

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[148]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Rostow to the President re Panama <del>C</del> 2 pp. <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-294</i>	2/11/67	A
#2 memo	Rostow to the President re Frei " " <del>C</del> 1 p. <i>dup of #105, NSF, CF, Chile, Vol 4</i>	2/11/67	A
#3 message	from Amb. Dungan in Santiago, Chile <del>C</del> 2 pp. <i>open 11-26-91 NLJ 91-291</i>	2/11/67	A
#4a memo	Katzenbach to the President re Westmoreland <del>S</del> 2 pp. <i>open 11-26-91 NLJ 91-291</i>	2/11/67	A
#7a cable	Copy of Moscow 3451 " " <del>TS</del> 1 p.	2/11/67	A
#8 memo	Rostow to the President re China <del>TS</del> 1 p. <i>open 11-1-93 NLJ 91-293</i>	2/11/67	A
#9 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam <del>S</del> 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-294</i>	2/11/67	A
#10a report	Proposed Inter-American Meeting of Presidents <del>C</del> 2 pp. <i>open 11-26-91 NLJ 91-291</i>	undated	A
#11a cable	Prime Minister (UK) to the President <i>open 5-1-00 RAC</i> <del>TS</del> 2 pp. <i>example NLJ 91-294</i> <i>Secret per NLJ 91-294 (dup of #910a, NSF, CF, UN, Sun/Tower, PLUS, Box 256)</i>	2/11/67	A
#12a cable	Prime Minister (UK) to the President <del>TS</del> 2 pp. <i>example NLJ 91-294 open 5-1-00 RAC</i> <i>Secret per NLJ 91-294 (dup of #910a, see above)</i>	2/11/67	A
#13 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam <del>TS</del> 3 pp. <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-294</i>	2/10/67	A
#14a memo	for Amb. Bruce and Cooper <del>TS</del> 2 pp. <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-294</i>	2/10/67	A
#16 memo	Rostow to the President re King Hassan <del>S</del> 1 p. <i>example NLJ 91-294 open 12-7-99 NLJ 99-20</i>	2/10/67	A
#17 memo	Rostow to the President re Latin America <del>S</del> 2 pp. <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-294</i>	2/10/67	A
#17a report	Rostow's Views and Recommendation <del>S</del> 1 p. <i>OPEN D-21.98</i>	2/10/67	A
#17b report	Table of Summit Package Costs <del>S</del> 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-294</i>	2/10/67	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President,  
Walt Rostow, Volume 20, February 1-11, 1967

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#19a letter	Maxwell Taylor to the President <del>S</del> 2 pp. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-294</i>	<del>2/6/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#27a cable	Michael Palliser to Walt Rostow <i>open 6-11-98</i> <del>S</del> 2 pp. <i>exempt NLS 91-294 RAC</i> (dup of #115a, NSF, CF, UN, Sunflower PLUS, BX 256)	<del>2/9/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#29 memo	Rostow to the President re King Hassan <del>C</del> 1 p. <i>exempt NLS 91-294 open 12-1-99 NLS 99-20</i>	<del>2/9/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#29a report	Interesting Facts about Morocco <del>PCI</del> 1 p. <i>open</i>	<del>2/9/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#30 memo	Rostow to the President re Soviet Union <del>TS</del> 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-294</i>	<del>2/9/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#30a cable	Moscow 3412 <i>open 11-26-91 NLS 91-291</i> <del>TS</del> 1 p.	<del>2/8/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#30b cable	London 6406 <i>sanitized 11-26-91 NLS 91-291</i> <del>TS</del> 2 pp. (Dup of #117d, NSF, CF, UN, Sunflower PLUS, BX 256) <i>Downgraded to Secret per NLS 91-291</i>	<del>2/9/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#30c cable	London 6399 <del>TS</del> 2 pp. <i>open 11-26-91 NLS 91-291</i>	<del>2/8/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#30d memo	Conversation between Read and Cooper " " <del>TS</del> 1 p.	<del>2/8/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#31 memo	Rostow to the President re King Hassan <del>S</del> 1 p. <i>exempt NLS 91-294 open 12-1-99 NLS 99-20</i>	<del>2/9/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#40	Duplicate of #31 <i>open 12-1-99 NLS 99-20</i>		
#41a cable	Saigon 17626 <i>open 11-26-91 NLS 91-291</i> <del>C</del> 5 pp.	<del>2/8/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#43a memcon	re Kosygin's Statements in the U.K. " " <del>S</del> 1 p.	<del>2/8/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#46 memo	Rostow to the President re foreign affairs <del>S</del> 2 pp. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-294</i>	<del>2/8/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#47 letter	the President to the Pope " " <del>PCI</del> 1 p.	<del>2/8/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#48 draft	letter from the President to the Pope " " <del>PCI</del> 1 p.	<del>2/8/67</del>	<del>A</del>

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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[3048]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#49a memo	Rusk to the President <del>C</del> 1 p. <i>open 11-26-91 NLS 91-291</i>	<del>2/7/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#49b draft	cable re Goldberg's Far Eastern Trip " <del>C</del> 3 pp.	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#52 cable	Rostow for Michael Palliser <del>S</del> 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-294</i>	<del>2/8/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#53 memo	Rostow to the President re Strauss " <del>C</del> 1 p. <i>[poss. dup. of # 118, Germany, Vol 12]</i>	<del>2/8/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#53a memcon	re Strauss <del>C</del> 1 p. "	<del>2/8/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#55a memo	Rostow to the President re King Hassan <del>S</del> 3 pp. <i>possible duplicate - files of WWR, Box 15 NON-VN JAN-Feb. 1967 Doc 179 open 12-1-99 NLS 99-20 sanitized 11-26-91 NLS 91-291</i>	<del>2/8/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#55c table	Morocco US Assistance <del>C</del> 1 p. <i>open 11-26-91 NLS 91-291</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#55e memo	State Dept. to the President re King Hassan <del>S</del> 1 p. <i>open 11-26-91 NLS 91-291</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#55f report	Topics King May Raise <del>S</del> 3 pp. <i>open 12-1-99 NLS 99-21 sanitized 11-26-91 NLS 91-291</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#55g report	Recommended Topics to Raise <del>S</del> 2 pp. <i>open 11-26-91 NLS 91-291</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#55h report	Scepe Paper <del>S</del> 2 pp. <i>sanitized 11-26-91 NLS 91-291 open 12-1-99</i>	<del>2/3/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#60 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam <del>TS</del> 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-294</i>	<del>2/7/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#60a cable	London 6360 <del>TS</del> 2 pp. <i>sanitized 11-26-91 NLS 91-291 sanitized 4-3-95 NLS 94-470 downgraded to "Confidential" per NLS 94-470 open 1-13-98 RAC</i>	<del>2/7/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#61 memo	Rostow to the President re N. Africa <del>S</del> 2 pp. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-294</i>	<del>2/7/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#61a memo	Rusk to the President re Morocco <del>S</del> 3 pp. <i>open 12-1-99 sanitized 11-26-91 NLS 91-291 NLS 99-21</i>	<del>2/4/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#61b memo	Rusk to the President re Morocco <del>C</del> 3 pp. <i>open 11-26-91 NLS 91-291</i>	<del>2/4/67</del>	<del>A</del>

## FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President,  
Walt Rostow, Volume 17, February 1-11, 1967

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#61c memo	W. Gaud to the President <i>open 11-15-91 NLS 91-292</i> <del>C</del> 3 pp.	<del>2/2/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#61d report	Presidential Finding <del>C</del> 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-294</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#61e report	re PL 480 and Morocco <del>C</del> 2 pp. <i>open 11-26-91 NLS 91-291</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#61f memo	Rusk to the President re Algeria <i>open 12-1-99 NLS 99-21</i> <del>S</del> 3 pp. <i>sanitized 11-26-91 NLS 91-291</i>	<del>2/4/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#61g report	Algeria's Self-Help Efforts <del>S</del> 2 pp. <i>open 11-26-91 NLS 91-291</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#61h report	Presidential Finding <del>S</del> 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-294</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#61i report	re PL 480 and Algeria <i>open 11-26-91 NLS 91-291</i> <del>S</del> 2 pp.	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#64 memo	Rostow to the President re Algeria <del>C</del> 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-294</i>	<del>2/7/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#73a memo	Rostow to the President re Western Europe <del>C</del> 1 p.	<del>2/7/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#76 memo	Rostow to the President and the Secretary re Vietnam <del>TS</del> 1 p.	<del>2/6/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#78a memo	Acting Director of the DIA to the President TS 1 p. <i>exempt NLS 91-290 Sanitize 2-16-00 NLS 99-22</i>	2/4/67	A
#79a memo	Ginsburgh to Rostow re Edward White 1 p.	<i>DUPLICATED</i> 2/6/67	C
#79b report	re Edward H. White 1 p.	<i>79e also</i> <i>IN File of WWR, Box 15, NIN-VN JAN-FEB 1967 Docs 15 A, B, C, d</i> undated	C
#79c transcript	of Edward H. White 1 p.	2/2/67	C
#79d report	re Edward H. White 1 p.	11/7/67	C

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Walt Rostow, Volume 20, February 1-11, 1967

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[5018]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#79e report	Achievement Series Scores 1 p.	undated	C
#80 memo	<del>Rostow to the President re foreign affairs</del> <del>S 2 pp. open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-294</del>	<del>2/6/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#82 memo	<del>Rostow to the President re Vietnam</del> <del>S 2 pp. open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-294</del>	<del>2/6/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#83 cable	<del>Paris 11650</del> open 11-26-91 NLJ 91-291 <del>S 8 pp.</del>	<del>2/2/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#88 memo	<del>Rostow to the Pres. re Consular Convention</del> <del>C 1 p. open 11-1-93 NLJ 91-293</del>	<del>2/6/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#89a memo	<del>Read to Rostow re Goldberg trip</del> <del>C 3 pp. open 11-26-91 NLJ 91-291</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#90 memo	<del>Rostow to the President re Vietnam</del> <del>TS 1 p. open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-294</del>	<del>2/4/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#90a cable	<del>USUN 3848</del> open 11-26-91 NLJ 91-291 <del>TS 2 pp.</del>	<del>2/2/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#91a memo	<del>Komer to the President</del> <del>S 1 p. open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-294</del>	<del>2/3/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#91b memo	<del>Rusk to the President re Vietnam</del> <del>S 3 pp. open 11-26-91 NLJ 91-291</del>	<del>1/12/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#92 memo	<del>Rostow to the President re Vietnam</del> <del>S 1 p. open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-294</del>	<del>2/4/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#92b letter	<del>Henry Cabot Lodge to Rostow</del> <del>C 1 p. open 11-26-91 NLJ 91-291</del>	<del>1/25/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#92c letter	<del>Rostow to Henry Cabot Lodge</del> <del>C 1 p. open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-294</del>	<del>1/18/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#93	Duplicate of #92 open 7-27-94 NLJ 91-294		
#93b	Duplicate of #92b "		
#93c	Duplicate of #92c "		
#94 message	<del>the President to President Marcos</del> <del>C 1 p. open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-294</del>	<del>2/4/67</del>	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#95 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>Sanitized 11-1-93 NLJ 91-293</i> <i>Sanitized 6/27/02 NLJ 99-23</i> <i>SAME SANITIZATION 2-11-05 NLJ 04-231</i>	2/4/67	A
#95a report	re Czech views on Vietnam S 3 pp. <i>Sanitized 11-1-93 NLJ 91-293</i> <i>MORE INFO RELEASED 2-14-05 NLJ 04-231</i>	2/4/67	A
#96 memo	Rostow to the President re Soviet Union S 1 p. <i>open 11-1-93 NLJ 91-293</i> <i>related document in File of WWR, BOX 15, NOV-UN JAN-Feb 1967, #14</i>	2/4/67	A
#97 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam TS 1 p. <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-294</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#97a draft	letter from the President to Ho Chi Minh TS 4 pp. <i>"</i>	2/4/67	A
#105a memo	William Jorden to Rostow C 3 pp. <i>"</i>	2/3/67	A
#107a cable	Prague 1275 <i>open 11-26-91 NLJ 91-291</i> C 1 p.	2/3/67	A
#108a cable	Manila 8184 <i>open 12-1-99 NLJ 99-21</i> S 2 pp. [sanitized NLJ 82-193]	2/3/67	A
#109a memo	Harriman to the President and the Secretary TS 2 pp. <i>open 11-26-91 NLJ 91-291</i>	2/2/67	A
#109b memo	Harriman to the President C 1 p. <i>"</i>	2/2/67	A
#112 memo	Rostow to the President re foreign affairs S 2 pp. <i>open 12-23-93 NLJ 91-294</i>	2/3/67	A
#113b letter	President Kenyatta to the President PCI 1 p. <i>"</i>	1/12/67	A
#114 memo	Clark Clifford for Rostow S 1 p. <i>open 11-1-93 NLJ 91-293</i>	2/2/67	A
#118a	Duplicate of #114 <i>open 8-5-94 NLJ 91-293</i>		
#120 memo	Rostow to the President re Gen. Franco S 1 p. <i>exempt NLJ 91-294 OPEN 12-1-99 NLJ 99-20</i>	2/2/67	A
#120a letter	Gen. Franco to the President <i>exempt NLJ 91-294</i> <del>PCI</del> 2 pp. <i>open 12-1-99 NLJ 99-20</i> <del>Confidential</del>	1/30/67	A

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#120b letter	<del>Spanish copy of Franco letter to Pres.</del> <del>PCF 2 pp.</del> <i>example NLS 91-294 open 12-1-99</i> <i>Confidential</i> <i>NLS 99-20</i>	<del>1/30/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#124a cable	<del>Saigon 17053</del> <i>open 11-26-91 NLS 91-291</i> <del>S 2 pp.</del>	<del>2/1/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#125 memo	<del>Rostow to the President re foreign affairs</del> <del>S 2 pp.</del> <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-294</i>	<del>2/1/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#126a cable	<del>Saigon 17054</del> <i>open 11-26-91 NLS 91-291</i> <del>S 5 pp.</del>	<del>2/1/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#126b cable	<del>Saigon 16456</del> <i>11</i> <del>S 4 pp.</del>	<del>1/25/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#127 memo	<del>Rostow to the President re Vietnam</del> <del>C 1 p.</del> <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-294</i>	<del>2/1/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#127d report	<del>Analysis of Harold Stassen's Proposals</del> <del>C 2 pp.</del> <i>open 12-23-93 NLS 91-294</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>

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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
39 memo	<del>Rostow to the President -</del> <i>open 11-4-99 NLS 96-297</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>2/9/67</del>	<del>A</del>
39a memo	<del>Rostow to the Chairman, AEC -</del> <i>open 11-4-99 NLS 96-297</i> <del>s 1 p</del>	<del>[2/67]</del>	<del>A</del>
39b ltr	Seaborg to the President - TS 3 pp	1/30/67	A
39c memo	<del>Draft NSAM -</del> <i>open 11-4-99 NLS 96-297</i> <del>S 2 pp</del>	<del>[1/67]</del>	<del>A</del>

## FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Rostow. Vol. 20, February 1 -11, 1967 Box 13

*Up-8 added to file 9-10-91*

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**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NEJ 91-294**  
**By rip, NARA, Date 12-2-93**

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday - February 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Flying of Panamanian Flag by Ships Transiting the Canal

The Panamanian National Assembly has passed a bill regulating the display of the national emblem, one provision of which re-quires that the flag be flown on ships transiting the Canal. President Robles has informed us that he cannot veto the measure for constitutional reasons. Panamanian Foreign Minister Eleta tells us that the President intends to make clear publicly that it would be unconstitutional for the Government of Panama to attempt to enforce the provision in the light of the existing canal treaty. But we can't be sure of this.

We can oppose application of the measure and run the serious risk of the nationalists whipping up a crisis over the issue, or we can quietly leave it up to the transiting ships whether or not to comply.

Present Canal Zone Regulations provide that transiting ships shall fly the colors of registry and the house (company) flag during daylight hours. The Regulations are silent on flying other flags. As a matter of maritime etiquette, however, ships fly the flag of the United States which has jurisdiction over canal waters. State and DOD lawyers say that if ships were also to fly the Panamanian flag as a complimentary ensign, it would not be inconsistent with our position that Panama has titular sovereignty over the Zone.

State, DOD, and Ambassador Anderson do not consider it in the national interest to make a big issue over the new Panamanian requirement. There is too much at stake in the Canal negotiations to risk a confrontation over a marginal issue which will be covered in the new treaties in any event.

State and DOD have developed, with Ambassador Anderson's endorsement, the following stand-by guidance for our Canal Zone authorities when ship captains inquire what they should do about the new law:

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"If advice is requested of Canal Zone authorities, the following reply should be given:

A ship in Canal Zone waters is required to fly its flag of registry and its house flag during daylight hours. As a matter of maritime etiquette ships also fly the flag of the United States which has jurisdiction over the Canal waters. Any other ensigns, pennants, burgees, or flags, such as the flag of the country from which a ship has departed and/or the flag of the country of destination, may be flown by ships transiting the Canal as complimentary ensigns.

"If Canal authorities are directly asked, after providing the above reply, whether the Panamanian flag could be flown as a complimentary ensign, the answer should be in the affirmative."

I endorse the guidance. My views are:

- We may get some static from flag-waving right-wingers in the US, but we can live with it.
- If we fight the bill and tell ship captains not to fly the Panamanian flag, we will give anti-US elements in Panama a patriotic issue on which to precipitate a crisis for Robles and us.
- If we go along with the recommended guidance, we do ourselves no harm and actually strengthen our hand vis-a-vis Panamanian and world opinion by showing our reasonableness.

I recommend that you approve the guidance in the understanding that State and Defense will inform appropriate members of Congress what we are doing and why.

Approve   ✓  

Disapprove       

See me       

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



2  
*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday - February 11, 1967

Mr. President:

This telegram from Ralph Dungan reports that Frei has decided not to try to come to the United States before the Summit meeting. It also explains the general strategy which Frei is following with respect to political problems at home and his participation in the OAS Summit.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By ig, NARA, Date 12-2-93

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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NJ 91-291

By WJ, NARA, Date 11-21-91

Message from Ambassador Ralph Dungan in Santiago, Chile (No. 2819)  
(dated February 11, 1967)

SUBJECT: President Frei's trip to the United States and the Buenos Aires Foreign Ministers' Meeting

1. Last evening Foreign Minister Valdes called to tell me that President Frei had decided to send him to Buenos Aires for the Meeting of Foreign Ministers and for Summit preparations.
2. The Foreign Minister also said that the President had asked him to tell me that Frei had decided not to come to the United States before the Summit, but rather to spend his maximum energy campaigning in the municipal elections now scheduled for April 2. This campaign begins today with a trip to the southern island of Chiloe. President Frei also wanted us to know that he will attend the Summit, permission or not.
3. Valdes will be leaving Monday and stated that he is most anxious to be in touch with Assistant Secretary Gordon at the latter's early convenience.
4. Comment: It appears to me that the Government of Chile has decided on the following strategy with respect to political problems it faces:

The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) will push aggressively in the municipal elections in order to strengthen (they would say underscore) popular support they now enjoy. In the meantime, they will conduct foreign affairs actively despite sniping from the right and also the Socialists especially, as the Government of Chile's positions accord with our own, as I expect them to.

We can expect full participation on Summit planning probably not too much getting out in front lest someone raise the question who Valdes actually represents.

5. Assuming the PDC emerges from the municipal elections in fair shape -- which, their early polls indicate, they should -- Frei will take a strong lead at the Summit and, if possible, from President Johnson's point of view, try a visit to the United States later in the year.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

6. The essence of the strategy is to overcome opposition within existing framework. As we have previously reported, we believe they have abandoned the idea of general elections, at least at this time.



4

~~SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

Saturday, February 11, 1967  
4:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here are Nick's views on  
General Taylor's memorandum to  
you.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By RG, NARA, Date 2-8-91



4a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 11, 1967

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-291

By inf, NARA, Date 11-21-91

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: General Taylor's Letter to You on  
Appointing General Westmoreland as  
Ambassador to Saigon

I think it would be unwise to appoint General Westmoreland as Ambassador and Commander-in-Chief of all US military forces in South Viet-Nam, as suggested by Max Taylor in his letter to you of February 6. The following disadvantages of this dual role would outweigh the possible gains in operational efficiency:

(a) The Ambassador's function would, in effect, be placed under MAC/V, and we would lose the Ambassador's freedom of action to monitor our operations from a political point of view.

(b) The appointment would present to the world, and particularly to the Vietnamese, an image of a US move towards greater military control, with overtones of a "Governor General" appointment. It even suggests military occupation, like Germany after World War II.

(c) It could have a most unfortunate effect on the thinking of the Vietnamese at a time when we are trying to promote greater participation in the government by Vietnamese civilians rather than generals.

(d) Westmoreland's dual position would make it difficult for the Departments of State and Defense to instruct him effectively in their respective areas of concern.

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

-2-

I would hope that when Ambassador Lodge resigned his post we could find an outstanding civilian candidate for his job. I think the political considerations will become increasingly important as compared with military operations where we have done so well. It is, therefore, vitally important that Lodge's successor have extraordinary political sensitivity in order to operate effectively during the coming period of intense Vietnamese political activity and factionalism. The elections for a new government will inevitably bring with them political divisions which we must do all we can to head off or heal, much in the way Ambassador Bunker operated in the Dominican Republic. And we must keep the military in perspective. This job requires someone who has Bunker's kind of experience and skill at negotiation.

If no outstanding civilian candidate could be found, I would have no serious objection to Westmoreland's being appointed Ambassador, if he were to resign from the Army, although this has some of the same drawbacks. He would then be in much the same position as was Max Taylor during his tour in Saigon. I would think, however, that Westmoreland's more valuable contribution would be to continue to serve as COMUSMACV, in which he has done such an excellent job--and in which he might be difficult to replace.

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~



Saturday, February 11, 1967  
10:25 am

Mr. President

Herewith Orville Freeman presents an urgent case for a 10% increase in rice acreage for 1967.

Announcement, he says, is required by February 15.

The case: Vietnamese rice needs and other PL 480 commitments.

W. W. Rostow



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

5a  
Mr. Walt Rostow

February 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM

To: The President  
From: Orville L. Freeman  
Secretary of Agriculture  
Subject: Rice Acreage Allotment

*Orville L. Freeman*

As you know, we have been delaying the final decision on the 1967 rice acreage allotment, hoping it would not be necessary to go above 1.8 million acres. However, the situation in Vietnam and in the world grain economy makes it necessary to increase the 1967 rice acreage allotment. I recommend that it be increased to 2 million acres, 10 percent above the preliminary level announced last fall and the same as 1966. This should be done by February 15, since planting time is near for South Texas and Louisiana.

If we hold acreage to 1.8 million, we will have only 591,000 tons for Vietnam and other P.L. 480 requirements (unless we reduce commercial export sales). This is not enough. Bob Komer advises 600,000 tons as a minimum planning figure for Vietnam although there is some chance we will not need that much. We need 100,000 tons for other countries at the very minimum.

A 2 million acre allotment will permit us to meet all needs and (a) either build up the carryover a bit, or (b) increase our P.L. 480 programming next year.

Expenditures in fiscal year 1968 (compared with the 1.8 million acre allotment) will either be (a) increased by \$13.5 million if we raise the carryover to 343,000 tons, or (b) increased by \$24 million if we decide to program slightly more rice and hold carryover to 294,000 tons (this year's level).

We have considered increasing the acreage allotment to 1.9 million instead of 2 million acres. We rejected this option because it would require us (in order to have 700,000 tons for P.L. 480) to pull stocks so low that prices would be increased substantially. Government costs (export subsidies and P.L. 480 purchases) would be about as high as with the larger allotment.



2-The President-February 10, 1967

The supply, income, and expenditure details are attached.

I have sent a copy to Walt Rostow, Charlie Schultze, Bob Komer,  
and Bill Gaud.

Action:

1. Proceed with announcement \_\_\_\_\_
2. Discuss with me \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

# Estimates for Rice Program

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
				1967-68	
				2.0 mil. acres	
	1965-66	1966-67	1.8 mil. acres	Carryout of 343	Carryout of 294
(000 metric tons)					
Production	2491	2779	2635	2860	2860
Domestic Use	1005	1071	1064	1064	1064
Exports	1414	1698	1652	1761	1809
(Dollar)	(885)	(996)	(1061)	(1061)	(1061)
(PL 480)	(529)	<u>1</u> /(702)	<u>1</u> /(591)	<u>2</u> /(700)	(748)
Carryout	268	294	229	343	294
(Million dollars)					
Value of production	376.2	407.6	399.5	415.6	428.8
P.L. 480 expenditures	60.4	120.5	101.4	114.4	127.1
Total expenditures	112.0	162.9	130.3	143.8	154.3

1/ Amount available without reducing commercial exports.

2/ 600,000 tons for Vietnam; 100,000 tons for others; both minimum planning figures.



Sat., Feb 11, 1967  
10:30 a.m.

6

MR. PRESIDENT:

You will wish to read these, especially  
Saigon's.

That fellow Ky has his head screwed  
on right.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET/SUNFLOWER/PLUS~~  
attachment (SAIGON 17822)  
(LONDON 6488)

Sat., Feb. 11, 67  
10:00 a.m.

2

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is the text of the message from  
the North Vietnamese in Moscow,  
to which I referred on the phone.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET/SUNFLOWER PLUS~~  
attachment (Moscow 3451)



7a

~~TOP SECRET/SUNFLOWER PLUS~~

Copy of Moscow 3451, Feb. 11, 1967

1. At Le Chang's request (phoned by Hoang Manh Tu at 11:45), DCM met with him at 13:00. Meeting attended by usual participants, lasted four minutes.
2. After thanking DCM for coming over, Le Chang said he wished to inform Hi that President's message to Ho Chi Minh delivered February 8 had been transmitted to Hanoi. Ho Chi Minh had received message and reply would be forwarded later.
3. In response to DCM question when message received in Hanoi, Le Chang said it had been transmitted immediately.

THOMPSON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-291  
By 11-8, NARA, Date 11-21-51

~~TOP SECRET/SUNFLOWER PLUS~~

Saturday, Feb. 11, 1967  
9:10 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I send this forward for the following reason.

It shows how the trouble in China may affect supplies to Hanoi and thus Hanoi's willingness to end the war.

It is clear the Chinese are trying to force a break in relations with Moscow. They know the consequences for Hanoi, but may be positioning themselves to blame Hanoi's failure on Soviet connivance with the U. S.

Moscow, on the other hand, may be positioning itself to blame China, while using the occasion of an ending the war to strengthen its position in Hanoi and Asia generally -- as Moscow already has done in North Korea, Japan, Indonesia.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

(No. 9, 10 Feb. 67, SC No. 01382/67)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-293  
By ig, NARA, Date 10-28-93



~~SECRET/SUNFLOWER~~

Saturday, February 11, 1967 -- 8:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

I know it clarified my mind, but what I think we have now is not an A-B proposal but an A-B-C-D proposal that makes sense and which we can justify to ourselves and before the world.

- A. Ho informs us that infiltration has stopped.
- B. On the basis of his assurance, we stop bombing the North.
- C. We surface in Saigon as a military fact that infiltration appears to have stopped and Hanoi either:
  - keeps silent; or
  - says we never did infiltrate, we are not infiltrating now, and invites people in to see.
- D. When that condition has been achieved and announced, we announce that the further augmentation of our forces will not take place.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By isp, NARA, Date 12-2-93

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET/SUNFLOWER~~

Friday, Feb. 10, 1967  
7:30 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Before the 12 o'clock meeting, <sup>Saturday,</sup> you may be interested to read this report of the group assembled, at your direction, to review the Summit proposals. ~~Q~~ You will note, they are basically in support of the position Secretary Rusk will propose; although they recognize the problem of commitment to higher levels of assistance during the war in Viet Nam.

The virtue of our present proposals is that a good deal of the carrot will dangle out in front until the Latin American governments solve the many hard problems necessary to get an integration treaty -- a period probably of several years.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment





DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

467  
10a

IN REPLY REFER TO:

PROPOSED INTER-AMERICAN MEETING OF PRESIDENTS

The Secretary, Assistant Secretary Gordon, and Ambassador Linowitz met on Monday afternoon, February 6, with a select, knowledgeable group of private citizens to obtain their reactions to our thinking with regard to the Inter-American Meeting of Presidents. Those attending were: Douglas Dillon; David Rockefeller; Father Theodore Hesburgh, President of Notre Dame; Adolf Berle; Robert Nathan; George Harrar, President of the Rockefeller Foundation, and Andrew McClellan and Ernest Lee of the AFL/CIO. A number of other invitees were unable to come because of conflicting engagements or because the snow-storm interfered with their travel plans.

The group showed deep interest in the proposed Summit meeting. These are the highlights of the discussion:

The group endorsed the main points of the proposed U.S. position. Some emphasized one point, others another, but all agreed that we had identified the main topics for positive action and no new topics were suggested.

The group assumed that there would be some discussion of world problems and thought that this would be a useful way of increasing Latin America's sense of responsibility in world affairs.

There was considerable discussion about trade, notably whether the United States should move toward a preferential system for the Western

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-291  
By ing, NARA, Date 11-21-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Hemisphere or whether we should work for a global system as recommended by UNCTAD whereby all industrial nations would give limited trade preferences to all of the developing countries. The consensus was that the UNCTAD global system would be preferable, but several members of the group doubted that the Europeans would go along. Some thought that if we could not get the Europeans to join us in giving trade preferences to all developing countries, then we should give serious consideration to a Western Hemisphere preference system for the Latin Americans, including some (but not full) reciprocity on their side.

All members of the group favored increased emphasis on multi-national projects such as highways and telecommunications, as a means of facilitating integration. Everyone, taking the lead from Douglas Dillon on the basis of his experience at Punta del Este in 1961, recognized that the Latin Americans would expect a Summit meeting to result in a higher level of assistance from the United States. This poses a dilemma in view of the Vietnam war and Congressional attitudes concerning foreign aid in general.

Some members of the group thought that the pressures for a higher general level of assistance could be reduced by stressing trade and specific projects at the Summit. Others, however, thought that because of pressing needs in agriculture and education it was both necessary and desirable to make new commitments for expanded efforts in these fields. Father Hesburgh of Notre Dame made an especially eloquent statement on this matter, pointing out that only these elements of the program contain a direct political appeal to the masses of Latin Americans.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



11

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday, 10 February 1967  
10:35 PM

MR. PRESIDENT:

Mr. Rostow has been informed of this message  
and asks that I forward it and mark the in-  
dicated sentence.

White House Situation Room

*John G. Murry*  
Briefing Officer

~~TOP SECRET~~RECEIVED  
WHCA

1967 FEB 11 03 02

MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT

PMUK 002/11  
 02.50 ZULU FEBUARY 11, 1967,  
 FROM PRIME MINISTER  
 TO PRESIDENT  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
 T 28/67  
 —MESSAGE BEGINS

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority RAC 19576  
 By ms NARA, Date 1-15-98

I AM SORRY TO BOMBARD YOU WITH ALL THESE TELEGRAMS ABOUT THE KOSYGIN TALKS BUT 20 OR 30 HOURS OF CONSECUTIVE DISCUSSION HAS THROWN UP A GREAT DEAL OF SOVIET THINKING WHICH WE SHALL ALL WANT TO STUDY.

I HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY THE GREAT CONTRAST BETWEEN HIS PRIVATE UTTERANCES AND HIS PUBLIC SPEECHS AND THERE IS A WARNING HERE FOR THE KREMLINOLOGISTS EMPLOYED BY THE PRESS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES WHO WRITE SUCH LEARNED PIECES ON THE BASIS OF PUBLIC SPEECHES BY SOVIET LEADERS.

IN PUBLIC HE TOOK A HARD LINE ON VIETNAM AND ON ALL THE SINFUL ENORMITIES OF AMERICAN POLICY, AND A VERY GENTLE LINE OF DENUNCIATION ON CHINA. IN PRIVATE HE WAS LESS TOUGH ON VIETNAM, MORE SELECTIVE IN HIS CRITICISM OF AMERICA AND QUITE UNINHIBITED ABOUT CHINA. BUT ON GERMANY HE WAS PRETTY TOUGH BOTH IN PUBLIC AND IN PRIVATE.

THE BASIC FACT ABOUT THE WHOLE WEEK IS THAT KOSYGIN IS OBSESSIONAL ABOUT THE CHINESE PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH HE IS COOL, RESERVED AND GIVEN TO UNDERSTATEMENT I HAVE NEVER HEARD ANY STATESMAN TALK IN SUCH TERMS ABOUT ANOTHER COUNTRY. CHINA HAS GONE MAD. CHINA IS IN CHAOS. CHINA IS AN ORGANISED MILITARY DICTATORSHIP WITH NO IDEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES. CHINA'S AIM IS NOT ONLY TO ENSLAVE VIETNAM BUT ALSO THE WHOLE OF ASIA. THE TROUBLE WITH THE UNITED STATES IS THAT THEY HAVE NOT YET PERCEIVED THE FULL EXTENT OF THE CHINESE MENACE. THESE ARE ONLY A FEW SELECTIONS FROM THE TIRADES I HAVE HAD, ALWAYS IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION. I HAVE GIVEN DAVID AND CHET A FULLER ACCOUNT OF WHAT HE HAS SAID.

HE DESCRIBED TO ME THE STATE OF ECONOMIC WARFARE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA AND I HAVE GIVEN DAVID THESE DETAILS. HE GAVE ME A ROCKET BECAUSE WE SENT A COMPUTER TO CHINA. PERSONALLY I THINK THIS IS A BIT HARD

I GOT A ROCKET FROM YOU AND NOW FROM KOSYGIN ON THE SAME POINT. HE COMPLAINED OF THE FIRMS, PARTICULARLY IN JAPAN BUT ALSO IN GERMANY, ITALY AND LESS SERIOUSLY, AS YET, CANADA, WHO ARE SUPPLYING OR BEING ASKED TO SUPPLY, ELECTRONIC AND OTHER EQUIPMENT WHICH THE CHINESE WILL USE FOR THEIR NUCLEAR MILITARY DEVELOPMENT. HE INDICATED HE WAS PREPARING A BLACK LIST OF THESE FIRMS TO ENSURE THEY GOT NO SOVIET ORDERS. HIS PRESENT RESTRICTIONS ON GENERAL TRADE WITH CHINA ARE APPROACHING THE HIGHER FORMS OF ECONOMIC WARFARE. WHATEVER THE SUBJECT HE WAS TEMPTED TO COME BACK TO HIS CHINESE OBSESSION WITH PAVLOVIAN PREDICTABILITY. AND WITHOUT TEMPTATION FOR EXAMPLE IN A DINNERTIME CONVERSATION WITH MY WIFE HE WOULD SUDDENLY TURN TO ME AND SAY HE WANTED TO TELL ME ABOUT CHINA. AND HE DID FOR A HALF HOUR WITHOUT STOPPING. HE SAID THEY HAD STOPPED ALL HOUSE-BUILDING TO CONCENTRATE ON MILITARY DEVELOPMENT AND NO CHILD ABOVE THE FIFTH GRADE WAS RECEIVING ANY SCHOOLING IN ORDER TO TRAIN THEM IN MILITARY AND POLITICAL TECHNIQUES. ALL IN ALL I GATHER YOU ARE A DISAPPOINTMENT TO HIM IN YOUR FAILURE TO RECOGNISE THE EXTENT OF THE CHINESE MENACE. *Subject*

THE OTHER THING ABOUT WHICH I AM GLAD TO SAY HE WAS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR WAS HIS DESIRE THAT WE SHOULD MAINTAIN THE CLOSEST RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. IN MY FIRST TETE A TETE CONVERSATION ON MONDAY AFTERNOON IN THE VIETNAM CONTEXT, WHILE HE FIRST SAID I SHOULD NOT BE AFRAID OF THE UNITED STATES OR ACCEPT ANY MONOPOLY DICTATION, HE WAS CAREFUL TO ADD IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THAT HE DID NOT WANT US TO BREAK OR EVEN STRAIN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES TO WHICH HE OBVIOUSLY ATTACHED THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE. SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE WEEK HE WAS ANXIOUS TO KNOW THAT WE WERE IN TOUCH WITH THE UNITED STATES. I AM SURE THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW THAT CHET COOPER HAS BEEN HERE OR THAT I HAVE HAD REGULAR MEETINGS WITH HIM AND WITH DAVID. IF HE DID, I KNOW, I FEEL HE WOULD HAVE BEEN REASSURED BY THE FACT. MORE THAN ONCE HE HAS ANXIOUSLY ASKED WHETHER I WOULD BE ON THE TELEPHONE TO YOU, OBVIOUSLY HOPING THAT I SHOULD BE. IN THE VIETNAMESE CONTEXT HE WANTED TO BE SURE OF AMERICAN AUTHENTICITY OF ANY PROPOSALS THAT WE PUT TO HIM BUT IT WAS NOT ONLY ON THIS SUBJECT THAT HE WANTED TO BE ASSURED THAT OUR TRANSATLANTIC LINES WERE IN FULL WORKING ORDER.

MESSAGE ENDS

~~TOP SECRET~~

02.50 ZULU

PRESERVATION COPY



12

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday, 10 February, 1967  
10:05 PM

MR. PRESIDENT:

Mr. Rostow, having been informed of the substance of this, requested that we send it up immediately.

White House Situation Room

*John J. Murney*  
Briefing Officer

PMUK

RECEIVED  
WHCA

~~TOP SECRET~~

PMUK 001/11

MESSAGE DRAFTED FRIDAY (10TH) EVENING

PMUK 001/11

MESSAGE DRAFTED FRIDAY (10TH) EVENING BUT DESPATCHED

01.30 ZULU

FEBRUARY 11, 1967

FROM PRIME MINISTER

TO PRESIDENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

T. 27/67

MESSAGE BEGINS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 14577

By isa NARA, Date 1-27-98

YOU WILL HAVE BEEN KEPT IN CLOSE TOUCH THROUGH DAVID AND CHET COOPER WITH THE PROGRESS OF OUR TALKS WITH KOSYGIN. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT YESTERDAY, THURSDAY, IN A LONG PRIVATE SESSION WITH HIM I REJECTED THE PROPOSAL HE HAS BEEN URGING PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY THAT WE SHOULD JOIN WITH HIM IN THE COMMUNIQUE IN ASKING YOU TO STOP THE BOMBING UNCONDITIONALLY SO THAT THE DRV FOREIGN MINISTERS STATEMENT TO BURCHETT COULD BECOME EFFECTIVE. AS THINGS ARE AT PRESENT (AND THE FORMAL TALKS END TODAY) THE COMMUNIQUE MAY CONTAIN NO MORE THAN A FORMAL STATEMENT OF OUR DISAGREEMENT ON THE VIETNAM ISSUE.

YOU WILL KNOW THAT THE FOREIGN SECRETARY YESTERDAY HANDED A NOTE TO KOSYGIN TRYING TO PUSH THE RUSSIANS INTO ACTIVATION OF THE GENEVA MACHINERY BUT, UNLESS KOSYGIN STRONGLY REVERSES HIS POSITION, THIS WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED.

BUT KOSYGIN AND I IN OUR PRIVATE TALK YESTERDAY MORNING BOTH AGREED ABOUT THE EXTREME URGENCY OF THE PROBLEM, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE TET TIMING, AND IN A PRE-LUNCH TALK TODAY HE SHOWED HIMSELF A LITTLE MORE FORTHCOMING AND VERY FULLY SEIZED OF THE URGENCY. AT THIS MEETING I WAS ABLE TO TELL HIM THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD GO ALONG WITH EITHER THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S PROPOSAL MENTIONED IN MY PRECEDING PARAGRAPH OR YOUR EARLIER TWO-PHASE PROPOSAL. BUT KNOWING YOUR OWN PREFERENCES AS BETWEEN THESE TWO PROPOSALS, I MADE IT CLEAR TO HIM THAT THE FIRST WAS OUR OWN AND NOT YOURS: AND THAT YOU WERE VERY CONCERNED THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE SAID BY HIM TO HANOI WHICH IMPLIED THAT YOU WERE GOING BACK ON YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE SECRECY OF THE ASSURANCES YOU WOULD RECEIVE UNDER YOUR OWN TWO-PHASE PROPOSAL OR THAT YOU WERE TRYING TO IMPOSE SOME SORT OF PUBLIC POSITION ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHICH THEY MIGHT CONSTRUE AS AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE THEM LOSE FACE OR CAUSE THEM ANY OTHER EMBARRASSMENT. KOSYGIN TOOK THIS POINT VERY CLEARLY AND HE BIT MORE FIRMLY THAN HITHERTO ON THE TWO-PHASE PROPOSAL AS A WHOLE. AT HIS REQUEST I THEREFORE GAVE HIM THIS EVENING A FURTHER PIECE OF PAPER, SETTING OUT IN WRITING OUR UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR POSITION ON THE TWO PROPOSALS: AND I SUBSEQUENTLY

FROM QUICK COPY

SENT HIM THE REVISED VERSION WHICH WE RECEIVED FROM ROSTWO, INDICATING TO HIM THAT THIS WAS THE AUTHENTIC STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN POSITION ON THE TWO-PHASE PROPOSAL AND SHOULD BE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE VERSION I HAD GIVEN HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING. HE HAS PROMISED TO CONSULT HANOI URGENTLY. APART FROM A RECEPTION I AM ATTENDING AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY THIS EVENING (FRIDAY) 23 # WE SHALL NOT NOW BE MEETING AGAIN UNTIL EARLY SUNDAY EVENING. AND WE HAVE AGREED TO LOOK AT THE VIETNAMESE SITUATION AGAIN THEN IN THE LIGHT OF ANY RESPONSE FROM HANOI DURING THE INTERVAL AND AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF A TET TIMETABLE.

INCIDENTALLY, WHEN I TOLD KOSYGIN ABOUT THE TREMENDOUS BUILD UP IN WATER-BORNE TRAFFIC FROM NORTH VIETNAM DURING THE FIRST PART OF TET AND OF THE DIFFICULTIES WITH WHICH THIS WOULD CONFRONT YOU IN CONSIDERING EXTENDING THE BOMBING PAUSE, HE SHOWED DISTINCT SIGNS OF CONSTRUCTIVE INTEREST - THOUGH WHETHER HE WILL ACTUALLY DO ANYTHING WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ABOUT IT I CANNOT, OF COURSE, JUDGE.

IN THIS CONNECTION I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU SHOULD LET ME KNOW BEFORE SUNDAY EVENING OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MIGHT HAVE TAKEN PLACE, PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO THE FATE OF THE MESSAGE THAT YOU HAVE COMMUNICATED TO HANOI. KOSYGIN IS IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH HANOI AND WILL KNOW THE LATEST FORM BY SUNDAY. I SHALL BE IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION IF HE KNOWS MORE THAN I DO. YOU CAN RELY ON OUR CONTINUING IN ALL OUR DEALINGS WITH HIM TO STAND ABSOLUTELY FIRM ON THE LINES Laid OUT IN YOUR TELEGRAM TO ME AND REPEATEDLY STATED SINCE THEN BY ME TO KOSYGIN. THIS WILL REMAIN OUR POSITION EVEN IF, THIS MEANS RECORDING A TOTAL DISAGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE WITH ALL THAT THAT WILL MEAN FOR ME IN TERMS OF DOMESTIC POLITICS, WHICH I DON'T NEED TO DESCRIBE TO YOU. BUT ALTHOUGH THE POLITICAL POSITION HERE WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT - AND I KNOW EQUALLY THE TREMENDOUSLY DIFFICULT POSITION YOU ARE FACING WITH MANY PRESSURES OF A VERY DIFFERENT KIND - I AM STANDING BY THE LINE IN YOUR LAST MESSAGE TO ME, ABOVE ALL BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT IS RIGHT.

IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT THE NEXT 48 HOURS WILL BE CRUCIAL PARTICULARLY THE PERIOD FROM 5.00 PM TO MIDNIGHT GMT ON SUNDAY WHEN KOSYGIN IS WITH ME AT CHEQUERS. WE SHALL DO EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER TO GET A SETTLEMENT. BUT WANT YOU TO KNOW AND YOU CAN RELY ON THIS ABSOLUTELY, THAT DURING THAT PERIOD AS THROUGHOUT THIS PAST WEEK WE SHALL MAKE NO COMMITMENTS OR PROPOSALS AS TO THE TERMS OF SETTLEMENT FOR VIETNAM WHICH DO NOT SQUARE ONE HUNDRED PER CENT WITH WHAT WE KNOW TO BE YOUR POLICY. KOSYGIN KNOWS THAT. YOU CAN RELY ON IT, TOO.

I SHALL BE SENDING YOU ANOTHER MESSAGE ON SATURDAY ABOUT TWO DIFFERENT SUBJECTS WHICH HAVE COME UP IN OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE AND WHICH MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE COMMUNIQUE.

MESSAGE ENDS 01.45 ZULU

~~TOP SECRET~~



Friday, Feb. 10, 1967  
2:30 p.m.

~~TOP SECRET - SUNFLOWER~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here are some of the questions we ought to answer in our own minds before we flash London, where a response is necessary by about 3:30 p.m., even though we do not have to decide all of them now or inform London now.

1. How do we assure ourselves that infiltration has stopped?  
(the exact language of your letter to Ho is: "I am assured.")

Possible answer: We stand down our bombing in the short run when we have Ho's word backed by the UK/USSR. We do not move to the next step, however -- "stop augmenting our forces" -- until unilateral U.S. military surveillance and Westy's judgment tell us infiltration has, in fact, stopped. In the longer run, we shall need our own unilateral surveillance, plus third country forces, to make this guarantee stick; for example, ICC countries, third country Asians, possibly even UK/USSR.

2. How many days before we stop augmenting our forces? What relation of that interval to our "assurance" infiltration has stopped? As indicated, we do not stop augmenting our forces until Westy tells us infiltration has stopped. (FYI. It was for this reason that I wanted the letter to Ho to contain the phrase "I am assured." You have a right to say when you are assured.)

3. What is Hanoi's choice of a channel for subsequent negotiation? Or do we have, if this deal goes through, merely a more limited war inside South Vietnam?

Obviously we must try to move as fast as possible towards negotiations to end the war inside South Vietnam.

4. If we negotiate bilaterally with Hanoi, how do we engage Saigon and NLF in military/political negotiations to end the fighting within South Vietnam?

This is a question of our persuading Ky to put himself into that posture and Hanoi persuading the NLF to respond. This is extremely delicate because Ky will have to know precisely how steady we are in all this:

-- how tough we are going to be on guaranteeing that infiltration has stopped before we stop augmenting our forces;

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By ing, NARA, Date 12-2-93



-- how firm we are going to be in interpreting the Manila pledge for troop withdrawals against withdrawals of North Vietnamese forces to the North;

-- above all, that we shall be firm in insisting on carrying through an orderly constitutional process on a one-man one-vote basis ~~and in sending the NLF~~ into the Government in Saigon.

*and not bringing forcing*

5. What do we say when bombing stops or we do not resume bombing at the end of Tet?

We shall have to make clear that we can only hold a "cat's got our tongue" position for a relatively few days. The first explanation that bombing has stopped should be a straight military announcement by our military authorities in Saigon that their evidence indicates infiltration has stopped. This would remove from Hanoi the necessity publicly to announce that infiltration has stopped.

6. Now the urgent gut question: Do we extend the Tet truce? Part of the Tet truce? The fact is we must send a cable to Westy and Ky not later than 10:00 a.m. tomorrow morning. We cannot expect a response from Hanoi to the British until the hoped for Kosygin message for a day or so at least. Unless Hanoi or the NLF get in touch with Ky very promptly, and respond to his initiative, I would recommend that we resume the war in the South but continue to hold down the bombing of the North for a few days, with this possible exception: the bombing of the supplies and forces just North of the DMZ if there are any really ominous movements. The reason for this suggestion is that it will provide some security cover for the negotiation -- we could allegedly hold the planes down for weather reasons -- and we ought not to let the forces in the South sit still until we are clear that a negotiation to move towards peace is envisaged between ourselves and Hanoi on the one hand, and Saigon and the NLF on the other. Whatever we decide between now and 10:00 a.m. tomorrow, we must have Wilsons tell Kosygin so that there can be no misunderstanding and no claim that we "blew a chance for peace."

7. Do we permit Lodge to inform Ky? Who else should be informed if we respond positively on this message to London? If we give Wilson the assent to put in this piece of paper, I am confident that we are duty bound to inform Ky immediately. More than that, I think it necessary to give him a quite full picture of the track we envisage. It would not be very difficult to panic the government and the Constituent Assembly, which would be true disaster. From the moment we send that message, we must treat them as partners in this difficult venture of ending the war. It is also

perfectly clear that Westy must know what we are up to. As for Holt, Park, etc., we could possibly wait until we have Hanoi's response.

8. Should not the two Co-Chairmen reaffirm their support of the General Accords of 1954 and 1962 and their responsibility for assuring that they will now be implemented? Should that assurance be public? Private?

Since what is envisaged here is something the two Co-Chairmen might, if they agree, send to Hanoi and Washington as an understanding, urging its acceptance, the issue of reassurance on the Geneva Accords can be separated. It is, however, our interest that publicly, or privately, (or both) this reaffirmation be one result of the London meeting of Kosygin and Wilson.

W. W. R.



Friday, February 10, 1967  
5:50 p. m.

14/  
*Sunflower*  
*Top Secret*

Mr. President:

Herewith the message as  
despatched.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 2-8-91

SUNFLOWER

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

~~TOP SECRET~~

NEJ 91-294

February 10, 1967

By ing, NARA, Date 12-2-93

Please pass literally eyes only Amb. Bruce and Mr. Cooper.

To meet 10:30 a.m. signal to Kosygin we are requesting courtesy of this irregular means of transmission. Formulation as cleared here at highest level and comments follow:

A) The United States will order a cessation of bombing of North Vietnam as soon as they are assured that infiltration from North Vietnam to South Vietnam has stopped. This assurance can be communicated in secret if North Vietnam so wishes.

B) Within a few days (with <sup>the</sup> a period to be agreed with the two sides before the bombing stops) the United States will stop further augmenting their force in South Vietnam. The cessation of bombing of North Vietnam is an action which will be immediately apparent. This requires that the stoppage of infiltration become public very quickly thereafter. If Hanoi is unwilling to announce the stoppage of infiltration, the United States must do so at the time it stops augmentation of U.S. forces. In that case, Hanoi must not deny it.

C) Any assurances from Hanoi can reach the United States direct, or through Soviet channels, or through the Soviet and British Governments. This is for North Vietnam to decide.

COMMENTS FOR WILSON:

You should be clear that the stoppage of augmentation by us would still permit the rotation of United States forces and their continued supply. Augmentation means no net increase. Stoppage of infiltration, however,

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

means that men and arms cannot move from North Vietnam into South Vietnam.

The phraseology of paragraph A above is to prevent the sudden movement of two or three divisions across the 17th parallel during the "few days" referred to in paragraph B.

It is very important that this arrangement in Vietnam not be translated into a communist seizure of Laos. The two Co-chairmen should agree between themselves that both will make a maximum effort in support of the 1954 and 1962 accords.

Assurance about infiltration ought to lead to prompt measures by the ICC, either as a Commission or as governments, to provide assurances to all concerned that these arrangements are being carried out. This should mean ICC observers in the DMZ and in whatever places in Laos may be required to keep the Ho Chi Minh trail under surveillance. Unless we receive immediate word from Hanoi that the above arrangements are in effect, it will be necessary for us to resume military action against North Viet Nam forces in and north of the Demilitarized Zone and resupply operations to those forces by land and sea. We do not expect to resume bombing against the Northern portions of North Viet Nam prior to Mr. Kosygin's departure from Britain. We are entirely serious about main proposals but see no reason why Tet should be extended, at substantial military risk, while further exchanges proceed. We still have nothing from Hanoi.

~~TOP SECRET~~



Friday, February 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Louis Heren, London Times, telephoned on Feb 9, and said their political correspondent understood that Kosygin said he would agree to reconvening the Geneva conference if the U. S. stopped bombing. He asked if that were true. I told him the simple answer was no. I then went on -- on an absolutely non-attributable basis -- background only -- and said that Kosygin's speech contained an ambiguous statement about other nations helping to bring peace; but there is doubt he wishes to convene the Geneva conference because that would bring the Chinese Communists in. I also called Heren's attention to Sec. Rusk's press conference statement.

Marianne Means came in on Feb 9 to talk about the situation in Communist China. I referred her, in the first instance, to Al Jenkins, our China watcher.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-20  
By is, NARA Date 10-25-97

~~SECRET~~

February 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Second Talk with King Hassan--Talking Points

We don't know exactly why King Hassan asked for a second talk with you. It's partly his desire to make the most of his visit. He may also feel he didn't make his points on security as clearly as he might have yesterday and may try to get a more precise commitment. He had a good talk with Secretary Rusk this morning, and we're not aware of any unresolved issues. I suggest the following talking points:

1. You understand he had a good talk with Secretary Rusk this morning. You appreciate his assurances on Cuban shipping. (He met our Findley requirements in principle but asked us to help him find a market for the phosphates which he now barter for Cuban sugar.)
2. You were pleased with your talk yesterday.
  - a. You were glad to see that economic development is uppermost in his mind and were struck by the spirit of his offer to contribute to African regional development. We'll continue to help as we can.
  - b. You understand his concerns over security and dedication to settling disputes with his neighbors peacefully. We're his friends.
  - c. You also appreciate his assurances that we can stay on at our telecommunications stations.
  - d. You're pleased the cultural exchange agreement has been signed.
3. You'd be happy to hear anything else on his mind.
4. If he presses for a clearer security guarantee from us, I suggest you (a) explain why any firm commitment is impossible but (b) assure him that you would be deeply concerned by any attack on Morocco.
5. If he presses for a communique, I'd try to sidestep by saying we don't usually have one in a working visit of this kind between close friends. But if you have to give way, you might offer to have George Christian cover mutually agreed points at his briefing tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~



17

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NEJ 91-294**  
**By ing, NARA, Date 12-2-93**

~~SECRET~~

Friday - February 10, 1967

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Your 6:00 p.m. Appointment with Secretary Rusk on  
OAS Summit Preparations**

Secretary Rusk wishes to discuss what he should say about the Summit meeting at Buenos Aires in view of the wide inter-agency disagreement on what our part of the Summit deal should be.

**The Summit Deal**

We are asking the Latin Americans to:

- take the plunge on economic integration;
- modernize their agricultural and educational systems;
- forego expensive military equipment.

These steps involve tough political decisions. What we are prepared to do to help is critical to their willingness to take the decisions. The success of the Summit hinges on this interplay.

Line Gordon and Sol Linowitz have recommended this package as our part of the deal:

1. Express willingness to ask Congress for up to \$300 million for Latin American integration adjustment assistance, to be contributed over a period of years and on a matching basis after the Latin American Common Market treaty is negotiated.
2. Approve asking Congress in this session for an authorization and appropriation in FY 1968 of \$300 million for replenishment of the Inter-American Development Bank Fund for Special Operations, i.e., \$50 million more than you have already approved for authorizing legislation for FY 1968.

~~SECRET~~



3. Indicate an intention to ask Congress to increase our Alliance for Progress assistance for education and agriculture by \$100 million in FY 1968 (it is already in the budget) and an average of \$200 million for the following four years, dependent on demonstrated need and adequate self help.
4. Consider modifying tying arrangements for our capital project loans (but not program loans) to permit hemisphere-wide procurement after the Latin Americans negotiate a Common Market Treaty. This would shift the tying from the present individual country basis to a regional basis. The balance of payments effects would not be appreciable.

A table on how the costs of this package would be spread out over the next five years is at Tab A.

#### Views of Other Agencies

Treasury - Joe Fowler opposes Recommendation 1 and 4 of the package. I don't believe he is sympathetic toward economic integration. He feels that if integration adjustment assistance is necessary, the Inter-American Bank should handle it, and by increasing our contribution (as per Recommendation 2 ) we would meet our responsibilities. On Recommendation 4, he agrees that the balance of payments effect will probably be small, but he fears adverse psychological effects on our balance of payments posture.

AID - Bill Gaud is strongly opposed to Recommendation 3. He fears that an increase of this dimension in the Alliance will most likely result in the Congress granting it at the expense of other areas.

BOB - Charlie Schultze prefers not to mention a specific amount for integration adjustment assistance in Recommendation 1. On paragraph 2, he favors seeking authorization only in this session, leaving the issue of whether to seek a supplemental appropriation this year or next January to be decided later.



My Views and Recommendation

Latin America stands at a crossroads. Over the next few years population increase, growing urban unemployment and agricultural backwardness could, at present rates of modest growth, lead to new social crises and political extremism. If the Latin American Presidents are willing to establish a Common Market and make a major effort to boost agriculture and improve education, the region during the 1970's could attain a level of "take-off" for self-sustained growth which would promote social and political stability and decrease dependence on US public financing.

The issue boils down to whether you wish to exploit this historic moment to get the Latin Americans to move boldly on integration, and thereby put your stamp on it, or whether you prefer to let nature take its course. The pressure of events can be expected to move the Latins gradually toward integration over the next 15-20 years. And we can take our chances on the present rate of growth under the Alliance keeping the hemisphere a step ahead of social and political troubles.

I favor the Gordon-Linowitz package because:

- I believe you should take advantage of the historic moment.
- If we make our part of the deal any less, I doubt whether the Latins will be willing to make the commitments we want.
- The package is so structured that financial commitments on integration and the untying of aid will not come into play for another 18-24 months after the Latins have negotiated their Common Market Treaty.
- The FY 1968 budget already provides for the \$100 million for agriculture and education for the coming fiscal year. By the time FY 1969 rolls around, the Vietnam situation hopefully will not represent the current drain and permit a further modest increase in the Alliance for Progress assistance.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By CG, NARA, Date 10-21-98

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By inf, NARA, Date 12-2-93

Table of Summit Package Costs

	Fiscal Years ( In \$ Millions)					
	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>On-going AID levels</u>	600	600	600	600	600	\$3,000
<u>Increase of AID</u> appropriations, to be used for education and agriculture pro- grams	<u>100</u>	<u>200</u>	( <u>200</u>	Average <u>200</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>\$ 900</u>
<u>On-going US contributions</u> to IDB-FSO	250	250	250			\$ 750
<u>Increase of US contribu-</u> tions to the IDB-FSO, for multinational projects	<u>50</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>50</u>			<u>\$ 150</u>
<u>Total on-going AID</u> and US contributions to FSO						\$3,750
<u>Total increase</u> to on-going programs						<u>\$1,050</u>
<u>Additional resources</u> for integration adjust- ment assistance contin- gent on signing of Common Market Treaty						(\$ 300).

~~SECRET~~



18  
✓  
1. ~~Seaborg~~  
2. ~~Briggs~~

February 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agreement with the Government of the Republic of Colombia  
Concerning Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy

The Atomic Energy Commission, with the concurrence of the Department of State, recommends that you approve an Amendment to the existing Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Colombia concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy. The proposed Amendment would extend the Agreement, which expires on March 28, 1967, for ten years.

The changes in the language in the proposed Amendment are basically designed to reflect new policies incorporated in recent agreements or as a result of legislation enacted since the signing of the old agreement. They are designed to extend to Colombia the benefits already included in other research-type agreements with other countries. In addition, there are changes intended to improve and reformulate language to conform with current usage. There is a further change meant to delete the obsolete requirement that Colombia retain title to enriched uranium until private users in the United States are permitted to acquire title to such material.

The new Agreement also provides that the International Atomic Energy Agency will be promptly requested to assume responsibility for applying safeguards to materials and facilities subject to safeguards under the Agreement.

I recommend that you approve this proposed Amendment. If you agree, there is presented herewith a letter to Dr. Seaborg for your signature.

If you sign the letter, the proposed Amendment will be formally executed by appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Colombia. In compliance with Section 123c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Amendment will then be placed before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

\_\_\_ Approved

\_\_\_ Disapproved

\_\_\_ See me

W. W. Rostow

February 10, 1967


Dear Dr. Seaborg:

In accordance with Section 123a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to me by letter dated February 6, 1967, a proposed Amendment to the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Colombia Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy and has recommended that I approve the proposed Amendment, determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution.

Pursuant to the provisions of 123b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and upon the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission, I hereby:


- (a) approve the proposed amendment and determine that the performance of the Agreement, as amended, will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States of America;
- (b) authorize the execution of the proposed amendment on behalf of the Government of the United States of America by appropriate authorities of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,



The Honorable  
Glenn T. Seaborg  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington

LBJ:CEJ:Feg



462  
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UNITED STATES  
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

FEB 6 1967

Dear Mr. President:

The Atomic Energy Commission recommends that you approve the enclosed proposed amendment to the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Colombia Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution. The Department of State supports the Commission's recommendation.

The proposed amendment which has been negotiated by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, would revise and extend the Agreement for Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Colombia which was signed at Washington on April 9, 1962, and which expires on March 28, 1967.

The proposed amendment would extend the Agreement for ten years, through March 28, 1977. In accordance with the policy of the United States, Article VII of the amendment provides that the International Atomic Energy Agency will promptly be requested to assume responsibility for applying safeguards to materials and facilities subject to safeguards under the Agreement for Cooperation. This Article envisages suspension of bilateral safeguards during the time when Agency safeguards are in effect.

In addition to editorial modifications and deletion of the obsolete requirement that Colombia retain title to enriched uranium until private users in the United States are permitted to acquire title to such material, the proposed amendment contains the provisions discussed below. These provisions are designed basically to reflect new policies or to extend to Colombia benefits already included in other research-type Agreements for Cooperation, as well as to improve and reformulate language to conform with current usage.


- (a) In lieu of relying on cross-references to an internal law of the United States, namely the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, Article I of the amendment would incorporate definitions for terms listed in, but currently defined only by reference in the present formulation of, Article I of the Agreement.



- (b) Proposed Article II updates and expands the formulation of language specifying types of information which may be exchanged. Information could be exchanged on health and safety related to all the areas of information specified in Article II, Paragraph A, of the Agreement rather than just to research reactors, materials testing reactors, and reactor experiments, as is presently the case.
- (c) As in several recent amendments to other Agreements for Cooperation, for example those with Turkey, Austria, the Philippines, China, and Israel, Article IV would permit the transfer of uranium enriched to more than 20% in U-235 when there is a technical or economic justification for such a transfer for use in fueling research reactors, materials testing reactors, and reactor experiments.
- (d) Article VI would reflect the "Private Ownership" legislation of 1964, by permitting arrangements for the transfer of special nuclear material to be made between either Party or authorized persons under its jurisdiction and authorized persons under the jurisdiction of the other Party. Such arrangements would be in addition to the government-to-government transactions currently allowed and would be subject to applicable laws, regulations, policies, and license requirements of Colombia and the United States.

Following your approval, determination, and authorization, the proposed amendment will be formally executed by appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Colombia. In compliance with Section 123c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the amendment will then be placed before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Respectfully yours,



Chairman

The President  
The White House

Enclosure:

Proposed Amendment to Agreement for Cooperation  
between the Government of the United States of  
America and the Government of the Republic of  
Colombia

1/2

DRAFT LETTER FOR POSSIBLE USE BY THE  
PRESIDENT IN RESPONDING TO  
DR. GLENN T. SEABORG

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

In accordance with Section 123a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to me by letter dated \_\_\_\_\_, 1966, a proposed amendment to the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Colombia Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy and has recommended that I approve the proposed amendment, determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution.

Pursuant to the provisions of 123b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and upon the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission, I hereby:

- (a) approve the proposed amendment and determine that the performance of the Agreement, as amended, will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States of America;

(b) authorize the execution of the proposed amendment on behalf of the Government of the United States of America by appropriate authorities of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,

The Honorable  
Glenn T. Seaborg  
Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington



~~SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

Friday, February 10, 1967 -- 10:40 am

Mr. President:

Herewith Max Taylor's administrative recommendations should Gen. Westmoreland be made Ambassador in Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 2-8-91

~~SECRET~~  
Eyes Only

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# INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

400 Army-Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202, Telephone (703) 558-1000



Maxwell D. Taylor, President

6 February 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-294

By ing, NARA, Date 12-2-93

Dear Mr. President:

At your Tuesday luncheon last week, you invited me to consider alternative ways to make General Westmoreland Ambassador to Viet-Nam in succession to Cabot Lodge. I have done so and the following are my conclusions.

The advantages of selecting Westmoreland arise from his personal attributes of leadership; his deep experience in the intricate problems of Viet-Nam, both civil and military; his immediate availability; and the opportunity which his appointment offers to put all U.S. resources under the effective direction of a single official. Likewise, there would be the advantage of improved leverage on the Vietnamese military which Westmoreland with his military prestige and added authority as Ambassador could exert in influencing the trend of the important political events which lie ahead.

On the negative side of the balance sheet, I can see at least two possible items--the opportunity afforded the critics to charge that the military have taken over to the detriment of our non-military objectives and the difficulty which Westmoreland may have in keeping out of the direct conduct of the war and shifting his interests and talents to the broader field of the direction of all U.S. activities. But in the absence of a very outstanding civilian candidate for Ambassador, I feel that in the selection of Westmoreland, the pros outweigh the cons by a substantial margin.

If this conclusion is accepted, it then becomes a question of how to readjust the top echelons of the U.S. organization in Viet-Nam to such a decision. I feel that in making such changes, the following points should be taken into account:

a. To unify responsibility for the total U.S. effort, Westmoreland should be concurrently Ambassador and Commander-in-Chief of all U.S. military forces in South Viet-Nam. As Ambassador, he would report to the President through the Secretary of State and as Commander-in-Chief, through CINCPAC, the JCS and the Secretary of Defense.

b. Westmoreland will need three able assistants, an Army 4-star general to exercise direct command over the U.S. military effort, a civilian of Ambassadorial rank to run the U.S. civil field activities, now incorporated in the new Office of Civil Operations, and a senior State Department official to run the U.S. Mission in the usual manner of a Deputy Chief of Mission.

~~SECRET~~  
Eyes Only

~~SECRET~~  
Eyes Only

-2-

With regard to the conduct of civil field activities, I would be inclined to keep them for the time being separate from the military channel of command under the Office of Civil Operations. If after several months it becomes clear that this arrangement is not sufficiently cohesive, then it may be desirable to integrate the U.S. military and civil structures to provide a single channel of direction and resources leading from Saigon to U.S. agencies and activities in the field.

Hoping that these comments may be of some use in resolving this important question,

Sincerely,

  
Maxwell D. Taylor

President Lyndon B. Johnson  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~  
Eyes Only



~~1-2~~  
Pres file

Friday, February 10, 1967  
10:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

This is how Glenn Seaborg and Nick  
propose to announce the postponement of  
CABRIOLET. It is essentially an honest  
statement. I support it.

W. W. Rostow

Approved           

Disapproved           

See me           

WWRostow:rlh

**OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

att to 4 61

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**ANNOUNCEMENT ON CABRIOLET DEFERRAL**

The nuclear excavation experiment, Cabriolet, is being temporarily postponed in order to avoid any possibility of complicating the current discussions concerning a Nonproliferation Treaty or the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which include consideration of provisions for peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.

In the weeks ahead, we shall be considering the relations between the peaceful and constructive uses of atomic energy and the issues raised in these discussions.

The experiment, part of the AEC's Plowshare program, involves a nuclear explosion 170 feet underground at the Commission's Nevada Test Site. The explosion would release about 2.5 kilotons of energy (equivalent to 2,500 tons of TNT), creating a crater about 115 to 145 feet deep, and 425 to 460 feet in diameter.

**OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

*sup*

Thursday, February 9, 1967 -- 5:20 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Courtesy Call on You by CENTO Secretary General  
Dr. Abbas Ali Khalatbary

State recommends you receive Dr. Khalatbary for a brief courtesy call during his annual official visit to Washington, March 10-17.

Receiving him would emphasize to Iran, Pakistan and Turkey continued U.S. support for the CENTO alliance. The Shah would also be pleased that you received one of his high officials.

If you approve, we'll bring it to Marv's attention nearer the time of his visit.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓ *Very reluctantly*

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_



February 9, 1967

Mr. President:

The State Department has received messages of condolence on the death of the astronauts from Chiefs of State, Heads of Government, and Ministers of Foreign Affairs from all over the world. It is assembling a set of these messages for Mmes. Grissom, White and Chaffee and suggests that you may wish to transmit the set of messages to each lady by a personal letter that would be included inside the cover of each book. Attached are draft letters for your signature if you agree to this procedure.

I recommend that you approve this recommendation. If you concur, I will request the State Department to proceed accordingly.

☒ Approved

W. W. Rostow

☐ Disapproved

☐ See me

to P 22a  
2/10

FEB 1 0 1967

Dear Mrs. Grissom:

The tragic death of your husband has been felt the world around.

The depth and breadth of these feelings are eloquently portrayed by the host of messages which this Government has received from abroad.

I want you to have copies of these messages in the hope that they will bring comfort and solace to you and your children today and in the future.

Sincerely,

LBJ

Mrs. Betty Grissom  
211 Pine Shadow Drive  
Seabrook, Texas

LBJ:CEJ:feg

FEB 10 1967

Dear Mrs. Chaffee:

The tragic death of your husband has been felt the world around.

The depth and breadth of these feelings are eloquently portrayed by the host of messages which this Government has received from abroad.

I want you to have copies of these messages in the hope that they will bring comfort and solace to you and your children today and in the future.

Sincerely,

LBJ

Mrs. Martha Chaffee  
18515 Barbuda Lane  
Nassau Bay  
Houston, Texas

LBJ:CEJ:feg



FEB 10 1967

Dear Mrs. White:

The tragic death of your husband has been felt the world around.

The depth and breadth of these feelings are eloquently portrayed by the host of messages which this Government has received from abroad.

I want you to have copies of these messages in the hope that they will bring comfort and solace to you and your children today and in the future.

Sincerely,

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Mrs. Patricia White  
911 Woodland Drive  
El Lago  
Seabrook, Texas

LBJ:CEJ:feg

February 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bushfire Disaster in Australia

You are aware of the bushfires that have caused loss of life and serious property damage in Tasmania. The Australian Government regards this as a major disaster. Ambassador Clark has sent a message of sympathy to the Tasmanian Government and recommends similar message from you to Prime Minister Holt. A suggested text is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

SUGGESTED TEXT

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have been saddened to hear of the tragic loss of life and property in Tasmania resulting from the disastrous bushfires raging there. I speak for all Americans when I express to you our profound sympathy for the people of Tasmania and all Australians who have suffered as a result of this misfortune.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

The Right Honorable  
Harold E. Holt  
Prime Minister of Australia  
Canberra



20  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Thursday, February 9, 1967  
7:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a report from  
Sec. Freeman on aspects of the Food  
for Freedom program. I have marked  
the key items.

*W. A. R.* Rostow

242



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1967

Personal and Confidential

MEMORANDUM

To: The President  
The White House

From: Orville L. Freeman *OLF*  
Secretary of Agriculture

Subject: International Food and Agriculture

I'm pleased to report that in my judgment we are proceeding satisfactorily to establish the machinery to implement the policies you set out in the Food for Freedom Program:

1. The Department of Agriculture, including the Land-Grant Colleges, is cooperating very closely with AID in the development of economic plans for the respective recipient countries making certain that the agriculture component is adequate and sound. It will take some time to work all the bugs out of this procedure which is one of internal mutual cooperation, but progress is encouraging.

This procedure makes it possible to call on a wide diversity of professional and technical know-how in the USDA and in the Land-Grant Colleges to help develop these plans and to resolve difficult questions of priorities.

2. The participating agency service agreement (PASA) program is proceeding well. You will recall that under PASA agreements AID contracts with the Department of Agriculture to take responsibility for a specific project or, as in the case of Vietnam, to recruit and generally supervise agricultural generalists. AID finances the USDA or Land-Grant College team.

Here again access to additional professional, scientific, and technical personnel is accomplished. With the USDA and the Land-Grant Colleges in the mainstream of the action, more professional and skilled people can be recruited and very much improved backstopping for them is available. We have been working at this now for some time, and again it has its complications but I believe in the overall, satisfactory progress is being made.

3. The Executive Order under which the new P.L. 480 will be administered has been drafted and after some pulling and tugging accepted by State, AID, and the USDA. This new pattern of cooperation will

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.3

Authority Dept. of Agriculture Cor 10/28/62

By rg, NARA, Date 3-26-91

## 2--The President

hopefully carry forward with increasing efficiency the policies which you set down in the Food for Freedom Program. There is a new awareness and sensitivity to the importance of agriculture in the developing countries.

4. For a number of years now various Prime Ministers, Agricultural Ministers, and our Ambassadors in various sections of Africa have urged that I personally visit Africa and review first-hand agricultural progress and needs. Schedule pressures heretofore have made that impossible. Priorities have been such that the limited travel time I could squeeze into my schedule went to Latin America and Asia. I find increasingly, however, more and more questions involving African agriculture coming to my desk. It would be very useful in dealing with some of these questions, particularly in making value judgments that are often both economic and political in nature, if I had had some direct exposure to that Continent. Accordingly, I am tentatively planning some time this spring or early summer when I have completed my testimony before the Congress and have delivered the six major addresses which are now in process outlining the Departmental goals to make a tour of key African countries. Such a swing would take two to three weeks. I would plan to take half a dozen of the professional and scientific people from the Department with me who have business in these countries. They will be able to further their mission and to help broaden my own horizons. If I can afford it, I hope to take Jane with me. Tentatively we would fly commercially to Africa and hope that we could arrange for some kind of government transport while there so we could handle a heavy schedule.

Any such plans must of course be subject to the domestic problems here and developments in Congress. I have no major legislation other than REA this session of Congress and expect to be in good shape by the middle of March.

Subject to unforeseen contingencies I hope you will take under consideration authorizing such a trip. I will report to you later as to the dates when I think it would be most timely.



25

Pres file

Thursday, February 9, 1967 -- 5:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

My JCS liaison, Colonel Bob Ginsburgh -- who is a thoughtful Ph.D. and not a "hawk" like me -- reports that Pentagon morale, as well as his, "was greatly boosted" by Sec. Rusk's press conference and your policy at this moment. I daresay the same can be guaranteed for our men in the field when word gets through.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Thursday, February 9, 1967  
2:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a re-draft on the  
peace theme, for your toast at dinner  
tonight.

W. W. Rostow

Toast for King Hassan of Morocco  
Dinner, Thursday February 9, 1967  
Words: 615

draft  
as of 2:45  
2/9/67

Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:

His Majesty, King Hassan, and I are continuing a very old tradition.

Our talks today are an echo of handwritten messages carried between  
our countries by sailing ships in the early days of American independence.

Morocco is among America's oldest friends, one of the first to  
recognize us as a free nation. The messages of George Washington,  
and His Majesty's illustrious ancestor, Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Abdallah  
(SEEDY MOHAMMED BEN ABDALLA), are treasured in our national Archives.

So our meeting is a modern expression of an ancient friendship.

It is also proof of our determination to stand as partners before the great  
tests of our time.

One of them is the widening gap between population and food supply.

The United States has proposed that all nations unite in a worldwide war  
on hunger. From our talks today, I am more confident than ever that  
our friends in Morocco are committed to that struggle.



But, as I said this morning, our ultimate task is to create among the nations of the world a community at peace. I often read and re-read Article I of the United Nations Charter.

I believe all of us -- especially those too young to know how the world felt in 1945 -- should come to know it line by line. Its principles -- one by one -- govern the actions of American foreign policy from day to day:

-- "collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace";

-- collective measures for "the suppression of acts of aggression";

-- "adjustment or settlement of international disputes by peaceful means";

-- the development of "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples";

-- "international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting

and encouraging respect for human rights ... without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."

Those words were written twenty-two years ago, but, I remind the world, they are our foreign policy tonight. And these words now have a special meaning, because we have lived by them. Since 1945 we have seen many threats to the peace and faced them down. In those years Americans have taken more than 200,000 casualties in collective measures to suppress acts of aggression. All of us, working together at different times and places, have made sure that aggression did not succeed.

We have not yet created the world at peace under law which was the objective in 1945 and is the objective still tonight. But we have made sure that the first rule of such a world was observed: aggression has not succeeded.

Meanwhile, behind that protection, we have made much progress in the

development of friendly relations among nations; and, above all, in international cooperation for the welfare of man.

In Western Europe; in Latin America; in Africa; in Asia -- cooperation in economic and social progress no longer is a matter of rhetoric. It is a fact.

And I tell you tonight that, looking ahead -- despite the terrible burden of war in Southeast Asia -- I am confident that we shall make more progress in the next generation in fulfilling the purposes stated in Article I of the United Nations Charter than we did in the last generation.

I know I speak for all / of us here, and all our countrymen, in expressing to His Majesty best wishes for a long life and good health. And, for our two countries, the wisdom and the strength to continue along the paths of peace and progress we have reaffirmed today.

Ladies and Gentlemen, His Majesty, the King.

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Thurs., F . 9, 1967  
7:45 p. m.

27

MR. PRESIDENT:

I propose to answer my friend Michael  
Palliser as follows:

Grateful for explanation. The rule  
here -- which Secretary Rusk followed  
today and I followed earlier -- was  
no substantive comment on any single  
channel. It was "two-way misunderstand-  
ing " that was damaging and with which  
we shall have to deal sometime.

For "interesting and delicate"  
I accept full opprobrium.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment



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1967 FEB 9 22 45

~~SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL

FOR WALT ROSTOW

FROM MICHAEL PALLISER

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 19231  
By is NARA, Date 1-22-98

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE. OF COURSE I UNDERSTAND THE SPIRIT IN WHICH YOU SENT IT. BUT I MUST MAKE CLEAR THE BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER WAS SPEAKING.

THE FIRST THING YOU SHOULD KNOW IS WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER ACTUALLY SAID. HE WAS ANSWERING A SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTION (IE OFF THE CUFF) WHICH REFERRED TO SOME TENTATIVE PRESS REPORTS THAT HANOI WAS WILLING TO START NEGOTIATIONS BUT CALLED THEM OFF WHEN THE AMERICANS STARTED BOMBING AGAIN LAST DECEMBER. HIS REPLY TO THIS WAS AS FOLLOWS,

I DO NOT THINK THAT DURING THIS WEEK IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO COMMENT ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT POINTS ABOUT VIETNAM, BQT, AS MY HON FRIEND HAS REFERRED TO THE DISCUSSIONS IN DECEMBER, OF WHICH I HAVE ALL THE DETAILS, PERHAPS I MIGHT TELL HIM IT IS MY VIEW THAT WHAT HAPPENED THEN WAS BASED ON A VERY CONSIDERABLE TWO-WAY MISUNDERSTANDING, AND THAT IS WHY I THINK CERTAIN EVENTS IN DECEMBER OCCURRED. IF MY HON FRIEND IS REFERRING TO THE POLISH DISCUSSIONS IN ANYTHING THAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE THEN, I DO NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL FOR ME TO OFFER COMMENTS THIS AFTERNOON.

THE BACKGROUND IS AS FOLLOWS. THE TENTATIVE PRESS REPORTS MENTIONED IN THE SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTION WERE ANYTHING BUT THAT. SEVERAL OF THE MAJOR BRITISH SUNDAY PAPERS (SEE ESPECIALLY SUNDAY TELEGRAPH OF FEBRUARY 5) HAD SPLASHED CONFIRMATION BY YOURSELF THAT, DESPITE THE PRESIDENTS ASSERTION THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SERIOUS INDICATIONS FROM HANOI THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WANTED TO TALK PEACE, BEHIND THE SCENES MOVES TOWARDS GETTING NEGOTIATIONS STARTED WERE DEFINITELY UNDER WAY. YOU WERE SPECIFICALLY QUOTED AS SAYING THAT AN EXTREMELY INTERESTING AND DELICATE PHASE IN DIPLOMATIC PROBING HAD OPENED IN AN EFFORT TO FIND OUT WHETHER THE COMMUNISTS WERE REALLY INTERESTED IN CEASE-FIRE TALKS. THE PRESS REPORTS NATURALLY COUPLED THIS WITH A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE WASHINGTON POST DISCLOSURES ABOUT THE LEWANDOWSKI TALKS.

I AM BOUND TO TELL YOU WITH THE SAME FRANKNESS AS YOU USED WITH ME - AND WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, I WELCOME BECAUSE IT IS THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH WE CAN EFFECTIVELY OPERATE - THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD REGARD WITH SOME IRONY, IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRESS REPORTS DESCRIBED ABOVE, WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT THE STRONG FEELING HERE THAT PUBLIC DISCUSSION, LEAKS, ETC., ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE ENTERPRISE ON WHICH WE ARE ENGAGED. THE FACT IS, I AM AFRAID, THAT IF IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE FOR THE BRITISH PRESS TO QUOTE YOU AS DEFINITELY AS THEY DID, THE SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTION TO THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD PROBABLY NEVER HAVE BEEN ASKED.

V V

THIS IS WATER OVER THE DAM. BUT YOU WILL NOTICE THAT IN FACT THE PRIME MINISTER REFUSED TO OFFER COMMENTS ON THE POLISH DISCUSSIONS AND, WHATEVER VIEW ONE TAKES ABOUT MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN DECEMBER, WHAT HE SAID WAS IN NO WAY CRITICAL OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT AND ALL HE REVEALED WAS THAT HE KNEW OF THE DISCUSSIONS IN DECEMBER. MOREOVER, WITH KOSYGIN HERE, THE PM WAS CONCERNED TO SEND HIM A DISCREET SIGNAL THAT IT WAS JUST NOT GOOD ENOUGH FOR HIM TO ACCEPT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THESIS ABOUT THE DECEMBER INCIDENT AND THUS THE VALIDITY OF THIS CURRENT VIEW AS EXPOUNDED TO BURCHETT. FINALLY, GIVEN THE POLITICAL SITUATION WITH WHICH THE PM HAS TO COPE IN PARLIAMENT, IT WOULD FRANKLY BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO BE PRECLUDED FROM MENTIONING THIS KNOWLEDGE WHEN YOUR OWN STATEMENT SHOWED CLEARLY HOW MUCH FIRE THERE WAS BENEATH THE SMOKE, AND WHEN THE WASHINGTON POST WAS ALLEGING THAT THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN ACTIVE IN THE SAME EXCHANGES. (WHETHER OR NOT THAT WAS TRUE IS OF COURSE IMMATERIAL IN THIS CONTEXT.)

ALL IN ALL I DO NOT THINK THAT THE PRIME MINISTER COULD POSSIBLY HAVE SAID LESS IN REPLY TO THE QUESTION WITHOUT EXPOSING HIMSELF TO HEAVY PRESSURE TO SAY A GREAT DEAL MORE. AS IT WAS, HIS ANSWER DISPOSED OF THE MATTER. HE IS PERHAPS MORE CONSCIOUS THAN MANY OVER HERE OF THE PRESIDENT'S CONCERN AT ANYTHING THAT ENDANGERS AMERICAN LIVES. BUT, AS YOU KNOW, ANYTHING SAID BY THOSE IN AUTHORITY IN WASHINGTON IS PUT UNDER THE MICROSCOPE HERE, AND THE MORE THAT IS SAID, THE MORE DIFFICULT IT IS FOR BRITISH MINISTERS TO CONFINE THEMSELVES TO NO COMMENT.

SORRY TO HAVE BEEN SO LENGTHY. BUT I WANTED TO CLEAR THIS UP FULLY. ALL THE BEST.

SIGNED MICHAEL PALLISER

FEBRUARY 9, 1967

MESSAGE ENDS

*Pres file*

Thursday, February 9, 1967  
7:45 p.m.

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Sec. Freeman on aspects of the Food  
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the key items.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

cc: Mr. Walter Rostow

February 9, 1967

Personal and Confidential

MEMORANDUM

To: The President  
The White House

From: Orville L. Freeman  
Secretary of Agriculture

Subject: International Food and Agriculture

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3. The Executive Order under which the new P.L. 480 will be administered has been drafted and after some pulling and tugging accepted by State, AID, and the USDA. This new pattern of cooperation will

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Section 3.2  
Authority Dept of Agriculture to 10/28/82  
By kg, NARA, Date 3-26-91



2--The President

hopefully carry forward with increasing efficiency the policies which you set down in the Food for Freedom Program. There is a new awareness and sensitivity to the importance of agriculture in the developing countries.

4. For a number of years now various Prime Ministers, Agricultural Ministers, and our Ambassadors in various sections of Africa have urged that I personally visit Africa and review first-hand agricultural progress and needs. Schedule pressures heretofore have made that impossible. Priorities have been such that the limited travel time I could squeeze into my schedule went to Latin America and Asia. I find increasingly, however, more and more questions involving African agriculture coming to my desk. It would be very useful in dealing with some of these questions, particularly in making value judgments that are often both economic and political in nature, if I had had some direct exposure to that Continent. Accordingly, I am tentatively planning some time this spring or early summer when I have completed my testimony before the Congress and have delivered the six major addresses which are now in process outlining the Departmental goals to make a tour of key African countries. Such a swing would take two to three weeks. I would plan to take half a dozen of the professional and scientific people from the Department with me who have business in these countries. They will be able to further their mission and to help broaden my own horizons. If I can afford it, I hope to take Jane with me. Tentatively we would fly commercially to Africa and hope that we could arrange for some kind of government transport while there so we could handle a heavy schedule.

Any such plans must of course be subject to the domestic problems here and developments in Congress. I have no major legislation other than REA this session of Congress and expect to be in good shape by the middle of March.

Subject to unforeseen contingencies I hope you will take under consideration authorizing such a trip. I will report to you later as to the dates when I think it would be most timely.

*Orville H. Freeman*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-20  
By id, NARA Date 10-25-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Chat with King Hassan Tonight

The King showed all the right instincts this morning and deserves your warm encouragement. He would be flattered by a short private talk this evening. After leaving you this morning, he showed some uncertainty over whether he had put his points across as clearly as possible. In a few private words you could show you understood. I'd suggest these points:

1. Your insights on Viet Nam. (He'd be flattered to hear straight from you in a little more detail how you see the situation.)

2. Your view of general Soviet purposes, finishing with the thought that we're watching Soviet moves in the Mediterranean carefully. You understand the concerns he expressed this morning, and we'll keep them firmly in mind. We're his friends.

3. You're delighted that economic development is uppermost in his mind and were struck by the spirit of his offer to contribute to African regional development. (This is the first we've heard this idea, and it deserves applause. You might want to tell him a little about the Korry report's emphasis on regional development--your African initiative.)

4. Just to wind up, two bilateral matters:

--You're glad to continue food aid. It's increasingly difficult. You appreciate his assurances on phasing down trade with Cuba. (Findley Amendment.)

--You also appreciate his assurances that we can stay on at our telecommunications stations.

I'm also attaching some general points of background interest for dinner conversation.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 9, 1967

Interesting Facts about Morocco--Dinner Conversation

1. History of US - Moroccan relations:

- Moroccans have always claimed they were the first to recognize American independence. We've never disagreed, but France was probably first by about two weeks. All this took place through Benjamin Franklin in Paris.
- George Washington recognized the Sultan's friendly posture by sending him a copy of the new US Constitution. (In recognition, King Hassan brought a copy of his new constitution to President Kennedy in 1963.)
- During our war with Tripoli, 1802-5, we were at war with Morocco for a brief period, largely over ship siezures. But by 1821, relations were friendly again, and the Sultan gave the American consul at Tangier a building to house his consulate.
- During the Civil War, Confederate agents tried to obtain supplies for Confederate raiders in Morocco, but the Moroccan authorities turned them over to the American consul.
- In 1871, the Sultan feared that European powers might partition his country. To avoid this, he said he was prepared to put Morocco under US protectorate.

2. Agriculture and population:

- American experts are now in Morocco studying the potential of dry farming. The Moroccans have been skeptical and, so far, are concentrating on irrigation. The King would be interested in hearing any personal experience from our west.
- In 1966, Morocco working with Ford Foundation launched a modest population-planning program. This presents religious problems for the King, as it does here.

3. The King would be interested in details of the President's Asian Trip.

Thurs., Feb. 9, 1967  
10:30 p.m.

~~TOP SECRET-SUNFLOWER~~  
LITERALLY EYES ONLY

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith some cables you should have by way of background and for discussion at or after the 12:45 meeting:

Tab A -- Hanoi's Moscow Charge's comments when the message was delivered. It is the cleanest, rawest statement of what they are trying to do: a psychological warfare offensive against a serious military instrument in order to permit them to continue to violate international agreements and international law.

Tab B - A wrap-up of where Cooper thinks the British stand with the Russians, including the main characteristics of the talks thus far. I have marked in red the key sentences at the bottom of page 1 and top of page 2.

Tab C - A less important cable on where the idea came from that the Russians might wish to reconvene a Geneva Conference.

Tab D - A memcon of a conversation between Ben Read (State) and Cooper, slowing up Cooper who was trying to push us a little too fast last night.

W. W. R.

(att: Moscow 3412 London 6406, 6399, memcon Read Cooper 2/8/67)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By ig, NARA, Date 12-2-93



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

30a

1

5

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

PP RUEHCR  
DE RUEHCR 3412FD 0391111  
ZNY TTTT

Info P 081030Z FEB 67 CONTROL: 7193  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW Recd : Feb. 8, 1967, 8:47 a.m.

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3107  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ MOSCOW 3412

NODIS/SUNFLOWER PLUS

REF: MOSCOW 3404

1. AT LE CHANG'S REQUEST (HOANG MANH TU PHONED AT 11:45) DCM MET WITH HIM 12:30 TODAY. MEETING LASTED SEVEN MINUTES. OTHER ATTENDEES SAME AS LAST NIGHT.

2. LE CHANG OPENED BY SAYING THAT IN CONTINUATION OF MEETING LAST NIGHT AND AFTER CAREFULLY READING PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, HE FELT IT NECESSARY STATE THAT MESSAGE CONTAINED POINTS SHOWING ABSENCE OF GOODWILL ON PART OF US. FOR EXAMPLE, MESSAGE POSES CONDITIONS FOR STOPPING OF BOMBINGS OF INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN COUNTRY OF DRV. BOMBING OF DRV IS CONDEMNED BY WORLD PUBLIC OPINION, INCLUDING US PUBLIC OPINION. PEOPLES OF WORLD, INCLUDING AMERICAN PEOPLE, ARE URGING IMMEDIATE CESSATIONS OF BOMBING OF DRV, AND SUCH CESSATION SHOULD BE UNCONDITIONAL. HOWEVER, LE CHANG WENT ON, HE WISHED SAY THAT HE COULD TRANSMIT

PAGE 2 RUEHCR 3412FD ~~TOP SECRET~~  
MESSAGE TODAY.

3. DCM SAID WOULD REPORT LE CHANG'S REMARKS TO HIS GOVT, AND ALSO EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT FACT PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WOULD BE TRANSMITTED TODAY.

4. IN RESPONSE LE CHANG'S QUERY WHETHER MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL, DCM SAID IT WAS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, AS WERE ALL THESE EXCHANGES.

GP-1. THOMPSON  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-291

By up, NARA, Date 11-21-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action DE RUDTCR 6406C 0401300  
ZNY TTTT  
Z 091222Z FEB 67  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
Info TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~TOP SECRET~~ LONDON 6406

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1967 FEB 9 AM 7 58

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 19255  
By us NARA, Date 1-22-98

NODIS/SUNFLOWER

FOR SECRETARY AND HARRIMAN FROM COOPER

1. IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO REVIEW CURRENT STATE OF PLAY AS OF 1030 TODAY.
2. AFTER SEVERAL SESSIONS WITH KOSYGIN - PRIVATE AND PLENARY, SECRET AND PUBLIC - WILSON AND BROWN SEEM TO FEEL THAT RUSSIANS ARE HERE TO DO SERIOUS BUSINESS ON ALL AGENDA ITEMS INCLUDING AND MOST ESPECIALLY VIETNAM. THIS IS IN MARKED CONTRAST TO VIEWS EXPRESSED LAST WEEKEND TO EFFECT THAT LOW LEVEL ENTOURAGE WITH KOSYGIN SIGNALLED NO DESIRE TO GET VERY DEEPLY INTO SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.
3. WILSON AND BROWN (AND ALSO SOME OLD FONOFF HANDS) ARE IMPRESSED WITH THESE ASPECTS OF CONVERSATIONS HELD THUS FAR:
  - A. KOSYGIN'S "OBSESSION" WITH CHINA AND READINESS TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT WITHOUT APPARENT INHIBITION.
  - B. PROBABLY BECAUSE OF CHINA, KOSYGIN'S SENSE OF URGENCY TO MOVE AHEAD ON SOME FORMULA (THUS FAR, HIS OWN) FOR JOINT UK-SOV APPROACH "TO ASSIST" GETTING THE US AND DRV, "THE TWO PRINCIPALS", TO SETTLE THE WAR.
  - C. KOSYGIN'S STATEMENTS THAT HE IS IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH HANOI AND HIS STATED READINESS TO REFER IMPORTANT NEW ISSUES AND APPROACHES DIRECTLY TO HANOI FOR CONSIDERATION, E.G. THE BRITISH VERSION OF PHASE A-PHASE B.
  - D. THE LOW KEY, NON-POLEMICAL TONE OF THE TALKS ON ALL ISSUES. (GORE-BOOTH SAID LAST NIGHT THAT TALKS ON BILATERAL ISSUES ARE MOVING SMOOTHLY AND "NOT BADLY").
4. WILSON AND BROWN HAVE SOME DIFFERENCES IN ASSESSMENT OF AND APPROACH TO TALKS THUS FAR. THEY BOTH THINK THERE IS A FISH ON THE HOOK, BUT WILSON THINKS IT MIGHT BE A SOMEWHAT BIGGER AND TASTIER FISH THAN BROWN. AND WILSON WANTS TO GIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Declassified to: SECRET~~  
~~Authority: NIS 91-291~~  
~~By: us, NARA, Date: 11-22-97~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- LONDON 6406, 091222Z FEB 67

IT LOTS OF LINE AND WORK IT IN SLOWLY, WHILE BROWN IS ALL FOR REELING IT IN FAST IF ONLY TO SEE WHAT IT IS HE HAS.

5. BOTH WILSON AND BROWN (BROWN IMMEDIATELY AND WILSON AFTER SOME MASSAGING) UNDERSTAND AND SYMPATHIZE WITH USG POSITION THAT TALKS-FOR-BOMBING-CESSATION IS A NON-STARTER. THEY HAVE BOTH GIVEN ASSURANCES ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN LAST FEW DAYS THAT THEY WILL NOT YIELD ON THIS POINT.

6. BUT BOTH PM AND FONSEC (AND FAIR TO SAY FONOFF TAYPES ALSO) SMELL CHANCE OF BREAKING LOG JAM AND ARE STRAINING AT EVERY POSSIBLE SIGN OR HINT OF MODIFICATIONS IN SOV LINE. THUS, LAST NIGHT'S FLAP ON GENEVA CONFERENCE GAMBIT. OBVIOUSLY, ANY KIND OF AN ARRANGEMENT THAT THE SOVS WILL AGREE TO AND WHICH BRITISH FEEL WILL PROTECT INTEGRITY USG POSITION RE RECIPROCAL ACT SEEMS ATTRACTIVE TO THEM - MOST ESPECIALLY IF THE BRITISH ROLE (E.G. AS CO-CHAIRMAN) IS CONSPICUOUS AND SIGNIFICANT.

7. I REPORTED WASH VIEW RE GENEVA CONFERENCE APPROACH TO GORE-BOOTH AND MURRAY EARLY THIS MORNING. THE FINAL BRIEF THAT WENT TO PM AND BROWN FOR PRIVATE SESSIONS THIS MORNING INCORPORATES IDEA THAT SOVS SHOULD BE PROBED ON SIGNIFICANCE THEIR REMARKS RE GENEVA. IF KOSYGIN IS READY FOR A GENEVA CONF EVEN WITHOUT CHINESE, PM AND BROWN SHOULD THEN INDICATE READINESS TO STUDY IMPLICATION OF THIS AND THEREBY GIVE US DESIRABLE TURN-AROUND TIME. (I AM SORRY FOR WHAT MIGHT HAVE APPEARED UNSEEMLY HASTE TO GET WASH REACTION TO GENEVA APPROACH BUT ATMOSPHERE HERE AS OF LATE LAST NIGHT SUCH THAT I FELT IT NECESSARY TO BE ABLE TO REPORT AT LEAST SOME REACTION PRIOR TO 1000 A.M. KOSYGIN-WILSON TALK TODAY.)

8. OBVIOUSLY PM AND FONSEC WILL APPRECIATE EARLIEST POSSIBLE GUIDANCE ON POSSIBILITY EXTENDING TET PAUSE BEYOND SCHEDULED FOUR DAYS.

9. I HAVE BEEN ASSURED THAT THERE WILL BE NO COMMUNIQUE OR PRESS CONFERENCES ON VIETNAM PRIOR TO CHEQUERS SESSION SUNDAY.

10. SINCE PREPARING ABOVE I HAVE GOTTEN A CALL FROM THE FONOFF TO THE EFFECT THAT KOSYGIN'S ANSWER TO QUERY RE SIGNIFICANCE HIS STATEMENT ON GENEVA WAS SUFFICIENTLY FORTHCOMING TO HAVE WARRANTED WILSON COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE KOSYGIN A PROPOSITION IN WRITING "LATER IN THE DAY" ABOUT CALLING GENEVA CONF PRESUMABLY ALONG LINES OF THREE PART DRAFT-I FORWARDED TO WASH EARLY THIS MORNING. I AM NOW ON WAY TO FONOFF FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON THIS. BRUCE

~~TOP SECRET~~



5 30c

# ING TELEGRAM Department of State

~~TOP SECRET~~

③

Action

Info

..... ZZ RUEHC  
DE RUDTOR 6399C 0400257  
ZNY TTTTT  
Z 090241Z FEB 67  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~TOP SECRET~~ LONDON 6399

7800

Feb. 8, 1967, 10:13 PM

NODIS/SUNFLOWER

FOR SECRETARY FROM COOPER

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-291  
By inf, NARA, Date 11-12-91

1. MET WITH BROWN AT HIS RESIDENCE FOLLOWING KOSYGIN DINNER. FOUND MYSELF IN MIDDLE OF TELEPHONE ARGUMENT WITH DOWNING STREET RE ORDER OF PRECEDENCE OF OFFICIAL CARS. RETIRED TO KITCHEN TO HELP MRS BROWN MAKE TEA. I WONT TROUBLE DEPARTMENT WITH OTHER BITS OF BACKGROUND AND ATMOSPHERE AT THIS LATE HOUR. GORE BOOTH AND MURRAY ARRIVED 2330.
2. BROWN (AND FONOFF TYPES, THOUGH TO LESSER EXTENT) IMPRESSED WITH KOSYGIN STATEMENT IN GUILDHALL SPEECH TODAY THAT "--- THE SOVIET GOVT CONSIDERS NOW AS IN 1954, GREAT BRITAIN JOINTLY WITH SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COUNTRIES, COULD MAKE HER CONTRIBUTION TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE VN QUESTION ON THE BASIS OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS WHICH MUST BE OBSERVED BY USA."
3. BROWN FEELS SOVS MAY BE SIGNALLING A READINESS TO CONVENE GENEVA. AT PRIVATE SESSION TOMORROW (10 AM WILSON AND KOSYGIN TO BE JOINED AT 1045 BY BROWN AND SOLDATOV) BROWN WILL ASK WILSON TO PRESS SOVS ON WHETHER THIS WAS A SERIOUS HINT THAT WITH OR WITHOUT CHINESE THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO JOIN UK IN CALL FOR EARLY CONVOCAION OF GENEVA. AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION BROWN ASKED FOR DRAFT WRITTEN PROPOSAL TO BE SUBMITTED TO HIM AND WILSON PRIOR TO 10 AM MEETING.
4. GORE BOOTH MURRAY AND I WENT BACK TO FONOFF AND PREPARED FOLLOWING (WHICH THEY UNDERSTAND VERY CLEARLY THAT THIS DOES NOT HAVE ANY OFFICIAL ENDORSEMENT OF USG DESPITE MY PARTICIPATION IN DRAFTING):

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-, LONDON 6399, February 8, 1967

QUOTE: THE TWO CO-CHAIRMEN WILL ANNOUNCE IMMEDIATELY THAT THEY:

A. INVITE THE US TO ASSURE THEM THAT THE BOMBING OF NVN WILL STOP;

B. INVITE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND THE US TO ASSURE THE CO-CHAIRMEN THAT THEY WILL TAKE MUTUAL AND EQUIVALENT STEPS TO HALT THE AUGMENTATION OF THEIR FORCES IN SVN.

C. IF ALL THE FOREGOING ASSURANCES ARE PROMPTLY RECEIVED THE TWO CO-CHAIRMEN WILL INVITE THE MEMBERS OF THE 1954 GENEVA CONFERENCE TO RECONVENE IN GENEVA ON 15 FEB TO WORK OUT A SETTLEMENT OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT. UNQUOTE.

5. IF SOVS WILL NOT BUY THIS, BROWN WILL PRESS THEM TO ENDORSE PHASE A - PHASE B FORMULA AS THEY FORMULATED IT YESTERDAY.

6. FOLLOWING FONOFF DRAFTING SESSION WENT TO DOWNING STREET AND CAUGHT WILSON ON WAY UP TO BED. INFORMED HIM OF CONTENTS "SUNFLOWER PLUS" AND OF WASHINGTON VIEW RE HIS COMMONS PERFORMANCE. WILSON SAID THERE WAS MORE (OR LESS) TO STORY THAN WASH HAD GOTTEN. SUGGESTED I GET TOGETHER WITH PALLISER FOR ACCURATE ACCOUNT. WHICH I WILL DO.

7. PLEASE PROVIDE ANY GUIDANCE PRIOR TO 0930 LONDON TIME.

BRUCE

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BWR  
Conversation between Benjamin H. Read and Chester Cooper  
February 8, 1967

W d  
30d  
(4)

11:20 p.m. (after talking with Secretary Rusk, Walt Rostow and Bill Bundy) I called Chet Cooper at Brown's Hotel, London (493 x-6020) with following message: (1) We can't tell whether single sentence quoted from Kosygin speech is or is not significant; (2) we would like UK at 10:00 a.m. meeting Thursday to probe Soviets for what, if any, importance they attach to it and what they are prepared to do, if anything, to implement it; (3) if Soviets do in fact attribute importance to it and are ready to issue a conference call or take the action to back it up, let us know forthwith, and we will give urgent considered substantive reaction to Brown's suggestion or any variant thereof. We cannot give such reaction at this time.

Cooper said he would convey these thoughts to Brown first thing in the morning. He did not know how fast the British would want to move on their proposal, but said he would indicate to them our desire to see the paper that they proposed to table before it is actually given to the Soviets.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 91-291  
By lip, NARA, Date 11-21-91

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SUNFLOWER PLUS

*Pres file 31*  
~~Mr. Watson~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-20  
By is, NARA Date 10-25-99

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, February 9, 1967  
9:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points--Your Meeting with King Hassan

1. You'd like to hear the King's concerns. (He'll probably describe the Soviet-backed military buildup in Algeria and the need for US military aid. He may propose a closer US-Moroccan tie and ask how much US help he can count on if attacked.)
2. In response, you can explain your political difficulty with security commitments. However, Morocco's security is important, and you have approved the \$14 million credit sale of military equipment he requested. The sale is subject to the following assurances from him, which you're sure are in line with his policy:
  - That the equipment will only be used for defense and that Morocco is committed to peaceful settlement of disputes.
  - That the sale will not hurt Morocco's economy and that Morocco will work for regional cooperation.
  - You'd like to minimize press attention; the North African arms race has already received too much.
3. You'd like to hear about Morocco's food production. You appreciated his letter on the subject last fall.
4. You've approved the wheat sale he requested (167,000 tons). But you'd like to explain your problems with food aid. To meet requirements of the Findley amendment, you'd appreciate assurance that he'll phase down Morocco's Cuban trade.
5. You appreciate his helpful position on VietNam and would like to tell him where we stand now.
6. You'd like to describe the exciting spirit of regional cooperation you found in Asia. You hope that spirit will grow in North Africa.
7. If the King mentions our naval commo center at Kenitra or our Voice of America station at Tangier, you can express appreciation and confirm our desire to stay on. If you see an opening, you might even say we'd like to put our VOA station on longer than year-to-year tenure. (But we don't want to mention this if it encourages Hassan to set a price.)

~~SECRET~~

W. W. Rostow

*Pres file*

Thursday, February 9, 1967  
11:05 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the revised dinner toast for tonight. I have strengthened it on page 3 by going back and stating strongly what is required from all in the interest of the human race and the food-population problem. It is not brilliant but I think it is solid.

W. W. Rostow



**Toast for King Hassan of Morocco  
Dinner, Thursday, February 9, 1967  
Words:**

**Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:**

**His Majesty, King Hassan and I are continuing a very old tradition. Our talks today are an echo of handwritten messages carried between our countries by sailing ships in the early days of American independence.**

**Morocco is among America's oldest friends, one of the first to recognize us as a free nation. The messages of George Washington, and His Majesty's illustrious ancestor, Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Abdallah (SEEDY MOHAMMED BEN ABDALLA), are treasured in our national Archives.**

**So our meeting is a modern expression of an ancient friendship. It is also proof of our determination to stand as partners before the great tests of our time.**

One of them is the widening gap between population and food supply.

The United States has proposed that all nations unite in a worldwide war on hunger. From our talks today, I am more confident than ever that our friends in Morocco are committed to that struggle.

We have joined in a program to increase the use of fertilizers and better seeds. Their efforts will help many other countries where food production can and must be increased.

This is an exciting venture. One imaginative part of it is the use of closed-circuit television to help train farmers in the better use of fertilizer. I believe it is the first such experiment to be tried in Africa.

I am also pleased that our experts are working together to improve dryland farming in Morocco, and other productive techniques. From my own life in Texas, I know what this can mean for those who live in dry and desolate regions.

If I seem to linger on the crises of food and farming, it is because His Majesty and I are convinced that they must be met and mastered today.

I wish to underline what I said in the State of the Union Message and in my message to the Congress on the food problem in India:

-- If we are not to lose the race between food and population, every nation, without exception, bears a heavy and direct responsibility;

-- Food deficit nations must at highest priority raise their agricultural production and productivity;

-- Voluntary population planning measures must be accelerated;

-- Food surplus nations must join in using their surpluses to prevent starvation;

-- Developed nations must contribute equally in fertilizers, pesticides, technology, and money.

These are our elemental, inescapable duties to the human race.

We have joined our hands in that today. Our discussions have renewed my faith that this most urgent problem of our age can be solved in time.

~~-6-~~

I know I speak for all of us here, and all our countrymen, in  
expressing to His Majesty best wishes for a long life and good health.

And, for our two countries, the wisdom and the strength to continue  
along the paths of peace and progress we have reaffirmed today.

Ladies and Gentlemen, His Majesty, the King.

# # # # #



there was a  
revised draft  
- by Valenti -  
later

Thursday, February 9, 1967  
2:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a re-draft on the  
peace theme, for your toast at dinner  
tonight.

W. W. Rostow

**Toast for King Hassan of Morocco  
Dinner, Thursday, February 9, 1967  
Words:**

**Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:**

**His Majesty, King Hassan, and I are continuing a very old tradition.**

**Our talks today are an echo of handwritten messages carried between  
our countries by sailing ships in the early days of American independence.**

**Morocco is among America's oldest friends, one of the first to  
recognize us as a free nation. The messages of George Washington,  
and His Majesty's illustrious ancestor, Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Abdallah  
(SEEDY MOHAMMED BEN ABDALLA), are treasured in our national Archives.**

**So our meeting is a modern expression of an ancient friendship.  
It is also proof of our determination to stand as partners before the great  
tests of our time.**

**One of them is the widening gap between population and food supply.  
The United States has proposed that all nations unite in a worldwide war  
on hunger. From our talks today, I am more confident than ever that  
our friends in Morocco are committed to that struggle.**

But, as I said this morning, our ultimate task is to create among the nations of the world a community at peace. I often read and re-read Article I of the United Nations Charter.

I believe all of us -- especially those too young to know how the world felt in 1945 -- should come to know it line by line. Its principles -- one by one -- govern the actions of American foreign policy from day to day:

- "collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace";
- collective measures for "the suppression of acts of aggression";
- "adjustment or settlement of international disputes by peaceful means";
- the development of "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples";
- "international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting

and encouraging respect for human rights ... without distinction  
as to race, sex, language, or religion. "

That is as good a statement of the principles governing the foreign policy  
of the United States as can be written.

Those words were written twenty-two years ago. The smoke still  
hung over the devastation of the Second World War. But they mean even  
more now than they did then; because since that time we have seen many  
threats to the peace and faced them down. Americans have taken more than  
200,000 casualties since that date in collective measures to suppress acts  
of aggression. But all of us, working together at different times and places  
have made sure that aggression did not succeed.

We have not yet created the world at peace under law which was the  
objective in 1945 and is the objective still tonight. But we have made sure  
that the first rule of such a world was observed: aggression has not succeeded.

Meanwhile, behind that protection we have made much progress in the



development of friendly relations among nations; and, above all, in international cooperation for the welfare of man.

In Western Europe; in Latin America; in Africa; in Asia -- cooperation in economic and social progress no longer is a matter of rhetoric. It is a fact.

And I tell you tonight that, looking ahead -- despite the terrible burden of war in Southeast Asia -- I am confident that we shall make more progress in the next generation in fulfilling the purposes stated in Article I of the United Nations Charter than we did in the last generation.

I know I speak for all of us here, and all our countrymen, in expressing to His Majesty best wishes for a long life and good health. And, for our two countries, the wisdom and the strength to continue along the paths of peace and progress we have reaffirmed today.

Ladies and Gentlemen, His Majesty, the King.

###

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Indian Agriculture Performance

You have thought me overly <sup>optimistic</sup> ~~pessimistic~~ about Indian food. It is too early in this crop year for firm yield data. But there are reasons why I expect next year's performance to be substantially better -- unless the monsoons fail in three successive years, which is highly unlikely.

1. Rainfall and Performance

Attached are three rainfall maps.

1964/65 was a bumper year, with normal or above average rainfall everywhere. 1965/66 was the first bad year, with below average rainfall (red) in 25 of the 30 states.

1966/67 shows the worst hit areas were fewer in number. The rainfall data don't show this, but in fact the drought in several states was much more severe this year than it had been in any single area last year.

Production this year in the drought-affected areas was lower than the bumper year by an estimated 10 million tons. ~~In the areas not hit by drought, production this year is estimated by our Department of Agriculture to be above the bumper year by an estimated 700,000 tons, or a 3% growth over the bumper year of two years ago.~~

2. Other Indicators

(1) Use of nitrogen fertilizers has more than doubled during the past three years.

1964/65	489,550 tons
1965/66	585,500 "
1966/67	950,000 "

~~Its use in the more go-ahead states like Punjab and Madras, where weather was good to excellent this year, contributed to increased production by 2.5% and 6.5% respectively.~~

(2) ~~The use of improved seeds was greatly expanded, from virtually none in 1965/66 to over 6 million acres in 1966/67. Demand for improved seeds is outstripping the supply. Private firms are expanding seed production. For example, the Annapurna Seed Farm Industries in Maharashtra has increased its controlled seed production from 32 acres to 600 acres.~~

(3) We now have information on a number of specific districts, where improved inputs have brought a substantial growth in output:

(a) Ludhiana District, Punjab

~~Consumption of chemical fertilizers increased 10 times between 1960/61 and 1965/66, and crop yields increased during the same period, as follows: corn 80%, peanuts 60%, wheat 50%, chickpeas 33%.~~

One farmer, using improved methods, seeds and more fertilizer obtained 70% more from Mexican wheat, and 90% more from hybrid corn than from his local varieties.

Another Punjabi farmer, using Sonora 64 Mexican wheat and improved practices grew 2.5 tons per acre instead of the average Punjabi yield of .52 tons per acre.

(b) In Kerala, 700,000 acres were planted in high yielding Taiwan III rice for the first time in 1966. These yielded an average of over 5,000 pounds per acre and in some cases reached 10,000 pounds. By comparison, native varieties yield 3,000 to 4,000 pounds.


(c) In Tanjore, an improved rice strain sown in 2/3 of the area, brought yields averaging 3,700 acres compared to normal yield of 2,400 pounds.

(4) In addition, price increases for food crops are stimulating farmers to try new seed strains and larger fertilizer inputs. The World Bank agricultural specialist, a shrewd Australian, thinks the demand for agricultural inputs will rise sharply this year.

(5) Admittedly, ~~none of these points are in themselves conclusive.~~ But they do underline the adverse effect of the two droughts, improvement despite it in some areas, and important changes in both attitude and practise.

W. Rostow

# RAINFALL IN INDIA



ARABIAN SEA ISLANDS

- |  |                          |                            |
|--|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. BAY ISLANDS                         | 11. HIMACHAL PRADESH     | 21. MARATHWADA             |
| 2. ASSAM (INCLUDING MANIPUR & TRIPURA) | 12. JAMMU & KASHMIR      | 22. VIDARBHA               |
| 3. SUB-HIMALAYAN W. BENGAL             | 13. RAJASTHAN, WEST      | 23. COASTAL ANDHRA PRADESH |
| 4. GANGETIC WEST BENGAL                | 14. RAJASTHAN, EAST      | 24. TELANGANA              |
| 5. ORISSA                              | 15. MADHYA PRADESH, WEST | 25. RAYALASEEMA            |
| 6. BIHAR PLATEAU                       | 16. MADHYA PRADESH, EAST | 26. MADRAS STATE           |
| 7. BIHAR PLAINS                        | 17. GUJARAT REGION       | 27. COASTAL MYSORE         |
| 8. UTTAR PRADESH, EAST                 | 18. SAURASHTRA & KUTCH   | 28. INTERIOR MYSORE, NORTH |
| 9. UTTAR PRADESH, WEST                 | 19. KONKAN               |                            |



INDIA: FOOD GRAIN PRODUCTION BY STATES  
(1,000 metric tons)

State	Total grain and pulses		
	1964/65	1965/66	1966/67 *
<u>States not affected by 1966/67</u>			
drought:			
Assam.....	1,966	1,902	1,887
Nagaland.....	71	43	100
Punjab.....	7,103	5,553	7,529
Jammu and Kashmir.....	576	449	633
Andhra Pradesh.....	7,311	6,356	7,012
Madras.....	5,792	5,251	6,174
Kerala.....	1,136	1,033	1,335
Union Territories.....	949	847	1,002
Subtotal.....	24,904	21,434	25,672
<u>States affected by 1966/67</u>			
drought:			
Bihar.....	7,531	6,951	4,398
West Bengal.....	6,228	5,449	5,710
Orissa.....	5,045	3,799	4,180
Uttar Pradesh.....	15,052	13,924	14,035
Rajasthan.....	5,261	3,792	4,710
Madhya Pradesh.....	10,140	6,675	7,711
Gujarat.....	2,818	2,305	2,053
Maharashtra.....	6,862	4,700	6,356
Mysore.....	4,557	3,261	4,210
Subtotal.....	63,494	50,856	53,363
Total.....	88,398	72,290	79,035

\* Latest estimate.

Thursday - February 9, 1967

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this New York Times report on how General Leber's appointment was received in Panama and the Zone:

"NEWS IS WELCOME  
Special to The New York Times

BALBOA, Canal Zone, February 6-- Word that President Johnson had nominated Brigadier General Walter P. Leber to become the next Governor of the Canal Zone met with a high degree of endorsement today both among waterway executives and rank-and-file residents.

The news was also well received in the Republic of Panama, where General and Mrs. Leber made many friends during his tour of duty as lieutenant governor.

Many Isthmians today commended Mr. Johnson's wisdom in choosing for this duty, which involves many complex problems and sensitive human relationships, a man with recent seasoning in the no. 2 spot."

W. W. Rostow

Thursday, Feb. 9, 1967  
4:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bob Anderson called with the following message, which I have given you before:

He and Gene Black feel strongly that we should find a way to get some wheat to Egypt. Hunger, they believe, is a real possibility which could blow Nasser's reaction into violence which would tear apart the Middle East.

I told him Sect. Rusk's anxiety that an Egyptian concessional grain deal could blow the aid bill in the Congress.

He said he understood; but the stakes were high.

In the course of congratulating Sect. Rusk on his press conference -- which I thought excellent -- I chatted with him about Bob's call and the problem.

He said: maybe we could work out a mixed purchase-aid deal on an interim basis to buy a little time.

I'll follow through so you can stare at it.

W. W. R.

cc: Hal Saunders

*Pres file* 37  
Thursday, Feb. 9, 1967  
4:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

As instructed, I saw Senator Bennett at 3:15 p. m. this afternoon and conveyed to him the relevant information.

He said:

- He was impressed; he had been tending towards support; his mind is now "clearer."
- He had not taken too seriously the Soviet espionage threat here because we are, in any case, an open society; but Mr. Hoover's evaluation seemed reassuring to him.
- He asked with how many countries we had most-favored nation clauses which would require granting diplomatic immunity to consulates. I arranged on the spot by telephone for him to be furnished a list.

He volunteered at the end that he understood fully the need for silence and security on the information I had passed to him on your instructions.

W. W. R.



38  
*Pres file*

Thursday, February 9, 1967 -- 5:20 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Courtesy Call on You by CENTO Secretary General  
Dr. Abbas Ali Khalatbary

State recommends you receive Dr. Khalatbary for a brief courtesy call during his annual official visit to Washington, March 10-17.

Receiving him would emphasize to Iran, Pakistan and Turkey continued U.S. support for the CENTO alliance. The Shah would also be pleased that you received one of his high officials.

If you approve, we'll bring it to Marv's attention nearer the time of his visit.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

February 9, 1967

39  
Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Atomic Energy Commission, with the concurrence of the Department of Defense and the informal agreement of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, recommends that you direct them to turn over all finished atomic weapons and atomic weapon components to the Department of Defense as soon as they are produced and thereby eliminating the need for the AEC to keep them in AEC custody. This change in procedure would eliminate duplication of custodial personnel without any reduction in the security of the weapons. The Bureau of the Budget and the AEC have already anticipated this savings in connection with the preparation of the FY 1968 budget.

I recommend that you approve this recommendation. If you concur, I will sign the attached memorandum to Dr. Seaborg.

W. W. Rostow

\_\_\_\_ Approved

\_\_\_\_ Disapproved

\_\_\_\_ See me

~~SECRET - FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

WWR:CEJ:feg

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NLI 96-297  
By CL, NARA Date 10-18-99

39a

~~SECRET~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN,  
U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

The President has noted and concurred in the recommendation contained in your letter to him of January 30, 1967, that all finished atomic weapons and atomic weapon components that are produced should be delivered to the Department of Defense. Accordingly, the President, pursuant to Section 91b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, directs the AEC to deliver such weapons and components to the Department of Defense at locations, times and in accordance with such procedures that may mutually be agreed to between the AEC and DOD.

It is noted that the elimination of certain custodial positions resulting from the change in this procedure and the resulting annual savings therefrom has already been anticipated in the FY 1968 budget as the result of joint action by AEC and the Bureau of the Budget. It is further noted that the recommendation had been discussed and informally concurred in by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and that the Department of Defense also agreed to the recommended procedure.

W. W. Rostow

cc: The Secretary of Defense

WWR:CEJ:feg

~~SECRET - FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-297  
By cb, NARA Date 10-18-99

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO.

TO: The Secretary of Defense  
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

This document consists of 2 pages  
No. 1 of 19 copies, Series Ref. II.

In accordance with the recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission, concurred in by the Department of Defense, and pursuant to Section 91b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, I direct the Atomic Energy Commission to deliver to the Department of Defense all finished atomic weapons and atomic weapon components heretofore or hereafter produced in accordance with directives issued pursuant to Section 91a.(2) of the said Act, and determined and certified by AEC as technically satisfactory and available for delivery to the stockpile. Such deliveries will be accomplished at locations, times and in accordance with procedures as mutually agreed to between the AEC and DOD. Weapon modernization, quality assurance, retirement, and other programs will continue and the transfer of weapons between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense will be continued as necessary to support these programs.

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA

Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination  
Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-297  
By CB, NARA Date 10-18-99



~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Current responsibilities of the DOD and the AEC with respect to atomic weapons, except those incident to removal of AEC custodians from National Stockpile Sites and Operational Storage Sites, are not affected by this directive.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-20  
By is, NARA Date 10-25-99

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, February 9, 1967  
9:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points--Your Meeting with King Hassan

1. You'd like to hear the King's concerns. (He'll probably describe the Soviet-backed military buildup in Algeria and the need for US military aid. He may propose a closer US-Moroccan tie and ask how much US help he can count on if attacked.)
2. In response, you can explain your political difficulty with security commitments. However, Morocco's security is important, and you have approved the \$14 million credit sale of military equipment he requested. The sale is subject to the following assurances from him, which you're sure are in line with his policy:
  - That the equipment will only be used for defense and that Morocco is committed to peaceful settlement of disputes.
  - That the sale will not hurt Morocco's economy and that Morocco will work for regional cooperation.
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3. You'd like to hear about Morocco's food production. You appreciated his letter on the subject last fall.
4. You've approved the wheat sale he requested (167,000 tons). But you'd like to explain your problems with food aid. To meet requirements of the Findley amendment, you'd appreciate assurance that he'll phase down Morocco's Cuban trade.
5. You appreciate his helpful position on VietNam and would like to tell him where we stand now.
6. You'd like to describe the exciting spirit of regional cooperation you found in Asia. You hope that spirit will grow in North Africa.
7. If the King mentions our naval commo center at Kenitra or our Voice of America station at Tangier, you can express appreciation and confirm our desire to stay on. If you see an opening, you might even say we'd like to put our VOA station on longer than year-to-year tenure. (But we don't want to mention this if it encourages Hassan to set a price.)

~~SECRET~~

W. W. Rostow

21

~~SECRET -- NODIS~~

Wednesday,  
February 8, 1967  
6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Lodge's weekly  
cable -- almost wholly pacification  
and politics.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 17626

~~SECRET -- NODIS~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By My, NARA, Date 2-8-91

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Wednesday, February 8, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 17626)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. Year of the Ram

Tomorrow is the beginning of TET, the three-day holiday which is the most important festival of the year -- Year of the Ram -- for all Vietnamese. Saigon is in a festive mood, whole blocks covered solidly with brilliant TET flowers and fusillades of fire crackers ringing constantly on every street. There appears to be no threat here now, as in the recent past, that the city might soon be in Communist hands, even though terrorism is common. There are high hopes for Constitutional government. I have less news this Wednesday than at any time in the last year and a half. I hope that "no news is good news."

B. Constitution

Before recessing February 3 for a ten-day TET vacation, the Assembly moved about half way through Chapter III of the Constitution dealing with legislative powers and organization. The Assembly has so far decided that the Lower House will have from 100 to 200 members and the Upper House 30 to 60. An unusual provision is that members of the Upper House will be elected at-large from the whole nation rather than from electoral districts. Since most well-known political figures live in Saigon, this provision could mean a "Saigon Senate" with little rural representation.

Representatives of the Assembly and the Directorate have been meeting intermittently to exchange views and to try to iron out their differences on Constitutional provisions. Both Deputies and members of the Directorate have told us that broad areas of agreement exist, but some important disagreements remain. A letter from General Thieu to Assembly Chairman Phan Khac Suu summarizes some of the Directorate's objections to the first draft of the Constitution.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

41a  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-291  
By 108, NARA, Date 11-21-91



The most important of these concern the role of the military in politics, the power of the legislature to force removal of the Prime Minister, the power to declare emergencies, and the abolition of censorship.

Members of the Directorate have told us that agreement has been reached on the important question of the legislature's power to force removal of the Prime Minister. They say that the National Assembly may "propose" the dismissal of the Cabinet, but the proposal is not binding on the President.

### C. Revamping the Army

The decisive factor in defeating the Huk uprising in the Philippines was the Magsaysay was able to get the Philippine Army to behave itself -- to be generous and considerate of the welfare of the civilians. The absence of such a helpful attitude on the part of the ARVN here has been a major problem.

It may be interesting, therefore, to read the following from a report by Lansdale of a visit to Southern Gia Dinh province on January 30, with General Thang, the Minister of Revolutionary Development:

"At Phuoc Ly, Thang asked an old woman how conditions were. She looked at his uniform, with General's stars on the collar, and promptly told him that everything was fine, just fine. After visiting with the Revolutionary Development cadre, Thang then went to the house of the old woman, and asked if he could come in and talk to her. He told her who he was, assured her that he was there to help. If everything was truly fine, he was happy. If there was a problem the people had, that he could work on while there, and they didn't let him help just by their keeping him ignorant, then he would be a poor public servant. With that, the woman told him that troops from the near-by ARVN battalion had torn down one of her buildings, for use in constructing an outpost. (Comment: This was the 2nd Battalion, 46th Regiment, 5th Division.)

"Thang discussed this with the battalion commander, learned that the old woman's story was true, pointed out sharply the harm done to the whole pacification effort by the act, and committed the battalion

to rebuild the structure for the old woman, as a civic action project. Thang said that he would return in a month to check on what had been done. He then asked the battalion commander and four of the Revolutionary Development cadre team to accompany him, while he visited the ARVN troops who were building the outpost.

"Thang had the soldiers stop work and gather around him. He told them about the old woman's house, how she and others in the hamlet resented the soldiers' action in pulling it down for their own use, and how contrary this was to their true mission of winning over the people to our cause and protecting them. He admitted that it was tempting to tear down structures and use the materials for building an outpost, when Headquarters wanted an outpost built, but supplied no means. He had done so himself in the past, just to get outposts built. He then told the story of one such outpost, in which all the local people, even women and children, had joined in a Viet Cong attack, due to their anger at troop behavior, and overwhelmed the outpost. Of what use, then, is such an outpost, even a fine one? He pointed out that the Army has the means and material today. It needs to be requested, obtained, and used. And, the soldiers must rebuild civilian structures they tear down for selfish use. Thang pointed to the Revolutionary Development cadre, saying that they and the soldiers must become comrades, working together for the people and the nation.

"The troops returned to their work. As we walked away, one of the soldiers said to the others: 'You know, he is right; just two years ago we were civilians and didn't like what the Army did ourselves.' Thang turned back to him and said: 'Good for you, remember that.'"

#### D. Hard Core Terrorists

After a conversation with Thieu, Lansdale reports:

"Thieu explained that the root of his worry was the current reorganization of Viet Cong provincial and village administrations. Since the September elections last year, which might have worried the Viet Cong, there reportedly has been an increasing influx of trained, hard-core Communist administrators into the Viet Cong political system all over the country, with weaker, non-Party administrators being weeded out. A number of the new hard-core administrators were from

the North, either Southerners given further training there or even Northerners. The National Liberation Front certainly seemed to be preparing itself for a different type of struggle in the near future. In a negotiated peace, and with Allied military forces withdrawn, the National Liberation Front could give a powerful contest to the Government of Vietnam, with a Communist-disciplined National Liberation Front political organization that could act in a united way, with a Viet Cong paramilitary organization to support it with necessary force. Under such circumstances, freedom in Vietnam might not survive."

This confirms the suspicion placed by Ky and others that there is a tremendous increase in terrorism, which is bound to rise and be at its peak when they start having elections under the Constitution.

In this connection, I cite this sentence from a Department of the Army study concerning the Malayan war:

"All losses can be endured and adjusted to except one -- the death of key individuals."

One dead leader will thus save years of work, atrocities, murder, ambushes -- which is why we are right to stress the guerrilla infrastructure as the real cancer.

#### E. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending February 4, the Viet Cong killed 34 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 55, and kidnapped 131. The dead include four Hamlet Chiefs, and the wife and child of a Hamlet Chief.

#### F. Chieu Hoi

Chieu Hoi returnees increased sharply during the week of January 22-28, with a total of 823. This compares with 592 for last week, and 420 and 437 for the previous two weeks. The total for this year now stands at 2,272, which is more than double the intake for January of last year, which was 1,103. If this rate is maintained throughout the year, we will get about 30,000 returnees in 1967.

We are revising our statistical procedures so that we will have an accurate breakdown of returnees into categories such as North Vietnamese Army personnel and Viet Cong Main Force as well as the previous broad categories of military and political. Last year, our figures indicate that 64 percent of the total returnees were military, 31 percent were political, and 5 percent fell into neither of these categories. A survey by Rand of a sample of 1,350 returnees last year showed one percent North Vietnam Army personnel, 6 percent Viet Cong Main Force, 7 percent local force, 60 percent armed guerrillas, and 26 percent civilians.

#### G. Economic

The Retail Price Index continued to move up last week, reaching a new high of 254. This compares with 247 for last week. The previous six weeks' Indexes were: 239, 216, 225, 232, 239, and 232. The continued price increase is mostly the result of increases in rice and pork, particularly the former. The Government is negotiating the purchase of rice from Thailand, and part of the price increases can be attributed to the usual rise at the TET season. However, rice prices are not expected to decline after TET this year because stocks will be low for some time.

#### H. Peace Talks

There has been great public and Government interest and some apprehension over the so-called "peace probes" of the last few weeks. I have discussed this subject with Thieu and Ky and find them understanding but uneasy.



*Pres file*

Wednesday  
February 8, 1967  
7:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

You may be interested in  
this account of how our man  
Don Ropa dealt with the ex-Peace  
Corps volunteers.

W. W. Rostow

4/2a

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Meeting with the ex-Peace Corps Volunteers

I met from 1:30 to 2:30 this afternoon with the delegation of former Peace Corps volunteers concerned over Vietnam. They presented the attached letter addressed to the President and held the floor throughout most of the hour elaborating their views.

Their main concern was that the U.S. could afford to "take the first step" in bringing about negotiations, that the security of our forces in Vietnam would not be compromised by halting the bombing. They doubted that the NLF was solely an instrument of Hanoi and wondered why the Administration was not more flexible in dealing directly with the Front. They particularly wanted the President to know that, in their judgment, opinion in countries where they have served is against us on Vietnam.

My only response was that our position on getting negotiations started had been carefully delineated by the President, Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Goldberg and yourself, that the key was reciprocal rather than unilateral deescalation, and that Hanoi is the party that must be heard from. I personally could add nothing to our position as so authoritatively stated and could not, in any event, speak for the Administration. But I would see to it that their full views were passed on with their letter. I indicated that a more formal response would probably be forthcoming (I'll draft this for your signature, if you wish).


The four ex-PCV's present were Aubrey Brown (PCV in Nigeria), Peter Von Christierson (PCV in Pakistan, and now working here with OEO), Marjory Donnelly (PCV Philippines), and Carole Snee (PCV Honduras). A fifth, Allen Brown (Yale in China program, Hong Kong) had no identification and was not passed by the guards.

*Copy 7 file given  
Jack Vaughan*

Brown explained that he and 40-odd ex-PCV's in New York City, all members of an association of former PCV's, had decided among themselves to compose the letter and circulate it to association members. Brown said, however, that the letter should not be regarded as a formal statement from their association.

They were quite pleasant, sincere and respectful throughout. I conveyed your regret that other commitments kept you from seeing them. They were understanding and satisfied that their letter and remarks would be sent on to the President.

Bob Fleming had queries from the press. I gave him the above which he believed was enough for his purposes. The Chicago Daily News wanted to be present for the meeting. I put them off, saying they were free to talk with the delegation afterward in the EOB lobby.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'D. W. Ropa', with a stylized flourish at the end.

D. W. Ropa

Room 34  
2 Washington Square North  
New York, New York 10003  
February 7, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

We are former Peace Corps Volunteers and others who have worked in similar programs in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Our service abroad has led to a heightened concern about U. S. foreign policy towards the developing nations.

In the past two months the eminent voices of Secretary General U Thant, Pope Paul, and the National Council of Churches --- together with the recent statements by student leaders, Rhodes Scholars, clergy, and members of the academic community --- have expressed concern about our government's policies in Vietnam. As U. S. citizens who have worked abroad, we too have become increasingly uneasy about these policies.

Thus, adding our voices to those who have already expressed concern, we call upon you, Mr. President, to take a decisive initiative towards a constructive peace in Vietnam by:

- 1) Halting the bombing of North Vietnam beginning with the Lunar New Year;
- 2) Accepting the direct participation of the National Liberation Front in peace negotiations; and
- 3) Discontinuing the present military build-up with a view towards the disengagement of all foreign forces from Vietnam.

Respectfully yours,

400 Returned Volunteers  
(Names of Signatories Follow)



Afghanistan

Elizabeth Lebenson, PC  
Jack E. Nelson, PC

Algeria

Charles R. Harper Jr., UPC  
David Porter  
Glenda Powell, CIMADE  
Sonia Strawn, MM

Bolivia

Jeffrey Ghelardi, PC  
Carol Sebold, PC

Brazil

Kenneth J. Dunn, PC  
Barbara Hall, UPC  
Robert E. Iix, ICYE

Burma

Alice M. Shae, ABFMS

Cameroon

Anabel L. Dwyer, PC  
Myron S. Rosenbaum, PC  
Yenwith K. Whitney, UPC

Central African Republic

Lawrence D. Spears, CWS

Ceylon

Leon Howell, WSCF

Chile

Nancy J. Gannaway, PC  
Clare Genz, PC  
George Genz, PC  
Rodney C. Kirk, PC  
Connee Shrawder, PC  
Espanola A. Smith, PC

Colombia

Suzanne M. Adam  
Marcia Espinal, PC  
Sue Garofalo, IFI  
Elizabeth J. Grace, PC  
Jan Greenfield, PC  
Harlan W. King

Colombia (con't)

Wanda J. McCaa, ILCA  
Yvonne Neu, PC  
Richard D. Roberto, PC  
John G. Neyenesch, PC  
Judith V. Neyenesch  
Larry V. Oman, PC  
Martha S. Oman, PC  
Richard A. Petersen, PC  
Jacquelyn Roberto, PC  
Francis Schrag  
Ann M. Schrand, PC  
Jerry Spearman, PC  
Carol Stein, PC  
Carl J. Stephani, PC  
Willie Thompson, PC  
M. Celeste Torrens, PC

Costa Rica

William S. Stone

Dahomey

Yvonne L. Williams, USIS

Dominican Republic

Fred Goff  
T. Procter Lippincott  
Elaine Reidy, PC  
Robyn Stockton, PC  
William L. Wipfler

Ecuador

Gary R. Enschede, PC  
Grace Funk, PC  
Robert Poinsett, PC  
David Ridenour, PC  
Martha J. Seymour, PC  
Douglas Strauss, PC

Ethiopia

Robert R. Albritton, PC  
Robert L. Berndt, PC  
James Boylson, PC  
Patricia Crepeau, PC  
Nancy R. Dean, PC  
Patricia F. DeWerth, PC  
H. Ernest Fox, PC  
Mary M. Fritz, PC

Ethiopia (con't)

Warren R. Fritz, PC  
Grover Hudson, PC  
Milton H. Hurwitz, PC  
John Kulczycki, PC  
Richard C. Crepeau, PC  
Steven Lowenstein  
Arlene L. Mahoney, PC  
Genevieve G. Ott, PC  
Patricia V. Renner, PC  
Paul A. Renner, PC  
Anthony W. Vigo, PC  
Haskell G. Ward

Ghana

Barbara A. Bunce, PC  
Ellen Corcoran, PC  
Altamese Council  
John P. Demos, PC  
Virginia Demos  
Diane Dwyer, PC  
Peter Dybwad, PC  
Newell Flather, PC  
Carolyn Garlich  
George E. Gariepy, PC  
Frank Guido, PC  
David C. Hutchinson, PC  
S. W. Kendall, PC  
Robert M. Krisko, PC  
Alfred M. Lee, PC  
Thomas W. Livingston, PC  
Georgianna S. McGuire, PC  
Meryl B. Menon  
Peter Miller  
Kevin O'Reilly, PC  
Thomas H. Peterson, PC  
Martin Wallenstein  
Ruth M. Yarrow, PC

Guinea

Alan Ehrlich, PC

Guyana

Elaine Zingg, FI  
Otto Zingg, FI

Honduras

Charles R. Kniker  
Frances M. Ryan, PC  
Carole A. Snee, PC

Hong Kong

Ann L. Allen, IRS  
Edwin J. Allen, Jr., YIC  
Charles H. Blatchford, YIC  
Judith G. Blatchford, W-Y  
Allan C. Brown, YIC  
Tim Christoffersen, WUS  
Frost W. Hubbard, YIC  
Frank Kehl, DPA  
Gerry Poppen  
George W. Renwick, WIA  
Jon L. Saari, YIC  
Raymond L. Whitehead, UCBWM  
Rhea M. Whitehead, UCBWM  
Thomas B. Wiens, YIC  
Edmund H. Worthy, Jr., YIC

India

E. Edwin Brooks, PC  
Gerhard A. Elston, WUS  
Betty Fisher  
Robert B. Fowles, FS  
E. Reid Gilbert, FS  
Jerry G. Glashagel, YMCA  
Mike Maidenbergl, PC  
Cynthia Mazer  
Michael J. Mazer, FF  
Fred Munson  
Mary Munson  
Dian M. Satula, AFSC  
Eva Lynn Wilson, PC  
Robert Young

Indonesia

Deborah A. McKean, FI  
Philip F. McKean, FI

Iran

Eleanor Keelen, UPC  
James H. Reed, PC  
Ruth A. Stephenson  
Joseph S. Teller, PC

Ivory Coast

Marlyn H. Dalsimer, PC  
William R. Dalsimer, PC  
Anita J. Glaze, PC

Japan

Charlotte Bunch, YMCA  
Janet S. Carino  
Carolyn M. Clapp  
Mary David  
Judith Dollenmayer  
Paul Griesy  
Sonja Hedlund, MM  
Malcolm L. Huslander, MM  
William R. Jones, EM  
Frank Kuhlman, MM  
Martha Kuhlman, MM  
Juliana Thatcher, MM  
Anna M. Thomson, MM

Kenya

Anna H. Bedford, FI  
Jerry L. Bedford, FI  
Norman E. Hodges, OCA

Korea

David E. Ross

Lebanon

Perry A. Williams

Liberia

William J. Boerst, PC  
Barbara Ferguson, PC  
Karen McClearey, PC  
Rhoda Miller, PC  
Peter Schwab, PC  
George Vance, PC

Malawi

Bruce O. Boston, FI  
Sandra Boston, FI  
John H. Case, PC  
James Heaton, PC  
Jeffrey A. James, PC  
David H. Koehler, C  
Edwin P. Morgan, PC  
Dorothy Schindler, OCA

Malaysia

Julia Chang, PC  
Howard H. Hintz, PC  
Karol A. Kalvin, PC

Malaysia (con't)

Florence Kesselring, MM  
Gloria L. Laird, PC  
Frances C. Li, PC  
Barbara T. Sample, PC  
Neil J. Weintraub, PC

Mexico

John Fishel, AFSC  
Beverly Johnson, MM  
Mary H. O'Leary, AA  
E. Jane Stringer, AA

Morocco

Barbara J. Sims, PC

Nepal

Stephen A. Cole, PC  
Terry J. Deklotz, PC  
Thomas B. Smith, PC

Niger

Jeanne R. Strong, OCA  
James Thomson, PC

Nigeria

Harden P. Ballantine, PC  
Merle Beckwith, PC  
Edward H. Berman, AAAP  
Julia C. Berman  
Paul Bestock, PC  
Lorena Blount, PC  
Ross Blount, UNICEF  
Max Brandt, PC  
Peter A. Brigham, PC  
Charles J. Briody III, PC  
Aubrey N. Brown III, PC  
Marianne Burgbacher  
Carol T. Burke, PC  
William M. Burke, PC  
Barbara Callaway, OCA  
Cedric C. Clark, PC  
Will Craven, PC  
Sally Cytron, PC  
Henry J. Drewal, PC  
Harry S. Drexler, PC  
Maurice E. Edwards, PC  
Henry Etzkowitz, PC

Nigeria (con't)

Stanley Field, PC  
 Luanne Finkel, PC  
 Murray W. Frank, PC  
 Joan Franklin, PC  
 V. James Garofalo, PC  
 Norman Gary, PC  
 Arlene H. Goodyear, PC  
 Donald R. Goodyear, PC  
 James Gross, PC  
 Eugene M. Harrington, PC  
 Dorothy A. Hassfeld, PC  
 Anne E. Higgins, PC  
 Donald A. Johnson, PC  
 Mary Ellen Joseph, PC  
 Stephen D. Krasner, PC  
 Sonja Krause, PC  
 Roger Landrum, PC  
 John Lord, PC  
 John L. McClure, PC  
 Suzy McKee, PC  
 Janet I. MacLaughlin, OCA  
 Thomas C. Marinkovich, PC  
 Julian W. Martin, PC  
 Mary Jo Moore, PC  
 John J. Nevadomsky, PC  
 Paul Newman, PC  
 Doretha Nicholson, PC  
 Shirley A. Robinson, PC  
 Carol Rosenfeld, PC  
 Kathryn Rosentreter, PC  
 Thomas L. Russell, PC  
 Margaret Sebastian, PC  
 A. Ruth Steward, PC  
 Robert Teller, PC  
 Robert Titzler, PC  
 Michael J. Tudor, PC  
 Al Ulmer, PC  
 Robin L. Ulmer, PC  
 Cynthia Vanda, PC  
 John H. Winkelman, PC  
 Marqui P. Young, PC

Pakistan

Peter Von Christierson, PC  
 Charlotte Crawford, PC  
 Jean Ellickson, PC  
 William A. Guth, PC

Pakistan (con't)

Florence Hammond  
 Judith M. Hein, PC  
 Jack A. Jordan, PC  
 Rachel Jordan, PC  
 Robert G. McGuire III, PC  
 Murray Milner, Jr., CWS  
 Sylvia Milner, CWS  
 David G. Miller, PC  
 Robert C. Terry, Jr., EIL  
 Marilyn Vogt, PC  
 Evelyn M. Weaver, MM

Panama

Bryna Herbold, PC  
 Carl F. Herbold, Jr., PC  
 Rosalyn Kobrin, PC  
 Stephen Paschall, PC  
 Vivian Saggese, PC

Peru

Virginia H. Black, PC  
 Andrea Burchard, PC  
 Roderick E. Burchard, PC  
 Richard A. Corson, MM  
 Henry Dietz, PC  
 Ginger Dupont, AYE  
 Barbara Gurr, PC  
 Jeanne Hanna, PC  
 William B. Hutchinson  
 Robert deG. Jacobi, PC  
 Stephen McCutchan, PC  
 J. Thomas Mon Pere, PC  
 Ida Shoatz, PC

Philippines

George Allen, UCC  
 Anne H. Bing, PC  
 Constance E. Brew, PC  
 Virginia Cochran, PC  
 Linda Creamer, PC  
 Marjorie A. Donnelly, PC  
 James Dries, PC  
 Ann Gallagher, PC  
 Katherine E. Hodge, PC  
 Elizabeth F. Howard, PC  
 Richard E. Joyce  
 Andrea S. Lowenstein, PC



Philippines (con't)

Malcolm W. Mintz, PC  
Dennis O'Brien, PC  
Marjorie Pfankuch, PC  
Herbert A. Probasco, PC  
Nicholas N. Royal, PC  
Ruth Royal, PC  
John H. Schweitzer, PC  
Mara Taub, PC  
Joan M. Waymon, PC  
Jesse C. Wells, PC  
Robert M. Wernet, PC  
Susan Witty, PC  
Mary K. Ziegenhagen, PC

Rhodesia

Joanne Martiny

Senegal

Geoffrey S. Howard, PC  
M. Tamara Lieberman  
Michael Popkin, PC  
David W. Robinson, Jr., FI  
Rita Wald, PC

Sierra Leone

Deborah W. Birnberg, PC  
Wilbur Mellema, PC  
Kyle Ogden, PC  
Linda H. Portmore, OCA

Somalia

Ethan Gologor, PC  
Burton Unger, PC

Syrian Arab Republic

Shirley Worcester, USIA

Taiwan

Sarah T. Abbott  
John Langlors, PIA  
C. L. Salter, OIC  
Linda Salter, OIC  
Alice Simpson, UPC  
Mark C. Thelin, OIC  
J. David Witwer

Tanzania

Kimberly Bush, Jr., AFSC  
Thomas D. Elkinton, AFSC-VISA  
Peter B. Evans, VTA  
Elise Forbes, VTA  
Gail M. Gillam, VTA  
David Giltron, AFSC  
Arden W. Holland, TEA  
Anita Johnson, PC  
G. Randall Kehler, VTA  
Michael R. Lanzano, TEA  
Jennifer Leaning, VTA  
L. Lloyd Morgan, PC  
Helen T. Muller, AFSC  
Werner E. Muller, Jr., AFSC  
Robert Myers, FF  
Glen J. Percy, VTA  
George H. Phillips, TEA  
Catherine Robins, VTA  
Christopher St. John, VTA  
Burton A. Segall, PC  
Mary E. Segall, PC  
David A. Shiman, TEA  
Barbara Slemmer, AFSC  
Robert R. Viscount, TEA  
David Wendt, VTA  
Mary Wilgress, AFSC  
Oliver Wilgress, AFSC  
Robert Wood, VTA  
Mary Yarwood, VTA

Thailand

Stephen Andors, PC  
Judith H. Bernstein, PC  
Margaret Ann Boyd, PC  
Robert R. Brauning, YMCA  
Dean Brodkey, PC  
Betty Lee Hawthorne, PC  
Mark Hawthorne, PC  
Clarence M. Nagao

Togo

Wallis Reid, PC

Turkey

Richard L. Faust  
Elizabeth Glass, PC  
Dorien Grunbaum  
Frank Neubauer, PC  
Miriam L. Pollack, FS  
Joseph A. Stork, PC  
Virginia Thelin, UCC

Tunisia

Henry L. Jennings, PC  
Nancy L. Lynn, PC

Uganda

James Wallace, TEA  
John Woelfil, TEA

United Arab Republic (Egypt)

Faye Edwards, UPC  
Evelyn Hatch, USIS

Venezuela

Melvin J. Bloom, PC  
David B. Essner, ACCION  
Stella S. Goyo, PC  
Roger Huitric, PC  
Karen Lindberg, PC  
Gilbert F. Whipple, ACCION

Vietnam

Eric Crystal, USAID  
John R. Garrett, VAA  
Susan Garrett, VAA  
Robert Green  
William E. Rutherford, ESL

Zambia

Tina Bristol  
Dorothy M. Bristol, AFSC  
James JE. Bristol, AFSC

Additional Signers

Jeanne Ballantine  
Frank Alsid de Chambeau, EVA  
Jane Falk  
Alice Hageman, FI  
Clare Hammann, EVS  
George W. Kittle, PC  
Barbara Lambie, IVS  
Michael S. Littleton, PC  
Timothy E. Lush, SCI  
Margaret C. Mudd  
Marion Mudd

Signatories served abroad with the following agencies:

ACCION

Afro-Anglo-American Program (AAP)  
American Baptist Foreign Mission Society (ABMS)  
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)  
Amigos Anonymous (AA)  
Church World Service (CWS)  
Comité Inter-Mouvement auprès des Evacués (CIMADE)  
Dartmouth Project Asia (DPA)  
Episcopal Mission (EM)  
Ecumenical Voluntary Service (EVS)  
Experiment in International Living (ELI)  
Ford Foundation (FF)  
Frontier Intern (FI)  
Fulbright Scholar (FS)  
International Rescue Committee (IRC)  
International Christian Youth Exchange (ICYE)  
Methodist Mission (MM)  
Oberlin in China (OIC)  
Operation Crossroads Africa (OCA)  
Overseas Voluntary Service (OVS)  
Peace Corps (PC)  
Princeton in Asia (PIA)  
Service Civil International (SCI)  
Teachers for East Africa (TEA)  
United Church Board for World Missionaries (UCBWM)  
United Church of Christ (UCC)  
UNICEF  
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)  
United States Information Service (USIS)  
United Presbyterian Church (UPC)  
Vietnamese American Association (VAA)  
Volunteer Teachers for Africa (VTA)  
Wellesley-Yenching Representative (W-Y)  
Williams in Asia (WIA)  
World Student Christian Federation (WSCF)  
World University Service (WUS)  
Yale in China (YIC)  
Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA)

*Pres file*

~~SECRET--LIMDIS~~

Wednesday, February 8, 1967  
7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Kohler reports  
on his execution of his task this  
morning.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET--LIMDIS~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ng, NARA, Date 2-8-91

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-291

By inf, NARA, Date 11-21-91~~SECRET--LIMDIS~~

Memorandum of Conversation, February 8, 1967

Subject: Chairman Kosygin's Statements in the U. K.

Participants: Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin  
Deputy Under Secretary Foy D. Kohler

Ambassador Dobrynin called on me at 11:00 a.m. today at my request.

I told the Ambassador that I had been asked to express to him the President's concern lest Chairman Kosygin in his press and TV conferences in the U. K. makes statements which would complicate the President's problems here connected with relations between the two countries. In this connection, I cited the efforts we are making to find a peaceful solution in Viet-Nam, the discussion regarding ABM deployment, and the efforts being made for ratification of the Consular Convention and Outer Space Treaties in the Senate as well as obtaining East-West legislation. I said the President hoped that Chairman Kosygin would find it appropriate in the circumstances to exercise restraint in his statements in the U. K. which would be immediately and widely publicized here. I specifically requested the Ambassador to pass this message to Chairman Kosygin.

The Ambassador responded that he would pass this message to Chairman Kosygin. He added that, of course, our differences on Viet-Nam were a considerable obstacle. I said that, much as we would like it, we certainly were not asking for a change in Soviet policy at this point. However, we did hope that Chairman Kosygin would take into account the importance to our relations of these many questions now pending and would find it possible not to let himself be pressed into statements which might complicate matters here or be injurious to the process of solution of some of the problems between us. Ambassador Dobrynin said he understood.

~~SECRET--LIMDIS~~



Wed., Feb. 8, 1967  
7:05 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Clark Clifford called to report the following.

Gordon Gray called Jordan's and Ervin's Administrative Assistants to get a feel of how they stood after his talk with them.

Both the assistants are pro the Consular Convention and hope their Senators will vote that way.

Ervin's assistant reports that only Russell has a chance to push Ervin over the line.

Jordan's assistant reports that Gordon Gray made a real impression; he is ripe; and believes a call from you might get his vote.

W. W. R.

45

Wednesday, Feb. 8, 1967  
7:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

When I called Joe Alsop, as you instructed, it turned out he already had a call in to me. I had him in briefly this afternoon. Instead of my telling him a story, he began to tell me one, as follows:

"I am about to write a story which, I guess, would better come from me than anyone else. The story will be on 'what has really happened in negotiations. '"

I said: Tell me, Joe. He said: It now seems that at the end of last year, Hanoi decided to negotiate. Their formula was negotiations for a stoppage of bombings. They presented this to you in Warsaw and you told them that we would require a de-escalatory action. The talks then broke down. They are now reviving them through Senator Kennedy's contact in Paris. "

I said the story is not true, but I limited myself to these points:

-- there was literally no contact in Warsaw;

-- the issue was not as he described it, and the bombing on the 13th-14th had nothing to do with the matter because the Poles told us bombing itself might be discussed; but nothing was discussed;

-- as for Paris, there was no contact, but only a theory.

Joe said, "Manac'h's theory?" I said "Yes." He said, "But I understand Hanoi confirmed Manac'h's theory." And he went on: Why did the French government, which had confirmed the text of Bobby's interview, deny it? I told him that the confirmation of Manac'h's theory was not done by Hanoi but was merely, on Manac'h's word, a general assent by their man in Paris. In fact, no North Vietnamese official has gone one word beyond the Hanoi statement that there could be talks if bombing stopped.

I went into this a bit because it was clear from what he said that he has been talking to Bobby. He then asked me what contacts do you have? I said I would tell him nothing about contacts except the following; and I went through the same three points I had been through with Potter, Marquis Childs, etc., yesterday:

-- there is a big psychological warfare offensive designed to make us stop the bombing of which these noises are a part;

-- there are ample opportunities for Hanoi to speak directly to us, but we have nothing beyond the statement of possible willingness to talk if we unconditionally stop bombing;

-- we are checking out with the greatest care all leads, no matter how tenuous.

I gather that Bobby gave Joe some kind of account of how he got to the White House and what transpired there.

I go into this detail so that you get the flavor of it. It is possible that his talk with me headed Joe off from a story that would have been damaging and corrupted his rather useful line on "no bombing cessation for talks." But we shall see.

Incidentally, he said Bobby would talk not about Vietnam policy tonight, but about China. We shall see how good his intelligence is.

W. W. R.

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, February 8, 1967

~~SECRET~~

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Summary

Pres file 2/6

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By isp, NARA, Date 12-2-93

1. German Offset

The British are very concerned with offset developments. The British Ambassador called on Secretary Rusk yesterday. He said there will be great pressure to pull all British troops out of Germany when it becomes known that Bonn cannot pay the 50-60 million pounds in offset which the British had counted on. Wilson is disturbed, and wants to send a special representative to Washington next week to discuss this.

2. East European Meeting in Warsaw

The Soviets had planned a meeting of Foreign Ministers in East Germany to discuss Bonn's recent -- and promising -- diplomatic offensive in East Europe. The Romanians balked and forced the transfer of the meeting to Warsaw. The Romanians are only sending a deputy foreign minister. He has been instructed to walk out if the Soviets criticize Romania's establishment of diplomatic ties with Bonn. The best bet is that the meeting will focus on Peking developments. They may talk "around" the Bonn question.

3. Wheat to Yugoslavia

We have told Belgrade, the Yugoslavs can buy 50,000 tons of wheat under CCC credit. They may buy another 50,000 tons later, and we are willing to consider an additional 300,000 tons.

4. Soviets Ask Overflights in Laos

Premier Souvanna has told us the Soviets have renewed their request for overflights of Soviet planes traveling from Rangoon to Hanoi. Souvanna got the impression that the request was "fairly urgent." This is clearly a reflection of Soviet troubles with Communist China. Souvanna has asked for a formal

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- 2 -

request in writing with details. He will tell us when he has the note in hand. His inclination is to grant the Soviet request for a "reasonable number" of such flights of civil aircraft.

5. Sino-Soviet Relations

You have seen the reports of mutual harassment of Embassies in Peking and Moscow. Pravda yesterday printed an item from an Italian paper stating that the Chinese hoped to force the Soviets to break official relations. Publication of such an item may be quite significant. It raises for the first time the real possibility of a diplomatic break between the big Communist powers.

/S/  
W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~



Feb. 8, 1967

47

Your Holiness:

I deeply appreciate your message, which is a great source of spiritual support. I devoutly share your wish that the suspension of hostilities over the Lunar New Year may be extended and may open the way to negotiations for a just and stable peace. The Governments of the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam, together with others, are devoting intensive efforts to this end. As you know, the Government of Viet-Nam has twice signified its readiness to discuss an extension of the truce with representatives of the other side.

We are prepared to talk at any time and place, in any forum, with the object of bringing peace to Viet-Nam.

In this connection we would be prepared to discuss the mutual, balanced reduction in military activity or violence, the cessation of hostilities, or practical arrangements which could lead to these results.

We shall continue our efforts for a peaceful and honorable settlement until they are crowned with success.

With great respect,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By ing, NARA, Date 12-2-93

Feb. 8, 1967

48

Your Holiness:

I deeply appreciate your message, which is a great source of spiritual support. I devoutly share your wish that the suspension of hostilities over the Lunar New Year may open the way to negotiations for a just and stable peace. The Governments of the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam, together with others, are devoting intensive efforts to this end. ~~As you know~~ <sup>As you know</sup>

The Government of Viet-Nam has twice signified its readiness to discuss an extension of the truce with representatives of the other side.

~~As you know~~ We are prepared to talk at any time and place, in any forum, with the object of bringing peace to Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia.

We are prepared for any mutual, balanced reduction in military activity or violence.

But we would be untrue to our own people and to others who depend upon us if we were to reduce unilaterally our military action merely in response to an expressed willingness to talk.

We shall continue our efforts for a peaceful and honorable settlement until they are crowned with success.

With great respect,

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By 478, NARA, Date 12-2-93

Lyndon B. Johnson

February 8, 1967

*Pres. file 111*

Mr. President:

The attached memorandum from Secretary Rusk gives Ambassador Goldberg's itinerary and requests your authorization to advise the Embassies en route and ask them to consult with the governments concerned.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

It looks doubtful that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will be able to hear testimony on the Space Treaty next week. However, Ambassador Goldberg is prepared to modify his itinerary at any point in order to return for the hearings.

Secretary Rusk also requests that you authorize a Presidential plane. Col. Cross' office has been informed and will arrange it if you approve.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

W. W. Rostow

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 7, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Ambassador Goldberg's  
Far Eastern Trip

As you requested, Ambassador Goldberg and I have reviewed and agreed upon the attached itinerary for his trip to Europe and the Far East. The trip would begin about the 17th of February and would take Ambassador Goldberg to various capitals, returning to New York about mid March. This itinerary is based on the assumption that we can secure the agreement of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hear our testimony on the Space Treaty sometime next week.

I intend promptly to inform our posts with a view to getting any suggestions they might have to assure the most effective use of Ambassador Goldberg's time.

Attached is the draft cable I propose to send which contains the itinerary of the trip. In view of the many stops, Ambassador Goldberg will require government transportation.

*Dean Rusk*  
Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Proposed Itinerary.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-291  
By *imp*, NARA, Date 11-21-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT TO: Amembassy LONDON  
" PARIS  
" ROME  
" BUCHAREST  
" SAIGON  
" BANGKOK  
" MANILA  
" RANGOON  
" DJAKARTA  
" TOKYO  
" SEOUL  
" TAIWAN

INFO: USUN NEW YORK  
STATE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-291  
By 48, NARA, Date 11-21-91

1. At request of the President, and with my endorsement, Ambassador Goldberg will make an extensive trip to various capitals. He will be accompanied by Mrs. Goldberg. As indicated in White House announcement today, trip is primarily fact-finding trip for the President. Trip will also give Ambassador Goldberg opportunity to: (a) discuss number of UN issues with governments concerned; (b) familiarize himself with number of specific problems of region (Far East); and (c) to attend Far Eastern Chiefs of Mission Conference in Manila. Ambassador Goldberg will also discuss and explain

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

and explain US policy in Vietnam where appropriate.

2. Would appreciate, after consultation with Government to which you accredited, comments and suggestions from all addressees as to most effective use of time available.

Following is itinerary.

February 17-18 - London - to discuss African issues and any more recent Vietnamese developments with high-level UK officials.

February 19-20-21 - Paris - to exchange views in NAC on UN matters; and to consult with French Government.

February 22-23 - Rome - to consult with Italian officials on UN matters, and if there are indications that Vatican desires further briefings, with Pope.

February 24-25-26 - Bucharest - to respond affirmatively to previous Rumanian invitation to Amb. Goldberg last year which latter unable to fulfill due to other commitments.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

February 27-March 1 - Saigon - briefing on Vietnam; review  
UN programs in Vietnam to  
develop additional recommenda-  
tions; to meet with high-level  
Vietnamese officials including  
members of Constituent Assembly.

March 2-3-4 - Bangkok - to meet with Thai officials and visit  
and consult on ECAFE, SEATO, ASA and  
Asian Development Bank.

March 5-6-7-8 - Manila - attend and address Chiefs of  
Mission Conference.

March 9-10 - Rangoon - to bring up to date Ne Win on recent  
developments.

March 11-12-13 - Djakarta - to discuss UN matters.

March 14-15-16 - Tokyo - to discuss UN matters and Asian  
development plans.

March 17-18 - Seoul - to discuss UN matters

March 19-20 - Taiwan

March 21 - Leave for New York.

END

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Wednesday, February 8, 1967

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Reply to Condolence Letter from Ambassador Dobrynin**

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin wrote to you expressing his sympathy in the loss of astronauts Grissom, White and Chaffee.

A draft reply has been prepared for your signature.

In the event you do not wish to reply directly, I can reply on your behalf.

W. W. Rostow

\_\_\_\_\_ I have signed

\_\_\_\_\_ You reply for me

WWR:BKS:amc

50a

FEB 9 1967

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the families of Astronauts Grissom, White and Chaffee and of the American people, I express our deep appreciation for your message of condolence for the tragic loss at Cape Kennedy. Your letter has been sent to the Astronauts' families.

These men were truly envoys of all mankind. There could be no better way to serve their memory than for all nations to join together in the task of understanding our space environment and in its successful exploration.

Sincerely,

*LBJ*

His Excellency  
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin  
Ambassador of the Union of  
Soviet Socialist Republics

LBJ:BKS:em (2/8/67)

Washington, D.C., January 28, 1967.


Dear Mr. President:

It was with the greatest sorrow that I learned of the tragic death of the three United State's astronauts - Virgil I. Grissom, Edward H. White II and Roger B. Chaffee, crew members of Apollo 1. Please, accept, Mr. President, my deepest sympathy in the loss of the three valiant men.

The three astronauts, without doubt, could have made a new contribution to the peaceful exploration of the outer space new vistas to which were opened by the space Treaty, signed yesterday.

Please convey my sincere condolences to the families of the deceased astronauts.

Very sincerely yours,



Anatoly F. Dobrynin



*Pres file*

Wednesday - February 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Birthday Greetings

State recommends that you send birthday greetings to Prime Minister Burnham (Tab A). He will be 44 on February 20. This is his first birthday in office since Guyana gained independence. I concur.

Approve ☐

Disapprove ☐

Jamaican Prime Minister Bustamante celebrates his 83rd birthday on February 24. He has recently announced that he will not be a candidate in the February 21 national elections and is retiring from public life. State recommends a birthday message which also pays tribute to his long record of distinguished service to his country (Tab B). I concur.

Approve ☐

Disapprove ☐

W. W. Rostow

Attachments :

Tab A -- Birthday greeting to Prime Minister Burnham of Guyana.

Tab B -- Birthday greeting to Jamaican Prime Minister Bustamante.

SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

TO SIR ALEXANDER BUSTAMANTE, JAMAICAN PRIME MINISTER

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

On the occasion of your eighty-third birthday, I send you my warmest regards and best wishes,

I know of your recent decision to retire from active public life. As you lay down the burdens of high office, I want to express warm admiration for your long record of distinguished service to your country and the cause of freedom. I will always be grateful for your close and continuing friendship.

Lyndon B. Johnson

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PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL GREETING  
TO PRIME MINISTER FORBES BURNHAM OF GUYANA ON FEBRUARY 20,  
1967

On this very special birthday Mrs. Johnson and I send warmest  
personal greetings and best wishes for your continued happiness.

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

2/8/67

52

(via private wire to London)

Personal for Michael Palliser from Walt Rostow

You should know <sup>we are</sup> ~~President~~ greatly <sup>distressed</sup> ~~disturbed~~ by PM's Parliamentary response to question on Polish contact as reported here. We have held the facts tightly in this government and have severely avoided any response, analysis, or explanation of that series of exchanges.

We are by no means convinced that there was a misunderstanding. Other explanations better fit the facts as we know them.

In any case it is the strong feeling here that public discussion, leaks, etc., are incompatible with the enterprise in which we are engaged, which includes a half million of our fighting men.

I'm sure you will understand.

Good hunting.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By sig, NARA, Date 12-2-93

Wednesday, February 8, 1967  
9:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this call from my old German friend Walther Casper. I am sure he is in good faith; and I have the same suspicion of Strauss.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By ing, NARA, Date 12-2-93

WWRostow:rlh



53a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, February 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

A close German friend in the liberal wing of the CDU, Walther Casper, called me this morning from Frankfurt. He said he was telephoning me as a matter of conscience and to give me some information and background for Willy Brandt's talks in Washington.

the  
1. Brandt will be in a difficult position in talking about/offset because of the budgetary situation and because very few German politicians know that we are willing to consider forms of offset other than the purchase of military hardware. For example, Helmut Schmidt of the SPD did not appear to understand that this was our position.

2. With respect to Strauss, he fears that he is playing this issue and the misunderstanding in Germany, in order to force a crisis between Germany and the U. S., which would strengthen the position of France on the continent and the position of pro-French politicians in Germany.

3. Therefore, he recommends that we find on the occasion of Willy Brandt's visit -- in a communique or otherwise -- an occasion to make clear publicly that while we will be seeking a full offset or neutralization of foreign exchange consequences of keeping troops in Germany, we do not regard the purchase of military hardware as the only route to this result.

W. W. Rostow

*cy to Ben Read S/S*  
*cy to Bator*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By ip, NARA, Date 12-2-93

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres. file*

Wednesday - February 8, 1967

Mr. President:

On his departure from the US, President-elect Costa e Silva sent you the message at Tab B.

I recommend that you send the acknowledgement at Tab A.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tabs A and B.

59a

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO  
BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT-ELECT COSTA e SILVA

Dear Mr. President-elect:

Thank you for your kind message. Mrs. Johnson and I enjoyed meeting you and Mrs. Costa e Silva, and we are gratified that your visit to our country was pleasant and fruitful. You made many friends in Washington who are looking forward to continuing close collaboration with your government.

I was glad to have the opportunity to exchange views with you on major issues. I hope that you will feel free to communicate personally with me in the future concerning such questions, as I plan to do with you. I am looking forward to seeing you again at the Meeting of American Presidents, where we will work together to promote the economic and social development of the hemisphere.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM BRAZILIAN  
PRESIDENT-ELECT COSTA e SILVA

New York, N. Y.

1957 February 1 - 4:59 p.m.

The President

The White House

At the moment of my departure from the American soil, I want to express to Your Excellency and Mrs. Johnson the profound appreciation of my wife and myself for the wonderful reception accorded to us during our fourteen days in your beautiful and generous country. I would like also to express my thanks to the members of Your Excellency's Government and to all those authorities who helped make our stay so pleasant and so fruitful. My visit to the United States of America confirms once more the great importance of the long-standing friendship between our two countries.

Please accept the expression of my warmest personal regards.

Arthur da Costa e Silva.

55  
~~SECRET~~

Wednesday  
February 8, 1967  
7:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

A briefer talking paper will be  
up tomorrow morning early.

W. W. Rostow

Memo for the President, "Your Talk with King Hassan."

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ry, NARA, Date 2-8-91

WWRostow:rlh



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-20  
By id, NARA Date 10-25-99

~~SECRET~~

February 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with King Hassan

King Hassan sets especially great store by his meeting with you. When he saw President Kennedy in 1963, they negotiated the terms under which we stayed on under cover at our naval intelligence and commo base at Kenitra after closing down our big SAC bases. He has more reason than many of our smaller-country visitors for figuring that the way to do business with the U. S. is to sit down with the President.

From our point of view, there is no such burning issue as the base question this time. The visit is mostly his initiative.

From his point of view, however, the visit will be crucial in determining where his big-power support will come from. He is at odds with De Gaulle, his former mentor. German economic and military help has been disappointing. He disputes Spain's claim to the phosphate-rich Spanish Sahara. He doesn't trust the USSR, which has sent \$180 million in military equipment to Algeria. A closer relationship with the U. S. seems his best remaining bet.

In fact, when Joe Palmer visited him a couple of weeks ago, he suggested a U. S. alliance with African moderates like himself, Bourguiba, Haile Selassie and a couple of others. He's deadly serious about this and even argues that we may welcome some such SEATO-like grouping a few years from now when the next Viet Nam breaks out--in Africa. Like Bourguiba, he has offered us extensive base rights in return.

He probably won't expect you to take him up on this, but the offer is a measure of his worry. His main interest in talking with you is to discuss the Algerian threat. He'll probably settle for an OK on his request for \$14 million in military sales, but he may probe pretty hard to see how far we'd go in coming to his aid.

In answering this pitch, you can explain your political problems with such commitments. You can tell him of our willingness to sell military equipment to the amount of \$14 million, which he requested. You can say we'd be deeply concerned by any attack on him.

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~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

However, it would also help if you could outline our hope for North African regional cooperation. You might describe the spirit of regionalism you found in Manila and elsewhere on your Asian trip. With all of their resources and advanced economic base, it would be tragic if the North African nations let suspicion undercut what they could accomplish together. This is why we are reluctant to see Morocco spend too much on arms. You'll have to concede that Algeria is a problem, but you may find a way to point out gently that both Algeria and Spain are seriously worried about Morocco's own territorial claims against them.

Hassan will also want to discuss food, and you can tell him you've approved his wheat sale for the second half of the year (167,000 tons). In doing so, you might want to give him your picture of the world food problem and your own political difficulties in continuing food aid. Morocco suffered drought last summer and has launched a crash fertilizer project (which we're helping with). But population growth is still ahead of food production, and encouragement from you would help. The King wrote you a good letter last fall on what Morocco is doing in agriculture, but he's still in the stage of talking a better game than he plays.

The same is generally true of his whole developmental effort. He's done a lot of basic work in the foothills but hasn't begun to climb yet (see attached charts). However, AID has picked Morocco as one of its concentration countries. That doesn't mean we'll be spending a lot of money there. It does mean that our aid has dropped sharply from the artificially high level (over \$70 million at the peak) of the years when we were paying "rent" for our SAC bases and is now seeking a more appropriate level (around \$10 million).

In connection with our food aid, you'll want to note the restrictions Congress has put on the program. The Findley amendment causes us special trouble with Morocco, which barter phosphates for badly needed Cuban sugar. We've tried--so far without success--to help the Moroccans find a better deal elsewhere. Nevertheless, Hassan is ready to give you his personal assurance that he will phase this trade down. It's on the basis of his assurance that you will be signing the Findley waiver.

Leonard Marks would like you to ask for a firmer tenure (now year-to-year) for his Voice of America relay transmitter. If he could nail that down, he might delay building a new \$25 million facility in Spain. However, State feels we ought to let sleeping dogs lie. In negotiating our stay at the naval commo station, President Kennedy mentioned five years, which would expire in 1968. Nevertheless, we're in a better position not

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 3 -

raising the subject and making the Moroccans ask us to leave. If the King raises the subject, you could express our appreciation and confirm our desire to stay.

I ought to warn you that these talks are more likely than most to take an unexpected turn. The King is something of a prima donna. He may, for instance, press hard for an answer on the security guarantee and, when you don't give him one, ask to come back and see you again Friday. (He got an extra meeting with President Kennedy.) You will sense how to handle him, but forewarned is forearmed.

The King may also press for a communique, which we don't normally include in this simpler visit format. My solution to this would be to ask George Christian at his Thursday afternoon briefing to make a fairly formal statement of subjects discussed which we might check with the King's party. He could announce the PL 480 deal then and perhaps a couple of smaller loans ~~that are ready to go~~. He could even invite one of the King's party to be present.


State's briefing memo is attached. Secretary Rusk's involvement with Brandt has so far kept him from signing the original. However, this does represent the Department's recommendation. I believe our discussion at lunch Tuesday gives you most of the background you need so doubt you will need to look at background papers. I'll have a last-minute talking paper for you in the morning.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

# MOROCCO - AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Indexes 1957-59=100




PC/SRD 1-27-67

556

CONFIDENTIAL

# MOROCCO - U. S. ASSISTANCE

## Trend of Net Obligations and Loan Authorizations



<sup>a</sup>/Excludes Export-Import Bank long-term loan of \$25.6 million in FY 1966  
<sup>b</sup>/A.I.D. only in FY 1967 and FY 1968

PC/SRD 1-27-67

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

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














By inf

NARA, Date

11-21-91



# MOROCCO--ECONOMIC COMPARISONS

ITEM	MOROCCO	JAPAN	MEXICO	PAKISTAN	NETHERLANDS
GNP PER CAPITA 1965					
GNP GROWTH ANNUAL RATE 1960-1965	3.6%	9.7%	5.9%	5.4%	4.7%
DEFENSE EXPEND. AS PERCENT OF GNP	0.5%	1.1%	0.6%	3.1% (BEFORE KASHMIR)	4.0%
GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE AS PERCENT OF 1965 IMPORTS					
DEBT OF CENTRAL GOV'T AS PERCENT OF GNP					

436  
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THE SECRETARY OF STAT.  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meetings with King Hassan II  
of Morocco

King Hassan is coming to the United States primarily to meet and talk with you, which he has wanted to do for some time. You will recall that he was to have had lunch with you last December on the occasion of his proposed visit to the UN, but that his trip was postponed in view of your operation. The King visited the United States as Crown Prince and came again as King on a State visit in March 1963.

Our purpose in inviting the King has been to demonstrate our general interest in Morocco. For his part, however, the King has become increasingly alarmed over the danger he sees for Morocco in the buildup of Soviet-supplied arms in neighboring Algeria. He will particularly want to use his meeting with you to emphasize his anxieties and to seek your help, through arms assistance and perhaps a defense commitment, in providing for Moroccan security.

Politically, the King can count on the traditional fidelity of the Moroccan people for the monarchy. Opposition parties exist but are frustrated. Among the youth and in the cities there is considerable dissatisfaction, but the King continues to enjoy substantial

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- E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-291

By 11-15-91, NARA, Date 11-15-91

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not automatically declassified.

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popularity in the country at large. With the prestige which enshrines the monarchy and the loyalty of Morocco's efficient army and security services, the King seems well able to control the internal situation and the monarchy continues to provide an essential element of stability and progress.

Economically, Morocco is plagued by the problems of most developing nations, including unemployment, under-investment, sagging agricultural output and a galloping birthrate. Under the U.S. assistance program, we are helping Morocco improve its agricultural production.

In foreign relations Hassan tries to remain on good terms with the African and Arab states and to avoid so far as possible the criticisms of the "revolutionary" states in the third world. He is presently on bad terms with France (over the Ben Barka scandal) and with Spain (because of his pressures to acquire Spanish Sahara). In addition, he has serious unresolved controversies, also arising from Moroccan territorial claims, with Algeria and Mauritania. He made a State visit to the Soviet Union in October 1966, but limited remarks on Viet-Nam in the joint communique to a hope for peace and a vague criticism of "foreign intervention".

Since becoming King, Hassan has worked generally to achieve closer relationships between the U.S. and Morocco. While he undoubtedly wants such ties on their merits, recent circumstances, including the deterioration in his relations with France, have prompted him to look more and more in our direction for help.

I enclose talking points on questions for discussion with the King.

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Topics the King May Raise
2. Recommended Topics to Raise

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Topics King May Raise

World Problems: The King will want a general review of the world situation with you and in particular will probably want to ascertain the latest U.S. attitudes on Vietnam, developments in China, U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, and Near East and African problems.

Morocco's Need for U.S. Support: This will be the King's primary interest. He has a shrewd political instinct, a quick mind and a talent for using conversation as a probing device. He will be employing all his wits to try to find out the extent to which he can rely on U.S. support to insure Moroccan security, particularly in the event of an attack by Algeria, and to help him over his economic difficulties. He will presumably emphasize particularly his need for arms, referring to his still-unanswered request of last May to buy \$14 million in tanks and anti-tank equipment and his more recent interest in obtaining radar and transport planes as well. (Morocco is already receiving a squadron of twelve F-5 jet fighters from us under an earlier agreement.)

To bolster his argument, the King may refer to Morocco's strategic location, guarding the Straits of Gibraltar and the southern flank of NATO. He may note the presence in Morocco of an important U.S. naval communications facility (at Kenitra) and a Voice of America radio relay station (at Tangier). He may add other examples to show that the U.S. has vital interests in his country.

The King may specifically raise with you, as he already has with Assistant Secretary Palmer, his willingness to enter into a formal political and military alliance together with the United States, under which, in return for our commitment to Moroccan security, the King would be prepared to grant us military bases or other facilities we may need. (It should be noted that

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NLJ 99-21

By is, NARA Date 10-25-99

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-2-

President Bourguiba of Tunisia, who will be visiting you in June, is seeking much the same kind of agreement.)

I recommend that you assure the King of our continuing close attention to his security problems. We see no present evidence of aggressive intentions on the part of Algeria and it is our estimate that Algeria will not in any event have the military capability of launching a serious attack for some time.

You may want to make sure the King realizes that it is not feasible for the U.S. to undertake a written or even oral commitment to Morocco's defense, but you can emphasize our obvious interest in Morocco and assure him that we would be deeply concerned over any clear aggression against his country.

In response to his request for arms, you can say that we have examined carefully the joint intelligence assessment of the Algerian arms buildup by our respective military experts in Rabat. You have already received from the U.S. Department of Defense a carefully-considered estimate of Morocco's additional military needs. On this basis, you are pleased to inform the King of our willingness in principle to sell to Morocco military equipment to the value of \$14 million, the amount he has requested.

The sale would be made on favorable credit and payment terms, thus relieving the burden on the Moroccan budget. Details will have to be worked out with the Moroccans by our Embassy in Rabat. Deliveries will inevitably have to be spread over several years.

Moreover, we consider the sale subject to the following assurances, which are fully in line with Moroccan policy: that the equipment will be used only for defense; that Morocco's economy will not suffer as a result of the purchase; that Morocco will continue to work for regional cooperation; and that Morocco is committed to the peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes.

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In addition to obtaining the King's acceptance of the foregoing conditions, it is important to ask his cooperation in minimizing public discussion on this military assistance. You can say too much press attention has been given already to the arms buildup in North Africa and that a number of our friends, including the Spanish, have expressed considerable anxiety about how we might respond to the Moroccan request for arms.

I recommend that you tell the King we therefore propose if necessary to inform the press merely that the U.S. is prepared to respond to a Moroccan request for limited additional arms purchases for defensive purposes. We hope the press can be induced to concentrate on other aspects of the visit, particularly the discussion on agricultural improvements in Morocco.

Kenitra Naval Communications Center and VOA Tangier: If the King should refer to the presence of these facilities, I recommend that you acknowledge their importance to us, express our appreciation to Morocco and confirm that we would like to keep them.

Spanish Sahara: If the King raises this subject, you can say that we consider it essential that the matter be settled peacefully and that, as all interested parties are committed to the principle of self-determination for the territory, a peaceful settlement should be possible. As Spain and Morocco need each other's friendship, they should be able to find some way to talk out their differences.

Morocco's Relations with France: Should the King express concern over the possibility of a rupture with France, you may wish to make clear to the King that the limited assistance the U.S. can provide does not offer a feasible alternative to French help. While we are sympathetic to Morocco's difficulties with France, we consider it important that French-Moroccan cooperation be preserved.

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Recommended Topics to Raise

Agriculture and Population Pressures: I think this is the most important subject for you to raise with the King. You can refer to your exchange of letters of several months ago with the King on the food problem and say that helping to increase agricultural productivity in developing countries like Morocco is one of the most important aims of U.S. foreign assistance today. You can compliment the King on various self-help measures already begun in Morocco and emphasize particularly your interest in the U.S.-supported program for increasing agricultural output (through fertilizers, seed selection, closed circuit TV, etc.). It would be useful to refer also to the role of the IBRD and to express the strong hope that the IBRD's recommendations for improvement in agricultural administration will be heeded. You can also express interest in the steps Morocco has taken to introduce family planning.

Finally, you can say you are pleased to inform the King that you have just approved a PL-480 sale of 167,000 tons of wheat for Morocco (half under Title I, half under Title IV).

North African Regional Development: Morocco's infrastructure and human resources make of it a vital element in any North African organism for regional cooperation. Although there are political difficulties involving the mutual Moroccan and Algerian hostility, Morocco should be encouraged to move ahead with realistic regional projects. I recommend that you suggest to King Hassan that Morocco concentrate on exploring the possibilities for advancing regional cooperation.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
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By inf, NARA, Date 11-21-91

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Morocco's Trade with Cuba: Morocco's trade with Cuba helps--however unintentionally--to provide the economic strength for Castro's regime to carry out subversion in Africa and elsewhere. While the King has agreed to reduce phosphate and other exports to Cuba, in order to qualify for PL-480 assistance under the Findley amendment, he may show some resentment over the economic hardship he claims this will cause Morocco. You may wish to stress your responsibility to observe the legislative requirements and to point out moreover that these requirements are directed against the very real dangers of Cuban subversion in Africa and elsewhere. You have approved a waiver for Morocco under the Findley amendment on the understanding that its exports to Cuba will be significantly reduced.

~~SECRET~~

VISIT OF KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO  
February 9-10, 1967

SCOPE PAPER

King Hassan is coming to the United States largely on his own initiative and primarily to meet with the President. He has wanted to consult with the President since 1964, and his desire has taken on a note of urgency during the past year. Because of the deterioration of his relations with France, a continuing fear of Algeria, and economic problems, the King is canvassing possibilities for military, economic and political assistance. Morocco is a friendly state, moderate in Arab, African and international councils and privately sympathetic to our position on Viet-Nam. We have an important Atlantic-Mediterranean naval communications facility there and a transmitting station for the Voice of America Africa and Middle East broadcasts.

Morocco's continuing primary concern is over unresolved problems with neighboring Algeria, and an estimated \$180 million worth of arms Algeria has received from the Soviet Union since the border conflict with Morocco in 1963. As a result, a considerable military imbalance exists. The King will almost certainly highlight his concern, and the concern of his military officers, about the modern Algerian arsenal and about Soviet motives for its use. The King will be interested in our attitude toward augmenting Morocco's defenses.

Morocco has received \$38 million worth of military supplies from the United States since 1960, and last year the King asked to buy \$12-\$14 million worth of tanks and anti-tank equipment. King Hassan has said that friendship is not a one way street and should the United States be willing to help in this situation, he would like to know what Morocco could do for the United States. We recommend that King Hassan be assured of our continued friendship and be told that we are willing to sell him arms in the amount he requested; \$14 million.

We would like Morocco to diminish its export trade to Cuba.

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**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLJ 99-21**

**By id, NARA Date 10-25-99**

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2.

The King will be exploring our attitudes and abilities to help in the economic sphere. The depressed Moroccan economy suffered a severe drought in 1966 and the per capita GNP is static. Foreign exchange reserves have declined from \$113 million to \$99 million over the past quarter, and there appears to be little prospect of achieving self-sufficiency in Moroccan food grain production in the foreseeable future. The United States has provided approximately \$500 million in economic assistance to Morocco since 1960. Moroccan self-help efforts include a special drive to increase the use of fertilizer and a birth-control program.

The King visited Moscow in October 1966 and received assurances of moderate amounts of economic assistance, mostly projects. He was also offered some military equipment (\$2 million worth of small arms).

During the past year Morocco has suffered a deterioration in its relations with France. The consequences for Morocco have included the suspension of vital French economic aid and the possibility of future economic penalties, including exclusion of Moroccan exports from the Common Market. There is evidence that President de Gaulle is personally antagonistic to the present regime in Morocco.

Recently, Morocco has shown concern over the policies of President Nasser of the UAR. The King is apparently convinced that the Egyptians have launched a campaign to topple King Hussein of Jordan and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. King Hassan fears that this campaign could widen to overthrow other moderate Arab monarchies and republics including Libya, Tunisia and Morocco.

Morocco, and the other North African states of the Maghreb, can be important components of our approach to regional development. There is considerable potential in Morocco for agricultural improvement and for regional projects in which the World Bank and other international organs could cooperate.

We hope the meeting with the King will give him the opportunity to outline his concerns at the highest level and assure him of our continuing interest in his security. We shall wish to stress the importance we place on economic development and the need to avoid an arms race.

Drafted by: AFN - Mr. Spicer

Cleared by: AF - Amb. Trimble AID - Mr. McCall  
DOD/ISA - Mr. Bader FBX - Mr. Barbour  
SPP - Mr. Campbell

S/S-S:PShostal, Room 7239A, Ext. 6952

~~SECRET~~

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55

Tuesday, February 7, 1967  
4:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Notes for Sidey meeting on peace feelers.

1. There are three basic facts:

-- We are certainly having mounted against us the most systematic and purposeful Communist psychological warfare operation since 1945, designed to make us stand down the bombing of the North unilaterally.

-- It is certain that a good many of the "contacts" that take place are designed not to convey important information to us, but to strengthen the power of that psychological warfare offensive by raising people's hopes and inducing them to press us harder to stop bombing.

-- It is also certain that through channels which are available to them and open, the North Vietnamese have never once communicated directly what they would be prepared to contribute to bring about a settlement. The hopeful noises one hears are accompanied by absolute dead silence from Hanoi thus far on the issues of substance. On the contrary, we have used those channels to put to them a great many positive proposals.

-- Nevertheless, we do not wholly rule out the possibility that Hanoi may be groping towards peace, in addition to conducting this offensive against us. Therefore, we have mounted in this government arrangements for following down to the source every suggestion of a possibility of movement towards peace: a whispering in a corridor; a theory about Hanoi developed by an official in the third foreign office; an impression of a visiting newspaperman; an ambiguity in a public statement which might suggest a change of position; a formal diplomatic suggestion (like Gromyko's on the timing of our withdrawal).

Those are the three central facts: psychological warfare offensive; the absolute lack of substantive response; our meticulous and total effort to make sure that nothing is missed.

2. How is it done? Here are some examples:

-- A member of the ICC goes to Hanoi, has a conversation with Hanoi officials; we evaluate it and check back to Hanoi for clarification either by the same or a parallel route. Indians, Poles, and Canadians have at different times carried such messages. Two experienced Western diplomats with old connections to Hanoi have gone in to explore and have reported back: Ronning and Sainteny.

Communist governments with diplomatic and other ties to Hanoi have sent messages in, or had other diplomatic contacts. They report back to us; we pursue their suggestions until we find -- as we always do -- that they come to nothing more than the Four Points, plus a unilateral bombing cessation.

-- We talk directly to the Soviet Union about Viet Nam, and listen to what they have to say; although they have steadily said they cannot negotiate in this matter.

-- Perhaps the most important form of communication with Hanoi are the open, firm, and official diplomatic statements of our position -- what we are seeking by way of a settlement -- enunciated by Secretary Rusk and others.

### 3. Who does it?

The President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, as in all security matters, follow these issues carefully and personally. Under Secretary Rusk in the State Department, Ambassador Harriman has a team, including professionals of the highest quality, who track down and probe every lead -- Ambassador Goldberg, Under Secretary Katzenbach, Assistant Secretary William Bundy, all are deeply engaged in following and assessing these matters.

W. W. R.

5  
Tuesday - February 7, 1967

Mr. President:

President Lopez of Honduras is flying to Miami tomorrow to enter the Baptist Hospital for a medical checkup in connection with a possible recurrence of gallstones.

I thought you might want to send him the attached message.

Approve

☒

Disapprove

☐

You may also want to ask Dr. Burkley to call the attending physician at the Miami Baptist Hospital as an expression of interest in the case.

Approve

☐

Disapprove

☐

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

57a

FEB 8 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Ambassador Jova informs me that you have come to the United States for medical attention.

While I regret the reason for your trip, I welcome you to our country and wish you well as you enter the hospital.

Please let me know if I can be of any assistance.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Oswaldo Lopez Arellano,  
President of the Republic of Honduras

LBJ: WGBowdler/jk 2/6/67



58

Tuesday, February 7, 1967  
4:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Notes ~~for~~ ~~on~~ ~~meeting~~ on peace feelers.

*Cy sent L O X to Ben Read  
for Sec Book 2/9/67*

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W. W. R.

Tuesday, February 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Response to Messages from Arthur Larson about Nuclear Test  
CABRIOLET

The State Department has prepared the attached draft reply to Arthur Larson's telegram and letter to you urging postponement of CABRIOLET.

Last fall Mr. Larson requested a meeting with you to discuss the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He was put off for the time being. The question now is whether you should see Mr. Larson prior to the Geneva Arms Conference which resumes on February 21.

Larson and his group will be helpful to you in building support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and such a meeting would give them a sense of participation that they don't have now. Larson would probably forget the CABRIOLET problem if he has the opportunity to talk with you about helping to launch the Treaty.

I recommend you see Mr. Larson sometime before February 21 for 15 minutes.

W. W. Rostow

\_\_\_\_\_ I do not want to see him. Send draft telegram.

\_\_\_\_\_ I will see him before February 21. Invite him before  
CABRIOLET test.

\_\_\_\_\_ You see him.

\_\_\_\_\_ See me.

WWR:SK:amc

57a

**Draft Reply to Arthur Larson**

**Thank you for the views and recommendation on the "Cabriolet" nuclear test contained in your January 31 telegram and your letter of February 1, 1967.**

**I appreciate the sincerity and integrity with which your views are advanced, and assure you that the decision to conduct this test to develop peaceful uses of nuclear explosives was taken by me only after an exceptionally comprehensive review, with all concerned Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch participating. This review took fully into account the resumption of the Geneva Disarmament Conference later this month and the continuing effort to secure a non-proliferation treaty, a goal which I support in fullest measure.**

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/SUNFLOWER

Tuesday, February 7, 1967 -- 8:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

We have a problem: real but soluble.

The British took our proposal of last night and put it into A -- B form; that is:

- first bombing halt;
- then simultaneous stopping of infiltration and troop movements.

That is not how we stated it last night; or to Hanoi today.

The reason: we gave Wilson and Brown the A -- B formula and told them to peddle it in Moscow and, again, on this occasion.

I talked with Sec. Rusk and he is confident that if they, in fact, buy the A -- B formula we can work it out to protect our interests.

I believe it can be done if we're short on the time-gap between A and B and mighty hard on verification.

If they buy anything, which I doubt, they'll buy the A -- B formula rather than the tougher formula to Hanoi -- where at lunch we virtually reversed the A and B. But that's a good initial bargaining position to be in -- if bargaining it gets to be.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By ing, NARA, Date 12-2-93

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/SUNFLOWER

b. 7, 1967

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For the Secretary and Harriman from Cooper

1. With Ambassador Bruce went to Downing Street for briefing on afternoon session. Present were Wilson, Burke, Trend, Palliser, and Murray.

2. The earlier part of the afternoon session was devoted to continuation of Soviet-British bilateral issues and only an hour or so devoted to Vietnam. Kosygin did not table a draft message to the President as he said he would do. Rather, he gave a pro-forma restatement of his earlier position on importance of the Vietnamese statements to Burchett.

3. Wilson read from his prepared briefing notes. The exposition of the Phase A - Phase B formula was changed from the version contained in my para. 5 London 6329. It was felt that it would be worth spelling this out in the simplest possible terms. The final text follows:

"Extract from statement by British Prime Minister at meeting with Mr. Kosygin on Feb. 7, 1967

....I am now satisfied that the Americans would now be prepared to move to further actions to strengthen mutual confidence if they were able to secure some assurance that this move would be reciprocated by the other side. For instance, I believe that they are now seeking to get word to Hanoi on the following lines. They recognize the need for a first and visible step. They further recognize that this step must mean the cessation of the bombing. This I believe they would do, and they recognize that it must be presented as being done unconditionally. Therefore we have to use our ingenuity to divorce in presentation the stopping of the bombing from the consequential actions. Yet you and I know that the consequential actions are essential if we are to get the bombing stopped.

The consequential actions are as follows. The United States are willing to stop the build-up of their forces in the South if they are assured that the movement of North Vietnamese forces from the North to the South will stop at the same time. Essentially therefore the two stages are kept apart. But because the United States Government know that the second stages will follow, they will therefore be able first to stop the bombing, even if there is a short period between the first stage and the actions to be taken by both sides in the second stage. There would be balanced concessions in the second stage; the first stage would be carried out by the United States alone; but the United States would only carry out the first stage because they would know that the second stage would follow within a short period of time.

The entry of American reinforcements to Vietnam can be easily observed. Therefore there could be no doubt on the part of the North Vietnamese that the Americans were keeping their part of the bargain.

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By is NARA, Date 1-8-98

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(London 6360)

The North Vietnamese action in the second stage would be seen as in response to the United States action in the second stage but it would be the result of a prior secret assurance."

4. Kosygin showed considerable interest in this formulation, He evidently had not understood it when Brown presented it to him last November. He asked Wilson to repeat it and then asked Wilson to deliver the text to him in writing this evening. This has been done. The British are virtually certain that Kosygin is going to transmit this to Hanoi. They hope that on Thursday afternoon when talks resume Kosygin will have a reply from Hanoi.

5. I was asked if we were sending a similar message to Hanoi. I said that I could not say for sure, but the implication of the President's communication to the Prime Minister was that such a message would be sent. The British hope that if any questions arise as to differences in the formulation of Phase A and Phase B as worked out today in London, and the formulation forwarded to Hanoi by Washington, Hanoi be told that the British text was authoritative in substance, although there may be stylistic or translation differences from the U.S. version.

## MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday/10:30 am  
February 7, 1967~~SECRET~~

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Three North African Decisions

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By imp, NARA, Date 12-2-93

Secretary Rusk wants to discuss with you at lunch the three attached North African decisions. The two Moroccan decisions--one food and a \$14 million military credit sale--are relatively easy and should be made before King Hassan arrives Thursday. The third is an Algerian PL 480 deal which the Secretary has added to the package because he would like to see us keep a foot in all North African doors.

We have also scheduled an NSC discussion on North Africa tomorrow to give you a picture of all our interests there and the whole complex of problems we face. You may want to give us a preliminary OK on the Moroccan programs and then hold the Algerian decision until after the NSC meeting if you still have reservations after the lunch today.

The attached bulky package boils down to this:

*President ok'd*

Tab A: The Secretary recommends you approve the \$14 million credit sale of arms King Hassan has asked for. Bill Gaud would prefer no sale on the grounds that these countries can't afford drain from economic development and that we should be trying to build regional cooperation in North Africa--not get into an arms race. We all sympathize with his view but, with \$180 million in Soviet arms next door in Algeria, it's hard to refuse Hassan permission to buy this small amount over 2-3 years. The Senior Interdepartmental Group, in endorsing this recommendation, recommended that we attach appropriate conditions to avoid disruption to economic development and to make sure the arms are primarily defensive.

Go ahead \_\_\_\_\_ See me \_\_\_\_\_

*President ok'd*

Tab B: The Secretary recommends that you make a finding that it is in the national interest to make grain sales to Morocco under PL 480. If you approve, he would go ahead with negotiation of 167,000 tons of wheat (\$11.3 million, 50-50 between local currency and dollar credit financing). The determination is necessary because Morocco still trades its phosphates for Cuban sugar. King Hassan will give you his personal assurance that Morocco will continue to phase down its Cuba trade to meet the requirements of the Findley amendment.

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Morocco has suffered from drought this year, and you approved sale last fall of a similar amount for the first half of the year. Morocco is overhauling its agriculture, and the King is behind a pretty decent program to increase cereal yields. Besides, Morocco is a good friend.

If you approve, we ask you to sign the determination at the signature tab.

*President asked for proposal in which Algeria bought some as well*

Tab C: The Secretary recommends a dollar credit sale of 200,000 tons of wheat to Algeria. Politically, this is the toughest of the three because of Algeria's posture on Viet Nam. However, on balance, Secretary Rusk feels that our North African policy requires keeping a position in Algeria. The alternative is to let all food aid drift to a halt and maintain only minimal diplomatic representation. Our long-run goal is to knit North Africa into one of Africa's most prosperous regional units. To do so, we need some influence in Algeria, and it's hard to expect our oil companies to shoulder the whole load. We will discuss this policy more fully at the NSC tomorrow.

A dollar credit sale of 200,000 tons does not seem out of line on pure self-help grounds. Algeria has already bought for cash in the U.S. more than 350,000 tons this year, and the U.S.S.R. has offered 200,000 tons from its own Canadian purchases.

If you approve, you would have to sign the finding at the second signature tab. Algeria's trade with Cuba is limited to non-strategic commodities for which you can make an exception.

We have touched base with Budget Bureau. They feel these requests are reasonable, and they confirm that all are within approved budgets and plans.

W. W. Rostow

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 4, 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: United States Military Sales to Morocco

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve credit sales to Morocco of \$14 million of arms, including tanks and anti-tank weapons.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

DISCUSSION:

The King of Morocco, who will visit you on February 9, has requested additional arms in view of what he regards as a serious threat from Algeria. There is considerable tension between the two countries as a result of border disputes and other long-standing differences. While we do not believe Algeria has aggressive intentions, the fact is that it has received in the past months about \$180 million worth of Soviet military equipment, including jet bombers, advanced MIG fighters, and SAM missiles. Some 2,000 Algerian military personnel have been sent to the U.S.S.R. for training, and 600 or more Soviet military advisers are presently in Algeria.

Algeria has significant numerical superiority over Morocco in all major arms categories, and whatever we do, will retain this superiority. The King realizes this but feels that some assistance is necessary to hold off an Algerian assault for sufficient time to bring the matter to the United Nations.

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GROUP 3

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-21  
By is, NARA Date 10-25-99

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The King, who is friendly to the United States, needs the support of his military forces to retain control of his government. This is the unanimous assessment of our intelligence agencies.

Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended a \$14 million arms package which they consider adequate to satisfy the King's political needs and which would provide the limited defensive capability which Morocco desires. Deliveries under the proposal would be stretched out from two to three years. No grant funds under Military Assistance Program are involved.

This proposal was reviewed and concurred in by the Senior Interdepartmental Group (Katzenbach, Vance, Wheeler, Helms, Marks, Gaud, Walt Rostow, Schnittker). Mr. Gaud would have preferred no military sales, but deferred to the unanimous judgment of the others.

The Senior Interdepartmental Group recommended that the military sales package be subject to:

- (a) the King's assurance that he will not reduce Morocco's outlay for agriculture and other essential development projects;
- (b) the King's agreement to intensify efforts toward Maghrebian economic cooperation; and
- (c) assurances that the military aid will be used for defensive purposes only.

In addition, Leonard Marks suggests that, in return for the arms package, we persuade the King to agree to a further five-year lease for our Voice of America radio relay facilities in Tangier.

I concur in the Senior Interdepartmental Group recommendation.

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When you meet the King on February 9 he will seek a security guarantee (which we should not give him) and raise the question of arms purchases. It would be appropriate to tell him then of your agreement in principle to an arms sale, making clear that details will have to be worked out between our respective military experts.

Since no grant funds are involved, I don't believe military credit sales of \$14 million to Morocco will trigger serious problems in Congress but we are taking soundings on the Hill to ascertain the climate there. It will make the Algerians unhappy, but we don't anticipate a serious reaction. On January 30, General Franco wrote to you expressing strong Spanish concerns, but we believe that we can allay these by pointing out the modest size of the program, the long lead time involved and the assurances we would have received from the King as to defensive purposes and the peaceful settlement of outstanding territorial questions. .

There are pending before you (and enclosed) Moroccan and Algerian Public Law 480 requests. The Algerian request has been pending with the Government for some time and if a favorable decision were to be made, it would be appropriate to do it at this time so that we could mitigate any adverse reaction in Algeria to the proposed arms sales to Morocco.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum for the President: Public Law 480  
Assistance to Morocco.
2. Memorandum for the President: Public Law 480  
Assistance to Algeria.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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February 4, 1967

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-291  
By 108, NARA, Date 11-15-91

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Presidential Finding that Morocco is a  
Friendly Country for Concessional Sales  
Under Public Law 480, As Amended

Recommendations:

1) That you make the finding that it is in the national interest to make concessional sales to Morocco under Section 103(d)(3) of Public Law 480, as amended by Public Law 89-808. Under Section 103(d)(3) you must inform the Senate and the House of Representatives of your finding and the reasons therefor which also must be published in the Federal Register. The finding will cover only Fiscal Year 1967 sales agreements.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2) That, if you approve the above recommendation, you authorize negotiation with Morocco of Public Law 480 sale of 167,000 tons of wheat for \$11.3 million split 50-50 between local currency and dollar credit financing.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

Morocco is a country with which we have had long traditional and friendly relations. A number of Public Law 480 sales have been consummated with Morocco since 1962 and have become an important element in our economic assistance programs to that country.

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not automatically declassified.

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Morocco suffered a severe drought this fiscal year and has had to import extraordinary quantities of wheat. Of the total 335,000 metric tons of wheat programmed for Morocco for Fiscal Year 1967 we have already signed an agreement for the sale of 168,000 metric tons. The remaining 167,000 metric tons needed during Fiscal Year 1967 require a Presidential finding since Morocco maintains export trade with Cuba. We have discussed this matter with the Moroccan Government and pointed out to them our legislative requirement. In reply the Moroccan Government has given the United States assurances that its exports to Cuba in those items for which there is no exception possible under the new legislation will be terminated immediately. In 1965 the total value of such exports was \$941,000 and included such non-strategic products as footwear, leather manufactures, refractory brick, cement and asbestos pressure pipe, buttons and plastic containers. In 1966, to the extent statistics are available, the amount and type of these export products have not varied significantly.

Morocco's exports of non-strategic foodstuffs, agricultural products, and raw materials for agriculture totalled about \$7 million in 1965 and \$6 million in 1966. In addition, in 1966 about \$8 million of phosphate products were processed in the Netherlands and West Germany and exported to Cuba from those countries. For these items the President may make an exception if he finds it in the national interest. The Moroccan Government has stated that, despite its great dependence on Cuban sugar which is supplied under barter terms, it agrees with the Findley amendment and intends to reduce these exports, especially phosphate.

In November and December three cargoes of phosphates of Moroccan origin were unloaded in North Vietnam from Polish and Red Chinese vessels. These cargoes had originated in Casablanca. According to Lloyds these cargoes were invoiced for Hong Kong and Communist China. We understand that title to these cargoes passed at the port of origin and that they were diverted to North Vietnam by the purchaser without the knowledge of the seller. The Moroccan Government has stated there is no trade with North Vietnam.

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The Congressmen responsible for Section 103(d)(3) of the Act were told that Morocco was a potential case for use of the Presidential waiver authority and the language of the law was specially adapted to meet the Moroccan problem.

Enclosed is a memorandum by Mr. Gaud and Mr. Schnittker which explains in detail the terms of the proposed sale and describes Morocco's self-help program. Also enclosed are a suggested Presidential finding and a suggested statement of the reasons that PL 480 sales to Morocco are in the national interest.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Gaud-Schnittker memorandum.
2. Suggested Presidential finding under Section 103(d) of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended.
3. Suggested statement of reasons that Public Law 480 Sales to Morocco are in national interest.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : The President

DATE: February 2, 1967

FROM :

SUBJECT: Public Law 480 Wheat for Morocco

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with Morocco a PL 480 sale of 167,000 tons of wheat for \$11.3 million split 50-50 between local currency and dollar credit financing. The local currency would be earmarked for US uses (20%), Cooley loans (10%) and economic development loans (70%). The credit would be payable over 20 years with interest at 1% during the two-year grace period and 2½% thereafter. The new provision of PL 480 requiring payment in hard currency of 5% of the commodity value upon delivery whenever practicable would apply. The State Department concurs in this recommendation.

Negotiation of the agreement cannot begin until you determine it in the US interest under the "Findley amendment" to PL 480. The Secretary of State is sending you a separate memorandum on that question.

US Interest in Morocco. The US wants Morocco to continue to support US positions in the UN and OAU, to moderate Middle East issues and work toward Maghrebian cooperation, and to permit US use of the Kenitra Naval Base and communications facilities, full access and transit rights for US civil aviation, and use of the Voice of America broadcasting facility at Tangier.

Morocco's Grain Situation. As a result of the serious drought last winter, Morocco's wheat production was 38% below the previous year. Corn production was down by 45% and barley by 57%. Yields of oats, rye, sorghum, other cereals and pulses were severely reduced. The 1966-67 cereal deficit will reach about 1.4 million tons compared to last year's imports of 390,000 tons. The 1967 wheat deficit is estimated to exceed 900,000 tons. About two-thirds of the deficit or some 640,000 tons have been met by commercial purchase from the US and other countries and earlier PL 480 sales and donations.

Self-Help. An unfavorable trend in the balance of payments was reversed for the first time since 1960 by an austerity program of credit and import restrictions which reduced imports by \$63 million in 1965. Reserves continued to increase until recent months when foreign exchange has been used to buy grains. Following IMF and IBRD

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Authority E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 Agriculture letter 10-28-82

By sig, NARA, Date 11-13-91

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-292

By sig, NARA, Date 11-13-91



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advice, Morocco has controlled inflationary financing and held down prices. The original Five Year Plan was replaced by a more realistic Three Year Plan incorporating IBRD recommendations. Confronted by a 3.2% population growth rate which outstrips GNP growth, the Moroccans have started a birth control program. A High Commission of Population and local commissions coordinate and implement assistance to 20,000 families.

Morocco allocates approximately 30% of the national budget to agriculture. Despite this substantial investment, food production has not kept pace with the population increase. Barley and wheat are Morocco's basic food crops. Barley production has not increased during the past decade and wheat production has increased only slightly. As things now stand, the prospects of Morocco becoming self-sufficient in food production in the short run are not good. However, with political stability and appropriate self-help measures, long-run prospects are favorable. Some specific self-help measures in agriculture are discussed below.

King Hassan recently launched a program to increase cereal yields on 500,000 acres by 30% by providing farmers with fertilizer and improved seed on easy credit and with training in their use. The program could produce 150,000 more tons of wheat yearly, nearly half of Morocco's normal wheat deficit.

Considerable progress has been made in reforestation and control of grazing in the reforested areas. Using US food-for-work assistance this program employs 14 million man-days yearly.

An artificial insemination program has begun and with US cooperation will be expanded in succeeding years. Farmers are being trained to upgrade foundation herds.

Progress has been made in establishing land reform policies and programs. This work is just beginning, however, compared to total country needs.

The sales agreement will state the following self-help measures which Morocco will undertake:

1. Continue efforts to increase grain and livestock production and to improve range management and other land improvement activities;
2. Increase and improve crop and livestock research emphasizing major grain crops in both dryland and irrigated areas;

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3. Improve erosion control measures in upper watersheds adjoining irrigation development projects;
4. Increase agricultural training at the secondary school level;
5. Streamline and stabilize Government institutions responsible for these activities.

Recommendation: That, contingent upon a finding under the Findley amendment, you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 agreement as described above.

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

*William L. Sand*

Administrator  
Agency for International Development

*John A. Schmitt*

Acting Secretary  
Department of Agriculture

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PRESIDENTIAL FINDING

Subject: Morocco--Finding that Sales Agreements are in the National Interest

In accordance with Section 103(d) of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, I have reviewed the status of Morocco for purposes of sales of agricultural commodities under Title I of that Act.

As a result of that review, and as required by Section 103(d) (3) of the Act, I hereby find that the making of sales agreements with Morocco under Title I of the Act is in the national interest of the United States. This finding applies to each such sales agreement with Morocco entered into during the Fiscal Year 1967. The reasons for this finding are set forth in the accompanying statement, which shall be made available to the Senate and House of Representatives and published in the Federal Register together with this finding.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By ing, NARA, Date 12-2-93

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STATEMENT OF REASONS THAT PUBLIC LAW 480  
SALES TO MOROCCO ARE IN NATIONAL INTEREST

The United States and Morocco have enjoyed cordial relations since the United States obtained its independence. The strategic importance of these relations is evident from Morocco's geographical position at the entrance to the Mediterranean and its proximity to the United States along the Atlantic. Since Moroccan independence its government has been stable and moderate, exercising a positive influence with other non-aligned African nations and in the Arab world, the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations. It is our policy to support this government which is developing Moroccan economic resources. These resources will be devoted to attaining higher standards of living, broader educational opportunities and improved health facilities in order for the Moroccan people to achieve a fuller participation in the benefits of modernization.

As a result of a severe drought during the last crop year, Morocco's wheat production was only 60 percent of normal levels. Total import requirements during Fiscal Year 1967 are estimated at 890,000 metric tons as compared with 325,000 metric tons for the previous year. This need for imported wheat has put a burden on Moroccan foreign exchange reserves. Morocco had serious foreign exchange payments difficulties in 1963 and 1964 and has not yet fully recovered. To meet its basic food requirements, Morocco has already contracted for large commercial purchases from the United States and is making maximum use of its own resources.

To alleviate the burden created by this exceptional situation, the United States programmed 335,000 metric tons of wheat for delivery during Fiscal Year 1967 under the sales provisions of Public Law 480. During July 1 to December 31, 1966, one-half of this amount was delivered. The remainder is needed during the second half of Fiscal Year 1967.

In 1965 Morocco exported to Cuba non-strategic food-stuffs, agricultural products and raw materials for agriculture valued at about \$7 million. In 1966 these exports amounted to about \$6 million. Morocco depends heavily on Cuban sugar and has paid for this sugar under barter terms. Despite its

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-291

By 48, NARA, Date 11-21-91

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great dependence on Cuban sugar, the Moroccan Government is continuing to seek other markets for these exports. For these items, the President may make an exception if he finds it in the national interest.

In 1965 Morocco exported to Cuba \$941,000 worth of goods for which no exception can be made under the new legislation. These exports included such non-strategic items as footwear, leather manufactures, refractory brick, cement and asbestos pressure pipe, buttons and plastic containers. No significant change in the amount and types of products is believed to have occurred in 1966. The Moroccan Government has assured the United States Government that exports of these items for which no exception can be made will be terminated immediately.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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February 4, 1967

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-21  
By is, NARA Date 10-25-99

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: PL 480 Assistance to Algeria

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend that you approve the recommendations in my memorandum of December 20, 1966 on food assistance to Algeria, against the background of the new legislation and the growing urgency of providing the Government of Algeria with an answer to its request of August 13 for food assistance.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

DISCUSSION:

Our inability to respond either affirmatively or negatively to the Algerian request for PL 480 assistance in a year of serious drought is being interpreted more and more by the Government of Algeria as an indication of systematic political hostility on our part, may have the undesirable effect of curtailing the useful diplomatic dialogue between us on a number of issues, and may lead the GOA to pursue the more radical foreign policies desired by its major aid donors, the USSR and perhaps France.

As a result of a disastrous drought, Algeria's wheat import requirements rose to 1,000,000 MT during the current fiscal year, or nearly three times the normal input. The Algerian Government has already acquired all but 200,000 to 300,000 tons through its own efforts, more than half through commercial purchases in the United States. The Soviet Union has offered 200,000 tons of wheat from Canadian sources. The wheat which we propose to supply would close the gap for this year.

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The allocation of 200,000 MT under our proposed Title IV PL 480 sale was made after an inter-agency review of our total wheat availabilities. The proposed sale takes into account all competing claims on our wheat resources, and the decision was taken at the technical level that Algeria required 200,000 MT of wheat under PL 480 concessional sales when its needs are compared with other countries. Morocco is receiving 335,000 MT and Tunisia 180,000 MT under PL 480 sales with financial conditions much more favorable than those proposed for Algeria. In effect, we would be meeting about 37% of Moroccan, 60% of Tunisian, and only 22% of Algerian wheat import requirements through concessional sales.

We believe also that the Boumediene Government, particularly within the past six months, has made a most determined effort to improve agricultural production and is fully aware of its deficiencies in this field. A self-help paper is enclosed.

Under the terms of the new legislation, because of Algeria's trade with Cuba, you would be required to make a finding that concessional sale of wheat to Algeria is in the national interest. In this connection, I would recommend that you point out that Algeria exports only a modest amount of non-strategic agricultural or food products to Cuba. A suggested "Presidential Finding and Statement of Reasons" is enclosed.

I believe it is important that we maintain enough of a stake in Algeria to bar the road to complete Soviet domination and to stop the growing polarization of the southwestern flank of the Mediterranean, which may well involve us in costly future East-West confrontations. If we do not succeed in maintaining some influence in Algiers, we will be faced increasingly with Moroccan and Tunisian requests for arms, at a substantially higher cost than our proposed modest program of assistance for Algeria. For this reason, I hope we can respond to the Algeria

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request in time to avoid the impression that cooperation with the United States is impossible and before the GOA turns in desperation, and against the wishes of the majority of its people, to other countries for the assistance it needs.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Algeria's Self-Help Efforts
2. Presidential Finding
3. Suggested Presidential Statement

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### ALGERIA'S SELF-HELP EFFORTS

Food production in Algeria has not increased during the past several years. Production of wheat and barley, the major food grains, has actually declined. Livestock production, including milk, eggs and meat, has shown little, if any, improvement. Short-run prospects of increasing food production are not good. Long-run prospects are favorable if the Government stabilizes its agricultural structure and if more resources are allocated to agriculture. Algeria has ample soil and water resources but trained agricultural technicians and capital are in short supply.

In 1963, the U.S. negotiated a food Agreement which included large amounts of U.S. food combined with U.S. technical assistance. Objectives were to assist Algeria with badly needed soil and water development projects in four pilot areas. Approximately 35 U.S. technicians were in Algeria working on this project in 1964 and 1965.

This self-help effort was not successful primarily because the GOA failed to provide either local funds or local technicians (possibly because they were not available) as they agreed to under the terms of the original Agreement. This project was phased out and the last U.S. technicians left the country in June 1966.

To become self-sufficient in food production Algeria must determine firm agricultural development priorities and provide local funds and manpower necessary to successfully implement them. Progress depends on increasing the number of local technicians trained in agriculture. More crop and livestock research is needed; soil and water control and development will be necessary, and farmers need improved and expanded services including price incentives, production supplies, credit and marketing.

Considerable external assistance is needed, both capital and technical. However, the country's limitations with respect to counterpart funds and manpower should be recognized by the major donors. If the U.S. continues PL 480 bilateral assistance the major donors should coordinate plans and programs.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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By

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Date 11-21-91

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The past year marks Algeria's greatest self-help efforts since independence in 1962. The Algerian Government has contracted with private firms, of which American are prominent, for feasibility studies in various areas. A survey is being conducted on family planning which has the support of the President and government officials.

Some specific self-help measures underway are:

1) In an effort to reduce the production of wine and increase the production of other food crops, Algeria is shifting about 125,000 acres of vineyards into other food crops. Algeria's greatest need if it is to achieve increased production is improved technology; there is a scarcity of Algerian talent in this field.

2) An effort is being made to increase the number of agricultural students and to improve the training of agricultural workers. During the period since independence, about 7,500 individuals have taken 2-10 months courses at Agricultural Centers and the number of graduates from agricultural training schools with 2-3 year courses has increased from 128 in 1963 to 188 in 1965 with an expected 236 in 1966. The UN Special Fund has initiated a project for accelerated agricultural training. Recognizing the serious lack of trained technicians, the GOA is currently reviewing its whole agricultural education system. It is expected that the conclusions reached will result in a request by the GOA for additional multilateral and possibly bilateral technical assistance to support the effort.

3) Algeria devoted 15% of its budget in 1966 to agriculture, in addition to short and medium term credit made available by banking institutions. Though this should perhaps be higher, the lack of trained cadres limits greater input. Therefore, Algeria is allocating substantial resources to education, from which future trained technicians will flow.

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PRESIDENTIAL FINDING

Subject: Algeria -- Finding that Sales Agreements are  
in the National Interest

In accordance with Section 103(d) of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, I have reviewed the status of Algeria for purposes of sales of agricultural commodities under Title I of that Act.

As a result of that review, and as required by Section 103(d)(3) of Act, I hereby find that the making of sales agreements with Algeria under Title I of the Act is in the national interest of the United States. This finding applies to each such sales agreement with Algeria entered into during the Fiscal Year 1967. The reasons for this finding are set forth in the accompanying statement, which shall be made available to the Senate and House of Representatives and published in the Federal Register together with this finding.

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By ing, NARA, Date 12-2-93

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STATEMENT OF REASONS THAT PUBLIC LAW 480  
SALES TO ALGERIA ARE IN NATIONAL INTEREST

Since achieving its independence in 1962, Algeria has received substantial assistance from the United States. The long struggle for independence left that country in a disorganized and depressed economic condition. The departure of nearly one million Europeans, the return of two and a half million Algerians to their homes, and the lack of adequate personnel and institutions had seriously disruptive consequences for the agricultural sector. To help meet urgent Algerian food requirements, the United States has directly and through the voluntary agencies supplied on a grant basis foodstuffs valued at about \$170 million since Algerian independence. In addition, early in 1966 the United States made a concessional sale of 200,000 MT of wheat to Algeria under Title IV of the Public Law 480 Legislation. The United States, therefore, has been a large supplier of essential food to Algeria in recent years.

During Fiscal Year 1967, Algeria suffered one of the worst droughts on record. Wheat production was only 60 percent of normal. As a result, Algerian import requirements for wheat rose to 1,000,000 MT. The Algerian Government purchased about 400,000 MT for cash from the United States, and has arranged to obtain about 200,000 from the Soviet Union and 100,000 MT from France. For the remaining 200,000 MT the Algerian Government has requested assistance in the form of a concessional sale under the then Title IV of Public Law.

Algeria has a limited export trade with Cuba. For the first six months of 1965 it was valued at \$2.6 million and believed to have continued at this level since that period. Available statistics indicate that the products exported are within the categories of medical supplies, non-strategic raw materials for agriculture, and non-strategic agricultural or food commodities, for which an exception can be made under Section 103(d) of Public Law 480, as amended by Public Law 89-808, and are of minor economic importance. Algeria does not have any current trade with North Vietnam and its ships do not call at Cuba or North Vietnam.

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We desire to extend humanitarian assistance to a friendly country with which we maintain normal diplomatic relations. Algeria is one of the most important countries in North Africa. It is essential that we maintain harmonious bilateral relations in terms of larger international problems in Africa and the world scene. The Algerian Government has faced a drain on its foreign exchange reserves because of the drought. Dollar repayable credit terms for this essential food will help alleviate this situation and permit the use of its foreign exchange resources for economic development.

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*Mr. Bator 63*

February 7, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a short note to Chancellor Kiesinger thanking him for his message of condolence on the deaths of Grissom, White and Chafee.

Both Kiesinger and German President Luebke sent condolences. The standard language you have already approved will be used to reply to Luebke, but we need your approval of the slightly different note to Kiesinger.

Francis M. Bator

Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

LSE:djw

Log # 368

Proposed Reply to Chancellor Kiesinger:

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I send you my thanks and those of the American people for your message of condolence on the tragic loss at Cape Kennedy. I know that it was a source of comfort for the families of astronauts Grissom, White and Chaffee. In their memory we rededicate ourselves to the task for which they gave their lives: the achievement of a better understanding of our common space environment, for the benefit of all men.

Sincerely,



2/7/67

Dear Mr. Grosvenor:

It was kind of you to send me copies of the National Geographic Society's newest map on Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. It is a splendid work in keeping with the Society's exceptional contributions to cartography over such a long period. I know how gratifying it is to you that your son, Commander Alexander Grosvenor, was able to contribute to it while serving his country on the CORAL SEA.

The map, I can assure you, is already being put to good use. I know it will ease our tasks considerably in that part of the world.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

15/ LBJ

Mr. Melville Bell Grosvenor  
President  
National Geographic Society  
Washington, D. C. 20036

LBJ:DR:paw

63a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 6, 1967

Mr. President:

This letter to Melville Grosvenor  
is recommended for your signature.

W. A. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, February 7, 1967 -- 8:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

An additional piece of information on the question raised by you at lunch.

Algeria so far this fiscal year has already bought 405,000 tons of wheat in the U.S. for cash. Its total need this year is about 1 million tons.

The Russians have offered 200,000 tons; they have bought 100,000 tons in France. If we went ahead with Sec. Rusk's recommendation for 200,000 tons, they will have bought about 40% of their requirements in the U.S. for this fiscal year.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By ing, NARA, Date 12-2-93

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, February 7, 1967  
7:40 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have now found Max Taylor's book and the quotation. As you see, it does not refer to President Kennedy's decision or yours, but to the decision in 1954.

"...I have often been asked whether, in the light of the demonstrated political weakness in South Vietnam, I now thought that the United States had made a mistake in 1954 in becoming involved in the defense of that country and in continuing to support it in the subsequent years. I have no hesitancy in saying that I believe our government did the right thing, although more from instinct than from sound judgment based on an analysis of alternatives and consequences."

As a consultant in Washington on Asia at that time, I would put it differently:

-- the consequences of commitment could not be assessed;

-- the consequences of a failure to commit ourselves were clear; namely, disintegration of Southeast Asia.

And that's the story of most of our great post-war decisions down to yours in 1965.

W. W. R.

62  
Tuesday, February 7, 1967  
7:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Clark Clifford called to report as follows on Gordon Gray's approach to Senators Jordan and Ervin. He asked to see them separately, but they apparently exchanged information and he saw them together for 50 minutes. He felt he had a pretty good armhold on them because of his past generosity in supporting their campaigns, and because he hadn't asked anything of either one since 1956. The meeting was friendly.

They are deeply disturbed by:

-- the volume of mail each is receiving from his State. The mail is overwhelmingly opposed to the Convention. It may be an organized campaign, but it is impressive to them.

-- the fact that Soviet arms are being used by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong against our men;

-- Sam Ervin said that the Convention was a bad precedent because it gave diplomatic immunity to consular officers. Gordon Gray did not have the answer to that. \*

Both are reported to have been impressed by Gordon Gray's judgment that he was confident that the Convention represented a real net gain to the United States. They remembered that he had, after all, served in four Administrations, and they took the judgment as important, coming from him.

Gordon Gray concluded as follows:

-- As of today we will not get either vote.

-- Each expressed his opinion that the legislation could not be passed.

Gordon Gray recommends that you talk to Jordan. He is a man who hates to go against his President. He has thus far only been talked to by people from the State Department. Gray believes that you might move him.

Gray judges that Ervin probably cannot be moved except by some of his Senate friends. Dick Russell might do it. (Clifford adds that Symington might be helpful; he is close to Ervin and is willing to work at it.) Gordon Gray thought that the Symington idea was good, but Russell was the most important potential influence on the vote.

W. W. R.

\*The answer is that the U. K. and Japan have already made this kind of arrangement with the Soviet Union; a good many other countries plan to. The reason is that the extra privilege granted means more to a non-Communist country than to a Communist country.



67

Tuesday, February 7, 1967 -- 6:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Ellen Wadley, co-producer of CBS's Face the Nation program, has asked me to appear on the program this Sunday, February 12. Others on the program would be: Martin Agronsky, Marvin Kalb, and a third person from the printed news medium.

I recommend against it at this time.

W. W. Rostow

Do it \_\_\_\_\_

Don't do it \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rlh

68

Tuesday, February 7, 1967 -- 6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

This afternoon I had three solid opportunities to get the party line across on peace feelers.

1. Marquis Childs called me and chatted about 12 or 15 minutes on the telephone. I marched him through the three points:

-- We are being subjected to major psychological campaign to make us stand down the bombing, and the hopeful peace noises are part of it.

-- We have not had one substantive direct word from Hanoi although there are ample opportunities. Thus the President's press conference statement that there are many communications but absolutely nothing serious.

-- Nevertheless, we are probing and will continue to probe every possible lead.

He then volunteered: "I don't think that Bobby Kennedy's talk was helpful." I said that because there is a campaign to try to stir hope for peace and push us into a unilateral bombing stand down, there is danger in generating false hopes in the face of a situation where the facts are precisely as I described them.

He then asked about the state of Communist China; and we chatted about the incredible relation with the Russians.

2. Phil Potter came in to return my old book on Communist China, which he had been reading. I went through with him precisely the same routine as with Marquis Childs on the peace feelers. Phil Potter, of course, is very clear in his head about the absolute necessity of not giving up the bombing of the North until we get some reciprocal response. He went back again to the State of the Union message and said he hoped you would stay absolutely with that line. He asked if I thought that our constant statement of our desire for peace encouraged men in Hanoi to think we might buy it cheap. I said there was some danger of that, although the tone of your State of the Union message on Viet Nam hit, in my judgment, just the right note for Hanoi. I also pointed out that the Communists tended to judge by the situation on the ground. What they see on the ground is steadily growing U. S. strength and the application of that strength. That helps.

3. Max Frankel came in to talk about Willy Brandt's trip and the German issues, but also about peace noises. I went through with him the four major issues:

- The tripartite talks;
- Non-proliferation treaty;
- German policy towards Eastern Europe;
- The British and the Common Market.

We both discussed what seems to be emerging; namely, that the Germans are increasingly interested in getting the peaceful applications of atomic energy.

On the peace feelers, I went down the same line as I had with Marquis Childs and Potter. Frankel asked if I thought the Russians had more leverage in Hanoi. I said they thought they did. He asked if they were using it. I said not that we know of. As an old Moscow hand, H observed that the Russians are not likely to forget for a very long time the Chinese making the wives of Soviet diplomats crawl onto the airplane before returning to Moscow. I said I agreed.

4. Carroll Kilpatrick telephoned me to comment on the Dirksen teaser and Wechsler article. I said I had no comment whatsoever. I added off the record that I could hardly think of a less useful discussion in the national interest.

W. W. Rostow

62

Tuesday, February 7, 1967  
12:15 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I talked with Fritz Hollings on the Consular Convention and marched through the key points.

He obviously understood the argument just fine.

His problem is timing: he finds it hard to reconcile with the Viet Nam war, Soviet weapons shooting our men, etc.

His main interest right now is to try to solidify support for you on Viet Nam.

He has his problem with Thurmond; but he's talked with Dick Russell.

Although he's made a public statement against, he doesn't regard his vote as yet foreclosed.

He will talk to me again when he comes back from an Inter-Parliamentary meeting in Mexico City, before the Senate vote.

My judgment is: he's not yet a lost vote; the key is Senator Russell, although WWR will try to help at the margin.

W. W. R.

Tuesday, Feb. 7, 1967  
11:25 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Nick saw Ambassador Goldberg:

1. On Vietnam, he is wholly on board.
2. On his trip, he is not on board; he is disappointed that he cannot make the speech to the Constituent Assembly. Nick told him that they would be working on the problem further.

W. W. R.



~~TOP SECRET~~

Lunch with the President

Tuesday, February 7, 1967

1. Viet Nam: Next Steps Negotiated. Sec. Rusk
2. Viet Nam: Komer Trip Guidelines. Sec. Rusk, Sec. McNamara, Mr. Komer
3. Viet Nam: Saigon Wives. Sec. Rusk, Mr. Komer
4. ABM's: Next Step. Sec. McNamara
5. Morocco Arms Credit Sales. Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara
6. Morocco PL 480. Sec. Rusk
7. Algeria PL 480. Sec. Rusk
8. Other

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 2-8-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 7, 1967  
4:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I received this morning a telephone call from Ambassador Ritchie of Canada. He emphasized that his call was "informal, preliminary, and discreet." Prime Minister Pearson will be going south for a vacation, either to Hobe Sound, Florida, or to the Caribbean for the period February 24 - March 5.

The Prime Minister would be pleased to drop in on you either on the way down, or on the way back. The Ambassador says that there is nothing urgent or particular that he has in mind to talk about; but there are certain matters of common interest on which he judges it might be useful to exchange views.

I promised Ambassador Ritchie that I would try to elicit a preliminary, informal, and discreet response. The Ambassador noted that the Prime Minister "would have no advice for you on Viet Nam." I asked him if the Prime Minister planned any speeches. He said "no."

W. W. R.

No \_\_\_\_\_

Just before February 24 \_\_\_\_\_

Just after March 5 \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

Tuesda, Feb. 7, 1967  
4:15 p. m.

73

MR. PRESIDENT:

I thought Ambassador Fenoaltea's  
comment on our European policy  
might amuse you.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, February 7, 1967

23a

Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Fenoaltea

Ambassador Fenoaltea came in briefly this morning and made three points:

1. Noting a reference in the Baltimore Sun to George Christian's recalling the original formulation of a possible "Presidential trip to Germany," he said that: the Government of Italy has already indicated its hope that if the President goes to Europe he will come to Italy; if the President were, in fact, to go only to Germany, that would be "regretted but understood;" however, if there was a week-end at Chequers, Italy would be "offended."

2. A European trip by the President should have, for optimum results, maximum advanced planning.

3. Finally, he noted that our policy towards Europe was now being praised by Lippmann. He urged that we stop, look, and listen. We are in good shape when Lippmann attacks us, but we should begin to worry if he praises our policy.

W. W. R.

(distribution: Pres.  
State Secretariat  
Francis Bator)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By 418, NARA, Date 12-2-93



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - February 6, 1967

Mr. President:

I have discreetly inquired into Mexican compliance with the Radio Broadcasting Agreement which you recently extended until December 31, 1967.

In the past, two principal problems have been:

- The Mexicans grant long term construction permits (as much as 30 years) to persons who take years in putting up the radio facilities. In the meantime, US radio stations are obliged to respect the frequency granted the new station even though it is not in operation. This situation is to be corrected in the new agreement on which negotiations are to start in mid-February.
- Mexican failure to comply with the "sunset to sunrise" provisions of the Agreement. During 1966 there was one such violation involving Mexican Station XESU in Tiajuana, operating on 790 kilocycles. Standard Broadcasting Station KABC, Los Angeles, California, has the right to night-time use of this frequency. KABC lodged a complaint in January 1966 that XESU had been using the channel at evening intervals which overlap their transmission. Embassy Mexico promptly took this up with the Mexican authorities. Since then, there have been no other violations of this nature.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 11-22-78

By cg/sep, NARA, Date 2-11-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Monday, February 6, 1967 -- 8:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Michael Palliser, my opposite number at No. 10 Downing, says that rather than talk, Prime Minister Wilson will dictate something on the teleprinter to which we can respond if we choose.

I think this is better.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By 118, NARA, Date 12-2-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, February 6, 1967 -- 8:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Mr. Secretary:

John Walsh of State has talked on the secure phone to Chet Cooper.  
The situation is as follows:

1. After the formal meeting Wilson and Kosygin met. Wilson had been pressing Kosygin for a firm commitment that they would negotiate if we stopped bombing.

2. Kosygin later said he called Hanoi and got that commitment. He then pressed Wilson to join him in a statement to Washington asking for us to stop bombing in the North in return for Hanoi entering into negotiations. Wilson refused. But Kosygin states that he will table tomorrow at 4:00 in the afternoon, London time, a draft of this type.

3. Wilson wants to know:

-- On what language would we insist? Could we furnish a draft?

-- Did we have anything concrete in mind in the President's press conference remarks that he is prepared to stop "for almost any reciprocal action";

-- If we want him to be tough, he will be tough.

4. Kosygin says the Russians are ready to underwrite Hanoi's commitment to talk if we stop bombing.

W. W. Rostow

My reaction: This is obviously a pressure play which we should take seriously but not react to with excessive haste. Also, if we are going to enter into counter-drafting, we ought to get the draft Wilson is talking about.

WWRostow:rln

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Pres file.* 77 ✓

February 6, 1967

Mr. President:

This letter to Melville Grosvenor  
is recommended for your signature.

*W. Earl* Rostow

77a

Dear Mr. Grosvenor:

It was kind of you to send me copies of the National Geographic Society's newest map on Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. It is a splendid work in keeping with the Society's exceptional contributions to cartography over such a long period. I know how gratifying it is to you that your son, Commander Alexander Grosvenor, was able to contribute to it while serving his country on the CORAL SEA.

The map, I can assure you, is already being put to good use. I know it will ease our tasks considerably in that part of the world.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

Mr. Melville Bell Grosvenor  
President  
National Geographic Society  
Washington, D. C. 20036

Monday, Feb 6, 1967  
1:00 p.m.

22

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith DIA supports the Consular  
Convention in writing.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment (log 384)



~~TOP SECRET~~

334

78a



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

4 February 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR Consular Convention

1. As Acting Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, I recognize that the establishment of Soviet Consulates in the United States is likely to increase somewhat the already considerable capability of the USSR to engage in espionage in the United States and note at the same time that this may require additional effort on the part of U.S. internal security services.
2. Nevertheless, it is my opinion that the establishment of U.S. Consulates in the Soviet Union would increase our own very limited opportunities to collect much needed intelligence on the USSR. The opening of a U.S. Consular facility in Leningrad, for example, would permit the extension of our collection activities [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Inclusion of other areas such as Vladivostok and Odessa would still further enhance our opportunities.
3. On balance, therefore, I strongly believe that a Consular Treaty which would permit us to open a Consulate in Leningrad or some other significant area would undoubtedly redound to the net advantage of the U.S. intelligence effort.
4. This view is shared by the chiefs of the service intelligence agencies.

*V. L. Lowrance*  
V. L. LOWRANCE  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Acting Director

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 99-22**  
**By is, NARA Date 1-11-00**

GROUP-1

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, Feb. , 1967  
3:45 p. m.

73

Mrs. Johnson:

Herewith the heartwarming record of  
young Edward White.

It was acquired with discretion.

We shall check out the other boys by  
similar channel; and then you can take  
stock of whether and how to move.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Monday, February 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Summary

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-294  
By uq, NARA, Date 12-2-93

1. Saigon Port

Confusion in the Saigon Port is the subject of another long piece in the Baltimore Sun this morning. In this connection, Ambassador Lodge reports some improvement and believes Premier Ky is doing his best. Lodge warns, however, that Ky could not give us full control of the Port without suffering a major political setback. Lodge recommends against asking Ky to give us full support.

2. Defoliation in Vietnam

Two defoliation missions were flown over the Southern half of the DMZ yesterday. In this connection, we were told that the Washington Star will begin today a series of articles on biological and chemical warfare. This may give us problems. Defense is alert to the problem.

3. Peking Protests to Moscow

The ChiComs are obviously furious about the Soviet action against their Embassy in Moscow last Friday. The Soviet police apparently destroyed display cases containing anti-Soviet propaganda material. The Chinese claim 31 of their people were beaten up. They have filed a strong official protest with the Soviet Government. The Russians, in their present mood, are not likely to give the Chinese much satisfaction.

4. Chinese Nationalist Activities

Chiang Kai-shek's people are stepping up their activity in the Thai-Burma-Laos border area. We presume they want to take advantage of any break down in internal security in the mainland. We think their action in the border area may backfire. We have:

- a. told Embassy Taipei to inform the Chinese that paramilitary activities in Southeast Asia are likely to work against both their interest and ours.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

- b. instructed Ambassador Sullivan to take this up with Premier Souvanna as soon as he gets back to Vientiane.
- c. asked Embassy Bangkok to discourage any Thai support for the Chinese Nationalist irregulars.

5. Nicaraguan Elections

The election in Nicaragua yesterday apparently involved no violence or serious incidents. But, electoral irregularities were wide-spread. Opposition protests can be expected. Results have been slow because of a news blackout in the country.

6. King Hassan Visit

Embassy Rabat reports King Hassan will want to talk about:

- a. military equipment.
- b. more food grain under PL 480.
- c. more private US investment in Morocco.
- d. closer relationship with the US.

We will have a full briefing paper for you in advance of the visit.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~



Monday, February 6, 1967  
3:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Boyd France of Business Week tells me they are going to do a covery story on me early in March.

He solicits cooperation as follows:

-- a picture with the President

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ See me \_\_\_\_\_

-- a picture taken in the situation room

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ See me \_\_\_\_\_

-- shots with working colleagues

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ See me \_\_\_\_\_

-- a long interview with me

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ See me \_\_\_\_\_

I have worked with Boyd France for many years.

He is a journalist of integrity who has never made a false move with me.

He is a friend of our Viet Nam policy and our foreign policy in general.

Business Week is a pretty straight magazine.

Although, as you know, I believe the man holding my job should be neither seen nor heard, I don't see how we can stop them from doing a story.

Therefore, I recommend cooperation as the lesser evil.

W. W. R.



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-294  
By sig, NARA, Date 12-2-93

February 6, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Hanoi "Proposal" Through Senator Kennedy

I have not seen the full text of the Newsweek report on this matter. However, news stories, for example the Washington Post piece on page one today, indicate that Newsweek went well beyond the true facts.

We have a copy of the Kennedy interview with a French Foreign Ministry official which is clearly the basis of this story. The text of the conversation is attached.

The French official in question is <sup>M.</sup> Messrs. Manac'h who is Asian Director of the Quai. The meeting occurred on January 31. Manac'h was accompanied by Mr. Brethes of the Quai. The Senator was accompanied by Mr. Van Den Heuvel. Foreign Service Officer John Dean of the American Embassy interpreted.

At no point did Manac'h profess to be speaking for the North Vietnamese. He underlined that what he was giving the Senator was his own "personal interpretation" and he also said that the formula of "three slices" was his "own invention." The heart of the Manac'h theory was:

(1) If the United States stopped bombing the North, Hanoi would be willing to talk with the United States, and this could produce a "system of balanced de-escalation."

(2) The next "slice" would be a discussion of the situation in South Viet-Nam.

(3) The third "slice" would involve an "overall settlement."

~~SECRET~~

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Senator Kennedy apparently feels he was misled in estimating the importance of the French theory by the comment of the Foreign Service Officer, Mr. Dean. At one point, Manac'h said he thought Hanoi was telling us: "If the Americans really want to get in touch with the Democratic Republic of North Viet-Nam, it will suffice if they definitively and unconditionally stopped bombing North Viet-Nam. Then talks would be possible between the United States and North Viet-Nam. "

Mr. Dean commented at that point: "That seems very new and very interesting to me, and I am taking the liberty of calling Senator Kennedy's attention to it. " He then asked if the North Vietnamese had told the French specifically of their intention to "divide the problems into slices. "

Manac'h replied it was "obviously my personal interpretation. "

Mr. Dean's interjection may have misled Senator Kennedy, but Manac'h's stress on this being his "own invention" would have seemed to have brought the thing back into prospective. Apparently, it didn't.

The three point formula, it is clear, was not a message from the North Vietnamese but rather the French interpretation of the situation as they see it. We do not know how the story was leaked to News-week. As you know, both the French Foreign Ministry and the North Vietnamese representative in Paris have denied that they passed any message from Hanoi to Senator Kennedy.

State believes the stories emanated from a member of the Senator's staff.

Under Secretary Katzenbach will be seeing Senator Kennedy this afternoon.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

~~SECRET~~

83

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

83  
Action

55  
Info

~~SECRET~~

(OFFICIAL TRANSLATION)

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BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 11650 SEONE OFTRE

LIMDIS - NOFORN

DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED

SUBJECT: QUAI RECORD KENNEDY-MANAC'H CONVERSATION. REPORT OF INTERVIEW OF JANUARY 31, 1967, BETWEEN SENATOR ROBERT KENNEDY AND MR. MANAC'H, EDITOR OF ASIE-OCEANIE. MR. MANAC'H, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MR. BRETHES, RECEIVED SENATOR ROBERT KENNEDY ON JANUARY 31. THE SENATOR WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MR. VAN DEN HEUVEL. MR. JOHN DEAN, OF THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY, ACTED AS INTERPRETER.

MR. KENNEDY: AMONG THE GREAT PROBLEMS THAT INTEREST ME AND WHICH I HAVE WANTED TO COME TO PARIS TO DISCUSS IS ASIA, AND ESPECIALLY, CHINA. WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THE UPIHEAVAL OCCURRING THERE, AND HOW DO YOU ASSESS IT? THERE IS ALSO, NATURALLY, VIET-NAM: IN WHAT DIRECTION IS THE CONFLICT EVOLVING AT PRESENT? WHAT, IN YOUR OPINION, CAN, AND SHOULD, THE UNITED STATES DO TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION? WHAT ARE YOUR PREDICTIONS REGARDING THE FUTURE OF VIET-NAM?

MR. MANAC'H: THESE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY THE TWO MAJOR PROBLEMS OF ASIA. THEIR VARIOUS ASPECTS AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY ARE INTERRELATED AT PRESENT APPEAR TO BE EVOLVING RAPIDLY, ALTHOUGH THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE PROBLEMS APPEARS TO HAVE CHANGED. HERETOFORE, IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT VIET-NAM WAS CAUGHT, SO TO SPEAK, IN A VISE CONSISTING OF INDONESIA, STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY A PRO-CHINESE COMMUNISM, AND COMMUNIST CHINA. AT PRESENT, INDONESIA APPEARS TO BE RID, AT LEAST FOR A WHILE, OF THE COMMUNIST BURDEN, AND CHINA HAS ENTERED INTO A PERIOD OF VERY SERIOUS INTERNAL CONVULSIONS. THIS SITUATION IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF POLITICAL CHOICES, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF WHAT IT IS, BUT ALSO BECAUSE, VERY LIKELY, IT CANNOT LAST.

TO COME BACK TO CHINA, THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PRESENT DISTURBANCES IS ONLY TOO OBVIOUS. THE STATE, THE GOVERNMENT--AND WHAT IS THE MOST SERIOUS

~~SECRET~~

(OFFICIAL TRANSLATION)

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-291  
By ug, NARA, Date 11-21-91

0 0 2 2 1 8

1967 FEB 2 PM 2 54

~~SECRET~~

(OFFICIAL TRANSLATION)

OF ALL--THE PARTY ITSELF, WHICH, IN A COMMUNIST COUNTRY, IS THE KEYSTONE OF THE EDIFICE, ARE, FOR THE MOMENT, DIVIDED. FROM ALL APPEARANCES, THE ARMY IS ALSO PLAGUED BY CERTAIN SCHISMS. ALTHOUGH THE COURSE EVENTS WILL TAKE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT, THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE WITH NEAR CERTAINTY THAT WHEN THE PROBLEM OF THE SUCCESSION ARISES, THAT COURSE WILL CAUSE VERY SERIOUS, ALTHOUGH AS YET INDEFINITE, DIFFICULTIES TO EMERGE. IT MAY BE SAID, FOR THE MOMENT, THAT OUT OF THE CURRENT CONFUSION, THERE LOOMS AN EFFORT THAT IS SEEKING TO DEFINE ITSELF, WITH GREAT DIFFICULTY, IN THE FORM OF A NEW ORDER WHOSE CHARACTERISTICS ARE CLEARLY APPARENT, THAT IS TO SAY, THE UPHOLDING OF A CONCEPT OF THE REVOLUTION WHICH, IN ORDER TO RENEW ITSELF AND SURVIVE, MUST AFFIRM ITSELF TO BE ULTRA-REVOLUTIONARY. MAO'S OBJECTIVE IS TWOFOLD: AT HOME, TO FIGHT AGAINST REVISIONISM, THAT IS TO SAY, AGAINST THE FORMATION OF "NEW CLASSES" OF THE BOUGEOIS TYPE, AS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND RUSSIA; AND ABROAD, AS THE CHINESE STATE, TO OPPOSE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN SO FAR AS THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S.S.R. IMPLIES "COLLUSION" WITH THE UNITED STATES; AND, AS A COMMUNIST POWER, TO TAKE AWAY FROM MOSCOW CONTROL OF THE INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT.

IT MUST BE NOTED, MOREOVER, THAT THE REACTIONS OF CHINA, NOW AS BEFORE, APPEAR, ABOVE ALL, TO BE THOSE OF A BIG POWER WHICH POLITICALLY, AND ALTHOUGH IT HAS HERETOFORE BEEN UNKNOWN, WISHES TO BE TREATED ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH THE OTHER TWO MAJOR POWERS. THIS IS THE ONLY EXPLANATION FOR ITS ATTITUDE REGARDING THE U.S.S.R. AND THE UNITED STATES, AND ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD SUCH PROBLEMS AS DISARMAMENT, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THE TASHKENT AGREEMENTS, ETC...

MR. KENNEDY: ARE THE UPHEAVALS OCCURRING IN CHINA IN THE INTEREST OF THE FREE WORLD OR NOT? IN OTHER WORDS, IS IT PREFERABLE TO HAVE A STABLE CHINA OR A CHINA SUFFERING FROM DISORDER?

MR. MANAC'H: THE QUESTION IS COMPLEX AND CAN LEAD TO TWO DIFFERENT REPLIES. ONE MAY THINK, ON THE ONE HAND, THAT A VICTORY BY THE ANTI-MAO OPPOSITION MIGHT LEAD TO THE APPLICATION BY CHINA OF A MORE MODERATE DOMESTIC AND ECONOMIC POLICY; AND ABROAD, TO A DECREASE IN THE TENSION WITH THE U.S.S.R., PERHAPS EVEN TO A CERTAIN COMING TO TERMS WITH MOSCOW. THE TRIUMPH OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION WOULD, ON THE CONTRARY, LEAD TO THE CONTINUATION OF A "CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY SYSTEM," IN OPPOSITION, AS IT WERE, TO THE REST OF THE WORLD AND ESPECIALLY, AND IN THE MOST VIOLENT MANNER, TO THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD BE FACED WITH THIS ALTERNATIVE...

MR. KENNEDY: THE PROBLEM IS, INDEED, VERY WELL PUT THUS; AND IT IS EASY TO SEE WHICH OF THE TWO FORMULAS WOULD BE BETTER FOR US.

MR. MANAC'H: I CONFESS THAT, FOR MY PART, I DO NOT SEE IT SO CLEARLY, AND I CONSIDER THAT THE BEST FORMULA WOULD RATHER BE A THIRD ONE, WHICH WOULD CONSIST IN HAVING CONTACTS WITH BOTH COUNTRIES. RECALLING THE ATTITUDE OF THE COMMUNIST POWERS TOWARD JAPAN IN RECENT YEARS MAY TEACH US SOMETHING. EIGHT YEARS AGO, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE U.S.S.R., THEN

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PARTNERS, APPLIED TO JAPAN THE SAME POLICY, WHICH CONSISTED IN NOT CONCLUDING ANY IMPORTANT AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN SO LONG AS IT DID NOT DENOUNCE THE DEFENSE PACT CONCLUDED WITH THE UNITED STATES AND DID NOT CHOOSE NEUTRALITY. AS SOON AS THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES BECAME DEFINITE, THEY GAVE UP THAT REQUIREMENT AND HAVE BEEN TRYING TO OUTDO EACH OTHER IN WOOLING JAPAN, AND THEIR COURTING BECAME THE MORE ASSIDUOUS AS THE SPLIT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM WIDENED. BY ITS POLICY OF OSTRACIZING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA THE UNITED STATES IS DEPRIVING ITSELF OF THE ADVANTAGES OF THE STRATEGY OF PLAYING OFF MOSCOW AGAINST PEKING.

MR. KENNEDY: IS THE PRESENT DISORDER IN CHINA, IN YOUR OPINION, HAVING AN EFFECT ON THE WAR IN VIET-NAM AND ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE HANOI GOVERNMENT?

MR. MANAC'H: WE CAN HAVE ONLY GENERAL IMPRESSIONS ON THIS POINT, BUT WE THINK SO. FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS AT LEAST, THE CHINESE HAVE SHOWN US TWO DIFFERENT VIETNAMESE POLICIES: A "HARD" LINE WHEREBY THERE COULD BE NO NEGOTIATION ON THE PROBLEM UNTIL THE DEPARTURE OF THE LAST AMERICAN SOLDIER; A "SOFT" LINE CONSISTING IN ADMITTING THAT THE MATTER, AFTER ALL, CONCERNS FIRST OF ALL THE VIETNAMESE, THAT IS TO SAY, HANOI, AND ESPECIALLY THE FNL [NFL]. THE CHINESE, NATURALLY, ADVISE THEIR VIETNAMESE FRIENDS TO CHOOSE THE "HARD LINE," BUT THEY RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF THE LATTER TO DECIDE FREELY.

IT IS OBVIOUSLY TO PEKING'S ADVANTAGE TO HAVE HANOI FOLLOW THE "HARD LINE." FIRST OF ALL, THE WAR IN VIET-NAM IS FOR CHINA THE KIND OF WAR OF LIBERATION THAT IT INTENDS TO PROPOSE TO A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES. ABOVE ALL, IT SEES NO ADVANTAGE IN A COMPROMISE PEACE THAT WOULD PERMIT THE UNITED STATES TO WITHDRAW FROM A LIMITED SECTOR. ON THE CONTRARY, IT CONSIDERS IT TO BE TO ITS ADVANTAGE, SINCE THE UNITED STATES IS CONTINUING TO HEM IT IN ON ITS SOUTHERN AND SEA FRONTIERS, TO TIRE IT OUT ON THE ENTIRE FRONT INSTEAD OF PERMITTING IT TO ECONOMIZE ON ONE LINK IN THE CHAIN.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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LINDIS - NOFORN

DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED

SUBJ: QUAL RECORD KENNEDY-MANAC'H CONVERSATION

DOES THE PRESENT CRISIS CHANGE THE ATTITUDE OF CHINA TOWARD VIET-NAM? WE HAVE NO INDICATIONS FOR STATING THAT IT DOES. HOWEVER IT IS NOT A PRIORI IMPOSSIBLE THAT THE WEAKENING OF CHINA MIGHT CAUSE IT TO RESIGN ITSELF TO THE "SOFT LINE." IT MAY DO SO, IN PRINCIPLE, WITHOUT LOSING FACE SINCE IT HAS ALWAYS PROCLAIMED THAT HANOI'S CHOICE WAS SOVEREIGN. NOW, WE ARE COMPELLED TO NOTE AT THIS TIME THAT THE INFLUENCE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNISM OVER NORTH VIET-NAM HAS INCREASED APPRECIABLY AND THAT CHINA'S INTERNAL DISTURBANCES ARE WORKING IN FAVOR OF SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. THE LATTER COULD BE ACCENTUATED IF THOSE DISTURBANCES SHOULD BECOME WORSE, IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY DELAYED OR PREVENTED SENDING SUPPLIES AND ARMS TO NORTH VIET-NAM, A LARGE PORTION OF WHICH COMES FROM CHINA OR PASSES THROUGH CHINA. FROM ALL THE FOREGOING WE GATHER THAT HANOI IS SEEKING TO REGAIN GREATER INDEPENDENCE FROM PEKING WITH A VIEW TO SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT.

MR. ROBERT KENNEDY: I SHOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU THE FOLLOWING THREE QUESTIONS:

(1) IN WHAT FORM MAY WE ENVISAGE THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAMESE PROBLEM? (2) WHAT CAN AND WHAT MUST THE UNITED STATES DO IN ORDER THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS MAY BE CARRIED OUT SUCCESSFULLY? (3) WHAT, FOR NORTH VIET-NAM, WOULD THE CONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT BE, CONDITIONS THAT IT COULD NOT RELINQUISH WITHOUT ABANDONING ITS VITAL INTERESTS?

MR. MANAC'H: IN ORDER TO ANSWER THE FIRST QUESTION IT IS NECESSARY IN THE FIRST PLACE TO CONSIDER THE ATTITUDE OF THE ADVERSARY, THAT IS, NORTH VIET-NAM AND THE FRONT. NOW WHAT BRINGS ABOUT THAT ATTITUDE IS, PRIMARILY, COMPLETE MISTRUST REGARDING THE PEACE OFFERS OF THE UNITED STATES. THAT STATE OF MIND ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PEACE CVERTURES HAVE, IN THE PAST, ALWAYS BEEN FOLLOWED OR EVEN ACCOMPANIED BY MILITARY ACTS. THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, FOR ITS PART, DOES NOT

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WANT TO HEAR ANY MENTION OF NEGOTIATIONS THAT WOULD BE CONTINGENT UPON A HALT IN THE FIGHTING UNLESS STRONG GUARANTIES ARE GIVEN BEFOREHAND. ACTUALLY, IT IS AFRAID THAT A PAUSE WOULD BRING ABOUT A "PSYCHOLOGICAL DEMORILIZATION" ON THE PART OF THE UNDERGROUND FIGHTERS, THE EFFECT OF WHICH COULD BE DISASTROUS. CONSIDERATION OF THE TYPE OF WARFARE WAGED BY THE FRONT IS, THEREFORE, A CAPITAL FACTOR IN DETERMINING WHAT IS INVOLVED IN THE PROBLEM AND IS, IN OUR EYES, ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS IF THERE SHOULD BE NEGOTIATIONS.

NOW, WE HAVE JUST NOTED, IN THIS CONNECTION, THE APPEARANCE OF A FACTOR THAT SEEMS TO US TO BE QUITE NEW, NAMELY THE STATEMENT THAT THE HANOI MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS JUST MADE TO WILFRIED BURCHETT, THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNALIST, AND THE MANNER IN WHICH HANOI'S REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS SET IT FORTH TO US.

IT APPEARS THAT AT PRESENT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, INSTEAD OF PRESENTING THE OVER-ALL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAMESE PROBLEM AS BEING ABSOLUTELY CONTINGENT UPON A RIGOROUS SET OF CONDITIONS THAT, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE AMERICANS, ARE TRYING TO CUT IT UP INTO "SLICES." PARDON A FRENCHMAN FOR RECALLING DESCARTES, WHO, IN HIS DISCOURSE ON METHOD RECOMMENDS "SPLITTING THE DIFFICULTIES INTO AS MANY FRAGMENTS AS POSSIBLE AND AS MANY AS MAY BE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO SOLVE THEM BETTER." I DO NOT MEAN THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE BECOME FOLLOWERS OF DESCARTES! IT SIMPLY APPEARS THAT THEY ARE SEEKING TO CIRCUMSCRIBE CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF A COMPLEX PROBLEM. THEY ARE TELLING US THIS, IN SUBSTANCE: "IF THE AMERICANS REALLY WANT TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF NORTH VIET-NAM IT WILL SUFFICE IF THEY DEFINITELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY STOP BOMBING NORTH VIET-NAM. THEN TALKS WOULD BE POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH VIET-NAM."

MR. JOHN DEAN: THAT SEEMS VERY NEW AND VERY INTERESTING TO ME, AND I AM TAKING THE LIBERTY OF CALLING SENATOR KENNEDY'S ATTENTION TO IT. HAVE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE INFORMED THE FRENCH IN A SPECIFIC MANNER OF THEIR INTENTION "TO DIVIDE THE PROBLEM INTO SLICES," THE FIRST SLICE TO BE DISCUSSED "TETE-A-TETE" BETWEEN AMERICA AND NORTH VIET-NAM, OR IS IT MERELY YOUR INTERPRETATION OF THEIR PURPOSE?

MR. MANAC'H: IT IS OBVIOUSLY MY PERSONAL INTERPRETATION AND THE "DIVIDE-INTO-SLICES" FORMULA IS MY OWN INVENTION, BUT THIS INTERPRETATION SEEMS TO ME TO BE SUPPORTED NOT ONLY BY THE STATEMENTS OF MR. TRINH AND MR. BO BUT BY INFORMATION WE HAVE FROM OTHER SOURCES. THE REPETITION OF THESE INDICATIONS STRENGTHENS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THERE IS ACTUALLY A LITTLE SOMETHING NEW HERE, WHICH CONSISTS ESSENTIALLY IN THIS: THE NORTH VIETNAMESE NO LONGER REGARD THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS AS HAVING TO DEAL WITH THE OVER-ALL PROBLEM OF VIET-NAM, THE SETTLEMENT OF WHICH WOULD CONTINUE TO DEPEND ON ACCEPTANCE OF THE FOUR-POINT PROGRAM, MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY THE OBLIGATION TO RECOGNIZE THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT AS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM. INSTEAD OF THAT, AND WITHOUT GIVING UP THESE CONDITIONS FOR THE PROBLEM AS A WHOLE, THEY ARE PROPOSING "A FIRST SLICE" OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN AMERICA AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM ALONE ON ONE SINGLE CONDITION: THE HALTING OF THE BOMBING.

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IT MAY BE REASONABLY INFERRED FROM THAT (BUT, I REPEAT, THIS IS A PERSONAL INTERPRETATION) THAT A SECOND SLICE DEALING WITH SOUTH VIET-NAM, AND A THIRD SLICE CONCERNING THE OVER-ALL SETTLEMENT COULD AFTERWARD BE DISCUSSED. THIS NEW PRESENTATION ENABLES THEM TO OFFER YOU THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT HAVING TO SETTLE THE "PRIOR CONDITION" (BY WHICH THEY THEMSELVES WERE BOUND PREVIOUSLY) OF RECOGNITION OF THE FRONT AS BEING ALONE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE AFFAIRS OF SOUTH VIET-NAM.

FROM ALL THAT IT FOLLOWS MORE THAN EVER, IN OUR EYES, AS WE HAVE KEPT SAYING TO OUR AMERICAN FRIENDS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 1967, THAT THE HALTING OF THE AIR RAIDS ON NORTH VIET-NAM IS ESSENTIAL. WE CANNOT FAIL TO NOTE THAT THESE BOMBINGS HAVE COMPLICATED THE PROBLEM INSTEAD OF SIMPLIFYING IT. THEY HAVE COMPLICATED IT BECAUSE OF THE CONSEQUENCES PRODUCED BOTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE AND IN THE VIETNAMESE SPHERE PROPERLY SPEAKING (THERE WAS A RAPID ENUMERATION OF THESE CONSEQUENCES, WHICH RAN COUNTER TO THE CALCULATIONS MADE IN WASHINGTON).

MR. R. KENNEDY: LET US START WITH THE PRESENT SITUATION. IF THE UNITED STATES AGREES TO HALT THE BOMBING FOR A CERTAIN LENGTH OF TIME, WOULD THAT MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO OPEN AN INITIAL SERIES OF NEGOTIATIONS? AFTERWARD, HOW DO YOU ENVISAGE THE SECOND AND THIRD "SLICES" OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS?

MR. MANAC'H: WE THINK THAT THE HALTING OF THE BOMBING WOULD BE OF SERIOUS SIGNIFICANCE ONLY IF IT WERE TO BE DEFINITIVE. FAILING THAT, AND IF IT WERE TO BE A SUSPENSION ONLY, IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED A MEANS OF APPLYING PRESSURE. IN CASE OF A DEFINITIVE HALT, IT WOULD BE UP TO NORTH VIET-NAM TO DETERMINE WHAT CONCESSION IT WOULD MAKE LATER IN A SYSTEM OF BALANCED DE-ESCALATION. BUT IT IS NOT GOING TOO FAR TO ASSUME, AS I MYSELF DO, THAT HANOI MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING ACCEPTABLE TO OFFER THE AMERICANS. THAT COUNTRY, TOO, IS TIRED OF THE WAR.

MR. KENNEDY: YOU THINK, THEN, THAT THE CONDITION ON WHICH HANOI CANNOT COMPROMISE IS THE HALTING OF THE BOMBING?

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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LINDIS - NOFORN

DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED

SUBJ: QUAL RECORD KENNEDY-MANAC'H CONVERSATION

MR. MANAC'H: "THAT IS, I THINK, THE CONDITION FAILING WHICH THERE CAN BE NO OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS."

MR. KENNEDY: "DO YOU THINK THAT ONCE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN BEGUN, THERE WOULD BE A CHANCE OF REACHING AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION, PRESERVING SOUTH VIET-NAM'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, FOR EXAMPLE? DO YOU THINK THE NORTH AND THE FRONT, AS FAR AS THE OVER-ALL SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM IS CONCERNED, WILL CONTINUE TO DEMAND THAT THE N.L.F. SHOULD BE THE ONLY SPOKESMAN FOR THE SOUTH?"

MR. MANAC'H: "THAT IS, AND PROBABLY WILL BE, THE ORIGINAL POSITION OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS. BUT IT MAY BE WONDERED WHETHER THAT WILL BE THEIR FINAL POSITION. WE FOR OUR PART HAVE ALWAYS THOUGHT THAT DEMAND UNREALISTIC, AND THAT THE DESTINY OF SOUTH VIET-NAM SHOULD BE DISCUSSED DEMOCRATICALLY BY ALL THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE. IN ANY CASE, ONE MAY HOPE FOR AN EVOLUTION BETWEEN THE STARTING POINT AND THE POINT OF ARRIVAL, AND, PARTICULARLY, CALCULATE ACTIONS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THAT EVOLUTION. THERE IS MATTER FOR NEGOTIATION HERE, EVEN IF IT IS AT THE COST OF GREAT DIFFICULTIES."

MR. KENNEDY: "WOULD NOT THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES BE DANGEROUSLY WEAKENED IF WE ANNOUNCED IN ADVANCE THE WITHDRAWAL OF OUR FORCES WITHIN A SET PERIOD? HOW COULD WE NEGOTIATE EFFECTIVELY UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS?"

MR. MANAC'H: "I CAN ONLY GIVE YOU MY OWN PERSONAL IDEAS ON THE SUBJECT, BUT I THINK THREE PHASES COULD BE CONSIDERED: (1) A DECLARATION OF NON-INTERVENTION ANNOUNCING THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW; (2) THE OPENING OF

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A CONFERENCE TO DETERMINE THE NECESSARY GUARANTEES FOR BOTH PARTIES;  
(3) THE CARRYING OUT OF THE WITHDRAWAL AS A RESULT OF THE AGREEMENT.  
SINCE THE SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS WILL INEVITABLY BE DIFFICULT, IT  
WOULD BE WELL IF THERE WERE A LONG CONFERENCE, ONE THAT COULD LAST ONE  
OR TWO YEARS, FOR EXAMPLE."

MR. KENNEDY: "ALL THIS SEEMS INTERESTING AND REASONABLE TO ME."

MR. VAN DEN HEUVEL: "ISN'T THE FIRST CONDITION YOU SPEAK OF ALREADY  
IN THE AMERICAN PROGRAM? HAVEN'T WE ANNOUNCED THAT WE WOULD STAY IN  
VIET-NAM ONLY FOR THE TIME THAT SOUTH VIET-NAM NEEDS TO ENABLE IT TO  
DETERMINE ITS OWN DESTINY FREELY?"

MR. MANAC'H: "AS YOU KNOW, THERE ARE MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE  
INTERPRETATION OF THIS ASPECT OF YOUR PROGRAM; STATEMENTS MADE IN THE  
PAST BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON WERE IMMEDIATELY REGARDED AS DEAD LETTERS BECAUSE  
THEY WERE ACCOMPANIED WITH MILITARY ACTION THAT CONTRADICTED THEM. IN  
ANY CASE, INTENSIFICATION OF THE HOSTILITIES HAS ALWAYS GIVEN HANOI AN  
EXCUSE TO REFUSE TO TAKE VERBAL ADVANCES SERIOUSLY."

MR. KENNEDY: "IN YOUR OPINION, HOW USEFUL CAN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE  
PRESENT CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF SOUTH VIET-NAM BE?"

MR. MANAC'H: "THE ASSEMBLY MAY NOT BE WITHOUT USEFULNESS, BUT MIRACLES  
CANNOT BE EXPECTED FROM IT. IN ANY CASE, IT CAN NOT BE THOUGHT THAT IT  
SERIOUSLY REPRESENTS THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AS A WHOLE."

MR. KENNEDY: "HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THE FAILURE OF THE 37-DAY TRUCE DECLARED  
BY WASHINGTON IN DECEMBER 1965?"

MR. MANAC'H: "THERE WERE MANY REASONS FOR THE FAILURE. ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL  
ONES WAS THAT NORTH VIET-NAM INTERPRETED WASHINGTON'S DECLARATION OF THE  
TRUCE AS A SORT OF ULTIMATUM, AS A MERE SUSPENSION OF THE THREAT. IT IS  
NOT POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS."

THE DISCUSSION ENDED WITH AN EXCHANGE OF COURTESIES, AND A REFERENCE  
TO A QUESTION DEALT WITH IN A SEPARATE NOTE.

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Monday, February 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting on April 3, 1954, of Congressional Leaders  
with Secretary Dulles on Indochina

An intense search is continuing for the detailed record of the meeting on April 3, 1954, which you and several other Congressional leaders attended, to discuss with Secretary Dulles the situation in Indochina.

However, the following extracts from the three documents we have found confirm your recollection of the position you took.

a. The summary of Secretary Dulles' May 5, 1954, briefing of members of Congress, including yourself, reads as follows:

"In an April 3 meeting with members of Congress, the conclusion was reached that U. S. military intervention required that the objectives outlined in your three pre-conditions set up earlier for our aid program should be met to an increased degree and that other states with interests in this area, particularly the UK and also Australia and New Zealand, should also agree to join in."

b. Secretary Dulles, in August 1954, summarized the April meeting as follows:

"On April 3, 1954, the Secretary of State and Admiral Radford met with a group of Congressional leaders to review the situation in Indochina and the possible course of United States action with respect to it. It was the sense of the meeting that the United States should not intervene alone but should attempt to secure the cooperation of other free nations concerned in Southeast Asia, and that if such cooperation could be assured, it was probable that the United States Congress would authorize United States participation in such 'united action'."

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Authority FRUS 1952-54, V. 13 pp 1224-25  
1329-1473  
By rg/ded, NARA, Date 7-8-91

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c. In summary of Secretary Dulles' conversation with French Foreign Minister Bidault on Southeast Asia, held August 14 in Paris, Secretary Dulles is reported to have spoken as follows:

"Mr. Dulles has had conversations with Congressional leaders of both houses on this subject and they think that the continuation of aid and participation, thereby of the United States in the struggle depends on the recognition by the other nations of the area of the fact that there is such a peril. The countries which have immediate interests in the area are Thailand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Burma. If they do not recognize the peril it would be difficult for the United States to continue the struggle or take a more active role in it. If other countries did not take the same interest as the United States, it would be difficult to have the United States Congress and the United States people continue with their present policy of which the first objective was to save the territory from Communist domination."

Librarians at Gettysburg; Abilene, Kansas; and Princeton (where the Dulles papers are kept) continue to search for the record of the April 3, 1954, meeting.

W. W. Rostow

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