the key sectors which can earn our exports, and guarantee us on a competitive basis against excessive imports.

In the very nature of things, none of this could have been carried through in two years. In speech after speech in 1964 I warned that time would be required for changing the industrial pattern and structure on the lines that were required, and that we should have to meet any immediate crises by the more orthodox financial means of recent years, until our industrial redevelopment was bearing fruit.

Industrial re-organisation, the acceptance of the techniques of national planning, through the National Plan, the Department of Economic Affairs, the strengthened machinery of N.E.D.C. is progressing fast. The Ministry of Technology was created to apply the techniques of new scientific advance to British industry with particular reference to those industrial sectors for whom it had direct responsibilities; computers and electronics, machine tools and engineering, and now ship building. But who among our detractors would have expected the operation to have been completed, the factories built and in production in less than two years? Who would have expected that the massive help we have given in these two years to civil research in science and in technology would by this time have provided from laboratory or pilot plant the new processes that would revolutionise our export and import position?

We have tackled the problems of the new industries case by case. 19 Industrial Economic Development Committees, the massive and searching enquiries into aircraft, tools, ship building - now printing and soon shipping - are bringing out with stark clarity the urgent measures that need to be taken by industry and by Government, if these industries are to complete their full pattern in the new Britain. Powerful investment incentives are coming into operation, key industries are receiving direct financial encouragement with research, with research development, and with pre-production orders for new projects.

We have created the Industrial Re-organisation Corporation to refashion the structure of some of our older and some of our newest industries, to get the benefit of large-scale production, particularly in industries where the unit of production was too small and timid. For there are industries in Britain today where, in five years, we have to make good the neglect of fifty.

We are stepping up food production to save imports. We are pushing on with the expansion and modernisation of industrial training and re-training to meet the needs of a generation of industrial change.

These are the policies that provide the key to the future, the strengthening of the industrial base which will allow us to expand year by year without those devastating lurches into balance of payments crises every time we dare to increase our industrial production.

But in 1966 we cannot wait for these measures to deliver the goods. While industry is going through a rapid process of change - a change which will be even more rapid in the years ahead - we need to ensure that the effort of our industries as they are today, to increase their exports and economise in imports, are not to be undermined by chronic shortages of labour and capacity, by over-full order books and by the long and uncertain deliveries which are the surest prescription to failure in export markets.

Our measures are aimed not at unemployment, but at re-deployment. And it is of paramount importance, however harsh this may seem, that where, as a result, demand and real employment fall, the labour is released to meet the urgent demands of the export and other key industries. At this time, hoarding of labour, work sharing, must be scheduled as practices totally inimical to our national recovery.

Not in manufacturing industry only, in building and construction too.

The cut-backs in office building and other less essential building will release manpower, skilled and unskilled, for the priority programmes of housing, hospital and school building, and the building of factories, not least in the development areas.

The measures that have been taken, then, are not a negative exercise in the old routine: they will be used to produce a springboard for further expansion, above all expansion in accordance with economic and social priorities. They are needed to buy time while a new industrial dynamic is forged in our essential industries. The gap that is being created in the economy will be progressively filled by exports and by the provision of the tools of economic expansion, particularly through the development of a new technology, and in the fullness of time, by much needed social provision.

But this is not the only difference from the old stop-go. I have referred to the exemption of housing, schools, hospitals, factories. I have referred to the measures we have taken to shield the development areas. Indeed we are pressing on with powerful and special investment incentives to help the development areas, and with a still bigger industrial factory programme in those areas, to even out the disparities in employment - and unemployment - between the prosperous areas and those of the North and North West, Scotland and Wales and other areas.

In sharp distinction to the policies of 1956/57 and 1961, we have shielded the social services from the cuts, for we feel that when it is necessary to tighten belts then above all is the time to protect those least able to protect themselves. This autumn we shall see a new attack on poverty through the new Social Security Act and the re-organised Ministry of Social Security. And social services are being given a new economic relevance, as we follow the Redundancy Payments Act, with the new Act coming into force next month, providing wage-related sickness, unemployment and injuries benefits.

But if these measures are to be truly used as a springboard for further expansion, if they are too decisively differentiated from the stop-go routine, two conditions are essential, productivity and the prices and incomes policy.

First, productivity: in addition to industrial redeployment including manpower deployment, we have to give the highest priority to measures aimed at increasing productivity. Our investment incentives and the modernisation drive are part of this - and here the drive is against backward employers, through tightening up the controls on monopoly and through our policy for prices.

But the biggest challenge facing the Trade Union Movement in the productivity drive is the elimination of every avoidable restrictive practice, whether at national or workshop level. And the biggest problem here is overmanning, deliberately employing more men than are needed to do a given job. In the long years of the depression, work-sharing, spinning out the work to make it go further, these were understandable. In the conditions we face today, so far from being a protection against unemployment they are the surest road to it. Equally they are the most effective bar to rising living standards. In a full employment economy or a near full employment economy living standards can rise only by more output per man. This is a basic reality in any system of economic society, capitalist, democratic, socialist, Communist. Increased money wages of themselves do not raise living standards. Higher living standards can be earned only by higher production, and this means higher production per man.

The restrictive practices that are still too prevalent today amount simply to a means of laying claim to a full day's pay for less than a full day's work.

In my speech at Scarborough three years ago, I quoted Swift, writing 250 years ago: "whoever can make two ears of corn or two blades of grass to grow upon a spot of ground where only one grew before, would deserve better of mankind and do more essential service to his country than the whole race of

politicians put together". The lesson for the industrial society of today is this. Any man or any group of men, any organisation, whether at national or local or factory level, who use industrial power to ensure that eight men have to be employed to do what six can do, are combining to damage the interests of Britain and indeed the long term interests and living standards of the men they seek to protect.

The same applies to restrictions on outdated apprenticeship and training requirements. For today one of the most serious bottlenecks in increasing production is the shortage of skilled manpower - even in many of our development areas. And there are still craft trades today where it is easier for a rich man to get through the eye of a needle than for a school leaver, perhaps from a grammar or a comprehensive or secondary technical school, - not to mention older men - with all the necessary qualifications, to be taken on for training owing to restrictive conditions on recruitment.

Again - as the process of industrial change renders ancient skills outdated, the emphasis must be on shorter periods of training and on multi-craft training.

And what is true of overmanning, the problem of numbers employed on a particular job, applies equally to demarcation, the problem of qualitative manning. Here it is right to pay tribute to the largely unchronicled record of individual Unions on demarcation problems in these past two years. What has been done is partly the result of Trade Union mergers and wholly the result of industrial statesmanship. At risk of being invidious I would pay tribute particularly to the recent achievements in ship building. If we go on at this rate the Trade Union Movement will rapidly be putting some of the learned professions to shame.

But there are still scandalous cases of who-does-what holdingback production, and even frustrating the installation of new and revolutionary techniques in production.

The Trade Union Movement will have to tackle this problem - to act and to act quickly, as soon as a problem is identified, to mediate and if necessary adjudicate.

For productivity is rising all too slowly.

In the past year, it is true, despite the knocking of our detractors, hourly output in manufacturing industry rose by 3 per cent.

But the benefits of increased production per man-hour were taken out in the form of fewer hours worked, in increased leisure. And if our people demand - as they have demanded, and won - increased leisure through shorter hours, we have the right to ask that each hour worked must be filled with sixty minutes worth of work well done.

The second condition of success is an effective prices and incomes policy. And productivity, here again, holds the key.

The policy of this movement, laid down over many years, and never more clearly or unitedly than at Scarborough in 1963, is for a planned expansion of incomes, real incomes. This means, can only mean, rising productivity, for where there is no increase in productivity, higher money wages lose their value through the rising prices, and real incomes fail to rise. Increased money wages without increased productivity are a hollow mockery. Worse, they increase industrial costs, exports are priced out of the market, rising home prices mean that British products yield place to imports, and disaster follows.

Productivity, then, is an essential to a planned incomes policy: it cannot be a substitute for it. Nor can we afford to wait.

In 1965 we paid ourselves increases in money incomes of about £1,800 million compared with the previous year. About £1,300 million of this represented increases in wages and salaries. Over the same period we earned only £600 million by way of increased production. In the 12 months up to July this year earnings per hour were rising by 9 to 10 per cent, productivity by 3 per cent.

This could only mean, did only mean, higher prices which increased industrial export costs, and at the same time robbed the increased pay packet of its meaning.

This is why we had to call a halt. The Government, after 15 months of the policy foreshadowed in the Declaration of Intent on Productivity, Prices and Incomes, has now called for a total standstill in prices and incomes, wages, salaries and dividends - for 6 months, followed by a further 6 months of severe restraint thereafter. This is required to give us a breathing space, to reassert a competitive position for ourselves abroad and to restore confidence in our economy.

The Government knows, as every Delegate knows, the anomalies, the inequities, as those caught by the beginning of the standstill have their agreed increases deferred, while others, happier in their timing, are receiving the benefit of an earlier award. The Government equally pays its tribute to the restraint and statesmanship of those who have accepted this deferment, whatever the disappointment, however - in many cases - however strong the case.

Clearly we considered whether exceptions could be made, exceptions for those where a wage increase had been previously agreed, exceptions for lower paid workers, for pay and productivity agreements. But reluctantly we had to conclude that the standstill must be general and absolute: to make exceptions would be to open the door to other, no doubt equally just, claims.

The period of restraint which follows the standstill must be governed by criteria which have still to be discussed with both sides of industry. It would be wrong for me to anticipate those discussions, but clearly they must cover, amongst other things:-

the role of pay and productivity agreements;

the problems of those in public service, for example where productivity tests are not appropriate;

the problem of lower paid workers - in the interests of lower paid workers, not as stalking horses to enable differentials to be invoked;

the role, for wages as well as prices, of the newly strengthened Prices and Incomes Board which has done such a tremendous job in the face of many and great difficulties, and whose reputation for fairness is now becoming so widely acknowledged.

Sir, as Congress knows, the Government have taken statutory powers both as regards the early warning system, references to the Board, and as regards the 6 months standstill. To take these powers as a precaution was essential: we hope that it will not be necessary to use them and that the policy will work by voluntary means. But if that is not so: if there is breakaway action, whether in wages or prices, or by any other challenge by any section of the community seeking to secure a privileged position for itself, the Government will, reluctantly, have to replace voluntary action by operating the statute. We do not seek as a long-term policy to destroy the machinery of collective bargaining, which has been built up by the statesmanship of this movement and of management over the generations - that is a pledge I give you. But after/six months' standstill and the six month period of severe restraint - after that period, long-term, it will still be necessary, if we are to maintain full employment, to ensure that the planned expansion of incomes is related to the increase in national productivity, and does not attempt to go beyond it.

Mr. President, I know that the Government's policy, and the attitudes of the trade union movement to it, are to be debated earnestly, searchingly, later this week. Congress will decide its policy and that of the movement it leads.

As I have said, the Government will have to decide its own action in the light of the problems that develop, and the national interest as a whole. But you will know that not only the Government but the whole country - and I believe our friends far more widely - will be following events at Blackpool with the deepest interest.

There will be plain, straight speaking. Hard things will be said, possibly even about the Government. We can take it. But two things I ask you to recognise.

First, I ask you to recognise that the Government is acting in clear sincerity, in the interests as we see them of the nation, and of the workers, by hand and brain, of this country. The methods, the powers we have taken are new and unprecedented, it is true: the aims and objectives are what we have proclaimed in Opposition and in Government, at Congress and Conference for many years.

For, over those years, we have said that an incomes policy, the planned expansion of incomes to which we are pledged, could only be demanded by a Government which by its social and taxation policies created the necessary climate of social justice. This we have done. Our first major act as a Government was to increase social security benefits for the old age pensioner, the war pensioner, the industrially disabled: there has been the help we gave to the pre-1948 industrial injury cases, the creation of new Ministry of Social Security entitlements in place of National Assistance. Our action on housing subsidies and rate relief, our restoration of rent control and security of tenure. And our fiscal record, diminishing fiscal privilege in expense accounts, tax free capital gains, as well as the corporation tax favouring investment as against dividends.

Two years ago, here at Blackpool I said clearly that our declared policy on incomes would be made a reality by a Labour Government because I said we would have the right to ask for it: we would have that right because we were prepared to contribute the three necessary conditions. We have contributed those conditions. The first, and I quote what I said in September 1964,

"an assurance of rising production and rising incomes, so that the sacrifice, the restraint, for which we ask is matched by an assurance that it will result in increased production and increased rewards. Second, an assurance of equity and social justice, in that our policies will be directed to the benefit of the nation as a whole and not to the advantage of a sectional interest. Third, an assurance that what we ask for in wages and salaries will apply equally to profits and dividends - and rents. We shall not create a free-for-all for the speculator, the land profiteer and the landlord - and then ask wage and salary earners alone to show a concern for the national interest that others are not required to show".

We have honoured those conditions, and in the face of great and hostile opposition.

We have delivered, and we have the right now to ask you and those you represent for your free and willing assent to what the national interest requires.

And the second thing is this. Restraint in incomes, an incomes policy related to productivity, is our only guarantee against unemployment. If incomes, any incomes, rise faster than productivity, we are back in the old dilemma when industrial expansion and full employment go under as a result of a balance of payments crisis. I have referred to the old stop-go-stop, with all it meant, and all it threatened, in terms of unemployment and short-time working. Yes, it produced a temporary equilibrium in our balance of payments, for idle factories import no raw materials, and the families of workers on short-time cannot afford much in the way of imported luxuries.

Yes, you can pay your way with unemployed factories and unemployed workers. But let us remember - over the past 10 years every stop phase in the stop-go rhythm was marked by higher and higher unemployment figures.

If as a nation we reject a policy of incomes restraint, then we are automatically opting for a return to stop-go conditions where much heavier unemployment will be needed to secure an equilibrium in our overseas trade and payments.

A free-for-all is one thing. But full employment means planning. And you cannot plan the economy for full employment, in full employment if a large and decisive factor remains in the anarchy of the free-for-all. But I have to warn that this is not all. It might be tempting to some to say, let things rip, and let the balance of payments go to hell. I told your General Council what this would mean. In a world where trade and finance are being increasingly threatened by growing illiquidity, where the world currency situation is pushing up interest rates in market after market, one false, careless step - particularly by the custodians of a major trading currency - could push the world into conditions not unlike those of the early 30's, where nation was set against nation, seeking to export its deficit, then its unemployment to its neighbours, where panic economic nationalism taking refuge in every device of currency manipulation and protectionism produced uncertainty and stagnation in world trade. This could happen again: it adds urgency to the efforts of the Government with our economic partners to find a solution to the world's liquidity problem.

And if it were to happen, we as a nation more dependent than almost any other on overseas trade, could well be plunged into a depression such as we have not seen in this generation, where the workless might be numbered not as $1\frac{1}{2}$ - 2 per cent but at $1\frac{1}{2}$ - 2 millions.

This, Mr. President and Delegates, is what is at stake. This is why, as I said at one of the TUC Conferences I addressed this summer, at the end of the day these issues are settled not by a card vote, whichever way it goes. They are settled by the much more grim reality that if our costs rise, and our trade balance goes wrong, other figures than card votes will take over, figures of under-capacity working and redundancies, and short-time, and unemployment.

I know what we are asking. I know the loyalties as well as the pressures, the deep ingrained traditions inherited from the defensive days of this movement. It is hard to say it, but we cannot fight the problems of tomorrow with the rusty tools of the past. We face a new challenge - the greatest I believe in our peacetime history.

For what is at stake is the ability of our country not only to pay her way, but to pay her way and maintain full employment, to be able to expand and not be plunged into crisis by expanding, above all to turn into reality the vision that we, the vision that those who have gone before us, have fought for, and which is now within our reach, the vision of a just society, generous and compassionate towards those who need our compassion, and powerful and steadfast in the fight for peace.

10 Downing Street,
Whitehall, S.W. 1.

45

Friday, September 9, 1966
2:00 p.m.

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Status Report

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Detention is apparently unrelated to the activity in which we are interested. He seems to be one of 300 Vietnamese picked up in Saigon because of concern about their political views. We have a report, too, that the Government of South Vietnam is suspicious of [REDACTED] relations with a couple of French businessmen suspected of being French agents.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

We have an indication from the Director General of the National Police that [REDACTED] That would be late tonight, Washington time, calculating from the time of the arrest.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

We and Saigon are concerned that the arrest of [REDACTED] may jeopardize the operation. However, Ambassador Lodge and his people are unanimous in not wanting to take this up with Ky at this time. They will take another look if [REDACTED] is not released soon.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

At this end, the inclination (State, CIA, McNamara) is to go along with Lodge's judgment for the moment and to sit tight. However, Dick Helms is sending out immediately an experienced operative to take a hand in this matter.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-411
By is, NARA Date 3-3-00

cc: Bill Moyers
Henry Wilson

Friday, September 9, 1966, 9:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bringing Erhard into Contact with the Congress

You instructed me to check with Rusk and McNamara about a possible Congressional reception for Erhard. Secretary Rusk is worried that a wide-open reception hosted by the armed forces and foreign affairs Committees might become difficult for Erhard -- in the light of the Mansfield proposal on troops in Europe, etc. He recommends, as an alternative -- and if you think it makes sense -- that the Vice President host a small lunch for Erhard on the Hill. Obviously, Senators Mansfield and Fulbright must be invited. However, the Vice President could manage the conversation if the lunch were kept reasonably small. McNamara agrees.

Francis M. Bator

OK -- I will call the Vice President _____

OK -- have Rusk/Ball ask the Vice President _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

Friday
September 9, 1966 -- 6:25 pm

Mr. President:

I don't want to clutter your reading;
but occasionally a minor item comes
through which gives us heart.

I think you will enjoy what this young
Dutchman, fighting with us in Viet Nam,
wrote home (top of page 2).

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

DEF 9 U.S.
NR POL 27 VETS
FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R REP AF

ARA EUR FE

NEA CU INR

E P IO

L FBO AID

SCA PPT SY

AGR COM FRB

INT LAB TAR

TR XMB AIR

ARMY CIA NAVY

OSD USIA NSA

WH-FBI WSC

20

A-136
NO.

UNCLASSIFIED

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1966 SEP 7 PM 7 10

INFO: BONN, BRUSSELS, LONDON

ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy THE HAGUE

DATE: September 2, 1966

SUBJECT: Dutch-American Marine in Vietnam Gains Publicity

REF :

A young Dutchman serving with the United States Marines in Vietnam was the subject of recent coverage in local newspapers. The Marine, Bert KNOESTER, was recently wounded in action and as a result his parents were interviewed by local reporters. The resulting publicity has been favorable to the United States, particularly in view of the comments by Knoester in his letters to his parents regarding the activities of anti-Vietnam demonstrators in the Netherlands.

The young man immigrated to the United States upon completion of his secondary schooling. He settled first in Texas and enlisted in the Marine Corps about three years ago. Earlier in his tour of duty as a Marine he was stationed aboard the USS Independence and was interviewed there two years ago by the same two reporters who recently interviewed his parents. This earlier acquaintance with the Marine increased the interest of the reporters in his case.

During their interview the reporters received permission from Mr. and Mrs. Knoester to read and quote some of the young man's letters from Vietnam. Of particular interest were the remarks made by the young Knoester in response to an article in one of the Dutch papers which his parents send him regularly regarding the demonstrations by Dutch youth against American policies in Vietnam.

FORM
4-62 DS-323

UNCLASSIFIED

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

POL:JECrump:ecg

9/1/66

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:CANcel en

Clearances:

DAO:RBHarrell (draft)

UNCLASSIFIED

2

"Your youth are a bunch of stupid teenagers who know nothing. They should have their heads knocked together and be sent out here so that they can be put in the front lines. I can imagine how scared they would be. They should see once what the Viet Cong are doing to the local inhabitants of Vietnam. They should also see how the Americans are fighting and giving their lives for these people. They should see the help which America is giving Vietnam for reconstruction. They should see how in Chu Lai the Americans are sparing no money nor effort to teach the Vietnamese, working fourteen to seventeen hours a day, seven days a week."

One of the reporters in a conversation with an Embassy officer stated that the young man's letters were indeed full of conviction about the American policies in Vietnam and indicated that he plans to remain in that country following his separation from the Marine Corps. One of his purposes in joining the service was to gain expeditious naturalization as a U.S. citizen, a goal which he reportedly will soon achieve.

SOHM

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 8, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agreement on US Private Investment in Big Indian
Fertilizer Plant

No action required, but I thought you would be interested to know that Amoco (Standard of Indiana) and the Indian Government expect to sign formal agreements next week for the Madras Fertilizer Plant-- India's second largest, operating or planned. Along with the top priority given to agriculture in the Fourth Plan published last week, this is more encouraging evidence that Mrs. Gandhi is pushing ahead with the agricultural policy reforms she and Subramaniam have agreed to as their part of our deal to continue PL 480 help.

The negotiations over this plant have crystallized a number of Indian policy decisions designed to speed fertilizer production and distribution. For instance, this is the first partnership between the Indian government and a foreign private firm. The Indian government will own 51% of the stock but has agreed that Amoco should have an equal voice in management and that the plant should distribute its products, free of controls. These concessions have triggered strong political reaction in India from the politicians who see in them more evidence that Mrs. Gandhi is selling out to foreigners.

AID has worked closely with Amoco and the bankers, and this is a good example of how AID cooperation with business and use of an investment guaranty can stretch the aid dollar. Amoco is making a \$9 million equity contribution, and a consortium of private US institutions is lending \$21 million. AID will issue an extended risk guaranty of \$15.75 million on that loan (75%). This use of the guaranty makes a \$30 million investment possible without using any USC funds. What's more, at least \$21 million will be used for buying US equipment, and Amoco's association with the plant may eventually increase export of US raw materials.

AID and State are considering ways of getting the most political mileage from this without stirring up Mrs. Gandhi's opposition.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 7-13-98

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Limited Official UseThursday - September 8, 1966
5:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Death of Wife of Former Argentine President Illia

The wife of former Argentine President Illia died this afternoon. You will recall that she was in Houston a couple of months ago for medical treatment. A message of condolence is in order. Because of how the message might be misused in the present Argentine political context, I think it would be advisable to give Ambassador Martin discretion in how to convey the message to Dr. Illia.

I recommend your approval of the attached telegram to Ambassador Martin containing the text of a suggested message and instructions concerning form of delivery.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓Disapprove

Attachment

Limited Official Use

Limited Official Use

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO BUENOS AIRES

Unless you perceive objection, please deliver following message
to former President Illia:

"I was saddened to learn of the death of Mrs. Illia.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in expressing our deepest
sympathy."

You may use your discretion regarding the form and manner in
which this message is delivered to former President. We do not
propose to make this message public.

Limited Official Use

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, September 8, 1966, 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

At Tab A is Erhard's reply to your message suggesting trilateral talks on offset, etc. The reply takes the Schroeder line -- delay the decision to start such talks until Erhard's visit.

George McGhee will see the Chancellor tomorrow morning. He will make a strong case that, in the light of Harold Wilson's problems, such a delay would create a very high risk of the unravelling process we all want to avoid. (McGhee's instructions are at Tab B.)

McCloy and the rest of us will work out a proposed response to Erhard's letter tomorrow morning.



Francis M. Bator

Attachments

Ihr (sgd. Ludwig Hard)." 50a

The official English translation reads as follows:

"The Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Chancellor

Bonn, September 7, 1966.

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you very much for your letter of August 25, 1966.

I have noted with great interest your proposal that the problem of the Armed Forces, deployment and sharing of the Foreign exchange burden, which will have to be met from the middle of next year, be examined at a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Finance of the United States, Germany and Great Britain. I, too, am greatly concerned about this and connected political and military problems. They are of considerable importance to the Alliance, whose preservation and consolidation is the common aim of our two Governments.

In any event the conference you proposed will have to be thoroughly prepared and its possible effect on the Alliance carefully examined. I suggest that, during my forthcoming visit to Washington, we include your proposal in a comprehensive discussion of the future of the Alliance and long-term planning for the defence of Europe.

The proposals to be submitted by the Anglo-German Mixed Commission, whose work will conclude in mid-October with a meeting of the competent German and British Ministers, will also have a bearing on the solution to the problem of off-setting the foreign exchange cost of Allied troops stationed on the

-3-


DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 7-13-98

continent, and hence on any examination of this problem by the three powers.

Your advice and support will be of especial value to me in the present difficult situation. I am looking forward to my visit to Washington with great pleasure. With cordial good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
(sgd. (Ludwig Erhard.)"

Respectfully yours,


(Minister Georg von Lilienfeld)
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

~~SECRET~~

COPY

EXDIS

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Sep 8, 3:10 PM '66

FOR AMBASSADOR McGHEE FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY

Schroeder discloses appalling lack of understanding of problems raised by proposed British action. Germans must be made to understand in unequivocal terms that unless we act immediately in concert with the FRG the British will be irrevocably set on a course of conduct that will result in substantial withdrawals from the BAOR. The result would put enormous pressure on the United States to make corresponding withdrawals and a process of unravelling can be started, with critical consequences.

It is totally unrealistic to postpone starting these discussions until after the Chancellor's visit since the pressure for action in Britain due to instability of sterling cannot be dealt with in a leisurely fashion. The British have now agreed to participate in trilateral talks on the condition that they be held immediately (i. e. next week) so as not to postpone the target date of October 13 for completion of the work of the Anglo-German Commission, by which date they are determined to have "results."

The US has proposed trilateral talks not repeat not for the purpose of "ganging up" on Germans but because offset and force level (including logistic backup) questions can no longer be considered separately or bilaterally. Re "ganging up" argument you should note we have already suggested to British they should take account of some \$20 million annually of balance of payments savings they will obtain through transfer of US aid squadrons from France to UK

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By ig, NARA, Date 8-25-88

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EXDIS

and reduce their German offset demands by that amount. Conceivably similar savings could be found. It would be our strong hope that out of trilateral discussions practical arrangements can be worked out on both questions of finance and force levels which will be acceptable on all three countries and preserve essential NATO security requirements which we are convinced will otherwise be endangered. The US is prepared to come to trilateral talks with suggestions for consideration to accomplish this end result. NATO would of course be consulted on any force level questions but it is of utmost importance that three countries be in agreement on them.

Accordingly, you should in your forthcoming talk with Erhard do your best to persuade him to agree to commencement of trilateral talks next week in view of serious dangers which would result from delay.

END

BALL

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