

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT  
WHCA

EEB038  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 256

1967 MAR 6 14 37

FROM WALT ROSTON  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAPS7112

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DR. JAMES POPPEN, A PHYSICIAN AT LAHEY CLINIC WHO HAS BEEN  
TREATING FORMER PRESIDENT LOPEZ MATEOS, HAS WRITTEN SECRETARY  
RUSK A LETTER DESCRIBING LOPEZ MATEOS' CONDITION AND  
RECOMMENDING A BRIEF NOTE OF ENCOURAGEMENT TO HELP HIM IN  
HIS PRESENT DEPRESSED STATE OF MIND.

GIVEN YOUR PREVIOUS ASSOCIATION WITH HIM, BOB SAYRE  
WANTED YOU TO KNOW ABOUT IT. IN CASE YOU WOULD WANT TO  
SEND A MESSAGE, I SUGGEST SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF THE  
FOLLOWING DRAFT.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT YOU WERE IN BOSTON RECENTLY FOR  
A MEDICAL CHECK-UP AND WAS PLEASED TO HEAR OF THE IMPROVE-  
MENT IN YOUR HEALTH. LADY BIRD AND I RECALL WITH PLEASURE  
OUR VISITS WITH YOU AND EXPRESS OUR MOST SINCERE DESIRE FOR  
YOUR CONTINUED RECOVERY.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

APPROVE-----

DISAPPROVE-----

SPEAK TO ME-----

DTG: 06/1415Z MAR 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines Feb, 27, 1983  
BY WJ, NARA, Date 4-19-91



Sent 9:17 PM  
61

ZCZCEB029  
OO WTE 13  
DE WTE 234

SENT  
WHCA

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP67101

1967 MAR 5 02 17

NODIS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-239  
By us, NARA Date 4-15-99

~~SECRET NODIS~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW TO THE PRESIDENT

THIS FIRST REPORT FROM MR. MCCLOY INDICATES THAT THEY ARE  
BEGINNING TO TALK TURKEY

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR KAISER (LONDON 7117)

SUBJ: TRILATERAL TALKS

1. FOLLOWING REPORT ON MCCLOY'S TWO-HOUR PRIVATE SESSION  
WITH THOMSON AND DUCKWITZ YESTERDAY AFTERNOON IS BASED ON  
NOTES TAKEN DURING DEBRIEFING GIVEN BY MCCLOY TO BOWIE,  
MCNAUGHTON, KAISER AND SPIERS, BEFORE MCCLOY'S DEPARTURE FOR  
STUTTGART. IT WAS AGREED THIS REPORT WOULD BE SENT IN EVEN  
THOUGH IT HAS NOT BEEN REVIEWED BY MCCLOY BUT THAT HE WOULD  
SEND ANY COMMENTS EITHER FROM BONN OR UPON HIS RETURN TO  
LONDON IN VIEW IMPORTANCE OF FLAVOR AND NUANCES WHICH THIS  
REPORT MAY NOT HAVE CAPTURED.

2. PRIVATE MEETING OF PRINCIPALS WAS HELD AT MCCLOY'S REQUEST.  
HE SAID US FELT TIME HAD COME TO GET DOWN TO CASES. THERE  
WAS NO POINT IN CONTINUING TO MAKE SPEECHES AT EACH OTHER  
WHICH DID NOT JOIN AT ANY ONE POINT. TASK WAS TO FIND A  
SOLUTION TO PRESENT PROBLEM AND FIRST NEED IS TO IDENTIFY THE  
VARIOUS GAPS AND CONSIDER VARIOUS ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES  
OF BRIDGING THEM. HE THEN REVIEWED SITUATION AS BETWEEN UK  
AND FRG AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT. IN 1965-66 UK FORCES IN FRG  
HAD INVOLVED FX COST OF ABOUT 95 MILLION POUNDS TO UK, WHICH  
WAS COMPENSATED FOR BY AN OFFSET OF ABOUT 55 MILLION POUNDS  
FROM FRG, LEAVING GAP OF ABOUT 40 MILLION POUNDS. UK HAS NOW  
REDUCED ITS COSTS TO 85 MILLION POUNDS PER YEAR AND WANTED  
A 100 PERCENT OFFSET. HOWEVER, BEST PRESENT PROSPECTS WERE A  
PAYMENT OF 31 MILLION POUNDS, LEAVING APPROX 55 MILLION POUNDS  
GAP. IT WAS CLEAR TO HIM THAT FRG SHOULD INCREASE ITS PAY-  
MENTS, WHILE UK STUDIED WHAT MORE IT COULD DO TO DECREASE  
ITS COSTS. WE SHOULD THEN SEE WHAT KIND OF GAP REMAINED.  
IT WAS EQUALLY CLEAR TO HIM, HOWEVER, THAT FRG COULD NOT  
FILL ENTIRE GAP AND THOMSON AGREED.

3. THOMSON AND DUCKWITZ THEN HAD A LENGTHY CONVERSATION  
BETWEEN THEMSELVES DURING WHICH MCCLOY WAS A PASSIVE OBSERVER.  
DUCKWITZ SAID HE WANTED ANSWERS TO SEVERAL QUESTIONS. FIRST,  
IF THE UK RECEIVED NO MORE THAN THE LAST GERMAN OFFER (PRE-

1967 MAR 4 PM 9:19  
SATURDAY

SUMABLY, HERE, HE WAS REFERRING TO THE 22 MILLION POUNDS) WHAT ATION, IN RESPECT OF TROOP LEVELS, WOULD THE BRITISH FEEL THEY HAD TO TAKE. THOMSON SAID IN THIS EVENT BRITISH WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE "MASSIVE," BY WHICH HE MEANT "AT LEAST ONE HALF AND POSSIBLY MORE" OF BAOR. DUCKWITZ THEN ASKED WHETHER, IF FRG RENEWED ITS 31.5 MILLION POUNDS OFFER, COULD THE FRG BE REASSURED THAT THE UK WOULD WITHDRAW NO MORE THAN ONE BRIGADE. THOMSON SAID HE WAS SURE THAT THE BRITISH COULD MAKE NO SUCH COMMITMENT. THE GERMAN OFFSET WOULD THEN HAVE TO BE MORE SUBSTANTIAL THAN THIS. DUCKWITZ REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THE FRG WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO MAKE A MORE SUBSTANTIAL OFFER IF THEY THOUGHT THAT THE BRITISH WOULD NEVERTHELESS WITHDRAW MORE THAN ONE BRIGADE.

4. DURING THIS DISCUSSION DUCKWITZ STRESSED HE HAD "NO AUTHORITY" TO TALK ABOUT THESE MATTERS AND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WHAT HE SAID NOT GET BACK TO KIESINGER. THOMSON INTERJECTED THAT HE WAS IN THE SAME POSITION AND HE DID NOT WANT WHAT HE SAID TO GET BACK TO THE PRIME MINISTER. DUCKWITZ STRESSED THE GREAT DIFFICULTY OF CHANGING THE CABINET DECISION WHICH HE HAD CONVEYED TO THE BRITISH AND THE US DURING HIS EARLY FEBRUARY VISITS TO WASHINGTON AND LONDON. DUCKWITZ THEN SAID TO THOMSON THAT THE GERMANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO INCREASE THEIR CIVIL PURCHASES TO DM250 MILLION, WHICH, WITH MILITARY PURCHASES IN THE ORDER OF DM200 MILLION WOULD AMOUNT TO DM450 MILLION (I.E. IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF 41 MILLION POUNDS). MCCLOY SAID THAT THIS SEEMED TO BE AN ENCOURAGING MOVE AND WAS AN INCREASE IN ABOUT 10 MILLION POUNDS IN THE OCTOBER OFFER. THIS APPEARED TO CALL FOR SOME RECIPROCITY FROM THE UK. THOMSON AGREED THAT THIS "GAVE A LITTLE GLIMMER OF HOPE" AND ASKED MCCLOY WHETHER THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO "STEP ASIDE" AND PERMIT SOME GERMAN PURCHASES IN THE UK OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE BE MADE IN THE US. THIS REDUCTION IN OFFSET PURCHASES BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE US COULD PRESUMABLY BE MADE UP IN AN INCREASE IN THE AMOUNT "NEUTRALIZED." IN OTHER WORDS, WOULD THE US PUSH SOME OF THE BUSINESS TO THE BRITISH?

5. MCCLOY SAID HE WOULD NOT THINK THAT WE COULD FORMALLY RECOGNIZE A PRIORITY FOR PURCHASES IN BRITAIN. IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR SECURITY REASONS FOR THE FRG TO BUY SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF ITS MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FROM THE US, WHERE THE NEEDED EQUIPMENT WAS AVAILABLE. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH THAT THE FRG FELT THAT IT COULD PURCHASE IN THE UK. PERHAPS THE UK SHOULD THINK IN TERMS OF MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS. THOMSON SAID UK WAS NOT INTERESTED IN MONETARY MANAGEMENT OR LINKING THIS MATTER WITH MONETARY REFORMS. THE BRITISH HAD TOO HEAVY A BURDEN OF SHORT-TERM INDEBTEDNESS ALREADY. HE HINTED, HOWEVER, THAT IF WE COULD, BY OTHER MEANS, CLOSELY APPROXIMATE THE BRITISH NEEDS, THEY MIGHT BE WILLING TO TAKE A SMALL PART OF THE GAP IN "NEUTRALIZATION." HE FURTHER SAID



THAT HE THOUGHT THE BRITISH MIGHT BE WILLING IN ADDITION JUST TO LIVE WITH A VERY SMALL FURTHER GAP. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS FOR THE BRITISH GOVT TO BE ABLE TO SHOW PUBLICLY A VERY SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION. THOMSON THEN SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD (HE DID NOT IDENTIFY WHERE) THAT THE USG COULD HELP FURTHER BY PURCHASING FURTHER "BITS AND PIECES" IN THE UK. HE THEN REFERRED TO THE "VAST SUMS OF FRG DEPOSITS IN THE US." SOME OF THESE, HE SAID, MIGHT BE DIVERTED TO COVER FRG PROCUREMENTS IN THE UK.

6. MCCLOY SAID THAT THIS COULD PROVE TO BE VERY DIFFICULT. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THESE DEPOSITS HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS FIGURES. FURTHERMORE, HE UNDERSTOOD THEY WERE EARMARKED FOR PURCHASES OF CERTAIN EQUIPMENT WHICH WERE AN INTEGRAL AND ESSENTIAL PART OF THE FRG MILITARY PROGRAM. THUS SUMS FROM THIS DEPOSIT PROBABLY COULD NOT BE DIVERTED WITHOUT DISRUPTING THE CONTINUITY OF GERMAN MILITARY PROCUREMENT.

7. THOMSON DENIED THAT THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE UK COMPELLED SOME REDUCTIONS IN THE BAOR. THE UK WANTED TO KEEP THE BAOR AT ITS PRESENT LEVEL. THEY WERE EMBARRASSED BY THE INCONSISTENCY OF SEEKING ENTRY INTO THE COMMON MARKET AT THE SAME TIME THEY WERE THREATENING TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM THE CONTINENT. THE UK WOULD THEREFORE LIKE TO ARRIVE AT A SITUATION WHERE THE GAP WOULD BE COVERED "SO THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TO GO BELOW 50,000 IN THE BAOR." (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH PRESENT "LEGAL" SIZE OF BAOR IS 55,000, WE UNDERSTAND ITS PRESENT STRENGTH IS JUST OVER 51,000. THEREFORE WE ARE NOT SURE WHAT THIS REF MEANS, I.E. "LEGALIZING" THE PRESENT SHORTFALL PLUS A PULL-OUT OF ANOTHER 1,000 PLUS, OR SOMETHING ELSE.) THOMSON INDICATED THAT THERE WAS A REAL PROBLEM ABOUT WHERE TO PUT THE FORCES RETURNED TO THE UK. HOWEVER HE STRESSED THAT THIS WOULD NOT DETER THE BRITISH FROM MAKING THE REDUCTIONS. IT WAS CLEAR, NEVERTHELESS, THERE ARE MANY FACTORS WHICH LEAD THE BRITISH TO PREFER NOT TO REDUCE.

8. MCCLOY TWICE EMPHASIZED TO DUCKWITZ THAT THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH TROOPS HAD A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO US LEVELS. DUCKWITZ THEN REFERRED TO PRESS REPORTS HE HAD SEEN ABOUT THE US HAVING DECIDED TO PULL OUT ONE DIVISION. MCCLOY SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DECISION AT ALL ON THIS MATTER BUT IT WAS TRUE SOME FAVORED SUCH A CUT WHICH WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A CUT OF THREE AIR WINGS. BOTH THE DIVISION AND THE AIR WINGS WOULD MOVE TO A ROTATIONAL BASIS. DUCKWITZ' REACTION CLEARLY INDICATED THAT HE WAS MORE TROUBLED BY THE THOUGHT OF REMOVAL OF THE AIR WINGS THAN OF PUTTING A DIVISION ON A ROTATIONAL BASIS. DUCKWITZ SEEMED TO ASSUME, HOWEVER, THAT A REDUCTION BY THE UK OF MORE THAN ONE BRIGADE WOULD TRIGGER A LARGER REDUCTION BY THE US THAN THE FRG COULD TAKE.



9. THOMSON STRESSED THAT THE PROBLEM FOR WILSON WAS THE POTENTIAL LOSS OF POLITICAL CONTROL OVER THE SITUATION. DUCKWITZ SAID THAT KIESINGER WAS IN EXACTLY THE SAME POSITION ON THE FINANCIAL SIDE. MCCLOY POINTED OUT THAT ALL THREE GOVTS APPARENTLY HAD THE SAME PROBLEM. WHAT THE PRESIDENT NEEDED WAS SOME INDICATIONS OF HOW FAR THE BRITISH AND GERMANS WOULD THEMSELVES GO TOWARDS CLOSING THE RESPECTIVE GAPS. HE REPEATED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE US WOULD RESPOND IN FULL MEASURE TO ANY INDICATIONS OF FLEXIBILITY BY THEM. HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT NEEDED AMMUNITION TO FIGHT HIS OWN REAR-GUARD REACTION AT HOME. THOMSON INDICATED THAT IF ENOUGH COULD BE DONE BY A COMBINATION OF ACTIONS TO KEEP THE BRITISH REDUCTION TO ONE BRIGADE OR LESS, THE BRITISH COULD UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW ANY OTHER FORCES WITHOUT AGREEMENT OF ITS ALLIES.

10. COMMENT: THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF THIS DISCUSSION WAS ON THE US-FRG PROBLEM. DUCKWITZ WAS PROBABLY IN A LESS FAVORABLE POSITION THAN THOMSON TO GIVE CLEAR INDICATIONS ABOUT WHAT THE GERMAN GOVT COULD DO IF IT WERE PRESSED. HOWEVER, WE CAN MAKE THE FOLLOWING JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE BRITISH POSITION FROM THIS TALK:

A. A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN GERMAN PURCHASES MUST BE AN ELEMENT.

B. THE SITUATION COULD BE HELPED IF THE US WOULD INDICATE A WILLINGNESS TO THROW SOME BUSINESS TO THE UK.

C. THE BRITISH WOULD BE WILLING TO COUNT SOME US PURCHASES IN THE "BITS AND PIECES" AREA AS A PARTIAL WAY TO FILL THE GAP.

D. THE BRITISH ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT SOME "STERILIZATION" ALTHOUGH THIS CAN NOT BE A LARGE ELEMENT OF THE PACKAGE.

E. THE BRITISH ARE PREPARED TO HAVE SOMETHING LESS THEN 100 PERCENT OFFSET EVEN WHEN ALL OF THESE ELEMENTS ARE COMBINED.

F. THE BRITISH WOULD PREFER TO KEEP ANY ACTUAL REDUCTIONS TO ONE BRIGADE OR LESS. (WITHDRAWAL OF ONE BRIGADE WOULD PROBABLY REDUCE THE BRITISH FX COST TO 80 MILLION POUNDS, ASSUMING STOCK LEVELS REMAIN AT THEIR PRESENT POSITION.) KAISER

DTG: 04/235 1Z MARCH 67

~~SECRET~~ NODIS



Roller 62

~~SECRET~~  
SENT  
WHCA

SENT RANCH  
7:13 AM EST  
SUNDAY 5 MARCH

WC

EEB032  
PP WTE10  
DE WTE 238

1967 MAR 5 12 13

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-239  
By is, NARA Date 4-15-99

FROM: WALT ROSTOW  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
CITE: CAP67104

~~SECRET~~

MR. ROSTOW REQUESTED RELAY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE  
FROM AMBASSADOR KAISER.

LONDON 7115

1. MCCLOY, ACCOMPANIED BY CHARGE AND POLMIL COUNSELOR, MET WITH WILSON (WHO HAD THOMSON AND PALLISER WITH HIM) AT 5PM MAR 3, AFTER CONCLUSION LENGTHY MEETING OF THREE PRINCIPALS (MCCLOY, THOMSON AND DUCKWITZ) ALONE. MCCLOY REVIEWED FOR PM POINTS HE HAD MADE AT TRIPARTITE SESSION THIS MORNING (LONDONS 7113). WILSON SAID BASIC BRITISH POSITION WAS TO GET THIS ENTIRE MATTER SETTLED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. IT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED MORE TIMES AROUND CABINET TABLE THAN ANY OTHER QUESTION ON BRITISH AGENDA. HE SAID IF HE WERE TO SUGGEST IN HOUSE OF COMMONS THAT UK HAD TO BUY ITS WAY INTO COMMON MARKET EITHER BY TRIMMING ITS POSITION ON NONPROLIFERATION OR ON OFFSET, "HE WOULD BE LYNCHED ON THE SPOT." IF HE HAD HIS "DRUTHERS" HE WOULD NOT TAKE A SINGLE MAN OUT OF THE BAOR EXCEPT AS PART OF RECIPROCAL AGREEMENT (HE ADDED PARENTHETICALLY THAT WHILE KOSYGIN HAD SEEMED TO SHOW AN INTEREST IN RECIPROCAL REDUCTIONS LAST YEAR, THIS HAD NOT BEEN THE CASE IN HIS LAST TALKS) OR BECAUSE OF A REAL CHANGE IN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

2. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WERE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IN GERMANY. EARLIER, A STABILIZING PRESENCE, WOULD BE SORELY MISSED. THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS UNSTABLE AND THERE WAS GREAT UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHERE THE REAL CENTER OF POWER LAY. WE DID NOT KNOW IF THE COALITION COULD LAST. HOWEVER THE UK TOO, HAS PROBLEMS. MANY OF THESE STEMMED FROM UNEQUIVOCAL BACKING HE HAD GIVEN US ON VIETNAM. SITUATION HAD BOILED OVER THIS WEEK AT CONCLUSION OF DEFENSE DEBATE. HALF OF PARLIAMENT WANTS UK TO GET OUT EAST OF SUEZ AND PUT MORE FORCES INTO BAOR IN ORDER TO BUY BRITISH WAY TO EEC. OTHERS WANT BRITS TO RETRANCH EVERY PLACE. HE HAD "CLOBBERED" HIS LABOR COLLEAGUES "GOOD AND PROPER" LAST NIGHT. THERE WAS A LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF TIMES HE COULD DO THIS, HOWEVER. IF HE DID IT ON BEHALF OF KIESINGER AND STRAUSS, HE WOULD GET LITTLE SUPPORT IN PARLIAMENT. NO LEADER IN HISTORY HAD TALKED TO HIS PARLIAMENTARY COLLEAGUES THE WAY HE HAD YESTERDAY. THEY HAD TAKEN IT PRETTY WELL BUT THERE WERE LIMITS TO THEIR TOLERANCE AND ONE COULD NOT PURSUE THIS TACTIC TOO OFTEN.

67 MAR 5 PM 7:22  
SUNDAY



3. WILSON SAID THERE COULD BE NO GIVE IN THE BRITISH POSITION ON THE MATTER OF OFFSETS. BRITAIN HAD SUFFERED PROPORTIONATELY MORE ON BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DUE TO STATIONING OF TROOPS THAN ANY OTHER NATO MEMBER. THE GERMANS HAD A 500 MILLION POUND SURPLUS THIS YEAR. IN ORDER TO ATTAIN A SURPLUS OF 50 MILLION POUNDS THE BRITISH HAD HAD TO LAUNCH SEVERE DEFLATION AND ACCEPT AN INCREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT. THERE HAD BEEN A TERRIBLE ROW WITH THE TRADE UNIONS, THE BASIS OF LABOR SUPPORT AT THE BEGINNING-ALTHOUGH NOW THE SITUATION WAS BETTER. IN THE FACE OF THIS HISTORY, HE COULD NOT GIVE WAY TO THE GERMANS. HE WOULD GET NO SUPPORT FOR SUCH A POLICY. HE WOULD BE WRONG TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE IS "ANYTHING WE CAN DO IF THE OFFSET IS NOT SOLVED." THIS IS A FIRM GOVERNMENT POSITION ON WHICH THE CABINET AGREED. THE HOSTILE VOTE SUFFERED AT THE END OF THE DEFENSE DEBATE WAS BASICALLY BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT, IN THE OPINION OF CRITICS, BEEN GETTING ON FAST ENOUGH WITH ITS DEFENSE SAVINGS. WILSON SAID THAT THE THING AT RISK WAS AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT ASPECT OF BRITISH POLICY--ITS SUPPORT FOR THE US ON VIETNAM.

4. WILSON BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT OF ABM'S, NOTING THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE BRITISH HAD HELPED IN PRODUCING THE CURRENT RUSSIAN AGREEMENTS TO TALKS. HE HAD STRONGLY REBUTTED KOSYGIN'S VIEW THAT THE MONEY THE US WOULD SAVE BY NOT DEPLOYING ABM'S WOULD BE PUT INTO ICBM'S. HE SAID KOSYGIN HAD BEEN OUTSPOKEN ON THE SUBJECT OF CHINA: THE TROUBLE WITH THE US AND UK KOSYGIN SAID, WAS THAT THEY DID NOT REALIZE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CHINA THREAT. HE HAD BEEN ALMOST AS STRONG ON GERMANY AND THE NDP. WILSON SAID JOKINGLY HE HAD THOUGHT OF SUGGESTING TO KOSYGIN THAT THE RUSSIANS COVER BRITISH OFFSET COSTS.

5. REVERTING TO PROBLEM OF TRILATERAL TALKS HE SAID THE UK WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO WAIT VERY LONG. TWO WEEKS IS EVEN TOO MUCH. IT HAD BEEN A YEAR SINCE THEIR POSITION HAD BEEN ENUNCIATED IN THE 1965 DEFENSE REVIEW. TWICE THEY HAD DELAYED: ONCE IN RESPONSE TO THE US PROPOSAL FOR TRILATERAL TALKS AND ONCE TO GIVE THE NEW GERMAN GOVERNMENT A CHANCE TO SORT OUT ITS POSITION. "BUT TIME IS MOVING ON." HE SAID ONE OF THE PROBLEMS AROSE FROM THE "ACTIVE US ARMS SALESMANSHIP," WHICH HAD FREEMPTED THE GERMAN MARKET. HOWEVER THE BRITISH WERE NOW GETTING MORE AGGRESSIVE AND THERE WERE CERTAIN JOINT AIRCRAFT PROJECTS WHICH MAY TURN OUT TO BE HELPFUL, BUT ONLY IN THE LONG RUN.

---



6. MCCLOY INTERJECTED THAT CONTRARY TO SOME OF THE CRITICISM THAT HAD BEEN MADE, THE US WAS NOT PURSUING FAVIAN TACTICS. THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED HIM TO TAKE A GOOD, HONEST LOOK AT THE SITUATION. THE PRESIDENT FELT THE TIME HAD COME FOR DECISIONS. (WILSON INTERRUPTED TO INDICATE HIS STRONG AGREEMENT WITH THIS POINT.) THE PRESIDENT NEEDED SOME COOPERATION FROM THE BRITISH AND THE GERMANS TO HELP HIM WITH HIS REARGUARD ACTION AGAINST THOSE ELEMENTS IN THE US, PARTICULARLY IN CONGRESS, THAT WANTED TO SEE LARGE REDUCTIONS IN THE US COMMITMENT IN EUROPE. MCCLOY EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT THE VERY SUCCESSFUL SECURITY SYSTEM WHICH HAD BEEN BUILT UP SINCE THE WAR WAS IN DANGER, AS INDEED WAS THE WHOLE STRENGTHENING OF THE ALLIANCE. THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO HIM THAT HE WOULD RESPOND IN FULL MEASURE TO ANY STEPS HIS ALLIES WOULD TAKE; THAT WHAT HE NEEDED WAS SOMETHING WITH WHICH TO FIGHT HIS HOSTILE SENATORIAL OPINIONS. HOWEVER THIS MEANT THAT THE BRITISH MUST SHADE THEIR OWN DEMANDS AND ACCEPT SOMETHING LESS THAN 200 PERCENT OFFSET OR "MASSIVE" WITHDRAWALS. AT THE SAME TIME THE GERMANS MUST BE PRESSED TO INCREASE SUBSTANTIALLY WHAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO DO ON THE FINANCIAL SIDE. THE PRESIDENT, IN THIS FRAMEWORK, WAS PREPARED TO BE FORTHCOMING IN THE US POSITION.

7. WHILE EXPRESSING HIS APPRECIATION FOR THESE CONSIDERATIONS, WILSON SAID HE COULD NOT SEE HIS CABINET COMPROMISING. "WE REALLY MEAN BUSINESS. WE EITHER GET OFFSET COVERED, OR ACTION WILL FOLLOW." HE HOPED THAT MCCLOY WOULD MAKE THIS CLEAR TO KIESINGER. THE UK IS NOT AFTER BUDGETARY ASSISTANCE, AS SOME SECTIONS OF THE PUBLIC THINK, BUT ONLY AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH WILL COVER ITS FOREIGN EXCHANGE COSTS. HE PERSONALLY FELT THAT MUCH WAS DEPENDENT ON THE POSITION OF STRAUSS, WHICH "MAKES IT DOUBLY DIFFICULT." HE DID NOT CARE HOW IT WAS DONE, "AS LONG AS AT THE END OF THE DAY THE GAP IS BRIDGED." MCCLOY REITERATED THAT THE UK SHOULD BE WILLING TO SETTLE FOR LESS THAN A COMPLETE BRIDGING. WILSON SAID THAT HE FELT THAT KIESINGER HELD THE KEY, AND "HE HAS TO TAKE COMMAND." IF HE IS PREPARED TO "SHOW ENOUGH GUTS, HE CAN SETTLE THE MATTER."

8. COMMENT, AS ABOVE REPORT INDICATES, WILSON WAS AS TOUGH AS EVER ON THE MAIN QUESTION. MCCLOY'S VISIT WITH HIM FOLLOWED THE TALK WITH DUCKWITZ AND THOMSON, AT THE END OF WHICH THOMSON WAS PRESSING THE US TO HELP FILL THE GAP. THOMSON PRECEDED MCCLOY TO THE PM AFTER ADMONISHING MCCLOY NOT TO INDICATE TO THE PM HE HAD SHOWN THE SIGNS OF "GIVE" WHICH HE HAD DISPLAYED AT THE DUCKWITZ-THOMSON MEETING. THE PM'S ATTITUDE DOES NOT AFFECT OUR JUDGEMENT THAT IF BOTH THE GERMANS AND WE ARE PREPARED TO GIVE SOME, THE BRITISH WILL, IN THE LAST ANALYSIS ACCEPT LESS THAN A COMPLETE CLOSING OF THE GAP OF THEIR FOREIGN EXCHANGE COSTS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, WILSON'S OWN INTERESTS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SERVED BY INDICATING A MORE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE AT THIS POINT.  
KAISER

DTG: 05/0502Z MARCH 1967

~~SECRET~~



63  
VZCZCEB025  
PP VTE 10  
DE WTE 227

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE WH70063

SENT  
WHCA

UNCLAS

1967 MAR 4 22 17  
MARCH 4, 1967

THE FOLLOWING AP SUMMARY OF AN IZVESTIA REPORT ON SENATOR ROBERT KENNEDY'S SPEECH MIGHT WELL HAVE BEEN WRITTEN BY THE SOVIETS TO CONVEY A MESSAGE TO HANOI, NAMELY, THAT HANOI SHOULD NOT FALL INTO THE TRAP OF THINKING THAT THE SENATOR'S SPEECH WILL RESULT IN A CHANGE OF U.S. POLICY.

(REPEAT ATTACHED AP REPORT)

MOSCOW, MARCH 4 (AP)-IZVESTIA TODAY REPORTED SEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY'S VIETNAM PEACE TALKS PROPOSAL BUT MAINTAINED THAT SENATE OPPOSITION DOES NOT INFLUENCE THE WHITE HOUSE.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER NEITHER PRAISED NOR CRITICIZED KENNEDY'S ADVOCACY OF A HALT TO THE U.S. BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM FOLLOWED BY PEACE TALKS WITHIN A WEEK. IT SIMPLY CALLED HIS SPEECH A NOTABLE EVENT ON CAPITOL HILL.

THE KREMLIN HAS SUPPORTED HANOI'S EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO START TALKS ONCE THE BOMBING AND OTHER U.S. MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM ARE STOPPED. IT HAS CONDEMNED THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION FOR NOT AGREEING TO THIS.

IZVESTIA SAID KENNEDY FOR A LONG TIME HAS BEEN "STRESSING HIS DISAGREEMENT WITH THE WHITE HOUSE ON THE VIETNAMESE QUESTION." BUT IT ADDED "ONE SHOULD NOT EXAGGERATE THE EXTENT OF THIS DISAGREEMENT."

THE PAPER SAID THAT IN THE SAME SPEECH THE NEW YORK DEMOCRAT "SWORE HIS SOLIDARITY WITH THE PURPOSES OF AMERICAN POLICY IN VIETNAM AND PRUDENTLY COMPLIMENTED THE PRESIDENT FOR 'ATTEMPTS TO ACHIEVE AN HONORABLE PEACE.'"

"SUCH A HALFWAY POLICY," IT CONTINUED, "IS CHARACTERISTIC OF THE SENATE OPPOSITION ON VIETNAM. IT IS IRRESOLUTE AND ITS NUMBERS ARE SMALL. IT DOES NOT INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF THE WHITE HOUSE."

DTG 04/2118Z MAR 1967

XEROX FROM QUEEN COPY



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM WALT ROSTOV  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP67096

SENT  
WHGA

Sent 5:18 PM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOV

1967 MAR 4/22 18

HERewith CHET BOWLES' MODERATELY OPTIMISTIC EVALUATION  
OF THE INDIAN ELECTION.  
NEW DELHI 12620

1. THROUGH OUR REGULAR REPORTING WE HAVE TRIED TO KEEP YOU INFORMED ABOUT THE INDIAN ELECTIONS AND IN MY SPECIAL CABLE NEW DELHI 12251 OF FEB 24 I TRIED TO PASS ON SOME OF THE ATMOSPHERE WHICH THE ELECTIONS HAVE GENERATED IN INDIA. IN THIS MESSAGE I OFFER AN ANALYSIS OF THE FORCES WHICH ARE TAKING SHAPE AND SOME OF THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY. AT THIS EARLY STAGE ANY SUCH ANALYSIS IS NECESSARILY TENTATIVE AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE.

2. THE ELECTION, IT IS FAIR TO SAY, BLEW LIKE A FRESH WIND THROUGHOUT INDIA. TO BE SURE IT BLEW AWAY SOME GOOD PEOPLE LIKE SUBRAMANIAM AND VENKATARAMAN IN MADRAS. THE NET RESULT, HOWEVER, WAS A CONVINCING DISPLAY OF PUBLIC DISTASTE FOR OLD FACES, OLD SLOGANS AND OLD HABITS OF MIND.

3. IT IS IMPORTANT TO LOOK BEYOND ADJECTIVES WHICH ARE CUSTOMARILY USED TO DESCRIBE THE CONGRESS PARTY SETBACK TO UNDERSTAND ITS SCOPE AND CAUSE.

A. IN NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE CONGRESS DROPPED FROM ALMOST 45 PERCENT TO 9.5 PERCENT OF THEIR 44 MILLION VOTES THAT HAVE THUS FAR BEEN COUNTED. COMBINED COMMUNIST PARTY VOTES DROPPED ABOUT 10 PERCENT IN 1962 TO 8.3 PERCENT IN 1967. THE MAJOR GAINS WERE MADE BY SVATANTRAGG JANA SANGH AND THE DMK.

B. ALTHOUGH HIGH PRICES, FOOD SCARCITY, OLD FACES, ETC. PLAYED A CRITICAL ROLE IN THE CONGRESS PARTY DEFEAT I BELIEVE THAT THE GREATLY IMPROVED AND IN MANY CASES BRILLIANT POLITICAL TACTICS AND ORGANIZATION BY OPPOSITION PARTIES PLAYED ALMOST EQUAL ROLE. FOR INSTANCE IN KERALA THE CONGRESS PARTY ACTUALLY GAINED ABOUT 100 THOUSAND VOTES OVER ITS VOTE IN 1965 WITH THE PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL MOVING FROM 33.6 PERCENT TO 35.4 PERCENT. YET THERE AND IN MADRAS THE OPPOSITION PARTIES PLACED THEIR COALITION SUPPORTED CANDIDATES WITH EXTRAORDINARY SKILL THEREBY REAPING A FAR BIGGER HARVEST OF WINNERS THAN WOULD NORMALLY HAVE BEEN INDICATED BY PROPORTION OF VOTE POLLED.

4. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS THAT CONCERN US NOW ARE (A) WILL THE CONGRESS PARTY BE ABLE TO DEVELOP A COORDINATED, DISCIPLINED PARTY-CAPABLE OF DEALING EFFECTIVELY WITH THE AWESOME NATIONAL PROBLEMS AND OF WORKING OUT PRACTICAL RESOLUTIONS WITH THE NEW STATE GOVTS INCLUDING THOSE NOT CONTROLLED BY CONGRESS; (B) WILL THE NON-CONGRESS OPPOSITION DEMONSTRATE REASONABLE RESPONSIBILITY IN DEALING WITH POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE ISSUES AS BANNING COW SLAUGHTER AND THE HINDI LANGUAGE QUESTION; (C) HOW WILL THE CONGRESS PARTY ADJUST TO ITS OPPOSITION STATUS IN THOSE STATES WHERE IT LOST POWER?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: 100-10-10-10-10

By: [Signature] NARA, Date: 4/19/00



5. WHILE IT IS MUCH TOO EARLY TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS THERE ARE STRAWS IN THE WIND WHICH ARE WORTH NOTING.

A. THUS FAR THE STILL SHELL SHOCKED CONGRESS PARTY LEADERS HAVE SHOWN POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION AND COHESIVENESS IN SCHEDULING THE SELECTION OF THE NEW PRIME MINISTER AND THE NEW CABINET QUICKLY AND IN SUPPORTING MOVE TO HAVE NEWLY ELECTED PARLIAMENT MEET IN MID MARCH.

B. CONGRESS HAS ALSO BEEN MOVING TOWARD THE SELECTION OF A PRIME MINISTER IN A RESIGNED MANNER. AS SUGGESTED IN NEW DELHI 12251 MRS. GANDHI PROBABLY HAS A BETTER CHANCE THAN ANYONE ELSE OF BEING SELECTED. HOWEVER IF SHE PROVES A LITTLE MORE WEARY OF THE BATTLE AND IF MORARJI TAKES A REALLY TOUGH STAND, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT MORARJI MIGHT WIN IN THE SECRET BALLOTING OR EVEN MORE LIKELY THAT CHAVAN MIGHT EMERGE AS THE QUOTE UNITY UNQUOTE CANDIDATE.

C. THE CONGRESS PARTY LEADERS HAVE THUS FAR SHOWN RESTRAINT IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH THE NEWLY ELECTED NON-CONGRESS STATE GOVTS. AMONG THE OPPOSITION PARTIES THE DMK HAS INDICATED A HIGH DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY IT HAS EVEN EXPRESSED REGRET THAT THERE IS NO LOK SABHA MEMBER FROM MADRAS WHO COULD BECOME A MEMBER OF THE CABINET. THERE ARE RUMORS THAT IT WILL CLEAR THE ROAD FOR EIGHER SUBRAMANIAM OR VENKATAMAN. THE SWATANTR HAS BEEN EQUALLY RESTRAINED. EVEN THE JANA SANGH APPEARS TO HAVE SOFTENED ITS POSITION ON THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE ISSUE AND AS YET HAS GENERALLY KEPT VERY QUIET ON INDIA'S RELATIONSHIPS WITH PAKISTAN. IN WEST BENGAL IT APPEARS THAT THE NEW CHIEF MINISTER WHO HEADS THE WINNING COALITION WILL RETAIN THE HOME MINISTRY WHICH ON THE BASIS OF SEATS 254 WOULD HAVE NORMALLY GONE TO LEADER OF THE LEFT COMMUNISTS.

6. ONE INTRIGUING POTENTIALLY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT WILL BE THE INCREASED COMPETITION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL STATES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. KERALA UNDER A COMMUNIST ORGANIZED GOVT WILL GO ALL OUT TO PROVE THAT IT CAN PROVIDE A BETTER LIFE FOR THE PEOPLE. IN MADRAS THE DMK OPERATING FROM A DIFFERENT APPROACH WILL STRIVE TO MAKE MADRAS THE FASTEST DEVELOPING STATE IN INDIA. IN ORISSA THERE WILL BE A SIMILAR EFFORT. THIS COMPETITION WITH SOME DISCREET HELP FROM OUR MISSION, COULD RESULT IN STATES LIKE MADRAS AND ORISSA BETTING HEAVILY ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFERING FRESH INDUCEMENTS NOT ONLY FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL BUT ALSO FOR DOMESTIC CAPITAL. IF THIS DEVELOPMENT SHOULD OCCUR, AND IF ITS RESULTS WERE SIGNIFICANT AS I BELIEVE THEY WOULD BE, EFFECT ON THE CENTRAL GOVT'S ECONOMIC THINKING WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT.

7. THESE, AS I SAY, ARE NOT MORE THAN STRAWS IN THE WIND. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT CONGRESS PARTY WILL BOG DOWN IN HOPELESS CONTESTS (WHICH RIGHT COMMUNISTS ARE TRYING TO PROMOTE) OR THAT WE MAY WITNESS A DONNEYBROOK BETWEEN THE WEAKENED CENTER AND THE STATES; IF SO THE PROPHETS OF GLOOM AND DOOM MAY BE CORRECT IN THEIR SUGGESTION THAT THIS IS INDIA'S LAST FULLY DEMOCRATIC ELECTION. AT THIS STAGE WE CAN ONLY SAY IN REBUTTAL: SO FAR, SO GOOD. BOWLES

DTG: 04/2121Z MARCH 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XEROX FROM QUECK COPY



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT  
WHCA

1967 MAR 4 20 06

67 MAR 4 PM 3:08

SATURDAY

EEB021  
CO WTE 10 WTE 8  
DE WTE 222

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN  
CITE CAP67094

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THERE FOLLOWS, FOR YOUR INFORMATION, A SUMMARY OF SECRETARY RUSK'S BACKGROUND BRIEFING MARCH 3 FOR 28 ASIAN, PACIFIC AND NEAR EASTERN CORRESPONDENTS (AP AND UPI WERE ALSO PRESENT):

#### VIETNAM

SECRETARY RUSK REFERRED TO MAI VAN BO'S FEBRUARY 22 INTERVIEW IN PARIS WITH NEW YORK TIMES AND TO HO CHI MINH'S MESSAGE OF FEBRUARY 13 TO THE POPE AS A CLEAR INDICATION THAT HANOI DEMANDS PERMANENT AND UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF U.S. BOMBING, BUT IS UNWILLING TO INDICATE WHAT IT WOULD DO IN RETURN.

PEKING'S PUBLIC ATTITUDE IS OPPOSED TO PEACE, NEGOTIATIONS, OR SETTLEMENT IN VIET-NAM EXCEPT ON COMMUNIST TERMS. PEKING'S INFLUENCE IN HANOI IS IMPORTANT, IS PROBABLY CONSIDERABLE, BUT WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO JUDGE THIS VERY PRECISELY.

THE PRESENT STALEMATE IN VIET-NAM IS NOTHING NEW. POLITICALLY, THERE HAS BEEN AN IMPASSE SINCE 1960, WHEN HANOI ORGANIZED THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT AND INVADED THE SOUTH. IN THE FOLLOWING YEAR, WE BEGAN ASSISTING SOUTH VIET-NAM TO RESIST THAT INVASION. THE SCALE OF INFILTRATION AND SUPPLIES MOVED INTO THE SOUTH IS NOT MASSIVE, BUT IS TROUBLESOME. THE LONGER THIS MOVEMENT CONTINUES, THE GREATER WILL BE THE COST TO HANOI. WE ARE PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT A SUSPENSION OF OUR BOMBING, ABOUT CONDITIONS, ABOUT OTHERS STEPS, ABOUT A FINAL SETTLEMENT, OR ABOUT ANY PART OF THE PROBLEM. BUT BEGINNING WITH THE INVASION IN 1960, THERE WERE FIVE YEARS IN WHICH THERE WAS NO U.S. BOMBING, WITH NO INTEREST FROM THE OTHER SIDE IN MOVING TOWARD PEACE.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12958,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY Ref ON 4-22-91

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



## US - INDIAN RELATIONS

WE HAVE NO PLANS FOR MAJOR CHANGES IN OUR POLICY TOWARD INDIA, BUT WE DO WANT TO CONTINUE OUR CLOSE, FRIENDLY AND NORMAL RELATIONS WITH INDIA UNDER THE NEW INDIAN GOVERNMENT.

## INDONESIA

WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY SIGNS THAT INDONESIA IS IMPROVING HER RELATIONS WITH OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES. INDONESIA FACES SEVERE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, THE MOST DIFFICULT OF WHICH ARE OF A SHORT TERM. THE U.S. IS WORKING WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE DEBT RELIEF, ADDITIONAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, INVESTMENT, AND SPARE PARTS TO GET INDONESIA'S INDUSTRY MOVING.

## NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, INCLUDING THOSE REGARDING PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND SAFEGUARDS, CAN BE ANSWERED SATISFACTORILY. OTHERS ARE MORE DIFFICULT. IF CERTAIN COUNTRIES ARE RELUCTANT TO FOREGO THE OPPORTUNITY TO BECOME NUCLEAR POWERS, WE CAN ONLY TRY TO FACT THIS SQUARELY AND SEEK AN ANSWER, BECAUSE THIS GOES TO THE WHOLE PURPOSE OF THE TREATY. ANOTHER DIFFICULT QUESTION IS THAT SOME NON-NUCLEAR POWERS MAY FEEL THAT THERE SHOULD BE A TREATY ONLY WHEN THE NUCLEAR POWERS MAKE SOME PROGRESS TOWARD GENERAL DISARMAMENT. AGREEMENT ON ABM'S WOULD BE A STEP IN THAT DIRECTION. BUT WE DON'T THINK WE SHOULD DELAY THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY UNTIL THERE IS AGREEMENT ON GENERAL DISARMAMENT.

## SEATO

THE SEATO MEETING HAS BEEN SCHEDULED TENTATIVELY FOR THE THIRD WEEK IN APRIL, PENDING RESPONSES FROM MEMBER NATIONS. THIS WON'T CONFLICT WITH THE LATIN AMERICAN SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN MID-APRIL. WE ANTICIPATE NO STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN SEATO, AND HAVE SEEN NO PROPOSALS FROM OTHERS ALONG THESE LINES. FIVE OF THE SEATO NATIONS HAVE TROOPS IN VIET-NAM, AND DESPITE THE FRENCH ATTITUDE, SEATO REMAINS VERY MUCH ALIVE.



## ASIAN SECURITY

WE HAVE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATIES WITH KOREA, JAPAN, CHINA, THE PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. WE DO NOT WANT TO TERMINATE THESE AGREEMENTS, NOR DO WE DESIRE TO EXTEND OUR ALLIANCES IN THAT AREA. THESE ALLIANCES GO A LONG WAY TOWARD STABILIZING THE SITUATION AND IN PROVIDING THE FRAMEWORK FOR A DURABLE PEACE. THE ASIANS THEMSELVES SEEM TO BE MOVING TOWARD GREATER REGIONAL COOPERATION.

## CHINA

WE HAVE HAD NO REAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON CHINA. THERE HAVE BEEN GENERAL TALKS WITH THE U.S.S.R., AND FROM TIME TO TIME WE HAVE HAD DISCUSSIONS IN WARSAW WITH THE CHINESE. WE CAN'T ASSESS THE RELATIVE INFLUENCE MOSCOW AND PEKING EXERCISE IN HANOI. THERE IS A CONTEST FOR INFLUENCE IN HANOI, AND GREAT RIVALRY THERE.

## EUROPEAN SECURITY

THE NATURE OF THE THREAT TO EUROPE SHOULD BE ASSESSED BY NATO, WHICH SHOULD DECIDE ON THE MEANS TO PROVIDE PRUDENT MILITARY FORCES TO GUARD AGAINST THIS THREAT, AND DETERMINE HOW THESE FORCES CAN BE MAINTAINED EQUITABLY.

DTG: 041835Z MAR 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



66  
~~SECRET~~  
SENT  
WHCA

1967 MAR 4 21 07

VZCZCEEB023  
OO WTE19  
DE WTE 216

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP67092

~~SECRET~~

YOU SHOULD KNOW THE DEPTH AND STRENGTH OF GEORGES'S  
FEELING ABOUT ANNOUNCING SOON A MAY VISIT BY KIESINGER.  
HIS CABLE [REDACTED] FOLLOW:

(MCGHEE CABLE FOLLOWS)

(CIA REPORT FOLLOWS)

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR MCGHEE (BONN 10253)

1. I AM ASKING [REDACTED] WHICH  
FORTUITOUSLY PROVIDES US WITH A DIRECT INSIGHT INTO  
KIESINGER'S REACTION TO MY DISCUSSION WITH HIM THE  
PRECEDING EVENING REGARDING A POSSIBLE VISIT TO WASHINGTON,  
AS REPORTED IN REFTEL. I FIND NO DISCREPANCY BETWEEN  
KIESINGER'S REACTIONS AS REPORTED BY ME [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] I BELIEVE THAT KIESINGER'S INTERPRETATION OF HOW  
I PUT THE QUESTION TO HIM, ACCORDS FULLY WITH MY OWN  
INTENT IN THIS REGARD.

2. I WOULD HOPE THAT CONSIDERATION WOULD BE GIVEN, IN  
REACHING THE DECISION REQUESTED IN MY RECOMMENDATION  
IN REFTEL, TO THE IMPORTANT EFFECT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF  
A KIESINGER VISIT WOULD HAVE, NOT JUST ON THE PRESENT  
CRITICAL SITUATION IN US-GERMAN RELATIONS TO WHICH I HAVE  
REFERRED, BUT TO THE POSSIBLE WORSENING EFFECT WHICH  
WE MUST STILL ANTICIPATE CAN BE CAUSED BY THE NPT. IT  
IS NOT CLEAR THAT WE HAVE YET REACHED THE PEAK OF GERMAN  
REACTION. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE VISIT, EVEN THOUGH  
UNRELATED TO NPT, WOULD DO MUCH TO TEMPER THIS REACTION.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-112  
By ms, NARA, Date 10-24-03



3. I ATTACH MORE IMPORTANCE TO MY RECOMMENDATION IN REFTEL THAN TO ANY OTHER THAT I HAVE MADE SINCE MY RESIDENCE IN BONN. I HOPE THAT THIS WILL BE GIVEN DUE ACCOUNT IN YOUR CONSIDERATION.

4. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS DECISION I WOULD HOPE THAT THE PRESIDENT COULD FIND TIME TO READ BOTH MY REFERENCE TELEGRAM [REDACTED] REFERRED TO HEREIN.

MCGHEE



DTG: 041716Z MAR 67

~~SECRET~~

REMOVED FROM QUICK COPY



~~SECRET~~

SENT  
WHCA

1967 MAR 4 18 37

EEB020  
ZZ WTE10  
DE WTE 221

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP67093

~~SECRET~~

1. SENATOR PERCY'S PROPOSITION WAS TRIED IN THE 5-DAY PAUSE OF MAY 1965 AND THE 37-DAY PAUSE OF DECEMBER 1965-JANUARY 1966. IT FAILED.
2. SINCE THAT TIME, HANOI HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT MIGHT TALK, BUT ONLY IF THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WERE "UNCONDITIONAL AND DEFINITIVE."
3. SENATOR PERCY'S PROPOSAL IS FOR A CONDITIONAL PAUSE IN BOMBING, WHICH HANOI HAS EXPLICITLY REJECTED IN ADVANCE -- AND DONE SO VERY RECENTLY.
4. THE FACT IS THAT WE HAVE SOMEWHAT CHANGED OUR POSITION SINCE THE 37-DAY PAUSE, SINCE WE NOW INSIST ON MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION; AND THEY HAVE CHANGED THEIR POSITION BY MAKING EXPLICIT THEIR TERMS FOR TALKS, NAMELY, AN "UNCONDITIONAL AND DEFINITIVE" CESSATION OF THE BOMBING.
5. NICK KATZENBACH, AFTER TAKING COUNCIL WITH HIS COLLEAGUES IN STATE, BELIEVES THAT:

67 MAR 4 PM 1:39

SATURDAY



-- THE WHITE HOUSE SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT RESPOND TO SENATOR PERCY'S PROPOSAL;

-- THAT, IF PRESSED, THE STATE DEPARTMENT SHOULD SAY THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE HAVE MADE CLEAR THE COUNTRY'S DESIRE FOR PEACE AND THE WIDE VARIETY OF APPROACHES WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE TO BRING ABOUT PEACE. THEY MIGHT THEN POINT TO THE PRESENT HANOI TERMS FOR UNCONDITIONAL AND DEFINITIVE END OF BOMBING WHICH WOULD, IN EFFECT, VALIDATE THEIR RIGHT TO INFILTRATION -- WHICH WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO DO.

6. COMMENT. I SUSPECT WE SHALL CONTINUE TO BE PRESSED BY VARIOUS TYPES OF DOVES FOR THIS KIND OF DRAMATIC GESTURE WHICH, IN FACT, HAS THE QUALITY OF AN ULTIMATUM IN IT. AT SOME STAGE WE MAY HAVE TO MAKE SUCH A GESTURE FOR COSMETIC PURPOSES. (YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT CHET COOPER, ALONE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, BELIEVES WE SHOULD NOW MAKE SUCH A GESTURE.)

7. BUT BEFORE WE MAKE ANY DECISION ON THIS, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD AWAIT U THANT'S MESSAGE, WHICH MAY BE SO FLAT AND DOGMATIC A HANOI STATEMENT AS TO TAKE US OFF THE HOOK.

DTG: 04/1816Z MAR 1967

~~SECRET~~

GROUP COUNT 40IMI 403



March 4, 1967

## FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

1. Senator Percy's proposition was tried in the 5-day pause of May 1965 and the 37-day pause of December 1965-January 1966. It failed.

2. Since that time, Hanoi has made it clear that it might talk, but only if the cessation of bombing were "unconditional and definitive."

3. Senator Percy's proposal is for a conditional pause in bombing, which Hanoi has explicitly rejected in advance -- and done so very recently.

4. The fact is that we have somewhat changed our position since the 37-day pause, since we now insist on mutual de-escalation; and they have changed their position by making explicit their terms for talks; namely, an "unconditional and definitive" cessation of the bombing.

5. Nick Katzenbach, after taking council with his colleagues in State, believes that:

-- The White House should <sup>not = repeat not =</sup> respond to Senator Percy's proposal;

-- That, if pressed, the State Department should say the President and Secretary of State have made clear the country's desire for peace and the wide variety of approaches we are prepared <sup>TO TAKE</sup> to bring about peace. They might then point to the present Hanoi terms for unconditional and definitive end of bombing which would, in effect, validate their right to infiltration -- which we are not prepared to do.

6. Comment. I suspect we shall continue to be pressed by various types of doves for this kind of dramatic gesture which, in fact, has the quality of an ultimatum in it. At some stage we may have to make such a gesture for cosmetic purposes. (You should know that Chet Cooper, alone in the State

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-350

By fw, NARA, Date 9-3-92



**3/4/67**

Department, believes we should now make such a gesture.)

7. But before we make any decision on this, I believe we should await U Thant's message, which may be so flat and dogmatic a Hanoi statement as to take us off the hook.

##



70  
SENT  
WHCA

EEAS65  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 212

1967 MAR 4 16 55

FROM WHSR (BROWN)  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE WH70056

UNCLAS

MR. PRESIDENT:  
THIS ARRIVED TODAY, MARCH 4TH FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

YOLANDA

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I WAS HIGHLY COMPLIMENTED THAT YOU CONSENTED TO PRESENT THE HEART AWARD TO MY SON JOHN AS MY REPRESENTATIVE. THE FOLLOWING MORNING MR. CHEATHAM, PRESIDENT OF THE ASSOCIATION, ARRIVED HERE IN THE DESERT AND MADE A PERSONAL PRESENTATION TO ME. I APPRECIATE YOUR HAVING TAKEN THE TIME FOR SUCH A GRACIOUS ACT AND ASSURE YOU THAT THIS GIVES THE AWARD AN ADDITIONAL VALUE FOR ME.

WHILE I WOULD NEVER READ, PERSONALLY, ANYTHING WRITTEN BY THE MAN, MR. MANCHESTER, I DO WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT WHEN HE INTERVIEWED ME MANY MONTHS AGO HE WAS INFORMED THAT I WOULD NOT ALLOW THE USE OF QUOTATIONS. MOREOVER THE QUOTATIONS HE DID USE, AS REPORTED TO ME BY A FRIEND, GIVE A FALSE PICTURE OF OUR CONVERSATION ON THE MORNING AFTER MR. KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I REGRET ANY EMBARRASSMENT THAT HIS DISTORTIONS MAY CAUSE YOU.

WITH WARM REGARD AND GREAT RESPECT,

SINCERELY,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

DTG: 04/1606Z MAR 67

67 MAR 4 AM 11:57

SATURDAY



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-350  
By ju, NARA, Date 9-3-92

March 4, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appropriate Welcome for President Bourguiba and the Shah

June and July will be tough months on the foreign visitors' account. So you will want to guard your time carefully. While most of the "Expo" visitors were coming on their own, two of them -- President Bourguiba of Tunisia and the Shah of Iran -- were invited by you last year for specific reasons of state. They will need better treatment than the others.

President Bourguiba:

Last May he was asked to come on an "official visit." As you know, Bourguiba has gone out on a limb to approve our stand on Vietnam and to speak out against Nasser; and he seeks a "special relationship" with us which would assure him against attack from Algeria. His staff knows that he won't get either the additional military help or the explicit guarantee from us he thinks he needs.

When he was here in 1961, he came on a "state visit" and therefore got the works -- a parade, a White House dinner, addressed a joint session of Congress, and the President attended a return reception at the Tunisian Embassy. His staff -- and he -- fears that if our reception of him is notably less than the last time, Algeria will see it as a green light. We don't buy this argument very far, though there may be something in it.

They also know that King Hassan of Morocco was received at a dinner and entertainment even though he had originally been invited for only an informal visit.

Bourguiba can't have a parade, or an address on the Hill; but if at all possible, we should have a dinner for him and an evening's entertainment.

Okay dinner and entertainment \_\_\_\_\_

Lunch only \_\_\_\_\_



It would be consistent with practise on an "official visit" if you were willing to attend briefly a return reception at the Tunisian Embassy. It would take half an hour, and they would be delighted. But, since there are so many other visitors coming, and each will watch closely for comparisons, you may not want to go this far.

Okay for return reception \_\_\_\_\_

No return reception \_\_\_\_\_

The Shah of Iran

You will recall last summer you invited him for an informal visit as a sweetener to our military package to discourage him from buying sophisticated weapons from Russia. He'll be coming with the Queen who will add luster to any occasion.

Since we invited him, and he's an old friend, we think a dinner and entertainment would be in order if you can stand it.

Okay for dinner \_\_\_\_\_

No, luncheon instead \_\_\_\_\_

W. W. Rostow



72

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-350  
By ju, NARA, Date 9-3-92

~~SECRET~~

Saturday - March 4, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ambassador Anderson briefs House Committee on Canal Treaty Negotiations

Bob Anderson appeared before the Panama Canal Subcommittee of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on February 28 to brief them on the status of Canal negotiations.

Congresswoman Sullivan and other members again made clear their opposition to the negotiations. Their major criticisms were:

- that not enough is being done to protect the American and Panamanian employees of the Canal;
- that Panama cannot be counted on to live up to the new treaty, and
- that the increased benefits to Panama under the new treaty will benefit only wealthy Panamanians.

Bob Anderson explained that we recognize that the negotiation of the new treaty will not by itself end our problems in Panama, but pointed out that there is no acceptable alternative to modernizing the Canal treaty arrangements.

The Subcommittee gave little indication of moderating their opposition, but did express appreciation for the frank review of issues.

/S/  
W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday - March 4, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Former President Lopez Mateos

Dr. James Poppen, one of the physicians at the Lahey Clinic who has been treating former President Lopez Mateos, has written Secretary Rusk the letter at Tab B describing Lopez Mateos' condition and recommending a brief note of encouragement to help him in his present depressed state of mind.

Given your previous association with him, Bob Sayre wanted you to know about it. In case you would want to send a message, I suggest something along the lines of the draft at Tab A.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments - Tabs A & B.

Approve

☒ 3/2/67

Disapprove

☐

Speak to me

☐

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12856, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Conf. Room, Feb. 24, 1983  
By Ng, NARA, Date 4/19/91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Suggested President Message to former Mexican President Lopez Mateos

Dear Mr. President:

I have just learned that you were in Boston recently for a medical check-up and was pleased to hear of the improvement in your health. Lady Bird and I recall with pleasure our visits with you and express our <sup>most</sup> sincere desire for your continued recovery.

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 4/19/91

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-350  
By fw, NARA, Date 9-3-92

SENT  
WHCA

1967 MAR 4 00 05

VZCZCEEB028  
OO WTE 10 WTE 8 SAN ANTONIO  
DE WTE 186

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO JAKE JACOBSEN FOR THE PRESIDENT  
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN  
CITE CAP67080

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MARCH 3, 1967

SUBJECT: FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUMMARY

1. THAIS AGREE TO BASES FOR B-52S

THE THAI GOVERNMENT HAS AGREED TO THE USE OF THE U-TAPAO BASE BY B-52S. A COORDINATED PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS WILL BE ARRANGED PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST B-52.

2. THAIS WANT TO ALLOW PRESS VISITS TO AIR BASES

THE THAI GOVERNMENT WANTS TO ALLOW US NEWS TEAMS TO VISIT US-USED THAI AIR BASES. THE VISITS WOULD TAKE PLACE MARCH 5-11. THE THAIS WANT TO GIVE ABC(JOHN SCALI) A BEAT ON THE OTHERS BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THEY ARE ASSURED FAVORABLE TREATMENT BY ABC. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WANTS THE THAIS TO ARRANGE THINGS SO THAT OTHER US NEWS ORGANIZATIONS WILL NOT BE UNDULY OFFENDED. DURING THE PRESS VISITS, WE WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT US PLANES ARE STRIKING NORTH VIETNAM FROM THAILAND, BUT WOULD SAY NOTHING ABOUT OPERATIONS IN LAOS OR OVERFLIGHTS OF THAT COUNTRY.

3. UK-SOVIET TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP

THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS REQUESTED EMBASSY LONDON TO DISCUSS WITH THE BRITISH THE POSSIBLE UK-SOVIET TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP. WHILE UNDERSTANDING THE BRITISH DESIRE TO APPEAR RESPONSIVE TO THE SOVIET INITIATIVE, WE THINK THE NEED TO PRESERVE ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY ARGUES AGAINST GOING TOO FAR TOO FAST. IN FACT, WE HOPE THE BRITISH WILL DECIDE TO QUIETLY BURY THE PROPOSED TREATY.

4. UN DEFICIT

THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS REJECTED A USUN RECOMMENDATION THAT THE US MAKE A SYMBOLIC CONTRIBUTION TO THE UN IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS AND THE FRENCH TO MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION. WE BELIEVE THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE NEGOTIATING A SECOND TIME TO OBTAIN THE CONTRIBUTIONS WE THOUGHT WE HAD GAINED DURING A PREVIOUS NEGOTIATING EXERCISE.



## 5. RELATIONS WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD ARE WORSENING

NASSER AND THE ARABIAN KINGS ARE SQUARING OFF AGAINST EACH OTHER, MORE THAN AT ANY TIME IN RECENT YEARS. NASSER BERATES HUSSEIN AND FAISAL, LETS THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION USE EGYPT AS A BASE AGAINST BOTH, AND HAS MOUNTED AIR RAIDS AGAINST FAISAL'S TOWNS NEAR YEMEN. HUSSEIN STRIKES BACK IN BITTER SPEECHES AND FAISAL STIMULATES EGYPTIAN UNREST BY APPEALING TO ISLAMIC LOYALTIES AND MAY "UNLEASH" ROYALIST TRIBES AGAINST NASSER'S TROOPS IN YEMEN. BOTH SIDES OVERESTIMATE WEAKNESS OF THEIR OPPONENT; EACH EXPECTS THE OTHER TO COLLAPSE. STATE IS EXPLORING WAYS OF MODERATING THE CONFLICT AND AVOIDING US INVOLVEMENT.

## 6. ISRAEL

THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO POSTPONE THE NEXT INSPECTION VISIT TO DIMONA. AMBASSADOR BARBOUR REPORTS CABINET DISCUSSIONS ARE IN PROCESS, AND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER UNDERSTANDS OUR "HIGHEST LEVEL" CONCERN AT THEIR REPEATED DELAYS.

## 7. SOVIET FISHING TRAWLER

AT LATEST WORD, THE SOVIET FISHING TRAWLER AND OUR COAST GUARD CUTTER ARE HOVE-TO 30-40 MILES FROM SAND POINT IN THE ALEUTIANS. THE SOVIET FLEET COMMANDER REQUESTED PERMISSION FROM VLADIVOSTOK TO ACCOMPANY THE TRAWLER INTO SAND POINT AND THE SHIPS ARE PRESUMABLY WAITING FOR THE ANSWER. FOLLOWING THIS, THE SHIPS WILL PROCEED TO SAND POINT, WITH THE STORIS TOWING THE TRAWLER IF THE SOVIETS DECIDE NOT TO COOPERATE.

THE US COMMISSIONER FROM ANCHORAGE AND A US ATTORNEY ARE ON THEIR WAY TO SAND POINT. IF THERE ARE NO COMPLICATIONS, THE COMMISSIONER WILL PROBABLY ARRAIGN THE VESSEL, ACCEPT BOND, AND PERHAPS ALLOW IT TO DEPART. THE US DISTRICT COURT IN ANCHORAGE WOULD THEN ACT ON THE CASE (IN TEN DAYS OR SO) WITH THE SOVIETS PRESUMABLY REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. IN THE LAST SUCH CASE A CANADIAN TRAWLER WAS FINED \$5,000 PLUS CATCH. HOWEVER, UNLIKE THE SOVIETS, THE CANADIANS DID NOT TRY TO OUTRUN THE AUTHORITIES.

THIS INCIDENT IS THE MOST RECENT IN A LONG SERIES OF SOVIET FISHING VIOLATIONS ABOUT WHICH DOBRYNIN WAS RECENTLY WARNED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEDDY IN THE STRONGEST TERMS. THE CASE APPEARS TO BE A STRAIGHT-FORWARD FISHING VIOLATION, AND NOT A CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE OPERATION.

DTG: 03/2251Z MAR 67

**SECRET**

SENT  
WHCA

1967 MAR 3 22 35

VZCZCEEA856  
PP WTE10  
DE WTE 184

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE WH70041

UNCLAS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FRIDAY - MARCH 3, 1967

A FIVE-YEAR OLD GRANDDAUGHTER OF PRESIDENT GUERRERO OF NICARAGUA DIED LAST NIGHT FROM INJURIES RECEIVED IN AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT THE PREVIOUS DAY. NINE OTHER MEMBERS OF PRESIDENT'S FAMILY WERE INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT. THE CHILD'S MOTHER WAS SERIOUSLY INJURED BUT IS RECOVERING.

I RECOMMEND THAT YOU SEND THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO PRESIDENT GUERRERO:

"MRS. JOHNSON AND I HAVE JUST LEARNED OF THE TRAGIC DEATH OF YOUR LITTLE GRANDDAUGHTER, TATIANA URBINA GUERRERO. WE SHARE YOUR GRIEF IN THIS SAD HOUR. PLEASE EXTEND OUR DEEPEST SYMPATHY TO YOUR DAUGHTER AND HER HUSBAND, LYNDON B. JOHNSON"

APPROVE MESSAGE

-----

*Call from Marie Feltner from K  
3/3/67 - 6:55pm*

DISAPPROVE MESSAGE

-----

DTG: 03/2150Z MAR 67

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



SENT  
WHCA

EE

1967 MAR 3 23 56

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

EA007  
OO WTE 10  
DE WTE 189

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE WH70044

UNCLAS L I M I T E D O F F I C I A L U S E

3/3/67

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

HERewith NICK K. REPORTS HIS SOUNDINGS ON THE "NUMBER OF COUNTRIES" PROBLEM. DESPITE THESE HOPES, I HAVE INSTRUCTED GAUD TO PERSIST IN DEVELOPING FOR YOUR REVIEW A PHASE-DOWN PLAN IN THE SPIRIT OF THE CONGRESS' INJUNCTION DURING THE LAST SESSION.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NUMBER OF COUNTRIES PROBLEM IN AID PROGRAM

WE HAVE CONTACTED, PERSONALLY, MEMBERS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE ABOVE PROBLEM. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO GET AN ACCURATE HEAD COUNT AT THIS POINT SINCE MOST MEMBERS WILL NOT PRESENTLY COMMIT THEMSELVES.

I HAD A LONG TALK WITH SENATOR FULBRIGHT AND HE WAS QUITE MODERATE AND NOT INCLINED TO BELABOR HIS VIEW ALTHOUGH I THINK IT WOULD BE A BIT MUCH TO EXPECT HIM TO ABANDON IT. SENATORS MORSE AND CLARK, WHO HAVE SUPPORTED HIM STRONGLY IN HIS POSITION, WERE LESS STRONG IN THEIR SUPPORT THAN PREVIOUSLY, BUT REMAIN COMMITTED WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION. SENATORS LAUSCHE, CARLSON, SPARKMAN, DODD AND CASE WERE OPPOSED TO THE LIMITATION. SENATORS GORE, HICKENLOOPER, WILLIAMS AND AIKEN ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION BUT UNCOMMITTED. SENATOR PELL TENDED TOWARDS FULBRIGHT AS DOES SENATOR COOPER.

I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE IF WE CONTINUE TO WORK AT IT, THAT WE CAN ELIMINATE OR MODIFY THE COUNTRY LIMITATION IN THE SENATE. AS YOU KNOW, DOC MORGAN IS STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF ITS ELIMINATION. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I SHOULD THINK, AT A MINIMUM, WE COULD HOLD THE PRESENT DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY IN THE BILL.

RESPECTFULLY,

S/ NICK KATZENBACH

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

DTG 03/2323Z MAR 1967

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



76  
SENT  
WHCA

1967 MAR 4 18 28

EEA871  
OO WIZIO  
DE WTE 220

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE WH70060

UNCLAS

HEREWITH THE LITTLE WE NOW KNOW ABOUT U THANT AND THE BOYS  
FROM HANOI. HE IS NOW AIRBORNE AND WE SHALL NOT BE HEARING  
FOR A WHILE WHAT, IN FACT, WAS COMMUNICATED.

TEXT RANGOON 1156

IN HIS MEETING WITH THE PRESS UPON HIS DEPARTURE  
FROM RANGOON, U THANT, AFTER EXPRESSING THANKS TO BURMA,  
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO NE WIN AND FOREIGN MINISTER,  
MADE REMARKS SUBSTANTIALLY AS FOLLOWS:

IN MY PRIVATE CAPACITY AND NOT AS SECRETARY GENERAL  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS I VISITED THE CONSUL-GENERAL OF  
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM MARCH 2 AND HAD AN  
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH HIM AND TWO OFFICIALS FROM HANOI  
WHO HAPPENED TO BE IN RANGOON.

I PRESENTED MY OWN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN  
VIETNAM. THEY IN TURN GAVE ME THEIR ASSESSMENT. THE  
TALKS WERE VERY USEFUL.

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT  
RECEIVED ANY MESSAGE FROM HO CHI MINH, THAT THE MEETING  
LASTED THREE HOURS, AND THAT HE HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY  
MESSAGE FROM FRANCE WHILE IN RANGOON.

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE GIVEN AS  
SPOKEN:

QUESTION: WAS THIS THE FIRST MEETING WITH THE NORTH  
VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVES? ANSWER: IT IS NOT IN THE PUBLIC  
INTEREST TO DISCLOSE THE BACKGROUND OF MY TALKS WITH DIPLOMATS.

QUESTION: DID THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SOUND OPTIMISTIC?

ANSWER: IT IS DIFFICULT TO DESCRIBE THE VIEWS OF A DIPLOMAT  
IN A FEW MINUTES. THEIR VIEWS ARE WELL KNOWN.

QUESTION: WERE THEY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF  
PEACE?

ANSWER: IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE TO BE OPTIMISTIC FOR  
THE MOMENT.

THE ABOVE REPRESENTS ENTIRE SUBSTANCE OF PRESS CONFERENCE:

BYROAD

DTU: 04/1805Z MAR-1967

EXCERPT FROM QUICK COPY

67 MAR 4 PM 1:33

SATURDAY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Pres file*

77

SECRET

March 3, 1967

Mr. President:

Secretary McNamara reports to you in this memorandum on the past effectiveness of MAP in Indonesia in maintaining a non-Communist orientation among the key military now holding power. He notes the suspension of the program early in 1965 at the height of our difficulties with Sukarno, and its resumption last September after the dramatic political turnabout.

The MAP level for FY 67 is \$2-1/2 million. Secretary McNamara projects a level of \$6 million for FY 68, essentially for civic action equipment, spare parts and U.S. training. A CINCPAC team has just completed a survey in Indonesia on effective programming of the new MAP level.

The "New Order" leaders in Indonesia have given high priority to military civic action. They regard Ambassador Green's assurances of expanded MAP and our help in debt rescheduling and new foreign aid as votes of confidence, which they are, in their efforts to bring order out of chaos.

Secretary McNamara is now considering additional Congressional briefings to insure a smooth passage for Indonesian MAP.

*W. Rostow*

Att:

Memo dtd 1 Mar 67 from  
SecDef re "Effectiveness of  
U.S. Military Assistance to  
Indonesia"

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority State 113-8-79  
By 4/1/80, NARA, Date 4/24/91

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

77a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

1 MAR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Effectiveness of U.S. Military Assistance to Indonesia

General Suharto's assumption of the powers of the Presidency has dramatized the significant shift in Indonesia's political orientation that has been taking place during the past sixteen months. This shift began on October 1, 1965, when the Indonesian Army, led by General Suharto, put down a Communist-inspired coup d'etat and then proceeded to eliminate the three million member Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as an effective political organization. Having crushed the PKI, the Army turned to the more difficult job of stripping President Sukarno of political power and reorienting Indonesian foreign policy away from close association with Peking and toward accommodation with its neighbors and the United States. This process appears now to be entering its final stage; the Indonesian Army is nearing complete control of the Indonesian Government.

I believe that our Military Assistance Program to Indonesia during the past few years contributed significantly to the Army's anticommunist, pro-U.S. orientation and encouraged it to move against the PKI when the opportunity was presented. That the PKI was acutely aware of this instinctive opposition in the Army is shown by the fact that five of the six Army generals assassinated by the PKI on that fateful October 1 had received training in U.S. Army schools and were known friends of the United States. Moreover, after the Army had put down the revolt, the key jobs went to U.S.-trained officers. Suharto himself is not U.S.-trained, but all thirteen top members of his staff, the group that now governs Indonesia, received training in the United States under the Military Assistance Program. In my judgment, our decisions to invest roughly \$5 million to bring some 2100 Indonesian military personnel to the United States for training, and to continue the program even during the bleak years 1963-65 when Sukarno was carrying on confrontation against Malaysia and working closely with Peking, have been very significant factors in determining the favorable orientation of the new Indonesian political elite.

Our total MAP to Indonesia from 1950 through 1965 was \$63.2 million. Roughly \$59 million was given in the years 1959-1965. Two-thirds of this (\$40 million) went to the Army and included over 100,000 small arms, some 2,000 trucks and other vehicles, and tactical communications equipment. When Sukarno began his confrontation against Malaysia in 1963, we

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~SECRET~~

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-1264

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

By 19 Group 4 NARA, Date 3-27-91

~~SECRET~~

eliminated from the program items that contributed to Indonesia's offensive capability, but we continued to supply small arms for support of the Army's internal security capability.

In 1962 we expanded the MAP to include engineering equipment for the Army's civic action program. A total of \$3 million of such equipment was delivered between 1962 and 1964. The civic action program was the brain-child of General Nasution (now Chairman of the Consultative Assembly) and General Yani (one of the generals killed by the Communists in October 1965) who believed the Army needed programs that would improve its image with the Indonesian people vis-a-vis the PKI. Another aspect of the civic action program was to bring key younger Army officers to the United States for training (at Harvard, Syracuse, and several other institutions) to prepare them for high level management responsibilities. This training proved to be of great value when the Army assumed control of the government.

We suspended shipments of new equipment to Indonesia in September 1964. In March 1965 we cancelled the remainder of the program, except the training of those Indonesians already in the United States. Roughly \$23 million for equipment, services, and training was cancelled, and the funds were subsequently recouped. However, we maintained close contact with the Indonesian Army leadership through our military attaches and our Defense Liaison Group, which was retained on a skeletal basis even after the termination of MAP.

In September 1966, when the Army had isolated Sukarno and formally ended confrontation against Malaysia, we resumed the military training program for Indonesian officers (at a cost of \$400,000 in FY 67). The primary emphasis of this training is on increasing the civic action capability of the Indonesian Armed Forces. During this past week, we have decided to increase the FY 67 MAP by \$2 million in order to provide spare parts for previously supplied engineering equipment and also some new equipment -- all for the civic action program. In FY 68 we plan to give Indonesia \$6 million in MAP, primarily for support of the civic action program.

It would be presumptuous to claim that our military assistance and training were solely responsible for the anticommunist orientation of the Indonesian Army, or even that they were the major factors in causing the Indonesian Army to turn against the PKI and swing Indonesia away from its pro-Peking orientation. Nevertheless, I firmly believe that these programs, together with our continued sympathy and support for the Army, encouraged its leaders to believe that they could count on U.S. support when they turned on the PKI and, later, against Sukarno. Our firm policy in Vietnam has also played a part in forming Army attitudes favorable to our objectives in Southeast Asia. A year and a half ago, Indonesia posed an ominous threat to the U.S. and the Free World. Today, the prospect is dramatically altered for the better. General Suharto's government is steering Indonesia back toward a posture that promises peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

*Robert S. McNamara*

~~SECRET~~



## PROCESSING NOTE

Document #78 from NSF, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 23, box 14, a three-page memo to the President from Walt Rostow dated March, 10, 1967, had been misfiled in Volume 22. Volume 22 already had a properly identified #78, a one-page memo to the President from Rostow dated March 3, 1967. The three-page memo from March 10, 1967 was transferred to its proper location in Volume 23 on this date.

January 24, 2001

Shannon Jarrett  
Archives Specialist

Friday, March 3, 1967  
8:15 a.m.

*held for Pres. return  
3/7/67*

Mr. President:

You may have heard of this remarkable resolution of "commendation and esteem"; but I am sure you would wish to see it.

I understand from Sec. Rusk that the two members who did not sign are Reps. Gross and Don Fraser, one on the extreme right, one on the left.

*Committee on Foreign  
Affairs, House of  
Representatives*

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



Friday, March 3, 1967  
4:20 p.m.

77  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-350  
By ju, NARA, Date 9-3-92

Mr. President:

This dialogue between  
Amb. Goldberg, Ky and Thieu  
is interesting because: (1) Some  
of Ky and Thieu's observations are  
interesting and sensible; (2) I  
suspect they had quite an impact  
on the Ambassador.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 19425 - 2 Sections  
SECRET LIMDIS



SENT  
WHCA~~SECRET~~

1967 MAR 3 22 19

VZCZCEEA854

PP WTE10

DE WTE180

~~MODIS~~FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP67076~~EYES ONLY~~~~SECRET MODIS EYES ONLY~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

3/3/67

HEREWITH GEORGE DELICATELY EXPLORES WITH KIESINGER AND COMES UP TENTATIVELY WITH MAY. IS THAT AGREEABLE IN PRINCIPLE? IT SOUNDS RIGHT TO ME: THE PROSPECT WILL HELP US WITH MCCLOY AND OTHER NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS AND WE SHOULD HAVE THINGS IN PRETTY GOOD SHAPE BY MAY.

SUBJECT: KIESINGER VISIT

FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN ME LATE YESTERDAY OVER THE TELEPHONE BY THE UNDER SECRETARY, I SOUNDED OUT CHANCELLOR KIESINGER LAST EVENING ON THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE VISIT TO THE STATES. KNOWING THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SUBJECT, I WAS, AS I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN IN THE PAST, EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS. AS INSTRUCTED, I DID NOT PURPORT TO SPEAK EITHER FOR THE PRESIDENT OR THE GOVERNMENT, BUT ASSUMED PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MY REMARKS. OUR DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE ALONE AFTER A SMALL INFORMAL DINNER IN HONOR OF RETIRING CON GEN PAUL SWEET, AN OLD FRIEND OF THE KIESINGERS, WHICH WAS THE FIRST PRIVATE SOCIAL FUNCTION THE KIESINGERS, HAVE ATTENDED SINCE HE ASSUMED OFFICE. SINCE I HAVE KNOWN KIESINGER WELL FOR ALMOST FOUR YEARS OUR CONVERSATION WAS ON A VERY EASY AND CONFIDENTIAL BASIS.

2. I BEGAN BY ADVISING THE CHANCELLOR THAT I WANTED TO DISCUSS FRANKLY WITH HIM THE QUESTION OF HIS POSSIBLE VISIT TO THE STATES, IN LIGHT OF THE SPECULATION ON THIS QUESTION WHICH HAD EMERGED ON THE PRECEDING DAY IN THE GERMAN PRESS. NATURALLY, AS THE HEAD OF A COUNTRY WHICH IS SUCH A CLOSE FRIEND AND ALLY HE WOULD ALWAYS BE WELCOME IN THE STATES. WE HAVE NOT AS YET RAISED THE QUESTION OF A VISIT WITH HIM OFFICIALLY BECAUSE WE HAVE NOT WISHED TO APPEAR TO BE "RUSHING" HIM SO SOON AFTER HIS COMING INTO OFFICE. WE HAVE WANTED TO GIVE HIM AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-52

By 10, NARA Date 3-20-00

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



CARRY OUT HIS PLANNED VISIT TO FRANCE, TO ESTABLISH HIS REGIME AND TO EVOLVE HIS OWN POLICIES--WITHOUT APPARENT PRESSURE FROM US. WE HAD, MOREOVER, OBSERVED CERTAIN STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM TO THE EFFECT THAT HE WISHED TO DELAY HIS VISIT TO AMERICA UNTIL AFTER HE HAD ACHIEVED HIS MAIN LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVES. WHEN HE REACHES THE CONCLUSION THAT HE IS READY FOR A VISIT, AND THERE IS SOMETHING IMPORTANT THAT HE WISHES TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRESIDENT, I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF HE WOULD ADVISE ME. I WAS CONFIDENT THAT, ONCE A TIME SUITABLE FOR BOTH HIM AND THE PRESIDENT COULD BE FOUND, THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN ARRANGING THE VISIT.

3. KIESINGER RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT HE HAD NEVER INTENDED TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WISHED TO DELAY HIS VISIT TO AMERICA FOR ANY REASON CONNECTED WITH HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE US. HE RECOUNTED HIS LONG BACKGROUND OF GOOD RELATIONSHIPS WITH AMERICANS IN BONN AND STUTTGART AND HIS FREQUENT VISITS TO THE US TO SEE HIS DAUGHTER WHO IS MARRIED TO AN AMERICAN CITIZEN. WHEN HE CAME TO POWER HE HAD FELT A STRONG NECESSITY FOR OVERCOMING THE RESULTS OF THE "NEGLECT" IN GERMAN FRENCH POLICY, WHICH HE CONSIDERED HAD RESULTED FROM SCHROEDER'S CURIOUSLY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD TH FRENCH. HE HAD TO THIS END VISITED GEN DE GAULLE AND THEY HAD HAD A VERY FRANK DISCUSSION. HE HAD POINTED OUT TO DE GAULLE THE LIMITATIONS ON FRENCH AND GERMAN COOPERATION, AND HAD ADVISED DE GAULLE THAT GERMANY WOULD CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH THE US. DE GAULLE HAD RESPONDED TO THIS IN A RATHER CYNICAL WAY, I.E. THAT THE GERMANS WOULD ULTIMATELY COME TO THE FRENCH VIEW WITH RESPECT TO THE US; HOWEVER, HE WOULD NOT SEEK TO INFLUENCE THEM IN THIS RESPECT. KIESINGER SAID THAT HE REALLY DIDN'T KNOW WHETHER ANYTHING IMPORTANT WOULD COME OF GERMANY'S RELATIONS WITH FRANCE; HOWEVER, HE CONSIDERED IT IMPORTANT FOR ALL THAT HE MAKE AN EFFORT TO CONTINUE FRIENDLY RELATIONS. I ASSURED HIM THAT WE FULLY AGREED.

4. KIESINGER THEN SAID THAT, ASSUMING WE THOUGHT IT DESIRABLE, HE WANTED TO GO TO THE US. WHEN SHOULD HE GO? I REPLIED THAT I BELIEVED THIS TO BE A DECISION FOR HIM. WHEN DID HE FEEL THAT HE WOULD BE READY, IN TERMS OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLICIES AND ACTIONS OF HIS REGIME? HE REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT IT BEST TO GO BEFORE HIS NEXT MEETING WITH DE GAULLE, WHICH IS NOW SCHEDULED FOR JUNE. HE HAS, UP TO NOW, BEEN CONSOLIDATING HIS LEADERSHIP OVER THE COALITION GOVERNMENT. I GATHERED THAT HE FELT THIS HAD JUST ABOUT, BUT PERHAPS NOT QUITE YET, BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. THERE WERE CERTAIN HIGH PRIORITY PIECES OF LEGISLATION THAT HE WISHED TO SEE WELL LAUNCHED TOWARD PASSAGE. WHEN I ASKED HIM IF HE REFERRED TO THE EMERGENCY LEGISLATION, THE STABILIZATION LAW AND A NEW ELECTORAL LAW, HE NODDED. HE HOPED THAT ALL THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY MAY. IN SHORT, HE THOUGHT MAY WAS THE RIGHT TIME.

5. KIESINGER SAID THAT THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER US LEADERS SHOULD, IN HIS VIEW, BE TO PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A BROAD DISCUSSION ON LONG-RANGE PROBLEMS AND POLICIES OF THE WEST VIS-A-VIS THE COMMUNIST BLOC. HE REFERRED, AS AN EXAMPLE, TO THE DISCUSSIONS HELD IN THE BILDERBERG GROUP, WHICH HE ON ONE OCCASION ATTENDED. HE DID NOT WISH TO NEGOTIATE SPECIFIC ISSUES, SUCH AS THE OFFSET OF THE NPT. INDEED HE HOPED THAT BY THEN THE NPT WOULD BE SIGNED ON CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD BE CONSIDERED TO BE HONORABLE FOR GERMANY. (I THOUGHT IT INTERESTING THAT HE APPARENTLY REVEALED HIS EXPECTATION THAT THE NPT WOULD BE SIGNED.)

6. I ADVISED THE CHANCELLOR THAT I WOULD INFORM MY GOVERNMENT FULLY ON OUR CONVERSATION, PORTRAYING IT AS NOT BEING AN INITIATIVE ON HIS PART BUT AS A RESULT OF A FRANK DISCUSSION WHICH I HAD MYSELF RAISED.

COMMENT:

I BELIEVE THAT KIESINGER HAS NOW GONE AS FAR AS WE CAN EXPECT HIM TO GO IN SUGGESTING THAT HE VISIT THE US. IN VIEW OF THE UNCERTAINTIES WHICH HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED PRIVATELY AND IN THE PRESS AS TO WHETHER HE WOULD BE WELCOME, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD EXPECT HIM TO BE THE FIRST TO MAKE THE SUGGESTION PUBLICLY. TO DO SO WOULD, FROM HIS VIEWPOINT, POSSIBLY RESULT IN AN EMBARRASSING REBUFF OR DELAY. WE WOULD, IN ALMOST ANY NORMAL SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES, WELCOME A VISIT FROM A NEW GERMAN CHANCELLOR-- IN CONNECTION WITH HIS CALLS ON OTHER HEADS OF ALLIED STATES. OUR ONLY HESITANCY IN THE PAST HAS, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, ARISEN OUT OF THE UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING OUR RELATIONSHIP TO THE PREVIOUS ERHARD GOVT AND KIESINGER'S RELATIONSHIP TO DE GAULLE. SINCE KIESINGER HAS, I BELIEVE, IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH ME, REMOVED ANY BARRIERS ARISING OUT OF THESE ASSOCIATIONS FROM HIS STANDPOINT, I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD DO THE SAME AND SHOULD PROCEED TO EXTEND A NORMAL INVITATION FOR HIM TO VISIT THE PRESIDENT, AND ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT A SUITABLE DATE IN MAY. IT IS OBVIOUS, IN ANY EVENT, THAT THE VISIT MUST ULTIMATELY TAKE PLACE. AS SOON AS A DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO EXPLORE THE TIME, I WOULD HOPE THAT AN ANNOUNCEMENT COULD BE MADE BOTH IN BONN AND WASHINGTON TO THIS EFFECT. THIS WOULD, I BELIEVE, HAVE THE EFFECT OF "PRICKING THE BUBBLE" OF SPECULATION WHICH HAS GROWN TO SIZEABLE PROPORTIONS HERE, AND WOULD ENABLE US TO RESUME A MORE NORMAL RELATIONSHIP AS PREPARATIONS FOR THE VISIT GET UNDERWAY.

DTG 03/2049Z MAR 1967

GROUPS 1190 IMI 1190



SENT  
WHCA

1967 MAR 3 21 45

VZCZCEEA853  
PP VTE10  
DE VTE 181FROM W. W. ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP67077~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FRIDAY-MARCH 3, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM - W. W. ROSTOW

POSSIBLE MEETING WITH COUNCIL OF LATIN AMERICA

SOL LINOWITZ HAS CONTACTED BILL BARLOW, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF LATIN AMERICA. THE COUNCIL IS HOLDING A MEETING OF ITS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE IN WASHINGTON ON MONDAY, MARCH 6. HE AND SECRETARY RUSK WILL BE MEETING WITH THE GROUP ON MONDAY TO ENLIST THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE SUMMIT JOINT RESOLUTION.

BARLOW SAID HE WOULD ASK THE GROUP TO STAY OVER UNTIL TUESDAY IF THERE WERE A CHANCE TO MEET WITH YOU.

SOL INQUIRES WHAT HE SHOULD TELL BARLOW ABOUT THE PROSPECT FOR TUESDAY.

WILL SEE GROUP ON TUESDAY ----

WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SEE GROUP  
ON TUESDAY ----

DTG 03/2117Z MAR 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 3-27-91

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



Limited Official Use

Friday - March 3, 1967

Mr. President:

Bob Sayre informs us that former Ambassador Ted Achilles called him for advice on a Latin America tour by Governor Romney.

Achilles told him that Romney plans three foreign trips this year: to Latin America in May or June, and to Vietnam and Europe during the second half. In Latin America Romney is thinking of visiting Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic. Mexico would be covered in a side trip.

Not knowing your views on how forthcoming he should be in offering assistance, Bob limited his response to describing general conditions in the area and in individual countries.

Is there any particular line which you want State to take on further approaches by Romney's staff on his travel plans?

W. W. Rostow

cc: Bill Jorden  
Francis Bator

Limited Official Use



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-350  
By ju, NARA, Date 9-3-92

*Pres file*

83

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, March 3, 1967 -- 4:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Jorden's useful summary and analysis of Senator Kennedy's proposal and speech.

Despite Bob McNamara's reservations, it is, essentially, an A-B proposal of the kind we have made because he insists that all three elements must be considered together.

It differs, of course, in that we asked for a cessation of infiltration and expressed a willingness to cease augmentation of our forces, whereas the Senator's proposal is fuzzy and could mean that we do not "increase the rate" of infiltration or augmentation.

When that is said, technically, the basic political and psychological thrust of Senator Kennedy's proposal is: "Stop the bombing and let's see." I conclude that we are faced with two elements, then, one of which was dealt with by Sec. Rusk's brief statement, the other by Gen. Westmoreland, your press conference, and your letter to Senator Jackson.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

532  
**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NJ 91-350**  
By fw, NARA, Date 9-3-92

Friday, March 3, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW (EYES ONLY)

SUBJECT: RFK Speech -- Summary and Comments

The heart of the Kennedy proposal (page 5) is:

-- halt the bombardment of the North and say we are ready to negotiate "within the week;"

-- make it clear discussions cannot continue "for a prolonged period" without agreement that neither side will "substantially increase the size of the war in South Viet-Nam -- by infiltration or reinforcement;"

-- ask an international group to "inspect the borders and ports of the country to report any further escalation;"

-- under direction of the UN -- and with an international presence gradually replacing American forces -- "move toward a final settlement which allows all the major political elements in South Viet-Nam to participate in the choice of leadership and shape their future direction as a people."

(Comment: This is essentially what we have proposed to Hanoi. It has been rejected.)

Kennedy claims that "the evidence is mounting that our initiative can finally bring the negotiations we have sought for so long..."

(Comment: No "evidence" is cited except the claim that "the same message has come to us in recent weeks from friends and adversaries alike...")

Kennedy quotes Kosygin who said that the first step "to enable talks" would have to be "unconditional cessation of the bombing of and all other aggressive acts against (North Viet-Nam)..."

~~CONFIDENTIAL-EYES ONLY~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL-EYES ONLY~~

(Comment: The Kennedy proposal is precisely what the Soviets and North Vietnamese have repeatedly rejected, for the cessation of bombing he proposes is clearly "conditional.")

The "conditional" nature of the Kennedy proposal is made clear (page 6) when he says:

"If the passage of substantial time and events proves that our adversaries do not sincerely seek a negotiated solution, if discussions are used only as a pretext to enlarge the conflict in the South, then we can re-examine our entire military strategy -- including the bombing or the possible erection of a physical barrier to block infiltration -- in light of the changing nature of the war."

He says that the resumption of military action against the North -- after a "dedicated effort to secure peace" -- would have increased understanding and support of our allies and our own people.

He suggests the halt in action against the North "would not affect our attacks on the infiltration trails in Laos or on enemy forces in the South."

(Comment: So we would continue to bomb in friendly areas -- with all the destruction and casualties he deplores -- but not in the area of the primary enemy.)

On the objectives of bombing, Kennedy says:

First, we sought "to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Viet-Nam." On this, he says the introduction of 400,000 American troops is a more effective proof of our commitment and determination.

Second, quoting the President, he says we sought "to convince the leaders of North Viet-Nam... (that) we will not be defeated." That, too, he says, has been achieved by the effective action of our ground forces in the South.

Finally, our purpose was "to slow down aggression." He then quotes General Ridgway as saying air action cannot stop infiltration (which was not the purpose). More tellingly, he quotes Secretary McNamara as saying:

~~CONFIDENTIAL-EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL-EYES ONLY~~

"I don't believe the bombing up to the present has significantly reduced, nor any bombing that I would contemplate in the future would significantly reduce, the actual flow of men and materials to the South."

(Comment: We have overwhelming evidence from POW's that bombing has made infiltration incredibly more difficult and also has imposed heavy burdens on the movements of materiel from North to South. We have evidence that infiltration has dropped in recent months, and something is producing that result.)

Kennedy says that "it should be clear by now that the bombing of the North cannot bring an end to the war in the South..."

(Comment: Another "strawman;" this has been stated repeatedly by Administration officials.)

Kennedy quotes Prime Minister Wilson as saying last week that "one single simple act of trust could have achieved (peace)." He doesn't say that the missing act was by Hanoi, that it was Hanoi's failure to react to our initiatives that prevented movement.

Inspection machinery for a ceasefire is described as follows:

"As soon as we halt the bombing of the North -- international teams under the United Nations or, perhaps, a strengthened International Control Commission, should be asked to provide detached and objective information to the world about any large buildup of troops or supplies by our adversaries."

(Comment: We have repeatedly pressed for a strengthening of the ICC machinery to no avail. The ICC has never been able to operate freely in North Viet-Nam. Surely if any inspection or control machinery were to be effective in watching infiltration, it would have to be free to look at training camps and roads and supply channels in the North. Kennedy does not address this problem. Nor does he confront the matter of numbers. The South Vietnamese have about 700,000 men under arms -- in all categories. We have 400,000-plus. Yet this large force has not been able to observe or prevent effective infiltration of men and supplies. Where is the ICC -- or the UN -- going to get the hundreds of thousands of men who would be required to do an effective policing job? Hanoi has demonstrated contempt for both the ICC and UN. When we proposed to strengthen the ICC in Cambodia, the Soviets turned

~~CONFIDENTIAL-EYES ONLY~~



CONFIDENTIAL-EYES ONLY

it down. So the record provides no basis for confidence that we can get effective controls through the methods suggested. In any case, the whole problem of inspection and control has been repeatedly explored within the Government and this, like so much in the Kennedy speech, opens no new avenues.)

Kennedy's third point is that "we must know and clearly state what kind of Viet-Nam we would like to see emerge from negotiations, and how we propose these general objectives could be best achieved."

His basic political formula is:

"All the people of South Viet-Nam, communist and non-communist, Buddhist and Christian, should be able to choose their leaders, and seek office through peaceful political processes, free from external coercion and internal violence. All should have the opportunity to seek peacefully a share of power and responsibility through free elections."

He says we should encourage the present government -- including the Constituent Assembly -- to begin discussions with the Liberation Front.

(Comment: The key element here, of course, is the inclusion of communists in the political process. This is a matter that has been discussed intensively here and has been raised in Saigon in at least tentative fashion. There is very strong resistance among many Vietnamese to any direct dealing with the Front and to the inclusion of an openly communist party in the political process. In any case, this most sensitive issue can only be resolved by the Vietnamese themselves.)

(Kennedy pays little attention to the political advances that have already been made. He does not seem to sense that the process of political development is well underway -- or at least prefers to ignore this fundamental element in current Vietnamese life. When he says "we must first encourage a free political process among non-communist South Vietnamese," he simply closes his eyes to all that has been happening over the past year.)

He says that "a communist state can no longer be assumed to be the automatically obedient instrument of expanding Russian or Chinese power."

CONFIDENTIAL-EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL-EYES ONLY~~

(Comment: No one who has been working on this problem over the past few years makes this assumption.)

\* \* \*

Some overall comments on the Kennedy speech:

On the basic proposal --

We have made this proposal to Hanoi, both directly and indirectly. We offered to stop the bombing in return for their ending infiltration. We offered to do this in phased fashion -- with the bombing halt preceding their reaction. We offered, in addition, to halt any increase in the size of our forces in the South. We have also offered to talk -- secretly or openly, anywhere, anytime.

And Hanoi has rejected these proposals -- flatly, firmly.

As soon as the Senator says we would be free to resume military action, including bombing, against the North if it did not deal in good faith, he abandons the "unconditional cessation" that Hanoi, Kosygin and others have repeatedly stated is the essential requirement.

It will be interesting to see Hanoi's comment on the Senator's speech. They will probably either pick up his passage on page 6 -- about our resuming action if Hanoi shows bad faith -- and lambast his speech as merely another restatement of the "arrogant" U.S. position, or focus on his call for an end of bombing in hopes of further stimulating support -- here and abroad -- for their basic position. The communist propaganda apparatus is perfectly capable of exploiting both these elements, and I would guess they would do so.

On the general tone and content --

I am reminded of Marc Antony's funeral oration -- in which he praised Brutus but thoroughly damned him. The speech pays lip service to the Administration's policy, but undermines that policy in obvious ways. I am also reminded of the Nixon technique -- constantly raising old issues as new issues, and raising as issues things which are not in dispute at all.

~~CONFIDENTIAL-EYES ONLY~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL-EYES ONLY~~

One striking feature of the speech is the total lack of mention of Ho Chi-minh or of the repeated hard statements of Hanoi's position. Everyone from the Pope to Kosygin is mentioned -- but not Ho. Yet Ho's letter to the Pope is the most authoritative answer to the proposals he sets forth.

I am also struck by the lack of reference to all the encouraging progress that has been made in South Viet-Nam in developing a new and constitutionally-based political life.

As a strictly personal judgement, I cannot read this speech as a serious and responsible effort to grasp the real problems of Viet-Nam or to move in the direction of a realistic settlement. I read it as a clever political move to keep the Senator in the forefront of foreign affairs. Of course, the more elaborate and intensive the efforts to respond in great detail, the more that political cause is supported.

I think the President's statement yesterday, the letter to Senator Jackson, and Secretary Rusk's statement cover the ground effectively, and sufficiently.

*Bill*  
William J. Jordan

~~CONFIDENTIAL-EYES ONLY~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Pres. file

84

March 3, 1967

Mr. President:

The attached annex to the morning report prepared by Dick Helms' people was a little too long to transmit by wire, but I did think you would want to see it, even if a little late.

*W. Rostow*  
W. Rostow



~~SECRET~~

84a

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-55

By CB, NARA Date 1-22-01

Egyptian-Saudi Tensions

Nasir and Faysal are again on a collision course. This could bring within the year major hostilities between Egypt and the Saudi monarchy, to which the US is closely linked.

This seemingly inevitable movement toward disaster began five years ago in Yemen, when Egyptian intelligence operatives helped some Yemeni army officers replace a [redacted] religious monarchy with an [redacted] republic. Unhappily for Nasir, the Yemeni monarchy was not destroyed. Instead, the ruler took to the hills with his family and tribal supporters, where with Saudi arms, money, and food, he launched a guerrilla campaign that has sputtered along with reasonable effect ever since.

Over the years, Nasir has found it an expensive proposition to keep the Yemen republic alive. At one time he had 70,000 troops there, sustained by substantial Soviet assistance. Only about half as many are there now, but this reflects a shift in Egyptian emphasis toward greater use of Soviet-supplied airpower and terror tactics, and not a decision by Nasir to cut his losses.

The Egyptians have been stepping up their air attacks recently, [redacted] On 27 January, they bombed with high explosives the Saudi border town of Najran used by the Yemeni royalists as a supply base. The Nasirites have also begun terrorist bomb attacks within Saudi Arabia itself.

The Saudis are not taking this lying down. Their [redacted] military establishment is being shored up with US Hawk missiles--a battery has already been sent to the southern border area--as well as British surface-to-air missiles. [redacted]

All in all, the recent Egyptian provocations seem only to have strengthened Faysal's resolve that if Nasir ever does quit Yemen, he will not do so in triumph. Faysal is on the point of "unleashing" guerrilla warfare.

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs  
(S)

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs  
(S)

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs  
(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Patient spadework begun by Ambassador Bunker in 1962 helped prepare the ground for the Agreement of Jidda in 1965. Under this accord, the Yemeni factions would form a government, the Egyptians would pull out, and the Saudis would pack away the Yemeni royal family in mothballs. The compromise soon broke down, however, with each side blaming the other. But the main reason was that Nasir saw his Yemeni assets slipping away from him just when he had spotted a new opening developing for him as the British announced their intention to leave Aden. They will probably be out of Aden within a year, leaving chaos behind them. Nasir has already trained a "liberation army" to fill the vacuum. [REDACTED]

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs

(S)

When Bunker began his good offices, the interested parties could view the US as an objective, if not completely neutral, mediator. Now they do not. As recently as last week, Nasir publicly accused us of about every sin in the book. At this juncture he views the US as the moving spirit behind his current list of self-appointed enemies--Faysal, King Husayn, and the Shah of Iran. [REDACTED]

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs

(S)

What makes the Egyptian-Saudi collision course especially worrisome is that it comes at a time when the British, who have in effect policed the area for a century, are pulling out. No one has volunteered to take their place.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

3/3/67

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

Herewith George delicately explores with Kiesinger and comes up tentatively with May. Is that agreeable in principle? It sounds right to me: the prospect will help us with McCloy and other negotiations in the next several months and we should have things in pretty good shape by May.

(repeat attached, Bonn 10199)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By CB, NARA, Date 10-21-98

86  
~~Long~~  
2. Pres file

Thursday - March 2, 1967

Mr. President:

You asked for an evaluation of and reply to Senator Jordan's letter on cotton textiles (Tab C).

Senator Jordan makes three points in his letter:

- The American textile industry and, in particular, the sales yarn producers were heavily involved in meeting U.S. Armed Services requirements during 1966.
- This major effort by our textile industry produced a real cotton shortage in 1966, with the result that foreign suppliers moved in to the tight supply situation with large quantities of yarn and obtained higher prices for their yarn than the prices charged by American spinners. (This was due to their ability to deliver quickly while American spinners were filling contracts fixed at lower prices.)
- The entire U.S. textile industry is "greatly distressed and will continue to be in trouble unless there is an immediate cutback" in US textile imports and you should give active and immediate support in bringing about a reduction.

The first two points are reflections of the facts which you supplied the Senator in the White House memorandum of February 18 (Tab B). With respect to the third point, the answer lies in the fact that cotton imports have declined from a peak of 10.3 million pounds in September 1966 to 4/5 million pounds in January of this year. Tony Solomon tells me that it is reasonably certain that the imports of yarn during 1967 will be substantially below the 1966 level.

With your approval, I propose to send the letter at Tab A to Senator Jordan in reply to his letter to you of February 21.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments - Tabs A, B, C.

Approve letter ✓. Disapprove letter \_\_\_\_\_. Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_.  
*orig copies sent to Central Files*

11:15pm, 3/4/67 Marie Fehner  
telephoned from Ranch.



+ : A      E6a

Dear Senator Jordan:

The President has asked me to write you concerning your letter of February 21 on the cotton textile problem.

I have noted your concern over the large imports of cotton yarn during 1966. You are essentially correct in your analysis of the events in the United States yarn market this past year which led to the large increase in the import of cotton yarns. A real shortage of sales yarn did develop and, as is always the case in such situations, the shortage produced an increase in both prices and imports.

With the alleviation of the short supply situation that existed in 1966, cotton yarn imports are now declining. They reached a peak around September at 10.3 million pounds. Imports in January 1967 were down to 4.5 million pounds. It is reasonably certain that imports of yarn in 1967 will be substantially below the 1966 level.

You may be sure that we will continue to watch this situation carefully.

Sincerely yours,

W. W. Rostow

Honorable B. Everett Jordan

United States Senate

Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday, February 18, 1967; 1:30 PM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Subject: Cotton yarn situation

You asked to be filled in on the current state of the cotton yarn market, pursuant to a distress call from the Hill.

Cotton yarn is one of the products most affected by Vietnam requirements. Overall, 1966 was a boom year for the industry, featuring a 300 million-pound (about 6%) surge in demand. Needs were so great and domestic productive capacity so fully utilized that we agreed to a number of one-shot increases in yarn import quotas. However, the market weakened noticeably in December and January. Prices dropped, order backlogs decreased, mill work weeks were cut (though usually only from six days to five), and there were some Christmas layoffs of as long as a week.


Though current numbers are not yet available, industry people seem to think that the trough bottomed in January, and that we are now in a mild upswing. The Government is watching the situation carefully, and making no more quota exceptions. In addition we are actively negotiating for restraints on imports from Mexico, the only major supplier not covered by the Long-Term Textile Arrangement. The specifics are as follows:

1. Yarn availabilities during 1966 totaled about 4.7 billion pounds, of which about 100 million pounds were imported. Domestic production was up more than 100 million pounds over 1965, and supplied the bulk of the 300 million-pound growth in demand.
2. Mostly because of the one-shot allowances mentioned above, imports nearly quadrupled in 1966 (from 24 million pounds to about 100 million). A great deal came from Mexico; the other major foreign supplier is Brazil.
3. It is generally agreed that this rise in imports was necessary if military requirements were to be met, because U.S. productive capacity was stretched to the maximum.
4. Sales and prices fell off sharply in December and January. Mill consumption fell from the 1966 peak of 37,500 bales a day in October to 36,100 bales in December (though still well above the 35,000 bales a day consumed in October 1965). It is not clear what factors influenced this softening. The industry cites a general weakening in textiles, tight money, inventory reduction, import competition, and earlier overstocking in fear of future price increases.



5. Imports also dropped sharply in the last quarter of 1966, from 11 million pounds in July to less than 7 million in December. (They still ran well above 1965, however.)
6. The Interagency Textile Administrative Committee (ITAC) has kept close tabs on the situation through its monthly meetings with the Management-Labor Textile Advisory Committee, and through a special meeting with people from the yarn industry on January 25. As a result, ITAC is granting no further one-shot allowances and we are pushing ahead with the Mexican negotiations:
7. The trade press and spokesmen for the textile industry now indicate that things have begun to look up:
  - Thursday's Daily News Record contains a generally optimistic report.
  - The America's Textile Reporter noted on February 9 that yarn sales seem to be on the upswing and spinners and selling agents are convinced the price decline has ended. (Prices in the first week of February were still about 3¢ a pound below 1966 highs.)
  - W. J. Erwin, board chairman of Dan River Mills and President of the American Textile Manufacturers Institute said in a speech Thursday that the industry seems to be recovering nicely after a necessary period of adjustment following several years of sustained growth.

I think the Erwin statement is precisely correct. And that impression is confirmed when one looks at such statistics as Dan River's recent balance sheet -- sales up 14% in 1966, earnings up more than 11%.



United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

February 21, 1967

MA  
To Robert  
for evaluation  
of reply  
Q  
Dear Mr. President:

I appreciate your note of yesterday containing the memorandum on the subject of cotton yarns, which you asked to be returned, and which is in reply to the information I left with you last week regarding the fantastic increase of imports of cotton yarn into this country.

There is one thing that I would like to stress and this can be very easily verified. When the Vietnam situation required an immediate and drastic increase in textiles for the Armed Services, the domestic textile manufacturers immediately diverted all of the production that the Armed Services required and just as fast as the mills could convert to the military requirements.

Naturally, this took a great deal of the production of the American mills away from the domestic markets which did provide a ready market for increased imports of textiles of all description into the United States.

The foreign countries, largely Brazil and Mexico, which had not been exporting yarns into the United States in prior years took advantage of this tight situation and moved in with huge quantities of yarn and glutted the American market. I have purchase invoices to prove that in a great many cases while the domestic consumer manufacturers of textiles were short on yarns and other textiles due to the war effort, the foreign mills made up this shortage charging the domestic mills more for the imported yarn than the American mills were charging their customers for the same item on whatever production they had to allot to the American manufacturer.



The President


-2-

February 21, 1967

In short, the foreign competitors not only grabbed a big portion of the domestic market, but they also overcharged the mills who bought the imported textiles when really they should have been selling it much cheaper as they get cotton at the same price our mills get it, but the main thing is their labor is a small fraction of the American manufacturer's labor cost.

The entire textile industry is greatly distressed and will continue to be in trouble unless there is an immediate cutback in the amount of textiles allowed to come into the United States, and your active and immediate support in bringing about this reduction is vital and will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

  
B. Everett Jordan, USS

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - March 2, 1967 -- 7:00 pm

Mr. President:

This is Sol Linowitz's first report on his efforts to gain support for the Joint Resolution on the Summit. It is encouraging. He is charging hard on this one.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 3-27-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



872

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 2, 1967

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Conferences with Senators Mansfield and  
Hickenlooper Regarding Proposed Joint  
Congressional Resolution on Summit

Pursuant to your instructions, I met this afternoon first with Senator Mansfield and then with Senator Hickenlooper to discuss the proposed Congressional Resolution regarding the Latin American Presidents' Conference.

Senator Mansfield told me that he thought the Resolution was fine and that he would be pleased to introduce it. He proposed that Senator Dirksen be a co-sponsor and suggested that I talk to Senator Dirksen about it.

Senator Mansfield thought that the \$1.5 billion figure in the Resolution might raise questions, but felt that the Resolution should be introduced in its present form. He urged that I talk to Senators Fulbright and Morse about it and I have made arrangements to do so. In Senator Mansfield's judgment the Resolution will have good support in the Senate if Senators Dirksen, Hickenlooper, Fulbright and Morse are for it.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12858,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

CONFIDENTIAL

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12858,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY ry ON 4-17-91

BY ry ON 4-17-91

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Then I met with Senator Hickenlooper. (Senator Smathers, the other Senatorial Member of the Buenos Aires Delegation, was to have been present but last minute developments made it impossible for him to join us.)

Senator Hickenlooper told me that he felt some real progress had been made at the Buenos Aires Conference. In connection with the Resolution, he first raised some questions as to certain of the specific provisions. He said that he thought the \$1.5 billion figure would precipitate considerable discussion and debate. We talked about an hour, and then Senator Hickenlooper indicated that he would be glad to go along with the Resolution in its present form and even volunteered to sponsor it. He did say, however, that if there were significant opposition to the inclusion of the \$1.5 billion figure in Paragraph 5 he would probably recommend that that paragraph be deleted. I told him that we would cooperate with him to insure the greatest bipartisan support for the Resolution. Senator Hickenlooper said that he would talk to Senator Dirksen about the Resolution and was confident he "would go along". He urged me to talk to Senators Fulbright and Morse, and I told him I would do so and would then advise him.

On Friday morning, I'll be seeing Congressmen Selden and Mailliard and also Congressman Reuss. In the afternoon I have an appointment with Senator Dirksen and a tentative appointment with Senator Fulbright.



Sol M. Linowitz

CONFIDENTIAL



88

Thursday, March 2, 1967  
1:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the draft for  
Senator Jackson you requested. It  
was cleared <sup>in detail</sup> by telephone with  
Sec. McNamara.

W. W. Rostow

88a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March <sup>1</sup>~~2~~, 1967

Dear Senator Jackson:

*(1st sentence was changed)*  
In further reference to our discussion of the reasons for and effects of bombing North Viet Nam I wish to set down for you the following.

We are bombing North Viet Nam because it is violating two solemn international agreements. In 1954 Hanoi agreed that North Viet Nam would not be "used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy."

In 1962 Hanoi agreed to withdraw all its military forces from Laos; to refrain from reintroducing such forces; and not to use the territory of Laos to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

Let me quote to you the recommendation made by General Maxwell Taylor to President Kennedy in his report of November 3, 1961, after Hanoi had violated the Geneva Declaration of 1954 but before the Geneva Declaration of 1962 was finally negotiated.

"While we feel that the program recommended represents those measures which should be taken in our present knowledge of the situation in Southeast Asia, I would not suggest that it is the final word. Future needs beyond this program will depend upon the kind of settlement we obtain in Laos and the manner in which Hanoi decides to adjust its conduct to that settlement. If the Hanoi decision is to continue the irregular war declared on South Viet-Nam in 1959 with continued infiltration and covert support of guerrilla bands in the territory of our ally, we will then have to decide whether to accept as legitimate the continued guidance, training and support of a guerrilla war across an international boundary, while the attacked react only inside their borders. ....

"It is my judgment and that of my colleagues that the United States must decide how it will cope with Khrushchev's 'wars of liberation' which are really para-wars of guerrilla aggression. This is a new and dangerous Communist technique



which bypasses our traditional political and military responses. While the final answer lies beyond the scope of this report, it is clear to me that the time may come in our relations to Southeast Asia when we must declare our intention to attack the source of guerrilla aggression in North Viet-Nam and impose on the Hanoi Government a price for participating in the current war which is commensurate with the damage being inflicted on its neighbors to the south. "

Not for one day after the Geneva Declaration of 1962 was signed did Hanoi meet its commitment or honor its earlier commitment of 1954. Aggression against South Viet Nam was continued throughout 1962, 1963, and 1964. Its forces were never withdrawn from Laos and Laos was violated in order to attack South Viet Nam.

When I became President and surveyed the problem faced by our nation, I reserved judgment on the decision which General Taylor forecast in 1961 we might have to make. But the fact was that the North Vietnamese continued illegally to infiltrate arms and men across international frontiers. And in 1964 they radically expanded this course of action. The trails became roads. Bands of infiltrators became regular military units.

Neither of the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference -- Great Britain and the Soviet Union -- proved able to stop this violation; nor did the three members of the International Control Commission -- India, Canada, and Poland.

With this failure of the international machinery designed to enforce the Geneva agreements we were thrown back, therefore, on our treaty responsibilities. Under the SEATO Treaty, presented to the Senate by President Eisenhower and ratified overwhelmingly, we had agreed that in the face of "armed attack in the treaty area" we would "act to meet the common danger. "

By February 1965 it was unmistakably clear there was armed attack in the most literal sense: South Viet Nam was almost lost to that armed attack. And in that month, on the

recommendation of the National Security Council, I decided that we had to "meet the common danger" by bringing our air power to bear against the source of the aggression.

We never believed aerial attack on North Viet Nam would, alone, end the war. We did, however, have three objectives.

The first was to back our fighting men and our fighting allies by demonstrating that the aggressor could not illegally bring hostile arms and men to bear against them from the security of a sanctuary.

Second, we sought to impose on North Viet Nam a cost for violating its international agreements.

Third, we sought to limit or raise the cost of bringing men and supplies to bear against the South.

All three of these important objectives have been achieved.

First, you should note that the military leaders now responsible for the safety and morale of our men in the field, without exception, back our bombing of the North. The same is true of the military and political leaders of those fighting side by side with us; that is to say, the leaders of Australia, Korea, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. They all know that it is right and necessary for us to refuse to accept North Viet Nam as a sanctuary at a time when the government in Hanoi is explicitly violating its international commitments and conducting aggression across international borders.

Second, we are, with remarkably limited cost in civilian lives, imposing a major cost on North Viet Nam for its violation of international agreements.

Our attacks on military targets in North Viet Nam have diverted about half a million men to cope with effects of our attacks. They are repairing the lines of supply and are engaged in anti-aircraft and coastal defense. This figure approximates the total number of men we now have fighting in Southeast Asia. It is not much less than the number of men



South Viet Nam has had to mobilize to deal with the guerrilla attack in the South.

At the cost of about 500 gallant American airmen killed, captured, or missing, we are bringing to bear on North Viet Nam a burden roughly equivalent to that which the Communists are imposing through guerrilla warfare on the South -- and we are doing it with far fewer civilian casualties in the North.

Finally, the bombing of North Viet Nam has raised the cost of bringing an armed man or a ton of supplies illegally across the border from the North to the South. Substantial casualties are inflicted on infiltrators and substantial tonnages of supplies are destroyed en route. Those who now reach the South arrive after harassment which lowers their effectiveness as reinforcements.

The bombing in the North is an action undertaken by your Government only after the most careful reflection. It is a response to a serious and systematic and protracted violation of international agreements. It is having significant consequences for those who chose to violate the agreements. It is an integral part of our total policy which aims not to destroy North Viet Nam but to force Hanoi to end its aggression so that the people of South Viet Nam can determine their own future without coercion.

Both the reasons for -- and the results of -- the bombing of North Viet Nam make it imperative that we continue to use this instrument of support for our men and our allies. It will end when the other side is willing to take equivalent action as part of a serious effort to end this war and bring peace to the people of Southeast Asia.

I take no satisfaction from the number of infiltrators killed on their way to South Viet Nam, from the number of trucks or of boats or of railroad cars destroyed or the tons of supplies destroyed. I take no satisfaction from the suffering of the people of North Viet Nam. I take no satisfaction from the fact that they have had to abandon their plans for economic and social development. I repeat what I said in Baltimore in

April 1965 -- I look forward to the day when the government and people of North Viet Nam can join, in peace, their fellows in Southeast Asia in developing and modernizing that region so full of energy and resources and promise. And on that day they will have -- if they wish -- the support of the United States in providing for their people an environment of progress. But right now I wish friend and neutral and adversary to know that we shall persist with our operations in the South -- we shall persist with our operations in the North -- until those who launched this aggression are prepared to move seriously to reinstall the agreements whose violation has brought the scourge of war to Southeast Asia.

Sincerely,

15/ LBJ

Honorable Henry M. Jackson  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

82  
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 2, 1967

Dear Andrew:

Your father made available to me a portion of your letter to him about India.


I was moved by your compassion and distress for what it means for hundreds of millions of people to be enmeshed in poverty and ignorance and fear. It is good to know that there are young Americans who have stared these facts in the face.

It is a source of basic strength to our nation that the Peace Corps is giving our young people a chance to see and understand the world as it really is and to share the adventures and hopes and frustrations of human beings on every continent.

I am grateful your father was thoughtful enough to share your thoughts with me.

You have my best wishes in your present work and in the years that lie ahead.

Sincerely,



Mr. Andrew Kilpatrick  
Behind Dr. Samads' Bungalow  
Audra Bridge  
Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh,  
India



~~Transp~~  
2. Pres file

Thursday, March 2, 1967  
6:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Marvin Watson suggested that  
I draft for you a letter to the son of  
Carroll Kilpatrick.

W. W. Rostow

90a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 2, 1967

Dear Andrew:

Your father made available to me a portion of your letter to him about India.

I was moved by your compassion and distress for what it means for hundreds of millions of people to be enmeshed in poverty and ignorance and fear. It is good to know that there are young Americans who have stared these facts in the face.

It is a source of basic strength to our nation that the Peace Corps is giving our young people a chance to see and understand the world as it really is and to share the adventures and hopes and frustrations of human beings on every continent.

I am grateful your father was thoughtful enough to share your thoughts with me.

You have my best wishes in your present work and in the years that lie ahead.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Andrew Kilpatrick  
Behind Dr. Samads' Bungalow  
Audra Bridge  
Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh,  
India

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, March 1, 1967  
4:50 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry H. Wilson, Jr.

Carroll Kipppatrick has a son who for nearly two years now has been with the Peace Corps in India.

Carroll showed me with some pride the attached excerpt of a letter from his son. The boy's name is Andrew.

The excerpt is mildly interesting.

I send it to you because it seems to me that it would mean a great deal to Carroll if you let him know you had seen it.

Attachment



Jabalpur, M.P. Feb. 14, 1967

"...They say one comes away from India loving it or hating it. I will come away with neither feeling. I do not love India, and there is very little here that I value. It will always be on my mind though how bad things can get. I have sympathy for the country. I wish I could help, but I also know ~~really~~ that I don't have the ability or the patience really to help these people, and very few care about helping themselves. It is rather frightening to feel that here is almost a hopeless problem. I believe as firmly as ever in the Peace Corps, but I think India will always really remain like some unreal nightmare that will come back in my deepest thoughts throughout my ~~lifetime~~ lifetime. I can say that the people of Ceylon, Nepal and Thailand - the ones I met - are fine people, and I have a lot of hope for those countries. I can only say that I have respect for a few dedicated Indians. The others are so lost in the maze of the heat and Hinduism and poverty and ignorance and fear that they don't seem really to be human beings. This is all the more reason to help them, and it is so difficult. They are the saddest people, and this is the most forlorn land I ever hope to see. These are my thoughts some of the time. Sometimes things go all right, and I think it has every hope of pulling through. I think two years here is enough though, because you can lose perspective on the rest of the world by thinking about India all the time."

Andrew K. Patrick

Thurs., March 2, 1967  
11:30 a.m.

91

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a [redacted]  
evaluation of civilian casualties in the  
North that sounds more like us than  
Harrison Salisbury. Should I leak it?

25X1A

~~1. Susp~~  
2. Pres file

W. W. R.

SECRET attachment [redacted]

25X1A

SANITIZED  
Authority NLS 019-014-1-62  
By CP, NARA, Date 12-13-01

91a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Y  
(C)

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC ~~XXX~~ ~~XXX~~ SDO ONE OCR ORR ~~DOE~~ ~~DOE~~ CIA/NMCC

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.O. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

1 23 07 Z

CITE

DIST 1 MARCH 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI

SUBJECT BOMB DAMAGE IN NORTH VIETNAM

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-55  
By CB, NARA Date 1-22-01

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

ACQ

FIELD NO.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

SOURCE

1. NORTH VIETNAM IS NOT SUFFERING PARTICULARLY AS A RESULT OF THE US BOMBINGS. ECONOMIC AND CIVILIAN LOSSES ARE RATHER ACCIDENTAL AND SMALL. THE BOMBING RAIDS ARE DIRECTED MAINLY AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS AND TRANSPORT. DURING A BOMBING RAID ON THE SUBURBS OF HANOI A TRANSPORT BATTALION WAS HIT. A VILLAGE NEAR HANOI WHICH WAS BURNED DURING A BOMBING RAID WAS A LARGE POL STORAGE CENTER. SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY BATTERIES ARE FREQUENTLY CONCEALED BY SIMPLE BAMBOO HUTS. VARIOUS

REPRESENTATIVES IN NORTH VIETNAM HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO FIND EVIDENCE THAT CIVILIANS WERE BEING DELIBERATELY BOMBED.

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Y  
(C)

TRANSPORTATION COLUMNS ARE OFTEN CAMOUFLAGED IN NORTH VIETNAMESE

~~SECRET~~  
(classification) (dis)



~~SECRET~~  
(classification)

SETTLEMENTS, AND THEY BECOME THE TARGETS OF BOMBING RAIDS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THERE ARE FIRES IN THE VILLAGES AND CIVILIAN LOSSES. THE PRECISION OF THE BOMBING IS VERY HIGH.

2. FIELD DISSEM: NONE

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)~~SECRET~~  
(classification)

*Pres file* 92

Thursday, March 2, 1967  
5:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith:

1. The CIA bombing balance sheet.
2. Our ten point factual statement.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

①

92a

THE PROS AND CONS OF THE BOMBING  
OF NORTH VIETNAM

I. Positive Effects of Bombing

A. Manpower Drain\*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-348  
By ing, NARA, Date 12-10-92

1. The airstrikes have tied up from 600,000 to 700,000 North Vietnamese people. The major categories are:

a. About 220,000 full-time and 100,000 to 200,000 part-time workers have been diverted to repair, reconstruction, dispersal, and transport programs.

b. About 150,000 persons are involved in part-time civil defense activities.

c. About 83,000 military personnel, or 20 percent of North Vietnam's military strength, are directly engaged in air defense activities; an additional 27,500 personnel are indirectly involved.

d. An estimated 20,000 to 25,000 personnel are directly involved in full-time coastal defense duties.

2. These diversions of manpower have limited North Vietnam's capability for sustained large-scale conventional military operations against South Vietnam.

3. The manpower shortage has also contributed substantially to a shortfall of from 5 to 10 percent in agricultural production and caused sharp increases in North Vietnam's food import requirements.

4. The North Vietnamese population has sustained from 36,000 to 38,000 casualties, of whom about 12,000 were military

---

\* Latest estimates and, therefore, higher than Secretary McNamara's 1 March press release.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

personnel. Most of the civilian casualties (at least two-thirds) are of a war-related nature -- for example, workers engaged in the repair of bomb damage, and truck drivers on logistic supply lines.

B. Military Effects

1. Air attacks have destroyed or inactivated significant percentages of total national capacity in direct military or war-supporting target categories. These include:

<u>Target Category</u>	<u>Percent of National Capacity Destroyed</u>
Barracks	23
Ammunition depots	69
Petroleum storage	55
Electric power	30 to 45
Explosives manufacturing	71
Radar sites	43

2. Additional significant destruction of airfields, naval bases, SAM sites, bridges, and communication facilities has taken place.

3. North Vietnamese prisoners tell us the bombing of North Vietnam and the Laotian Panhandle makes the infiltration of South Vietnam very difficult. A graphic picture of what infiltrators go through because of airstrikes is portrayed in the captured diary of a North Vietnamese soldier, Corporal Tap, who marched south last year. During a six-week trip down the Ho Chi Minh trail, Corporal Tap's unit was struck twice by American aircraft, and raids hit nearby on four other occasions. His unit usually had to travel at night without lights. As a result, men stumbled and fell, and often had to eat uncooked food. Once he broke regulations and lit a fire; just as he did so a reconnaissance plane zoomed overhead at treetop level, and it "made his hair stand on end." When his unit arrived in South Vietnam, it had suffered several casualties; many others had deserted. Many of the survivors had malaria; all were exhausted. We do not know how many infiltrators are lost on the march south, but we do know that stories and attitudes such as those expressed above are not unusual. While bombing is not the complete

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

answer to infiltration, it complicates the journey southward and reduces the morale and immediate combat effectiveness of those who make the arduous trip.

C. Political Effect

The bombing initially hardened popular attitudes in North Vietnam, enabling Hanoi to arouse and manipulate the nationalist sentiments of its people. But Hanoi's effort to persuade the United States to halt the bombing may now reflect the reduction of popular enthusiasm for its policies resulting from cumulative war-weariness of the populace. In addition, the shock created by our disregard of the "privileged sanctuary" for indirect aggression which North Vietnam represented evidently has increased factional debates in the Hanoi regime between advocates of aggression and those responsible for developing the north's economy and implementing its policy of "socialist revolution." This factional split parallels and reinforces the lines drawn between those favoring Peking's hard line, liberation war strategy, and those sympathizing with the USSR's concern over continued escalation. The growing cost of the war to the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Communist countries has reinforced their preference for negotiations in opposition to Hanoi's policy of continuing the war, which is enthusiastically supported only by Communist China.

D. Effect of Abandonment of Bombing on Hanoi

Hanoi would regard the abandonment of bombing its territory as a clear-cut major victory. It would believe that, by propaganda and political pressure, it had forced the United States to take this action. Hanoi's belief in ultimate victory would be strengthened; it would be greatly encouraged that the United States would ultimately tire of the war. Almost certainly, the North Vietnamese would not interpret a halt to the bombing as an act of US de-escalation, but as a sign that its policy was forcing the United States to retreat.

E. Economic Effects

1. The cost of repairing the damage caused by air attacks exceeds \$215 million, of which over \$80 million represents destruction of military equipment and supplies. Economic losses include not only repair costs of direct physical damage to transportation

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

equipment, bridges, and electric power plants but also heavy indirect losses stemming from the reduction of agricultural output, the impairment of foreign exchange earnings resulting from the inability to continue normal exports, and the expense of passive defense measures.

2. Estimated losses in agricultural production and the fishing industry total over \$30 million. Although the food situation is not yet critical, rice production was 300,000 tons below average in 1966; this deficit will create additional problems for the regime and will require more food imports from other Communist countries. North Vietnam has been forced to cut back on some of its exports of processed food.

3. Export losses attributable to the bombing total over \$15 million, an amount equivalent to about one-third of North Vietnam's usual annual export earnings of hard currencies.

4. The cost of the more than 20,000 units of transport equipment destroyed or damaged by air attacks is between \$35 million and \$40 million. The major losses of transport equipment are as follows:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Units</u>	
	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Vessels	4,451	8,233
Vehicles	2,548	2,377
Railroad stock	1,508	1,859

5. The air attacks have inflicted high costs in the maintaining of supplies for the Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. North Vietnam has had to increase the number of transport workers by 50,000 and to commit one-fourth of its truck inventory in the effort to maintain distribution and logistic activities at required levels. It is estimated that at least 3,000 truck drivers alone have been lost as a result of air attacks. The inability to move goods in daytime has reduced the operating efficiency of its

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

truck park by at least 50 percent and has at least doubled, if not tripled, the time required to transport goods. We estimate that losses in transit resulting from spoilage, pilferage, and air attack have reduced total traffic volume by 20 to 40 percent.

6. The air attacks have forced North Vietnam to undertake a program to disperse industry, which has disrupted normal economic production and aggravated the management and administration of economic activity.

7. The disruption caused by air interdiction of the transport system and electric power facilities, plus the dislocation of manpower, has required the indefinite postponement of Ho Chi Minh's plan to build North Vietnam into a modern industrial state. As the war continues, the industrial damage mounts, and the time when North Vietnam can hope to have a modern industrial sector is pushed progressively farther into the future. If Hanoi fails to react, a continuation of the air attacks will deal a most serious blow to North Vietnamese hopes for economic progress and status, nullifying a decade of intense effort and sacrifice on the part of the people.

#### F. Effects on South Vietnamese Morale

The bombing has given a real boost to the morale and determination of our South Vietnamese allies. The situation existing prior to the initiation of the aerial pressure campaign against North Vietnam was one the South Vietnamese found increasingly frustrating, discouraging, and intolerable. South Vietnam was racked by a war instigated, supported and controlled by Hanoi. The destruction and unrest caused by this war, however, was confined to South Vietnam. North Vietnam got off scot free. Its territory was immune to attack and it suffered no physical punishment despite the fact that it was waging war south of the 17th Parallel. This situation continued even after North Vietnam began taking a direct hand in the southern conflict. Ethnic North Vietnamese soldiers began appearing in South Vietnam in mid-1964; by the end of 1964 a whole division of the North Vietnamese Army (the 325th) was moving into South Vietnam. The policy decision to use the North Vietnamese Army in an attempt to crush the Saigon Government had obviously been made in Hanoi by 1964 and was in the process of implementation well before the start of our bombing.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Cessation of the bombing would be something the South Vietnamese would understandably find depressing and perplexing. They, who are bearing and will continue to bear the major burden of this war so long as Hanoi's aggression continues, would find it hard to comprehend why the aggressor should be relieved of his burden and no longer compelled to pay some price on his own territory for the hardship and destruction he is inflicting on his southern neighbors.

## II. The Negative Effects of the Bombing

### A. Costs of Operation

The air campaign against North Vietnam is expensive. Direct operating costs, which do not include the maintenance of air bases and the aircraft carriers or logistic support, have been:

	<u>Million US \$</u>	
	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>
Aircraft lost	305.8	605.6
Sortie overhead	98.0	330.4
Ordnance	56.2	311.5
Total	<u>460.0</u>	<u>1,247.5</u>

### B. Offsetting Effects of Communist Aid

North Vietnam's apparent willingness to withstand the effects of continued air attack may be explained by the assistance furnished by other Communist countries. Total economic and military aid delivered in 1966 amounted to more than \$500 million, or almost four times the damage resulting from air attack in 1966. There is at least a tacit implication that the USSR and Communist China have committed themselves to underwrite the eventual reconstruction of North Vietnam's industrial base.

### C. Innocent Civilian Casualties

While the air attacks have been directed solely at military and war supporting targets, it is true that there have been, unfortunately,

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

some innocent civilian casualties. Careful planning by US force commanders has held this total down to what must be recognized by any historical comparison as a very small number. Nevertheless, Hanoi, its Communist sympathizers around the world, and many well-meaning people in other countries have had a propaganda field day with the handful of authentic cases of innocent civilian casualties. This has hurt the image of the United States despite the good military record.

D. Adverse Third-Country Attitudes

While there is considerable third-country support for the bombing of North Vietnam, there is strong opposition to these air attacks in certain neutral countries. This opposition seems to stem from fear that the war may become a worldwide conflict, or that the United States is guilty of "aggression" against a weaker Asiatic state. Specific major nations in opposition include India and France; important segments of public opinion in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan share the opposition view.

E. Air Campaign a "Failure"

Finally, the air campaign is frequently criticized because it hasn't stopped the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam. But as Secretary McNamara has made clear, the United States never believed that it would. Air attack against military targets in the north was designed to make Hanoi pay a high price for continuing its infiltration, and it has done this.

F. The Bombing Is Prolonging the War, It Is Charged

The argument that the bombing of the north is prolonging the war or keeping Hanoi from the negotiating table overlooks the nature of Hanoi's aggression and the North Vietnamese rationale concerning the war in Vietnam. Although Hanoi has openly acknowledged since 1960 the role of North Vietnam as the rear base for the "revolution" in the south, it has supported that "revolution" through clandestine means to maintain the myth that the conflict in the south is an internal one.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

North Vietnam, therefore, officially views the cessation of the bombing as a means of restoring the war to its pre-bombing status and removing the north as an overt participant. The problem is thus not one of convincing Hanoi of our peaceful intent nor of our making a gesture of good will in order to negotiate with Hanoi. The bombing is not preventing Hanoi from halting its material support for the so-called "war of liberation" in the south, and cessation of the bombing would not in itself cause Hanoi to halt its unacknowledged aggression.

- 8 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, March 2, 1967  
4:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a ten-point factual statement on bombing.

1. We are bombing North Viet Nam because it is helping our fighting men and those of our allies to counter North Viet Nam's illegal aggression against the South.

2. Our bombing has required North Viet Nam to divert important manpower resources from support of their aggression in the South to repair the results of, and to defend against, our bombing campaign.

-- About 200,000 full-time and 100,000 part-time workers have been diverted to the repair and reconstruction of roads, railroads, and bridges.

-- About 125,000 people are engaged in air defense.

-- Some tens of thousands have been diverted to coastal defenses.

3. The North Vietnamese have gone to great lengths to try to make our bombing campaign less effective. Since 1965 they have increased their radars fivefold, the number of anti-aircraft weapons fourfold, and the number of jet fighters twofold. They have also introduced a large surface-to-air missile system. This has been an expensive proposition for them and these resources are not available for supporting the war in the South.

4. Over 70% of North Viet Nam's original petroleum storage capacity and over 70% of its ammunition depots and a large number of military supply facilities have been destroyed.

5. More than 700 bridges have been destroyed. Nearly 10,000 trucks and 2500 railroad cars have been destroyed or damaged. Additionally about 14,000 watercraft have been destroyed or damaged. According to some reports, one of the results has been that fishermen have been impressed into coastal transport duty for six-month periods.

6. One-third of North Viet Nam's total electric power generating capacity is out of operation. Exports of coal and cement are below normal levels, and there have been no recent shipments of apatite. This further strains North Viet Nam's weak foreign exchange position.

7. In 1964 North Viet Nam received \$115 million in aid from Communist countries. In 1965 aid increased to \$410 million. By 1966 \$505 million in external aid was needed to keep North Viet Nam in the war. This increase is mainly due to our air operations against the North.

8. The cumulative effects of the bombing have continued to disrupt portions of the North Vietnamese economy. Identified imports of bulk food stuffs totalled almost 24,000 tons in January compared with an average monthly import of 6,400 tons in 1966. Rice production last year was about 300,000 tons below the normal annual average due in part to the diversion of manpower required by the bombing campaign.

9. Deserters and captured North Vietnamese both relate tales of fear, low morale, disease and hardship on their movement South due to our bombing of the trails, roads, bridges and railroads. In 1966 PW's reported that air strikes had increased infiltration time by two months. Aircraft bombing is the factor cited most frequently as the cause for their decline in morale. It is estimated by one prisoner of war that 20% of the supplies destined for the South are destroyed en route.

10. Resupply because of our bombing has been slow, sporadic and incomplete. All types of medicine are in short supply and some have been exhausted. Some Communist units have had to discontinue the use of quinine as a preventative and limit it to use as a curative.

W. W. R.



93

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 2, 1967

Dear Dean:

Since I may not be in town when you see Ellsworth Bunker, I should like to tell you what I hope will prove possible in Saigon.

I have decided that the best solution is to give General Westmoreland the over-all task of Ambassador while maintaining his military command. I want you and Bob McNamara to confirm that this is possible without Senate confirmation.

As you know, however, the bringing to life within the next six months of a constitutional government in Saigon is as important to us as the course of military events in the field. I have concluded that there is one American above any other who is qualified to guide this process on behalf of the nation; and I feel, in justice to our fighting men and to the country as a whole, that only our best is justified in the circumstances.

Therefore, I wish you to ask Ellsworth Bunker if he is willing to serve as Ambassador at Large in Saigon, assuming responsibility for our political policy under Westmoreland's general direction.


We would assign an aircraft to Ellsworth so that he could easily move about the area and return, as necessary, for consultations in Washington.

As you know, I envisage assigning Bob Komer to serve with Westmoreland to drive forward our civil operations in Saigon, in fields other than that assigned to Ellsworth. I would be prepared, if you agree, to strengthen further the political side of the Saigon Embassy by assigning Bill Sullivan to assist Ambassador Bunker in his work.

I am conscious, of course, of the sacrifice I am asking Ellsworth to make at the age of 72. I can only recall that Henry Stimson was almost 73 when he became our greatest Secretary of War, serving for five years. I have in mind that Ellsworth would serve for only a relatively short period and I'm hopeful that, if I assured him I would not ask him to serve as Stimson did until he is 78 -- at least in Viet Nam -- he would do this for our country and for me. I do believe the task of political midwifery ahead is the highest possible challenge to the wisdom, discretion, strength, and tact which Ellsworth embodies uniquely.

I hope your full powers of persuasion will be brought to bear in laying our case before him, and that you and Ellsworth will feel free to come back to me with any refinements you may suggest in this proposal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Lyndon B. Johnson", written in a cursive, flowing style.

Honorable Dean Rusk  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

*Pres file*

Thursday, March 2, 1967  
4:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, to keep handy, all our  
bombing pauses.

W. W. Rostow



# BOMBING PAUSES

No.	From	To	Elapsed Time
1.	1200 EDT 5/11/65	0800 EDT 5/17/65	5 days, 20 hours
2.	0300 EST 12/24/65	1800 EST 1/29/66	36 days, 15 hours
3.	1800 EST 12/23/66	1800 EST 12/25/66	2 days
4.	1800 EST 12/30/66	1800 EST 1/1/67	2 days
5.	1800 EST 2/7/67	1200 EST 2/13/67	5 days, 18 hours

95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, March 2, 1967  
4:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

George reports further on  
Kiesinger's effort to get back in the  
game.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Bonn 10157

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 3-27-91

EHX164

1967 MAR 2 16 58

95a

00 RUEHEX  
DE RUEHC 2008 0611657  
ZNY CCCCC  
O 021615Z FEB 67  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEHIA/USIA  
O P 021531Z MARCH 67  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2999  
INFO RUOTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 982  
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1167  
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 211  
STATE GRNC  
BT

*Caggs*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-349

By 1-8-92, NARA, Date 1-8-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 10157

*Rostow*

SUBJECT: KIESINGER ON US RELATIONS

1. AT A LARGE LUNCHEON TENDERED TODAY BY CHANCELLOR KIESINGER FOR VISITING NATO SECGEN BROSIO KIESINGER, IN HIS REMARKS FOLLOWING THE LUNCHEON, MADE A NEW EFFORT TO SET ARIGHT HIS REPORTED REMARKS TO THE CDU/CSU PUBLISHERS HELD ON FEB 27. AFTER A PERSONAL TRIBUTE TO BROSIO AND REITERATION OF GERMAN SUPPORT FOR NATO, IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE THREAT HAD CHANGED THE FUNDAMENTAL SITUATION REMAINED, KIESINGER TURNED AND DIRECTED THE FOLLOWING REMARKS TO ME.

2. HE SAID THAT HE HAD IN RECENT WEEKS STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY FOR

PAGE 2 RUEHOL 10157 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RENEWING BROAD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE US IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMMON PROBLEMS WE FACE, AS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE MORE SPECIFIC ISSUES WHICH HAVE RECENTLY BEEN A MATTER OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN US. IN DOING SO, HE HAD BY NO MEANS INTENDED TO CRITICIZE THE US. HE RECOGNIZED THAT GERMANY, NO LESS THAN WE, HAD RESPONSIBILITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRECIPITATION OF THESE DISCUSSION.

3. PRIVATELY TO ME LATER HE REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT THIS IS WHAT HE HAD SAID, OR INTENDED TO SAY, TO THE CDU/CSU EDITORS. ALSO, THAT AFTER HIS UNFORTUNATE USE OF THE WORD "COMPLICITY" IN CONNECTION WITH THE US AND SOVIET INITIATION OF AN NPT, HE QUICKLY SHIFTED TO THE MORE APPROPRIATE REFERENCE TO OUR "COMMON RESPONSIBILITIES". IT WA

<sup>S</sup>  
HOWEVER, ONLY THE FIRST WHICH WAS REPORTED. KIESINGER FURTHER STATED TO ME THAT HIS REMARKS WITH RESPECT TO THE LACK OF CONSULTATION ON THE NPT HAD REFERRED TO THE EARLIER STAGES AND TO THE LACK OF A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, RATHER THAN THE DETAILS OF THE TREATY. HE RECALLED THAT I HAD GIVEN HIM A COMPLETE NPT DRAFT ON DEC 20, AND BLAMED THE GERMANS FOR BEING SLOW IN SEEKING CLARIFICATIONS, (WHICH IS, HOWEVER, UNDERSTANDABLE IN VIEW OF THE XMAS SEASON AND THE NEWNESS OF THE REGIME.)

4. OBVIOUSLY, KIESINGER IS STILL TRYING VERY HARD TO MAKE AMENDS FOR HIS REPORTED REMARKS. MCGHEE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 2, 1967


Dear Mr. Kaiser:

Thank you for sending me your report on the observance of UN Day 1966. I was glad to learn of the increased support for the UN among our citizens. Old friends of the UN were kept, and new ones were made.

Your willingness to serve as National Chairman was a great satisfaction to me. Your leadership speaks for itself in the results you have reported.

Please give my thanks to all your colleagues for their efforts in this worthy cause.

Sincerely,



Mr. Edgar F. Kaiser  
President, Kaiser Industries  
300 Lakeside Drive  
Oakland, California

*Com. sent to  
Central Files*

*Sent L.D. to Sec State  
& Sec McNamara*

97

*p.m. 3/2/67*

With respect to Senator Kennedy's proposal, we should like to make clear that during the 138-hour Tet truce, when no bombing of North Viet Nam was taking place, Hanoi had available several versions of the following formula:

- cessation of bombing;
- cessation of infiltration;
- cessation of augmentation of U.S. forces in South Viet Nam.

This offer was known to Hanoi by 7 February at the latest -- a day before the Tet truce began. Moreover, Hanoi knew for several months that we were prepared for such mutual de-escalation and knew that if our proposals were not judged satisfactory, they were free to seek clarification or propose alternative arrangements as a prelude to negotiation.

These offers -- in all their various versions -- were flatly refused by Hanoi.

Throughout this period it held to the position publicly expressed to His Holiness the Pope on February 13, 1967: The United States "must put an end to their aggression in Vietnam, end unconditionally and definitively the bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw from South Vietnam all American and satellite troops, recognize the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs. Only in such conditions can real peace be restored in Vietnam."

If such an offer of mutual de-escalation were accepted by Hanoi, we would, of course, welcome international assistance<sup>S</sup> in its surveillance. We have often, for example, suggested strengthening of the ICC.

We stand by the proposals for mutual de-escalation we have made to Hanoi; and, as the President said on February 13, "...the door is open and will remain open, and we are prepared at any time to go more than half way to meet any equitable overture from the other side."



78  
Thurs., March 2, 1967  
5:25 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the Secretary of State's statement  
as he will deliver it in a few minutes.

W. W. R.

phoned by State S retariat 5:20 pm 3/2/67

98a

As Secretary of State I should like our people to know that proposals substantially similar to those put forward by Senator Kennedy were in fact explored prior to, during, and since the Tet truce -- without results. We have had bombing pauses of 5 days in 1965; 37 days in December - January 1965-66; and 6 days in February 1967 -- and we encountered only hostile actions in response. There is, therefore, no reason to believe at this time that Hanoi is interested in proposals for mutual de-escalation such as those put forward by Senator Kennedy. As the President made clear when bombing was resumed two weeks ago, "...the door to peace is and will remain open, and we are prepared at any time to go more than half way to meet any equitable overture from the other side."

H

31  
~~Mr. Bator~~  
Press file

Thursday, March 2, 1967, 12:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

At Tab A is the verbatim text of Kiesinger's long talk of February 27. I am afraid I was too optimistic: Anatole Shub's report in the Post was substantially accurate. The speech was not issued as a press release. The German Embassy here called the Foreign Office in Bonn and had the text read to them over the telephone.

Francis M. Bator

Attachment

FMB:LSE:mst



~~SECRET~~ 99a

TEXT OF CHANCELLOR KIESINGER'S FEBRUARY 27, 1967 SPEECH  
TO THE PRESS UNION

I should like to add a word to the basic concept of our foreign policy. You have noticed that in my government declaration I tried to speak a new language. Not because I intended to make any radical changes in our policies to date. What I am after is to get our policies off dead center and get them moving in any direction that is practical and would have meaning. All of you will have had the impression in the past years that we were on the defensive all the time, and that we were continuously the object of the political moves -- and thus also the attacks -- of others.

Like those who were in office before us, we want to achieve this great goal: the reunification of our nation. But we have no intention just to resign ourselves on the issue of the Oder-Neisse line. Neither have we allowed ourselves to yield and concur with the view of Czechoslovakia that the Munich Pact was not validly concluded. There were certain trends in the Government to go that far and go on record that this pact was void from the beginning. I thought it would cause great mischief to adopt such a view. Other international agreements have been completed under similar circumstances of threat, threatened violence, etc., which no one ever dreamed of regarding for that reason as being void or having been invalidly concluded.

Certainly, we have said that we regard this pact as no longer in force. In answer to the question of a Czech journalist, as to the date from which that was so, I told him: We have not fixed that to the minute.

But that has nothing at all to do with the question of the legal position of the Sudeten Germans, with the protective obligations which we have assumed with respect to them, nor with their right to their homeland, which this Government recognizes, as have previous Governments. However vague and ill-defined this concept may be, we are all of us determined to maintain that such a right exists. It will probably have to be left to the future to put this right in concrete terms. This is one of the great problems which is in our minds when we think of the future -- of the future possible solutions of the question of reunification or the question of the territories east of the Oder and Neisse. You will recall that I stated in my government declaration: That is a matter for the peace treaty, and it will then be a solution that is acceptable to both nations. But then we will also have to proceed with the realization that one cannot just merely look backward to the past. That is our firm conviction. In the future there can be only a new solution within a new Europe. The difficulty involved here is simply that some of the details will have to be left also to the imagination of history. What will be cannot be settled and regulated in accordance with a predetermined schedule.'

We are of the opinion that we shall be able to realize our goals in these matters only if we succeed in healing the split in Europe -- in overcoming European antagonisms. If we lack faith in this possibility, in the prospect that the future will be different from our today and our yesterday (only recently I talked about this with the Soviet Ambassador

for all of two and a half hours), then all we can do is just wait for some miracle to happen, and that would leave our future ~~fast~~ to be shaped by the will of others.

It was also very interesting for me to learn from the opinion surveys, for instance, that the question people are most interested in and which receives the greatest number of affirmative answers is this: Do you think that we must normalize our relationship to our neighbors in the East? That question received more affirmative answers than did the other question of great importance to the individual regarding the security of his job, etc. That does not mean that we ought now to yield to romantic-utopian proposals, that we should now give some sort of earnest on future commitments, like recognizing the Oder-Neisse line, or this or that. Such advance payments on our part, it is my firm conviction, would gain nothing, and on the contrary, could lose us a great deal.

Overcoming European antagonism is something we must simply set out to accomplish. That is to say, we must first of all open a path to the East. We are doing this at the present time by entering into diplomatic relations with the countries in the East where the circumstances permit us to do so. By this I mean the countries that are willing to enter into diplomatic relations with us without stipulating conditions. This has been done with Rumania. And from what we know about the outcome of the Warsaw Conference, we may assume that this process will go forward, i. e., that other countries in the East and Southeast of Europe will likewise be prepared to enter into



diplomatic relations with us without setting conditions.

The following formula was arrived at in Warsaw: Entry into diplomatic relations is not yet equivalent to normalization of relations. All right, we accept that. Our intention also, going beyond the entry into diplomatic relations -- which is the necessary beginning -- is to reach normalization. Well, what does this mean? The other side has agreed on the following formulation: For relations to become normalized, the following three demands must be met: Recognition of the so-called DDR /German Democratic Republic -- East Germanȳ/; recognition of the Oder-Neisse line; and no access to nuclear weapons. That is the formula that was published. To what extent, apart from the general population, it is taken seriously by the political leaders of those countries is another question. Also here, if we undertook a searching analysis, we should certainly discover a wider range of views than is contained in this formulation. .

When these two conceptions confront each other in earnest -- the conception of the East and our demand for a settlement of the German question -- what remains for us is to seek through hard bargaining (for which it is essential to have contact with each other) to reach the point where these two concepts can be reconciled.

What does that mean? Let me illustrate it by an example. The Soviet Union keeps saying that we want to swallow the so-called DDR. And there are many who fully believe that. As a matter of fact, we have no such incorporation or annexation in mind. Our aim is simply to get conditions

that will permit our fellow countrymen to exercise their will. We want to help create an environment in which our fellow countrymen some day would be able to give expression to their political will -- and I do not have in mind at this time any single act -- give expression to that will in an ever increasing and more directed way within an evolutionary development. Our underlying assumption is that the will of our fellow countrymen on the other side -- as was the case with the Saar population in the past -- will remain unchanged. In other words, that the great majority of them, of their free will, would want to be reunited with us as we want to be reunited with them.

I am firmly convinced that if this comes to pass, this will be a potent fact that cannot be ignored in the long run by public opinion, and eventually by the rulers of the countries that are our neighbors to the East. That is the way that must be traveled. There is no other. We cannot allow ourselves to give up. We must keep on pursuing this task.

The Russian Ambassador has said to me: Why, that is like fire and water. These two can't get together. That is the denial of that will. I answered him, of course, that's precisely what we are saying. Give the people the free exercise of their will on the other side for once, and the outcome will show whether or not it is a matter for fire and water to meet. Of course, you have got to hope that you will have a little luck. The factors of luck play a very big part in world history. We must be able to visualize conjunctions of interest -- I have referred to that in my government declaration -- where the Soviet Union would deem it desirable to reach a settlement

like the one we are aspiring to, and to overcome European antagonisms. Of course, these antagonisms cannot be resolved so long as the German question remains unsettled.

The Soviet Union is isolated. To the East is China. The so-called former satellites in Europe certainly will not actively oppose the Soviet Union, but they are striving for greater independence for themselves. That is clear. Apart from these countries, the Soviet Union has no friends in the world -- Cuba excepted, of course -- and here and there maybe -- no, Albania would be a violent opponent. The Soviet Union also has its domestic problems. As we know, contrary to all the rules of Marxism, there is a mental evolution going on in the Soviet Union, with the upcoming generations quite naturally having different views about the world from those of the generations of their fathers and grandfathers. And so we must not just wait for these conjunctions of interests to come about, but we must, on the contrary, direct all our actions to making these situations materialize.

That is also the view of General deGaulle. I have had a long talk with him about this problem. And it is of great value to us that we are making these moves toward the East together and in cooperation with France. We know the issues involved. France gives us her support in the question of reunification. However, as regards the Oder-Neisse line, it is quite true that France, shall we say, does not see quite eye to eye. During our conversations on January 13 and 14 I attached importance to making it very



clear from the outset where our views coincided and where they did not. At the conclusion of our meeting we put our differences this way: NATO; the stationing of allied forces in Germany; Great Britain's entry into the Common Market, etc. We reached the conclusion: despite these divergencies it is possible to conduct what General deGaulle terms a long-term grand policy. That is of great help for us because this collaboration with France, which has good connections with the countries to the East of us, eliminates a certain distrust, a certain anxiety which might still prevail in those countries.

I am not going to dwell at great length now on other aspects of our foreign policy, because I do not wish to keep you too long. Just a few words. It is with concern that I view the relationship with our Western allies, and the United States in particular.

I have been telling my recent American visitors over and over again that things cannot go on like this. All we are doing is to discuss only those matters that are at issue between us. We have stopped talking about common policies altogether. What we built up at one time -- based on an irrepressible urge to work for freedom in the world -- is now threatening to become an empty shell, a mere mechanism: NATO -- the spirit of alliance that is NATO.

I know, of course, that this is due to the changes which have taken place in the world. General deGaulle taxes us Germans with being -- well, he put it politely -- too obedient to the Americans; all of us, Adenauer included. My answer to him was: I cannot accept this for my Government.

Naturally we know that American policy in Europe does not exclusively pursue American interests. There are some Germans who think that there is such a thing as a policy of friendship sustained by tokens of friendship. For those who believe that, there is, afterwards, always some disillusioning disappointment. The dominant factor of international politics are national interests. American policy in Germany, therefore, pursues American interests. It is our business to determine to what extent American interests coincide with ours -- the German and the European interests -- and to what extent they do not, or not any longer.

At the height of the Cold War they were largely identical, of course. Since that time, however, there has developed that strange, almost paradoxical situation which no diplomacy has apparently gotten a real grip on. The Alliance is still there, as before. The antagonism is still there, also. But over it there has developed a sort of tacit nuclear understanding or joint nuclear responsibility that forces these antagonists into an ever closer rapprochement. To put all that into diplomatic language is extremely difficult. Take the Non-proliferation Treaty, for instance. To my taste, much too much noise has been made in our country about this matter. I would have liked it better if we had calmly and with self-assurance waited to hear what other nations had to say to it. The fact is that other nations have quite a lot to say about it and they are doing it now. I do not mean that this important subject should not have been discussed in the press; actually it was helpful, and helpful also with respect to the bargaining position of the Government.

It is a very heavy decision that is asked of us -- a very heavy decision. But here again there is no need of making a mountain out of a molehill. There are unquestionably decisions that must be taken with respect to this treaty; decisions that we must demand be taken. Without these clarifications we would not be able to sign the treaty with a good conscience. These decisions have in the main to do with the question of the unhampered pursuit of scientific research in the field of the peaceful development of nuclear energy and the application of the results of such research for the benefit of our industry. That is the crucial point.

Then there is also the question, which in my view has been a little overdramatized, that relates to the technological spin-off for the powers which are developing nuclear weapons -- and to the willingness of those powers to let us share in these by-products. And then comes the question of policing. First, such policing should not, as a matter of course, be the right of the powers which have the nuclear monopoly. They cannot be allowed to have that monopoly and act as the policemen or the inspectors, at the same time. And second, there must be a settled procedure for the inspections. That is, everyone must know exactly what the inspectors may and may not do. There have recently been hints that inspection, which is a matter particularly insisted upon by the Americans, may be dropped from the treaty altogether because of the reluctance of the Russians; that, would open some very interesting possibilities.



It would be wonderful, as has been urged by Sweden, if jointly with achieving the goal of nonproliferation, in which we, too, have a vital interest, steps could be taken toward effective disarmament -- for example, the prohibition of underground tests. This would have been much easier to accomplish at the time when the Chinese nuclear bomb did not yet exist and the Chinese did not have the facilities for carrying forward the development of this nuclear bomb. So we can see that this is the point where we must face very great difficulties.

In Oberhausen I commented on the unjustifiable attacks of Mr. Kosygin by saying that the decisive factor regarding whether we are going to sign this treaty or not, is exclusively our own assessment and our own conscience. And that is how it is going to be.

We shall pursue this path to the end with all deliberation and firmness. I trust that at the end of that path we shall have accomplished a truly satisfactory solution which, on the one hand -- let me emphasize this once more -- gives us assurance about the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which is of great importance to us, and on the other hand, also ensures the vital rights of our own nation as well as those of the other non-nuclear powers.

But, let me say this in all candor, I would have preferred that if such a grave and far-reaching decision was to be placed before us, that all related aspects -- including the security aspect -- had been thoroughly deliberated upon among the allies. And that is precisely what was not done.

I have made it plain to many American visitors with whom I have discussed this issue, that we shall in the future insist upon such a comprehensive and thorough exploration of the interrelated political aspects, and shall do so in our own interest and in the interests of preserving and vitalizing the North Atlantic Alliance, which in our view continues to be an organization of vital importance.

Thurs., March 2, 1967  
11:35 a.m.

101

MR. PRESIDENT:

George McGhee comes in for an invitation to Kiesinger in a spirit of some desperation.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Bonn 9959)

P.S.  
Nick  
will be  
calling about his

Thursday, March 2, 1967  
11:45 a.m.

*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

These are first, not last, thoughts on Europe.

Bonn: Clifford  
Anderson  
Tyler

-- in short, Mac's recommendations are good.

Paris: Lodge

And there are others: Shep Stone and Bob Bowie, for example, for Bonn; or Tyler for Paris; and Lodge for Rome, if you wished to move now on the latter.

The real problem is Chip Bohlen and George.

One solution for George would be Argentina; although he would probably regard it as a let-down. In fact, Argentina is going to be critical to Latin American integration. Another would be to get him involved in domestic affairs -- perhaps Sect. of Commerce if the combined department doesn't come through.

As for Chip, perhaps Mac Bundy could get him attached to a university to write his memoirs, which would be interesting. We could keep him as an Ambassador-at-large if Ellsworth is off on other business; but we'd have to make sure he doesn't cross Foy Kohler's track on Soviet issues, where Chip is out-of-date.

Incidentally, the Philippines is one of our most critical posts. We need a strong wise man who would get Marcos moving. I'm frankly worried; Bill Jorden would be excellent; but I'd really hate to lose him for us. I'll be thinking of alternatives.

W. W. R.



Thurs., March 1, 1967  
11:25 a.m.

102

MR. PRESIDENT:

This letter Sect. Rusk sent over is  
the kind that keeps us all going.

*Pres file*

W. W. R.

Attachment (2/24 ltr fm Ronald Karliner)

102a

C O P Y

24 Feb 67

Honorable Mr. Dean Rusk  
US State Department  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rusk:

My name is Ronald Karliner and I'm assigned to the 366th Air Police Squadron at Da Nang Air Base, South Vietnam. I just got back to Da Nang after being TDY for over 5 months to Monkey Mountain, about eight miles northwest of here. When I came back an article printed in the Everyday Magazine of the St. Louis Post Dispatch had been circulated. It concerned an Eloise Hirsch and how she led some students to Washington to meet with you and discuss the Vietnam issue. The article stated how the students were displeased and were against the war.

Also mentioned in the article was the fact that the Post Dispatch, New York Times, and even Time Magazine had taken it upon themselves to call these students things like the "New American," and "The American Citizen under Twenty Five." It is statements like this, plus the actions of these students that caused great controversy over here and therefore we are writing you this letter. When I say we I mean men from the 366th Tac Fighter Wing, 3rd Marine Amphibious Force, and Naval Support Activities, Da Nang. I received the honor to write this letter because I live in St. Louis in a neighborhood near that of Miss Hirsch.

As you well know most of the GIs over here, of which there numbers over four hundred thousand, are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. I'm in that group. These people are Democrats and Republicans, liberals, and conservatives of all types of families. Yet I've never talked to a single GI over here and I probably never will, who says "get out of Vietnam."

We are fighting for the freedom of these people, as we once fought for our own. Of these thousands of young Americans over here we all take pride in fighting for the principles that made our country the greatest on earth. When our grandchildren read about Vietnam in history lessons we will be proud to tell them that we were part of that lesson. We will take our place in history with the Americans who fought for freedom in the Revolutionary War, both World Wars, and in Korea.

We are not the only young Americans who feel as we do. There are thousands more in the States who share our feelings. The people in Washington are doing their best for their country, just as we do it over here.

Not all young Americans, in fact not even a majority of us, sit in college classrooms, major in Political Science, and see fit to protest that which our government does. Not all young Americans share a room with the opposite sex and call it the new freedom in sex; not all young Americans attend LSD parties and park Volkswagons on the grass; and not all young Americans protest a war for freedom.

The St. Louis Post Dispatch, the New York Times, and Time Magazine have sorely overlooked millions of us, especially thousands of us that are over here. Yet we are alive too.

We are proud to be here fighting for America; millions back home are proud of us, and the morale over here has never been higher!

We all respect and admire our Administration and we know the feeling is mutual.

Sincerely,

Ronald P. Karliner  
A1C USAF  
AF17663185 Dr 24 Box 230  
366th Air Police Squadron  
APO San Francisco 96337

Thurs., March 2, 1967  
11:15 a.m.

Pres file

03

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Byroade speculates about a possible unpleasant Rangoon scenario.

WWR

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Rangoon 1142)



~~SECRET~~

103a

Copy of RANGOON 1142, March 2, 1967

1. In view of your 146804, you may be interested in my preferred scenario for play now under way in Burma. Scenario follows:

"DRV wants desperately stop American bombing. Decide to take advantage of U Thant's presence in Rangoon, either with his knowledge and agreement, or otherwise. DRV sends delegation to Rangoon, taking no unusual precautions re secrecy. Its presence in Rangoon becomes known to world press and huge speculation follows, particularly in view of U Thant's presence. At appropriate moment, DRV acknowledges the presence of its negotiating team in Rangoon and its readiness to start talks, provided the U. S. stops unconditionally and permanently all bombing of Vietnam. U Thant keeps silent, if part of the deal, as the prestige of his position would appear in any event to be behind DRV move for talks. U Thant keeps silent, even if not involved, because of his past public position on bombing. DRV representatives sit and wait in Rangoon. Intense drama surrounds the departure of Goldberg from Rangoon (remember script was written at time he also scheduled to be here) without accepting DRV offer to talk. World pressures arise over unreasonable U. S. position. We lose badly in this psychological warfare gambit, and in order not to suffer world criticism, we stop bombing (this only in DRV script, I hope!) and start prolonged talks. The war of attrition goes on in South Vietnam. "

2. My chief doubt re the above is that Commies are seldom this clever and flexible. One can only hope all this is wrong, and DRV representatives are here for meaningful talks.

BYROADE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-349  
By sig, NARA, Date 1-8-92

Thursday, March 2, 1967  
9:35 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here, at long last, is the full text of Kiesinger's comments to the CDU editors. I conclude that he means well, but has a bad case of localitis.

I still think it is important that you see him; be we should await a report from McCloy to make sure that there is ground under our feet with respect to offsets and all that.

W. W. R.

Attachment (Bonn 10137)

UNCLASSIFIED

Thursday, March 2, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM BONN (10137)

SUBJECT: Chancellor Kiesinger's Comments on U.S. -German Relations  
to CDU Editors

There follows a translation of that portion of Chancellor Kiesinger's address to CDU editors last Monday which deals with U.S. - German relations and the Non-Proliferation issue.

Begin text:

I do not want to speak at length about other aspects of our foreign policy, because I do not want to detain you too long. Only a few points. It is with concern that I view the relationship with our Western allies, especially with the United States of America.

I have told my American visitors repeatedly in recent days: It cannot go on this way. We talk with each other only about points of controversy. We no longer speak about common policies. What we have once built up and what was filled with an immense desire for the peace of the world, this threatens to become an empty shell, a mere structure: NATO, the spirit of the NATO Alliance.

Naturally I know that this has to do with the changes which have happened in the world. General DeGaulle complained that we Germans were -- he put it politely -- too obedient with regard to the Americans; all of us, even Adenauer. Now, I answered him: I cannot accept that for my Government.

Naturally we also know that American policy in Europe serves exclusively American interests. There are Germans who believe that there is in this respect a kind of friendship or friendly services. This always leads later to bitter disappointments. Politics between nations is determined by interests. Thus, American policy pursues American interests. It is our task to find out how far American interests coincide with our own, with German and with European interest, and how far they do not or do no longer coincide.

At the height of the Cold War these interests were naturally largely identical. Since then, however, this curious, almost paradoxical situation has developed, which apparently has not been correctly grasped by any diplomacy. The Alliance continues on. The antagonisms continue. But on top of this, a form of nuclear complicity or of a common nuclear responsibility has taken shape which forces these antagonists ever closer and closer together. And to put all this into diplomatic language, to bear this in mind in all debates and put it into the proper words is extremely difficult.

For example, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For my taste much too much noise has been made here about it. I would have preferred it if we for once quietly in all firmness would have waited to see what other people had to say about it because other nations have a great deal to say about it and in fact are now saying it. It is by no means that our press should not have spoken up about this important problem -- this was indeed a help also for the Government's negotiating position.

It is a very difficult decision which we are expected to make, a very difficult decision. But, here again, one should see the entire picture. There are doubtless points in this Treaty which we must absolutely insist upon, which unless clarified, would make it impossible for us in good conscience to sign the Treaty. These points concern, above all, the question of the unimpaired scientific research in the area of peaceful development of atomic energy and the utilization of these findings by our industry. This is the decisive point.

In addition, in my opinion, there is the question which has been presented somewhat overdramatically, that there is also a technological spinoff for the powers which develop nuclear weapons, and our participation in this.

And next comes the question of controls, first of all the controls must not be exercised precisely by those who have the nuclear monopoly. They should not at the same time be allowed to be the police and the controllers. And secondly, the controls must be very precisely regulated; that means, one must know precisely what the controllers are allowed to do and what not.

Recently there have been indications that the controls on which the Americans above all have insisted would be perhaps entirely



taken out of the Treaty on account of Russian hesitations, which naturally would produce a very interesting perspective.

It would be wonderful if it were possible -- Sweden tends somewhat in this direction -- to achieve through this goal of Non-Proliferation, in which we also have a vital interest, real progress toward disarmament or, for example, the question of now also banning underground tests. This would be very much easier to carry through in a world in which no Chinese atom bomb existed or in which there was no possibility for the Chinese to develop this bomb further, than at present. Thus, we see that just there lies one of the very big difficulties.

I said in Oberhausen with regard to the unqualified attacks of Herr Kosygin, that for us the question whether we sign this Treaty or not is exclusively a matter of our own opinion and of our own conscience. And it is going to stay that way.

We will pursue this path in all calmness and firmness to the end. I hope that in the end a really satisfactory solution can be found, which on the one hand -- I stress this now once more -- assures a solution of the very important problem of the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons and, on the other hand, will also ensure all the vital interests of our own nation and the vital interests of the non-nuclear powers.

However, I must frankly admit I would have wished that before we were confronted with such a difficult and far-reaching decision that all aspects which are connected with this, among others, also security considerations, had been considered in depth by the Allies. And that is exactly what has not occurred.

And I have made it clear to my American visitors, with whom I have spoken about this problem, that in the future we will insist upon such a comprehensive and thorough consultation regarding the political interrelations, not only in our own interest, but also in the interest of the preservation and the revitalization of the North Atlantic Alliance, which still in our opinion remains essential.

End text.

Thurs., March 1, 1967  
9:30 a.m.

135

**Literally Eyes Only**

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

Herewith Lodge's prompt reply to our message of last evening. We should, I think, reflect on his point about Ky and Thieu; and perhaps Honolulu would be the best solution, since they may not sort themselves out for sometime.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET-EYES ONLY~~ attachment

CONTROL 001791

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-349

By ju, NARA, Date 7-24-92

057 MAR 2 AM 8 47

OO RUEHC  
DE RUMJIR 19356 0611242  
ZNY TTTT  
O 021225Z MAR 67  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC CMEDIATE 4709  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ SAIGON 19356

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

REF: STATE 146937

FOLLOWING IS MY REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE:

1. I AM, OF COURSE, DELIGHTED TO MEET YOU AT ANY TIME AND PLACE YOU CHOOSE AND MARCH 20-25 IN BAGUIO WOULD BE FINE.
2. I RECOMMEND AGAINST A TRIP BY YOU TO SAIGON AS I DO NOT THINK SECURITY CONDITIONS ARE GOOD ENOUGH.
3. OFF HAND, A MEETING WITH THIEU AND KY AT SOME OTHER PLACE COULD RUN INTO DIFFICULTY BECAUSE OF THE APPROACHING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. THE MEETING MIGHT LOOK AS THOUGH YOU SUPPORTED A MILITARY MAN FOR PRESIDENT OF VIET-NAM.
4. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT YOU PROPOSE TO DISCUSS AT SUCH A MEETING AND THIS MIGHT CHANGE MY OPINION.
5. FROM HERE, IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE BEST PLACE FOR YOU TO MEET WITH WESTY AND ME WOULD BE HONOLULU. THIS IN THE U.S. AND AVOIDS MANY PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD INESCAPABLY ARISE IF YOU CAME TO EAST ASIA.
6. THE WISDOM OF A MEETING WITH THIEU AND KY DEPENDS ON THE AGENDA. THE SAFEST PLACE TO MEET IN VIET-NAM IS CAM RANH BAY.

LODGE

BT

Thurs., March 2, 1967  
11:15 a.m.

132

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Byroade speculates about a possible unpleasant Rangoon scenario.

WWR

SECRET attachment (Rangoon 1142)



SECRET

Copy of RANGOON 1142, March 2, 1967

1. In view of your 146804, you may be interested in my preferred scenario for play now under way in Burma. Scenario follows:

"DRV wants desperately stop American bombing. Decide to take advantage of U Thant's presence in Rangoon, either with his knowledge and agreement, or otherwise. DRV sends delegation to Rangoon, taking no unusual precautions re secrecy. Its presence in Rangoon becomes known to world press and huge speculation follows, particularly in view of U Thant's presence. At appropriate moment, DRV acknowledges the presence of its negotiating team in Rangoon and its readiness to start talks, provided the U.S. stops unconditionally and permanently all bombing of Vietnam. U Thant keeps silent, if part of the deal, as the prestige of his position would appear in any event to be behind DRV move for talks. U Thant keeps silent, even if not involved, because of his past public position on bombing. DRV representatives sit and wait in Rangoon. Intense drama surrounds the departure of Goldberg from Rangoon (remember script was written at time he also scheduled to be here) without accepting DRV offer to talk. World pressures arise over unreasonable U. S. position. We lose badly in this psychological warfare gambit, and in order not to suffer world criticism, we stop bombing (this only in DRV script, I hope!) and start prolonged talks. The war of attrition goes on in South Vietnam. "

2. My chief doubt re the above is that Commies are seldom this clever and flexible. One can only hope all this is wrong, and DRV representatives are here for meaningful talks.

BYROADE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-349  
By grip, NARA, Date 7/16/92

Wednesday, March 1, 1967 -- 9:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith my proposed statement on the reasons for and effects of bombing North Viet Nam.

1. We are bombing North Viet Nam because it is violating two solemn international agreements. In 1954 Hanoi agreed that North Viet Nam would not be "used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy."

In 1962 Hanoi agreed to withdraw all its military forces from Laos; to refrain from re-introducing such forces; and not to use the territory of Laos to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

2. Let me read to you the recommendation made by General Maxwell Taylor to President Kennedy in his report of November 3, 1961, after Hanoi had violated the Geneva Declaration of 1954 but before the Geneva Declaration of 1962 was finally completed.

"While we feel that the program recommended represents those measures which should be taken in our present knowledge of the situation in Southeast Asia, I would not suggest that it is the final word. Future needs beyond this program will depend upon the kind of settlement we obtain in Laos and the manner in which Hanoi decides to adjust its conduct to that settlement. If the Hanoi decision is to continue the irregular war declared on South Viet-Nam in 1959 with continued infiltration and covert support of guerrilla bands in the territory of our ally, we will then have to decide whether to accept as legitimate the continued guidance, training and support of a guerrilla war across an international boundary, while the attacked react only inside their borders. ....

"It is my judgment and that of my colleagues that the United States must decide how it will cope with Khrushchev's 'wars of liberation' which are really para-wars of guerrilla aggression.

This is a new and dangerous Communist technique which bypasses our traditional political and military responses. While the final answer lies beyond the scope of this report, it is clear to me that the time may come in our relations to Southeast Asia when we must declare our intention to attack the source of guerrilla aggression in North Vietnam and impose on the Hanoi Government a price for participating in the current war which is commensurate with the damage being inflicted on its neighbors to the south."

3. Not for one day did Hanoi meet its commitment made in 1962 or honor its commitment made in 1954. Aggression against South Viet Nam was continued throughout 1962, 1963, and 1964. Its forces were never withdrawn from Laos and Laos was violated in order to attack South Viet Nam.

4. When I became President and surveyed the problem faced by our nation, I reserved judgment on the decision which General Taylor forecast in 1961 we might have to make. But the fact was that in 1962 -- and 1963 -- and 1964 the North Vietnamese not only continued illegally to infiltrate arms and men across international frontiers. In 1964 they radically expanded this course of action. The trails became roads. Bands of infiltrators became regular military units.

5. Neither of the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference -- Great Britain and the Soviet Union -- were able to stop this violation. The three members of the International Control Commission -- India, Canada, and Poland -- were incapable of stopping this systematic act of aggression.

6. I decided, therefore, in February 1965, on the unanimous recommendation of the National Security Council, that we could no longer accept the concept of these international agreements. The international machinery created to

make these agreements effective had failed. The flow of men and supplies into South Viet Nam threatened to overcome that country.

Under the SEATO Treaty, presented to the Senate by President Eisenhower and ratified overwhelmingly by the Senate, we had agreed that in the face of "armed attack in the treaty area" we would "act to meet the common danger."

By February 1965 it was unmistakably clear there had been armed attack in the most literal sense; South Viet Nam was almost lost to that armed attack. I decided that we had to "meet the common danger" by bringing air power to bear against the source of the aggression.

7. We never believed aerial attack on North Viet Nam would, alone, end the war. We did, however, have three objectives. The first was to back our fighting men and our fighting allies by demonstrating that the aggressor could not illegally bring hostile arms and men to bear against them from the security of a sanctuary.

Second, we sought to impose on North Viet Nam a cost for violating its international agreements.

Third, we sought to limit and impose attrition on men and supplies being brought to bear illegally against the South and thus to limit the burden and the casualties borne by ourselves and our fighting allies in South Viet Nam.



8. All three of these limited but important objectives have been achieved.

9. First, you should note that the military leaders now responsible for our men in the field back, without exception, our bombing of the North. The same is true of the military and political leaders of those fighting side by side with us; that is to say, the leaders of Australia, Korea, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. They all know that it is right and necessary for us to refuse to accept North Viet Nam as a sanctuary at a time when the government in Hanoi is explicitly violating its international commitments and conducting aggression across international borders.

10. Second, we are, with remarkably limited cost in civilian lives, imposing a major cost on North Viet Nam -- and those who support North Viet Nam in this aggression -- for its violation of international agreements.

Our attacks on military targets in North Viet Nam have diverted about half a million men to support the infiltration effort. They are repairing the lines of supply and are engaged in anti-aircraft and coastal defense. This figure approximates the total number of men we now have fighting in Southeast Asia. It is not much less than the number of men South Viet Nam has had to mobilize to deal with the guerrilla attack in the South.

At

/The cost of 500 gallant American airmen killed or missing, we are bringing to bear on North Viet Nam a burden roughly equivalent to that which the Communists are imposing through guerrilla warfare on the

South -- and we are doing it with far fewer civilian casualties in the North.

11. In addition, the strain we are imposing on the North has forced a radical increase in the economic and military aid required to maintain North Viet Nam as a base of aggression against the South. We estimate military and economic aid from Communist sources in 1964 was about \$100 million; in 1965 about \$400 million; in 1966 about \$500 million.

We hope that our actions have conveyed, not merely to Hanoi but to those who support its violation of international agreements, that this aggression cannot be conducted without cost.

12. Finally, the bombing of North Viet Nam has raised the cost of bringing an armed man or a ton of supplies illegally across the border from the North to the South. Substantial casualties are inflicted on infiltrators and substantial tonnages of supplies are destroyed en route. Those who now reach the South arrive after long delays and harassment which lower their effectiveness as reinforcements.

13. The bombing in the North is an action undertaken by your Government only after the most careful reflection. It is a response to a serious and systematic and protracted violation of international agreements. It is having significant consequences for those who chose to violate the agreements. It is an integral part of our total policy which aims not to destroy North Viet Nam but to force Hanoi to end its aggression so that the people of South Viet Nam can determine their own future without coercion.

14. Both the reasons for -- and the results of -- the bombing of North Viet Nam make it imperative we continue to use this instrument of support for our men and our allies. It will end when the other side is willing to take equivalent action as part of a serious effort to end this war and bring peace to the people of Southeast Asia.

15. If bombing were not effective, if it were not imposing a heavy burden on the aggressor, if it were not making far more difficult the conduct of Hanoi's campaign of conquest, we can be sure that the elaborate propaganda apparatus of Hanoi and its friends would not have been devoting full time, and full energy, to bringing it to an end. Surely this effort -- to bring our bombing to an end in return for a vague promise of some kind of talks -- would not have been mounted if that bombing were not imposing painful costs and making Hanoi's efforts more difficult.

16. I take no satisfaction from the number of infiltrators killed on their way to South Viet Nam, from the number of trucks or of boats or of railroad cars destroyed or the tons of supplies destroyed. I take no satisfaction from the suffering of the people of North Viet Nam. I take no satisfaction from the fact that they have had to abandon their plans for economic and social development. I repeat what I said in Baltimore in April 1965 -- Look forward to the day when the government and people of North Viet Nam can join, in peace, their fellows in Southeast Asia in developing and modernizing that region so full of energy and promise. And on that day they will have -- if they wish -- the support of the United

States in providing for their people an environment of progress. But right now I wish friend and neutral and adversary to know that we shall persist with our operations in the South -- we shall persist with out operations in the North -- until those who launched this aggression and prepared to honor the agreements whose violation has brought the scourge of war to Southeast Asia.



108  
Wednesday, March 1, 1967  
9:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Lasky's book. Apparently  
RFK was in Saigon in 1951 (p. 126)

We find no other reference.

None of us recall RFK in Viet Nam  
since 1961; and I think we would.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 1, 1967  
8:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Attached are notes on two NSC meetings during February 1965 which dealt with recommendations on bombing North Viet Nam. During both meetings Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged upon you the actions which you approved.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

Summary Record of NSC meeting No. 548, Feb 10, 1965  
Memo for Mr. Rostow, Feb 8, 1967 (On February 18, 1965)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12956, Sec. 5.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By           , NARA, Date 4/23/91

Wednesday, March 1, 1967 - 7:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. Share in Asian Bank Special Funds

You will recall that Eugene Black was scheduled to begin today with his extensive consultations on the Hill concerning his trip and our proposed contribution to new Special Funds for the Asian Development Bank. Unfortunately, Gene has been hospitalized with a bad case of shingles. Therefore, he -- with the agreement of all your advisers -- proposes to send up his formal statement (draft at Tab A), to be followed by an appearance as soon as he can manage it.

The statement is approved around the government with the exception of one passage (page 22). The issue is what percentage share of the Funds the U. S. should agree to put up:

- State/AID (Gaud, Solomon and Bill Bundy) argue that we should agree to 50%. They point out that it is going to be very difficult to round up enough other contributors to achieve even this goal. They are worried that Special Funds may never materialize if we are too tough on the matching provision.
- Treasury (Barr speaking for Fowler) argues that our percentage should not exceed 40%. They cite the strong Congressional view that our 42% share in IDA should be decreased, and the likelihood that we will be before the same Committees (Banking and Currency and Foreign Relations) for IDA money at the same time we are pushing this Asian Bank request. They would agree to our financing as much as 50% of any single project, but <sup>argue</sup> that a total share of more than 40% simply won't have a chance on the Hill.

The situation on the Hill is mixed. Fulbright told Katzenbach yesterday that he would support the Asian Bank request. On the other hand, Treasury reports Republicans on the Banking and Currency Committee are working up an amendment to hold our share to 30%. On balance, it seems clear that the lower our share is, the more saleable the proposition becomes. But the foreign policy costs that worry State/AID are very real.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

My own solution would to be fuzz the issue for the moment by proposing a "minority" participation. This would give us leeway in the State/AID direction up to 49%, but would also leave room to retreat if Black finds that Treasury's fears were justified. I offer this suggestion for your consideration; I have not raised it with Barr or Gaud.

W. W. Rostow

Approve 50% share (State/AID Proposal) \_\_\_\_\_

Approve 40% share (Treasury Proposal) \_\_\_\_\_

Approve "minority" participation (Rostow Proposal) \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

EKHamilton/vmr

CONFIDENTIAL



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*W. W. Rostow*  
*Pres file*

Wednesday, March 1, 1967, 5:10 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Plan for Living Within the AID "Number of Countries" Limitations

Attached is the paper you requested on the AID country limitations. The guts of it is as follows:

- We will be able to live within two of the three limitations in FY 1968 -- those for Supporting Assistance and Technical Assistance.
- We cannot live within the 10-country limit on Development Loans without a very serious realignment of the program. (The most likely scheme -- a Trust Fund for loans to Africa -- is described, but not recommended.)
- The situation on the Hill looks better now than earlier; in any event, it is not clear that we could buy anything of consequence by changing our current position.
- It is recommended, therefore, that we continue on our present track until we have more evidence that the battle is lost or that there is a profitable deal to be made.
- If you have made up your mind that we must make the changes necessary to stay within the Development Loan limitation, we need a decision soon on how to handle the House hearings which begin in two weeks. (This problem is discussed on the last page of the paper.)

Gaud has reviewed the attached plan. He very strongly recommends that we not back off just yet. If we must eventually retreat, he thinks the Trust Fund proposal is probably the most sensible direction. Again, however, his strong preference is to proceed with the effort at friendly persuasion in which he has been heavily engaged.

You will wish to talk to Gaud and Katzenbach about this before you make up your mind. My own vote is that we make as much as possible of the fact

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-350

By *ju*, NARA, Date *9-3-92*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

that -- although we still disapprove of the limitations -- we will adjust to stay within two of the three in the hope that the Congress will at least give us more leeway on the Loan limit. This would also leave us with a trading card later in the session when the money cutting begins.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

111a

## Plan for Living Within AID "Number of Countries" Limitations

### Background

Last year's Foreign Assistance Act contains numerical limitations on the number of countries -- outside Latin America -- to which AID can furnish aid. (These limits do not apply to food aid, the Ex-Im Bank, or other programs not authorized through the Foreign Assistance Act.) Supporting Assistance, the security-related program heavily concentrated in Southeast Asia and Korea, is limited to 13 countries. Technical Assistance is restricted to 40 countries, and Development Loans to 10 countries.

However, the Act also authorizes the President to waive these limits when he finds it in the national interest. In January, the President approved waivers for FY 1967, authorizing Supporting Assistance for 17 countries, Technical Assistance for 48, and Development Loans for 29. Senators Fulbright, Morse, and Hickenlooper, among others, strongly objected. Morse announced he would sponsor an amendment to take away the President's waiver authority. On the other hand, Senators Cooper, Case and Lausche supported the Administration position. Subsequent Katzenbach/McArthur contacts suggested that the opposition, particularly Hickenlooper, was softening and that previous non-combatants such as Carlson and Aiken were sympathetic to the President's action. Doc Morgan and a majority of the House Foreign Affairs Committee seem solid in their support of the Administration.

Nevertheless, it is entirely possible that the President's waiver authority will be repealed this session, and/or that we will be forced to choose between living within the limitations or accepting some other serious damage to the program (e.g., an even larger money cut than now seems likely).

### Overall Summary

As we have tried to make clear to Senator Fulbright, the Administration is proceeding in the policy directions he favors as fast as the evolution of new regional and multilateral institutions permits. Consequently, we will be in a position to stay within at least two of the statutory limits in FY 1968.

Specifically, we will be well within the Supporting Assistance limit, and we can-- with relatively minor difficulty -- get down to the Technical Assistance limit. In the latter case, we can expect some problems in Africa. But they should be manageable.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 91-350  
By pw, NARA, Date 9-3-92

- 1 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

However, we will face a major problem in the 10-country limit on Development Loans. As the discussion below indicates, there is no way we can live within this number for the foreseeable future unless we are willing and able to find a way to remove ourselves entirely from the lending business in Africa. One possible means of doing that is sketched below; but, before running the risks involved, we should make a serious effort to get the Congress at least to raise the limits to a workable number. (We could survive fairly well, for example, if the Loan limit were raised from 10 to 20.)

Supporting Assistance and Technical Assistance

AID would be reducing the number of Supporting Assistance recipients as fast as possible even if there were no statutory limit. This has been accepted policy since 1961. Thus, this kind of aid is planned for only 10 countries in FY 1968, compared to the limit of 13. This should gain us a few points on the Hill -- but not many.

Proceeding on the Korry Report schedule, a sharp drop is also planned in the number of countries in which we will operate bilateral Technical Assistance programs. (35 of the 48 countries which are receiving this aid in 1967 are in Africa; the Korry schedule calls for phasing out 25 of them over 4-5 years.) Without the limitations, AID would expect to furnish technical assistance in 42 countries in FY 1968, compared with the limit of 40. In order to avoid problems on the Hill, we could cut two more countries -- probably Gabon and Rwanda -- to get down to 40. Thus, no Presidential waiver would be required for this account in FY 1968.

There is an important caveat with respect to Technical Assistance. The Korry Report calls for replacing each phased-out bilateral program with a Self Help Fund which our Ambassador in each country could use for modest targets of political and economic opportunity. In no case would this Fund exceed \$200,000 per year, but it would give our people a little sugar to spread around, without which they would suffer a very serious drop in influence. It is very important that the Congress agree that the country limitations do not apply to these Funds. We have so proposed in connection with our new draft Act. If the Congress does not accept our proposal, the political costs of living within the limitations will be much larger -- particularly in Africa -- than this memorandum assumes.

Development Loans

This is where the shoe really pinches. Unfortunately, it is also where Fulbright et al. are most adamant. If we are not able to get the 10-country limit either removed or raised, we must choose between another large waiver and drastic alteration of the program, particularly in Africa.



CONFIDENTIAL

The arithmetic is as follows: we will make loans in FY 1967 to 29 countries, 19 in Africa. In FY 1968, we plan to reduce this to 22, mainly by cutting out 6 African countries. We would expect the number to shrink slightly more -- to 20-- the following year as the Korry strategy comes fully into play. But that is all the leeway we have -- the Korry strategy calls for continued bilateral lending to about 10 "concentration" countries in Africa, and the total for the Near East/South Asia and the Far East will not go much lower than 10.

Therefore, if we are forced to live within the 10-country limitation, we need to find some means of breaking off a major segment of the loan program. The most obvious candidate is lending to Africa. Only 10% (about \$80 million of nearly \$800 million) of the Development Loan account would be involved, but farming out this portion would remove more than half the countries on the present list. The following section deals with the most likely scheme.

A Trust Fund for Africa

Assuming we want to continue our modest transfer of resources to Africa, the only institution now capable of taking over an \$80-90 million annual lending program is the World Bank. The African Development Bank, the only other real candidate, is barely formed and, although promising, not nearly ready to take on programs of this size. We might, however, ask the World Bank to enter into a gradually expanding working arrangement with the African Bank, as described below.

There is not much point in great precision about the regulations governing a trust fund. The trick would be getting George Woods to accept it on any terms; we couldn't be too insistent upon conditions. Separate administration of single-donor funds earmarked for a particular region would be a new and not entirely popular wrinkle for the Bank. We could try to guide Woods to some degree on the basis of our experience with the Social Progress Trust Fund of the Inter-American Bank, but we should understand at the outset that he would want and need great flexibility in playing his hand. Indeed, his agreement would probably depend heavily on how much flexibility the Bank is given as administrator. Recognizing these limits, we might suggest the following rules:

1. We would undertake to use the Bank/IDA as our primary lending instrument for all of Africa. Thus, we would plan annually to transfer 10-15% of our development loan funds to a new Bank Trust Fund for Africa.
2. The funds would be available for use only in Africa for major infrastructure projects (transportation, communications, and power), and AID's other fields of emphasis (health, education and agriculture).

CONFIDENTIAL

3. The money would be made available to the Bank family as a loan on the easiest terms we could get key people in Congress to go along with. We might specify that it be re-lent at the same rate -- perhaps with an additional 1/2% service charge. (Assuming we used AID's present interest floor, this would mean a final rate of 3% -- very high for Africa, but the best we can now do.)
4. We would retain as much operating control over the Trust Fund as Woods' politics could stand -- something between an annual review and a veto on every project.
5. We would urge the World Bank to establish a working arrangement with the African Development Bank whereby the ADB administered a growing proportion of these funds as the African institution matures. (This will happen slowly; we shouldn't advertise otherwise.)

Benefits and Costs

This scheme should get us some mileage with Fulbright and perhaps a few other Senators. (I emphasize should because it is not clear that anything that we do outside Vietnam -- short of stopping all Development Loans -- will really help us now with Fulbright.) But it probably would not transform Fulbright into an avid AID supporter, and it almost certainly would have no effect on Morse or the Republicans. Moreover, it would probably be a net debit in the House, particularly with Morgan. (In general, the more one removes aid from U.S. security and political purposes, the more trouble he has in the House.) The Trust Fund would certainly be denounced by Passman, Gross, et al as an unconscionable new giveway.

The proposal would also involve other very real costs which we should carefully weigh against the benefits of pleasing the Fulbright crowd. In Africa, it would be taken as a clear sign of U. S. disinterest and withdrawal. Our influence, both on bilateral questions and on such issues as U.N. votes, could be expected to wane. In such countries as Ethiopia and Morocco, it would force us to develop wholly new bases to support our extensive strategic facilities. In places like Liberia, Nigeria and East Africa, it would weaken historic relationships and reduce our leverage considerably. It would also cause some technical problems: Woods probably would not agree to a full "tying" arrangement so that we would probably have to live with some offshore procurement; we would also have to forego any chance of program lending in countries like Ghana and Tunisia where it is sometimes the most sensible form of assistance. We could also expect some opposition from domestic civil rights leaders. Finally, we would have to expect some negative effect on our IDA request, since Passman and Company could be expected to argue that this step simply doubles our present subsidy to IDA. (We now contribute \$104 million per year; this additional \$80-90 million, though earmarked for a special Trust Fund, would end up being administered by the same people.)

CONFIDENTIAL

Recommendation

My strong preference is that we stay on the present track until it becomes clear that we gain some advantage from changing our position. Specifically, we should continue to stress that:

- We are proceeding with an orderly transition to regional and multi-lateral instruments as quickly as circumstances allow.
- We continue to oppose the limitations; they are not in our draft bill and we hope the Congress will see fit to leave them out of this year's Act.
- Even if the limitations are maintained, however, we would not expect to use the waiver authority in FY 1968 for either Supporting Assistance or Technical Assistance.
- The limit on Development Loans is simply inconsistent with the real world and with any reasonable policy toward Africa. At best, it should be eliminated; at least, it should be raised.

If the President feels that this position simply won't do on the Hill, we should get to work immediately staffing out the details of the Trust Fund proposal. In the best of circumstances, it will take time to put together and negotiate. It would represent a very clear and public turnaround from our present stance and require careful explanation to the press and the Congress.

Immediate Action Problem

Hearings on the Aid bill are now scheduled to begin in the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 15. The House Appropriations Subcommittee will have hearings on the money bill early in April. We don't yet know the Senate schedule, but it will be similar. AID's elaborate written presentation goes to press on Friday. It proposes and justifies Technical Assistance in 42 countries and Development Loans in 22. Obviously, if the limitations were renewed, both steps would require waivers. We can probably get away on the Technical Assistance front by giving the Committee oral assurance that we will in fact get down to 40 countries if the limitations are kept in the Act.

However, if we must live within the 10-country limit on loans, we must choose between defending the above proposals in the expectation that we will change them later, or seeking to postpone the hearings while we work out something along the lines of the African Trust Fund. There is not time to do a reasonable job on the Trust Fund before the hearings and/or to redo the Congressional

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

presentation accordingly. Again, I would vote that we proceed with our present proposals and see what sort of reception we get. If it appears that the limitations will be re-enacted and that we will either lose the waiver authority, or that there will be serious problems on the Hill if we use it, then we should proceed with Woods and the Trust Fund.

Ed Hamilton



**TOP-SECRET -- LITERALLY EYES ONLY**

Wednesday, March 1, 1967 -- 4:55 p.m.

**Mr. President:**

At your instruction I talked with Sec. Rusk about proceeding with the Asian trip and telephoning to Lodge to that effect.

He does not regard the telephone to Saigon as wholly secure and recommends a cable. He guarantees that, aside from himself, only one code room officer will see the message.

He asked me to have a draft ready for you and for him to look at at the 5:30 p.m. meeting on the Latin American Summit.

The conditional form of the last sentence is due to Sec. Rusk's request that you not finally lock on until he has a chance to present to you certain considerations bearing on the trip.

W. W. Rostow

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority State 75-78, USC 3-23-79

By ag/cip, NARA, Date 4-19-71

WWRostow:rlh

**TOP-SECRET**

1122

3/1/67

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- LITERALLY EYES ONLY

DRAFT CABLE TO AMBASSADOR LODGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

I received your letter and greatly appreciated it. I shall be sending you my reply shortly.

I should very much like to talk with you before you give up your post in Saigon. I have in mind such issues as your successor; how to give the pacification drive maximum urgency; the Vietnamese Presidential elections; and other matters which will determine how things go in 1967.

I would like your judgment about the possibility of meeting you and Westy -- say, March 20-25 -- perhaps in Baguio, if we can work it out. I might then go over to Viet Nam for a day to talk with Ky and Thieu and to see some of our men. Before deciding finally, however, I would like to have your judgment as to whether such a gathering, which would be more in the spirit of Honolulu than Manila, would be wise.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State let 7-5-78, NSC 2-23-79

By RG/ep, NARA, Date 4-19-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Wednesday -  
March 1, 1967

Mr. President -

Herewith is a further favorable report  
on the Chief Justice's visit in Bolivia.

W. W. R.  
Attachment

Message from Embassy  
Bolivia of 2/28/67  
(no. 2134)

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

113a

BATCH  
ROUTED  
BUREAU  
DYES  
COUNCIL  
HARRIS  
JONES  
KELLEY  
LAWSON  
MAYERS  
TAYLOR  
WRIGHTS

UNCLASSIFIED

1967 FEB 28 AM 10 02

025431

43  
Action  
ARA  
Info  
SS  
GPM  
SP  
SC  
E  
P  
CU  
NSC  
INR  
CIA  
NSA  
AID  
PC  
SY  
RSR

OO RUEHC  
DE RUESLZ 002A 0591440  
ZNR UUUUU  
O P 281430Z FEB 67  
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO RUESLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY  
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
UNCLAS LA PAZ 2134

SUBJECT: WARREN VISIT

1. PROGRAM IN SUCRE FEBRUARY 27 WENT SMOOTHLY DESPITE DELAYS CAUSED BY LARGE CROWDS WHICH SLOWED MOVEMENT WITHIN THE CITY. CHIEF JUSTICE WAS IN GOOD SPIRITS THROUGHOUT DAY AND ENJOYED THE WARM, SPONTANEOUS RECEPTION BY RESIDENTS OF SUCRE AND PEASANTS FROM OUTLYING RURAL AREAS. AT A SOLEMN SESSION OF HONOR AT THE BOLIVIAN SUPREME COURT EARLY IN THE EVENING, BOLIVIAN CHIEF JUSTICE JOSE TORRICO CHARACTERIZED THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AS "THE STRONGEST PILLAR OF LIBERTY, ORDER, JUSTICE AND PROGRESS," AND CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN AS "A SUPERLATIVE GUARDIAN OF LIBERTY." AT DINNER FOLLOWING CEREMONY AT SUPREME COURT, HOSTED BY PRESIDENT BARRIENTOS, CHIEF JUSTICE ACCEPTED BOLIVIA'S HIGHEST AWARD, THE CONDOR OF THE ANDES, ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT.

2. THIS MORNING (FEBRUARY 28) THE CHIEF JUSTICE WILL BE THE PRINCIPAL SPEAKER AT A SEMINAR ATTENDED BY BOLIVIAN SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AND OTHER NOTED JURISTS. FOLLOWING THE SEMINAR HE WILL BE AWARDED AN HONORARY DEGREE FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO JAVIER, SUCRE.

3. ALL MEMBERS OF THE WARREN PARTY ARE FEELING WELL AND APPEAR TO BE ENJOYING THEIR VISIT TO THE HISTORIC CITY OF SUCRE.

4. WARREN VISIT CONTINUES TO DOMINATE FRONT PAGES MOST DAILIES. HENDERSON

BT

PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE, USIA 2/28/67

UNCLASSIFIED



*107-601*  
*125 file*  
Wednesday, March 1, 1967

Mr. President:

Our Embassy in London reports that the Wilson Government received a major setback as a result of yesterday's vote in Commons following a defense policy debate. Wilson had a majority of only 39 votes. He normally commands a majority of about 100. About 60 Labor members of Parliament abstained in order to record their protest.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, March 1, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM LONDON (6987)

114a  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-349  
By WJ, NARA, Date 1-8-92

London's press reaction to the outcome of last night's defense debate is unanimously that the result was a major setback for the Government.

We have not yet talked to Government and Parliamentary officials and leaders to get their reactions first-hand, and, of course, much of the reality of what happened will depend on what they think happened. To the Embassy, however, it seems that the result must clearly have come as a shock to Wilson, Healey, Brown and other Government leaders.

This is the most massive, back-bench disaffection on any major issue since the Government has been in power. What is more, it is hard to know what the Government can do about it.

It is true, as the critics say, that British defense policy is a mixture of ambiguities, dependent clauses and postponed or evaded decisions. It is not clear-cut, either, on Europe or East of Suez, on Britain's nuclear role or scope and nature of its future weapons requirements.

To us, it has seemed that this is less a matter of ineptness or indecisiveness on the part of the Government than an instinctive calculus that this is how to maximize support, or alternatively, minimize opposition. The present "straddling" policy on East of Suez, while it displeases Little-Englanders and Europe-Firsters still holds heavy hints of retrenchment and ultimate withdrawal. To put this policy in clearer focus would alienate not just the "imperialists," but those who genuinely feel (and it is noteworthy that Wilson and Healey are both in this camp) that Britain does have a contribution to make in the area and that in any event this presence gives Britain a degree of influence on U.S. policy which it would otherwise not have. The same is true about Europe. By relating BAOR levels to offset, the Government appeases, at least in part, those who want to see a retrenchment in Europe and at the same time presents issue in such a way that it is difficult for Europe-Firsters to quarrel with.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thus, the Government faces a basic dilemma. To adopt a clearer, more focused policy in any area might well risk losing net support. By exercising one option, it would foreclose another -- and every option has its supporters. How the Government reacts to the present situation will be interesting to watch.

At a minimum, the Embassy estimates that the effect of the debate will be to toughen British policy along lines least congenial to us. It can certainly give Wilson a major talking point in resisting American blandishments on specific East of Suez issues, to think twice about Aden, to be conciliatory with Maltese, to take a softer line on BAOR effects, etc. The first test likely to come on the last question.

The Embassy has always felt that British position on BAOR was calculatedly ambiguous, that there was a tacit agreement to disagree within Whitehall, and not to force issue before the decision was absolutely necessary. We have believed it was wise for us to leave well enough alone and not press the British for the final answer on whether, if in the event the Germans did not up their offset offer, Britain would, in the last analysis, cut BAOR to the level the offset would support. We have anticipated that when the crunch comes, the issue will find Callaghan on one side, Brown and Healey on the other, and probability was that the final decision would show more flexibility than Callaghan's present, rigid position; that, in the event, Britain would accept some gap between offset and foreign exchange costs of BAOR, so that withdrawals would not exceed 10,000 or so in the worst case.

Last night's event, however, could only have strengthened Callaghan's hand and weakened that of Brown and Healey. Although time heals, and when the decision finally has to be made, things may have moved back more to the status quo ante, we would judge that if the matter was adjudicated in the atmosphere of last night's debate, Callaghan would win hands down and BAOR reductions would be massive. There were many in the debate, on the Labor side, who concurred with Lord Montgomery's general judgment that 20,000-man BAOR was enough.

The basic dilemma for the Government will be: is now the time to make a basic decision on the direction of the Government

defense policy? If the "either/or" school were dominant, the decision would certainly be to get out of East of Suez. Our judgment is, however, that things have gone as badly as they can for the Government and its position is not likely to be improved by adopting a clearer line less panoplied with options.

Therefore, on balance, we would expect continuation of the essentially "straddling" defense policy, but almost certainly with more Government determination about the East of Suez rundowns and a more hard-hearted approach on BAOR.

KAISER



*Pres file*

Limited Official Use

Wednesday - March 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Special Mission to Costa e Silva's Inauguration

President-elect Costa e Silva will be inaugurated in Brasilia on March 15.

The Brazilian Government has asked that the United States be represented by a Special Mission of not more than three members and their wives. They specifically suggest an Ambassador on Special Mission (Tutbill is being invited separately), one Senator and one Congressman.

For Special Ambassador, State suggests one of these names:

- Dr. Milton Eisenhower \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clark Clifford \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. McGeorge Bundy \_\_\_\_\_
- Governor Harriman \_\_\_\_\_
- Ambassador Bunker \_\_\_\_\_

I favor Dr. Eisenhower if we can get him. You may prefer to send Governor Pat Brown. This would make it easier not to take him to the OAS Summit.

Governor Brown ✓

For the Senate representative, State suggests:

- Senator Eastland ✓
- or
- Senator Kuchel \_\_\_\_\_

Mike Manatos and I favor Eastland. This would permit him to visit Brazil which he had to by-pass on his recent Latin American tour because of adverse weather conditions in Rio.

Limited Official Use

For the House member, State recommends one of these:

Thomas E. Morgan \_\_\_\_\_

John Brademas \_\_\_\_\_

Charles Goodell \_\_\_\_\_

Frances Bolton \_\_\_\_\_

Henry Wilson suggests:

Armistead Selden, Jr. \_\_\_\_\_

Henry Reuss \_\_\_\_\_

William Robert Poage \_\_\_\_\_

Donald W. Riegle, Jr. \_\_\_\_\_

1st  
X  
2d

Henry prefers Selden.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-349  
By ju, NARA, Date 7-24-92

116

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - March 1, 1967

Mr. President:

Our Ambassador in Uruguay, Hank Hoyt, has sent you the following message:

"For the President -

We are delighted and excited by the prospect of your visit to Uruguay. The Summit meeting should offer an historic opportunity to place our relations with Latin America on a new footing and provide the high level personal contact so necessary in dealing with the people of this hemisphere. .

It should also be a dramatic example of your Administration's support of the Alliance for Progress and give a new impulse to that program at this important time when various countries are seeking to improve their economic and political systems.

I can assure you, Mr. President, that my own efforts and those of all the personnel of your Embassy here will be dedicated to providing the complete support and assistance necessary to assure the success of this meeting. Hoyt."

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday, March 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Rescheduling of CABRIOLET Test

117  
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-350

By JW, NARA, Date 9-3-92

Glenn Seaborg asked me to raise with you whether you wish to continue the temporary postponement of the nuclear escalation experiment, CABRIOLET. He calls attention to these facts which are elaborated upon in his attached memorandum:

1. If the test is to be made this spring, a decision to go ahead needs to be made by March 10.
2. Postponing the test beyond mid-April would mean an additional cost of \$1,400,000 if it were decided to conduct the test later.

AEC argues that a go-ahead for CABRIOLET now would insure continuing Congressional support for the nuclear excavation program and avoid interference with the Panama Canal Commission program.

AEC announced on February 10 that CABRIOLET was being temporarily postponed "in order to avoid any possibility of complicating the current decisions concerning a non-proliferation treaty . . ."

A decision to go ahead now would immediately raise questions as to how the situation has changed since the February 10 postponement.

Given the reason which was used to explain the postponement, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara agree that the only way to avoid a major inconsistency would be to delay the test at least until fall.

With regret, I recommend you take no action now, which means that CABRIOLET could not be conducted until next fall at least.

\_\_\_\_\_ Take no action now

\_\_\_\_\_ Go ahead with CABRIOLET

\_\_\_\_\_ Review rescheduling CABRIOLET and the next test, BUGGY, in spring.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:BKS:damc

CABRIOLET/ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



CABRIOLET FACTS

~~DECLASSIFIED~~  
~~E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6~~  
~~NLJ 99-79~~  
By JSN, NARA Date 5-22-00

I. Present Situation

- (a) Explosive in place - Most scientific instrumentation in place
- (b) Useful life expectancy of nuclear explosive in place ten weeks from February 1 (approximate emplacement date), or about mid-April
- (c) Grazing season starts mid-March to mid-April. At first, only a few cows are out to pasture. The number increases with the passage of time. After about mid-April the probability of having adverse publicity increases. Although the weather, device, and conditions of detonation were somewhat different, the Palanquin experiment was conducted on April 14, 1965 without much local reaction.

II. Execution - Spring 1967

- (a) Can conduct experiment up to mid-April with increasing probability of strong local reaction thereafter
- (b) Because of requirement for weather wait, need readiness capability of April 1 in order to be sure of detonating by mid-April
- (c) To be ready by April 1, need approval to reactivate by about March 10, 1967

III. Technical Consequence of Deferral Beyond FY 1967

- (a) Device reliability lost
- (b) Least costly action is to destruct in place
- (c) To conduct Cabriolet in FY 1968 or later would then require complete new construction and would require four months preparation

IV. Costs

- (a) Spent to date on Cabriolet..... \$ 2,729,000
- (b) Execute spring 1967..... \$ 477,000
- (c) Execute later

Destruct and roll-up.....	\$ 195,000
Execute experiment.....	1,700,000
	<u>\$ 1,895,000</u>

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

~~DECLASSIFIED~~  
~~E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6~~  
~~NLJ 99-79~~  
By cb, NARA Date 10-19-00

This document contains information defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended or the disclosure of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Costs (continued)

(d) Execute in spring 1967 is less costly by \$1,418,000

V. Options

- (a) Reschedule Cabriolet this spring with the remaining program to follow as planned;
- (b) slip Cabriolet until fall, but obtain the necessary approvals and funds to prepare for and execute both Cabriolet and Buggy in FY 1968; or
- (c) slip Cabriolet to FY 1968 and let the remaining program slip accordingly.

From a technical point of view, only alternative (c) would interfere with the Canal Commission program. However, alternative (a) is highly desirable from the point of view of maintaining Congressional support for nuclear excavation and for the Canal Commission program. In addition, alternative (a) would provide the greatest assistance to the negotiations underway with Panama, and would assist in maintaining technical interest in the nuclear excavation program.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wed., March 1, 1967  
5:20 p.m.

118

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Ambassador Lodge's weekly  
telegram -- on balance, full of movement  
in the right directions.

W. W. R.

1182

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-349

By ju, NARA, Date 7-24-92

Wednesday, March 1, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 19209)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. Lilienthal Visit

It was good to have David Lilienthal and his experts here. He traveled widely and spoke with businessmen, farmers, Government officials and college students. In fact, he spent one evening with 36 students, getting their views on the economic development of their country. He made a very favorable impression on the Vietnamese as a man genuinely interested in their problems and in their hopes for their country.

He was impressed by the caliber of the Vietnamese with whom he will work and was encouraged by their enthusiasm and their earnest desire to work. He believes, as do I, that both the human and the natural resources are here.

We are thus off to a good start on this project of defining Vietnam's economic path in the future. Mr. Lilienthal is already acting as a catalyst around which the Vietnamese can work and discuss what comes after their war. This could be nation-building in the best sense of the word.

B. Pressures on Hanoi

In Ky's mind, and that of other leading Vietnamese, the idea is growing that evolution towards a Constitutionally-elected President is a great source of pressure on Hanoi. They believe it would make establishment of Communism in the future much more difficult here, notably because it would make the insertion of the so-called National Liberation Front as such into the Government of Vietnam almost impossible. To be sure, individuals could in theory get elected to Congress in an individual capacity, but this would be totally different.

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS



In the Vietnamese view, to "put the National Liberation Front into the Government of Vietnam" would confer a benediction on the worst criminal-terrorist elements; would mean defeat and consequent stultification of all who have made sacrifices here; would confirm the right of the Viet Cong to hold at least the 20 percent of the population which they now largely control; would be signal to all Government troops to stop fighting; and would give a hunting license to the Viet Cong to start expansion of terrorism among the 80 percent presently not under Viet Cong domination. The current Government would undoubtedly regard putting the National Liberation Front into the Government of Vietnam as an individual death sentence for many Vietnamese, specifically including themselves.

The conviction that the developments mentioned above would be made much more difficult, if not impossible, under a Constitutional Government is responsible for Ky's desire to hold the election as soon as it is humanly possible to do so after the Constitution has been promulgated. Considering the difficulties of setting up an election, with the printing of the ballots and all the rest, I estimate a period of anywhere between three to six months after promulgation of a Constitution before the election could be held.

Another result of Ky's conviction that the move toward an elected Constitutional President is so important was his statement to me on the day when I went to see him to tell him about your decision on increased military pressure. At that time, he said that even if a civilian was elected President whom he, Ky, did not like, he would support him so that Vietnam could speak and act internationally with one strong, authoritative and legitimate voice. He obviously would be supporting the process rather than indulging individual preferences -- a wholesome and unusual attitude here. He also is much impressed with the question of legitimacy, and has been concerned by the feeling abroad that his Government lacks legitimacy. He believes that an election would confer a legitimacy which nobody could question.

All this naturally raises the question of the U.S. view of the Presidential election. I have asked my American colleagues here to say two things in response to all questions:

A. We have not and will not interfere in the internal affairs of Vietnam. The question of what individual they elect for President is their business and is an internal question.

B. We expect to recognize whoever is duly elected.

Comment: This is a safe position for us to take since there is as yet no candidate who is dangerous for us -- nor is there one in sight. I also prefer to use the word 'recognize' rather than the word 'support.' There is a vast difference between our 'supporting' a certain group in power, and our 'recognizing' that group as the due Government of Vietnam. I remember when the late Senator Taft criticized the administrators of the Marshall Plan for "supporting" the Labor Government of England. The answer was that we were not "supporting" the Labor Government and that in an election between them and the Conservatives, we would be impartial, but the Labor Government was the duly constituted government. And we had to work through it if the Marshall Plan were to be carried out.

Every day brings an attempt by someone, usually very cleverly done, to involve us in some of these candidacies. And there are all too many Americans who regard it as their God-given right to say whom they favor for President of Vietnam. This led me to utter words of caution at the Mission Council meeting of last Monday.

C. Constitution

Last week the Assembly moved swiftly through both the Executive and the Judiciary Sections of the draft Constitution. Still to be considered are sections on advisory councils, political parties and the opposition, amending the Constitution, and the transitional provisions.

The powers of the President were further increased, in accord with the wishes of the Government, by reducing the importance of the Prime Minister. The President will determine national policy and the Prime Minister will execute it; the President will also preside over the Council of Ministers, thus diminishing the authority of the Prime Minister over the Cabinet.

Among the problems yet to come before the Assembly is the proposal by General Thieu that the Assembly write into the Constitution provision for a high council for national defense and the armed forces. The council would advise the President on matters relating to national defense. In a February 22 letter to the Assembly, Thieu said that "The council will be an institution through which the military can make its voice heard, contribute to national reconstruction, and legally set forth the aspirations of those who have sacrificed so much for their country." Thieu also said that "such a council will keep military personnel from feeling that they are mere instruments of persons who are irresponsible or acting for their personal benefit."

Thieu in effect would give the present armed forces council a place in the basic law of the land. There is much to be said for thus constitutionally regularizing the rights and duties of the highest military authority in this country where it has an importance unknown in our country. Some civilian politicians fear that the body would not be content merely to advise the President. Presidential hopeful Tran Van Huong, for example, told an Embassy Officer that the armed forces council is an "illegal body" and that if it is embedded in the constitution it will "interfere" in the government in a destructive way. Best guess is that after a sharp debate, the Assembly will provide for such a body in the constitution.

Other major issues yet to be decided include the proposal for election of province chiefs, the role of the current assembly after the promulgation of the constitution, and provisions covering the formation and activities of political parties.

In his February 22 letter to the Assembly, the second such official message from the Government to the deputies, Thieu also opposed election of province chiefs and urged that the Assembly reconsider its decision on "no confidence" votes. As the constitution now stands, the

Legislature can force removal of the Prime Minister only by a 3/4 vote of the total membership of both Houses. Although in practice such a vote would probably prove extremely difficult if not impossible to achieve, the directorate is still dissatisfied with this provision. Thieu has asked that a vote of no confidence not be binding on the President under any circumstances.

#### D. Carrying out Manila Pledges

The Vietnamese Government has been slow in carrying out some of the promises made at Manila, but there is now some progress. The effort to elect thousands of Hamlet Chiefs and village officials is going well. Ky kicked off the organization of the elections personally by appearing at the corps seminars being held for the Provincial Officials who will conduct the elections. In a speech at the III Corps Seminar, Ky stressed the importance of building democracy at the lowest levels of society, and he emphasized the necessity for conducting completely honest elections. Although military personnel on active duty (including Regional forces and popular forces) will not be permitted to run in the Hamlet and village elections, Ky hit hard at those who may think that the military is not capable of playing a constructive role in the building of democracy. He asked for tolerance by the people of the military and vice versa. Also in Can Tho on February 28, Ky stressed the continuing role of the military in completing the social revolution. In III Corps, government preparations for the elections include planning for a training program after the elections for some 1,775 village officials.

During the past week, the land reform effort progressed with the distribution of land titles at two ceremonies attended by Ky and other Cabinet officials.

General Thieu is clearly and thoroughly committed to the Manila Pledge of a program of national reconciliation. In fact, he is enthusiastic about it, having called in Zorthian for a long discussion. Thieu said that he knew we felt the Government had not moved quickly enough to carry out its Manila commitments because he had not issued a National Reconciliation Proclamation either on TET or November 1. He explained that the Government had not made the necessary preparations by either of those dates and he had decided the simple issuance of a Proclamation without the necessary preparations would result in failure. He also pointed out that an offer of full civil and political rights for returnees would be less impressive without the existence of a Constitution.



Thieu told Zorthian that the occasion of the promulgation of the Constitution would be the best time for the announcement. He said this would provide enough time to undertake preparations for an increased influx of returnees and also give the Viet Cong enough time to come in and undergo a screening and a reorientation process before participating in the Presidential elections in the late summer or early fall.

Thieu also said that he felt there were three essential preparatory steps that must be accomplished between now and the time of the National Reconciliation Proclamation, as follows:

A. The first would be an intensive educational effort among Government officials down to the lowest ranks. He said he and other members of the Government would undertake this effort through travels around the country.

B. Secondly, adequate resources must be available to handle returnees both at Chieu Hoi centers and at resettlement projects.

C. Third, preparations must be made and resources assured for a major psychological operations campaign. Throughout his lengthy presentation of his ideas on this subject, Thieu emphasized the importance of performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam and the potential shortening of the war through draining off Viet Cong strength.

E. Chieu Hoi

Chieu Hoi returnees for the period February 12 - 18 totaled 616. This compares with 612 for last week and 441 for the same period in 1966. So far this year, 4,081 returnees have come in to Chieu Hoi centers. During the same period last year, the total was 2,263.

F. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending February 25, the Viet Cong killed 81 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 195, and kidnapped 99. The dead included one Village Chief, two Hamlet Chiefs, 3 Chieu Hoi returnees, one Revolutionary Development worker, and two National Policemen.

The figures for this week can be compared with the 49 killed, 171 wounded, and 59 kidnapped last week. There is, apparently, a marked increase in killing, wounding and kidnapping of local law enforcement officials.

This week set a new record for enemy killed, with 2,332 reported killed. This is the second week in a row that the enemy killed has exceeded 2,000. Last week was also an all-time high.

G. Viet Cong Terrorism

The Viet Cong attacked the Danang Airfield with rockets in pre-dawn darkness on February 27. Fifty-one rounds were fired from rocket launchers 6 to 8,000 meters away. The rockets were of a new model, hitherto unseen here. They were 6 inches in diameter, 40 inches long, and weighed 85 pounds each. Two lines of firing holes were later found, each 3 to 4 feet apart, with 70 rockets in one and 64 in the other. I wish I knew what this protends.

Thirty-five Vietnamese civilians are believed dead and 15 wounded. Fifteen American military personnel were killed, 57 wounded. The village was 30 percent destroyed by fire, with about 150 houses burned. Fifteen American aircraft were lightly damaged and a signal facility was also damaged.

Other terrorist incidents reported recently include the following:

Between 2:45 and 2:55 a.m. on February 22, the Viet Cong fired ten rounds of 81 mm mortar into the streets of Hoi An City, Quang Nam province, from a position approximately two and one-half kilometers north of the city. One round struck a portion of a Buddhist Pagoda, wounding four monks. One civilian was killed and 12 other civilians were wounded. At 11:50 a.m. on the same date, the Viet Cong fired three rounds of 60 mm mortar into Hoi An; two landed in the yard of an ARVN engineer unit, injuring three adult civilians and two small children. The third round struck a civilian's resident in the center of town, but failed to explode.

Moc Hoa, the capital of Kine Tuong province, was mortared by the Viet Cong on February 19 at 11:00 a.m. Nine civilians were killed and 91 other civilians were wounded, including ten policemen and sixteen members of their families. The majority of the wounded were women and children.

At 9:00 a.m. on February 14, the Viet Cong held a so-called People's Tribunal at Ha Tri I hamlet, Phu Thu district, Thua Thien province, in which two civilians were executed and one 52-year-old woman received a sentence of 12 years imprisonment.

#### H. Port of Saigon

After many great efforts some improvement in congestion of the Port of Saigon is appearing. Whereas the commercial cargo sitting in ships waiting to be discharged in Saigon was about 300,000 tons at the end of December, it is now down to about 160,000 tons. It may, of course, move up somewhat again, but we hope to be able to push this backed-up cargo figure lower and lower.

USAID has appointed a task force to contact the importers and encourage them to take their goods out of the Port quickly. We had excellent results last week with the "Velma Lykes," concerning which the task force told the 30 consignees when their goods would be discharged from the ship. The rule was that 99 percent of the cargo

was loaded directly into the importers' trucks and taken out of the Port. Captain Adams, of the "Velma Lykes," had anticipated 21 days in Port and was able to unload in 11 days. He was so delighted that he gave a luncheon in honor of the USAID and U.S. military employees who made possible such quick discharge.

We are learning a lot from our contacts with the importers, and are taking steps to set up a more efficient system to ensure that the importers know where their goods are and that they pick them up expeditiously.

#### I. Economic

For the first time in many weeks, the Retail Price Index declined. It now stands at 261, as compared with last week's 276. The chief reasons for the modest decline was an increase in pork supplies. Rice prices continued to move up, as they have done for the past two months.

The Wholesale Price Index for imported items is 229 this week. This figure compared with 225 last week and 223 for one month ago. Rumors of devaluation caused dollars and gold to jump upward on February 21, but they have since declined; dollars now stand at 173 and gold at 227. This compares with 175 and 225 as of one month ago.

Agreement was reached with the Government to increase imports of U.S. rice during the year from 200,000 to 300,000 tons under PL 480 on non-concessional terms, with 100 percent U.S. use of Piaster proceeds. Total rice imports for the year, therefore, should be 870,000 tons -- 750,000 from the U.S., 100,000 from Thailand, and 20,000 from Taiwan.

The domestic rice situation continues to be unsatisfactory. Latest estimates of this year's crop are 4.5 million tons. This compares with 4.8 million last year.

With the arrival of 1,500 tons of frozen pork from Argentina and good hog deliveries from the provinces, pork supplies



appear adequate. Probably about half of the frozen pork shipment will be put in cold storage and the rest will be sold.

On February 17, Germany agreed to lend the Government 11 million marks for construction of a slaughterhouse in Saigon. This, plus additional cold storage facilities, should allow the Government to maintain adequate supplies when domestic hog deliveries fall.

#### J. Military Jurisdiction over Civilians

The issue of military court martial jurisdiction over American and other third country civilians in Vietnam has received heavy press play, with evident and widespread Vietnamese concern that the U. S. is attempting to usurp Vietnamese sovereignty.

Typical of the press stories was the Saigon Daily News page one interview with Ho Tri Chau, President of the Saigon Bar Association, who reportedly said: "The Bar Association cannot conceive of any foreign power exercising legal authority in Vietnam, which is an independent nation... All crimes committed in Vietnam must be judged by Vietnamese courts in accordance with Vietnamese law." Chau said that there may be exceptions but these "must be worked out by an agreement between the two countries concerned."

President of Vietnam's Special Court, Nguyen Cao Quyen, was reported as saying, "As to citizens of third countries, the American authorities have absolutely no right to arrest them... Nowhere in this land is there private land of the Americans. There are no American bases, so the Americans cannot use American jurisdiction."

The Saigon Daily Than Chung (liberal--southern) editorialized that the U. S. decision to judge American and Allied nationals by military court demonstrates the "despicable attitude of Americans toward Vietnamese law and the Vietnamese people." The Daily Saigon Bao on February 20 inquired if Americans "are here to protect the country's sovereignty or to institute courts and spread American authority?" Saigon Bao concluded by expressing little hope of seeing "its insignificant opinion shaking the decision of a power which presently has half a million men in combat on its poor and luckless territory."

Happily, the Minister of Justice declared: "I am confident that the Government, Congress and the people of the United States are not going to take any decision in violation of the Vietnamese judiciary powers."

A high-ranking American public utterance would still be very useful.

Wed., March 1, 1967  
4:45 p.m.

119

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the first authentic extract  
from Kiesinger's Feb. 27 statement.  
In the context it may be clumsy, but  
he was trying to say something serious  
and constructive.

W. W. R.

Attachment

Excerpt from Kiesinger Speech of February 27 taken from a stenographic recording which was incomplete.

I have recently told my American visitors time and again: Things can not be allowed to continue as before. We only talk now about matters in dispute. We no longer talk about common policy. What we once built up and what was imbued with an indomitable will to preserve World freedom -- NATO and NATO's spirit of alliance -- now threatens to become an empty structure, a mere apparatus. The task at hand is to find out to what extent American interests are identical with ours, that is, German and European interests, and to what extent they are not or no longer are identical.

The Soviet Union is lonely. In Europe, the so-called former Satellites will certainly not align themselves against the Soviet Union, but they do seek more independence. That can readily be seen. Otherwise, the Soviet Union has no friends in the world except Cuba and here and there. It has internal problems, and of course, contrary to the Marxist concept, a spiritual evolution is now taking place in the Soviet Union itself. Coming generations in the Soviet Union will simply think differently about the world than in the generations of their fathers and grandfathers. We need no wait for this, but should adjust our actions to the development of situations that make such solutions possible.



~~SECRET~~

120  
Wednesday, March 1, 1967  
2:30 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This thoughtful cable from Alex Johnson is the kind Ambassadors should write but rarely do.

He conveys Sato's anxiety that U. S. detente with the U. S. S. R. could throw the Japanese position in Asia out of balance.

It is parallel to Western European anxiety about the detente and the non-proliferation treaty.

Basically, what Japan wants is a Communist China that is not so weak that it is under Soviet dominance and not so strong that it threatens Japan. It wants a Soviet Union not in open conflict with the U. S. but sufficiently preoccupied with the U. S. , China, etc. , so that it must take Japan seriously and doesn't feel free to lean on it.

Japan wants our protection, economic ties, and friendship. From that base it wants to build a position of leadership in Asia; trade from a position of strength with both Communist China and the Soviet Union.

But it doesn't want us buddying up too close to either Communist China or the U. S. S. R. -- especially the latter, because of its greater relative strength.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

(Tokyo 6126 3/1/67)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-52  
By is, NARA Date 3-20-170

~~SECRET~~

120a

Copy of TOKYO 6126 From Alexis Johnson March 1, 1967

1. I want to call attention to Sato's statements re the Soviet Union (in Tokyo's 6063). It will be noted that he expressed fear that the Soviets might take advantage of Chicom weakness to take action against the periphery of China; that he placed part of the blame for the rise of Mao on the Soviets (the rest of the blame rested on Japan); that he warned against trusting the Soviets, including the statements they make to us on the Chicoms, and in general, made clear that he considers the Soviets rather than Communist China, as the major threat to Japan. This is the first time that I have heard an expression of this kind from any Japanese leader, and it is clear to me that he was deliberately and advisedly taking advantage of an opportunity to make these statements.

2. We should, of course, not be surprised at this, as it corresponds with historical and deep-rooted Japanese attitudes toward Russia, whether imperial or Communist, while in the recent latest developments in China, have the appearance of somewhat reversing these historical Japanese attitudes, what Sato seemed to be indicating was that these short-term trends do not change the underlying pro-China, anti-Russia feelings of Japan. Although Japan is appalled at much of what is now going on in Communist China and is worried at the Chinese development of nuclear weapons, what Sato was saying was that a gain in Soviet territories or strength at the expense of China would be a source of deep concern to Japan.

3. We have recently had other signs of Japanese uneasiness over how the U. S. attitude toward mainland developments might develop, with some officials seeming to be concerned lest the United States might be hoping for prolonged disorder as the optimum state of affairs. To some extent this concern may reflect the worry that in the future the U. S. might be tempted to take sides in the mainland imbroglio or otherwise try to exploit the chaotic conditions there, and in the process get bogged down in the kind of morass which engulfed Japan in the late 30's; however, the concern over Soviet expansionism expressed by Sato seems to be a much larger element in Japanese misgivings.

4. I believe that there are also several implications in Sato's remarks with respect to U. S. -Japanese relations. First, while on the one hand they welcome a reduction in US-Soviet "tension" and the opportunity to improve their own relations with the Soviets, they are concerned that relations between the two "super powers", the U. S. and the U. S. S. R., not "improve" to the extent that we and the Soviets face Japan with fait accompli in matters concerning Japanese interests.

5. The schizophrenia of Japan on the nuclear proliferation treaty is a good example. Military considerations, e. g., the fact that the NPT requires Japan to renounce its options while doing nothing to meet its immediate concerns,

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-53

By is, NARA Date 10-30-99

which are the Soviet Union and Communist China, are in my opinion only a part of the reason for Japan's ambivalence on the NPT. Another important factor is the Japanese hypersensitivity to any suggestion that the U. S. and U. S. S. R. are moving toward a kind of "super-powers" club from which Japan will be forever excluded. The drive toward parity with the great powers has been one of the most consistent themes of Japan's modern history. In spite of its present attitudes on military and nuclear affairs, an implied relegation of Japan to second-class status because of her non-possession of nuclear arms would ultimately constitute a powerful incentive to go after an independent nuclear capability. These attitudes are, of course, being nurtured by public statements coming from West Germany, probably communicating even more forcefully in Japanese-German consultations on the NPT. Thus, I tend to agree with Ambassador Takeuchi that while in the end Japan will probably have no choice but to sign the NPT on whatever terms the U. S. and Soviets are able to agree upon, we should not necessarily take Japan for granted in this regard.

6. Fishing is another area where Japan discerns tendencies in U. S. - Soviet relations that are disturbing to it: not so much because of their intrinsic importance, but because of their reflection of what it discerns as tendencies in U. S. -Soviet relations. Japan, of course, recognizes that there is a certain basic congruence of U. S. -Soviet fishing interests in the North Pacific as opposed to the interests of Japan; however, I believe that it does genuinely disturb them when they think that we are using agreements already reached between ourselves and the Soviets to demand similar concessions or more from the Japanese. I am, of course, well aware of these fishery problems, and there is no reason that we should not bargain hard with the Japanese on them, but in devising our tactics we should be conscious of these Japanese attitudes and recognize that Japanese may well read more in the way of broad political implications into them than we intend.

7. As opportunity offers, I will probe on Sato's theme with him and also with Shimoda, who was former Ambassador in Moscow as well as DCM in Washington, and who now holds a key position in the Government of Japan on these matters. However, in the meanwhile, I did want to call the Department's attention to Sato's remarks and what I feel were the implications, that must be taken into account in our relations with this country .

JOHNSON

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 1, 1967 -- 3:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

I would be the first to admit the fallibility of your faithful servants down in the basement; but our problem with Kiesinger's text appears to be this: by orders no text has been issued. The CIA will get over to us a few paragraphs they have which were transcribed from notes.

Sec. Rusk tells me Kiesinger will shortly be making a public positive statement to try to undo the damage.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



Wed., March 1, 1967  
10:15 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Secretary Rusk just called me to report the following. George McGhee has called him from Bonn and urged that Kiesinger come here fairly soon. Secretary Rusk believes this is a good idea, although he is conscious of your scheduling problems. Therefore, he would like to have you consider permitting John McCloy (or George McGhee) to tell Kiesinger soon that you would like to see him, and are prepared to try to work out mutually convenient dates.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 1, 1967  
10:20 a. m.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-350  
By gw, NARA, Date 9-3-92

Mr. President:

Henry Owen suggests that Westy cool off RFK and other experts on bombing the North, by making the point in paragraph 1 of attached.

You may wish to talk to Bob McNamara about it.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-349

By ju, NARA, Date 7-24-92

~~SECRET~~

February 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Bombing the North

1. Proposal: General Westmoreland should hold a major press conference on the state of the war, and use it - among other things - to surface his views about the contribution that bombing of the North makes to saving lives of men whom he commands.
2. Rationale: Responsible US politicians will be less likely to attack a policy whose ending would, according to a respected field commander, increase casualties in his command - especially when that command runs to several hundred thousand men and presumably includes young men from families in most large constituencies.
3. Timing: This should be done as soon as possible, - to preclude political leaders in the US who have not yet fully committed themselves from coming out more explicitly against the bombing.

Ho

Henry Owen

~~SECRET~~

Wed., March , 1967  
9:15 a.m.

129

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is a rather imperfect transcript  
of my BBC interview which, I am told,  
was seen by ten million British viewers.

W. W. R.

Attachment



TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW BETWEEN ROBIN DAY AND PROF. W.W. ROSTOW

AS RECORDED 24th FEBRUARY 1967

- DAY: Professor Rostow, you're one of the leading academic figures who came to the White House with President Kennedy and then stayed on to serve his successor. Now what exactly is your job now in the White House with President Johnson?
- ROSTOW: My job is of course to serve the President. That means many things, but above all it means that my staff and I - there are about 16 men on it - are a two-way communications link between the great government departments that are involved in national security, notably State and Defence, but sometimes Treasury, AID, ~~our~~ *and the President*. *my* assistants. The link between them and the President on the one hand and then when the President decides we're a link in making his wishes happen. *and I am*
- DAY: Do you see him every day, or two or three times day, or two or three times a week?
- ROSTOW: I should say it comes nearer to a few times a day.
- DAY: And do you sit on the Cabinet Committee, or the top policy forming meetings of the President?
- ROSTOW: I'm present at Cabinet meetings. I am present at the Tuesday lunch which is really the occasion when the President meets with his two senior advisers, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara.
- DAY: How does the President operate? Does he, does he read a great deal, or does he derive most of his information from discussion and questioning?
- Rostow: He reads a great deal. He is an extraordinarily orderly executive in that sense, and a great deal of his reading goes far into the night and early into the morning hours. On the basis of reading, when he has formed a picture of an issue on the basis of all the papers, he will then probe and turn it around in his ~~mind~~ *and* and then talk to many people, ~~and~~ until he feels ready for a decision. But the foundation is voracious and careful reading.
- DAY: Is he a terrible strain to work for, because several of his closest aides have had to give up working for him, or any rate have given up working for him, because of his driving force and long hours he works?
- ROSTOW: Well, I can only report my own experience. He is an extraordinarily energetic man. He sets extremely high standards for himself and for his aides, but he is one of the most considerate bosses I've ever had.
- DAY: There's quite a wide impression, Professor Rostow, that the President is almost obsessed with the Vietnam problem, and he has little time or interest, or much less time and interest than he used to have in other problems - Europe and so on.
- ROSTOW: That is, <sup>as</sup> a simple fact, not true. Of course, when you have five hundred thousand of your men, fighting men, out in an area, as we now do in South-east Asia, and you have a nation of 15 million dependent upon you, and you have your Australian, and New Zealand and Korean and Thai and Phillipine allies dependent upon you, and the fate of an area dependent upon you, you give a lot of time to that problem. But what is remarkable in my experience with the President is the extraordinarily even division of his time in foreign policy, among Vietnam, European policy which engages in all its dimensions

ROSTOW: much of his time, problems such as the Indian food problem, the Alliance for Progress which is very close to his heart, the beginnings of a formation of a new African policy, all of East/West matters, whether it's the Consular Convention which is up before the Senate of the Non-Proliferation Agreement. I believe that the actual proportioning of his time in foreign policy, and attention, is much more even than is generally credited.

DAY: In a lecture you have given during your visit here to England, Professor Rostow, you said this, you said: The Vietnam war could be made the closing of one chapter in modern history and the opening of another." Now first of all, before we talk about Vietnam a little more, in what sense do you see a new chapter opening - a transition from one kind of world to another?

ROSTOW: That judgment ~~is~~ really ~~ex~~, flows from a view of what's happened in the first post-war generation, in which we've had to deal with a series of men and nations, some communist, some non-communist, who have felt it legitimate and right to try to use external force across international boundaries. Out of the experience of that generation, and their frustrations, and the demands of the people for more simple things than abstract ideological victories and so on, we're getting a new, more moderate, more pragmatic generation emerging. I believe that we could make the last stand of this phase of what I call romantic aggression, we could make the last stand of that in the attempted war of national liberation in south-east Asia. I say we could make it because I deeply feel that none of this is automatic. There are forces of moderation moving in the world and pragmatism, and the desire to get on with the task of building nations, and feeding people and educating them and giving them longer life. All of that's happening. But it does demand that we do not break up the coherence in the western world, not break up our attachment to collective security, that we not tempt people, so that these more constructive forces can emerge.

DAY: But how could the - how could the war in Vietnam and this old chapter and as you say perhaps be the last great confrontation of the cold war? What reason have you got for saying that?

ROSTOW: Well, because there's a fair chance that if we <sup>an integrated</sup> carry forward the policy we now have in Europe of maintaining a defence and then working with eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, that we could avoid future confrontations in that area. That leaves Asia as the great residual area. In Asia now there are three things happening. First of course there is the defence against aggression in South Vietnam. But two other things are happening. First the Asians themselves in Prime Minister Lee of Singapore's phrase, are using the time that the United States is buying in beginning to build an Asian regional structure, so that they can look after themselves better in the future. And the second factor is the changes taking place inside communist China.

DAY: Before I ask you about communist China, why do you see Vietnam, the Vietnam war, as such a crucial test of America's will and sticking power?

ROSTOW: Because we gave our word that we would be there to take action, to meet the common danger in the face of armed aggression. Armed aggression is taking place. It is recognized by the people of the area, by the Australians, New Zealanders, Thais, Phillipinos and by us. We said we'd be there; we are there. If we weren't there it would mean that our word was not good in Asia. And as I said in my talk, for us it's impossible to be faithful to our alliances in the Atlantic and unfaithful to them in the Pacific.

- DAY: But a good many of your distinguished countrymen, Professor Rostow, find it hard to stomach the idea that the cause of freedom and justice must depend on a big, rich, white country bombing a small, poor, brown country. That's how the argument is put. *for conducting*
- ROSTOW: Well, we think that we're not at war with North Vietnam. If we were at war with North Vietnam it would be a very different looking war. We're at war for very limited purposes, to frustrate an aggression, to re-install the Geneva ~~Agreement~~ of 54 and 62, and to give the people of South Vietnam a chance to determine their own fate on the basis of one man one vote. Now we are bombing the north because three things needed to be done, which the President explained in his Baltimore speech. First we had to limit within the capacity of our military action the flow of men and supplies from the north into the south. Secondly, we desired to impose on the north, which is obviously the source of the aggression, a costed war, and we're doing it in the least sanguinary way that we can, by attacking mainly the supply lines. Third there is a question of morale which should not be misunderstood. Those men fighting in the south, whether they're Vietnamese or Australians, or Americans, Koreans, know that this war is mounted from the north, and they would take poorly to the judgment that the only place that we can stop those supplies and men is inside the borders of South Vietnam. So those are the three reasons.
- DAY: But on the other hand, Secretary of Defence McNamara told the Senate last month, he said: "I don't believe that bombing up to the present has significantly reduced, nor any bombing that I could contemplate in the future would significantly reduce, the actual flow of men and materials into the south". So how can it be said that the bombing is militarily useful? *That* *being*
- ROSTOW: That quotation left out the other part of Secretary McNamara's statement which was the three limited conditions set by the President (DAY: Yes) were fulfilled. What he was talking about was that an expansion of this bombing could not stop this infiltration. What is happening now are these things. First on the trails a certain amount of the equipment and the men are shot up before they can come and fight. That happens. Secondly, the cost of getting a ton of supplies into the south, the cost of getting a man into the south, is increased. Some of the prisoners that are captured say they've lost 30% of their units enroute. And they come in having had to duck and weave and bob all the way down the trails from the north. This imposes a limit. But we cannot expect from bombing, and we're not trying to achieve, is a total cessation of the infiltration, nor do we believe that the kind of bombing we're conducting will in the end, by itself, be a determining factor, in the war. *by bombing*
- DAY: Could I ask you how you interpret the China situation - if you give a summary of your view on that?
- ROSTOW: Speaking as one who in the 1950's had to study China and write a book about it, I have the feeling that we're witnessing, as I said, a great drama, and it is not inappropriate to use the grand Greek concept of hubris, and of Greek tragedy here, because the men who came to power in 1949 were a quite remarkable group of men who'd been together almost since their youth. They were on a long march. They won an extraordinary, and to the communist world, unexpected victory on the mainland. They then, out of perhaps over-weening pride, made two major errors, one in their domestic policy, in agriculture, and the other in the posture they struck in the world scene. They thought they were much further forward in development

ROSTOW: than they were, and they neglected agriculture. The result is food  
(CONT'D) population situation which is not consistent with the modernization  
of the mainland. They immediately began to play a great power game  
in a world where there were great resistances. And so now this  
extraordinary group of men have fallen into conflict among themselves  
and their policies are failing. There's a great debate about the  
future of policy in China as well as the struggle for power. And  
none of this - at least I am not wise enough to say when and through  
what processes that will end. I do feel that the end of the line -  
soon or late - a more moderate China devoted more to the welfare of  
the people <sup>and</sup> than the growing of food, will emerge.

DAY: May I ask you, bring you to one final point, Professor Rostow -  
could you comment on a recent Letter to the London Times which has  
aroused quite a lot of interest here on this side of the Atlantic,  
from Senator Javits and a number of eminent Americans, urging an  
Atlantic trading system to strengthen Anglo-American ties, whether  
or not Britain goes into the Common Market. Now has this got any  
support in the Administration?

ROSTOW: The President made clear in his speech on October 7th that we look  
forward to a Europe in which Britain has joined. That is and has  
been an abiding hope of American policy. It remains <sup>our</sup> policy, and  
<sup>our</sup> hope, although obviously it is up to Great Britain and the  
Europeans to bring it about. We do have in the Atlantic an  
extraordinary and lively range of instruments for dealing with  
the trade gap, for example, as well as the OECD enterprises and  
the monetary mechanisms of the OECD and the IMF. So we don't lack  
really ways of dealing with Atlantic problems. The great issue  
is whether and when Britain gets into the Common Market.

DAY: But do you have an alternative policy if we're turned out?

ROSTOW: No we don't at the moment.

DAY: Thank you, Professor Rostow.

*via GATT*

125

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 1, 1967


Dear Mr. President:

On the occasion of your inauguration I send you greetings from the people of the United States and my personal best wishes for success in the important task you begin today. I am confident that the close ties of friendship between our two nations, born of common respect for democracy and the rights of individual men, will become even stronger in the coming years.

I look forward to meeting you at the forthcoming meeting of Presidents of the American Republics. It is especially fitting that we meet in Uruguay, as our basic purpose will be to consider ways of strengthening the Alliance for Progress, first given form in the Charter drafted at Punta del Este in August of 1961.

As you assume office today, you are faced with many difficult problems and your responsibilities are heavy. I am confident that Uruguay has the resources, both human and material, to overcome these difficulties and that under your leadership the Uruguayan people will enter a new era of well-being.

Sincerely,



His Excellency  
Oscar D. Gestido  
President of the  
Oriental Republic of Uruguay  
Montevideo.



March 1, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached, for your signature, is a letter of thanks to Edgar Kaiser, whom you appointed as National Chairman for UN Day 1966. He reported to you that 250 top business and labor leaders joined in his effort, and helped to organize state-wide conferences, parades, exhibits and school and library programs.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:ND:gg

126a

March 2, 1967

Dear Mr. Kaiser:

Thank you for sending me your report on the observance of UN Day 1966. I was glad to learn of the increased support for the UN among our citizens. Old friends of the UN were kept, and new ones were made.

Your willingness to serve as National Chairman was a great satisfaction to me. Your leadership speaks for itself in the results you have reported.

Please give my thanks to all your colleagues for their efforts in this worthy cause.

Sincerely,

LBS

Mr. Edgar F. Kaiser  
President, Kaiser Industries  
300 Lakeside Drive  
Oakland, California

LBJ:ND:gg

ret. to Lais

127

~~1. Pres file~~  
2. Pres file

Wednesday, March 1, 1967  
9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the letter about  
Bunker, redrafted as you  
instructed.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

March 2, 1967

Dear Dean:

Since I may not be in town when you see Ellsworth Bunker, I should like to tell you what I hope will prove possible in Saigon.

I have decided that the best solution is to give General Westmoreland the over-all task of Ambassador while maintaining his military command. I want you and Bob McNamara to confirm that this is possible without Senate confirmation.

As you know, however, the bringing to life within the next six months of a constitutional government in Saigon is as important to us as the course of military events in the field. I have concluded that there is one American above any other who is qualified to guide this process on behalf of the nation; and I feel, in justice to our fighting men and to the country as a whole, that only our best is justified in the circumstances.

Therefore, I wish you to ask Ellsworth Bunker if he is willing to serve as Ambassador at Large in Saigon, assuming responsibility for our political policy under Westmoreland's general direction.

We would assign an aircraft to Ellsworth so that he could easily move about the area and return, as necessary, for consultations in Washington.

As you know, I envisage assigning Bob Komer to serve with Westmoreland to drive forward our civil operations in Saigon, in fields other than that assigned to Ellsworth. I would be prepared, if you agree, to strengthen further the political side of the Saigon Embassy by assigning Bill Sullivan to assist Ambassador Bunker in his work.

I am conscious, of course, of the sacrifice I am asking Ellsworth to make at the age of 72. I can only recall that Henry Stimson was almost 73 when he became our greatest Secretary of War, serving for five years. I have in mind that Ellsworth would serve for only a relatively short period and I'm hopeful that, if I assured him I would not ask him to serve as Stimson did until he is 78 -- at least in Viet Nam -- he would do this for our country and for me. I do believe the task of political midwifery ahead is the highest possible challenge to the wisdom, discretion, strength, and tact which Ellsworth embodies uniquely.

I hope your full powers of persuasion will be brought to bear in laying our case before him, and that you and Ellsworth will feel free to come back to me with any refinements you may suggest in this proposal.

Sincerely,

*15/ Lyndon B. Johnson*

Honorable Dean Rusk  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWRostow:rln  
3/2/67



I am conscious, of course, of the sacrifice I am asking Ellsworth to make at the age of 72. I can only recall that Henry Stimson was almost 73 when he became our greatest Secretary of War, serving for five years. I have in mind that Ellsworth would serve for only a relatively short period. Nevertheless, I do believe the task of political midwifery ahead is the highest possible challenge to the wisdom, discretion, strength, and tact which Ellsworth embodies uniquely.

I hope your full powers of persuasion will be brought to bear in laying our case before him, and that you and Ellsworth will feel free to come back to me with any refinements you may suggest in this proposal.

Sincerely,

Honorable Dean Rusk  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWRostow:rlm  
3/1/67

*Pres file*

Wednesday -  
March 1, 1967

Mr. President:

President Diaz Ordaz celebrates his  
56th birthday on March 12.

State recommends that you send the  
attached message. I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Suggested birthday greetings  
to President Diaz Ordaz

Suggested Presidential Birthday Message to President Diaz Ordaz  
of Mexico

Dear Mr. President:

Lady Bird and I send you our warmest congratulations and good wishes on the occasion of your birthday. We pray that you may enjoy many more years of good health, happiness and service to your nation.

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency

Gustavo Diaz Ordaz

President of the United Mexican States.



11 snap

Wednesday -  
March 1, 1967

Mr. President:

President Diaz Ordaz celebrates his  
56th birthday on March 12.

State recommends that you send the  
attached message. I concur.

W. W. Rostow

approved  
3/7/67

Attachment

Suggested birthday greetings  
to President Diaz Ordaz

Suggested Presidential Birthday Message to President Diaz Ordaz  
of Mexico

Dear Mr. President:

Lady Bird and I send you our warmest congratulations and good wishes on the occasion of your birthday. We pray that you may enjoy many more years of good health, happiness and service to your nation.

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency

Gustavo Diaz Ordaz

President of the United Mexican States.