

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[1 of 8]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1a letter	Pres. to Mike Mansfield C 1 p. open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350	3/7/67	A
1b memo	Katzenbach to the Pres. C 1 p. open 7-21-92 NLS 91-349	3/4/67	A
1c	Duplicate of #1a open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350		
4 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re defense items S 1 p. open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350 [duplicate of #2b, NSAM 360; still closed]	3/9/67	A
5a cable	from American Embassy, Ankara C 1 p. open 1-27-92 NLS 91-349	3/9/67	A
6a memo	Maxwell Taylor to the Pres. C 5 pp. open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350	3/9/67	A
7 memo	Rostow to M. Watson re Korea C 1 p. open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350	3/9/67	A
11 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Germany PCI 1 p.	3/9/67	A
17 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam C 1 p. sanitized 2-8-93 NLS 91-347 [Duplicate of #143, NSF, CF, VN, Vol 67, Box 41]	3/8/67	A
17a report	Text of CIA report sanitized 1-29-01 NLS 99-55 [same] C 3 pp. sanitized 3-30-92 NLS 91-348 [Duplicate of #143a, NSF, CF, VN, Vol 67, Box 41]	3/8/67	A
19a memo	Eugene Rostow to Sec. State C 2 pp. open 1-27-92 NLS 91-349	3/7/67	A
20 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East C 1 p. open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350	3/8/67	A
21 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. sanitized 9-15-92 NLS 91-350 [Equal #7, NSF Agency File, VN Vol 6]	3/8/67	A
21a cable	USUN 4253 S 2 pp. open 11-10-99 NLS 99-53	3/8/67	A
22 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Cuba S 1 p. open 7-9-91	3/8/67	A
26a cable	Rostow to Cabot Lodge TS 3 pp. Duplicate in FILES of WWR BOX 4, "VIETNAM - WWRDSTOW, #290 open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350	3/8/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 22,
March 1-9, 1967, Box 14

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
27 memo	Rostow to Mrs. Johnson re Latin America S 2 pp. [duplicate of #1, Internat'l. Meetings & Travel File, "Punta del Este Summit 1967 (Mrs. Johnson's Travel)," Box 20]	3/8/67	A
30 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re non-proliferation C 1 p. open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350	3/8/67	A
31 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam TS 1 p. open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350	3/8/67	A
31a memo	Rusk to the Pres. TS 1 p. open 7-29-92 NLS 91-349	3/8/67	A
33a memo	Eugene Black to the Pres. C 1 p. open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350	3/6/67	A
33b memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Asian Bank C 2 p. open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350	3/1/67	A
36a memo	Alfred Jenkins to the Pres. re China S 2 p. same sanitization 9-21-92 NLS 92-213 [duplicate sanitized in NSF, Country File, "China, Vol. 9," Box 241, #91a]	3/7/67	A
36b cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 pp. exempt 3-30-92 NLS 91-348 exempt 1-29-01 NLS 99-55; exempt NLS 019-014-1 (2/02)	3/6/67	A
37 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re military spending S 1 p. sanitized 2-8-93 NLS 91-347 sanitized 1/6/00 NLS 99-59 same Sani NLS 019-014-1 (2/02)	3/7/67	A
37a memo	re military spending S 2 pp. sanitized 12-17-92 NLS 91-348 sanitized 1-29-01 NLS 99-55 (same sani)	2/6/67	A
38 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Cuba S 1 p. sanitized 4-3-97 NLS 95-865 same Sani 2/02 - NLS 019-014-1	3/7/67	A
40 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350	3/7/67	A
40a memo	to Pres. re Vietnam S 3 pp.	3/7/67	A
42a memo	N. Davis on the Vatican C 2 pp. exempt NLS 91-350 sanitized 3/28/00 NLS 99-52	3/3/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
43 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re trilateral talks S 1 p. open 9-15-92 NLJ 91-350	3/7/67	A
43a cable	London 7138 S 2 pp. [duplicate of #63a, NSC History, Trilateral Negotiations, "Book 2, Tabs 53-71," exempt NLJ 84-24] OPEN 3-27-98 STATE GUIDELINES	3/6/67	A
46e memo	Maxwell Taylor to the Pres. open 9-15-92 NLJ 91-350 C 2 pp. (Duplicate of 34a + 38a, NSF, CF, VN, "Gen. Taylor's Rpts on Overseas Oper + Misc. Memos," Box 260)	3/6/67	A
47 cable	CAP67110 re trilateral talks S 7 pp. [near duplicate of #60a, NSC History, Trilateral Negotiations, "Book 2, Tabs 53-71," sanitized NLJ 84-22] OPEN 3-26-98 FRUS 64-68XIII ITEM 239	3/6/67	A
48 cable	CAP67111 re Middle East S 3 pp. open 9-15-92 NLJ 91-350	3/4/67	A
51 cable	CAP67117 re Latin America C 2 pp.	3/6/67	A
53 cable	CAP67116 re UK dup of #3, NSF, CF, UK, Vol 10 S 1 p. exempt NLJ 91-350 UK GUIDELINES OPEN 3-26-98	3/6/67	A
54a cable	Amb. Bowles to the Pres. S 4 pp. Sanitized 7/5/00 NLJ 99-54 [duplicate of #38a, Files of Robert Komer, "Memos to the Pres. Jan.-May 1967," sanitized NLJ 89-21]	2/27/67	A
55 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Japan C 1 p. open 9-15-92 NLJ 91-350	3/6/67	A
58 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re UK S 2 pp. OPEN 3-28-98 UK GUIDELINES	3/6/67	A
59 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Latin America C 2 pp. open 9-15-92 NLJ 91-350	3/6/67	A
61 cable	CAP67101 re trilateral talks S 4 pp. open NLJ 98-239 4-15-99 [duplicate of #104, NSF, Country File, "UK, Vol. 10," exempt 1978]	3/5/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
62 cable	CAP67104 re trilateral talks S 3 pp. sanitized 7-29-92 NLS 91-349 <i>Open NLJ 98-239 4-15-99</i> [duplicate of #37, NSF, Country File, "UK, Vol. 10," exempt 1978]	3/5/67	A
66 cable <i>more info re lease</i>	CAP67092 re Germany <i>sanitized 7/15/00 NLS 99-64</i> S 3 pp. sanitized 2-8-93 NLS 91-347 <i>124-03 NW/RACLOS:112 dup. of #78, NSF, CF, Germany, Vol 12</i>	3/4/67	A
68 cable	CAP67093 re Vietnam <i>open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350</i> S 2 pp. [duplicate of #45, NSF, CF, VN, Vol. 67, Box 41]	3/4/67	A
69	Duplicate of #68 <i>open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350</i>		
71 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East PCI 2 pp. <i>open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350</i>	3/4/67	A
72 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Panama S 1 p. <i>open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350</i>	3/4/67	A
74 cable	CAP67080 re foreign affairs " S 2 pp.	3/3/67	A
78 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam <i>open 1-24-01</i> PCI 3 pp. [transferred to #78, NSF, Memos to Pres., Rostow, Vol. 23 on 1-24-01] [duplicate of #4, Files of Walt Rostow, "Sen. Robert Kennedy's Views on Vietnam"]	3/10/67	A
79 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350</i>	3/3/67	A
80 cable	CAP67076 re Germany <i>Open 3/28/00 NLS 99-52</i> S 3 pp. sanitized 9-15-92 NLS 91-350 <i>dup of #79, NSF CF Germany, Vol 12</i>	3/3/67	A
83 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam C 1 p. <i>open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350</i>	3/3/67	A
83a memo	W. Jordan to Rostow re Vietnam " C 6 pp.	3/3/67	A
84a report	Egyptian-Saudi Tensions PCI 2 pp. <i>exempt 3-30-92 NLS 91-348</i> <i>sanitized 1-29-01 NLS 99-55</i>	undated	A
85	Duplicate of #80 <i>OPEN 10.21.98</i>		
91 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>sanitized 2-8-93 NLS 91-347</i> <i>sanitized 7/15/00 NLS 99-64</i> <i>Same Sani 2/02 - NLS 019-014-1</i>	3/2/67	A

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March 1-9, 1967, Box 14

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
91a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 pp. <i>sanitized 1-29-01 NLS 99-55 (same)</i> <i>[duplicate of #155a, NSF, CF, VN, Vol 67, Box 41]</i>	3/1/67	A
92a report	Pres & Cons of the Bombing... TS 8 pp. open 12-17-92 NLS 91-348	undated	A
95a cable	Bonn 10157 <i>open 1-27-92 NLS 91-349</i> C 1 p.	3/2/67	A
103a cable	Rangoon 1142 <i>open 1-27-92</i> S 1 p. <i>NLS 91-349</i>	3/2/67	A
105a cable	Saigon 19356 TS 1 p. <i>open 7-29-92 NLS 91-349</i>	3/2/67	A
106a	Duplicate of #103a <i>open NLS 91-349</i>		
110 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Asian Bank C 2 pp. <i>open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350</i>	3/1/67	A
111 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re AID 11 C 2 pp.	3/1/67	A
111a report	Plan for Living Within AID... Limitations C 6 pp. <i>open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350</i>	undated	A
114a cable	London 6987 <i>open 1-27-92 NLS 91-349</i> C 3 pp.	3/1/67	A
116 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Latin America C 1 p. <i>open 7-29-92 NLS 91-349</i>	3/1/67	A
117 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re nuclear testing C 1 p. <i>open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350</i>	3/1/67	A
118a cable	Saigon 19209 S 11 p. <i>open 7-29-92 NLS 91-349</i>	3/1/67	A
120 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Japan <i>open 3/28/00 NLS 99-52</i> S 1 p. <i>sanitized 9-15-92 NLS 91-350</i>	3/1/67	A
120a cable	Tokyo 6126 <i>open 11-10-99 NLS 99-53</i> S 2 pp.	3/1/67	A
123 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>open 9-15-92 NLS 91-350</i>	3/1/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
123a-memo	Henry Owen re bombing 8 1 p. open 7-29-92 NLS 91349 [duplicate of #143a, NSF, CF, VN, Vol 67, Box 41]	2/28/67	A

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March 1-9, 1967, Box 14

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[7 of 8]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#3 memo	Walt Rostow to the President - Top Secret 1 p. <i>Sent to [unclear] / CBS 19 Dec 113</i> <i>Sent to [unclear] Dec 99-88</i>	3/9/67 open 10-23-09	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 22, March 1-9, 1967, Box 14

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878
p. 8 added to file 9/11/9

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
117a rpt	re nuclear testing - Open 11/6/60 NS n-79 6 2 pp	n.d.	A

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National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 22, March 1-9, 1967
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - March 7, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith is Nick Katzenbach's views (Tab B) on Senator Mansfield's proposal to reorganize the American Bureau in State.

I share Nick's conclusion, and prefer the first (Tab A) of the suggested replies, which is prepared for your signature, should you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tabs A & B.

Approve suggested
reply at Tab A

Disapprove

Speak to me

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *kg*, NARA, Date 3-26-91

1a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-350
By ju, NARA, Date 9-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Mike:

The Latin American experts at the State Department tell us they doubt that creation of a new Under Secretary of State for Hemispheric Affairs would make much of a helpful impact on our Latin American friends. On the contrary, they might view it cynically as a gesture of form instead of the substance they want.

What we really need is to move on with the kinds of support we propose for the Summit Meeting in April. I was glad to hear from Sol Linowitz of your favorable reaction to them.

I know Dean will be glad to discuss this with you further and in more detail if you wish.

Sincerely,

Honorable Mike Mansfield
Majority Leader
United States Senate

LBJ/WGB:mmm
3/7/67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-349
By ju, NARA, Date 7-24-92

March 4, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Senator Mansfield's Proposal to
Reorganize our Inter-American Bureau

Senator Mansfield has suggested that you consider announcing at the Summit the creation of an Under Secretary of State for Hemispheric Affairs, with Assistant Secretaries of State for North American and South American Affairs. This proposal varies from other proposals in that this bureau would include Canada.

A reorganization of our operations would not solve our basic problems with Latin America. These are obtaining more financial resources to support our policies and faster inter-agency action on program and policy proposals. On the other hand, the decisions that you made on March 1 will help substantially on both problems.

The reorganization of our Latin American operations which you directed in December 1963 has been made. It is working well and it would be a mistake to upset it.

I believe we should discourage the Senator's reorganization efforts, as suggested in the first attached draft reply. Alternatively you might wish merely to say that Secretary Rusk will be in touch with the Senator, along the lines of the second draft reply.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Enclosures:

1. Tab A - Draft Reply
2. Tab B - Alternate Draft Reply
2. Memorandum from Senator Mansfield

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUGGESTED REPLY:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-350
By ju, NARA, Date 9-3-92

Dear Mike:

The Latin American experts at the State Department tell us they doubt that creation of a new Under Secretary of State for Hemispheric Affairs would make much of a helpful impact on our Latin American friends. On the contrary, they might view it cynically as a gesture of form instead of the substance they want.

What we really need is to move on with the kinds of support we propose for the Summit Meeting in April. I was glad to hear from Sol Linowitz of your favorable reaction to them.

I know Dean will be glad to discuss this with you further and in more detail if you wish.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Suggested Reply:

Dear Mike:

Thank you for your thoughts on reorganizing our Latin American operations at the State Department. I have passed them on to Secretary Rusk and asked him to discuss his ideas with you.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

February 28, 1967

*Memo from U
to President
Copies to AHA*

TO: The President
FROM: Mike Mansfield
SUBJECT: Under Secretary of State for Hemispheric Affairs

In April you will be going to the Inter-American Summit Meeting to be held in Punta del Este, Uruguay. You will have many questions and problems to consider in the meantime, and there will be many pressures upon you during the Summit Meeting.

One possibility free from any outside pressure which I would like to call to your attention is that of reorganizing the Department of State. Instead of having an Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs with concurrent responsibility for the Alliance for Progress, it might be worthwhile to consider the creation of an Under Secretary of State for Hemispheric Affairs. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs at the present time has an almost impossibly complex and over-loaded job for one person to handle. His jurisdiction comprises twenty-four separate and independent countries with problems as diverse as those of Haiti and Brazil, Cuba and Colombia, Bolivia and Mexico. He also supervises the work of ten offices--twice the number of his nearest competitor who is Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

The following may be of interest:

1. In the past, various proposals for establishing the position of an Under Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs have been rejected--primarily for fear that pressure from other areas would result in general escalation of all geographical Assistant Secretaries to Under Secretary positions. Moreover, we have apparently been reluctant to treat our hemispheric neighbors to the south in any manner which might be interpreted as "preferential" or "discriminatory;" this despite the fact that our strong participation in the Organization of American States and the Alliance for Progress might well be called both preferential and discriminatory. The time may well have come when our unique relationship with our hemispheric neighbors might well be reorganized by a shift in the organization of the Department of State.

February 28, 1967

2. It is proposed, therefore, that there be established within the Department of State the position of Under Secretary of State for Hemispheric Affairs. This Under Secretary would in turn be assisted by two Assistant Secretaries--one in charge of South American Affairs and the other responsible for North American Affairs (with the exception, of course, of the United States itself). The breakdown of responsibility might be along the following lines:

Secretary of State

Under Secretary of State

Under Secretary of State for Hemispheric Affairs:

A. Assistant Secretary for North American Affairs

1. Office of Canadian Affairs
2. Office of Mexican Affairs
3. Office of Caribbean Affairs
4. Office of Central American Affairs
5. Office of Panamanian Affairs
6. Office of Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

B. Assistant Secretary for South American Affairs

1. Office of Argentine, Paraguayan and Uruguayan Affairs
2. Office of Colombian and Venezuelan Affairs
3. Office of Ecuadorean and Peruvian Affairs
4. Office of Bolivian and Chilean Affairs
5. Office of Brazilian Affairs

3. There might well be those (including perhaps the Canadians themselves) who would object to Canada's being transferred from EUR to ARA. However, Canada is being drawn more and more into inter-hemispheric affairs; there is always the very real possibility that it might become a member of OAS, and its bureaucratic alignment in the above suggested reorganization would appear to be essential for the justification of the new Under Secretaryship. Moreover, the possibility of occasional direct access of their Ambassador in Washington to an Under Secretary specializing in hemispheric affairs, particularly if the incumbent were of the high quality and international reputation of a Harriman or a Bunker, would very likely answer any initial adverse reaction that such a shift might cause.

4. Embodied in this proposal is the integral suggestion that the newly created Under Secretary himself would become the Administrator for the Alliance for Progress. He would of course be backstopped in this position by an Assistant Administrator for the Alliance as at present.

5. If these proposals have merit--and this would be for you to decide--you might wish to consider a public announcement of the establishment of a procedure such as that outlined above. It would be given maximum political advantage if it were to be made public by you at the Inter-American Summit Meeting to be held at Punta del Este in mid-April.

The President

- 3 -

February 28, 1967

6. The above is merely a suggestion which may or may not have merit, and I offer it only as a possibility which might be worthy of your consideration.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, March 9, 1967 - 3:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for your Meeting with Christopher Johnson,
Foreign Editor, London Financial Times - 6:00 p.m. today

Christopher Johnson's main interest will probably be Vietnam and U.S. - European/Soviet relations. On the latter, you might make the following points:

I. Western Europe

1. Atlantic Community, while in transition, is proving its strength and durability.
 - NATO has survived deGaulle's thrusts; relocation proceeding in an orderly fashion.
 - We are now hard at work in trilaterals on security arrangements for the years ahead. There are problems, but we are generally optimistic about prospects for agreement on military and financial arrangements which will maintain Alliance solidarity and readiness.
2. Successful Kennedy Round and international money negotiation important to further progress.
 - Time now terribly important in Geneva; our authority runs out in June. We are encouraged that the Europeans seem to be moving ahead, but we need to wrap things up soon with a balanced bargain.
 - Money talks also reaching a critical stage. Must press forward toward a more adequate and dependable financial basis for world trade.
3. We wish UK best of luck on entry into Common Market. Hope they will keep at it.
4. Europe must help us in poor countries -- India, Pakistan, etc. -- with food and other aid. Development in everybody's interest. None of us can do job alone.

II. East-West Relations

1. We were encouraged by the answer to President's letter to Kosygin on ABM. Look forward to frank discussions. We will seek agreement on ways to avoid futile ratchet in arms race, and perhaps to even cut back.
2. We support an equitable non-proliferation treaty. We will consult Allies -- Germans, Italians, UK, etc. -- every step of the way. Future of mankind depends on continuing process which has produced Test Ban Treaty, Outer Space Treaty, etc. We are determined to move forward as fast as possible.

3. We are also moving ahead with other steps to improve East-West environment: East-West Trade Bill, Consular Convention, Air Agreement, Fiat deal, Mac Bundy's exploration of an East-West Institute of Management and Administration. Together, these steps help build kind of atmosphere in which ultimate healing of division of Europe should be possible.

III. Vietnam

123

Francis M. Bator

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~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Thursday, March 9, 1967
7:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here is Dick Helms' report on the effects of bombing on infiltration. In addition to the summary, I have tried to mark some of the interesting details in the text. -- which is more vivid and helpful than the broad generalizations at the beginning.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

(

9 March 1967, Intelligence Memorandum, "An Evaluation of the Effects of Bombing on Infiltration Into South Vietnam."

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 141-020-029/1
By je, NARA, Date 10-23-09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-350
By ju, NARA, Date 9-3-92

4
Profile

~~SECRET~~

March 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Assignment of Highest National Priority
to Critical Defense Items

The Secretary of Defense has recommended that you place the following items listed below in the highest national priority category by authority granted under the Defense Production Act of 1950:

LRC 160-8 ECM Pod - a more sophisticated version of the present ECM Pod 160-1 and ALQ-71 which are used to jam enemy AAA and SAM radars. The 160-8 will also be capable of using the C-Band frequencies in the event the enemy employs them in the future.

Ammunition for Southeast Asia

CARTRIDGE, 105 mm, HE
CARTRIDGE, 60 mm, HE
FUZE, M557

The Secretary has also recommended the removal of the following from the top national category since production objectives have been or can be met without the use of the automatic DX program rating:

BOMB, 500 Lb, Mark 82, with fuze
CARTRIDGE, 105mm, I11, M314A2, with fuze M565
CARTRIDGE, 20mm, Mark X1 and X11, with fuze
FUZE, M532

The Bureau of the Budget has analyzed this request and recommends your concurrence. I also concur in the Defense recommendation. If you approve, I will sign the attached memorandum.

____ Approved

____ Disapproved

W. W. Rostow

____ See me

SECRET

4a

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO.

TO: The Vice President
 The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
 The Administrator, National Aeronautics and
 Space Administration
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Director, Bureau of the Budget
 The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

SUBJECT: Assignment of Highest National Priority to Critical
 Defense Items

In response to the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense in a memorandum of February 20, 1967, the President, under the authority granted by the Defense Production Act of 1950, today established the following items as being in the highest national priority category:

QRC 160-8 ECM Pod

Ammunition for Southeast Asia

CARTRIDGE, 105 mm, HE

CARTRIDGE, 60 mm, HE

FUZE, M557

The President also approved the removal of the following ammunition items from the highest national priority category:

Bomb, 500 LB, Mark 82, with fuze

Cartridge, 105mm, 111, M314A2, with fuze M565

Cartridge, 20mm, Mark X1 and X11, with fuze

Fuze, M532

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 79F00059

By ng/kip, NARA, Date 3-26-91

W. W. Rostow

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584
42
~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

20 FEB 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I recommend that you approve the following as programs of highest national priority which would make them eligible for use of the automatic DX industrial priority rating:

	(Millions of Dollars)	
	<u>FY 1967</u>	<u>FY 1968</u>
QRC 160-8 ECM Pod	39.0	-
Ammunition for Southeast Asia:		
Cartridge, 105mm, HE	273.7	372.1
Cartridge, 60mm, HE	51.0	76.4
Fuze, M557 PD, 105 155, 8" + 4.2	32.9	83.2

The QRC 160-8 ECM Pod will be a more sophisticated version of the present ECM Pod 160-1 and ALQ-71 which are used to jam enemy AAA and SAM radars. The 160-8 will also be capable of using the C-Band frequencies in the event the enemy employs them in the future.

I also recommend the deletion of the following from the top national category since production objectives have been or can be met without the use of the automatic DX program rating:

Bomb, 500 Lb, Mark 82, with fuze
Cartridge, 105mm, Ill, M314A2, with fuze M565
Cartridge, 20mm, Mark XI and XII, with fuze
Fuze, M532

Robert S. McNamara

35-
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 11652 Sec. 50A) and (1)
By *NS/UP*, NARA, Date *3-26-91*

~~SECRET~~

Sec Def Cont Pr. X -

1068

Pres file

Thursday, March 9, 1967, 3:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Emperor Haile Selassie has continued his travels to the Middle East after leaving here. You may be interested in the attached report from our Ambassador to Turkey concerning unsolicited comments HIM made about his stay in Washington.

Obviously, there is a certain amount of diplomatic blarney involved, but he seems to have gone out of his way to let you know he enjoyed himself.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

EKH:mst

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 9, 1967

FROM AMERICAN EMBASSY ANKARA

During reception for Diplomatic Corps, Emperor volunteered to Ambassador he was most grateful for very fine arrangements made for his visit to US. Said all possible was done by President Johnson and others to make it useful and successful. In subsequent conversation, he added he had had most useful talk with President which he greatly appreciated. Said he was ready at all times to assist in any way he could with other nonaligned states to achieve peace in Viet-Nam. His attitude toward Ambassador during several encounters was particularly warm and friendly.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-349
By inf, NARA, Date 1-8-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

6

Thursday, March 9, 1967
4:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Taylor's analysis of
Senator Kennedy's position on Viet Nam.

W W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 9, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-350

By JW, NARA, Date 9-3-92

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Senator R. F. Kennedy's Position on Viet-Nam Policy

Walt Rostow has informed me that you would like an analysis of Senator Kennedy's position on Viet-Nam policy as set forth in his speech before the Senate on March 2, accompanied by any comments I might have on the subject. In the following, I have summarized Senator Kennedy's position and the reasons therefore (as I understand them from the Congressional Record), followed by my own observations and recommendations.

I. Senator Kennedy's (RFK) Position

RFK supports the Administration's basic objective of assuring the Vietnamese people the right of self-determination and agrees that we must do whatever is necessary to attain that goal. However, we should try to do so without further escalation which works against our interest by increasing the damage to South Viet-Nam (which we must eventually help repair), by reversing the trend toward a detente with the USSR, by diverting our resources from the needs of the Great Society and by diminishing our leadership in the NATO alliance. Hence, it is in our interest to get to a conference table with all the participants of the Viet-Nam conflict as quickly as possible.

In RFK's view, the way to get to the conference table is to take advantage of the encouraging signs of a shift of position on the Communist side. Their spokesmen have abandoned the preconditions of last year that in advance of negotiations we accept the Hanoi 4 points, to include the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Now they are saying through such spokesmen as Nguyen Duy Trinh (Foreign Minister of North Viet-Nam), Kosygin and Podgorny that we need only to suspend our bombing to get negotiations started. While there are dangers involved and our efforts may fail, it is worth the risk to test the sincerity of these gentlemen, in spite of their past record, and see if there is any substance in these encouraging suggestions of a change of position on their part. Last year, we tried the experiment of the 37-day bombing pause in the hope of getting negotiations started without asking for any form of reciprocity and in the absence of the present favorable signs. How can we hold back now from a renewed attempt with the indications, contradictory though they sometimes are, that the other side will accept negotiations if we suspend bombing?

In this frame of mind, RFK proposes the following program (as I construct it from references scattered through his speech and the questions and answers following it.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- 2 -

a. The U.S. Government stops bombing North Viet-Nam without suggesting that the cessation is permanent. We indicate our readiness to begin negotiations within a week but must be prepared for a considerably longer delay before the other side responds. The proposal for negotiations will be directed to the USSR, NLF and the DRV. (The role of the GVN at this point is not mentioned).

b. If negotiations begin, the first order of business will be to get agreement that infiltration and reinforcement will cease on both sides --or at least the rate will not increase (there is ambiguity on this point). Such an agreement will be verified by UN or IOC teams which will patrol the borders, ports and roads (presumably only in South Viet-Nam).

c. If after a "substantial time" such an agreement is not reached or is violated, or if it becomes evident that discussions are being used to cover an additional build up of strength by the other side, or if "U.S. forces or the U.S. position is placed in danger" as revealed by the international observers, we would be justified in breaking off the negotiations and resuming the bombing. At this point, he says without amplification: "I am also aware of the precedent of Panama."

During this phase, the shooting war in South Viet-Nam has not necessarily stopped; the important thing appears to be to stop escalation. RFX says: "Even if hostilities continue, it will be necessary for both sides to refrain from escalating the war on the ground and trying to change the military balance."

d. Having got negotiations started and force levels frozen under international supervision, the next step in the schedule would be to negotiate a cease-fire to be monitored by the international teams which are also patrolling borders, ports and roads; a lay-down of arms (without specifying who is involved); a gradual withdrawal of foreign forces (not defined); and political steps to assure the security of all parties remaining in South Viet-Nam.

RFX recognizes the danger of a military coup from the right or a Communist effort to take over the government as foreign troops withdraw. Hence, he proposes an international force (additional to or in reinforcement of the international teams already on the ground) under UN direction to relieve U.S. forces and to take over internal security in South Viet-Nam. It is not clear what happens to the 700,000 odd military, paramilitary and police forces of the GVN and the 200,000 plus Viet Cong guerrillas which are presently in South Viet-Nam. Have they laid down their arms or are they standing down under the terms of a cease-fire? One assumes the latter but the point is not precisely made.

From this point, we enter the phase of the final settlement which is based upon elections with all political elements participating. RFX concedes

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

that there may be a prolonged period between the end of hostilities and such elections and considers it important in the interim to maintain the confidence of all parties that their political rights will be protected. Their physical and political security will be assured by the continued presence of the international force under UN supervision.

II. Arguments Supporting RFK's Position

a. We have nothing to lose and possibly much to gain by another try along the lines proposed. Even if we fail, we gain points in international estimation while exposing the insincerity of Kosygin and company.

b. We can dispense with bombing since the justification for it, if ever valid, has greatly diminished. The bombing is not necessary to reassure South Viet-Nam since our large military presence there is a much stronger guarantee. We do not need it to impress Hanoi with our determination since our military accomplishments in South Viet-Nam are more convincing evidence. Even the Administration leaders concede that bombing has not reduced infiltration. Meanwhile, bombing may be strengthening the resistance of Hanoi as Britain's was strengthened by the German air attacks.

At this point, RFK changes front and concedes that the bombing does make the war "more costly, difficult and painful" for North Viet-Nam but "we are not in Viet-Nam to play the role of an avenging angel. We are there to assure the self-determination of South Viet-Nam, to fight the war effectively, and to protect as many lives as possible." He believes that the bombing does not contribute to these ends and provides no protection to our troops in combat. "Our troops are being killed by the bullets and mines of forces in the south." He feels that such men as Gavin, Kennan and Reischauer would never recommend a step that would endanger our forces --yet they support an end to bombing.

c. We are alienating our friends world-wide by appearing to increase our demands preliminary to negotiation over what they were last year --this in the face of the apparent softening of the Communist position.

III. Comments

The weak points in RFK's position, as I see them, are the following:

a. Contrary to the Kennedy argument, there has been little indication of a softening of the official Communist position on a settlement in Viet-Nam.

Annex A is a tabulation of the official declarations (if we accept the Trinh-Burchett interview as official) of the Communist leaders mentioned

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In the senatorial discussions arising from the Kennedy address--Nguyen Duy Trinh, Ho Chi Minh, Korygin and Podgorny. A close reading shows that in no case is there a clear-cut offer to accept merely a cessation of bombing in exchange for the initiation of negotiations. In all cases, there is an additional "hooker" thrown in, usually phrased as the cessation of "other acts of aggression against the DRV" which can be stretched to cover almost anything, to include our reconnaissance overflights of North Viet-Nam, our naval activities in the Tonkin Gulf and our military operations in South Viet-Nam. Behind this price of admission demanded for the initiation of negotiations, we perceive the ultimate demands of Hanoi clearly stated in the March 1 statement.

"The best alternative for the United States is to recognize the four-point stand of the DRV Government, definitively and unconditionally stop its bombing and other war acts against the DRV, withdraw all U.S. and satellite troops from South Viet-Nam, recognize the NLFV, the sole genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their internal affairs."

This is essentially where we were last year with the exception that the preconditions to negotiation may have decreased, depending on the meaning attached to "other acts of aggression against the DRV."

b. The U.S. Government has never said that it will give up bombing in order to get negotiations started. The 37-day pause last year included no such offer. We were hoping for discussions without preconditions and wanted to see what might happen if the bombing were suspended--nothing did. This year we have been quite explicit--there must be some reciprocal action of de-escalation in exchange for our stopping the bombing. Meanwhile we remain ready as always to begin negotiations without preconditions.

RFK's assumption that an international inspection force can in a finite time be assembled, deployed to South Viet-Nam and police satisfactorily the borders, ports and roads is completely unrealistic. Even more so is the thought that the UN would or could form an international military force capable of maintaining security in South Viet-Nam as foreign troops withdraw. Without these forces, the Senator's program breaks down and requires the interruption of negotiations or the acceptance of a Panmunjon during which the enemy may build up his forces.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 5 -

IV. Recommendations

I would think that any further direct reply to Senator Kennedy would have no advantage. I do think it would be well to rebut some of the points he makes whenever the opportunity presents itself.

a. The U.S. Government has never changed its position on negotiations. We seek discussions without preconditions. A cessation of bombing is a precondition which we reject. However, we are prepared to consider a cessation of bombing if there is reciprocal action from the other side.

b. There has been no significant change in the official positions of Kossygin, Podgorny and Ho. They still impose impossible preconditions on negotiations.

c. By the nature of the problem, the practicability of obtaining effective third party verification of the cessation of infiltration is very slight. It is virtually inconceivable that the UN could or would field a force in South Viet-Nam capable of assuring internal security under the conditions envisaged by Senator Kennedy--such as we would welcome UN assistance.

d. The critics of the bombing think it is ineffective and unimportant. That is not the view of the North Vietnamese, the South Vietnamese or the American servicemen in Viet-Nam. They know better.

e. While Senator Kennedy recognizes the pitfall of a Panmunjom, he does not say how to avoid it. Indeed, he seems headed straight for it.

Maxwell D. Taylor

Enclosure:

Annex A.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ANNEX AStatements Regarding Conditions for Negotiations

JANUARY 28, 1967, WILFRED BURGESS' INTERVIEW WITH DRV FOREIGN MINISTER

"Question: The United States has spoken of the need for dialogue or contact between itself and the DRV. Would you comment on this statement?

"Answer: The United States has made such statements, but in its deeds it has shown the utmost obduracy and perfidy and continues the escalation, stepping up and expanding the aggressive war. If it really wants talks, it must first halt unconditionally the bombing raids and all other acts of war against the DRV. It is only after the unconditional cessation of U.S. bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV that there could be talks between the DRV and the United States.

"The four-point stand and the correct attitude of the DRV Government enjoy, we are sure, even stronger approval and support from all peace loving and justice-loving peoples and governments in the world. If the United States refuses to listen to reason, it will further unmask itself as an obdurate aggressor. The Vietnamese people are determined to fight until total victory to defend the north, liberate the south, achieve the peaceful reunification of the fatherland, and contribute to the maintenance of peace in this area and in the world."

* * * * *

February 8, 1967, KOSTOIN GUILDHALL LUNCHEON SPEECH, LONDON

"The United Kingdom is a state whose voice is heeded by many, and it is precisely for this reason that the Soviet Government believes that today, as in 1954, Great Britain together with the Soviet Union and other nations could make its contribution to the settlement of the Viet-Nam issue on the basis of the Geneva agreement, which must be implemented by the United States.

"The first step in this direction should be the unconditional termination of the U.S. bombing and of all other acts of aggression against the DRV, as was recently stated by the DRV Foreign Minister. This step is essential for talks to be held between the DRV and the United States. The Soviet Government welcomes that statement and regards it as an important and constructive proposal leading to a settlement of the conflict."

* * * * *

FEBRUARY 13, 1967, HO CHI MINH'S LETTER TO THE POPE

"The U.S. imperialist must put an end to their aggression in Viet-Nam, and unconditionally and definitively the bombing and all other acts of war

against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, withdraw from South Viet-Nam all American and satellite troops, recognize the South Viet-Nam National Front for Liberation, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs. Only in such conditions can real peace be restored in Viet-Nam."

* * * * *

FEBRUARY 27, 1967, PODGORNÝ DINNER SPEECH

"We are convinced that the position of the DRV Government and the NLFV, conforming as it does to the spirit of the Geneva agreements of 1954, provides a just basis for a settlement of the Viet-Nam question. Demonstrating its will for peace, the DRV Government declared recently through its Foreign Minister that talks between the DRV and the United States can be held after the unconditional termination of American bombing and all other acts of aggression against the DRV. We fully support this important, constructive proposal."

* * * * *

MARCH 1, 1967, DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT

"The best alternative for the United States is to recognize the four-point stand of the DRV Government, definitively and unconditionally stop its bombing and other war acts against the DRV, withdraw all U.S. and satellite troops from South Viet-Nam, recognize the NLFV, the sole genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their internal affairs."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-350
By ju, NARA, Date 9-3-92

Thursday, March 9, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

SUBJECT: Visit of Korean Prime Minister

As you know, Korean Prime Minister Chung Il-Kwon will arrive next Tuesday (March 14) for an official visit.

The schedule, as relayed to the Koreans, is:

11:30 a.m.	-- Arrival and welcome
12:00	-- Office call on the President
1:00 p.m.	-- Luncheon given by the President

I understand some consideration has been given to reducing the office call to 30 minutes. I am afraid this would be a hard blow for our Korean friends. We know the Prime Minister has counted on a good session with the President, particularly to discuss the former's recent visit to Viet-Nam, his conversations with Vietnamese leaders, and his ideas on how to win the war. He may also inform the President that Korea is sending additional troops. There are other bilateral matters to consider -- economic development, modernization of Korean Armed Forces, etc.

Prime Minister Chung is really travelling half way around the world primarily to see our President, and he would be disappointed if the promised hour is cut in half. I sincerely hope this can be reconsidered. If it meant some adjustment of the specific hours, for example pushing everything back a half hour, I am sure this would be preferable to reducing Chung's precious time with the leader of Korea's best friend and ally.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, March 9, 1967
2:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a brief reply to
Senator Williams.

W. W. Rostow

8a

March 9, 1967

Dear Senator Williams:

I am grateful for your proposal of March 6;
and I have instructed that it be carefully
staffed out.

I fully understand the concern which led you
to make it.

Sincerely,

Honorable Harrison A. Williams, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWR:mz

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 7, 1967
2:45 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

WALT ROSTOW

FROM: Mike Manatos

Attached is a copy of a letter to the President from Senator Harrison Williams, which I have acknowledged.

I have sent the original to the President and have informed him that I was sending a copy to you.

LYSTER HILL, ALA., CHAIRMAN
WAYNE HOWSE, OHIO
RALPH YARBOROUGH, TEX.
JOSEPH E. CLARK, PA.
JENNINGS BRADOLPH, W. VA.
HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, JR., FLA.
CLAYTONS PETT, R.I.
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASS.
RAYMOND NELSON, WIS.
ROBERT F. KENNEDY, N.Y.
JACOB K. SHAW, N.Y.
WINSTON L. PROFFER, VT.
PETER H. DOMINICK, CALIF.
GEORGE MURPHY, CALIF.
PAUL J. FRANK, ARIZ.
ROBERT F. SHAFER, ARIZ.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE

March 6, 1967

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Many of my constituents are voicing increased concern about our involvement in Vietnam and expressing the thought that a more intensive effort should be made to settle this conflict. Among these constituents our efforts to bring about a negotiated peace have been little noticed and less understood. The American people are extremely confused by news reports of differences of opinion among leaders in the Administration concerning the effects of the bombing of North Vietnam.

For its intrinsic merit and in an effort to make the Administration's sincere peace efforts crystal clear to our people as well as the people of the world, and to show our good faith and willingness to reach a negotiated settlement, I respectfully submit the following proposal for your consideration:

That a Peace Commission be appointed by you to represent this country. The members of this Commission should be of outstanding international stature in order to instill confidence in their abilities among the parties on the other side of this conflict.

That this Commission then be sent to a neutral site in Southeast Asia in close proximity to Vietnam, such as Rangoon. The Commission would seek to open channels of communication, either through the government of the neutral country or otherwise, with all the parties involved including Communist China, North Vietnam, and the National Liberation

The President

-2-

3/6/67

Front. If contact is established between the Commission and similar groups from the other parties involved, they should then seek to establish an agenda for discussion aimed at ending this conflict.

Without regard to the pros and cons involved in the cessation of bombing, such a Peace Commission in the area of the conflict would offer the most effective instrument for testing the sincerity of any action by, or overtures from, North Vietnam in response to initiatives on our part which we have already planned or which may develop in the months ahead.

While I am personally aware that the Administration already has in effect the essence of this proposal, the practical fact remains that it is not apparent to the people. I think one of the major values of this proposal is that it would provide highly visible and tangible evidence of our often-stated desire to remove this struggle from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

Mr. President, I recognize that there are ramifications to this suggestion far beyond what is outlined in this short letter, and I recognize that some of these ramifications may be known only to you. But I believe that the appointment and actions of such a Peace Commission would demonstrate to the world our earnest willingness to bring this conflict to the conference table and would place a burden on the opposing parties to respond in kind. In any event, I certainly do not think such action would in any way hurt anything.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,


Harrison A. Williams, Jr.

HAW:jbg

9

Thurs., March 9, 1967
12:45 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is an interesting and important fact.
For the second week running, the Chieu Hoi
figure is over a thousand:

-- for the week ending March 4 it totaled 1188;

-- for the previous week it was 1108.

The total for 1967 thus far is 6357. The comparable
figure for the same period in 1966 was 3845.

It is not yet a firm trend; but it is a hopeful fact.

W. W. R.

Copy of SAIGON 19939, March 9

March 9, 1967

9a

(For Donnelley from Zorthian)

1. During daily 5 o'clock briefing, Mission press officer Heller announced the arrival of SecState William Bundy and impending arrival of Senator Edward M. Brooke of Massachusetts. He provided an outline of Bundy activities for March 10 and 11.

2. Heller said Chieu Hoi (open arms) returnee figures for the week ending 4 March totaled 1188, including 716 military, 401 political, and 51 in other categories. This represents a new all-time high, breaking the record of 1108 set the preceding week. The total thus far for 1967 is 6357, compared with 3845 for the same period last year.

3. In reply to questions, Heller said the reasons for rising returnee totals included: (1) increasing military pressure by VN and allied forces; (2) psychological operations Tet campaign; and above all (3) ever deteriorating conditions in areas under VC control, contrasted by improving conditions in free areas of RVN.

4. Military briefing filed through regular MACV channels.

10

Thursday, March 9, 1967
10:30 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Senator Robert Kennedy's Proposal of March 2, 1967

1. I shall comment on three aspects of Senator Kennedy's proposal:

- its substance;
- its underlying assumption; and
- its public impact.

2. Substance

The proposal calls for a conditioned and, if necessary, temporary halt in the bombing. This is what we have already done five times. It also calls for a halt in bombardment, to be followed both by negotiations and an inspected reduction in both infiltration and reinforcement. This also we have offered; but in more clear terms. There is considerable ambiguity about the extent of the reduction in infiltration or reinforcement. The objective is stated to be to stop "any further escalation." Would that permit some continued infiltration? Some replacements of casualties and rotation? These matters are not addressed.

Finally, the proposal calls for an international inspection group. We have tried various ways to make the ICC more effective and have considered the problem of effective international inspection; but have not put forward a proposal under the direction of the UN for the simple reason that Hanoi refuses to recognize the legitimacy of any UN role in the matter.

Senator Kennedy asks for "the passage of substantial time" before we decide that "discussions are used only as a pretext to enlarge the conflict in the South" before our resuming military pressure against the North. He does, however, show an awareness of the Panmunjom problem.

In short, I conclude that while the substance of Senator Kennedy's proposal differs in detail from some of ours -- and lacks precision on certain critical points -- it is part of the same family of proposals we have made since the first bombing pause in May 1965:

-- We took the first step, as he suggests;

-- We asked for compensating de-escalation and a serious move towards negotiating the end of the war.

2. Underlying Assumptions

Senator Kennedy's key underlying assumption is that what Kosygin was offering in London is a position consistent with his proposal. Kosygin simply backed in London the position of Hanoi's Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in his interview with Burchett of January 28. What Trinh said was this:

"The U. S. imperialists must stop definitively and unconditionally the bombing raids and all other acts of war against the DRV. . . . If it really wants talks, it must first halt unconditionally the bombing raids and all other acts of war against the DRV. It is only after the unconditional cessation of U. S. bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV that there could be talks between the DRV and the United States. "

Senator Kennedy's proposition is for a conditioned halt in the bombing, whereas what we are being asked by Hanoi is for a definitive and unconditional halt in the bombing. We have five times halted bombing conditionally: each time the reaction was negative.

In short, the assumption that Senator Kennedy introduces that his proposition is consistent with the position of Kosygin and Hanoi's offer is not borne out by the facts.

3. Impact

Despite the fact that Senator Kennedy is talking about a highly conditioned halt to bombing, the net effect on public opinion is to suggest that we should accept the Trinh proposition of 'no bombing for the possibility of talk'; and to obscure the fact that we have tried five times a conditioned halt in bombing -- most recently for six days during and after Tet.

W. W. R.

11

March 9, 1967 -- sent to President about
6 or 6:30 AM

Mr. President:

I have two comments on the package to close the gap the boys worked out for the 11 AM Thursday meeting.

1. Proposition 5 is thoroughly legitimate if we nail the Germans down on the "no - gold and money co-operation". Joe Fowler faces a transition from gold - budget approach to an approach where we must watch our wages, prices, productivity, exports, etc., but not be governed by Dept. of Commerce balance of payments statistics. It will take a little while for Congress and the country to understand. But to refuse to play on Proposition 5, if he has the German commitment in his pocket on monetary co-operation is wrong.

2. The deal looks scrappy - held together with string and chewing gum. But it will be an historic turning point if it is followed by:

- a rise in the German military and/or foreign aid budget.
(Nothing is going to work if the Germans continue to choke themselves to death with their budgetary law).
- systematic U.K. - German efforts to arrange increased German purchases in the U.K.
- above all, extending the German monetary deal to Italy and other NATO members, except France.

All three are possible if we work at it.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-350
By ju, NARA, Date 9-3-92

WWR

Tipped in Situation Room

12
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DATA TAKEN FROM ~~TOP SECRET~~ SOURCES

Wednesday, March 8, 1967 -- 4:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, a seven point statement on how the bombing helps our fighting men and those of our allies to counter North Vietnam's illegal aggression against the south.

1. The air strikes have tied up between 600,000 and 700,000 people (this includes 20 per cent of North Vietnam's military strength). If these were not required for defense and reconstruction, they would be available for waging and supporting the aggression in the south.

2. The North Vietnamese have gone to great length to try to make our bombing campaign less effective. Since 1965, they have increased their radars fivefold, the number of antiaircraft weapons fourfold, and the number of jet fighters twofold. They have also introduced a large surface-to-air missile system. This has been an expensive diversion of resources away from their support of the war in the south.

3. Air attacks have destroyed significant percentages of North Vietnam's national capacity in direct military or war-supporting target categories:

- 70% -- ammunition depots
- 70% -- explosives manufacturing
- 55% -- petroleum storage (70% of original capacity)
- 30-45% -- electric power
- 23% -- barracks

4. More than 700 bridges have been destroyed. About 10,000 trucks, 2,500 railroad cars, and 14,000 watercraft have been destroyed or damaged -- estimated cost: \$35 - 40 million. North Vietnam has had to increase the number of transport workers by 50,000. According to some

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Authority MLG / CBS 19

By 102/28, NARA, Date 9/22/91

reports, they have had to impress fishermen into coastal transport duty for six-month periods. Time required to transport goods has at least doubled, if not tripled. Losses in transit have reduced total traffic volume by 20 to 40 per cent.

5. North Vietnamese deserters and prisoners tell us the bombing makes infiltration very difficult. In 1966, PW's reported that air strikes had increased infiltration time up to two months. They are forced to travel at night without lights and often have to eat uncooked food. They talk about fear, disease, lack of medicine, hardship, and low morale -- some casualties and many desertions. We don't know how many infiltrators and supplies (one PW estimated 20%) are lost on the march south, but we know that bombing complicates the journey and reduces the morale and immediate combat effectiveness of those who complete the arduous trip.

6. Cumulative effects of the bombing continue to disrupt parts of North Vietnam's economy. For example, estimated losses in North Vietnam's agricultural production and the fishing industry total over \$30 million. Although the food situation is not yet critical, rice production in 1966 was 300,000 tons below average. Identified imports of bulk food-stuffs totalled almost 24,000 tons in January compared with an average monthly import of 6,400 tons in 1966.

7. In 1964, North Vietnam received \$115 million in aid from communist countries. In 1965, aid increased to \$410 million. By 1966, \$505 million in external aid was needed to keep North Vietnam in the war. (This was about four times the damage resulting from air attacks in 1966.) At the same time, North Vietnam's exports of coal and cement are below normal levels and there have been no recent shipments of apatite. Export losses attributable to bombing total over \$15 million -- equal to one-third of North Vietnam's annual export earnings of hard currencies.

W. W. Rostow

EYES ONLY -- THE PRESIDENT

~~TOP SECRET~~
SUNFLOWER PLUS

Pres file

Wednesday, March 8, 1967
4:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith as requested:

1. Your letter to Ho Chi Minh.
2. Ho Chi Minh's reply.
3. The diary of the Kosygin week, with key proposals sidelines in yellow.

Attached to the diary are the full texts of the critical communications during that week.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUNFLOWER PLUS

EYES ONLY -- THE PRESIDENT

In Sunflower file

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, (b)
White House Conference, 1983
By *18*, I.A.A.A., Date 4/22/91

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Wednesday - March 8, 1967
7:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

At Tab A is a memorandum from Secretary Rusk recommending that you meet with the Congressional leadership tomorrow on the Summit Joint Resolution.

Your schedule tomorrow is too full to accommodate the meeting. Jim Jones tells me that your present 11:00 a.m. appointment on Friday can be changed to next week. I recommend that you agree to this shift so that we can move ahead with the Resolution without further delay.

At Tab B is a suggested talking points paper for your presentation at the leadership meeting.

W. W. Rostow

Approve leadership
meeting for Friday,
March 10, at 11:00 am _____

Prefer another time _____

Speak to me _____.

Attachments:

Tab A - Rusk memorandum

Tab B - Talking points paper.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Limited Official Use

March 8, 1967

Talking Points
for the President's Presentation to Congressional Leaders

The Summit Background

- The Buenos Aires meeting has convinced us that we are on the threshold of a new, important phase in inter-American relations: the establishment of a Latin American Common Market.
- Simon Bolivar dreamed of economic integration, but it foundered on the nationalism of the new republics.
- It has taken close to 150 years to convince the Latin Americans -- and ourselves -- that it is in the mutual interest for them to combine their individual markets into one large common market spanning the Rio Grande to Cape Horn.
- This fundamental change in attitude coincides with a realization that the modest growth rates achieved during the first half

Limited Official Use

decade of the Alliance -- satisfying as they may be -- are inadequate when projected against the needs of the 1970's.

- Hence we have the convergence of two currents which are making the Latin Americans rethink past policies and move in new directions.
- The timeliness of the Summit is that it comes at a time when hard political decisions at the highest level need to be taken and there is a disposition to do so.
- This is the historic setting for the Punta del Este meeting.
- I am convinced that while the initiative must be Latin American, we have a special opportunity and responsibility to encourage and assist.
- An integrated, more prosperous Latin America will be a stronger and more equal hemispheric partner and, on the basis of our Canadian and European experience, a better customer.

The Summit Package

- We and the Latin Americans agree that the Summit must concentrate on a few, concrete, new actions on which there is prior agreement and which will be of lasting significance to the hemisphere.

- These actions would build on proven policies of the Alliance
 - e.g., control of inflation, increased taxes, more liberal trade policies, encouragement of domestic and foreign private investment, administrative reform and improved planning -- which would be reaffirmed.

- The new actions include:
 - a determined effort to establish a functioning Latin American common market by 1980.

 - a new emphasis on multinational projects (roads, power lines, river basin developments, communications) which will link countries, promote integration and open inner frontiers of the Continent.

- cooperation on trade policy, especially in reducing European discrimination against Latin American exports.
 - modernization of rural life and an increase in agricultural productivity, principally food, to meet Latin American requirements and shortages in other areas of the world.
 - modernization of educational systems at all levels, but with special emphasis on science and technology; and intensification of health programs.
 - undertakings, individual or collective, to eliminate unnecessary military expenditures.
- These are the elements of the Summit package which the Foreign Ministers at Buenos Aires agreed to recommend to their Presidents.

Our Summit Role

- The decisions needed involve Latin Americans and are for them to take. We cannot do it for them. Our role is to encourage sound decisions and support them financially.
- The Latins want and expect our help. They know that our financial assistance is essential for them to do what needs doing, but they do not have their hands out.
- This approach, so clearly reflected in at Buenos Aires, is one sign of growing political maturity and confidence in us that if they do the right things, they can count on our support.
- We estimate that the Summit package calls for increased United States assistance of around \$1.5 billion over a five-year period. We have arrived at this order of magnitude figure on this tentative basis:

--- integration adjustment assistance:

approximately \$300 million over five years,
probably beginning in FY 1970.

--- increased resources for multinational projects:

raising the annual allocation to the IDB's Fund
for Special Operations from \$250 to \$300 mil-
lion for the next three years with the under-
standing that the Bank would set aside \$100
million per year for multinational projects.

--- education and agriculture:

an additional \$100 million for FY 1968 and \$200
million per year for the next four years, (this
is within the \$750 million per year authorized
last fall for the Alliance for Progress. The \$100
million for FY 1968 is already provided for in the
budget.)

In all cases there are to be matching self-help contributions

and the actual use of our additional funds would be tied to Latin American performance.

The Joint Resolution

- I consider the amounts described as a sound investment in Latin America, provided they take the decisions we anticipate at the Summit and follow through thereafter.
- Our assistance will, of course, be tied to their performance. They understand this.
- Before making any commitments for additional assistance under the Alliance for Progress, I wanted to consult the Congress and ask you to participate in the decision. This is the purpose of the resolution which you have seen.
- The resolution will signal to our Latin American friends that not only am I behind their crossing the threshold of a new

era, but also the American Congress and people are behind it. This will be an added incentive for them to take the hard political decisions required.

Pres file

Wednesday, March 8, 1967
4:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

The Chief Justice's trip continues to go well, including a helpful assist from Drew Pearson (last paragraph).

W. W. Rostow

Quito 3787

WWRostow:rlh

132
Wednesday, March 8, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM EMBASSY ECUADOR (Quito 3787)

SUBJECT: Visit of Chief Justice Warren

Chief Justice Warren and his party arrived March 4 at 11:15 a.m. and departed March 5 at 10:10 a.m. after successfully completing their program plus an unscheduled visit early March 5 (6:30 a.m.) to the Equatorial Monument (suggested by the Chief Justice). The visit was warmly received by all with whom the Chief Justice had contact, was well-publicized, and appeared to make a significant contribution to strengthening U.S.-Ecuadorean relations.

In a press conference in Hotel Quito, the Chief Justice (answering opening question from a Time-AP stringer) gave a useful historical background of the Commission report including the composition of the membership and citing its wide investigatory powers. The dispassionate exposition seemed convincing to reporters, placing the current Garrison claims (widely reported in the local press) in proper perspective. The reporters apparently were well satisfied and thereafter devoted their questions mostly to the legal field including world peace through law.

At a formal luncheon offered by President and Mrs. Arosemena in the Presidential Palace, the Chief Justice conversed with the President, Cabinet members, members of the Supreme Court and other Ecuadorean Judiciary. The atmosphere was cordial and informal, and no speeches were made.

During the visit to the Supreme Court, which held an extraordinary session in homage to the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court President made a brief speech of welcome praising the Chief Justice's long and distinguished legal career and dwelling on the "illegality" of Peruvian acquisition of former Ecuadorean territory as a result of the Rio Protocol. The Chief Justice replied with a speech emphasizing the universality of basic principles of law and justice, and stating that the best long-range hope for solution of disputes among nations was the development of a true international judicial system, permitting solutions by law rather than by force.

Former President Galo Plaza accompanied the Chief Justice on his visit to the Equatorial Monument.

News and photo coverage of the visit was extensive with most papers using USIS output on front pages. Both Quito television stations used a sequence of USIS photos of the day's events on evening newscasts. Radio newscasts reported on activities of the Warren party throughout the day.

While there has been no editorial comment to date, personal reactions of newsmen and official and private Ecuadoreans involved in the visit are most favorable. Drew Pearson was interviewed individually by newsmen and made useful comments on the need for Peruvian-Ecuadorean economic intergration which was given front page coverage in several papers and receptive editorial treatment in El Comercio.

COERR

~~SECRET~~ -- EXDIS

Wednesday, March 8, 1967
4:40 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You will, I believe, wish to read these conclusions and recommendations of the Chiefs of Mission Conference at Baguio, which has just ended.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ -- EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 3-26-91

WWRostow:rln

Wednesday, March 8, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM MANILA (60)

Following are the highlights of the conclusions and recommendations recorded at the East Asian Chiefs of Mission Conference at Baguio, March 6-8.

VietNam

The Ambassadors were unanimous in the view that the determination which the U. S. has demonstrated in fulfilling its commitment to defend South VietNam against aggression has had a major tonic effect on all the governments and people of the area. While all government leaders do not forthrightly speak out publicly to the degree we wish, there is no free government in the East Asian area (except possibly Cambodia) which does not basically approve of what the U. S. is doing with respect to VietNam. There is much better understanding of our policies and motives than was the case a year ago. The North Vietnamese effort to bring pressure on the U. S. to cease bombing without any substantive reciprocal act on the part of the North Vietnamese has had much less success in the area than seems to be the case with opinion in Europe and some minority opinion in the U. S.

While all the Ambassadors reported on the natural desire of the areas from which they came to have as early as possible a satisfactory conclusion of the war, none reported any sentiment for a unilateral U. S. withdrawal from VietNam or the acceptance by the U. S. of any settlement that would lead to direct or indirect North Vietnamese domination of South VietNam.

The Ambassadors were greatly interested in and encourage by the reports of progress by Ambassador Lodge, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland and none of the Ambassadors could themselves suggest nor did they report any suggestions from the governments to which they are accredited for substantial changes in the broad lines of policy now being pursued by the U. S. with respect to VietNam.

They all felt that the core of the problem of the North Vietnamese attitude toward peace was convincing North VietNam that no domestic or international pressures are going to cause the U. S. to flag in its determination. Hanoi will be affected crucially by continued political and military progress in South VietNam. In addition, if Hanoi sees or fears widespread disorder or extremist control in Communist China, this could be a major factor. It was felt that Hanoi may have been seriously disturbed by the Chinese picture in January, but may have been at least temporarily reassured by signs of settling down in February. A key question might be whether the power struggle

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

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Authority State letter 1/24/80
By rg/isp, NARA, Date 4/22/91

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

in China resumes and deterioration becomes more acute in the coming months; this was rated a 50-50 chance.

There was considerable discussion of area reaction to various aspects of the military action against North VietNam. There was general agreement that any additional air action that was considered necessary would be understood and accepted if it could be directly related to reducing the capabilities of North VietNam to support the military action in South VietNam. Attacks that appeared to result in a substantial increase in civilian casualties would cause adverse reactions in Japan and some other countries. However, it was also noted that with the passage of time, the feeling was growing in many other countries of the area that the U. S. should prosecute the war, in all of its aspects, with more vigor. All agreed that non-involved international opinion should not be a major factor in deciding upon our courses of action, and that prudent actions not clearly leading to an enlargement of the area of hostilities should be taken if they are obviously necessary to protect the forces of ourselves and our allies or to accelerate the end of the conflict. (The conference did not seek to reach a consensus on the degree to which additional bombing would affect Hanoi's will or the attitudes of the USSR and its degree of influence in Hanoi.)

There was concern over the reports of increasing use of Cambodian territory as a sanctuary and as a line of supply to the Viet Cong. While again it was felt great prudence should be exercised in any action that would enlarge the area of hostilities, it was felt that some degree of understanding in key countries of the area could be obtained for limited actions across the border of Cambodia if we were first able to present a strong public case on the degree of use of Cambodian territory by the Viet Cong and the military importance of taking countermeasures.

Finally, there was deep concern that as progress continues in VietNam, we do all we can to prepare domestic and international opinion to reject the possibility of an illusory peace proposal by the other side for a "cease fire" or "standstill" followed by negotiations that, under the conditions in VietNam, could only result in jeopardizing whatever we have achieved or in prolonging the conflict. While we should continue to maintain our limited aims in VietNam, our military pressure must be maintained until they are achieved and should not be relaxed in exchange for what may well be illusory promises.

Communist China

The great cultural revolution was seen as a desperate

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

effort by Mao to regain control of his party, to wipe out all ideas inconsistent with Maoism and fire the youth of China with a commitment to revolutionary struggle. Whether or not Mao prevails over widespread resistance from the pragmatists, the party structure will remain seriously damaged and the top leadership will probably never regain its old unity. The Great Cultural Revolution has aggravated Sino-Soviet relations, shaken Hanoi, and further isolated Communist China among the non-Communist countries and even within the Communist world.

Given this situation as well as the continuing rigidity of China's outlook, we believe the best we can do is to keep quiet about developments in China and to let Mainland China stew in its own juice while concentrating on efforts to strengthen the non-Communist areas of Asia into whose framework China will eventually fit. Although any gesture on our part toward easing tensions in our relations with Peiping would be rejected at this time, we believe we should nevertheless pursue certain measures, albeit of a marginal nature, which would at least have the effect of removing certain unnecessary irritations for Americans in their dealings involving China. This would include a further liberalization of travel policy, elimination of bunkering controls, removing requirements for certificates of origin up to \$100 in purchases in Hong Kong, and reducing the controls we attempt to exercise over certain subsidiaries and licensees of American companies doing business abroad.

Although we may find short range advantages in a disordered China, a frustrated and chaotic China would, over the long run, seem to be incompatible with the kind of world we want. We should continue to make clear that our ultimate objective with respect to Communist China is a modus vivendi whenever her policies permit this.

Apart from our policy toward China, recognition of Mongolia and the establishment of a U. S. Mission in Ulan Bator should in our opinion be achieved as soon as possible. This should involve diplomatic consultations first with Japan, then an exploration of the Mongolian side, and finally consultation with the Nationalist Chinese before any announcement.

Regional Cooperation

There have been several highly promising developments in East Asian regionalism this past year, with ADB, ASPAC and SEAMES being

inaugurated and ASA reactivated. We believe that economic, technical and cultural cooperation is the most feasible and likely at present, but that these developments will almost certainly improve political ties and hopefully serve over a longer period of time to set the stage for at least limited but effective military cooperation on a regional or, more likely, sub-regional basis. We recognize that regionalism is not an end in itself and that regional institutions, to be useful, must serve a specific need.

East Asian countries increasingly seek to take charge of their own affairs though they strongly welcome and need outside material support. We regard this trend as healthy and in our long-range interests. The theme is, however, an ambivalence between our understanding of the need to maintain minimum U.S. visibility in these organizations and yet our awareness that, without adequate U.S. support and influence, useful Asian institutions could falter or fail. We conclude, that it is best to adopt as far as feasible a "low posture," discreetly exercising our influence while drawing on the support of countries like Australia and Japan which can be helpful with other Asian countries on a number of issues related to our common interests.

We continue to see no early alternative to our current bilateral and multi-lateral defense arrangements. Until alternative defense arrangements of comparable effectiveness emerge, we must give full support to SEATO as the key security organization in Southeast Asia. It is possible but by no means certain that a Southeast Asian sub-regional organization (such as the currently proposed SEAARC) could be formed that eventually acquired some defense coloration. We believe that such an organization could prove highly beneficial, even if only capable of reaching common assessments of threats to the area and of speaking out with a common voice against direct or indirect aggression. Our degree of support for such an organization would depend on its viability and usefulness from our viewpoint.

The importance of the ADB to the area was recognized as a channel of increased Japanese contribution to area development, as a channel for contributions of small countries outside the area, and as a forum in which Asians can work out their own problems. It was recognized as important that procedures should be set up to keep U.S. director of ADB informed of developments of interest to it in the various countries.

The limitations of ECAFE and the Mekong Committee were recognized, although both perform most useful services as a forum for Asian discussion of their common problems and ECAFE has also acted as a catalytic agent for bringing into being such institutions as the ADB.

The procedures for handling our contemplated \$200 million special fund to the ADB were discussed. Some concern was expressed that the amount was too low, with even greater concern expressed that the contemplated formula for U. S. contributions might not serve our interests. We believe it important that the presentation to the Congress be made in terms that would not require matching contributions from other countries before the U. S. contribution could be made available for specific purposes. Specifically, we feel that the U. S. should preserve maximum flexibility to determine in each instance proportion of U.S. contribution as might be determined to be in U. S. interests. This would require the U. S. contribution be released to ADB for each project only after such determination is made.

More consideration should be given to the effect of our policies upon countries which depend upon one or two basic exports to finance their development. The effects of the present program for disposing of our surplus rubber stockpile was cited as requiring particular care.

Economic and Military Assistance

The tremendous resources we are now committing to Vietnam would make it utter folly not to continue to commit the relatively modest resources required to carry through with essential nation building type of assistance, as well as assistance to meet future defense and internal security, in the rest of the area. It is this type of effort on our part that can help prevent "future Vietnams" and contribute to essential progress and stability in the underdeveloped nations of the area.

The present level of funds available for aid-type activities in specific countries is marginal at best and will almost certainly be insufficient in the future to meet already foreseeable high priority needs, notably in Indonesia.

We feel strongly the MAP ceilings for the general area, outside Vietnam, are inadequate and that assistance given for defense and internal

security purposes will for a time have to be larger than the amounts in the program for the current year if critical security needs are to be met and the growing atmosphere of confidence is to continue. We feel specific concern over the budget being currently submitted because reductions of any significance at all would produce very serious consequences.

In this regard, we feel that inclusion of the Laos and Thai programs in this regular defense budget as being directly related to hostilities, is a concept which the Administration should continue to support strongly.

The conference took note of internal political and financial pressures on Britain which might cause it to accelerate withdrawal of its military forces East of Suez, even more rapidly than the present 1970 undertaking. It was thought to be particularly important for U. S. diplomacy to work toward persuading the U. K. to retain a military presence in Singapore and Malaysia and the most important of her base facilities in these countries.

In terms of broad U. S. interest in the area, it was estimated that British engagement with the regional problems of the area, the stability deriving from a British presence and the economic fall-out from the bases are of more consequence to U. S. interest than any given level of British forces. On the other hand, if the level of British forces could be kept substantial, this may enable Australia and New Zealand to send more forces to augment their badly balanced contingent in Vietnam. The balance of these factors needs to be weighed with a political assessment whether the British under current pressures, may pull out altogether if we continue to press them to adhere to a substantial level. We need, above all, to consult with Australia and New Zealand on our next moves and should consider ways direct or indirect to help the British meet the burdens of staying.

Some U. N. Considerations

Issues of immediate interest to the area in the U. N. were reviewed. It was believed that further efforts should be made to ensure closer consultation by friendly area members both among themselves and with us on U. N. matters. It was also hoped that certain area states could be encouraged to strengthen their representation at the U. N.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-54
By cb, NARA Date 6-30-00

17
Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, March 8, 1967
6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

This report on civilian
reactions in the southern part
of North Viet Nam to our air
raids will interest you.

W. W. Rostow

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

17a
EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Wednesday, March 8, 1967

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-55

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [REDACTED]

By cb, NARA Date 1-22-01

SUBJECT: North Vietnamese Civilian Reaction to U.S. Air Strikes

[REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

When some villagers in the coastal areas of North Vietnamese provinces between the 17th and 20th parallels were asked specifically, most of the fishermen linked the bombing of North Vietnam to the active pursuit of the war in the South by the Hanoi regime. The crew of a fishing boat from the Quang Xuong district believe that if the North Vietnamese Government stopped infiltrating troops and supplies into South Vietnam, the American bombing of North Vietnam would cease. None of the fishermen demonstrated any spirit for the war and none volunteered the opinion that the reunification of the two Vietnams was a cause worth fighting for. Their principal interest in the war is having the bombing stop.

Local Lao Dong Party Cadre tell the villagers that the bombing is in revenge for the terrible losses the United States and its "puppet"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

South Vietnamese Army are sustaining in the South. The villagers give progressively less credence to this claim as the war drags on, more men are drafted and never heard of again, and rationing becomes more acute. Although village officials report that many of the attacking aircraft are being shot down, the villagers do not believe this because they have witnessed little, if any, effective defense measures, and the air raids continue. One of the few who witnessed the downing of an American aircraft related how the aircraft flying protective cover took a heavy toll of militia and army troops who were attempting to capture airmen from the plane which had been shot down.

The North Vietnamese regime's inability to end the air attacks by counteractions has caused some villagers to seriously doubt the Government's oft-repeated boast of "the inevitability of victory." Many judge the decision to continue fighting in the South as a lack of official concern for the dangers and hardships the bombing is causing the people in the coastal villages.

Although many of those questioned described the bombing as "indiscriminate," when pressed most admitted that principal targets for attacking aircraft appeared to be security posts, bridges, radar installations, and coastal and inland waterways traffic. (Comment: Off-target bombs and flimsy construction of nearby structures seem to cause the majority of civilian casualties.)

The villagers, especially in areas that have been bombed repeatedly, are terrified by the raids. The populace, therefore, holds daytime activity to a minimum, and many of the Government-operated economic and administrative units, including the fishing cooperatives, have been either damaged, abandoned, or evacuated to areas that have not been bombed.

Because of air attacks on fishing boats, Government confiscation of boats for use in coastal and inland waterways cargo shipping, and breakdowns because of the lack of spare parts, fish production has been reduced in many areas to a point where the fishermen cannot turn in enough fish to the cooperatives in exchange for sufficient rice to support their families. The fishermen admitted that in such cases they often resort to hiding a portion of their catch for sale on the black market. The hours they spend fishing are dependent on considerations of safety from air attacks rather than on when the fish are likely to bite. The size of the crews on those boats remaining operative have accordingly increased.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In spite of monetary incentives offered by the Government to professional fishermen to serve as coastal shipping laborers, the fishermen avoid this service whenever possible because of the dangers involved from air strikes.

People in the coastal villages are resentful of the time they are required to spend, with no compensation, in repairing bomb damage and digging coastal defensive trenches and air raid shelters.

The fishermen frequently mentioned that Regular Army units in their villages were withdrawn after the village was bombed and that militia units are now providing internal security and manning anti-aircraft artillery sites. In at least one village the militia disregards orders instructing it to fire at all enemy aircraft because it assumes the ground fire will draw retaliatory attack.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18
Pres file

Wednesday, March 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Presence at the Coronation of the King of Tonga

The Kingdom of Tonga in the Southwest Pacific is crowning its new king, His Majesty Taufa'ahau Tupou IV, on July 4. The Privy Council has invited our government to be officially present. They would appreciate an early response so they can issue a formal invitation.

State recommends acceptance and that you designate a Personal Representative with the rank of Special Ambassador. They have no nominee, but will make suggestions for appropriate gifts.

Tonga is a constitutional monarchy under British protection. Queen Elizabeth has designated the Duke of Kent to represent the Crown. Embassy London advises that the British Government's decision whether to be represented at the ministerial level will depend in part on composition of our delegation.

I support State's recommendation and will, if you wish, submit nominees for you to consider. The new king is friendly to us and Tonga is influential within the Southwest Pacific Commission. The King's imposing physical stature (450 lbs - 6'4") may be a factor to consider in naming a representative.

A brief note on the Kingdom is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Accept invitation _____ Yes _____ No

Submit nominees _____ Yes _____ No

See me _____

KINGDOM OF TONGA

The Kingdom of Tonga is a constitutional monarchy under the protection of Great Britain and consists of three main groups of islands together with some 150 small islands, lying between 15 and 23 degrees south of the Equator and southwest of American Samoa. The capital city is Nuku'alofa. Its population, numbering about 71,000, is almost pure Polynesian and is devoutly Christian with Sunday observance written into the Constitution. Tongan traditions have been carefully preserved and the new King can trace his descent from ancient chiefs who ruled the Tongans before the Normans conquered England.

The Parliament is a unicameral body and consists of the Privy Council, plus seven nobles elected by the 33 hereditary nobles and seven commoners elected by adult male franchise. When the Parliament is not in session, ordinances are promulgated by the Privy Council which is presided over by the King and is composed of the Premier, two islands governors and the four Cabinet Ministers all appointed by the King. These same officials comprise the Cabinet which is presided over by the Premier. The Privy Council also sits as the Court of Appeal with the Chief Justice of Tonga as an additional member. British appointed officials--a Consul, a Resident Commissioner and a Secretary to Government--advise the Kingdom on financial, foreign affairs and on certain criminal matters. Tongans are British Protected Persons, as well as Tongan citizens.

One of the most unusual aspects of Tonga is its land tenure system. All land is the property of the Crown and every Tongan, when he attains the age of 16 years and thereby becomes a taxpayer, is entitled to a life-time interest in a bush allotment of $8\frac{1}{4}$ acres of land and a town site of $\frac{2}{5}$ ths of an acre. The Tongan economy is based upon agriculture and the principal products are bananas and copra.

King Taufa (the familiar form of address) is an imposing figure of about 450 lbs. and 6 ft. 4 inches tall. He is successor to his mother, Queen Salote, who reigned for 47 years. He is very friendly to the United States where he has been a frequent visitor.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Wednesday, March 8, 1967
6:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gene Rostow's
memorandum of conversation
with Sen. McGovern on the India
Food resolution, which has been
cleared with the Senator.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1991

By kg, NARA, Date 3-26-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

March 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Conversation with Senator McGovern on
India Food Resolution

I called on Senator McGovern yesterday to discuss the India Food Resolution. He had indicated an intention to amend the Resolution to eliminate any reference to "equal" matching of US contributions by other donors.

I began by explaining that I had come to seek the Senator's advice as to how we should proceed, that I understood his concern and recognized that elimination of the word "equal" would remove any doubts that the Resolution restricted the President's power under PL-480. On the other hand, I pointed out, our policy objective was to obtain equal matching by others; clear language to that effect would strengthen our bargaining position. The level of additional contributions we were seeking was quite ambitious, and we would need all the bargaining leverage we could get.

I expressed our concern that once the Resolution was opened to amendments, restrictive amendments, offered, for example, by Senator Ellender or Representative Findley, might succeed, to the detriment of the objectives shared by both the Senator and the Administration.

Finally, I reassured the Senator that both Secretary Freeman and I felt that this Resolution, which was intended to express Congress' support for the President's policy, did not restrict the President's broad authority under PL-480 to make such grain shipments to India as proved necessary. Freeman and I had tried to make this clear in our testimony, and we believed the same point was made by Senator Miller and Congressman Dole, the drafters of the Resolution.

I referred Senator McGovern to the following statement on this issue made by Congressman Dole at the House hearing:

" I think I might point out that it is very difficult to word this section. One contingency that we were concerned about was that, even despite this very effort

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-349
By sig, NARA, Date 1-8-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

to get people to match, that there should be a failure from other countries then we are faced with the choice of having starvation on the one hand, or, at least, hunger; and supplying food.

We feel there ought to be enough of an option so that we could supply additional food. I think it was the intent of the drafters that it read just as it was, with this one exception, that if you cannot do it, are you going to turn your back on the people of India? We say, "No".

Senator McGovern explained his difficulty with the Resolution: he had led the fight in Committee last year against Ellender to give the President his present broad authority under PL-480; indeed, he had worked to defeat a proposal by Senator Miller to include a 50-50 matching requirement in that legislation. Now, he was being asked to support a Resolution which, to many people, might look like a victory for those forces he had worked so hard to defeat. He did not intend to retreat from his position, which he believed to be the right one.

However, he appreciated that seeking to amend the Resolution might open a 'Pandora's Box' of damaging amendments. He was glad to receive my reassurances that Freeman and I did not consider the Resolution restrictive of the President's authority. For these reasons, he concluded, he would not seek to amend the Resolution. He would instead make a statement on the floor explaining his position on the basis of these assurances.

*Discussed on the phone with
Senator McJannet. He promised
again not to offer amendments.
He wishes there were no
Resolutions. He may Express
his reservations, but his intention
our statement. He may register a dissent
"No" vote. I
asked him earnestly to vote "yes."*

EVR

Eugene V. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-350
By ju, NARA, Date 9-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Profile

Wednesday, March 8, 1967 -- 6:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Abe Feinberg came in today to report the following after his trip to Israel.

1. There is a strong feeling in Israel that we are shifting our policy away from them; and the Prime Minister is "beleaguered."

2. In particular, the somewhat extravagant publicity given in Israel to our small arms shipment to Jordan plus the continued pressure from Syria plus their rather difficult economic position has them in the dumps.

3. Therefore, he hopes we can be responsive with respect to certain of their requests, notably these two:

-- 200 armored personnel carriers;

-- Hawk missile and Patton tank spares.

The first, he said, are extremely important to permit effective patrolling of the border. If we can't give a grant for them, we should let them purchase.

With respect to the spares, he thinks there should be a way for us to provide credit without violating our existing policy.

I told him that there was no change in our policy towards Israel; and that recommendations on these issues would be coming before the President soon.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Sec. Rusk

WWRostow:rlm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 8, 1967 -- 6:40

Mr. President:

SUBJECT: Hope Springs Eternal

This apparently casual conversation in New York is worth your noting. It has a certain credibility because:

- Kulebiakin is probably a KGB agent;
- He has been used to make important suggestions in a casual way before, as noted in the final paragraph.

Sec. Rusk, Sec. McNamara and I discussed this. We shall be going back to him and having Tommy drop a casual note to the new North Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow.

My initial reaction to Ho Chi Minh's reply was that they had decided to sweat us out until 1968. It is conceivable, however, that they merely wish to play out to the last drop the no-bombing-for-talk pitch before trying something more interesting. If so, we will know soon enough.

W. W. Rostow

USUN 4253

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-52
By is, NARA Date 3-24-00

WWRostow:rlm

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of Sta.

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Action

55

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 95-53

By is, NARA Date 10-30-99

EXDIS

VIETNAM

DURING LUNCH FINGER SUGGESTED TO KULEBIAKIN (USSR) IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO SOV-US RELATIONS IF SOV REPS DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY MAKE PROPAGANDA ATTACK ON US EACH TIME NEW COMITE MEETS. THIS TACTIC APPEARED TO SUGGEST SOV OBSESSSION WITH US WHICH WAS HARDLY FLATTERING TO SOV UNION AND DID NOT HELP RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES. THEN ASKED WHETHER KULEBIAKIN HAD ANY SUGGESTION FOR US ON IMPROVING RELATIONS.

KULEBIAKIN SAID BEST THING US COULD DO WOULD BE END FIGHTING IN VIETNAM. FIRST STEP WOULD BE FOR US TO STOP BOMBING

FINGER POINTED OUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NUMBER OF PAUSES IN BOMBING WITHOUT RESULT. NOTED FURTHER THAT PRES JOHNSON HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR AMERICAN TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND WOULD ENCOUNTER MOST SEVERE CRITICISM IF HE STOPPED BOMBING WITHOUT ANY RECIPROCAL ACTION, SINCE RESULT WOULD BE TO INCREASE RISK FOR AMERICAN TROOPS.

KULEBIAKIN SAID DIFFICULTY WAS LACK OF CONFIDENCE. NORTH VIETNAMESE DO NOT TRUST US. PERHAPS ANSWER MIGHT BE TO HAVE SECRET TALKS BETWEEN NORTH VIETNAMESE AND US IN ORDER TO EXPLORE TYPE OF NEGOTS AND NATURE OF SETTLEMENT. KULEBIANKIN SAID NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD LITTLE INTEREST IN TALKING TO WILSON OR U THANT. HE CITED FACT THAT THEY HAD USED THEIR CONSUL GENERAL TO TALK WITH U THANT AS INDICATION THAT THEY PLACED LITTLE IMPORTANCE ON THIS CONTACT. HE FELT HAVOI WOULD PREFER TALK DIRECTLY TO AMERICANS ON STRICTLY SECRET AND PRIVATE BASIS. SUCH TALKS MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN PARIS OR MOSCOW. AS FOR MOSCOW, HE THOUGHT PHAM VAN DONG WOULD HAVE MANY REASONS TO COME THERE AND THEREFORE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- USUN 4253, MARCH 7, 1967

~~IN ARRANGING SUCH PRESENCE. IF US CONSIDERED THOMPSON AN~~
APPROPRIATE SPOKESMAN, WE BELIEVED SOVS COULD ARRANGE PRIVATE
DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THOMPSON AND PHAM VAN DONG.

FINGER ASKED WHETHER PHAM VAN DONG COULD BE CONSIDERED
AUTHORITATIVE SPOKESMAN FOR HO CHI MINH AND KULEBIAKIN
REPLIED STRONGLY IN AFFIRMATIVE.

AT CLOSE OF CONVERSATION KULEBIAKIN REQUESTED THAT HIS
NAME BE KEPT OUT OF ANY FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSAL.
HE WOULD DENY ANY IDENTIFICATION WITH IT. IMPORTANT THING
WAS NOT HIS IDENTIFICATION BUT MERITS OR DEMERITS OF IDEA.

DURING CONVERSATION KULEBIAKIN WAS ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT OF
SEN KENNEDY PROPOSAL THAT US SUSPEND BOMBING FOR ONE WEEK
DURING WHICH TALKS SHOULD BEGIN. HE RESPONDED THAT SUCH
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION COULD HARDLY BE CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY
BY HANOI. HE EXPRESSED REGRET THAT RIVAL POLITICAL AMBITIONS
APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN FACTOR IN MAKING SUCH PROPOSAL PUBLIC
AND HOPE THAT SUCH SERIOUS PROBLEM AS VIETNAM WOULD NOT BE
UNDULY AFFECTED BY DOMESTIC US POLITICS.

COMMENT. KULEBIAKIN, WHO IS 4TH RANKING MEMBER OF SOV MISSION,
SPEAKS MORE FREELY, AND SOMETIMES LOOSELY, THAN OTHER
MEMBERS OF SOV MISSION. WE PRESUME HE IS KGB. ~~DEPT WILL~~
~~RECALL COMPARABLE CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM PRECEDING AND~~
~~DURING GROMYKO VISIT LAST FALL, BOTH WITH RESPECT TO~~
VIETNAM AND SUGGESTING GROMYKO MTG WITH SECRETARY.

GP-3.

BUFFUM
BT

~~SECRET~~

22

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 8, 1967 -- 7:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Soviet Strategic Missiles in Cuba

With further reference to my memorandum of last night and your notation asking for further study, you should know that there is a CIA-DIA team whose function it is to keep the issue of reintroduction of strategic weapons in Cuba under constant review.

At Tab A is a collection of their reports over the past year. The latest is dated February 23, 1967 and contains this conclusion:

"Since the CIA-DIA Team Report of 17 January 1967, we have received no intelligence which changes our conclusions that there are no strategic weapons or nuclear warheads in Cuba."

I recommend that you take the time to read this report because it will give you a clear picture of how this team sifts through reports on strategic weapons and checks them out.

The February report is particularly interesting because it covers the same charges made by Bethel yesterday which appeared in his newsletter on February 12.

At Tab B is an analysis of other charges made by Bethel in his testimony.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A -- Collection of the CIA-DIA Team reports

Tab B -- Analysis of Bethel charges.

WGB:WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 88-193
By jp/pc/ces, NARA, Date 1-30-90

~~TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY~~

Pres file

Wednesday, March 8, 1967 -- 6:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk, Sec. McNamara and I met to discuss a trip to the Pacific during March. We agreed:

- A trip to Guam would be a good idea.
- We recommend against a trip to Viet Nam, for the reasons I gave you on the telephone.
- There might be two working days at Guam: one with the American team; the second day with Ky and Thieu.
- The focus would be on: your talk with Westy, getting his feel for the situation and giving him guidance; pulling the new team together and charging it up; introducing the new team to Ky and Thieu.
- As for timing, the sooner the better, but we want to give Ellsworth a chance to fly out to Katmandu to persuade his wife that he should take the job -- that is, if you have settled on him.

Sec. Rusk is ready to discuss this with you in detail.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State 7-5-78, NSC 2-23-79
By as/eg, NARA, Date 4/19/91

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 19, NARA, Date 4/22/91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - March 8, 1967
5:00 p.m.

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Delegation to Brazilian Inaugural

Senator Eastland, after accepting your invitation to go to the Brazilian inaugural, had to decline.

Mike Manatos asked Senator Mansfield to suggest a replacement. Mansfield expects the Consular Treaty to come to a vote about March 15 and does not want any favorable Senators to be away. He would be pleased to have an invitation extended to any of the known opponents to the Treaty.

Mike Manatos suggests we try to get one of the following to go to Brazil:

- Senator Dodd _____
- Senator Cotton _____
- Senator Hruska _____
- Senator McClellan _____
- Senator Mundt _____
- Senator Talmadge _____

If you agree with this approach, please indicate the order in which you want us to approach the Senators on the invitation.

W. W. Rostow

Approve approach,
see marked order
of preference _____

Disapprove
approach _____. Speak to me _____.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DATA TAKEN FROM ~~TOP SECRET~~ SOURCES

Wednesday, March 8, 1967 -- 4:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, a seven point statement on how the bombing helps our fighting men and those of our allies to counter North Vietnam's illegal aggression against the south.

1. The air strikes have tied up between 600,000 and 700,000 people (this includes 20 per cent of North Vietnam's military strength). If these were not required for defense and reconstruction, they would be available for waging and supporting the aggression in the south.

2. The North Vietnamese have gone to great length to try to make our bombing campaign less effective. Since 1965, they have increased their radars fivefold, the number of antiaircraft weapons fourfold, and the number of jet fighters twofold. They have also introduced a large surface-to-air missile system. This has been an expensive diversion of resources away from their support of the war in the south.

3. Air attacks have destroyed significant percentages of North Vietnam's national capacity in direct military or war-supporting target categories:

- 70% -- ammunition depots
- 70% -- explosives manufacturing
- 55% -- petroleum storage (70% of original capacity)
- 30-45% -- electric power
- 23% -- barracks

4. More than 700 bridges have been destroyed. About 10,000 trucks, 2,500 railroad cars, and 14,000 watercraft have been destroyed or damaged -- estimated cost: \$35 - 40 million. North Vietnam has had to increase the number of transport workers by 50,000. According to some

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Authority NLS/CBS 19
By is, NARS, Date 6-22-84

reports, they have had to impress fishermen into coastal transport duty for six-month periods. Time required to transport goods has at least doubled, if not tripled. Losses in transit have reduced total traffic volume by 20 to 40 per cent.

5. North Vietnamese deserters and prisoners tell us the bombing makes infiltration very difficult. In 1966, PW's reported that air strikes had increased infiltration time up to two months. They are forced to travel at night without lights and often have to eat uncooked food. They talk about fear, disease, lack of medicine, hardship, and low morale -- some casualties and many desertions. We don't know how many infiltrators and supplies (one PW estimated 20%) are lost on the march south, but we know that bombing complicates the journey and reduces the morale and immediate combat effectiveness of those who complete the arduous trip.

6. Cumulative effects of the bombing continue to disrupt parts of North Vietnam's economy. For example, estimated losses in North Vietnam's agricultural production and the fishing industry total over \$30 million. Although the food situation is not yet critical, rice production in 1966 was 300,000 tons below average. Identified imports of bulk foodstuffs totalled almost 24,000 tons in January compared with an average monthly import of 6,400 tons in 1966.

7. In 1964, North Vietnam received \$115 million in aid from communist countries. In 1965, aid increased to \$410 million. By 1966, \$505 million in external aid was needed to keep North Vietnam in the war. (This was about four times the damage resulting from air attacks in 1966.) At the same time, North Vietnam's exports of coal and cement are below normal levels and there have been no recent shipments of apatite. Export losses attributable to bombing total over \$15 million -- equal to one-third of North Vietnam's annual export earnings of hard currencies.

Wash Rostow

26

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

Wednesday, March 8, 1967
8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith my telecon with
Cabot Lodge last night. We couldn't
get a secure phone.

"WH" is what I said: "BG" is
what he said.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24
By h8, NARA, Date 3-26-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

SENT
WHCA

1967 MAR 8 01 35

WHITE HOUSE TELECON 080100Z MARCH 1967

PRESENT WHITE HOUSE:

MR. WALTER W. ROSTOW

CLASSIFIED: ~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

WH-1

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

5 GOOD MORNING CABOT.

YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THE NEW YORK TIMES CARRIED A STORY
THIS MORNING THAT YOU WERE LEAVING AND THE PRESIDENT
WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY FINDING A SUCCESSOR.
VARIOUS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS WERE NAMED AND DISCUSSED.

I HAVE ONE QUESTION AND TWO OBSERVATIONS.

1. DO YOU KNOW WHO CHATTED WITH THE PRESS?

2. WE ARE ANXIOUS TO MEET YOUR WISHES ON TIMING. YOUR

LETTER WAS GREATLY APPRECIATED AND WILL HAVE A PROPER
RESPONSE.

3. WE ARE READY TO MOVE WHEN YOU ARE.

END WH-1

WH-2

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

THAT IS JUST FINE. WE'LL BE IN TOUCH.
WE HANDLED HERE IN SIMILAR VEIN.
ALL THE BEST.

END WH-2

WH-3

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

WE'LL KNOW MORE IN A FEW DAYS.
END WH-3

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM BAGIUO WITH AMB. LODGE PRESENT

BG-1

I DO NOT KNOW WHO CHATTED WITH THE PRESS.
I SUGGEST WE USE DATE IN MY LETTER ASSUMING YOU
ARE READY AT YOUR END
END BG-1

BG-2

I PLAN TO SAY TODAY AS FOLL:

THIS IS A REPORT THAT APPEARS EVERY SO OFTEN.

THE LAST TIME WAS LAST DECEMBER. I REPEAT NOW WHAT

I SAID THEN AS FOLL:

I SERVE AT THE PLEASURE OF THE PRESIDENT.

OBVIOUSLY ALL TOURS COME TO AND END SOMETIME. BUT I HAVE

NO DEFINITE PLANS OR FIRM DECISIONS WHATEVER.

END BG-2

BG-3

ANY NEWS ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING ME, SAY IN

HONOLULU, AT END OF MARCH???

END BG-3

BG-4

WARM REGARDS AND TO BED EARLY.

END BG-4

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

Wednesday, March 8, 1967
3:30 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. JOHNSON

SUBJECT: Your Attendance at the Summit

Background

The issue of whether wives would participate in the Summit was not addressed at the Buenos Aires Meeting of Foreign Ministers and has not been discussed on a bilateral basis except with Uruguayan authorities to determine the intentions of the host government. We have no reading on whether other Presidents intend to take their wives.

The Uruguayans now tell us that their First Lady, Mrs. Gestido, will participate in social events, but there is no indication of which we are aware that the Uruguayan Government is planning a special program for Presidential wives.

If any program of collective activities is undertaken, it is safe to assume that we will have to propose it, plan it, and provide most of the logistic support.

There is little for the wives to do in Punta del Este in the off season. The Uruguayan Government has urged that the President not visit Montevideo because of concern with their ability to provide adequate security. They would feel substantially the same way about your going into the city.

The alternatives, therefore, are for the wives to stay in Punta del Este or undertake some trips as described in the attached memorandum.

Considerations in your attending the Summit

Your decision to attend would probably predispose other Presidential wives to attend. Your non-attendance would have a corresponding negative effect.

If you do attend, you should plan activities with the other First Ladies present. It would not sit well with them for you to undertake activities by yourself outside of Punta del Este because of the inevitable press attention which you will draw.

The considerations in favor of your attending are:

- The strong moral support which you will give the President.
- The impetus which you could give to national parks, conservation of historical monuments and beautification by making side trips.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 10-21-98

~~SECRET~~

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2.

- The interest which your presence would arouse in the Summit and the Alliance for Progress among women in Latin America.
- The added impact which your presence would give to the President's trip to Punta del Este would help to offset some disappointment that he is not visiting other countries.

The considerations against your going are:

- There is little that you could do in Punta del Este, making side trips necessary.
- We cannot be sure what side trips you can make until we do further checking of facilities.
- There would be considerable work and expense involved in setting up a group program for possibly 20 Presidential wives.

Recommendation;

1. On balance, I think it would be useful for you to make the trip if we can be sure that some good side trips can be arranged that would get good press coverage.
2. I doubt that going just to Punta del Este is worth the effort unless the President wants you by his side; but that, in my view, would be decisive.
3. The advance party which leaves tomorrow should try to determine Uruguayan intentions about attendance and program for wives and carefully check out possibilities for side trips.
4. On the basis of the advance party's findings, you can reach a final decision.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

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~~SECRET~~

Possible Side Trips

for Mrs. Johnson and Other Presidential Wives

Assuming Mrs. Johnson makes the trip, she will want to participate in the opening ceremonies on Wednesday, April 12, and be present when the President makes his speech, which will probably be on the same day. The meeting is scheduled to continue through Thursday, April 13, and close on Friday, April 14, although it might extend into the following morning. Thus, there will be one, and possibly two days for special activities.

These are four possible side trips which Mrs. Johnson might consider if logistics permit. At Tab A is a map showing their location in relation to Punta del Este.

Trip to Iguazu Falls

The falls -- a national park area where the frontiers of Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil come together -- is regarded as one of the great natural spectacles of the world. (See book at Tab B for pictures). It is about 575 miles from Montevideo -- easy range for a day's outing by air. There is an airfield on the Brazilian side of the falls. It will not take a big jet but may be able to handle a Convair.

Mrs. Johnson (and other First Ladies) could visit the falls and have lunch in the hotel on the Brazilian side, which is supposed to be better than the one on the Argentine side. If she wishes to see an Alliance for Progress project, she could visit the hydroelectric plant which is being built on the Paraguayan side. This is a multinational project which will furnish power to the three countries. Construction is about half-way completed.

If there is time and transportation permits, the return trip might include a stop at Posadas, Argentina to see the ruins of the 17th Century Jesuit missions (see book at Tab B).

The themes which this trip provides fit nicely into Mrs. Johnson's interests: national parks, preservation of historical monuments, tourism and Alliance for Progress.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12556, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By reg/ld, NARA, Date 4/19/91

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-2-

Trip to Nahuel Huapi National Park

This vast Argentine national park in the heart of the Andes is on the border between Argentina and Chile. It is like our Rockies, with larger lakes and higher mountains. (See material at Tab C). Since the park is some 800 miles from Montevideo, the trip should be undertaken only if one of the big jets can land in Bariloche, the principal town on the shores of Lake Nahuel Huapi.

The activities available would be lunch at the Llao Llao Hotel and either a tour by boat or by car of the Lake Nahuel Huapi.

National parks and tourism would be the themes for this trip.

Boat Ride up the River Plate Estuary and Parana River Delta

If the weather were good, an excursion with lunch and special entertainment aboard a suitable boat would provide a pleasant and interesting way to spend a day and do some sightseeing.

The trip would probably start at Colonia, Uruguay which is directly across the estuary from Buenos Aires. The boat could cross over to Buenos Aires, cruise along the water-front, and then go up river into the Parana-Uruguay river delta.

Visit to an Estancia with Side Trip to a Town for Dedication of an Alliance for Progress Project

Through Embassy Montevideo we can try to arrange the dedication of an AFP project -- school, clinic, housing center -- in an interior town of Uruguay near a large estancia where Mrs. Johnson could go for a typical Uruguayan asado (barbecue).

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~~SECRET~~

-3-

Other Possibilities

There may be other activities which Embassy Montevideo may consider appropriate. The advance party can check with Ambassador and Mrs. Hoyt.

Attachments

- Tab A - Map.
- Tab B - Book on Iguazu Falls and 17th Century Jesuit Missions.
- Tab C - Material on Nahuel Huapi National Park.

~~SECRET~~

Wed., March 8, 1967
12:15 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith two versions of a possible statement by the Secretary of State on the history of negotiations. The first (Draft #2), reveals something about channels and is quite detailed. The second (Draft #3) gets the same points across with less blowing of channels.

I am making these available to Sect. Rusk.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachments

(cc to Sec Rusk w/atts)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
18, NARA, Date 4/22/91

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DRAFT (# 3) - Short Version of #2

March 8, 1967

I want to talk today about some of the efforts we have made to achieve peace in Viet-Nam -- and about the barriers we have encountered in trying to reach that goal.

In this process, we have talked with many representatives of many governments in almost every country of the world. We have talked, directly and indirectly, with Hanoi.

I do not propose to describe these contacts in great detail. I do not think it would be wise to do so. For we continue to hope that the channels now in existence will one day open up as a path toward reasonable and honorable settlement.

But I will outline the three principal lines of approach we have taken.

First, in carrying out the President's commitment to "unconditional negotiations," we have responded affirmatively to the public appeals of others for peace talks.

Second, we have acted unilaterally to meet the contention of Hanoi, and of others, that North Viet-Nam could not talk of peace -- or move toward peace -- while we were bombing the North.

Finally, we have approached Hanoi -- both directly and through intermediaries -- in a serious effort to achieve a peaceful

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Authority 71985-277

By Ag/esp, NARA, Date 4/22/91

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settlement or, at least, reciprocal steps to reduce the level of fighting.

In the first category, we agreed to cooperate when suggestions for negotiations were made:

- by the 17 non-aligned nations;
- by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers;
- by the Asian nations;
- by the British Co-chairman of the Geneva Conference;
- by members of the International Control Commission;
- by such leading personalities as the Secretary General of the United Nations and His Holiness, Pope Paul.

We have been prepared to go to a conference at any time and in any place to settle the war. We have been prepared to consider at that conference a step toward peace, or many steps, the beginnings of a settlement or a total settlement. We have been prepared to take mutual actions to reduce the violence, or to explore the shape of a final settlement before either side does anything.

The record shows that Hanoi has regularly and rigidly refused to accept any and all proposals to negotiate -- except on its own terms.

When efforts to open negotiations failed, we sought to remove what some claimed was the main obstacle -- the bombing of the North.

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We sought to test the contention that Hanoi might negotiate if we stopped bombing targets in its territory. We have tested this theory on five occasions. In each case, it has proved to be false.

The first serious test was in May 1965. At noon on May 12, the bombing of the North was halted.

We told the Soviets what we were doing. We told Hanoi what we were doing. We said we would be watching for some sign from the other side that it was ready to reduce its armed actions.

A message outlining our position -- and our hope -- was delivered to the North Vietnamese. It was returned the next day. A second note was delivered in Hanoi. It, too, was sent back. Hanoi and Peking both branded the pause a "trick."

With this hostile reaction clear, bombing was resumed after a pause of more than five days.

Then, we were told the pause should have been longer -- ten days or fifteen days.

On Christmas Eve 1965, we again stopped bombing. We set no date for its end. We issued no ultimatums. We only asked that Hanoi respond with some action of its own.

The Vice President, Ambassador Harriman, Ambassador Goldberg and others made contact with a large number of governments.

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We asked to urge Hanoi to help us translate our unilateral initiative into a reduction of hostilities -- and to move toward negotiations.

It is not true that we were then ready to extend the pause indefinitely in exchange for talks alone. We made it clear to Hanoi that the suspension could continue if there were "reciprocal reductions of hostilities."

We did not try to dictate what actions Hanoi should take. But we mentioned infiltration of men and supplies into the South, military action and terrorism in the South, and the withdrawal of Northern forces from the South as appropriate areas for action by them.

Hanoi's response was unyielding. We were told we had to stop the bombing "unconditionally and forever." We were told we had to accept Hanoi's Four Points. We were told that Hanoi had nothing more to say; it did not want to have serious talks on any basis other than its own preconditions.

Then, as now, it treated our offer to continue to halt bombing in return for action on its part as an "ultimatum."

After 37 days, during which Hanoi strengthened its military position in the South, bombing was resumed on January 31, 1966.

In the summer of 1966, we were approached by intermediaries who claimed to be in direct contact with Hanoi. We set forth in some

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detail our general approach to the problem of peace -- either through talks or through reciprocal actions. We made it clear that we remained ready once again to act first and to let Hanoi act in response to our initiative.

In November, we invited Hanoi, through these intermediaries, to respond in any way it considered appropriate to the principle of mutual de-escalation. There was no direct response.

We tried, then, to translate these indirect efforts at discussion into a direct dialogue with Hanoi's representative.

We said we were ready to stop the bombing if we knew what steps Hanoi would take in return. We were led to believe that Hanoi was willing to talk on this basis.

Our representative was designated and was ready to talk on December 6. No representative from Hanoi appeared. We were then told that our bombing attacks on December 13-14 had caused Hanoi to withdraw from the proposed talks.

To meet this point, we ordered a halt to all bombing within ten miles of Hanoi for "an indefinite period." We asked that Hanoi take some reciprocal action as a sign of good faith.

Hanoi did not act. Hanoi did not answer. The authorities in North Viet-Nam told the intermediary to break off the discussions.

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The pattern of military action continued as before. We have since indicated we do not feel bound by this 10-mile circle.

We stopped bombing again over Christmas 1966 and for 48 hours over New Years. In neither case was there any sign from Hanoi that it would reduce its action against the South. Indeed, the buildup of military forces and supplies was stepped up during these periods.

The question of possible de-escalation of the war arose again when the two co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference were meeting in London in early February.

We told the British and Soviet officials we were ready to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam if Hanoi would agree to stop infiltration of the South. Moreover, we would also promise not to increase the size of our forces in the South. We said we would welcome British and Soviet support for this position.

Remember, this basic position had been known to Hanoi for three months by the time it was raised again in London. To assure that there was no misunderstanding, we again conveyed our views directly to Hanoi.

The answer that came back from Hanoi was the same as before -- halt the bombing "definitively and unconditionally," pull

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out of Viet-Nam, recognize the Liberation Front, and let the Vietnamese settle their problems themselves. In short, it was a formula for turning South Viet-Nam over to the Communists and to Hanoi's control.

When the London talks ended and the Soviet Premier had returned home, we resumed bombing. It is true that one small positive step by Hanoi might have launched a serious move toward peace. But that step was not taken. It has not yet been taken.

What does this record show?

First, we have taken the initiative repeatedly in an effort to achieve mutual de-escalation.

Second, there has been no response to these efforts, either in terms of equivalent action or in willingness to undertake serious discussions, or both.

From beginning to end, the other side has stuck to the position stated by Ho Chi Minh -- that the United States must stop the bombing, definitively and unconditionally, and all other military action against the North.

The Soviet Union has never deviated from this position and its statements can only be read as reaffirmation of Hanoi's stand.

Third, in all of the contacts we have had with Hanoi, direct and indirect, there has been no indication that the North Vietnamese

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authorities yet want to bring the war to an end except on terms which would be equivalent to turning South Viet-Nam over to control of Hanoi and its agents.

We are not prepared to tie our hands militarily for the privilege of talks with Hanoi -- while the North Vietnamese remain free to conduct their campaign of conquest without restriction.

We are not prepared to endanger our men in the field -- or our allies -- or the long-suffering but determined Vietnamese who stand firm in defense of their people.

Hanoi may still believe that it can go on fighting longer than we can.

But the authorities in Hanoi are wrong. And whether the time be short or long, they will discover how wrong they are.

Let us hope that they discover their error sooner rather than later.

Meantime, our efforts to achieve peace will continue without let-up. We continue to explore every reasonable measure, large or small, that will move us in the direction of a settlement.

And we shall continue to help the Vietnamese people to build their nation in their own way -- and to find the security and progress they so deeply desire, and so richly deserve.

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DRAFT (#2)

March 8, 1967

The President has asked me to make known to our people some of the major efforts we have made -- the initiatives we have taken -- to bring the war in Viet-Nam to an end by negotiation.

We have carefully pursued a number of different lines of communication, direct and indirect, with Hanoi over the past several years. I will not describe them all; I do not think it would be wise to do so. But I would like to outline the three principal lines of approach we have taken.

First, in carrying out the President's commitment to "unconditional negotiations," we have responded affirmatively to the public appeals of others for peace talks.

Second, we have acted unilaterally to meet the contention of Hanoi, and of others, that North Viet-Nam could not talk of peace -- or move toward peace -- while we were bombing the North.

Finally, we have approached Hanoi -- both directly and through intermediaries -- in a serious effort to achieve a peaceful settlement or, at least, reciprocal steps to reduce the level of fighting.

In the first category, we agreed to cooperate when suggestions for negotiations were made:

-- by the 17 non-aligned nations;

-- by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers;

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Authority 76985-277
By g/aj, NARA, Date 4/22/91

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- by the Asian nations;
- by the British Co-chairman of the Geneva Conference;
- by members of the International Control Commission;
- by such leading personalities as the Secretary General of the United Nations and His Holiness, Pope Paul.

We have been prepared to go to a conference at any time and in any place to settle the war. We have been prepared to consider at that conference a step toward peace, or many steps, the beginnings of a settlement or a total settlement. We have been prepared to take mutual actions to reduce the violence, or to explore the shape of a final settlement before either side does anything.

The record shows that Hanoi has rigidly and regularly refused to accept any and all proposals to negotiate.

When one effort after another to get negotiations started met with failure, we tried to remove what some claimed was the main obstacle -- the bombing of the North. We were told by various governments that Hanoi could not begin to negotiate while we were bombing targets in its territory. We wanted to test this contention. We did test it on five occasions.

On May 10, 1965, the President decided to have a brief pause in bombing attacks against North Viet-Nam. The next day, we advised

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the Soviet Government that the pause would begin at noon on Wednesday, May 12. We made it clear we were acting in response to suggestions from various quarters, including public statements by authorities in Hanoi, that there could be no progress toward peace while air attacks continued.

We said we would be watching during the pause for signs of any significant reduction in armed action by the other side. We warned, however, that the pause should not be misinterpreted as a sign of weakness. We expressed the hope that the halt in our air attacks "may meet with a response which will permit further and more extended suspension of this form of military action in the expectation of equally constructive actions by the other side in the future."

Thus, from the outset, we made it clear that we were prepared to act first. But it was equally clear that we required that the other side respond to our initiative with deeds. We were not willing to equate military restraint on our part with vague promises or words only.

A message outlining the above position was delivered orally and in writing to an official of a North Vietnamese embassy who agreed to bring it to the attention of his Ambassador.

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On May 13, that message was returned in a plain envelope to our Embassy. On May 15, the Soviet Foreign Minister made it clear that his Government would not play a role on negotiations on Viet-Nam.

On May 17, a friendly power delivered a copy of our message to the authorities in Hanoi. It was returned the next day.

After this negative -- indeed, hostile -- reception by Hanoi to our approach, bombing was resumed.

As Christmas 1965 approached, our government was again put under heavy pressure to try another pause. We were told that five days had not been enough; it should be ten or fifteen days.

Despite our experience in May, a second pause began on December 24, 1965. In the days and weeks that followed, the Vice President, Ambassador Harriman, Ambassador Goldberg, Governor Williams, and others were in contact with a great many governments. We asked them to urge Hanoi to help us translate our unilateral initiative into a reduction of hostilities -- and to move toward negotiations.

On December 29, we contacted a representative of Hanoi and called attention to the pause in the bombing. We said: "If your government will now reciprocate by making a serious contribution toward peace, it would obviously have a favorable effect on the possibility of further extending the suspension."

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During this period, we tried earnestly to open direct conversations with Hanoi's representatives. We told them we wanted to explore the possibility of "reciprocal reductions of hostilities" and we said these might relate to the infiltration of men and military supplies into the South, the level of military action and terrorism in the South, or the withdrawal of regular North Vietnamese military units from the South, among others.

We also hoped such direct contacts would make it possible to work out arrangements for more formal negotiations.

We explained our position in a direct conversation with a representative of Hanoi on January 24. His answer was that their position "remained unchanged." He insisted the United States must stop bombing the North "unconditionally and forever." It must accept Hanoi's "four points." When our representative suggested further meetings, the Hanoi spokesman told us he had said everything he wished to say; he saw no need for any further meeting.

In another capital, direct talks with a Hanoi representative were also taking place. They ended with the following statement by the official of North Viet-Nam:

"A political settlement of the Viet-Nam problem can be envisaged only when the United States Government has accepted the four-point stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of

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Viet-Nam, has proved this by actual deeds, has stopped unconditionally and for good its air raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. "

Once again, Hanoi had made it unmistakably clear it was not interested in serious discussions; nor was it interested in taking actions in response to our actions. Then, as now, it treated our offer to continue to halt bombing in return for action on its part as an "ultimatum. "

With Hanoi's definite negative responses, bombing was resumed on January 31, 1966.

In the summer of 1966, we were approached by intermediaries who claimed to be in direct contact with Hanoi. The discussion centered on a possible reciprocal de-escalation of the war. We made it clear that, as we had demonstrated during the previous bombing pauses, we were ready to act first and permit Hanoi to act in response to our initiative.

In November, we invited Hanoi, through intermediaries, to respond in any way it considered appropriate to this principle of mutual de-escalation. There was no direct response.

We tried, then, to translate these indirect efforts at discussion into a direct dialogue with Hanoi's representatives. We agreed,

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in such discussions, to consider what a settlement in Viet-Nam might look like and whether agreement, in principle, might be achieved on such a settlement.

We specified we were ready to discuss steps of mutual de-escalation of the war in these talks. Once we knew what the other side was prepared to do, we said, we were ready to take prior initiative, including stopping the bombing of the North. We were led to believe that Hanoi was willing to talk on this basis.

Our representative was designated and was ready to talk on December 6. No representative from Hanoi appeared. We were then told by the intermediary that our bombing attacks of December 13-14 had caused Hanoi to withdraw from what had been alleged to be its commitment to enter discussions with us.

To meet this point, we removed what the intermediary had described as the major obstacle to the beginning of direct talks between the United States and North Viet-Nam. On December 24, we informed the intermediary that we had issued orders that there be no bombing within ten miles of Hanoi for "an indefinite period." We asked Hanoi to take some reciprocal action as a sign of good faith. Hanoi's response was negative. It took no action in response to our initiative. It told the intermediary to break off the discussions.

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The pattern of military action continued as before. We have since indicated we do not feel bound by this 10-mile circle.

There were brief pauses in the bombing over Christmas and New Year holidays. Again, Hanoi took no reciprocal action. It used the pauses to carry out supply and troop movements made easier by the bombing pauses.

The issue of possible de-escalation of the war arose again when the two Co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference were meeting in London in early February.

We informed the British and Soviet representatives that:

"We are prepared to take up with Hanoi steps of mutual de-escalation and are prepared to have the most private preliminary conversations with them on arrangements for serious discussions of a final settlement."

"Specifically, we are prepared to and plan, through established channels, to inform Hanoi that if they will agree to an assured stoppage of infiltration into South Viet-Nam, we will stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam and stop further augmentation of U.S. forces in South Viet-Nam. We would welcome your joint advocacy of this position."

At the same time, President Johnson made this position known directly to President Ho Chi Minh and informed the Co-chairmen of that fact.

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This proposal was made in good faith and it remains valid now. But we had little confidence at that time that the formula would be accepted. For this option had been available to Hanoi for three months, and there had been no answer.

Moreover, during that week, Hanoi was using the truce intensively to build up its forces at the Demilitarized Zone and to expand infiltration through Laos into South Viet-Nam. They were thus repeating the pattern they had pursued on every other occasion when we had displayed unilateral restraint by halting the bombing.

Ho Chi Minh's reply to the President included the following key passage:

"The Government of the United States must stop the bombing, definitively and unconditionally, and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, withdraw from South Viet-Nam all its troops and those of its satellites, recognize the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam and allow the people of Viet-Nam to settle their problems by themselves. This is the essence of the Four Points of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam as well as the expression of the / principles and essential provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1954 on Viet-Nam. It is the basis for a just political solution of the Vietnamese problem. In your message, you suggested direct talks

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between the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States. If the Government of the United States really wants such talks, it must first unconditionally halt the bombing as well as all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. Only after the unconditional stopping of the bombing and all/^{other}American acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam can the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States enter into conversations and discuss the questions in which both parties are interested."

It is clear what Hanoi's reply had been, and remained, to all proposals for a cessation of bombing conditioned on an equitable response from its side. It is demanding that we stop bombing unconditionally and permanently. It promises in return nothing but the possibility of talk.

What does this record show?

First, it is clear that we have been prepared to take the initiative in setting in motion mutual de-escalation -- and we have taken such initiatives five times.

Second, there has been no response to these efforts, either in terms of equivalent action or in willingness to undertake serious discussions, or both.

From beginning to end, the other side has stuck to the position stated less than a month ago by Ho Chi Minh -- that the United States

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must stop the bombing, definitively and unconditionally, and all other military action against the North.

The Soviet Union has never deviated from this position and its statements can only be read as reaffirmation of Hanoi's stand.

Third, in all of the many contacts we have had with Hanoi, direct and indirect, there is not the slightest indication that the North Vietnamese authorities now intend to bring the war to an end except on terms which would be equivalent to turning South Viet-Nam over to control of Hanoi and its agents.

We are not prepared to tie our hands militarily for the privilege of talks with Hanoi -- while the North Vietnamese remain free to conduct their campaign of conquest without restriction.

We are not prepared to endanger our men in the field -- or our allies -- or the long-suffering but determined Vietnamese who stand firm in defense of their people.

Hanoi may still believe that it can go on fighting longer than we can.

But the authorities in Hanoi are wrong. And whether the time be short or long, they will discover how wrong they are.

Let us hope that they discover their error sooner rather than later.

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Meantime, our efforts to achieve peace will continue without let-up. We shall continue to stand ready to explore every reasonable measure, large or small, that will move us in the direction of a settlement.

And we shall continue to help the Vietnamese people to build their nation in their own way -- and to find the security and progress they so deeply desire, and so richly deserve.

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3/8/67

29

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO AMBASSADOR LODGE AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND
FROM WALT ROSTOW

Highest authority ~~have~~ noted helpful column by Joe Alsop in today's Washington Post, ~~emphasizing the nature of President Kennedy's decision to fight the battle of Southeast Asia in Viet Nam rather than Laos, and taking on at the end Senator Robert Kennedy's present position~~

It would be helpful if you could encourage Alsop to do columns on three points:

-- in what specific respects the situation, both military and political, is improving in Viet Nam;

-- why it is essential to continue bombing the North, including the manner in which it saves the lives of U. S. fighting personnel;

-- why debate back home on Viet Nam policy hurts the war effort in South Viet Nam and tends to lengthen the war.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 11652
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY rg ON 4/22/91

Wednesday, March 8, 1967
9:45 a.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Nick Katzenbach and I met this morning to provide you with a fresh judgment on Project CABRIOLET (Nick was designated by Sect. Rusk).

What follows has also been checked this morning with Sect. McNamara who agrees.

In view of the reasons publicly given for the deferral of Project CABRIOLET on February 10 (attached), we believe there is no basis on which we could credibly explain why now -- a month later -- we have gone ahead.

Specifically, we could not claim that we were not "complicating the current discussions concerning a non-proliferation treaty." Those discussions are still going on.

In particular, we believe that if the experiment should vent sufficiently to permit detection in Canada, that fact might be seized upon by the non-nuclear countries to argue that the two major nuclear powers are callous about their agreements while asking the non-nuclear powers to accept extremely important positions of self-denial in the nuclear field.

There would also be, of course, the Arthur Larson type of argument at home. That group would certainly make a good deal of noise about a quick reversal of the February decision.

Therefore, we recommend that during the spring we reexamine the CABRIOLET decision with an eye to scheduling it firmly for the autumn. We should also consider at that time the scheduling of the next test -- BUGGY -- which is funded for fiscal 1968. If they were both conducted in fiscal 1968, we would not (repeat not) be interfering with the Panama Canal Commission program. We would have to assure that funds for CABRIOLET as well as BUGGY were available in fiscal 1968.



W. W. R.

Take no action now _____

Go ahead with CABRIOLET _____

Review rescheduling CABRIOLET and BUGGY in the spring,
assuring CABRIOLET funds are available in FY 1968 _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-350
By fw, NARA, Date 9-3-92



No. K-34
Tel. 973-3335 or
973-3446

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
(Friday, February 10, 1967)

FS

file

PROJECT CABRIOLET DEFERRED

The nuclear excavation experiment, Cabriolet, is being temporarily postponed in order to avoid any possibility of complicating the current discussions concerning a Non-proliferation Treaty or the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which include consideration of provisions for peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.

In the weeks ahead, we shall be considering the relations between the peaceful and constructive uses of atomic energy and the issues raised in these discussions.

The experiment, part of the AEC's Plowshare program, involves a nuclear explosion 170 feet underground at the Commission's Nevada Test Site. The explosion would release about 2.5 kilotons of energy (equivalent to 2,500 tons of TNT), creating a crater about 115 to 145 feet deep, and 425 to 460 feet in diameter.

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2/10/67

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 8, 1967
10:15 a.m.

P File.
handcarried
HJDR
31

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bob McNamara called from the Hill after his breakfast to report his discussion with Arthur Goldberg.

There are three points on his mind:

1. We should surface immediately the full history of our negotiations, including especially the Polish track.
2. We should go back immediately to U Thant on his cease-fire proposal; state that we have advocated this in the past, and would be pleased to discuss it with Hanoi.
3. On Saigon, he felt we badly need a strong, energetic civil team. Porter is used up.

My only comment on these three points is to agree with Sect. Rusk that we ought to get from U Thant in writing some version of his proposal to Hanoi about a cease fire so that we know what we are dealing with before responding.

Also attached is Sect. Rusk's account to you of his talk with Arthur Goldberg.

Obviously, what you mainly have to deal with is the marked sentence.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY ATTACHMENT~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-350
By fw, NARA, Date 9-3-92

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

31a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-349
By ju, NARA, Date 7-24-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

March 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have just finished an hour's talk with Arthur Goldberg.

He will tell you at 11 o'clock that he wishes to leave his present office before the next General Assembly. He expressed his interest in returning to the Court. I urged him not to leave his post both because it is a great public service and he is needed and because his departure would be widely interpreted as expressing dissent from your policy on Viet-Nam. He said he was troubled about the latter point and had been thinking very hard about it. It is quite clear to me that he is motivated by disagreement on Viet-Nam and feels that we have not done enough to probe for peace. He was especially critical of the two bombing strikes in the Hanoi area on December 13 and 14.

I reviewed our policy with him in some detail but I don't feel that I made much of a dent on him.

He came away from Saigon feeling that (a) we ought to push the South Vietnamese more than Lodge has been doing, and (b) that Westmoreland should put more of his military effort into pacification (as Lodge and the Marines wish) rather than on main force operations. He made a number of minor suggestions about such things as getting our own people in Saigon better informed about what is happening in the United States and the need for more attention to corruption, which I have noted. He reported that Porter seemed to be completely exhausted and spoke very highly of the competence of Colonel Wilson, Porter's Deputy.

He seems to feel that our military strength in Viet-Nam makes it easy for us to take major risks in such things as bombing pauses without reciprocity from the other side.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday
March 8, 1967 -- 10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk has offered the British in turn:

- William Bundy
- Nick Katzenbach
- himself.

He says Michael Stewart didn't kick up his heels with delight; but didn't argue and will have already reported to London.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 12-21-77, NSC 7-27-78

By ly/jp, NARA, Date 4/22/91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~1. recap~~
2. Pres file

Tuesday, March 7, 1967, 6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will recall the memo (copy at Tab B) I sent you last Thursday on the U. S. share in the Asian Bank Special Fund. State/AID are pushing for a pledge of 50%; Treasury believes that no more than 40% is saleable on the Hill. My own recommendation was that we fuzz the issue for now by speaking in terms of a "minority" participation, which would give us flexibility up to 49% in the State/AID direction of downward if the Congress insists.

At Tab A is a tardy but strong pitch for 50% from Gene Black. I send it along as an addition to the materials you will need to reach a decision.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

EKH:mst

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-350

By ju, NARA, Date 9-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Asian Bank Special Funds

I am sending you this note from Roosevelt Hospital in New York where I've been laid up for a week with a bad case of shingles. I don't know when this will be over.

Fortunately, I'm able to stay in pretty close touch with the Southeast Asia development effort. I look forward in particular to returning to consultations with the Congress on the proposed authorization of ADB Special Funds. In the meantime, my prepared statement will be delivered to Committee Chairmen and other Members for their views prior to preparation of our formal legislative proposal. Until I can come to Washington I will borrow a leaf from your book and work on this by 'phone.

It has come to my attention that the only outstanding item of my proposal which the interested Executive Departments have not agreed on has been referred to you for decision. This is the question of the percentage of U. S. participation in ADB Special Funds.

You might recall that when I outlined my proposal to you last December for a \$200 million U. S. special authorization for the ADB that I indicated our participation would be contingent on fully matching participation by other developed countries. I knew at the time it would be very difficult for the Asian countries--even with our help--to get matching funds for multilateral undertakings of significant size in Southeast Asia. Japan is the only other country likely to provide large amounts of aid to Southeast Asia on the terms needed.

The cooperative program you called for in April of 1965 has inspired and contributed to a growing number of Asian initiatives and proposals. In the case of ADB Special Funds I am convinced this activity will fail to accomplish the purpose I had in recommending it or you had in endorsing it unless we are prepared to put up half. While larger than our share in IDA, a U. S. share in ADB Special Funds limited to 50% would be an enormous improvement over our participation in special programs of the Inter-American Bank.

I, therefore, urge you to agree to our proceeding with plans for a 50% U. S. participation. If Congress won't agree, then at least we tried. If this is not agreeable to you, then I would like an opportunity to discuss this with you before a final decision is made. I will certainly do all I can to persuade the Congress to accept this.

Respectfully yours,

cc: Honorable William S. Gaud
Honorable Joseph W. Barr
Honorable William P. Bundy

E. R. Black

Eugene R. Black

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2026

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-350
By ju, NARA, Date 9-3-92

Wednesday, March 1, 1967 - 7:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. Share in Asian Bank Special Funds

You will recall that Eugene Black was scheduled to begin today with his extensive consultations on the Hill concerning his trip and our proposed contribution to new Special Funds for the Asian Development Bank. Unfortunately, Gene has been hospitalized with a bad case of shingles. Therefore, he -- with the agreement of all your advisers -- proposes to send up his formal statement (draft at Tab A), to be followed by an appearance as soon as he can manage it.

The statement is approved around the government with the exception of one passage (page 22). The issue is what percentage share of the Funds the U.S. should agree to put up:

- State/AID (Gaud, Solomon and Bill Bundy) argue that we should agree to 50%. They point out that it is going to be very difficult to round up enough other contributors to achieve even this goal. They are worried that Special Funds may never materialize if we are too tough on the matching provision.
- Treasury (Barr speaking for Fowler) argues that our percentage should not exceed 40%. They cite the strong Congressional view that our 42% share in IDA should be decreased, and the likelihood that we will be before the same Committees (Banking and Currency and Foreign Relations) for IDA money at the same time we are pushing this Asian Bank request. They would agree to our financing as much as 50% of any single project, but ^{argue} that a total share of more than 40% simply won't have a chance on the Hill.

The situation on the Hill is mixed. Fulbright told Katzenbach yesterday that he would support the Asian Bank request. On the other hand, Treasury reports Republicans on the Banking and Currency Committee are working up an amendment to hold our share to 30%. On balance, it seems clear that the lower our share is, the more saleable the proposition becomes. But the foreign policy costs that worry State/AID are very real.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

My own solution would be to fuzz the issue for the moment by proposing a "minority" participation. This would give us leeway in the State/AID direction up to 49%, but would also leave room to retreat if Black finds that Treasury's fears were justified. I offer this suggestion for your consideration; I have not raised it with Barr or Gaud.

W. W. Rostow

Approve 50% share (State/AID Proposal) _____

Approve 40% share (Treasury Proposal) _____

Approve "minority" participation (Rostow Proposal) _____

Speak to me _____

EKHamilton/vmr

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 7, 1967

Dear Congressman:

I first wish to thank you for responding so thoughtfully to the request for suggestions on policy towards Viet Nam, which I made at the White House briefing on February 6.

I am having your proposal carefully staffed out. I understand well the good and serious motives which have led you to make it.

The truth is, of course, that it is we who have stretched our minds and imaginations to take initiatives to try to bring this war to an early end by negotiation. The other side, week in and week out, has responded with a rigid formula which amounts, simply, to our withdrawal and turning the country over to them. And they have mounted -- and continue to mount -- a massive propaganda campaign to convince our people and others that the opposite is the case.

Nevertheless, I recognize the point you are making; and I thank you again for your constructive initiative.

Sincerely,

Honorable Paul Findley
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM


35

TO ROSTOW
MEMO - MEWIRE + KINTN
SEN - ANY LONG OR
ROSTOW 12 HOURS TO
PRES - COPY TO PRES
WHEN TO ROSTOW

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, March 6, 1967
7:50 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry H. Wilson, Jr. 

Paul Findley, who is a bright, tough, aggressive young Republican from Illinois, called this morning and asked to come here to bring a letter for your attention.

I told him to come ahead and to have lunch with me.

He did so, handed me the attached letter, and immediately upon his return to the Hill issued the attached release.

I have sent a copy of the letter to Bromley Smith.

Bromley and I will work out a response.

Attachments

COUNTIES:

ADAMS McDONOUGH
BROWN MORGAN
CALHOUN PIKE
CASS SANGAMON
GREENE SCHUYLER
HANCOCK SCOTT
JERSEY

PAUL FINDLEY
20TH DISTRICT, ILLINOIS

COMMITTEES:

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE
CHAIRMAN:
COMMITTEE ON NATO AND THE
ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

OFFICES:

ROOM 540, CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BLDG.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
ROOM 205, POST OFFICE BLDG.
SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANTS:
STEPHEN JONES—WASHINGTON
KENNETH A. STARK—SPRINGFIELD

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

March 6, 1967

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

In this letter I suggest a powerful but peaceful initiative to shorten the Vietnam war and end it with honor.

I do so in response to the request for suggestions on war policy you made to each of us attending a White House briefing on February 6. Two principal developments since then impell me to write: first, a tour last weekend of my Western Illinois district convinced me that my constituents are gravely disturbed over the prolonged length and present course of the war; second, as a member of the House Foreign Affairs committee, I am distressed by recent testimony at executive hearings by top-level officers of the Defense Department.

In my view, the situation requires a positive new move by those defending South Vietnam.

The move must of course contain no compromise of principle or commitment. It must demonstrate dramatically our dissatisfaction with present progress and our willingness to take whatever additional military measures are needed to bring the war swiftly to a satisfactory conclusion. At the same time it should prove conclusively that we are ready to sit down with the adversary under conditions which will immediately halt hardship to the people in North Vietnam.

Accordingly I suggest that the United States seek approval of our allies in carrying out the following initiative.

It would take the form of a message from you, as spokesman for allied governments, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. U Thant, setting forth an announcement of policy, a specific detailed offer to participate in peace discussions, an invitation for the participation of others and a guarantee of security terms.

March 6, 1967

The message would announce that allied governments will have a representative at a specified place on a specified day and hour, authorized and prepared to enter into peace discussions with an authorized representative of forces engaged in action against South Vietnam, which logically would be the foreign minister of North Vietnam, and any other principals the Secretary-General may deem appropriate to invite.

I suggest the meeting be held in Rangoon, Burma, starting at 10 a.m. on the earliest possible day. Burma would be a suitable place, because it is an Asian nation but one that is neutral in the present conflict. I further suggest that our Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, be designated as the allied representative.

The Secretary-General may wish to invite other nations with military personnel in the war theater to send representatives, and perhaps the three members of the International Control Commission -- Poland, Canada and India -- and the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference -- The United Kingdom and The Soviet Union.

In the message the Secretary-General would be:

1. Asked to preside and set the agenda, which would logically include the "14 points" of the United States, the "four points" of the Hanoi government, the program of the National Liberation Front, and the Geneva Agreements and Accords of 1954.

2. Assured that during the 24-hour period preceding the hour at which the meeting is scheduled to begin, no bombing, shelling or military action of any kind against North Vietnam will occur. This cessation will continue so long as the representative of enemy forces continues in good faith to discuss peace terms and so long as all enemy movements into South Vietnam are halted.

3. Reminded of the restraint in regard to military policies which the United States has so far imposed on itself, under which the port of Haiphong has been kept open to commerce, certain major areas and targets in North Vietnam have been identified as sanctuaries from attack, and the use of nuclear weapons has been prohibited.

4. Requested to notify the leadership of enemy forces that any of the following circumstances will cause military action against North Vietnam to be resumed automatically: if the representative of enemy forces does not show up at the appointed time; or, if, having appeared, he ceases to participate in the discussions in good faith; or, if any movement of enemy forces into South Vietnam should occur.

5. Requested to warn the leadership of enemy forces that if any of the circumstances enumerated in No. 4 above should occur, the United States

March 6, 1967


will immediately be forced to review critically all of its policies of military restraint and to adopt new policies employing measures of sufficient magnitude to end the war at an early date.

Mr. President, this initiative would constitute a specific reasonable offer to work out an armistice under terms which instantly remove all hardship of war from the people in North Vietnam but which do not compromise our commitments or principles in any respect.

At the same time, it would create a powerful incentive for cooperation by enemy leadership. If the cooperation is not forthcoming, it would provide allied forces defending South Vietnam with a proper opportunity to inaugurate new tactics. Through them the objectives that were not accomplished at the appointed peace meeting would be achieved by employing military means beyond those previously used.

I make these proposals with deep appreciation for your constant diligent effort to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Paul Findley".

Paul Findley
Representative in Congress

PF:ha

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, March 7, 1967
6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Goldberg did not see Sec. Rusk this afternoon. He went home to rest, but will have breakfast tomorrow.

Therefore, a paper for your 11 o'clock session with him will be delayed.

Here is one item he may raise: the Gimo's blunt request for logistic and materiel support for an invasion of the mainland.

It ties in with the attached report that post-Mao, Chiang "will consider opening talks with Peking with the object of bringing about a merger between Taiwan and the mainland" (p. 2).

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State let 7-5-78
By 4/9, NARA, Date 4-19-91

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: President Chiang's Request for U.S. Backing of Immediate
Invasion of the Mainland

Attached is an account of Ambassador Goldberg's conversation with President Chiang Kai-shek on March 1, 1967. In it (see especially marked portions) the Gimo, in the words of Taipei's EXDIS telegram 2623 of March 2:

"Bluntly and strongly urged that President Johnson give concurrence for immediate GRC military action against the Mao regime, maintaining that the Vietnam war could not be settled, the Chinese Communist nuclear menace removed or Asian security established so long as Mao remains in power on the mainland. . . . The Gimo estimated that the time for decisive action is now, while Mao is under attack and insecure. Delayed action would be too late. He emphasized that he would not want or need any U.S. manpower for the attack, that the GRC has 'completed all preparations' and could do the job alone, with logistic and materiel support from the U.S. He earnestly and repeatedly asked Goldberg to convey to President Johnson the urgency of taking a 'strong and courageous decision' to contribute to the GRC overthrow effort, in U.S. and Asian vital interest, and for the safety of all mankind. He felt that a negative decision would be a fateful error which would some day be greatly regretted by the United States."

It is very likely that Ambassador Goldberg will raise this subject with the President at his meeting with him tomorrow.

The Country Director for the GRC at State, Joe Bennett, is working on a suggested draft answer in the form of a polite, carefully considered response from President Johnson to President Chiang which he believes should be delivered by Ambassador McConaughy orally, rather than in writing. He points out that the GRC is inclined to pore over each phrase of a written communication on such a subject and to brood about it, and that sometimes written documents on this subject come back to haunt us.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 95-342

By rip, NARA Date 7-9-96

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~~SECRET~~


- 2 -

Bennett is assuming that the President will wish to answer with a "no." State believes the answer should center about the one point that we desire to avoid risking a widening of the present conflict in the area. What we are earnestly seeking is peace, not additional conflict.

I agree*with Bennett's general line and with the oral form he recommends. Chiang's message to the President was oral.

President Chiang's plea was unexpected in view of his recent emphasis on political rather than military measures with regard to the mainland.

There is no indication that the GRC is preparing to take unilateral military steps against the mainland. State, CIA and Embassy Taipei are, of course, monitoring this problem very carefully.


Alfred Jenkins

cc: Mr. Jorden
Mr. Ropa

* I have just learned that Sam Berger also agrees.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, March 7, 1967
5:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may be interested in this comparison of the scale and breakdown of U. S. and Soviet military spending. Paragraph 3 underlines the main points.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

6 Feb 1967 memorandum, Subject: Comparison of US and Soviet Military Expenditures.

25X1A

Cy 3, 27 January 1967, [REDACTED] "Trends in Soviet Military Spending." (both CIA documents)

1.3 (a)(4)

WWRostow:rlm

SANITIZED
Authority NLS 019-014-1-2
By Op, NARA, Date 12/13/01

6 February 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Comparison of US and Soviet Military Expenditures

1. The table below compares US and Soviet military and space spending in 1966. 1/


	<u>Billion Dollars</u>	
	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>
	<u>(FY 66)</u>	<u>(CY 66)</u>
Strategic Offense	4.6	5.5
Strategic Defense	1.6	5.5
General Purpose	30.3	17.3
RDT&E and Space	14.7	10.3
Command and General Support	22.3	13.1
Total	<u>73.5</u>	<u>51.7</u>

As this table indicates, the Soviets are spending somewhat more than the US for strategic offense, very much more for strategic defense, but only about 70 percent as much in total.

1/ This table includes civilian space (NASA) and nuclear weapons programs (AEC) for both countries. Soviet spending is in terms of US costs. The Soviet breakdown differs from the one presented in the CIA Special Report, [REDACTED] page 4. In the present instance, Soviet expenditures on nuclear weapons (except RDT&E) are placed under command and general support, for comparability with US data.

EO 12958
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2. The following table shows the percentages of total US and Soviet military and space spending in 1966, by mission.

	US Percent (Dollar Basis) FY 1966	USSR Percent (Ruble Basis) CY 1966 2/
Strategic Offense	6	13
Strategic Defense	2	13
General Purpose	41	30
RD&E and Space	20	25
Command and General Support	31	19
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

3. Following are comments on this comparison:

a. The US percentages are strikingly different from those which prevailed before the US became heavily involved in Vietnam.

b. The US share spent on strategic offense is all intercontinental; in recent years about one-third of the Soviet share has been for systems targeted against Europe and other peripheral areas.

c. The Soviet percentage for strategic defense consistently has been much larger than that of the US.

d. The large US percentage for general purpose forces is unusual. Before Vietnam it was about one-third of the total.

2/ These percentages are based on the ruble costs of Soviet military and space expenditures and not on the dollar costs presented on the first page of this memorandum.

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~~SECRET~~
Tuesday - March 7, 1967 - 8:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Report of Soviet Strategic Missiles in Cuba

I have checked the charges made by Paul Bethel before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee today that there are Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba.

Dick Helms has furnished me the following judgment passed by the United States Intelligence Board on March 2, 1967:

"We do not believe that the Soviets will again try to turn Cuba into a strategic base of their own, as in 1962. We think it highly unlikely that the USSR will attempt to re-introduce strategic missiles into Cuba. We recognize that the Soviets have the technical capability clandestinely to reintroduce the components of a strategic weapon system. But the build-up of strategic forces in the USSR in recent years would make the installation of strategic weapons in Cuba of less significance to the Soviet strategic posture than in 1962. In any event, we believe that the risk of another grave confrontation with the US would be unacceptable to the Soviets."

1-5 (c)
3-4 (b) (1)

You should know that Paul Bethel is a propagandist who for the past five years has traded on his brief experience in our Embassy in Havana to make a living out of the Cuban issue. What he told the Subcommittee today is the same tale which he has repeatedly published in his newsletter and tells everybody who is willing to listen to him. The sources for his charges are [redacted] Cuban refugees [redacted] what they tell our interviewers is critically examined by experts. Bethel accepts the stories without critical evaluation.

I am having State do an assessment of other charges made in his testimony. You will see from this how wild and irresponsible Bethel can be.

W. W. Rostow

P.S. Newsletter, in going to make me more paranoid about

himself

cc.

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SANITIZED

Authority NLS 019-014-1-4
By Q, NARA, Date 12-13-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I wanted you to know that Bill Moyers has asked Dick Moose on my staff whether we could provide him with some background material for a piece he is doing in connection with our military action in North Vietnam. Bill stressed that he wanted only unclassified material.

According to Dick, the theme which Bill wishes to stress is the care and restraint which have gone into the various decisions relating to our actions against the North. He would emphasize that new activities have been controlled, and flexible in design; in general they have been undertaken on the basis of evidence that the other side would not respond to pauses, and was not interested in reducing hostilities.

I believe that an article of this type would be useful. I did not want, however, to give Dick a go ahead without first checking with you.

W. W. Rostow

Give Bill any help he needs _____

Limit our response to public material readily available _____

Try to discourage him and do the bare minimum _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING CANCELLED PER E.O. 13526,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR 16 1983.

BY lg ON 4/22/91

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-350
By ju, NARA, Date 9-3-92

Pres file

~~SECRET~~-- EXDIS

Tuesday, March 7, 1967
11:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Goldberg's preliminary report on U Thant and the North Vietnamese.

It poses the question of a total ceasefire; although we don't have to move with U Thant until he hears from Hanoi.

We have been working on this problem here for some time (Bill Jorden and Bob Ginsburgh). On a contingency basis we should now go forward and work with the Vietnamese -- since the heart of the problem would be inside South Viet Nam should this route to peace ever be chosen.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~--EXDIS

WWRostow:rlh

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-350

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

By WD, NARA, Date 9-3-92

Tuesday, March 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Preliminary Report on Ambassador Goldberg's Meeting
with Secretary General U Thant on March 6, 1967

In reply to Goldberg's query, Thant gave the following report on his meeting with North Vietnamese representatives in Burma:

A. He, U Thant, had not anticipated the meeting but was advised of it while in Burma by the Government of Burma. He received notice that the Hanoi representatives were on the way and arrangements were made to get together during the latter part of his visit. He favored a private meeting but found the Hanoi representatives ready to let the press know about it and, therefore, he had no choice.

B. Present at the three-hour cordial meeting were the North Vietnamese Consul General in Burma plus two officials from the Hanoi Foreign Office.

C. The Secretary General did not put forward his three point program. The Hanoi representatives indicated a familiarity with it and for their part presented the usual position: i.e., stop the bombing, withdraw U.S. forces, accept the Four Points as a basis for negotiations.

D. To this the Secretary General said he responded it was obvious this is unacceptable to the Americans. The U.S. clearly insists on reciprocity in a military sense and the Hanoi program can, therefore, obviously not lead to any settlement.

E. The Hanoi representatives stood by their general program. They indicated a willingness to talk with him as an Asian figure, but not as Secretary General of the UN. The UN lacks competence. They inquired if the Secretary General had any other thoughts as to how the situation might be resolved.

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

F. The Secretary General told Goldberg that he saw no point at this time in pursuing his own ideas further with the Hanoi representatives since it was clear to him that both sides disagreed with his approach. He, therefore, replied to them that he thought one avenue to settlement might be a stand down by all concerned of all military activities.

G. The Hanoi representatives said they had no authority to discuss this type of proposal but would relay his thoughts to Hanoi and would, in turn, be in communication with him at some appropriate place. They did not indicate where this would be, but the Secretary General got the impression it would not be Burma.

H. The Secretary General said the Hanoi representatives took careful notes regarding his suggestion for a mutual standdown and raised the question as to the likelihood of violations during a standdown period which they might not be able to control. They agreed with his comment that this would be minor. The Secretary General said he thought this might be the heart of the matter. The mutual grounding of arms might provide the decisive movement toward peace. He said he told the Hanoi representatives he had not discussed this idea with the U. S. and did not know the U. S. reaction to it but would discuss it with us on his return.

I. The Hanoi representatives had prepared a draft press statement which would have noted his presentation of his views as a distinguished Asian statesman; their similar presentation of views; and a common understanding of the desirability of moving forward. The statement would have made clear the recognition of no UN involvement and when the Secretary General said he could not accept this denigration of the UN, the Hanoi representatives considered but decided in favor of no joint statement with each side free to say whatever they liked. Throughout the discussion, the Hanoi representatives professed to hold Thant in high regard as an Asian statesman.

J. At one point in the conversation the Hanoi representatives reviewed familiar grounds and rejected the concept of reciprocity in bombing on the grounds that they were not bombing the South, whereas it was the U. S. which carried bombing to the North. They rejected the concept of infiltration and denied both that it took place, or that it was an impetus to bombing of the North.

K. Summing up, Thant said he expected to receive some response from Hanoi, and said he was impressed that the Hanoi representatives had made no attempt to keep this discussion secret, indeed they had invited publicity.

Goldberg said he could not convey the U. S. reaction to this new variation of the Secretary General's earlier proposal but would report it and be in touch later.

Tuesday, March , 1967
10:05 a. m.

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MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith our excellent China-watcher, Al Jenkins, reflects on the state of the mainland.

He believes that in their own peculiar way the Chinese have turned the corner towards a "moderate" domestic and foreign policy.

I am inclined to agree -- although its emergence may be slow and tortuous. But they stared at the possibility of famine and drew back; and that's a beginning at least.

W. W. R.

SECR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The Next Chinese Dynasty and U.S. Policy

A. Failure of Mao's Supreme (and Last?) Effort at Purification

The turning point in the Cultural Revolution in the past three weeks has probably been a decisive one. There are still many imponderables, but the following seems fairly certain:

1. Insofar as the Cultural Revolution was to be an ideological remolding campaign, it has failed. Even as a purge device it appears to have failed far short of Mao's extravagant objectives, but it may well have succeeded for Chou En-lai's.

2. The prestige and authority of the Party have been damaged, but dissolution has stopped short of wrecking the Party's machinery; the concept of revolutionary communes, which Mao seems earlier to have envisaged as supplanting the Party, has been shelved. "Three-way alliances" are a far cry from "Paris communes," and are consonant with Chou's policies of stability and reason.

3. The damage to industry and agriculture is doubtless considerable, but will probably not be ruinous if present efforts to restore order are successful. Much depends upon peasant -- and Army -- reaction to increased Army participation in production. We should know more about the extent of damage in another month or so.

4. As expected, the Army is playing the crucial role in the Revolution's apparent denouement. The Army earlier would not back Mao's revolutionary rebels' take-overs, but is now backing Chou's efforts at preservation of nationhood and attention to the economy.

5. "Regionalism" is not a likelihood: the Army wouldn't have it.

6. The Army's crucial loyalty proved to be not to Mao and Lin, but to stability -- to the status quo. Most elements of the society seem to be preponderantly of like mind -- and the status quo is "creeping revisionism."

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Authority State letter 75-78
By eglip, NARA, Date 4-19-91

7. However, the battle is far from over. The prestige of Mao himself is probably still high; support for Maoism is obviously less, but of unknown proportions. Clearly, however, the actions of Chou are currently eclipsing the thought of Mao, even while the two leaders are professing to be in league -- an accommodation which Mao had to make, not Chou. Chou's great problem is that the state of the nation is such that even his policies will require Army insurance for their implementation. This is dangerous. He may not succeed.

B. Has the Succession, in Effect, Taken Place?

There are those who believe that Mao is still fully in charge, and that he now purposefully desires to halt at the present "Half-way House" with Chou as its major domo. I doubt the validity of both assumptions. Mao has simply been unable to carry out his announced policies, and reports of ill health are increasingly convincing. The recent Albanian report of Mao's partial incapacitation is more credible than the Mauritanian one that he is in good health. The Mauritanians, who had never seen Mao previously, could have met a double. This would not have been possible with the Albanians. Furthermore, the Albanians have no reason to invent ill-health for Mao -- quite the contrary. True, Maoism, under whatever -- doubtless complex -- auspices, ran the Cultural Revolution as long as it ran, but it has about run down. Some elements will surely continue to push for reforms in line with Mao's doctrinal purity, but their cause has received an impressive rebuff and we may have seen the last determined effort.

Prior to the sudden ascendancy of Lin Piao, the only three contenders other than Chou for Mao's mantle were Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and P'eng Chen. The latter three seem to be no longer in the running, and Liu's status is at least problematical. Furthermore, the policies which Chou has long advocated now appear to have military backing. Mao may be able to weather this embarrassment, but Lin may not.

So long as Mao's extreme policies were in command, the Army did not assist in the purging of provincial leaders. (The Army's role in the Peking purges is not clear.) Reports from the recent trouble spots of Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, Szechwan and Kwangtung now suggest compromises, with strong hints that some of the top leadership have been replaced, with Army acquiescence or connivance. Those involved are mostly Liu and Teng men, whose political demise both Mao and Chou would probably applaud. It will be interesting to see whether Chou men take their places. The top men in running the economy now appear to be Li Hsien-nien and T'ao Chen-lin, both of whom are long-time associates of Chou. Certainly they have not

secured or retained influence because of adherence to a particular policy line, for Li is far to the right within the lop-sided Chinese Communist spectrum, while T'ao was one of the most zealous of the Great Leapers. Chou himself appears lately to have a strong hand in running the military establishment.

C. Policy Implications

It is too early to decide that Chou is comfortably in the saddle and likely to remain there. The power struggle could continue for some time. Furthermore, we cannot be sure that Chou wants the top job. However, at the moment he is more in the saddle than anyone else and there is no one yet visible who is likely to challenge him successfully. Even if Chou does not want the top job he may have to rule, in fact if not in name, during a "holding in trust" period.

It is not too early to try to divine what sort of China we might have if Chou is to dominate the scene. This is a murky area in which to prophesy, for Chou has been an executor rather than an initiator, but it is worth the effort. The transition to some new course, which is now bound to come under whatever leadership, is likely to take quite a few more months. The outlines of the new course may be apparent by about May, however, and it is conceivable that we may be faced with some hard decisions by summer.

It seems to me that if Chou is running things we may expect something like the following:

1. Pragmatic, somewhat "revisionist," and increasingly effective economic policies, with heavy emphasis on agriculture.
2. An emphasis on "expertness" over "redress," with favorable effect on the economy and defense, after the effects of the Cultural Revolution can be overcome.
3. A China tending more to look to its own needs, possibly to the extent of being predominantly isolationist for a time, except for considerations of 4. and 5. below.
4. A foreign policy less ambitious, more realistic and rational, and therefore at the same time more effective. Something of the "Bandung spirit" could return.

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- 4 -

5. Attempts to capitalize on rationality and moderation to gain international acceptance, prestige and legitimatization.

6. Continued, but less frenetic, anti-Americanism. Post-Vietnam, chance greater for some accommodation.

7. Possibly a slow papering over of Sino-Soviet differences, but short of fraternal alliance. Chou has never loved the Russians.

8. Continued support for North Vietnam, but less obduracy in the event Hanoi should want to call a halt.

9. If the Gimo should die, a wooing of the GRC toward a "deal" -- in the expectation it will be softened up for such by its bleak future qua GRC resulting from Peking's successes in 5. above at Taipei's correlative expense.

If something like the above is in the offing, we have some hard policy decisions to make at some as yet unpredictable point. They all relate to two very basic decisions:

1. What sort of Taiwan (among the likely viable varieties) is it in the U.S. interest to have eventuate? How can we contribute to bringing it about?

Can the GRC, as such, survive the prospect of a "moderate" mainland regime which may be virtually universally accepted? Will it even attempt to, or will it make a deal with a moderate Peking giving promise of progress, thus yielding not only to "inevitability" but to deep Sinocentric urges -- especially if it seems to be a case of faute de mieux? Would the Taiwanese permit this? Should the UN interest itself in the status of the Island if such a conceivably bloody test appeared likely?

2. What should be our posture toward a more moderate mainland China?

Since the post-Maoist regime (with or without Mao as "Chairman Emeritus") is likely, at least for a time, to continue to be anti-American and to rebuff advances from us, should we fight its acceptance by others? Should we read this putative regimes' near-universal acceptance as being inevitable, and make a try for the supposed advantages

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SECRET

- 5 -

of early overtures, in the hope of a new day in Sino-American relations? Even if ultimate near-universal acceptance appears inevitable, is there merit in our delaying overtures until we appear to be swept along (because of GRC or other considerations)? Has the combination of China's "madness" and its growing power reached the point where we should seize upon the first good excuse to get China better articulated with international problems?

To what extent should we discuss these vital questions with certain allies before the time of decision? This applies especially, perhaps, to our Asian allies, and among them most particularly Japan. Since in the quest for a stable Asia the overriding desideratum is a reasonably promising balance of power, where does the Soviet Union, as a Pacific power, fit into the scheme?

These are some of the questions to which, it seems to me, the Government Community should now be addressing itself, and concerning which I hope to have something to say in future memoranda.


Alfred Jenkins


cc: Mr. Jorden
Mr. Ropa

SECRET

Tuesday, March , 1967
10:10 a.m.

42

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Mr. Melady again makes
the case for U. S. -Vatican diplomatic
relations.

Also some Ramparts gossip.

I am sending this also to Sect. Rusk.

W. W. R.

cc: Sect. Rusk

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 3, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL-NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Thomas Patrick Melady

42a
SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-52

By is, NARA Date 3-20-00

The purpose of Mr. Melady's call was to review what he believes are the strong arguments for establishing U.S.-Vatican diplomatic relations. He noted that Paul IV has taken a clear decision to assert the full presence of the Holy See in world affairs. The Pope has decided to assert his particular interest in the developing world, and has set up a special office to carry this program forward. The Vatican is trying to resume contact with Catholics on the Chinese mainland, and has also sent representatives to North Vietnam. The Pope continues to seek ways to end the Vietnam conflict.

The absence of a U.S. Government presence at the Vatican, according to Mr. Melady, is a serious liability for our country. Mr. Melady said in strict confidence that extraordinary missions like that of Ambassador Goldberg were somewhat resented, although the Vatican would not ever indicate this openly. (We have had informal reports confirming this from Ambassador Reinhardt.) Apparently what bothers the Vatican is that these special visits are conspicuous; and they also highlight our unwillingness to establish a more satisfactory relationship.

Ex 1.58
3.4
(B)
(b)

Regarding the church in Eastern Europe, Melady thinks that Soviet-Vatican relations may come more quickly than many people had thought before the Podgorny visit to the Pope. It may be a matter of months rather than years. Regarding Mindzenty, the Vatican continues its discreet efforts to solve the problem. Apparently Mindzenty says he will step down if he can participate in the choice of his successor. It will not be easy to find a man whom the Vatican, the Hungarian Government and Cardinal Mindzenty can agree on. Cardinal Koenig is said to believe Cardinal Mindzenty will live a prisoner in the Embassy until he dies.

Melady says the Catholic hierarchy made a confidential investigation of Ramparts magazine about a year ago. (Apparently Ramparts, while it calls itself a Catholic

~~CONFIDENTIAL - NODIS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL - NODIS~~

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magazine, is actually a thorn in the flesh of the American hierarchy.) Those looking into the situation were struck by the fact that Ramparts is being subsidized very heavily -- apparently by some person or persons in addition to the wife of the publisher. Melady also claims that Ramparts has some tie to the editorial staff of the New York Times in New York.

Nathaniel Davis

cc: Mr. Rostow
Mr. Bator

~~CONFIDENTIAL - NODIS~~

Pres file

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-350

By ju, NARA, Date 9-3-92

~~SECRET~~ -- NODIS

Tuesday, March 7, 1967
10:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a report of the Trilateral
Talks just before McCloy came home.

As you can see in the marked passages,
McCloy may be raising with you the possibility
of messages to both Kiesinger and Wilson to
help pull the party together towards a solid
deal.

McCloy will be seeing Sec. Rusk and
Sec. McNamara at 6 p.m. this evening. We
ought to budget for a session with you
tomorrow, Wednesday, March 8.

W. W. Rostow

Will see McCloy Wed., March 8 _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~ -- NODIS -- London 7138

WWRostow:rln

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

43a

~~SECRET~~

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CONTROL : 5430
Recd: March 6, 1967, 1:13 p.m.

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SUBJ: TRILATERAL TALKS

FOR WHITE HOUSE, SECRETARY RUSK AND SECRETARY MCNAMARA

1. MCCLOY MET ALONE AGAIN AT DINNER MARCH 5 WITH THOMSON AND DUCKWITZ. SESSION SET UP PRINCIPALLY TO ALLOW MCCLOY TO GIVE THEM A RUNDOWN ON HIS TALKS IN STUTTGART AND BONN. THE CHIEF REPORT THAT MCCLOY BROUGHT BACK WAS THE FEELING OF BOTH KIESINGER AND BRANDT THAT BRITISH WERE DETERMINED TO WITHDRAW ANYWAY AND NO USE MAKING FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE POSITIONS.

2. DUCKWITZ SAID HE WAS DEPRESSED, AS MCCLOY'S REPORT CONFIRMED HIS EARLIER IMPRESSION OF THE FEELING OF THE GERMAN GOVT.

3. THOMSON WAS OBVIOUSLY ANXIOUS TO DO ALL HE COULD TO DISPEL GERMANS' IMPRESSION, INSISTING BRITISH POSITION WAS TO AVOID WITHDRAWALS AND SEEK COMPROMISE. HE SAID MCCLOY REPORT WAS DISCONCERTING TO HIM, BUT HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY BRING THE MATTER TO ATTENTION OF PM IN HOPE FRG IMPRESSION COULD BE CORRECTED AND IT WOULD PROCEED TO IMPROVE THEIR OFFER.

4. DUCKWITZ SAID THAT IF REPEAT IF FRG CABINER DECISION COULD BE REVERSED AT ALL, HE FELT CONFIDENT IT WOULD INCLUDE OFFER OF 250 MILLION DM OF CIVILIAN GOODS IN ADDITION TO 200 MILLION DM MILITARY PURCHASES FOR 1967. THOMSON PRESSED STRONGLY ON NEED FOR GERMANS TO GO BEYOND THIS. DUCKWITZ SAID THAT EVEN ON THIS BASIS (I.E. DM 450 MILLION) HE FELT FRG WOULD EXPECT THERE BE NO REPEAT NO BRITISH WITHDRAWALS.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By *fw*, NARA, Date *3-27-98*

~~SECRET~~

-2- LONDON 7138 NODIS CM 5430

5. MCCLOY INTERVENED THAT FRG MIGHT HAVE TO RECONCILE ITSELF TO THINKING IN TERMS OF SOME SMALL BAOR REDUCTIONS, PERHAPS MOVING TO ROTATION FORMULA. ONLY ON THIS BASIS DID IT SEEM GAP COULD BE NARROWED ENOUGH TO HOPE THAT IT COULD BE BRIDGED. IF FRG OFFER WAS ONLY FOR DM 450 MILLION THERE WOULD BE LITTLE HOPE OF NO BRITISH WITHDRAWALS.

6. THOMSON SAID THAT THE BAOR COSTS WERE APPROXIMATELY DM 850 MILLION. A GERMAN OFFER OF DM 450 MILLION WOULD LEAVE A GAP OF DM 400 MILLION. HE SAID THAT PERHAPS, ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, THE UK ITSELF COULD HANDLE DM 200 MILLION (PRESUMABLY BY A COMBINATION OF "NEUTRALIZATION," REDUCTIONS, AND "SWALLOWING" SOME OF THE DIFFERENCE). COULD US HANDLE THE OTHER DM 200 MILLION? DUCKWITZ ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH THIS QUESTION AND ASKED WHETHER THE US COULD NOT DEFLECT THIS MUCH FROM FRG'S ADVANCE DEPOSITS IN US. THOMSON INDICATED HE COULD SEE A SOLUTION "THROUGH A COOPERATIVE EFFORT" WHICH WOULD HAVE GERMANS UPPING THEIR OFFSET PAYMENTS TO AT LEAST DM 450 MILLION, A "TOKEN" BRITISH REDUCTION, AND SOME US "HELP". DUCKWITZ ALSO URGED US TO THINK IN TERMS OF SOME ALLOCATION OF GERMAN ADVANCE DEPOSITS TO PURCHASES IN BRITAIN. MCCLOY REPEATED THIS VERY DIFFICULT TO DO.

7. DUCKWITZ THEN TOLD MCCLOY THAT THERE WOULD BE ONE MOVE WHICH HE FELT WOULD ~~BE OF THE GREATEST HELP~~ PRIOR TO MARCH 15 CABINET MEETING. IF PRESIDENT COULD CALL IN FRG AMBASSADOR IN WASH AND GIVE HIM A LETTER FOR KIESINGER, SAYING THAT IF BRITISH WITHDREW TO ANY SUBSTANTIAL EXTENT ~~IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO "FILL OUT THE LINE" IN~~ FRG, AND THAT THIS WOULD RESULT IN LESSENER SECURITY, IT WOULD BE OF GREATEST HELP IN GETTING KIESINGER AND CABINET TO ACT FAVORABLY. DUCKWITZ FELT SOME SUCH INTERVENTION ON TOP OF MCCLOY'S VISIT WOULD HAVE BEST CHANCE OF PRODUCING RESULTS. THOMSON URGED THAT A PERSONAL MESSAGE BE SENT AS WELL BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER. THOMSON APPEARED TO THINK THAT UK COULD BY A SERIES OF MEASURES SUCH AS SOME NEUTRALIZATION, SOME SMALL WITHDRAWAL, AND SOME SWALLOWING OF THE GAP REACH A COMPROMISE, PROVIDED THEY COULD BE ASSURED THROUGH US AND FRG COOPERATION A PROGRAM OF POUNDS 55 MILLION OF UK PURCHASES WOULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT. THOMSON INSISTED HIS INTIMATIONS OF WHAT UK COULD DO WERE VERY TENTATIVE AND PERSONAL, AND SOLID OFFERS WOULD HAVE TO BE THRESHED OUT WITH PM AND OTHERS; BUT MCCLOY GAINED IMPRESSION OF AN INCREASED DESIRE ON PART OF UK TO ~~KEEP BULK OF FORCES IN GERMANY.~~

8. DUCKWITZ WANTED TO HAVE US DISCUSS THE EVENTUALITIES IF NO REVERSAL FRG CABINET WAS REACHED ON MARCH 15. THOMSON SAID SITUATION WOULD BE DISASTROUS AND DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS IT.

KAISER
BT

~~SECRET~~

Profile

Tuesday, March 7, 1967
9:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk suggests you designate the Vice President, Gov. Harriman, or one among other possibilities, to serve as a special envoy tomorrow, Wed., March 8, in Ottawa at the services for the Governor-General.

W. W. Rostow

Vice President _____

Gov. Harriman _____

(Other)

See me _____

WWRostow:rlh

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

734
March 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Designation of Special Presidential
Representative for Funeral of
Governor-General of Canada

Recommendation:

That you agree to the appointment of a special
envoy for the funeral services of the Governor-General
of Canada and that you authorize me to look into the
availability of the Vice President or Governor Harriman.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The Governor-General of Canada, General Georges P.
Vanier, died on March 5. Funeral services are to be held
in Ottawa at 11:00 a.m. Wednesday, March 8. The Canadian
Ambassador has informed us that while the designation of
special emissaries from abroad is not being sought, if a
friendly government wants to send one he will be welcome.

Because of our close ties with Canada and because
General Vanier was a most distinguished soldier and
statesman and a good friend of the United States, I
believe it would be an appropriate gesture for you to
designate a special representative. Ambassador Butterworth
in Ottawa recommends an envoy be sent. I recommend, there-
fore, that the Department be authorized to look into the
availability of the Vice President or Governor Harriman.

DR

Dean Rusk

Other possibilities:

Senator Aiken

Senator Muskie

Gov. Nelson Rockefeller

45
Pres file

Tuesday, March 7, 1967 -- 9:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

We are scheduling lunch at 12:30 p.m. today so that Bob McNamara can meet a commitment on the Hill.

Sec. Rusk, who is on the Hill this morning, may be late in arriving. In that case, Nick will come at 12:30 and Sec. Rusk will join us when he is free.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Monday, March 6, 1967
5:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an interesting reaction of
General Taylor's that I am flagging for
Sect. Rusk, Sect. McNamara and (via the
back channel) for Ambassador Lodge.

W. W. R.

452

March 6, 1967

LDX

Sects. Rusk and McNamara

You will wish to read this interesting
note of General Taylor's.

W. W. R.

46-6

March 6, 1967

VIA CAS channel

To Ambassador Lodge from Walt Rostow

We'd like your comment on this
interesting memo of General Taylor's
to the President.

46c

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-350
By ju, NARA, Date 9-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: A Constitutional Issue of Importance in Saigon
Ref. Saigon, 19209

In his latest weekly cable, Ambassador Lodge refers to the proposal by General Thieu that the Constituent Assembly write into the Constitution a provision for a High Council for National Defense and the Armed Forces which would advise the President on matters related to national defense and give the military a way to make their voices heard and to set forth their aspirations in the national councils.

Our people in Saigon do not seem to be averse to this proposal but, because of my past troubles with the generals during the Khanh period, I must say that I would view it with real concern.

Cabot quotes Tran Van Huong on the subject, who as Prime Minister shared my experience with the generals in 1965--indeed, he lost his job to their intervention in his struggle with the Tri Quang Buddhists. His view is that such a Council, if imbedded in the Constitution, may interfere in the government in a destructive way. I must say that he has ground for that fear because of the following background of experience.

In the fall of 1964, after the failure of his Vung Tau constitution, Khanh and his generals (including Thieu and Ky) determined to withdraw from active participation in the government and to let their civilian critics take on the problems which had baffled them. They did so and from the sidelines enjoyed the spectacle of the struggle and fall of the Huong and Quat governments before the attacks of the various minority groups--offering the civilian leaders no help and sometimes contributing to their plight. Khanh could have saved Huong from the Buddhists but, instead, deliberately pulled the rug from under him.

During this time, I often appealed to the generals to show more responsibility, to get behind the government and to accept appropriate posts in the cabinet. Their answer was that the Armed Forces should be outside the government and in a sense parallel with it, reporting only to the Chief of State. I often felt that many officers had in mind the Japanese pre-war pattern whereby the Armed Forces reported directly to the Emperor through their ministers who were professional military officers nominated by the Army and Navy. Khanh and his associates seemed to be seeking some similar arrangement for by-passing the civilian Prime Minister and his cabinet.

This problem disappeared after the exile of Khanh and the installation of the Ky Government with the backing of the military Directorate. The rather

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

surprising stability of the Ky Government has been due to the fact that it has been underwritten by the generals who have accepted open responsibility for it. Such support in quality if not in form is essential to the survival of any government growing out of the new constitution.

With these thoughts in mind, I am somewhat alarmed by the emergence of this proposal from Thieu for a High Council which suggests that the Directorate may wish to move from a position in direct support of the government to one along side it in the manner of the Khanh concept. It may have been this suspicion which led to the reaction of Tran Van Huong who has a vivid memory of the events which I have recounted.


My suggestion would be to call the Saigon Embassy's attention to this past record and the implications which may lurk in the Thieu proposal and to urge our representatives to oppose this Council to the extent possible. If it can not be shelved, it should at least be incorporated within the government--possibly by making it advisory concurrently to the Prime Minister, the National Security Council and the President in approximate analogy to the relationships of our JCS.

Having mentioned Tran Van Huong in the foregoing context, I might add a brief evaluation of the man since his name keeps turning up as a possible civilian candidate for President. I worked very closely with him during his troubled days as Prime Minister and developed a high regard for his character and integrity.

Having said that, I must quickly add that I do not think that he would make an adequate President if that official is to be a DeGaulle towering over a business manager-type Prime Minister on the Pompidou pattern. Huong has a record of a bad heart and as a consequence is physically weak and slow of movement. He looks and acts much older than his years--actually about 60, I believe. He would never be a vigorous executive. As a result, in part at least, of his tribulations in office, he is violently anti-Buddhist (of the Tri Quang-type), anti-northern and anti-military. I doubt that he is big enough to soften such prejudices in the national interest if he becomes President.

On the positive side, Huong is honest, courageous, patriotic and listens well to advice. As Prime Minister, the official closest to him was the present Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Nguyen Luu Vien, who complemented him very well.

In summary, I would say that Huong, supported by a vigorous Prime Minister, could be an excellent representational Chief of State. He is not equipped to run the show in the manner of DeGaulle.


Maxwell D. Taylor

CONFIDENTIAL

By *pn* NARA Date 3-26-98

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SECRETSENT
WHCA**EXDIS**

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67110

1967 MAR 6 15 27

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

MARCH 6, 1967

HEREWITH MCCLOY WADES INTO KIESINGER PRECISELY AS INSTRUCTED AND KIESINGER TICKS OFF EACH OF THE PAINFUL ELEMENTS IN HIS POLITICAL POSITION, BUT COMES OUT POSITIVE, IN PRINCIPLE, THE GERMAN CABINET MEETING OF MARCH 15 EMERGES AS CRUCIAL.

SUBJ: MCCLOY'S MEETING WITH KIESINGER - TRILATERAL TALKS

THE FOLLOWING IS A MEMCON, CLEARED BY MR. MCCLOY, OF HIS AND AMB MCGHEE'S CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER MARCH 4 AT STUTTGART:

THE MEETING HAD BEEN REQUESTED WITH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER TO ENABLE MR. MCCLOY TO REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE TRILATERAL MEETING THAT HAD BEEN HELD ON THE PRECEDING DAY IN LONDON. THE MEETING WAS HELD IN THE GUEST HOUSE OF DR. SCHEUFELN IN STUTTGART.

1. MR. MCCLOY ADVISED THE CHANCELLOR THAT HE HAD BEFORE THE TRILATERAL MEETING MET TWICE WITH THE PRESIDENT IN WASHINGTON. ONE OF THESE MEETINGS INCLUDED THE LEADERS OF THE CONGRESS. DURING THESE MEETINGS, THE QUESTION OF US FORCE LEVELS IN EUROPE HAD BEEN FULLY DISCUSSED.

2. MR. MCCLOY SAID THAT HE FIRST WISHED TO MAKE REFERENCE TO THE CHANCELLOR'S PRESS CONFERENCE WITH CDU/CSU PUBLISHERS HELD ON FEBRUARY 27. THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE CONFERENCE, AS RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON, HAD CREATED A STRONG REACTION. THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAD BEEN CONCERNED AT THE REPORTED REMARK ABOUT "COMPLICITY" BETWEEN THE US AND USSR IN PUTTING FORWARD THE NPT. DIFFICULTIES ARE CREATED WHEN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO BE CRITICAL OF EACH OTHER. THE PRESIDENT RESENTED THE IMPLICATION THAT WE HAD GONE BEHIND THE BACKS OF OUR ALLIES OR THAT WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO SUBSTITUTE A US-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING FOR NATO. WE WERE DOING OUR BEST TO HELP NATO RECOVER FROM THE FRENCH BLOW. WE ARE AGAINST MASSIVE WITHDRAWALS OF TROOPS FROM NATO AND ARE DOING ALL WE CAN TO HOLD THE LINE ON FORCE LEVELS.

3. IN THE MEANTIME, THERE ARE STRONG DOMESTIC PRESSURES PARTICULARLY IN CONGRESS, FOR LARGE-SCALE US TROOP REDUCTIONS. ALTHOUGH THESE STEM FROM A VARIETY OF MOTIVES, THERE IS THE FEELING THAT EUROPE IS NOT BEARING ITS FAIR SHARE OF THE BURDEN. THE PRESIDENT WANTED HIM TO ADVISE KIESINGER THAT HE WANTED SOMETHING AS A BASE FROM WHICH TO FIGHT TO MAINTAIN THE US POSITION IN EUROPE AND WOULD DO SO. PROVIDE HE HAD SOME ROOM

TO MANEUVER. IF OTHERS WILL DO SOMETHING, WE WILL NOT BE FOUND LAGGING BEHIND. THE PRESIDENT HAD RECOUNTED THE SUBSTANTIAL FORCES THAT THE US HAD COMMITTED TO THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. HE WAS DETERMINED THAT WE SHOULD NOT ENDANGER THE FUTURE OF NATO. VARIOUS OF THE ALLIES SEEMED TO BE "TRAMPLING EACH OTHER" IN BEING THE FIRST TO WITHDRAW FORCES. THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED HIM TO ASSURE THE CHANCELLOR THAT IN HIS VIEW DECISIONS WITH RESPECT TO FORCE LEVELS SHOULD BE MADE ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS, INVOLVING NATO AS A WHOLE. THEY SHOULD NOT BE DETERMINED BY THE FINANCIAL AND BUDGETARY PROBLEMS OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES, BUT RATHER ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY. THE PRESIDENT NEEDED REINFORCEMENT FOR HIS POSITION.

4. THE PRESIDENT HOPED THAT THE CHANCELLOR WOULD UNDERSTAND HIS PROBLEMS, JUST AS HE TRIED TO UNDERSTAND PRIME MINISTER WILSON'S AND THE CHANCELLOR'S PROBLEMS. PUBLIC DISPUTES BETWEEN THE THREE ARE NOT HELPFUL. THE PRESIDENT THOUGHT HIS CONVERSATION WITH FONMIN BRANDT, DURING THE LATTER'S RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON, HAD REVEALED A DESIRE TO REACH COMMON POSITIONS AND POLICIES IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY. THE PRESIDENT HAD POINTED OUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN MANY CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GERMANS IN RECENT MONTHS, PERHAPS MORE THAN WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY.

5. CHANCELLOR KIESINGER INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN HIS INTENTION IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE IN QUESTION TO CRITICIZE THE US GOVT. HE SAID THAT WE, AND HE HAD STRESSED THE "WE" TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT HE MEANT BOTH THE US AND GERMANY, HAVE IN RECENT TIMES BEEN MAINLY DISCUSSING MATTERS IN DISPUTE BETWEEN US. WHEN HE MENTIONED THE WORD "COMPLICITY," IN DESCRIBING THE ORIGINS OF THE NPT, HE HAD DONE SO SMILINGLY. HE, MOREOVER, IMMEDIATELY SHIFTED TO THE WORDS "COMMON RESPONSIBILITIES". IT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE, IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR SPECIAL NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITIES, THAT IT IS THE US AND THE SOVIETS WHO MUST INITIATE SUCH A TREATY. HE BELIEVED THAT CONSULTATIONS MIGHT HAVE BEEN STARTED EARLIER; HOWEVER, IT WAS PARTLY THE FAULT OF THE GERMANS. THE GERMAN CABINET HAD KNOWN THAT AN NPT WAS PENDING BUT HAD FAILED TO RAISE THE QUESTION WITH THE US.

6. MCCLOY REPLIED THAT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT COME TO GERMANY TO DISCUSS THE NPT WITH THE CHANCELLOR, HE WAS, OF COURSE, DEEPLY INTERESTED IN IT. HE REMINDED KIESINGER THAT HE IS A MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT'S DISARMAMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE. THE FACT IS THAT THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN DISCUSSING AN NPT FOR MANY YEARS. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, LITTLE FOR THE US TO RAISE WITH ITS ALLIES UNTIL WE HAD SOME EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBLE BREAKTHROUGH WITH THE SOVIETS. HE HIMSELF HAD ALWAYS POINTED OUT THAT THE US MUST CONSULT WITH THE GERMANS AT THE VERY FIRST OPPORTUNITY, IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE THAT AN NPT WOULD HAVE FOR GERMANY. PERHAPS BOTH SIDES HAD BEEN AT FAULT. HOWEVER, HE PARTICULARLY DEPLORED SUCH EMOTIONAL STATEMENTS AS THAT REPORTEDLY MADE BY ADENAUER TO THE EFFECT THAT THE NPT WAS THE MORGENTHAU PLAN SQUARED. KIESINGER INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT HE STRONGLY DISAPPROVED OF THE ADENAUER STATEMENT AND HAD TOLD HIM SO.

7. IN RETURNING TO THE DISCUSSION IN THE TRILATERAL COMMITTEE ON FORCE LEVELS, MR. MCCLOY SAID HE HAD TOLD THE COMMITTEE THAT HE CONSIDERED THAT THE WEST WAS IN A CRITICAL SITUATION. WE MUST STOP DEROGATING NATO. WE MUST DO SOMETHING POSITIVE TO REAFFIRM OUR FAITH IN NATO. IN HIS PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE THOMSON AND GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE DUCKWITZ, HE HAD OUTLINED THE OPTIONS OPEN TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON. THE PRESIDENT IS SEEKING A BASIS FOR A DECISION ON FORCE LEVELS. BRITISH PRINCE WILSON HAD TOLD MCCLOY THAT IF THE FINANCIAL SIDE COULD BE COVERED, HE WOULD NOT REDUCE BRITISH FORCES AT ALL. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE, MR. MCCLOY SAID, TO SEPARATE THE QUESTION OF US AND UK FORCE LEVELS. A MASSIVE WITHDRAWAL BY THE UK WOULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT BEARING ON THE ABILITY OF THE US TO MAINTAIN ITS TROOP LEVEL. PERHAPS ALL INVOLVED COULD GIVE A LITTLE TO THE END THAT THERE WOULD BE NO WITHDRAWALS OR SUCH INSIGNIFICANT WITHDRAWALS THAT IT COULD BE TAKEN AS A RENEWAL OF FAITH IN NATO.

8. DUCKWITZ HAD ASKED THOMSON HOW MANY FORCES THEY WOULD WITHDRAW IF THE GERMANS PAID NO OFFSET, TO WHICH THOMSON HAD REPLIED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE MASSIVE, OVER HALF. DUCKWITZ HAD THEN ASKED HIM WHAT THE BRITISH WOULD DO IF THE GERMANS RENEWED THEIR PETERSBERG OFFSET OFFER; WOULD THEY LIMIT THEIR WITHDRAWALS TO A BRIGADE? THIS THOMSON SAID HE COULD NOT AGREE TO. THERE WOULD BE TOO LARGE A GAP. THEY WOULD BE FORCED TO WITHDRAW MORE.

9. MCCLOY HAD ASSURED THOMSON AND DUCKWITZ THAT THE US WAS PREPARED TO MOVE FROM ITS PREVIOUS RATHER TOUGH POSITION ON ARMS SALES DURING THE ERHARD ERA. THE GERMANS CAN IN THE FUTURE BUY ARMS WHEREVER THEY LIKE, ALTHOUGH WE ASSUME THAT THEY WILL STILL NEED SOME US ARMS AND WOULD LIKE TO KNOW THE GENERAL LEVEL OF THESE NEEDS. THE REST OF OUR FOREIGN EXCHANGE LOSSES, RESULTING FROM OUR TROOPS IN GERMANY, WE HOPE TO HAVE NEUTRALIZED THROUGH FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS WITH THE BUNDESBANK. THOMSON HAD PRESSED DUCKWITZ FOR SOME INDICATION AS TO WHAT THE GERMANS WOULD BE WILLING TO DO, HOWEVER DUCKWITZ HAD INSISTED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DECISION UNTIL THE GERMAN CABINET MEETING ON MARCH 15.

MCCLOY SAID THAT HE HAD INTERPRETED DUCKWITZ TO IMPLY THAT THE GERMANS COULD ACCEPT THE REMOVAL OF ONE OF THE SIX BRITISH BRIGADES. THOMSON MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE BRITISH PROBLEM WAS ONLY A FINANCIAL ONE, AND THAT HE HOPED IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO REMOVE NO MORE THAN A BRIGADE.

10. THOMSON SAID THAT THERE WAS LITTLE THE BRITISH COULD ACCEPT IN TERMS OF FINANCIAL NEUTRALIZATION. THEIR SHORT-TERM INDEBTEDNESS WAS TOO GREAT. THEY MIGHT, HOWEVER, BE ABLE TO OFFSET A PORTION OF THEIR FOREIGN EXCHANGE COSTS IN THIS WAY. HE ASKED MCCLOY WHY THE US COULD NOT LET GERMANY SPEND SOME OF THEIR US CREDITS FOR ARMS PURCHASES IN THE UK. MCCLOY HAD REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT CONSIDER THIS POSSIBLE, BECAUSE GERMAN ADVANCES HAD ALREADY BEEN INCORPORATED INTO THE US BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND ALLOCATED AGAINST NECESSARY PROCUREMENT PLANS.

11. MCCLOY SAID THAT THE US WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT THE GERMANS CAN DO, BOTH WITH RESPECT TO THE US AND UK OFFSET PAYMENTS. THE US IS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION, BECAUSE THE UK HAS ACCUSED US OF DELAYING THE RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM BY OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE TRILATERAL TALKS. HE KNEW OF THE INDEPENDENT POSITION OF THE BUNDESITBANK, BUT HE HOPED THAT THE CHANCELLOR WOULD USE SUCH INFLUENCE AS HE HAS TO ASSURE THAT THE BUNDESBANK COOPERATED IN SOME TYPE OF FINANCIAL NEUTRALIZATION OF OUR FOREIGN EXCHANGE LOSSES. THE UK CAN NOT HOLD THE LINE MUCH LONGER. THE US PRESIDENT IS UNDER GREAT PRESSURE FROM THE CONGRESS, HOWEVER, HE CAN HOLD THE LINE IF GIVEN SOME SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT FROM OUR ALLIES IN EUROPE. HE HOPED THAT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE IN THE NEXT TRILATERAL MEETING SCHEDULED FOR MARCH 20. IN CONCLUSION MCCLOY SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED HIM TO TELL THE CHANCELLOR THAT HE SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO TAKE UP WITH HIM DIRECTLY, ANY MATTER ARISING OUT OF OUR RELATIONS THAT TROUBLES HIM.

12. IN RESPONSE, KIESINGER SAID HIS EXPERTS HAD ADVISED HIM THAT THE BRITISH WERE DETERMINED TO REDUCE "MASSIVELY" IN ANY CASE. THIS IMPRESSION HAD BEEN CONFIRMED TO SOME DEGREE BY THE STATEMENTS MADE BY WILSON DURING HIS BONN VISIT WHEN HE REFERRED TO THE NECESSITY OF A "SURGICAL OPERATION," AFTER WHICH HE TRUSTED THERE WOULD BE NO HARD FEELINGS. THE BRITISH WHITE PAPER ON DEFENSE HAD ALSO SEEMED TO POINT TO THIS. MOREOVER, THEY HAD BEEN HEARING US RUMORS TO THE EFFECT THAT MCNAMARA WAS BENT ON REDUCING FORCES SUBSTANTIALLY AND THERE WAS ALWAYS THE THREAT OF THE MANSFIELD RESOLUTION.

13. THIS WAS ONE ASPECT OF THE SITUATION. ANOTHER WAS THE FACT THAT GERMAN FINANCES WERE IN A "MISERABLE MESS". THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE HAD TOLD HIM THAT THERE WAS REALLY VERY LITTLE OF VALUE TO THE FRG IN THE WAY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHICH THE UK HAD OR COULD READILY PRODUCE. THE FRG HAD IN OCTOBER SUGGESTED THE PETERSBERG COMPROMISE OF SOME 350 MILLION DM, PLUS SOME POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS. THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAD, HOWEVER, FOUND THERE WAS NO MONEY--STRAUSS INSISTING THAT THERE WAS NONE AT HIS DISPOSAL. THE COMBINATION OF ALL THESE FACTORS PRESENTED GREAT DIFFICULTIES. HE HOPED THAT DECISIONS COULD BE MADE AT THE CABINET MEETING SCHEDULED FOR THE MIDDLE OF MARCH. KIESINGER SAID THAT THE POSITION MCCLOY HAD TAKEN IN LONDON HAD BEEN VERY HELPFUL, AND THAT HE WOULD "TRY TO FIND A WAY".

14. KIESINGER THEN SAID THAT HE HOPED THE PRESIDENT WOULD UNDERSTAND HOW HIS USE OF THE TERM "COMPLICITY" HAD BEEN COMPLETELY MISINTERPRETED. HE REFERRED TO THE ATTEMPTS HE HAD MADE TO CORRECT THE MIS-IMPRESSION THAT THE FIRST REPORTS OF HIS TALK HAD MADE. ANB MCGHEE INTERVENED TO SAY THAT HE HAD CABLED TO WASHINGTON, POINTING OUT THE SERIES OF STEPS THE CHANCELLOR HAD TAKEN TO PUT THE PROPER INTERPRETATION ON HIS STATEMENT. KIESINGER SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD AND APPLAUDED THE OBJECTIVE OF REDUCING TENSIONS ON THE EAST-WEST ISSUE.

15. THE FURTHEST THING FROM HIS MIND HAD BEEN TO SUGGEST THAT THE US HAD ANY ILL PURPOSE IN RELATION TO GERMANY IN SEEKING A NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENT. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE US, HE WAS CERTAIN THE PURPOSE WAS TO AVOID ATOMIC WAR AND THE DANGERS INHERENT IN THE INDISCRIMINATE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

HE RECOGNIZED THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WHICH THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AS THE WORLD'S GREATEST NUCLEAR POWERS IMPOSED UPON THEM", YET HE WAS QUITE CERTAIN THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD OTHER MOTIVATIONS THAN THOSE OF THE US. FUNDAMENTALLY, THE SOVIET UNION WISHED TO KEEP GERMANY DOWN, AND HE FELT THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENT WAS DIRECTED PRIMARILY AGAINST GERMANY.

16. HE WISHED THAT BRANDT, WHEN IN WASHINGTON, COULD HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES THE REAL MOTIVES AND RATIONALE OF THE US IN REGARD TO THE AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET MOTIVATIONS. BRANDT HAD NOT DEVELOPED THIS CONCERN OF GERMANY. KIESINGER FELT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH BETTER IF THIS FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF POLICY COULD HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED AND WEIGHED BEFORE THE MATTER HAD BEEN TAKEN UP WITH THE SOVIETS. THE MATTER INVOLVED FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OF VITAL CONCERN TO GERMANY, AND HE WOULD HAVE WISHED THAT THE REASONING BEHIND THE AGREEMENT AND OUR PUTTING IT FORWARD AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME WITH AN EXPRESSION OF THE NEED FOR HASTE, COULD HAVE BEEN BETTER EXPLAINED. THERE WAS A REAL INTERNATIONAL POLICY ISSUE INVOLVED. HE DID NOT HOWEVER, PLACE THE FULL BLAME ON THE US FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH THE QUESTION HAD BEEN RAISED. EVERYONE KNEW THAT A DESIRE TO REACH A NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENT WAS PREVALENT, AND THERE HAD BEEN INDICATIONS THAT APPROACHES WERE PROBABLY BEING MADE BY THE US TO THE SOVIET UNION, THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENOUGH TO PROMPT THE ERHARD GOVT TO RAISE THE MATTER AT AN EARLY DATE WITH THE US GOVT, INSTEAD IT HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO COME TO A HEAD AT A PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE TIME. KIESINGER THOUGHT THAT, IN THIS RESPECT, BOTH OF US WERE TO BLAME. THE MATTER HAD BEEN BLOWN UP INTO A REAL POLITICAL ISSUE.

IN GERMANY. EVEN SUCH A DEVOTED PRO-AMERICAN AS BIRRENBACH HAD BEEN GREATLY DISTURBED ABOUT IT. IF IT HAD BEEN HANDLED DIFFERENTLY, PUBLIC OPINION COULD HAVE BEEN BETTER PREPARED AND A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE MOTIVATION OF THE US COULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED.

17. KIESINGER EMPHASIZED HIS DEEP CONCERN FOR THE WELFARE OF THE ALLIANCE. "I WANT TO STRENGTHEN NATO." IN RESPONSE TO DE GAULLE'S EFFORTS TO INDUCE HIM TO TAKE STEPS TO WEAKEN NATO, HE HAD TOLD HIM VERY CLEARLY THAT IT WAS FIRM GERMAN POLICY TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN NATO. HE HAD TOLD DE GAULLE THAT HE MUST UNDERSTAND THIS. THERE WAS A RISING FEELING, HOWEVER, IN GERMANY, THAT SOMETHING HAD "GONE WRONG" WITH THE FORMER PATTERN OF GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND GERMANY. THIS WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A FEELING THAT NATO WAS IN DANGER OF DEVELOPING INTO A SORT OF "SHELL WITH NO REAL SPIRIT LEFT IN IT." THERE WERE ELEMENTS IN THE NPD PARTY ATTEMPTING TO EXPLOIT AN ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING. THIS WAS AN UTTERLY NEW DEVELOPMENT IN GERMAN POLITICS IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE MOVE WOULD SUCCEED AND DID NOT ATTACH TOO GREAT IMPORTANCE TO IT, BUT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE HISTORY OF THE FRG THERE HAD BEEN A PUBLIC OUTCRY AGAINST A PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY OUR US ALLIES.

WHEN THERE HAD BEEN SOME INDICATION THAT THE NPD HAD BEEN LOSING GROUND IN HESSE AND BAVARIA SINCE THE ELECTIONS, BUT HE COULD NOT SAY THAT IN FUTURE ELECTIONS THE NPD MIGHT NOT HAVE SOME MEASURE OF SUCCESS. ADENAUER HAD DONE HARM TO US-GERMAN RELATIONS

BY HIS LIKENING THE NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENT TO THE MORGENTHAU PLAN SQUARED, AS HAD VAN DE GRUBEN BY LIKENING IT TO VERSAILLES. KIESINGER HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM ADENAUER COMPLAINING ABOUT THE AGREEMENT, TO WHICH HE HAD REPLIED VERY STRONGLY. YET THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT SOME DAMAGE HAD BEEN DONE. THE NON-PROLIFERATION SITUATION, COMING ON TOP OF THE QUESTION OF OFFSETS AND THE FALL OF ERHARD AFTER HIS UNFORTUNATE WASHINGTON VISIT, HAD CONSTITUTED THE LAST DROP WHICH MADE THE BARREL OVERFLOW, AT A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT PERIOD IN THE LIFE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

19. WE MUST REALIZE, KIESINGER SAID, THAT IT WAS ONE THING FOR GERMANY TO DECLARE AMONG ITS ALLIES THAT IT RENOUNCED THE MANUFACTURE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS, BUT QUITE ANOTHER THING TO ASK GERMANY TO ENTER INTO A BINDING AGREEMENT WITH ITS MAJOR ADVERSARY, LIMITING EVEN FURTHER ITS CAPABILITIES IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD. THIS TOOK MORE DOING, AND PUBLIC OPINION SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR IT.

THE BRUTAL STATEMENT OF KOSYGIN IN LONDON TO THE EFFECT THAT GERMANS HAD TO TAKE THE AGREEMENT AND LIKE IT, ADDED FUEL TO THE FLAMES. (KIESINGER HAD TAKEN PAINS TO OBTAIN THE EXACT TEXT OF KOSYGIN'S STATEMENT AND THE ACTUAL TEXT WAS EVEN HARSHER THAN THAT REPORTED.) THE ARGUMENT THAT IT WAS ALL INTENDED TO KEEP COUNTRIES LIKE ISRAEL AND INDIA FROM GETTING THE BOMB WAS NOT PARTICULARLY CONVINCING TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE, WHEN THEY ALL UNDERSTOOD THE SOVIET MOTIVATION BEHIND THE AGREEMENT.

20. EVEN THOUGH NO LESSER A MAN THEN ADENAUER HAD CALLED THE AGREEMENT A MORGENTHAU PLAN, KIESINGER DID NOT DESPAIR OF REACHING AN ACCEPTABLE TEXT AND HE ADDED, "I THINK WE CAN COME TO AGREEMENT." APROPOS OF HIS RELATIONS WITH FRANCE, WE WANTED TO DISPELL THE IDEA THAT EITHER HE OR GERMANY WAS HYPNOTIZED BY DE GAULLE "LIKE A RABBIT BY A SNAKE." THEY DID SEEK TO PURSUE A CONTINENTAL POLICY OF A CONSTRUCTIVE CHARACTER, BUT WITHOUT IN ANY WAY SEPARATING THEMSELVES FROM THEIR OVERSEAS ALLIES. HE USED THE EXPRESSION THAT HE WAS "CONSTANTLY ATTEMPTING TO KEEP FRANCE FROM GOING SOUR."

21 HE FULLY REALIZED THE NEED FOR "ALLIED HEADS OF STATE" TO REFRAIN FROM CRITICIZING EACH OTHER OR THEIR GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES IN PUBLIC, BUT WHEN KOSYGIN MADE HIS ATTACK ON GERMANY FROM BRITISH SOIL NOT ONE WORD WAS SAID IN PUBLIC REPUDIATION OF IT. THE ONLY STATESMAN IN EUROPE WHO HAD RESPONDED TO SUCH ATTACKS FROM ALLIED SOIL (IN THIS CASE BY PODGORNYY) WAS SARAGAT. WE CAN BE SURE THAT IF ANYONE FROM THE OTHER SIDE MADE ANY SUCH STATEMENTS FROM GERMAN SOIL AGAINST THE US OR ANY OTHER ALLY, KIESINGER WOULD IMMEDIATELY AND EMPHATICALLY DENOUNCE IT. MCCLOY REFERRED TO HIS STATEMENT IN LONDON TO THE EFFECT THAT HE DEPLORED THE FACT THAT NO REPLIES HAD BEEN MADE BY ALLIED HOST COUNTRIES, WHEN ATTACKS HAD BEEN MADE FROM THEIR SOIL ON ANOTHER ALLY. KIESINGER REPEATED THAT IT WAS HIS WISH TO RECLARIFY THE WHOLE ATMOSPHERE, AND TO THIS HE WOULD APPLY HIS BEST EFFERTS.

22. KIESINGER ALSO REFERRED TO THE RECENT BRITISH STATEMENT REGARDING THE ODER-NEISSE LINE, PRESUMABLY BY FONMIN BROWN, AND TO A STATEMENT MADE TO KIESINGER BY WILSON ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO BONN. WILSON HAD SAID THAT HE FELT BRITISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS HAD REACHED A HIGH WATER MARK, WHEN HE HAD INDICATED TO

THE SOVIETS THAT HE WAS IN FAVOR OF THE ODER-NEISSE LINE. WE MUST REALIZE HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS FOR ANY GERMAN LEADER TO ACQUIESCE IN ANY SUCH SENTIMENT. PERHAPS THIS MIGHT BE DEALT WITH AT SOME FUTURE TIME IN A NEW CONTEXT, BUT ANY GERMAN WHO NOW PUBLICLY ACCEPTED THE ODER-NEISSE LINE WOULD HAVE A "TERRIBLE RECORD" WITH THE GERMAN PEOPLE. WHEN MR. MCCLOY REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT HE HAD ONCE ADVOCATED THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE ODER-NEISSE LINE IN RETURN FOR REUNIFICATION AND FREE ELECTIONS, KIESINGER REPLIED THAT HE HAD RECALLED THIS AND HE SOMETIMES HAD "SLEEPLESS NIGHTS" WONDERING HOW HE WOULD HANDLE SUCH A PROPOSAL AS THIS IF IT CAME UP.

23. KIESINGER ALSO SAID THAT HE WANTED TO DISSOCIATE HIMSELF COMPLETELY FROM ANY CRITICISM CAST AGAINST THE US, OR AGAINST NATO, ON THE GROUND THAT NEITHER HAD DONE ANYTHING TO BRING ABOUT GERMAN REUNIFICATION. THIS WAS TOTALLY UNFAIR AND THE FAILURE OF REUNIFICATION WAS CERTAINLY NO FAULT OF THE ALLIES, AND PARTICULARLY NOT OF THE US. KIESINGER STATED THAT HE HAD THE FEELING THAT GERMANY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD ITS ALLES HAD NOT BEEN MADE AS CLEAR AS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN, AND IN THIS RESPECT HE REFERRED TO WILSON'S ANXIETY TO HAVE THE FRG BRING HEAVY AND EXTENSIVE PRESSURE ON DE GAULLE TO FORCE ACCEPTANCE OF BRITISH ENTRY INTO THE COMMON MARKET. GERMANY WAS MOST ANXIOUS TO HAVE THE BRITISH COME IN, BUT HE FELT THAT HEAVY PRESSURE FROM GERMANY IN THE FORM OF A DEMAND ON FRANCE WOULD NOT BE CONDUCIVE TOWARD ACHIEVING THE DESIRED RESULT. THIS DOES NOT MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WERE LUKEWARM ON THIS ISSUE.

24. MR. MCCLOY ASKED WHAT ATTITUDE HE MIGHT TAKE IF THE US REDUCED ITS FORCES BY ONE DIVISION, WITH ROTATION, EMPHASIZING THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE NO DECISION WHATEVER IN REGARD TO FORCE LEVELS AND THAT HE WAS ASKING SOLELY FOR HIS OWN INFORMATION. KIESINGER REPLIED THAT IT WAS AN INTERESTING SUGGESTION, BUT THAT HE WAS NOT A MILITARY MAN AND COULD NOT SAY WHAT EFFECT IT MIGHT HAVE. HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE MORE CONSIDERATION TO THE SUGGESTION IF THE QUESTION EVER CAME UP.

25. MR. MCCLOY CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT, ALTHOUGH OUR POSITION WAS NOT TO INSIST ON SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS IN REGARD TO MILITARY OFFSETS, WE WOULD HAVE A VERY HARD TIME OF IT IF, AS STRAUSS HAD SUGGESTED, GERMANY MIGHT COMMENCE THE PURCHASE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN FRANCE. THIS WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF REDUCING OUR OFFSETS IN FAVOR OF FRANCE, WHOSE TROOPS IN GERMANY WERE NOW UNCOMMITTED TO NATO, WHILE OURS WERE, AND WHILE THE MAJOR DETERRENT IN SUPPORT OF GERMAN SECURITY LIES OVERWHELMINGLY WITH THE US. KIESINGER REPLIED THAT THIS WAS NOT BEING SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLATED. SOME SUGGESTION HAD BEEN MADE THAT THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IN THE 70'S, BUT NO SUCH MOVES WERE NOW IN PROSPECT.

COMMENT: KIESINGER GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF SINCERITY AND REAL FRIENDSHIP FOR THE US THROUGHOUT THE TALK. HE SEEMED TO HAVE A FULL AWARENESS OF THE PRESIDENT'S DIFFICULT POSITION, AND THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT NEEDED TO GAIN ALL THE INFORMATION HE COULD BEFORE HE COULD MAKE A FINAL DECISION. KIESINGER SAID THAT HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO COOPERATE. HE ASKED PARTICULARLY THAT MCCLOY CONVEY HIS REGARDS AND GOOD WISHES TO THE PRESIDENT.

GP-3-MCGHEE

DTS: 061250Z MAR 67

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

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By ju NARA, Date 9-3-92

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1967 MAR 6 16 20

EYES ONLY

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67111

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

MARCH 4, 1967

FRESH FROM HIS STOP IN CAIRO, HAL SAUNDERS OF MY STAFF WHO IS QUIETLY TOURING THE MIDDLE EAST HAS REPORTED THE FOLLOWING

1. NASSER SHOULD BE TOLD SOON ONE WAY OR THE OTHER ABOUT WHEAT. IT HAS COME TO SYMBOLIZE OUR FUTURE INTENT TOWARD HIM AND HIS REGIME.
2. HELP ON THE IMF NEGOTIATIONS IS NEARLY AS IMPORTANT. OFFICIALS ARGUE THEY'VE CUT EXPENDITURES, HAVE MADE REAL ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS. THEIR SELF HELP PERFORMANCE IS "RELATIVELY POSITIVE."
3. NO ONE IN CAIRO BELIEVES THE SOVIETS AND NASSER ARE WORKING HAND IN GLOVE. THERE IS PARALLELISM OF POLICY, BUT CAIRO WANTS TO AVOID SOVIET CONTROL.
4. BECAUSE THE UAR IS THE CHIEF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND MODERNIZING RAPIDLY, SAUNDERS BELIEVES WE SHOULD BUILD SOME KIND OF NEW RELATIONSHIP.
5. HE DOUBTS THIS CAN BE DONE UNLESS YOU AND NASSER MEET SOMEWHERE TO DEFINE YOUR AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST AND DISAGREEMENT. HE ACKNOWLEDGES THE RISKS, BUT HOPES WE WILL CONSIDER THIS CAREFULLY, SINCE CAIRO PERSISTS IN SEEING EVERYTHING WE DO IN THE AREA AS DIRECTED AGAINST HIM -- THOSE NOT ACTIVELY WITH HIM MUST BE AGAINST HIM. (WWR COMMENT: PERHAPS A LETTER FROM YOU COULD DO THE JOB).
6. HAL COMMENDS A CAUTIOUS BUT REVITALIZED POLICY TO REBUILD OUR POSITION IN CAIRO, AVOIDING EQUALLY THE OVER-ENTHUSIASM OF THE EARLY 1960'S AND THE DISTRUST OF TODAY.

COMMENT

WE'VE SHOWN THIS TO NICK KATZENBACH ONLY. HE PLANS TO PURSUE WHEAT FOR THE UAR A BIT FURTHER ON THE HILL BEFORE MAKING A RECOMMENDATION TO YOU. PROBABLY A SMALL AMOUNT AS A GIFT, ABOUT MATCHING THE SOVIET UNION'S 250,000 TON GIFT (WHICH ELLENDER, AMONG OTHERS, SEEMS TO PREFER OVER A CREDIT SALE). WE HAVE SOME DOUBTS ON THE TIMING, BECAUSE IT MAY BE SEEN BOTH IN EGYPT AND ARABIA AS A REWARD FOR RAISING HELL. BUT THIS WILL BE LOOKED INTO BEFORE THE RECOMMENDATION COMES TO YOU.

HAL WILL BE BACK IN TEN DAYS, WHEN WE CAN GO INTO THE COMPLEX OF MIDDLE EAST ISSUES WITH A FRESH LOOK.

APPROX FROM QUICK COPY

FM HAROLD SAUNDERS 8693

TO THE WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY FOR WALT ROSTOW AND HOWARD WIGGINS

FOLLOWING IMPRESSIONS MY INTENSIVE TALKS IN CAIRO WITH FOREIGN MINISTER, TREASURY AND ECONOMY MINISTERS AND OTHERS BEAR ON YOUR WHEAT DECISION.

FIRST. WE OUGHT TO SAY SOMETHING TO EGYPTIANS ABOUT WHEAT SOON ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. DRAGGING OUT LINE THAT WE HAVE FOOD REQUEST "UNDER CONSIDERATION" REAPS ALL DISADVANTAGES OF NEGATIVE ANSWER WITHOUT GAINING ADVANTAGES OF KEEPING DOOR OPEN. MONTHS OF AMBIGUITY PLUS OTHER EVENTS MID EAST HAVE CONVINCED EGYPTIANS WE HAVE CAST OUR LOT WITH OTHER SIDE AND FOR THAT REASON HAVE DECIDED AGAINST WHEAT AID. THEY SAY BITTERLY THAT EVEN DULLES GAVE THEM AN ANSWER.

SECOND. WHEAT DECISION UNFORTUNATELY MORE THAN EVER SYMBOL OUR FUTURE INTENT BECAUSE IT INVOLVES BOTH DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN REQUIREMENTS. WE WOULD BE A LOT BETTER OFF IF WE COULD GET OFF THIS WICKET BUT FOR MOMENT IT LOOKS AS IF WHEAT ALONE CAN BREAK STALEMATE. I THINK WE MIGHT GET AWAY WITH DOLLAR SALE AS LONG AS GRACE PERIOD LONG ENOUGH TO COVER NEXT THREE YEARS WHICH EGYPTIANS SEE AS PERIOD OF REAL ECONOMIC PINCH. AFTER THAT, THEY NOT EUPHORIC BUT DO SEEM HAVE REASON HOPE OIL AND OTHER SLOWLY INCREASING EXPORTS PLUS IMPROVED IMPORT SUBSTITUTION WILL BEGIN PAY OFF.

THIRD. TO ECONOMIC INSIDERS, HELP IN NEW IMF NEGOTIATIONS ALMOST AS IMPORTANT AS FOOD DECISION. MAIN POINT MADE TO ME BY NAZI DEIF AND HAMED EL SAYEH WHOM YOU MET LAST FALL IS THAT THEY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN BRINGING EXPENDITURES UNDER CONTROL IN SIX MONTHS SINCE IMF TALKS BEGAN. THEREFORE NEW SITUATION EXISTS HERE AND GUNTER MISSION MUST COME END MARCH WITH SOME GIVE ITS POSITION.

FOURTH. DESPITE POLITICAL SYMBOLISM BOTH THESE ISSUES AND CONTRARY CONCEPTION CREATED BY USUAL INTRA-USG JUSTIFICATION OUR AID PROGRAM IN UAR, THIS FAR FROM PURELY POLITICAL PROGRAM DESIGNED BRIBE NASSER KEEP OUT OF OUR UAR. WASHINGTON, ESPECIALLY THE PRESS AND CONGRESS, BADLY NEEDS UNDERSTAND THAT UAR NOT JUST PROVERBIAL RATHOLE DOWN WHICH WE POUR OUR AID. ALL WASHINGTON FULLY AWARE FOREIGN EXCHANGE BIND. POINT NOT WIDELY APPRECIATED IS DEGREE TO WHICH THIS A PLACE OF REAL ACHIEVEMENT AND SOUND PLANNING. I NOW UNDERSTAND WHY WORLD BANK RELATIVELY OPTIMISTIC DESPITE GAPS IN EXECUTION. I WELL KNOW WEAKNESS THIS ARGUMENT IN OFFSETTING NASSER'S POLEMICS, BUT IT IMPORTANT PRESIDENT KNOW THAT SELF-HELP CASE RELATIVELY POSITIVE.

FIFTH. I FOUND NO ONE CAIRO WILLING ASSERT THAT NASSER AND SOVIETS WORKING HAND IN GLOVE. SOVIET-LIKE POLITICAL MODEL ADOPTED FOR PRAGMATIC REASONS SINCE WESTERN STYLE DEMOCRACY NOT SUITABLE NASSER'S STYLE. HARD EVIDENCE ANY FIRM MOSCOW-CAIRO UNDERSTANDING LACKING. SOVIET INFLUENCE AND PARALLELISM INTERESTS SUBSTANTIAL. BUT EGYPTIAN DESIRE AVOID SOVIET CONTROL IS UNANIMOUS IMPRESSION.

SIXTH. BECAUSE EGYPTIANS ARE MAKING HONEST DEVELOPMENT EFFORT AND DO NOT LOOK LIKE COMMUNIST TOOLS, BELIEVE IT STILL POSSIBLE BUILD SOME KIND US-UAR RELATIONSHIP IF WE CONSIDER IT WORTHWHILE. AFTER SEEING ENERGY WITH WHICH EGYPT MODERNIZING, I DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN DO OTHERWISE, THOUGH I RECOGNIZE DOMESTIC PRESSURES MAY TIP JUDGMENT OTHER WAY. COMMON ARGUMENT FOR RELATIONSHIP IS THAT NASSER CAN CAUSE US SO MUCH TROUBLE ELSEWHERE. THIS TRUE BUT IN MY VIEW MISSES SIMPLER MAIN POINT THAT EGYPT CLEARLY CHIEF POWER MODERN MIDDLE EAST.

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SEVENTH. IF WE DO WANT TO SUSTAIN LONG-TERM US POSITION CAIRO, ONLY SOUND FOUNDATION I CAN SEE IS EVENTUAL MEETING BETWEEN NASSER AND PRESIDENT. BECAUSE OUR CONTRADICTORY INTERESTS IN NEAR EAST WILL ALWAYS FEED EGYPTIAN SUSPICION WE WORKING AGAINST THEM, ONLY WAY ESTABLISH ACCURATE PICTURE LIMITS OUR OBJECTIVES IS FOR TWO PRESIDENTS REACH UNDERSTANDING EACH OTHER'S PURPOSES AND AGREE ON INEVITABLE AREAS DISAGREEMENT. I COULD SEE THIS WORKING OUT MUCH AS PRESIDENT'S UNDERSTANDING WITH AYUB. I REALIZE HARD THOUGHT NEEDED WEIGH RISKS FOR PRESIDENT AGAINST DISADVANTAGES, BUT I AM CONVINCED AS NEVER BEFORE THAT WIDE GULF MISUNDERSTANDING UNLIKELY BE BRIDGED ANY THEIR WAY. AMBASSADOR BATTLE ESSENTIALLY AGREES, THOUGH HE WISELY CAUTIOUS WE SHOULD NOT TRY THIS UNLESS WE WILLING SUSTAIN FOLLOWUP.

MY MAIN REASON FOR ARGUING THIS CASE IS THAT OUR BIGGEST PROBLEM IN CAIRO TODAY IS THAT NO AMOUNT OF LOGIC SUFFICIENT PERSUADE EGYPTIANS THAT EVERYTHING WE DO IN NEAR EAST NOT DIRECTED AT THEM. IT AMAZING WHAT SHREDS OF EVIDENCE THEY HAVE WOVEN TOGETHER TO PROVE THIS TO THEMSELVES. THESE NOT JUST DEBATING POINTS. EVERY OFFICIAL I TALKED TO FROM FOREIGN MINISTER ON DOWN OBVIOUSLY SINCERELY BELIEVES THIS. MAIN THREAD THIS FABRIC OF ILLOGIC SEEMS BE PHILOSOPHY THOSE NOT HELPING THEM MUST BE AGAINST THEM.

UNFORTUNATELY, THERE JUST ENOUGH TRUTH THEIR EVIDENCE TO MAKE IT DIFFICULT REFUTE. FOR INSTANCE, EDITORIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENTS THAT GET MOST PLAY MADE BY PEOPLE WHO HAVE IN FACT CHOSEN SIDES HERE. BEEN MORE DAMAGING, MCNAMARA STATEMENT THAT TENSIONS IN MIDDLE EAST "SPARKED BY UAR" CONSIDERED COUP DE GRACE IN ARGUMENT THAT WE VIEW CAIRO AS THE ENEMY.

THEREFORE, IF WE WISH STOP DRIFTING THIS PART OF WORLD ONE MAJOR ILLAR REVITALIZED POLICY MUST BE SOME EFFORT REBUILD IN CAIRO. LAST FIVE YEARS HAVE TAUGHT US NOT GO TOO FAR TOO FAST OR EXPECT TOO MUCH. FORTUNATELY INTERNATIONAL TOOLS AT HAND IN IMF AND WORLD BANK STUDY AND NOT IMPOSSIBLE TRY MOVING GRADALLY TO POSITION WE SHOOTING FOR IN 1961-62.

DTG 061321Z MARCH 1967

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

OPS1260 IMI 1260

Monday, March 6, 1967
10:30 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

George Carver is one of the three or four most
perceptive people in the government on Viet Nam.

After hearing his report on his latest trip,
I asked him to write it out.

You may wish to read it.

You may also wish to note his specially restricted
comments in his two-page letter to me at the end.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ attachment

(Logs 702-A
702-B)

Monday, March 6, 1967 -- 10:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

I once said to you -- I think at Camp David -- that we had more success stories in foreign aid to report than the Congress and our people generally understood.

You replied, quite correctly, who is graduated from aid except Taiwan and Greece? I responded by saying that while we didn't have many graduates, we had a number of countries on the way towards graduation; and this could be demonstrated by showing: their rise in rate of growth, combined with the decline in our aid to them, including especially the decline in supporting assistance.

To illustrate this proposition, I have had charts prepared, without text or sermonizing, on Korea and Turkey. You may want to go through them, noting in both cases not only their own progress but the rise in the proportion of their investment, financed from their own resources; decline in supporting assistance; the increase in their agricultural production and exports as well as in industrial output.

If you think these ten-year charts are helpful, we could have them prepared on other potential "success stories"; for example, Pakistan, Iran, Venezuela, Chile, etc.

My feeling is that by getting people to look at the problem over the past ten years, they can see more clearly what we have accomplished; they can see that there really is light at the end of the tunnel in the sense that there is an honest hope that special aid will end; and, therefore, they may have more heart in sweating it out.

W. W. Rostow

Get charts organized ^{over} and
other potential "success stories" _____

Don't bother _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rln

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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By ju NARA Date 9-3-92FEB047
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DE WTE 264FROM W. W. ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67117~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MONDAY - MARCH 6, 1967

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH LATIN AMERICAN EXPERTS ON THE SUMMIT

I MET YESTERDAY AT MY HOME FOR LUNCH WITH MILTON EISENHOWER, ADOLF BERLE, TOMM MANN, JACK VAUGHN, LINC GORDON AND SOL LINOWITZ TO DISCUSS THE LATIN AMERICAN SUMMIT.

WE HAD A USEFUL THREE-AND-A-HALF HOUR SESSION REVIEWING THE SUMMIT PACKAGE AND JOINT RESOLUTION, DISCUSSING THE FOCUS OF YOUR SPEECH AT THE SUMMIT AND EXAMINING SOME NEW IDEAS WHICH YOU MIGHT ADVANCE.

THESE ARE THE HIGHLIGHTS:

- ALL THOUGHT THAT THE SUMMIT PACKAGE WAS WELL STRUCTURED TO GET AT THE ROOT OF LATIN AMERICA'S BASIC DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS.
- ALL AGREED THAT TIME WAS RUNNING SHORT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE MOMENT FOR DECISIVE ACTION WAS NOW. THE SUMMIT OFFERED A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR THE LATIN AMERICANS TO MAKE THE NECESSARY POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND FOR YOU TO REDEFINE US POLICY.
- ALL AGREED THAT WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE LATIN AMERICANS TO MOVE RAPIDLY DOWN THE PATH OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AS THE SINGLE, MOST IMPORTANT STEP THEY CAN TAKE TO SPEED UP THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND TRANSFORM ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS. OUR HELP SHOULD BE CLOSELY GEARED TO THEIR PERFORMANCE.
- MILTON EISENHOWER STRESSED THAT THE SUMMIT GAVE YOU THE CHANCE TO DRAMATIZE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL THAT OUR RELATION WITH THE LATIN AMERICANS IS THAT OF JUNIOR PARTNER AND THAT WHILE MONEY IS IMPORTANT AND WE WILL HELP, IT CAN ONLY BE A SUPPLEMENT TO THEIR OWN COMMITMENT AND ACTION.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

- ADOLF BERLE FOCUSED ON THE TRADE ISSUE, POINTING OUT THAT IF MEANINGFUL HELP FOR THE LDC'S DOES NOT COME FROM THE KENNEDY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS, WE MAY HAVE TO THINK IN TERMS OF EXTENDING REGIONAL PREFERENCES FOR LATIN AMERICA.
- JACK VAUGHN OBSERVED THE NEED TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE BIRTH RATE AND THE URBAN SLUM PROBLEM, BUT ALL RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTIES IN DOING ANYTHING MEANINGFUL AT THE SUMMIT IN THESE TWO AREAS.

ON THEMES FOR YOUR SUMMIT SPEECH:

- MILTON EISENHOWER SUGGESTED THAT IN EMPHASIZING ECONOMIC INTEGRATION YOU POINT TO THE DRAMATIC SHIFT IN POLICY WHICH THIS REPRESENTS FOR US. HISTORICALLY, WE HAVE DISCOURAGED IT. ONLY IN THE LAST TEN YEARS HAS OUR THINKING SHIFTED. YOU WOULD BE THE FIRST PRESIDENT TO GIVE IT A MAJOR THRUST FORWARD.
- ADOLF BERLE SAID YOU SHOULD POINT TO THE PROGRESS MADE IN RECENT YEARS IN STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY AND GETTING GOVERNMENTS TO WORK FOR THE PEOPLE AS NEVER BEFORE.
- BOTH EISENHOWER AND BERLE URGED THAT YOU STRESS THAT THE US IS NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF BUILDING EMPIRES BUT WANTS TO HELP OTHERS IN THIS HEMISPHERE, AND ELSEWHERE, TO BUILD UP THEMSELVES. BERLE HAD AN EXCELLENT QUOTE FROM SENECA ABOUT THERE BEING NO POSSIBILITY OF LASTING FRIENDSHIP EXCEPT BETWEEN EQUALS.

IN THE REALM OF NEW IDEAS, THE GROUP THOUGHT WE SHOULD EXAMINE THESE AREAS:

- SPEEDING UP A SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FOR LATIN AMERICA;
- HELP IN PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL TV;
- DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH LIBRARIES ON MICROFILM;
- COOPERATION IN DEVELOPMENT OF "FOOD FROM SEA" RESOURCES;
- DEVELOPMENT OF PROTEIN CONCENTRATES FOR CHILD-FEEDING PROGRAMS; AND
- COMPUTERIZED ACCESS TO INFORMATION, PERHAPS DRAWING ON NIH'S DEVELOPMENT OF AN ELECTRONIC LIBRARY IN MEDICINE.

CONFIDENTIAL

DTG: 061746Z MAR 67

Monday, March 6, 1967

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

Axel Springer, the head of DIE WELT a big newspaper and magazine network in Germany, will be in the U.S. towards the end of April -- roughly the 10 days starting April 25. One of his men, whom I have known for a number of years, came in to see me to say he would very much like to see you on that occasion. Although he is emotional and his views wander about, basically Springer wishes to be pro-U.S. and pro-Johnson.

His man reported that, after George McGhee returned from Washington, he was doubtful that an appointment could be arranged. I know nothing about that; and there may be good reasons why you do not wish to see him. From what I know, however, this would be a useful man to see and to whom to explain your general views about Germany and Europe.

Accept off-the record talk with Axel Springer_____

No_____

See me_____

WWRostow:rln

EEB043
00 WTE10
DE WTE 263

SENT
WHCA

Authority UK Guidelines
By pw NARA Date 3-26-98

1967 MAR 6 18 28

FROM VALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67116

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MARCH 6, 1967

PAT DEAN AND MICHAEL STEWART CAME IN TODAY WITH THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON. THEY WILL BE TALKING IN THE SAME VEIN TO SECRETARY RUSK THIS AFTERNOON.

1. IT IS CLEAR THAT OUR PLANNED INCREASE IN PRESSURE ON NORTH VIET NAM WILL CONFRONT THE PRIME MINISTER WITH A PROBLEM OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UK. EVEN THE MODEST INCREASED ACTIONS WE HAVE ALREADY TAKEN HAVE LED TO CONSIDERABLE INCREASE IN NOISE FROM THE LABOR OPPOSITION.

2. IN GENERAL THE U. S. IS NOT GETTING THROUGH TO BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- WHY WE ARE IN VIET NAM;
- WHY WE BELIEVE OUR MILITARY AND POLITICAL POLICY WILL SUCCEED;
- WHY WE BELIEVE THE COURSE OF ACTION WE ARE PURSUING WILL BRING ABOUT PEACE.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER THEREFORE REQUESTS THAT WE SEND OVER TO BRITAIN FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS A PROMINENT POLITICAL FIGURE WHO WILL TALK AT LENGTH WITH EDITORS, MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, UNIVERSITY PEOPLE, AND OTHERS WHO HOLD PUBLIC OPINION TO EXPLAIN OUR CASE. THEY ARE NOT THINKING OF BIG PUBLIC OCCASIONS OR TALKING TO STUDENTS, BUT FRANK PRIVATE TALKS WITH THE MOST INFLUENTIAL PEOPLE IN BRITAIN. FOR THIS REASON THEY NEED NOT AN EXPERT BUT A RESPECTED POLITICAL FIGURE.

(THE CHOICE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE UP TO US; BUT BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATION THEY ARE THINKING OF SOMEONE LIKE THE VICE PRESIDENT OR AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG TO DO THE JOB.)

4. THE PRIME MINISTER FEELS THIS IS AN URGENT NEED IF HE IS TO HOLD THE LINE AS WE INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE NORTH; AND HE WOULD LIKE THE EXERCISE CARRIED OUT BEFORE EASTER.

5. FOR PURPOSES OF COVER, THE MAN DOING THE JOB MIGHT GIVE A LECTURE AT OXFORD OR CAMBRIDGE.

6. INCIDENTALLY, THEY TOLD ME THE PRIME MINISTER WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE WAY WE RESPONDED TO THE JUNIOR RUMOR.

001 061744Z MARCH 1967

~~SECRET~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

54
Pres file

6 March 1967

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Chet Bowles sent you attached long private message on land reform as the kind of "dramatic non-military initiative . . . urgently required to capture the political offensive in Vietnam and to lift the current sterile debate over bombing, negotiations and cease fires to a level of high purpose . . ."

As so often, Chet has a good idea but ignores all the problems of converting promise into performance. He talks about Japan and Taiwan but doesn't have much feel for the special circumstances of Vietnam. I know, because I've been pushing 10 months now for just such a dramatic land reform initiative--and find the experts almost unanimously against one on various grounds:

1. More is happening than Bowles realizes. I sent an experienced hand to Saigon for six weeks on just this problem. He reports that various steps taken by the GVN over the last several months add up to a land reform program "of some significance and potential . . . and considerable forward motion . . .", more than my expert had expected. Lodge in his 22 February weekly said much the same thing.

2. Land reform is just not the burning issue Bowles thinks. The Constituent Assembly turned down a "land to the tiller" plank 101-3. The peasant is much more interested in security, low rents, and a decent price for his crops. None of our polls and surveys has ever listed land reform high on the list of rural wants. Furthermore, land in Vietnam is not concentrated in a few large holdings. The 1959 land reform law limited holdings to 250 acres, and there are probably as many landholders as tenant farmers in Vietnam.

3. Existing land reform, tenure, and rent ceiling laws are pretty good--the gut problem is GVN administrative incapacity to carry them out. This creates a credibility problem. Bold talk by Ky/Thieu at Honolulu, then Manila, was so poorly followed up that the peasant doesn't believe it.

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7129 89-02

By 19/sep, NARA, Date 4-23-84

But having said all this, I still see room for more push on land reform. Ky and Thieu are getting more interested too, as they start running for office. Ky expanded the budget by 1.5 million piasters to expedite 100,000 land titles. Some 50,000 are already being issued. Gen. Thang, the RD Minister, asked me urgently for a land reform expert; I'm talking with Wolf Ladejinsky--the granddaddy of all experts--for a starter, though he too doubts that land reform is top priority any more (and he ought to know).

Lodge and the Mission are very reluctant to prod the GVN, but I have no such inhibitions. Therefore, I propose that (1) I send a sanitized version of the Bowles cable to Lodge and Porter, saying you were much taken with it--this will wake them up; (2) I revive my project, which Orville Freeman backs, for a dramatic but workable reform program; (3) I send out the expert Thang wants; and (4) I press the Mission to prod a more willing GVN. A dramatic program might well require about \$300-\$500 million in US subsidies to back up GVN compensation schemes (and make them credible), but as Bowles says only a few days of our war effort cost this much.

Proceed as indicated _____

Give me more fill-in _____

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

Attachment

OK *[initials]*

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-54
By CB, NARA Date 6-30-00

Mr. Garner
54a

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

Monday, February 27, 1967

The following message was received [REDACTED]

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

FROM AMBASSADOR BOWLES

I have taken the liberty of communicating directly with you by this special channel on only the two or three occasions when I had something of special importance to say.

This particular message reflects my belief that a dramatic non-military initiative is urgently required to capture the political offensive in Vietnam and to lift the current sterile debate over bombing, negotiations and cease-fires to a level of high purpose that the people in the villages of South Vietnam and in the cities of the United States, Europe, Africa and Asia can understand.

Specifically, I suggest that you press the South Vietnamese government into the early issuance of a nation-wide land reform proclamation. Such a measure might assure between 10 and 20 acres of land plus a pair of bullock, tools, seeds and credit to every rural family in South Vietnam. This could include those members of the Viet Cong who are willing within a prescribed period of time to lay down their arms and take an oath of allegiance to the Saigon government.

In 1946, MacArthur's sweeping Japanese land reform with a ceiling of 7 1/2 acres per family was an important factor in creating a politically stable, post-war Japanese society. By sharply increasing rural purchasing power, it also contributed significantly to the dynamism of the Japanese economy.

Similarly, President Truman's success in persuading Chiang Kai-shek to put through a massive land reform program in Taiwan helped to ease the bitter Taiwanese peasant opposition to the

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

Nationalist government and to provide a solid foundation for rapid economic development. If Chiang Kai-shek had only launched a similar program on the Chinese mainland in the 1930's or 1940's, he might still be in Peking.

As you may know, proposals for a similar land reform in South Vietnam were advanced in the mid-1950's by the same U.S. team that was responsible for the successful land reforms in Japan and Taiwan. However, Diem flatly rejected these proposals and the result was a relatively meaningless reform that was never fully implemented.

not quite so

If the Eisenhower administration had insisted on a forth-right land program as a condition for continued U.S. assistance (as we did in Taiwan), I am convinced that the Viet Cong would never have been able to establish their rapport with the South Vietnamese peasantry and the present costly war involving 400,000 U.S. troops would have been avoided.

On previous occasions I have proposed that our administration take the action that our predecessors failed to take and have run into a series of arguments which in this critical situation simply do not hold water. For instance, it is said (1) that such a move would antagonize the South Vietnamese landlords and some church leaders which we cannot afford to do at this juncture and (2) that while land reform is a laudable objective it could not be enforced during the war, it would create difficult administrative problems afterward and it would be expensive.

Identical arguments were advanced by Chiang Kai-shek and his associates in China during the Chinese Civil War when the land reform issue was pressed by our Government and by liberal Chinese leaders; these arguments are as mistaken now as they were then.

In respect to the first point, there is no doubt but that the rural landlords of South Vietnam, many of whom are now living in safety and relative luxury in the cities, will object vociferously to such a move just as their counterparts did in Japan and just as their Chinese counterparts would have objected if Chiang Kai-shek had mustered the courage and foresight to take the step in pre-Communist China. On that issue, there should be no doubt about whom we should support.

In respect to the second set of objections (i. e., the difficulty of putting through controversial economic reforms in the middle of a war), you face a problem somewhat similar to that of Lincoln in regard to the freeing of the slaves. The arguments against the Emancipation Proclamation were similarly focused on the claims that it would upset many property owners in the border states, that it could not be enforced in areas not occupied by the Union Army, and that even after the war, it would involve enormous administrative difficulties.

Nonetheless, only after Lincoln made the hard decision did the war become meaningful for most Americans (including many in the southern states) and to the millions of onlookers overseas.

As for the costs of purchasing the land from the landlords, it could not amount to more than the cost of one month of the current war.

For these reasons I hope you will reject the GD arguments about administrative difficulties, bad timing, loss to our property-owning friends, etc. and come out boldly for a sweeping irrevocable land reform proposal. Only in this way can we make our present massive efforts convincing and meaningful to the honest doubters (as distinct from the Communist sympathizers) in the United States and in other countries.

Even more important only by such an action can you effectively wrest the political initiative from the Communists, giving the long exploited South Vietnamese peasants for the first time in their history a stake in the success of the Central Government and at the same time offering the Viet Cong guerrillas and their sympathizers a persuasive inducement to lay down their arms.

I can see no possibility that the present struggle in Vietnam will ease as long as the South Vietnamese Government forces with U. S. support appear (from a peasant's eye view) to be fighting to enable the landlords to resume their pre-war exploitation of the rural people and the Viet Cong appear to be fighting to assure the peasants the ownership of the land which they till.

Right now we urgently need an initiative which is both politically dramatic and economically sound that will enable people everywhere to

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

-4-

judge your remarkable efforts in a fresh, new and understandable framework. I believe that a dramatic proclamation that the rural lands of South Vietnam shall henceforth belong to the peasants who till them meets this standard. Against the confused background of the Chinese upheaval, it would be historic in its implications.

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

55

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-350

By gW, NARA, Date 9-3-92

Pres file
Monday, March 6, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for former Prime Minister Kishi of Japan

Former Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi will be in Washington March 22-25. He wishes to pay a short courtesy call on you.

Mr. Kishi was most cooperative during his tenure as Prime Minister (1956-1960). His leadership was particularly important in working out the revised Security Treaty in 1960.

Though he now holds no official position -- except his seat in the parliament -- he remains one of the most influential men in Japanese political life. He is the brother of Prime Minister Sato. One of his followers, Finance Minister Fukuda, is probably the most likely candidate to succeed Sato.

Kishi's influence continues to be of great potential help to us -- regarding our security relations and support for our position in Viet-Nam. He will be seeing Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

Because of his past importance and his continuing influence in the Japanese inner circle, both State and our Embassy strongly recommend that you see him for at least a brief visit. I believe this would be time well spent and concur in their recommendation. He is travelling in a private capacity, and is not likely to raise any specific problems.

W. W. Rostow

Arrange appointment _____

Make no appointment _____

See Me _____

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, March , 1967
10:45 a.m.

56
Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an excellent basic draft,
if you wish to consider still the
possibility of a special Viet Nam
message to the Congress.

It is an up-to-date White Paper.

Bill Jorden wrote it.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLG 81-101By rg/min NARA, Date 4-22-91~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: The Five Day Pause (May 1965)

The decision was made on May 10, 1965 to have a brief pause in bombing attacks against North Viet-Nam. The pause was to be linked with Buddha's birthday. Ambassador Taylor was informed of this decision and instructed to seek the concurrence of the GVN. He did so. The GVN (Prime Minister Quat) agreed. The next day (May 11) Secretary Rusk explained our position to Ambassador Dobrynin. We also instructed Ambassador Kohler in Moscow to see the DRV Ambassador and convey a parallel message. The message was to be delivered orally but confirmed in writing with the request ^{it} to be transmitted to Hanoi.

The message said:

-- there would be no air attacks on North Viet-Nam beginning at noon Washington time, Wednesday, May 12 and running into the next week;

-- the United States was acting in response to "suggestions from various quarters, including public statements by Hanoi representatives" that there could be no progress toward peace while air attacks continued;

-- the United States was convinced the basic trouble in Southeast Asia was "armed action against the people ^{and} the Government of South Viet-Nam by forces whose actions can be decisively affected from North Viet-Nam;"

-- we would be watching during the pause for signs of "significant reductions in such armed actions."

We warned against the pause being misunderstood as an indication of weakness.

We hoped there would be no such misunderstanding and that the halt in air attacks "may meet with a response which will permit further and more extended suspension of this form of military action in the expectation of equally constructive actions by the other side in the future."

Embassy Moscow contacted Hanoi's Embassy by telephone but encountered difficulty in making a direct contact. The Ambassador

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~~TOP SECRET~~

then made an appointment with Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Firyubin. We told the Russians we tried to deliver the message directly, but the North Vietnamese Ambassador did not wish to receive our Ambassador. The former suggested that we transmit the message through the Soviet Government. We had delivered a copy of the message to a North Vietnamese Embassy employee who had agreed to bring it to the attention of the Ambassador. The Russian, after hearing our statement, interpreted it as a threat of renewed aggression against North Viet-Nam. Our Ambassador said he simply wanted the Soviets to transmit this message to the DRV. Firyubin said he would report this request. He noted they had no request from the DRV to provide this service. Later in the conversation, after he had received a written note from a colleague, the Russian official said the Soviet Government would not deliver the message. It was up to us to find "the most convenient way." (A footnote: Firyubin did not return the text of our communication which the Ambassador had given him. Thus, both the North Vietnamese Embassy and the Soviets had a copy of our message though both refused officially to receive it.)

On May 14 we asked the British here if they could convey our message directly to Hanoi through their representative there. On May 13 the message we had given the DRV Embassy employee in Moscow the day before was returned in a plain envelope to our Embassy.

Former Press Secretary Pierre Salinger was in Moscow at the time and was engaged by the Soviets in conversation relating to a possible Viet-Nam settlement. But the thrust of the Soviet position was that ^{they} thought we wanted some graceful way to withdraw from Viet-Nam. The Salinger channel collapsed without producing results. The Soviets made it clear they could not afford to be middlemen in peace efforts and suggested using some East European country instead.

In conversation with Secretary Rusk on May 15 in Vienna, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko made it clear that the Soviets would not negotiate on Viet-Nam.

On May 17 the British Consul General in Hanoi delivered a copy of our message to the DRV authorities. The message was returned to him the following day, May 18. In view of the negative, indeed hostile, reception by Hanoi to our approach, it was decided to resume bombing at about 0800 hours Saigon time May 18.
m

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On May 19 the French Foreign office told us that Mai Van Bo had approached Quai the day before. Bo was quoted as saying that Hanoi's four points were to be considered as working principles for negotiation rather than prior conditions. Bo claimed to be speaking with Hanoi's authority. This information was conveyed to us officially by the French on May 20.

Since the bombing resumed about 0100 on May 18 Paris time, Mai Van Bo's approach to the French came after the bombing had been resumed. Moreover we were not notified by the French, even informally, until the following day.

During this pause Hanoi publicly restated its well known position on settlement, namely, the four points and US withdrawal, and Peking publicly criticized efforts to negotiate a settlement.

Bill

William J. Jorden

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 719 81-101By ag/mic, NARA, Date 4/24/91~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: The Thirty-Seven Day Pause

The pause began with the Christmas truce on December 24, 1965.

At first, the extension was "a matter of our desiring to place full responsibility" on Hanoi and the Viet Cong for the renewal of hostilities. The expectation was that restrictions on the renewal of Rolling Thunder, Arc Light, etc. "would last only hours or a day or so at the most" (M. Bundy memo to the President, 12/24/65).

On December 27, 1965 Secretary Rusk informed Lodge that the President had decided he wished to defer resumption of bombing "for several more days possibly into the middle of next week."

Purpose of the extension: "A clear demonstration that we have explored fully every alternative but that the aggressor has left us no choice."

No commitment was made regarding a specific date for resumption.

Message also noted that Hanoi's propaganda machine had, on December 10 and 11, blasted the idea of a pause in advance.

The Secretary also noted "we will be in touch with a few interested Governments."

(Note: Westmoreland, Sharp and Lodge all had opposed extension of the pause.)

By December 28, Rusk had seen the Hungarian representative; Thompson talked to DoByrnin; State sent messages to the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand; there was a message to Gronouski in Warsaw; Yost saw U Thant; messages were sent to Tokyo, Seoul, Bangkok, Vientiane and Manila. In his talk with DoByrnin on December 28, Thompson noted that no bombing had occurred since December 24. The pause could be extended beyond the new year "unless there is a major provocation."

"If... the other side will now reciprocate by making a serious contribution toward peace it would obviously have a favorable effect on the possibility of further extending the suspension." DoByrnin promised

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to inform his Government; he did not undertake to pass information to Hanoi.

The President sent personal messages to: Chancellor Erhard, Prime Minister Wilson, Prime Minister Pearson, President deGaulle, Prime Minister Moro and Pope Paul on December 29. Over the next several days, Presidential messages went to Heads of State or Government in a large number of countries in all continents.

Harriman went to Warsaw and saw Rapacki.

On December 28 Ambassador Byroade in Rangoon was instructed to contact DRV Ambassador and give him an aide-memoire. This informed Hanoi of the stand down in bombing and indicated that reciprocal actions would have a favorable effect on extending the pause. In the absence of the Ambassador, Byroade delivered our message to the DRV Consul General on December 29. The latter promised to send the message to Hanoi.

The message delivered through Byroade used the same formulation Ambassador Thompson had used with Dobrynin, namely:

"If your Government will now reciprocate by making a serious contribution toward peace, it would obviously have a favorable effect on the possibility of further extending the suspension."

Thus, from the outset and throughout the pause, our emphasis was on the need for reciprocal action by Hanoi if the bombing pause was to lead to peaceful settlement.

On January 18, 1965 we told Embassy Moscow there were indications Hanoi might try to claim no direct substantive contact had been made by the United States with the DRV during the bombing pause. We instructed the Ambassador to make such direct contact. He was instructed to tell the Hanoi representative that we had stopped bombing on December 24 and had notified Hanoi officially of this in Rangoon on December 29. As we made clear in that notification, the suspension might continue for a limited period in the absence of major provocation and "further extension would depend on response and action from the DRV." We had thus far had no indication of Hanoi's response. If the Hanoi representative called the suspension an "ultimatum" the Ambassador should counter by saying that we considered it "an opportunity and responded to repeated suggestions by Hanoi itself and others that suspension of bombing would create conditions toward which moves could be made toward a peaceful solution."

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TOP SECRET

We saw two purposes to be served by direct conversations:

One would be to explore the possibility of "reciprocal reductions of hostilities." We have said we could continue the suspension "if there were significant reciprocal actions by the DRV." We recognized Hanoi might find it difficult to admit what it was doing or to admit it had stopped those actions. Direct contact provided an opportunity for them to indicate to us privately and confidentially what actions they were taking so we would understand and could take appropriate action on our side.

The Ambassador could note that during suspension we had evidence that infiltration was continuing. He was authorized to state that "significant reciprocal actions" would relate to:

- infiltration of men and equipment into the South;
- level of military activity and terrorism in the South;
- the withdrawal of regular North Vietnamese military units from the South.

A second purpose of direct contact might be to "explore conditions under which more formal negotiations might take place.

Hanoi's Ambassador was absent at the time. The meeting was arranged with the DRV Charge, Le Chang. The meeting was arranged and was held on January 24. It lasted an hour and a half.

The Ambassador told the Charge we could continue suspension of the bombing "if there were reciprocal actions by the DRV." Le Chang's answer was that the DRV's position "remained unchanged." As to suspension of the bombing, the US Government "has no right to bomb or strafe North Viet-Nam and the DRV regards such actions as an act of war against its sovereign Government." Hanoi thought suspension of the bombing was "for the purpose of passing a new stage of escalation and expansion of the war." The United States was trying to force the other side to sit down at a table and force the Vietnamese to accept conditions favorable to the United States. He insisted the United States must recognize the four points which he said reflected "the basic conditions of the Geneva Accords." The United States must

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stop bombing the North "unconditionally and forever." When we suggested further meeting or discussion, Hanoi's representative said he had said everything he wished to say and saw no need for any further meeting.

When our Ambassador said there were many other matters to discuss, Le Chang said that if the United States had anything to say, it could meet with Hanoi representatives in Rangoon. Those representatives would be "prepared to clarify the DRV position if necessary."

On January 20 we instructed Byroade to seek another appointment with Hanoi's Consul General. He was to remind him of our message of December 29 and ask whether there was any reply. He contacted the DRV Consulate on January 21. Byroade met with the DRV representative, Vu Ho Binh, that evening.

Vu told Byroade at the outset he considered our earlier aide-memoire to be "an ultimatum." He said he had no instructions from Hanoi regarding a reply. He added that his Government, meantime, had issued public statements which indicated its position.

(Those public statements, of course, reinforced the four points, attacked American aggression and urged the United States to leave Viet-Nam.

U Thant, in a news conference on January 20, had exposed the Rangoon contact.)

Three days later, on January 24, Byroade received an aide-memoire from Vu which set forth the elements of their January 21st conversation. The key item was: "I have no instruction from my Government to give you an answer." On January 27, on instructions, Byroade sent Vu a memo acknowledging receipt of his aide-memoire and noting his continued availability "at any time to receive any communication you may wish to address to me."

On January 31 Vu invited Byroade to a meeting. Vu handed Byroade an aide-memoire. The key sentence was: "A political settlement of the Viet-Nam problem can be envisaged only when the United States Government has accepted the four point stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, has proved this

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by actual deeds, has stopped unconditionally and for good its air raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

Bombing was resumed on Monday, January 31, 1966.

Bill

William J. Jorden

Att.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

Some of the more important diplomatic contacts made during the 37 day pause:

<u>Harriman</u>	<u>Goldberg</u>	<u>M. Bundy</u>	<u>Others</u>
Rapacki, 12/29/65	U Thant, 12/28	Pearson, 12/29	<u>Kohler</u> --
Gamulka, 12/30	The Pope, 12/29		Podgorny, 12/29
Tito, 1/1/66	Moro, 12/30		<u>VP Humphrey</u> --
Shastri, 1/2	Saragat, 12/30		/ PM Sato, 12/31
Ayub, 1/3	deGaulle, 12/31		Pres Marcos,
	Wilson, 1/1/66		12/31
			Kosygin, 1/13,
			in Delhi
			<u>Gov. Williams</u> --
			Boumedienne,
			(Algeria)
			Bourguiba, 1/2,
			(Tunisia)
			Haile Selassi,
			1/3
			<u>Rusk</u> -- Kosygin,
			1/13, in Delhi

54
ESBJ42
CO VTE18
DE VTE 260

SENT
WHCA

1967 MAR 6 17 38

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70072

UNCLAS

MONDAY, MARCH 6, 1967

AXEL SPRINGER, THE HEAD OF DIE WELT A BIG NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE NETWORK IN GERMANY, WILL BE IN THE U.S. TOWARDS THE END OF APRIL -- ROUGHLY THE 10 DAYS STARTING APRIL 25. ONE OF HIS MEN, WHOM I HAVE KNOWN FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, CAME IN TO SEE ME TO SAY HE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO SEE YOU ON THAT OCCASION. ALTHOUGH HE IS EMOTIONAL AND HIS VIEWS WANDER ABOUT, BASICALLY SPRINGER WISHES TO BE PRO-U.S. AND PRO-JOHNSON.

HIS MAN REPORTED THAT, AFTER GEORGE MCGHEE RETURNED FROM WASHINGTON, HE WAS DOUBTFUL THAT AN APPOINTMENT COULD BE ARRANGED. I KNOW NOTHING ABOUT THAT; AND THERE MAY BE GOOD REASONS WHY YOU DO NOT WISH TO SEE HIM. FROM WHAT I KNOW, HOWEVER, THIS WOULD BE A USEFUL MAN TO SEE AND TO WHOM TO EXPLAIN YOUR GENERAL VIEWS ABOUT GERMANY AND EUROPE.

ACCEPT OFF-THE-RECORD TALK WITH AXEL SPRINGER-----

NO-----

SEE ME-----

DTG: 061654Z MAR 67

~~SECRET~~

also LDT to [unclear]

March 6, 1967

58

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

Pat Dean and Michael Stewart came in today with the following message from Prime Minister Wilson. They will be talking in the same vein to Secretary Rusk this afternoon.

1. It is clear that our planned increase in pressure on North Viet Nam will confront the Prime Minister with a problem of public opinion in the UK. Even the modest increased actions we have already taken have led to considerable increase in noise from the Labor opposition.

2. In general the U. S. is not getting through to British public opinion on the following points:

- why we are in Viet Nam;
- why we believe our military and political policy will succeed;
- why we believe the course of action we are pursuing will bring about peace.

3. The Prime Minister therefore requests that we send over to Britain for two or three days a prominent political figure who will talk at length with editors, members of Parliament, university people, and others who mold public opinion to explain our case. They are not thinking of big public occasions or talking to students, but frank private talks with the most influential people in Britain. For this reason they need not an expert but a respected political figure.

(The choice would, of course, be up to us; but by way of illustration they are thinking of someone like the Vice President or Ambassador Goldberg to do the job.)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority UK Guidelines

by pw NARA. Date 3-26-98

3/6/67

4. The Prime Minister feels this is an urgent need if he is to hold the line as we increase pressure on the North; and he would like the exercise carried out before Easter.

5. For purposes of cover, the man doing the job might give a lecture at Oxford or Cambridge.

6. Incidentally, they told me the Prime Minister was grateful for the way we responded to the Junor rumor.

##

59
on wire
to P
12:30 P.M.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-350
By ju, NARA. Date 9-3-92

DC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - March 6, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: W. W. Rostow

SUBJECT: Meeting with Latin American Experts on the Summit

I met yesterday with Milton Eisenhower, Adolf Berle, Tom Mann, Jack Vaughn, Linc Gordon and Sol Linowitz to discuss the Latin American Summit.

We had a useful three-and-a-half hour session reviewing the Summit package and joint resolution, discussing the focus of your speech at the Summit and examining some new ideas which you might advance.

These are the highlights:

- All thought that the Summit package was well structured to get a at the root of Latin America's basic development problems.
- All agreed that time was running short in Latin America and the moment for decisive action was now. The Summit offered a historic opportunity for the Latin Americans to make the necessary political commitments and for you to redefine US policy .
- All agreed that we should encourage the Latin Americans to move rapidly down the path of economic integration as the ~~single~~ most important step they can take to speed up the development process and transform economic and social situations. Our help should be closely geared to their performance.
- Milton Eisenhower stressed that the Summit gave you the chance to dramatize at the highest level that our relation with the Latin Americans is that of junior partner and that while money is important and we will help, it can only be a supplement to their own commitment and action.
- Adolf Berle focused on the trade issue, pointing out that if meaningful help for the LDC's does not come from the Kennedy Round

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

negotiations, we may have to think in terms of extending regional preferences for Latin America.

- Jack Vaughn observed the need to come to grips with the birth rate and the urban slum problem, but all recognized the difficulties in doing anything meaningful at the Summit in these two areas.

On themes for your Summit speech:

- Milton Eisenhower suggested that in emphasizing economic integration you point to the dramatic shift in policy which this represents for us. Historically, we have discouraged it. Only in the last ten years has our thinking shifted. You would be the first President to give it a major thrust forward.
- Adolf Berle said you should point to the progress made in recent years in strengthening democracy and getting governments to work for the people as never before.
- Both Eisenhower and Berle urged that you stress that the US is not in the business of building empires but wants to help others in this hemisphere, and elsewhere, to build up themselves. Berle had an excellent quote from Seneca about there being no possibility of lasting friendship except between equals.

In the realm of new ideas, the group thought we should examine these areas:

- speeding up a satellite communications system for Latin America;
- help in promoting educational TV;
- development of research libraries on microfilm;
- cooperation in development of "food from sea" resources;
- development of protein concentrates for child-feeding programs; and
- computerized access to information, perhaps drawing on NIH's development of an electronic library in medicine.

W. W. Rostow