

Wednesday, October 12, 1966 -- 7:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

An idea.

In planning the themes for the major speeches on the Asian trip, it occurred to me that we might shoot for a book entitled "Asia and the United States."

The book would consist of your major speeches. It would be published as a paper back. It would be aimed at the students and the general public. It would consist not only of the speeches but a special introduction giving an account of the evolution of policy and events in Asia during your Administration, but reaching back further in our history. It would be annotated to explain some of the references. It would be enlivened by some pictures and a map of the tour, but it would not be primarily a picture or glamour book, but one designed to give a solid view of where we have come from and where we are going in relation to Asia.

It might well include your Baltimore speech and certain other statements not given on the tour.

Although we are making real progress in developing a distinctive approach of this Administration to Africa, Latin America, and Europe, it is clear that a good part of your Administration's place in history will consist in the ~~real~~ shaping of Asia and our relations to it. A book of this kind, published early in 1967 and solidly done, could make a significant contribution to public understanding.

There is the occasion for 5 or 6 major speeches on the tour. By way of illustration only, I attach a copy of a first draft for Canberra which I have passed along to Bob Kintner, Doug Cater, and Bill Bundy.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-103

By ing NARA. Date 2-6-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - October 12, 1966

(with ~~SECRET~~ attachment)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recognition of the Government of Barbados and Establishment of an Embassy

Barbados will become independent on November 30, 1966. Before leaving, George Ball sent you a memorandum (Tab A) recommending recognition of the new government and the establishment of an Embassy with a resident Ambassador.

John Macy is against appointing a resident Ambassador and favors accrediting our Ambassador in neighboring Trinidad (Tab B).

On the resident Ambassador question, there are two basic issues: cost and national interest.

On the cost, the difference between having a resident Ambassador or not is minimal. With recognition we would convert the present Consulate into an Embassy. State estimates that a resident Ambassador would raise net operating costs by only \$25 000 per year. Savings are, therefore, not an important factor. Furthermore, State has senior officers who could handle this job without going outside the government to recruit one.

The principal ingredient of national interest is that Barbados upon independence becomes an "American State" within the meaning of the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty. It is eligible to join the OAS and Prime Minister Barrow has indicated his intention to apply for membership. Since Franklin Roosevelt's time we have accorded equal diplomatic treatment to all independent Western Hemisphere states regardless of size or population. We should do no less for Barbados, which by joining the OAS may well accelerate the entry of Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana -- and Canada.

In other parts of the world we have not followed a consistent pattern in accrediting Ambassadors to "mini-States". In some countries of comparable size and/or population -- such as Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta and Gabon -- we have Ambassadors. In others -- like Gambia, Botswana, Lesotho and the Maldives Islands -- we do not. The special Western

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(with ~~SECRET~~ attachment)

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(with ~~SECRET~~ attachment)

-2-

Hemisphere relationship and the difference in our handling of "mini-states" elsewhere means that we can establish a resident Ambassador in Barbados without establishing a bad precedent.

An Ambassador in Bridgetown will represent us not only in Barbados (166 square miles, 260,000 population) but will also handle bilateral relations with some eight "associated states" (1,500 square miles, 800,000 population) -- a status which the U.K. is negotiating with other British Caribbean islands. A major function of the Ambassador will be to work toward our objective of bringing Barbados and these islands into economic -- and eventual political -- unity as the first step in working back toward the concept of federation with Jamaica and Trinidad.

I appreciate John Macy's concern over U.S. representation in "mini-states" and his interest in efficient and economic use of manpower, but in this case, interests of State seem to me overriding.

I recommend that you accord recognition to the new government and authorize the establishment of an Embassy with a resident Ambassador.

W. W. Rostow

Approve according
recognition

☒

Authorize Embassy
with resident Am-
bassador

☒

Authorize Embassy
without resident
Ambassador

Speak to me

cc - Bill Moyers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(with SECRET attachment)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 4, 1966

Tuesday - 4:45 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-103

By ing NARA. Date 2-6-91

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. Representation in Barbados

Bace's memo to Pres of 8/15/66

Barbados is scheduled to become independent November 30. The State Department recommends (Tab A) that the United States recognize the Government of Barbados at that time, and that you authorize establishment of an Embassy, headed by a resident ambassador in Bridgetown. The only issue that has been raised in this connection is whether we need a resident ambassador in Barbados.

STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION

In writing and orally, the State Department has presented this justification for a resident ambassador:

1. Barbados expects us to assign a resident ambassador, and would consider it unfriendly if we did not.
2. Post-war precedents virtually require that we accredit a resident ambassador.
3. The United States has "significant, strategic interest in this eastern-most Caribbean island." (See map on next page.)

AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW

In our discussions, we have raised these points with the Department:

1. Some twenty other countries that now have consular relations with Barbados are expected to recognize the new Government, but no country has decided to assign a resident ambassador there. The British will send a High Commissioner who will perform diplomatic functions. The Indian High Commissioner in Trinidad will be dually accredited to Barbados. (Barbados, itself, plans to

- 2 -

accredit its United Nations Ambassador to Washington. He will spend most of his time in New York and will occupy space in the Guyana Embassy when he is here.) Under these conditions, dual accreditation to Barbados of our Ambassador in Trinidad, or Jamaica, could hardly be considered unfriendly. Our Ambassador in Trinidad is 40 minutes by air from Barbados, and planes fly daily.

2. There are "post-war precedents" on both sides of this question. We now have friendly diplomatic relations with Gambia, Botswana, and the Maldiv Islands, although our Ambassadors are stationed elsewhere. This week the United States will recognize Lesotho, raising to four the number of countries with which we have relations without the benefit of a resident ambassador.

The State Department says that -- even in the Western Hemisphere -- we will not assign a resident ambassador to Antigua when, and if, it becomes independent. The Department would propose to cover Antigua from Barbados. My question is: Why not cover Barbados from Trinidad?


3. To say that the United States has a strategic interest in Barbados dilutes the meaning of that word. Barbados has a population about the size of Austin, Texas, and an area one-third the size of Los Angeles. We have a 105-man submarine detection station there -- one of six such stations in the area. Barbados is one of the ten Caribbean islands on which we have some 15,000 defense personnel deployed. (Tab B.)
4. I believe that to assign an ambassador in Barbados would be a waste of expensive manpower. We have too many under-employed ambassadors now (and once we accredit a resident ambassador, we are committed to continue the practice). Robert Miner in Trinidad, for example, is 55 years old, a talented Near East specialist, an expert in politico-military affairs, a graduate of the Imperial Defense College. He has complained to friends for several years that he's utterly bored, works only a few hours each day. Robinson McIlvaine, when he was Ambassador to Dahomey,

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told a White House visitor that he spent most of his time on the beach because there was nothing else to do. In view of the demands placed on our trained manpower by the Vietnam conflict and Great Society programs, we should be seeking ways to utilize our human resources better.

RECOMMENDATION

I recommend that, in the interest of efficient and economical use of manpower, the State Department be instructed to accredit to Barbados the current American Ambassador in Trinidad or Jamaica.



John W. Macy, Jr.

Attachments

Above recommendation approved. _____

Approve resident ambassador. _____

Discuss with me. _____



Inc A 418
—

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 15, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Recognition of the Government of Barbados
and Establishment of an Embassy

Recommendations:

- 1) That the United States accord recognition to the new Government of Barbados upon the granting of independence on November 30, 1966.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

- 2) That you authorize the Department of State to establish at Bridgetown an Embassy headed by a resident Ambassador.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The British colony of Barbados will become independent under the name Barbados on November 30, 1966. The new nation is expected to remain within the British Commonwealth, and Her Majesty's Government has advised us that it will accredit a resident High Commissioner to the new government. Barbados is also expected to apply for full membership in the United Nations.

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 89-105
By lig NARA, Date 11-16-89


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Because of our significant, strategic interest in this easternmost Caribbean island, and in keeping with post-war precedents, I recommend that the United States accord recognition to the new Government of Barbados immediately upon the granting of independence. I also recommend that we establish an Embassy at Bridgetown to be headed by a resident Ambassador.

The establishment of an Embassy would involve elevating the present Consulate General at Bridgetown to Mission status. It would be in our interest to have the United States Ambassador assume his duties on the day of independence.

My recommendations regarding persons qualified to serve as Ambassador to Barbados will be the subject of a separate memorandum.


Acting Secretary

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US FACILITIES IN CARIBBEAN, BAHAMAS AND WEST INDIES AREA

ANDROS ISLAND

USN Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) now under construction. Will be operated by approximately 300 civilian contractor employees.

ANTIGUA

USAF Tracking Station - 1 military and 180 civilian contractor employees.

Navy Oceanographic Station - 107 military personnel

BARBADOS

Navy Oceanographic Station - 105 military personnel

Army High Altitude Research Project (HARP) - occasional stationing of about 5 military and 10 civilians during tests.

CANAL ZONE

Army --	Fort Amador	985 military personnel
	Fort Clayton	3291 military personnel
	Fort Davis	1050 military personnel
	Fort Gulick	1030 military personnel
	Fort Kobbe	960 military personnel
	Fort Sherman	85 military personnel
	Quarry Heights	235 military personnel

Navy --	Fort Amador Communications Station	247 military personnel
	Rodman Naval Station	215 military personnel
	Security Activity	157 military personnel

Air Force --	Albrook Air Force Base	1,185 military personnel
	Howard Air Force Base	1,365 military personnel
	Quarry Heights	45 military personnel

CUBA

Guantanamo Naval Station - 2,500 military personnel

ELEUTHERA

USAF Tracking Station - 1 military and 120 civilian contractor employees

Navy Oceanographic Station - 126 military personnel

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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NARA. Date 3-11-91

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GRAND BAHAMAS

USAF Tracking Station - 1 military and 270 civilian contractor personnel

GRAND TURK

USAF Tracking Station - 1 military and 155 civilian contractor personnel

Navy Oceanographic Station - 107 military personnel

PUERTO RICO

Army -- Fort Brook 774 military personnel
Fort Buchanan 2,145 military personnel

Navy -- Roosevelt Roads Naval Station 1,700 military personnel
San Juan Naval Station and
Communications Station 1,750 military personnel
Vieques Fleet Marine Force 209 military personnel

Air Force -- Ramey Air Force Base 3,800 military personnel

SAN SALVADOR

Navy Oceanographic Station - 105 military personnel

TRINIDAD

USAF Tracking Station - 2 military and 115 civilian contractor personnel

Naval Station (Chaguaramas) - approximately 200 military personnel,
being reduced as base areas are returned to the Government of
Trinidad.

VLF navigational aid station (OMEGA) will be operated by approximately
30 civilian contractor employees.

IN CARIBBEAN SEA

Caribbean Ready Amphibious Group consists of 1,650 Marines in a
battalion landing team and 2,500 ship crews. It is capable of being
available at Guantanamo within 72 hours.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 89-103

By ing NARA, Date 2-6-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, October 12, 1966
4:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment of Ambassador Telles to US-Mexican Commission
Position

I talked this morning with Ray Telles about taking the Border Commission job.

He threw up a smoke screen of arguments that the appointment of a Latin American to this new, unknown position -- important as it is -- would not have the political effect of assuaging the complaints of our Latin American communities if this were the purpose. In this context, he mentioned the meeting which Harry McPherson is arranging with Latin American leaders on October 28.

Behind the smoke screen it is clear that he thinks the job lacks sufficient prestige. He is looking for a more important ambassadorship or equivalent high position here.

At the meeting he dodged my repeated efforts to commit him to take the job, and ended up by saying that he would like to talk to you about the political aspect affecting the Latin American community. I told him I would report to you on the conversation but made no commitment on an appointment.

After the meeting was over he called and talked cold turkey. He wants either:

-- The Mexico City Embassy; or

-- A job as Presidential Assistant to look after Mexican-Americans and, as part of that task, to head the U. S. delegation on the Border Commission.

I have the impression that he can be talked into accepting the Border position -- but it will take a conversation with you to do it.

The alternatives are:

1. for you to see him;
2. to dress up the Border Commission job with additional functions vis-a-vis the Latin American community (e. g. , your point of contact with Latin American community leaders);
3. to look for someone else to do the border job and let him stay in Costa Rica until another equivalent ambassadorship opens up, such as in Nicaragua.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Linc Gordon, John Macy and I reluctantly recommend that you see him.

W. W. Rostow

I will see him ✓

Pursue dressing up Border Commission job

Look for some one else for Border Commission

Speak to me

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(cc: Bill Moyers)
John Macy)

Wednesday, October 12, 1966
5:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Lodge's weekly cable. It is more and more clear that, barring a radical escalation from the north and barring a diplomatic breakthrough, our major task is to make pacification begin to work persuasively.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~
Saigon 8262

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 89-26
By mg NARA, Date 5-14-90

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Wednesday, October 12, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 8262)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. Secretary McNamara's Visit

The visit, like the previous one, is having a very stimulating and beneficial effect.

At the briefing, I made the following statement:

"The overall situation can be described as follows: In the 'military' war, our capacity to defeat the big Communist units and destroy redoubts is so well demonstrated that I would expect a very different military situation indeed here by next spring. Military success gives us the chance to get at the heart of the matter -- the 'criminal' or terrorist side.

"On the 'criminal' side, encouraging beginnings have been made where the Vietnamese have had the punch and protection of U.S. Marines, U.S. First Division, U.S. 25th Division, and Koreans. But pacification, although it is on the track, is not yet really rolling. One bottleneck is the lack of enough revolutionary development cadres. If this is hurried up too much, there is a sacrifice of quality which can mean failure. When pacification really rolls, I believe Hanoi will regard this fact as decisive.

"The political side, in spite of much fragility, evolves. One need not be an expert to see the difference between the political situation today and that which existed in November 1963. It is hard to measure the good which flows from having men in office long enough to learn their jobs, but it is surely good.

"The economic war is a constant struggle. As soon as measures are invented to cope with the inflation existing at the time we -- quite understandably -- bring in more of everything, and this strains the anti-inflation mechanism even further. We can take some satisfaction in the Prime Minister's devaluation order, in the sale of rice to the crowds in the cities from backs of trucks, in the decision to

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

By ingNARA, Date 7-11-89

turn the operation of the port over to the military (even though operation is still unsatisfactory), and in the fact that for some time now, the price rise has been halted. There is no famine. Crowds in the streets are not demonstrating against the high cost of living. This is a Viet Cong defeat.

"We, therefore, can see that progress is being made with regard to all four kinds of war, but that progress is quicker with some than in others.

"But we must also recognize these things:

"The mileage of roads which are open to all categories of persons is just about what it has been; the percentage of the population living under secure conditions is only a little bit greater than it was; the percentage of the population under Viet Cong domination is not substantially diminished, but still stands at about 20 percent; every day brings its tolls of public officials being assassinated, kidnapped, and tortured, with certainly no dramatic diminution; and MACV believes that the Viet Cong can still impress men at the rate of four battalions a month in South Vietnam.

"These conditions make it clear that we have not yet achieved a satisfactory outcome.

"This in no way diminishes the worth of the President's courageous, far-sighted and history-making decision of July 28, 1965, which, as time goes by, appears more and more as a big turning point of history. Because of this decision, we still have a South Vietnam. Because of this decision, it is clear to all that the Viet Cong cannot possibly win and that we cannot possibly be defeated. Because of this decision, the situation in this country is better than it has ever been before.

"If we persist, we will get at the things I listed above:

"Open roads, secure public officials; destruction or dissolution of the terrorist organization -- what Ho Chi Minh calls the 'guerrilla infrastructure.'

"Many do not care for the job of destroying the terrorist organization -- not that it causes us more casualties, it causes less;

not that it costs much money, which it doesn't when compared to other activities; but because it involves the fussy job of working with a wide variety of occupations beginning with the police and the local political community organizer and including the teacher, the doctor, the agricultural expert. It also depends on the Vietnamese doing so much themselves. It is nation-building, not war -- and both war and nation-building must go on together.

"Many are depressed by the thought that this type of counter-terrorism takes time, even though it would be clear that time was on our side and that our casualties would be light.

" But I believe that Ho Chi Minh is right when he says that this is the decisive factor -- not all-out bombing and escalation on the one hand or Western-type 'negotiations' on the other. "

B. Terrorism

On September 30, in Lam Dong province near Bao Loc, two policemen were transporting a Viet Cong prisoner on a public bus on Highway 20, when the bus was halted by a Viet Cong roadblock 16 kilometers northeast of Bao Loc. Both policemen and the Viet Cong prisoner tried to escape.

General Westmoreland reports that the terrorists seized one policeman, cut off both his arms at the elbow and then cut out his liver. The effect of this on the community can be imagined. This is the kind of thing which goes on much as it has for years. It is obviously not reached at all by a "cease-fire."

C. Constituent Assembly

Rules for the Constituent Assembly will probably be approved by early next week. The Credentials Committee has approved the seating of 8 deputies whose credentials were challenged, leaving 15 cases still to be considered. Probably no more than four or five will be rejected by the Committee. According to the Electoral Law, another election must be held to fill any seats left vacant because of such rejection. Voting for Assembly officers will probably begin next week.

D. Cabinet Crisis

The so-called "Cabinet Crisis" remains unsolved, and six Ministers have in effect indicated their desire to resign. They express concern over alleged use of police state methods and criticize Ky for not consulting with his Cabinet more frequently. The six Ministers include Deputy Prime Minister Vien and the Ministers of Youth, Labor, Education, Social Welfare, and Communications.

Both Thieu and Ky are discussing the problem with the six Ministers. The "resignations" have not been accepted, and the dissidents have made no public statements, though knowledge of the affair is widespread. The dissident Ministers are believed to be trying to force National Police Chief Nguyen Ngoc Loan out of the government or reduce his power. He is close to Ky, however, and we doubt that Ky will agree to his dismissal. Unless a compromise can be reached, it is not unlikely that some of the Ministers concerned will leave the government. Ky is working on a compromise and is optimistic that the matter will be settled before Manila. I have stressed the importance of this.

E. People's Army Council on Negotiations

The Council met October 10 and 11 to discuss ways of presenting to the world a true picture of the Vietnam situation. The discussion included conditions for a peaceful settlement. Foreign Minister Tran Van Do was present for the October 10 session, and he reviewed his peace proposals of last year -- North Vietnam must withdraw its troops and cadre, and the security of South Vietnam must be adequately guaranteed before Allied forces will be asked to leave. The Chairman of the People's Army Council Political Committee, Colonel Nguyen Van Duc, recommended three preconditions for peace negotiations: (a) North Vietnam must withdraw all its forces and cease all intervention in South Vietnam; (b) the Liberation Front must cease all military terrorist activity; (c) the Geneva Accords must be respected. Other Council members said that the Liberation Front should not be permitted to represent any part of the Vietnamese people in negotiations, and they stressed the necessity for Vietnam to state its own position rather than leaving the problem of negotiations to its Allies.

Foreign Minister Do also stressed the need for political stability. He noted that political instability encourages the Viet Cong and discourages Vietnam's allies. While he in no way alluded to the current Cabinet crisis, the inference was plain.

The Council now has before it a draft resolution which states the "true nature of the war in Vietnam." The draft contains no references to conditions for peace negotiations. It stresses the fact the South Vietnam is fighting in self-defense against Communist aggression, and says that the presence of Allied forces is necessary until peace is restored. The draft includes a proposal that the Council request the government to send "people's delegations" abroad to expose to the world the true situation in Vietnam. The idea was discussed at length and it appears to have Government of Vietnam blessing.

F. Montagnards

The first of three phased returns of Fulro dissidents was completed with a ceremony at Banmethout on October 6. Another major celebration is planned for October 17, with Prime Minister Ky attending. So far 2,757 Fulro troops have gathered near Banmethout for reintegration into Government of Vietnam controlled civil and military areas. Fulro representatives say that 7,000 Fulro troops and dependents remain in Cambodia. If the Montagnard leaders are satisfied that the Government of Vietnam is acting in good faith, all of these will ultimately return to Government of Vietnam control.

G. Economic

Retail prices continued stable, with a drop of three percent since last week. Rice rose slightly, however, probably because of the expectation that the Mekong flood will cause shortages. Import prices were up slightly, but there were no sharp changes. Green dollars rose from 168 to 169.

H. Americans and Vietnamese Killed

During the week October 2 to October 8, the Viet Cong killed 24 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 14 and kidnapped 14. The dead include 3 Hamlet Chiefs, 1 Deputy Hamlet Chief, 1 village Police Commissioner, and 2 village Administrative Commissioners.

Wednesday, October 12, 1966 -- 5:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

I recommend that Bill Bundy be included in your party on the pre-Manila phase of the trip. He has a good many threads of the trip in his hands and would, I am sure, make a contribution in handling some of the fast-moving problems that will arise.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, October 12, 1966

FROM: W. W. Rostow

TO: THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting to Discuss Secretary McNamara's Vietnam Trip

Secretary McNamara will be available from Friday A.M. on to report to you personally on his Vietnam trip.

In addition, you may wish to hear reports from others on the trip--Under Secretary Katzenbach, General Wheeler and Robert Komer--prior to your departure Monday.

Your schedule would permit a meeting Saturday morning.

I recommend you call an off-the-record NSC meeting Saturday for a discussion of the recommendations put forward by Secretary McNamara. It would be very helpful if General Wheeler could be accompanied by all of the Chiefs of Staff.

_____ Set up an off-the-record NSC meeting Saturday morning and include all the Chiefs of Staff

_____ Prefer no meeting this week

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 89-104
By ijf NARA, Date 9-6-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, October 12, 1966 -- 8:30 am

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Emperor Selassie's request to see you

At Tab A, Nick Katzenbach recommends that you politely decline Haile Selassie's request for an early Washington meeting with you. At Tab B is a proposed message which attempts to do this as gently as possible, offering to send a personal representative if the Emperor thinks it would be useful.

Selassie is worried about two related problems: possible Somali domination of French Somaliland, which contains Ethiopia's major outlet to the sea; and fear that the Russians are providing more sophisticated weapons to the Somalis than we are to the Ethiopians. There is some cause for the first worry. The second is primarily a tactic to get us to give him more MAP. Both are the latest manifestations of an old blood feud between Ethiopians and Somalis which is reminiscent of the India-Pakistan problem.

Ed Korry has handled the Emperor very well. (You may want to glance at the cables at Tab C.) Essentially, we are trying to keep the lid on -- to avoid violence over French Somaliland and/or an escalation of the arms race. There is some evidence that the Soviets are in fundamental agreement at least on the latter. The proposed message (1) avoids a crash meeting which could worsen things by stirring up the Somalis, (2) pushes Selassie toward a less bellicose position, and (3) notes in passing that the real answer might be regional disarmament plan for Africa. (President Nyerere of Tanzania has already suggested this.)

I recommend that you approve the message.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

addis 1162, 2 sections
Sept 22, 1966
Secret
W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 89-103

By *ing* NARA. Date 2-6-91~~SECRET~~

1. Hamilton
2. Ret

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Communication to Ethiopian
Emperor with Regard to His Request
to See You

Recommendation

That you approve the enclosed message to the
Emperor of Ethiopia.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion

The Emperor of Ethiopia has made an urgent request to see you for a few hours in Washington as soon as possible in order to discuss his worries about Soviet military assistance to Somalia, the resultant threat to Ethiopia and its need for more arms. He plans to talk about these matters with the Soviet leaders, but wishes to see you first before going to Moscow.

In addition to the problem of your tight schedule, I am concerned that any such sudden trip by the Emperor would tend to dramatize the tensions in the Horn of Africa and involve us directly in them.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 89-105

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By ijf NARA, Date 11-16-89

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I accordingly propose that you send the Emperor the enclosed message, suggesting the possibility of your sending a representative to see him and holding out the possibility of a trip here by the Emperor after the first of the year at the earliest.



Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Message to the Emperor
of Ethiopia

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PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO THE EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-103

By ing NARA. Date 2-6-91

Your Imperial Majesty:

Ambassador Korry has kept me fully informed of your recent conversations, and has conveyed to me your desire that we meet as soon as possible. I certainly understand the importance of the matters which prompt your request. Although these issues are, of course, of primary interest to the countries directly involved, they also affect the general peace and welfare of Africa and the world. Thus, under ordinary circumstances I would be most happy to receive you here to discuss them personally and at length.

However, as you know, I am leaving on Monday for 17 days in Asia, and I understand that you will also be away from your capital until late this month. My schedule for the period immediately following my return is already crowded well beyond capacity. I am afraid that I must, therefore, suggest that we postpone a personal discussion at least until I have worked my way through some of the backlog which will accumulate during my absence.

In the meantime, if you would find it useful, I should be pleased to send a personal representative to Addis Ababa to discuss these matters with you and your associates. I would choose a man in whom I have great personal confidence and who could accurately reflect my views. Perhaps it would be most to our mutual benefit if he were to come after you have

an opportunity to talk these problems over with your colleagues at the upcoming meeting of the Organization of African Unity. ^{However,} I will be happy to bow to your judgment on the matter of timing, as well as on the question of the usefulness of such a representative.

In any event, I hope Your Majesty understands that this reply does not reflect any lack of American interest in the problems which concern you. Ambassador Korry has well conveyed my own thoughts, which are the products of lengthy deliberation and a strong interest in the reduction of tensions in Africa and around the world. I fully recognize your high sense of responsibility for the security of Ethiopia and its trading outlets. But it seems to me of immense importance to Ethiopia and her neighbors that every effort be made to avoid any further escalation of the arms race. Indeed, it appears that all interests could well be served by movement in the direction of a regional armament agreement, perhaps administered through the OAU. All of us need to dig deeply into our reserves of goodwill and imagination in dealing with this kind of problem.

Nobody is more aware than I of the complexities involved in dealing with this kind of ^{issue} ~~problem~~, particularly when there is an absence of mutual trust between the parties to the negotiation. However, with time and patience and self-restraint, progress on the most difficult issues is often possible. I have every confidence that Your Majesty's leadership and statesmanship will be equal to the challenge of this most critical of the

issues facing Ethiopia and her neighbors. If you and your colleagues can work out your differences in a manner which assures peace and stability, your example will be an inspiration not only to Africa, but to all mankind. We stand ready to serve that cause in whatever way we can be useful.

My deepest apologies that I must postpone our meeting. Please let me know your views on a personal representative. I want you to know that my thoughts are with you in these difficult days.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Rostow 63

Monday, October 10, 1966 -- 5:30 pm

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Emperor Selassie's request to see you

At Tab A, Nick Katzenbach recommends that you politely decline Haile Selassie's request for an early Washington meeting with you. At Tab B is a proposed message which attempts to do this as gently as possible, offering to send a personal representative if the Emperor thinks it would be useful.

Selassie is worried about two related problems: possible Somali domination of French Somaliland, which contains Ethiopia's major outlet to the sea; and fear that the Russians are providing more sophisticated weapons to the Somalis than we are to the Ethiopians. There is some cause for the first worry. The second is primarily a tactic to get us to give him more MAP. Both are the latest manifestations of an old blood feud between Ethiopians and Somalis which is reminiscent of the India-Pakistan problem.

Ed Korry has handled the Emperor very well. (You may want to glance at the cables at Tab C.) Essentially, we are trying to keep the lid on -- to avoid violence over French Somaliland and/or an escalation of the arms race. There is some evidence that the Soviets are in fundamental agreement at least on the latter. The proposed message (1) avoids a crash meeting which could worsen things by stirring up the Somalis, (2) pushes Selassie toward a less bellicose position, and (3) notes in passing that the real answer might be regional disarmament plan for Africa. (President Nyerere of Tanzania has already suggested this.)

I recommend that you approve the message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve /

Disapprove

Speak to me

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 89-103
By ijg NARA. Date 2-6-91

EKH:vmr

~~SECRET~~

1. *sup*
2. *Pres file*

Wednesday, October 12, 1966

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: 80th Birthday Message to
President Chiang

On October 31 President Chiang Kai-shek will be 80 by the Chinese calendar, 79 by Western count. Special importance is being given in Taiwan to the President's birthday this year.

The Embassy has recommended a letter from you to Chiang in place of the usual telegram, and State concurs.

I recommend that you sign the attached letter.

W. W. Rostow

AJ:em

cc: WJJorden
DWRopa

October 14, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

**Mrs. Johnson joins me in extending to you,
on our behalf and on behalf of the American
people, our congratulations and good wishes
for your birthday.**

**We send you on this occasion our most sincere
hope for your continued good health and
personal happiness.**

Sincerely,

LBJ

**His Excellency
Chiang Kai-shek
President of the Republic of China
Taipei**

LBJ:State:AJ:em:rlh

Mr Rostow⁴⁸

Tuesday, Oct. 11, 1966 at 5:30

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a draft release announcing the appointment of McCloy as your representative in the tripartite discussions. The terms of reference in the draft have been agreed between us, the British and the Germans. The text has been cleared by Bowie and Leddy for State.

The original plan was to put this out tomorrow noon. However, we just received an AP ticker from Bonn suggesting that the Germans have leaked. I would propose that George post the attached text tonight.

Francis M. Bator

Go ahead _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

CC: Mr. Rostow



PROPOSED PRESS RELEASE ON TRIPARTITE TALKS

The President has appointed Mr. John J. McCloy as the United States Representative to the trilateral conversations to be held by the United States, the Federal German Republic and the United Kingdom, which were envisaged in the joint communique made by the President and Chancellor Erhard on September 27. It is understood that the other Representatives will be Dr. Karl Carstens for the German Federal Republic and Mr. George Thomson for the United Kingdom.

The three governments have invited Mr. Manlio Brosio, the Secretary General, to discuss with the group at its first meeting the ways in which its work could reinforce and assist NATO force planning already under way.

The purpose of these conversations is to undertake a searching reappraisal of the threat to security and -- taking into account changes in military technology and mobility -- of the forces required to maintain adequate deterrence and defense in Central Europe. The reappraisal will also deal with:

- equitable sharing of defense and other comparable burdens;
- the impact of troop deployments and force levels on the balance of payments of the United States and United Kingdom;
- the effect on the German economic and budgetary situation of measures designed to ameliorate balance of payments problems.

The first trilateral meeting will be held in Bonn, Germany, on October 20, 1966.

Tuesday, October 11, 1966 -- 7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

We just concluded a 2-1/2 hour review of the Asian trip. Here are some questions which require your decision.

1. Marv Watson is sending this up separately. Jim Cross has okayed a flight from Ohakea to Wellington in a New Zealand DC-6. Is that all right with you?

Yes _____. No _____.

2. We are planning for a major speech in Hawaii, preferably at the East-West Center. The questions are these:

Can we firm up final arrangements for an East-West Center speech? _____

We have a choice of an indoor auditorium seating 700 or an outdoor University installation believed to seat about 1500. The advantage of the indoor auditorium is that it is part of the East-West Center and safe from the bad weather that sometimes blows up around 4 p. m., when the speech is tentatively scheduled.

Indoors at East-West Center _____

Outdoor at University _____

3. Jim Cross tells us that he will have to take the party off from the long Dulles runways if we are to make it non-stop to Honolulu.

The Diplomatic Corps will certainly want to turn out. We could make it quite a nice occasion with band, departure, ^{statement} etc.

Arrange reasonably colorful departure with statement _____

Depart quietly _____

4. For the first time I am reasonably confident that we are shaking down pretty well in the speech-draft business.

5. As Marv has no doubt told you, we need your decision on the manifest so that those going can get their shots and otherwise prepare.

W. W. Rostow

Tuesday, October 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Last week, at my request, you signed a letter to Wes Vivian with the understanding that it would not be made public. Vivian appreciated that letter, but has now asked us if there is any chance for a substitute letter which he could use in his local Democratic Newsletter.

If you can go along with his request it would be desirable, from his point of view, to have a new letter. Unfortunately, the first one bore an October 4 date over the phrase "It was a pleasure to visit with you earlier this month..." The only added element in the attached letter is the last paragraph.

W. W. Rostow

Dear Wes:

It was a pleasure to visit with you here just before the opening session of the United Nations, to discuss Secretary General U Thant's proposals for ending the conflict in Vietnam. I know how deeply you feel about the necessity of our exploring all possible means of moving the conflict to the conference table. Because I fully share your desires in this respect, it was very useful to have your views.

As you know, Ambassador Goldberg, in his United Nations address, discussed at some length our government's suggestion for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

Sincerely,

The Honorable
Weston E. Vivian
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WEVivian:RMoose:cf

October 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to High Commissioner of Trust Territory
of Pacific Islands

Secretary Udall recommends for your approval the attached message to William Norwood, High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands which explains that you and Mrs. Johnson will not be able to visit the Territory during your Pacific trip.

I recommend that you approve the message and authorize Mr. Norwood to publicize it in the Territory. It will be immediately useful to him and will help to underline your continuing efforts on behalf of the Trust Territory.

You have already sent a message to the Governor of Guam. The absence of a communication to the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory might be misinterpreted.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

See me _____

WWR:BKS:amc

DRAFT TELEGRAM

Honorable William R. Norwood
High Commissioner of the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands
Saipan, Mariana Islands 96950

Mrs. Johnson and I greatly regret that we will be unable to visit the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands during our trip to the western Pacific and Asia. Although time will not permit such a stop, I ~~wish to~~ assure you and the people of Micronesia that we are deeply conscious of their needs and aspirations and that this Administration will continue to give full weight to the requirements for educational opportunities, improved health services, better communities, and the chance to make economic use of their resources. Will you please convey to the people of the Trust Territory our deep interest in their future and our regret that circumstances preclude our visiting, even briefly, their islands on this trip.

The President of the United States

Pres file~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 11, 1966 -- 1:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Bill Moyers raises urgently the question of whether your visit to Thailand should be an "official" or a "state" visit.

He also wants to know whether you would be prepared to stay in their equivalent of Blair House as opposed to a hotel.

As you see, the difference is essentially two white tie dinners versus one black tie dinner and a reception.

Bill Bundy recommends a state visit, primarily for the reasons set out in the last two sentences of the first paragraph. I concur.

W. W. Rostow

State visit _____

Official visit _____

Special residence _____

Hotel _____

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NSC 3-31-80 (#21)	
By <i>DEH</i>	NARS, Date <i>8-22-86</i>

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

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SANITIZED

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~~SECRET~~

NSC 3/31/80
JK

7/7/80

Tuesday, October 11, 1966

TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON

FROM BILL MOYERS

The Thailand visit is going to be impressive. The chief issue stalling the planning progress is whether the visit will be official or state. 1-301(6)
-301(d)
~~XGDS-3~~
XGDS-3
XGDS-1

strongly desires a state visit out of profound desire to pay full honor to the first American president ever to visit here. There is a genuine intent here to make you aware of the respect the Thais have for your efforts on their behalf, beginning in the visit of 1961 when you opened essential assistance.

SANITIZED

XGDS-3

1-301(d)

The first 24 hours here will be rest at their Camp David regardless of whether it is state or official. A state visit means the King and Queen will greet you at the airport, plus a white tie dinner on the second night and another dinner the third, and final, night. An official visit means a black tie dinner the second night and a reception the third, and final, night. There is no more or less time in the country involved either way.

The Thais also would like you to stay at the special guest house (their Blair House) on the palace grounds which offers total privacy and room for a 45-man staff, etc. No others would occupy it, so you would have it all to yourself. The alternative is hotel.

I plan to see Thais tomorrow so I would appreciate your guidance tonight as to your views on (1) a state versus official visit, and (2) the special residence versus the hotel.

~~SECRET~~

COPY
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY

(LDX to State Secretariat for transmittal)

October 11, 1966

TO: AmEmbassy Mexico City

Please deliver following message to President Diaz Ordaz

from President Johnson:

QUOTE I was ^{deeply}~~terribly~~ distressed to read on the ticker a few minutes ago
of the terrible damage done by hurricane Inez to towns and communities
along the coast.

If there is anything that we can do to be helpful, please let me know.
Our thoughts are with you and with your people in this stricken zone.

Warmest regards.

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

Bill Bowdler
concur
3:30 PM

UPI-117

ADD HURRICANE, TAMPICO (UPI-11)

AT LEAST TWO SMALL MEXICAN TOWNS WERE DESTROYED AND 30,000 PERSONS LEFT HOMELESS IN THE DEATH THROES OF HURRICANE INEZ, GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES SAID TODAY.

TORRENTIAL RAINS FELL FOR HOURS IN TAMAULIPAS, SAN LUIS POTOSI AND NUEVO LEON STATES.

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ORDERED AN EMERGENCY AIR LIFT TO THE STRICKEN ZONE, WHERE SOME COMMUNITIES WERE REPORTED RAZED BY THE HURRICANE THAT SLAMMED INTO LAND MONDAY AFTER RAMPAGING ACROSS THE GULF OF MEXICO FROM YUCATAN.

ERNESTO DOMINGUEZ, CHIEF OF THE GULF OF MEXICO WEATHER BUREAU, SAID INEZ WAS "COMPLETELY DISSIPATED" IN THE EASTERN SIERRA MADRE MOUNTAINS AND THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF REVIEW.

GOV. PRAXEDIS BALBOA OF TAMAULIPAS STATE SAID THE TOWNS OF GONZALEZ AND ESTACION MANUEL WERE VIRTUALLY DESTROYED AND THERE WAS NO WORD FROM ALDAMA.

AUTHORITIES SAID FERNANDO, ABASOLO, SOTO LA MARIANA, XICOTENCATL AND EL MANTESUFFERED HEAVY DAMAGES.

SOME 15,000 WERE REPORTED HOMELESS IN TAMPICO, 10,000 IN SAN FERNANDO AND 5,000 IN CIUDAD MANTE. EVACUATION TO HIGHER GROUND WAS UNDER WAY IN TAMPICO, MOST OF THE VILLAGES OF WHICH WERE COVERED BY TWO INCHES OF WATER.

10/11--BA214PED

*2 Pres file**President
saw him
in nyc
on 10/12/66*~~SECRET~~

October 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prince Souvanna Phouma

You have agreed to see Laos Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma at 9:30 a.m. on Thursday in New York.

He comes at a time of political conflict and uncertainty in Laos. The National Assembly has been dissolved after rejecting his government's new budget, tantamount to a vote of "no confidence." New elections probably will be held early next year, but the viability of the tripartite coalition government established by the 1962 Geneva Agreements has been shaken. Souvanna, nevertheless, continues to personify "tripartism," and your meeting with him will serve to buttress his leadership.

Souvanna is openly dedicated to Lao neutrality but in private strongly supports our actions to end North Vietnamese aggression.

King Savang Vatthana has told Ambassador Sullivan that our policy in Laos is "exactly right" in all respects and hoped we found Laotian policy "useful" to our larger purposes in Asia.

At the outset you may want to:

- (1) Regret that your illness a year ago prevented your seeing Souvanna then. A meeting had been tentatively arranged.
- (2) Note the unfortunate loss of life and crop damage from the recent flooding of the Mekong -- the worst in 40 years -- and promise our continuing assistance to help the Lao recover.

I recommend that you then give Souvanna an opportunity to present his general views on how to achieve peace in Vietnam and prospects in Southeast Asia. Specifically, he will want reassurance from you personally that

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NLJ

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By *sig* NARA, Date 5-14-90~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

-- We still hope to work positively with the Soviets toward stability in Southeast Asia. He has long viewed a tacit U.S. -Soviet detente as the best bulwark against Chinese ambitions.

-- We have no desire to expand the Vietnam conflict beyond present boundaries. He is highly sensitive to Communist propaganda on this point as it affects Laos.

-- We will continue to encourage other nations to augment their technical and economic aid to Laos. He is grateful for our aid but sees his country's neutral status and tenuous balance with the Soviets endangered by any appearance of being dependent on the U.S.

Aside from reassuring him on these matters you might also:

(1) Reaffirm our desire for Laos to live in peace and tranquility with its neighbors, our continuing economic and military assistance to build the economy and enable Laos to resist Communist pressures, and our commitment to the 1962 Geneva Agreements.

(2) Express understanding of Souvanna's difficulties in implementing those Agreements and our support for his continuing efforts as Prime Minister.

(3) Let him know how much we appreciate the political risks he takes in collaborating with our operations against infiltration routes into South Vietnam. (As cooperative as he has been, it should be noted that he has no official knowledge of Shining Brass operations and only limited knowledge of the Arc Light program.)

(4) Summarize briefly your expectations from the seven-nation conference in Manila and your Asian trip.

There are three specific matters that Souvanna may introduce:

Soviet overflight request. The Soviets have requested permission to make Soviet "air line" overflights of Laos enroute to Hanoi. Souvanna

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- 3 -

has deferred a response pending discussion with us. You might note the complexity of this and steer him to Secretary Rusk.

Foreign exchange stabilization. We support a Foreign Exchange Operations Fund along with the UK, France, Australia and Japan. There is a shortfall in CY 1966 funds available. If Souvanna expresses concern he might be reassured of our efforts with the other donors and again be referred to State.

Future of "tripartism." Souvanna and other Lao leaders are increasingly doubtful of the further utility of the coalition governmental arrangements specified in the 1962 Geneva Agreements. They tend to believe that an avowed neutralist prime minister, replacing the tripartite facade, would still satisfy the Soviets. This is a tricky area, and it might be advisable to hear Souvanna out without substantive comment.

Souvanna has keen insight and knowledge about most Southeast Asian leaders and their policies, including the North Vietnamese. He is particularly interested in the shifting relationships among Moscow, Peking and Hanoi. As committed as he is to maintaining the neutral image of Laos he recognizes that aggression from Hanoi is the source of troubles in Indochina. Advance information is that he will identify Hanoi as the aggressor in his UN address on October 18, and by implication condemn "wars of liberation" as well. Laos had an observer at the ASPAC meeting in Seoul, has joined the Asian Development Bank and is cooperating in regional programs as politically feasible.

Secretary Rusk elaborates on these matters in the attached memorandum, which includes a biographic statement.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 89-21

By 1-8 NARA, Date 7-11-89

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Talking Points for Your Meeting with
His Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma,
Prime Minister of Laos

The Prime Minister will undoubtedly wish to discuss rather thoroughly with you the current situation in Southeast Asia and prospects for the future. He will be quite interested in the conference at Manila and your visits to various Asian capitals.

As an experienced and skillful Asian statesman, the Prime Minister has keen insight and knowledge about most Southeast Asian leaders and their policies, including the North Vietnamese. He is very much interested in the shifting relationships among Moscow, Peking and Hanoi and would be flattered to have you seek his views.

Following are points you may wish to raise in discussions with the Prime Minister:

1. 1962 Geneva Agreements - To achieve the U.S. objective of an independent, neutral Laos, we have strongly encouraged and supported the Royal Lao Government (RLG) in its desire to live in peace and tranquility with its neighbors. We will continue to support the Prime Minister's efforts to achieve effective implementation of the 1962 arrangements. We continue to hope it will be possible to work positively with the Soviet Union toward conditions of greater stability in Southeast Asia.

2. No Wider War - The air operations we conduct in Laos with Souvanna's private approval have subjected him to heavy Communist pressures. We appreciate the political risks he has

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Group 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

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- 2 -

been willing to take in collaborating with our military efforts against the infiltration routes into South Vietnam as well as in support of his own forces. We are aware that Soviet and other Communist propaganda accuses us of preparation for land invasion of Laos and other actions we are not taking. Souvanna should be assured of the sincerity and depth of our hope that the Viet-Nam war will not expand beyond its current boundaries.

3. Continuity of the Government of National Union - We believe that Souvanna Phouma's role as Prime Minister is the best assurance of protecting the essentials of the 1962 settlement from both internal and international standpoints. We understand the stresses to which he has been subjected and appreciate his continued leadership.

4. Military Assistance - Responding to the Prime Minister's earlier requests, we have given, and will continue to provide as long as necessary, military assistance in terms of equipment and supplies to enable the Lao Armed Forces to resist Communist military pressures and defend the country against North Vietnamese aggression.

5. Economic Assistance - There is guarded but perceptible optimism regarding the potential economic development of Laos, particularly for expanded rice production, providing its other problems can be resolved. Recent flood damage will retard progress but does not alter the underlying prospect for improvement.

We will continue to provide economic and financial assistance to help improve the Lao economy and enable the country to move toward certain measures of self-sufficiency.

We appreciate and will continue to support the extensive RLG efforts to maintain and broaden multilateral participation in economic assistance to Laos. Both the RLG and the U. S. benefit politically and financially from increased third-country interest in Laos.

6. Mekong Flood - We are gratified that the recent devastating Mekong flood, which submerged much of Vientiane and the

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- 3 -

surrounding farm lands (rice and vegetables), did not cause a heavy loss of life. Our hearts go out to the people of Laos who have suffered so severely from it. Rehabilitation after such a serious economic loss (e.g., an estimated 100,000 tons of rice and more than 50,000 temporary refugees) will require prolonged effort, and we are prepared to work closely with Lao authorities.

The Prime Minister may raise the following points:

1. Soviet Overflight Request - The Soviets have recently asked permission to make Soviet "air line" overflights of Laos enroute to Hanoi. The Prime Minister has agreed to defer any response pending discussions with us. The proposal is discussed in the summary of recent developments in Laos. If the subject is raised by the Prime Minister, you may wish to listen to his views and then note that the subject is a complex one which should be explored at some length, suggesting that he discuss it with me.

2. Foreign Exchange Stabilization - The Prime Minister may express his concern over an apparent shortage in CY 1966 funds available to the Foreign Exchange Operations Fund, which the US, UK, France, Australia and Japan support. We acknowledge that there is a shortfall at present but have added to our contribution and are continuing to support RLG requests to other donors. We consider the Fund essential and are confident its needs will be met. If the Prime Minister desires, he and his Finance Minister, Sisouk na Champassak, who is accompanying him, might want to discuss the matter in greater detail with me.

I am enclosing a summary of recent events in Laos and a brief biographical sketch of the Prime Minister.

/s/ DEAN RUSK

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Summary of Recent Events in Laos.
2. Biographical Sketch of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma.

~~SECRET~~

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ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 OCT 11 PM 7 00

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 89-21

By ing NARA, Date 4-27-89LAOS

The U.S. Government continues to support the neutralization of Laos, worked out in the 1962 Geneva Accords. The 1962 settlement includes an internal formula for a tripartite coalition government of Communist (Pathet Lao), Neutralist, and rightwing elements and a 13-nation undertaking to respect the independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of Laos without foreign military involvement. These arrangements have been violated from the beginning by the Pathet Lao and by North Vietnam, sustained and encouraged by Communist China. Nevertheless, this underpopulated, undeveloped, multiracial and recently independent country caught in a maelstrom of external pressures, has maintained a degree of stability surprising to knowledgeable observers. The strategic Mekong valley flank of Thailand remains in non-communist hands. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma remains openly dedicated to his country's neutrality and in private strongly supports U.S. actions to end North Vietnamese aggression. Preserving these gains requires a constant "holding action" within Laos.

In an unusually forthright statement to Ambassador Sullivan on October 8, King Savang said that he considers U.S. policy in Laos exactly right in all its aspects and hopes the U.S. finds Laotian policy useful to larger U.S. purposes in Asia. The King also thanked Ambassador Sullivan for assistance rendered the people of Laos during the September flood by the U.S. Government and the Mission in Vientiane.

A. Continuity in Government - Months of growing tension between the government and a largely conservative National Assembly intensified on September 16 when the Assembly voted down the FY 1967 government budget and Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma reacted by asking King Savang Vattana to dissolve the Assembly. The outcome of this confrontation is uncertain. The King's Council on October 7 approved a proposal to dissolve the Assembly. This may mean that an election for a new Assembly would take place within three months. Retention of the legal framework of a coalition government and Souvanna's continuation as Prime Minister best serve Lao and U.S. interests.

Under Souvanna's leadership, the coalition formed in 1962 carefully balanced communist, Neutralist, and rightwing elements. From the beginning, the Pathet Lao sought to undercut the Accords through political obstructionism, subversion, and military operations against both Neutralist and Royal Government Forces (FAR). As Souvanna's position grew firmer, the communists withdrew from an active role in the government, and Laos reverted to a condition of de facto, though ill-defined partition. The Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces deny government control through much of the northern and eastern mountain areas, except for continued pockets of resistance among the Meo and other hill tribes; however, at least 75% of the population and most of the productive resources remain in government-controlled valley areas.

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- 2 -

B. Economic Deficiencies - In view of the continuing active warfare, even minimal political stability is impossible without continuing large injections of foreign aid. Laos has the largest per capita U.S. aid program in the world (economic aid \$55.1 million and military aid \$63.3 million in FY 1966). The economic aid program aims to fulfill both immediate and selective longer range development needs: a village cluster socio-economic-security program, with self-help emphasized; refugee relief for some 250,000 persons displaced by communist military pressure; agricultural development; public works; public health, fundamental education and school construction. The UK, France, Australia and Japan, as well as the U.S. promote financial stability through the Foreign Exchange Operations Fund (FEOF), with 1966 required injections totaling \$18.5 million.

C. Military Containment - The International Control Commission (ICC) revived by the 1962 Accords has not been able to prevent Pathet Lao-government hostilities or North Vietnamese aggression against Laos but has to some extent documented these violations. In response to Souvanna's request, the U.S. has provided increasing military equipment and supplies, without the presence of a military mission (prohibited by the 1962 Accords). U.S. efforts to contain the infiltration and resupply of communist forces in South Vietnam along the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" complex must continue to be compatible with Prime Minister Souvanna's staunchly defended posture of neutrality.

D. Soviet Request for Overflights of Laos - The Soviet Charge in Vientiane recently informed the Prime Minister that the Soviets would like to change the routing of their "air line" flights to Hanoi to avoid overflight of Communist China. The preferred alternative would be via New Delhi, Rangoon and by overflight of Laos. Souvanna asked for a formal request, not yet received, and has deferred a substantive response until after his Washington visit.

Currently, Soviet flights via Communist China are irregular and must be individually approved by the CPR, sometimes with delays and reported minor harassment of official travelers. The proposed alternate route would provide assured Soviet access to Hanoi and North Vietnamese in the event of a sharper Sino-Soviet split, but other alternate routes are also possible. At the same time, we believe Soviet flights, even if identified as non-military, would probably be used for personnel and cargo that would add to the over-all military capacity of North Vietnam. They would also interfere to some degree with current air activities over Laos. We will be exploring this complex question in discussions with Souvanna.

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PRINCE SOUVANNA PHOUMA

With the investiture of the present coalition government on June 23, 1962, His Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma became Prime Minister of Laos for the fourth time and concurrently assumed the portfolios of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and Rural Action. In September 1965 Souvanna obtained approval from the newly elected National Assembly for the continuation of the government, with minor cabinet shuffles, including Souvanna's assumption of the Foreign Affairs portfolio. Having served as Prime Minister through the crucial periods of 1951 through 1954, 1956 through 1958, and August to December 1960, he probably has had more experience in top-level government posts than any other Lao leader. Although he is opposed to Communism and is intellectually oriented toward the West, Souvanna has steadfastly worked for national reconciliation among all Lao factions, including the Pathet Lao and has endeavored consistently to maintain a neutral and independent Laos. In the last few years he has taken a firm attitude toward the Pathet Lao and has obtained the cooperation of the conservatives. Because of Souvanna's international reputation and the broad foreign support he enjoys, he continues to play a key role in Lao affairs and there is no visible alternative to him as head of the Royal Lao Government.

Prince Souvanna was born in October 1901. He studied in Hanoi and received degrees in architectural and electrical engineering from the Universities of Paris and Grenoble. From 1931 to the end of World War II he served as a government engineer. He joined the Lao Issara movement after the war and served with the government in exile in Bangkok until returning to Laos in 1950. Souvanna entered the cabinet in February 1950 and was a member of each succeeding cabinet until August 1958, twice serving as Prime Minister. In October 1958 he was appointed Ambassador to France and later was named to serve concurrently as Ambassador to Israel, Italy, West Germany, and Belgium. In April 1960 he was elected to the National Assembly, and he resigned his ambassadorships. In August 1960, following the Kong Le coup, he again became Prime Minister until his government was dismissed by royal order. Souvanna then set up a government in exile in Xieng Khouang, which he headed until the formation of the coalition government.

Souvanna has traveled widely and has visited the United States on a number of occasions. He is married to a half-French lady who is prominent in her own right. Souvanna speaks French, Thai, and Lao. He understands English but avoids using it.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-105
By sig NARA, Date 7-12-89

Tuesday, October 11, 1966 -- 7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

We just concluded a 2-1/2 hour review of the Asian trip. Here are some questions which require your decision.

1. Marv Watson is sending this up separately. Jim Cross has okayed a flight from Ohakea to Wellington in a New Zealand DC-6. Is that all right with you?

Yes _____. No _____.

2. We are planning for a major speech in Hawaii, preferably at the East-West Center. The questions are these:

Can we firm up final arrangements for an East-West Center speech? _____

We have a choice of an indoor auditorium seating 700 or an outdoor University installation believed to seat about 1500. The advantage of the indoor auditorium is that it is part of the East-West Center and safe from the bad weather that sometimes blows up around 4 p. m., when the speech is tentatively scheduled.

Indoors at East-West Center _____

Outdoor at University _____

3. Jim Cross tells us that he will have to take the party off from the long Dulles runways if we are to make it non-stop to Honolulu.

The Diplomatic Corps will certainly want to turn out. We could make it quite a nice occasion with band departure, ^{statement} etc.

Arrange reasonably colorful departure with statement _____

Depart quietly _____

4. For the first time I am reasonably confident that we are shaking down pretty well in the speech-draft business.

5. As Marv has no doubt told you, we need your decision on the manifest so that those going can get their shots and otherwise prepare.

W. W. Rostow

Monday, Oct. 10, 1966
9:15 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

My only substantive comment on the briefing papers is that Tommy T. is too defensive on Vietnam in two respects.

1. The U. S. S. R. assumed an explicit duty in 1954 and 1962 as Co-Chairman to prevent precisely the kind of infiltration across international frontiers which is now taking place. (Averell's paper has this more positive flavor.)

2. Our build-up in the South and our bombing in the North occurred in response to the enlarged 1964-65 offensive of Hanoi. A North Vietnamese division (the 325th) was in South Vietnam before our reinforcements began to arrive in 1965.

On non-proliferation, I wouldn't go into quite as much detail as Francis suggests. I would state the position on the veto and then leave it to Sect. Rusk at dinner and/or for a Pen Pal letter to Kosygin.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-104
By isg NARA, Date 9-6-89

Robert

56a

Sunday, October 9, 1966, 2:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, Monday,
October 10 at 5 p. m.

At Tab A is Tommy Thompson's briefing paper for your meeting with Gromyko. At Tab B is a paper on Viet-Nam prepared for the meeting by Averell Harriman.

I do not believe you will need a further full briefing paper from me. The two major topics of conversation will be Viet-Nam and non-proliferation. (Gromyko may even link the two by hinting that the Soviets will help us with Hanoi if we buy the Foster-Roshchin language.)

On non-proliferation, Gromyko is likely to say that:

- the Foster-Roshchin language represents a large concession by the Soviets;
- they cannot go any further;
- with India and others on the brink, it may be now or never for a treaty.

In line with your Camp David decision, you may wish to tell Gromyko that:

- we are ready to agree to language committing us to retain a U.S. veto;
- guaranteeing (by treaty, U.S. law and physical fact) a U.S. veto over firing U.S. weapons protects the essential and legitimate ~~Soviet~~ interest;
- our position on the veto will disappoint the Germans (and advocates of an independent European force), but we are prepared to face that.

Gromyko will probably say that the Soviets must have a further commitment against transfer of U. S. -produced nuclear weapons to a joint force. (He may even point out that U.S. law now prohibits such transfer of nuclear warheads.)

You may wish to answer that:

- as long as we keep the veto, "ownership is a secondary issue (it's a fuzzy capitalist notion, anyway);
- the critical issue is the legal right and physical ability to fire;
- on that, the Soviet and U.S. interests completely coincide;
- we should take advantage of this common interest and go ahead with the treaty.

(The above line fully reflects your Camp David decision, as I understand it. I won't waste your time with an appeal.)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

Francis M. Bator

NLI 89-26

By *ig* NARA, Date *5-14-90*

~~SECRET~~

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566



S/S-14971

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO
OCTOBER 10, 1966

Enclosed is a memorandum for the President's meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on October 10, 1966 at 5 P.M. It was drafted by Ambassador Thompson and represents the Department's views on subjects which the President may wish to discuss. Secretary Rusk saw and concurred in an earlier draft essentially on the same lines.

BHR

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure;
Memorandum for the President

Under this same cover I am sending a copy of the memo dated October 7 from Governor Harriman to the President and the Secretary on points for the President's consideration in talking with Gromyko.

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: MEETING WITH GROMYKO, 5 P.M. OCTOBER 10, 1966U.S. Objectives

The following are the principal objectives of your meeting with Gromyko:

1. To add one more step to the many we have taken to convince the Soviets and the rest of the world that we are leaving no stone unturned in our search for peace in Viet-Nam.
2. To exacerbate the Sino-Soviet quarrel. (The mere fact that you receive Gromyko will doubtless lead to Chinese charges against the Soviets of collusion with the U.S.)
3. To demonstrate to the Soviets that despite Viet-Nam, we are not only willing, but desirous of taking steps that will ease tension.

Talking Points

A. Viet-Nam. You may wish to tell Gromyko that you have been fully informed of his talks with Secretary Rusk and that you do not propose to repeat the statement of our position which is well known to him. There are, however, several points which you may wish to underscore:

1. First of all is your sincere desire for a peaceful settlement. You have taken every feasible step to move

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By cb, NARA, Date 8-25-98

2.

matters towards negotiation for a settlement or, pending that, for a reciprocal reduction in military activity. You have noted Mr. Gromyko's statement to the effect that every time we made a peaceful move we also took actions or made statements indicating a further American involvement. Such actions do not indicate bad faith on our part. They were previously planned and considered necessary only in view of the total lack of response from the other side.

2. We would be quite prepared to discuss what action each side might take to diminish the level of hostilities, but how can we do this when Hanoi will not talk to us in a conference, directly, or through third parties? Mr. Gromyko had suggested certain actions by us to establish a climate for a settlement but actions are needed on both sides to increase mutual confidence.

3. We will be grateful for anything the Soviets may be able to do to enable us to reach a peaceful settlement of this problem.

4. If Mr. Gromyko again urges unilateral U.S. actions, you may wish to note that the Soviets do not seem to have given us credit for having given up in advance one of our major negotiating assets; namely, we have made clear in advance our willingness to withdraw our troops and to give up the military bases which we have constructed in South Viet-Nam at enormous cost. In return for this, there has never been any concession from the other side.

B. Non-proliferation. Depending upon the status of Foster's continuing talks you may wish to emphasize our desire to overcome the remaining differences between us on the text of an agreement. It seems to us that as far as our objectives in non-proliferation are concerned we have a wide area of agreement. We do not intend to turn our weapons over to any other nation. Responsibility for firing U.S. weapons rests with the President under our law and policy, and there is no

prospect that this will or can be changed. However, we do not wish to undertake treaty obligations which would commit us to act as if no alliance of a collective security nature exists with our allies. We cannot say to them that collective security within the alliance is none of their business. We have gone a long way in seeking to reach compromise language with the Soviet Union and we do not believe that any real Soviet concerns would be affected by the language which we have proposed. Time is running out on this subject. We should therefore seek to resolve the remaining differences.

C. Communist China. You might wish to see whether Gromyko will be disposed to discuss this subject by touching on the following points:

1. We are amazed and puzzled by what appears to be going on in Communist China. The turmoil there will surely increase the difficulty the Chinese are encountering in feeding their enormous population.

2. These events are cause for concern which the Soviet Government may share. In particular we hope that the chaotic conditions in China will not tempt the Chinese to divert attention by military adventures. For our part, we will take no action which could legitimately serve as a pretext for such a dangerous course.

D. Germany. It seems unlikely that Gromyko will raise this as a separate subject. He will, of course, express the traditional Soviet views on Germany in the context of his remarks on non-proliferation. He might argue for admission of the so-called German Democratic Republic into the United Nations, although this is doubtful.

E. Outer Space Treaty. On October 4 the Soviets accepted two of our important compromise proposals and, for other treaty clauses such as that relating to the granting of tracking facilities, put forward compromise language of their own. This Soviet movement has brought us closer to a treaty, though

several problems remain to be worked out and our allies need time to react. Ambassador Goldberg is making an intensive effort to wrap up all of the major treaty points. If substantial agreement has been reached by October 10, you may want to express satisfaction; otherwise you might hope for a speedy conclusion.

F. Civil Air Agreement. We have prepared and the Soviets have agreed that Pan American send a small group to Moscow to review and update the agreement between the two airlines preparatory to the signing of the inter-governmental agreement here. We understand that General Loginov, the Soviet Minister of Aviation, will come here in early November for the signing. We are currently studying a few amendments proposed by the Soviets and are proposing a few minor, technical changes of our own.

G. Consular Agreement and Trade Expansion. You may also wish to express an intention of pressing for the ratification of the Consular Agreement and for Congressional action which would facilitate the expansion of trade.

H. Fisheries Problem. You may wish to express the hope that the U.S.-Soviet talks which will resume next month on the problem caused by the Soviet fishing fleet currently massed off our Northwest Coast will result in a reduction of the tensions this problem is creating for us.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

56d
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-21

By sig NARA, Date 7-11-89

~~SECRET~~

October 7, 1966 .

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Points for President's Talk with Gromyko

There are a number of indications that Soviets are giving serious consideration on how they can play an increased role in Vietnam with a view to bringing hostilities to an end, and assuring a political status for both North and South Vietnam, free from dependence on Red China.

It would seem, however, that Soviet leaders are not yet prepared to intervene directly and appear to be awaiting a request from Hanoi to do so. There are some indications that they consider it too early for action now (a) because the United States may become war weary and make further concessions in our position; and (b) because they are not yet sure that they can induce Hanoi to reject Peking's hard line. Thus, for the present, they want it to appear that they are standing firmly behind Hanoi and increasing their aid, particularly in the field of air defense.

Under these circumstances, I would recommend that you emphasize (1) your belief that the Soviet Union has an obligation to work for the ending of hostilities and a peaceful settlement; (2) the Soviet Union is the only country in a position to influence Hanoi constructively; (3) you stand behind Amb. Goldberg's recent proposals in the UN; (4) one of your important purposes in going to seven-nation conference in Manila is to promote a peaceful settlement; (5) Mr. Gromyko can assure his colleagues in Moscow that although you are determined to achieve our limited objectives of permitting South Vietnamese people to decide their own future, you are prepared to consider any proposals that they may have for talks, either privately or at some international forum. If Mr. Gromyko is negative or noncommittal, as he probably will be, I further suggest you might indicate the subject of Vietnam should be kept open and both sides should feel free to reopen it at any time.

W. Averell Harriman

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, Oct. 10, 1966
9:15 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

My only substantive comment on the briefing papers is that Tommy T. is too defensive on Vietnam in two respects.

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W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET attachment~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 89-26
By 48 NARA, Date 5-14-90

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

57a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON Sunday, October 9, 1966, 2:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, Monday,
October 10 at 5 p. m.

At Tab A is Tommy Thompson's briefing paper for your meeting with Gromyko. At Tab B is a paper on Viet-Nam prepared for the meeting by Averell Harriman.

I do not believe you will need a further full briefing paper from me. The two major topics of conversation will be Viet-Nam and non-proliferation. (Gromyko may even link the two by hinting that the Soviets will help us with Hanoi if we buy the Foster-Roshchin language.)

On non-proliferation, Gromyko is likely to say that:

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- they cannot go any further;
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In line with your Camp David decision, you may wish to tell Gromyko that:

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You may wish to answer that:

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(The above line fully reflects your Camp David decision, as I understand it. I won't waste your time with an appeal.)

Francis
Francis M. Bator

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By CB, NARA, Date 8-25-98

~~SECRET~~

Tab #
576

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: MEETING WITH GROMYKO, 5 P.M. OCTOBER 10, 1966

U.S. Objectives

The following are the principal objectives of your meeting with Gromyko:

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By CG, NARA, Date 8-25-98

2.

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Tab B
57c

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

October 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Points for President's Talk with Gromyko

There are a number of indications that Soviets are giving serious consideration on how they can play an increased role in Vietnam with a view to bringing hostilities to an end, and assuring a political status for both North and South Vietnam, free from dependence on Red China.

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Under these circumstances, I would recommend that you emphasize (1) your belief that the Soviet Union has an obligation to work for the ending of hostilities and a peaceful settlement; (2) the Soviet Union is the only country in a position to influence Hanoi constructively; (3) you stand behind Amb. Goldberg's recent proposals in the UN; (4) one of your important purposes in going to seven-nation conference in Manila is to promote a peaceful settlement; (5) Mr. Gromyko can assure his colleagues in Moscow that although you are determined to achieve our limited objectives of permitting South Vietnamese people to decide their own future, you are prepared to consider any proposals that they may have for talks, either privately or at some international forum. If Mr. Gromyko is negative or noncommittal, as he probably will be, I further suggest you might indicate the subject of Vietnam should be kept open and both sides should feel free to reopen it at any time.

W. Averell Harriman

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-105

~~SECRET~~

By rip NARA, Date 11-16-89

Pres file

Monday, October 10, 1966
7:10 a. m.

Mr. President:

Here, as you requested, is
Nick Katzenbach's personal view on
the Harriman Asia-Europe deal.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 8, 1966

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT W. ROSTOW

I have read Mr. Harriman's memorandum of October 3 entitled "Negotiations".

I agree that Moscow may well be interested in persuading Hanoi to move towards a settlement at some time perhaps in the reasonably near future. I am inclined to the view that this is in Moscow's interest and that the pot does not need to be sweetened by European arrangements affecting Germany. But even if I am wrong I doubt the wisdom of mixing Europe and Asia at our suggestion. I would have less reservations if the Russians made it clear that the two were mixed together in their mind.

All of this is quite apart from the desirability of a nuclear non-proliferation pact. As you know, I would be prepared to make more concessions with respect to MLF than you would.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By CB, NARA, Date 8-25-98

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ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 OCT 10 PM 4 37

Mr. Rostow
59

Pres file

Monday, Oct. 10, 1966 at 4:30

Mr. President:

You will wish to discuss with Secretary Rusk (and perhaps Gromyko) what Bob Fleming should say to the Press about your 5 PM meeting.

At a minimum, we could say:

1. " The President and Foreign Minister Gromyko had a cordial, frank and wide-ranging discussion. They discussed a number of subjects of mutual concern. "

Francis M. Bator

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Oct. 10, 1966

Walt:

Will you send this up?

F

FMB

Mr. Rostow

October 10, 1966

MEMO FOR ~~BILL MOYERS~~
BOB FLEMING

Jake Jacobsen phoned to
Brom Smith the President's approval
of the attached White House Press
Release.

well

W. W. Rostow

Att: Proposed Press Release - New Eximbank Loan for Israel

PROPOSED PRESS RELEASE

October 10, 1966

NEW EXIMBANK LOAN FOR ISRAEL

The sale of \$6 million in American goods and services will be financed by a relending credit authorized by the Export-Import Bank of Washington to the Industrial Development Bank of Israel. The Israeli bank will re-lend proceeds of the loan to medium-sized private Israeli manufacturers who need United States machinery and equipment.

The new loan brings to some \$250 million the Eximbank's total assistance to Israel since the country became independent in 1948. About \$230 million of this total has been in the form of direct loans to governmental and private enterprises in such fields as agriculture, industry, power and transportation. All repayments have been made as scheduled.

It is expected that the new loan will further assist industrial development in Israel, which in recent years has attained an average annual growth rate of some 15 percent. It will be repayable in 16 semi annual installments after a grace period of approximately two years. Interest on the loan will be at an annual rate of six percent.

This is the third Eximbank loan for Israel since the beginning of the new US fiscal year July 1. On September 28, the Bank authorized a loan of \$5,598,000 to assist El Al Israel Airlines in purchasing its seventh Boeing jet aircraft. On August 4, the Bank authorized a loan of \$1.3 million to American-Israeli Paper Mills, Ltd., for purchase of paper-making machinery in the US.

61
Mr. Rostow

LDX'd to
State

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

October 10, 1966

TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

Please deliver immediately following message from Walt Rostow, White House, to Mr. Abe Feinberg, staying at Hilton through 10 October:

White House will announce 10 October approval of Export-Import Bank loan of \$6 million to the Industrial Bank of Israel. This comes on heels of 28 September approval of \$5.6 million loan to help finance El Al Airlines' seventh Boeing jet.

President wished you to be notified.

Please confirm delivery.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Monday, October 10, 1966
5:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Prime Minister Wilson seems to have liked
your European speech, too.

Our problem will be to hold him a little
closer to strength and firmness; the conciliation
and flexibility come easier.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, October 10, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON

I want you to know how impressed we all were by your great and imaginative speech about European reconciliation and the new efforts you are making in that cause. No doubt this will come up if you are able to see George Brown later this week and I shall be very interested in anything further you can tell him of your plans and of your estimate of Soviet and East European attitudes. It is my own strong impression that, despite Vietnam, they want to push ahead with relations in Europe and with you and that this desire has recently grown. This is what makes your initiative so timely.

I was encouraged by what you said about the need to remove territorial and border disputes: and also by your mention of a possible revision in force levels on both sides. As I told you in July, when I suggested this revision to Kosygin he showed some interest in the idea. I am sure that it is worth our pursuing it.

I share your belief in the need for balance between strength and conciliation, between firmness and flexibility. This is not only what we want in the context of the alliance: I believe that it is at the same time -- linked with the possibility of co-operation in the economic field, which is fundamental to their interests--- exactly the right way to approach the East Europeans.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By Cb, NARA, Date 8-25-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reston
63a

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO THE EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-103

By ijg NARA. Date 2-16-91

Your Imperial Majesty:

Ambassador Korry has kept me fully informed of your recent conversations, and has conveyed to me your desire that we meet as soon as possible. I certainly understand the importance of the matters which prompt your request. Although these issues are, of course, of primary interest to the countries directly involved, they also affect the general peace and welfare of Africa and the world. Thus, under ordinary circumstances I would be most happy to receive you here to discuss them personally and at length.

However, as you know, I am leaving on Monday for 17 days in Asia, and I understand that you will also be away from your capital until late this month. My schedule for the period immediately following my return is already crowded well beyond capacity. I am afraid that I must, therefore, suggest that we postpone a personal discussion at least until I have worked my way through some of the backlog which will accumulate during my absence.

In the meantime, if you would find it useful, I should be pleased to send a personal representative to Addis Ababa to discuss these matters with you and your associates. I would choose a man in whom I have great personal confidence and who could accurately reflect my views. Perhaps it would be most to our mutual benefit if he were to come after you have

an opportunity to talk these problems over with your colleagues at the upcoming meeting of the Organisation of African Unity. ^{However,} I will be happy to bow to your judgment on the matter of timing, as well as on the question of the usefulness of such a representative.

In any event, I hope Your Majesty understands that this reply does not reflect any lack of American interest in the problems which concern you. Ambassador Kerry has well conveyed my own thoughts, which are the products of lengthy deliberation and a strong interest in the reduction of tensions in Africa and around the world. I fully recognize your high sense of responsibility for the security of Ethiopia and its trading outlets. But it seems to me of immense importance to Ethiopia and her neighbors that every effort be made to avoid any further escalation of the arms race. Indeed, it appears that all interests could well be served by movement in the direction of a regional armament agreement, perhaps administered through the OAU. All of us need to dig deeply into our reserves of goodwill and imagination in dealing with this kind of problem.

Nobody is more aware than I of the complexities involved in dealing with this kind of ^{issue} ~~problem~~, particularly when there is an absence of mutual trust between the parties to the negotiation. However, with time and patience and self-restraint, progress on the most difficult issues is often possible. I have every confidence that Your Majesty's leadership and statesmanship will be equal to the challenge of this most critical of the

issues facing Ethiopia and her neighbors. If you and your colleagues can work out your differences in a manner which assures peace and stability, your example will be an inspiration not only to Africa, but to all mankind. We stand ready to serve that cause in whatever way we can be useful.

My deepest apologies that I must postpone our meeting. Please let me know your views on a personal representative. I want you to know that my thoughts are with you in these difficult days.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Lamp
3.7.76 file

Friday/9:30 am
October 7, 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Another Israeli Loan

The Ex-Im Bank Board has just approved the last of the three loans for Israel that it will process this fall. This one is for \$6 million to be loaned to the Industrial Development Bank of Israel for relending to private medium-sized Israeli manufacturers. All of this money will be spent in the US for American machinery and equipment.

Again, I have saved first option on the announcement for you just in case you feel the time is riper now. Apart from the Bunker-desalting announcement and the left-over \$6 million, this is the last such Israeli aid move we anticipate before November 8th.

The attached press release could be put out from the White House, rounding up total Ex-Im help for Israel and underlining our role in Israel's significant industrial development. Since Ex-Im machinery operates pretty much in the open, the Israelis will know that this loan should have been approved about now. So if you don't feel announcing here would help you, we might as well let Ex-Im make a routine announcement so we don't appear to be blocking it.

W. W. Rostow

Approve WH release _____

Let Ex-Im make routine announcement _____

DECLASSIFIED	
NSC 8-18-81 (#137)	
By <i>DLH/gm</i>	159 NARS, Date <i>8-19-86</i>

CONFIDENTIAL

**\$6 MILLION OF U. S. EXPORTS TO ISRAEL
TO BE FINANCED BY NEW EXIMBANK LOAN**

The sale of American goods and services valued at \$6 million will be financed by a relending credit authorized by the Export-Import Bank of Washington to the Industrial Development Bank of Israel. Proceeds of the loan will be relent by that bank to private medium-sized Israeli manufacturers who require United States machinery and equipment.

The new loan brings to some \$250 million Eximbank's assistance to Israel authorized since the country became independent in 1948. About \$230 million of this total has been in the form of direct loans to governmental and private enterprises in such fields as agriculture, industry, power and transportation. All repayments have been made as scheduled.

It is expected that the new loan will further assist industrial development in Israel, which in recent years has attained an average annual growth rate of some 15 per cent.

Eximbank's new \$6 million loan will be repayable in 16 semi-annual installments after a grace period of approximately two years. Interest on the loan will be at an annual rate of six percent.

Friday, October 7, 1966 -- 10:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

Before going off this morning, I wanted to give you a very rough and initial suggested list for the Asian tour.

Bill Bundy, in particular, and the State Department, in general, have not been able to formulate anything very precise; although he ^{Bundy} phoned over some rough headings for me. Therefore, what you are getting here is a highly preliminary paper which has only one virtue: it gives you a chance to indicate under each heading what your own preferences are.

I. White House

President and Mrs. Johnson and personal staff
Congressional delegation?
Bill Moyers and press staff

W. W. Rostow and staff (I would like William Jorden, Richard Moose, and one of my secretaries, Miss Mildred Zayac. I want Moose* to keep in touch with the flow of intelligence and cables coming from Washington, while maintaining close liaison with Sec. Rusk's people. In addition, he is a young, flexible, efficient professional ex-Foreign Service Officer, whom we would use as a utility and fielder.)

John Roche, Harry McPherson, other speech writers

Col. Cross, etc.

Secret Service

Communicators

Dr. Hornig wishes to go. I don't see that that is required; but it is evidently a matter for you to decide.

Yoichi Okomoto

Robert Komer. (Bob is, like Nick, a turn-around problem. He ought to be at Manila. Perhaps he might go from Saigon and stay until we arrive, helping on the preparations in general and specifically for the Foreign Ministers meeting.

Others of your choice.

II. Department of State

- a. Sec. Rusk (may go direct to Manila for Foreign Ministers. A preliminary stop in Tokyo might be a gracious and useful gesture).

Mrs. Rusk?

Personal assistant

Secretary

2-3 security officers

- b. Under Secretary Katzenbach (After thinking over night, I believe, on balance, Nick should stay in Washington, for two reasons: first, he will have just completed a week in Saigon and be pretty tired to start another 3 weeks of whistle stopping. Second, he and Gene need to shake down as a team in relation to the State Dept as soon as possible. The 6th, 5th and 4th floors must get to know them, feel their hands on the reins. A further 3 week's hiatus may have important disadvantages. However, your decision).
- c. Gov. Harriman (As you know, we are thinking of sending Gov. Harriman off before the conference to talk with Mrs. Gandhi and, I would suggest, Ayub. He should be with Sec. Rusk at the Foreign Ministers session.)

Personal assistant

Secretary

- d. William Crockett

Personal assistant

- e. William Bundy

Personal assistant

Secretary

- f. Amb. Symington
- g. Secretariat: 2-4 needed to handle all diplomatic traffic.
- h. Office of International Conferences. They should go ahead of the party to Manila.

III. Department of Defense

Secretary McNamara and whomever he needs

IV. USIA

Leonard Marks

Secretary?

V. Other Agencies

Unless we want them for cosmetic effect, I don't think we need men from HEW and Agriculture if Bob Komer is present and the key people from Saigon. But you may have a clear judgment on this.

W. W. Rostow

*Moose has been on 6 major trips with Sec. Rusk, serving several times as chief of the Secretariat contingent.

Friday - October 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT -- INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Tuna Boat Incident with Peru

The remaining 6 American tuna boats left the Peruvian port of Talara yesterday evening and the case is now closed.

W. W. Rostow

cc - Bill Moyers

Thursday, October 6, 1966
3:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

VIA: Marvin Watson

SUBJECT: Saturday (October 8) Vietnam Meeting

Cancelled

1. Bob McNamara would like to get away about 10:30 a. m. and, therefore, if it is at all possible, he would like a meeting not later than 10:00 a. m.
2. He believes a small informal meeting with you, Nick Katzenbach, and Bob Komer, briefly to run over the issues they should handle, would be helpful. He does not believe a long formal meeting is required.
3. I agree with Bob.
4. As you were good enough to permit me to go away for this weekend to visit my son and celebrate my 50th birthday, I shall not be present on Saturday; but I have ensured that Bill Jorden and Bob Komer get you good briefing papers on Friday night.

W. W. Rostow

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OCT 6 1966

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: FY 1967 Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act

The Conference on the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act for FY 1967 met this afternoon and completed its work in 45 minutes.

The amounts appropriated for Foreign Assistance Act activities, compared with the budget requests, are:

	<u>Budget Request</u> (in millions of dollars)	<u>Appropriation</u> (in millions of dollars)
Economic	\$2, 469	\$2, 144
Military	917	792
TOTAL	<u>\$3, 386</u>	<u>\$2, 936</u>

The \$2, 936 million, which is the same total as the Senate bill, is the lowest appropriation for foreign assistance since FY 1968. It is clear from our talks with Senator Pastore that if the House conferees had tried harder (the House bill was \$110 million higher than the Senate bill), we could have done better.

Why didn't you + your people live with these conferees?
L

We are particularly squeezed in four appropriation categories:

	<u>Budget Request</u> (in millions of dollars)	<u>Appropriation</u> (in millions of dollars)
Development Loans	\$665	\$500
Supporting Assistance (including Vietnam)	747	690
Contingency Fund	70	35
Military Assistance	917	792

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

One other item of significance. The conferees agreed (a) to amend Section 205 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 so that it will permit -- rather than require -- the transfer of 10% of Development Loan funds to the World Bank family and (b) to drop the annual prohibition in the Appropriations Act on the use of loan funds for transfer to the World Bank family.

/s/ William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - October 6, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT -- INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Seizure of Tuna Boats by Peru

As of this afternoon the tuna boat problem with Peru is moving toward a solution, although we are not entirely out of the woods yet.

Nine of the twelve boats which entered the port of Talara to protest the seizure have departed. The captains of the three seized boats and the three remaining protest boats are negotiating with the Talara Port Captain on the terms of their departure. The prognosis is favorable.

Ambassador Pastor called President Belaunde as he promised. This -- plus Ambassador Jones' talks with the Foreign Minister -- smoothed the way for the early departure of the first nine boats. The remaining six boat captains have declined Embassy assistance in preference for dealing directly with the port captain. This has complicated and delayed the handling of the case.

State is keeping the California Congressional delegation fully informed of developments.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-103

By ing NARA. Date 2-6-91

cc - Bill Moyers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 6, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Pote Sarasin and Thanat Khoman

I have forwarded separately my briefing memorandum on the above, with State's briefing book.

You will be interested in the attached memo from Acting Secretary Katzenbach in this connection. It reports on a conversation between U. Alexis Johnson and the two Thai officials.

The main points were:

(1) That instead of a bilateral treaty at this time, we might consider a joint statement of mutual assurances. If this matter is raised, you may want to assure Pote and Thanat that we will see what can be worked out, perhaps for use at the time you meet with Minister Thanom; ~~(in Bangkok.)~~

(2) the Thai have been deeply upset by Senator Fulbright's criticism of them and of U.S. policy toward them. Pote believes that, without engaging in a debate with Fulbright, it would be very helpful if we could issue a statement after his and Thanat's call. The statement would reiterate our support for Thailand and for existing policy.

State supports this suggestion. I agree that it is reasonable.

A text of the proposed statement is attached. If you agree with this recommendation, you might want to show a draft of the statement to the two ministers.

Approve issuance of
statement

Disapprove

See Me

Walt Rostow
This would help, sir.
Walt

Att.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 89-26

By *WJ* NARA. Date *5-14-90*

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 6, 1966

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with Minister of National
Development Pote Sarasin and Minister of
Foreign Affairs Thanat Khoman of Thailand.

The following information is supplementary to that contained
in the memorandum of October 4, 1966, on the foregoing subject
transmitted to you by Secretary Rusk.

Alexis Johnson had a long talk on Wednesday with Pote Sarasin
on the desire that Foreign Minister Thanat has been expressing for
a bilateral defense treaty with the United States, and a shorter
talk with Thanat Khoman. Pote Sarasin, who is a very responsible
and influential figure in the Government, told Alex that the Thai
Government fully recognizes that to attempt to negotiate and obtain
ratification of a bilateral treaty at this time would not be in the
interest of either Government. It was his feeling that the necessi-
ties of the internal Thai political situation could be met by a
confidential statement from you to the Prime Minister. He felt that
the content of such a statement could be similar to things that we
have previously said to the Thai Government in such a form as to
enable Prime Minister Thanom to interpret the statement as a commit-
ment to protect Thailand against Chinese Communist retaliation for
U. S. use of Thai bases even if there should be a change in administra-
tion and in U. S. policy toward Southeast Asia. Alex pointed out
that, to give such a statement a balanced character and the U. S.
some assurance against a change in Thai Government policy with
respect to Thai bases, in which we were investing so heavily, it
would be desirable that something on this be said from the Thai
side. Pote Sarasin felt that this was entirely reasonable. Johnson
told him that he would see what could be worked out, perhaps for use
at the time that you meet Prime Minister Thanom in Manila.

Subsequently, Johnson confirmed with Foreign Minister Thanat
Khoman that Thanat was reconciled to something less than a bilateral

treaty

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-21

By lif NARA, Date 7-11-89

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

~~SECRET - NODIS~~


-2-

treaty but there was no discussion of details.

It is suggested that you not take the initiative in any detailed discussion of this subject with the two Ministers but, if it is raised by them, you simply indicate that you will be willing to consider something that could be discussed between you and the Prime Minister at the time of your meeting in Manila. We will submit a detailed recommendation to you in this regard.

Pote Sarasin also said that he did not think that the Thai Government would in the near future be willing to change its policy toward agreeing to more specific formal statements on our use of Thai bases for our air action against North Viet-Nam.

Pote Sarasin told Johnson that, while sophisticated Thais were well aware that Senator Fulbright did not represent a significant body of U. S. opinion, because of the Senator's position as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the fact that his name is so well known in Thailand because of the Fulbright scholarship program, his statements deeply wounded and disturbed most Thais. He felt that, without directly engaging in a debate with Fulbright, it would be very helpful if the U. S. Government could make some statement which would in effect be a repudiation of Fulbright's recent speech. We feel that this is reasonable and that the call of the two Ministers on you offers a good opportunity for making such a statement. We therefore suggest that, following their call, the White House Press Secretary issue a statement along the lines of the attached draft. It would be an appreciated and useful gesture if you would show this draft to the two Ministers.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft statement

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

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~~SECRET~~

DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT TO FOLLOW OCTOBER 7 CALL ON THE
PRESIDENT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE MINISTER OF
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The President met today with two distinguished statesmen from Thailand, Minister of National Development Pote Sarasin and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman. The discussion centered on the economic development programs of Thailand and on Thailand's continuing effort to defeat the insurgency initiated by outside forces over the last four years.

Minister Pote Sarasin reviewed Thailand's rapid economic progress. Some 60 percent of the Thai budget is devoted to economic development. The two Thai Ministers reported to the President that the insurgency in Northeast Thailand remained on a modest scale, although it was growing somewhat, and that the Thai Government was taking every possible measure to defeat that insurgency and was confident of achieving this result.

The President made clear that the United States would continue to join with other interested countries in assisting the economic development of Thailand, and noted that the

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-21

By sig NARA, Date 7-11-89

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soundness

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- 2 -

soundness and effectiveness of Thai progress had led in the last five years to major contributions by the World Bank and other nations. The President further indicated that the United States would continue to supply equipment and training to assist Thai actions against insurgency.

The President repeated to the Thai Ministers that the United States continued to adhere fully to its commitments to Thailand under the Southeast Asia Treaty of 1954, ratified by the Senate, and reaffirmed that this treaty represented an individual obligation of the United States in accordance with its terms and as stated in the communique between Foreign Minister Thanat and Secretary Rusk in 1962. The President made clear that this commitment had the full support of the American people, who recognized the major contribution Thailand was making to the security of the area and the firm Thai resolve to defend its own independence and freedom.

~~SECRET~~

WWR
21

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 89-26
By ug NARA. Date 5-14-90

October 6, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Pote Sarasin and Thanat Khoman

You have agreed to see Pote Sarasin, Thai Minister of National Development, and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman at 10:45 a. m. tomorrow.

Secretary Rusk urged this appointment to give the Thai highest level reassurance on several issues in our bilateral relations, issues which have been sharpened by recent press and Congressional focus on Thailand.

At the outset, you may want to:

- (1) Congratulate Pote on his election as President of the 10th Annual Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
- (2) praise Thanat for his UN speech and for his statesmanship in advancing Asian regionalism;
- (3) note that you look forward with great anticipation to your coming visit to their country;
- (4) underline that we continue to regard Thai independence and security as vital to our national interest and to world peace.

Secretary Rusk suggests that the most difficult of our bilateral problems be discussed with Prime Minister Thanom in Manila and Bangkok. These are: Thai interest in a bilateral defense treaty; executive agreement on use of Thai bases; public statements on use of Thai bases. (See TAB A)

The matters most likely to be raised by Pote and Thanat and suggested replies follow:

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Bilateral defense treaty. Our commitment to Thailand under SEATO has the same binding character as our bilateral treaties with other Pacific allies, which either pre-date SEATO or are with countries not protected by SEATO. This commitment is complete and cannot be strengthened by a bilateral treaty.

2. Executive agreement on use of Thai bases. We are assured that extensive procedures exist for prior Thai Government approval of all deployments and actions by U. S. forces. However, we stand ready to discuss these further and believe Manila and Bangkok visits would provide an appropriate forum.

3. Public acknowledgement of our use of Thai bases. This, too, seems an appropriate matter for discussion in Bangkok. (For your information, Thai unwillingness, heretofore, to publicly confirm our use of their bases was our main reason for resisting open hearings in the Senate.)

4. Press and Congressional criticism of Thailand. On balance, U. S. press coverage of Thailand has been favorable. Congressional criticism is isolated (Senators Fulbright and Morse) and not representative.

5. U. S. support for Thanat to join the World Court. We hope Thanat will continue as foreign minister where he has provided outstanding leadership toward Asian regional cooperation. However, we will vote for him if he presses his candidacy.

6. Military assistance level. Thai military leaders are uneasy about our delay in advising them of the FY 67 military assistance level. (For your information, this has yet to be resolved between State and Defense, and will be presented to you separately for decision.) If raised, you might tell the Thai we will advise them shortly.

- - -

You should know that Ambassador Martin believes Thanat is well in front of the Thai cabinet on these issues, that his persistence in advancing them does not necessarily reflect their views. This is

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

further reason for holding off definitive discussions until you see Thanom. Martin particularly argues against concessions on the bilateral defense treaty, executive agreement and public acknowledgement of our use of their bases, and using this occasion to announce the MAP aid level. He notes that, of the two ministers, Pote will have more long-range influence on our bilateral relations.

You will find the important bilateral issues elaborated at TAB C and biographic sketches of the two ministers at TAB D.

W. W. Rostow

Atts:
TABS A, B, C, D

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file
suspect*~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 6, 1966

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have given some thought to General Eisenhower's desire to travel. On both human and public grounds it is a good idea.

The time should be as soon after the election as his health and commitments permit. (I gather from Andy Goodpaster that he feels himself slowly failing and wants to do it soon.)

On the whole, a talk with De Gaulle would be complicating. If we can avoid it without pressure, fine. If not -- manageable.

Otherwise Africa, Ayub, Mrs. Gandhi, Saigon, Australia, New Zealand, are good.

I believe Korea is important; and Japan (if he's willing to let bygones be bygones) would be nice. I suspect the Japanese would like to make amends -- but we'd have to check it out carefully and quietly before suggesting it.

In all the other places I'm sure he would say and do things helpful to your purposes -- and the nation's interest -- after proper briefing.

W. W. Rostow

*get Goodpaster to proceed
to work up schedule --
How about my going to see
Eisenhower prior to my departure
and announcing his trip before
I leave ?*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 89-104

By *sig* NARA, Date 9-6-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - October 6, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT -- ACTION

SUBJECT: Reaction of Ambassador Telles to Mexican Border Job

Linc Gordon has conveyed to Ambassador Telles your desire that he head up our section of the US-Mexican Commission border problems.

Telles' reaction is equivocal. He says that he doubts that his appointment would have the "political impact which you have in mind." He would like to come up to discuss it.

Linc thinks that Telles has doubts about the stature of the job, and it may take a short chat with you to convince him (a) that the job is important, (b) his taking the job will have a positive political impact and (c) he is your choice.

Linc plans to ask Telles to come to Washington next week to discuss this and other matters. Linc inquires whether you would see Telles if this is necessary.

We are all agreed that Telles would be good for this job. Linc and I will talk with him when he arrives. If he is still hesitant about the job, I recommend that you see him.

W. W. Rostow


I will see Telles
if necessary _____

Prefer not to
receive him _____

Speak to me _____

cc: Bill Moyers
Jim Jones
John Macy

*rec'd back 10/8/66
but will if must
L*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 6, 1966

Mr. President:

The new team at State, plus a major effort by Francis, plus some guidance and advice from Bill Moyers and me, have produced this draft for the European speech.

I think it is good and worth delivering:

-- It will indicate your serious interest in Europe at a moment when our noises tend to be Asian.

-- It expresses a doctrine congenial in Europe, different from de Gaulle's, without quarreling.

-- The East-West passage will get the headlines and find support at home and abroad.

Query: Do you want to say again that you intend to visit Europe next year if at all possible?

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Thursday, October 6, 1966
6:30 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Kenneth Young, our former Ambassador to Thailand, telephoned the following after many intimate discussions with your Thai visitors of tomorrow (Friday). They are deeply offended and disturbed by Fulbright's talk about Thailand. Beyond offense, they feel that in fact, looking ahead, his kind of policy might triumph.

He recommends, therefore, that you analyze for them soberly the political strength that underlies our commitments to Asia in this country, and leave them with a sense that not only you but this nation is not likely to follow Fulbright's course.

I believe the suggestion is sound.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By 06, NARA, Date 8-25-98

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Rostow
Sent to the
President

76

Thursday, October 6, 1966 1:30 p.m.

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 7818)

I had a heart to heart talk with Ky last evening and told him he should realize how serious it would be if at Manila it appeared that there was even the slightest disagreement or conflict between him and you. Such a thing was absurd on its face because no American president could conceivably order several hundred thousand troops into a country without believing in that country's cause. Yet, I pointed out, Ky had seen for himself the way in which the press could take an isolated item out of context, such as marching to the North, or talking to the Viet Cong, and then distort it and magnify it. The period of the Conference would be an extremely bad time for statements of this kind to be made since there would be no time in which to correct them and false impressions could be generated.

Ky appeared much concerned and said with considerable feeling in his voice: "I can assure you I will do everything possible to avoid this kind of thing. I have been worrying about it long before you spoke of it. I intend to tell Thieu and everyone else who is going to Manila from Vietnam that statements of this kind must not be made."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 89-105
By ing NARA, Date 11-16-89

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, October 6, 1966

Mr. President:

Here is an interesting box score of attitudes toward US policy in Vietnam as expressed in 53 speeches made by representatives of UN members in the General Assembly debate still going on in New York.

Although Ambassador Goldberg does not think the box score should be used publicly, he does believe it can be used to counter assertions that the UN General Assembly debate indicates that the US is isolated in its Vietnam policy.

W. W. Rostow

*Review with Moyers upon
return and Bill White
now —*

772

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, October 6, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG (USUN, 1299)

SUBJECT: Attitudes Towards U.S. Policy on Vietnam Expressed in
United Nations General Assembly Speeches

With a total of 53 member nations (other than the U.S.) having made speeches in General Assembly debate as of October 5, USUN has prepared the following box score of attitudes towards U.S. policy in Vietnam as expressed therein. Classification of the comments is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, but represents an attempt at an accurate assessment based on a careful reading of the statements made. A chart of these attitudes is attached.

In summary, of 53 statements to date, 17 were favorable to the U.S. and only 6 unfavorable, while of 26 neutral statements, 6 gave the edge to the U.S., 17 were strictly neutral, and only 3 gave the edge against us.

This would indicate that the U.S. position on negotiations as expressed in the General Assembly debate statement (all country statements, except those of Brazil and the Philippines, were made after the Goldberg Address) is receiving fairly widespread approval. The remaining speeches may, of course, require a revised assessment. The figures should, therefore, be treated with caution. Nevertheless, the results so far may be useful in countering assertions that the UN General Assembly general debate indicates the U.S. is isolated in its Vietnam policy. We do not, however, believe the "box score" should be used publicly as such, as there are many shades of opinion in the statements and many "favorable" statements called for serious consideration of our latest proposals rather than expressing support for our military actions.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 89-105

By ing NARA, Date 7-12-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<u>Basically Favorable</u>	<u>Unfavorable</u>	<u>Essentially Neutral</u>	<u>Neutral, Showing Edge to U.S.</u>	<u>Neutral, Showing Edge Against U.S.</u>	<u>No Comment on Vietnam</u>
(17)	(6)	(17)	(6)	(3)	(4)
Denmark	Albania	Finland	Ethiopia	Pakistan	Panama
Turkey	France	Nigeria	Uganda	Burma	Sierra Leone
Kenya	Czechoslovakia	Burundi	Indonesia	Nepal	Peru
Costa Rica	U. S. S. R.	Kuwait	Ivory Coast		Iceland
Uruguay	Mongolia	Upper Volta	Cameroon		
Argentina	Bulgaria	Chile	Rwanda		
Netherlands		Venezuela			
Ecuador		Colombia	*		
Japan		Malaysia			
Australia		Senegal			
Canada		Guatemala			
Thailand		Mexico			
Brazil		Bolivia			
Philippines		Singapore			
Greece		Afghanistan			
Israel		Chad			
Norway		Austria			

*In addition, statements by retiring U. N. General Assembly President Fanfani and current U. N. General Assembly President Pazhwak fall into the "Essentially Neutral, but Showing Slight Edge to the U. S." category.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-105
By sig NARA, Date 7-12-89

9-66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - October 5, 1966 - 2:45pm

Mr. President:

I join with Bill Gaud and Charlie Schultze in recommending that you approve the loan for a private fertilizer plant in Brazil described in the attached memorandum.

The project is of cardinal importance to Brazil's efforts to expand agricultural production. It has been thoroughly staffed out. Joe Fowler agrees that the balance of payments impact is minimal.

W. W. Rostow

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-103
By sig NARA. Date 2-6-91

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10/6/66
ret'd with an L

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday - October 5, 1966 - 6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Current Situation in Haiti

You asked for an assessment of the situation in Haiti and the status of our contingency planning. The attached memorandum covers both matters.

I have asked Linc to take a hard look at Galo Plaza's proposal for expanded aid administered through an OAS Mission in Haiti. It would enable us to do more for the Haitian people than we are doing under present guidelines. We and the other hemisphere countries have a humanitarian responsibility to lessen their plight if means can be devised which ensure that the assistance goes to the people and not the Duvalier crowd. The proposal would also establish an OAS presence which might prove handy should collective action become necessary.

William G. Bowdler

Attachment

cc - Bill Moyers

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By CL, NARA, Date 9-3-98

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6Haitian Situation

NLJ 98-499

By is, NARA Date 10-21-99

Duvalier continues to maintain an iron grip on Haiti. The surface appearance that he has ameliorated the ruthlessness of his regime is misleading -- he has physically eliminated the opposition or driven it from the country and for the time being no one is opposing him.

The general economic and social situation continues to deteriorate. Although Haiti has maintained a reasonably sound financial situation, there has been no significant new investment in the country. Successive hurricane disasters over the last several years have also adversely affected the Haitian economy. Preliminary reports on the damage done by Hurricane Inez indicates that it has not been too serious. We are providing emergency relief.

Our ability to assist Haiti is limited. We terminated our bilateral economic programs in 1963 when it became obvious that Duvalier would not permit AID to operate except under his political control. We have continued minimal indirect assistance (\$3.3 million in FY 66) through multilateral and United States voluntary agencies.

We have followed basically two objectives with regard to Haiti: (1) assisting the Haitian people as much as possible without giving direct assistance to Duvalier and (2) establishing a greater international presence in Haiti and a greater awareness among the American Republics of the situation there in case contingencies should arise which would require action by the OAS or U.S.

We have tried to increase assistance through third agencies to the extent we have considered possible without assuming unacceptable political liabilities. We have urged Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia to give technical assistance. Israel and the Republic of China are considering small technical assistance projects if ways can be found to cover the dollar costs.

The IDB is considering a \$1.3 million project to improve Haiti's education facilities. The loan has the approval of all of the Latin members of the IDB Board. The project is stalled because Treasury is reluctant to vote for the project in the IDB at the same time AID is unwilling to provide assistance on a bilateral scale. Secretary Rusk

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-2-

has discussed this loan with Secretary Fowler. I have asked State for a memo so we can get this impasse resolved.

Dr. Galo Plaza Lasso, ex-President of Ecuador, recently visited Haiti and has proposed an enlarged program of technical assistance and some capital development for Haiti to be conducted by the OAS under strict controls. Duvalier indicated to Galo Plaza, and his Foreign Minister stated to Secretary Rusk, that Haiti would accept international control of the program. The Galo Plaza plan anticipates a large OAS presence in Haiti to be available when a major political crisis occurs. State is staffing out this proposal and will be making recommendations on it in the near future.

State, Defense and CIA have prepared a comprehensive contingency plan for Haiti. It considers all currently anticipated contingencies, including the employment of United States forces to evacuate Americans and other foreign nationals from Haiti. It includes up-to-date lists of acceptable Haitians inside and outside Haiti who could be used in forming a new government and of U.S. civilian and military personnel with Haitian experience who could be mobilized to work in Haiti as we had to do during the early days of the Dominican crisis.

We are also consulting on a regular basis with the large American countries about conditions in Haiti, but we have not discussed specific contingencies or possible United States and OAS reactions because such discussions would inevitably become public knowledge.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

80
sent to President
10/5/66

Wednesday, October 5, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 7732)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. Preparations for Seven Nation Conference

"Peaceful Settlement" I am in the midst of conferences with Thieu, Ky and Do on different ideas which can be grouped under the title "peaceful settlement." This had been planned for some time, but it takes on added urgency in view of the Seven Nation Conference. Several fears run through their minds:

A. One is that everyone will lose sight of terrorism and that something will be worked out which brings about withdrawal of the Army of North Vietnam and a general cessation of orthodox military activity by the U.S., but leaves the terrorist untouched. Since this is the real cancer in the Vietnamese body politic, this would be a true defeat -- even though the press might initially hail it as a "fair compromise." They think public opinion in the west is so orthodox that it does not grasp the fact that there are two kinds of wars here -- military and criminal. They believe that U Thant's ideas try to reach planes and orthodox troops but that he never suggests anything to reach terrorism.

B. They are interested in guarantees, in mutual security, in there being some kind of international aegis or consortium in which people help them when they are attacked and they would help others if they were attacked.

C. They fear the term "cease fire" as typical of a state of mind which does not give "criminal" war its due. They point out that some terrorists do their worst work without firearms. They worry lest an offer of "cease-fire" by Hanoi would be most embarrassing to the U.S. Government, forcing us to stop the combat activities which are most advantageous to us while permitting them to continue the terrorism which is most advantageous to them.

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-105
By lig NARA, Date 11-16-89

I am making a special effort to impress on Thieu and Ky the vital importance of avoiding appearance of public clashes with us -- which are especially unfortunate in view of the truth that on the fundamentals there is no split at all.

"Conference Communique" I believe the communique emerging from the Seven Power Conference should be extremely general, and that a Pandora's box of troubles may be opened if we try to get specific. A general declaration of solidarity against the enemy; a general declaration in favor of postwar planning and economic development; a general expression of a desire for peace -- this is the best that could be expected. And these things would mean a lot.

I have no doubt of our being able to bring the Vietnamese along with us when, as, and if, peace talks begin. But I do not think it is possible to get them to agree with us on detailed hypothetical questions on events which, if they occur at all, will occur at some remote time in the future. These are the questions which get us into trouble when we are asked them by journalists. They will create even greater trouble if they are asked by one Chief of State of another Chief of State.

B. Constituent Assembly

The Assembly will not settle down to serious work on the Constitution for some weeks. The deputies are heavily engaged in sorting out their political alliances, forming and reforming groupings. They are also preoccupied with such mundane items as credentials, by-laws, housing in crowded Saigon, and fans, microphones, and water pitchers.

The Assembly begins to appear as a reasonable body of men, although some deputies will undoubtedly make impassioned speeches which will please neither the Government of Vietnam nor the U.S. and youth (average age of the deputies is 42) and inexperience in parliamentary procedures will cause difficulties.

One sign of a constructive spirit was the Assembly's action on the potentially explosive issue of amnesty for prisoners. This took the form of a proposal that the Assembly request the Government of Vietnam to amnesty prisoners "in commemoration of the opening of the Assembly." A Catholic deputy called for release of their prisoners held since the overthrow of Diem. A Buddhist wanted the Assembly to demand the release of Buddhist "struggle" prisoners. A Montagnard deputy urged that Fulro prisoners be freed. The debate could have led to very specific demands for the wholesale release of various categories of political prisoners, risking an almost immediate conflict between the Government and the Assembly. But this was avoided when a substantial majority of the deputies voted to leave the question of who should be released up to the Government.

The Assembly message to the UN, still in draft as this is written, also shows a sober and constructive spirit. It does not take issue with U Thant's remarks on the election, but said simply that this Assembly is a freely-elected body representing the people of Vietnam, that the war in Vietnam is for South Vietnam a war of self-defense, and that the Vietnamese people are grateful for the assistance of friendly nations in repelling Communist aggression.

The Assembly will undoubtedly try to get into some essentially legislative areas. There will be speeches about such unpleasant subjects as inflation; the American presence and its impact on Vietnamese culture; and press censorship. The Government will get some heavy criticism from time to time, and Article 20 of the Electoral Law will certainly be debated. But the apparent willingness of both the Government and the Assembly to work together is encouraging.

more

Some say that Prime Minister Ky "controls" about 40 deputies -- a "control" which will vary greatly from issue to issue. It will also vary in accordance with unity or differences within the Directorate, and it will be affected by Government of Vietnam success or failure in handling such problems as inflation, the press, and the remnants of the Buddhist "struggle" campaign.

There appears to be a clear consensus in the Assembly favoring a strong executive. This will probably result in the adoption of a presidential form of government, quite possibly modified along the lines of the Korean example. Probably there will be two Houses, the Upper House being chosen differently from the Lower.

The key to executive control of the Vietnamese military is to provide the military with the legitimate role in the political process to which its importance in Vietnamese society and as a nation building force clearly entitle it. This may mean allowing military personnel to run for high office. We hope the military will have a place in the new governmental structure which will recognize their real power, use their executive skills, and thus reduce the possibility of coups -- and yet not allow the military to dominate the government.

Emergency powers for the executive present a difficult problem because Diem used his emergency powers to circumvent the essentially democratic nature of his Constitution and now deputies tend to be very suspicious of such provisions. Probably the best hope of getting adequate presidential emergency powers is to hedge them about with time limits and a legislative veto.

C. Montagnard Affairs

After many months of negotiation, the Montagnard dissidents are about to be integrated into the Vietnamese Armed Forces and the Vietnamese body politic. October 14 has been set as the date for a major ceremony marking the formal return of Fulro combatants to the Government of Vietnam control. With two Fulro representatives in the Constituent Assembly and Fulro units returning to Government of Vietnam control, the Montagnard problem at long last seems well in hand.

D. Buddhist Split Widens

After abortive attempts to paper over the differences between the Institute militants under Tri Quang and the moderates who are backing Tam Chau, the Institute now seems headed for a formal split. On October 2, Tam Chau accepted the return of the National Pagoda premises (the Vien Hoa Dao) from the Government. He did so without the consent of the Institute Council. None of the militants attended the ceremony, and the militant Deputy Chief of the Institute issued a communique saying that the return to the National Pagoda was a unilateral Tam Chau decision. The local press quotes militant leaders as saying that they intend to break completely with Tam Chau because of this action. But his action may be popular with the rank and file.

With control of the symbolic National Buddhist Shrine, the backing of northern monks and the Cambodian Theravada sect plus behind-the-scenes support from the government, Tam Chau is in a good position to form his own Buddhist organization. If he continues to be the moderate and constructive man which I believe him to be, I believe the majority of the Vietnamese Buddhist community will accept his leadership. Thus, there is at least the hope of the emergence of a positive Buddhist factor on the Vietnamese scene.

E. Cabinet Crisis

A crisis, so far not of serious dimensions, is taking place in the Ky Government. The Chief of the Office Staff of the Minister of Health, Nguyen Tan Loc, who, under Vietnamese and French custom, has the impressive title of "Director of Cabinet," was arrested September 29 and held overnight on vague charges of southern separatist activity. The charge is believed untrue. Southern members of the Cabinet, particularly Youth Minister Vo Long Trieu, interpreted the arrest as a move to intimidate southern officials. Trieu and other southern ministers apparently seriously considered submitting their resignations as a result.

At an October 3 Cabinet meeting Minister of Education Troung (southerner) raised the issue and suggested that Minister of Health Kha (a northerner) was trying to force Loc out of the Ministry, a charge which may well be true since Loc and Kha are known to have been

at odds over proposals to reorganize the Ministry. Deputy Prime Minister Vien (southerner) then charged that Kha has managed the Ministry of Health very poorly. Kha thereupon tendered his resignation.

It is not yet clear whether Prime Minister Ky will accept Kha's resignation. To fail to do so could trigger resignations by Trieu, Truong, and Vien. In any event, regional differences have unfortunately been intensified within the Government.

F. Economic

Mekong flood waters continued to rise, with four provinces hard hit. Total rice loss for the four provinces of Chau Doc, Kien Truong, Kien Phong, and An Giang is now estimated at about 437,560 metric tons of paddy. This is more than half of the rice crop in the affected area. Moreover, nearly half of the farmers in these provinces lost their entire crop. Livestock losses are not so severe because of the traditional practice of selling before the flood season in these areas.

We continue moving large quantities of relief supplies into the stricken areas, both by air and by truck. With the GVN and Chinats we plan to provide seeds and irrigation pumps to permit a very considerable expansion of the secondary and between-season crops such as mung beans, soy beans, corn, sweet potatoes, vegetables, and peanuts. The GVN Ministry of Agriculture has reacted fast and is planning an ambitious program to meet the needs of the flood victims.

Price levels declined further this week, reaching the level held prior to the disruption of transportation by the Viet Cong during the elections. Saigon retail prices were down three percent from last week and now stand at the same index level as one month ago. Prices of imported items either dropped or held steady. Dollars dropped slightly from 169 to 168.

G. Military

The military war continued at a high level of intensity. Enemy killed totaled 1,104 for this reporting period, and there were 106 large unit operations. Truck traffic north of the DMZ indicates that the enemy is continuing his build-up there. Six Marine battalions have been committed and MACV has alerted one Army brigade of three battalions to reinforce the Marines in Danang or PKU Bai if the enemy threat requires it.

In III Corps, draft dodger roundups were carried out, with the apprehension of 1,303 draft dodgers in the capital military district, 535 deserters were also picked up. In addition, 2,139 deserters and 824 draft dodgers have voluntarily given themselves up since September 20. JUSPAO reports some grumbling over the campaign, not with its intent but because of the rough manner in which it was sometimes carried out. Most people believe military service should be required of all eligible men and resent those who escape it.

H. Psychological

I am watching the psychological and political reaction to our first U.S. military pacification effort in a crowded area -- that of a battalion of the U.S. 25th Division in Long An province, I learn the following:

The novelty of the U.S. presence in Long An has worn off. There is public admiration for the troops' behavior. The initial fear of the negro soldiers soon vanished when people saw that the colored troops behaved as well as any others. They compared our troops with Vietnamese troops; and, in particular, our negroes with the French Senegalese; and both comparisons come out in our favor.

Following are excerpts from the report of Donald G. Besom, JUSPAO field representative for Long An:

A. "All of the refugees interviewed (they had been moved away to make room for U.S. troops) indicated that they were glad the Americans had come to the area, not only for the security they could provide, but also because of the new jobs they would create. In addition, they mentioned, almost like a prayer, that they hoped the Americans would operate in their home area, so that someday soon they could return to their own lands.

B. "The possible difficulty of handling the move of the refugees from one location to another had promised to be one of the biggest attitudinal problems involved in the arrival of the Americans. Because the various groups involved tried as hard as they did to prevent the move from becoming a problem, it didn't.

C. "Initial reaction on the part of the people, in some of the areas of operation in which the American unit has visited, has varied, people in more remote areas were afraid of the Americans at first because they were "so big"; however, by the time the Americans had left -- and the people had seen that they were not going to hurt them -- they had lost at least some of their fear. On the positive side, they compared the American

soldiers with ARVN and were impressed that the Americans acted better and didn't steal food. (Nor, for that matter, did they force the people to provide and cook food for them as did two ARVN soldiers who were a part of a joint U.S. - Vietnamese operation conducted in a hamlet close to Ben Luc.)

D. "The elections provided a good example this month of how effective GVN officialdom can be when it is pressured from above. Vietnamese information service, for example, as is undoubtedly true in other provinces, was active all over the province in informing the population about the elections."

E. JUSPAO is working on the theory that (1) the U.S. battalion might move to other parts of Long An sometime in the future, and that (2) by spreading the word throughout the province, "We can anticipate the Viet Cong propaganda program that undoubtedly will be directed at people in all areas of the province. We also wish to take advantage of the aggressiveness and firepower of the Americans to hit at the morale of the Viet Cong and to encourage them to come in under the Chieu Hoi program."

~~to Supp.~~
v. Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - October 5, 1966 - 2:45 pm

Mr. President:

I join with Bill Gaud and Charlie Schultze in recommending that you approve the loan for a private fertilizer plant in Brazil described in the attached memorandum.

The project is of cardinal importance to Brazil's efforts to expand agricultural production. It has been thoroughly staffed out. Joe Fowler agrees that the balance of payments impact is minimal.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 89-103

By ing NARA. Date 2-6-91

Attachment

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8/2

ROUTE SLIP

(Fold Here)

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

DATE 10/5/66

TO: Bill Bowdler

FROM: RWRichardson

REMARKS: Here are the Brazil papers concurred
in by Charlie Schultze and Fowler.
They are now ready to go to the
President for his concurrence.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

SEP 21 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Loan for a Private Fertilizer Plant in Brazil

Bill Gaud requests your authorization to make a \$14.8 million loan to help finance the first large integrated fertilizer plant in Brazil. The borrower, Ultrafertil, will be owned jointly by Phillips Petroleum Company (U. S.), a Brazilian holding company, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).

The project will cost \$70 million. All but the \$14.8 million AID loan will come from non-budgetary sources (Phillips, insurance companies, etc.).

This project was selected by the Brazilian Government from several applicants, including Grace and Gulf Oil, after careful study of the alternative proposals. One of the merits of this proposal is the marketing and distribution system offered by Ultrafertil which will serve to provide technical advice to farmers and to increase competition in the existing fertilizer distribution system.

Production from the new plant will provide fertilizer to farmers at prices 20 to 30 percent below current costs, thus reducing the need for the fertilizer subsidy program. The lower prices, plus improved marketing, are expected to increase fertilizer consumption in Central Brazil from 200,000 tons in 1965 to 800,000 tons by 1975. The new plant will supply 30 percent of the additional requirements. Future foreign exchange savings to Brazil resulting from domestic production of fertilizer are estimated at up to \$10 million per year.

Government policies essential to the success of the agricultural program, which have been agreed, are:

- reduced tariffs on certain fertilizer materials
- flexible pricing policies for agricultural foodstuffs
- continued control of surplus coffee and sugar production

This would be the first loan to be authorized for Brazil this fiscal year. The total U. S. program includes other project loans estimated at \$85 million and a program loan to be negotiated later this year.

Brazilian performance under the current program loan has been generally satisfactory. As Bill Gaud points out in his memo,

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- the budget deficit has been cut drastically
- the coffee diversification program continues on course
- credit policy will be further tightened to better control inflation

Balance of Payments

The loan will be used to finance purchases of goods and services from the United States. Of the private U. S. loans, at least the portion guaranteed by AID will also be spent in the U. S. Secretary Fowler agrees that the impact of this loan on the U. S. balance of payments will be minimal.

HH7

Effect on Domestic Economy

Commitments under this loan during the balance of this calendar year will be limited to \$2 million, exclusively for the purchase of U. S. engineering services. Expenditures will probably not exceed \$1 million. Commitments for plant and equipment under the loan will not be made until next year.

This proposal is the result of extended negotiations among the Brazilian Government, AID, private U. S. and Brazilian firms and the International Finance Corporation. Any postponement of the loan authorization would risk cancellation of the concession from the Brazilian Government for this project.

I recommend you approve this loan.

Charles L. Schultze

Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachment

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

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WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

SEP 12 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Proposed A.I.D. Loan for a Fertilizer Plant in Brazil

I recommend that you authorize me to proceed with a loan of \$14,300,000 to Ultrafertil S.A., a private Brazilian company owned by Phillips Petroleum Company; Cobrapar, a private Brazilian holding company; and the International Finance Corporation (I.F.C.). The loan will finance the construction of an integrated fertilizer plant near Santos, Brazil.

A. The Project

Brazil's agricultural sector uses relatively little fertilizer, and is heavily dependent on imports for the amount it does consume. In 1964, and again this past June, A.I.D. extended loans of \$15 and \$20 million, respectively, to finance fertilizer imports and provide local currency counterpart as a source of funds for fertilizer credit. The proposed project addresses the longer-run problem of increasing Brazil's fertilizer supplies by providing a domestic source of materials as well as a system of fourteen fertilizer distribution and farm-service centers in central-south Brazil.

The project will mobilize considerable private investment. The total cost of the project will be \$69.8 million. Phillips Petroleum will invest \$15.5 million to acquire 60% of the equity. The Brazilian partners of Phillips will own 30% of the shares and the I.F.C., 10%. In addition to its equity investment, the Phillips Petroleum Company will guaranty 25% of a loan of \$21.5 million from a group of private U.S. insurance companies; A.I.D. will issue an extended risk guaranty covering the remaining 75%.

The Total Program

This loan would be the first authorized for Brazil during the current fiscal year. It is anticipated that project lending will amount to approximately \$100 million in addition to program lending during FY 1967.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
A10 State Dept. Guidelines
By CB NARA, Date 8-25-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Memorandum for the President

-2-

Balance of Payments

All equipment and services financed by the A.I.D. loan will be imported exclusively from the United States. Further procurement substantially equal to the portion of the private loans guaranteed by A.I.D. will also come from the U.S. While one effect of the project will be to reduce U.S. fertilizer exports it is clear that Brazil now requires the development of a domestic industry. The long run effects on the U.S. economy of private U.S. participation in the project (in terms of equipment sales, dividend remittances, as well as exports of spare parts, services, and raw materials) are clearly preferable to the development of the Brazilian fertilizer industry without such participation.

Brazilian Self-Help

Both program and project lending to Brazil have been conditioned on specific self-help measures. Budget deficits, formerly the principal factor causing inflation, have been cut drastically and are now covered from non-inflationary sources. Reduction of the real return to coffee growers will further curb inflationary pressures, provide funds for development purposes, and encourage needed agricultural diversification. Price increases, while half 1964 levels, remain worrisome; in part they are due to measures to restore a market economy by elimination of subsidies and controls. Through credit restraint the Government hopes to restrain further major price rises this year.

Faced with increasing pressures for a relaxation of its economic reform program, the Brazilian Government relies heavily on U.S. support and assistance. Internationally, the Castello Branco administration continues to be a staunch partner of the United States. Former War Minister Arthur Costa e Silva, who is the unopposed candidate for President in the indirect election to be held on October 3, has publicly stated he will continue to carry on the programs of political, economic, and social reform initiated by the Castello Branco government.

The Government of Brazil's agricultural program includes new agricultural pricing policies designed to stimulate agricultural production and a number of measures (tariff reductions, provision of credit, and subsidies to farmers) to promote greater fertilizer use. The Ultrafertil project will complement this program in four important respects:

- 1) Ultrafertil's prices to farmers will lead to cost reductions of from 5% to 30%, depending on the material.
- 2) The Ultrafertil marketing program will promote the use of fertilizer and provide a variety of technical assistance to farmers.

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Memorandum for the President

-3-

3) The project will introduce new competition into the fertilizer industry which has been dominated by high-margin, lower volume distribution techniques.

4) A fertilizer industry in Brazil will reduce future foreign exchange requirements and thereby eliminate scarcities of fertilizer that have occurred during foreign exchange shortages.

/s/ William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wed., October 12, 1966
9:15 a.m.

F 82

MR. PRESIDENT:

I thought this interim report on how my good new man, Dick Moose, is executing your instruction to follow closely Congressional foreign policy statements would interest you.

My judgment is: we have made progress but still have some distance to go before State and my staff automatically gear their thought and action to the Hill as well as the Executive Branch.

W. W. Rostow

October 4, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record

Congressional Record follow up - When I came on board you asked me to review existing procedures in the Departments of State and Defense for following up on items appearing in the Congressional Record and, if necessary, to find ways to improve them. Inquiries at Defense have satisfied me that they follow the Record closely and have an efficient follow up system. This operation is coordinated out of the Office of the Secretary of Defense with implementation, in most instances, left to the individual services which report back to the Secretary's office.

The Department of State, on the other hand, did not have such a system. They were preparing a daily summary of foreign affairs items for information purposes, but there was no requirement for action by the bureaus and no follow up. I now compare notes with the Office of Congressional Relations each morning and we agree on the handling of each item. The situations which we deal with fall generally into the following categories:

- - Critical or inaccurate statements which can be corrected or rebutted by an offer of a briefing, by letter or by generation of a counter-item.
- - Proposals or ideas to which we can respond by various means, such as a call indicating our awareness of his interest or an offer of a briefing or background material.
- - "Broken Record" criticism, e. g. Senator Morse on Vietnam, or Congressman Rumsfeld on trade with communist countries. We can ignore this or drown it out.

Some examples of the types of action which we take are the following:

- - Charge by Senator Gruening that an elaborate Presidential palace is being built in Saigon with AID funds: At my request State cabled Saigon, got the facts and put them into a letter for the Senator. (I doubt that his views have changed but the issue seems dead for the moment.)

- - Congressmen Schweiker and Moorhead held a news conference on the subject, "The Unresponsive and Negative Attitude of the State Department on the Proposal for Establishment of a Permanent UN Peacekeeping Force." (This was a joint resolution sponsored by more than 70 Congressmen.) Although I could not get State onto this before the conference, they subsequently wrote to both Congressmen. We are establishing contacts with other influential members of this group, in particular Representative Kastenmeier, who has made some thoughtful suggestions about the problem of American participation.

- - Congressman Bingham, at State's suggestion, inserted a bulletin "Private Boycott versus the Public Interest," in response to a running series of criticism by Representatives Ashbrook, Rumsfeld, et al, on the evils of trading with Communist countries.

Recently State has been taking the initiative on more of these items, and even anticipating troublesome situations. When Thomas Dawson, the Peace Corpsman, was taken into Soviet custody, State contacted the Maryland Senators before they were aware of the situation and briefed them on the proposed handling. (This did not keep Senator Tydings from displaying appropriate public zeal, but it may well have had the effect of modifying his approach.)

Insertions in the Congressional Record - This program is gathering steam. We have been able to respond quickly in two recent "crisis" situations by putting material into the hands of Members for immediate use. The morning the President asked you to see that Senator Javits' criticism of the Honolulu Conference was countered, we had statements placed in both houses by noon. Yesterday afternoon, immediately following Senator Fulbright's speech about Thailand, we began preparation of countering material. This was placed with McGee, Muskie, Kuchel, Boggs and Morgan in time for use today. From this we should have three or four statements in tomorrow's Record.

On more routine questions, the number of insertions is increasing. Since last week we have obtained insertions covering subjects such as the withdrawal of OAS forces from the Dominican Republic, Cuban refugees, Thanat's UN speech, Reston's column on the UN's responsibility in getting Hanoi to respond to our offers, and the anniversary of the Immigration Act. We should have at least three additional insertions today and more importantly, I have enough items in production to enable me to place two or three daily. Production of material is the key to this operation, and although I could use more voluntary contributions, I find that if I produce the ideas, I can find drafters who will perform.

Meetings with Members - In a related area, you mentioned your desire to meet informally, perhaps over lunch, with small groups of Members from time to time. The rush to adjourn makes this impractical this month, but I think that when the new sessions begin, we can line up a productive series of meetings. The contacts which I am developing now should be useful in this regard. I would hope that we could have a regular series of lunches at which you might exchange views on subjects such as regionalism, our UN role, or European security.

In summary, I think that there is a real job to be done here and almost unlimited opportunities. The key seems to be responsiveness to what is being done and said on the Hill, coupled with the ability to move quickly. You have provided me with the tools and the backing which I need and I expect to put them to good use for the President.

Richard M. Moose

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2 Pres file

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~~RESTRICTED~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Extension Through October of LATCHKEY I

Commissioner Tape, Acting Chairman of AEC, has requested your approval of an extension through October of the approval you previously gave for LATCHKEY I, the FY 1967 First Quarter Underground Nuclear Testing Program. LATCHKEY I included 14 tests. Because of labor difficulties at the Nevada Test Site only six of the 14 have been conducted to date and AEC is scheduling 3 tests to be conducted before the end of October. The AEC plans to present an updated request for the balance of the Second Quarter program in the near future as soon as the labor situation clears up and they have evaluated the tests that they wish to conduct before the end of December.

Included in the three tests remaining to be executed before the end of October is the GREELEY event which presents a special problem because of its size -- 900 KT, the largest underground test to date. The AEC has concluded that this shot will cause some superficial damage to buildings (broken windows and cracked plaster) in Las Vegas and other neighboring towns that will result in some legitimate claims against the Government.

[REDACTED]

It should be noted that the AEC has been able to handle similar claims in connection with nuclear testing in Hattiesburg, Mississippi without excessive publicity or expense to the Government.

GREELEY is an important test contributing to the development of a high-yield ABM warhead. Due to the size of this test and the need for a thorough review of the operational safety aspects of the test, the test was referred to the agencies represented on the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests. No one of the agencies objected thereto. In addition, Dr. Hornig has reviewed the testing procedure and safety standards and satisfied himself that the test did not pose a problem from the standpoint of such considerations.

~~SECRET~~ ~~RESTRICTED~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-511
By is, NARA Date 11-4-99

FORMERLY RESTRICTED
Unauthorized disclosure
Sanctions. Handle as
Section 144.b., Atomic Energy Act, 1954.
Initials and Date
High Dissemination

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

I recommend your approval of the AEC request and if you agree, I will sign the attached authorization memorandum.

W. W. Rostow

☒ Approved
☐ Disapproved
☐ See me

~~SECRET~~

rec'd
10/6/66
5:12P

(6)

84

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - October 5, 1966 -- 2:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

I join with Bill Gaud and Charlie Schultze in recommending that you approve the loan for a private fertilizer plant in Brazil described in the attached memorandum.

The project is of cardinal importance to Brazil's efforts to expand agricultural production. It has been thoroughly staffed out. Joe Fowler agrees that the balance of payments impact is minimal.

W. Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-103
By ing NARA. Date 2-6-91

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Cy to Bill Moyers

Wednesday, October 5, 1966
12:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here is Bill Bundy's draft final
Presidential itinerary.

You will note a series of questions
and comments on page 3 and the eyes only
TOP SECRET annex.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12353, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCW NARS, Date 8-19-86

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

~~SECRET~~

First Draft

10/5/66

NLJ 89-104

By ing NARA, Date 9-6-89Final Presidential Itinerary

(Numbers in parentheses represent flight times and time changes in that order.)

1. Leave Washington October 17 0900
2. Arrive Honolulu (11 minus 6) October 17 1400
3. (Press plane might leave earlier to permit intermediate stop.)
4. Leave Honolulu October 18 0730
5. Arrive Pago Pago (5 minus 1) October 18 1130
6. Leave Pago Pago October 18 1230
7. Arrive Ohakea (4 minus 1 plus 24) October 19 1530
8. (Air to Wellington 20 minutes or drive 1-1/2 hours.)
9. Leave Ohakea October 20 1600
10. Arrive Canberra (3 minus 2) October 20 1700
11. Trip to Melbourne possibly afternoon October 21)
12. Leave Canberra October 22 2300
13. Arrive Manila (10 minus 2) October 23 0700
14. (Presidential and press aircraft may stop in Townsville for refueling.)
15. Consultations and Foreign Ministers - October 23
16. Conference - October 24-25.
17. Rest - in Baguio - October 26.
18. Leave ~~Baguio~~ ^{MANILA} October ~~26~~ 27 1400
19. Arrive Bangkok (3 minus 2) October 27 1500
20. (One day for air tour of Mekong and NE Thailand.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

21. Leave Bangkok	October 30	0900
22. Arrive Kuala Lumpur (2 plus 1/2)	October 30	1130
23. Leave Kuala Lumpur	October 31	1100
24. Arrive Seoul (6 plus 1-1/2)	October 31	1830
25. Leave Seoul	November 2	0900
26. Arrive Anchorage (8 plus 5 minus 24)	November 1	2200
27. Leave Anchorage	November 2	1000
28. Arrive Washington (6 plus 5 to EST)	November 2	2100

Alternative from Line 21 on

21. Leave Bangkok	October 30	1200
22. Arrive Kuala Lumpur (2 plus 1/2)	October 30	1430
23. Leave Kuala Lumpur	November 1	0800
24. Arrive Taipei (3-1/2 plus 1/2)	November 1	1200
25. Leave Taipei	November 1	1630
26. Arrive Seoul (2 plus 1)	November 1	1930
27. Leave Seoul	November 3	0900
28. Arrive Anchorage (8 plus 5 minus 24)	November 2	2200
29. Leave Anchorage	November 3	1000
30. Arrive Washington (6 plus 5 to EST)	November 3	2100

FE:WPBundy:mk

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Notes concerning Final Presidential Itinerary -- First Draft

(Line references are to the numbered lines in the itinerary.)

Line 1: Query if President would wish to make brief stop in California.

Line 2: Honolulu stop might include brief visit to the East-West Center. If the California stop were made, then the arrival time in Honolulu would probably be too late to permit this.

Line 11: Holt has suggested that the President go to Melbourne on the afternoon of October 21 and then go to Sydney for the night of the 21st and to rest there on the 22nd before leaving in the evening. While this would give a much wider Australian exposure, the logistic problems of moving delegation and press over to Sydney for a one-day stand seem to argue against it.

Lines 12-13: Although the Presidential aircraft can go non-stop from Canberra to Manila, the press plane cannot do so. Moreover, the Canberra runway is so short that it would probably be impossible for the Presidential aircraft to take off with a full fuel load. Hence, the time estimates in these lines really assume a Townsville refueling stop in the middle of the night. For the President's and the press' greater convenience, the Canberra departure might be advanced to 2200, with the Townsville refueling stop extended.

Alternative from Line 21 on: This alternative raises the basic policy question whether the President should stop in Taipei. Ambassador McConaughy, on a private turn-around, has given the firm judgment that the Generalissimo would welcome even a brief stop on these lines. However, a Presidential stop in Taipei would have significant warlike image impact, and would also tend to aggravate criticism in Japan that Japan was being omitted with every other place in the area included. (We believe this sentiment is more controllable without the Taipei stop.) On balance, we would recommend against the Taipei stop, subject to the judgment of ~~the~~ Secretary Rusk.

FE:WPBundy:mk 10/5/66

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By cb NARA, Date 9-3-98

85c

~~TOP SECRET~~

First Draft
10/4/66

EYES ONLY ANNEX TO PRESIDENTIAL ITINERARY

October 26 is listed in the schedule as a day of rest in Baguio, with departure from Manila on October 27.

The underlying plan is in fact that the President would go on an unannounced visit to US forces in Viet-Nam on the 26th.

The following is proposed as the way of handling this:

- a. The announced schedule would be as stated in the itinerary.
- b. In fact, however, we would expect that the President would return from South Viet-Nam and actually go to Baguio on the evening of the 26th and rest on the 27th, returning to Manila early on the morning of the 28th. However, this two-day "rest" period would so excite press speculation that it must not be announced.
- c. The Thai Government would be informed in utmost confidence of the President's plans and that in fact he would not arrive in Thailand until the 28th. We believe Thanom would cooperate fully and would be prepared to announce at noon on the 26th (when the President's trip to Viet-Nam was known) that the arrival in Thailand would not take place until the 28th. Thus the picture of 2-1/2 days in Bangkok which should be plausible to the press would be maintained until the very last moment to prevent speculation on the President's plans.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By CG, NARA, Date 8-25-98

FE:WPBundy:mk

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 4, 1966 -- 6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Arthur Goldberg called and wished you to know the following.

This afternoon the Soviet representatives in New York came in with space treaty proposals "which go a long way to meet our requirements." They will be meeting tomorrow to see if it is the real thing.

He regards it as "interesting" that they have moved on the space treaty because he feared after his conversation with Gromyko yesterday they would try to hinge progress on this treaty to other matters.

He believes they are trying to create a good atmosphere for Gromyko's meeting with you next Monday.

W. W. Rostow

cy to F. Butler
S. Keeny

WWRostow:rla

Tuesday, October 4, 1966 -- 6:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Saturday, October 1, 1966

Bannerman Wells, New York Times, telephoned to ask what we expected of Couve de Murville's visit. I said that we had no indication that he planned to deliver a new message to the President; that we understood the policy of France on NATO and Viet Nam. I assumed it would be a courtesy call and reminded Wells of your policy of not debating with the French, by going about our business.

Tuesday, October 4, 1966

Joseph Alsop telephoned and talked at length about Viet Nam. He has just returned from there. He said that we are making great progress in the attritional war against the VC. He is convinced that the VC and the North Vietnamese units are greatly understrength as compared to the levels at which they are carried in MACV order of battle. He asked me why Bob McNamara was "depressed." I said that I didn't find him depressed but anxious to get on with the effective organization of pacification. He said pacification will not work until the main force units are pretty well chopped up. I plan to see him next week. Alsop said he would like to report to you his reflections on Viet Nam, if you wish to see him.

Carroll Kilpatrick, The Washington Post, telephoned and said he had a report that the question of a visit by you to South Viet Nam was "open." I said that I had in front of me a list of possible places at which you might stop, but Viet Nam was not on that list. I indicated that we could not have any firm schedule of visits for several days, since the date of the conference was not set and we had not been able to discuss the matter with other governments.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Mr. Rostow 88

1. ~~sup~~
2. Pres file

Tuesday, October 4, 1966, 11:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is
a pleasant reply to General Ankrah's
congratulatory message on Gemini 11.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓ 9/5/66

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

EKH:mst

88a

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO GENERAL ANKRAH

I am most grateful for your thoughtful message on the flight of Gemini 11. Of course, we in America are proud of this achievement. But we take even greater pride in the benefits which the exploration of space will bring to all mankind.

Your interest and concern are deeply appreciated.

Lyndon B. Johnson

EKH:mst

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - October 4, 1966 - 6.15pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Brazilian President-elect Costa e Silva

The Brazilian Congress yesterday elected Marshall Artur da Costa e Silva to succeed General Castello Branco. This was a special, indirect election called under the government's temporary, special powers. Costa e Silva was unopposed. The opposition congressmen boycotted the balloting session. The President-elect is scheduled to assume office March 15, 1967, for a four-year term.

A message of congratulations is in order. Because of the extra-Constitutional measures under which the election took place and the semi-military origin of the present Brazilian administration, a message could occasion some adverse comment in Brazil and the U.S. But maintaining good relations with Costa e Silva overrides possible temporary criticism.

We can minimize the criticism by:

1. Making the message low key and protocolary in nature.
2. Delivering it on Thursday or Friday so as not to seem overly eager.
3. Not releasing the text here (but we would not oppose Costa e Silva doing so there).

Linc Gordon suggests the attached message and agrees on the method for handling described above. I recommend that you approve it on this basis.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ____
Prefer not to send ____
Speak to me ____
Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-103
By sig NARA. Date 2-16-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO
BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT-ELECT COSTA e SILVA

I extend congratulations on your election to the Presidency of the Republic of the United States of Brazil.

The longstanding ties of friendship and mutual respect between the United States of America and the United States of Brazil have always been close, and I hope that they will continue to be strengthened in the future. I look forward to cordial relations and close cooperation with you and your government in all matters of concern to our two countries and in our mutual search for answers to the great challenges facing our hemisphere and the world.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - October 4, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Seizure of Tuna Boats by Peru

We have the makings of what could turn out to be a bad tuna boat incident with Peru.

On October 2 Peruvian naval vessels (British purchased -- and MAP-supplied) detained three of our boats located 25-30 miles from shore for illegal fishing in Peruvian territorial waters and took them into port. Some 15 other tuna boats in the vicinity of the incident accompanied the detained boats into port as a protest demonstration.

The San Diego Tuna Boat Association and members of the California Congressional delegation have started to raise a fuss.

We have taken this action so far:

1. The Embassy has sent a knowledgeable First Secretary to Talara where the ships are being held to handle the case on the scene.
2. Ambassador Jones has spoken to the Foreign Minister urging:
(a) prompt release before pressures in both countries made it more difficult to find an easy way out, and (b) consideration of a modus operandi to avoid a repetition of this type of incident in the future.
3. ARA has asked Ambassador Celso Pastor to help out and he has promised to call President Belaunde.

The ball is in the Peruvian court. We are waiting to hear their reaction to our initiatives.

W. W. Rostow

cc - Bill Moyers


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-103

By *inf* NARA, Date 2-16-91



~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 4, 1966 -- 8:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talk With Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Razak

Your talk with Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak is scheduled for 12:30 p. m. tomorrow, Wednesday, October 5. He is the head of Malaysia's delegation to the UN. He is also the heir apparent to Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman.

You may wish:

1. To express appreciation for Malaysia's understanding and support of our position in Viet Nam. (Note: Because of their preoccupation with Indonesia, the Malaysians have made only a small contribution themselves -- mainly medicine, flood relief, some training for Americans and Vietnamese in jungle fighting);
2. Indicate our belief that an Asian initiative on Viet Nam is basically sound and that Malaysia's support for Thanat's peace proposal has added to its acceptability.

You are aware that Razak was quoted as saying that Malaysia would send troops to Viet Nam if asked. He claims he was misquoted and said only that he supported the general proposition of foreign assistance.

Razak may raise the following:

1. Military Assistance

He will come to the White House directly from a talk with Secretary McNamara.

The British are cutting back in their support, and recently turned down a Malaysian request for \$110 million of military aid. In 1965 we gave them a \$4 million credit on easy terms for military purchases. Encouraged by that, they may now look to us to fill the hole left by the British.

You might state:

You realize that he has talked with Secretary McNamara and suggest that he follow up on this with Defense and State. Note our heavy

SECRET

-2-

commitments, especially Viet Nam. You could point to the intent of Congress to limit MAP recipients to 40; new additions would be difficult. We hope the British will continue as a military supplier and will encourage them in this.

2. Economic development.

Malaysia launched this year a soundly conceived 5-year development plan. To meet goals, Malaysia will need \$630 million in foreign grants and loans. He may ask if we can do more to help.

You might state:

The U. S. joined with 12 other nations last May to discuss aid to Malaysia. We have offered help through the Ex-Im Bank. Future regional development programs will benefit Malaysia. We have continuing programs under Food for Peace and the Peace Corps. If Malaysia takes full advantage of our offers, total aid over the next 5 years could reach \$100 million. We will follow Malaysian economic developments with interest and will be alert for any useful contribution we can make.

3. Rubber.

World price has been declining steadily. Last month it was the lowest in 12 years. Malaysia is deeply concerned; government revenues come mainly from taxes on tin and rubber. They believe sale of our stockpiled rubber is pushing the price down.

You might state:

We are aware of the problem and are concerned for Malaysia's difficulties. The Department of State and others have the matter under urgent study, and we shall be in touch with the Malaysian government. There are serious budgetary reasons for our disposal policy.

The Deputy Prime Minister will be accompanied by Malaysian Ambassador Ong. Bill Bundy and I will be standing by. I suggest you see Deputy Prime Minister Razak alone at first, then call the rest of us in as you see fit. The Ambassador would consider it an honor to be able to meet with you.

A brief biographic sketch is attached.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RAZAK, Tun Abdul

MALAYSIA

Deputy Prime Minister

Razak, who is 44 years of age, is not only Deputy Prime Minister but also Minister of Defense and Minister of National and Rural Development. He ranks next in importance and influence to Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman in the government and in UMNO, the chief element of the ruling political grouping.

Razak, who is the heir apparent to the Tunku, is considered particularly effective as an administrator. The Rural Development Program which he directs has been highly successful. He has been friendly to the United States and is a strong supporter of the American Peace Corps contingent in Malaysia.

Razak has traveled extensively throughout Asia, Africa and the United States. He visited Puerto Rico for several days just prior to his present arrival in Washington.

He is married and has three sons and two daughters, speaks excellent English and is an ardent golfer.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-105By WJ NARA, Date 7-12-89~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENDA

Tuesday, October 4, 1966, at 1:15 p.m.

1. European Speech -- Sec. Rusk

Sec. Rusk should have his draft and recommendation over early tomorrow morning for you to read before lunch.

2. Viet Nam: Organization of Pacification -- Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have been informed by Porter that there will be great difficulty with Lodge about turning the organization of pacification over to the military.

3. Non-Proliferation -- Sec. McNamara

Sec. McNamara wishes to get settled exactly how we proceed in the light of your decision on last Sunday, including the formula we propose to use with the Russians.

4. Other

Tuesday - October 4, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letters of Introduction for Astronauts

Astronauts Neil A. Armstrong and Richard F. Gordon will tour South America from October 7 - 30.

It is customary for them to carry letters of introduction to the Chiefs of State of the countries they will visit. The countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Appropriate letters for your signature are attached. I recommend that you sign them.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Mr. Rostow

94

resp

October 4, 1966

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a routine greeting to the American Chamber of Commerce in the U.K. on its fiftieth anniversary. This was the first American Chamber abroad to receive the President's "E" for outstanding contributions to U.S. export expansion.

Francis M. Bator

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____


*OK
Phg
10/6/66*

94a

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO HARRY E. HARTZEL,
INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (U.K.)

My congratulations to the American Chamber of Commerce on its fiftieth anniversary and to you as the new President. The United States Government has long recognized the Chamber's contribution to Anglo-American understanding. The Chamber's efforts in support of expanded trade between the United States and Britain have been outstanding. Even more important, you continue to play a vital role in strengthening the ties of friendship between the United Kingdom and the United States.

Sincerely,



Lyndon B. Johnson



95
cy to F Bator

Tuesday, October 4, 1966 -- 5:10 p.m.

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Mr. President:

The Italian Ambassador wished me to convey to you the following message:

1. The Italian government greatly appreciates the mention in the Erhard communique of the Italian proposal for narrowing the technological gap in the Atlantic. They propose to carry forward vigorously.

2. With respect to a possible trip to Europe next year, they assume you would envisage a visit to Italy. The Italian government wishes you to know that they would look forward to such a visit "with the greatest enthusiasm."

3. He asked whether the reference to the European trip was merely formal or serious. I said that I was sure you hoped to visit Europe next year if conditions permitted.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Mr. Rostow
96

Pres file

October 4, 1966

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a routine greeting to the American Chamber of Commerce in the U.K. on its fiftieth anniversary. This was the first American Chamber abroad to receive the President's "E" for outstanding contributions to U.S. export expansion.

Francis M. Bator

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO HARRY E. HARTZEL,
INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (U.K.)

My congratulations to the American Chamber of Commerce on its fiftieth anniversary and to you as the new President. The United States Government has long recognized the Chamber's contribution to Anglo-American understanding. The Chamber's efforts in support of expanded trade between the United States and Britain have been outstanding. Even more important, you continue to play a vital role in strengthening the ties of friendship between the United Kingdom and the United States.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 4, 1966 -- 1:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Averell suggests that we make the following deal:

-- Tell the Russians there will be no "hardware participation" by the Germans and write it into the non-proliferation agreement;

-- The Russians commit themselves to getting Hanoi to make peace in Southeast Asia;

-- We pay off the Germans by making balance of payments concessions in the long-term Soviet agreement.

Much as I ache to get peace in Southeast Asia, there is something of the temptation of the devil in this. It is wrong to limit the President's freedom of action with respect to Germany and other ^{now} nuclear powers. It is wrong to let the Germans off the hook on balance of payments offsets.

In addition, there is no evidence that the Russians have the power to make Hanoi end the war.

Having given you this somewhat old-fashioned reaction, it is, nevertheless, a proposition of which you should be aware and may wish to turn over in your mind.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Mr. Harriman's Memorandum
dated October 3, 1966, "Negotiations"

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-27
By WJ, NARA Date 8-20-96

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1966

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: "Negotiations"

I believe the only real chance now in sight to induce Hanoi to negotiate a settlement depends on the influence Moscow is willing and able to exert. Events in China have probably made Hanoi look more towards Moscow than Peking, but have not eliminated Hanoi's dependence on Peking.

If Moscow is to take on the task of persuading Hanoi to move towards a settlement, the USSR will probably have to assume certain risks and obligations. Thus I believe we must offer some compensating inducements.

In my judgment, the overpowering desire of Moscow today is for greater stability in Europe. Regardless of how we assess developments in Germany in the years ahead, I am convinced that the Soviet leaders are deeply concerned over a possible reemergence of a German threat to Russian security. The Kremlin desires a nuclear non-proliferation pact with Germany particularly in mind. I seriously doubt that the Soviet Union will be satisfied with a formula which would permit "hardware participation" by the Germans. A possible quid pro quo for Moscow's action in Southeast Asia would be our abandoning the hardware option in our proposals for the pact. Although few Germans really believe a NATO hardware deal is probable, its abandonment would mean to the Germans the giving up of a hope which has some political appeal.

To induce a German Government to abandon this hope would probably require concessions in "offset" agreements. Yet, the end of hostilities in Vietnam would more than compensate for the dollar drain resulting from such a concession.

In addition, a mutual reduction in forces in Germany would probably appeal to Moscow.

In sum,

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 89-27


By inf, NARA, Date 8-4-94~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

In sum, I believe that we will have to agree on some arrangement affecting Germany if we are to induce Moscow to act in Vietnam. I recognize the political difficulties in Germany at the present time, but our interests are so overwhelming to get the war over in Vietnam, that I cannot help but feel we should move as rapidly as feasible.

I hope that there will be an opportunity for you to raise this subject, or at least touch on it, in your talk with Gromyko. It may require discussions with Soviet leaders in Moscow before an understanding can be worked out. But the stakes are so great in ending the fighting in Vietnam, that action along the lines outlined above is highly desirable.



W. Averell Harriman

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, Oct. 4, 1966
3:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You will wish to read this portrait of the negative reaction in German political circles to Erhard's Washington visit.

If we are to get a turn around, it must come about through the tripartite group. The present mood makes McCloy's participation all the more important.

The European speech could help.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

(Bonn 3944)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, October 4, 1966

78a

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR McGHEE (Bonn, 3944)

SUBJECT: German Reaction to Erhard's Washington Visit

It is now unmistakable -- from the talks we have had with Germans, from public statements and from media that Erhard's recent Washington visit is widely interpreted as marking the beginning of a period of increased divergence in German-American interests. This reaction is not limited to Bonn. Substantially the same appraisal has been reported by each of our consular offices in Germany, whom we have canvassed on this point. In fact, the preliminary comments we have heard from the foreign office and chancellery sources indicate that they view the Washington talks in a far more realistic and positive light than the press and politicians.

The federal press spokesman's efforts to influence public thinking in a more favorable direction have not had much effect. Countless editorials have made the point that in light of the Washington visit a reassessment of basic German foreign policy assumptions is required. A frequent theme is that the new divergencies of interests between Germany and the U.S. impose limits on the warmth and intimacy of the ever heretofore relatively trouble-free German-American collaboration. If Germany thought that it might have the role of most-favored European nation in American eyes, it can now stand disabused of that idea. The shift of American attention from Europe to Asia and the American desire for an understanding with the Soviet Union which will cement the status quo in Europe are developments of long-term importance which will have lasting adverse effects on German interests.

The following particular conclusions are frequently drawn:

- A. There will be long months of tough negotiations on the offset;
- B. All previous denials to the contrary notwithstanding, the Americans are now obviously going to withdraw forces from Europe;
- C. The stage has been set for an American-Soviet agreement on non-proliferation;

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-105
By if NARA, Date 7-12-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D. The passages in the communique concerning reunification and western unity are threadbare generalizations intended to distract attention from hard problems; the offer of a Bonn-Washington hot line is a gimmicky effort to the same end.

The point made in other NATO capitals, that the Germans have been given a place in a new tripartite "Directorate" has received little attention in Germany. Those who have commented -- Strauss for example -- have opposed the concept because it might place the Federal Republic of Germany at a disadvantage against the combined pressure of the U. S. and U. K.

We believe that the following circumstances in Germany -- beyond the undeniable problems involved in the talks, themselves -- have influenced the negative appraisal of the visit.

A. There was a predisposition to expect the worst created by repeated predictions of doom from politicians and the press during the weeks before the visits. Even Erhard had let it be known publicly that he expected "hard talks". Similarly, the pre-visit comment in Germany concentrated heavily on the offset question, thus riveting attention on the most difficult aspect of the talks.

B. The unsettled political atmosphere in Bonn spilled over on the visit. Many people found it impossible to imagine the Chancellor conducting successful talks in Washington in view of his seeming inability to master his own political problems at home.

C. Finally there are two groups of Germans who for reasons of their own were not unhappy for the visit to be seen in Germany as a failure: First, those politicians who are intent on replacing Erhard and see both a personal defeat for Erhard in Washington and a set-back for the close German-American ties with which Erhard is associated as contributing to this objective; and secondly those publicists, politicians and intellectuals who feel that Germany is too heavily oriented toward the United States and who wished the Washington visit to serve as a lesson. Gerstenmaier is an example of the first, the Stuttgarter Zeitung of the second.

The periodic crises in German confidence toward the United States have usually faded in a matter of months. Some positive rebalancing of the scales is likely again this time. Unfortunately, however, the nature of Germany's relations with the United States will continue to be a tool in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

the domestic political struggle, which is likely to continue for some time within the CDU/CSU. In seeking to unseat Erhard/Strauss, Gerstenmaier, Adenauer and others will direct part of their criticism at the United States. Moreover, the expected hard negotiations over the offset and the prospect of some troop withdrawals will continue to exert a destabilizing influence on our relations. Cooperation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the U.S. on the official level should remain satisfactory. No sudden changes in German policy are to be expected. The atmosphere of our relations during the next six months, however, is likely to be more troubled than during any previous postwar period.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, October 4, 1966
9:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

Sec. McNamara wishes to add the subject of naval gun fire against North Viet Nam to the agenda at lunch today.

Secs. Rusk and McNamara believe that the military advantages are outweighed by the "probable adverse reactions and possible military risks."

I concur at this time.

I am arranging that you receive a quiet briefing on the military situation and prospects at the DMZ.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

~~TOP SECRET~~

99a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Naval Gunfire Against North Vietnam

On a number of occasions since May of this year, General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp have recommended the use of naval gunfire against North Vietnam. These recommendations have had the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but have never received final approval, largely because of the international problems such action might entail. At present, naval fire on North Vietnam is authorized only in self defense against attack from the shore.

As you know, General Westmoreland is now quite concerned about the threat developing to the northernmost provinces of South Vietnam -- in the form of enemy attacks supported, and potentially launched from, the DMZ and southern portions of North Vietnam. He is urgently requesting authority to employ naval gunfire against North Vietnam south of 17° 30' -- i.e. from Dong Hoi south to the DMZ. Again, he has the support of CINCPAC and the Chiefs. The advantages and disadvantages of approving this request are briefly set forth below.

1. Advantages. General Westmoreland and the Chiefs point out that the enemy buildup in and north of the DMZ involves numerous fixed military targets and a vital supply axis along coastal Route 1, supplemented by waterborne traffic, all of which cannot be consistently and successfully engaged by air attack. Naval gunfire is less inhibited by darkness and weather than is tactical air. It can deliver reasonably accurate area and harassing fire under any weather conditions. It can engage targets, including moving targets, with observed fire in weather which would preclude effective air attack. In good weather, its accuracy at reasonable ranges is equal to that of air attack.

Operating within 12 miles of the coast, the various ships and weapons involved can effectively engage targets up to 12 or more miles inland -- a distance which encompasses the principal lines of communication in that part of North Vietnam and the eastern portions of the DMZ. At least in theory, the application of naval gunfire to targets in this area would free tactical air resources to engage targets along the more primitive LOC's to the west, in the western DMZ, and in the immediate battle area of any actual attack. Also, ships could be used to engage targets which the enemy has protected with heavy local defenses and thus avoid aircraft losses. (It is always possible, of course, to lose a ship to coastal guns or air attack.)

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 84-372 (#342)
By *DeGarcia* NWS, Date 8-21-86

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

This fire could be provided with resources already deployed, at the expense of support to forces in South Vietnam. Ammunition supplies are adequate. The most probable average commitment would be 4 ships (one 6" or 8"-gun cruiser, two 5"-gun destroyers, and one 5"-rocket ship) of the 7 to 11 such ships which have been engaged in naval gunfire support to operations within South Vietnam. On a number of occasions, this in-country support has been quite effective.

In sum, the arguments in favor of employing naval gunfire against North Vietnam are: a serious threat exists involving targets appropriate for naval gunfire; the resources are readily available; and this fire can be delivered under certain conditions which preclude air attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that we approve the use of naval gunfire south of Dong Hoi against radar and antiaircraft sites, other fixed military targets, convoys and elements of LOC's, and North Vietnamese craft which are definitely identified as naval vessels or vessels bearing military cargo. Attack would be prohibited against civilian craft and other targets which involve large collateral damage or civilian casualties.

2. Disadvantages. The disadvantages of this course of action still lie primarily in the reactions we may expect from the North Vietnamese, the Chinese, other nations, and certain elements here at home. There is also some doubt as to the measure of military advantage we would gain to offset these reactions.

While from one point of view the additional destructive force applied against North Vietnam by naval fire would be proportionately small, from another viewpoint this would be escalation, and a step toward extension of naval bombardment still farther north. The enemy probably would claim that we were engaging in a new kind of attack. Perhaps more important, since this is the kind of activity which would normally precede such action, the North Vietnamese and Chinese might conclude that we were in fact preparing to invade the North, and undertake some escalatory action in response. (At the very least, this action would lend credence to past South Vietnamese threats and American newspaper speculation concerning invasion.) Other nations, including some allies, would probably regret that we found this new departure necessary, and might dissociate themselves from it. International legal questions could be raised. It is certain that at least some of our detractors here at home would point to the action as a new and serious form of escalation. On the other side of this question, it must be conceded that our ships have already fired on North Vietnamese territory -- in defense against shore fire -- on three occasions (February, March and April of this year while engaged in search and rescue operations). There was no serious adverse reaction in these cases, but the self-defense nature of the fire was immediately demonstrable.

We have no guarantee that the incremental military benefits of naval gunfire would be of sufficient magnitude to compensate for these adverse reactions. Assuming that sufficient targets can be identified, ships engaged in this mission would probably fire on the order of 200 rounds per ship per day, or a total of 800 rounds.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- As one measure of the concentration involved, this would amount to 16 rounds per mile over the 50-odd miles of Route 1 from Dong Hoi to the DMZ.
- As another measure of weight of effort, the explosive charge in the average round involved is on the order of 14 pounds. This would mean about 6 tons delivered per day -- quite a small amount (roughly the equivalent of 10 attack sorties) compared with tonnages we have delivered in the same area with tactical air.
- The average shell has an effects radius of 40-90 yards against personnel, and a somewhat smaller radius against vehicles. Some types can achieve good penetration of concrete and other fortifications, particularly if the target presents a vertical face, but this requires precision, observed fire.

Granted, this weight of effort could be concentrated (especially that of the rocket ship), or substantially increased (by committing more ships or by including a higher proportion of heavier guns). Even so, when we consider the large amounts of tactical air available -- particularly in an emergency -- and the rather limited sets of circumstances under which naval gunfire enjoys an undisputed superiority, the military advantages appear less imposing.

- Few fixed targets would be so time-sensitive as to demand attack during weather conditions when naval ships could engage them and tactical air could not.
- At least half the problem with fleeting targets, such as convoys, is to locate and identify the target; this part of the problem would be the same for naval fire as for tactical air. This detracts from the admitted ability of naval ships to engage a target, once located, under certain conditions when tactical air would not be effective.
- While the enemy may undertake to increase antiaircraft defenses in southern North Vietnam to support of a major effort, at present his defenses in that area have been neutralized to the point where we lose relatively few aircraft.

3. Recommendations. On balance, I conclude that the military advantages of approving naval gunfire against North Vietnam at this time are outweighed by the probable adverse reactions and possible military risks. The Secretary of State and I recommend against approval.

Robert S. McNamara

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 4, 1966
9:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

As background to our discussion at lunch today, you may want to have this report of Porter's views on putting pacification under the military.

I conclude that Bob McNamara will have to feel his way out there; listen to Lodge; examine the problem; and then make a recommendation to you.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-104
By sig NARA, Date 9-6-89

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE
DEPARTMENT

October 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM

To : The Secretary

Thru : S/S

From : FE - Leonard Unger

Subject: Ambassador Porter's Views on Secretary McNamara's
Proposal to Place the Viet-Nam Pacification/RD Program
Under COMUSMACV

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-105
By ing NARA, Date 7-12-89

1. Ambassador Porter is at home in Massachusetts, where I talked with him by telephone today. He will arrive in Washington late Tuesday and come to the Department Wednesday morning. He hopes to be able to have some time with you in New York later in the week.
2. I mentioned the proposal on pacification made by Secretary McNamara with which Porter was familiar. He gave me his own personal views on this, which he agreed I should convey to you, but urged in the strongest terms that no decision be taken until Washington has a report and recommendations from the Mission. Porter emphasized that while strong views are held on this matter, the Mission could be counted on to carry out a thoroughly objective study to determine what in its view is most in the national interest; he suggested the possibility that one or two experts might be sent from Washington to participate in the study. Porter obviously anticipated serious resentment from the field if a decision were to be taken here without the Mission's views having been solicited.
3. Porter's personal view is that the proposal to put all pacification operations and personnel (on the US side) under COMUSMACV is quite impractical and is opposed most strongly by those with most experience in Viet-Nam. He considered that the military authorities who would be put in charge are markedly less competent than those presently responsible for the program and, despite their unquestioned abilities in the military field, they lack the kind of political understanding required to work effectively in this field. An additional factor is that the turnover rate among the military is so rapid that as compared with the civilian staff they have only a limited, recent knowledge of the situation and are handicapped in developing rapport with the Vietnamese.
4. If pacification is put entirely under the military Porter believes there will be a wholesale departure of those working on the civilian side.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-2-

5. Porter mentioned that there was a proposal for a more rational organization of pacification -- the one with which we are generally familiar which among other things would put the Regional and Popular Forces under Minister Thang -- but that MACV had rejected this. Nevertheless Porter said, quite privately, that he believed that General Westmoreland would not oppose some form of this and does not approve of the militarization of pacification.

6. In conclusion Ambassador Porter suggested caution on this issue and left the impression that if there were a quick decision in Washington we might have to reckon with a serious reaction from Ambassador Lodge.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

101

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, October 3, 1966

7:10 p. m.

MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Message from you to the US-Japan
Committee on Scientific Cooperation

The 6th meeting of this Committee, to be held
in Washington October 10-13, 1966, marks
its 5th anniversary.

You will recall that in January 1965 you and
Prime Minister Sato, in a joint communique,
"confirmed the desirability of maintaining
and utilizing" this Committee.

The Committee has been successful in its
scientific purposes, and has brought us a
political bonus.

I recommend that you approve the attached
suggested message to be read at the opening
session.

Walt Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

ENDED

SUGGESTED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
U.S. - JAPAN COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION

On the occasion of this sixth meeting, and after a half-decade of close working relationships, it is clear that the United States and Japan have established, through their Committee on Scientific Cooperation, a new path for cooperation between nations. This has been a truly joint program - in effort, in funds, and in scientific dedication. The research under the Committee has been proposed and carried out by individuals acting on behalf of their professional interest and public conscience.

Science and technology are vital ingredients in the continued growth of all nations, developed and developing, and in the search for a better life for all men. This Committee has advanced that cause. I believe that there is no practical limitation to what free men, acting together with initiative, resolution, and responsibility, can accomplish. I ask the Joint Committee to accept my congratulations for a successful program, and I join with you in your high hopes for the future.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, October 3, 1966 at 6:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Korry Report -- Status and Prospects

As you know, the Korry Report suggested two kinds of initiatives: a broader role for the World Bank in Africa, and a number of modifications of U.S. bilateral programs. The following summarizes the state of play on each front. At Tab A, for your signature, is a proposed NSAM -- explained below -- to carry out the changes in bilateral programs.

World Bank Position

You will recall that George Woods reacted very favorably to the Korry ideas. He agreed in August to discuss them with the African Finance Ministers at the Bank/Fund meetings (September 26-30) if, in the meanwhile, we got the major Europeans to support the proposals. After some ground-work at lower levels, Livingston Merchant went to Europe early in September to solicit help. The results were:

- (1) enthusiastic support from the U.K., Italy and Canada;
- (2) a flat turndown from France;
- (3) inconclusive replies from Germany and Belgium.

Woods did in fact raise the proposals in a general way with the African Finance Ministers last week. There was not enough time to get a solid feel for their reactions. We'll try to get Woods to follow up as quickly as possible. We also plan further approaches to the Europeans, particularly Germany.

Bilateral Program Changes

Bill Gaud and Joe Palmer have agreed to receive the attached NSAM. It has also been cleared on the Seventh Floor. Essentially, the NSAM asks State to set up a procedure for reviewing and carrying out each recommendation -- absent a compelling case against it -- by December 1. It also specifically requires State to consult with the other agencies concerned, and instructs my office to monitor the operation. I think it will do the job.

Walt Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 5, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 356


TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Agriculture
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Administrator of the Agency for
 International Development
 Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
 Agency
 Director, Bureau of the Budget
 Director, United States Information Agency
 Administrator, National Aeronautics and
 Space Administration
 Director of the Peace Corps
 President, Export-Import Bank

SUBJECT: Implementation of the Korry Report on Development
 Policies and Programs in Africa.

I have approved Ambassador Korry's Report in principle. Steps are already underway to carry out the several recommendations which involve an enlarged role in Africa for the World Bank. The Secretary of State -- together with the AID Administrator -- is authorized to take whatever additional actions are appropriate to this end.

I would like the Department of State to take primary responsibility in developing an action program to carry out the Report's other recommendations. I would hope that this program would be in effect by December 1. It should include steps for the implementation of each recommendation unless the Secretary of State finds that a particular recommendation is inappropriate or unsound, or that alternative steps would be preferable.

I would like the Administrator of AID to work closely with the Secretary of State or his designate in developing this program. Other agencies should be fully consulted on those recommendations which are of direct concern to them. I have asked Walt Rostow to serve as White House liaison for this effort.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

In view of the sensitive nature of many aspects of the Korry Report, it should not be made public, nor should its recommendations or plans for its implementation be released to the press except upon the explicit instructions of the Secretary of State.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Hughes" followed by a long horizontal stroke.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - October 3, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment with the Council for Latin America Board Members

The Executive Committee of the Council for Latin America plans to meet in Washington in November. They have inquired whether you would receive them.

The Council represents prominent businessmen with interests in Latin America. (See attached list). They meet periodically with Linc Gordon and his country directors for briefings and exchanges of views. The Council thus serves as a handy instrument for gaining understanding of our policies in Latin America among business leaders and enlisting their cooperation.

As we look ahead to the OAS Summit and a new impetus for the Alliance, the private sector must play a greater role in the new effort. At a meeting with the Council leaders, you could outline our plans and urge their support.

The meeting would also provide an opportunity for you to direct press attention to Latin America after being focused on Europe and Asia during September and October.

I recommend that you receive the group.

Bill Moyers

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachment

OFFICERS OF COUNCIL FOR LATIN AMERICA

Chairman	- David Rockefeller
Senior Vice-Chairman	- John F. Gallagher
President	- William E. Barlow
Vice Chairman	- Henry W. Balgooyen
"	- Harold S. Geneen
"	- George S. Moore
"	- John D. J. Moore
"	- John R. White - (Treasurer)
"	- William S. Youngman, Jr.

Other Members of the

Executive Committee:	- Charles M. Brinckerhoff
	- Albert L. Cole
	- Earl C. Daum
	- S. Maurice McAshan, Jr.
	- Robert W. Purcell - (Secretary)
	- J. Howard Rambin, Jr.
	- Thomas E. Sunderland
	- A. Thomas Taylor
	- Rawleigh Warner, Jr.

~~SECRET~~

Monday, October 3, 1966 -- 5:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

We have some trouble to clear up with Holt.

He now says that his Parliament will not close down until October 28. Therefore, he wants an earlier date for the conference. He also feels it necessary that your visit come when Parliament is still sitting.

Our best option is to persuade him to accelerate his Parliamentary time table and to arrive in the Philippines in time for the Chiefs of Government to begin their meeting on October 28.

The attached draft message from you to him is designed to achieve this. If he accepts, alternative D-2 is the appropriate itinerary for the trip. It is clearly the best we could devise, providing rest days, etc.

If he cannot meet us on this point, we would propose that the conference take place October 24-25. In that case, alternative E-1, attached, is the possible itinerary.

Your decision on whether we go out to Holt with this message is obviously urgent.


W. W. Rostow

Dispatch message _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 9-3-98

~~SECRET~~ DRAFT

10/3/66

(Message from the President to Prime Minister Holt)

Dear Harold:

Ambassador Waller, supplemented by a message from Sir John Bunting, has told us that you have serious difficulty with Marcos' latest proposal to hold the seven-nation conference on October 28 and 29, preceded by a meeting of Foreign Ministers on the 26th and 27th.

I understand that under its present schedule your Parliament would have its two concluding days on October 27 and 28, and that you feel that you personally must be present on these days. I understand further that you feel that a visit by me should not take place after Parliament had risen.

Clearly Marcos must remain the focal point in ironing out the conference dates. As we understand it, a major element in his thinking is the great difficulty of making adequate arrangements, either in Manila or Baguio, as early as the originally scheduled date of the 18th or shortly thereafter. Our own people have been in close touch with the arrangement problem in the Philippines, and they tell me that these difficulties -- particularly accommodations and communications -- are indeed great and would be virtually impossible to surmount by the originally envisaged dates. This holds true in spite of our own offer of extensive assistance.

Thus, the choice of dates appears to narrow down to the 26th - 29th as Marcos now proposes -- but with the chiefs of government only required on the 28th and 29th -- or the possibility of chiefs of government meeting

~~SECRET~~

-2-

10/3/66

for two days on the 24th and 25th, with the Foreign Ministers meeting on the two previous days.

The latter would appear to meet your point about being back in Canberra for the presently planned last two days of your parliamentary session on the 27th and 28th.

As between these two choices, I would want you to have my own thinking, especially as it relates to the possibility of my visiting Australia. If the conference comes on the 28th and 29th, I could readily schedule visits to Australia and New Zealand on my way out, and would probably plan to visit Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, and Seoul after the conference. (The Kuala Lumpur stop seems to me particularly desirable since it is not a troop-contributing country.)

On the other hand, if the conference were set on the 24th and 25th, I could not get away early enough to visit the other three stops before the conference, and could only visit New Zealand and Australia on any reasonable schedule by leaving as early as the 16th. This has real difficulty for me in view of the uncertainty as to when our own Congress will finish. Like your Parliament, it has major legislation still pending, and will doubtless be sitting into the weekend to try to clean this up.

All of this leads me to a substantial preference in favor of the 28th and 29th -- which I know will also give Marcos that much more time to complete the arrangements. I therefore wonder whether there is any possibility that you could accelerate your Parliamentary timetable so that you could finish the session by, say, the 26th and thus arrive in the Philippines in time for

~~SECRET~~

-3-

10/3/66

the chiefs of government to begin their meetings on the 28th. I recognize the difficulty you face, and I do not want in any way to get between you and Marcos. But I ~~would~~ think ~~that~~ you should know my own thinking fully.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

1046

Alternative D-2

999

(11 minus 6)

(5 minus 2)

(4 minus 0 plus 24)

Rec'd October 23.

(2-1/2 minus 0)

(6 minus 2)

Rest & Consultation - October 26 - 27.

State 11-19-79 (908)
By DCH/jai:sp Date 8-25-86

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

Arrive Manila	Evening of	October 30	
Leave Manila		October 31	1000
Arrive Kuala Lumpur (2-1/2 minus 1/2)		October 31	1200
Leave Kuala Lumpur		November 1	1000
Arrive Bangkok (2 minus 1/3)		November 1	1130
(Mekong and NE Thailand air tour - November 2)			
Leave Bangkok		November 3	1000
Arrive Seoul (6 plus 2)		November 3	1800
Leave Seoul		November 5	0900
Arrive Anchorage (8 plus 5 minus 24)		November 4	2200
(Press plane might have to leave Seoul earlier for intermediate stop.)			
Leave Anchorage		November 5	1000
Arrive Washington (6 plus 5 to E-T)		November 6	2100

FE:WPBundy:mk 10/3/66

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, Oct. 3, 1966
5:45 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

My first reaction to this proposal of Max Taylor's (as I told him) was to let the new team settle down before reviewing NSAM 341.

My second reaction was that having a review made now might help focus Nick and Gene on these organizational issues right away before they are caught up in crises, trips to Saigon, etc.

In any case, Max will talk to Nick about it so he can make a judgment.

Walt Rostow

See what Nick says _____

Tell Max to make the review _____

Hold off the review _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL attachment~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 89-26
By WJ NARA, Date 5-14-90

INDEXED
7711

105a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 3, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Review of the Implementation of NSAM 341

Shortly after your approval last March of NSAM 341, assigning overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental matters overseas to the Secretary of State, you indicated that you wished me to review the implementation of this arrangement about September 1. Because of the changing personnel situation in several key positions in State, I have refrained from bringing up this matter until now.

As you will recall, the Under Secretary of State, as Chairman of the Senior Interdepartmental Group established by the NSAM, plays a key role in the functioning of the system. With the accession of Mr. Katzenbach to this position, it would appear timely and helpful to him to have this review started soon in order to make the finding available for his guidance. Also, it would be timely to estimate the strength of this organization as State is presently considering the possibility of superimposing on it the planning, programming and budgeting of overseas activities.

If you wish this job undertaken, I suggest that a letter be sent to me along the lines of the draft attached hereto.

Maxwell D. Taylor
Maxwell D. Taylor

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 89-26
By WJ NARA, Date 5-14-90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT

Dear General Taylor:

Now that the responsibilities and organizational arrangements established by NSAM 341 have been in effect for over six months, I would like you to make a review of the functioning of these arrangements and give me your comments as to their effectiveness. As I would like this report by November 15, you may limit your consideration to those elements of the system located here in Washington.

You are authorized to call on any department or agency of the Federal Government for information and assistance in conducting this review.

Sincerely,

~~SECRET~~

October 3, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is one remaining Southeast Asian leader not presently scheduled to see you whom you may wish to grant an appointment. This is Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, who is clearly heir apparent to the Tunku and already discharging many of the Prime Minister's responsibilities.

The Malaysians have made repeated requests to State since August for an appointment. They apparently are sensitive to what they regard as limited high level attention since the Tunku's state visit in July 1964. Razak is here seeking military assistance. Since we are hesitant to make firm commitments at this time, State believes a meeting with you would ease his disappointment.

The more persuasive argument for proposing still another meeting with a Southeast Asian leader at this time is the relevance of Malaysia's position on Vietnam to the forthcoming conference. Razak strongly supported our Vietnam policies in his UN speech on September 26; he and other Malaysian leaders have been actively promoting Asian regionalism.

A meeting with Razak would provide press and public focus which could contribute to the objectives of the Philippines Conference by pointing up the support of other Asians not militarily aligned with us in Vietnam.

Razak will be here this week only.

I share Secretary Rusk's recommendation that you see him in your office for a short call this week. Your seeing him takes on additional importance since we now schedule a stop in Kuala Lumpur.

W. W. Rostow

Approve for _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

*Saw President
12 30
10/5/66*

DECLASSIFIED	
NLS 85-120 (#2266)	
By <i>W. J. C.</i>	NARS, Date <i>8-22-86</i>

P. S. Please note the attached comment by Razak made in New York to the Press.

Monday, October 3, 1966 -- 2:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

We want these results from the Philippines conference:

1. A reaffirmation of the commitment among the fighting allies to see it through to a ^{new} honorable peace.
2. An agreed position among the fighting allies ^{and} in Saigon on the terms on which peace will be sought.
3. An approach by the Saigon government, backed by the fighting allies, to those now fighting with the VC, including perhaps an amnesty offer, which would go beyond the appeal made in the Honolulu declaration by the Vietnamese government.
4. Increased emphasis by Saigon, backed by the fighting allies, on pacification, land reform, planning for long-term economic development (including future use of our bases), education, health, agriculture, etc.
5. If possible, an agreed statement of support for Cambodian territorial integrity and independence.
6. Support from all the governments for Asian regional economic development without creating or appearing to create a new Asian grouping made up of the fighting allies.

In general, we want the government in Saigon to recommit itself to its allies and to the world to getting on with the Honolulu program, where much progress has been made, including the commitment to go forward in next steps towards constitutional government.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

September 29, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: 7-Nation Conference on Viet-Nam

The purpose of the conference in the Philippines was defined by President Marcos as follows:

"... the proposed conference would presumably include a review of the military situation, but would stress the non-military, economic and political situations and programs being carried forward by the South Vietnamese Government, together with a review of the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the conflict."

In announcing your acceptance of the invitation, Bill Moyers quoted from the Marcos description. He said in addition that "further details would evolve in the process of consultation and an agenda would be fixed in that process."

Australian Prime Minister Holt, in his acceptance, said:

"Since this is a conference of heads of government whose forces are joined in resisting Communist aggression in South Viet-Nam, there will naturally be an assessment of the military situation. But also the Australian Government sees the conference as one which will look towards the attainment of a just and enduring peace, and towards the further development of programs of civil aid and economic reconstruction in South Viet-Nam, and in the area generally, which would buttress freedom and progress."

Prime Minister Ky said:

"This conference will be an opportunity to examine again the problems connected with Viet-Nam and to inform the allies about activities which Viet-Nam is presently carrying on as well as future projects. The conference will tighten the bonds of understanding and

strengthen the support of the allies for Viet-Nam's endeavor to defend its national independence and provide for the well-being of our people. This conference will help Viet-Nam have confidence that the Vietnamese people are not alone in the struggle to defend freedom and resist communist aggression. This conference will also evidence the unity of purpose of the nations which are beside us in the struggle of the Vietnamese people."

Korea and Thailand used the Marcos formulation in their announcements. New Zealand followed Holt's general line.

Thus, the conference can be said to offer an opportunity for the heads of governments most directly involved in Viet-Nam to:

1. review the military situation;
2. hear detailed reports on the current economic and political situation in Viet-Nam;
3. consider ways in which the participants and others can most effectively help the Vietnamese achieve improved security and provide economic progress for their people;
4. study plans for Viet-Nam's future economic development and methods for increasing the economic cooperation of Southeast Asia and other nations;
5. explore possible avenues for achieving a just and honorable settlement to the conflict.

W. W. Rostow

P. S. I am increasingly convinced that we should add the general theme of Asian regional development. It is necessary if you are to touch down in Japan and Malaysia. And it is, simply, right to widen out beyond Viet Nam in the wake of your Baltimore speech, the Asian Development Bank, the Mekong, etc.

W. W. R.

The quotations from members of Congress will be coming along very shortly.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday, October 1, 1966

1:30 p. m.

SECRET

MR. PRESIDENT:

The latest information is:

-- It would be really difficult for Holt to be away from Canberra in the week of October 24; but

-- the Australians want you very much to be there while Parliament is still sitting.


In the light of this, Bill Bundy has produced the attached itinerary which would make the date of the conference October 31 - November 2, with November 3 the time for a quick trip to Saigon. This itinerary would get you back in Washington at 10:00 p. m. Saturday, November 5.

It is Bill Bundy's judgment that Marcos is likely to accept these dates for the conference.

After checking in some further detail into Baguio, the site looks quite possible if we keep the number of American correspondents well under 200 (which Bill Moyers thinks possible) and do a lot of work on Baguio between now and then. Fortunately the Administrative Officer of our Embassy in Manila is here in town and he is good. None of the problems would really be easier in Manila.

W. A. Rostow

SECRET attachment



SECRET

Possible Presidential Itinerary

Alternative C

(Order of stops reversed from Alternative B)

(numbers in parentheses represent flight times and time changes in that order.)

Leave Washington		October 21	0900
Arrive Honolulu	(10 minus 6)	October 21	1300

(Press plane might leave earlier to permit intermediate stop.)

Leave Honolulu		October 22	0730
Arrive Fiji	(6 minus 2 plus 24)	October 23	1130
Leave Fiji		October 23	1300
Arrive Ohakea	(3 minus 0)	October 23	1600

(Drive to Wellington approximately 1-1/2 hours.)

Leave Ohakea		Mon., October 24	1600
Arrive Canberra	(3 minus 2)	October 24	1700
Leave Canberra		October 26	0830
Arrive Townsville	(2-1/2 minus 0)	October 26	1100

(Day of rest in Townsville if facilities adequate. Alternative would be rest day in Canberra.)

Leave Townsville		October 27	0700
Arrive Kuala Lumpur	(7 minus 2-1/2)	October 27	1130
Leave Kuala Lumpur		October 28	0930
Arrive Bangkok	(2 minus 1/2)	October 28	1100
Leave Bangkok		October 29	1000

~~SECRET~~

-2-

(Via Mekong Valley and NE Thailand, perhaps offering ride to senior Thai officials.)

Arrive Manila (4-1/2 plus 1) October 29 1530

(Afternoon for call on Marcos and Philippine arrangements.)

Leave Manila Sun, October 30 0900

Arrive Baguio (1 plus 0) October 30 1000

(Afternoon for US and GVN consultations.)

Conference -- October 31, November 1 -- Communique at noon November 2

Day of Rest - in Baguio ^{Nov.} ~~October~~ 3

Arrive Manila evening of November 3

Leave Manila November 4 0800

(Perhaps offer ride to President Park.)

Arrive Seoul (3-1/2 plus 1) November 4 1230

Leave Seoul November 5 0900

Arrive Anchorage (8 plus 5 minus 24) November 4 2200

(Press plane might have to leave Seoul earlier for intermediate stop.)

Leave Anchorage November 5 1000

Arrive Washington (6 plus 6) November 5 2200

FE:WPBundy:mk 10/1/66

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, October 1, 1966
1:30 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

The latest information is:

- It would be really difficult for Holt to be away from Canberra in the week of October 24; but
- the Australians want you very much to be there while Parliament is still sitting.

In the light of this, Bill Bundy has produced the attached itinerary which would make the date of the conference October 31 - November 2, with November 3 the time for a quick trip to Saigon. This itinerary would get you back in Washington at 10:00 p. m. Saturday, November 5.

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W. W. Rostow

SECRET attachment

(Alternative C)

DECLASSIFIED	
State 5-1-79; NSC 9-17-79 (#3)	
By <i>DKH per isp</i>	NARS, Date <i>8-25-86</i>

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-2-

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FE:WPBundy:mk 10/1/66

SECRET

SECRET

Possible Presidential Itinerary

Alternative C

(Order of stops reversed from Alternative B)

(numbers in parentheses represent flight times and time changes in that order.)

Leave Washington October 21 0900

Arrive Honolulu (10 minus 6) October 21 1300

(Press plane might leave earlier to permit intermediate stop.)

Leave Honolulu October 22 0730

Arrive Fiji (6 minus 2 plus 24) October 23 1130

Leave Fiji October 23 1300

Arrive Ohakea (3 minus 0) October 23 1600

(Drive to Wellington approximately 1-1/2 hours.)

Leave Ohakea Mon., October 24 1600

Arrive Canberra (3 minus 2) October 24 1700

Leave Canberra October 26 0830

Arrive Townsville (2-1/2 minus 0) October 26 1100

(Day of rest in Townsville if facilities adequate. Alternative would be rest day in Canberra.)

Leave Townsville October 27 0700

Arrive Kuala Lumpur (7 minus 2-1/2) October 27 1130

Leave Kuala Lumpur October 28 0930

Arrive Bangkok (2 minus 1/2) October 28 1100

Leave Bangkok October 29 1000

DECLASSIFIED
State 5-1-74 NSC 9-17-79 (#3)
By 004 per 158 NARS, Date 8-25-86

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-2-

(Via Mekong Valley and NE Thailand, perhaps offering ride to senior Thai officials.)

Arrive Manila	(4-1/2 plus 1)	October 29	1530
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Day of Rest - in Baguio October 3

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Leave Manila		November 4	0800
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(Perhaps offer ride to President Park.)

Arrive Seoul	(3-1/2 plus 1)	November 4	1230
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Leave Seoul		November 5	0900
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Arrive Anchorage	(8 plus 5 minus 24)	November 4	2200
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(Press plane might have to leave Seoul earlier for intermediate stop.)

Leave Anchorage		November 5	1000
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Arrive Washington	(6 plus 6)	November 5	2200
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FE:WPBundy:mk 10/1/66

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Issues for Discussion Saturday, P. M., October 1, 1966

1. Asia conference dates and message to Marcos.
2. Planning for Baguio conference.
3. India/Pak arms problem.
4. European speech: time, place, etc.
5. McCloy and tripartite exercise.

Following if time permits and there is interest:

6. Prospects for Chirep issue in November.
7. Non-proliferation issue.
8. U. S. position for Latin-American summit.
9. Foreign Aid presentation.
10. Special item: CABRIOLET (Katzenbach and E. Rostow)

Saturday, October 1, 1966
1:30 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

This interesting, low-level chatter with a Soviet official in London raises a question that I think we shall have to persuade Saigon to answer. (There is no point in our answering it unless we can bring Saigon along.) The question is: what are we offering the VC for the long pull if they stop their killing?

The possibilities range from taking over the police and the army to decimation like the Indonesian Communist party.

I believe the answer lies in something like this:

-- a guarantee of amnesty, backed by us, if they lay down their arms and join in the peaceful life of South Vietnam;

-- an offer of safe conduct for those who wish to go peacefully to the North;

-- an offer to let them form a political party and run for office under the constitution, once the killing stops.

I do not believe they should be offered a place in the government, unless they earn it under the constitution.

We have Lodge beginning to work Ky in this direction. He may make a great amnesty offer on November 1, an important Vietnamese anniversary (overthrow of Diem).

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET attachment~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-104
By rip NARA, Date 9-6-89

~~SECRET~~

Friday, September 30, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM LONDON (2634)

This summary memorandum of conversation between Embassy Officer Cross and Ivan A. Koulikov, listed as Second Secretary Soviet Embassy, is being sent telegraphically because it might be useful in assessing overall Soviet attitudes toward negotiations on Vietnam. The detailed memorandum of conversation is being pouched to Cooper.

Koulikov had previously indicated to a reliable American correspondent (Landay Westinghouse Radio) that he was seeking contact with American Embassy Officers. Koulikov had also made the point to Landay that he thought Vietnam war could be made to "melt away" on the basis of secret understandings with North Vietnam provided there were additional arrangements for economic aid to the entire country and with some sort of promise of eventual re-unification. Understandings would have to be arrived at directly between Washington and Hanoi but Moscow could be a private avenue for the U.S. to telegraph its interest in such discussions to North Vietnam.

During a two-hour luncheon conversation, Koulikov proved to be polished and non-dogmatic talker who was obviously well-briefed. He notably underemphasized public statements and publicized national positions on Vietnam. Even those of his own government, acknowledging that Soviets "real" position was, like that of the U.S. Government, "somewhat different from what it was forced to say out loud."

Koulikov made the following major points:

A. North Vietnam would not attend any international conference on Vietnam until certain things had been solidly agreed.

B. Most important of these necessary prior understandings would be some assurance of continued existence of the National Liberation Front and its participation in the political life in South Vietnam after foreign forces had withdrawn. (Agreement on actual withdrawal would be relatively easy since this is "not a major problem" according to Koulikov.) Koulikov was told that as had been said publicly there were no insuperable

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By CB, NARA, Date 8-25-98

obstacles to National Liberation Front participation in negotiations and in any case, what did North Vietnam mean by "continued existence" and "assured participation?"

Soviets could not even begin exploring with North Vietnam the subject of National Liberation Front's future position and possibility of negotiations generally unless it had a "realistic" answer to the first question. North Vietnamese were sure to ask: Would the Vietnam which emerged from an agreement with the U.S. be worth the immense sacrifices of the Vietnamese people? It was obviously not satisfactory from the North Vietnamese point of view to return to the status quo prior to the introduction of foreign troops. What would the new Vietnam look like? After all, North Vietnamese believed they could hold out long enough to tire us and thereby win in Vietnam. Cross said North Vietnamese might actually believe the U.S. would quit but it was unrealistic for the Communist side to build policy on this assumption. The Soviets, as a more experienced, older Communist brother, should try to educate Asian comrades as to our undeniable ability and willingness to continue the war at this level for a year or even increase our effort. The Soviets might draw on their own experience over the past 25 years which, although there have been many ups and downs, has at least taught them they could arrive at a mutually acceptable and viable arrangement with us for preserving peace. North Vietnam could benefit from Soviet advice on how to go about reaching understandings with us and of course advantages of doing so.

The Department will wish to see the full memorandum of conversation before deciding whether it would be useful to continue this dialogue and if so what line to follow. Koulikov tried to give the impression, particularly at the end of the conversation, that he was speaking for more than himself. He expressed eagerness to meet again soon and "talk frankly and realistically." In this connection, it is worth noting that the Soviet Ambassador in London is M. N. Smirnovsky who Gov. Harriman will recall was active in Laos Conference, both in Geneva and as Minister Counselor in Washington.

BRUCE

Saturday, Oct. 1, 1966
11:30 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

I gather Tommy Thompson would very much wish to see you before the formal announcement of his appointment to Moscow.

I take it he wants reassurance from you that his appointment to Moscow is not a "banishment" from Washington. He is making a very considerable personal sacrifice to accept the post and, I assume, wants private and, in some form or other, public reassurance.

W. W. Rostow

Bring him in _____

Unnecessary _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 89-104
By lig NARA, Date 9-6-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, Oct. 1, 1966
2:45 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have a superb JCS liaison officer, Col. Robert Ginsburgh.

I suggest you read his memorandum to me.

In reading it you should know that Bob is a Ph. D. , civilian-minded, who has made important contributions to our work on negotiating positions, political development in Vietnam, etc.

I know that in addition to these military measures he would support strongly all the measures we are now considering to carry forward our constructive work in the South.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING, CANCELLED PER E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY DCH ON 8-22-86

114a

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
1 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Vietnam - The Next Phase

Some time within the next two to three weeks I think it would be worth the President's time to reflect on and plan for his immediate post-election strategy in Vietnam.

I assume that the November elections will indicate basic public support for the President's Vietnam policy.

I am equally convinced that if Hanoi does not immediately sue for peace they will closely watch our actions immediately after the election for a clue to what they should expect from the US in the next two years. In the process of re-evaluating their position, they must attempt to gauge their capability for holding out until after the Nov '68 elections.

The closer we get to the Nov '68 elections, the greater will be the incentive for the VC/DRV to hold on at all costs in hopes of a political reversal of the US position in Vietnam. In fact in terms of the effect of the war in Vietnam on US domestic politics, it seems to me that the national political conventions are equally as significant as the fall '68 elections.

I do not believe that any US administration -- Republican or Democratic would either abandon our commitment to Vietnam or recklessly escalate -- regardless of campaign oratory. Because of the campaign oratory, however, I believe that it is in the US national interest to win this war in Vietnam before the beginning of the political conventions in the summer of 1968. This does not mean that we would need to have all of our troops out of Vietnam by that time or that all anti-guerrilla action needs to have ceased. But we must do our best to be clearly over the hump by then, and it would be extremely helpful to have started a phased troop withdrawal.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 89-26
By lip NARA. Date 5-14-90

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP - 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action program: In view of the above, I recommend the following:

1. Establish at top levels within the government the objective of winning--or at least passing the crest - by 1 June 1968. Keep this goal out of the press.
2. Allow the Communists one week to evaluate the political impact of the November election.
3. After one week, get the word privately to the VC/DRV that the US is prepared to resume its program of increasing pressure--at a faster rate than before. Issue no public ultimatums.
4. If no satisfactory de-escalatory signals are received within 10 days to two weeks resume our program of increasing pressures:
 - a. Resume the POL campaign.
 - b. Over a 2 - 3 week period take out the remaining hydro-electric plants.
 - c. Destroy the steel plant.
 - d. Mine the ports.
 - e. Eliminate the NVN air forces.
 - f. Attack the air defense system.
 - g. As d and e are eliminated shift weight of effort back to interdiction campaign.
5. As soon as details are worked out announce reorganization of pacification activities and beginning of new phase of operations.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

6. By 1 January announce intention and commence withdrawal of up to two divisions and appropriate air units from Europe for transfer to Vietnam, with redeployment determined on basis of logistic capability. Justify as a temporary move without committing US to necessarily redeploy to Europe after Vietnam war is over.

Finally, I urge that decisions on the above recommendations be made as soon as possible so that implementation can begin immediately after the November elections.



ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~TOP SECRET~~

Rostow 115
Re

October 1, 1966, 2:45

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from General Ankrah of Ghana

Attached for your signature is a draft reply to a letter from General Ankrah, Chief of State of the Republic of Ghana.

The draft reply:

- a. commits us to no specific project
- b. praises General Ankrah for his courageous internal economic austerity program, and
- c. encourages him to begin the technical and economic studies needed to get financing for the regional economic projects he has listed in his letter to us.

AID and State Department have been trying to get from Ghanaian officials specific details of the regional projects put forward by General Ankrah.

I recommend that you sign the draft letter.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:BKS:amc

October 2, 1966

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We have given your thoughtful and substantive letter the careful attention it deserved.

First I would tell you how gratified I am at your suggestions for regional economic cooperation between Ghana and her neighbors. I firmly believe that imaginative use of shared resources can revolutionize living standards in many nations of Africa and throughout the developing world in the coming years.

I would encourage you strongly to explore these ideas with the leaders of the other countries concerned with a view to beginning as soon as possible the appropriate technical and economic studies. Obviously, the nature and extent of American financial assistance will depend on the individual merits of each project, the availability of other financing, and the limitations of our global commitments. But you may be sure that any and all proposals will receive a sympathetic hearing and as constructive a response as we can manage.

I was particularly happy to learn that you are thinking in terms of a jointly-owned fertilizer plant. As our own food surpluses disappear, we grow more and more convinced that the most serious long-range problem facing the developing countries is a proper balance between food supply and population. Any viable program to this end requires major increases in food production. That invariably means, among other things, more and better fertilizer, with the distribution facilities and technical assistance necessary to make it available to farmers and efficiently used by them. It would be an act of great vision and statesmanship if Ghana and her sister states were to band together in a common endeavor to assure an expanding supply of this precious commodity.

Turning to your internal economic situation, I can certainly appreciate the problems you face in holding the line on government spending. My own current problems are similar. Your

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-104
By ijg NARA, Date 9-6-87

policies sound sensible and courageous. I know that the Ghanaian people have suffered many hardships, but that the rehabilitation of the economy imposes new burdens upon them. But I also know that you and they have the foresight and fortitude to carry through with the measures necessary to restore stability and solid growth.

My colleagues report that their conversations with Colonel Afrifa were most pleasant and instructive. I hope that such discussions can become permanent aspects of the close relations between our two countries. They are very much to our mutual advantage.

I want you to know that my thoughts and best wishes will be with you in the difficult months ahead.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Lieutenant General J. A. Ankrah, O.O.V., M.C.
Chairman, National Liberation Council of
the Republic of Ghana
Accra

WWR:BKS:amc

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday, October 1, 1966 -- 12:00 Noon

Mr. President:

At Tab A Secretary Rusk recommends that you determine that it is in the national interest to use up to \$100,000 of AID money to buy a radio transmitter as an independence gift to Basutoland (now to be called Lesotho). A Presidential determination is necessary because of the restrictions added by the Congress to the Foreign Aid bill which sharply limit the number of countries in which certain AID appropriations can be used without such a determination. Bill Gaud and Charlie Schultze support the Secretary's request.

The law now limits ordinary use of AID's Supporting Assistance account -- from which these gifts are usually funded -- to 13 countries. Any additions require a specific finding by the President that they are in the national interest. The AID Congressional Presentation contained a list of 13 countries in which we definitely planned to furnish this kind of aid. The list did not include Lesotho because AID hoped to finance the gift from 1966 funds. Indecision on what the gift should be slipped the financing into this fiscal year. Thus, we now need your formal approval to add Lesotho to the list of Supporting Assistance recipients for this very limited purpose.

I recommend that you sign the determination (Tab B).

Walt. Rostow

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Determination under Section 401 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the "Act"), permitting the furnishing of Supporting Assistance to the Kingdom of Lesotho (Basutoland) in FY 1967.

Recommendation

I recommend that you sign the attached memorandum determining that it is in the national interest of the United States to furnish up to \$100,000 in Supporting Assistance to Lesotho in FY 1967 to provide an independence gift. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development concur in this recommendation.

Discussion

Basutoland will receive its independence on October 4, 1966 as the Kingdom of Lesotho. An enclave in South Africa, it is one of three former British High Commission Territories soon to receive their independence. The others are Bechuanaland and Swaziland. Though small and of little economic significance, these territories have been a subject of considerable concern as a result of their exposed position as African neighbors of the Republic of South Africa, whose racial policies they deplore, but on whom they are almost wholly dependent economically.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-105

By ing NARA, Date 11-16-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
declassified after 12 years.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

It is customary for the United States to present a gift to a country when it becomes independent. To break with this tradition in the case of Lesotho could be misinterpreted as indifference toward this African-ruled enclave within the white redoubt. The radio transmitting equipment (worth up to \$100,000) which we intend to supply will be used by Lesotho to strengthen internal communications and will thereby contribute to political stability in the country. We do not intend to furnish any further assistance to Lesotho in FY 1967.

Section 401 of the Act states that Supporting Assistance may be provided in any fiscal year to not more than 13 countries unless the President determines that it is in the national interest to furnish Supporting Assistance to additional countries. In our FY 1967 presentation to the Congress last January we submitted proposed Supporting Assistance programs for 13 countries (list also enclosed), not including Lesotho. We plan to have programs in more than 13 countries and will soon be coming to you with our complete program and a request for the necessary determinations. Meanwhile, a Presidential Determination is required to make the gift to Lesotho.

Procurement of the equipment and services will be in the United States.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

FY 1967 Supporting Assistance Programs Presented to the Congress

Proposed Determination

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FY 1967 SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
PRESENTED TO THE CONGRESS

Bolivia

Dominican Republic

Haiti

Trinidad and Tobago

Jordan

Yemen

Congo (K)

Guinea

Rwanda

Korea

Laos

Thailand

Vietnam

116c

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Presidential Determination
No.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Determination under Section 401 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the "Act"), permitting the furnishing of Supporting Assistance to the Kingdom of Lesotho (Basutoland) in FY 1967

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of September 29, 1966, I hereby determine, pursuant to Section 401 of the Act, that it is in the national interest of the United States to furnish Supporting Assistance to Lesotho in FY 1967 to provide an independence gift.

You are requested on my behalf to give notice of this action, together with the reasons therefor, pursuant to Section 401 of the Act, to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson 10/3/66