

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[1048]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#5 memo	Rostow to the President re Dominican Rep. Confidential 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i>	1/14/67	A
#7 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i> Top Secret 1 p. <i>Dupe in VN Co File "Marigold-Incomplete" #3</i> <i>Downgraded per NLS 91-176</i>	1/14/67	A <i>5-18-00</i> <i>NLS 95-191</i>
#7a memo	Averell Harriman to the President <i>sanitized</i> Top Secret 1 p. <i>7-6-92 NLS 91-176</i> <i>Downgraded per NLS 91-176</i>	1/14/67	A
#8a memo	Dean Rusk to the President re Vietnam Secret <i>sanitized</i> 4 pp. <i>NLS 81-188</i> <i>Dupe in VN Co File, "Marigold-Incomplete" #2a</i>	1/14/67	A
#9 memo	Rostow to the President re India Secret 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i>	1/13/67	A
#9a draft	Draft message to Mrs. Gandhi " Possible classified information 2 pp.	1/13/67	A
#14 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam Top Secret 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i>	1/13/67	A
#15 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam " Secret 1 p.	1/13/67	A
#15a draft	Draft cable to Saigon <i>open 10-2-91</i> Secret 4 pp. <i>NLS 91-176</i>	1/10/67	A
#18 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam Secret 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i>	1/13/67	A
#18a memo	Dean Rusk to the President re Vietnam Secret 3 pp. <i>open 7-6-92 NLS 91-176</i>	1/12/67	A
#20 memo	Rostow to the President re Foreign Affairs Secret 2 pp. <i>sanitized 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i> <i>open NLS 91-11 1-11-00</i>	1/13/67	A
#21a memo	Richard Helms to the President Secret 3 pp. <i>open 1-30-91</i> <i>NLS 91-177</i>	ca. 1/9/67	A
#22 memo	Rostow to the President re Colombia Confidential 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i> <i>[Dup. in Diary Backup-1/13/67]</i>	1/13/67	A
#26 memo	Rostow to the President re Latin America Secret 1 p. <i>Exempt 9-15-95 NLS 91-178</i> <i>Exempt 6/25/00 NLS 99-13</i>	1/12/67	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow
Volume 18, January 1-14, 1967

Box 12

RESTRICTION CODES

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[2 of 8]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#26a memo	William V. Broe to William G. Bowdler Secret 3 pp. <i>Exempt 622-04 NLS 04-12</i> <i>Exempt 6/1/80 NLS 9/1-77</i>	1/11/67	A
#28 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam Secret 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 9/1-180</i>	1/12/67	A
#28b memo	McNamara to the President Secret 1 p. <i>open 7-6-92 NLS 9/1-179</i>	1/6/67	A
#29 memo	Rostow to the President re Foreign Affairs Secret 2 pp. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 9/1-180</i>	1/12/67	A
#30a cable	Vientiane 4177 <i>Open 10-2-91 NLS 9/1-176</i> Confidential 1 p.	1/12/67	A
#31 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam Secret 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 9/1-180</i>	1/12/67	A
#31a memo	Rostow to the Secretary of State Secret 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 9/1-180</i>	1/4/67	A
#31c memo	John Roche to the President Possible classified information 2 pp. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 9/1-180</i>	1/11/67	A
#35 memo	Rostow to the President re Uruguay Confidential 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 9/1-180</i>	1/12/67	A
#38 memo	Rostow to the President re Panama " Confidential 1 p.	1/12/67	A
#42 memo	Rostow to the President re Panama " Confidential 1 p.	1/11/67	A
#44 memo	Rostow to the President re Goldberg " Secret 1 p. <i>[dup. in Daily Backup - 1/11/67]</i>	1/10/67	A
#46 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam " Secret 2 pp.	1/10/67	A
#49 memo	Rostow to the President re Foreign Affairs Secret 2 pp. <i>Exempt NLS 9/1-80 Open NLS 9/1-11 1-11-00</i>	1/10/67	A
#51 memo	Rostow to the President re Panama Confidential 1 p. <i>sanitized 9-15-95 NLS 9/1-178</i> <i>same san 12/01 - NLS 019-012-2</i>	1/10/67	A
#52 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam <i>open</i> Possible Classified Information 1 p.	1/10/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#52a cable	Saigon 15193 <i>open 10-2-91 NLS 91-176</i> Confidential 2 pp.	1/9/67	A
#52b cable	Saigon 15080 " Secret 5 pp.	1/9/67	A
#57a memo	Rusk to Ambassador McGhee " Secret 1 p.	undated	A
#59 memo	Rostow to the President re Foreign Affairs Secret 1 p. <i>sanitized 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i>	1/9/67 <i>OPEN 10-21-98</i>	A
#61 memo	Rostow to the President re Panama Confidential 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i>	1/9/67	A
#61a cable	Message from Embassy Panama Possible classified information 1 p. <i>open 10-2-91 NLS 91-176</i>	1/6/67	A
#62 memo	Rostow to the President re Panama Confidential 1 p. <i>sanitized 9-15-95 NLS 91-178</i> <i>Since sanitized 6/29/00 NS 94-13</i>	1/9/67	A
#64 memo	Rostow to the President re Western Europe Confidential 1 p. <i>exempt NLS 91-180</i>	1/9/67 <i>OPEN 10-21-98</i>	A
#71 memo	Rostow to the President re the UAR Confidential 1 p. <i>sanitized 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i>	1/7/67 <i>OPEN MLT 1-11-00</i>	A
#71a memo	Charles Schultze to the President Confidential 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i>	12/26/66	A
#71b memo	William Gaud to the President Confidential 2 pp. <i>open 11-8-91 NLS 91-181</i>	12/13/66	A
#71c report	Background Annex Confidential 2 pp. <i>open 11-8-91 NLS 91-181</i>	undated	A
#71d memo	The President to the Administrator of AID Confidential 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i>	undated	A
#71e memo	William Gaud to Charles Schultze Confidential 2 pp. <i>open 11-8-91 NLS 91-181</i>	12/13/66	A
#73 memo	Rostow to the President re personnel 1 p. <i>Sanitized 6-20-97 per TH</i>	1/7/67	C
#76 memo	Rostow to the President re South America Secret 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i>	1/7/67	A

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National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#77 memo	W.G. Bowdler to Walt Rostow Secret 1 p. <i>open 4-8-91</i>	1/7/67	A
#77a draft	Schedule for President's Latin American Trip Secret 4 pp. <i>open 4-18-91</i>	1/5/67	A
#77b draft	List of Statements, Toasts, Speeches Secret 19 pp. <i>open 4-12-93 NLJ 91-180</i>	1/4/67	A
#77c report	Summit Preparation Schedule <i>open</i> Possible classified information 2 pp.	undated	A
#79 memo	Rostow to the President re Foreign Affairs Secret 2 pp. <i>sanitized 4-12-93 NLJ 91-180</i>	1/7/67	A
#82 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam Confidential 1 p. <i>open 2-24-93 NLJ 91-404</i>	1/7/67	A
#82a cable	Vientiane 3977 <i>open 10-2-91</i> Confidential 2 pp. <i>NLJ 91-176</i>	1/6/67	A
#84 memo	Francis M. Bator to the President Confidential 2 pp. <i>open 2-11-93 NLJ 92-50</i>	1/6/67	A
#84a memo	Dean Rusk to the President re Yugoslavia Confidential 4 pp. <i>open 7-6-92 NLJ 91-176</i>	12/31/66	A
#84e report	Consultation on PL-480 re Yugoslavia Confidential 5 pp. <i>open 10-2-91 NLJ 91-176</i>	undated	A
#84f report	re opinions of Senators " Confidential 2 pp.	undated	A
#88a memcon	Conversation with Amb. Lucet of France Secret 2 pp. <i>sanitized 10-2-91 NLJ 91-176</i>	1/5/67	A
#90 notes	Notes of meeting, 1/4/67 exempt <i>NLJ 91-180</i> Top Secret 6 pp. <i>OPEN 11-10-99 NLJ 99-99</i> <i>Downgraded per NLJ 91-180</i>	1/6/67	A
#92a memo	Dean Rusk to the President re Spain Confidential 2 pp. <i>open 7-6-92 NLJ 91-176</i>	12/29/66	A
#94 memo	Rostow to the President re Soviet Union Top Secret 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLJ 91-180</i>	1/5/67	A
#94a memcon	Conversation with Amb. Dobrynin Top Secret 7 pp. <i>sanitized 10-2-91 NLJ 91-176</i> <i>Downgraded to Secret per NLJ 91-176</i>	1/5/67	A
FILE LOCATION	(dup of #a, NSF CFVN, Manifold II) National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow Volume 18, January 1-14, 1967		

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#94b draft	Letter from the President to Ho Chi Minh Top Secret 4 pp. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i>	1/5/67	A
#95a memo	Charles Schultze to the President " re Foreign Aid Confidential 2 pp.	12/30/66	A
#95b memo	William Gaud to the President re aid Confidential 5 pp. <i>open 11-8-91 NLS 91-181</i>	12/3/66	A
#95c memo	The President to the Administrator of AID Confidential 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i>	1/5/67	A
#95d memo	Charles Schultze to the President re aid Confidential 2 pp. <i>OPEN 10.13.98</i>	12/26/66	A
#95e memo	William Gaud to the President re aid Confidential 4 pp. <i>open 11-8-91 NLS 91-181</i>	12/9/66	A
#95f memo	The President to the Administrator of AID Confidential 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i>	1/5/67	A
#97 memo	Rostow to the President re Foreign Affairs Secret 2 pp. <i>sanitized 4-12-93 NLS 91-180 OPEN 10.21.98</i>	1/5/67	A
#98 memo	Rostow to the President re Panama Secret 1 p. <i>sanitized 7-15-95 NLS 91-178</i> <i>sent sanitized 6/21/00 NLS 99-13</i>	1/5/67	A
#98a cable	Panama 2050 <i>sanitized 10-2-91 NLS 91-176</i> Secret 4 pp. <i>More Info Released NLS 99-12</i>	1/4/67	A
#102 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam Secret 1 p. <i>sanitized 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i>	1/4/67 <i>OPEN 10.21.98</i>	A
#102a cable	Deptel 111909 to Tokyo <i>exempt NLS 91-176</i> Secret 7 pp. <i>OPEN 10.21.98</i>	1/3/67	A
#103 memo	Rostow to the President re Soviet Union Secret 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i>	1/4/67	A
#105 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam <i>open 5-18-00 NLS 91-180</i> Top Secret 1 p. <i>exempt NLS 91-180</i> <i>Downgraded to NLS 91-180 (dup of #4, NSF, CEVN, marigold II)</i>	1/4/67	A
#105a memo	re McNaughton-Zinechuk Lunch Top Secret 4 pp. <i>open 7-6-92 NLS 91-179</i>	1/3/67	A
#109 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam Confidential 1 p. <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 91-180</i>	1/3/66	A

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Volume 18, January 1-14, 1967

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#109a cable	Saigon 14701 <i>Open 10-2-91 NLJ 91-176</i> Confidential 2 pp.	12/31/66	A
#113 memo	Rostow to the President re Foreign Affairs Secret 3 pp. <i>Paritized 4-12-93</i> NLJ 91-180 <i>OPEN 10.21.98</i>	1/3/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#13 memo	W.W. Rostow to the President - Top Secret 1 p <i>Exempt 7/5/00 NS 99-84</i>	1/13/67	A
#13a memo	Nathaniel Davis to Rostow - Top Secret 2 p <i>Exempt 7/5/00 NS 99-84</i>	1/13/67	A
#74 memo	Walt Rostow to the President - Top Secret 1 p <i>Sanitized 7/5/00 NS 99-85</i> SAME SANITIZATION 9-10-04 NW 04-114 & NW 92-394	1/7/67	A

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National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow
Volume 18, January 1 - 15, 1967

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
56 memo	Rostow to the President - S 1 p Open 3/26/01 NLS 99-74	1/9/67	A
56a memo	Rostow to the Chairman, AEC - S 1 p Sanitized 3/26/01 NLS 99-74	1/11/67	A
91 memo	Rostow to the President - Open 3/31/00 NLS 99-76 S 1 p	1/5/67	A
91a memo	Rostow to Secretary of Defense & Chairman, AEC - S 1 p Sanitized 3/31/00 NLS 99-76	1/7/67	A
91b memo	James Ramey and Robert McNamara to the President - S 2 pp Sanitized 4/26/00 NLS 99-76	1/5/67	A
91c rpt	Attachment to 91c re NATO - S 1 p Sanitized 4/26/00 NLS 99-76	[1/67]	A

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NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 18, January 1-14, 1967
Box 12

(page 8 added to file 9-1091)

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President's South American Tour

April 11 - 23, 1967

15 stops

11 countries

13 days (including Conference)

14,831 miles.



p. File 2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sat., Jan. 14, 1967
10:15 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here are two memoranda you requested from
Secretary Freeman.

One makes the case for maintaining a
high rate of flow during the non-monsoon
months of January - May to get as much grain
into position as possible around the country
before the rains complicate distribution. It
also supports sending a top-level Presidential
committee to India after the Indian election.

The second makes the case in terms of
domestic political interests for not altering
the present method of financing PL-480.

W. R.



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM

To: The President
The White House

From: Orville L. Freeman
Secretary of Agriculture

Subject: Your oral inquiries made January 12, 1967

The questions you directed to me in your office on January 12 may now be moot in light of the conference held later that same day. Because the answers might bear on future decision-making, I am nonetheless responding as directed.

In light of the fact that the Indian winter wheat (rabi) crop comes to harvest in April and May, you inquired about the pressure to maintain the pipeline through those months and speculated as to whether the Indians couldn't get by for a short period without shipments from the outside.

This inquiry was directed to both the availability of a new crop and also whether the Indians might not move more grain from other areas around the country into the drouth-struck sections. My answer was less than satisfactory, for I did not have the latest information on the rabi crop, nor of any actions taken recently by the Indian Government to strengthen their ability to move grain internally. I cabled promptly to the USDA Agricultural Attache in New Delhi to get the latest information. It discloses that:

1. ~~The crop in Bihar and the U.P., the worst hit states, has~~ improve some since our last report. Production of supplemental crops such as potatoes has been stepped up sharply. ~~However, this improve-~~ ment is reported to be largely cancelled by a further deterioration ~~in the other states of Northern and Central India.~~ The total national estimate then remains unchanged for all practical purposes. Less grain will have to be moved into Bihar and U.P., but more will be required in other areas of North and Central India.

2. ~~The Indian Government appears to be trying to work out new plans~~ to move more grain from state to state, but they are still mostly on paper. ~~A~~ Short of physical force (it would probably take the army) it is doubtful that they could increase the movement from farm surplus to deficit states.

2--The President--1/13/67

The States, although coming around some, are still highly independent. The Central Government will use the Army only under the most extreme circumstances. The current election situation doesn't strengthen the Central Government.

However, ~~there is some rice that might be diverted from South India to meet needs in April and May if the Central Government acted strongly enough.~~ It would have to be substantially restored later to meet pressing need in the South.

It would be my estimate of the situation, then, that ~~there would not be famine in India during the months of April and May, even if grain from outside the country was cut off.~~

However, this is only a partial answer to your real question. The movement of grain within India is complicated and inefficient. ~~It is particularly so during the monsoon season.~~ When the rains come and the rivers run full, it is often impossible to move materials any great distances. ~~Therefore, we acted early and decisively last year to get grain positioned around the country where heavy need was likely.~~ If we are to prevent great hardship, it will, we believe, be necessary to do the same thing again. Precisely how much must be positioned in advance and where cannot be predicted with sharp accuracy. If, however, our goal is to prevent starvation in India, then we will need to move rapidly during the non-monsoon months of January, February, March, April, May, and get as much grain into position as possible. Then, when the rains hit and it's difficult to move through the ports, and almost impossible to move around certain sections of the country, we will be able to meet local need.

~~This is the reason that our planning has been on a total over-all nation-wide yearly basis dealing in round figures.~~ It is the only way we can be sure to prevent starvation. This means, of course, that if we do not maintain the pipeline during the crucial non-monsoon months of April and May, there will be a short fall of something in the neighborhood of two million tons for the year, if the over-all estimates based on the best figures we can get from several sources prove to be accurate.

~~A small, top-level Presidential Committee to go to India after the Indian election and reach a judgment as to future demands on the United States in light of India's condition and prospects would, in my judgment, be an excellent idea.~~ I will make some recommendations on the make-up of such a Committee. Some of the President's Food and Fiber Commission members who are getting a solid agricultural background would be admirably equipped for such an assignment.

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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM

To: The President
The White House

From: Orville L. Freeman
Secretary of Agriculture

Subject: Public Law 480 - India - Food for Freedom Financing

This is to follow up our conversations re financing the Food for Freedom Program (P.L. 480) including the current allocation to India. You know that ~~Public Law 480 food programs are financed through the Commodity Credit Corporation~~. Expenditures are made and ~~the funds~~ (less that paid to the CCC by other Departments of the U.S. Government who use soft currency to pay U.S. obligations in the L.D.C.) ~~are restored by the following Congress~~. The expenditures in question are carefully reviewed and analyzed by the Appropriations Committee, but ~~they are reviewing what has been done rather than authorizing precisely what will be done in the coming year~~. This system grew up from necessity.

~~Food supply is subject to many uncertainties, pestilence, insects, world production and market changes. All of these sharply affect the American farmer and the related Agri-business sector of our nation. Obviously, it is impossible to forecast or control these forces. To protect the farmer, the Congress developed farm programs with a goal of reaching parity. As a practical matter it was found to be almost impossible to fund these commodity programs in advance. There are too many uncertainties. Therefore, Congress authorized the organization of the Commodity Credit Corporation under the Corporate laws of Delaware to operate much as a private business corporation. The Corporation (now under Federal Charter) reports to the Congress. Congress, if satisfied that the guide lines set down have been followed replenishes the Corporation resources. This system has, I think, worked very satisfactorily in the past, and to my knowledge no one has suggested that we should revert to the old system of getting specific appropriations prior to expenditures.~~

2--The President--1/13/67

I set down this background to place this system in perspective for your consideration. There is a tendency because of the pressure of international food needs and the fact we have reached a stage of relative well-being in our domestic agriculture to judge our agricultural system of funding through the CCC in international terms. ~~I submit that this should not be done at the expense of domestic considerations.~~ I will not burden you now with an analysis of why I think the continuation of our farm program is essential. ~~The Farm Bureau and other right-wing forces will attack it strongly this year on the grounds we have eliminated surpluses and are making progress.~~ I will be meeting that attack head-on around the country, for I believe we would soon be back where we started five years ago if we abolished our farm programs. Their attack will be not on the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965, but rather on funding it. They would be delighted to change the current method of financing through replenishment of the CCC and to move funding into the normal appropriation process. ~~In all likelihood, they could kill our farm programs in this fashion.~~ Therefore, I would urge your consideration of the domestic aspects of the current system of replenishing the CCC in addition to its use to finance our P.L. 480 food movement to less developed countries.

Finally, I would add that to the extent that we can find a use for food which might be produced in surplus in a given year because of unusually favorable weather, doing so is in the interest of American agriculture. ~~Moving surplus foods into use even on concessional terms around the world is better and cheaper than paying storage on it at home.~~

The wheat market is currently soft. ~~Prices have been dropping down recently.~~

Saturday, January 14, 1967
5:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with New Zealand Ambassador

New Zealand Ambassador George Laking will call on you at 11:45 A. M. on Monday (Jan. 16).

He is returning to Wellington to take up two responsible positions in his Government.

I suggest that you:

(1) congratulate the Ambassador on his appointment as Secretary of the Department of External Affairs and Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department;

(2) express U. S. appreciation for continuing New Zealand support in Viet-Nam;

(3) comment on his 13 years of service in Washington (6 as Ambassador; previously as Minister and Counselor).

You may wish to talk with the Ambassador about the situation in Viet-Nam, giving him your current assessment. You may also wish to ask him for his estimate of his country's future role (New Zealand now has a 180-man artillery battery and a 15-man medical team; a review of New Zealand defense matters, including the possibility of increasing their Viet-Nam effort, is scheduled to be completed before the Cabinet meets on January 24).

You might also ask the Ambassador how he expects the visit of Prime Minister Ky to New Zealand later this month is likely to go. (Note: there has been strong criticism from the opposition and the press.)

The Ambassador would undoubtedly be pleased to be asked to convey your personal greetings to Prime Minister Holyoake.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

4


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, January 14, 1967; 10:45AM

Mr. President:

Francis Bator asked me to make sure you had seen the attached lead editorials from this morning's Post and Times, and to let you know that State will send copies to all capitals for use in our dealings on the Kennedy Round. These pieces should be most useful as a demonstration of the importance you attach to the negotiations and the political sacrifices you have made to insure their success.

Conversations with people from other papers indicate that there may be several more such editorials. Francis will keep you informed.



Ed Hamilton

An Act of Courage

President Johnson has said so little about the need for lowering tariff barriers to international trade that some observers erroneously concluded that he had little sympathy for that cause. They were wrong. The President's decision to terminate the high, escape-clause rates of duty on watch movements and glass is an act of courage, one that was vehemently opposed by protectionist spokesmen from industry, labor and the Congress. By acting with firm conviction, the President made some political enemies. But he has increased the likelihood of success in the Kennedy Round of tariff-cutting negotiations and advanced the cause of freer international trade.

The high tariff on watch movements dates back to 1954 when President Eisenhower declared it necessary to protect the domestic industry from serious injury as a result of increased imports that were attributed to concessions granted under the reciprocal trade legislation. In the ensuing years the domestic industry insisted that protection was also essential on grounds of national defense. The late President Kennedy raised the tariff rate on glass in a misguided effort to assist the depressed economy of West Virginia. There was instant retaliation by European countries.

Of the two decisions, the action on watch movements is the most important, both in terms of the volume of trade and the political impact. The Swiss government felt so strongly about the watch-tariff issue that they were threatening to withdraw their Kennedy Round trade offers. Had that happened most of the Common Market countries, under the most-favored-nation principle of nondiscrimination, would have been compelled to withdraw many of their offers, and the chain-like reaction could have wrecked the negotiations.

Paradoxically the principal opposition to reducing the watch tariff comes from the domestic companies that are also major producers in Switzerland and Japan. By playing the protectionist game, they were apparently inflicting more injury upon their competitors, the independent importers, than they suffered as importers of their own, foreign-made products.

In making his decision to terminate the escape-clause duty, the President was assured by the Defense Department that the national security will not be impaired. The demand for missiles and other timed weapons has widely diffused the skills needed to produce horological mechanisms. There need be little concern about the financial position of the domestic watchmakers. Their order books are full.

The voice of the White House has often been raised in behalf of freer trade, but President Johnson provided the indispensable element, not the profile, not the rhetoric, but a willingness to stand on principle when the political disadvantages hopelessly outweigh any prospects for gain. That is the essence of political courage.



41 b

Mr. Johnson's Tariff Courage

President Johnson's decision to roll back watch and sheet-glass tariffs—despite powerful opposition mobilized by those industries in a Congress he no longer dominates—was an act of political courage with broader world implications than trade in those products would suggest. It affects the atmosphere of the entire Kennedy Round of trade negotiations now nearing completion in Geneva.

The Kennedy Round centers on an American offer of deep tariff cuts to persuade the Common Market to lower trade barriers toward other European countries and the outside world as a whole. Economically, success is vital to the export trade of Britain and many other countries, including the United States. Politically, the unity of the Atlantic Community is involved.

The decision on watches, a major Swiss export, eliminates the danger that Berne will withdraw many of its Kennedy Round offers, a move that could trigger similar action by the Common Market. The partial rollback in glass tariffs is symbolically important because the tariffs were raised in 1962, only a few months after a previous reduction. This circumstance outraged Belgium, and the Common Market as a whole joined in retaliatory tariff increases against several American export products.

Even more significant is the fact that the original American tariff increases for watches and glass took place under an "escape clause" which long had been a psychological impediment to trade liberalization. Europeans had come to suspect that the United States would rescind tariff cuts whenever foreign industries really succeeded in penetrating the American market.

Business requests for escape clause protection were, in fact, rarely granted by Washington. But the frequency of such requests and the lengthy procedures involved often created enough uncertainty to discourage European companies from the huge investment in product adaptation and merchandising needed to crack the American market.

To persuade Europe to enter the Kennedy Round, the 1962 Trade Expansion Act turned toward a new concept, "adjustment assistance" to American business and labor affected by foreign competition. The escape clause itself was made more difficult to use and a Presidential review was instituted that promised to roll back tariffs previously raised under escape clause procedures.

With his action on watches and glass, President Johnson now has kept that promise in all five of the cases on which he has had to rule and given Europe new reason for confidence that the tariff cuts made in the Kennedy Round will not be easily reversed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday - January 14, 1967

Mr. President -

When Garcia Godoy presented credentials last October, he did so in company with two other Ambassadors. He did not have a chance to talk to you about the Dominican Republic as he would have liked.

In recent weeks he has indicated to Linc Gordon and Bill Bowdler great interest in having a private, informal chat with you. Behind this interest is the feeling that as one of the key actors in the Dominican drama who contributed so much to the successful outcome, he expected to have the chance to reminisce with you and discuss the future of the Dominican Republic.

Linc Gordon has asked that I inquire if you would receive him. If you could spare a few minutes, it would be a nice gesture -- as well as a way to cement good relations with the man who may well succeed Balaguer to the presidency in 1970.

W. W. Rostow

Approve appointment ____

Prefer to wait until
some other time ____

See me ____.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-180
By ing, NARA, Date 4-7-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6

Saturday, January 14, 1967 -- 1:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

I called Adolf Berle and gave him the message you outlined.

I told him, also, that to serve a President who was doing what he believed right -- who is beleaguered -- is a great satisfaction. He said:

1. He is most pleased if the article gave you comfort.
2. The remarkable thing about it was not the article but the fact the New York Times had published it. He had pushed Johnny Oakes around hard at a dinner party recently -- enough to give him a guilty conscience.
3. The response to your State of the Union message, as he heard from ordinary citizens in New York City -- taxi drivers, waiters, etc. -- was most positive. He summarized it as: "We have a President who is doing his job."
4. He asked me to convey to you and to Mrs. Johnson his best wishes for a year which will certainly be hard but he hopes will be rewarding.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

Saturday, January 14, 1967
2:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith three moves in the peace field
reported by Gov. Harriman.

I'm sceptical of the Sainteny move; but,
if we have other moves going, I guess not much
harm will be done. (I just don't want the French
in this; he can't go without de Gaulle's approval;
and, besides, it has for Hanoi all the memories
of 1954 -- a bad image for them and for us.)

But Sec. Rusk may have better reasons
than I can think of.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Memo for the President
and the Sec. of State from
W. A. Harriman

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 95-191
By 48, NARA, Date 4-11-90

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rlh

160
7a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

January 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE


Subject: "Negotiations Committee"

The Negotiations Committee met Thursday, January 12, and agreed on the following:

(1) Chet Cooper should go to Paris to take up with Sainteny his own idea as expressed to me that he might return to Hanoi to find out specifically, if possible, what "reciprocal action" the North Vietnamese leaders would take if bombing were stopped, and take soundings on other pertinent subjects. (The Secretary has agreed to this step.)

(2) The guidance to be given Ambassador Thompson for his discussions with Kosygin was discussed, and it was agreed a draft should be prepared for your approval.

(3) It was agreed that a covert deniable contact should be made with the NLF representative in Algiers to discuss the proposal of the Polish Ambassador, allegedly on behalf of the NLF. It was further agreed that the Poles should be called off as it seems wiser to deal directly than to do so through them.


W. Averell Harriman

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 95-135
By ing, NARA, Date 7-13-95

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

8

Sat., January 14, 1967
2:15 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Secretary Rusk's report of his conversation with Harrison Salisbury. Aside from the ambiguous hint which we have already had and are exploring via the Swedes, the most important point is that marked on pages 3-4.

As you know, we are trying to open up this approach via Moscow. If it doesn't work in the next week or so, I still believe we ought to try a letter from you, before the end of the Tet truce.

W. W. R.

SECRET attachment

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8a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 14, 1967

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 95-135
By isp, NARA, Date 7-13-95

Subject: Highlights of Harrison Salisbury
Private Report To Me.

1. Salisbury came down from New York to see me on Friday afternoon, the 13th. He said that only Reston was aware that he was coming to see us, and that he believed there would be no disclosure from the Times. For the moment we have not indicated that we have seen him, but feel it would be wise to admit it if questions are seriously raised over the weekend or later. We do not want to build him up, but neither do we wish to have our contact with him seem something to be concealed.

2. The highlight of his account concerns remarks by Pham Van Dong in response to Salisbury's questions, after Pham Van Dong had completed the full statement carried in the Times on January 8. Salisbury pressed him on Hanoi making some response if the US were to stop bombing or take some other action, and Pham Van Dong made four replies:

a. After emphasizing that the first step toward discussions must be the end of US air attacks on the North, he said that--once the US had halted its attacks--"as far as we are concerned we will take an appropriate stand."

b. At a later point, Pham Van Dong said: "If the US really wants a settlement, the first thing is to have good will. Of course we know what we should do if the US shows good will. If they stop the whole war, we know what we should do. If they stop doing harm to the North, we know what we should do."

* This is the same formulation which the Swedes are exploring further.

~~SECRET--EXDIS~~
DR

~~SECRET--EXDIS~~

-2-

c. At another point, Pham Van Dong said: "The moment the US puts an end to the war, we will respect each other and settle every question."

d. At still another point, Pham Van Dong said that with a cessation of hostilities "we can speak about other things. After this, there will be no lack of generosity on our part."

3. The latter two of these quotations add nothing in our judgment. The first two might conceivably be significant as indicating an awareness by Pham Van Dong that reciprocal action is required before we can stop the bombing. However, he consistently refused, under what Salisbury describes as repeated questioning, to elaborate on what he meant by "an appropriate stand" or what he meant by "we know what we should do." At other points in the conversation, Pham Van Dong took the standard line that our bombing was aggression and that we were not entitled to get anything in return for stopping it.

4. Our net judgment is that Pham Van Dong's unreported statements--which the North Vietnamese would not let Salisbury print--are interesting as mood music, but give us no real handle beyond what we already had from similar statements last summer to Sainteney, and to at least one other source.

5. Apart from this specific information--on which Salisbury clearly appeared to regard himself as a confidential reporter to his government only--the full report of his visit contains three other interesting elements:

a. In a series of talks at lower levels before his interview with Pham Van Dong, he found the North Vietnamese arguing that domestic economic and political factors must have an effect on your capacity to continue, or if necessary intensify, the war. These North Vietnamese thought the war was killing the Great Society, inflation was rampant, the gold

~~SECRET--EXDIS~~

~~SECRET--EXDIS~~

-3-

drain problem was serious, we would have manpower difficulties with the draft, and we would have to pull forces from Europe. Salisbury says he refuted each of these arguments and tried very hard to get across to them that the US was not France and had ample power and resources to go on at any level desired. He is not sure he destroyed these illusions, and their depth and variety are certainly significant as indicators of Hanoi's thinking.

b. While the North Vietnamese themselves could not be drawn into discussion of the crisis in China, the consensus in the diplomatic community in Hanoi was that Hanoi's leaders were deeply concerned. Salisbury thought they were afraid that the crisis could lead to a sealing of the border, to the Chinese stopping Soviet shipments, or to the Chinese stopping their own crucial aid including rice. How much of this was Salisbury and how much was (unidentified) diplomats was hard to tell, but the report is interesting.

c. At the same time, Salisbury thought that Hanoi had two great concerns about getting into discussions or taking any public action along the lines of reducing hostilities. One was that the Communist Chinese "had a pistol at their back." The second, which he based on two or three direct references in conversations with North Vietnamese, was that Hanoi was deeply concerned that any gesture toward peace would affect the morale and discipline of its own people and presumably the Viet Cong and NLF. The North Vietnamese told Salisbury, in effect, that they would have a serious problem in keeping their people at concert pitch or in resuming actions once they were reduced.

We are inclined to take this last point quite seriously. We are also inclined to share Salisbury's conclusion that if Hanoi ever started down the road to peace they would

~~SECRET--EXDIS~~

~~SECRET--EXDIS~~

-4-

have to have a clear idea at the outset just where they would come out, and that a conclusion would be reached rapidly. Salisbury notes that if Hanoi took some steps that became known to the Chinese, the Chinese could "pull the plug" on their aid or put pressure on Hanoi. All of this pointed, in his judgment, to working out all the essential elements of a final settlement in the most private and secret way, and he himself stressed the necessity of such conversations many times to the North Vietnamese he talked to, including Pham Van Dong. This line of thinking is consistent with our own growing belief that we should be thinking in terms of a "package deal" reached through wholly secret discussions.

6. Salisbury also had a fair amount of incidental intelligence on conditions in Hanoi and the limited areas he visited outside the city. He said he would be available for further conversations, and we will review all aspects of his report to see if this is desirable. However, he himself thinks that his main information concerns the unpublished interview with Pham Van Dong, as described at the beginning of this memorandum. We are preparing an absolutely full and detailed report today.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET--EXDIS~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 13, 1967

SUBJECT: Letter to Mrs. Gandhi in Advance of Your Special
Emissary on the Indian Food Problem

State recommends a message to Mrs. Gandhi to precede Gene's arrival.* We're pegging it to her New Year's message but our real purpose is to set the stage for Gene by giving Mrs. Gandhi a foretaste of how gravely you view her food problems.

The message sets India's difficulties within the wider framework of the world food problem and expresses the hope that India will play a constructive role in helping the world to face this task. It urges them to do more for themselves. It restates your concern about India's needs, but from here on it will have to be a truly international effort.

This word from you will confirm Gene's position as a man with your full confidence and will pave the way for serious talk right away.

If you approve the attached text, we will send it telegraphically for quick delivery.

W. W. Rostow

Approve Disapprove

*as changed
but make it a
little jazzier.
Now scheduled for next Tues. (c)*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-180
By ing, NARA, Date 4-7-93

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-180
By sig, NARA, Date 4-7-93

72

DRAFT MESSAGE TO MRS. GANDHI

January 13, 1967

Your message to me conveying New Year's greetings was most welcome. Although the months ahead will certainly be fraught with grave problems, I fully share your hope and expectation that we shall overcome them and that cooperation between our two governments and peoples will grow still closer.

I continue to give serious thought to your government's problems in providing enough food for your people. I see your difficulty this year as symptomatic of the fact that, quite apart from your particular problems of drought, many regions of the world are losing the ability to feed themselves. I foresee unimaginable tragedy if the world fails to reverse this trend.

I profoundly hope that India will take the lead in inspiring and urging all nations -- rich and poor alike -- to join a truly worldwide effort to bring population and food production into balance. The day is past when the United States can bear this burden alone. We count on the Government of India to become an example of what a determined people can do for themselves. We count on your government also to dramatize to all nations of the world the depth of this problem.

It is my earnest hope that your own representatives in other capitals will press your case with their host governments -- an effort we will support but which your government will, of course, wish to lead.

At the same time I realize with the utmost sympathy that the problems you face in the months that lie immediately ahead cannot be solved entirely by your own efforts. Substantial external assistance will be required to avert what you rightly describe as a human tragedy. I want you to know that I am deeply concerned that this aid be forthcoming in sufficient and timely fashion. However, as I said in my recent State of the Union message, I am convinced that this problem is a responsibility of the international community, and will have to be met by a truly international effort.

To explain my thoughts more fully, I am sending Mr. Eugene V. Rostow, our Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, as my personal emissary to discuss this problem with you and with the leaders of other friendly and interested countries. He will be arriving in New Delhi shortly after you receive this letter.

2. this file

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

January 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to a Vietnam "Peace Appeal" from Greece

A group of prominent Greek political figures--a conservative cross-section--has sent you the attached appeal to end the war in Vietnam. But basically it's a public appeal to the Communist nations to help persuade Peiping and Hanoi to take you up on your peace offers. It therefore comes out as a helpful noise.

Ambassador Talbot feels these are responsible and important enough people to rate an answer. He would like to send each of the signatories the following message in your name:

"I warmly appreciate the Appeal for Peace which you have sent me. I particularly value it because it comes from Greece, with its record of resistance to Communist aggression, and with its long history of dedication to the noblest ideals of mankind.

"I deeply share your desire for an end to war, and I shall continue to do all in my power for an honorable and lasting peace in Viet-Nam. Like you, I hope the day will soon come when we can dedicate all our skills and resources to economic progress."

We've taken careful soundings to be sure such a response wouldn't put you in the middle of the coming Greek election campaign, and we see no problem.

W. W. Rostow

Approve 

Disapprove _____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

102

Athens
30 December 1966

Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson
President of U. S. A.
c/o The American Ambassador
Athens

Appeal for Peace

Along with many important problems of our own country we are also facing problems that threaten the peace of the entire world. We, the undersigned Greeks, wish that the coming New Year (1967) brings peace to the people of Vietnam and removes the present danger of world war.

Knowing the sufferings of the Vietnamese people perhaps better than anyone since the Greeks suffered similarly, and believing that the continuation of this war is a great danger to world peace, we Greeks, small in power but rich in experience, address this appeal for peace to all authorities in the world in the hope of achieving world cooperation in the effort to bring an end to the Vietnamese war and to establish peace in the world.

We address this appeal for peace especially to those communist countries which desire peace. These countries must do their utmost to convince the governments of China and North Vietnam to accept the offer of peace coming from the sincere, progressive democratic countries many of which, for the sake of world peace, are allied with the South Vietnamese people.

An example of the sincerity of these democratic countries is their offer to participate in the social and economic development of the war-weary, poverty-stricken people of Southeast Asia by rendering large-scale financial and other aid. The offer is contingent upon the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all foreign military forces.

May the Almighty God bless the efforts of those nations which truly desire peace.

- E. Averof Tositsas, Deputy, Former Minister of the
Food and Agriculture Organization
- D. Thanopoulos, Deputy, Former Minister and Vice
President of Parliament
- E. Savopoulos, Deputy, Former Minister

Th. Manolopoulos, Deputy, Former Minister
A. Frontistis, Deputy, Honorary Chief of Greek General
Staff of National Defense
Cl. Damianos, Deputy
J. Tsirimocos, Deputy
C. Papadimitriou, Deputy
Cr. Bougas, Deputy
G. Grafacos, Deputy
A. Gelestathis, Deputy
D. Garagenis, Deputy
T. Michailidis, Deputy
D. Ioanou, Deputy
P. Sakelariou, Former Chief of Army General Staff
E. Kelaithis, Former Chief of Air Force General Staff
C. Caravitis, Lt. General, Retired
F. Macris, General Secretary of Greek General Federation
of Labor
D. Theodorou, Alternate General Secretary of Greek General
Federation of Labor
D. Yianoucakis, Writer
B. Spiropoulos, Writer

11
JAN 13 1967

Dear Ralph:

Many thanks for your letter of January 12. I want you to know, again, that there is no man in the world who wants an honorable peace in Viet Nam more than I do.

I want you also to know that under my personal direction we are now exhausting every possible method which contains the promise of discussions that might lead to an honorable peace, and we will continue to do so. On the other hand, it is fundamental for all of us to recognize that demonstrating that aggression cannot succeed is the minimum condition for building a world of peace and order.

Sincerely,



Honorable Ralph W. Yarborough
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

LBJ: WWR:mz

Friday, Jan. 13, 1967
12:45 p.m.

12

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a proposed reply to Senator
Yarborough.

W. W. R.

Attachment

January 13, 1967

Dear Ralph:

Many thanks for your letter of January 12. I want you to know, again, that there is no man in the world who wants an honorable peace in Viet Nam more than I do.

I want you also to know that under my personal direction we are now exhausting every possible method which contains the promise of discussions that might lead to an honorable peace, and we will continue to do so. On the other hand, it is fundamental for all of us to recognize that demonstrating that aggression cannot succeed is the minimum condition for building a world of peace and order.

Sincerely,

LBJ

Honorable Ralph W. Yarborough
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

LBJ: WWR:mz 1/13/67

CARL HAYDEN, ARIZ., CHAIRMAN

RICHARD B. RUSSELL, GA.
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WILLIAM PROXMIRE, WIS.
RALPH YARBROUGH, TEX.

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MARGARET CHASE SMITH, MAINE
THOMAS H. KUCHEL, CALIF.
ROMAN L. HRUSKA, NEBR.
GORDON ALLOTT, COLO.
NORRIS COTTON, N.H.
CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

January 12, 1967

THOMAS J. SCOTT, CHIEF CLERK
WM. W. WOODRUFF, ASST. CHIEF CLERK

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your January 9 response to my proposal for posting a Presidential Peace Commission in a neutral capital. I appreciate your description of the Harriman "peace team" and the traditional diplomatic channels which now exist for negotiation. If these efforts of ours could be more dramatically demonstrated to the American public and the world there would be less urgency in my recommendation. Since I still believe that this Peace Commission proposal has considerable merit, I wish to address myself to a few of the problems which were dealt with in your reply and press reports.

It seems to me that the presence of a Peace Commission in a neutral capital, the existence of traditional diplomatic channels, and the exploration of all leads by your roving representatives do not represent mutually exclusive or contradictory concepts. Although the latter two devices are necessary in our search for peace, the addition of the Peace Commission might provide a mechanism not present or sufficiently attractive in the existing diplomatic channels. The presence of a Presidential Peace Commission might, for example, encourage initiatives by interested third parties who may have reluctance for or fear of traditional diplomatic channels or have limited access to roving representatives.


It is not inconceivable that individuals who may not merit a visit by a roving representative could provide before the Commission an initiative which might develop into full negotiations.

The thought that the visibility of a Peace Commission might inhibit the other side has some validity but it does not seem sufficient to negate the soundness of my proposal. Since the other side has used every opportunity for publicizing the merits of its position and yet (so far as I know) has resisted and frustrated all prior "quiet contacts," our Peace Commission would give us an opportunity to publicize the sincerity of our efforts and the other side's intransigence if they choose to ignore the Commission or the existing channels of negotiation. Their propaganda efforts show a sensitivity to world opinion. Might not re-emphasized peace efforts on our part evoke some similar response or movement from them? It would at least aid us in the court of world opinion as well as with people at home who desire more visible peace efforts.

Although I would perhaps share the estimate of your advisers that the ultimate route to negotiations will come through quiet diplomacy, neither it nor military escalation seems to have provoked any movement toward peace in Hanoi. Discussions initiated before a Peace Commission may provide additional opportunities and ideas for quiet diplomacy.

Mr. President, all of us are proud of the fine job which our fighting men are doing in this difficult war. We are also deeply troubled by the plight of the innocent Vietnamese people who suffer because they stand in the path of the Communist grasp for power. I believe that we owe it to our courageous men and the innocent Vietnamese people to exhaust every route to a negotiated peace.

Respectfully yours,



Ralph W. Yarborough

RWY:dyf

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, January 13, 1967
7:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

As they indicated this afternoon in the Mansion, Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara have agreed to the JCS proposal to expand U. S. naval interdiction against North Vietnamese military and logistic watercraft northward from the 18th parallel to the 19th parallel.

Both Secretaries agreed that they would not approve now the use of artillery and naval gunfire against targets in North Viet Nam -- perhaps later.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-180
By WJ, NARA, Date 4-7-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

15
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Friday, January 13, 1967 -- 7:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

This cable is agreed by State and Defense.

It proposes that, in the face of the Viet Cong Tet truce announcement, we should maintain our suspension of offensive operations for 4 days as originally planned but not extend it for the full 7 days.

Behind this lies Westmoreland's strong opposition to any truce at all and his conviction that a 7-day truce would result in unacceptable costs to our fighting men in the field.

Cy Vance and Nick Katzenbach worked out this compromise.

*Sgt. Rush
agreed.*

I am told that Amb. Goldberg still supports the 7-day truce.

*Sgt. M. Noman
agreed.*

This is a matter on which I believe you should rule.

W. Rostow
W. Rostow

Telegram cleared _____

7-Day truce _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-180
By *W. Rostow*, NARA, Date 4-7-93

~~SECRET~~

15a

TELEGRAM Department of State

~~SECRET~~
Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

ACT: **Amembassy SAIGON** IMMEDIATE
INFO: Amembassies: BANGKOK PRIORITY
CANBERRA
MANILA
SEOUL
VIENTIANE
WELLINGTON
CINCPAC

STATE

EXDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-176
By SP, NARA, Date 9-11-91

1. We believe that Allies, in face of Viet Cong seven-day Tet truce announcement, should maintain own suspension of offensive operations for four days, as originally planned, but not extend to full seven days. Will also want to maintain adequate latitude for appropriate response to enemy incidents or tactical maneuvers. ~~Amembassy Saigon, Bangkok, Manila, Seoul, Vientiane, Wellington, CINCPAC, State, Exdis, Polad, and all other offices concerned are requested to suspend offensive operations for four days.~~

2. Believe we should maintain suspension, despite Viet Cong abuse of earlier truces, because of deep roots which Tet period has in Vietnamese tradition and religion; allies cannot ignore this factor after having suspended offensive operations during

WRSmyser:aba 1/10/67	7731	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA - Leonard Unger
EA/VN-Mr. Miller	EA-Mr. Bundy	
DOD Mr. Vance	S/S-	
P - Mr. Phillips	WH-Mr. Rostow	

CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES
BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room 6243

INFO:

Page 2 of telegram to ACTION: SAIGON IMMEDIATE; Amembassies BANGKOK,
CANBERRA, MANILA, SEOUL, VIENTIANE, WELLINGTON; CINCPAC - PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

Classification

traditional Western holidays. We also want to exploit Tet period potential for launching national reconciliation program on assumption GVN proclamation made in time.

3. On other hand, we do not want to expose allied forces to Viet Cong "incidents" during full week, and do not want to allow Viet Cong to engage in massive supply operations under cover of "truce" over such period.

4. We recognize that this course may expose us to criticism from segments of U.S. and world public opinion wanting longer truce, but believe this criticism can be met by following:

(a) Making clear (with GVN if possible) that we are willing to talk to Hanoi at any time about an extension of truce for seven days or even longer, on properly agreed and supervised basis;

(b) Pointing out on background or even in ^{direct statement} ~~public~~ how other side had used Christmas and New Year truce periods for supply shipments, and particularly casualties which had resulted both during truces and after Christmas truce as result of Viet Cong incidents and of Viet Cong tactical operations prepared under protection of truce

(c) Making clear truce as it stands is necessarily unsupervised and therefore unsatisfactory over longer period.

Classification

5. We therefore favor following ^{language for} announcement by GVN:
BEGIN TEXT

6. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet Nam and its allies have standing orders to take, if necessary, all appropriate measures for self-defense during this period, bearing in mind the results of the suspension of offensive operations during the Christmas and New Year periods. The Government of the Republic of Viet Nam and its allies will expect that the suspension of offensive operations during the Tet period will not be used by the other side to gain surreptitious tactical military advantage.

7. The ~~United States Government~~ Government of the Republic of Viet Nam
also is prepared to meet with representatives of North Viet Nam to
work out arrangements for ~~exchange of prisoners of war~~
an extension of the suspension of offensive operations

CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES
BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/TIA, Room 6243

Page 4 of telegram to ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE; INFO:
Amembassies BANGKOK, CANBERRA, MANILA, SEOUL, VIENTIANE, WELLINGTON,
CINCPAC - PRIORITY ~~SECRET~~

Classification

~~During the next seven days or even longer, on a properly agreed and supervised/~~ basis.
END TEXT

8. Embassy should consult with GVN on proposed text. After these consultations completed, if GVN agrees, consultations with other Manila nations can be held in Saigon as before Christmas truce. We do not plan separate consultations in other allied capitals unless required by local situation.

9. We are sending by septel requisite military instructions.

GP-1

END

~~SECRET~~

January 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: A Look at the Past Week in China

The stubborn stalemate between Mao and his opponents persists after the struggle's most convulsive week yet:

1. While reports of breakdown in public order involving violence in a dozen major cities may be exaggerated, both Peking and provincial radios have confirmed widespread disorder. Peking is urging striking workers to return to their jobs, and fear is expressed of potentially serious damage to the economy.

2. Peking editorials calling for the Army's backing and soliciting its loyalty, poster attacks against three top military leaders, and a reorganization of the military's Cultural Revolution Committee give clearest indication yet that Army support of Mao is problematical. The test may come if Mao's young activists go to the farms as planned, and there meet widespread opposition similar to that met in many factories. (Some 90% of Army personnel come from farm families.)

3. The week saw the first really earnest attempt by Premier Chou En-lai to moderate activities of the Red Guards and to protect several top leaders from their wrath. Significantly, Madame Mao has backed Chou in these efforts and for the first time Chou has claimed Mao's support in them as well. I read the new forthrightness of Chou's moderation efforts as further indication of the strength of Mao's opponents. Throughout his career Chou has had the instinctive knack of nicely timed gravitation to the winning side.

4. The provincial party apparatus, believed overwhelmingly to support Mao's chief opponents, apparently remains intact (with only Shanghai in doubt) after the most determined attacks to date against it.

5. The continued silence (since November 26) of Mao's heir apparent, Defense Minister Lin Biao, is an increasingly intriguing puzzle.

It is true that in all the confusion of the week, Mao and his supporters have retained the initiative. The opposition has only reacted. Still, no significant victories can yet be chalked up for Mao, and there is no evidence that the opposition is buckling.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority NLQ 85-262
By 18/isp, NARA, Date 2-5-91

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

The Cultural Revolution has had a pulsating character throughout. The pattern has been:

1. Attacks on those "following the capitalist line" by Mao-Lin and their supporters;
2. Determined and predominantly successful resistance from the opposition;
3. Mao-Lin appraisal of the opposition's strength, resulting in brief tactical withdrawal;
4. Renewed attack, usually through a new avenue.

Chou's moderation efforts may signify entry once again into a phase three situation.

The basic fact of the matter is that all of the problems undermining Mao's position remain

- fragmented and embittered leaders,
- revisionist and indolent cadre,
- policy and personal differences in every major element of the society,
- a long list of failures in domestic and foreign policies, and
- a populace as a whole which must by now be bone weary of 17 years of incessant ideological floggings.

Finally, and very importantly, Mao's own prestige has been seriously, perhaps irretrievably, tarnished in this as yet unavailing fracas.

/s/
W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Jorden

AJenkins:mmm

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

January 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary Orville L. Freeman
Agriculture Department

Under Secretary Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Department of State

Mr. William S. Gaud, Administrator, AID

SUBJECT: January 12, 1967 Meeting with the President on the Indian
Food Package

It is my understanding that at last evening's meeting with the
President, it was agreed:

1. to firm up our understanding with George Woode that the India consortium will assume responsibility for food aid;
2. to develop plans on the assumption of a 10-million ton Indian import requirement for CY 67, of which the U. S. might deliver 6 million tons (including amounts already allocated); but no commitment could be made to such a U. S. contribution until Congressional review;
3. to go hard for 50-50 sharing by May or June, although it was recognized we might not be able to do it on a regular basis;
4. to send scouts to India to win Indian acceptance of this general approach and mobilize vigorous Indian demarches in appropriate capitals, and then to Japan and Western Europe immediately to see how near we could come to 50-50 shares;
5. to prepare a message to go to Congress by January 23rd, if possible, after we receive a preliminary report from our scouts. It would announce an interim allocation of 1 million tons, (1/2 wheat and 1/2 sorghum) and the \$25 million CARE Title II request. It was recognized that a positive message would help in the Indian elections, but a disappointing proposal could adversely affect the outcome;

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Bu 5-25-78, NSC ltr 4-2-79

By esp/18, NARA, Date 2-4-91

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

6. that hearings on the message would not start until after the Indian election;
7. that a second interim allocation of 1 million tons more before a long term agreement, was not entirely out of the question, but could not be made without a recommendation from relevant Members of Congress;
8. that after getting preliminary reactions from prospective donors, Under Secretary Katzenbach and Secretary Freeman will renew soundings with Congressional leaders and members of the Appropriations Committees, including Members Ford, Mahan, Rooney, Russell, Ellender, and the top ten members of appropriations committees in both House and Senate.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-180
By W-8, NARA, Date 4-7-93

January 13, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Permission for Mission Wives to Reside in Saigon

The attached memo from Secretary Rusk asks your permission to change existing rules regarding the presence of wives in Saigon.

Ambassador Lodge strongly supports the recommended change. He notes:

- (1) Absence of wives has created a serious morale problem;
- (2) It is a major obstacle to recruiting good men and to keeping able people for longer than 18 months;
- (3) Several hundred women are already in Saigon (employees of Government agencies, wives of private contractor personnel, etc.);
- (4) There have been no serious incidents involving American women in Saigon for two years, and the danger is considered small.

The proposed rule changes would be strict. They would:

- (1) Admit wives but no children;
- (2) Require that housing be found in existing facilities;
- (3) Require that those wives admitted agree to work;
- (4) Permit wives to go to Saigon only if their husbands agreed to a 36-month tour.

Bob Komer and Bill Leonhart agree that admission of wives on the above terms would have a favorable effect on morale and performance throughout the Mission. I concur in the recommended change in policy.

W. W. Rostow

Approve new policy _____
Disapprove _____
See Me _____

~~SECRET~~

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18a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 12, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposal by Ambassador Lodge to Permit
Additional Wives in Saigon on Stated
Conditions.

1. Ambassador Lodge proposes that the present permission for wives of members of the US Mission Council in Saigon (10 in number) be expanded to permit the residence in Saigon of wives of US civilian personnel in the Mission who are prepared to accept extended tours of duty and whose continued service in Viet-Nam is desired.

2. The conditions would be as follows:

a. Wives only would be permitted, and children would continue to be excluded totally.

b. Accommodation must be available without increasing the load on housing facilities in Saigon.

c. The wives would agree to undertake some kind of work in Saigon. If they possessed a certain skill, such as being a secretary, teacher, or nurse, they would undertake to do that. Otherwise, they would help the hard-pressed Vietnamese women with their charities.

d. The wives would understand, and perhaps sign an appropriate statement, that they would not make any special demands whatever on the post exchange or administrative section and would accept life in Saigon for what it is.

e. The permission to have wives would extend to those now serving 18-month or longer tours in Viet-Nam, who were prepared to accept total tours of 36 months

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-176
By ing NARA, Date 7-2-92

~~SECRET~~

-2-

with leave at the half-way point. Secondly, wives could be brought by new men assigned to Saigon who were prepared to accept, in advance, a 36-month tour with leave at the half-way point. In the case of new men, there would be an initial period of 3-6 months when a man would come alone and settle down before he could bring his wife.

3. The reasons for the proposed change are as follows:

a. The Mission confronts a serious personnel crisis in the coming months. A large number of key men are now completing, or will shortly complete, the 18-month tour of duty prescribed for civilian members of the Mission following the initial decisions of early 1965 to withdraw wives. Many of these men have made it clear that they will not be prepared to extend their tours unless their wives can join them. Many highly qualified new candidates might also be induced to accept by permission to bring their wives under the stated conditions.

b. The existing situation is bad from a morale standpoint, both in Saigon and at other points in East Asia where wives are currently residing. Inevitably, there has been a considerable amount of loose living in Saigon, while the wives resident at other points have had their own troubles and have been a significant burden to other missions. The occasional permission to leave Saigon to join wives resident elsewhere has not relieved this situation, while it has on occasion detracted from the performance of the Mission.

c. Over the past two years, except for the Embassy bombing in April 1965, in which the casualties included several women working for the Embassy, there have been no serious incidents involving American women in Saigon. While there is always the possibility of such incidents, the present fact is that several

~~SECRET~~

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-3-

hundred American women are in Saigon as employees of various agencies or as the wives of civilian contractors not affected by the ban on the wives of Mission personnel. Under present circumstances, the security hazard does not appear serious, and appears clearly outweighed by the advantages of permitting wives under the stated conditions. Moreover, public opinion does not appear to differentiate between the killing of women and the killing of men.

d. Not only Ambassador Lodge but several recent visitors to the Mission, such as Mr. Komer and Ambassador Leonhart, believe that the admission of wives on these conditions would have a major favorable effect on the morale and performance of the entire Mission. It is judged that those men who have children or whose wives could not meet the conditions would share in this favorable effect.

4. If the revised policy is adopted, Ambassador Lodge estimates that it will in practice affect only a fraction of Mission members. In the case of the present permission extending to the ten members of the Mission Council, three wives are more or less regularly in residence. It seems doubtful that the percentage will be as high for the Mission as a whole, and the resulting estimate is that on the order of 50-100 wives will take advantage of the new permission at most.

5. I recommend that you approve the proposal.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____


Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

JAN 13 1967

Dear Arleigh:

It was good of you to report to me directly your conversations out in the country about Viet Nam.

I agree that the great majority of our people are prepared to see it through and understand what is at stake for ourselves and all the world. I should like you to know that it is a comfort for me to know that you, with all your years of experience, veteran as you are of many of our nation's postwar crises, believe in what we are doing in Southeast Asia.

Sincerely,

LBJ

Admiral Arleigh Burke
Suite 600
810 Eighteenth Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Friday, January 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Summary

1. Soviet Views on Kiesinger Government

The British Ambassador in Bonn has reported that in discussions with the Soviet Ambassadors to West and East Germany, both took a surprisingly hard line towards the new Bonn Government. The British Ambassador received the impression that the Soviets are making a strong effort to block current German efforts to establish diplomatic relations with certain Eastern European countries.

2. Jordan's Financial Problems

The Department of State has instructed Embassy London to inform the British of our concern over the financial problems Jordan will face if, as appears likely, United Arab Command funds for hardware and maintenance are cut off. We hope the British will discourage the Jordanians from purchasing additional equipment, but would be delighted if the UK could do more to assist Jordan in meeting its existing financial commitments.

3. Canadians Decide Against Recognizing ChiComs

The Canadian Ambassador told Assistant Secretary Bundy yesterday his Government agreed that it would be unwise at this time for Canada to move toward recognition of Peking. The Ambassador promised that his government would be in touch with us quickly if changes on the mainland occur sufficient for Canada to reconsider the question of recognition.

4. Constituent Assembly Proposes to Prolong Itself

The most controversial provision of the draft constitution may prove to be its final chapter, which, in addition to empowering the Assembly to establish electoral procedures for the executive and legislative branches, authorizes the Assembly to serve as an interim legislature until a permanent legislature is elected.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

There has thus far been no official Directorate reaction to the Assembly's attempt to prolong its life and broaden its powers, but alternative measures for setting up the necessary electoral machinery are reportedly under consideration by the military leaders.

5. Thieu May Oppose Removal of General Co

According to Embassy Saigon, Premier Ky's reported intention to remove Deputy Prime Minister of Defense Co, may produce backlash in the form of a closer alliance between President Thieu and General Co. Together they would resist any move by Ky against Co.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Fri., Jan. 13, 1966
10:45 a. m.

21

MR. PRESIDENT:

I encouraged Dick Helms to file with you
this report of his briefing of the Russell
Subcommittee of January 9.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment
(log 119)

119 21a



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
The White House

SUBJECT : Briefing of the Russell Subcommittee,
9 January 1967

I thought you would be interested in having a brief report on my appearance before the CIA Subcommittees of Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations on Monday. Ten Senators were present for the session which lasted about two hours and a half. The regular members in attendance were Senators Richard B. Russell, Carl Hayden, John Stennis, Stuart Symington, Margaret Chase Smith, Milton R. Young, and Karl E. Mundt. In addition, Senator Russell had invited from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senators Fulbright, Hickenlooper and Mansfield. Senator Russell specifically indicated that these Senators should feel free to ask any questions about the information presented or Agency activities.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-117
By 40, NARA, Date 1-29-92

Senator Russell had asked me beforehand to make brief statements on several subjects of particular interest to him and his group. Accordingly, I spoke briefly on Soviet military developments, including the unresolved problem within the intelligence community of the exact status of the Anti-Ballistic Missile deployment program. Next, I set forth our information on Chinese Communist activities in the advanced weapons field, and some speculative thoughts on the meaning of the present turmoil within the Chinese political leadership. I followed this with a brief resume of statements regarding negotiations which have been made by the Hanoi leadership over the past year, indicating their unchanging and negative stance. I concluded with a brief account of the Rhodesian question and the related problem of sanctions.


After each of these statements, Senator Russell asked a question and invited the others present to do so as well. Most of these questions sought only an elucidation of the facts. Senator Mansfield asked about the present deployment of forces along the Sino-Soviet border and any evidences we had of clashes there between the Russians and the Chinese. I replied to this that we had no indications of anything other

~~SECRET~~

than occasional skirmishes between small groups. Other Senators asked questions about civilian casualties in Vietnam, Communist infiltration into the South, progress in pacification, and the advances made by the constituent assembly.

Several questions were broader in scope. For example, Senator Fulbright inquired about the effectiveness of the bombing in North Vietnam, in response to which I gave him the conclusions of the latest CIA assessment. Senator Mansfield expressed some surprise that recent statements by Hanoi were not in my view less rigid than formerly and sought more specific assurances, which I provided in detail. Senator Symington cited my description of the limited Soviet ABM deployment around Moscow and asked whether Secretary McNamara had not suggested a much broader deployment. I was able to provide appropriate clarification.

The tone of the discussion throughout was thoughtful, businesslike, and cordial.


Richard Helms
Director

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - January 13, 1967

Mr. President -

In your talk with the Colombian Ambassador this morning when he presents credentials, it is important that you mention President Lleras' letter on the world coffee economy.

I suggest that you indicate that you have sent President Lleras an interim reply and will soon be sending him your substantive observations on his proposals.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-180
By WJ, NARA, Date 4-7-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WJR 23
Pms file

Thursday, January 12, 1967, 5:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to General Franco

At Tab A, for your signature, is a short note to General Franco. It is in reply to a warm letter (Tab B) the General sent you after his meeting with Averell Harriman. The Governor is anxious to have you send a reply (I have checked this personally); apparently the Franco letter is an unusually friendly gesture.

I suggest that, if you approve the letter, we tell the Spanish we will not release it here, but have no objection if they want to do so in Madrid.

Francis M. Bator

No letter _____

Speak to me _____

FMB:LSE:mst

239
JAN 13 1967

Dear General Franco:

I am glad that you had such a good talk with Ambassador Harriman. He has told me of the warm reception he received from you and members of your government while he was in Madrid.

I also want to tell you of my admiration for the medical mission the Spanish Government has sent to Viet-Nam. I am sure that the Vietnamese people are most grateful for this assistance. It provides welcome support for our own efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in Southeast Asia.

Sincerely,

/S/ LBJ

His Excellency
General Francisco Franco Bahamonde
Chief of the Spanish State
Madrid

LBJ:FMB:djw
1/12/67

✓
MIR

Thursday, January 12, 1967
5:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

At Tab A, for your approval, is a short note replying to King Baudouin's letter of condolence on Governor Herter's death (Tab B).

If you approve, I suggest we tell the Belgians we will not release the message here, but have no objection if they do so.

Francis M. Bator

No reply_____

See me_____

FMB:LSE:mst

SUGGESTED REPLY

Your Majesty:

I very much appreciated your message of sympathy on the death of Christian Herter. It is comforting to know that so many others in the world join in our sorrow at the passing of this distinguished statesman.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

OK
L

Pres. file

Thursday, January 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Request of W. R. Hearst, Jr., to Serve on President's Panel of Consultants on Foreign Affairs

Last spring when you approved the appointment of panels of outside consultants to assist each regional Assistant Secretary of State, you agreed with my recommendation that the President's Panel of Consultants on Foreign Affairs play a passive role until such time as the occasion arose when it could be usefully called together. The Panel has not met as a group since July 1965.

The State Department regional consultants groups are in business. I shall report to you shortly on what they have done and plan to do.

Several editors and correspondents are now serving on the State panels such as Bill Attwood and Jim Loeb.

I recommend that you tell Hearst:

- a. The President's Panel is at present inactive because of the establishment of the State Panels. How you will use it in the future will depend on how well the new system operates.
- b. Secretary Rusk would welcome his participation in one of the State groups.
- c. If he will let you know which region interests him most, you will request Secretary Rusk to add him to the panel of his choice--Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, or United Nations Affairs.

W. W. Rostow

_____ Draft letter along these lines for me to send to Hearst

_____ You handle with Hearst

_____ See me

WWR:BKS;amc

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

January 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agenda for Indian Food Meeting--6:30 p.m.

1. Should we put food aid into the World Bank's India consortium? We'll need your OK to get George Woods' formal agreement, get the Indians aboard and lay the groundwork with other consortium members.

2. What planning figure for US food aid should we set for the rest of CY 1967? Rusk-Freeman-Gaud recommend 4.4 million tons (on top of the 1.6 million you have already approved). This is higher than the 3 million tons you directed them to start with as a working figure.

--You will want to satisfy yourself that their figure is tight enough.

--You may also want to ask Secretary Freeman how he thinks it will go down on the Hill. (Congressman Poage did not specifically address the overall planning figure.)

3. How big an interim allocation? Rusk-Freeman-Gaud recommend 2 million tons by about 23 January. Congressman Poage recommends 1.7 million. Secretary Freeman may feel that's cutting it close since this allocation will have to carry us until the consortium machinery gets working and India's new government can sign a major agreement in mid-April. However, the tactical advantage of sticking close to Poage's figure may override.

4. What is the best timing for your message?

--Should you announce an interim allocation separately now and hold your message till the end of January? (This would allow for consortium consultations, and it might suit the Congress which will not want to begin debate until after the Indians vote.)

--Should you keep the interim allocation and the message together and shoot for a message about 23 January?

5. Does the draft message strike the right balance between the Indian problem and the broader War on Hunger? Right now, it's long. One way to cut would be to make it more clearly an India message.

6. When should we go ahead with the CARE program, if we do?

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 65-25-78, MSC 4-7-79By WSP/28, NARA, Date 2-4-91

~~SECRET~~

January 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Secretary of Defense has recommended that you place the two programs listed below in the highest national priority category by authority granted under the Defense Production Act of 1950:

Mk 84, Mod 1, 2000 lb Low Drag Bomb

Project PRACTICE NINE

The urgency of the need for the Mk 84 Mod 1 bomb is to obtain as soon as possible a supply of bombs to be used in South Vietnam against underground targets and reinforced structures. This bomb will replace the Mk 81 bomb which has proved to be inadequate.

PRACTICE NINE is a program similarly made urgent by the requirements of South Vietnam. It is a weapon system designed to interdict infiltration involving both land and air interdiction techniques. The program determination for PRACTICE NINE covers only a portion of the total PRACTICE NINE requirements. An additional determination will be requested covering PRACTICE NINE ammunition.

The Bureau of the Budget has analyzed these two requests and recommends your concurrence. If you approve, I will sign the attached memo.

☒ Approved

W. W. Rostow

☐ Disapproved

☐ See me

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-180
By WJG, NARA, Date 4-7-93

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

January 13, 1967

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO.

TO: The Vice President
 The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
 The Administrator, National Aeronautics and
 Space Administration
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Director, Bureau of the Budget
 The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

SUBJECT: Assignment of Highest National Priority to the Mk 84,
 Mod 1 2000 lb Bomb and to Project PRACTICE NINE

In response to the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense in a memorandum of January 6, 1967, and to the recommendation of the Deputy Secretary of Defense in a memorandum of January 7, 1967, the President, under authority granted by the Defense Production Act of 1950, today established the following programs as being in the highest national priority category:

Mk 84, Mod 1, 2000 lb Low Drag Bomb

Project PRACTICE NINE

The President also approved the removal of the Mk 81 bomb from the highest national priority category.

/s/ W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

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Authority TISC 79 F000 59
By sp/ed, NARA, Date 2-25-91

~~SECRET~~

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286

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

6 JAN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I recommend that you approve the MK 84, Mod 1, 2000 Lb. Low Drag Bomb as a program of highest national priority which would make it eligible for use of the automatic DX industrial priority rating.

The MK 84 Bomb is required for operational use in Southeast Asia against such hard targets as underground POL tanks, reinforced concrete structures, large steel truss bridges, tunnels, and other underground fortifications.

Assignment of the DX priority to this program will have little impact on the production schedules of other programs in view of its relatively limited dollar value of \$31.1 million through FY 1968.

The Department of Defense will remove the MK 81 Bomb as a highest national priority program to accommodate the addition of the MK 84 Bomb to this category.

Robert S. McNamara

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-179
By isp NARA. Date 7-2-92

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X-

91

~~SECRET~~

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28c

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

January 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I recommend that you approve Project PRACTICE NINE as a program of highest national priority, thereby making it eligible for use of the automatic DX industrial priority rating.

This program involves an infiltration interdiction system to be designed and developed for potential deployment to and operation in Southeast Asia to substantially reduce the flow of men and supplies from North to South Vietnam. It will require experimentation and development, production and test of sensors, data systems, aircraft modifications and a command and control complex. In-theater air operations and logistic support will require certain additional Southeast Asia construction effort.

The funding ceilings to be established are approximately as follows:

	(Millions)	
	<u>FY 1967</u>	<u>FY 1968</u>
PRACTICE NINE	\$129.1	\$ 81.3

Cyril Vance
Deputy

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 11652 Sec 5(A) and (D)

By 18, NARA, Date 2-25-91

~~SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS;
RECLASSIFIED AFTER 10 YEARS.
50D DTR 1200.10

~~SECRET~~

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-

5752

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ

By WJ, NARA, Date 4-7-93

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, January 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Summary

1. Kiesinger/Brandt Visit to Paris

Ambassador McGhee believes that when German Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt go to Paris (January 13-14), they will be anxious to demonstrate that they can get along with the French better than their predecessors. Both men are convinced that earlier opportunities for closer relations with France were lost largely because of the attitudes and behavior of their predecessors.

A number of tough problems are likely to be discussed with de Gaulle, including:

European Unification - The Germans may agree to set up machinery for closer consultations among the Governments of the six EEC countries. They may also agree to step up joint French-German arms production and scientific research and development programs.

UK/EEC Negotiations - The Germans are not likely to agree to take a hard position on UK entry into the Common Market, but neither are they ready to push British entry to the point of a fight with the French.

Vietnam - It is highly unlikely that the Germans, despite a possible French push, will agree to any public criticism of the US.

Non-proliferation - Kiesinger and Brandt may listen to French criticism of the Non-proliferation Treaty with some sympathy, but they will probably not take any decision for or against while in Paris.

2. German Relations with Eastern Europe

The Germans believe the main stumbling block to their efforts to establish diplomatic relations with Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, will be the Berlin Clause. They want the British, French, and ourselves to make clear that we have authorized the Federal Government to represent Berlin in certain

~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

consular and other matters. We are inclined to go along with this request, but the British and French are bearish on what they regard as a dilution of the status of the allied powers in Berlin. If worse comes to worse, the Germans may exchange diplomatic missions and attempt to assert de facto consular responsibility for West Berliners with the tacit agreement of the host governments. This is the line the German Trade Mission in Bucharest has already taken.

3. Americans in Violation of Soviet Law

To the great relief of everyone, the Soviets have allowed an American exchange mathematician, Lawrence Shepp, whom they were holding on several charges, to quietly leave the country. In this connection, our Charge in Moscow has expressed to the Department his concern over the increasing number of cases of American citizens violating Soviet law. He suggests the Department consider taking more drastic steps to stop these activities; in particular, stronger language in our information hand-outs and improvement of the selection procedures for exchanges.

4. UAR-IMF Relations

The Department of State has informed Embassy Cairo that the UAR failed to make repayments to the International Monetary Fund of \$4.5 million due December 31. The IMF has notified the Egyptians that the case is without precedent and that it plans to bring the matter to the attention of the Executive Directors by January 16, which will prejudice the UAR's credit rating.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, January 12, 1967
2:05 p.m.

Souvanna Phouma's view of our bombing
North Viet Nam (attached) will interest you.

W. W. Rostow

Vientiane 4177
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 2-6-91

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Vientiane 4177, January 12, 1967, from Sullivan

In anticipation of my return to Washington, I called on Souvanna this morning for a long tour d'horizon. Our conversation covered several topics such as internal Lao politics, military situation, Kong Le, and Soviet policy toward Laos which I shall report in separate cables.

The one significant point which Souvanna asked me to carry back to Washington from him concerned U. S. bombing of North Viet Nam. He asked that I express his hope that the U. S. Government would not become rattled by the very clever Hanoi propaganda campaign "supported by Paris," against our bombing operations. He felt sure the campaign reflected the fact that Hanoi was hurting from the bombing and wanted a respite. He wanted Washington to know that he considers that Laos "profits enormously" from our bombing of North Viet Nam and that he earnestly supports its continuation.

I assured Souvanna that I would convey his views and cited to him relevant passages from President's State of the Union speech to demonstrate consistency of our policy.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NUJ 91-176
By WJF, NARA, Date 9-11-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-180
By WJR, NARA, Date 4-7-93

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, January 12, 1967 -- 2:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: John Roche's Suggestion About the NLF in Negotiations.

1. The propaganda pressure on "recognizing the NLF" is not, in my view, very serious. On the other hand, it is in our interest, at the right time, to clarify the proper role of the NLF in a settlement.

2. That role is to negotiate out three issues, mainly with the government in Saigon:

- how to end the war in the South;
- how to guarantee the VC who lay down their arms, against the kind of purge that took place in Indonesia;
- how to bring the constitutional process into effect in areas now controlled by the VC.

General Taylor thinks this negotiation could best be conducted, in the first instance, by military field commanders rather than at a government level. I agree.

3. The offer should come not from the U. S. but from the government in Saigon. We and other allies could then agree. It should be an initiative Saigon undertakes from a position of confidence and strength in order to bring peace and constitutional order to South Viet Nam.

4. Lodge should begin now, in my view, to try to get this element introduced into the amnesty proposals. (In this connection, the attached memorandum which I sent on a personal basis to Sec. Rusk, may interest you.)

5. If the war ends by negotiations, there would, then, be two elements:

- an international negotiation to re-install effectively the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords, in which the NLF appear, if they wish, as part of the Hanoi delegation;
- a negotiation between Saigon and the NLF to end the fighting within South Viet Nam, to provide guarantees for those who gave up terror, and to yield, in the end, a unified body politic in that nation.

WWRostow:rln

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ *Personal*

January 4, 1967

Mr. Secretary:

As the pre-negotiating dance proceeds, I am personally convinced that the government in Saigon should be persuaded soon to state:

1. In the end, the problem of peace is not merely a matter of international negotiation but a matter for South Vietnamese to settle.
2. Therefore, they are ready to discuss with any South Vietnamese how all citizens can join in creating a peaceful, constitutionally-ruled nation.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-180
By sig, NARA, Date 4-7-93

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Walt:

Give me your views on that.

LBJ:mary s

1/11/67

8:00p

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 11, 1967

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

We have been taking quite a propaganda beating on the issue of "recognizing" the NLF in Vietnam. It is a phony, but a nasty one:

--if we refuse, we seem like rigid, simple-minded logicians;

--if we flatly agree, the Commies will immediately misconstrue the action as acceptance of the legitimacy of the NLF--with bad consequences in Saigon.

Our policy of studied ambiguity has therefore made sense, but has involved us in a defensive position where we spend most of our time fending off attacks (e.g., U Thant's assault yesterday).

Yet it seems to me we are in a position to do more than dig in and hold on. Why not turn the dagger around and let the Communists and their friends deal with it for a while?

To be precise, why not offer to Hanoi the following package:

- 1) We "recognize" the NLF as a party to negotiations.
- 2) They "recognize" the GVN as a party to negotiations.

After all, the GVN has a hell of a lot more substance than the NLF and what reasonable man could object to "recognizing" it?

Also it can be announced as a search for a "Vietnamese dialogue" on the war.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-180
By WJ, NARA, Date 4-7-93

And it puts Hanoi, Moscow, and all the other Communist powers on the spot:

--Hanoi because "recognizing" the GVN undermines their four points--and would be a double-cross of the Southern branch of the Vietnamese Communist party (the Lao Dong).

--Moscow and the other Communist powers because they are put on the horns of the same dilemma we are on now.

1) If they accept, their action can be construed by us as legitimization of the GVN and a betrayal of the NLF.

2) If they refuse, they can be denounced as rigid cold warriors, etc.

As I said at the outset, the issue is unreal. It is just dirty pool, but winning at dirty pool is hardly unAmerican.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized 'J' and 'R' followed by a horizontal line.

John P. Roche

MEMORANDUM

25
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

31d

January 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

I have tried to work up a reasoned philosophical statement of why we are fighting in Vietnam. K

The preliminary draft is attached. I have left a gap on specific performance in Vietnam because I am not sure what priorities you wish to stress.

If you wish, I will be glad to go into the details and send you a finished draft.

As you will see, I simply do not share the gloom and doom on this topic. Our position makes sense and we have really been doing quite a job.


John P. Roche

SPEECH ON VIETNAM
(Roche draft)

Today I should like to take half an hour of your time to report on the war in Vietnam.

In particular, I want to set forth what I believe to be the basis of our commitment, the place of Vietnam in our overall world policy, and finally the specific steps we are taking to implement our principles in Vietnam itself.

Let me say at the outset that in my thirty years in Washington I cannot recall a period comparable to the one we are living through today.

It is a period which finds exhilaration and frustration going hand in hand.

--Where notable, even breathtaking accomplishment is often overshadowed by even more rapidly accelerating expectations.

--Where complaints about suppression of dissent and violations of civil rights have accompanied the greatest libertarian breakthrough in our history as a nation.

The President of **the United States** is naturally the focus of this frustration and discontent. It is part of his job description.

Yet, when I look at our time in historical perspective, I confess that I would not wish to trade places with any other President.

For while we face crises in 1967, they are different in quality from any we have faced before.

--They are crises born of responsibility, not of disaster.

--They are crises which have arisen from the American people's commitment to its ideals, not from public despair.

Let me be specific.

Why is there a Vietnam crisis?

Let me momentarily recall to you the State of the Union address a quarter of a century ago and contrast our position in January 1967 with that of January 1942.

The national mood today in no way resembles the stunned fury of January 6, 1942, when Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered-- in the wake of Pearl Harbor--a magnificent call to all Americans to face the crisis of war.

Nor does our national military posture resemble that of a quarter of a century ago.

--There is no need to rebuild our fleet or create our armed forces virtually from scratch.

--In 1967 we are clearly the most powerful nation on earth, one which cherishes as its deepest aspiration the hope that this awesome power may never be put to the test.

The crisis in Vietnam must be understood as an outgrowth of our sense of responsibility, not our weakness.

We have been accused of intervening in Vietnam to obtain military bases, or economic advantages.

It has been suggested that we are suffering from "arrogance of power;" that we are consumed by irrational anti-communism.

I submit to you that these charges are false.

--We want no bases in Vietnam.

--We want no economic advantages in Vietnam.

--We are not arrogant or irrational in the exercise of our power.

. --Never in history has a nation been so cautious in utilizing such incredible power as modern weapons have put at our disposal.

--And let me make it clear that we are not fighting an idea called "communism" in Vietnam.

--The United States and its allies are fighting armed communist terrorism and the regular army of North Vietnam.

--If the communists were prepared to fight an idea called freedom with an idea called communism, there would be no war in Vietnam.

--Any time the communists reject violence and terror as the instruments of social and political change, we can live in peace with them.

--We are prepared to take any risks involved in a peaceful confrontation between their ideals and ours.

Our commitment to aid the people of the Republic of Vietnam was not the consequence of irrational whim or of imperialist calculation.

It was an outgrowth of a reasoned, coherent foreign policy which we have followed since Stalin destroyed the wartime alliance and launched the Cold War.

A policy founded on the premise that so long as the communists persisted in the use of force--whether nuclear, conventional, or guerrilla--we would in concert with our allies employ sufficient force--at whatever level necessary--to deter their expansionist ambitions.

But it has never been our goal simply to counter force with force. Our objective has been to use our military power to make other kinds of power effective.

--Thus the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provided a shield behind which the devastated nations of Western Europe could rebuild, hopefully to the point where American power would be superfluous.

This policy has been enormously successful. Those who question our motives in Asia might note the vitality and independence of our European friends.

--It is no mean testimony to our altruism.

--to the willingness of the American people to commit huge sums of their tax money and, if necessary, the lives of their sons to preserve and build free nations far beyond their borders.

This policy is now undergoing a new test in Asia.

It is not a test of our choosing, but it is one we can not fail.

--We are confronted by new opponents who have refused to believe the evidence of the past twenty years.

--who are convinced that the United States is incapable of sustained commitment.

--who have fundamentally misjudged the maturity of the American people.

So let me say to you--my countrymen--and to the leaders in Hanoi:

--Our policy is simple. We want no war in Vietnam and we are eager to negotiate an honorable settlement with any authoritative spokesmen for the communists.

--But our eagerness for a peaceful solution should not for one moment be confused with indecision or lack of faith in our goals.

We have made a total commitment to limited objectives.

We will neither enlarge the war nor abandon our Vietnamese allies.

We will fight as long as we must.

Yet we are prepared--once the shooting stops--to join with our opponents in fighting the only war in which we seek escalation:

--the war against hunger, poverty, squalor and disease.

This, I submit to you, is not a policy of noisy saber rattling.

It is a policy founded upon sober, responsible commitment.

The American people have learned from the history of the past half-century that the most certain route to disaster is the arrogance of isolationism:

--the illusion that we could live in an affluent fortress and let the world slide into chaos and totalitarianism.

American men are fighting tonight in Vietnam because we as a nation have accepted the burden of moral responsibility.

We are not trying to shape the world in our image, but we will not stand by and permit others to impose the iron mold of totalitarianism by acts of aggression.

Let us now turn to Vietnam and examine our accomplishments.

(State and DOD could prepare summaries for this section.)

Finally, we cannot know the future.

(This, among other things, dooms us to live with a "credibility gap" as generations to come wonder why we failed to appreciate what was going to happen.)

But we do know that we are moving into an era unlike any in the history of civilization.

Never before has there been a society which has undergone in the historically insignificant span of fifty years so singular a non-violent transformation:

- from agricultural to industrial
- from rural to urban
- from prejudice to equality
- from isolation to commitment
- from insulation to responsibility.

Before our very eyes a modern America has emerged bringing with it our traditional ideals but applying them in new ways to new problems with a creativity worthy of the man who build the Republic.

This modern America has also brought with it a new set of crises:

--crises--like Vietnam--which have grown from the expansion of our ideals, not their failure.

We shall dedicate ourselves to mastering these crises.

But at the same time we should be as a people proud that they are crises of hope and responsibility--not crises of desperation.

Thursday, January 12, 1967 -- 3:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

The Vice President called me and said that he had telephoned Jack Bell of AP about the ticker story.

Bell checked his notes. Bell agrees that what the Vice President said was that President Johnson seeks to end the cold war. He admitted the inaccuracy of his formulation.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Thursday, January 12, 1967 -- 1:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

The Vice President reports as follows.

He was asked about the passage in your speech which states that you desire not to continue but to end the cold war. He said that this was, indeed, your objective. You were seeking to call the country's attention to changes which had come about, notably in Europe, and that you were carrying forward your oft stated theme of reconciliation.

He stated flatly that the quotation was inaccurate; that is, he did not say "President Johnson believes the cold war is over;" he did not say "I know that as far as he is concerned the cold war is over."

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Pres file

January 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Request by New Zealand Ambassador for an Appointment

The attached memo from Secretary Rusk recommends that you see New Zealand Ambassador Laking before his departure for Wellington on January 16. The Ambassador has been in Washington since May 1961. He returns to New Zealand to assume two responsible posts: Secretary for External Affairs and Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department.

I agree it would be useful if you could see him, even briefly.

W. W. Rostow

Att

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

107
34a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request by New Zealand Ambassador
for an Appointment Upon His Departure
from Washington

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend that an appointment for New Zealand Ambassador George Laking be granted, if possible, prior to his departure on Monday, January 16, 1967.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

DISCUSSION:

New Zealand Ambassador George Laking will conclude his appointment to Washington on January 16. He is returning to Wellington to become Secretary of the Department of External Affairs and Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department. He has requested an appointment with you before leaving Washington.

This appointment would provide an opportunity for you to review New Zealand's participation with us in Viet-Nam as a follow-up to your discussions with Prime Minister Holyoake in Wellington.


Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - January 12, 1967

Mr. President:

We must soon reach a decision on the site for the OAS Summit. Sol Linowitz tells me the OAS Council will be ready to act between January 20 and February 1.

Uruguay seems to be the best spot. Altitude, lack of facilities, security or political reasons rule out the other South American capitals.

The beach resort of Punta del Este -- 55 miles from Montevideo -- is the place around which a consensus is developing. Other major inter-American conferences at the Ministerial level have been held there. The question is whether the physical facilities are adequate for a Presidential meeting. ,

Bill Crockett, Linc Gordon, Sol Linowitz and the conference people at the Pan American Union -- all of whom have been in Punta del Este -- say that it can be fixed up to provide minimum accommodations.

Before we commit you to Punta del Este, I would feel more comfortable if one or two persons from here who are familiar with Presidential requirements for accommodations and communications make a quick trip to make an assessment. I have checked this with Marv Watson and he concurs.

W. W. Rostow

Approve sending
two persons

☒

Prefer to accept
State's judgment

☐

Speak to me

☐

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-180
By rip, NARA, Date 4-7-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, January 11, 1967 - 6:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Executive Order on Food Aid

As you directed, I have asked Charlie Schultze to go slow on the Food Aid Order now in preparation. But he will need more specific guidance soon. The relevant facts are as follows:

1. There must be an Executive Order of some kind if the program is to operate at all. Authorities must be delegated, procedures established, administrative arrangements revised to fit the new Act, etc.
2. Most of the provisions in the draft Order are agreed among the relevant agencies, including Agriculture. (There seems to be some differences between Orville and his people on this; but it seems clear that his objections do not extend to the minor authorities and technical details of the Order.)
3. The Order does not divest Agriculture of a leading role in formulation of policy and administration of programs. It does strengthen State/AID. Many of your advisers -- including Schultze, Katzenbach, Gaud, Califano, Bator and myself -- believe that we should move in this direction if we are to maximize our leverage on recipient countries and give any substance to our promise that food aid will be more closely coordinated with other economic aid.

Thus, Schultze and I believe it makes sense to get the relevant senior people together and try to thrash out an Order -- without prejudice to your decision, and with clear notice to any Congressional or press questioners that no decisions have been made. If agreement is impossible, we would plan to come to you with a full presentation of the issues and options.

None of this is meant to ignore the very real Congressional problem which concerns Orville. Any hint of movement to strengthen State/AID in the food aid business raises some hackles on the Hill -- but it also pleases some people. On balance, I am convinced that the substantive case for some movement is strong enough that you should have an opportunity to hear it before making up your mind.

W. W. Rostow

You and Schultze go ahead with meeting as above ✓

Revise the Order to take out the passage to which Freeman objects _____

Stop work on the Order _____

Speak to me _____

EKH_amilton/vmr

Wednesday, January 11, 1967 -- 7:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the first take on my press contacts concerning the State of the Union message.

1. Russ Wiggins. He thought it an excellent message. He believes it ends a period of ambiguity and sets the country on the right road, both at home and abroad. While chatting, he threw out some ideas on Viet Nam:

- Get all our troops out of Saigon, as the Japanese did during their occupation of Viet Nam;
- Publish a 20-year development plan for Viet Nam to dramatize continuity and long-run character of our interest in that country;
- Work out a de facto system of de-escalation in which we would regulate our bombing of the North in accordance with the number of Communist incidents and attacks initiated in the South.

2. Scotty Reston. He said he found the message good. It involved making a series of hard decisions which he greatly respected; in particular, wire tapping, the tax increase, the ABM issue. He greatly welcomed the simplicity and candor of your statement. He found the whole of your program, foreign and domestic, "noble" in its scope and direction. He said no other country in history could mount this kind of program. He was present at the briefing yesterday and thought the concept of our passage through a transition was correct and illuminating.

3. Joe Alsop. He was at a "duty dinner" and did not see the speech on television. He read it and found it "good." Moreover, he had spoken to two or three people, all of whom agreed that it was excellent. He took the occasion to say how furious he was that we had stopped bombing near Hanoi because of Harrison Salisbury. I said that was incorrect. He said he didn't believe me. I left it at that. We then talked about the convulsion in mainland China at some length.

4. I was called by Bob Carroll of Newsday; Andrew Hamilton of Newhouse newspapers; Ronald Burns of the New York Journal of Commerce to clear up relatively minor matters of interpretation in the text.

WWRostow:rln

W. W. Rostow

cc: Robert Kintner

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, January 12, 1967
9:00 am

Pres file 38

Mr. President:

The situation in Panama remains quiet.

The open forum at the University last night was not much of a show. The Embassy reported that the meeting had initially attracted some 400 people, but quickly dwindled to about 150.

No problems are expected today, but we will keep a close watch on the situation.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-180
By 108, NARA, Date 4-29-83

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, January 11, 1967

5 39
Pres file

WWR:

Re: Message on Ironsi's death

We now have a further cable from Lagos with a fairly hard report (from Gowon through the British High Commissioner) that the GON is announcing Ironsi's death on Saturday, January 14. The announcement will also publicize the fact that there will be a State funeral on Monday.

This would seem sufficient basis for seeking Presidential approval of the proposed messages of condolence.



Ed Hamilton

WWR 39a

Tuesday, January 10, 1966 - 11:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

At Tab A is a proposed message of condolence to the Government of Nigeria on the deaths last July of former Supreme Military Commander Ironsi and several other high ranking officials. At Tab B is a proposed message to Mrs. Ironsi.

Although the details of Ironsi's death are common knowledge, there has never been an official announcement. In the wave of optimism following last week's meeting of the regional military governors, it appears that the Government is finally going to risk making Ironsi's killing official. We understand that the British, the Germans, and probably others will send condolences. State believes it would be appropriate for you to do so as well.

If you approve, the messages will be held until an official announcement is made.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message to Government ____ Approve message to widow ____

Disapprove ____

Speak to me ____

EKHHamilton/vmr

1/10/68

Proposed Presidential Message to Colonel Gowon of Nigeria

Dear Colonel Gowon:

The tragic events which resulted in the deaths of General Ironsi and several fellow officers are a source of deep regret to me and to all Americans. My countrymen join me in extending deepest sympathy and condolences to you and to the Nigerian people.

1/10/67

Proposed Presidential Message to Widow of General Ironsi

Dear Mrs. Ironsi:

Mrs. Johnson joins me in expressing deepest sympathy to you and your family on the tragic death of your husband. Our thoughts and prayers are with you in this difficult time.

Pres file

Wednesday, January 11, 1967
3:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

We haven't had an opportunity to get at this "see me" item. It concerns a plane for Chief Justice Warren for his trip to Latin America February 25 - March 5.

If you were thinking of putting an aircraft at the disposal of the Chief Justice, it might be a good idea:

- It would reduce the opportunities for incidents;
- There are no political drawbacks.

W. W. Rostow

Arrange aircraft via Jim Cross_____

No_____

See me_____

WWRostow:rlh

MEMORANDUM

13
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday -
January 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Chief Justice Warren to Latin America

I learned today that Chief Justice Warren has agreed to participate in a series of seminars in Latin America under the auspices of State's Bureau of Cultural Affairs.

The planned itinerary is:

Chile -- February 25-27.
Bolivia -- February 28-March 2.
Peru -- March 3-5.

The seminars will be with 35 to 40 top level representatives of government, business, industry, communications, judiciary and the legal profession.

The topics on which the Chief Justice will speak are:

- "Law as the agent of freedom".
- "Role of American courts in the American Government".
- "New concepts in America's continuing revolution".

From the standpoint of our relations with the three countries, and our image throughout Latin America, the Chief Justice's tour should prove to be most helpful. There is always a security problem, and State tells me the Embassies are being instructed to take special precautions to avoid unpleasant incidents involving the Chief Justice.

Although unrelated to the OAS Summit and your trip, the presence of so high a United States official in Latin America will arouse public interest and redound to your benefit when you go six weeks later.

Walt Rostow

Speak to me _____

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

I am greatly honored to extend the best wishes of all Americans to the people of Finland as they celebrate their fiftieth year of independence.

Finland has always occupied a place of honor among freedom-loving nations. This hardy people has shown the world what can be accomplished through self-reliance, equal opportunity for all, and a deep commitment to democratic institutions. Finland's great achievements have not been accidental. They are the result of what the Finns call "sisu" -- courage, determination and love of country. The world has ample proof that the Finns possess these qualities in unusual measure.

This Anniversary celebrates an extraordinarily creative and productive half-century. But the future is brighter still. The achievements of the past provide a solid basis for future success in the task of bettering the lot of man. The people of America are happy to be associated with the Finnish people in this great enterprise, and grateful for the many Finnish contributions to the common good.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, January 11, 1967 -- 8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

You might be interested in the following passage from a cable explaining the relatively quiet anniversary in Panama.

*Panama 2099
1/10/67*

"Principal factors contributing to passage of anniversary without major incident are: (1) for the first time, secondary schools are on vacation; (2) January 9, 1967, fell on working day which tended reduce popular participation; (3) government made obvious and concerted effort to play down commemorative activities and to pre-empt extremists by organizing official low key ceremonies; (4) despite inflammatory coverage and editorials in January 9 Critica, Expreso, La Hora and La Prensa, most media handling of event stressed need for moderation and solemnity; (5) presence of National Guard on streets in large numbers obviously prepared to prevent any untoward incidents; and (6) what appeared to us to be a generally apathetic attitude of public towards events which might disturb the prevailing climate of relative well being and progress."

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-180
By NJ, NARA, Date 4-7-93

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

43

Wed., January 11, 1967
12:30 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Arleigh Burke filed this letter of support
for your Viet-Nam policy through me.

He also reports widespread public support.

Should I draft a reply?

W. W. R.

Yes _____

No _____

See me _____

Pres file~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, January 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Goldberg's Appointment at 12:30 P. M., January 11

Ambassador Goldberg requested an appointment with you. He may raise the following subjects:

1. Viet Nam.

You will recall your conversation with Goldberg on Christmas about his visiting several capitals in the interest of investigating the possibility of negotiations on Vietnam.

Ambassador Goldberg believes that his trip should not be limited to discussions on Vietnam. He desires to talk about Rhodesia in London and about South Africa with NATO leaders. He desires to give two lectures in Rome.

Ambassador Goldberg does not think he should leave on his trip until he has testified for the Foreign Relations Committee on the Outer Space Treaty.

2. Appointments at the United States Mission in New York.

Ambassador Goldberg may raise with you the names of individuals he wishes to add to his United Nations staff.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-180
By ing, NARA, Date 4-7-93

~~SECRET~~

January 10, 1967

45
Pres file

Themes for Backgrounding Foreign Policy Passage of State of Union Message

1. "We are in the midst of a great transition . . . from narrow nationalism to regional and global cooperation; from the harsh spirit of the cold war to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a troubled and threatened planet." This is the President's central theme and applies to all that follows on foreign policy.
2. In Latin America, from a national to a regional approach to Latin American development. The principal focus of the Chiefs of State meeting will be, as we already know from discussions throughout the Hemisphere, on economic integration and multinational projects.
3. In Africa, the same direction. The thrust of our assistance effort will be towards backing African institutions prepared to move on a regional and subregional basis with respect to transport, communications, education, etc.
4. In South Asia, from war and confrontation to arms limitation, reconciliation, and cooperation. And so, also, in the Middle East. There transitions will take time and will not be easy; although there are some hopeful signs in South Asia.
5. In Western Europe the transition is from NATO as an instrument simply for defense, to NATO as the strong base from which we develop wider consultation through NATO, OECD, etc. and seek together new, constructive relations with the governments and peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
6. With respect to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the transition is from cold war towards enlarged peaceful contacts. In particular, we shall be trying to see if we can now find the terms with the Soviet Union for avoiding another major round in the arms race.
7. With respect to food supply, the transition is from a virtually unilateral effort by the U. S. to cover food deficits throughout the world by our surpluses towards a concerted global program to win the race between food supply and population.
8. In Viet Nam the transition is from the desperate struggle of 1965-66 to defeat the offensive of the North Vietnamese and VC main force units, to the carrying forward of the democratic political process; pacification of the countryside; and an honorable peace at the earliest time the Communists are ready for it. In short, we hope for a transition from war to reconciliation.
9. In the rest of free Asia the transition is from uncertainty and fragmentation to confidence and cooperative regional development.
10. With respect to Communist China, the transition for which we hope and for which we are ready, is from Chinese Communist doctrines and policies of aggression to detente and cooperation.

The President believes that with patience and persistence all these transitions are possible -- if this nation has the capacity to "undergo the fatigues of supporting" our present policies.

Pres file 46
cy sent R Kennen

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-80
By ijp, NARA, Date 4-7-93

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, January 10, 1967 -- 3:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith talking points for your discussion with Cabot Lodge tomorrow, January 11, at 11:30 a.m.

1. The next two months are critical and will set the pattern for a year we hope will prove decisive. You are counting on him.
2. In particular, it is essential he use all the wisdom and skill of a lifetime in politics to help the South Vietnamese:
 - find military-civilian agreement on the constitution and on the candidates for the national election;
 - consolidate the moderate non-Communist majority into a national political alliance -- or party -- so that:
 - (1) Ky -- or whoever -- has a political base and national program when he runs: a truly new look.
 - (2) We have the beginnings of a party that can defeat the VC if they give up the war and enter politics.

None of us knows when the South Vietnamese may have to face that test. We must help them prepare now.

3. Keep close to Westy. No matter how it is organized, pacification requires intense military-civil cooperation. There is too much talk already of civil versus military attitudes and policies. Pacification is a two-fisted, military-civil job. Westy and Cabot should live in each other's pockets.

4. Moreover, Westy's influence over the Vietnamese military may be valuable to Cabot in finding a new political base in South Viet Nam. For these purposes, Cabot should regard Westy as a valuable political aide.

5. Encourage Ky, from his situation of strength, to reach out, communicate with, and be prepared to negotiate with the NLF. Tell him we are not going to sell out to the Communists and to operate from confidence, not fear.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

6. You might indicate we shall be formulating a NSAM to crystallize our 1967 policy, after Bus Wheeler returns. You understand he has read it in draft. You hope he left behind his suggestions. (FYI: He's aboard; but we want him to feel you want him aboard.)

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

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Pres file

Tuesday, January 10, 1967
3:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sol's note to me on the
Newsweek article.

It indicates, incidentally, how
Bonafede conned him into talking
about his conversation with you.

I believe his statement is in
good faith.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE ON THE COUNCIL
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

47a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

January 10, 1967

The Honorable
Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

Dear Walt:

I've read the incredible mishmash on page 53 of the current issue of Newsweek and would like to bring these comments to your attention:

(1) A great number of the alleged "facts" are, as I am sure you know, entirely woven out of whole cloth.

For example: That I was offered the job of "running the CIA"; that the President calls me "when Latin American problems come to the fore"; that I "ordered a complete reappraisal of Cuban policy"; that I am responsible for the voluntary agreement to limit arms purchases (the fact is, of course, that Linc initiated this program and had it under way when I came on the job); that my talks with President Belaunde resulted in some kind of action on his part to call off negotiations by supersonic jets, etc.


(2) Other alleged "facts" are simply bald misstatements. For example: That the President prefers my counsel to that of Linc Gordon; that I "declined to attend" the LAFTA Conference in Montevideo (As you well know, I went to Montevideo precisely for the purpose of meeting with the Foreign Ministers attending the LAFTA Conference.); etc., etc.

(3) The Texas Ranch episode is a clear-cut case of breach of confidence: Bonafede had come up to see me and we had had a brief conversation. He then said "I'm curious about something and perhaps you can tell it to me--either on or off the record. What really happens when people like Gordon and you visit the President on the Ranch? Does the President really want to know your views or does he tell you his own position?" I said to him: "Let me tell you this entirely off the record: I think you should know that when we did meet with the President he was especially interested in eliciting our views and these are the kinds of questions the President asked Linc and me and here is the way we responded." Interestingly enough, most of the comments attributed to me in the piece were those which I indicated were actually made by Linc.

At an appropriate time I wish you would be good enough to bring these comments to the President's attention to be sure that no erroneous impression is created through such garbled claptrap.

The over-riding important fact is that Linc. and I have a very warm and happy working relationship and intend to maintain it. We are determined that drivel such as this will not interfere with our doing our best to serve the President most effectively.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Sol M. Linowitz', written over a horizontal line.

Sol M. Linowitz

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, January 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Summary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-17
By is, NARA Date 1-11-00

1. Continued Turmoil in China

Our Consul General in Hong Kong speculates that attacks last October against persons and institutions vital to normal functioning of the State may have been used as a threat to bring hesitant party leaders into line for purposes of the turbulent "Political Operations Conference" of last October. The Consul General sees abundant evidence that Maoists now face an even more critical situation. Recent attacks against leaders, including Foreign Minister Chen Yi, may reflect a similar attempt to compel the adherence of recalcitrant supporters at this time of stress. Hong Kong believes these attacks probably also reflect policy disagreements stemming from the decision to extend the Cultural Revolution on a large scale to factories and farms. Key governmental figures almost certainly oppose this decision because of its adverse effect on production.

Hong Kong further notes that Mao's opponents in the industrial sector show no signs of giving up. If reports are accurate, the scale of violent opposition is approaching open revolt, and far exceeds anything of the sort in the past -- a sign that opponents are able to mobilize workers against the Maoists.

2. Goldwater-Chiang Talks

In a private talk the Generalissimo told Senator Goldwater that he did not advocate a Nationalist Chinese counterattack on the mainland now and was confident that developments would bring an opportunity later.

3. Burmese Display Interest in Military Equipment

The Burmese military have in the past several weeks sounded us out on making available more modern naval and air equipment, including Mach II aircraft. Ambassador Byroade is not certain of Burmese motivations, particularly whether Ne Win is now prepared to risk provoking Chinese hostility, which his

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- 2 -

policies have studiously avoided in the past. The State Department has stressed to Embassy Rangoon that supply of the military equipment desired, which exceeds needs for internal security, would pose basic policy considerations. Byroade has been authorized to provide limited sales data while avoiding any implication of a commitment now or in the future. Our tactic is not to "cold-shoulder" the Burmese request for sales information -- while tactfully not encouraging military equipment supply exceeding the present modest program of military spare parts.

4. Israeli-Syrian Border

Israel has now suffered the first civilian casualties -- so far, minor -- in the current round of border shooting. The Israeli Government has sent a note to the UN Security Council. Prime Minister Eshkol has publicly accused Syria of "warming up its Israeli and Jordanian borders" and warned that "Syria is not immune" if Israeli citizens are harmed. While memories of our reaction to Israel's 13 November attack may inhibit Israel, Ambassador Barbour reports that responsible Israeli officials are convinced that the raid did more good than harm -- so any Israeli deaths may push them quickly into another reprisal.

5. Food for the UAR

Egyptian officials are gradually lifting the curtain to us on their wheat deal with the USSR. It now appears that the terms are not as easy as the original announcement made them sound, and the UAR is still interested in US wheat. Ambassador Battle recommends an early answer to UAR PL 480 requests pending since last spring. He feels that the IMF's firm stand urging UAR devaluation and our failure to answer UAF food requests are becoming linked in Egyptian minds as part of a collective Western effort to turn the screws. (Secretary Rusk is seeing Ambassador Kamel this afternoon, and the State Department hopes to have a recommendation to you by the end of the week.)

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

41

January 10, 1967

MEMO FOR MR. BENJAMIN READ

Attached copy of letter from the
President to Senator Yarborough is
forwarded for your information.

W. W. Rostow

Tuesday - January 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Greeting from Former Argentine President Illia

Dr. Illia has sent you the Christmas and New Year greeting at Tab A. He makes special reference to the Meeting of Presidents which he first proposed and you seconded.

I recommend that you send him the reply at Tab B. Delivery would be through the Embassy.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments :

Tab A - Greeting from former
Argentine President Illia

Tab B - Recommended reply.

500

Message from Former Argentine President Illia

"ARTURO U. ILLIA

Buenos Aires, December 22, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

The Christmas Season, which renews our faith, and the New Year, which betokens decisive responsibility for the peace and happiness of the entire world, are auspicious occasions for expressing good wishes for the recovery of your health and the fulfillment of the noble aspirations of your people and government.

I also hope that the Meeting of Presidents of the Americas, which we proposed and which gained your immediate approval, will arrive at concrete formulas enabling the nations of the Hemisphere to further their development and economic integration, and endure the benefits of democracy and social justice for all their inhabitants without distinction of nationality, creed, race or class.

With high consideration and esteem,

/s/ A. Illia

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C. "

January 11, 1967

Dear Dr. Illia:

Thank you for your message of greeting and encouragement in this holiday season.

I fully share your hope that the forthcoming Meeting of American Presidents will stimulate greater mutual effort to assure the increased well-being of all the nations and peoples of the Hemisphere.

May the New Year bring you good health and happiness.

Sincerely,

(S) Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Dr. Arturo Illia
Buenos Aires, Argentina

LBJ/WGB:mmm
January 10, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - January 10, 1967

Mr. President -

██████████ as of noon today the situation in Panama remains quiet.

1.3(a)(4)

An open forum is scheduled for 7:00 pm at the University. The speakers will discuss the anniversary and the treaty negotiations. We can expect much sound and fury in the speeches, but our intelligence continues to be that major incidents beyond the control of the National Guard are not expected.

I have asked our Embassy to monitor the forum and advise us when it is over. I will keep you informed.

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED
Authority NLI 019-012-2-1
By sp, NARA, Date 12-10-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tues., January 10, 1967
12:15 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I forward these two political reports from Saigon to give you a feel for the evolving political situation in Saigon which may prove the big story of 1967.

Specifically:

1. The improving dialogue between the Directorate and the Assembly.
2. The unresolved political fate of Ky and Thieu.
3. Ky's cautious but serious efforts to weed out some corrupt military types.
4. What pacification tasks in a province look like: security vs. main force; security vs. local guerrillas; effective local government.
5. Ky's political problem: should he try to be George Washington or not?

~~SECRET~~ and

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachments

(Saigon 15080
15193)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

52a

Monday, January 9, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM SAIGON (15193)

Deputies La Thanh Nghe and Dr. Phan Quang Dan confirmed to Embassy officials on January 8 in separate conversations that the Government of Vietnam is making a major effort to reconcile potential differences with the Constituent Assembly over the working of the Constitution before the final draft is adopted for presentation to the Directorate. They believed it likely, although not certain, that agreement can be reached without a major controversy between the Constituent Assembly and the Government of Vietnam. Dr. Dan said evolution of Government of Vietnam - Constituent Assembly communications is so favorable, he saw no need for the January 10 Press Conference.

The Mission has been pressing this behind-the-scenes approach on members of the Directorate for the past few weeks, both through direct conversation and indirectly through people known to be close advisors of Thieu and Ky. On January 6 at an airport departure ceremony for Ambassador But Diem, a political counselor spoke briefly with Prime Minister Ky and urged him to reach as much advance agreement with the Deputies as possible, using Decree 21-66 only as a last resort. Ky replied he had already begun to see the individual Deputies and intended to see many more in the next ten days. We know that Thieu has also invited some Deputies for informal discussions. The delegation from the Directorate had the first meeting with Constituent Assembly representatives on January 7 as expected, although the meeting was apparently inconclusive.

The moderate tone of the statement to be read by Phan Khac Suu at the January 10 Press Conference on Decree 21-66 may be a sign that Government of Vietnam efforts are paying off. The text of the statement, given to us by the Constituent Assembly Press Officer January 7, restates Constituent Assembly and Government of Vietnam positions on Decree 21-66, particularly Article 20. The statement reviews the steps the Constituent Assembly has taken to have the decree amended, including the November 18 meeting between the Directorate and the Constituent Assembly "Amendment Committee."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

91-176

By ijp, NARA, Date 9-11-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

It also contains a critique of the Directorate's December 27 reply to the Constituent Assembly in which the Constituent Assembly's request for amendment of the decree is turned down. The statement says that the purpose of the Press Conference is to outline to local and foreign press the Constituent Assembly's struggle to achieve independence and help public opinion "understand our problems. We have absolutely no intention of creating difficulties." The statement makes frequent reference to the good will existing between the Constituent Assembly and the Directorate, but concludes that the latter is being "too cautious."

Specific points of the potential disagreement between the Government of Vietnam and the Constituent Assembly mentioned by La Thanh Nghe and Dr. Dan have been noted previously. They believe none of them pose insurmountable problems so long as the present spirit of good will and compromise on both sides continues. However, Nghe did raise one complicating factor which has not been previously reported, namely, the existence of differences of view between Ky and Thieu over the Constitution. Nghe was unwilling to discuss this point, but did refer to the obvious disagreement between the two men over the question of minimum age for presidential candidates. As the draft presently stands, the minimum age is set at 40. This would have the effect of eliminating Ky from the race and is widely believed to have been inserted for precisely this purpose. On this point, Dr. Dan said there had been clear majority of Constituent Assembly Deputies in favor of the minimum age limit of 40, until recently when a strong movement for a minimum age limit of 35 had begun. The two groups are now of roughly equal size and are struggling with one another within the Constituent Assembly.

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

Monday, January 9, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM SAIGON (15080)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-176
By ijg, NARA, Date 9-11-91

At the personal invitation of Prime Minister Ky and with my permission, Colonel Sam Wilson came up from Long An province and met with the Prime Minister in his Tan Son Nhut quarters from 10:00 to 11:45 a.m. on January 6. Points of probable interest emerging during the discussion are covered below.

The Prime Minister's first question was to ask for Wilson's appraisal of the 46th Regiment (ARVN) and its Commander, Lt. Col. Nguyen Van Hai. (General Westmoreland had passed word that this would probably come up and urged Wilson to express himself strongly.) Wilson replied that, in his opinion, the 46th is a poor regiment, that the Commander is ineffective, probably corrupt and deserves to be relieved from command. He noted further that evidence of this officer's malfeasance and his misconduct has been collected by MACV over a considerable period of time and is little short of overwhelming. In view of these facts, Wilson strongly recommended Hai's prompt relief. Ky asked if Wilson had discussed this matter with General Khang. Wilson replied that the subject had come up briefly in a side discussion with General Khang during the Prime Minister's visit to Long An on November 30. At that time Khang had said that he planned to leave Hai in position for a time and observe his performance more closely, that conceivably Hai would improve enough to remain where he is.

Ky then noted that Hai is a close friend of Chinh's who is a friend of Khang's who is a friend of the Prime Minister's. Nonetheless, he added, friendship is a secondary consideration in a matter of this sort. "You saw what I did in the case of Thi. He was and still is my friend. Yet, when time came to act, I had to act."

Comment: Ky's intention to begin applying pressure on Khang to secure the removal of the 46th Regiment Commander seems implicit in this remark.

Ky then turned to the subject of General Chinh and asked for Wilson's appraisal. Wilson replied that Chinh appeared to be an honest man and a sincere, patriotic Vietnamese nationalist with the best interests of his country at heart. On the other hand, he is shy, retiring, intelligent in the abstract, impractical, hypersensitive, and -- on balance -- a poor commander.

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

Given the fact that Chinh is imaginative and writes well, he probably would prove more valuable were he serving in some staff capacity rather than as a Commander. The Prime Minister listened carefully, added that this corresponds completely with his own opinion, commented briefly on Chinh's youth and immaturity and then dropped the subject.

The Prime Minister said that the subject of corruption within the Government of Vietnam continued to trouble him. Two instances have arisen recently and he will probably have to make an example of the individuals involved.

A) The first incident concerns an ARVN Lt. Colonel of finance services who had been serving with the JGS where he had been handling construction contracts for the ARVN. Upon learning that he was about to be transferred to the Ministry of Security, this officer had come to General Vy and proposed a deal which involved making off with some 79 million piasters. In return for his collaboration and assistance, General Vy was to get three million for himself. General Vy had the officer arrested on the spot and an investigation is now under way to determine who else may have been involved. (This matter had been reported to General Rosson by General Vy.)

B) The second incident concerned activities of the ARVN in Lam Dong province on the road leading to Dalat. According to the Prime Minister, he recently learned that these ARVN elements have been halting civilian traffic and forcing people to remain in place for hours, telling them that Viet Cong road blocks lie ahead of them. When the people become hungry and seek something to eat, ARVN representatives and dependents offer them food at extortionary prices, such as 100 piasters for a bowl of rice. There have been instances, the Prime Minister continued, when people have been compelled to remain in place on the road overnight. On some of these occasions, ARVN soldiers have forced some of the female passengers to submit to them for an evening of pleasure. This places the Government of Vietnam in a very difficult moral position versus the Viet Cong, he added, and immediate steps are under way to get to the bottom of this situation.

According to the Prime Minister, one of the major objectives for 1967 is to improve the performance level of overall attitudes of the ARVN. He pointed out that the ARVN is stabilizing at present force levels (600-odd thousand), that it was highly unlikely for any new units to be formed during this calendar year and, thus, a clear-cut opportunity exists for qualitative improvement.

Somewhat abruptly in the middle of the conversation, the Prime Minister asked what is the attitude of Americans concerning General Co. When Wilson replied that he could not speak for Americans on this subject, the Prime Minister pressed for Wilson's personal opinion. Qualifying his answer by reiterating that he was speaking solely for himself, Wilson said he considered Co a dissident influence with the Government of Vietnam and a probable source of corruption. The Prime Minister simply nodded and made no further comment on this subject.

Some time was spent discussing the general situation in Long An. Wilson stated his feeling that things were beginning to move ahead. Two obstacles to progress, in the form of two inept and corrupt officials (Can Duoc District Chief and Province Police Chief), have been removed, resulting in a significant morale improvement in those two areas, particularly among local National Policemen. Major efforts are being directed at improving collection and processing of tactical intelligence. The Province Chief is being encouraged (as he has been by all past advisors) to engage in more short-range, limited-objective, offensive operations involving platoon- and company-sized units, rather than to indulge his strong penchant for complex, multi-battalion operations which require detailed coordination and extensive support and usually wind up as walks in the sun, netting nothing. A bright spot in the present scene is the Rach Kien operation, where a U.S. battalion has provided a security shield behind which Government of Vietnam provincial officials are busily working to re-establish Governmental control over an area heretofore dominated by the Viet Cong. To date, coordination and cooperation at Rach Kien between the U.S. tactical unit and local Vietnamese officials has been excellent and we look forward to repeats of this type venture.

At this point, the Prime Minister asked how long in Wilson's judgment will it take to secure Long An province. In response, Wilson noted that there are three broad areas of endeavor in Long An: those actions to achieve military security, i. e., operations against Viet Cong Main Force units and other Viet Cong tactical forces; efforts to gain a modicum of internal security and law and order against the threat posed by village guerrillas and Viet Cong terrorists, primarily a task for National Police and para-military elements; and -- finally -- the fundamentally important task of getting the local government to function in an effective, responsive fashion. Viewing the Prime Minister's question as pertaining to military security only, Wilson estimated that some six to nine months would be required, given the necessary military forces. He then added that he was unable to say with precision at this particular juncture what would constitute the "necessary military forces."

The conversation then shifted to the general subject of politics, with the Prime Minister saying that he was doing everything within his power to keep his relationships with the National Constituent Assembly representatives on a sound, healthy basis and describing various meetings and dinners he was continuing to have with selected members to this end. When Wilson stressed the great importance of avoiding any kind of direct confrontation, the Prime Minister remarked somewhat patronizingly, "I simply remind them that they are my children and I am their father. But for me, they would not exist. Children must get along well with their father."

The final subject discussed in some detail was the question of the Prime Minister's own political future. (This was the only direct question raised by Wilson during the entire conversation.) Ky said that he still has not made up his mind exactly what to do. Although there are those who do not believe it, his strong personal desire is to get out of politics and go back to the air force. But whether this is the right thing for him to do or not, he is not sure. Then there is the question of General Thieu who has yet to make his intentions clear. Since Thieu lacks a strong political following ("people say he is too 'clever'; do not trust him fully."), he might well be defeated by some civilian politician like Phan Khac Suu. The results of such a development could be dangerous indeed, since such an individual would have difficulty keeping the military in check. In other words, the man in authority must be someone the Corps Commanders will respect and listen to. The Prime Minister then opined that by the latter part of 1967 or early 1968 (his prediction is the latter period), some kind of cease-fire will occur. This will place the Government of Vietnam in perhaps the most delicate situation it has faced yet. With 600 thousand men under arms and the guns silent (although the Viet Cong will be busily strengthening themselves clandestinely), ARVN senior commanders will tend to turn their frustrated energies to pursuit of selfish political ambitions. At this point, unless there is a military man at the helm who has the confidence of the ARVN commanders and some degree of authority over them, no government will last for very long. There will be coups and counter-coups, the likes of which we have not seen before. This, concluded Ky, is what makes it so difficult to choose between what he truly wants to do and what he ought to do. Wilson responded by saying that, in his opinion, history has left the Prime Minister little choice.

The meeting ended on this note with the Prime Minister requesting Wilson to let the Prime Minister's aide know whenever Wilson

is again in Saigon and expressing a desire to get together from time to time for drinks and dinner or similar informal social occasion.

Comment:

A) The Prime Minister was suffering from a bad cold and seemed a trifle quiet and subdued.

B) Ambassador Bui Diem arrived on a farewell call during the course of the meeting and was present during the discussion of improving the performance level of the ARVN and the comments on General Co.

Tues., Jan. 10, 1967
11:45 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

The draft is now good; tight; substantive.

If you could take the pain of a few more minutes,*
I do recommend going back to the passage on
partnership at home and abroad towards the end.

Tomorrow's newspapers may not headline it;
but it's the kind of thing that stays in the public
mind long after the debate on taxes subsides.

W. W. R.

* I'd settle for one minute!

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - January 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Mexican Cotton Imports Agreement

Linc Gordon has carried out your instructions.

He told Ambassador Margain on December 27 that:

- you had personally approved the generous offer we made to Mexico.
- it was not an easy decision because of the domestic flack it will draw, and
- you had made the decision because of its importance to Mexican-US relations and your high personal esteem for President Diaz. Ordaz.

Ambassador Margain promised to pass the message immediately on to his President. He said Mexican technicians would soon come to Washington to work out details of the agreement.

Linc Gordon was not able to reach Senator Mansfield until last Wednesday. The Senator said that he was "delighted" with the solution.

W. W. Rostow

cc - Francis Bator

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State ltr 11-22-78
By rg/cap, NARA, Date 2-5-91

~~SECRET~~

January 9, 1967

Pres file 55

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: China's Vaulting Chaos

Mao's regime is in serious difficulty, to a degree that civil war has become a distinct possibility.

Months of growing chaos in the top leadership are now followed by widespread resistance to pro-Mao elements in Central, South and East China, as Mao's Red Guards and other "rebel" groups have attempted to move the Cultural Revolution to farms and factories. You have noted reports of violent clashes in Canton, Foochow, Shanghai, Nanking, the Chusan Islands and Peking itself, and of the breakdown of rail service in several sectors. In Nanking large-scale arrests (apparently of pro-Mao elements!) by Army and public security forces have been reported.

The source of most of our information on this highly confused situation remains press reports of "wall newspapers" in Peking. However, both Peking and Shanghai broadcasts have now confirmed serious resistance, and have warned of adverse effects on production. At the same time the Peking broadcast insists "It is an erroneous point of view that the Great Cultural Revolution antagonizes the development of production!" Mao forces are evidently determined to go through with their attempted "proletarianization" of the nation despite mounting costs now threatening the regime itself.

Most of the clashes have occurred in areas where Propaganda Chief T'ao Chu, number four in the Peking hierarchy, retains strong support of the party machinery. Much of this resistance has doubtless been triggered by recent official attacks on T'ao, principally on the part of Mao's wife. Attacks on T'ao were probably in turn prompted by his attempts to protect provincial party cadre who are opposing the Mao-Lin line.

The battle is clearly drawn. On Mao and Lin's side appear to be:

- a small and seemingly dwindling minority in the party;
- probably the bulk of the seriously divided Red Guards; and
- an indeterminate percentage of the armed forces.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 85-262
By 28/10/88, NARA, Date 2-5-91

SECRET

- 2 -

Ranged against these are, apparently:

- the bulk of both the leadership and the lesser party apparatus;
- a goodly portion of the worker groups so far tested by Red Guard revolutionary activity; and
- an unknown portion of the Army.

Much more resistance from workers and peasants seems sure to come, as Mao's revolution is carried further into the provinces.

The big question mark is the direction in which the Army will finally lend its predominant support. It cannot stand aside much longer, if present chaos continues. If it proves to be as divided as other major elements of the nation have been, the "Mao dynasty" is in for more bloody convulsions, and almost certain demise.

Premier Chou remains the best hope of achieving a compromise in the interest of preserving the nation and the regime's hard-won, limited accomplishments. However, Mao has made his war one of veritable "religious" fervor, and compromise now appears highly unlikely. We must expect one side or the other to win out. As of now the anti-Mao forces appear the stronger, and gaining. It is curious that Mao's heir apparent, Lin Piao, has not appeared since November 26. Mao-Lin interests in Peking appear to have been left primarily in Madame Mao's hands, and the precarious condition of those interests is underlined today by wall posters announcing the dissolution of the capital's anti-Mao public security forces, and -- perhaps the most significant straw in today's East wind -- other posters accusing National Defense Council Member, General Liu Chih-chien, of siding with the anti-Maoists.

W. W. Rostow

AJenkins:mm

cc: Mr. Jorden
Mr. Ropa

SECRET

56

~~1. [unclear]~~
2. [unclear]

~~SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

January 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Third Quarter FY 1967 Underground Nuclear Test Program (LATCHKEY III)

The Atomic Energy Commission has submitted for your approval the AEC underground nuclear tests proposed for the third quarter underground nuclear test program (LATCHKEY III). This program has been reviewed by the agencies represented on your Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests and they have no objection to your approval of the recommended AEC Program, which consists of 14 tests. The 14 tests recommended include Project CABRIOLET which you have already authorized. However, AEC understands that it will have to coordinate with the Under Secretary of State on the timing, handling and content of an appropriate public statement prior to the test as to the nature and purpose of the event and that the statement will have to be cleared by State, ACDA, Defense and the White House prior to release.

I recommend that you authorize the AEC to go ahead with its proposed program. If you agree, I will sign the attached memorandum to Chairman Seaborg.

W. W. Rostow

____ Approved
____ Disapproved
____ See me

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-74
By CM, NARA Date 3-21-01

WWR:CEJ:feg

~~SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-74
By CM, NARA Date 3-21-01

56a

~~SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

January 11, 1967

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN,
U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION**

**SUBJECT: Third Quarter FY 1967 Underground Nuclear
Test Program (LATCHKEY III)**

Reference is made to the request contained in your letter to the President of December 23, 1966, on behalf of the Atomic Energy Commission for approval of the underground nuclear tests planned for execution in the third quarter of FY 1967 (LATCHKEY III).

The testing program proposed in your letter, which consists of 14 tests sponsored by the Atomic Energy Commission, is approved. The conduct of Project CABRIOLET included in the 14 recommended tests is, of course, subject to the conditions set forth in my memorandum to you of December 21, 1966.



6.1(a)

(S/
W. W. Rostow

WWR:CEJ:feg

~~SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA~~

SECRET

Monday, January 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Visits of German Officials to Washington

Unless you have a differing view, Secretary Rusk plans to send the attached cable to Ambassador McGhee for his guidance in dealing with Chancellor Kiesinger's desire to visit Washington.

As regards Willy Brandt's visit in early February, Secretary Rusk would see him and bring him by for an office call on you.

I see no reason why Secretary Rusk should not proceed as he proposes.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/ATTACHMENTSECRET

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By kg, NARA, Date 2-6-91

~~SECRET~~

FOR AMBASSADOR MCGHEE FROM SECRETARY RUSK

SUBJECT: Meeting Between the President and Chancellor Kiesinger

I share your hope that before too long it may be possible to arrange for a meeting between the President and Chancellor Kiesinger at a mutually convenient time and place. But in view of the uncertainties surrounding the President's schedule as well as other factors bearing on the question of time and place I feel that we cannot at this point encourage German expectations of an early decision on a meeting. If they make an official request, rather than probing through the press, we will of course have to consider how to respond. But I hope that this will not happen for a while. It would be much better if consideration of this question could be held in abeyance, certainly until after assessment of the results of Kiesinger's meetings with deGaulle this month and with Wilson next month. You should be guided accordingly when you call on the Chancellor.

Let me emphasize that there is no reluctance here whatever about a meeting with Kiesinger arising out of his "past" or his "flirtation with deGaulle." As a new Chancellor, he has many problems in front of him, including the feeling among some Germans that Erhard was too close to the United States. Surely the Chancellor ought to have a chance to shake down his Cabinet, get his feet on the ground and have his initial contacts with deGaulle, Wilson and perhaps other European leaders before a major venture across the Atlantic. Further, there would be some advantage in Brandt's having a probe or two toward the East.

As far as Willy Brandt is concerned, I would always be glad to see him, as I told you when you were here. I understand that he may be receiving some private invitations to the United States, one of which might be a suitable occasion. As far as timing is concerned, I would be at his disposal except for a period of a week or ten days in the middle of February when I am going to the Buenos Aires Conference of Inter-American Foreign Ministers.

#####

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-176
By ij, NARA, Date 9-11-91

1. ~~Aug~~
2. Pres file

Monday, January 9, 1967
8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith proposed draft letter
to Senator Mansfield.

Sec. Rusk has read it; amended
it slightly; and states that he likes it.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

1. ~~sup~~
2. Pres file

JAN 9 1967

Dear Mike:

I greatly value your telephone conversation and memorandum of Friday, January 6.

We shall consider your memorandum and reread your earlier analysis of June 9, 1965.

My first reactions to your interesting interpretation of Hanoi's "signals" are these.

1. It is not yet clear whether they are signalling us on their terms for negotiation rather than carrying forward their old campaign to get us unconditionally to stand down bombing of the North. We don't rule out that there may be something serious here. We are stretching every resource at our command to find out not only whether they wish to negotiate but whether their terms for settlement and ours are compatible. At the moment, however, we must honestly say that we have not been able to discover through private channels any indication of a change in their basic position.
2. I am inclined to agree that they are probably interested in knowing the terms of a settlement before they commit themselves publicly to negotiate. Among the issues in their minds may be, as you suggest, the question of troop withdrawals and ultimate unity. In return, the critical question for us, on the political side, is whether they are prepared to accept honest self-determination by the people of South Viet Nam in an environment freed of aggression and terror. You should know, Mike, that we have been using a variety of ways, public and private, to convey to them our picture of what a settlement might look like. Thus far the greatest unanswered question is whether they are prepared to see the third of their four points settled by free, democratic elections in the South rather than by force.

3. In your clear summary paragraph on page 3 you state that they have announced what they expect to result from the negotiations. You know, of course, that we have been even more explicit, with Secretary Rusk's fourteen points which I enclose. We are prepared, either in open or secret negotiations, to find out whether these two views are compatible. The immediate question is whether they are prepared to explore this possibility or whether they will continue to seek by means of force, harassment, and what they call "protracted warfare" to achieve what they may not be able to achieve through honest self-determination.

Turning now to your memorandum of June 9, 1965, I would make the same point: Our force is being used and will be used to frustrate the aggression in order to permit self-determination by the South Vietnamese people as to their political future in an environment of peace. We have never had and do not have the intent to use force in Viet Nam to achieve any other purpose.

And in this, I believe, you and I deeply agree. I'm sure you have derived encouragement over the past year, as I have, in the real progress towards constitutional government made in South Viet Nam.

Again, many thanks.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

P.S. Thanks for the generous statements about the Presidency and me on the television "News & Notes"

Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWRostow:DRusk:rlh

572

FOURTEEN POINTS FOR PEACE

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia.

2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or any part thereof:

-- We are ready to negotiate a settlement based on a strict observance of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements, which observance was called for in the communique of the recent meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries in Bucharest. And we will support a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, or an Asian conference, or any other generally acceptable forum.

3. We would welcome 'negotiations without preconditions' as called for by 17 non-aligned nations on April 1, 1965.

4. We would welcome "unconditional discussions" as called for by President Johnson on April 7, 1965:

-- If the other side will not come to a conference, we are prepared to engage in direct discussions or discussions through an intermediary.

5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions:

-- We have attempted, many times, to engage the other side in a discussion of a mutual de-escalation of the level of violence, and we remain prepared to engage in such a mutual de-escalation.

-- We stand ready to cooperate fully in getting discussions which could lead to a cessation of hostilities started promptly and brought to a successful completion.

6. Hanoi's "Four Points" could be discussed along with other points which others may wish to proposed

-- We would be prepared to accept preliminary discussions to reach agreement on a set of points as a basis for negotiations.

7. We want no U. S. bases in Southeast Asia:

-- We are prepared to assist in the conversion of these bases for peaceful uses that will benefit the peoples of the entire area.

8. We do not desire to retain U. S. troops in South Viet-Nam after peace is assured:

-- We seek no permanent military bases, no permanent establishment of troops, no permanent alliances, no permanent American "presence" of any kind in South Viet-Nam.

-- We have pledged in the Manila Communique that "Allied forces are in the Republic of Viet-Nam because that country is the object of aggression and its Government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled."

9. We support free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice:

-- We support the development of broadly-based democratic institutions in South Viet-Nam.

-- We do not seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country's future.

10. The question of reunification of Viet-Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision:

-- It should not be decided by the use of force.

-- We are fully prepared to support the decision of the Vietnamese people.

11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral if that be their option:

-- We do not seek to impose a policy of alignment on South Viet-Nam.

-- We support the neutrality policy of the Royal Government of Laos, and we support the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia.

12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars:

-- We support the growing efforts by the nations of the area to cooperate in the achievement of their economic and social goals.

13. The President has said "The Viet Cong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem."

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped:

-- We are prepared to order a cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam, the moment we are assured -- privately or otherwise -- that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation of the other side.

We do not seek the unconditional surrender of North Vietnam; what we do seek is to assure for the people of South Vietnam the right to decide their own political destiny, free of force.

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

January 6, 1967

TO : The President
FROM : Mike Mansfield
SUBJECT: Possible "signals" from North Viet Nam.

Pursuant to our telephone conversation this morning, it may be helpful to elaborate somewhat on my interpretation of current North Vietnamese attitudes as indicated in the Salisbury articles and elsewhere.

It would appear that Hanoi's "signals" are intended to get across to us a message which goes something like this:

"1. Of course, we are hurting and we want the bombing stopped. But let us be clear about one thing: we are not going to say 'Uncle' to you no matter what you do in the way of bombardment.

"2. As of now, we are still masters in our own house in North Viet Nam. We can still talk settlement for ourselves with you or anyone and we don't have to ask the Chinese or the Russians for permission. We do not know how long that will go on, however, because our dependency on other Communist nations and, particularly China, is bound to grow as you pile on the pressure.

"3. Of course we will talk with the United States about a settlement but not unconditionally. We will not talk until it is clear that you, Americans, not only mean to withdraw

your forces from Viet Nam, as you say you will, but also that there is no question that they will be withdrawn. That does not necessarily have to happen before a settlement but it has got to be assured in at least a reasonable period of time thereafter and your words on this point are not enough. After all, we thought we were finished with foreign troops on Vietnamese soil when we made the Geneva Agreements with France and look what happened. Furthermore, we will not talk with you, Americans, until your military operations make it crystal clear that you are not seeking through negotiations to stall the war into a more or less permanent division of Viet Nam, as in Korea, in which you and your Vietnamese allies in Saigon (who are mostly northerners, by the way) run the south, and we and our allies down there (who are mostly southerners, by the way) are excluded from the political leadership of South Viet Nam. To be frank, we want it the other way around and we think the people of Viet Nam see it our way and not yours.

"4. There is no point in talking to you Americans unconditionally at this time, because you do not even begin to see the situation as we see it. Well, we can wait because you have come a long way to fight this war and you are spending a lot of money and you are in a strange and inhospitable place here in Viet Nam and your allies in the south are not of much use. By contrast, we are defending our own land and our

allies are mostly southerners who can live and fight very cheaply (even your experts figure the Viet Cong budget at less than \$50 million a year) and, in any case, they have got no other place to go because they are already home."

Obviously, the above interpretation is not very sophisticated, but your many highly skilled experts in the Executive Branch can sand down the rougher edges and give you a much more penetrating analysis of this sudden flurry of peace talk from Hanoi. I have simply set down, for what they may be worth, my reactions. In a paragraph, I think Hanoi is trying to say:

"The basic question is not one of getting to negotiations with us. The basic problem is what do you Americans expect to result from negotiations and you ought to know that before you sit down. You know what we want; we have said it many times and always in the same language. Now, what do you expect to come, in the end, from your commitment and military activity in our country?"

In this connection, I would most respectfully suggest, Mr. President, that you have your aides restudy my memorandum to you, dated June 9, 1965, a copy of which is attached. It may still be pertinent, in part, to the problem of achieving a negotiated settlement in Viet Nam. I refer, in particular, to the three numbered sections which deal in alternative U.S. goals in Viet Nam and my estimate, at the time, of the military costs of achieving each of them. It would appear that our present level of military activity corresponds to some degree with the goal which is listed as alternative 2, and is on a course which

would appear designed to reach alternative number 1. So long as that continues to be the case, it would not appear to me to be prudent to expect useful negotiations to come from the current Hanoi signals.

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

58d
June 9, 1965

To: The President
From: Mike Mansfield
Subject: Viet Nam

Pursuant to our telephone conversation last night, here are some additional thoughts.

The formal delegation of authority to Westmoreland to commit American combat troops comes at a time when the last semblance of constituted government (the Quat group) in Saigon is disappearing. As I understand it, Westmoreland will respond to requests from the Vietnamese military not the Vietnamese government. This underscores the fact that there is not a government to speak of in Saigon. In short we are now at the point where we are no longer dealing with anyone who represents anybody in a political sense. We are simply acting to prevent a collapse of the Vietnamese military forces which we pay for and supply in any event and who presumably are going in the same direction we are going. That reality is not going to be lost on any government--friend or foe--anywhere in the world.

It raises again the question, and it is a crucial one: In what direction are we going in Viet Nam? We can talk of negotiations, conferences and peace. We can talk of the independence and welfare of the people of South Viet Nam. We can talk of unconditional discussions. But the question is going to be asked increasingly: What do we mean when we say we are going to stay in South Viet Nam and for what specific United States or Vietnamese ends are we going to stay there? The question will be asked increasingly at home no less than abroad.

And it is the crucial question because the answer to it should control the extent and nature of our military involvement in Viet Nam. As I see it, at this point, we can mean one of three things when we say we are going to stay in South Viet Nam. I am no military expert but, on the basis of our past experience elsewhere and developments in Viet Nam since the first of the year, it seems to me that the military costs of each of these three alternatives would look something like this:

The President
Regarding Viet Nam
June 9, 1965
Page Two

1. Do we mean that we are going to stay in Viet Nam until we or our Vietnamese military allies prevail everywhere south of the 17th parallel down to the smallest hamlet? If that is what we mean, we are talking in terms of years or decades, and upwards of a million American soldiers on the ground in South Viet Nam, assuming that the Chinese do not become involved with men.

2. Or are we talking about holding the military situation about where it is now? So far as I can judge, from second hand reports, this would mean that our side must retain the provincial capitols, the larger towns in the interior, Saigon, and the coastal cities and we must be able to maintain at least tenuous lines of communication on the ground in between. If that is what we are talking about when we say we are going to stay in Viet Nam, then the 300,000 McNamara estimate is probably too low but something in the range of 500,000 might do it, at least if Giap's army does not move in full and open force across the 17th parallel.

3. Or are we talking about staying in Viet Nam in order to hold a bargaining position for negotiations which might be expected to permit some reasonable choice--self-determination--on the part of the South Vietnamese people as to their political future, some protection for Vietnamese who have been on our side and some prospect of a bonafide peace based on eventual withdrawal of all foreign forces. If that is what we are talking about, then it would appear to me that instead of committing United States combat forces to the difficult-to-defend Vietnamese outposts, cities and towns scattered in the interior, we ought to be drawing the Vietnamese garrisons in those towns into the coastal bases and into Saigon where they would add to our strength, rather than the reverse. And at the same time, we should stop waiting for signals but rather launch a powerful diplomatic peace-offensive to try to get to a conference table. Unless the situation is already totally hopeless, this kind of holding of South Viet Nam may be feasible--at least for a year or so with something on the order of 100,000 or less United States combat forces on the ground backed by powerful naval and air units.

Moreover, if a sustained peace offensive, simultaneously, succeeds in bringing about a conference during the next six months, new elements will inevitably be introduced into the situation and it is conceivable that they could begin to point the way to a resolution of the problem.

The President
Regarding Viet Nam
June 9, 1965
Page Three

The absence of a decision as to which of the above approaches really serves our national interests, seems to me to be the crux of the difficulty which has confronted us all along. I think you know my personal view as to which course is preferable in the national interest. But as things are now going, it is apparent that you are being advised to continue to take at least the second course. The rate of commitment is accelerating and it is quite likely that it will lead rapidly to pressure to follow the first course, if not to go beyond it to all-out war with China. That may not be the way it looks now but a course once set in motion, as you know, often develops its own momentum and rationale whatever the initial intentions.

As for the question of Taylor's replacement, as I told you, Lodge's name may set off an immediate and hostile debate of the whole situation in the Senate. You have got U. Alexis Johnson out there already. He has played a major role and has had a major responsibility in this situation for years. It would seem to me that if we are going to continue on the course of getting in deeper he is the logical man to continue with it.

With respect to another Congressional resolution on the situation, I cannot see the value of it at this point whether it originates here or with you. The Senate cannot direct you in the conduct of foreign relations even if it wanted to and I think you know that there is no substantial group in the Senate which is going to take the initiative in urging you to put more American ground forces into South Viet Nam. I think you know too, that what has been done to date in the way of resolutions, however one-sided the votes, has been done with grave doubts and much trepidation on the part of many Senators. It has been done largely on faith, out of loyalty to you and on the basis of the general view that when the President has the responsibility and when he requests legislative support in a crisis, he should have it.

But if you make another request, at this time, in connection specifically with the use of ground forces, I am concerned at the possible reaction. It is not nearly as predictable as in the past when the requests have been for support of policy in general terms or for funds. A request at this time could set off a wave of criticism and of demands for inquiries which, in the end, even though a resolution were overwhelmingly approved, would not in any way strengthen your hand, render your task easier or make your burden of responsibility lighter.

~~SECRET~~

Monday, January 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Summary

1. Ecuador Seizes Three US Tuna Boats

Ecuador has seized three of our tuna clippers 40-60 miles from shore. The Ecuadoreans, together with Chile and Peru, claim territorial waters of 200 miles. Ambassador Coerr is trying to work out their prompt release, so that a situation will not arise where the Kuchel amendment (suspension of aid to countries seizing our boats on the high seas) comes into play.

2. Aeroflot Link with South America

A member of the Chilean Embassy in Moscow reports that the Soviets will try to establish an air route to South American in 1967. The weekly flight would run Moscow-Paris-Dakar-Rio de Janeiro-Montevideo-Buenos Aires-Santiago.

3. Vietnamese Reconciliation Program.

South Vietnamese Minister of Information Tri has informed Embassy Saigon that, despite Cabinet opposition to a public offer of government careers to middle and high-level VC, he had been authorized to make covert approaches to known VC leaders in order to test techniques. Tri added that it may be possible to make a public appeal in April when the constitution is proclaimed. The Embassy recommends we continue to press for a general civil and political rights proclamation prior to Tet and follow-up Tri's plans for a covert "careers" program now with a public announcement in April.

4. Czech Air Negotiations

Because of the unsettled Kazan affair, the Department of State has deferred making any decision on a date for civil air negotiations with Czechoslovakia. State will not connect these two questions openly, but see no harm in letting the Czechs draw their own conclusions.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By CB, NARA, Date 10-21-98

~~SECRET~~

to p 60

Monday, January 9, 1967
4:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Although I have not consulted my colleagues, all of us, I believe, regard the most effective exposition of your thoughts those occasions where you may hold forth, without any limitation of time, free to throw in anecdotes and illustrations; to return again to your main themes, etc.

One way to project this to our people would be for you to tape, under comfortable conditions, in the Mansion or down at the Ranch, a relaxed two-hour interview with the understanding that you would be free to edit it down to, say, a half hour or even an hour.

I am sending copies of this to my colleagues, who are more expert in such matters.

W. W. R.

cc: Mr. Moyers
Mr. Kintner
Mr. McPherson
Mr. Callfano

61

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday -
January 9, 1967

Mr. President -

This cable from Ambassador Adair describes press reaction to the signing of an important loan with Panama for projects in slum areas.

The favorable publicity helps to create the psychological climate of forward motion we want. Coming on the eve of the January 9 anniversary, it also helps to blunt the efforts of those who would whip up anti-US feelings.

The budget surplus referred to in the last paragraph of the cable amounts only to \$1.5 million. The surplus is on the operating side of the budget and will probably be applied to the floating debt.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-180
By Kip, NARA, Date 4-7-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*2080

6/a

Message from Embassy Panama
(January 6, 1967)

1. The \$12 million loan and grant agreements which were signed this week (Wednesday, January 4, 1967) by President Marco A. Robles and U.S. Ambassador Charles W. Adair, Jr., have met with favorable reaction from most sources.

2. Following a live nation-wide radio and television network broadcast from the Presidential Palace, the event was given banner treatment on the front pages of leading newspapers, which also carried the complete text of Embassy and Government of Panama release, and the texts of statements by Ambassador Adair and President Robles. The program received laudatory comments in editorials and columns in the press and on radio and television.

3. Media commentators agree on the amicable atmosphere in which the loan was negotiated, and express general agreement that the urban development program should be a blow to poverty and sub-normal conditions in the country.

4. Yesterday's El Panama America, the leading Spanish afternoon paper, commented in "Pulso de Panama" that "those who have before claimed that the results of the Alliance for Progress have been thus far negative, will now have to agree that, in the case of Panama, it has meant a positive contribution to our economic, social and cultural development."

5. La Prensa points out in its editorial that "never before has the fight against poverty, unemployment and, fundamentally, against the low material and social conditions of the popular sectors, received the stimulation and the thrust now made effective with the \$12 million to be destined to the "Plan Robles" urban development program.

6. "Puntos", a front-page column published by pro-Government El Dia, says "an appreciable aid has been offered the people of Panama by the Alliance for Progress", and adds that "this program, directed at improving the living conditions and working capabilities of the more needy levels of the population, constitutes the most dynamic expression of the revolutionary democratic doctrine of cooperation and stimulation to the growth of those communities in the process of development.

7. El Mundo, another evening paper, concludes a listing of the projects to be undertaken with the loans by stating that "1967 looms as a promising year, thus insuring great activity in the economic and social fields".

8. "Radio Aeropuerto" asked why it was necessary to negotiate a loan since the Government reported a budget surplus for 1966."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-176
By isg, NARA, Date 9-11-91

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-13
By cb, NARA Date 6-22-00

82

Pro file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday -
January 9, 1967

Mr. President -

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED] as of 3:00 o'clock this afternoon the situation was quiet in Panama.

Several ceremonies were held in Panama City this morning but without incident.

One small group of students tried to enter the Zone, but the Panamanian National Guard handled them with ease.

There is to be a rally at the University tonight. This could produce some fireworks -- but the National Guard is expected to be able to cope with any situation that might arise.

W. W. Rostow

*Will follow closely:
1/2 @*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

for file

Monday, January 9, 1967
3:20 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I got with Sol Linowitz on the lines of your instruction.

1. He is terribly distressed, as only a new man can be when he sees how the press can fix you up good.
2. He says there are a number of flat falsehoods in the story; for example, his ordering a review of Cuban policy.
3. His relations with Linc are excellent: they are even planning to play string quartets together!
4. He will immediately talk to Linc.
5. I urged him to clam up with the press for a while.
6. He thinks the story is a systematic distortion of a joint backgrounder they did after coming back from Austin. He'll send me the text.
7. He wishes you to know how badly he feels about it.

W. W. R.

64

Monday, January 9, 1967
3:30 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached are Francis Bator's comments on the De Gaulle memo sent you by General Eisenhower.

My comments are:

1. It is a fair description of De Gaulle's strategy and tactics.
2. Operationally:
 - A German request for French troop withdrawal from Germany can be ruled out as wholly unrealistic;
 - Insistence by other Common Market members on U. K. entrance -- with the threat of breaking up the Common Market if De Gaulle doesn't agree -- is a very long shot: it would require a British position more forthcoming and a German policy more tough towards Paris than any we can now envisage;
 - In any case, U. S. efforts to push Germany hard on these matters would backfire.
3. Therefore, we are left with our present policy of sweating out De Gaulle and hoping for a somewhat different French policy when he passes from the scene; although he could conceivably so overplay his hand at some point as to bring about the kind of crisis the paper recommends. But thus far he's played his European policy with great shrewdness.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

cc: Bator

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By CB, NARA, Date 10-21-98

Monday, Jan. 9, 1967
1:15 p.m.

65

MR. PRESIDENT:

You may see the Israeli-Syrian tank
"battle" on the ticker.

Here's Howard Wriggins' quick and --
for the moment -- reassuring roundup.

W. W. R.

65a

January 9, 1967

TO: W. W. Rostow

FROM: Howard Wriggins

SUBJECT: Alleged tank battle between Israelis and Syrians

Thus far there is nothing in this incident to cause unusual alarm.

This is the sowing season. Each year there are similar incidents, as the Israelis seek to extend their own cultivation further into the de-militarized zone and the Syrians riposte by taking pot shots at the offending tractor drivers. Usually the exchanges are limited to small arms. This one, from the press releases only, appears to have escalated a bit further. (One two years ago did go up to a quick air exchange.) Since a number of tanks are emplaced as substitutes for artillery, these exchanges may have been between fixed points, rather than the "tank battle" described.

From the Israeli point of view, the terrain in this area is highly unfavorable, and preparing action against Syria in this locale is difficult. Had the Israelis been setting up another Samu-type raid against the Israelis, or had the "tank battle" been on the verge of really escalating, the Israelis would have brought in planes by now, and we would have heard about it.

Conclusion as of 12:30 p.m., Monday: no need to worry more than usual.

PRESERVATION COPY

Mon., a. 9, 1967
12:45 p. m.

66

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a draft reply to Senator
Yarborough, at your urgent request.

W. W. R.

Attachment

66a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Ralph:

Many thanks for your letter of January 4, proposing the posting of a Presidential peace commission in a neutral capital.

As you know, we already have a "peace team" headed by Averell Harriman. They are following leads -- no matter how dubious or unpromising -- in every corner of the world. In a larger sense the whole of our diplomatic resources, wherever they may be, are available -- and are being used -- to probe, follow up, and serve as a channel of communications on leads to peace through negotiations.

Secretary Rusk and I will give your suggestion further thought; but my initial feeling is that the advantages the scheme might have in dramatizing our peaceful intent would be outweighed by the visibility of the mission, which would make it more difficult rather than less difficult for the kind of quiet contact that might lead us to peace.

Therefore, while I fully share your objective, Ralph, I would hesitate to endorse it without much further reflection.

Sincerely,

Honorable Ralph W. Yarborough
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

January 9, 1967

Dear Ralph:

Many thanks for your letter of January 4 proposing the posting of a Presidential peace commission in a neutral capital.

As you know, we already have a "peace team" headed by Averell Harriman. It includes six of the most experienced and senior members of the Department of State. They are following leads -- no matter how dubious or unpromising -- in every corner of the world. We have already demonstrated that our representatives are prepared to travel far and fast to move towards peace. You will also recall my public commitment to send Secretary Rusk to a conference anywhere, on twenty-four hours' notice.

In a larger sense, the whole of our diplomatic resources -- in Washington, New York, and wherever we have representatives abroad -- are available, and are being used, to probe, follow up, and serve as a channel of communications on leads to peace through negotiations. There are a number of capitals where both we and Hanoi have Ambassadors. Nevertheless, I take the view that every proposal that might bring an honorable end to the war should be examined most carefully.

Therefore, I have consulted with my most trusted advisers concerning your proposal, including Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Goldberg, Governor Harriman, and Walt Rostow. We have also been in touch on this matter with some of your colleagues on the Hill with long experience in foreign affairs. All of us fully share your objective and understand with sympathy the thought that lies behind it. But the consensus is this: If Hanoi is prepared for overt negotiations, there are many channels open and waiting. The advantages the scheme might have in further dramatizing our peaceful intent would be outweighed by the visibility of the mission and the small chance that the other side would utilize such a group.


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1/10/67

(done 1/9/67)

We have good reason to believe that such public notice would make more difficult rather than less difficult establishing the kind of quiet contact that may prove most effective in finding the road to peace.

Many thanks for making available to us your proposal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Honorable Ralph W. Yarborough
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWR:mz

67a

CARL HAYDEN, ARIZ., CHAIRMAN
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ROMAN L. HRUSKA, NEBR.
GORDON ALLOTT, COLO.
NORRIS COTTON, N.H.
CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

January 4, 1967

THOMAS J. SCOTT, CHIEF CLERK
WM. W. WOODRUFF, ASST. CHIEF CLERK

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

In view of our continuing desire to explore all avenues to peace in Vietnam and to encourage all initiatives which can lead to an honorable cessation of the hostilities, I propose that the United States establish as soon as possible a high ranking Presidential Peace Commission to be posted to a suitable neutral site where the commission would be available at all times to discuss peace with the North Vietnamese, any interested responsible emissaries, or indeed any interested persons who desire to discuss routes to peace in Southeast Asia.

Our "Peace Team" representatives should be well known in the international community as men with a sincere interest in the pursuit of peace. They should be men who unquestionably carry the confidence of the President and are associated with the authority of his office. Their mandate should include no preconditions and should make abundantly clear to the world community that they will receive anyone at any time to explore any possibility to achieve an effective and honorable peace in Vietnam. Of course it is recognized that before such open discussions can blossom into negotiations, the government of North Vietnam must be represented, but I think it very important that the United States show its willingness to talk of approaches to peace with any group or person that may be interested. It might well be a

amw
1-9-67
1041 a.m.

The President
January 4, 1967
Page 2

a long wait for our peace delegation, but their willingness to wait should be made evident. Even if our representatives sit in an empty room without contact for many weeks, the empty chairs would be another symbol of our peace efforts which would have a salutary effect upon world opinion.

I believe that the city to be chosen for stationing this permanent negotiating team should be one both geographically convenient and politically acceptable or even attractive to the North Vietnamese, their third country intermediaries, or their friends. Perhaps rather than choosing an international capital like Geneva where there has been a precedent for Southeast Asia negotiations, we might use a city in such a country as Burma, Ceylon, or Cambodia where the Peace Commission's proximity to the scene of the conflict would have a profound psychological effect on all people and especially Asians who would see that peace is only a short journey by road or plane for those who have the good will to make the journey.


The appointment of such a Peace Commission would be a ringing affirmation of our willingness to explore all roads to peace by talking to anyone who has a sincere interest in this goal. We can in good faith ask anyone-the Vietnamese or their intermediaries-to test our sincerity by making that one day journey. All the world would know that the cessation of bombing, de-escalation, and the withdrawal of American troops is figuratively speaking within sight of Hanoi. Our door would be open and our team representatives would be waiting.

Since I hope to offer my plan for a fuller public discussion in the near future, I would welcome

The President
January 4, 1967
Page 3

receiving the comments of you or a representative of
the Administration on the proposal at an early date.

Respectively yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Ralph W. Yarborough', with a long, sweeping underline that extends downwards and to the left.

Ralph W. Yarborough

RWY:dyf

cc to: The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

Friday, J. 9, 1967

68

MR. PRESIDENT:

I support this suggestion of Gen. Taylor's that he revisit South Vietnam. He added to me that he would expect this trip to be extremely low key. He has already had a word with Cabot Lodge, who was agreeable.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

68a

January 9, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. President:

Walt Rostow has conveyed your wish that I remain at my post as a Consultant and I shall comply with the utmost pleasure. However, in so doing, I feel an urgent need to revisit South Viet-Nam for a few days in order to get a refresher course in the realities of the local situation. At the same time, I would like to do some work in Hong Kong and Singapore for your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. I have discussed this trip with Clark Clifford who believes it would be useful. If State and Defense have no objection, do you approve? I would expect to devote to the trip about two weeks in the latter part of this month.

Maxwell D. Taylor

Yes _____

No _____

See me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 2-6-91

Mr. Rostow

69

[Handwritten signature]
2 files

January 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message of Condolence to President Makarios of
Cyprus on the Death of His Father

Archbishop Makarios' aged father died on January 4. We continue to have some differences from time to time with Makarios. But the State Department believes a message of condolence from you would have a beneficial effect.

The attached draft message is for your approval.

W. W. Rostow

approved 1/9/67

Att: Draft Message to Makarios (WH-38)

69a

SUGGESTED TELEGRAM TO
PRESIDENT MAKARIOS

His Beatitude

Archbishop Makarios, III,

President of the Republic of Cyprus,

Nicosia.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending our deepest sympathy
on the death of your father.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Mr. Rostow

70

1 sup
2 Pres. file

January 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Messages to Muslim Arab leaders at the end of
Ramadan -- 'Id al-Fitr

The end of Ramadan, the Muslim's most important
religious festival, is expected about January 12.

Each year you have sent such messages of greeting
to heads of state in the Arab Peninsula and the UAR. Although
these messages would come hard on the heels of your New Years
greetings, our Arab specialists believe they are desirable.

If you approve, our Embassies would be informed that
while we do not plan to release the text here, you have no
objection to their doing so.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

1/9/67

Disapprove _____

See me _____

Att. Draft messages to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, UAR (WH-32)

70a

MESSAGE TO KING FAISAL OF SAUDI ARABIA

Your Majesty:

On behalf of the American people, it is my great pleasure to extend sincere greetings and warmest good wishes to Your Majesty and to the people of Saudi Arabia on the occasion of 'Id al-Fitr.

Lyndon B. Johnson

MESSAGE TO AMIR OF KUWAIT

Your Highness:

On the occasion of 'Id al-Fitr I take great pleasure in extending, on behalf of the American people, sincere congratulations and warmest good wishes to Your Highness and to the people of Kuwait.

Lyndon B. Johnson

70c

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SALLAL OF YEMEN

Dear Mr. President:

I take pleasure in extending, on behalf of the people of the United States of America, sincere congratulations and good wishes to you and the people of the Yemen Arab Republic on the occasion of *Id al-Fitr.

Lyndon B. Johnson

70d

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT NASSER OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of the American people, I take great pleasure in extending to you and the people of the United Arab Republic sincere greetings and warmest good wishes on the occasion of 'Id al-Fitr.

Lyndon B. Johnson

1. [unclear]
2. [unclear]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Determination - Technical Assistance for the UAR

The attached determination to permit continuation of technical assistance to the UAR should have been included with Charlie Schultze's broader memo on technical assistance to more than 40 countries, which you approved. The UAR was on that list but requires this special determination in addition.

This determination finds that such aid is essential in the national interest and will not assist aggressive actions by the UAR.

The UAR program consists mainly of \$1.6 million for technical help in agriculture and public administration. In addition AID would also continue to help the American University in Cairo and support small humanitarian programs run by CARE and other US voluntary agencies. It would also make available investment guarantees for qualified American firms.

The Soviet Union's recent offer of 650,000 tons of grain has taken us off the hook temporarily on our touchy wheat decision. Secretary Rusk will probably soon recommend you consider a smaller PL 480 program in other commodities the UAR needs. But in view of the political difficulty of that kind of decision, it makes sense to preserve the continuity of these small technical programs. They are our main remaining link with elements in the UAR that may outlast Nasser.

Since you have already signed the basic determination on technical assistance, I recommend you sign the attached.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-17
By is, NARA Date 1-11-80

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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71a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

DEC 26 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Presidential Determinations to Permit AID to Furnish Technical Assistance to Certain Countries

Attached are two memoranda from AID Administrator Gaud recommending that you determine:

- that technical assistance to more than 40 countries in the current fiscal year is in the national interest (required by section 211(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act) and
- that assistance to the United Arab Republic is essential to the national interest and will not assist aggressive actions by the U.A.R. (required by section 620(p) of the Foreign Assistance Act and section 117 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act).

These determinations must be reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Speaker of the House. In the case of the "number of countries" determination, at least 30 days must elapse after submission of the report before technical assistance can be provided to more than 40 countries. Both determinations would direct Gaud to make the necessary reports on your behalf.

I am holding Gaud's request that you make another determination--required for development lending to more than ten countries this year--until the AID budget level and the recipient countries during FY 1967 and 1968 are decided.

These are the major examples of the types of restrictions which you said in your signing statement "unduly and unnecessarily limit the management of our foreign aid program."

Number of Countries

In last January's Congressional Presentation, AID requested funds for technical assistance to 47 countries. Since then, requirements have emerged for three more (Indonesia, and the newly independent states of Botswana and Lesotho), and two (Cyprus and Iran) have been dropped from the list because aid is being phased out. This comes to a total of 48 countries.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-180

By WJ, NARA, Date 4-7-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Although we are still carrying on discussions with AID about the level of technical assistance in several countries during FY 1967 and 1968, we are in agreement as to the countries in which this activity will be carried on in 1967. Bill Gaud feels, and I concur, that it would be unwise to distinguish between a "basic" 40 countries and the other eight which are scheduled to receive technical assistance this year. Accordingly, the attached determination would make a "national interest" finding with respect to all 40.

Of these, 35 are in Africa. In keeping with the policy set forth in the Korry Report, AID plans to continue major programs in ten of them and to phase out bilateral assistance to the other 25 except for a limited Self-Help Fund administered by the Ambassador in each country. Until suitable legislative history can be established, however, even these small programs must be counted against the limitation.

United Arab Republic

In addition to being included in the above determination, the U.A.R. requires a specific determination. (The same is true of Indonesia, for which you made the necessary finding on September 1, 1966).

Although only \$1.6 million in technical assistance is projected for the U.A.R. this year, it is of particular importance as a signal that we are keeping the door open for improved relations. We have made no development loans since 1963, and none is planned for this year. Our last P. L. 480 sales program expired last June.

Other aspects of our activities in the U.A.R. include food donations through private voluntary agencies, assistance to the American-sponsored American University of Cairo, and the possibility of some AID guarantees of private U. S. investment.

Recommendation

I recommend that you sign the two determinations attached.

(signed) Charles E. Schultze
Charles E. Schultze
Director

Attachments

100-50 11 5 42

100-50 11 5 42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

712

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

DEC 13 1966

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Determinations to Permit Furnishing of Economic Assistance
to the United Arab Republic in Fiscal Year 1967

I recommend that you make the necessary determinations to permit the furnishing of the within described economic assistance for the United Arab Republic in Fiscal Year 1967.

Section 117 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1967, and Section 620(p) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, require that before assistance be furnished to the United Arab Republic (UAR), the President must determine such assistance to be essential to the national interest of the United States. Section 620(p) requires a further determination that such assistance will neither directly nor indirectly assist aggressive actions by the UAR, and also requires that determinations thereunder be reported to Congress.

Our proposed program includes \$1.6 million for Technical Assistance. It does not include Development Lending. No loans have been approved since Fiscal Year 1963 and none is intended for Fiscal Year 1967. In addition to the relatively modest Technical Assistance program, we would continue assistance to the American University in Cairo and the availability of guarantees for American private investments in the UAR, as well as support the humanitarian efforts of the American Voluntary Agencies operating in the UAR.

In recent years, with the elimination of Development Lending and the curtailment of our PL 480 sales program, our assistance policy has been sharply altered. Although we have reduced our technical assistance and assistance channelled through the American Voluntary Agencies, we have not totally eliminated either program or the availability of investment guarantees.

We believe that the presence of Americans in the UAR's closed society is in our interest. We further believe that maintenance of our limited assistance program has served as a signal to the UAR that we have not given up the hope that relations between our countries could improve. Unilateral termination of our relatively modest program, with the resultant withdrawal of American personnel, would likely be interpreted by the UAR as an indication that we finally had given up all hope for

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-181
By WJG, NARA, Date 11-5-91

improved relations. We believe it essential to the national interest, especially in this time of turbulence in the Middle East, not to give such a signal.

We will periodically review the desirability of continuing even this reduced program in the light of evolving US/UAR relationships.

The Department of State concurs in this recommendation.

William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud

Enclosures:

1. Background Annex
2. Presidential Determination

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

71c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BACKGROUND ANNEX

1. Legal Requirements for Determination

Section 117 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1967, (the Appropriation Act) provides that no funds appropriated thereby shall be available for assistance to the United Arab Republic (UAR) unless the President determines that such availability is essential to the national interest of the United States. The President made this determination under the same provision in the FY 1965 Appropriation Act in order to permit the furnishing of assistance to the UAR during the past year.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 amended the authorization act to include a similar prohibition. This provision, Section 620(p) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the Act), prohibits assistance under the Act to the UAR unless the President finds and reports within thirty days of such finding to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Speaker of the House that such assistance is essential to the national interest of the United States and that such assistance will neither directly nor indirectly assist aggressive actions by the United Arab Republic.

2. Need for Assistance

The proposed United States assistance to the UAR under the Foreign Assistance Act includes continuation of the Technical Assistance program at the level of \$1.6 million during FY 1967. No Development Loan has been authorized for the UAR since FY 1963 and none is proposed for FY 1967. We do plan to continue the availability of investment guarantees for U. S. investors in the UAR. Under PL 480, we have only a Title III food donation program administered by U. S. voluntary agencies. The multi-year PL 480 program, approved in October 1962, terminated in June 1965. A six-month PL 480 program on harder terms expired June 30, 1966, and the UAR subsequently has met part of its food import needs by purchasing U. S. wheat on three-year CCC credit terms.

The Technical Assistance projects which it is proposed be financed are for programs in assisting the development of agricultural extension services; assistance to the responsible UAR agency in the planning and administration of the UAR development program; and assistance in specialized fields of communications, public safety, civil aviation, engineering education, leadership training, and the providing of scientific books.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 5

Declassified following release

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-181

By sig, NARA, Date 11-5-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Continuation of the Technical Assistance program will provide an opportunity for American technicians to be in personal contact with UAR personnel in key ministries. Selected UAR personnel are also brought to the United States for training, thus increasing our opportunity to influence Egyptians with a potential for moderation. Such contacts (as in the case of Indonesia and elsewhere) have proven to be a useful channel for a continuing flow of Western-oriented ideas and have helped to preserve and even expand a reservoir of good will towards the United States.

In these circumstances, it is believed essential to the national interest of the United States to continue assistance at the present modest level. Termination of the Technical Assistance program at this time, with the resultant withdrawal of U. S. personnel, would be interpreted by the UAR as an indication the United States intends to bring aid relationships with the UAR to an end and would substantially impair actual and potential influence of the United States in this important Near East country.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

71d

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Presidential Determination

No. 67-17

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: Determinations under Section 620(p) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the Act), and under Section 117 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1967 (the Appropriation Act) permitting the furnishing of economic assistance to the United Arab Republic in Fiscal Year 1967

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of December 13, 1966, I hereby:

(1) determine, pursuant to Sections 620(p) of the Act and 117 of the Appropriation Act, that continuation in Fiscal Year 1967 of economic assistance to the United Arab Republic, as described in said memorandum, is essential to the national interest of the United States, and

(2) determine, pursuant to Section 620(p) of the Act, that continuation in Fiscal Year 1967 of economic assistance to the United Arab Republic, as described in said memorandum, will neither directly nor indirectly assist aggressive actions by the United Arab Republic.

Pursuant to Section 620(p) of the Act, you are requested, on my behalf, to report these determinations within thirty days to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-180

By WJ, NARA, Date 4-7-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GROUP 1
Declassified following release

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

DO-1/66-C/199

71e

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

DEC 13 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE CHARLES L. SCHULTZE
Director, Bureau of the Budget

SUBJECT: Presidential Determination to Permit Continuation of
Assistance to the United Arab Republic

A.I.D. is requesting that the President make the determinations required under Section 620(p) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and Section 117 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1967, to permit the continuation of a limited economic assistance program in the United Arab Republic.

The determinations are stated in broad terms so that if necessary they may be construed to cover issuance of guaranties for private investments in the UAR under Part I, Chapter 2, Title III of the Act. By doing this, A.I.D. seeks to avoid commitment to the position that investment guaranties necessarily constitute "assistance" to a country so as to be subject to statutory prohibitions such as Sections 620(p) and 117. This is desired because the statutory language and legislative history on the applicability of such prohibitions to investment guaranties may fairly be considered ambiguous.

While up to this point the issue has not been squarely presented, it now appears that applications for guaranties of investments by U. S. firms in the UAR will be forthcoming in FY 1967. To refer specifically to authority to issue guaranties in the Presidential Determination, therefore, would imply recognition by the Executive Branch that investment guaranties were considered "assistance" subject to the statutory prohibitions. Use of the proposed general language, on the other hand, would assure the validity of guaranties in the UAR in FY 1967, and still not foreclose A.I.D. from claiming authority for issuance of investment guaranties, notwithstanding a prohibition against assistance to the country of investment, should such action seem appropriate to a future situation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-181
By isp, NARA, Date 11-5-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Presidential Determination to Permit Continuation of
Assistance to the United Arab Republic

2

A.I.D. also proposes to make a donation in FY 1967 to the American University in Cairo. However, the assistance will be furnished under Section 214 of the Act to the institution as one of the "schools and libraries outside the United States founded or sponsored by United States citizens and serving as study and demonstration centers for ideas and practices of the United States". Although benefits from such donations accrue to the country wherein the institution happens to be situated, as well as to other countries from which students come to the school, we do not consider that the circumstances of this donation require it to be classed as "assistance to the UAR" for purposes of the applicable prohibitions. The American University in Cairo was founded and sponsored by American citizens and is also incorporated in the United States. A substantial portion of this school's enrollment is drawn from outside the UAR. Furthermore, the FY 1967 House Appropriations Committee Report recommending retention of the prohibition on assistance to the UAR (Section 117), at page 28, also specifically recommended, at page 14, the appropriation of \$1,200,000 for the American University in Cairo.

Apart from the investment guaranties and the Section 214 donation, the legal issues raised by the application of Sections 620(p) of the Act and 117 of the Appropriation Act are adequately disposed of in the Background Annex of the memorandum to the President. In addition, it should be noted that there are a number of outstanding claims by United States citizens against the United Arab Republic that raised the question of the possible applicability of the Hickenlooper Amendment, Section 620(e) of the Act. We have looked into this situation and found that claims for a substantial amount have in fact been settled by the United Arab Republic and that the United Arab Republic has displayed a willingness to discuss settlement of the remainder. On the basis of our review, we have concluded that we are not required to suspend assistance to the United Arab Republic under Section 620(e) of the Act. We will continue to pursue the settlement of these claims.

This division of legal issues between this memorandum to you and the memorandum from the Administrator to the President is for the purpose of presenting the relevant issues to the President, while avoiding the necessity of indicating to Congress, by express reference in the memorandum to the President, our lack of certainty concerning the validity of a guaranty issued to cover an investment in a country to which "assistance" has been prohibited.

If you are in accord with this approach, I would appreciate your bringing this matter to the President's attention as soon as possible.

William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

72
Saturday, January 7, 1967
4:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

This Thai response to your
letter on their additional troops
indicates its good effect.

W. W. Rostow

Bangkok 8538

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WWRostow:rln

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Bangkok 8538, January 7, 1967

I delivered the President's letter to Prime Minister Thanom this morning. He said he was extremely gratified for this recognition of Thai-American intimacy and the extent of the Thai contribution to the achievement of our common objectives. He said that, while these contributions were recognized by the senior members of the American Government, the American public and press were not so well informed.

Thanom was particularly appreciative of the formulation "to reinforce" which would help when he presented the President's letter to the Cabinet next Tuesday.

As always, Thanom was particularly pleased to have this direct communication from the President. It obviously strengthens his determination and will be of considerable help to him in bringing along the more conservative members of his Cabinet.

He does not plan to release the letter, at least until after there is a direct exchange between the South Vietnamese government and the Royal Thai government. Saigon may wish to encourage a response from Ky to get this in motion.

Martin

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

73
Saturday, January 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

You asked me to look into the qualities of Mr. Idar Rimestad as replacement for Bill Crockett.

I find Rimestad has an excellent and consistent record as an administrative officer. In particular, he did distinguished work in three complex operations: the Moscow Embassy, the Paris Embassy, and setting up ACDA. There is every reason to think that he could do the housekeeping job at State with efficiency, and handle his relations well on the Hill. (In ACDA he had the responsibility of presenting a separate budget.)

SANITIZED

He sounds like the right man, if the idea Nick Katzenbach is working out with Secretary Rusk comes to life. That idea is to find a first-rate man to help Nick lead the way in programming systematically the use of resources and personnel in all aspects of foreign affairs. That is not a job which, on the record, Rimestad could handle.

Therefore, I think we have found a good successor to Bill; but Secretary Rusk and Nick should be encouraged to set up soon the coordination of foreign affairs resources.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:amc

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY h9 ON 2-25-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

74
Free file

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

Saturday, January 7, 1967
4:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith some intelligence reports that Ky may be probing to open contacts with the NLF.

They could be, as explained, an Indonesian blow-hard; but there might be something in it.

Good idea if it were true; although we both ought to be closer in this probing stage of the business.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

Cy 1 -- ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 6 January 1967, ~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-11+ ML592-3314
By is, NARA, Date 9-10-04

WWRostow:rlh

Friday -
January 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Chief Justice Warren to Latin America

I learned today that Chief Justice Warren has agreed to participate in a series of seminars in Latin America under the auspices of State's Bureau of Cultural Affairs.

The planned itinerary is:

Chile -- February 25-27.
Bolivia -- February 28-March 2.
Peru -- March 3-5.

The seminars will be with 35 to 40 top level representatives of government, business, industry, communications, judiciary and the legal profession.

The topics on which the Chief Justice will speak are:

- "Law as the agent of freedom".
- "Role of American courts in the American Government".
- "New concepts in America's continuing revolution".

From the standpoint of our relations with the three countries, and our image throughout Latin America, the Chief Justice's tour should prove to be most helpful. There is always a security problem, and State tells me the Embassies are being instructed to take special precautions to avoid unpleasant incidents involving the Chief Justice.

Although unrelated to the OAS Summit and your trip, the presence of so high a United States official in Latin America will arouse public interest and redound to your benefit when you go six weeks later.

W. W. Rostow