

Monday, Feb. 6, 1967
12:45 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Clark Clifford reports:

1. He felt the lunch was most helpful to his people and he hopes it was for you.
2. He has seen Stu Symington, who now says:
 - he's for the Consular Convention;
 - he will work actively to get it through.

W. W. R.

Monday, Feb 6, 1967
12:45 p.m.

86

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Bill Moyers dictated account
of "smelling something."

I explained why the President needed as
little talk about all this as was possible.

W. W. R.

Attachment

26a

Monday, February 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR W. W. ROSTOW

Jimmy Breslin was at a cocktail party the other night with a drink in his hand and no notebook. He asked me a lot of questions in the presence of some other reporters and we talked casually -- without his taking notes. Everyone else seemed to think it was a non-session, but Breslin that night wrote a story in which he really distorted and butchered what I had said.

When I saw the story, I immediately wired him and told him what he quoted me as saying bore no relationship to what I had said. Bob Pierpont, who was a party to the conversation, confirmed my side of the account. Breslin wired back and said he was sorry that he had, indeed, "butchered" it.

Nonetheless NEWSWEEK apparently picked up the quote used by Breslin. TIME intended to use it but, after checking with me, abandoned it. What I told Breslin -- again confirmed by Pierpont -- was simply: "You can smell something burning, but it may be us. That is why the President has to be cautious and non-committal in public. Something is happening, but no one knows what it is, and it might not bode well. The elements of a settlement are certainly there, but will the Communists recognize them? For the first time since I came to the White House, people feel there is some light, but that is because the military situation is turned around. When that light will work out, no one knows. You can't predict when it will end. That is where the credibility gap comes in. When men predict and it doesn't come out. I do know that Viet Nam has moved from the hopeless stage -- thanks to Westmoreland and those fellows -- but the ball is in the Communist court as far as settlement is concerned and there is just no indication that they have changed their mind, even though they may be sending up a lot of smoke."

There were 12 or 13 other reporters present, and no one thought of writing a story -- they recognized there was nothing new in what I said. The only one who did was Breslin, a New York feature writer who is not up on foreign policy or politics.

Bill Moyers

Mr. Rostow

Pres file

87

February 6, 1967

Mr. Rostow -

This memo for your signature thanks Helms for the intelligence community's annual report on its counterintelligence programs.

No need to read the covering note.

The requirement for an annual report should remain. It serves to keep the Board informed and does help to coordinate the activities of the several Departments and agencies involved.

Bromley Smith

273
87a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Invitation to Meet the National
Foreign Policy Conference for
Organization Officials

Recommendation:

That you speak informally at the Department of State's annual Foreign Policy Conference for leaders of national, non-governmental organizations, to be held on Wednesday and Thursday, March 8 and 9.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

On Wednesday, March 8, 9:15 - 5:00 p.m., and Thursday, March 9, 9:00 a.m. - noon, we will hold our annual conference for leaders of a broad cross-section of major national, non-governmental organizations which have action programs in world affairs. These groups convey a wealth of information on foreign policy to their memberships through publications, study programs, conferences and other types of information programs.

The conference will discuss our foreign policy goals, and progress in reaching them. There will be ample opportunity for discussion. This group is especially sympathetic to our long-range policies and great social goals.

The NGO Conference, usually attended by some 400 organization leaders, is held on a "background only" basis. Your appearance could be arranged at any time under whatever ground rules you prefer.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

88

Monday, Feb. 6, 1967
11:00 a.m.

PERSONAL --~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bob Murphy reports that he spoke to Senators Hickenlooper and George Murphy about the intelligence interest in the Consular Convention.

He emphasized that he had been initially opposed, but had come around mainly because of our real intelligence interest.

He says:

-- Hickenlooper was extremely sympathetic;

-- G. Murphy was friendly, listened, but he's uncertain of how he will, in fact, go. He hopes he "gained a little ground."

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-293
By 1-8, NARA, Date 10-28-93

Monday, February 6, 1967
11:10 a.m.

89

MR. PRESIDENT:

I am informed that Amb. Goldberg wishes to discuss with you primarily his proposals for further limited unilateral de-escalation of the bombing (attached).

I also attach Sect. Rusk's recommendation that you urge the Ambassador to use his trip to look into:

- UN projects in Viet Nam;
- long-term economic planning.

W. W. R.

TS - Sunflower
+ CONFIDENTIAL attachment 5

(via Marvin Watson)

89a



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-291
By ing, NARA, Date 11-21-91

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: President's Conversation with
Ambassador Goldberg Regarding Trip
to Vietnam

The Secretary recommends that the President, in his talk with Ambassador Goldberg today, should ask the Ambassador to look into ongoing social and economic activities of the United Nations system in Vietnam. He might also be asked to explore the desirability and opportunities for a larger role by the family of U.N. Agencies in the long-range development of Vietnam.

Over the past year we have sought to increase modestly the activities of the United Nations as a complement to the obviously far more extensive bilateral activities in social and economic development.

At the present time the U.N. programs are small. They include a fisheries project run by the Food and Agriculture Organization requiring a minimum of \$1.1 million from international sources; a UNESCO-executed project for a National Technical Center to cost \$1.5 million; a series of projects in sanitation and disease control and for the training of health personnel by the World Health Organization; child care and family welfare projects by UNICEF; and the establishment of social welfare training facilities by the U.N. itself. Most of these projects are financed by the United Nations Development Program. The U.N. has also strengthened

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-2-

its presence recently by naming a new resident representative, John Wood of Canada. The annual spending level of these U.N. projects amounts to \$2 million (1967). We feel there is great need and considerable merit in an expanded role for the United Nations in these fields.

Joe Sisco has been meeting over the past months with a number of the Directors General of these organizations, discussing fund-in-trust arrangements which might be set up with the U.N. and the Specialized Agencies by the U.S. and other governments, and the necessary actions to be taken by the various Boards of Governors in order to get the Specialized Agencies and the U.N. to move ahead. He saw Harry Labouisse, Director of UNICEF, on Friday, and was assured that ~~UNICEF intends to increase its activities in badly needed child welfare, and development of community schools.~~

~~The U.N. has not done anything in the field of refugees in Vietnam and this is one particular area to which Ambassador Goldberg might pay special attention.~~

Another problem has been to get the Vietnamese to develop sensible projects and to furnish appropriate counter-part so that projects can be launched promptly. These ongoing U.N. activities should help lay the basis for a much larger participation of the United Nations in the long-range development of Vietnam, in cooperation with the Asian Development Bank, the IBRD and other financial institutions and as part of the Mekong Basin development and the President's Southeast Asian Development plan as set forth in his Baltimore speech.

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-3-

Ambassador Goldberg's visit to Saigon offers a special opportunity to explore future developments with our Embassy and AID Mission, Professor Nguyen Dang Thuc who was appointed by Prime Minister Ky to work with Mr. Lilienthal on the joint planning study of the long-range development of Vietnam, and the Vietnamese Government.

BHR

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, February 4, 1967
12:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Goldberg suggests that:

-- for the time being we not undertake
"new or additional" targeting in North Viet Nam;

-- following the Tet ceasefire we further
reduce bombing in the North; inform Hanoi; and
express our expectation that North Viet Nam
undertake "some corresponding de-escalatory
action."

Comment: Although I remain sceptical
that mutual de-escalation is the likely route to
peace, we ought to develop better thought on:

-- what action by them would be de-
escalatory;

-- and, especially, how we should monitor
and measure it.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~
USUN 3848 -- NODIS
SUNFLOWER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-294
By sig, NARA, Date 12-2-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-291

By 408, NARA, Date 11-21-91

USUN 3848 -- NODIS -- SUNFLOWER, February 2, 1967

From the President and Secretary of State from Goldberg

In connection with Hanoi's recent approaches, both direct and indirect, I have already indicated my agreement with the appraisal in the last telegram to Moscow in SUNFLOWER series that approaches could represent either:

A. A sign of serious interest on Hanoi's part in beginning process toward reaching settlement or toward mutual abatement of the conflict; or

B. Part of an intensified propaganda effort to increase pressure of world and domestic opinion on U. S. to end bombing.

I consider it essential that, in reacting to these approaches, we follow course which does not exclude either of these possibilities and which takes into account slightly greater weight given in assessment to the first possibility. Our reaction, in short, must serve dual purpose: It must demonstrate convincingly to Hanoi that we are prepared to accept Hanoi's direct approach as serious move and to respond affirmatively; at same time, our reaction must be such that it will protect our public position in event Hanoi's direct approach turns out to be propaganda effort.

With these purposes in mind, I wish to urge two additional steps to policy which has been approved for responding to Hanoi's direct approach:

First, while this approach is being explored, and until it is ascertained beyond reasonable doubt that it is not serious move on Hanoi's part, we should undertake no new or additional targeting for our bombing sorties in North Vietnam.

Second, following the Tet ceasefire, we should reduce the bombing of North Vietnam by a small but significant amount, namely: suspend those bombing sorties which are directed against targets not related to the North's infiltration of men and supplies into South. As I understand from Secretary McNamara's statement to Cabinet on February 1, this would involve suspension of approximately 5% of present sorties in North.

This second step would be taken without any announcement and with every possible effort made to ensure its complete secrecy. We should notify Hanoi directly of this action. Perhaps at outset of the Tet ceasefire, stating that: It represents a substantial earnest of our desire to de-escalate conflict; we would expect North Vietnam, within reasonably

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-2-

prompt period, to inform U.S. of and actually carry out some corresponding de-escalatory action on its part; and, finally, we are prepared to include further steps toward mutual de-escalation as one of subjects to be explored in private talks.

The principal advantages I see to these additional steps on our part are as follows: They offer something of substance to Hanoi immediately and the prospect of something more in future; there is, moreover, reasonable prospect of keeping secret our action, as well as any action Hanoi might choose to take in response. These in themselves could be significant factor in persuading Hanoi to continue direct contact with us. At same time, I believe the steps I have proposed would serve to protect our public position: on the other hand, we would be relatively free from charge that we had not responded affirmatively to Hanoi's approaches. Our public record on this score will need bolstering, for it appears the record is being rather badly clouded by Polish version of how our mid-December bombings interfered with what they conceive to be a very promising chance of talks with Hanoi. On other hand, since reduction of bombing would be relatively small and would not involve suspension of sorties directed against targets related to North Vietnamese infiltration, our action would not open us to charge of having placed in Jeopardy status and security of our forces in South.

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Saturday,
February 4, 1967
12:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

In view of Bob's
recruiting problem, this deserves,
I believe, to stay on the agenda.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
EO 12356, Sec 3.4(b)
Authority WH Guidelines 2-24-83
By sg, NARA, Date 2-8-91

WWRostow:rlh

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

91a

~~SECRET~~

3 February 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Wives in Saigon. I would normally hesitate to add to Dean Rusk's word on this subject. Nor am I filing a contingent personal plea (I would not take my wife to Saigon because of our three children).

But as one heavily engaged in recruiting key people for nine months now, I know how much this issue affects our ability to get the best. It is an awful handicap to fielding the top team in Saigon which is so essential.

I'd argue that with 400,000 Americans taking casualties in Vietnam, any dependent casualties would no longer cause much stir. The war has become too big for that.

Indeed, Lodge's proposal seems too stringent to be useful. Few people would sign up for a 36 month tour (designed to meet Lodge's special problem) even with wife privileges. I'd settle for 24 months.

While allowing civilian wives would cause military grumbling, I'd meet that by pointing out that military serve only 13 months and civilians 24. Indeed, one might allow wives for those military who extend for a second tour (26 months).

I might be wrong, but I think this issue would be a two day wonder in the press when announced.

So I respectfully urge that you reopen this matter at Tuesday lunch.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3,4
NHJ 91-294
By 122, NARA, Date 12-2-93 R. W. Komer

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 12, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposal by Ambassador Lodge to Permit
Additional Wives in Saigon on Stated
Conditions.

1. Ambassador Lodge proposes that the present permission for wives of members of the US Mission Council in Saigon (10 in number) be expanded to permit the residence in Saigon of wives of US civilian personnel in the Mission who are prepared to accept extended tours of duty and whose continued service in Viet-Nam is desired.

2. The conditions would be as follows:

a. Wives only would be permitted, and children would continue to be excluded totally.

b. Accommodation must be available without increasing the load on housing facilities in Saigon.

c. The wives would agree to undertake some kind of work in Saigon. If they possessed a certain skill, such as being a secretary, teacher, or nurse, they would undertake to do that. Otherwise, they would help the hard-pressed Vietnamese women with their charities.

d. The wives would understand, and perhaps sign an appropriate statement, that they would not make any special demands whatever on the post exchange or administrative section and would accept life in Saigon for what it is.

e. The permission to have wives would extend to those now serving 18-month or longer tours in Viet-Nam, who were prepared to accept total tours of 36 months

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ

91-291

By

NARA, Date

11-21-91

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-2-

with leave at the half-way point. Secondly, wives could be brought by new men assigned to Saigon who were prepared to accept, in advance, a 36-month tour with leave at the half-way point. In the case of new men, there would be an initial period of 3-6 months when a man would come alone and settle down before he could bring his wife.

3. The reasons for the proposed change are as follows:

a. The Mission confronts a serious personnel crisis in the coming months. A large number of key men are now completing, or will shortly complete, the 18-month tour of duty prescribed for civilian members of the Mission following the initial decisions of early 1965 to withdraw wives. Many of these men have made it clear that they will not be prepared to extend their tours unless their wives can join them. Many highly qualified new candidates might also be induced to accept by permission to bring their wives under the stated conditions.

b. The existing situation is bad from a morale standpoint, both in Saigon and at other points in East Asia where wives are currently residing. Inevitably, there has been a considerable amount of loose living in Saigon, while the wives resident at other points have had their own troubles and have been a significant burden to other missions. The occasional permission to leave Saigon to join wives resident elsewhere has not relieved this situation, while it has on occasion detracted from the performance of the Mission.

c. Over the past two years, except for the Embassy bombing in April 1965, in which the casualties included several women working for the Embassy, there have been no serious incidents involving American women in Saigon. While there is always the possibility of such incidents, the present fact is that several

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-3-

hundred American women are in Saigon as employees of various agencies or as the wives of civilian contractors not affected by the ban on the wives of Mission personnel. Under present circumstances, the security hazard does not appear serious, and appears clearly outweighed by the advantages of permitting wives under the stated conditions. Moreover, public opinion does not appear to differentiate between the killing of women and the killing of men.

d. Not only Ambassador Lodge but several recent visitors to the Mission, such as Mr. Komer and Ambassador Leonhart, believe that the admission of wives on these conditions would have a major favorable effect on the morale and performance of the entire Mission. It is judged that those men who have children or whose wives could not meet the conditions would share in this favorable effect.

4. If the revised policy is adopted, Ambassador Lodge estimates that it will in practice affect only a fraction of Mission members. In the case of the present permission extending to the ten members of the Mission Council, three wives are more or less regularly in residence. It seems doubtful that the percentage will be as high for the Mission as a whole, and the resulting estimate is that on the order of 50-100 wives will take advantage of the new permission at most.

5. I recommend that you approve the proposal.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____


Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 4, 1967
3:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

In addition to Bob Komer's suggested terms of reference, I attach a letter from Cabot in response to my letter of January 18.

As you see, he asks that I come out to Saigon. I would, of course, go if you thought it wise; but my impression is that if there ever was a town that didn't need an extra visiting fireman, it is Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-294
By ing, NARA, Date 12-2-93

WWRostow:rlh

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

4 February 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bob Komer and I have talked over how best to utilize his trip to Vietnam. He leaves next Saturday. I see several important items of pending business which he could give a real push forward. Bob feels as I do that, whatever may be in the wind on the negotiating front, it is only prudent to keep up the pressure in the South.

1. Pacification. The field is still moving slowly on this one, especially on ARVN revamping and on the concrete, detailed civil/military planning for 1967 which is indispensable to get pacification moving. If Bob McNamara agrees (and Komer says he does), we ought to charge Komer with needling Lodge, Porter, Westy, and the GVN (which is the biggest bottleneck). The theme would be: "After all the talk about putting ARVN into pacification, how much is really being accomplished? The President wants to know."

2. Management of Pacification on the US Side. The first 90 of the 90-120 days you allowed the civil side to produce will be up around 15 February. You saw Max Taylor's view that the new organization should be given another six months. This issue also turns on who replaces Lodge in Saigon. So all I suggest is that you charge Komer to render a candid progress report.

3. Political Evolution. The field and Washington are shaping up to an argument over whether the US should discreetly use its influence to limit the risk that this hopeful process will go off the rails. As Max Taylor reported, the Mission's inclination is to let nature take its course. Komer and I believe that we should shape our stand around four basic propositions: (a) the Ky/Thieu combo mustn't perpetuate itself--making the whole exercise appear a sham; (b) Thieu/Ky shouldn't run against each other--thus splitting the military; (c) no blatant election-rigging; and (d) we'd prefer a southerner in one of the top spots to forestall a north/south split. If we can decide our own policy line on these matters, Komer would be a good transmission belt.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71987-50By ylp, NARA, Date 3-21-91~~SECRET~~

4. Economic and Other Civil Side Matters. Komer is all charged up on these, so needs no special mandate. He'll be in touch with you directly on his plans?

I suggest that you mention at Tuesday lunch what you want Komer to do. McNamara and Rusk may have some added thoughts. May I put this on the agenda?

Yes

No

See me

W. A. R. Rostow

92-b

Saigon, Viet-Nam
January 25, 1967

Personal ~~Confidential~~ Eyes Only

The Honorable W. W. Rostow
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Walt:

Thanks so much for your good letter of January 18.

There is much truth in what you say. Certainly all elements should stay together, and the sooner the social and political life of this country can be thoroughly organized on a national basis the better.

All of the above suggests to me how helpful it would be to us here if the President could spare you to come out here, if only for a few days. We would greatly benefit by your advice, and I believe we could show you some persons and things which would interest you. Any time after Bob Komer's return to Washington would be convenient here. I would, of course, want you to stay with me as my guest. Naturally, I would quite understand it if the President could not spare you.

As ever yours,

Henry C. Lodge

Henry Cabot Lodge

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-291
By *ing*, NARA, Date 11-21-91

92c
January 18, 1967

Dear Cabot:

As you take hold in this dramatic phase of your great service in Saigon, I wish to underline one thought on which we touched in our conversation here.

I believe it is not ruled out that we shall enter soon rather than late a political phase with the VC and the NLF.

It will be critical that:

- the military stay together;
- the military and the non-Communist civilians stay together.

If contacts and politics open up with the South Vietnamese Communists, a military split or a military-civil confrontation could undo politically the victory in the field. (In my judgment, we are well beyond Gettysburg and well into the Wilderness in this war.)

One major reason we may enter a political phase soon rather than late is Hanoi's and the NLF's understanding that a crystallization of a legitimate military-civil government and political party could seal their long-run fate in a way that defeat in the field did not. They may feel if they move towards politics now, and exploit the various political schisms in the South, they may still retrieve much they have lost in war.

Therefore, I would hope you would use all your great weight and prestige to make the military and civil leaders lift their eyes beyond their current politicking; move rapidly to the formulation of national goals and to building a big national political party that could overwhelm the NLF (and the Popular Front it will attempt) in any election.

We shall need this in any case; but it may be later than we and they think.

It was a joy to see you here and share your courage, patriotism, and wisdom.

Yours,

W. W. Rostow

Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge
American Ambassador
Saigon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-294
By sig, NARA, Date 12-2-93

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 4, 1967
3:00 p.m.

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W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-294
By WJ, NARA, Date 7-29-94

WWRostow:rlh

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

4 February 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bob Komer and I have talked over how best to utilize his trip to Vietnam. He leaves next Saturday. I see several important items of pending business which he could give a real push forward. Bob feels as I do that, whatever may be in the wind on the negotiating front, it is only prudent to keep up the pressure in the South.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority ML 87-50By 18/10p, NARA, Date 3-21-91~~SECRET~~

4. Economic and Other Civil Side Matters. Komer is all charged up on these, so needs no special mandate. ~~He'll be in touch with you directly on his plans.~~

I suggest that you mention at Tuesday lunch what you want Komer to do. McNamara and Rusk may have some added thoughts. May I put this on the agenda?

Yes +

No

See me

W. Rostow Rostow

Saigon, Viet-Nam
January 25, 1967

~~Personal Confidential Eyes Only~~

The Honorable W. W. Rostow
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Walt:

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As ever yours,

Henry L.

Henry Cabot Lodge

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-294
By *ig*, NARA, Date 7-29-94

~~Personal-Confidential-Eyes Only~~

73c
January 18, 1967

Dear Cabot:

As you take hold in this dramatic phase of your great service in Saigon, I wish to underline one thought on which we touched in our conversation here.

I believe it is not ruled out that we shall enter soon rather than late a political phase with the VC and the NLF.

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- the military stay together;
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Yours,

W. W. Rostow

Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge
American Ambassador
Saigon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-294
By ig, NARA, Date 7-29-94

94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 4, 1967

Johnson

~~DRAFT~~ PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
PRESIDENT MARCOS

I think of you often as you recuperate from our common malady. I want you to know that you would be most welcome if at any time you felt that you would like to have some period of convalescence in the United States. My own doctors would, of course, be at your disposal for any checkups that you might wish them to make. If at any time such an idea appeals to you I will be glad to send a plane for you.

With warm best wishes to you and Mrs. Marcos from
Mrs. Johnson and myself,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

*sent via CIA channels
with info cy to ⁴⁵ Amb. in Manila*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-294
By inf, NARA, Date 12-2-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2-4-67
12 47 PM

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Saturday, February 4, 1967 -- 3:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

This [] report is worth reading because of the point it alleges other Communist nations are making to Hanoi; namely, that they should accept a permanent U.S. presence in South Viet Nam. This may seem outlandish; but some of us have thought this is what Hanoi would want if it ever became rational. The reason is, of course, that the Soviet logistical and military position is weak in North Viet Nam as compared to that of Communist China. In the long pull, the Soviet Union needs our presence, as a means of containing Communist China, if it is to hold its influence in North Viet Nam. We may be a long distance from having the men in Hanoi thinking in these terms; but it is interesting that [] this is the line of thought in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

W. W. Rostow

DB-315/00381-67

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-231
By us, NARA, Date 2-11-05

EO 12958 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 4, 1967

Comments by [redacted] Official on Vietnam War,
3 February 1967

[redacted]

Summary:

[redacted] official said that prospects for early peace in Vietnam have recently markedly improved for the following reasons:

A. Hanoi and the National Liberation Front have reassessed the impact of internal United States opposition and adverse world public opinion to the Vietnam war and have found it ineffectual.

B. Hanoi and the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam, now realized that the U. S. cannot be exhausted by continuation of guerrilla warfare.

C. Because of the current Chinese internal upheavals Chinese Communist influence in the Government of North Vietnam (DRV) is lessening, while Soviet influence is increasing.

D. Soviet Bloc countries are making concerted and increasingly successful efforts to convince the Government of North Vietnam to accept permanent U. S. presence in South Vietnam which would be balanced by Soviet presence in North Vietnam.

[redacted]
made the following comments concerning the Vietnam war:

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

A. Approximately on 9 January the [] prospects for early peace negotiations were extremely dim. At the present, however, [] believes that the conditions prevailing in early January, which resulted in this estimate, have changed significantly so that it is likely that peace negotiations will begin soon.

B. The Government of North Vietnam and the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) have now concluded that their earlier estimate of the significance of internal United States opposition and adverse world public opinion was wrong; that, in fact, U.S. Government policy remains firm and is not influenced by either of these factors.

C. The Government of North Vietnam and the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam had previously believed that the United States would soon "exhaust itself" fighting a guerrilla war, a type of warfare which the U.S. military is not equipped to handle. Especially the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam leadership had held this belief because it was thought that the primitive people, like South Vietnamese, can tolerate the hardships of such a war more easily than the "over-civilized and over-mechanized" Americans. The proven willingness of the Americans to continue to pursue the guerrilla war has resulted in a change of this estimate as well.

D. The single most persuasive factor which resulted in the revised official [] view that the Vietnam war may be ended soon, is the effect of the current upheavals in Communist China. The Government of North Vietnam recognizes that it is an unwilling tool in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Anti-Chicom feelings have always been present in the Government of North Vietnam, but have been suppressed for fear of Chicom reprisals. The present internal upheavals in China, which have resulted in relative Chicom impotence in Foreign activity have enabled the Government of North Vietnam to bring the previously latent anti-Chicom attitude into the open. [] the Government of North Vietnam understands "or, let me say, must be made to understand" that Soviet hegemony is infinitely preferable to Chinese hegemony.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

E. Soviet Bloc countries are making a concerted effort to convince the Government of North Vietnam to accept a permanent United States presence in South Vietnam. The Government of North Vietnam leadership is being told that South Vietnam would in any event, be a burden to the Government of North Vietnam because of its many problems resulting from its poor economy, instability and internal racial and religious conflicts. The permanent U.S. presence in South Vietnam should, in any event, be acceptable to the Government of North Vietnam because its effect would be counter-balanced by a Soviet presence in North Vietnam.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 4, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Igor Ivanov

At lunch on January 27, Dobrynin gave me a handwritten letter in Russian from the parents of Igor Ivanov, covered by a brief letter of his own to you (Tab A). They are appeals that you allow Ivanov to return to the Soviet Union.

Ivanov was an Amtorg chauffeur who was arrested on October 29, 1963 at a clandestine meeting with an American engineer named Butenko and two other Russians (UN diplomats who had immunity). Ivanov and Butenko were tried and convicted in 1964, but Ivanov has been free since then on \$100,000 bail, pending appeal of the case. The appeal may be heard within the next month or two.

Since 1964 the Soviets have repeatedly raised the case with us, sometimes at a very high level. When Foy Kohler talked with Podgorny about Wortham and Gilmour last November, Podgorny countered with Ivanov -- although he denied he was suggesting a trade. Our position has been that we would not trade an espionage agent for an arrested tourist. The timing of the Ivanovs' letter -- which is artfully composed -- is undoubtedly related to Kazan's release and Wortham's appeal -- which is expected to be acted on Monday.

The State Department recommends we see how Wortham's appeal comes out, and tell Dobrynin for the time being that the Ivanovs' letter is being considered. The case will come to a head in any event when the appeal of Ivanov's case is heard.

While the Consular Convention is being debated, it is probably just as well that consideration of Ivanov's situation be deferred. You are under no obligation to the Russians to make a quick decision.

Walt Rostow

Have State tell Dobrynin the
Ivanovs' letter is being considered

Speak to me

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-293
By *WJ*, NARA, Date 10-28-93

912
January 27, 1967

Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

As the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, I have received a letter addressed to you, Mr. President, from the parents of a Soviet citizen Mr. Ivanov, who was tried here and is now on bail pending appeal.

They asked me to submit this letter to you with their deep hope that you, as the President of the United States, will see it possible to free their only son.

On my part, I would ask you to look personally into the matter and to give favorable consideration to the request of the parents whose feelings and motives in writing to you, I hope you agree, are quite understandable.

Respectfully yours,



Anatoly F. Dobrynin

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

TRANSLATION

Mr. President:

The parents of Igor Ivanov, who was arrested by the American authorities in 1963 and sentenced by an American court to twenty years' imprisonment, appeal to you. The authorities of your country severely punished our son, but we are firmly convinced that our son Igor has always been an honest man and could not cause your country any harm.

In this case we appeal to you as a person who is himself the father of a family and who, apparently, will soon have the joy of being a grandfather. I, Igor's father, am already 68 years old, and his mother is 63. We have twice experienced the happiness of bringing into the world two sons (we have heard that you also have two children). But we have also experienced great grief in losing one of our sons. Our older son, Lev Ivanov, died in February 1944, defending against the fascist invaders not only our people but also other peoples, including your country as well. The last time we saw our son Lev was when we were seeing him off to the Army.

My wife and I are already sick old people, and therefore we cannot leave home. We fear very much that we may never again be fortunate enough to see our younger son, the only support and hope we have in life. It is dreadful for us to think that the day we saw our Igor off to your country might be for us old people the last day we would see him. We respect the people of your country and would not want to believe that our son would be detained in its territory for such a long time that we could never see him.

But now three years have already gone by in painful expectation without result, and it has become clear to us, although we do not want to believe this either, that the representatives of your country are not taking any

action whatsoever to alleviate Igor's sentence and reunite him with his parents. My wife and I sometimes listen to the "Voice of America" broadcasts and know that you have frequently expressed yourself in favor of improving Soviet-American relations and that the government of the USA also wishes to improve these relations. For us these words of yours are always connected with the hope for the freedom of our son, and we are convinced that you will not refuse to consider this request of ours and permit Igor to return home. You are a father yourself and you cannot fail to understand us.

You, Mr. Johnson, are the President of a great country. Return our son to us old people. We are sure that many fathers and mothers would duly appreciate such a humane gesture on your part.

Respectfully yours,

Father: /name illegible/

Mother: Yu. Ivanova

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-294
By ijp, NARA, Date 12-2-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUPER-SUNFLOWER -- LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's slight redrafting of the proposed Presidential letter.

It is a major policy step; and you will wish to consider it most carefully.

I have assured (with Sec. Rusk's knowledge) that Bob McNamara has a copy; but that's all.

Here are some problems to be settled, aside from the move itself.

1. Should it await a response from our last to Hanoi; or should we override it? I recommend that we wait, unless the delay is excessive. By excessive I mean beyond the next few days: Tet begins Wednesday.

2. Should we transmit via the Vietnamese in Moscow or another channel? We'd better use Moscow: time is getting short; and the Russians already know about the bilateral (Dobrynin mentioned it to Kohler).

3. The end of a pause. The critical language is: "Would be met with a prompt appropriate gesture of restraint by your authorities." In short, how would we recognize such a gesture: What would ^{we} take as the occasion to resume?

4. There is the question of where secure talks can be held. Tommy doesn't think security in Moscow will last much longer. We may have to ask the Russians for a couple of secure cottages in the country.

There are risks in all this; but for two reasons I back it:

-- with the Marigold leaks and all the rest, we need to clear the record;

-- Hanoi is in a very different position than it was a year ago: it is they who have stirred the hopes of peace; they have been doing the equivalent of sending Goldberg, Harriman, etc. around the world. This puts it to them.

WWRostow:rlh

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

97a

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-294

By ig, NARA, Date 12-2-93

DRAFT

Letter from President Johnson to Ho Chi Minh

February 4, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to you in the hope that the conflict in Viet-Nam can be brought to an end. That conflict has already taken a heavy toll -- in lives lost, in wounds inflicted, in property destroyed, and in simple human misery. If we fail to find a just and peaceful solution, history will judge us harshly.

Therefore, I believe that we both have a heavy obligation to seek earnestly the path to peace. It is in response to that obligation that I am writing directly to you.

We have tried over the past several years, in a variety of ways and through a number of channels, to convey to you and your colleagues our desire to achieve a peaceful settlement. For whatever reasons, these efforts have not achieved any results.

It may be that our thoughts and yours, our attitudes and yours, have been distorted or misinterpreted as they passed through these various channels. Certainly that is always a danger in indirect communication.

There is one good way to overcome this problem and to move forward in the search for a peaceful settlement. That

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

-2-

is for us to arrange for direct talks between trusted representatives in a secure setting and away from the glare of publicity. Such talks should not be used as a propaganda exercise but should be a serious effort to find a workable and mutually acceptable solution.

In the interest of creating an atmosphere conducive to the success of such talks, I am seriously considering not resuming the bombing of targets in the territory of North Viet-Nam after Tet. We would make no immediate public statement or explanation.

My hope would be that such action would make it possible for our representatives to meet promptly and to begin serious work on a realistic formula for settlement.

You will realize, I am sure, that the unilateral halt of the bombing beyond Tet would raise serious problems for us. We would be inundated with questions as to the reason for the action. There would be much speculation that secret talks were underway. There would be many Americans who would criticize us for what they see as one-sided and dangerous concessions.

I would be prepared to live with these questions and with the criticism if, by such action, we would have opened the road to peace.

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

-3-

But you will understand, too, that we would not be able to remain silent on these matters for a lengthy period. I would hope, therefore, that by the end of the Tet holidays our representatives would have begun talks and shortly thereafter made sufficient progress to permit some kind of announcement explaining why our bombing had stopped.

If we do end the bombing, I would assume that such restraint on our part ^{would} be met with a prompt appropriate gesture of restraint by your authorities. Willingness to take such actions on your part, as I have said before, would permit us to take additional actions to bring about the de-escalation or cessation of hostilities.

As to the site of the bilateral discussions I propose, there are several possibilities. We could, for example, have our representatives meet in Moscow where preliminary contacts have already occurred. They could meet in some other country such as Burma. You may have other arrangements or sites in mind, and I would try to meet your suggestions.

The important thing is to end a conflict that has brought burdens to both our peoples, and above all to the people of

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

-4-

South Viet-Nam. If you have any thoughts about the actions I am contemplating, it would be most important that I receive them as soon as possible.

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

Saturday, February 4, 1967

Mr. President:

Senator Eastland is following this itinerary in his South American trip:

January 24-28 - Lima, Peru

January 28-

February 1 - Santiago, Chile

February 1-6 - Buenos Aires, Argentina

February 6-9 - Sao Paulo, Brazil

February 9-14 - Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

(Sec. Rusk personally)
As you requested, I had State give advance notice of the Senator's travel plans to our Ambassadors in the four countries. They were told to assume personal responsibility for assisting the Senator and his party.

The Ambassadors are also under instruction to report how the visit went and what they did to assist.

You have seen the report from Ambassador Jones in Peru. As soon as the others are received, I will send them to you.

W.W.R6stow

73

CONFIDENTIAL

Saturday, February 4, 1967 -- 12:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

At 12:19 p. m. today I received a telephone call from Amb. Dobrynin who reported as follows:

In view of your personal request to him concerning the Kiev Exhibition, the Soviet government is pleased to agree that the exhibition will go forward in the ~~third quarter~~ ^{first half} of 1967. Negotiations will be pursued between the U. S. Embassy in Moscow and the Soviet Cultural Relations Department.

I thanked Dobrynin and said that, given your struggle with the Consular Convention, this was a helpful move. He said that he backed it for that reason and because you had spoken to him personally at the reception on the occasion of the signing of the Space Treaty.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 2-8-91

WWRostow:rlh

CONFIDENTIAL

120
FEB 3 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Governor Brown recently returned from a visit to Chile. He has reported to me on his conversation with you and conveyed your message of regret over postponement of your trip.

Ambassador Dungan has delivered my letter of January 24 to you. If you are not able to come to Washington before the Meeting of Presidents, I look forward to meeting you there.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Eduardo Frei Montalva
President of the Republic of Chile
Santiago
LBJ/WGB:cc

Friday, February 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

I had no contacts today with the news media.

W. W. Rostow

RLN

Rostow

102

Pres file

Friday, February 3, 1967 -

Mr. President:

You will recall authorizing me to talk to Rudy Peterson of the San Francisco Bank of America about running a private action group to drum up public and Congressional support for the Foreign Aid bill. Peterson was the unanimous choice of Eugene Black, Jim Perkins, Mac Bundy, Dave Bell, et al. (At Tab B is a copy of the earlier memo describing the job and proposing Peterson.)

After thinking it over, Peterson replied that he would be glad to serve as a member of such a group, but couldn't take on the chairmanship. Therefore, if we are to go ahead with what I continue to think is a highly necessary operation, we will need another man of stature to head it.

At Tab A, Bill Gaud reports that Perkins & Co. unanimously recommend we now try David Kennedy, Chairman of the Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Company in Chicago. If he is unavailable, they would suggest Frank Stanton of CBS or Irwin Miller of the Cummins Engine Company. They also strongly recommend that you make the first approach to Kennedy yourself.

I agree that we should make a try for Kennedy, but your schedule may not permit a personal chat. If not, I could do it. In any event, if you want to do this, we should move soon.

W. W. Rostow

I will speak to Kennedy; you follow up _____

You go ahead with pitch to Kennedy _____

Not now _____

Speak to me _____

EKHamilton/vmr

1020



10025

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON

February 1, 1967

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Public Support Committee for the A.I.D. Program

The General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs (of which Jim Perkins is the Chairman) met here yesterday and the day before. I told them that Rudolph A. Peterson, President, Bank of America, was not willing to take over the chairmanship of the National Committee on International Development - the public support group which was headed by Sol Linowitz until his recent appointment as Ambassador to the Organization of American States.

The Perkins Committee discussed a number of other possible chairmen. They finally agreed on the following three names which they asked me to submit to you:

David M. Kennedy, Chairman
Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Co.
Chicago, Illinois


Frank Stanton, Chairman
Columbia Broadcasting System
New York City

Irwin Miller, President
Cummins Engine Company
Columbus, Indiana

The Advisory Committee feels that Mr. Kennedy would be the best of the three. If you do not agree, or if he declines, they have no clear preference between Messrs. Stanton and Miller. They asked me to impress two additional points upon you:

- the chance of getting any of these three men to accept, and to do the job that needs to be done if they do accept, is likely to turn on whether you yourself are willing to ask them to take on the job, and
- time is very much of the essence, inasmuch as the legislative session is already under way.

The members of the Advisory Committee are prepared to give all the help they can to support the Committee once it gets organized - as are we in A. I. D.



William S. Gaud

102c



File AID Political
Action Comm.

Thursday, October 13, 1966, 3:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Generating Support for Foreign Aid, and Your Meeting
this Afternoon with Eugene Black

After you reminded the Perkins Committee that your major aid problem is to get enough public support to turn around the Congress, Jim Perkins had a dinner discussion with George Woods and three of the principal Committee members: David Rockefeller, Gene Black, and Dave Bell.

Perkins tells me they concluded that:

- the main assignment of their Committee has been to advise on policy;
- this function should be kept separate from an organized lobbying effort;
- there is very great need for an effective private lobbying organization.
- the best first step would probably be to energize the virtually dormant Linowitz Committee by appointing a high-powered man of stature and visibility to succeed Sol Linowitz as chairman. (They talked about Rudy Peterson of the San Francisco Bank of America, Ben Heineman, David Kennedy, and Stewart Saunders -- in that order of preference. Perkins et al believe that Peterson would be first rate -- and think he would do it if you ask him personally.)

Question: Do you want us quietly to encourage Perkins, Black, Bell, Rockefeller -- and perhaps Mac Bundy -- to suggest a plan for a political-action organization in support of foreign aid?

I think all of your advisers are agreed that a big outside effort is essential if we are to get off dead center -- or even to protect the present minimum program. On the other hand, an energetic lobbying operation would put pressure on the Administration, as well as the Congress, to come up with more aid money. (We may not be able to get anyone of stature to take on the job without a Presidential assurance that we will welcome such pressure and will try to be responsive.)

I understand that Black will be in to see you this afternoon -- you may want to talk with him about this. You might also want to get his advice on people. (He told me he thought Peterson would be a ten-strike.)

If, after talking with Black, you want us to encourage this, I will explore with Perkins, Bundy and Bell how we might proceed. (If you want to do this, we should start the ball rolling while you are in Asia.)

Francis M. Bator

Go ahead and have them work up a plan_____

Do nothing_____

Speak to me_____

* * * *

Have Black sound out Peterson_____

Speak to me_____

Fri., Feb. 3, 1967
12:45 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You may be interested in the attached observations on transport bombing, taken from a letter from General Schnez, Commander of the III Korps of the German army, to Bert Spivy, Acting Director of the Joint Staff.

His point is that the bombing of a transport system, if sustained long enough and hard enough, gradually eats up the capacity for repair, leading to a total breakdown. He describes how this happened to the Germans in Italy. Then, showing an awareness of the difference in the more primitive setting of North Vietnam, he predicts that "provided that you never give up," we can produce the same result in the transport system of North Vietnam. I believe his observation is essentially sound.

W. W. R.

(ltr from Gen. Schnez to Lt. Gen. Spivy)

"I am following the Vietnam war events pretty close -- as far as it can be done by just reading newspapers. To a certain extent I am an expert in bombings and transportation. During the last half year of WW II, I have been directing military transportation all over Italy. On the Italian theater of war the Allied Air Force attacked only traffic systems, but those frequently and almost daily. I was in command of an enormous organization responsible for the repair and restoration of these installations and communications, and I believe that we have employed the utmost technical means to prevent the cutting-off of the Italian theater by the Allied Air Force. From this time dates my detailed, intensive and very own experience, that although one may be able for a long time to prevent such an outcome, there will finally come the time where even an army of high technical standard will run out of the necessary means, p. ex., bridging equipment, relay station waterpumps for the supply of locomotive engines, etc. The physical capabilities of soldiers employed for repair work will also come to an end under permanent bombing so that they cannot keep up with destructions. Conclusions for bomber commands are obvious: To bomb again and again. The success will surely come, even if the contrary seems to be true. Eventually the margin will become too great between the one second necessary for the destruction of a bridge and the number of days it will take to repair it. There will be the moment when the flow of repair material will stop, when personnel employed with repair work will be physically overtaxed.

This I tell you only because I read again and again that bombing of the supply system would be futile. It is sure that a primitive army will come up with expedients, substitutes and makeshifts again and again; but I am convinced that some day even these will not last any more, provided that you never give up!"

Friday, February 3, 1967
6:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Chet reports first
Indian reaction to food for India.
They are pleased. They should be.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~
New Delhi 11129

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 5 (b)
White House GLENN, J. M. 1963
By 18, NARA, Date 2-11-91

~~SECRET~~

104a

copy of NEW DELHI 11129, Feb. 3, 1967

From Bowles

1. Reception here to Presidential message on food assistance for India has been excellent. Substance and scope of message helped lift heavy weight off people's minds at a critical moment. Key Indian leaders deeply appreciate President's vote of confidence in their own efforts and are strong in reaffirming their determination to live up to this confidence.

2. I would only add that all of us in the Mission in Delhi are gratified by this timely action. With continued support and sensitive handling I believe we may be on the verge of a historic breakthrough in India both in agricultural production and economic development generally. Prospects should become much clearer over the next few months as the new government is chosen and gets down to business.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ex. Oct 1979
By sp/kg, NARA, Date 2-11-91

~~SECRET~~

Friday, Feb. 3, 1967
6:45 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bill Jorden is an old friend of Dr. Howard Rusk, whom, I understand, you will see at noon tomorrow, Saturday. You may wish to read this memorandum from Bill to me, reporting a conversation with Dr. Rusk and his eagerness to set in motion work inside South Vietnam on behalf of injured civilians.

W. W. R.

CONFIDENTIAL attachment

105.2

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-294
By 1-8, NARA, Date 12-2-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

February 3, 1967

Subject: Medical Assistance to Viet-Nam

As you know, medical care for the Vietnamese people is a very real problem. The number of doctors is limited, and the majority are in the armed forces. We have been doing a good deal through our AID program, both to provide medical care and to train Vietnamese doctors and nurses. Third countries have also been active in this field. But the gap between needs and available facilities remains wide.

Critics of U.S. policy have moved into this area with a vengeance. You are aware of recent articles--with pictures--that have pointed up the number of Vietnamese, especially children, who have been maimed by military action in the South. Dr. Benjamin Spock and other known critics have formed what they call the Committee of Responsibility. Their purpose is to raise \$3 million to bring about 100 Vietnamese children to this country for treatment. We can be absolutely certain that this program, if it succeeds, will be exploited to the utmost for propaganda value.

Everyone I have talked with who has knowledge of this matter is agreed: first, that it is preferable to care for the Vietnamese in Viet-Nam or as close to Viet-Nam as possible; second, that every dollar spent for this purpose in Viet-Nam will provide ten times as much care as the same dollar in the U.S.; third, that the psychological effects on young children moved 10,000 miles into strange surroundings and exploited for propaganda (as they would be) could be disastrous.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

This leads me to the purpose of this memo.

I talked last night with an old and dear friend, Dr. Howard Rusk. As you know, he is one of the outstanding medical men in the United States. He has been a driving force in the Korea-America Foundation and I can testify to the excellence of its work in Korea. He was also instrumental in bringing Vietnamese Army paraplegics to this country for rehabilitation, including fitting of artificial limbs.

He is eager to help further with the problem of medical care in Viet-Nam. He is confident he can enlist the services of some of our country's leading orthopedists, plastic surgeons, pediatricians, and other specialists to serve in Viet-Nam on a rotating basis. This kind of program should be undertaken: (1) because it is right; (2) because it will help us immeasurably in Viet-Nam; (3) because it will enlist the interest and concern of many Americans, in the medical profession and outside; (4) because it will undercut the critics' attempt to exploit this area of activity; (5) because it has the potential for building an important reservoir of good-will for the United States in Viet-Nam for years to come.

I gather that Dr. Rusk's idea is to do as much of the medical treatment as possible in Viet-Nam, secondarily in the Philippines, and possibly in Hawaii in extreme cases. I do not know how much this is likely to cost or whether all or some of the support can be enlisted from non-governmental sources.

But I am confident this is an area of activity that would be of sincere interest to the President. I understand that an appointment has been arranged for tomorrow at noon at which time Dr. Rusk can describe his ideas in detail with the President.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

I wanted you to know the above background, and my own deep feeling that this is an area of potentially great service to our country and to Viet-Nam.

And if anyone can do the job that is crying to be done in this field, it is Howard Rusk.

You may wish to convey part or all of the above to the President.

William J. Jorden

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Friday, February 3, 1967
11:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Yesterday the following telephoned me after your press conference to clarify its precise meaning; and Jack Sutherland came in for the same purpose: Jess Cook (TIME), Ben Bradlee (Washington Post), Bonnie Angelo (Newhouse), Ted Knap (Scripps Howard), John Hightower (AP). I told them that you meant precisely what you said:

-- thus far, all the reports and communications did not yet indicate a "serious" willingness to negotiate to end the war;

-- you did not regard a unilateral cessation of bombing the North, accompanied by an ambiguous promise to negotiate, as "serious."

The stories seemed to have come out today in good balance.

Les Carpenter called to ask me whether it was true that Kazan would be sent home tomorrow. He said television cameras were already moving up to Boston. I said we had no firm information, but hoped he would be home soon. (In fact, we had fair information yesterday, and firm information today, that he will be arriving in Boston tomorrow, Saturday.) The Czechs have asked us to hold the information until he is out of the country -- wheels up 4 a.m. our time tomorrow morning -- but word is about, and Massachusetts politicians involved, notably Ted Kennedy, will be up there to greet their local hero.

I had a good long talk with Drew Pearson, bringing in Bill Bowdler to help generate appropriate speeches for the Chief Justice on his trip to Latin America.

Jack Leacacos came in mainly to discuss the outline of a book he is writing about the State Department. He also asked about your press conference observations.

In the course of my conversation with Bonnie Angelo, I underlined the importance of your India food message. She said that she would generate a story. ~

W. W. R.

Friday, Feb. 3, 1967
12:40 p.m.

107

Pres. file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the first formal word
of Kazan's deportation from Prague.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (Prague 1275)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LIMDIS

1072

February 3, 1967

From Prague 1275

After receiving information from Kazan's attorney dispatched in Prague's 1273 I asked Ambassador Trhlik for immediate interview. Upon receiving me this morning at 11:30 he said he had good news, namely, that court had acted favorably on motion that Kazan's sentence would be suspended and that he would be immediately deported.

Trhlik said reservations had been made for Kazan under pseudonym Stachovsky on Czech Air Line plane leaving for Paris 9:50 a.m. tomorrow, February 4. Trhlik asked information be held confidential until noon tomorrow Prague time. Same embargo will be observed by Czech news media.

Trhlik stated Embassy could have immediate access to Kazan and that further arrangements which would involve some matters of finance could be worked out with Foreign Ministry Consular Department. There would be no objection to Wenick's being present at Kazan's departure.

Trhlik and I agree but for different reasons that case had been unfortunate but that conclusion was favorable. He expressed hope casually that progress could now be made on financial and economic questions of interest to Czechoslovakia.

Re paragraph above, please telegraph authorization immediately to reach us today for expenditure \$300 on Kazan's behalf for transportation.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-291
By wp, NARA, Date 11-21-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, Feb. 3, 1967
12:35 p.m.

108
Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a rather disturbing account of some possible ambiguity in President Marcos' post-operative condition, with a suggestion of the possibility that he may wish to come for medical treatment to the United States.

The information is not hard. There is often gossip under these circumstances. But I thought you'd wish to have the full report.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Manila 8184)

108a

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

FROM MANILA 8184, February 3, 1967

For past several days Manila has been buzzing with rumors regarding state of President Marcos' health following his operation January 24 for removal of inflamed gall bladder. These have run gamut from stories, allegedly planted by Mayor Villegas' office, that presence of "adhesions" would necessitate second operation to rumor current in medical and insurance circles that operation had disclosed cancer. So far as latter concerned, it should be noted that General Hans Menzi, Marcos' military aide, in reporting operation to Ambassador Blair on morning of January 24 stated that operation fully successful and "revealed no malignancy."

Manila is of course notorious for its rumormongers, particularly in anything which affects the First Family. We normally tend to discount most of them. In this case we have taken special pains to sound out gently those close to President, all of whom until today have given no indication of anything more than normal post-operative recuperation supporting official bulletins appearing in press.

Charge saw President briefly yesterday evening in hospital, accompanying Mayor Blaisdell of Honolulu on brief courtesy call. At that time President appeared in excellent spirits and joked about his operation as being "the operation of Presidents," referring to President Johnson's operation and that of President Eisenhower. Said he was pestering his doctors to allow him back on golf course before end of month's waiting period they had prescribed.

President otherwise has been receiving stream of Government officials and Congressmen (latter in connection with current maneuvering in Senate and House reorganization) and large group left just prior to Charge's call yesterday. Executive Secretary Salas in fact had told Charge in earlier exchange at hospital that President working hard already and had stayed up until 1:00 A.M. the night before studying various matters.

This afternoon, Governor Gomualdez of Leyte in calling on Admiral Kossler, CINCPACREPPHIL, said in response to question that President was not doing as well as he should be, there being "some difficulty with the biopsy," and that President felt his doctors had not done a good job. He went on to say that his cousin, Mrs. Marcos,

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-21

By is, NARA Date 10-25-99

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

had told him that the President was requesting air transportation for medical treatment in the United States. (Similar story was explicitly denied in formal Malacanang statement to press yesterday.) In later conversation with Embassy Assistant Naval Attache, Romualdez said further that Mrs. Marcos had gone so far as to cancel long-standing public engagement in Tacloban on grounds she would have to be in the United States with her husband.

We are putting all of our resources to work to find out most discreetly if there is any confirmation of any of the foregoing and will report immediately any positive information one way or the other. If true, it may be that the matter is being handled strictly in family channels and may surface through Ben Romualdez in Washington. Meanwhile, information should, of course, be very tightly held.

Wilson

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

Fri., Feb. , 1967
12:30 p.m.

109

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Averell Harriman suggests an extended unilateral bombing pause during Tet; and reports further arrangements to debrief Baggs.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET-SUNFLOWER~~ attachment

109a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-291
By ing, NARA, Date 11-21-91
February 2, 1967

SUNFLOWER

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: "Negotiations Committee"

At the Negotiations Committee meeting this afternoon, I raised the question of the extension of the bombing pause beyond the four-day Tet period.

As this subject is so serious a matter of policy, I did not ask for an expression of opinion on whether the pause should be extended, but rather on how it might be dealt with, if the President should decide to take this action.

The following procedures were suggested:

(1) Hanoi should be informed through Moscow channel prior to the beginning of the Tet period that bombing would not be resumed after Tet. No indication should be given of the duration of the pause. Hanoi should also be informed that we would watch with interest what Hanoi did during the Tet period and beyond in the movement of supplies to the South by road and sea, and other indications of positive reaction in de-escalation, as well as take into account their reply to our messages of January 20 and 31. Hanoi should be given this advance notice of the pause since otherwise the North Vietnamese may not recognize its significance and use it automatically for their military advantage.

(2) We should request Brown to inform Kosygin in London of the above, and ask him to point out on his own initiative the opportunity the Soviets have to use their influence in Hanoi for a favorable response in reciprocal de-escalation and in willingness to begin immediate discussions.

- - - -

I strongly recommend that the pause be extended for the full seven-day Tet period and beyond for a sufficient length of time to permit a reaction from Hanoi.

My reasons

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

- 2 -

My reasons for urging this action now are:

(1) The Tet period will be the last chance the President will have for another year to extend a pause which has been begun during a season of good will. This pause may encourage Hanoi to start serious negotiation.

(2) With the recent diplomatic and propaganda build-up, the world is looking for some response from the US. This pressure will increase. By extending the pause, the President will place himself in a strong position abroad as well as at home to show again that he is in the lead in seeking a peaceful settlement. If Hanoi abuses the pause, it will strengthen the President's hand in the prosecution of the war. If it becomes desirable to resume bombing, the DRV/VC will undoubtedly provide credible public justification by some terrorist or military action.


W. Averell Harriman

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

109-b

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 2, 1967


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Confirming my word to you at the Roosevelt Portrait ceremonies, I talked with Bill Fulbright about Baggs.

I have arranged for Baggs to see Nick Katzenbach and myself Saturday morning. Fulbright says that he may sit in on this meeting.

In addition, Bob McNamara will talk with Baggs in the afternoon.

Bill seems completely satisfied with these arrangements and understands why we all recommended against your receiving Baggs.


W. Averell Harriman

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-291
By ijp, NARA, Date 11-21-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, Feb 3, 1967
12:45 p.m.

110

MR. PRESIDENT:

This report of a contact with Chet
Holifield by one of my men may interest
you.

W. W. R.

110a

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

February 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW


SUBJECT: Congressional Contact

I kept a luncheon date yesterday on the Hill with the Administrative Assistant to California Congressman Chet Holifield and found that the Congressman had decided to join us.

He led much of the conversation with musings on some of his colleagues, particularly those advanced in age, his political circumstance in his Los Angeles district (very secure) and ABM strategy. As you know, he alternates the chairmanship of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy with Senator Pastore. The Committee had just received a briefing from Livermore Laboratory on the ABM defense problem, and he was preoccupied with their size-up of the problem.

Vietnam entered the conversation only when he observed that the Administration would do better in expanding public support for policies there by concentrating on the nature of our vital interests that are at stake. He said he was able to keep the issue of Vietnam within manageable bounds in the last election by following this tack.

I avoided any substantive policy discussion. At the end he expressed his admiration for you and offered his services at any time we wished to "float" a matter on the Hill. I promised to convey that offer to you.


D. W. Ropa

cc: Mr. Jorden
Mr. Moose

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

may,

Friday, February 3, 1967 -- 12:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Just to confirm my understanding of your ruling on the January 11, 1967 memorandum of Secretaries Rusk and Udall about a speech on May 23 at the opening of the International Conference on Water for Peace, I have informed Interior, State and the Vice President's office:

-- You have not ruled out the possibility of making the opening address;

-- If you do not make it, the Vice President will;

-- A speech should be prepared.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Dr. Hornig
Mr. Chas. Johnson

WWRostow:rlh

Thurs., January 12, 1967
2:45 p.m.

to P 111a

MR. PRESIDENT:

Secretaries Rusk and Udall have recommended that you make the opening address at the International Conference on Water for Peace, which will open in Washington on May 23, 1967. Dr. Hornig strongly endorses their recommendation.

Your invitation to other governments and to intergovernmental agencies has been very well received, and a large and illustrious attendance is expected.

I join my colleagues in this recommendation, if your calendar permits.

- OK
- if not VP
- Speech prepared

W. W. R.

Mr. President:

Just to confirm ~~your~~ my understanding of your ruling on the January 11, 1967 memorandum of Secs. Rusk and Udall about a speech on May 23 at the opening of the International Conference on Water for Peace, I ~~today~~ have informed Interior and State; and the Vice-Presidents' office:

- You have not ruled out the possibility of making the opening address;
- If you do not make it, the Vice-Presidents will;
- A speech should be prepared.

WWR

111b

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The International Conference
on Water for Peace

Recommendation:

We recommend that you make the opening address at the International Conference on Water for Peace which will open in Washington, D.C. on May 23, 1967.


Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The International Conference on Water for Peace which you proposed in your remarks on October 7, 1965 to the International Symposium on Water Desalination, will open in the Ballroom of the Sheraton Park Hotel at 11:00 a.m. on Tuesday, May 23, 1967. On the basis of the responses received thus far to the invitations we have extended, we expect a large attendance. The participants will include governmental representatives on the expert and ministerial level together with representatives from nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations having an interest in water problems. The conference will extend over an eleven-day period.

In view of the importance of the conference and your interest in it, we hope that you will make the opening address. We envisage your address to be a major substantive statement which would set the general tone for the conference. If you agree, a draft statement will be prepared for your consideration.


Secretary of State


Secretary of the Interior

JAN 6 - 1967

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Summary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-294
By ip, NARA, Date 12-2-93

1. Moscow Exhibit

Secretary Rusk and I have asked Ambassador Dobrynin to urge his Government to proceed with the Industrial Design Exhibit. (The Soviets have been delaying the admission of the Exhibit, thereby raising the possibility of a violation of our Exchange Agreement). Dobrynin said he had already so recommended to Moscow, and that he will telegraph the Secretary's message to Foreign Affairs Minister Gromyko.

2. US-UAR Relations

Ambassador Battle reports a significant conversation between our UAR Country Director, now in Cairo, and Vice President Muhieddin, the UAR's top man on economic problems. Muhieddin's main theme was that the US appeared to have sided with the UAR's adversaries in the area and that a broad US-UAR confrontation more and more appears unavoidable. Continued failure to answer the UAR's food request is the immediate issue, but he sees our support for Kings Hussein and Faisal as other major evidence. Muhieddin argued that the UAR has made a substantial contribution toward containing the Arab-Israeli dispute and deserved better from us. Battle considers his views typical of those now current in Cairo. (Under Secretary Katzenbach is now struggling with a recommendation for you on the food request.)

3. Summit Preparations

Secretary Rusk is now heavily engaged in Summit preparations. He is meeting today with his Cabinet colleagues to review the Summit package I described to you last week. Next Monday, he is scheduled to meet with a blue ribbon group of outside advisors to get their views.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

4. Your Letter to President Frei

Ralph Dungan delivered your letter to President Frei on the postponed visit. Frei again expressed deep appreciation of your understanding of his political predicament. Frei is considering several solutions to the institutional crisis, but is not sure when one can be put into effect, which would permit the rescheduling of his visit.

5. Latin American Views on "Territorial Seas"

The State Department has instructed Embassy Panama to attempt to persuade President Robles to veto the National Assembly's bill extending Panama's territorial waters to 200 miles.

In a discussion with Ambassador Coerr concerning Ecuador's seizure of US vessels beyond the 12-mile limit, President Arosemena noted the action of the Panamanian Assembly and expressed the view that we would sooner or later have to accept the "Latin American" position.

6. Thai Concern Over Proposed B-52 Operations

After discussing our B-52 operations with the Thai National Security Council, Ambassador Martin reports that the Thais feel their cooperation has been taken for granted -- thus subjecting them to humiliating contempt. While Thanom probably would accede to our request, he is being pressured by others who question the past Thai policy of all-out cooperation with the US. Martin believes that a favorable Thai decision on U Tapao could be obtained if we would simultaneously announce the deployment of a Hawk battalion while giving the Thais an indication that we can be forthcoming on some of their other requested items.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Rostow 113
Hold copy
w/Incoming
Rus file

Friday, February 3, 1967 -

Mr. President:

At Tab A, for your signature, is a pleasant reply to President Kenyatta's letter (Tab B) introducing the Kenyan Ministers of Finance and Agriculture, who just finished a visit here. Kenyatta's letter asked for appointments for the Ministers with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and noted with pleasure Joe Palmer's recent visit to Kenya.

The two Ministers were here to push two Kenyan proposals — a request for counterinsurgency arms to fight the Somali guerrillas, and a settlement of a minor dispute arising from the terms of a recent food aid agreement. Neither problem was significant enough to justify appointments with Rusk and McNamara, but the Ministers were received by Katzenbach, Gaud, and others. They got reasonable satisfaction on the food problem, and our agreement to send a public safety expert to study the insurgency situation.

The proposed reply seems a suitable combination of warmth and formality. There should be no problem about the absence of meetings with Rusk and McNamara. (Although they knew what was in the letter and could have passed it to us at any time, the Ministers did not deliver it until their session with Ed Hamilton on the last morning of their visit.)

W. W. Rostow

EKHamilton/rm

1134
FEB 4 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter about the recent visit of your Minister of Finance, Mr. Gichuru, and your Minister for Agriculture, Mr. McKenzie. I recall with pleasure meeting both of them when they were here last spring.

I understand that the Ministers had useful discussions with senior officials of the Departments of State, Defense, and Agriculture and the Agency for International Development. They also met informally with several Congressmen. Their visit has certainly given us a better understanding of Kenya's problems, particularly those involving internal security and food grains. I am sure that they, in turn, have a clearer picture of our position and that these discussions have contributed to our continuing friendship and cooperation.

I also deeply appreciated your good wishes for the new year. All Americans share your hope that 1967 will bring progress toward genuine and lasting peace for all the peoples of the world.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Jomo Kenyatta
President of the Republic
of Kenya
Nairobi

LBJ:EKHamilton/vmr 2/3/67

12th January, 1967.

President Lyndon B. Johnson,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
U.S.A.

1189

Dear Mr. President,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-294
By ip, NARA, Date 12-2-93

You will remember that early last year I sent my Minister for Finance, Mr. J.S. Gichuru, and my Minister for Agriculture, Mr. B.R. McKenzie, to see you to outline our financial and economic problems. These problems have not improved and we now have a further difficulty concerning our Northern Province.

Mr. Gichuru and Mr. McKenzie will be in Washington on approximately 16th January for about a week. I know that you are extremely busy, but I would be most grateful if you could arrange for your Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, and Mr. McNamara to see them about these problems.

I enjoyed the opportunity of seeing Mr. Palmer when he was out here a few weeks ago. We had very good discussions on general issues and he was kind enough to bring your personal greetings.

May I take this opportunity of wishing you a Happy New Year and may 1967 see the World moving towards a peaceful conclusion to its many problems.

Yours sincerely
Jomo Kenyatta

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

February 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

When the Board meets with the President at noon February 3, we plan to comment briefly on the following topics:

1. Significant Intelligence Gaps and Deficiencies.
2. U. S. Intelligence Efforts Relating to Vietnam and Communist China.
3. The National Reconnaissance Program.
4. Improved Systems for the Processing of Intelligence.
5. Counterespionage.

Clark M. Clifford

Clark M. Clifford
Chairman

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-293
By kip, NARA, Date 10-28-93

~~SECRET~~

114
~~SECRET~~
handcarried
brought
to Watson
for P 2/3
6:30 PM

2/2/67 ~~1-2-67~~
2. Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Annual Report of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Attached for your signature is a letter transmitting the sixth annual report of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to Congress.

The report presents a detailed account of the full range of U. S. government activities relating to arms control and disarmament during 1966. I think it will help project a positive image of our activities in this field without raising any special problems with Congress. Although the report touches on some sensitive problems such as the non-proliferation treaty and the ABM freeze, I believe they are handled satisfactorily.

The letter of transmittal to Congress restates your strong endorsement of our current arms control initiatives, particularly efforts to achieve a non-proliferation treaty, and attempts to help set the stage for discussions that might lead to a freeze on offensive and defensive strategic weapons.

If you approve, the attached report together with the letter of transmittal will be printed for delivery to Congress and public distribution.

I recommend that you sign the attached letter of transmittal and approve the attached ACDA annual report.

15/
W. W. Rostow

Attachments (2)

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

2/7/67
Wayne Hawks
picked up 2d attachment
to return to ACDA =
for printing
purposes

SMKeeny:jb:2-1-67
bcc: SMK file and chron
WWR (2)
SMK come-back copy

To The Congress of The United States:

I am transmitting herewith the Sixth Annual Report of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I do so with considerable satisfaction, since this year has seen significant progress in this nation's twenty-year effort to bring under control the armaments which are the product of man's twentieth century ingenuity.

In 1966 a significant link was added to the still slender chain of arms control agreements -- a treaty banning weapons of mass destruction in outer space and on celestial bodies. Its significance will grow as our mastery of space grows, and our children will remark the wisdom of this agreement to a greater degree than the present state of our own knowledge quite permits today.

The past year has also brought us close to another agreement, one of even greater immediacy -- a treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons here on earth. Our hopes are high that this long effort will soon be crowned with success.

The United States has been trying to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons since 1946. At that time Bernard Baruch, speaking for the United States at the United Nations, said "If we fail we have damned every man to be the slave of fear." It is true that we failed then, but we did not become the "slaves of fear;" instead we persisted. In the

Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961, Congress decreed that the search for ways to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war should become a matter of first emphasis for the United States Government. The establishment of an independent Agency to work out ways to bring the arms race under control was the act of a rational people who refused to submit to the fearful implications of the nuclear age.

Several things are evident from a reading of this Report. The first is that we are succeeding, after a few short years, in developing an integrated and highly expert attack on the problem of arms control and disarmament. Our security has two faces -- strength and restraint; arms and arms control. We have come to the point where our thinking about weapons is paralleled by our thinking about how to control them. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency plays a central role in this development.

The second is that despite the magnitude and complexity of armament imposed on the world by the cold war, the problem can be made to yield to imagination and determination, so that now we might legitimately begin to count up the score: we have cut down the danger of "accidental war" with the hot line, curtailed the injection of radioactive waste into the atmosphere with the limited test ban treaty, and joined in strengthening the system of safeguards designed by the International Atomic Energy Agency to close one of the doors to nuclear weapons.

The United States has anticipated the future by putting all of Antarctica, and more recently outer

space, off limits to weapons of mass destruction. Non-armament is easier than disarmament, and in these terms alone, the value of these latter treaties cannot be overestimated. In addition, however, we should not overlook the significance of this approach to the problems in arms control we face right now. A treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons will have this same preventive element -- without it we face the prospect of a world in which more than a dozen nations will possess nuclear weapons. If our hopes for success in a treaty are realized, the chances for still further agreements will be greatly enhanced. These next steps will also be more difficult, because they must involve the weapons we might otherwise add to our arsenals, or even those now on hand.

This brings us to my last observation, which is that this Report reveals the sobering reality of the immensity of the task we have undertaken. Read in the context of recent developments in the Soviet Union -- the buildup of their strategic forces and the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow -- we are reminded that our hard-won accomplishments can be swept away overnight by still another costly and futile escalation of the arms race.

It is my belief that the United States and the Soviet Union have reached a watershed in the dispiriting history of our arms competition. Decisions may be made on both sides which will trigger another upward spiral. The paradox is that this should be happening at a time when there is abundant evidence that our mutual antagonism is beginning to ease. I

am determined to use all the resources at my command to encourage the reduction in tension that is in our mutual interest, and to avoid further, mutually-defeating buildup. The work of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will continue to be of invaluable assistance in this urgent task.

Sincerely,

Long
2. Pres file

sent thru R. Komer

Thursday, February 2, 1967
3:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

In the attached draft letter I have taken the occasion to respond not merely by patting the Marines on the back but telling them gently to get on with it a bit faster. There has been a bit more publicity than solid action in the Marines' pacification effort, although it has been a pioneering job of great usefulness.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

116a

February 4, 1967

Dear General Greene:

Thank you for making available Major Kriegel's paper on Revolutionary Development.

We have many tasks in Viet Nam in 1967. None is more important than working with the Vietnamese to accelerate the provision of local security in the countryside, and building behind that security the beginnings of a progressive democratic life in the villages.

I know how much the Marines have contributed in ideas and in experiment in this critical field.

I am counting on the Marines, working with the Vietnamese, to expand radically their actual pacification operations during 1967.

Sincerely,

LBJ

General Wallace M. Greene, Jr.
Commandant
U. S. Marine Corps
Washington, D. C. 20380

LBJ:WWR:mz

~~1-2-67~~
2, 11:40 a.m.

Thursday, February 2, 1967
11:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Leonard Marks requests your permission to designate May 25 as U.S. Day at the Canadian Fair at Montreal. As he emphasizes, "The designation of this date does not in any way indicate that the President will be visiting the Fair at that time or on any other date." But, for planning purposes he needs a firm decision.

W. W. Rostow

Approved ✓

Disapproved _____

See me _____

copy with Sec Rusk

WWRostow:rlh



DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

117a

February 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Walt Rostow
The White House

The Government of Canada has been urging us to designate a "National Day" for our presentation at the EXPO 67 Fair in Montreal.

We have been informed that we are the only nation not yet showing a date for a National Day and that the final printing for the Fair schedule listing all National Day events is now being completed.

In view of these circumstances, I propose that we designate May 25 as United States Day. The designation of this date does not in any way indicate that the President will be visiting the Fair at that time or on any other date.

Appropriate ceremonies will be held on our National Day regardless of the plans of the President to visit the Fair.

Will you please let me know if this meets with the President's approval.



Leonard H. Marks

cc: The Honorable
Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

118
Revised

Thursday, February 2, 1967
6:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Clark Clifford files
the agenda for the meeting at noon
tomorrow, Friday, February 3, with
your Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 2-8-91

~~SECRET~~

118

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

February 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

When the Board meets with the President at noon February 3, we plan to comment briefly on the following topics:

1. Significant Intelligence Gaps and Deficiencies.
2. U. S. Intelligence Efforts Relating to Vietnam and Communist China.
3. The National Reconnaissance Program.
4. Improved Systems for the Processing of Intelligence.
5. Counterespionage.

Clark M. Clifford

Clark M. Clifford
Chairman

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-293
By *kg*, NARA, Date 8-5-94

~~SECRET~~

11³
Profile

Thursday, February 2, 1967
4:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Henry Owen sent this over.

That fellow sure has been at
it a long time.

W. W. Rostow

Wisdom Revisited

Excerpts from "George C. Marshall -- Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942,"
Chapter III, "The Hungry Table"

General Marshall was alarmed in late September (1941) when Walter Lippmann, in his widely read column, suggested that "All popular doubts, political confusions, all ambiguity would be removed by a clear decision to shrink the Army and concentrate our major effort upon the Navy, the air force and lend-lease." In "The Case for a Smaller Army," the writer explained that the program of a large army was born out of the dangers of encirclement that threatened the United States in the summer of 1940 when it seemed that Britain might fall and the Navy would be unable to carry the burden of defending the country by itself. This danger had passed... "I think that a surgical operation is indicated - an operation to shrink the army...."

Lippmann's punditry, reflecting views then current of the Navy, the Lend-Lease authorities, the British and even the anti-French agents then in Washington, apparently stirred the President near the end of September to invite Marshall to the White House to discuss the possibility of cutting the size of the Army....

In the welter of material he (Marshall) carried with him to the White House one of the most important documents was a memorandum by Assistant Secretaries McCloy and Lovett. They argued vigorously that reduction in the size of the Army would be disastrous.... "Abandonment of maximum effort in any form would be considered a step toward appeasement for a negotiated peace is at the root of the Lippmann article -- not a complete victory."

Afterward Marshall was never sure whether he had been needlessly apprehensive or if the President had changed his mind with characteristic abruptness.

~~SECRET~~

February 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from General Franco

General Franco has written the attached to express his concern that King Hassan will use his visit next week to create an impression of US support for his claims against Spanish territory in North Africa. This letter caps a prolonged Spanish diplomatic effort to make sure the Moroccans don't get an inside track with us on the argument with Spain over the phosphate-rich Spanish Sahara.

This is one of several interrelated issues which we will try to sort out for you in the NSC meeting on North Africa we have scheduled next Wednesday. In the meantime State is preparing a reply for you and Spanish concerns are being wrapped into our preparations for Hassan's visit.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-20
By is, NARA Date 10-25-99

~~SECRET~~



EMBAJADA DE ESPAÑA
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Translation

120a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 99-20
By is, NARA Date 10-25-99

The Head of the State
and Commander in Chief of the National Armies.
Personal.
Palacio de El Pardo
30 January 1967

His Excellency, Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America

My Dear President Johnson:

Please forgive me for retaining your attention for a few moments, but I trust that the importance of what I have to say will justify my writing directly - to Your Excellency.

The publicity which is being given in Morocco to the announced visit of His Majesty the King to the United States and the fact that among the Ministers - accompanying him will be the Minister for Mauritanian and Saharan affairs, coincides with a campaign of expansionist claims on the territories of her neighbours - Algeria, Mauritania and Spain - and reveals Morocco's intentions to exploit the King's visit to the United States to attempt to present the United States as being implicated in her aspirations. I have therefore thought it best to forewarn you of this possibility; firstly, because none of the parties affected are ready to cede their rights, and in our case the Spanish right of sovereignty is clear as is the firm and repeatedly evidenced loyalty of the people of the Sahara - about -- 26.000 inhabitants -; and secondly, because this sparsely populated territory has a very marked geo-strategic importance as it includes an extensive portion of the African coast immediately adjacent to the clearly Spanish Canary Islands, which are a center of world -- sea-routes, and which Spain has for centuries developed and defended.

Among the objectives publicized in Morocco for this visit is that of asking the American Administra-

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EMBAJADA DE ESPAÑA
WASHINGTON

tion for a larger economic and military aid. While I find their economic interest legitimate and very convenient for the peace, development and internal stability of their country, in which we are truly interested, such is not the case with respect to military aid. The American Government is aware through our Representatives of the constant Spanish concern with respect to the increase of armaments taking place in North Africa with the general intention of threatening peace and attempting to satisfy imperialist ambitions in conflict with neighbouring countries. But no one is threatening the integrity of Morocco's frontiers; she already has sufficient weapons for her defence and for her internal peace and security; and Spain, who only a few years ago underwent the agression of supposedly spontaneous bands which Morocco utilized to break the peace in the territories of Ifni and Sahara, now feels alarmed by Morocco's attempt to secure more arms at a time in which she is stirring up bellicose feelings in her inhabitants. It is really incongruous that when Morocco's economic need is at its greatest she should wish to devote to military expenses amounts far in excess of her means in the hope that another country will finance them.

I have wished Your Excellency to be acquainted with this concern, in order to avoid the possibility that, in the light of an apparent neutrality, and heeding a supposed need for self-defence which has been ably and artificially contrived, your Administration might err on the side of generosity in this military aspect.

Due to my great confidence in your judgement and fairness, I feel satisfied in having made this known to you.

At these moments, when the United States is going through a great sorrow at the loss of her heroic astronauts, I wish to express to you the solidarity and appreciation that this sacrifice has inspired throughout all the Spanish nation.

May I avail myself of this opportunity to reiterate to you my highest consideration and affection.

I remain, Your Excellency's good friend

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



1206

El Jefe del Estado
Generalísimo de los Ejércitos Nacionales

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-20
By is, NARA Date 10-25-99

PERSONAL

Palacio de El Pardo, 30 de enero de 1967.

Excmo. Señor Lyndon B. Johnson.
Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América.

Querido Presidente Johnson:

Perdonadme que distraiga vuestra atención unos momentos, pero la importancia que doy a cuanto voy a exponeros espero que justifique el que escriba directamente a Vuestra Excelencia.

El anuncio de la visita del Rey de Marruecos a los Estados Unidos, la publicidad que en aquella nación viene dándosele y la circunstancia de acompañarle entre otros Ministros el titulado de Asuntos de Mauritania y del Sahara, coincidiendo con una campaña de reivindicaciones expansionistas sobre territorios de sus naciones vecinas -Argelia, Mauritania y España-, descubren el propósito de utilizar el viaje a los Estados Unidos para pretender presentar a Norteamérica como implicada en sus pretensiones. Por ello he querido preveniros, pues aparte de que ninguno de los afectados está dispuesto a ceder en sus derechos, y en nuestro caso están bien claros los derechos de soberanía española y la firme adhesión del pueblo saharauí -unos 26.000 habitantes-, repetidamente demostrada, ese territorio tan poco poblado tiene una importancia geoestratégica de gran trascendencia, por comprender una extensa parte de la costa africana inmediata a las Islas Canarias, netamente españolas, por las que discurren las comunicaciones marítimas del mundo y en las que España desde hace siglos viene guardando y desarrollando su actividad.


Entre los propósitos que en Marruecos se han hecho públicos como objetivos del viaje, está el de recabar de la Administración americana una ayuda económica y militar de mayor amplitud. Y así mientras la primera, la económica, la encuentro legítima y muy conveniente a la paz, al desarrollo y a la estabilidad interna de aquel país, que tanto nos interesa, no sucede lo mismo en cuanto respecta a la ayuda militar. Las autoridades americanas conocen a través de nuestros representantes, la constante preocupación española en relación con el desarrollo de los armamentos en el Norte de África, dirigidos en general a amenazar la paz e intentar satisfacer ambiciones imperialistas en pugna con los vecinos. Nadie amena-

za a Marruecos en la integridad de sus fronteras; cuenta con armamento suficiente para su defensa y la de su paz y seguridad interiores; pero España, que padeció hace pocos años la agresión de bandas armadas que, bajo la apariencia de espontaneidad, Marruecos utilizó para alterar la paz en los territorios de Ifni y Sahara, tiene que sentirse alarmada de esta nueva pretensión de aumentar sus armamentos en los momentos en que viene excitándose a la belicoidad a sus habitantes. Resulta realmente incongruente que cuando tantas necesidades tiene aquella nación en el orden económico, pretenda dedicar a gastos militares cantidades superiores a los medios de que dispone y aspirar a que otro se los pague.

Esta es la preocupación que quiero que Vuestra Excelencia conozca, para que no pueda suceder que, bajo la apariencia de una supuesta neutralidad y ante la hábil y artificiosa presentación de una necesidad de defenderse, pueda vuestra Administración en este orden militar pecar de generosa. La gran confianza que tengo en vuestro buen juicio y rectitud, me dejan tranquilo después de que lo conozcais.

En estos momentos, en que los Estados Unidos pasan por el dolor de la pérdida de sus heroicos astronautas, quiero expresaros la solidaridad y aprecio que en nuestra nación todos sentimos hacia vuestro sacrificio.

Reiterándoos la expresión de mi más alta consideración y afecto, queda de Vuestra Excelencia buen amigo,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "J. F. Kennedy", written over a horizontal line. The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping initial "J" and a long, trailing flourish.

Thursday, February 2, 1967
12:00 noon

MR. PRESIDENT:

As instructed,

We have launched a quiet inquiry to determine the potential qualification of young Edward White (age 13) for appointment to West Point.

Although neither Colonel Grissom nor Commander Chaffee was a service academy graduate, you may wish to give similar consideration to appointments to service academies for the sons of Colonel Grissom and Commander Chaffee, if they check out as promising. Grissom's sons are Scott (16) and Mark (13). Chaffee's son is Stephen (5).

As a matter of equity and public reaction, I believe this is worth your judgment.

W. W. R.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

Wednesday, February 1, 1967 -- 8:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Stewart Loory, Los Angeles Times, newly assigned to the White House, came in to see me today. I briefed him on two matters:

-- The nature of my job, emphasizing its role as a means of two-way communication between the President and the national security community; and

-- The broad ranging nature of our foreign policy which, despite the burdens of Viet Nam, is basically a worldwide and constructive policy.

The only matter he raised at length is whether Viet Nam is interfering with our relations with the Soviet Union. I expressed my own view which is this: That ~~negotiations~~^{nothing} of first-class importance between ourselves and the Soviet Union is being held up by Viet Nam; and I did not expect great issues to be settled after Viet Nam which could not now be dealt with.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Wednesday, February 1, 1967 -- 7:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

I asked Clark Clifford to come in this evening and share some thoughts on Viet Nam.

It was worth while.

I recommend that you find an occasion soon to get his perspective.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Wednesday, Feb. 1, 1967
12:00 noon

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MR. PRESIDENT:

I thought you would be interested in
Ky's view of peace prospects and an
appropriate policy in this period.

W. W. R.

SECRET attachment

Copy of SAIGON 17053, Feb. 1, 1967

1. Pursuant to your 128175, I called Ky on Wednesday morning and cited the newspaper articles by Salisbury, Burchett, and in the Communist newspaper Nhan Dan as well as the messages in Cairo and New Delhi, all of them trying to get us to stop the bombing without any de-escalation on their side. I asked Ky what he thought.

2. Ky believes that "we are getting stronger every day, and they are getting weaker every day -- and they know it." They are hurt by the bombing, and by the tremendous military "meat-grinder" which devours the troops which they send into South Viet-Nam. In particular, he said, "our political progress is the worst thing for them." They know that once a constitutional government is installed in Viet-Nam, he added, they will have no more chance. For that reason, Ky said, he had decided that the elections should be held three months after the promulgation of the constitution and not six months.

3. Ky believed that there was a change in tactics on the part of the Communists. He cited the Pham Van Dong interview with Gloria Stewart, which, in effect, said it would be satisfactory for Hanoi to be under a separate non-Communist government. He believed they meant it.

4. Clearly, Ky said, terror was increasing in South Viet-Nam. It exists now "more than ever," and will increase, notably at election time.

5. Their difficulties were three times as great as ours, said Ky. It was important to elect a constitutional President as soon as possible for many reasons, including peace talks. Until there is an elected government in Viet-Nam, it is very important to keep all peace overtures very quiet because news of them will affect the morale of the Vietnamese. He cited the statement of Senator Robert Kennedy as an example of something which could create great difficulty and of which he feared the Communists would take advantage. It is a typical Communist tactic openly to support peace and privately to keep on fighting. It is difficult for free countries to cope with this kind of thing unless they have strong leadership. This was why he was in such a hurry about elections, and why he intended to invite the maximum number of journalists to come to watch the elections here.

6. He believed we should keep up the pressure-bombing the North, "meat-grinder" operations in the South, and above all, political progress. He considers that what makes them want peace is the thought of their own weakness and of our strength. So-called "peace offensives" and arguments in the West make them more bellicose.

7. He believed that conditions in mainland China must be a worry

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-291
By 150, NARA, Date 11-21-91

Copy of SAIGON 17053, Feb. 1, 1967

to Hanoi, but he thought that Peking would continue to supply them with rice. He recalled the very cold winter in 1945 similar to the winter which they are having in North Viet-Nam now. Plans were made to bring rice from South Viet-Nam, and then the Japanese took it all. The result was, Ky said, that a million North Vietnamese died. He remembered how, as a boy of 15, he saw the bodies lying around in the streets and being taken away in truckloads. He concluded that the North Vietnamese could stand much as individuals, but that shortages as they are enduring now would inevitably put a crimp into military operations.

LODEE

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, February 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Summary

125
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-294
By ing, NARA, Date 12-2-93

1. Embassy Saigon to Stress Importance of Civilian Role in New Government

The State Department has informed Embassy Saigon that our basic concern in the forthcoming elections is that political development complement military progress. Despite the power realities represented by the military, the new government must be more broadly representative of all non-Communist groups. It must involve elected civilians in executive branch and an elected legislature with influence on the military. The Embassy was asked: to reassess the election situation taking into consideration the views of the provincial leaders and cadre; to reconsider how personalities are to be fitted into key positions; and to impress on Thieu and Ky the importance we attach to transition toward more representative government.

2. Podgorny Conversation with the Pope

Embassy Rome reports that the only matter of substance raised between Soviet Chief of State Podgorny and Pope Paul concerned the problem of religious liberty in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Podgorny reportedly brushed aside discussion of Vietnam, while the Pope was unreceptive to Podgorny's efforts to turn the conversation to the dangers of German revanchism.

3. Effect of Japanese Election on Foreign Policy Positions


Ambassador Johnson discussed today with Vice Foreign Minister Shimoda the questions of defense consultations and ChiCom missile and nuclear technology. Shimoda stated that, in the light of the election results, Japan should be able to move forward on additional aid to South Vietnam. He noted that it would be hard to get money for additional food aid to India unless the European Governments were also participating.

~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

Shimoda informed the Ambassador that the Germans had approached the Japanese in Tokyo suggesting the two Governments concert their positions on various aspects of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He said the Japanese declined.


W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Wed., Feb. 1, 1967
3:30 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Lodge's weekly cable.

Note, particularly, the item marked in red on p. 3.

I believe Ky's evaluation may be correct: if they want negotiations now, it may be to get in on **or** short circuit the constitutional process before the election.

If this is right, you may see a big push for a "coalition government" before the election.

On page 5, we are scheduling Max Taylor for TV, but it's a good round-up and we could easily circulate for use on the Hill.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET-NODIS~~ attachment (Saigon 17054)

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Wednesday, February 1, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 17054)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. Unilateral "Peace" Talks

1262

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-291
By ijf, NARA, Date 11-21-91

There is strong reaction here to some of the so-called "peace" proposals being aired in the U. S. press. Catholic groups in particular are active. The Greater Catholic Solidarity Force, for example, recently sent cables to you, to Pope Paul, and to U Thant. The cable to the Pope, like that addressed to you, warns against a "false peace" and specifically, objects to any coalition government with the National Liberation Front. The cable to U Thant objects to his "tendentious attitude" and the "pretense that the so-called National Liberation Front of South Vietnam is a leftist national organization independent of Hanoi." The editor of the influential Catholic newspaper, Xay Dung, has launched a campaign against a peace which would lead to a Communist takeover.

This activity may have been provoked in part by Senator Fulbright's views. Taking their cue from Ky's angry charge that Fulbright is a colonialist, the Vietnamese press was strident in their criticism of him.

Senator Robert Kennedy's remarks about peace talks also provoked a reaction in the headlines here, the newspaper Than Chung saying: "Contrary to Senator Kennedy's statement in Paris, the United States will reject all French proposals on Vietnam for the time being," and the newspaper Saigon Bao saying: "The White House scoffed at irresponsible statements from Senator Kennedy on peace talks."

The newspaper Tu Do said:

"In a meeting with the Oxford University's students in London, Senator Robert Kennedy disclosed that secret negotiations are under way between the United States and North Vietnam. Although Mr. Kennedy confirmed that the talks centered on war prisoners, it is doubtful that the cease-fire issue was not brought forward. If this was true, the United States has committed two big mistakes:

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

"First, through the meeting -- even secret -- with the Viet Cong representatives, the United States indirectly acknowledges that the Viet Cong are a separate armed movement, independent from North Vietnam. Secondly, by opening unilateral talks with the Viet Cong, without the participation of the Republic of Vietnam, the United States has ignored the voice of free Vietnam and encroached upon the self-determination right of the Vietnamese people.

"We, Vietnamese, reassert that South Vietnam is the victim of an aggression directed by North Vietnam and that the Allied forces -- including the American ones -- are here to help us repel the aggression. We hope that the United States will not betray her own ideals or disavow her commitment toward the Vietnamese people."

B. Political Maturity

Evidence of growing political maturity and stability can be seen in the week's events in Vietnam. The case of General Co, with all of its heavy implications while Ky was out of the country (troop movements, talk among politicians and some unit commanders, precautions at Tan Son Nhut, etc.) is the type of thing that brought down other governments in the past. While there was some nervousness this time, Ky and the Government of Vietnam seem to have weathered this successfully. If we "count our blessings," this stability is surely one of them.

Also both Thieu and Ky are now publicly committed to a clean-up campaign to eliminate corruption in their Government. They might have moved against corruption anyway, but their realization that it could cost them votes was a stimulus.

Not until January 30 was there any public acknowledgement that Co had been fired on charges of corruption. On that evening, General Thieu announced a month-long clean-up campaign at a reception for 200 Vietnamese journalists. Asked by one journalist why Co had been fired, Thieu said flatly that the action was taken in connection with the problem of corruption.

Another sign of political maturity is a growing awareness by the military leadership that they need civilian support. In his recent swing through the Delta provinces, General Thieu made a point of

visiting hamlets and pagodas as well as military installations. He spoke to students and farmers as well as gatherings of Army personnel, Assembly members, and he has also been active in seeking support from civilian politicians outside the Assembly.

Another "blessing" seems to be a growing awareness that methods which are political and Constitutional and which have recourse to elections are a good way to decide important questions and are preferable to violence, conspiracies and coups. This idea is old to us, but relatively new to them.

Finally, this military government has concluded that of all the things we are doing to North Vietnam -- bombing from the air and destruction on the ground -- "the worst thing for them" (to use Ky's phrase) is the political progress. This is why he favors holding elections for President three -- and not six -- months after promulgation of the Constitution.

C. Constitution

The "Constituent Assembly" has completed work on Chapters I and II of the Constitution (basic provisions and rights and duties of citizens). It has about six weeks work left to do. While debate was often spirited, the only real clash came over the issue of military participation in politics. In a bitter four-hour debate, the Assembly decided to soften the requirement that military personnel elected to high offices must resign from the military; as the provision now stands, they are only required to go on leave without pay. But despite strong appeals from the military Deputies, the Assembly refused to modify the article which prohibits military personnel on active duty from engaging in political party activity.

D. Chieu Hoi

The number of Chieu Hoi returnees for January 15-21 was 592. This compares with 420 and 437 for the previous two weeks, and brings the total for this year to 1,449. The weekly figure compares with 252 for the corresponding week in 1966 and the total at this time in 1966 was 856. As you know, 1966 was twice as good as 1965.

A Viet Cong report captured during Operation CEDAR FALLS calls the Chieu Hoi program a "great asset" for the free world forces. The report, dated December 20, estimates the intelligence provided free world forces by Chieu Hoi returnees to be 70 - 80 percent accurate.

First reports from an in-depth series of interviews with returnees reveals that the principal reasons for leaving the Viet Cong are nostalgia for families, intense military pressures, and disillusionment with the Viet Cong. Returnees who came in during the CEDAR FALLS operation agreed that the B-52 raids caused great fear among the Viet Cong.

A Northern civilian who fled North Vietnam in November reported seeing in North Vietnam a number of leaflets dropped by Allied aircraft, including an effective plea to North Vietnam soldiers to defect. He said that the leaflets were dropped in such quantities that the cadres were unable to collect and destroy them.

E. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending January 28, the Viet Cong killed 26 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 24, and kidnapped 72.

A particularly gruesome report of Viet Cong brutality was reported this week: In Kien Hoa province, a Viet Cong arrested by Resources Control Police reported that a policeman kidnapped by the Viet Cong was given a "formal" trial presided over by two Viet Cong "judges." The policeman was led into the trial room blindfolded and with his hands tied behind him. The accused was charged with "action against the National Liberation Front" and was sentenced to death, the execution to be carried out at once. The Viet Cong tied the policeman's arms and legs, cut open his stomach, removed both eyes with a bayonet and then cut his head off.

Ky believes -- and I agree -- that without such monstrous horrors the guerrilla organization would collapse.

F. Economic

The Retail Price Index last week reached 247, the highest yet. The increase from last week's 232 is largely due to the continued

sharp rise in the price of rice. Rice has been going steadily up for several weeks and is close to 30 percent over the level of one month ago. The problem is that stocks are low. We have repeatedly urged the Government of Vietnam to make timely arrangements to purchase rice, but they did not act in time to prevent this price upsurge. It is now anticipated that the price will continue to rise after the TET holidays instead of declining as is the usual case. I have discussed this problem with Prime Minister Ky, and I believe action will now be taken to remedy the situation.

G. Three Reactions

Senator Yarborough of Texas sent me a letter of congratulations on the reaction to my television broadcast on January 8, and asked for a transcript of the broadcast, which I am sending him.

This suggests to me that he -- or some other Senator -- might be given the material contained in Paragraph 1 of the Weekly for January 25 (attached), as the basis for a speech in the Senate, which could then be mailed out under the frank. None of the material is classified. If you approve this idea, I have some additional material which I can provide.

I also had an encouraging meeting with Bishop Smith who is the Methodist Bishop for Oklahoma and New Mexico. He is also a friend of the late Bob Kerr. He strongly supports our policy. I believe a sermon by him on the point that aggression is profoundly immoral as well as being against the United Nations Charter and that there is something evil and monstrous in large nations seeking to overwhelm small ones by force could be helpful. I have an impression that many clergymen do not understand this, and that such a sermon could be most effective and also have much true merit.

Joseph Fried is the Vietnam correspondent of the New York Daily News. He is very bright. Also, he has often been critical. He told me that there could be absolutely no question of the "tremendous" progress which had occurred here since your decision to commit U.S. troops.

LODGE

126-b

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Wednesday, January 25, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 16456)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. Vietnam Changes in 1 1/2 Years

General Max Taylor, who departed this morning, kindly asked for a list of the changes which had taken place in Vietnam during the last year and a half (for many of which he sowed the seed when he was on duty here). He intends to use this material in the press and on television upon his return. The compilation which we made reflects such tremendous credit on your decision to commit U. S. troops that I thought it would interest you to have it, as follows:

"Changes in Vietnam since the President's Decision to Commit U. S. Troops (announced on July 28, 1965)

1 Overt Aggression:

A. U. S. forced⁴ build-up and field deployment accomplished with a minimum of disturbance.

B. Third country allied forces in place. Now over 50,000 troops from five countries.

C. Army of Vietnam (ARVN) has been strongly supported by U. S. forces.

D. Enemy Main Force threat has been contained; enemy Main Force units have been either kept off balance or defeated.

E. Friendly troops have begun to enter enemy base areas in strength and for long periods.

F. Bombing of the North has been sustained and has increased enemy supply problems.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-291

By 1-8, NARA, Date 11-21-91

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

G. Naval control of South Vietnam coast and major rivers has been put into effect with great success.

H. Viet Cong defectors doubled (20,000 in 1966, expected to be greater in 1967).

I. All ratios now highly favorable each week. Enemy losses in killed, captured, and weapons are punishingly one-sided.

II Clandestine Aggression

A. Better understanding of Revolutionary Development; first steps being taken to revamp ARVN. The Revolutionary Development cadres have been formed, trained and the concepts of their deployment developed. From the first political action teams to the well-trained Revolutionary Development teams is a long step forward.

B. Revolutionary Development has been subjected to planned programming of a high order, with integrated organization from Ministerial level downward.

C. Police Force has been expanded and better trained.

D. Communist control in countryside has been rejected by population whenever security conditions permit. People living under secure conditions estimated to have increased from 54 percent to 59 percent during 1966, with no change in the 20 percent largely under Viet Cong influence.

III Political

A. One government over period as contrasted with frequent changes immediately beforehand means that everyone has had time to learn to do his job. Order restored in Hue/Danang, which had been effectively removed from Government of Vietnam jurisdiction.

B. Increased security has enabled political evolution to occur, whereas no political institutions were taking root immediately beforehand.

C. Political life and popular representation became an accepted fact and there is promise of wholesome political development in the future.

- D. Elections of September 11 were a remarkable manifestation.
- E. Work of the Constituent Assembly proceeding on schedule.
- F. Popular resistance to the Viet Cong continues. No development of a defeatist attitude.
- G. No more Corps Commander "war lords."

IV Economic

- A. Runaway inflation prevented.
- B. Food has been plentiful and available to the general public.
- C. Imports increased dramatically.
- D. Full employment has been achieved and sustained.
- E. Major construction tasks accomplished in particular ports have been expanded dramatically.
- F. Refugees have been cared for.
- G. Transportation has been accomplished to outlying areas.
- H. Economic planning for the future has been re-started.
- I. Financial position of the Government of Vietnam has greatly strengthened due to increasingly strong foreign exchange position.
- J. Increasing measures have been taken to deny economic resources to the enemy.

V. Social

- A. Amazing growth in health facilities in provincial area plus substantial improvement in medical education.
- B. Expansion of primary education in particular, but strengthening of educational system in general.
- C. Greater press freedom and press responsibility."

To be sure, we still face enormous problems, notably as regards eliminating the terrorist inner circle -- and everything in Vietnam is still fragile and precarious.

I wonder whether the above list of "changes in Vietnam" could not be distributed to top officials in Washington, in Saigon and to U.S. Ambassadors abroad for them to use in their press backgrounding and their conversations with opinion makers. yes

B. Military

As usual, the performance of U.S. forces regarding overt aggression has been outstanding. For example, General Westmoreland tells me that the "Cedar Falls" operation in Binh Duong, which started on January 8, and is still continuing, is the most significant success to date in Vietnam. This operation resulted so far in killing 679 Viet Cong soldiers, taking 198 prisoners, and detaining 508 suspects. Five hundred-eleven individual and 23 crew-served weapons, as well as large quantities of rice, were taken. The surprising totals of 650,000 vials of penicillin and two tons of Vitamin C were seized.

A total of 5,967 refugees were evacuated in what I believe is the outstanding operation of its kind since this war began. These people were transported by many methods to specially prepared camps, and were enabled to bring with them their livestock -- ducks, pigs, buffalos -- an operation which speaks well both for the civil and the military.

Our own losses in the operation were 73 killed and 322 wounded.

As a result of this operation, a total of 374 Viet Cong have come into the Chieu Hoi camps -- the largest ever to come in as a result of a single combat operation.

The enemy fought from underground fortifications, work on which was started in 1946.

A large number of documents has been captured, including an attack plan on the city of Saigon. I am told that in them is detailed identification of the billets occupied by Americans.

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Harold Stassen's Proposals

You asked me to see Harold Stassen and staff out his ideas. I talked with him on December 15 and he has written several letters since that time. He has also written a Letter to the Editor of the New York Times making essentially the same proposals he made to you (Tab E).

Stassen's basic idea is that we support UN membership for both halves of the divided states of Vietnam, Korea, China and Germany. He believes this would 'open the way to resolve the Vietnamese War.' Mr. Stassen's proposal and argumentation is at Tab C, and a staff analysis of the idea is at Tab D. The staff conclusion is that we should not adopt Stassen's proposal. The State Department, other interested agencies and your NSC staff all believe that the admission to the UN of East Germany, Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam would damage our interests without making the contribution toward resolving the Vietnamese War Mr. Stassen hopes for.

I have prepared a letter for you to send to Harold Stassen if you wish to (Tab A), and one which I could send if you would prefer (Tab B). I recommend the latter, as Stassen already carries on an extensive correspondence with the State Department and will try to do the same with you.

W. W. Rostow

(Sign Presidential letter at Tab A)

Rostow letter at Tab B approved ✓

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-294
By ing, NARA, Date 12-2-93

WWR
WWR:ND:gg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Mr. Stassen:

Since you wrote me on December 14, I understand you have talked with Walt Rostow and amplified these ideas in your excellent letter of December 22. I have studied your proposals, together with comments and analysis by officers of the State Department, other interested agencies and my own staff.

You may be interested and reassured to know that some of these ideas were proposed and seriously considered within the Government on several occasions during the past year. I can assure you that we are anxious to explore all possible avenues to a Vietnam settlement and will not reject any proposal simply because it involves a radical change in policy or a sharp break with the past.

The conclusion of my advisers, with which I agree, is that universal membership in the United Nations would not now open the way to resolve the Vietnamese War. A number of your other ideas are under active study and I appreciate having them. I have asked Walt Rostow and Joseph Sisco to make themselves available on a continuing basis for further discussion of these matters as appropriate.

Sincerely,

Honorable Harold E. Stassen
1020 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Building
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

not used

LBJ:ND:gg

FEB 3 1967

Dear Mr. Stassen:

At the request of the President, the proposals you made in your excellent letter of December 22 have been studied in the Department of State and elsewhere. You may be interested and reassured to know that some of these ideas were proposed and seriously considered within the Government on several occasions during the past year. I can assure you that we are anxious to explore all possible avenues to a Vietnam settlement and will not reject any proposal simply because it involves a radical change in policy or a sharp break with the past.

The conclusion of these studies is that universal membership in the United Nations would not now open the way to resolve the Vietnamese War. A number of your other ideas are under active consideration. Assistant Secretary Sisco and I are available and would be happy to discuss any further views you may have. I know the President appreciates your letters to him and the constructive contribution you continue to make to the resolution of the foreign policy questions which face our country.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Walt
W. W. Rostow

Honorable Harold E. Stassen
1020 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Building
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

1270

X
HAROLD E. STASSEN
1020 FIDELITY-PHILADELPHIA TRUST BUILDING
PHILADELPHIA 9, PENNSYLVANIA
KINGSLEY 5-7466

December 22, 1966

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

H
Confirming and supplementing my conference on December 15th with Walt Rostow, and following up on my letter to you of December 1, I respectfully suggest the following method of implementing successfully your concern over Vietnam and the United Nations.

An initiative should be taken by you for the United States toward modernizing and strengthening the United Nations, and to use the United Nations, thus modernized and strengthened, to solve the Vietnam situation. On the basis of my experience and continuing study, I am confident that these results can be accomplished.

One key part of the essential modernizing and strengthening of the United Nations is a comprehensive amendment of the United Nations Charter so as to provide universal membership for all peoples whatever may be their current form of government. This is so clearly one world in the age of space development and nuclear capabilities that all of the peoples on this world must be brought within the United Nations framework if there is to be a reasonable opportunity of attaining the expressed and prime objective of the United Nations, and of all humanity, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

Such a comprehensive amendment of the United Nations Charter can be accomplished through an amending convention without a veto. Senator Vandenberg, Senator Connally, and I and others foresaw this future need at San Francisco in 1945

when we were drafting and signing the Charter, and we added this amending convention provision.

This suggestion would mean that the two German Governments, the two Vietnam Governments, the two Chinese Governments, the two Korean Governments, and the remaining colonial areas, as they obtain national sovereign status, would all be eligible for membership.

This would tend to move the intense world struggle to an arena within the organization and to be resolved on a long-term competitive basis without the violence and tragedy of war. It would open the way to resolve the Vietnamese War. And I have faith that over the future decades the way of freedom for humanity would win out in such an evolutionary competition without war.

As you may recall, it is my further view that the Vietnamese situation cannot be resolved successfully by a continuation or an expansion of the present direct American War involvement in Vietnam. Neither can it be resolved within the United Nations without the modernizing and strengthening here suggested.

I recognize the point Mr. Rostow made of the opposition of the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, but I do not agree with the evaluation that this is a bar. Faced with a clear alternative of having both German Governments in the United Nations in a universal membership policy and of thus enhancing the prospects for world peace, or of having the German peoples remain outside of the United Nations organization, I believe the German people and the government of the Federal Republic of Germany would join in such a membership move, even though they may at first express narrow opposition. Their initial expressions should not be permitted to veto this imperative worldwide move. Furthermore, the contemporary increase in narrow nationalism in Germany will continue if they remain outside of the United Nations.

On the second point Mr. Rostow raised, of the optimism of the North Vietnamese Government reported from

intelligence sources, and therefore of a doubt that the moves I propose would succeed with the North Vietnamese, may I point out that their present attitude is not a guide to their attitude if they had open to them the door to the world of United Nations membership as a separate North Vietnamese Government. Furthermore, their present attitude is based in part on public opinion in the world and in the United States. The proposal and initiative which I suggest would win over both world opinion, and near unanimity in U. S. opinion, through the fairness and farsighted aim of evolving world peace, with competition of systems and not war.


In the comprehensive amendment of the United Nations Charter, a new sound method of finance should be incorporated. A one percent charge on all international movement of goods, materials, and machinery would appear to be best for this purpose. The Suez clearance of the United Nations is a small but significant favorable precedent. Also there should be modernized methods of functioning, such as a Council of Regional Secretaries with weighted voting, a Board of Arbitration, a Panel of Mediators, a World Court of Equity, and a small elite United Nations police force.

Parallel to the initiative of which I write, the United States involvement in the Vietnamese War should be quieted down in a strong but defensive posture, and de-escalated in a manner that will place the clear responsibility for initiating war action in each instance on the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. This will reduce American and South Vietnamese casualties and will parallel the United Nations initiative here suggested.

I continue to feel that a direct discussion with you of these matters would be constructive and trust that after you have reviewed Mr. Rostow's report and this letter, you will decide to provide an occasion for me to further clarify and explain the suggestions.

With my personal respects and best wishes,

Sincerely yours,



Harold E. Stassen

HES/cbh

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
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ANALYSIS OF HAROLD STASSEN'S PROPOSALS

1. Mr. Stassen proposes comprehensive amendment of the UN Charter through an amending convention without the veto.

The legal experts in State say that Mr. Stassen is not correct in saying this can be done. It is true that a convention could be called, and could establish veto-free rules of procedure. However, the revisions would then have to be ratified by the permanent members of the Security Council before they could come into force.

2. Mr. Stassen's main proposal is that the UN admit the divided states of Vietnam, Korea, China and Germany, believing this would "open the way to resolve the Vietnamese War."

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam first requested admission to the UN in 1948, pressed its claim intermittently during the next ten years, but was consistently voted down by the Security Council. The Republic of Vietnam also pressed for admission, but encountered a Soviet veto. At one point the Soviets supported the admission of both North and South Vietnam in the General Assembly, but were defeated by a majority which included the United States. Since 1957, the Soviets have taken the position that admission of Vietnam should await unification. The Government of Vietnam maintains a permanent observer mission in New York and is a member of most of the specialized agencies of the UN. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam is not represented in any.

Admission of both Vietnams does have something to be said for it. Ambassador Sullivan proposed this six months ago. It would strengthen the concept of an independent South Vietnam. Eventual UN jurisdiction in any peacekeeping arrangements in Vietnam would be facilitated. The arguments made for the admission of Red China -- contact with the world community, etc. -- are equally valid for North Vietnam. An offer to admit both Vietnams might be part of a comprehensive package for a Vietnam resolution. However, taken by itself, such an offer would hardly be likely to resolve the conflict, and the prospects of acceptance by the Soviet Union and by the North Vietnamese themselves are highly uncertain.

If both Vietnams were taken into the UN, that action would create strong pressures for the admission of other divided countries, where the problems are greater. As regards Korea, the USSR proposed the admission of both Koreas in 1957--a proposal which the Security Council rejected 10 to 1 (the USSR). Under our leadership, the General Assembly also rejected a resolution favoring the admission of North and South Korea. The Republic

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-2-

of Korea has observer status in the UN and the General Assembly has designated it as the only lawful government in Korea. North Korea is unrepresented. The admission of both North and South would be sharply opposed by the Korean Government in Seoul. They--and others--might regard our about-face as particularly unbecoming in light of their commitment of troops to the Vietnam struggle.

So far as China is concerned, Mr. Stassen's proposal is for a two-Chinas policy--opposed by the supporters of the Republic of China on the one hand and the Communists on the other. In the voting at the UN this year this combination of opponents was a majority.

The admission of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic would be a triumph for East German diplomacy. Such a proposal, coming from the United States, would be resented in Bonn. The day may come when the two Germanys will move in this direction. It is important however, that we respect German initiative in the evolving relationship between the two Germanys, and not force the pace.

3. On the last page of his letter, Mr. Stassen touches on a variety of subjects. He advocates a one percent charge on the international movement of goods, material and machinery, in order to finance the UN. This is one of several proposals in this regard, and probably not the most promising (a better one might be the proposal of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace to put the resources of the ocean's bottom under UN jurisdiction and allow them to charge license fees). Mr. Stassen has a good point when he suggests refurbishing the UN's arbitration boards and mediating panels. Regarding his proposal for a standing UN police force, our official view is that the financing of peacekeeping is the most urgent first step in this area. Mr. Stassen's proposal that we unilaterally de-escalate the Vietnam conflict has been extensively debated and the arguments are familiar.

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End of War Through Use of U.N.

To the Editor:

From my continuing study I believe it is urgent that the United Nations be modernized and strengthened in a comprehensive measure and used to end the extensive American war involvement in Vietnam.

I am confident that the latter objective could be realized in an honorable and desirable manner. The necessary amending of the Charter can be through a convention without a veto, as Senator Arthur Vandenberg and Senator Tom Connally and I and the others foresaw this need at the time of drafting and signing the Charter.

This modernizing and strengthening should include universal membership in a revised United Nations Charter, bringing all of the people on this one world within the organization whatsoever their present form of government; thus moving the intense world struggle toward a long-term, nonwar competition of systems. This is preferable to a continuation of a sharply spreading war, with inherent growing dangers of a future world nuclear war. Furthermore, I have faith that such a competition would result gradually in future decades in freedom for all peoples.

All Eligible

This universal membership would mean that both German Governments, both Vietnam Governments, both Chinese Governments, both Korean Governments and the remaining colonial areas, upon their attainment of sovereign status, would all be eligible for representation. I am certain that through this step the American war involvement in Vietnam can be reduced immediately, can be quieted down in a short time and, for all practical purposes, can be ended at an early date in an honorable and desirable manner.

I am also convinced from my extensive experience in Asia and in Vietnam that a continuation or an expansion of the present American war effort in Vietnam will not lead to a solution.

The United Nations Charter amendments should include new, sound financial arrangements and improved methods for functioning to reach peaceful solutions and to make constructive progress.

May I express the hope for development of public opinion and the governmental conclusions required to take the essential initiative toward such an amending convention for the United Nations and toward the use of the United Nations to end the present unfortunate trend of war in Vietnam.

HAROLD E. STASSEN

Letters

to the Editor of The Times

the main virtue of being completely different—but are they necessarily noble tributes to a great leader?

Why any massive construction at all? A well-designed public park with appropriate sculpture would be a lasting mark of affection and respect.

ELI JACQUES KAHN
New York, Jan. 25, 1967

Antimissile System

To the Editor:

A disturbing problem—the question of developing an antimissile system—faces the American people today. Many of us are reacting against such a vast expenditure—some \$40 billion; others are disturbed by the prospect of the expansion of the arms race if we cannot persuade the Soviet Union to give up its apparent intention of erecting its own antimissile defense system.

President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara are reluctant to take the steps necessary for this country to meet the Russian challenge. They want the Soviets to accept the kind of three-year moratorium recommended by the Wiesner report. But Major General Talensky replies that "it is quite illogical to demand abstention from creating such weapons in the face of the vast stockpiles of highly powerful means of attack from the other side."

The Russian leaders are worried by the three- or four-to-one margin of missiles the United States has over their supply, as well as by the future nuclear threat from Red China and, possibly at a later date, from West Germany.

Dangerous Realities

I would suggest that instead of vainly trying to create a world that cannot exist, we must face the dangerous realities of the world as it actually is. We should urge our political leaders to initiate an antimissile program, regardless of the high cost—one that will provide increased security for the American people.

McNamara's alternative solution—the Poseidon rocket—is also needed as an additional nuclear weapon for our protection against the Soviet threat, but it is not a valid substitute.

It is regrettable that the arms race must be stepped up, but our Government is bound by its responsibility to safeguard the American people. This respon-

that the university should be investigated. This was Reagan's earlier expression of dissatisfaction with the administration's handling of the Berkeley riots. (Again, the Regents had refused to accept Kerr's resignation after that crisis.)

Reagan's unskillful political leadership brought on the dismissal of the university president. Through television appearances, the Governor has identified himself so closely and so popularly both with his earlier views on the university and his subsequent budget and tuition proposals that any opposition to these measures, whether on the grounds on which Kerr opposed them or purely political ones, would provoke a political crisis.

Loss of Stature

Reagan's real disservice to California has been to draw the university into the politics which characterizes the southern part of that state. The students and the institution could doubtless recover from these strange economies the Governor is anxious to impose. But it is unlikely that the Board of Regents will soon recover the stature that it rightly lost by submitting to Reagan's pressures of recent weeks.

It is not likely that an honorable educator would serve as president of the university while that position is so vulnerable to political guile. Nor is it likely that the university will continue to enjoy the faculty its greatness has attracted. The students who will now doubtless be asked to pay tuition will ultimately receive an inferior education. This will be a much greater loss to the state than its "gains" from the contrived savings of Reagan's fiscal discipline.

Unhappily, this profane introduction of politics into university education will discredit the university more than the Governor. [Editorial Jan. 27.]

WILLIAM H. WAINWRIGHT
The Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy
Medford, Mass., Jan. 21, 1967

Limits on Earnings

To the Editor:

President Johnson's message on the aged makes a small pass at a big and outdated inequity in the Social Security system. That inequity is the low limit on what the over-65 can earn without deductions from Social Security payments contrasted with no limit on unearned income

limit has been lifted from \$1 to \$1,500. This makes the problem. Older people with skill is needed to overcome shortages are making more \$5,000 a year.

When Social Security payments are increased, the elderly will be asked to make greater sacrifices in for insurance benefits for which and his employer have paid.

While we're at it, let's see if it is possible for experienced people to strengthen the nation-threatened economy out being penalized. Let the earners and the co-clipppers on an equal footing.

CHESTER S. WIL
Former Director of Public Affairs
Community Council
Greater New York
New York, Jan. 21

Laws to Protect Rights of Workers

To the Editor:

The President's State Union speech made no reference to his 1966 civil rights bill except a reference to its controversial aspect, its housing provision. It was, in fact, plus the Administration's refusal to compromise matter, which sealed the fate of the 1966 bill.

Yet it must be clear to people that all of our civil rights accomplishments the South rest upon a foundation of sand as long rights workers are not permitted in their exercise of civil and civil liberties and as Southern juries go on struck.

The election of Lest dox must give us all a fear that civil rights and Negroes who assert rights, especially in rural areas will be subjected to with the certainty that the state juries will convict those who have illegally and with against them.

Have we so soon the fate of Medgar Evers, Michael Swerner, James Ray, Andrew Goodman, Liuzzo? In fact, at it ought to be clear people that the protection of the individual against and terror in the pursuit of civil liberties, civil right to suffrage has been the subject of legislation to be passed.

JOHN
Professor of Political Science
The City University of New York
New York, Jan. 21

Economics of

To the Editor:

It may be true, as