

Rostow S
60
~~1. [unclear]~~
2. Pres file

Wednesday, September 21, 1966 - 6:00 pm

Mr. President:

As you know, two British territories in South Africa -- Bechuanaland and Basutoland -- become independent countries (Botswana and Lesotho, respectively) within the next two weeks. In the attached, Secretary Rusk recommends that we:

- recognize both states as soon as they become independent;
- make embassies of our present consulates in both countries;
- accredit our Ambassador to Zambia to represent us in Botswana as well; and
- accredit our Ambasaador to Malawi to also handle our affairs in Lesotho.

This is certainly workable and will save us some money. Joe Palmer assures me that it will not be taken as a snub by the two new countries. I recommend that you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve recognition of Botswana and Lesotho ☒ Disapprove ☐

Approve double accreditation of ambassadors ☒ Disapprove ☐

Approve raising U. S. consulates to embassies ☒ Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐

EKHamilton/vmr

3349
602

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 16, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Recognition of Botswana and Lesotho
and Establishment of Embassies at
Gaberones and Maseru

Recommendation:

I recommend that the United States recognize the Republic of Botswana and the Kingdom of Lesotho upon their independence; raise the present Consulates at Gaberones and Maseru to Class IV Embassies on those dates; and accredit also to Botswana Ambassador Robert C. Good who is resident in Lusaka, Zambia and accredit also to Lesotho Ambassador Marshall P. Jones who is resident in Blantyre, Malawi.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The British Protectorate of Bechuanaland is to become an independent republic within the British Commonwealth on September 30, 1966 and will be known as Botswana. The British Colony of Basutoland will become an independent kingdom within the British Commonwealth on October 4, 1966 and will be known as the Kingdom of Lesotho.

It has been decided not to assign Ambassadors to be resident in Gaberones and Maseru for the following reasons:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
declassified after 12 years.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 88-47
By inf, NARA, Date 6-2-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

(1) We believe that our day-to-day relations with Botswana and Lesotho can be handled adequately by our presently proposed resident American staff (one experienced FSO-3, one junior officer and a secretary in each instance).

(2) This arrangement will save residence construction and other expenses that assignment of resident Ambassadors would entail.

(3) This arrangement will accord with that in the Gambia, where we have a Charge in Bathurst and have also accredited to the Gambia the Ambassador to Senegal, who is resident in Dakar.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, September 21, 1966 -- 7:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Tom Lambert, Los Angeles Times, telephoned about your State Department appointments. I backgrounded him on each man.

Hugh Sidey, TIME magazine, telephoned to ask if there was anything in reports that TIME had that we planned a major military escalation in Viet Nam after the election. I said the history of Viet Nam is a history of our responding to their escalation. At the moment, what we were thinking about was how, while dealing with the main force units, to make the total pacification effort more effective on the Vietnamese side and on our own as well.

Max Frankel, New York Times, called to ask if I had any foreign policy articles written by my brother Gene. I told him all I had was a gentle but firm recent reply to a Gaullist paper delivered at a European conference.

As you know, I backgrounded, along with Bob Fleming, some 5 or 6 White House correspondents on your State Department appointments.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

September 21, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Don Hornig is leaving tomorrow afternoon to attend the Centennial of the Romanian Academy. He would very much appreciate your signing the attached letter which he would then deliver to the Romanian Chief of State. The State Department thinks it would be helpful, and another small "bridge building" gesture.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment
As stated

September 21, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

On the Centennial Anniversary of the Romanian Academy, I welcome the opportunity to send you my regards, and extend through you my congratulations and best wishes for the future. I am gratified that my Science Adviser, Dr. Donald Hornig, is able to participate in the Academy's celebration. American scientists recall with pleasure, as do I, that representatives of the Romanian Academy were here in the United States only three years ago, when our own National Academy of Sciences celebrated its Centennial.

Science and scholarship are the common preserves of all minds, and therefore of all men. In this realm we share each others achievements, challenges and opportunities.

A beginning has been made in the exchange of knowledge and ideas between the scholars of our two countries. It is my hope that this undertaking will expand and bear fruit for the benefit of the Romanian and American peoples.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Chivu Stoica,
President of the State Council of the
Socialist Republic of Romania

LBJ:ND:gg

Wednesday, September 21, 1966 -- 5:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

Just so you have it handy, here are the facts about Nick Katzenbach's foreign affairs experience.

Incidentally, he has already talked to Fulbright who was mainly troubled because he wasn't informed in advance; and Bobby Kennedy has agreed to respond to inquiries underlining Nick's role in the Cuba missile crisis and other foreign affairs problems in 1961-64.

1. Nick's major work is something of a modern classic and has been translated into Portuguese, German, Spanish and Japanese. The title: The Political Foundations of International Law, 1961 (co-authored with Morton A. Kaplan). He has also written a book on space law which involves many international problems.

2. He has taught courses and given seminars at Yale and at Chicago in international business problems.

3. In the Department of Defense in 1952 his work with the Air Force was mainly international, involving, for example, the negotiation of air bases with Portugal and France.

4. He was a consultant to the Secretary of State in 1959-60.

5. As you noted, you have consulted him on many international problems, including the problem of the Dominican Republic.

I would say Nick has done a good job of getting this information around, having spoken to Max Frankel and the Washington Post.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file 64

Wednesday
September 21, 1966
1:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Lodge's weekly telegram.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 6414
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12352, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCIA NARS, Date 3-19-86

64a

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Wednesday, September 21, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 6414)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. Pacification

I called a special meeting of the U. S. Mission Council to hear General Weyand's plans for the employment of U. S. troops in the pacification of Long An.

All were favorably impressed by his awareness of the civil factor as distinguished from the purely military. He intends to fight outside of the cities and plans to use artillery and air power in a way so as to avoid injuring civilians. He plans intensive police methods. The camp for our troops will be adjacent to a town because this is one of the few dry places in the area. He hopes that this will not expose the civilians in this town to whatever enemy attack there may be on our troops.

There will be 1,000 U. S. troops who, it is hoped, will be a catalyst for the 8,600 Vietnamese who are already under arms in Long An one way or another -- military and police.

General Weyand was assured of the help of all civilian agencies in the U. S. Mission. In particular, I put him in touch with Everett Bumgardner of USIA, who has intimate knowledge of local politics and people in Long An, who is married to a Vietnamese, and who is about to leave Vietnam.

This operation will be a test in two different ways: First, it will be a test of our ability to pacify a thickly settled area (Long An population is about 400,000, which makes it the most heavily populated province in the Third Corps); second, it will be a test of our ability to operate in an area where the countryside outside of the cities is largely rice paddy and, therefore, largely under water.

Both of these conditions exist in the Delta. As we are considering introducing U. S. troops into the Delta, this gives the Long An operation added interest.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-413

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

By cb, NARA Date 10-21-99

One of the many attractive features of this Long An operation is that, if successful, it will tend to pacify an important area close up to Saigon. For three years I have thought that pacifying the area close to Saigon had special and tremendous value. Indeed, if, having done that, we were then to pacify a few miles to the southwest, we would have eliminated terror in a very small area geographically, but which includes fifty percent of the population of the entire country. The strategic and political consequences of that could be big.

I therefore applaud General Westmoreland's proposal to eliminate forests within a radius of 30 kilometers or so from Saigon where some of the Viet Cong units are based, in hiding. The technique is borrowed from the King Ranch in Texas, using a heavy ball and chain pulled behind a tractor to uproot trees and the so-called "Rome plow" -- another heavy tractor with a sharp blade on the front. U.S. Army engineer units are being formed to do this.

The purpose of these operations will be fivefold:

- A. To clear the forest and to deny it as a hiding area to the Viet Cong;
- B. To prepare land for cultivation; for example, for resettlement of refugees;
- C. To engage in reforestation and forest improvement;
- D. To provide a source of lumber and stimulate the Vietnamese wood industry; and,
- E. To take the branches, twigs, and leafy debris and make charcoal. (In view of Viet Cong control of Camau peninsula, charcoal is quite scarce in Vietnam, and the people much prefer to cook with it.)

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Section B of Lodge's Weekly Telegram

B. Election Aftermath

Many Vietnamese were surprised by the size of the Viet Cong defeat. The Government's ability to protect voters and candidates increased public confidence in the Government of Vietnam. Reports indicate Vietnamese morale is higher than at any time in my service here.

Vietnamese were also surprised by the honesty of the elections. Many had expected that the Government would, as a matter of course, arrange for the election of hand-picked candidates. Our provincial reporters say that people say that this did not happen and that elections were truly free. This was revolutionary for the Vietnamese.

For example, in previous Vietnamese elections, the Government often insured the success of its candidates by ordering Army units to cast their ballots for Government candidates. Sometimes a unit was marched to several different polling stations to cast its vote two or three times. The fact that this apparently did not happen on September 11 is still big news in the Vietnamese market places. Juspao personnel in the Third Corps say that the fact spread rapidly by word of mouth. The failure of many military personnel to vote at all -- sometimes because they were too busy protecting other voters, sometimes because their commanders had neglected to register them -- convinced many people in Long An that this was an honest election. And they are still talking about it.

One important index to an election is how the losers react. Throughout Vietnam only four defeated candidates here challenged the validity of the elections. These challenges, now being examined by regular courts, at worst indicate only isolated instances of improper activity by individual candidates. The challenges reflect no Government effort to control the elections. The Viet Cong are predictably denouncing the elections as a monstrous fraud. Probably in an effort to draw attention away from their failure and the forthcoming Constitutional Convention, the Viet Cong radio on September 16 revealed a "political task conference" of their own, which took place in August.

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

Defensive in tone and full of assertions that the Viet Cong line is "correct" in this "new situation," the broadcast hardly reflects Viet Cong confidence.

The election may have shaken the Viet Cong. They pride themselves on their combined political-military strategy, and they count on us to rely exclusively on military means. They have just suffered a solid political defeat because they tried to use violent criminal means against a political process. There must be many among them who are wondering about the "correctness" of their line.

Juspao reports: "Even though the majority still do not know for what or even for whom they voted, they do know that there is now a real difference between the Government of Vietnam and the Communists. Lurking in the background, however, is a feeling of uneasiness over what the Viet Cong will do in the next election, which many regard as the "important" one, and whether the Government of Vietnam can provide equal security during the approaching rice harvest. The election success and the general stabilization of prices have spread a feeling of optimism throughout the country."

LODGE

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

C. Constitutional Convention

While the carpenters put the finishing touches on the Convention Hall, the local press is advising the successful candidates on what to do, and the newly-elected delegates are trying to form alliances.

There is much discussion on what should go into the Constitution. The delegates, the Government, and the press all seem to favor a strong executive. In most cases this means a preference for a presidential system, though there is a highly vocal minority that sees a parliamentary system as the only insurance against a Diem-style dictatorship. Many of those who are talking presidential system are thinking of combining it with the parliamentary system along the lines in the Korean Constitution. Thinking in the Directorate also seems headed in this direction. I have sent my views in a separate telegram.

Under discussion is the question of whether or not the Constitutional Convention should be transformed into the first legislature when the new Constitution goes into effect. The Government has taken no stand on this issue, probably because they want to see how the Convention performs and also because leaving the question open gives the Government some leverage on the delegates.

Another subject of discussion is Article 20 of the Electoral Law. This is the article which provides that Government modification of the Convention's draft Constitution is binding unless overridden by a two-thirds majority of the Convention. Some delegates-elect have called for a repudiation of the article. In a September 16 speech to the Association of Foreign Correspondents, Ky indicated that Article 20 is a safeguard against the possibility of irresponsible action by the Convention, and he said flatly that it is needed. Reaction to this statement has so far been remarkably subdued.

Much private discussion revolves around the subject of the military's role in any future government. Speculation on whether General Thieu or General Ky will run for president is widespread. Some politicians are focusing on ways to "force" the military to accept a civilian regime. Others are thinking more realistically of ways to fold the military into an essentially civilian regime.

Several are trying to form blocs within the Convention, in particular a southern bloc. The southern movement hinges on the widespread feeling among southerners that the south is not adequately represented in the Government. Note the "Movement for the Renaissance of the South" which put up at least seven lists and won six seats in the election. This organization was put together by Youth Minister Vo Long Trieu and reportedly enjoys the support of Fourth Corps Commander General Dang Van Quang. We are not clear what, if any, relations exists between the "Renaissance" and another southern-based alliance, which the Chairman of the People's Army Council, Tran Van Van, is forming.

D. Economic

Viet Cong activity over the election weekend disrupted shipment of hogs and other foodstuffs to Saigon. The result was a jump of 16 percent in the Saigon Retail Index. Deliveries resumed after the election, and the Index dropped five percent between September 12 and September 16. Vegetable prices continued to rise, however, because of continued Viet Cong roadblocks on Highway 20 to Dalat. Prices of imported goods dropped slightly as compared with last week, while green dollars rose from 166 to 170. Rice prices have been holding steady at a lower level than that which prevailed in July and August. Rice dealers apparently expect a price increase, however, because there is good evidence that they are holding fairly large stocks in the Delta. The Minister of Economy has been meeting with rice dealers but they are asking a price almost nine percent higher than the current market price and so far have offered him only 14,000 tons.

E. Americans and Vietnamese Killed

From September 11 to September 17, the Viet Cong killed 40 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 175, and kidnapped 20. This included three Hamlet Chiefs and one minor village official. We can compare these figures with the period September 4 to 10 when the Viet Cong killed 41 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 185, and kidnapped 21. If we add the 172 Vietnamese military killed in action this week to the 40 Vietnamese civilians killed by the Viet Cong, there were 212 Vietnamese killed in this period. This compares with American losses of 98 killed in action in the same period.

General Weyand told me that in the last seven months in his area, 26 U.S. troops and 36 Vietnamese civilians were killed as a result of human error and accidents. The figures for injured and wounded are 100 soldiers and 68 civilians. General Weyand emphasized that he in no way was proud of these statistics; however, they do show that he is giving the same attention to the protection of Vietnamese civilians that he gives to his own soldiers.

F. Terror

In five incidents since January of this year, the Viet Cong have killed 54 refugees, wounded 97, and kidnapped 11 others in the province of Quang Tin. Their most recent attacks on the Quang Tin refugees took place on September 7 and 9. On September 7 they attacked a resettlement camp within the city limits of the province capital. They killed 4, wounded 8, and left 565 homeless. On September 9 they mortared a refugee camp 40 kilometers north of the province capital, wounding 12 and destroying five homes. In addition to the killed and wounded, a total of 363 homes, one school, and one hospital have been destroyed by these vicious attacks.

G. American Presence in Saigon

As part of an effort to hold down the visibility of the American presence in Saigon, I have started keeping statistics on the numbers of U.S. personnel in this area on a monthly basis and have been pressing to shift more people out to the field. Figures available so far reveal the following trend:

| | <u>January</u> | <u>March</u> | <u>August</u> | <u>September</u> |
|------------------------------|----------------|--------------|---------------|------------------|
| Military and DOD civilians | - | - | 19,588 | 19,673 |
| USAID-contract & direct hire | 470 | 508 | 642 | 685 |
| Juspao | 97 | 98 | 98 | 104 |
| Oatembassy (Includes CIA) | 222 | 249 | 259 | 254 |

Our presence in Saigon continues to rise slightly, although there are a number of actions under way which, I hope will

bring this down in time. The most dramatic improvement will concern the military, who are constructing temporary housing facilities so as to shift their center of gravity out of the city and into the countryside.

LODGE

Wednesday
September 21, 1966
2:55 p. m.

Mr. President:

This collegial letter from Chet
to Gene Locke is both interesting and
represents a good gesture.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12856, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCA NARS, Date 8-19-86

CONFIDENTIAL

65a

New Delhi, India

PERSONAL

September 16, 1966

The Honorable
Eugene V. Locke
Ambassador to Pakistan
American Embassy
Rawalpindi, Pakistan

Dear Gene:

Since our meeting in Bangkok you and I have both been on tenter hooks in regard to future plans for military aid. Although my convictions point in a different direction from your own I do understand your viewpoint and respect your forthright approach to a difficult decision.

Although the relationship between Pakistan and India is hardly what you and I would like it to be there are signs of easing tensions on both sides in the last few weeks. Two days ago in Calcutta I talked with Lt. General Manekshaw who heads India's Eastern Command and found him in an extremely relaxed mood in regard to India's relationship to East Pakistan.

He had recently had a visit with his Pakistani counterpart and reported that everything is going smoothly and even cordially and that there will be no difficulties unless "the politicians on one side or the other stir them up."

Similarly our information here in Delhi indicates that the recent discussions between General Khan and General Kumaramangalam were a very real success. I was particularly pleased since the Indian invitation was the result of our suggestion to the Indian Foreign Secretary that if the atmosphere in Pakistan and India is not ready for a discussion of policy questions at least the top technicians could begin to iron out their problems and that a meeting of the Army Chiefs would provide a good starting point.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

CONFIDENTIAL

By ju, NARA, Date 7-15-98

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

On Tuesday of next week I am leaving for the US for consultations which I find are essential on a twice a year basis. I shall be in Washington about ten days with an additional week devoted to family reunions and personal business.

It occurred to me that immediately after my return in the middle of October, it would be helpful if an exchange of views could take place between our two Missions. Since it would create too much speculation if I went to Rawalpindi or you came to Delhi, I wonder what you would think of Jerry Greene, my Deputy, calling on you and your associates in Rawalpindi? Jerry would be fully informed of my impressions of the Washington situation and he knows the problems of India at least as well as I do. If you feel that this will be helpful, Jerry can come to Rawalpindi anytime between October 19 and 28.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

CONFIDENTIAL

Pres file

Wednesday, September 21, 1966
1:55 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Helms' account of his
briefing of Senators on the study of the
Vietnamese Communist "Will to Persist."

It sounds useful, even if no conversions
were made.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By OCIA NARS, Date 8-19-86



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

20 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT: Senatorial Briefing

1. Pursuant to your call on 2 September, forwarding the President's desire that I brief Senators Mansfield, Russell, and Fulbright on the findings of the "Will to Persist" study, I met with these gentlemen at 9:30 on 19 September, every effort to make an earlier arrangement having been to no avail. Mr. William Darden, Professional Staff Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, was the only other person present [REDACTED]

2. I presented the core of the "Will to Persist" study orally, and answered a variety of questions about force levels, infiltration rates, and related military questions. Then, to make certain that all of the findings had been given proper emphasis, I handed each of the Senators a summary of these points, so that they could read together precisely the same language as was used in the study. When they had finished reading, the discussion began and lasted until 10:30.

3. In point of fact, the three Senators talked largely among themselves, and it was clear that positions which each had previously held about the Vietnamese war failed to be influenced by the material in the study. Senator Fulbright quite clearly remains convinced of two particular viewpoints: (a) He is persuaded that the Vietnamese war was initially a civil war, that it has always been a civil war, and that it has been internationalized by the United States in recent times; (b) He believes that Mendes-France, with whom he said he had talked, pulled the French Government out of Indo-China, not because the French people did not have the will

EO 12958
1.5(c)<10Yrs
EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 98-415

By is, NARA Date 1-28-00

~~SECRET~~

to fight, but because it was the intelligent thing to do in light of economic resources of France which were being "wasted" in an unimportant country of the world. Senator Fulbright voiced the opinion that the Administration should pay attention to Anthony Eden's recent book which Dean Acheson reviewed favorably in THE WASHINGTON POST (the book is entitled "Toward Peace in Indo-China").

4. At another point in the discussion, Senator Fulbright expressed his disagreement with the contention which he claims Secretary Rusk has made, i.e. that the United States military presence in Vietnam is keeping the Chinese from expanding into Southeast Asia. The Senator commented that Communist China is in a bad mess politically and economically and that she is not going anywhere outside her borders for a long time to come.

5. At one point, Senator Fulbright asked me if the purpose of my briefing on the study findings was designed to stop Senator Mansfield and himself from criticizing the Administration's handling of the Vietnamese situation. I replied, "I received no such instructions from the President or anyone else. I was simply asked to present to you gentlemen together the results of this study." Senator Fulbright immediately dropped the issue.

6. Senator Russell stated that he had been interested in the content of the briefing and that he would have by himself come to essentially the same conclusions, although perhaps not couched in such "fine phrases". Senator Mansfield, as he left the gathering, commented that he was particularly pleased to note that the Agency had presented to the President such an objective and thorough report.

7. To summarize, I truly believe that the briefing was useful, but I am equally convinced that it did little to change the views of the three Senators present.

8. Please let me know if you want more detail.

Rich
Richard Helms
Director

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Wednesday
September 21, 1966
11:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

The fault was mine. I should
have arranged direct delivery to the
Hill.

But they did get into the Record.

W. W. Rostow .

672

September 20, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Congressional Statements on Viet-Nam

I got out two statements on Viet-Nam -- in answer to the Republican policy statement -- by 11:30 this morning. They were re-typed and went to Henry Wilson's office at Noon.

I just talked with Dave Bunn who got them about 2:30 p. m. He passed them along to Congressmen Morris and Moss, who both agreed to put them in the Record. Dave thinks there was plenty of time because the House was in session until quite late.

William J. Jordan

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12353, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Oct NARS, Date 8-19-86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Speaker:

There is always a temptation to look for political or personal advantage in the actions of government.

That temptation is particularly acute in an election year.

Yesterday, our Republican colleagues here in this House gave in to that temptation.

They have tried to make personal -- and political -- the determined effort of this country to help the brave South Vietnamese retain their freedom, their independence, and the right to choose their own future.

In doing so, they have ignored facts.

They have slandered brave allies.

And they have paid no attention whatsoever to the actions of a determined aggressor.

They say, for example, that American forces have taken over the major burden of the fighting in Viet-Nam.

What are the facts?

I grant you, Mr. Speaker, that if one reads only our newspapers and looks only at our television, he gets an impression of an almost totally "American" effort.

But I would remind my colleagues that what we read -- and what is really happening -- are often two very different things.

We have about 300,000 American troops in Viet-Nam. They are fighting bravely. They are probably the best trained, best conditioned, and most highly motivated forces we have ever put into the field. And they deserve our full support, our highest praise, and deepest gratitude.

But this is only part of the story, Mr. Speaker.

First, the majority of these forces are not engaged in direct combat. As in any military operation, large numbers of men are required for other duties -- for logistics and supply, for construction, for repair and maintenance -- and for the thousands of other jobs that are part of a military effort.

Second, the Vietnamese have about 600,000 men in uniform and under arms. About half of them are in the regular military forces. Others are in such units as regional and popular forces, in the irregular defense forces, and combat police.

And this large force is based on a population of 15 million -- not 190 million.

I have the figures here of combat casualties for last week.

Let me remind this House that 44 Americans were killed in action in that week.

But 174 Vietnamese soldiers were killed during the same period -- four times as many as the brave Americans who made the ultimate sacrifice.

And let me remind ourselves, too, that these are people who have been fighting for many years.

Yet still they fight -- still they die -- still they struggle on.

And I would remind the House that we and the Vietnamese are not fighting alone. Our Korean allies have a division in Viet-Nam and are sending another. On a per capita basis, they will soon have more men in Viet-Nam than we have.'

The Australians have sent a regiment. The New Zealanders are helping. And in the past week, Filipino forces have begun to arrive. Thailand -- even though it is fighting its own battle against Communist subversion -- is helping with air transport and training.

It is quite true -- as we all know -- that our effort in Viet-Nam has expanded.

But why has it been necessary, Mr. Speaker?

The truth is that the North Vietnamese aggressors have greatly expanded their efforts over the past year to conquer the South. Regular units of the North Vietnamese army have been moving into the South.

And our President has expanded our efforts to meet that increased threat. He has acted in response to the request of our commander in the field -- General Westmoreland -- who has asked for more.

And we have responded, too, to the request of our Vietnamese allies.

They have seen the increased danger. They have acted to repel the attack. And they have asked for help.

We have given it.

In short, our President and our Government have acted to meet a grave threat. They have done no less than was necessary -- and no more.

For the President's policy has been -- is -- and will remain -- to do what is required to beat back aggression and to leave the South Vietnamese free to make their own future.

He has acted with firmness -- but he has acted with restraint.

And in time the wisdom of this course will be apparent to all.

Mr. Speaker:

Advice is cheap -- and easy.

Men who do not carry the burdens of responsibility have little trouble in telling us what should be done.

Men who do not have all the facts can lay out a course of action that sounds good.

It is awfully tempting to sit in the grandstand -- and tell the coach where he made his mistake on the last play.

Yesterday, our President and his advisers got a good deal of unsolicited advice on how to conduct the war in Viet-Nam.

It was a Monday -- and the Monday morning quarterbacks were busy.

The trouble -- one trouble -- is that yesterday's advice is not the same as last week's -- or last year's.

First, the critics say that we are doing too much.

Then, in almost the same breath, they say we are not doing enough.

They complain at the size of the American involvement.

Then, they say that we should have done more sooner.

They tell us they do not want a wider war. But they then suggest that perhaps we should do some things that would make such a wider war more likely.

They know that our enemy is counting on our impatience.

But then they ask why we can't get the job done quicker.

They complain about the past.

But when it comes to the future -- they are strangely silent about just exactly what should be done.

They say we have to find a way to end the war "more speedily." But we must do it, Mr. Speaker, "at a smaller cost."

That, I submit, is demagoguery of the worst sort.

What is their fast -- and cheap -- solution?

There is no answer.

Do they propose that we now double our effort?

No answer.

Or do they think we are doing too much?

No answer.

What it all adds up to, Mr. Speaker, is an effort to turn a national effort to short-run political advantage.

And, in my opinion, it merely reinforces the impression in Hanoi and in Peking that we are truly impatient -- and that we have no confidence in what we are doing.

It only adds to their hope that if they stick it out, we will finally look for an easy way to withdraw.

Well, I think they are wrong.

And I trust that the men in Hanoi will look to what we are doing -- and what we intend to do -- rather than listen to the political statements.

And I am confident that the American people will do the same.

They are wiser than our Republican colleagues seem to think.

They know there is no fast, sure and cheap road to success -- in war -- or in politics.

Pres file

Wednesday
September 21, 1966
11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Bill Jorden reports on your
impact on Ne Win.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCAT NARS, Date 8-19-86

68a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 20, 1966

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Ne Win

A cheerful note!

Ne Win was so pleased with his visit to the U.S. that on departure (from Honolulu) he said he would be very happy if Gene Black could visit him when he goes to Asia -- to discuss economic and other problems.

After Black, Ne Win would be pleased to have a visit from CINCPAC!!!

The President must really have had an impact.

Bill
William J. Jorden

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-44

By ij NARA, Date 6-7-89

Wednesday, September 21, 1966
7:55 a. m.

Mr. President:

Here -- for your clearance -- is Arthur Goldberg's draft speech for tomorrow, Thursday, September 22.

Sec. Rusk has gone over it carefully and cleared it.

The key passages on Viet Nam and China (sidelined in red) do not go beyond existing policy.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, September 20, 1966, 8:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to invite George Ball and his wife to the Erhard dinner next Monday. They are not now on the list. Since it may be the last official White House function while George is still in the Government, it would be a nice gesture to have him there. (I assume Bess Abell will receive enough cancellations to make this possible.)

For 3

Francis M. Bator

Yes _____

No _____

Tuesday
September 20, 1966
5:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

I forward this draft which
Spurge Keeny did at Bill Moyers'
request.

W. W. Rostow

Dear Dr. Larson:

I want to express my appreciation for your letter of September 12, forwarding me the "Statement on the Non-Proliferation of Atomic Weapons" by the Educational Committee to Halt Atomic Weapons Spread.

I share with you and your Committee a deep concern about the spread of nuclear weapons which I consider to be one of the most serious problems of our time.

I sincerely hope that we can achieve agreement on a Non-Proliferation Treaty that will contribute to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. As I stated recently, I believe that we can find acceptable compromise language on which reasonable men can agree.

I trust that you and your distinguished group of colleagues will continue your interest in this most important problem.

Sincerely,

Dr. Arthur Larson, Chairman
Educational Committee to
Halt Atomic Weapons Spread
345 East 46th Street
New York, New York 10017

LBJ:SMKeeny:jb:9-19-66

Tuesday
September 20, 1966
5:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

We now have direct and
reasonably responsible notes on what
Ch'en Yi really said to the Japanese
delegation. Highlights attached.
Key passage marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 20, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recent Statements of Chinese Communist Foreign Minister

Embassy Tokyo has cabled an account of an interview given September 6 by Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi to a Japanese Diet Delegation visiting Peking. Highlights of Ch'en's statements (based on full notes by Japanese present, but not necessarily verbatim):

U.S. has taken exceedingly cruel measures towards China up to the present. America has pushed against China 90, 100, 120 times. China has given ground 10, 20, 40 times but we cannot be patient any longer . . . America has ignored China's lawful position in the United Nations, has plotted to injure our economy by setting up the Coordination Committee on East-West Trade Controls and has sought to strangle China economically . . . Constantly intruded into China's territorial air space and seas . . . We cannot remain silent in face of this sort of thing . . . America is encroaching step by step on China and is trying to roll back China.

The Cultural Revolution is part of preparation for war. It is so that no back-stabbing (may) emerge when America comes to attack China . . . The direct effect of the great Cultural Revolution is to eliminate forces which would cooperate with the United States if the latter came to attack China.

In regard to Japan-China friendship . . . we hold firmly to the principle that politics and economics are indivisible. On this basis we would like a normalization of Japan and China diplomatic relations.

We are not thinking about opening a new route apart from the Warsaw Talks for Sino-American negotiations. That also would be ineffective. However, I am not too pessimistic about Sino-American relations. I believe there is a basis for Mr. Kosaka's statement "The United States will probably not attack China" . . . the United States is afraid of China, and China is a bit afraid of the United States. No matter who may become President of the United

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- 2 -

States they will probably not invade present-day China. We will not attack from our side. We do not engage in reckless adventures . . . we are always preparing against American aggression but I do not know whether the U.S. will really come to attack us or not. Every day I read about ten American newspapers and listen to the Voice of America. I think (Sino-American relations) will be solved at some time. Solution of problems by China and the U.S. would mean solution of other problems of the world. The problem at present is that the U.S. is trying to force China to surrender through the use of force. There are a host of problems in Sino-American relations and it would be difficult to resolve them at one stroke.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Jorden

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SEPT 17

REFERENCE: STATE 49095

NSC 1. FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATED TEXT REQUESTED REF TEL. PAREN-
 INR THETICAL COMMENTS ETC. ARE IN ORIGINAL UNLESS MARKED EMBASSY
 CIA COMMENTS.

NSA 2. ESSENTIALS OF MEETING WITH FONMIN CH'EN I: PLACE: FONMIN'S
 DOD OFFICE, STATE COUNCIL BUILDING TIME: 9:00-11:40 A.M. (CHINA
 NIC TIME), SEPT 6 (TUESDAY). PARTICIPANTS CHINESE SIDE: CH'EN
 ACDA I, LIAO CHENG-CHIH, WANG HSIAO-YUN, HSIAO HSIANG-CH'EN AND
 RSR OTHERS; JAPANESE SIDE: ALL MEMBERS OF DIET DELEGATION VISITING
 CHINA.

3. EMBASSY COMMENT: (THIS PARAGRAPH IS REPORTER'S NOTE INSERTED
 IN DIFFERENT-COLORED INK.) THIS IS GENERAL SUBSTANCE, AND IS
 BULK OF CHEN I'S STATEMENTS. THERE IS SOME VARIATION IN
 MODE OF EXPRESSIONS BUT I THINK IT CONVEYS MEANING ACCURATELY.
 MOREOVER, REPRESENTATIVES FURUI AND KOSAKA TOOK UP MAIN
 POINTS AT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH JAPANESE NEWSPAPER CORRES-
 PONDENTS STATIONED AT PEKING, BUT MANY POINTS ARE STILL
 UNPUBLISHED, SO PLEASE KEEP THIS IN MIND.

4. CH'EN I: I WELCOME YOUR EXCELLENCIES. ALL OF YOU ARE TO
 MEET WITH PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI SUBSEQUENTLY, SO I WOULD LIKE
 TO LAY GROUND WORK FOR YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH PREMIER CHOU.
 I WILL SAY AS MUCH AS I CAN ABOUT SUBJECTS WE DISCUSS TODAY
 AND ASK YOU TO TAKE UP WHAT I LEAVE OUT WHEN YOU TALK WITH
 PREMIER CHOU. BY THE WAY, IS MY OLD FRIEND MATSUMURA KENZO
 IN GOOD HEALTH?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines & NLS 88-43

By FW, NARA, Date 7-15-98~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- TOKYO 272, SEPTEMBER 17 (SECTION I OF VIII)

5. FURUI: MATSUMURA IS IN VERY GOOD HEALTH. HE WAS KIND ENOUGH TO COME TO SEE US OFF AND ENCOURAGE US WHEN WE TOOK OFF FROM HANEDA. HE SENDS HIS SPECIAL REGARDS TO YOUR EXCELLENCY CH'EN I.

6. GH'EN I: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

7 FURUI: IT HAS NEVER HAPPENED BEFORE THAT EIGHT DIET MEMBERS OF LDP, INCLUDING FORMER CABINET MINISTERS, VISITED CHINA TOGETHER. OUR BASIC DESIRE IS TO ASCERTAIN TRUE FACE OF CHINA AT PRESENT. THIS IS FIRST VISIT TO CHINA FOR SEVEN AMONG OUR GROUP. WE BELIEVE THAT LEARNING TRUE SITUATION OF CHINA IS ABOVE ALL FOUNDATION OF CHINESE-JAPANESE FRIENDSHIP.

8. CH'EN I: THAT IS VERY FINE AND I WELCOME YOU. I FEEL WE HAVE OBLIGATION TO ASSIST ALL OF YOU IN HAVING GOOD LOOK AT PRESENT STATE OF CHINA, IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AT PRESENT, THERE IS ON ONE HAND TENDENCY TO PRAISE CHINA EXCESSIVELY AND ON OTHER THERE ARE PEOPLE WHO TAKE MALICIOUS ATTITUDE WITHOUT KNOWING FACTS. WE ARE NOT AT ALL AFRAID. THEREFORE, WE ARE MUCH HONORED TO HAVE FAMOUS PEOPLE LIKE YOU SEE CHINA. WELL THEN, ASK YOUR QUESTIONS. I WILL NOT ASK ANY QUESTIONS.

9. FURUI: WE WERE NOT THINKING OF ASKING JUST ONE OR TWO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS. WE WOULD INSTEAD LIKE TO KNOW ABOUT CHINA'S BASIC PROBLEMS; FOR INSTANCE, PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, BASIC PROBLEMS OF DOMESTIC CONSTRUCTION, ETC.

10. CH'EN I: YOU MENTIONED PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS BUT WHAT SHALL I TALK ABOUT?

11. KOSAKA: TAKING YOU AT YOUR KIND WORD, WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE VERY FRANK MUTUAL DISCUSSION. JAPAN AND CHINA HAVE HISTORY OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS FOR MORE THAN 1,000 YEARS. FEELING OF FRIENDSHIP AND AFFINITY EXISTS BECAUSE OF MANY FACTORS IN CULTURE, CUSTOMS, ETC RECENTLY FEELING OF DESIRE TO PROMOTE FRIENDSHIP IN SOME WAY HAS GREATLY STRENGTHENED. VISITING CHINA AT PRESENT TIME, OUR INTEREST IN "GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION" IN PARTICULAR HAS BEEN MUCH STRENGTHENED. EVEN ADMITTING THAT THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG AND SOCIALIST STRUCTURE MAY BE CONSIDERED MOST SUITABLE TO CHINA, OUR JAPAN IS CAPITALIST COUNTRY. OF COURSE THERE ARE VARIOUS DEFECTS IN CAPITALISM BUT WE ARE TRYING TO IMPROVE THESE ONE BY ONE. I WOULD LIKE TO ASK WHAT CHINA THINKS OF BANDUNG SPIRIT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. EMMERSON
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 4:25 A.M., SEPT 17

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, USIA, 4:25 A.M., SEPT 17

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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REFERENCE: STATE 49095 (CONTINUED)

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12. CH'EN K: YOU HAVE RAISED GOOD QUESTION. I UNDERSTAND YOUR INTEREST AND WILL TAKE UP THIS QUESTION. WE BELIEVE PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE POSSIBLE EVEN AMONG COUNTRIES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN OUR THOUGHT ON THIS. NOTHING IN BOOKS, MAGAZINES, NEWSPAPERS, ETC. WHICH WE PUT OUT HAS MEANING OF OPPOSING PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE. AS YOU KNOW, IT WAS NOT OUR FAULT THAT SECOND ASIA-AFRICA CONFERENCE COULD NOT BE OPENED. SOME PEOPLE TRIED TO DRAG SOVIET UNION INTO THIS CONFERENCE AND PLOTTED ANTI-CHINA ACTIVITIES. FURTHERMORE, THEY TRIED TO BRING PUPPET COUNTRIES

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PAGE 2 RUALOT 2072D/2 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OF THE US INTO CONFERENCE AND TRIED TO BOYCOTT CHINA AND BRING UN SECGEN U THANT FORCIBLY INTO CONFERENCE. WE RECOGNIZED HOW DANGEROUS THIS SORT OF DEALING WAS AND I THINK IT WAS UNAVOIDABLE FOR US TO PUT STOP TO IT. HOW ON EARTH CAN SOVIET UNION BE BROUGHT INTO AA CONFERENCE? THIS WOULD BE JUST LIKE BRINGING CHINA INTO **MIDDLE** OF EUROPE. NEVERTHELESS THEY TRIED TO BRING SOVIET UNION IN BY FORCE. BRITAIN AND FRANCE USED TO HAVE LOTS OF COLONIES IN ASIA AND THEY STILL HAVE SOME. ACCORDING TO LOGIC OF THOSE PEOPLE IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO BRING ENGLAND AND FRANCE AS WELL TO AA CONFERENCE. WE WILL NOT YIELD TO THIS SORT OF PLOTTING. WHY SHOULD REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND SOUTH VIETNAM PARTICIPATE IN AA CONFERENCE? IF THEY PARTICIPATED, DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WOULD ARISE AND CONFERENCE WOULD SPLIT UP. ALL COUNTRIES OF THIS SORT REPRESENT US AND BRITAIN AND IN THIS WAY PRINCIPLE OF AA CONFERENCE WOULD DISAPPEAR. NEVERTHELESS, SOME PEOPLE TRIED TO GET THEM INTO CONFERENCE. IN ADDITION THEY TRIED TO HAVE SECGEN U THANT TAKE PART IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-2- Tokyo 2072, September, (Section II of VIII)

PAGE 3 RUALOT 2072D/2 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
OPENING CEREMONY OF SECOND AA CONFERENCE. UN IS EXCLUDING CHINA.
THERE IS NO REASON FOR CHINA TO HAVE SEC GEN U THANT TAKE PART.
HIS ROLE IS OBVIOUS. HE WOULD STIR UP NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
UNDER INFLUENCE OF US AND SOVIET UNION. CHINA CANNOT YIELD TO
US AND SOVIET UNION EVEN IF IT MEANS DESTROYING THE WHOLE
BUSINESS. I THINK THAT YOU JAPANESE PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND THIS
POINT IF YOU LOOK AT IT FROM OUR POSITION. IT IS WRONG THAT
ONLY WHAT US AND SOVIET UNION SAY SHOULD BE ACCEPTED WHILE
STATEMENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES ARE NOT. TO PUT IT BLUNTLY,
THEIR STRENGTH COMES ONLY FROM FACT THAT THEY HAVE NUCLEAR
BOMBS. APART FROM THAT WHAT ON EARTH SORT OF CIVILIZATION
DO THEY HAVE? CHINA'S ACTIVITIES SAVED AA CONFERENCE. CHINA
PROTECTED PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE. CHINA PERFORMED MERITORIOUS
SERVICE. IN SITUATION OF THAT SORT WORLD PEACE CANNOT BE
THOUGHT OF. AT PRESENT UN IS DISCREDITED AND SERVES NO USEFUL
PURPOSE. HOWEVER, AA CONFERENCE STILL HAS MEANING. BUT THEY
ARE TRYING TO BORE INTO THIS TOO. THE LARGE COUNTRIES ARE

PAGE 4 RUALOT 2072D/2 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
TRYING TO PUSH THE SMALL COUNTRIES AROUND, BUT THEIR PLOTS
WILL EVENTUALLY END IN FAILURE. CHINA HAS NO THOUGHT AT ALL
OF FOREIGN POLICY OF TRYING TO PUSH OTHER COUNTRIES AROUND.
I ONLY SPEAK FRANKLY AND I AM VERY BAD AT DIPLOMACY. IF CHINA
TRIED FOREIGN POLICY OF PUSHING PEOPLE AROUND IT WOULD CER-
TAINLY FAIL. IMMEDIATELY AFTER END OF SECOND WORLD WAR PRES-
TIGE OF US WAS STILL HIGH BUT NOW ITS PRESTIGE IS STEADILY
DECLINING. SOVIET UNION SAME. US AND SOVIET UNION ARE NOW
PLOTTING TO CONTROL THE WORLD.

13. SOVIET UNION FIRST LOST ITS PRESTIGE IN CHINA. THEY
ATTEMPTED TO INTERFERE IN CHINA'S POLITICS, ECONOMY, CULTURE
AND EDUCATION. THEREFORE WE SWEEPED THEM
OUT COMPLETELY. WE BELIEVE THAT THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG IS COM-
pletely CORRECT WAY OF THINKING FOR US CHINESE PEOPLE, BUT
WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF FORCING IT ON FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
THIS IS BECAUSE SUCH FORCING, EVEN IF IT SUCCEEDED FOR A WHILE,
WOULD NOT SUCCEED IN LONG RUN. FROM FORTY-FIVE YEARS AGO WE

PAGE 5 RUALOT 2072D/2 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
HAVE TAKEN UP MARXISM-LENINISM AND FOUGHT FOR IT. THIS
IDEOLOGY WAS NOT FORCED ON US BY ANYBODY. WE TOOK IT UP
OURSELVES. IF ANY OF OUR FRIENDS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES ARE IN-
TERESTED IN THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG WE WELCOME THEM. WE TELL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-3- Tokyo 2072, September 17, (Section II of VIII)

PEOPLE OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAT WHETHER OR NOT THEIR COUNTRY ADOPTS THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG (SOCIALISM) SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AUTONOMOUSLY. THERE IS NO CHANGE ON THIS POINT SINCE MR. FURUI VISITED CHINA BEFORE. HOWEVER, WE CANNOT CO-EXIST WITH AMERICAN IMPERIALISM BUT WE CAN CO-EXIST WITH COUNTRIES OF ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA. AMERICAN IMPERIALISM IS OCCUPYING TAIWAN. MOREOVER IT IS SABOTAGING OUR CONSTRUCTION OF CHINA AND INTERFERING WITH OUR OBTAINING OUR LAWFUL POSITION IN THE UN. IT IS CONTINUING AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM. THEREFORE CO-EXISTENCE IS IMPOSSIBLE. ALL THIS IS FAULT OF AMERICA. IT IS NOT OUR RESPONSIBILITY. I HAVE SAID THIS INNUMERABLE TIMES. CERTAINLY AMERICA IS POWERFUL COUNTRY. EMMERSON

Note: Advance copy to S/S-O, 09/17/66, 4:40 a.m.

Passed White House, USIA, 09/17/66, 4:40 a.m.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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L ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION THREE OF EIGHT TOKYO 2072

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SEPT 17

AF REFERENCE: STATE 49095 (CONTINUED)

NEA HOWEVER, CHINA IS NOT WEAK. IF AMERICA EVER COMES TO ATTACK
IO CHINA, IT IS FINE. WE WILL FIGHT TO THE END. I HAVE HEARD SOME
P OF YOU HERE SAY THE FOL: WOULD IT NOT BE BETTER FOR CHINA TO
NSC YIELD 10PERCENT AND OBTAIN THE REMAINING 90PERCENT I BELIEVE
INR THIS REFERS TO VIETNAM PROBLEM. THE VIETNAM PROBLEM IS PROBLEM
CIA FOR THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. IN REGARD TO VIETNAM WE WILL HELP
NSA VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO FIGHT TO END AGAINST AMERICAN IM-
DOD PERIALISM, BUT IT IS MISTAKEN TO THINK IN TERMS OF WHETHER WE
NIC WILL NEGOTIATE OR NOT NEGOTIATE ON THE VIETNAM QUESTION.
ACDA AT PRESENT THERE IS MISTAKEN WAY OF THINKING IN FOREIGN

RSR PAGE 2 RUALOT 2072D /3 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
COUNTRIES. THAT IS THAT IN REGARD TO SOLUTION OF VIETNAM PRO-
BLEM PEACE CANNOT BE OBTAINED BECAUSE CHINA IS STANDING IN
BACK OF VIETNAM. THIS IS MALICIOUS WAY OF THINKING WHICH TRIES
TO SPLIT CHINA AND VIETNAM. THINGS CONCERNING VIETNAM MUST BE
DECIDED BY VIETNAMESE PEOPLE THEMSELVES. CHINA DOES NOT HOLD
THE KEY TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM. VIETNAMESE PEOPLE SAY THAT
THEY WILL FIGHT TO THE END RESISTING AMERICAN IMPERIALISM.
HOWEVER, IN VIETNAM HO CHI MINH AND PREMIER PHAM VAN DONG,
ETC. IN EARLIER STAGE OF CHINESE REVOLUTION TOOK PART IN CHINESE
REVOLUTION AND WERE KIND ENOUGH TO SHED MUCH BLOOD FOR US.
WITH THIS SORT OF HISTORICAL CONNECTION HOW COULD WE REMAIN
SPECTATORS? WITHOUT ANY CONNECTION WITH MARIXM-LENINISM AND
THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG, LONG TIME AGO MENCIUS SAID THAT WHEN
THERE IS A FIRE AT YOUR NEIGHBOR'S GIVE THEM HELP. WE HELPED
KOREA AT TIME OF KOREAN WAR AND NOW IT WOULD BE OUT OF
QUESTION NOT TO HELP VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. WE ARE SUPPORTING
MOVEMENT IN JAPAN FOR ABOLITION OF SECURITY TREATY. THIS IS NOT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- Tokyo 2072, September 17, (Section III of VIII)

PAGE 3 RUALOT 2072D/3 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IF AMERICA SHOULD GAIN UPPER HAND IN VIETNAM IT WOULD BE TERRIBLE THING. FIRES OF WAR WOULD PROBABLY SPREAD TO CHINA AS WELL. IN THAT CASE FIRE WOULD SPREAD TO ALL PARTS OF ASIA AS WELL. WE ARE AIDING VIETNAM IN ORDER TO PRESERVE PEACE. WE ARE IN FAVOR OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE. RECENTLY US IS LOSING ITS PRESTIGE AND THIS IS BECAUSE IT IS FAILING IN VIETNAM.

14. US HAS TAKEN EXCEEDINGLY CRUEL MEASURES TOWARD CHINA UP TO PRESENT. AMERICA HAS PUSHED AGAINST CHINA 90, 100, 120 TIMES. CHINA HAS GIVEN GROUND 10, 20, 40 TIMES BUT WE CANNOT BE PATIENT ANY LONGER. RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA HAVE BEEN IN BAD SITUATION FOR FORTY YEARS UP TO NOW. SINO-JAPANESE WAR LASTED FOR EIGHT YEARS. HOWEVER, MILITARISM WILL PROBABLY NOT REVIVE IN JAPAN. AFTER SECOND WORLD WAR AMERICA INCITED CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND LIT FIRE OF CHINESE CIVIL WAR. HAPPILY, AMERICA AND CHIANG KAI-SHEK WERE DEFEATED AND CHINA WAS LIBERATED. THEREAFTER AMERICA BEGAN KOREAN WAR, AND THEY SENT TROOPS TO TAIWAN AND PUT TAIWAN UNDER OCCUPATION SITUATION. HAPPILY KOREAN WAR ENDED IN (EMBASSY COMMENT: THEIR) DEFEAT

PAGE 4 RUALOT 2072D/3 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BUT THEY HAVE IGNORED CHINA'S LAWFUL POSITION IN UN, HAVE PLOTTED TO INJURE OUR ECONOMY BY SETTING UP COCOM AND HAVE SOUGHT TO STRANGLE CHINA ECONOMICALLY.

15. REGARDING JAPAN-CHINA TRADE, ALTHOUGH IT SHOULD BE NATURAL FOR TRADE TO GO ON, THEY HAVE INTERFERED WITH IT AND OPOSED IT REPEATEDLY. WHO ON EARTH GAVE THEM RIGHT TO OPPOSE IT? DO THEY THINK THAT CHRIST OR MOHAMMED GAVE IT TO THEM? IN 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENTS WERE CONCLUDED BUT US RAPIDLY BEGAN ACTIONS WHICH VIOLATED THEM. MOREOVER, THEY ALSO VIOLATED SECOND GENEVA AGREEMENTS OF 1962 AND AMERICA'S AIRCRAFT CONSTANTLY INTRUDE INTO CHINA'S TERRITORIAL AIR SPACE AND ITS WARSHIPS CONSTANTLY INVADE CHINA'S TERRITORIAL SEAS. FAR FROM DRAWING BACK, AMERICA CONSTANTLY AGGRESSES AGAINST CHINA. YESTERDAY (SEPT 5) AMERICAN AIRCRAFT BOMBED CHINESE MERCHANT SHIP. WE CANNOT REMAIN SILENT IN FACE OF THIS SORT OF THING. PRESENT IS NOT SITUATION FOR CHINA TO YIELD GROUND TO AMERICA. AMERICA IS ENCROACHING STEP BY STEP ON CHINA AND IS TRYING TO ROLL BACK CHINA.

(THEN HE WENT ON TO GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- Tokyo 2072, September 17, (Section III of VIII)

PAGE 5 RUALOT 2072D /3 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

16. GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION IS INEVITABLE THING FOR US. IT IS PART OF PREPARATION FOR WAR. IT IS SO THAT NO BACK-STABBERS EMERGE WHEN AMERICA COMES TO ATTACK CHINA, OR IF THERE ARE BACK-STABBERS THEY WILL BE KEPT TO MINIMUM. WE OF COURSE HAVE NO INTENTION OF ATTACKING JAPAN OR ALL OF YOU. PREVIOUSLY CHINA AND JAPAN MET IN MUTUAL SLAUGHTER BUT THIS WAS RESPONSIBILITY OF JAPANESE LEADERSHIP FACTION OF THAT TIME-- NOT RESPONSIBILITY OF MASSES OF PEOPLE. I WOULD NOT WANT TO SEE MUTUAL SLAUGHTER AGAIN APPEAR IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS. I WANT TO RAISE HIGH BANNER OF SINO-JAPANESE FRIENDSHIP. HOWEVER, I MUST TELL YOU FOLLOWING STORY. AT TIME OF SINO-JAPANESE WAR PUPPET GOVT OF WANG CHING-WEI WAS SET UP NORTH OF WANG CHAO ROAD IN SHANGHAI. SO THAT SECOND WANG CHING-WEI WOULD NOT BE SET UP IN SAME MANNER IF US SHOULD COME TO ATTACK CHINA--FOR THIS PURPOSE WE MUST MAKE SUCCESS OF GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION. EMMERSON

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0, 09/17/66, 5:35 a.m.

Passed White House, USIA, 09/17/66, 5:35 a.m.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SAL REFERENCE: STATE 49095 (CONTINUED)

AF
EUR GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION IS GRADUALLY ACHIEVING SUCCESS IN
NEA ELIMINATING SUCH DANGER. GREAT MAJORITY OF CHINESE PEOPLE SUPPORT
IO THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG AND CONSEQUENTLY ARE SUPPORTING AC-
P TIVITIES OF RED GUARDS. DIRECT EFFECT OF GREAT CULTURAL RE-
NSC OLUTION IS TO ELIMINATE FORCES WHICH WOULD COOPERATE WITH
INR US IF LATTER CAME TO ATTACK CHINA.

CIA 17. MR. KUO MO-JO AND MO-JO AND MR. LIAO CHENG-CHIH ARE
NSA SPLENDID DIPLOMATS. (CH'EN I LOOKED AT LIAO WHO WAS PRESENT
DOD AND EVERYONE LAUGHED.) PERHAPS LIAO CHENG-CHIH OBJECTS TO
NIC
ACDA

RSR PAGE 2 RUALOT 2072D/4 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THIS BUT SINCE I AM VERY FRANK I SAID IT EVEN WITH HIM HERE.
PLEASE DO NOT TELL KUO MO-JO THAT I SAID HE WAS FINE DIPLO-
MAT (EVERYBODY LAUGHED)

18. ACCORDING TO JAPANESE NEWSPAPER REPORTS IT SEEMS THERE
ARE VARIOUS CRITICISMS IN JAPAN OF GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION.
THAT IS INEVITABLE. ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT, QUESTION WAS
RAISED WHETHER GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION WAS NOT AIMED AT
WORLDWIDE REVOLUTION. FROM STANDPOINT OF MARXISM-LENINISM IT
IS HISTORICAL INEVITABILITY THAT SOCIALISM WILL REPLACE
CAPITALISM JUST AS CAPITALISM REPLACED FEUDALISM. FOR EXAMPLE,
GREAT FRENCH BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION SWEEPED AWAY FEUDALISM AND SOVIET
OCT REVOLUTION VANQUISHED "BOURGEOIS-ISM" LET ME TELL YOU A
JOKE AT THIS POINT.

19. WHEN WE PASS ON FROM SOCIALIST STRUCTURE TO COMMUNIST
STRUCTURE WE PEOPLE OF TODAY WILL BE RIGHTIST FIGURES. IN
OTHER WORDS, WE WILL BE CONSERVATIVES. SOME DECADES FROM NOW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- Tokyo 2072, September 17, (SECTION IV OF VIII)

WE WILL PROBABLY BE REGARDED AS A RIGHTIST FACTION. THIS IS PRINCIPLE OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. HOWEVER, QUESTION WHETHER VARIOUS COUNTRIES RETAIN CAPITALIST STRUCTURE OR ADOPT

PAGE 3 RUALOT 2072D/4 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SOCIALIST STRUCTURE IS FOR PEOPLE OF THOSE COUNTRIES TO DECIDE. THEY CANNOT OBTAIN IT BY OTHER FOREIGN COUNTRIES BRINGING IT IN. IN PARTICULAR IT CANNOT BE FORCED ON THEM BY ARMED STRENGTH AS AMERICA TRIES TO DO.

20. AMERICA'S STUPID IDEA IS TO ATTEMPT TO FORCE SYSTEM ON FOREIGN COUNTRIES BY FORCE OF ARMS. SOVIET UNION DOES NOT GO AS FAR AS AMERICA BUT THEY INTRODUCE REVISIONISM AND TRY TO FORCE IT ON PEOPLE. IT IS GOOD TO LEAVE QUESTION WHETHER CAPITALISM IS GOOD OR SOCIALISM IS GOOD TO CHOICE OF COUNTRY CONCERNED. I REPEAT, AT PRESENT PEOPLE OF CHINA ARE CHOOSING STRUCTURE OF SOCIALIST SYSTEM. IT IS ALSO FACT THAT WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. WE HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH PRINCE SIHANOUK, WITH AYUB KHAN OF PAKISTAN AND WITH KING OF AFGHANISTAN, AND MUTUALLY DISCUSS COEXISTING IN PEACE. CHIANG KAI-SHEK HAD GREAT ARMY OF 4 MILLION AND HAD AMERICAN AID IN ADDITION, BUT HE WAS DEFEATED BY US. WE DO NOT INTERFERE MILITARILY IN OTHER COUNTRIES BY ARMED FORCE.

PAGE 4 RUALOT 2072D/4 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
21. FIRST PRINCIPLE OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY IS SOLVING PROBLEMS THROUGH MUTUAL DISCUSSIONS ON BASIS OF EQUALITY. QUESTION OF WHETHER FOREIGN COUNTRY HAS CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY OR IS CAPITALIST OR SOCIALIST IS SOMETHING FOR PEOPLE OF THAT COUNTRY TO DECIDE.

22. IF GREAT MAJORITY OF PEOPLE OF CHINA HATED SOCIALISM, WE COULD NOT HELP WITHDRAW. MOREOVER, IF WE CANNOT BRING IMPROVEMENTS IN CLOTHING, FOOD, HOUSING AND OTHER ASPECTS OF CULTURAL EXISTENCE AND ALSO TO SPIRITUAL LIFE, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH SOCIALIST STRUCTURE FIRMLY.

23. OF COURSE, WE AND JAPAN ARE IN DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES. WE BELIEVE SOCIALISM IS HISTORICALLY INEVITABLE BUT WHETHER VARIOUS COUNTRIES ADOPT SOCIALISM OR NOT IS FOR PEOPLE OF THOSE COUNTRIES TO DECIDE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- Tokyo 2072, September 17, (SECTION IV OF VIII)

24. AT PRESENT SOVIET UNION IS PUSHING FORWARD REVISIONISM AND IS RETREATING TO CAPITALISM. TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA AND VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE ARE ALSO RETREATING TO CAPITALISM. CAPITALISM IS ON THE UPSWING (EMBASSY COMMENT: WRITER OF LETTER INSERTED PARENTTICAL QUESTION MARK AT THIS

PAGE 5 RUALOT 2072D/4 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
POINT.) HOWEVER, IN CHINA POSSIBILITY OF RETURN TO CAPITALISM HAS BEEN REDUCED THROUGH GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION. HOWEVER, I CANNOT SAY WITH ASSURANCE IT WILL BE KEPT IN CHECK MERELY AS IT IS. (DURING BRIEF REST PERIOD HAJIME FUKUDA WAS INTRODUCED AS HOLDER OF 5TH RANK IN GO).

25. CH'EN I: AT PRESENT IT IS AS IF CHINA WAS PLAYING GO WITH AMERICAN IMPERIALISM. FOR CHINA AND JAPAN TO WIN AT THIS GAME OF GO LET US MAKE TWO "EYES" OF JAPAN AND CHINA. THEN IF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM CAN ONLY MAKE ONE "EYES" OF JAPAN AND CHINA. THEN IF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM CAN ONLY MAKE ONE "EYE" I THINK IT WILL BE EASY. EMMERSON
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 6:13 a.m., September 17, 1966

NOTE: Passed White House, USIA at 6:13 a.m., September 17, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION FIVE OF EIGHT TOKYO 2072

SEPT 17

REFERENCE: STATE 49095 (CONTINUED)

26. IN ORDER FOR SOCIALISM TO REPLACE CAPITALISM MANY EFFORTS MUST BE CARRIED ON. FOR EXAMPLE, LET US LOOK AT CASE OF FRANCE. FRANCE IS ONE OF REPRESENTATIVE COUNTRIES OF CAPITALISM. IT ADVANCED TO CAPITALISM WHEN PEOPLE LIKE ROUSSEAU AND MONTESQUIEU APPEARED. FRANCE IS ADVANCING FROM CAPITALISM TO IMPERIALISM AND HAS BECOME 4TH REPUBLIC. FORTY YEARS AGO WHEN WE STUDIED IN FRANCE, MONARCHIST PARTY STILL REMAINED IN FRANCE. AS FRANCE HAS TAKEN CAPITALIST ROAD, IT HAS ENGAGED IN THREE GREAT WARS UP TO NOW (FRANCO-PRUSSIAN, 1ST AND 2ND WORLD WARS). AS LONG AS FRANCE IS ON CAPITALIST ROAD IT CANNOT AVOID SUCH WARS.

27. UNITED STATES HAS TAKEN CAPITALIST ROAD SINCE 1760 AND NOW IS BECOMING IMPERIALIST SUPER-POWER OF WORLD. DURING THIS PERIOD IT HAS EXPERIENCED CIVIL WAR AND VARIOUS OTHER WARS AND

RSR

PAGE 2 RUALOT 2072D/5 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ASRKT 1 A L
PRESIDENTS HAVE BEEN ASSASSINATED SIX TIMES. IN PRESENT DAY AMERICA FEUDALISM IS STRONG IN THIRTEEN SOUTHERN STATES AND THERE ARE KKK ORGANIZATIONS, AND ANTI-HUMANISM WHICH PLOTS MASSACRE OF BLACK PEOPLE.

28. AT PRESENT EVEN AMERICA IS NOT PERFECT CAPITALIST COUNTRY. EVEN THOUGH THERE IS DEMOCRACY IN PART OF AMERICA, IN PART THERE IS NOT DEMOCRACY. IN ENGLAND CAPITALISM ADVANCED RELATIVELY SMOOTHLY BUT DURING THIS PERIOD THEY HAD GREAT REBELLION OF CROMWELL ETC. IN ADDITION, THEY PUT WEALTH OF COLONIES INTO THEIR POCKETS.

29. IN REGARD TO JAPAN, I AM NOT TOO WELL INFORMED, BUT IF I CAN ASK YOU TO EXCUSE WHAT I HAVE TO SAY, IN TIME SINCE JAPAN TOOK CAPATALIST ROAD IT HAS PAID MANY BLOOD SACRIFICES, IN RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ETC. ALL COUNTRIES HAVE SUFFERED MANY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- Tokyo 2072, September 17, (Section V of VIII)

CASUALTIES FOR SAKE OF MAINTAINING CAPITALIST SYSTEM.

30. HOWEVER, IN PRESENT DAY CHINA WE MUST EXPERIENCE MANY STRUGGLES FOR SAKE OF FIRMLY ESTABLISHING THIS SOCIALISM IN 1957 IN CHINA THERE WAS GREAT COUNTER-OFFENSIVE OF CAPITALISM. THIS WAS SOMETHING THE VARIOUS DEMOCRATIC PARTIES STIRRED

PAGE 3 RUALOT 2072D/5 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UP, AND JOINING HAND WITH AMERICA THEY TRIED TO BLOCK SOCIALISM. (EMBASSY COMMENT: FIRST LETTER ENDS AT THIS POINT, NUMBERED PAGE 9. SECOND LETTER PICKS UP AT NUMBERED PAGE 10 AS FOLLOWS:) THEY ALSO TRIED TO CHANGE CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY BASICALLY.

31. GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION THIS TIME IS ALSO BIG STRUGGLE, STRUGGLE AGAINST REVIONISTS. THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO FOLLOW ROAD OF SOVIET REVISIONISM.

32. IN SOVIET UNION KRUSHCHEV REVIONISM APPEARED AT TIME OF STALIN'S DEATH. HOWEVER IN CHINA IT HAS ARISEN ALTHOUGH CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG IS STILL ALIVE. IT MAY ARISE AGAIN IN FUTURE. THEREFORE WE ARE CONSTANTLY PAYING ATTENTION TO EXTERNAL SITUATION.

33. US ATTEMPTED TO ENCOURAGE REVIONISM INSIDE CHINA BUT THIS ENDED IN FAILURE. THIS TIME THEY ARE TRYING TO LAUNCH ATTACK FROM OUTSIDE. GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION IS PRECISELY COUNTER-ATTACK AGAINST THIS. AT PRESENT THIS MOVEMENT OF GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION IS SUCCEEDING. POLITICAL CONTROL IS BEING STABILIZED AND FOREIGN POLICY IS NOT CHANGING. IF REVIONISTS

PAGE 4 RUALOT 2072D/5 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
REPENT AND CORRECT THEIR OWN MISTAKES MAO TSE-TUNG IS GRANTING THEM CHANCE FOR NEW LIFE. THIS IS IN ORDER TO AVOID BEFOREHAND THE CASUALTIES WHICH WOULD RESULT IF AMERICA COMES TO ATTACK CHINA WITH THE CONSEQUENT BLOODY TRAGEDY. GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION IS WHAT WILL ACCOMPLISH THIS. PROGRESS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY AND POSSIBLE THROUGH GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION. WE CAN ALSO PROMOTE HISTORY, LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER FIELDS OF STUDY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-3- Tokyo 2072, September 17, (Section V of VIII)

34. IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES THEY ARE SAYING THAT THROUGH GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION CHIN'S ANCIENT CIVILIZATION WILL ALL BE DESTROYED TO THE PRESENT ARE BEING RESPECTED. THOSE PARTS WHICH ARE NOT ARE BEING REFORMED. THIS IS UNAVOIDABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS BIG STATUE OF LION IN FRONT OF STATE COUNCIL BUILDING WHERE YOU NOW ARE BUT IT WAS MOVED OUT OF COMPOUND BY RED GUARDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION. GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION CONSISTS OF CRITICIZING FORMS OF EVERYTHING IN SOCIETY.

35. EVEN IN CHINA CAPITALISTS EXIST IN WORLDS OF HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. WHEN THEY ARE FAMOUS THEY HAVE

PAGE 5RUALOT 2072D/5 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THEIR FOLLOWERS WRITE ARTICLES AND SO ON AND THEY PUT THE ROYALTIES IN THEIR OWN POCKETS. DISCIPLES WHEN THEY BECOME FAMOUS TRY TO COURT THE FAVOR OF THEIR MASTERS. PEOPLE WHO HAVE BECOME CAPITALISTS OF THIS SORT TRY TO HOLD DOWN PROMISING NEWCOMERS. WHEN A FLOWER IS UNDER A STONE AND CANNOT GROW IT IS NECESSARY TO REMOVE THE STONE. KUO MO-JO, WHOM YOU ALL KNOW, DOES HIS WRITING HIMSELF AND IS NOT CAPITALIST. BUT HE HAD ARTICLE OF SELF-CRITICISM PUBLISHED IN UNIVERSITY NEWSPAPER. OF COURSE HE IS NOT PUTTING ANY ROYALTIES IN HIS POCKET.
EMMERSON

Note: Advance copy to S/S-O, 09/17/66, 6:37 a.m.

Passed White House, USIA, 09/17/66, 6:37 a.m.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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L ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION SIX OF EIGHT TOKYO 2072

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SAL SEPT 17

AF REFERENCE: STATE 49095 (CONTINUED)

NEA 36. QUESTIONS EVEN COME UP IN REGARD TO PEOPLE IN POSITIONS
IO LIKE MY OWN. A CERTAIN CABINET MINISTER HAD HIS SECRETARY
P WRITE A MANUSCRIPT AND MADE NO CONTRIBUTION HIMSELF. PEOPLE OF
NSC THIS SORT SHOULD BE PULLED DOWN FROM THEIR PLACES. ALSO AMONG
INR PEOPLE OF OFFICE DIRECTOR CLASS THERE ARE SOME WHO PASS OFF
CIA WHAT SHOULD BE THEIR OWN DUTIES TO THEIR SUBORDINATES. THIS
NSA BUREAUCRATISM MUST BE REFORMED.
DOD 37. IT IS POSSIBLE FOR BUREAUCRATISM AND CAPITALISM TO
NIC EXIST EVEN IN SOCIALIST STRUCTURE. THROUGH PRESENT GREAT
ACDA CULTURAL REVOLUTION WE CAN PUT STOP TO THIS BUREAUCRATISM
RSR AND TO CAPITALISM AND REVIONISM AS WELL. I THINK THIS SOCIALISM
OF CHINA IS GOOD THING FOR SAKE OF WHOLE WORLD. IT WAS

PAGE 2 RUALOT 2072D/6 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
RECENTLY PROPOSED THAT MOVING GOVT AGRICULTURE MINISTRY OFFICES
TO FARMING VILLAGES, INDUSTRY MINISTRY OFFICES TO URBAN IN-
DUSTRIAL AREAS, ETC. MIGHT BE GOOD IDEA. IN SUCH CASE WHERE
ON EARTH SHOULD OUR FOREIGN MINISTRY MOVE TO? IT WOULD
NOT DO TO PUT IT IN PEOPLE'S COMMUNE AND WE SIMPLY CAN'T
LOCATE IT ANYWHERE EXCEPT PEKING, BUT I BELIEVE THAT EVEN IN
FOREIGN MINISTRY WE MUST FROM TIME TO TIME GO INTO FARMING
VILLAGES AND CITIES AND INCREASE CONTACT WITH FARMERS AND WOR-
KERS.

38. GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION WILL NARROW AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE
GAP BETWEEN PEOPLE AND GOVT. IT IS NECESSARY TO ELIMINATE PHE-
NOMENON OF RICH PEOPLE GETTING RICHER AND POOR PEOPLE GETTING
POORER. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ELIMINATE COMPLETELY DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN CITIES AND FARMING VILLAGES. WORKERS AND FARMERS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-2- SECTION SIX OF EIGHT TOKYO 2072, SEPTEMBER 17
OR WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS AND MANUAL LABORERS, BUT WE MUST GREAT-
LY EXTENT OF THESE DIFFERENCES. IT IS SAID OF COAL MINERS THAT
IF THEY WORK TEN YEARS IT MAKES THEIR LIVES TEN YEARS
SHORTER. WE MUST SOLVE THIS SORT OF PROBLEM.

PAGE 3 RUALOT 2027D/6 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

39. THIS GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION WILL CONTINUE SEVERAL
DECADES MORE. IT HAS JUST BEGUN. IF WE DO NOT GO AHEAD TO
DO AS I SAID, SOCIALISM WILL END UP RETREATING INTO CAPITALISM
AND REVIONISM. SOVIET UNION AND COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE
SHOULD ALSO HAVE GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION?

40. AT PRESENT IT IS SOVIET UNION WHICH IS MOST UPSET AT SEEING
CHINA'S GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION. DURING PAST FEW YEARS
NUMBER OF ANTI-CHINA WRITINGS APPEARING IN SOVIET UNION HAS
REACHED 10,000 VOLUMES (MEANING 10,000 PERSONS
ARE WRITING). THIS IS EVEN MORE THAN IN U.S. IN INVESTIGATING
ABOUT HUNDRED OF THESE WRITINGS WE FIND THAT FAMOUS AUTHORS,
BEST KNOWN (EMBASSY COMMENT: NEXT WORD ILLEGIBLE PROBABLY
"CHESS PLAYERS") MOVIE DIRECTORS, FAMOUS PHILOSOPHERS, CHAIRMEN
OF KHOLKHOZ, GOVT OFFICE DIRECTORS, ETC. HAVE TENS OR
HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF RUBLES IN THEIR BANK ACCOUNTS.
HERE IS THE SECRET.

41. THE SOVIET PEOPLE AGREE WITH CHINA'S GREAT CULTURAL
REVOLUTION. THAT IS BECAUSE THEY DO NOT HAVE TENS OR HUNDREDS
OF THOUSANDS IN SAVINGS. IN CHINA SOME PEOPLE SUCH AS

PAGE 4 RUALOT 2072D/6 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SCIENTIFIC AUTHORITIES, FAMOUS WRITERS, ETC. ALSO HAD SUBSTAN-
TIAL SAVINGS. THESE PEOPLE SEEK REVIONISM AND LOOK FORWARD
TO AMERICAN INVASION. I DO NOT HAVE SAVINGS SO I CAN SLEEP
EASILY AT NIGHT. IN THIS GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION IT IS OUR
POLICY TO STOP OR REDUCE INCOME OF HIGHER PAID PERSONS. AND
BUREAUCRATIC OFFICIALS WILL BE REMOVED FROM THEIR POSTS.
I AM MOST CONCERNED ABOUT THE LOW LEVEL OF THE LEADERS OF
FARMERS AND WORKERS. THUS CHINA HAS ITS HANDS FULL WITH ITS
OWN AFFAIRS. THEREFORE CHINA DOES NOT HAVE LEISURE TO INTERFERE
IN AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. IF ONE CANNOT HANDLE ONE'S
OWN MATTERS WELL HOW SHOULD HE TAKE CARE OF OTHER PEOPLES'
MATTERS?

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-3- SECTION SIX OF EIGHT TOKYO 2072, SEPTEMBER 17

42. I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK A BIT IN REGARD TO JAPAN-CHINA FRIENDSHIP.

1. EVEN IN MIDST OF GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION, CHINA WOULD LIKE TO PRESERVE JAPAN-CHINA FRIENDSHIP.

2. WE HOLD FIRMLY TO PRINCIPLE THAT POLITICS AND ECONOMICS ARE INDIVISIBLE.

43. ON THIS BASIS WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE EFFORTS FOR REALIZING NORMALIZATION OF JAPAN-CHINA DIPLOMATIC RELATION. WE ARE

PAGE 5 RUALOT 2072D/6 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISSATISFIED WITH FACT THAT SATO CABINET IS UNFRIENDLY. I DO NOT FORGET. AT TIME OF IKEDA CABINET, SATO, THEN OPPOSING IKEDA POLICY, SAID TO OUR MR. NAN HAN-CHEN THAT HE, HIMSELF, AGREED WITH PRINCIPLE THAT ECONOMICS AND POLITICS WERE INSEPARABLE. BUT WHAT HAPPENED? ONCE HE BECAME PRIME MINISTER HE TURNED TO OPPOSITE VIEW. AND HE IS FOLLOWING AFTER AMERICAN IMPERIALISM. WE DO NOT HAVE ANY EXPECTATIONS OF SATO CABINET.

4. AT PRESENT THERE IS APPEARANCE OF UNITED STATES, SOVIET UNION AND JAPAN DEALING WITH CHINA IN THREE COUNTRY ALLIANCE. VISIT OF FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TO JAPAN AT END OF LAST MONTH WAS SIGN OF THIS. I THINK IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR JAPAN NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN JAPAN-US-SOVIET TRI-LATERAL ALLIANCE. IT WOULD NOT DO FOR JAPAN AND CHINA TO MEET AGAIN IN MUTUAL SLAUGHTER. EMMERSON

BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE, USIA 79/17/66, 8:10AM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action 0 170603Z SEPT 66 1 5 5 7 0
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G ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION SEVEN OF EIGHT TOKYO 2072

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H REFERENCE: STATE 49095 (CONTINUED)

SAL WE HOPE THAT THESIS PUT FORWARD BY MR. MATSUMURA WILL WIN OUT.
AF

EUR 45. MR MATSUMURA'S STANDPOINT AND OUR STANDPOINT DIFFER
NEA IN IDEOLOGY BUT MR. MATSUMURA IS JAPANESE PARTIOT AND
IO I AM CHINESE PATRIOT; THEREFORE, MR. MATSUMURA AND I CAN DISCUSS
P MATTERS. TO PARTICIPATE IN US-JAPAN-SOVIET ALLIANCE IS DAN-
NSC GEROUS THING. WE WARMLY WELCOME VISIT OF ALL OF YOU TO CHINA.
INR WE ARE BASING OURSELVES AS BEFORE ON BANDUNG SPIRIT.

CIA 46. RECENTLY, I MET GROUP OF YOUNG FRENCHMEN. AT THAT TIME THESE
NSA FRENCH YOUTHS WERE VERY EAGER, SAYING THAT WHEN THEY GOT BACK
DOD TO THEIR COUNTRY THEY WERE GOING TO CARRY OUT A GREAT CULTURAL
NIC

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RSR PAGE 2 RUALOT 2720/7 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
REVOLUTION. I EXPRESSED OPPOSITION. WHY? BECAUSE POLICE OF YOUR
COUNTRY WOULD NOT LOCK ON QUIETLY, I TOLD THEM.

47. GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION IS ONLY A MEANS OF STRENGTHENING
THE POLICIES WHICH CHINA HAS FOLLOWED UP TO NOW. WE SUPPORT
THE VIEWS OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE CALLING FOR ABOLITION OF BASES.
UNITED STATES IS STILL STATIONING FORCES IN JAPAN 20 YEARS AFTER
THE WAR. BUT JAPAN SHOULD BE ABLE TO DEFEND ITS OWN COUNTRY
BY ITSELF BY NOW. MISSILES IN OKINAWA ARE POINTED IN DIRECTION
OF PEKING AND SHANGHAI. THIS MATTER DOES NOT MEAN WE ARE IN-
TERFERING IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF JAPAN. WE DEAL WITH THIS MATTER
AS PROBLEM CONCERNING OURSELVES. THERE IS PROVERB "DO NOT DO
TO OTHERS WHAT YOU DO NOT WANT DONE TO YOURSELF". THIS IS
WORTH REMEMBERING CAREFULLY.

48. THINGS THAT RED GUARDS SAY DO NOT BECOME NATIONAL POLICY.
POLICY IS SOMETHING DECIDED BY GOVT OF COUNTRY. IN FOREIGN COUN-
TRIES THEY ARE SAYING THAT RED GUARDS ARE FOR PURPOSE
OF ATTACKING UNITED STATES BUT THEY ARE NOT FOR THAT PURPOSE.

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-2- (SECTION SEVEN OF EIGHT) TOKYO 2072, SEPTEMBER 17

MR. KOSAKA DELIVERED STATEMENT ON SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS.)

49. CH-EN I: I WILL ALSO MAKE STATEMENT WITHOUT PARTIALITY.

IN REGARD TO WARSAW TALKS BOTH UNITED STATES AND CHINA DESIRE TO CONTINUE THEM. IF WE DID NOT HAVE DESIRE TO DISCUSS

PAGE 3 RUALOT 2072D/7 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THINGS PEACEFULLY WE WOULD ALREADY HAVE CALLED OFF THE TALKS.

50. CHINA HAS ALWAYS CONSISTENTLY TAKEN ATTITUDE OF SOLVING THINGS THROUGH DISCUSSIONS. PROBLEM IS THAT AMERICA HAS NOT DISCUSSED THINGS. AS FOR PRACTICAL PROBLEMS, AMERICA IS SENDING TROOPS TO VIETNAM. THEY ARE NOT EVEN WITHDRAWING THEIR FORCES FROM VIETNAM WHICH IS THE MINIMUM PROBLEM. (WITH REGARD TO WHAT MR. KOSAKA HAD SAID) I DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE FEELING THAT THE JAPANESE PEOPLE HAVE TOWARD UNITED STATES, SO I WILL NOT CRITICIZE IT; BUT UNITED STATES IS COMPLETELY BARBARIC COUNTRY.

51. WARSAW TALKS HAVE ALREADY CONTINUED FOR OVER 10 YEARS, ALSO AT 1962 GENEVA CONFERENCE I MYSELF WENT THERE AND NEGOTIATED WITH THE AMERICANS. EVEN AT THAT TIME, ALL PRINCIPAL POLICIES OF UNITED STATES WERE STEERED BY HOSTILITY TOWARD

PAGE 4 RUALOT 2072D/7 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CHINA. KEY TO CHANGE IN SITUATION IS ON AMERICAN SIDE.

52. THUS WE ARE NOT THINKING ABOUT OPENING A NEW ROUTE APART FROM THE WARSAW TALKS ETC. FOR SINO-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS. THAT ALSO WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE.

53. HOWEVER, I AM NOT TOO PRESSIMISTIC ABOUT SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. I BELIVE THERE IS BASIS FOR MR. KOSAKA'S STATEMENT "THE UNITED STATES WILL PROBABLY NOT ATTACK CHINA". THAT IS BECAUSE YOU ARE CLOSER TO UNITED STATES THAN WE ARE. TO TELL TRUTH, UNITED STATES IS AFRAID OF CHINA, AND CHINA IS A BIT AFRAID OF UNITED STATES. NO MATTER WHO MAY BECOME PRESIDENT OF UNITED STATES THEY WILL PROBABLY NOT INVADE PRESENT DAY CHINA. WE WILL NOT ATTACK FROM OUR SIDE. WE DO NOT ENGAGE IN RECKLESS ADVENTURES. OF COURSE, VICTORY AND DEFEAT IS ANOTHER QUESTION. ACCORDING TO POLITICAL PRINCIPLES ONE CANNOT WIN BY MILITARY MEANS WHILE LOSING SYMPATHY OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES. CHINA DOES NOT, IN FACT, HAVE POWER TO ATTACK U.S.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-3- (SECTION SEVEN OF EIGHT) TOKYO 2072, SEPTEMBER 17

54. GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION AIMS AT SWEEPING OUT PEOPLE WHO DO NOTHING. WE PERSONNEL OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS BECAUSE

PAGE 5 RUALOT 2072D/7 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OF OUR FREQUENT CONTACTS WITH PEOPLE OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES HAVE TENDENCY TO BECOME SOMEWHAT DISSIPATED INDIVIDUALS. THERE-
FOR, PERSONNEL OF FOREIGN MINISTRY ALSO MUST GO OUT INTO FARM VILLAGES AND FACTORIES AND INCREASE THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE PEOPLE. IF PEOPLE ENJOY LUXURIES, GREED WILL EMERGE.

55. WE ARE ALWAYS PREPAREING AGAINST AMERICAN AGGRESSION BUT I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER U.S. WILL REALLY COME TO ATTACK US OR NOT. EVERYDAY I READ ABOUT 10 AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS AND LISTEN TO VOICE OF AMERICA. WE CARRY ON RE-
SEARCH ON PROBLEMS OF UNITES STATES WITH GREAT EAGERNESS. YOU EXPRESS GREAT CONCERN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS MAY CONTINUE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION AND I FEEL SAME WAY ON THIS POINT, BUT I THINK THEY WILL BE SOLVED AT SOETIME. SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS BETWEEN CHINA AND U.S. WOULD MEAN SOLUTION OF OTHER PROBLZMS OF WORLDS. (7)

56. BUT PROBLEM AT PRESENT IS THAT U.S. IS TRYING TO FORCE CHINA TO SURRENDER THROUGH USE OF FORCE. THERE ARE A HOST OF

PROBLEMS IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE THEM AT ONE STROKE. AT LEAST I CAN SAY THAT THE FIRST THING IS TO GET U.S. TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM VIETNAM. EMMERSON

BT NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE, USIA AT 8:40 AM 9/17/66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUMJDH/AMCONGEN HONG KONG IMMEDIATE
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REFERENCE: STATE 49095 (CONTINUED)

57. UNITED STATES ~~ALREADY~~ HAS SENT 280,000 MEN AND SAY THEY WILL SEND 500,000 BY END OF THIS YEAR. THUS, NOT ONLY VIETNAMESE PEOPLE BUT ALSO UNITED STATES IS SUFFERING NUMEROUS CASUALTIES. AND THEY SAY THEY WILL HAVE 700,000 MEN BY FALL OF NEXT YEAR AND INCREASE TO 1,000,000 BY END OF THAT YEAR. WHEN THEY ARE PUTTING IN THIS SIZE FORCE AGAINST VIETNAM WHICH ONLY HAS 14 MILLION PEOPLE, IF THEY ATTACKED CHINA WITH ITS 700 MILLION PEOPLE HOW MANY TROOPS WOULD THEY EXPECT TO PUT IN?

58. PERSON WHO TIED THE BELL ON SHOULD BE THE ONE WHO TAKES THE BELL OFF.

PAGE 2 RUALOT 2072D/8 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

59. IN AMERICA TODAY THERE ARE TWO FACTIONS CONCERNING VIETNAM PROBLEM. ONE OF THEM IS FACTION WHICH DESIRES TO PUSH FORWARD WITH AGGRESSION: THE OTHER IS FACTION WHICH FAVORS GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL.

(AT THIS POINT, AT 11:40 AM, CONFERENCE WAS CUT OFF EVEN THOUGH IT HAD BEEN PROMISED THAT IT WAS ALL RIGHT TO CONTINUE UNTIL ABOUT 12:30.) EMMERSON

BT NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE, USIA AT 8:25 AM 9/17/66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, September 20, 1966 -- 6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Saturday, September 17, 1966

Tom Lambert, Los Angeles Times, came in to discuss Viet Nam. He did most of the talk. He explained as nearly as he could see the logic of the situation called for Hanoi to change its position and begin to probe for a negotiation on the best terms possible. He noted: they were getting nowhere in the South militarily; their political stock in the South was falling as well as on the world scene; they were hurting in the North; their great ally China was seized by a fit of madness. I said that was indeed the logic but it was unclear how logical they were, notably in the light of their doctrine of protracted war in which they prided themselves on their ability to sweat it out longer than us. He asked if we had any indications they were willing to negotiate. I said that from all the contacts we still had no such indication.

Joseph Newman came in to present an idea he has about Cuba. He wants to go there and write about Castro. He believes that Castro must be so afraid of being pushed out by the Russians in favor of more orthodox Communists and so disillusioned with his whole experience that he would settle for being a national revolutionary, break up his ties to Russia, and give up trying to foment insurrection in the rest of Latin America. I said this was an interesting hypothesis but I knew of no evidence for it. Thus far he was a man much more interested in guerrilla warfare than in growing sugar; but we look carefully for any sign of change.

Monday, September 19, 1966

Marquis Childs was in to discuss China. I gave him some unclassified evidence on what is going on in various Chinese cities, and referred him to our China watcher, Al Jenkins.

Tuesday, September 20, 1966

Joseph Kraft telephoned this morning. He asked about the Erhard visit. I elaborated the view expressed in your Lancaster, Ohio, speech that we wanted all changes in the Alliance to come about through collective judgment and collective action.

Herbert von Borch, DIE WELT, Germany. This German came in to get the background on the Erhard visit. He asked about the nuclear issue. I said I did not know what matters Chancellor Erhard would raise but talked along the lines of Sec. Rusk's recent press conference. With respect to the financial and troop issues, I explained why we felt it was important that all decisions in these fields should be multilateral rather than bilateral.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

74

Tuesday
September 20, 1966
5:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

More China series.

These [] letters give
a worm's eye view of the mess in
China.

We have many reports that the
food situation is tightening up badly.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EO 12958 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-14
By us, NARA, Date 7-30-04

SANITIZED

74a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 20, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Adverse Reactions to Mao's Cultural Revolution

1.3
(a)(5)

Recent [REDACTED] of letters from the China mainland include the following glimpses of the meaning of the Cultural Revolution to the Chinese man-in-the-street:

From a letter from Shihch'i, Kwangtung, July 30, 1966: "I have sad news for you. Because of the current great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, people in Shihch'i are told to give up their religion. They say religion is superstitious thinking and feudal thinking which opposes Mr. Mao's ideology and the current campaign. They want people to throw out the Buddhas, statues and ancestral tablets from their homes, communes and temples. All the temples have been raided and smashed. They want me to turn out our Buddha and ancestral tablet too. I don't know what to do. I tried to argue with them, for according to our national law people have freedom of religion . . . I also told them that you are a nun and Buddha means much to you, but they don't care . . . Please write to me as soon as possible and tell me what I should do . . ."

From a letter from Shanghai, July 28, 1966: "Today is my weekly day off but I couldn't sleep late for there is a big shortage of daily food in Shanghai lately. People get up very early to try to get some vegetables and meat . . . The recent campaign has just been carried out at our factory . . . This is the most serious and severe campaign I have seen since the liberation. Don't worry about me, I will be very careful . . ."

From a letter from Nanhai, Kwangtung, August 1, 1966: "Small group meetings on the campaign here were held five times a week for two or three hours a session . . . The factory workers did not suffer from any pressure in the meetings, but Party and Youth League members among them did, out of fear of being purged . . . Most of the workers were not the least bit interested in the campaign. They tried to participate as little as possible, particularly since the main targets were Party and Youth League members."

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Jorden

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 88-44

By WJ, NARA, Date 6-7-89

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 20, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Adverse Reactions to Mao's Cultural Revolution

EO 12958 1.5(c)<10Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

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W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ

98-416

By is, NARA Date 1-31-00~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

74c
ROUTINE

IN 85808

PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC
EXO DDI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

301334Z

CITE

EO 12958 1.5(c) <10Yrs

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) >25Yrs

(C)

DIST 30 AUGUST 1966


COUNTRY: CHINA

DOI: JUNE-AUGUST 1966

SUBJECT: ADVERSE REACTIONS TO SOCIALIST CULTURAL REVOLUTION

ACQ:

SOURCE:



BATOR
BOWDLER
BOYD
BUDGET

JENSON
JORDON
KERRY
KORNEY
MOYERS
TAYLOR
WRIGGINS

EO 12958 1.5(c) <10Yrs

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) >25Yrs

(C)

1. (SUMMARY) LETTERS FROM KWANGTUNG INDICATE THAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 98-415

By is, NARA Date 1-28-00

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

RELIGIOUS OBJECTS WERE BEING SMASHED IN SHIHCH'I IN LATE JULY AS PART OF THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THAT STUDENTS IN NANHAI HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE CAMPAIGN WOULD END TEMPORARILY ON 18 AUGUST FOR A ONE-WEEK SUMMER VACATION. THE WRITER OF THE LETTER ABOUT RELIGIOUS MATTERS TRIED TO ARGUE WITH THE AUTHORITIES PLEADING THAT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM WAS LAW IN CHINA. A SHANGHAI CORRESPONDENT, IN COMMENTING ON FOOD SHORTAGE THERE, NOTED THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION WAS THE MOST SERIOUS AND SEVERE SINCE 1949. A REFUGEE FROM CANTON REPORTS CROWDS HAD TO BE CALMED BY POLICE WHEN ONE WOMAN BEING STRUGGLED WAS KICKED BY CADRES DURING A CAMPAIGN MEETING. CAMPAIGN MEETINGS IN A FACTORY IN SHUNTE, KWANGTUNG, WERE ATTENDED LISTLESSLY BY WORKERS.)

2. FROM A LETTER FROM SHIHCH'I (N 22-22, E 113-36), KWANG-
TUNG, DATED 30 JULY 1966: " I HAVE SAD NEWS FOR YOU, BECAUSE OF
THE CURRENT GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION, PEOPLE IN
SHIHCH'I ARE TOLD TO GIVE UP THEIR RELIGION. THEY SAY RELIGION
IS SUPERSTITIOUS THINKING AND FEUDAL THINKING WHICH OPPOSES MR.
MAO'S IDEOLOGY AND THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN. THEY WANT PEOPLE TO
THROW OUT THE BUDDHAS, STATUES AND ANCESTRAL TABLETS FROM THEIR

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

HOMES, COMMUNES AND TEMPLES. ALL THE TEMPLES HAVE BEEN
RAIDED AND SMASHED. THEY WANT ME TO TURN OUT OUR BUDDHA AND
ANCESTRAL TABLET TOO. I DON'T KNOW WHAT TO DO. I TRIED TO
ARGUE WITH THEM, FOR ACCORDING TO OUR NATIONAL LAW PEOPLE HAVE
FREEDOM OF RELIGION. THEY SHOULDN'T FORCE US TO DO THAT. I
ALSO TOLD THEM THAT YOU ARE A NUN AND THAT BUDDHA MEANS MUCH
TO YOU, BUT THEY DON'T CARE. THEY PROMISE TO WAIT TILL I GET
YOUR REPLY, SO PLEASE WRITE TO ME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND TELL
ME WHAT I SHOULD DO..."

3. FROM A LETTER FROM SHANGHAI, KIANGSU, DATED 28 JULY
1966: "TODAY IS MY WEEKLY DAY OFF BUT I COULDN'T SLEEP LATE
IN THE MORNING FOR THERE IS A BIG SHORTAGE OF DAILY FOOD IN
SHANGHAI LATELY. PEOPLE GET UP VERY EARLY IN THE MORNING TO TRY
TO GET SOME VEGETABLES AND MEAT. I THINK THAT IS BECAUSE OF THE
HOT WEATHER. THIS SUMMER IS TERRIBLY HOT. BESIDES, THE RECENT
CAMPAIGN HAS JUST BEEN CARRIED OUT AT OUR FACTORY. WE ATTENDED
A WHOLE DAY MEETING LAST WEEK AND TODAY THERE IS A MEETING BEING
HELD, BUT IT IS FOR THE CADRES. THIS IS A VERY SEVERE MOVEMENT.
THOUSANDS OF SLOGANS, NOTICES AND ARTICLES WHICH ARE CONCERNED
WITH THE CAMPAIGN ARE POSTED EVERYWHERE AT OUR FACTORY. THIS IS

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THE MOST SERIOUS AND SEVERE CAMPAIGN I HAVE SEEN SINCE THE
LIBERATION. DON'T WORRY ABOUT ME, I WILL BE VERY CAREFUL..."

4. FROM A LETTER FROM NANHAI (N23-02, E 113-08), KWANGTUNG,
DATED 1 AUGUST 1966: "I TOLD YOU ABOUT THE RECENT CAMPAIGN IN
MY LAST LETTER, I DIDN'T KNOW WHEN OUR VACATION WOULD BE WHEN
I WROTE THAT LETTER. TODAY WE HAVE JUST BEEN NOTIFIED THAT
FROM 19 AUGUST TO 25 AUGUST IS OUR ONE WEEK SUMMER VACATION.
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION CAMPAIGN WILL COME TO AN END ON 18
AUGUST, HOWEVER IT IS ONLY THE FIRST PERIOD OF THIS CAMPAIGN
WHICH WILL CONTINUE UNTIL 1968. THIS HAS BEEN DECIDED BY THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE. WE WILL BE SENT TO UNDERGO LABOR WORK
AFTER OUR ONE WEEK VACATION. IF WE CAN SATISFY OUR TEACHER
WITH OUR APPEARANCE DURING THE HALF-YEAR WORKING PERIOD, THEN
WE WILL BE SENT TO COLLEGE WITHOUT ANY EXAMINATION. ALSO WE
MUST SHOW THAT OUR THINKING IS THE SAME AS OUR PEOPLE, OUR PARTY
AND OUR CHAIRMAN MAO. IF WE FAIL, WE WILL NEVER GET INTO THE
COLLEGES..."

5. IN JUNE 1966 THE CONTENT OF THE SOCIALIST CULTURAL
REVOLUTION MEETINGS IN A STREET COMMITTEE IN CANTON CHANGED
AND RESIDENTS WERE ORDERED TO DENOUNCE THE ERRORS OF EACH OTHER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

ABOUT TEN RESIDENTS WERE SELECTED TO BE STRUGGLED IN THE MASS MEETINGS. ONE WOMAN WHO WAS ACCUSED WAS KICKED BY CADRES DURING THE STRUGGLE MEETINGS. THE RESIDENTS BECAME FURIOUS AT THE CADRES ABOUT THIS AND BEGAN TO SHOUT AT THE CADRES. THE CADRES HAD TO CALL FOR THE POLICE TO CALM THE CROWD DOWN. BY MID AUGUST 1966 THE CONTENT OF THE MEETINGS HAD CHANGED AGAIN AND THE CADRES WERE CLASSIFYING THE PEOPLE OF THE STREET INTO THREE CLASSES: 1. TOTALLY ANTI-PARTY ELEMENTS, 2. SLIGHTLY ANTI-PARTY ELEMENTS AND, 3. GOOD ELEMENTS.

6. IN JUNE 1966 THE SOCIALIST CULTURAL REVOLUTION BEGAN AT THE SHUNTE SUGAR REFINERY, SHUNTE HSIEN (N 22-50, E 113-16), KWANGTUNG. THE CAMPAIGN WAS CONDUCTED BY THE VERY SAME PEOPLE WHO CONDUCTED THE FOUR CLEARANCES CAMPAIGN IN THE FACTORY, BUT UNDER THE NAME OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION WORK TEAM. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN, ACCORDING TO THE SPEECHES OF THE WORK TEAM, WAS TO CONSOLIDATE THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN CHINA AND OBEY CHAIRMAN MAO'S ORDERS. SMALL GROUP MEETINGS ON THE CAMPAIGN WERE HELD FIVE TIMES A WEEK FOR TWO TO THREE HOURS A SESSION. MAO'S WORKS WERE STUDIED IN THE MEETINGS. THE FACTORY WORKERS DID NOT SUFFER FROM ANY PRESSURE IN THE MEETINGS, BUT PARTY AND YOUTH

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

LEAGUE MEMBERS AMONG THEM DID, OUT OF FEAR OF BEING PURGED.

ALL FACTORY WORKERS WERE ORDERED TO RECITE MAO'S WORKS OUT LOUD
OR THEY WOULD BE DENOUNCED AS ANTI PARTY. MOST OF THE WORKERS
WERE NOT THE LEAST BIT INTERESTED IN THE CAMPAIGN. THEY TRIED
TO PARTICIPATE AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE
MAIN TARGETS WERE PARTY AND YOUTH LEAGUE MEMBERS.

7. FIELD DISSEM STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCPAC PACFLT
ARPAC PACAF [REDACTED]

EO 12958 1.5(c)<10Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday
September 20, 1966
5:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

I think you will be interested in this summary by Bill Jorden of his talk with the Australian Ambassador to Cambodia.

W. W. Rostow

P.S. We still hope to get Averell in by the end of the year.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12353, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCM NARS, Date 9-5-86

~~Confidential~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 20, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Cambodia

752
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-412
By is, NARA Date 10-6-99

I had an interesting talk yesterday with Ambassador Noel Deschamps, the Australian envoy in Cambodia. He is on two months leave.

The more interesting points were:

1. The most significant development in Cambodia in recent months has been the drift away from Red China. It is the product of several things: Peking's taking Sihanouk for granted; its rejection of his plan to beef up the ICC to oversee his borders; its repudiation of the Geneva Agreements, which Sihanouk sees as a bulwark to his country's position.

2. The deGaulle visit was a plus in one important respect: France has replaced Communist China as Cambodia's "best friend." This relates to (1) above.

3. Sihanouk's principal interest in life is getting the broadest possible international recognition of and support for his borders. (We ought to keep this in mind when and if Harriman ever gets to Phnom Penh).

4. It was the handling of the recent border incident -- rather than the incident itself -- that pushed Sihanouk into cancelling the Harriman trip. On a more recent incident -- which occurred just before Deschamps' departure -- Sihanouk was asked about it; he replied: "That kind of thing happens in war." (I would suggest that Sihanouk's volatility gives no assurance he might not go through the roof on the next one!)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. Deschamps thinks chances are good that we can send an official visitor to Cambodia in the next few months. Sihanouk is in a mood to welcome such a visit. He wants us to recognize his borders and intercede with the Thai and Vietnamese to do likewise.

6. Sihanouk's main enemies are the Vietnamese and the Thai. He dislikes and distrust both, the Thai more than the Vietnamese. He is probably less concerned with the latter -- for the moment -- because they are involved in trouble at home, and Viet-Nam is not unified.


7. Sihanouk would look on Vietnamese unification as a disaster for him. He therefore tends to favor a victory for the South that would leave the country divided, rather than victory for Ho Chi Minh.

8. Internally, Cambodia is doing fairly well in terms of political stability. No major discontent. Sihanouk works hard and constantly at keeping his people happy. The economy is poor -- but discontent is low because the people generally don't know how bad off they are. No serious problem of communist subversion.

9. Australia enjoys probably the best relations of any nearby power, despite its involvement with us in Viet-Nam. Sihanouk says he judges Australia -- and others -- by the way they treat him and his country, and not by what they do elsewhere.

10. Sihanouk has said a number of complimentary things about General Ky, and Deschamps thinks it not impossible that Sihanouk would welcome a friendly gesture from the Saigon Government, especially some kind of agreement on the borders. He is ready to abandon Cambodian claims to disputed islands in return. (The islands in question are really meaningless for both countries.)

Summary: Sihanouk is a diplomatic challenge of the first order. The President's instinct in trying to get something moving with Cambodia is absolutely correct.


William J. Jorden

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6P
76

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, Sept. 20, 1966
6:15 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Andy Goodpaster's report
on his latest talk with Gen. Eisenhower.

W. A. R. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

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SECRET



THE JOINT STAFF

**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301**

19 September 1966


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. During a visit I made to Gettysburg last Friday, I spent about a half-hour with General Eisenhower at his home bringing him up to date on the progress of affairs in South Vietnam. During telephone conversations previously, I had arranged to give him a report on the South Vietnamese elections, in which he was keenly interested.

2. He had no particular comment on the events I reported. He made several remarks concerning the undesirability of seeing the Vietnamese war drag on too long. These remarks are reported in the last paragraph of my Memorandum for Record, attached.


A. J. GOODPASTER
Lt General, USA

Attachment



SECRET

76b

SECRET



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

19 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with General Eisenhower,
16 September 1966

1. During a meeting with General Eisenhower at his home in Gettysburg on 16 September 1966, I spent about a half-hour with him reviewing the progress of affairs in South Vietnam. The principal topic for discussion was the election of 11 September in South Vietnam, the results of which I had previously discussed with him by telephone.

2. I utilized Ambassador Lodge's reports on the matter, highlighting both the violent (and unsuccessful) opposition by the Viet Cong and the impressively large turnout of registered voters. Opposition included some 166 Viet Cong acts of terrorism, resulting in 19 killed and 120 wounded within a 24-hour period. On the plus side was the GVN use of publicity, together with the confirmation by many observers that the election was quite "clean". I reported Ambassador Lodge's thought that the government may be providing security for more people than previously estimated -- perhaps 65 percent rather than 54 percent. I also relayed Ambassador Lodge's comment that the elections showed the weakness of the militant institute Buddhists, and that the fact that 80.8 percent of those registered voted indicates that the government has greater influence over the population than previously credited. General Eisenhower thought that this report demonstrated an excellent accomplishment, which should be of great value in its effect upon the Vietnamese people, and for propaganda purposes.

3. I commented that there is a good deal of talk in the air around the world about the possibility that a basis for negotiations might be found, as well as rumors that approaches are being made. I told him that I was aware of nothing of concrete or definite nature in this regard, although the U.S. Government has given careful

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| DECLASSIFIED | |
| NLS MR 77-148 # 77 | |
| By DUB | NARS, Date 8-14-86 |

SECRET

thought to its position, and in fact has passed the word widely that genuine approaches would be welcomed, although one-sided preconditions such as our stopping the bombing without some kind of de-escalation on the Communist side did not seem to provide an adequate basis for action.

4. I next reported on the progress of military operations, indicating that in general these continue to go quite well. General Westmoreland is quite concerned at this time, as are the Joint Chiefs of Staff, over the Vietnamese forces that are concentrated in and near the demilitarized zone. Consideration is being given to a variety of requests and recommendations by General Westmoreland for air and naval actions, as well as special operations, which might spoil the enemy's attack, support and protect our own engaged forces, and reduce the risk to our forces in the area. General Eisenhower stated that it would be well to have reserve forces available so that, as the enemy is drawn into positions of the DMZ where he can be attacked, we could attack with heavy effect.

5. Next I reported the emphasis that General Westmoreland is giving to military support of revolutionary development. In formulating his concept and plans for the coming months, he has made it very clear that he proposes to utilize U.S. units wherever possible -- operating in close coordination with Vietnamese units -- to extend the secure areas, open routes of communication within South Vietnam, and provide a security environment within which revolutionary development activities can go forward. General Eisenhower welcomed these measures, and indicated he thought this course of action was entirely sound.

6. I next responded to a question General Eisenhower had raised a few weeks ago after reading a "profile" of the PAVN soldier in South Vietnam, as to whether the North Vietnamese soldiers were engaging in terrorism. I told him the situation seemed to be as follows: The North Vietnamese soldiers in regular units do not engage in terrorism on a regular basis. Most terrorist acts in South Vietnam are carried out by political cadres, and local units. North Vietnamese serving in such units, and particularly as cadres, have been involved in terrorism. The North Vietnamese regular soldier is surprised and disillusioned to find that he is not welcomed as a liberator and that terrorism is being conducted by the Viet Cong against South Vietnamese people.

SECRET

7. Finally, I reported, in response to another question recently asked by General Eisenhower, that the number of people enlisting in the Army and the number being inducted are very close to equal. In June, for example, some 20,000 were inducted, while approximately 21,000 enlisted for the first time, or re-enlisted.

8. General Eisenhower concluded with a comment that he had been seeing various statements implying that "small wars", or hostilities such as those in Vietnam, could go on almost indefinitely. Some comments in fact suggest that such a condition must be regarded as normal, and that our society must be geared to support this as well as other on-going programs. He indicated he would challenge such a view. As to open conflict, he felt this is not something that can go on and on, but is something that should rather be brought to an end as soon as possible. He commented that our people inevitably get tired of supporting involvements of this kind which go on for a long time, with no end in sight.



A. J. GOODPASTER
Lt General, USA

SECRET

file

77

*sent to Watson
9/20/66*

September 20, 1966.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Australian Treasurer

William McMahon, Treasurer of Australia, Deputy Leader of Prime Minister Holt's Liberal Party, and Holt's likely successor, will be visiting Washington in the coming week. He will be here for the World Bank meeting.

Ambassador Clark has written that a short visit with you would be "in the best interests of our Government." He notes that McMahon has shown courage and devotion to "our cause throughout the world" and that our country has "no better friend" in Australia.

You might enjoy a short talk with him. I suggest that if you see him, it be done without announcement. Otherwise we can expect problems with requests from other foreign visitors of equal rank.

McMahon is scheduled to arrive here the evening of the 25th.

W. W. Rostow

Will see him _____

Will not see him _____

See me _____

77a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 19, 1966

TO: Walt Rostow

FROM: Marvin Watson

May I have your recommendation
please.



776

EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Canberra, Australia

September 14, 1966

The Honorable
Marvin Watson
Secretary to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Marvin:

My very close friend, the Honorable William McMahon, Treasurer of Australia, will be in Washington from the evening of September 25th to September 30th attending a meeting of the World Bank. While in Washington Mr. McMahon will be staying at the Sheraton Park Hotel. As you know, Mr. McMahon succeeded our good friend Honorable Harold Holt upon his ascension to the office of Prime Minister. The office of Treasurer in Australia is considered the Number Two office and in the event that it was necessary to select a successor to Mr. Holt I am certain that Mr. McMahon would be an immediate choice. Mr. McMahon is also Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party, which has been in power for almost 20 years. As the Number Two man of the Government Party and in the Cabinet Mr. McMahon, of course, plays an important role in the establishment and direction of Government policy, particularly in the area of finances and economics. I know of no better friend that the United States has in Australia than Mr. McMahon, and he shows great courage and devotion to our cause throughout the world. In doing this he is giving support to Mr. Holt who is his leader.

I believe it is in the best interests of our Government that you arrange for the President to have a short visit with Mr. McMahon at the White House. It would be helpful to me


in my work out here and it would be helpful to Mr. McMahon in his devoted support of the United States.

Mr. McMahon will be in New York at the Waldorf Astoria from September 16th - 20th. He will go from New York to Montreal to attend a Commonwealth Finance Ministers meeting and return to New York on September 22nd or 23rd before going to Washington on the evening of September 25th.

Marvin, I will be deeply grateful to you for your assistance in this matter. Let me just say that I was the only Ambassador to attend Bill McMahon's wedding and we have been very close friends during my tour here. Mrs. McMahon will not be with him since they are looking for a baby next month.

Kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'E. Clark', with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

Edward Clark
American Ambassador

Pres file

Tuesday, September 20, 1966
2:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

This is another in the China series.

It is a recap of the Red Guards operation that makes clear the object of the exercise is an assault on the Communist Party apparatus.

What is not clear is whether the object is to yield a purged Communist Party or a kind of military takeover.

I cannot help believing that this wild trouble in China may make it easier for Hanoi to get out of the war.

W. W. Rostow

Hong Kong 1988

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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| State 8-14-79; NSC 12-22-20 (H91) | |
| By | Date |
| 100 per 158 | 8-19-86 |
| NARS, Date | |

WWRostow:rlm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 19, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM HONG KONG (1988)

SUBJECT: Red Guards and Party Purge

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-413
By CB, NARA Date 10-21-99

Previous cables from this post on the subject of Red Guards have expressed the belief that the new youth organization is intended for use as a purge instrument against Party elements opposed or unresponsive to Maoist policy. Reports [REDACTED] from Chicom national and provincial media, foreign press, and the Peking diplomatic community have confirmed this belief, and have documented the fact that Guards have been used against municipal, provincial, and even regional Party Committees throughout the provinces. There is now enough evidence available to attempt a preliminary assessment of the extent, techniques, sequence and future prospects of what has now been labelled (by Lin Piao and others) as the Red Guards' major task. 3.4(b)(1)

Extent of Attack

Since August, revolutionary students and Red Guards have reportedly moved against Party authorities in provinces of Kweichow, Keilungkiang, Honan, Hopeh, Anhwei, Yunnan, Shensi, Hunan, Shantung, Kiangsu, Kansu, Szechuan, Fukien, and the municipalities of Peking, Shanghai, and Canton. Other provinces which, like Kirin and Inner Mongolia, have reported Party purges without mentioning the participation of the Red Guards, are not on the list, nor are provinces like Liaoning and Kwasgsi in which clashes between Red Guards and rival organizations or factory workers have taken place without mention of Party Committees. However, this is no proof that the Red Guards are not performing the same role in these areas. A handful of provinces, including Kiangsi, Tsinghai, and Ninghsia, have been silent on the subject.

Techniques of Struggle and Opposition

Red Guards and revolutionary students have apparently used both political denunciation and violent tactics in their attacks on Party elements. Wall posters, rallies, humiliation marches, and even hunger strikes have apparently been employed in many places

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

but fists, clubs and other weapons have also been used, especially where resistance has been organized. The opposition has in most reported cases resorted or been accused of resorting to violence, evidently for its own protection, organizing citizenry to beat up Red Guards, a tactic that is said to have resulted in bloody free-for-alls in the cities of Kweilin, Tientsin, Hengyang, Changsha, Sian, Tsingtao, and Foochow. Opposing elements have also counter criticized Red Guards in wall posters and at rallies. The city of Kweiyang was reportedly the scene of three anti-Red Guard rallies in the early part of September. Peking Red Guards have apparently been criticized as revisionists in wall posters by Wuhan Red Guards and by anonymous elements.

Sequence of Violence

Analysis of the evidence at hand shows that the period of heaviest Guard attacks on the Party, and violence and opposition to the Guards by Party members and their organizations, took place during the last ten days of August and the first week of September. The last days of August particularly concentrated, with incidents and rallies reported from Kansu ("late August"), Tientsin and Peking (August 25), Hofei (August 25 and 27), Shangtung (August 26), Harbin (August 28), and Hengyang, (where Party headquarters were reportedly set afire by Peking Red Guards on August 30). Early September was also an active period with incidents reported from Peking, Wuhan and Hangchow (all on September 2). The fact that the period of violence straddled the August 31 rally is evidence that Lin Piao's exhortation not to "hit people" did not sink in immediately. Nor obviously, did the opposition regard this stricture as applying to them, for the People's Daily found it necessary five days later to issue a stern warning promising punishment under criminal law to any of the "enemy" who "dared resort to force." Judging from reports of clashes between Red Guards and rival organizations from Kweilin (September 9) and Anshan (September 14, quoted by recent arrivals from China in the Hong Kong China Mail September 16) suggested that the threat has failed to cow opposition at least in some places.

Maoist Reaction to Crisis

Rereading of the 16 Points shows that Maoists expected that the Red Guards and revolutionary students would unavoidably meet "relatively great resistance" and suffer "one or several setbacks" as

soon as they were taken from campus training grounds and launched against "power holders" in the adult body politic. The 16 Points, based on experience of the first stage of the Cultural Revolution in educational institutions, also anticipated tactics to be used against Guards and outlawed a struggle of masses against masses, students against students, and indiscriminate name calling. There is strong reason to believe that Maoists anticipated neither the extent of popular opposition against the Guards, nor the capability of opposition elements in the Party to capitalize on public antipathy toward the Guards to rouse workers and peasants against them.

The Maoists response to this realization has been twofold:

- (1) Attempt to remove sources of friction between the Guards and populace, and
- (2) To coordinate and organize the Guards into a more effective fighting force.

The first response is evident in a September 12 appeal for solidarity between workers, peasants, and revolutionary students against dissident Party elements; in an apparently genuine effort to control Red Guard excesses among the population; and in stipulation of September 7 and 15 editorials designed to prevent Red Guards from interfering with the economy and alienating peasants and workers.

The second response is evident in the reorganization of provincial Red Guard units under tighter People's Liberation Army supervision and extensive coordination of efforts to "link up" nationwide Red Guards organization, evidence in itself that the Red Guards have been an imperfect instrument and may have exceeded instructions (if indeed there was detailed guidance) in some areas. (As one example, we cite Red Guard posters criticizing Chou En-Lai observed by visitors in Canton.)

Both above responses appear to have the primary aim of focussing Red Guard activities on the most important task of purging the Party, and of making them better able to perform this task. If the above is true, regime appeals of recent weeks for restraint, solidarity, and noninterference with the economy represent preparations for carrying forward and perhaps even intensifying the purge rather than evidence of any slowdown in the Cultural Revolution. (These appeals

for restraint have notably not been directed at Red Guard activities against Party elements.)

Future Prospects

Recent indications appear to confirm this conjecture. Lin Piao's demand at the September 15 rally that the headquarters of "power holders" be "bombarded" was preceded by a September 12 Kweichow broadcast debating whether or not to destroy a "command post" with shellfire. (While the reference, like its predecessors appears figurative, the possibility that the Red Guards may someday be armed by new People's Liberation Army "instructors" cannot be ruled out.) Meanwhile, a new category of purge target may be emerging: the high level figures whose attitude toward the Red Guards has rendered them unacceptable to Maoists. Reported criticisms of new Peking Party Committee First Secretary Li Hsueh-Feng (September 14) for revisionism and Southwest Bureau First Secretary Li Ching-Chuan (September 13) for an ambiguous attitude toward student demonstrations in Chengtu August 15, may be harbingers of things to come. (Other possibility is, of course, that the Red Guards have exceeded their authority in attacking these figures.)

The crisis has not yet resolved, although Maoists appear to have the advantage at the moment. The gravity of the situation is underlined by the felt need to hold yet another gigantic mass meeting in Peking September 15, a resort to rule by rally which emphasizes Mao and Lin's distrust of the standard political structure and its unresponsiveness to them.

What Maoists have in mind for the future, if they can bring it off, is perhaps a repeat throughout the society of the university pattern, in which new responsive activists Cultural Revolution Committees are being built upon the wreckage of the old Party Committees. Whether this can be accomplished beyond the cloistered walls of academic institutions in the rest of society is still questionable, with one of the key imponderables being the economy, about which such concern has been expressed within the regime during the past week.

RICE

79

Tuesday
September 20, 1966
12:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Gen. Klein may not be the greatest of all political analysts, but his picture of Erhard's rubber-kneed political position is essentially accurate.

W. W. Rostow

Cable from Amb. McGhee

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-412
By ia NARA Date 10-6-99

WWRostow:rln

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722
September 19, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR McGHEE

SUBJECT: General Klein on Erhard's Current Mood

General Julius Klein, who is currently visiting in Germany and apparently still has close contacts with the Chancellor and his personal assistant Hohmann (he says he has seen Erhard three times in the past week), has provided us with an account of his various conversations.

Klein reported that never before had he seen the Chancellor in such a shaken condition. He is fighting for his political life, and knows that many of his party colleagues are sharpening their knives to take advantage of the first opportunity to finish him off. During his initial meeting with Klein, Erhard seemed scared stiff at the prospect of his impending visit to the United States. He asked Klein what the reaction would be in the United States if he were suddenly to develop a diplomatic illness causing cancellation of the trip. Klein said he responded that no one would believe this, and that he would be finished both in the United States and in Germany. The Chancellor commented this was exactly the way he felt. Klein said the Chancellor had undoubtedly been receiving advice that he should call off the trip from a number of CDU politicians, and probably also from Westrick.

Klein observed that the Chancellor had asked him a number of questions of a kind which he had never raised before. For example, he could not believe that the Mansfield resolution had not been put forward without the Executive's secret blessing. Despite his difficulties with Barzel, the Chancellor went on, he could not imagine the CDU majority leader putting forward a resolution of this kind contrary to his own policies. Klein said he tried to explain to Erhard how our legislative system works in relation to the Executive, and he had hoped he had made some impression on the Chancellor.

In their two subsequent conversations, according to Klein, the Chancellor had seemed slightly more relaxed about the prospects for his Washington visit but was still very much a harassed and anxious man. The majority of his advisers are still counselling calling the trip off, and if that is not possible, are telling him that he must come back with some success or he will be politically finished. Since the prospects for a success on the offset are considered dim, the only idea which the Chancellor has so far had would be to obtain the consent of the President for a visit here to show his interest in Europe.

Klein said that the Chancellor was suspicious of most of the CDU politicians who were giving him advice. He was afraid that they would gang up against

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 98-413

By CB, NARA Date 10-21-99

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him even during his short absence in the United States, and was trying to gain assurances from party leaders such as Barzel that they would sit on the lid during his trip. Pressure was developing to have the Chancellor take Westrick along, and Erhard at least today seemed to be moving in this direction since it would enable him to prove publicly that he and Westrick are still friends despite the latter's resignation. On the other hand, it is quite clear, according to Klein, that Westrick would actually be intended to serve as a watchdog over the Chancellor in order to make sure that he made no concessions to the President.

The problem of succession to Westrick continues at fever pitch, according to Klein. Party leaders are pressing strongly for designation of the CDU whip, Will Rasner, as State Secretary, although Erhard's preference is decidedly for Hohmann. If Rasner must enter the Chancellor's office, then Erhard wants two State Secretaries to be designated, one of whom would be Hohmann, but this has run into strong resistance.

In the prevailing atmosphere, Klein believes, the Chancellor tends to interpret everything in the light of the immediate effects it will have on his personal political position. This will certainly be true of his visit to the United States. For this reason, the Chancellor will be in no position to make any concessions on such matters as nuclear non-proliferation.

Comment:

While the foregoing may seem highly colored, allowing for some possible exaggerations, it probably reflects with reasonable accuracy the Chancellor's current mood. The ebbing of his political position has been so rapid, and the prospect of restoring it must seem so bleak at this juncture, that he has become highly sensitized to the political maneuvering which is normal in Bonn and interprets it -- probably with some justification -- as directed against him personally. Whether his suspicion of individuals is justified is difficult to say at this point, since the Bonn political scene is overheated with rumors and speculation the order of the day.

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AGENDA

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 88-46
By sig NARA, Date 9-6-89

Lunch Meeting, Tuesday, September 20, 1966, 1:00 p.m.

1. The German Offset Issue -- Sec. McNamara and Mr. Ball

Sec. McNamara, George Ball and Joe Fowler will be meeting this afternoon at the State Department to consider a proposal which will avoid immediate unilateral troop withdrawals and maintain the offset by means which would include devices other than the purchase of U. S. military equipment.

The lunch discussion should, therefore, be merely an occasion for general talk about the Erhard visit and the lines of approach being taken by Sec. McNamara and Mr. Ball.

2. Speech on Europe -- Mr. Ball

I understand that George Ball is sending over a slightly revised draft of the speech on Europe generated in the wake of Mr. Acheson's exercise. I believe it to be a good basis for a major address by you.

You may wish to discuss at lunch two questions: Whether you want to explore with Erhard, when he is here, the main lines of this speech (preliminary draft attached); the timing of such a speech. (My own recommendation is that it should be delivered shortly after the Erhard visit, assuming it goes tolerably well and we have the tripartite discussions on the track.)

3. George Ball may raise with you orally the suggestion that Erhard be permitted to announce, after his visit, that you envisage a trip to Europe next spring.

4. PL 480 -- India. -- George Ball

Agriculture and State have been on to me about a decision on Indian PL 480. You will recall that I sent up several days ago the attached analysis suggesting that the order of magnitude of Indian wheat aid and the proposed timing of shipments is not likely to have a significant effect on the U. S. bread price, notably in the light of the increased estimate of the current U. S. wheat harvest.

5. Ky Visit to Washington -- George Ball

State wishes to report to you and get your guidance on Ky's proposed trip to the U. S. after the election in November and whether he should envisage a trip to Washington. I personally am much less jumpy about this than some others.

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6. Hanoi's Alleged Note to Delhi -- Mr. Ball

I told you on the phone that New Delhi reports a quite promising message in writing from Hanoi. We are going out to get the text. Mr. Ball wishes to suggest its substance and possible significance.

7. U. S. Intrusions into CHICOM Air Space.

You may wish to ask Sec. McNamara what can be done to cut down the possibilities of accident leading to U. S. planes overflying Communist China. The answer may be to widen somewhat the forbidden zone in North Viet Nam below the CHICOM border, limiting our interdiction of transport facilities to points below that zone.

8. Latin American Summit -- Mr. Ball

For information purposes State wishes to report to you the present state of arrangements for the Latin American Summit in view of OAS decisions this week and other contacts with Latin American governments. The U. S. position is being battled out now between State and Treasury. It will be coming forward to you shortly.

9. Other Items.

W. W. Rostow

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~~SECRET~~ - LIMDIS

Tuesday, September 20, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BOWLES (New Delhi, 4243)

On September 19 at his request, I called on C. S. Jha at the Foreign Office. Jha explained that Mea had received a cable from Hanoi late last week which quoted from an aide memoire that had just been given to Indian Consul General by the Government of Vietnam Foreign Office. Although the aide memoire itself had not yet been received, Jha felt that I should know about it without further delay.

According to cabled analysis, the aide memoire made the following points:

A. The U. S. appears to be laying basis for a further escalation of the war. Government of North Vietnam anticipates an armed invasion of the Demilitarized Zone, U. S. troop landings in North Vietnam itself and blockade by mines or other measures of Haiphong Harbor. U. S. peace proposals are simply designed to obscure its war plans. (Note: Consul General stated parenthetically that, although Government of North Vietnam analysis is grossly distorted, he is convinced that North Vietnamese leaders genuinely accept this analysis.)

B. North Vietnam stated in the aide memoire that it is prepared to accept any "reasonable proposal" for policing the Demilitarized Zone. (Note: Jha pointed out that the Government of India had made several proposals to which there had not yet been any reaction.)

C. In reference to President Johnson's statement that U. S. is prepared to withdraw its troops on a phased basis North Vietnam is ready to embark on any discussion which may be "fruitful". The Hanoi official who presented aide memoire to Indian Consul General remarked that his government had been in touch from time-to-time with the U. S. Government.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By gwo, NARA, Date 7-15-98

~~SECRET~~ - LIMDIS

The Consul General felt that the aide memoire was important:

A. Because this was the first formal aide memoire which he had ever received from North Vietnam, and

B. Because he was asked to come to the Foreign Office on very short notice and in an atmosphere of high importance.

C. Because its language, although sharply critical of the U. S. , was less bitter than usual.

D. Because it referred in a rather affirmative way to the President's statement on withdrawal.

The Consul General stated that China's position in Hanoi has deteriorated sharply in the last few weeks because of the struggles going on inside China and that the Soviets relieved for a moment from Chinese pressure, may be willing to take a more affirmative position.

The Consul General stated that he felt that, while he could not judge what is going on in the minds of the Hanoi leadership, he sensed that they may be beginning to look for a way out. He suggested the following starting point for a fresh attempt.

A. A statement by President Johnson that the U. S. is prepared to remove its troops within three years after establishment of peace.

B. The U. S. Government should stop its bombing without insisting that North Vietnam be labelled aggressors or in the initial stage that their ground forces should be publicly pulled out. If a favorable setting can be created, he believes that Hanoi may be prepared to remove its troops and that indeed a confidential agreement might be reached on this point.

6. I suggested that it would be unrealistic to expect us to stop bombing until it was clear that North Vietnam forces whose entry into South Vietnam led to the bombing were being withdrawn. I stressed that we are not looking for headline victories over Ho Chi Minh nor do we desire to humiliate North Vietnam. However the fact remains that bombing has effectively hampered flow of North Vietnamese supplies to its troops south of the 17th parallel and it is unreasonable to expect us to forego this exercise until we have something concrete to go on.

7. In response to my question Jha stated that he could not personally judge how much importance should be attached to this aide memoire; when the full text arrives it may be a little clearer. However he saw in it some indication that North Vietnam is more serious about a settlement than it was a few months ago and that time may be ripe for a fresh U. S. initiative.

8. Jha suggested that President might state that he is prepared to remove U. S. troops on a specifically announced phased basis as soon as it is clear that (A) a peace settlement had been reached, and (b) North Vietnam has demonstrated that this time it intends to keep the peace.

9. Jha emphasized that the Hanoi Government is extremely sensitive and consequently that it is important that as far as possible we use words that they can accept. While he realized the difficulties of negotiating under these circumstances he felt the manner in which we approach negotiations and language which we used in discussing the various issues is at least as important as substance of our position.

Comment: I would emphasize again that C. S. Jha did not have the actual text of the Aide Memoire and himself stressed caution in interpreting the report from Hanoi until a full and accurate text is received.

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Tuesday, September 20, 1966 -- 11:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this before lunch. George McGhee argues:

1. How we handle Erhard's trip will be "one of the most important decisions U. S. has faced in the postwar period."
2. We should envisage offset arrangements which would permit in the future the Germans to offset not only by hardware but also additional space and foreign aid outlays, plus, if necessary, the purchase of Roosa bonds.

I personally believe the right answer lies in this direction.

(In this connection, you will be interested in George Woods' advice to us, given to me at a leisurely Saturday lunch. He says that Blessing, the present head of the German Central Bank, should be soon retiring because of illness. If we can get him replaced by a vigorous and imaginative young man named Wilfred Guth, a great many of our present problems with Germany in offset, aid, and monetary policy generally would be solved. Guth is now head of a major German bank, Credit Anstalt, and is the obvious man to take over. The political problem is that he is the son of Erhard's sister!)

W. W. Rostow

Bonn 3361

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By gn NARA, Date 7-15-98

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~~SECRET - LIMDIS~~

Tuesday, September 20, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR McGHEE (Bonn, 3361)

SUBJECT: The Offset and American Troop Level in Germany

The German Position

As indicated previously, all indications are that Chancellor Erhard will, during his meeting with the President on September 26 - 27, seek a "stretch-out" of the existing offset agreement ending on June 30, 1967, and both a reduction and extension to other types of purchases in any future agreement. In effect, what he is seeking is a 50 percent scaledown from June 30, 1966 on. I previously analyzed Erhard's situation both economically and politically and concluded that he will not be bluffing. He has little choice. Erhard, will, I predict, throw himself on the President's mercy on the basis of his and Germany's past performances as a good ally -- ie, for having met the offset up till now, for the large increases in the German military budget from 1961-1964, for the purchase of Roosa bonds and for support of U.S. policy in Vietnam.

U. S. Reaction

The U. S. reaction to Erhard's appeal will, I believe, be one of the most important decisions the U. S. has faced in the post-war period. It can be made only at the highest level in our Government. If we are able to reach agreement with Erhard without significantly reducing U. S. combat forces in Europe, we have an opportunity to stabilize the NATO of the 14 and U. S. relations with Germany at a critical time. If, however, we fail to reach agreement and move to reduce our combat forces in Germany (a division or more) as a direct consequence of German failure to meet the offset, the following adverse consequences can ensue:

A. The Erhard Government will fall, or will in any event be irretrievably weakened. Neither he nor his successor, after such a U. S. turndown, would in the future be willing to base German policy on the U. S. with confidence. Germany and American will tend to drift apart.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 88-47
By uf, NARA, Date 6-2-88

B. The U. S. troop commitment is not to Germany but to NATO. It can be changed only after full discussion with NATO. If it is known that we have presented NATO with a fait accompli on U. S. troop levels as a result of German failure to meet the offset, our position in NATO will be greatly weakened as will the whole future of NATO itself.

C. If we reduce our forces under such circumstances the British will, as they even now indicate, certainly do so. There is no reason why others should not follow suit -- the unraveling of NATO will begin.

D. It would be necessary to review the concept of flexible response which we have promoted, since the remaining NATO forces might have to resort immediately to the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the event of an all-out Soviet attack. Increased European pressure will result for the early use of our strategic forces -- inviting Soviet retaliation on our cities.

E. The U. S. Seventh Army would be broken up as a fighting unit. The divisions sent home would probably be scattered and dissipated. A reduced 7th Army could not only not hope to stop a conventional Soviet attack but would, in all probability, not even be able to defend itself or retire in order.

F. The U. S. would have lost perhaps its only opportunity to bargain for the withdrawal of equivalent Soviet forces.

G. It would be clearly not just to Germans but demonstrated to Europeans that we put a low price tag on our military commitment to Europe. In the future Europeans would have little confidence in our assertions that American and European security are indivisible or that we, as we say, consider the Soviet threat to be undiminished.

H. Germany, which has until now depended almost entirely on the U. S. for its security, would be forced to reorient its basic security policy. This could take the form of increased dependence on Gaullist France, a "go-it-alone" nationalism or efforts to accommodate itself with the Soviets.

I. If Germany increases its forces to make up the gap created by our withdrawal, the status quo with the East would be altered and fears would be engendered in Europe as well as in the East.

J. The Soviets could be expected to assume a much stronger position vis-a-vis Germany and Europe. They would be in an increasingly better position to make exorbitant demands and engage in blackmail, particularly in Berlin where we, as principal recipients of such pressures, would have only a weakened 7th Army as backup.

K. America would no longer be able to play a decisive role in the great decisions affecting the future of Europe which still lie ahead. Western Europeans would increasingly tend to handle their own affairs independently, possibly including a rapprochement with the East.

L. Our ability to influence internal developments in Europe and to obtain support for U.S. efforts in other areas, such as Vietnam, would be greatly decreased.

M. Groups in America who are already clamoring for a reduction of U.S. troops in Germany will be encouraged by the example of their own Government. It would be difficult to arrest an increasingly isolationist trend.

Result: U.S. force reductions under present circumstances would, because of the cumulative effect of the foregoing, be considered generally as a major shift in U.S. policy. History would record it as the ebb point -- the beginning of an American withdrawal from Europe.

Proposed Tactics in Dealing with Erhard

In order to avert the foregoing consequences, it is recommended that:

A. If, as I anticipate, Erhard presents a strong case for relief under the present offset, that we accept debt pre-payments of \$214 million and the purchase of Roosa bonds for \$136 million in substitution for \$350 million in the present target (that amount not already budgeted or planned for including \$170 million from the 1966 budget, a \$250 million pre-payment in 1966 and \$350 from the 1967 budget).

B. That for the future, we agree with the Germans:

1. In order to effect a saving to Germany under the offset we will reduce our offset costs, beginning July 1, 1967, to a maximum figure to be subsequently agreed, through attrition of backup and logistical personnel (perhaps to \$600 million through loss of between 25 and 35,000); the timing of the announcement of this move would be left open for agreement with the Germans in the light of their domestic situation.

2. German public purchases in the field of space, foreign aid and other areas where additionality can be established will be counted toward the offset where specifically approved (the annual amount in these categories will probably not exceed \$25-50 million); and that,

3. The remainder will be met through additional training and arms purchases to the maximum extent possible (even the Germans would agree to \$350 million as a level of recurrent purchases), and where this is not possible by suitable financial arrangements (probably by the purchase of Roosa bonds).

C. That a joint U.S. -German Commission will be appointed to give effect to these recommendations which, in co-operation with the U.K. and NATO, would initiate studies as to:

1. German ability to meet the offset; and,

2. The optimum level of U.S. and other NATO forces in Europe. Mr. McCloy would be appointed as our representative to this commission heading a U.S. negotiating team composed of representatives of State, Defense and Treasury. The joint commission would meet as soon as possible and, as appropriate, with their U.K. opposite numbers, looking toward a final report, to be followed by review of their findings in NATO insofar as troop levels are concerned, before the end of the year.

Tues., Sept. 2 1966
11:00 a. m.

83

MR. PRESIDENT:

As background to lunch and discussion of Ky's possible visit to the U. S. , you may be interested in this interesting conversation between Ambassador Lodge and Ky on Ky's successful handling of himself at a press conference, and Ky's view of his future as a politician.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~-attachment

Monday, September 19, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Saigon, 6366)

I called on Ky and began by saying that his press conference of last Saturday had been the best he had ever had. FYI: He had followed my advice to the letter, having insisted that questions be submitted in writing and that both questions and answers be given in both English and Vietnamese. End FYI. I said that I thought his answer to questions about going to North Vietnam, which has been a hardy perennial for every journalist in Saigon, had been excellent.

He seemed very pleased and said that he had taken my advice to heart, that he was very grateful for it, and that he was sure it was good. He felt he had had a good verification of this when the correspondent of Agence France Presse had told him how disappointed he had been there had been no fireworks.

After giving him a few copies of the Juspao publication on world editorial opinion concerning the September 11 elections, I told him of the news that I had had from Washington that those who were managing the speaking engagement which he was expected to attend in Southern California in November were planning to have some sort of a "confrontation." I had heard it said that they would ask somebody from the Government in Washington -- or even Senator Fulbright to appear at the same time. I pointed out the obvious impropriety of doing such a thing, saying that Ky was Prime Minister of a country and should not be equated with anyone who was not of the same rank. I also pointed out the unfair advantage for a debater who is performing on his home soil when he confronts a foreigner who doesn't know the lay of the land. He agreed with all of this and agreed that he would instruct the Vietnamese Ambassador in Washington to tell the people organizing the speaking engagement in California that a) he was not definite in his own mind whether he would go at all, and, b) that it was absolutely certain that he would not go if there was any question of a "confrontation."

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-43

By ing, NARA, Date 6-23-88

He then asked me point blank whether I thought it was a good thing for him to go to the United States at all. I said I could see advantages in it if it was well managed, notably as regards press relations, and if the timing was right. I said that I could not speak for Washington on this subject, because I did not know what else was going on in Washington, and what the Washington angles might be. But I said that I would find out. He nodded his head. I think he would have been really offended if I had said that under no circumstances must he ever plan to visit the United States. He feels very close to us and has indeed many warm friends and admirers among Americans. (Comment: A previous telegram conveys what I think should be the policy on this, and I would appreciate being advised when convenient. End comment.)

Having finished the business for which I came, I started to leave and he asked me to stay. He said he wanted to talk to me confidentially. He said this: "I am going to resign sometime. The more I am in politics, the more I find too many bad things I don't like, too many bad peoples (He used the plural word.)." He said he had taken command fifteen months ago in a difficult situation, that many good things had been accomplished, but it was clear that he would continue to have trouble, meaning corruption.

I asked who he had to take his place.

Ky said he didn't know. He hadn't thought of it.

I said, you simply cannot walk out without making responsible arrangements for a successor.

Ky said, "I can't associate any longer with these people," (meaning Co and Quang), "and yet purges now will mean trouble." He then added: "If I go, Thieu, Thang, Tri will all go too."

I said that the succession had to be absolutely assured, that it would be unthinkable for him simply to walk away from the whole thing and that I had been prepared to have him leave after elections for Chief Executive had been held under the new Constitution. But to leave before that, and, in particular, to leave without making any arrangements for a successor, would revive Tri Quang, would open

the way to coups, including Communist coups. I said that he had some very impressive accomplishments to his credit: the devaluation of the currency, the military operation of the port, remaining in office long enough for everybody throughout the country to learn how to do their job. I said that in Hue and Danang and again on Election Day, he had shown great talent for the use of force which was an indispensable attribute in an underdeveloped country, understanding these things he also had the good judgment not to rush in hot-headedly. If he were simply to walk out, all this would be called into question.

Ky said that the members of the Directorate were "pushing" him and yet if he did anything, they would put it all onto him. I said he had a right to require them to carry part of the blame. Upon questioning from me, he said he did not think getting rid of Co and Quang would be as difficult as getting rid of Thi but he was sick to death of having to deal with things like this.

I said that high public office was a difficult load for a man in any country, that it was hard to get into politics but it was also hard to get out of it in the right way. For him simply to leave because he was sick of corruption without making any arrangements for the succession would give him regrets all the rest of his life. I said I had a right to speak as there were more than 350,000 American troops in this country and we had a very strong interest in who was Prime Minister of Vietnam.

As we left, he agreed to think over what I had said.
(Comment: It appears to me that Ky was not announcing his resignation to me, but rather was venting his frustrations. He may also have been testing my attitude toward him. He put no time limit on his action and I do not expect him to decide anything without talking it over some more with me. End comment.)

84

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tues., Sept. 20, 1966
10:00 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT :

Here is my draft letter of acceptance
of George Ball's resignation.

I am sending it up early so that you can
revise it if it doesn't hit quite the right
tone.

Walt Rostow

Tues., Sept. 20, 1966
10:00 a.m.

to J 84a
File

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is my draft letter of acceptance
of George Ball's resignation.

I am sending it up early so that you can
revise it if it doesn't hit quite the right
tone.

W. W. Rostow

September 21, 1966

Dear George:

I accept your resignation with deep personal as well as official regret.

Along with your colleagues, you have indeed helped shape our foreign policy at a critical period in the nation's history. You have helped see through great crises and major constructive initiatives.

I would wish you to know how greatly I have appreciated the energy, skill, experience, and candor you brought to a post which is one of the very highest and most important in your country's service.

Although you have earned the right to private life, after these five and a half years in the line of fire, I would like to think that I shall be able to call on you from time to time in the days ahead.

Sincerely,



Honorable George W. Ball
Under Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWR:mz

84c

September 17, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

As you know from our past conversations, the time has come when, for personal and family reasons, I must return to private life. I am, therefore, submitting my resignation to be effective, if convenient to you, on September 30.

I take this step reluctantly. For more than five and a half years I have shared in helping to shape the foreign policy of the leading nation of the world. The experience of those years has brought great personal rewards.

I have been fortunate in my colleagues. It has been a high privilege to work closely with Secretary Rusk and other men whom I respect and admire and for whom I have deep affection.

I have served at a critical time in history--a period of pervasive change, of challenge and hope for America and the world.

Most important, I have been constantly impressed and encouraged by the climate of free inquiry at the top reaches of government. This has been one of the many benefits of your leadership.

As President, you not only bear the burden of decisions but you establish the atmosphere in which decisions are made. Over the past years our nation has faced complex and obdurate problems and I have watched you make hard choices. What has been deeply

The President,

The White House.

satisfying to me--and I am sure to all of us--has been your insistence on full discussion and the unfettered expression of views on all issues.

I leave the public service with full confidence that the central decisions that lie ahead will--as in the past--be rigorously examined and prayerfully made with the sensitivity and perception that mark your leadership.

These have been rich years for me, Mr. President, and I am grateful. As you well know, I stand ready at any time to be of help.

Sincerely yours,

George W. Ball

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, Sept 19, 1966 - 12:20pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. Atomic Information Proposed for Communication
to NATO Member States and ACCHAN

Secretary McNamara has requested a statutory determination that will permit a wider dissemination of certain essential atomic information among the officials and military officers that have a genuine need to know to permit them to participate in NATO nuclear planning. He and Chairman Seaborg have signed a formal determination which has been presented for your concurrence. The determination has also been reviewed and concurred in by the Department of State.

I recommend that you approve the Secretary's recommendation and request your permission to sign the attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and AEC Chairman.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-46

By inf NARA, Date 9-6-89~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

SUBJECT: U. S. Atomic Information Proposed for Communication
to NATO Member States and ACCHAN

Reference is made to your memorandum for the President of August 25, 1966, informing him that the Department of Defense has a requirement to extend the dissemination of atomic information within NATO member states and the Channel Command and, concurrently, provide a more common basis for atomic cooperation between NATO member states and military elements. Your memorandum further informed him that pursuant to Executive Order 10841, as amended, the Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have joined in a statutory determination that the proposed cooperation and the proposed communication of atomic information as set forth in the enclosure to your memorandum will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense security. It is understood that the Department of State has been informed of and concurs in the above action.

It has been noted that previous determinations have been made which permit limited dissemination of the atomic information involved to NATO member states and the Channel Command and that the proposed determination would permit member states and CINCHAN to disseminate internally information received to the extent required for NATO planning purposes and provide a more common basis for atomic cooperation throughout NATO under provisions of the NATO Agreement and supporting Administrative Arrangements. It has further been noted that all NATO countries, except France and Iceland, will by the terms of this statutory determination receive information on

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-4/2

By is, NARA Date 10-6-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

numbers, yield and locations as specified in paragraph 3(a) of the determination. Countries with whom we have existing bilateral agreements will receive additional information as listed in paragraph 3(b).

The statutory determination as proposed has been concurred in, subject to the conditions and understandings contained in the memorandum for the President of August 25 referred to above.

It is understood that the Department of Defense will notify the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of this determination prior to communication of this information.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~Copy 1 of 60 copies each
of 4 pages, Series AUNITED STATES ATOMIC INFORMATION PROPOSED FOR COMMUNICATION
TO NATO MEMBER STATES AND ACCHAN (U)

- (U) United States atomic information outlined below may be communicated on a need-to-know basis to the authorized recipients herein specified.
- (C) Except where otherwise qualified in a particular information category, the information may be communicated to the extent that the weapons to which it relates are available for use by NATO assigned or earmarked units or for use by other units of a member state in support of NATO. The term "in support of NATO" refers to those weapons and weapon systems programmed for employment by units which although not assigned to or earmarked for NATO command, would operate in such a manner as to influence directly the plans and operations of NATO military commands.

1. AUTHORIZED RECIPIENTSa. NATO Member States

- (C) (1)
- NATO Member States -- Non-bilateral Agreement

Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, and Portugal. Personnel of Ministries of Defense and their subordinate military units and activities who have been delegated, by their respective national superiors, to have responsibility for NATO atomic matters to which the information pertains.

- (2)
- NATO Member States -- Bilateral Agreement

- (C) Belgium, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Personnel of Ministries of Defense and their subordinate military units and activities who have responsibilities for NATO atomic matters to which the information pertains.

b. ACCHAN

- (C) CINCHAN and personnel within his immediate headquarters and subordinate international headquarters and commands, and within national forces assigned to, or earmarked for, ACCHAN. Such dissemination by CINCHAN may be made on the basis that a subordinate may be provided such portion of the information as his superior receives and subsequently determines, in accordance with standards prescribed by his major commander, is essential for the effective performance of the subordinate's specific NATO function.


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Atomic Energy Act of 1954

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-134
By SJ, NARA, Date 11-26-02

~~SECRET~~(CFRD) 2. WEAPONS

The scope of information specified below applies to the following weapons:



L.1(a)

(SRD) 3. INFORMATION

a. For all recipients listed in paragraph 1 above pertaining to those weapons listed in paragraph 2:

(1) Yields.

(2) Numbers of nuclear weapons by type for use by forces assigned or earmarked for SACEUR, SACLANT, and CINCHAN and those in support of NATO.

(3) Location of atomic weapons for NATO use or in support of NATO.


(4) The association of specific weapons:

(a) with NATO forces in terms of a capability for delivering a weapon by Mark number;

(b) with a NATO country; and

(c) with a foreign aircraft or other delivery system.

b.



1.5(d)

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Atomic Energy Act of 1954

PAGES 3 AND 4 HAVE BEEN WITHHELD IN THEIR ENTIRETY
UNDER E.O. 12958, SECTION 6.1(a).

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

AUG 25 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. Atomic Information Proposed for Communication to
NATO Member States and ACCHAN (U)

(C) The Department of Defense has a requirement to extend the dissemination of atomic information within NATO member states and the Channel Command and, concurrently, provide a more common basis for atomic cooperation between NATO member states and military elements.

(C) We have set forth the atomic information and additional access requirements in the inclosure to this memorandum. Previous determinations have been made which permit release of the atomic information involved to NATO member states and the Channel Command, but with dissemination limited to high level officials and a limited number of advisors to each as are certified to the Secretary General of NATO as requiring the information concerned for NATO purposes. Approval of the proposed determination will permit an authorization for member states and CINCHAN to disseminate information received internally to the extent required for NATO planning purposes and provide a more common basis for atomic cooperation throughout NATO under provisions of the NATO Agreement and supporting Administrative Arrangements.

(C) We propose as a minimum that all NATO countries, except [redacted] will by the terms of this statutory determination receive information on numbers, yields and locations as specified in paragraph 3(a) of the determination.

3.4(b)(6)

[redacted]
[redacted] Countries with whom we have existing (active) bilateral agreements (i.e., [redacted] Germany, [redacted] and the United Kingdom) will receive additional information as listed in paragraph 3(b). Recipients will be required to protect the atomic information released under this determination in accordance with the 1964 Agreement and its supporting Annexes.

When separated from inclosures

handle this document as ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X- 4784

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 98-417+46-134

By cbm, NARA, Date 6-19-05

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
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
(C) In view of NSAM 197 concerning commitments to support NATO forces with atomic weapons, communications to member states and CINCHAN will be handled so as to avoid the interpretation of a U.S. commitment to subsequently provide weapons or delivery systems beyond those presently authorized by the President.

(U) Pursuant to Executive Order 10841, as amended, the Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have determined that the proposed cooperation and the proposed communication of atomic information set forth in the attachment will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

(U) As required by Executive Order 10956, amending Executive Order 10841, the determination is hereby referred to the President.

(U) The Department of Defense will notify the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of this determination, subject to any qualifications the President may impose, prior to communication of this information.


Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
AUG 25 1966


Secretary of Defense
JUL 30 1966

1 Attachment

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~~SECRET~~

Copy 1 of 60 copies each
of 4 pages, Series A

UNITED STATES ATOMIC INFORMATION PROPOSED FOR COMMUNICATION
TO NATO MEMBER STATES AND ACCHAN (U)

- (U) United States atomic information outlined below may be communicated on a need-to-know basis to the authorized recipients herein specified.
- (C) Except where otherwise qualified in a particular information category, the information may be communicated to the extent that the weapons to which it relates are available for use by NATO assigned or earmarked units or for use by other units of a member state in support of NATO. The term "in support of NATO" refers to those weapons and weapon systems programmed for employment by units which although not assigned to or earmarked for NATO command, would operate in such a manner as to influence directly the plans and operations of NATO military commands.

1. AUTHORIZED RECIPIENTS

a. NATO Member States

- (C) (1) NATO Member States -- Non-bilateral Agreement

Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, and Portugal. Personnel of Ministries of Defense and their subordinate military units and activities who have been delegated, by their respective national superiors, to have responsibility for NATO atomic matters to which the information pertains.

- (2) NATO Member States -- Bilateral Agreement

- (C) Belgium, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Personnel of Ministries of Defense and their subordinate military units and activities who have responsibilities for NATO atomic matters to which the information pertains.

b. ACCHAN

- (C) CINCHAN and personnel within his immediate headquarters and subordinate international headquarters and commands, and within national forces assigned to, or earmarked for, ACCHAN. Such dissemination by CINCHAN may be made on the basis that a subordinate may be provided such portion of the information as his superior receives and subsequently determines, in accordance with standards prescribed by his major commander, is essential for the effective performance of the subordinate's specific NATO function.

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Atomic Energy Act of 1954


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SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 98-417
By cbm, NARA, 6-11-05

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(CFRD) 2. WEAPONS

The scope of information specified below applies to the following weapons:



6.1(a)

(SRD) 3. INFORMATION

a. For all recipients listed in paragraph 1 above pertaining to those weapons listed in paragraph 2:

- (1) Yields.
- (2) Numbers of nuclear weapons by type for use by forces assigned or earmarked for SACEUR, SACLAN, and CINCHAN and those in support of NATO.
- (3) Location of atomic weapons for NATO use or in support of NATO.
- (4) The association of specific weapons:
 - (a) with NATO forces in terms of a capability for delivering a weapon by Mark number;
 - (b) with a NATO country; and
 - (c) with a foreign aircraft or other delivery system.

b. For specific member states listed in 1a.(2):

- (1) Fuzing options.
- (2) Characteristics and purposes of fuzes and external features of weapons as required for loading and delivery operations for those weapons available for NATO assigned or earmarked forces.
- (3) Type and operational description of those safety features of weapons and ancillary equipment as required for loading or delivery operations for those weapons available for NATO assigned or earmarked forces.
- (4) The probability against accidental or premature nuclear explosion and the overall probability against dud or abort.

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Atomic Energy Act of 1954

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(5) Safety criteria which reveal the approximate amount of high explosive in specific weapons when information is revealed by reference to quantities of explosives such as:

(a) Incremental amounts as given in tables of Quantity-Distance Standards for Explosives as approved by the Armed Services Safety Board on December 1, 1955. (In lieu of an increment, e.g.,

[REDACTED]

6.1(a)

(b) Equivalent weight of a standard general purpose bomb.

(6) Weapons may be identified as gun assembly or implosion, as appropriate. Gun assembly weapons may be described as safe against accidental assembly, and implosion weapons may be described as one-point safe.

(7)

[REDACTED]

6.1(a)

(8) Capacity and capability of atomic delivery systems and units in terms of the number of those specific type weapons programmed for NATO use or in support of NATO (not to reveal locations otherwise prohibited).

(9) Capacity and capability of special weapons storage units in support of NATO assigned or earmarked forces.

(10) The fact that the Polaris A-3 missile will use a re-entry system consisting of a cluster of three re-entry bodies, each of which may contain a specified nuclear warhead.

(11) Tactical spacing information as follows:

(a) An atomic weapon concerning which information has been authorized for communication to NATO may be identified to the recipient for purpose of indicating time spacing as an "A" or "B" type weapon.

(b) The fact that there is the possibility of preinitiation (no details revealed) as the reason for the time spacing for United States atomic weapons.

(c) The time spacing required (to avoid preinitiation) between the detonations of United States atomic weapons as functions of distance between bursts during the attack of a target or targets is given by the following table:

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Atomic Energy Act of 1954

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3.4(b)(2)

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Atomic Energy Act of 1954

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Monday, September 19, 1966 -- 7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bob McNamara's memorandum to you on how to handle the offset problem with Erhard.

State has been working all day on a plan to deal with the offset problem without a radical unilateral troop reduction.


Tonight George McGhee has come in with a strong cable, which I am getting typed for you, underlining the danger of a substantial troop reduction arrived at unilaterally and making certain proposals for alternative offsets.

I suspect this will be the major item for discussion at lunch tomorrow. I will get you George McGhee's cable and, I trust, the State Department paper before then.

The object at lunch should not be to make final decisions but for you to hear from George Ball and Bob McNamara their somewhat different perspective on the problem we face and the options open to us.

We shall be coming back to you for final decisions before McNamara leaves for Europe.

W. W. Rostow



WWRostow:rlh

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

19 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
NLJ 83-248 (#12c)
By *WJH/jcs* NARS, Date *8-19-86*

Chancellor Erhard, in December 1963 and again in December 1965, reaffirmed his intention to fulfill the offset arrangement. In 1963, the Communique stated, "The President expressed appreciation for the cooperative arrangement whereby United States dollar expenditures for American military forces in Germany are offset by German purchases of military equipment in the United States. It was agreed that this arrangement should continue." Last December 21, the joint Communique said that you and he "discussed the arrangements between the two governments whereby United States military expenditures in Germany entering the balance of payments are offset by the Federal Republic through its purchase of United States military equipment and services. It was agreed that these arrangements were of great value to both governments and should be fully executed and continued."

The current German commitment is to place \$1,350,000,000 of military orders in the US in calendar years 1965-1966 and to make payments of that amount in US fiscal years 1966-1967. As of September 1, the orders (with three months to go) have reached only \$665 million, or less than half of the commitment, and payments (with nine months to go) have reached only \$261 million, or about 20% of the commitment. A September 9 cable from Ambassador McGhee reported that the German Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs in the Chancellor's office said "as matters now stand he sees no real alternative to a large shortfall in the present offset payments target next June 30 and a stretchout of the period in which to meet the target."

It is clear that the difficulty arises from the inadequacy of the German military budget. That budget increased annually until 1963. It has leveled off since then. Indeed, in real terms (taking account of inflation), the 1967 German military budget is almost 10% less than in 1963. Germany now devotes 5% of her Gross National Product to defense, compared to 6% in 1963. The UK spends 6.8% and the US 8.8%. While the Gross National Product of Germany is increasing on an average of 5% a year, none of the increase is being devoted to military expenditures. The Chancellor states that the reason for this allocation of resources is domestic political pressures.

It should be remembered and understood that the German shortfall in meeting the offset is not because Germany has no military requirements to make purchases in the United States. US policy has been to ask Germany (1) to do only what she promised to do -- namely, to meet the offset, (2) to buy only what she needs to bring her forces up to NATO standards, and (3) to buy from us only those items which it is most economical to purchase in the US. With respect to German requirements to meet NATO standards, the German forces are seriously deficient. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and USCINCEUR have concurred in a report which indicated some \$4 billion in German requirements for initial equipping, modernizing and

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training and for reserve stocks. By way of comparison: The US has a division slice of more than 41,000 men in Europe while the Germans have 27,000; the US has been maintaining 90 days of war reserve stocks in Europe while the Germans barely meet 30 days on some items and considerably less than that in the major equipment area; the US is at 100% of equipment levels in all its divisions while the Germans are not only less fully equipped, but equipped with less modern arms. Another comparison: The United States has 230,000 tons of bombs either in or in transit to Southeast Asia; the German Air Force's total inventory amounts to approximately 4400 tons -- an obviously inadequate amount. If Germany were to procure proper conventional ordnance for her aircraft, expenditures on the order of \$150 million would be involved for this item alone. German statements to the effect that they do not need the military items involved in the offset are therefore clearly untrue.

Our best estimates are that, unless something is done, there will be a very large gap between the foreign exchange costs of US deployments to Germany (an average of approximately \$850 million a year over the next five years) and German foreign-exchange expenditures on the military account in the US (predicted by the Germans to average \$350 million a year). Therefore, unless changes are made, a gap of \$500 million a year should be expected next year and probably every year thereafter.

It would not be wise for the United States to accept this gap as a continuing situation.

I believe that we should break the problem into two parts. The first part is the current offset referred to above; the second part is the follow-on offset arrangement.

With respect to the current offset, the agreement to place \$1,350,000,000 of orders by the end of December 1966 cannot be fulfilled. Payment, however, of the \$1,350,000,000 by June 1967, in accordance with that part of the offset arrangement, could be made despite the reduced budget by German borrowing for prepayment against future orders. This approach is not fully satisfactory, but is probably the most we can now ask for. The Chancellor almost certainly will object to such an approach, but in my view we should push hard for this form of fulfillment of the current offset.

With respect to the follow-on offset arrangement, we should:

a. Press the Chancellor for a larger defense budget and consequent offset. In view of the Chancellor's political problems, the pay-off from this pressure may not be great in the next two years, but it may produce returns in the longer run. (In this connection, the Chancellor may propose the inclusion in the offset of purchases of space items, items destined for foreign military assistance, passenger aircraft for the German airline, and so on. We should accept any items which are truly "additional" and not merely a "giving of credit" to Germany for purchases, such as the passenger aircraft, which Germany would make here anyway. The total of such "additional" items will be very small and therefore almost irrelevant to the basic problem.

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b. Insist on trilateral (US-UK-Germany) discussions to address the question of how the remaining gap will be closed -- including arrangements for US troop reductions.

We must face the fact that the United States can deal with any remaining gap only (1) by cutting US military expenditures in Germany or (2) by absorbing the balance of payments drain caused by the excess of US expenditures over German offset.

I believe we can cut US military expenditures in Europe by about \$200 million (\$160 million in Germany) without significantly reducing our military effectiveness. (The JCS do not concur.) This \$200 million total is reached by reducing each division slice by 10,000 support personnel (a total of 50,000 men, producing a saving of \$125 million); by "dual-basing" approximately half of our 700 reconnaissance and fighter aircraft (saving \$60 million); and by other economies (\$15 million). But a deficit in the vicinity of \$300 million is likely to remain. This \$300 million cannot be saved without removing major combat units.

Even the \$200 million adjustments may have a traumatic psychological impact in Germany, in NATO and in the United States. Adjustments to close all of the remaining \$300 million gap, by cutting US combat power, would be even more traumatic and, in my view, dangerous; but I believe some reductions in US combat power will have to be considered if the problem cannot be solved in any other way.

The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury have received copies of this memorandum. The Secretary of the Treasury concurs in it. I believe the Secretary of State does also; however, he is planning to supplement this memorandum with a paper describing the political pressures which today limit the Chancellor's freedom of action.

Robert S. McNamara

cc: Secretary of State
Secretary of the Treasury
Mr. Rostow ✓

CJCS

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ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 SEP 19 PM 3 28

MEMORANDUM

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW'S OFFICE



Secretary McNamara asked that the original of the attached memo be put in the President's night reading today.

Deely Gates

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1966 SEP 19 PM 3 28

[Handwritten signature]

sent, a letter regarding today.
of the attached memo re but in the event -
especially mention that the objective

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW'S OFFICE 

CHIEF OF THE BUREAU

MEMORANDUM

Monday, September 19, 1966
1:20 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status of Civilian Morale in North Vietnam

This wrap-up is based on the full text of the comprehensive CIA report from all sources, which Sect. McNamara initiated.

When bombing of the North first began, it generated a high degree of patriotic response. It was not unlike the initial reaction of the British when the Germans hit their homeland in 1940. But it seems clear that the initial level of patriotic fervor has not been maintained.

As a result of the bombing, every segment of the population has been forced to make sacrifices in living standards. Hardest hit are those living in southern North Vietnam -- about 15% of the population. Letters to relatives and friends (e. g., in Thailand) mention personal hardships and anxieties more than do letters from other parts of the country.

The NVN Ministry of Labor released data early this year on absenteeism among construction workers. It was worst among the people in the southern provinces -- averaging more than 16 days per worker -- or 5% of total working days scheduled. Shortages of food are reported.

Main sources of complaint elsewhere are: hardships caused by evacuation from urban centers; splitting of families; lower quality of consumer goods; longer work hours without added pay; loss of income resulting from transfers from normal jobs to defense-related tasks,

The regime has talked publicly of the need for tighter discipline among both Party members and the general population. A high government official called a few months ago for revision of the legal code dealing with counter-revolutionary activities, protection of state property, and the rights and duties of citizens "in order to satisfy the demands of wartime."

As the bombing has continued, economic and political problems have intensified. Patriotic fervor appears to have diminished.

Official publications have complained of difficulties in using people already mobilized. There have been complaints about lack of experience and discipline among Party cadres. Prejudice and discrimination against the young and against women, are reported.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 93-159

By ip, NARA, Date 4-18-96

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

9/19/66

Managerial inefficiency is reported; for example, a recent message reported 1,600 workers being sent to a highway repair site, with no supervisory personnel present or available.

Captured North Vietnamese soldiers in the South have told us that people in the North are aware of the hardships, sickness and injuries suffered by infiltrated troops. As morale of NVN troops in the South drops, there is every reason to believe it will have an effect on the folks at home.

Outlook

Civilian morale is likely to continue to drop in the North over the next year. Trouble on the farms -- resulting largely from labor mobilization -- has already affected the current harvest. Food prices have started to rise on the free market. Beyond food shortages, other strains are likely to increase.

There is no agreement in the intelligence community as to when morale may reach the breaking point. The intelligence community doubts that weakening morale will deprive the Hanoi leadership in the coming year of the freedom to pursue the conflict in any manner it chooses. My feeling is that the pressures on the regime may be greater than most of us realize.

I make this point not because I believe they are hurting enough to force them to negotiate now -- or at any particular early date; but because debate about bombing in this town between crusaders and detractors has sometimes failed to make clear the important middle ground: that we are imposing a day-to-day cost on Hanoi; this cost is considerable, if not decisive; it is rising; and we shouldn't let them off the hook until the very day they make parallel de-escalatory moves.

W. W. Rostow

Pres. file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 19, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry

As you instructed, I met with leaders of 25 national Jewish organizations this afternoon. They presented the attached declaration, asking me to give it to you.

They made two requests:

- They want a Presidential statement deploring the plight of the Soviet Jews. (Secretary Rusk opposes such statements, because they aggravate our relations with the Soviet Government and may well hurt the Soviet Jews more than they help. He thinks the Soviets "freeze" when it looks as if they would be knuckling under to American pressure. However, the American Jewish community disagrees, believing your public concern is effective, and a great encouragement to the persecuted Jews. You might consider a brief reference to the Jews, along with others denied their rights in the world, in a speech sometime in the next six weeks.)
- They want more and stronger private approaches to Soviet diplomats. They also want diplomatic approaches to the Eastern Europeans, hoping they will influence the Soviets. (Secretary Rusk says he will raise the plight of the Jews when he talks to Gromyko ^{this} ~~next~~ week. We agreed that it would be useful to tell the Jewish delegation in confidence that he would do so; and they were most appreciative. I shall ask the State Department to take other appropriate occasions to show our concern.)

W. W. Rostow

Attachment
As stated

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 88-46
By ing NARA, Date 9-6-86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-275
By cb, NARA, Date 9-7-94

~~SECRET~~

Monday - September 19, 1966

Mr. President -

This is CIA's estimate of the prospects for stability in the DR over the next six months following withdrawal of the IAPF.

It is somewhat gloomier than the Crimmins - Bunker - Bowdler cautious optimism. But even the pessimists seem to agree that Balaguer has a better than even chance to see his way through the next six months.

W. W. Rostow

ATTACHMENT

SNIE 86.2-2-66, 19 Sept 66

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-45

By ing NARA, Date 3-15-89

90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - September 19, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Colombia: What We Achieved With Our Program Loan

A year ago when Colombia faced a severe political-economic crisis, you authorized a \$65 million program loan to Colombia on the basis of meaningful self-help measures. Today the situation in Colombia contrasts most favorably with that of last fall, thanks in considerable part to that loan.

The outlook then was grim:

- The budget was seriously in deficit.
- The inflationary threat was grave.
- Disposable foreign exchange reserves were badly depleted.
- Substantial payment arrears had accumulated.
- An over-valued exchange rate resulted in stifling controls.
- Public confidence was at a low ebb.
- The spring general elections and survival of the National Front were in doubt.

In September, 1965, the Consultative Group (IBRD, IMF, AID) helped the Colombians draw up a stabilization program buttressed by external financial support. After a year the program has removed the main causes of instability. This is the picture today:

- The current budgetary surplus has reached levels permitting an acceleration of investment expenditures.
- The inflationary spiral has been brought under control.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

- Net exchange reserves have increased by some \$41 million, with payments arrears eliminated.
- Trade liberalization has exceeded the IMF target.
- There has been a resurgence of confidence inside and outside Colombia.
- The elections were orderly and the democratic, progressive forces of the National Front emerged strengthened.

Much remains to be done, of course, but our investment in this important Latin American country during the past 12 months has paid off.

W. W. Rostow

cc - Bill Moyers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 19, 1966

Dear President Senghor:

Thank you so much for your letter of September 3.


I was greatly distressed to learn of the damage which prolonged drought has done to the Senegalese economy, particularly the current grain crop. I can assure you, Mr. President, that my own childhood on a farm in an arid region taught me the value of water and the curse of drought.

I have asked my associates to give your request careful, sympathetic and prompt consideration. However, as you know, there are heavy demands on our limited grain supplies. I am pleased to learn, therefore, that your government is also canvassing other available sources.

I hope to be ready to discuss this matter with you in detail during your visit here.

I am very much looking forward to seeing you.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Leopold Sedar Senghor
President of the Republic of Senegal
Dakar

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 88-45
By inf NARA, Date 3-15-89

Monday, September 19, 1966 -- 12:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

I received at 11:30 a. m. today Mr. Jacques Torczyner, President of the Zionist Organization of America.

Mr. Torczyner has two requests:

-- That I reconsider my turn down of a speech to his organization at lunch on October 21 (I regretted on the advice of Bill Moyers and Harry McPherson who know more about these matters than I do).

-- That you consider using the occasion of the Zionist organization meeting (October 20-23) to speak to them at any time in that period convenient to you. The meeting ends with a dinner October 23.

Mr. Torczyner's argument was as follows:

-- Your record with respect to Israel and Jewish affairs goes back at least to your role in the Arab-Israeli war of 1956 and is remarkably sympathetic.

-- You have commanded down through the 1964 election an astonishing support and affection from Jews in America.

-- The gossip and discussion stimulated by the reports of what you said to the Jewish War Veterans has disturbed the Jewish community in the U. S. When I asked what the resentment was, he said that the Jews in America had come to feel themselves wholly American; they are not united as a Jewish community; and they were disturbed to be identified as Jews with respect to whatever opinions they happen to take on a particular issue confronting America, like Viet Nam.

-- He said that Goldberg's session in New York was not effective and did not convince those who participated.

-- He feels that your personal appearance before an enthusiastic Jewish audience in which you spoke positively, without defensiveness, about whatever was on your mind would end the matter, and, in addition, it would be good for New York politics.

Torczyner also said that he was ready to bring Dayan back to the U. S. to talk about Viet Nam if we so wished. He believes Dayan will be available after Ben-Gurion's 80th birthday celebration.

I regret that I do not know enough about the importance to be attached to the Zionist Organization of America and Mr. Torczyner to advise you on this question, nor do I have a confident feel for how serious things are in the American Jewish community.

I am sending copies to Bill Moyers and Harry McPherson.

W. W. Rostow

Reconsider and speak to the Zionist Organization lunch Oct. 21 no

Inform Torczyner that my appearance October 20-23 is not feasible ✓

Tell Torczyner I am considering appearance at Zionist Organization of America session no

See me _____

cc Bill Moyers
Harry McPherson

forget it
L

WWRostow:rlh

September 19, 1966 - 12:15 pm

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Thailand and the U.S. Role

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 88-44
By inf NARA, Date 6-7-89

Bill Bundy is to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow in closed session.

Attached is his prepared statement. Secretary Rusk has gone over it and approved this version.

The following main elements are covered:

- Historical background -- pages 1-2
- Post-war Collective security -- pages 2-3
- Thai Resistance to "wars of national liberation" -- pages 3-5
- Thai support for Free World positions -- pages 5-6
- Regional Cooperation -- pages 6-7
- Thailand and her neighbors -- pages 7-9
- Communist threat to Thailand -- pages 9-12
- The Thai Nation -- pages 12-13
- Present Thai Government -- pages 13-16
- Thai efforts to deal with Insurgency -- pages 16-19
- U. S. Assistance -- page 20
- U. S. Military in Thailand -- pages 20-21
- Legal Basis for U. S. Assistance -- pages 21-25
- Aid from Third Countries -- pages 25-26
- Military Aid from Third Countries -- page 26
- Conclusion -- page 27

I think you will find it particularly useful to look at:

pages 3-5 in which the Thai contribution to Laos and Viet-Nam is covered effectively;

pages 9-12, containing a good description of the present threat to Thailand;

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

pages 12-13, which point out the essential differences between Thailand and Viet-Nam;

pages 16-19, describing what the Thai are doing to meet their problems;

page 20 (U. S. Assistance) gives the monetary extent of our aid;

pages 20-21, a good description of our military presence which keeps it in focus;

pages 25-26, interesting in its emphasis on aid from others (18 countries) and the fact that Third Country and International aid to Thailand exceeds that from the U. S;

page 27, (Conclusion) is worth reading in full.

I have highlighted key portions.

Copies are to be in the hands of Committee members this afternoon.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

~~SECRET~~

Monday, Sept. 19, 1966
11:15 a.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Marvin Watson

Roy Jenkins, British Home Secretary, and a rising star in the Labor government, is in town today and Tuesday. He is touring this country primarily to see U. S. prisons.

He was to have seen Bill Moyers today. Bill, without committing you in any way, indicated that he would see if your schedule might permit him to slip in and have a few words with you.

Pat Dean called me about it this morning. Seeing Jenkins is not necessary. If you so wished, however, it might give you a chance to get a feel for British Labor government thought and leave with Jenkins, for transmittal to London, your concern about the unilateral troop withdrawals and other hasty actions which might unhinge the Germans, Congressional opinion here, etc.

W. W. Rostow

Get Jenkins in _____

Schedule too tight _____

See me _____

Wednesday, September 21, 1966
7:55 a. m.

Mr. President:

Here -- for your clearance -- is Arthur Goldberg's draft speech for tomorrow, Thursday, September 22.

Sec. Rusk has gone over it carefully and cleared it.

The key passages on Viet Nam and China (sidelined in red) do not go beyond existing policy.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Monday, Sept. 19 1966
11:15 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This fair-minded editorial on the
Vietnamese election may interest you.

W. W. R.

Attachment from
"The Economist"

do not make headlines. Headlines are made by angry expressions of disappointment and "threats" of withdrawal. But it has become pretty clear that such "threats," as bargaining counters, soon lose their credibility with repetition. Another note is now being struck, as it was on Wednesday by President Obote, when he spoke of the possibility of Uganda being reluctantly compelled to part company with a Commonwealth which it still values highly, and indicated his intention, if it should ever come to that, of withdrawing without futile recrimination.

With the sorry exception of Sir Albert Margai of Sierra Leone, the Africans and their allies in the Rhodesia dispute have generally put their case in reasoned terms during these Marlborough House talks. (This even applies to Mr Kapwepwe, apart from his final childish outbursts of mere rudeness.) At bottom, they have concentrated on bringing home the undoubted fact that Britain simply could not expect its relations with them to be unaffected if it spinelessly consented to the Smith government's take-over of Rhodesia's 4 million Africans, which they see as amounting to an extension of the South African government's control of 15 million non-white subjects. This fact, of course, ought not to need to be brought home either to British politicians or to the British public; but it does. In the intervals between Commonwealth conferences, bland assumptions tend to gain ground that Britain's standing in the world would not suffer noticeably if it did some neat little deal with Mr Ian Smith that abandoned Rhodesia's Africans to him. Even if this conference had ended in complete and caustic disagreement about ways of handling Rhodesia, it could still in this way have had a real educational value.

A meeting like this can, in fact, be seen as primarily a teach-in at the highest level. The enlightenment is not one-sided. Some African political leaders seem to need this kind of top level teach-in to convince them that it is simply not possible for them to impose on Britain unacceptable courses of action. It can also be educative for some of them, to note at first hand, in London, that to couch advice about British policy virtually in the form of commands can be counter-productive. This enlightenment may not come to people who can only bellow their advice at Britain across vast distances, as would happen if indeed there were no more of these conferences.

For both the British and the Africans, a Commonwealth meeting is also a salutary reminder that most of the membership is neither British nor African—and neither black nor

white. True, the other member governments had gone along, with widely varying degrees of enthusiasm, with the Africans' insistence on devoting almost all of this session to the Rhodesian question. In most cases, they recognise that all members must be concerned with an issue that bears so directly on the principle of human equality, and on the process of emergence into sovereignty, the process that accounts for their own presence at the Marlborough House table. Even so, this conference has provided some necessary reminders that all member states have their own regional and other pre-occupations. If Mr George Brown gave prominence to British aims in Europe when he addressed Tuesday's session, if this address was promptly followed by sharp Indo-Pakistani exchanges about nuclear proliferation as well as about Kashmir, if the prime ministers of Malaysia and Singapore showed a certain common preoccupation with (not, of course, a common approach to) their own region's problems and prospects, so much the better. Perspective matters. Rhodesia is in the Commonwealth spotlight; but its problems exist not in a vacuum, but in a complex world whose various troubles directly affect the chances of solving them.

In turn, this conference too has not taken place in a vacuum. Its participants, once freed from the battle over draft communiqués, lift their eyes and see that the Rhodesian problem (like the Commonwealth) is still there. After all this, what next? During their debates, the murder of Dr Verwoerd and his swift replacement by the famously tough Mr Vorster (see page 1120) drew fresh attention to South Africa's significance as the hard reality that underlies the Rhodesian problem and makes it so hard. As they disperse from London, some of them will go straight to New York, where Rhodesia will loom large in the UN Assembly's debates on the whole complex of southern African issues. Will they there insist on the whole world community honestly squaring up to the fact that any attempt to make the pressures upon the Salisbury government more effective must mean, in some degree, making them (or the threat of them) effective upon its South African mainstay? Whether or not the Commonwealth countries can in fact now unite in taking any specific initiative at the United Nations, the prospects of mounting a truly effective international effort to speed a Rhodesian solution must depend very largely on their joint ability to rally other states in support of their eventual plan of action. The Commonwealth still exists—wiser, perhaps, without being sadder. The final verdict on the operational, as distinct from educational, value of its latest conference cannot yet be brought in.

The Economist Sept. 17, 1966

Evidence for the Defence

It wasn't a western-style free election; but that 80 per cent has made its point

IT was not like polling day at Huyton. The reservations about Sunday's election in South Vietnam are entirely justified. Some voters may even have been pushed to the polls at gun-point, as the Tass correspondent claims, though other reporters with a reputation for honest coverage of Vietnam's seamy side spotted nothing of the sort either in Saigon or outside. There was doubtless some quiet stuffing of ballot boxes out in the boondocks, though a government that invited the United Nations to supervise the election, and is still open to demands for a post-election check, is unlikely to have risked too much fiddling of the books. What there will certainly have been is a good deal of unspoken intimidation. When a government of Marshal Ky's sort invites you to vote, many people who would otherwise have preferred to stay at home catch the point and dutifully troop in to the polling booths, if only to register blank votes. Let it be repeated: this was not a really free election. There are very few wholly free

elections anywhere. In the spectrum of relative freedom, South Vietnam's election stands somewhere between an election in, say, Greece (where the opposition claims that the police in country areas use a degree of "persuasion") and an election in a communist country where there is only one list of candidates and persuasion is almost total.

But South Vietnam's exact place on the electoral spectrum is not the issue. For all the reservations about it, Sunday's voting did demonstrate two things. The first is that the government is able to administer a much larger part of the country than most people realised it could. It turns out that about 70 per cent of the population live in areas where Saigon's writ runs strongly enough for an election to be held without the Vietcong being able to disrupt it. This does not mean that the government controls as much as seventh-tenths of the country at all times and for all purposes. Organising an election is a daytime affair. Some of the areas where voting

took place during Sunday will have been partly or wholly under Vietcong control the night after. But to the extent that a government's authority can be measured by its ability to run a complicated business like an election over a period of several weeks, the Saigon regime has shown that it is much the bigger of the two rival powers in the land. The National Liberation Front is still confined to the relatively unpopulated back-country and, outside the back-country, to night-running operations. It cannot yet claim that it has got the government bottled up in a handful of city enclaves.

This says something for the government's effectiveness; it proves nothing about its popularity. The second important thing about Sunday's vote is that, of the South Vietnamese who were in a position to choose between voting and not voting, over four-fifths did vote (and a lot of them probably spent Sunday night explaining why to the Vietcong).

Plenty of these were simple souls doing what the men in uniform told them to do. But no one who has met the intelligent and cultured Vietnamese middle class, or watched some of them demonstrate their opposition to the government in the Buddhist riots last May, would claim that all South Vietnamese are docile poll-fodder. It was plain several weeks before voting day that the government was not in full command of the outcome of the election. There was a "floating electorate"—20 or 30 per cent of those registered, at a guess—made up of hesitators who could have decided to stay at home if they wanted to as an anti-government gesture. They were the difference between, say, a 50 or 60 per cent poll—the docile obeyers of orders—and an 80 or 90 per cent one. In the event the majority of this floating electorate seems to have turned out. This is the advantage of risking even a semi-free election. Nobody pays attention to the 99.92 per cent

that President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam notched up for himself in 1964 because nobody believes that communist election organisers leave anything to chance. But when a government loosens the screws enough to leave the size of the turnout genuinely in doubt—as Sunday's turnout in South Vietnam was, with the Vietcong and the Buddhist leaders for different reasons trying hard to whittle it down—an 80 per cent vote makes the sceptics sit up and take notice. Marshal Ky's gamble has paid off.

None of this makes South Vietnam a democracy; not even the first steps in that direction will have been taken until a constitution has been drafted and a legislative assembly has come into existence. But it does puncture two arguments President Johnson's critics have lately been using. It punctures the claim that the government's authority has virtually collapsed outside Saigon and a few other large towns. And it deflates the argument that the South Vietnamese are so war-weary that they have lost the wish to preserve a non-communist system. The majority of those who are capable of framing an independent judgment are not ready to throw in the towel publicly. The moral basis for the Americans' intervention in Vietnam depends on their ability to produce some reasonable evidence that they are there with the consent of most South Vietnamese. When there was not even the most rudimentary mechanism for testing this consent, and especially when the Buddhist leaders were in revolt against Marshal Ky, the evidence was in doubt. Now the onus is thrown back on the communists. It is up to them to demonstrate the justification for continuing a war which they started in 1959 after a five-year truce. Which comes closer to a demonstration of popular assent—an 80 per cent vote in a semi-free election, or a 99 per cent vote in a wholly unfree one?

How Far Left for Jo?

DELEGATES to the Trades Union Congress at Blackpool, as they edged into the conference hall, often had thrust into their hands a buff coloured tract bearing the message: "You put him in. . . . Now get him out." The crimes listed against Mr Wilson included creating half a million unemployed by next year and "subordinating the interests of trade unionists to the continuation of vast overseas expenditure and Tory foreign policies." The principal remedies proposed were: opposing the incomes policy and wages freeze, "increasing the worker's share of responsibility and profits in his industry," setting up works councils and insisting that the "so-called Labour Government" make an all-out attack on "the big monopolies." At a casual glance, this looked routine stuff from the Communist slogan factory in King Street. In fact, it bore the imprimatur of the Liberal Party Organisation.

This may have been no more than a hastily-scribbled pamphlet designed to cash in on the TUC delegates' likely disillusion with Mr Wilson. As such it may even have won more passing sympathy than Mr Heath's blatant bid for the same market. It may well be that the pamphlet was the product of the few weeks when the Liberal press office was under the care of Mr George Kiloh, national chairman of the

The Liberal Assembly next week gives Mr Grimond and his followers a badly-needed chance to work out where exactly they want to go

has been quoted as saying that the Young Liberals had recruited "only one or two former Trotskyists.")

The Liberal leadership can certainly be given credit for showing more tact and understanding in dealing with their youth movement than the Labour party ever has. Whether a series of recent meetings with leading Young Liberals has really done the trick only next week's Assembly can show, but Mr Kiloh and his friends seem to have dropped their demand that the Liberal MPs should resort to "violent tactics" and are now ready to "back Jo."

The Young Liberals' extremism is a portent of the basic problem now looming before the party. Mr Grimond has spent nine years trying to create a radical, non-socialist party of the left, only to find Mr Wilson and Mr Heath both elbowing their way into the same corner. The Young Liberals are showing one way out, by moving further to the left, but even if they match Mr Grimond's own pathological dislike of the Tories, what in fact do they have in common with the other Liberal MPs? With Mr Emlyn Hooson, for instance, that prim young man straight from the Welsh bible belt? Or with Mr Jeremy Thorpe, witty as they come but dependent for his seat in Parliament on Devon farmers? What sort of impact are the young Liberals likely to have on the middle

Monday, September 19, 1966
9:30 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Commissioner Ramey's response to your invitation to present a personal assessment of the progress and problems in the nuclear desalting program.

Jim Ramey has been, as you know, an effective crusader in this effort. The memorandum reflects impatience at the pace of progress and with those who have had reservations about the program.

His specific recommendations are:

- that you assemble those concerned and express your personal interest and support;
- that the expanded program submitted to you in September 1965 by AEC and Interior be made a part of the new Water for Peace program.

I have followed this field closely for some years as State Department planner. If there is any bureaucrat in this town who wants to see this program go operational more than Jim Ramey, it is I; for it could have immense foreign policy and human benefits.

The problem has been that technology has not yet yielded us economic irrigation water by this route; and various bureaucrats have been afraid of getting us into either excessive subsidies or actual white elephants.

On the other hand, I am not personally convinced that calculations of those who have resisted are the last word. I keep remembering that we would not have built the transcontinental railway on a conventional cost/benefit basis.

Therefore, I place great store by the Bunker exercise. I believe he must keep his mind equally open to Ramey and (say) the Budget Bureau; and he must be equipped with some first-rate men who have not been fighting this war. Properly conducted, the Israeli exercise plus the project firming up for the Metropolitan Water District in California should give us some hard answers.

In addition, I am told, the Water for Peace Conference will take up nuclear desalting in a serious way.

As for your meeting the experts, I believe the right occasion would be a session with Bunker when he is far enough along.

I assume you will wish me to make Jim Ramey's memorandum quietly available to Bunker.

W. W. Rostow

Make Ramey memo available to Bunker ✓

Call early expert session as Ramey suggests

Await Bunker report

See me

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

September 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW ←

Walt --

This memorandum of Ramey's is a pretty barefaced effort at undercutting the normal processes of government. His charges are completely unjustified except from the standpoint of an unscrupulous promoter of his own interests. Don Hornig, Charlie Schultze, State Department, Gardner Ackley as well as your own staff can all be listed as "doubters" when measured by Ramey's yardstick. He apparently feels that all of the funds available for foreign assistance should be devoted to nuclear desalting.

With Brom's guidance, I have drafted the attached memorandum that you may wish to use as the basis for a note to the President covering the Ramey letter -- which the President has not yet seen.


Charles E. Johnson

Mr. Rostow:
I have edited the draft memo to the President
BKS

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

68 99

Saturday - September 17, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Birthday Greeting to Brazilian President Castello Branco

President Castello Branco celebrates his 66th birthday next Tuesday, September 20.

He sent you birthday greetings. State recommends that you reciprocate.


I think it would be a nice gesture. A suggested message for your approval is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Proposed message to
President Castello Branco

Approve message



Disapprove

99a

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL BIRTHDAY MESSAGE TO BRAZILIAN
PRESIDENT CASTELLO BRANCO

On the occasion of your birthday I send you my sincere congratulations
and best wishes for your continued health and prosperity.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

to P 100
12:15

~~SECRET - SAVIN~~

Saturday, September 17, 1966
12:00 noon

MR. PRESIDENT:

The town is somewhat exercised this morning about the possibility that we have been involved in a fairly deep penetration of Chinese Communist territory above the North Vietnamese border.

The military believe two incidents are involved:

- a U. S. attack on the Hanoi/Peking railroad 30 miles or so southwest of the CHICOM border;
- a CHICOM training exercise at the same time north of the border.

The State Department suspects that there is only one incident and our planes penetrated the CHICOM border in the course of the engagement with MIGs.

3.3(b)
(1), (3)

CINCPAC is studying our [REDACTED] alongside our tracking of our own aircraft. I will report to you CINCPAC's result.

Secretary Rusk mentioned to me his uneasiness at incidents of this kind at this time.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET - SAVIN~~ attachments

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-13
By cbm, NARA, Date 6-14-04

~~SECRET - SAVIN~~

1002
Saturday, September 17, 1966

NMCC MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: CHICOM Air Activity

3.3(b)(1), (3) At 9:24 p.m. EDT September 17, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
(map enclosed).

3.3(b)(1), (3) These [REDACTED] coincide, timewise, with an armed reconnaissance mission of four USAF F-105's along the Hanoi-Peking railroad, between 30 and 35 miles southwest of CHICOM border, from which only three aircraft returned. There was a MIG engagement, however, the aircraft was lost to ground fire.

3.3(b)(1), (3) Certain aspects of the [REDACTED] suggest that it might have related to a training exercise against their own aircraft.

3.3(b)(1), (3) CINCPAC is investigating to include analysis of [REDACTED] and our own flight following and navigational data, with emphasis on the above flight which lost one F-105, including the circumstances of that loss.

~~SECRET - SAVIN~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-13
By cbm, NARA, Date 6-14-04

Saturday, September 17, 1966
10:00 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Indo/Pakistan military talks

There is as yet no information on these talks except a FBIS report (#82, 14 Sept. , attached).

They appear very limited, but successful.

The agreement appears to be this: troops should be kept in peace stations, and if any movements are necessary, they should be carried out with advance notice to the other side, so that there may be no misunderstanding and tension may be avoided. No troops are withdrawing from any territory.

The meetings between the military representatives were thoroughly cordial. The Pakistan Commander in Chief-designate is General Yahya Khan, and India's Chief of Army Staff is Kumaramangalam. The two generals are old friends and were in a prisoner-of-war camp together in Italy in World War II!

W. W. Rostow

Copy of FBIS 82

Indo-Pakistani Military Talks

Military leaders of India and Pakistan have agreed on steps to insure the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the border areas. The agreement was reached in the talks in New Delhi between Chief of Army Staff General Kumaramangalam and Commander in Chief-designate of the Pakistan Army, Lt. General Yahya Khan. A Defense Ministry spokesman told newsmen this evening that it had been generally agreed that as far as possible troops should be kept in peace stations, and army movement in border areas should be avoided. If any movements become necessary, they should be carried out with advance notice to the other side so there may be no misunderstanding, and tension may be avoided. There is, however, no question of anyone withdrawing from anywhere. Recent tension has arisen because of reports of movements of troops toward the border areas.

The spokesman said that the agreement between the Army representatives was a matter for happiness and he hoped it would help reduce tension in the border areas.

General Yahya Khan, who returned to Pakistan this evening, told newsmen at Palam Airport that the talks were satisfactory. He said that they had reached a soldiers' agreement in continuation of the earlier agreement between the Army Chiefs of the two countries. He said that he had invited General Kumaramangalam to visit Pakistan, and they would meet when the occasion arose.

All-India Radio's correspondent says the talks between the Army representatives this morning, which lasted over two hours, were held in a cordial atmosphere. Gen. Yahya Khan gave a luncheon in honor of General Kumaramangalam. The two generals, our correspondent points out, were together in a prisoner-of-war camp in Italy during World War II. Both tried to escape. Gen. Yahya Khan succeeded, and General Kumaramangalam was recaptured by the Germans.

INDO-PAKISTANI MILITARY TALKS

Wiggins

DELHI DOMESTIC SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1530Z 14 SEP 66 B

(TEXT) MILITARY LEADERS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN HAVE AGREED ON STEPS TO INSURE THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL CONDITIONS IN THE BORDER AREAS. THE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED IN THE TALKS IN NEW DELHI BETWEEN CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF GENERAL KUMARAMANGALAM AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF DESIGNATE OF THE PAKISTAN ARMY LT. GENERAL YAHYA KHAN. A DEFENSE MINISTRY SPOKESMAN TOLD NEWSMEN THIS EVENING THAT IT HAD BEEN GENERALLY AGREED THAT AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TROOPS SHOULD BE KEPT IN PEACE STATIONS, AND ARMY MOVEMENT IN BORDER AREAS SHOULD BE AVOIDED. IF ANY MOVEMENTS BECOME NECESSARY THEY SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT WITH ADVANCE NOTICE TO THE OTHER SIDE SO THERE MAY BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING, AND TENSION MAY BE AVOIDED. THERE IS, HOWEVER, NO QUESTION OF ANYONE WITHDRAWING FROM ANYWHERE. RECENT TENSION HAS ARISEN BECAUSE OF REPORTS OF MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS TOWARD THE BORDER AREAS.

THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ARMY REPRESENTATIVES WAS A MATTER FOR HAPPINESS AND HE HOPED IT WOULD HELP REDUCE TENSION IN THE BORDER AREAS.

GENERAL YAHYA KHAN, WHO RETURNED TO PAKISTAN THIS EVENING, TOLD NEWSMEN AT PALAM AIRPORT THAT THE TALKS WERE SATISFACTORY. HE SAID THAT THEY HAD REACHED A SOLDIERS' AGREEMENT IN CONTINUATION OF THE EARLIER AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ARMY CHIEFS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. HE SAID THAT HE HAD INVITED GENERAL KUMARAMANGALAM TO VISIT PAKISTAN, AND THEY WOULD MEET WHEN THE OCCASION AROSE.

ALL-INDIA RADIO'S CORRESPONDENT SAYS THE TALKS BETWEEN THE ARMY REPRESENTATIVES THIS MORNING, WHICH LASTED OVER TWO HOURS, WERE HELD IN A CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE. GEN. YAHYA KHAN GAVE A LUNCHEON IN HONOR OF GENERAL KUMARAMANGALAM. THE TWO GENERALS, OUR CORRESPONDENT POINTS OUT, WERE TOGETHER IN A PRISONER-OF-WAR CAMP IN ITALY DURING WORLD WAR II. BOTH TRIED TO ESCAPE. GEN. YAYAH KHAN SUCCEEDED, AND GENERAL KUMARAMANGALAM WAS RECAPTURED BY THE GERMANS.

14 SEP 2153Z AT/HH

Sat., Sept. 17, 1966
9:30 a. m.

57
102

MR. PRESIDENT:

I asked Gene to put on paper an argument
he is using in public on why Vietnam is
not a civil war.

It gives a good sense of his style.

W. W. R.

P. S. Note the P. S.

W.

YALE UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOL
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

EUGENE V. ROSTOW

September 13, 1966

Walt W. Rostow, Esq.
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Walt:

Here is the sketch you asked me to try when we talked this morning:

"The fighting in Vietnam naturally absorbs the world's concern. In the discussion and debate through which free men probe the true meaning of these somber events, those who hold opposing views often fail to face each other's arguments. This process of questioning and debate is not simply a measure of the health of our democracy. It is the very essence of democracy.

"I shall try today to define the main issue in the controversy in the perspective of my responsibilities, in order to help isolate what I think are the real interests of the United States.

"Many believe in what we and other nations are doing in Vietnam. They are convinced that we are containing aggression, as we did in Greece, Berlin and Korea.

"Some disagree. They say we are interfering in a family quarrel among the Vietnamese, the internal affair of the Vietnamese people.

"How can one tell a civil war from international aggression, open or concealed? Is there one country, one state, in Vietnam, or two?

"This is a question of fact, and not a very complex one. Since 1954, there have been two Vietnams, two political entities which exist and function in that area, just as there are two German states, and two states in Korea. The reasons for the tragic division of Vietnam are all too familiar. The Vietnamese live on the border of the cold war. And they were divided in fact by the truce through which some of the Communist leaders of the time came to accept the Truman Doctrine as the basis for détente, and, we had reason to hope, for a regime ultimately of peaceful coexistence as well. Those men came to see that unilateral changes in the boundaries of the two systems, changes accomplished by force, or at least by open and visible force, were too risky to be undertaken.

"The result was the division of Vietnam into two states. The men who arranged the end of the fighting in 1954 hoped for the peaceful unification of Vietnam, just as their colleagues a few years earlier had hoped for the peaceful unification of Germany and of Korea. But they knew too that peaceful unification was unlikely to occur, because Communist leaders had receded from a position they have held in only one case since the war, that of Austria. And ~~men~~ ^{states} could work for an Austrian solution ~~of~~ Vietnam. But meanwhile, they had to prepare for a solution in Vietnam like those in Germany and in Korea, where, we should not forget, elections to unify the country were repeatedly promised too. Provision was made for the movement of refugees who wished to move from North to South, or from South to North. In the event, (how many) men, women and children left their homes in North Vietnam, and came to live in the South. These are hardly arrangements men would make if they thought the country would soon be unified.

"One may argue about whether the two states should be recognized diplomatically, and afforded full rights before the United Nations. One cannot argue about whether they exist. For all practical purposes, the two states function. They do what governments do. They tax. They raise armies. They conduct schools and post offices. They are separate states, entitled to the normal protection of international law and custom.

"Equally, there is no real argument about the fact that North Vietnam has long been helping the forces which are seeking to conquer South Vietnam. People can argue, and they do, about whether the regime in North Vietnam organized and started the fighting in South Vietnam, or simply joined later. The evidence we have is clear. But even if the facts were what some of our critics say they are, the answer would be the same. If one state helps an insurrection in another, its help to the revolutionaries is and always has been an act of war. South Vietnam is entitled to ask for the help of friendly powers to repel that hostile act. Even if North Vietnam were doing no more than to assist a force revolting against the government in South Vietnam, its conduct is an act of aggression, which violates international law, and threatens the equilibrium of peace.

"One can see the real meaning of these events if one imagined them occurring in Germany, or in Korea. Would the world be concerned if attempts were made to unify those countries by force? The answer is self-evident.

"Some earnest and well meaning men repeat the arguments we used to hear so often in the 'Thirties. It is unnecessary to resist and contain aggression, they contend, because tyranny is an evil, and will not long survive.* We can abandon the Truman Doctrine, they say, because the

* Old Mr. Villard used to argue this position fiercely with Henry and me.

Communist governments are no longer controlled by one body, and have lost the will to spread their gospel by the sword.

"These views are often sincerely held by high-minded and religious men. But I am convinced that they are naive and wrong. In this harsh world of ours, virtue doesn't always triumph unaided. If the United States had not upheld the Truman Doctrine for twenty long years, the Communist regimes would not now be divided, and experimenting with the apple of liberty. They would be living under the iron rule of another Stalin, and the boundaries of his power would be far different from those we know.

"We are often accused of opposing Communism as such, and of seeking to police the social life of every country in the world. Nothing could be further from the truth. Our sole interest is in peace. We are concerned only with aggression, not with revolution. A social upheaval threatens the general peace only if it involves a concealed aggression.

"America has learned from the hard experience of two world wars that she cannot stand aside from the politics of the world. We are inevitably drawn into any major change in the balance of power. A great wave of cumulative change in the distribution of political influence could generate a sense of panic that could lead men over the brink once more. Since 1945, the United States has been trying to achieve and maintain some basic rules of order and of justice in the world community. Only when such rules are accepted can the world hope for peace. That is the moral of what Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy did in Berlin, Korea, Lebanon and Cuba. That is the thought of the Marshall Plan and of the Point Four program. That is the purpose, and the only purpose, of our course in Vietnam."

You see the line of argument. I have not attempted more than a sketch. I haven't time at the moment.

I do think this kind of reasoning is the missing element in our public discourse. I have found it most effective with the dissidents around here -- at least with those who will listen at all. And I am getting some good letters about my tilt with Ken Galbraith in "Commentary" this month.

With love, and best wishes for a Happy New Year to everybody,

Yours,



EVR/sb

P.S. Please give your boss my sympathy on his contre-temps with some of the Rabbis. As the Good Book points out, we are a stiff-necked people!

Limited Official Use

Saturday - September 17, 1966 4 PM

Mr. President:

You asked for Ellsworth Bunker's comments on the FBI report that the Dominicans had asked Hoffa to organize their dock workers.

Ellsworth comments as follows:

- "1. I believe it would be highly undesirable to have Mr. Hoffa and/or his organization involved in the Dominican Republic labor situation. If the Dominican Government desires assistance relative to organization of the Dominican dock workers or in regard to other labor matters, I believe it should make contact with our Embassy either directly through our Labor Attache, who is a competent and reliable individual, or through covert channels.
2. Involvement of Mr. Hoffa and the Teamsters Union could also run counter to the interest of the AFL/CIO who are working in the Dominican Republic through the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD).
3. I believe it would be advisable to get word to Mr. Hoffa that it is not in the interest of the United States to have his organization involved in what is essentially a domestic Dominican labor and political situation."

I recommend that Marvin have the FBI convey to Hoffa through Mr. I. Irving Davidson the view expressed by Ellsworth in paragraph 3.

W. W. Rostow

cc - Bill Moyers

Limited Official Use

to P 104

Saturday, Sept. 17, 1966
12:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Reply to President Senghor's letter of September 3

Senghor's letter (Tab A - delivered in Washington on September 7) transmitted a report on Senegalese grain prospects in the light of the current drought, and requested 193,000 tons of millet (sorghum) to fill the expected shortage. State and Agriculture immediately sent people to Dakar to get the data necessary to judge Senegal's eligibility under our P. L. 480 ground rules. As it looks now, we probably will be able to help; we will try to have detailed recommendations ready for you before Senghor arrives.

The proposed interim reply at Tab B assures Senghor that you understand his problem, and indicates that you hope to be ready to give him an answer during his visit (September 28-29). The reply will be delivered to him in Ottawa, his first stop in North America.

W. W. Rostow

September 19, 1966

Dear President Senghor:

Thank you so much for your letter of September 3.

I was greatly distressed to learn of the damage which prolonged drought has done to the Senegalese economy, particularly the current grain crop. I can assure you, Mr. President, that my own childhood on a farm in an arid region taught me the value of water and the curse of drought.

I have asked my associates to give your request careful, sympathetic and prompt consideration. However, as you know, there are heavy demands on our limited grain supplies. I am pleased to learn, therefore, that your government is also canvassing other available sources.

I hope to be ready to discuss this matter with you in detail during your visit here.

I am very much looking forward to seeing you.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Leopold Sedar Senghor
President of the Republic of Senegal
Dakar
LBJ:EKH:mz

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
/ NJ 88-45
By ig NARA, Date 3-15-89

Friday, Sept. 16, 1966
5:10 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT: China Series

The Red Guards are getting into more trouble
than Stokely Carmichael and SNCC.

These Japanese correspondent reports give
some feel for what is coming close to a
revolutionary situation -- if it's not soon
called off.

W. W. Rostow

Limited Official Use

Thursday, September 15, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM TOKYO (1979)

The following is a summary of recent reports from Japanese correspondents in Peking concerning incidents involving Red Guards and other developments. Most correspondents referred to wall newspapers in Peking as their sources.

A. Chengchow, Honan -- Red Guards who came from Peking have been placed under arrest by the Honan Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

B. Tientsin -- On the morning of August 26, twenty-five Red Guards arrived from Peking. The evening of the same day, members of the "Red Corps" organized by the Tientsin Municipal Party Committee fought the Red Guards for eight hours in front of the Municipal Committee Headquarters. The Red Corps also confined those teachers and students of Tientsin schools, who had been supporting the Red Guards, in one of the Tientsin high schools and refused to allow them food or water.

C. Hofei, Anhui -- On August 25, Red Guards from Peking University and the Industrial College of Hofei posted wall newspapers criticizing the Anhui Provincial Committee First Secretary Li Pao-Hua. Li did not permit them into the Headquarters building, and a local crowd surrounded and beat them. Vice-Governor of Anhui province Li Fan-Fu (in charge of propaganda) held First Secretary Li Pao-Hua responsible for anti-Party and anti-Socialist activities within the province.

D. Sian, Shensi -- Students of four Sian colleges began putting up wall newspapers August 14 criticizing the Provincial Committee. One of the Committee members recruited workers and farmers, told them that the students were right-wingers, with the result that workers and farmers crying "defend the Municipal Committee" and "defend the Provincial Committee" beat up the students. When Li Teng-Ying, Deputy Chief of the Cultural Revolution section of the North-West Bureau, tried to quiet the crowd, he also was attacked and wounded. Tokyo Shimbun reported on September 8 that trouble in Sian is continuing. According to

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posters put up in Peking September 8, teachers and students of the Sian Engineering College organized a "Proletariat Revolution Rebellion Corps." The University's Party Committee and Cultural Revolution Subcommittee disapproved of this organization, mobilized their own supporters to beat them up. Rebellion Corps then went to Shensi Provincial Party Committee and Party's North-Western Bureau Headquarters to request the University Party Committee be instructed to stop political persecution. This request was turned down, and the Rebellion Corps started hunger strike on September 5. Thirty thousand persons from 200 schools, plus 200 representatives of outlying schools and organizations, started sympathy hunger strikes in front of the Provincial Committee Headquarters.

E. Changsha, Hunan -- Hunan University Red Guards posted wall newspapers criticizing the Municipal Committee on August 19. The Municipal Committee organized a Red Corps to prevent them. Chang Ping-Hua, former First Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee and now in the Chinese Communist Party propaganda department, delivered a speech at Hunan University August 31. In his speech he supported the students in their conflict with the Provincial Committee. He said he would side with students against the faction which holds power, which is following capitalism and which oppresses the masses and students' movement.

F. Tsingtao -- Members of the Medical Academy accused the Chief and Deputy Chief of Municipal Cultural Revolution section as anti-Party and anti-Socialist. Municipal Committee First Secretary Li Ching-Tao on August 26 accused Medical Academy students of causing disturbances, mobilized 40,000 people to attack the students of the Medical Academy, Shantung Oceanographic Academy and Shantung Chemical Industry College. Crowds surrounded 4,000 students, and 110 students were injured.

G. Peking -- On August 25 Red Guards of Changping (now called Tungfeng) entered the Municipal Cultural Bureau and beat up Cultural Revolution Committee Vice-Chairman and five others because Mao's portrait was not properly hung. On the evening of September 2, in a "half-work, half-study technical school," Red Guards divided into two factions called "Red Flag Red Guards" and "Mao-Tse-Tung'ism Red Guards" and began fighting each other with iron clubs and sticks.

H. Wuhan -- On September 2 students from Peking University and Peking Education University critized Ghang Ti-Hsueh, Second

Secretary of Hunan Provincial Committee and Governor of Hunan Province, as an anti-Party revisionist. Hunan had had no rainfall for over 70 days and is suffering from drought. Yet the Peking students paid no attention and caused foolish disturbances (this came from a handbill posted by the Red Guards of Wuhan Hydroelectricity School).

I. Kweilin -- 100,000 people attacked students who criticized the Vice-Mayor, and troops were required to quell this riot. Wei Kuo-Ching, Governor and First Secretary of Provincial Committee, told the students they should unite with workers, farmers, and soldiers and be more prudent.

J. Yangchow, Kiangu -- On September 2 Red Guards from Nanking, Tsientsin, and Taiyuan entered the city and attacked the Municipal Committee and started a hunger strike in front of Committee Headquarters. They expressed dissatisfaction with Committee Secretary's explanations, removed and trampled down the signs of government and public officers, put a tri-cornered hat on the Chief District Official and led him about the town.

The Yomiuri correspondent reported on September 7 that Peking was flooded with Red Guards from local areas and that, although a new semester opened September 1, classes had not yet started. The number of Red Guards in Peking from local areas reached 270,000, but more are now leaving than are coming in. Several hundred thousand Red Guard bulletins have been put up on streets in Peking, and it is quite evident that violence and free-for-all fights have occurred in many cities throughout the country. The correspondent noted that the conflict between Red Guards and workers is obvious and thought it likely that a conflict between conservative farmers and revolutionary students would take place.

Free-for-all fights were reported in Tsinan, Suchow, Wufei, Hangchow, Canton, and Kweilin, in addition to cities listed above. Tokyo Shimbun correspondent Ito reported September 11 that confrontation between Party Headquarters in Peking and local Party units being intensified instead of being reduced. Correspondent Ito noted that Party Committees throughout China have split into two and that in many local districts opposition groups are the stronger. Ito noted that Mao has admitted that 90 percent of work teams have failed and that Mao had probably expected he could sweep away all opponents after Peng Chen had been dismissed and Peking Municipal Committee reorganized.

However, Ito noted that local people have shown antipathy toward students from other areas and that local authorities have generally identified themselves with local people in order to protect themselves. Ito noted that Red Guards are aimed at completely eradicating opponents to "great leap forward," but local authorities, which had bitter experience from "great leap forward," are resisting, and their resistance is supported by masses, who naturally desire to maintain the economic advantages experienced since the end of "great leap." The correspondent wondered whether the Red Guard could succeed even though it is backed by Mao's great popularity and the Army of Lin Piao.

Nihon Keizai's Amejima reported September 10 that order is being gradually restored in Peking, Shanghai and Tientsin and that Red Guards are beginning to participate in agricultural work as advance units for the "great leap forward." Demands made by Red Guards for political and economic changes have not been realized. Samejima reported that, according to "reliable sources," the Chinese Communist Party has not yet decided how to answer such demands as ceasing to pay interest to former national capitalists or on investments made by overseas Chinese and to discontinue various "democratic parties." He reported that in a recent trip through Northwest China, he had been unable to buy newspapers.

Samejima also reported September 7 that he had recently visited communes in Hunan, Shensi and Kwangtung provinces and had been impressed with the extent to which communes are storing food and increasing the stock of machine tools. He interpreted this, and the Red Guards movement, as part of the preparation for war with the U.S.

cy to Chas Johnson
106

Friday, September 16, 1966
5:40 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cabriolet Nuclear Cratering Experiment

The Secretary of State, following last Tuesday's lunch discussion, has reviewed the pros and cons of proceeding with AEC's proposed nuclear cratering experiment called "Cabriolet."

He supports the AEC's recommendation that it be permitted to conduct the Cabriolet test on or about December 1, 1966 at the Nevada Test Site.

The Secretary limits his endorsement to Cabriolet. He believes each cratering shot should be the subject of a separate decision.

I concur in the Secretary's recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Approved ✓

Disapproved _____

See me _____

SS informed 11:15 9/17
they will also notify Com. Tafe
S. Keen notified 9/19/66

ret'd aff'd 9/17/66
am

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 88-46
By rip NARA, Date 8-30-89

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 16, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Cabriolet Nuclear Cratering Experiment

Recommendation:

I recommend that you authorize the AEC to conduct the Cabriolet test, without prejudice to the decision on any subsequent cratering experiment in the Plowshare series which should be evaluated and decided on the merits at the time and in light of experience with Cabriolet.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Problem:

The AEC is requesting approval to conduct Cabriolet, a 2.7 kiloton nuclear cratering Plowshare experiment, about December 1, 1966, in Nevada. Some radioactive debris will be released into the atmosphere, since the object of the experiment is to produce a crater. There is no health hazard involved, but a detectable amount of radioactive debris can be expected to drift from Nevada and cross the Canadian border. The consensus among proponents and opponents is that there is a 50-50 chance that a certain amount of debris would be picked up and identified by the Canadians as coming from Cabriolet; a much slighter chance that detection would occur when the debris had proceeded beyond Canada.

Pros

The main arguments AEC and others have cited for conducting Cabriolet are:

It would permit continued U.S. technical progress in nuclear excavation, which we have indications the USSR is also pursuing.

It would help maintain the credibility of the nuclear excavation option for a sea level Panama Isthmus Canal.

It would furnish data necessary to support the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission program, and permit tentative planning of follow-on experiments needed if the Commission's reporting schedule to you is to be kept.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-413
By JSH, NARA Date 5-22-00

~~SECRET~~

2

It would allay Joint Atomic Energy Committee concern that we seem to have stopped conducting a nuclear excavation program, whereas testimony to the Congress in connection with the Test Ban Treaty, as well as subsequently, indicated that cratering experiments could and would continue to be conducted without violating the Treaty or future amendments thereto.

Cons

The main arguments which ACDA and others have made against conducting Cabriolet are:

There is an even chance that it would expose the U.S. to a charge of violating the Test Ban Treaty by depositing across our border detectable, identifiable radioactive debris from a U.S. test.

Consideration of Cabriolet should not be separated from the decision to be made on the overall Plowshare program. To be meaningful, Cabriolet would have to be followed by other and larger shots, thus increasing still further the probability of charges of Treaty violation.

If we are charged publicly with a violation of the Treaty as a result of Cabriolet, it could hamper consideration of other Plowshare peaceful explosion proposals, such as that suggesting the creation of an international entity to offer Plowshare services to the world.

The ACDA General Advisory Committee on Disarmament, headed by John McCloy, expressed a formal consensus without dissent on September 13 that it opposed the conduct of Cabriolet, because of "prejudice to non-proliferation" and concern about a conscious violation of the Test Ban Treaty. The Committee includes men such as I. I. Rabi, Herbert York, John Cowles, George Kistiakowsky, Roger Blough and Tray Post.

Discussion:

This problem has been considered fully and carefully over a considerable period of time at the highest levels of government. It is my view that the advantages of proceeding with Cabriolet outweigh the risks.


Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

Friday, September 16, 1966, 2:30 p.m.

WWR 107
To Day
called
SS

~~SECRET~~

Mr. President:

Can we have your approval for the following message to
Erhard?

QUOTE. Dear Mr. Chancellor:

Thank you for your letter of September 7. I am greatly
looking forward to your visit and I fully understand your
desire to defer tripartite discussions until after you
and I have had a chance to canvass the full situation.

With best regards, Sincerely yours, Lyndon B. Johnson.

UNQUOTE.

It has been cleared by Ball (for Rusk).

Francis M. Bator

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐

FMB:mst

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 88-46
By inf NARA, Date 8-30-89

OK

Friday, Sept. 16, 1966
5:45 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

We have drafted this as a brief you
might toss to a skeptic.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

to P

108

108a
September 16, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-44

By inf NARA, Date 6-7-89

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. Aid to the Philippines

Whenever the United States agrees to help a country in need, it is easy -- and all too common -- to ascribe a cynical motive to that action. It is easy, too, to put a price tag on the action and to believe that thereby you have described a policy. It is all too simple -- and generally superficial -- to take an action by Government A and an action by Government B and make one the "pay off" for the other.

This has been the approach in some of the reporting of your decision to lend new assistance to the Government of President Marcos.

Much of the reporting ignores several fundamental points involved in this decision. Among these fundamental points, I would note the following:

1. The assistance program just announced in outline is a determined effort to help a friendly country that is in trouble.

The Philippine economy has become almost a model of unstructured, unbalanced, and stunted growth. The late 1950's were boom years. Gross National Product was growing at more than 5% a year. Industrialization was proceeding at a fast pace. But the rapid growth was unstable. The peso was over-valued. Import prices were artificially low. There were virtually guaranteed markets for the main exports.

In 1962, exchange controls were eliminated. The peso suffered almost 100% devaluation. Many marginal industries were in trouble. World prices for Philippine exports fell. Growth rates declined. The economy began to stagnate. The agricultural sector (employing between 70 and 80 per cent of

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the population) failed to expand. The Philippines, a rich farming country, finds itself importing 90% of its milk and dairy products and 10% of its total food needs. The population continues to rise dramatically (about 3.3% a year) as GNP stagnates at about 4%.

Our Filipino friends frankly admit that their operations are plagued by bureaucratic ineptness and nonperformance. Tax collections are inefficient and graft-ridden. Smuggling robs the federal treasury of \$100 million or more a year.

In the last half of 1965, credit restraints were largely ignored with the result that there was a 5% increase in the money supply since June 1955. A 10% rise in living costs occurred in the same period.

In part as a reflection of deepening economic trouble, Communist insurgents have increased their activity; propaganda efforts, recruitment and terrorism are all on the rise.

So here is a country in deep trouble, and we are trying to help.

The cynical can assert that we are merely "repaying" for Filipinos for their decision to send troops to Viet-Nam. The fact is that we would have helped them in any case -- indeed, most of the programs now going forward were being considered long before the Philippine's courageous decision to help their Vietnamese neighbors.

Needless to say, we are not providing economic aid to our Australian and New Zealand friends -- who also have sent troops to Viet-Nam.

2. In working with President Marcos, we are cooperating with a new and active administration, one that has clearly recognized its country's fundamental problems and a chief executive who is fiercely determined to move his country forward.

President Marcos is not a man to ask for handouts or gifts without strings. He is a proud man. He is a man who wants progress for his people. He believes -- and we share the belief -- that the development and prosperity of his country is good, not only for the Philippines, but for Asia and for us.

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He has taken steps to improve the efficient operation of his government. He has searched for men of capability and devotion and put them in positions of responsibility. He continues that search. He has moved actively against smuggling. He is trying to improve his country's tax collection system. He has worked out a Four-Year Development Program which underlines his goals, and we are working with his specialists to refine that program and to outline workable and feasible projects.

And his principal goal is to improve the agriculture of his country. He wants to expand productivity. He wants to build new roads that will bring the countryside into contact with the towns -- and therefore with the markets. He wants to provide electric power for his people in the countryside, and to give them the water they need for irrigation.

An important element in President Marcos' plan is his concentration on 10 of his country's provinces. These are areas where the need for improvement is greatest.

Beyond meeting the present urgent problems in his economy, President Marcos wants his country to move proudly forward over the frontiers of science and technology. He wants to share in the exploration of space and of the ocean depths, to improve the technical and scientific training of his young people, and to provide for both training and research in the area of economic development.

We are cooperating with him in these ambitious enterprises -- not to help a man but to help a man who wants to help his people.

3. A careful look at the proposed forms of our assistance shows that each one is designed to help President Marcos and the Philippines to meet some of the specific problems they face -- particularly in the agricultural sector.

To be specific:

(1) A \$4.5 million loan

This is for irrigation. It will make possible the reconstruction and extension of existing irrigation works, providing much-needed water for the farmers.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(2) Feasibility study loan -- \$2 million

This will permit the Filipinos to conduct engineering and economic studies, with our help, which will tell them whether proposed new projects, including additional irrigation works, make sense. These studies will follow up surveys already conducted in the Water Resources survey.

(3) PL-480 (Title II)

A grant of food grains and other agricultural products.

This will provide:

(a) Partial payment (in the amount of \$3.5 million) to some 30,000 workers who will be digging and renovating irrigation ditches and building or repairing local roads.

(b) \$.5 million in grains, returns from which will help to capitalize livestock cooperatives.

(4) PL-480 (Title IV)

Sale of between \$20 and \$25 million worth of needed cotton, feed grains and tobacco.

(Note: This is repayable in dollars at 3.5% interest.)

The peso proceeds from sale of these products will provide increased capital for the Agriculture Credit Administration.

They will also be used:

-- for local costs of irrigation rehabilitation projects;

-- for feeder road construction;

-- possibly for some capital for the Land Bank.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

There may also be some small grants to government agencies for such things as: agricultural research, technical training in agriculture; pest and crop disease control; land classification studies in connection with land reform.

(5) Engineering equipment (\$1.8 million)

This is equipment from surplus military stocks. It will be renovated by use of AID funds. Value of the repaired equipment is estimated at \$10 million and it will be given to provincial governments (in 8 of the 10 critical provinces). The equipment is to be used in the road-building program and for irrigation and other agricultural development projects.

We will also be supplying some spare parts and technical training on operations and maintenance.

(6) Other technical assistance (about \$1 million)

To be used for such things as providing for a team from the U. S. Farmers Union to advise on agricultural credit, and for a team from the Rural Electric Cooperative Association to help work up projects for establishing new rural electrification cooperatives.

(7) PL-480 (Title III)

This is a continuing program. It provides food products to U. S. voluntary agencies, such as the Catholic Relief Service, for their programs of aid to needy Filipinos.

(8) In view of the need for better performance in the tax collection field, we have sent several specialists from the Internal Revenue Service to the Philippines. This is a small project which represents about 2-1/2 man-years of labor on our part annually.

Even our assistance in the military field is related closely to President Marcos desire to help his farmers.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The five engineer battalions we have agreed to support this year with equipment will be used by him in civic action projects -- primarily road-building in rural areas.

Thus, we see when we look beneath the titles and the amounts, that the assistance program that we are working out with the Philippines is designed to meet specific needs, and primarily those needs in the field of agriculture which the Philippine Government and we recognize as most urgent.

4. Finally, it should be clear that the kind of program outlined in this memo and which we hope to carry out with the Philippines Government is a reflection of your consistent -- and often repeated -- concern with the problem of food production in a world where the population is rising steadily.

For example, on March 19, 1964, in your foreign aid message, you noted:

"Funds for educational and technical cooperation -- to help start schools, health centers, agricultural experimental stations, credit services, and dozen of other institutions... But they will be used by selected projects to raise the ability of less fortunate peoples to meet their own needs."

A year later, on January 14, 1965, you said:

"In the years ahead, if the developing countries are to continue to grow, they must rapidly enlarge their capacity to provide food for their people. Up to a point, they can and should improve their ability to buy some of their food from abroad. For the most part, however, they must expand and diversify their own production of food."

On February 10, 1966 -- in your Food for Freedom -- you said:

"We will launch a major, new attack on worldwide hunger. We will present this year a new food aid program designed around the principle of intense cooperation with those in all hungry countries who are ready to help themselves. We will direct our assistance program toward a cooperative effort to increase agricultural production."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

And again this year -- on June 30, 1966 in your Food for Peace Report -- you said:

"In simplest terms the task of bringing food and population into balance -- while maintaining progress in health, education and economic growth -- is the most critical challenge many countries are facing today. It will probably remain their most urgent challenge in the immediate years ahead. The world's capacity to respond will dramatically effect the course which individuals and nations choose in confronting their problems and neighbors in coming generations."

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

top 109

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Fri., Sept. 16, 1966
5:45 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is the NMCC report on the Chinese
Communist claim that we attacked a
village. They deny it.

Walt Rostow

~~SECRET-SAVIN~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-13
By *ctm*, NARA, Date *6-14-04*

109a

C O P Y

~~SECRET-SAVIN~~

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

16 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

3.3(b)(1),(3) CHICOM allegations that US F-105 aircraft violated China's territorial air space and conducted ground strafing are categorically denied by the 7th Air Force. On the day in question (9 September) [redacted] information on [redacted] a flight of 2 US F-105's, which up to this moment had not crossed the border, were engaged by CHICOM MIG's on the North Vietnam side of the border, near the area in question, [redacted]

3.3(b)(1),(3) [redacted] However, it is emphasized that any such violation was unintentional, that if it occurred it was after the US aircraft had been attacked and incident to their evasion and withdrawal, and that no ground attacks were made by the US aircraft.

~~SECRET-SAVIN~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-13
By cbm, NARA, Date 6-14-04

Friday, September 16, 1966
5:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here is the cable I referred to
at the Tuesday lunch, in which the
Indians complain that de Gaulle
destroyed a promising idea by
presenting it publicly and prematurely.

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 1221

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 88-46
By inf NARA, Date 8-30-89

WWRostow:rln

110a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, September 15, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR KOHLER (Moscow, 1221)

According to Indian Minister Jaipal, Indian officialdom is annoyed by De Gaulle's Vietnamese effort. Jaipal explained to our Economic Counselor that the Soviet Charge in Hanoi had told the Indians earlier the North Vietnamese might be prepared to go to the conference table if the Americans would cease bombing and indicate a readiness to depart Vietnam within a given time frame. Such a timetable would be set by the Americans and could be anything from three to five, six years.

As the Indians see it, De Gaulle wrested this idea, put it in the public domain prematurely and from an international political point of view, ineptly, and only succeeded in getting it shot down.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 7-15-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

111

Friday, September 16, 1966 -- 5:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

At Bill Moyers' request, I saw Orr Kelly, The Evening Star, and 8 others with the American Press Institute Seminar: J. Montgomery Curtis, Director, American Press Institute, Columbia University; Richard M. Parrack, Editor, Lancashire Evening Telegraph, Lancashire, England; Trygve Ramberg, Night Editor, Aftenposten, Oslo, Norway; Per Thomsen, Editor, Aftenblad, Stavanger, Norway; Hannes Oljelund, Assistant Managing Editor, Svenska Dagbladet, Stockholm, Sweden; Teo Mertanen, Editor, Helsingin, Het Parool, Amsterdam; Dr. Robert Rapp, Foreign Editor, Der Kurier, Berlin.

I briefed them on our foreign policy, in general, along the lines of the Lancaster, Ohio, speech. The bulk of their questions were about Viet Nam. A Finnish correspondent took the occasion to tell me that we "neglect" Finland. Your visit as Vice President and Sec. Rusk's were greatly appreciated; but the Soviets have people in there every week and it is having an accumulative effect. I'll check this out.

Jack Leacacos, Cleveland Plain Dealer, telephoned. He is writing a text book on the organization of the State Department and wants to have lunch to discuss it.

I telephoned J. Russell Wiggins, The Washington Post, to point out the distortion in the presentation of the Marcos' visit. I emphasized the significance of his vision of an Asian regional organization that would permit us in time to diminish the extent of our present responsibility. He said he agreed and would get something written.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Pres file

Notes for Diary -- President Marcos' visit 14-15 September, 1966

The President had a long private working session with President Marcos and saw him also on a number of social occasions. The final working session was on the communique. More than most, this visit involved not merely the two leaders getting to know one another, but a remarkable range of practical business that was, by and large, successfully completed.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday/5:00 pm
September 16, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: ~~Cape Kennedy Trip with Erhard~~

You are now scheduled to meet with Erhard

--Monday (the 26th) at 11:30-1:00 p.m., and at dinner;

--Tuesday (the 27th) at 11:00 a.m. (communique).

~~John Leddy suggests that it would be a great favor to Erhard if you could also spare Tuesday afternoon and evening for a quick trip to Cape Kennedy. This would strengthen Erhard's case at home that the visit was a great success--and that his relations with the President are as strong as ever. And it would help to dispel any sense of confrontation--on offset, troop cuts, etc.~~

~~This not a must; I know how tight your schedule is.~~

FMB

Francis M. Bator

Schedule trip to Cape Kennedy _____

Maybe. Don't make a definite date yet _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

OK - good idea.
upLIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Friday, Sept. 16, 1966
5:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is a probably reliable report of an
Erhard backgrounder.

From all evidence, Erhard is a man with a
dilemma and no plan to get out of it.

We must lead him out.

We are working hard -- State, Treasury,
Francis -- to have a plan ready.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

~~SECRET~~

Friday, September 16, 1966

3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] Chancellor Ludwig Erhard told a small group [REDACTED] that he does not anticipate that the agenda for his forthcoming visit to Washington will "provide enough time" for a discussion of German involvement in a possible future MLF. In any event, said the Chancellor, the West Germans would be willing to discuss such a force only if the concept were completely different from any that has thus far been advanced. In the meantime, Bonn will press its case for a fight to defend German soil against atomic attacks by an appeal to "international public opinion."

When a further discussion of West German involvement in the Western defense strategy centered upon the matter of offset payments, Erhard evinced a degree of firmness bordering on the belligerent. He conceded that it behooves the Germans to appreciate the balance of payments problems with which the U.S. is confronted. Nonetheless, he said, U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara's "demands" in the area of offset payments are "completely arbitrary" and must be categorically rejected. Asked whether he would display this attitude during his forthcoming visit to Washington, the Chancellor replied emphatically -- "You can bet on that."

3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NIJ/RAC 01-50
By SJ, NARA, Date 11-30-01

115
Mr. Rostan
16, 1966 - 9:00 pm

SUBJECT: Handshake with Zoltan Kodaly

Kodaly is here at the invitation of several U. S. universities to lecture on choral music. At 83, he ranks second to Bartok among modern Hungarian composers, and is a man of great stature in Hungary, elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and everywhere in the world of music. Kodaly has no personal politics, but -- because of his personal independence and significance -- is a very considerable symbol. A handshake and a picture with you would be interpreted in Eastern Europe as a most graceful gesture and could put an extra brick or two on our bridges.

Francis M. Bator

City

No _____

Friday, September 16, 1966 -- 11:50 a. m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk has reached President Marcos and told him of our hope that he keep off the numbers and emphasize the other aspects of his visit at the Press Club.

He took it well and with understanding.

I gave Sec. Rusk the line I used in the backgrounder last evening. He said he will follow through at his press conference.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

~~Mr. Postaw~~
1175
328 ✓

1. ~~copy~~
2. Pres. file

September 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Mr. Robert E. Kintner

Attached, for your approval, is a friendly message to be read by Governor Harriman at the Steuben Day Parade on September 17. You have designated Governor Harriman as your personal representative.

Francis M. Bator

Attachment
As stated

Message approved ✓

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

It is my great pleasure to extend best wishes through Averell Harriman to the Americans of German descent who today honor the memory of Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben.

General von Steuben was among the first in an illustrious line of Germans whose devotion to the cause of liberty led them to these shores. More than eight million Germans followed him and helped to build our nation.

The descendants of these men and women strengthen our economic and political life, enlarge our culture and advance our science.

We are honored that the German Vice Chancellor, Mr. Eric Mende, is with you in New York. His government has just made another German contribution to American culture -- a large gift to the Metropolitan Opera. Because of this gift, New York will have better music. This is fitting, as it adds to the countless gifts of music that America and the world have received from the German spirit and genius.

I wish you all well.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Thursday
September 15, 1966
9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

I believe you will wish to read
the two attached cables from Foy
Kohler. They suggest the talks with
Sec. Rusk may have some substance.

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 1270 and 1280

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12853, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DA NARS, Date 8-19-86

~~SECRET~~21
Action

002

55

Info

PP RUEHCR RUEHDT
DE RUEHCR 1270FD 2571315
ZNY SSSSS
P 141310Z SEP 66
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK
STATE GRNC
BT

12420

September 14, 1966

1:29PM

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 1270

SEPTEMBER 14

EXDIS

REF: MOSCOW'S 1263

WHEN I SAW GROMYKO TODAY ON ANOTHER MATTER, HE SAID SOVIET ATTITUDE WAS POSITIVE TOWARD HOLDING CONVERSATIONS ON VARIOUS MATTERS WITH SECRETARY IN NEW YORK AS WELL AS TOWARDS QUESTION OF HIS VISITING OTHER PARTS OF US AND THAT HE WOULD WISH DISCUSS ALL THIS IN GREATER DETAIL IN NEW YORK. (IN VIEW FACT GROMYKO TOOK SPECIAL NOTE OF POSSIBLE VISIT WASHINGTON WHILE AT SAME TIME HE NOT GREAT TRAVELER, IT APPEARS HE MIGHT BE INTERESTED ONLY IN TRIP TO WASHINGTON AND POSSIBLY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT.)

GP-1. KOHLER
BTO

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-47

By *inf*, NARA, Date *6-2-88*~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

118b

002

~~SECRET~~

81
Action

SS

Info

CONTROL: 12504
RECD: SEPTEMBER 14, 1966, 2:15PM

FROM: MOSCOW

ACTION: SECSTATE

S ~~E~~ C R E T MOSCOW 1280

E X D I S

SEPTEMBER 14

REF: MOSCOW'S 1263

1. AT LUNCH AT SPASO TODAY, DOBRYNIN AND I HAD FAR-RANGING DISCUSSION ON SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. SUBSTANCE LARGELY REPETITIVE CONVERSATION WITH GROMYKO REPORTED REFTEL BUT FOLLOWING POINTS OF INTEREST EMERGED:

(A) OUTER SPACE. SOMEWHAT LIKE GROMYKO, DOBRYNIN SHOWED LITTLE INTEREST IN DISCUSSING, LEAVING IMPRESSION SOV SIDE EXPECTS SATISFACTORY OUTCOME CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS LEGAL COMMITTEE AND DOES NOT ANTICIPATE MAJOR PROBLEMS FOR DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY. (THIS LEAVES ME WITH IMPRESSION THAT WHILE SOVIETS MAKING STRONG PITCH FOR MAXIMUM ON EQUAL ACCESS TO TRACKING FACILITIES, THEY REALIZE NOT FEASIBLE OBTAIN THEIR STATED OBJECTIVES AND WILL SETTLE FOR COMPROMISE ALONG LINES SUGGESTED USUN 736-CONCEIVABLY EVEN LESS.)

(B) NON-PROLIFERATION. SOVIETS REALIZE SITUATION HAS CHANGED, WITH PRESSURES GROWING IN THIRD COUNTRIES FOR DEVELOPMENT NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES. DOBRYNIN PRACTICALLY SAID THEY REALIZE UNLESS NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENT OBTAINED SOON, SUBJECT WILL BE HOPELESSLY COMPLICATED BY DEMANDS FOR GUARANTEES FOR NON-NUCLEAR POWERS.

(C) WHEN I COMMENTED SOVS HAD NOW PRACTICALLY WON THEIR FIGHT WITH CHICOMS LEAVING LATTER DRAMATICALLY ISOLATED AND SHOULD NOW BE ABLE MOVE FORWARD IN RELATIONS WITH US, DOBRYNIN DID NOT DISAGREE.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By mw, NARA, Date 7-15-98

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- MOSCOW 1280, September 14

2. DOBRYNIN CONFIRMED GROMYKO'S INTEREST IN VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY PROBING AS TO SUITABLE DATE. AFTER I HAD REVIEWED SECRETARY'S TENTATIVE SCHEDULE AND HE HAD COMMENTED NATURALLY NOT SUITABLE GROMYKO TO COME DURING ERHARD VISIT, I SAID OTHER THAN FIRST WEEK IN NEW YORK AND COMMITMENTS BACK IN WASHINGTON, I THOUGHT SECRETARY'S SCHEDULE STILL FAIRLY FLEXIBLE AND ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE WORKED OUT IN NEW YORK.

3. DOBRYNIN, WITH WIFE AND DAUGHTER ARE RETURNING TOGETHER WITH GROMYKO ON LATTER'S PLANE SEPT 18. HE APPARENTLY PLANS REMAIN IN NEW YORK AT LEAST DURING ENSUING WEEK.

GP-2.
KOHLE

~~SECRET~~

Thursday - September 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to the Second Inter-American Conference of
the Partners of the Alliance

The Second Inter-American Conference of the Partners of the Alliance will be held in Rio de Janeiro on September 19-22. Approximately 200 private sector delegates from the United States and Latin America will participate.

The Partners Program in this country has been doing good work, if on a modest scale. Partner Committees have been organized in some 30 States and the District of Columbia. During the past year and a half these Committees have provided direct material, technical and educational assistance to 15 Latin American countries in excess of \$3 Million.

State and AID recommend that you send a message to the Conference. I concur.

A suggested draft for your approval is attached.

W. W. Rostow

approved 9/16/66

Attachment

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO THE
SECOND INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE OF PARTNERS OF ALLIANCE
IN RIO DE JANEIRO, SEPTEMBER 19-22, 1966

Five years ago, we of the Americas accepted a new challenge to increase the tempo and the magnitude of the change required to help our people live better through their own productive efforts. More than ever before, we are dedicated to meeting this continuing challenge through dedication and work in an environment of freedom, health and opportunity.

The meeting of the Partners of the Alliance is evidence that the people of the hemisphere are working together -- that they are determined to bring added knowledge, better health and an increased understanding of the value of shared responsibilities to the task of furthering the well-being of all of our people.

Your partnerships have made a good beginning. They are fine examples of the heritage and ideals we commonly share. It is my hope that in the coming year your achievements will be even greater as this sense of partnership of the Americas continues to grow.

~~1-2-58~~
2 Pres file~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 15, 1955

SUBJECT: Independence Day Message to Yemen - September 26th

State Department recommends you approve the following message to the Yemeni President on the anniversary of their Republic:

"Excellency:

I am pleased on behalf of the people of the United States of America to convey greetings and good wishes to the people of Yemen on the occasion of the fourth celebration of the establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic. "

We have deliberately kept this to the ceremonial minimum in order not to antagonize King Faisal. We can't ignore the occasion but the situation in Yemen is in such flux that we would gain little by going overboard.

Two things contribute to the present uncertainty in Yemen. The Kuwaiti mediation is still going on with some chance of bringing the Saudis and Egyptians to an agreement on ending their respective interventions. Meanwhile, the Egyptians are suffering their worst case of Yemeni dissatisfaction with their involvement. Most of the responsible Yemeni leaders have just flown to Cairo to try to put some limits on Egyptian control.

I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-412
By is, NARA Date 10-6-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. ~~summary~~
2. *Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 15, 1966

SUBJECT: Your Representative at Gursel's Funeral

Former President Gursel's long illness has toned down earlier Turkish plans for an elaborate funeral with cabinet level representatives from friendly countries.

However, State feels we should send someone from outside Turkey as your representative, and I agree. Because Gursel was being treated here when he lapsed into his final coma, we have a special tie. Moreover, you personally paid your respects then, and it would be fitting to send your own representative.

Ray Hare is the logical choice. He knew Gursel well when he was ambassador to Turkey and accompanied him back to Turkey when he was flown back from Walter Reed last March.

I support State's recommendation that you appoint Hare. He will have to leave early tomorrow afternoon to get to the Saturday ceremony.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Pres. file 122

Thursday - September 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to the Second Inter-American Conference of
the Partners of the Alliance

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The Partners Program in this country has been doing good work, if on a modest scale. Partner Committees have been organized in some 30 States and the District of Columbia. During the past year and a half these Committees have provided direct material, technical and educational assistance to 15 Latin American countries in excess of \$3 million.

State and AID recommend that you send a message to the Conference. I concur.

A suggested draft for your approval is attached.

W. W. Rostow

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IN RIO DE JANEIRO, SEPTEMBER 19-22, 1966

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The meeting of the Partners of the Alliance is evidence that the people of the hemisphere are working together -- that they are determined to bring added knowledge, better health and an increased understanding of the value of shared responsibilities to the task of furthering the well-being of all of our people.

Your partnerships have made a good beginning. They are fine examples of the heritage and ideals we commonly share. It is my hope that in the coming year your achievements will be even greater as this sense of partnership of the Americas continues to grow.

3306 5 ¹²³
Mr. Rostow
P. R. Rostow

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 15, 1966

SUBJECT: National Day Greetings for King Faisal - September 23rd.

I have broadened the usual formal greetings to mention his June visit because I think it's worth keeping these ties warm. Therefore, if you approve, we will send the following in your name:

"Your Majesty:

On behalf of the people of the United States of America I take pleasure in extending to Your Majesty and the people of Saudi Arabia congratulations and sincere best wishes on the occasion of the celebration of the National Day of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. I take this opportunity to reiterate my pleasure in your recent visit here and to add my own personal greetings and hope for Your Majesty's continued prosperity and good health."

Faisal was visibly pleased over the photo album of his visit here, which you sent. His thank-you note is attached.

He has been quite active since he was here. He is now on a trip to Turkey, Morocco, Guinea, Mali and Tunisia. While we don't expect anything specific to come out of these visits, he is doing a good job of improving communication and understanding, much as he did here. The Kuwaitis have also brought Nasser and Faisal through another round of mediation over Yemen. There are still a couple of sticking points but some promise.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

OFFICIAL TRANSLATION

In the Name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful

Your Excellency Mr. President:

I received with gratitude the collection of photographs which Your Excellency sent to me, and which perpetuate the happy occasions spent by Your Excellency's side, as well as part of the popular overwhelming sentiment I sensed during my visit to your beautiful country.

Please accept the assurances of my highest appreciation and esteem for Mrs. Johnson, and the most sincere expressions of friendship and gratitude to Your Excellency.

Sincerely,

Faisal

His Excellency,

Lyndon B. Johnson,

President of the United States of America.

Jidda, 23 Rabie Thani, 1386 Higra,
Corresponding to August 10, 1966

Thursday, September 15, 1966 -- 2:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Pursuant to your instruction, I called in Jim Ramey and asked him to indicate to Senator Anderson your desire to see the Italian deal go through. I made it clear that you, Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara had examined the problem carefully; were convinced that the deal would not get us into submarine technology; and were determined that this would not happen.

Ramey tells me today that he spoke with Senator Anderson. The Senator understood and said he would consider it.

It is Ramey's impression that Senator Anderson will, "by another route," try to establish how much you personally want to see this piece of business transacted.

W. W. Rostow

Thursday, Sept. 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Philippine Communique

In accordance with your instructions, we gave the Philippine delegation a text this morning, as attached. Apart from certain minor wording changes, which we can accept, the issues of substance are the following:

1. Paragraph order

They would like the present paragraphs on scientific cooperation (2. a., 3 and 4) to follow the present paragraph 13 ending on page 6. In short, they want the communique to start with a full discussion of economic matters. We believe that the reason is the overwhelming importance of the economic commitments as the communique will read in Manila.

2. Stabilization credit

In the present paragraph 7, page 3. a., they not only wish to maintain their previous text, but to add a specific commitment for a stabilization credit. Treasury is strongly opposed, and Secretary Rusk agrees with their opposition. Treasury will have a memorandum for you.

3. Offshore procurement

In paragraph 13, pages 5 and 6, they wish to retain the bracketed language calling for a special committee. This would imply a degree of favoritism for the Philippines that we believe is not warranted. Our language gives them the right to participate on a "full and equitable basis," and the present office in Manila should be adequate.

4. Military construction

They wish to retain the bracketed language in the first sentence of paragraph 14, page 6. DOD and all of us oppose this, since it implies a commitment for additional military construction. Our underlined sentence is as far as we think we can go.

5. Lump sum for veterans

In paragraph 20, pages 8 and 9, they still wish to retain reference to a lump sum settlement requiring Congressional action. We have told them flatly that any further Congressional action in this area, particularly in a lump sum, is out of the question. As you know, Marcos is already well aware that he

9/15/66

is getting more than he expected in this whole area. We suspect that he is making political capital by pressing a demand that he knows will not be accepted.

6. Special education fund

In paragraph 22, page 9, they still wish to keep the language in brackets. We have told them that the intent of Congress requires that you personally approve not merely a listing of categories as in their language, but that you must approve the allocation of amounts as well. We have also told them that you could approve specific projects now, such as the cultural center, and that payments could start on such projects. However, we have stuck to the Treasury position -- which we believe sound -- that the U. S. cannot, and is not obligated to, release the whole of the fund until full agreement has been reached on the purposes. Even then, we would plan to make payments only as projects matured. They want the fund deposited in the Philippines for balance of payments reasons; the Treasury and all of us are strongly opposed to this for exactly the same reasons.

William P. Bundy