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December 5, 1966

Mr. President:

Here is a thoughtful, well written CIA paper on the view from Hanoi.

It concludes that Hanoi may be choosing between:

- a return to full-scale guerrilla war;
- the opening of a negotiating track.

The authors do not know of Marigold.

It leaves out, curiously, the pressure of bombing in the North. This may be an item in the equation which could tip the balance towards negotiation; but we shall shortly see.

3.3(b)(1) In this connection, [REDACTED]

"There is a growing conviction among Vietnamese that they have no possibility of 'winning.' The mounting losses in industrial economy and manpower are now reaching a serious stage though still not desperate. There is also a realization that they had some illusions about internal disunity in America among political parties about the American role in Vietnam. They now realize that the Republican Party may be even more determined."

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-15
By cbm, NARA, Date 6-14-04

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Memo for the Director,
30 Nov 1966, Subject: The
View from Hanoi.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

30 November 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The View from Hanoi

1. What is the view from Hanoi? What is Hanoi's current evaluation of: (a) the course of the war? (b) the political situation in South Vietnam? (c) the international climate, including US domestic opinion?

2. The Military Situation. In the spring of 1965 Hanoi made two fateful decisions. The first was to pass up an opportunity for negotiations, provided by a private Soviet proposal to reconvene the Geneva conference; this was soon followed by the famous four points, a program patently designed to discourage any negotiations. The second decision was to meet the prospective American buildup of ground forces by continuing the input of North Vietnamese regular units, and trying to maintain offensive operations, decisions which apparently were questioned by some "comrades," including perhaps General Giap.

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GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 89-22

By ing NARA, Date 11-16-89

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3. Hanoi has had a good 12 months to evaluate the consequences of this general policy. From the military viewpoint, developments must be fairly discouraging. Since the inconclusive battle of the Ia Drang Valley (November 1965), the regular NVN regiments have not won any major engagement. Even if one accepts the official NVN position that this is a protracted war of attrition, the statistics cast doubt on the validity of Hanoi's previous strategy. To the extent to which wars can be measured by statistics the NVA/VC forces are losing.

4. The operation across the DMZ which began in June provided further evidence that their offensive strategy was faltering. It is still not too clear what precise objectives this bold move was intended to accomplish. But whatever its purpose the operation was stalled. No important ground was gained, only a small American force was diverted from another area, and no little Dienbienphus were contrived before the US congressional elections.

5. Adding to the setback in the northern tip of South Vietnam was the mauling of the NVA/VC in Binh Dinh (Operation Irving) followed by the equally costly operation in Tay Ninh (Operation Attleboro) which took a heavy toll of men and materiel

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in the long held base area of War Zone C. What must be impressive to Hanoi is the ability of the US to move from one major battle to another, while the NVA/VC have been incapable of mounting a series of major offensive operations which would seem necessary to the success of their strategy.

6. For example, there was apparently no effort made to relieve the pressures in the DMZ by major action elsewhere, which points up a simple fact about the war: the NVA/VC units can no longer mount or prepare major operations without inviting highly damaging US spoiling attacks. The proposition that the Communist forces have lost the battlefield initiative has become a cliché, but it is nevertheless one that must be disturbing to Hanoi.*

7. It can be argued, of course, that Hanoi does not take such a short-term view, but sees the war as part of a long-term revolutionary process which began 20 years ago. Moreover, the North Vietnamese can point to some significant achievements: their main forces are larger today than a year ago and the flow of men

* For example, the present situation bears little resemblance to General Giap's claim of last May, "In the military field, the Southern people now have a strong regular force, capable of fighting increasingly large battles."

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and materiel is at least adequate to maintain this level. The intervention of the US has not yet shaken morale importantly. And an entire area -- the Delta -- has been relatively unaffected by the US action. In short, the NVA/VC forces are still intact.

8. How important is the military factor? Over a year ago General Giap asserted, "the essential problem, the decisive problem is who will be the final victor on the battlefields of South Vietnam ...". If we are in any significant measure correct in our judgment of how the situation looks to them, the Communist military strategists must already have had doubts over their future strategy.

9. The Political Situation. On the political front, Ho Chi Minh and his advisors are faced with a more ambiguous situation. One hard fact confronting Hanoi, however, is the surprising durability of the Ky government despite repeated crises. If the NVN regime has been counting on a state of permanent upheaval in Saigon, they should now revise their estimate. To be sure, there will be more crises, squabbles, and infighting in Saigon, but even some consistent critics are allowing a bit of optimism to creep into their observations.*

* For example, Denis Warner, "South Vietnam's Political Awakening," The Reporter, 17 November 1966.

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10. Hanoi could, of course, take refuge in the long view. It might reason that a superficial stability cannot conceal the fundamental problems of regional and religious conflicts which inevitably come to the fore in South Vietnam. Hanoi might postpone decisions about the war in the hope that, over the next year, the work of the constituent assembly and national elections could produce a South Vietnamese government more favorable to the Communists as a prospective negotiating partner. Or they may believe that the process of developing a constitutional government will prove so disruptive that recent progress will be wiped out.

11. But it cannot be too comforting, if Hanoi's leaders compare the current situation with their estimate in early 1965 that the complete collapse of South Vietnam was not far off. And they must be influenced by the fact that despite the successive turnovers in Saigon, no important political, military, or religious figure has defected to the National Front since the death of Diem.

12. Of considerable concern to Hanoi, perhaps even more so than the political developments in Saigon, is the effectiveness of the Revolutionary Development program. This threatens the VC directly. Hanoi's propaganda and military actions are strong indications that destroying this program is a key objective. Hanoi probably views

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this program as relatively ineffective, thus far, it is probably more apprehensive over the future. Of particular concern to Hanoi would be the assignment of more ARVN units to security roles, since this would require the VC to use larger, better armed units to combat the Revolutionary Development program.

13. The Enemy -- the US. Some of these political developments in Saigon as well as the trends on the battleground have been apparent for some time. Thus, in order to account for Hanoi's persistent determination to fight on, many Western observers have increasingly focused on the state of US domestic and international opinion as the main prop in Hanoi's calculations. It is difficult to see these matters from Hanoi's point of view. How do the Communist leaders evaluate a student riot at Berkeley or Harvard? How do they interpret the election of Congressman X or the defeat of Senator Y? The standard estimate has been that Hanoi believes that a combination of US and international opinion will eventually force the US to offer important concessions to disengage from the war.

14. One wonders whether this is still a sound estimate of Hanoi's view. It is characteristic of hoary Marxist-Leninist analyses that "the people" will prevail on the capitalists to

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change their policies. But Communist leaders have become much more sophisticated since the 1920's and 1930's, and Ho Chi Minh has a well deserved reputation for political acuity. Ho should now recognize that the effect of US opinion on US policy is difficult enough for Dr. Gallup and Lou Harris to measure, let alone for the American section of the NVN foreign office. And public opinion is a weak reed on which to base a political-military strategy.

15. The trouble is that Ho has been through this before with the French. Even General Giap concedes that French politics were as important to his victory as the tide of battle. We do not know whether Ho really believes, as he claims, that the US will decide to give way, or whether he clings to this out of growing desperation. Unfortunately, it makes quite a difference.

16. In any case, the North Vietnamese almost certainly recognize that the presidential election of 1968 is an important target date for planning purposes. If they do still believe that American opinion and politics will in the long term prove decisive, then there is a strong incentive to hang on until mid-1968. Nevertheless, they must worry whether frustration over the war will

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lead to a sharp escalation over the next 18 months. Thus, this important factor can work in both ways on Hanoi.

17. As far as hard evidence is concerned, there is none. The repeated statements of various Vietnamese are not a good guide, since one could hardly expect them to engage in a frank analysis either with the Premier of Rumania or an AFP correspondent. But it may be indicative that Hanoi's reaction to the results of US congressional elections has been to dismiss them as unimportant. Hanoi could have chosen to read into the results a growing opposition to the war, or at least emphasize this propaganda line. That they did not may mean they are backing off one step, so as not to encourage illusion in their own country.

18. The International Climate. As to Hanoi's evaluation of international opinion, the picture may be a little clearer. As the Economist pointed out recently, the vaunted "third force" is not at present a very effective factor in international politics. If Hanoi's leaders expected a year ago that a ground swell of international opinion would eventually overwhelm the US, they

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must now be quite disappointed. Undoubtedly fate has dealt them some unkind blows: some of the more strident voices, Nkrumah's, Ben Bella's, Sukarno's are silent, and Hanoi pays some price, for example in India, for its close alliance with China. Finally, Hanoi's own intransigence has repeatedly denied potential supporters the opportunity and the means to bring real diplomatic pressures on the US. It is perhaps indicative of the state of affairs, that outside the Communist world, Bertrand Russell is currently Hanoi's loudest and most colorful champion.

19. China -- the Uncertain Ally. A new factor bearing on Hanoi's position is the crisis in China. Hanoi cannot fail to be seriously concerned about the disruption of a previously stable political leadership in Peking. Hanoi is affected in two ways. First, there is the growing tension between Moscow and Peking. To be sure Hanoi has managed to steer clear of this conflict and fairly skillfully, and has even profited materially from Sino-Soviet competition. But given the uncertainties in China, there is a growing chance that China might force Hanoi to take a stand against Russia. The attitude of the Chinese toward "fence

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sitting" has become progressively sharper. Hanoi is likely to see little choice but to align with China. This must seem highly unpalatable.

20. A second effect on Hanoi of China's situation may be that China now looks less reliable as a deterrent. The North Vietnamese cannot have failed to notice that China's role in and its international role as Hanoi's champion have been greatly over-shadowed by Peking's domestic troubles. Of course, China's military potential has not diminished, but there is a growing impression abroad, particularly in Japan, that the danger of Chinese intervention is receding. Thus, Hanoi tends to be deprived of a high card. The firing of China's nuclear missile caused some international apprehension over the development of a strategic capability, but Hanoi probably realizes that this is still too far in the future to affect the current situation.

21. In sum, China is increasingly exposed as a rather uncertain and unstable ally, and the net result may be a loss of Chinese influence in Hanoi.

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22. The USSR. It has usually been considered that the USSR was a counterweight to the Chinese in Hanoi, and that a rise in Soviet influence meant a rise in the chance of a negotiating situation. As far as the Soviet attitude was concerned, this was probably more likely in the early days of Soviet involvement in the war than now. The Soviets may see certain byproducts from the war in terms of their own interests: strains on American resources and aggravation of US problems in Europe. At the same time, the Soviets must be aware of the risk of escalation. And neither China nor Russia has the degree of influence or control necessary to force political or military decisions on Hanoi. Thus, the USSR has little choice but to wait for the moment in which Hanoi seems susceptible to Soviet advice. Such advice probably would be for Hanoi to move toward political action, but the Soviets probably also realize that they cannot provide the guarantee of an outcome that would satisfy Hanoi.

23. Hanoi's Future Strategy. The foregoing presents a bleak picture for Hanoi and a probability that it will become worse. Even so, Hanoi is not necessarily as impressed as an outside observer with what the latter would see as adversity. The North

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Vietnamese are apt to view their overall situation as worse than a year ago, but not yet critical. They almost certainly would believe that their present situation is much better than the Viet Minh's prospects in say 1951. But the question remains whether they will conclude that their basic interests can be better served by a new and different combination of military and political tactics.

24. Hanoi could view its future strategy in terms of three options. First, to change the character of the war by escalation either through use of their own forces or by calling in the Chinese. This seems highly unlikely and has seemed so for some time. Escalation in this manner is probably not a serious alternative at present, especially as long as the situation in China is so unstable. This does not mean that Hanoi will not keep the pressure on the US by the use of a select number of Communist "volunteers" in NVN.

25. Hanoi could change the nature of the war in another way, by reverting to "protracted war" in which guerilla operations are primary. This alternative must seem attractive in the military

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sense. Operations in small units, terrorism, sabotage, etc., might hold the answer to the question of how to cope with superior US mobility and fire power in large engagements. A guerrilla strategy, moreover, would be consistent with a policy of long term resistance, in which the war weariness of the enemy becomes the main objective. Under this strategy, Hanoi would have several options for disposing the NVA regiments. It could break them down into smaller units, or it could retain them intact as a potential threat in order to tie down American forces in certain areas. Hanoi might even withdraw certain units, attempting to bargain for a US withdrawal.

26. The key question, however, is whether a reversion from a supposedly higher stage of revolutionary warfare to a lower one can be accomplished without serious damage to the morale and the structure of the fighting force. According to General Giap, "guerrilla war must multiply. To keep itself in life and develop, guerrilla warfare has necessarily to develop into mobile warfare. This is a general law." There is some evidence that this issue of guerrilla versus mobile warfare has been under debate in Hanoi, though it is expressed in a modified

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form, i.e., "offensive" versus "defensive" operations. It may be that we are already witnessing an adjustment toward the "defensive" option.

27. One consequence of a shift in military strategy toward protracted, guerrilla operation might be a loosening up of political tactics. Hanoi's handling of the four point program and its relationship to negotiations might be modified. They might hope to regain some international support by appearing more flexible and in the process to create apprehension in Saigon and uncertainties in the US. Thus Hanoi might seek to create an ambiguous situation in which the US would find it politically difficult to maintain or increase the military pressures, particularly the bombing of North Vietnam.

28. An alternative to such a change in tactics would be a more basic shift in political strategy. That is, the North Vietnamese might attempt to obtain by negotiations or reciprocal actions a US withdrawal or diminution of the war in the expectation of gaining their objectives by means other than those they have been pursuing. This alternative too may be up for reappraisal

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in Hanoi, though there is no hard evidence that this is so. The recent overtures to the US from the USSR and Eastern Europeans for a pause in bombing operations could be an indication that Hanoi's resolve to reject any move toward negotiations is weakening. Some recent hints of changes in the fortunes of top level leaders in Hanoi could indicate that a policy review is underway.

29. Hanoi's opposition to negotiations and the reasons for it are well known and need not be discussed at length. The North Vietnamese must still be deeply suspicious that any negotiations will deny them the important gains they believe have been won on the battlefield. The main question in their minds, however, may be whether some negotiation is inevitable, and whether their position will be stronger or weaker. A year ago they probably estimated that it would be stronger, now they must have doubts.

30. Our best judgment is that faced with the defeat of its present strategy and confronted with unpalatable options, Hanoi is procrastinating. Next spring, after the dry season, is a more likely time than now for modifications in strategy. But if Hanoi is now reconsidering its fortunes, then the two live options


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are a modification of military tactics toward guerrilla operations or a shift toward the political track, with all its hazards. Our view is that the military option -- i.e., some new combination of guerrilla and large unit operations -- is still likely to be the preferred course; and given time to work out the consequences and problems, Hanoi may move this way. But this is by no means certain, and for the first time in the last two years, there is a chance of a serious political move from the Communist side.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

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Monday, December 5, 1966
6 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Out of our discussions of the structure of the Foreign Policy passage for the State of the Union message -- centered around the four general propositions set forth in the Lancaster, Ohio, speech -- Henry Owen suggested that we might make a pamphlet out of your foreign policy addresses.

He enlisted Ernest Lindley; and the attached draft pamphlet resulted.

Both Bill Moyers and I believe it is worth your attention and should be considered for publication.

W. W. R.

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to [unclear]

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WHCA

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DE WTE 2537

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP661173

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5 DECEMBER 1966

1. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF AIR STRIKES ON FRIDAY, DECEMBER 2, AGAINST TWO POL SITES AND A VEHICLE DEPOT COMPLEX IN THE HANOI AREA:

A. HA GIA POL STORAGE: THE TARGET AREA WAS STRUCK BY 44 AIRCRAFT. SIXTEEN AIRCRAFT ALSO SCHEDULED TO STRIKE THE TARGET WERE UNABLE TO REACH THE TARGET AREA BECAUSE OF WEATHER CONDITIONS AND FAILURE OF NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT. FORTY ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR THE STRIKE AIRCRAFT. SEVERAL MIGS WERE SIGHTED IN THE AREA AND ONE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN FOUR MIG-21S AND FOUR F-105S OCCURRED WITH NO DAMAGE REPORTED. NUMEROUS SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES WERE SIGHTED. THREE F-4CS WERE DOWNED BY SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES AND ONE F-105D WAS SHOT DOWN BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY FIRE. ONE RF-4C ON A WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER NORTH VIETNAM IS MISSING. PILOT REPORTS INDICATE THERE WERE TWO LARGE INTENSE FIRES IN THE TARGET AREA, ONE LARGE EXPLOSION AND NUMEROUS SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS. THE TARGET AREA WAS COVERED BY THICK BLACK SMOKE. INITIAL PHOTO INTERPRETATION REPORTS SHOW SEVEN OF EIGHT 6X13 FOOT STORAGE TANKS DESTROYED (ESTIMATED 19,290 GALLON STORAGE CAPACITY), POSSIBLY STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO ONE SEMI-UNDERGROUND TANK (40 FEET IN DIAMETER), SEVERE DAMAGE TO THREE BUILDINGS. LIGHT DAMAGE TO TWO BUILDINGS AND INTERDICTION OF THE ROAD NETWORK IN THE TARGET AREA.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-124
By lip, NARA, Date 11-3-92

PRESERVATION COPY

B. CAN THON POL STORAGE: THE TARGET AREA WAS STRUCK BY 14 AIRCRAFT. ONE F-4B WAS SHOT DOWN BY ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY FIRE AFTER STRIKING THE TARGET. PILOT REPORTS REVEAL A LARGE SECONDARY EXPLOSION IN THE TARGET AREA WITH A FIREBALL EXTENDING TO 2,000 FEET WITH DENSE BLACK SMOKE RISING TO 5,000 FEET. SEVERAL SMALL SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS WERE OBSERVED IN THE AREA AND THE ENTIRE TARGET AREA WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES. PHOTOGRAPHIC BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT IS NOT YET AVAILABLE, BUT IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE TARGET RECEIVED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE.

C. VAN DIEN VEHICLE DEPOT COMPLEX: TWENTY-SEVEN AIRCRAFT STRUCK THE TARGET AREA. NO AIRCRAFT WERE LOST ON THIS MISSION. SMOKE COVERING MAJOR PORTIONS OF THE TARGET AREA PRECLUDES A COMPLETE BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. A FIELD INTERPRETATION OF DECEMBER 2 PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE TARGET INDICATES FOUR FIRES IN THE TARGET AREA WITH FOUR MAINTENANCE BUILDINGS DESTROYED AND FOUR MAINTENANCE BUILDINGS DAMAGED.

2. ON SUNDAY, DECEMBER 4, AT 3:28 AM EST, THE HA GIA POL STORAGE AREA WAS STRUCK AGAIN WITH 16 AIRCRAFT ATTACKING THE TARGET. SEVERAL MIGS WERE SIGHTED IN THE AREA AND THREE ENGAGEMENTS WITH MIGS WERE REPORTED WHICH FORCED SOME OF THE STRIKE AIRCRAFT TO JETTISON THEIR ORDNANCE PRIOR TO THE ATTACK ON THE TARGET. PILOTS REPORT THREE ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY SITES IN THE VICINITY OF THE TARGET WERE DESTROYED, BUT NO DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF THE STRIKE ON THE POL STORAGE AREA HAS BEEN RECEIVED.

3. ALSO ON DECEMBER 4, AT 3:45 AM EST, 20 AIRCRAFT STRUCK THE YEN VIEN RAILROAD CLASSIFICATION YARD, SIX MILES NORTHEAST OF HANOI. ALL ORDNANCE WAS REPORTED IN THE TARGET AREA. THE ENTIRE TARGET AREA WAS REPORTED TO BE OBSCURED BY FLAME AND SMOKE WHICH PRECLUDED DAMAGE ASSESSMENT BY PILOTS. PILOTS REPORTED THAT SMOKE FROM THE TARGET AREA ROSE TO 10,000 FEET.

4. TODAY, DECEMBER 5, AT ABOUT 1:00 AM EST, A USAF RF-101 ON A PHOTO-RECONNAISSANCE MISSION MAKING A BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF THE HA GIA POL STORAGE AREA WAS DOWN FROM UNKNOWN CAUSES APPROXIMATELY 24 MILES NORTHWEST OF HANOI. THERE WAS A GOOD CHUTE AND THE BEEPER WAS HEARD. SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORTS TO PICK UP THE DOWNED PILOT ARE IN PROGRESS.

DTG 05/1353Z DEC 1966

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OO WTE10
DE WTE 2541

FROM: ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: VH60729

UNCLAS

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Sent
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FOLLOWING, FOR YOUR APPROVAL, IS SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO BE
TAPED BY OUR AMBASSADOR AND BROADCAST OVER KENYAN RADIO
ON OCCASION OF THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE INDEPENDENCE
OF KENYA (DECEMBER 12). (THERE WILL ALSO BE MESSAGES
FROM WILSON, DEGAULLE, ETC., BUT NONE FROM THE BLOC.)

QUOTE

AFTER THREE YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE, THE PEOPLE OF
KENYA, CAN BE JUSTLY PROUD OF THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENTS.
WORKING TOGETHER, THEY ARE MAKING A RICH LAND BEAR
NEW FRUITS. INDUSTRY IS GROWING. A WHOLE NEW GENERATION
OF BOYS AND GIRLS IS GOING TO SCHOOL. THE LAND IS
ALIVE WITH PROMISE AND HOPE.

THESE ACHIEVEMENTS DO NOT REPRESENT THE EFFORTS
OF ONE PERSON, NOR OF ONE PARTY, NOR OF ONE GROUP.
RATHER, THEY REPRESENT THE COOPERATIVE LABORS OF
ONE PEOPLE, WHO, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF A WISE AND
RESPECTED PRESIDENT, HAVE RISEN TO MEET THE GREAT
CHALLENGE OF OUR TIME -- THE CHALLENGE OF INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE.

WE HONOR FREEDOM, AS YOU DO; WE STRIVE FOR EQUALITY,
AS YOU DO; AND WE RESPECT HARD WORK, AS YOU DO.
IN THE PAST THREE YEARS, YOU HAVE GIVEN THE WORLD
AMPLE PROOF OF YOUR DETERMINATION TO UPHOLD THESE
CONCEPTS. KENYA HAS SHOWED THAT SHE IS PREPARED TO LEAD,
SHE IS WILLING TO SPEAK OUT HONESTLY ON MATTERS THAT
CAUSE HER CONCERN AND TO LISTEN TO THE IDEAS AND
OPINIONS OF OTHERS, NOT IN A SPIRIT OF HOSTILITY,
BUT WITH A RECEPTIVE, OPEN-MINDED ATTITUDE WHICH GAINS
THE RESPECT AND CONFIDENCE OF HER NEIGHBORS.

A GREAT AMERICAN, THOMAS JEFFERSON, ONCE SAID,
"THE GOD WHO GAVE US LIFE GAVE US LIBERTY AT THE SAME TIME."
I KNOW, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU STRIVE TO MAINTAIN THIS
LIBERTY JUST AS WE DO. I ALSO KNOW THAT AS LONG AS
THERE ARE PEOPLE IN THE WORLD WHO ARE DEDICATED TO THE
LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF ALL, NO MATTER WHAT THE COLOR
OF THEIR SKINS, NO MATTER WHERE THEY COME FROM OR WHAT
GROUP THEY REPRESENT, THESE PRECIOUS BELIEFS WILL
GIVE US STRENGTH TO MOVE AGAINST THOSE WHO SEEK TO
DESTROY AND UPROOT THEM.

I AM HAPPY, MR. PRESIDENT, TO EXTEND MY BEST WISHES
ON THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA.

UNQUOTE

DTG: 051702Z DEC 66

GROUPS 440 IMI 440

December 5, 1966

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FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

cc: M. Watson
sent by wire to
Randy

Clark Clifford requests a meeting between you and your Intelligence Advisory Board on February 3, the second day of their February session.

The preferred time would be late morning or early afternoon, before West Coast members drift off for their planes.

Clark envisaged brief (3-minute) presentations of five or six key subjects, with you having an opportunity to question, probe, and comment.

We would arrange an agenda.

Meeting approved for February 3 _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

Monday, December 5, 1966
11:00 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

In thinking about the State of the Union message, I went through our major problems at home and abroad; looked at where we have achieved success and where we still must make progress; and emerged with one theme which unites our approach to both domestic and foreign policy -- the principle of responsible participation or partnership.

I thought you might wish to consider it.

I am giving a copy to Bill Moyers.

New Subject.

In presenting the expanded budget this year, you may wish to put it into perspective by recalling what Robert Taft said in 1951, during the Korean War. With GNP running at about \$300 billion, he believed "We should strive to limit federal expenditures during the emergency to about \$75 billion." The equivalent figure now would be almost of the order of \$200 billion; that is, 25% of GNP.

There is no inherent virtue in a rising federal budget per se; but there is no reason for alarm at a federal budget the size of ours, given the nation's GNP.

W. W. R.

(cc Bill Moyers)

The Great Society we aim to build at home and the peaceful world community we are helping to build on the world scene both rest on the same principle -- the principle of partnership.

In a partnership each of those who participates shares in making decisions; but each also shares the responsibility of moving toward a common objective.

Responsible participation is the key to progress and order in the modern world.

Where we have succeeded, where we have made progress, we have done so by applying this principle.

--Where cities have been renewed, it has been done by the close working together of the federal, state, and local governments in combination with private enterprise, the universities, and all elements in the urban communities themselves.

--The smooth bringing into effect of Medicare was a miracle of cooperation, reaching from Washington down to the doctors and hospitals in every city and town of the country.

-- We have enjoyed six years of rising prosperity without serious inflation because government, industry, and labor, for the first time in our peacetime history, have thus far placed national prosperity and price stability above narrower interests.

--Our achievements in space represent a unique common enterprise among government, private industry, and science.

The lesson is the same abroad:

-- The partnership of NATO has for almost a generation protected the West and will go on protecting the West although we are now only fourteen;

-- Nineteen nations work together in the Alliance for Progress, which is lifting the level and quality of life in Latin America;

-- 31 nations in the Asian Development Bank have created not only a new and important institution, but a new and important atmosphere of cooperation and dedication to the welfare of the peoples of Asia;

-- 6 nations have understood that their security depends on the defeat of aggression in Viet-nam and have sent their sons to fight side by side with the Vietnamese.

These are only a few examples of working partnership.

It is equally true that where we still have great problems to overcome, partnership is the right and necessary means.

-- In race relations, for example. The federal government can help, but alone it cannot solve the problem of social equality in our society. Every element in every community -- private as well as public -- must work and plan and act together if we are to fulfill the principles to which this society was committed at its birth, and to which we have recommitted ourselves.

-- In the war on poverty, again, the federal government can lead, but the states and local communities must contribute their proper share of the resources and most of the ideas and plans and dedicated people. And in the end, the defeat of poverty requires the responsible participation of those whose lives we seek to elevate.

And so it is with:

- the problem of feeding the world's growing population;
- assistance to developing nations;
- the orderly expansion of world trade;
- the evolution of a national monetary system;
- and, above all, the making of a stable peace.

None of these things can we do alone.

All can be achieved if nations accept the goals and accept the responsibilities as well as the rights of partners in moving towards them.

The simple truth is this: modern science and technology have made this great continental democracy into something like an old-fashioned small town where men knew they had to take into account their neighbors' interests and problems as well as their own. He who pursued his interests without proper regard for those of others was known to be a poor citizen.

In the same way, modern science and technology are making this whole planet a community which must begin to think like an old-fashioned nation, where lesser interests must give way to the larger common interests of all humanity.

This is a time of transition from old ways of looking at things to new ways. At home and abroad we are escaping from old ways of thinking and acting, old slogans, old battle cries. That transition is often slow; sometimes painful; in a few cases, it is dangerous.

But men are learning that in the modern world none of the things they want for their children, or for their nation, can be achieved without entering into responsible partnership with others.

###

~~SECRET~~

~~NODIS~~

71
via wire
to Rusk

December 5, 1966

FROM WALT ROSTOW

TO THE PRESIDENT

Just before leaving for Asia Sec. Rusk asked me to call the following to your attention.

1. Dobrynin is being recalled Wednesday for consultations in Moscow. The occasion may be a meeting of the Supreme Soviet.
2. If you approve a Pen Pal letter, it would be helpful to let Dobrynin see it when transmitted, before his return.
3. If you prefer no letter, a Thompson-Dobrynin conversation along the lines of the letter would be helpful if Tommy could say the conversation was authorized by you. Tuesday is the last day for such a conversation.
4. Either method would offer a satisfactory response to Kohler's farewell conversation with Kosygin.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-124
By ijg, NARA, Date 11-3-92

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~ ~~NODIS~~

SENT TO STATE VIA LOX
@ 10:30, 3 DEC.

72
Rostow
Pres file

SENT
WHCA

EEA452
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 2526

1966 DEC 4 02 49

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP661165

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-124
By ing, NARA, Date 11-3-92

66 DEC 3 PM 9:49

SATURDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HERewith SECRETARY RUSK'S PERSONAL REDRAFT OF A MESSAGE
FROM YOU TO U THANT. HE BELIEVES IT SHOULD NOT BE EXCESSIVELY
EFFUSIVE. I CONCURR.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL:

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE JOIN ME IN WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS
ON YOUR RE-APPOINTMENT FOR AN ADDITIONAL FIVE-YEAR TERM.
YOUR SELFLESS DECISION TO CONTINUE TO SERVE THE ORGANIZATION
WILL, I AM SURE, INSPIRE THE MEMBERSHIP TO STRENGTHEN THE
UNITED NATIONS IN DISCHARGING THE GREAT PURPOSES OF THE CHARTER.

IN THESE TROUBLED TIMES, THE DEVOTION OF THE BEST TALENTS,
ENERGIES AND EFFORTS OF MEN OF GOOD WILL TO THE CAUSE OF WORLD
PEACE IS MORE INDISPENSABLE THAN EVER BEFORE. WE ARE THEREFORE
ESPECIALLY PLEASED THAT YOU HAVE REDEDICATED
YOURSELF TO THIS GREAT TASK.

YOU MAY DEPEND ON MY CONTINUING CLOSEST PERSONAL ATTENTION
TO THE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE ORGANIZATION IN ITS SEARCH
FOR PEACE.

IN THE YEARS AHEAD, IT IS MY GREATEST HOPE THAT YOUR
REDEDICATED FAITH AND SKILLS WILL CHARGE THE UNITED NATIONS
WITH NEW STRENGTH, THE HUMAN FAMILY WITH NEW HOPE, AND SO
GIVE NEW SUBSTANCE TO THE PROMISE OF THE CHARTER. AS
YOU ENTER ON YOUR NEW TERM OF OFFICE, YOU CARRY WITH YOU MY
BEST PERSONAL WISHES.

DTG: 040144Z DEC 1966

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

73

Pres file

SENT
RECEIVED
WHCA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1966 DEC 4 02 42

EEA431
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2525

FROM: WALT ROSTON
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661164

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECEMBER 2, 1966

SUBJECT: INDIAN FOOD

HERE IS THE ROUND-UP ON INDIAN GRAIN. AS PARA 7 INDICATES IF WE WISH TO GET POLITICAL IMPACT, SUNDAY NOON OUR TIME IS THE LAST MOMENT FOR COMMUNICATION BEFORE PARLIAMENT CLOSES.

PARTLY THROUGH INDIAN EFFORTS AND PARTLY THROUGH OUR OWN, THE CANADIAN AND AUSTRALIAN SHIPMENTS WILL COVER THE MID-JANUARY PIPELINE GAP, BUT THAT IS PROBABLY ALL WE CAN COUNT ON FROM THAT QUARTER UNTIL THE NEW AUSTRALIAN CABINET IS FORMED ABOUT 12-13 DECEMBER. THIS LEAVES THE CRUCIAL PRE-ELECTION PERIOD IN FEBRUARY STILL NOT COVERED, BUT A DECISION HERE THIS WEEKEND WOULD PERMIT U.S. ARRIVALS TO RESUME BY THE END OF JANUARY. THAT WOULD GIVE US TIME TO PHASE IN WHATEVER MORE THE AUSTRALIANS AND CANADIANS DO AND TO GET A BETTER FIX ON OUR OWN LONGER TERM EFFORT.

HERE ARE THE SPECIFIC ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION AS OF TONIGHT:

1. THE CANADIANS HAVE ANNOUNCED AN IMMEDIATE GRANT OF 321 MILLION (ABOUT 200,000 TONS OF WHEAT AND FLOUR, PLUS MILK POWDER). THE INDIANS HAVE RESERVED SHIPPING TO MOVE 100,000 TONS BEFORE DECEMBER 16, WHICH WILL ARRIVE SIX WEEKS LATER. IN ADDITION, THE CANADIANS WILL REQUEST AN APPROPRIATION FOR A \$75-MILLION FOOD AID PROGRAM FOR FY 67-68, A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION OF WHICH WILL BE FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ng/cb, NARA, Date 9-3-98

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

66 DEC 3 PM 9:45
SATURDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. THE AUSTRALIANS SAY THEY CANNOT MOVE ON GRANT AID TO INDIA UNTIL MAYBE 12-13 DECEMBER, AFTER THE NEW CABINET IS FORMED. (THEIR VOTE-COUNTING PROCESS IS SLOW AND HOLT WILL PROBABLY WANT TO MAKE SOME CABINET CHANGES, WHICH WILL TAKE TIME.) THEY HAVE ANNOUNCED A COMMERCIAL SALE OF 150,000 TONS AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS THINKING OF A GRANT OF 150,000 TONS TO MATCH, THOUGH A FIRM DECISION CANNOT YET BE COUNTED ON. THEY, TOO, ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT BURDEN SHARING FOR NEXT CALENDAR YEAR.

3. BEFORE OUR INSTRUCTIONS HAD GOT TO DELHI, THE INDIANS HAD ASKED FRANCE FOR WHEAT, MILK POWDER, FERTILIZER AND PESTICIDES. THEY ASKED FOR SALE OF WHEAT FOR RUPEES OR AT LEAST ON LONG TERM CREDIT. THE FRENCH HAVE NOT YET RESPONDED, AND STATE IS AWAITING NEWS FROM EITHER PARIS OR NEW DELHI.

4. INDIA HAS APPROACHED THE USSR FOR 1 MILLION TONS, BUT THEY HAVE NOT RECEIVED AN ANSWER.

5. MEANWHILE, THE INDIANS HAVE PURCHASED 150,000 TONS IN AUSTRALIA, SOME OF WHICH WILL BE SHIPPED IN DECEMBER FOR ARRIVAL IN EARLY JANUARY. THE GOI EMBASSY WASHINGTON REPORTS THAT THEY ARE SEEKING AUTHORIZATION TO BUY HERE, BUT THEY HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED AN OKAY.

6. PIPELINE. THE LAST SHIP CARRYING GRAIN UNDER PRESENT AGREEMENTS WILL LEAVE THE U.S. ON 10 DECEMBER.

7. THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT CLOSES ON MONDAY. IT COULD END ON A POSITIVE NOTE, IF SUBRAMANIAM COULD ANNOUNCE SOME DECISION BY US. HE HAS DEFENDED US--AND YOU--AGAINST OUR CRITICS AND NEEDS SUCH HELP. HE HAS HELD OFF ANNOUNCING THE CANADIAN DEAL IN HOPES THAT HE COULD ANNOUNCE THE TWO TOGETHER. THIS WOULD EASE URBAN FOOD PRICES IN THE CRITICAL PRE-ELECTION PERIOD AND STRENGTHEN THE HANDS OF INDIANS WHO WILL BE CRUCIAL IN THE POST-ELECTION CABINET IN DEALING WITH INDIA'S AGRICULTURAL PROBLEM. TO ACHIEVE THIS, WE WOULD HAVE TO COMMUNICATE A DECISION BY SUNDAY MORNING OUR TIME.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 040144Z DEC 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Friday - December 2, 1966

TO
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW
SUBJECT: Americans in Cuba

74
sent by wire
to Ranch
12/2/66
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-124
By sig, NARA, Date 11-3-92

In my briefing memorandum for the Amistad visit I suggested that you ask President Diaz Ordaz what progress he had made in persuading Castro to let some 1000 Americans and their immediate families leave Cuba.

Foreign Minister Carrillo Flores now reports that Castro has agreed to their departure on three conditions:

- the Mexican Government provide transit visas;
- no representation or intervention by any government (including the Swiss) other than Mexico;
- transportation from Cuba to Mexico only on Mexican charter flights.

On the surface Castro's terms are surprisingly lenient. We thought he would try to strike a harder bargain. We don't know whether there are any side conditions involving only Mexico, such as resumption of Mexican commercial flights to Havana. And we are puzzled by the specific refusal to allow any Swiss intervention. The Swiss represent us in Cuba and have all the records of the Americans wishing to leave. It is hard to see how they can avoid becoming involved.

These and other angles require clarification. State will be doing this and submitting a recommendation to you.

Mexican success in persuading Castro to move on this question warrants our ~~deepest~~ ^{sincere} gratitude. For a year, the Swiss have been trying to obtain their release with no success.

The Mexicans appear to have done the trick -- perhaps because Castro is trying to mend fences after the Mexicans caught Cuban agents red-handed abetting disturbances in Mexico and one Cuban diplomat working with a ring furnishing arms and money to Guatemalan guerrillas.

~~W. W. Rostow~~

cc -- ~~Bill Moyers~~

~~SECRET~~

12/2/66

(3-45)

75

Herewith a summary of John McCloy's report to me by telephone upon his return. He will be putting his thoughts on paper.

1. The limited job to be done at this stage was done -- an agreed report of the three to the NATO meeting.

2. He found German politicians so preoccupied with the making of a new government that he thought it useless to probe at length. He nevertheless saw a good many people.

3. He and George McGhee also judged there was some danger he might be accused of meddling in German politics if he were too active at this stage. Thus his early return.

4. He found a widespread feeling, reaching beyond political circles, that the U. S. had pressed Erhard too hard. The general view is that he would have gone in any case in a little while, but our toughness on the current offset was involved in his downfall.

5. The Germans are also sorry for themselves because we have been talking to the British and Russians, but not to them, about non-proliferation and other matters. Their feeling is: our only serious dialogue these days is about money.

6. The new government contains a group of ambitious prima donnas. It is unclear how they will work together.

7. There will be some kind of move "towards Paris"; but no one believes Paris can do much for Germany.

8. He was somewhat disturbed that the British reported to him that some American source was ^{still} feeding the view that the whole tripartite exercise

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

91-124

By ing, NARA, Date 11-3-92

12/2/66

was window-dressing for U. S. and U. K. troop withdrawals. He took literally your language: "The U. S. has neither decided to keep present force levels nor to reduce them." The point of the exercise was to establish what was necessary and how it should be financed.

9. On substance, he found Carstens somewhat hopeful on getting in time, financial offsets to supplement equipment purchases; and he found a number of German politicians conscious of their responsibility to explain to the German people that the offset was to neutralize windfall German gains, not payment for U. S. forces.

10. He's now convinced we've grossly overdone the relative weakness of the German divisions versus our own.

11. He concludes:

-- We can get somewhere if we are patient and give the German Government a little time to sort itself out.

-- We should not get rattled at a German move "towards Paris";

-- We have a repair job in U. S. -German relations that can be done if we are willing to talk seriously with the Germans over a wide front.

###

~~XXXXXX~~

~~XXXX~~

~~SECRET~~

*sent to Ranch
by wire
12/2/66*

December 2, 1966

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

Following is preliminary agenda of matters Sec. Rusk will wish to raise with you upon arrival at Ranch tomorrow.

1. Marigold -- Next steps.
2. Pen Pal -- Possible draft to Moscow.
3. Additional Viet Nam forces -- present prospects.
4. Truce Appeal Survey -- results of soundings in various capitals.
5. Non-proliferation -- status of negotiations.
6. Cuban refugees -- proposal made to Mexico by Havana.
7. Personnel matters.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3.4(b)
VINTAGE COPY, Feb. 24, 1983
by DLH on 10/18/86, Date 8-27-86

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 2, 1966

77
by wire to
Russett

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW CAP 661145

SUBJECT: US Trade and Investment Mission to Korea

AID, State, and Commerce have come some distance in shaping up the mission which would be "Industry Organized-Government Approved." Time tentatively scheduled for March.

The key question now is a team leader. They have put four names to me and requested that I sound them out in a priority order you determine. Their names are: Robert B. Anderson; George W. Ball; C. Douglas Dillon; Walker L. Cisler. They want a man of distinction with public as well as business experience and no direct business connections in Korea.

Senior Vice-President of Manufacturers Hanover Trust.

They have a good fallback in Tristan Beplat ~~who~~. They believe, he would serve as number two if a better known figure could be found as number one.

The questions are:

1. Should I approach any of the suggested men to head the mission?

Others?

2. If so, in what order?

3. Should ~~be~~ ^{we} go with Beplat as number one?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By Walter D. H. NARA, Date 3-25-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

78

SENT
WHCA

~~SECRET~~

1966 DEC 2 19 27

Sent
1:27 PM

EEA425
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2491

FROM: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM (MCCAFFERTY)
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661142

~~SECRET~~

2 DECEMBER 1966

SUBJECT: NMCC REPORT ON TODAY'S AIR STRIKES IN HANOI AREA

1. INFORMATION AVAILABLE AS OF 11:30 AM EST, 2 DECEMBER, INDICATES THAT THE STRIKES AGAINST TWO POL'S AND ONE VEHICLE STORAGE AREA WERE SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTED AT APPROXIMATELY 1:00 AM EST THIS MORNING. SIX U.S. AIRCRAFT WERE LOST ON THESE STRIKES. A RECAPITULATION OF THE EVENTS SCHEDULED AND THE RESULTS INITIALLY REPORTED IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE 7TH AIR FORCE SCHEDULED ONE HUNDRED AIRCRAFT ON MISSIONS AGAINST HA GIA POL LOCATED 16 MILES NORTH-NORTHWEST OF HANOI. FIVE AIRCRAFT WERE LOST (1USAF F-105, 1USAF RF-4C, AND 3 USAF F-4C'S). A POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT AT LEAST 2 USAF AIRCRAFT WERE DOWNED BY SA-2 MISSILES SINCE NUMEROUS AIRBORNE SA-2S WERE SIGHTED. THREE MIG-21S WERE ALSO SIGHTED; HOWEVER NO MIG ENGAGEMENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED.

DESTROYED WERE 7 OF 8 SMALL POL TANKS, 1 WAREHOUSE, 1 AMMUNITION STORAGE BUILDING, AND 1 AUTOMATIC WEAPON SITE. THREE LARGE POL TANKS AND 3 WAREHOUSES WERE DAMAGED. ROADS IN THE SURROUNDING AREA WERE HEAVILY INTERDICTED.

B. TWENTY-SEVEN AIRCRAFT FROM THE USS TICONDEROGA AND THIRTY-TWO AIRCRAFT FROM THE USS FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT DELIVERED A COORDINATED STRIKE ON VAN DIEN VEHICLE DEPOT 6 MILES SOUTH OF HANOI. DESPITE HEAVY FLAK AND 26 SAMS SIGHTED, ALL AIRCRAFT RETURNED SAFELY. INITIAL ESTIMATES INDICATE 95 PERCENT OF THE BOMBS WERE ON TARGET AND THE TARGET WAS 90 PERCENT DESTROYED. NUMEROUS FIRES AND SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS OCCURRED.

C. TWENTY-FOUR AIRCRAFT FROM THE USS CORAL SEA STRUCK CAN THON POL, 38 MILES NORTHEAST OF HANOI. ONE U.S. NAVY AIRCRAFT, AN F-4B, WAS LOST TO HEAVY ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE. FIVE SAMS WERE ALSO SIGHTED. THE PILOTS REPORT ALL BOMBS IN TARGET AREA WITH HEAVY BLACK SMOKE RISING TO 5,000 FEET AND SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 93-431
By CB, NARA, Date 8-27-98

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 021745Z DEC 1966

~~VIA LEX TO THE RANCH~~

*sent by wire
to Ranch*

Mr. Rostow

79

Friday, December 2, 1966 -- 2 pm

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BATOR

VIA ROSTOW

SUBJECT: East-West Institute

-- next week --

Secretary Rusk is agreeable to your announcing Bundy as your emissary for an East-West Institute exploration. I understand from Jake that you plan to telephone Mac to ask him to take this on and to come to the Ranch for an announcement.

In talking to Bundy, you might wish to say the following:

- You want him to take on the task of working out a plan for an East-West Institute of Management and Administration;
- In doing so, he should consult with interested governments (both in Eastern and Western Europe) and appropriate private groups;
- We have not worked out any specifics. It would be Mac's job to propose to the President (after talking with the right people in and out of governments) precisely what should be done and how. (In general, we have in mind an institution which would sponsor everything from short conferences ~~to~~ to full-length courses covering management techniques of all sorts: budgeting, system analysis, etc. / This would throw together economists, engineers, city managers and planners, plant managers, and the like -- both practioners and academics. The orientation of the Institute would be technical and strictly non-political.)
- If Mac is willing to take on the job, you would like him to come down to the Ranch to talk it over; following this, you would propose to announce his appointment to the press.

As you know, we will need some time -- before you make the public announcement -- to inform our friends in NATO. Once you have a firm date with ~~Brady~~ Bundy, State will instruct Harlan Cleveland to explain the proposal to his colleagues. (To avoid leaks, we will try to schedule this no more than 24 hours in advance of ~~your~~ your announcement.) ^{enable us to} To work this out, I would recommend that you hold off the session with Mac until Tuesday at the earliest. It will help us here if Jake could give me a ring as soon as you have set the date with Bundy.

We will try to work out a draft press announcement of the Bundy appointment for your approval. If we get it done in time, Walt will bring it with him tomorrow.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - December 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Senator Smathers and the Haitian Loan

You asked me to find out whether Secretary Fowler had consulted Senator Smathers on our approving the Inter-American Bank's loan to Haiti for improvement of education facilities.

True Davis did the consulting, and he tells us that he checked Senator Smathers first. The Senator was most affirmative in endorsing our voting for the loan, expressing concern over the plight of the Haitian people.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By W. J. R. H. NARA, Date 3-25-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

sent by wire
to Rostow
12/2/66

81
SENT
WHCA

1966 DEC 2 18 17

Sent
1:17 PM

EEA422
00 WTE 10
DE WTE 2490

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661141

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-124
By *inf*, NARA, Date 11-3-92

~~SECRET~~

12/1/66

WE HAVE NOW RECEIVED DEFINITE WORD FROM THE AUSTRALIANS THAT THEY CANNOT MOVE ON GRANT AID TO INDIA UNTIL THE NEW CABINET IS FORMED, WHICH MAY POSTPONE A DECISION FOR A WEEK AND A HALF TO TWO WEEKS. THEIR MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CONSIDERS SOME AID TO INDIA "A LEAD PIPE CINCH," BUT THEY CAN'T TAKE ACTION TILL THE CABINET IS ORGANIZED. THEY ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF A GRANT OF 150,000 TONS TO MATCH THEIR RECENT COMMERCIAL SALE OF 150,000 TONS.

THE CANADIANS HAVE MOVED WITH THEIR GRANT EQUIVALENT TO 200,000 TONS.

I THEREFORE BELIEVE WE SHOULD PROCEED URGENTLY TO TELL THE INDIANS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO MOVE ON 500,000 TONS OF WHEAT AND 250,000 TONS OF SORGHUM IF THEY WILL PROMPTLY BEGIN PURCHASING 500,000 TONS OF WHEAT IN DONOR MARKETS IN ROUGH PROPORTION TO THE RESPECTIVE CONCESSIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS.

TIME IS SHORT BECAUSE OF (A) THE PIPELINE PROBLEM; (B) THE REAL POSSIBILITY THAT THE INDIANS, NOT KNOWING WHAT WE ARE UP TO, MAY START PLACING LARGE PURCHASE ORDERS ELSEWHERE; AND (C) GROWING POLITICAL RESENTMENT BUILDING UP IN INDIA AGAINST THE PRO-AMERICANS IN THE REGIME WHO ARE ALSO THOSE MOST COMPETENT AND DEDICATED IN CARRYING FORWARD AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE WHOLE IBRD PROGRAM.

MACOMBER WHO HAS BEEN FOLLOWING THIS HOUR BY HOUR CONCURS.

DTG: 021741Z DEC 1966

GP290 IM1290

Limited Official Use

Thursday - December 1, 1966

*sent by wire
to Rost
12/1/66*

From: W. W. Rostow

To: The President

Info: Bill Moyers

Congratulatory Messages to Uruguay

Last Sunday's model elections in Uruguay resulted in a new President and a constitutional change returning the country to the Presidential system. -- both welcome developments.

President-elect Oscar Gestido is a 65-year old retired Air Force officer with a record of competent civilian administration over the past ten years. He is a moderate in politics and economics and a good friend of the United States. It appears that he will have ample working majorities in both houses of Congress.

State recommends that you send the attached messages to President Heber congratulating him and the Uruguayan people on the elections and to President-elect Gestido on his victory.

I recommend your approval.

Approve _____.

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

Limited Official Use

Attachments

Proposed Congratulatory Message to President-elect Oscar Gestido
of Uruguay

Dear Mr. President: *elect*

I send warm congratulations on the occasion of your election to the Presidency of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay. I wish every success in your new office, which will be especially challenging in view of the constitutional changes which the Uruguayan people have just adopted.

I am sure that the long-standing ties of friendship between our two countries will be further strengthened during your administration , and I look forward to fruitful cooperation with you in carrying forward the Alliance for Progress in which we all joined at Punta del Este.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Proposed Message from President Johnson to Outgoing President Heber
of Uruguay

Dear Mr. President:

Uruguay has once again presented to the Hemisphere and to the world an outstanding example of a democratic and orderly national election, carried out with exemplary fairness, impartiality and national tranquility. Your government and the Uruguayan people can take justifiable pride in this reiteration of their devotion to the finest precepts of democracy. ~~Please accept, Mr. President,~~
our Congratulations and best wishes.

Lyndon B. Johnson

EEA397
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2461

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-124
By ing, NARA, Date 11-3-92

SENT
WHCA

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP661121

1966 DEC 1 16 00

~~CONFIDENTIAL EXDIS~~

DECEMBER 1, 1966

HEREWITH ED CLARK'S FIRST EXCHANGE WITH HOLT. THERE MAY
BE SOME DELAY.

CANBERRA 2903

1. I HAVE JUST TALKED WITH PRIME MINISTER HOLT IN MELBOURNE ABOUT INDIAN FOOD PROBLEM. I STRESSED URGENCY OF SITUATION AND NEED FOR PROMPT ACTION. I ALSO STRESSED THAT THIS MATTER RECEIVING HIGHEST LEVEL ATTENTION IN UNITED STATES.
2. HOLT SAID HE HAD TALKED BY TELEPHONE TO HASLUCK AND THE TREASURER, MCMAHON, TODAY AND FOUND THEM HESITANT TO RUSH IN WITH EMERGENCY AID UNTIL THERE HAD BEEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK AT THE OVERALL INDIAN FOOD PROBLEM AND IN PARTICULAR TO SEE WHAT INDIANS ARE DOING TO HELP THEMSELVES. HE WAS CRITICAL OF PAST PERFORMANCE OF INDIAN GOVERNMENT ON THEIR FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM AND ALSO QUESTIONED WHY ONLY FOOD EXPORTERS WERE ASKED TO HELP. HE THOUGHT GERMANY, UK, FRANCE, JAPAN AND OTHERS COULD PROVIDE FINANCIAL AID WHICH COULD BE USED TO PURCHASE WHEAT ON WORLD MARKET.
3. I EXPLAINED THAT TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE AND WHILE OTHER NATIONS COULD AND SHOULD BE BROUGHT INTO ANY COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM, ONLY THREE WHEAT EXPORTERS--US, CANADA AND AUSTRALIA-- ARE ABLE TO ACT IN TIME TO MEET CRISIS WHICH WILL DEVELOP IN JANUARY JUST BEFORE INDIAN ELECTIONS.
4. PRIMIN SAID HE WOULD TRY TO BE HELPFUL, BUT WANTS TO TALK TO TWO OR THREE ADDITIONAL MINISTERS BEFORE REACHING ANY DECISION. FACT THAT NEW CABINET WILL NOT BE FORMED FOR AT LEAST A WEEK MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO ACT, BUT HE SAID HE WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD BY TELEPHONE TOMORROW MORNING.
5. I FEEL CONFIDENT THAT GOA WILL FINALLY COME UP WITH A FOOD PROGRAM FOR INDIA, BUT WE WILL HAVE TO BE PATIENT FOR WHILE LONGER UNTIL THEY CAN REACH A CONSENSUS OF PRINCIPAL MINISTERS. I WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THIS IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE AND WILL KEEP THE DEPT. ADVISED.

CLARK

DTG: 01/1510 DEC 66

PRESERVATION COPY

GPS 380 IMI 380

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

SENT
WHCA

ZEV KK

1966 DEC 1 16 18

EEA398
CO WTE10
DE WTE 2460FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661120~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

DECEMBER 1, 1966

THIS CABLE ON PROSPECTS FOR MORE AUSTRALIAN HELP IN
VIETNAM WILL INTEREST YOU.

CANBERRA 2886

1. IN BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH DCM, PRIME MINISTER SAID HE INTENDS UNDERTAKE GENERAL REVIEW OF GOA MILITARY COMMITMENTS AS SOON AS SIR JOHN WILTON, CHAIRMAN CHIEFS OF STAFF, RETURNS FROM SAIGON, AND NEW CABINET FORMED SOMETIME NEXT WEEK. HOLT INDICATED THAT, WITH ELECTION SUCCESS BEHIND HIM IN WHICH VIET-NAM MAJOR ISSUE, CABINET SHOULD CONSIDER ON URGENT BASIS WHAT MORE GOA CAN CONTRIBUTE TO VIET-NAM. HE SAID CABINET WOULD ALSO REVIEW FORCES COMMITTED TO MALAYSIA AND GET DETERMINATION WHETHER SOME ELEMENTS GOA FORCES THERE MIGHT BETTER BE UTILIZED IN VIET-NAM. HE STRESSED GOA DESIRE MAINTAIN BRITISH FORCES IN MALAYSIA AND SAID GOA WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS IN THEIR CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS IN THEIR OWN FORCE STRUCTURE IN MALAYSIA.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRVS 64-68, 601 27#20By jc NARA, Date 4-20-05

2. COMMENT: FOLLOWING ARE PRESENT PROSPECTS FOR AN INCREASE IN MILITARY COMMITMENT TO SVN:

THREE OF EIGHT ARMY BATTALIONS ARE OVERSEAS NOW. TWO OF REMAINING FIVE WERE RECENTLY ACTIVATED AND WILL NOT BE EQUIPPED OR COMBAT READY FOR SOME TIME. ARMY IS HARD PUT TO ABSORB NEW SELECTIVE NATIONAL SERVICE INPUT OF PERSONNEL AND SUPPORT PRESENT OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT. A THIRD BATTALION COULD BE SENT TO VIET-NAM BY CONSOLIDATING AND TRANSFERRING TRAINED PERSONNEL FROM AUSTRALIAN BASED BATTALIONS. THIS COULD BE DONE IN THREE TO FOUR MONTHS' TIME, AT EXPENSE OF SLOWING DOWN TRAINING OTHER BATTALIONS AND ABSORPTION NATIONAL SERVICE MEN. ARMY'S POSITION IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE A THIRD BATTALION IN AUSTRALIAN VIET-NAM TASK FORCE AND RAA DOES HAVE PLANS TO IMPLEMENT INCREASE PROVIDING ORDER IS GIVEN.

MOST LIKELY SOURCE FOR RELATIVELY EARLY AUGMENTATION IN SVN IS AIR FORCE. PROBABLY UNITS WOULD BE LIGHT BOMBER SQUADRON (CANBERRA'S) FOR FIGHTER-BOMBER SQUADRON (SABRE'S). LIKE ALL AUSTRALIAN UNITS, AIR FORCE IS FAMILIAR WITH US OPERATIONS AND COULD BE EASILY INTEGRATED.

NAVY COULD PROBABLY RELEASE UP TO FOUR MINESWEEPERS NOW BASED MALAYSIA. IN ADDITION, AS NEW PATROL BOATS NOW BEING ACQUIRED BECOME AVAILABLE, THESE COULD BE ASSIGNED. BUT THIS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR ABOUT TWO YEARS.

CLARK

DTG: 01/1511Z DEC 66

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

GPS: 500

Literally For The President
Eyes Only
From Walt Rostow

Sect. Rusk believes This ^{merged from Sign CAP 66136}
is a message of importance.
Tommy Thompson Agrees.
Sect. Rusk will discuss with you
on Saturday.

We have gone out to Lodge
for certain Clarifications we shall
have by Saturday.

I am impressed by:

1. Their concern for Secrecy.
This is what Hanoi and Moscow
would want, if They were anxious
to keep Peiping and the NLF
out of the act.

2. The indication of Warsaw
or Moscow as ~~locus~~ focus for further
talks, for the same reason.

3. But There are, of course,
possible booby-traps here we'll
have to watch.

4. Above all, by the phrase
"as fast as possible". As you
know, I have felt that if Hanoi was
ever serious They would want a quick
complete deal, not a slow negotiation.