

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Thursday, September 8, 1966, 11:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

I have discussed the attached tactical suggestion on non-proliferation with Walt. You should know that he prefers his original proposal: that we approach the Russians before taking it up with the Germans. Before making up your mind, you will wish to hear his argument in detail, as well as get the views of Rusk and McNamara.

The heart of the problem is timing. In terms of Alliance politics, it would be best to play this slowly, over several months. However, that does not meet your November problem.

  
Francis M. Bator

Attachment

OK to go forward  
Walt

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, September 7, 1966 - 9:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: ~~Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Sharing~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 88-156  
By inf, NARA, Date 1-27-92

After a lazy week on the Massachusetts shore, I just read Walt's very fine memo on non-proliferation (Tab A). I ~~strongly second his proposal that we sound out the Russians on language which would commit us to keeping a veto indefinitely on the firing of any US-produced weapons, even if these are owned by some joint NATO force.~~ This is the point where the Russians have a legitimate security interest; it is a fair test of their willingness to move on non-proliferation.

However, I would suggest a ~~marginal change in Walt's procedure.~~ I think we should (1) ~~tell the Germans our plans before Secretary Rusk approaches Gromyko;~~ and (2) ~~tell the Russians that, while we will want to consult with our allies, we are ready to move if Moscow is.~~

~~By first telling the Germans, we eliminate the danger of a Russian leak to Bonn that we are dickering with Moscow behind Erhard's back. Further, we will be in a better position to tell the Russians that we mean business. If Rusk can only tell Gromyko that we are willing to check this out with our allies, we may not get a real test of Moscow -- and it would be harder to put the monkey on the Russians' back. A more definite U.S. proposal would give us a much more convincing public case that we have moved more than halfway and that it is now up to Kosygin.~~

Approaching the Germans Educating the Germans that this move is really in their interest -- that they lose nothing of real value and shift the onus of blocking a treaty from Bonn to Moscow -- is crucial. ~~I think it requires a personal Presidential emissary -- someone trusted by the Germans (and known to be sympathetic to their nuclear interests), close to you, and able to make the case with clarity and precision.~~

Although he will not, I am sure, propose himself, ~~I would strongly recommend that you ask Walt to do this.~~ I think he fills the bill better than anyone else in the Government. And -- while I know your views about international travel by your staff -- I do not think this is something which can be done by anyone from the outside.

~~Whoever is sent -- if you approve an emissary -- should go to Germany very soon.~~ And I think he should tell Erhard, albeit gently, that this is what we will do, not ask his permission. ~~(In terms of narrow foreign policy considerations, it would be better to do this during the winter -- after we make headway~~

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~~on troop levels, offset, etc. However, this would ignore your important November problem. Thus, I would vote for sending Rostow right away, well before the Erhard visit. Erhard is bound to raise this issue. Unless we have prepared him, we would have to hit him cold when he is here.)~~

Procedure Before making up your mind you will wish to hear out Rusk and McNamara, both on Walt's proposal and the tactics.



Francis M. Bator

Set up meeting with Rusk, McNamara, Ball, et al \_\_\_\_\_

Wait \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Friday, September 9, 1966, 9:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bringing Erhard into Contact with the Congress

You instructed me to check with Rusk and McNamara about a possible Congressional reception for Erhard. Secretary Rusk is worried that a wide-open reception hosted by the armed forces and foreign affairs Committees might become difficult for Erhard -- in the light of the Mansfield proposal on troops in Europe, etc. He recommends, as an alternative -- and if you think it makes sense -- that the Vice President host a small lunch for Erhard on the Hill. Obviously, Senators Mansfield and Fulbright must be invited. However, the Vice President could manage the conversation if the lunch were kept reasonably small. McNamara agrees.

Francis M. Bator

OK -- I will call the Vice President \_\_\_\_\_

OK -- have Rusk/Ball ask the Vice President \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_



Friday, September 9, 1966 -- 5:45 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Chalmers Roberts, The Washington Post, telephoned today to ask why he wasn't "leaked the Rusk letter instead of Scotty Reston." I told him I knew nothing about it. He also probed at various stories about changes in view about the war in Hanoi and Peiping. I told him that there was no scrap of evidence, of which I was aware, that indicated they were ready to negotiate.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 9, 1966

SUBJECT: Message for President Shazar

President Shazar's brother has just died. Shazar was close to him, and the death is especially sad because the brother was able to join him in Israel from Russia only a couple of years ago.

Since Shazar has just been your guest and was so attentive to your family, I felt you might like to send him a brief personal note of condolence. If you approve, we will send the following telegraphically to Ambassador Barbour for quick delivery:

"I was saddened to learn of the death of your brother Dr. Abraham Rubashoff who was reunited with you in Israel only so very recently. Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending you and your family our deeply felt condolences."

Shazar is still talking of his visit here. Foreign Minister Eban told Ambassador Barbour just a few days ago that Shazar had mentioned how many little gestures obviously bore your personal touch. Shazar told Ambassador Harman at the end of his stay here that this visit had made all the problems of being President worthwhile.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Friday, September 9, 1966  
3:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Lodge picked his moment and  
was as bare-knuckled as we could  
wish.

Only hope it sticks.

Ky has learned so much and done  
so well, on balance, that it would be  
real nice.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 5604  
~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DWA NARS, Date 8-18-86



~~SECRET EXDIS~~

Friday, September 9, 1966

## TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Saigon, 5604)

When I saw Ky the morning of September 9, I sensed that the moment was ripe and took advantage of it to give him a piece of my mind, which I had long been contemplating, about the disastrous nature of his press relations. I began by asking him whether it would not be possible for him not to have so many press conferences. If he did have press conferences, could he not have them in an orderly way with questions submitted in writing and Bui Diem sifting the questions and all questions and answers given both in English and in Vietnamese - which would give him time to think.

He immediately became apologetic and said he realized how many mistakes he had made and what a bad performance it had been yesterday.

Realizing that he was in this chastened frame of mind, I went on to say that the press conferences of the kind he had been having could absolutely destroy him. I said that I simply could not understand why he thought it was necessary to do this. He had a tremendous record of solid achievement: restoration of law and order in Hue and Danang; devaluation of the currency; mitigation of the congestion of the port; advancing the nation's march toward constitutional democracy. These were all deeds. A public man who has such actions to his credit does not need to talk. I said that many Prime Ministers did nothing and, therefore, they must try to deceive the public by talking. His case was exactly the reverse.

I cited the case of Wendell Willkie who, after his nomination in 1940, had been a tremendously attractive figure with a very good chance to win. But, I said, in three short weeks at Colorado Springs he absolutely destroyed himself by desultory interviews with any newspaperman who happened to come along. For one thing, he had by this procedure prematurely made public some of his most telling points which he should have saved for the last part of the campaign and, for another thing, he got himself tripped up into positions which he had spent the rest of the summer explaining. Yet he had been a very attractive and dynamic man, just as General Ky is. But this doesn't prevent the press from chewing a man into little pieces.

I recalled the visit of Prime Minister Khrushchev in 1959 when he had one press conference upon arrival and one upon departure with all questions in writing, all questions and answers in English and Russian, and all questions sifted by Gromyko. Why could not Ky follow the same procedure, I asked. The time may come when Ky will go to the United States and when this happens

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 88-152  
By 118, NARA, Date 7-27-88

he will not be just another Prime Minister. He will not be like the Prime Minister of Afghanistan, or Nepal; he will be the Prime Minister of a nation at war in which there are several hundred thousand American troops. He will be looked at by the fathers and mothers of soldiers who are all prepared to believe in him and have confidence in him. But this will not happen if he has the kind of press conferences he has been having lately.

Ky said he realized that I was right and was grateful to me for giving him this good advice. He said that yesterday he had not intended to have a press conference, but that they started asking him questions and he felt that he ought to answer. I said he did not have to answer. All he has to do is put on a pleasant smile and wave his hands and say, "Sorry boys, that's all". Ky said he wanted to say something about the elections. I said, put out what you want to put out on the election, and then say, "Sorry that's all" and "walk to your car".

I think that this made an impression on him, and I hope that you will not have the kind of distressing experiences which you have been having and which distress me as much as they do you.

This has been a difficult matter for me because it involves criticizing him to his face and I wanted to wait until I knew that he was very much upset as he was this morning.



55  
Friday, September 9, 1966  
11:00 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Your 5:00 p. m. appointment with General Ne Win  
today, Friday, Sept. 9

There is no substantive business of which Bill Bundy and I are aware for this final session.

I recommend, therefore, that you again take him off by himself, thank him for his candor in talking with you yesterday, pursue any points further, and leave him feeling that in the President of the United States, far away in Washington, he now has a friend who trusts him, his judgment, and his integrity.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 7-13-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - September 9, 1966 - 7:15 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bunker's Report on the DR

Ambassador Bunker returned from the Dominican Republic last night.

Attached is his report on what he found.

The essence of his report is summarized in this sentence:

"I came away, therefore, with a feeling that very considerable progress had been made, that the country was calmer than I had ever seen it, and that President Balaguer was acting with determination and a good deal of courage in tackling the many difficult problems with which he is faced."

Ambassador Bunker will contact Senator Fulbright early next week when the Senator returns to Washington to inform him of his views on the Dominican situation.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 88-156  
By isp, NARA, Date 1-27-92

cc - Bill Moyers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

56th

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By gn, NARA, Date 7-13-98

September 9, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Present Situation in the Dominican Republic

1. During the period September 6-8, I had an opportunity to review the situation in the Dominican Republic with President Balaguer, ex-President Garcia Godoy and Professor Bosch as well as with Ambassador Crimmins, the United States MAAG and AID officials, Generals Braga and Linvill of the IAPF, and Dominican civilians.

2. I have come away with the impression that despite a situation which presented many difficulties of a political, economic and social nature, the new administration of President Balaguer has made commendable progress. Political compromises, not always desirable, had to be made in an effort to overcome and heal old hatreds and bring into the Government as wide a spectrum as possible. Strenuous efforts had to be made to set in motion a stagnant economy. While austerity measures had to be applied to the economic situation, at the same time account had to be taken of the dangerous and explosive situation arising from widespread unemployment, and measures to increase job opportunities had to be planned and implemented. The loyalty and cooperation of the Armed Forces, historically a question mark in the Dominican political situation, had to be secured.

3. I believe the new Administration has made considerable progress in working toward the solution of these difficult and complex problems. Despite a few initial missteps and an early tendency on the part of the Reformista congressional majority to ride roughshod over the opposition, President Balaguer has made serious efforts to obtain the cooperation

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.



of Professor Bosch and the PRD. Professor Bosch for his part has expressed his personal friendliness for President Balaguer and has endeavored to carry out his role and that of his party as a constructive opposition. I mentioned to both President Balaguer and Professor Bosch that it seemed to me essential, if the country were to pull through the difficult situation it faced, that both the leaders and their parties should endeavor to cooperate and work together. Both expressed themselves as being in full agreement.

4. On the economic side President Balaguer is holding weekly meetings with Ambassador Crimmins, top members of our AID staff and Dominican officials concerned with economic problems. Both President Balaguer and Ambassador Crimmins stated that they felt very satisfactory progress was being made in implementing the AID programs. The Government is also beginning to grapple with the difficult problem of reorganization of the Sugar Corporation, Dr. Balaguer wished me to express to you his very deep appreciation for the allocation to the Dominican Republic of additional sugar quota and for the support and assistance he had received. While other problems have been encountered, as, for example, the present depressed tobacco market and some additional unemployment brought about by austerity measures, on the part of the business community there appears to be increasing confidence in the ability of the Government to survive the present difficulties.

5. In response to my question about the attitude of the Armed Forces, President Balaguer replied that he considered that his relations with the Minister of the Armed Forces, the Chiefs of Staff and other leaders were excellent, that he held weekly luncheon meetings with them, that they accepted the fact that the military establishment was in need of reorganization, including a reduction in numbers. He has already taken steps to reduce its size by attrition and begun to dismantle the power base of a troublesome group at the San Isidro air base near Santo Domingo. He said that in some elements, particularly in

the Air Force, changes would have to be made but that in general he was well satisfied that a proper relationship existed between the Government and the Armed Forces. He also expressed himself as pleased by the plans for reorganization submitted by the MAAG and proposed to go ahead with them although they would have to be put into effect gradually.

6. I reminded the President that as of September 1 there were 2700 troops of the IAPF in the Dominican Republic and that according to the present schedule the last contingent would leave on September 20. The President replied that this schedule was entirely satisfactory to him but then inquired whether it would be possible to retain, for psychological purposes, a small group until the end of September or perhaps even for a week or two in October without any formal request from him. I replied that while this might be possible any substantial extension would require a new resolution by the OAS following a formal request from him. Dr. Balaguer stated categorically that he did not wish to make such a request and my own view is that little is to be gained by an extension of the kind he has suggested; and that on the other hand perhaps a good deal of criticism of the OAS, the IAPF, and especially the U.S. might result. Both General Braga and General Linvill feel that an extension such as suggested by Dr. Balaguer would be unwise.

7. Dr. Garcia Godoy expressed considerable optimism over the results of the Government's efforts during the first two months in office. In spite of some initial errors he felt that Dr. Balaguer was gaining experience and confidence and that there was a widespread feeling in the country that this administration must be kept in power for its full four year term. Dr. Garcia Godoy, who expects to arrive in Washington September 18 as the Dominican Ambassador, has been performing a very useful role in an advisory capacity to both President Balaguer and Professor Bosch and as intermediary with them.



8. The one exception to the generally favorable view which I received was that of Professor Bosch. While he reiterated his determination to work with President Balaguer, for whom he expressed personal friendship, he said that plotting was continuing and that the only way to put an end to it was to "dismantle the terrorist apparatus" led mainly by extreme right-wing civilians. He added that General Imbert was always the center of these plots but that if the eight or ten leaders were given overseas diplomatic assignments the backbone of the plotting would be broken and Imbert would quiet down. Professor Bosch said that he felt his own presence in the Dominican Republic was vital since he was in a position to exercise restraint on the masses. He expressed great concern over the economic and social problems that beset the country and felt that President Balaguer should exercise care in applying his austerity program not to aggravate further the unemployment problem. He estimated that there were between 80 or 90 thousand unemployed in Santo Domingo alone.

9. With the exception of Professor Bosch, I could find no one who felt that there were signs of any widespread plotting or any likelihood that efforts would be made to overthrow the government. While some irreconcilable elements of the extreme Left and Right stand ready to oppose President Balaguer, these have no significant popular following. While they still possess a significant quantity of arms, considerable progress has been made in collecting heavy weapons and President Balaguer is of the opinion that considerably more progress will be made in this respect. I believe that the Dominican military is loyal to Balaguer and is capable of putting down any uprising that might be foreseeable in present circumstances. The major opposition parties, Bosch's PRD and the Social Christian PRSC, in assuming the role of constructive opposition give the government their support. I came away, therefore, with a feeling that very considerable progress had been made, that the country was calmer than I had ever seen it and that President Balaguer was acting with determination and a good deal of courage in tackling the many difficult problems with which he is faced.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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10. In Senator Fulbright's absence this week from Washington I talked with his Executive Assistant, Mr. Williams, before leaving for Santo Domingo about reports the Senator had received regarding a plot to overthrow President Balaguer. I informed Mr. Williams that while rumors were always circulating in the Dominican Republic, I knew of no serious or significant plotting against the Government; that I expected to investigate these reports when I was in Santo Domingo; and that I should be glad to inform Senator Fulbright of my views when he returned next week to Washington. Mr. Williams expressed his appreciation and undertook to inform Senator Fulbright.

Ellsworth Bunker

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 8, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting Today at 5:00 p.m. with General Ne Win

I suggest that you meet privately with the General at the outset. This will be a chance to discuss:

(1) Viet-Nam -- to outline your position, your hope for an early settlement that will leave the Vietnamese people free and independent. You might also express an interest in moving forward with the constructive business of regional economic development. You may want to ask the General for his views, particularly regarding the chances of working out a peaceful settlement.

(2) Southeast Asia Regional Development -- a chance to ask the General for his views and for the ways he thinks we can be most helpful to our friends in Southeast Asia in achieving progress in economic developments and other fields.

(3) Communist China -- Ne Win has been there several times. You might ask him for his interpretation of what is now going on -- and what it means for Asia and for the world.

Standing by in the Cabinet Room as needed will be:

George Ball  
Bill Bundy  
Ambassador Byroade  
W. W. Rostow

Brig. Thaung Dan (Minister of  
Information and Culture)  
Col. Tin OO (Member, Revolutionary Council)  
Ambassador Tun Win  
Col. Ko Ko (Secretary, Revolutionary Council)  
UN Ambassador Soe Tin (possibly)

A reminder: Ne Win is a "slow starter" -- reacts best to quiet questions of his views.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Pro file* 57

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, September 8, 1966 at 12 noon

Mr. President:

Attached is a cable reporting on George Ball's conversations with Brown and Callaghan. The interesting sections are marked in yellow. Briefly:

- they agreed to join with us and the Germans in trilateral talks;
- they want us to understand that they have to move fast. Wilson must have specific savings to announce to Parliament by the middle of October.

We also have a message this morning from McGhee reporting that Schroeder is dragging his feet on trilateral talks. He is clearly worried about a U.S.-UK gang-up. Ball is calling in vonLilienfeld (Knappstein is on leave) to make it clear how important this is to us and how clearly it is in the German interest as well.

McCloy arrives this afternoon. Bowie, McNaughton, Deming, and I will begin working with him right off.

*Fm?*  
Francis M. Bator

*OK*  
*7*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 88-156  
By 128, NARA, Date 1-27-92



~~SECRET EXDIS~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-153

By inf, NARA, Date 8-25-88

Copy of LONDON 1924, Sept. 7, 1966

1. The Under Secretary, accompanied by Spiers, met with George Brown at 11:30. Lord Hood, Maclehose, and Day also attended on British side. The session continued during lunch, at which the above were joined by Callaghan, Ambassador Bruce, Gore-Booth and Figgures (Treasury). A meeting of minds was achieved rather quickly on holding tripartite talks as early as possible next week, subject to FRG agreement and understanding that such talks would not prejudice the UK timetable on accomplishing BAOR savings objectives.

2. Brown opened the session by alluding to pressures under which the UK is operating and the absolute necessity to "put the pound in order" next year. If there were a repetition of this year's Sterling crisis, Britain could write off expansion and, indeed, its future as a nation. These fundamentals set timetable which decreed that the UK must have results which will show up at the beginning of next year. This in turn requires basic decisions to be made by October 13 (date of Ministerial level mixed commission meeting in Bonn). Although UK does not start with a desire to withdraw troops and maintains position that withdrawals will only take place if 100% offset coverage cannot be achieved, current indications are that maximum which could be achieved in offset would be about 45 million pounds Sterling, leaving a gap <sup>949</sup> which cannot be closed by economies short of troop withdrawals. Nevertheless, Brown said, the UK has not made any final decisions and is willing to listen to any practical ideas which U. S. or others may have to deal with the situation. If any alternatives can be agreed by Oct. 13 date, so much the better, but shortly thereafter Parliament will return and the Government will face question which must be dealt with in terms of concrete plans to achieve needed savings. Accordingly, while UK welcomed the idea of tripartite talks on longer term aspects of this problem, such discussions cannot be allowed to delay urgent actions.

3. The Under Secretary indicated there had been some misinterpretation of US motives in proposing these discussions. We are not seeking a slow-down on British plans for dealing with what we know is an urgent situation. However, there are pressures on us as well, and we want to avoid unravelling which may come from each government dealing separately with issues they face. The Under Secretary said we are prepared to move fast; that McCloy has agreed to undertake negotiations for US; that we have several new ideas under crash consideration; and that we are prepared for rapid decisions to meet UK exigencies. The US is prepared to send McCloy either to London or Bonn next week. While such a meeting might set in train longer term studies, its principal focus should be on speedy decisions.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

By gw, NARA, Date 7-13-98



(copy of LONDON 1924, 9/7/66)

It may be desirable for UK itself to do some phasing down. If this occurred it would of course free German resources to help meet the British situation. On the other hand, it may be common conclusion that there is no better alternative than the British have themselves identified; but in any event, such discussions will insure that the situation is canvassed thoroughly by the three governments principally concerned as a prelude to wider discussions in NATO. Such discussions need not in any way disturb the British timetable.

4. In light of the Under Secretary's explanation, ~~Brown indicated his~~ agreement to talks. This could result in "mature, adult, alliance-worthy consideration" insuring that what Britain did to meet its immediate problem impinged to a minimum on longer-run considerations. Talks at this point could also lay basis for full review of needed troop levels, dual "basing" etc. He reiterated that Britain was prepared to participate in these talks ~~on understanding this would not delay timetable.~~

5. Brown asked that McCloy "have it clearly in his head" that what was involved was not too contemplative and time-consuming a process, and that first priority would be to identify immediate possibilities which would reduce to a minimum forces that the UK would need to withdraw. The Under Secretary raised the question of whether forces returned from Europe would be demobilized. Brown said that a special Cabinet meeting had been held this morning to deal with this problem, and it had been agreed that forces would not be disbanded but would be moved from "assignment" to "ear-marking" for SACEUR, with terms of availability being subject to negotiation. The Under Secretary indicated this decision would be very much welcome in NATO.

6. At lunch Brown rehearsed results of prior discussions for Callaghan who concurred in agreement reached. During discussion ~~Callaghan noted~~ "for benefit of Foreign Office officials present", that he had only most reluctantly agreed to limit overseas spending savings to 100 million pounds Sterling. He had wanted a 200 million pound sterling target and still felt this would be necessary. He also said (speaking off the record) that ~~he did not~~ see how the UK could afford to go ahead with the F-111 deal. Brown said that "if we cannot pay for them, we will not buy them." The Under Secretary wondered whether any consideration had been given to not going ahead with the Polaris program. Brown indicated this was now beyond the point of no return, but wondered whether it would not be wise to assign Polaris east of Suez, thus easing the nuclear guarantee problem and helping on the non-proliferation front. (Comment: Brown did not explain the chain of logic underlying this suggestion.)

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

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(copy of LONDON 1924, 9/7/66)

7. As regards the locale of tripartite talks, Callaghan expressed some preference for London on the grounds that the mixed commission meeting in October would be in Bonn. Brown left lead on this to Callaghan, but asked that if meeting were held in Germany, McCloy stop by briefly on his way for preliminary US/UK get-together. Under Secretary indicated that locale was question USG would wish to check with Bonn.

8. The only other subject discussed was the question of Article VII sanctions versus South Africa, with Brown and Callaghan clearly on opposite sides of the question. Brown stated unequivocally that under no circumstances would he permit UK veto of Security Council resolution against South Africa. The principal problem, then, since the US would not exercise veto either, was for US and UK to explore means of avoiding being put in this situation. Gore-Booth and Callaghan took opposite positions, indicating their belief that UK veto was better than situation which might precipitate another Sterling crisis and lead to death of UN due to practical inability of institution to insure effective sanctions. Callaghan admitted that his was minority view, however, and the Cabinet would undoubtedly support Brown, who asked that this position be conveyed to Secretary and White House in strongest possible terms.

BRUCE

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

Thursday, Sept. 8, 1966  
11:45 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the draft joint communique arrived at after protracted discussion at Williamsburg between our people and the Burmese last night.

Both the Burmese and the State Department hope that you and General Ne Win can agree on the communique at your meeting at 5 o'clock this afternoon.

The critical issue was, of course, what to say about Vietnam.

We think it would be wrong to have a communique with no reference to Vietnam. What was decided, given differences of view with the Burmese on this matter, was that each leader would express his own position. The Burmese position (marked in red 1) focusses, from our point of view, unduly on the unity of Vietnam; but so long as we are not committed to Ne Win's position we can live with that.

A difficulty arose in the concluding sentence of paragraph 5 (marked in red 2). This sentence now states that "an early settlement of the Vietnam question is essential to insure a secure and lasting peace in that country." the problem is "early." The emphasis on "early" is either wrong or meaningless. An early settlement is desirable; but a secure and lasting peace in Vietnam may only come, as you have said, after transiting a long, hard road.

Otherwise the sentence means peace is necessary for peace. Therefore, we went back to State on this matter. State recommends that they go to the Burmese and ask that the paragraph be dropped. Since it was State's suggestion, they anticipate no difficulty.

State feels that trying to negotiate a substitute paragraph that made a little sense might lead the Burmese to drop all references to Vietnam; and we don't want that. It would lead to the inference that we had quarrelled or that our views were further apart, even, than they are.

Therefore, we hope the communique will come to you without the paragraph marked (2) in red.

W. W. Rostow

Draft communique approved for 5 o'clock meeting  
today, Thursday, Sept. 8                     

I will wish to discuss changes with Ne Win                     

See me

VISIT OF GENERAL NE WIN OF THE UNION OF BURMA  
Washington, September 8-10, 1966

DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE

1. At the invitation of President Johnson, His Excellency General Ne Win, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma, has paid a state visit to the United States of America. During his visit, the Chairman met with the President and leading members of the United States Government.
2. The Chairman and Madame Ne Win and the members of their party were accorded a warm welcome and were extended cordial hospitality by the government and the people of the United States. The Chairman expressed his sincere thanks to the government and the people of the United States for their welcome and hospitality.
3. During the visit the President and the Chairman discussed the further development of the friendly relations existing between the United States and the Union of Burma and exchanged views on international questions of common interest. These discussions were held in an atmosphere of cordiality and mutual understanding.
4. The President expressed his understanding of the policy of peace and non-alignment pursued by the Union of Burma and his respect for its sovereignty and independence. The Chairman expressed his understanding of the policy of the United States towards Burma and appreciation for the friendly attitude of the American people. The two leaders affirmed their determination to strengthen the friendly relations



between their two countries in the mutual interest of their two peoples and in the service of the cause of peace and international understanding.

5. During their discussions, the President and the Chairman reviewed recent developments in South and Southeast Asia in the context of the universal desire of people everywhere to achieve peace and a better life. The President expressed his deep and abiding interest in the achievement of peace and stability in Southeast Asia which would permit the countries of the area in friendly cooperation with each other to devote their energies to economic development and the enrichment of the lives of their peoples. In this connection, he explained the policies the United States is pursuing to help the people of the Republic of Vietnam to defend their freedom and to reconstruct their war-torn society and his efforts, which he is determined to pursue with the greatest vigor, in behalf of an early settlement for peace with justice. The Chairman expressed Burma's desire for a political settlement of the Vietnam question on the basis of respect for her sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity.

The two leaders agreed that an early settlement of the Vietnam question is essential to insure a secure and lasting peace in that country.

6. The President and the Chairman reaffirmed their belief that mutual respect, non-interference, and equality among all states are the basic principles underlying the creation of a stable, peaceful international order. The two leaders agreed that every nation should have the right



to choose its own political, economic and social system and its own way of life free from any outside interference or pressure.

7. The President and the Chairman reiterated the support of their countries for the United Nations and emphasized the need for it to develop into an increasingly effective instrument not only for the maintenance of international peace and security but also for the promotion of friendly relations and cooperation among nations and peoples for their economic and social advancement.

8. The two leaders stressed the urgent need to secure general and complete disarmament under effective international control. They were deeply concerned over the serious dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons and expressed the hope that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would be extended to cover underground tests as well and that the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee would devote itself with a sense of urgency and determination to the conclusion of a treaty to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

September 8, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. - Burma Communique

The Burmese have agreed to dropping the final paragraph in paragraph 5 of the Communique, as we proposed.

In the interest of getting some positive language in that would express a common sentiment of the two leaders, they have accepted insertion of the following:

"The two leaders reaffirmed their earnest desire for an early and peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam."

If you approve, we will tell State they can send the text to Rangoon for simultaneous release to the Burmese press when the Communique is released here tomorrow after your second meeting with General Ne Win.

W. W. Rostow

Approve suggested paragraph \_\_\_\_\_

Approve transmission to Rangoon \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-157

By up NARA. Date 2-12-90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, September 8, 1966 -- 5:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Tuesday, September 6, 1966

Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News, came in to talk about Viet Nam; but mainly presented his highly favorable and optimistic reactions to the weekend whistle stopping in the Middle West. He said: How do you square the newspaper image of the President's position in the country with the response he got. My reply was this is a company town and the Washington Post and New York Times can easily be misread.

Samuel White, Paris correspondent for London Evening Standard, came in and asked about our view of de Gaulle and Asia. I explained to him our general approach to Viet Nam and our Asia policy since your Baltimore speech of last year.

Wednesday, September 7, 1966

Edward Weintal and Milan Kubic, NEWSWEEK, came in mainly to give Kubic, NEWSWEEK's Latin American correspondent, a chance to chat about Latin America. I assessed for him the economic and political situation in various Latin American countries. He tried hard to smoke out from me what our proposals will be for the Summit; but he was not too difficult to fend off. Taking off from the Argentine coup, we had an interesting discussion of the political evolution in Latin America and the Latin American difficulty in finding a national consensus among moderates.

Thursday, September 8, 1966

Robert Esterbrook, The Washington Post, came in to discuss China and Viet Nam. I called to his attention the structure of the Lancaster, Ohio, speech as a general formulation of our foreign policy. He said he would read it carefully with that in mind. He wanted to know if we felt we could meet our troop commitments in Viet Nam without withdrawing major forces from Europe. I said I couldn't predict what the other side would do, but at the present time we are fully capable of meeting our commitments in Europe plus our Viet Nam requirements.



Max Frankel, New York Times, came in to talk, upon his transfer to the White House correspondent contingent. He asked about how our shop ran. I explained its functioning and discussed the specific initiatives, outside Viet Nam, you have taken in recent months, emphasizing this was, in my view, a creative period in foreign policy as a whole and not a period where we were painted in a corner by Viet Nam.

Cecil Harmsworth King, publisher of the London Daily Mail, and Ralph Champion, N. Y. Bureau Chief, London Daily Mail, came in before their interview with you. Mr. King is obsessed with Wilson's weakness and believes that Wilson will not last for more than a year. It was difficult to get him off his own strongly held views about the British Labor government.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~Lang~~ 61  
2 Pres. file

September 8, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Draft Message to the International Atomic Energy Agency  
General Conference in Vienna on September 21, 1966

Chairman Seaborg has submitted for your approval the attached short draft message from you to the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference. The message would be delivered by Seaborg in his capacity as head of the U. S. delegation.

I recommend that you approve the message.

W. W. Rostow

Approved ☒

Disapproved ☐

See me ☐

6/a

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON  
TO THE IAEA CONFERENCE

I welcome this opportunity to speak, through Chairman Seaborg, to the delegates to the 10th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I believe it is highly significant that you are participating in the 10th annual meeting of this organization, which has grown in such a short time to an organization of 96 member states and which has contributed so much to the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The IAEA has provided the means whereby all of its members can work together and share the scientific developments of many nations. Exciting advances in nuclear applications have been made in the service of mankind. The atom has been unlocked and its energy harnessed; the technologies of nuclear power and desalting can be joined to convert saline water to fresh water, and the isotopes that come from nuclear research offer unusual applications and promise in medicine, and agriculture and industry. This work is of the utmost importance to the future of mankind and must be continued with increasing effort and support. At this time let me renew my country's pledge to assist the

IAEA in the future as we have in the past in the full pursuit of its goals and enormous potential.

I should like to emphasize to you my country's dedication to three principles which are of particular relevance to this organization. We are deeply committed to the principle of international cooperation for peace in every field of human endeavor. We believe strongly in sharing the benefits of scientific progress and we have consistently acted on this belief. And we have worked, and will continue to work, toward the economic development of the world's less developed countries.

If nuclear energy is to play its rightful role in contributing to these goals, the Agency has a crucial responsibility to see that the vast beneficial uses of nuclear energy are not diverted for military purposes. I cannot say often enough that the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons is one of the most important tasks of our times. We look on the Agency's safeguards system as one of the principal instruments for accomplishing this task. The U. S. Government fully supports the Agency system and we will do all in our power to support the continued growth and technical effectiveness of the system. But its success depends

on the support of all members - and I urge all members to foster the continued healthy development and widespread application of this vital system.

On behalf of the people of the United States, I send you congratulations for your achievements and very best wishes for your future undertakings.



*for Pres. diary - Sept 7, 1966*

Amb. Konan Bédié (Ivory Coast) paid a farewell call on the President, reiterating his country's support for our policies in Viet Nam and with respect to Communist China, asking for some support in Ivory Coast economic development. The meeting was interrupted by telephone calls from Averell Harriman, at the Democratic Convention in New York, concerning the Viet Nam resolution.

*M. Rostow* 63

Wednesday, September 7, 1966, 3:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Through: Marvin Watson

Attached is a memo from Secretary Rusk asking that you meet with our Ambassador to Italy, Frederick Reinhardt, sometime between today and Friday. (I apologize for this late request, but the memo came in only a few minutes ago.)

This is certainly not a must -- I know how tough your schedule is. If you prefer, Walt and I can talk to Reinhardt, explaining that it is a bad week for you. (Alternatively, I might just bring him for a quick handshake and a picture.)

Francis M. Bator

Set up 15-20 minute meeting\_\_\_\_  
Schedule time for quick handshake  
and picture\_\_\_\_  
Rostow/Bator to see him\_\_\_\_  
Speak to me\_\_\_\_

WWR 64  
WWR called  
SS "you  
can go  
w/ the  
Capetown  
cable"  
7:30 PM  
9/7

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, September 7, 1966 - 5:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: More on Verwoerd's Assassin

At Tab A is a new cable from South Africa on the U. S. connection of Demetrio Tsafandakis. I am afraid that our cat is out of the bag, and that it would be very dangerous to seem to be backward about disclosing what information about the assassin we have. Essentially Roundtree reports that:

- South African Security Police questioned [redacted] people in Pretoria about the assassin's "period of service in the U. S. Navy" -- indicating that the South Africans already know most of what we know.
- Due to a mix-up on the approved answer to such questions, [redacted] was authorized to give the South Africans the information we had minus the Robert Kennedy aspects. (Roundtree is very apologetic; the mix-up was understandable consequence of his being in Capetown at the time the inquiry was made in Pretoria.)
- The South African Security people have now asked for an interview with our Consul in Capetown, clearly as a result of the information received in Pretoria. Roundtree has authorized such a meeting for 11:00 tomorrow morning (6:00 a.m. our time). He sees no alternative but to give the South Africans the full story, omitting -- but saying nothing inconsistent with -- the Robert Kennedy episode.

In the meantime, our embassy in Lisbon has discovered a file on the assassin running through 1962. Essentially, it suggests that Tsafandakis has spent the last 16 years wandering around Europe, periodically applying for immigration to the United States. I will send you a separate memorandum summarizing this new information.

It seems to me that the question of telling the SAC <sup>details of the</sup> the Capetown contacts -- except for the Robert Kennedy connection -- has now been foreclosed. To try to deny anything that has already been said or to hold out dates and details would create suspicions and encourage public charges. Unless instructed otherwise, therefore, we plan to cable Roundtree to go ahead with his meeting as planned.

O.K. ✓

Tell Roundtree to hold off \_\_\_\_  
Speak to me \_\_\_\_

W. W. Rostow

Ref: Capetown 204

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 04-239  
By iso, NARA, Date 1-21-05

E.D. 12958  
3.3(b)(1)

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~~SECRET~~ CAPE TOWN 304

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*Hamilton*

LIMDIS

SEPTEMBER 7

SUBJECT: MURDERER OF VERWOERD

REF: CAPE TOWN EMBTEL 292

1. [REDACTED] FOR TRACING PURPOSES ONLY REPORTED WASHINGTON THROUGH HIS CHANNELS, REPEATED TO [REDACTED] BRIEF SUBSTANCE INFO ON ISAFENDAKIS OBTAINED IN COURSE CONTACTS WITH CONGEN. WASHINGTON REPLIED WITH SUGGESTION THAT, SUBJECT MY APPROVAL, INFO BE IMPARTED SECURITY POLICE BY [REDACTED] NEITHER HAD KNOWLEDGE MY REFTEL. [REDACTED] THEN ASKED THROUGH [REDACTED] THAT I AUTHORIZZ HIM TO DO SO. I EXPLAINED THAT I PREFERRED HANDLE MATTER AS OTHER THAN "INTELLIGENCE TYPE" OPERATION AND INTENDED HAVING EMBASSY OFFICER BRIEF APPROPRIATE SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICIAL AS SOON AS I HAD RECEIVED REPLY TO MY MESSAGE. UNFORTUNATLEY, HOWEVER, BEFORE RECEIVING THIS INFORMATION AND IN RESPONSE DIRECT QUERY FROM SAG SECURITY BRANCH OFFICER ABOUT ASSAILANT'S "PERIOD OF SERVICE IN US NAVY", [REDACTED] CONSULTED ECON COUNSELOR PRETOIRA AND RESPONDED QUICKLY AND WITHOUT MY HAVING PREVIOUSU KNOWLEDGE. INFORMATION WHICH HE GAVE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT BUT I HAD HOPED AVOID SITUATION IN WHICH [REDACTED] IMMEDIATELY DISCLOSED KNOWLEDGE OF MATTER, PERHAPS IMPLYING TO SOUTH AFRICANS FAR MORE THAN FACTS WOULD WARRANT, ALL ORIGINAL INFO HAVING BEEN BASED ON ROUTINE VISTS TO CONGEN. I UNDERSTAND FOLLOWING TEXT OF INFO PASSED:

3.4  
(b)(1)

SANTIZED  
R.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-408  
By iss, NARA, Date 9-24-03



TEXT: A. ASSASSIN DEMETRIOS TSAFENDAKIS REPEATEDLY SINCE NOVEMBER 1965 HAS COME INTO CONSULATE IN CAPE TOWN TO ATTEMPT TO PRESS \$100,000 CLAIM AGAINST US GOVERNMENT FOR "COMPENSATION FOR PHYSICAL AND MENTAL SUFFERING, LOSS OF WAGES AND GENERAL DAMAGES" BECAUSE US GOVERNMENT SENT HIM TO GREECE RATHER THAN SOUTH AFRICA ON DEPORTATION, AS HE HAD REQUESTED. TSAFENDAKIS SERVED IN THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE NAVY FROM 1941 TO 1946. HE WAS DEPORTED TO GREECE IN 1947.

B. TSAFENDAKIS CLAIMS THAT HE WORKED FOR AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION MISSION IN GREECE AS AN INTERPRETER UNTIL 1950, THEN WENT TO FRANCE THROUGH GREEK RED CROSS AND FINALLY TO PORTUGAL. THERE HE OBTAINED PORTUGUESE PASSPORT AND, IN 1964, PASSAGE BACK TO LOURENCO MARQUES. THE SAME YEAR HE CAME TO SOUTH AFRICA. *obtained*

C. ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL IN CONSULATE WHO DEALT WITH HIM, TSAFENDAKIS DID NOT APPEAR UNSTABLE, ALTHOUGH HIS ASSERTION THAT US GOVERNMENT OWED HIM COMPENSATION BORDERED ON THE OBSESSIVE.

D. DEMETRIOS TSAFENDAKIS: DOB: CA 1918; POB: LOURENCO MARQUES; CIT: PORTUGUESE OF GREEK DESCENT.

E. [REDACTED] COOPERATING FULLY THIS MATTER AND ATTEMPTING OBTAIN DETAILS OF SUBJECT'S PAST HISTORY AND PRESENT CONTACTS AS MAY BE AVAILABLE IN UNITED STATES. END TEXT.

3.4  
(b)(1)

2. CONGEN CAPE TOWN RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL THIS AFTERNOON FROM CAPT. VAN WYK, LOCAL SECURITY BRANCH OFFICER, ASKING TO INTERVIEW CONGEN OFFICIAL ON SUBJECT OF ASSASSIN. HE SAID SECURITY BRANCH HAD INFO FROM PRETORIA CONCERNING ASSASSIN'S "REPEATED" CONTACT WITH CONGEN CAPE TOWN. IN COURSE CONVERSATION CAPT VAN WYK MADE IT CLEAR THAT SECURITY BRANCH APPROACHING CONGEN AS RESULT CONTACT WITH CASHIN PRETORIA. IN CIRCUMSTANCES CONGEN AGREED SEE CAPTAIN AT ELEVEN THURSDAY MORNING.

3. AFTER CONSIDERATION, IT SEEMS OBVIOUS WE MUST NOW GIVE SUBSTANTIALLY FULL STORY TO CAPTAIN VAN WYK, AND I HAVE AUTHORIZED WATROUS TO DO SO AT MEETING TOMORROW AVOIDING VOLUNTEERING INFO THAT TSAFENDAKIS' LAST VISIT TO CONGEN HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH SENATOR KENNEDY'S VISIT, THOUGH SAYING NOTHING INCONSISTENT WITH THIS. IT MAY BE THAT SPECIAL BRANCH HAS TSAFENDAKIS' FILES INCLUDING LETTER MAY 27 FROM CONGEN MENTIONED REFTEL.

4. IT IS OF COURSE OUR OBJECTIVE TO IMPART INFO TO SAG, AND OTHERWISE TO DEAL WITH MATTZR, IN MANNER BEST CALCULATED AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING AND INDICATE APPROPRIATE COOPERATION.

ROUNTREE

~~SECRET LIMDIS~~

Mr Rostow 65  
to P

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday  
September 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Civil Air Agreement With the USSR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 88-156  
By 1-10, NARA, Date 1-27-92

Last Saturday you directed me to set up a meeting with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara to decide whether Congressional soundings should be taken now on offering to sign the civil air agreement with the USSR.

Secretary Rusk will not be available until next week to participate in such a meeting.

If the agreement is to be signed by Secretary Rusk and Mr. Gromyko in New York as originally proposed, a decision to go ahead should be made as soon as possible.

1. Congressional consultations will take at least a day. Although the agreement does not require legislative ratification, the positions of the Congressmen to be consulted must be obtained before a final decision is made to offer to sign the agreement.

2. The USSR will require several days at least to react to an offer to sign now. As we reported to you, Ambassador Kohler thinks there is only a 50-50 chance the Soviets will pick up an offer.

3. If we make the offer and the Soviets accept, it has been suggested that the signing take place before September 22, the day suggested for any speech you might make to the UN General Assembly.

To postpone a meeting to decide this question until Secretary Rusk returns would make almost impossible the time schedule described above.

I recommend that you schedule an early meeting with Secretary McNamara and Acting Secretary Ball.

W. W. Rostow

☒ Set up meeting with Secretary McNamara and Acting Secretary Ball

☐ Hold off until Secretary Rusk can participate

☐ See me

~~SECRET~~

66  
6P

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-156

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ By 48, NARA, Date 1-27-92 Saturday, Sept. 3, 1966 - 9:30 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: JCS Objections to Civil Air Agreement with the USSR

The JCS objections to a Civil Air agreement with the USSR were last stated in 1963 when the Administration was considering signing the agreement negotiated two years earlier.

Secretary McNamara stated in 1963 that the JCS objections were not of a nature to alter his view that we should go ahead and sign the agreement. That is still his view.

The Chiefs cited the following three factors:

- a. The agreement would facilitate Soviet political/economic penetration of other countries, especially in Latin America.
- b. The route to be flown would put Soviet planes in the vicinity of Iceland and Greenland. Soviet planes thus might overfly or make unscheduled landings at sensitive US military installations in these countries.
- c. There is an inconsistency in opening New York to Soviet planes while discouraging other Free World nations from permitting the Soviet airline to obtain operating rights in their countries.

The Department of State responded to these objections in 1963 by pointing out:

The choice of route would depend on rights which the Russians can obtain from third countries.

It is unlikely that Denmark would permit the USSR to overfly Greenland or that Iceland would permit the Soviets to overfly its territory.

Emergency stops are required for humanitarian reasons and handled in accordance with international practice. There is no way to avoid these eventualities, but the military could take security measures in the event emergency landings were made at US bases.

Some difficulties could be dealt with in technical discussions following the signing of the agreement. If the Soviets insisted on a routing which was undesirable from the security point of view, the US could always prevent the service being inaugurated by refusing to exchange implementing notes.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

As of today, the first and the third points made by the JCS have less validity than they had in 1963. Linc Gordon feels that we can handle any repercussions in Latin America. Canada and several other Free World nations have signed agreements with the USSR since 1963 so that we would not appear as inconsistent as we might have, had we signed an agreement then.

My recommendation is that you meet with Sect. Rusk and Sect. McNamara and walk around this once more before instructing Sect. Rusk to begin Congressional consultations -- perhaps at the next Tuesday lunch.

W. W. Rostow

Set up meeting with Sects. Rusk and McNamara ✓

9/5/66

Put on next Tuesday lunch agenda \_\_\_\_\_

Permit Congressional consultations to begin \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

DDP GRC RLS 8-11-63

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Return to E-DA

Aviation's Record Unit

JCSM-774-63

3 - OCT 1963

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30

By jw, NARA, Date 7-13-98

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Civil Air Agreement with the USSR (U)

I-13023/63  
m. d. d. d.

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 18 September 1963, subject as above, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were informed that the US-USSR Civil Aviation Agreement negotiated in 1961 would probably be signed during the current visit of Mr. Gromyko to the United States. The memorandum further advised that the Interagency Committee on International Aviation contemplated no renegotiation or substantial change in the agreement and consequently no new US position is to be developed.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a number of factors incident to this agreement warrant a re-evaluation of the proposal prior to US concurrence in order to determine whether adherence to such an agreement continues to be in the national interest. These factors relate to (a) facilitating Soviet politico-economic penetration into other countries as a direct outcome of the agreement, (b) the specific route to be flown by Aeroflot and its relation to US defense interests, and (c) the apparent inconsistency of opening the major US air terminal to Aeroflot operations while discouraging other Free World nations from permitting Aeroflot operating rights. (Points a & b are expanded below.)

a. Politico-Economic Penetration. Should the agreement be signed, the Soviets will be operating from Moscow to New York. This route will be in addition to their current Moscow to Cuba route. While the United States will be in a position to refuse permission for the Soviets to extend their route from New York into Latin America, it will be extremely difficult to prevent or discourage an extension from Cuba or Africa into Latin America. This factor will mitigate against the determined US attempt to keep

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See Def Cont. No. 1-6515

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
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Castro isolated and the desire to prevent Soviet penetration into other areas of the Free World, particularly the Western Hemisphere.

b. Specific Routes to be Flown. The 1961 agreement did not contain a completely detailed international routing; although the agreement contemplated nonstop routing in each direction, provision was made for "technical stops" (i.e., fuel and repairs) enroute. While Iceland and Greenland are not included in the agreement, a Great Circle route will put Aeroflot aircraft over or in the vicinity of these countries; thus overflight and landing become a distinct possibility. In 1961, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff took the position that "... for military reasons Aeroflot's presence in the airspace of Greenland and Iceland or their landing at any of our installations there would be unacceptable. We would be particularly concerned if Aeroflot's personnel were to be stationed at Keflavik or Aeroflot planes would fly across central or northern part of Greenland." While the Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to adhere to this position, it now appears that economic and operational factors favor routings through these areas. For example, Pan American Airways is interested in keeping the Aeroflot route as far to the north as possible, in the hope that this will prevent the Soviets from acquiring a foothold in the European market and on the route between Europe and the United States. In this event, overflights of and unscheduled landings at sensitive US military installations by Aeroflot must be anticipated if such terminal rights are granted and Great Circle routes are authorized.

3. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you express their concern in this matter to the Secretary of State and recommend that the US position be re-evaluated prior to further discussion with the Soviets. Should discussions already be underway, it is urged that no US commitments or agreements be made or implied until the Joint Chiefs of Staff have an opportunity to review the specifics of the proposals being considered.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

  
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

2

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~~E~~

AC/2-USSR

Return to E:OA

Aviation's Record Unit

TO : G - U. Alexis Johnson

DATE: October 4, 1963

FROM : E - G. Griffith Johnson

SUBJECT: JCS Views on United States-USSR Civil Air Transport Agreement

Paragraph 2(b) of the JCS memorandum raises the objection that Aeroflot aircraft may overfly or make non-scheduled stops in territory en route between Moscow and New York which would present military security problems to the United States.

It is necessary to indicate precisely what is involved. The agreement accords the airlines of both parties the right to carry traffic between New York and Moscow. It is not possible under the agreement for either airline to pick up or discharge traffic at any point en route. Hence, the only stops that may be made en route in third countries are technical stops. The Agreed Minute states that technical stops may be made only at Stockholm, Oslo, Shannon, or Gander. Stops at Keflavik or Sondrestrom, for example, are not permitted.

The JCS objections can, therefore, apply only to two situations, as follows:

1. The overflight by Aeroflot aircraft of territory, such as Iceland and Greenland, where the USAF has strategic installations.
2. Emergency stops of Aeroflot aircraft at USAF bases, such as Keflavik and Sondrestrom.

With regard to the overflight question, we do not expect that Denmark will grant the USSR permission to overfly Greenland, nor will Iceland permit the Soviets to overfly its territory. We are undertaking to confirm with both those governments our understanding that neither will grant such permission.

GROUP 3

Declassified at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By ju NARA, Date 7-13-96

/With regard

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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With regard to the emergency stop question, the United States would be required for humanitarian reasons and in accordance with international practice to allow Aeroflot aircraft to land at any necessary airfield for emergency reasons. The possibility of such emergency landings already exists with regard to the Aeroflot flights between Moscow and Habana; the probability of emergency landings on this service is greater than on a New York service. There is, in brief, no way to avoid those possible eventualities. Presumably, the USAF can take whatever security measures are necessary in the event of emergency landings at its bases. The question of probability of such landings is not one which can be answered categorically. However, we doubt that Aeroflot would attempt to make landings at USAF installations except for truly emergency reasons, if only because such incidents would cast an unfavorable reflection on the competence of Aeroflot and its aircraft. If landings were made for reasons which, upon investigation, were determined not to be of an emergency nature, it is always open to this Government to protest and ultimately to invoke the suspension provisions of the bilateral agreement.

In connection with both the overflight and emergency landing questions, we do not know what route Aeroflot would like to be able to fly between Moscow and New York. This Government cannot, of course, control the route taken over international waters. The Moscow-New York great circle is directly over Iceland and cuts the very southern tip of Greenland by a few miles. However, an aircraft can not fly a true great circle, nor is such a route always operationally desirable. Our understanding, based on discussions with the Federal Aviation Agency, is that, if the USSR can obtain Swedish and Norwegian overflight permission, the preferred airways route would take the aircraft south of Iceland and Greenland. If technical stops were made in either Stockholm, Oslo or Shannon, even the great circle route would be south of Iceland and Greenland. On the other hand, if Swedish or Norwegian overflight permission is not given (and it is by no means certain that it will be given), Aeroflot might choose to operate from the North Cape where it would take a more northerly route to New York. The North Cape-New York great circle is over central Greenland. If a technical stop were scheduled at Gander, however, the routing would be between Greenland and Iceland.

The final Aeroflot choice on routing will depend on (1) the rights in third countries the USSR can obtain, (2) the type of aircraft used, and (3) navigation and safety considerations.

/It should

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-3-

It should be noted that the airline services can not begin until the two governments have exchanged diplomatic notes following signing of the agreement. During the course of the technical discussions which will follow signing of the agreement, the route Aeroflot will wish to follow will presumably be made known. Should the routing indicated be an undesirable one from the security viewpoint, it is open to the United States Government to prevent the services being inaugurated by refusing to exchange the implementing notes.

The foregoing situation is no different now from that in 1961 when the security problems were fully considered before the text of the agreement was initialed.

**Enclosures:**

1. Civil Air Transport Agreement.
2. Agreed Minute.
3. Letter to OSD dated August 22, 1961.
4. Letter from OSD dated July 19, 1961.

cc: Mr. - Governor Harrison


SOV - Mr. Gathrie

E/OA - Mr. Ferguson

CA/AL:HH:shh

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: U.S.-Soviet Civil Air Agreement

Recommendation:

I recommend that you authorize the Department of State to inform the Soviet Government that we would be willing to conclude the U.S.-Soviet Civil Air Agreement in November or December of this year.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

In discussions about U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations, Soviet officials have sharply criticized us for talking about our desire to improve bilateral relations without being willing to take the steps which would make such an improvement possible. They cite the Consular Convention and the Civil Air Agreement as examples.

When we signed the Consular Convention in 1964, we decided that its ratification should precede conclusion of the Civil Air Agreement, which was initiated in 1961 but not signed because of developments in Berlin. This allocation of priorities is now unrealistic. The Consular Convention is now before the Senate, but it is unlikely that the Senate will approve it in the foreseeable future. It is similarly unlikely that the Senate will act on our East-West trade legislation this year. In general, therefore, our bilateral relations will have in coming months what Brezhnev has called "a tendency toward freezing."

We must find some way to give positive content to our repeated professions that we desire an improvement in bilateral relations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 88-153  
By ip NARA Date 3-1-90



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Probably the only feasible proposal which we can make at this time which the Soviets will recognize as significant is conclusion of the Air Agreement. We negotiated this Agreement in 1961 because we believed that it would promote our efforts to develop contacts between Soviet citizens and Americans. Weekly Aeroflot flights to New York would remove a major barrier to increased Soviet tourism to the U.S. -- the problem of foreign exchange. Many West European countries have had civil air agreements with the U.S.S.R. for some time. Japan has just concluded one. The Canadians will complete negotiations in the near future.

The advantages of signing a Civil Air Agreement are the same now as they were in 1961. We believe that the Soviet Government also continues to be keenly interested in concluding such an Agreement and in beginning air service.

We believe that even though the Consular Convention is not ratified, the Civil Air Agreement should be signed in November or December of this year, so that Pan American and Aeroflot can begin reciprocal flights in the spring of 1967.

*Dean Rusk*  
Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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## MEMORANDUM

①  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON67  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 88-156  
By WJ, NARA Date 1-27-92*Why do parent change  
of staff object*  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, September 1, 1966 -- 2:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

After our lunch last Tuesday Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Bill Moyers and I discussed various constructive moves we might make towards Moscow.

Secretary Rusk came up with the suggestion that we could now sign the U. S. - Soviet Air Agreement. You may recall that he sent a recommendation over on July 15 recommending that you authorize the Department of State to inform the Soviet government that we would be willing to conclude the Civil Air Agreement in November or December of this year. He then asked that it be held up because of troubles with the Soviet Union over the track meet, our cultural agreement, etc.

On Secretary Rusk's return from the Tuesday lunch, he requested an urgent review of this matter to see if there were any factors which should be brought to his attention and yours since July 15. As the attached memorandum to me indicates:

-- Amb. Kohler believes that the chances of early Soviet agreement are slightly under 50-50 but that we should proceed now to advise the Soviets of our willingness to sign;

-- other governments are not likely to misconstrue or overreact to an American initiative in this field;

-- State Department does not believe that the basic views of the various Departments of the Government have changed recently; that is, the JCS objected but the Department of Defense overruled the Chiefs and interposed no objection to the Agreement. The FAA, CAB, and the Department of Commerce expressed no opposition.

What Secretary Rusk is now requesting of you is that you authorize the Department of State to consult immediately with interested Congressional leaders, including Senators Fulbright, Hickenlooper, Magnuson, and Monroney.

If Congressional attitudes seemed to warrant, we would then request your authorization to permit us to instruct Amb. Kohler to inform the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs of our interest in proceeding with the signing of the Agreement, suggesting that this be done by Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York at the time of the convening of the General Assembly.

*W.A.W.* Rostow

Permit State to consult Congressional Leaders \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me ☒





DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 31, 1966

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

13410

MEMORANDUM TO MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: U.S.-Soviet Civil Air Agreement

Following your luncheon discussion yesterday with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara about possible early action to conclude the U.S.-Soviet Air Agreement, Secretary Rusk asked for an urgent review of this matter to see if there were any factors which should be brought to his attention and yours since July 15, 1966, when the Secretary recommended in a memorandum to the President that we be authorized to inform the Soviet Government that we were willing to sign the Agreement.

Ambassador Kohler's views were sought, and, as you know, he has stated that the chances of early Soviet agreement are "slightly under 50-50", but that we should proceed now to advise the Soviets of our willingness to sign as evidence of the sincerity of our stated desire to maintain normal relations with the USSR. (Moscow 1053)

The Bureau of European Affairs concurs with the Ambassador's views and notes that after five years delay in signing the Agreement, its use as a bargaining item has long since become counter-productive; that maximum usefulness from the Agreement is obtainable in the present context -- as a sweetener in a prolonged stand-off situation. Soviet rejection or procrastination to an overture would not be disadvantageous, although this of course is not our objective.

In the present world situation and following the signing of the Canadian-USSR Agreement, there is a reasonable likelihood that other Governments will not

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-153

By ig, NARA, Date 8-25-88

misconstrue or overreact to an American initiative in this field. Assistant Secretary Gordon reports that there are no new factors in the Latin American sphere that need to be noted since the Secretary made his recommendation on July 15.

When last consulted earlier this summer, Pan American Airlines, the American carrier which would carry out the Agreement on our side, felt that flights to Moscow would probably not be profitable for some time to come, but on balance saw some advantage in serving Moscow. After the Agreement is signed, Pan Am would probably wish to have discussions with the Soviet carrier, Aeroflot, regarding intermediate stops, to improve profits of the operation. We are not aware of what the Soviet attitude would be to such a request except for a not-discouraging Soviet response to informal mention of this possibility by Juan Trippe in Moscow last June.

In one regard there is more justification for implementation of the Agreement now (for the 1967 tourist season) than when it was negotiated and initialled in 1961. Over 20,000 Americans now visit the USSR each year; many would be inconvenienced by implementation of such an agreement.

We have not made a formal effort to obtain the views of various agencies of the U.S. Government or various parts of the Department since 1963. At that time the JCS objected, but the Department of Defense overruled the Chiefs and interposed no objection to the Agreement. The FAA, CAB, and the Department of Commerce expressed no opposition. We know that the FAA would now like to make one relatively small technical change in the separate "Agreed Minute" but this can probably be done fairly simply and need not be a preliminary requirement for signing the Agreement.

On the basis of the foregoing the Secretary has suggested that we propose to the President that he authorize the Department of State to consult immediately with interested

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

3

Congressional leaders, including Senators Fulbright, Hickenlooper, Magnuson, and Monroney. If Congressional attitudes seemed to warrant it, we would then request highest level authorization to permit us to instruct Ambassador Kohler to inform the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs of our interest in proceeding with the signing of the Agreement and suggesting that this be done by Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York at the time of the convening of the General Assembly.

BHR

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

F to P 69

Wednesday, Sept. 7, 1966  
4:50 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Week by week Lodge's cables suggest  
the war is getting more and more political!

The last paragraph, quoting Ho, would be  
exactly my own evaluation -- although our  
election may play a part and we could notch up  
the cost in the North a bit by picking up some  
power stations, etc.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Saigon 5433)



69a

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Wednesday, September 7, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 5433)

Herewith my weekly telegram.

All elements seem to be stepping up their campaign as Election Day approaches. This includes the Viet Cong, the anti-election drive of the militant Buddhist Institute leaders, the candidates and the Government of Vietnam. The attention of the Vietnamese public is thus focused on this election probably to a greater degree than has ever been true in any past elections. Although interested in platforms and individual qualifications, the voters are probably even more keenly aware that Viet Cong and Buddhist Institute opposition may have created a situation in which a respectable turnout will be read as an endorsement of the Ky regime and a rejection of the Viet Cong. If the vote is small, an attempt will undoubtedly be made to interpret it as a sign of opposition to the present regime. I believe this would be unfair. A small vote would be a tribute to the effectiveness of Viet Cong terror and the blame for harassing Vietnam's move toward democracy should be fixed squarely on the Viet Cong.

In no case could a small vote be attributed to the attractiveness of the Viet Cong "argument" since the Viet Cong makes no argument and depends entirely on muscle. Americans at home who tend to think of the Viet Cong as being an attractive, socially conscious, liberal party should be under no illusions about this. Everything we can learn leads us to believe that Viet Cong voting strength is virtually nil -- which is why they have not entered candidates and have instead tried to disrupt the election itself.

#### A. Elections

Voter registration must be described as heavy. The total number registered is 5,288,512 -- 12.7 percent gain over the 4,693,371 registered for the Provincial and Municipal Council elections of last year. This includes an increase of 38 percent in Danang and 20 percent in Quang Tri Province, both of which are former "struggle" strongholds.

The Vietnamese Information Service, which we have often criticized, has surprised us by the aggressive and generally effective job it has done in publicizing the elections. The newspapers are filled with election stories

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DECLASSIFIED  
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NLJ 88-152  
By 48, NARA, Date 7-27-88

now, and candidates are being heard and seen on television and radio, via get-out-and-vote songs, slogans, and skits. Information on the election is also being carried into the hamlets and villages through-out the country. In Binh Dinh province, local authorities even staged "mock elections" to prepare the people for September 11. The Information Service is getting help from the Army, the Civil Service, and (behind the scenes) from us. And there is no denying the fact that the Viet Cong and the extremist Buddhists in the Institute have helped to make the public aware of the forthcoming elections.

As expected, the Viet Cong are making an effort to discredit and disrupt the elections. I agree with our embassy staff that this is a "major" effort. General Thieu, however, talking to me about the terroristic phase of the effort, thinks it is "normal" and "about on a par with that they would do for Ho Chi Minh's birthday". The terrorism seems to us to be considerably more than anything they do for Ho Chi Minh's birthday. We have had this week something in the way of terrorism every day or night in Saigon and expect some increase, with emphasis on kidnapping as a device to frighten voters away from the polls.

The U.S. 25th Infantry Division has captured a four page Viet Cong Top Secret directive. The directive stresses the importance of the elections and the opportunity for the Viet Cong to inflict a decisive political defeat on the U.S. and the Government of Vietnam. Three Viet Cong goals are listed: prevent people from voting; force candidates to withdraw; and smother the election with mass protests. Citing the authority of the Viet Cong Central Committee, it directs that during the ten days preceding election, each subordinate unit will organize propaganda meetings, conduct at least three acts of violence against local officials, national police and Chieu Hoi cadres; and set explosives at ballot box locations.

We hear that four cells were formed in the First Corps to counter the elections: one in Danang; two in Quang Nam; and one in Quang Tri -- and that all have been arrested.

In Thua Thien Province, our people report a sharp increase in Viet Cong incidents, most of which are aimed at the elections. In Viet Cong controlled areas, the people are forbidden to vote on pain of death; in contested areas, the Viet Cong threaten retaliation if the people vote; in Government of Vietnam controlled areas, the Viet Cong urge the people to cast blank ballots.

In Hue, Government of Vietnam authorities captured a member of a Viet Cong terror squad that infiltrated into the city especially for the elections. He admitted that his mission was to assassinate all three candidates on one list. In Quang Ngai Province, the Viet Cong blew up a car in a convoy that was taking one of the candidates to the villages to campaign there. A bus in Vinh Long was mined, with 15 civilians killed and 25 wounded. Local authorities say this attack is a Viet Cong effort to close the main district road in that area so that voters will be afraid to come to the polls. There are also reports that the Viet Cong are planning large unit actions on September 11 so as to disrupt the elections.

The Government of Vietnam is doing its best to meet this Viet Cong terror. Candidates have bodyguards assigned to them and in some areas they are sleeping in special quarters under heavy police protection. Special guards will be set up at the polling places. Government of Vietnam intelligence operations, check points, and the like have been intensified in order to pick up terrorists. The military are running operations designed to keep the Viet Cong off balance just before the elections. Just before and on election day, every effort will be made to secure and protect roads so that voters can reach the polling places. The Government of Vietnam has also armed itself with a legal weapon by promulgating a decree specifying prison sentences for anyone found "guilty of interfering with citizens' right to vote or freedom to stand for election."

In some areas, including Saigon, government cadre are delivering voter registering cards to voters' homes if the voters fail to pick them up. Possibly they are also giving the voters a bit of advice on how to vote.

In Quang Tin Province, the province chief told one of our consulate officers that he is offering a reward to any of his district chiefs who manage to turn out more than 80 percent of the registered voters on the election day. He has also let it be known that any district chief whose district turns out less than 80 percent will be penalized. The same province chief told his people to spread the word that those who do not vote may find it difficult to travel in the province after election. On the other hand, in neighboring Quang Nam Province, the province chief says he will use no coercion whatever to get out the vote; significantly, he is predicting that only about 50 percent of the registered voters in his province will go to the polls. In Thua Thien Province, where the "struggle" was strongest, the army is carrying out an elaborate information and exhortation campaign to get out the vote. One of their documents advises that "the military have the duty to push the good friends and relatives to vote".

In keeping with Vietnamese political traditions, a great deal of electioneering here is subsurface. Many candidates prefer to base their campaign purely upon personal contacts. As in Massachusetts, people do not go to rallies in large numbers. There is widespread use of the Vietnamese equivalent of campaign workers. There have been only a few sharp public debates and heated exchanges between candidates and voters.

In Bien Hoa Province, for example, partisan hecklers reminded one candidate that he had made the same promises when he ran for the Provincial Council but he has not yet delivered. Former Chief of State Pham Khac Suu was asked why, if he favors free speech and press, he did nothing about it when he was Chief of State. Another candidate was questioned sharply on his wealth and his claim that he is a poor man-of-the-people. The press has reported such questioning in detail, and our provincial reporters tell me the crowds seem to relish this kind of give and take.

Unfortunately the militant leaders of the Buddhist Institute have now evidently decided to continue to try to disrupt the elections. Tri Quang in a conversation with an American on September 3 said he would settle for nothing less than the removal of Thieu and Ky. Failing this, he intends to continue urging a boycott of the election, and to this end he also continues his "hunger fast". Another militant leader September 5 told an embassy officer that not only will the militants continue to oppose the elections, but they will also oppose the convention which results and they will oppose any constitution which the convention writes.

On September 6, the institute militants held a press conference in which



they called for "non-cooperation" in the elections, denounced the government and accused it of repressive acts against Buddhism, and announced that Institute leaders will stage a 72 hour hunger strike beginning on the afternoon of September 8. People are asked to pray for Tri Quang. Acting Head of the Institute Thich Thien Hoa reportedly strongly criticized the United States and again said we must bear responsibility for the life of Tri Quang. We have reports of the circulation of many anti-election tracts by the militant Institute Buddhists in Saigon and Hue. There are also reports that Institute delegations have gone to a number of provinces in an effort to enlist the help of local Buddhist leaders in their boycott of the election.

The Buddhist Institute militants are going to have some effect. It is at least possible that Tri Quang will die before the election. There are other reports that some monks may immolate themselves just before election day. Such events might further decrease voter turnout, and they would make a bad impression abroad, which would tend to obscure the real significance of the elections.

#### B. Desertions

The desertion rate in the Vietnamese Armed Forces has dropped steadily since February, when desertions totalled 13,241 (these figures include Regional and Popular Forces as well as Regulars). This dropped to 8,352 in July. This is still too high and is more than twice what it was in 1964. The improvement recently is probably due to a Government-wide pay raise in June, a new decree law setting much stiffer penalties for desertion, and the improved morale which flows from the fact that many Vietnamese servicemen now believe the Viet Cong can be and are being defeated. If I were to single out one single factor causing desertions, I would pick inflation.

#### C. Economic

Almost all retail and import prices held steady or fell this week, but the retail index rose slightly over last week because of higher chicken prices. Dollars went up to 167 from last week's 160. Public opinion survey shows that public concern over high prices has declined. Stabilization of prices, though at a high level, plus concentration on the forthcoming election has made inflation a far less common topic of conversation than it was a few weeks ago.

Our fear that we were in for more labor trouble at RMK-BRJ has not materialized. The company issued a good statement saying that Americans and third country nations would be released first, followed by lay-offs of Vietnamese only if necessary. The statement also said that efforts would be

made to help any discharged Vietnamese find other employment. The statement was well received, and we do not anticipate any strikes at this time.

#### D. Americans and Vietnamese Killed

During the period August 28 to September 3, the Viet Cong killed 67 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 17, and kidnapped 26. This includes one official, a village police chief, who was killed by the Viet Cong. These figures may be compared with the previous two weeks when for each week the Viet Cong respectively killed 32 and 50, wounded 74 and 155, and kidnapped 82 and 13. If we add the 109 Vietnamese military killed this week to the 67 Vietnamese civilians killed, we get a total of 176 Vietnamese killed; this compares with 39 Americans killed in the same period.

Comment: This is the second week in a row I have been able to send you this type of statement. If you would like to release this in Washington, please instruct. Otherwise I will put it out here. End comment.

Informal soundings of opinion in provinces on reaction to mistaken attacks against villages reveals a natural general resentment against both the U. S. and the Government regardless of which might be specifically at fault. There is a tendency, however, to show greater outrage over acts by individuals that cause injury or death than to the almost faceless destruction by military units. Quick medical and civic action, and prompt payment for damages, are indispensable. But in at least one case in IV Corps where Viet Cong help for the stricken arrived before U.S./Government of Vietnam help, the latter was angrily rejected by the villagers. When the Viet Cong can plausibly be blamed for attracting the fire, the victims show active resentment against them.

#### E. Words from Ho

Last week I heard a report of a statement made to the Indian diplomat Rahman, Chairman of the ICC, some months ago by Ho Chi Minh to this effect: "American bombing is hurting us in North Vietnam, but it is not yet decisive". Ho then added: "When I see our guerrilla innerstructure in South Vietnam beginning to crumble, then that will be decisive".

*Pres file*

*71*

*Wednesday*  
September 7, 1966 - 11:10AM

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Marcos Visit

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 88-19  
By inf, NARA, Date 12-10-91

This is a status report on the Marcos visit. It is submitted in line with your request to be informed in advance of the outstanding issues and the current state of preparations.

Arrangements.

No special problems. Full schedule is attached (TAB A).

Key items: Arrival ceremony -- Wednesday, Sept. 14;  
Meetings with you -- both at 5 p.m., Sept. 14  
and 15.  
Address joint session of Congress -- 12:30 p.m.  
Sept. 15;  
Departure -- Sept. 16.

Background Material.

TAB B. Biographic data on President and Mrs. Marcos is at

TAB C. Background papers (political, economic and military) at

Communique.

Still under discussion in Manila.

Marcos' Objectives.

(1) To highlight his support for our policies in Southeast Asia and to obtain tangible evidence of American support for his leadership and for rapid improvement in the Philippine economy;

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(2) Major domestic goal: to advance his country and to overcome criticism of his strongly pro-American lead;

(3) To use the Army in rural development projects as the most effective means of improving the deteriorating economic situation and coping with rising popular dissatisfaction; wants engineering equipment for 10 battalions;

(4) To hold his critics at bay, he needs: (a) to bring home some concrete achievements on the veterans' benefits and claims problem (a hot political issue in Manila); to be able to point to continued U. S. support for his economic development goals and his ambitious 4-year development plan;

(5) Try to get us to agree to some formula for an end of the "parity" provisions of Laurel-Langley (due to expire in 1974); he may propose a joint committee to study this.

#### Our Objectives.

(1) Keep Marcos on our side and help him silence his critics;

(2) Keep him and the Philippines cooperative regarding use of our bases in the Philippines, especially as regards logistic support for Viet-Nam;

(3) Continue and possibly expand Philippine engagement in Viet-Nam -- in troops and maximum use of our facilities in his country, including combat launch if necessary;

(4) Improve general trade and investment climate in the Philippines and find ways to protect American acquired rights after 1974.

#### Pending Issues.

##### (1) Engineer Construction Battalions --

Equipment for 3 battalions will be funded by Defense as "Viet-Nam related." Two more will be funded from FY '67 MAP for the Philippines by substituting for other items.

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Problem: The other 5. Defense has refused to fund on grounds of unavailability of '67 MAP funds. AID is unwilling to complete an essentially military assistance program which Defense has already started. Issue is still unresolved.

State underlines that this item is "the single most important item in the package we are trying to arrange for Marcos."

(2) Veterans Claims and Benefits --

You are familiar with this one.

On benefits, two bills have passed the House. Another is under consideration in Committee. Estimated cost of the proposed benefits package: about \$17 Million a year.

On claims, you have approved payment of the two claims we regard as having an equitable base; we are asking Marcos to drop the other five claims. Ambassador Blair has been authorized to take this up with Marcos. Settlement details will have to be worked out after the Marcos visit.

Estimated cost of the two claims: about \$42 Million. Defense has these funds available.

State believes Marcos will find it politically difficult to drop all other claims.

(3) Economic Aid --

The Filipinos has given us a number of very large and ambitious requests for military and economic aid. They have not defined priorities sharply, nor have they justified projects sufficiently for workable loan proposals to be staffed out in advance of the visit.

Communique language will probably have to be vague. State thinks it will be strong enough for Marcos' purposes if it indicates we are willing to lend active support to a Philippine initiative in organizing multilateral assistance for Marcos' four-year development plan.

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The World Bank is relaxing its stiff stand against further aid to the Philippines in view of the latter's recent steps, legislative and otherwise, to bear their share of costs. The Bank is still reluctant to agree to a formal Consultative Group until there is more evidence the Filipinos are capable of benefitting from it.

State and AID do not recommend a new PL-480 agreement under any Title because: (a) there is no clear and specific request from Manila; (b) there is continuing uncertainty whether the Phils will allow a private trader to take up to 90,000 tons of corn through commercial channels under Title IV.

Affirmative action on PL-480 is possible if the Filipinos decide what they want, and how much.

(4) Defense Relations --

Negotiations on the Rusk-Ramos Agreement are nearly complete. This will make legally binding the Bohlen Serrano Memo of Understanding of 1959. Under it, we will: (a) cut the time of our bases agreement to 25 years from 99 years; (b) agree to consult with the GOP on operational use of our bases outside SEATO and Mutual Defense Treaty commitments.

We will also reaffirm U. S. policy on mutual defense as expressed by Dulles in 1954 and President Eisenhower in 1958. Depending on Marcos' reaction, we may wish to put language on this matter into the communique.

(5) Civil Air --

PanAmerican has dropped its long-standing opposition to a Philippine route request (Manila-Honolulu-San Francisco). But Manila has shown no interest in this of late -- largely because of political uncertainties surrounding a battle for control of PAL (Philippine Air Line). There may be movement on this before Marcos arrives.

(6) Laurel-Langley --

State thinks we cannot afford to suggest that L-L can be terminated ahead of schedule. Marcos has suggested setting up a joint preparatory committee on this matter. We can agree to discuss this.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(7) Lesser Matters --

The Communique may include language on such things as: (a) opening a Viet-Nam procurement information office in Manila; (b) disbursements under the Special Fund for Education (if we get Filipino project proposals), and others.

Special Items.

Bill Jorden is submitting a separate memo on ideas he suggested earlier and in which you expressed an interest.

General Problems of the Visit.

Both sides are anxious to move ahead with concrete steps that will demonstrate our close partnership.

However, our Government is generally reluctant to place more resources at the disposal of the Philippines because they have made so little use of offers of such assistance in the past.

The Philippine Government under Marcos is still too new to propose effective means of using the large sums that it wants for political reasons.

W. W. Rostow

Atts:

TABS, A, B, C.

~~SECRET~~



Wednesday, September 7, 1966 -- 9:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

The doctors report Sec. Rusk is "heavy with flu." He will be in hospital the rest of this week, possibly into next.

As you know, George Ball returns late today.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Tuesday  
September 6, 1966  
7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

The attached memorandum is  
self-explanatory.

I believe the risks of our silence  
are greater than the risks of our  
candor; but I did not wish to clear  
this without your guidance.

W. W. Rostow

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 6, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: U. S. Connection of Verwoerd's Assassin

Verwoerd was killed by Demetrios Tsafendakis, a Portuguese national who was deported from the United States to Greece in 1947. We know nothing yet about his time here except that he was a foreign seaman employed by the Merchant Marine in World War II. His whereabouts between 1947 and 1965 are also vague. He appeared at our consulate<sup>in Capetown</sup> last November to file a claim for \$100,000 in damages resulting from his being deported to Greece, rather than to South Africa (which, he maintained, was his home country). He said that he had made earlier attempts to file his claim at American consulates in France, Switzerland, and Portugal.

Our consul in Capetown informed Tsafendakis that such claims could be filed only through his country's embassy in Washington or in U.S. Federal Court. He seemed to accept this quietly. He reappeared at the consulate in May, however, and asked that his affidavit be given to Senator Robert Kennedy when the latter arrived in early June. The consulate immediately returned the affidavit with a letter pointing out that Kennedy's visit was to be very short and busy, and suggesting that Tsafendakis write to him in Washington. (A five-hour search of the Kennedy files this afternoon has yielded no such letter.) This was the last known U.S. contact with the assassin.

We must now decide whether and when to tell the South Africans what little we know about Tsafendakis. Rountree wants to tell them and has asked for instructions. State plans to tell him to go ahead, but will do nothing without White House clearance.

I think we should clear the instruction. In doing so, we run a risk of nasty insinuations by the SAG; but the risks involved in not disclosing information which is certain to be discovered soon seem to me much greater.



Ed Hamilton

Clear message \_\_\_\_\_

Instruct Rountree not to inform SAG \_\_\_\_\_



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-156

By           , NARA, Date 1-27-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, September 6, 1966 -- 5:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NSC Staff Contacts With Soviet and Eastern European Diplomats.

When I came aboard in April, I laid down the rule that contacts with Soviet and Eastern European diplomats would be handled by Francis Bator and myself; and that before such contacts our security people would be informed and they, in turn, would inform the FBI.

On August 30 Bill Jorden informed Brom Smith immediately after he received a call from a Mr. Bubnov of the Soviet Embassy, who said he was calling on the recommendation of Carl Marcy. Bill checked with Marcy who said Bubnov was trying to get in touch with knowledgeable people in the White House. When Bubnov called, Jorden said he was not working on European matters and turned down an invitation to lunch. He mentioned that we had an East-West man on the staff, Nat Davis, former Minister to Bulgaria and a friend of Bill Moyers.

I immediately called Nat and found that Bubnov had already been on the phone to him. Nat, following State Department procedures with which he was familiar, had made an engagement for lunch. Nat is new and I had not told him what the rules of the game are down here.

I called in Nat and explained that our general rule was to avoid such contacts by the NSC staff. He made the perfectly good point that his business was East-West affairs; he was a professional at dealing in these matters; and he would like permission to see Soviet and Eastern European diplomats from time to time as part of his normal business. I said I would think it over.

This morning I asked him to postpone his lunch with Bubnov, which he has done.

In no circumstance would I recommend that the basic rule for the NSC staff be changed. I do wish your guidance, however, on the special case of Nat Davis whose business on the staff is East-West relations.

The subject matter of his work argues that he should have such contacts, carefully monitored and approved in advance by Francis or me. Arguing against is the fact that he is not so deeply engaged with you

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

personally as to permit him to reflect precisely your views; although he knows, of course, the lines of governmental policy in general.

The options are these:

Let Davis have contacts on a tight leash ✓;

Confine Davis' contacts to Eastern European diplomats but not the Soviet Embassy \_\_\_\_\_;

No Eastern European or Soviet Embassy contacts for Davis \_\_\_\_\_.

I do not feel strongly about this. Davis feels he could contribute more if permitted the kinds of contacts he would have if he worked in the State Department; but contacts with anyone linked to the White House are a special matter.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Mr. Rostow

*Pres file*

*cy to Ben  
B. May  
J. Jones*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-156

By *inf*, NARA, Date *1-27-92*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 6, 1966

SUBJECT: Receiving President Nasser's Newly Wed Daughter

Secretary Rusk recommends that you receive Nasser's daughter and new son-in-law while they are in the US on their honeymoon (until 14 September) and perhaps give them a small silver gift.

This unusual suggestion deserves serious consideration.

At the root of our problems with Nasser is his own feeling that we are out to get him personally. This is partly because Arab politicians see conspiracy behind every tree. It's partly because Nasser honestly feels John Foster Dulles deliberately double-crossed him on the Aswan Dam deal. It's partly because his revolutionary mentality needs a straw man to joust with, and "imperialism" fills the bill in this ex-British land. But it's also partly because he feels we have always treated him like a leper since he is one of the few major non-Communist leaders never invited to Washington--Tito, Nkrumah and Ben Bella have come and even Sukarno several times.

One gesture like this will not solve our problems with Nasser; his deep-seated views will take time to change. But I can think of few gestures better calculated to show him you have nothing against him personally.

If you like this idea, it would take only a few moments, maybe in the rose garden, and then we could have them taken on an individual tour of the public rooms of the White House. You and Mrs. Johnson have much in common with them since their minds are undoubtedly still full of their own recent wedding.

I think this is a unique opportunity for personal diplomacy. I would not normally recommend your spending your time this way. But this sort of gesture can do as much for us as most of the wheat deals we could sign.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 2, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit to the United States of  
Lt. and Mrs. Ashraf Marawan  
(nee Mona Abdel Nasser)

Recommendation:

That you receive the daughter of President Gamal Abdel Nasser and her husband, Lt. Ashraf Marawan.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

President Nasser's daughter and her husband arrived in New York in the evening of August 31. They will be in this country until September 14. You sent President Nasser a message welcoming the newly married couple to the United States. Their itinerary during their trip to this country does not call for a visit to Washington. President Nasser is so sensitive on these matters that while I am sure he would be greatly pleased if his daughter and her husband were to be received by you, he would not wish to be in the position of having suggested such a visit only to be turned down. At a time when we wish to keep the door open in US-UAR relations but are unable to respond to their major requests for aid, a gesture such as this would be helpful.

We have in mind a very brief call upon you perhaps in conjunction with a guided tour of the public areas of the White House. If you should receive them it would be appropriate if they were given a small gift as a wedding present and as a token of friendship. A suitably engraved silver box of the finest American craftsmanship would serve this purpose very handsomely. Their schedule could be arranged to suit your convenience.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Message sent to President Nasser.
2. Itinerary of Lt. and Mrs. Ashraf Marawan.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-153

By *lig*, NARA, Date 8-25-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VISIT OF PRESIDENT NASSER'S DAUGHTERMembers of Party:

Mrs. Mona Abdel Nasser Marawan  
Lt. Ashraf Marawan (husband)  
Mr. Munir Hafez, UAR President's Office (already in New York)

Schedule:

Wednesday, August 31 Arrive Kennedy Airport, New York  
5:45 p.m. Alitalia Flight 644  
(to stay at Waldorf Astoria)

Thursday, September 1 All three members of party will be admitted  
8:30 a.m. to U.S. Naval Hospital in New York for  
complete medical examination

Sunday, September 4 Kennedy Airport to Los Angeles via American  
Airlines, Flight No. 3, leaving at noon  
and arriving Los Angeles 2:23 p.m.

Monday - Tuesday In Los Angeles, including visit to Disneyland.  
September 5 - 6 Will stay at Beverly Wilshire. Will visit  
Disneyland at 11:30 a.m. on September 6.

Leave Los Angeles at 1:25 p.m. via United  
Airlines, Flight No. 73-F; arrive San Francisco  
at 2:23 p.m.

Wednesday, Thursday, In San Francisco, Fairmount Hotel.  
Friday, Saturday Leave San Francisco September 10 at 1:00 p.m.  
September 7 - 10 via American Airlines, Flight No. 16; arrive  
Kennedy Airport 9:00 p.m.

Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, In New York for shopping  
Wednesday  
September 11 - 14

Wednesday, September 14 Leave New York for Paris and Cairo.

75c

33577

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

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87  
Orig  
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Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy CAIRO

IMMEDIATE

Aug 23 5 45 PM '68

STATE 33577

LIMDIS

EMBTTEL 890

Please deliver following Presidential message, dated

August 23, to President Nasser:

QUOTE Dear Mr. President:

I am delighted to learn confidentially that your daughter and her husband are planning a honeymoon visit to our country soon. I hope their visit will be a happy and a memorable one.

As you know, Mrs. Johnson and I also have some newlyweds in our family.

We ask God's blessing on these young couples and give thanks for the universal human experiences which bind us all.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DWA, NARA, Date 4-19-88

Signed original being pouched.

RUSK

|                                      |   |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| Drafted by                           | Telegraphic transmission and                                  |
| <del>Text recd from WH 8/23/66</del> | classification approved by <del>S/S Herbert B. Thompson</del> |

CONFIDENTIAL

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Tuesday  
September 6, 1966  
3:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

George McGhee's account of how  
he handled the chore with Adenauer,  
which I conveyed to him on your  
behalf, may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

76a

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 7-13-98

Bonn/Bad Godesberg  
Germany

September 1, 1966

The Honorable  
Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
Executive Offices of the White House

Dear Walt:

I hope you will forgive me for not acknowledging earlier your letter of August 9, which I received at the Farm. I have waited, however, until I could report the carrying out of the President's wishes with respect to Dr. Adenauer which you conveyed.

Immediately upon my return to Bonn on August 22nd I put in a request to see the former Chancellor, who received me this morning. Except for the portion of the conversation dealing with the President's request, the meeting has been reported in Bonn's 2698.

I conveyed the President's greetings to the Chancellor, and injected both points you wished raised into the conversation in a semi-humorous vein. Despite what he may have told Sulzberger, Adenauer laughed heartily at any suggestion that the President in his toast intended to equate Churchill with Wilson.


With respect to Adenauer's remark to Sulzberger that we should withdraw troops from south Viet Nam, I jokingly said that the President was interested in his views on international questions but hoped that he would in the future convey them through me. The Chancellor reacted rather sheepishly, like a schoolboy caught with his hand in the cookie jar. He admitted having taken advantage of the forum provided by Sulzberger to provoke the President into a defense of retaining American forces in Europe.

You would be interested in his reasoning. He said that there are now two leaders within the Democratic Party -- the President and Robert Kennedy. In the debate which will ensue between them, each will be vying with the other for the support of the American people. Adenauer's objective was to be sure that President Johnson does not, in this debate, offer the American people a reduction of forces in Germany.

Knowing Adenauer, there is no way of being certain that this was the reason which prompted him to make his remark about troops in Viet Nam. His explanation, which is typical of him, could easily be a contrived one. I do not believe, however, that his remarks were serious, or reflected his real position on this issue. He did not contest the counter-vailing argument I made.

I hope things go well with you. I am very pleased that you are there with the President. He told me when I saw him how valuable your assistance is.

With warm regards,



George C. McGhee  
American Ambassador



761  
August 9, 1966

Dear George:

The President would be grateful if you would undertake in a casual way a minor chore on your return to Bonn.

The President was a little disturbed by the press accounts of Adenauer's confusing his toast at lunch for Harold Wilson as comparing the two Prime Ministers. The attached clarifies what the President said.

Second, you might recall the President's respect and affection for Adenauer; his fond memory of his trip to the Ranch; and suggest that, if he has advice for the President on Viet Nam, he would be glad to receive it directly (rather than via the New York Times or Washington Post).

I am sure you will know how to handle this gracefully.

I hope you are making the most of your time at Middleburg.

All the best.

Yours,

W. W. Rostow

Honorable George C. McGhee  
Farmer's Delight  
Middleburg, Virginia

WWRostow:rlh

Mr. <sup>77</sup> Rostow

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 6, 1966

SUBJECT: Farewell Call by Pakistani Ambassador

G. Ahmed would like to pay a farewell call on you before he leaves Washington 15 September.

This would be a good way to reciprocate Ayub's warm welcome for Gene Locke. There is no urgent need for a verbal message to Ayub because you have just written him, and Locke has obviously reflected your fresh views. However, with the difficult decision on military spares still ahead of us, we can make good use of any opportunity to keep your lines to Ayub alive and warm.

I recommend you see him.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒ \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 88-156  
By WJ, NARA, Date 1-27-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 5, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ne Win Visit

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 89-64  
By rip NARA. Date 2-2-90

Herewith the Briefing Book for the Ne Win visit.

General Ne Win, his wife and official party will arrive in the United States on September 7 and overnight at Williamsburg. Formal arrival ceremony in Washington will be at the Ellipse at 11:30 a. m., September 8. You have two meetings scheduled with General Ne Win, both at 5:00 p. m. on September 8 and 9.

There are no major bilateral problems to be settled. The purpose of the visit is primarily to establish a better atmosphere in U.S. -Burmese relations.

I suggest you read:

- (1) Scope Paper at Tab B of General Papers;
- (2) Secretary Rusk's memorandum and Ambassador Byroade's Cable of August 18, both at Tab C of General Papers;
- (3) Suggestions on Approaching the Burmese and Topics of Conversation at Tab D;
- (4) Biographic sketches on Ne Win and his wife (Tabs A and B) under Biographic Sketches.

Some of the Background papers are worth noting, particularly: Burma's Internal Situation and Foreign Policy (Tab A); Burma's Attitude on Viet-Nam (Tab B); Burma and U. S. Economic Aid (Tab I); Burma and the Military Assistance Program (Tab K).

The Welcoming Statement and your Toast (under Public Statements) are being re-done.

We will be submitting a separate one-page talking paper.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

~~SECRET~~



Monday, September 5, 1966 -- 4:20 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

I telephoned Scotty Reston, New York Times, to call his attention to the structure of the Lancaster speech and the balanced and realistic, if simple, presentation it made of our foreign policy. He said he would examine it carefully.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Shirley Jones  
at Bowdler

Monday, September 5, 1966 -- 9:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Linc Gordon is anxious that you meet with the Board of Directors of the Council for Latin America.

As you know, it is a businessmen's group with which we have worked quite well on Latin American problems. The directors include David Rockefeller, John Gallagher, George Moore, John Moore, etc. (Names attached).

To round them all up on the same day requires considerable lead time.

Linc prefers some time during the week of October 24-27.

Mid-December is a second choice.

Given the need for influential support for our summit proposals, I recommend that you see them, if possible.

W. W. Rostow

October 24-27 okay \_\_\_\_\_

Schedule mid-December \_\_\_\_\_

Regret ✓

See me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rln

3136  
80a



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 31, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Possible Meeting of President with  
The Council for Latin America

Bill Barlow, the Executive Head of David Rockefeller's Council for Latin America tells me that they want to schedule one of their three annual board meetings in Washington in October. They are most hopeful that the President might agree to meet with them at that time. The dates are flexible, provided that 6 or 7 weeks notice can be given. This rules out the first half of October. In view of my own absence from October 16 to 21 they should aim the date shortly thereafter. The ideal time for them would be during the week of October 24, perhaps on October 27.

Barlow recognizes that this is only two weeks before the election, and that this might create conflicts with the President's calendar. If the President preferred, The Council for Latin America would defer the meeting until mid-December, although their preference would be clearly for October.

I undertook to explore this matter through you and to give Barlow a reply within the next few days so that he may reserve the indicated date for his group of very busy board members.

I am sure that neither you or the President requires any background information about the Council, but I am enclosing a current list of the directors as a reminder. I consider it highly desirable that the President meet with them.

LG.

Lincoln Gordon

Enclosure:

CLA List of Directors



OFFICERS OF COUNCIL FOR LATIN AMERICA

Chairman.....David Rockefeller  
Senior Vice-Chairman...John F. Gallagher  
President.....William E. Barlow  
Vice-Chairmen.....Henry W. Balgooyen, Harold S. Geneen,  
George S. Moore, John D. J. Moore,  
John R. White (Treasurer),  
William S. Youngman, Jr.

Other Members of the Executive Committee:

Charles M. Brinckerhoff, Albert L. Cole,  
Earl C. Daum, S. Maurice McAshan, Jr.,  
Robert W. Purcell (Secretary),  
J. Howard Rambin, Jr., Thomas E. Sunderland,  
A. Thomas Taylor, Rawleigh Warner, Jr.

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Monday, September 5, 1966  
4:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

I spoke with Amb. Bunker who leaves tomorrow, Tuesday, September 6, for the Dominican Republic.

Bunker will try to call Sen. Fulbright before he leaves.

He has talked with one of the Dominican military now about to attend the Inter-American Defense College, who is alleged to be involved in these plots. He assured Bunker that he is not involved that he, personally, does not believe a military coup is a serious likelihood.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

- 2 -

Dear Bill:

As Ellsworth Bunker may have told you, he is leaving on Tuesday, September 6, for a brief trip to the Dominican Republic.

In the course of this visit, he will make a careful assessment of the reports that an attempt is being planned to overthrow President Balaguer.

On his return, I have instructed him to share promptly with you any information he develops, as well as his judgment of the situation.

Needless to say, I share your anxiety at these reports; and I am grateful that you took the trouble to call them to my attention.

Sincerely,

Honorable J. W. Fulbright  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWRostow:rla



J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK., CHAIRMAN

JOHN SPARKMAN, ALA.  
MIKE MANSFIELD, MONT.  
WAYNE MORSE, OREG.  
ALBERT GORE, TENN.  
FRANK J. LAUSCHE, OHIO  
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO  
STUART SYMINGTON, MO.  
THOMAS J. DODD, CONN.  
JOSEPH S. CLARK, PA.  
CLAIBORNE PELL, R.I.  
EUGENE J. MCCARTHY, MINN.  
GALE W. MCGEE, WYO.

BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, IOWA  
GEORGE D. AIKEN, VT.  
FRANK CARLSON, KANS.  
JOHN J. WILLIAMS, DEL.  
KARL E. MUNDT, S. DAK.  
CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J.

United States Senate  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

CARL MARCY, CHIEF OF STAFF  
ARTHUR M. KUHL, CHIEF CLERK

September 1, 1966

MM  
The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.


Dear Mr. President:

I have received disturbing reports from a number of sources suggesting that Dominican military leaders may be planning an attempt to overthrow the government of President Balaguer. It is said that a coup d'etat might be attempted in late September or early October when the Inter-American Peace Force will have been withdrawn. This information came to me from former President Bosch, from Mr. Norman Thomas, who has written to Vice President Humphrey and Assistant Secretary Gordon as well as several members of the Senate. I have also noted press reports of a possible bid for power by the military in the Christian Science Monitor of August 26, in El Tiempo of New York on August 29 and in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch on August 28.

I am unable to judge the accuracy of this information and I am well aware that you may already possess more complete and reliable information about the situation in the Dominican Republic. Because of your Administration's strong support for the re-establishment and maintenance of constitutional government in the Dominican Republic, however, I felt sure you would want to receive any available information on a possible threat to Dominican democracy.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

  
J. W. Fulbright  
Chairman

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, September 5, 1966 -- 3:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

Herewith three [redacted] cables and one [redacted]

On [redacted], the bird is not yet in hand; but he hasn't retreated to the bush either. The two back-up cables are a Washington-Saigon exchange on how to handle him if he really fights. In fact, we won't be able to judge how to play him until we talk and understand better his motivation, objectives, and willingness to play.

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

With respect to [redacted] Hanoi is still hard; but, despite discouragement, the [redacted] are still working at it.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

In addition, I attach a long account of a lively performance [redacted]

[redacted] I am skeptical;  
but it is certainly worth reading.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 5246  
Saigon 5245  
To Saigon 41139  
Saigon 5229  
Warsaw 523

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 98-411**  
**By is, NARA Date 3-3-00**

WWRostow:rln

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- To Saigon 41139, September 3, 1966, from State Dept.

THRUSH

Agree that circumstances might require our making some statement about nephew's defection. We are considering what might be suitable text and will review this with you immediately if at some point following defection public expression appears required.

However, we want to keep our eyes on optimum objective of surfacing taking place through appearance of nephew with high Viet Nam government official making appeal for national reconciliation, etc. We realize difficulties in way of persuading government of Viet Nam, and perhaps nephew as well, to take part in such a move but we want to play our cards so as to keep this possibility, or next best arrangement, open and avoid either foreclosing or seriously detracting from its potential effect by earlier surfacing and too much emphasis on direct U. S. involvement in defection. We recognize that at some point Viet Cong may themselves say something on nephew's disappearance and lacking firm info may hope stimulate government of Viet Nam or U. S. Government response. However, at that stage believe we could and should avoid any comment until we, or, better, government of Viet Nam, ready to speak; this has virtue also if there are other defectors who may be following.

Agree you should not try keep secret from Ky where nephew has been taken since we could not hold this position for very long in any case. As regards matter of concealing that defection took place in South Viet Nam, we wonder whether Ky would not accept this if you were to appeal to him not to ask us for the moment where and how the defection brought about and leaving him with impression it did not necessarily take place in South Viet Nam; this has special importance if others may be following in nephew's footsteps. If others not involved we have no serious objections to formula you have suggested for reply if Ky inquires, namely, that arrangements for defection made in Cambodia but actual pick up in South Viet Nam. In fact, in last analysis we leave to your judgment how you handle this point in light of relations with Ky, risks of leaks, and possible dangers to any moves still under way.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 88-17  
By ig, NARA, Date 2-2-89

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~ -- Saigon 5245, September 5, 1966

THRUSH

We note optimum objective stated paragraph 2 of State Dept. 41139, i. e., appeal for national reconciliation. We do not disagree with this as important objective, but we will not, of course, be in position to determine possibilities in that respect until we can examine attitudes of both nephew and government of Viet Nam, which may not be practical for some time.

If matter proceeds as hoped, our first effort will be to determine what is desired of us with respect to family, concerning whose safety we have given definite assurances.

Next, we would wish to obtain as much intelligence as possible bearing on American prisoners, additional defectors, and political attitudes.

We would need sufficient time to relax nephew and his group so as to evoke maximum cooperation prior to government of Viet Nam becoming too deeply involved. I continue to believe Ky would keep secret for reasonable period of time, especially if I could assure him he would be promptly informed of nature of information being acquired by us.

We could then consult appropriately concerning timing of any announcement that may seem necessary or desirable. I would aim, through this procedure, at holding off early demands from colonial loan, for example, to see and deal with nephew and group.

Wish to caution Department that some time may yet be required, despite firmer arrangements mentioned previously, for entire matter to ripen. Principal's son did not appear yesterday for reasons unknown to uncle, but we standing by. For time being we do not wish to appear too eager or change basic position which is that they have come to us in this matter. If matter fails to progress, we will consider whether other tactics or approach desirable.

Lodge

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 88-17  
By ing, NARA, Date 2-2-89

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- Saigon 5246, September 5, 1966

THRUSH

1. Uncle and intermediary came to American's house 12:45 p.m. today, September 5. Uncle said he was visited by representative of principal's son at 10:30 a.m. this morning and was given following message:
2. Son was unable to come into Saigon as planned. (Uncle speculated this due to son's inability to break away from obligations arising out of de Gaulle's visit to Cambodia. We assume this connected with requirement for contact with North Vietnamese in Cambodia on occasion of visit.)
3. Uncle should go to certain place in Delta today to meet principal or latter's son.
4. Uncle said he intended to leave this afternoon by car or bus. He had bus ticket in his possession. American urged he go by car in order save time and offered defray expenses. Uncle said offer not necessary as he had plenty of funds. We believe he has already departed.
5. Uncle asked arrangements be made for him to get in touch with American from Delta. We have done this.
6. CAS informed.

Lodge

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 88-17 and NLJ 98-408  
By js, NARA, Date 6-24-04

~~TOP SECRET~~

82-d

~~SECRET~~ -- Saigon 5229, September 4, 1966

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 88-17  
By inf, NARA, Date 2-2-89

MARIGOLD

1. D'Orlandi said that Lewandowski had returned from 16 days in Hanoi profoundly discouraged. His two closest contacts Phan van Dong and General Giap were both away. His talk with Ho Chi Minh produced nothing of interest. There was absolutely no sign of a desire to stop the war.
2. D'Orlandi made it clear that he was not going to stay on in Saigon if there was to be no forward motion at all from Lewandowski's side. He, therefore, would make immediate plans to go back to Rome and occupy himself with other things.
3. Lewandowski pleaded with him not to do this, citing his conviction that Saigon was the only place where the type of clandestine understanding, which is so indispensable, could be worked out.
4. D'Orlandi said he would be willing to work with Lewandowski to try to develop a compromise formula, which could then be submitted to Moscow or Washington.
5. Comment!! What are Department's views of this suggestion? It could be that some ideas and clarification might come out of it, and that it would not, of course, commit us to anything. I doubt whether the Pole will be authorized. End of comment.
6. Incidental intelligence obtained by Lewandowski was as follows:
  - a. There is much worry that Peking might do "unpredictable things" in view of the uproar going on there.
  - b. Hanoi could not see the point of our bombing Haiphong, which, according to Lewandowski, could only accommodate four ships and had no cranes or facilities for unloading. Why do a thing, he asked, which would only throw Hanoi into Peking's lap and make it impossible for the Russians to have any influence?
  - c. Lewandowski learned that the Ho Chi Minh letter to de Gaulle embraced the de Gaulle thesis of U. S. withdrawal, neutralization, etc. That is the first time that Ho Chi Minh had formally done so.

Lodge

~~SECRET~~



82-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-408  
By iss, NARA, Date 9-24-03

Warsaw 523, September 5, 1966

1. At September 1 luncheon I gave for Amb. Drozniak, Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz drew me aside from group before and after lunch with obvious purpose of private discussion on wide range of subjects. Conversations lasted over an hour, during which he said he was talking as Winiewicz to Gronouski, not as Deputy Foreign Minister to Ambassador.
2. Winiewicz stressed repeatedly that Poles want to do all they can to end Viet Nam war, but that Hanoi is suspicious of Poles as result of such activity as role played by Poles after Harriman visit. Poles must be careful not to increase this suspicion. This is why they are so cautious with respect to ICC role in demilitarized zone and Cambodia. If they are to be effective, they cannot act in any way which might undermine Hanoi's confidence in them.
3. In response to my reference to conversations with Foreign Office Director General Michalowski, Winiewicz said Poles had noted our emphasis on point three of Hanoi's four points, and were working hard on reformulation which both Hanoi and U. S. could live with.
4. While recognizing that U. S. cannot arbitrarily pull out of Viet Nam, he observed that it is essential that bombing of North Viet Nam stop. I said that our 37-day bombing pause elicited no positive response from Hanoi, and that he must realize that the President cannot call a halt to bombing without firm evidence Hanoi is ready to respond. I added that Poles are in good position to quietly receive such information from Hanoi, and I could assure him that once we get hard news that Hanoi is genuinely interested in moving toward peace, we would have no difficulty in ending the bombing. Winiewicz repeated that Poles are doing all they can to find a solution, and he expressed thought that useful discussions might be conducted in halls of UN. (Comment: I was surprised that he didn't give me standard rejoinder that until bombing stops Poles are powerless to even approach Hanoi.)
5. At one point, after some discussion of pall Viet Nam war casts over our relations, Winiewicz said flatly that he is convinced that war will end in 1967, and that once it is over, Poland and U. S. will make great progress. Later when I pressed him on his assurance, he said that if he wasn't so convinced he would have to conclude that every leader in the world was out of his mind.

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6. Winiewicz said Poles are watching Chinese situation closely. Against background of repeated foreign Polish failures and hopelessness of solving their economic problems, Chinese are turning to destroying all vestiges of a good life (cosmetic shops, beauty parlors, etc.) and emphasizing "work, work, work." He said, however, that Red Guards had been curbed and that there are posters today all over Peking saying Red Guards had not followed orders. He said this might be the time when "something could develop," and repeated the observation that Poles will be "exploring the possibilities" in the halls of UN.

7. Winiewicz went to great lengths to convince me that Ho Chi Minh has no use for Chinese. He noted that Ho recalls hundreds of years of Chinese occupation and is now more fearful of Chinese than he has ever been. He said that for over a year now Ho has been resisting pressure from Chinese to match U. S. troops in South with Chinese troops in North. He added that if I don't understand Ho's fears on this score, I should visualize the reaction here if West Germans offered to send troops into Poland to protect the Poles.

8. In stressing Ho's desire to be independent of Chinese, Winiewicz said that there have been three developments in Socialist world vis-a-vis Russia: First, complete dependence; second, a strong desire to be independent of Russia; and, third, the present stage, a desire to be independent but cooperate closely with Russia. He said Ho is in the second stage in relation to China.

9. Turning to the Soviet Union, I said I had heard several explanations as to why the Soviets are making no effort to bring peace to Viet Nam: (a) Soviets really do not want peace, and are happy to see China and U. S. occupied in Southeast Asia; (b) Soviets want peace but are powerless to take effective action; (c) Soviets are concerned about losing prestige with unaligned nations if they show any lessening of their militancy; and (d) Soviets fear loss of support from Eastern European Socialist camp in ideological struggle if they show less than full support of North Viet Nam war effort. I asked Winiewicz if any of these propositions correctly explained Moscow's attitude.

10. Winiewicz answered flatly that none is correct. He said Kosygin and Brezhnev would be very happy if they woke up tomorrow morning and found war ended. As for Eastern European Socialist countries, they would be more than happy if Soviet Union made a move for peace: "We would rejoice; believe me, we would rejoice."

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-3-

11. Soviet caution, he said, stems from Sino-Soviet struggle for influence in Asia. He termed this a struggle between those who believe in peaceful coexistence and those who do not. He pointed out that a few years ago China had all the influence in North Korea; Russia had none. Now situation is reversed. He said it took a long time for Koreans to come to accept Russians and to believe Soviet Union would stand behind them. Not until they accepted this as fact did Koreans move over into Soviet camp. With this experience, Soviets are extremely careful to avoid giving Ho any notion that they are not standing fully behind him. Winiewicz said that if Soviets give Hanoi any reason to doubt them, they will not only fail in their effort to bring Hanoi into Soviet camp but they also stand to lose credit that has been painstakingly built up with Koreans. Thus, he concluded, while Russians want to bring end to war, they will make no move until Ho lets them know he wants them to do so.

12. Turning to ~~N~~ational Liberation Front, Winiewicz attached great significance to fact National Liberation Front's July 22 message of congratulations to Poland referred three or four times to "Nation" of South Viet Nam, not "people" of South Viet Nam. He claimed this signifies distinct change in National Liberation Front attitude. Winiewicz noted that Poles felt previously that National Liberation Front was close to Chinese and was thinking only of unified Viet Nam victory. Poles have changed their opinion about National Liberation Front closeness to China and now believe National Liberation Front is interested in establishing neutralized South Vietnamese nation with unification a long-term future objective. (Comment: He put great store on this alleged change in attitude as evidence of a lessening of Chinese influence. He said that "National Liberation Forde will not now be bottleneck" it has been in dealing with Hanoi.) *Front*

13. Returning to China's internal problems, Winiewicz said the current gossip, to which Poles give some credence because it comes from Asian sources, is that Lin Piao's advancement into leadership was engineered by Mao's young, attractive and forceful wife. Winiewicz flatly asserted that Mao has lost his faculties. He can point his finger at men to be purged or advanced, but his wife, who has a romance going with Lin Piao, is real power behind throne. He added that he thinks Mao, influenced by his wife, purposely kept Lin in background until proper moment. He also noted that while Lin Piao at 59 is one of younger men in leadership group, he has been in ill health and some time ago was observed being helped into a meeting by two men.

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14. Winiewicz also said that time to have brought China into UN was after Bandung in 1955 when Chou En-Lai was a real power. Poles regard Chou as moderate and are intrigued by fact that he has stood back from current fray and is now number three in hierarchy as against being number four prior to the purge.

15. Two other comments by Winiewicz on China should be mentioned. He said that the Poles were present when Mao's great swim was supposed to take place but saw no evidence that it actually happened. When I asked if current upset in China was impeding Soviet shipments to North Viet Nam, he said there always have been great difficulties.

16. During our discussion of bilateral economic relations (which I will summarize in separate telegram), I observed that broken windows at the Embassy (July 19 demonstration) were not helpful. Winiewicz replied that we must know that there are a variety of forces in Poland; that there are "hardliners." "I tell you, Gronouski, nobody in the Foreign Office had any idea that was going to happen, starting with Kliszko to Ochob off on the side, to Rapacki and right down the line." He added that in Poland and U. S. there are people who do not believe in coexistence. "We have some hardliners above me who don't want coexistence. It would be suicide for me to buck them." He said we have to work with them and hope eventually to convince them. He added that Foreign Office has a great desire to work with and develop relations with U. S., but hardliners in both countries create problems.

17. Winiewicz made it clear throughout that he had a vision and was assuming center stage at Drozniak's party. Thus, after I toasted Drozniak with some kind words, Drozniak reached for his glass and was about to respond when Winiewicz interrupted saying, "It might seem unusual, Mr. Ambassador, but I am going to respond for Drozniak." He spoke of Drozniak's and my missions as being difficult but extremely important. He then said that it is of paramount importance that "all of us do everything we can" to solve the problems that confront us and that Poland, though a "small and weak country," had worked exhaustively in this direction and continues to do so. (Comment: It was clear that he was referring to both our bilateral relations and Viet Nam, and he spoke in a tone of determination and optimism. His toast amounted to a pledge of cooperation, as was his earlier table conversation comment that "You can be sure that everyone at this table" has strong feelings of friendship for the U. S. In addition to Winiewicz and Drozniak, Poles present included Milnikiel, Director, Department III, Foreign Office; Tomorrowicz, Permanent Representative to UN General Assembly; and Sieradzki, Deputy Director, Dept. III.)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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18. Comment: This was most extraordinary conversation I have had since coming to Warsaw. Winiewicz clearly set out to convince me that Polish Foreign Office is deeply interested in U. S. - Polish friendship, that Poles are prepared to make real effort to help end Viet Nam war, and that current developments in Southeast Asia have greatly improved prospects for Viet Nam settlement.

19. The attitude of Winiewicz was extremely friendly and his comments were unusually open and frank. I was surprised by his willingness to express a specific position on variety of subjects which heretofore have been treated by Polish officials in vague and guarded manner. He struck me as unusually forthcoming in his discussion of the "hardliners," detailed interpretation of Soviet position, flat prediction that Viet Nam war would be settled in 1967, assertion that there had been significant change in National Liberation Front objectives, statement that Poles are working hard on acceptable reformulation of Hanoi's point three, analysis of China internally and vis-a-vis Soviets and North Viet Nam, and emphasis on efforts Poles will make in UN corridors.

20. While some of his comments were obviously personal (i. e., "It would be suicide for me to buck the hardliners."), for one as experienced and sophisticated as Winiewicz it is unlikely that tone and substance of his remarks were without authorization. Up to this point the most Poles have been willing to say is that if we accept in principle Hanoi's four points, admit National Liberation Front to negotiations and stop bombing, there is some hope that progress can be made. Why have they now decided to convey improvement in the outlook for peace in Viet Nam?

21. The intention of the Poles may be to hold out prospects for peace simply to make us hesitant to "rock the boat" by further escalation of the war. On other hand, we should not wholly discount possibility that Poles have received some signal which leads them to believe that Soviets, Hanoi, or National Liberation Front, or all three, may now be more receptive to peace moves than they have been in the past.

22. The stress Winiewicz placed on Sino-Soviet conflict and the attention he directed to Ho's fear of China and shift of Korea and National Liberation Front out of China's camp, could mean Soviets are facing up to some unpalatable alternatives.

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(a) A showdown with China, which is becoming more and more difficult to avoid, is unthinkable while war is raging in Viet Nam. Yet their prestige in Asia may ultimately require Soviets to respond to Chinese abuse.

(b) The buildup of its dispute with China could result in China further impeding Soviet overland delivery of supplies to Viet Nam, and forcing Soviets into undesirable choice of reducing its help to Hanoi or accepting risks inherent in delivery by Southeast Asia.

(c) If, because of decline in Soviet aid and U. S. military pressure, Ho's military situation becomes increasingly untenable, Ho may be faced with alternative of moving toward peace or calling for Chinese, Soviet, and Eastern European troop support. The manner in which Soviets and other Eastern European countries have soft-pedaled their willingness to send troops, and direct confrontation with U. S. implications of such a move, suggests that this development would force Soviets to make a most difficult decision. From standpoint of influence in Asia, they could not very well stand on sidelines while Chinese troops moved into war. Yet to commit troops would be assuming greater risks than Soviets are likely to want to assume.

23. Given these alternatives, and if in fact Ho fears introduction of Chinese troops, but knows he cannot call on Soviet and Eastern European troops without also accepting Chinese, Soviets may very well consider this propitious time for its Polish ally to investigate peace climate.

Gronouski

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 5, 1966  
4:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

I spoke with Amb. Bunker who leaves tomorrow, Tuesday, September 6, for the Dominican Republic.

Bunker will try to call Sen. Fulbright before he leaves.

He has talked with one of the Dominican military now about to attend the Inter-American Defense College, who is alleged to be involved in these plots. He assured Bunker that he is not involved that he, personally, does not believe a military coup is a serious likelihood.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1966

Dear Bill:

As Ellsworth Bunker may have told you, he is leaving on Tuesday, September 6, for a brief trip to the Dominican Republic.

In the course of this visit, he will make a careful assessment of the reports that an attempt is being planned to overthrow President Balaguer.

On his return, I have instructed him to share promptly with you any information he develops, as well as his judgment of the situation.

Needless to say, I share your anxiety at these reports; and I am grateful that you took the trouble to call them to my attention.

Sincerely,

Honorable J. W. Fulbright  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.



~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, September 5, 1966 -- 1:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

When I came over here I agreed to Sec. Rusk's request that I make known to him any substantive ideas I generated, so that he would be able to respond to them knowledgeably in his discussions with you.

Therefore, I sent him today this top secret, personal memorandum stating my notions about non-proliferation and arms control. This memorandum for the first time proposes some language we might use on the veto question. It puts the argument, I think, in the clearest way I have yet been able to formulate. I have also made this memorandum available to Bob McNamara and Bill Moyers.

I thought you might like to see this particular draft before our discussion at lunch tomorrow, Tuesday, September 6.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 88-55  
By 48, NARA, Date 12-9-91

WWRostow:rlh

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 92-34

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

By sig, NARA, Date 4-10-94

~~TOP SECRET - PERSONAL~~

September 3, 1966

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary Rusk

In conformity with our understanding when I came to work here, I wish to lay before you my thoughts on non-proliferation and arms control at the present stage.

I have gotten into the matter personally because, as we know, the President would like to move in this area soon; and as a matter of conscience, I wish to feel sure in my mind that we do everything in our power to get an agreement compatible with our interests, including that part of our interests which depends on the maintenance of stable alliances with Western Europe.

I am not confident that anything we can offer the Soviet Union will lead to an agreement; but I have concluded that there is one further move we could make which is justified by our own interests, those of Western Europe, and those of the Soviet Union when they are properly and objectively examined.

The Proposal

That move would be to propose to Gromyko language of the following kind which might be added, for example, to Butch Fisher's proposed Article I, Geneva 881 (August 25): "or to take other actions which might permit nuclear weapons of its manufacture to be fired without its assent."

I am proposing, in short, that we commit ourselves not to give up the veto in any arrangements we might arrive at within our NATO or other alliances; that we envisage no European arrangement except one where either the U.K. or French veto applies, or one in which the U.K. and France are wholly subsumed within a new, fully integrated European political entity; and that if a European force emerges it operate with that part of ours in Europe or targetted on objectives relevant to European defense on something like a two-key basis.

I believe this is the issue which most requires probing with Gromyko. If he indicates that an agreement might be possible on this basis, he should be told we would then be willing to take the matter up with our European allies.

Argument

Although it may take time and some difficulty to persuade our European allies that this is a correct course, I believe that act of persuasion could be accomplished.

9/3/66

My reasons for this view are as follows:

1. In fact, no American President is going to place in the hands of the Europeans -- or anyone else -- the right to determine when we are engaged in a nuclear war or when nuclear weapons of our manufacture may be fired.

2. So long as we remain a fully committed ally of Europe, Europeans can, I believe, be made to see that:

-- it is grossly unrealistic for them to think of firing their nuclear weapons without ours so long as we are committed members of the Alliance; and

-- the threat to use a small nuclear force in Europe (national or collective) to engage us in a nuclear war to which we were not committed could only lead to the U. S. pulling back and dissociating itself from European defense.

3. The outcome of a sober and careful discussion with the Europeans would, I believe, be an understanding that so long as they wanted our total commitment, including a nuclear commitment, to the defense of Europe, a European nuclear force could relate to ours only on the same basis as the two-key system now works: namely, that affirmative action both by Europe and the U. S. would be necessary for the firing of nuclear weapons in defense of Europe.

4. I am aware, of course, that several U. S. statements in the past implied that if the Europeans fully united we would not rule out the possibility of their having an independent right to fire nuclear weapons from a presumably integrated European nuclear force. Behind these statements were three judgments:

-- It was wise to encourage the movement towards European unity; and unity would be encouraged by "not ruling out" the possibility of a European force with a right to fire as independent as that now enjoyed by U. K. and France.

-- If and when the Europeans ever got to a position of true integration and seriously contemplated the problem, they would, in fact, not ask for the surrender of the U. S. veto, because they would lose more in the dilution of the U. S. commitment this would bring about than they would gain by this act of "independence".

-- If and when the Europeans ever got to a position of true integration, and there was a European executive equivalent to the President of the United States, a rational arrangement could be worked out with that executive consistent with the true interests of both the U. S. and Europe.



9/3/66

There was a sense in which those statements were designed to humor the European movement along pending its serious contemplation of the problem.

In effect, if Gromyko's response was promising, we would be facing the veto issue sooner than we might otherwise have to face it, because the European clause in the treaty makes a reality out of a quite distant but important contingency; but we would not be altering our policy, because we have known we never would really give up the veto.

5. By making this offer in something like the language I suggest we would be cutting through the grave ambiguities which now surround the concepts of "transfer" and "control" while leaving in the Atlantic as a whole, in Europe and in Asia a wide range of options open for the future nuclear organization of the non-Communist world. The MLF, for example, never envisaged that we would surrender our veto. Sober Europeans (for example, the European team that worked on the Alistair Buchan study of a European capability) long ago concluded that Europe would lose vastly more from claiming an independent right to fire, in the inevitable dilution of the U. S. commitment to Europe, than Europe could gain from claiming this right for a European force, given the inevitable disproportion in the nuclear forces of Europe and the U. S. in the foreseeable future.

6. What could and should emerge from a serious discussion with the Europeans would, I think, be this: what the Europeans are really groping for -- although they are not very clear about it -- is not an independent right to fire, but an insurance policy against the possibility that at some future time some American administration might pick up its nuclear weapons and its troops and go home. The British and French national nuclear establishments and a future possible European nuclear force is a kind of insurance that, if we should ever withdraw, Western Europe would not be left naked of nuclear capability that might be built up. The proposal I suggest would not deny the Europeans the possibility of that kind of insurance.

7. What it would deny the Europeans are two things which they ought not to have:

-- a European force which they might think was capable of triggering the use of SAC without our assent;

-- a loosely-knit European force which would, in effect, give the Germans a national capability.



9/3/66

8. If, by any chance, we were to succeed in moving Gromyko along these lines and also moving our European colleagues (except the French), we would then face a sequence of further problems. A non-proliferation agreement is a limited and partial approach to the non-proliferation problem. It would simply dramatize and heighten the security-political-prestige requirements of the non-nuclear powers. It would not solve them. Specifically:

-- the pressure to create a hardware solution within the framework of this agreement would be heightened in the Atlantic;

-- the British planning notion of moving towards some sort of European defense effort within NATO might have more currency;

-- as the Indians contemplated the meaning of this kind of non-proliferation agreement, thought about how to solve their difficult security-political-prestige problem would be heightened;

-- the debate in Japan about its future nuclear role would be brought even more to the surface.

9. The outcome of this follow-on debate cannot be predicted; but if this kind of non-proliferation formula is acceptable to the Soviet Union we would still have available to us a flexible array of methods for organizing the nuclear affairs of the non-Communist world ranging from bilateral two-key systems to a variety of collective arrangements. All we would be committed to was a proposition we would not, in any case, violate; namely, that our nuclear weapons would not be used without our assent.

10. I should also point out that at this particular moment in American political life, this kind of non-proliferation agreement would have a stabilizing role in basic U. S. relations to the rest of the non-Communist world. By forcing us to try to avoid proliferation and simultaneously forcing us to acknowledge that we cannot agree to the use of our nuclear weapons without our assent, passage by the Senate of this kind of treaty would involve a Senate commitment to stay deeply in the world. If we don't want proliferation and we don't want to pass out our weapons to others, there is only one answer: collective security deeply engaging the U. S. That is what logic and disproportionate U. S. nuclear strength demand.

11. If we find that Gromyko is not content with this kind of legitimate clarification of the U. S. veto issue, I believe this is the direction, in any

~~TOP SECRET~~ PERSONAL

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9/3/66

case, that we shall have to move with respect to Europe, India, and Japan if proliferation is to be avoided; but the track may move more slowly if a non-proliferation treaty fails at this stage.

12. My final observation is that our concern with this approach to non-proliferation should not keep us from trying to get hold of the ABM race very soon, before it seizes us all by the throat. As you know, my own preference is for a tripartite package involving: an ABM freeze; mutual satellite photography inspection; and a comprehensive test ban. There are problems with each; but taken together they are more viable than taken separately. Their consummation would also register the kind of progress in arms control between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. which the Indians (and others) have said will be necessary if a non-proliferation agreement is to be acceptable.

*Walt* Rostow

1. ~~Surveys~~  
2. Pres file

Monday, September 5, 1966 -- 9:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Mr. Henry Wilson

SUBJECT: Congressman Tenzer's Peace Proposal.

Congressman Herbert Tenzer, freshman Democrat from New York's normally Republican 5th District (Nassau County), is having trouble in his reelection campaign with a third party peace candidate.

He has written the attached letter to you in an effort to lure the near-doves into his camp. But he does not want to be out of step with the President and with your efforts in Viet Nam.

We cannot endorse his proposal; but he believes a letter like that attached would be useful to him. He would distribute his letter and your response to his constituents. The purpose would be to underline your interest and his in achieving peace.

If you prefer, I can sign a letter to Tenzer in a similar vein.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

You sign letter \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

WJJ:WWR:rln

September 7, 1966

Dear Congressman Tenzer:

I thank you for your thoughtful letter of August 31.

All of us want to see the earliest possible establishment of peace in Viet Nam, a peace that will leave the brave and long-suffering people of South Viet Nam masters in their own land, free from terror and intimidation, free from external aggression, and free to create their own political and economic institutions. No one would be happier than I to see the earliest possible achievement of that goal.

You know of the intensive and extensive efforts we have made to bring the fighting to a close and to settle this matter by peaceful means. Those efforts continue, often quietly and away from the glare of publicity.

But, as you know, every effort to date has encountered a loud and abusive rejection from Hanoi and from Peiping. Most recently, Foreign Minister Thanat of Thailand and other leaders in Asia proposed an Asian conference to work toward peace in Viet Nam. The Communists' reaction was swift and totally negative.

Nonetheless, we and others who genuinely seek peace will persist in its pursuit.

I have asked my advisers to study your specific proposal and to give it the careful consideration it merits.

Meantime, I thank you for your consideration and for the solid work you have carried out in the past Congress. I know the good people of your District recognize the great efforts you have made in their behalf and in behalf of our nation.

Sincerely,

LBJ

Honorable Herbert Tenzer  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WJJorden:WWRostow:rlh



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 1, 1966

To: Walt Rostow

From: Henry H. Wilson, Jr.

I attach copy of letter to the President from Congressman Tenzer.

Tenzer is a solid supporter of the President on all items, both foreign and domestic.

He is an impressive Democratic freshman from a Republican district.

He is troubled by a third party peace candidate, and the purpose of his letter is to lure the near-doves into his camp; however, he does not want to do this in such fashion as to be in any way out of step with the President.

He does not expect any action to follow his letter; however, he would like, in order of preference: (1) a letter over the President's signature acknowledging receipt of his letter which he might feel free to release together with his own letter; or, (2) simply permission to release his own letter.

I would like a quick suggestion from you as to whether either of the above courses should be taken or, if not, whether you have suggestions for alteration of his letter.

HERBERT TENZER  
8TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTEE:  
JUDICIARY

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, D.C. 20515**

85C  
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PHONE: AREA CODE 202: 225-3811

DISTRICT OFFICE:  
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PLEASE REPLY TO  
WASHINGTON OFFICE

August 31, 1966

President Lyndon B. Johnson  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

The conflict in Vietnam is the number one problem troubling most of my constituents. The increasingly dangerous course which the conflict is taking is of grave concern to all of us. Recent developments make it even more urgent, that we intensify our efforts to search for peace through diplomatic channels and by political means.

I recognize that our foreign policy is based on the principle that we encourage the development of a community of nations exercising the freedom to choose their own form of government. That is why our basic commitment to South Vietnam is morally correct. At the same time, a great Nation must have an equally great commitment to peace, and it is to this I wish to address myself.

I have told my constituents that you want peace as much as I do, and as much as they do. I have told them that you have the greater responsibility in making the day-to-day and hour-to-hour decisions.

I have told them of your efforts to search out peace and of your numerous proposals for peace. I related how you searched without success for signs of reciprocal de-escalation during the two pauses in the bombing.

Our Nation is the greatest and the strongest in the world and with that greater strength goes greater responsibility. Therefore, in exercising and carrying out that responsibility I suggest that we show to the nations of the world, and to our troubled citizens at home, that we can match our greater strength with even greater humility--because our common objective is world peace.

Mr. President, you have oftentimes stated that it is the policy of the United States to seek a settlement of the conflict by peaceful means; that we do not seek either territory or permanent bases in South Vietnam; that we are ready to meet any place, any time and that we welcome "negotiations without preconditions."

August 31, 1966

Mr. President, I suggest that you initiate a courageous and dramatic step to move the Vietnam war from the battlefield to the conference table. I make the following proposals, which, hopefully and prayerfully may bring about an end to hostilities and the beginning of negotiations for peace.

Announce to the world that you have:

- 1.- set the date, fixed the time, and appointed the place for a peace conference on Vietnam. (Consider Asia or Geneva);
- 2.-sent invitations to North Vietnam, South Vietnam, the National Liberation Front and other interested parties to participate;
- 3.-agreed that twenty four (24) hours before the conference, as further evidence of our peaceful intentions, the United States will cease aerial bombings in North Vietnam, pending the appearance of Hanoi at the Peace table;
- 4.-agreed that seventy-two (72) hours, after the conference starts, there shall be a reciprocal cease-fire coupled with a cessation of all movement of troops and materiel while negotiations are being carried on in good faith. Provision for removal of the sick and wounded and movement of food, clothing and medical supplies, under appropriate inspection and supervision shall be made;
- 5.-agreed that if items 3 and 4 above have been complied with-- then 48 hours after the cease fire, the Secretary of State will be present at the negotiations to meet with his counter parts of the other nations invited to the conference;
- 6.-agreed that the agenda to be mutually agreed upon may include the 14 points of the United States, the 4 points of the Hanoi government, the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962, and such other items which the parties may by mutual agreement add;
- 7.-extended an invitation to the co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, (the Soviet Union, and Great Britain), to the members of the International Control Commission (India, Canada and Poland) and to the Secretary General of the United Nations to take part in the conference;

Mr. President, by making these proposals you will have announced to the world and to our concerned citizens that the United States not only has the sincere desire, but also the determination to pursue peace, and that our government wants to see all killing and destruction stopped. By these proposals you will have seized initiative and given to the world the full measure of the continuing efforts of the United States to achieve a peaceful settlement.

President Lyndon B. Johnson  
Page Three

August 31, 1966

Mr. President, you now have an excellent opportunity for creative diplomacy and dynamic statesmanship. Let us hope and pray that North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front will recognize our good intentions and come to the peace table. If they do, both sides will have gained much. Should they fail to appear, let the eyes of the world behold the empty chairs and let the ears of the world hear the thunder of the silence from those invited - but unrepresented at the peace table.

Lead us, Mr. President, in once again taking the first steps on the path of de-escalation and on the path towards peace. The world will recognize that you heeded the words of the Prophet Zechariah, 9:10, who said: "and he shall speak peace unto the nations".

This act of courage and magnanimity will be applauded by the entire world and our citizens at home.

Respectfully,

  
HERBERT TENZER, M. C.

HT:ds



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 2, 1966  
Friday - 9:25 a.m.

FOR WALT ROSTOW

FROM: Charles D. Roche

Attached is a letter sent by Congressman Tenzer whom the President would like to help, insofar as possible, with his serious reelection problems.

Tenzer wants an acknowledging letter from the President that his proposals are being considered. I suspect that you may feel that his thoughts run too far astray from expressed Administration posture and that publication of an exchange of letters might further muddy the waters that have been strewn with senatorial garbage.

If this is to be your recommendation to the President, you may want to let me know and I think we can talk to Tenzer and call the whole show off. In any event, I am hopeful that you will come up with some new push for peace ballyhoo to help in the election.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 5, 1966  
11:30 a. m.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 7-13-98

Mr. President:

Here is a useful dispatch from Rangoon,  
prepared for Ne Win's visit.

It outlines Burmese views on Viet Nam  
under three headings:

- Public record: strictly neutral.
- Press: objective but pro-Communist  
bias shows in some papers.
- Private: anti-colonial sentiment more  
than outweighed by fear of the Chinese.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

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### THE BURMESE POSITION ON VIETNAM

The Burmese position on Vietnam must be considered from three sides: (1) the public record of official statements on Vietnam; (2) the position taken by the official RGUB newspapers in reporting and commenting on Vietnam; and (3) the personal views of Burmese officials -- and specifically Ne Win -- on Vietnam.

(1) The Public Record a. The RGUB takes great pains to maintain strict neutrality in all official statements on Vietnam. It seldom issues any public statement on Vietnam except in the text of joint communiques following state visits, when it insists upon language which is unexceptionable from our point of view. The phrasing usually adopted in joint communiques, for example, expresses concern for the "dangerous" or "deteriorating" situation in Vietnam and calls for a peaceful settlement based on "the principles of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Vietnam embodied in the 1954 Geneva Agreement."

b. Ne Win has stubbornly resisted pressures, especially from the Chinese Communists, to force him into a less neutral position. He is wary and resentful of attempts to trap him into an appearance of acquiescing in Chinese views, although he is not always able to avoid unilateral Chinese attacks on the United States at official Sino-Burmese functions. During the most recent visit of President Liu Shao-chih to Rangoon in April 1966, Ne Win was reportedly annoyed by Liu's gratuitous and vehement attack on the United States in a speech at the welcoming banquet. When the joint communique for the visit omitted any reference to Vietnam, the omission was interpreted by observers as a reflection of Ne Win's anger, as well as an indication of basic disagreement over the issue. The Burmese apparently were not prepared to go further than referring to the Geneva accords, and the Chinese, who had accepted similar references in previous communiques, were no longer willing to advocate negotiations along those lines.

c. Ne Win has been even less responsive to the North Vietnamese. His belated reply to Ho Chih Minh's circular letter of January 1966 soliciting support from neutral heads of state came close to being an actual snub. He expressed great sympathy for the people of Vietnam, "particularly the people of South Vietnam, who have been subjected continuously to untold misery and suffering for the last twenty years." He acknowledged that the Vietnamese problem "initially was caused by foreign domination and foreign interference" but expressed the hope that "it should be possible to achieve a truly independent, democratic and sovereign Vietnam, as envisaged in the Geneva Agreements, by some other way than through the continuing suffering of the people of Vietnam."

#### GROUP-3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 7-13-98

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Enclosure 1  
Rangoon A-42  
2

d. Only twice has the RGUB broken its usual silence to issue statements concerning Vietnam on its own initiative. In March 1965, it opposed the use of gas in Vietnam, and in July 1966 it "deeply regretted" the bombing of fuel depots near Hanoi and Haiphong. In both instances, the Revolutionary Government criticized actions of the United States on grounds that they tended to aggravate the military situation and would make negotiations toward a political solution more difficult. The statements were mild and unemotional and refrained from placing blame on either side. The fact that the Burmese have never criticized actions of the North Vietnamese or the Chinese and have departed from their usual policy of silence only to express disapproval of actions taken by the United States, does present an unbalanced aspect, however restrained the criticism. On the whole, however, the public record is meticulously neutral.

(2) The Press Coverage. The RGUB's official press does not observe as scrupulous a standard of neutrality and objectivity on Vietnam as the Foreign Office. Although the government's press policy prohibits the publication or distribution of cold-war propaganda, the policy is not strictly enforced on the government-owned newspapers. Factual reporting on Vietnam is fairly well-balanced and avoids the most strident Communist propaganda releases, largely because of careful editing by the RGUB news agency controlling distribution. The two English-language newspapers (Working People's Daily and Guardian) also closely follow official policy in their editorial commentary. However, pro-Communist editors on the RGUB's three Burmese-language newspapers (Working People's Daily, Mirror and Botataung) are allowed considerable license in airing their consistently anti-American views in editorials, foreign news commentary, and in an occasional Hsinhua propaganda photograph of the Vietnam war. From our viewpoint, the question is not the publication of attacks on our policy, but the fact that such attacks are almost never balanced by criticism of the other side. This is periodically called to the attention of the Foreign Office, which is sympathetic to our view but unable to exercise effective control over the government's vernacular press.

(3) The Personal Views. a. Neither the public record of meticulous neutrality nor the pro-Communist slant of some of the government newspapers accurately reflect the private views of Burmese officials. Vietnam poses a painful dilemma for the Burmese, a dilemma both of conflicting emotional attitudes and of irreconcilable political considerations.

b. Underlying and coloring their views on almost all issues, of course, is a strong, emotional anti-colonialism. The Burmese dislike the idea of American or European influence dominating any part of Southeast Asia. They tend to be suspicious of U.S. motives in pouring so much of its manpower and resources into the defense of Vietnam, yet they cynically accept the charge that Americans

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prefer to let Asians fight their wars for them. They may also derive a measure of satisfaction to racial pride from seeing the ill-equipped Vietcong putting up a good fight against the most powerful nation on earth.

c. On the other hand, and more than balancing their skepticism of U.S. motives, is their fear and deep distrust of China. Most thoughtful Burmese officials, including General Ne Win, realize that China is the most dangerous threat to Burma's independence. They are thus acutely aware of China's role in Vietnam. Some Burmese, again including Ne Win, probably would welcome a decisive and humiliating defeat for China in Vietnam, provided it could be accomplished without costly consequences for the remainder of Southeast Asia. Above all, however, they are anxious to avoid becoming involved in a general conflict in Southeast Asia. For this reason, they are fearful of any step toward escalating the war in Vietnam. They also fear that if we press China too hard, the Chinese may start a counter-irritant in Thailand, which would threaten them more directly than Vietnam, or even in Burma itself. Thus, although the Burmese do not want to see us lose in Vietnam, or to withdraw from Southeast Asia before an effective deterrent to Chinese aggression can be substituted, they continue to hope for negotiations rather than a military victory. In their view, an optimum solution would probably be a settlement involving neutralization of South and North Vietnam under some form of international guarantee, accompanied by the withdrawal of all foreign influences from the area.

d. Although they are prepared to allow Rangoon to be used as the site of talks, should both sides agree, the Burmese are unwilling to take any initiative to encourage a settlement under present circumstances. Highly sensitive to Chinese opposition to negotiations, they are afraid that any such initiative would anger the Chinese or would in some other way involve them in the conflict. Until both sides are willing to negotiate, they feel they can best serve their interests by remaining neutral, generally passive, and on good terms with both sides.

<sup>ham</sup>  
POL/ECON:RAMcLendon/elc 8-26-66

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Annex A  
to Enclosure 1  
Rangoon A-42  
1

Section on Vietnam from the Joint Communique issued after visit of Ne Win to China, July 24 to August 1, 1965.

The two sides once again expressed their deep concern over the increasingly grave situation in South-East Asia, particularly in Vietnam. They were of the view that a lasting settlement of the Vietnam question would be achieved only if the Vietnamese people were free to settle their own problems and determine their own future without any foreign interference. They considered that any ultimate settlement of the Vietnam question must respect the principles of independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam embodied in the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam.

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Annex B  
to Enclosure 1  
Rangoon A-42  
1

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Section on Vietnam from the Joint Communiqué issued after visit of Ne Win to the USSR, September 14 to 24, 1965.

Having exchanged views on the question of the dangerous developments in Vietnam, the two sides agreed that settlement of the Vietnam problem in accordance with the legitimate rights, aspirations and desires of the Vietnam people must be based on the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Vietnam without outside interference and pressure. In the opinion of the two sides, the Geneva Agreements of 1954 on Indochina must serve as the basis for the normalization of the Vietnam situation.

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Annex C  
to Enclosure 1  
Rangoon A-42  
1

Section on Vietnam from the Joint Communiqué issued after visit of Ne Win to  
Socialist Republic of Romania, June 24 to 27, 1966.

The Romanian and Burmese leaders discussed the Vietnamese problem and considered that the events which are taking place in Vietnam endanger peace in South-East Asia and in the whole world. They agreed that a lasting settlement of the Vietnamese problem could be achieved only if the Vietnamese people were free to settle alone their own problems and determine that any ultimate settlement of the Vietnamese problem must be based on the Principles of sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Agreement.

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Sunday, September 4, 1966 -- 11:00 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Chalmers Roberts, Washington Post, came in on Saturday, September 3, to discuss the various elements that enter into the feeling on the Hill and in various parts of the country that we are "over-extended."

I began by pointing out:

-- The concentration of Soviet and Chinese Communist capabilities, with which Europe and Asia could not cope without us, gave no objective basis for withdrawal.

-- The burden of our military and foreign aid expenditures was diminishing -- not increasing -- as a proportion of GNP. In that sense there was no over-extension.

-- There was uneasiness in <sup>Congress</sup>Europe about the failure of the Europeans to do more both in European defense and in support of our position in Viet Nam; and some were very anxious about the balance of payments effects of our European commitment.

-- The war in South Viet Nam was more difficult to understand and more frustrating than a conventional conflict, like that in Korea.

-- We, like other industrial democracies, were having difficulty maintaining relatively full employment without inflation and confronted strong domestic pressures for government outlays in the cities and elsewhere.

Taken together, these factors produced, in my view, a problem with which the Administration was dealing on all fronts; but not a desperate or unmanageable crisis.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

sept. 3, 1966

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-156

By 158, NARA, Date 1-27-92

Dear Mr. President:

I read your letter with deep interest and have given careful thought to the subjects you raised.

I greatly value Brazil's solidarity with the United States in the face of the problems in Viet Nam. The people of South Viet Nam, I am certain, appreciate Brazil's generous donations of supplies.

You may rest assured that the United States is determined to continue its support of South Viet Nam's resistance to Communist aggression until this aggression ceases and South Viet Nam can decide its own future free of outside coercion. At the same time, the United States continues its offer of unconditional discussions looking toward a peaceful settlement.

Your views with respect to the proposed meeting of the Chiefs of State of this Hemisphere are of real interest. Like you, I am ready to participate in such a meeting if it is well and carefully prepared.

Judging by the reaction in the Hemisphere to the proposal, it seems to me that the possibilities for a constructive meeting are good. Therefore, we should go forward with intensive and detailed preparations. For this purpose it would seem that the formation of a small working group of representatives of the Governments is essential. I hope that such a group can soon be set up.

With respect to the question of the site of the meeting, I, too, feel that Lima would be satisfactory, without having any marked preference. The distance from Washington is not a problem. I am, of course, prepared to meet at whatever place in Latin America seems most satisfactory to our colleagues.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

I was particularly struck by the emphasis which you place upon regional economic integration and education. I heartily agree.

I hope that we and our fellow Chiefs of State can take steps at the meeting which will lead, within a relatively short time, to an acceleration of the process of Latin America's economic integration.

I also hope that we can find new and more effective ways to help our peoples achieve their maximum potential through increased educational opportunities. These measures may well include multinational institutions for advanced training in science and technology.

At the same time, I think we should seek ways to improve living standards in the agricultural areas of the Hemisphere and to increase production both for local consumption and to supply a larger share of growing world needs.

We should also search for possibilities of reducing the expenditures of the nations of the Hemisphere on arms not essential for the maintenance of order and the defense of the Free World.

I was favorably impressed by your proposal for a collective condemnation of the subversive program coming out of the Tri-Continental Conference held this year in Habana. I agree with you completely on this matter and support the view that we should give importance to strengthening individual and collective efforts to safeguard our domestic institutions against this alien menace.

These problems seem to me of greater immediacy than others. If we can accomplish these things, we shall indeed have done much for our peoples.

Ambassador Tuthill sent me word of your vigorous opposition to the creation of blocs within the inter-American system. I believe, as you do, that we should continue to work together for a further strengthening of the inter-American system as a whole.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

You may wish to know that I met this week with members of the Brazilian War College who were visiting here and greatly enjoyed the occasion.

May I say again how much I appreciate receiving your personal views on important questions we both face. Let us continue this periodic exchange which I find helpful and which contributes to a further strengthening of relations between our two countries.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

IS/

His Excellency  
Marshal Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco  
President  
United States of Brazil  
Brasilia, D. F.

LBJ:State:BKS:WWR:mz



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 88-169  
By ing, NARA, Date 11-20-91

89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, Sept. 3, 1966 - 9:30 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: JCS Objections to Civil Air Agreement with the USSR

The JCS objections to a Civil Air agreement with the USSR were last stated in 1963 when the Administration was considering signing the agreement negotiated two years earlier.

Secretary McNamara stated in 1963 that the JCS objections were not of a nature to alter his view that we should go ahead and sign the agreement. That is still his view.

The Chiefs cited the following three factors:

- a. The agreement would facilitate Soviet political/economic penetration of other countries, especially in Latin America.
- b. The route to be flown would put Soviet planes in the vicinity of Iceland and Greenland. Soviet planes thus might overfly or make unscheduled landings at sensitive US military installations in these countries.
- c. There is an inconsistency in opening New York to Soviet planes while discouraging other Free World nations from permitting the Soviet airline to obtain operating rights in their countries.

The Department of State responded to these objections in 1963 by pointing out:

The choice of route would depend on rights which the Russians can obtain from third countries.

It is unlikely that Denmark would permit the USSR to overfly Greenland or that Iceland would permit the Soviets to overfly its territory.

Emergency stops are required for humanitarian reasons and handled in accordance with international practice. There is no way to avoid these eventualities, but the military could take security measures in the event emergency landings were made at US bases.

Some difficulties could be dealt with in technical discussions following the signing of the agreement. If the Soviets insisted on a routing which was undesirable from the security point of view, the US could always prevent the service being inaugurated by refusing to exchange implementing notes.

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-2-

As of today, the first and the third points made by the JCS have less validity than they had in 1963. Linc Gordon feels that we can handle any repercussions in Latin America. Canada and several other Free World nations have signed agreements with the USSR since 1963 so that we would not appear as inconsistent as we might have, had we signed an agreement then.

My recommendation is that you meet with Sect. Rusk and Sect. McNamara and walk around this once more before instructing Sect. Rusk to begin Congressional consultations -- perhaps at the next Tuesday lunch.

W. W. Rostow

Set up meeting with Sects. Rusk and McNamara ✓

Put on next Tuesday lunch agenda \_\_\_\_\_

Permit Congressional consultations to begin \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, September 2, 1966  
6:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

Henry Kissinger sent me a copy of this letter from Kurt Birrenbach.

He's about as good a friend as we have in Europe -- in any country -- and as steady a German.

His anxiety about our steadiness and about our troops (sidelined) reflects a loneliness among the Germans and a sense of being badly treated that is beginning to worry me.

The Erhard visit may be one of the most important U. S. -German meetings of recent times, both because issues of substance will be involved and because the Germans (not merely Erhard) need reassurance, -- which is different from giving them everything they want.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Professor Henry A. Kissinger  
Center for International Affairs  
Harvard University  
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Kissinger:

Just before I left on my vacation I received the text of the statement which you made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On the whole I agree with all your conclusions. I consider this not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end. In my opinion ~~the primary significance of the hardware solution is to reinforce and render more durable the position of the non-nuclear powers within an organization such as the McNamara Committee.~~ Furthermore, ~~a hardware solution will serve to keep open the options for a future European solution (in closest integration with the United States).~~ There remains the question as to whether it would be more feasible to let a European solution evolve from the existing European nuclear weapons systems, as you believe, or to let it evolve from an Atlantic hardware solution, entirely or as a supplementing factor. ~~For this reason I felt that the European clause in such a solution always was of crucial importance.~~

There are in particular four points in your statement which I would like to emphasize. No one has more clearly than you directed the attention of the United States to the extreme vulnerability, both internal and external, of West Germany's situation. I can only underscore this. To have to choose between the United States and France puts especially my own party in a nearly untenable position. For that reason the Luxembourg method, under which West Germany would act as part of a collective group, seemed to me just as promising as the joint action of



the Fourteen within NATO. As soon as we act alone, the weakness I have described becomes noticeable, as you have found in connection with the Franco-German bilateral negotiations about the status of French troops in West Germany.

The second factor I would like to stress particularly is that ~~West Germany--still not sure of itself after the shock effects of the past--needs an ally on which it can implicitly depend and whose future course of action is predictable. Such was the United States in the 'fifties. This is, unfortunately, no longer the case, although appearances may be more alarming than reality.~~

The third point, on which I particularly agree with you, is that it is highly important to harmonize foreign policy within NATO. I am thinking in this connection especially of ~~the~~ crisis management, of the international negotiations on arms control, of the policy of détente, and in particular the policy with respect to Germany. For more than ten years the recommendations of the three wise men in NATO have been disregarded. What crises the alliance might have been spared, if these recommendations had been put into practice!

The fourth point on which I particularly concur with you refers to the activities of the McNamara Committee. West Germany and the other non-nuclear European powers should, to the extent that they so desire, participate in every phase of the nuclear decision-making process within NATO. If the process of consensus in the United States ends with a decision of the President, this decision can no longer be reversed. Therefore ~~we must attach decisive importance to obtaining a hearing for our arguments at each stage of this process.~~ Of course, such participation in the a common strategy, which is now more remote than ever. ~~Only after looking at the picture of the present-day situation, especially the fateful discussions about the presence of United States forces in Europe, can we gauge how far we are still from the goals which~~

you and I have in mind.

I was very sorry that I did not see you the last time. I hope there will soon be a fresh opportunity. I myself will fly to Washington in October for a few days. Perhaps then there will be an opportunity.

With kindest regards and all good wishes,

Yours,

[signed] Birrenbach

~~Long~~ 91  
2 Pres. file

Friday, September 2, 1966  
5:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Water for Peace Program

In connection with your proposed speech on Water for Peace, Rusk and Udall have sent the attached joint letters, including one for possible publication, transmitting a copy of the report of the Interdepartmental Committee of Water for Peace. The letter for publication recommends that you approve "the timely implementation of the initial priority program."

I understand that Charlie Schultze plans to raise a number of questions about the financing and administrative management of elements of this program. These reservations on the part of the BOB do not affect the material contained in your proposed speech.

In the circumstances, I believe that we should not release the report of the Interdepartmental Committee of Water for Peace and the transmittal letter from Rusk and Udall until you have received Schultze's comments thereon.

W. W. Rostow

Approve holding release of report and transmittal letter       /      

Disapprove                     

See me

3140  
9/12

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 31, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

We are transmitting to you by separate memorandum designed to be made public our recommendations on the Water for Peace Program you announced last October 7.

Enclosed with this letter are preliminary cost estimates at two possible levels of funding. We will refine these estimates as you deem appropriate and develop the requisite new legislation which will be required.

We have made no specific recommendation regarding the international fund you foresaw in your October 7 address. We have concluded that in the immediate future international funding sources seem adequate, but we will keep the need for international funds under constant review.

Although we propose that a Water for Peace office should be established, and agree that both Departments must be involved in its operation and management, we have not attempted to delineate at this juncture precisely how this effort would be organized. This we will do after receiving your reaction to our program recommendations.

In addition to the \$1.2 million appropriation to finance the International Water for Peace Conference which is being requested in the current fiscal year, we have also agreed to seek \$2.5 million to finance fiscal year 1967 United States activities in support of the International Hydrological Decade which will provide an essential scientific base for the Water for Peace Program.

We will, of course, be pleased to supply any additional material or information that you consider appropriate. Our Departments stand prepared to do anything necessary to move this program forward.

Respectfully yours,

*Dean Rusk*

Secretary of State

*Lawrence H. Hall*  
Secretary of the Interior

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.



3140  
916

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 31, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

You announced the Water for Peace Program last October 7 at the First International Symposium on Water Desalination. This program will help satisfy basic human needs, as outlined in your remarks of welcome to the delegates of that meeting.

The combined efforts of the United States, other nations and international organizations, will be needed to keep pace with global requirements for water. In your October 7 address you called for more comprehensive cooperative action to meet these requirements, and pledged the United States to assume a leading role in this endeavor.

Some steps have already been taken toward this objective. The United States has engaged in extensive water development activities abroad, and a substantial increase in these activities is now contemplated. The United States continues to support similar activities carried out by the United Nations and its agencies. Preparations are well advanced for an International Conference on Water for Peace scheduled for next May; discussions with foreign participants have begun; Congressional approval and authorization of funds for the conference are expected momentarily. In short, the Water for Peace program is under way.

Since your October 7 speech, an Interdepartmental Committee on Water for Peace has reviewed the world-wide water situation and produced the enclosed report. From a wide range of recommended actions, this committee has

The President,  
The White House

developed an initial program which calls for concentrating efforts on the following areas:

1. Regional cooperation. Strong emphasis is given to expanded programs of regional cooperation. They are designed to improve utilization of human and financial resources, to help the developing countries plan and carry out their own water development projects, and to promote international cooperation. Priorities are given to the establishment of regional centers for collecting and disseminating information, assisting governmental agencies and conducting studies, seminars and training sessions; to the organization of regional institutions and programs for professional education and technical training; and to the cooperative development of international river systems.

2. Improved technical cooperation. The United States is urged to improve its ability to train foreign nationals in water specialities both here and abroad. An expanded capacity to send experts overseas, to provide various technical services and to support the International Hydrological Decade, is recommended.

3. Community water supply and environmental sanitation. A rapid increase in the availability of potable water receives special emphasis. An appropriate goal for 1980 would be a 50% rise in the proportion of people in the developing countries having access to such water. More effective cooperative efforts to combat water pollution is stressed, as well as assistance in building desalting plants abroad.

4. Supporting mechanisms in the U.S. The principal suggestions in this area are: sponsoring the International Conference on Water for Peace referred to above; establishing a program to encourage technical experts in the water field to participate in overseas activities; and creating within the Government an office to coordinate Water for Peace activities.

Interwoven with all aspects of this program is a vital need for coordinated, international participation. A Water for Peace Program, to be effective, must engage the interest,

the will and financial support of other nations, of the United Nations and its family of organizations, and of other international bodies. The United States should give strong encouragement and support to international agencies which offer technical aid or capital assistance. Substantially larger amounts of capital than currently available will be required in the future to finance anticipated development. We will keep this situation under constant review, in order to ensure that the Water for Peace program fulfills its purpose.

We commend the Water for Peace Report to your attention. We recommend that you approve its recommendations in general, and specifically the timely implementation of the initial priority program. It is our conviction that benefits to the United States and to the cause of world peace would be material and substantial. An international program to promote water development and so serve all mankind is, indeed, a program for peace.

Respectfully yours,

*Dean Rusk*

Secretary of State

*Hubert H. H. Hall*  
Secretary of the Interior

Enclosure:

Ltr. fr. Interdepartmental  
Committee with accompany-  
ing Water for Peace Report

## U.S. WATER FOR PEACE PROGRAM

COST ESTIMATES  
(in \$ millions)

| <u>Priority Program</u> <sup>a</sup>   | <u>FY</u><br><u>1967</u> | <u>FY 1968</u> |             | <u>FY 1969</u> |             | <u>FY 1970</u> |             |
|--|--------------------------|----------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|
|  |                          | <u>Low</u>     | <u>High</u> | <u>Low</u>     | <u>High</u> | <u>Low</u>     | <u>High</u> |
| 1. Regional Centers for Water Resources Development  |                          | .5             | 1.0         | 1.5            | 3.0         | 2.7            | 4.5         |
| 2. Education and Training  |                          | 2.5            | 8.0         | 6.0            | 15.0        | 7.0            | 22.0        |
| 3. Increase assistance for all water projects,<br>particularly community water supply <sup>b,c</sup> |                          | 10.0           | 20.0        | 30.0           | 80.0        | 40.0           | 120.0       |
| 4. Cooperative studies in water pollution  |                          | .2             | .5          | .3             | .6          | .5             | 1.2         |
| 5. Assistance to desalination plants <sup>c,d</sup>  |                          | 2.0            | 20.0        | 10.0           | 80.0        | 10.0           | 80.0        |
| 6. International Rivers <sup>c,e</sup>   |                          | .3             | .5          | .5             | 25.0        | .9             | 50.0        |
| 7. International Hydrological Decade   | 2.5                      | 8.0            | 8.0         | 9.0            | 9.0         | 11.0           | 11.0        |
| 8. Expert technical services   |                          | 1.0            | 2.0         | 2.0            | 6.0         | 3.0            | 9.0         |
| 9. Support international organizations <sup>f</sup>  |                          | -              | -           | -              | -           | -              | -           |
| 10. Support U.S. career water service  |                          | .2             | .4          | .3             | .5          | .4             | .8          |
| 11. Water for Peace office   | .1                       | .3             | .6          | .4             | .9          | .5             | 1.5         |
| 12. International Conference on Water for Peace  | <u>1.2</u>               | <u>-</u>       | <u>-</u>    | <u>-</u>       | <u>-</u>    | <u>-</u>       | <u>-</u>    |
| Total: Priority Program  | 3.8                      | 25.0           | 61.0        | 60.0           | 220.0       | 76.0           | 300.0       |



Notes

- a. See letters of transmittal.
- b. Increase above normal levels of assistance for all water projects. Includes community water supply, irrigation, river basin development, hydropower, etc.
- c. Primarily for capital assistance, including project feasibility studies.
- d. Does not include possible joint project with Mexico.
- e. Does not include already programmed assistance, e.g., Mekong, Indus.
- f. No special contributions are contemplated at this time over and above those already planned, with possible exception of contribution to UN for studies of international rivers included under item number 6.



91e

UNITED STATES  
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240

Dear Secretaries Rusk and Udall:

President Johnson launched the Water for Peace Program last October 7 in an address to the delegates to the First International Symposium on Water Desalination in Washington, D. C. The President noted that the need for water is worldwide and so is the responsibility for promoting its beneficial use and full development. Accordingly, he pledged the support and assistance of the United States in developing these resources through "a massive cooperative international effort to find solutions for man's water problems."

In response to the President's initiative, you jointly agreed to establish an interdepartmental committee\* to review the extent of the world-wide needs and opportunity for water development, to assess the ongoing international, bilateral and national efforts to respond to these needs and opportunities, and to submit recommendations as to what the United States, in cooperation with other interested countries and international bodies, should do to fulfill the President's call to action.

\*Kenneth Holum, Assistant Secretary for Water and Power Development, Department of the Interior, Chairman;  
Herman Pollack, Acting Director, International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State;  
John A. Baker, Assistant Secretary, Department of Agriculture;  
James M. Quigley, Assistant Secretary, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, later replaced by Dr. Philip R. Lee, Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs;  
James T. Ramey, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission;  
Alfred B. Fitt, General Counsel, Department of Army;  
Dr. Robert White, Administrator, Environmental Science Services Administration, Department of Commerce;  
Dr. Albert H. Moseman, Assistant Administrator, Agency for International Development;  
Henry S. Rowen, Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, observer;  
Dr. Dean F. Peterson, Technical Assistant, Office of Science and Technology, observer.

- Attached is the report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Water for Peace.

Early in our studies, we found the President's call for an expanded cooperative attack on water problems to be an essential complement to his commitment to accelerate the United States contribution to global efforts designed to combat hunger, disease and ignorance. Sickness resulting from an inadequate supply of pure water causes an estimated 10,000,000 deaths--almost half of them infants--and 500,000,000 incapacitation illnesses each year. Occasionally an excess of water, but more frequently a lack of water or failure to use available supplies efficiently for food production, threaten additional millions with undernourishment and starvation.

Water supply and water quality problems are not limited to poor or underdeveloped nations. In many of the more advanced nations, competition for the use of water supplies is growing and the supply of usable water is becoming increasingly scarce. All countries have water problems.

A broad survey of the world's water needs leads to four conclusions: First, that notwithstanding the many significant current international water programs, the worldwide effort is not keeping pace with the worldwide needs. Second, water problems are so varied and the opportunities for development so complex, that water resources development in each country should be fully coordinated with the development of other economic and human resources. Third, that the most urgent need throughout the developing world is for an increased understanding of and capacity to deal with the problems involved in water resources development and management. Fourth, that existing and anticipated technological advances make possible the solutions of problems which earlier were considered insurmountable.

For these reasons, we recommend that the Water for Peace Program initially emphasize the exchange of information and water resources technology among the nations of the world, the training of technical and operating personnel, and the provision of experts to help in the assessment of water needs and resources and the planning of programs.

Solving the world's water problems will ultimately require substantially greater amounts of capital than is currently being expended. Increased requirements for international capital assistance will need to be under constant review and should be related to the ability of countries to use such assistance effectively. In the meantime, additional capital assistance required for the short term can be furnished through existing channels, although at expanded levels. Financing exceptional projects, such as large desalting plants, may require special arrangements which should be worked out on an individual basis. The form of additional U. S. capital financing of water projects should, of course, be consistent with U. S. balance of payments policy.

As its contribution to the worldwide effort, the United States should strengthen its own competence in water matters and should provide export assistance to the countries that lack the technical expertise to solve their water problem. We should participate in a world-wide effort to help other countries develop their own ability to plan, build and manage facilities required to make the best use of available water resources for their health and economic well-being.

The recommendations in the report are based on the knowledge and experience of experts in many fields of water science, technology, management, planning, engineering and construction who participated in this study. These recommendations cover a broad spectrum of useful steps which should be undertaken to assure coordinated progress in this complex field. From among these comprehensive recommendations, the Interdepartmental Committee selected 12 actions for priority attention and action in the initial program. It is recommended that the United States:

- (1) Assist in strengthening or establishing regional or sub-regional centers for water resource development with the participation of the countries in the region. It is anticipated that this normally will be done with the cooperation of international and regional organizations, and that the assistance of other developed countries will be invited. These centers should assist national and local governments and regional organizations in such activities as information and data collection and dissemination, surveys and studies, and specialized training courses and seminars directed to augmenting the capability for planning and implementing water development programs;
- (2) Foster expanded educational training programs by (a) contributing to the creation or strengthening of regional or sub-regional institutions to provide professional training at the graduate and undergraduate level in water-related disciplines; (b) supporting regional or sub-regional technical and vocational training programs; (c) supporting United States university and other programs to train water specialists from abroad; and (d) sponsoring appropriate scholarships and fellowships to foreign students;
- (3) Increase substantially the assistance we now are giving the developing nations in all aspects of water resources development, with particular emphasis on improving community water supplies. Recognizing that provision of pure water for human needs is of high priority, we urge that all nations and international organizations increase their community water supply programs to the end that by 1980 there will be a 50 percent increase in the proportions of the urban and rural populations in the developing countries who are served by piped drinking water.
- (4) Initiate more effective cooperation with other nations and international organizations in devising plans and developing techniques for combating water pollution in all its forms.



(5) Offer to assist in the construction of desalting plants in areas where this advancing technology can make a major contribution to the solution of water supply problems.

(6) Foster the development of international river basins because of the unique opportunities they provide for multiple purpose development, international collaboration and reduction of tensions endangering peace.

(7) Provide substantial financial and technical support for the International Hydrological Decade.

(8) Expand the capacity of the United States to send abroad qualified teams of water resources experts to provide various technical services to countries requesting such help in meeting their water needs.


(9) Support accelerated and expanded programs for water resources development within the United Nations and its specialized agencies; continue to support international sources of capital for water development projects.

(10) Establish an appropriate program in the career service for technical employees in the water field so as to make overseas assignments attractive to the best qualified Federal employees.


(11) Establish a Water for Peace Office, under interdepartmental guidance, to coordinate international water resources efforts, to serve as a central point to stimulate interest in international water programs and to ensure the effective discharge of U. S. commitments under the Water for Peace Program.

(12) Sponsor an International Conference on Water for Peace in Washington, D. C., May 23-31, 1967. The conference should serve to focus universal attention on mankind's needs for water and stimulate practical cooperation in promoting water development and solving specific water problems.

Sincerely yours,



Kenneth Holum



Herman Pollack

Hon. Dean Rusk  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

Hon. Stewart L. Udall  
Secretary of the Interior  
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure

Friday, Sept. 2, 1966  
7:00 pm

Kit'd from  
P. 9/5/66

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Sect. Rusk's recommendations for the hard core arrangements for the Erhard visit; that is, the White House portion.

We had a good working session the other day with Jim Symington, Liz Carpenter, Bess Abell, etc., on the visit as a whole.

My only comment on Sect. Rusk's proposal is that, given the seriousness of the issues before us on the occasion, you may wish to budget for a bit more working time with the Chancellor -- perhaps before dinner.

But we can see at the time.

W. W. R.

(log 3182)

3182  
92a

SEP - 2 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Chancellor Erhard's Visit

Recommendation:

That you approve the White House portion of the program for Chancellor Erhard's visit as outlined in this memorandum.

Approve ✓ Disapprove                     

Discussion:

You have invited Chancellor Erhard to make an informal visit September 26-27. The Chancellor has accepted and will probably arrive in Washington on the evening of September 25. He will be accompanied by Mrs. Erhard and an official party of approximately twenty persons.

I suggest that you meet privately with Erhard on the morning of September 26, that you meet with him and his entourage later that morning, and that you agree to a brief Communique meeting with the Chancellor, myself, and perhaps some others on September 27. Further, I suggest you and Mrs. Johnson give a White House dinner for the Chancellor and Mrs. Erhard on the evening of September 26.

/S/ DEAN RUSK

Dean Rusk

RECEIVED  
RUSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 SEP 2 PM 4 59



Friday  
September 2, 1966  
7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Bill Gaud reports the opening  
moves with the House Appropriations  
Committee.

W. W. Rostow

93a  
**LIMITED OFFICIAL USE**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON

cc: Mr. Rostow ✓

OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

September 2, 1966

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Foreign Aid - House Appropriations Committee**

I have had several talks with George Mahon about the AID bill since I last talked to you. So far, he insists that:


- he is not prepared to eliminate from the Appropriations Act the prohibition against our making 10 per cent of our Development Loan funds available to members of the World Bank family as required by Section 205 of the authorization bill, and
- his Committee will have to cut the economic aid portion of the bill - probably by \$150 million.

I have emphasized that our appropriations request is at a rock bottom level. After taking into account the results of the Senate-House Conference on the authorization bill, our economic aid appropriations request for FY 1967 is \$2.414 billion. That is \$49 million less than the \$2.463 billion that was appropriated for economic aid for FY 1966.

If the Appropriations Act prohibits us from using Section 205, that will be tantamount to a cut of approximately \$74 million (10 per cent of the new appropriation of \$665 million plus 10 per cent of carry-overs and anticipated repayments). This is no mean cut in itself. Last year he cut the bill \$75 million and the House upheld it. Particularly in view of the fact that our request is \$49 million below last year's appropriation, a \$75 million cut would seem to be enough this year - if there must be any cut at all.

The Passman Subcommittee plans to mark up on Wednesday, September 7. The outcome of that mark up is sure to be worked out by George Mahon in advance.

Between now and Wednesday I expect to see and talk to George Mahon again. We are also working on those members of the Subcommittee whom we have a chance of influencing.

  
William S. Gaud

**LIMITED OFFICIAL USE**

*Rostow*

94

Friday  
September 2, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Senator Fulbright's Letter on Threats Against President  
Balaguer

Mike Manatos sent you earlier today a letter from Senator Fulbright calling your attention to reports of threats to overthrow the government of President Balaguer. (Tab A)

Ambassador Bunker will be talking to Balaguer on Wednesday in Santo Domingo. I have told him about the Fulbright letter.

Ambassador Bunker, upon his return Thursday will report to you his estimate of the possibility of Balaguer's being overthrown. If you wish, he will talk to Senator Fulbright.

W. W. Rostow

\_\_\_\_\_ Ask Bunker upon his return  
to talk to Fulbright

\_\_\_\_\_ Ask Bunker to draft reply  
for me to send to Fulbright

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 88-156

By 129, NARA, Date 1-27-92

WWR:BKS:saw

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

94a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 2, 1966

To: Walt Rostow

From: Mike Manatos *mm.*

Attached is a copy of a letter from Senator Fulbright about reports that are coming to him of an attempt to overthrow the Balaguer government. I have sent the original to the President.



September 2, 1966

Dear Senator:

May I acknowledge your letter of September 1 to the President regarding reports that have come to you of the possibility of an attempt to overthrow the government of President Balaguer.

Your letter will have the immediate and careful attention of the President and his advisers.

Sincerely,

Mike Manatos  
Administrative Assistant  
to the President

Honorable J. W. Fulbright  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

jl/jf

94c

J. W. FULBRIGHT, ASK. CHAIRMAN

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CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J.

# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

CARL MARCY, CHIEF OF STAFF  
ARTHUR M. WARE, CHIEF CLERK

September 1, 1966

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have received disturbing reports from a number of sources suggesting that Dominican military leaders may be planning an attempt to overthrow the government of President Balaguer. It is said that a coup d'etat might be attempted in late September or early October when the Inter-American Peace Force will have been withdrawn. This information came to me from former President Bosch, from Mr. Norman Thomas, who has written to Vice President Humphrey and Assistant Secretary Gordon as well as several members of the Senate. I have also noted press reports of a possible bid for power by the military in the Christian Science Monitor of August 26; in El Tiempo of New York on August 29 and in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch on August 28.

I am unable to judge the accuracy of this information and I am well aware that you may already possess more complete and reliable information about the situation in the Dominican Republic. Because of your Administration's strong support for the re-establishment and maintenance of constitutional government in the Dominican Republic, however, I felt sure you would want to receive any available information on a possible threat to Dominican democracy.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

J. W. Fulbright  
Chairman

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

Fri., Sept. 2, 1966  
5:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This report of De Gaulle's views and plans with respect to Viet-nam are sufficiently byzantine to be credible.

I thought you'd like to read it.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~-attachment

Friday, September 2, 1966 -- 5:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Jack Leacacos, The Cleveland Plain Dealer, came in to take stock of the present situation in Viet Nam. As usual, he was perceptive, making his own comments as well as listening. His major feeling is that if we can hold steady through the Vietnamese and our own Congressional elections, keeping the pressure on, things ought to break favorably in subsequent months. I said I thought this was not impossible, but no one was in a position to make a reliable prognosis.

Leslie Carpenter came in to discuss how decisions were made on Viet Nam. I pointed out that, as in any military engagement, the President was directly involved in every major decision; Secretaries Rusk and McNamara were your principal advisers; the views of the JCS, Gen. Westmoreland, Amb. Lodge, Robert Komer had a significant role in forming the framework for your decisions.

Henry Gemmill and Fred Taylor, Wall Street Journal, were referred to me by Bill Moyers. They are writing a story on Bob McNamara. I answered their questions, emphasizing the remarkable relationship between Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara, and the depth of Sec. McNamara's view that military force was and should be the instrument of political policy.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, September 2, 1966  
1:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

In the light of my memorandum to you of August 12, 1966, I have talked with Bob McNamara at length about the non-proliferation treaty.

He agrees that the heart of the matter is this: so long as we are committed to NATO we cannot, should not, will not give up our veto over the firing of nuclear weapons in that theater.

The issue arises in connection with the "European clause": it never arose with the MLF, where the retention of our veto was universally accepted.

There have been several U. S. statements in the past which implied that if the Europeans fully united we would not rule out the possibility of their having an independent right to fire nuclear weapons from a presumably integrated European nuclear force. Behind these statements were three judgments:

-- It was wise to encourage the movement towards European unity, and unity would be encouraged by "not ruling out" the possibility of a European force with a right to fire as independent as that now enjoyed by U. K. and France;

-- If and when the Europeans ever got to a position of true integration and seriously contemplated the problem, they would, in fact, not ask for the surrender of the U. S. veto, because they would lose more in the dilution of the U. S. commitment this would bring about than they would gain by this act of "independence; "

-- If and when the Europeans ever got to a position of true integration, and there was a European executive equivalent to the President of the United States, a rational arrangement could be worked out with that executive consistent with the requirements of the alliance.

The non-proliferation treaty forces us to face this issue sooner than we might otherwise have to face it; because the European clause in the treaty makes a reality out of a quite distant but important contingency.

If we are now to probe Gromyko and the Russians deeply as to the possibility of a non-proliferation treaty, Bob McNamara's and my judgment

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9/2/66

is that the probe should take place on this question: Would the Russians sign a treaty if we were to guarantee that we would not surrender under any future circumstances, and whatever the form of nuclear organization in the West, our veto over the firing of nuclear weapons?

As I said in my memo, this is the one issue on which the Russians might have a legitimate interest in the nuclear organization of the West, and it is an issue where Russian and U. S. interests converge with those of Europe, if the Europeans think the matter through.

If Secretary Rusk should find that Gromyko was willing to accept a non-proliferation treaty based on this principle, we would, however, then face an interesting problem of persuading the Europeans to accept this proposition. I believe the job could be done because, at bottom, what the Europeans are really groping for -- although they are not very clear about it -- is not an independent right to fire, but an insurance policy against the possibility that at some future time some American administration might pick up its nuclear weapons and its troops and go home. The British and French national nuclear capabilities and a future possible European nuclear force is a kind of insurance that, if we should ever move in this way, Western Europe would not be left naked of nuclear capacity.

But so long as we remain a fully committed ally of Europe, Europeans can, I believe, be made to see:

-- that it is ridiculous for them to think of firing their nuclear weapons without ours; and

-- that the threat to use a small nuclear force in Europe to engage us in a nuclear war to which we were not committed could only lead to the U. S. pulling back and dissociating itself from European defense.

No American President is going to place in the hands of the Europeans -- or anyone else -- the right to determine when we are engaged in a nuclear war.

The outcome of such sober and careful discussion with the Europeans would, I believe, be an understanding that so long as they wanted our total commitment, including a nuclear commitment, to the defense of Europe, a European nuclear force could relate to ours only on the same basis as the two-key system now works: namely, that affirmative action both by Europe and the U. S. would be necessary for the firing of nuclear weapons in defense of Europe.

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-3-

9/2/66

Therefore, we suggest that:

1. Secretary Rusk focus on this question of the continued U. S. veto in his talks with Gromyko;

2. If it emerges that this is the critical issue with Moscow, we then tell Gromyko that we must talk with our allies and then come back to him.

I am raising this with you at Bob McNamara's request. He feels that you, Secretary Rusk, and he ought to talk about this before the conversation with Gromyko is undertaken in New York. For some reason he did not feel free to raise it directly with Secretary Rusk, as I suggested he might. It is possible that Secretary Rusk would have views which differed from Bob's and mine in this matter; and he may have alternative formulae to suggest to try out on Gromyko.

This matter is so fundamental that you may wish to budget for a small and quite leisurely meeting with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara in which we could hear Secretary Rusk's views about how to probe Gromyko; Bob McNamara would have a chance to express his; and you would have a chance to give Secretary Rusk guidance for his talks on this subject with Gromyko.

To recall my own approach to this question of the U. S. veto, I am attaching my memorandum of August 12.

W. W. Rostow

Set up a special meeting \_\_\_\_\_

Put on Tuesday lunch agenda \_\_\_\_\_ ✓

Leave it to Secretary Rusk \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET attachment

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*Pres file*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday  
September 2, 1966  
11:35 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Prime Minister Holt

Attached for your signature is a letter to  
Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt.  
This answers his letter to you of Aug. 16  
(attached).

I recommend you sign.

*Walt* Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment



~~SECRET~~

September 2, 1966

Dear Harold:

My thanks for your good letter of August 16. I was happy to hear from you.

I am delighted that Australian public opinion is so strong in support of our joint effort to defeat aggression in Southeast Asia.

Recent reports from both Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland suggest that this effort is prospering.

Preparations for the Vietnam election are going well, with 542 candidates competing vigorously for 108 seats. These candidates seem broadly representative of Vietnamese society: government officials, businessmen, teachers, army officers, etc. The government is making a vigorous effort to encourage a large vote; the Viet Cong are clearly preparing a wave of terrorism, in an attempt to disrupt that vote. But, by and large, the long and difficult process of building a representative government seems to be well launched.

On the military side, we are continuing to keep the enemy's Main Force units off balance, by vigorous spoiling attacks -- such as that delivered recently by Australian forces. These attacks have prevented the North Vietnamese regular army units in South Vietnam from breaking out of sparsely inhabited parts of the country. In the more populated areas, the work of pacification and revolutionary development goes forward with gradually increasing success. This is where, in the end, the war has to be won.

I appreciate your passing on the impressions gleaned by Paul Hasluck during his recent visit to Djakarta. We share your hope that the formal end of confrontation will mean a real end to hostilities. Indonesia's new political leaders face tremendous problems; but they also have a large opportunity to play a constructive role in Southeast Asia. We should design our policies to help their efforts. I hope that you can encourage your colleagues at the Commonwealth Conference to the same end.

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

- 2 -

I am glad to hear of the increase in your aid budget. One of the problems most on my mind nowadays is the need for effective help to developing countries. This is a field in which the US has long been hard at work, and in which I hope other industrial countries will play an increasing part.

One of the key problems here is the world food supply. The experts tell me that by 1983, if present trends continue, the total food import needs of developing countries will exceed likely food exports from the rest of the world. To forestall a major crisis, we have to help the developing countries increase their food output; until they do we have to join in meeting their emergency food needs. Both our countries have a large role to play here; I am hopeful the Congress will soon pass our Food for Freedom bill.

My other main concern nowadays is Europe.

Recent decisions by fourteen of the NATO countries ensure that effective Western deterrence will be maintained, despite French withdrawals. The main thing to watch, from here on out, will be whether the NATO crisis has an unsettling effect on Germany. We must guard against the development of a German feeling of isolation and insecurity, which could undo much of the good work of the last two decades in Europe.

This is one reason for our continuing support for efforts to build a united Europe, closely linked to the US. Those efforts go forward despite setbacks and delay. The most important venture in this field, at the moment, is the Kennedy Round. I am hopeful that this, our first attempt to do serious economic business with the European Common Market, will succeed. The critical point will come, I suspect, some time between September and March.

Side by side with support for Western unity go our efforts to build bridges of greater understanding to the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. I am under no illusion that the division of Europe and Germany can be quickly healed. But my hope is that, by encouraging gradual evolution in Moscow and Eastern Europe, we can help to create the right climate for an eventual settlement.

SECRET



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-3-

Some progress has been made. We seem to be moving toward an outer space agreement with the Russians. We are seeking a non-proliferation agreement on a compromise basis which would not require either side to abandon its past positions; I am asking Dean Rusk to pursue this with Gromyko in New York at the General Assembly. If we could find some agreed way of dealing with the verification problem, progress could also be made toward a wider test ban.

I am asking Congress for authority to grant most-favored-nation treatment to the Communist countries. And I have asked our best people in the Executive Branch to put their minds to what other steps the Western nations could take, even without East-West agreement, to convey to the Communist countries our desire for peaceful relations, trade, and contacts with the East.

All this will give you some idea of the range of my concerns right now. Our efforts to help build a viable world order have many facets; we will clearly be at it a long time. It is a real source of encouragement to know that we are partners in this great business.

Sincerely,



The Right Honorable  
Harold E. Holt, M.P.  
Prime Minister of Australia  
Canberra

LBJ:WJJ:mm

~~SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIME MINISTER,  
CANBERRA.

16th August, 1966.

Dear Lyndon,

I thought you might like to see how some recent public opinion polls have been working out on subject matters of interest to you. Details appear in the attached copy news clippings.

The poll on support for the Government has been steady throughout my period of office at the highest level the Government parties have ever achieved. The latest taking is only one point short of our peak - and five points above the percentage we obtained in the 1963 elections when we were returned to office with a large majority. Ours is, as you know, a preferential system of voting, and we receive, on average, in excess of 80% of the preferences of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP). That party is shown as likely to receive 7% of the total vote cast. The percentage shown for our opposition, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) - 40% - is six points below that of the 1963 election. We face a general election late in November. The gap between the major parties is likely to narrow in an election atmosphere as old loyalties re-assert themselves, but we are in the strongest position we have ever been coming to an election and, barring any major unfavourable developments, should at least hold our present substantial majority.

You will see from the details given that there has been a useful increase of support for our national service policy - the Australian version of "the Draft". The percentage is within a point of that reached last September. The previous poll was taken in May at a time when the first national servicemen were on their way to Vietnam. You will note that support is stronger from men and women aged less than 50 than among those in older age groups.

The other poll headed "Australians Back LBJ" will have a special interest for you because it relates to two of the statements made by me while in Washington backing you and the American effort in Vietnam. There is an encouraging strength of support on both.

Taken together, these three polls reveal convincingly that the Government continues to enjoy the backing of solid majorities on its military participation in Vietnam, its association for these and other defensive purposes with the USA, and for its general conduct of the nation's affairs.

2 . . .

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-407  
By CG, NARA Date 10-21-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

stew-jude 8/25



Our Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, has just returned from a very successful visit to Indonesia. He was the first Foreign Minister to make contact in Djakarta with the leading figures in the new Administration. He had a useful talk with Suharto, lasting about an hour, and three separate conversations with Foreign Minister Malik who discussed frankly and fully with him the present and future outlook. He also made a number of other significant contacts. Mr. Hasluck called on Sukarno at Bogor and found him in a cheerful mood and very friendly. Sukarno made no attempt to discuss any current affairs, although there were plenty of openings for him to do so. Hasluck thought he had aged noticeably since he saw him two years ago.

Hasluck has expressed to me his belief that the formal ending of confrontation last week will genuinely mean ending of armed hostilities and may well be the prelude to Malaysian and Indonesian friendship of perhaps even an emotional closeness.

In Djakarta he stressed our view that a unified and viable Malaysia was as essential as a unified and viable Indonesia to stability in the region. No doubt we have some major problems ahead of us still. We can expect a good deal of division and confusion to mark Indonesian efforts to reconstruct the economy and produce policies for this purpose of sufficient realism, but it is at least a great relief to see an end to "confrontation" and be able to turn our thinking to constructive possibilities for the future.

There had been suggestions originating in Djakarta that I should call in on my way to London for the Prime Ministers' Conference in September. I have decided against that. Hasluck's visit has met our immediate requirements and laid some good foundations. There is some awkwardness in the fact that Sukarno is still nominally Prime Minister as well as President. He would be undesirably on display in the ceremonial and functions associated with a meeting of Heads of Governments. We have to take care, also, that the new regime is not embarrassed by too large an influx of non-Asian dignitaries at a time when they are still subject to the criticism that they have aligned themselves with the "Nekolims".


The Budget we announce this evening will include a 34% increase in Defence and increased provision for International Aid. It will also show the largest peace-time deficit - \$A533 million - for which we have ever budgetted. Our revenues have been hit by lower farm incomes in drought affected areas and the tightness of capital markets around the world leaves little scope for government borrowing. However, we shall be going ahead steadily with a fully-sustained immigration programme and a good deal of useful development. We've even managed to lend New Zealand a few dollars (\$A20 million) to ease its balance of payments position.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I was glad to see you give Harold Wilson such a good reception and speak so warmly about him at your White House luncheon. He is going through a very tough time and we must wish him well.

We have been sharing from afar something of your happiness through our reading of the reports of what must have been a most colourful and successful wedding occasion. What a wonderful beginning to their married life for Luci and Patrick. May their happiness bring through all the years ahead reflected joys to you and Mrs. Johnson as well.

*With warmest regards  
to you*



President Lyndon B. Johnson,  
President of the United States of America.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Melb Herald 9/8

## SUPPORT FOR LCP STILL STRONG

— Gallup Poll

Support for the Federal Liberal-CP Government, although down a little, is well above the level of the last Federal election in 1963, according to an Australia-wide Gallup Poll last month.

Each of the 2070 people interviewed was handed a ballot paper and asked:

"If a Federal election were being held today, which party would you like to see win?"

Ballot papers, when marked, were dropped into boxes carried by the interviewers.

When the boxes were opened, it was found that: 49% wanted LCP to win, 38% wanted A.L.P. to win,

6% wanted DLP to win, 2% were independent voters, and 5% hadn't answered.

Assuming that the 5% who didn't answer divide like the others, present support for the political parties can be estimated as:

LCP 51%, A.L.P. 40%, DLP 7% and Independent 2%.

The following table shows that support for the LCP is now 5% greater than at the last election in 1963:

|        | 1963 Gallup Polls '63 |    |    |
|--------|-----------------------|----|----|
|        | election April July   |    |    |
|        | %                     | %  | %  |
| LCP    | 46                    | 52 | 51 |
| DLP    | 7                     | 7  | 7  |
| A.L.P. | 40                    | 40 | 40 |
| Ind.   | 1                     | 1  | 2  |

Gallup  
Poll finds

MORE  
SUPPORT  
CALL-UP

Two people out of three now support the call-up of 20-year-old men for military training, according to a Gallup Poll.

It has found there is less opposition to the scheme now than in May, but still a little more than there was a year ago.

Each of 2000 men and women interviewed recently was reminded that each year about 8000 20-year-olds were being called up for two years' military training, with possible overseas service.

Those people were then asked whether they were for, or against, that call-up.

Early in May when 1400 National Servicemen were on the way to Vietnam there was a swing against the call-up. But about one in 10 have since changed their minds in favor of support, as the table shows.

|             | 1965<br>Sept.<br>p.c. | 1966<br>May<br>p.c. | To-<br>day<br>p.c. |
|-------------|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| For . . . . | 69                    | 63                  | 68                 |
| Against . . | 23                    | 31                  | 26                 |
| Undecided   | 8                     | 6                   | 6                  |

MORE MEN

Those in favor of the call-up comprise:

- 72 per cent of the men and 64 per cent of the women.
- 70 per cent of men and women aged less than 50, compared with
- 67 per cent of those 50-69, and 57 per cent of those over 70.
- 76 per cent of Liberal-CP voters, 69 per cent of DLP voters and 56 per cent of A.L.P. voters.

Comments by those in favor of the call-up often were:

- No discrimination; all should go;
- Does them good; teaches them discipline;
- Someone must defend us.

Those against the call-up of a proportion of 20-year-olds usually said:

- They should not be sent overseas;
- We should get volunteers; or
- All should be called up.

MELBOURNE  
HERALD  
13.8.66



Melb. Herald 6/8

# GALLUP POLL

## Australians back LBJ

Most Australians—both LCP voters and A.L.P. voters—approve Mr Holt's major statements in America.

- That he accepted the military judgment of the United States that it was necessary to bomb the oil dumps in Hanoi and Haiphong, and
  - That Australia would stay all the way with America in the defence of South Vietnam and South East Asia.
- In the second half of July, soon after Mr Holt made these statements in America, Gallup Poll interviewers in more than

200 districts throughout Australia asked 2070 people:

*Did you hear about the American bombing of oil dumps in Hanoi and Haiphong in North Vietnam, a couple of weeks ago?*

Nine out of 10 said they had heard of that bombing.

They were then asked if they approved, or disapproved, the first of those statements by our Prime Minister, Mr Holt, which was read exactly as printed above. People answered:

Approve bombing 56 p.c.  
Disapprove . . . 24 p.c.  
No opinion . . . 20 p.c.

Strongest approval came from men (67 p.c.), LCP voters of both sexes (66 p.c.) and people aged 21-29 (60 p.c.).

Women answered: Approve 45 p.c., Disapprove 27 p.c., No opinion 28 p.c.

A.L.P. voters answered: Approve 43 p.c., Disapprove 34 p.c., No opinion 23 p.c.

All the way with LBJ. When asked whether they approved, or disapproved Mr Holt's second statement (also read exactly as printed above), the same 2070 people answered:

Approve supporting USA . . . 64 p.c.  
Disapprove . . . 23 p.c.  
No opinion . . . 13 p.c.

On this question, the major population groups are in fairly close agreement.

Even A.L.P. voters answered: Approve 54 p.c., Disapprove 33 p.c., No opinion 13 p.c.

Pres file 99

Friday, September 2, 1966  
11:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Lodge states: "I would be very happy if the U. S. made no comment at all on" de Gaulle's speech.

Given good press handling thus far, Sec. Rusk believes that neither you nor he has to get into it formally, as of this morning.

If we have to deal with it at a high level, I recommend:

1. You keep out of it.

2. Sec. Rusk make a factual firm, quiet statement correcting the factual errors and quoting the record of our willingness to withdraw as the other side stops aggression.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 5090

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 88-157  
By uif NARA, Date 2-2-90

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

99a  
Friday, September 2, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Saigon, 5090)

In his speech in Phnom Penh, de Gaulle said: "The political and military authority of the United States installed itself in its turn in South Vietnam and at the same time the war was rekindled in the form of a national resistance."

If words have any meaning, this means that the United States in effect committed an aggression in South Vietnam and that those who opposed it constituted a "national resistance".

This is a total untruth and de Gaulle must know that it is. The aggression here is crystal clear - as clear as was the German aggression against France in 1940. De Gaulle was glad to have American help in repelling that aggression then and he should at least not be making our work harder now.

To charge us with aggression when our young men are dying here to repel it will be a sharp and painful thought to those who are aware of what de Gaulle said.

The attempt to compare our position in Vietnam with the French position in Algeria also verges on fantasy. When the French came back to impose colonialism in Vietnam in 1945 why did they not apply their so-called Algerian policy?

Finally, de Gaulle repeats once again his favorite old saw that "there can be no military solution to Vietnam". This is something that every American connected with Vietnam believes - and, greatly to their credit, this includes the American military. We have said countless times that the war here is basically a political struggle for the welfare of the average man, and for his adherence to his government, but that military and criminal violence must be put down in order to create the opportunities to make the necessary economic, social, and political gains.

I shall resist the temptation to attribute motives and to say that his statement is due to anti-Americanism or to a desire to have us fail where they failed or to his extraordinary tendency to try to equate a nation of 40 million with a nation of 200 million.

The above is sent in the hopes that it may be useful for your private use. I would be very happy if the U. S. made no comment at all on the speech.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-152

By 1-8, NARA, Date 7-27-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

Friday, September 2, 1966

10:00 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Indian and Pak PL 480 Agreements

After our talk yesterday morning about the relation between our domestic bread prices and our India-Pak PL 480 programs, I asked the Budget Bureau informally for an opinion. The Bureau has headed the inter-agency operation of which I spoke.

The attached strikes me as a good updated analysis based on the facts developed during the July inter-agency review of our wheat situation. It is not a formal memo checked with Agriculture. I believe you will wish to read it.

The argument is that we set the FY 1967 PL 480 planning figure only after reviewing domestic projections of consumption, exports and the carryover necessary to keep prices in line. Speculation in the market has kept prices unexpectedly high. But this is a largely irrational element on which cutting PL 480 shipments would have almost no significant effect. It might even have the contrary effect by indicating panic about the domestic position.

Therefore, though the reaction of speculators is impossible to predict, it looks to me as if these Indian and Pak agreements would have no effect on domestic prices. I would hate to hold the small Pak agreement up much longer; and I believe the pared down proposal for India is about as far as we should go, given their pre-harvest and pre-election requirements and our commitments. That proposal -- only running through February -- gives us the chance to make a fresh assessment after the Indian November harvest is in.

But if you still feel uncomfortable, we might hold back on the larger Indian deal -- I propose delaying signing until late September anyway -- and ask for a formal Agriculture-Budget answer to your question.


W. W. Rostow

I'm satisfied; go ahead with your approach on both India and Pakistan ✓

Go ahead with Pakistan now; ask for a formal Agriculture-Budget analysis on India         

See me         

~~SECRET~~





EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

September 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject: Effect of P.L. 480 sales on domestic wheat prices

This is in response to your request for an analysis of the effect of P.L. 480 sales on domestic wheat prices.

1. In July, an interagency group reviewed our wheat situation. It established reasonable projections of domestic consumption (660 million bushels), commercial exports (300 million bushels) and desirable carryover (400 million bushels) with a view to avoiding further domestic price increases. The 413 million bushels left over--allocated to P.L. 480--were not expected to have any disruptive effect on domestic prices.

2. The current unusually high prices apparently are due to market speculation that the supply situation is tighter than publicized.

-- Normally prices turn down at the start of harvest (May-June), but this year they continued to move up.

-- Then they jumped sharply on announcement of the 3-year Canadian-Soviet wheat agreement as speculators saw new evidence of tightening world supplies.

3. We do not expect prices to move any higher during the year, barring any unusual events such as further Soviet purchases or unexpected crop failure in other countries.

-- The August crop report indicates 46 million bushels more production than anticipated at the time the carryover and P.L. 480 planning figures were set and at the time the 1967 crop acreage allotment increase was proposed.

4. Even if all P.L. 480 wheat shipments were stopped now, we would not expect a drop of more than 15 cents per bushel.

-- Many of the recipient countries would have to buy the wheat anyway--probably mostly in the U.S.--so that total demand here would remain almost the same and any domestic price drop would be very small. Of course, this would have a severe impact on economic development.

- Curtailing shipments might even move prices upward temporarily if there were some speculation that the action was being taken because of a tight supply situation. The announcement that our P.L. 480 program this year would be 25% less than last year may have contributed to the current speculative pressure on prices.
5. A 15-cent drop in the price of wheat would not decrease the price of wheat flour or bread. It would take a drop of 70 cents or more per bushel to reduce the price of a loaf of bread by 1 cent.
6. Approval of the proposed agreement for 50 million bushels for India and Pakistan (1.4 million tons) would not have any noticeable effect on domestic prices.



Charles J. Zwick  
Assistant Director

Thurs. , Sept. 1, 1966  
11:00 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

We should keep our fingers crossed;  
but this could be good news.

Sect. Rusk, Alex Johnson, and Bill  
Bundy have worked out a scenario in  
response which I can describe for you.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 4969 - ~~SECRET NODIS THRUSH~~

10/a

~~SECRET - NODIS~~ Thrush

Thursday, September 1, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Saigon, 4969)

The uncle saw Nguyen Huu Tho at Go Dau Ha in Tay Ninh province yesterday. Arrangements were made for the uncle to take our man to Can Tho on "Monday or Tuesday" at a point near the airport. The exact place will be given to the uncle when he goes to Go Dau Ha on Saturday. On that day, the uncle will meet Tho's son who will give him the exact time and place and will then come back to Saigon with him.

On arriving in Saigon, the son will give a letter to our man at our man's house on Sunday morning. The letter will be signed by Tho in his official capacity as president of the organization. Our man does not know what will be in the letter.

But he is sure that it will not impede further actions since it is understood that our man will go to Can Tho on Monday or Tuesday to "pick up" Tho.

Comment: It becomes urgent to decide where Tho should be taken. He is understandably concerned about his security as regards the Government of Vietnam. Unless you can think of something better, I plan to have Tho met at Can Tho by [REDACTED] plane of sufficient size and range to take him and his party to Chu Lai, which is an all-American base, and from where I suggest he be flown to Okinawa [REDACTED] is equipped to process him.

3.4  
(b)(1)

Upon reflection, I think this is better than flying him to Guam or taking him out to a carrier. Obviously we are honor bound to get him out of the country immediately.

Other questions which arise are: When do you divulge this? When do we tell the Government of Vietnam? And what do we tell them? End comment.

It is expected that the son will be staying at our man's house in Saigon as a "gesture of good faith."

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-408  
By iso, NARA, Date 9-24-03

~~SECRET - NODIS~~ Thrush



Our man has suggested that we would be generous with money and personal security. Tho has said that he would eventually like to return to South Vietnam and take part in politics.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-156

By 127, NARA, Date 1-27-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, September 1, 1966 -- 2:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

After our lunch last Tuesday Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Bill Moyers and I discussed various constructive moves we might make towards Moscow.

Secretary Rusk came up with the suggestion that we could now sign the U. S. - Soviet Air Agreement. You may recall that he sent a recommendation over on July 15 recommending that you authorize the Department of State to inform the Soviet government that we would be willing to conclude the Civil Air Agreement in November or December of this year. He then asked that it be held up because of troubles with the Soviet Union over the track meet, our cultural agreement, etc.

On Secretary Rusk's return from the Tuesday lunch, he requested an urgent review of this matter to see if there were any factors which should be brought to his attention and yours since July 15. As the attached memorandum to me indicates:

-- Amb. Kohler believes that the chances of early Soviet agreement are slightly under 50-50 but that we should proceed now to advise the Soviets of our willingness to sign;

-- other governments are not likely to misconstrue or overreact to an American initiative in this field;

-- State Department does not believe that the basic views of the various Departments of the Government have changed recently; that is, the JCS objected but the Department of Defense overruled the Chiefs and interposed no objection to the Agreement. The FAA, CAB, and the Department of Commerce expressed no opposition.

What Secretary Rusk is now requesting of you is that you authorize the Department of State to consult immediately with interested Congressional leaders, including Senators Fulbright, Hickenlooper, Magnuson, and Monroney.

If Congressional attitudes seemed to warrant, we would then request your authorization to permit us to instruct Amb. Kohler to inform the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs of our interest in proceeding with the signing of the Agreement, suggesting that this be done by Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York at the time of the convening of the General Assembly.

W. W. Rostow

Permit State to consult Congressional Leaders \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

2377  
102a  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: U.S.-Soviet Civil Air Agreement

Recommendation:

I recommend that you authorize the Department of State to inform the Soviet Government that we would be willing to conclude the U.S.-Soviet Civil Air Agreement in November or December of this year.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

In discussions about U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations, Soviet officials have sharply criticized us for talking about our desire to improve bilateral relations without being willing to take the steps which would make such an improvement possible. They cite the Consular Convention and the Civil Air Agreement as examples.

When we signed the Consular Convention in 1964, we decided that its ratification should precede conclusion of the Civil Air Agreement, which was initialled in 1961 but not signed because of developments in Berlin. This allocation of priorities is now unrealistic. The Consular Convention is now before the Senate, but it is unlikely that the Senate will approve it in the foreseeable future. It is similarly unlikely that the Senate will act on our East-West trade legislation this year. In general, therefore, our bilateral relations will have in coming months what Brezhnev has called "a tendency toward freezing."

We must find some way to give positive content to our repeated professions that we desire an improvement in bilateral relations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 88-153  
By ij NARA, Date 6-7-87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Probably the only feasible proposal which we can make at this time which the Soviets will recognize as significant is conclusion of the Air Agreement. We negotiated this Agreement in 1961 because we believed that it would promote our efforts to develop contacts between Soviet citizens and Americans. Weekly Aeroflot flights to New York would remove a major barrier to increased Soviet tourism to the U.S. -- the problem of foreign exchange. Many West European countries have had civil air agreements with the U.S.S.R. for some time. Japan has just concluded one. The Canadians will complete negotiations in the near future.

The advantages of signing a Civil Air Agreement are the same now as they were in 1961. We believe that the Soviet Government also continues to be keenly interested in concluding such an Agreement and in beginning air service.

We believe that even though the Consular Convention is not ratified, the Civil Air Agreement should be signed in November or December of this year, so that Pan American and Aeroflot can begin reciprocal flights in the spring of 1967.

*Dean Rusk*  
Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

3152

102-6

August 31, 1966

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

13410

MEMORANDUM TO MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: U.S.-Soviet Civil Air Agreement

Following your luncheon discussion yesterday with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara about possible early action to conclude the U.S.-Soviet Air Agreement, Secretary Rusk asked for an urgent review of this matter to see if there were any factors which should be brought to his attention and yours since July 15, 1966, when the Secretary recommended in a memorandum to the President that we be authorized to inform the Soviet Government that we were willing to sign the Agreement.

Ambassador Kohler's views were sought, and, as you know, he has stated that the chances of early Soviet agreement are "slightly under 50-50", but that we should proceed now to advise the Soviets of our willingness to sign as evidence of the sincerity of our stated desire to maintain normal relations with the USSR. (Moscow 1053)

The Bureau of European Affairs concurs with the Ambassador's views and notes that after five years delay in signing the Agreement, its use as a bargaining item has long since become counter-productive; that maximum usefulness from the Agreement is obtainable in the present context -- as a sweetener in a prolonged stand-off situation. Soviet rejection or procrastination to an overture would not be disadvantageous, although this of course is not our objective.

In the present world situation and following the signing of the Canadian-USSR Agreement, there is a reasonable likelihood that other Governments will not

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 88-153  
By uf, NARA, Date 8-25-88

misconstrue or overreact to an American initiative in this field. Assistant Secretary Gordon reports that there are no new factors in the Latin American sphere that need to be noted since the Secretary made his recommendation on July 15.

When last consulted earlier this summer, Pan American Airlines, the American carrier which would carry out the Agreement on our side, felt that flights to Moscow would probably not be profitable for some time to come, but on balance saw some advantage in serving Moscow. After the Agreement is signed, Pan Am would probably wish to have discussions with the Soviet carrier, Aeroflot, regarding intermediate stops, to improve profits of the operation. We are not aware of what the Soviet attitude would be to such a request except for a not-discouraging Soviet response to informal mention of this possibility by Juan Trippe in Moscow last June.

In one regard there is more justification for implementation of the Agreement now (for the 1967 tourist season) than when it was negotiated and initialled in 1961. Over 20,000 Americans now visit the USSR each year; many would be inconvenienced by implementation of such an agreement.

We have not made a formal effort to obtain the views of various agencies of the U.S. Government or various parts of the Department since 1963. At that time the JCS objected, but the Department of Defense overruled the Chiefs and interposed no objection to the Agreement. The FAA, CAB, and the Department of Commerce expressed no opposition. We know that the FAA would now like to make one relatively small technical change in the separate "Agreed Minute" but this can probably be done fairly simply and need not be a preliminary requirement for signing the Agreement.

On the basis of the foregoing the Secretary has suggested that we propose to the President that he authorize the Department of State to consult immediately with interested

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

3

Congressional leaders, including Senators Fulbright, Hickenlooper, Magnuson, and Monroney. If Congressional attitudes seemed to warrant it, we would then request highest level authorization to permit us to instruct Ambassador Kohler to inform the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs of our interest in proceeding with the signing of the Agreement and suggesting that this be done by Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York at the time of the convening of the General Assembly.

QAR

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

Thursday, September 1, 1966 -- 3:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Wednesday, August 31, 1966

Robert Cahn and Saville Davis, The Christian Science Monitor, came in to see me in the course of a story they are working up on how the President does his business. I described the basic functions of my office, emphasizing that primarily it is a channel of two-way communication between the President and the national security agencies. They were impressed with the picture I gave them of your operating by paper and careful drafting, rather than verbally and casually -- which they said was a popular image.

Rowland Evans telephoned, as Bill Moyers warned me he might. He asked how I felt about the speeches in Idaho and Denver last week. I said I thought they were fine. He tried to find a difference of view on my part with respect to the non-proliferation passage. I argued strongly that both speeches were consistent with the policy you had earlier enunciated and which I had supported.

Sid Levy, Kiplinger Letter, came in to talk with me, as an economist, trying to draw me out on a tax cut. I said no decision had been made and there were many forces at work which might push the issue in one direction or other.

Thursday, September 1, 1966

William S. White telephoned, full of anger at Fulbright's behavior over Thailand and General de Gaulle's speech which he found outrageous. I explained why we did not find a public discussion of Thailand helpful at the present time and also why we found General de Gaulle's speech lacking in balance.

White asked if the Democratic Policy Committee statement on NATO had our quiet support. I said that it came as a surprise and was judged disruptive.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



*Pres file*

Thursday, September 1, 1966  
2:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a redraft of the  
letter to Congressman Ryan,  
as per your instructions.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Dear Bill:

Thank you for sending me the statement issued by you and twenty-three of your colleagues in support of an Asian-sponsored peace conference on Viet Nam.

I believe you know of our support for this initiative -- and, indeed, for any other initiative that would bring the war in Viet Nam to the conference table.

Our problem is that Hanoi has rejected the Thai proposal and all others which might bring peace.

Our common task is to persuade those who persist in carrying forward this war that negotiation is the right road.

Any contribution you and your colleagues can make to that act of persuasion would be of great value.

Sincerely,

Honorable William F. Ryan  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWRostow:rlh

Wednesday  
August 31, 1966 - 6:15 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith as requested a draft  
reply to Congressman Ryan.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Dear Bill:

Thank you for sending me the statement issued by you and twenty-three of your colleagues in support of an Asian-sponsored peace conference on Viet Nam.

I believe you know of our support for this initiative -- and, indeed, for any other initiative that would bring the war in Viet Nam to the conference table.

We do not know, of course, what the fate of this Asian peace proposal will be. It was, nevertheless, heartening to see still another example of Asians coming together to take increased responsibility for the destiny of their region. Their increased willingness to work together for common objectives is one of the most heartening tendencies on the world scene.

Sincerely,

Honorable William F. Ryan  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWRostow:rin



9/1/66

To: Secretary McNamara

From: W. W. Rostow

For information. *President Johnson*  
*sent to Prime Minister Wilson*  
*today*

*Lg 3128*

9/1/66

Log 3128

To: Secretary of State

From: W. W. Rostow

The attached message was sent via  
private wire to Prime Minister Wilson.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By 82, NARA, Date 7-13-98

SENT  
WHCA

~~SECRET~~

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1966 SEP 1 17 45

RRUS 001/01  
1707Z 1 SEP 66  
FM THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE PRIME MINISTER  
SECRET  
CAP66613

I FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR ANXIETY TO COMPLETE THE STEPS NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH YOUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS. WE PUT THE SAFEGUARDING OF STERLING HIGH ON OUR LIST OF PRIORITIES AND, AS YOU KNOW, I ADMIRE THE STURDY MEASURES YOU HAVE TAKEN SO FAR TO PUT YOUR HOUSE IN GOOD ORDER.

YET, AS WE HAVE FOUND OUT IN THIS COUNTRY, STEPS TO STOP THE OUTFLOW OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE MUST ALWAYS BE MEASURED AGAINST THE COST IN TERMS OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY. THUS, I AM CONCERNED THAT THE PROPOSALS YOU ARE CONSIDERING WITH RESPECT TO THE BAOR BE CAREFULLY HANDLED OR THEY MAY START THE UNRAVELLING OF OUR WESTERN DEFENSES. DE GAULLE'S ABRUPT ACTION IN PULLING HIS OWN FORCES OUT OF NATO WAS A BRUTAL BLOW AT THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE, AND THERE COULD BE GREAT DANGER FROM FURTHER WITHDRAWALS THAT ARE NOT RELATED TO A COMMON PLAN.

ABOVE ALL, WE MUST AVOID ANY ACTIONS THAT MIGHT TEND TO MAKE THE GERMANS FEEL THEY WERE NOT FULL PARTNERS ON THE TEAM. ERHARD IS IN DEEP TROUBLE AND THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN GERMANY TODAY IS ANYTHING BUT HEALTHY. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES THAT WE SHOW SENSITIVITY TO GERMAN OPINION WHICH SEEMS MORE AND MORE CONFUSED AND APPREHENSIVE. FOR THAT REASON I WOULD THINK IT UNWISE FOR US TO HOLD BILATERAL TALKS IN ADVANCE THAT MIGHT LEAD THE GERMANS TO BELIEVE THAT WE WERE PREPARING A FAIT ACCOMPLI. OF COURSE, DURING THE TRIPARTITE TALKS THERE WILL NATURALLY BE BILATERAL EXCHANGES AMONG THOSE TAKING PART, AND WE WILL BE READY FOR SUCH TALKS AT THE EARLIEST FEASIBLE TIME.

MEANWHILE, I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT YOU WILL NOT PRESS THE NATO DISCUSSIONS TOO VIGOROUSLY. IT COULD GREATLY COMPLICATE THE PROBLEM IF PLANS WERE RIGIDLY WORKED OUT WITHIN THE NATO COUNCIL BEFORE WE HAD A CHANCE FOR QUIET TALKS AMONG OUR THREE GOVERNMENTS.

MESSAGE ENDS

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, September 1, 1966  
9:00 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Filipino Veterans Claims and Benefits

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 88-19  
By ing, NARA, Date 12-10-91

The Joint United States-Philippine Veterans Commission to evaluate problems of Filipino veterans benefits and claims has completed its findings and given its recommendations. The benefits and claims issue has been a long-standing irritant in our relations with the Philippines.

The U. S. Panel of the Joint Commission recommended (Tab 3) that we broaden and extend certain benefits for Filipino veterans. Congressman Teague has introduced appropriate legislation, which if enacted would cost about \$17 million per year (total cost: approximately \$425 million over the next 30-plus years until death of the last Filipino veteran).

The Filipino Panel also raised the separate question of World War II claims. Our Panel found merit in two of the seven Filipino claims and referred these to Defense to determine both our moral obligation and the feasibility of payment.

Deputy Secretary Vance recommends in the accompanying memorandum (Tab 2) that these two claims be paid. They concern pay and allowances for approximately 100,000 recognized Filipino guerrillas and the refunding of erroneous deductions from back pay. It is estimated these would cost no more than approximately \$42 million. Vance says funds are available without new legislation. Vance further recommends that the terms of settlement be embodied in an Executive Agreement.

In his memorandum (Tab 1), Secretary Rusk agrees the two claims have a substantial equitable basis and notes that settlement at this time would go far toward removing a long-standing irritant.

He recommends we advise Marcos prior to his arrival that we are sympathetically considering settlement of the two claims, that in return Marcos should agree to drop the other five as not warranting further consideration, and that settlement details on the two claims should be worked out jointly following the State visit. We are considering an offset arrangement to deal with the settlement's impact on our balance of payments.

There are indications, not confirmed, that Marcos may find it hard to drop the other five claims. He may seek instead an overall General Release agreement for all seven. If this develops, we will prepare a recommended course of action for your consideration.

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- 2 -

General Decker, Chairman of the U.S. Panel, considers the task you gave him as completed and asks your instructions concerning the discharge of the U.S. Panel. Since Rusk and Vance believe settlement details on the two claims can be worked out jointly following the State Visit, it appears that the work of the U.S. Panel is completed.

I recommend:

That you approve payment of the two claims.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That Ambassador Blair inform Marcos we are ~~sympathetically~~ considering settlement of the two claims, that in return Marcos *must* ~~should~~ drop the other five claims, and that details on the two *may be able* ~~should~~ be worked out jointly after the State Visit.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That the recommendations of the U.S. Panel and terms of settlement of the two claims be embodied in an Executive Agreement.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That the U.S. Panel be discharged from its responsibility.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*Walt* Rostow

Attachments

*changes made by  
President*

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

3118  
106a

August 29, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: State Visit of President Marcos of the  
Philippines--Settlement of Two Philippine  
War Claims

Recommendation

That you authorize Ambassador Blair to inform President Marcos that during his visit to Washington you propose to state to him:

1. That we are sympathetically considering the settlement of two Philippine war claims presented to us by the Philippine panel during the recent veterans talks;
2. That if we do this, President Marcos should drop the other five claims.
3. That because of the technicalities involved, the details of settlement would be worked out after the State Visit by representatives of our two Governments.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Background

1. The United States Panel of the Joint United States-Philippine Veterans Commission which recently held talks with the Filipinos in Manila and in Washington has made a series of recommendations pertaining to Philippine veterans' benefits which are being sent to you under cover of a letter from General Decker, the United States Chairman. Congressman Teague has introduced legislation which if enacted would cost about \$17 million a year.

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Group 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-17

By ing NARA, Date 8-9-90

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-2-

2. In conformity with your instructions, the United States Panel also listened to Philippine presentations on the separate issue of Philippine World War II claims. In a letter of August 6, 1966, to Secretary McNamara, General Decker proposed that Defense study the legal or moral obligation, and the feasibility, of our paying two of the seven claims the Filipinos presented. These are:

a. Some \$39 million in unpaid pay and allowances to approximately 100,000 recognized Philippine guerrillas;

b. Refunding of about \$2.7 million erroneous deductions of three months' advance salary from back pay of certain Philippine veterans.

3. In a memorandum addressed to you, Secretary McNamara concludes that there is an equitable basis for payment of these two claims and that payment can be effected from existing funds without the need for Congressional authorization or appropriation.

4. I share the view that these two claims have a substantial equitable basis. Their settlement at this time would go a long way to remove one of the long-standing irritants in United States-Philippine relations and to help assure the success of the State Visit. It would provide President Marcos, who is deeply and personally involved in the veterans' claims problem, with tangible results of high value and broad appeal in the Philippines.

5. President Marcos is aware that favorable consideration of some of the claims will have been proposed by the United States Panel and is certain to raise the issue with you during his visit September 14-16. I believe you should tell him that any settlement we may be able to work out should be premised on an understanding that he would drop the other five Philippine war claims, which the United States Panel found do not warrant further consideration.\*

---

\*We have assured General Decker, however, that we would inform you of his personal belief, not necessarily shared by the other United States Panel members, that one other Philippine claim--pertaining to back pay for veterans of the Philippine Army during the so-called "parole" period when they were let out of Japanese prison camps--may deserve further scrutiny.

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-3-

6. I further feel you should tell President Marcos at the time of his visit that you are not in position to decide with him then and there on the exact amount of the settlement or on the other principal details that remain to be arranged. These, in addition to exact cost, include:

a. The type of financial settlement, taking into account procedures we are now developing with Treasury to minimize the impact of this settlement, as well as of the additional veterans benefits being proposed, on our balance of payments situation; and

b. To whom and by whom the disbursement should be made in the Philippines in order to ensure to the extent feasible that it reaches the proper recipients.

These details could be settled after the visit by representatives of our two Governments.

7. In order to prepare President Marcos for your discussion with him, I believe it highly desirable that you authorize Ambassador Blair to convey the substance of our views to President Marcos before the latter departs for Washington.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30  
By jm, NARA, Date 7-13-98

25 AUG 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General G. H. Decker, Chairman of the U.S. Panel of the Joint Philippine - U.S. Commission for Study of Philippine Veterans Problems, referred two claims for the consideration of the Department of Defense. These two claims involve (1) the pay and allowances of unpaid recognized Philippine Army guerrillas amounting to about \$39,000,000 and (2) the refund of erroneous deductions of three-months advance salary of Philippine Army personnel which would cost about \$2,700,000.

Claims for Pay and Allowances  
for Recognized Army Guerrillas

In studying this matter we find that the deadline for filing original claims for arrears in pay was June 30, 1948. Recognized guerrilla units and rosters of individuals serving in these units were approved during the period 1945 through June 30, 1948. It appears, therefore, that sufficient time was not allowed for recognized guerrillas or their next of kin to file claims for arrears in pay due them. The situation in the Philippine Islands during the years of reoccupation and for a number of years thereafter was far from normal. No doubt this condition and the high rate of illiteracy in the Philippines resulted in a large number of legitimate guerrilla claims not being filed.

Claims for Erroneous Deductions  
of Three-Months Advance Salary

The Finance Service, Army of the Philippines, made all disbursements to the Philippine Army. The complete pay records of disbursements are therefore in the custody of the Republic of the Philippines. During the past eighteen months a large Philippine task force has extracted individual pay data from these fiscal records and found that erroneous deductions of three-months advance salary were made in 42,000 cases.

Funds Available - No Congressional Action Needed

These claims may be paid without the necessity of legislation. Account No. 21 M 2300 "Expenses, Army of the Philippines - Prior Years," may

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X- 5384

be used for this purpose. Treasury has funds amounting to \$103,000,000 which are available for restoration to this account. The General Accounting Office (GAO) concurs that the 21 M 2300 account may be used for this purpose. They further agreed that the ten-year statute of limitations concerning such claims does not apply in this case. The only caveat the GAO imposed on us, which is not a problem in this matter, is that any payments made under these claims must not be made for any pay and allowances accruing after June 30, 1946. All monies due under these two claims would be for periods earlier than this date.

Balance of Payments Problem


The Departments of State and Treasury have been working on the balance of payments problem with respect to increasing Philippine veterans benefits by legislation now before the Congress. We have informally asked representatives of these departments to consider the balance of payments problem should the two claims under consideration be recognized.

Recommendation and Suggestions  
for Implementing These Claims

In view of these facts I recommend that these two claims be paid.

Should you concur in the payment of these two claims it is suggested that recommendations of the U.S. panel be generally adopted and embodied in an Executive Agreement (see attachment). We have recommended that the State Department give consideration to such an Agreement. The joint communique prepared for release after you have met with President Marcos should be carefully worded concerning these two claims.

It is further recommended that in your conversation with President Marcos that you consider adopting the position that the U.S. Government is sympathetic concerning these two claims, but that the details such as the precise amount of money, the method of payment, and the problems concerning balance of payments must be worked out by our technical staffs. We, of course, will work closely with State and Treasury representatives on these matters.



Attachment

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

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ATTACHMENT

The U.S. panel's position that these claims should be paid only if the Republic of the Philippines agrees to the conditions set forth below should generally be adopted. These conditions are as follows:

- a. That a lump-sum payment be made to the Republic of the Philippines and that Government assume full responsibility for development, adjudication and payments of all claims relating thereto.
- b. That the administrative cost involved under a. above will be borne by the Republic of the Philippines.
- c. That pay and allowances will be granted only to individuals who were not previously paid.
- d. That pay and allowances will be granted only to individuals whose names appear on U.S. approved guerrilla rosters.
- e. That pay and allowances will not be made for a period in excess of that contained on U.S. approved guerrilla rosters.
- f. That the Republic of the Philippines agrees to hold the United States harmless for all future claims, including individual claims, for arrears in pay for the World War II period.
- g. That a program to reopen and consider additional units and individuals for guerrilla recognition should not be undertaken.

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Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30  
By ju, NARA, Date 7-13-88

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JOINT PHILIPPINE - U.S. COMMISSION FOR STUDY  
OF PHILIPPINE VETERANS PROBLEMS

UNITED STATES PANEL

810 VERMONT AVENUE, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20420

~~SECRET~~ NOFORM

August 22, 1966

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson  
The President  
The White House

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Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30  
By fw, NARA, Date 7.13.98

Dear Mr. President:

The Washington meetings of the Joint Philippine-United States Commission for Study of Philippine Veterans Problems were concluded on August 4, 1966. As in Manila, the meetings were conducted in an atmosphere of cordial friendliness. A copy of the Final Joint Communique which expresses the general tenor of the conference is at Tab A.

In accordance with the guidelines established by its terms of reference, the United States Panel has confined its recommendations to those benefits administered by the Veterans Administration which are or would be provided to Philippine Veterans of World War II. Favorable consideration has been given to the broadening and/or extending of the following benefits:

- a. Hospital and Medical Benefits.
- b. War Orphans Educational Assistance.
- c. Veterans benefits to be paid in pesos at the rate of 50¢ for each dollar authorized.
- d. Refund of erroneous National Service Life Insurance premiums.

(Summary of these programs at Tab B.)

The annual cost of these recommended programs in the first full year would be approximately \$17,400,000. The ultimate total cost

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The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson

projected is estimated to be approximately \$425,000,000.

Philippine veterans benefits and war claims have been the subject of much controversy in the past twenty years and the source of some irritation between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States. It is the contention of the Filipinos that those veterans of the Philippine Commonwealth Army, called into the service of the Armed Forces of the United States by Military Order of the President of the United States on July 26, 1941, are entitled to the same benefits as United States soldiers and veterans.

While United States policy toward the Filipino veteran has not granted him complete parity with the United States veteran, it is the opinion of the United States Panel that the treatment afforded the Filipino veterans has been generous. After the liberation of the Philippines, the United States expended more than \$250 million for redemption of guerrilla notes, arrears in pay and other military pay claims. In the area of benefits administered by the Veterans Administration, the United States has paid over \$1 billion to Filipino beneficiaries since 1946. At the current rate of peso exchange, under existing laws the United States will ultimately expend another \$169 million in compensation for veterans and their dependents. In 1955 the United States gave a modern hospital to the Philippines costing \$9.4 million, and since then has provided funds for contract hospitalization and operations assistance totaling \$9.5 million.

The United States Panel has attempted to view the issues in a fully objective manner. The Panel has considered all items presented in terms of the equities involved and in light of current economic considerations. During the deliberations of the Joint Philippine-United States Commission in Manila, the Philippine Panel presented seven claims which relate to World War II active duty pay (Tab C). After thorough consideration it is the opinion of the United States Panel that five of these claims do not warrant further consideration. Four of these five previously have been considered and rejected by our Government.

Two claims, however, appear to have merit and have been referred to the Secretary of Defense for further consideration. They

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The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson

are the Claim for Pay and Allowances of Unpaid Guerrillas and the Claim for Refund of Deduction for 3-Month Advance Salary.

If it is decided to settle the two claims mentioned, the Panel believes that an attempt should be made to obtain President Marcos' agreement to forego any further efforts to obtain payment on other World War II arrears in pay claims and that measures be taken insofar as possible to assure payment to the entitled beneficiaries.

It is our view that with the submission of the accompanying Report the work of the American Panel is complete. I therefore request your instructions concerning the discharge of the United States Panel of the Joint Philippine-United States Commission.



G. H. DECKER  
General, USA (Ret.)  
Chairman

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TAB A

Joint Communique of the Philippine-U. S. Commission for Study of Philippine Veterans Problems. August 4, 1966.

1. At the invitation of President Lyndon B. Johnson, the Joint Philippine-United States Commission for Study of Philippine Veterans Problems met in Washington, D. C. August 2, August 3 and August 4, 1966, to continue the discussions on matters pertaining to Filipino veterans of World War II.
2. The meetings followed meetings of the Commission July 5 through July 8, 1966, in Manila, R. P., at which time the discussions were initiated.
3. The discussions were marked by continued free and candid exchange of views by the representatives of both governments. In a spirit of fairness, mutual respect and regard for each other's interest, it was accepted that the discussions were based on the common desire to strengthen the relations between two friendly nations. It was accepted that there is a sincere desire on the part of representatives of both governments to resolve problems which affect the welfare of Filipino war veterans, widows and orphans and dependents.
4. It is the understanding of both panels that progress was made toward understanding on certain matters discussed.
5. The Joint Commission took cognizance of the following legislative matters before the U. S. Congress:
  - A. Legislation pertaining to the relationship and value of the peso to the dollar in payments of benefits by the U. S. to Filipino veterans, orphans, widows and dependents has been introduced in the U. S. Congress.
  - B. Legislation pertaining to medical care for eligible veterans, liberalizing standards of admittance, and financial support for certain medical training has been introduced in the U. S. Congress.
  - C. Legislation pertaining to refund of erroneous deductions for National Service Life Insurance has been introduced in the U. S. Congress.
  - D. Legislation pertaining to educational benefits for war orphans has been introduced in the U. S. Congress.

6. It was understood that U. S. Legislative action and executive branch approval is necessary before legislation introduced becomes effective. It is further understood that appropriations by the U. S. Congress would be necessary before any of the legislative proposals could be funded.
7. It was understood that the issues outside the prerogative of the U. S. Panel have been referred by the U. S. Panel to the appropriate agencies of the U. S. Government for study and consideration.
8. The Joint Commission will make a report and recommendations to the President of the Republic of the Philippines and the President of the United States, which will be based on reports made by each panel. Recommendations of the U. S. Panel and recommendations of the Philippine Panel will be transmitted to both Presidents for their further consideration.
9. The Joint Commission took special note of the friendly and cordial relationship of the panel members, and of the atmosphere of respect and cordiality that prevailed during the discussions.
10. The Joint Commission commended the technical staffs of the respective panels and the Secretariat for the efficient and effective support of the respective panels.

(Signed)

George H. Decker  
Gen. George H. Decker  
Chairman, U. S. Panel  
Co-Chairman, Joint Commission

(Signed)

Eulogio Balao  
Gen. Eulogio Balao  
Chairman, Philippine Panel  
Co-Chairman, Joint Commission

Washington, D. C.  
August 4, 1966



## TAB B

Hospital and Medical Benefits

We recommend the broadening of eligibility for admission for hospitalization at United States expense at the Veterans Memorial Hospital, Manila, to include non-service connected Commonwealth Army veterans and service connected and non-service connected "new Philippine Scouts." Additionally, we recommend extending entitlement to out-patient treatment at Veterans Memorial Hospital for service connected new Philippine Scouts and funds to upgrade equipment and facilities at Veterans Memorial Hospital. It is estimated that the cost would range from \$723,500 in FY 1967 to \$1,769,000 in FY 1973. Assuming that the enabling legislation (Grants in Aid) continues to be extended as long as entitled beneficiaries survive, the total cost will approximate \$71,000,000.

War Orphans Educational Assistance

We recommend extension of the benefits of the War Orphans Educational Assistance program to the children of those Philippine veterans who died or have become permanently and totally disabled by reason of their service during World War II. The annual cost of extending these benefits to approximately 8,000 eligible children would approximate \$3,000,000 to \$4,000,000 in the first full year. It is estimated the total cost of the program would be \$15,000,000.

Veterans Benefits to be paid in pesos at the rate of 50¢ for each dollar authorized.

Benefits now paid Philippine veterans in pesos are paid at the rate of one peso for each dollar authorized. We recommend that such veterans be paid in pesos at the rate of 50¢ for each dollar authorized. The estimated additional annual cost is \$13,000,000. The ultimate total cost of this program is estimated to be \$338,700,000.

Refund of National Service Life Insurance Premium Deductions

Erroneous deductions of NSLI premiums were made from the arrears in pay of Philippine soldiers at the time of mustering out. We recommend that erroneous deductions be refunded. Until all claims have been presented and examined it is difficult to arrive at an accurate estimate of the total one-time cost of this program. However, it should not exceed \$400,000.

TAB C

WW II ACTIVE DUTY PAY CLAIMS

Claims Warranting Further Consideration

Agenda Item D - Claim for Pay and Allowances of Unpaid  
PA Guerrillas.

Agenda Item H - Refund of Deductions of 3-Month Advance Salary.

Claims Previously Rejected by US and Not Warranting Further  
Consideration

Agenda Item B - Pay Equalization (ExO 22).

Agenda Item C - Straight Payment for "No Casualty Status"  
under the Missing Persons Act.

Agenda Item F - Refund for Emergency and/or Guerrilla  
Notes Deductions.

Agenda Item G - Unpaid Quarters Allowances.

New Claim Not Warranting Consideration

Agenda Item J - Claim for Philippine Scouts.