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Wednesday, January 25, 1967 -- 6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contact

I had a long session today with Adelbert de Segonzac, France Soir. We mainly discussed Viet Nam.

I tried to focus him on the emergent younger generation -- military and civilian -- in South Viet Nam and parallel to modern South Korea. I pointed out that much of European thinking about South Viet Nam was based on an analogy with French colonial experience; whereas our thought and policy focused on encouraging a new generation of authentic nationalists. He found this a new thought and said he would take it into account in his dispatches.

We also discussed Communist China.

I have now firmed it up, as instructed, with Leonard Marks that my staff and I will participate regularly in meetings with the foreign press, which he will host.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Presfile 60

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NEJ 9/-256 By NARA, Date /2-2-93

SECRET

January 25, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Assignment of Highest National Priority to GRAVEL, CBU 24/29, and DRAGONTOOTH

The Secretary of Defense has recommended that you place the three ammunition items listed below in the highest national priority category by authority granted under the Defense Production Act of 1950:

GRAVEL - an air-dispensed antipersonnel system (dispenser and mine) for purpose of area denial. The mine becomes inert after a predetermined number of hours has expired.

CBU 24/29 - an air-dispensed antimateriel/personnel system (dispenser and bomblet) which upon detonation saturates a wide target area with hundreds of thousands of high velocity fragment balls resulting in a high probability of target kills.

DRAGONTOOTH - an air-dispensed antipersonnel system (dispenser and a small wedge-shaped mine) to hinder and disrupt enemy activities.

These items are urgently needed to implement Project PRACTICE NINE and other Southeast Asia requirements. You previously approved other procurements for PRACTICE NINE for DX priority rating in NSAM 358.

The Bureau of the Budget has analyzed this request and recommends your concurrence. I also concur in the Defense recommendation. If you approve, I will sign the attached memo.

SECRET

 Approved			
 Disapproved	w.	w.	Rostow
 See me			

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO.

TO:

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce

The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

The Director of Central Intelligence The Director, Bureau of the Budget

The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

SUBJECT:

Assignment of Highest National Priority to GRAVEL,

CBU 24/29, and DRAGONTOOTH

In response to the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense in a memorandum of January 13, 1967, the President, under authority granted by the Defense Production Act of 1950, today established the following ammunition program items as being in the highest national priority category:

GRAVEL

CBU 24/29

DRAGONTOOTH

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 9/-256

By P, NARA, Date 12-23-93

W. W. Rostow

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Johnson 60b

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON

13 JAN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I recommend that you approve certain selected ammunition as a program of highest national priority, thereby making it eligible for use of the automatic DX industrial priority rating.

The selected ammunition program involves three individual items, all required urgently in Southeast Asia. These items are described below:

GRAVEL is an air-dispensed antipersonnel system (dispenser and mine) for purpose of area denial. The mine becomes inert after a predetermined number of hours has expired.

CBU 24/29 is an air-dispensed antimateriel/personnel system (dispenser and bomblet) which upon detonation saturates a wide target area with hundreds of thousands of high velocity fragment balls resulting in a high probability of target kills.

DRAGONTOOTH is an air-dispensed antipersonnel system (dispenser and a small wedge-shaped mine) to hinder and disrupt enemy activities.

The dollar values of the three ammunition items are:

(Millions of Dollars)

FY 1967	FY 1968
115.4	126.0
258.8	222.5
41.2	37.0
	115.4 258.8

Ants. Mara

DUE IN UD AT 10 YEAR
INTERVALS: NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 9/-25/

By 25, NARA, Date 9-1/-9/

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Sec Der Cont Mr. X-_

8ANITIZED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 99-19 by cb , NARA Date 6-20-00

61

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is the best single reconstruction I have read of the inner politics of mainland China in this crisis.

It is written by an imaginative, scholarly, bold CIA man

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

W. W. R.

-GONFIDENTIAL attachment

(sit. Rm. has cy , no doubt, at attach.)

Mr LRostow 62.

CONFIDENTIAL

January 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Iraqi Generals -- 25 January

This need only be a brief ceremonial meeting. Its main purpose is to receive warmly a friendly gesture by Iraqi President Aref.

General Sabri, who heads the Iraqi delegation, will present you with a gift (a carpet, we believe) and convey an oral message from President Aref.

In return, Secretary Rusk suggests you present a silver cigarette box for President Aref and ask General Sabri to convey your own good wishes and your desire to build an ever closer relationship between our two governments. (You need not be more specific. But our real purpose is to encourage the Iraqi moderates whom Aref heads to become a stabilizing influence in a tense area.)

Ambassador Hani will accompany the generals. You will recall your chat with him when he paid his respects at the hospital last fall.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NL 91-256 NARA, Date 12-2-43

CONFIDENTIAL

January 24, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Ambassador Tomic has delivered your letter of January 20 explaining your decision to postpone your trip to the United States.

I want you to know that I fully understand the reasons. The frankness and sincerity with which you state them convey a sense of confidence which I greatly appreciate and reciprocate.

You may be sure that you will be welcome here whenever you find that you can make the trip. I look forward to meeting you personally when we gather with our colleagues of the other American Republics in April. But I do not regard this as a substitute for having you and Mrs. Frei as our guests in Washington.

With warm best wishes,

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Eduardo Frei Montalva
President of the Republic of Chile
Santiago

LBJ:WB:mz

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 9/- 256

By 4-2, NARA, Date 12-2-93

SANITIZED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 99-19 By cb , NARA Date 6-22-00

-SECRET-

Tuesday, January 24, 1967 11:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

I sent up on January 21 a proposed pledge for the Turkish consortium.

You should know the consortium meets in Paris on Thursday. If the U.S. delegate is to leave town with instructions, we should have your ruling by tomorrow morning at the latest.

If you wish to withhold action or alter policy sharply, we should know this today in order to get the consortium date postponed.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

W. W. Rostow

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SANITIZED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 99-19

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Mr. Rostow

SECRET

January 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Pledge at the Turkish Consortium


The Turkish Consortium meets next Thursday, and Bill Gaud requests (Tab B) your authorization to pledge up to \$65 million in non-project loans from FY 1967 funds. This coupled with project loans (which you will see as they're ready) would bring our FY 1967 lending to \$120 million, \$10 million under last year.

This is our next step in building this consortium into an effective instrument for bringing the Europeans more fully into the Turkish aid business. Since 1962, we've pushed their contribution from almost nothing to 56% of total non-project aid. As part of that effort, we worked out in 1965 a three-year debt rescheduling--\$48 million this year, of which \$44 million is from the Europeans. All this is part of our blueprint for putting Turkey on its own feet in the early 1970s and well on the way to joining the Common Market.

The Turks had a good year in 1966. The attached memos from Gaud and Schultze (Tab A) paint this picture in more detail, but very simply GNP increased 8.4% and agricultural output 8.5% while the Turks reversed an upward trend in prices early in the year.

But there is still room for improvement. To keep the heat on, Gaud would condition this loan on Turkish adherence to the IMF's stabilization program. He would release the loan in two slices—one in February and one in July only after he was satisfied the Turks have met those conditions. We'd like the Turks eventually to agree to substantial exchange reform and import liberalization. But while we'll keep after them to lay the groundwork, we can't realistically expect to go ahead this year because Turk reserves are too low and other aid donors too pressed to provide the needed extra cushion.

Apart from economic objectives, this pledge is important in sustaining our political relationship with Turkey.



--Demirel's government is a good one. He defended our position in Viet Nam when Kosygin visited. He has publicly stood up for Turkey's NATO tie and our position in Turkey as part of that alliance relationship. He is winning the confidence of the Turkish military--crucial to making an ultimate Cyprus settlement stick. He is committed to going a rational route to economic development and is gradually selling free enterprise economics. His success in putting Turkey on its feet by 1973--our joint objective--will depend on outside support for the next 5-6 years.

--Secretary McNamara has successfully launched a dialogue with the Turkish military on programming our military aid five years ahead. We have carefully balanced the pressure we apply in those negotiations by cutting aid with our gradual cuts in economic aid.

Our objective is to keep the pressure on Europe to increase its contribution and on Turkey to increase imports from the US and are working to that end. Acting Secretary Barr's memo (Tab C) underscores these concerns. He is especially concerned to achieve a "significant increase" in the share of other consortium members. If things go well at the Consortium meeting, we will achieve that objective by pushing their share from 36% of non-project lending (not counting the debt roll-over) last year to 41% this year. However, our pressures for help on Indonesian debt rescheduling and Indian food are taxing their ability to provide aid, so the Consortium next week may fall short of its \$110 million target. If so we will keep the heat on.

I recommend you approve pledging up to \$65 million provided others do their fair share. I think the way to define for ourselves what share is fair is to shoot for current consortium targets. Thursday (Barr agrees). If we hit them, good enough progress for this year. If others fall short, AID would negotiate a loan and release a \$35 million slice in February. Then if we have not succeeded in getting others to raise their contributions, AID would come back to you before releasing the second slice in July, to determine whether we should cut our total. If others hit the target by then and our share maintains its downward trend, they would just go ahead with the second slice.

W. W. Rostow

Approve your formulation	
See ms	

SECRET-



2 4

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT BUREAU OF THE BUDGET WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

. JAN 2 0 587

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Authorization to Pledge and Negotiate a Program Loan to Turkey

In the attached memorandum AID Administrator Gaud requests your approval to pledge a program loan of up to \$65 million for CY 1967 at the Turkey Consortium meeting, now scheduled for January 27. Gaud also requests your approval to negotiate this loan, probably some time in February, with details and amount subject to the normal inter-agency review process.

In addition, AID plans on making project loans to Turkey of \$50 million during the balance of this fiscal year. Major projects will be submitted for your review.

The Amount

Although the Turks have requested total program assistance of \$191 million, AID believes their requirement can be held to \$158 million. The size of the proposed program loan is related to Turkey's continuing short-term need for foreign exchange and the planned gradual reduction in our economic assistance to Turkey. Our share of total Consortium program lending is declining from 70% in 1965 to 60% proposed for 1967. If debt rescheduling is included, our share in 1967 is 44%. I believe this is the largest cut we can make without serious damage to Turkey's foreign exchange situation. AID intends to reduce its program loan to \$45 million in 1963.

The attached table summarizes our aid to Turkey. Economic aid and P. L. 480 have been declining in recent years, while military assistance has been increasing somewhat.

Turkey's Economic Performance

Turkey's progress in 1966 was little short of spectacular. GNP increased by 8.4%, agricultural output by 8.5%, tax revenues by 23%, and investment by 15%. This growth rests on shaky foundations. It entailed large public expenditures and a major drawdown of foreign exchange reserves. Price rises were avoided by a sharp increase in the availability of imports. Thus, Turkey continues to have (1) a budgetary deficit, and (2) a serious shortage of foreign exchange.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-256

By 12-2-93

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Self-help Conditions

The potential inflationary consequences of the budget deficit have led AID to condition this program loan, like last year's, on Turkey's continued maintenance of price stability. This will be related to the specific IMF stabilization program, which is expected to limit price increases to no more than 2% during 1967. Release of the second tranche (\$30 million) of the loan in July will be dependent on satisfactory performance in this area in the first half of the year.

AID and the DNF believe that further difficult measures-devaluation and liberalization of imports--are required to ensure Turkey's eventual competitive entry into the Common Market. There is relatively little progress that can be reported on this front and the outlook is not promising. The DNF will consult further with Turkey at mid-year on these issues.

Impact on U. S. Balance of Payments


- I believe this loan contains adequate balance of payments safeguards.
 - . It will be used solely to finance the purchase of U. S. goods and services.
 - . It contains several new procedures designed to further increase Turkish commercial imports from the U. S.

Recommendation

I recommend that you authorize the pledging and negotiation of the proposed \$65 million program loan to Turkey.

(signai) Charles & Calcultus Charles & Calcultus Director

Attachments	
Approve	
Disapprove	



FISCAL YEAR OBLIGATIONS (Dollars in millions)

-	1965	1966	1967 (proposed)	1968 (Budget)
Program Loan	80	70	65	45
Project Loans	67	59	50	55
Special opium eradica- tion program	•• •	**	5	**
Technical Cooperation	4.5	4.5	4.2	5.8
Total AID	151.5	133.5	124.2	105.8
Military assistance	112.0	127.7	134.0	134.0
P. L. 480	59.1	28.2	6.0	6.0

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 9/-256

By 12-2-93



J . . .



DEPARTMENT OF STATE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

JAN 1 6 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Program Assistance for Turkey

I am requesting your authorization (1) to pledge at the annual meeting on January 23 of the OECD Consortium for Turkey a program loan of up to \$65 million for 1967 and (2) to begin negotiations on a program loan agreement with Turkey if satisfactory agreement can be reached on various self-help measures described below.

This program loan is \$5 million less than in 1966 and \$15 million less than in 1965. These decreases reflect a continuing reduction of our support as Turkey moves towards self-sustaining growth.

We also expect to make a number of project loans, totalling up to \$50 million, to Turkey in 1967. We will be submitting them later for your approval as required. In addition, we expect to agree with the Turkish Government on an opium eradication program. In support of that program we will be requesting your authority to conclude a \$5 million fertilizer import loan. The total U.S. lending to Turkey in FY 1967 will be approximately \$120 million, \$10 million less than 1966.

Self-Help Performance

We believe Turkish economic development progress is good. We are convinced that, despite current troublesome areas of price stability and exchange rate mal-adjustment, Turkey can have a high rate of economic growth and be free of concessionary assistance by 1973. This conviction is premised, however, on two factors: 1) continuing adequate support from the U. S. and other Consortium members and 2) continuing adequate Turkish self-help.

In 1966 economic progress in Turkey exceeded that of any other OECD country.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 9/-252

By NARA, Date 9-27-9

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intervals; not
automatically declassified



- GMP has increased 8.1%, a rate of growth well above the plan target of 7%. Even if fortuitous elements such as excellent weather resulting in an extraordinary cereals harvest are excluded, the rate of increase in GMP is 7%.
- Price stability was maintained. Even though prices rose in the early months by 5%, this trend is now reversed and, in October, prices were 3% below February and only 4% above the 1965 average, an acceptable rise.
- Agricultural output increased 8.5% due in part to good weather which compares with the plan target of 4.2% and actual performance over the past decade of 2.5% per year.
- Hew population control measures were instituted.
- -- Investment increased sharply by 10% in 1965 and by 15% in 1966.
- Tax revenues increased approximately 23% over 1965.
- -- Foreign exchange receipts were up over 15%.

Despite Turkey's commendable performance in 1966, Turkey's basic development problems still remain. Moreover, these accomplishments were financed by budgetary deficits and by running down foreign exchange reserves which now are at a critically low level.

Although tax revenues increased in 1966, expenditures have increased at an even higher rate. In order to ease this tight financial position the government is: (1) deferring payments due, (2) borrowing short-term from the Central Bank, and (3) issuing treasury notes at high (9%) interest rates. These measures will probably reduce the budget deficit to about 4% of planned expenditures. However, deferring payments is disruptive as investments partially completed must be curtailed.

In spite of the increase in foreign exchange receipts the Turkish balance of payments deteriorated during 1966. Imports increased 26%, exports rose by 7% and as a result the trade deficit increased from \$77 million in 1965 to \$155 million in 1966. Financing this deficit required a draw-down in foreign exchange reserves resulting in lower year-end reserves; this is especially serious as reserves normally increase in the fall.



CONTINENTIAL

Self-Help Conditions in 1967

To assure the termination of assistance by 1973 Turkey should place more emphasis on the development of a competitive market economy. Consequently, our strategy emphasizes the need for: (1) monetary stability, and (2) exchange reform and import liberalization.

A devaluation sufficient to permit meaningful import liberalization is a very serious step for the Turkish government as it involves memerous crucial economic and political decisions. In view of other issues, i.g. continuation of U. S. military bases and installations, now dominating U. S.-Turkish relations, we do not feel the U. S. should press bilaterally for such reforms. However, the IMF, led by experienced and knowledgeable officials, shares our concern and is pressing the Government of Turkey to adopt a comprehensive exchange reform program.

Some progress has already been made. We have attempted to persuade Turkish government lenders that reform is needed by pointing out the consequences of their current policies and the benefits to be derived from alternative policies. Concurrently, the INF has been discussing exchange reform with the Prime Minister, Finance Minister and other senior officials. Another meeting between the IMF and the Turkish Government is scheduled for June. At that time the IMF will press once again for exchange reform.

In view of the Turkish-IMF discussions on exchange reform we are not now requiring basic changes in trade policies. However, we will continue to emphasize export promotion and believe that a stremuous effort by Turkey could result in increases in foreign exchange earnings.

We intend to condition this program loan on Turkey's adherence to the stabilization program developed by the IMF. This includes specific limits on Central Bank credit to the banks, commercial Central Bank advances to the Treasury, and Central Bank advances to various government corporations. These ceilings should limit the increase in the price level to no more than 2%.

Such stringent credit controls will force the Turkish Government to give greater emphasis to increasing tax revenues and/or reducing non-essential expenditures. The State Economic Enterprises are a major drain on government revenues. We intend to encourage the Government to take overall steps to improve the financial condition of these enterprises including raising prices on their products.

We intend to release this program loan in two tranches: \$35 million in February and \$30 million in July dependent on Turkish adherence to the IMF stabilization program during the first six months of 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

The 1967 Turkish Request

The 1967 Turkish Development Plan assumes a 7% increase in GAP, 11% increase in imports, and 3% increase in exports. According to the Turks, program assistance requirement, exclusive of debt rescheduling, is \$145 million. We believe Turkey should net an additional \$35 million from additional foreign exchange carnings and savings; therefore, we consider their realistic program assistance requirement to be only \$110 million, approximately the same assumt pledged by the Consortium in 1966.

Turkey will also receive approximately \$48 million in debt relief as part of the 1965 debt rescheduling. The U.S. share is \$4.2 million; the rest comes from Western European donors.

The total non-project assistance requirement is therefore \$158 million with the U.S. contribution being \$69.2 million or 44%.

Although we intend to press other Consortium members to increase their support for Turkey and thereby reduce our percentage contribution, we are not very optimistic. It may be difficult for some members (Great Britain and Italy) to match their 1966 program pledges. Consortium members will, of course, be making project loans to Turkey. In the past three years other Consortium members have provided 54% (\$217 million) of the total project loan commitments.

U. S. Interests -

A strong independent Turkey is a sajor factor in the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean and makes a significant contribution to U. S. and free world security. We seek to maintain U. S. and MATO installations in Turkey.

Recent Political Development

The Turkish government under the Premiership of Suleyman Demirel is providing more continuity and consistency than the unstable ecalitical regimes of the period immediately prior to the election of the Justice Party in October 1965. The JP position was strengthened further when it won majority control of the Sonate in the June 1966 elections.

This orderly transfer to office of a popularly elected government less than six years after its ideological forebear, the Democratic Party

- 5 -

Government, had been violently overthrown was a gain for political moderation and conciliation. This transfer of office, however, has not been accompanied by the immediate transfer of governmental power; the government is still heavily staffed with members of the traditional Turkish elite who favor statist policies and, therefore, are hostile to the free enterprise philosophy of the Justice Party. If the Justice Party Covernment can maintain reasonable economic stability and avoid alienating the military, the Turkish political system should continue to evolve along democratic lines.

Anti-Americanism is currently popular with some elements of the opposition in Turkey but it is to date neither unmanageable nor dangerous. Early in 1966, General Sumay was elected President and he is expected to visit the U.S. in early April.

Effects on U. S. Balance of Payments

The program loan made under this pledge will not adversely effect the U. S. balance of payments as it will be used exclusively to finance the importation of U. S. goods and services. In addition, with our program lending, we are attempting to increase U. S. exports not financed by A.I.D., in the short run, by stimulating greater use of Turkey's own foreign exchange to purchase U. S. products and, in the long run, by increasing market acceptance of U. S. products.

In 1967 we will move toward these two objectives by:

- a) Eliminating A.I.D. financing for imports on the quota or restricted list which were previously either totally or partially A.I.D. financed and thereby forcing the Turkish Government to use its free foreign exchange to finance these necessary imports from the U.S.
- b) Modifying Turkish import procedures to reduce delivery delays on A.I.D. financed imports, thereby reducing the cost of these goods to the importer and increasing acceptability of U. S. products in the general Turkish market.

Recommendation:

I recommend that you authorize the pledging and subsequent negotiation of a program loan to the Government of Turkey of up to \$65 million out of FY 1967 funds, to be released in two tranches - \$35 million upon signing the loan agreement and \$30 million in July subject to performance under the IMF stabilization program.

/s/ William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud





TREASURY DEPARTMENT

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

-CONFIDENTIAL

January 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: U.S. Aid to Turkey

The Agency for International Development has recommended that you approve a United States pledge of \$65 million in program loan assistance for Turkey in FY 1967, at the meeting of the OECD Turkish Consortium on January 27.

In view of our balance of payments problem, I have been concerned that up until this year the trend of our commercial exports has been down while a very high proportion of our exports to Turkey are financed by U.S. aid. Commercial exports of the other Consortium members are considerably greater in relation to the volume of economic aid they provide. Turkish practices in allocating foreign exchange for U.S. trade also leave much to be desired.

While ATD has taken welcome steps on these problems, we must do more to assure that U.S. exports arising from United States program loans do not substitute for commercial sales in that country. And we must assure that the Europeans take on an even larger share of the total program aid.

I therefore recommend that:

- --our pledge this year be made contingent on a significant increase in the relative share of 1967 program assistance to Turkey provided by the other Consortium members;
- -- that we make a further substantial reduction in both the amount and share of our program assistance next year;

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 99-17 By S NARA, Date 2:27:02

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

- --we seek assurances that financing of certain shortterm trade obligations (about \$25 million) required by Turkey will be financed from non-Turkish European sources in addition to regular Consortium pledges;
- --AID examine the commodity composition of its program aid to assure that exports under the program are truly additional to those we would otherwise have received. It should also keep under review Turkish trade regulations and practices with a view to increasing the U.S. share of its commercial trade.

Joseph W. Barr

Tuesday, January 24, 1967 -- 7:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

You wanted to know something about Carl Oberhague of M. I. T.

In my time he was a physicist there -- a good solid one.

He served for a time in the Eastman Kodak Company and then became Director of the Lincoln Laboratory. About 2 years ago he left the Laboratory to undertake a special project called INTRAC which is seeking to apply computer techniques to library management problems.

I would guess that he is a unique, valuable figure in the library field. Library work generally does not command scientists; and there can be few wholly competent men now trying to bring computer techniques to bear on library management. Therefore -- although I cannot vouch for this persoanly -- I would guess he is an excellent choice for the committee.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

SECRET

Tuesday, January 24, 1967 -- 8:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

You wanted to look at a draft resolution. Herewith two -- count the, two. (The reason: They tried hard to get together during the day but their respective commitments -- notably Nick's on the Hill -prevented it. And they wanted to meet your deadline for evening reading.)

Orville's puts in some numbers: 6 million tons costing not less than \$360 million; Nick's sticks to the language: "The Congress urges the President to continue to use all authorities available to him to contribute the United States' share of the international response to the Indian emergency." A passage identical to Orville's final paragraph. Aside from language, therefore, the basic decision is whether you want the kind of figures Orville has introduced.

W. W. Rostow

Authority State to 2-25-78; nsc la 4-2-79

By /25/120, NARA, Date 2-49/

WWRostow:rln

20. Freeman

66a

Draft joint resolution to support United States participation in international efforts to relieve victims of hunger in India and to enhance India's capacity to meet the food needs of its people

WHEREAS the Congress has declared it to be the policy of the United States to use the abundant agricultural productivity of the United States to combat hunger and malnutrition and to encourage economic development in the developing countries; and

WHEREAS in pursuance of such policy American farmers have already been asked to increase their production of wheat and other grains;

WHEREAS two years of drought have caused a grave food shortage in India threatening the lives of millions of people and the health of tens of millions of people;

WHEREAS the disaster in India is of such magnitude that to prevent starvation it will be necessary for the United States to send India not less than 6 million tons of grain this calendar year which will cost not less than \$360 million.

WHEREAS the strong programs of economic and agricultural development that have been launched in India would be swept away if the international community failed to act swiftly and on an adequate scale to meet this emergency: Therefore be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled that:

The Congress endorses and supports the President's initiative in organizing substantial American participation in an urgent international effort designed to:

(a) Help meet India's critical food shortages by making available to India under PL 480, as amended, wheat and other agricultural commodities to meet India's urgent food aid requirements

as the United States share in the international response to the Indian emergency in cooperation with other countries and multi-lateral organizations such as the IBRD, the OECD, the FAO, and others;

- (b) Continue to help combat malnutrition especially among mothers and children and an expanded program directed to those areas in India where the drought has been most severe;
- (c) Encourage and assist those measures which the Government of India is undertaking to achieve its goals of food sufficiency and economic growth; and
- (d) Develop a systematic and comprehensive approach to the war on hunger.

The Congress urges the President to continue to use all authority available to him to contribute the United States' share in the international response to the Indian emergency.

Mr Kalgobach

Draft joint resolution to support United States participation in international efforts to relieve victims of hunger in India and to enhance India's capacity to meet the food needs of its people

WHEREAS the Congress has declared it to be the policy of the United States to combat hunger and malnutrition and to encourage economic development in the developing countries;

WHEREAS two years of drought have caused a grave food shortage in India threatening the lives of millions of people and the health of tens of millions of people;

WHEREAS the strong programs of economic and agricultural development that have been launched in India would be swept away if the international community failed to act swiftly and on an adequate scale to meet this emergency: Therefore be it

resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled that:

The Congress endorses and supports the President's initiative in organizing substantial American participation in cooperation with other countries and with multilateral organizations, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Food and Agricultural Organization, and others, in urgent international efforts designed to:

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Authority State ta 5-25-18; nsc la

By in lig., NARA, Date 2-4-91



- (a) help meet India's critical food shortages by making available to India agricultural commodities or other resources to meet India's urgent food aid requirements;
- (b) continue to help combat malnutrition especially among mothers and children under an expanded program directed to those areas in India where the drought has been most severe;
- (c) encourage and assist those measures which the Government of India is undertaking to achieve its goals of food sufficiency and economic growth; and
- (d) develop a systematic and comprehensive approach to the war on hunger.

The Congress urges the President to continue to use all authorities available to him to contribute the United States' share of the international response to the Indian emergency.



TOP SECRET

Tuesday, January 24, 1967 -- 8:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith responses to Bob McNamara's proposal for a statement (and accompanying pictures) on civilian casualties in North Viet Nam.

l. Bob Komer weighs in as follows: "On McNamara draft statement about North Viet Nam civilian casualties, I tend to favor release with editing to make casualty estimates less firm. I think this will help diffuse issue. However, I feel less solid about releasing photos, which I think will show lots of misses."

2. George Christian and I agree as follows:

- -- We are now sure the issue is as hot now as Bob McNamara feels it is. He is clearly under the gun from The New York Times; but The Times is not the country. On the other hand, we must respect the fact that he is the man under this particular gun.
- -- No matter how the thing is packaged, The New York Times -- and possibly others -- would tend to play it for the high figure -- the 26,000.
- -- As for the pictures, Bob McNamara's legitimate points about the location of civil damage near military targets and the use of civil buildings for military purposes might not come through. For example, I suspect The New York Times would use the photographs, if at all, selectively for their own argument and not Bob's. It is the picture of civilian damage, not the fine-grained argument about the location of anti-aircraft, that is liable to come through.
- -- In any case, in a war situation where we are bombing to prevent men and supplies from coming through and inflicting casualties on our own men -- and those of our allies -- we do not feel a responsibility to explain at great length civil casualties on the other side or to reveal official U.S. Government photographs whose use against us we cannot now foresee or predict.

Therefore, George and I tend to advise against our taking the initiative along these lines in this matter.

TOP SECRET

-2-

3. If we should be forced to make a statement, Bob McNamara's is as good a one as we can crank up, with this one exception: It does not make the point that every North Vietnamese soldier caught on the trails and every ton of supplies destroyed lifts a burden which we otherwise would have to deal with by more men and more casualties in South Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

-TOP SECRET

Tuesday, January 24, 1967 -- 6:40 p.m. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: News Media Contacts I had a long session with John Hightower, AP, this afternoon. We discussed Viet Nam in all its dimensions, at some length. He is anxious to do a serious piece trying to give shape to the war in Viet Nam; indicating what we have accomplished since our troops became engaged in 1965; indicating also his judgment that we are now on a winning track. He says that one of the major problems in the country is the people cannot see the shape of the war and, therefore, cannot perceive when we are making progress, as they could in a war with a fixed front like Korea. I agree with him wholeheartedly about this. I did not leak to him some interesting statistics -- 1962-67 -- I have had prepared for possible use in the special report on Viet Nam to the Congress. Nevertheless, I did encourage him to pursue his line of thought. He believes we are winning the war; and he is right. We also talked at length about Communist China. Carroll Kilpatrick, The Washington Post, dropped in to ask me if the Vice President was about to leave for Hanoi. I said he wasn't. He then asked about negotiations. I said there was a good deal of noise in the system but absolutely nothing solid. W. W. Rostow WWRostow:rln

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday, January 24, 1967 6:30 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I discussed with Secretary Rusk your suggested scenario for the Space Treaty signing. His view is as follows:

- 1. There would be some "misapprehension" if, on an occasion of this kind, you said nothing. Therefore, he suggests that you make a very short introductory statement.
- 2. He proposes that, then, he would respond briefly to your opening remarks; perhaps for six minutes -- along the lines you suggested.
- 3. He considered with Sisco and Meeker the question of Arthur Goldberg's then speaking. They all agreed that if we fielded three, the other signers might well feel impelled to say a few well chosen words. On the other hand, they feel it quite proper that the President and Foreign Minister of the host country speak briefly without other orations. If you agreed, they would let the signers know in advance the proposed procedure.
- 4. Some 20 nations at least will have instructions permitting them to sign by Friday.
- 5. I, of course, made clear to Secretary Rusk precisely why you proposed an alternative way to run the show; but he asked me to put back to you this scenario.

W. W. R.

Go back to scenario without President	al statement
Accept Rusk proposal	
See me	
	DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKED CANCELLED PER E.O. 19:356. SEC 10 AKD ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
	BY Af ON 2-6-91

Tuesday, January 24, 1967

-GONFIDENTIAL

MR. PRESIDENT:

I enclose the letter which President Frei has sent you, together with an English Granslation (Tab A).

President Frei's basically good character is reflected in the sincerity and frankness with which he spells out the reasons why he has taken this hard decision to postpone his trip to the United States.

Attached is a suggested reply to President Frei (Tab B) which you could either give to Ambassador Tomic when you see him today, or let Ralph Dungan take back to Santiago when he returns later this week. I favor letting Ralph carry it.

W. W. R.

Attachments: Tabs A & B

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NHJ 91-256

By 12-2-93

-CONFIDENTIAL-

January 24, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Ambassador Tomic has delivered your letter of January 20 explaining your decision to postpone your trip to the United States.

I want you to know that I fully understand the reasons. The frankness and sincerity with which you state them convey a sense of confidence which I greatly appreciate and reciprocate.

You may be sure that you will be welcome here whenever you find that you can make the trip. I look forward to meeting you personally when we gather with our colleagues of the other American Republics in April. But I do not regard this as a substitute for having you and Mrs. Frei as our guests in Washington.

With warm best wishes.

Sincerely,

[Styndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Eduardo Frei Montalva
President of the Republic of Chile
Santiago

LBJ:WB:mz

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 9/- 256

By 6, NARA, Date 12-2-93

EMBAJADA DE GHILE

Santiago, Chile January 20, 1967

DRCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 9/-256

By , NARA, Date 12-2-9

My dear Mr. President:

Although I have not yet had the opportunity of meeting you personally and therefore do not have the privilege of calling myself your friend, I allow myself to address you as if we were so. This letter is written without protocolar formalities but with the utmost frankness and sincerity, and I hope you will consider it as such.

After mature reflection, I have decided not to travel to the United States, according to the very special and distinguished invitation you have extended to me and that I promptly accepted. I considered this trip could have had real importance. I was looking forward to meeting you personally, Mr. President, and discussing with you the problems that concern our two countries and the whole Hemisphere.

Unfortunately, due to circumstances of internal politics - that you, as a man of such vast experience in this field will hopefully understand - the Senate of the Republic has denied me the constitutional permission to leave the country.

First of all, I wish to assure you that this resolution of one branch of the Legislature does not imply an attitude of animosity against the United States, and is strictly the result of a domestic political situation.

I want to tell you as well, that this Senate is not representative of the present political position of the Chilean electorate. I was elected in 1964, by an over-whelming majority, and shortly after that, the Chilean Congress was renewed - the whole of the House of Representatives and half of the Senate - according to our political organization. In the House of Representatives we have a clear majority that is enthusiastically in favor of the trip.

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson
The President of the United States
Washington, D. C.

On the other hand, this refusal is due to the forces of the extreme Right, that want to prevent the agrarian, tax, administrative and other reforms in which we are engaged - (in other words, they are systematically opposed to the aims of the Alliance for Progress) - as well as to the forces of the Marxist Left. But in no instance whatsoever does this accidental and merely juridical mechanism represent the will of the nation. After the negative decision of the Senate, great masses of people throughout the country and especially in Santiago, have expressed their solidarity to the Government, in protest for the attitude adopted by this branch of Congress.

I hope you will forgive this unwilling discourtesy toward whom has shown such an open and friendly attitude to Chile and myself. I still have the hope that in the near future - when these domestic problems have been solved - I may have the opportunity of taking this trip.

I could - overriding the constitutional precept - have travelled to the United States. But I think it might have been inconvenient. You, who are a representative of a great Democracy, will be the first to understand the need to comply with the Law, however painful that may be on some occasions.

I convey once more my feelings of gratitude for your invitation. I hope that in the future we will be able not only to continue with the cooperation of both our countries, but to reaffirm it, so as not to allow for the triumph of those who have wanted to hinder the sound and traditional friendship between the Government of the United States and the Government of Chile, that is the permanent policy of my Government.

Cordially

Tuesday, January 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Summary

1. Laotian Communists Intensify Pressure

The Communists are intensifying military pressure on the Government in widely separated areas.

In Northern Laos, Communist forces are continuing their campaign to clear Government troops from "liberated areas."

In Southern Laos, Government troops during the past week have had sharp engagements with Communist units around the rim of the Bolovens plateau, near the southern end of Laos. Thus far there is no indication that the current activity is a prelude to a concerted attempt to push the Government forces out of the area or to overrun the nearby town of Attopeu. The Communists have mounted a similar effort in this area in past years when Government forces threatened the vital infiltration corridor.

2. Balaguer Arrests Likely to Draw Opposition

On the basis of vague reports (not confirmed by US sources) of joint anti-Government plotting by leftists and rightists, Balaguer has made a series of arrests which include leaders of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), Communists and right-wing extremists.

TOP SECRET

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-25 6

By 420, NARA, Date 12-2-93

TOP SECRET

The indiscriminate nature of the arrests seems sure to provoke intensified opposition attacks on Balaguer for his arbitrary action and the adoption of "neo-Trujillo" policies.

3. Chiang to Avoid Provocation of ChiComs

Embassy Taipei offers the following assessment of the likelihood of a Chiang Kai-shek initiative against the mainland: "There continues to be no overt signs of preparations for any major military action against the mainland, and no detectable increases in planning, training or accumulation of supplies or shipping. We have reliable reports that President Chiang has ordered that no actions be taken to provoke the Chinese Communists."

4. Cultural Revolution May Take New Appseach

The Consulate General in Hong Kong reports that, over the weekend, China mainland media continued to present a chaotic picture of confusion in Peking, resistance and disruption in the provinces, and concern over the situation on the part of Maoists, which now borders on hysteria. The "Peoples' Daily" editorial of January 22 implies that Maoists are far from united and that opponents are still in power. The editorial maintains that powersmust be seized "from the bottom to the top," thus admitting that the initial plan of the Cultural Revolution to revamp the body politic from the top down, has failed.

W. W. Rostow

-TOP SECRET

Tuesday, January 24, 1967
12:30 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith two supplementary items for today's agenda which, I am told by State, Secretary Rusk will raise with you.

i. Tactics U. S. Consular Convention

Secretary Rusk may propose that Nick Katzenbach call on Senator Dirksen this afternoon and promise that Soviet Consulates in the United States would not be opened, under the Convention, until after the war in Viet Nam was settled. This is believed necessary to split the Republican opposition which is forming up.

2. Should you raise question of Brazilian destroyers for Viet Nam with Costa e Silva ?tomorrow ?

State is proposing a deal in which you would make a National Security determination, granting an additional two Bravo destroyers to Brazil if:

- -- Brazil pays the \$10 million necessary for rehabilitation;
- -- Brazil commits itself to a one-year operation off Viet Nam in conjunction with our naval patrols.

W. W.R.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 9/-256

By P, NARA, Date 12-2-93

CONFIDENTIAL

Lunch Meeting With the President Tuesday, January 24, 1967, at 1:00 p.m.

AGENDA

- 1. State of Negotiating Tracks. (Sec. Rusk)
- 2. How to Handle Sen. Fulbright's Book. (Sec. Rusk)
- 3. Wilson's Request for an Extra Day of Bombing Stand-Down,
 Post-Tet. (Sec. Rusk)
- 4. U.K. Credits to Cuba. (Sec. Rusk)

 Sec. Rusk will have a draft letter to Prime Minister Wilson.
- 5. Miscellaneous.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By Ag., NARA, Date 2-6-91

Tuesday, January 24, 1967 10:00 a.m.

- CONFIDENTIAL

MR. PRESIDENT:

I enclose the letter which President Frei has sent you, together with an English Wanslation (Tab A).

President Frei's basically good character is reflected in the sincerity and frankness with which he spells out the reasons why he has taken this hard decision to postpone his trip to the United States.

Attached is a suggested reply to President Frei (Tab B) which you could either give to Ambassador Tomic when you see him today, or let Ralph Dungan take back to Santiago when he returns later this week. I favor letting Ralph carry it.

W. W. R.

Attachments: Tabs A & B

DECLASSIFIED

R.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 9/-256

By , NARA, Date 12-2-93

PROPOSED WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED FOLLOWING CONFIRMATION OF CHILEAN ANNOUNCEMENT

President Johnson received today a personal letter from President Eduardo Frei of Chile outlining why it is impossible for President Frei to visit the United States as planned on February 1 and 2.

The President expressed the hope that it might be possible for President Frei to make the visit some time later in the year.

760

CONFIDENTIAL

cc - Jim Jones

Monday - January 23, 1967 4:20 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: President Frei Cancels Visit

Charge Dean in Santiago informs us that Frei has decided to cancel his visit to the US. He is expected to make a public announcement between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock, our time.

Chilean Ambassador Tomic, who returned to Washington over the weekend, brought a letter from President Frei with instructions to deliver it to you personally.

In order for you to be able to say that you had been informed of Frei's decision via a personal letter prior to the announcement, Tomic is delivering the letter to us within the next half hour. He still would appreciate the opportunity to see you briefly to convey President Frei's deep regret orally. I strongly recommend that you agree to see him some time tomorrow.

Attached is a proposed statement that George Christian might make following President Frei's announcement.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment	DECLAR E.O. 1235 NEJ 9 By , NA	SSIFIED 6, Sec. 3.4 7-256 ARA, Date 12	<u>3</u> -93
Approve Tomic appointment			
Disapprove			
Speak to me			

Tuesday, January 24, 1967 10:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft message to Marcos.

Subject to your judgment, I figures that with a wife like his, he doesn't need a pretty nurse.

W. W. Rostow

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FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO PRESIDENT MARCOS

Mrs. Johnson and I were distressed to hear of your operation, but greatly relieved at the result.

Gall bladder trouble seems to be developing as the President's malady of the 1960's. But I'm sure that with the affectionate care of your lovely lady all will be well.

Our thoughts will be with you both in the days and weeks ahead.

Monday, January 23, 1967 -- 6:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Subject: News Media Contacts

Having carefully checked which items were safe for publication, I gave <u>Drew Pearson</u> the harmless ones, as instructed. He seemed fascinated.

Rowlie Evans called up about to write a story that Gen. Taylor had been sent by you to check on infiltration figures. I persuaded him -- he said -- that the straight goods was that he was simply dropping in for a few days while carrying out a routine Intelligence Board mission. I pointed out that to check on infiltration figures one would have to take several weeks. He said I had turned off a good column. We shall see.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

_CONFIDENTIAL == LIMDIS

Monday, January 23, 1967 2:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the detailed notes on Baggs and Ashmore in Hanoi. I have marked the most relevant passages. Their message is:

- l. Hanoi is tired of the war and wishes to end it honorably.
- 2. They interpret Ho as saying, stop bombing and he will talk.

What comes through clearly, as it has with other recent visitors to Hanoi, is that they are trying to wig-wag to us that they might be willing to settle by negotiation.

We shall see.

W. W. Rostow

-CONFIDENTIAL -- LAMDIS

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 9/- 256

By 120, NARA, Date 12-2-93

Mulete Hause The Mr. Roston Note p 2 pari 3

January 18, 1967

Report on Visit to Hanoi by Three Members of Center for Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara

Mr. William P. Bundy - EA Mr. William Baggs - Editor Miami Herald

Mr. Harry S. Ashmore- Center for Study of Democratic Institutions

Mr. Heyward Isham - EA

S/S INR-Mr. Hughes ACA - Mr. Jacobson Secretary of Defense OSD/ISA - Mr. McNaughton EA - Mr. Bundy

note: Except for subtendings which have been added this is a verbaling report as distated by Broggs land ashmore, no uses of it should be made in itsellingence publications. Background of Trip

EA/VN - Mr. Isham White House - 2

The visit to Hanoi was arranged by Luis Quintanilla, a retired Ambassador of Mexico, who spent a month in Mainland China last October and visited Hanoi for four days after his visit to China. During his visit to Hanoi, Mr. Quintanilla met with Ho Chi Minh and proposed a private conversation with two Americans from the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. Subsequently invitations were issued from Hanoi to us.

Visas for the trip to Hanoi were picked up at the Representation of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in Phnom Penh. We met on January the 2nd with Nguyen-Dang-Khoa, First Secretary of the Representation, who was acting as Charge at the time. We had to wait for the ICC flight. On January 5th, we were invited by the North Viet Representation in Phnom Penh for tea. This time we met Nguyen Thuy Vu, who was acting as Chief of the DRV Representation in Phnom Penh. It may be of interest to note that the mission in Phnom Penh has the rank of a Representation because arrangements have not been concluded for Cambodia and the DRV to have embassies in either country. This arrangement is being worked on now. We were informed that the Representation in Phnom Penh has a higher status than any other DRV embassy or mission abroad.

We arrived in Hanoi on January 6, a Friday, and remained until January 14th, a Saturday. During this time we had three conversations which merit a report.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

By 12, NARA, Date 1-3-92

Meeting with DRV Officials

The first, on January 10th, was supposed to be a meeting with intellectuals. Instead, arriving at the building which houses the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, we found three Ministers of the DRV. One was Hoang Tung, Editor of Nhan Dan, the principal newspaper of the government, and a confident of the Chi Minh. Mr. Tung is also President of the North Viet-Nam Journalist Association. He carries a government rank of Minister. He obviously was the most important person we dealt with. Also present were Pham Ngoc Thuan, Chairman of the Committee and a Minister, and Tran Cong Tuong, who is secretary General of the Journalist Association and also Vice Chairman of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, was also present. The conversation lasted three and one-half hours. Mr. Tung asked us to be frank and specific. During this conversation the North Vietnamese were quite candid and made the following points:

- l. A de-escalation is more distant from reality than a ceasefire. The de-escalation, in their view, would imply a concession by a country which considers that it has been the victim of aggression, but ceasefire could be viewed as an arrangement between two equals.
- 2. The implication was strong that the DRV would have to obtain approval of the National Liberation Front before moving to a table, even for private conversations with the US. However, talk of the FLN was pretty much glossed over by the North Vietnamese.
- 3. The gentlemen said, in unmistakable words, that the DRV was tired of war and wished to end it honorably.
- 4. They agreed to the theory of the need for preliminary talks. In this part of the conversation they twice referred to President Johnson's address at John Hopkins which they understood to say that there was need for talks unless there was some prospect for success visibles.
- 5. Perhaps the preliminary talks should have, as a common ambition, the withdrawal of all foreign troops in Viet-Nam. Otherwise no agenda would be necessary and no conditions were suggested.
- 6. We got the impression that elections in the South are probably negotiable as to the date and method.
- 7. There was no talk of neutralization of Viet-Nam and Southeasts.
 - 8. There was no talk of amnesty for any part of South Viet-Nam.

The Attorney General, Tran Cong Tuong, obviously was sent to the meeting to give us the legal history of the conflict from the DRV view. In subsidiary conversation he made the observation that the United States was ambitious for a pax America. Ashmore denied it, explaining that US obligations since the end of World War II had committed our military presence in various parts of the world and that we were anxious to conclude the necessity of having troops abroad as soon as reasonable. Also mentioned was that the presence of American troops in Asia had been necessitated by the hostilities between China and the United States. The North Viets had nothing to say about this, but they did not offer a demurrer. We also argued that if we were all going to be honest in this conversation that we had to admit that both sides had an obligation to end the war and that it was not a unilateral proposition. If, we argued, the North Viets wanted us to return home to report to our country a recommendation that a peace conversation be considered, then the North Viets had a similar obligation to urge their government to sit down to such conversations in a conciliatary mood.

Throughout the conversation the North Vietnamese took a standard position in reference to the Government of South Viet-Nam. They referred always to the Saigon regime as a puppet government of the United States and they referred to Marshal Ky and other persons in the Saigon government as traitors to Viet-Nam. However they conspicuously avoided pursuing this line to the point of suggesting that under no circumstances would they deal with the Saigon regime. Ashmore asked several questions probing this position and it seemed clear that they did not want to leave the impression that this was in any sense a condition for negotiation. The impression was that the ultimate arrangement for unlifeation of the country was completely open to discussion.

Conversation with "Nhan Dan" Editor

The second conversation, on January 12th, was with Hoang Tung, in his office at the newspaper. The only other person present was an interpreter. Mr. Quintanilla did not accompany us inasmuch as we thought we might have a more frank discussion if it were restricted to us.

The conversation was in two parts. Mr. Tung wanted us to talk first.

It was our impression that what we told Mr. Tung, and he took extensive notes of the conversation and had available the interpreter's notes as well, would be reported in much detail to Ho Chi Minh. Indeed, our remarks to Mr. Tung formed the background of the conversation with Ho Chi Minh.

We observed to Mr. Tung that the war could go on for many years. We emphasized that the United States had the capacity to maintain its military presence, or a larger one, and we recognized that so did the DRV. We said that our understanding was that our Government wished to avoid the death and destruction of a long war.

We emphasized to Mr. Tung that we did not represent our Government, that we had no power of attorney, but that we would report to persons in

Government when we returned home.

We proposed exploratory talks between the DRV and the United States and suggested, if desirable, the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions could arrange the facilities for such a conversation.

We pointed out to Mr. Tung that the United States had obligations to South Viet-Nam, or the Ky Government, and also to Thailand and Laos.

U.S. Commitments in Southeast Asia

In reference to these American obligations in Southeast Asia, the point was made that whatever position legally or morally Viet-Nam might take in regard to these matters, they could not realistically ignore them. That while we were in no position to discuss these matters in any detail we thought it would have to be recognized that in some fashion they would have to be on the agenda of any formal negotiations for a settlement of the conflict. Mr. Tung accepted this without any demurrer and gave every indication that he agreed this was an essential element in any future discussion.

Len Unger had suggested we propose that the DRV permit the International Red Cross to come into North Viet-Nam. We recommended this to Mr. Tung, and pointed out that some of our conversations in Hanoi had given us the information that Vietnamese captured in the South were not permitted to write to their families in the North, and that American families would like to communicate with captured Americans in Viet-Nam and send parcels to them. Mr. Tung made a note of the suggestion and said his Government would take it under consideration.

We explained to Mr. Tung that it was our view that the United States does not want more war. Mr. Tung asked what explained, what seemed to him, a change in the United States policy? We said that our private opini on was that the experience since 1964 indicated a military solution in the Vietnamese conflict is not plausible. We went on to ask how could the United States end the war when all reasonable suggestions to Hanoi met only silence. We explained that a Western country, such as the United States, could get caught up in a war, where events shape new and violent events, where many people and their emotions become involved, and where deaths and war costs can almost insist, against the national desire, that the war continue and be intensified.

We also emphasized that Viet-Nam should not believe bose visitors who come to Hanoi and say that a majority of Americans protest this war and went instant peace. We admitted that some Americans do protest the war, that students and intellectuals and some politicans might protest, but that this was a minority in the country and that they were without great influence in the Government.

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During all of our conversations in Hanoi it was evident that official persons there were counting on a growing protest in the United States. It was also evident that they have been fed a lot of pap about the protest movement in our country.

Desire for Settlement Stressed

After we had made our various representations, Mr. Tung spoke with some emphasis:

"If the United States Government is willing to end the war, shows some concrete example of good intentions, then something can be done."

"The Vietnamese are not unreasonable. It is not true that we do not wish to find a settlement of the war."

Then Mr. Tung said: "I will arrange for you to talk to the leaders of our government."

The conversation lasted two and one half hours. Before leaving, we repeated three requests for consideration:

- 1. "Would the DRV be willing to meet, privately or otherwise; in exploratory talks with the US?"
- 2. Are indirect communications possible between the two a governments while the bombing continues and until the time is mature for direct and official communications.
 - 3. Again we asked if the International Red Cross could be allowed to operate in North Viet-Nam.

Mr. Tung said his Government would take the three issues under consideration.

Interview with Ho Chi Minh

Later in the day Mr. Tung called upon us at the hotel and said that Ho Chi Minh would like to see us. We arrived at his office, formerly the palace of the French Governor, at 5:00 PM and talked until almost 7:00 PM. Ambassador Quintanilla accompanied Baggs and Ashmore but he was not involved in the conversation except in the cordialities of it.

At this meeting were Ho, Mr. Tung, an interpreter, and the poet, To Huu, who is Ho's personal secretary.

After a few minutes of social conversation Ho asked if we could talk among ourselves. In what seemed an effort by him to make certain we understood he asked a second time if we could talk in confidence.

TOWN BUTTON WITH A TOTAL OF

Ho Suggests Halt in Bombing, Troop Reinforcements

We then pointed out to the President that of course we could talk in confidence and we emphasized, again, that we did not represent the United States Government, that we had come to issue an invitation to the DRV to participate in the Geneva convocation in May, scheduled by the Center, but that we, of course, were very much interested in the possibility of peace in Southeast Asia. We told him that all of this conversation would be reported to persons in our Government. The President then took the lead in bringing the conversation around to specific possibilities of a settlement. There was a minimum of repetition of the official Vietnamese line. Ho said there was no possibility of any useful conversation with the *United States until the bombing stopped. He complained that on other occasions, in a cessation of bombing, more and more United States troops had been introduced into the country. He suggested that no new troops should.... be introduced in the South by the United States during any future conversation between the DRV and the United States.* Baggs asked if the DRV would begin a conversation, with the idea of negotiating an end to the war, if the bombing stopped. Ho responded by saying that private talks could begin after the bombing stopped. We questioned him twice more on this specific issue. Ho said that he was a businessman and that he wanted to see the goods before the price for purchase was established. This, clearly, meant he wanted to see an account of good faith by the United States, such as stopping the bombing.

Ho observed that the DRV cherished peace but that it would never surrender its independence and freedom to purchase a peace with the United States or any party. He said the people of Viet-Nam had fought too long for their independence and freedom to compromise it at a peace conference.

Not even the nuclear weapons of the United States, he said, could force a surrender after so long and violent a struggle for the independence of his country. He said that in any meeting, private and exploratory or even public, he had no conditions to suggest, or an agenda, except that the bombings be stopped and the troop introductions be ceased during the conversations.

Ashmore reminded Ho that the Center had originally proposed to arrange a meeting of private persons on an unofficial basis for preliminary discussions for possible settlement. He asked Ho if he felt such a meeting might be in order as a preliminary to any official negotiations. Ho did not finally reject the suggestion but he made clear he would prefer to move directly to talks at the official level. Ashmore said that the Center would remain available for any such arrangements if it were desired. The question of whether such a meeting could take place while the bombing continues, on a wholly unofficial level, remains open.

Refusal of Reciprocal Gesture in Respons e to Bombing Halt

Ho appeared to be adamant on the question of any gesture by the DRV before the bombings ceased. He implied that the first gesture of the DRV, in response to ceasation of bombing, would be to talk.

We explained to President Ho that President Johnson had meant exactly what he said when he proposed "unconditional talks". He nodded. We pointed out that we were convinced our Government did not want any permanent bases in Viet-Nam and that our ultimate hope was for withdrawal of troops after an honorable settlement. But we also pointed out that it was our belief that any settlement would involve some raucous politics and at this point Ho mentioned "face". He implied that he was aware that, the United States had problems of face and our impression was that he also was suggesting that he had similar problems. He also implied that he would not be doctrinaire about the terms of a settlement.

Ho then said, again, that the bombings must stop without condition before any talks can begin.

No Reference to NLF Role in Talks

At no time did he suggest that the NLF had to be represented. He mentioned the fighting in the South and the heroics of it but made no mention of NLF presence being necessary at an exploratory conference.

Impressions of Ho

There is no question in our minds that Ho Chi Minh can carry a personal decision and make it the policy of his government. Our impression is that he consults with his cabinet before a decision, indeed he meets with most of the cabinet members daily, but that his vote is the deciding. one.

We also got the feeling that Ho considers himself a fellow who had been sold down the river several times in this Vietnamese episode, and that he wanted concrete acts now before any talks begin. We inquired once more about any gestures by the DRV, if American stopped the bombing, and he said this would be like a person who has been shot at and held up by a bandit in Chicago, and then was asked by the bandit what price the victim would be willing to pay for the bandit to stop shooting at him.

It is possibly significant that in this conversation, with Ho as well as in the preliminary conversations with Tung, a sharp distinction was made between the war in the South and the bombing of North Viet-Nam. In other words Ho tended to treat the issue of the bombing as one directly involving his government and the United States while the conflict in the South was a separate affair. This is not to suggest that this distinction would arise as any condition in negotiations but it was made in marked fashion/

There is no evidence that Ho enjoys anything but good health. He is very keen and speaks with much vigor.

One thing appeared certain to us. He is not going to negotiate under duress.

On the day following our conversation with Ho, Mr. Tung came to see us at the hotel. Only Mr. Tung, Quintanilla, Ashmore and Baggs were present at the conversation. Mr. Tung said he had just come from the

Palace and a conversation with President Ho, who sent us his good wishes and wishes for some success upon our return to the United States.

His reason for coming was to review the conversation we had with Ho Chi Minh, to make sure that there was an understanding of it. Baggs read the notes of the conversation substantially in the form given in this report, and there was no demurrer by Mr. Tung. These notes were reviewed in careful detail with Mr. Tung.

Invitation Extended to Attend Geneva Meeting

Ashmore presented to Ho Chi Minh a formal invitation for North Vietnamese participation in the Center's convocation in Geneva. Included in this invitation was the suggestion that a session be held there under the chairmanship of Chester Ronning, the Canadian Diplomat, which would include representatives from all the Southeast Asian countries, including South Viet-Nam. Mr. Tung on the following day reported that the invitation was under consideration but that no answer could be given at this time. There was no rejection of the proposal that a conversation might include a representative of the Government of South Viet-Nam.

Quintanilla Peace Proposal

Luis Quintanilla prepared in advance of our trip a proposal for a settlement between the United States and North Viet-Nam. He wanted to present this personally to the North Vietnamese. To make certain that there be no impression that any such proposal was being presented officially on behalf of the United States, Baggs and Ashmore disassociated themselves completely from the paper and did not participate in the discussions on it held by Quintanilla with Tung and others. This paper was considered by officials of the North Vietnamese Government and at their suggestion Quintanilla made some specific changes in it. This paper has been given Fulton Freeman in Mexico City and Quintanilla has had a lengthy conversation with him reviewing his discussions in Hanoi. We are not, therefore, attempting to cover this here.

We would like to drop a few observations in concluding this report.

Concluding Remarks

It appears no question but that Ho makes the decisions in Hanoi. The NLF is independent to a degree, although it confers with the DRV on all important matters. There is some Chinese influence in the NLF. We were told on what we think is as reliable an authority as you can get in Hanoi that about 20 percent of the NLF is communist, and that the majority of sentiment in the NLF is nationalistic, and very much in favor of a neutralization of Southeast Asia. It seems inevitable that some measures of conflict are going to grow between the NLF and the DRV. At the moment, General Giap plans strategy for both DRV and NLF. It is our opinion that Ho Chi Minh, because of his immense prestige

in the country, could probably, at this time, persuade the NLF to abide by any decision he makes.

Based on our many conversations with government persons, it is our opinion that the leadership in the DRV is going to become collective and of an uncertain mood after Ho passes the scene. It is quite possible that all kinds of influence, including Chinese, could insinuate themselves into power after Ho.

There is present a very strong sense of nationalism in the DRV. We have travelled in Yugoslavia and talked to many government persons there, and were impressed of a similar nationalist persuasion in Hanoi. Nationalism appears much stronger than any doctrinaire sense of Marxism. In the circumstances the remarks of Ho impress us as an offer to come to the table and the elements in the offer are simple enough, we stop the bombing and he will talk

EST JAH 83 JAH 11 55

OF ASSESSED

THE WHITE HOUSE



SECRET

January 23, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed message to Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew on regional cooperation

State recommends you send a personal message to Lee to further encourage his active participation in regional activities following Eugene Black's successful visit to Singapore.

It is their belief that your personal encouragement will help move him out of the isolation he feels and demonstrate our recognition of the key regional role Singapore can play.

I share that belief and recommend your approval of the attached message.

Att.

Proposed message to Singapore Prime Minister Lee

Approved ______
See me

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-256

By 12-2-93

SECRET

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 9/-256

By 20, NARA, Date 12-2-9.3

A ...

Eugene Black has told me of his recent visit with you. I am glad you and your cabinet engaged in such a full and frank exchange of views and ideas with him. I hope that such frankness will be characteristic of future conversations between yourself and Ambassador Galbraith. This is the only way we can come to understand one another and establish areas of common interest and common action.

Mr. Black's report increased my understanding of your country and the principles governing its policy. As you know, I share your conviction that regional cooperation is the key to peace, stability, and prosperity in Southeast Asia. As I announced in my State of the Union message, I plan to ask the Congress for special funds to be used to encourage Southeast Asian nations to move toward regional cooperation in economic and social development. The tasks are not easy nor will the results be immediate. But, with the dedication, foresight and hard work of leaders, such as yourself, important results can be achieved.

Again, you have my appreciation for your warm reception of Mr. Black and Ambassador Galbraith. I look forward to the arrival of Ambassador Wong and the growth of mutual cooperation in building a strong, free and prosperous Southeast Asia.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Lee Kuan Yew
Prime Minister of Singapore

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Explosion in U. S. Embassy Montevideo


An explosive device was set off at the entrance to the building in which our Embassy in Montevideo has its offices.

Although it produced a loud noise, it caused very little damage. Its force was insufficient to break the glass in a door two feet away. No one was in the area at the time of the explosion.

The noise attracted local press and photographers. Police technicians are examining the device to determine its origin.

W. W. Rostow

Mr. Rostow Pres. file



SECRET

January 23, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Discussion with Gene Locke today, 12:30 (January 23)

All reports indicate Gene has done a first rate job. His relations with the Pakistanis are good and he is fully in charge of his Embassy.

His main aim on this trip is to return to Rawalpindi with authority to tell Ayub we are resuming the sale of lethal spares to reactivate the planes and tanks we delivered before the Indo-Pak war.

This question is complicated. Resuming arms shipments to the sub-continent has implications on the Hill, and if it became known now, would probably adversely affect the Indian elections which begin in three weeks; Gene believes that not to proceed now will make Ayub's task with his military virtually impossible. State and Defense are not yet agreed on what advice to give you on this, though they are hard at work on a recommendation.

You may therefore want to hear Gene out, but not make any commitments to him until you hear from Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

The background is as follows:

- -- Gene thought he had this deal buttoned up before he left town last June. But after he left, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara were worried about the effects on the Hill and on Indian politics and opposed it before the Indian elections.
- -- In September, a new approach was authorized. If Ayub would limit his relationship with China, hold his defense budget down and undertake to open talks with India on arms limitation, we would be ready to resume the sale of spares. Ayub bought the first two points, and he began steps on the third. His approach to the Indians on arms limitation implied Indian movement toward a parallel "political settlement" of Kashmir and the Indians, while forthcoming in early conversations, subsequently clammed up. So the performance of both sides was pretty poor, though not unexpected.

-SECRET

State and Defense are urgently studying this one in order to give you their advice by the end of the week.

- -- State and Defense are studying the following proposal: we now
 (a) permit third countries (in practise, largely Germany) to sell
 lethal U.S.-type equipment (freeze has been on this also since the
 Indo-Pak war); (b) resume the sale of lethal spares to Pakistan;
 (c) withdraw our military missions from India and Pakistan; and
 (d) reopen sales programs to both countries, treating them like
 other countries.
- -- Secretary Rusk has not yet addressed himself to these questions on this round.

Gene will try to get an answer from you today. I recommend you promise him an answer before he leaves at the end of the week. Apart from this, you might authorize him to carry back to Ayub your personal appreciation for the understanding reached on our facilities; your concern over the rough year he is having economically and your respect for the way his government has dug in and fended for itself; your own concern for the world's food shortages and our inability to go on shouldering the whole burden.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file 83

Monday, January 23, 1967 2:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Dave Bronheim reports two heartening developments in the Dominican Republic, where we need more of such.

W. W. Rostow



DEPARTMENT OF STATE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Washington, D. C. 20523

UNITED STATES COORDINATOR
ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

January 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William G. Bowdler

The White House

SUBJECT: The Dominican Republic

During my recent trip to the Dominican Republic I saw two of the best projects in the hemisphere for involving the people in the development process, and for building democratic institutions.

In the rural areas the Organization for Community Development has 175 promoters working with 1,300 communities. They teach the communities how to use democratic methods in solving community problems. The communities decide what needs to be done and how to do it. Work has been done on roads, schools, irrigation canals and producers coops. Approximately 650,000 people benefit from these projects. The communities have contributed in labor and materials about three-eighths of the \$4 million estimated value of the projects.

In Santo Domingo there is an institute of social services that has 25 youngsters already trained and at work in the slums. They are assisted by 1000 young helpers who have received a short (six-week) training course. The 25 promoters will be supplemented by an additional 30 to be trained during 1967. They work on projects that are analogous to our own community action projects.

The response to the people, both in urban and rural areas, has been

David Bronheim

Deputy U.S. Coordinator

Pres file 84

-CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, January 23, 1967 - 5:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Two-part Package on Food Aid

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NEJ 91-256 NARA, Date 12-2-93

Two decisions are involved in the attached package: By ____, NARA, Date 12-2-93

- -- Action on a Gaud-Freeman-Schultze recommendation for a \$2.1 million wheat program for Peru (These papers are at Tab A.)
- -- Whether you want to continue reviewing all food aid proposals, or adopt a Schultze-recommended cutoff which will decrease the number of small programs we ask you to approve. (Schultze memo at Tab B.)

Wheat for Peru

The Freeman-Gaud memorandum presents a full rundown on Peru's recent agricultural performance and the commitments we will seek in return for this program. The terms are relatively hard -- 25% down payment in dollars and full dollar repayment over 20 years with 2 1/2% interest. Moreover, this credit would substitute for appart of an AID loan already extended -- and on softer terms. The package is so favorable to us that it seems hard to believe that the Peruvians will accept it; but State/AID has reason to believe they will. I certainly agree we should try.

Approve ______
Disapprove _____
Speak to me

Food Aid Cutoff

Charlie Schultze points out (Tab B) that Presidential review of every food aid proposal will mean 65-70 items per year, almost half of which will be for less than \$5 million each. (The Peruvian program is the sixth in the last three weeks-and business is relatively slow because we are not yet up to full speed under the new Act.) He suggests that you agree to review only the programs which involve more than \$10 million. This would cut out about two-thirds of the proposals but still cover almost 90% of total food committed. Alternatively, he suggests a \$5 million cutoff which would relieve you of almost one-half the requests, but still involve you in 94% of total commitments.

This is entirely a question of how you want to use your time. On balance, I suspect most programs below \$10 million are not worth your review when compared with other claims on your attention, but we can certainly manage if you feel otherwise. Thus, I would add a mild second to Charlie's recommendation.

Approve \$10 million cutoff	Continue sending them all
Approve \$5 million cutoff	Speak to me

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

MAN 1 6 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 Program for Peru

Attached is a memorandum from Secretary Freeman and AID Administrator Gaud recommending your approval to negotiate a \$2.1 million credit sales agreement with Peru for 30,000 tons of wheat and wheat flour. Because of the generally optimistic long-run outlook for Peru's foreign exchange earnings, credit terms will be 25 percent down payment, 20 years repayment in dollars at 2 1/2 percent.

Reinstituting of P. L. 480 Program

This will be the first P. L. 480 sales agreement since the slow-down of aid in 1964 connected with the International Petroleum Company dispute, which by mutual agreement has cooled off. AID resumed major activities late in FY 1966 with a \$13 million development loan program, including a loan for agricultural credit.

Under agreement reached in negotiating the AID agricultural credit loan, the proceeds of this P. L. 480 sale will substitute for part of the U. S. dollar obligation under the AID loan. The same self-help assurances which AID seeks in connection with its assistance programs to agriculture in Peru will be required under the P. L. 480 agreement.

This is a relatively small program for Peru, much reduced from their \$14 million request. In view of the fact that it will substitute for part of an AID loan on softer terms, the real value to Peru must be in the reopening of P. L. 480 assistance. While there is a question as to whether Peru will accept this proposal, State and AID soundings indicate that it is acceptable.

Recommendation

I recommend that you authorize negotiations for this proposed agreement.

Charles L. Schultze

alianles L'Schutter

Attachment
Approve_____
Disapprove_____



84.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

The President

DATE:

December 2 7 1966

FROM

SUBJECT:

PL 480 Program for Peru

We recommend that you authorize us to proceed with negotiations with the Government of Peru for a Title IV, PL 480 sales agreement as follows:

Commodity Composition:

U.S. Fiscal Year 1967

Commodity	Approximate Maximum Quantity (metric tons)	Estimated Market Value(1,00	Estimated CCC Cost
Wheat/wheat flour Ocean transportation Total	30,000 (estimated)	\$1,957 102 \$2,059	\$2,302 209 \$2,511

Credit Terms:

The credit terms will provide that payment of the principal amount financed by the USG for commodities, ocean transportation and other costs in connection with commodities delivered in each calendar year shall be made in 19 annual installments. The first installment will be due on March 31 immediately following the calendar year of shipment. This payment will be for 25 percent of the total amount financed in connection with shipments made during the preceding calendar year. Payment for the balance of amounts financed will be made in 18 approximately equal annual installments due on March 31 of successive calendar years. The interest rate will be $2\frac{1}{2}$ percent per annum.

Peru's Food Situation

Peru's agricultural output in 1966 will be about 1% below that of 1965. Unfavorable weather affected this year's grain and potato crops while cotton production declined due to lower world prices. Production increases are expected for a number of foodstuffs not affected by weather, and cotton land is being diverted to food production which will increase next year's yield. However, the

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 9/-252

By 22, NARA, Date 9-27-9/

increases have not yet been sufficient to cover the annual rate of population growth, especially in the urban areas, and food imports are increasing. Wheat production is approximately 140,000 tons annually with consumption approaching 600,000 tons. Peru has concentrated on production for export in past years but we are encouraging the GOP to establish meaningful long-term policies to meet domestic food requirements. Such a change, however, will require time before import requirements begin to diminish.

Peru has imported annually from 1960-1965 an average of 400,000 tons of wheat and wheat flour. Even though Peru is moving to increase production, imports of agricultural commodities continue to increase requiring scarce foreign exchange which could be used for high-priority development activities. Peru purchases commercially large amounts of food grain primarily from Argentina, Canada and the United States. U.S. sales of wheat during fiscal year 1965 to Peru were about 85,000 tons and reached approximately 205,000 tons in fiscal year 1966. These sales will continue under the proposed sales agreement. However, the provision of a portion of Peru's food imports under PL 480 will serve as an added relief to Peru's declined foreign exchange reserves.

Peru's Self-Help Efforts

Investment by the GOP in the agricultural sector increased from 10 percent of the government budget in 1960 to 25 percent in 1965; this includes central government support of the Ministry of Agriculture and transfer payments to the National Agricultural Research and Extension Service and to the National Agrarian Reform Office. Due to the recurring serious budget deficit of the central government, the operating budget of the Ministry of Agriculture was only increased 1% in 1966, but the transfer payments to the independent public subsector agencies under the Ministry continued at their previously high level.

The Belaunde administration has moved ahead with expanded programs in agrarian reform, irrigation projects, road building, supervised agricultural credit, and community self-help to increase agricultural output. However, in spite of the progress being made, the agricultural gains are not keeping up with the demands for food.

The activities of Cooperacion Popular have been important in creating a sense of forward movement in rural areas and local involvement in the development process. Nearly 3,000 community

self-help projects were completed in the first two-year period under this program, more than 4,000 projects are currently underway, and over 11,000 community requests for assistance are pending. All projects undertaken under Cooperacion Popular are self-help efforts initiated by the local village or township utilizing local labor and often local materials. Thus, the program helps to develop agricultural efficiency and to decrease the movement of the rural population to the cities, a factor which has contributed to the food deficit.

Another major self-help effort in the agricultural sector is the agricultural university at La Molina which has expanded its budget from 5 million soles in 1960 to 115 million soles by 1965 with a corresponding expansion in personnel and facilities over and above assistance received through external loans. Enrollment has doubled and the number of staff members with advanced degrees has increased from 6 to 81 during the same period. The university now is one of the outstanding institutions in its field in Latin America.

The credit channels for small and medium sized farm operators continue to be expanded. About 20,000 loans for nearly \$17 million have been made under a supervised agricultural credit program and funds have been earmarked to reach approximately 27,000 farmers each year hereafter.

Our Aid Understanding with Peru

The United States has a vital interest in President Belaunde's current efforts to modernize Peru economically and socially through democratic methods since Peru is one of the largest countries in Latin America, a major trading partner of the United States and an area of heavy U.S. investment.

A \$9 million agricultural credit loan made by ATD earlier this year includes a condition that if any Peruvian soles become available as the result of a PL 480 program during the course of disbursement of the dollar loan, those soles shall replace an equivalent dollar amount under the ATD loan. We signed the loan agreement with the GOP on November 23, 1966. The soles generated by this proposed PL 480 program will permit us to reduce the dollars committed under the ATD loan by approximately \$1.6 million.

Major new commitments of economic assistance had been temporarily postponed due to the unresolved issue of the International Petroleum Corporation (IPC) dispute. As the status of IPC remains unimpaired and

negotiations are continuing between the company and the Government to achieve agreement, ATD recently renewed its loan program to Peru.


Recommendation

That you authorize us to begin negotiations with Peru for a PL 480 sales agreement for the remainder of the fiscal year.

In negotiations, we plan to seek assurance that the GOP will:
(1) carry out their commitments for increasing support to the supervised agriculture credit fund administered by the Agriculture Bank;
(2) coordinate the various new offices operating in support of
agricultural development; (3) initiate an evaluation of the effectiveness of the supervised agricultural credit program; and (4) establish
an integrated national agricultural development policy to include a
listing of priority needs and the appropriate relationships between
production credit, marketing, extension assistance, research and
government assistance agencies.

	Approve:
	Disapprove:
William 1. Gard	On the the
Administrator gency for International	Secretary Department of Agriculture

Orville L. Freeman



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JAN 1 6 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Procedures for Approving New P. L. 480 Commitments

Attached is the $\underline{\text{sixth}}$ request for approval to negotiate a P. L. 480 sales agreement to be forwarded to you in three weeks. The six are:

- . Pakistan, valued at \$35.7 million,
- . Tunisia, valued at \$8.5 million,
- . Congo, valued at \$6.2 million,
- . Ghana, valued at \$5.9 million,
- . Peru, valued at \$2.1 million, and
- . Sudan, valued at \$450 thousand.

Once the agencies become familiar with procedures under the new law, I expect the number of requests to increase fairly sharply. Since this will place a heavy burden on you, I suggest that you establish a cut-off point below which you need not review specific proposals. Based on experience during 1966:

- If you review all proposals, you will receive 66 requests a year.
- If you review proposals valued at \$5 million or more, you will receive 35 requests, covering 94% of total P. L. 480 sales.
- If you review proposals valued at \$10 million or more, you will receive 24 requests, covering 88% of total P. L. 480 sales.

-COMPTINE THAT

CONFIDENTIAL with attachments

Of course, countries which present special problems of foreign policy or Congressional relations would continue to be forwarded to you for approval in any case. Any proposal which you do not see will continue to be subject to the USDA/State/AID/Treasury/Commerce/Budget Bureau review process and to the self-help requirements of the new legislation.

Recommendation

Since agreements above \$10 million will cover such a large portion of the total program, and since any agreement involving significant policy issues will be submitted anyway, I recommend the \$10 million cutoff.

Charles L. Schultze

Director

11c cacimento	
Establish a	\$10 million cut-off
Establish a	\$5 million cut-off
I want to se	ee them all

CONFIDENTIAL with attachments

Presfile

Monday, January 23, 1967 - 4:30 pm

Mr. President:

Attached is Secretary Fowler's preliminary report to you on the Chequers meeting with his opposite numbers from Britain, France, Germany and Italy. As you know, these were exploratory sessions aimed at developing a common awareness of mutual problems caused by rising interest rates in most advanced countries. Fowler reports that useful contacts were made, and a "best efforts" agreement reached, but no specific measures were pledged.

Francis Bator accompanied the Secretary, and will return Wednesday evening after some informal talks in London. I am sure he will give you his impressions of the Chequers meeting as well.

W. W. Rostow





THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY WASHINGTON

January 23, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Meeting at Chequers

Attached you will find a copy of the communique on the meeting of the Finance Ministers this past weekend.

It was a very useful meeting and accomplished as much as we could reasonably hope.

I believe all present have a sincere conviction that further easing of monetary stringency in the major industrial countries and capital markets 'would be helpful in the context of the development of their own economies and of the world economy as a whole". Whether or not they will be able to assure that the monetary policies of their respective countries "should have regard to the effect on other countries" which is particularly applicable to the Germans, the Italians and, to a lesser degree, the French, remains to be seen,

As you can see, the last sentence in paragraph three amounts to a "best efforts" agreement to cooperate in such a way as to "enable interest rates in their respective countries to be lower than they otherwise would be". The telling part of the paragraph is, of course, the qualifying words "within the limits of their respective responsibilities" which spells out that the central bankers have considerable to say in this area and, of course, Parliaments or the Congress insofar as taxing and fiscal policy is concerned.

At the very least, the meeting set a very good tone on this subject and focused attention on the need for cooperation by the Common Market countries if we and the U.K. are to keep our rates on a downward path without causing substantial balance of payments outflows.

The Germans moved down their bank rate a half point last week but need to do a great deal more for their own good (because their economy looks relatively stagnant) and to reduce the gap in rates as pictured in the attached chart entitled "Central Government Bond Yields", which has been expanding over the last three years.

The situation in the money market rates (see attached chart on money market rates) does not particularly point to Germany. There we must watch the Eurodollar rate which, happily, has been coming down with our short-term money rate.

I had a brief side exchange with Mr. Debré, the French Minister, concerning his recent antics in connection with gold and the liquidity negotiations. Also, I had several side conversations with Chancellor Callaghan who expects to be here next month for a series of bilateral meetings with us. I would-like to fill you in sometime on these side meetings since they were highly relevant not only to our financial but to our overall political situation vis-a-vis Western Europe and the U.K.

Henry H. Fowler


Attachments

Communique

- 1. Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and United States met at Chequers on January 21st and 22nd 1967 for informal discussions about the international interaction of their respective countries' economic and monetary policies. The Ministers taking part were M. Michel Debre, Minister of the Economy and Finances of France; Professor Karl Schiller, Minister of Economics of the Federal Republic of Germany; Signor Emilio Colombo, Minister of the Treasury of Italy; Mr. Henry Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States; and Mr. James Callaghan, Chancellor of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom. The meeting was arranged at the invitation of Mr. Callaghan.
- 2. The Ministers welcomed recent steps taken by some of the countries represented to ease credit and monetary stringency which in the past had played a useful part in moderating their domestic inflationary pressures. They agreed that in some countries some further easing would be helpful in the context of the development of their own economies and of the world economy as a whole.
- 3. The monetary policies called for in the present situation should be adapted to the different conditions obtaining in their respective countries and should have regard to their effect on other countries. The Ministers agreed that they would all make it their objective within the limits of their respective responsibilities to co-operate in such a way as to enable interest rates in their respective countries to be lower than they otherwise would be.
- 4. No other question was dealt with at the meeting.

central government bond yields for Selected countries 1963-1966 (average yields to maturity on issues with at least 12 years' life in % per annum)

PERCENT PER ANNUM




Notes: ¹Bonds of local authorities

Source: International Monetary Fund, IFS.

MONEY MARKET RATES for SELECTED COUNTRIES 1963-1966





Notes: 1 Average tender rate for 3 month Treasury Bills

2. Average of daily or weekly call money rates

Source: International Monetary Fund, IFS.

Monday, January 23, 1967 4:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

I have marked some interesting items in Glenn Seaborg's report to you (attached) of January 3-14.

The Australian item was new to me, also. In the wake of a non-proliferation agreement, we shall have to work out -- I predict -- some new nuclear relations in Asia, notably with Japan and Australia.

W. W. Rostow

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

January 18, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to enclose a brief report on the recent overseas visit of our Atomic Energy Delegation, including Commissioner Gerald F. Tape, to Australia, Thailand, India and Pakistan from January 3 through January 14. We had the opportunity to meet and discuss matters of mutual interest with Prime Minister Thanom of Thailand, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan, as well as meeting at length with my counterparts in the respective nuclear energy commissions in each of the countries visited.

I also had the pleasure, following your suggestion to me, to speak before sizeable audiences in Sydney, Bangkok, Bombay and Lahore on our country's program on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and current developments in nuclear research. As you know, I also participated in the Summer Science School at the University of Sydney (broadcast on Australian national TV) and gave two lectures to the outstanding students attending the School, including the ten Lyndon B. Johnson scholars whom you recently met in Washington. In addition, I held extensive press conferences in each of the countries visited.

In each country we received a warm and most hospitable reception. Of especial interest to me was Prime Minister Gandhi's renewed pledge to pursue only the peaceful aspects of nuclear energy and Pakistan's continued concern regarding the trustworthiness of India's announced intention. It was also obvious to me that nuclear power will play an important and an increasing role in Southeast Asia. With the exception of Australia, each of the countries has a

remarkably high projected growth rate of electrical power demand-coupled with limited low cost conventional fuel resources. Nuclear power will not only be economically competitive in these areas but will serve to hasten their rate of development. The use of radiation to increase the shelf-life of perishable foods and for the disinfestation of food grains, which I stressed in India and Pakistan at the suggestion of Dr. Walter Rostow, also has the potential to play an important role in helping to alleviate the food problem in these countries of Southeast Asia:

Also of great interest to me was the revelation that Australia is in the throes of an intensive internal debate to attempt to decide whether they should undertake a program to build the atomic bomb as a defense against China.

If I can provide any further information to you regarding any aspect of the trip, I would be pleased to do so. I also want to thank you once again for making the fine Military Airline Command aircraft available for our party. The crew was excellent and saw to it that our entire trip was on schedule.

Respectfully submitted,

Glenn T. Seaborg

The President
The White House

Enclosure

cc: Honorable Dean Rusk

JAN 18 11 05 MI '87

THE WHITE TOUSE

TRIP REPORT

AUSTRALIA, THAILAND, INDIA, AND PAKISTAN

JANUARY 3 THROUGH JANUARY 14, 1967

BY GLENN T. SEABORG

AUSTRALIA (January 5 - January 9)

The host for our Atomic Energy Delegation was the Australian AEC and its Chairman, Sir Phillip Baxter. In addition to meeting with the AAEC we also had the opportunity to meet Minister Fairbairn (Minister of State for National Development) and other Parliamentary delegates, and to discuss our mutual nuclear energy activities.

Australia's civilian nuclear power program is still in an early stage, because of the substantial quantities of low-cost coal available for power generation. However, planning is now proceeding for the introduction of nuclear power in 1975. I encouraged them to consider their first nuclear power station from the viewpoint of gaining reactor experience and not solely from the viewpoint of immediate economics, since there is no doubt in my mind that nuclear power will eventually be economic as Australia's power demands increase.

Because of Australia's natural uranium resources they are presently interested in a boiling light-water-cooled, heavy water moderated, natural uranium fueled reactor somewhat analogous to the Canadian and United Kingdom reactor designs. They are in fact closely cooperating with the UK in their present stage of reactor development. We also discussed the merits of the U. S. approach of slightly enriched reactor systems and suggested that when the Australian government is actually prepared to proceed, world-wide bids be solicited so that they could assess the economic advantages and disadvantages of all competitive reactor systems.

The U. S. Plowshare program was of extreme interest to the Australian officials with whom we met as well as the Australian press. Because of the largely undeveloped and unpopulated nature of much of Australia, the concept

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of using relatively inexpensive nuclear explosives for the building of harbors near rich ore deposits, the construction of dams in river gorges to store the water which flows only a month or two out of the year, the construction of basins for water storage, the breaking and mining of ore deposits and the fracturing of gas bearing rock strata to increase the gas recovery yield appears to offer the Australians an important tool for the continued development of their nation. I noted the restraints imposed on excavation type projects by the Limited Test Ban Treaty, but indicated that fully contained projects could be conducted without concern. The Australian officials indicated that they would not wish to be the first to formally suggest the use of nuclear explosives in such a manner as to necessitate the modification of the Test Ban Treaty. Nonetheless, a very strong interest exists in Plowshare applications and if the treaty questions can be reconciled, I am certain that the US will receive firm requests from Australia to proceed with several of these projects.

In my other discussions with members of the governmental joint Parliamentary Committee having a special responsibility for nuclear energy affairs, the possibility of Australia eventually having to construct nuclear weapons for reasons of national security was raised by the members on several occasions. I attempted to deter this line of reasoning. In the several discussions I had with Mr. William Wentworth, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Majority Committee on Atomic Energy, he expressed the view that Australia should support a non-proliferation treaty only if it contains adequate guarantees against aggression by other nations; otherwise, he believes, such a treaty would be detrimental to Australia's friends, including the US, and helpful to its enemies.

I was particularly impressed by Mr. Wentworth's familiarity with the gas centrifuge method of separating the uranium isotopes. He was familiar with the potential for improvement in this method through advanced technology, and expressed the belief that the classification of this information by the US confirmed the fact that the technological problems are largely resolved.

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I had a particularly interesting conversation with Sir Leslie Martin (who is an Australian AEC member, the Scientific Advisor to the Defense Department, head of the Universities Support Committee, and was a student of Rutherford at Cambridge University in England). Although the Australian government has not told the US government about it, he said there is an internal debate going on as to whether Australia should build the plutonium atomic bomb as a defense against China; he said that both Prime Ministers Menzies and Holt had considered informing President Johnson about this but did not do so.

I concluded my visit to Australia by participating with Ambassador Clark and Dr. George Mueller of NASA in the opening of the Summer Science School at the University of Sydney. I also presented two lectures on the Transuranium Elements to the students, including the ten Lyndon B. Johnson scholars. I might add that our ten US students presented an excellent picture of scholastic leadership and achievement in the US.

In discussions with Ambassador Clark, he advised that if the US is to eventually proceed with Plowshare activities in Australia or for that matter any items of a complex political nature (such as the use of Australia as a site for high yield underground weapons testing), his experience indicated that the wisest course to follow is to acquaint the Australians with the situation and its problems at an early date and allow them to work along with us toward a resolution of the matter.

THAILAND (January 10)

At the special invitation of Prime Minister Thanom and Pote Sarasin, the Minister of National Development, and with the encouragement of Ambassador Martin, our Atomic Energy Delegation rearranged our schedule so that we could make a one-day visit to Bangkok. The Prime Minister was especially appreciative about your making an aircraft available to our party which permitted us to visit Thailand.

While Thailand has at present a relatively small electric generating capability, its projected growth rate for electrical power demand is remarkable and its indigenous supply of conventional fuels such as coal, oil, and gas is limited. Small nuclear power stations will undoubtedly be competitive and needed in the early 1970's.

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During the discussion of Ambassador Martin, Commissioner Tape and me with the Prime Minister, the matter of constructing a canal across the Kra Isthmus with the help of nuclear explosives arose together with other Plowshare projects. The Kra canal would cut off almost a thousand miles of transport by sea from Bangkok to the west and even more should the Straits of Malacca be closed due to international tensions. It was obvious that once the political intricacies of such a project were resolved, there would be considerable interest.

Also during our talk with the Prime Minister, I had the opportunity to stress the importance of a regional approach to the development and application of nuclear energy. Thailand, because of its excellent relations with most neighboring countries, could serve as a center for training and research for the Philippines, South Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Burma. The Prime Minister and Minister Sarasin received this suggestion with considerable interest.

As a conclusion to our visit, I had the opportunity to give an address on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to a large audience, and to hold a press conference. Both of these were given at the Thai Atomic Energy Center for Peace which our party toured at the conclusion of the visit.

INDIA (January 11 - January 12)

In India, I was the guest of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission and its Chairman, Dr. Vikram Sarabhai. During our visit, India's impressive atomic energy research establishment at Trombay was renamed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in honor of the late Dr. Homi Bhabha, former Chairman of the Indian AEC and a world renowned scientist. The Heads or senior officials of a number of atomic energy authorities around the world attended the dedication ceremony, which was arranged by Dr. Sarabhai to coincide with our visit.

During this visit, I held extensive conversations with Chairman Sarabhai and visited the Indian atomic energy research establishment at Trombay outside Bombay

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and the Tarapur Atomic Power Project, 60 miles north of Bombay, which will provide 380 MW of electric power from two enriched uranium, boiling water power reactors designed and manufactured by the General Electric Company. This nuclear power plant, the largest now underway in Asia, is being financed by a US AID loan of \$80 million.

In my conversations with Chairman Sarabhai, I reiterated the importance which the US attaches to the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. particularly explored with him the disturbing reports that India might undertake the development of nuclear explosives on the ground that they were to be used only for peaceful purposes. Chairman Sarabhai stated categorically that no such program was in progress or contemplated. However, he maintained the view that the decision of each nation on whether to develop peaceful nuclear explosives should not be inhibited by a nonproliferation treaty. I stressed that the US position is that the development of peaceful nuclear explosives is tantamount to the development of nuclear weapons and that the legitimate needs of nations for these highly sophisticated devices should be met my the nuclear powers, such as the US, which have developed them. Sarabhai feels that the IAEA safeguards system may actually be counterproductive, leading to the spread of nuclear weapons information, as a result of the information gained by the international inspectors being taken back to their individual countries; I do not agree with this point of view.

Chairman Sarabhai's position on the development of peaceful nuclear explosives is characteristic of Indian thinking on the general issue of non-proliferation. This is that India has decided in its own self-interest to forego the development of nuclear weapons and to concentrate on peaceful nuclear applications, but that India should not be prevented by treaty from the development of nuclear weapons whenever its national interest requires. This view was reflected in remarks delivered by Chairman Sarabhai and Prime Minister Gandhi at the dedication ceremony.

I also discussed with Chairman Sarabhai the implementation of our arrangements for increased cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy, which we developed with him during his visit to the US last November, as the guest of the US Atomic Energy Commission. These

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arrangements have now been approved by the Indian Government and we are making plans for their prompt implementation. One of the areas covered by our new arrangements is cooperation in the application of radiation to the preservation of food and the disinfestation of grain. In this regard, I offered to Chairman Sarabhai the loan of an experimental irradiator, containing 30,000 curies of cobalt-60, which can be used by India in extending its studies of the radiation preservation of various foodstuffs, including fish and the disinfestation of food grains. In return for the loan of this irradiator without cost to India, the US will receive the full results of the experimental work performed. I later discussed this offer with Prime Minister Gandhi during my meeting with her at the dedication ceremony.

Chairman Sarabhai was optimistic concerning the benefits that the radiation preservation of food may bring in alleviating India's critical food situation and I share this optimism. One of the products on which the Indian AEC plans to concentrate its efforts in the radiation preservation field is fish, and the experimental irradiator which I offered can be of considerable help in advancing these studies. The Indian Ocean is a rich source of food, particularly proteins in which the Indian diet is so deficient, yet little of these products penetrate more than a few miles inland, largely because of the high rate of spoilage. While much work remains to be done, radiation pasteurization is one of the techniques which holds promise for extending the shelf life of such perishable food products by the extra time necessary to enable their distribution to far larger numbers of people.

The disinfestation of grain is also an urgent problem. Current estimates indicate that 10% to 20% of India's grain crop is destroyed by insect pests before it reaches the market place. Radiation may make an important contribution to the reduction of this tragic loss, providing the equally important problem of reinfestation of the grain following radiation, because of the poor food distribution system, can be solved.

In view of these many advantages to India of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy obtainable through cooperation with the United States, I discussed with

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Sarabhai the possibility of stationing a USAEC Scientific Representative in India. He was enthusiastic about this suggestion and urged that such a representative be stationed at the Consulate in Bombay rather than at the Embassy in New Delhi.

Turning to the facilities we visited, I can report that India has a truly remarkable peaceful nuclear energy program. The research facilities near Bombay are equal in scope and sophistication to those of many of the most advanced countries outside the military nuclear powers. Among other achievements, India has built, through its own efforts, the only plant at present for the extraction and purification of plutonium from irradiated fuel elements in any country other than the military nuclear powers. is no doubt that with these facilities and with its competent nuclear scientists and engineers, India has the capability to design and develop nuclear devices on a comparatively short time schedule. However, India has no plutonium nor capability to produce plutonium other than that which is committed by international agreement to use for peaceful purposes only. To be specific, the Canadian-Indian Reactor Uranium System (CIRUS Reactor), a research reactor, is confined, by international agreement between Canada and India, to use only for peaceful purposes, although there are no safeguard arrangements in effect to ensure compliance with this guarantee through on-site inspection. larger nuclear power projects, on which India is now receiving help from the US and Canada, are subject to both quarantees and effective safeguard arrangements.

I believe that the Tarapur Atomic Power Project will become one of the show-cases of United States assistance in India and, in fact, in Asia. It is now about 70% complete and on schedule. By 1968, it will be supplying its power to the largest electric power grid in India. The US suppliers, the US AID, and the Indian Atomic Energy Commission all merit genuine congratulations for their performance on this project to date.

One of the most useful aspects of my visit to India was the technical lecture which I presented on the transuranium elements and my press conference. The lecture, which was attended by an estimated 800 Indian scientists and engineers, and which was an entirely scientific report, helped, in my view, to underscore the strong US interest in

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basic research, and, by implication, the support which the United States Government receives from the scientific community in the US.

In the press conference which I held, I paid tribute to the exceptional progress which India has made in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, in contrast to Mainland China which has chosen a military path. The achievement of nuclear detonations by Communist China has made deep inroads on India's prestige and self-confidence, and my assessment that India was capable of achieving a nuclear weapons capability, even though it had wisely chosen to devote its efforts to peaceful uses, received, along with other aspects of my visit, broad press coverage. I also appeared, together with Dr. Homi Sethna, the Director of Bhabha Atomic Energy Center at Trombay, on All India Radio in a discussion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the cooperation between India and the United States in this field.

To summarize my impressions of India, I believe that it is clearly the leader in peaceful applications of nuclear energy in Asia, with the single exception of Japan. It has the capability of mounting a significant nuclear weapons program on relatively short notice, but I saw nothing on my visit to suggest that, at the present, it is engaged in any such activities. I believe that India can benefit in large measure from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that it is in our national interest to assist them inthose activities, under the effective safeguard arrangements we have developed to ensure against diversion to military uses of any US supplied help.

PAKISTAN (January 13 - January 14)

My visit to Pakistan was hosted by Dr. I. H. Usmani, Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. I visited Pakistan's new Institute for Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) at Islamabad (where I gave a talk on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy), and its Atomic Energy Center at Lahore, and presented a check for \$350,000 to the Government of Pakistan in fulfillment of a US commitment to share in the cost of Pakistan's first research reactor, under the Atoms-for-Peace program. Most importantly, along with Ambassador Locke and Commissioner Tape, I visited President Ayub Khan and had what I believe

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was a constructive conversation with him on a broad range of nuclear energy problems.

Pakistan is far behind India in its nuclear energy achievements. Pakistan's first reactor - a small research unit - is just now achieving routine operation. Pakistan has begun a nuclear power program through a cooperative arrangement with Canada to construct a 140 MWe power plant of the natural uranium, heavy water moderated type. It has a good, but early start, on the uses of radioisotopes for medical, agricultural, industrial, and food irradiation purposes.

I believe that Pakistan will unquestionably need and make extensive use of nuclear power for the generation of electricity, although I believe it will lag well behind India due to the supplies of natural gas in Pakistan, its limited but significant hydroelectric potential, and the smaller unit size which the Pakistani power grid can now accommodate.

I found in Pakistan a deep concern regarding the nuclear intentions of India. In introducing me in connection with my lecture to an audience at the Lahore Atomic Energy Center and my presentation of the \$350,000 reactor grant to Pakistan, Chairman Usmani publicly expressed his mistrust of India's nuclear objectives and stated that, if India were to explode a nuclear device, the US and other nations would share the blame by having provided India with assistance without international controls. A number of questions during the press conference I held after my lecture and check presentation were in a similar vein.

As in India, the press conference which I held was well attended, and was the subject of widespread reporting. I emphasized the affirmative steps the US has taken to cooperate with Pakistan in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the fact that we insist on safe-guards over any nuclear assistance which we provide. I am hopeful that this assurance, which, for example, was headlined in The Pakistan Times: "US Not to Help India Make A-Bomb," may contribute significantly to alleviating the suspicion and concern which even informed Pakistanis now hold in relation to Indian nuclear intentions.

During the visit which I paid on President Ayub Khan, I had a further chance to counter Pakistan's contention that the US is aiding India in achieving a nuclear weapons capability. I gave President Ayub Khan categorical assurance that US nuclear assistance to all nations, including India, was provided under safeguard arrangements which ensure against diversion of nuclear materials to military purposes. President Ayub Khan appeared to be receptive to these assurances and stated that the undertaking of a military nuclear program by India would be - and I quote - "ruinous not only to India but to Pakistan as well." Ambassador Locke and I made clear our strong agreement with this statement. I also stressed the strenuous efforts which the US is making to bring about the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty.

I extended to President Ayub Khan an offer, identical to that which I made to India, to lend Pakistan a 30,000 curie radiation source for research and development in irradiation preservation of foods. I also offered to enter into a "sister-laboratory" arrangement between a USAEC National Laboratory and Pakistan's new Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology. These offers, which I had already discussed with Chairman Usmani, were well received, and should contribute significantly to strengthening our good relationship with Pakistan on peaceful uses of atomic energy.

I was impressed with President Ayub Khan's suggestion that the developing nations and other smaller powers might group together and take the initiative to help bring about a non-proliferation treaty. We in the Atomic Energy Commission have consistently tried to encourage other nations - both individually and as a group - to place their nuclear programs under effective international safeguards.

To summarize, I believe that Pakistan, along with India can share in the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, although Pakistan's needs and capabilities will dictate a somewhat longer time schedule there than in India. I believe that Pakistan is far removed from either the intent or the capability to develop nuclear weapons, but that it is deeply disturbed by India's status in both regards. I believe that continuing US measures, such as my visit to Pakistan and increased assistance to legitimate Pakistan objectives in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can help alleviate this problem.



Mr. Rostow 87
Pres. file. January 23, 1967 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: The Indians are badgering the Australians When Ambassador Clark talked to our staff, he reported that the Indian Ambassador in Canberra was not lifting a finger to seek help from the Australians. Subsequently, we have learned from the Australians that they are mad at the Indians for putting so much pressure on them! They are doing this in New Delhi, through the Australian High Commissioner, instead of in Canberra. Ambassador Clark was not likely to be aware of these Indian efforts by the time he left Canberra. We'll report to you Australia's reactions to our combined efforts when we hear from our man in Canberra.

W. W. R.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You are scheduled to meet with the National Security Council at noon, Wednesday, January 25 to discuss the Southern Rhodesian problem.

Dick Helms requests your permission to send his Deputy, Admiral Taylor to this meeting. Helms has a long-standing invitation to meet in New York with a group of influential businessmen who have been helpful to the Agency.

He is willing to cancel this meeting, but would prefer to attend because of the difficulty of altering the present arrangements.

I recommend that you authorize Director Helms to keep his New York engagement and send his Deputy to the NSC meeting.

W. W. Rostow

OK for Helms to send Admiral Taylor
Helms should attend NSC meeting
See Me
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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By et , NARA, Date (0.21-98)

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SECRET -- EXDIS

Monday, January 23, 1967 -- 12:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith two messages concerning food.

- 1. Harold Holt replies, backing the effort to bring other industrial nations into "shared responsibility." The Australians have been informed about our change in policy and the purpose of Gene Rostow's trip. We are waiting until Gene returns before getting George Woods to suggest to the Australians that they join the World Bank consortium on this new basis.
- 2. In Paris Gene made about 2¢: the French came up with 3,000 tons of dried milk, worth \$1,400,000, although they confirmed their commitment to increase their contribution to the Indian consortium by 50% this year. On a Community Chest basis, France should put in 7.9 million, not 1.4 million. We shall get the Indians to try to push them higher than 1.4 via fertilizers, pesticides, etc.

W. W. Rostow

Canberra 3631, Unclassified Paris 10932, Secret -- EXDIS

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91- 256

By 22, NARA, Date 12-2-93

- SECRET -- EXDIS

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UNCLASSIFIED

Canberra 3631, January 23, 1967

Letter to the President from Harold Holt

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your recent cordial and generous message. I am, indeed, gratified to know that the increase in our Vietnam force has given such satisfaction. The U.S. contribution to the security and progress of the Asian and Pacific region is performing a service to the prosperity, security and well-being of the entire free world, and you may be assured that this is the view taken by the Australian people.

Our armed services have appreciated the speedy arrangements made by your military authorities in Saigon for detailed discussions about the many procedures required to increase forces. We hope to complete arrangements for the despatch to Vietnam of the new elements of the forces shortly.

We were glad, as in the past, to be able to further assist India in an emergency food shortage. The problem is a vexed one for the future stability of the free world and we would wish to work towards a position where food aid of this kind is a shared responsibility and not one exclusively borne by the major food producing and exporting countries.

May I say that I am encouraged by the prospect that 1967 may take our countries into a deepening relationship in our effort to assist the countries of the region to further their social and economic progress.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Harold Holt

(original text being airpouched.)

SECRET -- EXDIS

Paris 10932, January 21, 1967, from E. V. Rostow and John Schnittker

In meeting this morning Herve Alphand authorized me to report that French government fully agrees to need for international effort to meet emergency Indian food needs this year on humanitarian, political and economic grounds. While French government cannot increase its Indian consortium participation in cash, since it is already committed to 50% increase, it will undertake to do everything possible as additive contribution in dried milk, fertilizer, pesticides or other means.

At Finance Ministry later, where same view was confirmed as governmental position, we were told that Debre decided this morning to make available immediately three thousand tons of dried milk, Embassy will explore other possibilities with French officials next week. French would prefer one consortium meeting to two, if consultative process continues to go well.

We have stressed that our recommendation of consortium for present period was provisional only, based on practical necessities at this time.

Authority State la 5-25-78, nsc ist By siphe, NARA, Date 2-4-91

SECRET -- EXDIS

fre file

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday - January 23, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Nicaraguan Stituation

The rioting which broke out in Managua yesterday was a deliberate provocation by opposition candidate Fernando Aguero to gain at least a delay in the February 5 general elections and, if possible, intervention by the US or OAS.

In a speech to his followers, Aguero called upon the Nicaraguan National Guard to join him in overthrowing the Somozas. (General "Tachito" Somoga is the Government's candidate.) He then led a demonstration through the city. A clash between the demonstrators and the National Guard occurred, leading to an extensive street fight.

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Aguero and his entourage took refuge in Managua's largest hotel in the center of the city. The National Guard has the hotel surrounded. Through the night, there was sporadic sniping at the National Guard, but the Government seems to be firmly in control. the Government has authorized two priests to enter the hotel to talk to Aguero.

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Ambassador Brown reports that to his best knowledge, no Americans have been hurt. Some 20 United States citizens are in the besieged hotel. Brown has asked Nicaraguan authorities to exercise extreme care in any action against Aguero so that the lives of Americans and other foreigners will not be endangered.

W. W. Rostow

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Authority NLT 0 (9-01 2-3-5

By A, NARA, Date 12-10-01

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Pres file

TOP SECRET

Monday, January 23, 1967 10:45 a.m.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NEJ 91-256

By NARA, Date 12-2-93

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: ROLLING THUNDER 53

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara asked me to put to you their agreed recommendations about which targets submitted by the JCS in ROLLING THUNDER 53 should be accepted at the present time, and which should be deferred until after Tet and until after we see what, if anything, develops in the various flowered negotiating tracks.

- 1. They would accept nine military support targets (marked in red in the table attached to the enclosed map): barracks, ammo and supply depots. This table also indicates with a (d) the JCS targets which they recommend for deferral.
- 2. In substance, they would defer a major ammo depot near Haiphong (for fear of substantial civilian casualties); the steel plant; the cement plant; and six electric power plants.
- 3. They would hold the naval sea interdiction zone to the 19th parallel where it now is; the JCS kept to their original recommendation of extension to the 20th parallel.
- 4. The operational instruction now reads: "You are authorized to transit the Hanoi/Haiphong restricted areas as necessary in conducting air operations; however, transit of the Hanoi prohibited area by strike aircraft should be avoided." This is the 10-mile zone. Although Secretaries Rusk and McNamara did not address themselves to this point, you may wish to strengthen the language by substituting "will" for "should" to underline the importance of not having an operational accident in that zone at this time.
- 5. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara also recommend that, whatever the weather situation, no more than three of these new targets should be struck in any one week, to avoid the image of an accelerated, intensive, and concerted campaign.

My own recommendation is that you support the two Secretaries in this matter; and also change "should" to "will." I do so for two reasons:

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TOP SECRET attachment

- -- at this particular moment we should stay straight and level and not introduce new target systems or take operational risks which might weaken our negotiating record;
- -- I believe before we go into any new target systems -- if that should be required after Tet -- you should hear systematic argument on alternative "northern strategies" so that we decide something more fundamental than merely adding a few targets to the existing list.

W. W. R.

Approve recommendations of Sects. Rusk and McNamara
Alter their recommendations as follows
Alter language from "should" to "will"
See me

TOP SECRET

(SecDefCont No. 7639)

Pres file

CONFIDENTIAL

Sunday - January 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with Ambassador Garcia Godoy

Garcia Godoy, who has just returned from Santo Domingo, will want to:

- -- reminisce about the happy outcome of the Dominican crisis;
- -- describe the general situation in the DR;
- -- perhaps ask for continued favored treatment in the assignment of sugar shortfalls.

Political Situation. Balaguer continues to enjoy greater public backing and political stability than we had reason to expect. We are concerned that he continues to neglect his <u>Reformista</u> Party. Since the Communists and left-wing opposition are so badly divided by factional disputes, they are not in a position now to give him much trouble. This could change, accelerating political polarization and forcing Balaguer to rely more on the military. Ambassador Crimmins continues to urge Balaguer to build a strong civilian political base. You might stress the importance of such action.

Economic Situation. In six months Balaguer has checked deterioration of the economy and started the slow process of recovery. His austerity program has won general acceptance. He has held inflationary pressures in check. Labor has given him no serious difficulties. He has balanced his operating budget. The 1967 budget foresees a surplus on the operating side, giving him \$23 million for investment. Unemployment is still serious, however, and he has not overcome his balance of payments problems. US private companies are exploring investment possibilities, but have not taken a plunge in a big way yet.

Sugar. Because of the unfavorable balance of payments, he may ask for continued favored treatment in the allocation of deficits. Last year you gave them the entire Philippine and Panamanian deficit, bringing the total Dominican quota to 602,000 tons.

You might tell Garcia Godoy that we do not expect large short-falls this year, and the Dominicans should plan on about 460,000 tons for 1967.

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Garcia Godoy would appreciate any word you can give him about his good friend Ellsworth Bunker.

Garcia Godoy speaks excellent English. Linc Gordon will accompany him.

W. W. Rostow

Saturday, January 21, 1967 -- 3:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

The man executed by the Cubans was, not, I am told, one of ours.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-256

By Sp., NARA, Date 12-2-93

CONFIDENTIAL

January 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cift and Message from Iraq's President

Attached is a special recommendation from Secretary Rusk that you briefly receive the Deputy Chief of the Iraqi Army on January 23, 24 or 25 just long enough for a few words and an exchange of gifts.

This is a rather unusual request but one that warrants serious consideration. General Sabri is here at the Pentagon's invitation for an orientation tour with four other senior officers who have considerable political power in Iraq. But President Aref at the last minute took advantage of his trip to have him bring you a personal gift (a carpet) and message.

I wouldn't normally recommend you spend your time this way-nor would Secretary Rusk. However, we both feel strongly this is an
opportunity we shouldn't miss.

Iraq is at a crossroads. If its moderates—headed by Aref—can win out, Iraq could break out of Nasser's sphere and become stabilizing influence. In the short run, this is important to our oil companies which are trying to work their way out of the box Syria has them in. A more radical government in Iraq might threaten to nationalize them. In the longer run, our objective in the Middle East is to encourage governments like Aref's to stand on their own—and not to get sucked into the more radical Arab nationalist movements that cause us (and Israel) so much trouble.

We have considered inviting Aref here for a visit but so far have judged that would do him more harm than good in his own sensitive political situation. However, by this gesture he is reaching out to strengthen his relationship with you. This is unexpectedly encouraging. I believe we ought to reciprocate by receiving his emissary.

CONFIDENTIAL

Secretary Rusk, to save you, has suggested only that you receive General Sabri. It would spread the advantage we gain to receive all five of the generals because the corps commanders in Iraq are often the keys to political stability. I recommend you receive the entire delegation.

W. W. Rostow

I'll see General Sabri	
I'll see all five together if Secretary Rusk would like	1/4/67
Disapprove	/

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

January 20, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Presentation of Gift from Iraqi President

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that you receive Major General Hassan Sabri, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army, on January 23, 24, or 25 long enough for him to present a gift sent to you by the President of Iraq, and that you present him with a gift in exchange.

isapprove
)

DISCUSSION:

Major General Hassan Sabri, accompanied by four other senior Iraqi Army officers, is arriving in Washington on January 22 for a Military Aid Program orientation tour in the United States. The delegation, whose members have considerable political power in Iraq, will be carrying both an oral message and a gift for you from President Aref of Iraq. The gift is understood to be a carpet. Our Ambassador in Iraq strongly recommends that you receive the delegation plus the Iraqi Ambassador here for a few minutes in order to exchange gifts.

Ambassador Strong's recommendation is undoubtedly prompted by the fact that Iraq is entering a critical

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356; Sec. 3.4

NIJ 9/-255

By 139, NARA, Date 4-9-92

decision period. President Aref has been trying to build up an "Iraq-firster" regime which would put Iraq's national interests ahead of the strained attempts to maintain unity of policy with the radical Arab nationalist states such as the UAR and Syria. The Syrian shutting off of the main oil pipeline of the part American owned Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) is contributing to the importance of the decision President Aref will have to make on the composition of his government. The present cabinet has shown itself too weak to make the sort of decisions required of it by the expected drastic decrease of the IPC revenues on which the Iraqi Government depends. A more radical cabinet might attempt to nationalize IPC, a course which would be self-defeating and precipitate a greater economic crisis. In the current juggling in Iraq. Aref heads the forces of moderation which are trying to find a non-disruptive solution to the oil crisis. In the long term, if these moderates can maintain power in Iraq they will make an important contribution to stability in the area.

We therefore believe that in the forthcoming critical period, we should continue to stiffen President Aref's morale, and that any such personal recognition by you of his special emissary would serve this purpose by strengthening the cordial ties already established by past messages exchanged between you and President Aref through diplomatic channels.

General Sabri will be available in the Washington area January 23, 24, and 25. If you can receive him and the Iraqi Ambassador for a few minutes during that period, the Department of State could provide a silver cigarette box bearing the Presidential seal for you to make an exchange present for President Aref.

Dean Rusk

CONFIDENTIAL

Saturday, January 21, 1967 3:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Gaud states for your information (and instruction, if you so desire) his plan to consolidate AID work relating to

- -- food and population;
- -- encouragement of private enterprise.

W. W. Rostow

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Roston 95a

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT WASHINGTON

January 21, 1967

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Improving A.I.D.'s ability to handle the War on Hunger and to mobilize the private sector in support of development

I propose to reorganize A.I.D.'s Washington staff offices to enable us to concentrate our efforts more effectively on two priority areas:

- -- the War on Hunger, including agriculture, population, and nutrition, and
- -- the mobilization of private resources for development purposes.

We have already made considerable progress in beefing up present activities in these areas. However, I believe that a reorganization of our present staff offices will emphasize their priority and importance, will get them more high level attention, and will lead to our achieving better results than we have to date.

The War on Hunger. There is no office in A.I.D. which has as its sole function the prosecution of the War on Hunger. I propose to remedy this by consolidating in a new staff unit all staff functions dealing with agricultural and rural development, PL 480, nutrition and population control. This new office will be charged with direct and exclusive responsibility for seeing to it that we in A.I.D. do everything we can to help the developing nations achieve a balance between food and mouths.

This new office will be headed by Assistant Administrator Herbert J. Waters. His present office (the Office of Material Resources) will be disbanded. Those of its functions which relate to the War on Hunger will become part of his new office. Those which relate to other aspects of our business will be assigned elsewhere in the Agency as appropriate.

The mobilization of private resources. There is likewise no office in the Agency which has as its sole function the mobilization of private resources for purposes of development. There is an Office of Development Finance and Private Enterprise which has some responsibilities in this area. But it also has other responsibilities which absorb much of its time and energies. Furthermore, other offices in the Agency (including Herb Waters' present shop, for example) are also engaged in promoting the use of private resources for development.

I plan to convert the present Office of Development Finance and Private Enterprise into an Office of Private Resources. We will take from it those of its present functions which are not related to its new job. We will also transfer to it those functions which are related to its new job but which are now being performed by other parts of the Agency.

This new office will be headed by Herbert Salzman, who is now in charge of the Office of Development Finance and Private Enterprise. In the few months he has been with the Agency, he has clearly demonstrated his aptitude for his new assignment.

I have discussed these changes with Secretary Rusk and Budget Director Schultze. They both agree to them.

No legislation is necessary to carry out this plan and establish these new offices. Nor is a new Presidential appointment necessary for either Waters or Salzman.

The new Bureau for Vietnam Affairs. I have put off setting up this Bureau until the Poats business is settled. We can move ahead on it quickly once the Senate has approved his nomination.

Once we have made the changes discussed above, A.I.D. will be in a better position to deal with three major problems: Vietnam, the War on Hunger, and persuading the private sector to play a larger part in the development. business.

William S. Gaud

J. Pres plu

CONFIDENTIAL

Saturday, January 21, 1967 -- 2:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached is the suggested text of a letter proposed by State from you to Prime Minister Helyoake of New Zealand concerning increased military contribution in Viet Nam. The letter would be sent telegraphically through our Embassy to reach the Prime Minister prior to January 24, when the New Zealand cabinet is expected to consider this subject. Your letter would reinforce Ambassador Laking's reports of his calls on you, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

I recommend that you sign the letter.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-256

By NARA, Date 12-2-93

-CONFIDENTIAL

JAN 2 2 1967

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Before Ambassador Laking left Washington, I discussed with him the situation in Viet-Nam and the steps I am taking to keep up, and even increase, the now favorable momentum there. He will tell you more of our conversation.

As I stated to Congress, we are going to see this problem through. I proposed measures, including a tax increase that will affect most Americans, to ensure that our resources will be adequate and I expect Congress to approve more specific requests I shall be making in the near future.

New Zealand's military and political support have made a great contribution to progress in Viet-Nam and nothing has personally encouraged me more than the response you and our other allies have made to the needs of the South Vietnamese people. It has proven that our alliances in the Far East are effective in opposing aggression.

The military situation is improving slowly as insurgent losses rise and their communications and logistics lines are destroyed. At the same time, there is an urgent need for larger numbers of ground troops to provide a military shield as ARVN units expand their pacification operations.

I know you are in close touch with this situation and I am confident that New Zealand will do all it can to help meet this urgent need.

Sincerely. /S/ Lyndon B. Johnson

The Right Honorable Keith J. Holyoake Prime Minister of New Zealand Wellington

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NEJ 9/-256

By, NARA, Date 12-2-93

LBJ:State:AleSJ:tmt 1/21/67

Saturday, January 21, 1967 1:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an account of Ky's visit thus far in Australia. Ky has shown he has both guts and political presence; although he was aided by the caricature drawn of him by the opposition.

W. W. Rostow

Canberra 3605

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WWRostow:rln

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Canberra 3605, January 20, 1967

With Ky visit half over, fears of hostile demonstrations and ugly incidents seem to have been misplaced. Calls by labor leader Calwell for mass meetings and vocal opposition have gone largely unheeded with all right wing and moderate members of his own party finding excuses to be elsewhere. Public reaction to visit seems primarily one of apathy.

Ky has been given full TV and press coverage and has performed impressively. Press which was largely hostile prior to visit, now carrying articles and editorials which are almost eulogies. Government of Australia officials now regret strict security measures which have severely limited public contact and may allow Ky to break out of strict program for unannounced visits to shopping centers or beach resorts if present favorable trend continues. Overall image Ky has projected is one of moderation, sincerity and personal concern with non-military aspects of war.

This image has contrasted sharply with picture drawn of him by Calwell and press prior to vitit.

One substantive point which may have developed as result of Canberra talks concerns increased Government of Australia civilian aid to Viet Nam. Prime Minister Holt indicated he would explain several types of civilian projects Government of Australia might be able to contribute and would invite Ky to choose among them. Since Cabinet meeting held on short notice just following discussions with Ky, it is possible some decisions on this type of aid may be announced just prior to Ky departure.

Best comment on visit seemed that of senior official in Prime Minister's Department who has private labor sympathies. He described visit as major triumph for Holt and personal disaster for Calwell. Said Holt has now shown himself as having courage to take on what seemed to be unpopular cause and carry it off well while Calwell started to lead parade but found nobody following. In short, Government now feels major dangers are passed even though possibility of some disturbances still exists Sydney and Melbourne.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 9/-256

By , NARA, Date /2-2-9 3

TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE

Saturday, January 21, 1967 -- 9:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

This is background for your meeting today or tomorrow with Secs. Rusk and McNamara on the ABM scenario.

- 1. There was a long session late yesterday, including Nick, Vance, Foster, Kohler, as well as the two Secretaries. The subject: How to approach the negotiation with Moscow. Two points of view were exposed which might be called: the "conventional" and the "unconventional."
- 2. Sec. Rusk suggested the "conventional" scenario. We would start by giving Tommy a paper indicating the main headings for negotiating a freeze on ABM's, and offensive missile launchers in which we suggest a willingness to rely primarily on unilateral inspection. That would be the big change from the Geneva talks. If they were interested, we might build up to negotiations at the level of, say, Cy Vance and Foster. Then to the Rusk-McNamara level.
- 3. The "unconventional" scenario was suggested by Bob. He would start at the level of Sec. Rusk and himself. The reason: to get the top levels of government in Moscow to face the full implications of not making a deal by indicating what we would have to do to counter a Soviet ABM system. His fear is that the "conventional" approach would run into the conventional blocks we encountered in Geneva over many years. (He feels in his heart that only if he can talk turkey and numbers directly to Kosygin and Brezhnev is there a chance of shaking them loose.)
- 4. We ended up with agreement that two papers would be put to you over the weekend:
 - -- a note for Tommy to hand Gromyko, representing a "conventional" opening gambit;
 - -- a modification in Tommy's present letter of introduction to Kosygin in which you would supply something of an initial "bang" by underlining the critical importance you personally attach to stopping the strategic nuclear arms race.
- 4. My own view is that this is an acceptable opening gambit; but, if things don't move, an attempt to break the log-jam, by unleashing Bob to educate the Kremlin top brass, should be attemptéd.

TOP SECRET

- 6. A thoughtful paper is coming forward to the Committee of Principals, through the bureaucracy, on the substance of our position. The Deputies will meet on it late Monday. Then the two Secretaries should enter deeply into it. And it should come to you by the end of next week. (If you should like a copy now of the present draft, I have one.)
- 7. Therefore, your weekend meeting with the two secretaries will focus on the opening gambit and the two proposed messages to Moscow:
 - -- Tommy to Gromyko;
 - -- modifications in your letter via Tommy to Kosygin.

Sec. Rusk is preparing the drafts, which I have not yet seen.

8. You may wish personally to hear debate on the "conventional" versus "unconventional" approaches.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

TOP SECRET

Mr. Rostow I

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 9/- 256

By 22, NARA, Date 12-2-93

CONFIDENTIAL

January 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cift and Message from Iraq's President

Attached is a special recommendation from Secretary Rusk that you briefly receive the Deputy Chief of the Iraqi Army on January 23, 24 or 25 just long enough for a few words and an exchange of gifts.

This is a rather unusual request but one that warrants serious consideration. General Sabri is here at the Pentagon's invitation for an orientation tour with four other senior officers who have considerable political power in Iraq. But President Aref at the last minute took advantage of his trip to have him bring you a personal gift (a carpet) and message.

I wouldn't normally recommend you spend your time this way-nor would Secretary Rusk. However, we both feel strongly this is an opportunity we shouldn't miss.

Iraq is at a crossroads. If its moderates—headed by Aref—can win out, Iraq could break out of Nasser's sphere and become stabilizing influence. In the short run, this is important to our oil companies which are trying to work their way out of the box Syria has them in. A more radical government in Iraq might threaten to nationalize them. In the longer run, our objective in the Middle East is to encourage governments like Aref's to stand on their own—and not to get sucked into the more radical Arab nationalist movements that cause us (and Israel) so much trouble.

We have considered inviting Aref here for a visit but so far have judged that would do him more harm than good in his own sensitive political situation. However, by this gesture he is reaching out to strengthen his relationship with you. This is unexpectedly encouraging. I believe we ought to reciprocate by receiving his emissary.

CONFIDENTIAL

Secretary Rusk, to save you, has suggested only that you receive General Sabri. It would spread the advantage we gain to receive all five of the generals because the corps commanders in Iraq are often the keys to political stability. I recommend you receive the entire delegation.

W. W. Rostow

I'll see General Sabri	-	
I'll see all five together if Secretary Rusk would like	V	1/24/67
Disapprove		

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

99a

January 20, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Presentation of Gift from Iraqi President

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that you receive Major General Hassan Sabri, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army, on January 23, 24, or 25 long enough for him to present a gift sent to you by the President of Iraq, and that you present him with a gift in exchange.

Approve	Disappı	rove	

DISCUSSION:

Major General Hassan Sabri, accompanied by four other senior Iraqi Army officers, is arriving in Washington on January 22 for a Military Aid Program orientation tour in the United States. The delegation, whose members have considerable political power in Iraq, will be carrying both an oral message and a gift for you from President Aref of Iraq. The gift is understood to be a carpet. Our Ambassador in Iraq strongly recommends that you receive the delegation plus the Iraqi Ambassador here for a few minutes in order to exchange gifts.

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Authority NLT 91-255

By Ct | isp , NARA, Date 0-13-98

decision period. President Aref has been trying to build up an "Iraq-firster" regime which would put Iraq's national interests ahead of the strained attempts to maintain unity of policy with the radical Arab nationalist states such as the UAR and Syria. The Syrian shutting off of the main oil pipeline of the part American owned Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) is contributing to the importance of the decision President Aref will have to make on the composition of his government. The present cabinet has shown itself too weak to make the sort of decisions required of it by the expected drastic decrease of the IPC revenues on which the Iraqi Government depends. A more radical cabinet might attempt to nationalize IPC, a course which would be self-defeating and precipitate a greater economic crisis. In the current juggling in Iraq, Aref heads the forces of moderation which are trying to find a non-disruptive solution to the oil crisis. In the long term, if these moderates can maintain power in Iraq they will make an important contribution to stability in the area.

We therefore believe that in the forthcoming critical period, we should continue to stiffen President Aref's morale, and that any such personal recognition by you of his special emissary would serve this purpose by strengthening the cordial ties already established by past messages exchanged between you and President Aref through diplomatic channels.

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Dean Rusk

<u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>

TOP SECRET

Saturday, January 21, 1967 -- 9:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Here is Wilson back wanting not to be "knowledgeable" -- as we said -- but "fully in possession of the facts" -- which Cooper made clear we could not promise.

"Many thanks for your message. Yes, indeed, Chet Cooper has given an admirably full briefing to George Brown and myself and I am glad to feel that we are now fully in possession of the facts. I am grateful to you for responding so promptly and helpfully and for letting Cooper come to talk to us in this way.

"As I told him, I think it essential that I should be completely up to date when Kosygin arrives here on February 6. I hope you will feel able to let me have any further briefing this may require shortly before that date. If Cooper could pay us another short visit, that would be admirable."

I suggest:

- -- no answer now;
- -- a briefing (via Bruce) before Kosygin arrives on what we feel it safe and proper to tell him. I would <u>not</u> recommend now that we tell him of any direct channel that may develop.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-15
By , NARA Date 1-1(-1-0)

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

TOP SECRET

January 21, 1967

2 Presfile

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a welcoming message to be placed at the entrance to the U.S. pavilion at the Budapest, Poznan and Plovdiv trade fairs. It will also be used in the U.S. brochure.

Walt W. Rostow

	/
Approved	V
Disapproved	
Speak to me	

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE FOR BUDAPEST/POZNAN/PLOVDIV INTERNATIONAL TRADE FAIRS, 1967

Welcome to the United States Pavilion at the Budapest/Poznan/
Plovdiv International Trade Fair. The theme of our exhibition is
"Building for the Future."

In the pavilion you will see the methods used by the American construction industry. Here we show the industry's most modern engineering practices and machines as they are used to build new homes, offices, factories and roads. For example, we are using these techniques to develop the American highway system, comprising over 4, 200, 000 kilometers, spanning the continent, and bringing our 198,000,000 people closer together.

All people wish to leave a better world and a fuller life to their children. In the United States we are striving to give our children a foundation upon which to build for the coming century. We cannot solve their problems, but we hope to give them a solid platform upon which they can stand as they meet the challenges of a new age. A part of this must be an efficient and modern environment of housing, industrial building, and communication. We hope this exhibit will help you understand our methods, equipment and approach, and thus contribute to a broader understanding between our two countries.

Pres file

Friday, January 20, 1967 5:12 p.m.

Mr. President:

If not a nickel, Gene has made at least 3¢ in Rome.

W. W. Rostow

SECKET -- EXDIS Rome 3786

SECRET - EXDIS

ROME 3786 -- FROM E. V. ROSTOW and JOHN SCHNITTKER

After full meeting with Italian officials, and separate talks with Ortona and Fanfani, Fanfani authorizes us to report that Italian government agrees in principle to our approach and will support assumption by consortium of additive responsibility for Indian emergency food aid by mid-year 1967. The Italian government will have all kinds of political and bureaucratic difficulty in making a soft loan for as much as \$14 million. The soft loan, if made, would most probably be one for 16 years at a subsidized interest rate of 2-1/2 or 3 per cent for fertilizer shipments.

Fanfani also suggest possibility that for the future consortium might collectively finance construction and operation of one or more fertilizer plants to provide fertilizer needed in war against hunger in the developing countries.

Ortona has agreed to report to Ambassador as soon as possible on "modalities and amount."

Embassy staff thoroughly briefed and will follow up vigorously.

Indian chargé made his presentation to the Foreign Office as we met with official group.

SECRET -- EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State la 5-25-18; nsche 4-2-79
By in /18, NARA, Date 2-4-9/

Mr. Rostow 103 Presefile

SECRET

January 20, 1967

4 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed message to Japanese Prime Minister Sato following Gene's discussion of Indian food

Gene and Alex Johnson have recommended you send a personal message to Sato welcoming his positive assurance of support for additional food aid to India. State supports that recommendation and suggests you send the attached message.

The letter is not more enthusiastic because (a) Japanese performance on India remains to be seen, and (b) they continue to be somewhat sticky on Indonesian debt rescheduling.

Nevertheless, as drafted, it should stiffen Japan's will to do well on the food front -- in addition to its more familiar aid activities in Southeast Asia.

W. W. R.

	DECLASSIFIED
	E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
Approved	NEJ 91-256
	By, NARA, Date 12-2-93
See me	

-SECRET

SECRET

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Under Secretary of State Rostow has informed me of his discussions with you and your Government on the critical food problem India faces today.

I was happy to learn that your Government is contemplating a farsighted and constructive response in this matter. This is in keeping with the responsible leadership Japan is exercising in a widening range of cooperative development efforts.

I particularly welcome your view that food aid is an international responsibility and should be in addition to projected Consortium aid. Your prompt and affirmative response should encourage other advanced nations to act similarly.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 9/-256

By 22, NARA, Date 12-2-93

SECRET

2. Pres file 104

Friday, January 20, 1967 4:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

I propose the attached draft reply to our good friend Dr. Jackson. I have, of course, cleared this draft with State.

The strategy of the letter is to restate the main points put to the U.S. in our own language rather than his.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

JAN 2 1 1967

Dear Dr. Jackson:

It was so good of you to come in to see me on January 20.

I was much interested in your letter of December 21, 1966 addressed to the Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists of the USSR, which was endorsed by so many of the good citizens of our country.

As for the propositions that you propose, I would first make clear once again that in Viet-Nam, as elsewhere, we stand by the right of people to adopt and support the government of their choice, in an environment of peace, without coercion of any kind.

You know also that we are seeking by every means at our disposal to bring an honorable peace at the earliest moment in Viet-Nam. I would hope that the government of the Soviet Union could play an important part in bringing about peace, because of its special obligations as co-chairman of the Geneva Conferences which produced the Accords of 1954 and 1962.

As for withdrawal of our troops, we have made it clear before the world -- most notably at the Manila Conference of last October -- that: "They shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled."

I am glad that through the common bond of your religious beliefs you are in contact with Soviet citizens. It has been our policy throughout my term of office to develop and encourage every opportunity we can find to increase the contacts between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States and to find agreements that would move all of us towards a world of peace and order.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

Dr. J. H. Jackson, President National Baptist Convention, USA., Inc. 3101 South Parkway Chicago, Illinois 60616

LBJ:WWR:pas 1/20/67 Friday, January 20, 1967 4:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

I propose the attached draft reply to our good friend Dr. Jackson. I have, of course, cleared this draft with State.

The strategy of the letter is to restate the main points put to the U.S. in our own language rather than his.

W. W. Rostow

December 21, 1966

The Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists of the USSR G. P.O. Box 520 Moscow, USSR

Dear Brethren:

This comes as a reply to the last two letters received from you on peace, for which I was most thankful.

In your first letter you were concerned about a strategy for peace in Viet Nam. You expressed satisfaction about the protest among U. S. A. citizens against U. S. government policies in Viet Nam and implied that our government should withdraw its forces from Viet Nam as a way to peace. I join you wholeheartedly in a desire for peace, not only in Viet Nam, but throughout all the world.

I am not an officer of my government, and make no attempt to speak for my country on foreign policy. But as a citizen, I believe my government is concerned about peace in Viet Nam. I think that there is something you can do in your country and I can do in mine to help in the struggle for peace in Viet Nam now. The following are the propositions that I propose to you:

- 1. Let us endorse the right of people to choose and support the form of government of their choice.
- 2. Let us petition our respective governments to assume jointly the role of peace maker between the governments of Hanoi and Saigon, always giving due regard to the peace making function of the United Nations.
- 3. You petition your government to use its influence to help cut off the flow of supplies that support Hanoi's war efforts, and ask your government as the acknowledged leader of International Communism,

to urge upon the Hanoi government to grant to the government of Saigon its right of autonomy with a pledge of respect and peace.

- 4. We will pledge to petition our government to withdraw its support of the war efforts of the Saigon government in both men and materials and ask that the U. S. government use its good offices to help Saigon in constructive ways of peace.
- 5. Let us petition our respective nations to use their MIGHT to help establish the RIGHT in the world; the right relations among all men and nations, the right to freedom, justice and the right to economic and political security and the right of self determination for all nations and people.
- 6. Let both of us seek an audience with the heads of our respective governments at once and present these petitions with a request that they give an answer that we can share with one another, and with the people of our respective countries.

I was sorry to learn of the death of your late President Zhidkov and my personal friend and brother in Christ. Please communicate my sympathy to his family and all the Baptists of Russia.

Yours truly,

J. H. Jackson, President National Baptist Convention, USA., Inc.

JHJ:nm

P. S. The following names represent a national committee that endorses the entire text of the letter.

We, the undersigned, give full endorsement to the fore-going letter sent by the president of the National Baptist Convention, USA., Inc. to the Baptists of Russia. We give this endorsement in the interest of peace in Viet Nam and in the interest of a cooperative venture between our two governments, giving due regard however to the peace-making functions of the United Nations.

Rev. U. J. Robinson, Alabama Rev. A. W. Wilson, Alabama Rev. J. L. Ware, Alabama Rev. R. T. Thomas, Alabama Rev. F. T. Guy, Arkansas Rev. C. B. Knox, Arkansas Mr. Emmett Harris, Arkansas Rev. John L. Alexander, California Rev. A. M. Ali, California Rev. J. H. Allen, California Rev. Samuel J. Anderson, California Rev. N. W. Anderson, California Rev. L. C. Armour, California Rev. W. H. Austin, California Rev. H. V. Brown, California Rev. Hillery T. Broadus, California Rev. James A. Brooks, California Rev. Elliott, Brown, California Rev. T. S. Bryant, California Rev. J. E. Brown, California Rev. R. W. Brown, California Rev. G. L. Burks, California Rev. William A. Brown, California Rev. Wallace M. Bruiett, California Rev. Robert W. Batts, California Rev. Emmett Burns, California Rev. L. W. Butler, California Rev. Bernard O. Byrd, California Rev. John L. Branham, California Rev. A. B. Billingsley, California Rev. Jodie O. Barnett, California Rev. J. A. Barber, California Rev. R. L. Blake, California Rev. L. B. Brass, II, California Rev. D. W. Bradlwy, California Rev. T. N. Bell, California Rev. A. D. Bell, California Rev. Atha J. Baugh, California Rev. W. H. Banks, California Rev. James D. Brown, California Rev. A. C. Brown, California Rev. James Bobo, California Rev. T. A. Boarders, California Rev. T. W. Coffee, California Rev. Bobby Cain, California Rev. Robert E. L. Cain, California Rev. H. C. Carter, California Rev. K. C. Chambers, California Rev. H. C. Cornelius, California Rev. Elmer Chambers, California Rev. O. A. Carter, Chlifornia Rev. T. M. Chambers, Jr., California Rev. Robert L. Chew, California

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Professor S. L. Hilton, Mississippi Rev. B. D. Rushing, Mississippi Miss F. O. Alexander, Mississippi Rev. L. R. Chandler, Mississippi Rev. J. W. West, Mississippi Rev. F. D. Matthews, Mississippi Rev. David Matthews, Mississippi Rev. Edgar Jude, Mississippi Rev. L. S. Bowman, Mississippi Rev. W. C. Mazique, Mississippi Rev. J. H. Henderson, Mississippi Rev. B. W. Washington, Mississippi Rev. Famous McElhaney, Mississippi Rev. L. C. Pickens, Mississippi Rev. R. T. Strong, Mississippi Rev. L. R. Perry, Mississippi Rev. George Hoskins, Mississippi Rev. J. S. Reed, Mississippi Rev. L. R. Harrison, Mississippi Rev. J. T. Hall, Mississippi Rev. H. A. Armstrong, Mississippi Rev. B. T. Eatmon, Mississippi Rev. J. D. Collins, Mississippi Rev. R. F. Vernon, Mississippi Rev. B. L. Shelby, Mississippi Rev. V. H. Wells, Missouri Rev. J. D. Howard, Missouri Rev. D. L. Langford, Missouri Rev. G. H. Pruitt, Missouri Rev. L. A. Holden, Missouri Rev. B. F. Johnson, New Jersey Rev. R. J. Jeter, New Jersey Rev. R. M. Pitts, North Carolina Rev. K. O. P. Goodwin, North Carolina Rev. R. E. Henderson, Ohio Rev. J. D. White, Ohio Rev. J. Stallworth, Ohio Rev. O. M. Hoover, Ohio Rev. J. Saunders, Ohio Rev. S. B. Bagley, Oklahoma q Rev. L. G, Carr, Pennsylvania Rev. D. W. Hoggard, Pennsylvania Rev. W. L. Bentley, Pennsylvania Rev. J. B. Waller, Pennsylvania Rev. Clarense Davis, Jr., Pennsylvania Rev. George Kenner, Pennsylvania Rev. Rollan C. Lawford, Pennsylvania Rev. G. G. McCoy, Pennsylvania Mr. Olive White, Pennsylvania Rev. Win. J. Harvey, III, Pennsylvania Rev. W. L. Wilson, South Carolina

Mrs. Clara Jackson, Mississippi Mrs. E. McGowan, Mississippi Mrs. Zee A. Barron, Mississippi Rev. J. F. Redmond, Mississippi Rev. J. Buckner, Mississippi Rev. C. G. Inge, Mississippi Rev. B. T. McSwine, Mississippi Rev. L. C. Collins, Mississippi Rev. L. S. Spann, Mississippi Rev. J. H. Henderson, Mississippi Rev. R. L. White, Mississippi Rev. L. D. Woodley, Mississippi Rev. D. D. Smith, Mississippi Rev. B. B. Bryant, Mississippi Rev. W. H. Calhoun, Mississippi Rev. W. L. Newton, Mississippi Rev. John Matthews, Mississippi Rev. L. A. Holden, Mississippi Rev. J. J. Johnson, Mississippi Rev. V. B. Brown, Mississippi Rev. L. Luckett, Mississippi Rev. E. S. Hicks, Mississippi Rev. C. C. Cobb, Mississippi Rev. H. Hardaway, Mississippi Rev. î. H. Henderson, Jr., Missouri Rev. H. H. Hall, Missouri Rev. W. S. Woolridge, Missouri Rev. W. A. Scott, Sr., Missouri Rev. C. C. Wheeler, III, Missouru Rev. R. P. Means, New Jersey Rev. S. L. Foote, New Jersey Rev. O. L. Sherrill, North Carolina Rev. C. W. Kerry, Jr., North Carolin Rev. E. J. Benton, Ohio Rev. S. L. Cole, Ohio Rev. A. H. Jarmon, Ohio Rev. E. Caviness, Ohio Rev. A. Waller, Ohio Rev. Phale Hale, Ohio Rev. T. O. Chappell, Oklahoma Rev. James B. Cayce, Pennsylvania Rev. M. L. Gayton, Pennsylvania Rev. W. H. Waller, Pennsylvania Rev. R. L. Thomas, Pennsylvania Rev. J. E. Hamblin, Pennsylvania Mrs. Isabel Hoggard, Pennsylvania Rev. Willard Lamb, Pennsylvania Rev. Emerson Talmadge, Pennsylvania Mr. R. H. Merritt, Pennsylvania Rev. R. D. Twiggs, Pennsylvania Rev. C. C. Stewart, South Carolina

Rev. J. L. Brody, South Carolina

Rev. L. C. Jenkins, South Carolina

Rev. A. E. Campbell, Tennessee

Rev. E. L. Slay, Tennessee

Rev. D. C. Washington, Tennessee

Rev. W. Herbert Brewster, Tennessee

Rev. Roy Love, Tennessee

Rev. R. E. James, Tennessee

Rev. E. W. Williamson, Tennessee

Rev. Fletcher Hammond, Tennessee

Rev. J. C. Bonner, Tennessee

Rev. S. T. Alexander, Texas

Rev. C. C. Harper, Texas

Rev. U. S. Keeling, Texas

Rev. C. A. W. Clark, Texas

Rev. L. F. Hardy, Texas

Rev. John W. Williams, Texas

Rev. N. W. Brown, Virginia

Rev. Warren S. Lewis, West Virginia

Rev. W. J. Calvin, Wisconsin

Rev. E. H. Hankerson, Washington

Rev. E. W. Bratton, Washington

Rev. C. J. Waller, Washington

Rev. B. A. Taylor, Washington,

Rev. J. M. Kelly, South Carolina

Rev. Maxie S. Gordon, South Carolina

Rev. L. A. Hamblin, Tennessee

Rev. H. H. Harper, Tennessee

Rev. W. T. Crutcher, Tennessee

Rev. N. Alston, Tennessee

Rev. M. Kirby, Tennessee

Rev. L. R. Sweeney, Tennessee

Rev. C. M. Lee, Tennessee

Rev. Maynard Turner, Tennessee

Rev. W. H. Dudley, Texas

Rev. E. O. Sweet, Texas

Rev. M. M. Pearson, Texas

Rev. S. H. Jones, Texas

Rev. C. T. Daniel, Texas

Rev. J. H. Harris, Texas

Rev. R. L. Taylor, Virginia

Rev. J. D. Marshburn, Virginia

Rev. Louis S. Beauchamp, Wisconsin

Rev. E. S. Brazill, Washington

Rev. G. B. Lloyd, Washington

Rev. C. A. Taylor, Washington

Rev. H. King Griffin, Washington

Rev. Fountain W. Penick, Washington

SECRET

January 20, 1967

VIA PRIVATE CHANNEL

FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON

TO THE PRIME MINISTER

I trust your talk with David Bruce and Cooper settled the questions you raised earlier with David and put you in a knowledgeable position to deal with Kosygin.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 9/-256

By 20, NARA, Date 12-2-9 3

WWRostow:rln

-SECRET

-SECRET -- LITERALLY EYES ONLY -- MARIGOLD

Friday, January 20, 1967 -- 5:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Another flower has sprung up -- this time in Rome.

You should know that our last message, via Moscow, was graciously received today and transmitted to Hanoi.

To engage the Italians in trying to fix direct talks with us is a most serious step by Hanoi -- and encouraging.

We shall be back with a proposed response soon.

W. W. Rostow

Rome 3787

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91- 256

By P, NARA, Date 12-2-93

WWRostow:rln

SECRET

SECRET

Friday, January 20, 1967 -- 3:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

As you know, a debate continues on the absolute size of the enemy order of battle in Viet Nam.

Whatever the size, you should know that official statistics now show for the first time a net decline in both VC main force and North Viet Nam army units for the fourth quarter of 1966.

This is the first reversal of the upward trend since 1960.

W. W. Rostow

Authority Mig - CBS 22

By Min, NARA, Date 2-7-91

WWRostow:rln

SECRET

SECRET

COMPARATIVE COMMUNIST MILITARY STRENGTH (12 JANUARY) (OSD Sources)

	K						1966			
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	lst Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr
vc VC									:	
Main/:Local Forces	5.5	26.7	33.8	34.4	44.8	56.9	60.0	62.1	64.1	61.7
Irregulars	30.0	40.0	50.0	60.0	91.8		1		110.0	
Political/Military Cadres						39.2			40.0	40.0
Admin/Infiltration/Logistics						17.5	17.5	17.5		
Total VC	35.5	66.7	83.8	94.4	136.6		1	229.6		
NVA				`	2.5	26. 1	37.5	46.8	48.4	44.9
Total Enemy Forces	35.5	66.7	83.8	94.4	139.1	249.7	265.0	276.4	281.0	275.1
Increase		31.2	17.1	10.6	44.7	110.6	15.3	11.4	4.6	-5.9
Percent Increase										
on Annual Basis		88	25.6	12.7	47.5	81	24.4	17.2	6.8	-4.8
				t			1	10	. 6	

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

January 20, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached is a memo from Secretary Rusk urging that you see West German Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister, Willy Brandt, on Feb. 8 or 9. (I understand that you tentatively agreed at the Tuesday lunch to see him.) Brandt will be in Washington before going on to make speeches in New York (Feb. 9) and Chicago (Feb. 10). Rusk will give him a lunch on February 8.

I know how tough your schedule is. However, I think it is very important that you have at least a short meeting with Brandt. As Number Two man and Foreign Minister in the new government -- and as leader of his party -- he will be a key man in our dealings with Germany and an important counter-weight to Strauss (on non-proliferation, for example). In the past, our people have tended not to pay too much attention to his party. A short session with you will go far to give him a sense that we take him seriously.

Francis M. Bator

Approve	0 1
Date Time	٧(
No	
Speak to me .	

President saw willy Brandt 7 et 8, 1967

THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON



January 19, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Vice Chancellor Brandt's Visit

Recommendation:

That you agree to see German Vice Chancellor Willy Brandt, February 8 or 9, 1967.

A	7.
Approve	Disapprove

Discussion:

Brandt has been invited by the Adlai Stevenson Institute for International Affairs in Chicago to be the principal speaker at their inaugural dinner February 10. He has also been invited to appear before the (New York) Council on Foreign Relations February 9. I recall that you usually saw Brandt when he was here as Governing Mayor of Berlin, the last time in February 1966. I think he would expect to see you when he comes. If you can spare the time, it would be most worthwhile to see him. He comes for the first time as Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister, representing the new Kiesinger Government. An exchange of views with you at this stage of our relations with that government could have a profound effect on the policies which it will pursue in the coming year. Furthermore, Brandt retains considerable influence in his own right, as the former Mayor (and to many the symbol) of Berlin, and as the chief of the Social Democratic Party.

I am planning a luncheon for Brandt on February 8. I understand that he plans to leave Washington for New York about 4 p.m. on February 9.

Dean Rusk

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET -- NODIS -- MARIGOLD

Friday, January 20, 1967 -- 2:15 p.m.

W. W. Rostow

Mr. President:

Only the last page of this account of Cooper soothing Brown and Wilson need concern you.

Wilson proposes that we extend the bombing pause an extra day because Kosygin leaves London on the 13th! (The Tet pause is February 8-12.)

He would also value a response to his message to you on being kept informed.

Sec. Rusk tentatively believes we could oblige him with a day or so of delay in resuming attacks on the North; and I'm sure you will wish to hear his reasons.

I find it odd for Wilson to suggest we jiggle with a deadly war in this way; although it is conceivable that we might wish to extend the Tet pause for serious reasons of our own, if anything interesting should develop.

As for a response, I believe it should consist in a brief note expressing the hope that Cooper's mission answered his questions, like this:

"I trust your talk with David Bruce and Cooper settled the questions you raised earlier with David and put you in a knowledgeable position to deal with Kosygin."

Approve message______

Disapprove message_____

See me______

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By Cb /ra_, NARA, Date 3-18-98

SECRET -- NODIS -- MARIGOLD

WWRostow:rln

Limited Official Use

Friday - January 20, 1967

Mr. President -

Our Charge in Santiago delivered your message to President Frei through Foreign Minister Valdes. He received no reaction.

You will have seen the <u>Washington Post</u> and <u>New York Times</u> stories this morning saying that Frei had decided to cancel his trip. Ambassador Tomic, who is in Santiago, called his Embassy here late last night to say that no decision has yet been made.

In a speech last night President Frei condemned the Senate action and described the happy state of US-Chilean relations. He said he would send a bill to Congress giving the President authority to dissolve the Congress and call for new elections once during a Presidential term. But he gave no hint on what he would do about the visit.

W. W. Rostow

Friday, January 20, 1967 -- 9:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a suggested agenda for your meeting with the Trustees of Education and World Affairs, at 11:30 a.m. this morning.

They will have had an hour with Sec. Rusk, Sec. McNamara and me. I gather from Sol Linowitz that they have some concrete proposals for improving the dialogue between the Government and the academic community. They should crystallize between 10:30 and 11:30 a.m.

You might then proceed as follows:

- 1. Welcome them and their initiative in trying to generate better understanding between the Government and the academic community.
- 2. Ask Herman Wells, who is chairman, to summarize the conclusions arrived at in the first hour.
- 3. Ask each of the others present for further observations. (There are only 5 plus Linowitz -- all quite distinguished and constructive in mood.)
 - 4. You may wish to respond at the end.

In terms of substance, I gather they are most concerned about the projection to the academic community of our foreign policy, especially its positive aspects. For example, the more effective projection of the "other war" in Viet Nam, movement toward constitutional government, etc.

W. W. Rostow

P. S. Fred Seitz, President, National Academy of Sciences, will be present. He was good enough, at the last minute, to represent you at the opening of the Venezuelan bridge. You may wish to thank him as you go around the table.

cc: Marvin Watson Douglas Cater

W. W. R.

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W. W. Rostow

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cc: Marvin Watson Douglas Cater

W. W. R.

1122

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

1130

January 19, 1967

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Meetings with the Trustees of Education and World Affairs at the White House,
January 20 at 10:30 a.m. and 11:30 a.m.

Two meetings have been arranged with the Trustees of Education and World Affairs (EWA) to discuss the status of the dialogue between the Government and the academic community. The Trustees of EWA will meet first with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and with you in the Cabinet Room of the White House on January 20 at 10:30 a.m. They will then meet with the President at 11:30 a.m.

The Trustees of EWA have expressed concern during the past year about what they describe as the alienation of substantial elements of the academic community from the national leadership. They feel that there has been a breakdown of communications resulting primarily from disagreement over foreign policy questions, particularly Viet-Nam. They devoted a special seminar session to this topic in June 1966, and discussed it again at their October 17, 1966 Board meeting. The Trustees have offered to play a role in cooperating to restore the dialogue. A memorandum explaining the feeling among some of the Trustees on this topic is enclosed.

Education and World Affairs, founded in 1962, is a private, non-profit, educational organization designed to strengthen the work of American colleges and universities in world affairs generally. It is supported by the Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation. Its Board of Trustees includes several presidents of universities and other distinguished members of the academic community.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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The Trustees of EWA who will participate in the meeting are:

T. Keith Glennan, President, Associated Universities, Inc.

John A. Hannah, President, Michigan State University.

Sol M. Linowitz, U. S. Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States.

William W. Marvel, President, Education and World Affairs.

Frederick Seitz, President, National Academy of Sciences.

Herman B. Wells, Chancellor, Indiana University.

Logan Wilson, President, American Council on Education.

Benjamin H. Read / Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

- Biographic notes on participants.
- Memorandum from Herman B. Wells and William W. Marvel to Trustees of EWA, dated June 17, 1966.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Blographic notes on those attending mosting of Trustees of Education and World Affairs with the President on January 20, 1967.

Mr. T. Keith Glennan

Dorn Enderlin, H. D., 1905
Resident of Reston, Virginia
President, Associated Universities, Inc.
educational administrator; director, Clevito
Inc; Republic Steel Corp; Rand Corp.,
Standard Gil Co. (0.); Harris-Intertypo;
National City Bank of Cleveland;
Cleveland Illuminating Company;
Trustee, Case Institute of Technology.

Mr. John A. Hannah

Born Grand Rapids, Mich., 1902
Resident, Lancing, Mich.
President, Michigan State University
Director, Manufacturers National Bank
of Direit; American Bank & Trust;
Michigan Bell Telephone Company
Chairman, Fod. Commission on Civil Rights;
President's Council on Equal Opportunity;
Educational Policies Commission;
National Committee on Templyration Reform.

Amb. Sol M. Linowicz

U. S. Representative to the Gounell of the Organization of American States.

Mr. Frederick Seitz

Born San Francisco, Calif., 1911
Resident of Urbana, Ill.
President, Mational Academy of Sciences
Member, American Academy of Arts and
Sciences; Follow, American Phys. Scc.;
American Society for Matale; American
Instituto, Mining and Metali. Engineers;
Director, training program, Clinton
Laboratories.

Mr. Herman B. Wells

Mr. Herman B. Wells

Born Jamestown, "Ind., 1902 Resident of Bloomington, Ind. Chancellor, Indiana University Member, Board of Sponsors, World University Service; Past President, Indiana Society of Academic and Social Sciences; author of report of the Study Commission for Indiana Financial Institutions.

Mr. Logan Wilson

Born Huntsville, Tex., 1907
Resident of Washington, D. C.
President, American Council on Education;
Former President and Chancellor,
University of Texas; Director, Center for
Advanced Study of Behavioral Sciences;
Formerly with Carnegie Foundation;
Member, Board of Education and World
Affairs, Inc.
Fellow, A.A.A.S.; member of Southern
University Conference, Assn. of American
Colleges; National Assn. of State
Universities:

Mr. William W. Marvel

Born Baltimore, Md., 1920
Resident of Princeton, N. J.
President, Education and World Affaire, The.
Formerly Executive Associate of the
Carnegic Corporation; Serund in the
Intelligence Corps of the U. S. Army in
Panama, Puerto Rico, the U. S. and China;
Was program officer for non-European Areas
in the Office of the Director for Mutual
Security in Washington; co-author with Wil
William T. R. Fox of a report, "Military
Assistance and the Security of the U.S.,
1947-56"; author of report submitted to
Dept. of State in 1961, "Educational
and Cultural Advancement in Latin America".

Member of

Momber of the Ambrican Political Science Assn, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Advisory Council of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs of Princeton University; member of the Citizens Council for Higher Education in New Jersey.

1967 JAN 18 FA 5 25

TOP SECRET

Friday, January 20, 1967 -- 2:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

I shall rarely send you raw intelligence; but, starting at the paper clip are bits and pieces I had assembled to give me a direct feel for what is happening in the Chinese Communist economy.

If you have the time -- and want to see what a country looks like that's having a nervous breakdown -- go through them.

This convulsion is certainly one of the great events of our time.

W. W? Rostow

Attachment

Memo "The Impact of the 'Cultural Revolution' on the Economy of Communist China."

> DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 95-334 By Ct., NARA Date 1-17-97

CONFIDENTIAL

January 19, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 9/-256

By 120, NARA, Date 12-2-93

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Gene Rostow's schedule -- more time in Brussels and Paris?

He is presently scheduled to return to Washington on January 25. This is the best we can do -- it means hitting Paris on the weekend and leaves only 1/2 day apiece for The Hague and Brussels.

Embassy Brussels urges us to let the party stay a day and a half there -- in addition to Indian food, there are European fish to fry. The Kennedy Round, OECD affairs and Belgium's NATO initiative deserve a shot of high level U.S. attention. More time in Paris would permit a more thorough sounding there.

But to change the schedule will mean a Congressional message could not be prepared, reviewed with you and reworked for presentation to Congress before Wednesday, February 1. If he came back the 25th, a message could be ready by Monday, January 30.

Which do you prefer?

	w. w.	Rostow	In Rostole trel
Have him stay in Brussels and Paris longer and get back here January	27th		The Rostole till Ben Rend Rendert soil he couldn't judge.
Have him come home soonest - Januar	y 25th _		maybe EVR ropat could file upat

CONFIDENTIAL-

Thursday, January 19, 1967 2:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to read this Memcon of Secretary Rusk's talk with Harrison Salisbury. Once again it confirms:

- -- The possibility -- if not probability -- that they are looking for a way out;
- -- Secret talks with us without an intermediary is the proper route.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET -- EXIDS

Authority NSC 3-15-82 re NLT 82-129

By OCH , NARS, Date 3-26-82

TAB A 1180

SECRET

Comparison of Salisbury Notes on Interview with Pham Van Dong, January 3, 1967, with Text as Approved by North Viet-Nam Foreign Ministry*

Below are listed the major substantive changes made by DRV authorities in Salisbury's original notes.

1. DRV Response to US "Good Will"

The following passage from original notes was deleted:
"Of course, if your are prepared (to show good will H.S.) we know what we should do if the US shows good
will. If they stop the whole war we know what we should
do! If it stops doing harm to the North we know what we
should do."

2. Considerations of US Honor Appraised

Original: "Honor consists in not fighting an unjust war and if an unjust war has been fought they must resist and put an end to it." Approved text: "The legitimate honor of the United States consists in not fighting an unjust war and if the United States has fought an unjust war it would be better for them not to speak of honor any longer." Original: "We are not fighting to destroy the United States." Approved text: "We do not think of humiliating the United States. The United States is a big power. America respects its honor."

3. <u>US Credibility - Peace Inititatives and Escalation</u>

Original: "Everybody in the world now says your Government doesn't speak the truth. Every paper says it is a liar. I beg your pardon, but your Government has not got a very good name. But who can it deceive?" Approved text: Passage deleted.

Authority NSC letter 3-1582 (ENLISH-188)

By DCH, NARS, Date 3-16-82

SECRET

*Published in the New York Times, January 8, 1967. Dong spoke in Vietnamese and the conversation was translated into English by interpreters.

SECRET -2

4. Disagreements with Communist States Conceded

Original: After stressing DRV determination to fight and win the "sacred war for independence, freedom, life"; Dong says this is difficult not only for Americans to understand but for "many of our friends in Europe, even close Communist friends, Communist comrades." Approved text deletes all reference to "Communist friends", who in the original notes were described as afraid of US power, unable to see how the DRV could resist "an expeditionary corps of 400,000 well-equipped with weapons and the nearby Seventh Fleet", and concerned that the DRV could not win the war. The approved text ascribes these views only to "our friends in Europe." Original notes continue: "But now we are being victorious and we are telling our friends, our Communist comrades, and they admit they don't understand it." Approved text again deletes references to "Communist comrades" and substitutes "telling them (i.e., "our friends in Europe") that finally we will win. admit that truth, but they do not understand it."

5. Indecision within Leadership

Original: Referring to increased defense potential, including anti-aircraft defense, Dong stated: "We have passed the most difficult stages and surpassed moments of indecision." Approved text deletes whole second clause after "stages".

6. Resoluteness Stressed

Original: After declaring people's determination to fight and win the "sacred war", Dong said, "in the minds of the Viet Nam people lies victory. It is from this point of view that the problem will be solved." Approved text deleted this passage and substituted: "...our victory stems from this very resoluteness, that is the key to a solution to all our problems."

7. DRV Readiness Generalized

Original: "...three million (youth) have volunteered in the army and proved their capability in every respect." Approved

SECRET -3

text: "...three million (youth) stand ready and have proved their capability in every respect."

8. NLF Status Emphasized

Original: "Since the NLF leads the struggle of the people, it has won warm support." Approved text changes "leads" to "is the clear sighted leader of" and adds: "It is now the only genuine representative of the people of South Viet Nam." Original text: "Of course they cannot recognize the NLF and not talk to it." Approved text changes the negatives to "must". Original text: "We respect the program of the NLF -- in the present and in the future." Approved text places period after "NLF" and inserts: "The problem of the war in the South is to be settled with the NLF in the present and in the future."

9. Clarification of Position on Settlement

Original text: "Since it is still very difficult to agree -our position is very clear and simple because the truth
is always simple. Our position concerning settlement is
clear. It is composed of two points (sic) and concerning
South Viet Nam we have the third of the four points."
Approved text: "Of course it is still very difficult for
them to agree. As far as we are concerned, our position is
very clear and simple because the truth is always simple.
It is composed of our four point stand and the point I have
just mentioned.* Concerning South Viet Nam, we have the
third of four points."

10. Reunification

Original notes: "Viet Nam is one country, one nation. That is recognized by the Geneva Accords and the present situation. And in South Viet Nam there is the NLF which is the leader of the struggle." Approved text: "Viet Nam is one country, one nation. But there are the Geneva Accords. There is the present situation, and in South Viet Nam there is the NLF which is the leader of the struggle."

SECRET

*I.e., an unconditional and permanent end to the bombing and all hostile activity against the North.

SECRET -4

11. National Independence

Original: "We are masters of our destiny, our affairs, our policy, our major and minor policies." Approved text substitutes "country" for "destiny".

1156

Salisbury Interview with Pham Van Dong, January 2, 1967

Remarks Following Opening Statements

(I tell him of deep concern for peace, of desire of many Americans that means be found for bringing war to an end; of periodic nature of war; that this is an appropriate moment to explore means for settlement; that all wars must end in talks; that it is difficult; difficult for both sides; it is easier to continue; to fight a hard r war; that to take up difficult problem of making the peace; that both sides must make a contribution to this effort. He has mentioned that as preliminary to talks the US should halt bombing or halt escalation. I have a suggestion: the heart of problem is lack of confidence; doubt; distrust. Each side believes that if indicates its willing to talk the other will hit it harder; or that if talks start they will be used merely as interval in which force levels can be increased and regrouping carried out. Therefore, seems to me that only way start can be made is for quiet conversation out of sight in some corner of world where US and DRV can explore what each is precared to do--that is, if US stops bombing what will DRV do. A program for Freaching conference table can be worked out without commitments; without publicity. Only after that can there be a conference and formal negotiations. I say that it seems to me that DRV should be prepared to make special contribution to creation of atmosphere for talks. It should be prepared to take some step just as US does. Possibly a standstill in force levels. A promise not to reinforce the South. This to be advanced after US agrees to halt bombing)

(He man waits a bit before talking. Obviously turning over in his mind what I have said. He seems to be in some difficulty about

responding)

I think I am talking to a man with whom I can speak freely. I think that in the face of such a big question I can say everything necessary. I am ready to listen to all you have to say in a spirit of friendlines. In this spirit Im telling you my view of what we think about your suggestion. In your suggestion there is one point which we cannot accept. On this point we have made know our position formally. Today I want to talk with you about this point. You have suggested that we (agree to do) something to reply to one thing that the American side does about the North. We think it is not correct to raise the question in this way. The American government is conducting a clear war of aggression against North Vietnam. This is contrary to all rules; of law. We think this is a particularly serious act of war.

I think that good willed people understand the nature of this act. Can you imagine that your country is being bombed by the airforce of any other country? In that case what would be the reaction of the American people? And what would their atttitude be if the other country demands that if you want us to stop

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ttacks you must pay something?
(I reply that I was not suggesting any "price". That there was no question of any " demand". I merely thought that it would be a token of enormous goodwill and goodfaith if the Vietnam government could find it in its heart to make such a gesture or move of its own goodwill -- not as a condition but as a free act. I said I thought such a move would have tremendous potential for the success of negotiation and bringing about an end of the war and quite frankly for achieving their objectives)
(Again he seemed to go into a brown study and when he began

talking it was very halting and pausing compared with his previous

riskness)

I am pondering what you have just said. I think that in the present situationit is very difficult for the American rulers to carry out correct actions. Honest actions. And necessary actions. I mean to say that the attitude of the American government toward the North. The simpkest thing is to respect the DRV -- that is the simplest and most elementary thing in relations between countries. You have made a criminal action. If you stop this criminal act...but to this is not a simple matter. In stopping a criminal action this has another meaning. You have suggested that we do some generous action if you (make a) start minim (move) with good intentions. We must consider this is too great a demand on us and frankly specking this is an ironic demand. We can talk together. Frankly speaking with another persons I would not discuss it. In any case this requires some thinking about. (a few words lost) and an American. The American side has committed a very unjust very rough action against us, the American war of aggression. We must go back to the origin of the war and from this we must draw a conclusion that it is the American side which must stop the war and only after that we can speak about other things. After this we will not lack generosity on our part you may be assured of that. But we must not confuse right or wrong and what is most dangerous in the world is

to confuse right and wrong, just and unjust causes.

I can tell you that there were many people who came to talk to us .. with confusion in their minds and they know (our view) not a theoretical question. It is a practical question. With such

confusion in the mind no solution can be found.

Decause we are determined to fight on until our sacred ribinia rights are recognized. That is why we cannot be deceived. That is why right at the start we must draw a clear distinction for fundamental things. This war is an American aggressive war. The American side must stop the war. From that all other questions will be solved. This is nothing new. But i/d must tell it again because if we do not start from this premise nothing else has any basis. For our part we will not leave any misunderstanding on this point. Because this will not solve the question. Moreover it will complicate the question. The US must stop unconditionally and for good the air attack on the North. As far as we are concerned we will take an appropriate stand.

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{ I expressed disappointment that we was not prepare to make amore precise statement of what that stand might be; of some move made in a spirit of goodwill. I said I felt that this would create an atmosphere favorable to a negotiated settlement; that the timing might be missed in other circumstances; let us grant that the US started this all—then the US could appropriately take the first step. Indeed, it was proposed that it take the principal steps. But there must be second steps by the other side)

Of course we will thijk about these questions. We must take a principal stand and a principled attitue. We cannot let our sense be misunderstood If we are misunderstood on this point great difficulties will ensue. The About your idea I have some points to make. You say the US must stop the war (My point being this as a first step) It is time to do so. If this is what the American ruling circles think it would be a very good thing and this would be an ideal solution. But from that we have been talking about this is not yet the thought of the Washington rulers. But we think the time will come when they will have to think that this serves them better.

Now the second point. You have said that as the US started the war of the US has to take the principal steps. But do the American ruling circles think in this manner. It would be very good if many Americans think in this way. That is why your two points are correct points.

If now the US ruling circles do not think along these lines it would be very good if many Americans think along these lines. Events move in this direction and this is an irresistible force.

Is this the conclusion we can draw from our talks?

(I said the cituation seemed to me to lack an aspect of equity. The US would take a step but the nature of the countervaling step from the other side was not yet clear. Frankly, President Johnson had said again and again he was ready to go anywhere anytime in order to discuss a settlement. And there was doubt that the DRV was equally willing)

Speaking about equity --if you mean that the two sides should take the same steps--you are wrong. And that means you encourage the aggressor. We from principle to not agree with this. In our belief we must take an appropriate stand. But it is wrong to say that we are putting some conditions. What I have told you are not conditions but valid conclusions for a discussion. The question is how to reach a settlement which can be enforced.

You have said President Johnson is ready for negotiations anywhere anytime and on our side same thing cant be said. I think this cannot deceive public opinion in the world. The proof is that public opinion is zsrongly against President Johnson. For example, when the Paris newspaper LeMonde wrote that in its view Johnson lacks goodwill. In its issue of Sept 14 it published an article "The Key to Peace is in "ashington". The people (party) who have (has) to make the first steps is Washington. We have no doubt on this point.

Everything must come in its time. We cannot press history forward. If this coes not come today it will come tomorrow. It is no use to make haste. If we show haste the question will be wrong and we will have to wait again.

W: must let the situation ripen.

(I say it is important not to pass the movement of ripeness. Once minepast the fruit spoils. It seems to me the time is now ripe)

Think; that this has been a good talk. We understand each ther. It is good that I understand you and frank talk is a good thing. We need frank talks to understand each other. If we do not agree today we will tomorrow. Otherwise the day after tomorrow.

03160 salisbury premi . hanoi january third in a extremelay detailed discussion of north vietnam views on war with unistates premier pham van dong emphasized that first step toward discussion. must be end of unistates air attacks on north para once unistates has halted its attacks on north he declared colon quote far as we are concerned we will take an appropriate stand unquote the premier did not define precisely the nature of this quote appropriate stand unquote although he was pressed to do so by interviewer para however in slightly different context he declared colon quote if you brackets amountamental funistates unbrackets really want are settlement the first thing himm is to have goodwill stop for of course we know what we should do if the united states shows goodwill stop if they stop the whole war we know what we should do stop if they stop doing hand to the north we know what we should do unquote para at another point premier said quote the moment the unistates putis an end to the war we will respect each other and settle every question dash why dont you brackets unistates unbrackets think that way quote para at another point he said that with cessation of hostilities quot we can speak about other things stop after this there will be no lack of generosity on our part dash you may be sure of that unquote para at same time premier stressed again and again and again. 3 that northvietnam was prepared to fight ten years twenty years any number of years in support of sovereignty and independence in what he called quote our sacred war unquote para quote we are determinate to fight on until our sacred rights are repognized unquote/stressing vietnams long valiant history in resisting invaders stop three times im vietnamese drove mongols out of their country and ASKED HOW MANY TIMES PENTAGEN WANTED TO PIGHT were ready to do it three times more para quote we are an independent country unquote he said requote we have our policy of independence . and sovreignty stop we are masters of our destiny comma of our affairs comma of our policy comma of our policy both major and minor stop if we were not independent we could not wage such aye war as we are now waging stop we are independent and sovereign in all our foreign policy stop that is situation up to present and so it will be in future unquote para he stressed vietnams independence he said because in unistates quote there has been so much misunderstanding on this point pem uncuote paramore salisbury

TAB D Page 1

The New York Times

peace in Viet Nam?

December 27th 1966

Questions proposed for discussion with President Ho Chi Minh: What can be said concerning some modus vivendi for oringing hostilities between the United States and Viet Nam to an end? Has bombing in the north helped or hindered cooperation between North and South against the United States? The United States contends that it is ready for talks to end the wal at any time and any place but that Viet Nam will not talk nor respond to proposals for discussions --what can be said to this point? If American land forces enter North Viet Ham either across the 17th parallel or by a sea landing will North Viet Nam accept the offers of vo unteer assistance which have seen made to her? What is the present estimate of the civilian death toll in the North and of non-military property damage? Is it true that Viet Nam is prepared to carry on the war 10, 20 or 30 years if necessary to attain her aims? How can arrangements be made for the exchange or release of American fliers now held by North Viet Nam? How does the struggle of Viet Nam against the United States differ from that ggainst the French? How does North Viet Nam envisage the specific means for achi ving reunification of the country? Can Asi n nations play any special role in an er ort toward

Times square new york ny 10036

December 27th 1966

Questions proposes for discussion with Prime Minister Phame Van Denn:

How has the Victnamese people seen organized for the ar aminot the United States? What has seen the effect on the Victnamese economy?

What are the differences and the similarities between the struggle against the French and that against the United States? What, in general terms, is the nature of plane and organization for an extended war, say one lasting 10, 20 or 30 years, against the United States?

Does America's advanced technology and curplus of material means help or hinder the American military effort and, if so, how?

Are there any steps which third party nations might take which would aid in bringing peace in Viet Nam?

Both the United States and Viet Nam say they are prepared to discuss an end of hostilities under certain specified conditions but neither side accepts the others proposal. How can this deadlock be broken?

Under what conditions would Viet Nam accept volunteers from other nations to assist in her war effort?

What would be the result in terms of broadening the war if the United States were to cross the 17th paralel on land or by sea landings?

The New York Times

December 27th 1966

Subjects for discussion with Defense Minister, General Vo Nguyen Giap:

What have been the military consequences of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam?

How would intense bombing of Hapoi and Haiphong affect the North Victnamese military effort?

What are the differences and similarities involved in the struggle against the French and that against the Americans?

What can be said concerning coordination of efforts in the North and in the South against the Americans?

Can any comment be made on the American contention that cranized units of North Vietnamese troops are engaged in the South?

What would be the consequences of American land operations in the North, either by invasion across the 17th parallel or by landings on the coast of the North?

How would be compare the comparative military leadership of the French and the Americans and the comparative fighting abilities of the French troops and the American troops.

Are the technical and material resources of the United States a help or a hindrance in a People's war?

As a military man how does he compare the tactics and abilities of the French generals and the Americans Taylor and Westmoreland?

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Rostow 115e

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 13, 1967

1700-1830

SUBJECT:

Secretary Rusk's Appointment with Harrison Salisbury

PARTICIPANTS:

Secretary Rusk

William P. Bundy, EA

Harrison Salisbury, New York Times

COPIES TO:

s/s

This memorandum covers the sensitive portions of Salisbury's report, relating to the unreported parts of the Pham Van Dong interview and to other unreported conversations with North Vietnamese officials. A separate report, for more general circulation, is being prepared on Salisbury's less sensitive observations.

I. Pham Van Dong Interview

- 1. Salisbury had asked to see Ho, Pham Van Dong, and Giap. He was told that he would probably only see one. The interview was finally arranged for January 2nd. It took place in the presence of Mr. Dien of the Information Ministry and two interpreters. Pham Van Dong spoke in Vietnamese, Salisbury in English, so that the whole of the interview was translated. Salisbury thought the interpreters were very mediocre, which could affect the sense of what he said. However, Salisbury's report of Pham Van Dong's opening statement was fully reviewed and edited by the North Vietnamese Foreign Office, so that there is no translation problem there.
 - 2. Salisbury took notes during the conversation and wrote up his

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By OCH NARS, Date 3-28-82

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notes immediately after the interview. He then wrote his first story as well as a full account of Pham Van Dong's opening statement. The full account, after editing, was sent to the Times and published January 8th. Rather than burden this momorandum with that published report, it has been reviewed against Salisbury's notes, and the significant editing changes by the North Vietnamese are shown in TAB A attached. In essence, Hanoi's editors:

- a. Struck out a key passage in which Pham Van Dong said that if the US "stops doing harm to the North we know what we should do." In the same passage, Pham Van Dong said: "We know what we should do if the US shows good will."
 - b. Deleted statements that the US did not tell the truth and was widely considered a liar.
 - c. Deleted references to "Communist" friends and comrades not understanding how the DRV could continue to resist. The references were changed to "our friends in Europe."
 - d. Deleted a reference to past "moments of indecision" about anti-aircraft defense.
 - e. In connection with the NLF, <u>added</u> the sentence that: "It is now the only genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam." Also added a more specific sentence (although the thought was already implicit) that: "The problem of the war in the South is to be settled with the NLF in the present and in the future."
 - f. Made a very subtle but possibly significant change in one passage. The original read: "Vietnam is one country, one nation. That is recognized by the Geneva Accords and the present situation." The approved text reads: "Vietnam is one country, one nation. But there are the Geneva Accords. There is the present situation. . . ." The added "but" could be construed as an admission that the Geneva Accords actually provided for two Vietnams, with reunification to be worked out. Pham Van Dong went on to say that reunification was something "the two parts of the country will

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have to decide together", and continued: "People say we will annex the South. We are not doing this stupid, criminal act."

Other lesser changes will be found in TAB A.

- 3. TAB B contains Salisbury's original notes of the exchanges that followed Pham Van Dong's opening statement. By far the highlight of these exchanges is Pham Van Dong's statement that Hanoi "will take an appropriate stand" if the US stopped bombing unconditionally and for good. He later repeated the same phrase. Salisbury used this statement, and the "we know what we should do" statements as the lead in the first copy that he proposed to file and submitted to Hanoi, as agreed prior to the visit, for editing. This copy is attached as TAB C. In it, Hanoi deleted the part marked A in the margin. In other words, the conclusion is inescapable that Hanoi did nt wish Pham Van Dong's statements along these lines to be made public. Salisbury himself thinks this gives them special significance.
- 4. In these exchanges, Salisbury's report, as TAB B shows, is that Pham Van Dong deliberated and hesitated before responding to Salisbury's probe, which had included both a strong suggestion of private talks and the suggestion that Hanoi take some step such as a standstill in force levels or a promise not to reinforce the South, after the US had agreed to stop bombing. Salisbury also pressed Pham Van Dong hard for something more specific than the "appropriate stand" statement, expressing Salisbury's own disappointment that Pham Van Dong was not prepared to be more precise. Pham Van Dong resolutely refused to say anything more, and the rest of the discussion described in TAB B shows him stressing the familiar argument that the US must stop its "aggressive" acts and that it was unjust to pair these with any action by Hanoi.
- 5. At the close, Pham Van Dong took the position that Washington must make the first move. His final substantive remark was: "We must let the situation ripen." He expressed appreciation and the need for "frank talks" and said: "If we

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do not agree today we will tomorrow. Otherwise, the day after tomorrow."

NOTE

The sentence about "an appropriate stand", like other parts of the interview that were not published, could be subject to the translation problem as to what Pham Van Dong said. However, the fact that Salisbury twice got the "appropriate stand" phrase seems to make it pretty sure.

- 6. As to Salisbury's part of the conversation, only briefly summarized in TAB B, Salisbury reports that he laid great stress on Hanoi making some move if the US did. He also stressed that the only way to a settlement lay in truly private discussions, and these could be useful only if both sides meant to get somewhere. He told Pham Van Dong the US was ahead in the eyes of the world because of its declared willingness to talk, and he reports that this point appeared to irritate Pham Van Dong. Finally, he says that his own closing remarks conveyed a note of sadness that Pham Van Dong had not produced more.
- 7. Salisbury's own conclusion was that Pham Van Dong was rejecting the idea of reciprocal action -- or at least refusing to spell it out -- but that he was not rejecting the notion of quiet talks. He reports -- and this notably does not appear in the TAB B notes -- that he asked Pham Van Dong what might be a suitable locale for private talks. Pham Van Dong replied that all North Vietnamese representatives abroad were qualified. Salisbury asked about Paris, and Pham Van Dong replied that this was "perfectly good."

II. Other Conversations with North Vietnamese

- 1. Salisbury made clear at the outset, and to several North Vietnamese, that he had had no contact with the USG and was bearing no instructions from us. He says the DRV reaction made it clear that they had had the idea that he would be carrying instructions, but he thinks they finally accepted as fact what he told them.
- 2. Dien. The first North Vietnamese with whom Salisbury talked was Ngo Dien, Director of the Information Department in the Foreign Ministry. Dien's first question was what the prospects for a settlement were. Salisbury responded that he thought each side had an honest desire for peace, but the situation was complex and made more confused especially by harsh public statements on both sides. Dien asked what could be done, and Salisbury replied that the only approach seemed to him to be private talks between the US and DRV, with any public discussions following later. Salisbury said it was a case for the diplomats and that mutuality was needed. He reports that he expressed this same thought repeatedly to virtually all North Vietnamese he saw, including Pham Van Dong.
- 3. Salisbury worked out the arrangements for the Pham Van Dong interview with Dien and then the Foreign Office. In response to their request, he left a list of questions addressed hypothetically to Ho, Pham Van Dong, and Giap. These questions are attached as Tab D. As one compares the questions with what Pham Van Dong and others actually discussed, it may be noted that he avoided questions on the release of American fliers, the possible role of Asian nations, steps that third nations might take toward peace, questions on coordination between the effort of the North and the South, and some more military questions addressed to Giap.
- 4. Following Salisbury's opening conversation with Dien, presumably about December 24, he had several talks over the next few days, which he himself regarded as exploratory and designed to sort out the topics that might best be used in his interview with Pham Van Dong. These were as follows:

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- 5. Col. Ha Van Lau. (This man is the ICC Liaison Officer, who conducted almost everything with Ronning.) Lau gave Salisbury pretty much the standard North Vietnamese line on the origins of the war, and put forth nothing of substance. On his side, Salisbury stressed the same thing he had said to Dien about the necessity for quiet secret talks.
- 6. Luu Quy Ky. This man Salisbury understood to be Vice Chairman of the Cultural Relations Department. (He has been the designated escort officer for people like Quintanilla.) In these talks, Ky was probing what the US planned to do, particularly the possibility of US escalation. Salisbury stressed that it was an illusion to suppose that the US could not go on with the war and increase its effort if it chose. In response to Ky's probing about the costs of the war, Salisbury says he replied that the costs were not high enough to impede the US in any significant sense. Ky spoke of the North Vietnamese going on for 20 years, and Salisbury replied that the US could do the same, but it certainly would be a painful process.
- 7. Foreign Office Representative. Salisbury does not recall the name of this man. He saw him for a long lunch and the man then escorted him throughout the following day during Salisbury's visit to Phat Dien. It may be nowworthy that the conversations were entirely between the two men, since the North Vietnamese spoke passable English. In these conversations—the luncheon topics being repeated and gone over at length during the Phat Dien excursion—the North Vietnamese man was intent on exploring Salisbury's views on the problems the US should be having, as he saw it, with the war. The topics were:
 - a. The US economic situation. The North Vietnamese argued that we could not escalate the war and still do the Great Society. Salisbury responded that the President would not be able to expand the Great Society but would not cut it back. The North Vietnamese thought there was serious inflation in the US. Salisbury noted that he had just come through Detroit, where the wages of workers in the auto plants had just been raised to \$5 an hour. At these wage rates, US workers could stand quite a bit of inflation. In

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short, Salisbury says he argued flatly that there was no use in the North Vietnamese thinking that economic factors would weaken the US effort. The North Vietnamese man referred to the fact that France had been forced to cut back its effort because of inflation and cost. Salisbury replied that there was no parallel whatever between France in 1954 and the US today.

- US Political Situation. When the North Vietnamese man raised the election results, Salisbury replied that the Republicans in general took a harder line than the Democrats and were 70% "hawks" while the Democrats might be more evenly balanced. In any case, Salisbury said, the majority of the Congress backed the President and stood, if anythig, for stronger (In recounting this exchange, Salisbury said measures. that none of the North Vietnamese representatives had tried to argue to him that peace advocates in the US had important influence. The subject had been raised once or twice, and Salisbury had responded that the North Vietnamese would be foolish to rely on pressures from this group.)
- c. Gold Drain. The North Vietnamese thought the US would have to cut back for this reason. Salisbury said the over-all situation was entirely controllable.
- d. Manpower Problems. The North Vietnamese man thought that the US could not find the necessary manpower without expanding the draft into a general mobilization. Salisbury explained that the US had not even called up its reserves as yet (although he himself thought we should) and that the President already had ample authority to raise manpower through the draft without additional Congressional authorization.
- e. Withdrawal of Forces from Europe. The North Vietnamese man thought this would be a serious factor for the US. Salisbury replied that the President could pull back more men if he wanted to. The North Vietnamese asked about the Russian threat if we should. Salisbury said the Russian threat did not worry us, that we got along all right with the Russians these days.

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Salisbury has no idea whether the North Vietnamese really believe all this stuff, but he asserts that he beat them back on all these points. He told them over and over again that if they believed these things they simply did not understand the US and that this was very bad.

- Dien Again. Shortly before the actual Pham Van Dong interview, Salisbury saw Dien again in what appeared to be a wind-up of these exploratory conversations. They went over some of the same ground as previously. By this time Dien was gloating over the world-wide uproar aroused by Salisbury's first stories. Salisbury says he replied that the North Vietnamese should not get their hopes up because of that uproar. There might be a big debate in the US, but the President, Secretary Rusk, and Secretary McNamara were not likely to change their views. their irritation might make them only more inclined to dig (At this point, Salisbury commented that in all his contacts the North Vietnamese had seemed to be very well abreast of current world news. He assumed they got all the wire services, AFP by teletype, and AP, UPI, and Reuters by some rapid and full method.)
- 9. <u>Miscellaneous Topics</u>. Subsequent to his original interview with the Secretary and Mr. Bundy, Salisbury called Bundy on Monday morning, January 16, to pick out the following points that had <u>not</u> been covered in his previous account to us. Some of these points are of possible major interest:
 - a. Dien and ofters had said to Salisbury that there could be no talks unless we stopped escalating and stopped sending troops. However, this suggestion—which on its face falls far short of the insistence on unconditional stopping of the bombing—was not raised in the later conversations or by Pham Van Dong, who of course took a considerably harder line.
 - b. The Foreign Office man told Salisbury flatly that if we crossed the 17th parallel the Chinese Communists would come in in force.

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- c. As an over-all impression, Salis bury detected considerable contempt among the North Vietnamese for third-country intermediaries. This led Salisbury to the conclusion that they much preferred direct talks with us if they decided to do something.
- d. Salisbury noted a general North Vietnamese tendency to make a hard response for the record and then sneak back to the subject and say something indirectly, or even in a double negative form, that could be interpreted in a more conciliatory way. This led him to conclude that, in any talks we might have with them eventually, they would probably turn down flat anything they construed as a "demand" or "condition" but might indicate a willingness to make "gestures" that would add up to the same thing or at least something.
- e. The Foreign Office man asked Salisbury what the President's program for Asia was about. Salisbury responded in a long discourse about our efforts to assist in Asian development, the Mekong projects, etc.,/specifically called attention to what the President had said about these programs being open to North Viet-Nam in conditions of peace. The Foreign Office man listened carefully, but did not express any reaction. (This may be interesting, since the public North Vietnamese position has been to spurn "American bribes."
- 10. Other Miscellaneous Points. In the original interview with Secretary Rusk, Salisbury made these additional points in response to questions:
 - a. The North Vietnamese never referred to other contacts with US representatives.
 - b. When Salisbury probed on one occasion on the difference between a suspension of the bombing and a total cessation, the North Vietnamese man insisted on the latter. Salisbury rejoined that the US could still resume if something nasty happened, and there was no reply.

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- c. None of the North Vietnamese denied that there were North Vietnamese forces in the South. They did not admit it specifically, but they made many references to their giving all the support they could, and the implicit assumption was that this included forces.
- d. On the NLF, Salisbury said that his <u>Times</u> story was a full account of his contact with the NLF representative. He himself was impressed by the different line taken by the NLF man as compared to the North Vietnamese. He had also picked up, from an Eastern European diplomat, a report that the Chinese and North Koreans objected to the NLF program as not being truly Communist, and had attempted to put pressure on the NLF through Hanoi to change it.
- e. Several of the North Vietnamese had shown real sensitivity to the position Hanoi would be in if there were some reduction in hostilities, or possibly a known initiation of discussions. They stressed that the North Vietnamese people were at concert pitch and would let down badly if they thought the struggle was not going on. They said frankly that Hanoi would have real difficulty in bringing them back to their present taut level of effort. Salisbury thought this point very important.
- f. In none of his conversations was there any discussion of Cambodia, Laos, or the DMZ problem.
- g. There were references to the Geneva Accords in several of his conversations, always with the standard position that the US should recognize the Accords (presumably as embodied in the the 4 points). Salisbury gave a stock response that point 1 of our 14 points expressly reaffirmed our support for the Geneva Accords. He said this seemed to strike some of the North Vietnamese as news! The North Vietnamese themselves never referred to the 14 points.
 - h. There were very few references to the Chinese

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in his talks with the North Vietnamese. On one occasion, after Salisbury had made his remark about how satisfactorily we were getting along with the Soviets, the Foreign Office man said that the Chinese would stand by Hanoi regardless. There were no references to internal developments in Communist China, which the North Vietnamese clearly regarded as sensitive and which Salisbury did not try to probe.

i. The North Vietnamese referred only once to political developments in South Viet-Nam. Salisbury asked whether, as a part of the political evolution in the South, Hanoi would sit still for anybody in the present government remaining there. In response, the North Vietnamese (Dien) did not exclude this, but reverted to the standard line that the NLF would work out all those problems.

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III. General Salisbury Impressions

- 1. Effect of developments in Communist China. Although this subject, as noted above, did not come up at all in Salisbury's talks with the North Vietnamese, it was the central theme of his discussions with resident diplomats. Salisbury described these diplomats -- on cross-questioning this seemed to boil down to the Eastern Europeans -- as feeling that "all" the North Vietnamese were "desperately concerned" at the Chinese situation and what could result. Salisbury himself thought that the specific areas of concern might be a sealing of the border in the event of internal conflict, a stoppage of Soviet shipments. through China (either by policy decision or perhaps, though Salisbury did not say this, because of disorder), or a stopping of crucial Chinese Communist aid, notably rice. In addition, either from his diplomatic sources or on his own (and it was impossible in this phase of the report to tell which) Salisbury thought that Hanoi considered that the Communist Chinese had a pistol at their back. From this, it was Salisbury's own conclusion that Hanoi must know just where it would come out before it started negotiations or took any identifiable step toward peace. Negotiations, or a step toward peace, could lead the Chinese to "pull the plug" on their help to Hanoi. In giving us this combination of what sources had said and his own view, Salisbury went on to express the view that Ho and Pham Van Dong were truly independent and not pro-Communist Chinese, but that others were in the latter category. He did not appear to have any specific backing for this judgment, and we suspect that it too is what he thought to be a "consensus" among resident diplomats.
- 2. Hanoi fear of domestic weakening in the event of steps to peace. As noted above, Salisbury did have a couple of references to this topic in his conversations. In addition, he had apparently picked up some other comments from diplomats or others. His own conclusion was that Hanoi is desperately concerned on this issue and afraid that false hopes for peace would cause the performance of their people to decline and be incapable of being restored. He thought this fear was alongside their fear of the Communist Chinese, as a reason for their needing to know just where they would come out before they made any move.

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Although

3. Readiness for Secret Explorations. / the account of his conversations, particularly the Pham Van Dong one, was evasive on this score, despite Salisbury's apparent frequent pressing, it was his own conclusion -- based on atmospherics alone -- that the North Vietnamese were in fact ready for really secret explorations. By this he apparently meant explorations that would establish what each side would be doing if we stopped the bombing; it may be noteworthy that he did not once argue to us that we should stop the bombing in return for mere willingnes to talk, although this is of course just the position the Times has taken and Salisbury may privately share.

However, he seemed to have in mind discussions to establish reciprocal actions, and he was obviously stressing the further point that Hanoi would probably want to know what the whole settlement would look like and that it could be achieved in fairly short order. All of these were his conclusions, but they are worth setting down.

January 19, 1967

Dear Line:

I accept with real regret your letter of resignation of January 19, 1967. Given the distinguished position you will occupy from July 1, as I told you when we talked, I have no choice. Our great educational institutions are fundamental to the progress of our society and play a major role in lifting the level of education on the world scene. They require the kind of leadership you will, I am sure, provide.

I congratulate both you and The Johns Hopkins University.

You have brought to Latin American affairs in the last six years a rare combination of experience and scholarship, idealism and practical judgment. Your career in public service illustrates the change through which we have passed in recent years: from a primary focus on Europe to a balanced global policy. You made a major contribution after the war to European reconstruction, but then turned to the great adventure of Latin American economic and social development.

You helped formulate and bring to life the Alliance for Progress; at a critical time you served with great distinction as our Ambassador to Brazil; in the past year you have helped lead the Alliance for Progress to a point where it is no longer a concept or a hope, but a working reality. In the weeks and months ahead we shall be working together to increase the momentum of the Alliance and, especially, to make the Inter-American Meeting of Presidents the greatest possible success.

After you have assumed your new post, I shall be counting on you from time to time to serve your country in an advisory capacity.

You will leave your post in Washington with the thanks and gratitude of all of us.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in very best wishes to Allison as well as to yourself.

Sincerely, /S/ Lyndon B. Johnson

Honorable Lincoln Gordon Assistant Secretary of State Department of State Washington, D. C.

LBJ: WWRostow: rln

Pres file

CONFIDENTIAL -- LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Monday, January 16, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith Linc Gordon's letter of resignation, which we worked over together on Saturday, plus a draft response from you.

His new appointment will be announced in Baltimore and here at 4:00 p.m. this Thursday, January 19.

We should be ready to issue the texts of the two letters at that time.

Linc will be leaving about 3:00 p.m. for Baltimore to attend a ceremony at about 4:30 p.m. and he would like to be able to take with him personally, for the press there, some 40 copies. We shall also want Spanish and Portuguese translations for USIA by 4:00 p.m. Therefore, we ought to mimeograph, if possible -- in secrecy -- by early afternoon. (I am told it will be a big press affair in Bal timore.

Attached is the full scenario for the day.

W. W. Rostow

Scenario approved	
Alter scenario as follows	
See me	
	DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 16, 1983.
	BY 49 ON 2-1-91

WWRostow:rln

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