

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

18612

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 memo	to President from Rostow possible classified info <i>opening 7-23-90 NLS 90-49</i>	11/30/66	A
#2a letter	to President Ahmed Sekou Toure from Pres. Johnson possible classified info <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-49</i>	12/02/66	A
#3 memo	to President from Bator confidential <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-48</i>	11/30/66	A
#5 memo cable	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-49</i>	11/30/66	A
#6 cable	to President from Rostow confidential "	11/30/66	A
#7 memo	to President from Rostow re: Latin America secret "	11/30/66	A
#7a agenda	Gordon-Linowitz-Rostow talks with President secret "	11/29/66	A
#8 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 2-5-90 NLS 89-227</i>	11/30/66	A
#8a report	Vietnam, 1967 secret "	11/28/66	A
#13 memo	to President from W. W. Rostow confidential <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-49</i>	11/29/66	A
#15 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-46</i>	11/29/66	A
#15b report	Post Manila Trip secret	11/22/66	A
#15d report	Indonesia secret	undated	A
#15e report	Ceylon secret	undated	A
#15f report	India secret	undated xx	A
#15g report	Pakistan Secret <i>OPEN 9-3-98</i> Secret <i>opening 3-5-90 NLS 90-50</i>	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President
Walt Rostow, vol. 15 Nov. 1 - 30, 1966
Box 11

RESTRICTION CODES

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

27012

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#15h report	Iran secret <i>open 3-5-90 NLJ 90-50</i>	2 p undated	A
#15i report	Italy secret "	2 p undated	A
#15j report	France secret "	1 p undated	A
#15k report	Bonn secret "	1 p undated	A
#15-L report	London secret "	1 p undated	A
#15m report	Morocco secret "	2 p undated	A
#15n report	re: Manila Conference secret "	1 p undated	A
#16 memo	to Pres. from W. Rostow re: Pres. Bokassa possible classified info <i>open 7-23-90 NLJ 90-49</i>	1 p 11/29/66	A
#16a letter	to Pres. Bokassa from Pres. Johnson possible classified info "	2 p 11/29/66	A
#17 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 5-17-90 NLJ 89-26</i>	1 p 11/29/66	A
#17a memo	to President from Dean Rusk re: NPT secret <i>sanitized 5-1-89 NLJ 89-27 OPEN 9.3.98</i>	3 p 11/28/66	A
#17b memo	re: nuclear weapons secret <i>open 5-1-89 NLJ 89-27</i>	1 p undated	A
#18 cable	to President from Rostow <i>OPEN 12-7-99</i> secret <i>exempt NLJ 90-48 NLJ 98-510</i>	2 p 11/29/66	A
#19 cable	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 1-16-90</i>	1 p 11/29/66	A
#20 memo	to President from Rostow confidential [sanitized 9/27/78] <i>(dup. of #81 NSF, NSF History, Indian Territory, Vol. III)</i> <i>OPEN 9.3.98</i>	2 p 11/28/66	A

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3812

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#21 memo	from Rostow from to President <i>open 1-16-90</i> confidential re: Amistad Dam Visit 1 p	11/28/66	A
#22 memo	to President from Rostow re: Amistad Visit confidential <i>open 1-16-90</i> 1 p	11/28/66	A
#23 memo	to President from Rostow re: Mexico <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-49</i> confidential 1 p	11/28/66	A
#25 memo	to President from Rostow re: India confidential [sanitized 9/27/78] dup. #20 2 p	11/28/66	A
<i>open 3/06</i> #30 cable	to Jacobsen from WH Sit. Room confidential <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-46</i> 2 p	11/27/66	A
#31 cable	to President from Rostow <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-49</i> confidential 2 p	11/27/66	A
#32 cable	to President from Rostow confidential [sanitized 8/15/78] 2 p	11/27/66	A
#33 cable	<i>(dup of #21, NSC History, Indian Farmers, Vol III)</i> to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 1-16-90</i> 1 p	<i>OPEN 9-3-98</i> 11/27/66	A
#36 memo	to President from Rostow re: India <i>open 11-8-92 NLS 96-23</i> confidential [sanitized 9/27/78] <i>(dup of #12, File of Wm. Norr 10-12/66, Bx 15)</i> 1 p	11/25/66	A
#37 memo	to President from Rostow re: Nepal confidential <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-49</i> 1 p	11/25/66	A
#37a letter	to King of Nepal from Pres. Johnson "possible classified info" 2 p	11/30/66	A
#39 cable	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-46</i> 3 p	11/25/66	A
#41 cable	to Jacobsen for President from Bromley Smith secret <i>sanitized 5-11-90 NLS 90-44</i> <i>open 12-7-99 NLS 98-510</i> 2 p	11/23/66	A
#42 cable	to Jacobsen for President from Howard Wriggins Secret <i>exempt NLS 90-49</i> <i>OPEN 8-26-98</i> 3 p	11/23/66	A
#43 cable	to President from Rostow <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-48</i> secret [sanitized 8/25/86] 5 p	11/23/66	A
#44 agenda <i>dup #51</i>	proposed NATO Meeting agenda <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-48</i> secret 1 p	11/22/66	A

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4812

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#45 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 5-17-90 NLS 90-44</i>	1 p 11/22/66	A
#46 memo	to President from Rostow re: Israel secret <i>Exempt NLS 90-49 open 12-7-99 NLS 98-510</i>	1 p 11/22/66	A
#46a letter	from Israel Embassy <i>open 12-7-99</i> secret <i>Exempt NLS 90-49 NLS 98-510</i>	9 p 11/21/66	A
#47 cable	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-46</i>	1 p 11/22/66	A
#49 cable	Tokyo 3825 <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-46</i> confidential	1 p 11/22/66	A
#50 cable	to Eugene Black from Rostow confidential <i>open 1-16-90</i>	1 p 11/22/66	A
#51 agenda <i>Aug #44</i>	proposed agenda NATO Meeting <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-48</i> secret	1 p 11/22/66	A
#52 memo cable	to President from Rostow <i>open 12-7-99</i> secret <i>Exempt NLS 90-48 NLS 98-510</i>	2 p 11/22/66	A
#54 cable	to President from Rostow <i>sanitized 7-23-90 NLS 90-46</i> Secret <i>OPEN 9-3-98</i>	2 p 11/21/66	A
#55 memo	to President from Rostow Secret <i>sanitized 1-21-93 NLS 90-47</i> <i>Sanitized 4/19/00 NLS 98-508</i>	1 p 11/21/66	A
#56 cable	to President from Rostow secret <i>Exempt NLS 90-46 OPEN 9-3-98</i>	1 p 11/21/66	A
#57 memo	to President from Rostow Secret <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-48</i>	1 p 11/21/66	A
#58 memo	to President from Rostow // secret	1 p 11/21/66	A
#60 memo	to President from Rostow re: Vietnam confidential <i>open 1-16-90</i>	1 p 11/21/66	A
#60a report	re: Vietnam confidential <i>open 10-27-99 NLS 98-513</i>	2 p 11/19/66	A

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5812

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#62 cable	to President from Rostow Secret exempt NLS 90-49 OPEN 8-26-98	4 p 11/20/66	A
#68 memo	to E. V. Rostow from W. W. Rostow confidential open 7-23-90 NLS 90-48	1 p 11/19/66	A
#69 agenda	for the President secret open 5-17-90 NLS 90-44	2 p 11/19/66	A
#72 memo	to President from Bator secret open 7-23-90 NLS 90-48	1 p 11/18/66	A
#73 message	to PM Wilson from President Johnson " secret "	1 p undated	A
#74 memo	to President from Bator re: technological gap confidential	1 p 11/18/66	A
#74a report	re: technological gap confidential open 1-16-90	1 p 11/25/66	A
#76 memo	cover memo from Michael Stewart to President secret exempt NLS 90-48 OPEN 3-26-98	1 p 11/18/66	A
#76a message	to Pres. Johnson from RM British Prime Minister possible classified info exempt NLS 90-48 OPEN 3-26-98 UK GUIDELINES	2 p 11/18/66	A
#77a cable	text of Bonn 6001 confidential exempt NLS 90-45 OPEN 9-23-90 NLS 97404	3 p 11/18/66	A
#82 memo	to President from Rostow secret sanitized 5-17-90 NLS 90-44 OPEN 12-7-99 NLS 98-5104	1 p 11/18/66	A
#83 memo	to President from Rostow re: Dominican Situation secret sanitized 1-21-93 NLS 90-43 Sanitized 11-11-00 NLS 98-508 Sanitized 8-11-02 more info released	2 p 11/18/66	A
#83a cable	text of Santo Domingo 1515 confidential open 6-25-90 NLS 90-45	6 p 11/14/66	A
#83b cable	text of Santo Domingo 1542 secret open 6-25-90 NLS 90-45	6 p 11/16/66	A
#87a letter	to Pres. of Zambia from Pres. Johnson possible classified info open 7-23-90 NLS 90-49	1 p undated	A

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Walt Rostow, vol. 15 Nov. 1 - 30, 1966
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67812

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#88 memo	to President from Rostow re: Dominican Situation secret sanitized 8113102 2 p	11/18/66	A
#88a cable	text of Santo Domingo 1515 confidential OPEN 8-26-98 6 p	11/14/66	A
#88b cable	text of Santo Domingo 1542 secret OPEN 8-26-98 6 p	11/16/66	A
#89 memo	to President from Rostow confidential open 7-23-90 NLJ 90-46 2 p	11/17/66	A
#91a cable	extract from Airgram A-452 secret sanitized 6-25-90 NLJ 90-45 OPEN 9-3-98 1 p	09/25/-	A
#91b cable	excerpt from USUN 1337 secret sanitized 6-25-90 NLJ 90-45 OPEN 9-3-98 1 p	10/07/66	A
#93 memo	to President from Rostow re: daily foreign affairs summary secret sanitized 1-21-93 NLJ 90-47 3 p <i>Sanitized 4/19/00 NLJ 98-508</i>	11/17/66	A
#95 memo	to President from Rostow secret sanitized 1-21-93 NLJ 90-47 1 p <i>Sanitized 4/19/00 NLJ 98-508; para 12/01</i>	11/17/66	A
#96a letter	to Walt Rostow from Ed. Lansdale confidential opened 9-6-88 1 p <i>NO INFO RELEASED 2-11-05 NLJ 019-011-2-46 NLJ 04-232</i>	11/12/66	A
#96b memo	to Ambassador from Lansdale confidential opened 9-6-88 1 p	11/08/66	A
#96c memo	re: Vietnam confidential open 2-1-89 NLJ 88-214 9 p	11/08/66	A
#97a cable	text of Saigon 11117 open 6-25-90 NLJ 90-45 secret <i>(Dep. of #656, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS, Vol IV (9))</i> 7 p	11/17/66	A
#99a memo	to President from WM. Bundy re: trip to Taipei and Tokyo secret open 6-25-90 NLJ 90-45 3 p	11/15/66	A
#100 memo	to President from Rostow re: SEA Education Projects confidential open 7-23-90 NLJ 90-46 2 p	11/17/66	A
#100a memo	for President from Schultze re: SEA Education Projects confidential 2 p	11/10/66	A
#101 memo	to President from Rostow re: Colombia confidential open 1-16-90 1 p	11/15/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#101a memo dup #25 FDR, Tues. Luncheon, Box 3	to President from Rostow re: Colombia sanitized confidential <i>open 6-26-95 NLS 94-407</i>	7-23-90 NLS 90-49 1 p 11/15/66	A
#104 memo	to President from Rostow re: Singapore secret <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-46</i>	1 p 11/15/66	A
#105a message	to President from Prime Minister secret <i>sanitized 10-24-94 NLS 94-253</i>	2 p 11/15/66	A
#104b memo	to President from Wm. Gaud re: Singapore secret <i>open 1-16-90</i>	1 p 11/05/66	A
#104c report	background annex secret	1 p undated	A
#106 memo dup #11 FDR, Tues. Luncheon, Box 3	to President from Rostow re: China secret <i>open 6-26-95 NLS 94-407</i>	1 p 11/14/66	A
#107b memcon	between Walt Rostow and Amb. B. K. Nehru secret <i>sanitized 9-27-78</i>	2 p 11/14/66	A
#108 memo	to President from Rostow re: Moroccan aid secret <i>sanitized 7-23-90 NLS 90-49</i>	1 p 11/14/66	A
#110 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 5-7-93 NLS 91-81</i>	1 p 11/14/66	A
#111a memo	to President from McNamara Secret <i>open 1-24-91 NLS 88-225</i>	1 p 11/14/66	A
#112 memo	to President from Rostow re: China secret <i>open 9-12-97 NLS 97-92</i>	1 p 11/14/66	A
#115 cable	to President from Rostow top secret <i>sanitized 5-17-90 NLS 90-44</i>	4 p 11/13/66	A
#116 cable	to President from Rostow confidential <i>OPEN 9-3-98</i>	3 p 11/11/66	A
#117 cable	to President from Freeman confidential <i>open 1-16-90</i>	4 p 11/12/66	A
#118 cable	from President from Rostow to PM Wilson secret <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-46</i>	1 p 11/12/66	A
#119 memo	to Rostow from Bowdler secret <i>open 7-23-90 NLS 90-49</i>	1 p 11/12/66	A

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8012

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#120 memo	to President from Rostow confidential	2 p 11/12/66	A
#121 cable	to President from Rostow sanitized 5-19-90 NLJ 90-44 top secret open 12-7-99 NLJ 98-510	2 p 11/11/66	A
#122 cable	to President from Rostow secret open 1-21-93 NLJ 90-47	1 p 11/11/66	A
#123 cable	to President from Rostow and Bator sanitized 7-23-90 NLJ 90-48 secret same sanitization 7-26-95 NLJ 94-253 OPEN 9-3-98	1 p 11/11/66	A
#125 cable	to President from Rostow sanitized 7-23-90 NLJ 90-46 confidential open 9-27-95 NLJ 94-457	2 p 11/12/66	A
#126 cable	to President from Rostow confidential OPEN 9-3-98	3 p 11/11/66	A
#127 cable	to President from Rostow open 7-23-90 NLJ 90-46 confidential xxx	2 p 11/11/66	A
#128 cable	to President from Rostow secret open 12-7-99 NLJ 98-510	1 p 11/11/66	A
#129 memo	to Rostow from Bowdler confidential exempt NLJ 90-49 OPEN 9-3-98	11/11/66	A
#130 memo	to President from Rostow confidential OPEN 9-3-98	2 p 11/11/66	A
#131 cable	to President from Freeman confidential open 1-16-90	3 p 11/11/66	A
#132 memo	to Rostow from Bowdler re: Haiti secret open 1-21-93 NLJ 90-47	1 p 11/11/66	A
#133 cable	to President from Charles Schultze confidential open 7-23-90 NLJ 90-46	2 p 11/11/66	A
#134 cable	to President from Rostow open 7-23-90 NLJ 90-46 confidential	2 p 11/11/66	A
#137 cable	to President from Rostow open 12-7-99 NLJ 98-510 secret exempt NLJ 90-49	1 p 11/11/66	A
#138 cable	to President from Rostow OPEN 8-26-98 confidential exempt NLJ 90-49	2 p 11/11/66	A

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9812

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#139 cable	to President from Rostow classified 7-23-90 NLS 90-46 confidential OPEN 9-3-98	1 p 11/11/66	A
#140 memo	to President from Rostow classified 7-23-90 NLS 90-48 confidential OPEN 9-3-98	1 p 11/11/66	A
#141 memo	to President from Rostow re: AID budget confidential open 1-16-90	1 p 11/11/66	A
#141a memo	to President from Wm. Gaud re: AID confidential OPEN 9-3-98	2 p 11/10/66	A
#142 memo	to Walt from Bowdler re: Haiti secret classified 1-21-93 NLS 90-47 Open NLS 019-011-26-12/01	1 p 11/11/66	A
#143d letter	to Dean Rusk possible classified info open 6-25-90 NLS 90-45	10 p 10/31/66	A
#144 memo	to President from Rostow re: Vietnam open 12-7-99 NLS 98-510 secret exempt NLS 90-46 classified 4-17-95 NLS 94-45L	2 p 11/11/66	A
#145 memo	for President from Bator re: PM Pearson confidential open 7-23-90 NLS 90-48	2 pp 11/10/66	A
#147 memo	to President from Rostow open 12-7-99 NLS 98-510 confidential classified 7-23-90 NLS 90-46	1 p 11/09/66	A
#147a memo	to Rostow from Jenkins classified 7-23-90 NLS 90-46 confidential open 12-7-99 NLS 98-510	2 p 11/08/66	A
#148 memo	to President from Rostow top secret open 5-17-90 NLS 90-44	2 pp 11/09/66	A
#149 memo	to President from Rostow confidential open 7-23-90 NLS 90-49	2 p 11/08/66	A
#150 memo	to President from Rostow confidential open 5-17-90 NLS 90-44	2 p 11/08/66	A
#152 memo	to President from Rostow re: Middle East secret open 7-23-90 NLS 90-49	1 p 11/08/66	A
#152a letter	to J. W. Fulbright from Rostow secret open 7-23-90 NLS 90-49	2 p 11/08/66	A
#155a memo	for President from Katzenbach secret exempt NLS 90-45 OPEN 9-3-98	1 p 11/04/66	A

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10/12

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#155b letter	to President Jomo Kenyatta from Pres. Johnson possible classified info	Open 7-23-90 2 p 11/07/66	NLJ 90-49 A
#156 memo	to President from Rostow re: daily cable summary top secret Sanitized 1-21-93 NLJ 90-47 Sanitized 4/19/00 NLJ 98-508	4 p 11/07/66	A
#157 memo	to Jacobsen from Rostow secret Sanitized 1-21-93 NLJ 90-47 Open 4/19/00 NLJ 98-508	1 p 11/07/66	A
#159 cable	to President from Rostow Sanitized 7-23-90 NLJ 90-48 Secret OPEN 9.3.98	2 p 11/07/66	A
#162 memo	to President from Rostow confidential Open 7-23-90 NLJ 90-46	1 p 11/06/66	A
#164 memo	to President from Rostow " secret	1p 11/05/66	A
#165 memo	to President from Rostow secret Open 12-14-89 NLJ 89-127	1 p 11/05/66	A
#165a memo	to President from Dean Rusk re: China secret exempt NLJ 90-45 Open NLT 98-509 4-27-99	3 p 11/05/66	A
#166 memo	to President from Rostow secret Open 7-23-90 NLJ 90-46	1 p 11/05/66	A
#168a memo	to President from Rostow top secret Open 9-28-97 NLT 92-23	1 p 11/03/66	A
#168b memo	for President from Dean Rusk Sanitized 9-25-97 NLT 92-24 secret Open 9-25-97 NLT 92-24	2 p undated	A
#168f cable	State 68390 to Wellington secret Open 7-23-90 NLJ 90-45	2 p undated	A
#170a cable	text of Bonn 5493 secret Open 6-25-90 NLJ 90-45	1 p 11/04/66	A
#171a cable	text of Seoul 2461 confidential Open 6-25-90 NLJ 90-45	1 p 11/04/66	A
#172a cable	text of Canberra 2462 Open NLT 98-509 4-27-99 confidential exempt NLJ 90-45 (dup. #1616, NSF, LF Australia Vol 2)	2 p 11/04/66	A
#173 memo	to President from Rostow Open 3/12/03	1 p 11/04/66	C

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115812

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#174 memo	to President from Rostow sanitized 7-23-90 NLS 90-46 confidential same sanitization 8112103 NLS 98-507	1 p 11/03/66	A
#174a memo	to Chairman AEC from Rostow confidential open 7-23-90 NLS 90-46	1 p 11/04/66	A
#174b letter	to Walt Rostow from Gen. Seaberg confidential open 1-3-00 NLS 98-506	1 p 10/15/66	A
#176a report	re: Manila Conference sanitized 6-25-90 NLS 90-45 secret [sanitized 11/13/80] open NLS 98-507 4-27-99	18 p undated	A
#179 memcon	between Walt Rostow and Kim Chon-Yom secret open 7-23-90 NLS 90-46	2 p 11/03/66	A
#181 memo	to President from Rostow sanitized 5-17-90 NLS 90-44 top secret open 8-28-94 NLS 97-23	1 p 11/03/66	A
#184 memo	to President from Rostow sanitized 5-17-90 NLS 90-44 top secret open 9-3-98	1 p 11/03/66	A
#183 memo	to President from Rostow confidential open 7-23-90 NLS 90-48	1 p 11/03/66	A
#183a cable	text of Bonn 5393 confidential open 6-25-90 NLS 90-45	4 p 11/03/66	A
#188a letter	to Pres. Johnson from Arthur da Costa e Silva possible classified info open 7-23-90 NLS 90-49	1 p 10/20/66	A
#85 memo	to President from Rostow re: nuclear testing secret - sanitized 8-10-04 NLS 98-507	1 p 11/18/66	A
#85a memo	for Chairman AEC from Rostow secret open 8112103 NLS 98-507	1 p 11/19/66	A
#85b letter	to Walt Rostow from Glenn Seaborg secret sanitized 1-3-00 NLS 98-506	2 p 11/16/66	A
#85c report	re: safety testing secret sanitized 1-3-00 NLS 98-506	1 p undated	A
#85d memo	to Chairman, AEC from President secret open 1-3-00 NLS 98-506	1 p undated	A
#158 memo	to President from Rostow re: Germany Exempt NLS 89-28 secret - sanitized 8-16-99 NLS 97-403	1 p 11/07/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to President
Walt Rostow, vol. 15 Nov. 1 - 30, 1966
Box 11

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#158a memo	to Deputy Sec Dept. Def from Rostow <i>Exempt NLS 89-28</i> secret - <i>Sanitized 8-10-04 NLS 98-507</i>	1 p undated	A
#158b memo	to Deputy Sec Dept. Def from Rostow <i>Exempt NLS 89-28</i> secret - <i>Sanitized 8-10-04 NLS 98-507</i>	1 p undated	A
#158c memo	to President from Cyrus Vance <i>Sanitized 5-18-89 NLS 89-30</i> secret - <i>Sanitized 8/2/00 NLS 98-505</i>	2 p 11/01/66	A
#158d memo	to President from Cyrus Vance secret <i>Sanitized 8/2/00 NLS 98-505</i>	2 p 11/01/66	A
#182 memo	for President from Rostow Secret - open 8/12/03 NLS 98-507	1 p 11/03/66	A
#182a memo	for President from Rostow secret - open 8/12/03 NLS 98-507	1 p 11/04/66	A
#182b letter	to President from Glenn Seaborg secret <i>Sanitized 1-3-00 NLS 98-506</i>	2 p 10/27/66	A
#182c report	re: nuclear testing secret - <i>Sanitized 1-3-00 NLS 98-506</i>	4 p undated	A
#182d memo	for Chairman, AEC from the President secret - <i>Sanitized 3-8-00 NLS 98-506</i>	1 p undated	A

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*WWR
Hed 1*

VIA LDX TO RANCH

Wednesday, November 30, 1966 - 6:00 pm

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

Following is suggested message of condolence to President Lamizana of Upper Volta, whose thirteen year old daughter drowned on Sunday.

QUOTE

I have heard the distressing news of the loss
of your young daughter. You have my profound
sympathy in this time of grief.

UNQUOTE

*approved
11/30/66*

WWR/EKH/vmr

WWR 2

Wednesday, November 30, 1966 - 3:15 pm

Mr. President:

At Tab A Secretary Rusk recommends that you approve a stiff but friendly message to Sekou Toure which McIlvaine could carry with him when he returns to Conakry (probably early next week). The draft message is at Tab B. Toure's letter to you -- to which this would technically be a reply -- is at Tab C.

This letter would be the beginning of a "correct but distant" phase in our relations with Guinea. We are cutting our Embassy staff and AID Mission to a minimum. Our people are instructed to indicate to the Guineans that we are willing to adopt a warmer stance whenever they are ready to be reasonable, but not before. I concur fully with this approach and with the Secretary's recommended letter.

However, I do not want to give the impression that Toure has changed his spots. The entire "kidnapping" incident reflects basic instability in Guinean politics and Toure's personality. Every step Toure took in this matter followed a move which suggested a trend in the other direction -- he followed conciliation with new outrage and outrage with conciliation. We now seem to be in a conciliation phase. But there can be no guarantee that it will endure. (The Guinean Ambassador here is not a very good weathervane on this point -- he was horrified by everything that Toure did and said so.) Thus, this message and the gesture of returning McIlvaine to Conakry should not be taken either here or there as a decisive indication that the difficulties are over.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-510
By is, NARA Date 10-20-99

EKH/vmr

December 2, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk has forwarded to me your letter of November 16 and has reported to me on his talk with Ambassador Bangoura and on Ambassador McIlvaine's last meeting with you.

I was pleased to note that you feel it should be possible to place relations between Guinea and the United States on a renewed basis of mutual understanding and friendship. This coincides with our wishes and I can assure you of our good will.

Accordingly, I am asking Ambassador McIlvaine to return to Conakry and work closely with you to assure such relations between our two countries.

In closing I thank you for the inscribed copy of your book which Ambassador Bangoura was kind enough to deliver.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Ahmed Sekou Toure
President of the Republic of Guinea
Conakry

LBJ/WWR/EKH/vmr
11/30/66 -- pm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-49
By ij NARA. Date 7-17-90

Mr. Rostow ³

VIA LDX TO RENCH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, November 30, 1966 - 6:30 pm

~~FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BATOR~~

To The President

approved
11/30/66

Ludwig Erhard resigned today and Kurt Kiesinger will probably be elected to replace him tomorrow. George McGhee thinks it would be good for you to be among the first to congratulate Kiesinger. Following, for your approval, is a pleasant message which would not be delivered until he has taken office.

QUOTE

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

The American people join me in extending congratulations and warmest good wishes on your election as Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. ^{*hope*} I ~~know~~ that we will continue to enjoy the same close and friendly relations with the Federal Republic under your leadership, as under that of your two distinguished predecessors. I am confident that working together we can make progress in our common search for a lasting and just peace.

UNQUOTE

Also for your approval is a warm personal message to Erhard:

QUOTE

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 90-48
By ing NARA. Date 7-16-90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

My countrymen and I extend to you our warmest best wishes as you retire as Federal Chancellor. The Federal Republic and the free world owe much to the courage and wisdom you have demonstrated over so many years. I particularly value your great contribution to strengthening the ties of friendship that link our two countries, and will never forget your dedicated work in the cause of peace and freedom.

You have, old friend, my hopes for your happiness and health in the years to come.

UNQUOTE

(can be released at the Ranch)
~~I suggest that we release~~ The message to Kiesinger ~~here~~ following confirmation of delivery. Because of the personal nature of the note to Erhard it would be better not to release it here, but let him do so if he wants to.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*sent via pouch
to Ranch*

Wednesday, November 30, 1966
9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

The dispatch of the attached letter to Ed Korry would be a well-earned gesture.

Incidentally, I have it on good authority that he is extremely anxious to know if you are prepared to offer him the Embassy in Belgrade. He believes that his usefulness in Ethiopia has greatly declined with the passage of time. He does not wish to work in African Affairs. He does not wish to take up the post of Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. He has several outside offers but would prefer to continue to work in the Government.

W. W. Rostow

White House 4a

Dear Ed:

December 2, 1966

I want you to know how much I appreciate the extraordinary job you did in reviewing our development policies and programs in Africa. As you know, I have approved your recommendations in principle, in the hope that the approach you outline can be the foundation of a new era of economic cooperation in Africa which will best serve the interests and aspirations of all Africans as well as all Americans.

All of your countrymen are deeply in your debt.

Best personal regards.

Sincerely,

LBJ

The Honorable Edward M. Korry
American Ambassador
American Embassy
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

LBJ/EKH/vmr
11/29/66 - 7:00 pm

5
~~SECRET~~

SENT
WHCA

1966 NOV 30 15 55

EEA377
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2440

FROM: W. W. ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
INFO: GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE: CAP661107

~~SECRET~~

YOU MAY HAVE SEEN AP AND UPI REPORTS TO THE EFFECT THAT
"THE US IS SENDING 36 F-104 STAR FIGHTERS TO STRENGTHEN
THE FORCES OF KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN."

THE NEW ELEMENT IN THESE STORIES IS THE ACCURATE IDENTIFICATION
OF TYPES AND NUMBERS OF PLANES. WHEN WE LET THE JORDANIANS
ANNOUNCE THE SALE ON 2 APRIL 1966, THEY SPECIFIED ONLY
"A NUMBER OF MILITARY JET AIRCRAFT." THE DEAL YOU APPROVED
IN FEBRUARY INCLUDED "UP TO 36" PLANES, 12 TO BE BOUGHT THEN FOR
LATE 1967 DELIVERY AND 24 MORE AVAILABLE FOR ORDER AROUND 1 JAN-
UARY 1967 FOR DELIVERY 1968 AND AFTER. THIS IS A DOLLAR SALE.
ALL THAT HAS BEEN DONE SO FAR IN THE CURRENT CRISIS IS TO
SPEED UP DELIVERY OF THE FIRST PLANES BY A COUPLE OF MONTHS.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT WILL CONTINUE TO REFUSE COMMENT ON DETAILS,
BUT WE LONG AGO ACKNOWLEDGED THIS SALE, THUS THERE IS NO REASON
TO BE CONCERNED BY APPEARANCE OF THESE STORIES. OUR MAIN JOB
RIGHT NOW IS TO BOLSTER HUSSEIN, AND THE STORIES HELP, THOUGH
THEY ARE NOTHING NEW. CHANCES ARE THE DETAILS SLIPPED OUT THROUGH
RELEASE OF LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE JORDANIAN MILITARY
AND THE UNITED ARAB COMMAND.

THERE MAY BE MORE STORIES OF THIS KIND SINCE GENERAL KHAMMASH,
HUSSEIN'S CHIEF OF STAFF, IS HERE AND IS TALKING TO STATE AND
DEFENSE OFFICIALS. HE SAW SECRETARY RUSK YESTERDAY AFTERNOON
AND MAY REMAIN FOR TWO WEEKS GOING OVER HIS REQUESTS FOR
NEW EQUIPMENT. OUR ROLLING OUT THE RED CARPET FOR HIM IS ONE
WAY TO HELP EASE HUSSEIN'S REGIME THROUGH THIS TENSE PERIOD.

DTG: 301519Z NOVEMBER 1966

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 90-49

By ing NARA, Date 7-17-90

SENT
WHCA

1966 NOV 30 16 59

V
EEA379
TO WTE10
DE WTE 2442

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661109

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EXDIS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL EXDIS~~

NOVEMBER 30, 1966

HEREWITH ED CLARK'S LATEST. ON THIS BASIS, SHOULD WE PUT PROPOSITION TO INDIAN'S NOW OR WAIT UNTIL WE HAVE DEFINITE WORD FROM HOLT? THE CANADIANS HAVE ALREADY ANNOUNCED THEIR GRANT.

CANBERRA 2866

1. HAVE NOW HAD OPPORTUNITY DISCUSS INDIAN FOOD PROBLEM BRIEFLY WITH PRIMIN HOLT AND BUNTING, SECRETARY OF PM'S DEPT., AND THEY BOTH INDICATE WILLINGNESS MOVE QUICKLY IN REACHING DECISION. WHILE NORMALLY DECISION OF THIS KIND WOULD REQUIRE CABINET APPROVAL, BUNTING SAYS SINCE NEW CABINET WILL NOT BE FORMED UNTIL LATE NEXT WEEK, PM, MINISTER HASLUCK AND MCMAHON, THE TREASURER, MAY BE ABLE TO TAKE EMERGENCY ACTION NEXT DAY OR TWO AND GET FORMAL CABINET APPROVAL LATER. BUNTING WILL ATTEMPT GET PM IN TOUCH WITH HASLUCK ON THIS TODAY (HASLUCK IS IN PERTH) AND THEN WITH MCMAHON (WHO IS IN SYDNEY) LATE TODAY OR TOMORROW MORNING. IF ALL GOES WELL, WE COULD HAVE SOME DEFINITE WORD TOMORROW OR FRIDAY. (LATE TODAY OR TOMORROW WASHINGTON TIME.)

2. EVERYONE CONCERNED HERE KNOWS WE CONSIDER MATTER TO BE OF UTMOST URGENCY AND I AM SURE THEY WILL TRY TO BE RESPONSIVE TO OUR REQUESTS. WE HAVE NO INDICATION YET, HOWEVER, WHETHER THEY WILL BE ABLE MEET OUR REQUEST FOR 200,000 TONS IN FULL.

3. WILL ADVISE SOONEST.

CLARK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 30/1615Z NOV 1966

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ

90-49

By mg NARA. Date 7-17-90

7

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 30, 1966 -- 9:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

This broad agenda on Latin America was drafted yesterday by Gordon, Linowitz, and Bill Bowdler. It is worth reading as a quick summary of the Latin American situation.

For your talks on Saturday, I suggest the following simpler agenda.

1. Linowitz' trip to Central America. (Linowitz)
2. Preparations and Prospects for the Summit meeting. (Gordon)
3. Implications of the Summit for U. S. Policy. (Gordon)

For your information, Latin Americans' preparations for the Summit are now going rather well. We have put ourselves in the position where we do not have to decide what ad-ons to the Alliance for Progress we shall make until we can see how seriously the Latin Americans are prepared to move forward. Our Latin American experts are thinking in terms of an add-on of perhaps \$200,000, partially through the IDB, which would put additional resources into international projects and integration, on the one hand, agriculture and education, on the other.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-49
By inf NARA. Date 7-17-90

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

November 29, 1966

7a

AGENDA

for Gordon-Linowitz-Rostow Talks with the President

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 90-49

By wp NARA. Date 7-17-90

1. General Political Situation

- a) 1966 has been a banner election year: Costa Rica, Guatemala, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay.
- b) Except for the Argentine setback, representative democracy has been considerably strengthened through the electoral process and with it the promise of greater political stability.
- c) Soft spots continue to be: Haiti, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Panama.
- d) So-called "arms race" centering around recent subsonic aircraft purchases by Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela is a real -- but exaggerated -- problem.

2. General Economic Situation

- a) Most encouraging trend is that the hemisphere is moving out of the economic crisis stage and can now increasingly devote its attention and energies to development.
 - All the major countries have passed the economic crisis stage; the ones still caught in it are small countries: Ecuador, Uruguay, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Panama.
 - The new political and economic stability is fostering:
 - institutional reform;
 - steady increase in tax revenues;
 - greater attention to development planning;
 - more diversification;
 - increase in important private investment projects;
 - movement toward Latin American economic integration.

- b) But the base for this progress is still fragile:
 - problems of inadequate exports;
 - inflationary pressures remain;
 - rise in population;
 - impact of any deflationary trend in the US and Europe;
 - growing urban unemployment;
 - backwardness of agriculture.
- c) The Alliance for Progress at a crossroads:
 - has had another year of solid accomplishments, although we will fall short of 2.5% GNP per capita.-
 - but economic and social progress must be accelerated if the present gains are to be consolidated;
 - Alliance goals and requirements which the President will wish to keep in mind as he reviews the FY 1968 budget.

3. Special Issues

a) Summit Preparations:

- Status of OAS work;
- Status of our preparations;
- Linowitz trip to Central America;
- Projected Gordon-Linowitz trip to South America, following which they wish to report to the President on Summit prospects and obtain his approval of time and place for the Summit and of our program and its budget implications.

b) Dominican Republic

- Political polarization process and what we propose to do to arrest it.
- Present economic situation and outlook for 1967.

c) Haiti

- Duvalier has weathered another crisis, but the situation remains explosive.
- Status of our contingency planning.

d) Panama Negotiations

- Status of the negotiations.
- Outlook for negotiations of satisfactory treaties with the Robles Government.

e) Visits by Latin Americans

- President Frei.
- President-elect Costa e Silva.

f) Amistad Dam Visit

- Scenario.
- Themes for remarks.

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 30, 1966 -- 9:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

You may be interested in the attached paper I wrote to clear my own mind and to share with my colleagues on the special committee you set up, chaired by Nick Katzenbach and including Cy Vance and Bob Komer along with myself.

It is a map of the problem with, I believe, the right action headings.

On reflection, we need three things to make it move:

-- Westmoreland must allocate more of his own military resources to pacification as well as press the ARVN forward into this task; and he should work up a plan for the military side of pacification for 1967.

-- We shall need in Saigon a vigorous Ambassador with great managerial skill, to drive forward hard this kind of program at that end.

-- As suggested on pages 24-25, we need to tighten the back-stopping of this whole program in Washington.

I am also considering, but did not put into this paper, further ways in which military power might be used in the course of 1967 to force a decision on the other side without excessive risk of escalating the war.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 89-227
By ijp NARA. Date 2-2-90

WWRostow:rlh

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-227

By ing NARA, Date 2-2-90

Draft for discussion

Limited circulation

November 28, 1966

A Strategy for Viet Nam, 1967

I. Object. The object of the plan outlined below is to maximize the chance that we force a decision by Hanoi in the course of the calendar year 1967 to end the war in Viet Nam on terms compatible with our interests; that is, an end to hostilities in Laos as well as in Viet Nam; the acceptance of the Geneva framework for Southeast Asia; acceptance of an essentially independent South Viet Nam that can determine its future on a one-man, one-vote basis or a reasonable approximation thereof.

The paper concludes with a discussion of the problem that will be posed for us if the war continues well into 1968.

II. The problem: the Hanoi equation. We must assume that Hanoi will accept something like our terms only when a combination of factors makes it clear that it is more in Hanoi's interest to end the war than to continue. Hanoi remains in the war now because, on balance, each

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-2-

of the factors listed below has not tipped far enough, individually or in combination, to make it urgent and desirable to stop hostilities; the advantages and costs of continuing the war still outweigh the advantages and costs of getting out.

A. The Situation in the South. The VC infrastructure in the South, although damaged, is still in being and capable of continuing to impose a heavy cost on South Viet Nam and to require the presence of massive allied forces to prevent a VC victory. In addition to this technical fact, Hanoi is thus far unwilling to take the decision to cut off support in men, supplies, and leadership to the South for reasons of ideology, self-respect, and, presumably, Chinese Communist pressure or threat. It does not now pretend to cherish the high hopes for early military victory of 1964 and early 1965; but it clings to a position like that of 1962-63, when it believed that its staying power would be greater than that of the U.S. :

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-3-

"Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars -- and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win" (Pham Van Dong, autumn 1962).

B. Damage in the North. There is no doubt that the bombing in the North constitutes a heavy burden on Hanoi. This is the principal difference between its view of the endurance doctrine of 1962-63 and its view in 1966-67. Thus far, however, with the support of other Communist nations it has been able to cushion the results of this bombing to some extent and has thus far accepted stagnation or decline in its over-all domestic development plus a massive diversion of manpower to fend off the most dangerous consequences of the bombing. What we do not know is whether the effects of the bombing are judged in Hanoi a major degenerative factor, with a time limit on what is endurable, or a stabilized factor, given the level of external assistance. Evidence runs both ways.

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-4-

What can be said is this: At its present level and targetting, bombing appears to involve the same kind of painful but endurable pressure on the North as small-scale guerrilla warfare in the South.

C. Relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Just as Hanoi is unwilling to take the ideological and political decision of cutting off the VC in the South, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are unwilling to take the decision to cut off military and economic aid to Hanoi.

This is true despite the fact that the costs of economic aid to Hanoi are rising rapidly and are an awkward marginal burden on economies where resource allocation is, in any case, a difficult matter. In part, this reluctance is due to the ideological competition with Communist China and the fear that Chinese Communist influence might become decisive in Hanoi if the Soviet Union were to cut off economic aid. Nevertheless, the net influence of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on Hanoi is probably towards a negotiated end to the war: to counter Chinese Communist

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-5-

influence; to remove a situation which is both a demonstration of relative impotence and a threat of escalation; and to cut aid costs.

D. Communist China. Hanoi has already permitted a substantial number of Chinese Communist engineering and anti-aircraft forces to enter North Viet Nam. It wishes, for purposes of its own long-run future, to maintain a relationship with Communist China which is supportive but not dominating. It does not feel free, probably because of geographical and logistical circumstances, to move toward the kind of independence of Communist China which North Korea felt free to assert because of the proximity of the Soviet Union and the credibility of Moscow's security as well as economic guarantees. Nor does it now appear credible to Hanoi to seek greater independence of Communist China by an understanding with the other major power which might offer that guarantee; that is, the United States. Communist China has thus far thrown its weight in Hanoi towards continuing the war. It may, in addition,

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-6-

exercise some direct influence over the leadership of the VC -- almost certainly more direct influence than Moscow and Eastern Europe.

It is probably true that Hanoi can make peace without risking a Chinese Communist invasion; but Chinese Communist influence is evidently an inhibiting factor of some importance.

E. The Political Situation in the South. Although undoubtedly disappointed by the outcome of the I Corps crisis of April-May 1966 and by the outcome of the election for the Constituent Assembly, Hanoi may maintain hopes of either a political breakdown in the South which might permit it to join dissident non-Communist elements in the seizure of power, or the emergence of a civil government with which it could more easily negotiate a favorable solution than with the present military government in Saigon. Such hopes of a popular front or coalition government may be countered by fears that the potential VC role in South

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-7-

Vietnamese politics may progressively diminish if the constitutional process moves forward on present planned lines.

F. Free World Diplomacy. With the assistance of other Communist nations, Hanoi has conducted a massive political and psychological campaign in the Free World with minimum and maximum objectives.

The minimum objective is to restrain U. S. bombing of North Viet Nam to targets which constitute thus far livable levels of damage, given the outside assistance available to Hanoi. At the maximum, the objective has been to press the U. S. unilaterally to cease bombing the North and, even, unilaterally to withdraw from support of South Viet Nam. Although Hanoi has failed in its maximum objectives, it must judge that it has succeeded tolerably well in its minimum objectives and will continue the effort.

G. The United States. Thus far Hanoi has avoided all direct negotiation with the U. S., while leaving many channels open for contact

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-8-

and negotiation should the equation shift in ways which made such negotiation desirable in Hanoi's interest. It may judge that knowledge of direct negotiation with the U. S. would leak and damage morale among the VC, notably at a time when the VC are on the defensive. Therefore, so long as the Communists are on the defensive, an indicated willingness to negotiate directly may signal a willingness to end the war soon.

H. Conclusion.

In short, while it has suffered a profound setback from its hopeful position in 1964 and early 1965, Hanoi has found, thus far, a rationale for continuing the conflict and a domestic and foreign policy strategy which permits it to continue. The most important factors holding Hanoi in the war appear to be:

- the continued existence of the VC infrastructure and the VC capacity to continue guerrilla operations;

- the possibility of rendering bombing of the North with existing targetting endurable by its own measures and expanded external assistance ;

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-9-

-- Chinese Communist influence, pressure, and (conceivably) threat.

The other factors in the equation are either neutral or argue that the war should be ended.

III. The Situation: the United States Equation. The equation for U.S.

policy is, essentially, the other side of the coin of the seven variables which enter the Hanoi equation. We have been operating and we shall have to continue to operate in such a way as to shift these variables to a point where Hanoi concludes that it is its interest to end the war rather than to continue it. It is not a question of simply "proving that they cannot win." In a military sense that has already happened; and what follows assumes we shall continue to keep the initiative against and impose heavy attrition on VC and NVN main force units. It is a question of creating a situation in which they feel there is more to gain (or less to lose) by ending the war now than by continuing it on current and foreseeable terms.

In any situation as complex as this, the answer lies in acting on all of the variables available, to the extent that one has a grip on them, rather than on any single variable; and, in any case, we can only guess at the weights attached to them in Hanoi's calculations. Some may prove more critical than others. Some may be more susceptible to our initiative and action than others. But if the picture of Hanoi's equation is correct, the object of U.S. policy is to produce in 1967 a sense that all the factors judged relevant by Hanoi are moving unfavorably -- or as many of them as we can move.

The following action program is based on this judgment about our task plus the concluding assessment in paragraph III, H, above.

IV. The Proposed U. S. Program.

A. Action against the VC.

The relatively viable state of the VC infrastructure was judged in para. III to be a major factor ^{keeping} ~~helping~~ Hanoi in the war. Given

Communist doctrines about guerrilla warfare -- and especially the doctrine of superior endurance in protracted conflict -- it is clear that perhaps the most important task in 1967 is to produce a setting in which the VC appear to be disintegrating. This would make the rationale for continuing to accept the costs of bombing in the North less persuasive. It would increase the leverage of Moscow and Eastern Europe over Hanoi. It would undercut the position of the Chinese Communists. The major headings for such a policy for accelerating the disintegration of the VC are familiar and appear to be the following.

1. A dramatic and sustained political and psychological appeal to the VC to join in the making of a new South Vietnamese nation
 - a. an amnesty offer in which the Constituent Assembly might be associated with the government
 - b. enlarged and sustained efforts to defect VC leaders
 - c. a radical expansion in Chieu Hoi efforts

2. Accelerated pacification

- a. new organizational arrangements
- b. converting ARVN forces to pacification functions
- c. rapid pacification of certain key areas

3. A workable land reform scheme

B. Increasing the cost in the North. The object of our bombing,

against the background of A, above, is to make Hanoi feel that it is paying a higher and higher price to preserve a probably diminishing asset.

To do this, three measures should be accelerated.

1. The barrier. The coming in of the barrier would promise

Hanoi that the cost of infiltration is likely to increase and that it might, even, find difficulty in withdrawing its regular forces now in the South.

Since the barrier will come in slowly, it is to be assumed that Hanoi will seek and find limited countermeasures. The barrier will evidently not work 100%. It is, however, an important cost-increasing tool.

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-13-

2. Attrition against infiltration routes. We do not yet know the dispositions of Hanoi with respect to infiltration in 1967, either with respect to scale or routes. In particular, we do not know the extent to which the Laos routes will be used as opposed to direct crossing of the DMZ or various seaborne efforts. Given our experience with attacks on infiltration routes in 1966, it should be possible for us to mount in 1967 a more purposeful and effective attritional campaign against infiltration than we did last year, including the extension of close-in attack of coastal shipping in North Vietnamese waters.

3. The attack on high priority targets in Hanoi-Haiphong area.

At various times we have already hit oil targets, power plants, SAM installations, docks, coal mines. Without drama or sudden escalation, we should gradually, steadily, hit more such targets where the problem of replacement requires time and expense, and the costs of the war economy

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-14-

are substantial. We should continue as an important insurance policy the attack on oil. Power plants appear particularly attractive because of the wide dependence on them.

So long as the situation remains as it is within Communist China, the mining of the sea approaches to Haiphong should be ruled out because of the dependence on Communist China that would result; but this judgment should be periodically reexamined in the light of all the circumstances.

In the meanwhile, ways of blocking access between Haiphong and Hanoi should be studied, including the possibility of systematic interdiction -- the object being not to close off access to the USSR and Eastern Europe but to render the delivery of such supplies increasingly costly.

C. Diplomacy via the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It is a fact that Moscow and the Eastern European capitals have in recent months become more activist with respect to Hanoi and the ending of the war. We do not completely understand this shift. It may stem from some combination of

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-15-

these three elements:

- A sense that the forces in Hanoi willing to end the war are gathering strength.
- A sense that Hanoi is more willing to listen to Moscow due to the troubles inside Communist China.
- Increased interest in peace (and increased leverage) due to the radical rise in aid to Hanoi required from the USSR and Eastern Europe because of our bombing the North.

It is also clear that the influence of Moscow and its friends has its limits in Hanoi. We cannot count on this influence and leverage alone to bring peace. We have to operate on all the other elements in the equation which might bring Hanoi around. But we should maintain as close and direct a dialogue with the USSR and Eastern Europe as we can, and, especially, try to understand better the reasons for their recent activism.

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In this connection, we should be prepared to discuss with Moscow, as soon and as explicitly as Moscow is prepared to discuss with us, the character of a Southeast Asian settlement, including what we believe our role and the role of the Soviet Union in that area might be over the long run. There are great inhibitions in discussing such matters explicitly. The Soviet Union has preferred to move in parallel and implicitly in similar circumstances; for example, the Indian subcontinent. Nevertheless, it is an area in which the Soviet Union evidently intends to maintain an influence in competition with both Communist China and the U. S. -- an influence with which we can live to a certain degree.

D. Communist China. Chinese Communist policy towards the war in Viet Nam may be one consideration at stake in the struggle within Communist China. Our direct influence on the outcome of that struggle is exceedingly limited, although our indirect influence has been considerable via our policies

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- 17 -

in various parts of the world which have contributed to the failure of Mao's expansionist plans and tactics. We do not know enough about the so-called moderate forces inside Communist China to understand whether, if they gained the upper hand, they would join the Soviet Union in encouraging Hanoi to seek a settlement and the withdrawal of U. S. forces from South Viet Nam. Mao has clearly taken the view that the pinning down in Southeast Asia of massive U. S. forces was good for Communist China because it would lead to failure and a once-and-for-all withdrawal in humiliation of U. S. from the Asian mainland. It is conceivable that moderate forces might emerge which would settle for a negotiated withdrawal of the U. S. from its Viet Nam bases and the neutralization of South Viet Nam and Laos, implicit in the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords. This kind of shift is a matter to which we should be sensitive; but it is in the hands of domestic Chinese Communist politics rather than U. S.

diplomacy or communication.

Of all the variables, the Chinese Communist policy towards the war in Viet Nam and the nature of its influence over Hanoi is least in our hands except to the extent that we and the Vietnamese succeeded in producing erosion and disintegration of the VC infrastructure -- a fact which will undoubtedly impress Peiping, given the experience of its leaders and, indeed, the nature of its doctrines of protracted warfare.

E. Political situation in the South. Here we have two major tasks with minimum and maximum objectives. At the minimum we must assure that the political life of South Viet Nam moves forward on the constitutional path to which it is committed, without conflict and disorder which would leave major openings for the VC, or produce, through instability and recurrent crises, a sense of hopelessness within the U. S. As part of this effort, we must contain inflation at the minimum within limits that are

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-19-

tolerable and do not produce social and economic disruption in the life of the country.

At the maximum we must play for the emergence of a political and economic situation in South Viet Nam which is inherently attractive to the VC and projects to the world a vision of forward movement. On the political side, the key problem is clearly this: to develop a relationship between the military and civil politicians that would permit a constitutional government to emerge in 1967, which has legitimacy before the world and sufficient linkage to the military establishment; for the military will remain the heart of South Vietnamese organized nationhood for the foreseeable future. We must avoid either acute military-civil conflict or a military takeover which aborts the constitutional track.

In cases where these conditions have been met at similar stages of history (for example, Turkey in the inter-war years, Pakistan since 1958, Korea since 1961), the key to the transition has been the emergence of a

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-20-

political leader or leaders who have the confidence of both the armed forces and a sizeable proportion of the civilian politicians. This is so critical an issue that we cannot afford to be passive with respect to it.

A second maximum objective is to open the ports and roads at a pace which gives a short-run lift to the Vietnamese economy while pressing forward rapidly and dramatically with the formulation of a postwar development program.

F. Free World diplomacy. The two critical elements here are:

-- An expansion -- even a modest expansion -- in Free World forces fighting beside us in South Viet Nam.

-- Pressing out to the world systematically the dual concept; a new and vital Free Asia is emerging; it is with us in our intent to see the war in Viet Nam through to an honorable peace.

We have made progress with this doctrine as a result of the President's trip to Asia. It must be systematically projected by every device of

communication at our disposal.

G. The United States base. The outcome of the Congressional election of 1966 has given us a base to pursue the strategy outlined above for 1967.

The object of that strategy should be to shift the variables during 1967 to the point where Hanoi is willing to end the war. For 1967 -- and as a hedge against a continuation of the war into 1968 -- we face, nevertheless, certain fundamental, unsolved problems with domestic opinion:

-- The need to give our citizens a better sense of how to measure progress in a war of this kind. All our people now have is a bewildering statement of daily and weekly casualty figures plus accounts of occasional pitched battles on the ground and of raids on the North. These are accompanied by evidence that the VC still have the capacity to shoot up U.S. installations, throw mortars into the center of Saigon, etc. We have not found a way to make clear, even, the character of our progress against main force units, let alone a way of showing what progress we may make in the countryside towards pacification and development.

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-22-

A special task force in the government should take this problem in hand, coordinating with Saigon, so that in 1967 we get more mature and shapely reporting of the war.

-- We must drive home systematically the message of the President's trip to Asia; that is, a new and vital Asia is emerging, which is determined to work together and is with us on Viet Nam.

This must be, again, a steady campaign in which we find and project all the concrete evidence of forward movement in Free Asia and evidence of Asian attitudes towards Viet Nam.

-- By every device we can conceive, we should make the war a bipartisan venture in domestic political terms, reaching out to the Republicans for advice and engaging them with the fullest possible briefings.

H. Negotiating with Hanoi. Our basic tactic with Hanoi has been to pick up their desire to have us stop bombing in the North and move them towards the conference table by asking them what compensatory de-escalation

in the South they are prepared to undertake. Since various other nations, notably in Eastern Europe, are apparently prepared to talk to Hanoi along these lines, it should be pursued. But it should be pursued with a consciousness that it may have arisen not from an authentic desire of Hanoi to negotiate, but from a desire to lift from North Viet Nam and its allies the burden of bombing so that the war can be pursued in greater confidence with greater prospects of North Vietnamese success.

It is also possible that the de-escalation formula poses a great danger to Hanoi because a cutback or end to infiltration might produce very serious consequences for the VC, both technically, in terms of supplies, and psychologically, in terms of a conviction that Hanoi was deserting the VC and making terms at their expense. Therefore, we should mount a parallel line of communication with Hanoi directly. The object should be the discussion of the end position -- a complete package deal -- while the war goes on; with the object of ending the war briskly and completely when

the end position is agreed.

V. Organization. The premium which attaches to ending the war in 1967 is obvious. The nature of the problem is such that if we are to maximize the chances that the war will be ended in 1967, we must force the pace of movement in a coordinated way along each of the lines of the program set out above. This requires:

-- A common understanding of the concept of working intensively on each of the elements of the equation, shared fully by Saigon and Washington.

-- The most vigorous possible leadership in Saigon, both by the Ambassador and MACV -- and both in coordination.

-- Centralized drive and direction in Washington of all the elements of the program, cutting to the minimum normal delays in making decisions here.

Under Secretary Katzenbach and his committee should undertake the latter assignment; but it will only work if the Under Secretary himself can allocate the time to lead the enterprise.

It would be disastrous if present centers of initiative felt they were layered by such an undertaking -- and the buck had passed somewhere else.

The Under Secretary's committee should:

- spot delays in implementing the agreed plan and end them;
- spot gaps in implementing the agreed plan and fill them;
- re-survey the evolving situation and make recommendations
for changes in the plan.

VII. 1968

If the war cannot be ended in 1967 and runs through the election of 1968, the task will be:

- to have achieved maximum progress;
- to be able to demonstrate the reality of that progress persuasively
to our people;
- to achieve maximum bipartisan support for continuing our Viet Nam
and Asian policies.

We must be able to hold a position of: don't throw away a winning effort and

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-26-

defeat a position of: don't throw good men and money after bad.

In seeking a decision in 1967 we must, as an insurance policy,
lay the groundwork for such a stance in 1968.

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November 30, 1966

MEMO TO MR. JACOBSEN

Jake:

Attached is the information you requested on the post now held by James Roosevelt.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 29, 1966

MEMORANDUM TO MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Perquisites of US Representative on ECOSOC

The United States representative on the Economic and Social Council receives a salary of \$26,000 a year. He has the rank of Ambassador.

The US mission to the United Nations provides him with secretarial and staff assistance.

He receives no living allowance. His entertaining allowance depends on the allocation by Ambassador Goldberg of the Mission's lump sum allowance. It is a small amount.

He is entitled to call on the USUN motor pool for transportation.

Brom
Bromley Smith

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 30, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: A Bridge-Building Initiative

Proposal

Last spring's Acheson Report on constructive steps in Europe -- approved by Ball and Vance on behalf of Rusk and McNamara -- recommended that you propose an East-West Institute of Management and Administration. After some work on the idea here -- in connection with your Rose Garden speech to a delegation of Austrian businessmen -- you tentatively approved language announcing the appointment of Mac Bundy as your emissary to consult with interested governments (East and West), and private groups, and to come up with a specific plan for such an Institute. However, you later decided, pursuant to a last-minute request from Secretary Rusk, to hold off until we had time to inform Harlan Cleveland's NATO colleagues in Brussels. Nothing has happened since.

I believe the institute is a first-rate idea -- in terms of both short and long term international politics. And of all possible bridge-building moves, it will draw least fire from our economic warriors, while gaining pats on the back from people who favor bridge-building. Therefore, if you are still favorably disposed, I recommend that we do a quick NATO check and go ahead with an announcement, perhaps next week. (To avoid leaks, the announcement should follow within 24 hours of a check in Brussels.)

If you want him to take this on, Mac would be ready and willing. (In June you considered other possible candidates: Kingman Brewster, Doug Dillon, Clark Kerr. In terms of sensitivity to Presidential interest, contacts with the domestic and international academic and financial communities and, with governments, capacity to get Ford and other foundations into the act, etc., Bundy seems to be much the best choice. However, we can certainly look further if you wish.)

What the Institute Would Do

We would not want to nail down the specifics at the outset; it would offend both our friends and the Eastern Europeans. Bundy's job would be to conduct a real consultation, not a hard sell. However, those of us who have worked on the idea have in mind an institution based on the proposition that all advanced economies -- capitalist, socialist, communist -- share the problem of efficiently

managing large programs and enterprises: factories and cities, subway systems and air traffic, hospitals and water pollution. There is great demand -- in Russia and Yugoslavia as well as the UK and Germany -- for the new techniques of management designed to cope with these problems.

Accordingly, the institution would sponsor everything from short conferences to full-length courses, covering management techniques of all sorts: budgeting, systems analysis, operations research, linear programming, and even some aggregate economics of the CEA variety. It would throw together economists, engineers, city managers and planners, plant managers, agriculturalists, and even social psychologists -- both practitioners and academics. The orientation of the institute would be technical and strictly non-political. The faculty might consist in part of established academics on loan or sabbatical. It should have a permanent site in a "neutral" European country, perhaps Austria, and be governed by a joint board with members from both East and West. It might have an annual budget of \$3-\$4 million funded jointly from governments and private sources. Bundy's job would be to put together a workable plan.

Politics: Foreign I think such a Presidential proposal would be a significant plus. The odds on a positive Soviet reaction are fairly long, but the Yugoslavs are a reasonable bet and the Poles and Rumanians almost as good. A lot will depend on our tactics. And even if nothing comes of it, the President will be given credit for having made a practical forward-looking bridge-building proposal. Even more important, it will strike a friendly note with the rising and important class of technocrats in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Politics: Domestic The pro-bridge-building people will be pleased, and even the economic warriors will have a hard time finding reasons to complain.

If you approve in principle, I will ask Gene Rostow and John Leddy to take a last check with Secretary Rusk, and arrange for a NATO check.

FM3
Francis M. Bator

Go ahead with a NATO check; tell Bundy; and
plan a Presidential announcement next week _____

Submit other names _____

Do nothing now _____

Speak to me _____

OK
but check with
Sec. Rusk is
essential
✓

11

Wednesday, November 30, 1966

Mr. President:

Ambassador Symington, with Secretary Rusk's approval, suggests that you designate Secretary Rusk to receive the credentials of newly arrived Ambassadors while you are in Texas. The new Ambassadors from Botswana and the Ivory Coast are waiting now and others are expected before the first of the year.

As Symington points out, there is a precedent for this and I believe it is a good suggestion. If Secretary Rusk can take care of some of these fellows for you, it will be time gained in a very busy season. Although as Symington points out these Ambassadors will still wish to call on you when you return, it would be easy to handle them as a group -- thereby economizing on time.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒ _____

Disapprove ☐ _____

*Jake Jacobsen telephoned Mr Rostow
12/1/66*

11a

THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 22, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presentation of Credentials by
Appointed Ambassadors in Washington.

The Ambassadors of the Republic of Botswana and the Ivory Coast have called upon the Secretary of State and are now ready to present their credentials to you. A number of other ambassadors, whose agreements have been granted, may arrive before the beginning of 1967.

Legally and Constitutionally, the President may, at any time, delegate the function of receiving in person of ambassadors of other countries. This was done in 1955 under President Eisenhower.

If you feel it would be useful, you may wish to request the Secretary of State to accept the credentials of these newly-accredited ambassadors in Washington during your absence.

Of course, they still will wish to call on you upon your return. However, this should only involve a few minutes in your office including the taking of a photograph.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____


James W. Symington

CONFIDENTIAL

November 30, 1966

FOR PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

Here is a paragraph-by-paragraph comment on yesterday's
NYT India food editorial:

Paragraph 1: We have not "decided to interrupt" shipments. As you know, we have simply not decided on our next step.

Paragraph 2: ~~the~~ Indian port "jam-ups" are overplayed. To keep grain flowing quickly and smoothly, Indians must keep a constant backlog of 250,000 tons in ships in port areas.

stat
(b) It ~~will~~ be very difficult to prevent a dip in ^{U.S.} January arrivals, which now include 564,000 tons of both wheat and milo against average arrivals over the past few months of 8-900,000 tons. ^{normally} It takes 8 ~~to~~ weeks from Washington decision to Indian arrival. The last ship under present agreements will leave 7 December and arrive mid-January. Best we could hope for from decision now is late January arrival, ~~unless~~ ^{we can divert ships at sea or the Australians move on a creek basis.}

Paragraph 3: Our decision has nothing to do with Vietnam.

Paragraph 4: "Seven million tons tentatively promised to India." ~~We have no promise beyond your food message and the 27 May agreement. We will have shipped by 7 December all grain under agreement. Between 1 July and 7 December, we will have shipped all that agreement.~~

~~of the wheat we promised--2.3 million tons.~~ Back in July, a joint

Agriculture-AID-State-Budget internal planning exercise tentatively

earmarked 5 million tons of wheat for India in FY 1967 for what we then

expected would be a "normal year's Indian program. The Freeman-Rusk-

Gaud recommendation of 22 August that you approve 1.2 million tons of

DECLASSIFIED
State 1-12-78 NSC 8-15-78 (#86)
By <i>DeWen In</i> NARS, Date 8-22-86

CONFIDENTIAL

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- 2 -

wheat for India would have drawn on ~~the remaining 2.7 million tons in~~ that "normal" year's program of 5 million. However, not even Indian officials would claim that we "tentatively promised" anything beyond the 27 May agreement.

Paragraph 5: On 8 October at my request, Bill Gaud sent me an appraisal of Indian agricultural performance cleared with USDA and State staffs. It painted about the same generally positive picture as Secretary Freeman's recently returned expert gave him last weekend. This was an informal paper designed by me to force AID and Agriculture to get together on a common assessment of the situation.

Paragraphs 6, 7: (a) Generally accurate, though we are not "refusing" loans to public sector fertilizer projects as a matter of principle. (b) We would like to see India break down zonal barriers which inhibit free flow of commodities between states. However, we generally recognize that completely doing away with them will require some ^{national} buffer stocks to ease the shock. So we can probably not expect total abrogation in an emergency year right before elections.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - November 29, 1966
8:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for Brazilian President-elect Costa e Silva

I know that you prefer not to have foreign visitors during January, but I am asking you to reconsider the case of Brazilian President-elect Costa e Silva for these reasons:

- It involves only an office appointment and not the full treatment of a state visit.
- He has accepted invitations to visit Western Europe during January and will be passing through the US on his way to Japan in late January.
- He has declined a Soviet invitation and let Ambassador Tuthill know how much he would appreciate an invitation to the United States.
- Maintaining his goodwill after he assumes office on March 15 is of such importance to continued close US-Brazilian cooperation on hemispheric and world issues.

I recommend that you authorize us to extend an invitation to him to visit the US and to call on you at a mutually acceptable date in late January.

Walt Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

cc - Bill Moyers

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 90-49

By *ing* NARA, Date 7-17-90

14
Tuesday
November 29, 1966
11:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Attached is a proposed
reply, for your signature, to
George Woods.

W. W. Rostow

November 30, 1966

Dear George:

My sincere thanks for your most thoughtful letter of November 21. Your good wishes and support are a source of strength and encouragement.

As you say, we have accomplished a good deal in three years -- less, perhaps, than we might have hoped, but far more than might have been reasonably expected. But this is no time for any of us to rest on our oars. You can be sure that your President has no intention to "relax or waiver."

There are important and difficult tasks ahead. But I am utterly convinced that this country of ours, when it sets its mind to do a job, can accomplish the impossible. And so we shall move forward.

The World Bank and IDA have been playing a vital role in many of our more important tasks in the world. I am sure you are right that they can, indeed, encourage the sub-continent of Asia in the direction of a more hopeful economic system. And there are other challenges that must be faced and met.

My thanks for your kind words on the operation. I am feeling better almost hourly in these happy surroundings.

As you said, the responsibilities of this office are doubtless greater than ever before. But our cause is good and just, and with the determination and devotion of the American people, with the help of able and unselfish men such as yourself, and with the cooperation of friends in many other lands, we shall continue to do what must be done -- at home and abroad.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

/s/ LBJ

Mr. George D. Woods
President
International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
Washington, D. C. 20433

LBJ:WJJ:WWR:mz (11/28/66)



INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20433, U.S.A.

146

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

November 21, 1966

My dear Mr. President:

I write to say congratulations on the vast and important accomplishments of your first three years in the highest office in our country. You may be justifiably proud of the record. At the same time I ask you not to relax or waiver in the execution and perfection of your domestic programs for social benefits and the enactment, from time to time as appropriate, of the taxes needed to support them. From my point of view as an international civil servant (a temporary status) it is quite clear that we cannot do what should be done abroad--economically, militarily, diplomatically--unless we are both strong and progressive at home.

I wholly agree with what is being done in Asia and the Pacific; it is depressing beyond words but without a feasible alternative. I feel that by following a flexible but basically hard procedure, in tandem with the U.S. Government, the World Bank and IDA can encourage the so-called sub-Continent of Asia in the direction of a more hopeful economic system --including a better working relationship between the two countries.

In common with all your friends, I am relieved and happy about the outcome of your surgery. A few weeks in the surroundings you like, and which give you a better perspective of the imponderables and the frustrations of your office, should accelerate your complete recovery--an end which everyone desires.

Every good wish for the years ahead. The responsibilities of the President today are probably greater than ever before. But offsetting that sobering fact, the number of people in the United States and in countries throughout the world, who are wishing you well and hoping you will be successful in your undertakings is certainly far higher than ever in history.

With great respect,

Sincerely,

Mr. George D. Woods

[not Hon]

President
International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
Washington, D.C. 20433

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

~~SECRET~~

15
Tuesday, November 29, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Herewith Averell Harriman's report on his travels following the Manila Conference. He found everywhere that the Conference and your Asian trip had made precisely the impressions on the rest of the world which you had intended. I think that you will find his catalog of those impressions most rewarding.

He goes on to summarize the prevailing attitudes which he encountered on the war and the question of negotiations. They were:

- Uniform acceptance of your sincerity in seeking a peaceful solution.
- The opinion that there is a better chance of starting negotiations through private US-North Vietnamese conversations than through a Geneva-type conference.
- The extreme unpopularity of the bombings with people everywhere. (Harriman stressed the restrictive areas of the targets, the care exercised to avoid civilian casualties, and your determination to avoid enlarging the conflict.)
- The widespread impression that stopping the bombing will somehow lead to talks. (Harriman countered by emphasizing the necessity for a prior indication of reciprocal actions).

Governor Harriman obviously did a first-class sales job.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 90-46

By lg NARA, Date 7-16-90

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

November 28, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I am attaching my report on my trip, made at your direction, to ten countries in Asia, Europe and Africa following the Manila Conference.

The first section of the report deals with my general observations and conclusions. The second section covers specific comments on my discussions in each of the countries visited.



W. Averell Harriman

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 NOV 29 AM 8 53

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

November 22, 1966

~~SECRET~~

REPORT OF POST-MANILA TRIP

In my talks with Heads of State and Ministers, I found, everywhere, that the Manila Conference and the President's Asian trip had made a most favorable impression. It was evident that several points in the communique and declarations were viewed as being of particular significance, and I stressed these in my presentation:

- 1) The fact that the President sat at a round table with six Asian leaders as equals;
- 2) The favorable military developments in South Vietnam;
- 3) Agreement that objectives were limited to giving South Vietnamese people the opportunity to decide their own future;
- 4) The desire to reduce hostilities as soon as possible and undertake negotiations for a peaceful settlement;
- 5) Agreement that when aggression from the North had ceased, Allied troops would be withdrawn within six months;
- 6) The fact that the only discussion of escalation dealt with increased effort on pacification;
- 7) The commitment by the Government of South Vietnam to complete the Constitution, hold national elections next year, and village and hamlet elections in January. (In this connection, the September elections had made a

favorable

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-50
By ip NARA, Date 3-1-90

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favorable impression, and the commitment to take these further steps increased the prestige of the Saigon Government);

8) The further commitment of the GVN to undertake a program of national reconciliation giving hope that discussions would eventually take place between all political factions within South Vietnam;

9) The pledge for regional cooperation in social and economic development in which the US would participate;

10) Although a number of these points had been previously stated by the Government of the United States or South Vietnam, the fact that they were agreed to at this meeting of seven nations gave them greater weight and credence.

I found uniform acceptance of the President's sincerity in seeking a peaceful solution. In response to my request all government leaders stated their willingness to do everything they could to bring about private or public negotiations. Particularly in Italy and in London, the Ministers were interested in discussing this subject in detail. In other countries, good will was expressed but no specific suggestions emerged.

There was also considerable opinion that it would probably be more practical to get negotiations started through private conversations between the United States and North Vietnam rather than through a Geneva-type conference. Some thought that the North Vietnamese would want to know where they and the NLF would come out in a settlement before agreeing to engage in public negotiations. In addition, some suggested that since Red China would continue to oppose negotiations, Hanoi might wish to face Peking with a fait accompli rather than an argument as to whether or not to negotiate.

In almost

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In almost every conversation the subject of a suspension of the bombing was raised, particularly now that the military situation had improved. Almost all expressed the belief that talks could be gotten under way if we would stop the bombing, but no one could give any positive assurances. In most cases the opinions expressed were based on contacts with Eastern European countries, although in India there had been direct discussions by Indian representatives in Hanoi.

I expressed as my personal opinion that calls for unilateral action on the part of the United States, as proposed by President de Gaulle in Phnom Penh, did not further the cause of peace but, in fact, increased Hanoi's intransigence. I suggested that if anyone had proposals to make, a call be made to both sides to reduce hostilities.

I explained that the President had expressed his willingness to stop the bombing, but only if reciprocal action were taken by Hanoi. I pointed out that the same people who were now asking for a cessation in bombing had done so last year, and were again holding out the hope for a favorable reaction from Hanoi. The suggestions last year had been for a pause of at most two to three weeks, whereas, in fact, the President had continued the pause for over five weeks. The only reaction from Hanoi was to take military advantage of the pause by substantially increasing shipments to the South, rebuilding bridges, constructing detours and repairing roads. I furthermore explained that the bombing was a military necessity and had to be continued unless there was parallel deescalation of hostilities on the part of North Vietnam.

Although these discussions helped clarify the situation with the governments, they brought out the fact that bombing was extremely unpopular among the people everywhere. The bombing is thought of in terms of experiences of World War II with the heavy civilian casualties and suffering. In addition, the idea of a great power such as the United States hitting a small country was repugnant. Fear was also expressed that bombing would expand the war to a confrontation with China or the Soviet Union.

I emphasized

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I emphasized both in talks with the governments and with the press the restricted nature of the targets and the care exercised to avoid as far as practicable, civilian casualties. I pointed out that although the President was determined to achieve his minimum objectives, he had stated that he had no intention of enlarging the conflict. Nevertheless, in every country I visited I found the strongest hope that some way could be found to stop the bombing in the North, and particularly that there would be no further escalation. I gained the impression that the favorable reaction from the Manila Conference would be dissipated if there was an evident escalation of the bombing. George Brown, who has done much to keep the Labor Party in line on Vietnam, stated flatly that any further escalation "might well lose you the support of all your friends in Europe like me who are trying to help."

I took advantage of the opportunity to state to the press, and on television and radio where available, on my arrival and departure at the airports and at special press conferences the salient points I made to the governments. I had a remarkably good press, even in Pakistan where the press usually distorts anything an American visitor says. I believe this good reaction was primarily because of the good will the President had generated by the Manila Conference and his Asian visits.

~~SECRET~~

MATTERS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST
IN EACH COUNTRY

~~SECRET~~

15-d

Indonesia

The Indonesian Ministers showed great interest in every aspect of the developments in Vietnam and planned to send a trusted emissary to Hanoi to explore Hanoi's willingness to negotiate. Although they intend to maintain a nonaligned foreign policy, I am inclined to believe that they are so anti-communist and have taken such a vigorous action against the Chicoms in Indonesia, they will not be an effective intermediary. I encouraged them, however, to make every effort.

I was impressed with the determination of General Suharto and his civilian colleagues to come to grips with their extremely difficult economic and political problems. The army is playing a key role in the "new order" and, though in control, the leaders are not yet willing to break completely with Sukarno as he is still the "god ruler" to many people, particularly in central Java. They believe they have him under control.

I agree with our Ambassador's recommendations for a modest interim aid program pending international agreement on a moratorium of debt service and new internationally supported programs to help put the country on its feet.

The army itself desperately needs equipment and spare parts for transportation and roadbuilding in connection with its civic action program. Much of this equipment was originally furnished by us. An election is planned in July of 1968 and the army wishes, in addition to improving conditions in the rural communities, to increase its popularity with the people. Six million dollars has been recommended by the Ambassador and the Country Team which seems extremely modest as the stakes are so high. I understand that favorable consideration is being given to this request, but not until FY 1968. This is too late. Prompt action should be taken.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 90-50

By sp NARA. Date 3-1-90

152

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Ceylon

Prime Minister Senanayake showed great interest in developments in Vietnam and clearly believes a non-communist South Vietnam is in the interests of Ceylon. He will do anything he can to promote a peaceful settlement. There is, however, little he can do except possibly influence the Buddhists in South Vietnam. The people of Ceylon are overwhelmingly Buddhist but the country enjoys complete religious tolerance. Some months ago the Prime Minister sent two Buddhist lay leaders to Saigon to investigate alleged persecution of and discrimination against Buddhists in South Vietnam. The report, although somewhat qualified, completely quieted the Ceylonese Buddhists who were about to attack the South Vietnamese Government.

At my request, the Prime Minister arranged for me to see half a dozen of the Buddhist leaders. I talked with them separately in Colombo and also in Kandy. They are strongly anti-communist and worried about the developments in Southeast Asia. Several had been to Thailand as well as South Vietnam. They feel deeply that the Buddhists in Vietnam should stop their internal conflicts and work with the Catholics and other groups to develop a strong anti-communist government. There is a possibility, if Ambassador Lodge ever thinks it desirable, of several of them going to South Vietnam to encourage the Buddhists to end their conflict and to adopt more responsible and constructive policies.

The present government won an election in 1965 from a left wing group which had included several communists in the government. The first thing the new government did was to settle the claims of the oil companies for expropriated properties and it has been encouraging private investment. However, when the government came into power, the country was in bad financial condition, which was compounded by a serious drought immediately followed by a disastrous flood. They have called in the IMF and have agreed to accept the program recommended. The IMF plan includes the need for fifty million dollars a year of outside loans. The Embassy has recommended that we undertake to make

available

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 90-50
By 40 NARA. Date 3-1-90

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Ceylon (page 2)

available thirty percent of this sum, or fifteen million dollars, half in P.L. 480 agricultural products and half in development loans. The latter requires a Presidential finding of national interest for a waiver to the 10 country limitation. I was impressed with the integrity and good will of the Ministers I met. The present government's policies are so clearly in our interests as compared to the opposition that it is clearly in the national interest to give this assistance. Our leadership is probably required to get other countries to do their share. Delay in decision by us is causing considerable financial difficulties which has been increased by a collapse in the price of tea. Tea comprises 60% of Ceylon's exports.

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~~SECRET~~India

I have little new to report on New Delhi since the Government is so preoccupied with its own problems. I did express to several officials, including the Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, that I considered speeches such as President de Gaulle's in Phnom Penh and the tripartite communique of Mrs. Gandhi, Tito and Nasser calling for unilateral action on the part of the United States as an encouragement to Hanoi's intransigence. Furthermore, I urged the Prime Minister and the others that I saw to take more vigorous action to fulfill their responsibilities as Chairman of the ICC. The Government is cautiously exploring the possibilities of bringing about negotiations for a peaceful settlement. Although their representatives in Hanoi have had some discussions, they have not been sufficiently definite to be encouraging.

In spite of India's financial position, the Foreign Minister told me that India was giving modest credits for Indian products to the new government in Djakarta as they thought its survival was of the utmost importance to India's future.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

90-50

By

NARA. Date 3-1-90

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159
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Pakistan

I had an hour's talk with President Ayub followed by luncheon with his new Foreign Minister and one or two others. In response to my request, which I made in the name of the President, he indicated that they would take advantage of any opportunity that arose to bring pressure on Hanoi, but did not indicate that he had any particular influence. Both Ayub and the Foreign Minister emphasized that Hanoi would be loath to permit Chinese or Russian troops into North Vietnam, especially Chinese. Ho would prefer to be independent of both Moscow and Peiping - another Tito. Ayub also claimed that at least a part of the NLF would like to be independent of Hanoi.

The Foreign Minister, who had just returned from China, was most guarded in his account of conditions in China. In fact, he tried to give me the impression that the cultural revolution with its Red Guard was coming to an end. However, it was a relief not to have to talk to Bhutto and the former Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed. President Ayub was as cordial as usual, though completely preoccupied with Kashmir. I feel that with reasonable effort we can improve our relations with him.

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State Dept. Guidelines
By g, NARA 5-3-98

~~SECRET~~Iran

In my short stopover in Tehran, I had a two-hour talk with the Shah. As I have known him for twenty-four years, we had a most frank discussion of everything that was on his mind. He strongly supports our position in Vietnam. He listened attentively to developments in Manila and Vietnam and indicated satisfaction that he had been able to make some contribution in sending a medical team and giving other assistance. I thanked him in the President's name and suggested that additional assistance would be welcome.

The Shah has matured over the years and the country has made striking progress. It is on a sounder basis politically, socially, and economically. The Shah has been to Moscow and to countries in Eastern Europe recently. I was relieved to find that he was under no illusion about Moscow. Although he has accepted economic aid and is increasing trade, he knows that Moscow wants to unseat him and replace him with a leftist government. He is, however, under the impression that he can sell substantial quantities of oil directly to Eastern Europe.

I urged caution in his demands of our oil companies to increase their production. As I was there in 1951 during the Mossadeq period to attempt to negotiate a settlement, I could point to the danger of a break. I gather from my oil friends that this advice has had a useful effect. However, I have some sympathy for the Shah's position. I understand Kuwait is getting one hundred million dollars more in royalties than Iran and of course doesn't know what to do with the money. Iran could put this money to good use both in increasing its military strength and in investing in sound economic developments.

The Shah is no longer concerned that the Soviet Union will attack him from the North but is gravely concerned that the Soviets will encourage Nasser and Iraq to encircle him. He wants to be strong enough to meet this threat. He spoke of the large quantities of weapons the Soviets had furnished Iraq and the UAR. He feels that with the withdrawal of the British from Aden, the UAR will take over Yemen, next the Southern Arabian

Federation,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-50
By ip NARA. Date 3-1-90

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Iran (page 2)

Federation, and thereby arrive at the Persian Gulf. He feels that he cannot expect us automatically to come to his assistance if he is attacked and therefore he must be able to defend himself. He is pleased with the recent purchase of supersonic aircraft and would like to have more money to invest in both defense and in economic development. He takes pride in the fact that his gross national product has increased by more than ten percent a year in the last couple of years and hopes to be able to continue that momentum. He appears to be more confident in his political position.

The change in Tehran since my first visit in 1942 is fantastic.

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Italy

I called on Moro, Fanfani and Nenni and talked with other officials at a luncheon given by Fanfani. Fanfani particularly was much interested in every aspect of Vietnam. He is keen to do something constructive and feels that there is some hope in his contacts. He reminded me that I had asked Italy for assistance to SVN when I saw him last January and pointed out that they had given considerable assistance since my visit. A large orphanage in Saigon was being built.

I raised the question of Chinese representation and urged him not to take a position without full consultation with the United States and not to go beyond support of a study group. Fanfani asked me to talk to Nenni in the same vein. Later, I found Nenni quite agreeable to that position.

Nenni is concerned about the bombing and feels that a settlement could be reached if we would stop. I of course gave him the usual answer.

I found Fanfani surprisingly well informed and astute on the problems of Vietnam and Red China. He believes that there is more chance of quiet talks between the United States and North Vietnam than any public meeting. He was especially pleased with the tone of the Manila communique and although he regarded Vietnam as "a local problem" for the United States, Italy was most anxious to see it settled. The United States could then concentrate more on the current problems in Europe which he described as particularly delicate and difficult at the present time.

My talk with Moro was not as detailed but covered much the same ground.

In my audience with the Pope, he showed an understanding and concern for Vietnam and a desire to do whatever he could

to end

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 90-50

By up NARA. Date 3-1-90

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Italy (page 2)

to end the war. I emphasized that in any appeal he made for cessation of hostilities he should be even-handed in his call on North Vietnam as well as the United States. Otherwise I explained it would only increase Hanoi's intransigence. He assured me that that would be his policy.

He expressed his hope for another Christmas truce that would last more than forty-eight hours.

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~~SECRET~~France

My discussion with the NATO Council in Paris appeared to satisfy all the Members except the French. I explained that the United States was a two-ocean nation and had never permitted its obligations in the Pacific to detract from its concern for Europe. I pointed out that it was at the height of the Korean War, when we had little excess military strength, that the NATO forces were planned. It was December 1950 that President Truman asked General Eisenhower to take the Supreme Command of NATO forces. Ambassador Cleveland has reported that the talks were useful, and quieted to some extent the concern of the Council Members.

My meeting with Foreign Minister Couve de Murville was a courtesy call. I expressed the view that France had an obligation to attempt to end the fighting and should use its influence with Hanoi to that end. I told him what I had said to the NATO Council and others that President de Gaulle's speech in Phnom Penh was counterproductive and had increased, in my judgment, Hanoi's intransigence. As usual he was genial but cynical.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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By if NARA. Date 3-1-90~~SECRET~~

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Bonn

Although the German Ministers were much preoccupied with their own problems, they showed great interest in Manila and developments in Vietnam. Perhaps of all the European countries they have greater understanding of the need to stop aggression. As Erhard said to the press in my presence last year, "The American firm stand in Vietnam proves again what great allies they are, proves again that they will stand with us in Berlin." The Germans also take satisfaction in the fact that they are doing more than any other country in giving help in the humanitarian field. In addition to their hospital ship, they have sent medical personnel and supplies and other equipment such as buses. I underlined to Erhard, the other Ministers, and members of the Bundestadt I met, the hope that they would carry their work on and expand it.

I had the impression that the German crisis is not as deep as some would have us believe, but is due more to the personal inadequacies of Erhard and to the trend towards the Willi Brandt conception of the abandonment of Adenauer's rigidities in relations with Eastern Europe and East Germany. I opposed Dulles' subservience to what I considered Adenauer's unrealistic policies and believe the attitudes of the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats are more in line with American interests. I gather Schroeder is somewhat more flexible although I did not see him.

We must keep Germany firmly in NATO and a strong part of the integrated force, but we should encourage her to improve relations with Eastern Europe and reduce the real fear in Eastern Europe of what they call "German revanchism".

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 90-50
By ip NARA, Date 3-1-90

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~~SECRET~~London

Foreign Secretary George Brown and Prime Minister Wilson are anxious to do everything they can to help bring about the end of hostilities in Vietnam. They rightly recognize their responsibilities as Cochairmen. Brown, though new in the diplomatic field, has been one of the strongest backers from the ranks of Labor of Wilson's support of U.S. policy in Vietnam. He would of course like the personal kudos of pulling off a deal in Moscow but his motives are good. I spent some hours with him discussing every aspect of the Russian situation. He is hopeful but realistic that the Russians may not have the necessary influence in Hanoi to bring about negotiations.

Wilson is of course much involved in his problems with Rhodesia and the economic difficulties at home which will affect his policies. He appeared, however, very confident that the domestic economy was on the mend.

I had lunch with Ted Heath who feels Wilson has muddied the water with Rhodesia. He also feels it was a mistake to announce Britain's withdrawal from Aden before the South Arabian Federation was strong enough to stand on its own. He is concerned over Nasser's continued actions in Yemen which threaten Western oil interests in the Arabian Peninsula.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-50
By JP NARA, Date 3-1-90

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~~SECRET~~Morocco

At Ambassador Tasca's urging and to fulfill an old promise to the King, I stopped off at Rabat on my way home. The King is understanding of and has sympathy with our policies in Vietnam. There is not much he can do. He has sent one cargo of phosphate fertilizer and I encouraged him to do more. He was just back from a visit to the Soviet Union and had obtained agreements for economic assistance. Whether these will materialize in actual deliveries is still to be seen. They do involve, however, sending a number of Russian technicians promptly and his Ministers were anxious to get from us our experience with subversive action in other parts of the world. I think it is much to our interest to encourage this.

In spite of his hospitable reception, the King is under no illusions that the Soviets would like to unseat him and supplant him with a leftist government. In fact, he told me they had been frank in telling him that although they wanted to be friendly, he must understand that if he got into difficulties with any of the countries that were in the "socialist family," the Soviet Union would be on their side. He told me they mentioned the following countries: UAR, Algeria, Mali, Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville), Tanzania, Somalia, Syria and Iraq.

The King is concerned over the extremely heavy shipments of arms to Algeria. They are so large that our own military officers in Rabat are at a loss to understand just what the Russians have in mind. The King shares the Shah's and the Ethiopian Emperor's concern over Nasser's aggressive intentions. They are all worried over what will happen when the British leave Aden. They look upon Nasser as a Soviet tool and watch with concern the military build-up with Russian weapons in UAR, Iraq, Algeria, Somalia, and now Syria.

The King is unhappy that we have refused to sell him ten to fifteen million dollars in tank and anti-tank weapons which

he feels

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 90-50

By up NARA, Date 3-1-90

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Morocco (page 2)

he feels is necessary to enable Morocco to hold out against Algerian attack for the few days necessary to take the issue to the Security Council. Without more modern weapons, he feels an Algerian attack might penetrate so deeply in Moroccan territory that he would be unseated.

The King expressed concern about the defense of Saudi Arabia against possible Nasser attack and hopes we will give King Faysal full support.

For my part I have been and am now increasingly concerned about what the Soviets are up to in the Middle East and feel there should be a strategic study of the military, political, and economic implications of the entire area from Morocco to Iran. The threat to the oil resources is as much in Libya as in the Arabian Peninsula. Morocco is on the right flank of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The use of facilities in Morocco are vital to its operation.

I hope by the time the King arrives in February, there can be at least a preliminary estimate which will make possible some decision on his problems.


~~SECRET~~General

The trip was well worthwhile. I was well received everywhere. , I was able to answer questions and satisfy to some extent the doubts in the minds of the members of the governments, as well as the press.

The Manila Conference has created a better understanding in the countries I visited of our purposes, our limited objectives and our future attitudes. I emphasized that the President was determined to achieve our limited objectives but that the fears and criticisms that our actions threaten world peace were not justified. I explained that the President had no intention of enlarging the war to include Red China or the Soviet Union.

There is almost universal popular opposition to bombing of North Vietnam and there is a strong hope that a way will be found to end it. This hope is stimulated by the Eastern European countries. The Soviets are frustrated by not being able to protect from attack what they call a "sister socialist state" and Moscow allies are anxious to see this attack ended. I emphasized on every occasion, however, that the bombing was a military necessity and that the President could not stop it unless there was reciprocal action on the part of Hanoi.

Because of the nature of the Manila Communique and Declarations, it is generally assumed that there will be no further escalation in the bombing of North Vietnam. It seems evident that if there is a noticeable escalation, much of the good will of Manila will be dissipated.



W. Averell Harriman

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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90-50

By

NARA, Date

3-1-90

Tuesday, November 29, 1966 - 2 pm

Mr. President:

Attached, for your signature, is a suggested reply to President Bokassa of the Central African Republic (CAR), who has written you to request U. S. economic aid. The CAR is one of the most backward and sparsely populated of African countries. It is a good example of the kind of place we plan to handle in the future through the World Bank and new regional and subregional institutions -- a la the Korry Report. The proposed reply tries to explain our position to Bokassa as gently as possible.

W. W. Rostow

Rostow - 16
Hold

Pres file

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-49
By inf NARA, Date 7-17-90

104

December 2, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your most welcome letter, brought to the White House by your distinguished Minister of State, Mr. Alexandre Banza. I am very sorry that I was not able to meet Minister Banza personally, but my Special Assistant, Mr. Walt Rostow, and Mr. Joseph Palmer, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, received him in my behalf and gave me full reports on their conversations. His visit was most pleasant and useful to us.

I was very interested to read your comments on the problems facing the Central African Republic. As you know, it is our policy to assist, within our means, the development of African nations determined to improve their living standards. Despite the restraints imposed by our balance of payments and our national budget, we are trying to make our assistance to Africa increasingly effective. For example, we are now emphasizing regional projects and regional institutions, because we believe that economic growth can often be best achieved in units with a larger resource base and market system than are present in a single country and can be facilitated by the development of African regional and subregional institutions.

We are moving in these directions in the hope that we can help the nations of Africa to build an effective, multilateral framework for economic cooperation -- among themselves and with industrial nations which recognize the importance of African development. We believe that this is the best assurance that the opportunities you describe will be fully realized by the Central African Republic and her sister states throughout your great continent.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 90-49
By ing NARA. Date 7-17-90

I want you to know, Mr. President, that I treasure the excellent relations that exist between our two countries. The American people will always be concerned to maintain the bonds of friendship which unite us. In this spirit, I extend my best wishes for your own good health and for the happiness and prosperity of the Government and people of the Central African Republic.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Jean-Bedel Bokassa
President of the Central African Republic
Bangui

LBJ/EKH/vmr
11/29/66 -- 2:00 pm

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 29, 1966
9:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a memorandum from the Secretary of State on non-proliferation language. He proposes that we accept the change suggested by a Soviet representative in New York, which would add the phrase "to any recipient whatsoever" in connection with both the transfer and control clauses of the treaty.

The major effect would be to prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons to the U. K. -- or to other states which have manufactured nuclear weapons.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 89-26
By ing NARA, Date 5-14-90

WWRostow:rln

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 28, 1966

~~SECRET~~

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested Language for the Non-Proliferation Treaty:
Relationship to Existing and Possible Allied Nuclear
Arrangements.

Attached to this memorandum is new language for
the first article of a non-proliferation treaty.

This draft states an obligation by a nuclear-weapon
State ". . . not to transfer nuclear weapons. . . to any
recipient whatsoever directly, or indirectly; (and) not to
relinquish to any recipient whatsoever its control over its
nuclear weapons. . . ." This draft is based on the language
which was attached to my memorandum to you of October 14 on
this subject. It incorporates changes in this earlier
language suggested, on a personal basis, by the Soviet repre-
sentative in New York. The Soviet representative stated that
he did not know whether these changes would make our draft
acceptable to Moscow but said that they would improve it a
great deal from the Soviet point of view.

The first change suggested is to prohibit transfers
of nuclear weapons "to any recipient whatsoever." Our earlier
language would have precluded transfers of nuclear weapons to
any non-nuclear-weapon state "either individually or by virtue
of its membership in a military alliance or group of States."
The second change is to prohibit the relinquishment of control
over its nuclear weapons "to any recipient whatsoever" as
contrasted with the previous language which prohibited a
relinquishment of control without explicitly saying to whom.

There follows an analysis of the suggested revised
language. It shows that with the exception of the transfer of
nuclear weapons (as opposed to control of them) to the U. K.,

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State Dept. Guidelines

By h NARA, Date 9-3-98

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- 2 -

dealt with in paragraph 6) the revised language would not change the substantive obligations over those stated in our prior language.

Like our earlier draft, the undertakings in the new one would parallel the obligations of the U. S. Atomic Energy Act.

Like the earlier one, this draft:

1) Would not disturb existing bilateral arrangements. I believe the Soviets already understand this but this should be made quite clear as a matter of negotiating history.

2) Would have no bearing on the decision of the NATO allies to go to war, or on the establishment of a permanent NATO committee for nuclear planning and consultation.

3) Would not preclude the assignment to NATO of additional Polaris submarines with U. S. nuclear weapons in a manner consistent with present legislation.

4) Would not rule out the establishment of a multilateral entity in which non-nuclear-weapons states participated, and to which they made financial contributions, so long as there was no transfer to this entity of an ownership interest in nuclear warheads (as opposed to delivery vehicles) and so long as the United States retained control over the nuclear warheads. It would not bar participants in such an entity from having their own veto either on the basis of prohibiting firing from their territory or as otherwise provided by agreement.

5) Would not bar succession by a federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. It would bar transfer of nuclear warheads to a European defense community not involving a new federated European state. But it would permit the formation of a European collective nuclear force, with joint ownership of delivery vehicles, so long as any participating nuclear-weapon state (U. K. or France) retained control of its nuclear warheads.

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- 3 -

6) Would bar transfers of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives to the U. K. (The earlier draft would only have prohibited relinquishment of control over such weapons or explosives to the U. K.) However, we cannot now transfer completed weapons to the U. K. under the Atomic Energy Act. (The U. S. has for many months taken the position publicly that nuclear explosive devices, even for peaceful purposes, cannot realistically and properly be distinguished from nuclear weapons.) In general, the kind of cooperation in which we now engage with the British would be protected by the third clause of the proposed language which would prohibit assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives only to non-nuclear-weapon States.

.

I believe this language would keep open enough options for the present, and the treaty would, of course, contain a provision permitting U. S. withdrawal if it later felt its supreme interests were jeopardized. If you approve, I will authorize Mr. Foster to state to the Soviet representative that he believes that if the language attached commends itself to the Soviet Union it would be considered by the United States as a suitable basis for consultation with its allies in order to facilitate coming to a final position by both sides.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Attachment: Draft Article I.

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Attachment

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~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

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ARTICLE I

"Each nuclear-weapons State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives to any recipient whatsoever directly, or indirectly; not to relinquish to any recipient whatsoever its control over its nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives."

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 89-27

By ing NARA, Date 4-26-89

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~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

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18

FROM: WALT ROSTOV
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661098

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-510
By is, NARA Date 10-20-99

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 29, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOV

HEREWITH A MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON AFTER HIS
TALKS WITH GENE ROSTOV.

OUR COMMENTS WILL FOLLOW.

PM UX 001/29
1500 ZULU NOVEMBER 29 1966
FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT
SECRET
T.387/66
MESSAGE BEGINS

I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR SECOND MESSAGE OF
NOVEMBER 19 EXPLAINING THE TERMS OF YOUR OFFER OF
35 MILLION DOLLARS TO MAKE EASIER OUR TASK IN THE TRIPARTITE
TALKS. MY TALK WITH GENE ROSTOV WAS ALSO EXTREMELY VALUABLE
AND FRUITFUL, AS I AM SURE HE WILL HAVE TOLD YOU.
I ENTIRELY SHARE YOUR WISH TO SEE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON
THESE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS AS A CONTRIBUTION TO HOLDING NATO
TOGETHER AT THIS DIFFICULT TIME. YOU YOURSELF, OF COURSE,
FULLY UNDERSTAND THE NEEDS FOR US TO ACHIEVE A BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS SURPLUS IF WE ARE TO GO ON MAKING OUR CONTRIBUTION
TO THE COMMON CAUSE IN NATO AND ELSEWHERE, INCLUDING THE
FAR EAST. WE ALSO HAVE TO CONSIDER THE EFFECT ON OUR OTHER
NATO ALLIES IF THE TRIPARTITE TALKS GO ON TOO LONG.

NEVERTHELESS, GIVEN ESPECIALLY THE DIFFICULTY FOR THE
GERMANS IN TAKING EFFECTIVE DECISIONS FOR SOME LITTLE TIME,
I AM SURE IT IS RIGHT THAT WE SHOULD ACCEPT YOUR HELPFUL OFFER
OF 35 MILLION DOLLARS AND I AM GLAD TO KNOW THAT PAYMENT
CAN ACTUALLY BE MADE BEFORE DECEMBER 31 1967 AT THE LATEST,
EVEN IF DEFINITE ORDERS HAVE NOT BEEN PLACED BY THEN.
I TALKED TO GENE ROSTOV ABOUT THE EXACT TERMS OF THE OFFER.
MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT WE FOR OUR PART WOULD MAKE NO
CHANGES IN OUR TROOP AND SUPPLY DISPOSITIONS IN GERMANY
BEFORE THE END OF JUNE 1967: BUT THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE HELD
TO PREVENT US FROM MAKING SAVINGS IN THE PERSONAL EXPENDITURE
OF OUR TROOPS AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE ECONOMIES NOT AFFECTING
THEIR COMBAT CAPABILITY. NOR WOULD IT BE DESIGNED TO PREVENT
US FROM ROTATING OUR TROOPS IN THE NORMAL WAY OR PREPARING IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR ANY WITHDRAWALS WHICH MAY SUBSEQUENTLY
PROVE NECESSARY. MEANWHILE WE SHOULD CONTINUE WITH THE
TRIPARTITE TALK AND DO OUR UTMOST TO REACH THE EARLIEST
POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON THE MILITARY AND FINANCIAL QUESTIONS
AT ISSUE. SO THAT WE MAY THEN AS YOU SAY CONCERT ANY MOVES

ABROX FROM QUICK COPY

TOGETHER. I SINCERELY HOPE THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE THIS EARLY NEXT YEAR. BUT IF, BY THE END OF JUNE 1967, AGREEMENT HAS STILL NOT BEEN REACHED, THEN, AS JIM CALLAGHAN AND I WERE AT PAINS TO MAKE CLEAR TO GENE ROSTOW, WE SHOULD HAVE TO REGARD OURSELVES AS FREE TO TAKE WHATEVER MEASURES SEEMED NECESSARY TO US TO COVER IN FULL THE BALANCE OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE COSTS OF OUR FORCES IN GERMANY IN 1967/68, REMAINING AFTER PAYMENTS BY GERMANY AND YOUR PAYMENT OF 35 MILLION DOLLARS.

AS REGARDS THE ORDERS WHICH YOU WILL PLACE HERE, I WOULD ONLY SAY TWO THINGS AT THIS STAGE. FIRST, THEY MUST MAKE A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM AND TO EMPLOYMENT IN THIS COUNTRY. THIS MEANS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE PURCHASE OF FUEL WITH A HIGH IMPORT CONTENT WOULD NOT MEET OUR NEEDS, SO WE SHALL HAVE TO LOOK FOR HARDWARE PURCHASES. SECOND, I WAS GLAD TO HAVE YOUR ASSURANCE, AND ITS CLARIFICATION BY ROSTOW, THAT THESE ORDERS WOULD BE ADDITIONAL TO THE F.111 ARRANGEMENT AND TO THE CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE DOLLAR ACCRUALS FROM UNITED STATES FORCES STATIONED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. I ASSUME THAT BOB MCNAMARA WILL ARRANGE FOR HIS PEOPLE TO DISCUSS WITH OURS IN DETAIL THE ORDERS TO BE PLACED, THE PAYMENT ARRANGEMENTS, AND THE MECHANISM FOR ENSURING ADDITIONALITY.

I UNDERSTAND FROM GENE ROSTOW THAT, WITH REGARD TO THE FAR EAST, WHICH YOU MENTIONED IN YOUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 19 YOU WOULD WISH US TO MAKE NO DRAMATIC CHANGE IN OUR FORCE DISPOSITIONS THERE WITHIN THE SIX MONTHS PERIOD WE ARE CONSIDERING. I CAN CERTAINLY ASSURE YOU THAT APART FROM THE CHANGES RESULTING FROM OUR DEFENCE REVIEW AND OUR ECONOMY MEASURES OF JULY, WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY DISCUSSED TOGETHER, WE HAVE NOTHING IN MIND FOR THAT PERIOD.

I TAKE IT THAT YOU WILL NOW WANT TO TAKE SOUNDINGS ON THE HILL. WE MUST THEN CONSIDER HOW TO TELL THE GERMANS THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE BETWEEN US, WITHOUT GIVING THEM ANY CAUSE TO THINK THAT THERE IS ANY LESS REASON FOR THEM TO MEET YOUR AND OUR FOREIGN EXCHANGE COSTS TO THE FULLEST EXTENT THEY CAN. WE MUST ALSO CONSIDER HOW TO TELL THE REST OF NATO, WHO WILL UNDOUBTEDLY NEED REASSURANCE AT THE PROSPECT OF THE TRIPARTITE TALKS LASTING LONGER THAN THEY THOUGHT AT FIRST. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE MUST CLEARLY TRY TO REACH TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON A REPORT TO NATO WHICH WILL ALLOW THEM TO GIVE THE FULLEST POSSIBLE GUIDANCE TO THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES, SO THAT NATOS CONSIDERATION OF STRATEGY AND FORCE LEVELS CAN GO FORWARD IN PARALLEL WITH OUR OWN TRIPARTITE EXERCISE.

FINALLY, WE MUST CONSIDER TOGETHER THE TERMS AND TIMING OF A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH, FOR MY PART, I SHOULD LIKE TO SEE NOT LATER THAN THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING IN DECEMBER AND THE ADJOURNMENT OF PARLIAMENT FOR THE CHRISTMAS RECESS.

MANY THANKS AGAIN FOR ALL YOUR HELP IN THIS DIFFICULT BUT, FOR US, ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL MATTER.

MESSAGE ENDS

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

DTG: 291749Z NOV 66

SENT
WHCA**SECRET**EEA360
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2420

1966 NOV 29 15 44

FROM: W. W. ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
INFO: BILL MOYERS
CITE: CAP661096~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT CHIANG KAI-SHEK HAS RESPONDED TO YOUR LETTER BY DECIDING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WILL NOT, REPEAT NOT, WITHDRAW FROM THE UN IN THE EVENT THE ITALIAN STUDY RESOLUTION IS PASSED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. TO REGISTER PROTEST IN THE EVENT THE ITALIAN RESOLUTION PASSES, THE CHINESE DELEGATION WILL STAGE A TEMPORARY WALK-OUT AFTER DECLARING THAT NATIONALIST CHINA DOES NOT RELINQUISH ANY OF ITS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS A UN MEMBER.

THE CHINESE SAY THEIR DECISION WAS BASED ON OUR STATEMENT THAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO US INTERESTS.

AMBASSADOR MCCONAUGHY BELIEVES WE HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN KEEPING THE CHINESE FROM TAKING AN ACTION HARMFUL TO US AND TO THEM.

DTG: 291513Z NOVEMBER 1966

GROUP COUNT IS 150 IMI 150

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*sent by wire 20
to Ranch*

November 28, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

State wants your clearance on the following deal.

1. The Canadians would put up 21 million dollars in special food assistance to India as a pure grant. They may be announcing this in any case this afternoon or tomorrow morning. It consists of 150 thousand tons of wheat plus \$9 million worth of flour, milk concentrates, etc.
2. We would put up 500 thousand tons of grain valued at \$35 million on concessional terms (PL 480 Title I).
3. The Indians would agree to buy either from us alone (or from us and the Canadians) an additional 500 thousand tons of grain. (The Canadians may take the view that it is inappropriate, given the Indian foreign exchange position, to buy grain now. Besides, they may think that it would fudge up their normal commercial marketing arrangements. In that case, the 500,000 tons order would come to us.)
4. This would be the nut of the deal. Are we empowered to put this deal to the Indians, once we have confirmed the Canadian \$21 million grant offer?
5. In addition, we would go out promptly to the Australians and ask them to put up 200,000 tons of grain on concessional terms. Our people think we might end up getting 100,000 tons, but it will take time *for two* ^{State does} ~~And we do~~ not think the deal should be held up until the Australians come round.

reasons. First, the Australians are only now gathering in their harvest and don't quite know where they stand. Second, they haven't yet moved over like the Canadians to the idea of concessional grain

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

6. We would also go out to the French with a request that they put up some grain on concessional terms. We are not optimistic.

7. For your information, the last grain ship carrying wheat under present agreements from the U. S. to India will leave on December 7 and arrive by mid January.

Grain arrivals from all sources, repeat all sources, now look as follows: October 918, 000 tons; November 820, 000 tons; December ⁸²⁰ ~~793~~, 000 tons; January 564, 000 tons; February zero.

In short, no grain arrivals are yet firmed up between mid January and the end of February.

8. The best estimate we have for the current harvest is 78.5 million tons, not 84 million tons. The Indians are projecting higher figures in order to avoid panic and to get through their elections.

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres. file

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday-November 28, 1966 - 4:00 p.m.

From: W. W. Rostow

To: The President

Info: Bill Moyers

Suggested Delegation to Amistad Dam Visit

*Jacobson telephoned
Wm Bowdler
on 11/28/66*

I suggest the following to comprise your party:

- Mrs. Johnson
- Secretary Udall
- Assistant Secretary Gordon
- Ambassador Freeman
- US Water and ~~Boundary~~ Commissioner Friedkin
- Governor Connally
- Congressman O. C. Fisher
- Congressman Eligio de la Garza.

*add
Senator Yarborough
Cong. - not Kazen
Cong. White*

Approve ☒ .

Disapprove ☐ .

Speak to me ☐ .

We understand that President Diaz Ordaz plans to bring:

- Mrs. Diaz Ordaz
- Minister of Hydraulic Works
- Jose Hernandez Teran
- Mexican Water and Boundary
- Commissioner David Herrera
- Jordan
- Coahuila State Governor
- Braulio Fernandez Aguirre.

E.O. 11652 (b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By Out, NARA, Date 1-16-90

The Mexicans have indicated that they would be pleased if we would invite Ambassador Margain to come along.

Approve ☒ .

Disapprove ☐ .

Pres file

CONFIDENTIALMonday-November 28, 1966 -
4:00 p.m.

From: W. W. Rostow
 To: The President
 Info: Bill Moyers

*Johnson telephoned
 Brudler on 11/24/66*

Scenario for Amistad Visit - Saturday, December 3.

President Diaz Ordaz suggests the following:

- 12:00 noon - Arrival of President Johnson and Party at the Mexican construction site where he will be met by President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz.
- 12:00 - Luncheon at two possible sites:
 1:30 pm -
 -- more formal lunch in Ciudad Acuña (16 miles away)
 -- barbecue at Mexican construction site.
- 1:30 -
 3:30 pm - helicopter tour of construction site with stops at key locations.
- 3:45 pm - Departure from Mexican construction site.

The tour of the construction site can be shortened if you desire.

President Diaz Ordaz inquires whether you prefer luncheon at Ciudad Acuña or barbecue at construction site.

Prefer Ciudad Acuña lunch ☐Prefer construction site barbecue ☒

E.O. 12300, Sec. 3.4(b)
 White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
 By DeH, NARA, Date 1-16-90

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - November 28, 1966 - 4:00 p.m.

From: W. W. Rostow
To: The President
Info: Bill Moyers

Press Announcement of Visit

Ambassador Freeman has asked the Mexicans to make no announcement of the visit until we can coordinate a simultaneous release.

He reports, however, that many people know about it and strongly recommends that the announcement be made tomorrow morning at the latest -- otherwise it is going to leak. Commissioner Friedkin reports that Mexican officials at the construction site are also aware of the impending visit -- another potential source for leaks.

I strongly recommend that the announcement be made tomorrow morning.

Attached is a suggested press statement which I have cleared with Linc Gordon.

OK for 11:30 am release
Tues. 1 Nov 29
Ranch time

Attachment

Suggested press statement.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-49
By inf NARA. Date 7-17-90

Jackson telephoned
Boulder 11/28/66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Suggested Press Announcement

At the invitation of President Diaz Ordaz, President Johnson will join the Mexican President on Saturday, December 3, to make a joint inspection of the Amistad Dam construction site on the Rio Grande.

The President will be accompanied by ^{Mrs. Johnson} Secretary Stewart Udall, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Lincoln Gordon, Ambassador Fulton Freeman, Governor John Connally, Congressmen O. C. Fisher and Eligio de la Garza, and United States Boundary and Water Commissioner Joseph L. Friedkin.

Amistad Dam is the second major international storage dam to be built by the two governments on the Rio Grande pursuant to the 1944 Water Treaty.

The dam will prevent floods originating in rivers on both sides of the boundary from causing loss of life and great property damage such as occurred in the floods of 1954 and 1958. It will also assist in water conservation and offer potential power generation. It will enable the two governments for the first time to control the waters of the Rio Grande throughout its international section.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 28, 1966

Mr. President:

You should know of the following conversation. Stu Symington called me. He said: "You and I have been hawks on Viet Nam since 1961. I am thinking of getting off the train soon. If I do, the first one to know will be the President; but we are old friends and I wanted to give you this warning.

"It looks to me that with the restraints on the use of airpower, we can't win. We are getting in deeper and deeper with no end in sight.

"In 1968 Nixon will murder us. He will become the biggest dove of all times. There never has been a man in American public life that could turn so fast on a dime.

"I am going out now to Asia and will stop in Viet Nam. I'll be in touch with you when I get back. But I wanted you to know that this is how I feel right now."

I said that I hoped he would spend enough time in Viet Nam to get a feel for the situation and understand why the mood of our people out there is more hopeful than his. I told him that I would be most interested in hearing his views when he returned and that I was sure you would also wish to hear from him.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MESSAGE
NOT PART SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12812
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY *Det* OR *8-25-86*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC 1/30 P/S State Dep. GL.
By SPW NARA, Date 3/1/06

*Per file
sent by wire to Rand*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 28, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

State wants your clearance on the following deal.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

6. We would also go out to the French with a request that they put up some grain on concessional terms. We are not optimistic.

7. For your information, the last grain ship carrying wheat under present agreements from the U. S. to India will leave on December 7 and arrive by mid January.

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In short, no grain arrivals are yet firmed up between mid January and the end of February.

8. The best estimate we have for the current harvest is 78.5 million tons, not 84 million tons. The Indians are projecting higher figures in order to avoid panic and to get through their elections.

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear George:

My sincere thanks for your most thoughtful letter of November 21. Your good wishes and support are a source of strength and encouragement.

As you say, we have accomplished a good deal in three years -- less, perhaps, than we might have hoped, but far more than might have been reasonably expected. But this is no time for any of us to rest on our oars. You can be sure that your President has no intention to "relax or waiver."

There are important and difficult tasks ahead. But I am utterly convinced that this country of ours, when it sets its mind to do a job, can accomplish the impossible. And so we shall move forward.

The World Bank and IDA have been playing a vital role in many of our more important tasks in the world. I am sure you are right that they can, indeed, encourage the sub-continent of Asia in the direction of a more hopeful economic system. And there are other challenges that must be faced and met.

My thanks for your kind words on the operation. I am feeling better almost hourly in these happy surroundings.

As you said, the responsibilities of this office are doubtless greater than ever before. But our cause is good and just, and with the determination and devotion of the American people, with the help of able and unselfish men such as yourself, and with the cooperation of friends in many other lands, we shall continue to do what must be done -- at home and abroad.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

Mr. George D. Woods
President
International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
Washington, D. C. 20433

LBJ:WJJ:WWR:mz (11/28/66)

November 28, 1966

Mr. President:

Subject: Operation Train Wreck

Attached is unsolicited,
unverifiable, but credible
testimony.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment: Letter to Mr. Walt Rostow from Philip Kaiser,
dated November 25, 1966, re performance of Eugene Rostow.

~~SECRET~~ -- EXDIS

November 28, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW -- INFORMATION

The following cable from New Delhi just arrived from Dorothy Jacobson to Orville Freeman. Abel was chief Department of Agriculture technician sent out to India, whose report should be completed today in Washington.

QUOTE Judgment expressed in memo sent with Abel further confirmed since his departure. U. S. interests would be substantially served and genuinely critical threat of famine ameliorated if way could be found to authorize enough grain shipments to keep pipeline full. Believe it extremely important to take some action immediately. UNQUOTE

Message quoted: New Delhi 7727

DECLASSIFIED	
STATE 4-28-78; NSC 11-24-78 (#132)	
By OCH/pn/ES	NARS, Date 8-25-86

~~SECRET~~ -- EXDIS

*sent by wire
to Ranch*

~~SECRET~~ -- EXDIS

November 28, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW -- INFORMATION

The following cable from New Delhi just arrived from Dorothy Jacobson to Orville Freeman. Abel was chief Department of Agriculture technician sent out to India, whose report should be completed today in Washington.

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DECLASSIFIED
State 4-28-78; NSC 11-24-78 (#13)
X Apr 158 8-25-86

~~SECRET~~ -- EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

30

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT
WHCA

1966 NOV 27 03 38

EEA332
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 2386

FROM: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM (ROSEN)
TO : JAKE JACOBSEN
CITE: CAP661071

66 NOV 26 PM 11:03

SATURDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES TO
PRIME MINISTERS HOLT AND HOLYOAKE FOR PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL.

1. HOLT MESSAGE

QUOTE:

MY WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR MAGNIFICENT ELECTION
VICTORY YESTERDAY.

YOU AND YOUR LIBERAL AND COUNTRY PARTY COLLEAGUES
HAVE RECEIVED A RINGING VOTE OF CONFIDENCE FROM THE PEOPLE
OF AUSTRALIA.

AS YOU BEGIN A NEW TERM AS PRIME MINISTER, YOU MAY
BE SURE THAT I SPEAK FOR ALL AMERICANS WHEN I WISH YOU
EVERY SUCCESS.

YOU MAY ALSO BE ASSURED THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED
STATES WILL SPARE NO EFFORT IN JOINING WITH AUSTRALIANS
IN EVERY SPHERE AND AT EVERY LEVEL TO STRIVE FOR THE COMMON
PRINCIPLES WE TOGETHER HOLD.

SINCERELY

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

90-46

By mg NARA, Date 7-16-90

UNQUOTE

2. HOLYOAKE MESSAGE

QUOTE:

IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME TO SEND YOU MY SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR ELECTION VICTORY YESTERDAY. I SHALL LOOK FORWAED TO CONTINUING THE VERY CLOSE AND FRUITFUL COOPERATION THAT WE HAVE ENJOYED IN THE PAST.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT TOGETHER WE CAN PERSERVERE AND SUCCEED IN ACCOMPLISHING THE GOOD AND COMMON GOALS FOR WHICH OUR TWO PEOPLES HAVE SO LONG STRUGGLED.

SINCERELY

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

UNQUOTE

3. WHILE WE WOULD HAVE NO PLAN TO RELEASE THE MESSAGES, UNLESS THE PRESIDENT SO DESIRED, WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION IF THE RECIPIENTS DID SO.

DTG: 270301Z NOV 66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Rostow

SENT
WHCA

EEA336
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2389

1966 NOV 27 20 40

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661074

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

66 NOV 27 PM 3:44

SUNDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN APPROVING THE \$100 MILLION PROGRAM LOAN FOR COLOMBIA, YOU INQUIRED WHETHER WE WERE NOT GIVING THIS COUNTRY TOO BIG A SLICE OF AVAILABLE ALLIANCE FUNDS AND MIGHT FIND OURSELVES SHORT FOR MEETING THE NEEDS OF OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBERS.

THE SHORT ANSWER IS: THE COLOMBIA LOAN WAS CALCULATED WITHIN A PLAN TO LIVE WITH THE FY 1967 APPROPRIATION FOR LATIN AMERICA. THE OBJECT WAS TO GIVE COLOMBIA THE KIND OF LIFT WE HAVE GIVEN AT A CRITICAL STAGE TO BRAZIL AND CHILE IN THE PAST TWO YEARS. NOW BRAZIL AND CHILE ARE MOVING, AID IS ON THE WAY DOWN. DETAILS FOLLOW.

THE ALLIANCE LOAN PROGRAM FOR FY 1967 IS LESS THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS; CONGRESS REDUCED THE LOAN FUND BY \$35 MILLION--FROM \$455 MILLION NOA, TO \$420 MILLION NOA. INCLUDING REPAYMENTS AND RECOVERIES, THIS MEANS PROGRAM LEVELS FOR 1967 OF ONLY \$470 MILLION INSTEAD OF THE \$500 MILLION.

BY TRIMMING COUNTRY PROGRAMS AND DEFERRING SOME PROJECTS INTO FY 1968, STATE/AID HAVE ADJUSTED THE 1967 LOAN PROGRAM TO FIT WITHIN THE LOWER AMOUNT APPROVED BY CONGRESS AS FOLLOWS:

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 90-49

By sig NARA. Date 7-17-90

	FY 1966	FY 1967 (TENTATIVE)
	(\$ MILLIONS)	
BRAZIL	229	190
CHILE	90	65
COLOMBIA	81	100
	---	---
SUBTOTAL	(400)	(355)
PERU	13	40
CENTRAL AMERICA	28	26
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	14	12
PANAMA	8	28
OTHER:	42	22
(BOLIVIA, ECUADOR, PARAGUAY, GUYANA, JAMAICA)	---	---
	505	470

REDUCTIONS IN THE BRAZIL AND CHILE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN THE PRINCIPAL MEANS OF LIVING WITHIN AVAILABLE FUNDS WHILE STILL PERMITTING THE START OF MAJOR PROGRAMS IN PANAMA AND PERU. BARRING UNFORESEEN EMERGENCIES, I BELIEVE WE CAN MAKE IT THROUGH THE FISCAL YEAR WITHOUT INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTY.

THERE WILL BE PROBLEMS IN TRYING TO GET MORE FUNDS FOR FY 1968 FOR TWO PURPOSES RELATED TO THE SUMMIT MEETING:

-- TO EXPAND INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK'S RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR INTEGRATION AND MULTINATIONAL PROJECTS;

-- TO EXPAND SPECIAL PROGRAMS IN EDUCATION AND AGRICULTURE.

THE CASE FOR THESE WILL DEPEND IN PART ON HOW BOLDLY LATIN AMERICA WILL BE PREPARED TO MOVE AT THE SUMMIT. WE ARE NOW TRYING TO FIND OUT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 271943Z NOV 66

EEA334
OO WTE10
DE WTE2388

CONFIDENTIAL

SENT
WHCA

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661073

1966 NOV 27 20 26

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 27, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM TO ME FROM BILL MACOMBER, JUST BACK FROM NEW DELHI, WILL INTEREST YOU AS A BACKGROUND FOR YOUR TALK WITH ORVILLE FREEMAN, WHICH, I UNDERSTAND, IS SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 28.

QUOTE I HAVE RETURNED THIS MORNING FROM A TRIP TO THE SUBCONTINENT AND I THOUGHT THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS, WITH RESPECT TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN INDIA, MIGHT BE OF INTEREST TO YOU:

1. NO OFFICIAL THAT I COULD FIND, EITHER U.S. OR INDIAN, NOW TAKES FURTHER PL 480 WHEAT SHIPMENTS FOR GRANTED. THAT MESSAGE HAS GOTTEN ACROSS.
2. AMBASSADOR BOWLES DID NOT MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT IN EFFECT SAYING, "DON'T WORRY, THE FOOD IS COMING". EARLIER, HOWEVER, HE DID ON A BACKGROUND BASIS SAY THIS TO A NUMBER OF RESIDENT U.S. NEWSPAPERMEN, AS HE FEARED THAT THEY OTHERWISE MIGHT WRITE STORIES WHICH WOULD EXACERBATE THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT'S PROBLEMS IN THIS PRE-ELECTION PERIOD. HE AND/OR OTHER EMBASSY OFFICIALS ARE NO LONGER MAKING COMMENTS OF THIS KIND ON A BACKGROUND OR OTHER BASIS.
3. SENIOR EMBASSY AND A.I.D. OFFICIALS REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN THAT IF ADDITIONAL PL 480 SHIPMENTS WERE NOT AUTHORIZED SOON, A BUBBLE WOULD APPEAR IN THE FOOD PIPELINE APPROXIMATELY 2-3 WEEKS BEFORE THE FEBRUARY ELECTIONS. THEY BELIEVE THIS WILL HAVE ADVERSE EFFECTS FOR MRS. GANDHI'S GOVERNMENT AND ESPECIALLY FOR MINISTERS SUCH AS SUBRAMANIAM AND ASHOK MEHTA. I STRESSED TO THE EMBASSY THE DANGER OF PREDICTING A BUBBLE IN THE FOOD PIPELINE UNLESS THEY WERE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN THAT IT WOULD IN FACT DEVELOP. I EMPHASIZED THE HIGHLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE EFFECT OF "CRYING WOLF" ON THIS ISSUE.

66 NOV 27 PM 38

SUNDAY

4. INDIAN AND EMBASSY OFFICIALS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DEVELOPING DROUGHT SITUATION IN THE STATES OF BIHAR AND EASTERN U.P. WHILE SOME EXPRESSED HOPE THAT LATE RAINS COULD STILL UNDO SOME OF THE PREDICTED DAMAGE, THE GENERAL FEELING IS THAT THESE TWO STATES ARE FACING MAJOR CROP FAILURES. IF SO, THIS COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN PRODUCING A SERIOUS SHORTFALL IN INDIAN PRODUCTION FOR THE SECOND YEAR RUNNING.

5. IN THEIR CONVERSATIONS WITH ME, AMERICAN AND INDIAN OFFICIALS REPEATEDLY URGED, IF IT WERE NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE U.S. TO AUTHORIZE SHIPMENTS OF 2 MILLION TONS OF GRAIN AT THIS TIME, THAT A FRACTION OF THIS AMOUNT (SUBRAMANIAM MENTIONED 500 THOUSAND) BE AUTHORIZED NOW IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE A BREAK IN THE PIPELINE.

6. THE NEED FOR IMPROVED AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION NOW DOMINATES INDIAN ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS. THIS IS IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THE SITUATION I FOUND WHEN I VISITED INDIA TWO YEARS AGO. AT THAT TIME THE FOCUS OF INDIAN ECONOMIC PLANNERS WAS ON THE INDUSTRIAL RATHER THAN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR.

7. FINALLY, WHILE IT IS PERHAPS TOO STRONG TO SAY THAT THE CURRENT INDIAN GOVERNMENT IS FLOUNDERING IN THIS PRE-ELECTION PERIOD, IT IS CLEAR THAT MRS. GANDHI'S LEADERSHIP IS SOMETHING LESS THAN DEFT AND FORCEFUL. THE BETTING, AS OF WHEN I LEFT DELHI, STILL FAVORED HER CONTINUING ON AS PRIME MINISTER AFTER ELECTIONS, BUT I DID NOT GET THE IMPRESSION THAT ANYONE WOULD GIVE VERY LONG ODDS ON THIS. THE MAJOR FACTORS IN HER FAVOR (APART FROM HER NAME) SEEMED TO BE THAT (A) SHE IS IN THE JOB, AND (B) AMONG OTHER CONGRESS PARTY PERSONALITIES, THERE IS NOT AT THIS TIME ANY GENERALLY AGREED UPON ALTERNATIVE. UNQUOTE.

DTG: 271849 NOVEMBER 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT
WHCA

Rostow

1966 NOV 27 20 34

EEA335
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2340

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661025

66 NOV 27 PM 3:45

SUNDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: MESSAGE THANKING U THANT FOR HIS CONGRATULATIONS
ON GEMINI FLIGHT

FOLLOWING FOR YOUR APPROVAL IS FRIENDLY MESSAGE TO U THANT
FOR HIS CONGRATULATIONS ON GEMINI XII. I BELIEVE HE WILL APPRECIATE
THIS COURTESY. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS SUGGESTED A ROUTINE PRESS
RELEASE EITHER IN TEXAS OR NEW YORK.

QUOTE: I GREATLY APPRECIATE THE MESSAGE YOU SENT ME ON THE
OCCASION OF THE GEMINI TWELVE FLIGHT, AND HAVE CONVEYED IT TO
THOSE CONCERNED. I AM SORRY THAT URGENT COMMITMENTS IN THE UNITED
NATIONS PREVENTED YOUR WITNESSING THE LAUNCH.

BOTH OF US ARE WORKING TO ENSURE THAT MANKIND ENJOYS THE
PEACEFUL USE OF OUTER SPACE. I AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR WHOLEHEARTED
COOPERATION AND THAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT IN THE
PREPARATION OF A TREATY WHICH WILL GUARANTEE THAT OUTER SPACE
AND CELESTIAL BODIES SHALLBE PERPETUALLY FREE FOR EXPLORATION AND
USE BY ALL.


I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR FURTHER COOPERATION IN EVERY ASPECT OF
THE MANY-SIDED SEARCH FOR PEACE. LYNDON B. JOHNSON UNQUOTE

DTG: 271949Z NOV 1966

DECLASSIFIED

Authority White House Guidelines, 2-24-83
By DAH, NARA, Date 1-16-90

CONFIDENTIAL



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NOV 27 21 31

FROM: ROSTOV
TO: JACOBSEN
CITE: CAP661876

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

I BELIEVE THIS IS THE FREEMAN MEMORANDUM YOU COULDN'T FIND
AND THEREFORE REQUESTED BY WIRE.

QUOTE:

NOVEMBER 7, 1966

TO: THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

FROM: ORVILLE FREEMAN
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF THE INDIAN SITUATION

I. CURRENT CROP PROSPECTS

THE MORE RECENT REPORTS FROM NEW DELHI, ESTIMATING THE COMING FOOD-GRAIN HARVEST AT 80-85 MILLION TONS, INDICATES A MUCH SMALLER FOODGRAIN HARVEST THAN WAS ANTICIPATED BY INDIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS A FEW MONTHS AGO. IT NOW SEEMS QUITE LIKELY THAT INDIA'S FOOD SITUATION WILL CONTINUE TO BE PRECARIOUS THROUGHOUT THE COMING YEAR AND THAT GRAIN IMPORT NEEDS WILL CONTINUE TO BE HIGH. THIS IS DUE IN PART TO A VERY POOR MONSOON AND IN PART TO SHORTCOMINGS IN THIS YEAR'S AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT EFFORT.

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SUNDAY
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II. AN EVALUATION OF THIS YEAR'S AGRICULTURAL EFFORT

THE NATURE OF THE MONSOON CONTINUES TO BE THE OVERWHELMING FACTOR DETERMINING THE LEVEL OF FOOD PRODUCTION ON THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT. THE SECOND MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IS THE USE OF FERTILIZER. IN THIS AREA, THE INDIANS HAVE PERFORMED WELL ON SOME COUNTS BUT POORLY ON OTHERS. THEY HAVE WILLINGLY ALLOCATED SCARCE FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOR THE IMPORT OF FERTILIZER IN ORDER TO MEET THE AGREED UPON TARGETS FOR FERTILIZER AVAILABILITY. HOWEVER, LAST YEAR BECAUSE OF DELAYS IN FINANCING MUCH OF THE FERTILIZER WAS NOT ORDERED ON TIME.

EFFORTS TO INCREASE FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL FERTILIZER IN INDIA HAVE BEEN QUITE SUCCESSFUL COMPARED WITH ANY PREVIOUS EFFORTS BUT NOT ADEQUATE WHEN RELATED TO THE SCALE OF INDIA'S NEEDS. A SIMILAR SHORTFALL EXISTS FOR INVESTMENT IN PESTICIDES AND THE MULTIPLICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF IMPROVED SEED VARIETIES.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

MINISTER SUBRAMANIAM SEEMS TO BE DOING HIS UTMOST TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES FOR INDIAN AGRICULTURE WHICH HE AND I MUTUALLY AGREED UPON SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. BUT PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN FERTILIZER IS MOVING SLOWLY. THE REASON IS, AT LEAST IN PART, THAT BOTH SIDES (THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE FOREIGN INVESTORS) ARE TRYING TO GET THE BEST DEAL POSSIBLE FOR THEMSELVES AND ARE WILLING TO DELAY IN ORDER TO GET IT. THE FOLLOW-THROUGH NECESSARY TO COMPLETE COMPLICATED NEGOTIATIONS IS LACKING ON THE INDIAN SIDE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM OF ENSURING THE NECESSARY ACTION FOR FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT CAN ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE PRIME MINISTER HERSELF. SOMEHOW SHE MUST BE MADE TO REALIZE THIS. REACHING AGREEMENT WITH MINISTER SUBRAMANIAM, HOWEVER COMPETENT AND INFLUENTIAL HE MAY BE, IS NOT ENOUGH. THE PRIME MINISTER, HOWEVER, IS DEEPLY PRE-OCCUPIED WITH THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE GENERAL ELECTION TO BE HELD IN FEBRUARY. THE KEY FIGURES IN POLITICS ARE JOCKEYING FOR POSITION IN ANTICIPATION OF THE FORMATION OF A NEW CABINET IN FEBRUARY.

WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE RELUCTANCE OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT TO EASE CONTROLS AND REGULATIONS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR. TWO YEARS AGO I WENT TO INDIA AND HELPED THEM TO SET UP A FOODGRAINS CORPORATION, COMPARABLE TO OUR COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION, WHICH WOULD HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPPORTING FARM PRICES AT A LEVEL WHICH WOULD MAKE THE USE OF MODERN INPUTS PROFITABLE. IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IS USING THE FOODGRAINS CORPORATION TO PROCURE FOODGRAINS AT BELOW MARKET PRICES, THUS DISCOURAGING FOOD PRODUCTION RATHER THAN STIMULATING IT WITH PROPER PRICING AS WAS ORIGINALLY INTENDED. HOWEVER, PROCUREMENT PRICES HAVE RECENTLY BEEN RAISED IN FOUR STATES. WE ARE PLANNING TO SEND TO INDIA, WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO, A MEMBER OF THE TEAM WHO ORIGINALLY HELPED ESTABLISH THIS CORPORATION TO EVALUATE ITS PERFORMANCE.

III. PROPOSED ACTION ON PL 480 INTERIM AGREEMENT


THESE MATTERS AND SOME OTHERS THAT WE ARE CHECKING OUT NEED TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION BEFORE ALLOCATING ANY SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF FOOD ASSISTANCE. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO REVIEW WITH THE INDIANS A PROGRESS CHECK LIST IN DETAIL WHEN NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE IN DECEMBER FOR THE BALANCE OF FISCAL 1967. IN THE MEANTIME I WOULD URGE THAT WE GO SLOWLY AND MAKE ONLY THE MINIMUM NECESSARY ALLOCATION TO AVOID BREAKING THE PIPE LINE.

WE CAN EXPECT NO SUBSTANTIAL POLICY CHANGES BEFORE THE INDIAN ELECTIONS IN LATE FEBRUARY AND OUR NEGOTIATIONS IN DECEMBER SHOULD BE KEPT QUIET SO AS TO AVOID PROVIDING AMMUNITION TO THOSE WHO ATTACK THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT FOR BEING TOO SUBSERVIENT TO U.S. WISHES. BUT IN THE DECEMBER NEGOTIATIONS WE CAN AND WILL EXPLORE A NUMBER OF SELF-HELP MEASURES WHICH COULD IMPROVE INDIA'S AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE AND IMPRESS UPON INDIAN LEADERS HOW GRAVELY WE VIEW PERFORMANCE SHORTFALLS.

WE RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT WE GO AHEAD AT THIS TIME WITH 1.2 MILLION TONS OF WHEAT AND 800,000 TONS OF GRAIN SORGHUM ON AN INTERIM BASIS, MEANWHILE PREPARING FOR DETAILED TOP LEVEL NEGOTIATIONS IN DECEMBER. BY EARLY DECEMBER WE SHOULD HAVE MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE NATURE OF SHORTCOMINGS OF THIS YEAR'S AGRICULTURAL EFFORT AS WELL AS THE FIRST REPORT ON OUR OWN WHEAT ACREAGE.

STATE AND AID CONCUR ON THIS ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION.

UNQUOTE



DTG: 272018Z NOV 66

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

Friday - November 25, 1966

To: The President

From: W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
 State 11-22-78 (#56a)
 By *RLH per 158* NARS, Date 8-25-86

Last Wednesday at a meeting between Secretary Udall and Mexican Minister of Hydraulic Resources Hernandez Teran on the Colorado River problem, Minister Hernandez made the comment that President Diaz Ordaz was anxious to inspect the work on Amistad Dam in the near future and hoped that you might join him.

From Carrillo Flores Tony Freeman has learned more details of President Diaz's interest. The essential portions of Freeman's cable are attached.

In brief, President Diaz Ordaz ~~would~~ suggest a helicopter visit over the Amistad construction site with brief stops at the key locations. The inspection might be preceded by an informal breakfast, or followed by lunch, preferably on the Mexican side. He does not intend to raise substantive matters.

Diaz Ordaz had December 2 in mind but would be glad to consider alternative timing in the near future if delay made it possible for you to join him. As ~~Tony~~ Carrillo Flores repeatedly point^{ed} out to Freeman, President Diaz Ordaz's primary concern is with your health and unimpeded recuperation, and he does not want you to consider making the trip unless it meets with the full approval of your doctors.

Linc Gordon favors your making the trip, but wants to consult Secretary Ruisk.

I read Diaz Ordaz's suggestion as a desire to enhance his political swing through northern Mexico by having you join him at Amistad. In recent months he has had rough going in dealing with student disturbances and probably wants to refurbish his public image.

If you feel up to the trip, fine. If you do not, I am sure he will understand.

Advise Diaz Ordaz you can make trip in mid-December if he can wait that long.

_____.

Prefer not to make the trip

_____.

Speak to me _____.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

35a

*Telegram
Mexico 2938*

Message from Ambassador Freeman in Mexico, November 25, 1966,
Concerning Possible Meeting of Presidents at Amistad Dam

President Diaz Ordaz (has confirmed yesterday to Carrillo) genuinely is interested in early inspection trip to Amistad Construction Works for the following reasons:

- a. The amount of construction equipment on the site and the extent of the joint effort currently is at about the maximum with gradual diminution to be expected as work approaches completion;
- b. Amistad is a superb example of close US-Mexican joint collaboration, with financing, engineering and construction efforts about evenly divided, and which will almost equally benefit the people on both sides of the frontier;
- c. This gigantic and impressive operation has never been sufficiently dramatized for the Mexican people, the majority of whom are totally unaware of this effort, and a Presidential visit would do much to accomplish this purpose. President Diaz Ordaz, therefore, is now planning ~~to~~ visit to Coahuila next week on a periodic political swing and now tentatively plans to visit Amistad Construction Works on the morning of Friday, December 2, having spent the night of December 1 at a Mexican construction camp. He would expect to leave Ciudad Acuna about noon, December 2, returning directly to Mexico City.

Because of President Johnson's historic interest and great assistance in the realization of Amistad Dam, and naturally because of heightened dramatic interest both in Mexico and worldwide, Diaz Ordaz would be deeply interested in making this a joint inspection visit of two Presidents -- particularly since location of Amistad is relatively close to the LBJ Ranch. However, Diaz Ordaz's primary concern (as reiterated several times by Carrillo) is for President Johnson's health and unimpeded recuperation. He is, therefore, insistent that no consideration whatever be given to President Johnson's meeting the foregoing tentative schedule if it did not meet with the full approval of the President's medical advisers.

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CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Should it prove feasible, even on such short notice, for President Johnson to join in a brief inspection trip on the morning of December 2, it might be possible to arrange an informal breakfast preceding the inspection or luncheon following (preferably on the Mexican side of the border). Helicopter visit over all aspects of construction with brief stops at key locations would probably be the most practical and expeditious means and the least demanding on President Johnson's health.

In response to my inquiry, there is no intention whatsoever on the part of President Diaz Ordaz to use the occasion as a cover or vehicle for substantive talks. There is no subject of urgency which Diaz Ordaz desires to take up with President Johnson, and whatever informal conversations might take place would be simple continuation of friendly dialogue initiated at the LBJ Ranch in November 1964 and further developed last April in Mexico City.

Diaz Ordaz intends to take Minister of Hydraulic Resources Hernandez Teran with him and, whether or not President Johnson would find it possible to participate, would very much appreciate the presence of Secretary Udall. The latter made a deep, friendly and exceedingly favorable impression on Hernandez Teran, and the latter hopes eventually to interest Udall in making an extended visit to important hydraulic projects in Mexico, in partial reciprocity of the warm reception accorded him in Washington.

President Diaz Ordaz has no current Congressional authority to leave the country, even for brief helicopter trip across the border to inspect the US construction works on Amistad. If, however, President Johnson were to agree to accompany him, President Diaz Ordaz would seek such authority urgently which would probably be granted without question.

Carrillo Flores has just telephoned to report further conversation with President Diaz Ordaz. In addition to confirming the foregoing, and particularly concern over the President's health, President Diaz Ordaz wished to insist that nothing definitive or sacred over the date of December 2, for the Amistad visit. Since the site of the Dam is so close to the LBJ Ranch as well as relatively close to Mexico City, President Diaz Ordaz would be glad to consider any alternative timing for the visit within the relatively near future. However, it is obvious he is desirous of making the trip as soon as possible while much preferring to do so in company of President Johnson.

Since time is clearly of the essence, I would appreciate State and White House reaction with the least possible delay.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Friday, November 25, 1966
7:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Indian Food Shipments

1. *summary*
2. *Profile*

Attached is a memorandum from Secretary Freeman on the "Indian Rescue Mission" of last year. It vividly describes how: (a) we appraised the problem; (b) a Department of Agriculture representative worked as an expeditor in Subramaniam's ministry; (c) a U. S. port expert helped in expediting food shipments; (d) U. S. unloading manufacturers and trade groups advised Indian officials; (e) Indian consumers were encouraged to absorb more milo; (f) we overcame transport bottlenecks in the U. S.

These are substantial achievements; and as Secretary Freeman says: "You can be proud of the record of your country and your Government."

But to be sure we see this achievement in perspective, I have had a table prepared summarizing our grain shipments to India over the past several years. (In millions of tons.)

	<u>CY 64</u>	<u>FY 65</u>	<u>CY 65</u>	<u>FY 66</u>	<u>CY 66</u>
Wheat	5.8	5.9	5.6	6.9	6.3
Rice	0.3	0.3	0.2	--	--
Milo	--	--	--	1.1	2.0
Total	6.1	6.2	5.8	8.0	8.3

In sum, for the emergency in FY 66, we upped our wheat shipments by 1 million tons (from 5.9 to 6.9) and added 1.1 million tons of coarse grains not previously shipped; a total increase of 2 million tons, or up by 30% over FY 65. In addition, India acquired a million more tons from Canada and received amounts of cash or credit worth \$100 million.

When Secretary Freeman's team reports next week, we should have a clear picture of just how effective the Indians were at dealing with this food emergency. We now estimate that India drew down its stocks by some 6 million tons and the GOI was unexpectedly successful at unloading and moving supplies to the cities where they were most urgently needed.

In my judgment, any publicity which we might give to this year's achievement, as Secretary Freeman suggests, should be carefully reviewed to be sure it gives due place to the effort made by the Indians and to the contribution of other countries, which we so energetically encouraged.

Encourage Freeman to prepare publicity,
but you check it for tone
Discourage publicity

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-23
By *sig*, NARA Date 9-18-96



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

5261 36a

November 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM

To: The President
The White House

From: Orville L. Freeman *OLF*
Secretary of Agriculture

Subject: Calendar 1966 India Rescue Mission - Actions taken
Pursuant to National Security Action Memorandum 339

The attached memorandum reviews the actions taken to make it possible for India to receive and distribute almost 11 million tons of grain during calendar year 1966.

I believe this report will be of interest to the President by way of reviewing actions taken last year and possibly as a background for decisions to be made for the year ahead. It is also possible that such a report in a more narrative popularized version might be publicly released. With that in mind we are preparing such a version. I submit that this record of accomplishment will bring credit to the Administration and might be useful in negating some of the current criticism.

Enclosure




DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

November 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM

To: The President
The White House

From: Orville L. Freeman 
Secretary of Agriculture

Subject: Indian Food Emergency -- Actions taken pursuant to
National Security Action Memorandum 339

About this time last year it became apparent that the failure of the monsoons would have a serious effect on the 1965-66 foodgrain harvest in India. During his visit to Washington the latter part of December, Food and Agriculture Minister Subramaniam informed you and several of us that the Indian estimate for the food grain crop was about 76.0 million tons as compared to the record 88.4 million tons harvested in 1964-65 (July-June). (Most recent Indian reports indicate the crop to have been only 72.0 million tons.) He asked that we provide emergency quantities of food to help meet a total request of 10-11 million tons during 1966.

You instructed me in National Security Action Memorandum 339 to take such measures as were necessary to avert a critical food shortage and possible starvation in India. Following is an account of the principal efforts required, the problems encountered, and the actions taken to solve them in carrying out this mission.

1. Management of the mission

An Interagency Task Force was formed under the leadership of a senior member of my staff to give direction to what became one of the largest food movements in history. The contributions and cooperation of many agencies and individuals in the U.S. Government were outstanding.

2. Appraisal of the problem

A Food Grains Team went to India for a rapid reconnaissance of requirements and logistical problems in January. It surveyed a number of key problems which needed solution if this mammoth job were to be done.

We needed to agree on requirements to prevent famine. The Team examined Indian statistics on production and requirements by

2--The President

States on a monthly basis. Based on this examination, a month by month schedule of movement to individual States was established with the Government of India as a guide for action through the summer. Only in this way was it possible to provide for needs in areas which became inaccessible during the rainy season by movement and storage of grain during the dry spring months.

Total requirements for the calendar year were established at 11 million tons on an arrival basis.

We needed to assess the port and transportation capacity. India had rarely received and handled more than half a million tons of grain in a single month and the few instances of a larger volume were isolated. The consensus among most knowledgeable people in the transportation field was that the limit of such movement would be much less than a million tons. After a quick survey of all major ports in India, the Food Grains Team, working with the Government of India, established 1.2 million tons of grain and other bulk cargo as a feasible target for the non-monsoon months. Grain leaving the United States after mid-April and arriving in India in the monsoon months of June, July and August faces formidable weather problems in most Indian ports. This placed a high priority on shipments to arrive in April and May since it was already too late for massive arrivals during the winter months.

We needed to confirm that inland distribution facilities and procedures were adequate. The Team visited three of the States most heavily affected -- Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajasthan. It also examined food distribution operations in several major cities and rural areas. It satisfied itself that a workable system was in effect which, if food could reach India, would meet the emergency. Different from this year, the 1965-66 drought was very general and therefore the principal problem was to feed the urban population. This year large rural populations are affected which will make distribution a much more difficult task.

We needed to plan the use of ships which could be accommodated in Indian ports. In the past, Indian food grain movements under our concessional sales programs had been confined to relatively small dry bulk carriers and medium sized tankers. With the

3--The President

increased pressure on Indian ports the Team considered and proposed the use of large tankers of up to 100,000 ton capacity for selected movements with off-loading at sea off the coast of India to smaller ships which could disperse to a number of local ports for unloading. This plan extended the total unloading capacity of India ports.

3. Special representative in the field

The Indian Minister of Food and Agriculture arranged for my special representative to set up an office in his Ministry to act as liaison and to cooperate with the Ministry, port authorities and Ministries of Transport, Railways and Finance in solving problems of food movement and distribution. My representative worked as a member of the Indian team in planning food arrivals and distribution within India. Similarly he acted as an expeditor in giving rapid effect to actions requiring agreement of the Embassy, the AID Mission and the Government of India. Half of his time was spent in the field where during the summer he kept a close watch on the key points of potential trouble in the movement of grain.

4. Port management

An outstanding port administrator from the South Carolina State Port Authority was engaged to assist in expediting grain movements in Indian ports during the period of heaviest movement. He worked as an expert associate of my special representative, traveling to port cities and advising Indian port administrators on methods of breaking bottlenecks and keeping food grains moving.

5. Industry participation

Senior representatives of the three manufacturers of pneumatic grain handling equipment being used in India were asked to go to India to improve the rate of discharge of grain sorghums using their equipment in view of the importance of that commodity in meeting the food crisis. The companies responded immediately by putting technicians and training crews to work in the ports in time to prepare for the heaviest movement of milo.

4--The President

6. U. S. trade groups cooperate

A team of grain specialists was assembled under the leadership of the U. S. Feed Grains Council and Western Wheat Associates (commodity organizations cooperating with the USDA for export market promotion) to advise Indian officials and technicians on receiving, transporting and storing grain, particularly grain sorghums. A particular problem was that of storing sorghums during the rainy season since this grain is more susceptible to damage than most other cereals. One of the team members was selected from the sorghum area of Amarillo, Texas, because of this problem.

7. Consumer acceptance of grain sorghums

Coupled with the problems of handling and storing milo in large quantities was the problem of people getting used to a new food. Grain sorghums and millets bulk large in the Indian food grain picture but our milo has different characteristics of taste from those they know.

We sent a home economist with long experience in Asia out in March to work on this problem of developing recipes, conducting demonstrations and assisting Indian home science staffs to acquaint consumers with this type of milo. During the summer she made an extensive trip by train and automobile to ten broadly distributed cities to initiate this program. The work continued into the fall and will have a helpful effect on India's ability to use milo in the current crisis.

8. U. S. Logistics

A movement of grain as large as the Indian program has a marked impact on domestic transportation and market facilities. Eight million tons of grain is equivalent to a 20-25 percent of a normal U. S. wheat crop. An extremely tight time schedule made this movement even more difficult than it would have been under more normal circumstances. It demanded careful scheduling and coordination to get the most out of our own facilities which were strained to the maximum.

- (1) Ocean shipping had to be engaged by the Indian Supply Mission designating ports of call before authorizations were issued. Later the Commodity Credit Corporation and the grain trade had to meet these schedules at the designated ports of loading. We did not have the flexibility which prior authorizations would have provided.

5--The President

- (2) Last summer saw a renewal of a major boxcar shortage which made the problem of grain movement to meet tight and inflexible schedules a continuing transportation crisis. The railroads cooperated by establishing nine unit trains with hopper cars that went straight through from loading points such as Minneapolis to the designated port. The unit train would then deadhead back for another load. This proved to be a great timesaver, saving at least 15 days per trip over ordinary boxcar transport. Scheduling would have broken down otherwise. One such train provided a daily ration of 10 ounces of wheat for 29,760,000 people. \$240,000 in transportation charges was saved. You might find the enclosed article from the Pennsylvania Railway of interest.
- (3) Commercial movements of grain from our ports is very large beginning in early summer. Last summer it was unusually heavy because of larger than usual commercial export demand for all grains. Moreover, the use of large tankers for movement to India (required to make possible off-loading through small ports as explained above) put a strain on U. S. port elevators and port facilities, since most of them cannot handle ships of this draft and size. At times there was more of a problem of congestion in U. S. ports than in those of India. Nonetheless time deadlines were met.

Results

During this last year of effort directed toward meeting the food problem in India the following principal jobs were done:

Over 11 million tons of food grain will have been received in India by the end of December or the first half of January.

Indian ports have demonstrated for several months that they can handle well over a million tons of bulk cargo a month.

Grain was moved into India and out to areas which later became inaccessible during the rainy season in time to avoid unmanageable food crises.

Indian dock labor, which the Food Grain Team conferred with during their survey, stayed on the job during the most crucial months of the spring and summer in spite of very bad working conditions.

6--The President

Several large tankers were employed in moving grain into India for the first time. This practice will result in financial savings as well as more effective use of ports.

The Indian Government learned by experience that a concerted effort by others as well as themselves can avoid famine which in the past has claimed millions of lives under circumstances no worse than those of the past year.

Conclusions

You can be proud of the record of your country and your Government for their part in meeting the Indian food crisis. This was probably the largest rescue mission of its kind in history. It was successfully carried out.

It is a cruel trick of fate that we may have to help do it all over again this next year.

Enclosure

WHEAT

for India's hungry masses

The statistic is astonishing:

Each PRR jumbo hopper car moving to the grain dock carries enough wheat to feed 400,000 people for a day.

And Engineman Charles B. Dick is rather staggered to think that his train of 53 cars is hauling enough wheat to provide a day's ration for 21,000,000 people of India.

"They're hungry—they need the wheat now—and PRR people are doing their part to get it to them without delay," says Thomas J. Bradley, manager of grain foreign sales.

Since February, PRR freight employees have been speeding an average of 100,000 tons per month to the Canton Grain Elevator, at Baltimore, Md.

There the wheat pours into ocean-going vessels, which steam south to the Panama Canal, then west across the Pacific to the bustling, sun-drenched docks of Bombay, Calcutta and other ports on the Indian sub-continent.

To PRR Fireman John M. Finerty, on Freight No. WPB-4, "it's good to know that in addition to all the money the Government spends for munitions for foreign countries, we're also spending to feed the hungry."

And his engineman, Charles B. Dick, feels very gratified that the



PRR Engineman C. B. Dick pilots the wheat train along the Susquehanna to Baltimore.

cargo for delivery to a Western railroad. The word comes from the office of Marshall Kealing, supervisor of special equipment.

Mr. Swenson promptly informs Mr. Hoium, who then decides which grain elevator the train should go to for loading.

There are 16 grain elevators in Minnesota and Wisconsin involved in this movement. Four Western railroads do the shuttling between these points and the PRR at Chicago. They are the Soo Line, the Chicago & Northwestern, the Milwaukee, and the Burlington Lines.



The loaded trains pull out of the



Train includes many of the PRR jumbo hoppers, each able to haul 100 tons of grain.




At the Canton Grain Elevator, Baltimore, L. E. Boone places the cars for unloading.



In Minneapolis last February, Sales Rep. R. P. Burke and District Sales Mgr. J. R. Swenson watch start of the wheat move.



Oren J. Hoiu, Commodity Credit Corporation, discusses shipments with PRR's J. R. Swenson. Below, a Soo Line wheat train heads through February snow to Chicago.



it possible to transport the grain faster than ever before—and at less cost to the Government.

"It's a new kind of railroading," says Mr. Dick.

The grain comes in solid trains, which are quickly unloaded, then dispatched westward for another full load. There is no switching, no train break-up en route.

The fast PRR service is in response to President Lyndon B. Johnson's request that the wheat be shipped "as quickly as possible."

"I think I need not dwell at length on the very serious situation that confronts the Government of India and the people as a result of the drought and famine that exist there," he said last January.

George R. McPherson, director of the Inventory Management Division, U.S. Department of Agriculture, came to the PRR with this assignment: A fast, steady movement of large quantities of grain for dockside loading. Tom Bradley relayed the details to Sales Department officers for an answer.

They assigned 175 of the PRR's new jumbo hopper cars, plus a number of other cars, to this job. The cars were arranged in four units for the shuttle runs.

The covered hoppers were welcome equipment, said Oren J. Hoiu, of the Commodity Credit Corporation.

"They speed the loading, delivery and unloading of grain, and there is little loss of grain in transit," he told J. R. Swenson, the PRR's district sales manager at Minneapolis, Minn.

To keep these cars on the go, Mr. Swenson is alerted as soon as a trainload of empties arrives at Chi-

a straight-shot run to Baltimore. Each car is promptly pushed over the unloading troughs. The hoppers on the undersides of the cars are opened, and the grain rains down onto underground conveyor belts. These carry the grain up into the cylindrical elevator bins. From there the grain flows out through long chutes into the gaping holds of ocean freighters.

"Setting up this movement has taken a lot of effort on the part of a lot of people," said Mr. Bradley, a long-time expert in grain traffic to the Atlantic ports.

"And our men have been handling this thing as if each train is something special. There's been no lessening of interest anywhere along the way.

"I think we're all proud to have a part in this humanitarian program—and happy that we've done our part effectively."

Norwegian vessel takes on a load totaling 19,245 tons of wheat and heads for India.



In a ship docked at Calcutta, India, workers in the hold fill sacks with grain.

At distribution center in New Delhi, Indian women obtain wheat for their families.



*Sent by pouch
11/28/66*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*1. sup
2. file*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to King Mahendra of Nepal

State proposes the attached answer to King Mahendra's letter of September 8. It has been cleared by State, AID, Treasury and Peace Corps. The letter is designed to do four things:

1. Reassure the King that we have no intention of interfering in Nepal's internal affairs and urging him to talk with Ambassador Laise, in whom you repose full confidence, on her arrival if he has doubts about this.
2. Recognize his interest in the Karnali River dam project but indicate we will be better placed to consider the proposal only when the project is in the hands of George Woods' bank.
3. Reject the King's request to have Indian rupees designated for Nepal deposited in Nepal itself instead of held in India, as is our current practise.
4. Welcome the King's son, Crown Prince Birendra, to the U. S., where he will be studying at Harvard next year.

The letter skirts the booby traps in the King's letter without giving cause for offense. The tone is friendly and considerate, as is appropriate for this small but strategically-placed country, sandwiched between India and China.

I recommend you sign this letter.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-49
By inf NARA, Date 7-17-90

November 30, 1966
~~Dec 1, 1966~~

Your Majesty:

Now that I am back from my Asian trip and recovering from my recent operation I can reply at greater length to your letter of September 8 than was possible in my message to you last month.

We want to cooperate to the fullest possible measure to promote the independence of Nepal and to assist where we can your efforts for economic development. Our consistent policy is to contribute to these aims in ways which fully respect the sovereignty of Nepal. If there are any problems which you feel exist, I would want them resolved. Your Majesty has kindly agreed to receive as my Ambassador, Miss Carol C. Laise, who will arrive in Kathmandu late this month. She has my complete trust and confidence, and I hope that you will discuss freely with her any matters whatsoever on which you wish my understanding and cooperation.

I realize you attach great importance to the hydro-electric development of the Karnali River basin, and I appreciate your wish to go ahead with an independent evaluation of the United Nations study. When Your Majesty's Government has formally submitted the question of further study of the project to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, we, as members, will be better placed to give consideration to the proposal.

You suggested that we deposit in Nepal those Public Law 480 rupees generated in India by the sale of agricultural products and earmarked by agreement with India for use in our Nepal AID program. We usually deposit such funds in banks in the country where the

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-49
By inf NARA. Date 7-17-90

commodities are sold. We will, however, bear your suggestion in mind when the International Monetary Fund reviews the report of its team which visited Nepal in late October to study the effect of the Indian devaluation. I understand that since you wrote, however, the amount of Indian rupees held by your National Bank has considerably increased, and I assume this welcome improvement has reduced the urgency of the proposed transfer.

I understand your son, Crown Prince Birendra, plans to attend Harvard University next year. I am delighted that he is coming to the United States as part of his study program, and I hope his stay will be enjoyable and profitable.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

LBJ

His Majesty
Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva
King of Nepal
Kathmandu

SENT
WHCA~~SECRET~~EEA306
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 2356

1966 NOV 25 19 02

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661051~~SECRET~~SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF AMBASSADOR LODGE'S WEEKLY REPORT
1) REORGANIZATION OF U.S. MISSION

EMBASSY HAS MOVED IMMEDIATELY TO CARRY OUT REORGANIZATION OF THE CIVIL SIDE OF THE U.S. MISSION. DEP. AMBASSADOR BILL PORTER IS SETTING UP AN OFFICE WHERE HE WILL PULL TOGETHER ALL ELEMENTS WHICH HAVE IN THE PAST HAD SEPARATE CHARGE OF FIELD OPERATIONS OF THE VARIOUS AGENCIES.

LODGE VISITED FOURTH U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION IN THE FIELD-- BETWEEN PLEIKU AND CAMBODIAN BORDER. ALSO UNITS OF THE FIRST CAVALRY AND OF KOREAN AND VIETNAMESE FORCES. HE CONCLUDES: "OUR SOLDIERS ARE MAGNIFICENT." HE ALSO CONCLUDES: "WE ARE SIMPLY NOT GETTING ENOUGH MILEAGE OUT OF THE ARVN."

LODGE UNDERLINES IMPORTANCE OF GETTING ARVN TO PLAY A MORE EFFECTIVE ROLE IN PACIFICATION. HE BELIEVES THAT IF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY IN THE FIELD WERE "ACTING LIKE A HELPFUL, FRIENDLY, NON-ARROGANT, AND EFFICIENT CONSTABULARY," IT WOULD GENERATE LOCAL CONFIDENCE THAT WOULD GREATLY SIMPLIFY THE PACIFICATION PROBLEM.

2) DESTROYING TERRORIST "INFRASTRUCTURE"

LODGE HAS DIRECTED THE NEW MISSION COORDINATOR, GEORGE JACOBSON, TO DETERMINE (A) HOW MANY TERRORISTS AND VC CADRE HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED IN 1966 THROUGH ARREST, DEATH, OR OTHER MEANS; AND (B) WHAT WAS DISPOSITION OF THOSE PICKED UP IN MILITARY SWEEPS, ARRESTS, ETC.

SURVEY THUS FAR INDICATES THAT BETWEEN 10,000 AND 20,000 IN THE VC APPARATUS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY NAME, ALIASES, AND IN SOME CASES EVEN ADDRESS. REPORTS COME LARGELY FROM PRISONERS, DEFECTORS, AND DOCUMENTS CAPTURED.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS/CBS 10By ms, NARS, Date 11-28-83

INFORMATION ON WHAT HAPPENS TO THOSE PICKED UP IS SKETCHY. LODGE REPORTS VIETNAMESE HAVE "A VERY UNSATISFACTORY SYSTEM FOR RECORDING, CLASSIFYING AND FOLLOWING THROUGH TO THE TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT OF THESE PEOPLE." HE THINKS STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO PUT THE TERRORISTS OUT OF CIRCULATION. HE AND THE MISSION ARE TRYING TO GET TO THE BOTTOM OF THIS PROBLEM AND TO ENCOURAGE IMPROVEMENT.

3) TERRORIST INCIDENTS

LODGE CITES A NUMBER OF RECENT INCIDENTS--BOMBING OF A BUS STOP IN TAN BINH DISTRICT; VC MINING OF A BUS IN VENH LONG PROVINCE--15 PASSENGERS WOUNDED.

4) VIETNAMESE KILLED

IN THE WEEK ENDING NOVEMBER 19, THE VC KILLED 59 VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS, WOUNDED 44, KIDNAPPED 57.

5) CHIEU HOI

UPWARD TREND OF VC DEFECTIONS CONTINUED THIS WEEK. 611 REPORTED INTO CHIEU HOI CENTERS. RATE IN PREVIOUS SIX WEEKS WAS: 315, 377, 477, 392, 501, AND 566. TOTAL FOR 1966 THUS FAR: 16,398 COMPARED WITH 11,214 FOR ALL OF 1965.

6) PUBLIC OPINION

REGIONAL SURVEYS INDICATE VIETNAMESE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT: VC TERRORISM; LACK OF DISCIPLINE AMONG VIETNAMESE ARMY FORCES; INFLATION.

7) CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

ASSEMBLY NOW WORKING IN COMMITTEES INCLOSED SESSIONS ON "BASIC PRINCIPLES" OF CONSTITUTION. WILL BE SUBMITTED TO FULL ASSEMBLY FOR DEBATE AND APPROVAL.

ASSEMBLY MEMBERS CONTINUE TO PRESS GOVERNMENT TO REVISE DECREE 21 WHICH GOVERNS ASSEMBLY RELATIONS WITH GVN. ASSEMBLYMEN THINK GVN SHOULD NOT HAVE RIGHT TO CHANGE ARTICLES IN PROPOSED CONSTITUTION WITHOUT BACKING OF A MAJORITY OF THE ASSEMBLY. 12 ASSEMBLYMEN MET WITH CHIEF OF STATE THIEU. HE HAS PROMISED TO STUDY THEIR PROPOSALS AND TO ANSWER IN TWO WEEKS.

ASSEMBLY ALSO WANTS TO PROLONG LIFE OF ASSEMBLY UNTIL A NATIONAL LEGISLATURE IS CONVENED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.

STATUS OF MILITARYMEN AND CIVIL SERVANTS IN THE ASSEMBLY IS ALSO IN DISPUTE.

BOTH SIDES PROFESS TO SEE ROOM FOR COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT.

8) ECONOMIC

SAIGON RETAIL PRICE INDEX UP ONE PERCENTAGE POINT THIS WEEK -- NOW STANDS AT 224. IT WAS 222 WEEK BEFORE AND 225 WEEK BEFORE THAT.

DROP IN PORK PRICE OF SET BY INCREASES IN RICE AND VEGETABLES.

PRICE OF DOLLARS HAS DROPPED.

INFLATION CONTINUES A SOURCE OF WORRY FOR PEOPLE AND FOR GOVERNMENT.

9) LOSS AND DIVERSION OF PX SUPPLIES

SAIGON OFFICIALS MADE GOOD ON THEIR PROMISE FOR A CRACKDOWN ON THE BLACKMARKET. STALLS HAVE BEEN CLOSED; TIGHTER PATROLLING OF PORT AREA

10) BUDDHIST DEVELOPMENTS

MODERATE AND ANTI-COMMUNIST LEADER THICH TAM CHAU IS MOVING TO STRENGTHEN ANTI-COMMUNIST FACTION IN THE BUDDHIST MOVEMENT. HE IS MORE STRONGLY OPPOSING THICH TRI QUANG.

PRIME MINISTER KY REMOVED CONTROVERSIAL GENERAL QUANG FROM COMMAND OF FOURTH CORPS. HE IS NOW MINISTER OF PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT. NO REPERCUSSIONS WITHIN THE ARMY THUS FAR.

THE SQUABBLE AMONG DISSIDENT MINISTERS WHICH BEGAN BEFORE THE MANILA CONFERENCE HAS VIRTUALLY ENDED. MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND FINANCE HAS BEEN SPLIT INTO THREE MINISTRIES -- COMMERCE, INDUSTRY AND FINANCE. NEW APPOINTMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE CABINET -- ALL SOUTHERNERS. DEVELOPMENTS INDICATE KY'S GROWING MATURITY AND POLITICAL SKILL, ALTHOUGH HE MUST STILL FIGHT "IMPULSIVENESS."

DTG: 251813Z NOVEMBER 1966

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SENT
WHCAEEA314
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2362FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP661055*Roston*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: SECRETARY RUSK'S PROPOSED REPLY TO EUGENE BLACK

SECRETARY RUSK REQUESTS YOUR APPROVAL OF FOLLOWING DRAFT MESSAGE TO BLACK AND OFFERS TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH YOU BY PHONE IF THAT SHOULD PROVE TO BE HELPFUL. HE HOPES TO BE ABLE TO SEND HIS MESSAGE BY THE END OF BUSINESS TODAY.

(BLACK'S INCOMING CABLE IS REPEATED AS NEXT FOLLOWING MESSAGE.)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

90-46

By *uf*

NARA, Date

7-16-90

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

QUOTE

FOR EUGENE BLACK FROM THE SECRETARY

HAVE REVIEWED PROBLEM WITH PRESIDENT AND HAVE CONCLUDED THAT OUR INTERESTS IN ACTUALLY ACHIEVING SUCCESSFUL ESTABLISHMENT OF PROMISING REGIONAL EDUCATIONAL PROJECTS YOU HAVE INSPIRED WILL BEST BE SERVED BY AVOIDING NEWS REPORTS WHICH MAY APPEAR TO BE PREJUDGMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL DECISION. WE, THEREFORE, ENDORSE POSITION YOU OUTLINE IN PARA 3 WITH FOLLOWING GUIDANCE:

IN CLOSED SESSION WITH MINISTERS OR PREFERABLY ONLY IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS, USE 50-50 MATCHING FORMULA BUT WITH CAUTION THAT WE NOT CONTEMPLATING MORE THAN \$28 MILLION OVER 5-7 YEARS WITH STRONG ADDITIONAL CAUTION THAT THIS IS ENTIRELY STATEMENT OF ATTITUDE EXECUTIVE BRANCH SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL DECISIONS AND ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS; AND UNTIL ADMINISTRATION HAS CONSULTED WITH CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES ON THIS PROPOSAL IN JANUARY IT WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING TO OUR PROSPECTS AND THEIRS TO REVEAL SPECIFIC FIGURES PUBLICLY.

EMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR OBTAINING OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS TO ASSURE STRONG SUPPORT.

REMIND MINISTERS THAT US HAS NOT BEEN FOUND WANTING IN PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR SECURITY AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA BUT THAT THEY MUST FULLY UNDERSTAND NECESSITIES OUR CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM REGARDING SPECIFIC STEPS.

END QUOTE

TOKYO 3888

LIMDIS

FOR SECRETARY RUSK AND W.W. ROSTOW FROM EUGENE BLACK

SUBJECT: SEA REGIONAL EDUCATION PROGRAM

REF: A. TOKYO 3866 B. STATE 89907 C. STATE 90760

1. YOUR INSTRUCTIONS (REF B) APPARENTLY CROSSED WITH MY MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT (REF A) WHICH I SENT BECAUSE INSTRUCTIONS HAD NOT BEEN RECEIVED AT THAT TIME. UNTIL GAUD ARRIVAL TOKYO PREVIOUS DAY I HAD ASSUMED 1550 DETERMINATION WOULD BE GRANTED.

NOV 25 PM 6:16
FRIDAY

2. INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED REF B DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND IN VIEW OF OUR EFFORTS DURING THE PAST YEAR.

3. MANILA SEAMES MEETING WILL CONSIST OF OPEN AND CLOSED SESSIONS. IF UNAVOIDABLE I WILL RELUCTANTLY CONFINE MY STATEMENT AT OPEN SESSION TO LIMITED AUTHORITY CONTAINED REF B. HOWEVER, UNLESS I HEAR FROM YOU TO CONTRARY I PLAN INDICATE TO MINISTERS AT CLOSED SESSION THAT IT IS OUR PRESENT PLAN TO SUBMIT TO CONGRESS IN JANUARY REQUEST FOR UP TO \$28 MILLION TO SUPPORT SEAMES PROJECTS.

4. FAILURE OF U.S. TO PLEDGE EVEN AT CLOSED SESSION UP TO 50 PERCENT OF FUNDS REQUIRED FOR SPECIFIED REGIONAL EDUCATION PROJECTS OVER 5-7 YEAR PERIOD WOULD IN ANY CASE CONSTITUTE SERIOUS BLOW TO CREDIBILITY U.S. STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT REGIONAL COOPERATION.

5. IF, AT MANILA MEETING I REFUSE EVEN TO INDICATE AMOUNT WHICH PRESIDENT WILL REQUEST FROM CONGRESS, THE RESULTING DAMAGE TO U.S. RELIABILITY WOULD BE IMMENSE. CONSIDERING MAGNITUDE OF SUMS MENTIONED IN PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ON SEA REGIONAL COOPERATION, ASIAN MINISTERS MEETING AT MANILA WOULD BE QUITE UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND WHY U.S. NOT WILLING TO STATE THAT PRESIDENT IS PLANNING TO REQUEST SPECIFIC AND MEANINGFUL AMOUNT FOR THESE ESSENTIAL PURPOSES.

6. I AM CONFIDENT THAT I CAN PERSUADE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP TO SUPPORT SEAMES AFTER PRESENTING HISTORY AND PURPOSE THIS PROJECT.

7. IF COURSE PROPOSED ABOVE NOT SATISFACTORY I BELIEVE ASIAN INITIATIVE AND SUPPORT REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION MAY BE STIFLED FOR LONG TIME TO COME. SEAMES PROJECTS WHICH DRAWN UP WITH ASSISTANCE AMERICAN EXPERTS IS FIRST CONCRETE PRACTICAL EXAMPLE OF ASIAN INITIATIVE REGIONAL COOPERATION SINCE FORMATION OF ADB. SEAMES PROJECT HAS STRONG SUPPORT THROUGHOUT REGION.

8. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS MESSAGE WITH GAUD WHO CONCURS.

GP-4. JOHNSON

DTG: 25/2150Z NOV 66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 23, 1966

Mr. President:

Pursuant to your instructions, I have made a fresh assessment of the price support loan level for cotton in 1967. Agriculture, State, CEA, and the Bureau of Budget have taken part.

Here is the way the problem shapes up and the options I would lay before you.

1. The agreed objective of national policy is to bring our level of cotton stocks down to a "normal" figure of 4-6 million bales over the next several years. We have made good progress in the last year (from, roughly, 17 to 13 million bales). A 5 million bale level of exports takes about 2.7 million bales out of stocks each year. If we can hold to that level, we are only 3 or 4 years away from the goal.
2. A 1/2¢ cut for fiscal 1968 in our cotton price support level will, in the short run, have only a minor effect on our exports: an increase from 5 million bales in fiscal 1967 to 5,150,000 in fiscal 1968 is the estimated result of a 1/2¢ further cut in the support price.
3. The U. S. budgetary loss due to a 1/2¢ cut in the support price is estimated at about \$17 million: an increase of \$40 million in the direct subsidy minus about \$23 million gained due to CCC sales and reduced storage.
4. The loss on balance of payments is \$23 million, of which \$10 million is direct loss due to lower cotton prices; \$8 million due to reduced Latin American foreign exchange earnings and thus reduced purchases in the U. S. (\$13 million total Latin American loss); \$5 million due to reduced foreign exchange earnings in other cotton producing areas (the total loss for areas other than Latin American is \$17 million).
5. Over-all, then, we stand to lose \$17 million on the budget; \$23 million in foreign exchange; and other nations will lose \$30 million in foreign exchange due to a 1/2¢ cut in the cotton support price. There was no controversy about these figures at the meeting.
6. The reason Agriculture is proposing that we take these costs at home and abroad is, of course, that in the longer run it wants us to be able to sustain an export level of, say, 6 million bales; it wants to reduce our stocks; it wants to force through lower world prices a further

reduction in cotton acreage in other countries. They can argue, therefore, that in the long run our position will be better than in the short run.

7. The competitive position of cotton with synthetic fibers is complex. Here in the U. S. cotton at present prices is competing well with rayon. Abroad the transport costs raise the price of cotton to a point where rayon may be doing better than holding its own. The experts aren't sure.

The new nonsellulosic synthetics are likely to cut into cotton and other synthetics at home and abroad because new attractive products are coming onto the market and productivity in this field is increasing. But the effect on cotton is cushioned because cotton is often mixed with them.

8. The effect of a lower cotton price on agricultural diversification is also complex. Strong forces are, in any case, at work in Mexico to shift them into feed grains, oil seeds, and beef as the Mexicans get richer and turn to more protein in their diet. Our two cent cut in cotton support prices last year may have encouraged this tendency; but it can't be sorted out clearly. In other places (for example, Peru) some land has gone into food and out of cotton simply because population increase is pushing them into a food deficit position.

9. When all else is stripped away, Agriculture's case comes to this: A fear that if we do not further cut the support price (and the world price), others will think that the trend in U. S. policy has been reversed and they will be tempted to go back into enlarged cotton acreage. They do not fear this result for fiscal 1968 when they expect us to market, in any case, about 5 million bales as residual supplier. They do fear what might happen in fiscal 1969 and fiscal 1970. They admit they cannot be dogmatic about this because none of us can firmly say that the forces of diversification pressing down on cotton acreage in Latin America and elsewhere will, in fact, be outweighed by the probability of the present 21¢ support level.

10. By law Agriculture is asked to set the cotton price support level at not more than 90% of the estimated world market price; but, in fact, the world market price is determined by our price support level. By administrative means Agriculture believes that it could meet the letter of the law -- for one year -- either by holding at 21¢ per pound or by cutting to 20-1/2¢. But Agriculture says some in Congress believe the spirit of the legislation requires a further cut in price this year.

11. On the political position, I have asked Henry Wilson as well as Agriculture, for an assessment. I am sure your assessment would be better than anything we can supply. What they tell me is this:

-- Whitten and Poage will strongly favor a reduction.

-- Mahon will probably favor a reduction but is more reasonable.

-- Senator Talmadge will be strong for a cut in the support level.

-- Senator Ellender wants "more exports" but doesn't have a clear, logical position.

-- There is a group of major cotton cooperatives centered principally in Mississippi, Georgia, and West Texas who would "probably not be unhappy if the loan price was not reduced" (Wilson). They apparently produce low quality short-staple cotton and they stand to lose some revenue from storage in their warehouses if the cotton support price is lowered.

EEA285
PP WTE 10
DE WTE 2327

FROM: BROMLEY SMITH
TO : JACOBSEN FOR THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661030

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUMMARY

1. JORDANIAN INTERNAL SITUATION CRITICAL

THE JORDANIAN DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SECURITY HAS TOLD US THAT DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE BROKEN OUT IN EVERY MAJOR JORDANIAN CENTER ON THE WEST BANK. AMBASSADOR BURNS REPORTS THE SITUATION HAS BECOME SO GRAVE THAT HE CANNOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HUSSEIN WILL ATTACK ISRAEL. WHEN BURNS CAUTIONED HUSSEIN THAT THIS WOULD BE SUICIDE, HUSSEIN REPLIED, "I KNOW THAT, BUT THERE COULD COME A POINT WHEN I WOULD SAY TO HELL WITH THE REGIME. LET'S GO DOWN FIGHTING OUR ENEMIES INSTEAD OF OUR OWN PEOPLE." MEANWHILE, THE CAIRO PRESS IS PLAYING UP JORDANIAN DEMONSTRATIONS AND ENCOURAGING HUSSEIN'S OVERTHROW. WE EXPECT TO HAVE FOR YOU LATER TODAY A PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM YOU TO KING HUSSEIN WHICH WE BELIEVE WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HIM IN CONTROLLING HIS OWN EXTREMISTS.

2. ISRAELIS ORDER MAXIMUM RESTRAINT

FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN ACKNOWLEDGED TO AMBASSADOR BARBOUR HIS GOVERNMENT'S FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE DONE BY ISRAEL'S ATTACK. ESHKOL HAS APPROVED AS BASIC ISRAELI POLICY THE REESTABLISHMENT OF STABILITY IN JORDAN, HAS ORDERED "MAXIMUM RESTRAINT" AND WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID CONTACTS WHICH MIGHT FLARE INTO SERIOUS CLASHES. HE AUTHORIZED US TO REASSURE HUSSEIN ON THESE POINTS. BARBOUR COMMENTS THAT HIS CONVERSATION "CONFIRMS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE DEEPLY SHAKEN AND SHOCKED BY REVELATION OF THE DEGREE OF PRECARIOUSNESS OF HUSSEIN'S REGIME."

1966 NOV 23 19 53

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-510

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3. GUINEA EXPELLS FIVE MEMBERS OF EMBASSY CONAKRY

THE GUINEAN GOVERNMENT YESTERDAY DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA FIVE MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF OF EMBASSY CONAKRY WHOM THEY ACCUSED OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RECENT FIRING OF SEVERAL LOCAL EMPLOYEES. AMBASSADOR MCILVAIN HAD EARLIER TOLD THE GUINEANS THAT HE ACCEPTED FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FIRINGS, AND ANY ACTION TO BE TAKEN SHOULD BE DIRECTED AT HIM. THE GUINEANS IGNORED THIS. WE HAVE PROTESTED, BUT TAKEN NO RETALIATORY ACTION. OUR EMBASSY RECOMMEND AGAINST ANY EXPULSIONS OF GUINEANS FROM THE UNITED STATES.

4. RWANDA-BURUNDI TENSIONS INCREASE

RELATIONS BETWEEN RWANDA AND BURUNDI HAVE BECOME SO STRAINED AS A RESULT OF INCURSIONS FROM BURUNDI INTO RWANDA THAT DIRECT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO ARMIES IS A REAL POSSIBILITY. THE OAU IS ATTEMPTING TO MEDIATE. WE ARE SUGGESTING THAT THE CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT (KINSHASA) SEND EMISSARIES TO THE TWO CAPITALS IN AN EFFORT TO COOL THINGS OFF.

5. STATE DEPARTMENT DENIES STORY ON GROMYKO TALKS

THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN YESTERDAY KNOCKED DOWN THE NEW YORK TIMES STORY WHICH SUGGESTED THAT GROMYKO HAD EXPRESSED SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT RED CHINA IN HIS TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY RUSK. AMBASSADOR THOMPSON CALLED AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN TO ASSURE HIM WE WOULD ISSUE A FLAT DENIAL.

DTG: 231819Z NOV 1966

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4:40 PM

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DE WTE 2331

1966 NOV 23 21 40

FROM: HOWARD WRIGGINS
TO : JAKE JACOBSEN FOR THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661033

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 23, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN

OUR NEXT STEP IN DEFUSING THE JORDAN-ISRAEL CRISIS IS TO BOLSTER KING HUSSEIN. HE IS UNDER GREAT PRESSURE BOTH FROM THE PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS IN HIS POPULATION AND FROM THE JUNIOR ARMY OFFICERS WHO CHARGE THAT HE HAS NOT PROVIDED ADEQUATELY FOR JORDAN'S DEFENSE. DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE SPREAD TO ALL THE MAJOR CENTERS IN WEST JORDAN. HE HAS ASKED US FOR SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO HELP HIM DEMONSTRATE THAT HE HAS MOVED TO PREVENT A REPEAT OF THE MAULING ISRAEL GAVE JORDAN'S FORCES ON NOVEMBER 13. SOME OF HIS ADVISORS TELL HIM THAT ONLY ATTACKING ISRAEL WILL WIN THE POPULAR SUPPORT NECESSARY TO SAVE HIS REGIME.

FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW EITHER OF THE EXTREME APPROACHES JORDAN OFFICIALS ARE TALKING ABOUT AMOUNT TO SUICIDE. AN ATTACK ON ISRAEL COULD RESULT IN NOTHING BUT A SEVERE JORDANIAN DEFEAT. EXPANDING THE ARMY TO THE EXTENT THE KING IS TALKING ABOUT WOULD BE ECONOMIC SUICIDE BECAUSE THE JORDANIAN BUDGET -- ALREADY HEAVILY SUBSIDIZED BY US -- COULD NOT STAND THE ADDITIONAL \$20 MILLION A YEAR IN NORMAL SUPPORT MAINTENANCE COSTS WE ESTIMATE WOULD BE REQUIRED.

THE KING MAY STILL CHOOSE TO COMMIT SUICIDE. HE HAS TOLD AMBASSADOR BURNS THAT A POINT MAY COME WHEN HE WOULD RATHER GO DOWN FIGHTING HIS ENEMIES RATHER THAN HIS OWN PEOPLE. HOWEVER, OUR JOB IS TO (A) DO WHAT WE CAN TO HELP HIM THROUGH THIS TENSE PERIOD AND (B) TO RESTORE BALANCE TO HIS THINKING. WE ARE CONVINCED -- AND WE NOW HAVE ESHKOL'S OWN ASSURANCES -- THAT ISRAEL HAS NOT CHANGED ITS POLICY TOWARD JORDAN AS THE KING SEEMS TO BELIEVE. WITH THE GRADUAL RESTORATION OF CALM, WE HOPE TO TURN HIS THINKING TO MODEST EFFORTS TO BETTER CONTROL HIS BORDERS.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dept. Declass. List

By cb, NARA, Date 8-26-98

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, APPROVED BY UNDERSECRETARY KATZENBACH, FROM YOU TO THE KING IS DESIGNED TO HELP HIM OVER THE CURRENT CRISIS.

IT EXPRESSES OUR SYMPATHY TO HUSSEIN, MAKES CLEAR OUR SHARP DISAPPROVAL OF ISRAEL'S ACTION AND REAFFIRMS OUR INTEREST IN THE PEACE, SECURITY, AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF JORDAN. IT SEEKS TO ALLAY HIS FEARS THAT THIS MAJOR RAID REPRESENTS A CHANGE IN ISRAEL'S POLICY TOWARD THE WEST BANK BY INDICATING YOU HAVE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE EVENTS HE FEARS WILL IN FACT OCCUR. (WE HAVE THE FIRMEST ASSURANCES FROM ISRAEL TO THIS EFFECT.) IT MAKES CLEAR THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE FULLY AWARE THAT A REPEAT PERFORMANCE WILL HAVE THE GRAVEST CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS.

I BELIEVE WE NOW HAVE THE ISRAELIS FOCUSSED ON BETTER CONTROL OF THE BORDERS -- THE MOST NECESSARY IMMEDIATE STEP IN LAUNCHING A PERIOD OF QUIET IN ISRAEL-JORDAN RELATIONS. IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT TO GET HUSSEIN CONCENTRATING ON THIS PROBLEM RATHER THAN MAKING UNREALISTIC CALLS ON US TO MAKE JORDAN AND ISRAEL MILITARILY EQUAL. WE WILL ALSO HAVE TO HELP HIM PARRY THRUSTS AGAIN FROM THE USSR AND UAR, WHO ARE STANDING IN THE WINGS WAITING TO JUMP IN WITH OFFERS OF NEW EQUIPMENT AS THEY WERE WHEN YOU APPROVED OUR PLANE SALE. HOWEVER, THIS MESSAGE IS THE FIRST STEP IN THAT DIRECTION.

QUOTE

YOUR MAJESTY:

WORDS OF SYMPATHY ARE SMALL COMFORT WHEN LIVES HAVE BEEN NEEDLESSLY DESTROYED. I DO, HOWEVER, WANT TO CONVEY TO YOUR MAJESTY A SENSE OF THE SORROW AND CONCERN THE MILITARY ACTION BY ISRAEL IN THE HEBRON AREA HAS RAISED IN ME AND IN THIS COUNTRY GENERALLY. MY DISAPPROVAL OF THIS ACTION HAS BEEN MADE KNOWN TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IN THE STRONGEST TERMS. OUR SUPPORT OF CONDEMNATION OF THIS ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S STATEMENT DURING THE SECURITY COUNCIL HEARINGS DEMONSTRATE THE DEPTH OF MY FEELINGS AND THOSE OF OUR COUNTRY.

THIS ACTION HAS PLACED YOUR MAJESTY IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. I AM CERTAIN THAT WITH YOUR DEMONSTRATED COURAGE, WISDOM AND MODERATION, YOUR DIFFICULTIES WILL BE OVERCOME. FOR OUR PART, I ASSURE YOU THAT THIS GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS ITS INTEREST IN THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF JORDAN AND IN THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND WELL-BEING OF ITS PEOPLE. I HAVE ORDERED AN URGENT REVIEW OF MEASURES WHICH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COULD TAKE TO ASSIST YOU DURING THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD. WE WILL CONTINUE TO BE IN TOUCH WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT ON THIS QUESTION.

FINALLY AMBASSADOR B. NS HAS INFORMED ME OF YOUR MAJESTY'S CONCERN THAT ISRAEL'S POLICIES HAVE CHANGED AND THAT ISRAEL NOW INTENDS TO OCCUPY TERRITORY ON THE WEST BANK OF THE JORDAN RIVER. WHILE I CAN UNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR THIS CONCERN, I HAVE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE EVENTS YOU FEAR WILL IN FACT OCCUR. IN THIS CONNECTION MY GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF FORCE TO ALTER ARMISTICE LINES OR BORDERS IN THE NEAR EAST HAS BEEN MADE UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

THE STRONG PRIVATE REPRESENTATIONS WE HAVE MADE IN ISRAEL AS WELL AS OUR FORTHRIGHT PUBLIC STATEMENTS MAKE CLEAR THAT SHOULD ISRAEL ADOPT THE POLICIES YOU FEAR IT WOULD HAVE THE GRAVEST CONSEQUENCES FOR UNITED STATES-ISRAEL RELATIONS. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT OUR POSITION IS FULLY UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED BY THE ISRAELIS.

SINCERELY,

END QUOTE

APPROVE-----

DISAPPROVE-----

DTG: 232006Z NOV 1966

~~SECRET~~

GPS: 1050

Ben cleared with revisions

SENT
WHCA

1966 NOV 23 03 49

EEA277
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2321

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661026

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 90-48

By inf NARA. Date 7-16-90

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

NOVEMBER 22, 1966

HEREWITH DRAFT GUIDANCE TO MCCLOY FOR THE TRIPARTITE MEETING ON NOVEMBER 25, AGREED LATE THIS AFTERNOON BETWEEN SECRETARY RUSK AND SECRETARY MCNAMARA.

MCCLOY CAME IN FROM NEW YORK DURING THE AFTERNOON. HE HAD A GENERAL TALK WITH SECRETARY RUSK, BUT HE HAS NOT YET SEEN THIS DRAFT. IT WILL BE DISCUSSED ON THE PLANE.

ALTHOUGH TREASURY WAS NOT CONSULTED THIS AFTERNOON, THE FIGURE FOR 90 PERCENT OFFSET OF OUR GROSS FOREIGN EXCHANGE COSTS ON MILITARY ACCOUNT SET AS A NEGOTIATING TARGET, IS THE FIGURE RECOMMENDED BY THE TREASURY.

FOLLOWING THE DRAFT IS A MEMORANDUM FROM BATOR AND MYSELF TO YOU GIVING SOME OF THE BACKGROUND AND OUR ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED.

WE BOTH BELIEVE THE APPROACH RECOMMENDED TO YOU BY SECRETARIES RUSK AND MCNAMARA IS SOUND AT THIS STAGE.

QUOTE

GUIDANCE FOR TRIPARTITE MEETING ON NOVEMBER 25.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE NATURE OF MR. MCCLOY'S RECOMMENDATIONS, AND IN VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN GERMANY, IT WILL PROBABLY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS AT THE NOVEMBER 25 MEETING, WHICH SHOULD THEREFORE BE REGARDED AS A FURTHER EXPLORATORY STEP LOOKING TOWARD CONCLUSION SOME TIME DURING THE SPRING. THE ARRANGEMENT WITH THE BRITISH FOR A \$35 MILLION BUNDLE SHOULD PROVIDE AMPLE TIME TO COMPLETE THE TRILATERAL TALKS ON AN ORDERLY BASIS. SUCH ADDITIONAL TIME WILL CLEARLY BE NEEDED IF THE BASIC ISSUES REGARDING FORCE LEVELS AND REDEPLOYMENTS SET FORTH IN THE MCCLOY REPORT ARE TO BE THOROUGHLY CONSIDERED AND DECIDED WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

WE, THEREFORE, PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING POSITIONS FOR MR. MCCLOY AT THE NOVEMBER 25 MEETING.

1. "YOU SHOULD REAFFIRM THE MINUTES TENTATIVELY AGREED UPON AT THE FIRST TRIPARTITE MEETING WHICH DEAL ESSENTIALLY WITH THE QUESTION OF STRATEGY BUT WHICH LEAVE OPEN THE QUESTIONS OF REDEPLOYMENTS, WARNING, REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY, AND ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THIS RAISES NO PROBLEMS FOR US, AND IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO NAIL DOWN THE BRITISH AND (TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE) THE GERMANS.

2. WITH RESPECT TO FORCE LEVELS, YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE ARE CONTINUING TO EXAMINE THE QUESTION OF FORCE LEVELS, REDEPLOYMENT, ETC., IN THE LIGHT OF THE AGREED MINUTES. YOU COULD NOTE THAT ADDITIONAL TIME ON THIS QUESTION WOULD CLEARLY BE REQUIRED IN ANY EVENT IN VIEW OF THE GERMAN SITUATION.

3. YOU SHOULD EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE THREE GOVERNMENTS COULD HAVE A SOLUTION IN SIGHT FOR ALL ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM -- STRATEGY, FORCE LEVELS, WARNING TIME, REDEPLOYMENT AND REINFORCEMENT, AND FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS -- BY MAY IF POSSIBLE.

4. YOU SHOULD LAY ON THE TABLE FOR DISCUSSION AN OUTLINE OF A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS CONSISTING OF THE FOLLOWING POINTS, AIMED AT ACHIEVING 90 PERCENT OFFSET OF OUR GROSS FOREIGN EXCHANGE COSTS ON MILITARY ACCOUNT:

- A. GERMAN MILITARY PURCHASES, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE.
- B. GERMAN PURCHASES OF OTHER ITEMS CONSIDERED TRULY ADDITIVE.
- C. SOME METHOD OF NEUTRALIZING THE MONETARY EFFECTS OF SHORTFALLS, INCLUDING CENTRAL BANK COOPERATION.
- D. THE POSSIBILITY OF MULTILATERALIZING THE ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN NATO.

5. YOU SHOULD TRY TO HAVE THE THREE MAKE A PRELIMINARY REPORT TO NATO BEFORE THE MINISTERIAL MEETING IN DECEMBER. THIS WOULD BE A PROGRESS REPORT WHICH WOULD BE NON-SUBSTANTIVE AND INTERIM BUT MIGHT INCLUDE THE AGREED MINUTES OF THE FIRST MEETING.

6. YOU SHOULD KEEP OPEN THE KEY ELEMENTS OF WARNING TIME AND FORCE LEVELS AND REDEPLOYMENT UNTIL WE HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE THE SUBJECTS FULLER CONSIDERATION AND TO REACH A DECISION AND, FOR OBVIOUS TACTICAL REASONS, UNTIL AN AGREED SOLUTION IS IN SIGHT AMONG THE THREE ON ALL ELEMENTS IN THE PACKAGE, INCLUDING THE IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FINANCE."

UNQUOTE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW AND BATOR

SUBJECT: U.S. POSITION IN TRILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS TO MCCLOY

I. ARGUMENT

MCCLOY BELIEVES THAT:

1. U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWALS DURING THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO WOULD UNACCEPTABLY WEAKEN OUR CONVENTIONAL MILITARY OPTION IN EUROPE (EVEN IF OTHER GOVERNMENTS DON'T MAKE SIMILAR CUTS);

2. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, IF THE U.S. CUTS TROOPS, OTHERS WOULD FOLLOW SUIT. (HE ESTIMATES THAT MATERIAL U.S. WITHDRAWALS WOULD RESULT IN A 3-4 DIVISION REDUCTION OVERALL -- FROM 22 TO 18-19 DIVISIONS. HE THINKS THIS WOULD (1) APPRECIABLY REDUCE NATO'S CAPABILITY FOR A FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, (2) INCREASE THE RISKS OF SOVIET PRESSURE OR PROBES, AND (3) REDUCE YOUR RANGE OF CHOICE IN A CRISIS. IF CUTS WERE JUDGED UNAVOIDABLE, MCCLOY WOULD, AT A MAXIMUM, WITHDRAW TWO BRIGADES OF ONE DIVISION, LEAVING ONE BRIGADE IN GERMANY, REPLACING IT WITH ONE OF THE OTHERS EVERY FOUR MONTHS. HE ESTIMATES THAT THIS WOULD SAVE \$28 MILLION A YEAR IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE, BUT COST \$150 MILLION IN THE BUDGET. BUT MCCLOY DOESN'T RECOMMEND THIS.)

3. ANY TROOP CUTS WOULD HAVE DANGEROUS POLITICAL EFFECTS IN EUROPE, ESPECIALLY IN GERMANY. (CREDIBILITY OF U.S. NUCLEAR COMMITMENT, COHESION OF NATO, ETC.)

4. THEREFORE, MCCLOY WANTS YOU TO DECIDE THAT WE WILL:

-- NOT MAKE ANY APPRECIABLE TROOP CUTS;

-- SQUEEZE AS MUCH OFFSET MONEY AS POSSIBLE OUT OF THE GERMANS, BOTH FOR US AND FOR THE UK. (WE WOULD PROPOSE TO LET THE GERMANS COUNT, AS PART OF THE OFFSET, PURCHASES OF ADDITIVE NON-MILITARY GOODS AND LONG-TERM BONDS, AS WELL AS MILITARY PURCHASES. THE TOTAL OFFSET TARGET WOULD BE AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE "NET WINDFALL FOREIGN EXCHANGE GAIN" TO GERMANY FROM U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING. WE THINK THIS IS 85-90 PERCENT OF OUR GROSS DRAIN; THE GERMANS THINK IT'S MUCH LESS (50 PERCENT); MCCLOY WOULD PROPOSE A COMPROMISE OF 75-80 PERCENT.)

-- BE PREPARED TO EAT THE DIFFERENCE, THOUGH HIS REPORT DOES NOT SAY SO EXPLICITLY. (THE ARITHMETIC: OUR PRESENT GROSS DRAIN IN GERMANY IS \$850 MILLION; THE GERMANS NOW SAY THEY CAN COME UP WITH \$350 MILLION; MCCLOY'S FORMULA WOULD MEAN THEY WOULD PAY \$640-\$680 MILLION; IF HE CAN SELL IT, THERE WOULD STILL BE A SHORTFALL OF \$170-\$210 MILLION; MORE LIKELY, HE WILL NOT SUCCEED, AND THE SHORTFALL WILL BE CLOSER TO \$300-\$400 MILLION.)

5. THERE WOULD ALSO BE A \$100-\$130 MILLION GERMAN SHORTFALL VIS-A-VIS THE UK. (MCCLOY WOULD PROBABLY VOTE THAT WE TAKE UP AS MUCH OF THE BRITISH SLACK AS NECESSARY TO KEEP THE UK FROM CUTTING THE BAOR.)

MCCLOY'S VIEWS

AS YOU KNOW, MCNAMARA THINKS THAT THERE IS ROOM FOR TROOP WITHDRAWALS WHICH WILL NOT CUT INTO MILITARY JSCL -- WITHDRAWALS WHICH WOULD SAVE SOME \$200 MILLION. MORE IMPORTANT, BOB BELIEVES THAT A "NO-CUT" POSITION IS IMPOSSIBLE DOMESTIC POLITICS. IF WE TRY TO FOLLOW MCCLOY AND END UP WITH A \$400-\$500 MILLION SHORTFALL IN OFFSET, THE CONGRESS WILL FORCE YOU INTO DEEPER TROOP CUTS THAN ANY OF US THINK SAFE. THEREFORE, BOB WILL WANT TO USE THE TRILATERAL EXERCISE FOR SOME PREVENTIVE SURGERY -- A CUT OF AT LEAST ONE-PLUS DIVISION. IN THIS WAY, HE WOULD HOPE TO REDUCE THE OFFSET SHORTFALL TO \$250 MILLION OR LESS.

II. YOUR CHOICES AT THE MEETING TOMORROW

THE DRAFT INSTRUCTION OF SECRETARY RUSK AND SECRETARY MCNAMARA RECOMMENDS THAT YOU POSTPONE FINAL DECISION BUT TELL MCCLOY THAT:

1. YOU CANNOT DECIDE NOW THAT **WE WILL NOT CUT. THE CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF NO CUTS -- AND A BIG BALANCE OF PAYMENTS LOSS -- MAY BE UNWORKABLE. THE FINAL DECISION ON FORCES WILL INEVITABLY DEPEND IN PART ON HOW MUCH MONEY MCCLOY CAN GET OUT OF THE GERMANS.**

2. OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION SHOULD BE THAT **WE DO NOT WISH TO CUT BECAUSE WITHDRAWALS NOW WOULD RISK UNRAVELLING OF THE ALLIANCE.**

3. HOWEVER, HE IS ALSO TO SAY THAT THE PAYMENTS PROBLEM IS DEEPLY SERIOUS POLITICAL BUSINESS -- BOTH FOR THE U.S. AND THE UK. THERE MUST BE GERMAN OFFSET OF THEIR NET WINDFALL GAIN (VIA WEAPONS PURCHASES, PLUS ADDITIVE GOODS, PLUS LONG-TERM BONDS). IN OUR VIEW **THEIR NET GAIN IS 90 PERCENT OF OUR GROSS DRAIN.**

4. HE MUST NOT SAY THAT ANY FORCE CUTS WOULD BE MILITARILY DANGEROUS, SINCE THIS WOULD FORECLOSE **YOUR OPTIONS.**

III. ROSTOW-BATOR COMMENT

IN CONSIDERING THE ABOVE, YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT MCCLOY MAY REACT STRONGLY TO A POSTPONEMENT OF THE BASIC DECISION. HE BELIEVES IT WILL LEAVE HIM IN A WEAKENED POSITION, AND HE MAY FEEL IT FORESHADOWS A LATER DECISION AGAINST HIS RECOMMENDATIONS. (ROSTOW, MORE THAN BATOR, THINKS THAT THE MCCLOY RECOMMENDATIONS REPRESENT AN INITIAL NEGOTIATING POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE REST OF US, AS WELL AS THE GERMANS -- NOT A FIXED THEOLOGY.)

NEVERTHELESS, WE AGREE WITH THE TACTICAL POSTPONEMENT THE TWO SECRETARIES SUGGEST. BUT THE BASIC PROBLEM WILL NOT GO AWAY -- AND WE WILL HAVE TO FACE IT SOON OR LATE. QUITE POSSIBLE SOON: THE PROCESS OF FORMING THE NEW GERMAN GOVERNMENT MAY WELL GENERATE A FIRM GERMAN POSITION. IN ANY CASE:

THE FINAL OUTCOME DEPENDS ON THE STRENGTH OF THE NEW GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO DO TWO THINGS:

- INCREASE ITS MILITARY BUDGET RIGHT NOW, AND, FOR THE FUTURE, PROGRAM A STEADY EVEN IF MODEST REGULAR PERCENTAGE INCREASE;
- FORCE THE BUNDESBANK TO PLAY THE KIND OF FLEXIBLE GAME THAT IS REQUIRED FOR OFFSETS IN TERMS OF LONG-TERM BONDS.

AT THE MOMENT, IT IS EASIER ON THE EVIDENCE TO BE MORE PESSIMISTIC THAN OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE OUTCOME. AT WORST WE SHALL BE LEFT WITH A CHOICE BETWEEN A SHARP CUT IN THE U.S. AND UK TROOPS, AND ABSORBING A FOREIGN EXCHANGE COST OF \$400-\$500 MILLION.

BUT NOW WE HAVE THE TIME TO PROBE, EXPLORE, AND FIND OUT.

DTG: 230142Z NOV 1966

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

BPS: 2030

~~SECRET~~

Proposed Agenda
NATO Meeting
The Ranch, November 22, 1966

I. The U. K. and German Situations. (Sec. Rusk)

It would be useful to set the stage by having Sec. Rusk underline the fact that we have bought time with the British and we simply do not know -- and will not know for some weeks -- what kind of German government we shall have.

II. The Tripartite Exercise and the McCloy Report. (Mr. McCloy)

You might thank McCloy for undertaking this assignment and ask him to report the results of the first session; the working parties now meeting; and briefly summarize his report. He needs his day in court.

III. Draft Instructions for November 25 meeting. (It may be postponed to November 28 at British request.) (Sec. Rusk)

Sec. Rusk could report agreement or disagreement on the draft instructions, as discovered on the plane.

IV. Your Guidance.

V. Viet Nam, etc.

Sec. Rusk is bringing down several other matters. You may wish to excuse Mr. McCloy to take these up.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 90-48
By ing NARA. Date 7-16-90

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

90-44

By ing NARA. Date 5-15-90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, November 22, 1966 -- 8:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached are Secretary Rusk's recommendations for scheduling a program of foreign visitors during the first seven months of 1967. You have previously approved in principle 12 of the 19 visits involved. Of the 19, only 4 are State visits and the remainder are of the informal, working variety. Your agreement now to the over-all schedule would permit planning to move ahead subject, of course, to such adjustments as may prove necessary later on.

If you do not want to give a go-ahead on the whole roster now, I would still recommend that you approve the firm rescheduling of the visits originally set for this December: President Sunay of Turkey, King Hassan of Morocco, and Vice President C. K. Yen of the Republic of China.

The Turks are possibly the most important of the three and the most in need of reassurance. It would definitely be in our interest to give them a new date now. Between February 10th and 14th would be best from their point of view. This would allow Sunay to make plans to combine his visit with a stop in Kansas City for the opening of the Turkish Art Exhibit on February 16th.

King Hassan is next in priority. The firm rescheduling of his visit for February would reciprocate his taking the initiative to cancel his travel plans on 24 hours notice.

Chinese Vice President Yen is the third of the December group. Agreement to an informal visit in March would be desirable. The Chinese are hurting now because of the UN representation issue and rescheduling Yen's visit would be a small but useful gesture.

W. W. Rostow

Approve over-all schedule, subject to later adjustment _____

Approve rescheduling now of:

Sunay (February 10-14) _____

Hassan (February) _____

Yen (March) _____

Discuss _____

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 22, 1966 -- 11:50 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a message from Prime Minister Eshkol to you, presented to Sec. Rusk by Amb. Harman.

1. Eshkol defends and explains the retaliatory raid.
2. On page 5 he acknowledges that the results were different than those expected.
3. The shock of this incident is turning Israeli minds (page 6) to more effective methods of passive border control.
4. He pleads for a "temperate" position in the UN, given all the circumstances.

Evron called on me today in the light of the two contacts you ordered us to undertake.

Evron underlined the shock felt in Israel at the consequences of the raid and reaffirmed that the Israeli government is now beginning to think seriously about more effective passive defense.

I am trying hard to get us to go to Jordan with proposals for an advisory mission and/or technical assistance to help them better control their borders. If on both sides we could get better border control, the crisis will have been turned to good account.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-510
By is, NARA Date 10-20-99

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

NLJ 98-510
By is, NARA Date 10-20-99

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

~~SECRET~~

The Prime Minister has asked me to say that he has followed with close and sympathetic interest the developments connected with the President's health and is relieved and delighted to hear of his swift and resilient recovery. The entire Israeli people know what the President's active leadership means for the cause of world peace and the advancement of human welfare.

The Prime Minister has given careful consideration to the view of the President conveyed to me by Mr. Komer. The Prime Minister is distressed by the course which events have taken since the disturbances of November 12 and November 13, and the President's comments are being studied with the utmost respect.

The Prime Minister has asked me to convey to you in all frankness how this situation appears from the vantage point of Jerusalem. On November 12 three of our young soldiers were brutally killed and six others wounded well within Israel's borders by terrorists who came from the Mount Hebron area and returned to it after their deed was done. There was not the slightest excuse or provocation from this attack. It came after a period of months during which we had not reacted to a single one of the many acts of murder and sabotage committed against us from Syrian

2.

and Jordanian territory. The attacks from Jordan territory had, in particular, given our people a growing sense of physical insecurity. Commando groups had reached Jerusalem where they had deposited explosive charges under apartment buildings at Romema with the intention of killing their inhabitants. They had derailed a train on the Jerusalem - Tel-Aviv route, a particularly shocking experience for our population which could easily imagine the possible disaster arising from such acts. Terrorist groups had blown up installations near the Dead Sea. They had laid mines at Ein Gedi.

A government which cannot safely run its railroad between its major cities, which cannot prevent foreign aggression at the seat of its government, which cannot ensure roads free from foreign mines, which cannot offer its citizens the same security as the residents of all neighboring states enjoy - is clearly in a serious position from the viewpoint of its central security responsibility. The Prime Minister is sure that the President will realise how difficult it is for him to discharge his responsibilities when citizens are afraid to travel by train, to traverse the roads or to sleep at night not knowing if they will be awakened by sudden bombings.

3.

Early on November, after consultation with the Government of the United States, we took our case to the Security Council. This seemed to inspire the terrorist groups to a new burst of aggressive activity. They committed daily outrages while the Security Council was sitting. Syrian leaders and the official Jordan spokesman at the United Nations used the occasion to proclaim their support for a "popular war" which could bring about the liquidation of Israel. The Security Council, as usual, refused to adopt any resolution, however mild, in response to our plea, although the majority clearly thought that we were in the right. The Soviet veto brought the proceedings to an end. It became apparent that United Nations procedures would not be applied against any Arab state, no matter what it said or did.

The Prime Minister knew, of course, of King Hussein's efforts to restrain and arrest some members of the terrorist groups. This was an important fact, contrasting with the Syrian Government's active encouragement of terrorism. But the fact remained that certain areas like the Mount Hebron area were effectively beyond the restraining influence of the Jordan authorities. There are enclaves where the influence of terrorist groups is especially strong. Our

4.

action, in our own mind, was not directed against King Hussein but against elements in the population hostile to Israel's security - and perhaps no less hostile to Jordanian authority. It may be that King Hussein himself under-estimated the terrible strain arising for the Government and people of Israel from the latest series of raids and the refusal of the Security Council to act on them. His own representative at the United Nations came out in open support of Syria and in favor of a "war of liberation" against Israel. In many cases arrested terrorists were too quickly released. Jordanian authorities refused to allow United Nations investigators to follow tracks into Jordan territory after attacks on Israel. So here we were being bombed, mined and threatened, with all avenues of political satisfaction blocked by Arab-Soviet resistance.

On November 13 the Prime Minister had to consider whether he could in all conscience refuse to sanction any action in response to the November 12 aggression, after he had withheld action in a dozen cases of assault from across the border in recent weeks. He felt that such a refusal would not only demoralize our own people, especially in the frontier areas. It would also open the way for a

5.

new wave of attacks by terrorist groups. These groups were openly exultant. They were in full cry. There was a strong intuition in Jerusalem that a spreading infection of attacks would be the result of any prolongation, after so many weeks, of Israeli passivity. Of the serious options open to the Prime Minister it seemed that inaction would be the likeliest one to provoke and invite an unmanageable series of assaults. That judgment was reached after deep and honest mediation and in the spirit of a heavy responsibility which ultimately cannot be evaded or shared.

What was planned as a limited local action turned out differently, owing to the arrival in force of Arab Legion infantry who unexpectedly engaged our units at close range. The Prime Minister acknowledges, as he has done publicly, that the development of the operation and the casualties suffered were beyond what was intended or anticipated. He does not under-estimate the effects of this expansion of conflict. But he feels strongly that much international tension has been caused by exaggeration of what occurred. There were 18 Jordanian dead of whom three were civilians from amongst a population of 4,000 in the area - not 56 dead including 30 civilians as some

6.

in the area and at the United Nations once thought. We used 8 tanks and not 80 (none of them Pattons). The total of troops involved on our side was less than 400, not 3,000, as some sources said. We used no aircraft in combat against troops or civilians on the ground. These factors are adduced not in order to under estimate what occurred, but simply to restore a sense of proportion. This was not a major eruption of international hostilities, and comparisons with the 1956 fighting are far-fetched. According to our information it is possible that some appraisals of the weakening of Hussein's position are also exaggerated.

In regard to the future, the Prime Minister wishes to say that he has ordered a study to be made and action to be taken in regard to methods of improving our static defense. We have begun fencing off many kilometers in the Jerusalem area and considerable stretches along the railroad which comes very close to the frontier over a long distance. We have prolonged military service of our young men in order to make it possible to increase patrol activity and guard duties. The Prime Minister is exploring every possible technique of a constructive nature to make it less easy to penetrate our territory. In other words, The Prime Minister wants to do everything possible to

7.

prevent the necessity for the kind of action which seemed necessary to us on November 13.

The central point is that our basic policy has not changed. We stand by the Armistice Agreement. We support the status quo in our region. We uphold the sovereignty and integrity of existing states. We would like to have a stable understanding with Jordan which might evolve into affirmative friendly relations. The Prime Minister would like the events of 12-13 November to be the last episode of force in Israel-Jordan relations or, indeed, in the area as a whole. This can be achieved by the mutual will of the governments concerned.

The Prime Minister invites the understanding of the President for the dilemmas in which we have found ourselves. It is important that friends should understand each other in their difficult hours, and this is a difficult hour for us.

The Prime Minister has asked me to add a word about an immediate problem. The situation, already tense, might deteriorate still further if the United Nations Security Council were to push its criticism beyond any reasonable limit. It is now considering a text more violent and intemperate than any ever adopted in United Nations history

8.

in relation to the Middle East. After all, we are not dealing here with a vast war, but with an incident of relatively limited scope. If the text now before the Security Council which utterly ignores Israel's losses, anxieties and difficulties, were adopted there would be two results: a renewal of Arab raids on the assumption that the security of Israeli lives is of no interest to anybody; and, in Israel, a mood of isolation, frustration and disillusionment with international justice, which would create a climate in which it would be difficult for prudent counsels to prevail. During the past fifteen years of Arab hostility to Israel on every front the United Nations organs have not adopted any resolution directly censuring the policy of Arab belligerency.

Surely the principles of equity and the American-Israel friendship set some limit to the vehemence of any condemnation which the United States delegation can support or condone.

The Prime Minister wishes me to say that he has expressed himself frankly because the friendship between our nations and the President's personal part in cultivating this friendship are deeply valued by us.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

9.

All that Israel wants is to be left alone by her neighbors, to pursue her tasks in peace and quiet. Surely this is a reasonable wish. The Prime Minister does not think that we need despair of achieving it.

Washington, D.C.
November 21, 1966

47
DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

EYES NODIS
EYES ONLY

ZCZCEEA261
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2304

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661021

~~SECRET~~ NODIS EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE

FOLLOWING IS SAIGON CABLE 11498

1. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED A LETTER FROM BARRY GOLDWATER CONCERNING A VISIT BY HIM TO SAIGON IN JANUARY. THE SUBSTANTIVE PART OF IT IS AS FOLLOWS:

2. QUOTE. "BEFORE I MAKE ANY PLANS TO DO THIS, HOWEVER, I WOULD WANT TO DO IT WITH THE KNOWLEDGE THAT SUCH A VISIT WOULD BE IN AGREEMENT WITH WHAT YOU FELT THE BEST INTEREST OF OUR COUNTRY AND OUR EFFORTS.

YOU CAN BE PERFECTLY FRANK WITH ME ON THIS MATTER FOR I KNOW THAT THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE IN MY POSITION HAVE VISITED SOUTH VIET-NAM AND I KNOW THAT MINE MIGHT HAVE A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT APPEARANCE TO IT. "BECAUSE WE ARE NOW FORMULATING OUR PLANS, I WOULD APPRECIATE AS EARLY AN ANSWER AS POSSIBLE ON THIS." UNQUOTE

3. I WILL, OF COURSE, ADVISE HIM AS YOU WISH HIM TO BE ADVISED AND, IF YOU WISH, WILL BE GLAD TO DO SO IN MY OWN NAME.
LODGE

~~SECRET~~
NODIS

EYES ONLY

DTG: 221433Z NOV 66

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-46
By WJF NARA. Date 7-16-90

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

Pres file

Tuesday
November 22, 1966
2:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here is the score sheet on
official reactions to the Manila
conference. Not bad. In fact,
on the whole, good.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Classification, Feb. 24, 1983
By DLH NARS, Date 8-23-86

WWRostow:rln

TABULATION OF
OFFICIAL REACTIONS TO THE MANILA CONFERENCE

Country	enthusiastic favorable	preoccupied	no official public statement	negative hostile	no occupied other matters	approves resisting aggression	approves unity theme	approves peace theme	favorable troop withdrawal	favorable to SVN commitment	fear of escalation	notes cessation bombing	notes negative Communist reaction	studied Manila documents
Afghanistan			X	X										X
Algeria			X	X						X				
Argentina	X	X			X	X		X			X	X		
Australia	X				X	X	X	X	X					X
Austria	X	X			X		X			X				X
Belgium	X	X				X	X							X
Bolivia	X	X	X			X								
Botswana														
Brazil	X	X			X	X			X			X	X	
Bulgaria			X								X			
Burma			X											
Burundi			X	X							X			
Cambodia				X	X						X			
Cameroon	X	X	X		X									
Canada	X	X			X	X	X	X	X		X			X
Central African Rep.	X	X				X								X
Ceylon	X	X				X				X				X
Chad	X	X			X				X	X				X
Chile	X	X	X			X								X
China, Republic of	X	X	X	X	X									X
China, Communist				X										
Colombia	X	X			X	X								X
Congo (B)														
Congo (K)														
Costa Rica	X	X			X	X			X			X	X	
Cuba				X	X						X			

SECRET - LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED
State 5-15-79 (# 71c)
By DA pm ip NARS, Date 8-25-86

- 2 -

Country	enthusiastic favorable	preoccupied	no official public statement	negative hostile	other matters	resisting aggression	unity theme	peace theme	troop withdrawal	favorable to SVN commitment	escalation	President's trip	negative Communist propaganda	studied Manila documents
Cyprus	x	x				x	x			x	x	x		
Czechoslovakia			x							x				
Dahomey														
Denmark	x	x	x			x	x	x		x			x	
Dominican Republic	x		x		x	x			x					x
Ecuador	x		x			x								x
El Salvador	x	x	x						x					x
Ethiopia	x	x	x			x	x							x
Finland	x		x											x
France			x	x	x						x	x	x	
Gabon			x											x
Gambia														
Germany (FRG)	x	x	x			x		x				x	x	
Ghana	x	x			x	x					x			x
Greece			x	x										x
Guatemala			x	x		x								x
Guinea														
Guyana	x		x			x								x
Haiti			x											x
Honduras	x		x			x	x			x				x
Hong Kong			x			x								
Hungary			x	x							x			
Iceland			x			x				x	x			x
India	x		x	x		x	x	x		x				x
Indonesia	x		x			x		x					x	x
Iran	x		x			x							x	x

- 3 -

Country	enthusiastic favorable	preoccupied no official public statement	no occupied other matters negative hostile	favors resisting aggression	approves unity theme	favors peace theme	favors troop withdrawal	favorable to SPT commitment	fear of escalation	favors cessation	notes negative Communist reaction	studied Manila documents
Iraq	x	x			x						x	x
Ireland	x	x		x			x					
Israel	x	x			x						x	x
Italy	x	x			x	x			x			x
Ivory Coast	x	x	x									
Jamaica	x				x		x				x	x
Japan	x		x		x	x						x
Jordan	x		x									x
Kenya			x									x
Korea, Republic of	x			x	x	x	x	x			x	x
Kuwait		x	x	x		x					x	x
Laos	x		x									x
Lebanon	x		x	x	x		x					x
Lesotho												
Liberia	x				x							x
Libya		x	x						x			x
Luxembourg	x		x		x			x				x
Malagasy	x	x	x									x
Malawi	x	x	x		x		x					x
Malaysia	x	x	x	x	x		x	x				x
Mali												
Malta	x		x		x							
Mauritania		x	x									x
Mexico												
Morocco	x		x	x	x		x					x
Nepal			x									x

~~SECRET~~ - LIMDIS

~~SECRET~~ - LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED

49

SENT
WHCA

1966 NOV 22 15 10

ZCZCEEA260
OO VTE10
DE VTE 2305

FROM: WALT ROSTOV
TO : THE PRESIDENT
INFO: BILL MOYERS
CITE: CAP661022

LINDIS

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LINDIS EYES ONLY

TOKYO 3825

EYES ONLY LINDIS

QUOTE: I HAVE COMPLETED MY TRIP TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AM LEAVING
MANILA ON PERSONAL BUSINESS TO CAIRO AND KUWAIT FOR A FEW DAYS.
WILL BE IN WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 10 FOR A SPECIAL MEETING WITH
SECRETARY MCNAMARA ON SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT COMMITTEE BUSINESS.
I WOULD LIKE TO COME DOWN TO SEE YOU AND REPORT ON MY TRIP
EITHER SATURDAY AFTERNOON DECEMBER 10 OR SUNDAY DECEMBER 11
OR ALTERNATIVELY MONDAY DECEMBER 12. WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE
YOUR ADVISING IF THIS IS AGREEABLE. WITH WARMEST PERSONAL
REGARDS. EUGENE BLACK UNQUOTE

JOHNSON

DTG: 221434Z NOV 66

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 90-46

By sup NARA. Date 7-16-90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LINDIS

EYES ONLY

GPS: 140

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 22, 1966

Send LDX to State Department to transmit to

Mr. Eugene Black from Walt Rostow, EYES ONLY

The President would be delighted to see you. He has tentatively set your visit for Saturday afternoon December 10 and would be pleased to have you stay over night. We will reconfirm closer to the occasion.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By alt NARA, Date 1-18-90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Proposed Agenda
NATO Meeting
The Ranch, November 22, 1966

I. The U. K. and German Situations. (Sec. Rusk)

It would be useful to set the stage by having Sec. Rusk underline the fact that we have bought time with the British and we simply do not know -- and will not know for some weeks -- what kind of German government we shall have.

II. The Tripartite Exercise and the McCloy Report. (Mr. McCloy)

You might thank McCloy for undertaking this assignment and ask him to report the results of the first session; the working parties now meeting; and briefly summarize his report. He needs his day in court.

III. Draft Instructions for November 25 meeting. (It may be postponed to November 28 at British request.) (Sec. Rusk)

Sec. Rusk could report agreement or disagreement on the draft instructions, as discovered on the plane.

IV. Your Guidance.

V. Viet Nam, etc.

Sec. Rusk is bringing down several other matters. You may wish to excuse Mr. McCloy to take these up.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 90-48
By lip NARA. Date 7-16-90

~~SECRET~~

SENT
WHCA

1965 NOV 22 17 26

52
~~SECRET~~

ZCZCEEA254
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2307

~~NODIS~~

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661023

~~SECRET NODIS~~

NOVEMBER 22, 1965

THIS CABLE FROM GENE ROSTOW INDICATES THAT WILSON
HAS BOUGHT YOUR PROPOSAL WHICH GIVES US SOME TIME TO
BREATHE AND LET THE TRIPARTITE EXERCISE UNFOLD.

(REPEAT LONDON 4243)

CONTROL: 20065
REC'D : NOV 22, 8:05 A.M.

FROM: LONDON

~~SECRET LONDON 4243~~

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-510
By is, NARA Date 10-20-99

AEROX FROM QUICK COPY

FOR SECRETARY AND MCCLOY FROM UNDER SECRETARY ROSTOW

1. AFTER DAY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH BRITISH MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS ENDING IN MEETINGS WITH CALLAGHAN ALONE AND THEN WITH WILSON AND CALLAGHAN TOGETHER IN WHICH ALL POINTS IN THREE MESSAGES BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER WERE INTENSIVELY CANVASSED, PRIME MINISTER AUTHORIZED ME TO TELL YOU THAT HE ACCEPTS THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL AD REFERENDUM TO THE CABINET ON THE UNDERSTANDING (A) THAT QUOTE CONCERT UNQUOTE MEANS WE MOVE TOGETHER BUT DOES NOT REPEAT NOT GIVE US A VETO, AND (B) THAT BRITAIN IS NOW COMMITTING ITSELF TO A DELAY OF ABOUT SIX MONTHS. BEYOND THAT POINT WILSON INSISTS THAT BRITAIN WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT SETTLE FOR ANYTHING LESS THAN FULL COVERAGE OF ITS EXCHANGE COSTS IN GERMANY. WILSON EXPRESSED HOPE US PROCUREMENT WOULD NOT BE FOR PETROLEUM -- WITH ITS HIGH IMPORT CONTENT -- AND CALLAGHAN URGED US IF POSSIBLE TO PUT ORDERS THAT WOULD CREATE EMPLOYMENT IN BRITAIN.

2. I MADE CLEAR US CANNOT PROMISE THAT TRILATERAL TALKS WILL COME OUT WITH RECOMMENDATION FOR TROOP AND STOCK WITHDRAWALS. I EXPRESSED HOPE WE COULD WIND UP THE TRILATERALS WITHIN SIX MONTHS, BUT SAID THAT DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN THE TALKS MADE A STRICT TIMETABLE IMPOSSIBLE. I WARNED WILSON IT MIGHT BE DAMAGING OR IMPOSSIBLE TO INSIST ON 100 PERCENT COVERAGE.

3. WILSON SAID HE COULD GO AHEAD ON THIS BASIS AND WOULD REPLY TO PRESIDENT AFTER CABINET DECISION. WE AGREED THIS ARRANGEMENT SHOULD BE KEPT SECRET FOR PRESENT. US AND UK SHOULD WORK OUT TIME AND MODE OF ANNOUNCEMENT, WHICH COULD WELL BE MADE AT NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING NEXT MONTH.

4. CALLAGHAN PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IN FINAL DISCUSSIONS.

5. REPORT ON MEETING WITH PM AND CALLAGHAN FOLLOWS IN SEPARATE CABLE.

BRUCE

~~SECRET~~

~~NOBIS~~

DTG: 221626Z NOV 65

SENT
WHCA

1966 NOV 21 15 44

EEA242
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 2282

FROM: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: WH60652

UNCLAS

FOLLOWING IS STATE DEPT CABLE TOKYO 2200

PASS THE WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM EUGENE R. BLACK

QUOTE. DELIGHTED TO LEARN YOUR OPERATION WAS A SUCCESS
AND THAT YOU ARE ALREADY WELL ON THE ROAD TO RECOVERY.

I LEFT KOREA WITH THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THOSE BRAVE
PEOPLE FELT YOUR VISIT REALLY PUT THEIR COUNTRY ON THE
MAP WHERE IT BELONGS. HAVE NOW VISITED LAOS, THAILAND,
BURMA, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, INDONESIA, SOUTH VIETNAM,
TAIWAN, KOREA AND NOW JAPAN. FOUND GREAT INTEREST IN
YOUR PROGRAM AND KEEN DESIRE TO DEVELOP REGIONAL
COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPORTANCE OF IT.

TRUST YOU WILL BE BACK IN THE SADDLE BY THE TIME I RETURN.
MEANWHILE, HAVE THE BEST OF RESTS. GENE BLACK. UNQUOTE.
JOHNSON

DTG: 211527Z NOV 66

54

EEA241

OO WTE 10
DE WTE 2281

SENT
WHCA

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661012

1966 NOV 21 15 42

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

EXDIS

FOLLOWING IS STATE DEPT CABLE USUN 2499

SENATOR MANSFIELD'S VISIT TO NY

DEPT PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR PRESIDENT

AS REQUESTED BY THE PRESIDENT I INVITED SENATOR MANSFIELD TO JOIN ME IN NY LAST FRIDAY FOR A DISCUSSION ON THE ROLE OF UN IN VIETNAM CONFLICT. THIS RESULTED FROM SPEECH GIVEN BY MANSFIELD AT JOHNS HOPKINS RECENTLY WHICH SPEECH WAS WIDELY REPORTED IN PRESS AND CALLED FOR INVOLVEMENT BY UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN SETTLING VIETNAM AT MEETINGS WHERE PEKING, HANOI AND VIETCONG WOULD BE INVITED TO BE PRESENT.

I RECEIVED SENATOR MANSFIELD VERY CORDIALLY AND WE HAD MOST FRIENDLY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. FOR SENATOR'S INFORMATION I GAVE HIM MEMORANDUM RECOUNTING OUR EFFORTS TO INVOLVE UN AND ITS ORGANS INCLUDING SECURITY COUNCIL IN BRINGING ABOUT HONORABLE SETTLEMENT IN VIETNAM. COPY OF THIS MEMO IS BEING FORWARDED BY POUCH.

SENATOR MANSFIELD SAT WITH OUR DELEGATION DURING PART OF DEBATE ON CHIREP AND HAD PRIVATE MEETING WITH CAMBODIAN REPRESENTATIVE.

MANSFIELD ON MY INITIATION ALSO JOINED ME IN LUNCHEON HONORING UNDER SECRETARY KATZENBACH DURING WHICH I PRESENTED UNDER SECRETARY AND SENATOR TO U THANT AND ALL OF UNDER SECRETARIES OF UN. FOLLOWING LUNCHEON, SECRETARY GENERAL, MANSFIELD, KATZENBACH AND I HAD PRIVATE TALK IN MY APARTMENT.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By 7 NARA, Date 9-3-91

REFERRING TO MANSFIELD'S JOHNS HOPKINS PROPOSAL I ASKED FOR SECRETARY GENERAL'S COMMENTS CONCERNING THEM.

SECRETARY GENERAL VERY FORTHRIGHTLY SAID IN HIS CONSIDERED JUDGMENT NO PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED BY HAVING FORMAL SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF VIETNAM CONFLICT. HE EXPRESSED VIGOROUSLY VIEW TO MANSFIELD THAT SECURITY COUNCIL CONFRONTATION AT THIS TIME WOULD BE HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE AND COULD ONLY LEAD TO INCREASE TENSIONS BETWEEN SOVIET UNION AND US. HE FURTHER STATED IN HIS VIEW ONLY HOPE FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM WOULD BE THROUGH PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS NOT EXCLUDING HIS OWN. HE INTIMATED HE BELIEVED HIS CHANNEL WAS OPEN AS RESULT OF HIS DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW LAST SUMMER WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR. THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED.

MANSFIELD APPEARED TO BE MUCH IMPRESSED BY SECRETARY GENERAL'S COMMENTS AND SEIZING UPON THEM STATED SECRETARY GENERAL'S VIEWS REINFORCED US POSITION THAT SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD STAND FOR ANOTHER FULL TERM.

SECRETARY GENERAL ELABORATED ON HIS VIEWS ON VIETNAM REPEATING BY NO FAMILIAR STORY ABOUT ATTEMPTS TO BRING ABOUT DIRECT DIALOGUE THROUGH MEDIUM OF GOVERNOR STEVENSON IN 1964 AND 1965. SECRETARY GENERAL'S VERSION OF WHAT OCCURRED DURING THIS PERIOD HAS BEEN REPORTED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AND NOTHING NEW WAS ADDED IN COURSE OF HIS RECITAL.

IN ADDITION TO FOREGOING MEETING MANSFIELD MET PRIVATELY FOR FEW MINUTES WITH SECRETARY GENERAL.

BEFORE LEAVING MANSFIELD THANKED ME FOR OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED HIM TO REVIEW MATTER WITH ME AND MEMBERS OF MY DELEGATION AND SECRETARY GENERAL.

MANSFIELD DID NOT RAISE WITH ME QUESTION OF TAKING TRIP ON HIS OWN TO PEKING, MOSCOW AND OTHER SUCH STOPS. ON CONTRARY HE INDICATED GREAT INTEREST IN MY PROJECTED TRIP TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND POSSIBILITY OF JOINING ME ON THIS TRIP. I TOLD HIM THIS IS MATTER WE COULD DISCUSS BUT THAT AS OF NOW MY PLANS WERE VERY UNCERTAIN.

GOLDBERG

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 21/1434Z NOV 66

Monday - November 21, 1966

Send
on wire 55
6 PM

To: The President
From: W. W. Rostow
Subject: Haitian Situation

Rumors are rife that Haiti has been, or is about to be, invaded. Miami and the Dominican Republic are mentioned as jumping off places. Many US reporters have been lured into thinking that the Haitian situation is about to blow and have gone to Miami and Port-au-Prince. This has added to the speculation. CBS, in particular, has been guilty of feeding the rumor mill.

A check of all points concerned shows this:

Port-au-Prince - Embassy says that the atmosphere is tense and the armed forces are on full alert but there has been no invasion.

Santo Domingo - Embassy and FBI report that normality prevails along the Haitian-Dominican border.

Miami - Customs FBI [REDACTED] Cuban and Haitian exile groups [REDACTED] report quarrelling and division among the would-be invaders, with no overt moves to move men and materials.

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)>25V
(C)

State has assured Duvalier that we will not permit US territory to be used as an invasion springboard.

We continue to monitor the situation closely from here.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-508
By is, NARA Date 4-7-00

~~SECRET~~

BOX FROM QUICK COPY

EEA239
00 WTE 10
DE WTE 2279

SENT
WHCA

1966 NOV 21 13 22

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661011

SECRET EXDIS

IN CONNECTION WITH GOLDBERG'S DRAFT SPEECH, YOU WILL WISH
TO BE AWARE OF FOLLOWING CONVERSATION IN TAIPEI.

(REPEAT TAIPEI 1483)

1. ACTING FONMIN SAMPSON SHEN CALLED ME TO MOFA 5:30 LOCAL
TIME THIS AFTERNOON TO INFORM ME OFFICIALLY THAT A GRC
DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL THAT IF ITALIAN
RESOLUTION CALLING FOR STUDY COMMITTEE WERE TO PASS, THE GRC
WILL ON THE SAME DAY ANNOUNCE ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM THE UN.
HE SAID GRC HAD TELEGRAPHED TO FONMIN WEI TODAY, TELLING
HIM TO CONVEY THIS DECISION TO SECRETARY, IF IN NEW YORK,
AND TO GOLDBERG.

2. SHEN SAID THAT DECISION REACHED AFTER CONSIDERATION OF ITS
CONSEQUENCES, AND WAS TAKEN IN LIGHT OF FACT THAT USG, AFTER
SUPPORTING POSITION OF GRC IN UN FOR MANY YEARS, NOW FELT IT
NECESSARY SUPPORT STUDY COMMITTEE RESOLUTION THAT HAS EFFECT
OF CALLING INTO QUESTION GRC RIGHTS AS FOUNDING MEMBER OF UN.
GRC FELT IT WOULD ONLY ENCOUNTER INSULTS IF IT STAYED IN
AFTER STUDY COMMITTEE RESOLUTION IS PASSED. GRC WOULD
CONTINUE TO WORK AGAINST RESOLUTION, AND FELT THERE WAS SOME
POSSIBILITY IT MIGHT NOT PASS.

3. I REGISTERED VIGOROUS ADVERSE REACTION TO DECISION, TERMING
IT HASTY, ILL-ADVISED, NOT CONSONANT WITH POSITION TAKEN BY
FONMIN WEI WITH SECRETARY LAST WEEK, AND NOT IN LINE WITH
OUR AGREED POLICY OF CLOSE ADVANCE CONSULTATION AND COOPERA-
TION ON MATTERS OF MAJOR MUTUAL CONCERN. I NOTED THAT STEP
IF TAKEN WOULD AMOUNT TO ABANDONMENT OF UN FIELD TO CHICOMS
PRESENTING THEM WITH A MAJOR OPPORTUNITY WHICH THEY MIGHT
SEIZE TO DETRIMENT OF ALL ALLIES.

4. I DEPLORED GRC FAILURE TO GIVE ME CHANCE TO PRESENT US
POSITION AGAIN BEFORE DECISION TAKEN AND SAID I WOULD PREFER
NOT TO TAKE DECISION AS DEFINITIVE AT THIS STAGE. I PUT
SHEN ON NOTICE THAT GRC MIGHT RECEIVE REQUEST FROM ME FOR
EARLY APPOINTMENT WITH PRES. CHIANG AFTER I HAD RECEIVED
INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON.

5. FULL REPORT OF CONVERSATION FOLLOWS SEPTTEL.

MCCONAUGHY

DTG: 211257Z NOV 66

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.3
State Dept. Guidelines
By 7 NARA, Date 9-3-98

~~SECRET~~

57
Number 21, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT

From WALT ROSTOW

Conclusions and recommendations of McCloy Report follow this message.

Marv Watson is arranging courier to arrive Ranch about noon tomorrow with full report which deserves reading -- especially Volume I -- among other reasons, to assure McCloy he's had his day in court.

Both Secretaries recommend meeting with you on Wednesday as early as party can arrive, with return same day.

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara are meeting tonight to discuss substance of report and differences which will have to be resolved.

We shall inform you tomorrow of issues in contention and propose, as you suggested, a scenario. We need better to see lay of the land.

The two Secretaries will be discussing their recommendations as to who should come along to the Ranch on Wednesday. At the moment, from his shop, Secretary Rusk suggests McCloy, Bowie, and Leddy. Secretary McNamara wants the smallest possible party. Your guidance would be helpful. I'm sure that you will wish to talk to principals alone at a certain stage, but there are also important advantages in having those who have done the work and must carry through decisions; e. g., Deming (in absence Fowler), Bowie, Leddy, Bator and McNaughton.

McCloy Conclusions and Recommendations follow:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-48
By ig NARA. Date 7-16-90

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 21, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 90-48
By inf NARA. Date 7-16-90

~~Secretaries Rusk and McNamara meeting on McCloy Report,~~
Conclusions and Recommendations of ~~which follow,~~ *McCloy Report follow this message.*

Marv Watson is arranging courier to arrive Ranch about noon tomorrow with full report which deserves reading, *-- especially Volume I --* among other reasons to assure McCloy he's had his day in court.

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I'm sure that you will wish to talk to principals alone at a certain stage, but there are also important advantages in having those who *have done the work and* must carry through decisions ~~along~~; e.g., Deming (in absence Fowler), Bowie, Leddy, Bator, and McNaughton.

McCloy Conclusions and Recommendations follow:

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions:

1. NATO continues to be indispensable for European security and stability -- interests vital to the US. (Section A).


2. The strategy of flexible response, backed by adequate conventional, as well as nuclear capabilities, is essential for balanced defense and effective deterrence under present conditions. (Section B).

3. Existing NATO conventional forces for the Central Region are adequate in size to support a flexible response strategy, though certain imbalances and deficiencies need correction. (Section B).

4. Any material reduction in US forces will probably trigger Allied force cuts. The cumulative effect could reduce substantially NATO conventional capability to support a flexible response strategy and lower the nuclear threshold. While the effect of such cuts on the deterrent cannot be assessed with precision, they could enhance to some degree the risk of Soviet pressures or actions at lower levels, especially in view of the growing Soviet strategic nuclear strength. (Section C).

5. With

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-2-

5. With our existing capacity for deploying forces from CONUS to Europe, the time required to return any forces withdrawn to the US would make them much less effective than forces in place in Europe in terms of the flexible response strategy and the deterrent. The time required to deploy ground forces can be substantially reduced during the next several years by major expenditures for duplicate equipment, facilities, and necessary readiness. With such improvements, reinforcement would still take at least three weeks. (Section C).

6. Politically, any material withdrawal of US forces from Europe, in its present unsettled state, would seriously increase the risks of NATO disintegration and reduction of US influence in Europe. (Section D).

7. The extent to which Germany will be prepared to provide future offsets for US military expenditures in Germany will be uncertain until a new German Government gains a solid footing. The prospects for offsets should be improved by -- (a) relating their amount to the net foreign exchange gain to the Federal Republic from the US military expenditures in Germany; (b) expanding the forms of offset to include non-military purchases, as well as neutralizing by financial means; and (c)
relating

~~SECRET~~

relating the offset obligations to the state of the US and German balance of payments. (Section E).

8. The US has an interest in the continued maintenance of UK forces in Germany for their effect on the cohesion of NATO and the position of the UK in Europe. (Section F).

Recommendations:

1. I recommend, for the political and military reasons outlined, that the US should not withdraw any significant forces from the Central Region in Europe under current conditions.

2. I recommend that the US explore with the Government of the Federal Republic new arrangements to neutralize balance of payments effects of US expenditures in Germany:

(a) to the extent of net gains to the German balance of payments;

(b) by means of military purchases, other additive purchases, and appropriate financial devices; and

(c) subject to the general state of US and FRG balance of payments.

3. I recommend that the US explore with the UK and the Federal Republic of Germany how the UK can be enabled

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~~-4-~~

enabled to retain on the Central Front its present level of forces.

4. I recommend that the US continue to encourage its NATO Allies to provide reasonable stocks, equipment, support and reserves for forces in conformity with a flexible response strategy.

~~SECRET~~