

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 12, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NIJ 94-457
 By cb, NARA, Date 6-2-95

In the light of your hold-up on the Cambodian dam decision and with another day to turn around, I find that the lawyers can argue either way as to whether a "national security waiver" is necessary. The reason for the debate is that what the Cambodians are doing ^{in trade} with both Hanoi and the Vieg Cong is, relatively, so small. Beyond what the lawyers might argue is what the Congressional leadership might be persuaded ^{to accept} in terms of substance. ~~Clearly~~ ^{To} engage Cambodia with the regional institutions of Free Asia at this time via the Prek Thnot project is in the national interest and, even, the national security interest, if we can pull it off.

But, as I say, that is a matter of persuasion and Congressional leadership judgment rather than a ^{formal} legal matter.

Query: Do you wish us to prepare both the legal case for not requiring a national security waiver and a talking paper on the substance of the matter, whose persuasiveness you could then judge?

As a fallback I have been talking with Bill Bundy ^{along} the following lines: We might ^{get Bundy to go} go to the Japanese at the level at least of the Foreign Minister if not Sato. ^{He} We would say that here is a chance for them to contribute constructively in the whole Southeast Asian area at a time when problems arising from the war make it difficult for us to do what

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we otherwise would like to do. We could remind them that they are not otherwise contributing on a large scale to Viet Nam. Indeed, they are getting very significant trade benefits from the scale of Vietnamese requirements during the war. This is one way in which they might be helpful in the context of the war in Viet Nam.

In short, the fall-back would be to put quite ^{heavy} ~~heavy~~ high-level pressure on the Japs to back whatever part of the \$11 million ^{is} necessary to get the project started.

WWRostow:rlh

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1966 NOV 12 00 00

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EEA185
00 WTE10
DE WTE 2196

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : JAKE JACOBSEN FOR THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66964

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: DAILY CABLE SUMMARY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-510
By is, NARA Date 10-20-99

1966 NOV 11 PM 7:01
FRIDAY

1. KY-LODGE CONVERSATION

KY TOLD LODGE THAT A DECISION WOULD SOON BE MADE TO MOVE GENERAL QUANG OUT OF THE IV CORPS. LODGE COMMENTS THAT KY HAS BEEN PREPARING LONG AND WELL FOR THIS MOVE BUT WARNS THAT IT MAY STIR UP RESENTMENTS. KY WAS CONFIDENT THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WOULD SOON START DRAFTING THE CONSTITUTION AND THAT ARTICLE 20 OF THE DECREE-LAW WOULD BE "NO PROBLEM". (THE ASSEMBLY YESTERDAY UNANIMOUSLY AGREED TO APPOINT A 12-MAN "AMENDMENT COMMITTEE" TO DETERMINE WHAT CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE IN THE THE DECREE-LAW.) KY HAD NO VALID EXPLANATION OF THE DELAY IN ANNOUNCING THE AMNESTY AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROGRAM SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER 1. LODGE, NEVERTHELESS, SAYS KY APPEARS TO BELIEVE IN THE PROGRAM.

3. THAI STATUS OF FORCES NEGOTIATIONS

AMBASSADOR MARTIN HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED NOT TO PUT FORWARD A DRAFT OF A FULLY RECIPROCAL STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA), ALTHOUGH SOME SIGNIFICANT WORDING CHANGES MIGHT BE MADE IN THE PROPOSED DRAFT TO GIVE IT THE APPEARANCE OF RECIPROCITY. STATE'S OBJECTIONS TO A RECIPROCAL SOFA (AS DESIRED BY THE THAI'S) ARE THAT IT WOULD: 1) REQUIRE SENATE RATIFICATION, AND 2) REOPEN ALL OTHER SOFA AGREEMENTS IN ASIA, WHICH ARE NON-RECIPROCAL.

4. DEGAULLE ON US RIGHTS

PRESIDENT DEGAULLE TOLD AMBASSADOR BOHLEN NOVEMBER 10 THAT ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE FOR US MILITARY SUPPLIES TO REMAIN ON FRENCH SOIL BEYOND APRIL 1, 1967 AND THAT HE INTENDED, FOR THE PRESENT, TO CONTINUE TO APPROVE OVERFLIGHTS ON A MONTHLY BASIS.

5. DEGAULLE ON GERMANY

PRESIDENT DEGAULLE TOLD BOHLEN: 1) HE THOUGHT THE SITUATION IN GERMANY "SERIOUS;" 2) THE GERMANS GOT ON HIS NERVES, AS DID ALL PEOPLE WHO DID NOT KNOW WHAT THEY WANTED; 3) ERHARD, WHILE NOT AN EVIL MAN, WAS VERY WEAK AND NOT ENTIRELY FRANK WITH THE FRENCH; 4) HIS CRITICISM OF GERMANY'S ALWAYS SEEKING A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US WAS ENTIRELY DIRECTED AT THE GERMANS, AND 5) ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES HE FOUND WITH THE GERMANS WAS THAT THEY HAD NEVER REALLY FACED UP TO THE FACT THAT THEY HAD LOST THE WAR.

6. KIESINGER NOMINATION

EMBASSY BONN REPORTS THAT IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS KIESINGER'S PROSPECTS. IN HIS ACCEPTANCE STATEMENT KIESINGER PROMISED TO NEGOTIATE WITH BOTH THE FREE DEMOCRATS (FDP) AND THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS (SPD) FOR A COALITION. HE IS REGARDED AS FAVORING A COALITION WITH THE FDP (FREE DEMOCRATS.) INITIAL FDP (FREE DEMOCRAT) REACTION, HOWEVER, TO KIESINGER'S NOMINATION IS EXTREMELY NEGATIVE. THE SPD (SOCIAL DEMOCRATS) HAS NOT YET REACTED, AND PROBABLY WILL NOT UNTIL AFTER THE PARTY'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETS TODAY. IF THE SPD (SOCIAL DEMOCRATS) SHOULD DECIDE TO PRESENT A CANDIDATE OF ITS OWN, WITH FDP (FREEDEMOCRAT) SUPPORT, IT WILL HAVE TO MOVE QUICKLY THROUGH A VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. THIS CAN ONLY BE DONE SO LONG AS ERHARD REMAINS IN OFFICE. AFTER HIS RESIGNATION THE FEDERAL PRESIDENT WILL PROPOSE A NEW CHANCELLOR. CUSTOMARILY, THE PRESIDENT FIRST TURNS TO THE STRONGEST PARLIAMENTARY PARTY, I. E., THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS.

7. AMERICANS IN CUBA

THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO BLOCK THE DEPARTURE OF ABOUT 1,000 AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO HAVE REQUESTED PERMISSION TO LEAVE. SINCE MANY ARE DESTITUTE, STATE HAS AUTHORIZED THE SWISS TO PROVIDE THEM WITH SUBSISTENCE FUNDS. IN ADDITION TO THE PERSISTENT EFFORTS OF THE SWISS TO PERSUADE CASTRO TO LET THESE PEOPLE GO, U THANT'S INTERVENTION IS BEING SOUGHT.

8. GUINEA

THE EXODUS OF OUR PERSONNEL BEGINS TODAY WITH THE MOVEMENT OF 20 PAN-AM TECHNICIANS AND THEIR DEPENDENTS TO MONROVIA VIA KLM; THE PEACE CORPS CONTINGENT (62 VOLUNTEERS AND 10 STAFF AND DEPENDENTS) IS SCHEDULED TO FLY TO DAKAR BY CHARTERED AIRCRAFT ON MONDAY. AMBASSADOR MCILVAIN IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS NEXT WEEK AFTER THE PEACE CORPS HAS LEFT. BEFORE HE LEAVES, MCILVAIN HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SEE PRESIDENT TOURE AND REFUTE THE UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS MADE AGAINST US IN THE GUINEA-GHANA AFFAIR.

9. CHIREP

SECRETARY RUSK TOLD THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR IN THE STRONGEST TERMS YESTERDAY THAT WE CANNOT STAND PAT. BESIDES THE CHINESE, THE JAPANESE ARE THE MOST RELUCTANT TO MOVE, BEING CONCERNED THAT SATO'S POSITION MIGHT BE THREATENED IF THE WORST OCCURRED IN NEW YORK. WE ARE ENLISTING CO-SPONSORS FOR OUR IMPORTANT QUESTION RESOLUTION AND MAY EVEN TABLE IT TODAY TO MAKE SURE IT HAS PRECEDENCE OVER THE CANADIANS RESOLUTION IF WE FAIL TO DETER THEM FROM PRESENTING IT. THE ITALIANS AND CHILEANS ARE PRIVATELY CIRCULATING RESOLUTIONS ON A STUDY COMMITTEE, GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR APPROACH.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-47

1966 NOV 12 00 09

By ju, NARA, Date 1-19-93

EEA187
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2200

~~SECRET~~

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66967

~~SECRET~~

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1966

FRIDAY
NOV 11 1966 7 23

TO : THE PRESIDENT
FROM: W.W. ROSTOW
SUBJECT: LATEST HAITIAN DEVELOPMENTS

AMBASSADOR TIMMONS REPORTS SEVERAL DIFFERENT SOURCES NOW
TELL HIM THAT DUVALIER HAS DISMISSED A NUMBER OF HIGH
MILITARY OFFICERS AND DIRECTED THEIR ARREST.

THE SOURCES HAVE MENTIONED AT LEAST FOUR OFFICERS WHO,
ACCORDING TO PREVIOUS INTELLIGENCE, ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE
BEEN PLOTTING.

TIMMONS HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM THESE REPORTS, BUT
IT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISING IF DUVALIER HAD PLOTTERS
PENETRATED AND HAS DECIDED TO MOVE AGAINST THEM.

NET EFFECT OF THESE REPORTS IS TO DECREASE LIKELIHOOD OF
A DUVALIER OVERTHROW.

NEVERTHELESS, STATE, CIA AND DEFENSE ARE KEEPING A
CLOSE WATCH OVER THE SITUATION. BILL BOWDLER IS
MONITORING DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY FROM HERE. THE
CARIBBEAN AMPHIBIOUS FORCE IS IN PUERTO RICO. IT HAS A
REACTION TIME OF 28-36 HOURS, WHICH FOR NOW IS ABOUT RIGHT.

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DTG: 112304Z NOV 1966

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1966 NOV 12 01 11

FROM: ROSTOW AND BATOR
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66968

~~SECRET~~

FOLLOWING FOR YOUR APPROVAL IS A SUGGESTED REPLY TO
HAROLD WILSON'S MESSAGE TO YOU:

QUOTE: MANY THANKS FOR YOUR KIND THOUGHTS WHICH I
GREATLY APPRECIATE. IT IS FRUSTRATING TO BE TIED UP LIKE
THIS BUT MY DOCTORS ASSURE ME THAT IT WILL ONLY BE FOR A
FEW DAYS.

THE ASIAN TRIP WAS FASCINATING AND WE WERE PLEASED WITH THE
RESULTS OF THE MANILA CONFERENCE. I BELIEVE WE ARE ON THE
RIGHT TRACK ALTHOUGH THERE IS STILL MUCH TO BE DONE IN
VIET-NAM AND IN ASIA. ABOVE ALL, I AM CONVINCED A VITAL NEW
ASIA WILL RAPIDLY EMERGE IF WE SEE IT THROUGH IN VIET-MAN.

AVERELL TELLS ME HE HAD A GOOD GO-AROUND WITH YOU.
SINCERELY. END QUOTE

WILSON'S INCOMING MESSAGE:

QUOTE: I WAS SO SORRY TO HEAR OF YOUR OPERATION, AND WAS
GLAD TO READ THAT IT IS ONLY A MINOR AFFAIR. BUT I CAN IMAGINE
HOW FRUSTRATING IT MUST BE FOR YOU, AT HIS EXCEPTIONALLY
IMPORTANT AND BUSY MOMENT, TO HAVE TO TAKE TIME OFF FOR
THIS. PLEASE ACCEPT MY WARMEST WISHES FOR ITS COMPLETE
SUCCESS AND FOR YOUR VERY SPEEDY RETURN TO FULL STRENGTH.

I HAVE READ WITH THE GREATEST INTEREST ACCOUNTS OF YOUR
ASIAN TRIP. YOU MUST HAVE FOUND IT A FASCINATING AND ENCOURAGING
EXPERIENCE. END QUOTE

DTG: 112330Z NOV 1966

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb NARA, Date 9-3-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 12, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

I believe you will wish to read this thoughtful assessment of
Kiesinger.

(repeat Bonn 5807)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12353, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCH NARS, Date 8-26-86

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-457
By cb, NARA, Date 6-2-95

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1966 NOV 12 17 54

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DE WTE 2207

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 12, 1966

IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR HOLD-UP ON THE CAMBODIAN DAM DECISION AND WITH ANOTHER DAY TO TURN AROUND, I FIND THAT THE LAWYERS CAN ARGUE EITHER WAY AS TO WHETHER A "NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER" IS NECESSARY. THE REASON FOR THE DEBATE IS THAT WHAT THE CAMBODIANS ARE DOING IN TRADE WITH BOTH HANOI AND THE VIET CONG IS, RELATIVELY, SO SMALL.

BEYOND WHAT THE LAWYERS MIGHT ARGUE IS WHAT THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT IN TERMS OF SUBSTANCE. TO ENGAGE CAMBODIA WITH THE REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF FREE ASIA AT THIS TIME VIA THE PREK THNOT PROJECT IS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND, EVEN, THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST, IF WE CAN PULL IT OFF.

BUT, AS I SAY, THAT IS A MATTER OF PERSUASION AND CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP JUDGMENT RATHER THAN A FORMAL LEGAL MATTER.

QUERY: DO YOU WISH US TO PREPARE BOTH THE LEGAL CASE FOR NOT REQUIRING A NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER AND A TALKING PAPER ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER, WHOSE PERSUASIVENESS YOU COULD THEN JUDGE?

AS A FALLBACK I HAVE BEEN TALKING WITH BILL BUNDY ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: WE MIGHT GET BLACK TO GO TO THE JAPANESE AT THE LEVEL AT LEAST OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER IF NOT SATO. HE WOULD SAY THAT THERE IS A CHANCE FOR THEM TO CONTRIBUTE CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE WHOLE SOUTHEAST ASIAN AREA AT A TIME WHEN PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE WAR MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO DO WHAT WE OTHERWISE WOULD LIKE TO DO. WE COULD REMIND THEM THAT THEY ARE NOT OTHERWISE CONTRIBUTING ON A LARGE SCALE TO VIET NAM. INDEED, THEY ARE GETTING VERY SIGNIFICANT TRADE BENEFITS FROM THE SCALE OF VIETNAMESE REQUIREMENTS DURING THE WAR. THIS IS ONE WAY IN WHICH THEY MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WAR IN VIET NAM.

IN SHORT, THE FALL-BACK WOULD BE TO PUT QUITE HEAVY HIGH-LEVEL PRESSURE ON THE JAPS TO BACK WHATEVER PART OF THE \$11 MILLION IS NECESSARY TO GET THE PROJECT STARTED.

DTG: 12/1713Z NOV 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DE WTE 2191

FROM: WALT ROSTOV
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66960

DECLASSIFIED
EXEMPT FROM GDS
DATE 08-01-83
BY SP-5 JAL/DAL
9-3-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 11, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOV

I THOUGHT YOU WOULD ENJOY THIS MEASURED ASSESSMENT OF
YOUR THAI VISIT. IT WAS WORTH THE HEAT AND CEREMONIALS.

(REPEAT BANGKOK 6185)

1. HAD WE REPORTED ON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT IMMEDIATELY
AFTER HIS DEPARTURE, WE SHOULD CONFIDENTLY HAVE TERMED IT
A GREAT SUCCESS. HOWEVER, WE DELAYED ASSESSING THE EFFECTS
OF THE VISIT IN ORDER TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT OUR REPORT
REFLECTED A SAMPLING OF ALL SHADES OF THAI OPINION
AROUND THE COUNTRY AS WELL AS THE VIEWS OF PERCEPTIVE
FOREIGN OBSERVERS. THE EVIDENCE IS IN AND IT IS NOT
POSSIBLE TO DRAW ANY JUDGMENT EXCEPT THAT THE VISIT WAS
A COMPLETE AND UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS.

2. PUBLIC IMPACT

THE PUBLIC REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WAS MOST
IMPRESSIVE. NUMEROUS THAI, BOTH PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL, HAVE
WITH EVIDENT SINCERITY EXPRESSED THEIR DELIGHT WITH THE
VISIT AND THEIR AFFECTION FOR THE PRESIDENT. MUCH OF THIS
COMMENT WAS EFFUSIVE TO THE POINT OF BEING EMBARRASSING AND
SOME CAME FROM SURPRISING SOURCES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE CSOC
OPERATIONS HEAD, GENERAL SAIYUD, A NOTABLY HARD-NOSED
COUNTERINSURGENT, HVALED POETIC ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S
"HUMILITY, SINCERITY, AND COMPASSION" AND ABOUT THE DEEP
IMPRESSION MADE ON THE THAI BY THE CONTRAST BETWEEN
THE MODESTY OF HIS BEHAVIOR AND THE STRENGTH AND POWER
OF HIS LEADERSHIP.

THE REACTION OF FOREIGNERS IN THAILAND IS CONSISTENT WITH
THE THAI REACTION. THE GENERAL OBSERVATION OF THE DIPLOMATIC
CORPS IS THAT THE VISIT WAS UNIQUE IN TWO RESPECTS (A)
THE ATTENTION AND IMPORTANCE GIVEN THE VISIT BY THE THAI
GOVERNMENT, (B) THE INTEREST SHOWN BY THE THAI PUBLIC.

ALL ELEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY FEEL THAT THEIR
STATUS AND ACTIVITIES HAVE BENEFITED FROM THE VISIT. THIS
VIEW WAS EXPRESSED BY AMERICAN MISSIONARIES UPOUNTRY,
BY THE ACADEMICIANS WHO WERE PROMINENTLY REPRESENTED AT
THE CHULALONGKORN CEREMONY AND WITH PARTICULAR FERVOR BY
THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY WHICH FEELS THAT ITS
ASSOCIATION WITH THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT HAS HAD AN IMMEDIATE
LUBRICATING EFFECT ON RELATIONS WITH THAI OFFICIAL AND
BUSINESS PERSONALITIES.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

3. THAI INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY

THIS GROUP, NOT NOTED FOR PRO-AMERICAN SENTIMENT, WAS COMPLETELY CAPTURED BY THE PRESIDENT'S ACCEPTANCE OF AN HONORARY DEGREE FROM CHULALONGKORN AND ESPECIALLY BY HIS SELECTION OF THAILAND FOR THE SIGNATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION ACT. A MEASURE OF THE THAI REACTION IS THE FACT THAT THE UNIVERSITY HAS PETITIONED THE ROYAL HOUSEHOLD FOR THE PERMANENT POSSESSION OF THE TABLE AT WHICH THE PRESIDENT SIGNED THE ACT (THE TABLE BELONGED TO THE KING) AND INTENDS TO SET UP A PERMANENT MEMORIAL OF THE EVENT COMPLETE WITH TABLE, PHOTOGRAPHS, PENS, ETC.

4. THE SPEECHES

THE PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC REMARKS WERE AVIDLY READ AND ENTHUSIASTICALLY RECEIVED BY THE THAI. IN PARTICULAR, THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ABOUT THAI INDEPENDENCE PRE-DATING THAT OF THE UNITED STATES WAS JUST THE NOTE REQUIRED TO NEGATE FULLY THE EFFECTS OF SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S REMARKS ABOUT THAILAND'S COLONIAL STATUS. BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRAPHAT HAD PUBLICLY PREDICTED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE, AND THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT HE DID SO TO THE COMPLETE SATISFACTION OF ALL. EXCEPT FORMIN THANAT (SEE PARA 9 BELOW).

5. THAI PRESS COMMENT

THE THAI PRESS, WHICH SINCE SARIT'S DAY HAS DEVELOPED SUBTLE CRITICISM INTO A FINE ART, WAS UNCOMPLICATEDLY ENTHUSIASTIC. THE COVERAGE WAS UNIQUELY INTENSE.

6. IN SHORT THE PUBLIC ASPECTS OF THE TRIP ADDED UP TO A TENSITRIKE WITH ALL ELEMENTS AND CLASSES OF THE COMMUNITY. SO FAR AS WE CAN DETERMINE THERE WAS NO FALSE NOTE ANYWHERE. ON THE SUBSTANTIVE SIDE, AS WELL, MUCH GOOD WAS DONE.

7. REGIONAL COOPERATION

THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRAISE WHICH THE PRESIDENT GAVE TO THAI LEADERSHIP IN REGIONAL ACTIVITIES GAVE ADDED MOMENTUM TO THIS ASPECT OF THAI POLICY. THE PRESIDENT SET THE SCENE FOR THE ARRIVAL OF EUGENE BLACK WHO TOOK FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE WARM GLOW TO MAXIMIZE THE THAI COMMITMENT TO REGIONALISM. BLACK STRESSED AND THE THAI WHOLEHEARTEDLY ACCEPTED THEIR SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR: -) DEVELOPING GOOD REGIONAL PROJECTS,) OBTAINING MEANINGFUL AND MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION FROM THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, AND C) OBTAINING SIGNIFICANT THIRD COUNTRY PARTICIPATION. ALL OF THIS HAS SERVED TO BRING TO FRUITION THIS MISSION'S LONG EFFORT TO ENGENDER RESPONSIBLE AND EFFECTIVE THAI LEADERSHIP IN THE REGIONAL FIELD. ALL THE NECESSARY INTANGIBLES ARE IN HAND. IT REMAINS ONLY FOR THE U.S. TO MOVE FROM EXHORTATION (WHICH IS NO LONGER NECESSARY) TO EXPENDITURE (WHICH IS BECOMING OVERDUE).

8. THE KING'S ROLE

A FASCINATING BY-PRODUCT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WAS THE KING'S RESPONSE TO THE DEFT ENCOURAGEMENT HE WAS GIVEN TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THAI POLICY. THE KING WAS NOT ONLY GRATEFUL BUT WILLING, AND WITH OBVIOUS RELISH DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS IN THE PROCESS OF BECOMING "A LITTLE MORE OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCH." THERE IS NOTHING FOR US BUT BENEFIT IN A GREATER ROLE FOR THE KING IN THAI POLICY FORMULATION; AND THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT HAS OPENED THE DOOR TO THIS DEVELOPMENT.

9. THANAT'S "NEW COMMITMENT"

AT THE SUBSTANTIVE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER, THANAT, ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE, RAISED ONCE AGAIN HIS BELIEF THAT THE THAI INTEREST REQUIRES A NEW AND FIRMER COMMITMENT FROM THE U.S. SECY RUSK SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY TO ARGUE THE MATTER IN THE PRESENCE OF THE WHOLE TOP LEVEL OF THE THAI GOVT. AT THE END OF THE REBUTTAL THANAT WAS HAPPY TO DROP THE ISSUE HAVING RECEIVED NOT ONE WORD OF SUPPORT FROM HIS COLLEAGUES. IN A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, THE PRESIDENT MADE A COMPELLING PRESENTATION OF THE DEPTH OF THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT ILLUSTRATED IN PERSONAL AS WELL AS POLICY TERMS. I BELIEVE THAT FOR THE TIME BEING WE HAVE PUT AN END TO THIS INITIATIVE, AND WE WILL TRY TO BUILD UPON THE GOOD WORK DONE DURING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. WE MUST, HOWEVER, RECOGNIZE THAT TIME WILL ERODE THE CURRENT THAI SENSE OF SATISFACTION. THIS IS TRUE FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE DEPENDABILITY OF THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA IS, FOR THE THAI, A QUESTION OF NATIONAL SURVIVAL. THAI NEED FOR ASSURANCE IS, THEREFORE, ESSENTIALLY INSATIABLE. IT IS A CONSTANT FACT OR IN OUR RELATIONS AND WE MUST RECOGNIZE MORE THAN ON ANY OTHER SINGLE FACTOR IN OUR RELATIONS AND WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE SPEED WITH WHICH THAI CONFIDENCE ERODES WILL DEPEND, MORE THAN ON ANY OTHER SINGLE FACTOR, ON THE REALISM WITH WHICH THE U.S. GOVT DEALS WITH THE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THAILAND.

10. AN IMMEDIATE CASE IN POINT IS THE SOFA NEGOTIATION. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE UNGRUDGINGLY BEHAVE LIKE PARTNERS IN A GREAT ENTERPRISE. NOTHING COULD BE MORE INCONSISTENT WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT THAN A NIGGLING AND UNGRACTIOUS APPROACH TO THE THAI DESIRE THAT WE OBSERVE THE FORMS (IF NOT THE REALITY) OF AN EQUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOVEREIGN NATIONS.

DTG: 112055Z NOV 1966

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OO, WTE13
DE WTE 2198

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP66965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 11, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

THIS THOUGHTFUL EVALUATION OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION
AND PROCESS IN SAIGON IS WORTH YOUR READING.
(REPEAT SAIGON 10632)

1. WHILE THERE IS CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL ACTIVITY HERE, I BELIEVE WE ARE EXPERIENCING SOMETHING CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN A "RESURGENCE OF POLITICAL UNREST" AS STATED REFTEL. VIET-NAM IS IN THE THROES OF A POLITICAL EVOLUTION. AS POLITICS BECOMES AN INCREASINGLY SIGNIFICANT FEATURE OF THE ENVIRONMENT WE MUST EXPECT A GREAT DEAL OF GIVE AND TAKE, NOT UNLIKE WHAT GOES ON IN CONGRESS.
2. SOME INDIVIDUALS AND SOME EVENTS WILL NOT GIVE US ANY CAUSE FOR JOY. THE MINISTERIAL DISSIDENTS, CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY RUMBLING, ATTEMPTS TO REACTIVATE "STRUGGLE MENTALITY" IN HUE, POLITICAL JOCKEYING FOR POSITION, AND AN INCREASE IN THE INTENSITY OF POLITICAL RUMORS OF ALL SORTS, ARE PART OF THE PROCESS. BUT WE DO NOT SEE IN THEM A REAL THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT OR TO THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION THAT HAS BEEN CHARTED LEADING TO A CONSTITUTIONALLY BASED REPRESENTATIVE CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN 1967.
3. THE MINISTERIAL RESIGNATIONS, WHETHER THREE OR FOUR FINALLY, MAY BE REGRETTABLE BUT THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT. THIS SITUATION DOES NOT REMOTELY RESEMBLE THAT WHICH WOULD BE CREATED IF THE AMERICAN CABINET WERE TO RESIGN. IT RESEMBLES EVEN LESS WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE BRITISH CABINET FACED A SIMILAR PROBLEM. THE PRESENT GVN DOES NOT REST ON THE SUPPORT OF POLITICAL LEADERS. IT RESTS ON MILITARY POWER AND THE UNITY OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP. IT IS WORKING TOWARD A POPULAR, REPRESENTATIVE BASE BUT THERE IS A LONG WAY TO GO.

4. WE DO NOT BELIEVE MINISTERIAL RESIGNATIONS CAN BE HEADED OFF MORE THAN THEY HAVE BEEN. OF THE SIX REMAINING MINISTERS INVOLVED, AT LEAST THREE INCLUDING THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER VIEN ARE LIKELY TO STAY. THAT IS NOT A BAD EFFORT ON KY'S PART OR OUR OWN, BECAUSE WE HAVE MADE DISCREETLY AND REPEATEDLY CLEAR OUR OWN VIEWS TO EACH OF THE PERSONS INVOLVED.

5. AS REGARDS THE IMPACT OF CABINET RESIGNATIONS ON FOREIGN OPINION. THERE HAS BEEN A TENDENCY FOR THE DISSIDENTS TO PLAY UPON THE FOREIGN PRESS WHO AT FIRST REACTED GLEEFULLY AT THE PROSPECT OF A "CRISIS". BUT WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE PRESS HAS BEEN GETTING A BETTER PERSPECTIVE ON THE MATTER. WE HAVE DONE A GREAT DEAL OF BACKGROUNDING ON THIS PROBLEM AND THE REACTION AMONG THE BETTER JOURNALISTS HAS BEEN GOOD.

6. THE SITUATION IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IS NOT SURPRISING. THEY ARE TOUCHY AND FEELING THEIR WAY. THE ATTENTION TO ARTICLE 20 WILL CONTINUE BUT WE BELIEVE THE MAJORITY OF MEMBERS ARE NOT SEEKING A COLLISION WITH THE GOVERNMENT. DR. DAN IS NOT THE RINGLEADER OF THE TRULY ANTI-GVN GROUP; TRAN VAN VAN IS BUT HIS LINE IS NOT WIDELY FOLLOWED. ALL ELEMENTS OF THE MISSION HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN SMOOTHING OUT THE DIFFERENCES AND URGING THE QUIET WORKING OUT OF PROBLEMS. A VOCAL MINORITY WILL NEVERTHELESS KEEP SOME SORT OF POT BOILING. SO FAR WE CONSIDER THE FUNCTIONING AND ATMOSPHERE OF THE ASSEMBLY AS PROMISING AND PROGRESSIVELY IMPROVING. THEY WILL PUSH THE GVN HARD, AND THE GOVERNMENT WILL NEED TO APPLY POLITICAL BALM FROM TIME TO TIME. THE ASSEMBLY WILL SEEK TO EXPEND ITS AUTHORITY AND THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE WARY OF INCURSIONS INTO ITS OWN FIELDS. THIS, TOO, IS PART OF THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION THAT IS GOING TO BE IN PROCESS OVER THE COMING MONTHS. SO FAR NEITHER THE GOVERNMENT NOR THE ASSEMBLY APPEARS TO WANT TO STOP THE PROCESS. IN THE LIGHT OF PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WE DO NOT EXPECT THIS TO CHANGE, SO THAT CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT WILL BE PURSUED WITH OCCASIONAL FITS AND STARTS.

GP-4.

LODGE

DTG 112201Z NOV 1966

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00 WTE10
DE WTE 2200

~~SECRET~~
FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66967

~~SECRET~~

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1966

TO : THE PRESIDENT
FROM: W.W. ROSTOW
SUBJECT: LATEST HAITIAN DEVELOPMENTS

AMBASSADOR TIMMONS REPORTS SEVERAL DIFFERENT SOURCES NOW TELL HIM THAT DUVALIER HAS DISMISSED A NUMBER OF HIGH MILITARY OFFICERS AND DIRECTED THEIR ARREST.

THE SOURCES HAVE MENTIONED AT LEAST FOUR OFFICERS WHO, ACCORDING TO PREVIOUS INTELLIGENCE, ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN PLOTTING.

TIMMONS HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM THESE REPORTS, BUT IT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISING IF DUVALIER HAD PLOTTERS PENETRATED AND HAS DECIDED TO MOVE AGAINST THEM.

NET EFFECT OF THESE REPORTS IS TO DECREASE LIKELIHOOD OF A DUVALIER OVERTHROW.

NEVERTHELESS, STATE, CIA AND DEFENSE ARE KEEPING A CLOSE WATCH OVER THE SITUATION. BILL BOWDLER IS MONITORING DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY FROM HERE. THE CARIBBEAN AMPHIBIOUS FORCE IS IN PUERTO RICO. IT HAS A REACTION TIME OF 28-36 HOURS, WHICH FOR NOW IS ABOUT RIGHT.

DTG: 112304Z NOV 1966

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-510
By is, NARA Date 10-20-99

*sent by wire
to Rostow*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, November 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Dominican Situation

I recommend that you send the following to the President in response to his request for a status report on the Dominican Republic:

TO: The President
FROM: W.W.Rostow
SUBJECT: Dominican Situation

As reflected in Ellsworth Bunkers recent report to you, the prospects for continued political stability in the Dominican Republic are favorable.

During recent weeks Balaguer eliminated potential trouble makers in the military from both the left and the right. He dispersed the rightist ground units of the Air Force from the San Isidro Base a month ago. On November 10 he reassigned all the former Constitutionalist personnel from the 27th of February Camp prior to closing it.

On the labor front, the powerful Communist-dominated port workers union went on strike in late October in an attempt to reverse a Balaguer decision on port work distribution. Balaguer moved troops into the port area to enforce his decision and the strike promptly collapsed. There has been no significant trouble with labor in other sectors.

Cooperation between Balaguer's PR party and Bosch's PRD -- a long shot at best -- has deteriorated. The extent of the deterioration is not clear. Bosch has resigned the presidency of his party and says that he is going abroad for an extended visit. In the recent party convention the more Constitutionalist elements of the PRD were named to key positions and the two moderates which joined Balaguer's cabinet were ousted. The new leadership made statements indicating a PRD intention to abandon the "constructive opposition" policy. But in recent days the leadership has been taking a considerably more moderate, but still ambiguous, line.

Perhaps of more concern is Balaguer's failure to build up the PR

party organization and broaden its popular support. He needs this kind of political base to deal effectively with a possibly more radical PRD and the extreme left if they decide to launch anti-government activities. Without such a base, Balaguer will have to look to the military for support which is not healthy. Ambassador Crimmins is working to moderate the PRD and to encourage Balaguer not to neglect his political base.

On the economic front, Balaguer is pushing his austerity program but finding that it is not the panacea he thought. Tightened credit and import restrictions have predictably depressed the economy and reduced government revenues. Rationalization of the sugar industry has added to unemployment. But so far all significant elements of the economy appear resigned to accepting the sacrifices with little more than grumbling.

In an effort to ease the impact of austerity on the poor, Balaguer has recently cut rents and prices of certain basic foodstuffs. He is also trying to accelerate utilization of our \$40 million which now provides some 20,000 jobs, a figure to be doubled when all planned investments are activated.

Balaguer is not going to solve his basic economic problems until he comes to grips with the seriously overvalued peso. He still refuses to consider devaluation. An IMF mission has just returned making a study of the economic picture. Our AID mission is making a fresh evaluation. In the next 2-3 weeks Bill Gaud and Lino Gordon will be reviewing the Dominican situation to decide how we will handle our aid for 1967. It becomes increasingly clear that continued assistance must be conditioned on stronger self-help measures, starting with devaluation. As soon as we have a clearer fix on the economic situation, I will send you another report.

W.G. Bowdler

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 11, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

Eugene Black is in a bind on the Prek Thnot Mekong Project in Cambodia. The Mekong Committee, the Japanese and others had counted on a U. S. contribution to this, the next natural Mekong Project after Nam Ngum in Laos.

Section 107-B of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act requires that you determine that it is in the security interest of the U. S. to make a loan to a country which is trading with North Viet Nam. The well publicized movement of goods across the Cambodian-Vietnamese border makes it hard for us to recommend that you make a "national security" determination as now required as opposed to a "national interest" determination which would earlier have been required. State and AID propose to go back to Black, who raised this matter, and have him tell the Japanese and others that "while we are unable to participate in the first phase of this project, we would hope the restoration of peace in Viet Nam or other changes in the situation would permit substantial U. S. participation in financing the project's second phase." The first phase is likely to take a little over a year.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By NY, NARA, Date 4-3-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

This is going to create difficulties for Japan and will be regarded as a blow to the Mekong Committee. Black's job will be to persuade the Japanese and other interested countries to finance the relatively small start on the projects ^{of \$11 million} and to ~~have~~ ~~per~~ preserved Cambodian participation until we are through these rough waters.

perceive

Unless you ~~perceive~~ some other way around this, we shall proceed along these lines. But I did not want a matter this closely related to your whole Asian program to be dealt with without your knowledge and personal guidance.

We ought to get a telegram out to Black within the next day or so.

Cannot sign national security waiver _____

Prepare national security waiver _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

00 WTE 10
DE WTE 2199

DECLASS
Authority Agriculture Letter 10/28/82
By DA, NARA, Date 1-16-90

131

FROM: ORVILLE L. FREEMAN VIA WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP 66966

CONFIDENTIAL

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

NOV 11, 1966

~~TO THE PRESIDENT~~
~~FROM ORVILLE L. FREEMAN~~
~~VIA ROSTOW~~
SUBJECT INDIA TRIP

1. MARTIN ABEL AND ART THOMPSON FROM MY STAFF (BIOGRAPHIES ATTACHED) WILL LEAVE AT 5:00 P.M. NOVEMBER 14 AND TRAVEL DIRECTLY TO INDIA. EACH HAS HAD EXTENSIVE EXPOSURE TO INDIAN AGRICULTURE BOTH FROM A THEORETICAL AND AN OPERATIONAL STANDPOINT. MARTIN ABEL IS A TOUGH-MINDED CRITIC OF INDIAN PROGRESS WHO HAS CONSISTENTLY EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR STRONG AND UNRELENTING PRESSURE FROM THE UNITED STATES TO GET INDIAN AGRICULTURE MOVING. ART THOMPSON HAS REPRESENTED ME IN INDIA SEVERAL TIMES OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS ON AGRICULTURAL QUESTIONS. THEIR OWN FIRM VIEWS IN REGARD TO WHAT INDIA MUST DO HAVE BEEN FORTIFIED BY MY OWN STRONG INSTRUCTIONS. THE USDA AGRICULTURAL ATTACHE IN NEW DELHI, JIM BOULWARE IS ALSO EXPERIENCED, TOUGH-MINDED AND WELL INFORMED.
2. ASSISTANT SECRETARY DOROTHY JACOBSON WILL JOIN ABEL AND THOMPSON THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 20 TO REVIEW THEIR FINDINGS AND HELP PREPARE A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ME BY NOVEMBER 26.

THIS TEAM OF FOUR RANKING USDA PEOPLE IS WELL BALANCED. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH INDIA HAS MET THE COMMITMENTS MADE TO US A YEAR AGO, AND WILL MAKE REALISTIC AND TOUGH-MINDED RECOMMENDATIONS TO ME.

3. I AM TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION IN INDIA THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 20, BUT THIS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE. I HAVE TALKED WITH SENATORS HANSFIELD, DIRKSEN AND JACK MILLER. I HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO REACH THE SPEAKER BUT WILL CALL OTHER HOUSE MEMBERS AFTER CLEARING WITH HIM.

IF WE CAN'T GET CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVES TO NEW DELHI THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 20 I WILL TRY TO GET A FOUR MAN GROUP TO GO SOMETIME IN DECEMBER.

4. MY CABLES TO AMBASSADOR BOWLES AND MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE SUBRAMANIAN ARE ATTACHED.

[1]

CABLE----

TO : AMBASSADOR BOWLES, NEW DELHI

FROM: ORVILLE L. FREEMAN

IN ORDER TO MORE ACCURATELY ASSESS PROGRESS IN INDIA'S AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT EFFORT (AND AT THE DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT) I AM SENDING TWO OF MY TOP ECONOMISTS, MARTIN ABEL AND ART THOMPSON, FOR A QUICK ON-THE-SPOT REVIEW. BOTH HAVE BEEN TO INDIA SEVERAL TIMES WORKING TO ESTABLISH THE FOOD GRAINS CORPORATION AND EVALUATING THE DRAFT OF INDIA'S FOURTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN.

BEFORE ALLOCATING ANY MORE FOOD AID, A DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS AND PERFORMANCE IN SEVERAL KEY AREAS SUCH AS THE FUNCTIONING OF THE FOOD GRAINS CORPORATION, PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF FERTILIZER, AGREEMENTS FOR NEW FERTILIZER PRODUCTION, THE HIGH-YIELDING VARIETIES PROGRAM, ETC. IS NEEDED.

ABEL-THOMPSON TEAM SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE ON PAA-2 EARLY WEDNESDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 16. DURING FIRST 2 DAYS, STARTING NOT LATER THAN WEDNESDAY NOON, THEY WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH KEY MISSION OFFICIALS INCLUDING JIM BOULWARE, OLEN SALISBURY (IN NEW DELHI), ERNIE STERN, RUSSELL OLSON, AND JIM COOPERMAN OF AID, AND SELECTED OFFICIALS FROM THE FORD AND ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATIONS WHO MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN THIS ASSESSMENT.

THE UTMOST URGENCY IS ATTACHED TO THIS ASSESSMENT. THE NEW LEGISLATION REQUIRES THAT FUTURE FOOD AID SHIPMENTS BE JUSTIFIED BY ADEQUATE SELF-HELP EFFORTS. AS DEMONSTRATED BY LAST TUESDAY'S ELECTION WE FACE SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEMS.

MRS. JACOBSON WILL JOIN THE TEAM THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 20. WE ARE TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR KEY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE, BOTH REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS TO JOIN IN THE EVALUATION SCHEDULED FOR THAT WEEK, BUT THESE MAY BE DELAYED.

TO: C. SUBRAMANIAN

FROM: ORVILLE FREEMAN

WE ARE MUCH DISHEARTENED HERE BY THE REPORTS OF ANOTHER POOR CROP IN INDIA. COMING AFTER LAST YEAR'S NEAR DISASTROUS CROP, IT POSES EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. WE FACE DIFFICULT SUPPLY, DOMESTIC FOOD PRICE AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS HERE AS EVIDENCED BY THIS WEEK'S ELECTIONS.

THIS ADMINISTRATION IS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE FAILURE OF MAJOR FOOD PRODUCING COUNTRIES OTHER THAN CANADA TO CONTRIBUTE FOODGRAINS TO INDIA ON A MEANINGFUL SCALE.

THE NEW FOOD AID LEGISLATION REQUIRES THAT WE CAREFULLY ASSESS AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE IN COUNTRIES REQUESTING FOOD AID. AT THE DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT I AM THEREFORE SENDING IMMEDIATELY 2 OF MY TOP ECONOMISTS TO INDIA TO UNDERTAKE A QUICK ON-THE-SPOT

[2]

ASSESSMENT OF THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION EFFORT, PARTICULARLY THE FUNCTIONING OF THE FOODGRAINS CORPORATION, PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN THE PRODUCTION OF FERTILIZER, THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE 6.5 MILLION TONS TARGET OF ADDITIONAL FOODGRAIN PRODUCTION IS BEING ACHIEVED UNDER THE HIGH-YIELDING VARIETIES PROGRAM, AND OTHER JOINTLY AGREED TARGETS WHICH HELP TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SELF-HELP REQUIREMENT OF OUR NEW LEGISLATION IS MET.

THIS TEAM OF ECONOMISTS, CONSISTING OF MARTIN ABEL AND ART THOMPSON, HAVE WORKED WITH YOU AND YOUR STAFF PREVIOUSLY. THEY WILL BE JOINED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DOROTHY JACOBSON THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 20. IT IS TENTATIVELY PLANNED THAT SEVERAL MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FROM BOTH HOUSES AND BOTH PARTIES WILL JOIN THE TEAM THAT WEEK. OUR SHORT SUPPLY SITUATION HAS RESULTED IN INCREASED CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN.

11-11-66

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES

MARTIN E. ABEL, STAFF ASSISTANT, OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR, ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

DR. ABEL'S PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE IS THE AREA OF FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE. HE HAS BEEN INTIMATELY INVOLVED WITH AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS IN INDIA IN RECENT YEARS. HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE'S FOODGRAIN PRICE POLICY TEAM THAT ASSISTED IN THE FORMULATION OF INDIA'S PRICE SUPPORT POLICY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FOODGRAINS CORPORATION OF INDIA.

DR. ABEL WAS LAST IN INDIA JUST OVER A YEAR AGO WHEN HE AND LES BROWN DID AN INTENSIVE EVALUATION OF THE AGRICULTURAL PART OF INDIA'S TENTATIVE FOURTH FIVE YEAR PLAN. ONE OF THE DEPARTMENT'S BRIGHT YOUNG ECONOMISTS, HE HAS BEEN WORKING ON INDIAN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS ON AN ALMOST CONTINUOUS BASIS OVER THE PAST 3 YEARS.

ARTHUR THOMPSON, DIRECTOR, GRAIN POLICY STAFF, AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION AND CONSERVATION SERVICE, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

ARTHUR THOMPSON, BORN IN IOWA ON SEPTEMBER 2, 1906, HAS SPENT 30 YEARS ADMINISTERING FARM PROGRAMS AT LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS. IN RECENT YEARS HE HAS SPENT MOST OF HIS TIME WORKING ON DOMESTIC FARM POLICIES AND PROGRAMS. HE SERVED ABROAD AS AGRICULTURAL ATTACHE IN ARGENTINA FROM 1945 TO 1949.

THREE YEARS AGO HE WENT TO INDIA AS A MEMBER OF THE FOODGRAIN PRICE POLICY TEAM WHICH ASSISTED IN THE FORMULATION OF THE FOODGRAIN PRICE POLICY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FOODGRAINS CORPORATION OF INDIA. HE HAS VISITED INDIA ONCE YEARLY SINCE THEN TO ADVISE ON THE CONTINUING OPERATIONS OF THE CORPORATION.

DTG: 112202Z NOV 1966

GROUPS-1340 RPT 1340

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[3]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 90-47
By ju, NARA, Date 1-19-93

*sent by wire
to Ransick*

132

~~SECRET~~

Friday, November 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Haiti

I recommend this follow-up message to the President:

TO: The President
FROM: W.W. Rostow
SUBJECT: Latest Haitian Developments

Ambassador Timmons reports several different sources now tell him that Duvalier has dismissed a number of high military officers and directed their arrest.

The sources have mentioned at least four officers who, according to previous intelligence are alleged to have been plotting.

Timmons has not been able to confirm these reports, but it would not be surprising if Duvalier had plotters penetrated and has decided to move against them.

Net effect of these reports is to decrease likelihood of a Duvalier overthrow.

Nevertheless, State, CIA and Defense are keeping a close watch over the situation. Bill Bowdler is monitoring developments closely from here. The Caribbean Amphibious Force is in Puerto Rico. It has a reaction time of 28-36 hours which for now is about right.

WGBowdler

~~SECRET~~

SENT
WHCA

1966 NOV 11 21 05

EEA177
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2187

FROM: CHARLES SCHULTZE VIA WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66957

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM SCHULTZE VIA ROSTOW

NOV 10 1966

SUBJECT: PROPOSED COMMITMENT OF FUNDS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA
REGIONAL EDUCATION PROJECTS

AS YOU KNOW, EUGENE BLACK IS NOW IN THE FAR EAST DISCUSSING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POSSIBILITIES WITH SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS. ON NOVEMBER 28, IN MANILA, HE PLANS TO MEET WITH THE MINISTERS OF EDUCATION OF SIX SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS -- LAOS, MALAYSIA, THE PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND, AND VIETNAM -- TO DISCUSS PROPOSALS THEY HAVE DEVELOPED FOR REGIONAL PROJECTS IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION. THE NOVEMBER MEETING IN MANILA WILL CULMINATE A YEAR'S WORK ON DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOLLOWING BLACK'S INITIAL MEETING WITH THE EDUCATION MINISTERS IN NOVEMBER 1965. IT IS LIKELY THAT DURING THE UPCOMING CONFERENCE, THE SIX MINISTERS WILL AGREE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SEVERAL REGIONAL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND RELATED PROGRAMS. THE BEST DEVELOPED PROPOSAL TO DATE IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GRADUATE-LEVEL ASIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY IN BANGKOK.

BLACK ACCORDS THESE EDUCATIONAL PROPOSALS -- DEVELOPED THROUGH ASIAN INITIATIVE -- HIGH PRIORITY UNDER OUR PROGRAM FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT WHICH YOU ANNOUNCED IN APRIL 1965. HE BELIEVES THAT A FIRM COMMITMENT OF US FINANCIAL SUPPORT IS ESSENTIAL IF THESE PROJECTS ARE TO GET OFF THE GROUND.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 90-46
By 48 NARA, Date 7-17-90

96 NOV 11 PM 4:09

FRIDAY

IF YOU APPROVE, BLACK WOULD LIKE TO ANNOUNCE AT THE UPCOMING MANILA MEETING THAT THE UNITED STATES, SUBJECT TO PROVISION OF FUNDS BY THE CONGRESS, STANDS READY TO COMMIT UP TO \$28 MILLION TO SUPPORT NOT MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE CAPITAL AND INITIAL OPERATING COSTS OF SEVERAL NEW REGIONAL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OVER THE PERIOD FY 1967-73. THIS ASSISTANCE WOULD BE FURNISHED ON A DECLINING BASIS OVER THAT PERIOD, WITH THE ASIANS PICKING UP THE TAB THEREAFTER. THE COMMITMENT WOULD BE MADE ONLY IF THE SIX MINISTERS REACH AGREEMENT ON A PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS. FUNDS WOULD BE PROVIDED BY AID, STARTING WITH \$2 MILLION IN FY 1967 AND \$3-5 MILLION IN FY 1968.

BECAUSE THE MANILA MEETING IS ONLY 2 1/2 WEEKS AWAY, BLACK NEEDS GUIDANCE QUICKLY SO THAT HE CAN MAKE THE NECESSARY PREPARATIONS. BILL GAUD RECOMMENDS APPROVAL OF THIS REQUEST, AND HAS SECURED THE CONCURRENCE OF THE INTERESTED EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES, INCLUDING TREASURY.

I RECOMMEND THAT YOU APPROVE THIS REQUEST. IF YOU APPROVE, I WILL PROCEED WITH THE REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION AND NOTIFICATION.
WALT ROSTOW CONCURS.

CHARLES L. SCHULTZE
DIRECTOR

APPROVE-----

DISAPPROVE-----

DTG: 112019Z NOV 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EEA184
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2198

134

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP66965

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

1966 NOV 11 23 541, 1966

THIS THOUGHTFUL EVALUATION OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION
AND PROCESS IN SAIGON IS WORTH YOUR READING.
(REPEAT SAIGON 10682)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 90-46
By inf NARA, Date 7-17-90

1. WHILE THERE IS CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL ACTIVITY HERE, I BELIEVE WE ARE EXPERIENCING SOMETHING CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN A "RESURGENCE OF POLITICAL UNREST" AS STATED REFTTEL. VIET-NAM IS IN THE THROES OF A POLITICAL EVOLUTION. AS POLITICS BECOMES AN INCREASINGLY SIGNIFICANT FEATURE OF THE ENVIRONMENT WE MUST EXPECT A GREAT DEAL OF GIVE AND TAKE, NOT UNLIKE WHAT GOES ON IN CONGRESS.
2. SOME INDIVIDUALS AND SOME EVENTS WILL NOT GIVE US ANY CAUSE FOR JOY. THE MINISTERIAL DISSIDENTS, CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY RUMBLING, ATTEMPTS TO REACTIVATE "STRUGGLE MENTALITY" IN HUE, POLITICAL JOCKEYING FOR POSITION, AND AN INCREASE IN THE INTENSITY OF POLITICAL RUMORS OF ALL SORTS, ARE PART OF THE PROCESS. BUT WE DO NOT SEE IN THEM A REAL THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT OR TO THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION THAT HAS BEEN CHARTED LEADING TO A CONSTITUTIONALLY BASED REPRESENTATIVE CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN 1967.
3. THE MINISTERIAL RESIGNATIONS, WHETHER THREE OR FOUR FINALLY, MAY BE REGRETTABLE BUT THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT. THIS SITUATION DOES NOT REMOTELY RESEMBLE THAT WHICH WOULD BE CREATED IF THE AMERICAN CABINET WERE TO RESIGN. IT RESEMBLES EVEN LESS WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE BRITISH CABINET FACED A SIMILAR PROBLEM. THE PRESENT GVN DOES NOT REST ON THE SUPPORT OF POLITICAL LEADERS. IT RESTS ON MILITARY POWER AND THE UNITY OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP. IT IS WORKING TOWARD A POPULAR, REPRESENTATIVE BASE BUT THERE IS A LONG WAY TO GO.
4. WE DO NOT BELIEVE MINISTERIAL RESIGNATIONS CAN BE HEADED OFF MORE THAN THEY HAVE BEEN. OF THE SIX REMAINING MINISTERS INVOLVED, AT LEAST THREE INCLUDING THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER VIEN ARE LIKELY TO STAY. THAT IS NOT A BAD EFFORT ON KY'S PART OR OUR OWN, BECAUSE WE HAVE MADE DISCREETLY AND REPEATEDLY CLEAR OUR OWN VIEWS TO EACH OF THE PERSONS INVOLVED.
5. AS REGARDS THE IMPACT OF CABINET RESIGNATIONS ON FOREIGN OPINION. THERE HAS BEEN A TENDENCY FOR THE DISSIDENTS TO PLAY UPON THE FOREIGN PRESS WHO AT FIRST REACTED GLEEFULLY AT THE PROSPECT OF A "CRISIS". BUT WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE PRESS HAS BEEN GETTING A BETTER PERSPECTIVE ON THE MATTER. WE HAVE DONE A GREAT DEAL OF BACKGROUNDING ON THIS PROBLEM AND THE REACTION AMONG THE BETTER JOURNALISTS HAS BEEN GOOD.

NOV 11 PM 7 01
FRIDAY

5. THE SITUATION IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IS NOT SURPRISING. THEY ARE TOUCHY AND FEELING THEIR WAY. THE ATTENTION TO ARTICLE 20 WILL CONTINUE BUT WE BELIEVE THE MAJORITY OF MEMBERS ARE NOT SEEKING A COLLISION WITH THE GOVERNMENT. DR. DAN IS NOT THE RINGLEADER OF THE TRULY ANTI-GVN GROUP; TRAN VAN VAN IS BUT HIS LINE IS NOT WIDELY FOLLOWED. ALL ELEMENTS OF THE MISSION HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN SMOOTHING OUT THE DIFFERENCES AND URGING THE QUIET WORKING OUT OF PROBLEMS. A VOCAL MINORITY WILL NEVERTHELESS KEEP SOME SORT OF POT BOILING. SO FAR WE CONSIDER THE FUNCTIONING AND ATMOSPHERE OF THE ASSEMBLY AS PROMISING AND PROGRESSIVELY IMPROVING. THEY WILL PUSH THE GVN HARD, AND THE GOVERNMENT WILL NEED TO APPLY POLITICAL BALM FROM TIME TO TIME. THE ASSEMBLY WILL SEEK TO EXPEND ITS AUTHORITY AND THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE WARY OF INCURSIONS INTO ITS OWN FIELDS. THIS, TOO, IS PART OF THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION THAT IS GOING TO BE IN PROCESS OVER THE COMING MONTHS. SO FAR NEITHER THE GOVERNMENT NOR THE ASSEMBLY APPEARS TO WANT TO STOP THE PROCESS. IN THE LIGHT OF PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WE DO NOT EXPECT THIS TO CHANGE, SO THAT CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT WILL BE PURSUED WITH OCCASIONAL FITS AND STARTS.

GP-4.

LODGE

DTG 112201Z NOV 1966

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1966 NOV 11 20 14

Sent
3:14 PM

EEA176
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2186

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: WH60622

UNCLAS

TELEGRAM

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1966

FROM WALT ROSTOW TO THE PRESIDENT

WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOUR APPROVAL OF THE FOLLOWING
TWO SENTENCES TO BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR REPLIES IN
YOUR NAME TO MESSAGES FROM HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT
AND OTHER PROMINENT FOREIGN LEADERS.

QUOTE THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE OF CONCERN.
I DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFULNESS AND YOUR GOOD
WISHES. UNQUOTE

REPLIES TO OFFICIALS OF LESSER RANK, SUCH AS AMBASSADORS
ACCREDITED TO WASHINGTON, WOULD BE SIGNED BY APPROPRIATE
STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS.

DTG: 112001Z NOV 1966

EEA179
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2189

SENT
WHCA

1966 NOV 11 21 15

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: WH60623

U N C L A S

NOVEMBER 11, 1966

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR NEHRU
OFFERING CONDOLENCES ON HIS MOTHER'S DEATH

THERE IS ATTACHED A SUGGESTED LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO INDIAN AMBASSADOR B.K. NEHRU OFFERING THE PRESIDENT'S CONDOLENCES TO THE AMBASSADOR UPON THE DEATH OF HIS MOTHER. IF THE PRESIDENT DEEMS IT APPROPRIATE TO SEND SUCH A LETTER, I FEEL THAT AMBASSADOR NEHRU WOULD BE TOUCHED AND GRATEFUL FOR THIS GESTURE.

SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR NEHRU

DEAR B. K.:

MRS. JOHNSON AND I ARE DEEPLY SADDENED BY THE LOSS YOU HAVE SUFFERED IN YOUR MOTHER'S DEATH. INDIA AND ALL OF US ARE MADE THE POORER BY THE PASSING OF ONE WHO SELFLESSLY DEDICATED HER LIFE TO THE SERVICE OF THE UNDERPRIVILEGED OF HER COUNTRY. HER WORK AMONG THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN OF INDIA, IN PARTICULAR, SETS AN EXAMPLE FOR THOSE WHO WOULD LEAD USEFUL AND FRUITFUL LIVES. WE HONOR THOSE LIKE YOUR MOTHER WHO COLLABORATED WITH MAHATMA GANDHI AND FOLLOWED IN HIS FOOTSTEPS.

YOU AND YOUR FAMILY HAVE OUR PROFOUND SYMPATHY AND REGRET.

SINCERELY,
LYNDON B. JOHNSON

DTG: 112033Z NOV 1966

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1966 NOV 11 21 15

EEA178
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2188

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP66958

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-510
By is, NARA Date 10-20-99

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 11, 1966
TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

YOU WILL BE INTERESTED IN THIS FOLLOW-UP BY BOWLES TO THE INDIANS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SECRET INDIA-PAK MEETINGS. YOU WILL NOTE IN PARAGRAPH 4 THE STATE OF MRS. GANDHI'S COMPOSURE.

(REPEAT NEW DELHI 6928)

1. AFTER ENCOURAGING DISCUSSION WITH C.S. JHA ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF SECRET NO AGENDA MEETINGS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN AND BEFORE RECEIVING STATE 81259 I COVERED THE POSSIBILITIES AT LENGTH AND IN DEPTH WITH L.K. JHA.

2. JHA WHO LIKE EVERYONE ELSE WAS DISTRAUGHT AND UNDERSTANDABLY FOCUSSED ON NEW DELHI DISTURBANCES AND THE GENERAL NATIONAL DISARRAY, WAS NOT EAGER TO TAKE ON A FRESH IDEA. HOWEVER I INSISTED THAT SOME KIND OF BEGINNING WAS ESSENTIAL AND EVENTUALLY MANAGED TO OPEN A DIALOGUE.

3. JHA STRESSED THAT DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENTS WERE OUT OF THE QUESTION IN CURRENT EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERE, ADDING THAT ANY AGREEMENT REACHED WITH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ALMOST MEANINGLESS. NEVERTHELESS HE AGREED THAT WITH GENUINE GOODWILL ON BOTH SIDES A SECRET PRELIMINARY MEETING IN THE NEXT MONTH OR SO MIGHT (A) ESTABLISH A MORE CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS; (B) LEAD TO AGREEMENT ON THE FORM AND PROCEDURES THAT SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS MIGHT FOLLOW AFTER THE NEW INDIAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN INSTALLED; (C) POSSIBLY ESTABLISH A TEMPORARY MORATORIUM ON ADDITIONAL MILITARY EXPANSION UNTIL FURTHER MEETINGS COULD BE HELD AND (D) PERSUADE PAKS NOT TO PLUNGE PAK-INDIA DIFFERENCES BACK INTO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT A MOMENT WHEN THE HARASSED INDIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE NO POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE BUT TO LAUNCH A VIGOROUS VERBAL COUNTER-ATTACK FOR DOMESTIC PURPOSES, THEREBY FURTHER FREEZING THE SITUATION.

4. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION L.K. JHA AGREED TO EXPLORE THIS PROPOSAL WITH MRS. GANDHI AS SOON AS SHE REGAINS SOME OF HER COMPOSURE WHICH HE SAID IS NOW AT THE VANISHING POINT. I SHALL SEE HIM AGAIN IN A WEEK OR SO. BOWLES

DTG 112024Z NOV 1966

66 NOV 11 PM 4:32

SECRET

SENT
WHCA

138

EEA182
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2192

1966 NOV 11 22 23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP66961

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 93-340

By cg, NARA, Date 8-26-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: W.W. ROSTOW
SUBJECT: DOMINICAN SITUATION

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1966

AS REFLECTED IN ELLSWORTH BUNKERS RECENT REPORT TO YOU,
THE PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ARE FAVORABLE.

DURING RECENT WEEKS BALAGUER ELIMINATED POTENTIAL TROUBLE
MAKERS IN THE MILITARY FROM BOTH THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT.
HE DISPERSED THE RIGHTIST GROUND UNITS OF THE AIR FORCE
FROM THE SAN ISIDRO BASE A MONTH AGO. ON NOVEMBER 10
HE REASSIGNED ALL THE FORMER CONSTITUTIONALIST PERSONNEL
FROM THE 27TH OF FEBRUARY CAMP PRIOR TO CLOSING IT.

ON THE LABOR FRONT, THE POWERFUL COMMUNIST-DOMINATED
PORT WORKERS UNION WENT ON STRIKE IN LATE OCTOBER IN AN
ATTEMPT TO REVERSE A BALAGUER DECISION ON PORT WORK
DISTRIBUTION. BALAGUER MOVED TROOPS INTO THE PORT AREA
TO ENFORCE HIS DECISION AND THE STRIKE PROMPTLY COLLAPSED.
THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT TROUBLE WITH LABOR IN OTHER
SECTORS.

COOPERATION BETWEEN BALAGUER'S PR PARTY AND BOSCH'S
PRD -- A LONG SHOT AT BEST -- HAS DETERIORATED. THE EXTENT
OF THE DETERIORATION IS NOT CLEAR. BOSCH HAS RESIGNED
THE PRESIDENCY OF HIS PARTY AND SAYS THAT HE IS GOING
ABROAD FOR AN EXTENDED VISIT. IN THE RECENT PARTY CONVENTION
THE MORE CONSTITUTIONALIST ELEMENTS OF THE PRD WERE NAMED
TO KEY POSITIONS AND THE TWO MODERATES WHICH JOINED BALAGUER'S
CABINET WERE OUSTED. THE NEW LEADERSHIP MADE STATEMENTS
INDICATING A PRD INTENTION TO ABANDON THE "CONSTRUCTIVE
OPPOSITION" POLICY. BUT IN RECENT DAYS THE LEADERSHIP
HAS BEEN TAKING A CONSIDERABLY MORE MODERATE, BUT STILL
AMBIGUOUS, LINE.

PERHAPS OF MORE CONCERN IS BALAGUER'S FAILURE TO BUILD
UP THE PR PARTY ORGANIZATION AND BROADEN ITS POPULAR SUPPORT.
HE NEEDS THIS KIND OF POLITICAL BASE TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY
WITH A POSSIBLY MORE RADICAL PRD AND THE EXTREME LEFT
IF THEY DECIDE TO LAUNCH ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES.
WITHOUT SUCH A BASE, BALAGUER WILL HAVE TO LOOK TO
THE MILITARY FOR SUPPORT WHICH IS NOT HEALTHY. AMBASSADOR
CRIMMINS IS WORKING TO MODERATE THE PRD AND TO ENCOURAGE
BALAGUER NOT TO NEGLECT HIS POLITICAL BASE.

99 NOV 11 PM 5:30

ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT, BALAGUER IS PUSHING HIS AUSTERITY PROGRAM BUT FINDING THAT IT IS NOT THE PANACEA HE THOUGHT. TIGHTENED CREDIT AND IMPORT RESTRICTIONS HAVE PREDICTABLY DEPRESSED THE ECONOMY AND REDUCED GOVERNMENT REVENUES. RATIONALIZATION OF THE SUGAR INDUSTRY HAS ADDED TO UNEMPLOYMENT. BUT SO FAR ALL SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF THE ECONOMY APPEAR RESIGNED TO ACCEPTING THE SACRIFICES WITH LITTLE MORE THAN GRUMBLING.

IN AN EFFORT TO EASE THE IMPACT OF AUSTERITY ON THE POOR, BALAGUER HAS RECENTLY CUT RENTS AND PRICES OF CERTAIN BASIC FOODSTUFFS. HE IS ALSO TRYING TO ACCELERATE UTILIZATION OF OUR \$40 MILLION WHICH NOW PROVIDES SOME 20,000 JOBS, A FIGURE TO BE DOUBLED WHEN ALL PLANNED INVESTMENTS ARE ACTIVATED.

BALAGUER IS NOT GOING TO SOLVE HIS BASIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS UNTIL HE COMES TO GRIP WITH THE SERIOUSLY OVERVALUED PESO. HE STILL REFUSES TO CONSIDER DEVALUATION. AN IMF MISSION HAS JUST RETURNED FROM MAKING A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC PICTURE. OUR AID MISSION IS MAKING A FRESH EVALUATION. IN THE NEXT 2-3 WEEKS BILL GAUD AND LINC GORDON WILL BE REVIEWING THE DOMINICAN SITUATION TO DECIDE HOW WE WILL HANDLE OUR AID FOR 1967. IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT CONTINUED ASSISTANCE MUST BE CONDITIONED ON STRONGER SELF-HELP MEASURES, STARTING WITH DEVALUATION. AS SOON AS WE HAVE A CLEARER FIX ON THE ECONOMIC SITUATION, I WILL SEND YOU ANOTHER REPORT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG 112117Z NOV 1966

EEA180
OO WTE 10
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SENT
WHCA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66959

1966 NOV 11 21 55

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 11, 1966

EUGENE BLACK IS IN A BIND ON THE PREK THNOT MEKONG PROJECT IN CAMBODIA. THE MEKONG COMMITTEE, THE JAPANESE AND OTHERS HAD COUNTED ON A U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO THIS, THE NEXT NATURAL MEKONG PROJECT AFTER NAM NGUM IN LAOS.

SECTION 107-B OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE APPROPRIATIONS ACT REQUIRES THAT YOU DETERMINE THAT IT IS IN THE SECURITY INTEREST OF THE U.S. TO MAKE A LOAN TO A COUNTRY WHICH IS TRADING WITH NORTH VIET NAM. THE WELL PUBLICIZED MOVEMENT OF GOODS ACROSS THE CAMBODIAN-VIETNAMESE BORDER MAKES IT HARD FOR US TO RECOMMEND THAT YOU MAKE A "NATIONAL SECURITY" DETERMINATION AS NOW REQUIRED AS OPPOSED TO A "NATIONAL INTEREST" DETERMINATION WHICH WOULD EARLIER HAVE BEEN REQUIRED. STATE AND AID PROPOSE TO GO BACK TO BLACK, WHO RAISED THIS MATTER, AND HAVE HIM TELL THE JAPANESE AND OTHERS THAT "WHILE WE ARE UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FIRST PHASE OF THIS PROJECT, WE WOULD HOPE THE RESTORATION OF PEACE IN VIET NAM OR OTHER CHANGES IN THE SITUATION WOULD PERMIT SUBSTANTIAL U.S. PARTICIPATION IN FINANCING THE PROJECT'S SECOND PHASE." THE FIRST PHASE IS LIKELY TO TAKE A LITTLE OVER A YEAR.

THIS IS GOING TO CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR JAPAN AND WILL BE REGARDED AS A BLOW TO THE MEKONG COMMITTEE. BLACK'S JOB WILL BE TO PERSUADE THE JAPANESE AND OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES TO FINANCE THE RELATIVELY SMALL START ON THE PROJECTS (\$11 MILLION) AND TO PRESERVE CAMBODIAN PARTICIPATION UNTIL WE ARE THROUGH THESE ROUGH WATERS.

UNLESS YOU PERCEIVE SOME OTHER WAY AROUND THIS, WE SHALL PROCEED ALONG THESE LINES. BUT I DID NOT WANT A MATTER THIS CLOSELY RELATED TO YOUR WHOLE ASIAN PROGRAM TO BE DEALT WITH WITHOUT YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND PERSONAL GUIDANCE.

WE OUGHT TO GET A TELEGRAM OUT TO BLACK WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR SO.

CANNOT SIGN NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER -----

PREPARE NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER -----

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG:112054Z NOV 1966

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By 7, NARA, Date 9-3-98

CONFIDENTIAL

November 11, 1966

140
by wire to Rostow
my agent Rostow

TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

I delivered the message to Ambassador Knappstein who said he would immediately report it. He wished me to tell you:

1. You should not take the statement of the Minister of Interior too seriously. There is, in general, a tendency for a little wildness during a cabinet crisis like this. The Minister of Interior was reaching out for some nationalist support and did it badly.

2. He expects a government to emerge that will deal with the short-term offset problem. He said the money involved is "not too great."

3. He is much encouraged by the mood of the tripartite talks in which, he said, everyone is reaching out to understand the other man's situation and problems. He appreciates in particular the quality of the American team led by Mr. McCloy.

4. He wanted you to understand that he personally understands the sympathy and understanding you have shown, as President, for the German position and will convey this also to Bonn.

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 10/17/66, Guideline
By ly NARA, Date 2-3-98

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, November 11, 1966
10:35 a. m.

141
via pouch
to Rostow
11/11/66

Mr. President:

Bill Gaud wanted you to see the
attached.

I am developing some ideas on how to
cope with the limited AID budget for next
year and still back your play in various
constructive enterprises throughout the
world.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DAK, NARA, Date 1-16-90

Wm Gaud memo, 11, 10, 66, to the President
"Effect of Congressional Cuts on AID's Program for FY 1967"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Boston
1044

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

November 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Effect of Congressional Cuts on AID's Program for FY 1967

We are now reviewing our FY 1967 program to adjust it to the amount of funds actually made available to us by the Congress.

We requested \$2.469 billion of NOA for economic aid. The Congress gave us \$2.144 billion, a reduction of \$325 million. However, as you might expect, this cut was not distributed evenly across the board. Some categories of funds suffered more than others.

The Alliance for Progress. The Alliance funds were cut from \$543 million to \$508 million. This 6% cut was the smallest in any of our major programs. Compared to the rest of our program, the Alliance was not badly hurt.

Development Loans. We asked for \$665 million and got \$500 million, a cut of 25%. By skimping wherever possible, and deferring to 1968 all funding that can safely be postponed, we can probably get through the year. But it will be a tight squeeze.

Technical Assistance. Here we took a 14% cut - from \$231 million to \$200 million. This was a shocker, as the Congress does not usually cut deeply into technical assistance. Nearly all our available funds will be needed to continue existing projects. We will be able to start fewer new projects. This will seriously interfere with our plans to expand our activities in the fields of agriculture, education and health. It will also make it impossible to carry out our new authority to make institutional grants to universities in order to build up their capacity and resources in the development field.

Supporting Assistance. Our \$747 million request was cut 8% to \$690 million. Not counting the \$550 million requested for Vietnam, the cut was 29%: from \$197 million to \$140 million. Such a cut would be hard to absorb under any circumstances. It is particularly tough because our original \$747 million request did not include supporting assistance requirements for Indonesia, Panama and the Dominican Republic which developed after the FY 1967 budget was presented to the Congress.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AID Guidelines
By 50 NARA, Date 9-3-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

The Contingency Fund. We got \$35 million rather than the \$70 million we requested. Fortunately, the Congress reappropriated \$35 million of Contingency funds which remained unobligated at the end of FY 1966. This gives us a Contingency Fund of \$70 million (as compared with the \$105 million we hoped for). To meet the shortfall in inescapable Supporting Assistance requirements, we have already programmed or reserved all of the Contingency Fund.

The big question is whether we can avoid a supplemental request for Supporting Assistance and the Contingency Fund. As things look now, we have no margin of safety in these funds. Only time will tell whether we can get by. We have two new elements of flexibility that should enable us to live within our means in Vietnam:

- The Department of Defense has agreed to fund the military-related part of our Vietnam program, amounting to about \$90-\$95 million;
- the Government of Vietnam has agreed to use part of their foreign exchange reserves to pay for a larger share of the Commercial Import Program; however, we promised to put our savings back into their development program.

If we do have to go up for a supplemental, we may be able to avoid going to the authorizing committees. We now have unused authorizations of \$25 million for Supporting Assistance and \$75 million for the Contingency Fund. Hopefully, a supplemental request would not exceed these amounts.

I am sending a copy of this memorandum to Charlie Schultze and will keep him posted on developments.

William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Friday, November 11, 1966

142.
sent to Rensel
via wire
11/11/66

Walt:

I suggest that you send this report to the President on the
Haitian situation:

TO: The President
FROM: W.W. Rostow
SUBJECT: Haitian Situation

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
~~E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6~~
~~NLI 98-120~~
~~By , NARA Date 8-10-99~~

In the past few days two independent sources have approached our Embassy in Haiti on impending coup plans against Duvalier.

We have no hard information of any muscle behind either plan. The consensus of State-CIA-DCD is that the approaches, in the absence of such muscle, are probably intended to seek US involvement without which the plotters know that they cannot succeed. In the case of one approach made directly to Ambassador Timmons, there is a possibility of a Duvalier provocation.

Over the past three months there has been some increase in popular unrest as reflected in protest demonstrations in several areas. These have not been of a magnitude to threaten Duvalier's position.

In the State-CIA-DCD meeting this morning we reviewed our contingency plans and decided on these precautionary steps:

1. Make sure that the Caribbean Amphibious Force is in a position to react promptly in case of need.
2. Up-date our list of acceptable Haitian exiles and US Government officials with Haitian experience who could be rounded up quickly and positioned for sending to Haiti.
3. Instruct our Embassies in Latin America to inform the Governments of increasing unrest in Haiti so that they are alert to possible trouble.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
Authority 019-011-2-6
By JP, NARA, Date 12/8/01

W.G. Bowdler

1420
~~1. [unclear]~~
2. Pres file
TELEGRAM

Friday, November 11, 1966

FROM WALT ROSTOW TO THE PRESIDENT

We would like to have your approval of the following two sentences to be used as the basis for replies in your name to messages from heads of state or government and other prominent foreign leaders.

Quote Thank you for your kind message of concern. I deeply appreciate your thoughtfulness and your good wishes. Unquote

Replies to officials of lesser rank, such as Ambassadors accredited to Washington, would be signed by appropriate State Department officials.

143
sent by pouch to Rusk
1. map
2. Pres file

Friday, November 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Price Support Loan Level for Cotton for 1967

During the Asian Trip you decided to postpone until your return a decision on a 1/2¢ cut in the support price for cotton desired by Agriculture and opposed by State. (Tab A)

Secretary Freeman and Secretary Rusk hold firm to their respective positions and have prepared new memoranda (Tab B) amplifying their arguments.

I have checked Charlie Schultze and he still sides with Agriculture but doesn't feel strongly about it. (Tab C)

I continue to be more impressed by Secretary Rusk's arguments -- but domestic politics may be more decisive.

W.W.Rostow

Approve 1/2¢ cut in
price support _____

Hold the support at
the present level _____

Speak to me _____



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM

To : The President
From : Acting Secretary

John A. Schmitt

Subject: Price Support Loan Level for Cotton for 1967

In the first year of the new cotton program we have cut cotton production by 29 percent, will reduce cotton stocks about 4 million bales, and will increase cotton exports about 2 million bales.

To continue these gains and to follow the intent of the Congress, we propose to reduce the price support loan for 1967 by one-half cent -- to 20½ cents per pound.

This small reduction will increase our costs slightly because of unwanted rigidities in the law. We believe it is necessary, however because of legislative history and to better compete with other fibers.

It will have a modest adverse impact on our Latin American neighbors. But it will be attacked by Congressmen from Cotton States as only nominal compliance with the spirit of the law. Mr. Poage and Mr. Whitten expect at least a one-cent reduction in the loan level each year (1967 to 1969) and almost wrote such a requirement into the law. Announcement of the support level needs to be made soon.

The position of the Secretary of State as drafted for us by State in order to put this question to the President is shown below. We have discussed his position in detail with Assistant Secretaries Solomon and Gordon.

The State Department believes the support price and the export price should not be reduced for the next crop year for the following reasons:

1. The existing program is achieving its objectives: U.S. exports up to 5 million bales in crop year 1966-67, against 3 million last year; lower U.S. production; slightly lower, instead of increasing, foreign free world production; and a reduction of U.S. stocks from 16.8 to 13.0 million bales. ~~We see no reason to believe that these trends will not continue in the absence of a further price reduction.~~

2. A price reduction would increase U.S. budgetary costs and would hurt the U.S. balance of payments slightly.
3. A half cent price reduction would reduce Latin American earnings from cotton exports by over 13 million dollars at a time when U.S. Congressional aid cuts and lower P.L. 480 availabilities are forcing a reduction in U.S. development assistance to Latin America in 1967.
4. The eleven Latin American cotton exporting countries, led by Mexico, would renew their protests and would make our cotton policy a major issue both before and at the Latin American Summit meeting next spring, arguing that it contradicts our declared policy of helping their development through trade as well as aid.

Action:

1. Go ahead with $\frac{1}{2}$ cent drop in the price support loan.
2. Hold the price support loan at the present level.

✓ until we can discuss -

2

31
1436



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

November 3, 1966

MEMORANDUM

To: The President
The White House

From: Orville L. Freeman
Secretary of Agriculture

Subject: Cotton Price Support

At your direction (relayed by Walt Rostow from New Zealand), I postponed action on the 1967 upland cotton price support level. The Agriculture Department position (1/2 cent decrease) and the State Department position (hold steady at 21 cents) were presented in an October 14 memorandum to the President from Under Secretary Schnittker (attached) to which Mr. Rostow responded.

The cotton producer referendum is scheduled for December 5-9. The price support level is a key element for the producer in deciding his vote. Therefore an early decision on the support level is necessary.

Recently Latin American Ambassadors led by Mexico protested to Lincoln Gordon charging that we were driving cotton prices below cost of production. This is not so -- but we are certainly making cotton expansion abroad less attractive, after 10 years of holding a high price umbrella over the world.

My position is as follows:

1. To compete with rayon in world markets, cotton prices need to be a little lower, even though cotton's competitive position is improved by this year's lower prices. Cotton producers worldwide have lost six million bales to growth in world rayon use the past 10 years mostly because cotton has not been price competitive. It is to the interest of all cotton exporting nations that cotton be competitive. Privately producers in Latin American countries agree. They also know that a shift to food crops would be desirable in many countries. Nonetheless certain Government officials continue to make "great noises" about this. I can't help but feel that their domestic politics and the pressure of large producers with political influence (some American) have more to do with this position than the merits.

Some of the political leaders in Mexico now "sounding off" told me several years ago that if the United States dropped export subsidies and sold competitively at world prices they could not complain if we had a production payment program to help our domestic producers. Under the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 we not only dropped export subsidies and went to a one-price system, but also severely curtailed our own production by tying payments to acreage diversion. It is to their interest as well as ours to remove the great surplus hanging over the world market. (We will cut it four million bales this year.) They know this. I explained it patiently when you sent me to Mexico. Yet they continue to attack the U.S. publicly on every occasion. They are acting in both bad faith and bad manners.

2. To get U.S. exports up to a satisfactory level of six million bales per year, further restraint in world production is required. This year's lower prices may be slowing the expansion of world production, but so far (and for many years) U.S. cotton producers have borne all the burden of production restraint. World production has increased for many years while U.S. production was stabilized by our own actions, and then cut sharply this year.

The legislative history of the cotton section of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 makes it clear that the U.S. will regain its historic share of the world market. That is generally considered to be six million bales now, and it would grow as consumption grows. We might get by without strong Congressional protest if we export 5.5 million bales in this first year, (we are likely to be closer to 5 million bales) provided we take some action to strengthen exports in crop year 1968. Otherwise there will be a violent Congressional reaction charging bad faith.

3. The law requires me to set the loan level in 1967 at a level not exceeding 90 percent of the estimated world market price for cotton. We will have the greatest difficulty meeting this requirement of law and keeping Congress in line unless the loan is reduced at least one-half cent. A one-cent reduction would be more appropriate. We proposed the one-half cent figure to give maximum weight to diplomatic considerations and still operate our program to comply with the law. If we fail to do this there will be great Congressional pressure to open up Commodity Credit Corporation stocks for sale at whatever price it takes to move cotton. This would break world markets and we would be guilty of dumping. Mahon, Poage, Whitten and Eastland are only a few of the cotton leaders on the Hill watching what we do like a hawk.

3--The President

4. Therefore I would strongly recommend that we take the moderate step of dropping supports one-half cent. That will keep faith with Congress, eliminate the danger of more drastic action, and won't really hurt the Latin American countries.

If they are told firmly once again what our position is and why, maybe they will at last cease and desist their violent public attacks on an Administration that has done so much for them.

5. Mexico has been a leader in attacking our cotton policy. Yet Mexico's total export earnings will probably be up 20 percent this year because of cotton yarn exports to the U.S., twenty-five times greater than last year, and bigger beef, sugar, and other agricultural exports to the U.S.

Total export earnings for the eight major Latin American countries this year will be up 14 percent. Much of this is the result of past U.S. aid.

In short and in summary, Latin America will not be hurt in the short run, and will be better off in the long run if they get more land into needed food production and out of cotton. We have a serious obligation to Congress to become more competitive in the world market. A one-half cent drop in cotton supports represents a minimum effort in this direction.

Enclosure

143C

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Cotton Price Support Level for 1967

Recommendation:

I recommend against acceptance of Secretary Freeman's proposal that the cotton support price be reduced to 20.5 cents per pound in 1967, because I believe that it is unnecessary from the viewpoint of our domestic cotton situation, and would have serious effects on our relations with Latin America to the point where it could impair the outlook for a successful meeting of the American Presidents next spring.

Discussion:

Secretary Freeman, in his memorandum of November 3 to you, said that a further reduction of our cotton support price is necessary to attain the domestic objectives of the cotton program, make cotton competitive with rayon, halt production increases in Latin America, get our exports up to historical levels, and meet the requirements of our cotton legislation that the United States loan level be set at 90 percent of the world market price. He also stated that a price decrease will not hurt Latin American countries.

The following are my views on the issues involved:

1. The critical domestic stock problem is on its way to being solved:

The build-up of our stocks, which has been a major economic and political irritant domestically, has been reversed. Stocks,

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

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- 2 -

which reached 16.8 million bales on August 1, 1966, will be pared down to 13.0 million bales by next August. Since a part of the stocks represent normal carryover, we will in just one year of the program have made major progress.

2. Our cotton exports will be up to historic levels. They are forecast for 5 million bales and, since we are the residual suppliers, cannot be increased by a price reduction. Other cotton growing countries cannot afford to hold stocks.

3. A further reduction in price will increase U.S. budgetary costs and adversely affect our balance of payments. A reduction in U.S. cotton export prices will mean increased direct payments to farmers, and therefore increased budgetary cost. Any increase in our sales, domestic or export, as a result of the price reduction, will be too small to reduce storage costs enough to offset the increased direct payment costs, we believe. A reduction in price will also adversely affect our balance of payments; directly by reducing the value of our cotton exports by \$12.5 million, and indirectly by reducing the purchasing power of Latin American cotton-producing countries, which purchase 40 per cent of their imports from the United States.

4. Present price levels are discouraging cotton production increases abroad. Foreign as well as United States production is reacting to the recent decline in cotton prices. Latin America's production is estimated to be down from 7.8 million bales last year to 7.6 million bales in 1966; acreage reductions are in proportion. Production also seems to have declined for free-world producers outside Latin America.

5. A further reduction in price will hurt Latin American balance of payments and development efforts. Latin America is especially sensitive to our cotton export pricing program, since most of its cotton is exported. Last season almost one-half of the free world's cotton exports came from Latin America; almost two-thirds of the Latin American crop was exported.

Latin America's cotton exports in 1965 amounted to over 4.9 million bales. The two cent decline in world cotton prices this season, resulting from the reduction in our support price,

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- 3 -

has already cost Latin America about \$50 million in foreign exchange revenue. A further reduction of a half cent a pound would raise the cumulative loss in succeeding years to over \$60 million per annum. This is a large sum for Latin America to lose. It represents about 20 per cent of our average annual disbursement in Fiscal Years 1965 and 1966 for development loans and support assistance under the Alliance for Progress.

6. A price reduction will have serious foreign relations impact and the Summit Meeting of American Presidents is likely to be used to air them. Eleven Ambassadors of Latin American cotton producing countries called on Assistant Secretary Gordon last week to protest our cotton program. The note they left, a copy of which I am enclosing, reflects, I believe, a genuine adverse public reaction that has built up in those countries over the past year, and a further reduction in our cotton support price would inevitably be widely resented. Expressions of concern over prices for their exports have been a consistent feature of Latin American representations at Inter-American conferences. Latin American representatives have already proposed that the Meeting of Presidents consider measures to insure stable prices for their basic products. Any reduction in the United States support price for cotton for 1967 will be immediately reflected in world prices and will provide a new focus for this recurrent problem in our relations with Latin America.

7. Cotton is now competitive with rayon. Secretary Freeman's memorandum states that cotton prices must decline further in order to avoid further losses to man-made fibers, and says "privately, producers in Latin American countries agree." Cotton prices to mills in the United States fell from 27.12 cents per pound in August, 1965 to 24.97 cents in August, 1966. Rayon staple fiber prices held steady at 28 cents a pound. This has cost rayon a small but significant part of its market. During the 1965-1966 season cotton consumption on the cotton system increased by 3 per cent while rayon and acetate consumption decreased by a like amount.

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-4-

8. Cotton-importing countries would be the principal beneficiaries of a price reduction. Since total world trade in cotton is growing very slowly, the only net gain from lower prices, I fear, would accrue to foreign cotton importers, in the main, the wealthy industrialized countries; also the communist bloc, which is a net importer of cotton, will benefit.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Copy of note from
Latin American Ambassadors.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TRANSLATION

Washington, D. C.,
October 31, 1966.

Excellency:

The undersigned Chiefs of Mission of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru, present their compliments to Your Excellency and wish to refer to our notes of September 13, 1965 and April 28, 1966, in which we stated that the price of 24.07 cents per pound for Middling one-inch cotton at average location, at the beginning of the season, which prevailed for several years, represents the present critical level below which cotton production ceases to be profitable in our respective countries, and requested that the United States re-establish such level of prices at the earliest possible date, and increase it with the monthly carrying charges paid by the buyers of cotton.

His Excellency

Dean Rusk

Secretary of State

Washington, D. C.

In

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 90-45

By ing NARA. Date 6-19-90

25021

12/1/66

In spite of this request, the Government of the United States, through its first sale of cotton for delivery in the cotton year 1966-67, made by the Commodity Credit Corporation on March 9, 1966, set 22.23 cents per pound as the price for the 1966-67 cotton year. This decrease in price stemmed from the support price of 21 cents per pound for cotton set by the Agricultural Act of 1965.

This Act states that the Secretary of Agriculture, taking into account the level of world cotton production, the consumption, and other factors, could increase or decrease the support price, provided that it is not in excess of 90% of the price that the Secretary estimates will be the average world price for cotton in the cotton year for which he is setting the price.

This Act which has great repercussions in the Latin American economy, gives wide discretionary powers to the Secretary of Agriculture, who may use them as he sees fit, and make of the price, an instrument to regulate cotton production in the world, inasmuch as the prices of the world market move around the price set by the United States, which is the principal exporting country.

Taking

Taking into consideration that in accordance with the present practice of the cotton markets, the world price is directly affected by the United States price support, we express to Your Excellency the grave concern of our Governments by published reports to the effect that the discussions held by the National Cotton Advisory Committee in Washington, on September 13, and 14 last, revolved around a proposal to decrease to 20 cents the present support price of 21 cents, which presupposes a decrease, also of one cent, in the price that the United States will set for cotton for the 1967-68 cotton year. The members of the Committee requested that the support price, and the scale of payments with which the United States will subsidize production, be made known as early as possible. This projected measure, that would not affect the income of American farmers -- because of the direct subsidy which is paid to them -- would, on the other hand, seriously injure not only the Latin American farmers, but also the economies of their respective countries.

We wish to point out to Your Excellency that cotton production in Latin America in the cotton year 1966-67 is estimated to be 270 thousand bales lower than in 1965-66.

In

In the countries outside the Communist Bloc, with the exception of the United States, it is estimated that production this year will be 655 thousand bales higher than last year, but the increases are due according to information given us, to better climatic conditions, and to the efforts of countries having a deficit in cotton production to become self-sufficient. For instance, the principal increase of 500 thousand bales occurred in a deficit country, such as India, whose annual deficit in the last few years has been above 400 thousand bales.

Furthermore, the principal increases in production have taken place in the countries of the Communist Bloc, which the same as India, are net importers of cotton. The deficit of the Communist countries has been about 2 million bales per year.

We believe that a country in the process of economic development, which has a deficit in cotton production, and which has the proper climate, cannot be denied the right to become self-sufficient.

On the other hand, the prices of cotton in the world market have been stable and some cottons of the same quality as that of the United States are being sold above the United States price.

A decrease in the support price and in the sale price of cotton in the United States would cause, not only a great injury to the economies of the Latin American countries which produce cotton, as was stated in our previous notes, but would be incongruous with the present situation, which presents the following aspects:

1. - The great strength in cotton prices in the world markets of free competition, as already mentioned.
2. - The reduction which has taken place in cotton production in Latin America, as stated above.
3. - The great reduction in production effected in the United States, estimated at 3, 4 million bales below a normal annual production of 14 million bales which results in a net decrease in world production, outside the Communist Bloc, of 2, 8 million bales.
4. - The elimination of rayon competition, as a result: (a) of an increase in the prices of rayon in the United States of 3 to 5 cents per pound, beginning October 1st and (b) of the reduction in rayon production, as shown by the decision of one of the largest manufacturers, to abandon completely the production of this fiber because it is the least profitable of those they manufacture.

5. - The chronic world inflation which in industrialized countries in 1966, has gone beyond the limits of an increase of 2 to 3 % per year in the cost of living, which had been registered for twenty years, year after year, since the end of the Second World War. This constant inflation, which worsened this year, has increased considerably the cost of cotton production, and it would be paradoxical that the fruit obtained each time with greater production costs, would sell at successively lower prices.

6. - The efforts of important personalities and private associations of the Latin American cotton producing countries, and also of the United States, to strengthen the International Institute For Cotton, whose purpose is to promote cotton consumption, through advertising and publicity, paid at the rate of one dollar for each bale of cotton that the member countries export to Western Europe and Japan.

Furthermore, we wish to emphasize that the price, as a mechanism to regulate production, becomes inoperative in two cases:

1. - In the countries of the Communist Bloc, which are not governed by an economic system based on the profit motive.

2. - In the countries in process of economic development, which have a deficit in cotton production, which have the proper climate, are

attempting

attempting to reach self-sufficiency and which also, because they lack foreign exchange, will produce cotton at any price.

On the other hand, the volume of cotton which moves in international trade continues to be the same, independent of the level of prices. This shows that through a reduction in price, no greater sales volume is achieved. The only thing that is caused, is an injury to the countries in process of economic development, which are the ones in most need to increase their foreign exchange earnings to finance such development. Instead, industrialized countries are helped - a help they do not need - by low cotton prices, which permit them to pay less for the raw material they import. Also, through low cotton prices, assistance is given to communist countries, which are net importers. Their imports, as it has already been mentioned, amount to about two million bales per year.

We wish to give special emphasis to the doctrine expressed by President Johnson in the address that he delivered in Mexico City on April 18, 1966, in which he said:

"For my country's part, we are guided by certain basic convictions upon which our faith in the future rests. Let me be specific about some of those convictions: Seventh, we shall

continue

continue to work with your own able President Díaz Ordaz and work with our Latin American friends throughout the hemisphere to augment and to stabilize earnings from traditional exports, while assisting efforts to expand those new exports on which Latin American trade will increasingly depend in the future."

Also we wish to underline the concepts expressed by the Presidents of Mexico and the United States in their Joint Press Communiqué, issued in Mexico City, on the same date, April 15, 1966, which reads as follows in the pertinent part:

"... The two Presidents expressed their deep concern with respect to the international cotton market, an article which is the principal export product of Mexico, and also of great interest to the United States and other countries of the Continent. The two Presidents agreed that their Governments should consult with each other and with the other interested Governments in problems concerning the production and marketing of cotton."

By reason of all the foregoing, we will appreciate it if Your Excellency will please ask the President that no reduction be made in the support price of cotton. On the contrary, that such support price be increased, and that the Commodity Credit Corporation raise its selling price at the start of the new cotton year, so that a return to the economic

level

level of 24.07 at the beginning of the cotton year can be effected as soon as possible.

Also we request Your Excellency to please insist that the carrying charges be set at a figure that will reflect accurately the expenses incurred by the buyers of cotton. Such expenses amount to 250 points per year or more than 20 points per month, and that the Commodity Credit Corporation, start adding such carrying charges beginning in the month of October, which is the month in which they begin to be charged in the market place. In the present cotton year the Commodity Credit Corporation will not start adding carrying charges until January, and the total which it will charge will be only 105 points instead of a figure close to 250.

Trusting that our just aspirations will be well received by the authorities of the Government of the United States, the undersigned Chiefs of Mission, avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of their highest and most distinguished consideration.

Alvaro C. Alsogaray
Ambassador of Argentina

Vasco Leitao da Cunha
Ambassador of Brazil

Eduardo

Eduardo Uribe
Ambassador of Colombia

Fernando Ortuño
Ambassador of Costa Rica

Juan Escaffini H.,
Chargé d'Affaires a. i.
Ramón de Clairmont Dueñas
Ambassador of El Salvador

Francisco Linares
Ambassador of Guatemala

Ricardo Midence Soto
Ambassador of Honduras

Hugo B. Margáin
Ambassador of Mexico

Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa
Ambassador of Nicaragua

Juan Plate
Ambassador of Paraguay

Celso Pastor
Ambassador of Peru

143e

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

October 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Reduction in Cotton Price Supports

In the attached memo, John Schnittker asks your approval for a $\frac{1}{2}$ ¢ cut in the support price for cotton.

I concur.

The cotton program is a direct payment program. We make up the difference between the support price and a higher price to farmers by direct subsidies.

Consequently, many farming interests want a cut in the support rate -- it lowers the market price and sells more cotton.

Poage and Whitten want a 1¢ cut. The State Department wants no cut (primarily because it would reduce world prices and Latin American earnings from cotton exports).

We agree with Agriculture -- but don't feel strongly about it.

There are only nominal budgetary consequences. A lower support price forces us to increase our direct subsidies. But it also allows us to sell more cotton out of CCC stocks. The two effects more or less cancel.

The lower support price would help a little on the anti-inflation front. Although textile mills haven't yet passed along the earlier cotton price cuts, Gardner Ackley tells me that the textile market is weakening some -- and this might help.

Charles L. Schultze

Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachment

~~SECRET~~
~~LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

Friday, November 11, 1966 -- 6:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

I called on the Apostolic Delegate, His Excellency Egidio Vagnozzi, at 5:00 p. m. this afternoon. I made two points.

First, the President was concerned that any appeals for movement towards de-escalation and peace in Viet Nam be evenly balanced. I cited our experience with the 37-day pause, etc.

Second, that unilateral appeals to and pressure on the U. S. might well take us further from peace rather than towards it, because it would encourage Hanoi to believe that American will and action might be weakened.

His Excellency then asked: Is it the President's judgment that the efforts of the Vatican towards peace have not been evenhanded?

I said it was not a question of judgment on the past but a certain anxiety concerning the future.

He then took over and said:

-- He would gladly deliver this message.

-- He was worried that there were influences in the Vatican that were pacifists and for peace in Viet Nam at any price.

-- In fact, he was worried enough about certain actions by members of the Church to consider seriously whether the Church might not have been infiltrated. He cited the focusing of some priests in the U. S. on the Viet Nam issue in terms indistinguishable from Communist positions. He also cited a priest in Milwaukee who was passing out burtons saying "Burn, baby, burn" and talking to negro youths in terms of encouraging them to violence. He plans a conversation with one of J. Edgar Hoover's assistants on this subject.

-- He said that his own long experience in the Philippines convinced him that we must defeat the aggression in Viet Nam or all of Southeast Asia will be lost. (He will send me an interview in which he said as much to the press.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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I told him something of our trip to Asia and our sense that there are vital nations there which are determined to have their independence and are supporting us fully -- indeed, relying on us for their security.

The interview closed by his again stating his support of our position on Viet Nam, reaffirming that he would promptly inform the Vatican of our discussion and be in touch with me if there was a response.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Sec. Rusk

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

Pres. file

M. Rostow

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*telephone call
from Jake Jacobson
at Ranch, to Mr. Rostow
said President
delayed message
to Pearson.
LN*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 90-48

By *mg* NARA, Date 7-16-90

November 10, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BATOR

Following message to you from Canadian Prime Minister Pearson has just been received:

QTE My dear Lyndon,

As you prepare to enter hospital, I want you to know of my concern and of my very warm good wishes. I know personally how worrying these things can be.

I am sure you will be eager to be back to full-time activity as soon as humanly possible. With this in mind, and knowing the burdens you bear at home and on the world scene, I do hope that you will shortly be fully restored to your normal good health and strength. I can assure you that all Canadians share this hope.

With very kind regards to you both, Yours sincerely, Mike Pearson.

END QTE

Following is suggested reply to be delivered by our Embassy in Ottawa:

QTE Dear Mike:

I am most grateful for your kind message of good wishes. This is, as you say, a "worrying" time, but my doctors tell me I should be back at work in no time at all.

I also want you to know how much I appreciated your thoughtful message as I flew over Canada on my return from the Pacific. The determination

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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of the people we visited to achieve a ^{lasting} ~~just~~ peace and a prosperous, stable Asia further strengthened my conviction that their cause is just and we are on the right course.

Lyndon B. Johnson END QTE

Because of its personal nature I recommend that we not release this message either here or in Canada.

LBJ:FMB:LSE:djw
11/10/66

Log # 3988

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, November 9, 1966 -- 6:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

I have just been informed that Sec. Rusk, having reviewed the Indian situation, supports the attached proposal of Sec. Freeman; namely, "that we go ahead at this time with 1.2 million tons of wheat and 800,000 tons of grain sorghum on an interim basis, meanwhile preparing for detailed top level negotiations in December." (page 2)

Sec. Rusk also requested that I make available to you Bowles' cables on the Indian economic and political situation. They are attached.

As I indicated on the wire today (Wednesday), I do believe the time has come to move forward with the Freeman interim agreement.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachments

WWRostow:rlh

*via pouch
to Ranch*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, November 9, 1966 -- 12:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

This talk between the Chinese Communist defector Miao and our China watcher Al Jenkins is worth reading. Miao's advice and judgment are about as sensible as I have seen, notably his advice that "since the Chinese only understand reciprocity, we should not push too far without response," and his judgment that "China is very sick but is not likely to be cured from the outside."

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-510
By is, NARA Date 10-20-99

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

147a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-510
By is, NARA Date 10-20-99
November 8, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Conversation with Defector Miao Chen-pai

1. I talked with Miao for almost two hours yesterday, mostly in Chinese. His Mandarin is better than reported and his English, which he is now studying full time, has improved remarkably. Conversation with him is more worthwhile than his former rank would indicate because of his high intelligence, his perceptivity, his evident intellectual honesty, and his retentive memory.

2. Miao emphasized that Communist China must be contained as in Vietnam. He further said we should never "give up" Taiwan to the Communists in any attempt to buy good relations. It was true that Taiwan was the major stumbling block to relations, but by no means the only one. The Chinese needed, for both ideological and practical domestic reasons, to throw us into the role of "bad people." Giving up Taiwan would be interpreted by the Chinese as weakness and nothing else. (I assured him there was no thought of this.)

3. Miao thought we should keep two considerations constantly in mind in trying to interpret Chicom policies: (1) the Chinese thirst for equality among the world powers, and (2) Chinese preoccupation with domestic considerations. He thought we sometimes interpreted Chinese actions in an international context at times when they were fashioned almost entirely from domestic concerns, which we were not likely to affect very much in any event.

4. Nevertheless, Miao thought that our bridge-building efforts were right; the Chinese must be given an option if they are to alter their pathological hostility to the United States. Since the Chinese only understand reciprocity, however, we should not push too far without response. It was good to try to arrange an exchange of people and ideas, although the Chinese would not reciprocate until the post-Mao era. He doubted that trade offers would affect the political situation at all. We should proceed with steps concerning trade which are in our own economic long-term interest, quite apart from political considerations. The Chinese would understand this because that is just what they themselves are doing, despite advertisement to the contrary.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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5. Miao thought that entry into the United Nations would not alter Chinese policies for the foreseeable future. Domestic change must come first. China is very sick but it is not likely to be cured from the outside.

6. After Mao, Miao thought China would be able gradually to improve its relations with both the Soviets and us. A clear choice between the two would not have to be made because there was not that much difference between the Soviet revisionists and the American capitalists. Among the major nations today, in social organization China was in one camp and all the rest in comparison could pretty well be lumped in the other, so great was their difference from China. Miao added, however, that the similarity between the Soviet Union and the United States was not so great as to give him any pause in choosing which one to defect to!

7. Miao thinks most Chinese believe most of what the regime tells them concerning international affairs. Mainland Chinese who have radios not only fear to listen to foreign broadcasts but actually have little desire to, since they are unable to relate to the world which those broadcasts describe and have no hope of joining that world. Hence the broadcasts fill no realistic or felt need except for the rare individual. He listened to foreign broadcasts mostly for Arabic language practice. His defection was primarily a matter of revulsion at the course of the Cultural Revolution.



Alfred Jenkins

cc: Mr. Davis
Mr. Jessup
Mr. Jorden
Mr. Redmon
Mr. Ropa
State EA/ACA - for China Working Group

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Walt Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 9, 1966 -- 8:45 a.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-44
By 48 NARA. Date 5-15-90

You will receive this morning by courier the JCS views on expanded military pressure against North Viet Nam. Sec. McNamara and Sec. Rusk will forward their views as soon as they have had a chance to study Gen. Wheeler's recommendations.

My own views are as follows:

1. We must begin now to lean more heavily on the North. I have reviewed all the evidence and all the reports we have on the effect of bombing the North. It is clear that the attritional cost we are imposing is significant for the North Vietnamese in military and economic terms and increasingly significant for Moscow and the Eastern European countries which are being forced to expand military and economic aid sharply to compensate for our bombing; and they don't like it. That increased burden may add to their interest in a negotiated settlement.
2. The expansion in military pressure should be as steady and undramatic as we can make it.
3. We have to take into account George Brown's visit to Moscow later in the month. There is no reason to be excessively hopeful about that visit; but we must give him a fair chance to probe. It might help his

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

mission if we ^{signalled} ~~signified~~, between now and then, our intent to up the ante in the North; but it could destroy his mission if we did anything excessively dramatic or noisy.

4. The Rolling Thunder program proposed by the JCS probably goes too far at this time in the light of the Brown visit.

5. Therefore, I suggest you approve certain limited targets from the JCS recommendations, which would make clear to Hanoi and Moscow the seriousness of our future intent, without putting them under public challenge or ultimatum. For example, we might hit the SAM support sites, one or two thermo-power plants, one of the two unstruck POL storage facilities, and extend the surface sea interdiction zone a bit to the north. In the last few weeks the sea interdiction between the 17th parallel and 17°13' has been an effective operation. An additional northward shift of 30 minutes would represent the kind of steady incremental increased pressure we wish to signal.

6. A limited quietly expanded program of this type, involving no new target systems, is, I believe, what we need between now and Brown's visit: Properly done it could both increase Moscow's leverage on Hanoi and Brown's leverage in Moscow. While he is actually in Moscow, we might cut back to armed reconnaissance.

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Confidential~~

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Tuesday, November 8, 1966 - 7 pm

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM ROSTOW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-49
By ing NARA. Date 7-17-90

I am sure you have followed problems in Guinea through ticker. The following is summary of events and reactions so far:

1. After several days of seeming progress toward GOG recognition that U.S. not involved in Ghana's kidnapping of Guinea's foreign minister, Sekou Toure reversed field this afternoon with marathon spellbinder to the effect that:

- (a) U.S. totally responsible for Ghana-Guinea problem;
- (b) incident typical of constant U.S. imperialist subversion;
- (c) Peace Corps (about 75 volunteers and staff) must leave Guinea within a week;
- (d) Pan American must cease all flights to and from Conakry;
- (e) any "provocative" U.S. nationals subject to deportation;
- (f) U.S. welcome to reduce aid (about \$20-25 million per year) --
Guinea will not tolerate "economic blackmail" where her "dignity and liberty" concerned.

2. Toure did not repeat not announce break of relations. High foreign office official has told our DCM he does not plan to do so.

3. McIlvaine's reports he doubts we can maintain relations after this, but warns against hasty action.

4. We are instructing McIlvaine to tell Guineans we are withdrawing Peace Corps immediately.

5. Unless McIlvaine has strong views to contrary, he also being instructed to:

- (a) evacuate all dependents of official U.S. personnel;
- (b) advise all private U.S. citizens and AID contract personnel to leave;
- (c) make arrangements to cut Embassy and AID mission people to essential minimum;
- (d) prepare to be called home for consultation soon.

Everyone here agreed we should not over-react in direction of break in relations unless we are left no alternative. We will return to you for decision if and when that point approaches.

~~Handy~~
2. Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 8, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: December Visits

While I don't want to hurry you until you have a clearer idea of your recuperation schedule, it would help us if we could know how you feel about going ahead with the visits of King Hassan, President Sunay and Vice President Yen.

1. Hassan's (1 December) is simply a luncheon in connection with his trip to the UN. He has already said he would understand if you had to postpone. But the one angle worth keeping in mind is that by postponing we'll probably lose the simplicity of a working lunch, since the UN General Assembly will probably adjourn in mid-December. If you ~~felt~~ ^{put} up to it, I'm sure he'd be thrilled to call on you at the Ranch, though we don't want to start a parade. The only drawback in postponing is that we probably couldn't get away with a simple lunch if he weren't just dropping in after a speech at the UN.

Let it stand _____

Postpone _____

2. In Sunay's case, it probably would be desirable to stick to the full state visit in Washington (scheduled for 6-8 December). The purpose is to give him recognition as the new President of a major ally and to ease the atmosphere for some tough negotiations on bases and facilities which are down the road. This is more easily done in Washington, where the aura of a state visit can have its effects back home in Turkey. While Hassan has had the state visit treatment before, Sunay has not and we feel that's a good part of what we want to accomplish. Since he is not a head of government, a "working" visit at the Ranch wouldn't ring true.

Let it stand _____

Postpone _____

3. You have agreed to see Yen on December 13. His visit is an informal working one designed to increase his prestige in Taiwan and abroad. If you let this visit stand, you may wish to consider a luncheon in conjunction with his call, since the Secretary will not be here and we understand the Vice President may also be away. This

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

90-44

By ij NARA, Date 5-15-96~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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visit could be shifted to the Ranch, if you wish. The Chinese would also be quite agreeable to a postponement. However, if the two earlier visits should stand, a postponement would be difficult to explain.

Let it stand _____

Postpone _____

I am sure all of your visitors would understand if you would rather clear your December schedule now. Hassan and Yen have already given you an opening to do this, and I'm sure the Turks would if they knew you'd feel more comfortable. However, we'd like a little time if you decide to postpone to let the visitors know privately before the press has the story, and it would help if we could give them a rain check date at the same time.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:HW:HS:lw

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, November 8, 1966
7:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

At Marvin's suggestion I wrote a note to Dr. Paul White to head off a suggestion from him that you relax by meeting with a large group of citizens interested in foreign policy. He has responded with this warm note which I thought you would like to see.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

151a

PAUL DUDLEY WHITE, M. D.
264 BEACON STREET
BOSTON, MASS. 02116

CONSULTATION BY APPOINTMENT


October 17, 1966

Dear Mr. Rostow:

Thank you very much for your kind letter of October 10, and when the President gets back from his present strenuous trip, will you give him my best wishes and tell him that I am completely in accord with his idea of getting the views of everybody he sees, which include the people at large as well as all the others, like myself. We just don't want him to work too hard and we want him to keep his weight down. He is about the hardest worker I have ever seen, but he should be sensible about having relaxation now and then, and if he does get discouraged, to get the support of all of us who want to help him and not bother him.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Paul D. White". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed name.

Mr. W. W. Rostow
The White House
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 8, 1966 -- 4:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Fulbright Letter on Middle East Arms Race

Senator Fulbright is using our recent sale of F-4's to Iran as a handle for writing you of his concern over the arms race in the Middle East.

He is not accurate in saying that "the decision to sell these aircraft to Iran may initiate a qualitative arms escalation in the Middle East." Iran wants these planes because the USSR has long since sold advanced fighters and bombers to Iraq and the UAR. As you know from your decisions on Israel, Jordan and Iran, we've been painfully careful in this area not to get out in front with our arms sales. But the Communist nations have put in some \$2.3 billion in arms, and there comes a time when we can't refuse to sell the legitimate means of defense.

I think we ought to ignore Fulbright's suggestion in his last paragraph that the Foreign Relations Committee initiate a study of the scope and implications of U.S. arms sales around the world. Given Fulbright's bias that these sales are bad, he probably could make this irritating for us.

Sales are increasing -- partly to shift from grant aid to credit sales in countries like Iran and Israel which can afford to buy and partly to bolster our balance of payments. Some of these sales outside the Middle East have probably not been as well coordinated with other aspects of our policy as they might have been, and we are considering procedures for tightening the reins.

If you do not wish to reply yourself, I will answer his letter along the lines of the attached draft.

W. W. Rostow

Your answer OK _____

Draft me a reply _____

HHSaunders:WW Rostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 90-49

By ing NARA, Date 7-17-90

152a

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 90-49

By inf NARA. Date 7-17-90

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT -- November 8, 1966

Dear Bill:

The President appreciates your letter on arms sales in the Middle East and will be considering it further in the weeks ahead. As you suggest, few problems have caused him more concern.

One of our main objectives is to achieve some sort of arms limitation in that area. This obviously requires either agreement on arms levels there among the important arms users or at least tacit cooperation among the major arms suppliers. Both of these groups are, as you know, only marginally responsive to our wishes. So, while we share your objective, we are having trouble achieving it.

I do not believe U. S. sales have initiated an escalation in the Middle East arms race. The Communist nations have put some \$2.3 billion worth of arms into the region, most recently having signed the largest deal ever with Iraq, including MIG-21's. It is this massive assistance which frightens those states unwilling or unable to acquire arms from the Communist nations.

We have persistently resisted the tendencies of those states to build defensive establishments beyond their means. But, when they ask for help in balancing these large Soviet transfers which they believe pose an urgent security threat and when they are willing to devote their own resources to their defense, it is difficult for us to deny them the

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-2-

means to defend themselves, even though we try to persuade them to spend less on arms and more on development. Until we succeed in slowing the arms spiral, which in its present phase results from heavy Soviet transfers, we face this difficult choice: whether we should leave our friends without the means they feel they need to defend themselves or attempt through modest sales to help them achieve at least minimum defensive capability.

We have been as sparing in resolving this dilemma as we can be under circumstances where they can -- and do -- turn to others in the West to meet what they regard as their essential security needs.

There is no indication from our contacts that the Soviet Union is prepared to forego the leverage -- and the power of disruption -- it now enjoys through its Middle East sales of conventional arms; although this is a matter we continue to explore.

W. W. Rostow

Honorable J. W. Fulbright

United States Senate

Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

153
sent to
Rancho thru
Juana Roberts
11/8/66

Tuesday - November 8, 1966

Mr. President :

I believe you will be interested in the attached status report on the Chamizal settlement.

As things now stand, we should be able to go ahead with the transfer ceremony on target: September 1967.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

CHAMIZAL STATUS REPORT

The Congress has substantially completed the legislative program for the Chamizal settlement.

The Chamizal Convention entered into force on January 14, 1964. The Congress enacted enabling legislation on April 29, 1964. Appropriations became available on August 31 of that year, and acquisition of lands for transfer to Mexico and otherwise required for the project got under way in December. From the beginning the relocation of the main lines and yards of three railroads, of three border inspection facilities, and of an irrigation canal presented the major difficulties. Only recently have Commissioner Friedkin, of the International Boundary and Water Commission, and the General Services Administration been able to invite bids for this work. They expect to award contracts shortly requiring completion by August 1967. It appears, therefore, that we shall be able to transfer the lands to Mexico in September 1967.

The President announced on September 4, 1965 his approval of three projects designed to assist the city of El Paso in adjusting to the changes necessitated by the settlement:

- a four-lane, limited access Chamizal Memorial Highway costing \$12 million to run along the Rio Grande in south El Paso for 12.5 miles;
- a Chamizal Memorial Park to be constructed at a cost of \$2.2 million on lands received from Mexico in the settlement; and
- relocation and enlargement of the irrigation canal along the river channel, which is itself to be relocated as a part of the settlement.

Congress, in authorizing the Chamizal highway, required the State of Texas to pay 50 percent of the cost of construction (in effect, about 38 percent of the total cost). The highway authorized would be more than twice as long as originally contemplated, and the terms offered are more favorable to Texas than those under the regular Federal aid system for intra-State roads. It may still be some time before we know whether the highway will be constructed under the terms of the authorizing legislation.

Planning for the other two projects is more advanced. Congress authorized the Chamizal Park in an Act approved June 30, 1966. The Interior Department is requesting funds for this project for fiscal 1968, but construction cannot begin before July 1967. Relocation of the irrigation canal can and will be completed by September 1967.

The Department of State believes that the Administration has fulfilled all obligations it might be interpreted to have incurred with El Paso in connection with the Chamizal settlement. After the transfer of lands and recognition of Mexican sovereignty over them late in 1967, it will remain for the International Boundary and Water Commission to relocate the Rio Grande in a concrete-lined channel for 4.3 miles along the new boundary in El Paso. Assuming the availability of funds, this final part of the settlement would be completed probably in calendar year 1968.

154

SENT
WHCA

1966 NOV 8 18 31

EEA131
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2130

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : JAKE JACOBSEN
CITE: WH60608

U N C L A S

NOVEMBER 8, 1966

FOLLOWING, FOR THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL, IS A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SARAGAT ABOUT DEVASTATING FLOODS IN ITALY. THE OFFER OF HELP IS SAFE. AMBASSADOR REINHARDT IS MAKING USE OF HIS \$25,000 EMERGENCY FUND AND WE ARE PROVIDING HELICOPTERS AND OTHER EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT. THERE IS A CHANCE THAT REINHARDT WILL COME IN FOR SOME MORE MONEY, BUT THE AMOUNT WILL NOT BE LARGE.

THIS DRAFT MESSAGE REPLACES REPEAT REPLACES THE DRAFT SENT TO YOU LAST NIGHT BY BOB KINTNER.

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO SARAGAT

"I WAS DEEPLY DISTRESSED TO LEARN OF THE TRAGIC LOSS OF LIFE AND HUMAN SUFFERING CAUSED BY THE FLOODS IN CENTRAL AND NORTHERN ITALY. ALL AMERICANS JOIN ME IN OFFERING OUR HEARTFELT SYMPATHY TO YOU AND OUR GOOD FRIENDS THE ITALIAN PEOPLE. WE STAND READY TO HELP IN ANY WAY WE CAN."

DTG: 081815Z NOVEMBER 1966

155

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, November 7, 1966
7:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Subject: Reply to President Kenyatta
of Kenya

Attached, for your signature, is
a proposed reply to President Kenyatta's
letter on Rhodesia.

Nick Katzenbach's note explains the
substance. The draft is basically his --
with a few changes of which he approves.

Walt W. Rostow

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 4, 1966

~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested Reply to President Kenyatta's
Letter on Rhodesia

President Kenyatta has written asking you to press the British Government to carry out two actions concerning Rhodesia:

1. Apply mandatory sanctions against the Smith regime, including a stiffer oil sanction than is now in effect;
2. Declare that the Rhodesian question must be settled by majority rule.

The suggested reply I enclose seeks to be warm without being responsive on these two points. I believe we should not press the British on them at this time while they are playing out their last card with Smith, although we may well wish to discuss these points in the consultations with the British on Rhodesia which we plan shortly.


Under Secretary

Enclosure:

Suggested reply to
President Kenyatta.

~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By h, NARA, Date 9-3-98

1556

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Nov. 7, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

I was pleased to receive your views on Southern Rhodesia for I have watched with respect the skill and success of your efforts to achieve racial understanding in Kenya. I am gratified to know that the views of the United States on Southern Rhodesia have been a source of encouragement to you.

We stand firmly on the position I expressed last May, that only when legitimate government is restored in Southern Rhodesia "can steps be taken to open the full power and responsibility of nationhood to all the people of Rhodesia -- not just six percent of them." Ambassador Goldberg recently reaffirmed our position at the United Nations when he said: "We are not, and never will be, content with a minority government in Southern Rhodesia."

The problem in Southern Rhodesia is a matter of basic human rights. We continue to share your concern about the unjust effect of the situation on the people of Southern Rhodesia and the abrasive effect on relations among the races throughout the world.

I find both of your specific suggestions of interest. With respect to a strengthened sanction on petroleum products, we are prepared to support proposals in the Security Council for mandatory sanctions, although we believe a decision on particular items might more properly await study at the time a resolution on sanctions is proposed in the Security Council. At the same time, I appreciate this suggestion and assure you that we will consider it carefully in developing our position and in discussions with others. With respect to your second suggestion, the kind of declaration you mention might well develop as Kenya and other members of the Commonwealth consult further with the British. In any event, I will bear your suggestion in mind as a possible topic of discussion as we may have occasion, in the light of developments, to talk to the United Kingdom.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 90-49
By WJ NARA. Date 7-17-90

All of us must work together to achieve a solution that will bring majority rule to Rhodesia. I appreciate not only your suggestions but also your willingness, in this cooperative spirit, to exchange frank views with me on this important matter.

Sincerely,

LBJ

His Excellency
Jomo Kenyatta
President of the Republic of Kenya
Nairobi

~~TOP SECRET~~

11/7/66

FROM WALT ROSTOW

TO THE PRESIDENT

Herewith the Daily Cable Summary:

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-508
By iz, NARA Date 4-7-00

1. More on Brown, the Common Market and the Moscow Trip

During his visit to Bonn, Brown reportedly told SPD officials in great confidence that if the Cabinet first approves, he will make (on November 9) a "far-reaching" declaration on UK entry into the EEC.

Brown believes Gromyko's invitation to come to Moscow (which he described as "urgent, frank and almost desperate") was based on a Soviet desire for a quick non-proliferation treaty, and willingness to negotiate on Vietnam. Gromyko reportedly indicated to Brown that if the Americans cease bombing a "positive turn in the situation is immediately possible."

2. Mindszenty not Bar to Better US-Hungarian Relations

A Hungarian official has commented on Cardinal Mindszenty's presence in our Budapest legation, indicating receptivity to any U.S. suggestion for solution and saying Mindszenty's presence is not a bar to better relations.

3. Dominican Political Situation

Bosch visited Ambassador Crimmins and painted an excessively gloomy picture of the present situation and future prospects. ~~As reflected in~~
Nevertheless, there has been some deterioration in the political picture as reflected in Bunker's memo to you.

PRESERVATION COPY

~~Bunker's memo to you, there has been some deterioration in the political picture.~~ Crimmins is sending an analysis of the present trend toward greater political polarization, which we shall forward.

4. Haitian Coup Imminent ³

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~that~~ that key plotters have indicated that plans to overthrow the Duvalier regime are too advanced to turn back.

Although no date has been set for the coup, most of those involved believe that it will take place within a few days. The plotters are adherents of the Haitian Coalition which is anti-communist and anti-Duvalier. We have checked contingency plans which are in as good shape as can be expected in an uncertain world.

5. UAR-Syrian Defense Pact

Ambassador Battle reports the new UAR-Syrian joint defense pact has potential substance, though its execution may founder on normal Arab political rivalries. He believes it may help stabilize the Israeli-Syrian border because it is unlikely Nasser would have promised to support Syria without some assurance of Syrian restraint on the border.

6. ~~The~~ Indian Nuclear Policy

Following talks with President Radhakrishnan and others, Bowles sees no basis for suspecting a shift in Indian nuclear policy. The earlier UN report that India ^{would} ~~did~~ make Chicom agreement a

condition for signing the non-proliferation treaty was denied. The ^{latest} ~~state~~
Department ~~progress report on NSAM 255 is in, and we~~ concludes
that, though undramatic, ^{the} inconspicuous steps we are taking are
strengthening the hand of Indians who oppose going nuclear.

7. Indian-Pakistani Arms Talks

The Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi has been instructed to take up Indian Foreign Minister Singh's suggestion for secret talks. Pak Foreign Secretary Yusuf believes New Delhi would be the best place to discuss arms limitation but that talks on political issues should proceed simultaneously at another location.

8. US-Turk Bilateral Defense Arrangements

Turkey has put up a tough first draft of a comprehensive agreement on all US facilities, to replace past piecemeal agreements. The Turks ask a high price for allowing us to retain intelligence facilities there and, as we seek to reduce MAP, the Russians are behaving nicely toward the Turks and the opposition is making an issue of ~~the~~ undue American presence.

9. Guinea Situation

Ambassador McIlvaine reports that Conakry is calm and that he plans to return to Washington on consultation after hearing from Toure on November 8, and after observing whether normalcy and

the safety of American citizens will continue. Bangoura told Assistant Secretary Palmer that Toure now realizes that he went too far in his treatment of American citizens.

10. Australians and Wheat Prices

The Australians are satisfied with our offer to support an increase to \$1.85 with appropriate competitive differentials between American and Canadian wheat.

FILED IN 100-100000

Lois

151

~~SECRET~~

November 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAKE JACOBSEN

Attached is a memorandum from CIA Director Helms summarizing the Intelligence Community's latest estimate of Soviet General Purpose Forces.

The Russians are beginning to pay more attention to their ground forces which remain deployed for operations against the Central Region of NATO.

The President might be interested in reading Paragraph 6 on Page 6 which summarizes the gradual build up which the Russians have made along the Sino-Soviet border.

N 11-14-66

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W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-508
By is, NARA Date 4-7-00

~~SECRET~~

158

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-403
By CB, NARA Date 7-30-99

*To Rostow
via next panel*


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November 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Warheads to Support NATO Forces
of the Federal Republic of Germany



All of these weapons will be equipped with permissive link installations (PAL) in accordance with NSAM 160 before the weapons are dispersed. Approval of the request will not involve any increase in the area totals of nuclear weapons now authorized for dispersal to West Germany and will not require any increase in the total dispersal ceiling established by NSAM 334.

If you approve, I will sign the two attached memoranda to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

____ Approved

W. W. Rostow

____ Disapproved

____ See me

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~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Warheads to Support [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

6.1
(a)

[REDACTED]

It was noted [REDACTED] the
Atomic Energy Commission concur in the requested dispersal.

6.1
(a)

[REDACTED]

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 98-507
By us, NARA, Date 4-15-04

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
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~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Weapons to Support [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

6.1
(a)



SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 98-507
By iso, NARA, Date 4-15-04

W. W. Rostow

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

1 Jackson
2 Ret
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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-505
By cb, NARA Date 7-28-00

1 NOV 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Warheads to Support NATO Forces
of the Federal Republic of Germany

6.1(a)

The Department of Defense requests approval to disperse [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The additional dispersals are consistent with current U.S. plans for nuclear warhead support of non-U.S. NATO delivery systems.

6.1(a)



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Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

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and without exceeding country totals or the total dispersal ceiling set by NSAM 334. [REDACTED]

6.1(a)

[REDACTED] This battalion is scheduled to have a nuclear delivery capability in December 1966.

6.1(a)

[REDACTED]

The weapons for which dispersal authority is requested are all programmed for permissive action link (PAL) in accordance with NSAM 160 and the current PAL schedule. Installation of PAL will be completed before the weapons are dispersed. U.S. unilateral communications to the U.S. custodial detachment will be operational prior to weapon dispersal. All other requirements for custodial facilities, personnel, security and communications will have been met prior to dispersal.

Approval of this request will not require any increase in the area total of nuclear weapons now authorized for dispersal to West Germany, and will not require any increase in the total dispersal ceiling established by NSAM 334.

The Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission concur in this request for dispersal action.

Cyrus Vance

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Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination
Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954



~~SECRET~~

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

1. JGKMS-10
2. Ret
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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-505
By CG, NARA Date 7-28-00

1 NOV 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Weapons to Support Federal
Republic of Germany Air Force Units

This is a request for authorization to disperse U.S. nuclear weapons to support a nuclear strike capability for a NATO-committed German Air Force (GAF) squadron.

b.1(a) [REDACTED]

Specific authorization for dispersal is required for each squadron as it becomes operational.

b.1(a) [REDACTED]

1.5(a) U.S. unilateral communications to the U.S. custodial detachment at [REDACTED] and other necessary custody and security arrangements, will be completed prior to dispersal of weapons. The yield of these weapons

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Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

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~~SECRET~~

2

are within the limitations of NSAM 143 and the weapons have PAL locking devices installed in accordance with NSAM 160. Approval of this request will not require any increase in the area totals of nuclear weapons proposed for dispersal to West Germany in FY 66 over those reflected in NSAM 334.

The Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission have concurred in this requested dispersal action.

Cyril Vance

~~SECRET~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination
Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EEA114
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2110

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66911

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM SECY RUSK VIA WALT ROSTOW

I BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOW GO AHEAD AND GIVE OUR PROPOSED ARTICLE I LANGUAGE ON NON-PROLIFERATION TO THE SOVIETS PRIVATELY IN NEW YORK, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT WE MEET THE CRITERIA SET BY GEORGE MCGHEE IN PARA 3 OF BONN 5564, WHICH IS BEING REPEATED TO YOU BELOW. UNLESS WE HEAR TO THE CONTRARY FROM YOU TODAY, I WILL AUTHORIZE BILL FOSTER TO TAKE THIS STEP.

~~SECRET~~ BONN 5564

N O D I S

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR MCGHEE

REF: STATE 79249

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By CB, NARA, Date 9-3-98

1. THERE IS OF COURSE NO SURE WAY OF ESTIMATING, AT THIS TIME, THE OFFICIAL REACTION OF THE NEXT GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO THE NEW US LANGUAGE ON NON-PROLIFERATION WILL BE. CERTAIN POSSIBLE CABINET COMBINATIONS NOW UNDER NEGOTIATION WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE THAN OTHERS. IN ANY EVENT, SHOULD DISCUSSION OF NEW LANGUAGE WITH THE SOVIETS MOVE AHEAD RAPIDLY, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT GERMAN OFFICIALS WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO GIVE US FIRM VIEWS DURING THIS TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY.

2. WHATEVER ELSE HAPPENS, HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE GERMANS BE INFORMED OFFICIALLY RATHER THAN THROUGH READING ABOUT NEW US PROPOSALS IN THE PRESS. THEY ARE ALREADY HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF OUR INTENTIONS IN THIS FIELD, AS EVIDENCED BY KNAPPSTEIN'S CONVERSATION WITH YOU AND THE REPORTING FROM WASHINGTON BY GERMAN CORRESPONDENTS WHICH IS WIDELY REFLECTED IN THE LOCAL PRESS. ONE WAY OF AVOIDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPECULATION AND FURTHER SUSPICION ABOUT WHAT WE ARE DOING WOULD BE TO GIVE THE GERMANS OUR NEW LANGUAGE--AT LEAST AT THE SAME TIME AS WE BEGIN EXPLORATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. THIS COULD BE DONE IN CONFIDENCE WITH SCHROEDER WHO IS AS LIKELY AS ANYONE TO PROVIDE AN ELEMENT OF CONTINUITY BETWEEN THE OLD AND THE NEW CABINETS.

3. IN PRINCIPLE, HOWEVER, THE PROCEDURE WHICH YOU SUGGEST WOULD APPEAR TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE CRITERION IN BONN 5393, I.E., WE SHOULD NOT, DURING THIS PERIOD OF GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS IN GERMANY TAKE ANY DECISION TO MAKE IMPORTANT SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN OUR DRAFT NONPROLIFERATION TREATY, ESPECIALLY AS THEY AFFECT OPTIONS ON A NATO OR EUROPEAN NUCLEAR ARRANGEMENT. THIS WOULD BE ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE KIND OF INFORMAL EXCHANGE WITH THE SOVIETS FORESEEN WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A DEFINITIVE COMMITMENT ON OUR PART TO ANY SPECIFIC LANGUAGE PRIOR TO CONSULTATION WITH THE GERMANS AND BECAUSE I CONTINUE TO FEEL, AS INDICATED IN BONN 4673, THAT IN THE END ANY LIKELY NEW GERMAN GOVT CAN BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT THE NEW US LANGUAGE

MCBHEE

DTG: 071639Z NOV 66

~~SECRET~~

NODIS

Rostow 160

Nov 6, 1966

To: The President
Through: Jake Jacobson
From: Walt Rostow

The language in the communique is as follows:

"In particular, they declared that Allied forces are in the Republic of Viet-Nam because that country is the object of aggression and its government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled."

At your press conference, you said:

"I think it is very clear that the seven participants in that conference felt that they wanted the entire world to know that if infiltration, would cease, if the aggression would cease, if the violence would cease, from the standpoint of our adversary, the allies would gladly reciprocate by withdrawing their troops, and that they would withdraw them in a period of not to exceed six months."

And later:

"We have explained we would pull out just as soon as the infiltration, the aggression and the violence ceases."

Behind the discussion is the fact that both Secretary Rusk and Goldberg/ in effect implied that we would get our troops out when the foreign element in the operation--that is troops, infiltration, etc.--~~and~~ is eliminated. Their position is based on the gamble that either violence would then subside or that Ky could handle it.

Your more wholesome position set as a criterion not only infiltration and troops but also the ceasing of violence.

Drafted by Wm Jordan

*to Rostow
via pouch
11/7/66*

Sunday, November 6, 1966 -- 12:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the reply from Westmoreland about the remarks of the Secretary of the Australian Department of Army, which I requested at your instruction.

"We do not have complete text of his speech, nor are we familiar with context in which his remarks were made. However, I have seen references B and C and submit the following views based on the information contained therein:

"A. Difficulties with position at Bien Hoa:

"News stories published last year when the Australians first arrived in Vietnam mentioned certain command and logistical problems encountered by Australian troops in adapting to the existing military situation. Also, there was at least one news story to the effect that Australian troops were complaining because they thought American troops did not practice good noise and light discipline and relied too much on power and not enough on stealth. Mr. White may have been referring to this early period in drawing a comparison between the situation then and now. Such problems do not exist today. Relationship between U. S., Australian and Vietnamese troops is excellent.

"B. Bombing of North Vietnam:

"(1) Mr. White has stated the two basic purposes of the North Vietnam bombing program. Interdiction of the flow of men and material from North Vietnam to Southnam has been effective. No one expected the air strikes to stop the flow, but there is no question that they have made infiltration infinitely more difficult; have been costly to the enemy in terms of war materiel and transportation; have diverted manpower from other tasks; and have affected the morale of invading troops adversely. They also have forced North Vietnam to use the shorter DMZ route.

"(2) I do not agree completely with Mr. White's personal assessment of the will and stamina of the North Vietnamese. He concedes that the bombing might have an impact on North Vietnam leaders, but not on the general public. In my view, it is doubtful that any people can sustain their will indefinitely in a deteriorating situation unbroken by any gains or any hope for relief."

~~"C. Paragraph 3 of reference C furnishes answers to reasons for Mr. White's remarks appearing in print."~~

WWRostow:rlh

W. W. Rostow

162
sent to Rusk via airtel

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sunday, November 6, 1966 -- 11:25 a. m.

TO: The President

THROUGH: Jake Jacobsen

FROM: Walt Rostow

Have talked with Sec. Rusk about reconciliation communique
and your press conference language on withdrawal.

We agree it can be done and without great strain.

He will appear on TODAY show tomorrow morning and expects
to take on the issue. But he wishes to listen to the various TV shows
today before formulating precisely what he will say tomorrow.

Therefore, he will be in touch with you late this afternoon
directly.

I will leave it at that unless you wish me to get into the matter
further. If so, I shall await word from Jake.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
By NLJ 90-46
By inf NARA, Date 7-16-90

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*to Rusk
via phone 11/7/66*

Sunday, November 6, 1966 -- 12:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

I received a telephone call from Rutherford Poats. As you know, his appointment as Deputy Director of AID was held up in the Senate by Senator Birch Bayh on the grounds of mismanagement of the AID program in Viet Nam.

Poats said to me that he in no way wished to embarrass you or to press you to put his name forward again; but that, if I agreed, I should give you my evaluation of him so that you would not feel that you had made a poor choice. I told him that I could give you that evaluation in good conscience.

Poats is truly one of the most promising younger men to emerge in recent years in the Government. He has been both a capable administrator and an imaginative administrator of his region which includes, of course, the extremely complex problems of Viet Nam.

In particular, he played a leading role in designing the economic passages in your Baltimore speech and, more important, in mounting the follow-up. His paper was the basic paper on the table when we moved forward on the Asian Development Bank, the Mekong Committee, and the mounting of Eugene Black's mission.

I know this story well since we worked closely together at that time in the State Department, when He was pushing in the same direction from my post in the Planning Council.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

104

Saturday, November 5, 1966
1:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Our liaison officer with the JCS, Col. Ginsburgh, was good enough to arrange that I see this morning this letter from Gen. Westmoreland to Congressman Rivers. I thought it important that you be aware of it. It is possible that Bob McNamara has shown it to you. Nevertheless, I checked back with Gen. Wheeler and he agreed that you should be knowledgeable of its existence.

My impression is that he stays very much within the lines of our policy; but he does say (page 4) that it is his estimate that we will require "an increase in current U. S. ground, sea and air strength by roughly one-third."

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-46
By inf NARA. Date 7-16-90

*via pouch to
Ranch*

Saturday, November 5, 1966
12:47 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the memorandum on Chirep
Sec. Rusk, I am told, promised you yesterday.

Nat Davis, our staff man, who was
recently in New York to sound out the situation,
tells me this is probably the best we can do if
we wish to avoid being in a minority and having
to resort to the two-thirds rule.

Even the Study Committee may be hard
to hold with a majority.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 89-127
By ing NARA. Date 12-8-89

Sec. Rusk memo to the President,
dated Nov 5, 1966, "Chinese Representation."

WWRostow:rlh

3954
165a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 5, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Chinese Representation

Recommendation

That you authorize me to try to persuade the Canadians to alter their present 'one China-one Taiwan' proposal to one more acceptable to us, involving a UN General Assembly Study Committee.

APPROVE ✓

DISAPPROVE _____

Discussion

The Canadian Cabinet has decided to consult with friendly governments immediately on the introduction of a United Nations General Assembly resolution which would ask the President of the Assembly to explore possibilities of a solution based on a seat for both the Republic of China and Red China in the Assembly, with the Security Council seat going to Peking. The Canadians say that without this opportunity, they would be obliged this year to abstain on the Albanian resolution, which provides for replacing the Republic of China by Red China in all UN organs. The Belgians and the Italians have also informed us of their intention to make a similar new move.

The Canadian shift makes a critical difference. If we lose the support of these friends, it is probable that the Albanian resolution will obtain a simple majority for the first time. We could probably still prevent its adoption by relying on the procedural device of requiring that such a resolution receive a

2/3

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-509
By is, NARA Date 4-27-99

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

2/3 majority for adoption, but we will have suffered an important defeat.

I have urged Paul Martin not to do anything further about this until I have had a chance to raise the matter with you. He is proceeding with consultations with a few governments (UK, Italy, Belgium, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan) at once, but has agreed to defer submission of his proposal formally to the General Assembly for a short time pending consultations with us.

We could stand on our present tactics and oppose Canada's new move; we do not believe they can be dissuaded. Canada and the Belgians have told us that unless they are able to pursue a new course, they no longer will oppose the Albanian resolution; others such as Italy, whose Government is under strong Socialist pressure, are likely to take the same position. In these circumstances, the necessary majority to prevent Red China replacing the GRC would be seriously undermined.

A second option would be for us to stand aside; let the Canadians and others go ahead as they see fit on the assumption the Canadian proposal probably would not get the required 2/3 vote in the face of Peking's opposition. This has great risks since there are elements in the Canadian proposal, e.g. giving the Security Council seat to Red China, which we would not want the Assembly to endorse even by a simple majority.

We conclude, therefore, we must engage the Canadians next week with the safest countermeasure we can offer, i.e. establishment of a Study Committee to examine all facets of the Chinese representation issue and report back to the next General Assembly. There are admitted risks in pursuing this suggestion since we can not be sure of the composition of the Committee and more importantly, we can not guarantee what its recommendations will be. At a minimum, I would expect that this Committee would recommend

some

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

some form of "two Chinas" solution, and that we would have to take a stand on this during the Committee's work and subsequently at next year's General Assembly.

We feel strongly that the present Canadian text prejudices the ultimate decision of the Assembly. I would like to make a major effort with the Canadians to move them from their present course to another which we could support. This would be the best protection for the GRC. The Canadians seem to have the bit in their teeth, and I am not certain how far we can get with them.

A shift to a Study Committee would be a less radical departure from past tactics than Canada's "one China-one Taiwan" proposal, it would be more palatable to our close Asian allies, and while the GRC would oppose a Study Committee, it is less offensive because the ultimate solution would not be prejudged. It offers some flexibility on how rapidly subsequent Assemblies move towards a definite substantive decision.

I would also consult quickly with the GRC to assure they understand the reasons for our efforts with the Canadians and others.

Ambassador Goldberg concurs in the recommendation.



Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

November 5, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

*sent by 1pm
pouch to
Rmch**okayed by Pres.*

I recommend your approval of this proposed message to the King of Laos, which State believes will further consolidate his support for our policies in Southeast Asia. Bill Bundy particularly urged, after briefing the King on the Manila conference, that you reaffirm to him our desire to avoid any enlarging of the Vietnam conflict.

Your Majesty:

I am delighted that you were able to receive Mr. Bundy to report on the Manila Conference deliberations, which of course had a direct and important bearing on the security of your country.

I am particularly pleased to learn from Mr. Bundy that you were more than satisfied with the results of this Conference. I share this view, and I wish to take this occasion to assure Your Majesty that the Conference accurately reflected my country's constant and firm determination to pursue its present policies in Southeast Asia.

At the same time, I wish to stress that it remains our desire to avoid any enlargement of the war. We are particularly conscious of the hopes of the people of Laos that the war will not spread further to their territory. We shall continue to act in close consultation with the government of your country to this end.

Sincerely,

Lyndon Baines Johnson

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
-NLJ 90-46
By *[signature]* NARA, Date 7-16-90

~~SECRET~~

*sent via pouch
to Ranch*

Saturday
November 5, 1966
11:25 a. m.

Mr. President:

This relatively hopeful
telephone conversation about German
politics may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

conversation with Georg von Lilienfeld, 11/4/66

WWRostow:rln

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Friday, November 4, 1966

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Georg von Lilienfeld, Minister, German Embassy, telephoned me at 5:20 p. m. today. He said that there had been in the last few days several stories in the Washington Post which indicate that German politics are not only in chaos but taking an anti-American turn.

He has been on the telephone with a number of political figures including Erik Blumenfeld. He concludes that there is a strong desire to make the most of the recent development and to get a strong government capable of making decisions. Specifically, men are looking for a government which would have the strength to meet its financial obligations, including obligations under the offset agreement which would involve the tax increase.

He wished to communicate to me this optimistic undertone which he derived from his conversations with Bonn.

I said that I had not had an opportunity to catch up fully with the McCloy exercise but my judgment was that this was a good time to produce that kind of German government, because we were investing in the McCloy exercise our best talent and creative thought.

W. W. Rostow

cc: State
F. Bator

WWRostow:rln

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Friday, November 4, 1966
8:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

Attached are the back-up papers for the three formal items on the agenda for today's 10:30 a. m. meeting with Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara.

1. Language for Non-Proliferation Treaty.
2. Tripartite Technical Discussions on Nuclear Testing Detection System.
3. Reorganization of Revolutionary Development Program in Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

Thursday, November 3, 1966

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Secretary Rusk would like to arrange a meeting with you and Secretary McNamara, today or tomorrow, to cover the following items:

1. Language for Non-Proliferation Treaty

Discussions with the Russians are awaiting a decision as to whether we are going to propose new language for Article I of the draft non-proliferation treaty. Ambassador Dobrynin has reflected concern as to when we will be prepared to resume discussions.

Secretary Rusk is debating whether we should table new language now or wait a settling down of the political situation in Germany. Ambassador McGee recommends no action now.

2. Tripartite Technical Discussions on Nuclear Testing Detection System

UK Foreign Secretary George Brown has proposed that the US, UK and USSR agree to a meeting of experts to review the existing capability to detect and identify underground events by seismic means. Reportedly there has been significant progress in the field of detection. The Soviets, previously opposed to such technical decisions, now have told the UK that they will participate. We have indicated our interest in the proposal but a decision by you is necessary before proceeding further.

3. Reorganization of Revolutionary Development Program in Vietnam

W. W. Rostow

_____ Schedule meeting this afternoon

_____ Schedule meeting tomorrow

_____ See me

~~TOP SECRET~~

1688

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: US-UK-USSR Technical Conference on Seismic
Identification for Verification of a
Comprehensive Test Ban

Present U.S. policy supports a comprehensive nuclear test ban provided that it can be adequately verified to protect U.S. security interests. The achievement of an agreement with the Soviets has been at an impasse over the nature of the verification required, with the U.S. insisting on the necessity of on-site inspections and the Soviet claiming without providing evidence that "on-site" inspections are not necessary in view of other available technical capabilities.

Over the years the U.S. has urged technical talks to try to resolve the differences of opinion on the adequacy of seismic identification techniques. The non-aligned nations have supported the U.S. in this proposal, but the Soviets have refused to participate in such discussions, claiming that the issues were primarily political.

Recently there has been indication of a shift in the Soviet position on technical talks. During U.S. Foreign Secretary Brown's visit here on October 14, 1966, he was accompanied by Sir Solly Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Advisor to the British Government, who reported on a recent visit he made to Moscow. Zuckerman says that Soviet scientists have agreed to participate in tripartite US, UK, and USSR discussions on this subject. Following up on these Soviet discussions, the UK representatives explored with me and later with Dr. Hornig and Dr. Scoville (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), the possibility of U.S. participation in a tripartite scientific conference to examine current and possible future capabilities for the seismic identification of underground events. I expressed interest in the proposal but indicated my desire to consult with you prior to giving U.S. agreement to participate in the meeting. We have not yet discussed the possibility of technical meetings directly with the Soviets.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-24

By iss, NARA Date 9-24-97

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

In the past year we have discovered that our capability to identify seismic events is significantly better than previously believed, and this fact will certainly be brought to light in the meeting. At the same time, the meeting will certainly document the fact that there is a definite threshold for detection and identification of seismic events with our present seismic systems. The meeting should also provide an opportunity to explore the Soviet reaction to additional seismic stations within the USSR which might substantially improve the capability of a verification system.

I have discussed this with Secretary McNamara, Chairman Seaborg and ACDA Director William Foster, and they join with me in recommending that we should proceed with the proposed technical conference.

Your concurrence is requested.

Dean Rusk

CONCUR: _____

NON-CONCUR: _____

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

OFFICE OF
THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

October 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Draft Language for a Non-Proliferation Treaty

Attached is a memorandum from you to the President transmitting draft language for a non-proliferation treaty. It has been drafted to carry out the decisions which you made at our meeting yesterday evening.

Adrian S. Fisher

Adrian S. Fisher


Attachment:

Memorandum for the President

Group 1.

cc: C - Robert R. Bowie
M - Eugene V. Rostow
S/AL - Llewellyn E. Thompson

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS



SECRET - EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested Language for the Non-Proliferation
'Treaty: Relationship to Existing and Possible'
Allied Nuclear Arrangements.

Attached to this memorandum is language which I think should be presented to the Soviets to follow through on my discussions with Gromyko Monday night. This draft states an obligation by a nuclear-weapon State "...not to transfer nuclear weapons. ...directly or indirectly to a non-nuclear-weapon State, either individually or by virtue of its membership in a military alliance or group of States; (and) not to relinquish its control over its nuclear weapons ..."


These undertakings parallel the provisions of the U. S. Atomic Energy Act.

This draft:

- 1) Would not disturb existing bilateral arrangements.
- 2) Would have no bearing on the decision of the NATO allies to go to war, or on the establishment of a permanent NATO committee for nuclear planning and consultation.
- 3) Would not preclude the assignment to NATO of additional Polaris submarines with U. S. nuclear weapons in a manner consistent with present legislation.
- 4) Would not rule out the establishment of a multi-lateral entity in which non-nuclear-weapon states participated, and to which they made financial contributions, so long as there was no transfer to this entity of an ownership interest in nuclear warheads (as opposed to delivery vehicles) and so long as the United States retained control over the nuclear

SECRET - EXDIS

GROUP 1.



- 2 -

warheads. It would not bar participants in such an entity from having their own veto either on the basis of prohibiting firing from their territory or as otherwise provided by agreement.

5) Would not bar succession by a federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. It would bar transfer of nuclear warheads to a European defense community not involving a new federated European state. It would permit the formation of a European collective nuclear force, with joint ownership of delivery vehicles, so long as any participating nuclear-weapon state (U. K. or France) retained control of its nuclear warheads.

I believe this language would keep open enough options for the present, and the treaty would, of course, contain a provision permitting U. S. withdrawal if it later felt its supreme interests were jeopardized. We also have proposed a provision for review of the treaty after five years.

Dean Rusk

Attachment:
Suggested Language.

October 14, 1966


~~SECRET - EMDIS~~

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives directly or indirectly to a non-nuclear-weapon State, either individually or by virtue of its membership in a military alliance or group of States; not to relinquish its control over its nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives.

~~SECRET - EMDIS~~

GROUP 1.



FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 68390

168f

FOLLOWING SENT WELLINGTON PRIORITY FROM DEPT OCT 18TH.

QTE STATE 68390

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 90-45

By 1-8 NARA, Date 7-20-90

FOR S/S WILLIAMSON - PASS ROSTOW - FOR THE PRESIDENT

STATE/DEFENSE AND **KOMER** RECOMMEND YOUR CONCURRENCE IN THE GENERAL PLAN RECOMMENDED BY BOTH SECRETARY MCNAMARA AND UNDER SECRETARY KATZENBACH REGARDING REORGANIZATION ON THE AMERICAN SIDE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) PROGRAM IN VIET-NAM. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT YOU APPROVE OUR SENDING THE FOLLOWING STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR LODGE:

BEGIN TEXT

PERSONAL FOR **LODGE**. YOU HAVE DESCRIBED THE RD PROGRAM AS THE HEART OF THE MATTER IN SVN. WE AGREE. ALSO, YOU HAVE REPORTED AND WE AGREE THAT PROGRESS IN THE RD PROGRAM SO FAR HAS **BEEN** SLIGHT AND UNSATISFACTORY. WE ALL AGREE THAT PROGRESS **MUST** BE MADE IN THIS CRUCIAL AREA IF THE **WAR** IS TO BE **WON** IN THE SOUTH AND IF THE NORTH IS TO BE PERSUADED TO NEGOTIATE. IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT SOME ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES ARE **REQUIRED** ON THE AMERICAN SIDE TO GET RD MOVING-- TO BRING **HARDER** PRESSURE ON THE GVN TO DO ITS JOB AND TO GET **SOZID** AND **REALISTIC** PLANNING WITH RESPECT TO THE WHILE EFFORT.

WE HAD CONSIDERED PUTTING THE ENTIRE YROGRAM UNDER COMUSMACV TO ACHIEVE THESE ENDS; AND THIS MAY ULTIMATELY PROVE TO BE THE BEST SOLUTION. BUT RECOGNIZING CERTAIN OBJECTIONS TO THIS APPROACH, WE ARE PREPARED TO TRY A SOLUTION WHICH LEAVES THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS UNDER CIVILIAN MANAGEMENT. AS WE SEE IT, THE TRIAL ORGANIZATION WOULD INVOLVE THE FOLLOWING CHANGES:

1. THE SEVERAL CIVILIAN LINES OF COMMAND WITHIN U.S. AGENCIES WOULD BE CONSOLIDATED INTO ONE. THUS, LINE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO RD CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS WOULD REST SOLELY WITH ONE HIGH-RANKING CIVILIAN. (WE PRESUME THIS MAN WOULD BE AMBASSADOR PORTER. IF SO, HE WOULD HAVE TO BE RELIEVED OF ALL OTHER DUTIES, AND YOU WOULD HAVE TO HAVE ANOTHER DEPUTY ASSIGNED TO ABSORB THE SUBSTANTIAL OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW MET BY AMBASSADOR PORTER.) THE AUTHORITY OF THIS CIVILIAN WOULD BE MADE CLEAR AND FULL TO EACH CONSTITUENT AGENCY OF THE CIVILIAN RD TEAM, INCLUDING RELOCATION OF PERSONNEL, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIORITIES IRRESPECTIVE OF AGENCY PRIORITIES, AND THE APPORTIONMENT OF THE FUNDS ALLOCATED FOR RD BY EACH AGENCY TO VIET-NAM (BOUNDED ONLY BY STATUTORY LIMITATIONS).

2. TO STRENGTHEN PORTER ADMINISTRATIVELY, IT MIGHT BE WELL TO ASSIGN HIM A COMPETENT PRINCIPAL DEPUTY AND EXECUTIVE OFFICER--A MILITARY OFFICER OF TWO OR THREE-STAR RANK. IF THIS OFFICER IS DESIRED, GENERAL WESTMORELAND CAN SUPPLY HIM OR, IF HE REQUESTS, THE OFFICER CAN BE PROVIDED FROM HERE. THIS OFFICER WOULD NOT BE TO COMMAND U.S. MILITARY FORCES OR OPERATIONS OR TO PERFORM MACV'S FUNCTIONS OF ADVISING AND PRODDING THE ARVN, BUT WOULD BE TO PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE STRENGTH ON THE CIVILIAN SIDE AND TO SERVE AS A BRIDGE TO MACV, ENSURING EFFICIENT INTERFACE BETWEEN THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY STRUCTURES.

3. WE UNDERSTAND GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS ALREADY CONSIDERING A MACV SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR PACIFICATION OR A DEPUTY FOR PACIFICATION. WE PRESUME THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF SUCH A SPECIAL ASSISTANT OR DEPUTY COULD BE TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH THE CHANGES ON THE CIVILIAN SIDE, MAKING POSSIBLE THE HIGHEST-LEVEL COMMAND FOCUS AND CONSOLIDATION TO MACV'S RD CONCERNS AND STAFF.

4. CAREFUL DEFINITION AND DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE U.S. CIVILIAN AND U.S. MILITARY SIDES WOULD BE NECESSARY IN THE WHILE RD ESTABLISHMENT IN SOUTH VIET-NAM TO ENSURE THAT NOTHING FALLS BETWEEN THE STOOLS AND THAT THE TWO EFFORTS FULLY MESH.

WE ARE MOST ANXIOUS, AS WE KNOW YOU ARE, TO MAKE PROGRESS IN RD. SO THIS NEW ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE ON TRIAL FOR 90-120 DAYS, AT THE END OF WHICH WE WOULD TAKE STOCK OF PROGRESS AND RECONSIDER WHETHER TO ASSIGN ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR RD TO COMUSMACV. END TEXT. RUSK UNQTE KATZENBACH
BT

NNNN

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NODIS

169
Cy to B. Meyer

Friday, November 4, 1966 -- 9:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

Two possible press conference items.

1. Ed Reischauer is quoted in the Post this morning as critical of the Asian trip. Sec. Rusk and I recommend that if the matter comes up, you say, simply, you haven't seen what Professor Reischauer said. Sec. Rusk believes that his total statement, if we had it, would be much better balanced than the Post quoted.

2. On the Kuchel initiative, you might say:

a. Sec. Rusk will be in touch with Senator Kuchel.

b. If there is to be an Asian conference, it should be at the initiative of Asians -- not U.S. We, of course, support any initiative that has promise of successfully bringing the matter to the negotiating table.

3. We will be getting up to you in a matter of minutes an analysis and recommendation on how to deal with Nixon's blast published fully in the New York Times.

W. W. Rostow

Friday, November 4, 1966
11:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Averell and the Pope,
with the bombing pause request
coming up.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~
Bonn 5493

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DAH NARS, Date 8-21-86

170a

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

Friday, November 4, 1966

For the President and Secretary of State from Harriman (Bonn, 5493)

With Ambassador Reinhardt, I had a 45-minute audience with the Pope on November 2. He appeared gratified when I expressed your deep appreciation of his peace initiatives. He showed keen interest in Manila and understanding of developments in Vietnam. He expressed the hope that you would find it possible to repeat this year a pause in bombing at Christmas, as you had last year. He said his Christmas Message would express such a hope.

The Pope asked me to convey to you his warm greetings, deep appreciation for your untiring search for peace, and his prayers.

I am bringing to Washington Reinhardt's memorandum of conversation which includes details of points of interest in the conversation.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 90-45
By ig NARA. Date 6-19-90

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

Friday, November 4, 1966
11:35 a. m.

Mr. President :

You will wish to read this
evaluation from Amb. Brown on
the success of your trip to Korea.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Seoul 2461

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By OCW NARS, Date 8-26-86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, November 4, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BROWN (Seoul, 2461)

Everything we have heard since your departure, from virtually every source, confirms our view that your visit to Seoul was a resounding success. As might be expected there is some minor cavilling over the lack of any specific aid offers and some qualified remarks by opposition political parties seeking to remain on the good side of the U.S. while diminishing favorable effect of your visit on President Pak's personal political fortunes. These, however, cannot detract from a clearly heartfelt and universal feeling of appreciation for "the fact of your visit and the way in which you and Mrs. Johnson responded to the efforts of the Korean people to make you welcome. "

Later on we will analyze in greater detail the reactions of the Korean Government to the visit and to the Manila Conference. I thought you would be interested, however, in the description of President Pak's feelings as relayed to me yesterday by the Prime Minister, who was himself in a most ebullient mood. The Prime Minister said that on the evening afor your departure, the President and a group of his closest advisors had held a private celebration. The Prime Minister said that President Pak had been gayer and more relaxed that evening than he had ever seen him in all the years of their acquaintance. The Prime Minister remarked specially that President Pak, remembered literally every word you had said to him and was able to repeat them all for his associates.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 90-45
By ig NARA. Date 6-19-90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, November 4, 1966
12:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

You will enjoy this cable from
Amb. Clark on the Australian
government reaction to the Manila
conference.

W. W. Rostow

Canberra 2462

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, November 4, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR CLARK (Canberra, 2462)

SUBJECT: Australian Government Reaction to Manila Conference

Prime Minister Holt, who is still in a state of euphoria as a result of the President's visit, has commented to us that Manila was "a great meeting that just couldn't have been better." His enthusiasm, however, is not shared by Bunting, Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department, who was more relieved that no serious problems arose during the Conference than impressed by solid accomplishments. He had been apprehensive that the Filipinos might carry peace too far and press for a communique implying peace at any price, which fortunately did not happen, although he is still concerned that the Government of the Philippines may pursue this theme in other forums. He was also concerned that the Thais might press for a "Pacific Charter," or that the Koreans would adopt too belligerent a posture. He was pleased that no country took an extreme position and that a feeling of unanimity prevailed. Beyond this, however, he doesn't feel that a great deal was accomplished.

On the other hand, Jockel, First Assistant Secretary for External Affairs, who participated in the drafting of the communique, considers the Conference achieved some very positive results. He shared Bunting's criticism of the Filipino's "peace communique" and their rather erratic behavior generally, but said other delegates had made very useful contributions. Among Asian participants, he was especially impressed by Ky and others from Vietnam. Jockel considers the communique, for which he gives the U.S. delegation the most credit, is a very good document. He said it is in complete harmony with Australian policy on Vietnam.

Jockel feels the Vietnamese made a number of commitments on land reform, local elections, respecting the 17th parallel, and other matters which got a great deal out of the Conference in terms of a firm commitment on the part of the participants to see the war through and the absence of any reference to participation of the NLF in peace negotiations or other "peace gestures" which South Vietnam would have had great difficulty accepting. He was also impressed by the feeling of unity which existed and the fact that participants took the Conference seriously and not for show.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-509

By is, NARA Date 4-27-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Both Bunting and Jockel agree the Manila Conference plus ASPAC and the President's visit have helped give the Australians an increased sense of participation in Asian-Pacific affairs and brought them to realize they have an important role to play in the region. They also believe an important by-product of the meeting is that Asians are more convinced than before that the U.S. has deep and abiding interests in Asian affairs and that we are not going to tire of the struggle for peace and progress.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 4, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Red Duggan, African Specialist, Foreign Service Officer, deserves an assignment in Africa.

You will recall my discussion with you concerning Red Duggan, an African specialist in the Foreign Service, who lost his eyesight while on duty in Africa. He was recommended to me for the Policy Planning Council, and with some doubts I took him on. He proved to be one of the most effective members of the Council.

This is possible because he and his wife, a former foreign service secretary, work closely together. She helps by reading cables to him and editing the papers he types on his own. He attends all meetings without her. Since going blind, he has traveled throughout Africa. He is deeply knowledgeable on African matters, and is a productive, capable citizen. I am persuaded he can perform effectively. But he needs to be given a chance overseas to prove himself to the skeptical personnel people in State.

One logical opening was to be London's African specialist, but Ambassador Bruce has refused to have him, erroneously believing that he can't do the job.

He could also be a Chief of Mission in an African country. Joe Palmer is opposing his appointment.

I recommend that you authorize me to tell Bill Crockett that a decent overseas post must be found for Duggan, preferably as a Chief of Mission to a smaller African country.

Another alternative is this: Glen Ferguson, new Ambassador to Kenya, asked Red to be his DCM, but this was vetoed by Steeves.

W. W. Rostow

Yes, do so _____

See me _____

Drop it _____

2. Pres. file

Thursday, November 3, 1966 -- 10:30 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Approval of Schedule Proposed for GREELEY

The Atomic Energy Commission, at the request of the White House, rescheduled the GREELEY event for November 15 or as soon thereafter as feasible instead of October as you had originally approved. You will recall that the GREELEY event is our largest underground test to date [] and some substantial damage to buildings in Las Vegas is anticipated.

6.1 (a)

I recommend that you authorize the AEC to go ahead on this test in November as proposed and if you agree I will sign the attached note to Chairman Seaborg.

W. W. Rostow

☒ Approved
☐ Disapproved
☐ See me

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-507
By SJ, NARA, Date 7-26-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Nov. 4, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN,
U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

SUBJECT: Approval of Schedule Proposed for GREELEY

The schedule of actions in connection with the GREELEY event proposed in your letter to me of October 15 has been noted and approved. The authority to conduct GREELEY in October has been extended to permit the event to be conducted in November as requested.

It is noted that you will keep my office informed of the specific test date as the execution plan develops.

/s/

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-46
By inf NARA, Date 7-16-90

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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

3775

1748

OCT 15 1966

Dear Walt:

Reference is made to my letter of September 23, 1966, regarding the LATCHKEY underground test program and your response of October 3, 1966.

This is to advise you of the present planning for the GREELEY event previously approved for October.

Preliminary work in the surrounding areas normally carried out by the Public Health Service will commence at a low-key level on November 2, 1966. The public announcement of the test will be made on November 9, 1966. Execution is now planned for about November 15, 1966.

In accordance with the above, extension of the authority to execute the GREELEY event in November is requested. We will keep your office advised of the specific test date as the execution plan develops.

Cordially,

(Signed) Martin T. Seaberg

Chairman

Honorable W. W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-506
By is, NARA Date 10-10-99

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S. Code, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, November 3, 1966 -- 10:30 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I recommend your approval of this message to the Eighth Conference of the World Fellowship of Buddhists, meeting in Chiangmai, Thailand, November 6-10.

Messages from heads of state are customarily read the opening day. Presidential messages were sent to previous world Buddhist meetings in 1955 and 1961, and our posts in Buddhist countries urge the advisability of one from you this year.

State believes your message would help redress any misconceptions from recent Vietnam events that the U.S. is anti-Buddhist, and coming soon after the Manila meeting would be a further expression of broad U.S. interest in social and spiritual betterment.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

See me ☐

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

(To be delivered to Her Serene Highness Princess Poon Pismai Diskul, President, World Fellowship of Buddhist Conference, Chiangmai, Thailand.)

"My countrymen and I wish to extend to you and the assembled delegates of the 8th General Conference of the World Fellowship of Buddhists our hopes for a successful conference and our full support for the realization of your goal to 'promote peace and harmony among mankind.' To this noble program we would like to add our pledge to work unstintingly for the attainment of peace, freedom, health and social opportunity for all.

"As inheritors of the traditions passed down by those who first settled in the American colonies in pursuit of religious peace and freedom, we firmly believe in the freedom of all religious faiths for the betterment of man and in the continuing reaffirmation of these convictions to help achieve peace in this world.

"May the World Fellowship of Buddhists be successful in its efforts to channel further the moral, social, and educational forces of Buddhism into the attainment of a better world.

Lyndon B. Johnson"

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W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET - LIMDIS~~PRELIMINARY REPORT
ON OFFICIAL REACTION TO THE MANILA CONFERENCESummary

1. The most significant, voluminous and strongest support for the objectives of the Manila conference understandably came from the nations which participated in the conference. Not only was the conference well covered by their newsmen, their publics were additionally well informed by subsequent press and radio conferences held by their delegations upon their return from the conference. This impact was further accentuated by the President's post-conference visits during which the main themes of the conference were presented.
2. The attitudes expressed by non-participating Far Eastern nations were also very favorable (with the exception of Cambodia as reported by Communist sources). There is no doubt that greater understanding and free Asian unity was achieved at Manila.
3. Favorable reactions which emerged in Asia and elsewhere were close to the Manila themes of standing firm against aggression, seeking a peaceful solution and sharpened awareness of free Asian unity at the conference.
4. Negative reactions which were evident in non-Far Eastern areas seemed to center on failure unilaterally to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam and failure to call for a return to the Geneva Accords.
5. The harsh reactions of the Asian Communists to the conference which charged that it was a U.S. conference of puppets and a "peace fraud" stood in stark contrast to the positive notes of the three Manila documents.
6. Communist reaction outside Asia to the conference was uniformly negative, derisive and dissembling. Communist propaganda charged that the conference was a cover for plans for expansion of the war.
7. Outside of the Far East, official reactions usually conformed to pre-existing frames of reference. Non-aligned countries (such as Indonesia and Ceylon) preferred to avoid open official comment. Some countries chose to consider themselves to be uninvolved in Viet-Nam, (e.g. Lebanon) or are actually preoccupied by internal crises or other serious problems (e.g. Germany, Zambia and Ethiopia). Many countries have declined comment, in some cases expressing support in private; in other cases feeling it was not necessary to make a comment because their positions were well known (e.g. Brazil, Greece, Iran, Somalia, Kuwait).

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-509

By is, NARA Date 4-27-99~~SECRET - LIMDIS~~

8. Governor Harriman was accorded an understanding reception by the Asian and Near Eastern leaders upon whom he called. The reactions of the Indonesians, Ceylonese and Pakistanis to his presentations were encouraging. The Indian reaction was rigid and directed against the continued bombing of North Viet-Nam.

9. Assistant Secretary Bundy was also well received by the King of Laos who declared he was in complete accord with the conference. (Assistant Secretary Bundy has yet to visit Tokyo and Taipei.)

10. In Europe, where press coverage of the conference has been heavy and, for the most part, factual, official comment tends to parallel public opinion. European governments see no necessity, however, to react immediately and publicly to a distant conference (e.g., the Netherlands). The British Government is unlikely to be overly demonstrative, but will continue to support the basic themes permeating the Manila Conference. The French Government is unlikely to make any statement at variance with President de Gaulle's recent press conference or his address in Cambodia in which he reiterated the French attitude on Viet-Nam. Official German reaction has been sparse due largely to the government crisis, although it is evident from the press coverage that the German people approve of the results of the Manila Conference.

11. Austria is officially sympathetic and supports the Manila Conference goals, but is not expecting to depart from its neutral position by commenting openly on the conference.

12. African reaction so far has been sparse. Support and approval is most evident in Ethiopia, Liberia, Togo and Malagasy, mild hostility continues in Algeria, and non-involvement preoccupies many other countries (e.g., Morocco, Burundi).

13. A number of Latin American countries hold that no special announcements are required inasmuch as they already support U.S. policy in Viet-Nam (e.g., Brazil, Jamaica). Guyana, Uruguay and Venezuela have commented favorably.

14. Additional reports are expected from our posts as foreign governments study the Manila Conference documents and other reports which they have been given and as the diplomatic dialogues continue.

EA/RA:^{FLL}FLockhart:evc

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November 2, 1966

DETAILED REPORT ON
OFFICIAL REACTIONS TO THE
MANILA CONFERENCE

East Asia and Pacific Area

New Zealand

1. In a press interview in Manila at the conclusion of the conference, Prime Minister Holyoake said: "The unity shown must have an effect on world opinion, and no country can afford to ignore public opinion. It is up to the Communists; the ball is in their court. We can only hope and pray that they will come to the table." (Melbourne Overseas Service, 1500, October 25.)

2. In an interview at the Wellington Airport upon his return, the Prime Minister acknowledged his full support for the Manila principles for ending the war in Viet-Nam. (Wellington Overseas Service, 0740, October 27.)

3. The Prime Minister later told our Ambassador privately that he was greatly pleased with the results of the conference which had been more than worthwhile in bringing about unity and understanding. He also remarked that his opinion of Chairman Thieu and Prime Minister Ky had been greatly improved and that he saw them as capable, honest and dedicated leaders. (Wellington's 1097, Confidential.)

Australia

1. A communique on the talks between the President and the Prime Minister was issued at Canberra on October 21, upon the conclusion of the President's successful visit to Australia. The communique noted agreement that North Viet-Nam could not win a military victory and that the Free World forces would have to maintain their present military effort until a satisfactory settlement could be reached. It also stated that prospects for a peaceful settlement, the social and economic development of Viet-Nam and Asia, and Asian regional development were discussed between the President and the Prime Minister. (Canberra's 2338, Unclassified.)

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2. At Manila upon the conclusion of the conference, Prime Minister Holt was quoted in the press as saying that: "The conference went beyond our best expectations in the resolutions and unity expressed. It was sure to have a heartening effect on the world as a whole. There were no significant differences. (Melbourne Overseas Service, 1500, October 25.)

3. At the Manila Airport, he was quoted to the effect that the highly significant unanimity among the conferees means strength that allows the allies to offer the other side a chance to come to the negotiating table. (Melbourne Overseas Service, 0700, October 26.)

4. And, on the 27th the Prime Minister, in his report to Parliament, reaffirmed Australia's commitment in Viet-Nam and to preventing communism from rolling through Southeast Asia. Viet-Nam is the battleground for human values of freedom and human dignity. If free choice is preserved in Viet-Nam, then the future and stability of all free peoples in Asia and the Pacific region will be guaranteed. (Melbourne Overseas Service, 1100, October 27.)

The Philippines

1. Not only has President Marcos expressed to our Ambassador at Manila his extreme satisfaction with the outcome of the conference, but with characteristic stamina and speed is following up the conference with new initiatives.

a. He has instructed Philippine Embassies in Asian capitals to circulate copies of the communique.

b. The Philippine Ambassador to Indonesia has been instructed to make a full report to Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik.

c. Foreign Secretary Ramos was instructed to confer with Vietnamese officials in Saigon to establish consultative machinery

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d. The Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations has transmitted letters from President Marcos to the General Assembly President and the Secretary General notifying them that the Philippines plans to convene an all-Asia conference on Viet-Nam. The letters disclosed that Burma has offered itself as host but not as a mediator for the conference. (USUN's 1988, Confidential and Rangoon's 634, Confidential.)

2. Our Ambassador in Manila also reports that the over-all impact of the conference and President Johnson's visit has been outstandingly favorable and successful, leading to a heightened Philippine sense of involvement in the problem of Viet-Nam and in the regional concerns of the Pacific Area. (Manila's 4774 and 4786, Secret.)

3. According to a press report, Foreign Secretary Ramos said that the three documents of the conference will be sent officially to the North Vietnamese Government through a third party having diplomatic relations with Hanoi. (AFP, 1110, October 27.)

Viet-Nam

1. At the conclusion of the conference, Prime Minister Ky said in press interview in Manila that he was very happy with the results of the conference and that all the allies were determined to resist aggression and help rehabilitate Viet-Nam. (Melbourne Overseas Service, 1500, October 25.)

2. Upon their return to Saigon on October 26, Chairman Thieu and Prime Minister Ky met with the press. Thieu emphasized that the unity at Manila will lead to unity of action. He called special attention to the three documents issued at the conference; he spelled out the Goals of Freedom; he discussed at length the various aspects of the Communique as they related to Viet-Nam and reiterated Viet-Nam's identity with the Declaration on Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific. He called upon the aggressors to end their acts of aggression on all aspects and to withdraw all their armed forces, weapons and cadres to the north and stated that when the Communists comply, the Republic of Viet-Nam will ask the allies to withdraw. (Saigon's 9434, LOU, and 261244, Unclassified, and Saigon Domestic Broadcast, 1100, October 26.)

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3. On October 30, Prime Minister Ky made a radio broadcast to the people which emphasized the determination to resist aggression, while at the same time welcoming the return of compatriots from Communist-controlled areas, including Communist cadres and troops. He noted the support achieved at Manila and called upon the citizens to unify to overcome the Communists and to build democracy. The address, while less precise than Thieu's airport speech, was consistent with the Manila Communique. (Saigon's 9650, LOU)

4. Chief of State Thieu on October 31 delivered a similar radio address. He summed up the aims of the 1963 revolution: "Defeat the aggressors, restore lasting and genuine peace, improve the society and build democracy." (Saigon's 9798, Unclassified.)

5. Our Embassy discussed the Manila Communique, particularly Article 9 dealing with prisoners of war, with the Acting ICRC Representative. He commented favorably on the communique, but expressed doubt that the North Vietnamese would be willing to cooperate. (Saigon's 9651, LOU)

Thailand

1. Thailand's satisfaction with the results of the conference, gratification with United States' aid to Thailand, unity at Manila, and acknowledgement of United States' understanding of Asian problems were the themes which appeared in the official statement by Prime Minister Thanom and Foreign Minister Thanat in their separate airport press interviews upon their return from Manila on October 28. In the meantime, Thai press radio and TV had given full coverage to the Manila Conference, including open statements by the conferees and the final three documents.

2. President Johnson's subsequent 2-day visit to Thailand and the tremendous welcome accorded him replaced the conference as the principal news, except as reference was made to it and its aims in the various official addresses and welcomes made during the course of the visit. There is no question that the twin events were officially received with great enthusiasm and support. (Bangkok's 5442, 270301, and 301120, Unclassified.)

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3. Prime Minister Thanom held a press conference on October 31, which dealt largely with US-Thai bilateral relations and matters discussed during the President's visit. (Bangkok's 011101, Unclassified)

Malaysia

Although there has been no official Malaysian comment on the Manila Conference reported, it is clear from the addresses of the King and of the Prime Minister welcoming President Johnson that Malaysia is dedicated to the same ideals of freedom, democracy, human rights and security from aggression which were embodied in the three conference documents. (Kuala Lumpur's 1799 and 1800, Unclassified.) This is further attested to by the full coverage given by the press to the Manila Conference.

Indonesia

1. Governor Harriman's discussions on the Manila Conference with the Indonesian leadership reflected considerable understanding and support for US policy in Viet-Nam.

2. The talk with General Suharto was entirely on the conference. General Suharto stated he was convinced the US wanted a peaceful settlement and that it was Indonesia's duty to do all possible to help achieve one. He clearly understands the importance of stopping the Chinese Communists from advancing in Southeast Asia. He was obviously concerned over the Viet-Nam problem and noted, in particular, the need for strong popular support, as well as the need for external assistance. It was clear that the Indonesian military leaders consider the US role in Viet-Nam essential and are grateful for the protection afforded Indonesia by the US stance in Southeast Asia.

3. Acting Foreign Minister Diah stressed Indonesia's desire for peace and said that the real problem was that the other side is not ready to negotiate.

4. Governor Harriman has reported his own conviction that we have an unique opportunity to help Indonesia's reconstruction so that it can play an effective role in the development of a non-Communist

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Asia. These privately expressed views of the Indonesian leadership are not being reflected in Indonesian editorials in view, among other reasons, of the need not to be over-identified with the US. (Djakarta's 2031, 2036, 2037, 2083, Confidential, and Colombo's 855, Secret-Limdis.)

Republic of Korea

1. At the end of the first day of the conference, President Park was extremely pleased with the proceedings, especially that there was unity on the need to stand firm. (TDCS 314/13485-66, October 25) At the Seoul Airport, upon his return on October 26, he said that the conference which demonstrated the united and firm determination of the Free World, conviction in victory and which worked out effective measures to restore peace and to accelerate Viet-Nam's economic progress will be a great blow to the Communist aggressors. (Seoul Domestic Service, 0720, October 26.)

2. In a conversation with our Ambassador in Seoul, President Park reiterated his satisfaction with the three main results, namely, unity of purpose; determination to continue the struggle as long as necessary to bring about an honorable peace; and, the declaration of ideals. Other members of the Korean delegation have expressed similar views to our Embassy. (Seoul's 2314 and 2330, Confidential.)

3. At the conclusion of President Johnson's visit to Korea, a joint communique was issued which inter alia reaffirmed strong US-Korean ties, the common dedication to securing peace in Asia, the joint satisfaction over the unity demonstrated at the Manila Conference, and the need to ensure that aggression will not again menace the Republic of Korea. (Seoul's 2402, Unclassified)

Japan

1. Official Japanese comment on the conference has been limited because of its non-participation and in the absence of the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Office did, according to the Japanese press, call the communique's proposal on foreign troop removal a "bold proposal" and informally reaffirmed Japan's desire for peaceful settlement and Japan's role in economic development and stabilization. (Jiji, 1540, October 26)

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2. In the meantime, Foreign Minister Shiina in Jakarta conferring with General Suharto reiterated Japan's view that a peaceful solution was necessary. (Djakarta Domestic Service, 1200, October 26.)

3. Assistant Secretary William P. Bundy is due to arrive at Tokyo on November 4 for discussions with Japanese officials concerning the Manila Conference.

Laos

1. The King of Laos expressed to Assistant Secretary Bundy his view that the Manila Conference was more than satisfying and that the foremost result, from an Asian perspective, was continuity of United States policy despite "insidious propaganda" (i. e. de Gaulle).

2. He described US policy in Asia as morally correct. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma told Eugene Black that the determination of the US and the other six nations was heartwarming to Laos. (Vientiane's 2647 and 2671, Confidential.)

Seven-Nation Letter to UN

A letter signed by the representatives of the nations which participated in the Manila Conference is in preparation among concerned delegations in New York prior to delivery to the Secretary General of the United Nations. It will request him to circulate among the delegates copies of the three documents issued at Manila.

Asian Communists

Peking, Hanoi and the NFLSV variously referred to the Manila Conference as a "puppet show" and a "farce," stressing that its purpose was to intensify and expand the war in Viet-Nam. They said the United States was attempting to fool world opinion and the voters of the United States in the forthcoming elections and to create an illusion of peace. The US conditions for peace were called "insolent" and a demand for surrender to "US aggression" and "US imperialism's

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counterrevolutionary violence." The United States was accused of assembling its Asian "satellites" into a new aggressive military alliance, which Peking called "anti-China." The Chinese Communists were the only ones to take the line that the "revisionist leadership of the Soviet Union" had a part in the joint communique. North Korea issued a statement censuring the conference, which was similar to the other condemnations. (Unclassified)

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EUROPE

France

The French Foreign Office cannot be expected to depart from the well-known views on Viet-Nam which President de Gaulle stated at his press conference on October 28.

Germany

Our Embassy at Bonn expects that Governor Harriman's discussions this next weekend will refocus German attention on the Manila Conference which had been diverted by the government crisis. (Bonn "s 5320 Confidential).

Austria

Our Embassy at Vienna reports that Austrian officials are privately sympathetic to the United States position, the government maintains its neutral stance by refraining from public statements. Foreign Office officials feel that the Conference was another positive move toward a solution of the Viet-Nam situation which would include the interests of Asian partners. (Vienna's 1755, Confidential)

Portugal

The Portugese official attitude toward the US policy in Viet-Nam is reflected in the favorable and positive Portugese press reporting on the Manila Conference. In addition, many favorable comments on the conference and the President's trip have been made to our Embassy by European and Latin American members of the diplomatic corps. (Lisbon's 502, Confidential)

The Netherlands

The Chief of the Southeast Asia bureau of the Foreign Office personally believes that the Conference has contributed to better understanding

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but noted that, despite important, forward-looking decisions, the Conference was unlikely to have any great impact in the Netherlands. He added that the Ministry remains strongly sympathetic to the U. S. on Viet-Nam. (The Hague's 944, Confidential).

Malta

The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and Cabinet Ministers have on their own initiative commented to our Charge' that the Manila Conference has made clear that the United States goal for Southeast Asia is peace. Malta's consistent support for United States policy in Viet-Nam is unchanged. (Valletta's 177, Confidential)

Soviet and Eastern European Bloc

Soviet and East European bloc press and radio treatment of the Manila Conference was uniformly negative. The President's trip was belittled as relating to the U. S. elections, extensive coverage was given to hostile demonstrations in countries on his itinerary, and the conference itself was disparaged as a "new war council" which would lead to further escalation of the conflict. Various commentaries pointed out that no "major" Asian country was represented at the Manila gathering, which included only U. S. "puppets." Efforts to portray the conference as devoted to peace were dismissed as hypocritical. Soviet and East European bloc reaction to the joint communique depicted it as containing little that was new and charged that the proposal on foreign troop withdrawals was hedged with various types of conditions. An "Izvestia" review on October 29 asserted that the conference documents did not contain the slightest admission of a desire by the U. S. and its accomplices to end their aggression in Viet-Nam and claimed that the U. S. had failed in its effort to create the illusion of widespread support for its actions in Viet-Nam. (Limited Official Use)

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Ceylon

Governor Harriman's post-Conference visit to Colombo was successful. Prime Minister Senanayake reacted favorably to the results of the

Manila

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Manila Conference and expressed a willingness to do what he could to help. Other officials also gave cautious and indirect approval. US sincerity was accepted and there were definite signs that the Ceylonese were relieved to discover that our policy is not to escalate the war but to seek peace. Governor Harriman's sessions with Buddhist leaders were also productive. In general press reaction to his visit was good, neither negative nor hostile. (Colombo's 850, 879, and 892, Confidential)

India

Governor Harriman's discussions with Prime Minister, Gandhi and Foreign Minister Singh revealed no change in India's attitude on Viet-Nam. These private discussions did not differ from the public Indian position as stated in the Nasser-Tito-Gandhi Tripartite communique of October 24. Mrs. Gandhi was quite assertive in her discussions with the Governor on the point that we should stop bombing North Vietnam without prior conditions as an essential move toward negotiations. The Indians maintained that indications had been received from Hanoi and from Moscow that North Vietnam would respond if the bombing were stopped. The Indians promised to spell out the details. (New Delhi's 6120, 6273 Confidential and Tehran's 1959 Secret)

Pakistan

President Ayub seemed appreciative of the detailed briefing given him by Governor Harriman and knowledgeable as to the US position. He saw little that he could do at this stage but agreed to follow developments closely. As he saw it the crux of the matter lay in Pekings' desire to keep the fighting going. Hanoi wants to maintain independence from both Peking and Moscow and does not want to ask for Chinese Communist troops. (Rawalpindi's 1673 Confidential and Tehran's 1958 Secret)

Afghanistan

Editorials in two government-controlled papers compared the Manila communique most unfavorably with the Tito-Nasser-Gandhi communique. They rejected the facts that the Viet Cong have any relationship to North Vietnam, that North Vietnam is the aggressor and that there was sincerity at the conference. (Kabul's 1776, Unclassified)

Saudi

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Saudi Arabia

Although Saudi Arabia quietly supports our Viet-Nam policy, it prefers not to take a public position to that end. Officials have been following the President's trip and the Manila Conference with interest and have received the pertinent documents and a briefing. (Jidda's 1665 Confidential)

Iran

The Shah of Iran continues to be basically pro-Free World but the Iranian disposition to pursue an independent policy militates against public pronouncements supporting our Viet-Nam policy. The Shah privately agrees with the necessity to repel the North Vietnamese aggression even though some of the communiques issued during his tour of bloc countries have highlighted the viewpoint that outside forces should leave Viet-Nam and permit the Vietnamese to solve their own problems. (Tehran's 1910 Secret)

Kuwait

Although the Manila Conference received good press treatment, Kuwait officials, preoccupied with local matters, have not paid very much attention to the voluminous material on the Conference, the trip, and Viet-Nam which is available. Two Foreign Office officials have reacted favorably to the communique and saw great promise for a peaceful settlement if the other side were willing. For them Communist China is the stumbling block. There appears little likelihood of Kuwait's stepping out of its own non-aligned role to make a positive statement of support, however. (Kuwait's 410, Confidential)

Lebanon

Lebanese officials were mildly interested in the Manila Conference and hopeful that it would end the Viet-Nam conflict. The Foreign Minister, during a review of the conference, acknowledged that there were positive results. (Beirut's 3901, Confidential)

Greece

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Greece

While we should not expect any public official statement from the Greek Government concerning the Manila Conference, the detailed briefing and documentation given to the Foreign Office will be useful to Greek officials in their frequent discussions on Viet-Nam with Eastern European diplomats. For the Greeks, the news of the Chinese Communist nuclear explosion and missile development tended to overshadow the Manila Conference. They are obviously concerned. (Athens' 2125, Confidential)

AFRICA

Algeria

Algerian officials have taken no official public note of the Manila Conference. In private they remain critical of US involvement in Viet-Nam. The Foreign Minister in a brief airport arrival statement on October 27 underlined the precarious nature of world peace because of the war in Viet-Nam. Boumediene echoed the same thought in his National Day speech when he condemned the war, particularly the bombing of North Vietnam, as endangering world peace. (Algiers' 1416 and 1424 Confidential)

Morocco

There has been no official reaction to the Manila Conference except for one government newspaper which stated that the conference aimed at saving mankind from devastation and building a better world. The King of Morocco during his visit to Moscow stated publicly, "we are exerting every effort and appreciate all good intentions aimed at ending the war in Viet-Nam and that there not occur anything similar in other places. It is our wish that the Vietnamese people actually be able to decide their own fate under conditions of maximum freedom and that no one be in a position to interfere with their fate." (Rabat's 1978 Unclassified and Moscow's 1964 Limited Official Use)

Liberia

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Liberia

President Tubman has told our Embassy that the Manila Conference and the President's trip served a very useful purpose and should prove that the United States is not isolated. A few days earlier at his press conference President Tubman in reference to the Manila Conference said that "any conference aimed at finding peace is always desirable." Liberia became the first African country to give assistance to Viet-Nam when the Liberian Ambassador in Washington presented a \$50,000 check to the Vietnamese Ambassador for medicine and medical supplies. (Monrovia's 1740 Unclassified and 1763 Confidential and Department's 73917)

Togo

The Secretary General of the Presidency has told our Embassy that he appreciates the United States willingness to make every effort to search for a peaceful solution and that he understands why the United States must remain firm. (Lome's 567 Confidential)

Zambia

Zambia has not reacted officially to the Manila Conference and it is unlikely to do so, being preoccupied with the Rhodesian rebellion. (Lusaka's 780, Confidential)

Burundi

Although Burundi has not reacted officially to the Manila Conference an indication of its attitude is evident in the Foreign Minister's declaration of October 28 which ignored the conference but called for a return to the Geneva Accords, cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of foreign troops, and decisions to be made by the Vietnamese peoples. (Bujumbura's 301, Confidential)

Kenya

Kenya has not reacted officially although texts of the Manila documents have been sent to the Foreign Office. (Nairobi's 1894, Confidential)

Somali

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Somali Republic

Although our Ambassador had a long discussion on October 27 with President Aden after the latter's return from abroad, the Manila Conference was not discussed. The President explained that in the joint communique issued upon the occasion of his visit to Moscow he intended that the reference to withdrawal of foreign troops from Viet-Nam would cover North Vietnamese. (Mogadiscio's 985, Confidential)

Ethiopia

The Ethiopian Government's attention has been focussed on the OAU Conference. Nevertheless, the impact of the Manila Conference has helped to point up the fact that Asian states have a major interest in defending their security through collective efforts in South Viet-Nam and that the war is not a white power's war. (Addis Ababa's 1632, Confidential)

Malagasy

The President of Malagasy completely supports the U.S. position on Viet-Nam but probably will make no public statement regarding the Manila Conference to that effect since he has reportedly instructed his Cabinet and Ambassadors to make no statements critical of the U.S. or supporting the U.S. unless instructed. (Tananarive's 608, Secret)

AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Haiti

President Duvalier rarely reacts to events such as the Manila Conference either publicly or officially. It is unlikely that there will be any official reaction. The Foreign Minister has been given texts of the Manila documents. (Port-au-Prince's 498, Confidential)

Jamaica

The External Affairs Secretary during a Senate debate stated Jamaica's
approval

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approval of the Manila Conference and called upon the Soviet Union to persuade the Viet Cong to come to the negotiating table. He stated that the infiltration from the North was wrong and expressed concern over the United States build-up. Local press coverage of the Conference and the trip has been extensive and helpful. (Kingston's 977, Confidential)

Guyana

Most Guyana officials, including the Prime Minister, hold sympathetic attitudes toward President Johnson's efforts to bring the Viet-Nam conflict to an honorable conclusion. So far there have been no public statements concerning the conference by Guyana officials, but they have been kept informed about developments by our Embassy. (Georgetown's 389, Confidential)

Uruguay

A leading officer in the Foreign Ministry told our Embassy that the most significant result of the Manila Conference was the unity and support of all the participating nations in regard to the necessity to stop the aggression. (Montevideo's 872 Confidential)

Venezuela

The unity and unanimity displayed at the Manila Conference, the positive tone of the declarations and the responsible position on the peace proposals taken by the South Vietnamese delegation have impressed the Foreign Office. (Caracas' 2457, Confidential)

Brazil

The Brazilian Foreign Office does not expect to make a statement of official reaction to the Manila Conference inasmuch as Brazil supports the US position on Viet-Nam. (Rio de Janeiro's 5245, Confidential)

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1. summary
2. Profile

November 3, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

The Junior Chamber International meeting in Kyoto, Japan, is an important international forum, and it would be highly desirable for the President to send his greetings.

A proposed text is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

November 3, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This message to the Junior Chamber International, which has its 21st congress in Kyoto, Japan, beginning next Monday, is recommended for your approval.

It is an important international gathering of young leaders from 77 nations, and it provides a good forum for a message related to the objectives of the Asian trip.

You may recall that you had been invited to attend the Kyoto meeting.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

See me ☐

TO THE JUNIOR CHAMBER INTERNATIONAL

The people of America join me in warmly greeting the Junior Chamber International on the occasion of its Twenty-First Congress in Kyoto, Japan.

You meet at a time of momentous change in the world. It is fitting that you gather this year in Asia where so much has occurred in recent months to encourage the belief that cooperative effort can accelerate progress in the war against poverty, ignorance, and disease, while providing also the basis for peace and order in the part of the world where about two-thirds of humanity live.

I have seen this spirit and its hopeful initial results in my recent travels throughout Asia and the Pacific. The region is full of new initiatives for social and economic advance through regional and sub-regional institutions.

This momentum is paralleled elsewhere in the world as nations begin to break the shackles of narrow nationalism and find the means increasingly to shape their own destinies in a modern world where nationalism is not enough.

Young leaders the world over have been in the forefront of these developments which are showing the way to a world of peace, progress, and order.

The Junior Chamber International can indeed be proud of its leadership and enduring accomplishments in these tasks.

-2-

The American people salute you and join me in their gratitude
for your pioneering efforts throughout the world.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Thurs., Nov. 3, 1966
6 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is what I was doing when you
were taking the elderly party up in
the chopper.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET attachment~~

51/e 179

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

By NJ 90-46
NARA, Date 7-16-90

(orig to: Pres.)
(cc: State)
#

Thursday, Nov. 3, 1966

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum of conversation, Korean Minister of Finance Kim Chong-Yom, and W. W. Rostow, in Seoul, November 1, 1966

I met today with the Minister of Finance and then, at lunch, with a number of his aides. Minister Kim began by saying he had something to offer and something to ask.

As for the offer, it concerned how Korea can help Vietnam economically. I had talked about this with Minister Kim in Washington. They have examined their possibilities and they concluded that the following are the fields in which they might be useful to Vietnam:

- medical training and doctors
- a training institute in construction techniques
- agricultural extension
- textiles
- electricity

I explained that at Manila, Ky had announced that Vietnam was about to undertake long-term planning for reconstruction, and that in many ways Korea was in a position to give more practical and relevant advice than the U.S. In particular, they could help make the Vietnamese plan more realistic with respect to sectoral and project planning and the planning of regional development, which will be extremely important to keep political balance in South Vietnam. He said they would consider adding this to the list.

Turning to what he had to ask, their proposition came to this: In the second 5-year plan, they estimate their requirements gross (including debt repayments) at \$1.7 billion over the next five years. (Attached at Tab A is the rough breakdown of the requirements as noted by one of Minister Kim's aides.) The confrontation on where they get the money will come on December 8-9, when the World Bank consultative group meets. The World Bank has filed a laudatory report on the second 5-year plan, and sent out a recent mission which praises its technical quality. *

*On my return I checked with George Woods. He is high on Korea. WWR

~~SECRET~~

-2-

I said that there was no position on the Korean 5-year plan yet formulated in the United States Government. On a non-official basis, I would give them two pieces of advice:

-- strive to the maximum to bring in private enterprise which at this stage in Korean development, when new industries are being opened up, has a vital role to play;

-- reduce as much of their planning to specific projects with good feasibility studies. That is the easiest way to raise money.

Returning to his requests, Kim made three:

First, that we support quickly the studies necessary to build a 300 megawatt (\$50 million) atomic energy reactor in the plan as presently published. They had calculated that thermo power would be more efficient than nuclear power until the 1970's. This is apparently no longer true. And they could use a nuclear reactor as soon as they could get one.

Second, they are going to try to raise private capital for a big petro-chemical complex designed, I believe, by A. D. Little. They would like some U. S. Government money in support of that complex. I asked if the ExIm Bank might be a suitable source. They said yes.

Third, they urgently need a first-rate expert in population control. There has been a high rate of IUD withdrawals. They would like to get the best advice possible on this matter.

Attached (Tab B) is an Aide Memoire entitled "Summary Proposal for Economic Development in Korea." It sets out in somewhat greater detail the directions in which they would like the U. S. assistance.

At lunch I met about 10 of Minister Kim's staff. I asked them: "Putting aside U. S. aid, what are your major problems?" They said:

- inflation;
- unemployment;
- population control.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

179a



MINISTRY OF FINANCE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
SEOUL, KOREA

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER

Gross	1. 7
long term	0. 8. 8
SA	0. 1. 6
PL480	0. 1. 9
priv donate	0. 3. 5
T C	3
- Repaymt etc	0. 3. 1

Net

179c



SUMMARY PROPOSAL
FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF KOREA

1. Financial and Technical Assistance for the National Land Development Plan
 - A. Seoul-Inchon Area Development Program, etc.
2. Assistance on Population Problems
3. Active U. S. Assistance for the Investment of Social Overhead Capital
 - A. Transportation development.
 - B. Harbor development.
 - C. Highway construction and improvement.
4. U. S. Assistance on Korea-Vietnam Economic Cooperation
 - A. More opportunity for Korean firms to bid on U. S. Military contracts.
5. Increased U. S. Government Promotion of Private Investment in Korea
 - A. Expansion of various risk guarantees given by the U. S. Government to U. S. firms planning to invest in Korea.
 - B. Cancellation of various charges for these guarantees.
 - C. Promotion of increased relations between U. S. and Korean businessmen to promote better interest in Korea.
6. Earlier Conclusion of Exemption of Double Taxation of U. S. Investors
7. Lift of U. S. Import Restrictions on Textiles, Manufactured & Agricultural Goods
8. Additional AID Loans
 - A. Nuclear power plant, capacity 300 MW.
 - B. Petrochemical industry development.
 - C. Other Projects.

Thursday, November 3, 1966
7:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk has drafted this personal message which he proposes to deliver promptly, if you approve, to Senator Kuchel. It would then be released. This would permit you, at the press conference tomorrow, to note Sec. Rusk's communication to Kuchel.

He believes it inappropriate for you to reply directly.

Sec. Rusk wishes your prompt guidance in this matter.

Ww Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

DRAFT -- November 3, 1966

The Honorable Thomas H. Kuchel
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

I have just seen your telegram to the President about an all-Asian peace conference in Burma. As you know, the United States has welcomed all initiatives which might be taken by any government or groups of governments working toward an early and peaceful conclusion of the violence in Viet Nam.

You say that it is unrealistic to hope that Communist nations in Asia would agree to participate in such a conference at this time. The government of Burma has stated that "if both parties to the Viet Nam conflict should request, there would be no objection to Rangoon being used as the venue of the meeting." There would seem to be, therefore, some question as to whether Burma would agree to the holding of a conference in Rangoon without both sides.

Your telegram seems to reflect your understanding that the value of an Asian conference would be enhanced if it were an Asian conference on Asian initiative. It would undermine that value if the United States should attempt to interfere with initiatives of its own to try to bring about such a meeting. Any such action by Asian countries would find a constructive attitude on the part of the United States.

101 Dean Rusk

Thursday, November 3, 1966

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Secretary Rusk would like to arrange a meeting with you and Secretary McNamara, today or tomorrow, to cover the following items:

1. Language for Non-Proliferation Treaty

Discussions with the Russians are awaiting a decision as to whether we are going to propose new language for Article I of the draft non-proliferation treaty. Ambassador Dobrynin has reflected concern as to when we will be prepared to resume discussions.

Secretary Rusk is debating whether we should table new language now or wait a settling down of the political situation in Germany. Ambassador McGee recommends no action now.

2. Tripartite Technical Discussions on Nuclear Testing Detection System

UK Foreign Secretary George Brown has proposed that the US, UK and USSR agree to a meeting of experts to review the existing capability to detect and identify underground events by seismic means. Reportedly there has been significant progress in the field of detection. The Soviets, previously opposed to such technical decisions, now have told the UK that they will participate. We have indicated our interest in the proposal but a decision by you is necessary before proceeding further.

3. Reorganization of Revolutionary Development Program in Vietnam

W. W. Rostow

_____ Schedule meeting this afternoon

_____ Schedule meeting tomorrow

_____ See me

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

Thursday, November 3, 1966 -- 7:15 p.m

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Second Quarter FY 1967 Underground Nuclear Test
Program (LATCHKEY II)

The Atomic Energy Commission has submitted for your approval the AEC-DOD underground nuclear tests proposed for the two remaining months, November and December, of LATCHKEY II -- the second quarter underground nuclear test program. This program has been reviewed by the agencies represented on your Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests and they have no objection to your approval of the recommended AEC program except that they noted that authorization of CABRIOLET should be withheld pending final decision by you with respect to that event.

The November-December schedule also includes the GREELEY event which is the large underground nuclear test scheduled to be conducted at the Nevada Test Site on or shortly after November 15. This is the test you previously approved for October and which was subsequently delayed until November at the request of the White House. A separate approval of the new time is also pending your approval.

I recommend that you authorize the AEC to go ahead on its proposed November-December schedule as proposed except for the reservation on CABRIOLET. If you agree I will sign the attached memorandum to Chairman Seaborg.

☒ Approved
☐ Disapproved
☐ See me

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-507
By Sj, NARA, Date 7-28-03

~~SECRET~~~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

Nov 4, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Second Quarter FY 1967 Underground Nuclear Test
Program (LATCHKEY II)

The Atomic Energy Commission has submitted for your approval the AEC-DOD underground nuclear tests proposed for the two remaining months, November and December, of LATCHKEY II -- the second quarter underground nuclear test program. This program has been reviewed by the agencies represented on your Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests and they have no objection to your approval of the recommended AEC program except that they noted that authorization of CABRIOLET should be withheld pending final decision by you with respect to that event.

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I recommend that you authorize the AEC to go ahead on its proposed November-December schedule as proposed except for the reservation on CABRIOLET. If you agree I will sign the attached memorandum to Chairman Seaborg.

____ Approved


____ Disapproved

____ See me

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-507
By SJ, NARA, Date 7-28-03



~~SECRET~~
UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

182 b

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-506
By is, NARA Date 11-4-99

OCT 27 1966

This document consists of 2 pages
No. 2 of 32 Copies, Series A


Dear Mr. President:

By White House memorandum of October 5, 1966, we were advised of the approved extension of authority to conduct certain uncompleted LATCHKEY I underground nuclear tests in the month of October. In our letter of October 15, 1966, we requested a further extension of authority to conduct one of the approved tests, GREELEY, in the month of November. Early action on that test was necessary to provide sufficient lead time to insure meeting the scheduled date. The purpose of this letter is to summarize our test plan for the remaining months of LATCHKEY II, November and December 1966, and to request approval to conduct that program as proposed. This plan has been developed to satisfy the requirements of both the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense, and has the concurrence of the DOD.

The program for the last two months of the second quarter, FY 1967 consists of seven tests sponsored by the AEC and two tests sponsored by the DOD. A description of these events is provided in Enclosure 1. The AEC test program includes two events, GREELEY and CABRIOLET, which have been presented separately for review.

The DOD test program includes one event, STERLING, which also was presented for separate review.

With the exception of the cratering experiment, CABRIOLET, each of the events described in the enclosure is designed to be fully contained. As in the past, all tests will be subject to thorough review by the agencies concerned and will be executed only with the expectation that they can be conducted within the requirements and constraints of the limited test ban treaty.



~~SECRET~~

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DOE
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DOE
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- 2 -

DOE
6.1a

A proposed authorization to expend these materials and conduct the test program as described is provided in Enclosure 2.

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) Glenn I. Seaborg

Chairman

The President
The White House

Enclosures:

1. Cys 1A&2A November-December
Test Program
2. Cys 1A&2A Draft Endorsement

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This document consists of 4 pages
No. 2 of 30 Copies, Series A

182c

**NOVEMBER-DECEMBER TEST PROGRAM
LATCHKEY II**

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-506
By is, NARA Date 11-4-99

I. AEC Tests

a. Reliability

<u>Device (Sponsor)</u>	<u>Estimated Yield (KT)</u>	<u>Event Name</u>	<u>Approximate Date</u>
		CERISE	November

DOE
6.1a

b. Tailored Outputs

<u>Device (Sponsor)</u>	<u>Estimated Yield (KT)</u>	<u>Event Name</u>	<u>Approximate Date</u>
		GREELEY	November
		NASH	December

DOE
6.1a

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure 1

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or the disclosure of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person is prohibited.

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

DOE
6.1a

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c. Primary/Single Stage Development

<u>Device (Sponsor)</u>	<u>Estimated Yield (KT)</u>	<u>Event Name</u>	<u>Approximate Date</u>
-----------------------------	---------------------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------------

		SIDECAR	December
--	--	---------	----------

DOE
6.1a

--

d. Advanced Technology

<u>Device (Sponsor)</u>	<u>Estimated Yield (KT)</u>	<u>Event Name</u>	<u>Approximate Date</u>
-----------------------------	---------------------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------------

		AJAX	November
--	--	------	----------

DOE
6.1a


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- 3 -


a. AEC PLOWSHARE Tests

<u>Device (Sponsor)</u>	<u>Estimated Yield (KT)</u>	<u>Event Name</u>	<u>Approximate Date</u>
		SIMMS	November
		CABRIOLET	December

6.1a

The objective of experiments in this category is to further the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.


SIMMS is an event in the continuing program to develop clean, reliable nuclear explosives for excavation.



DOE
6.1a

CABRIOLET is a nuclear excavation experiment planned for execution at the Nevada Test Site. It is designed for the purpose of obtaining data on cratering effects in hard, dry rock, and to study the resulting distribution of radioactivity.

II. DOD Tests

<u>Device (Sponsor)</u>	<u>Estimated Yield (KT)</u>	<u>Event Name</u>	<u>Approximate Date</u>
		NEW POINT	December
		STERLING	December

DOE
6.1a

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~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

STERLING is the second event in a series to investigate the decoupling theory in a salt medium. The event will be detonated in the 110-foot diameter SALMON cavity in the Tatum salt dome in Mississippi, to determine if shot-generated cavities decouple. This test is a part of the U.S. program to improve means for detecting, locating, and identifying underground nuclear detonations.

~~SECRET~~

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182-d

DRAFT ENDORSEMENT


This document consists of 1 pages
No. 2 of 30 Copies, Series A

Memorandum for

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

Reference your letter of _____, requesting approval of a proposed November-December 1966 underground nuclear test program. That program, consisting of seven Atomic Energy Commission tests and two Department of Defense tests, is approved.

DOFC
6.1a



The President

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-506
By is, NARA Date 2-28-00

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure 2

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

This document contains restricted data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. No part of the disclosure of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday
November 3, 1966, -- 1:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith George McGhee's latest report on the crisis in Bonn. You will note (page 4, para. E) that George now judges it a bad time to "take any decision to make important substantive changes in our draft non-proliferation treaty, especially if they effect options on a NATO or European nuclear arrangement."

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Bonn 5393

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

90-48

By ijp

NARA, Date

7-16-90

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL - LIMDIS~~

Thursday, November 3, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR McGHEE (Bonn, 5393)

SUBJECT: Implications of a new German Government for U.S. Policy

While the Embassy will continue to report significant day to day developments affecting the current German Governmental crisis, it may be useful at this point to attempt some assessment of the overall implications insofar as U.S. interests are concerned.

The still fluid situation in Bonn as to the precise contours of the next Government brings with it both opportunities and dangers in our relations with Germany. At this juncture, the latter will probably pre-dominate.

There is reason to think that Germany has reached a watershed in its postwar political development. In retrospect, it may well appear that the Erhard Government was the last Government of the postwar era. There are, of course, objective limits within which German policy must develop. However, the postwar era was also marked by many self-imposed limits. Some of these will now disappear, regardless of the composition of the next Government. This will become especially notable if CSU leader Strauss, as appears likely, should occupy an important position in a new Government; however, it is basically not a matter of personalities. A trend toward greater self-assertion and closer attention to specific German interests has, of course, been evident for some time. It has not yet markedly affected German foreign policy, mainly because the Erhard Government tended to respond more to the traditional postwar influences than to the new demands for greater German assertiveness. The next Government will, we believe, cease to operate in this postwar framework, which was characterized inter alia by a disposition on the part of the German Government to look to us for guidance on almost any given issue.

There is a natural German tendency for French influence to fill any vacuum left by a diminution of Germany's ties with the U.S. The momentum toward closer relations with France will probably continue for some time. Although it is unlikely to result in basic policy changes, since the French have in the final analysis little to offer the Germans, the

~~CONFIDENTIAL - LIMDIS~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ

90-45

By

NARA. Date

6-19-90

new Government will doubtless try to give the public impression a better "balance" in its relations with the U.S. and France.

On the other hand, the impending change in Government will also bring opportunities for us as well as Germany. While the new Government which finally emerges from the transitional period will almost certainly be more difficult to deal with than its predecessor, it will also be a more strongly-led Government, more willing to play an active role. It will be better able to fulfill its undertakings. Although the new Government will not proceed from the assumption that there is a virtual identity of U.S. and German interests, it can be expected to recognize that there will remain a large area where our mutual interests are sufficiently close to permit fruitful cooperation. After all, Germany must continue to rely on us for its basic security.

During this transitional period, we shall obviously have to proceed with great caution. There is a tendency, although fortunately not expressed widely or forcefully, to put some of the blame on us for the demise of the Erhard Government. President DeGaulle's press conference statement of October 28 was undoubtedly meant, with deliberate intent, to be the coup de grace for Erhard as the man who had spurned cooperation with France in favor of a close tie to the U.S. Fortunately for us, however, there are so many obvious reasons why Erhard must be replaced, and the view that he must is so universally held here, that we may get off lightly.

What should we do in the meantime? Some of the immediate consequences are obvious, and we do not wish to belabor them. We must lean over backward in order to avoid the impression that we are in any way interfering in the present crisis. We can probably live with any Government that emerges - no matter who is Chancellor or what form the coalition takes. There will be a tendency here to look closely for indications of U.S. intervention, and every statement we make will be combed over with this in mind. During the period in which we must wait for the formation of the new Government, we should, through our normal foreign policy pronouncements, do what we can to create an atmosphere which will work in our favor in its selection and orientation. The following issues appear to be relevant.

A. The Offset --

Any concessions made now to Erhard under the current offset would appear to be an intervention in his behalf. The best we can

do is to maintain a neutral stance, and stand ready to enter into discussions with any Government that emerges on how the current German undertakings will be fulfilled. It will continue to be difficult for us to grant concessions at that stage, even if we so desired, since it would be hard to explain why we offer to a new Chancellor what we withheld from Erhard. A forum now exists in the Trilateral Committee for discussion of future offset agreements, which obviates the need, for the time being, for us to make any new statements on this issue.

When the new Government is ready to deal with this problem, it is conceivable that we may be confronted with a firm German proposal, with Parliamentary backing. We do not, at this juncture, believe that such a proposal would seek to renege on the current commitment to pay DM 3.8 billion -- or necessarily to seek a moratorium; however, it may affect the mode of payment. Any proposal on a longer range offset in the Trilateral Committee will probably correspond closely to that made by Erhard in Washington.

B. Trilateral Talks --

Little progress can be expected on the broad policy aspects of the Trilateral Talks until a new German Government has had time to determine its policy toward the issues involved. Earlier actions to induce the Germans to accept decisions -- especially on troop withdrawals which they will probably oppose strongly -- should be avoided. If the Germans get the impression that vital security objectives are being sacrificed because of U.S. - U.K. financial requirements, they may seek an alternative -- such as a closer bilateral understanding with the French -- which would be damaging to the Western alliance.

C. Detente --

During the last year German opinion on Eastern policy and reunification has been developing quite favorably from our point of view. However, the process has been slow and uneven and these issues remain among the most contentious in German politics. During this transitional period we will, therefore, want to exercise great care in interpreting our own policy on these issues. The central theme of such interpretations should be to emphasize that we have no intention of jettisoning our fundamental post-war policy in Central Europe. Our basic position on Germany's Eastern frontiers, and of active support of German reunification by whatever peaceful means are available, remain unchanged. On the other hand, we would not wish to negate the basic Eastward-looking impact of the President's speech of October 7.

D. Presidential Visit --

Until Erhard's fate is determined, it would be, of course, inappropriate to say anything about a possible Presidential visit to Germany, resulting from the invitation Erhard recently extended in Washington. Soon after a new Chancellor takes office, we will undoubtedly wish to invite him to Washington. If on this occasion the new Chancellor should issue a new invitation and if the European situation as a whole is appropriate, I would hope that the President could respond favorably.

E. Nonproliferation --

We should not, during this period, take any decision to make important substantive changes in our draft nonproliferation treaty, especially if they effect options on a NATO or European nuclear arrangement. After a new Government is formed, careful consideration should be given as to how consultations on this issue should be handled. Since there is much apprehension here that we will present the Germans with a fait accompli on this issue, we should take every opportunity to reassure them that they will be fully consulted.

The foregoing views must necessarily be only tentative and subject to revision in the light of what is a rapidly changing situation. We should, however, be fully aware that an important turning point has now been reached in Germany, and be ready to take advantage of any opportunities favorably to affect the attitude of a new Government. Forbearance may, however, at a given point be just as important in this connection as speedy action.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, November 3, 1966
1:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the cables which relate to the following:

Swedish Ambassador to Communist China, Petri, is reported to have seen the Vietnamese Foreign Minister during a visit to Hanoi, October 24-29. He says that he has from Hanoi some information "as to what Hanoi would do" if we stopped bombing. He refuses to report this message indirectly and wishes to come to Washington to talk to either the Vice President or the Secretary of State.

Nick Katzenbach says that we have made arrangements to get him here to talk with Sec. Rusk in the next week or ten days.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

Stockholm 527
Vientiane 2662
Hong Kong 3140
London 3615
Vientiane 2741

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 9-3-98

Thursday, November 3, 1966 -- 9:40 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith are some notes for your talk this morning with Senator Fulbright.

1. The agreement on all four points at Manila was authentic.

So far as Ky and Thieu were concerned, it emerged that they were not "hawkish." Their moderation came out not only in their speeches, which in itself might be suspect, but in answers to questions in the private session of the conference and in the Chiefs of State and Government meeting where the communique was finally drafted. The same was true of Pák who, once he was convinced Marcos and the New Zealanders were not in a mood to sell out in Viet Nam, was all for the search for peace in Viet Nam and reconciliation in general in Asia. You might give Fulbright the attached list of specifics accomplished at Manila. (Tab A)

2. The vitality of the New Asia.

Malaysia, Thailand and Korea are truly heartening places to see. In all cases there is momentum in agriculture as well as industry and there is growing confidence. The Philippines is the weakest of all on the economic and social side; but Marcos has begun to collect taxes and to limit smuggling. If he doesn't become too enamored of the glories of international statesmanship, we should see real improvement there. (You might say again to Fulbright that, if his doctors would permit, he should really go out and see the area for himself.)

3. The desire of the Asians to do more for themselves is real.

If we stay on the present track, there really are forces at work in Asia which promise diminished rather than increased U. S. involvement in the years ahead. We cannot pull back to Honolulu. But there is an honest hope that, post-Viet Nam, we can encourage the Asians to do more for themselves while we do somewhat less.

4. So far as aid is concerned:

Malaysia has a GNP per capita of \$300. and, if the prices of rubber and tin remain tolerably good, they will need relatively little help.

Thailand, except for military assistance, is going so well that it also will require relatively little assistance once Viet Nam is settled.

Korea is shifting very rapidly onto loans, its second 5-year plan is regarded by the World Bank as one of the best and most practical and best balanced it has ever seen. We hope to handle that plan on a consultative basis led by the World Bank, and we can look forward to its being virtually off the dole in the early 1970's.

Our real problems in Asia in the aid field are Indonesia where we are working multilaterally and, of course, in India and Pakistan.

After Viet Nam, we may wish to beef up assistance, notably for multinational projects which would bind the area closer together; but your major impression is that this is not a region which needs vast increases of U. S. aid, although there will be special cases and projects.

5. As for Viet Nam, there is a great deal to suggest that many forces are being brought to bear on Hanoi from Russia, Eastern Europe and elsewhere to move toward the negotiating table. The mess in Communist China may be helping. But the hard fact is that Hanoi has not yet moved. We will have to do everything we can to make it move -- and as soon as possible.

6. As for the trip as a whole, it was a success and foreshadowed good relationship among the countries of Asia and with the U. S. for the future -- but on one condition: that we see it through to an honorable peace in Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

called

Some Results of the Manila Conference

~~TABLE~~ when peace is attained in Viet Nam

To make more concrete our intent ~~to withdraw our forces~~ ^{the armistice}

In response to a suggestion of Gromyko's, we all made the commitment to withdraw ~~our~~ forces not later than 6 months after the following conditions were fulfilled: "as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides."

The government of Viet Nam committed itself to the following:

-- to continue the effort to overcome the tyranny of poverty, disease, illiteracy and social injustice;

-- to train and assign a substantial share of the armed forces to clear-and-hold actions in order to provide a shield behind which a new society can be built;

-- the training of Revolutionary Development cadres will be improved. More electricity and good water will be provided. More and better schools will be built and staffed. Refugees will be taught new skills. Health and medical facilities will be expanded.

-- -- to work out a series of measures to modernize agriculture and to assure the cultivator the fruits of his labors. Land reform and tenure provisions will be granted top priority. Agricultural credit will be expanded. Crops will be improved and diversified.

-- to maintain by constant effort to keep inflation under control;

-- to begin planning for an expanding postwar economy, including conversion of military installations;

-- to hold an ^{national} election ~~within six months~~ to select a representative government.

after the constitution is completed (probably before the deadline of March 1967) to hold village and hamlet elections ^{early} in 1967;

-- to prepare a program of national reconciliation and to open all doors to those Vietnamese who have been misled or coerced into casting their ~~xxx~~ lot with the Viet Cong. The Government seeks to bring them back to participate as free men in national life under amnesty and other measures.

within
six
months

Thursday,
November 3, 1966
3:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here is a much shortened version of the proposed letter to the Congressional leadership. It is on two pages and leaves nothing essential out. I am forwarding it through Bill Moyers who may be able to cut it further. I have typed it on your stationery simply to see how long it would, in fact, be.

W W. Rostow

186a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 3, 1966

Dear

I would have enjoyed a meeting of the full leadership of the Congress today to discuss my Asian trip and all its implications. But, in the absence of a number of your colleagues, I would like to convey to you personally some of my principal conclusions.

First, I found a huge reservoir of friendliness and goodwill toward the United States in all parts of the Pacific region.

They recognize, from our past actions in Korea and from our present actions in Viet-Nam, that we are prepared to sacrifice to see them remain free and prepared to help them develop their economic life.

Second, I found that those closest to the danger of aggression and subversion are those who understand best why that danger must be faced and turned back. These are people who are prepared to stand up and be counted. It is now clear to one and all that we are not in this thing alone.

Third, there is profound understanding in Asia that by our firm stand in Viet-Nam and in Southeast Asia, we are buying time for all the nations of that region to face their own problems realistically and to begin to build their own future together as a region.

Finally, I found an Asia very much on the move. In one country after another I found leaders and governments intent on making a better life for their peoples. Their problems are immense. But they are not daunted by the scale of the task. And they are making progress -- sometimes amazing progress -- as in Korea.

We stated our resolve to resist aggression; conquer hunger, illiteracy and disease; build a region of security, order and progress; seek reconciliation and peace.

There were other accomplishments that received little or no attention in many of the reports from Manila. I call your attention to the following commitments by Vietnamese Chief of State Thieu and Prime Minister Ky: to train and assign a substantial share of the Vietnamese armed forces to clear-and-hold actions in order to provide a shield behind which a new society can be built; to give land reform "top priority"; to begin mapping a new and expanded postwar economy (and the related allied commitment to plan conversion of military installations in the context of Vietnamese peacetime planning); to begin holding village and hamlet elections early in 1967; to carry forward a program of National Reconciliation; to ask their allies to remove their forces as the military and subversive forces of North Viet-Nam are withdrawn and peace becomes possible in the South -- to which we replied, with Vietnamese agreement, with the six months proposition.

I consider all of these substantial advances in the continuing effort to achieve a peaceful, secure, and prosperous South Viet-Nam.

In closing, I want to pass along my impression of the men who are fighting in Viet-Nam. They are magnificent. They are the best fighting force our nation has ever fielded. They are brave, and good humored, and selfless.

I sincerely wish you could have been with me -- to see them and to see the vital and exciting Asia that is forming up and will take shape if we see it through to an honorable peace in Viet-Nam.

Sincerely,

Pres file

Thursday

~~Wednesday~~ - November 3, 1966 - 10:30 AM

Mr. President:

Peruvian President Belaunde replied to your offer of assistance to the earthquake victims with the message at Tab A.

A description of what we did is at Tab B.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

sub # 187a

Lima, Peru

October 19, 1966

His Excellency Lyndon Johnson
President of the United States of America
Washington

I appreciated your kind message of sympathy on the occasion of the earthquake that struck the Central Coast of Peru and the Capital of the Republic. The damage was increased by a tidal wave that caused considerable losses in the fishing area of Casma, north of Lima. The historic town of Huaura, where San Martin, the liberator, proclaimed the independence of Peru, was almost completely destroyed. Ambassador Jones called on me in order to deliver your message, and I talked with him about the very urgent relief measures for the victims that we are beginning. With the renewed assurance of my sincere friendship and highest consideration.

Fernando Belaunde Terry
President of Peru

Peru Earthquake and Disaster Relief Operation

In response to a request from the Government of Peru, and based upon an exchange of cables between President Johnson and President Belaunde, AID initiated a program of disaster relief.

Four C-130's delivered 56 tents, 3,000 blankets and 1,900 cots to Lima from Department of Defense stocks in Panama. (AID funded this shipment, which is estimated to cost \$66,000, out of World Wide Disaster relief funds.) AID also funded most of a second shipment of relief supplies which was transported free of charge by Panagra and Braniff airlines; this shipment included 350 tents purchased by AID at an estimated cost of \$25,375. AID has also authorized necessary food distribution of PL 480 Title II/III stocks already on hand in Peru to feed earthquake victims.

U.S. Voluntary Agencies have donated 2,500 blankets and 185 tents which are being flown free of charge by Panagra and Braniff. The Texas Partners of the Alliance also have contributed a quantity of blankets which are being flown without charge by Braniff.

Through the supplies thus far granted, AID, the Voluntary Agencies and the Government of Chile (which sent blankets, mattresses, food and medical supplies) furnished sufficient assistance to shelter more than 3,000 of the initial estimate of 5,000 people left homeless by the earthquake.

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Mr. Rostow

Pre-file

Thursday - November 3, 1966

Mr. President:

**Brazilian President-elect Costa e Silva
sent you this warm acknowledgment of
your congratulatory message while you
were away.**

W. W. Rostow

October 20, 1966

To His Excellency
President Lyndon B. Johnson

Profoundly moved, I thank Your Excellency for the kind sentiments. Coming from the Chief of a State that -- from the beginning of our Nations -- has shown the most unequivocal demonstrations of friendship for Brazil, your deference goes beyond me to become a salutation from one people to another.

I am absolutely convinced that the relations between the United States of America and Brazil will be increasingly cordial and our cooperation closer, because both countries are moved by the same high ideals of harmony, justice and fraternity.

Cordially,

/s/ Arthur da Costa e Silva

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-49
By inf NARA. Date 7-17-90

Thursday
November 3, 1966
1:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a proposed draft letter
for your consideration, to be sent to
the Senate and House leadership.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Dear

We have just returned from 17 unforgettable, excitement-packed and rewarding days in Asia and the far Pacific.

I would have enjoyed a meeting of the full leadership of the Congress today to discuss the trip and all its implications. But, in the absence of a number of your colleagues, I would like to convey to you personally some of my principal conclusions.

First, I found a huge reservoir of friendliness and goodwill toward the United States in all parts of the Pacific region. I think most of us have not had any real conception of the depth of the regard in which our country is held or of the understanding and appreciation of our policies and our actions.

Asians know that we are not the new imperialists of Communist propaganda. They know that we do not seek domination or colonies or special privilege. They know that we are their friends, and that we wish them well.

They recognize, from our past actions in Korea and from our present actions in Viet-Nam, that we are prepared to sacrifice to see them remain free. They recognize, too, that our economic programs

have one clear goal: to help them meet the ancient problems of hunger, disease, poverty, and illiteracy and to permit them to achieve the economic progress that their people so desperately need and want.

Second, I found that those closest to the danger of aggression and subversion are those who understand best why that danger must be faced and turned back. These are people who are prepared to stand up and be counted.

The Koreans, who have lived through their own tragic experience of Communist aggression, know what it means. And they are proud, now, to be able to help another friendly country to resist similar aggression.

The Malaysians similarly understand what a long guerrilla war can mean to a country. The Thai have their own subversive threat to meet, yet they are assisting in valuable ways in our joint efforts to beat back the attack from North Viet-Nam. Similarly, the Philippines are boosting their commitment to the joint effort.

And Australia and New Zealand have come to realize that much of their future will be determined in Asia, and so have cast their lot with the free men of that region.

Third, there is profound understanding in Asia that by our firm stand in Viet-Nam and in Southeast Asia, we are buying time for the nations of that region to face their own problems realistically and to begin to build their own future.

I talked at length with Asian leaders about the future of their region -- of their dreams and of the regional groupings that are already taking shape. One after another told me that they recognize much of what has been accomplished would have been impossible without the presence of an American shield of strength and determination.

Finally, I found an Asia very much on the move. In one country after another, I found leaders and governments intent on making a better life for their peoples. Their problems are immense. But they are not daunted by the scale of the task. They are building schools, training specialists, building roads into the countryside, improving the performance of their farmers, building new industries. And they are working together. New rice strains from the Rice Research Institute at Los Banos in the Philippines are going to many countries -- in Asia and on other continents. The Engineering Institute in Bangkok has brought together students and instructors from practically all Asian nations. There are many other points of joint enterprise.

You are aware of the main outlines of the Manila Conference. There, the leaders of seven very different nations talked with candor, with understanding and with a common sense of purpose. We acknowledged that we are neighbors and that we are partners, and that each of us has an important stake in the peaceful and democratic development of that great part of the world

That partnership will endure as long as the leaders who met at Manila want it to. And I think it will endure long after those of us who met there have passed from the scene.

We stated our resolve to seek four goals:

- the resistance of aggression;
- the conquering of hunger, illiteracy and disease;
- the building of a region of security, order and progress;
- the reconciliation of old enmities and new antagonisms, and the achievement of peace throughout Asia and the Pacific.

There were other accomplishments that received little or no attention in many of the reports from Manila. I call your attention to the following commitments by Vietnamese Chief of State Thieu and Prime Minister Ky:

- to train and assign a substantial share of the Vietnamese armed forces to clear-and-hold actions in order to provide a shield behind which a new society can be built;
- to give land reform "top priority;"
- to begin mapping a new and expanded post-war economy (and the related allied commitment to plan conversion of military installations in the context of Vietnamese peacetime planning);
- to begin holding village and hamlet elections early in 1967;

-- to carry forward a program of National Reconciliation;
-- to ask their allies to remove their forces as the military and subversive forces of North Viet-Nam are withdrawn and peace becomes possible in the South -- to which we replied with Vietnamese agreement -- with the six months proposition.

I consider all of these substantial advances in the continuing effort to achieve a peaceful, secure and prosperous South Viet-Nam.

In Viet-Nam, we are fighting at this very moment for the goals of freedom that we adopted at Manila. Those goals are what the struggle in Viet-Nam is really all about -- whether these people have the right to self-determination, whether they can select the leaders of their own choice, or whether they can have them imposed by someone else.

In closing, I want to pass along my impression of the men who are fighting in Viet-Nam for this just cause. They are magnificent. They are the best fighting force our nation has ever fielded. They are brave, and good humored, and selfless.

They are doing a job superbly well. They know why they are there. They are ready to see it through to a successful conclusion.

They are men whose performance, whose courage and whose sacrifices can only make all Americans proud.

I sincerely wish you could have been with me -- to see them and to see the vital and exciting Asia that is taking shape.

The above will at least convey some sense of the feeling of challenge and of accomplishment we all can feel in that most important part of the globe from which I have just returned, where the role of the United States is of such crucial importance and freedom is surely the wave of the future.

Sincerely,

Thursday, November 3, 1966 -- 9:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith are some notes for your talk this morning with Senator Fulbright.

1. The agreement on all four points at Manila was authentic.

So far as Ky and Thieu were concerned, it emerged that they were not "hawkish." Their moderation came out not only in their speeches, which in itself might be suspect, but in answers to questions in the private session of the conference and in the Chiefs of State and Government meeting where the communique was finally drafted. The same was true of Park who, once he was convinced Marcos and the New Zealanders were not in a mood to sell out in Viet Nam, was all for the search for peace in Viet Nam and reconciliation in general in Asia. You might give Fulbright the attached list of specifics accomplished at Manils. (Tab A)

2. The vitality of the New Asia.

Malaysia, Thailand and Korea are truly heartening places to see. In all cases there is momentum in agriculture as well as industry and there is growing confidence. The Philippines is the weakest of all on the economic and social side; but Marcos has begun to collect taxes and to limit smuggling. If he doesn't become too enamored of the glories of international statesmanship, we should see real improvement there. (You might say again to Fulbright that, if his doctors would permit, he should really go out and see the area for himself.)

3. The desire of the Asians to do more for themselves is real.

If we stay on the present track, there really are forces at work in Asia which promise diminished rather than increased U. S. involvement in the years ahead. We cannot pull back to Honolulu. But there is an honest hope that, post-Viet Nam, we can encourage the Asians to do more for themselves while we do somewhat less.

4. So far as aid is concerned:

Malaysia has a GNP per capita of \$300.00 and, if the prices of rubber and tin remain tolerably good, they will need relatively little help.

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After Viet Nam, we may wish to beef up assistance, notably for multinational projects which would bind the area closer together; but your major impression is that this is not a region which needs vast increases of U. S. aid, although there will be special cases and projects.

5. As for Viet Nam, there is a great deal to suggest that many forces are being brought to bear on Hanoi from Russia, Eastern Europe and elsewhere to move toward the negotiating table. The mess in Communist China may be helping. But the hard fact is that Hanoi has not yet moved. We will have to do everything we can to make it move -- and as soon as possible.

6. As for the trip as a whole, it was a success and foreshadowed good relationship among the countries of Asia and with the U. S. for the future -- but on one condition: that we see it through to an honorable peace in Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

TAB A

In response to a suggestion of Gromyko's, we all made the commitment to withdraw our forces not later than 6 months after the following conditions were fulfilled, "as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides."

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-- to maintain by constant effort to keep inflation under control;

-- to begin planning for an expanding postwar economy, including conversion of military installations;

-- to hold an election within six months to select a representative government.

-- after the constitution is completed, probably before the deadline of March 1967, to hold village and hamlet elections;

-- to prepare a program of national reconciliation and to open all doors to those Vietnamese who have been misled or coerced into casting their ~~xxx~~ lot with the Viet Cong. The Government seeks to bring them back to participate as free men in national life under amnesty and other measures.

November 2, 1966
6:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a message of greeting to the Summit Meeting of the Organization for African Unity (November 5-9 in Addis Ababa). It reaffirms our support for the Organization and for the movement toward cooperation which it represents.

Plans for the meeting are now in disarray because Ghana has waylaid the Guinean Delegation and is holding the entire group -- including the Foreign Minister -- until the Guinea releases about 100 Ghanaians now reportedly held prisoner in Conakry. The OAU has sent a team of mediators to try to patch things up before the Addis sessions begin. But the meeting may blow up and/or dissolve into a spitting match.

However, the message must be sent on Thursday, November 3, if it is to arrive in time to be delivered before the meeting. I agree with State's recommendation that we send it. It just might marginally increase pressure on the Africans to grow up, and it would do no damage if the meeting went sour.

W/ W. Rostow

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE
AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

My distinguished friends,

I am happy to extend greetings from the Government and people of the United States of America to the Organization of African Unity as it meets in Addis Ababa for its annual assembly.

Last May, at the ceremony in Washington commemorating the third anniversary of the OAU, I emphasized that we in the United States share the aspirations of the OAU for all the peoples of Africa. I wish to reaffirm this commitment today, and to express our continued support for programs of continental and regional cooperation which lead to fulfillment of these aspirations.

My best wishes to you all.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson