

Saturday, February 18, 1967  
12:35 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Kaiser reports that  
the British press is holding up pretty  
well.

The Guardian's shift is quite  
remarkable.

W. W. Rostow

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
London 6692, February 17, 1967

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London 6692, February 17, 1967

Subject: Resumption of Bombings: Press Comment

1. Additional reflection on events leading to resumption of bombing has not altered initial balance of favorable press reaction that blame lies with Hanoi. Today's Economist assessment, "Were the Americans wrong?" And Guardian editorial, "Whose Side Are We On?" take to task Labor backbenchers who are protesting the U.S. action.

2. Economist commentary does not wholly absolve U.S. but, on examination, finds U.S. decision completely reasonable. "By requiring U.S. to call its bombers back from the North, without any matching de-escalation on Hanoi's part, they would give the Communists substantial tactical advantage for as long as talks went on. This would be built-in temptation for North Vietnamese to drag talks on as long as possible without getting down to serious business. It would also be built-in irritant for American public opinion. It would be sort of conference almost certain to break up in explosion of furious accusations of bad faith." Economist reviewing events in London concludes, Kossygin seems to have agreed North Vietnamese should make some reciprocal concession but refused. Economist thus finds Labor backbenchers, unless they are careful, "may find themselves in curious position of being more pro-Hanoi than Prime Minister of Soviet Union."

3. Significantly, Guardian, which has been major voice opposing U.S. involvement in Vietnam, today expresses analysis of war which goes much farther in fairness to U.S. than in past. Editorial still comments U.S. decision to become involved was mistake but absolves U.S. motivation for that decision. "American motives in Vietnam are much the same as they were in Berlin airlift, in Korea, and over Cuba missile crisis. They are sound motives -- and on the other three occasions the policy worked." Guardian goes on to suggest Americans made mistake of taking on hopeless task in Vietnam and were wrong to start bombing, but "again it was assessment rather than motive which was bad." Editorial concludes: "The morality of the war is complex atrocities against civilians are the speciality of the Vietcong. The moral casus belli as seen in the North was the South's refusal, with American support, to hold elections. The moral indignation over that looks odd coming from Communists, who are hardly experts at holding the type of election envisaged by the Geneva Agreement. And last weekend Ho Chi Minh was wrong not to let the Americans have their signal. All this offers plenty to protest about. Going to fight for the other side is to be as wicked -- and more hysterical -- as the worst of the Washington hawks." In view

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London 6692

of past Guardian sentiments and fact that Guardian is major articulator of Left dissent on Vietnam, this is remarkable shift toward sympathy of U. S.

Signed: Kaiser

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*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 18, 1967 -- 9:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a report on how things are going at the Foreign Ministers meeting at Buenos Aires.

1. The following is a key policy statement made by Sec. Rusk in a closed session yesterday, February 17:

"Secretary said not true, as had been reported some quarters, that U.S. was here to twist arms or that President Johnson primarily interested in Summit for internal political reasons. He recalled that Summit was Argentine initiative in which Chile had also had interest. He said that President Johnson greatly interested in Alliance for Progress and wanted to achieve better balance of public opinion in the United States, bringing it back to renewed enthusiasm for the Alliance.

"Re integration, Secretary said this was probably most important decision Latin Americans had to take since independence. U.S. does not underestimate difficulties but decision needed to achieve economic progress and strength. Decision had, in fact, already been expressed in principle in Charter of Punta del Este and revised OAS Charter. U.S. very sympathetic to integration movement because U.S. wants strong Latin Americans to decide to move toward more rapid integration. U.S. will play its appropriate supporting role. U.S. is considering adjustment assistance and assistance for multinational projects but would have to consult the Congress on any specific action.

"United States is also considering assistance in agriculture, education, and science and technology. Psychology of Alliance needs to be strengthened. Members of the Alliance must build on strength of what has been accomplished, not simply react to needs.

"Secretary said that Latin Americans should understand, however, that it very important that we consult carefully with Congress. Therefore, we need to know as much as possible in specific terms about what Latin America is prepared to do on integration and under the Alliance for Progress now in order to carry on such consultations between Buenos Aires and time of Summit. He asked maximum discretion on this point."

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-2-

2. Bill Bowdler's two private reports to me by the back channel.
3. A report by Bob Sayre on other less critical aspects of the meeting.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Three meetings were scheduled for Buenos Aires:

1. IA-ECOSOC

This meeting was held from February 13 to 15. Lincoln Gordon represented the United States. Sanz de Santamaria was re-elected Chairman of CIAP. Romero of Bolivia, Sola of Argentina, and Roberto Campos of Brazil were elected as members. Budgetary decisions were taken and the regular annual meeting of IA-ECOSOC scheduled for June 30 at Santiago.

2. Third Extraordinary Inter-American Conference

This conference is to review and approve amendments to the OAS Charter. It began on February 15 and is expected to complete its work on February 22 with a formal signing of a Protocol to the OAS Charter.

Two working committees were established and began their work the afternoon of February 16. Principal developments to date are:

A. Since there appeared to be no substantial disagreement on the Charter amendments, the Foreign Ministers agreed to dispense with general debate.

B. The Ecuadorean Foreign Minister urged strengthening the new OAS Permanent Council's role in the pacific

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-325  
By mg, NARA, Date 11-7-91

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- 2 -

settlement of disputes so that the Council could take cognizance of a dispute at the request of one party. Ecuador seeks this amendment so that it may subsequently present the Peru-Ecuador boundary dispute to the Council. Ecuador has no support for its amendment.

C. The Argentine Foreign Minister told us in a bilateral discussion that he hoped the Brazilians would introduce their proposal to incorporate the Inter-American Defense Board into the Charter. This proposal does not have majority support and we have agreed with the Brazilians that it should probably be dropped.

D. Secretary General Mora announced that Trinidad and Tobago had formally applied for membership in the OAS.

### 3. Eleventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers

This meeting is to consider the agenda, date and site of the proposed meeting of American Presidents. It will commence today and run concurrently with the Third Conference. It is expected to complete its work by February 21.

Since this Meeting has not actually begun, the reports on it from our Delegation cover only bilateral consultations. The substance of these conversations is:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

A. The Argentine and Chilean Foreign Ministers commented favorably on a draft "Annotated Agenda" that we provided in an attempt to get the discussion started but noted that the specifics had to be worked out.

B. The Colombian Foreign Minister emphasized the need for more concrete information on what the U.S. is prepared to do on preferences, commodity agreements, price stabilization for primary products, and financial support for Latin American integration.

C. The Argentine Foreign Minister feels that a multilateral non-receipt declaration on arms may not be possible because it would be regarded as a U.S. initiative. On the other hand, he thought Argentina might be willing to make a unilateral declaration. Our Embassy at Rio reports that the Brazilian military is not in favor of a multilateral declaration.

D. The Chilean Foreign Minister told Rusk that President Frei would attend a Summit Meeting and is agreeable to mid-April.

A consensus seems to be developing that our proposed Annotated Agenda would provide a satisfactory basis for a

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- 4 -

Summit Meeting if: (a) it were made more specific both in terms of what is desired of the Latins and what we are prepared to do on the financial side; (b) it stated a more forthcoming position on the part of the United States on trade and commodity problems; and (c) it were less specific on what the Latins are expected to do on arms limitation probably limiting itself to a recommendation that the Latins meet and work out a conventional arms limitation proposal among themselves.

February 17, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WASHINGTON ENVELOPE AND DELIVER TO THE WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY  
WALT ROSTOW,  
DO NOT SEND ELECTRICALLY

956

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-323  
By ing, NARA, Date 11-18-93

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY 171935Z

FM WILLIAM BOWDLER TO WALT ROSTOW, WHITE HOUSE:

"1. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE TELEGRAPHIC REPORT ON THE FIRST PRIVATE WORKING SESSION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS ON THE SUMMIT (EMBTTEL 3161). THE FM'S HAVE STILL NOT COME TO GRIPS WITH BASIC ISSUES IN WAY IN WHICH WE CAN DETERMINE HOW FAR THEY ARE PREPARED TO GO ON KEY ISSUE OF INTEGRATION. FROM THE PREVAILING MOOD I AM STILL OPTIMISTIC THAT IN NEXT FEW DAYS WE WILL GET A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO TAKE A MEANINGFUL JUMP.

"2. YOU SHOULD KNOW, IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY LEARNED VIA OTHER CHANNELS, THAT SECRETARY IS THINKING OF RETURNING WASHINGTON MONDAY AFTERNOON, FEBRUARY 20, AND HAVING ELLSWORTH BUNKER TAKE HIS PLACE HERE. I DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THAT HE HAS TAKEN FINAL DECISION.

"3. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MISTAKE FOR HIM TO LEAVE HERE IF QUESTION OF HOW FAR THE LATINOS ARE PREPARED TO GO ON INTEGRATION IS STILL IN DOUBT. I THINK HIS PRESENCE MAY BE ESSENTIAL IN GETTING THEM TO AGREE IN PRINCIPLE ON



PAGE 2 BUENOS AIRES EYES ONLY 171935 ~~SECRET~~

BASIC ELEMENTS AND SCHEDULE FOR INTEGRATION WHICH ARE CRITICAL TO OUR DECISION WHETHER TO PROCEED WITH SUMMIT AND SEEK CONGRESSIONAL ENDORSEMENT AS REFLECTED IN DRAFT JOINT RESOLUTION I SENT YOU YESTERDAY. I MAKE FOREGOING OBSERVATIONS RECOGNIZING THAT THERE MAY BE COMPELLING REASONS FOR HIS RETURN WITH WHICH I AM NOT FAMILIAR.

"4. SOL AND LINC SHARE VIEW THAT SECRETARY'S PRESENCE THROUGH CONSIDERATION OF INTEGRATION QUESTION MOST IMPORTANT AND ARE SO ADVISING HIM.

"5. TOMORROW OR SUNDAY I MAY, DEPENDING ON HOW INTEGRATION DISCUSSIONS PROGRESS AND SECRETARY'S THINKING ON RETURN FIRMS UP, RECOMMEND THAT YOU CALL HIM TO GET DIRECT PERSONAL IMPRESSION HOW THINGS ARE GOING AND, ON THAT BASIS, COUNSEL HIM TO STAY ON ANOTHER DAY OR TWO."

~~SECRET~~

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**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 99-50**

**By cb, NARA Date 6-30-00**

950

TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
ZEM  
FOLLOWING MSG RECEIVED

EU 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

~~SECRET~~ 181130Z

FROM BOWDLER TO WALT ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE

1. FOLLOWING SESSIONS OF FRIDAY THIS IS STATE OF PLAY ON SUMMIT:
  - A) THERE IS AGREEMENT ON PUNTA DEL ESTE AS SITE.
  - B) THERE IS GENERAL DISPOSITION FOR APRIL 12-14 DATE BUT IN VIEW OF PERU'S STRONG STAND (SUPPORTED BY VENEZUELA AND EL SALVADOR) AGAINST FIXING DATE UNTIL AGENDA IS AGREED UPON, DECISION POSTPONED.
  - C) THERE IS AGREEMENT ON METHOD OF WORK: CONSIDERATION OF AGENDA FOLLOWED BY ANNOTATIONS FOR EACH ITEM PREPARED BY A TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP IN WHICH DAVE BRONHEIM SITS FOR US.
  - D) FOREIGN MINISTERS TODAY TAKE UP WORKING GROUP DRAFT OF AGENDA, WHICH GENERALLY CORRESPONDS TO OUR VIEWS, AND, TIME PERMITTING, START DISCUSSION ECONOMIC INTEGRATION.
2. THE MOOD IS DEFINITELY TO PROCEED WITH THE SUMMIT. SAFE TO SAY THAT THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TOPICS WHICH SHOULD BE DISCUSSED: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, MULTINATIONAL PROJECTS, MODERNIZATION OF AGRICULTURE AND EDUCATION, TRADE AND FINANCING. COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT AT SUMMIT ON NON-RECEIPT CERTAIN ARMAMENTS NOT LIKELY IN FORM WE ORIGINALLY CONTEMPLATED BECAUSE OF DISCLOSURES OF OUR NON-RECEIPT FORMULA. BUT WE ARE WORKING ON ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL TO COME OUT WITH STATEMENTS OF THEIR OWN IN INTERVAL BEFORE SUMMIT WHICH COULD BE ADHERED TO BY OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND NOTED AT SUMMIT.

PAGE 2 BUENOS AIRES 181130Z

3. CLEARLY BASIC ISSUES INVOLVE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. FROM COMMENTS IN THREE FOREIGN MINISTER WORKING SESSIONS SO FAR, IT IS EVIDENT THAT SCHEDULE FOR INTEGRATION, MECHANISM FOR NEGOTIATING TREATY (WHETHER NEW MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SHOULD BE SET UP OR HOLD JOINT SESSION OF LAFTA AND CACM COUNCILS, PLUS PANAMA, DR AND HAITI), AND PACE AT WHICH LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (THIS BIG POINT WITH CENTRAL AMERICANS) WOULD BE EXPECTED TO REDUCE TARIFFS AND OTHER TRADE BARRIERS WILL BE THORNY POINTS. IF WE CAN REACH AGREEMENT ON MEANINGFUL GUIDELINES FOR ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, I DO NOT EXPECT MUCH TROUBLE ON OTHER ITEMS.

4. ON PROSPECTS I AM HESITANT TO MAKE PREDICTIONS UNTIL THE FOREIGN MINISTERS GET INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF INTEGRATION. (SO FAR DISCUSSION HAS BEEN IN VAGUE, GENERAL TERMS DURING COURSE OF OPENING STATEMENTS). IF I HAD TO HAZARD A GUESS, I WOULD SAY THAT WE WILL PROBABLY COME OUT WITH SUFFICIENT AGREEMENT ON MEANINGFUL STEPS TO PROCEED WITH SUMMIT: WE SHOULD HAVE A MUCH CLEARER READING POSSIBLY TODAY AND, IF NOT, BY MONDAY. THESE MEETINGS MOVE PAINFULLY SLOWLY, AS YOU WELL KNOW.

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**SECRET**

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Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 18, 1967 -- 9:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

This letter from Jean Monnet to Gene shows the danger that the non-proliferation treaty could crystallize against us the most powerful pro-U. S. forces in Europe.

You should also know we are heading this particular issue off in our latest instructions to Foster in Geneva.

Gene also reports (with fingers crossed) that:

-- He believes we have an agreed State-Defense negotiating position on the trilateral talks to which McCloy also will sign on. This would be excellent.

-- He recommends that you meet alone with Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara on Tuesday and then have a larger meeting -- with McCloy, Fowler, etc. -- formally to settle our negotiating path.

In my judgment, the heart of the issue is not troops but a monetary-offset plan. Any troop withdrawals which will still keep the alliance will not save enough to cover our balance of payments problem.

I believe we are on the way to finding such a plan -- although I'll only believe it when the Germans are truly locked in.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-323  
By ljg, NARA, Date 11-18-93

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~



February 14, 1967

PERSONAL

*My dear Gene -*

I am glad to have seen you a few minutes and I want to recall the point of our conversation.

You will remember that I emphasized the fact that my remarks did not in any way bear on the military aspect of the non proliferation treaty, but solely on its civilian aspects.

Euratom is an important unit of the European Community. It deals solely with civilian uses of atomic energy and this is practically the only area in which close cooperation on equal footing has been established and is working between the USA and the European Community.

The draft treaty on non proliferation would require that the peaceful activities of the non weapon nuclear States would be controlled by the IAEA. Therefore, in addition to Euratom control, the members of the European Community would submit to control by the Vienna Agency, with the exception of France which is a nuclear military state. It would thus create and institutionalize discrimination in this field of peaceful development where it does not exist up to now. The very basis of European integration which is equality between the member countries, is threatened by the introduction from outside of such discrimination.

The Six are since almost ten years bound and organised together for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Within the Euratom territory the same control applied to all civilian activities of each of the member countries including France.

Even if the non nuclear weapon members were to accept to submit to the IAEA, it is difficult to see how the existing situation could be changed without the consent of all members. This situation results from the Euratom treaty and from the Euratom - US agreement which both proceed of a common decision of the Six.

.../...

Assuming this difficulty could be overcome, IAEA intervention would recreate an administrative border line splitting the nuclear common market and shrinking industrial integration in a vital technological sector.

For these reasons, while Europe has always believed - as the President has repeatedly said - that European integration was part of the USA foreign policy, it may be led to believe that American policy is changing and has come to regard the necessary understanding between the USA and USSR and the uniting of Europe not as a process completing each other but as conflicting.

As you know, I am deeply convinced that the context of the European Community is necessary to solve the German problem and to achieve a lasting peace between East and West.

*With best regards*

*Yours ever,*

*Yours,*

N.B. I enclose herewith a copy which please give to Walt and please convey *the best*

*my best regards -*

*I was hoping to see you this evening - but as your leaving is now uncertain, I think it is wiser to send you these notes -*

*Yours,*

*The Hon. P. Rostow -*

*Pres file*~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, February 18, 1967 -- 9:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Paragraph 3 in the attached cable will interest you. I have no doubt that it is the Soviet and Eastern European assessment that we are winning the war in Viet Nam. Zinchuk, yesterday in talking with Bill Bundy, put the point in a somewhat different way as follows: Recent events "had caused Moscow to wonder whether it had become the basic US view that the military situation was steadily improving from our standpoint and that we therefore did not really want negotiations at the present time in the belief that the situation had become steadily more favorable to us."

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 18243 (Confidential)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 91-322  
By isj, NARA, Date 12-2-92

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Action

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Info

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SAIGON 18243

L I M D I S

1. VICTOR MOORE, ERSTWHILE CANADIAN MEMBER OF THE ICC, CAME INTO THE OFFICE, HAVING BEEN SENT BACK BY PAUL MARTIN TO SERVE THROUGH THE END OF FEBRUARY. MOORE SAID THAT MARTIN FELT IT WOULD NOT LOOK RIGHT FOR THE POST TO BE VACANT UNTIL THE NEW MAN ARRIVES IN MARCH.

2. HAVING IN MIND STATE 138951, I GATHERED FROM MOORE THAT HE HAS NO IDEA AT ALL THAT THERE WILL BE ANY KIND OF BREAK OR ULTIMATUM IN HANOI WITH RESPECT TO EITHER CANADA OR INDIA.

3. MOORE SPOKE OF A RECENT TALK WITH LEWANDOWSKI WHO MADE THE RATHER SURPRISING ADMISSION THAT THE MILITARY WAR IN VIETNAM WAS GOING VERY WELL FOR OUR SIDE AND THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN HIS MIND THAT WE WOULD WIN IT. HE STRESSED POOR PERFORMANCE IN PACIFICATION, HOWEVER, WHILE GRUDGINGLY ADMITTING SOME SUCCESS FOR OUR SIDE IN THE POLITICAL FIELD. MOORE SAYS THIS IS THE FIRST TIME LEWANDOWSKI HAS EVER MADE A STATEMENT TO HIM SO DIFFERENT FROM THE USUAL COMMUNIST LINE.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-49  
By is, NARA Date 10-25-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*

Saturday, February 18, 1967 -- 9:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

The following telegram was received from Haile Selassie:

To His Excellency Mr. L. B. Johnson, President of the United States of America, The White House, Washington, D. C.

As we leave your excellency's great country, we wish to take the opportunity of extending our deep gratitude to your excellency and through you to Mrs. Johnson, members of the United States Government, and the peoples of the United States for the spontaneous and warm welcome accorded us during our short stay in your country. We are fully confident that the frank and friendly discussions which we have held during the visit will further strengthen the long standing that so happily exists between our two countries and peoples in promoting the noble cause of world peace. Accept, excellency, again our sincere best wishes for your continued well being and progress and prosperity of your country and people.

Signed:: Haile Selassie, Emperor

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

*Pres file*

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Saturday, February 18, 1967  
9:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Lodge throws his weight  
mildly behind the idea of not turning  
down Ky this time on a trip to the U.S.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~  
Saigon 18303

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-323  
By sig, NARA, Date 11-18-93

WWRostow:rlh

1967 FEB 18 02 41

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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3868  
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~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 18303

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-325  
By 40, NARA, Date 11-7-91

L I M D I S

FOR BUNDY FROM LODGE

REF: STATE 137916

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE KY VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. IN DISCUSSING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN VAN DO HIS ATTENDANCE AT SEATO AND TCC MEETINGS, HE GAVE NO INDICATION OF AWARENESS OF A POSSIBLE KY VISIT AT ABOUT THAT TIME AND CONFIRMED HIS OWN PLANS TO ATTEND.
2. WE HAVE IN THE MEANTIME LEARNED FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS OFFICER THAT KY HAS BEEN INVITED TO ADDRESS THE OVERSEAS PRESS CLUB ANNUAL "INTERNATIONAL MEETING" IN WASHINGTON ON APRIL 21. KY'S PRESS OFFICER HAD REQUESTED INFORMATION ABOUT CPC FROM JUSPAO.
3. COMMENT: THIS IS IN GENERAL REPETITION OF TACTIC USED LAST YEAR. MAYBE BUI DIEM INSPIRED THIS INVITATION. EVIDENTLY, KY

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 18303 ~~SECRET~~  
REMAINS EAGER TO GO. THE OVERSEAS PRESS CLUB UNDOUBTEDLY PROVIDES A GOOD FORUM FOR KY IF HE IS DETERMINED TO GO, AND A VISIT TIED TO SUCH AN INVITATION COULD BE SOMEWHAT LESS OFFICIAL THAN OTHERWISE MIGHT BE NECESSARY.

4. ASSUMING THAT KY DOES NOT PLAN TO ATTEND SEATO AND TCC MEETINGS, THE PRIMARY QUESTION IS THE RELATIONSHIP OF HIS VISIT TO THE ELECTIONS HERE, WHICH WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE IN AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER. AN AMERICAN "EMBRACE" WOULD HURT HIS CHANCES BUT A SUCCESSFUL VISIT COULD HELP. IN ANY EVENT, IF THERE IS TO BE A VISIT, THE EARLIER IT COMES THE BETTER.

5. ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO JUDGE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACIES DEFINITELY, KY AND THIEU HAVE CLEARLY BOTH BEEN INTERESTED. BOTH UNDOUBTEDLY REALIZE THAT OPPOSING TICKETS BY THEM WOULD SPLIT THE ARMED FORCES DEEPLY AND DANGEROUSLY. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT BE WORKED OUT FOR THIEU TO BECOME DEFENSE MINISTER AND CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF. KY COULD BE MUCH THE MOST POWERFUL POTENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE -- ASSUMING

THERE IS TO BE A VISIT, THE EARLIER IT COMES THE BETTER.

5. ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO JUDGE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACIES DEFINITELY, KY AND THIEU HAVE CLEARLY BOTH BEEN INTERESTED. BOTH UNDOUBTEDLY REALIZE THAT OPPOSING TICKETS BY THEM WOULD SPLIT THE ARMED FORCES DEEPLY AND DANGEROUSLY. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT BE WORKED OUT FOR THIEU TO BECOME DEFENSE MINISTER AND CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF. KY COULD BE MUCH THE MOST POWERFUL POTENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE -- ASSUMING HE CAN ATTRACT SUFFICIENT SUPPORT FROM OTHER POLITICAL GROUPINGS REPRESENTING SEVERAL POLITICAL ELEMENTS, WHICH I SHOULD THINK HE COULD PROBABLY DO.

6. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT MIGHT BE UNWISE FOR US TO

~~PAGE 3 RUMJIR 18303 SECRET~~

OPPOSE HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON TO SPEAK BEFORE THE OVERSEAS PRESS CLUB. WE SHOULD LEAVE TO HIM TO DECIDE WHETHER TO RUN THE RISK OF AN AMERICAN "EMBRACE". I JUDGE HE HAS ALREADY DECIDED THAT AN AMERICAN VISIT WOULD BE A PLUS.

7. I RECOMMEND THAT WHEN HE RAISES THIS INVITATION WITH US, WE SAY THAT HE WILL, OF COURSE, BE WELCOME IN WASHINGTON. WE HAVE TWICE BEFORE HEADED HIM OFF AND TO OBJECT A THIRD TIME MIGHT CREATE A STRAIN.

8. WE CAN ADD THAT ALTHOUGH THE TIME IS, OF COURSE, SHORT, WE WOULD TRY TO ARRANGE APPOINTMENTS IN THE U.S. APPROPRIATE TO SUCH AN INFORMAL VISIT. WE SHOULD ALSO WARN HIM SOLEMNLY OF POSSIBLE PRESS ATTACKS AND OF THE ADVANTAGE WHICH GROUPS OF EXHIBITIONISTS WILL SEEK TO TAKE OF HIS PRESENCE.

9. I AM SURE KY IS AWARE THAT HIS PRESENCE WILL STIMULATE DEMONSTRATIONS AND PRESS ATTACKS, ALTHOUGH HE MAY NOT APPRECIATE THEIR POTENTIAL INTENSITY. HE HANDLED THESE WELL IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, HOWEVER, AND THE VISITS THERE APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN NET GAINS BOTH TO HIM AND TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED. HE HAS BECOME MORE SKILLFUL AT PRESS RELATIONS. I SUSPECT THAT, WITH LUCK, HE WILL NOT DO BADLY IN THE UNITED

~~PAGE 4 RUMJIR 18303 SECRET~~

STATES AND THAT MUCH MORE WILL BE LOST IN TERMS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH HIM BY SAYING "NO" THAN BY GIVING HIM A CHANCE TO IMPROVE THE IMPRESSION PEOPLE HAVE OF HIM THERE AND HERE.

GP-3. LODGE  
BT

NNNN

~~SECRET LINDS~~



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Pres file

~~TOP SECRET -- TRINE~~

Saturday, February 18, 1967  
9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

[REDACTED]

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including  
an alleged comment of General de Gaulle which,  
somehow, didn't get into the conversation you had  
with the junior Senator from New York.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET -- TRINE~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-110  
By isa, NARA, Date 10-30-03

WWRostow:rlh

*Pres file*

Saturday, February 18, 1967  
9:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Just as a matter of information, I attach a note received late yesterday from Henry Wilson. It meshes with the item on page 4 of today's (Saturday, Feb. 18) New York Times.

The answer is that they should get on with their work in Congress.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1967

*Pres file*

TO: Walt Rostow

FROM: Henry H. Wilson, Jr. *HHW*

Dick Ottinger bent my ear for awhile concerning the last paragraph of the President's message on Food for India.

I take it that Ottinger and others cheered the reference to the \$25 million figure only to learn that the language was intended to be read as a re-statement of the \$25 million figure which the Congress last year authorized and appropriated.

He is very disturbed about this matter, and I just received from him the attached carbon of letter to George McGovern.

I don't quite figure Ottinger's angle on this.

He does not represent a farming district, and he is not basically a foreign policy type.

I think he must be reflecting the voluntary do-good organizations.

I take it that he is worked up about the failure of the Government to exercise its administrative authority in unfreezing \$25 million.

I make no particular brief for unfreezing the money.

This certainly is not a matter that can be of basic political necessity to a Member.

But Ottinger is a pretty bull-headed type, and I simply am raising the point that he is perfectly capable of starting a pretty good flap in the newspapers about it.

Attachment

RICHARD L. OTTINGER  
25TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

1215 LONGWORTH BUILDING  
225-5536 (202)

COMMITTEE ON  
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN  
COMMERCE

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
Washington, D.C. 20515

1016  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OFFICE:  
ROOM 214 MAIN POST OFFICE  
YONKERS, NEW YORK 10701  
(914) YO 5-0300

CENTRAL DISTRICT OFFICE:  
1 VAN WART STREET  
ELMSFORD, NEW YORK 10523  
(914) LY 2-5300

NORTHERN DISTRICT OFFICE:  
50 MAIN STREET  
BREWSTER, NEW YORK 10509  
(914) BR 9-8089

February 16, 1967

Hon. George S. McGovern  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator McGovern:

I know you share my concern over the delay in freeing the \$25 million emergency food relief allocation for CARE in India. My administrative assistant, Paul Schosberg, has discussed this on a number of occasions with Ben Stong of your office.

I am enclosing a copy of a draft statement which might be appropriate for insertion in the Congressional Record in the event that action on this is not forthcoming. I would greatly appreciate your comments.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Richard L. Ottinger  
Member of Congress

RLO/psb

DRAFT

We are much concerned to learn that approval of an allocation of \$25 million of emergency food relief to be distributed in India by CARE and other American voluntary agencies has been delayed pending Congressional action on the resolution authorizing food aid for India during the balance of 1967.

It is our understanding that these funds were urgently requested last autumn as a necessary resource to prevent the starvation of several millions of young children in the drought-stricken Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, and that the U.S. agencies involved in execution of Public Law 480 had given their approval as far back as December.

It would have been fully within Administration authority under P.L. 480 to approve this allocation in December. Many of us in Congress expected that announcement of approval of the funds at the time of the Presidential message indicating that 2 million tons of wheat were being shipped to India. We were sorely disappointed when no such announcement was made.

During hearings on the Food for Freedom legislation, it was made abundantly clear that emergency assistance, such as the CARE allocation, was to be treated in an entirely different manner from the main commodity program. In our view, the vague political considerations involved in including the CARE funds in the food for India resolution are greatly outweighed

by the urgent need for these funds. This could be unfortunately interpreted by many as playing politics with the lives of millions of Indian children who are today living on an average of 700 calories a day.

We urge the Administration to immediately exercise its authority to approve an allocation of \$25 million for emergency food relief to be distributed in India by CARE and other American voluntary agencies and to make clear to the Congress, the nation and the world that the United States can be humanitarian as well as politic.



Friday, February 17, 1967  
8:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Unleashing Ed Hamilton on the  
press looks more promising than  
unleashing Chiang Kai-shek.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, February 17, 1967 - 7:30 pm

WWR:

The following are press people I have talked with today on the Fulbright problem, along with some indication of what I am told we can expect from each:

1. Graham Hovey -- Editorial Board of the New York Times.  
(An editorial, perhaps combined with the previously-planned one on the Foreign Aid message)
2. Philip Geyelin and Selig Harrison -- Editorial Board of the Washington Post  
(at least one editorial)
3. Dick Dudman -- Foreign Affairs man for the St. Louis Post Dispatch  
(a feature story, and perhaps an editorial)
4. George Sherman -- Foreign Affairs man for the Washington Star  
(at least a sympathetic story)
5. Andrew Hamilton -- Washington representative of the Newhouse chain -- papers in New Orleans, Syracuse, St. Louis, etc.  
(a feature story, probably early next week)
6. Don Downing -- White House reporter for Time  
(Downing claims that Time had planned a cover story on the President-Fulbright exchange of letters, but now plans a NSA/CIA cover. He would still expect a fairly long story on this.)
7. Andrew Kopkind -- Associate Editor of the New Republic  
(This week's issue went to bed yesterday. Kopkind thinks that an article and/or editorial is likely in next week's issue.)

In each case, I went through the full history of the problem, the initiatives we have included in the Foreign Aid Bill in the directions Fulbright and we want to go, and a detailed explanation of the effect these limitations would have on aid to Africa. I have a number of people in mind to contact tomorrow -- including the Louisville Courier Journal, and the Nation.

On the civil rights front, Cliff Alexander and I have put together a list of people we want to educate to this problem. We believe we can get a series of strong public statements. We will be on the phone first thing in the morning.



Ed Hamilton

February 17, 1967

60/2

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Fortune on India's Economy

February's Fortune magazine carries a story by Marvin Zim of Time-Life on India's economy. After a familiar recap of past difficulties, it points out some of the positive new steps being taken:

1. A top-level committee expedites decisions on requests for fertilizer investment. As examples, he cites:

December 8 - Mangalore plant authorized for 250,000 tons.

December 12 - Armour/Birla proposal approved for 160,000 ton plant in Goa.

Early January, Phillips Petroleum signed letter of intent for a 145,000-ton plant.

Note: This is a quick clean up of long-delayed projects, and suggests real progress. But there are no other candidates yet waiting in line to jump the Indian hurdles.

2. The importance of agricultural credit is increasingly realized.
3. Devaluation and import liberalization should have real advantages.

Note: He does not discuss how GOI policies may be losing some of the benefits expected from devaluation. Nor does he mention the depressive effects of the continued food shortage as the GOI strives to avoid shortage-induced inflation while remaining unsure of how much foreign exchange it can count on.

W. W. Rostow

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Ed Hamilton

1. *scrip*  
2. *Pres file*

February 17, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Good-bye Message for King Hassan

King Hassan leaves New York late tomorrow, and we recommend the following message:

"Your Majesty:

"As you prepare to leave the United States, I want to express my great satisfaction that your visit has served to strengthen still further the historic ties of friendship between our two peoples.

"Forged during the earliest days of our own independence, these ties have endured because they have always been based on mutual respect and understanding and because of our mutual devotion to peace and justice in freedom.

"Our frank talks were most useful. We can go forward together in the search for a world order where the strong are just, the weak secure, the people prospering and the peace preserved.

"Mrs. Johnson and I enjoyed greatly having you here. God willing, we will meet again, either here or in your own country, which it would give us great satisfaction to visit. Meanwhile rest assured, Majesty, of our continuing friendship, interest and esteem.

Sincerely,"

I recommend approval.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

2/17/67

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-323

By 118, NARA, Date 11-18-93~~CONFIDENTIAL -- EYES ONLY~~

Friday, February 17, 1967 -- 3:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

You should know that we have a quite serious problem with Goldberg.

Nick spoke to him; but he is not appeased -- perhaps unappeasable.

I was asked by Sisco and Ben Read to talk to Goldberg before he saw the Secretary General at lunch, which I did. His points are these.

1. He took his job on the assumption that in major matters involving his work, he would have a chance to express his views before decisions were made.

2. In this particular case some of the formulations put forward during the week did not fit what he had been empowered to say in the UN on the basis of our policy. He said he understood the situation was quite particular; but he was not consulted as to what language might have been offered which would have reconciled his position and that which we put forward.

3. He does not now believe his Asian trip is worth while. It will be taken as a peace mission no matter what we say. He is inclined to cancel it.

I tried to explain to him that we were counter-punching at odd hours of the day and night to issues posed directly to you by the Prime Minister; and that the fact that he was not called in in no way reflected a desire or a decision by you to forego his counsel.

He seemed quite dug in, saying several times that Stevenson had the same problem; implying that it was probably inevitable and he thought that the man in New York should be a professional rather than a public figure who would insist on having his views heard before decisions are made.

You should know that a part of the problem is that up at Harvard somebody shoved a microphone before him and asked him about the extension of the bombing pause beyond Tet, which he could not answer; and I gather the New York Post has an article or editorial suggesting that he was not consulted. Obviously all this cuts pretty deep.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, February 17, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Summary

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-322

By 118, NARA, Date 12-2-921. Hanoi Worried by ICC Citations of Geneva Violations

The British tell us that Hanoi is disturbed about two ICC resolutions citing North Vietnam for violations of the Geneva Agreements. The North Vietnamese have apparently told the Indian Consul General in Hanoi that if the ICC resolutions are circulated, North Vietnam would "break relations" with India. The Canadian ICC man in Hanoi received the same ultimatum. The Indians and Canadians both believe that "breaking relations" means closing the Hanoi Bureau of the ICC.

The violations involved concern:

- a) The introduction of MIGS and SAMS into the North;
- b) The infiltration of the 325th Division of the North Vietnamese Army into the South.

The latter is based on ICC interrogation of seven prisoners from the 325th.

This obviously is the one that really bothers Hanoi since it underlines the fact of their aggression in the South.

2. Possible Anti-American Action in Indonesia

Djakarta reports that the anti-US campaign is heating up in the Surabaya area. This is a center of pro-Sukarno feeling. The Embassy has asked for Consulate Surabaya's recommendations on how and what circumstances it would be advisable to remove American dependents from the area.

3. US Aid to Jordan

Recent publicity about our military aid to Jordan has stirred concern in Israel. We have told the Israelis to relax. We added that Jordanian publicity on this matter had been expected.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

4. Hungary-West German Relations

The Romanians have told us that they expect Hungary to be the next Communist country to enter into diplomatic relations with Bonn. No further verification.

5. Grain for Hanoi

We have learned that Hanoi plans to import more grain in the first three months of this year than during all of 1966 -- about 56,000 tons. This is a result of the exceptionally poor crop in North Vietnam since 1966. This level of imports should permit North Vietnam to avoid a major food crisis.

15/  
W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

Friday, February 17, 1967  
10:30 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You asked for some independent views on operations against the North in the next phase.

General observations. We have a choice among three strategies: or we can execute all three -- short of putting U. S. forces on the ground in North Viet Nam. I have described them in terms of North Viet Nam's status as a kind of funnel for resources to fight in the South.

Strategy A. Interdicting or Narrowing the Top of the Funnel.

Here the objective would be to try to limit supplies coming from the outside into North Viet Nam. Given the limited North Vietnamese contribution in production, relative to the war in the South, this would clearly be the most effective form of action against the North. It would involve primarily:

-- mining the harbor approaches to three major North Vietnamese ports, all close to Hanoi: Haiphong, Hon Gai, Cam Pha;

-- systematically interdicting the railroad line from Hanoi northeast to the Chinese border.

The cost consists in the risk that we get a major reaction from the Soviet Union and/or Communist China. It is not clear that the Soviet Union could do anything very effective in North Viet Nam itself. It might react elsewhere in the world, notably in East-West matters.

On the other hand -- and we simply do not know -- closing access to the sea routes might lead the Soviet Union to press Hanoi harder for a settlement.

As for the Chinese Communists, there is relatively little they can do in the North or in South Viet Nam. They might use the occasion to put forces into Laos, Thailand, or even Burma, thus enlarging the war at points where it is extremely difficult for us to get at them. But thus far, they have shown a marked tendency to avoid putting themselves in a position where we might justifiably attack the Chinese mainland.

The problem here is simple ignorance on our side as to what the reaction might be.

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-322

By ijg NARA, Date 12-2-92

2/17/67

On the plus side is the fact that this would be the most effective military course of action and it might force an early negotiated end to the war by creating a crisis so severe for everyone on the other side that they would have to decide either to end the war or to undertake extremely risky or undesirable courses of action.

Strategy B. Hammering the Middle of the Funnel.

Here the headings are quite familiar: taking on

-- 8 electric power targets, constituting 82% of their residual collective power capacity;

-- the cement plant;

-- the steel plant;

-- perhaps hammering directly at certain port installations;

-- striking in greater depth at lines of communication and military supply and ammunition depots and barracks.

The advantage here is that it would place an awkward further burden directly on Hanoi, making the operation of their economic life substantially more difficult, interfering marginally with the war effort in the South.

The cost in this case is mainly in increased noises from the British left wing, our own opposition to Viet Nam policy, U Thant, etc. The attached appendix lists the electric power, steel and cement targets and estimated civilian casualties calculated to be associated with them.

Strategy C. Narrowing the broad Bottom of the Funnel.

We are already doing quite a good job on this, but certain additional actions are possible:

-- mining the river mouths of two important transshipment points in the southern part of North Viet Nam: the mouths of the Song Giang and Kien Giang (rivers);

-- naval to shore gun fire;



2/17/67

-- expanded Shining Brass operations in Laos (intelligence and harassing teams).

In terms of political and military costs, there would be virtually no noise except, perhaps, for naval gun fire on shore targets; but even this is not certain.

I do not believe we should move into a maximum campaign against the North, convulsively, right now. I believe electric power is the best next move, if we want to pound the middle of the funnel. But it should be done thoroughly, if at a deliberate pace.

On the other hand, I believe we ought not to rule out, out of hand, Strategy A; that is constricting the top of the funnel. We ought to put a few sober and objective minds to work trying to clarify the precise nature of the risks -- and possibilities -- involved in pursuing that course of action. We should remember the VC are giving the Saigon River considerable treatment with mines and attacks on mine-sweepers right now.

If we go for electric power, I believe we ought to do the job thoroughly, including the Hanoi plant and the transformer station out in the country 7 miles from Hanoi. It should be done, however, with specially briefed and trained crews; only a few strike planes would be involved; and we would have to lift the 10-mile circle, which, in any case, we may wish to do, since the Warsaw track which initiated it is now a dead line.

We shall also need a <sup>Public</sup> military rationale as closely related to military operations in the South as possible.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET attachment~~~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

North Viet Nam Electric Power Net -- 1967

<u>Target No.</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Capacity (KW)</u>	<u>% Current National capacity</u>	<u>Civilian Casualties</u>
81	Hanoi TPP	32,500	25	19
80	Haiphong TPP West	10,000	8	5
82.12	Haiphong TPP East	7,000	6	20
82.16	Thai Nguyen TPP	12,000*	9	10
82.17	Viet Tri TPP	16,000	13	11
82.13	Hon Gai TPP	15,000	12	10
82.26	Bac Giang TPP	12,000	9	20
82.24	Hanoi Transformer Station			7
		<u>104,500</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>102</u>

\*Installed capacity of 24,000 KW is 50% operational

Current national capacity: 128,000 KW

Pre-strike national capacity: 187,000 KW

76	Thai Nguyen Steel Plant (only areas G, K, Q and rolling stock)	15
77.1	Haiphong cement plant	19

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 91-322  
By WJ, NARA, Date 12-2-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

In forwarding this report to the Congress, I wish to make clear that there is no problem on the agenda of this Government -- there is no problem on the agenda of the human race -- as important as arms control and disarmament.

We have lived in a nuclear age now for almost 22 years. There are some who may have become hardened, cynical, or fatalistic about the arms race which marches forward every year, eating into our resources; absorbing our best scientific, technological and industrial talent; enlarging the dark shadow cast across the future of mankind. *It* I want you to know that your President is determined to press with every bit of imagination and wit and intelligence and commitment at his disposal to try to break into the arms race; to level it off; to bring about measures of arms control and disarmament.

There are many other tasks that this world community has to face ;  
from *finding an honorable peace* ~~ending the war~~ in Viet Nam to *escalating* ~~fighting~~ the war against hunger;  
from building islands of prosperity and order in various regions of the world

to reaching across the barriers of the Cold War in Europe -- and, in time,

with respect to mainland China. *PK* But all these efforts *could* ~~will fail~~ and turn

to ashes if we cannot grip and control the arms race.

It is against the background of this policy and this intent that

I submit to you.....

Friday, Feb. 17, 1967

10:50 AM

110  
Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval,  
is a departure message for the  
Emperor. He leaves from New  
York tonight.

W. W. Rostow

EKH:djw

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE

Your Majesty:

Your Majesty's visit to our country has been a special ~~pleasure~~ *satisfaction* for me. I was particularly pleased that we had an opportunity to renew our personal friendship and to reaffirm the deep and enduring bonds between our two countries. As you leave our shores, you carry with you my highest esteem and the respect and affection of the American people.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in extending our best wishes for a pleasant and safe journey.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

LSE:EKH:djw

Mr. Rostow

*Pres file*

111

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 16, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Releasing Second Half of Indian Program Loan

Last spring you authorized an overall pledge of up to \$335 million in non-project loans to India as part of George Woods' deal to persuade the Indians to devalue the rupee and liberalize import controls. We pledged only \$280 million and released the first slice of \$150 million last summer. India's self-help performance since then has been quite good in spite of the problems Mrs. Gandhi faces. Now AID is about ready to go with the second slice once Bill Gaud and Treasury agree on a few balance of payments details.

Bill's normal timetable would be to authorize the loan sometime next week and to have the signing ceremony a couple of weeks after that. The Indian election will be over by 21 February, and there is no one time better than another in the next month. Therefore, I see no foreign policy reason for not letting him go ahead. However, you may prefer to hold off until after the Congressional resolution on food, which may not pass until just before the Easter Recess, even though this loan is not part of our food effort. I'd appreciate your guidance.

Just for your information, the second \$70 million slice of the Pakistan loan which you approved right before Christmas should also be ready for signature within a week or two, but I see no problem there.

W. W. Rostow

Go ahead with India signing when ready \_\_\_\_\_

Wait till after the Congressional resolution \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AID ltr 1/30/78

By ry/hg, NARA, Date 3-26-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON*Pres file*

112

Thursday, February 16, 1967, 3:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached is a ~~request~~ for a meeting with you for the editor of the London Economist, Alastair Burnet, and the foreign editor, Brian Beedham. The request comes from John Midgley, The Economist's very fine correspondent in Washington. Burnet and Beedham will be here during the ~~week of April 2~~.

If your schedule permits, ~~this~~ would be a good thing to do. Burnet and Beedham are able men, influential in their own right, and The Economist carries considerable weight throughout the world. It would be a plus to give them a personal sense of the President's range of thought on foreign affairs. (Walt and I would of course do the necessary preparatory paper for you.)

*fr:*

Francis M. Bator

*I support.  
The Economist  
has been the  
strongest voice  
outside the  
U.S. for  
our  
Vietnam  
policy.  
Walt*


Marvin to schedule appointment \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

CC: George Christian





WASHINGTON OFFICE  
NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004  
TELEPHONE: 63-5753  
TELEGRAMS AND CABLES:  
MISTECON WASHINGTON

PUBLISHED WEEKLY  
IN LONDON, ENGLAND

112a

February 10th, 1967.

Mr. Francis Bator,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

*Dear Francis,*

I have seen George Christian to inform him that the Editor of The Economist, Alastair Burnet, and the Foreign Editor, Brian Beedham, are planning to visit Washington in the spring in hopes that the President will be ~~able~~ so good as to see them.

The dates of the visit and the length of stay are still under discussion. Mr Burnet's original idea was to arrive at Easter, March 26th, but after talking to Mr. Christian I have recommended that he put it off till a week later, April 2nd. I do not think this is going to present any difficulty, and so I am assuming that he and Mr Beedham will plan to arrive on April 2nd and will stay several days.

The possibility of being received by the President for a talk will be the main factor in their decision to come or not and I much hope that consideration may be given to it. It should not be time wasted. Both are bright, youngish men. Both were Harkness Fellows after leaving Oxford. Brian Beedham was Washington correspondent of The Economist from 1958 to 1961 and received an award from the University of California at Los Angeles for excellence in reporting United States affairs. Alastair Burnet is well known on British television, but it is in his capacity as Editor of The Economist (in which post he succeeded Donald Tyerman in 1965) that he will be coming to Washington on this occasion.

*Yours ever,*

*John*

John Midgley.

*I should have added that  
both are known to  
Dr Rostow, and that  
we hope I can come too.*

Thursday, February 16, 1967  
6:35 p.m.

Memorandum for the President

Thru: Mr. Hopkins

For your signature, there is attached the Full Power for Ambassador Bunker to sign the Protocol which will come out of the Inter-American Conference now in progress in Buenos Aires.

This document is necessary in order that Ambassador Bunker can substitute for Secretary Rusk who now plans to return to Washington Monday prior to the signing ceremonies.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file 114

FEB 15 1967

Dear Bill:

I have your letter of the 8th with reference to my determinations of January 5, 1967, increasing the number of countries eligible for Development Loans from 10 to 29 and for Technical Assistance from 40 to 48.

As a general proposition, I believe the exercise of Presidential discretion should be rare and only on the strongest facts. And I think that in connection with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 the discretion which I exercised is proper.

The numerical limitations on the number of countries to which the United States could give aid were introduced by the Foreign Relations Committee into the legislation over the strong objections of the Administration. We believed, as a matter of principle, that an aid program could not be sensibly limited in this way, that some flexibility is necessary, and that any assistance program has to be capable of responding to changing world circumstances.

Equally importantly, we pointed out to your Committee that numerical limitations on the number of countries would force abrupt and uneconomic termination of present programs in a number of countries.

While your Committee, and the Senate as a whole, rejected these arguments, the House of Representatives agreed with them. The House Committee strongly took the position, as did the House Managers in the Conference Report, that numerical limitations were unwise. The result of differences in this respect between the House and Senate was the compromise permitting Presidential determination to exceed the statutory limits whenever the President determined it was in the national interest to do so.

In this connection I believe that it was widely understood by the Congress, for the reasons expressed to the Committee and to the Conference, that this discretion would have to be exercised in a number of instances. I do not believe, therefore, that my determinations of January 5 came as a surprise to the



Congress. They were entirely consistent with the compromise which Congress arrived at in enacting the legislation. And each determination was the result of a careful review which led me to conclude that the national interest indeed required the action that I took.

More specifically, as you know, I have determined that our Technical Assistance programs should number 48 rather than 40. Seven of these are in the Near East and South Asia. Six are in the Far East. The remaining 35 are in Africa. If we suddenly reduced the number of our Technical Assistance programs from 48 to 40, Africa would suffer most -- if not all -- of the loss.

We share your view that some of our bilateral aid should be replaced by multilateral and regional aid. As recommended in the Korry report, we have decided to terminate our bilateral aid programs in a number of African countries and deal with them only on a multilateral or regional basis. But we cannot make this change overnight. It would not make sense to abandon Technical Assistance projects which are already under way. Accordingly, although we will not start new Technical Assistance projects in a number of countries, I have determined that it is in the national interest to complete those projects which have already been begun. As they are completed, the number of countries in which we will have regular Technical Assistance programs will decline to less than 40.

Let me now turn to Development Loans. Last January we stated in our presentation to the Congress that in FY 1967 we definitely expected to make Development Loans to 10 specific countries, that we considered three other specific countries eligible for Development Loans, and that Development Loans would also be made to a number of additional African countries depending upon whether particular projects proved feasible and were ready for financing during the course of the fiscal year. The Senate bill limited us to making Development Loans to 10 countries only. In Conference, there was added the clause permitting the President to exceed that number.

We now propose to make Development Loans to 29 countries. Of these 8 are in the Near East and South Asia, 2 are in the



Far East and 19 are in Africa. If we were limited to 10 countries only, the burden would again be borne by our African program.

As recommended in the Korry report, we propose to make no further bilateral loans to a number of African countries, and to provide assistance to them on a multilateral or regional basis. We do, however, propose to complete projects which are now under way, and to go forward with Development Loans for which joint planning has reached an advanced stage even though loan authorizations have not yet been entered into. Ultimately, this will mean that we will be making Development Loans to 20 countries, 10 in Africa and 10 elsewhere. But for this year and next -- while we are finishing unfinished business -- the number will be more than 20. And under no circumstances can I see the wisdom of reducing the number to 10 in the foreseeable future.

There are two other numerical restrictions contained in the Act bearing on the number of countries to which we can give aid. One limits to 13 the number of countries to which we can give Supporting Assistance. As you know, I have determined that the national interest requires increasing this to 17. The Act also limited to 40 the number of countries to which we can give military assistance. We are living within that restriction.

I know that you have differences with the Administration with respect to the aid program, and particularly with respect to Development Loans. But there is no disagreement between us as to the importance of foreign aid. During the past few months we have made important policy changes in the foreign aid programs, and which will increase its multilateral and regional aspects. I would hope very much that you would be able to support the Administration's efforts to move in that direction.

If arbitrary restrictions are imposed the victims will be a number of African countries where the programs are small, the needs great, and the consequences to our foreign policy important. I believe it is in the national interest for this

Government to support -- even though the dollar amounts are relatively modest -- these new nations in their struggle to achieve equality and economic development.

Sincerely,

*LBJ*

The Honorable J. W. Fulbright  
Chairman  
Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:NdeB. K:WWR:mz



susg.  
Pres. file

Friday, February 10, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Gaud's draft response to Bill Fulbright's letter on the number of countries eligible for development loans. I would suggest adding a sentence after the word "immediately," in the next to last paragraph, as follows:

"What we are talking about is not some abstract principle but the time it will take to turn around arrangements in a young and inexperienced continent and among young and inexperienced countries. I believe they and we deserve this flexibility during the transition. Therefore, it is my judgment...."

I have had typed on green a draft which incorporates this change.

W. W. Rostow

P.S. I have also taken out Bill Gaud's last line: "I am sorry you do not agree."

WWRostow:rln

Dear Bill:

I have your letter of February 8 with reference to my determinations of January 5, 1967, increasing the number of countries eligible for Development Loans from 10 to 29 and for Technical Assistance from 40 to 48.

The amendments adopted by the Congress last year expressly authorized the President to exceed the statutory limitations if he determined it was necessary to do so in the national interest. My determinations of January 5 were the result of a careful review of the economic aid program for FY 1967. That review led me to conclude that the national interest requires the action that I have taken.

As Bill Gaud explained to your Committee, we have made certain policy changes which will lead to a more concentrated and effective aid program -- particularly with respect to Africa. The full impact of these changes will not be felt immediately. What we are talking about is not some abstract principle but the time it will take to turn around arrangements in a young and inexperienced continent and among young and inexperienced countries. I believe they and we deserve this flexibility during the transition. Therefore, it is my judgment that U. S. interests are best served by our proceeding with the Development Loan and Technical Assistance programs that I have approved.

Sincerely,

The Honorable J. W. Fulbright  
Chairman  
Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

*not used*

LBJ:WGaud:WWRostow:rlh

The Honorable J. W. Fulbright  
Chairman  
Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I have your letter of the 8th with reference to my determinations of January 5, 1967, increasing the number of countries eligible for Development Loans from 10 to 29 and for Technical Assistance from 40 to 48.

The amendments adopted by the Congress last year expressly authorized the President to exceed the statutory limitations if he determined it was necessary to do so in the national interest. My determinations of January 5 were the result of a careful review of the economic aid program for FY 1967. That review led me to conclude that the national interest requires the action that I have taken.

As Bill Gaud explained to your Committee, we have made certain policy changes which will lead to a more concentrated and effective aid program - particularly with respect to Africa. The full impact of these changes will not be felt immediately. Meanwhile, it is my judgment that U.S. interests are best served by our proceeding with the Development Loan and Technical Assistance programs that I have approved.

I am sorry you do not agree.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

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W. MARVIN WATSON

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# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

CARL MARCY, CHIEF OF STAFF  
ARTHUR M. KUHL, CHIEF CLERK

February 8, 1967


Dear Mr. President:

MM

This letter concerns your determinations of January 5, 1967, received by the Committee on Foreign Relations on January 17, increasing the number of countries eligible for development loans from ten to twenty-nine and for technical assistance and cooperation grants from forty to forty-eight.

The Committee has heard Mr. William Gaud's justification of the action. Unfortunately, because of the press of other business there has not been an opportunity for the Committee to meet to take formal action since his presentation. With the Lincoln Day recess now upon us, the thirty day waiting period will be over before the Committee can consider the matter further. In view of this, I feel that I am obligated to advise you that I personally deplore this action and I believe that many members on both sides of the aisle are also seriously concerned.

Sincerely yours,

  
J. W. Fulbright  
Chairman

The President  
The White House

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, February 16, 1967  
5:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

I attach the latest report on the HAWKINS and INGRAHAM in the Black Sea. No trouble yet. I also attach an account of the rationale for and experiences of the U.S. Navy in the Black Sea in the year 1966.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-323  
By hjs, NARA, Date 11-18-93



FROM: CTG 60.7

SITREP 6 16/800Z

115a

~~SECRET~~

BLACK SEA OPERATIONS

CTG 60.7 reported at 1:28 PM EST today that the position of the destroyers HAWKINS and INGRAHAM was 42 - 24 N 29 - 30.7 E. Wind was 27 knots with sea swells from 8 to 10 feet.

At 10:18 AM EST a small trawler was sighted at a distance of 8 miles. The trawler matched the task group's course and speed for a short period and then opened to the South. Poor visibility precluded positive identification of the contact.

At 11:54 AM EST HAWKINS tracked three air contacts on its air search radar - one contact to the North at about 62 miles and two others to the South at 100 miles. The contacts were evaluated as MIG-17s and MIG-19s.

Deteriorating sea conditions necessitated slowing the two ships of the group to 15 knots to prevent pounding.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-324

By isp, NARA, Date 8-13-91

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, February 16, 1967

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-323  
By wp, NARA, Date 11-18-93

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Black Sea Operations by U.S. Naval Vessels

During 1966, three U.S. Navy destroyers conducted operations in the Black Sea. The purpose of these operations was to exercise freedom of the seas, or what the Navy calls exercising the right to use the high seas. The secondary purpose was intelligence collection as the opportunity arose.

None of these three vessels were harassed by the Soviets, although they did experience routine surveillance by Soviet air and naval forces. The Navy does not consider this surveillance to be unusual, stating that it was exactly what they would do under similar circumstances.

During the period January 10 to 13, 1966, the U.S. guided missile frigate Yarnell and the destroyer Forrest Royal were subjected to Soviet surface and aerial surveillance while conducting Black Sea operations. This surveillance began shortly after the vessels entered the Black Sea and continued until their Bosphorus exit. Aerial surveillance consisted of several overflights by Soviet twin-jet bombers and a reconnaissance sea plane. Surface observation was performed initially by a guided missile destroyer that was later joined by another guided missile destroyer and a mine-sweeper.

The USS Corry entered the Black Sea on February 9, 1966, and departed on February 12. Soviet Air Force reaction consisted of overflights by several twin-jet aircraft and one reconnaissance sea plane. Numerous Soviet naval vessels are known to have been alerted to this voyage but no contact was reported.

The USS Waccamaw was harassed by a Soviet destroyer while transiting the Dardenelles on May 23, 1966. This vessel

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

was not enroute to the Black Sea, but rather was going to Istanbul on a port call. While in the Dardenelles ship channel, a Soviet destroyer was observed coming straight ahead on a collision course. The Waccamaw was on the right-hand side of the ship channel and only 1200 yards from shoal water. In order to avert a collision, the Waccamaw was forced to take evasive action which placed it in danger of running aground due to the closeness of the shoal water. The Commanding Officer evaluated the situation as premeditated harassment. No signals or signs of difficulty were displayed by the Soviet destroyer.

*W. Rostow*

~~SECRET~~

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, February 16, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Summary

1. Kosygin in London

The British have provided an interesting rundown on their impressions of Kosygin and his approach to problems other than Vietnam.

They found:

-- Kosygin the man was genuinely impressive. He was on top of every subject, calm and decisive. He listened to arguments and replied directly. He left no doubt he was fully in charge, and no one was "looking over his shoulder."

-- European Security -- Kosygin hoped for a European Security Conference next year; preparatory conference later this year. Question of US participation in such a conference was left open.

-- Germany -- Kosygin seemed seriously concerned about rising German nationalism, and he was rigid on maintaining the status quo as regards the Federal Republic.

-- Treaty of Friendship -- Kosygin proposes a "Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression." The British turned down the non-aggression part. The two sides will begin negotiating Friendship Treaty soon.

-- China -- Kosygin and his colleagues were passionate in condemning recent events in China. You have seen reports reflecting this.

2. Soviet Press on Bombing

Moscow reports that Soviet editors "found their tongues" on resumption of bombing North Vietnam. A rash of articles has claimed US prestige has lowered, that the Pentagon and Rusk are guilty, that the US is trying to take advantage of Sino-Soviet differences, and that the British are "unreliable."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By CB, NARA, Date 10-21-98~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Despite the quantity of criticism, the Embassy does not find it as tough as we might have expected.

3. Non-Proliferation Treaty

We have heard at the UN that the Germans are trying for a common front with India and Sweden -- especially on a clause that would not prohibit technical research as long as its peaceful.

4. Rusk in Buenos Aires

The Chilean Foreign Secretary told Rusk of their serious embarrassment that President Frei was unable to visit the US. The Chilean said, however, that Frei would attend the Latin American Summit Conference whenever and wherever it is held.

Our proposed agenda has met with general acceptance.

5. Food Aid to India

We have told the French that the Japanese are considering aid of about \$10-15 million; the West Germans are talking about \$35 million; the UK is trying to find an additional \$20 million from their tight budget. The French have said their share of food aid to India has been held low because of French aid burdens in Africa. They still have not made up their minds about joining the consortium.

6. Poland and the Vatican

The Vatican has sent its top negotiator with Communist countries, Monsignor Casaroli, to Warsaw. This may signal a new break in the church-state thaw which began two months ago. Casaroli may be laying the groundwork for a possible meeting between the Pope and Polish Chief of State Ochab -- when the latter visits Rome this spring.

7. Rumors of Ky Visit

There are conflicting reports about a possible Ky visit to the US. We have asked Ambassador Lodge for his judgment, and we are trying to damp this down. The Vietnamese Ambassador told Bill Jorden yesterday that Ky has an invitation to speak at the Overseas Press Club in April. Jorden convinced the Ambassador this would be unwise and the latter will try to discourage any Ky visit -- at least until after the Vietnamese elections -- when he visits Saigon in about two weeks.

~~SECRET~~

W. W. Rostow

PRESERVATION COPY

Thursday, February 16, 1967  
1:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, in his own hand,  
Pat Dean records that the Post  
story was "without any foundation  
whatever." When he was in  
yesterday, I assured him that  
you did not regard him as a possible  
source of the leak.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.14. 11. 67.

Dear Mr President,

Last Monday the Washington Post carried an article on its front page by Mr Reistrop stating that I was one of the sources of information about an interview between yourself, Mr Katzenbach & the Senator Robert Kennedy.

I think Mr Walt Rostow has at my request already informed you that so far as I am concerned Mr Reistrop's story is without any foundation whatever.

I am now writing in order to assure you personally, Mr President,

that the story in Mr. Reiskind's  
article is, "So far as concerns  
me, completely without foundation."

Yours Sincerely

Patrick Dean

---

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, February 16, 1967  
1:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here is the Department of  
State's speculation on the Moroccan  
arms sales leak.

In effect, it says that about  
anyone in town could have leaked it;  
but they have no notion who it was.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-323  
By sig, NARA, Date 11-18-93

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MOROCCAN ARMS SALES LEAK

Our review of the Moroccan arms sales leak reveals interesting but inconclusive information. The available facts are summarized below:

1. The Leak - In his New York Times article on Friday, February 10, Benjamin Welles reported:

"King Hassan II of Morocco received a royal greeting at the White House today from President Johnson. It was reliably reported to have included the promise of approximately \$15 million in arms to help bolster Morocco's defenses."

2. The Author - Welles has been interested in Morocco for many years. Last fall he followed closely the preparations for the then-scheduled visit of the King. He maintained his interest in this subject in the intervening period. When the visit actually occurred, he possessed considerable background information. On February 9, he talked to officers of the African Bureau about the opening ceremony but did not raise the arms sale question, although he did mention that he had a stringer message from Rabat to the effect the Moroccans wanted more F5s. On February 11, he told a Department officer that he had known the precise figure of \$14 million but had chosen to use the formulation of "approximately \$15 million" to protect his source.

3. Potential Sources of the Leak - Welles could have obtained his information from a wide variety of sources: (a) The Government - Evidently, military planners had been using a \$12-14 million figure for some months. The Interdepartmental Regional Group for Africa had met on this subject with a split finding ranging from \$14 million (State-DOD) to \$5 million (AID). Subsequently, SIG had reviewed this subject and recommended a \$14 million program. Thus, long before the Welles article was released, officials of State, DOD, JCS, CIA, AID, Treasury, Agriculture, USIA and the White House were aware that a \$14 million program had been recommended. Since Welles has wide contacts within the government, he might have obtained his information from any one of the cited Departments and agencies. (b) The Moroccans - Welles has contacts with the Moroccans and could have obtained the information from them. However, the King flatly denied this to the Secretary and we are inclined to believe him.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-325

By ing, NARA, Date 11-7-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

The authorized sales level is less than the Moroccans had wished; (c) The Hill - Welles could have obtained his information from a wide variety of Congressional sources. The Department began consultations on February 8, when Ross Adair was informed. On February 9, Congressman Ford and O'Hara, Carl Marcy, Boyd Crawford, and the staff assistants of Senators Mansfield, McCarthy, Gore and Symington were informed of the arms sales program. In addition, the DOD Congressional Relations were in contact with the House and Senate Armed Services Committee on this subject.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, February 16, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESIDENT

SUBJECT: SEATO and Troop Contributor's Meeting

Here is the background on the planned SEATO and Troop Contributor's meetings in April.

SEATO meetings have been hosted in turn on a normal rotation basis for many years. The annual meeting was last held in Washington in 1960. Last year, it was in Canberra. In the Canberra communique it was stated by all that this year's meeting would be in Washington. Planning has been going forward on that basis for the last year. Secretary Rusk has approved the arrangements at every step. It is the general feeling at State that any change in the sight -- and even more so in the idea of the US hosting the meeting -- would be badly received by all SEATO members and would have most unfortunate consequences.

Since Manila, there has been pressure for a meeting of nations contributing troops to Vietnam. As you know, a follow-up meeting was anticipated at Manila.

Since 6 of the 7 Foreign Ministers involved would be present for the SEATO meeting in Washington, it was felt that we could handle the Troop Contributor's Conference most expeditiously and in the lowest key by having it follow on the SEATO sessions. A separate meeting, in another place or in another country, would attract a great deal more attention. It would also represent a major inconvenience for all of the Foreign Minister involved to meet in Washington for SEATO and then go to another country for the TCC meeting.

Secretary Rusk also approved planning for the TCC following on SEATO.

The plan as it stands now is to have the SEATO meeting convene on April 18 and run through the morning of the 20th. The TCC meeting would be very brief and would occupy only the afternoon of the 20th, or possibly, a brief session on the morning of the 21st.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-323  
By wp, NARA, Date 11-18-93



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

If this is changed -- either as regards the TCC meeting on the SEATO meeting as well -- I strongly recommend that we get Secretary Rusk's views on this matter since he has been following it closely and issued the invitation to Washington at the Canberra meeting last year.

W. W. Rostow

Check with Secretary Rusk \_\_\_\_\_

Move TCC to Honolulu \_\_\_\_\_

Move both to Honolulu \_\_\_\_\_

Move both out of country \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Wednesday,  
February 15, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith Lodge's weekly  
telegram.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Wednesday, February 15, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 18014)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. Terrorists - GuerrillasDECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-325  
By *ing*, NARA, Date 11-7-91

On Monday morning, shortly before Bob Komer's arrival, the Viet Cong committed an act of terrorism of a kind which I have been predicting for a long time. They set up a mortar inside the city of Saigon -- inside a house to be exact -- and fired four rounds through an opening in the tin roof before an ARVN Lieutenant in the area called the police. The police reacted quickly and prevented the Viet Cong from firing the additional 14 Chinese-manufactured mortar rounds found in the house.

One of the mortar rounds scored an utterly improbable -- and tragic -- hit on a truck convoy in the center of Saigon at a point about midway between my house and General Westmoreland's office, killing 11 ARVN Airborne soldiers and wounding 8. The other three rounds caused no casualties. At the firing site, the Viet Cong had apparently rigged the house for detonation if caught in the act and when the police moved in, three Vietnamese civilians were killed (2 police) and 31 Vietnamese civilians wounded (6 police). One dead Viet Cong was found in the house and the Vietnamese police picked up two suspects. Follow-up police action resulted in a round of 158 persons about 60 of whom were draft dodgers or men of military age but not properly registered.

Captured enemy documents, prisoner interrogations, and agent reports indicate that the Viet Cong intend to increase terrorism and attacks against U.S. facilities and personnel. Ky has also said to me that more terrorism can be expected as the Viet Cong Main Force units become less and less effective against our troops.

Though poorly executed, this particular mortar attack was well planned and shows clearly the Viet Cong's understanding that

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

defense against this type of attack is very difficult indeed. We may know more about the reason for this particular act of terrorism after a more thorough police investigation. But it is now a matter of conjecture. The Viet Cong may have acted as a retaliatory measure for our recent operations against Viet Cong command and control organizations in operations such as CEDAR FALLS; or possibly, they merely wanted to demonstrate that while we can hit North Vietnamese targets in our way, they can hit the center of the capital city of South Vietnam targets in their way.

Sam Wilson, coming in from Long An, told me that during TET he helicoptered all over a roughly rectangular area measuring about 25 by 18 miles at about 100 foot altitude. Due to the TET truce, nobody fired at him -- an unusual opportunity, therefore, to see Long An. In this area, he counted 112 yellow-starred Viet Cong flags and banners, which he plotted on the map.

He says that in Long An, the U.S. has 135 military advisers and one police adviser. There are about 12,000 military men and 1,140 policemen. This means that when the military achieve a success, there is not the wherewithal to take advantage of it. This obviously means that there must be either more police or else, temporarily, more military doing the work of the police -- or a combination of the two. Broadly speaking, the same situation probably holds true throughout much of Vietnam.

On February 10, I visited the Second Corps MACV Commander and the OCO Regional Director at Nhatrang. My purpose was to check on progress in eliminating the hard-core Viet Cong infrastructure which, I continue to believe, is the single most important and difficult task in winning the war and one the Vietnamese must do themselves.

I found (not surprisingly) that our free world military forces continue to do better against the conventional North Vietnamese and Main Force Viet Cong units than the Vietnamese are in the military/police-type operations necessary to "comb out" the highly efficient, disciplined and invisible Communist Party apparatus.

I also wanted to check the progress of re-vamping the Government of Vietnam military forces, notably the ARVN, to fit them for their new role in Revolutionary Development. Since

January 2, MACV-trained Vietnamese teams (with U. S. supervision) have been conducting a retraining program for ARVN battalions. This training is aimed at changing the attitude of the Vietnamese soldier as regards conduct, courtesy, and a spirit of helpfulness toward the people.

I learned that the Minister of Revolutionary Development, General Than, has prescribed that his inspection teams will, each month, select the "outstanding ARVN battalion of the month." In addition to a ceremony, each man in the battalion will receive 500 piasters. General Thang wants to make the soldier realize that stealing chickens and pigs, or driving military vehicles at breakneck speed through hamlets, will disqualify his battalion. Hopefully, team spirit will occur which will induce soldiers to police each other, stimulated by the thought that an act of thoughtlessness, illegality, or discourtesy by a single soldier could cost every man in the battalion 500 piasters.

A report on the successful defense of a new life hamlet by local militia forces operating under the direction of Revolutionary Development personnel states that on January 21 an estimated Viet Cong battalion attacked Tan Truong Giong hamlet in Vinh Binh province. The attack was believed to be a Viet Cong reaction to expanding Government control in the area under the impetus of Revolutionary Development personnel.

The attack began at 8 o'clock in the evening and lasted until 5 in the morning, when the Viet Cong were finally driven off. The attackers used machine guns, automatic rifles, and grenade launchers, and the fighting was sometimes hand-to-hand. Led by well-trained and devoted Revolutionary Development personnel and supported by artillery and an armed C-47, the local forces repelled the Viet Cong and inflicted heavy casualties on them.

Morale of the Revolutionary Development personnel and the local defense forces was reported to be high. They are local heroes, and immediately after the attack an additional 20 local men volunteered to join the hamlet militia.

This episode seems to show that with a screen of ARVN and Allied forces to protect against overwhelming attacks by the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army regulars, the local people can defend themselves against small-scale attack.

General Thang recently said that the Revolutionary Development program in Phu Yen province is the best in the nation. One of our officers analyzed the success of the program there as coming from several basic factors: effective middle-level leadership, successful deployment of security forces in support of the program, and careful selection and training of personnel. These are easy to list, but putting them together is hard.

In 1966, the Viet Cong killed 593 Revolutionary Development personnel and captured 75. Personnel in one province, Binh Dinh, captured 510 Viet Cong. However, last year 603 Revolutionary Development personnel deserted, 696 resigned, and 686 were fired.

A magazine for Revolutionary Development personnel will begin appearing March 1. The first broadcast of a radio series on Revolutionary Development is scheduled for March 27.

#### B. TET

The TET cease-fire was marked by a higher rate of incidents than that of the Christmas and New Year truces. The enemy initiated 338 incidents with friendly losses of 81 dead. The incidents included the shelling of a U.S. destroyer by Vietnamese shore batteries and acts such as the grenading of a TET party in the home of the Deputy Chief of Kontum province (three dead and six wounded). The Viet Cong also used the Vietnamese liking of TET firecrackers as a cover for bringing explosives into Saigon. At least one bomb disguised as a large firecracker was discovered by authorities.

The enemy used the TET cease-fire to conduct well-organized logistic efforts in the North. On February 8 and 9, 458 trucks, over 300 men, and 681 ships and boats were sighted moving South to the Demilitarized Zone. An estimated 39,000 tons could have been moved at this rate during the 96-hour period of the scheduled cease-fire.

General Thieu addressed a TET message to the nation, appearing on both television and radio, pleading for unity and political stability in the face of the Viet Cong threat and promising

to intensify all efforts to build more just, prosperous and democratic society. He said in part:

"In the new year, with the benefit of the military victories won last year, and thanks to the superiority of our forces and the forces of our allies, we are resolved to shorten the war by intensifying our efforts in every aspect -- military, pacification, political, social and economic. With effective assistance from the Allied forces, our troops will concentrate their efforts on Revolutionary Development, a field up to now not well taken care of because of lack of personnel and because of the critical military situation. Now we will be able to increase our efforts toward agrarian reform, to give lands to the farmers, to set up new life program in the rural areas, to help the poor."

Thieu did not make the dramatic kind of "national reconciliation" statement for which we had hoped, but he did use the phrase -- as he had told me he would -- and the speech did contain a call for the Viet Cong to join their non-Communist brothers in building a nation. As Thieu told me beforehand, a national reconciliation effort requires psychological preparation. It is not easy to persuade people of the merit of the idea of welcoming home those who have inflicted so much suffering on this land. There are complaints, for example, the Chieu Hoi returnees are getting too much attention and too much help as compared with their always-loyal fellow Vietnamese citizens. If my memory is correct, in France during World War II many vichy French were not allowed to vote, to be candidates for office or to hold office.

As yet, we have no figures for Chieu Hoi returnees during the TET period. JUSPAO distributed over 100 million leaflets. Also, a TET film was reported to have been received enthusiastically by audiences who were visibly moved by the story of a Viet Cong youth who decided to come home.

### C. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending February 11, the Viet Cong killed 23 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 22 and kidnapped 7. The dead included two Revolutionary Development cadre, two Deputy Hamlet Chiefs, two policemen, one Chief of a Provincial Educational Office, one Chief of a Provincial Montagnard Office, and one school teacher.

D. Constitution

The Constitutional Convention returned to work on February 14 and at once decided to take the emergency powers section of the draft Constitution out of the Legislative section and place it under the Executive. This is an important and much-needed change in the original draft, and one which both we and the Government have favored. We had been concerned that giving the emergency powers to the Legislative made for a dangerously weak Executive. This would be especially troublesome in a war. The exact form of Presidential powers to declare emergencies and govern by decree will be hammered out later.

E. Reforming the Legal System

Ever since independence in Vietnam, the legal system has been a patchwork of several old French codes and new Vietnamese law put on the books for the most part under the Diem regime. Justice has been hard to get, and I suspect that hard-core guerrilla infrastructure men have found refuge within its complexities. Now the new and growing interest in legal government under a Constitution has given a new impetus to overhauling the Vietnamese legal code.

New civil and criminal codes of procedure have recently been drawn up by the Ministry of Justice and await signature by the Prime Minister. Draft criminal and civil codes are now under study in several Ministries, and a new commercial code is currently being written. The Ministry of Justice is also setting up training courses, one for judges to update their knowledge of procedures, and one on basic principles of justice for hamlet and village officials.

F. Americans Out of Saigon

You will recall that I have been trying to use the influence of this office to reduce the numbers of Americans in the politically and economically sensitive Saigon-Cholon area. Here are concentrated politicians, journalists, diplomats, and businessmen -- opinion-makers here and abroad. Any rowdyism hurts, as does inflation. For many months, the best I could point to was a slight



reduction -- at least no increase. The biggest category of Americans was the military with about 18,000, with civilian employees of U.S. contractors totaling about 2,400.

I am happy to report that General Westmoreland now has a scheme to reduce the 18,000 to about 6,500 by the end of 1967. Significant results are to be achieved this spring. Nothing could be better as far as preventing anti-Americanism is concerned. He and his staff deserve full praise.

#### G. Open Roads

Here are some new figures on the vital subject of open roads:

During the nine years of war between the French and the Viet Minh from 1945-1954, about 60 percent of the 12,000-kilometer network suffered severe damage. For example, two-thirds of Route 1 between Saigon and Hue was impassable and of 310 bridges on this Route, 240 had to be rebuilt. From 1957 to 1961, much was accomplished by the Government of Vietnam Ministry of Public Works, assisted by USAID, and the existing road system was opened with improvements being made rapidly.

From 1961 to 1965, Viet Cong sabotage, deterioration from lack of maintenance and destruction by floods reduced the system to an estimated 50 percent operational level for national and interprovincial routes and less than 20 percent for provincial routes.

The number of highway sabotage incidents dropped during 1966 as compared to 1965 from 946 to 407 incidents. This drop in frequency of incidents is expected to continue to improve as increasing security permits maintenance crews to work.

Another measurement is the relative security classification of national road routes between 1965 and 1966. In the summary below, "Open, relative security" means free movement during daylight hours for civilians as well as military with minimum Viet Cong interference or highway damage. "Open, with escort required" indicates frequently Viet Cong or interdicted routes. "Closed" are areas either closed due to major highway sabotage or constant Viet Cong activity. Figures are as follows:

	1965	1966
Open, relative security	57%	77%
Open, with escort	19%	5%
Closed	24%	18%

The marked decrease in escort requirements is believed to be due to the increased presence of troops throughout Vietnam and the much-faster reaction forces available. Study of these figures revealed a cycle whereby the major overall road network opened in 1945; then was reduced to an operational level of 40 percent by the end of the war in 1954; was opened again by 1961; reduced again to less than the 50 percent level in 1965; and is now opening up again to a level of between 60 and 70 percent level and still improving.

#### H. Economic

The Retail Price Index inched up to another new high, reaching 259 by last week. This compares with 254, the level set the preceding week. Rice prices continue to move up while pork, milk and sugar held steady. The wholesale price index on imports stands at 230, the same as last week but up seven points over the previous week and 28 points over last month.

On January 25, the National Bank began debiting commercial banks for delinquent PL 480 and CIP payments. Since the June devaluation, banks have been allowed to delay payments beyond normal terms and a "float" of about 3 billion piasters in favor of commercial banks had accumulated. A January action by the National Bank drew this "float" down by about one billion piasters. National Bank officials say they may continue reducing the total "float" after TET. The result is that commercial banks have found liquidity sharply reduced. They have lessened margin requirements for new licensing on some commodities and have appealed to the National Bank to authorize liberalization of credit through change in reserve requirements and their measures.

Wednesday, February 15, 1967 -- 3:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here is a list of press men who want to see me in a hurry.

John Steele  
Peter Lisagor  
Hugh Sidey  
Ted Weintal  
Jack Sutherland  
Stan Carter

They, I am sure, will want to talk about what has been going on and what there is in Wilson's ambiguous hopes.

I have been telling all those inquiring that the situation is quite simple:

-- Sec. Rusk made clear our position: We shall accept anything even-handed but not "no-bombing for talk."

-- The President at his press conference made it clear that there are many communications but nothing serious; that is, nothing except "no-bombing for possible talks." That is still exactly where we now stand.

When asked: What about Wilson's hopes and belief that he was near a settlement, I reply: We have absolutely no evidence that Hanoi is prepared to move off its unacceptable formula.

When asked about the Polish track or the Kosygin-Wilson talks, I say: We don't discuss particular communications.

My question is this: Would it not be better to have George Christian, Nick, or Bill Bundy background them all along these lines than do it man-by-man?

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

The President believes strongly that the integrity and independence of the education community must be preserved. He has directed a careful review of any activities that may endanger this integrity and independence.

He has further directed Secretaries Rusk and Gardner to formulate a policy which will provide necessary guidance for all government agencies in their relationships to the international activities of American educational organizations.

The President also recognizes the need of America's private organizations to participate in activities overseas. Other countries provide heavy subsidy for such activities. He has asked Secretary Rusk to explore means for adequately supporting U. S. organizations to play their proper vital role.

Wednesday, February 15, 1967  
10:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Ernest Lindley sent me this evaluation  
of your impact on Australia, done by a thoughtful  
journalist. I thought you might be interested.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

123a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

February 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW,  
THE WHITE HOUSE.

Dear Walt:

Attached is an excerpt from a personal letter from A. D. Rothman, an American who for many years was the chief correspondent in the U.S. of the Australian Associated Press and The Sydney Morning Herald. Although he spent most of his time here, he visited Australia from time to time and knows more about that country than any other American I know. He and his wife are presently in Australia in the course of a leisurely world tour.

Rothman is a journalist of measured judgments. The President, as well as you, might be interested in his evaluation of the Australian reaction.

Yours,



Ernest K. Lindley

Attachment:

From A. D. Rothman.

Since our arrival in Australia there were two events which were of great interest: the visit of Pres. Johnson and the parliamentary elections. I know that Johnson's visit was reported at length at home. I suppose not much escaped the American newspaper men who covered the tour. But perhaps one significant aspect was not generally borne in on observers:

Few countries are as captive of American dynamism as Australia. American music from jazz through musical drama to the symphony; art and architecture from the comic strip to the skyscraper; every phase of electronics from radio and TV to the great computers; the movies; heavy manufactures and light, from the caterpillar tractor and the supersonic jet to the trick canopener; food and drink, from frozen cheesecake and canned chicken to bourbon whiskey; literature, from the girly magazines to the most avant-garde negro novel; the American language, from Mencken's elaborate studies to the newest items of slang;

2--

and American history, few countries can boast as many Civil War buffs as Australia--all these have given Australia an American mold. But I really believe that Australians never came as close to feeling America as they did on seeing Johnson and hearing him.

He made a profound impression. I spent more than a month asking Australians in all walks of life what their reactions were to the president. Almost universally they were stirred, expressed great admiration for him, compared him to their own politicians greatly to the disadvantage of the latter, and generally saw him in the role of a great social reformer in his own country. Not all the dynamism of America which has penetrated Australia has been of the best. In my view, Johnson somehow presented a side of America which not too many Americans themselves realize exists, namely, a nation of dedication.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, February 15, 1967  
6:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

I think you will wish to read this  
note to me from our excellent China  
watcher, Al Jenkins.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 2-27-91

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Is Mao Engaged in Tactical **Backtracking**?

Events of the last couple of days have the smell of something rather big having happened in Peking. Unquestionably **an effort** is being made to curb the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, at least for the present:

-- Red Guards have again been urged to return home and this time appear to be complying;

-- primary and secondary education are to be resumed;

-- widespread humiliation of errant leaders and cadre is to cease and reliable elements in the party apparatus are to be won over rather than attacked;

-- the military, having for the most part not responded to the plea to support revolutionary rebel take-over, is now moving in on the side of simply maintaining public order;

-- spring planting in the countryside is to be emphasized at the expense of political activity;

-- the xenophobic spree has been turned off like a faucet, at least for the present.

These developments follow a brief period wherein the Army was tested with far less than satisfactory results from the Maoist viewpoint. I believe this to have been only the last in a series of surprises for Mao concerning the magnitude of his opposition, as he has successively turned during the Cultural Revolution to the several major elements in the society. He has increasingly suffered from a classical phenomenon of a regime of this sort: the difficulty of receiving accurate reports, either from the home or the foreign front, which would often be unflattering to one who has been deified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 719 85-261

By ng/ky NARA, Date 3-25-91

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

If because of the test results of the Cultural Revolution Mao is now forced to face reality and curb that Revolution far short of its goals, his prestige will again have suffered severely. Having built revolutionary fires, he may even find it difficult to lower the temperature of the Revolution to the desired degree. Animosity has obviously been greatly heightened among the split leadership and Mao's methods in conducting the Revolution have contributed to sharpening the large opposition which he has progressively uncovered in each phase of the Revolution.

As Lin Piao's activity and perhaps even prestige has sunk, Chou En-lai's has risen. However, while Lin is less obviously heir apparent, Chou is not yet in that role. Chou may be smart enough not to aspire to being heir apparent, when it is not now apparent what he would be inheriting! He is emerging stronger, but I still look upon him as a first class "DCM" to a "political appointee" -- which may yet turn out to be a military self-appointee.

What can be said is that the forces of moderation (in domestic policy) are on the march and are not likely to be stopped. If those forces should coalesce and become articulate, I believe the peasants, the most important element not yet appreciably tested, may support them. For never have so many worked so hard for so little -- after having been promised so much for so long.

  
Alfred Jenkins

cc: Mr. Jorden  
Mr. Ropa

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, February 15, 1967 -- 6:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

I have received the following message from Amb. Ritchie of Canada.

"Our Prime Minister (Pearson) is reluctant to cut into the President's weekend; therefore, he would suggest either March 7 or March 8 in place of March 5 or 6."

Incidentally, Ritchie said that, should you be at the Ranch, he would be delighted to see you there, if that were convenient.

W. W. Rostow

Set up appointment March 7 \_\_\_\_\_ -

March 8 \_\_\_\_\_

March 5 \_\_\_\_\_

March 6 \_\_\_\_\_

Wednesday, February 15, 1967 -

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Providing the World Bank with a Sanitized Version of the  
Korry Report

George Woods is now ready to carry out the major recommendations of the Korry Report as they concern the World Bank. (You will recall that the Report recommended that the Bank become a central coordinator for aid to Africa, particularly in the areas of communication, transportation and power.) Woods has designated his first-rate Vice President -- Mohamed Shoaib, former Finance Minister of Pakistan -- to take on the job. Shoaib leaves a week from tomorrow for meetings with people from the UN Development Program, the Economic Commission for Africa, and the Organization of African Unity to start setting up the framework.

Woods and Shoaib believe -- and Ed Korry, Joe Palmer and I agree -- that it would be useful if Shoaib could take with him a sanitized version of the appropriate portions of the Korry Report. It would provide an analytic basis for an expanded Bank role as a basis for discussion. If you approve, we would plan to give it to Shoaib next week.

Obviously, the editing has to be very carefully done. Everybody understands that the first priority is to protect your flexibility. We would go over the text here word by word before giving any clearances. Shoaib promises that he would use the paper on a confidential basis, but we would have to expect the gist of it to leak. Thus, we should make it available on a limited basis on the Hill and to knowledgeable members of the press. I would plan to come back to you on this part of the problem when we have a paper and a specific plan of action.

I recommend you authorize us to proceed. If you want to examine the document before it is given to Shoaib, we would expect to have it for you early next week.

W. W. Rostow

Go ahead with carefully edited version \_\_\_\_\_

O.K. in principle; let me see the finished product  
before you give it to Shoaib \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_ EKHamilton/vmr

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

127  
Wednesday, February 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congratulations to Prime Minister Sato

The newly elected Lower House of the Japanese Diet has just held its opening session. In the next day or two, it will re-elect Sato as Prime Minister. State recommends a brief congratulatory message from you. It would be delivered as soon as his re-election is accomplished.

Proposed text is attached.

I recommend that you send such a message.

*W. Rostow*  
W. Rostow

Att.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I extend my warmest congratulations on your re-election as Prime Minister of Japan.

Let us continue to work closely together, as we have in the past, in the interest of peace and human betterment in Asia *and the world.*

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

February 14, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to General Franco

You saw last week Franco's letter warning you against arming King Hassan. Franco fears Morocco's claim on the phosphate-rich Spanish Sahara.

Now that you've talked with Hassan, you can write reassuringly to Franco. The arms sale you approved is small and will be spread over several years. More important, I didn't read Hassan as intent on aggression, and I think it's safe to describe for Franco Hassan's emphasis on his peaceful pursuits.

Because of our large base interests in Spain--up for renegotiation next year--it's worth giving Franco the sense that we're looking out for his interests.

Attached letter for signature if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-323  
By sig, NARA, Date 11-18-93

~~SECRET~~

FEB 15 1967

Dear General Franco:

On behalf of the families of Astronauts Grissom, White and Chaffee and of the American people, I express our heart-felt appreciation for your message of condolence on the tragic loss at Cape Kennedy. Those heroic men, as you so aptly described them, were truly envoys of mankind. In their memory, we are rededicating ourselves to the task of achieving, together with nations like Spain, an understanding of our common space environment and its successful exploration for the benefit of all people.

I have also read carefully your views on King Hassan's visit. I was pleased to note your support for the peace, development and internal stability of North Africa. I know this reflects the historic friendship between Spain and the Maghreb states, and I am confident that Spain will continue its efforts to achieve an acceptable and timely settlement of outstanding issues with them.

I share your concern over the increase of armaments in North Africa. We, too, are disturbed by the threat to peace and by the diversion of time and money from pressing economic development needs.

But, as we have outlined to your Ambassador, a significant gap has developed between the Algerian arms inventory and the inventories of Tunisia and Morocco. The Moroccans and Tunisians are alarmed, and they have asked the United States for help. The Moroccans first made the request about which you wrote in the spring of 1966. Because of our concern, we have acted only after evaluating all its serious implications. We have kept Spain's interests most sympathetically in mind.

On the basis of careful study and my conversations with King Hassan, we have agreed to sell Morocco a limited amount of military equipment. Under the terms of our agreement, these arms are sold with the proviso that they be used exclusively for defense, and deliveries will be spread over several years in the light of the situation as it evolves.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-323  
By ijp, NARA, Date 11-18-93

In our conversations, the King stressed his overriding concern that Morocco's resources be used for the economic benefit of his people. He told me that his only purpose in acquiring more arms is to provide minimum defense. Everything he said implied his commitment to the peaceful route.

For my part, I emphasized in my public statements and in our private talks the themes of conciliation, regional cooperation and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

I trust this will reinforce your confidence in our judgment and reassure you that the action we have taken is modest and prudent.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
General Francisco Franco Bahamonde  
Chief of the Spanish State  
Madrid

cc: Mr. Bator

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 2/14/67

The Head of the State  
and Commander in Chief of the National Armies.  
Personal.  
Palacio de El Pardo  
30 January 1967

His Excellency, Lyndon B. Johnson  
President of the United States of America

My Dear President Johnson:

Please forgive me for retaining your attention for a few moments, but I trust that the importance of what I have to say will justify my writing directly - to Your Excellency.

The publicity which is being given in Morocco to the announced visit of His Majesty the King to the United States and the fact that among the Ministers - accompanying him will be the Minister for Mauritanian and Saharan affairs, coincides with a campaign of expansionist claims on the territories of her neighbours - Algeria, Mauritania and Spain - and reveals Morocco's intentions to exploit the King's visit to the United States to attempt to present the United States as being implicated in her aspirations. I have therefore thought it best to forewarn you of this possibility; firstly, because none of the parties affected are ready to cede their rights, and in our case the Spanish right of sovereignty is clear as is the firm and repeatedly evidenced loyalty of the people of the Sahara - about 26.000 inhabitants -; and secondly, because this sparsely populated territory has a very marked geo-strategic importance as it includes an extensive portion of the African coast immediately adjacent to the clearly Spanish Canary Islands, which are a center of world -- sea-routes, and which Spain has for centuries developed and defended.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-20  
By js, NARA Date 10-25-99

Among the objectives publicized in Morocco for this visit is that of asking the American Administra-



EMBAJADA DE ESPAÑA  
WASHINGTON

tion for a larger economic and military aid. While I find their economic interest legitimate and very convenient for the peace, development and internal stability of their country, in which we are truly interested, such is not the case with respect to military aid. The American Government is aware through our Representatives of the constant Spanish concern with respect to the increase of armaments taking place in North Africa with the general intention of threatening peace and attempting to satisfy imperialist ambitions in conflict with neighbouring countries. But no one is threatening the integrity of Morocco's frontiers; she already has sufficient weapons for her defence and for her internal peace and security; and Spain, who only a few years ago underwent the aggression of supposedly spontaneous bands which Morocco utilized to break the peace in the territories of Ifni and Sahara, now feels alarmed by Morocco's attempt to secure more arms at a time in which she is stirring up bellicose feelings in her inhabitants. It is really incongruous that when Morocco's economic need is at its greatest she should wish to devote to military expenses amounts far in excess of her means in the hope that another country will finance them.

I have wished Your Excellency to be acquainted with this concern, in order to avoid the possibility that, in the light of an apparent neutrality, and heeding a supposed need for self-defence which has been ably and artificially contrived, your Administration might err on the side of generosity in this military aspect.

Due to my great confidence in your judgement and fairness, I feel satisfied in having made this known to you.

At these moments, when the United States is going through a great sorrow at the loss of her heroic astronauts, I wish to express to you the solidarity and appreciation that this sacrifice has inspired throughout all the Spanish nation.

May I avail myself of this opportunity to reiterate to you my highest consideration and affection.

I remain, Your Excellency's good friend



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R. W. Rostow

**Tuesday, February 14, 1967**  
**1:20 p. m.**

**Mr. President:**

**I see no harm in you also  
replying (Tab A); but you may  
wish to see the attached letter  
(Tab B) which I sent to Mr. Kessler  
in response to his letter to me (Tab C).**

**W. W. Rostow**

**WWRostow:rla**

1272

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 11, 1967

Dear Mr. Kessler:

John Roche has shown me your letter to him and Walt Rostow and I want you to know that I was deeply moved by it.

Dissenters like you are indeed the yeast that leavens the bread, and -- while my conscience takes me down one road yours leads you down another -- I am proud to be the President of a nation which nurtures such a tradition of principled non-conformity.

When you say that you are fighting for your convictions because you love your country, you are in my judgment associating yourself with the highest standard of American idealism.

I am sorry that we differ on Vietnam, but I am glad that, at a more fundamental level, we share the same dedication to democratic values.

Sincerely yours,

LBJ

Mr. Stowell V. Kessler  
Presbyterian Manse  
Beverly, West Virginia

February 11, 1967

Dear Mr. Kessler:

I wish to tell you how moved I was to receive your letter of February 6.

The candor, integrity, and humanity of what you had to say shone through. Those of us who must at this time be extremely close to the Vietnamese affair feel as deeply as you do about the tragic position of the people of South Viet Nam -- indeed, of the people of North Viet Nam. What we know well and solidly -- and what may not be so clear to our people -- is that they prefer to fight this through, as others have before them in history, rather than to surrender their right to shape their own destiny. They maintain 700,000 men under arms -- the equivalent in the U.S., for our population, of 9 million. This is not a professional army but, with all its problems, is as authentic an expression of the will of the people as one can find in a young, unformed, developing nation.

The tragedy of Viet Nam is lightened for us, also, because we know what it means to the hundreds of millions of people in non-Communist countries, who are now counting on us to see it through to an honorable peace and, on that faith, drawing together in mutual support in economic and social development in a most remarkable way.

As for Mr. Roche and myself -- and, above all, the President -- your compassionate concern for some of the attitudes exposed at the meeting is appreciated; but I can tell you I have known no satisfaction greater than trying to help the President through these difficult times. I understand quite well how that meeting was organized and managed; but I also, as an old teacher, sensed that there were a good many young people in that room who, whatever their views on policy, were in good faith.

I shall always treasure your letter as a demonstration that this was, indeed, the case. Many thanks.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow

Mr. Stowell V. Kessler  
Presbyterian Manse  
Beverly, West Virginia

February 6, 1967  
 Presbyterian Manse  
 Beverly, West Virginia

Dr. Walter Rostow  
 Special Consultant to  
 The President

*copy made  
 sent to J. Roche  
 2/8/67  
 [initials]*

Dear Mr. Rostow

I wish to apologize to you and Mr. Roche and most of all the man you represented, the President for the kind of non-dialogue and abuse you were exposed to at the United States Student Press Association this past weekend. I regret that we live in a time when the answers to questions and the questions themselves are so hard and frustrating.

I wish that you would convey to the President just one sentiment from one member of the conference. Though I find fault with the policy I want more than anything else to find a rationalization for changing that situation. I was in all likelihood one of the oldest students at the conference. I am thirty-two years of age. I am attending Davis and Elkins College in West Virginia. I am receiving several hundreds of dollars each year from the government thanks to the President's educational loan programs. I am married and have three children. I am a veteran of the Korean War having served with the 7th Division in that conflict. All in all I served in the U.S. Army for almost ten years.

I fought hard in that war against tyranny but I also have fought hard in the Civil Rights struggle. I have lost several positions because of my convictions on that issue. I must say that I have to live as a dissenter in this society with a very sad spirit because I love my country and that is precisely the reason that I am still fighting for these convictions. I am studying for the ministry and still have five years of study ahead of me.

I have attended several meetings of various left-wing groups and the fact is that one is faced with the terrible reality that the extremists, who hate this nation, have control of most of them. So what do you do? Do you support the policy, or do you fight the policy? I have tried to do my homework on this issue and have spent many hundreds of hours reading the various accounts of the involvement. I feel that in all honesty that I have nothing to say that will make any difference. It would be so much easier to join with the majority who support the war. I would shed a lot of tears if I could do that. They would be tears of relief. But right now I am shedding tears for the Vietnamese people who I see caught between the terrorism of the Viet Cong and the weapons of the United States.

What I do believe is that the President is being crucified with the other great men of history because he must walk a very hard and bitter road which he did not make. I want him to know that some of us in the protest have the same hard bitter road to walk. We experience the same loneliness and sadness. Of course I shall never have the opportunity to tell him these things but I hope that you will understand that we are not all uninformed. Further I hope you will agree with me that idealism is necessary along with pragmatism.

I should consider it a great favor to have a photograph of you and Mr. Roche as a reminder of the struggle for freedom that each of us in his own way is making. May God bless the people in those villages as this terrible saga continues and may you rest assured that many of us feel a partnership with you and the President even though we differ in some areas of the policy.

Sincerely yours,

*Stowell V. Kessler*  
 Stowell V. Kessler

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, February 14, 1967  
6:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the full text of Wilson's  
Parliamentary statement.

*Walt*  
W. W. Rostow

London 6571

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *ky*, NARA, Date 3-1-91

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WILSON'S STATEMENT TO PARLIAMENT ON VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT WILSON STATEMENT TO PARLIAMENT TODAY ON  
SUBJECT RECENT VIETNAM PEACE NEGOTIATIONS:

QUOTE AS I TOLD THE HOUSE YESTERDAY, MR. KOSYGIN AND I DEVOTED  
MAJOR PART OF OUR DISCUSSIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF VIETNAM. OUR DIS-  
CUSSIONS WERE URGENT AND CONSTRUCTIVE. THEY WERE ALSO CONFIDENTIAL  
AND MUST REMAIN SO, AS MUST, EQUALLY MY CONTACTS WITH THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE UNITED STATES.

MY RIGHT HON. FRIEND AND I MADE A SUSTAINED EFFORT TO TRY TO  
SECURE CONDITIONS DURING VIETNAMESE NEW YEAR TRUCE PERIOD WHICH

PAGE 2 RUDTOR 6571C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT. I BELIEVE THERE  
WERE MOMENTS WHEN THIS COULD HAVE BEEN VERY NEAR.

THE TRAGIC DISAPPOINTMENT OF THESE HOPES FOR TRUCE PERIOD WHICH  
BECAME PUBLIC LAST NIGHT MUST NOT, AND WILL NOT, DETER US FROM  
PRESSING ON FOR A SOLUTION. AS I TOLD THE HOUSE YESTERDAY 'IF THE  
PRESENT OPPORTUNITY IS MISSED WE MUST NOT GIVE UP HOPE; ROAD TO  
SOLUTION REMAINS OPEN'.

THAT IS THE POSITION.

I DO NOT UNDER-RATE RENEWED DANGERS THAT ACCOMPANY RESUMPTION  
OF FIGHTING; AND WE MUST ALL REGRET THAT THE TET PERIOD, PERIOD OF  
THE VIETNAMESE NEW YEAR, WAS NOT UTILIZED TO CREATE CONDITIONS THAT  
WERE NEEDED FOR A MOVE TO CONFERENCE TABLE. IN PARTICULAR, THE  
MASSIVE SOUTHWARD MOVEMENT OF TROOPS AND SUPPLIES IN THE NORTH, ON  
A SCALE FAR GREATER THAN IN THE CHRISTMAS, OR INDEED IN ANY PRE-  
VIOUS CEASEFIRE, THREATENED TO CREATE A SEVERE MILITARY UNBALANCE.  
IT ALSO MADE IT HARDER FOR AMERICANS TO BELIEVE THAT NORTH VIET-  
NAMESE LEADERS WISHED TO USE TRUCE FOR AN EFFORT TO PEACE RATHER  
THAN A FURTHER EFFORT IN WAR.

PRESERVATION COPY



AS I MADE CLEAR YESTERDAY, WHAT IS LACKING FOR SETTLEMENT IS  
FIRST ENOUGH GENERAL REALIZATION THAT SOONER OR LATER THERE MUST BE

PAGE 3 RUDTCR 6571C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, AND SECONDLY, NECESSARY DEGREE OF TRUST AND  
CONFIDENCE ON PART OF EACH OF THE NATIONS FIGHTING THIS WAR ABOUT  
THE SINCERITY OF DESIRE OF THE OTHER TO WORK FOR A NEGOTIATED  
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

NORTH VIETNAM WILL STILL NOT SEIZE PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR  
NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE, PRESUMABLY, THEY DO NOT ACCEPT SINCERITY  
OF REPEATED AMERICAN STATEMENTS THAT WHEN NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE  
THEY WILL BE UNCONDITIONAL, OR ABOUT THEIR WILLINGNESS, GIVEN  
APPROPRIATE GUARANTEES, TO STOP BOMBING.

EQUALLY - AND SUSPICIONS HAVE BEEN AGGRAVATED BY MILITARY MOVE-  
MENTS DURING TET - THE AMERICANS DO NOT FOR THEIR PART FEEL ABLE  
TO TRUST NORTH VIETNAMESE TO NEGOTIATE WITH GENUINE INTENT AND TO  
REFRAIN FROM USING PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS TO BUILD UP MILITARY  
STRENGTH AND COMPEL SOUTH VIETNAMESE, AMERICANS, AUSTRALIAN, NEW  
ZEALAND AND OTHER FORCES TO FIGHT WITH THEIR HANDS TIED BEHIND THEIR  
BACKS.

TRUST HAS GOT TO BE BUILT UP. FOR MY PART, IF THIS NEEDS SAYING,  
I ACCEPT ONE HUNDRED PER CENT AMERICAN SINCERITY TO NEGOTIATE FOR  
PEACE. AND I MUST ADD THIS. I BELIEVE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE ALSO  
GENUINE IN THEIR DESIRE FOR PEACE. THEY EQUALLY ARE CONCERNED TO  
AVOID A SITUATION IN WHICH THEY FEEL THEY WOULD BE LEAVING PERHAPS  
100,000 NORTH VIETNAMESE AT RISK IN SOUTH, DENUDED OF NECESSARY  
SUPPLIES.

PAGE 4 RUDTCR 6571C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
IT IS TO BRIDGE WHAT I DESCRIBED YESTERDAY AS VERY SMALL REMAINING  
GAP BY CREATING NECESSARY CONFIDENCE AND GUARANTEES BOTH WAYS THAT  
MY RIGHT HON. FRIEND AND I HAVE BEEN SO ACTIVE IN THIS PAST WEEK  
TO DO OUR BEST TO SEE THAT BREATHING SPACE PROVIDED BY TET WAS  
USED. DEEP CONCERN ALL OF US FEEL THAT THIS HAS NOT PROVED POSS-  
IBLE MUST NOT BLIND US TO FACT THAT PEACE IS ATTAINABLE AT ANY TIME  
ON BASIS ON WHICH WE HAVE BEEN WORKING.

THESE DISAPPOINTMENTS SHOULD NOT DRIVE ANY OF US INTO PANIC  
MEASURES, REVERSALS OF POLICY OR INTO DELUSION THAT PEACE CAN BE  
SECURED BY DRAMATIC BUT INEFFECTUAL DECLARATIONS. THOSE OF US WHO  
HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN THIS MATTER HAVE DUTY TO KEEP COOL AND KEEP  
OUR EYES FIXED ON GOAL WE SET OURSELVES LAST WEEK, TO USE THE  
INFLUENCE WE POSSESS TO PREVENT BITTERNESS AS WELL AS FIGHTING  
FOR ESCALATING, AND TO BEGIN AGAIN, HOWEVER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES,  
TO CREATE TWO-WAY CONFIDENCE -  
TO REMEMBER ABOVE ALL THAT OUR OBJECTIVE IS NOT TO STRIKE ALLEGEDLY  
MORAL POSTURES OR TO MAKE UNHELPFUL DENUNCIATORY DECLARATIONS -  
OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO SECURE PEACE. UNQUOTE

2. DEBATE FOLLIWING STATEMENT AND COMMENT FOLLOW SEPTEL.

DECLASSIFY UPON RECEIPT KAISER  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, February 14, 1967  
5:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Wilson's backgrounder to the  
British press worked pretty well  
on the first day.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

London 6543

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House: GFD/Sec, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ly, NARA, Date 3-25-91

WWRostow:rlh

February 14, 1967

13/a

From London 6543

Subject: Resumption Bombings: UK Press Comment

Hanoi target of criticism in acute press unhappiness over resumption bombing. All papers express sorrow that beginning of negotiations paved by Wilson-Kosygin talks which seemed so close at hand had not received the needed consent from Hanoi. On other hand no paper with exception Guardian (para. 3) question US explanation of military necessity for resuming bombing.

Popular press comes down hardest on Hanoi with Mirror banner headline, "Hanoi snub wrecks Premier's peace bid," and Express headline "Why LBJ bombed again -- Hanoi shot down peace attempt." Mail states bombing resumed because "Hanoi defied pressure from Russia and Britain for peace move." President Ho seen as having "dashed hopes of both sides by withholding least response to American bombing pause and drove home disregard for world pressure publicly in message to Pope." Scenario of breakdown carried in most press stories has Wilson obtaining minimum terms for starting talks from Washington, relaying them to Kosygin, who in turn is reported to have cabled them to Hanoi. Hanoi is alternatively reported to have failed to reply, or to have rejected the terms. Agreement on a truce and ensuing negotiations is generally portrayed as having been within "hairs breadth of success."

Telegraph portrays Kosygin as possibly responsible for failure, suggesting: "What must remain in doubt after Kosygin's visit is whether Russians are using Voice in Hanoi much or, if they are, whether Hanoi wants to listen." Times article headlined, "Wilson hoped against hope until last moment," suggests all that was needed from Hanoi was "very small move." Article continues, "British Government continues to be profoundly convinced that Washington wants talks . . . "despite resumption of bombing. Guardian front-page article states agreement "which seemed to be within reach . . . ran into stoney silence from Hanoi . . . " Guardian editorial carries only comment critical of US resumption. Editorial noting it "tragic he (Ho) did not give the word," states, "That is still no justification for American resumption of bombing, which was unjustified in first place."

Press generally seems residual hope for settlement as result mechanisms for negotiations developed by Wilson-Kosygin talks. Times comments, "Joint procedure now existing, whatever it may be, will serve as well in conditions of full-scale warfare as in slightly more promising conditions of bombing pause."

Kaiser

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Authority State Oct 12/21/77  
By 18/18, NARA, Date 3-25-91



122

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-325  
By ju, NARA, Date 5-15-92

*sent Pac  
2/15/67*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NO DIS

February 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You asked (1) where I thought the initial leak of the Robert Kennedy peace feeler came from and (2) who was responsible for special treatment in Embassies given to Senator Kennedy if he was given such treatment.

I do not know where the leak originated but I am inclined to believe that it came from the Department of State rather than from Senator Kennedy. The reporting cable from which Newsweek could have gotten its story was given normal distribution within the Department; indeed, it was treated so routinely that it took me two days to locate the cable. Conservatively this cable went to over one hundred people. Since it concerned Europe, many of these were not connected with Viet-Nam and not familiar with what might or might not be a "peace feeler". This cable, which attributed significance to the Manah'h statement, seems to me to be the probable source of Newsweek's story.

In addition, Senator Kennedy complained to me about the leak and seemed genuinely confused by it. While it could have come from a member of his staff, the only one with sufficient detail to have been the source of the story would have been William vanden Heuvel.

I do not believe Senator Kennedy got special treatment from Embassies. To the extent that he may have, I will take full responsibility for it, since I asked the Embassies

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL-NODIS~~

-2-

involved to set up appointments for him in accordance with his request, unless they objected to doing so. This is the customary way of dealing with senatorial appointments. In this instance I first learned of the Senator's trip when he called the French Embassy and asked Ambassador Lucet to arrange certain appointments for him. The Ambassador brought this to our attention feeling, quite rightly, that appointments should be requested by the State Department or by our Embassy abroad in these matters.

Initially Senator Kennedy expressed an interest in talking with the Communist Chinese Ambassador in Paris and the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Paris. Both I and Averell Harriman dissuaded him from this, and told him that the Embassy could have nothing to do with setting up such appointments and that it would be unwise from governmental point of view for him to talk with people such as this. The suggestion that he talk to Manac'h came independently from both Governor Harriman and myself because he had expressed an interest in discussing the Viet-Nam problem with a knowledgeable French diplomat who was independent of de Gaulle.

The Senator's visit to Italy also came at my suggestion, on the recommendation of other officials in the State Department, who felt that if he visited London, Paris and Bonn the Italians' nose would be out of joint and this would reflect on us as well as the Senator because of their sensitivity to being left out.

Senator Kennedy was given routine briefings with respect to the countries visited. In short, I believe he got the same treatment that we would normally give a Senator, but what he does attracts more attention than would similar visits and interviews by most other members of the Senate.

Acting Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL-NODIS~~

Friday, Feb. 14, 1967  
10:45 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This confirms my report of yesterday  
that we have London pretty well in hand  
for the moment.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET/SUNFLOWER attachment~~

(London 6543)



~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/SUNFLOWER~~

Copy of LONDON 6543, Feb. 14, 1967

For Actg Secretary and Rostow from Kaiser and Cooper

1. We met with Prime Minister, George Brown, Burke Trend, Gore-Bpboth, and Donald Murray at 6:45 last night to discuss how best to deal publicly with the resumption of bombing and the events of the past week. We brought over a sanitized version of your 135799 which we had received shortly before we left for Downing Street.

2. The mood of Wilson and the others was friendly, understanding, and cheerful. They were convinced they had done what they could and that we had gone to tremendous lengths to meet Hanoi "more than half way."

3. Even before we raised the subject, Wilson and Brown pointed out the necessity to protect the Soviet channel. They were delighted we were thinking in the same terms. They also recognized the necessity of stone-walling on the sensitive aspects of recent days.

4. Wilson recognizes that he will have some difficult moments with his party in Commons (indeed 100 Labor MP's have already signed a petition against resumption of bombing) but he seems confident that in the light of everything that has taken place, this past week, he can deal with it.

5. Wilson said he had given a background press conference to the lobby correspondents following his appearance in the House. He pointed out to them that Hanoi could have peace if they had shown any readiness to respond to the efforts that had been exerted to reach a settlement. This morning's London papers have taken this line and have given the US, the UK, and the Russians very high marks for their efforts. Hanoi is universally regarded as the villain in the piece. A more detailed review of the press will be reaching Washington in a separate telegram, London 6544.

6. Cooper is leaving for Paris at 1230 today and will meet with Gene Rostow later this afternoon.

KAISER

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-11  
By ing, NARA Date 5-23-96

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/SUNFLOWER~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-322

By ing, NARA, Date 12-2-92~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 14, 1967 -- 10:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

In your session with Haile Selassie you have a choice:

-- Ed Korry warns he may begin with a long formal statement. You can let him make that statement and then counter-punch; or

-- You can begin with the following points:

a. You understand the problems faced by the Emperor with Somalia; the uncertain future of French Somaliland; the British withdrawal from Aden; and the problem in Eritrea of Moslem dissidence.

b. We stand firm in our recognition of the territorial integrity of Ethiopia.

c. Our interest is reflected in the very substantial economic and military aid we have provided (\$60 million in 1966, more than \$300 million over-all).

d. We are prepared to help the Emperor further in a modest way with his internal security problems.

e. But we are determined to avoid promoting arms races in Africa, where people need all their resources for their development.

f. We look to the wisdom of the Emperor and his statesman-like restraint -- in East Africa and in the whole continent.

FYI: We are putting together a small package of about \$2 million in counter-insurgency help over the next two years, which will save him the embarrassment of returning empty-handed.

P.S. As for Roche's point about Djibouti, there will be a plebiscite on the 19th: either stay with the French or independence. If they vote for independence, there may be trouble because the people are ethnically Somalias and Ethiopia needs the port. That will be the time to press for a UN internationalization.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, Feb. 4, 1967  
5:30 p.m.

135

MR. PRESIDENT:

It will interest you to know that  
Billy Hughes, a famous Australian  
(biography attached) unloaded this  
on Senator Fulbright.

W. W. R.

Attachment

1352  
991

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

February 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW ←  
THE WHITE HOUSE.

Dear Walt:

I think you may have met Billy (Sir Wilfrid) Kent Hughes, a famous Australian Rhodes Scholar (Victoria and Christ Church): K.B.E., O.B.E., M.V.O., M.C. (1916), E.D., Gallipoli and the Western Front (mentioned in dispatches 4 times and, if memory serves, a major at 21), Australian Olympic runner, British Empire quarter-mile champion, 1/2 Blue in both Athletics and Lacrosse, captain of Oxford ski-ing team, in cabinet of Victoria for many years, returned to active military service 1940, was surrendered at Singapore and spent 3 1/2 years as prisoner of war, M.H.R. from Melbourne since 1949, member of Commonwealth cabinet for some years, Chairman of Olympic Games in 1956 (Melbourne), Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee of House of Commons 1956-61, author of intelligence letter, leading Australian advocate of rearmament and active role in defense of Viet-Nam--he broke with Menzies on defense, sacrificing his Chairmanship of Foreign Affairs Committee and quite possibly appointment as Minister of Defense, but is on good terms with Holt. He's a great guy with whom I have had frequent contact in recent years.

*a copy of* You and others at the White House may enjoy reading a copy of a letter by him which arrived today.

*Yours  
Conrad*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

*Conrad K. Lindley*

C  
O  
P

8th Feb. '967

1356

Y (cy of letter to Senator Fulbright from Sir Wilfrid Kent Hughes)

My dear Senator,

I hope to be in Washington later on this year and, if possible, to enjoy yet another conversation with a fellow Rhodes Scholar and Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

On the other hand I still cannot understand why you continue to extend the length of the war in South East Asia by raising the hopes of the Communists on the correctness of their theory. Namely, that America will get tired of the conflict and withdraw from the region.

Maybe you are right in saying "not a single one of our European allies has been willing to send even a token force to Vietnam as a symbolic gesture of support", but to spread the doctrine that your allies in this region of the world are not solidly behind America is so highly dangerous that I can only vehemently protest with any such force as I can command.

Let's be practical. Europe is no longer interested in Asia and would like to be quit of their commitments after they are given a slice of the lucrative trade cake. Sweden, whom you quote, has always been vividly aware of her past history and the fact that she is situated in "No-man's Land" between the Communists and the West.

Britain, whether we like it or not, can no longer afford to remain east of Suez and is now, much as one may deplore the fact, a second-class world power whose influence on world politics, peace and prosperity lies in her close cooperation with Europe, either in EFTA or in the Common Market, or both.

As for France -- the legacy of her colonial administration in Indo-China literally stinks in the nostrils of any intelligent person who happens to live in this region.

Le Grand Charles, having failed in Asia, is apparently determined to do what he can to make sure that no one else succeeds.

Latin America has so many troubles of its own, particularly in fighting Communist subversive activities, that they have no time to even think about South East Asia.

As for Africa, there is no alternative for practically every country north of the Zambesi other than a return to tribal discipline with all its concomitant bestiality and barbarisms.



What could any single community of Africa do with respect to S. E. Asia?

Most of their leaders would have to refer to a map to know where it was.

The main dangers of Communist aggression in the world to-day are in two areas in the following order of priority -- (1) South East Asia and the Western Pacific; (2) The Middle East.

I hope you will not be annoyed with me for saying what I feel in a very forthright manner. During the war I spent four years in Asia. Since the war I have made extended visits to this region; in 1955, '58 and every year for the last five years.

I firmly believe that Taiwan with American aid is one of the post-war miracles of the world and that South Korea will shortly be another example of what can be done with American aid, assistance and wisdom and long-range planning.

S. E. Asia wishes to follow the same pattern and tremendous strides are being made in regional cooperation and development in such countries as Thailand and Malaysia.

The task of stopping Communist aggression in South Vietnam and Laos still, unfortunately, has not been completed, but I am firmly convinced that once it is, the whole region of S. E. Asia including Australia and New Zealand and the free countries of the Western Pacific will establish a pattern of success and progress which could well alter the whole future of world history by its example.

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136  
~~TOP SECRET~~

Lunch with the President

Tuesday, February 14, 1967

Agenda

1. Trilateral Talks. Secretary McNamara.

Defense is now re-working a State draft with which it has some disagreements. Secretary McNamara wishes to pose the question of a meeting with the President about Friday. Or, should it await Secretary Rusk's return, possibly Monday?

2. ABM's. Secretary McNamara.

Still no word from Moscow. The first move is to get Thompson to see Kosygin -- which he has not yet done. Then, perhaps, another high level approach from here.

3. PL 480 for the UAR? Acting Secretary Katzenbach .

Report on State's position.

4. Report on Non-Proliferation Treaty. Acting Secretary Katzenbach.

Status of discussions.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By Reg, NARA, Date 3-26-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, Feb. 14, 1967  
6:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Harry McPherson  
Marvin Watson

A friend of mine named Richard Rogan of California came in and asked me to put to you the following:

The Constitutional Rights Foundation will be meeting late April-early May, in Los Angeles. He describes it as a bipartisan, non-partisan organization in the field of civil rights, freedom of expression, etc.

They would like you to speak at their annual banquet. The date could be set for either Saturday, April 29, or Saturday, May 6.

The Democrats in California feel that it would be valuable for you to come at this time as a prelude to 1968.

I should underline that I only know Dick Rogan as the husband of an old friend of mine; I personally know nothing about the Constitutional Rights Foundation, or about politics in California. Therefore, I am sending this through Harry McPherson and Marvin Watson.

W. W. R.

Tuesday, February 14, 1967  
6:15 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Marvin Watson

When Richard Rogan was in to see me, he said that he would like his wife, Mrs. Mary Goode Rogan, considered for a vacancy on the U. S. District Court in California. I attach a copy of her biographical data and references in her present role as Judge of the Burbank Municipal Court.

I would only say that I went to high school with Mary (Goode) Rogan. She was the associate editor when I was editor of our high school newspaper. She was the first girl I took to the movies. She went through the Yale Law School. She is smart as a whip. In addition to being a judge, she has five boys and one girl, ages 11 to 22.

If you are looking for a woman to elevate, Mary would be just fine.

On the other hand, I know nothing whatsoever about judicial appointments.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, February 14, 1967  
7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

At my request Dick Helms is filing this account of the Senators and Representatives with whom the Agency has been in touch on the RAMPARTS matter.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-321  
By WJ, NARA, Date 6-22-93

WWRostow:

Tuesday, Feb. 14, 1967  
6:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

As instructed, I leaned on Mr. Newbold Noyes. I told him:

-- The Senator asked to come in; and the request was immediately granted;

-- His whole trip was surveyed;

-- The alleged feeler was analyzed; he said that he did not understand that Manac'h had said anything interesting; it was the State Department officer who thought it important; he had spoken to no one and had not leaked anything dramatic.

-- It was agreed that probably the leak had come from the State Department; there was a discussion about what, if anything, the Senator should say on leaving; the President advised him neither one way nor the other; the Senator decided to go out and meet the press.

Noyes said that one of his reporters had the story for some time but had not used it. I asked him where he got it. He said he didn't know, but would check and let me know tomorrow. I asked if the story had been checked with either the President, Katzenbach, or myself. He said No. I said that it was quite possible that the Senator, or perhaps those close to him, had been circulating a dramatic tale; but there are two sides to these stories; I was giving it to him straight; and it might be wise to check before extending myths. Noyes said that he understood this and thought that this was fair.

He promised to check with his writers, get at the source, and, if possible, let me know tomorrow.

He closed by saying: This is a pretty rough day with the White House. I just had George Christian chew me out for Carl Rowan's civil rights story.

W. W. R.

P. S. Newbold Noyes has just called me back to tell me that the source was Senator Kennedy himself. I said again that our point was simply this: In a case of this kind, it is worth checking both sides. He agreed it was.

W. W. R.

Tuesday, February 14, 1967  
6:55 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Ed Hamilton's useful report on the meeting this afternoon with the Emperor. On page 2 are four talking points for tonight. Ed reports that the Emperor seemed completely cheerful -- perhaps disappointed that there is no prospect for massive military aid but untroubled about the question of time this morning.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



14/a

Tuesday, February 14, 1967 -

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-323  
By ig, NARA, Date 11-18-93

WWR:

SUBJECT: McNamara-Katzenbach Meeting with HIM

McNamara and Katzenbach had a 1-1/2 hour friendly meeting with the Emperor this afternoon. HIM opened with an abbreviated version of his speech to the President. Again, his specific requests were for a doubling of our MAP and a new program of budget support -- amount unspecified. McNamara replied:

1. The Ethiopian army is well-trained, well-equipped, and three times the Somali forces.
2. The long Ethiopian-Somali frontier is difficult to defend, but the Emperor's army seems well up to it.
3. In our view, a larger force would be an impossible burden for the Ethiopian economy to carry if it were to improve the standard of living at the same time.
4. There may be some problems of maintenance and utilization of present equipment. We may be able to help some in these areas. (McNamara did not spell this out; he apparently means a speed-up in deliveries of current commitments.)
5. It is a fact of life that the Congress looks upon increased military aid with great displeasure.

Katzenbach added that we are already supporting the Emperor's budget through revenues from PL 480 shipments of cotton. He urged the Emperor to seek political solutions to his problems with the Somalis. HIM replied that his hand is always out to Somalia, but that they always refuse it.

In summary, it was agreed that:

1. The Emperor would submit their requests and rationale in writing.
2. McNamara, Katzenbach and Korry would undertake a careful personal review of this whole range of issues, and
3. Korry would then give them our replies in detail when the Emperor had returned to Addis Ababa. (The Emperor goes to Sudan and Turkey after leaving here; he won't be home for a month.)

I would suggest the President take the following line in any conversations tonight:

1. He understands HIM's talks with McNamara and Katzenbach were most useful to both sides -- each of us better understands the other's problems.
2. Assure the Emperor that the promised review of his requests will be thorough and as sympathetic as our restraints allow.
3. Emphasize that we believe there are real possibilities of softening the Ethiopian-Somalian problem through joint development of shared resolutions -- particularly river basins.
4. Repeat that our conception of the Ethiopian security problem stresses internal security and that we will do our best to be as forthcoming as possible.

Ed Hamilton

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

142 A  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 1944/  
By is NARA, Date 1-8-98

Monday, February 13, 1967  
4:00 p.m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

For The President's Diary

Herewith a brief account of the exchanges on Viet Nam negotiations and a peace settlement, starting Monday, February 6, 1967, to the resumption of bombing the North at about 12:30 p.m. February 13.

I.

The events began when, after his first talk with Kosygin, Prime Minister Wilson signalled that he wished to talk to the President on the telephone. This was 7:35 p.m. The President, engaged in a Congressional briefing, was immediately informed, as was Secretary Rusk.

The substance of Wilson's message was that he found Kosygin deeply concerned about the state of Communist China and the threat it represented, and willing, apparently, to underwrite Hanoi's commitment to talk if we stopped the bombing.

The President asked Walt Rostow immediately to telephone 10 Downing Street and tell Michael Palliser, the Prime Minister's special aide for foreign policy, that we were not prepared to accept talks in exchange for a cessation of bombing North Viet Nam.

Mr. Rostow added (indicating that this was a personal judgment and not a Presidential instruction) that throughout the week that was beginning the British should be conscious that we could not afford to move into a Panmunjom position; that is, a condition in which the war proceeded for a long period but we had imposed on ourselves severe self-denial in respect to military operations. This was done on a noisy scrambler telephone; but Palliser confirmed the two messages lucidly.

The Prime Minister then redrafted his message (T. 22/67) so as to avoid putting to us on his own account a no-bombing v. talk proposition. Nevertheless, since it had been put by Kosygin, it required a response; and Wilson was asking for our alternative proposition.

The President came down to the Situation Room about 9:00 p.m. After preliminary discussion with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Walt Rostow, he retired to his bedroom while preliminary drafting was completed along the lines directed by the President. The message was then taken to the President's bedroom; revised by him; and dispatched directly to the Prime Minister at about midnight Washington time. It included the following passage:

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2/13/67

"We are prepared to take up with Hanoi steps of mutual de-escalation and are prepared to have the most private preliminary conversations with them on arrangements for serious discussions of a final settlement.

"Specifically, we are prepared to and plan, through established channels, to inform Hanoi that if they will agree to an assured stoppage of infiltration into South Viet Nam, we will stop the bombing of North Viet Nam and stop further augmentation of U. S. forces in South Viet Nam. We would welcome your joint advocacy of this position.

"Further, or alternatively, you should know we would recommend to the South Vietnamese military authorities that they discuss with North Vietnamese military authorities a prolongation of the Tet cease-fire."

## II.

The following day, Tuesday, February 7, 1967, the President dispatched to President Ho Chi Minh the letter which he had planned to send for some time containing the following formula:

"With these problems in mind, I am prepared to move even further towards an ending of hostilities than your Government has proposed in either public statements or through private diplomatic channels. I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of U.S. forces in South Viet Nam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Viet Nam by land and by sea has stopped. These acts of restraint on both sides would, I believe, make it possible for us to conduct serious and private discussions leading toward an early peace."

Wilson requested that he have the text of that letter. In State telegram 133516, February 8, it was explained why it would be inappropriate to make the full text available -- our commitment to secrecy on that channel. We stood by the formula in the February 6 message to the Prime Minister as sufficient for talks with Kosygin.

On February 8 and 9, Wilson explored the matter of an A - B formula. He also probed at the possibility (derived from a public statement of Kosygin's) of the Soviet Union's willingness to join Britain in convoking a new Geneva conference.

Partly because we doubted that the Soviet Union would wish a Geneva conference, since it would involve the Chinese Communists, we urged Wilson to stay with the A - B formula.

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 3 -

2/13/67

On the morning of February 10 (at 11:50 a.m.) we heard from Chester Cooper in London that Kosygin had indicated (in Wilson's judgment) some interest in the A - B formula as stated by Wilson. We were then flashed a suggested text and urged to respond promptly before Kosygin left London at 10:30 p.m. London time for Scotland.

Secretary Rusk was tied up in a lunch with the King of Morocco and the signing of a treaty with him. Therefore, the meeting to formulate the requested response could not take place until about 3:15 p.m. At the President's instruction, Walt Rostow informed Burke Trend at 10 Downing Street that we would transmit a reply but we could not quite meet the 10:30 (London time) deadline and they might have to transmit it to Kosygin in writing somewhat later.

The cable -- supplementing Cooper's phone call -- (London 6456, Feb. 10, 12:12 p.m.) indicated that "guidance was needed urgently." The President had every reason to think nothing would be transmitted to Kosygin until we had replied. Wilson's proposed formula was as follows:

"A) The United States will stop bombing North Vietnam as soon as they are assured that infiltration from North Vietnam to South Vietnam will stop. This assurance can be communicated in secret if North Vietnam so wishes.

"B) Within a few days (with the period to be agreed between the two sides) before the bombing stops the United States will stop further augmenting their forces in South Vietnam and North Vietnam will stop infiltration and movement of forces into the South.

"C) The cessation of bombing of North Vietnam and the cessation of build-up of United States forces in the South are actions which will be immediately apparent.

"D) A cessation of infiltration is more difficult for the world to observe. Nevertheless the United States will not demand any public statement from North Vietnam.

"E) Any secret assurances from Hanoi can reach the United States direct, or through Soviet channels, or through the Soviet and British governments. This is for North Vietnam to decide."

This was found unsatisfactory; and, at a meeting in the Cabinet Room on the afternoon of February 10 (with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Katzenbach, Mr. William Bundy, and Mr. Walt Rostow), a different formulation was proposed which was transmitted to Bruce and Cooper over the President's private line to 10 Downing Street.

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The formula proposed was the following:

"A) The United States will order a cessation of bombing of North Vietnam as soon as they are assured that infiltration from North Vietnam to South Vietnam has stopped. This assurance can be communicated in secret if North Vietnam so wishes.

*after the bombing stops* "B) Within a few days (with the period to be agreed with the two sides) the United States will stop further augmenting their force in South Vietnam. The cessation of bombing of North Vietnam is an action which will be immediately apparent. This requires that the stoppage of infiltration become public very quickly thereafter. If Hanoi is unwilling to announce the stoppage of infiltration, the United States must do so at the time it stops augmentation of U. S. forces. In that case, Hanoi must not deny it.

"C) Any assurances from Hanoi can reach the United States direct, or through Soviet channels, or through the Soviet and British Governments. This is for North Vietnam to decide."

Cooper called to confirm that this was, in fact, President Johnson's personal position. Walt Rostow confirmed this with the President and so informed Cooper. This message was delivered to Kosygin shortly after 10:30 p. m.

### III.

As Prime Minister Wilson approached his final 5-hour session with Kosygin on Sunday night, February 12, he was evidently distressed at what he regarded as the difference between what he had given Kosygin and we had given him authoritatively. He sent two messages (T. 30/67 and T. 31/67, February 12) on the assumption that, somehow, it might be possible for Kosygin to buy his (Wilson's) February 10 formula but not ours.

Wilson's messages were considered in the Situation Room late at night February 11-12. The President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Rostow, gathered there. As time wore on, Mrs. Johnson and Mary Slater brought food and drink. Finally, CAP 67043 was dispatched explaining temperately our position.

We were assured the next morning by Ambassador Bruce, Mr. Cooper and by the Prime Minister (T. 33/67) that all was well as Wilson entered his last evening with Kosygin.

At 4:00 p. m. February 12, Secretary Rusk received a flash message as follows:

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"Wilson proposes to put following proposition to Kosygin, if he can obtain President Johnson's approval by 7:00 p. m. EST. If he does not do so, he will not put forward the proposal. He would be willing to put forward a variation if we suggest. He proposes:

"If you (Kosygin) can get an assurance from Hanoi, communicated directly to the U. S. or through the Soviets, before 10:00 a. m. GMT tomorrow, that no arms or people will move across the 17th parallel (extended from Gulf of Tonkin through Laos), I (Harold Wilson) will get an assurance from the US that the US will not resume bombing from that time. Having gotten such an assurance from the DRV, the US would stop further augmentation of its forces in the South. "

Wilson evidently wanted one last chance at an A - B formula; although there had been no indication of interest in or commitment to an A - B formula by Kosygin in his Chequers talks up to that point.

The President outlined over the telephone to Walt Rostow the kind of response he would like to have both for the record and to give Wilson a last chance.

The President, the Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. William Bundy, Mr. Walt Rostow met in the Cabinet Room at about 5:15 p. m. Mr. Rostow was instructed to tell Cooper a message would be coming to be available at Chequers by the time indicated. The message was drafted.

The President, wishing to leave no possibility of misunderstanding, asked Rostow to telephone Cooper the minor changes we proposed in the message so that it would be available to the Prime Minister at Chequers. The Prime Minister got on the telephone and told Rostow he would be seeing Kosygin within an hour. He reported that at dinner Kosygin was not forthcoming. He could await the arrival of the full message for his hotel meeting with Kosygin regarding a prisoner named Brooke in Moscow.

That message (CAP 67045) was dispatched about 7:00 p. m. Washington time. It contained the following approved final formula for Kosygin:

"If you can get a North Vietnamese assurance -- communicated either direct to the United States or through you -- before 10:00 a. m. British time tomorrow that all movement of troops and supplies into South Viet Nam will stop at that time, I will get an assurance from the U. S. that they will not resume bombing of North Viet Nam from that time. Of course the U. S. build-up would also then stop within a matter of days.

"This would then give you and me the opportunity to try to consolidate and build on what has been achieved by bringing the parties together and promoting further balanced measures of de-escalation. "

Shortly after receipt in London, Cooper called to say our response was "wonderful."

IV.

Michael Palliser and Chester Cooper called me at 9:30 p.m. Sunday, February 12. Chester Cooper reported as follows:

The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had transmitted the agreed message.

They began by paraphrasing the opening paragraphs we had sent:

-- The A - B formula had been available for three months. There had been no answer.

-- It had been available in Hanoi directly from Washington since last Tuesday. There was no answer.

-- The President was going more than half way.

-- The President had to bear in mind his responsibility to his troops and his allies. The agreed formula was then stated.

The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary threw their full weight behind it. They said peace was within our grasp. They asked Kosygin to support it.

Kosygin did not agree to support it but did agree immediately to transmit it, and he wrote out the telegram in his own hand. Kosygin then complained that the 7 or 8 hours offered him were insufficient. He asked for more time. Cooper and Bruce made it clear that if more time were asked for, it could only be a matter of hours.

At 10:00 p.m. Prime Minister Wilson telephoned me. He repeated much of what Cooper had told me, adding these two items. First, Kosygin took him aside and said he was worried by this problem: 100,000 men in the south might get their throats cut; he could be attacked as a traitor. Prime Minister Wilson said that, nevertheless, he would send the message (written out in purple ink, beautifully written by Kosygin's hand, but he could not read it).

Second, Prime Minister Wilson turned to his main business and pleaded with us to give the Russians and Hanoi more time. He said that Kosygin had complained of the eight hours. Wilson thought he needed time to talk to his

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colleagues. In Hanoi the government was run by a committee and they were split between a pro-Chinese faction and the others.

I asked: How much time are you asking for? He shifted from "another 8 hours" to a request for a 24-hour extension. I told him I would get in touch with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State.

Secretary McNamara said that he saw no reason for it but, after exploring the matter with the President, he could push the time of resumption of operations up to roughly noon Washington time and the moment for receipt of a signal to 11:00 a.m.

Secretary Rusk was against an extension beyond the time suggested by Secretary McNamara.

He underlined that:

-- They had ample time to contemplate the proposal;

-- There was no reason for them not to come back to an A - B formula if they so wished, even if operations were going forward against the North. Our commitment to the principle of mutual de-escalation was deeply rooted in the Government as policy.

In the light of this advice and his own reflection on the problem, the President personally dictated the message that went to the Prime Minister at about 1:00 a.m. Monday, February 13, 1967.

V.

Early Monday morning, February 13, two pieces of information arrived from London:

-- Wilson reported that Kosygin had told him that he had no reply from Hanoi, but Moscow was pressing;

-- The British passed to us an intercepted telephone message to Moscow en clair which suggested that Moscow was in fact pressing Hanoi on the grounds that all they had to do was to give a confidential, positive answer.

On the basis of this information, the President assembled in the Cabinet Room at 8:30 a.m. the Vice President; Secretary McNamara; Deputy Secretary Vance; General Wheeler; Under Secretary Katzenbach; Mr. Kohler; Mr. W. Bundy; and W. Rostow. They were joined after some time by General Taylor. The President asked Mr. Bundy to state the facts as we now knew them, and then

asked for Mr. Kohler's interpretation.

Mr. Kohler said that what struck him was that now the Soviet Union was, for the first time, in the act. This was a different situation than that which had existed since Shelepin's visit to Hanoi in early 1966. After his frustration, the Soviets took the position that they could do nothing and it was not their business. Apparently the situation inside China both spurred the Soviet Union to take a more active role, and gave them an occasion to do so since, presumably, the trouble in China reduces Chinese influence in Hanoi.

It was agreed that the intercepted message we had received from the British intelligence authorities was authentic; although the President later observed that this might have been a dignified way for the Soviets, in effect, to ask us for more time.

The President then put the question: "What do we do now, if anything, to make our present dispositions more flexible?": the existing dispositions being that we had until 11:00 a.m., Washington time, to receive a response, and we had planned to have military operations resumed at noon -- at least close-in naval.

After a discussion which went fully two hours, in which all elements in the problem were patiently reviewed, it was decided:

1. We should ask CINCPAC what the earliest time could be prudently to resume naval military activity in coastal waters up to the 19th parallel, and also resume some bombing operations north of the DMZ.

2. General Wheeler put this question to CINCPAC, who responded: probably by 3 p.m., Washington time, but perhaps earlier. He would inform General Wheeler of the approximate time over target after discussion with his subordinate air commander.

3. We would announce, through the Defense Department when CINCPAC gave us a firm time over target North Viet Nam, that military operations against the North had been resumed.

4. It was agreed that we would not inform the British until we had a firm time for the Defense Department statement, and this would be done on a routine basis via State and Pat Dean, not via a message from the President to Wilson.

5. At the 11 o'clock White House briefing and the 12 o'clock State briefing, we would continue, as we have over the weekend, with a firm "no

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comment. " In fact, time over target proved to be as early as 12:<sup>07</sup>~~30~~ p. m.

In coming to this decision, the following elements were explored and reconciled:

-- The need to provide some leeway should a decision be reached in Hanoi and there be problems in the time of transmission. This was to be provided by the several hours between 11:00 a. m. and the resumption of military activities which can be turned off on about 35 minutes' notice; although time was truncated by a state of greater alert and quicker response in the field than had been calculated.

-- The need to avoid a public announcement of the resumption of military activities against the North before operations actually start, since we do not wish to give the enemy warning time;

-- The desirability of not separating the resumption of naval from air operations against the North;

-- The need to protect us (by promptness and sticking to the basic decision made in our reply to Wilson), while giving Hanoi one more chance from being drawn, through a fuzzy answer, into a protracted period of "no bombing for talk. "

There was considerable discussion of the basic position in which we find ourselves after the London exchanges and the President's message to Hanoi should Hanoi accept, at some stage, an A - B formula.

On the one hand it is agreed that an actual cessation of infiltration would, as Kosygin stated to Wilson, put the North Vietnamese and other Communist forces in South Viet Nam into jeopardy. Secretary McNamara agreed -- as he has previously -- that, for this reason, the deal is unlikely to be acceptable to Hanoi, and any deal could only come about after much more extensive talks between ourselves and Hanoi to clarify all the elements involved.

Rostow stated that he had said to Wilson, when he raised this point, that what we envisaged was that the Northern troops be permitted to go to North Viet Nam, and the troops in the South be granted amnesty. It was open to Hanoi to discuss these and other matters with us if they were really serious about ending the war.

On the other hand, General Taylor asked what would we do if they accepted and did not in fact end infiltration. We were offering in our formula two blue chips for one -- and that one ambiguous; that is, both a bombing cessation and

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no net increment in our forces, against a commitment to cease infiltration.

It was pointed out that the interval of time between the cessation of bombing and the cessation of augmentation of our forces would provide us a chance to exercise unilateral surveillance capabilities and, possibly in addition, international means for monitoring that Hanoi's word had, in fact, been kept.

It was also pointed out that if, in fact, they promised to end infiltration or seriously cut it down, that act would both undercut their own forces in the South and the political bargaining position of the NLF vis-à-vis Saigon. Nick Katzenback summarized that we are not offering to trade two blue chips against one; but two nickels against 50¢.

The President indicated that he had not expected anything to come of probes at this phase; and his anxiety was to separate Kosygin and Wilson and avoid their heading together for Hanoi, or Wilson's heading for Washington. He held to his fundamental view that successful negotiations -- if and when they came -- would have to be direct and bilateral.

VI.

The end of the story of the week, February 6-13, 1967, is not yet wholly clear. On Saturday, February 11, we were informed in Moscow by the North Vietnamese that there would be a reply from Hanoi to the President's letter to Ho Chi Minh. We indicated in our communication to Wilson of early morning February 12, we did not expect it until the Wilson-Kosygin discussions had ended. Until that communication arrives, the record of this episode cannot be closed.

It was clear, however, that, despite the reaching out of Wilson and the President to make available to Kosygin and Hanoi the most attractive possible A - B formula, Hanoi was not yet prepared to move from its effort to force us to trade a cessation of bombing merely for a promise to talk -- despite the possibility of moving during Tet.

In dealing with this problem, the President had to bear in mind many factors:

-- The need to make sure that no real possibility of movement towards peace was lost;

-- The need to assure that the expected failure of the Wilson-Kosygin talks could not be legitimately blamed on our policy or positions by either party -- thus, at David Bruce's strong personal recommendations, the hold-down of bombing the North until Kosygin's departure from London;



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-- The need to assure that we not get trapped in a disadvantageous or politically untenable formula;

-- The need to preserve the direct channel to Hanoi via their Moscow Embassy and avoid getting trapped by potentially dangerous U. K. -U. S. S. R. joint pressure for a no-bombing-for-talk formula;

-- The need to assure ourselves and our military that we would not place our Marines in particular jeopardy due to the concentration and ample re-supply of the three (or four) NVN divisions just north of the DMZ.

 W. W. R.

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MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 19441  
By ics NARA, Date 1-8-98

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, February 13, 1967  
4:00 p. m.

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For The President's Diary

Herewith a brief account of the exchanges on Viet Nam negotiations and a peace settlement, starting Monday, February 6, 1967, to the resumption of bombing the North at about 12:30 p. m. February 13.

I.

The events began when, after his first talk with Kosygin, Prime Minister Wilson signalled that he wished to talk to the President on the telephone. This was 7:35 p. m. The President, engaged in a Congressional briefing, was immediately informed, as was Secretary Rusk.

The substance of Wilson's message was that he found Kosygin deeply concerned about the state of Communist China and the threat it represented, and willing, apparently, to underwrite Hanoi's commitment to talk if we stopped the bombing.

The President asked Walt Rostow immediately to telephone 10 Downing Street and tell Michael Palliser, the Prime Minister's special aide for foreign policy, that we were not prepared to accept talks in exchange for a cessation of bombing North Viet Nam.

Mr. Rostow added (indicating that this was a personal judgment and not a Presidential instruction) that throughout the week that was beginning the British should be conscious that we could not afford to move into a Panmunjom position; that is, a condition in which the war proceeded for a long period but we had imposed on ourselves severe self-denial in respect to military operations. This was done on a noisy scrambler telephone; but Palliser confirmed the two messages lucidly.

The Prime Minister then redrafted his message (T.22/67) so as to avoid putting to us on his own account a no-bombing v. talk proposition. Nevertheless, since it had been put by Kosygin, it required a response; and Wilson was asking for our alternative proposition.

The President came down to the Situation Room about 9:00 p. m. After preliminary discussion with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Walt Rostow, he retired to his bedroom while preliminary drafting was completed along the lines directed by the President. The message was then taken to the President's bedroom; revised by him; and dispatched directly to the Prime Minister at about midnight Washington time. It included the following passage:

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"We are prepared to take up with Hanoi steps of mutual de-escalation and are prepared to have the most private preliminary conversations with them on arrangements for serious discussions of a final settlement.

"Specifically, we are prepared to and plan, through established channels, to inform Hanoi that if they will agree to an assured stoppage of infiltration into South Viet Nam, we will stop the bombing of North Viet Nam and stop further augmentation of U. S. forces in South Viet Nam. We would welcome your joint advocacy of this position.

"Further, or alternatively, you should know we would recommend to the South Vietnamese military authorities that they discuss with North Vietnamese military authorities a prolongation of the Tet cease-fire."

## II.

The following day, Tuesday, February 7, 1967, the President dispatched to President Ho Chi Minh the letter which he had planned to send for some time containing the following formula:

"With these problems in mind, I am prepared to move even further towards an ending of hostilities than your Government has proposed in either public statements or through private diplomatic channels. I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of U. S. forces in South Viet Nam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Viet Nam by land and by sea has stopped. These acts of restraint on both sides would, I believe, make it possible for us to conduct serious and private discussions leading toward an early peace."

Wilson requested that he have the text of that letter. In State telegram 133516, February 8, it was explained why it would be inappropriate to make the full text available -- our commitment to secrecy on that channel. We stood by the formula in the February 6 message to the Prime Minister as sufficient for talks with Kosygin.

On February 8 and 9, Wilson explored the matter of an A - B formula. He also probed at the possibility (derived from a public statement of Kosygin's) of the Soviet Union's willingness to join Britain in convoking a new Geneva conference.

Partly because we doubted that the Soviet Union would wish a Geneva conference, since it would involve the Chinese Communists, we urged Wilson to stay with the A - B formula.

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On the morning of February 10 (at 11:50 a.m.) we heard from Chester Cooper in London that Kosygin had indicated (in Wilson's judgment) some interest in the A - B formula as stated by Wilson. We were then flashed a suggested text and urged to respond promptly before Kosygin left London at 10:30 p.m. London time for Scotland. ✓

Secretary Rusk was tied up in a lunch with the King of Morocco and the signing of a treaty with him. Therefore, the meeting to formulate the requested response could not take place until about 3:15 p.m. At the President's instruction, Walt Rostow informed Burke Trend at 10 Downing Street that we would transmit a reply but we could not quite meet the 10:30 (London time) deadline and they might have to transmit it to Kosygin in writing somewhat later. 2

The cable -- supplementing Cooper's phone call -- (London 6456, Feb. 10, 12:12 p.m.) indicated that "guidance was needed urgently." The President had every reason to think nothing would be transmitted to Kosygin until we had replied. Wilson's proposed formula was as follows: ✓

"A) The United States will stop bombing North Vietnam as soon as they are assured that infiltration from North Vietnam to South Vietnam will stop. This assurance can be communicated in secret if North Vietnam so wishes.

"B) Within a few days (with the period to be agreed between the two sides) before the bombing stops the United States will stop further augmenting their forces in South Vietnam and North Vietnam will stop infiltration and movement of forces into the South.

"C) The cessation of bombing of North Vietnam and the cessation of build-up of United States forces in the South are actions which will be immediately apparent.

"D) A cessation of infiltration is more difficult for the world to observe. Nevertheless the United States will not demand any public statement from North Vietnam.

"E) Any secret assurances from Hanoi can reach the United States direct, or through Soviet channels, or through the Soviet and British governments. This is for North Vietnam to decide."

This was found unsatisfactory; and, at a meeting in the Cabinet Room on the afternoon of February 10 (with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Katzenbach, Mr. William Bundy, and Mr. Walt Rostow), a different formulation was proposed which was transmitted to Bruce and Cooper over the President's private line to 10 Downing Street. ✓

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The formula proposed was the following:

"A) The United States will order a cessation of bombing of North Vietnam as soon as they are assured that infiltration from North Vietnam to South Vietnam has stopped. This assurance can be communicated in secret if North Vietnam so wishes.

*after* ② "B) Within a few days (with the period to be agreed with the two sides) before the bombing stops the United States will stop further augmenting their force in South Vietnam. The cessation of bombing of North Vietnam is an action which will be immediately apparent. This requires that the stoppage of infiltration become public very quickly thereafter. If Hanoi is unwilling to announce the stoppage of infiltration, the United States must do so at the time it stops augmentation of U. S. forces. In that case, Hanoi must not deny it.

"C) Any assurances from Hanoi can reach the United States direct, or through Soviet channels, or through the Soviet and British Governments. This is for North Vietnam to decide."

Cooper called to confirm that this was, in fact, President Johnson's personal position. Walt Rostow confirmed this with the President and so informed Cooper. This message was delivered to Kosygin shortly after 10:30 p. m.

### III.

As Prime Minister Wilson approached his final 5-hour session with Kosygin on Sunday night, February 12, he was evidently distressed at what he regarded as the difference between what he had given Kosygin and we had given him authoritatively. He sent two messages (T. 30/67 and T. 31/67, February 12) on the assumption that, somehow, it might be possible for Kosygin to buy his (Wilson's) February 10 formula but not ours. ✓

Wilson's messages were considered in the Situation Room late at night February 11-12. The President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Rostow, gathered there. As time wore on, Mrs. Johnson and Mary Slater brought food and drink. Finally, CAP 67043 was dispatched explaining temperately our position. ✓

We were assured the next morning by Ambassador Bruce, Mr. Cooper and by the Prime Minister (T. 33/67) that all was well as Wilson entered his last evening with Kosygin. ✓

At 4:00 p. m. February 12, Secretary Rusk received a flash message as follows: ✓

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"Wilson proposes to put following proposition to Kosygin, if he can obtain President Johnson's approval by 7:00 p.m. EST. If he does not do so, he will not put forward the proposal. He would be willing to put forward a variation if we suggest. He proposes:

"If you (Kosygin) can get an assurance from Hanoi, communicated directly to the U. S. or through the Soviets, before 10:00 a.m. GMT tomorrow, that no arms or people will move across the 17th parallel (extended from Gulf of Tonkin through Laos), I (Harold Wilson) will get an assurance from the US that the US will not resume bombing from that time. Having gotten such an assurance from the DRV, the US would stop further augmentation of its forces in the South."

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The President outlined over the telephone to Walt Rostow the kind of response he would like to have both for the record and to give Wilson a last chance.

The President, the Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. William Bundy, Mr. Walt Rostow met in the Cabinet Room at about 5:15 p.m. Mr. Rostow was instructed to tell Cooper a message would be coming to be available at Chequers by the time indicated. The message was drafted.

The President, wishing to leave no possibility of misunderstanding, asked Rostow to telephone Cooper the minor changes we proposed in the message so that it would be available to the Prime Minister at Chequers. The Prime Minister got on the telephone and told Rostow he would be seeing Kosygin within an hour. He reported that at dinner Kosygin was not forthcoming. He could await the arrival of the full message for his hotel meeting with Kosygin regarding a prisoner named Brooke in Moscow.

That message (CAP 67045) was dispatched about 7:00 p.m. Washington time. It contained the following approved final formula for Kosygin: ✓

"If you can get a North Vietnamese assurance -- communicated either direct to the United States or through you -- before 10:00 a.m. British time tomorrow that all movement of troops and supplies into South Viet Nam will stop at that time, I will get an assurance from the U. S. that they will not resume bombing of North Viet Nam from that time. Of course the U. S. build-up would also then stop within a matter of days.

"This would then give you and me the opportunity to try to consolidate and build on what has been achieved by bringing the parties together and promoting further balanced measures of de-escalation."



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Shortly after receipt in London, Cooper called to say our response was "wonderful."

#### IV.

Michael Palliser and Chester Cooper called me at 9:30 p.m. Sunday, February 12. Chester Cooper reported as follows:

The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had transmitted the agreed message.

They began by paraphrasing the opening paragraphs we had sent:

- The A - B formula had been available for three months. There had been no answer.
- It had been available in Hanoi directly from Washington since last Tuesday. There was no answer.
- The President was going more than half way.
- The President had to bear in mind his responsibility to his troops and his allies. The agreed formula was then stated.

The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary threw their full weight behind it. They said peace was within our grasp. They asked Kosygin to support it.

Kosygin did not agree to support it but did agree immediately to transmit it, and he wrote out the telegram in his own hand. Kosygin then complained that the 7 or 8 hours offered him were insufficient. He asked for more time. Cooper and Bruce made it clear that if more time were asked for, it could only be a matter of hours.

At 10:00 p.m. Prime Minister Wilson telephoned me. He repeated much of what Cooper had told me, adding these two items. First, Kosygin took him aside and said he was worried by this problem: 100,000 men in the south might get their throats cut; he could be attacked as a traitor. Prime Minister Wilson said that, nevertheless, he would send the message (written out in purple ink, beautifully written by Kosygin's hand, but he could not read it).

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colleagues. In Hanoi the government was run by a committee and they were split between a pro-Chinese faction and the others.

I asked: How much time are you asking for? He shifted from "another 8 hours" to a request for a 24-hour extension. I told him I would get in touch with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State.

Secretary McNamara said that he saw no reason for it but, after exploring the matter with the President, he could push the time of resumption of operations up to roughly noon Washington time and the moment for receipt of a signal to 11:00 a.m.

Secretary Rusk was against an extension beyond the time suggested by Secretary McNamara.

He underlined that:

-- They had ample time to contemplate the proposal;

-- There was no reason for them not to come back to an A - B formula if they so wished, even if operations were going forward against the North. Our commitment to the principle of mutual de-escalation was deeply rooted in the Government as policy.

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V.

Early Monday morning, February 13, two pieces of information arrived from London:

-- Wilson reported that Kosygin had told him that he had no reply from Hanoi, but Moscow was pressing; ✓

-- The British passed to us an intercepted telephone message to Moscow en clair which suggested that Moscow was in fact pressing Hanoi on the grounds that all they had to do was to give a confidential, positive answer. ✓

On the basis of this information, the President assembled in the Cabinet Room at 8:30 a.m. the Vice President; Secretary McNamara; Deputy Secretary Vance; General Wheeler; Under Secretary Katzenbach; Mr. Kohler; Mr. W. Bundy; and W. Rostow. They were joined after some time by General Taylor. The President asked Mr. Bundy to state the facts as we now knew them, and then

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asked for Mr. Kohler's interpretation.

Mr. Kohler said that what struck him was that now the Soviet Union was, for the first time, in the act. This was a different situation than that which had existed since Shelepin's visit to Hanoi in early 1966. After his frustration, the Soviets took the position that they could do nothing and it was not their business. Apparently the situation inside China both spurred the Soviet Union to take a more active role, and gave them an occasion to do so since, presumably, the trouble in China reduces Chinese influence in Hanoi.

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1. We should ask CINCPAC what the earliest time could be prudently to resume naval military activity in coastal waters up to the 19th parallel, and also resume some bombing operations north of the DMZ.

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3. We would announce, through the Defense Department when CINCPAC gave us a firm time over target North Viet Nam, that military operations against the North had been resumed.

4. It was agreed that we would not inform the British until we had a firm time for the Defense Department statement, and this would be done on a routine basis via State and Pat Dean, not via a message from the President to Wilson.

5. At the 11 o'clock White House briefing and the 12 o'clock State briefing, we would continue, as we have over the weekend, with a firm "no

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2/13/67

comment. " In fact, time over target proved to be as early as 12:<sup>07</sup>~~30~~ p. m.

In coming to this decision, the following elements were explored and reconciled:

-- The need to provide some leeway should a decision be reached in Hanoi and there be problems in the time of transmission. This was to be provided by the several hours between 11:00 a. m. and the resumption of military activities which can be turned off on about 35 minutes' notice; although time was truncated by a state of greater alert and quicker response in the field than had been calculated.

-- The need to avoid a public announcement of the resumption of military activities against the North before operations actually start, since we do not wish to give the enemy warning time;

-- The desirability of not separating the resumption of naval from air operations against the North;

-- The need to protect us (by promptness and sticking to the basic decision made in our reply to Wilson), while giving Hanoi one more chance from being drawn, through a fuzzy answer, into a protracted period of "no bombing for talk. "

There was considerable discussion of the basic position in which we find ourselves after the London exchanges and the President's message to Hanoi should Hanoi accept, at some stage, an A - B formula.

On the one hand it is agreed that an actual cessation of infiltration would, as Kosygin stated to Wilson, put the North Vietnamese and other Communist forces in South Viet Nam into jeopardy. Secretary McNamara agreed -- as he has previously -- that, for this reason, the deal is unlikely to be acceptable to Hanoi, and any deal could only come about after much more extensive talks between ourselves and Hanoi to clarify all the elements involved.

Rostow stated that he had said to Wilson, when he raised this point, that what we envisaged was that the Northern troops be permitted to go to North Viet Nam, and the troops in the South be granted amnesty. It was open to Hanoi to discuss these and other matters with us if they were really serious about ending the war.

On the other hand, General Taylor asked what would we do if they accepted and did not in fact end infiltration. We were offering in our formula two blue chips for one -- and that one ambiguous; that is, both a bombing cessation and

~~TOP SECRET~~

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2/13/67

no net increment in our forces, against a commitment to cease infiltration.

It was pointed out that the interval of time between the cessation of bombing and the cessation of augmentation of our forces would provide us a chance to exercise unilateral surveillance capabilities and, possibly in addition, international means for monitoring that Hanoi's word had, in fact, been kept.

It was also pointed out that if, in fact, they promised to end infiltration or seriously cut it down, that act would both undercut their own forces in the South and the political bargaining position of the NLF vis-à-vis Saigon. Nick Katzenback summarized that we are not offering to trade two blue chips against one; but two nickels against 50¢.

The President indicated that he had not expected anything to come of probes at this phase; and his anxiety was to separate Kosygin and Wilson and avoid their heading together for Hanoi, or Wilson's heading for Washington. He held to his fundamental view that successful negotiations -- if and when they came -- would have to be direct and bilateral.

#### VI.

The end of the story of the week, February 6-13, 1967, is not yet wholly clear. On Saturday, February 11, we were informed in Moscow by the North Vietnamese that there would be a reply from Hanoi to the President's letter to Ho Chi Minh. We indicated in our communication to Wilson of early morning February 12, we did not expect it until the Wilson-Kosygin discussions had ended. Until that communication arrives, the record of this episode cannot be closed.

It was clear, however, that, despite the reaching out of Wilson and the President to make available to Kosygin and Hanoi the most attractive possible A - B formula, Hanoi was not yet prepared to move from its effort to force us to trade a cessation of bombing merely for a promise to talk -- despite the possibility of moving during Tet.

In dealing with this problem, the President had to bear in mind many factors:

- The need to make sure that no real possibility of movement towards peace was lost;
- The need to assure that the expected failure of the Wilson-Kosygin talks could not be legitimately blamed on our policy or positions by either party -- thus, at David Bruce's strong personal recommendations, the hold-down of bombing the North until Kosygin's departure from London;

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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2/13/67

- The need to assure that we not get trapped in a disadvantageous or politically untenable formula;
- The need to preserve the direct channel to Hanoi via their Moscow Embassy and avoid getting trapped by potentially dangerous U. K. -U. S. S. R. joint pressure for a no-bombing-for-talk formula;
- The need to assure ourselves and our military that we would not place our Marines in particular jeopardy due to the concentration and ample re-supply of the three (or four) NVN divisions just north of the DMZ.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 13, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Algerian Food Deal

Following our NSC meeting Wednesday, Joe Palmer called in the Algerian Ambassador to discuss future Algerian purchases here. Ambassador Guellal said he is "confident that Algeria would continue to have every reason to look to the American commercial market for its future requirements." He felt that approval of the PL 480 request would make it easier for Algeria to continue buying here commercially.

It's difficult to spell out a precise condition for making them continue their purchases here next year. Our 200,000 tons would complete their requirements for this year (500,000 tons or 50% already bought here for about \$31 million cash), and next year's needs aren't clear yet. We feel sure Algeria will be in the market again, but Algiers may have to put up a more optimistic front. Katzenbach and Palmer believe circumstances will drive the Algerians to buy here again.

Harriman has also talked with Guellal and feels going ahead with this deal is the best basis for keeping the door open for future purchases when they know what they need.

I see the deal shaping up like this: We tell the Algerians we'll go ahead with this deal. At the same time, we'd explain the importance of their purchases here this year in enabling us to make this decision. If they come back into the market again, they'll be clear on what we have in mind.

If you agree to go ahead on this basis with the 200,000-ton dollar credit sale Secretary Rusk recommends, we'll need your signature on the attached Findley amendment waiver. Algeria's trade with Cuba is limited to non-strategic commodities for which you can make an exception. Algeria does not have any current trade with North VietNam. I recommend we go ahead.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-323  
By sig, NARA, Date 11-18-93

W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENTIAL FINDING

Subject: Algeria -- Finding that Sales Agreements are  
in the National Interest

In accordance with Section 103(d) of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, I have reviewed the status of Algeria for purposes of sales of agricultural commodities under Title I of that Act.

As a result of that review, and as required by Section 103(d)(3) of Act, I hereby find that the making of sales agreements with Algeria under Title I of the Act is in the national interest of the United States. This finding applies to each such sales agreement with Algeria entered into during the Fiscal Year 1967. The reasons for this finding are set forth in the accompanying statement, which shall be made available to the Senate and House of Representatives and published in the Federal Register together with this finding.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By cb, NARA, Date 10-21-98

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

February 13, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Feinberg--1:00 p.m. Tuesday, 14 February

In preparation for your talk with Abe Feinberg, you ought to know where we stand on this year's Israeli aid requests. State, Defense and AID are putting them all together, and Secretary Rusk will have one package of recommendations for you in the next two weeks.

My preliminary feeling is that aid for them will be tough this year and that you may want to use your talk with Feinberg to lay the groundwork for a slim response. We need not feel defensive about this since our aid in FY 1966 was the highest single year ever by 25% because of the plane sale (see attached chart).

The Israelis argue that they need continued help over the next 2-3 years while they work their way through the austere economic measures necessary to make them more competitive in European markets and help close their trade gap. They point to their especially high debt repayments and their heavy defense burden. But given their substantial foreign exchange reserves, some of their points are exaggerated by normal aid standards.

These austerity measures have thrown Israel into a recession, which we expect to be short-lived. The government allowed Israel's growth rate to slip to 7% in 1965 (previously over 10%) but was shocked when it slumped to 1-2% in 1966. This is probably a main reason for their aid requests.

They've made six separate requests, totaling at least \$75 million:

1. Grant military aid--\$9.4 million. They've asked for 200 armed personnel carriers and \$2 million in spares for tanks we've already sold. They are clearly trying to match our December Jordan package. Since their raid caused that package, no one here wants to give in on this. Besides, we've never given grant military aid to Israel, and no one feels we should break that precedent, especially so soon after the Israeli raid. JCS sees no serious military requirement for the APCs. However, Eshkol considers the APCs important, and we'll undoubtedly end up considering a credit sale, though State and Defense oppose.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-323  
By WJ, NARA, Date 11-18-93

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- 2 -

2. Credits of \$14 million to buy maintenance items for Hawk missiles and tanks. They want the same terms we gave on the 1962 Hawk sale (10% down, 10 years, 3.5%). Defense doesn't believe we should finance maintenance and, in any case, couldn't come close to 1962 terms today. However, if you feel it's essential to come up with some military help, there might be a little give here with harder terms.

3. Development loans of \$20 million. They got only \$10 million last year (plus \$10 million Ex-Im), and we've already given them that \$6 million left over from FY 1963. With today's even tighter aid criteria it will be tough to justify any AID lending at all, though Ex-Im loans are still possible. Even the Israelis know this request is unrealistic.

4. PL 480--\$32 million (same as last year). Congress has been increasingly critical of highly concessional sales to Israel where per capita GNP is already higher than in several European countries. However, we could probably come up with \$23 million on harder terms, even without wheat.

5. Deliver 8 aircraft next December instead of the 4 now scheduled. We all feel this would be desirable but, since these are new production items needed in VietNam, we'll want to hear Secretary McNamara's final view.

6. An exception to AID policy to let Israel bid on AID-financed fertilizer purchases for Korea and VietNam. AID will probably come around on this since we can pay half in dollars and half in excess Israeli pounds.

In addition, we have just agreed to increase their cotton textile quota by 35%.

In the background is desalting. Ambassador Bunker's report will be ready shortly. His economic study appears to show that for either a nuclear or an oil-fueled plant an outright grant of some \$50 million would be required to produce water at realistic cost. He found Eshkol more relaxed on the timetable than he had expected. It doesn't look as if we'll be spending much money on this in FY 1967, but if we ever decide to go ahead, it will cost us quite a bit. Of course, you will want to hear from Bunker before you say anything to Feinberg that could be read as a commitment.

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
What this adds up to is that--with last year's high aid level behind and desalting possibly still ahead of us--we ought to be able to make a low year stick this year. Therefore, I'd propose leveling with Abe, explaining your problems and asking his help in making them clear to others.

If you have a moment, it would be worth your time to skim the attached description of the overall US-Israeli balance sheet. It was done for our panel of outside consultants on Middle Eastern affairs who met here over the weekend. It's a neat and straightforward statement of what we've done for Israel and how our relationship has been pretty much a one-way street. You might want to get this balance across to Abe as a means of letting him know there are limits.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-320

By ing NARA. Date 3-2-92

~~SECRET~~

A.I.D. July 18, 1966



U.S - ISRAEL RELATIONS

What We Have Done for Israel?

Since 1948 a key feature of U.S. policy in the Near East has been our close relations and identification with the state of Israel. Given Israel's small size and lack of strategic importance, our support over the years can only be described as massive.

We have, first of all, given Israel a security guarantee, albeit de facto rather than de jure. Beginning with the Tripartite Declaration in 1950, and extending up to President Kennedy's statement of May 1963, which has been reaffirmed by President Johnson, we have publicly and privately committed ourselves to the independence and integrity of Israel.

Secondly, we have recognized Israel's need to modernize and strengthen her arsenal in the face of obsolescence and Soviet arms sales to Arab states. We have recently made some significant contributions to Israel's security needs: in 1962 we sold Hawk missiles to Israel; in 1965 more than 200 Patton tanks; and in 1966 we agreed to sell a limited number of advanced combat aircraft. All of these sales were on concessionary credit terms.

Third, we have provided Israel with economic assistance totalling \$1.1 billion in public grants, loans, and concessionary credits. Our assistance has been an important factor in Israel's "economic miracle".

Finally, we have given Israel broad political support on a wide range of issues, such as: safeguarding Israel's access to a fair share of the Jordan waters; urging acceptance of Israel in international forums and organizations; encouraging a more realistic and stabilizing Arab attitude on the Arab-Israel dispute.

Is this a One-Way Street?

In terms of tangible quid pro quos, there is little to cite in the way of returns for this support. Notably, Israel has not made significant concessions on the Arab-Israel dispute, in spite of the fact that at various times we have made clear our deep interest in a more forthcoming Israeli attitude. The Israeli rejection of the Joseph Johnson initiative on the refugee problem was more emphatic (and official!) than the Arab rejection. On arms control, another high priority U.S. objective in the area, we have been equally unsuccessful in obtaining significant Israeli concessions. In spite of repeated U.S. urgings Israel has refused to accept IAEA safeguards over its reactor at Dimona, and on certain other arms control matters we have the impression that Israel is not entirely leveling with us. The Israeli Government has also not refrained from stirring concern and agitation among Israel's supporters in the U.S. on our Near East policies, particularly those policies designed to maintain the U.S. position in the Arab states.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLI 99-49**  
**By is, NARA Date 10-25-99**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On the other hand, there are some important pluses in this equation. Although not forswearing military reprisal as an answer to border provocation, Israel is aware of our deep disapproval and knows there is much to lose if it resorts to this measure too readily. In spite of the absence of tangible arms control concessions, the Israeli Government is aware of the gravity of our concern over the possibility of nuclear proliferation and we believe this a factor influencing the Israeli Government toward restraint. On international issues, Israel generally takes a pro-West position in contrast to the non-aligned, and in some cases pro-Soviet, attitude of many of the Arab states. Finally, as Israelis themselves so frequently point out, Israel is a parliamentary democracy sharing Western concepts and cultural values.

Could We Be Dealing Differently with Israel?

Are these gains worth the very considerable price we are paying, not only in terms of direct assistance to Israel but the indirect political losses we are sustaining in the Arab world as a result of our policy? Does the USG have the freedom to do otherwise? The existence of a large, well-organized group of Israel sympathizers within the U.S. body politic obviously puts a limit on the degree to which the USG might contemplate a different policy. The question is whether, within these realistic limits, we can or should be attempting to moderate the degree of our support for Israel. Would this win votes for us in the Arab states? Would a somewhat tougher policy towards Israel be likely to elicit greater Israeli concessions on matters which are important to us (most often the very issues that bear vitally on Israel's security)? Would a high level briefing of the principal contributors to the Zionist-Israel establishment on the political realities in the Near East reduce pressures occasionally mounted against policy?

Conversely, we might ask whether we have not been over-sensitive to the possible repercussions in the Arab states caused by U.S. actions in favor of Israel. The Arab reaction to our sales of tanks and aircraft to Israel was surprisingly mild. Our relations in certain Arab states (UAR, Iraq, Algeria) may already be at such a minimal point that we do not stand to lose much by further actions in support of Israel. This also raises the question whether an even more forthcoming U.S. attitude toward Israel would be likely to elicit a greater Israeli response to our own policy objectives.

NEA/IAI:2/8/67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, February 13, 1967  
1:05 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the precise communi-  
que language on Viet Nam.

It is OK.

W. W. Rostow

London 6507

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 12-24-77, NSC 7-27-78

By ng/lip, NARA, Date 3-25-91

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INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 144  
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 711  
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON 174  
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LONDON 6507

SUBJECT: COMMUNIQUE ON KOSYGIN-WILSON TALKS -- VIETNAM

FOLLOWING IS EXTRACT OF LENGTHY COMMUNIQUE ISSUED 1200Z  
FEBRUARY 13 FOLLOWING DEPARTURE OF KOSYGIN:

"THERE WAS A PROLONGED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE CHAIRMAN  
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR AND THE BRITISH PRIME  
MINISTER CONCERNING EVENTS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA. BOTH  
GOVERNMENTS DEEPLY REGRETTED THAT THE WAR IN VIETNAM CONTINUES  
WITH THE LOSS OF MORE HUMAN LIVES. THEY AGREED THAT THESE  
EVENTS WERE A DANGER TO NEIGHBORING STATES AND TO THE PEACE  
AND STABILITY OF THE REGION AND THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO  
ACHIEVE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE END OF THE VIETNAM WAR.

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 6507C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
"BOTH GOVERNMENTS CONFIRMED THEIR ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES  
OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS OF 1954 AND 1962 WHICH WERE SIGNED  
BY BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND GREAT BRITAIN. THEY SET FORTH  
THEIR RESPECTIVE VIEWS ON THE WAYS TO BRING ABOUT PEACE IN  
VIETNAM. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE A CLOSE  
STUDY OF THE SITUATION AND WILL MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT  
WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM,  
AND WILL MAINTAIN CONTACT TO THIS END." KAISER  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec 1/24/78  
By rg/rg, NARA, Date 3-25-91

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, February 13, 1967  
2:12 p.m.

Mr. President:

Michael Palliser has sent us  
the full text of what Wilson said in  
Parliament.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

147a

1967 FEB 13 13

FOLLOWING FOR ROSTOW FROM PALLISER  
FOLLOWING IS SECTION ON VIETNAM FROM PRIME MINISTERS STATEMENT  
TODAY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ABOUT MR  
KOSYGIN'S VISIT

BEGINS:

FINALLY, SIR, I MUST TELL THE HOUSE THAT WE DEVOTED THE MAJOR PART OF OUR DISCUSSION TO THE PROBLEM OF VIETNAM AND WE DID SO WITH A GREAT SENSE OF URGENCY AND OF THE DANGERS THE WORLD FACES IF THERE IS NOT A SPEEDY AND HONOURABLE SOLUTION.

THE HOUSE WILL UNDERSTAND I MUST NOT GO INTO DETAILS AT THIS MOMENT OF TIME. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CLEAR THE VIEW WHICH I HAVE REACHED AFTER THESE VERY DETAILED AND SEARCHING DISCUSSIONS - AND TO MAKE IT CLEAR AS WELL THAT HERE I AM RECORDING MY OWN VIEW AND THAT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. I BELIEVE THAT DESPITE THE DEEPLY HELD DIFFERENCES IN THE ATTITUDES OF THE MAJOR PARTICIPANTS, THE GAP IS NOT UNBRIDGEABLE, GIVEN A REALISTIC APPRECIATION OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY FACTORS INVOLVED AND ABOVE ALL GIVEN A BELIEF ON EACH SIDE THAT THE OTHER DESIRES A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

I BELIEVE THAT A SOLUTION COULD NOW BE REACHED. BUT IF THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY IS MISSED, WE MUST NOT GIVE UP HOPE. THE ROAD TO A SOLUTION REMAINS OPEN. AND ONE REASON FOR HOPE IS THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND OURSELVES, AS THE HOUSE WILL HAVE SEEN, WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE A CLOSE STUDY OF THE SITUATION AND WILL MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM, AND WILL MAINTAIN CONTACT TO THIS END.

ENDS  
FEBRUARY 13, 1967.

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*Pres file*

~~TOP SECRET/N ODIS/SUNFLOWER~~

Monday, February 13, 1967  
5:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here is the way the Chequers  
episode looked to Cooper.

W. W. Rostow

London 6516

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/SUNFLOWER~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By af, NARA, Date 3-26-91

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*~~TOP SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
 NLJ 96-11  
 By up, NARA Date 5-23-96

~~TOP SECRET~~ LONDON 6516

NODIS/SUNFLOWER

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY AND ROSTOW FROM COOPER.

1. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE EVENTS OF THE PAST 24 HOURS HAVE BEEN OVERTAKEN, AND SOME OTHERS STRAIN CREDULITY, IT MIGHT BE WELL TO TRY TO RECONSTRUCT THEM FOR THE RECORD.

2. AS I INDICATED OVER THE TELEPHONE TO THE SECRETARIAT DUTY OFFICER SUNDAY MORNING, THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT HAD BEEN JUST RECEIVED IN LONDON SEEMED, ON THE BASIS OF PRELIMINARY REACTIONS, TO HAVE CLEARED THE AIR. (THIS WAS CONFIRMED LATER IN THE DAY.)

3. IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON, I MET PALLISER AT DOWNING STREET (BACK DOOR), AND WAS THEN HUSTLED OUT TO CHEQUERS (TRADESMEN'S ENTRANCE). I WAS INSTALLED IN THE GARRET "PRISON ROOM" (GRACED BY LADY MARY GREY IN 1565).

4. I HAD 10 MINUTES ALONE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER BEFORE THE SESSIONS STARTED, AND SHOWED HIM THE FINAL RACK-UP OF VILATIONS AND LOGISTICS BUILDUP WHICH I HAD ALREADY PASSED TO GEORGE BROWN. I TOOK THIS OCCASION TO TELL THE PM THAT THE PRESIDENT AND TOP WASHINGTON OFFICIALS HAD BEEN SUFFICIENTLY CONCERNED ABOUT HIS PROBLEMS TO HAVE MET THROUGH SATUDAY NIGHT. WILSON INDICATED HE WAS MOLLIFIED BY THE TONE OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AND SAID HE HAD, AS A RESULT, "MUTED" THE MESSAGE HE HAD SENT TO WASHINGTON LATER IN THE MORNING.

5. IT WAS CLEAR FROM CONVERSATIONS IN THE PONOFF ON SUNDAY MORNING THAT BROWN AND COMPANY WERE READY TO "FORGET ABOUT SEMANTICS" AND GET DOWN TO SUBSTANCE. WILSON (AS OF AN HOUR BEFORE THE RUSSIAN ARRIVAL) WAS STILL TENSE AND VAGUELY WORRIED ABOUT HIS "CREDIBILITY": HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN (SHARED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE) ABOUT PROBLEMS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AFTER KOSYGIN LEFT, IF THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT AND BOMBING WAS RESUMED.

6. KOSYGIN ARRIVED AT CHEQUERS ABOUT AN HOUR LATE. WILSON HAD BEEN PLANNING TO TALK WITH HIM PRIVATELY FOR A HALF-HOUR OR SO

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-2- LONDON 6516, 131735Z FEB 67

BEFORE OPENING THE SESSION TO BROWN AND OTHERS. IN ORDER TO AVOID HAVING BROWN COOL HIS HEELS AND HIS TEMPER WHILE THE TETE-A-TETE WAS GOING ON, IT HAD BEEN DECIDED THAT BROWN WOULD ARRIVE AT CHEQUERS ABOUT A HALF-HOUR AFTER KOSYGIN. BUT DUE TO KOSYGIN'S LATE ARRIVAL, BROWN ARRIVED IN ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS AND DID, IN FACT, HAVE TO MAINTAIN HIS COOL.

7. AFTER ABOUT AN HOUR, MURRAY (FONOFF) EMERGED WITH A DRAFT COMMUNIQUE ON VIETNAM WHICH THE SOVS PROPOSED AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE BRITISH DRAFT. MURRAY AND I REWORDED THE SOV SUBMISSION AND WITH ONE OR TWO MINISCULE MODIFICATIONS, THE SOVS BOUGHT THE REVISED VERSION -- AN ANODYNE AND NOT VERY NOURISHING DOCUMENT.

8. MURRAY LEFT A COPY OF THE MESSAGE THE PM HAD SENT TO WASHINGTON EARLIER IN THE DAY (I HAD NOT SEEN IT UNTIL THEN). HEDGING AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING QUERIED LATER IN THE EVENING FOR A REACTION TO THIS, I CALLED WASHINGTON (READ) AND WAS INFORMED THAT THE FIRST PARA (WHICH ACKNOWLEDGED THE DANGER TO AMERICAN FORCES OF THE BUILDUP NORTH OF THE DMZ) HAD MET WITH A FAVORABLE RECEPTION. READ WAS NON-COMMITTAL ON THE SECOND PARA (I.E. WILSON'S PROPOSAL FOR A TELESOPED TIME PERIOD BETWEEN PHASE A PHASE B), AND I DID NOT PRESS HIM. HOWEVER, I DID SUGGEST THAT THE PM MIGHT, ONE LAST TIME, WARN KOSYGIN ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUILDUP NORTH OF THE DMZ AND SEE IF HE COULD GET KOSYGIN TO PASS HIS OWN WARNING ON TO HANOI. READ INDICATED THIS WOULD DO NO HARM.

9. THE CONFERENCE RECESSED ABOUT 7:30 PM, AND WILSON AND TREND CAME UP TO MY GARRET QUARTERS TO REPORT ON THE TETE-A-TETE AND THE SUBSEQUENT OPEN SESSION. (I REPORTED THE ESSENCE OF THIS BY TELEPHONE TO READ AND ROSTOW AFTER WILSON WENT DOWN TO REJOIN HIS GUESTS.) IN SUMMARY, THE MOOD WAS AMEABLE BUT FIRM ON BOTH SIDES. KOSYGIN DID NOT REFER TO EITHER OF THE PHASE A PHASE B MESSAGES WHICH HE HAD GOTTEN THE PREVIOUS NIGHT. HE REJECTED THE BRITISH COMMUNIQUE ON VIETNAM AND SUBMITTED HIS OWN (WHICH, AS INDICATED ABOVE, MURRAY AND I HAD ALREADY REVISED). HE THEN TABLED ANOTHER, BRIEF, ONE-PARA PAPER WHICH WILSON DESCRIBED AS "INNOCUOUS AND PLATITUDINOUS" (I HAVE NEVER FOUND OUT EXACTLY WHAT THIS WAS). KOSYGIN THEN SAID HE HAD PLANNED TO SUBMIT A THIRD PAPER WHICH WAS A JOINT ENDORSEMENT OF HANOI'S POSITION AS INCORPORATED IN THE BURCHETT INTERVIEW, BUT HE WOULD NOT DO SO SINCE IT WAS CLEAR THE BRITISH WOULD REJECT IT. KOSYGIN EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING BRITISH PRESS REPORTS (HENRY BRANDON IN THE SUNDAY TIMES WAS A GOOD EXAMPLE) THAT THE "HAWKS"

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- LONDON 6516, 131735Z FEB 67

IN WASHINGTON WERE IN THE ASCENDANCY. ACCORDING TO KOSYGIN, THIS WOULD ONLY RESULT IN PERMITTING THE "HAWKS" (I.E., CHINESE FACTION) IN HANOI TO GET A LEG UP ON THE "SOVIET WING". (INCIDENTALLY, WILSON SAID THAT KOSYGIN WAS MUCH MORE FORTH-COMING ABOUT THE "TWO FACTIONS" IN HANOI THAN HE HAD BEEN EARLIER IN THE WEEK.) WILSON REMINDED KOSYGIN OF THE TWO WARNINGS HE HAD ALREADY GIVEN HIM ABOUT NORTH VIETNAMESE BEHAVIOR DURING TET.

10. ALTHOUGH KOSYGIN HAD NOT COME FORWARD WITH A RESPONSE TO EITHER WILSON'S MESSAGE OR OUR OWN VERSION OF PHASE A PHASE B, WILSON FELT THAT KOSYGIN'S MOOD WAS SUCH THAT IT WOULD BE WORTH-WHILE TRYING TO MAKE ONE LAST ATTEMPT TO ENGAGE HIM IN A DIRECT ATTEMPT TO BRING HANOI AROUND. I SUGGESTED TO WILSON THAT HE MIGHT TRY TO GET KOSYGIN TO PRESS HANOI TO STAND FAST NORTH OF THE DMZ. WILSON THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE WORTH A TRY. WE THEN WORKED OUT A SOMEWHAT BROADER FORMULA WHICH TREND, PALLISER AND I WAS LATER SPELLED OUT IN WRITING AND CHECKED WITH WILSON, I THEN TRANSMITTED THIS BY TELEPHONE TO READ AND BY TELETAPE TO ROSTOW. WILSON SAID HE WOULD NOT SUBMIT THIS PROPOSITION UNTIL HE HAD THE PRESIDENT'S OKAY.

11. WILSON OBVIOUSLY FELT THAT EVEN IF KOSYGIN REJECTED THE FORMULA, HE WOULD BE BETTER OFF IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS FOR THIS LAST MINUTE ATTEMPT.

12. THE MEETING WAS LITERALLY ADJOURNING (I COULD HEAR THE MOTORCYCLE ESCORT REVVING UP) WHEN I GOT WORD FROM WASHINGTON THAT A DECISION WAS BEING REACHED. I GOT A MESSAGE TO WILSON THAT AN ANSWER WAS ON ITS WAY, AND WILSON, IN TURN, MANAGED TO DELAY KOSYGIN'S DEPARTURE. AFTER THE ROSTOW-WILSON CONVERSATION, WILSON TOLD KOSYGIN THAT HE THOUGHT HE MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING MORE TO TELL HIM LATER ON IN THE EVENING.

13. WILSON THEN ASKED ME TO MEET HIM AT DOWNING STREET WHERE THE WASHINGTON RESPONSE WOULD BE COMING IN. I TELEPHONED AMB BRUCE AND SUGGESTED HE JOIN US.

14. WILSON, BROWN, BURKE TREND, PALLISER, MURRAY, AMB BRUCE, AND I ASSEMBLED AT DOWNING STREET SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT. WILSON WAS DELIGHTED WITH THE MESSAGE HE RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON, AND DASHED OUT TO CLARIDGES WITH BROWN AND THE INTERPRETER AT HIS HEELS.

15. HE RETURNED AT ABOUT 0215 TO REPORT THAT KOSYGIN HAD EVIDENCED GREAT INTEREST IN THE PROPOSAL. KOSYGIN SAID HE WOULD

~~TOP SECRET~~

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-4- LONDON 6516, 131735Z FEB 67

TRANSMIT IT TO HANOI BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE BRIEF TIME AVAILABLE BEFORE AN ANSWER WAS EXPECTED. WILSON REPORTED THAT KOSYGIN WAS IN FACT WRITING A MESSAGE AS HE TALKED. (WE HAVE HAD LATER CONFIRMATION OF THIS.)

16. WILSON WAS ANXIOUS TO INDICATE HOW STRONGLY HE AND BROWN PRESSED THEIR VIEWS ON KOSYGIN, AND ASKED THE INTERPRETER TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING VERBATIM NOTES AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE TONE OF THE CONVERSATION:

BEGIN QUOTE -

THE PRIME MINISTER SAID:

YOU MUST ALSO BEAR IN MIND OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO THE MEN FIGHTING THERE, TO OUR ALLIES, TO THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM WHO ARE COUNTING ON US TO BRING ABOUT AN HONOURABLE PEACE. I WANT TO SAY VERY VERY FRANKLY SINCE WE ARE FRIENDS, TO MAKE ONE OBSERVATION. I HAVE HAD VERY DEEP WORRIES AND ANXIETIES IN THE LAST TWO OR THREE DAYS. ON THIS MESSAGE I WOULD GO ALL THE WAY. I WOULD FEEL THAT ANYONE WHO DOESN'T GO ALL THE WAY IS REALLY PREVENTING PEACE.

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

IT IS AVAILABLE NOW.

PRIME MINISTER:

PEACE IS IN OUR GRASP TOMORROW.

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

CAN YOU DO IT? IT IS AVAILABLE!

PRIME MINISTER:

IT IS DIFFICULT BUT AVAILABLE. I WANT YOU TO TRANSMIT THIS TO NORTH VIETNAM, I HOPE WITH YOUR FULL BLESSING.

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

WITH FULL BACKING PLEASE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-5- LONDON 6516, 131735Z FEB 67

PRIME MINISTER:

IF YOU TELL ME THAT YOU NEED A FEW HOURS MORE TIME - JUST TELL ME, AND I WILL DO MY BEST. END QUOTE.

17. WILSON ASKED ME TO CALL WASHINGTON AND REPORT THE ESSENCE OF THE CONVERSATION. I REPORTED TO WILSON THAT ROSTOW HAD EXPRESSED KEEN INTEREST IN THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE PAST FEW HOURS AND THAT WALT HAD INDICATED THAT WASHINGTON WOULD NOT "PRESS THE BUTTON AT ONE MINUTE AFTER TEN O'CLOCK". ON THE OTHER HAND, WASHINGTON WOULD ENTERTAIN AN EXTENSION OF THE DEADLINE IN TERMS OF "HOURS NOT DAYS".

18. WILSON WAS RELIEVED TO LEARN THAT HE HAD A LITTLE MORE ELBOW ROOM WITH RESPECT TO THE TEN AM DEADLINE, BUT WHEN IT APPEARED THAT KOSYGIN WOULD NOT ARRIVE IN MOSCOW UNTIL ABOUT 1600 HOURS LONDON TIME, BOTH BROWN AND WILSON GOT A LITTLE PANICKY. THERE WAS A QUICK AND RATHER HEATED EXCHANGE ABOUT THE ADDITIONAL TIME THAT MIGHT BE REQUIRED. WILSON THEN CALLED ROSTOW TO PRESS FOR AN ADDITIONAL 24 HOURS. DOWNING STREET WAS RELIEVED TO SOME EXTENT WHEN WORD WAS LATER RECEIVED OF THE SIX HOUR EXTENSION.  
KAISER

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

PRESERVATION COPY



*1. copy  
2. Pres file*

February 13, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: \$25 million Emergency Food for U. S. Agencies,  
including CARE

Delhi reports that the CARE program now feeding supplemental rations to 3.6 million children in U. P. and Bihar cannot continue at present levels without immediate assurances of additional supplies.

The Embassy is reluctant to urge the agencies to attempt to borrow supplies from the GOI because they fear this will be construed as prejudging a Congressional decision which will not be taken until the Congress passes the Resolution on Indian food, probably early next month. *(Bowles proposes an additional \$3 million in aid to Vol. Agencies.)*

Now that key members of Congress have sponsored a resolution in both Houses which includes the \$25 million emergency food relief for CARE and other U. S. voluntary agencies, it seems safe enough to encourage them to seek advances. These can be repaid when the Congressional resolution is passed.

And it will be a good test of just how seriously the GOI takes this type of program if it is asked to make an advance of India's own scarce resources to keep the program going.

W. W. Rostow

Okay for them to seek advances \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_ *✓*

*2/16/67  
wait for legislation*

Monday, Feb. 13, 1967

5:45 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith first draft of a statement for the President done by Bill Jorden.

It aims to give enough substance to account for what has been going on in recent months by way of exploration, without blowing too explicitly any of the diplomatic tracks.

Above all, it strongly reaffirms your own press conference position as well as Secretary Rusk's press conference position, and puts the monkey on Hanoi's back.

My recommendation, at the moment, would be that we wait a few days, if pressures don't build up on you, to see if Hanoi replies to your direct approach. If their reply should be flatly negative, some such statement might well be in order.

In the meanwhile, you may wish to give us further guidance on the basis of this preliminary draft.

W.W.R.

DRAFT

February 13, 1967

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I have today ordered the resumption of military attacks against military targets in North Viet-Nam.

I hoped that order would not be necessary.

I hoped that the lull in the fighting over recent days would produce concrete steps toward peace.

I hoped that reason would prevail -- and that Hanoi would join us in making common efforts in the direction of a just and honorable settlement.

My hopes -- your hopes -- the hopes of most of mankind -- have not been realized.

And so we have had to return to those actions that are necessary if aggression is not to succeed, if the people of South Viet-Nam are to have a chance to build their own society in their own way.

It is appropriate at this juncture that I report to you on what has been happening.

One thing that has happened is that we have been the target over the past half year or more of one of the most intensive -- and extensive -- propaganda campaigns of recent times. That campaign

has had one objective: to get us to take unilateral action in the military field -- to get us to stop attacks against the source of aggression, North Viet-Nam.

We have been told that if we stopped bombing, something useful would happen, some steps would be taken by the other side. And we have been asked to tie our own hands, militarily, and that the other side then might be willing to talk.

As the world knows, there now have been five separate periods in which we have not attacked the North. The most recent stand-down lasted four days and then was extended by us to six.

What happened?

Two things:

First, Hanoi provided no word, either directly or indirectly, regarding its willingness to take any reciprocal action;

second, and more important, the authorities in the North took advantage of each one of these periods of restraint on our part to improve their military posture.

In the period of self-enforced military inaction just ended, the North Vietnamese moved armed forces southward toward South Viet-Nam. They sent trucks loaded with supplies and men along roads they normally avoid using. More than one thousand boats of all sizes carried thousands of tons of supplies to the area just north of the Demilitarized Zone.

That has been their answer to our restraint.

We have made it clear on countless occasions that we are prepared to sit down with representatives of Hanoi to discuss arrangements for peace. We are ready to talk with them alone. We are ready to join with them and others in a more formal conference. We will meet in secret; we will meet in open session; we will meet in any place -- at any time.

We have made something else clear -- that we are ready to consider reciprocal actions aimed at lowering the level of fighting. We are ready to have each side take small steps in this direction -- or large steps. We ask only that these mutual actions be balanced and equitable.

Finally, we have made it clear that we are ready to move down the path of negotiation or the path of reciprocal action -- or down both at the same time.

We have never proposed that the aggressors in this war must limit their actions before we would talk. We have some idea what their reaction would be if we did make such a proposal.

But by the same token, we are not prepared that our actions be balanced only by their words.

We have long been prepared to end our attacks on the North. All we require is that the North end its attack on the South. If they are

prepared to tell us what they are prepared to do -- however small a step it may be -- they can be sure that we will meet them with an equal or larger move toward peace.

Our position is not unknown in Hanoi.

I can report to you tonight that our views on this matter were conveyed to the authorities in Hanoi in some detail three months ago. Using the good offices of an intermediary from a third country, we informed Hanoi of our willingness to end the bombing if they would agree to take some corresponding military step.

We have had no response from Hanoi to that proposal.

Later -- based on this contact -- we offered to meet with a representative of Hanoi in the capital of a third country.

Our representative was present and ready to talk on December 6. No representative of Hanoi appeared.

That was one week before the air strikes on targets near Hanoi which were used as the excuse for breaking off this contact.

In the period just ended, we were aware that British and Soviet officials were discussing the situation in Viet-Nam -- and the possibilities of bring<sup>ing</sup> peace.

We did not know whether those discussions might achieve results.

But we hoped profoundly that they would produce at least some small measure of progress in the direction of a just settlement.



To make evident that hope, we deferred for two days the resumption of our military activity in North Viet-Nam -- until the talks in London had ended.

But again, there was no word from Hanoi.

As I speak to you, there has been no word.

All we hear is the endlessly repeated propaganda refrain.

And we have stopped listening to that refrain. We are not prepared to endanger our brave men in the field -- or our allies -- or the long-suffering but determined Vietnamese who stand firm in defense of their people.

We are not prepared to tie our hands militarily for the privilege of talks with Hanoi -- while the North Vietnamese remain free to conduct their campaign of conquest without restriction.

We have seen all too clearly Hanoi's willingness to take advantage of each expression of our restraint.

We have seen the hopes of many and the optimism of some shattered on the rock of Hanoi's intransigence.

As I said in the State of the Union address:

"Our adversary still believes, I think, tonight, that he can go on fighting longer than we can, and longer than we and our allies will be prepared to stand up and resist."

But he is wrong. And whether the time be short or long, he will discover how wrong he is.

Let us pray that he discovers his error sooner rather than later.

Then he -- and we -- and the people of South Viet-Nam can all live in peace.

Then we can turn our efforts and our attention to the work of peace.

We believe that day will come, through it may not come soon.

Our efforts to achieve peace will continue without let-up.

We shall continue to explore every reasonable possibility for measures, large or small, that will move us in the direction of a settlement.

Meantime, our job is before us -- and it will not wait.

The tasks ahead will be difficult. They will be trying. But we shall move forward -- with our friends -- to accomplish them.

We can do no more.

We shall do no less.

Monday, February 13, 1967  
4:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Max Frankel called and reported as follows.

He had just finished lunch with Ambassador Dobrynin. He said he had some questions to ask me.

I said: How did it go? He said: First I want to ask you the same questions I put to him, and then I will tell you. I said: Fair deal. What are the questions? He said: Do you regard the resumption of bombing in the North as the end of a chapter? Are negotiations finished?

I said that the situation remained precisely where it was at the President's press conference and with Secretary Rusk's statement of our position. Specifically, we have still had no serious response to our efforts to find a formula for mutual de-escalation; and, as Secretary Rusk had made clear, we are prepared for a very wide range of equitable formulae for talking, de-escalating, or both. That is still the situation.

He then said: There are some who believe that we shall use the failure to get negotiations now as an excuse for turning off negotiations and proceeding to improve our military and political situation in South Viet Nam. Is this true?

I said we did intend to try to improve the position in South Viet Nam, but the statement was false because we stood ready to make good on any response to the position outlined by Secretary Rusk in his press conference. We are ready for balanced negotiations whenever they are.

I then said: What about your friend at lunch?

Frankel said that Dobrynin said that we were "in mid-passage." It was unfortunate that bombing had been resumed; but this did not mean that efforts to get a settlement had come to an end.

W. W. R.

Monday, Feb. 13, 1967  
2:45 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/SUNFLOWER

MR. PRESIDENT:

Phil Kaiser and Chet Cooper called to report the following. When they came over to talk to the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, they found them already conscious of what we had in mind (as well they might have been after my talk with Palliser, which Kaiser didn't know). Wilson had already acted to background the British press in the House of Commons lobby, indicating that the problem lay in Hanoi's unwillingness to respond. He reported to Kaiser that he had "put the monkey on their back."

Kaiser went on to say that he found no hostility or ill-feeling about our role in the week with Wilson -- on the contrary, since we had done our job together.

Moreover, Wilson volunteered an understanding of the President's political problems in the U. S. The Prime Minister already knew that bombing had been resumed, and seemed quite at peace with that fact.

Wilson faces tomorrow a meeting with the Parliamentary members of his party, among whom are a good many quite prepared to trade no bombing for talk. He seemed quite ready to deal with them.

In short, Kaiser's report indicates we're in tolerably good shape; but will have to see how Wilson responds to further political pressure.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By fw/rjg, NARA, Date 3-30-98

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/SUNFLOWER


Monday, February 13, 1967  
1:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Once again the Economist is intelligent and helpful on Viet Nam. The opening two sentences are first-class journalism. The marked passage is as good a statement of our attitude -- and the case for it -- as I have seen in print.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



February 11, 1967

# Your Problem Too, Alexei

A FUNNY thing happened to Mr Kosygin on the way to Guildhall. His Chinese ex-allies went off their collective head. This is going to change Mr Kosygin's ideas about a lot of things; and with luck, though for his own good reasons he was still beating the anti-American drum at Guildhall on Wednesday night, one of them is the Vietnam war.

Two years ago last Monday, to the day, Mr Kosygin was in Hanoi when the first American bombs started dropping on North Vietnam. He had gone to the Far East in the hope of re-establishing Russia's influence over the communist countries of Asia, the influence that Mr Khrushchev had virtually abandoned. On Monday this week, two years later, Mr Kosygin was welcomed in London on the day when Russian women and children were being obliged by Red Guards to crawl under a portrait of Mao Tse-tung at Peking airport. Mr Kosygin knows in his heart that he has failed in the major part of what he was trying to achieve two years ago. For the time being China is beyond being influenced by the Russians or anybody else. The Central Country has decided it doesn't give a damn what the Outer Barbarians think of it. There is only one realistic conclusion for Mr Kosygin to draw. The two great powers that are responsible for China's borders, Russian on its west and the United States on its east, and both in Vietnam, must somehow co-ordinate their efforts to contain Maoism. This is why Mr Kosygin now has a real incentive to look for a settlement of the Vietnam war. He also has a real opportunity, because the North Vietnamese can see perfectly well what the chaos in China means for them: the European communists are the only sane allies they have left.

This is the likeliest explanation of what has been happening between Hanoi and Washington in the last two weeks. The secret probings and counter-probings that have been going on since Mr Gromyko's visit to Washington in October have suddenly popped to the surface. The Russians have presumably started to use their powers of persuasion. Exactly when the first hint came is something for the historians to decide. It may have been when President Ho Chi Minh issued his curious invitation via an American rabbi during January, asking President Johnson to visit him in Hanoi if he did not come "with a gun at his hip." It may have been when the North Vietnamese foreign minister said a few days later that it was "only after the unconditional end of

American bombing of North Vietnam" that "there could be talks," a careful piece of veiled phrasing that the North Vietnamese then asked their east European friends to draw to Washington's attention. Whichever the first hint was, the gist is plain: you call the bombers off, and we'll sit down and start talking. Talk about what? Some east Europeans at the United Nations have been circulating a scheme, which is said to have the blessing of the North Vietnamese, for a coalition government to run South Vietnam after the ceasefire. Senator Robert Kennedy, while he was in Paris at the end of January, is said to have been given an agenda of what the North Vietnamese would be willing to discuss at a conference. The North Vietnamese and the French both deny that any such document has been given to him; but so they would, even if it had.

It is an "interesting and delicate phase," said Mr Walt Rostow over the weekend. He can say that again. It is so delicate that a lot of people who are heartily sick of the war are in danger of missing the point about the manoeuvring that is now under way. Why don't the Americans snap up the hints from Hanoi, and start negotiating tomorrow? The answer is that the North Vietnamese haven't yet said enough to make it clear what they are after. The Americans and North Vietnamese both have good grounds for wanting the war to end, but not at any price. There is no reason to think that the Americans, in particular, want peace so badly that they have stopped caring what happens to South Vietnam afterwards. And exactly the same applies to the starting of negotiations. The Americans want to start talking, but not at any price, and especially not if it means finding themselves in a militarily weaker position if the talks fail. Fair enough; that would be to invite Hanoi to make the talks fail.

This is the first of the two things that must be cleared up before negotiations begin to make sense. The North Vietnamese may be trying to get an end to the bombing, without any matching de-escalation on their part, by just sitting down and talking, and talking, and talking. The document that Senator Kennedy is said to have been given in Paris, if it really exists, supports the suspicion that this is what they are up to. Item number one on North Vietnam's agenda for the proposed conference is a discussion about relations between the United States and North Vietnam. That could go on for ever without getting down to the heart of the



matter, which is South Vietnam. It is perfectly reasonable for President Johnson to reply that he is not going to call off the bombers until he has reason to believe that this will be followed by a cut in North Vietnam's help to the rebels in the south. If the North Vietnamese promise publicly or privately that it will, or if the Russians make the promise for them, then the way will be open for negotiations.

As it happens, this condition may be met more easily than seemed likely a few weeks ago. Officials in Washington are now saying that the number of infiltrators padding in from the north dropped from an average of 7,000 a month in the first half of last year to an average of about 2,000 a month in the second half. It is true that this cut may not be a voluntary act by the North Vietnamese; it may have been forced on them by the bombing of their supply lines. It is also true that as late as November General Westmoreland, the American commander in Vietnam, was telling *US News and World Report* that the infiltrators were still coming in at the 7,000-a-month rate. But the important thing is the estimate accepted in the White House. If Mr Johnson is willing to believe that the flow has fallen off, and if he gets an assurance that it will not be bumped up again after the bombing stops, he will have got the counter-concession he wants. The war will have been de-escalated the way it should be, by both sides together. The Vietcong will be largely cut off from their best source of fresh fighters and shiny new weapons. The bombing of the north having justified itself, could be stopped so that talks can start.

Suppose this happens. Even then, there is a second point that will have to be got straight before a conference has a chance of succeeding. What sort of government is South Vietnam intended to have when the fighting stops: communist or non-communist? There is no third choice. To be sure, there are various possible models on each side of the dividing line. A communist country can be a brutally obscurantist Albania or a relatively liberal Yugoslavia; a non-communist one, even in Asia, can be anything from another Formosa to another Japan or Malaysia. But the dividing line is there. In the way its government and its economy are organised, South Vietnam after the war will belong to one category or the other. There is no way of fudging it. This is what the war is all about. Unless one side or the other swallows its ideological pride, no conference is going to get anywhere. One's guess is that the Americans would still be willing, at a pinch, to see South Vietnam go communist if they believed that that would be the end of it. But they have never been given reason to think it would be the end; and the communist rebellions in Laos and Thailand are there to remind them of what would almost certainly happen next. If the dividing line in Asia is to be fixed anywhere east of India, it looks as if it will have to be Vietnam. So will the Vietnamese communists swallow their pride?

There has been a steady trickle of hints that they will. A number of east European communists have been saying all winter that they believe North Vietnam would accept a non-communist government in Saigon provided it was a reasonably liberal one. Mr Harrison Salisbury of the *New York Times* was given a broad hint while he was in Hanoi that the National Liberation Front might not necessarily insist on South Vietnam going communist. President Johnson's problem is to find out whether they really mean it. Unless they do mean it, there is no point in talking about a coalition, or "bringing the communists back into the system," or whatever. Coalitions between communists and non-communists do work sometimes, but only when one side consciously and willingly accepts a minor part in a system basically run by the other side. That is the basis on which the communists take part in Finland's government, and the peasant party in Poland's. To set up a coalition without having reached a prior agreement on this

fundamental point is simply to invite another civil war. And that, in Vietnam, where we came in.

But if the communists in Vietnam are willing to accept this fundamental point, a wholly new situation will have come about. The necessary machinery for broadening South Vietnam's government is almost complete, and should soon be in operation. By April the constituent assembly will have drawn up a new constitution. This will be followed by the election of a president and a national assembly between July and September. These elections, like last September's, will presumably show that the Saigon government effectively controls most of South Vietnam, at any rate in daylight. More important, the elections will create a legitimate system of government into which the members of the National Liberation Front, or those of them who are willing to work out their future in a non-communist society, can gradually be absorbed. It would be that "reasonably liberal" government the North Vietnamese are said to be insisting on.

Maybe the process of de-escalating and then talking will be started by the truce that began on Wednesday and goes on until Sunday. Maybe the bombers will not go back to the attack on the north next week; maybe the flow of communist recruits into the south will not be resumed. More likely, things will return to their bloody normality. Unless a great deal more has been happening than meets the eye, North Vietnam is still struggling to avoid the decision that could wind the war up this year. And so is Russia. Mr Kosygin and his colleagues are being asked to steel themselves to do a very difficult thing: to advise their fellow-communists in Hanoi that they must give up the hope of bringing the south within the fold. But until they can bring themselves to it, there will be a ragged hole in the foreign policy that circumstances, and Chairman Mao, are steadily forcing on Russia. What eventually happens in Vietnam depends on many people, but on Alexei Kosygin more than most.

Monday, February 13, 1967 -- 3:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

I called Amb. Ed Ritchie and told him that, in principle, you would be prepared to receive Prime Minister Pearson at the end of his vacation. He said the natural dates, depending on your convenience, were March 5 or March 6.

I then rather lucidly explained that it would not be helpful if the occasion were used for observations on Viet Nam either in public or in other discussions that the Prime Minister might have in Washington.

Ed immediately said: "I understand this fully." He then cited three matters which could, conceivably, be referred to, if you agreed:

-- If you did decide on a date for your visit to Montreal by that time, the occasion of Pearson's visit might be a natural moment to announce it.

-- Pearson might be able to say some things helpful in the Congress about both foreign aid and your approach to the food-population problem, including the Indian resolution. He pointed out that the Canadians at last were doing a fairly reputable job in foreign aid and were contributing to a serious multilateral approach to the food problem.

-- Depending upon how discussions, which are now going forward with the State Department, developed, something might be said about the law of the sea and an international conference on fishing. But that depended upon diplomacy between now and then.

I responded that I could make no commitments for the President as to what might be appropriate at that time; but that I would report. I also asked him to come back with a firm indication of the Prime Minister's timing; I would then refer that to you; and we could see how the occasion might be arranged.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Monday, Feb. 13, 1967

Mr. President -

Here is Acting Secretary Katzenbach's proposed reply to the clergymen's request to you to authorize a 60-day truce in Vietnam. If you approve he will sign the letter and dispatch it at once.

15/  
Walt Rostow

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Rabbi Eisendrath:

The President has asked me to reply to your letter of February 8, in which you and other religious leaders associating themselves with your views urge a 60-day truce to facilitate private diplomatic efforts to resolve the Viet-Nam conflict.

The President deeply appreciates the motives which inspired you to write to him. He and all who work with him devotedly desire to see a just and stable peace established in Viet-Nam. Within the United States Government, as well as within many other governments, the most intensive labors have been and continue to be devoted to finding ways of moving toward peace. Twice in the past month alone the Government of Viet-Nam has announced its readiness to discuss an extension of the current Lunar New Year truce with representatives of the other side. We fully support this initiative.

It is therefore deeply troubling to the President and to all of us that there is still no real and persuasive sign that the other side shares our deep desire for peace in Viet-Nam. Although Hanoi has recently stated that talks could begin if and when the United States permanently stopped the bombing of targets in North Viet-Nam, we have been able to find no evidence whatever that our cessation of the bombing would be matched by corresponding measures by the other side to reduce the tempo of the conflict. On the contrary, even during the present truce, North Viet-Nam has taken advantage of the suspension of attacks to engage in large-scale resupply activities in the southern portion of North Viet-Nam - - activities which can only be designed to support offensive operations against U.S., South Vietnamese, and free world forces defending South Viet-Nam against outside attack.

I am

Rabbi Maurice N. Eisendrath, President,  
Union of American Hebrew Congregations,  
838 Fifth Avenue,  
New York, New York 10021.

I am sure that you can understand the burden of responsibility that would be the President's were he to order a permanent cessation of the bombing and North Viet-Nam continued or intensified its military operations against South Viet-Nam. We remain ready to take the first step toward peace, but we would fail in our responsibility if we were to do so without being absolutely certain that the other side would take reciprocal actions. We are prepared to discuss the balanced reduction in military activity, the cessation of hostilities, or any particular arrangements which could lead to these results.

The President asks me to assure you and those who associate themselves with your views that we will continue to search for peace with the same devotion that we have in the past, and that we will always be prepared to take the first step. But for lasting peace to come to Viet-Nam, the other side must show an equal readiness.

Sincerely yours,

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach  
Under Secretary



1556

838 Fifth Avenue · New York, N. Y. 10021 · (212) 249-0100

Rabbi Maurice N. Eisendrath, President

February 8, 1967

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Like you, the undersigned share the burden of anguish which the mounting war in Vietnam has laid upon every sensitive conscience. Like you, we pray for the day when the bloodshed will cease and mankind can turn once again to the great task of building a just and peaceful world. To such a world the United States can make the kind of vast and humane contribution which is so true to our traditions and our finest values as a nation.

At this moment, all parties to the conflict in Vietnam are considering the length and circumstances for another Tet truce. Any truce, however brief, saves some lives and at least introduces a pause into the nightmare of violence. The undersigned believe that now is the propitious moment for the United States to exercise its great leadership in a call for an extraordinary 60-day truce with a freeze on all military operations and a stand-fast imposed upon all parties in the conflict.

We believe that such a protracted pause will give the ongoing private diplomatic efforts an enhanced opportunity to achieve success. We believe that such a pause on both sides would inspire a new heart and a new spirit on all sides.

As His Excellency, U Thant, has emphasized repeatedly, negotiations are difficult if not impossible under the continuing rain of bombs and of mounting bloodshed both south and north.

We have the feeling that the world has approached a crucial crossroad in the Vietnam war and that further escalation on both sides may unleash forces which tear the fragile fabric of restraint and doom mankind to a wider and suicidal war.

This is the moment, Mr. President, for all of us to take a pause, not only on the military battlefields, but also in the escalating war fever which is beginning to grip our nation and other peoples as well. We plead with you for a generous and imaginative initiative by the United States of America. We know that there are risks involved in our proposal, but we deeply believe that the risk of an almost compulsive cycle of escalation is an even greater risk, one



February 8, 1967


which fills the hearts of all mankind with trembling and dread.

We are deeply mindful of the agony of spirit which has been imposed upon you by the weight of these events. We do more than merely share your agony, we sincerely wish to help you. We see the mood of America becoming increasingly bellicose and this at a time when what is needed is a greater American predisposition towards peace and not war. If an extended truce period could be affected, we would do even more to help mobilize a climate for peace in our country by intensified educational efforts with our constituents on the issues of the war and the various possibilities for bringing it to an end.

We fervently hope that you will give serious consideration to this suggestion for a possible breakthrough in this impasse which so darkens the future.

May God grant peace, His most precious possession, and may we be co-partners with Him in sanctifying life and peace.

Respectfully,

  
Maurice N. Eisendrath

Rev. George S. Bancroft, Omaha, Nebraska

Dr. John Bennett, President, Union Theological Seminary, N.Y.C.

Dr. Algernon D. Black, Senior Leader, N.Y. Society for Ethical Culture, N.Y.C.

Rev. Dr. Harold Bosley, Christ Church Methodist, N.Y.C.

The Rev. Malcomn Boyd, National Field Representative, Episcopal Society for Cultural and Racial Unity, Washington, D.C.

Rabbi Balfour Brickner, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, N.Y.C.

Dr. Edwin T. Dahlberg, Past President, National Council of Churches, Phoenix, Arizona

Rev. A. Ralph Davis, Minister, Chicago, Ill.

Rev. Edward H. Flannery, Seton Hall University, South Orange, N.J.

Dr. Alan Geyer, Director of International Relations, United Church  
of Christ, N.Y.C.

Bishop A. Raymond Grant, Portland Area Methodist, Portland, Oregon

Dr. Dana McLean Greeley, President, Unitarian Universalist Association,  
Boston, Mass.

Bishop, Rt. Rev. Shinsho Hanayama, D. Litt., Superintendent, Buddhist  
Churches of America, San Francisco, California

Rev. Dr. Donald Harrington, Sr. Minister, Community Church of New York,  
N.Y.C.

Rabbi Abraham J. Heschel, Professor, Jewish Theological Seminary, N.Y.C.

Rabbi Arthur J. Lelyveld, Fairmount Temple, President American Jewish  
Congress, Cleveland, Ohio

Bishop John Wesley Lord, Bishop Methodist Church, Washington, D.C.

The Rev. Burrett Eaton McBee, Synod Executive, Synod of N.E.,  
United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., Dedham, Mass.

The Rev. John B. Morris, Executive Director, The Episcopal Society  
for Cultural and Racial Unity, Atlanta, Georgia

Dr. Bernhard E. Olson, Director of Program Research and Materials,  
National Conference of Christians & Jews, N.Y.C.

Bishop James A. Pike, Theologian in Residence, Center for the Study  
of Democratic Institution, Santa Barbara, Calif.

Rabbi Joachim Prinz, Temple B'nai Abraham, Orange, N.J.

Dr. Carl Soule, UN Representative of Board of Christian Social Concerns  
of the Methodist Church, N.Y.C.

Rabbi Jacob J. Weinstein, President, Central Conference of American  
Rabbis, Chicago, Ill.

Bishop Lloyd C. Wicke, The Methodist Church, N.Y. Area, N.Y.C.

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, February 13, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Summary

1. West German Diplomatic Offensive

Embassy Moscow thinks Bonn's diplomatic moves in Eastern Europe have shown that:

a) strong attraction between Germany and Eastern Europe has not disappeared;

b) some of the Warsaw Pact states (especially Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia) are so interested in opening relations with Bonn, that they are ready to do so at the expense of their Warsaw Pact partner, East Germany;

c) Soviets have failed in their effort to use the West German "threat" to strengthen Warsaw Pact ties.

Moscow's efforts to get a common position toward Bonn at the Warsaw meeting, appears to have failed dismally.

2. UAR Cancels Overflights

The Egyptians have cancelled their previous permission for US aircraft carrying arms to Jordan to overfly the UAR. No explanation was given. We have asked the Embassy to request reconsideration.

3. Saudi-UAR Tension

The Saudi's have asked us to step up delivery of US military equipment to strengthen Saudi defenses along the Yemen border. Their Defense and Aviation Minister has urged us to put pressure on Nasser to get him to the conference table.

~~TOP SECRET~~

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 99-48**  
**By is, NARA Date 10-25-99**

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

4. Latin American Nuclear Free Zone

The draft Nuclear Free Zone Treaty was approved by acclamation yesterday. We are not satisfied with the wording of several articles, and are particularly concerned that it is not an effective arms control measure. Our delegation thinks the treaty is about the best we could have expected under the circumstances. They note the preparatory commission was under great pressure to wrap up the treaty in time for the OAS Foreign Ministers' meeting.

5. US-Japan Security Treaty

We have a confidential report that Prime Minister Sato is going to try for a 10-year extension of the treaty. As you know, the treaty becomes subject to revision or abrogation on a one-year notice starting in 1970. This opens the way for an annual fight generated by treaty critics. Sato wants the 10-year renewal to guarantee the treaty survival in case his Liberal Democratic Party losses strength. Inner circles of the Japanese Government are also reported to be debating how to get around constitutional restrictions so that Japanese troops could take part in peace-keeping activities overseas.

6. China

The pot continues to boil in China. It appears that the military have been given control over the police in Peking. The same thing maybe happening elsewhere. Some of the top military leaders continue to be criticized by the Red Guards. It appears that the military forces have sided with anti-Red Guard elements in a number of places.

This is particularly true in Tibet.

3.4.  
(b)(1,6)

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, February 13, 1967

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

State recommends that you send the attached message to President Lleras expressing sympathy for the loss of life and material damage caused by last Thursday's earthquake in Colombia. I concur.

Our Embassy in Bogota has informed us that it appears that no disaster relief from the United States will be required or requested.

W. W. Rostow

Approve

☒

Disapprove

☐

Attachment

Proposed Presidential  
message of sympathy

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO COLOMBIAN  
PRESIDENT CARLOS LLERAS RESTREPO

I was deeply saddened to learn of the loss of life and damage caused by last Thursday's earthquake. Speaking on behalf of all my fellow citizens, I wish to express profound sympathy to the Colombian Government and people for all those who have suffered through this calamity.

Lyndon B. Johnson



~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/MARIGOLD

Sunday, February 12, 1967  
9:00 p. m.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-322

Mr. President:

By 1-8, NARA, Date 12-2-92

Quite independent of the diary of this week which I am doing, I had Bill Jorden do a history of the A-B formula from November 13, 1966 to February 12, 1967.

It is essential as background for any public statement you may be called upon to make; and I suspect that if, as we expect, bombing resumes and we have no significant signal from Ho, a public statement will be required soon.

Bill and I will start <sup>*rough drafting*</sup> tomorrow morning.

In tone it should follow directly that of the State of the Union Message. Its theme:

- Of course we can't trade bombing for talk;
- We have tried and will try: the record and our consciences are clear;
- The simple fact is that they have exchanged with us no single, substantive, responsive word;
- We shall persist....

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/MARIGOLD

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/MARIGOLD

158a  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 19556  
By is NARA, Date 1-27-98

cc McNamara EO  
HDTaylor EO

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: A Short History of Phases A & B

What follows is a short account of the history of our approach to a solution of the Viet-Nam problem by applying a phased formula -- stop the bombing and then move on to other de-escalatory steps.

It is important at the outset to recall that our use of the Phase A-B formula was prompted by our clear impression from the Poles in the MARIGOLD talks in Saigon that:

- Hanoi required a "total package";
- Hanoi required total secrecy in working out a solution;
- the gap between a stop in the bombing and Hanoi's response was a "face saving" device so Hanoi could avoid appearing to be acting under our military pressure.

The "package deal" went to Lodge on November 13. It suggested mutual de-escalation in two separate phases: Phase One -- we would stop bombing; Phase Two would see the execution of all other agreed de-escalatory actions. Hanoi's actions in Phase Two would "appear to respond to our actions in Phase Two."

This was passed to the Pole on November 14. The Pole thought that the Two-Phase plan was "complicated but had possibilities." The Italian Ambassador thought the package deal was "a very substantial concession" on our part.

On December 1, the Pole told us that he had presented our views, as he understood them, to Hanoi and that the presentation

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/MARIGOLD

had included the Phase One-Two formulation. The Pole said that if our views were as he had outlined them, we should confirm them by conversation with the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw. The next day, Lodge was instructed to tell the Pole that our Embassy in Warsaw would contact the North Vietnamese Ambassador on December 6. Lodge carried out this instruction the following day, December 3. The Pole said his Foreign Ministry would establish the first contact between the North Vietnamese Ambassador and the American representative.

Both in Saigon and Warsaw, we repeatedly stated that we had gone quite far in advancing a peace formula but that we still did not have one solid word from Hanoi.

Throughout this period (first week in December), the Poles kept hammering away at the problem of bombing. They were told (by Gronouski) that we were ready to make the bombing the first item of business in talks with the North Vietnamese. He also reminded them of the A-B package formula. We told the Poles that their efforts to nail us in advance to anything on the bombing could endanger the beginning of talks, and they would have to take full responsibility. We consistently related bombing to what the other side was doing and made clear we were ready to talk about both, but not one side of the equation.

On December 13, Rapacki told our Ambassador that "in December, new elements appeared on the scene which were negatively assessed in Hanoi. Not suprisingly, therefore, with this new situation..., there was a reappraisal by the party most directly involved. As a result, we are faced with a postponement of the Warsaw meetings." Note, this pessimistic note was sounded before the bombings of the 13th and 14th in the Hanoi area. On December 15, Rapacki told us that Hanoi had asked him to terminate all conversations begun in Saigon.

We told Gronouski to tell the Poles:

the Saigon talks -- and then the Warsaw follow-up -- took place while the war continued -- our actions including bombing, and Viet Cong actions including infiltration and terror. This continuation of the war was not related in the Saigon talks to efforts to get talks

started. Our package proposal -- with Phase A and B -- was designed to facilitate a process of de-escalation as soon as possible after the Warsaw talks began.

Note that this period -- mid-December -- was one of both intensive press coverage of our bombing of the North, of outcries against it at home and abroad, and of heightened Communist propaganda efforts to exploit the situation and put pressure on us to act unilaterally, i.e., to stop the bombing. Hanoi and Warsaw -- and probably Moscow -- thought they had us over a barrel and apparently decided to see if they couldn't extract a major concession from us.

Soon after, the other side began to leak their version of MARIGOLD. For example, on December 17, Lewandowski in Saigon complained to the Netherlands Charge about our actions blocking peace talks. The Communists saw to it that their version of the events went to the Pope, to U Thant, and to others. Eventually they leaked it to the press.

On December 22, Gronouski told the Poles that any bombing in Hanoi proper had been accidental; nonetheless, we had decided not to attack any targets within 10 miles of Hanoi for an indefinite period.

The Poles welcomed this move. But they were not able to get Hanoi to enter negotiations. So by December 30, the Warsaw phase seemed at an end. The level of propaganda was intensified by all Communist media and diplomatic representatives.

Meantime, we had advanced the Phase A-B formula in other channels. On November 24, Secretary Rusk had given Gromyko a paper (which went to George Brown on November 27). It said:

"Consideration might be given to the possibility of the parties agreeing secretly on mutual measures of de-escalation which would be to stop the bombing and the second step would be further action of de-escalation by the American side to which the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong would respond by similar acts of de-escalation, but with both phases forming part of a firm prior understanding."

Thus, both the Soviets and the British were fully aware of our approach and of our insistence that the steps in Phase B be agreed upon before Phase A was undertaken.

Hanoi could have been in no doubt of our attitude on this matter. They had been informed of the Phase A-B approach through Lewandowski in November. We described our outlook to them directly in a message which our Charge delivered to the DRV Charge on February 2, 1967. This said in part:

"The USG is aware that the DRV is sensitive to any public link between a stopping of the bombing and reciprocal actions on Hanoi's part... For this reason, we remind the DRV of the USG suggestion that the stopping of the bombing might take place as a prior and ostensibly unilateral action. Before doing this, we would want a private understanding with the DRV that additional subsequent steps would be taken that would amount in the aggregate to an equitable and reciprocal reduction of hostile action. The USG takes this opportunity to renew this suggestion as one to which the DRV may wish to give serious consideration."

We told the British of our intention to make a direct approach to North Vietnam on February 7. In a message to the Prime Minister, the President said in part:

"Specifically, we are prepared to and plan, through established channels, to inform Hanoi that if they will agree to an assured stoppage of infiltration into South Vietnam, we will stop the bombing of North Vietnam and stop further augmentation of U.S. forces in South Vietnam."

Prime Minister Wilson put it to Kosygin, on February 7, as follows:

"I am satisfied that the Americans would now be prepared to move to further actions to strengthen mutual confidence if they were able to secure some assurances that this move would be reciprocated by the other side...to enable them (the US) to (stop the bombing), they need to be assured that the movement of forces from the DRV to South Vietnam will stop. Given this assurance, they will certainly stop the bombing, but they will go further (to halt augmentation for stopping infiltration)..."

On that same day (February 7), the President sent a message directly to Ho which said:

"I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of US forces in South Vietnam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Vietnam by land and by sea has stopped."

We asked London to inform the Prime Minister on February 8 that the substance of our message to Hanoi was identical to the wording in the President's message to the Prime Minister.

The next day (the 9th), we told London to tell the British that "we ourselves would be much more inclined to have them table the more general Phase A-Phase B formula."

We probably raised some problems for ourselves by the release on February 9 of the modified "14 Points" following Secretary Rusk's news conference. Point 14 said:

"We are prepared to order a cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam, the moment we are assured -- privately or otherwise -- that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation on the other side."

This was the general formula we had used in public, in speeches and the Goldberg letter to U Thant, etc. It did not take into consideration the halt in augmentation of our forces or the specific language of exchanges in the secret channels we had been using.

Our approach to this matter, including the need to know what would be done in Phase B before Phase A was undertaken, was spelled out in a phone conversation the night of February 6 by Mr. Rostow in a talk with Michael Palliser of the Prime Minister's office.

The British messed things up with their presentation to Kosygin on February 10. In their Point (a) they said:

"the United States will stop bombing North Vietnam as soon as they are assured that infiltration from North Vietnam to South Vietnam will stop."



They then<sup>7</sup> proposed that "within a few days" of the bombing halt, the U.S. would stop augmenting its forces in the South while North Vietnam stopped infiltration into the South.

We informed London immediately that this was not our approved approach and that we would send them our version. Meantime, they went ahead and presented the above to Kosygin.

Our version, sent to the Prime Minister, was as follows:

"A. The United States will order a cessation of bombing of North Vietnam as soon as they are assured that infiltration from North Vietnam to South Vietnam has stopped...

"B. Within a few days (with the period to be agreed with the two sides before bombing stops), the United States will stop further augmenting their forces in South Vietnam..."

This was delivered to Kosygin before he left for Scotland the evening of the 10th.

Meantime, on the strong urging of the British and of our Ambassador in London, it was decided that bombing of the North would not be resumed at the end of the TET truce period (6 P.M. EST, February 11). We agreed to wait until Kosygin had left Britain for home (early Monday morning, February 13).

On February 12, as he prepared for his final meeting with Kosygin, Wilson came in with language he proposed to offer. It would have told the Soviet leader:

"If you (Kosygin) can get a North Vietnamese assurance -- communicated either direct to the U.S. or through you before 10 A.M. British time tomorrow -- that all movement of troops and supplies across the 17th Parallel will stop at that time, I will get an assurance from the U.S. that they will not resume bombing of North Vietnam from that time. Of course, the U.S. build-up would also then stop forthwith.

"This would then<sup>7</sup> give you and me the opportunity to try and consolidate and build on what has been achieved by bringing the parties together and promoting further balanced measures of de-escalation."

It was decided to go along with this further extension of the bombing lull. The wording was revised as follows:

"If you can get a North Vietnamese assurance -- communicated either direct to the U.S. or through you -- before 10 A.M. British time tomorrow that all movement of troops and supplies into South Vietnam will stop at that time, I will get an assurance from the U.S. that they will not resume bombing of North Vietnam from that time. Of course, the U.S. build-up would also then stop within a matter of days."

We added that "with this deal consummated, we would, of course, be prepared to move promptly to a neutral spot to engage in unconditional negotiations designed to bring peace to the area."

The British exchange with Kosygin occurred against a background of three significant developments:

- clear indications of a build-up of North Vietnamese forces just North of the DMZ (including heavy logistical movements by sea and road, and the involvement of three North Vietnamese Divisions);
- continuing intensive propaganda efforts to achieve a unilateral halt in bombing of North Vietnam;
- NO repeat NO word of any kind from Hanoi!

William J. Jorden

Sunday, February 12, 1967 -- 3:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: News Media Contact

Neil Sheehan, New York Times, telephoned as to the meaning of the pause. I told him I could say nothing on an attributable or non-attributable basis. When he pressed, I said, "You can't get blood <sup>from</sup> ~~out~~ of a stone." He stopped.

I said the same to a fellow from the London Financial Times, whose name I didn't quite get.

W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, February 12, 1967  
3:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will find interesting this French Foreign Office hard-headed assessment of what Hanoi is up to. It represents a change in the professional French view; and is quite different from de Gaulle's assessment.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 12210

~~SECRET~~

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Authority NLG 85-360

By Ref/cip, NARA, Date 3-26-91

WWRostow:rln

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~~SECRET~~

Copy of PARIS 12210, Feb. 11, 1967

Subject: Hanoi Peace Feelers

Quai Director of Western Hemisphere Affairs told Counselor on Feb. 10 that whereas he could not reveal all details, there was truth to Jean Daniel's report that French representative in Hanoi had reported to Paris his conversation with NVN official (Director European Affairs) which indicated that Hanoi is actively seeking peace talks with the U. S. Government. The Director stated that based on reports reaching the Quai, "there is no doubt that Hanoi's attitude has changed substantially in past month. "

However, according to Jurgensen, Hanoi chose to try public approach via Trinh interview obviously "to get something for nothing, they could get away with it," and "to bring public opinion pressure to bear on USG. "

Jurgensen reiterated the view previously expressed by Quai director Vauris that even Hanoi would not be so ill-informed as to attempt to pass genuine, sensitive message re peace talks to White House through Burchett channel. Burchett article, followed up in different key world capitals by important correspondents, papers, TV, radio and officials, e. g. , Bo, Kosygin, and even including endorsement by Viet Cong, was patently propaganda.

Jurgensen fully endorsed Department position as presented to Lucet. He thought U. S. should "bomb more and harder;" "Hanoi is coming around. "

McBRIDE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-49  
By is, NARA Date 10-25-99 ~~SECRET~~