

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1568

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	to President from Bromley Smith secret <i>sanitized 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i> OPEN 9-3-98	2 p 12/13/66	A
#2 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 11-10-99</i> secret <i>exempt NLS 91-124 NLS 98-501</i>	1 p 12/13/66	A
#2a cable	text of Amman 1474 <i>open 9-14-99 NLS 98-500</i> secret <i>exempt NLS 91-125</i>	2 p 12/13/66	A
#4 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i>	1 p 12/12/66	A
#4a memo	to President from Rostow re: Chile " confidential	2 p 12/12/66	A
#4b cable	to Am. Emb. Santiago for Dean and Linowitz " confidential	2 p undated	A
#6 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i>	1 p 12/12/66	A
#6a memo	to President from Rostow re: Chile " confidential	2 p 12/12/66	A
#6b cable	to Am. Emb. Santiago for Dean and Linowitz " confidential	2 p undated	A
#7 memo	to President from Rostow re: King Hussein <i>open 11-10-99 NLS 98-501</i> secret <i>sanitized 11-12-92 NLS 91-108</i>	2 p 12/12/66	A
#7a memo	to President from Rostow re: King Hussein <i>open 11-10-99 NLS 98-501</i> secret <i>sanitized 11-12-92 NLS 91-108</i>	1 p 12/10/66	A
#7b memo	to President from Katzenbach <i>open 9-14-99</i> secret <i>exempt NLS 91-125 NLS 98-500</i>	2 p 12/10/66	A
#7c letter	to King Hussein from Katzenbach secret <i>open 10-1-91 NLS 91-110</i>	2 p undated	A
#8 memo	to President from Rostow <i>exempt NLS 91-108</i> top secret <i>open 11-10-99 NLS 98-501</i> <i>downgraded to secret</i>	1 p 12/12/66	A
#8a cable	Amman 1457 top secret <i>exempt NLS 91-110</i> <i>open 9-14-99 NLS 98-500</i>	2 p 12/11/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President
Walt Rostow, Vol. 7y Dec. 1 - 13, 1966
Box 11 16

RESTRICTION CODES

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#9a memo	to President from Katzenbach <i>open 9-14-99</i> secret exempt NLS 91-125 <i>NLS 98-500</i> 2 p	12/12/66	A
#9b memo	to Acting Secretary from Handley secret exempt NLS 91-125 <i>OPEN 9-3-98</i> 1 p	12/12/66	A
#9c memo	to President from Katzenbach secret exempt NLS 91-125 <i>OPEN 9-3-98</i> 2 p	undated	A
#9d letter	to King Hussein from Pres. Johnson secret <i>open 11-12-92 NLS 91-108</i> 2 p	undated	A
#11a memo	to President from Katzenbach secret [duplicate #9a] 2 p	12/12/66	A
#11b memo	duplicate #9b		
#11c memo	duplicate #9c		
#11d memo	duplicate #9d <i>open 8-3-94 NLS 91-108</i>		
#12 memo	to President from Rostow <i>open 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i> confidential 1 p	12/12/66	A
#12a memo	to President from Rostow re: Chile " confidential 2 p	12/12/66	A
#12b cable	xx to Amembassy Santiago for Dean and Linowitz " confidential 2 p	undated	A
#13 memo	to Acting Sec.State from Rostow <i>OPEN 5-3-98</i> secret [sanitized 3/18/86] 2 p	12/12/66	A
#15 memo	to President from WWR re: nuclear testing <i>open 11-8-96 NLS 96-23</i> confidential <i>sanitized 1-18-90 NLS 89-28</i> 1 p	12/12/66	A
#16 memo	to President from Rostow re: daily foreign affairs summary secret <i>sanitized 3-1-93 NLS 91-123</i> <i>open 11-10-99 NLS 98-501</i> 2 p	12/12/66	A
#17 memo	to President from Rostow re: King Hussein secret <i>sanitized 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i> 2 p	12/12/66	A
#17a memo	to President from Rostow re: King Hussein secret <i>sanitized 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i> 1 p	12/10/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#17c letter	to King Hussein from Katzenbach secret <i>open 10-1-91 NLS 91-110</i>	2 p undated	A
#18 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i>	1 p 12/12/66	A
#18a cable	Bangkok 7472 secret <i>open 8-20-91 NLS 91-125</i>	3 p 12/11/66	A
#18b cable	from Amb. Lodge 0472 <i>sanitized 2-1-89 NLS 88-214</i> secret <i>open 9-14-99 NLS 98-500</i>	1 p 12/12/66	A
#19a memo	to Rostow from Ackley re: budget confidential <i>open 3-25-91</i>	1 p 12/11/66	A
#20 memo	to President from Rostow re: King Hussein top secret <i>open 11-10-99 NLS 98-501</i>	1 p 12/12/66	A
#21 memo	to President from Rostow re: Vietnam secret <i>open 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i>	1 p 12/11/66	A
#21a cable	Bangkok 7467 secret <i>open 8-20-91 NLS 91-125</i>	2 p 12/11/66	A
#21b cable	Bangkok 7475 secret "	1 p 12/11/66	A
#21c cable	Bangkok 7474 secret "	2 p 12/11/66	A
#22 memo	to President from Rostow re: air defense top secret <i>open 1-18-90 NLS 89-28</i>	1 p 12/11/66	A
#22a memo	to Rostow from Katzenbach re: air defense top secret <i>open 5-1-89 NLS 89-27</i>	2 p 12/10/66	A
#22b memo	to Rostow from Thompson re: air defense top secret <i>open 5-1-89 NLS 89-27</i>	2 p 12/10/66	A
#22c report	Kohler statement re: ABMs top secret <i>xx open 5-1-89 NLS 89-27</i>	2 p 12/10/66	A
#22d memo	to Rostow from Hornig re: ABMs <i>Open 10/18/00 NLS 98-503</i> top secret <i>sanitized 1-18-90 NLS 89-28</i> <i>Downgrade to secret NLS 89-28</i>	3 p 12/10/66	A
#22e memo	for record by WWR re: air defense <i>open 1-18-90 NLS 89-28</i> top secret <i>Exempt NLS 88-213</i>	1 p 12/10/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#23 memo	to President from Rostow re: nuclear testing secret <i>open 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i>	1 p 12/11/66	A
#23a memo	to Rostow from Katzenbach secret <i>exempt NLS 91-125</i> OPEN 8-3-98	2 p 12/10/66	A
#24 memo	to President from Rostow re: Vietnam. OPEN 1-14-96 NLS 95-22 top secret <i>(dup. of #23, NSF, CF, VN, Marigold I, Bx 147)</i>	1 p 12/11/66	A
#24a cable	Saigon 13064 <i>sanitized 2-1-89 NLS 88-214</i> secret <i>(dup. of #23, see above)</i> OPEN 2-3-98	1 p 12/10/66	A
#24b cable	Saigon 13059 top secret <i>open 2-1-89 NLS 88-214</i>	1 p 12/10/65	A
#25 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i>	1 p 12/11/66	A
#25a cable	Amman 1456 <i>open 9-14-99 NLS 98-500</i> secret <i>exempt NLS 91-125</i>	5 p 12/11/66	A
#27 memo	to President from Rostow re: ABM top secret <i>open 1-18-90 NLS 89-28</i>	1 p 12/10/66	A
#27a notes	meeting with President in Austin, Texas top secret <i>open 1-18-90 NLS 89-28</i>	9 p 12/10/66	A
#27b memo	for the record re: air defense top secret <i>open 5-31-91 NLS 89-25</i>	5 p 12/07/66	A
#28 memo	to President from Rostow re: King Hussein secret	1 p 12/10/66	A
#28a memo	to President from Katzenbach re: Jordan secret <i>open 9-14-99 NLS 98-500</i>	2 p 12/10/66	A
#28b letter	to King Hussein from Katzenbach secret OPEN 9-3-98 NLS 91-110	2 p undated	A
#30b memo	to President from Komer re: Vietnam secret <i>open 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i>	1 p 12/10/66	A
#31 memo	to President from Rostow re: Chile confidential <i>open 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i>	2 p 12/10/66	A
#31b memo	to President from Schultze re: Chile confidential	2 p 11/30/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#31d memo	to President from Wm. Gaud re: Chile confidential <i>open 6-26-91 NLS 91-126</i>	8 p 11/16/66	A
#31f note	from Henry Fowler re: Chile confidential <i>open 3-7-94 NLS 94-22</i>	1 p undated	A
#31i memo	to President re: Chile confidential <i>OPEN 8-27-98 NLS 94-112</i> exempt NLS 91-125	2 p 11/23/66	A
#33 memo	to President from Rostow re: Malaysia Secret [sanitized 3/18/86] <i>OPEN 9-3-98</i>	1 p 12/10/66	A
#33a memo	to President from Katzenbach re: Malaysia secret [sanitized 10/9/85] <i>OPEN 9-3-98</i>	1 p 12/06/66	A
#34 memo	to President from Rostow re: daily foreign affairs secret <i>open 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i>	3 p 12/10/66	A
#35 memo	to President from Rostow re: Laos secret <i>open 5-17-90 NLS 89-26</i>	1 p 12/10/66	A
#35b memo	to President from Wm. Gaud re: Laos secret	2 p 12/06/66	A
#35c report	re: Laos secret	3 p undated	A
#35d report	re: Laos secret	4 p undated	A
#35e report	re: Laos secret	4 p undated	A
#35f report	re: Laos secret	1 p undated	A
#37a memcon	re: Germany confidential <i>open 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i>	2 p 12/10/66	A
#39 memo	to President from Rostow " " confidential	1 p 12/10/66	A
#39a letter	to President from Robert Anderson " " confidential	2 p 12/01/66	A
#40a cable	to Amb. Lodge from Rostow <i>Sanitized 10/18/92 NLS 98-503</i> confidential <i>sanitized 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i>	1 p 12/09/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#40b cable	from Amb. Lodge 0405 <i>open 9-14-99 NLJ 98-500</i> confidential <i>sanitized 8-20-91 NLJ 91-125</i> 1 p	12/09/66	A
#42 memo	to President from Rostow re: canal negotiations confidential <i>open 11-11-92 NLJ 91-124</i> 1 p	12/09/66	A
#44 memo	to President from Rostow re: canal negotiations confidential <i>open 11-11-92 NLJ 91-124</i> 1 p	12/09/66	A
#45a letter	to Kenyatta from Pres. Johnson // possible classified info 1 p	undated	A
#46 memo	to President from WWR re: Eugene Black's trip to Asia secret <i>open 11-28-88 NLJ 86-214</i> 2 p	12/09/66	A
#48 cable	for President from Walt Rostow secret <i>exempt NLJ 91-124</i> <i>OPEN 8-27-98</i> 1 p	12/09/66	A
#49 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 11-11-92 NLJ 91-124</i> 1 p	12/09/66	A
#49a cable	text of Bonn 6906 confidential <i>open 8-20-91 NLJ 91-125</i> 4 p	12/08/66	A
#50 cable	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 11-11-92 NLJ 91-124</i> 1 p	12/08/66	A
#53 cable	to President from Rostow // confidential 1 p	12/08/66	A
#55 cable	to Amb. Lodge from Rostow confidential <i>sanitized 6-22-04 NLJ 04-15</i> 1 p	12/07/66	A
#56 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 11-11-92 NLJ 91-124</i> 1 p	12/07/66	A
#57 memo	to Amb. Lodge from Rostow <i>Sanitized 10/18/00 NLJ 98-503</i> confidential <i>sanitized 11-11-92 NLJ 91-124</i> 1 p	12/07/66	A
#58 memo	to President from Rostow re: Latin America <i>Sanitized 10/18/00 NLJ 98-503</i> secret <i>sanitized 11-11-92 NLJ 91-124</i> 1 p	12/07/66	A
#58a report	Dom. Rep. Sit. Report <i>open 9-14-99 NLJ 98-500</i> confidential <i>exempt NLJ 91-125</i> 2 p	12/06/66	A
#58b report	re: Guatemala confidential <i>open 8-20-91 NLJ 91-125</i> 1 p	undated	A

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#58c report	re: Panama secret <i>open 8-20-91 NLS 91-125</i> 2 p	undated	A
#60 memo	to President from Rostow re: Brazil confidential <i>open 4-6-88 NLS 86-276</i> 3 p	12/06/66	A
#60a memo	to President from Gaud re: Brazil confidential [sanitized 3/15/77] <i>OPEN 8-27-98</i> 9 p	11/22/66	A
#62 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i> 1 p	12/05/66	A
#65 memo	to President from Rostow re: Vietnam secret <i>Sanitized 10/18/80 OLS 48-503 Sanitized 6-22-04 NLS 04-15 none released</i> 1 p	12/05/66	A
#65a memo	re: Vietnam secret <i>open 12-4-89 NLS 89-22</i> 16 p	11/30/66	A
#67 cable	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i> 2 p	12/05/66	A
#71 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i> 1 p	12/05/66	A
#72 cable	to President from Rostow " confidential 1 p	12/04/66	A
#73 cable	to President from Rostow confidential [sanitized 9/27/78] <i>OPEN 9-3-98</i> 2 p	12/04/66	A
#74 memo	to President from Rostow re: Mexico secret <i>open 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i> 1 p	12/02/66	A
#75 memo	to President from Rostow " possible classified info 2 p	12/02/66	A
#77 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 3-25-91</i> 1 p	12/02/66	A
#78 cable	to President from WH Sit. Room re: Vietnam secret <i>OPEN 8-27-98</i> <i>NLS 93-431</i> 1 p	12/02/66	A
#80 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 3-25-91</i> 1 p	12/02/66	A
#81 cable	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 11-11-92 NLS 91-124</i> 1 p	12/02/66	A

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#83 cable	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 11-11-92 NLS 91-124 1 p</i>	12/01/66	A
#84 cable	to President from Rostow secret <i>sanitized 5-17-98 NLS 89-26</i> <i>OPEN 4.20.05</i> <i>FRUS 64.68, VOL. 27, #20</i>	12/01/66	A

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Tuesday, December 13, 1966, 2:40 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Summary

1. Saigon Port Control

Unless there is a dramatic improvement in the next few days, the State Department has instructed Embassy Saigon to propose to Prime Minister Ky that MACV take over the commercial port, preferably on February 1, but not later than on March 1.

2. Realignment in Constituent Assembly Groupings.

A realignment of political groupings may be under way in the South Vietnamese Constituent Assembly. According to fairly reliable sources, the South Vietnamese Constituent Assembly's second and third largest political groups have recently merged to form the Democratic Alliance Bloc. The new bloc -- composed of Catholic, Hoa Hao, and Nationalist Party supporters -- seems to represent an effort by some Catholic elements to form a broad religious-oriented group in the assembly.

3. Dutch Flights to Cuba

Under the guise of "diplomatic flights," the Dutch airline KLM has recently stepped up its Havana-Curacao flights to pick up Cuban refugees. While the purpose is meritorious, these flights are in effect commercial and if continued will create pressure for other free-world airlines to do likewise -- thereby weakening our Cuban air isolation policy. The State Department has instructed our Embassy at The Hague to ask the Dutch Government to restrict KLM flights to service runs for its Embassy in Havana as the British do.

4. American Bases in France

Ambassador Bohlen notes that there are indications that the French are going to ask to purchase equipment or complete installations from our bases. Bohlen believes that such sales would be to our economic advantage. He suggests that we might use the French desire to purchase this equipment as a basis for suggesting French assent to maintaining installations which we would like to keep in stand-by condition.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By xq/cb, NARA, Date 9-3-98

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- 2 -

5. Macao Crisis Subsides

The crisis in Macao appears to have passed with the acceptance by the Portuguese Governor of the demands of the Kwangtung Provincial Government, including issuance of a public apology to the Chinese residents. Should the situation deteriorate again our Consul General in Hong Kong has been given standing authorization to proceed with warnings to American residents.

6. Kohler Talks to American Legion

Foy Kohler spent Sunday with the Florida State Conference of the American Legion. Florida Legion Posts have actively promoted boycotts of Yugoslav tobacco and sought in other ways to discourage trade with Eastern Europe. At noon Foy spoke on East-West relations to some 1,200 Legionnaires. They listened attentively to his speech, questioned him closely about our East-West policy, and seemed to accept his arguments. The Florida leadership had decided to discipline two of its recalcitrant members and said Foy's presence and efforts "nailed it down."

7. WFTU Muzzles ChiComs

The General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), meeting in Sofia last week, withdrew the right to speak from the Chinese Communist delegation. The ChiCom delegation leader had attacked the Soviets in violent terms and had ignored the chair's repeated instructions to desist and, finally, to yield the rostrum. Several delegations, including those from Romania, Japan, Ceylon, Indonesia and Cuba, opposed the decision. The WFTU sanctions against the ChiComs are severe, but limited. WFTU meetings are becoming annual occasions for a donnybrook between the ChiComs and the Soviets, but ChiCom provocations are still far from sufficient to win majority approval for their expulsion from the organization.

8. UK Urges Israel to Tighten Borders

The British Ambassador to Israel has been instructed to advise the Israelis to abandon cross-border retaliation and tighten its static defenses against terrorism. This supports Secretary Katzenbach's proposal to Foreign Minister Eban yesterday.

Bromley Smith

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET -- NODIS~~

Tuesday, December 13, 1966
9:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Our Amb. Burns in Jordan filed this off-beat, speculative cable.

It is worth reading, because, when Hussein says the Israelis must have been out to get him, this is precisely the scenario and rationale he has in mind.

Incidentally, Eban, in talking with me yesterday, referred to this general theory; said he was aware it was held by some Jordanians; and said it was not Israeli policy.

W. W. Rostow

Amman 1474

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-501
By is, NARA Date 11-1-99

WWRostow:rlh

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~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

Tuesday, December 13, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BURNS (Amman 1474)

As the Department is aware, I have spent many years in State Department administration. There is an abundance of machiavellian minds in administration, and this no doubt accounts for my proneness to wonder if the motives of Middle Eastern states are all they seem to be.

With this caveat, I should like to express a few additional thoughts on the subject. I ask especially for the indulgence of Ambassador Barbour, whose indication that we in Amembassy Amman could be letting our thinking get too byzantine could be correct, though I am afraid we are not cured yet.

It seems to me that the UAR, Syria, and Israel, at least, could be less worried about the consequences of an Arab-Israeli war and the end of Jordan than we might think, and certainly less worried than we are. I suspect they count that an Arab-Israeli war would not be permitted by the U.N. and the great powers, including the USSR, to last but a few days. In the event of a short Arab-Israeli war, which would be stopped before anybody, with the exception of Jordan, got too badly hurt, the UAR, Syria and Israel may calculate they could end up ahead of the game.

For Israel there would be the neutralization of the West Bank in some form or other. And for Cairo and Damascus there would be a Jordan Arab Republic on the East Bank, or perhaps dismemberment of the East Bank.

A short Arab-Israeli war could even take some of the heat off the radical Arab leaders with regard to the Palestine problem. If the West Bank, for example, should end up under some form of U.N. control, this might provide the "out" for the radical Arab leaders that U.N. Emergency Force forces appear to have done on the UAR-Israeli border.

I am not trying to imply that the Israeli attack on Samu was part of a dark plot to set in train an Arab-Israeli war or cause the liquidation of the Hashemites. I still subscribe to the belief that Samu was related to terrorism. Nor do I discount the attractions for Israel and for the UAR

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-500

By iso, NARA Date 4-27-99

~~SECRET~~

in retaining the present set-up in Jordan and for peace on the Arab-Israeli border. They must know well enough that once one starts tampering with the status quo, events could get out of hand in unexpected ways. Thus, while I do not think Tel Aviv or Cairo are formally set upon a course to unseat the Hashemites or have a war, there could nonetheless be strong policy considerations working against their instincts for caution. Neither Samu, nor radio Cairo, are exactly reflective of a cautious approach. And Damascus evidences even less caution.

If there is any substance in the speculations expressed above, then the continuation of a moderate Jordan, as former Ambassador to Jordan Macomber once told me, is "the stopper that keeps the dirty water from running out of the bathtub."

Interestingly enough, I suspect that if there could be a short, controlled Arab-Israel war at the expense of Jordan, the Arab-Israeli problem would be further along the road towards solution, and the remainder of that road might well be a peaceful one.

The problem, of course, is how could a change in the status quo in Jordan, with the attendant possibility of an Arab-Israeli war, be accomplished in a controlled manner? Could an Arab-Israeli clash, should it occur, be stopped in a few days? And what, contrary to expectations, if the Soviets did not want to stop it?

There are too many "ifs" in this equation for comfort. The status quo in Jordan, fragile as it is, is vital to the continued balance of the Middle East as we know it today. It would seem far safer to stick with the "known" and unstintedly to take the steps necessary to preserve a moderate regime in Jordan, than not to respond favorably to Jordan's request for assistance, or to respond with too little, too late, which could set matters on another course.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, December 13, 1966 -- 8:55 p.m.

Mr. President:


Nick and I saw Fineberg, Krim, and David Ginsburg who happened to be in New York.

We went through the scenario, as you directed. They all indicated at the end that they thought it would be manageable not only with the Israelis but with their friends here. They intend to get to work much as they did on the earlier Jordan package.

We assume Arthur saw the Israeli Ambassador today. I will let you know as soon as I have a report.

I will see Abe Fineberg tomorrow here in Washington.

W. W. Rostow



WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, December 12, 1966
7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sol Linowitz will be seeing Frei either tomorrow night or Wednesday morning -- our time.

You may wish to have him deliver the invitation in Ralph Dungan's absence.

W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-124
By WJG, NARA, Date 11-3-92

PRESERVATION COPY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-124

By ing, NARA, Date 11-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, December 12, 1966 -- 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached is a draft cable which would inform Frei of your invitation and authorize start of negotiations on FY 1967 assistance, with the objective of completion at a time which would permit signing of loan agreement during the Frei visit.

I have reviewed the negotiating instructions on our assistance. They include:

-- A proviso that our \$35 million program loan will be in three tranches, the final \$15 million subject to need in the light of copper prices and exchange reserve trend.

-- A series of self-help measures, including the complete elimination of borrowing from the Central Bank for monetary purposes; a significant devaluation of the escudo; a shift in public investment towards agriculture, education, and industry and away from less productive forms of public investment.

-- The proposed sector loans in agriculture and education will also carry important self-help features, and, by being negotiated with the Agriculture and Education Ministers, will put them under pressure to follow through and give them a stake in following through.

Over-all we have brought Chilean aid for calendar 1967 down by \$40 million as compared with calendar 1966. Given the proviso on copper price and exchange reserves, given also the self-help conditions we shall exact, I think this is a tight package.

I recommend, therefore, that you approve our going ahead.

If you approve, I shall keep you informed of the course of the negotiations so that you can make sure our negotiating instructions are fulfilled.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

We shall also want your approval for the Califano-Solomon-Gordon proposal (explained in Tab D) to secure a commitment from the Chileans that Anaconda will supply the U.S. with 125,000 tons or more at market price during 1967. They regard this arrangement as greatly superior to a repetition of the 1966 proposal.

Walt
W. Rostow

Approve draft cable _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

Approve \$65 million assistance package _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

Approve Califano-Solomon-Gordon Chilean
copper purchase arrangement _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TC AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

For Dean and Linowitz

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-124
By 1-8, NARA, Date 11-3-92

Ambassador Linowitz authorized to inform President Frei that the President would be happy to have him come to Washington during week of January 30 if this date convenient for a two-day informal working visit. Format of such visits varies and we will need work out details with President Frei. Generally it includes following:

- Reception at airport by Secretary of State and possibly Vice President.
- Reception by President at White House and military honors on South Lawn.
- One or more working sessions with the President.
- Luncheon by the President at the White House.
- Housing at Blair House.

At same time, Charge Dean authorized to inform President Frei that Embassy is prepared to open negotiations for \$65 million FY 1967 assistance for Chile. Embassy is to negotiate in accordance with November 16 memorandum supplemented by detailed negotiating instruction paper dated November 10.

We wish to have negotiations proceed without publicity and completed if possible in time for announcement and possible signing during Frei

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

visit. Assume we can count on full GOC cooperation in meeting this objective. We want to avoid giving impression to Chileans, however, that we are eager to meet this schedule and thereby weaken our negotiation position.

White House desires announce visit ASAP. Advise soonest whether President Frei can accept for week of January 30. Announcement would indicate invitation extended and accepted and approximate timing without specifying date at this time.

Ambassador Dungan has been informed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 12, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment with Sir Robert Menzies

You have agreed to receive Sir Robert Menzies at 11:00 a.m. Tuesday, December 13. Sir Robert, who was Prime Minister of Australia from 1949 until his resignation this January, is currently the visiting scholar in residence at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville. He has been delivering a series of open lectures on Australian constitutional law at the University. On December 15, however, his lecture subject will be Viet-Nam. It is expected that at this open lecture, which will be covered by media representatives, Sir Robert will explain the factors which influenced the decision of Australia to become involved in the Viet-Nam conflict. This decision was made when he was Prime Minister.

Sir Robert will conclude his residence at the University of Virginia shortly after the first of the year.

Sir Robert will probably travel from Charlottesville to Washington on the morning of December 13 for his appointment with you, and may remain in Washington overnight with the Australian Ambassador.

The purpose of Sir Robert's call is simply to pay his respects. He may inquire about your Asian trip and your reactions to the Manila Conference. He will be especially interested in Viet-Nam.

Talking Points: You may wish to

- express your personal pleasure at meeting again with a long-time, true friend of the United States -- one who has not only demonstrated uncommon perception in foreign affairs, but fortunately has also had the eloquence to influence others, to the Free World's great benefit;

- express the hope that he is enjoying his extended visit to our country;

- ask for his appraisal of the remarkable endorsement of Australia's policies (in which Sir Robert has played such a large role in formulating) as evidenced by the recent election results;

- give your views in some detail on developments in Viet-Nam and the significance of our joint efforts there.

- 2 -

As a parting pleasantry you may wish to say that you understand that one of the two Australian yachts competing to challenge us in the America's Cup Races next summer is named the "Dame Pattie" (for his wife).

A biographic sketch is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

MENZIES, Sir Robert Gordon

AUSTRALIA

Sir Robert Menzies, a strong friend of the U.S. and fervent Anglophile, was Prime Minister from 1949 until January 1966, and was also leader of the Liberal Party from its inception in 1944. He held the External Affairs portfolio from February 1960 until December 1961. A lawyer by profession, he has been a key figure in Australian politics for more than a quarter of a century. Possessing an unusually keen intellect, personal magnetism, a sharp wit and a talent for polemics, Menzies stands out in any political gathering. As a spokesman for his country's foreign policy, he followed a course based on close alignment with the U.K., the Commonwealth and the U.S. He advocates a strong line against Communism and renders staunch support to the United Nations. In defending Australia's continued refusal to recognize Red China, Menzies asserts that to do otherwise would mean adoption of a policy by which Formosa would be handed over to Communism and confidence in SEATO destroyed. He received the Most Noble Order of the Thistle as a personal award from Queen Elizabeth in March 1963, the highest honor ever bestowed upon an Australian.

Born December 20, 1894, Sir Robert is the son of a country storekeeper of Scottish ancestry. He completed his studies with distinction at the University of Melbourne, where he was awarded a master of laws degree. Menzies entered the federal Parliament in 1932, and was Attorney General from 1934 until 1939, when he resigned in a policy disagreement. In those latter years, he was also deputy leader of the United Australian Party (UAP), the precursor of the Liberal Party.

Sir Robert has been a frequent visitor to the United States. He holds a number of decorations, including the U.S. Legion of Merit, and is the author of several books: The Rule of Law During War (1917), To the People of Britain at War from the Prime Minister of Australia (1941), The Forgotten People (1958), and Studies in Australian Constitution (1933). He has also contributed to contemporary art and legal journals. An art enthusiast, he originated the idea for the establishment of the Australian Academy of Art.

Sir Robert is the father of two sons and a daughter. His wife, Dame Pattie, was awarded the G.B.E. (Dame Grand Cross of the Order of the British Empire) in 1954.

6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, December 12, 1966
7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Sol Linowitz will be seeing Frei either tomorrow night or Wednesday morning -- our time.

You may wish to have him deliver the invitation in Ralph Dungan's absence.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-124
By sig, NARA, Date 11-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlm

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-124
By li-8, NARA, Date 11-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, December 12, 1966 -- 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached is a draft cable which would inform Frei of your invitation and authorize start of negotiations on FY 1967 assistance, with the objective of completion at a time which would permit signing of loan agreement during the Frei visit.

I have reviewed the negotiating instructions on our assistance. They include:

-- A proviso that our \$35 million program loan will be in three tranches, the final \$15 million subject to need in the light of copper prices and exchange reserve trend.

-- A series of self-help measures, including the complete elimination of borrowing from the Central Bank for monetary purposes; a significant devaluation of the escudo; a shift in public investment towards agriculture, education, and industry and away from less productive forms of public investment.

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Over-all we have brought Chilean aid for calendar 1967 down by \$40 million as compared with calendar 1966. Given the proviso on copper price and exchange reserves, given also the self-help conditions we shall exact, I think this is a tight package.

I recommend, therefore, that you approve our going ahead.

If you approve, I shall keep you informed of the course of the negotiations so that you can make sure our negotiating instructions are fulfilled.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

We shall also want your approval for the Califano-Solomon-Gordon proposal (explained in Tab D) to secure a commitment from the Chileans that Anaconda will supply the U. S. with 125,000 tons or more at market price during 1967. They regard this arrangement as greatly superior to a repetition of the 1966 proposal.

W. W. Rostow

Approve draft cable _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

Approve \$65 million assistance package _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

Approve Califano-Solomon-Gordon Chilean
copper purchase arrangement _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

WWRostow/WBowdler:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

For Dean and Linowitz

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 9/1-124
By 1-8, NARA, Date 11-3-92

Ambassador Linowitz authorized to inform President Frei that the President would be happy to have him come to Washington during week of January 30 if this date convenient for a two-day informal working visit. Format of such visits varies and we will need work out details with President Frei. Generally it includes following:

- Reception at airport by Secretary of State and possibly Vice President.
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- Luncheon by the President at the White House.
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We wish to have negotiations proceed without publicity and completed if possible in time for announcement and possible signing during Frei

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

visit. Assume we can count on full GOC cooperation in meeting this objective. We want to avoid giving impression to Chileans, however, that we are eager to meet this schedule and thereby weaken our negotiation position.

White House desires announce visit ASAP. Advise soonest whether President Frei can accept for week of January 30. Announcement would indicate invitation extended and accepted and approximate timing without specifying date at this time.

Ambassador Dungan has been informed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Monday, December 12, 1966 -- 11:35 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: King Hussein's Problem

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-501

By is, NARA Date 11-1-99

At this morning's breakfast with the Vice President, Bob McNamara, Nick Katzenbach, Bill Handley, Bill Macomber, Howard Wriggins, and Rodger Davies, the King's problem was thoroughly discussed. Sisco and Goldberg could not attend; but both have been brought in. Nick talked with Goldberg and, while not familiar with the details, Goldberg agrees this is broadly the right course. Sisco, who was committed to breakfast with Eban, is now going over the package. The conclusions were as follows.

1. The proposed package was insufficient to meet the King's essential political needs.

2. Movement on a larger package would be appropriate only as we pressed discussions with Israel on improving border surveillance technology. These will be started by Nick with Eban today and would go forward at the UN and in the Middle East with Israel, and, hopefully, with the Arab countries as well.

3. Bob McNamara, Nick, and the others agreed that the package for Hussein should be expanded in the following ways: (a) delivery of the 12 F-104's presently in the Jordanian pipeline should be accelerated. Six should be drawn from the inventory within 30 days and delivered to Hussein even though the pilots and ground environment are not yet ready; (b) 18 self-propeller anti-aircraft units should be airlifted within 30 to 60 days; (c) the \$4.7 million package to improve mobility, firepower, and effectiveness -- which you have already seen -- should also be airlifted.

4. When he talks to General Khammash, Bob McNamara would make clear that, while this is less than the King asked for, it is a substantial and prompt response and that we have several parallel concerns: (a) the King should stress quality, rather than quantity, and we could only make this package available if he agrees to keep his manpower at present levels; (b) we assume he would continue his policy of moderation and restraint and his considerable efforts to prevent guerrillas from using Jordan as a

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~~SECRET~~

-2-

base for operations against Israel and we will consider helping him to improve his border police (AID is reviewing this part of his problem); (c) no United Arab Command troops should be situated on the West bank area of Jordan.

5. Several present hoped that you could personally take ten minutes with Khammash before he sees Bob McNamara tomorrow at 11 o'clock to discuss: (a) our concern for Hussein's future; (b) our substantial and prompt response; and (c) our need to discuss the longer run financial implications of this assistance. However, Nick does not want to trouble you, knowing that, if you see Khammash even for five minutes, you will feel it necessary to see Eban. I believe you should keep out at this stage.

6. We will get flack from the Israelis no matter what we do, although Eban acknowledged to Goldberg the raid was a grave error. It was the consensus of all present, including the Vice President, that this sort of package is what is required and we'll have to use our discussions with Eban to insure Israel's friends here sit tight.

7. Unfortunately, time is short, because Khammash should see McNamara and McNamara leaves for European discussion tomorrow afternoon. Nevertheless, I see little alternative to helping Hussein in this way. And we will press hard on Israel the importance of border stabilization through the UN if possible and directly, if that is the only way.

8. I, therefore, recommend you accept the attached package, plus accelerated delivery of 6 F-104's within a month and 18 40mm AA guns within 60 days, under the conditions set out in paragraph 4.

9. Nick and Bob suggest Bill Macomber, an old Jordanian hand, shortly go out to talk, on your behalf, to his friend Hussein. His cover would be an examination of the AID implications of Hussein's defense problem.

10. A short letter from you to King Hussein will come up shortly for signature. It could be carried back by the King's emissary, General Khammash, who returns on Tuesday evening, Dec. 13, or Wednesday, Dec. 14.

W. W. Rostow

HWriggins:WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Response to King Hussein's Military Equipment Request

We can't come close to meeting Hussein's \$200 million request. We don't have the money, and that big a program would ruin Jordan's promising economic development.

So Secretary McNamara has designed a small package to tackle Hussein's main problem--his army's morale. It includes only \$4.7 million (reprogrammed from existing appropriations) on top of \$3.5 million already in Jordan's FY 1967 military aid program. Instead of enlarging his forces, it would help him improve pay, mobility and organization to tide him over the present crisis of confidence with the army.

This offer probably won't satisfy Hussein. We see it as the starting point for a tough series of negotiations over our whole aid program. We may have to give a little, but before we do we'd send former Ambassador Bill Macomber to try to talk Hussein back to reason.

If you approve this approach, Secretary McNamara will go over the package with Hussein's army commander at 11:00 a.m. Tuesday. Secretary Katzenbach also requests your approval of the attached message from him to Hussein explaining the rationale for the package. We feel the Secretaries should handle this initial response, since you've already sent the King one message and may have to step in again later.

No matter what we do, the Israelis and their friends will object. But we're just cleaning up the mess Israel's raid created and we've taken Israel's military concerns into account. Our JCS says this small package will not affect the military balance on Israel's borders. If you approve, State and Defense will brief key Members of Congress on the program, and we'll tell the Israelis what's involved as soon as we've told the Jordanians.

I recommend you approve.

Check this out thro
W. Rostow
Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-501

By is, NARA Date 11-1-99

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Grant of Military Equipment to
Jordan

Recommendation:

That you approve the sending of the enclosed letter from Acting Secretary Katzenbach to King Hussein which agrees to grant certain items of military equipment to Jordan.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The Israeli raid of November 13 on Samua village in Jordan damaged the nation's sense of security, jeopardized the morale of the Jordan Arab Army and weakened the King's prestige. In an attempt to restore his standing with the army and vindicate his policy of relying on the U.S. for support, King Hussein sent his Chief of Staff General Amir Khammash to Washington with a request for:

1. A grant of \$130 million worth of military equipment.
2. An agreement that the USG pay future installments on contracts previously signed with the USG for military jet aircraft and military ground equipment in the total amount of approximately \$70 million.
3. U.S. assent and support for an increase in the annual military budget of Jordan by \$28 million per year.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-500

By uo, NARA Date 4-27-99

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

2

The Secretary of Defense and I agree that we should meet the request by offering a modest additional amount of military equipment to Jordan by reprogramming approximately \$4.7 million in MAP funds from lower priority needs. These items will be in addition to an existing MAP of \$3.5 million to Jordan for this fiscal year. The additional equipment was selected so as to increase mobility, firepower and effectiveness of communications for the Jordan Arab Army while minimizing additional manpower requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that even a significantly larger amount of additional equipment would have no appreciable effect on the military balance in the area.

We may receive some reaction from the Government of Israel. We are dealing with this reaction by keeping the Israelis generally informed and explaining to them that this grant, by strengthening King Hussein, would be in their interest. We have also spoken to several Congressmen and will continue our congressional briefings.

We believe that this grant may fail to satisfy King Hussein. If it appears likely that Hussein will take drastic action inconsistent with our relationship with Jordan, we intend to send a team to Amman headed by a high ranking official to listen to the King's views. In any case, we expect to have a difficult series of negotiations with him soon on the future level of our aid programs to Jordan.

The letter to King Hussein would be sent telegraphically.


Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter to King Hussein from
the Acting Secretary

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

7c

~~SECRET~~

Your Majesty:

We continue to follow with admiration the way you and your government are dealing with the difficult situation confronting you. We have been grateful, too, for the presence here of your distinguished Chief of Staff. Through him we have been able to gain, at first hand, a fuller appreciation of the problems you are facing.

Let me say at the outset that we understand the great concern which the Israeli action of November 13 has caused you, both as to the adequacy of your defense and the wisdom of your policy of moderation. However, we continue to believe that the attack at Samua does not presage a change in Israel's previous policy. This is an element in our calculations which I believe it important to underscore. At the same time we can well appreciate the unfortunate effect which the raid of November 13th has had on your nation's sense of security and on the morale of the Jordan Arab Army. This is, I assure you, a matter of concern to us, as we fully recognize the important role the Jordan Arab Army plays today, and must play for some time to come, in the maintenance of Jordanian stability and security.

We recognize, too, the importance of that stability and security to the achievement of economic growth and self-sufficiency upon which, as you have often emphasized, so much in the long run depends. It is for this reason that in addition to our major and in many ways unique economic assistance program, we recognize the importance of a Jordan military assistance program.

As General Khammash will report to you, however, we are very seriously concerned by the long-term financial and economic implications of the current and projected force goals and of the indicated equipment requirements of the Jordan Arab Army. These concerns are strengthened by our understanding that some increase in the pay of all enlisted ranks is likely to be essential in the very near future.

We feel that action with respect to an increase in force levels requires more thorough and thoughtful consideration than it has been

possible

His Majesty
Hussein I,
King of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-110
By 128, NARA, Date 9-16-91

~~SECRET~~


-2-

possible to give in the short time available. Hopefully, a few weeks hence and in more tranquil circumstances, both of our governments will be in a better position to engage in a useful discussion respecting the longer-term implications of the problems now facing us in the Middle East. The United States would welcome at that time an opportunity to discuss the relationship of recent events to the limits on your budgetary expenditure as set forth in the several United States-Jordan agreements, the appropriate size of the Jordanian armed forces and the nature of their equipment, the levels of external assistance likely to be available from traditional sources, and what role the United States might usefully play in a Jordanian effort to develop supplementary financial support from other Arab states which have an important stake in the continued integrity and stability of Jordan.

Meanwhile we are very much aware that your attention and energies must for the present continue to be focused on the immediate problem of surmounting your internal difficulties. We on our part are most anxious, without waiting for the discussions I have mentioned, to take additional steps now to help you meet the immediate problems. With this in mind, Secretary McNamara has been pleased to respond quickly to part of the equipment needs which General Khammash has outlined. Details are being provided to General Khammash. This is a substantial response in which we have been guided both by what can be made available relatively promptly and by the need which the Jordan Arab Army feels for an upgrading of firepower and an improvement of its mobility and communications. When this equipment is in place (and delivery over the next few months is feasible), we believe it will have a significant effect in improving the defensive capabilities of the army. It is our hope, too, that knowledge of this prompt and substantial response on our part will have an immediate and beneficial effect on army morale.

Your Majesty, my government continues to watch closely events now unfolding in the Middle East. In reiterating our admiration for the manner in which you are facing the problems these events have created for Jordan, let me also renew our assurances of continued United States friendship and support.

Sincerely yours,



~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE~~

Monday, December 12, 1966
2:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

You should read this quite extraordinary
revelation by Hussein.

Among experts there is some doubt as to
its truth; but it could be that the contacts existed
in a very narrow circle and were not known to
the whole government or to the Israeli military.
In that case, as they faced heavy pressure to
retaliate, those who had the contacts would have
been in a most difficult bind.

The final warning about secrecy is justified.

W. W. Rostow

Amman 1457

~~TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-501
By is, NARA Date 11-1-99

WWRostow:rln

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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3

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL : 9566
RECD : DECEMBER 11, 12:09 PM

Info

FROM : AMMAN
ACTION : SECSTATE IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-500
By us, NARA Date 4-27-99

~~TOP SECRET~~ AMMAN 1457

NODIS

REFTEL AMMAN'S 1456

DEPARTMENT PASS TO TEL AVIV FOR AMBASSADOR BARBOUR.

1. THE KING DISCLOSED TO EMBOFF O'CONNEL AND ME LAST NIGHT THAT HE HAS BEEN IN SECRET CONTACT WITH ISRAELI LEADERS FOR PAST THREE YEARS THROUGH SECRET CORRESPONDENCE AND DIRECT PERSONAL CLANDESTINE MEETINGS. THROUGH THESE DISCUSSIONS AND EXCHANGES, AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS WERE REACHED WHICH, SAID KING, WERE TO HAVE INSURED PEACE BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL AND EVENTUALLY, WITH HOPE, TO HAVE ACHIEVED A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM.

2. THESE REVELATIONS CAME ABOUT IN THE FOLLOWING FASHION. TOWARDS THE END OF THE CONVERSATION REPORTED REFTEL, THE KING SAID HE WONDERED WHAT MORE HE COULD HAVE DONE TO HAVE AVERTED WHAT HAS HAPPENED. HE THEN SAID QUIETLY THERE WAS ONE ELEMENT AFFECTING THE WHOLE PICTURE WHICH NO ONE IN HIS COUNTRY, EXCEPT HIMSELF, KNEW ABOUT.

3. HE DID NOT BELIEVE IN WAR AS A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINE PROBLEM, HE SAID. HE HAD CONSISTENTLY FOLLOWED A COURSE OF MODERATION ON THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PALESTINE IN THE HOPE THAT REASONABLE MEN COULD ONE DAY NEGOTIATE A JUST SETTLEMENT. HE HAD DONE HIS UTMOST TO ELIMINATE TERRORISM AGAINST ISRAEL FROM ACROSS JORDAN'S BORDER. THE U.S. KNEW ALL THESE THINGS AND SO DID THE ISRAELIS. THE ISRAELIS KNEW IT, HE SAID, BECAUSE "I TOLD THEM SO PERSONALLY."

4. "FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS," THE KING SAID, "I HAVE BEEN MEETING SECRETLY WITH GOLDA MEIER, EBAN AND OTHERS. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THESE PROBLEMS AT LENGTH AND AGREED ON ALL ASPECTS OF THEM. I TOLD THEM, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT I

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 1457 NODIS DEC 11

COULD NOT ABSORB OR TOLERATE A SERIOUS RETALIATORY RIAD. THEY ACCEPTED THE LOGIC OF THIS AND PROMISED THERE WOULD NEVER BE ONE. MOREOVER, IN ADDITION TO THESE SECRET PERSONAL MEETINGS, I HAVE MAINTAINED A PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE ISRAELI LEADERS. THESE EXCHANGES HAVE SERVED TO "UNDERSCORE AND REINFORCE OUR UNDERSTANDINGS."

5. "THE LAST MESSAGE I RECEIVED FROM THE ISRAELIS WAS FURTHER TO REASSURE ME THAT THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF ATTACKING JORDAN. I RECEIVED THE MESSAGE ON NOV. 13, THE VERY DAY THE ISRAELI TROOPS ATTACKED SAMJ'." THE KING ADDED THAT THE MESSAGE WAS UNSOLICITED, AND HAD BEEN DESPATCHED PRESUMABLY 24 TO 48 HOURS BEFORE HE RECEIVED IT.

6. "AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED THIS ATTACK WAS A COMPLETE BETRAYAL BY THEM OF EVERYTHING I HAD TRIED TO DO FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE, STABILITY AND MODERATION AT HIGH PERSONAL POLITICAL RISK. STRANGELY, DESPITE OUR SECRET DISCUSSIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE, DESPITE SECRET AGREEMENTS, UNDERSTANDINGS AND ASSURANCES, I NEVER FULLY TRUSTED THEIR INTENTIONS TOWARD ME OR TOWARD JORDAN, IN ASSESSING ISRAELI INTENTIONS I ASK YOU TO PUT MY EXPERIENCES WITH THEM INTO YOUR EQUATION."

7. "YOU WILL EXCUSE ME," HE ADDED "IF I FIND IT IRONIC THAT THE SAME EBAN WHO EXPRESSED TO ME SUCH UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEMS HERE AND GAVE SUCH FIRM ASSURANCES IS NOW ON HIS WAY TO WASHINGTON TO TELL YOU, I AM SURE, THAT JORDAN'S NEEDS SHOULD NOT BE MET."

8. THE KING CLOSED THE DISCUSSION BY SAYING BITTERLY: "THIS IS WHAT ONE GETS FOR TRYING TO BE A MODERATE, OR PERHAPS FOR BEING STUPID."

8. THE KING ASKED THAT THIS INFORMATION BE HELD IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE BY THE MOST LIMITED NUMBER OF PEOPLE. (IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT HUSSEIN'S GRANDFATHER, KING ABDULLAH, WAS ASSASSINATED BY A PALESTINIAN WHEN IT BECAME KNOWN ABDULLAH HAD CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS.)

GP-1

BURNS

NOT PASSED TEL AVIV BY OCT.

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, December 12, 1966

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick's recommendations on Jordan.
He asks for two approvals.

The top memorandum summarizes the defense package Bob McNamara and Nick recommend. Arthur Goldberg has concurred in it word for word. Bob hopes to hear from us early enough to be able to tell the Jordanian Chief of Staff at 11:00 A.M. Tuesday of your decision before Bob goes off to Paris shortly after noon.

The second is a letter from you to Hussein which would tell him of your concern and open the door for Bill Macomber to discuss with him our conditions for the package, and see if anything else may be necessary to keep him in business.


W.W. ROSTOW

5219
92

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Military Assistance to Jordan

I have the following recommendations with respect to increased military assistance to Jordan. I have discussed these with Ambassador Goldberg and he is in agreement.

1. We should proceed with the recommendations in the attached memorandum which expedite current programmed MAP assistance and include an increment, primarily of defensive weapons, totalling \$6 to \$7 Million.
2. We should candidly inform the Israeli Government about this program. Based on my conversation with Foreign Minister Abba Eban, I believe that the Israeli Government will accept this program as necessary to support the regime of King Hussein. Eban quite candidly said that the Israelis had as much of a stake in preserving the King as we did.
3. Ambassador Goldberg believes that we are likely to have a sizable domestic problem with respect to the increment even if the Israeli Government quietly agrees to it. He believes, and I agree, that in presenting this to the Israelis (and to the Jewish community in this country) it would be helpful to give something to the Israeli side of the ledger: We recommend
 - a. We tell the Israelis that we will make every effort to speed up deliveries of Skyhawks (A4's). Bob McNamara has no objection to this

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-500
By is, NARA Date 4-27-99

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
-2-

commitment and believes delivery probably can be speeded up somewhat to enable some delivery in advance of the scheduled date.

b. We tell the Israeli Government that we will attempt to assist them in working out static defense plans and, to the extent possible, help with hardware to make this effective. We should further state to them that while we cannot presently commit ourselves to any dollar-for-dollar offsetting through AID or otherwise of our increased commitments to Jordan, we will take this into account in giving sympathetic consideration to Israeli requests for assistance; for example, we might be able to subsidize some of their African operations which indirectly benefit us. (There is a good deal of opposition to any firm commitment in this respect and many Government officials believe that we should not really offer anything in this regard to Israel at this time. Ambassador Goldberg and I believe, however, that to meet the sensibilities of the Israelis (and their domestic supporters) that we should make this general commitment as an appropriate response. The amount is not large and such a commitment would help the Israelis and help us domestically. We believe this can be worked out to the satisfaction of all, particularly since it is not necessary to do this simultaneously with the Jordanian move and can be worked out at a later date.)

Ambassador Goldberg would be happy to take this up with Ambassador Harman, who could help us greatly here with the Jewish community.

Respectfully,


Acting Secretary

attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

96

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

MEMORANDUM

December 12, 1966

TO: The Acting Secretary
THROUGH: S/S *g Pu*
FROM: NEA - William J. Handley *WJH*
SUBJECT: Jordanian Request for Military Assistance

There is attached for your approval a memorandum transmitting to the President the text of a proposed letter to King Hussein. As agreed in our meeting this morning, the enclosed letter has been prepared for the President's signature and replaces the draft letter from you to the King which was forwarded to the President with your earlier memorandum on this subject.

Recommendation:

That you sign the enclosed memorandum to the President.

Attachments:

1. Memorandum for the President
2. Proposed Letter to King Hussein

NEA/ARN:ALAtherton:lab
12/12/66

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By CG, NARA, Date 9-3-98

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

9c

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Response to Jordanian Request for
Additional Military Equipment

Recommendation:

That you sign the enclosed letter to King Hussein informing him that we have agreed to grant certain items of military equipment to Jordan.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discussion:

In a meeting this morning with the Vice President, Bob McNamara and Walt Rostow, we agreed to recommend to you that our response to King Hussein's request for additional military assistance be conveyed in a letter from you to the King, rather than in a letter for my signature as suggested in my memorandum of December 10. We also agreed that the military package we offer Jordan should be augmented by 36 40 mm anti-aircraft guns and that a substantial portion of this package should be airlifted to Jordan for maximum psychological impact. We would also further accelerate the delivery of the F-104 aircraft we have agreed to sell to Jordan.

The package we now propose still falls substantially short of what King Hussein has asked us to provide. In order to derive maximum benefit from our response, we propose in the enclosed letter that you offer to send a high-ranking emissary to Amman to discuss the broader implications of Jordan's proposed military build-up. We have in mind Ambassador Macomber of AID, who as former Ambassador to Jordan is personally and favorably known to the King. Specifically we feel we must seek assurances that there will be no significant increase in the force levels of the Jordanian military establishment, that Jordan's moderate military policies, including efforts to control terrorism, will remain unchanged and that no

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By CS, NARA, Date 9-3-98

~~SECRET~~

2

non-Jordanian Arab military forces will be stationed on the West Bank of the Jordan River.

Your letter to King Hussein will be transmitted telegraphically to Amman. The signed original will be handed to General Khamash tomorrow by Secretary McNamara.


Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter to King Hussein

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9-d

Your Majesty:

My Government and I continue to watch closely the events now unfolding in the Middle East. We have reviewed carefully the request carried to us by your distinguished Chief of Staff and have concluded that we should act quickly in providing additional military assistance. I have instructed Secretary McNamara to discuss the details of our response with General Khammash. While this response does not meet your request in full, it is, I believe, a substantial and significant one. In addition, and with a view to making this special support as helpful to you as possible, I have asked that every effort be made to ensure that the equipment reaches you with as little delay as possible. To accomplish this a substantial portion will be air lifted.

I understand that you will, of course, continue your wise policy of restraint and will continue the measures you have previously adopted to enhance stability in the

His Majesty
Hussein I,
King of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-108
By sig, NARA, Date 11-4-92

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

area. I trust, also, that this will enable you to resist the stationing of non-Jordanian troops in Jordan.

We have not had time to consider adequately the full budgetary and economic implications of a build-up in Jordan's military establishment. While this has not prevented our acting promptly and affirmatively, I am seriously concerned over these implications; and I would like to send an emissary to discuss with you the force levels of Jordan's army and related economic problems of concern to both of us. The emissary would have my highest confidence and would be a person well known to you.

We understand the great concern which the Israeli action of November 13 has caused you and the difficulties you have faced as a result of it. We have sought to be helpful. I have great admiration for the manner in which you are facing these problems and for your policy of moderation. I know this to be the course of wisdom and I wish to assure you of continued United States friendship and support.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

1. Rostow
2. Pres. file

December 12, 1966

Mr. President:

I recommend your approval of this reply by telegram to Vietnamese Lt. General Nguyen Van Thieu's letter to you expressing his pleasure at meeting you in Manila.

This provides an opportunity to underscore the importance we attach to maintaining the momentum generated at Manila.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove

See me

12/12/66

Recommended Reply

Dear General Thieu:

I greatly appreciate your thoughtful letter of November 9 regarding the highly successful Manila Conference. I found it a most valuable and rewarding experience to meet with you and your colleagues, as well as with the representatives of the other five nations contributing forces to the struggle in South Viet-Nam, in order to chart our common course for the future.

I am reassured by Secretary Rusk that you agree that the momentum generated at the Manila Conference must not slacken, either with respect to our determination to thwart aggression or with respect to our equally firm devotion to the search for peace.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Lt. General Nguyen Van Thieu
Chairman of the National Leadership
Committee
Republic of Viet-Nam
Saigon

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, December 12, 1966

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick's recommendations on Jordan. He asks for two approvals.

The top memorandum summarizes the defense package Bob McNamara and Nick recommend. Arthur Goldberg has concurred in it word for word. Bob hopes to hear from us early enough to be able to tell the Jordanian Chief of Staff at 11:00 A.M. Tuesday of your decision before Bob goes off to Paris shortly after noon.

The second is a letter from you to Hussein which would tell him of your concern and open the door for Bill Macomber to discuss with him our conditions for the package, and see if anything else may be necessary to keep him in business.


W.W. ROSTOW

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Military Assistance to Jordan

I have the following recommendations with respect to increased military assistance to Jordan. I have discussed these with Ambassador Goldberg and he is in agreement.

1. We should proceed with the recommendations in the attached memorandum which expedite current programmed MAP assistance and include an increment, primarily of defensive weapons, totalling \$6 to \$7 Million.
2. We should candidly inform the Israeli Government about this program. Based on my conversation with Foreign Minister Abba Eban, I believe that the Israeli Government will accept this program as necessary to support the regime of King Hussein. Eban quite candidly said that the Israelis had as much of a stake in preserving the King as we did.
3. Ambassador Goldberg believes that we are likely to have a sizable domestic problem with respect to the increment even if the Israeli Government quietly agrees to it. He believes, and I agree, that in presenting this to the Israelis (and to the Jewish community in this country) it would be helpful to give something to the Israeli side of the ledger: We recommend
 - a. We tell the Israelis that we will make every effort to speed up deliveries of Skyhawks (A4's). Bob McNamara has no objection to this

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NEJ 98-500
By cp/mw NARA, Date 10/24/15

~~SECRET~~

-2-

commitment and believes delivery probably can be speeded up somewhat to enable some delivery in advance of the scheduled date.

b. We tell the Israeli Government that we will attempt to assist them in working out static defense plans and, to the extent possible, help with hardware to make this effective. We should further state to them that while we cannot presently commit ourselves to any dollar-for-dollar offsetting through AID or otherwise of our increased commitments to Jordan, we will take this into account in giving sympathetic consideration to Israeli requests for assistance; for example, we might be able to subsidize some of their African operations which indirectly benefit us. (There is a good deal of opposition to any firm commitment in this respect and many Government officials believe that we should not really offer anything in this regard to Israel at this time. Ambassador Goldberg and I believe, however, that to meet the sensibilities of the Israelis (and their domestic supporters) that we should make this general commitment as an appropriate response. The amount is not large and such a commitment would help the Israelis and help us domestically. We believe this can be worked out to the satisfaction of all, particularly since it is not necessary to do this simultaneously with the Jordanian move and can be worked out at a later date.)

Ambassador Goldberg would be happy to take this up with Ambassador Harman, who could help us greatly here with the Jewish community.

Respectfully,


Acting Secretary

attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

116

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM

December 12, 1966

TO: The Acting Secretary
THROUGH: S/S *JPW*
FROM: NEA - William J. Handley *WJH*
SUBJECT: Jordanian Request for Military Assistance

There is attached for your approval a memorandum transmitting to the President the text of a proposed letter to King Hussein. As agreed in our meeting this morning, the enclosed letter has been prepared for the President's signature and replaces the draft letter from you to the King which was forwarded to the President with your earlier memorandum on this subject.

Recommendation:

That you sign the enclosed memorandum to the President.

Attachments:

1. Memorandum for the President
2. Proposed Letter to King Hussein

WJH
NEA/ARN:AL*WJH* Atherton:lab
12/12/66

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By CB, NARA, Date 9-3-98

SECRET/EXDIS



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

11c

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Response to Jordanian Request for
Additional Military Equipment

Recommendation:

That you sign the enclosed letter to King Hussein informing him that we have agreed to grant certain items of military equipment to Jordan.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discussion:

In a meeting this morning with the Vice President, Bob McNamara and Walt Rostow, we agreed to recommend to you that our response to King Hussein's request for additional military assistance be conveyed in a letter from you to the King, rather than in a letter for my signature as suggested in my memorandum of December 10. We also agreed that the military package we offer Jordan should be augmented by 36 40 mm anti-aircraft guns and that a substantial portion of this package should be airlifted to Jordan for maximum psychological impact. We would also further accelerate the delivery of the F-104 aircraft we have agreed to sell to Jordan.

The package we now propose still falls substantially short of what King Hussein has asked us to provide. In order to derive maximum benefit from our response, we propose in the enclosed letter that you offer to send a high-ranking emissary to Amman to discuss the broader implications of Jordan's proposed military build-up. We have in mind Ambassador Macomber of AID, who as former Ambassador to Jordan is personally and favorably known to the King. Specifically we feel we must seek assurances that there will be no significant increase in the force levels of the Jordanian military establishment, that Jordan's moderate military policies, including efforts to control terrorism, will remain unchanged and that no

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By cb NARA, Date 9-3-98

SECRET

2

non-Jordanian Arab military forces will be stationed on the West Bank of the Jordan River.

• Your letter to King Hussein will be transmitted telegraphically to Amman. The signed original will be handed to General Khammash tomorrow by Secretary McNamara.

Robert McNamara
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter to King Hussein

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

11a

Your Majesty:

My Government and I continue to watch closely the events now unfolding in the Middle East. We have reviewed carefully the request carried to us by your distinguished Chief of Staff and have concluded that we should act quickly in providing additional military assistance. I have instructed Secretary McNamara to discuss the details of our response with General Khammash. While this response does not meet your request in full, it is, I believe, a substantial and significant one. In addition, and with a view to making this special support as helpful to you as possible, I have asked that every effort be made to ensure that the equipment reaches you with as little delay as possible. To accomplish this a substantial portion will be air lifted.

I understand that you will, of course, continue your wise policy of restraint and will continue the measures you have previously adopted to enhance stability in the

His Majesty
Hussein I,
King of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-108
By sig, NARA, Date 8-3-94

~~SECRET~~

area. I trust, also, that this will enable you to resist the stationing of non-Jordanian troops in Jordan.

We have not had time to consider adequately the full budgetary and economic implications of a build-up in Jordan's military establishment. While this has not prevented our acting promptly and affirmatively, I am seriously concerned over these implications; and I would like to send an emissary to discuss with you the force levels of Jordan's army and related economic problems of concern to both of us. The emissary would have my highest confidence and would be a person well known to you.

We understand the great concern which the Israeli action of November 13 has caused you and the difficulties you have faced as a result of it. We have sought to be helpful. I have great admiration for the manner in which you are facing these problems and for your policy of moderation. I know this to be the course of wisdom and I wish to assure you of continued United States friendship and support.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, December 12, 1966
7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sol Linowitz will be seeing Frei either tomorrow night or Wednesday morning -- our time.

You may wish to have him deliver the invitation in Ralph Dungan's absence.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-124
By 108, NARA, Date 11-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

126

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-124
By ing, NARA, Date 11-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, December 12, 1966 -- 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached is a draft cable which would inform Frei of your invitation and authorize start of negotiations on FY 1967 assistance, with the objective of completion at a time which would permit signing of loan agreement during the Frei visit.

I have reviewed the negotiating instructions on our assistance. They include:

-- A proviso that our \$35 million program loan will be in three tranches, the final \$15 million subject to need in the light of copper prices and exchange reserve trend.

-- A series of self-help measures, including the complete elimination of borrowing from the Central Bank for monetary purposes; a significant devaluation of the escudo; a shift in public investment towards agriculture, education, and industry and away from less productive forms of public investment.

-- The proposed sector loans in agriculture and education will also carry important self-help features, and, by being negotiated with the Agriculture and Education Ministers, will put them under pressure to follow through and give them a stake in following through.

Over-all we have brought Chilean aid for calendar 1967 down by \$40 million as compared with calendar 1966. Given the proviso on copper price and exchange reserves, given also the self-help conditions we shall exact, I think this is a tight package.

I recommend, therefore, that you approve our going ahead.

If you approve, I shall keep you informed of the course of the negotiations so that you can make sure our negotiating instructions are fulfilled.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

We shall also want your approval for the Califano-Solomon-Gordon proposal (explained in Tab D) to secure a commitment from the Chileans that Anaconda will supply the U. S. with 125,000 tons or more at market price during 1967. They regard this arrangement as greatly superior to a repetition of the 1966 proposal.

W. W. Rostow

Approve draft cable _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

Approve \$65 million assistance package _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

Approve Califano-Solomon-Gordon Chilean
copper purchase arrangement _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

WWRostow/WBowdler:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

For Dean and Linowitz

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-124
By ing, NARA, Date 11-3-92

Ambassador Linowitz authorized to inform President Frei that the President would be happy to have him come to Washington during week of January 30 if this date convenient for a two-day informal working visit. Format of such visits varies and we will need work out details with President Frei. Generally it includes following:

- Reception at airport by Secretary of State and possibly Vice President.
- Reception by President at White House and military honors on South Lawn.
- One or more working sessions with the President.
- Luncheon by the President at the White House.
- Housing at Blair House.

At same time, Charge Dean authorized to inform President Frei that Embassy is prepared to open negotiations for \$65 million FY 1967 assistance for Chile. Embassy is to negotiate in accordance with November 16 memorandum supplemented by detailed negotiating instruction paper dated November 10.

We wish to have negotiations proceed without publicity and completed if possible in time for announcement and possible signing during Frei

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

visit. Assume we can count on full GOC cooperation in meeting this objective. We want to avoid giving impression to Chileans, however, that we are eager to meet this schedule and thereby weaken our negotiation position.

White House desires announce visit ASAP. Advise soonest whether President Frei can accept for week of January 30. Announcement would indicate invitation extended and accepted and approximate timing without specifying date at this time.

Ambassador Dungan has been informed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 12, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Helicopters for Malaysia

The President has considered carefully your memorandum of December 6 (copy attached) on the above subject. He has weighed and is sympathetic to the arguments therein regarding an offer of support for the purchase at 5-1/2 per cent interest and 7 years repayment.

However, he recalls that this matter was the one item of serious business raised with him by the Tunku on his recent visit to Malaysia. He attaches importance to the friendship of the Tunku and to the good relations that have developed between our two countries.

Given the importance of Malaysia's role in Southeast Asia, its internal situation, and its sympathetic understanding of our policy in Viet-Nam, the President believes that a somewhat more concessional offer is in order on a "one shot" basis. The sale will, of course, benefit our balance of payments. He has approved our support for an offer of 4 per cent for 7 years.

He believes that it is possible to make such an offer and at the same time make clear to the Malaysians that it is not a precedent, that it is made at considerable sacrifice on our part, and that it will not provide the basis for any future sales. The Malaysians should be reminded of our severe and burdensome obligations elsewhere in Asia.

As to financing, possibilities within the present MAP program should be explored first. Defense might want to consider hardening somewhat the concessional terms for other sales. Drawing on the contingency reserve for credit sales is another possibility.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By rq/cb, NARA, Date 9-3-98

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The special circumstances of the President's trip to Malaysia and the Tunku's personal appeal could be considered as putting this matter in the 'contingency' category.

If there are major considerations not heretofore brought to the President's attention, he has expressed his willingness to take them under advisement. In the absence of such overriding considerations, he has approved moving ahead along the lines noted in the third paragraph of this memorandum.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

cc: Secretary McNamara

~~SECRET~~

14
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 12, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment with Sir Robert Menzies

You have agreed to receive Sir Robert Menzies at 11:00 a.m. Tuesday, December 13. Sir Robert, who was Prime Minister of Australia from 1949 until his resignation this January, is currently the visiting scholar in residence at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville. He has been delivering a series of open lectures on Australian constitutional law at the University. On December 15, however, his lecture subject will be Viet-Nam. It is expected that at this open lecture, which will be covered by media representatives, Sir Robert will explain the factors which influenced the decision of Australia to become involved in the Viet-Nam conflict. This decision was made when he was Prime Minister.

Sir Robert will conclude his residence at the University of Virginia shortly after the first of the year.

Sir Robert will probably travel from Charlottesville to Washington on the morning of December 13 for his appointment with you, and may remain in Washington overnight with the Australian Ambassador.

The purpose of Sir Robert's call is simply to pay his respects. He may inquire about your Asian trip and your reactions to the Manila Conference. He will be especially interested in Viet-Nam.

Talking Points: You may wish to

- express your personal pleasure at meeting again with a long-time, true friend of the United States -- one who has not only demonstrated uncommon perception in foreign affairs, but fortunately has also had the eloquence to influence others, to the Free World's great benefit;

- express the hope that he is enjoying his extended visit to our country;

- ask for his appraisal of the remarkable endorsement of Australia's policies (in which Sir Robert has played such a large role in formulating) as evidenced by the recent election results;

- give your views in some detail on developments in Viet-Nam and the significance of our joint efforts there.

As a parting pleasantry you may wish to say that you understand that one of the two Australian yachts competing to challenge us in the America's Cup Races next summer is named the "Dame Pattie" (for his wife).

A biographic sketch is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

MENZIES, Sir Robert Gordon

AUSTRALIA

Sir Robert Menzies, a strong friend of the U.S. and fervent Anglophile, was Prime Minister from 1949 until January 1966, and was also leader of the Liberal Party from its inception in 1944. He held the External Affairs portfolio from February 1960 until December 1961. A lawyer by profession, he has been a key figure in Australian politics for more than a quarter of a century. Possessing an unusually keen intellect, personal magnetism, a sharp wit and a talent for polemics, Menzies stands out in any political gathering. As a spokesman for his country's foreign policy, he followed a course based on close alignment with the U.K., the Commonwealth and the U.S. He advocates a strong line against Communism and renders staunch support to the United Nations. In defending Australia's continued refusal to recognize Red China, Menzies asserts that to do otherwise would mean adoption of a policy by which Formosa would be handed over to Communism and confidence in SEATO destroyed. He received the Most Noble Order of the Thistle as a personal award from Queen Elizabeth in March 1963, the highest honor ever bestowed upon an Australian.

Born December 20, 1894, Sir Robert is the son of a country storekeeper of Scottish ancestry. He completed his studies with distinction at the University of Melbourne, where he was awarded a master of laws degree. Menzies entered the federal Parliament in 1932, and was Attorney General from 1934 until 1939, when he resigned in a policy disagreement. In those latter years, he was also deputy leader of the United Australian Party (UAP), the precursor of the Liberal Party.

Sir Robert has been a frequent visitor to the United States. He holds a number of decorations, including the U.S. legion of Merit, and is the author of several books: The Rule of Law During War (1917), To the People of Britain at War from the Prime Minister of Australia (1941), The Forgotten People (1958), and Studies in Australian Constitution (1933). He has also contributed to contemporary art and legal journals. An art enthusiast, he originated the idea for the establishment of the Australian Academy of Art.

Sir Robert is the father of two sons and a daughter. His wife, Dame Pattie, was awarded the G.B.E. (Dame Grand Cross of the Order of the British Empire) in 1954.

15

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-23
By ip, NARA Date 9-18-96

Monday, December 12, 1966
4:15 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have talked at length with Hornig. He will also talk with Nick.

He is not persuadable because:

- he doesn't believe nuclear excavation has serious economic prospects;
- he doesn't believe the Soviets have much of a nuclear excavation program (he admits some);
- he doesn't want to take a 50/50 risk of a detectable venting (although he admits the Soviets did);
- he doesn't believe we should have gotten into the possibility of a Panama Canal excavation;
- he doesn't want us to do anything to offend his friends in the scientific community who share his view.

When I quoted Sect. Rusk's judgment that we could not have achieved a Test Ban Treaty without a commitment to go forward with PLOWSHARE, he said the testimony did not guarantee a PLOWSHARE success.

When I asked him what to do about Bob Anderson's problem, he said, in effect, not getting into a debate about a Test Ban Treaty violation is more important than Bob Anderson's problem with the Congress.

In short, whereas Nick says CABRIOLET will strengthen our hands on Panama and PLOWSHARE talks with the Russians-- therefore, go ahead; Hornig says: to hell with nuclear excavation.

Whereas Nick says we shall to figure out the relation of nuclear excavation to the Test Ban Treaty and non-proliferation, Hornig says, literally: "Don't rock the boat. "

My own view is:

- we should go with CABRIOLET;
- we badly need a fundamental review of the whole PLOWSHARE program, including the prospects for nuclear excavation.

I wish I could present you a consensus rather than split advice, but I can't.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~

Monday, December 12, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Daily Foreign Affairs Summary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-501
By is, NARA Date 11-1-99

1. Soviets Study Indian Food Request

A reliable press source told Embassy New Delhi the Soviet Ambassador has been recalled to Moscow for consultation in connection with the Indian request for food aid. Minister of Food and Agriculture Subramaniam told the Embassy he was surprised that the Soviets had not indicated that they would provide assistance, since they could win a propaganda victory by announcing even token aid.

2. Czech Employee of the UN Secretariat

U Thant has informed us of an alleged espionage-defection attempt involving a Czech Secretariat employee, Eugene Vacek. According to the Czechs, an American named Hamilton (allegedly representing CIA) approached Vacek on December 6, saying he knew Vacek had tried to recruit American citizen Pamela Engle. Hamilton allegedly offered Vacek money to work for us and threatened his arrest on espionage charges if he refused. Allegedly he also linked this case to the Kazan arrest in Prague.

The Czechs say Vacek and his family have moved to the Czech mission for safety, going to and from the UN in a diplomatic car to ensure immunity.

We have checked with both the CIA and FBI, who confirm they are not involved, and "Hamilton" is unknown to them. Vacek did try to recruit Pamela Engle, who works for the Hudson Institute (which handles classified work). He offered her \$2,000 and other inducements.

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- 2 -

The present Czech complaint to the Secretary General may be an attempt to manufacture a story to put us on the defensive, as Vacek probably realizes Pamela Engle reported his activities to the FBI. We have authorized Goldberg to give U Thant the full facts. There is a considerable possibility, of course, that the Czechs will leak their version to the press.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority WLT 98-501
By up/rw NARA, Date 10/26/05

Monday, December 12, 1966 -- 11:35 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: King Hussein's Problem

At this morning's breakfast with the Vice President, Bob McNamara, Nick Katzenbach, Bill Handley, Bill Macomber, Howard Wriggins, and Rodger Davies, the King's problem was thoroughly discussed. Sisco and Goldberg could not attend; but both have been brought in. Nick talked with Goldberg and, while not familiar with the details, Goldberg agrees this is broadly the right course. Sisco, who was committed to breakfast with Eban, is now going over the package.* The conclusions were as follows.

1. The proposed package was insufficient to meet the King's essential political needs.

2. Movement on a larger package would be appropriate only as we pressed discussions with Israel on improving border surveillance technology. These will be started by Nick with Eban today and would go forward at the UN and in the Middle East with Israel, and, hopefully, with the Arab countries as well.

3. Bob McNamara, Nick, and the others agreed that the package for Hussein should be expanded in the following ways: (a) delivery of the 12 F-104's presently in the Jordanian pipeline should be accelerated. Six should be drawn from the inventory within 30 days and delivered to Hussein even though the pilots and ground environment are not yet ready; (b) 18 self-propeller antiaircraft units should be airlifted within 30 to 60 days; (c) the \$4.7 million package to improve mobility, firepower, and effectiveness -- which you have already seen -- should also be airlifted.

4. When he talks to General Khammash, Bob McNamara would make clear that, while this is less than the King asked for, it is a substantial and prompt response and that we have several parallel concerns: (a) the King should stress quality, rather than quantity, and we could only make this package available if he agrees to keep his manpower at present levels; (b) we assume he would continue his policy of moderation and restraint and his considerable efforts to prevent guerrillas from using Jordan as a

* He has gone to New York to clear with Goldberg. will hear later in the afternoon

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-2-

base for operations against Israel and we will consider helping him to improve his border police (AID is reviewing this part of his problem); (c) no United Arab Command troops should be situated on the West bank area of Jordan.

5. Several present hoped that you could personally take ten minutes with Khammash before he sees Bob McNamara tomorrow at 11 o'clock to discuss: (a) our concern for Hussein's future; (b) our substantial and prompt response; and (c) our need to discuss the longer run financial implications of this assistance. However, Nick does not want to trouble you, knowing that, if you see Khammash even for five minutes, you will feel it necessary to see Eban. I believe you should keep out at this stage.

6. We will get flack from the Israelis no matter what we do, although Eban acknowledged to Goldberg the raid was a grave error. It was the consensus of all present, including the Vice President, that this sort of package is what is required and we'll have to use our discussions with Eban to insure Israel's friends here sit tight.

7. Unfortunately, time is short, because Khammash should see McNamara and McNamara leaves for European discussion tomorrow afternoon. Nevertheless, I see little alternative to helping Hussein in this way. And we will press hard on Israel the importance of border stabilization through the UN if possible and directly, if that is the only way.

8. I, therefore, recommend you accept the attached package, plus accelerated delivery of 6 F-104's within a month and 18 40mm AA guns within 60 days, under the conditions set out in paragraph 4.

9. Nick and Bob suggest Bill Macomber, an old Jordanian hand, shortly go out to talk, on your behalf, to his friend Hussein. His cover would be an examination of the AID implications of Hussein's defense problem.

10. A short letter from you to King Hussein will come up shortly for signature. It could be carried back by the King's emissary, General Khammash, who returns on Tuesday evening, Dec. 13, or Wednesday, Dec. 14.

W. W. Rostow

HWriggins:WWRostow:rln

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Response to King Hussein's Military Equipment Request

1.3
(a)(5)

We can't come close to meeting Hussein's [redacted] request. We don't have the money, and that big a program would ruin Jordan's promising economic development.

So Secretary McNamara has designed a small package to tackle Hussein's main problem--his army's morale. It includes only \$4.7 million (reprogrammed from existing appropriations) on top of \$3.5 million already in Jordan's FY 1967 military aid program. Instead of enlarging his forces, it would help him improve pay, mobility and organization to tide him over the present crisis of confidence with the army.

This offer probably won't satisfy Hussein. We see it as the starting point for a tough series of negotiations over our whole aid program. We may have to give a little, but before we do we'd send former Ambassador Bill Macomber [redacted] 1.3(a)(5)

If you approve this approach, Secretary McNamara will go over the package with Hussein's army commander at 11:00 a.m. Tuesday. Secretary Katzenbach also requests your approval of the attached message from him to Hussein explaining the rationale for the package. We feel the Secretaries should handle this initial response, since you've already sent the King one message and may have to step in again later.

No matter what we do, the Israelis and their friends will object. But we're just cleaning up the mess Israel's raid created and we've taken Israel's military concerns into account. Our JCS says this small package will not affect the military balance on Israel's borders. If you approve, State and Defense will brief key Members of Congress on the program, and we'll tell the Israelis what's involved as soon as we've told the Jordanians.

I recommend you approve.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

*Check this out also
Walt Rostow*

Walt Rostow

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-124

By *108*, NARA, Date *11-3-92*

5202
176



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Grant of Military Equipment to
Jordan

Recommendation:

That you approve the sending of the enclosed letter from Acting Secretary Katzenbach to King Hussein which agrees to grant certain items of military equipment to Jordan.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The Israeli raid of November 13 on Samua village in Jordan damaged the nation's sense of security, jeopardized the morale of the Jordan Arab Army and weakened the King's prestige. In an attempt to restore his standing with the army and vindicate his policy of relying on the U.S. for support, King Hussein sent his Chief of Staff General Amir Khammash to Washington with a request for:

1. A grant of \$130 million worth of military equipment.
2. An agreement that the USG pay future installments on contracts previously signed with the USG for military jet aircraft and military ground equipment in the total amount of approximately \$70 million.
3. U.S. assent and support for an increase in the annual military budget of Jordan by \$28 million per year.

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NCJ 98-500
By WJW NARA, Date 10/26/05

~~SECRET~~

2

The Secretary of Defense and I agree that we should meet the request by offering a modest additional amount of military equipment to Jordan by reprogramming approximately \$4.7 million in MAP funds from lower priority needs. These items will be in addition to an existing MAP of \$3.5 million to Jordan for this fiscal year. The additional equipment was selected so as to increase mobility, firepower and effectiveness of communications for the Jordan Arab Army while minimizing additional manpower requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that even a significantly larger amount of additional equipment would have no appreciable effect on the military balance in the area.

We may receive some reaction from the Government of Israel. We are dealing with this reaction by keeping the Israelis generally informed and explaining to them that this grant, by strengthening King Hussein, would be in their interest. We have also spoken to several Congressmen and will continue our congressional briefings.

We believe that this grant may fail to satisfy King Hussein. If it appears likely that Hussein will take drastic action inconsistent with our relationship with Jordan, we intend to send a team to Amman headed by a high ranking official to listen to the King's views. In any case, we expect to have a difficult series of negotiations with him soon on the future level of our aid programs to Jordan.

The letter to King Hussein would be sent telegraphically.


Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter to King Hussein from
the Acting Secretary

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

17c

~~SECRET~~

Your Majesty:

We continue to follow with admiration the way you and your government are dealing with the difficult situation confronting you. We have been grateful, too, for the presence here of your distinguished Chief of Staff. Through him we have been able to gain, at first hand, a fuller appreciation of the problems you are facing.

Let me say at the outset that we understand the great concern which the Israeli action of November 13 has caused you, both as to the adequacy of your defense and the wisdom of your policy of moderation. However, we continue to believe that the attack at Samua does not presage a change in Israel's previous policy. This is an element in our calculations which I believe it important to underscore. At the same time we can well appreciate the unfortunate effect which the raid of November 13th has had on your nation's sense of security and on the morale of the Jordan Arab Army. This is, I assure you, a matter of concern to us, as we fully recognize the important role the Jordan Arab Army plays today, and must play for some time to come, in the maintenance of Jordanian stability and security.

We recognize, too, the importance of that stability and security to the achievement of economic growth and self-sufficiency upon which, as you have often emphasized, so much in the long run depends. It is for this reason that in addition to our major and in many ways unique economic assistance program, we recognize the importance of a Jordan military assistance program.

As General Khammash will report to you, however, we are very seriously concerned by the long-term financial and economic implications of the current and projected force goals and of the indicated equipment requirements of the Jordan Arab Army. These concerns are strengthened by our understanding that some increase in the pay of all enlisted ranks is likely to be essential in the very near future.

We feel that action with respect to an increase in force levels requires more thorough and thoughtful consideration than it has been

possible

His Majesty
Hussein I,
King of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-110
By inf, NARA, Date 9-16-91

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
-2-

possible to give in the short time available. Hopefully, a few weeks hence and in more tranquil circumstances, both of our governments will be in a better position to engage in a useful discussion respecting the longer-term implications of the problems now facing us in the Middle East. The United States would welcome at that time an opportunity to discuss the relationship of recent events to the limits on your budgetary expenditure as set forth in the several United States-Jordan agreements, the appropriate size of the Jordanian armed forces and the nature of their equipment, the levels of external assistance likely to be available from traditional sources, and what role the United States might usefully play in a Jordanian effort to develop supplementary financial support from other Arab states which have an important stake in the continued integrity and stability of Jordan.

Meanwhile we are very much aware that your attention and energies must for the present continue to be focused on the immediate problem of surmounting your internal difficulties. We on our part are most anxious, without waiting for the discussions I have mentioned, to take additional steps now to help you meet the immediate problems. With this in mind, Secretary McNamara has been pleased to respond quickly to part of the equipment needs which General Khammash has outlined. Details are being provided to General Khammash. This is a substantial response in which we have been guided both by what can be made available relatively promptly and by the need which the Jordan Arab Army feels for an upgrading of firepower and an improvement of its mobility and communications. When this equipment is in place (and delivery over the next few months is feasible), we believe it will have a significant effect in improving the defensive capabilities of the army. It is our hope, too, that knowledge of this prompt and substantial response on our part will have an immediate and beneficial effect on army morale.

Your Majesty, my government continues to watch closely events now unfolding in the Middle East. In reiterating our admiration for the manner in which you are facing the problems these events have created for Jordan, let me also renew our assurances of continued United States friendship and support.

Sincerely yours,



~~SECRET~~

Pro file

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Monday, December 12, 1966
9:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

Before your meeting with Bob Komer you may wish to read Amb. Lodge's assessment of the over-all situation, which fits fairly closely the main thrust of the draft NSAM I sent up which Bob and I have been working on.

You may also wish to see Lodge's response to the further request which I forwarded to him on reactions of visiting members of the Senate and Congress.

W. W. Rostow

Bangkok 7472
Lodge 0472

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-124
By ig, NARA, Date 11-3-92

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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SECTO 41

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-125

By isp, NARA, Date 8-12-91

FOLLOWING IS TEXT MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY AMBASSADOR LODGE
FOR SECRETARY GIVING AMBASSADOR'S LATEST GENERAL ASSESSMENT
SITUATION IN VIET-NAM:

QTE THE OVER-ALL SITUATION CAN BE DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:

1. IN THE 'MILITARY' WAR, OUR CAPACITY TO DEFEAT THE BIG
COMMUNIST UNITS AND DESTROY REDOUBTS IS SO WELL DEMONSTRATED THAT
I WOULD EXPECT A VERY DIFFERENT MILITARY SITUATION INDEED HERE BY
NEXT YEAR. MILITARY SUCCESS GIVES US THE CHANCE TO GET AT THE
HEART OF THE MATTER -- THE 'CRIMINAL' OR TERRORIST SIDE.

2. THE HEART OF THE MATTER IN THE WAR IN VIET-NAM IS TO DESTROY
THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION AND NETWORK -- WHAT HO CHI MINH CALLS
THE 'GUERRILLA INFRASTRUCTURE' -- SO THAT TERRORISTS CAN NO
LONGER ASSASSINATE, KIDNAP, TORTURE, SABOTAGE, CUT ROADS, BLOW
BRIDGES, ENGAGE IN SUDDEN AND SURREPTITIOUS MORTARING AND SHELL FIRE
(AS THEY HAVE RECENTLY BEEN DOING IN SAIGON), AND, ABOVE ALL, SO
THAT THEY CAN NO LONGER IMPRESS YOUNG MALES INTO THE SERVICE OF
THE VIET CONG, AS THEY ARE STILL CAPABLE OF DOING, AT A RATE OF
FOUR BATTALIONS A MONTH.

ON THE 'CRIMINAL' SIDE, THEREFORE, ENCOURAGING BEGINNINGS
HAVE BEEN MADE WHERE THE VIETNAMESE HAVE HAD THE PUNCH AND PROTECTION
OF US MARINES, US FIRST DIVISION, US 25TH DIVISION, AND KOREANS.
BUT PACIFICATION, ALTHOUGH IT IS ON THE TRACK, IS NOT YET REALLY
ROLLING.

THE CRUCIAL BOTTLENECK WHICH IS PREVENTING PACIFICATION
FROM REALLY ROLLING IS THE ARVN, WHICH WAS DESIGNED ORIGINALLY AS
A EASTERN-TYPE ARMY TO COPE WITH FOREIGN INVASION, AND NOT AS
A CONSTABULARY-TYPE ORGANIZATION TO FERRET OUT TERRORISTS AND
GUERRILLAS. MACV, THEREFORE, HAS STARTED A FAR-REACHING PROGRAM
TO REVAMP THE ARVN SO THAT IT WILL PROVIDE REAL SECURITY.
UNTIL THIS IS DONE, THE POLICE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
PERSONNEL CANNOT OPERATE AS THEY SHOULD AND, OF COURSE, NEITHER
CAN THE WHOLE RANGE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS, WHICH AIM

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-2- BANGKOK 7472, 111050Z DECEMBER 66

TO BRING THE 'SOCIAL REVOLUTION'.

I'M ALSO COMING TO THE VIEW THAT, IF ARVN WERE TO PLAY THE PART IN PACIFICATION WHICH IT SHOULD PLAY, THERE WOULD BE MANY COMMUNITIES WHERE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT TEAMS WOULD NOT BE NEEDED BECAUSE THE CONFIDENCE GENERATED BY AN ARVN ACTING LIKE A HELPFUL, FRIENDLY, NON-ARROGANT AND EFFICIENT CONSTABULARY WOULD CREATE SUCH CONFIDENCE THAT IN MANY PLACES A COMMUNITY LIFE WOULD SPRING UP FROM WITHIN ITS OWN RESOURCES.

SO MUCH, THEN, FOR THE 'MILITARY' WAR AND THE 'CRIMINAL' WAR.

3. THE THIRD KIND OF WAR IS THE 'POLITICAL' WHICH, IN SPITE OF MUCH FRAGILITY, EVOLVES. ONE NEED NOT BE AN EXPERT TO SEE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE POLITICAL SITUATION TODAY AND THAT WHICH EXISTED IN NOVEMBER 1963. IT IS HARD TO MEASURE THE GOOD WHICH FLOWS FROM HAVING MEN IN OFFICE LONG ENOUGH TO LEARN THEIR JOBS, BUT IT IS SURELY GREAT. VIET-NAM IS MOVING TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY. THIS MAY BE A MORE BITTER BLOW TO THE COMMUNISTS THAN MANY PEOPLE IN THE US APPRECIATE.

4. THE ECONOMIC WAR IS A CONSTANT STRUGGLE. AS SOON AS MEASURES ARE INVENTED TO COPE WITH THE INFLATION EXISTING AT THE TIME, WE -- QUITE UNDERSTANDABLY -- BRING IN MORE OF EVERYTHING, AND THIS STRAINS THE ANTI-INFLATION MECHANISM EVEN FURTHER. WE CAN TAKE SOME SATISFACTION IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S DEVALUATION ORDER, IN THE SALE OF RICE TO THE CROWDS IN THE CITIES FROM BACKS OF TRUCKS, IN THE DECISION TO TURN THE OPERATION OF THE PORT OVER TO THE MILITARY (EVEN THOUGH OPERATION IS STILL UNSATISFACTORY), AND IN THE FACT THAT FOR SOME TIME NOW, THE PRICE RISE HAS BEEN HALTED. THERE IS NO FAMINE. CROWDS IN THE STREETS ARE NOT DEMONSTRATING AGAINST THE HIGH COST OF LIVING. THIS IS A VIET CONG DEFEAT.

5. WE, THEREFORE, CAN SEE THAT PROGRESS IS BEING MADE WITH REGARD TO ALL FOUR KINDS OF WAR, BUT THAT PROGRESS IS QUICKER WITH SOME THAN WITH OTHERS.

6. BUT WE MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THESE THINGS:

7. THE MILEAGE OF ROADS WHICH ARE OPEN TO ALL CATEGORIES OF PERSONS IS JUST ABOUT WHAT IT HAS BEEN; THE PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION LIVING UNDER SECURE CONDITIONS IS ONLY A LITTLE BIT GREATER THAN IT WAS; THE PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION UNDER VIET CONG DOMINATION IS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISHED, BUT STILL STANDS AT ABOUT 20 PERCENT; EVERY DAY BRINGS ITS TOLLS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS BEING ASSASSINATED, KIDNAPPED, AND TORTURED, WITH CERTAINLY NO

~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL~~

-3- BANGKOK 7472, 111050Z DECEMBER 66

DRAMATIC DIMINUTION; AND MACV BELIEVES THAT THE VIET CONG CAN STILL IMPRESS MEN AT THE RATE OF FOUR BATTALIONS A MONTH IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.

8. THESE CONDITIONS MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE HAVE NOT YET ACHIEVED A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME.

9. THIS IN NO WAY DIMINISHED THE WORTH OF THE PRESIDENT'S COURAGEOUS, FAR-SIGHTED AND HISTORY-MAKING DECISION OF JULY 28, 1965, WHICH, AS TIME GOES BY, APPEARS MORE AND MORE AS A BIG TURNING POINT OF HISTORY. BECAUSE OF THIS DECISION, WE STILL HAVE A SOUTH VIET-NAM. BECAUSE OF THIS DECISION, IT IS CLEAR TO ALL THAT THE VIET CONG CANNOT POSSIBLY WIN AND THAT WE CANNOT POSSIBLY BE DEFEATED. BECAUSE OF THIS DECISION, THE SITUATION IN THIS COUNTRY IS BETTER THAN IT HAS EVER BEEN BEFORE. BECAUSE OF IT, IT IS CLEAR THAT WITH PERSISTENCE WE ARE SURE TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

10. IF WE PERSIST, WE WILL GET AT THE THINGS I LISTED ABOVE: OPEN ROADS, SECURE PUBLIC OFFICIALS; DESTRUCTION OR DISSOLUTION OF THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION -- WHAT HO CHI MINH CALLS THE 'GUERRILLA INFRASTRUCTURE.'

11. SOME DO NOT CARE FOR THE JOB OF DESTROYING THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION -- NOT THAT IT CAUSES US MORE CASUALTIES, IT CAUSES US LESS; NOT THAT IT COSTS MUCH MONEY, WHICH IT DOESN'T WHEN COMPARED TO OTHER ACTIVITIES; BUT BECAUSE IT INVOLVES THE FUSSY JOB OF WORKING WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF OCCUPATIONS BEGINNING WITH THE POLICE AND THE LOCAL POLITICAL COMMUNITY ORGANIZER AND INCLUDING THE TEACHER, THE DOCTOR, THE AGRICULTURAL EXPERT. IT ALSO DEPENDS ON THE VIETNAMESE DOING MOST OF IT THEMSELVES. IT IS NATION BUILDING; NOT WAR -- AND BOTH WAR AND NATION BUILDING MUST GO ON TOGETHER.

12. SOME ARE DEPRESSED BY THE THOUGHT THAT THIS TYPE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM TAKES TIME, EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD BE CLEAR THAT TIME WAS ON OUR SIDE AND THAT OUR CASUALTIES WOULD BE LIGHT.

13. BUT I BELIEVE THAT HO CHI MINH IS RIGHT WHEN HE SAYS THAT THIS IS THE DECISIVE FACTOR -- NOT ALL-OUT BOMBING AND ESCALATION ON THE ONE HAND OR WESTERN TYPE 'NEGOTIATIONS' ON THE OTHER.

14. WE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY NEVER SEE THE KIND OF ENDING OF THE WAR TO WHICH PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST IS CONDITIONED, THAT IS, HEADLINES SAYING 'THE WAR IS OVER' OR 'ARMISTICE IS SIGNED'. BUT THE ENDING OF CASUALTIES, THE FADING AWAY OF THE ENEMY, THE OPENING OF ROADS, THE FACT THAT OFFICIALS ARE SLEEPING IN THE VILLAGES WILL ALL TELL THE STORY.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY SENT TO S/S-O AT 7:15 A.M. 12/11/66

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY FOR ROSTOW (NO NIACT)

REFERENCE YOUR CAP 661229

HAVE ASKED WESTY AND PORTER TO HAVE OFFICER
ASSIGNED TO EACH VISITING SENATOR AND CONGRESSMAN
SUMMARIZE IDEAS EXPRESSED AND TRANSMIT TO YOU.

FOLLOWING ARE SOME OBSERVATIONS OF MINE.

SENATOR JACKSON, WASH.: CONCERNED ABOUT U.S.
TROOPS IN DELTA.

SENATOR HOLLINGS, S.C.: EAGER FOR ARGUMENTS
RE INCREASED BOMBING OF NVN. HE APPEARS UNDER SOME
PRESSURE FROM RETIRED OFFICERS IN S.C., SUCH AS GEN.
MARK CLARK, FOR ALL OUT BOMBING OF NVN.

SENATOR THURMOND, S.C.: ASKED FOR CHANCE TO
MEET KY AND HAVE PHOTO TAKEN. WHEN I ARRANGED IT
HE COULD NOT COME AS HE WAS ON CARRIER.

GP-1
200

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-500
By is, NARA Date 4-27-99

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday
December 12, 1966
9:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Gardner Ackley presented
to me his table on changes in defense
purchases on a national accounts
basis. Here it is.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DCI NARS, Date 8-28-86

WWRostow:rlh

CONFIDENTIAL

19a

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1966

NOTE FOR HONORABLE WALT W. ROSTOW

Monthly defense expenditures on an Administrative Budget basis are too erratic to be meaningful.

Here is the record and forecast of half-year changes in defense purchases, on a national accounts basis (seasonally adjusted):

	<u>Purchases</u> (billions)	<u>Change over</u> <u>2 quarters</u>
1965 - second quarter	\$49.1	
fourth quarter	52.5	\$3.4
1966 - second quarter	57.1	4.6
fourth quarter	65.8	8.7
1967 - second quarter	70.3	4.5
fourth quarter	72.8	2.5
1968 - second quarter	74.4	1.6

If Arthur Burns is right, we should not raise taxes.


Gardner Ackley

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By per DCH NARA, Date 3-25-91

~~TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE~~

Monday, December 12, 1966
2:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

You should read this quite extraordinary revelation by Hussein.

Among experts there is some doubt as to its truth; but it could be that the contacts existed in a very narrow circle and were not known to the whole government or to the Israeli military. In that case, as they faced heavy pressure to retaliate, those who had the contacts would have been in a most difficult bind.

The final warning about secrecy is justified.

W. W. Rostow

Amman 1457

~~TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-501
By is, NARA Date 11-1-99

WWRostow:rlh

*1. [unclear]
2. Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, December 11, 1966 -- 11:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Here are three telegrams from Sec. Rusk, which you will wish to read. They cover:

- 1. Expanded third country participation in Viet Nam; *(Bongshuk 7467)
Secto 39
Dec 11, 1966
EXDIS - Secret*
- 2. American wives in Viet Nam; *Bongshuk 7475
Secto 45 NODIS
Dec 11, 1966 secret*
- 3. The conversion of ARVN to pacification; the political scene in Saigon; and Amb. Lodge's plans in the U.S. *Bongshuk 7474
Secto 43
Dec 11, 1966*

for wives A decision from you on Sec. Rusk, Lodge and Porter's recommendation is called for.

Approved ✓

Disapproved _____

See me _____

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-124
By sig, NARA, Date 11-3-92

WWRostow:rln

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1966 DEC 11 08 53

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO INFO WHITE HOUSE
P R 110713Z DEC 66
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4067
INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON 938
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~~SECRET~~ BANGKOK 7467

EXDIS/LOUISIANA

SECTO - 39

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND ACTING SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY

1. IN MY TALKS WITH THIEU, KY, AND DO IN SAIGON I HAVE STRESSED TO ALL THREE THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF GETTING ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE FROM THIRD COUNTRIES. I HAVE POINTED OUT THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF SUCH HELP, IT CAN BE OF THE GREATEST POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE IN BRINGING HOME TO HANOI THE BROAD INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT WE HAVE, AND I HAVE ALSO STRESSED ITS IMPORTANCE FOR A U.S. PUBLIC OPINION SENSITIVE TO THE THOUGHT WE ARE BEING ASKED TO ASSUME TOO MUCH ON OUR OWN. I SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED FAVORABLE INDICATIONS FROM SATO AND NATIONALIST CHINESE, TOLD THEM I WOULD BE RAISING SUBJECT WITH THAI AND IN NATO, AND WAS CONFIDENT THAT AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS WOULD

PAGE TWO RUMT K 7467K ~~SECRET~~

DO MORE NOW THAT ELECTIONS WERE OVER. I STRESSED ABOVE ALL THE NEED TO MOVE FAST AND TO DEVISE NEW PROJECTS.

2. IN TALKING THIS OVER WITH AMBASSADOR LODGE AND MEMBERS OF THE MISSION, IT IS CLEAR THAT WE HAVE A MAJOR JOB TO DO ON OUR OWN SIDE IN VIRTUALLY DESIGNING PROJECTS OURSELVES AND REFINING THE USUAL BROAD GVN SHOPPING LISTS SO THAT THEY REALLY FIT WHAT INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES ARE IN A POSITION TO CONTRIBUTE. THIS HAS NOW BEEN DONE WELL FOR TAIWAN AND JAPAN, AND KOREA HAS MADE A GOOD START, BUT THERE IS MUCH MORE TO DO, AND LODGE AND HIS TEAM ARE GOING TO GIVE IT MUCH INCREASED EMPHASIS, AS WE MUST AT THE WASHINGTON END TO KEEP PACE.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-125
By ig, NARA, Date 8-12-91

OF THE MISSION, IT IS CLEAR THAT WE HAVE A MAJOR JOB TO DO ON OUR OWN SIDE IN VIRTUALLY DESIGNING PROJECTS OURSELVES AND REFINING THE USUAL BROAD GW SHOPPING LISTS SO THAT THEY REALLY FIT WHAT INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES ARE IN A POSITION TO CONTRIBUTE. THIS HAS NOW BEEN DONE WELL FOR TAIWAN AND JAPAN, AND KOREA HAS MADE A GOOD START, BUT THERE IS MUCH MORE TO DO, AND LODGE AND HIS TEAM ARE GOING TO GIVE IT MUCH INCREASED EMPHASIS, AS WE MUST AT THE WASHINGTON END TO KEEP PACE.

3. ON ONE SPECIFIC PROJECT, THE KOREAN LOGISTIC SERVICE CORPS, I FIND THAT WESTMORELAND IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF DISCIPLINE AND FINANCING. HOWEVER, THE FORMER SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT IF THE SERVICE CORPS IS MADE UP OF RECENT VETERANS WITH SERVICE IN VIET-NAM INCLUDING KATUSA WHO HAVE BEEN INTEGRATED WITH AMERICAN FORCES IN THE PAST. AS TO THE FINANCING AND PIASTER BURDEN, I STRONGLY SUSPECT THAT A KOREAN WILL SPEND LESS PIASTERS IN VIET-NAM THAN AN EQUIVALENT AMERICAN OR AMERICANS, AND BELIEVE THAT THIS COULD EVEN BE THE SUBJECT OF SPECIFIC

PAGE THREE RUMTBK 7467 ~~SECRET~~

AGREEMENT WITH PAK THAT THEY WILL SEND A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF THEIR EARNINGS HOME. IN SHORT, I FEEL STRONGLY THAT THIS PROJECT NEEDS A NEW AND HARDER LOOK WITH DOD, AND PERHAPS AN ACTION TEAM IN SAIGON AND IN KOREA TO GET IT UNDERWAY. DEPARTMENT SHOULD TAKE THIS UP URGENTLY WITH DOD. ON THE OTHER KOREAN SUBJECTS, EMBASSY SAIGON IS STRONGLY FAVORABLE TO KOREAN ACTIVITY IN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT FIELD, AND THIS MIGHT BE WORKED OUT BY SEPARATE TEAM.

4. ON THE PHILIPPINES, I SAW BLAIR IN TAIPEI TO STRESS IMPORTANCE OF ADDED PHIL CONTRIBUTION, AND HIS STAFF HAVE BEEN IN SAIGON FOR TEN DAYS IRONING OUT POSSIBILITIES. BEST BETS APPEAR TO BE MEDICAL AND CONSTRUCTION TEAMS FINANCED THROUGH FOUNDATION FROM FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FUNDS. MANILA AND MY PARTY HAVE ALL DETAILS TO GET THIS UNDER WAY SOONEST. BLAIR JUST DOES NOT THINK MARCOS CAN MAKE ADDITIONAL MILITARY CONTRIBUTION FOR THE TIME BEING, ALTHOUGH I HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY ONE POSSIBLE IDEA OF BRINGING PHILIPPINE AND POSSIBLY OTHER THIRD COUNTRY PILOTS TO SVN TO FLY F-5 AIRCRAFT. BUNDY WILL BE EXPLORING THIS ON HIS RETURN.

5. THIS IS OF COURSE AN INTERIM REPORT, AND I SHALL BE PURSUING SUBJECT ACTIVELY IN BANGKOK AND TEHRAN, AND AT THE PARIS NATO MEETING.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-125

By 48, NARA, Date 8-12-91

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SECTO 43

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING SECRETARY

I AM SENDING SEPARATE TELEGRAM MEMORANDUM BY LODGE GIVING HIS LATEST GENERAL ASSESSMENT SITUATION IN VIET-NAM. IT SEEMS TO CONFORM TO THE BRIEFINGS I HAD ON MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS PLUS DISCUSSIONS WITH TOP VIETNAMESE LEADERS.

I TRIED TO EMPHASIZE BOTH TO VIETNAMESE LEADERS AND TO OUR OWN SENIOR AMERICANS THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF ADDITIONAL THIRD COUNTRY HELP. THIEU AND KY ARE ENTIRELY RESPONSIVE, EMBASSY LEADERSHIP HAS THE CLEAR MESSAGE AND WESTMORELAND IS READY TO RECEIVE ADDITIONAL MILITARY ELEMENTS BUT HAS SOME RELUCTANCE TO INVOLVE CIVILIAN COMPONENTS WITHOUT MILITARY DISCIPLINE IN THE MILITARY OPERATIONS THEMSELVES. I THINK WE CAN FIND AN ANSWER TO THIS FOR THE KOREAN SERVICE CORPS TYPE OF IDEA.

I AM CONVINCED WE MUST PRESS HARD FOR A RAPID CONVERSION OF ARVN TO PACIFICATION. THE NEWS-MAKING INCIDENTS IN AND AROUND SAIGON MAY BE PARTLY DUE TO THE RELUCTANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT TO SURROUND ITSELF WITH MAJOR ARVN UNITS UNDER VIGOROUS LEADERSHIP SO NEAR THE CENTER OF POWER. PERHAPS THIS FEAR OF A POSSIBLE COUP CAN BE OVERCOME IF ARVN IS FULLY COMMITTED TO PACIFICATION AND THE WAR BECOMES ONE OF LIEUTENANTS AND CAPTAINS RATHER THAN OF GENERALS. (THIS WAS THE WAY THIEU PUT IT.)

I WAS IMPRESSED WITH THIEU'S THOUGHTFULNESS ON POLITICAL MATTERS AND THE POLITICS OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE VIET CONG. DETAILS ARE BEING REPORTED IN SEPARATE TELEGRAM. KY continues TO MATURE. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY SEEMS TO BE MAKING GOOD PROGRESS BUT THE CRITICAL POINT WILL COME WHEN WE FIND OUT WHETHER THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND THE MILITARY DIRECTORATE CAN IN FACT AGREE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND WORK TOGETHER THROUGH THE TRANSITION PERIOD.

I AM CONVINCED WE MUST PRESS HARD FOR A RAPID CONVERSION OF ARVN TO PACIFICATION. THE NEWS-MAKING INCIDENTS IN AND AROUND SAIGON MAY BE PARTLY DUE TO THE RELUCTANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT TO SURROUND ITSELF WITH MAJOR ARVN UNITS UNDER VIGOROUS LEADERSHIP SO NEAR THE CENTER OF POWER. PERHAPS THIS FEAR OF A POSSIBLE COUP CAN BE OVERCOME IF ARVN IS FULLY COMMITTED TO PACIFICATION AND THE WAR BECOMES ONE OF LIEUTENANTS AND CAPTAINS RATHER THAN OF GENERALS. (THIS WAS THE WAY THIEU PUT IT.)

I WAS IMPRESSED WITH THIEU'S THOUGHTFULNESS ON POLITICAL MATTERS AND THE POLITICS OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE VIET CONG. DETAILS ARE BEING REPORTED IN SEPARATE TELEGRAM. KY continues TO MATURE. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY SEEMS TO BE MAKING GOOD PROGRESS BUT THE CRITICAL POINT WILL COME WHEN WE FIND OUT WHETHER THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND THE MILITARY DIRECTORATE CAN IN FACT AGREE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND WORK TOGETHER THROUGH THE TRANSITION PERIOD.

WE HAVE COLLECTED CONSIDERABLE DETAIL ON POSSIBILITIES OF THIRD COUNTRY HELP THAT IS NEEDED AND CAN BE EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED AND I SHALL MAKE USE OF THIS IN TALKING WITH NATO MINISTERS. I WILL BE SEEING THAI PRIME MINISTER LATER THIS EVENING AND WILL URGE HIM TO GET STARTED ON ADDITIONAL THAI MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN VIET-NAM DESPITE THEIR NEEDS IN THAILAND. I THINK WE SHOULD ASSUME THAT ADDITIONAL HELP FROM KOREA, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND WILL COST US IN BUDGETARY SUPPORT AND SOME TYPES OF HELP CAN BE EXPENSIVE. BUT I HAVE BEEN ASSUMING THAT ADDITIONAL MANPOWER IS A MAJOR OBJECT.

INCIDENTALLY, CABOT LODGE WILL BE FLYING STRAIGHT TO BOSTON AND WILL TELEPHONE THE PRESIDENT FROM THERE TO ASCERTAIN YOUR WISHES AS TO WHEN HE SHOULD MAKE HIS FIRST REPORT TO YOU. I WOULD SUGGEST HE BE GIVEN A DAY OR TWO TO CATCH HIS BREATH BEFORE COMING TO WASHINGTON AND THAT WE PLAN THAT HE WILL SPEND THE CHRISTMAS-NEW YEAR'S PERIOD WITH HIS FAMILY. HE COULD THEN BE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON TO BE OF ANY HELP WITH RETURNING CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP, TELEVISION PROGRAMS OR OTHER REQUIREMENTS. I THINK IT BEST THAT I REPORT ON OTHER ASPECTS PERSONALLY UPON MY RETURN BUT I FOUND HIM IN GOOD HEALTH, IN GOOD SPIRITS AND READY TO BE OF SERVICE. RUSK

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NODIS

SECTO 44

FOR PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-125
By mg, NARA, Date 8-12-91

1. DURING MY SAIGON VISIT, CABOT LODGE TOOK UP WITH ME THE QUESTION OF EASING SLIGHTLY THE PRESENT POLICY ON WIVES OF CIVILIAN MEMBERS OF THE MISSION. HE BELIEVES THAT WE ARE APPROACHING A CRITICAL POINT, AT WHICH SEVERAL MEN WITH UNIQUE TALENTS WILL NOT ACCEPT AN EXTENSION OF THEIR TOURS OF DUTY UNLESS THEY ARE ALLOWED TO BRING THEIR WIVES. HE HAS IN MIND VERY PRECISE CONDITIONS, SUCH AS, NO CHILDREN UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, ADEQUATE ACCOMMODATION, AND THE WIFE TO TAKE A JOB OR ITS EQUIVALENT IN SPECIFIC CHARITABLE WORK WITH THE VIETNAMESE.

2. IN ADDITION TO THE SPECIFIC IMPORTANCE OF THESE KEY INDIVIDUALS, LODGE BELIEVES THAT THE OVERALL MORALE SITUATION IN THE MISSION WOULD BE GREATLY IMPROVED BY LIMITED POLICY EXTENSION ALONG THESE LINES. HE NOTES THAT THERE ARE NOW SOME 700 AMERICAN WOMEN IN SAIGON IN ANY EVENT, AND THAT THERE HAVE NEVER BEEN, APART FROM THE EMBASSY BOMBING ITSELF OF APRIL 1965, ANY INCIDENTS INVOLVING AMERICAN WOMEN IN ANY WAY.

3. I AM INCLINED TO SUPPORT AMBASSADOR LODGE'S RECOMMENDATION ON THIS MATTER, AND WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS IT FULLY WITH YOU ON MY RETURN.

4. HOWEVER, THERE IS ONE OTHER ASPECT THAT REQUIRES IMMEDIATE ATTENTION. BOTH LODGE AND PORTER BELIEVE THAT THE MISSION WILL CONFRONT A PARTICULAR MORALE PROBLEM BETWEEN CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR'S. A VERY GREAT NUMBER OF MEN WILL WANT TO JOIN THEIR WIVES AT OTHER ASIAN POINTS, AND THE SELECTION OF THOSE TO DO SO WILL INEVITABLY CAUSE GREAT PAIN. THUS, BOTH FOR THE SAKE OF MAINTAINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MISSION AND FOR MORALE, LODGE AND PORTER WOULD LIKE A TEMPORARY AUTHORITY TO PERMIT CIVILIAN MEMBERS OF THE MISSION TO BRING THEIR WIVES (ONLY) TO SAIGON BETWEEN CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR'S, AT THEIR OWN EXPENSE AND SUBJECT TO A CLEAR SHOWING OF ADEQUATE ACCOMMODATION. THEY HAVE CHECKED THE LOCATION OF THE VARIOUS WIVES AND BELIEVE THAT NOT MORE THAN ABOUT 40 WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS PRIVILEGE, BUT THAT THESE WOULD MAKE ALL THE DIFFERENCE TO THE MORALE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MISSION. SINCE THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE ANNOUNCED IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO BE EFFECTIVE, I JOIN LODGE AND PORTER IN ASKING THAT YOU CONSIDER THIS RECOMMENDATION FAVORABLY. NOT ONLY FROM THEM, BUT FROM A GREAT MANY REPORTS AT ALL LEVELS, I BELIEVE THEIR ARGUMENTS ARE WARRANTED AND THAT THE SECURITY HAZARDS ARE MINIMAL.

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~~TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE~~

Sunday, December 11, 1966 - 12:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, as you requested, the memoranda on the probable Soviet response to a U.S. decision to deploy ABM defenses.

not attached
to this copy

-- Dick Helms and the CIA say they will restore their assured damage capability with an enlarged ICBM program.

-- Katzenbach, Thompson, and Kohler suggest they would expand their ABM program which is now at an early stage. They are all inclined to agree (as does CIA) that only the Moscow system is an ABM (the so-called Tallinn system is for air defense).

-- Hornig emphasizes, again, the very early stage of the Soviet ABM deployment; but does not directly answer the question put to him, arguing, rather, for a negotiation at this time.

I argue they would have to reestablish their assured destruction capability in the U.S. in the cheapest possible way. (ABM's are much more expensive than ICBM's -- a point not fully taken into account in the three memoranda from the State Department.)

In one way or another, all the papers suggest that the environment may be right for a negotiation.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 89-28
By sig NARA, Date 1-3-90

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~~TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE~~

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 10, 1966

~~TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WALT W. ROSTOW

Subject: ABM Program

You have inquired as to what I think the Soviet reaction would be to an ABM deployment by the United States under either Posture "A" or Posture "B" of Secretary McNamara's memorandum.

1. It is not presently clear how extensive the present Soviet ABM deployment is. Whether or not they intend presently a full scale deployment, I would assume that the initial reaction of any announcement of a U.S. ABM system would be to encourage and expedite a full scale Soviet deployment.

I base this conclusion on the history of Soviet emphasis on defensive systems coupled with the fact that they have already commenced such a deployment.

I think the Soviet Union will also be forced to react by increasing its offensive nuclear force to take into account our ABM deployment. While it would clearly be rational to do this immediately -- and there is no question about Soviet technical competence in this regard -- I am less certain as to how quickly they would react. Ideology and history to the contrary notwithstanding, I think we should assume that they will react in this way, although it may not be their first reaction.

The cost of a Soviet ABM deployment and improved and expanded ICBM capabilities might be prohibitive in cost if pursued simultaneously. In this event, the rational thing to do

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NLJ 89-27
By mg NARA, Date 4-26-89

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would be to cut back ABM deployment and concentrate on an offensive nuclear force. But the fact that they are defense-minded and that they have already commenced an ABM program might lead them to postpone committing extensive resources to improved ICBMs.

I would agree with Secretary McNamara's conclusions that a rational response by the Soviet Union would not essentially change the existing situation; but I believe there is a good possibility that this response (offensive missiles) might be delayed for a period of time. If this is correct, deployment of an ABM system would give us a short term advantage over the Soviet Union, and it might be two, three or four years before the status quo was restored. That it would be restored, I have no substantial doubt.

2. I think the Soviet Government should be approached directly with as candid a statement of the existing situation as security permits -- and I think this could be quite candid. I think we should inform them of our intentions, absent an agreement, which would as nearly as possible freeze existing offensive and defensive systems. I think we should state our intention of deploying some ABM system if it is impossible to reach a satisfactory understanding.

The Soviets have always linked the need for a freeze on both offensive and defensive systems. I find this both significant and puzzling since it would seem to me that a purely defensive freeze would be clearly to their advantage. The only explanation of this that I can see is that they do tend to think in defensive terms which, to a degree, would support the thesis that they don't approach the problem as rationally as we do.

3. While you have not asked my views on Third Country problems it seems to me that how these are handled is perhaps an equally important problem to be faced.


Acting Secretary

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

December 10, 1966

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. Walt Rostow
The White House

FROM : S/AL - Llewellyn E. Thompson

The difficulty of predicting Soviet reactions is compounded by the fact that in the period since the end of the war, their reaction to actions on our part which were known to them were not what we would consider rational or called for in the circumstances. Soviet assessment of a U.S. deployment of a significant ABM system will vary considerably, pending upon whether we were reacting to a major Soviet deployment or whether we had initiated this new step in the arms race. I do not believe we can consider it as established that the Soviets have at this time decided upon a major ABM deployment. The Soviets have clearly embarked upon a plan to increase the number of their ICBMs and to deploy many of them in hardened sites. I believe they will carry this plan to completion.

If we initiate major ABM deployment, I feel confident that the Soviet response in the first instance would be to do likewise rather than to increase the number of their ICBMs beyond already planned levels. I would doubt that the Soviets could both deploy a major ABM system and increase ICBMs beyond planned levels without taking drastic action in some other field, such as suspending their space program.

If it is clearly the Soviets that initiate ABM deployment and we respond with a similar system, I would even more doubt that they would increase their offensive weapons beyond planned levels during the next five years or so because of the pressure upon their resources of other important programs in the non-military field. I think it quite likely, however, that as the significance of our planned improvement in the quality of our

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NIJ 89-27
By ing NARA, Date 4-26-89

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- 2 -

offensive capability becomes increasingly clear to them, they may respond with a similar program of qualitative improvement. I would expect that in any of these situations, the Soviets would increase their submarine launched missile capability.

Since the last war, whenever the Soviets have been faced with a choice between the development of offensive or defensive capability, they have generally opted for the defensive. This can partly be explained by their belief in their own ideology, which postulates that Communism would inevitably spread over the entire world and that the principle military problem for the Communist countries is to protect themselves from the danger that imperialism in its death throes might lash out against them in a desperate military gamble.

Given the economic problems which the Soviets already face in the allocation of their resources, which are insufficient to meet their goals, I believe that their civilian leaders would welcome an opportunity to avoid incurring the enormous expenditure which the deployment of a major ABM system would entail, at least over the next few years. On the other hand, the civilian leadership is weak in comparison to past regimes and it seems probable that this has automatically increased the relative influence of the Soviet military.

As the Soviet military acquire knowledge of the qualitative improvement in our ICBMs, they may well argue that an ABM system is essential to offset or at least raise doubts in our minds as to the efficacy of our offensive capability, since we could never be sure how effective their ABM system was. On balance, however, I believe we have a good chance of negotiating an ABM, ICBM freeze.

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~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

STATEMENT BY DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOY D. KOHLER RE
POSSIBLE SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. DEPLOYMENT OF ABM'S.

PROBLEM:

To estimate Soviet reaction to U.S. deployment of ABM's assuming that the Soviet side is planning to go all out in deploying an ABM system and that the U.S. is responding not only by increasing its nuclear striking capability but by itself beginning the deployment of an ABM system.

CONCLUSION:

1. In the contingency above described, the Soviets would seek means of restoring what they consider a reasonable balance of nuclear deterrents.

2. However, I would not expect that their reaction would be purely one of trying "to increase the second strike damage potential of their offensive forces." The Russians are traditionally defense-minded and would certainly think in terms of improving their ABM defenses as well as their offensive forces. There are too many technical unknowns for me to estimate what conclusions they might reach, but the result would probably be some mix in improvement of both systems. The Soviets would not necessarily seek parity in offensive forces. Khrushchev once referred to alleged U.S. statements that U.S. forces could destroy the Soviet Union five times over and commented that the Soviets had enough to destroy us once and that was enough. While this was Khrushchev, I believe some of the same philosophy continues to prevail within the Soviet leadership. They would certainly think in terms of super power nuclear warheads, capable of blacking out radar facilities and guidance and control systems.

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By inf NARA, Date 4-26-89

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
3. Financial factors would play a role and would weigh heavily with the civilian leadership, particularly with someone like Prime Minister Kosygin. With vast investment requirements in the civilian economy, with \$300 billion GNP against our \$630 billion and military and space programs running about 80% of our investment, the Soviet leadership would be up against an almost insoluble problem. Since the Soviet military are relatively powerful at this time when the "collective" leadership is relatively weak consideration of the Soviet response to our deployment of ABM's might be a divisive factor within the Politburo.

4. In these circumstances I would anticipate that the Soviets would be increasingly receptive to proposals for a freeze on both ICBM and ABM systems.

NOTE ON ASSUMPTIONS:

I do not believe that the Soviets have made a firm decision to go all out in developing an ABM system - more specifically that the civilian leadership has made a commitment on this to the Soviet military. I doubt that the Tallin system is an ABM system, although I am prepared to admit that it might be so designed as to have a potential for development in this direction. I accept that the Moscow system is an ABM system, but I strongly suspect that the Soviet leadership is aware of its relatively primitive nature and regards it as experimental. I would doubt that there is a forward commitment of funds but would rather believe that the program is practically on a year-to-year basis and competes with civilian requirements for allocation of limited resources.

December 10, 1966


Foy D. Kohler

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

December 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR

W. W. Rostow

Subject: Soviet Reaction to ABM Deployment

The following is a rather hasty paper. I hope, over the week end, to put something more thoughtful together.

A key question is whether the Russians consider that we are responding to a large-scale deployment on their part, or whether they see us as escalating the competition.

The analysis shown to us assumes that a Soviet ABM deployment is under way. Now, while there is little doubt that the Moscow system is an ABM system, there is a real question whether the Talinn system which is being deployed rapidly (23 sites as of 12/7/66) is for air defense or ABM use. The most recent NIE (10-26-66) concludes that it is probably an air defense system, although it may have marginal ABM capabilities. All of the people I have had look at the problem (the PSAC Reconnaissance Panel, Chairman Dr. Edwin Land, and Strategic Offense and Defense Panel, Chairman Dr. Marvin Goldberger) concur in this view (but DIA does not).

The essence of the problem is that the radars at the Talinn sites are too small to give an area capability unless early warning and acquisition are performed by the Hen House radars at distant locations. But (1) the large Hen House radars are soft and undefended, and (2) some of the sites are not covered by Hen House radars; e. g. the last three discovered are too far East. If not used in conjunction with Hen House radars, this is a point defense system with a radius of coverage of about 30-200 miles. In that case, some of them are very poorly sited, e. g. one on a peninsula in the Crimea (Feodosiya) which would largely defend water, although it is excellently sited to bar intrusion by aircraft.

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and declassification

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3 pages, cy 1 of
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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-503
By cb, NARA Date 10-5-00

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Therefore, I conclude that it would be incorrect to proceed from the assumption that a general deployment is underway in the USSR and we must take into account the possibility that the Soviets do not see themselves as having initiated one. In this case they would regard the deployment of a general system--even a "thin" one--if undertaken on anything like a crash basis as a new threat to their deterrence and would react strongly to it.

One might note, though, that for this same reason they might react favorably to proposals to mutually limit ABM deployments on a mutual example basis.

In judging possible Soviet reaction, one cannot underestimate the extent to which they apparently feel themselves "under the gun." My basis for saying that is that I am possibly the only American who has recently spoken directly to Marshall Malinovsky, the Minister of Defense (November 7, 1964) and who has seen the reddening of his face when he says, "Your Mr. McNamara thinks he can overwhelm us with his thousands of rockets." For this reason I see their increased ^{hard missile} deployment rate as an effort to catch up and eliminate the threat of a first strike by us. I suspect they are keenly aware of our advantage in both missiles and aircraft and would react as strongly as they could if their deterrence were threatened.

Consequently, if we are to have any hope of stabilizing a race which in the end poses increasingly serious threats to both sides and becomes increasingly expensive, it seems unwise to start down a new road unless: (1) there is better evidence than we have now that we face a new threat, (2) the deployment would give us a real military advantage (which it appears not to), (3) it can be done in a way which minimizes the provocation or new challenge unless there is reason to believe that the pressure would produce a "truce."

For all these reasons, I would continue to delay a deployment decision until the diplomatic possibilities have been more thoroughly explored and the intelligence has improved. If this is not practicable, I would start slowly on an experimental basis with a "thin" system--for the additional reason that there are still many technical problems to be solved before a sensible system can be put together.

One other factor should also be considered. Some will argue that the continued engagement of their technical talent in these areas will impoverish the civilian economy. The effect might be the reverse--that by being forced

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to work on priority problems of the greatest technical sophistication they will acquire a higher technological capacity than they would otherwise achieve--if fewer cars, consumer goods, etc. There is reason to believe that although their technology definitely lags ours in substantially all areas, their relative position may be improving (e. g. as shown by a comparison of their radars or aircraft with ours in 1950 and in 1966). I think it is clear that their best engineering, quality production and management is in the defense industries. But I have seen first hand that there is no shortage of highly trained scientists and engineers in the non-defense area (they train twice as many as we do). I have also noted that key people in science (e. g. Keldysh, President of the Academy), in the electronics, computer and communications industry have a defense or military background. Hence, one can hypothesize that there may in fact be a strong "spin off" such as we ascribe to DOD, NASA and AEC.



Donald F. Hornig
Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, December 10, 1966
2:30 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Soviet reaction to U. S. deployment of Nike-X, Postures A or B

1. A U. S. ABM program to reduce fatalities in a nuclear exchange to the range of 5-15 million would force the Soviet Union to respond to re-establish the credibility of its assured destruction capability -- both to themselves and to the world. They regard this capability as the bed-rock of their security, now secrecy has been virtually lost.

2. They would seek the cheapest way to accomplish this objective, given the severe resource allocation conflicts they now confront -- and will continue foreseeably to confront.

3. The precise mix they would choose I cannot confidently predict; but it might well include ICBM's with very large warheads.

4. Among the ways they might envisage to achieve this objective will be negotiations to stabilize the nuclear arms race with the United States; although that route will confront at least three severe problems:

-- inspection and sea-based ICBM's;

-- warheads as opposed to launching vehicles, as the unit of measure in an agreement;

-- the parity question: can they accept a freeze which appears to lock them into permanent nuclear inferiority?

They will carefully weigh the advantages and costs of an agreement against the advantages and costs of the next cheapest way to re-establish an adequate assured destruction capability.

5. I recommend that we war-game and staff out the problem stated in para. 4, as a matter of urgency.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-28

By ij NARA, Date 1-3-90

~~TOP SECRET~~

Pres file~~SECRET~~

Sunday - December 11, 1966 -- 12:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, as you requested, Nick Katzenbach's recommendation on Cabriolet.

He recommends that we proceed with presently planned PLOWSHARE experiments and then, depending on the outcome, find ways of relating PLOWSHARE, if it works, to the test ban treaty, non-proliferation, etc.

This is, essentially, Sec. Rusk's position, in which I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Proceed with Cabriolet _____

Hold Cabriolet _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-124
By sig, NARA, Date 11-3-92

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

5209
23a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 10, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WALT W. ROSTOW

Subject: Cabriolet

I have reviewed the Cabriolet project in accordance with my memorandum of October 8. While I think the decision is a close one, I think we should probably proceed with the program, at least in terms of the initial experiments now scheduled. This would include Cabriolet, Buggy and as much of Plowshare as present planning encompasses.

In large measure, I am persuaded to this course by the fact that it is useful in the current Panama Canal negotiations and by the fact that the Soviet Union is pursuing similar programs. In each instance -- whatever our future position may be -- I think pursuing this program at this time would strengthen our hand.

Having said this, I must add that I am very unpersuaded that even assuming the success of these experiments, there is much scope for this peaceful use of atomic explosions. It would require a modification of the Test Ban Treaty, which I am inclined to think would be unfortunate; and I think we should pause before legitimizing explosions as "peaceful uses" at a time when we are attempting to prevent non-proliferation and there is no meaningful technical distinction between a peaceful nuclear device and a nuclear weapon.

But these are problems which can be considered in

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 9-3-98

~~SECRET~~

Page 2

the future after completion of the programmed experiments. And the answers are not sufficiently clear to me now to warrant reversal of decisions already taken by the Administration and by Congress.


Acting Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

Sunday, December 11, 1966 -- 12:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

These two cables are interesting:

-- A debating point with Warsaw that "at the very moment that Lewandowski was complaining about U.S. bombardment, the Communists were planning to blow the building in which the conversations were taking place."

-- The casualties in Hanoi may well have been caused by a spent missile falling into the city.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 95-22
By cb, NARA, Date 10-5-95

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 13064, Dec 10, 1966, Secret

Saigon 13059, Dec 10, 1966, TOP SECRET -- Marigold, cy 5

WWRostow:rln

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**24-a*~~SECRET~~

009474

6
Action

SS

Info

VV MJA082JIA220
OO RUDTCR RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 13064 3450410
ZNY SSSSS
O 110350Z DEC 66
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFOR RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

1966 DEC 10 PM 11 31

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 13064

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

BANGKOK FOR BUNDY

REF: SAIGON 12939

1. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN DEC. 2
AIRSTRIKES NEAR HANOI PROVIDED BY BRITISH CONSUL
GENERAL COLVIN (PROTECT SOURCE) WHO IS SPENDING
FEW DAYS IN SAIGON.
2. THREE TO FOUR HOUSES WERE OBSERVED TO HAVE
BEEN HEAVILY DAMAGED. HOUSES WERE WELL WITHIN
CITY, APPROXIMATELY 300 YARDS FROM UK CONSULATE
GENERAL. RUMORS IN HANOI DIPLOMATIC CORPS WERE
THAT 187 CIVILIAN CASUALTIES WERE CAUSED BY DEC. 2
STRIKE, INCLUDING 11 WOMEN AND 9 CHILDREN.
3. SOURCE STATED THAT NVN AUTHORITIES ARE EXPLOITING
ABOVE AS EVIDENCE OF ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN POPULATION.
HOWEVER, IT IS HIGHLY POSSIBLE THAT DAMAGE AND
CASUALTIES WERE ACTUALLY CAUSED BY SPENT SAM
MISSILE FALLING INTO CITY.

GP-3

LODGE
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 12:02 A.M., DECEMBER 11
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, 12:02 A.M.,
DECEMBER 11.

~~SECRET~~*NOTE HANDLED AS WINDIS PER S/S-O.*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By Rg/cr, NARA, Date 9-3-98

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

5 ²⁴⁶

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 9463
RECEIVED: DECEMBER 10, 1966, 9:43 P.M.

Info

FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~TOP SECRET SAIGON 13059~~

NODIS/MARIGOLD

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 88-214
By ug, NARA, Date 1-27-89

1. D'ORLANDI TOLD ME SATURDAY NIGHT THAT A PLASTIC EXPLOSIVE DEVICE HAD BEEN FOUND THE GENERAL AREA OF THE APARTMENT HOUSE IN WHICH THE ITALIAN EMBASSY IS SITUATED, AND APARTMENT HOUSE WHICH IS ADJACENT TO MACV HEADQUARTERS.
 2. UPON CHECKING I FOUND THAT THIS WAS TRUE AND THAT MACV HAD REMOVED THE EXPLOSIVES.
 3. THE SECRETARY THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE A USEFUL DEBATING POINT IN WARSAW OR WITH LEWANDOWSKI HERE THAT AT THE VERY MOMENT THAT LEWANDOWSKI WAS COMPLAINING ABOUT U.S. BOMBARDMENT, THE COMMUNISTS WERE PLANNING TO BLOW THE BUILDING IN WHICH THE COVERSATIONS WERE TAKING PLACE.
 4. THIS IS OF COURSE TO BE ADDED TO THE RECENT COMMUNIST ATTEMPTS IN THE LAST FEW DAYS TO MINE THE SAIGON RIVER, TO BLOW UP THE KIN DO THEATER, TO MAKE A COMMANDO RAID ON THE AIRPORT, TO DESTROY THE MAIN BRIDGES COMING INTO TOWN, TO ASSASSINATE LEADING MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY--ALL THE WHILE COMPLAINING ABOUT OUR BOMBING OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN NORTH VIETNAM. WE HAD DONE NONE OF THE THINGS IN NORTH VIETNAM WHICH THEY WERE CURRENTLY DOING IN THE SAIGON AREA.
 5. LEWANDOWSKI ALSO TOLD D'ORLANDI THAT HE EXPECTED MORE TERRORISM IN SAIGON INCLUDING SOME MAJOR KIDNAPPINGS.
- LODGE.

RNL/5

NOTE: Mr. Walsh, S/S, notified 10:00 P.M., 12/10/66.

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

24-a

6
Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

009474 ~~SANITIZED~~

1966 DEC 10 PM-11 31

VV MJA082JIA220
OO RUDTOR RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 13064 3450410
ZNY SSSSS
O 110350Z DEC 66
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFOR RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 13064

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

BANGKOK FOR BUNDY

REF: SAIGON 12939

~~SANITIZED~~

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 88-214

By up, NARA, Date 1-27-89

1. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN DEC. 2
AIRSTRIKES NEAR HANOI PROVIDED BY [REDACTED]

2. THREE TO FOUR HOUSES WERE OBSERVED TO HAVE
BEEN HEAVILY DAMAGED. HOUSES WERE WELL WITHIN
CITY, APPROXIMATELY 300 YARDS FROM [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] RUMORS IN HANOI DIPLOMATIC CORPS WERE
THAT 187 CIVILIAN CASUALTIES WERE CAUSED BY DEC. 2
STRIKE, INCLUDING 11 WOMEN AND 9 CHILDREN.

3. SOURCE STATED THAT NVN AUTHORITIES ARE EXPLOITING
ABOVE AS EVIDENCE OF ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN POPULATION.
HOWEVER, IT IS HIGHLY POSSIBLE THAT DAMAGE AND
CASUALTIES WERE ACTUALLY CAUSED BY SPENT SAM
MISSILE FALLING INTO CITY.

GP-3

LODGE
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 12:02 A.M., DECEMBER 11
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, 12:02 A.M.,
DECEMBER 11.

~~SECRET~~

NOTE HANDLED AS WINDIS PER S/S-O.

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, December 11, 1966
1:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this rather ominous
cable from Jordan.

I'll be in touch with Nick and others
about it and make sure you get recommenda-
tions soon.

W. W. Rostow

Amman 1456, 2 parts

~~SECRET -- EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-124
By inf, NARA, Date 11-3-92

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHEX
DE RUEHC 9559 3451855
ZNY SSSSS
O 111728Z DEC 66
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO WHITE HOUSE
O R 111320Z DEC 66
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUDAC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1045
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 169
RUEFPSA/CINCSRIKE
RUEKDA/DEFENSE OSD
RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 214
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 283
RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 206
RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM 231
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 219
RUQTBG/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 156
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 138
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 159
STATE GRNC
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-500
By isa, NARA Date 4-27-99

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1456 SECTION ONE OF TWO

EXDIS

NOFORN

1. I WAS CALLED TO SEE THE KING LATE YESTERDAY EVENING AT HOMAR, THE KING'S PRIVATE RESIDENCE OUTSIDE AMMAN. EMBOFF ACCOMPANIED ME.

2. THE MEETING WITH THE KING LASTED ONE HOUR. I HAVE NEVER SEEN HIM SO GRIM OR SO OBVIOUSLY UNDER PRESSURE. IT WAS

PAGE 2 RUQWKG 191A ~~SECRET~~

APPARENT THAT HE HAD TO USE THE UTMOST IN SELF-RESTRAINT TO KEEP HIS EMOTIONS FROM ERUPTING OPENLY. AT SEVERAL POINTS IN THE CONVERSATION HE HAD TEARS IN HIS EYES. THEN HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE SURFACE MANIFESTATIONS OF DISCONTENT IN THE FORM OF DEMONSTRATIONS HAD ABATED, PRESSURES UNDER THE SURFACE WERE IN FACT BUILDING UP. THE DISCONTENT ON THE WEST BANK IS DEEPER THAN HE HAD IMAGINED. "THE GROWING SPLIT BETWEEN EAST BANK AND WEST BANK HAS RUINED MY DREAMS." THE ONLY THING THAT BINDS THE ARMY TO HIM, HE SAID, IS TRADITIONAL LOYALTY, BUT THIS TIE IS DAILY GROWING WEAKER. "THERE IS NEAR DESPAIR IN THE ARMY AND THE ARMY NO LONGER HAS CONFIDENCE IN ME. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IS THAT THE ARMY IS OVER-EXTENDED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY FOR REASONS OF INTERNAL SECURITY, AND THIS IS CAUSING THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE TO BECOME INCREASINGLY FED UP, AN OBVIOUS OBJECTIVE OF THOSE OPPOSED TO THIS REGIME." THE KING OBSERVED THAT HE IS BESET ON ALL SIDES BY ENEMIES, OUTSIDE JORDAN AND WITHIN JORDAN, WITH SYRIA OPENLY CALLING FOR IS OVERTHROW, PUBLICLY OFFERING ARMS FOR THE PURPOSE, AND COVERTLY INFILTRATING ARMS AND TERRORISTS INTO JORDAN TO

4. THE KING SAID HE SIMPLY MUST HAVE WASHINGTON'S DECISION ON HIS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE. NOR COULD HE LONGER FOREGO THE PRESENCE AND HELP OF GENERAL KHAMMASH IN AMMAN AT THIS CRITICAL TIME. GENERAL KHAMMASH HAD BEEN IN WASHINGTON FOR NEARLY TWO WEEKS, AND AS YET HE HAS BEEN GIVEN NO ANSWER. KHAMMASH'S APPOINTMENT WITH SECRETARY MCNAMARA HAS BEEN TWICE POSTPONED, AND THE APPOINTMENT IS NOW SET FOR WEDNESDAY. THE KING IS AWARE THAT THE ISRAELI FOMMIN IS VISITING WASHINGTON EARLY NEXT WEEK, BEFORE WEDNESDAY. THE KING WISHES GENERAL KHAMMASH TO LEAVE WASHINGTON ON WEDNESDAY EVENING, AND WHATEVER ANSWER GENERAL KHAMMASH IS GIVEN BEFORE HE LEAVES WILL HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE KING AS THE FINAL ANSWER. TIME IS RUNNING OUT OF HIM, SAID THE KING, AND HE CAN NO LONGER DELAY MAKING DECISIONS ON THE COURSES OF ACTION HE MUST TAKE. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES A TEMPORIZING ANSWER TO KHAMMASH WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED AS A NEGATIVE ANSWER.

5. IF GENERAL KHAMMASH RECEIVES AN ANSWER "WHICH IS NOT RESPONSIVE," THE KING WOULD NOT GO TO WASHINGTON, AS, UNTIL

~~PAGE 4 RUOMKG 191A S E T~~ ~~R E T~~

RECENTLY, HE HAD CONTEMPLATED DOING SHOULD KHAMMASH FAIL TO GET A SATISFACTORY ANSWER. THE KING SAID HE GREATLY ADMIRES PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND IT WOULD GIVE HIM GREAT PERSONAL SATISFACTION TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY. BUT THE PRESSURES BUILDING UP ON HIM ARE SO GREAT, HE SAID, THAT THERE IS NO LONGER TIME FOR A TRIP TO WASHINGTON. NOR, IF KHAMMASH IS UNSUCCESSFUL, WOULD A TRIP BY HIM, HE REFLECTED, WITH ITS ATTENDANT PUBLICITY, SERVE THE INTERESTS OF EITHER OF US. FOR A DECADE, THE KING SAID, WE AND HE HAVE BEEN PARTNERS. AND IN THIS CRITICAL HOUR WE ARE THE ONLY FRIEND TO WHOM HE CAN TURN. IF WE CANNOT HELP HIM, HE SAID, THEN HE MUST MOVE QUICKLY TO AN ALTERNATE COURSE. "THE RIGHT ANSWER FROM THE US WOULD ENABLE ME TO JUSTIFY MY PAST POLICY TO MY ARMY, TO MY PEOPLE, TO THE PLO, AND TO EVERYONE ELSE. IF I DO NOT GET THE RIGHT ANSWER, EVEN I MUST CONCLUDE MY PAST POLICY HAS BEEN A FAILURE."

6. SINCE HE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN OBTAINING POSTPONEMENT OF THE ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING IN CAIRO, THE KING SAID, AND SINCE KHAMMASH HAS NOT GOTTEN AN ANSWER FROM US, THE KING HAD FELT HE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO MAKE A CONCESSION TO

~~PAGE 5 RUQMKG 191A SECRET~~

THE PRESSURES HE WAS SUBJECTED TO AT THE CAIRO MEETING. FRIDAY HE HAD HAD TO INSTRUCT HIS DELEGATION IN CAIRO TO AGREE TO THE STATIONING OF SAUDI AND IRAQI TROOPS IN JORDAN. THE KING SAID THAT THREE BRIGADES OF THESE FOREIGN ARAB TROOPS WOULD BE INVOLVED. IN RETURN FOR THIS CONCESSION THE ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL HAD AGREED TO MEET JORDAN'S DEMANDS, WHICH INCLUDE, INTER ALIA, THE STRENGTHENING OF EGYPTIAN FORCES IN THE ISRAELI BORDER AREA (PRESUMABLY SINAI). THE STATIONING OF IRAQI AND SAUDI TROOPS IN JORDAN WOULD NOT COME ABOUT FOR A LEAST TWO MONTHS, SAID HUSSEIN, SINCE A GREAT DEAL HAD TO BE WORKED OUT FIRST. I ASKED THE KING WHETHER IN THE EVENT THE US WERE RESPONSIVE TO HIS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE HE WOULD NONETHELESS HAVE TO GO THROUGH WITH THE STATIONING OF IRAQI AND SAUDI TROOPS IN JORDAN. THE KING REPLIED THAT HE SUPPOSED HE MIGHT SOMEHOW BE ABLE TO HEAD IT OFF DURING THE COURSE OF THE TECHNICAL NEGOTIATIONS TO COME IN THIS REGARD. HE SAID HE IS NOT HAPPY WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD TO SEND TO HIS DELEGATION IN CAIRO.

7. THE KING SAID THAT IF THE US CANNOT BE RESPONSIVE TO HIS

~~PAGE 6 RUQMKG 191A SECRET~~

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE, HE SAW THREE COURSES OPEN TO HIM.

8. THE FIRST COURSE WAS TO TURN TO THE EAST. "I WILL NOT TRY TO MISLEAD YOU, NOR TO BLACKMAIL YOU, BY TELLING YOU I WILL TURN TO THE EAST. I CANNOT AND WILL NOT DO SO. MY REIGN HAS BEEN DEVOTED TOWARDS BUILDING JORDAN TO BE A SELF-SUFFICIENT, MODERATE, EVOLUTIONARY STATE. I HAVE ALL MY LIFE FOUGHT THE EAST. IF IN THE END JORDAN FEELS SHE MUST TURN TO THE EAST, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE UNDER SOMEONE ELSE, NOT WITH ME."

9. THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE, SAID THE KING, WAS TO "BATTEN DOWN THE HATCHES AND TAKE ON EVERYONE WHO IS WORKING AGAINST ME AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME." THIS WAS A COURSE WHICH TEMPTED HIM, SAID THE KING, BECAUSE HE WAS READY FOR A FIGHT AND HE DID NOT CARE ABOUT HIS OWN FATE. BUT, HUSSEIN SAID, "THE DECK IS STACKED AGAINST ME AND I DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO COMMIT THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN LOYAL TO ME TO A COURSE WHICH WOULD LIKELY MEAN THEIR DOOM."

GP-3. BURNS.

BT

NNNN

~~SECRET NOFORN EXCIS~~

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

EHA-284
OO RUEHEX
DE RUEHC 9562 3451757
ZNY SSSSS
O 111641Z DEC 66
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE
O R 111320Z DEC 66
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1046
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 170
RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE
RUEKDA/DEFENSE OSD
RUEIVCR:AMEMBASSY CAIRO 215
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 284
RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 207
RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM 232
RUQMVV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 190
RUQTBG/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 157
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 139
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 160
STATE GRNC
DT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1456 SECTION TWO OF TWO

EXDIS

NOFORN

10. THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE, SAID THE KING, IS THE ONE WHICH COMMENDS ITSELF TO HIM AS THE BEST. HE WOULD DECLARE THE WEST BANK A "MILITARY DIRECTORATE" AND CALL ON ALL ARAB STATES, AND THE PLO, TO FURNISH FORCES TO BE STATIONED ON THE WEST BANK FOR THE PROTECTION OF THAT AREA. JORDAN

PAGE 2 RUQMKC 192A ~~SECRET~~

WOULD LEAVE ON THE WEST BANK ITS PRO RATA CONTRIBUTION OF FORCES, AND WITHDRAW THE REMAINDER OF ITS FORCES, NOW STATIONED ON THE WEST BANK, TO THE EAST BANK. THE KING WOULD NOT, HE SAID, MAKE THIS AS AN OFFER, TO BE ACCEPTED OR REJECTED BY THE PALESTINIANS AND BY THE OTHER ARAB STATES. HE WOULD SIMPLY ANNOUNCE THIS IS WHAT HE HAS DECIDED TO DO, AND IF OTHER ARAB STATES DO NOT FURNISH THE NECESSARY DEFENSE FORCES, THAT WOULD JUST BE TOO BAD. AT LEAST THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD PERMIT HIM TO MAKE A REDOUBT OF THE EAST BANK, HE SAID, AND "THIS MIGHT OFFER ME ONE LAST CHANCE TO SERVE MY CAUSE." THE KING OBSERVED THAT PRIME MINISTER TELL THOUGHT OF THE "MILITARY DIRECTORATE" IDEA AS A MEANS OF CALLING THE BLUFF OF PALESTINIANS AND OF OTHER ARAB STATES. HUSSEIN INDICATED HE DIAGNOSES THE SITUATION IN JORDAN AS MORE CRITICAL THAN DOES TELL. HE INDICATED FURTHER THAT HE IS SERIOUS ABOUT ESTABLISHING A "MILITARY DIRECTORATE," AND NOT AS A MEANS TO CALL A BLUFF. THE KING SAID HE WAS QUITE AWARE THAT IF THE WEST BANK WERE TRANSFORMED INTO A "MILITARY DIRECTORATE". MUCH AS HE ENVISAGES, ISRAEL MIGHT DECIDE TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION. HE SAID THIS WAS A CHANCE HE AND ALL THE ARABS WOULD SIMPLY

HAVE TO TAKE. TO TRY TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO IN THE FACE OF AN UNFAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM WASHINGTON TO HIS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WAS CLEARLY IMPOSSIBLE.

1. COMMENT: THERE WERE MANY INDICATIONS DURING THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION THAT THE KING HAS BECOME SUSPICIOUS OF US MOTIVATIONS AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO JORDAN. HE IS PERTURBED THAT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO GIVE GENERAL KHAMMASH AN ANSWER DURING THE FIRST WEEK THE GENERAL WAS IN WASHINGTON. I GATHER HIS APPREHENSIONS ARE TWOFOLD: (A) THAT, AS HE SEES IT, WE ARE SO CLOSELY TIED TO ISRAEL, AND THE ISRAELIS CAN SUENATE SUCH PRESSURE ON US, THAT THIS IS A POWERFUL INHIBITING FACTOR IN OUR ABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE KING'S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE; (B) THAT THE KING BELIEVES THE US DOES NOT HAVE FULL APPRECIATION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION CONCERNING JORDAN OR OF WHAT THE KING CONSIDERS THE POTENT DESIRES OF OTHERS TO REPLACE OUR INFLUENCE IN JORDAN, OR EVEN TO LIQUIDATE JORDAN.

12. I THINK WE CAN TAKE AT FACE VALUE THE KING'S STATEMENT THAT WE MUST GIVE GENERAL KHAMMASH AN ANSWER BY WEDNESDAY AND THAT THE ANSWER WE GIVE WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THE KING TO

BE THE FINAL ANSWER.

13. I REGRET I CANNOT SAY WITH ANY DEGREE OF CERTAINTY WHAT THE KING AND GENERAL KHAMMASH WOULD CONSIDER TO BE A "SATISFACTORY RESPONSE." SINCE GENERAL KHAMMASH IS IN WASHINGTON, AND HE IS THE KEY MAN IN THIS REGARD AND THE KING WILL LIKELY ABIDE BY KHAMMASH'S JUDGMENT, THE DEPARTMENT IS IN A BETTER POSITION THAN EMBASSY AMMAN TO PROBE THE ANSWER. I AM FAIRLY CERTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT THE PACKAGE OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF OUR TEL 1415 REPRESENTS MINIMUM, AND I CANNOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT EVEN THAT PACKAGE IS UNDERSHOOTING WHAT KHAMMASH AND THE KING CONSIDER TO BE THE MINIMUM.

14. THE CONCEPT OF A PALESTINE ENTITY IS NOT A NEW IDEA WITH THE KING; HE WAS TURNING OVER SOMETHING OF THIS SORT IN HIS MIND LAST SUMMER IN POLITICAL RAHER HAN MILITARY TERMS AS A MEANS OF COPING WITH HIS WEST BANK PROBLEM.

15. THE KING SAID HE HOPED THE VIEWS HE HAD EXPRESSED AT THE MEETING LAST EVENING COULD BE BROUGHT TO THE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF THE PRESIDENT.

GP-3. BURNS

BT

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Sunday, December 11, 1966

Mr. President:

Arthur Burns' recommendations, after a long descriptive wind-up, are on page 14, as follows:

*ref: Ltr to Pres from Burns
12/5/66 w/encs: Remarks
by Burns "The Economic
+ Financial Outlook"
at Manhattan
Trust
Bldg
Conf., NY
Dec 2, 1966*

"In the first place, if the purpose of a tax increase is to cool off the economy, such a process is already under way without it. Before a tax increase can be seriously considered on this ground, it will at least need to be demonstrated that the projected monthly rate of federal expenditure for the remainder of this fiscal year exceeds by a substantial margin the rate of expenditure during the months for which data are already available. The figures published by the press in recent days carry no such implication. On the other hand, if the purpose of a tax increase is to permit our monetary authorities to ease credit conditions, this can also be accomplished by curbing expenditures. In fact, expenditures are inherently more flexible than tax rates, so that a moderate retrenchment in non-military spending can be continued, intensified, or dropped later, depending on economic conditions. And it is also useful to recall what history so plainly teaches, that a tax increase which is initially intended to be temporary may last indefinitely and impede progress in the end."

His argument is based on a basically simple analysis:

- a recession is already under way in the civil economy;
- it will be compensated for to an extent he doesn't know by rising government outlays.

My comments are these:

1. His question about the projected rate of monthly expenditures for the rest of the fiscal year is sound, if looked at on a net basis. (Gardner Ackley is preparing a table for you, as a result of my query.)
2. The key to avoiding a recession is creating an environment in which construction revives: that means reduced interest rates plus whatever push the government can mount.

3. Part of our package should be an attempt to get labor back closer to the productivity guidelines. I know it's tough; but our ability to hold the Great Society programs, get housing going again, and avoid a rise in unemployment requires that they play their part. They know, basically, a recession is under way, which will hurt them most.

4. You may want to lock McNamara, Schultze, Ackley, Califano, etc. in a room and tell them to come up with the best mix (or alternatives) to:

- hold the line on Great Society programs;
- revive housing;
- damp inflation.

Some tax increase will probably have to be part of that mix, although we shall need to compensate by pushing construction.

5. I haven't followed these matters all that closely and you shouldn't take my impressions too seriously.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, December 10, 1966 -- 6:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

I have now reconstructed my notes on the Austin ABM debate, as you instructed.

I attach, also, Cy Vance's notes on the other items which were debated. I checked them against mine. His are consistent, but less detailed. If you wish more detail on the other items, I can supply it.

I am, of course, giving this paper no circulation whatsoever.

By tomorrow morning I should have in hand all the memoranda you requested on the question of the Soviet response to our mounting an ABM system.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-28
By sig NARA. Date 1-3-90

WWRostow:rln

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 89-28

DRAFT ~~TOP SECRET~~By icg NARA, Date 1-3-90

12/10/66

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

Notes on Meeting with the President in Austin, Texas, December 6, 1966
with Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Those present were: The President
Secretary McNamara
Deputy Secretary Vance
General Wheeler
General Johnson
Admiral McDonald
General McConnell
General Greene
W. W. Rostow

Secretary McNamara reported that agreement had been reached between the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary, and Members of the Joint Chiefs on all but five major issues: the ABM defense system; advance strategic bomber; advanced ICBM; the Army force structure; and the appropriate number of nuclear fleet escort ships.

The latest Defense budget figures for submission to the President were these:

FY 1967 Vietnam Supplemental, \$14.7 billion (NOA)

Overall Defense budget FY 1968 - \$77.7 billion (NOA)

Overall expenditures Fiscal 1967 - \$68.3

Overall expenditures Fiscal 1968 - \$74.6

The President asked if the Joint Chiefs confirmed Secretary McNamara's statement. The Chairman so stated, and Admiral David McDonald added that in his experience the Secretary and the Chiefs have never been "so close together," except on the five specified issues.

General Wheeler then stated the case for the deployment of an ABM system. He said two new facts had to be taken into account: (1) the USSR was deploying an ABM system around Moscow, and they were deploying a system widely throughout the USSR which might have ABM capabilities; (2) they were installing at an accelerated rate hardened ICBM's, the S-11, a city buster. By 1971 they might have between 800-1100 ICBM's.

We do not know the objective of Soviet nuclear policy: whether it is parity with the U. S. or superiority. But, taken together, their new program could reduce our assured destruction capability; complicate our targeting; reduce confidence in our ability to penetrate; reduce our first-strike capability; and improve the Soviet capability to pursue aims short of nuclear war.

The Chairman then quoted from Secretary McNamara's paper the latter's key judgment:

"After studying the subject exhaustively, Mr. Vance and I have concluded we should not initiate ABM deployment at this time for any of these purposes. We believe that:

"1. The Soviet Union would be forced to react to a U. S. ABM deployment by increasing its offensive nuclear force with the result that:

a. The risk of a Soviet nuclear attack on the U. S. would not be further decreased.

b. The damage to the U. S. from a Soviet nuclear attack, in the event deterrence failed, would not be reduced in any meaningful sense.

The foundation of our security is the deterrence of a Soviet nuclear attack. We believe such an attack can be prevented if it is understood by the Soviets that we possess strategic nuclear forces so powerful as to be capable of absorbing a Soviet first strike and surviving with sufficient strength to impose unacceptable damage on them (e. g., destruction by blast and radiation alone of approximately 20%-30% of their people and 50% of their industry). We have such power today. We must maintain it in the future, adjusting our forces to offset actual or potential changes in theirs."

General Wheeler expressed disagreement with this judgment. He said we cannot predict confidently how the Soviet Union would react to counter our deployment of an ABM system. The costs would constitute an important diversion of resources. The development of multiple warheads would reduce the kilotonnage of their nuclear payloads; they~~xx~~ would face grave uncertainties in targeting against our ABM's. He said deterrence was not only technology, it was a state of mind. Our having an ABM system would increase our deterrence capability no matter what they did.

On the other hand, a lack of a deployed ABM might increase the possibilities of war by accident; create an imbalance or a sense of imbalance between the U. S. and USSR; suggest that we are interested only in the offense; suggest also that the U. S. was not willing to pay to maintain its present nuclear superiority.

We would be denying to many of our own people a chance to survive a nuclear exchange: 30-50 million lives might be saved by NIKE-X.

Therefore, the JCS recommends to the President that we initiate deployment of the NIKE-X system in order to maintain the present overall favorable nuclear balance and give to us some or all of the following advantages:

- damage limiting capability;
- the imposition of new uncertainties should the Soviets contemplate initiating nuclear war;
- to demonstrate that we are not first-strike minded;
- and to maintain the kind of favorable power environment which helped us during the Cuba missile crisis.

Specifically the JCS recommends that we immediately decide to develop Option A to protect 25 U. S. cities. The cost in Fiscal 1968 would be \$800 million; for the period Fiscal 67-76, \$10 billion.

The President asked if there was any difference between the JCS and Secretary McNamara concerning the costs. Secretary McNamara said "No. "

The President then asked if our position would be better if the Soviet Union did not react to our deployment. The Secretary agreed that our position would be better; but that it was "inconceivable" that the Soviet Union would not react to counter our deployment of an ABM system.

The President then asked what determined the difference in judgment between the Secretary and the JCS.

Secretary McNamara replied that the difference lay less in rational calculation than in the inherently emotional nature of the issue. It was extremely hard to make the case for a policy which appeared to be denying protection to our people, when the Soviet Union was willing to employ large resources to protect its people. He said he was fully aware that if the President decided against deploying an ABM system he would face a most difficult time politically and psychologically. Why, then, does he recommend against?

First, the Soviet Union has been wrong in its nuclear defense policy for a decade. They have systematically spent 2 or 3 times what we have on defense. It has not been worth it. Their defenses are not worth a damn. We still can impose unacceptable losses on them even after a first strike.

Because they are making an error in deploying ABM's is no reason we should also make that error.

Second, we must be clear why it would be an error for us. If we go ahead with the \$10 billion ABM program and they did not react if the U. S. struck first, they would lose 70 million of their population, and we would lose only 15 million of ours. Therefore, they would have to do something about it. Their security would depend on their doing something about it. They would have to bring back their assured damage capability to something like 80 million U. S. fatalities under their planning case, which is U. S. strikes first. As they did so, we could not hold to our initial \$10 million ABM system. We would have to expand in response to what they did, both our ABM and our offensive systems.

Secretary McNamara concluded that we would ^{be} launching ourselves and the Soviet Union into two decades of escalatory action in the nuclear field in which the costs on each side would prove to be of the order of \$30-40 billion. We would each end up no better off than we are at present.

Secretary McNamara then said there are certain rational roles for a limited ABM system, in particular these four:

- to protect our offensive force, notably our Minutemen;
- to protect in the time frame 1975-85 against a CHICOM ICBM capability;
- to protect against an accidental firing of a single missile;
- to protect against a small blackmail Soviet attack.

12/10/66

In the face of the terrible dilemma faced by the President, Secretary McNamara is inclined to recommend, as a fallback from his judgment against the ABM system, a limited system with these four capabilities. On the basis of that system we could explore whether the Soviet Union was willing to negotiate a freeze acceptable to us.

The President then asked, "Is there any middle ground in this debate?" Secretary McNamara said that the emotionalism attaching to the ABM issue made middle ground hard to find.

The President asked what would the view be in the Congress?

Secretary McNamara said about 25% of the Congress -- the Liberals -- would oppose the ABM. Senators Russell, Stennis, etc., would strongly favor it, and they would have about 40% of the Congress with them. The balance of 35% would remain in the middle and be subject to persuasion. The President asked who might be on that middle ground. Secretary McNamara replied Senators like Keuchel and Javits.

He pointed out further that the Congress had been interesting itself in this matter for a long time. Last year they voted \$165 million for ABM's, and when he inquired what they had in mind, they didn't know: they merely wanted to move in that direction.

The President asked again, "What is a middle alternative?"

Secretary McNamara pointed out that we did not have to make a final decision one way or the other right now. For example, we had important technical problems to overcome with respect to the warheads for the Olympia ABM. We had to

12/10/66

install at Kwajalein a quite revolutionary system for '69 tests of the ABM. It is quite risky in fact to start building plant for the ABM system before those tests are complete. In short, there are technical reasons to go slow.

With these unsolved technical problems as a background, we could move forward with a limited system to get the four objectives Secretary McNamara had earlier stated. As for the fifth objective -- population protection -- we would not be able to walk away from that forever, but we would have some time to see if anything could be worked out with the Soviet Union to avoid the interacting escalation in the nuclear arms race that was otherwise inevitable.

Deputy Secretary Vance then added that he did not believe we could stand for long with Posture A, which promised to protect 25 cities. Under pressure from other cities and regions, the Congress would go for a full program. It would be wiser to face from the beginning that if we started down the road to population protection, it is really Posture B that we were undertaking -- a \$20 billion rather than a \$10 billion program.

General Wheeler said that, given the lead time, we ought to begin to build factories now for certain of the components about which we are technically sure. We do not have that capability and it should not be delayed.

Secretary McNamara came back again to the point that a decision not to deploy would create emotional and political problems in the country, and that a decision to deploy merely to protect offensive forces would face the

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same emotional problem. There would be a strong impulse to protect people, not missiles. As for the factories, he said the components are complex; there are many parts to be tested .

Our experience is that the system will prove more expensive than we presently calculated.

General Johnson said the critical question was U. S. casualties. An ABM system would cut our casualties in a nuclear exchange. Secretary McNamara replied that he completely disagreed because the USSR would react to re-establish its assured damage capability.

General Johnson said that there were constraints on their ability if they did react. Secretary McNamara replied that both an Air Force study and an NIE had indicated that the Soviet Union could not afford not to react.

The President wondered if the best opportunity for agreement among us would not be a decision to move ahead on a limited basis and to see what we can negotiate with the Soviet Union. Admiral McDonald said the Soviet Union was now moving ahead both with ABM's and to increase its offensive nuclear force. Secretary McNamara said that their defensive effort was wasted.

General McConnell said that their defensive effort was not wholly wasted. They had imposed ~~excess~~ heavy additional costs on the U. S. to assure our continued penetration ability.

Secretary McNamara said we have over-reacted. We have more than insured that we can still maintain our assured damage capability. The Soviet ABM's have not saved Soviet lives.

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General McConnell said he can't forget that we are dealing with the descendants of Genghis Khan. They only understand force.

Secretary McNamara agreed and said that is why, at whatever cost, we must maintain our assured second-strike damage capability. Deputy Secretary Vance added that that is why we have gone ahead with POSEIDON and other means to assure our ability to penetrate an ABM system.

Secretary McNamara asked if the JCS would wish to express any views if there were a press conference. The members of the JCS replied that none of them desired to meet the press.

The subject then turned to the second item in which there was disagreement; that is, the advanced strategic bomber (AMSA).



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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

December 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. AMSA

Mr. McNamara asked General McConnell to state the position of the Joint Chiefs with respect to AMSA. General McConnell said that the Chiefs wish to proceed to contract definition. He said he wanted to make very clear that this did not mean full-scale development. General McConnell said further that the Chiefs wish to do full-scale development of the engines required for an advanced manned strategic aircraft, but went on to point out that this engine would have uses for other aircraft as well as AMSA. He stated, thirdly, that the Chiefs wish to proceed with further avionic development for the AMSA. He said the Chiefs wish to proceed to contract definition so that we would be in a position to seek to obtain an IOC in 1974. General McConnell went on to say that it was his own personal belief that it would not be possible to get an IOC of 1974, even if we proceeded on the schedule recommended by the JCS. He said he believed that a more likely IOC would be 1976.

Mr. McNamara pointed out that he and Mr. Vance did not feel that we need an IOC of 1974. Further, he said it is not clear that we need a new manned bomber.

The President then asked General McConnell the difference between the FB-111 and the AMSA in respect of speed and other characteristics. General McConnell said the AMSA would have a slightly higher speed, more range, and a substantially greater bomb carrying capacity. He said the latter factor was of greatest importance. General McConnell said he wanted to repeat that he is not asking for full-scale development.

Mr. McNamara then said it is doubtful that we will need a new manned bomber because of difficulties associated with penetration of the Soviet Union during that time period. He also said that missiles plus the FB-111 force which the United States will have at that time may be enough to meet our force requirements.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-25

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By ijp, NARA, Date 5-17-91

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Mr. McNamara said that it was his opinion, and that of Mr. Vance, that we did not need to move as fast as the Air Force is requesting, and that we should go forward with the development of engines and avionics which are not unique to the AMSA.

General McConnell then said he wanted to point out that the Air Force had done a number of studies which had indicated that a mixture of bombers and missiles is more cost effective than missiles alone.

The President said he would consider the matter and give his decision at a later date.

2. ICM

Mr. McNamara said that the difference between the recommendation of the Chiefs and that of himself and Mr. Vance was merely when we might need such an advanced intercontinental ballistic missile. He said we do not disagree that preliminary work should be started.

General McConnell stated that the Joint Chiefs recommend that we develop an ICM at a total cost in FY 1968 of \$36 million. This \$36 million would be broken down into \$10 million for various component development, and the balance for contract definition. General McConnell said the Secretary of the Air Force would not go to contract definition but would spend \$19 million for component development. General McConnell said the Joint Chiefs could live with a \$19 million program.

Mr. McNamara responded that he thought we could work this out as he and Mr. Vance were recommending a program of \$19 million, and the only question between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mr. McNamara and Mr. Vance was how fast we should proceed.

General McConnell emphasized that for the expenditure of \$2 1/2 million in offense, we could cause the Soviets to spend \$80 million in defense. Mr. McNamara pointed out that this was the very point he and Mr. Vance had been making in the ABM discussion.

3. Army Force Structure

Mr. McNamara said that the Army has recommended that two more brigades be authorized in the Active Army, with a possibility of adding another division to the Active Army force structure in Calendar Year 1967. He said the Army proposed that these additional forces be

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equipped with equipment taken from the Reserve. He pointed out that thus the effect of authorizing these additional forces would merely be one of substituting the deployment time of Active forces for Reserve forces. He then asked General Johnson to speak to this issue.

General Johnson said that normally we use Active forces to build a time bridge, during which time Reserve forces are called to active duty and brought to a point of training where they can be deployed. He said that with respect to part of our reserve force, i. e., the Selected Reserve Force, we have reduced the training time required before that force could be deployed from 14 to 11 weeks. He said we expect to reduce it further to reach a goal of 8 weeks.

General Johnson then said he wanted to point out that we had certain additional "bills" which had been laid before us: (1) the requirement of three divisions to meet NATO commitments; (2) 40,000 personnel to maintain the proposed barrier in South Vietnam; and (3) a corps contingency force of three divisions. He said that to meet these "bills" we have only five division forces in the continental United States in the Active Army. He said this caused him concern because of indications of possible aggressive action by the North Koreans, and the possibility that the situation might become more unstable in Cyprus and Jordan, and that the United States might be required to supply forces for these contingencies.

General Johnson said if he were queried by the Congress as to the adequacy of our ground forces, he would have to say we were very thin. He said, therefore, he recommends that the additional forces he has requested be authorized.

Mr. McNamara said that we are equipment limited -- that this did not mean we did not have additional equipment, but that we had bought equipment for only the authorized force structure. He said, therefore, what General Johnson was talking about was merely shifting equipment from the Reserve to the Active Army, thus substituting a slight reduction in reaction time.

He said an alternative to General Johnson's proposal was the calling up of Reserves. He said further that he and Mr. Vance had raised with the Joint Chiefs last week the desirability of calling up Reserves, and they did not recommend we do so at this time. The President then asked each of the Chiefs whether they favored a call-up of Reserves at this time. Each of the Chiefs replied in the negative.

4. Navy Shipbuilding

Mr. McNamara stated that we were proposing to go forward with the construction of one DLGN, which had been authorized in the FY 1967 budget, and the construction of two DDG's. He said that Admiral McDonald would recommend that we add another DLGN in the FY 1968 budget. He pointed out, however, that he thought there was a broader issue that Admiral McDonald might wish to address -- the entire shipbuilding program.

Admiral McDonald said he wanted to point out that there had been no major Navy escort ships constructed since 1962. He said last year the Department of Defense had supported two DDG's but no DLGN. He said he felt this year we ought to have one more DLGN over and above the one authorized by the Congress in FY 1967, and that if we did not put in another DLGN, we would end up in the same wrangle with the Congress that we had last year.

Admiral McDonald said the basic issue is how many nuclear escorts there should be per carrier. He said he and the Navy believe there should be two per nuclear carrier, while Mr. McNamara and Mr. Vance felt there should be only one. Admiral McDonald said he did not feel we were pushing too fast on nuclear power, because the Navy was asking for only these two DLGN's and was not asking for any other nuclear powered ships.

Admiral McDonald said he also wanted to mention the issue of nuclear submarines. He said nuclear submarines were one of the most important elements of our ASW program. He said currently we have 105 submarines in our ASW program, and that this figure was agreed to by both the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He said the Navy ~~feels~~ that all of these submarines should be nuclear powered, but that up to now the Office of the Secretary of Defense believes that we should have only 68 nuclear submarines. Admiral McDonald said that in the past we had been constructing five nuclear attack submarines per year, and the Navy feels we should continue at five per year until we get a higher number.

Admiral McDonald said his main concern is what happens in 1968 and beyond, and that we need at least five per year for the next three years.

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Mr. McNamara pointed out that the Navy hopes in 1968 to have a newer class of submarine. Therefore, he said both he and Mr. Vance have felt it advantageous to put two of the five submarines which were tentatively scheduled for FY 1968 over until next year, which would thus permit the Navy to take advantage of the newer technology that would be available in such a new class.

The President reserved decision on this issue.

The President on three different occasions during the discussions asked whether it was correct to state that, apart from the five issues which had been presented to him, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement with the budget. Each of the Chiefs said that this was the fact. Admiral McDonald stated that he thought the Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense and Mr. Vance were closer together this year than any other year that he could remember.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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December 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Grant of Military Equipment to
Jordan

Recommendation:

That you approve the sending of the enclosed letter from Acting Secretary Katzenbach to King Hussein which agrees to grant certain items of military equipment to Jordan.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The Israeli raid of November 13 on Samua village in Jordan damaged the nation's sense of security, jeopardized the morale of the Jordan Arab Army and weakened the King's prestige. In an attempt to restore his standing with the army and vindicate his policy of relying on the U.S. for support, King Hussein sent his Chief of Staff General Amir Khammash to Washington with a request for:

1. A grant of \$130 million worth of military equipment.
2. An agreement that the USG pay future installments on contracts previously signed with the USG for military jet aircraft and military ground equipment in the total amount of approximately \$70 million.
3. U.S. assent and support for an increase in the annual military budget of Jordan by \$28 million per year.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-500

By us, NARA Date 4-27-99

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downgrading and
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The Secretary of Defense and I agree that we should meet the request by offering a modest additional amount of military equipment to Jordan by reprogramming approximately \$4.7 million in MAP funds from lower priority needs. These items will be in addition to an existing MAP of \$3.5 million to Jordan for this fiscal year. The additional equipment was selected so as to increase mobility, firepower and effectiveness of communications for the Jordan Arab Army while minimizing additional manpower requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that even a significantly larger amount of additional equipment would have no appreciable effect on the military balance in the area.

We may receive some reaction from the Government of Israel. We are dealing with this reaction by keeping the Israelis generally informed and explaining to them that this grant, by strengthening King Hussein, would be in their interest. We have also spoken to several Congressmen and will continue our congressional briefings.

We believe that this grant may fail to satisfy King Hussein. If it appears likely that Hussein will take drastic action inconsistent with our relationship with Jordan, we intend to send a team to Amman headed by a high ranking official to listen to the King's views. In any case, we expect to have a difficult series of negotiations with him soon on the future level of our aid programs to Jordan.

The letter to King Hussein would be sent telegraphically.


Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter to King Hussein from
the Acting Secretary

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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Your Majesty:

We continue to follow with admiration the way you and your government are dealing with the difficult situation confronting you. We have been grateful, too, for the presence here of your distinguished Chief of Staff. Through him we have been able to gain, at first hand, a fuller appreciation of the problems you are facing.

Let me say at the outset that we understand the great concern which the Israeli action of November 13 has caused you, both as to the adequacy of your defense and the wisdom of your policy of moderation. However, we continue to believe that the attack at Samua does not presage a change in Israel's previous policy. This is an element in our calculations which I believe it important to underscore. At the same time we can well appreciate the unfortunate effect which the raid of November 13th has had on your nation's sense of security and on the morale of the Jordan Arab Army. This is, I assure you, a matter of concern to us, as we fully recognize the important role the Jordan Arab Army plays today, and must play for some time to come, in the maintenance of Jordanian stability and security.

We recognize, too, the importance of that stability and security to the achievement of economic growth and self-sufficiency upon which, as you have often emphasized, so much in the long run depends. It is for this reason that in addition to our major and in many ways unique economic assistance program, we recognize the importance of a Jordan military assistance program.

As General Khammash will report to you, however, we are very seriously concerned by the long-term financial and economic implications of the current and projected force goals and of the indicated equipment requirements of the Jordan Arab Army. These concerns are strengthened by our understanding that some increase in the pay of all enlisted ranks is likely to be essential in the very near future.

We feel that action with respect to an increase in force levels requires more thorough and thoughtful consideration than it has been

possible

His Majesty
Hussein I,
King of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan.

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Authority NLS 91-110
By cb, NARA, Date 9-3-98

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
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possible to give in the short time available. Hopefully, a few weeks hence and in more tranquil circumstances, both of our governments will be in a better position to engage in a useful discussion respecting the longer-term implications of the problems now facing us in the Middle East. The United States would welcome at that time an opportunity to discuss the relationship of recent events to the limits on your budgetary expenditure as set forth in the several United States-Jordan agreements, the appropriate size of the Jordanian armed forces and the nature of their equipment, the levels of external assistance likely to be available from traditional sources, and what role the United States might usefully play in a Jordanian effort to develop supplementary financial support from other Arab states which have an important stake in the continued integrity and stability of Jordan.

Meanwhile we are very much aware that your attention and energies must for the present continue to be focused on the immediate problem of surmounting your internal difficulties. We on our part are most anxious, without waiting for the discussions I have mentioned, to take additional steps now to help you meet the immediate problems. With this in mind, Secretary McNamara has been pleased to respond quickly to part of the equipment needs which General Khammash has outlined. Details are being provided to General Khammash. This is a substantial response in which we have been guided both by what can be made available relatively promptly and by the need which the Jordan Arab Army feels for an upgrading of firepower and an improvement of its mobility and communications. When this equipment is in place (and delivery over the next few months is feasible), we believe it will have a significant effect in improving the defensive capabilities of the army. It is our hope, too, that knowledge of this prompt and substantial response on our part will have an immediate and beneficial effect on army morale.

Your Majesty, my government continues to watch closely events now unfolding in the Middle East. In reiterating our admiration for the manner in which you are facing the problems these events have created for Jordan, let me also renew our assurances of continued United States friendship and support.

Sincerely yours,



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Mr. Rostow 29

1. Susp
2. Pres file

Saturday
December 9, 1966 — 11:30 AM

Mr. President:

I recommend for your signature this reply to former Indonesian Ambassador Palar's letter advising you that his assignment here is completed.

W. W. Rostow

Disapprove _____

See Me _____

December 12, 1966

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you for your letter expressing appreciation for the courtesy and consideration extended to you during your tour of duty as Indonesian Ambassador to the United States. I, too, regret that the opportunity did not arise to bid you farewell personally before the termination of your mission.

I congratulate you on the many years of service you have given to your country and wish you well in your new endeavors. I know that we share the hope that relations between Indonesia and the United States will continue to improve in the years that lie ahead.

Sincerely,

LBJ

His Excellency L. N. Palar
c/o The Embassy of the
Republic of Indonesia
2020 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:State:DWR:heg

~~1. copy~~
2. Pres file

Saturday, December 10, 1966
6:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

As Bob indicates in the attached, we have been trying to formalize a 1967 Viet Nam plan. Here is a draft NSAM which contains its main features.

I might have some language changes to suggest; but I believe it is a good start.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

good

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12353, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Out NARS, Date 8-26-86

cc: Mr. Robert Komer

WWRostow:rlh

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 10, 1966

Walt,

Here is our revised action program (all your changes included) in draft NSAM form.

I want to show it to you first, also because I use your name in vain in my covering note. But will you please endorse it on to the President (with comment if you wish) for Sunday night reading. I hope to see him Monday on other matters, and can get a preliminary reaction then.

R. W. Komer

OK

I'd have some language
changes of a minor
kind to suggest -
but it's a start

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I hope to talk with you briefly Monday about the attached outline of an optimum Vietnam strategy for 1967. Walt Rostow and I have been plugging for this as a means of getting a clear focus on the all-out effort needed next year.

We suggest putting it in the form of attached NSAM, as one way of providing the necessary emphasis. The components are nothing new, but put together this way with your imprimatur they would have real force. If you agree in principle, we would promptly negotiate it out around the town.

Equally important, a plan of this sort would provide the basis for clear assignment of responsibilities for execution and for necessary management changes to make sure they get effectively carried out.

I will confess to a case of "the six-month frustrations", having now been in the job long enough to realize both the immensity of the task and the sheer difficulty of getting things done. But I am equally convinced that if we can jack up our management in Washington and especially Saigon, and press the GVN a lot harder than we have, we'll be able to see daylight by the end of 1967.



R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-124
By sig, NARA, Date 11-3-92

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10 December 1966

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. _____

SUBJECT: Strategic Guidelines for 1967 in Vietnam

Now that the extensive deployment and skillful use of U.S. forces has greatly improved our military position in Vietnam, it is imperative that we mount and effectively orchestrate a concerted military, civil, and political effort to achieve a satisfactory outcome as soon as possible. To this end, I approve the following guidelines for such an effort, and for ensuring that it is effectively carried out.

I. Our Strategic Aims. These must be to:

A. Maximize the prospects for a satisfactory outcome in Vietnam by December 1967-June 1968 or, if this is not possible, put us in the best position for the longer pull.


B. Be equally suited to (a) forcing Hanoi to negotiate; (b) weakening the VC/NVA to the point where Hanoi will opt to fade away; or (c) at the minimum, making it patently clear to all (especially the South Vietnamese and U.S. public) that the war is demonstrably being won.

C. Complement our anti-main force campaign and bombing offensive by greatly increased efforts to pacify the countryside and increase the attractive power of the GVN--all these to the end of accelerating the erosion of southern VC strength and creating a bandwagon psychology among the people of SVN. This strategy is also well suited to exploiting any possibilities of a Hanoi/NLF split.

II. Action Programs for 1967. To achieve our strategic aims will require a maximum continuing effort in the following nine program areas:

A. Press a Major Pacification Effort, employing the bulk of the RVNAF.

1. Devise a concrete and detailed US/GVN pacification plan for 1967 which will: (a) set realistic goals by region and

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by province, with emphasis on areas or LOCs where early results are possible; (b) provide for adequate force allocations and time-phasing; (c) properly dovetail the military and civil programs.

2. Retrain, re-motivate and deploy a steadily increasing proportion of ARVN in supporting the RF and PF in clear-and-hold operations as the key to pacification.
3. Progressively open essential roads, railroad and canals on a planned schedule.
4. Revitalize and accelerate the civil side of pacification.
5. Devise improved techniques for measuring pacification progress and presenting them to the public.

B. Step up the Anti-Main Force Spoiling Offensive, as made feasible by the increase in FW maneuver battalions.

1. Introduce modest US forces into certain key Delta areas.
2. Stress offensive actions to clear VC base areas and LOCs around Saigon.
3. Lay on a major re-examination of our intelligence on VC/NVA strength.

C. Make More Effective Programs to Limit Infiltration and Impose a Cost on Hanoi for the Aggression.

1. Refine the bombing offensive with respect to both efficiency of route harassment and quality of targets.
2. Press forward with barrier system.
3. Examine other ways to apply military pressure on the North.

D. Mount a Major, Continuing National Reconciliation Program, designed to maximize the inducements aimed at eroding VC strength.

1. Expand and revitalize Chieu Hoi Program to handle 45,000 lower level defectors a year.
2. Press a sustained middle and high level defector program under appropriate auspices.
3. Ensure that new Constitution is consistent with re-integration of VC into the national life.
4. Develop a US contingency plan on how to handle VC/NLF in the next local and national elections, examining options of allowing VC to vote or perhaps even inviting NLF to run as a party in next national election.
5. Enlarge efforts to establish contacts with the VC/NLF.

E. Press for the Emergence of a Popularly-Based GVN, with adequate checks and balances between the civilians and the military, and between northerners and southerners.

1. Make clear well in advance to the Directory that the US cannot accept a retrogression to military government, another coup, or blatant election rigging.
2. Press home to all--civilian and military--the importance of national unity and pulling together, as a minimum US condition for continued US support of SVN.
3. Use all our influence behind the scenes to bring about a smooth transition to a representative GVN, but one in which the still indispensable military role is not submerged.

F. Press for Other Key Elements of the Manila Program which will enhance the GVN's attractiveness.

1. Encourage better local government, including elected hamlet, village, and district/province officials.

2. Insist on a workable scheme of land reform, land tenure, and rent moratorium.
3. Vigorously attack corruption and misuse of US aid.

G. Maintain the Civil Economy and Keep a Firm Lid on Inflation.

1. Enforce a vigorous stabilization program.
2. Definitively lick the port bottleneck--both movement into the warehouses and movement out.
3. Maintain an adequate import level.
4. Generate more rice from the countryside.
5. Accelerate the creation of infrastructure for economic development.
6. Mount an imaginative postwar planning exercise.

H. Devise a Pre-Negotiating and Negotiating Strategy Consistent with the Above.

1. Take such initiatives as will credibly enhance our posture that we are always ready to talk and ever alert for new avenues to negotiation.
2. Vigorously pursue serious negotiating leads.

I. Mount a Major Information Campaign to inform both the US electorate and world opinion of the realities in Vietnam, finding ways credibly to measure progress.