

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[1 of 7]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Rostow to the President re Soviet Union Secret 1 p. open 2-5-93 NLS 91-254	1/31/67	A
#1a memo	Richard Helms to the President Secret 3 pp. exempt NLS 91-253 Exempt 6/27/00 NLS 99-10; exempt 12/01-NLS 019-012-3	1/31/67	A
#2 memo	Rostow to the President re Amb. Goldberg Secret 1 p. open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256 (dup. of #176, NSF, Name File, Rostow memos)	1/31/67	A
#4a letter	Indira Gandhi to the President Possible classified information 2 pp. open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256 (dup. of #9a, NSF, Spec. Hofs Comres, India-1/1/67-4/30/67, Box 23)	1/23/67	A
#4b carbon	copy of document #4c open 4-16-92 NLS 91-255		
#4c letter	Chester Bowles to the President " Secret 1 p.	1/27/67	A
#4d letter	Chester Bowles to Dean Rusk Secret 4 pp. open 1-6-92 NLS 91-255	1/27/67	A
#6a draft	Letter from the President to Ho Chi Minh Top Secret 3 pp. open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256	1/30/67	A
#7 memo	Rostow to the President re Germany " Confidential 1 p. dup. of #125, NSF, CF, Germany, Vol 12	1/31/67	A
#7a cable	Bonn 8769 open 1-6-92 NLS 91-255 Confidential 3 pp.	1/30/67	A
#8	copy of document #2 open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256		
#9 memo	Rostow to the President re Foreign Affairs Secret 2 pp. open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256	1/31/67	A
#10 memo	Rostow to the President re Germany " Confidential 1 p. dup. of #122, NSF, CF, Germany, Vol 12	1/31/67	A
#10a cable	Bonn 8889 exempt NLS 91-255 OPEN 10-21-98 Confidential 1 p. Dup of #122, NSF, CF, Germany, Vol 12	1/31/67	A
#19a note	Handwritten note from Cabot Lodge to Pres. Top Secret 1 p. open 4-16-92 NLS 91-255	1/21/67	A
#25 memo	Rostow to the President re Peru " Secret 1 p.	1/30/67	A
#31 memo	Rostow to the President re Foreign Affairs Secret 2 pp. open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256	1/28/67	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow
Volume 19, January 15-31, 1967

RESTRICTION CODES

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#37a memo	Sol M. Linowitz to the President Confidential 3 pp. <i>open 1-6-92 NLJ 91-255</i>	1/26/67	A
#40 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam Top Secret 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>	1/27/67	A
#47 memo	Rostow to the President re Foreign Affairs Secret 2 pp.	1/26/67	A
#57a cable	Saigon 16456 <i>open 1-6-92 NLJ 91-255</i> Secret 9 pp.	1/25/67	A
#58 memo	Rostow to the President re Mexico Secret 2 pp. <i>sanitized 2-5-93 NLJ 91-254</i> <i>same sanitization, NLJ 99-19 6/27/00</i> <i>same sanitization, NLJ 99-19 6/27/00</i>	1/25/67	A
#60 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam Secret 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>	1/25/67	A
#60a memo	National Security Action Memorandum " Secret 1 p.	undated	A
#60b memo	McNamara to the President Secret 1 p. <i>open 9-12-91 NLJ 91-251</i>	1/13/78	A
#61 memo	Rostow to the President re China Possible classified information 1 p. <i>sanitized 2-5-93 NLJ 91-254</i> <i>same sanitization, NLJ 99-19 6/27/00</i>	1/25/67	A
#62 memo	Rostow to the President re Iraq Confidential 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i> <i>[dup. on Navy Backup - 1/25/07]</i>	1/24/67	A
#63 letter	The President to the President of Chile " Possible classified information 1 p.	1/24/67	A
#64 memo	Rostow to the President re Turkey Secret 1 p. <i>sanitized 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i> <i>same sanitization, NLJ 99-19 6/27/00</i>	1/24/67	A
#64a memo	Rostow to the President re Turkey Secret 3 pp. <i>sanitized 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i> <i>same sanitization, NLJ 99-19 6/27/00</i>	1/21/67	A
#64c memo	Charles Schultze to the President Confidential 2 pp. <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>	1/20/67	A
#64d list	Fiscal Year Obligations " Confidential 1 p.	undated	A
#64f memo	William Gaud to the President Confidential 5 pp. <i>open 9-27-91 NLJ 91-252</i>	1/16/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#64h memo	Joseph Barr to the President open 4/10/02 NLJ 99-17 Confidential 2 pp.	1/21/67	A
#67 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam Top Secret 2 pp. <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>	1/24/67	A
#70 memo	Rostow to the President re Chile " Confidential 1 p.	1/24/67	A
#70a	copy of document #63 <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>		
#70b letter	the President of Chile to the President " Possible classified information 2 pp.	1/20/67	A
#71 memo	Rostow to the President re Foreign Affairs " Top Secret 2 pp.	1/24/67	A
#72 memo	Rostow to the President re lunch meeting " Confidential 1 p.	1/24/67	A
#74	copy of document #70 <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>		
#75	copy of document #64		
#76a memo	Rostow to the President re Chile Confidential 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>	1/23/67	A
#79 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam " Confidential 1 p.	1/23/67	A
#79a report	Report on Visit to Hanoi... <i>open 1-6-92</i> Confidential 9 pp. <i>NLJ 91-255</i>	1/18/67	A
#80 memo	Rostow to the President re Singapore Secret 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>	1/23/67	A
#80a draft	Suggested message to Prime Minister Singapore Confidential 1 p.	undated	A
#82 memo	Rostow to the President re India/Pakistan Secret 2 pp. <i>exempt NLJ 91-256 open 2-1-00 NLJ 99-15</i>	1/23/67	A
#84 memo	Rostow to the President re Peru Confidential 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>	1/23/67	A
#84a memo	Charles Schultze to the President " Confidential 1 p.	1/16/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#84b memo	Orville Freeman to the President Confidential 4 pp. <i>Open 9-27-91 NLJ 91-252</i>	12/27/66	A
#84c memo	Charles Schultze to the President Confidential 2 pp. <i>Open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>	1/16/67	A
#88 memo	Rostow to the President re S. Rhodesia Confidential 1 p. <i>sanitized 2-5-93 NLJ 91-254</i>	1/23/67	A <i>OPEN 10-21-98</i>
#89 memo	Rostow to the President re Food Aid Secret 1 p. <i>Open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>	1/23/67	A
#90 memo	Rostow to the President re Nicaragua Confidential 1 p. <i>sanitized 2-5-93 NLJ 91-254</i> <i>same sanitization, NLJ 99-19 6/21/00</i>	1/23/67	A
#91 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam Top Secret 2 pp. <i>Open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>	1/23/67	A
#92 memo	Rostow to the President re Dominican Republic Confidential 2 pp.	1/22/67	A
#94 memo	Rostow to the President re Iraq Confidential 2 pp. <i>Open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i> <i>(deep in diary Backup - 1/25/07)</i>	1/21/67	A
#94a memo	Dean Rusk to the President re Iraq Confidential 2 pp. <i>Open 4-16-92 NLJ 91-255</i>	1/20/67	A
#96 memo	Rostow to the President re New Zealand Confidential 1 p. <i>Open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>	1/21/67	A
#96a letter	the President to Prime Minister New Zealand Possible classified information <i>Open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>	1/22/67	A
#98 memo	Rostow to the President re Soviet Union Top Secret 2 pp. <i>Open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>	1/21/67	A
#99	copy of document #94 <i>Open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>		
#99a	copy of document #94a <i>OPEN 10-13-98</i>		
#100 memo	Rostow to the President re Soviet Union Top Secret 1 p. <i>sanitized 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i> <i>Downgraded per NLJ 91-256</i>	1/21/67	A <i>Open 2-1-00 NLJ 99-15</i>
#103 memo	Rostow to the President re Japan Secret 1 p. <i>Open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>	1/20/67	A
#103a draft	Suggested message to Prime Minister of Japan Secret 1 p. <i>Open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-256</i>	undated	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#105 message	President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson Secret 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256</i>	1/20/67	A
#106 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam " Secret 1 p.	1/20/67	A
#108a memo	Dean Rusk to the President re Brandt Confidential 1 p. <i>open 1-6-92 NLS 91-255</i>	1/19/67	A
#109 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam Top Secret 1 p. <i>sanitized 12-23-93 NLS 91-256</i> <i>Downgraded per NLS 91-256</i>	1/20/67	A <i>open</i>
#113 memo	Rostow to the President re China (duplicate of #107, NSF, Country File, China, "Vol. 8," Box 240 sanitized) Top Secret 1 p. <i>open 1-28-97 NLS 95-334</i>	1/20/67	A
#114 memo	Rostow to the President re W. Europe <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256</i> Confidential 1 p. <i>(dup. of #185, NSF Name File, Rostow memos)</i>	1/19/67	A
#117 memo	Rostow to the President re Soviet Union Top Secret 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256</i>	1/19/67	A
#117a memcon	re US-Soviet Discussion of Nuclear Weapons Top Secret 2 pp. <i>Exempt NLS 91-255</i> <i>open 2-1-00 NLS 99-15</i> <i>Downgraded to Secret per NLS 91-255</i>	1/18/67	A
#117b oral statement	Dobrynin statement in Russian <i>Exempt NLS 91-255</i> <i>undated</i> Possible classified information 1 p. <i>open 2-1-00 NLS 99-15</i> Secret per NLS 91-255		A
#118	copy of document #117 <i>open 8-03-94 NLS 91-256</i>		
#118a	copy of document #117a <i>open 2-1-00 NLS 99-15</i>		
#118b	copy of document #117b <i>open 2-1-00 NLS 99-15</i>		
#123 memo	Rostow to the President re Foreign Affairs Secret 4 pp. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256</i>	1/19/67	A
#127 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam Secret 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256</i>	1/18/67	A
#127a cable	Mexico 3955 <i>open 1-6-92 NLS 91-255</i> Secret 3 pp.	1/18/67	A
#127b cable	Mexico 3956 " Secret 3 pp.	1/18/67	A

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#132 memo	Rostow to the President re Foreign Affairs Top Secret 3 pp. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256</i>	1/18/67	A
#133 memo	Rostow to the President re European trip Secret 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256</i> <i>(dup. of #186, NSF Namefile, Rostow memos)</i>	1/18/67	A
#133a memo	Rostow to the President re European trip Secret 1 p.	1/18/67	A
#135 memo	Rostow to the President re Japan Secret 1 p.	1/18/67	A
#135a cable	Tokyo 5037 <i>open 1-6-92</i> Secret 1 p. <i>NLS 91-255</i>	1/18/67	A
#136 memo	Rostow to the President re Chile Confidential 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256</i>	1/18/67	A
#136a cable	Santiago 2441 <i>open 1-6-92</i> Confidential 1 p. <i>NLS 91-255</i>	1/18/67	A
#137 memo	Rostow to the President re FBI Report Secret 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256</i>	1/18/67	A
#137a report	FBI report <i>exempt 7-20-92 NLS 91-250</i> Secret 2 pp. <i>[Dupl #22a, NSF Agency File, UN Vol 6]</i>	1/18/67	A
#138a letter	Rostow to Henry Cabot Lodge Confidential 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256</i>	1/18/67	A
#140 memo	Rostow to the President re Colombia Possible classified information 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256</i>	1/17/67	A
#140a letter	President to the President of Colombia Possible classified information 2 pp.	1/17/67	A
#142 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam Top Secret 2 pp.	1/17/67	A
#143a memo	Lincoln Gordon to the Secretary of State Confidential 2 pp. <i>open 1-6-92 NLS 91-255</i>	1/12/67	A
#148 memo	Rostow to the President re Foreign Affairs Secret 2 pp. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256</i>	1/17/67	A
#150 memo	Rostow to the President re Germany Confidential 1 p. <i>dup. of #129, NSF, CF Germany, Vol 12</i>	1/16/67	A

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#150a cable	Bonn 8224 exempt NLS 91-255 OPEN 6.10.99 Confidential 3 pp. dup. of #128a, NSF, CF, Germany, Vol 12	1/16/67	A
#151 memo	Francis M. Bator for the President Secret 2 pp. open 2-11-93 NLS 92-50	1/16/67	A
#151a memo	Dean Rusk to the President re Food Aid Confidential 2 pp. open 1-6-92 NLS 91-255	1/14/67	A
#151b memo	Henry H. Fowler to the President open 4/9/02 NLS 99-17 Secret 1 p. Dup. of #130d, NSF, CF, Germany, Vol 12	1/12/67	A
#152 memo	Rostow to the President re Latin America trip Secret 1 p. sanitized 2-5-93 NLS 91-259 same sent 12/01-NLS 019-012-3 Same Sanitized 6/27/00 NLS 99-19	1/16/67	A
#152a report	Preliminary Security Summary Secret 2 pp. sanitized 10-20-92 NLS 91-253 same sent 12/01-NLS 019-012-3 Sanitized 7/5/00 NLS 99-98	undated	A
#152b memo	re President's Trip to Latin America Secret 4 pp. sanitized 10-20-92 NLS 91-253 same sent 12/01-NLS 019-012-3 Sanitized 7/5/00 NLS 99-98	1/16/67	A
#159 memo	Rostow to the President re Foreign Affairs Secret 2 pp. open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256	1/16/67	A
#161 memo	Rostow to the President re Great Britain Secret 2 pp. exempt NLS 91-256 Open NLS 98-241 4-22-99	1/16/67	A
#161a cable	Deptel 118905 to London Open 11-17-99 NLS 99-16 Secret 7 pp. sanitized 1-6-92 NLS 91-255	1/15/67	A
#162 memo	Rostow to the President re Middle East Secret 1 p. open 12-23-93 NLS 91-256	1/16/67	A
#162b memo	Hal Saunders to Walt Rostow // Secret 1 p.	1/16/67	A
#163 memo	Rostow to the President re New Zealand Confidential 1 p. exempt NLS 91-256 open 2-1-00 NLS 99-15	1/16/67	A
039a letter	Seaborg to LB) sanitized 8.10.04 NLS 99-77	1/30/07	

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~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, January 31, 1967
7:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Helms' response to the question you put to him.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Memo 31 Jan 1967, "Soviet Consular Treaty"

WWRostow:rlh

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-254
By ju, NARA, Date 1-28-93

2

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-256

By 118, NARA, Date 12-2-93

~~SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

Tuesday, January 31, 1967 -- 10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

I had a long talk with Joe Sisco who gave me, I am sure, as honest a picture as he could of Amb. Goldberg's mind and feelings.

1. Amb. Goldberg stepped down from the Supreme Court and remains conscious of the height he had achieved in our society.

2. Like his predecessors, he did not, at the beginning, understand the extent to which the job in New York is and must be limited in its authority and, ultimately, subordinated to the Secretary of State. He has come to understand the inherent limitations of the post.

3. On the other hand, he is intensely loyal to you personally and to the Administration. He does not wish to take any action which would hurt us between now and 1968. Sisco tells me that he put the question directly to Sisco who told him flatly: You cannot leave the Administration before 1968.

4. Goldberg has been searching for a way to leave his post with appropriate dignity: he inquires as to the successor to Mr. Justice Clark. He asks whether Phil Jessup's post on the International Court of Justice at The Hague may soon be vacant.

5. Sisco's view is the key to keeping him at his post for a while is his trip to Saigon. He has been pressing to make a speech to the Constituent Assembly. He does not want a trip in which he "simply reviews the troops." Bill Bundy and others find some difficulty in having an American Ambassador talk directly to the Constituent Assembly; but they are working on other ways to give him something dramatic to do on the civil side, if he goes to Saigon; for example, speak at the American University with members of the Constituent Assembly present. I suggested some other ways to associate him with constructive civil enterprises in a dramatic way when he is in Viet Nam. The issue will be coming soon to Secretary Rusk.

6. Sisco said that he believes his greatest possible service to you and the Administration will be to give us a warning if Arthur's mood gets desperate and he comes close to a decision. I told him to stay close to Arthur; let us know how it goes; and suggest as many ways as he can of letting him feel he is in on the substance of policy.

I will try to have him over for an early lunch here when he is in town.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, January 31, 1967
5:45 p. m.

SP 3

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Mrs. Gandhi thanks you warmly for your efforts on behalf of India, and for dispatching Gene on his mission.

Also a letter from Chet Bowles on the potential economic breakthrough in India, if we can get enough foreign exchange to continue liberalization.

W. W. R.



भारतीय राजदूतावास
वाशिंगटन, डी० सी०
EMBASSY OF INDIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 31, 1967.

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honour to transmit to you
the enclosed cover containing Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi's letter dated 23rd January
addressed to you.

With my highest regard and esteem,

Yours sincerely,

(B.K. Nehru)
Ambassador of India

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson,
The President of the United States,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.



4a
प्रधान मंत्री भवन
PRIME MINISTER'S HOUSE
NEW DELHI
Poona,
January 23, 1967.

Dear Mr. Johnson,

Thank you for the message, sent through your Ambassador, regarding the visit of Mr. Eugene Rostow. Unfortunately on the 19th when Mr. Rostow came, I was out of town. These days I am touring incessantly. The entire country has to be covered before the middle of February and my schedule is too tight to allow any change.

Our Minister for Food and Agriculture and my other colleagues and officials tell me that the discussions with Mr. Rostow were frank, friendly and purposeful.

I am touched by your concern for our food problem and your efforts to mobilise assistance for us not only in your own great country but also in other capitals.

The threat of world population outstripping world food supply is a problem of international magnitude. It certainly calls for resolute action on the part of countries which are themselves affected. But it also needs the support of better placed nations. When man has begun to explore outer space and to shoot at the moon, our sympathies cannot be limited by national boundaries.

My Government is committed to a policy of increasing our food production and to checking the growth of population. It is a tremendous effort but we are confident of achieving it. I am at present on a two-day tour of Maharashtra. This State has made remarkable progress in industry, education, etc. but only 6% of land is irrigated. Earlier this year parts of the State were very seriously affected by drought. I believe I mentioned in one of my letters to you in what spirit the Government and peasants faced that

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-256
By sig, NARA, Date 12-2-93

p.t.o.



प्रधान मंत्री भवन
PRIME MINISTER'S HOUSE
NEW DELHI

- 2 -

grim situation. The Chief Minister now tells me that within a year this State will be entirely self-sufficient in foodgrains.

In the country as a whole we are working towards a target of self-sufficiency in foodgrains by the end of 1971. Until then we must seek help from countries which have the capacity and the will to assist us. For many years, the generosity of the United States has enabled us to fill the gap in our requirements without straining our balance of payments, or diverting resources from our economic development. We recognise that it may not be possible for you to continue to bear such a large proportion of the aid burden in the years to come. We are continuing and strengthening our efforts, which I know you have welcomed and supported, to meet an increasing part of our requirements from other sources.

I confess that we have been somewhat reluctant to approach too many countries, because our experience last year showed that the response from many of them was very poor and some of them frankly took the line of being unable to provide any food aid, except by cutting down developmental aid. I am glad that Mr. Rostow has fully agreed with us that our food aid should be over and above and not at the cost of developmental aid. I hope his visit to European capitals will be fruitful.

May I once again express our deep appreciation of all that your country and you personally have been doing to help India to become economically self-reliant and self-sufficient in the matter of food.

With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Indira Gandhi
(Indira Gandhi)

His Excellency
Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of United States of America,
Washington.

~~SECRET~~

46

New Delhi, India

PERSONAL

January 27, 1967

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a letter to the Secretary of State about what I believe to be an opportunity for a major economic breakthrough in India that could provide an important boost to your efforts and to American interests in this part of the world.

I do hope you will have an opportunity to read it.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:

As Stated

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-255
By ms NARA. Date 4-9-92

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EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
New Delhi, India

PERSONAL

January 27, 1967

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a letter to the Secretary of State about what I believe to be an opportunity for a major economic breakthrough in India that could provide an important boost to your efforts and to American interests in this part of the world.

I do hope you will have an opportunity to read it.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:

As Stated

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-255
By sig, NARA. Date 4-7-92

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EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
New Delhi, India

January 27, 1967

C
O
P
Y

The Honorable
Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dean:

Gene Rostow's brief visit to New Delhi was highly successful. Gene projected just the right mixture of sensitivity, firmness and confidence and the Indians responded favorably.

In general we believe that the Indian foodgrain outlook for the next few years is much more promising than is generally assumed. A revolution has been quietly developing in Indian agriculture during the last two years, although as Gene noted it has thus far been masked by two major droughts. With a few good monsoons Subramaniam's goal of Indian self-sufficiency in foodgrains by 1972 may not be as visionary as some people think.

The program he launched last spring calls for sowing 32 million acres by 1971 with Indian adaptations of high yielding rice and wheat seeds from Taiwan and Mexico. With an increasing flow of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and the more effective use of water, this effort already covers more than 5 million acres. During my recent visit to South India I saw many paddy fields which are now producing two or three times more rice than in any previous year.

Since agriculture accounts for nearly 50% of India's GNP, a breakthrough on this order would have a dramatic effect on the Indian economy. As production increases purchasing power in the rural areas will rise and markets for sewing machines, shoes, cloth, tile roofing and other consumer goods will expand. We have already seen the dynamic effects of this process in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea; now it is beginning in India.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-255
By lip, NARA, Date 1-3-92

Yet even those Americans who are most concerned about India are still inclined to present the Indian question in negative terms, i.e., the collapse of Indian democracy would deal a shattering blow to the political stability of Asia and the Middle East, the vast investment we are making in South Viet-Nam would become largely meaningless, etc.

Although this is all true enough it is time that we begin to see our stake in India from a more affirmative perspective, i.e., if the Indian experiment succeeds, the positive impact throughout Asia, the Middle East and even Africa will be profound. A democratic India moving toward economic self-sufficiency would effectively challenge China as a primary political force in Asia. Its success would give other developing nations confidence in the process of democratic growth. This inevitably would lead India toward a closer relationship to Japan and toward a much more vigorous and realistic political posture in Asia as a whole.

I now believe there is a better than even chance that with well-conceived and timely assistance from us the Indian experiment will succeed in the coming decade.

This leads me to a point which I feel is of fundamental importance. Unlike South Viet-Nam and most other developing countries India already has the administrative machinery and the political organization which are essential to rapid economic growth. This plus its basic western orientation, its antipathy towards China, its vast population and its strategic location means that India is one of the few countries which has the potential to emerge as a decisive US foreign policy success in the years immediately ahead.

Last Spring following Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the United States, the Indian Government made a series of courageous decisions in regard to devaluation and import liberalization. To this promising base we can now add the very real prospect of the agricultural breakthrough which I mentioned.

While it is impossible to assess with any precision the kind of Indian Government we will be dealing with after the elections, there is every indication that there will be greater emphasis on maintaining good relations with the US. For instance, I believe that the new

government will be more inclined to ease or at least to soft-pedal its differences with the US on how best to assure a stable and free Viet-Nam. It will also be prepared (provided it has adequate foreign exchange support) to move even more vigorously toward further economic liberalization and encouragement for the private sector.

Unhappily, there is a massive obstacle to the realization of this objective: namely, the Indian foreign exchange gap which is likely to grow to crisis proportions by early summer.

According to our analysis, the Indian economy, with a continuation of foreign assistance at the level recently provided by the Consortium, the Soviet Union and other nations, can be expected to grow at an average rate of no more than 4-1/2% annually. In order to generate the capital savings needed to achieve self-sustaining growth within say a ten year period, India's growth rate must be raised to at least 6-1/2%.

Assuming that India continues to pursue its present agricultural and economic policies, we are convinced that this growth rate could be achieved if India were assured of \$1.2 billion annually from the Consortium for the next few years. This would require something like \$550 million annually from the US. (Note: India must pay \$2.5 billion in debt-servicing and repayment obligations to the Consortium nations during the five year period that began last April.)

The primary US contribution to the foreign exchange support required to support India's push toward self-sufficiency comes, of course, from the AID program. However I understand that the 1968 AID budget request for India is only about \$400 million and that even this is uncertain.

This underscores the need to educate Congress on the very real possibility of an economic breakthrough in India and the major stake we have in turning this possibility into a reality. Despite the still awesome poverty, the unrest generated by rapid social change, and the irritating attitudes of some Indian Government officials, India's potential success story has been evident to every Congressman and Senator who has visited us here in the last year.

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I believe that a well conceived presentation might persuade a majority in Congress to support a larger AID budget now in order to assist India to reach the stage of self-sufficiency so that we can get out of the AID-India business within say a ten or twelve year time span.

Aside from the AID budget one potential source of the additional funds which India requires is the Export-Import Bank. For several years the Bank provided roughly \$50 million a year to India. However Ex-Im has made no substantial new commitment of funds for the last two years and unless the President and you can persuade Harold Linder to help there is little prospect for additional assistance from this quarter in the future.

An expanded budget for IDA is another possibility.

Turning this vast country into a success, rather than simply keeping it afloat, is a proposition that deserves a high priority.

We cannot afford to lose the economic momentum which was begun in India last spring with the key devaluation and liberalization decisions and which now appears about to receive an additional boost in agriculture. Nor can we afford to lose the opportunity for a dramatic foreign policy success that will be a major credit to the Johnson Administration and an increasing force for the future stability of Asia.

With my warm regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

~~SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Lunch Meeting With the President
Tuesday, January 31, 1967, at 1:45 p.m.

AGENDA

1. Negotiating Situation. Sec. Rusk

Sec. Rusk will have with him a draft cable for your clearance.
2. Release of Data on Civilian Casualties and Aerial Photographs.
Sec. McNamara
3. Trilateral Talks: U.S. Negotiating Position. Secs. Rusk and McNamara
4. Senator Gore's Open Hearings on ABM and Non-Proliferation.
Secs. Rusk and McNamara

In a letter to Sec. Rusk, Senator Gore asked for hearings beginning February 3.
5. Ambassador for Saigon. The President
6. The Barrier. Sec. McNamara and Gen. Taylor
7. Bombing Policy Against the North. Secs. Rusk and McNamara & Gen.
Taylor
8. Personnel. Sec. Rusk

Sec. Rusk would like to see you after the meeting on some personnel matters.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 2-6-91

Tuesday, Jan. 1, 1967
10:30 a.m.

Jan 31, 1967

P file 6

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here's the best way I can think of
to push Hanoi over the edge into negotia-
tions before the end of Tet, and also
leave your record clean as a whistle for
what we may have to do thereafter.

I've sent a copy to Sect. Rusk.

W. W. R.

TOP SECRET attachment

*(handcarried to P at 10:20
by WWR)*

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~DRAFTDECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-256
By ip, NARA, Date 12-2-93

Letter from President Johnson to Ho Chi Minh

January 30, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to you in the hope that the conflict in Viet-Nam can be brought to an end. That conflict has already taken a heavy toll -- in lives lost, in wounds inflicted, in property destroyed, and in simple human misery. If we fail to find a just and peaceful solution, that toll will certainly rise.

Therefore, I believe that we both have a heavy moral obligation to seek earnestly the path to peace. It is in response to that obligation that I am writing directly to you.

We have tried over the past several years, in a variety of ways and through a number of channels, to convey to you and your colleagues our desire to achieve a peaceful settlement. For whatever reasons, these efforts have not achieved any results.

It may be that our thoughts and yours, our attitudes and yours, have been distorted or misinterpreted as they passed through these various channels. Certainly that is always a danger in indirect communication.

There is one good way to overcome this problem and to move forward in the search for a peaceful settlement. That is for us to

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-2-

arrange for direct talks between trusted representatives in a secure setting and away from the glare of publicity. Such talks should not be used as a propaganda exercise but should be a deadly serious effort to find a workable and mutually acceptable solution.

[In the interest of creating an atmosphere conducive to the success of such talks, I have today ordered a unilateral halt to the bombing of targets in the territory of North Viet-Nam. We shall make no further statement or explanation.]

I hope that this will make it possible for our representatives to meet promptly and to begin serious work on a realistic formula for settlement.

[You will realize, I am sure, that the unilateral halt of the bombing raises some problems for us. We shall be inundated with questions as to the reason for this action. There will be much speculation that secret talks are underway. There will be some Americans who will criticize us for what they see as one-sided concessions.

I am prepared to live with these questions and with the criticism if, by this action, we shall have opened the road to peace.

But you will understand, too, that we will not be able to remain silent on these matters for a lengthy period. I would hope, therefore, that by the end of the Tet holidays our representatives

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~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~

-3-

would have made sufficient progress to permit some kind of announcement explaining the reason for our stopping of bombing.

Nor would it be acceptable to me if the cessation of the bombing were to be used to continue or even increase the flow of men and materiel in support of the Liberation Front. Therefore, I would ask that the restraint demonstrated on our part by ending the bombing would meet with a prompt equivalent gesture of restraint by your authorities.

As to the site of the kind of bilateral discussions I propose, there are several possibilities. We could, for example, have our representatives meet in Moscow where some preliminary contact has already occurred. We could meet in a neutral country such as Burma. I would be prepared to send a representative and a small staff directly to Hanoi. We could arrange to pick up your representative in Hanoi and deliver him to an aircraft carrier in the Gulf of Tonkin. You may have other arrangements or sites in mind, and I shall welcome your thoughts.

The important thing is to act quickly and effectively to end a conflict that has brought burdens to both our peoples, and above all to the people of South Viet-Nam.

Sincerely,

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, January 31, 1967
9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

You should get the flavor of the rising emotional reaction against us in Germany as a non-proliferation agreement begins to look like a reality rather than an abstraction.

We have other reports on this vein.

I have been talking to Francis Bator and the people at State to get plans organized to soften this as much as possible.

The real problem is that it is a raw emotional reaction to being locked in by us in a deal with Moscow, which makes them acknowledge a position of permanent inequality as against Britain and France.

The only real answer is to turn down the big arms race with Moscow and find other ways to give the Germans dignity and stature.

W. W. Rostow

Bonn 8769

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-256
By ijg, NARA, Date 12-2-93

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, January 30, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM BONN (8769)

SUBJECT: Non-proliferation Treaty

The Non-proliferation Treaty is encountering a great deal of criticism and outright hostility in Germany which, as in the case of the partial test ban treaty, is targeted as much on the United States -- as sponsor of the treaty -- as on the treaty itself. Since the draft text remains secret much of the public comment is being made by politicians and editorialists who have not seen the treaty. The result has been a pronounced trend toward emotional suppositions and inferences which boil down to a conclusion that Germany and the other non-nuclears are being locked in a permanently disadvantageous position by the two nuclear giants.

Despite this widespread negative attitude, opinion at a high level within the government and the parties is by no means uniform or entirely hostile. Foreign Minister Brandt seems to be reasonably well disposed toward the treaty as do most of his SPD colleagues with the exception of the Party's Acting Parliamentary Floor Leader Helmut Schmidt. We have seen the substance of a background press briefing given personally by Brandt to German journalists yesterday which, while defining certain requirements, was not negative in tone.

Brandt first stressed that the U. S. had kept the West German Government adequately informed. (Faced with a sharply incredulous reaction from his audience, Brandt retreated somewhat on this point.) He said that the question of an option for a European nuclear force was not important since "if there should be a United Europe some day," it would not be bound by commitments made prior to its existence.

Brandt stated that from the German point of view, it was important that certain assurances be given in connection with the treaty including:

A. A commitment by the nuclear powers on "vertical disarmament" -- possibly a preamble to the treaty.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-255
By *ijp*, NARA, Date 1-3-92

B. A guarantee that the non-nuclears would have access to technological spin-off from military nuclear development.

C. Clarification that the treaty would not prevent non-nuclears from pursuing programs for the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Brandt said that the West German Government was undertaking consultations with other non-nuclear states concerning the treaty. According to today's press, exchanges of view have begun with Japan, Israel, Sweden, Italy and Canada. Locally, the Japanese Embassy has told us that the German Ambassador in Tokyo has talked with the Japanese Foreign Office several times on the subject but without making any specific proposals.

There are numerous press articles today which are obviously based on Brandt's briefing. Most also make reference to Ambassador Grewe's speech on the same subject which serves to highlight the difference in attitude within official circles. We have heard repeatedly, for example, that Disarmament Commissioner Schnippenkoetter, in talking to non-Americans, goes so far as to refer to the treaty as an American "betrayal" of the West German Government. He and some others are obsessed with concern over the vagueness of the treaty language which, in their view, will be interpreted by the Soviets in such a way as to impair nuclear defense within the Alliance. This view is also strongly held by the traditionally conservative elements in the CDU/CSU. The CSU Chairman of the Bundestag Defense Committee Zimmermann, in talking to Embassy Officers this week, catalogues a whole series of objections to the treaty which he will express publicly this weekend in Munich. We have noticed that along-side the conviction -- expressed by Schnippenkoetter, Zimmermann, et al -- that the Soviets will interpret the treaty differently is an evident doubt as to how the U. S. itself will interpret the language of the treaty in the future.

The Government shows no signs of changing the decision taken on January 11 to approve the Non-proliferation Treaty in principle. Chancellor Kiesinger seems determined to avoid giving the impression that the West German Government is standing in the way of the non-proliferation concept. Brandt, we believe, can be expected to continue to set a reasonable tone in discussing the issue which may calm the press somewhat. Nevertheless, we expect sharp opposition within the Cabinet, the CDU/CSU and among CDU/CSU-oriented papers to continue. The

theme will be the old one -- American/Soviet agreement at the expense of the West German Government. It will be within the context, however, of such concerns as a resultant technological gap, the exclusion of a European nuclear force option and a weakening of NATO. Unless there should be unpredictable negative developments during the course of the debate, we believe that the West German Government will sign the treaty in the interest of its moral image and of its progress in achieving better relations with Eastern Europe. There will be a residue of ill feeling toward the U.S., however, particularly among conservative CDU/CSU elements, similar to that following the test ban treaty which is likely to add to our problems in dealing with the West German Government for some time to come.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-256

~~SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~ By ing, NARA, Date 12-2-93

Tuesday, January 31, 1967 -- 10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

I had a long talk with Joe Sisco who gave me, I am sure, as honest a picture as he could of Amb. Goldberg's mind and feelings.

1. Amb. Goldberg stepped down from the Supreme Court and remains conscious of the height he had achieved in our society.

2. Like his predecessors, he did not, at the beginning, understand the extent to which the job in New York is and must be limited in its authority and, ultimately, subordinated to the Secretary of State. He has come to understand the inherent limitations of the post.

3. On the other hand, he is intensely loyal to you personally and to the Administration. He does not wish to take any action which would hurt us between now and 1968. Sisco tells me that he put the question directly to Sisco who told him flatly: You cannot leave the Administration before 1968.

4. Goldberg has been searching for a way to leave his post with appropriate dignity: he inquires as to the successor to Mr. Justice Clark. He asks whether Phil Jessup's post on the International Court of Justice at The Hague may soon be vacant.

5. Sisco's view is the key to keeping him at his post for a while is his trip to Saigon. He has been pressing to make a speech to the Constituent Assembly. He does not want a trip in which he "simply reviews the troops." Bill Bundy and others find some difficulty in having an American Ambassador talk directly to the Constituent Assembly; but they are working on other ways to give him something dramatic to do on the civil side, if he goes to Saigon; for example, speak at the American University with members of the Constituent Assembly present. I suggested some other ways to associate him with constructive civil enterprises in a dramatic way when he is in Viet Nam. The issue will be coming soon to Secretary Rusk.

6. Sisco said that he believes his greatest possible service to you and the Administration will be to give us a warning if Arthur's mood gets desperate and he comes close to a decision. I told him to stay close to Arthur; let us know how it goes; and suggest as many ways as he can of letting him feel he is in on the substance of policy.

I will try to have him over for an early lunch here when he is in town.

W. W. Rostow

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, January 31, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Summary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-256
By isg, NARA, Date 12-2-931. Chi Coms Seek to Provoke Soviets

Embassy Moscow believes that continued demonstrations and acts of hooliganism against the Soviet Embassy in Peking, Chinese student demonstrations against Soviet embassies elsewhere, and anti-Soviet vituperation over radio Peking indicate the Chinese may be seriously attempting to provoke the Soviets into making a diplomatic break. Furthermore, Moscow is responding with tough pronouncements. Our Embassy is inclined to believe, however, that Moscow will refrain from initiating complete diplomatic break if it can be avoided. Moscow must contend with the effect of a diplomatic rupture on deliveries through China to Hanoi, as well as on current Soviet maneuvers against Peking in the international Communist movement.

2. Opposition to Mao Continues

Our Consulate General in Hong Kong interprets developments in China over the weekend as continuing evidence of weakness in the Maoist camp. Peking posters continue to report armed clashes in the Northwest province of Sinkiang (which contains the nuclear test site and other important nuclear installations). So far over a hundred people have been killed. Violent opposition in the Western province of Szechuan has also been reported. That province contains several large new industrial complexes.

3. Bonn's Moves in Eastern Europe Trouble Communists

Bonn's opening-to-the-East, highlighted by the Romanian-German decision to establish relations, is giving the Communist Governments their troubles. Bonn's initiative was undoubtedly discussed during the Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny trip to Warsaw -- and last Thursday the East Germans, obviously alarmed, warned the other Eastern European countries against establishing diplomatic relations with Bonn. On Saturday, Moscow issued

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a somewhat milder statement which did not mention relations, but which warned of the resurgence of neo-Nazis and militarists in German political life. (This statement has been firmly rejected by Chancellor Kiesinger). We have a late report, the Czechs will follow the East-German-Soviet lead.

These warnings will give the Hungarians and Bulgarians pause in their negotiations with Bonn -- but may not deter them. The Soviets may have intentionally waited until after the Romanian move because they knew they could not stop the Romanians in any case.

4. The Kazan Case

The Kazan trial opened yesterday in Prague in closed session, but with Embassy officers present. We are getting "signals" from the Czechs that the case will be settled with conviction, a suspended sentence, and expulsion after a four-day trial.

5. Risk to US in UAR-Saudi Confrontation

Ambassadors Battle and Eilts are both increasingly disturbed over rising tensions between the UAR and Saudi Arabia. Battle worries that our assurances to Saudi Arabia will draw us into open confrontation with Nasser if hostilities escalate. He concludes that the only way to avoid deeper involvement is to take a new initiative -- like the Bunker mediation of 1962-63 -- to buy time for both sides to cool off. He recommends we offer our good offices or mediation.

W. W. Rostow

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12

Tuesday, January 31, 1967
7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Chancellor Kiesinger
goes out of his way to indicate that
he still wants to keep his powder
dry in relation to the U.S.

W. W. Rostow

Bonn 8889

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-256
By ig, NARA, Date 12-2-93

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January 31, 1967

Bonn 8889

SUBJECT: Chancellor Kiesinger's Concern for U.S. Understanding.

During a dinner party given by the Chancellor yesterday evening, he drew the Deputy Chief of Mission aside to express the hope that there would be no misunderstanding in the United States as to his intentions. He was firmly committed to NATO and to the necessity for a continuing U.S. troop presence in Europe as essential to German security. He also wanted us to know that the developing German eastern policy would be conducted with due regard for U.S. interests, and that we should not be alarmed if, in view of current French influence in Eastern Europe, the FRG relied primarily on the French to vouch for it.

Kiesinger went on to say that he did not have the impression from his recent visit to Paris that de Gaulle hated the United States or was taking revenge for imagined or real slights suffered in the past. He was, however, genuinely resentful of U.S. cultural and economic influence in France and of what he considered the contaminating effect of the overwhelming American presence in Europe. Kiesinger noted he had emphasized that the FRG wants a strong United States in Europe to which de Gaulle had responded with a shrug.

Comment: Osterheld, who remains on in the Chancellory as head of the External Political Affairs Section, later stressed to the Deputy Chief of Mission that the Chancellor is very sensitive to the possibility that his actions will be misunderstood in the United States. He wants us to know that the basic German policy of friendship towards us and reliance upon us for the security of Europe remains unchanged.

We have heard from other sources of Kiesinger's concern in this regard. We have no reason to doubt his sincerity, though some of the advice he is getting from within his Party may not be so friendly.

McGhee

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By CB, NARA, Date 10-21-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

11

Tuesday, January 31, 1967
6:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the draft statement on
the Consular Convention which you
requested from State.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Suggested Statement by the President on the Consular Convention

I very much hope the Senate will give its advice and consent to the proposed Consular Convention with the U. S. S. R. I have no doubt that ratification of this treaty is in our national interest.

Let me make two points about it:

First, we need this treaty to protect the 18 thousand American citizens who each year travel to the Soviet Union. The Convention requires immediate notification to us whenever an American citizen is arrested in the U. S. S. R., and it insures our right to visit that citizen within four days and as often thereafter as is desirable.

We need these rights to help to protect our own citizens. These are rights which Soviet citizens who travel in this country already have guaranteed by our Constitution.

Second, the Convention does not provide for the opening of consulates in this country or in the Soviet Union. It does provide that should any such consulates be opened, the officials would have diplomatic immunity.

The Secretary of State tells me that no negotiations for consulates are under way, and that the most that he can envision in the foreseeable future is the opening of one consulate in each country to be manned by 10 to 15 people.

There are presently 452 Soviet officials in the United States with diplomatic immunity. If an additional consulate were opened, another ten would be added. Mr. Hoover has assured me that this small increment

would raise no problems which the FBI cannot effectively and efficiently deal with.

In short, we need this Convention to protect American citizens abroad and it raises no problems with respect to our own national security.

12
Mr. Reston

January 31, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is
a warm birthday message to Ludwig
Erhard, who will be 70 on February 5.

I suggest we not release the
message here, but tell Erhard we
have no objection if he wants to do
so in Bonn.

Francis M. Bator

Approve ✓

1/1/67

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

SUGGESTED BIRTHDAY MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR ERHARD

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending you our warmest birthday greetings. You have our best wishes, my good friend, for a happy life of continued distinguished service to your country and to free people everywhere.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

January 30, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: India Food Message

Here is the version of the India food message which is on Secretary Rusk's desk. We are sending this to you immediately although it is very untidy and changes resulting from your instructions at lunchtime have not yet been made. The State Department informs me a freshly typed version will be available in two hours.

Secretary Rusk has not yet approved this version.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 2-4-91

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, Jan. 30, 1967
4:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Bill Jorden's first draft
questions and answers for tonight.

W W. R.

VIET-NAM: SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

QUESTION: What is going on in Viet-Nam -- an uprising against oppression? A revolution? A civil war?

None of these things. It is a case of direct aggression by the North against the South, with aid and encouragement from Communist countries, particularly Red China. After 1954, there was steady progress in the South -- more food, better health, churches, schools, etc.

North Viet-Nam could not tolerate the success story of freedom emerging next door. They decided to take over the South, by the way. Red China has boasted of backing the Viet-Nam war and said it would back others like it. There are North Vietnamese military units operating in the South -- as many as 48,000 troops.

In a different sense, there is a revolution in the South -- *the South Vietnamese* one led by ~~us~~, not the Communists. It is a revolution against oppressive Communist dictatorship, *a revolution for political freedom, security and a better life.*

QUESTION: Is there still a civil ~~war~~ war in the South -- Buddhists against Government? One internal group against another?

South Viet-Nam is young, is seeking political stability. Contesting groups are sincere, essentially anti-communist and anxious for a stable government. The unrest of the past has not helped the war

effort. But it is evidence of political competition. Present government has done well. We believe it will continue ^{to do so} until a civilian regime can take over.

QUESTION: What is the war really like?

We face about 100,000 men in organized military units, another 100-120,000 guerrillas. Some of the hard core units are North Vietnamese. In others, key leaders, officers, technicians, and political organizers come mainly from the North. Infiltration into the South continues. Perhaps 75,000 soldiers and political agents have moved South in the last five years. They are the reason we are bombing North Viet-Nam.

The guerrillas are mainly from the South. Most are young. Some join for adventure or out of curiosity. Many serve against their will -- impressed or kidnapped by the Viet Cong. In the last three years, ^{South Vietnamese} 18,000 were kidnapped. The VC are able to whipsaw these young men and their families -- threatening harm to the families if the boys do not perform; threatening the young men if their families do not cooperate with the Viet Cong.

The Communists use terror to impose their will. Farmers, village officials and others are victimized. In one year, more than 1,700 local officials were killed, wounded or kidnapped by the VC. That is about the same as having the Mayor of every American town of more than 10,000 subjected to some sort of violence.

Organized VC military units operate from jungle and mountain bases.

These wretched conditions have prevailed for almost 20 years. Of course, the people do not like it. But while the people hate the communists, they fear them more. This fear is the heart of the war.

QUESTION: Why are we Americans there?

The answer, in a word, is freedom -- freedom for others, freedom for ourselves. In 1954 we promised to help South Viet-Nam. In 1961 they asked for our help and we responded.

In 1954 few thought South Viet-Nam would last six months. But they are still fighting, and getting stronger all the time.

Countries around the world respect our loyalty to the Vietnamese. A number of favorable developments -- in Indonesia, Pakistan, the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere, are directly related to the resolution we have shown in Viet-Nam. The aggressors -- including Red China -- see very clearly what U.S. integrity means.

Apart from this, our presence in Viet-Nam has a selfish side. Our own freedom is directly involved. In trying to conquer South Viet-Nam, the Communists have laid down a challenge to all of us. If we back away we will have surrendered part of our stake in Asia -- part of the right of the U.S. to engage in commerce with one of the richest regions of the world; part of our own standard of living. We will have abandoned a portion of our international economic freedom.

word

More important if we backed off, the ~~world~~ would go out to our friends that we cannot be trusted. It would signal to our ~~enemies~~ enemies that we are neither to be respected nor feared. If we back off, we can look for more Viet-Nams -- and not just in Southeast Asia. We would learn again the hard lesson that nobody ever won anything by backing away.

QUESTION: How about the Vietnamese -- are they willing to fight or will we have to carry the whole battle?

The Vietnamese are willing to fight -- are fighting. This little country has three quarters of a million men under arms. Some have been fighting for 16 years. Two-thirds of those under arms are volunteers.

Last year they lost more than 9,400 men killed fighting for their country. The equivalent, on a per capita basis, would be 100,000 Americans.

The soldiers do not carry the burden alone. In the past two years, more than 21,000 Vietnamese civilians were killed, wounded, or kidnapped by the Communists. Yes, the Vietnamese understand sacrifices.

QUESTION: Do the Vietnamese really want our help? What about anti-American demonstrations?

Demonstrations have been conducted by a vocal minority. Some of them are Communist inspired. In some cases students are looking for an emotional outlet. The great bulk of the Vietnamese people

are not involved in any way. They want peace and they see in us the strength, the power and the resolution needed to bring them that peace. Increasingly, they are providing us with the information we need to find and destroy the enemy. The people who bring us this information are, in fact, voting with their lives.

QUESTION: How do we help them?

First, we must realize the war has three distinct faces.

The first is the one we know best -- the problem of seeking out and attacking the ^{enemy's} ~~enemies~~ regular military formations. We understand this kind of fighting. We are equipped for it and our forces are punishing the enemy severely day and night.

The second face is the guerrilla war. In this war the main battlefield is people more than territory. The Viet Cong want control of the people. They want their labor, their food, their money, their sons.

~~The~~ At first, they make promises -- no more taxes, no more landlords. But soon the farmer faces the Viet Cong reality. He must pay part of his rice crop. He must provide money and his sons must either volunteer or be taken to serve the VC.

QUESTION: How do we combat this aspect of the war?

We do it by using some of the guerrilla's own methods against him -- by resorting to small units, by ambushes, by operating day and night. The VC guerrilla has some advantages -- he knows the country better, he is more likely to be harbored by the people, and he can usually

get information from the farmers.

We too have advantages -- better communications, better supplies, far greater mobility. We can move troops over a jungle at 100 miles per hour; guerrillas' progress on the ground is a few miles a day.

We are making progress in this face of the war. Thousands of guerrillas have been killed. Many Vietnamese families have more freedom and more security than ever before. But despite the progress, we ~~xxxxxx~~ recognize this as a slow and undramatic job.

The third face of the war -- and quite as important as the other two -- is provided for the freedom and the livelihood of the Vietnamese people. The average Vietnamese is poor, his health is not good. He is frightened and he is illiterate. Unless steps are taken to correct these conditions, the people will be fair game for subversion again once our fighting job is done.

That is why we have invested so heavily in this "other war" -- the struggle for better health, better education, better living conditions. For many American civilians working in Viet-Nam this is an around-the-clock job. And even our military units are working to help the people when they are not actually engaged in combat. For example, our Marine Corps doctors have treated more than one million sick Vietnamese in the two years they have been in Viet-Nam.

We are also helping the Vietnamese develop their own village defense militia so they can protect themselves when our organized military

units move on to a new area.

QUESTION: Has there been any progress in this effort?

The progress in the military field is easy to see. It can be counted in the numbers of enemy killed and captured, in the weapons seized and in the growing number of VC who surrender.

Progress in the "other war" is not so easy to see, but it is there. For example, roads are open today which were impossible to travel a year or two ago. Scores of villages now have chiefs who feel safe in sleeping at home at night.

Schools have been opened, bridges built, market places are operating in areas that a year ago would have been considered VC territory.

But the progress is not as rapid as we would like and does not compare with the advances that have been made on the ~~last~~ military side.

QUESTION: Do the VC represent the wishes of the South Vietnamese people?

There is ~~not~~ no substance to the VC claim that they represent the people.

The Vietnamese want peace. What have the VC brought them? Terror -- more than five thousand civilians killed in the past 3 years; extortion -- the rice tribute ^{demanded} ~~defended~~ by the VC is more than 50% in some areas. Kidnapping -- more than 13,000 people seized in 1965. Murder~~ing~~ -- more than 800 Vietnamese civilian officials killed in the past three years.

In the Northern provinces alone, more than one-quarter million

people have left their homes in VC territory and asked the government for protection.

QUESTION: What about bombing in the North. Is it so inaccurate that many civilians are being killed?

The bombing is accurate -- more accurate than in any previous war. We have struck only at military targets. And sometimes attacks are conducted at a great hazard to our own pilots in the interest of avoiding civilian casualties.

But it is inevitable that some civilians are going to get hurt. Many of them work or live in the vicinity of oil tanks, railroads and bridges which are legitimate targets. Some casualties result from the falling fragments of heavy anti-aircraft fire. I recall that on December 7, 1941, several hundred Americans were wounded by fall-out from our own anti-aircraft.

Our purpose in bombing the north is military. If civilians are hurt, it is accidental. Moreover, I would compare the accidental casualties in the North with the thousands of South Vietnamese civilians who have been killed, tortured and wounded, not by accident, but as a result of deliberate VC policy.

QUESTION: Is there any way to end the war quickly?

Victory, in our terms, is a stable South Viet-Nam, free to make its own choice, economically sound, and not dependent on anybody. This condition is going to come slowly. It means both helping South Viet-Nam

^{achieve}
~~fighting~~ internal stability and convincing Hanoi ~~agencies~~ that further interference in South Viet-Nam affairs would be excessively costly.

What we are doing is aimed at both these objectives, but there can be ~~not~~ no dramatically short route to this kind of victory. Victory depends on men's loyalty and convictions. It is the ^{prize}~~price~~ that goes to the resolute and to the patient.

VIET-NAM: SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS*redone
in a different
form* 15

Question: What is going on in Viet-Nam -- an uprising against oppression?
A revolution? A civil war?

Answer: None of these things. It is a case of direct aggression by the North against the South, with aid and encouragement from Communist countries, particularly Red China. After 1954, there was steady progress in the South -- more food, better health, churches, schools, etc.

North Viet-Nam could not tolerate the success story of freedom emerging next door. They decided to take over the South by force. Red China has boasted of backing the Viet-Nam war and said it would back others like it. There are North Vietnamese military units operating in the South -- as many as 48,000 troops.

In a different sense, there is a revolution in the South -- one led by the South Vietnamese, not the Communists. It is a revolution against oppressive Communist dictatorship, a revolution for political freedom, for Constitutional government, for security, and a better life. That is the revolution the people want and the one we are backing.

Question: Is there still a civil war in the South -- Buddhists against Government?
One internal group against another?

Answer: South Viet-Nam is young, is seeking political stability. Contesting groups are sincere, essentially anti-Communist and anxious for a stable government. The unrest of the past has not helped the war effort. But it is evident of political competition. The present government has done well. We believe it will continue to do so until a constitutional regime can take over.

Question: What is the war really like?

We face about 100,000 men in organized military units, another 100-120,000 guerrillas. Some of the hard core units are North Vietnamese. In others, key leaders, officers, technicians, and political organizers come mainly from the North. Infiltration into the South continues. Perhaps 75,000 soldiers and political agents have moved South in the last five years. They are the reason we are bombing North Viet-Nam.

The guerrillas are mainly from the South. Most are young. Some join for adventure or out of curiosity. Many serve against their will -- impressed or kidnapped by the Viet Cong. In the last three years, 18,000 South Vietnamese were kidnapped. The VC are able to whipsaw these young men and their families -- threatening harm to the families if the boys do not perform; threatening the young men if their families do not cooperate with the Viet Cong.

The Communists use terror to impose their will. Farmers, village officials and others are victimized. In one year, more than 1,700 local officials were killed, wounded or kidnapped by the VC. That is about the same as having the Mayor of every American town of more than 10,000 subjected to some sort of violence.

Organized VC military units operate from jungle and mountain bases.

These wretched conditions have prevailed for almost 20 years. Of course, the people do not like it. But while the people hate the Communists, they fear them more. This fear is the heart of the war.

Question: Why are we Americans there?

The answer, in a word, is freedom -- freedom for others, freedom for ourselves. In 1954 we promised to help South Viet-Nam if attacked. In 1961, they were under extreme attack and asked for our help, and we responded.

In 1954 few thought South Viet-Nam would last six months. But they are still fighting, and getting stronger all the time.

Countries around the world respect our loyalty to the Vietnamese. A number of favorable developments -- in Indonesia, Pakistan, the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere, are directly related to the resolution we have shown in Viet-Nam. The aggressors -- including Red China -- see very clearly what U. S. integrity means.

Apart from this, our presence in Viet-Nam has a selfish side. Our own freedom is directly involved. In trying to conquer South Viet-Nam, the Communists have laid down a challenge to all of us. If we back away we will have surrendered for the first time since 1945 the minimum condition for international order; namely, that external aggression must not succeed.

More important if we backed off, the word would go out to our friends that we cannot be trusted. It would signal to our enemies that we are neither to be respected nor feared. If we back off, we can look for more Viet-Nams -- and not just in Southeast Asia. We would learn again the hard lesson that nobody ever won security by backing away from aggression.

Question: How about the Vietnamese -- are they willing to fight or will we have to carry the whole battle?

Answer: The Vietnamese are willing to fight -- are fighting. This little country has three quarters of a million men under arms. Some have been fighting for 16 years. Two-thirds of those under arms are volunteers. The equivalent for the United States would be 9 million men under arms.

Last year they lost more than 9,400 men killed fighting for their country. The equivalent, on a per capita basis, would be 100,000 Americans.

The soldiers do not carry the burden alone. In the past two years, more than 21,000 Vietnamese civilians were killed, wounded, or kidnapped by the Communists. Yes, the Vietnamese understand sacrifices.

Question: Do the Vietnamese really want our help? What about anti-American demonstrations?

Answer: Demonstrations have been conducted by a vocal minority. Some of them are Communist inspired. In some cases students are looking for an emotional outlet. The great bulk of the Vietnamese people are not involved in any way in such demonstrations. They want peace and they see in us the strength, the power and the resolution needed to bring them that peace. Increasingly, they are providing us with the information we need to find and destroy the enemy. The people who bring us this information are, in fact, voting with their lives.

Surely, these people look forward to the day when soldiers from abroad -- even friendly soldiers -- are not fighting in their country. And so do we.

Question: How do we help them?

Answer: First, we must realize the war has three distinct faces.

The first is the one we know best -- the problem of seeking out and attacking the enemy's regular military formations. We understand this kind of fighting. We are equipped for it and our forces are punishing the enemy severely day and night.

The second face is the guerrilla war. In this war the main battlefield is people more than territory. The Viet Cong want control of the people. They want their labor, their food, their money, their sons.

At first, they make promises -- no more taxes, no more landlords. But soon the farmer faces the Viet Cong reality. He must pay part of his rice crop. He must provide money and his sons must either volunteer or be taken to serve the VC.

Question: How do we combat this aspect of the war?

Answer: We do it by using some of the guerrilla's own methods against him -- by resorting to small units, by ambushes, by operating day and night. The guerrilla has certain advantages in that kind of war. But we too have advantages -- better communications, better supplies, far greater mobility. We can move troops over a jungle at 100 miles per hour; guerrillas' progress on the ground is a few miles a day.

Working with the Vietnamese military, police, and civilians, we are making progress in this phase of the war. Thousands of guerrillas

have been killed. Many Vietnamese families have more freedom and more security than ever before. But despite the progress, we recognize this as a slow and undramatic job.

The third face of the war -- and quite as important as the other two -- is providing for the freedom and the livelihood of the Vietnamese people. The average Vietnamese is poor, his health is not good. He is frightened and may lack all the benefits of education. Unless steps are taken to correct these conditions, the people will be fair game for subversion again once our fighting job is done.

That is why we have invested so heavily in this "other war" -- the struggle for better health, better education, better living conditions. For many American civilians working in Viet-Nam this is an around-the-clock job. And even our military units are working to help the people when they are not actually engaged in combat. For example, our Marine Corps doctors have treated more than one million sick Vietnamese in the two years they have been in Viet-Nam.

We are also helping the Vietnamese develop their own village defense militia so they can protect themselves when our organized military units move on to a new area.

Question: Has there been any progress in this effort?

Answer: The progress in the military field is easy to see. It can be counted in the numbers of enemy killed and captured, in the weapons seized and in the growing number of VC who surrender.

Progress in the "other war" is not so easy to see, but it is there. For example, roads are open today which were impossible to travel a year or two ago. Scores of villages now have chiefs who feel safe in sleeping at home at night.

Schools have been opened, bridges built, market places are operating in areas that a year ago would have been considered VC territory.

But the progress is not as rapid as we would like and does not compare with the advances that have been made on the military side.

In 1967 we hope to see this front move forward more swiftly.

Question: Do the VC represent the wishes of the South Vietnamese people?

Answer: There is no substance to the VC claim that they represent the people -- as the elections for the Constituent Assembly last year demonstrated.

The Vietnamese want peace. What have the VC brought them? Terror -- more than five thousand civilians killed in the past 3 years; extortion -- the rice tribute demanded by the VC is more than 50% in some areas; kidnapping -- more than 13,000 people seized in 1965; murder -- more than 800 Vietnamese civilian officials killed in the past three years.

In the Northern provinces alone, more than one-quarter million people have left their homes in VC territory and asked the government for protection.

Question: What about bombing in the North? Is it so inaccurate that many civilians are being killed?

Answer: The bombing is accurate -- more accurate than in any previous war. Only military targets have been authorized. And sometimes attacks are conducted at a great hazard to our own pilots in the interest of avoiding civilian casualties.

But it is inevitable that some civilians are going to get hurt and killed. Many of them work or live in the vicinity of oil tanks, railroads and bridges which are legitimate targets. Some casualties result from the falling fragments of heavy anti-aircraft fire.

Our purpose in bombing the North is military. If civilians are hurt or killed, it is accidental or because they are in military target areas. Moreover, I would compare the accidental casualties in the North with the thousands of South Vietnamese civilians who have been killed, tortured and wounded, not by accident, but as a result of deliberate VC policy. We want people to be as concerned about the South Vietnamese and Americans as they are about our enemies.

Question: Is there any way to end the war quickly?

Answer: Victory, in our terms, is a stable South Viet Nam, free to make its own choice, economically sound, and not dependent on anybody. This condition is going to come slowly. It means both helping South Viet Nam achieve internal stability and convincing Hanoi that further interference in South Viet Nam affairs would be excessively costly. What we are doing

is aimed at both these objectives, but there can be no dramatically short route to this kind of victory. Victory depends on men's loyalty and convictions. It is the prize that goes to the resolute and to the patient.

January 30, 1967

Q + A notes finally
went to P This way 16

I wish to say a few words to you about Viet-Nam.

There is great public debate and confusion; but essentially the facts are simple. What we confront is a case of direct aggression by the North against the South, with aid and encouragement from Communist countries, particularly Red China. After 1954, there was steady progress in the South -- more food, better health, churches, schools, etc.

North Viet-Nam could not tolerate the success story of freedom emerging next door. They decided to take over the South by force. Red China has boasted of backing the Viet-Nam war and said it would back others like it. There are North Vietnamese military units operating in the South -- as many as 48,000 troops.

What is the war really like?

We face about 100,000 men in organized military units, another 100-120,000 guerrillas. Some of the hard core units are North Vietnamese. In others, key leaders, officers, technicians, and political organizers come mainly from the North. Infiltration into the South continues. Perhaps 75,000 soldiers and political agents have moved South in the last five years. They are the reason we are bombing North Viet-Nam.

The guerrillas are mainly from the South. Most are young. Some join for adventure or out of curiosity. Many serve against their will -- impressed or kidnapped by the Viet Cong. In the last three years, 18,000 South Vietnamese were kidnapped. The VC are able to whipsaw these young men and their families -- threatening harm to the families

if the boys do not perform; threatening the young men if their families do not cooperate with the Viet Cong.

The Communists use terror to impose their will. Farmers, village officials and others are victimized. In one year, more than 1,700 local officials were killed, wounded or kidnapped by the VC. That is about the same as having the Mayor of every American town of more than 10,000 subjected to some sort of violence.

Organized VC military units operate from jungle and mountain bases.

These wretched conditions have prevailed for almost 20 years. Of course, the people do not like it. But while the people hate the Communists, they fear them more. This fear is the heart of the war.

Why are we Americans there?

The answer, in a word, is freedom -- freedom for others, freedom for ourselves. In 1954 we promised to help South Viet-Nam if attacked. In 1961, they were under extreme attack and asked for our help, and we responded.

In 1954 few thought South Viet-Nam would last six months. But they are still fighting, and getting stronger all the time.

Countries around the world respect our loyalty to the Vietnamese. A number of favorable developments -- in Indonesia, Pakistan, the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere, are directly related to the resolution we have shown in Viet-Nam. The aggressors -- including Red China -- see very clearly what U. S. integrity means.

Apart from this, our presence in Viet-Nam has a selfish side. Our own freedom is directly involved. In trying to conquer South Viet-Nam, the Communists have laid down a challenge to all of us. If we back away we will have surrendered for the first time since 1945 the minimum condition for international order; namely, that external aggression must not succeed.

More important, if we backed off, the word would go out to our friends that we cannot be trusted. It would signal to our enemies that we are neither to be respected nor feared. If we back off, we can look for more Viet-Nams -- and not just in Southeast Asia. We would learn again the hard lesson that nobody every won security by backing away from aggression.

But it is the Vietnamese who bear the brunt of this conflict.

The Vietnamese are willing to fight -- they are fighting. This little country has three-quarters of a million men under arms. Some have been fighting for 16 years. Two-thirds of those under arms are volunteers. The equivalent for the United States would be 9 million men under arms.

Last year they lost more than 9,400 men killed fighting for their country. The equivalent, on a per capita basis, would be 100,000 Americans.

The soldiers do not carry the burden alone. In the past two years, more than 21,000 Vietnamese civilians were killed, wounded, or kidnapped by the Communists. Yes, the Vietnamese understand sacrifices.

And they need our help. The average Vietnamese is poor, his health is not good. He is frightened and may lack all the benefits of education. Unless steps are taken to correct these conditions, the people will be fair game for subversion again once our fighting job is done.

That is why we have invested so heavily in this "other war" -- the struggle for better health, better education, better living conditions. For many American civilians working in Viet-Nam this is an around-the-clock job. And even our military units are working to help the people when they are not actually engaged in combat. For example, our Marine Corps doctors have treated more than one million sick Vietnamese in the two years they have been in Viet-Nam.

We are also helping the Vietnamese develop their own village defense militia so they can protect themselves when our organized military units move on to a new area.

The progress in the military field is easy to see. It can be counted in the numbers of enemy killed and captured, in the weapons seized and in the growing number of VC who surrender.

Progress in the "other war" is not so easy to see, but it is there. For example, roads are open today which were impossible to travel a year or two ago. Scores of villages now have chiefs who feel safe in sleeping at home at night.

Schools have been opened, bridges built, market places are operating in areas that a year ago would have been considered VC territory.

But the progress is not as rapid as we would like and does not compare with the advances that have been made on the military side.

In 1967 we hope to see this front move forward more swiftly.

What about bombing in the North? Is it so inaccurate that many civilians are being killed?

The bombing is accurate -- more accurate than in any previous war. Only military targets have been authorized. And sometimes attacks are conducted at a great hazard to our own pilots in the interest of avoiding civilian casualties.

But it is inevitable that some civilians are going to get hurt and killed. Many of them work or live in the vicinity of oil tanks, railroads and bridges which are legitimate targets. Some casualties result from the falling fragments of heavy anti-aircraft fire.

Our purpose in bombing the North is military. If civilians are hurt or killed, it is accidental or because they are in military target areas. Moreover, I would compare the accidental casualties in the North with the thousands of South Vietnamese civilians who have been killed, tortured and wounded, not by accident, but as a result of deliberate VC policy. We want people to be as concerned about the South Vietnamese and Americans as they are about our enemies.

We seek victory in South Viet-Nam; but what does victory mean?

Victory, in our terms, is a stable South Viet-Nam, free to make its own choice, economically sound, and not dependent on anybody.

This condition is going to come slowly. It means both helping South Viet-Nam achieve internal stability and convincing Hanoi that further interference in South Viet-Nam affairs would be excessively costly.

What we are doing is aimed at both these objectives, but there can be no dramatically short route to this kind of victory. Victory depends on men's loyalty and convictions. It is the prize that goes to the resolute and to the patient.

Monday, January 30, 1967 -- 6:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

We had a family lunch with Susan Mary and Joe Alsop yesterday -- children, grandmother and all. When we withdrew for coffee, he said this: "I am 56 years old. I have never asked to see a President. But, if the President wanted to see me, I should be very happy to tell him my thoughts and especially why I believe he is on a winning track." In short, Joe Alsop would like to see you.

W. W. Rostow

Will see Joe _____

See me _____

Monday, January 30, 1967 -- 6:40 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

John B. Oakes, New York Times, came in in a most constructive mood for a briefing on Viet Nam, before he goes. I gave him some indications that the war is going reasonably well and told him something about the lively evolving political process. I also told him how glad I was that he was going to see for himself and expressed the hope that he would find a day or so to visit South Korea.

Stu Hensley, UPI, came in. He asked about:

-- Bobby Kennedy on peace talks.

I told him there was nothing solid yet and we had no basis for thinking things would break favorably. *soon*

-- ABM negotiations with the Soviet Union.

I told him there was no reason to be excessively optimistic but we felt it right to make a most serious effort to stabilize the arms race at this stage. I told him to come back whenever the spirit moved him.

^{cwa}
~~Stuart~~ Alsop came in for lunch with me today. We mainly talked about Viet Nam. He says that he thinks his brother Joe is over-optimistic. I said I agreed with him about over-optimism but Joe is right in believing that things are moving well and in the right direction.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

19

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Monday, January 30, 1967
4:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a personal hand-written
note to you from Cabot Lodge.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 1-30-91

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saigon, Jan. 21. 1967 ^{19a}

Dear Mr. President:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-255
By isp NARA. Date 7-9-92

Further to our conversation of
January 11, I would say, after
careful consideration, that the
nominations of either Mac Bundy or
Bob McNamara could not be
faulted. They meet all the criteria.
Excellent too would be Clark Clifford.

Respectfully

Carlin L.

January 30, 1967

Marvin --

The President asked to be reminded as to time of the reception hosted by Sec. Rusk for those attending the State Department Foreign Policy Conference for Business Executives. The reception will be at 6:30 p.m. today, Monday, Jan 30, on 8th floor of Dept of State. The wives of those attending the conference are also invited to the reception.

W. W. Rostow

Piles for file

January 30, 1967

Mr. President:

Condolence messages on the death of the Astronauts are pouring in from all over the world.

The Department of State would like your approval of the attached text to be used to acknowledge these messages without further referral to the White House.

I recommend that you approve this text. If you approve, I will sign the attached memo to the State Department.

_____ Approve

W. W. Rostow

_____ Disapprove

_____ See me

WWR:CEJ:feg

21a

Draft Presidential Reply to Message of
Condolence for the death of
Astronauts Grissom, White and Chaffee

On behalf of the families of Astronauts
Grissom, White and Chaffee and of the American
people, ~~may~~ I express our heartfelt appreciation
for your message of condolence for the tragic loss
at Cape Kennedy.

These men were truly envoys of mankind. In
their memory we rededicate ourselves to the task
of achieving, together with all nations, an
understanding of our common space environment and
its successful exploration for the mutual benefit
of all peoples on earth.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

**SUBJECT: Suggested Presidential Reply to the Messages of
Condolence for the Death of Astronauts Grissom,
White and Chaffee**

**The President has approved the text of the draft Presidential
message you recommended to be used in acknowledging messages
of condolence over the death of the Astronauts.**

**It is noted that all original messages as well as translations
(where appropriate) will be sent immediately to the White House.**

W. W. Rostow

WWR:CEJ:feg

Monday, January 30, 1967
12:00 noon

Mr. President:

Herewith the proposed draft resolution
to be discussed informally today with Poage by
Freeman and Katzenbach, should you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Altered as indicated _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~

22
January 30, 1967

Draft joint resolution to support United States participation in international efforts to relieve victims of hunger in India and to enhance India's capacity to meet the food needs of its people.

WHEREAS the Congress has declared it to be the policy of the United States to combat hunger and malnutrition and to encourage economic development in the developing countries;

WHEREAS two years of drought have caused a grave food shortage in India threatening the lives of millions of people and the health of tens of millions of people;

WHEREAS the United States has already committed 3.6 million tons of grain valued at \$275 million as a part of the 10 million tons of grain valued at \$750 million that it is now estimated must come from outside India if starvation is to be prevented in that land this calendar year of 1967 and has additionally provided \$25 million of emergency food relief under Title II of PL 480 legislation for distribution by CARE and other American voluntary agencies;

WHEREAS the strong programs of economic and agricultural development that have been launched in India would be swept away if the international community failed to act swiftly and on an adequate scale to meet this emergency: Therefore be it
resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled that:

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State 645-25-78, nsc 64 4-2-79
By sp/28, NARA, Date 2-4-91

~~SECRET~~

-2-

The Congress endorses and supports the President's initiative in organizing substantial American participation in cooperation with other countries and with multilateral organizations, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Food and Agricultural Organization, and others, in urgent international efforts designed to:

(a) help meet India's critical food shortages by making available to India agricultural commodities or other resources to meet India's urgent food aid requirements;

(b) continue to help combat malnutrition under an expanded program directed to those areas in India where the drought has been most severe;

(c) encourage and assist those measures which the Government of India is undertaking to achieve its goals of food sufficiency and economic growth; and

(d) develop a systematic and comprehensive approach to the war on hunger based on principles of equitable burden sharing among the developed and industrial countries and of vigorous self-help programs among the developing countries.

The Congress urges the President to continue his efforts to obtain the cooperation of other Nations and international organizations in the war on hunger in India. Further, the Congress recommends, on the basis of estimates available now, that the President provide an additional

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-3-

2.4 million tons of food grain as the United States share toward meeting the remaining India food deficit and specifically extends its support to the use of approximately \$150 million of funds available to the Commodity Credit Corporation in calendar year 1967 which will be required to accomplish this purpose.

SECRET

Monday, January 30, 1967
12:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

The most likely source of the quotation to which Schlesinger made reference is your statement at Camp Stanley in Korea on November 1, 1966:

"We had better establish a rule we established in Europe when we went there: that no dictator, just because he has power, because he has might, can snuff out freedom and liberty.

"We have had to show it couldn't be done in Korea. We may have to show it can't be done in other areas of the Pacific. We are showing right now it can't be done in Viet-Nam. Four hundred thousand of our young men, the flower of our manhood, the very tops, are out there.

"It is better to do it there than it is in Honolulu. We hope that we can establish the fact that men are equal in the world; might doesn't make right in the world. "

In that context I don't see any reason to back away: if there is any lesson, we know it is that ambitious dictators keep going until someone stops them.

W. W. R.

Monday, January 30, 1967 -- 12:00 noon

Mr. President:

General Momyer, Commander of the Seventh Air Force in Viet Nam, is in town until 11:30 a.m., Wednesday, February 1.

Bus Wheeler thought you might like to talk with him, among other things about the MIG-21 turkey shoot and, in general, about the use of airpower within South Viet Nam and against the North.

If you have time, this man may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

Set it up_____

No_____

See me_____

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

Monday, January 30, 1967 -- 11:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Following is a report by Amb. Jones, Lima, on the visit of Sen. Eastland and his party:

"Please assure President that Senator Eastland and party left Lima this morning (Jan 28) apparently well-pleased with their visit here. I met Senator at airport on his arrival January 25 and saw him aboard his plane to Chile this morning. Eastland party had lunch with my wife and me at residence first day their Lima sojourn, following unclassified but full Embassy briefing. Other activities included visit to National Agrarian University and local cotton plantation on outskirts of Lima and to Grace and Company Sugar plantation at Paramonga.

"On several occasions Senator expressed appreciation for program, Embassy assistance, and made complimentary remarks about quality of my staff."

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-255
By ing NARA. Date 4-5-92

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

26
Monday, January 30, 1967
10:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the debriefing of Baggs
and Ashmore, which I sent up on
January 23, with attached note.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Monday, January 30, 1967
9:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

I'm taking steps to get these
passages from Thanat into the
Congressional Record.

They will interest you.

W. W. Rostow

Bangkok 9605
Unclassified

WWRostow:rlh

TEXT OF CABLE FROM BANGKOK (9605)

Foreign Minister Thanat, in a speech before a large rotary audience to which US and other press representatives were invited, combined a strong defense of the US and Free World effort in Vietnam with a velvet-gloved, but obvious, slap at critics of that effort.

The following are excerpts from the long speech illustrative of Thanat's approach:

The fact that war is still raging in South Vietnam and in Laos and at the border between Thailand and Laos, and Thailand and Cambodia, cannot give us a sense of compacency. The world is fraught with dangers, with threat, with perhaps the ominous shadow of a larger conflagration. . . we feel that the decision of many nations, and particularly the US, in following the new practice of coming to the rescue of a small nation, the victim of aggression, has been and still is not only a courageous move, but a decision that will have an important bearing on present and future conditions of the world. . . if some. . . Australia, New Zealand, the US, of course, Thailand, the Philippines and others, have not tried to break with the old habit of letting the victims of aggression being swallowed up, we may have to face. . . in the future, a nuclear holocaust. But thanks to the wisdom and courage of the President of the United States, President Johnson, we are now succeeding in putting out a small fire. It was. . . a decision that will go down in history as the move that prevented the world from having to face another major conflagration.

At the same time, you are aware. . . that the war in South Vietnam has given rise to a crop of innumerable cases of mental contradictions, of mental confusions and of mental convulsions. . . There are Westerners, "pundits" probably, who try to use us as pawns. . . who say that the independence of a small nation in Southeast Asia is not worth the sacrifice of American soldiers or other soldiers. Who cares if South Vietnam goes down as a Communist victim of aggression? . . . In the opinion of these Westerners, the Prime Ministers of Southeast Asia, of South Vietnam, can be replaced as easily as if it is a question of changing socks or shirts. . . These people who are imbued with old traditionalist concepts think that what is worthwhile is Europe, the Western Hemisphere. . . (However) nowadays there is no small nation which is not worth to be saved from aggression, particularly Communist aggression, because by saving it you are not saving a small nation. . . but saving yourself. . . because we have to face a new breed of people whose appetites are whetted by concessions. . . Therefore, if we yield to them in South Vietnam, we will have to yield to them in Laos, we will have to yield to them in Cambodia and perhaps in whole of sea. . . We (Thailand) have always supported the position that South Vietnam should be helped. . . (For) if

we don't make the sacrifice now , we will have to accept and to endure and to bear the burden of larger sacrifices in the future.

(Thus) we are cooperating with all the nations that have agreed to accept sacrifices now, and we have allowed them to make use of our facilities and our installations. We do it because we want to see the war of aggression that is now raging in South Vietnam come to an end as quickly as possible with the least cost to human lives, whether they be American lives, or South Vietnamese lives, or our own lives... There is no other course that will bring to Southeast Asia and to the whole world peace and stability.

Now in Southeast Asia and in Asia and in the whole world we are developing a new sense of mutual interests, a new awareness that we exist together, that we prosper together or we perish together... (Thus) we have been staunch supporters of regional cooperation... The year ahead will be a year of consolidation... The military situation in South Vietnam will somewhat recede... but importance will be given to political and propaganda efforts not only from the... Communist side, but even within our own ranks... Redoubling their efforts to confuse our minds... the minds of our people... To create a lack of confidence.

The Viet Cong (who use) terror and torture... are the people for whom many tears, crocodile tears perhaps, have been shed. These are the people who should be saved in the opinions of certain people, either in the West or in Asia. But for us who live around here and whose lives are constantly in danger, we think of them in quite different terms.

While we are fighting to save ourselves, to insure our survival, we have not lost sight of the fact that bullets do not solve problems. On the contrary, the built-in solution lies in the realization that our future depends on working together, not only in purely co-existing, but in joining hands, not only collective defense, but collective prosperity and collective endeavors. These will be the things that will happen in the future.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday, January 28, 1967 -- 4:40 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Joe Alsop came in for an hour. He is full of a most interesting proposition. Vance has showed him the infiltration figures for 1966. They show a rapid decline from the middle of the year. Joe says, in his usual way: "It is perfectly obvious that the bombing of oil hurt them badly and immediately; they cut down infiltration; and moved to shorter lines of supply by pushing directly across the DMZ." He thinks that the order of battle has fallen off much more than our figures have showed. He thinks we are in the process of winning the war quite rapidly but won't acknowledge it. I cautioned him some on his exuberance -- which is not normal with Joe -- but my personal view is that he is nearer the mark than most of the analysts. *

Andrew Wilson, a British journalist, came in to discuss on an off-the-record basis whether politico-military war gaming -- about which he is writing a book -- is a constructive contribution to policy-making. I told him that it was not a panacea but had justified itself as a supplementary tool in the bureaucracy.

Tom Lambert, Los Angeles Times, telephoned about Bobby Kennedy's statement at Oxford, England. I told him that we did not have a direct quotation. He could be referring to the New York Times story of last week about NLF contacts in Cairo, on which the State Department had already commented. I knew of nothing which would justify the hope of an imminent break in the negotiating situation reflected in the AP dispatch.

Walt Rostow

* P.S. I later called him and gave material from a recently captured document which was declassified on Jan. 28.

Saturday, January 28, 1967
4:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick Katzenbach recommends a telegram from you to the Cuban Medical Association in Exile, on January 28, 1967, to commemorate the 114th anniversary of the birthday anniversary of Jose Marti. I support Nick's recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

ow:rlh

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

313

29a

January 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Telegraphic Message to the Cuban Exiles
on January 28

Recommendation:

That you send a telegram along the lines of the enclosed draft in reply to the letter addressed to you by the Cuban Medical Association in Exile.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Background:

January 28, 1967, marks the 114th anniversary of the birth of Cuban independence hero Jose Marti. On this day the Cuban exile community has scheduled a large rally in the Miami Stadium under the sponsorship of the Cuban Medical Association in Exile whose President, Dr. Enrique Huertas, has been the principal promoter of the event.

It is expected that some criticism of our Cuban policy will be voiced on this occasion and that a resolution or petition may be taken urging that Cuba be included on the agenda for the OAS Summit Meeting. Dr. Huertas may also be expected to try to utilize this rally to confirm his status as the "new leader" of the Cuban exiles.

Despite the above negative aspects I believe the occasion offers the chance to reach significant numbers of Cuban exiles with a warm message showing that the Administration remains very much concerned with Cuba. It should serve also to meliorate possible criticism emanating from the rally. The President of

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Decontrolled following 1/30/69

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- 2 -

the Council of the OAS, Panamanian Ambassador Eduardo Ritter Aislán who will be the principal non-Cuban speaker at the rally, recommends that we take this step.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Enclosures:

1. Draft telegram.
2. Letter from Dr. Huertas.

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UNCLASSIFIED

Cuban Medical Association in Exile
213 Aragon Avenue
Coral Gables, Florida 33134

Today you are gathered to honor the great Cuban patriot, Jose Marti on the 114th Anniversary of his birth. Marti was a dedicated and tenacious fighter for freedom and all those who honor freedom join with you today in honoring his memory.

Marti understood well that the struggle for liberty can be long and difficult. But he also knew that the cause was just and that freedom must ultimately triumph.

Pres file

January 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Rabbinical Council of America

Rabbi Levovitz, President of the Rabbinical Council, has written you (letter attached) asking for a message to the convocation of 900 Orthodox Rabbis starting Monday.

This is a responsible group, much concerned with the situation in the Middle East. I think it's wise to respond, since ignoring this request could lead to the erroneous conclusion that you don't care. A message from you may help keep their concerns in perspective.

I recommend you approve the attached message. I've touched base with Harry McPherson, and State has gone over the text carefully.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

January 25, 1967

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO
THE CONVOCATION OF THE
RABBINICAL COUNCIL OF AMERICA

I write to greet the convocation of the Rabbinical Council at a time when we are all concerned over maintaining peace in the Middle East. We share the fervent hope that the time may soon come when men everywhere will know that the world will no longer tolerate resort to force to achieve change--that productive change can come only from the honest work of men's hands and minds.

The achievements of the Israeli people over a scant two decades have taught us all what skill and determination can do. Israel today is an impressive tribute to the dedication of its people as well as to the support of nations and friends around the world. The US is proud to be one of these nations.

For the past two decades the US has been in the forefront of those genuinely wishing to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict troubling the Near East. This is not easy to achieve but we must persevere in our efforts to make progress toward this objective. We have made it clear that we will resolutely oppose the use of force or the threat of force by one state against another in the area. We intend to live up to that commitment but we must recognize that until basic solutions are found, tensions are likely to continue placing the highest

- 2 -

premium on cool and farsighted statesmanship. We must do all we can -- and we must ask our friends in the area to go that extra mile with us -- in the unrelenting search for the peaceful way.

I join you in praying that peace may come to all lands. I pledge our determination to work with all nations dedicated to that goal.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Telegram to be sent to:

Rabbi Pesach Z. Levovitz
President, Rabbinical Council of America
Brunswick Hotel
Lake Wood, New Jersey

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, January 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Summary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-256
By ip, NARA, Date 12-2-93

1. Saigon Views on Dealings with NLF and Hanoi

Embassy Saigon comments that Ky's statements in response to a newsman's questions regarding dealing with the National Liberation Front indicate the Prime Minister may become more flexible on this question. The Embassy also sees in Ky's remarks the possibility that peace moves will likely be an important issue in the coming presidential campaign.

In the same vein, Foreign Minister Do has told the Embassy he believes: 1) the bombing is hurting the North Vietnamese and should be maintained; 2) Saigon should be prepared for direct contact with the VC/NLF, as well as with Hanoi; 3) every avenue to the Viet Cong, secret or public, should be kept open; 4) he should keep the possibility of negotiations before the Directorate.

2. Russian Views on B-52's in Thailand

Our Charge in Vientiane reports that the Russian Ambassador told him he hoped we would give "serious thought" to the implications of stationing B-52's in Thailand, where they might overfly neutral Laos. The Charge comments that the Soviets will probably approach Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma on the subject and he cannot envisage any circumstances under which Souvanna would permit such flights.

3. Tension in Nicaragua Abating

Ambassador Brown reports some relaxation in the tension which gripped Managua at mid-week following the arrest of over 200 persons suspected of being involved in the January 22 disturbances and the closing of opposition newspapers and radio stations. Yesterday, the Bishop of Managua was allowed to visit a group of prisoners and some opposition news media resumed operations. Ambassador Brown continues to urge moderation on Nicaraguan authorities.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

4. Ecuador-Peru Border Tension

As the 25th anniversary of the Ecuador-Peru border protocol approaches, the Ecuadorians are increasingly nervous that the Peruvians may try to pull a fast one. The State Department has instructed our Embassies in both countries to do everything possible to control tensions.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Saturday
January 28, 1967 - 1:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

**Herewith the first three messages
of condolence. Several more have been
received from other heads of state.**

W. W. Rostow

Message from:

**Prime Minister Wilson
King Constantine, Greece
U Thant**

~~SECRET~~

January 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agenda for Indian Food Meeting

1. How big an interim allocation? Rusk-Freeman-Gaud recommended 2 million tons. Poage recommended 1.7 million. At our 12 January meeting, you preferred 1 million. Gene Rostow reports that 1 million would seriously undercut Indian leaders who have staked their positions on following the agricultural and economic policies we're pushing. He recommends you reconsider and proposes 2 million.
2. Title I or II -- rupee sales or grant? This is an issue only because Poage recommended Title II grant. The Executive Branch unanimously favors rupee sale, but you may want Secretary Freeman to argue the case to satisfy yourself.
3. What do we ask Congress for? You asked Charlie Schultze to explore the possibility of seeking an appropriation. He believes we should stay within the framework of present CCC appropriations requests, which cover India (see memo at attached). He suggests other ways of meeting your political requirements.
4. At our previous meeting, you approved including the CARE program in the message to Congress. Do you still want to handle it that way?
5. Does the message to Congress as now drafted strike the right note? If so, I will do a final editing job incorporating your instructions from this meeting.
6. When should the message go to Congress? If it can go Monday or Tuesday, the interim allocation will take care of the pipeline. If you hold it till later, Secretary Freeman believes we should let the Indians begin buying and booking ships on a reimbursable basis.
7. Backgrounding the press. Careful backgrounding of both American and Indian reporters will insure presentation in the best light.

W. W. Rostow

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~~SECRET~~Authority State Dec 5-28-78, NSC Dec 4-2-79By 18/1/91, NARA, Date 2-4-91

January 27, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a warm
reply to U Thant's congratulatory
message on The Outer Space Treaty.
His message is at Tab A.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

My dear Mr. Secretary-General:

I am grateful
~~Heartfelt thanks~~ for your message on the signing of the Outer Space Treaty. Congratulations truly belong to the United Nations and its whole membership. The role of the United Nations in the development of this historic treaty was of the greatest importance.

With you, I consider the Outer Space Treaty a landmark in the march toward peace. To the extent that my own efforts and those of my Government can contribute, I pledge that there will be further steps. I join you in the conviction that an agreement controlling the spread of nuclear weapons should be among the first of the ones ahead.

January 25, 1967

The President

The White House

I wish it were possible for me to be present in Washington, London and Moscow at the same time on the auspicious occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. May I convey to you my sincere congratulations and express my feeling of deep satisfaction at this historic event in international relations--a feeling which, I am certain, is shared by all peoples everywhere. I am particularly gratified that the United Nations was able to make a significant contribution towards this major achievement. One conquest of space gives rise to man's new problems because of the terrifying military potentialities involved and also because of the impact of space technology on our physical environment. As man ventures into space he cannot rely solely on his scientific and technological knowledge, great as it may be. He must equally depend on legally binding universal standards of conduct, progressively developed as science unravels the mysteries of space. It is both urgent and necessary that the powerful forces generated by human ingenuity be kept under control and utilized for the benefit of humanity and the strengthening of peace. It is most gratifying to see that the problems of exploring outer space are being solved through positive and sustained international

action and measures within the framework of the United Nations. I have no doubt that this Treaty will not only greatly reduce the danger of conflict in space, but also improve international cooperation and the prospects of peace on our own planet. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the present Treaty are landmarks in man's march towards international peace and security. I fervently hope that these achievements will be shortly followed by similar agreements on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other steps towards general and complete disarmament. Highest consideration.

U Thant

Secretary-General

United Nations

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, January 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Planning is well underway for official visits here during February, March and April:

King Hassan of Morocco, February 9
Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, February 13-14
Prime Minister Chung of Korea, March 14
Prime Minister Maiwandwal of Afghanistan, March 28
President Sunay of Turkey, April 3-4

We now need to move ahead on planning for May visits by suggesting specific dates to King Olav of Norway, and Vice President C. K. Yen of China. You approved their visits on the overall schedule for the first half of 1967.

After checking your calendar, and sounding out the visitors concerned, I suggest the following:

King Olav, May 2-4

This would involve on May 2 a lawn arrival, parade, office meeting, and dinner. On May 3, you would have a communique meeting with the King and make a brief appearance at the Norwegian reception.

Approve participation for May 2-3 _____

See me _____

Vice President Yen, May 9

A simple format -- lawn arrival, office meeting, and luncheon -- all on May 9.

Approve participation for May 9 _____

See me _____

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 2-4-91

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If you approve these dates, the visits could be announced in February. The February-April visits -- dates for which you approved on January 6 -- have been announced, except for that of the Korean Prime Minister. At the request of the Koreans, that announcement has been tentatively set for early February.

Announce Olav and Yen visits during February_____

See me_____

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, January 27, 1967 -- 6:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contact

Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News, came in. We had a long talk about Viet Nam. He was sympathetic and, on the whole, optimistic about how things were going, both militarily and politically.

He told me, incidentally, that some Republicans were working up a resolution on the Consular Convention which would support the convention if and when the Russians stopped supporting North Viet Nam and helped bring the war to an end.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Friday, January 27, 1967
6:00 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I understand that, at your request,
Sol Linowitz has sent you this memorandum on the OAS Summit.

I share his positive approach to your participation in the meeting, but I think the memorandum I sent you this morning will give you a better picture of what we want out of the Summit -- and how we propose to negotiate to get it.

W. W. R.

recd
1-26-67
430P

SEND TO
WALT ROSTOW

WALT - THIS
GIVE THIS
ATTENTION
RIGHT AWAY

Marvin
Watson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1967

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Latin American Summit Conference

I know that you are giving thought to the forthcoming Latin America Summit Conference, and I want to put my own views and observations before you as clearly as I can:

1. It is most important that there be no misunderstanding about your intention to attend the Summit Conference when and where it is held. You have, of course, several times made this clear but in the past week my Latin American colleagues at the OAS have been asking whether you are really planning to attend. (Unfortunately, some recent newspaper accounts have nurtured this uncertainty.) A positive atmosphere needs to be created. I, therefore, think it would be useful if at an early date you could again firmly express your intention to take part in such a conference.

2. It is equally important that you make clear why you will attend, in terms that respond to Latin American as well as United States interest. The main reasons for a Summit are (a) that Latin America is at

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-255

By ijg, NARA, Date 1-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

crossroads--it needs a higher rate of progress in order to meet the needs of its people and avoid more severe social and political explosions; (b) the Latin Americans need reassurance of our continued readiness to work in a partnership with them toward common goals.

3. During the past three days the Ambassadors to the OAS have been meeting as representatives of the Foreign Ministers of the various countries to discuss preliminary plans for the Summit Conference and the forthcoming Foreign Ministers Conference. Although there have been extended debates and an impression of strong disagreement as to date and site, my informal talks with the Ambassadors reveal broad agreement that the conference should be held between April 12 through 14, and that the place be Punta del Este.

4. The mere fact that you will be personally attending a Latin American Summit Conference--the second time in history that an American President has met in such a conference with the Presidents of the Latin American countries--will make the occasion a significant and noteworthy one. Above anything else, it will dramatically reflect your personal interest in Latin America and the willingness of the United States to join as a partner with the other countries of this Hemisphere to further our common objectives.

5. All the indications are that the "package" to be disclosed at the conference will justify such a meeting of Presidents. In the first place, a commitment to economic integration at such a conference will give it the dramatic push forward it urgently needs. Secondly, such a conference can give real impetus to the Alliance for Progress--especially in education and agriculture. A more liberal position by the United States on trade will have very important impact in Latin America. In addition, the prospects for an arms limitation agreement, the announcement of the nuclear pact, and

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
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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possible resolution of the Chile-Bolivia dispute will give the conference further international impact. The announcement of a few multinational projects in communications, transportation and river development will add another dimension of significance.

6. Quite frankly, the Latin Americans probably hope for larger financial commitments from us than will be possible. But combining their own self-help efforts with such financial undertakings as we do make should provide a "mix" which will give Inter-American relationships a major thrust forward. This does, however, underscore the need not to raise expectations unrealistically.

7. I know that there are different points of view with regard to the advisability of your undertaking a tour following the Summit Conference. My own feeling is that a visit to eleven countries as some have proposed would be both too much and too arduous and would really not permit more than flying touchdowns at various places on a breathless schedule. On the other hand, I feel that if you could visit several countries after the conference this would be highly valuable. I think it would be better to wait until after the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Buenos Aires in a couple of weeks, and then decide. My own present inclination would be to recommend that after Uruguay you consider visiting (1) Buenos Aires, (2) Santiago, (3) Rio de Janeiro, (4) Lima, and (5) some point in Venezuela (not Caracas). (This will mean leaving out Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay and Colombia--but it should be possible to indicate that on a trip such as this one it simply is not feasible for the President to visit all the countries).


Sol M. Linowitz

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Friday - January 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Program for the OAS Summit

This is an interim report on preparations for the Summit. Linc Gordon and Sol Linowitz are putting the Summit package described in this memorandum into final shape for discussion with Secretary Rusk on February 1. Linc is recommending to Secretary Rusk that he next:

1. meet with Fowler, Gaud, Schultze, Gardner and Freeman to obtain their agreement;
2. convene a select advisory group of distinguished Americans with Latin American interests to review the package. (See suggested list at Tab A); and
3. forward the package to you.

Why a Presidential Meeting

There are three important reasons for a Presidential meeting:

- Latin America is at a crossroads. Over the next few years, population increase, growing urban unemployment, and agricultural backwardness will, at present rates of modest growth, lead to new social crises and political extremism. Only Presidents can decide whether to abandon this risky course and embark on an intensified effort to accelerate economic and social progress which can lift Latin America to a level of self-sustaining growth (a minimum of 7% instead of the present 5.5%) under stable, democratic institutions. A Latin American Common Market is basic to this effort.
- The Latin Americans need to be reassured at the Presidential level that we will not be distracted by other world problems

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~~SECRET~~Authority 77-984-158By ry/ies, NARA, Date 1-30-91

from our long-term commitment to work with them under the Alliance.

- Only Presidents can decide to limit the acquisition of sophisticated armaments for their armed forces.

The Summit Deal

The Latin Americans should be prepared to:

- accelerate integration of their economies toward a Latin American Common Market;
- negotiate and implement major multinational development projects;
- modernize their agricultural and educational systems;
- achieve greater participation of their people at the local level in the development process, thus strengthening democratic institutions;
- work with us in promoting private investment; and
- forego sophisticated, expensive military equipment.

Each point involves adjustments and risks requiring tough political decisions. To help the Latin American Presidents to take the jump, we must assure them that they can count on our support. The amount and form of our expanded economic assistance is essential to achieve these substantive goals and psychologically important, and probably decisive, in what they will agree to at the Summit.

The Summit Theme

The Summit should be built around this concept: charting the historic transition of Latin America from a decade of national planning and development (the 1960's) to a decade of regional integration and

accelerated progress (the 1970's) through which Latin America can achieve the cohesion and strength necessary to play its proper role on the world scene. The Summit theme might be "The 1970's: Decade of Unity and Accelerated Progress".

The Maximum Package

The maximum package, making the meeting an unqualified success, would have these elements:

Economic Integration - The Latin Americans would commit themselves to establish progressively a Common Market (LACM) by 1980. This would include specific target dates for negotiating a treaty and for the LACM coming into force, as well as specific interim measures toward full integration. We would agree to provide, contingent on negotiation of a Common Market Treaty and on the basis of matching contributions, up to \$300 million over a 5-year period to an Integration Fund to provide adjustment assistance for dislocations caused by integration.

Multinational Projects - The Latin Americans would agree to link their transportation, communications, power and industrial infrastructure as an aid to integration and development. To start this process we would increase our contribution to the Inter-American Bank's Fund for Special Operations (IDB-FSO) from the contemplated annual level of \$250 million over the next three years to \$300 million per year, provided the Latin Americans matched this with corresponding increases in their shares and substantial IDB resources were earmarked for multinational projects. (Provision for this increase in our IDB-FSO contribution for 1968 has already been made in budget.) Additional assistance for carrying out approved multinational projects might come later.

Under this heading different Presidents might announce decisions to move forward with specific multinational projects. We have in mind for you:

- announcement with Colombia and Panama of plans for completion of the Pan American Highway;
- assistance in establishing a Latin American satellite communications system, including announcement of a date for the launching of the first satellite for Latin America; and
- a food-from-the-sea conference looking toward multinational research and development of marine resources.

Agriculture and Education - Education and agriculture are critical areas in the higher growth effort. If the Latin Americans are prepared to modernize in these sectors, move on integration, and maintain strong self-help efforts in other areas, we would increase our bilateral Alliance lending for these purposes by \$900 million over the next five years. (\$100 million of this amount is already included in the FY 1968 budget.)

The goal in agriculture would be to raise the production rate to 2% above the rate of population increase. (They are now roughly equal at 3%). Emphasis would be placed on provision of incentives, technical knowledge, tools and land for production.

In education, we would support such specific efforts as greatly improved training in science and technology, expanded secondary school systems, use of educational TV and expanded scholarship programs.

Trade and Investment - The Latins want us to give them preferential treatment for some of their basic products. We cannot accede to regional preferences, but at the Summit you could assure them that we are exploring with other major industrialized countries what practical steps can be taken to increase the export earnings of all developing countries. One proposal envisages the possibility of offering all developing countries a head start in the further movement toward tariff cuts on a world-wide basis. We will be discussing this idea further within the world

trading community to see whether a broad consensus can be reached on such a new trade policy.

In the commodity field, you could express willingness:

- to extend the International Coffee Agreement and to reverse our previous stand on the Coffee Diversification Fund and make a contribution (perhaps \$15-25 million a year for two years) on a matching formula basis and with European contributions for diversification in Africa;
- to contribute to diversification funds for other basic products whenever such funds are a desirable part of a coordinated approach to a commodity problem.

We would also announce the "untieing" of our assistance to permit procurement of goods and services in all Alliance for Progress countries (but not Europe and Japan) under AID-financed capital projects and related technical assistance. This would meet a long-standing Latin American request at extremely modest cost to the US balance of payments.

On private investment -- which is on the upswing, but still lagging behind Charter of Punta del Este expectations:

- The Latin American Presidents should agree to foster private national and foreign investment which promotes competitiveness and is consonant with national development and integration requirements;
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- The governments should pursue more vigorously negotiation of double taxation treaties; and

- You might announce our willingness, subject to eventual Congressional approval, to grant a 7% investment credit to American capital going to Latin America, when we enter into double taxation treaties.

Political Actions - To give a political balance to the Summit and enhance its public impact, we are considering the following:

- a decision by the Presidents to work for greater involvement by their people at the local level in the development process through development councils, cooperatives, and short-term Peace Corps-type volunteer activities in order to make the Alliance for Progress a grass-roots reality;
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- announcement by Chile and Bolivia that they are actively discussing a settlement of their differences, with Chile giving Bolivia an enclave on the coast to build a seaport (if the Chileans are prepared to consider such a solution);
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- a statement on the Communist subversive threat emanating from Cuba.

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maximum package do not present significant difficulties, they should remain about the same. It is still sufficient for a successful Summit.

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- either a group of countries agreeing to go all the way on Common Market Treaty, with the others indicating general willingness to join later,
- or a slower schedule encompassing all countries under which they would:
 - reaffirm their determination to establish a LACM;
 - agree to complete and implement the necessary studies related thereto; and
 - establish a Ministerial Coordinating Committee to work toward creation of a complete LACM.

If one of these alternatives is the best we can get, our offer to contribute to an Integration Fund could still stand contingent upon negotiation of a treaty.

Through bilateral diplomatic channels we will be working on the political items. It is too early to tell how many will be ready to be surfaced at the Summit.

How to Achieve Agreement on the Package

Negotiations would proceed in three stages:

- (1) At the Buenos Aires Meeting of Foreign Ministers beginning on February 15, Secretary Rusk would discuss an annotated agenda containing the basic elements of our maximum package (minus the specific amounts of money and the political items we are considering with other governments). We would also

indicates the type of Presidential Declaration and Communique we envisage for the Summit meeting. If he obtains agreement to at least the minimum package, the Foreign Ministers would proceed to fix the date, place and agenda for the Summit and set up a high-level group to prepare a draft of the Summit Declaration and Communique. If he does not obtain a satisfactory agreement, the Summit would be postponed.

- (2) In the seven weeks between the BA Meeting and the Summit, we would work in the high-level group and through our Embassies to bring about hard agreement on documents as close to our maximum position as possible.
- (3) Taking advantage of the special psychological chemistry which operates at a meeting at this level, you would push your colleagues to go the rest of the way in accepting our maximum package.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Tab A - Suggested list of Summit Select Advisory Group.

~~SECRET~~

38c

Suggested Summit Select Advisory Group

Milton Eisenhower	- President - Johns Hopkins University
David Rockefeller	- President - Chase Manhattan Bank
Franklin Murphy	- Chancellor - UCLA
Adolfo Berle	
John F. Gallagher	- Vice President - International Operations, Sears Roebuck
Father Theodore Hesburgh	- President - Notre Dame
McGeorge Bundy	- Ford Foundation
George Meany	- AFL/CIO
Douglas Dillon	
Luis Munoz Marin	- Ex-Governor of Puerto Rico
Robert Nathan	- Chairman, Robert Nathan Associates
John Knight	- Publisher, Knight Newspapers

~~SECRET~~

DET. 100 TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
RECORD. DELETED PER E.O. 14176.
AND DELETED ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAY 11, 1962.

BY h3 CN 2-6-61

January 27, 1967

Mr. President:


You will be meeting Dobrynin this afternoon and there is a very slight chance the question of our Industrial Design exhibit might come up in conversation.

Briefly, the Soviets are showing signs of reneging on their Exchange Agreement commitment to accept an American Industrial Design exhibition. The exhibition itself is on the Soviet-Hungarian border and the guides and other personnel are assembled here in Washington. The exhibit should be opening next month.

If the Soviets do renege (as you remember they tried to do the same thing with the Hand Tools exhibit), the subsequent publicity will make things harder for the Consular Convention, the East-West Trade Bill and even the Space Treaty, as opponents will raise the cry that agreements with the Soviets won't be kept.

This afternoon's occasion, where you are hosting the signing ceremony, is probably not a good time to bring the matter up. If you should have occasion to mention it in connection with other things however, it might be useful. In any case, we are doing our best to make clear how strongly we feel about this matter both here and in Moscow.

W. W. Rostow



~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

JAN 30 1967

This document consists of 3 pages
No. 1 of 19 copies, Series A

AUTHENTICATED Jan 24 1967
U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
BY: S. L. Brownson / Charles Winters
DOCUMENT NO. LXI-7372-1A

Dear Mr. President:

When the Atomic Energy Act was enacted, all atomic weapons were initially placed in Atomic Energy Commission custody. As the need for greater readiness became apparent and the necessity for technical surveillance decreased, an increasingly larger portion of the stockpile was transferred by Presidential order to the Department of Defense. The AEC at the present is directed to retain custody of a relatively small number of weapons, thus requiring custodians at National Stockpile and Operational Storage Sites for this purpose.

After careful review, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have agreed that AEC custody of the presently required and projected small number of weapons serves no practical purpose. Elimination of this requirement would save 36 AEC positions and realize an annual AEC savings of \$293,000. It would also eliminate the requirement for Presidential emergency action to transfer the remainder of the stockpile to the DOD. This action would not change the AEC continuing responsibilities as established by Executive Order 10841 and National Security Action Memorandums 51, 197 and 272.

Historically, DOD custody of most of the [REDACTED] has evolved in the following manner. Subsequent to the Manhattan Project, the AEC, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, maintained custody of all nuclear and non-nuclear atomic weapon components. This status of the stockpile continued until 1950, when President Truman exercised the authority granted the President in Section 6.a.(2) of the 1946 Act and directed that designated quantities

3.4(6)
(2,5)

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 99-77
By us, NARA, Date 7-5-04

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination
Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954~~

WEAPON STOCKPILE INFORMATION

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The President

- 2 -

of non-nuclear components be delivered to the DOD for dispersal to specific areas. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In 1953, President Eisenhower directed the transfer to the DOD of additional nuclear components of atomic weapons. [REDACTED]

6.1
(a)

Under all of these directives, the DOD acquired custody of the transferred components. However, in 1955, when transfer of some thermonuclear weapons was authorized by President Eisenhower, he stated that weapons with [REDACTED] (even though dispersed to military units) would continue to remain in AEC custody. Therefore, this required the AEC to place custodians at many SAC bases and on ships at sea. Initially, civilian custodians were utilized, but the impracticality of this arrangement on ships was soon recognized, and, as a result, in the fall of 1956, the Designated Atomic Energy Commission Military Representative (DAECMR) concept was developed. Under this arrangement, commanding officers of SAC bases and Naval combatant and ammunition ships were designated AEC Custodians (i.e., DAECMR) directly responsible to the AEC, thereby effecting AEC custody without the use of AEC civilian personnel at these locations. This concept covered all dispersal locations storing high yield weapons and continued until President Eisenhower, in 1959, directed the transfer of custody to the DOD of all weapons dispersed to the DOD including, for the first time, those with [REDACTED]

3.4
(b)(2)

3.4 (b)(2)

6.1
(a)

Subsequent actions have authorized the transfer of continuously growing percentages of the total [REDACTED] to the DOD. President Kennedy's consideration of the FY 1961 dispersal program included a requirement for retaining a substantial reserve in the [REDACTED]. Part of this reserve was to remain in AEC custody. The approval of the FY 1964 dispersal plan, for the first time, gave priority to meeting the authorized transfer to the DOD with the remainder to be retained in AEC custody. [REDACTED]

3.4
(b)(2)

6.1
(a)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 3 -


The actions mentioned above were taken to provide effective nuclear defense of the United States. The Commission discussed and explained these actions to the Congress by way of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in recognition of the Commission's responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act.

In view of trends in past years, in the interest of economy, and since transfer of the total finished [REDACTED] would not change the AEC's continuing responsibilities in connection with [REDACTED] transferred to the DOD, it is recommended that you direct the AEC, pursuant to Section 91b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to deliver all finished [REDACTED] to the DOD, as indicated in the enclosed draft NSAM.

3.4
(b)(2)

The Secretary of Defense has concurred in this recommendation.

Respectfully yours,



Chairman

The President
The White House

Enclosure:
Cy 1 Dft II of
National Security
Action Memorandum

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, Jan. 27, 1967
1:10 p.m.

~~TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

Herewith Hanoi's initial direct response in Moscow:

1. It is a response to our January 10 message, which simply proposed bilateral secret talks to end the war, not to our more detailed January 20 message which laid out an agenda.
2. In substance, their opening gambit is in one sentence marked on page 2:

"The unconditional cessation of bombing and all other acts of war against the democratic Republic of Vietnam being materialized, the democratic Republic of Vietnam could then exchange views with the United States concerning the place or date for contact between the two parties as the Government of the United States proposed in its message handed over on January 10, 1967."

3. They promise comment on our Jan. 20 message "at an appropriate time."
4. State will be considering our response this afternoon and should have recommendations over by the end of the day.
5. My initial reaction: "They are either saying: 'no'; or starting a negotiation from the very hard end."

W. W. R.

Moscow 3218
1/27/67 *u* *celas*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-256
By ind, NARA, Date 12-2-93

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

41

~~SECRET~~

Friday - January 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Program for the OAS Summit

This is an interim report on preparations for the Summit. Linc Gordon and Sol Linowitz are putting the Summit package described in this memorandum into final shape for discussion with Secretary Rusk on February 1. Linc is recommending to Secretary Rusk that he next:

1. meet with Fowler, Gaud, Schultze, Gardner and Freeman to obtain their agreement;
2. convene a select advisory group of distinguished Americans with Latin American interests to review the package. (See suggested list at Tab A); and
3. forward the package to you.

Why a Presidential Meeting

There are three important reasons for a Presidential meeting:

- Latin America is at a crossroads. Over the next few years, population increase, growing urban unemployment, and agricultural backwardness will, at present rates of modest growth, lead to new social crises and political extremism. Only Presidents can decide whether to abandon this risky course and embark on an intensified effort to accelerate economic and social progress which can lift Latin America to a level of self-sustaining growth (a minimum of 7% instead of the present 5.5%) under stable, democratic institutions. A Latin American Common Market is basic to this effort.
- The Latin Americans need to be reassured at the Presidential level that we will not be distracted by other world problems

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority NLJ 84-158
By rylcs, NARA, Date 1-30-91

from our long-term commitment to work with them under the Alliance.

- Only Presidents can decide to limit the acquisition of sophisticated armaments for their armed forces.

The Summit Deal

The Latin Americans should be prepared to:

- accelerate integration of their economies toward a Latin American Common Market;
- negotiate and implement major multinational development projects;
- modernize their agricultural and educational systems;
- achieve greater participation of their people at the local level in the development process, thus strengthening democratic institutions;
- work with us in promoting private investment; and
- forego sophisticated, expensive military equipment.

Each point involves adjustments and risks requiring tough political decisions. To help the Latin American Presidents to take the jump, we must assure them that they can count on our support. The amount and form of our expanded economic assistance is essential to achieve these substantive goals and psychologically important, and probably decisive, in what they will agree to at the Summit.

The Summit Theme

The Summit should be built around this concept: charting the historic transition of Latin America from a decade of national planning and development (the 1960's) to a decade of regional integration and

accelerated progress (the 1970's) through which Latin America can achieve the cohesion and strength necessary to play its proper role on the world scene. The Summit theme might be "The 1970's: Decade of Unity and Accelerated Progress".

The Maximum Package

The maximum package, making the meeting an unqualified success, would have these elements:

Economic Integration - The Latin Americans would commit themselves to establish progressively a Common Market (LACM) by 1980. This would include specific target dates for negotiating a treaty and for the LACM coming into force, as well as specific interim measures toward full integration. We would agree to provide, contingent on negotiation of a Common Market Treaty and on the basis of matching contributions, up to \$300 million over a 5-year period to an Integration Fund to provide adjustment assistance for dislocations caused by integration.

Multinational Projects - The Latin Americans would agree to link their transportation, communications, power and industrial infrastructure as an aid to integration and development. To start this process we would increase our contribution to the Inter-American Bank's Fund for Special Operations (IDB-FSO) from the contemplated annual level of \$250 million over the next three years to \$300 million per year, provided the Latin Americans matched this with corresponding increases in their shares and substantial IDB resources were earmarked for multinational projects. (Provision for this increase in our IDB-FSO contribution for 1968 has already been made in budget.) Additional assistance for carrying out approved multinational projects might come later.

Under this heading different Presidents might announce decisions to move forward with specific multinational projects. We have in mind for you:

- announcement with Colombia and Panama of plans for completion of the Pan American Highway;
- assistance in establishing a Latin American satellite communications system, including announcement of a date for the launching of the first satellite for Latin America; and
- a food-from-the-sea conference looking toward multinational research and development of marine resources.

Agriculture and Education - Education and agriculture are critical areas in the higher growth effort. If the Latin Americans are prepared to modernize in these sectors, move on integration, and maintain strong self-help efforts in other areas, we would increase our bilateral Alliance lending for these purposes by \$900 million over the next five years. (\$100 million of this amount is already included in the FY 1968 budget.)

The goal in agriculture would be to raise the production rate to 2% above the rate of population increase. (They are now roughly equal at 3%). Emphasis would be placed on provision of incentives, technical knowledge, tools and land for production.

In education, we would support such specific efforts as greatly improved training in science and technology, expanded secondary school systems, use of educational TV and expanded scholarship programs.

Trade and Investment - The Latins want us to give them preferential treatment for some of their basic products. We cannot accede to regional preferences, but at the Summit you could assure them that we are exploring with other major industrialized countries what practical steps can be taken to increase the export earnings of all developing countries. One proposal envisages the possibility of offering all developing countries a head start in the further movement toward tariff cuts on a world-wide basis. We will be discussing this idea further within the world

trading community to see whether a broad consensus can be reached on such a new trade policy.

In the commodity field, you could express willingness:

- to extend the International Coffee Agreement and to reverse our previous stand on the Coffee Diversification Fund and make a contribution (perhaps \$15-25 million a year for two years) on a matching formula basis and with European contributions for diversification in Africa;
- to contribute to diversification funds for other basic products whenever such funds are a desirable part of a coordinated approach to a commodity problem.

We would also announce the "untieing" of our assistance to permit procurement of goods and services in all Alliance for Progress countries (but not Europe and Japan) under AID-financed capital projects and related technical assistance. This would meet a long-standing Latin American request at extremely modest cost to the US balance of payments.

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W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Tab A - Suggested list of Summit Select Advisory Group.

4/12

A

4/6
~~SECRET~~

Suggested Summit Select Advisory Group

Milton Eisenhower	- President - John Hopkins University
David Rockefeller	- President - Chase Manhattan Bank
Franklin Murphy	- Chancellor - UCLA
Adolfe Berle	
John F. Gallagher	- Vice President - International Operations, Sears Roebuck
Father Theodore Hesburgh	- President - Notre Dame
McGeorge Bundy	- Ford Foundation
George Meany	- AFL/CIO
Douglas Dillon	
Luis Munoz Marin	- Ex-Governor of Puerto Rico
Robert Nathan	- Chairman, Robert Nathan Associates
John Knight	- Publisher, Knight Newspapers

~~SECRET~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MATTER AND CANCELLED PER E.O. 12812
SEC. 1.0 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO
MAY 10, 1983.

BY 18 CN 26-91

Thursday, January 26, 1967 -- 4:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk would like to amend the scenario for tomorrow's signing ceremony as follows:

1. The President would make a statement.
2. Sec. Rusk would make a statement.
3. The President would call on Amb. Goldberg who would read a statement from UN Secretary General UnThant but have no words of his own.
4. The signing would then take place.

The third element has been introduced after negotiations between Sec. Rusk and Amb. Goldberg, in order to permit the Ambassador to play a part and underline the UN role by reading U Thant's statement.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rln

~~copy~~
2. Pres file

Thursday, January 26, 1967
4:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

I was drafting a note to Dr. Poling for my signature when the attached clipping on the death of his wife was brought to my attention. I thought, under the circumstances, you might wish to send along a note like the attached.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

January 26, 1967

Dear Dr. Poling:

I was saddened to read of the death of your wife, who shared so much of the good work you have done over the years.

I wish also to thank you for your letter of January 9. I greatly appreciate your support for our country's purposes and policy in Viet Nam. Your understanding will help sustain me in the days ahead as we meet our responsibilities and search for an honorable peace.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

Dr. Daniel A. Poling
Christian Herald
27 East 39th Street
New York, New York 10016

LBJ:DR:WWR:mz

2/21

Thursday, January 26, 1967 -- 6:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

John Hightower telephoned about the New York Times story about NLF contacts in Cairo. I assured him that there was no substance in it.

Murrey Marder, Washington Post, came in at my request. He raised:

-- Whether we could get the Consular Convention through and the consequences of not getting it through for U.S. - Soviet relations.

-- The situation and prospects in Viet Nam, to which I talked at some length about the military-civil progress in recent months.

-- The ABM issue and the prospects for an agreement with the Soviet Union.

I said that it would be a profound and difficult negotiation. It would be wrong to be over-optimistic; but equally wrong to not try.

-- He said the Post is about to publish a story about increased Chinese Nationalists in the Burma-Laos-Thailand area.

I said I knew nothing new about this. (I am looking into it now.)

He asked if I didn't spend most of my time on Viet Nam. I pointed out to him that, while Viet Nam was a serious part of our business, we are engaged in creative and relatively hopeful operations all over the world, from non-proliferation to food-population.

Peter Gross, New York Times man in Moscow, came in to probe hard and professionally on: the Consular Convention and its prospects; non-proliferation; Viet Nam negotiations; ABM negotiations; mutual troop withdrawals from Europe. I indicated the status of each, along the lines that we talk about them publicly. The most interesting aspect of this talk was his description of the depth of the anxiety in the Soviet Union at all levels -- from high officials to cab drivers -- about what is going on in Communist China.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Thurs., Jr 26, 1967
6 p.m.

65

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith George McGhee's personal
(and favorable) assessment of Kiesinger.

The real question is not Kiesinger's
motives or personal qualities, but
whether he can derive a good policy from
that Cabinet -- and, notably, control
Strauss who may be using his post as
Finance Minister to control a good deal
of total policy.

W. W. R.

Attachment

(cc FBator)

45a

cc: F. B.

Bonn/Bad Godesberg,
Germany
January 16, 1967

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

I am taking the liberty of writing you about Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger in order to provide a personal assessment of the man who has become the Chief Executive of the Federal Republic of Germany. While it is hazardous to make predictions about the length of his tenure--the CDU/SPD coalition government which he heads has been in office for less than two months--I think it reasonable to operate on the assumption that he will remain Chancellor until 1969 and possibly beyond that date. Certainly, he is a man with whom we shall be dealing for some time to come. Since the course followed by his government will be of great importance to the United States, we shall need to know him well.

When Kiesinger became Chancellor, attention abroad was understandably directed at his former membership in the Nazi Party. He joined the Party in 1933 and remained in it until the end without, however, ever serving as a Party official. He worked in the German Foreign Office during the war where he was charged with liaison functions with other German ministries, including the Propaganda Ministry. His position in the Foreign Office was relatively junior and he did not become a member of the career diplomatic service. Following the war he was briefly in American custody. In 1947 he was classified as a nominal party member by a denazification board, and in 1948, on appeal, his judgment was reversed and he was completely exonerated. This, in brief, is the burden of Kiesinger's past. It is evident that he has not borne it lightly. The foreign outcry during his efforts to form the present government is said almost to have persuaded him to renounce his candidacy.

Since becoming Chancellor, Kiesinger has sought to explain to his own people and to the world his attitude toward the Nazi regime. He has said that as early as 1934 he recognized the criminal character of the Nazi movement. He made firm plans to emigrate in 1938 and in a television interview seen by millions of Germans last week, he stated that if his plans had materialized he, like Willi Brandt, would have opposed the Nazi government from abroad. In this interview he told the German people that he had hoped that Germany would not win the last war. Kiesinger could not hope to gain politically in Germany from such a statement.

One cannot condone membership in the Nazi Party. It is evident, however, that the political activity of this man during the post-war period has shown no trace of Nazi thinking. It is therefore important that his publicized Nazi membership not obscure the other aspects of his background and character which are likely to govern his actions as Federal Chancellor.

Kiesinger was raised in a cultivated household of mixed Catholic and Protestant parentage. He followed the Catholic faith but is proud of a pietist influence which came to him through his father. As a young man, he wrote poetry and hoped, for a time, to combine literary and political careers. He soon gave up literature in favor of politics but he retained and shows still today many characteristics of an artist and an intellectual. He is a person of elegant appearance and great personal charm. With this, he combines a gift for oratory and felicitous expression. Whereas both Adenauer and Erhard were somewhat provincial in personality, Kiesinger is far more the man of the world. He has travelled widely--including frequent visits to America--and speaks both French and English. His daughter resides in Washington, being married to an American citizen of German origin.

These are the external marks of the man. His strength in the face of opposition remains to be proven. At the moment it can be said that he has undertaken his new responsibilities with greater decision and authority than even his friends had expected. He has shown independence of judgment and the ability to explain lucidly and persuasively the policies of his government.

These policies from our point of view seem sound. Kiesinger is profoundly pro-Western. Devoted to European culture, he can be expected to place great importance on the strengthening of the European community. He will wish to develop understanding and

cooperation with France. There is nothing in his past or present statements, however, to suggest that he would like to see Western Europe as a third force between the Soviet Union and the United States as de Gaulle would have it. I have been particularly gratified to find that he is a man who insists that Germany should learn to rely on itself. In his policy statement before the Bundestag, he said that "perhaps in the past years we have sometimes put too much emphasis on our own trials and worries and interests with the United States--which of course was understandable in view of our position as the weaker and afflicted partner--without realizing that a big power like the United States has its own worries and problems... We shall not forget this and should consider in what way we can share more resolutely than hitherto in the responsibility in the preservation of the world peace."

I have known Kiesinger now for more than three years, having often talked with him in confidence and at length in his home state and here in Bonn. I believe that he is a person with whom you can establish a relationship of confidence. It is not clear how soon you will meet. Kiesinger quite rightly does not wish to push and desires first to make his necessary visits in Europe and to make a good start in settling his own urgent domestic problems. When the time comes, I am convinced that you will enjoy working with him. I hope that, in the meantime, this informal sketch may be of value as you deal with Kiesinger at a distance and assess the actions of his government.

Sincerely,

George C. McGhee
American Ambassador

Thursday, January 26, 1967 -- 5:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

State thinks it would be advisable for Gene Rostow and John Schnittker to hold a backgrounder tomorrow on their trip. The reason is the Indian correspondents here (Times of India, and one or two others) will be filing their stories any way; and State thinks it would be better to get the stories straight by giving our side of it.

W. W. Rostow

Okay to hold backgrounder _____

Disapproved _____

See me ✓ _____

*they ought to keep their mouth shut
until we know what we're going to do*

rlh

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, January 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Summary

1. New Zealand May Increase Vietnam Commitment

Prime Minister Holyoake informed Ambassador Powell that, although he had not yet cleared the idea with his cabinet, he is thinking of increasing the New Zealand military commitment in Vietnam by one infantry battalion from Malaysia, a frigate, and possibly a squadron of elite troops. The Ambassador predicts that the Prime Minister will take the action in his own good time.

2. Mao's Appeal May Disrupt Army

Our Consulate General at Hong Kong believes Mao's call for army support may carry into military circles the same disruption now prevailing in the civilian sector. If the army responds, it will represent a long stride toward civil war.

3. Release of Cong Prisoners

Governor Harriman has asked Ambassador Lodge to explore ways in which we might bring the South Vietnamese Government around to our point of view regarding the possible future release of low-level Viet Cong POWs in an effort to benefit Americans captured by the VC. The Governor pointed out that the publicity surrounding the recent release of three VC and the South Vietnamese Government's stated intention to keep them under "surveillance" destroyed any hope that the operation could encourage the release of other US prisoners.

4. New Fighting in Nicaragua

Embassy Managua reports that street fighting again broke out in Managua yesterday afternoon. Although opposition leader Aguero and his principal followers remain free, the Government has initiated a massive roundup of Communists and lesser opposition figures. The Embassy has refused a request from an Aguero confidant to act as a channel of communications with the Government; it comments that the opposition's objective throughout the present crisis has been to involve the US in an effort to remove the Somozas and the Liberal Party from power.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

5. Israeli-Syrian Talks

Israeli and Syrian negotiators met yesterday to begin discussing where farmers can cultivate along their disputed border. The beginning of the plowing season normally brings with it exchanges of gunfire. The tension thus produced could, in the current atmosphere charged by terrorism, trigger a serious clash. We have no firm reports on the talks yet. It's clear the Israelis got to the press first and are trying to make it appear that the Syrians have agreed to end all hostile acts. The Syrians, on the other hand, will try to steer the talks away from the subject of terrorism. In any case, the fact that the two sides are meeting together for the first time in eight years is an important step, though we should not expect too much from it.

6. Arrests Accompany Co Dismissal

Police Director Loan has arrested some 30 middle-grade officers in an apparent follow-up to the dismissal of Defense Minister Co. It is not clear whether Loan is acting on his own, on authority granted by Premier Ky before his departure, or with the concurrence of other members of the Directorate, including Chief of State Thieu. The arrests, however, may arouse fears and suspicions on the part of southern politicians.

15/
W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, January 26, 1967, 10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Harold Wilson wanted you to know that his meeting with Robert Kennedy this evening was requested by the Senator, who is in the UK for a weekend conference of parliamentarians. The Prime Minister wanted to be sure you understood the circumstances. He felt he could not say no to the Senator's request.

This message came in a call from Michael Stewart, their No. 2 at the Embassy.

Francis

Francis M. Bator

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chan
2/27

Thursday, January 26, 1967
10:00 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Westy's command guidance for 1967 will interest you.

It is clear:

- we have the initiative;
- we will have sufficient forces for steady offensive pressure on base areas, pacification, opening roads, etc.

The unsolved problems are:

- the detailed planning of pacification, province by province;
- galvanizing the ARVN for pacification;
- getting the right allocation of U. S. forces between pacification and base area attacks;
- getting the right coordination from Saigon down to the provinces between military and civil elements and between U. S. and Vietnamese efforts.

But we're moving; and Westy's vision of 1967 is basically cheering.

W. W. R.

SECRET attachment (DOD 63890 1/24/67)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12850, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Conf. Files, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 2-25-91

From Westmoreland

Subject: Command Guidance

1. During the past year, the buildup and successes of US/FWMA forces have created a new climate in South Vietnam for much of 1966, we were engaged in a holding action characterized by border surveillance to detect and prevent infiltration, reconnaissance to locate enemy forces which could threaten our objectives, and spoiling attacks to disrupt enemy plans before they could be executed. US/FWMA forces have demonstrated convincingly their determination, their dedication, and their professional competence in assisting the Government of Vietnam to defeat the Viet Cong/ North Vietnam forces and to gain control of the population, the resources, and the territory of South Vietnam. We have entered a new phase of the conflict and must reexamine our strategy to insure that it takes advantage of existing strategic opportunities. The Viet Cong/North Vietnam forces no longer have the capability of achieving a military victory. We must make 1967 the year during which it will become evident to the enemy and the world that we can and will achieve our military objectives. Concurrently, we must recognize that military success alone will not achieve the Free World objectives in Vietnam. A political, economic and psychological victory is equally important.

2. During the coming year we will mount a general offensive designed to:

- a. Maintain the momentum of the offensive on a 7-day-a-week, around-the-clock basis.
- b. Decimate enemy forces, destroy his base areas and disrupt the Viet Cong infrastructure.
- c. Interdict enemy land and water lines of communication, denying him the opportunity to resupply and reinforce his units and bases in South Vietnam
- d. Open, secure and use land and water line of communication.
- e. Convince the enemy, through the vigor of our offensives and accompanying psychological operations, that he faces defeat.
- f. Support political and economic progress in South Vietnam.

3. In the coming year we must increase the momentum of our successes. We will move to exploit the damage already done to the enemy by attacking him in areas long considered sacrosanct. Carefully planned and vigorously

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1998

By 14, NARA, Date 2-25-91

executed successive major offensives against enemy base areas and main forces will destroy his combat potential. During periods when major offensives are being planned but are not actually in progress, our forces will destroy the smaller, close-in base areas to continue the pressure on the enemy at all levels and at all times.

4. The principles of mass surprise and economy of force are guide posts in apportioning resources against the full spectrum of enemy elements -- main forces, local forces, supply system, guerrillas, and the Viet Cong infrastructure. Sustained operations will be planned in support of RVNAF (South Vietnam Air Force) forces to destroy local guerrillas and Viet Cong infrastructure. A major part of our strategy will be to complete the tasks undertaken and not to allow the enemy to deceive us into piecemeal or sporadic utilization of our growing resources.

5. Of particular importance in our strategy is the focusing of our effort on the enemy base areas and supply systems, the Achilles heel of the Viet Cong/North Vietnam forces. Because of his tenuous supply lines leading into and through South Vietnam, the enemy is dependent on the buildup of weapons, equipment, food and medical supplies which are located in his base areas. Destruction of established enemy base areas denies him the opportunity to rest, retrain, recuperate and resupply easily. Thorough, meticulous search in areas in which our forces are operating is a key to the successful accomplishment of this important task. If we can neutralize the enemy base areas and prevent replenishment of the materiel captured or destroyed, we will have taken a long stride toward ultimate victory.

6. The overall strategy will include aggressive action to open, secure and use land and water lines of communication. We must recognize the necessity of a military contribution to the development and strengthening of the economic posture of South Vietnam. Economic viability is dependent upon getting goods to the marketplace. Increased use of land and water lines of communication for military activities is essential in view of our limited tactical airlift capability. Continued use of these lines of communication also provide an increase in friendly presence throughout South Vietnam.

7. Increased emphasis must be placed on the use of long-range combat patrols. They play a vital role in the conduct of economy-of-force operations. Extensive use of these assets will provide much greater knowledge of where the enemy is, and equally important, where he is not. This will permit us to apply our combat power where lucrative results can be obtained.

8. We possess vastly superior combat power and should take advantage of every opportunity to exploit it. The B-52 strikes are examples of the application of combat power against enemy bases and troop concentrations. The B-52 strike provides us with an economy-of-force weapon to maintain pressure on the enemy when troop formations are engaged otherwise. Preplanned integration of the B-52 strike into schemes of maneuver also will be emphasized. Immediate and aggressive followup will be conducted, whenever practicable, to exploit the psychological effect of air bombardment and to assess strike damage to the target.

9. It is essential that the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Air Force be improved. Concurrently, the image of the military forces of South Vietnam in the eyes of the world and especially in the United States must reflect the contribution which has been and is being made to the overall effort in South Vietnam. Much of the press reporting on this subject is unfair and indicates a lack of understanding of the South Vietnamese Air Force contribution. This, in turn, has a deleterious effect on RVNAF morale and effectiveness. RVNAF must be made to realize that there are military tasks as well as non-military tasks associated with Revolutionary Development. Every influence must be used to get RVNAF (South Vietnamese Air Force) to cease conducting an intermittent war and instead to maintain continuous pressure on enemy forces. We must insure that maximum use is made of South Vietnamese forces in all our planned major offensives and that they are given tasks which are important and which will contribute to their continued growth potential. We then must insure that full credit is given to their accomplishments in each of these operations.

10. A basic precept for the success of revolutionary development is that security should spread radially from secure bases to provide protection to more of the population. In order to maintain continuous pressure on the enemy, US/Free World forces must be prepared to move to positions peripheral to areas of primary RVNAF operations. The protective shield thus established and persistently pushed outward creates the secure environment within which GVN agencies can conduct Revolutionary Development programs. During the coming year the GVN hopes to surge ahead in the Revolutionary Development program and they deserve our support.

11. Psychological operations will be flexible and timely -- quickly responding to the tactical situation and immediately exploiting any psychological opportunity which is created by our expanding offensive. Continuous attention will be given to development of PsyWar themes pointed toward inducing defections from the ranks of the Viet Cong and North Vietnam Army, and toward convincing the enemy and the people that the only hope for peace

over the long term is allegiance to and support of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

12. In summary, we have two equally important tasks to accomplish simultaneously -- maintain relentless pressure on enemy combat forces and support systems and provide expanding security to the population. Our progress will be measured in terms of Viet Cong bases eliminated, of territory cleared of enemy influence, of population secured, of land and water lines of communication which provide uninterrupted flow of goods ~~and~~ market, and of enemy forces destroyed. The number and nature of our tasks require a combination of deliberate planning and flexible execution. Imagination in the use of our assets, understanding of the political and economic effect of our actions, appreciation of our role in support of the people of South Vietnam, and anticipation of the future leadership needs of South Vietnam will contribute to our success and to attainment of US objectives. The majority of the people will gravitate toward the side which manifests greater strength. We must demonstrate throughout the country that the Government of South Vietnam is the stronger.

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extra
copy

Thursday, January 26, 1967
10:00 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

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SECRET attachment (DOD 63890 1/24/67)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 2-25-91

From Westmoreland

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988
By 19, NARA, Date 2-25-91

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Wednesday
January 25, 1967
4:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a ^{draft} reply to

Mr. Griggs.

W. W. Rostow

3/10
January 26, 1967

Dear Mr. Griggs:

The Vice President was good enough to send me your reply, as one independent citizen, to a statement published in the Duluth News-Tribune.

I merely wish to tell you that I was pleased equally by your lucid statement of support for our nation's position in Viet Nam and by the sturdiness of your exercise of the responsibility of citizenship.

What you say is quite correct: the decision to make peace lies in the hands of Hanoi; and the demonstrated unity of this nation is one of the factors which, in the end, will bring us an honorable peace.

Sincerely,

N/LBJ

Mr. Richard L. Griggs
1406 Alworth Building
Duluth, Minnesota

LBJ:WWR:mz

January 25, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a friendly greeting which will be placed at the entrance to the American pavilion at the international food processing exhibition in Moscow next May.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

Welcome to the exhibition of the United States at
INPRODMASH-67.

This is the first time the United States has officially participated in a Soviet Industrial Fair. The American Government and the food processing and packaging industry of our country have worked together to assemble this exhibition.

As you tour our pavilion you will see some of the advanced electronic and automated equipment we use to process and package food in the United States. You will see how this technology benefits the American consumer. We hope the exhibition will lead to a better understanding of America and to increased trade between our countries.

Lyndon B. Johnson

53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, January 25, 1967 -- 5:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

An additional personal observation.

I spent a long evening with Costa e Silva. He is anxious that it be understood that:

-- He is a man of intellectual quality, having led his class at the Brazilian Military Academy;

-- He is a humane Brazilian citizen authentically interested in the welfare of his people.

In fact, I believe he will try to reduce, somewhat, the remarkable austerity of Castelo Branco's period in office. Therefore, I suggest you engage him in discussion of the future of Brazilian educational institutions; how to break the bottleneck which prevents workers' children from getting into high schools (Castelo Branco began movement on this); housing; etc. He would be pleased and flattered if you talked to him, as one who would understand, about your own sense of commitment to the Great Society programs.

In short, I suggest you treat him less as a soldier and more as a fellow civil statesman.

On an initial impression, this would not be easy to do, especially if he wears his dark glasses.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State la 3/15/77 nsc la
1/20/78

By

NARA, Date 2

~~SECRET~~

54
Wednesday - January 25, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Brazilian President-elect Costa e Silva

Your involvement in President-elect Costa e Silva's private visit to Washington is a half-hour appointment in your office, followed by lunch.

Secretary Rusk has sent an excellent briefing book which is attached. I recommend that you review the papers which I have marked in red on the Index: the Scope Paper, the Secretary's memorandum to you, a summary of Brazil's political and economic situation with charts, and the biographies.

Purpose of the Visit

The shortness of the visit with you will not allow for detailed substantive discussions -- and Costa e Silva is not looking for any. A sensitive man, who feels that he did not get the treatment he deserved during his 1965 visit as Minister of War, he will be assessing our attitude toward him and his government. This is why it is important that you receive him warmly and express appreciation for Brazil's close collaboration on hemispheric and world issues.

Points You Might Cover

1. The OAS Summit provides a unique opportunity for opening a new chapter in inter-American cooperation. Latin America stands at a cross-roads. If it continues at the present modest rate of growth, it may avert serious crises for the next year or two until population increase, growing urban unemployment and backward agriculture produce new social crises and political extremism. If Latin America embarks on a new effort to accelerate economic and social progress, it can achieve self-sustaining development under stable, democratic institutions. The chartering of this new effort, to encompass the decade of the 1970's, is what we want to do at the Summit. We hope we can count on his and Brazil's full cooperation.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

1/20/78
Authority State la 5/15/77; NSC la
By kg, NARA, Date 2/7/91

2. Brazil's economic progress since 1964 is satisfying to Brazil and to us. Under the Alliance for Progress we have made available to Brazil close to \$1 billion during this period. You might stress the importance we attach to continuation of the economic stabilization program and further reduction of inflation. The image which Brazil projects -- of stable, democratic political development, as well as economic progress with better distribution of the gains among its people -- is extremely important in Latin America and in the United States, particularly with respect to Alliance appropriations.
3. Brazil's close cooperation we value highly. We are grateful for the assistance during the Dominican crisis, the leadership at the UN on the seating of Red China, and the support in policies to keep Castro isolated. We also appreciate Brazil's strong moral support on Vietnam and its gifts of coffee and medical supplies to the Vietnamese people.
4. Your assessment of the Vietnam situation -- coupled with a re-affirmation that it will not distract us from our hemispheric responsibilities -- would be well received by him. You might express the hope that Brazil will find it possible to make a further contribution to the Vietnam effort.

Points He Might Raise

1. Our economic assistance is vital and he hopes that the US will maintain this help. You might reply that this is your intent, and you hope that the policies of his government will make it easy for us to do so.
2. Increased military assistance from the US is important to enable Brazil's armed forces to perform peacekeeping responsibilities abroad and internal security at home. You might point out that our assistance to Brazil is the highest in the hemisphere, reflecting our understanding of Brazil's size and aspirations and cooperation with us, but also note that we are operating under an \$85 million ceiling set by the Congress.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Briefing book

SECRET

Wednesday, January 25, 1967 -- 6:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith some positive clippings on your foreign policy -- even one from Lippmann!

We haven't exactly turned the tide; but will plug away -- and the truth will out.

W. W. Rostow

Wednesday, January 25, 1967
5:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

It will come as a great surprise to you that we have an Indian pipeline problem to which Sec. Freeman addresses himself herewith.

W. W. Rostow



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

56a
January 25, 1967

MEMORANDUM

To: The President
The White House

From: Orville L. Freeman
Secretary of Agriculture *OLF*

Subject: India's Foodgrain Needs -- Logistics

As the President knows, India has scheduled arrivals of 2.3 million tons of foodgrains through the first three months of 1967. These arrivals consist of 1.6 million tons from the U.S., 0.7 million tons from Canada, Australia, U.S.S.R., and commercial purchases. This exhausts the presently known supply.

Additional arrivals must be scheduled very soon now if the foodgrain pipeline is not to be broken and if advantage is to be taken of pre-monsoon weather so local reserves can be set up in shortage areas which are inaccessible to supply from the outside when the rains come in June. A reasonable objective based on the best current need estimate of 10 million tons for the calendar year is that an additional 3.0 million tons arrive in India before June 30. It will take 2 million tons from the United States to reach this target. Substantially all of what the President allocates should leave our shores before the end of April to beat the monsoon. The consortium arrangement in the mill presumably will provide for India's needs during the second half of the year. There is little or no likelihood that grain moving under consortium arrangements will reach India before the monsoon.

One important question the President will resolve in the proposed message on India to the Congress is how and when this 2 million tons should be provided. But, however this question may be decided, there is need within the next few days to begin work on a buying and shipping schedule which can place 2 million tons of U.S. grain in India by the end of June. Arrangements for the movement of a substantial amount should be made by the end of January.

There are means which we have used in the past to bridge problems of time needed to engage shipping and assemble grain pending formal agreement between two governments. This method is to give the foreign government a letter saying that "if and when" an agreement is signed we will cover under it -- on whatever terms are agreed -- a stated quantity of grain which the government may have bought in the U.S. on commercial terms. (A copy of such a letter is attached.)

2--The President

Since the new provisions of P.L. 480 will take some time to negotiate it would be of great assistance in the orderly movement of commodities to put this procedure into effect immediately for an amount of at least 500,000 tons. The use of this reimbursement system will then give us the time needed to negotiate a new agreement with India under the new law.

If you authorize the negotiation of a new agreement for 2 million tons of grain that amount -- plus the one million tons that India would have to procure from other sources -- should take care of her needs until June 30, when the consortium arrangements could have been concluded.

If you authorize the negotiation of an agreement for an amount less than 2 million tons, with the remainder to be provided in a second agreement to be concluded later, perhaps after some action by the Congress, we would again likely need authorization to use the reimbursement system to fill the gap.

Important factors relevant to the timing of these arrangements are:

1. Possible advantages of delaying Congressional hearings until after the selection of the new Indian Cabinet following the February 20 elections. This will not be completed under their Constitution until mid-April.
2. A consortium meeting on the food problem could not be held before early March at best and will probably need to be followed by some period of follow-up negotiations before we can know what is available from other countries.
3. It will take some time to negotiate an agreement under the new law since we will need to reach agreement on the shape of India's self-help efforts to increase agricultural productivity.
4. The critical period for foodgrain shipments is between now and late June, when movement of food into some of the shortage areas in northern India may become virtually impossible. A shortfall from the total of 10 million tons for the calendar year could best come in the last few months of the year when the size of the new fall crop is known.

Attachment

566

His Excellency
Mr. Braj Kumar Nehru
Ambassador of India
2536 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

This is in reference to the proposed plan for the advanced procurement of wheat prior to the execution of a sales agreement under Title I, Public Law 480.

In view of the urgent need for wheat in India, it is proposed that wheat be procured with the following understanding:

The Government of India may procure up to 500,000 metric tons of wheat with its own resources on and after the date this proposal is accepted by you. If and when the Title I, Public Law 480 sales agreement between the Government of India and the Government of the United States is signed, the Government of India may request the issuance of a purchase authorization to reimburse the Government of India for wheat purchased under this arrangement. The authorization, when issued will provide for the financing of sales in accordance with the Title I, Public Law 480 Regulations.

After the purchase authorization is issued, the Government of India may request reimbursement by submitting paid documents to the Commodity Credit Corporation as required by the Title I Regulations, except that in lieu of Form CCC-329 and Form CCC-106, there shall be submitted a copy of the sale contract and a copy of the confirmation of the liner booking contract or a copy of a charter party. The paid detailed invoice shall include the following certification:

"The undersigned hereby certifies that the commodity for which payment is claimed herein was not acquired by the supplier from Anthony DeAngelis, Adolf Gobel, Inc., Allied Crude Vegetable Oil Refining Corporation, Atlantic Industries and Terminal, Inc., Chicago Refining Corporation, Continental Refining and Packaging, Co., Inc., Eastern Edible Refining

2

Corporation, Metropolitan Fats and Oils Co., Inc.
Metropolitan Shortening Corporation, Queens Shortening
and Refining Corporation, Riverside Shortening Corpora-
tion, Shortening Corporation of America, Inc., Trans-World
Refining Corporation, or Universal Automated Industries, Inc."

With regard to Form CCC-329-3, Statement of Transmittal of Ocean Bills of Lading, each purchase authorization for wheat, when issued, will eliminate the requirement for submission of Form CCC-329-3, but will require submission of three non-negotiable copies of ocean ladings in lieu of the usual one copy.

With regard to prior price review each purchase authorization for wheat will eliminate the requirement for suppliers of wheat to obtain prior price review but will provide that reimbursement to the Government of India shall not exceed prices approved for CCC financing.

In all other respects, the provisions of the Title I, Public Law 480 Regulations shall apply.

Wheat not to exceed 500,000 metric tons of the following classes will be eligible for financing:

- (1) White wheat of the subclasses hard white, soft white, white club and western white, U. S. No. 2 or better.
- (2) Hard red spring wheat of the subclasses dark northern spring, northern spring and red spring, U. S. No. 3 or better.
- (3) Hard red winter wheat of the subclasses dark hard winter, hard winter, and yellow hard winter, U. S. No. 2 or better.
- (4) Durum wheat of the subclass hard amber durum, U. S. No. 3 or better.

Shipments of hard and durum wheat to be f.o.b. vessel, U. S. Gulf port(s), U. S. Atlantic Coast Port(s), U. S. Great Lake Port(s) and/or Canadian transshipment point(s). Shipments of white wheat to be f.o.b. vessel, U. S. Pacific Coast Port(s) only. Public Law 664, 83rd Congress (Cargo Preference) requires that at least 50 percent of the total tonnage of wheat to be provided under the contemplated sales agreement will be transported on privately-owned U. S. flag commercial vessels. CCC will reimburse ocean freight charges only to the extent that such charges are higher than would otherwise be the case by reason of the requirement that the commodities be transported on U. S. flag vessels. The balance of such ocean freight charges for transportation on U. S. flag vessels must be paid in dollars by the Government of India.

Wheat procured under the above arrangement after the date of execution of the contemplated sales agreement between our two Governments will not be eligible for reimbursement by CCC.

It is understood that in the event wheat is not included in the contemplated sales agreement, CCC will not reimburse the Government of India for wheat purchased under the above arrangement.

If this proposal meets with your approval, please indicate your acceptance by signing in the space provided on the carbon copy and return the signed copy to this office.

Sincerely yours,

For the Government of India

Date

P file
511

~~SECRET~~ -- NODIS

Wednesday, January 25, 1967
12:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a resumption of Amb. Lodge's weekly telegram.

Sanger 16456

I concur in his recommendation, marked, on page 4. We may also wish to get Gen. Taylor on television soon after his return.

Incidentally, General Taylor arrives at 9:50 p.m. on Saturday at Andrews and, therefore, will not be available for lunch on Saturday.

W. W. Rostow

Reschedule _____

Bring him along on Tuesday _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~ -- NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 2-25-91

WWRostow:rla

572

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Wednesday, January 25, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 16456)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. Vietnam Changes in 1 1/2 Years

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-255
By mg, NARA, Date 1-3-92

General Max Taylor, who departed this morning, kindly asked for a list of the changes which had taken place in Vietnam during the last year and a half (for many of which he sowed the seed when he was on duty here). He intends to use this material in the press and on television upon his return. The compilation which we made reflects such tremendous credit on your decision to commit U.S. troops that I thought it would interest you to have it, as follows:

"Changes in Vietnam since the President's Decision to Commit U.S. Troops (announced on July 28, 1965)

1 Overt Aggression:

A. U.S. forced build-up and field deployment accomplished with a minimum of disturbance.

B. Third country allied forces in place. Now over 50,000 troops from five countries.

C. Army of Vietnam (ARVN) has been strongly supported by U.S. forces.

D. Enemy Main Force threat has been contained; enemy Main Force units have been either kept off balance or defeated.

E. Friendly troops have begun to enter enemy base areas in strength and for long periods.

F. Bombing of the North has been sustained and has increased enemy supply problems.

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

G. Naval control of South Vietnam coast and major rivers has been put into effect with great success.

H. Viet Cong defectors doubled (20,000 in 1966, expected to be greater in 1967).

I. All ratios now highly favorable each week. Enemy losses in killed, captured, and weapons are punishingly one-sided.

II Clandestine Aggression

A. Better understanding of Revolutionary Development; first steps being taken to revamp ARVN. The Revolutionary Development cadres have been formed, trained and the concepts of their deployment developed. From the first political action teams to the well-trained Revolutionary Development teams is a long step forward.

B. Revolutionary Development has been subjected to planned programming of a high order, with integrated organization from Ministerial level downward.

C. Police Force has been expanded and better trained.

D. Communist control in countryside has been rejected by population whenever security conditions permit. People living under secure conditions estimated to have increased from 54 percent to 59 percent during 1966, with no change in the 20 percent largely under Viet Cong influence.

III Political

A. One government over period as contrasted with frequent changes immediately beforehand means that everyone has had time to learn to do his job. Order restored in Hue/Danang, which had been effectively removed from Government of Vietnam jurisdiction.

B. Increased security has enabled political evolution to occur, whereas no political institutions were taking root immediately beforehand.

C. Political life and popular representation became an accepted fact and there is promise of wholesome political development in the future.

- D. Elections of September 11 were a remarkable manifestation.
- E. Work of the Constituent Assembly proceeding on schedule.
- F. Popular resistance to the Viet Cong continues. No development of a defeatist attitude.
- G. No more Corps Commander "war lords."

IV Economic

- A. Runaway inflation prevented.
- B. Food has been plentiful and available to the general public.
- C. Imports increased dramatically.
- D. Full employment has been achieved and sustained.
- E. Major construction tasks accomplished in particular ports have been expanded dramatically.
- F. Refugees have been cared for.
- G. Transportation has been accomplished to outlying areas.
- H. Economic planning for the future has been re-started.
- I. Financial position of the Government of Vietnam has greatly strengthened due to increasingly strong foreign exchange position.
- J. Increasing measures have been taken to deny economic resources to the enemy.

V. Social

- A. Amazing growth in health facilities in provincial area plus substantial improvement in medical education.
- B. Expansion of primary education in particular, but strengthening of educational system in general.
- C. Greater press freedom and press responsibility."

To be sure, we still face enormous problems, notably as regards eliminating the terrorist inner circle -- and everything in Vietnam is still fragile and precarious.

I wonder whether the above list of "changes in Vietnam" could not be distributed to top officials in Washington, in Saigon and to U.S. Ambassadors abroad for them to use in their press backgrounding and their conversations with opinion makers.

B. Military

As usual, the performance of U.S. forces regarding overt aggression has been outstanding. For example, General Westmoreland tells me that the "Cedar Falls" operation in Binh Duong, which started on January 8, and is still continuing, is the most significant success to date in Vietnam. This operation resulted so far in killing 679 Viet Cong soldiers, taking 198 prisoners, and detaining 508 suspects. Five hundred-eleven individual and 23 crew-served weapons, as well as large quantities of rice, were taken. The surprising totals of 650,000 vials of penicillin and two tons of Vitamin C were seized.

A total of 5,967 refugees were evacuated in what I believe is the outstanding operation of its kind since this war began. These people were transported by many methods to specially prepared camps, and were enabled to bring with them their livestock -- ducks, pigs, buffalos -- an operation which speaks well both for the civil and the military.

Our own losses in the operation were 73 killed and 322 wounded.

As a result of this operation, a total of 374 Viet Cong have come into the Chieu Hoi camps -- the largest ever to come in as a result of a single combat operation.

The enemy fought from underground fortifications, work on which was started in 1946.

A large number of documents has been captured, including an attack plan on the city of Saigon. I am told that in them is detailed identification of the billets occupied by Americans.

One document contains the Viet Cong high command's estimate of the situation as regards numbers of persons in Vietnam under Viet Cong control. Their estimate is the same as ours: that during the last year they have lost control over about a million people and that the trend is bad for them.

C. Psychological Warfare

An outstanding example of psychological warfare was carried out by the Koreans in their recent advance south from Qui Nhon. They established a sort of "trading post" in a mountain pass where the local people could come and get things they wanted in exchange for their own produce. This became a popular meeting place. As a result of this, the Koreans over a period of months came to know who was who in the area which they planned to liberate. By careful interrogation, they discovered who the hardcore Viet Cong were. They also answered many questions, such as why they, Koreans, were fighting in Vietnam. When the time for the advance was ripe, they dropped leaflets announcing that no one would be killed, and that if anybody was hurt, it was the fault of the Viet Cong. They then went in and picked up hardcore Viet Cong terrorists and leaders.

This is the kind of clever politics, plus clever soldiering which our side must do. It is what I have been dreaming of for three years. And now it has happened. We are going all out to get the word around so that others may do the same.

D. Vietnamese

In the week ending January 21, the Viet Cong killed 44 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 26, and abducted 103. The dead and wounded included a District Chief, three Hamlet Chiefs, and nine National Policemen.

The 44 Vietnamese civilians killed this week may be compared with the following figures for the previous six weeks: 36, 33, 34, 30, 19, and 21. Civilians wounded for the previous six weeks were: 31, 52, 63, 68, 37, 15. Civilians abducted for the previous six weeks were: 27, 104, 97, 44, 20, 136.

E. Chieu Hoi

Returnees for the week of January 8 - 14 totaled 420. This figure is expected to go higher when we have all the figures resulting from the Cedar Falls operation. Last week's total was 437, bringing the total for this year to 857.

The total number of Chieu Hoi returnees for last year was 20,242, far more than in any previous year. The 1966 total can be compared with 11,124 in 1965 and 5,417 in 1964.

A special Tet drive to bring in Chieu Hoi returnees during the Tet holiday season is under way. Instructions were sent to Regional and Provincial Chieu Hoi Chiefs on January 11, and a special task force has been set up in Saigon to supervise the drive. In connection with the campaign over 31 million leaflets have already been airdropped, and the Vietnamese radio is featuring material keyed to the campaign.

F. Civil Operations

The "Office of Civil Operations" under Bill Porter made their first major report to Max Taylor and me on January 22. This was the first time all agencies from the civil side of the house were able to speak with one voice. This reorganization of agencies and reorientation in individual agency thinking has been under way only since December 1, and already there are concrete examples of better performance. For example, I doubt very much that the 5,967 refugees who have come in from the Cedar Falls operations could have been handled as expeditiously under the previous arrangement.

I believe Porter has impressively justified the confidence expressed in him when you put him in charge of the civil side last February.

G. The Constitution

The Assembly has completed the first draft and is well into the first section of a final draft. Broadly speaking, the first draft of the Constitution seems workable. It will be modified in the coming weeks but the main features are unlikely to change.

It contains nine chapters and 135 articles. It provides for a modified Presidential system, with a Prime Minister appointed by and responsible to the President. The bicameral legislature has rather strong powers as regards the Executive. Not only may the legislature "propose" the removal of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, but it may also declare national emergencies, and it has a major responsibility for foreign policy. On the other hand, the President not only has the usual power to veto legislation, as in our system, but he may also amend bills sent to him for signature. Such amendments can only be overridden by a two-thirds vote of both houses.

Other features of the Constitution are: a well-written section on the rights and duties of citizens; provision for a Supreme Court with the power of the judicial review; an independent judiciary; and an inspectorate. One chapter is devoted entirely to the role of political parties and the opposition. It provides for the free establishment of political parties which "respect the Constitution, the law, and the national sovereignty," and says that "the State encourages and assists progress towards a two-party system."

The crucial question of the role of the military in the future government is the subject of several articles. Military personnel elected to offices such as President, Vice President, Senator or Congressman must resign for the Armed Forces. Military personnel holding key offices in the central government must resign or go on leave without pay; this provision means that military men serving Ministers need not resign from the Armed Forces, but can simply go on leave without pay. There is a ban on political party activity by military personnel on active duty. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. And there is also a provision for a National Security Council, though its function and powers are not spelled out.

The Government currently seeks change in several parts of the draft, particularly in those provisions which curtail the powers of the President. It wants to increase Presidential powers to deal with emergencies and to conduct foreign affairs. It does not want the Prime Minister to be subject to a vote of "no confidence" by the legislature. It also objects to provisions which call for the present Constituent Assembly to serve as the legislative arm of the government until elections are held under the Constitution first National Assembly. Although the Assembly provided for appointment of Province Chiefs

in insecure areas during the first term of the first President, the Constitution appears to require the election of these officials whenever possible; the Directorate is opposed to this provision.

I agree with the Government that the President should have the normal powers with respect to emergencies and foreign affairs. We are using our influence to help bring about the necessary changes to that end. I also favor some provision to insure that the President will be elected by at least a large plurality. With a large number of candidates, some thinning out device is indispensable to prevent the winner from having a very low percentage of the total vote.

H. Economic

Inflation remains a threat, but Saigon Retail Prices are holding reasonably steady. The Retail Price Index now stands at 239. This compares with 231, 243, 239, 216, 225, and 232 for the previous six weeks.

Considering the nearness to the Tet holidays, when prices normally increase, the Index is not bad. It does not, however, show that rice prices have been rising since January 1, and rice has psychological importance out of proportion to its real effect on the family budget. The main reason for the increase in the price of rice is the expectation of a smaller crop and damage from military operations in the Delta. There are also indications of hoarding.

The government is seeking to buy 200,000 tons of rice, and has made inquiries in Thailand and Burma. It is also thinking about buying 20,000 tons in Taiwan, but no concrete steps have yet been taken to meet the problem of dwindling stocks. We estimate that mid-January stocks will total no more than 40,000 tons. Delta deliveries to Saigon during the first half of January totaled 14,000 tons as compared with 15,000 tons for the first half of January 1966.

Pork supply does not look bad. Last week 9,000 hogs were delivered from the Delta through official channels, and the price of pork has remained unchanged. It now appears, however, that there will be no additional supply of pork for Tet. The Government of Vietnam and the supplier of 15,000 tons for frozen pork that were to have come from Argentina have been unable to agree on the terms of air shipment of 100 tons before Tet.

I. Overall Results of U.S. Vietnam Policy

Ambassador Martin in Thailand in a recent speech tells of a European commenting that the public discussion of Vietnam in the U. S. was filled with gloomy forebodings of disaster. Yet from Europe, he said, it looks different. Martin described what this European thought, as follows:

"The rest of the world has assumed that our primary objective is the denial of Southeast Asia to Communist Chinese hegemony. It is quite clear to everyone except ourselves, and possibly Hanoi and Peking, that we have already achieved this objective. Historians will quite likely regard what we have done in Vietnam as the crucial turning point in the life of the developing two-thirds of the world. If Communist China had succeeded in this attempt, it would have led to such a complete validation of 'the thought of Mao Tse-tung' that a nuclear confrontation might have become inevitable. Our firm stand in South Vietnam has led directly to the almost complete elimination of Communist Chinese influence from Africa and Latin America. Mao believed that the techniques of the 'War of Liberation' could not be contained by the most powerful nation the world had ever known. Had Mao been proved correct, then Africa and Latin America as well as Asia would have certainly been engulfed by this technique."

"My European friend," Ambassador Martin continued, "went on to say the American policy in Asia and the Pacific was on the verge of a success as great as that in Europe in the fifties. He reminded me that the same sort of attacks were made by Americans on American policy then as are being made now. He said he still found it fascinating that while Americans were sometimes irritating in their insistence on their superiority in so many ways, they consistently underrated their accomplishments abroad. As a matter of fact, he said, America has handled its unequalled power with great imagination, its vast military strength with ingenuity and with enormous restraint."

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday - January 25, 1967

MR. PRESIDENT:

25x1A

I have looked into [REDACTED] report that Carrillo Flores is cool to the idea of a Summit meeting. The report is apparently based on [REDACTED]

25x1C

[REDACTED] on Carrillo Flores' January 18 press conference.

Ambassador Freeman's report on the same conference is as follows:

"In answer to a question by a Mexican journalist, he said it was incorrect that Mexico was being 'pressured' to attend the Summit meeting against his better judgment. The attitude of President Diaz Ordaz, he said, has constantly been (a) if held, the Summit should produce concrete results of benefit to the Latin American people and (b) Mexico would attend if there were a clear consensus among the Latin American States in favor of holding it and would cooperate fully in preparations for the Summit."

"Regarding the state of Summit preparations, Carrillo Flores said that the Mexican Government, while recognizing the complexity of the subjects, had hoped for greater progress at this point in pin-pointing specific subjects to be discussed. He considered the OAS experts' paper 'very valuable', however, and stated that it was reviewed on January 16 by the National Council on Foreign Commerce along with the heads of appropriate Mexican Government secretariats."

"The Mexican Government is in agreement, he said, that two of the principal subjects to be discussed, i.e., acceleration of Latin American economic integration and implementation of the objectives of the Alliance for Progress, were the two most likely to produce specific results, but it is premature at this point to anticipate whether such results would materialize."

SANITIZED

~~SECRET~~

Authority NLT 019-012-3-2
By g, NARA, Date 12/10/01

~~SECRET~~

-2-

EO 12958
3.4(h)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Linc Gordon believes that [REDACTED] interpretation of Carrillo Flores' press comments reflects the attitude of the Mexican Government before your meeting with Diaz Ordaz on December 3 and his (Linc Gordon's) meeting with Diaz Ordaz and Carrillo Flores in Mexico City just before he reported to you at the Ranch on December 20. Clare Boonstra, the DCM in Mexico, who is here on consultation prior to assuming his new job as Ambassador to Costa Rica, confirms Linc Gordon's interpretation of the Mexican view on the Summit. Diaz Ordaz has passed the word to his Ministers and it is now filtering down through the bureaucracy that Mexico is in favor of a Summit meeting. Carrillo Flores' press comments, quoted above, reflect a cautious but favorable attitude.

18
W. W. Rostow

by WGB

~~SECRET~~