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Tuesday, March 14, 1967 -- 9:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

General Taylor says he is at your disposition -- and flattered.

He has an engagement to speak at the Canadian Club, Montreal, on Monday. Subject: Viet Nam.

He will, of course, cancel if you think he can serve you better Guam than Montreal.

W. W. Rostow

Go to Guam \_\_\_\_\_

Appear in Montreal \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-56  
By is, NARA Date 1-11-00

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March 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: New Delhi Assesses New Indian Cabinet

Ambassador Bowles reports that the new Cabinet will be dominated by a "troika" composed of Mrs. Gandhi, Morarji Desai in Finance, and Chavan in the Home Ministry. If they work together closely, India could have its "most effective central government since independence. However, cooperation is by no means certain and it is impossible at this stage to foresee the outcome." Of 19 Cabinet Ministers and 14 Ministers of State, 12 are new appointments. Three are newcomers to Delhi.

Morarji Desai will be strong at Finance, somewhat hairshirt in the policies he prefers, and acutely sensitive to real or fancied efforts by us or George Woods to bring undue pressure on him. We have kept in close touch with him all along. He will support Chavan on strong measures for law and order, will be anti-Soviet and generally pro-US, though inclined to a rather stiff line on Pakistan.

Chavan stays at the Home Ministry, a welcome development because he is probably the ablest man in the Government. Being only 54, he may well be Prime Minister one day. He was tough on restoring order before the election; he is politically adroit, a necessary quality in order to develop appropriate and quite unprecedented relations between the Central Government and the six states (out of 17) not having Congress Governments.

Jagjivan Ram replaces Subramaniam at Agriculture. He is a long time party stalwart (Mrs. Gandhi at one time probably would have called him a "party hack"). He is politically important because he represents the largest single voting block, the "Untouchables." He does not have Subramaniam's imagination or quick decisiveness, but is an experienced administrator, and a much more adept political operator than Subramaniam. He is likely to retain established operating agricultural programs and has an able staff. He has feathered his own nest to some extent in the past, but his political experience should be valuable as he deals with recalcitrant State governments, both Congress and non-Congress on food procurement and distribution.

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The new Minister of Health and Family Planning, S. Chandrasekhar, is a great improvement. Once a part-time member of the University of California, the 48-year old demographer will bring new vigor and competence in a critical area, replacing a tired lady doctor who never pushed birth control.

Chagla continues at External Affairs (unfortunately), though the staff is likely to be strengthened and our position helped when Indian Ambassador in Paris, Dayal, returns to the Ministry.

Asoka Mehta continues at Planning and has added the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals. This is important in attracting fertilizer investment from abroad, since historically this Ministry has been one of the most difficult in dealing with foreign capital.

The new Minister of Steel, Mines and Metals, 48-year old Chenna Reddi, has a reputation for initiative, energy, and administrative skill.

At Education, Triguna Sen is a distinguished educator and outstanding administrator. According to the Embassy, he brings to the job unusual skill, experience and high reputation in education administration.

The Embassy concludes that while the Cabinet is a mixed bag, it has energy at the top if the three will pull together and a number of younger more energetic and imaginative people have replaced the discredited "syndicate", now fatigued and all-too-familiar. Chet makes the best of it. But we think it likely the Cabinet will often be divided at the top and lack initiative.

W. W. Rostow

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March 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Korean Prime Minister Chung Il-Kwon

The Korean Prime Minister arrives tomorrow. Schedule is:

11:30 A. M.	-	Welcoming Ceremony
12:00	-	Office call
1:00 P. M.	-	White House luncheon

I suggest you open the talk by:

- recalling your visit to Korea and the warm reception;
- praising the role of Korean armed forces in Viet-Nam;
- noting that Prime Minister Chung has recently been in Viet-Nam and asking for his opinions on what he saw.

He may raise his idea of dividing Viet-Nam into military districts with a military commander in each (U.S., Vietnamese, ROK).

Picking up ideas mentioned in your Seoul visit, he may raise proposals for a large number of Korean civilians to work in the revolutionary development effort and logistic support.

In reply, I suggest you:

Thank him for his views. Suggest that the conduct of military operations be discussed between his Defense Minister (KIM) and Secretary McNamara.

On revolutionary development, note that the purpose is to bring the government closer to the people. We think that has to be mainly a Vietnamese job. We are sure the Vietnamese Government will welcome Korean advice and assistance--but they have to do the job.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-358  
By inf NARA. Date 3-24-92

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(2) He is almost certain to make a plea for more rapid modernization of Korean armed forces. He may cite the growing danger of infiltration from North Korea.

In reply, I suggest you:

-- note decision just announced to supply ROK forces in Viet-Nam with M-16 rifles; they will also be going to ROK forces in Korea; note all American forces in Korea don't yet have them.

-- we will be delivering nine (9) fast patrol boats to Korean Navy this summer; we are considering sending three (3) destroyer escorts; destroyers would require new legislation in Congress.

-- ask him to discuss details with McNamara.

(3) He may tell you Korea has decided to send three Marine companies (about 1,000) men to Viet-Nam; he will hope the United States will support them in same way we support other ROK forces in Viet-Nam.

In reply, I suggest you:

Express our gratification; say we are ready to work out support details; McNamara and Ambassador Brown will follow up.

(4) He may express concern about declining United States support of the ROK military budget through support assistance and PL 480.

In reply, I suggest you:

-- note ROK Government itself recognized grant assistance would decline; this was taken into consideration in Korea's 5-Year Plan.

-- we were gratified by President's Park's support of this trend in his New Year's Message to the National Assembly.

-- we will continue to support the ROK military budget.

(5) He may ask for explicit support for the 5-Year economic plan.

In reply, I suggest you:

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-- note our endorsement of the Plan at the Paris meeting of the Consultative Group for Korea; we will help in every appropriate way;

-- underline importance of private investment and expanded trade and call attention to the Ball Mission which will be leaving for Korea this week.

You may wish to ask him for the outlook on the coming Korean elections (Presidential on May, 3, National Assembly later in May).

More detailed discussion of each of these problems is included in the attached briefing book. You may wish to read Secretary Rusk's covering memorandum at Tab A.

W. W. Rostow

Atts.

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**Prime Minister Chung will be accompanied by:**

**Defense Minister KIM Sung Eun  
Commerce and Industry Minister PAK Choong Hoon  
Presidential Secretary General LEE Hu Rak  
Ambassador KIM Hyun Chul  
Economic Planning Officer YANG Yoon Sae (Interpreter)**

**Standing by on the American side:**

**Secretary Rusk (or Under Secretary Katzenbach)  
Ambassador Symington  
Assistant Secretary Sam Berger  
Walt W. Rostow**

*[Handwritten signature]*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Treatment of Foreign Vessels Illegally Fishing Within U.S.  
9-Mile Exclusive Fisheries Zone

The Secretary of State has developed, with the concurrence of the Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, Interior, Transportation, and the Attorney General, procedures for the enforcement of Public Law 89-658, approved by you last October, which establishes a U. S. contiguous fishery zone of nine nautical miles beyond the three nautical mile territorial sea. This law provides that within this nine mile zone the U. S. will exercise the same exclusive rights over fisheries as in the territorial sea. However, we will continue to recognize traditional fishing by foreign vessels belonging to Japan, Canada, Mexico, the USSR and all parties to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries International Convention. (This latter group other than the countries mentioned represents a very minor proportion of those countries fishing in the U.S. contiguous fishery zone.) The countries involved were all notified of the new law prior to December 1, 1966.

These instructions are needed to provide for the enforcement of the new law by the Commandant of the Coast Guard and have been concurred in by all affected agency heads. They are internal governmental instructions not requiring publication in the Federal Register as would be the case if they were regulations. I recommend that you authorize me to sign the attached draft NSAM. The treatment of Soviet Bloc fishing vessels in U. S. territorial waters will continue to be governed by NSAM 265 of October 14, 1963, a copy of which I attach for your information. Also attached is a copy of PL 89-658.

\_\_\_\_ Approved

\_\_\_\_ Disapproved

\_\_\_\_ See me

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-358  
By *[initials]* NARA. Date 3-24-92



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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-358  
By ing NARA. Date 3-24-92

March 14, 1967

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO.

TO: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Secretary of the Interior  
The Secretary of Transportation  
The Attorney General

SUBJECT: Treatment of Foreign Vessels Illegally Fishing Within  
9-Mile Exclusive Fisheries Zone

Public Law 89-658, which was approved by the President on October 14, 1966, establishes a fisheries zone of nine nautical miles beyond the three nautical mile territorial sea. This legislation applies to the United States, its territories and possessions, but not to other areas under United States administration. Within this fisheries zone the United States exercises the same exclusive rights over fisheries as in the territorial sea, subject to continuation of such traditional fishing by foreign vessels as may be recognized by the United States. Foreign vessels and nationals violating the provisions of this law may be seized, arrested and punished in accordance with federal law.

The following instructions regarding the enforcement of PL 89-658 are approved:

1. All Governments likely to be directly concerned with the implementation of PL 89-658 have been officially notified by the Department of State. Such notification was completed prior to December 1, 1966; the countries concerned included Japan, Canada, Mexico, the USSR and all parties to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.

2. a. Except as provided in paragraph 2. b. the following procedure shall apply. If there is reasonable or probable cause to believe that a vessel has violated PL 89-658, as defined in paragraph 3, it may be boarded and searched. If enough evidence is found that the vessel has been violating United States law it shall be detained for further investigation. If no reason for detaining the vessel is found it shall be permitted to continue on its way.

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b. Vessels of Japan, Canada, Mexico and the USSR fishing for the stocks of fish or as otherwise noted in the specific areas as described below will not be boarded and searched but will be sighted and reported to the operational commander and the Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard; information to State, Interior, Treasury and Defense. The Department of State will pass notice of violation to the country concerned; in case of Soviet vessels notice of violation to appropriate Soviet fishing fleet commanders by Coast Guard District Commanders will also be made if possible. This procedure will continue for the four countries concerned until new instructions are received from the Department of State reflecting the status of negotiations for the recognition of traditional fisheries for each country.

(1) Mexico - Fishing within the 3 to 12 mile zone off Southern California and Texas.

(2) Japan

(a) Trawling and long-lining in the 3 to 12 mile zone off the State of Alaska in the Bering Sea, the North Pacific Ocean, and the Gulf of Alaska west of 148° West Longitude.

(b) Whaling in the zone off the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands, and all other areas of the Pacific Coast of Alaska, including the Gulf of Alaska.

(c) Salmon fishing in the zone off the Aleutians west of 175° West Longitude.

(d) King crab fishing in the zone in the Bering Sea off the Alaska Peninsula and the Pribilof Islands.

(e) Tuna fishing in the zone off Southern California, the State of Hawaii, the Atlantic coast from New York to Maryland inclusive, the Atlantic coast of Florida, and off Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida west of 85° West Longitude.

(3) USSR - Fishing within the 3 to 12 mile zone off the State of Alaska.

(4) Canada - Fishing within the 3 to 12 mile zone off Alaska, the Pacific Coast and New England states.

3. a. For the purpose of this directive, reason to believe that a foreign vessel has violated the law includes foreign vessels having fishing gear in use or rigged for use so as to lead to the evaluated conclusion that the vessel's intention is to commence fishing within the zone or that the vessel has recently completed removing the fishing gear from the waters within the zone.

b. Whenever foreign vessels are found carrying out fishing fleet support activities in the fisheries zone, the Coast Guard may, where there is reason to believe that a vessel has fish that were illegally caught in the territorial sea or the fisheries zone, board such vessel to determine if a violation has occurred. If reasonable cause does not exist, or if upon boarding there is no evidence to support a violation, the foreign vessel concerned shall be informed that it is in the fisheries zone of the United States and is to depart immediately. No force is authorized should an order to leave the fisheries zone be ignored.

c. The Commandant of the Coast Guard is directed to establish in consultation with other enforcement agencies criteria of proof for the guidance of subordinate commanders in enforcing this law. These criteria should specify that vessels which, under a reasonable interpretation of the evidence, may be deemed to have violated the law inadvertently shall be escorted out of the zone, and shall only be detained to the extent necessary to establish such inadvertency.

4. The distinction between the fisheries zone and the territorial sea is pertinent in carrying out enforcement procedures. As defined by law, fishing vessels within the territorial sea must be in innocent passage; within the contiguous fishery zone foreign vessels need only refrain from fishing operations as defined above. The doctrine of hot pursuit applies to foreign vessels fishing in the zone.

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5. Every effort should be made not to discriminate between countries in the enforcement of this law.

6. All necessary force may be employed in carrying out these instructions provided that there is clear evidence that a violation of the law has occurred.

7. The Department of State, Interior, Treasury, Transportation and Defense will be kept informed by the most expeditious means of any action taken by enforcement agencies under these instructions.

8. The Commandant of the Coast Guard is authorized to delegate authority to the various Coast Guard District Commanders to take immediate action under these instructions.

9. Treatment of Soviet Bloc fishing vessels in United States territorial waters will continue to be governed by NSAM 265 of October 14, 1963.

*W. W. Rostow*  
W. W. Rostow

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 14, 1963

## NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 265

TO: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Secretary of the Treasury

SUBJECT: Treatment of Soviet Bloc Fishing Vessels

The following instructions, regarding U.S. Coast Guard treatment of Soviet Bloc fishing vessels entering United States territorial waters, have been approved:

1. A vessel in innocent passage, as defined by the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Geneva, 1958, will not be disturbed, but will be kept under surveillance while it remains in U.S. territorial waters.

2. A vessel that enters U.S. territorial waters will not be considered in innocent passage and may be stopped, boarded, and searched if:

(a) The Coast Guard has intelligence information which gives reasonable grounds for believing that the vessel is engaged in violation of U.S. laws, or that it constitutes a threat to U.S. security.

(b) The vessel is configured in such a manner as to raise a reasonable suspicion that it is engaged in violating U.S. laws, or that it threatens U.S. security. Thus, if what purports to be a normal fishing vessel in innocent passage were obviously configured for the collection of electronic intelligence, its passage would not be considered innocent until it had been boarded and searched, and its innocent character established.

(c) The vessel behaves in such a manner that it may be reasonably suspected of violating U.S. laws or endangering U.S. security. Such behavior, when considered in the context of existing circumstances, might include (1) stopping, anchoring, or hovering not incident to navigation; (2) making contact with a vessel from the beach; (3) having its own boats

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NLJ 91-358

By ing NARA, Date 3-24-92



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in the water; (4) fishing illegally; (5) having its nets or trawls rigged for immediate use in an area where it cannot legally fish; (6) operating at night without lights or with illegal lights; (7) communicating with the shore.

3. A vessel that enters U.S. territorial waters by reason of "force majeure", distress, or for shelter from a very dangerous storm shall be permitted to remain while its reason for entering continues to exist. However, it shall be boarded and searched to make sure that its reason for entry is valid, that it is not violating U.S. laws, and that it does not threaten U.S. security. While it remains in U.S. waters it shall be kept under surveillance.

4. If, upon boarding and search of a vessel discovered within U.S. territorial waters, evidence is found that the vessel is or has been violating U.S. laws or constitutes a threat to U.S. security, it shall be detained for further investigation. If no reason for detaining the vessel is found, it shall be escorted to the high seas, permitted to continue its innocent passage, or permitted to remain if it has a continuing valid reason such as "force majeure".

5. All necessary force may be employed in carrying out these instructions.

6. The Departments of State, Treasury, and Navy will be kept informed by rapid means of any action taken by the Coast Guard under these instructions.

7. The Commandant of the Coast Guard is authorized to delegate authority to the various Coast Guard District Commanders to take immediate action under these instructions.

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy

Copy to: The Secretary of the Navy  
Commandant of the Coast Guard

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"U/C File Copy"



[CORRECTED PRINT]

Public Law 89-658  
89th Congress, S. 2218  
October 14, 1966

# An Act

80 STAT. 908

To establish a contiguous fishery zone beyond the territorial sea of the United States.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That there is established a fisheries zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States. The United States will exercise the same exclusive rights in respect to fisheries in the zone as it has in its territorial sea, subject to the continuation of traditional fishing by foreign states within this zone as may be recognized by the United States.

Fisheries zone  
contiguous to  
U.S. territo-  
rial sea.  
Establishment.

SEC. 2. The fisheries zone has as its inner boundary the outer limits of the territorial sea and as its seaward boundary a line drawn so that each point on the line is nine nautical miles from the nearest point in the inner boundary.

SEC. 3. Whenever the President determines that a portion of the fisheries zone conflicts with the territorial waters or fisheries zone of another country, he may establish a seaward boundary for such portion of the zone in substitution for the seaward boundary described in section 2.

Seaward boundary.

SEC. 4. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as extending the jurisdiction of the States to the natural resources beneath and in the waters within the fisheries zone established by this Act or as diminishing their jurisdiction to such resources beneath and in the waters of the territorial seas of the United States.

Approved October 14, 1966.

## LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

- HOUSE REPORT No. 2086 accompanying H.R. 9531 (Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fisheries).  
SENATE REPORT No. 1280 (Comm. on Commerce).  
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 112 (1966):  
June 20: Considered and passed Senate.  
Oct. 3: Considered and passed House, amended, in lieu of H.R. 9531.  
Oct. 5: Senate concurred in House amendments.

1. ~~encl~~  
2. Profile

March 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Representation at the King of Tonga's Coronation

Pursuant to your decision that the U.S. be officially represented at the July 4 coronation of King Taufa of Tonga, I offer the following names for your consideration.

⑦ ✓ Dr. Gilbert Grosvenor, President of the National Geographic Society, is acquainted with the King. The National Geographic will publish an extensive article on Tonga shortly after the coronation.

Dr. Robert R. Robbins, head of the Department of Government at Tufts University. A former U.S. Commissioner of the South Pacific Commission, he was the King's mentor when the latter was crown prince, is close to him and is one of the very few scholars of the Pacific islands. State is encouraging greater academic interest in the area.

② ✓ Former Governor Edmund G. Brown. Tonga has a special affinity for California. Nearly all Tongans in the U.S. reside there.

① ✓ Hawaii Governor John Burns. He has interested himself in Tonga, making it possible for scholarship grants for Tongan students in Hawaii. State is encouraging more extensive cooperative arrangements between Hawaii and Tonga.

Governor Carlton Skinner, Senior U.S. Commissioner of the South Pacific Commission, has worked closely with Tongan leaders and is well regarded throughout the area.

Governor Rex Lee of American Samoa. Governor Lee is on good terms with the King. He has received a personal invitation to be present for the coronation.

all 3 OK. If all can go OK if not in  
order listed  
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In my memo of March 8, I noted King Taufa's imposing physical stature as a factor to weigh in naming a representative. Tongans actually regard height and girth as symbolic of authority and eminence. Each of the above would qualify (at least in height) on this count.

W. W. Rostow

Monday, March 13, 1967 -- 8:10 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested Party from Washington for Guam Conference

Here is a list for your approval of those who would be going from Washington for the Guam Conference.

Secretary McNamara  
Assistant Secretary McNaughton  
One assistant

General Wheeler  
One assistant

Secretary Rusk  
Governor Harriman  
David Lilienthal  
Director of Secretariat Benjamin Read  
Assistant Secretariat Officer, Mr. Shostal  
Two security officers  
One secretary  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Leonard Unger  
Assistant to Mr. Unger, Mr. Bruce  
Viet Nam expert, Mr. C. Flowerree

Secretary Rusk recommends that both AID Director Gaud and his Assistant, Rutherford Poats, be invited because of the help it would be to them on the Hill.

CIA Director Helms

Ambassador Lodge hopes that his Political Counselor Habib can join the party at Honolulu to continue on to Guam.

White House  
Walt Rostow  
One secretary  
Robert Komer

W. W. Rostow



~~SECRET~~

Monday - March 13, 1967  
7:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

I met this afternoon with Admiral Rufus Taylor and members of his Latin American staff and Bob Sayre to review the security picture in Montevideo and Punta del Este.

This is the picture:

- The security team of the new Gestido Government is green but it is working hard -- and well -- [REDACTED]
- The Uruguayans have 3000 patrolmen in Montevideo and 10,000 troops with good equipment and communications.
- [REDACTED]
- Plans for the security of Punta del Este are well conceived and are being put into effect. Punta del Este's geographic position facilitates security arrangements. There is no reason why good security cannot be provided.
- Montevideo, where most of Uruguay's 10,000 communists are located, presents another problem. Blocked from Punta del Este, the communists may concentrate on disturbances in the capital to discourage attendance before the meeting and capture headlines while it is going on.

These are the steps we are taking to improve Uruguayan security and to pre-empt the propaganda initiative from the communists:

-- [REDACTED]

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)-25Yrs  
(C)

- Through [REDACTED] our Embassy we will urge President Gestido to make it clear to the Communist leadership at an early date that he will not tolerate disturbances and is prepared to take strong action against them if they persist in their activities.
- State will instruct our Ambassadors to urge the Presidents in their countries to follow your example by coming out with strong public statements regarding their participation in the Summit. These statements can be played heavily throughout the hemisphere to create a positive atmosphere and bolster the resolve of President Gestido to take a no-nonsense attitude with the Communists.

I will continue monitoring this situation closely and keep you informed.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Monday, March 13, 1967 -- 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Roy Reed, New York Times, telephoned to ask for information -- beyond what George Christian gave in his press briefing -- on the trip to Guam.

I told Mr. Reed I had nothing more to add.

He said he had indication something big was to come out of the meeting.

I repeated that I had nothing to add beyond what George had said.

W. W. Rostow

rlh

WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 13, 1967

Dear Harry:

I am grateful that you sent me directly your thoughts about Viet Nam. It should -- and does -- concern us all.

I am asking Walt Rostow to go over with you carefully your specific suggestions about bombing, and to inform you of some of the intense planning that is going forward on negotiations.

Sincerely,

Honorable Harry C. McPherson, Jr.  
The White House

LBJ:WWR:mz

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 11, 1967  
Saturday - 4:30 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

I hesitate to belabor you with suggestions about Vietnam. But I feel that everybody on your staff who has ideas about it ought to tell you about them, and not somebody else.

(1) I believe in the policy of bombing the North. But I cannot see where the continued and increasing bombing of areas around Hanoi and Haiphong will get us. If I were on Ho's staff, I would expect it and recommend preparing against it. I would fear being killed myself, but I would try to steel myself against that fear. I would advise Ho to do just what he is doing: stimulate an outcry around the world, whip up my own people for a prolonged resistance, dig shelters throughout the populated areas, and turn down offers to talk made under the threat of intensified bombing of the capital area.

I believe in a policy of punishing armed aggression. I would saturate the area north of the 17th parallel, in North Vietnam and Laos. I would warn the North that I intended to do this: bomb a thirty to fifty mile band north of the parallel. Anything that moved in that area would be hit. My purpose would be to halt the aggression, and still not raise terrible memories of World War II urban population bombing. My understanding of the post-World War II bombing studies is that sporadic bombing of military targets, such as we are conducting in the North today, were not very effective. Saturation alone succeeded.

After adopting this policy, I would renew the effort to talk, making it clear that as the infiltration diminished, so would the bombing.

It may be that lifting the bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area will take some of the heat off Ho Chi Minh and make it easier for him to talk. Continuing the bombing of the North, but limiting it to the border area, would give you military results and would not require you to back away from the requirement for reciprocity.

(2) I don't know how much work is being done now on what we would offer the North, or the NLF. I hope there is a team going full



speed right now on both. If there is a danger that we will not have a series of offers, demands, and fall-back positions ready in the event the North and the NLF want to talk, it ought to be removed by hard work now.

*Harry*  
Harry C. McPherson, Jr.

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 99-58**  
**By CG, NARA Date 6-30-00**

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*Pres. file*

~~Confidential~~

Monday - March 13, 1967

Mr. President:

This report from our Embassy in Montevideo places Communist anti-Summit activities in perspective.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

I am having a meeting with [REDACTED] State to review security arrangements and what is being done to counter Communist propaganda.

W. W. Rentow

Attachment

Montevideo's 1972, 3/11/67

~~Confidential~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MONTEVIDEO 1972

CIA

SUBJECT: COMMUNISTS STEP UP CAMPAIGN AGAINST PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE

NSA

1. COMMUNISTS HELD OUTDOOR DEMONSTRATION EVENING MARCH 10 IN CENTRALLY LOCATED PUBLIC SQUARE WHICH ATTRACTED ABOUT 1000 (ALTHOUGH CROWD DWINDLED TO LESS THAN HALF BEFORE MEETING ENDED). MEETING WAS CALLED TO PRESENT FOR POPULAR CONSIDERATION COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY, TO SUPPORT PUBLIC HEALTH WORKERS WAGE DEMANDS, AND TO REPUDIATE SUMMIT MEETING.

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2. SPEAKERS INCLUDED COMMUNIST NATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGISLATORS WHO USED OPPORTUNITY TO DENIGRATE SUMMIT, CONDEMN GOU FOR HAVING REFUSED ADDITIONAL WAGE RAISES TO PUBLIC EMPLOYERS, AND SUPPORT MOVEMENT FOR PUERTO RICAN INDEPENDENCE. LEGISLATORS REFERRED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN MOST SNURRILOUS TERMS, AND TO SEVERAL LA PRESIDENTS IN EQUALLY DISRESPECTFUL LANGUAGE.

RSR

3. MEANWHILE, COMMUNIST-LED NATIONAL LABOR CONFEDERATION (CNT) ANNOUNCED SIX-POINT PLAN TO SUPPORT ACTIVITIES REPUDIATING SUMMIT. AMONG POINTS ARE DECLARATION APRIL 10-16 WEEK OF FIGHT FOR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMAND SUMMIT BE CANCELLED. CNT IS TO COORDINATE ITS ACTIVITIES WITH MARXIST-LED UNIVERSITY STUDENTS FEDERATION (FEUU) AND HOLD MANIFESTATIONS AND STRIKES DURING APRIL 10-7 WEEK.

4. COMMENT, SINCE COMMUNISTS BEGAN INTENSIFY THEIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE, THEY HAVE STEPPED UP CONSIDERABLY THEIR SMEARING ATTACKS ON PRESIDENT JOHNSON PERSONALLY AND ALMOST DAILY REFER TO HIM IN THEIR PAPER EL POPULAR INSULTINGLY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-361

By ing NARA. Date 5-4-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- MONTEVIDEO 1972, MARCH 11, 1967

IT APPEARS THESE ATTACKS WILL CONTINUE AND INCREASE IN INTENSITY AS DATE OF CONFERENCE APPROACHES UNLESS GOU STEPS IN WITH STIFF WARNINGS TO COMMUNIST LEADERS. MOREOVER, FACT THAT CNT THREATENING STRIKES AND MANIFESTATIONS ON ENTIRELY POLITICAL ISSUES COORDINATED WITH COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVITIES IS FURTHER INDICATION COMMUNISTS GIVING HIGHEST PRIORITY THEIR ATTEMPTS HAVE SUMMIT CANCELLED, OR AT LEAST TO USE OCCASION FOR COMMUNIST EFFORTS CLAIM POPULAR REPUDIATION OF U.S. WORLD AND LA POLICIES. WHILE WE TAKE THESE COMMUNIST PREPARATIONS SERIOUSLY, AND WILL BE WORKING WITH GOU AUTHORITIES ON MEANS TO CONTROL THEM, EMBASSY WISHES EMPHASIZE THAT THERE IS NO REPEAT NO GENERAL CLIMATE OF AGITATION OR OF ANTI-SUMMIT ATTITUDES. RATHER, THE GENERAL SITUATION IS QUIET, AND THE GENERAL ATTITUDE ON SUMMIT IS A MIXTURE OF PRIDE THAT IT WILL BE HELD IN URUGUAY AND INTEREST IN THE ISSUES INVOLVED.

GP-3. HOYT

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, March 13, 1967  
12:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

You will wish, before lunch, to  
get Tommy's reaction to his instruction.  
I don't wholly agree with the view he  
expresses.

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 3880

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ry, NARA, Date 4-17-91



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

5 41a

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

Info CONTROL: 12149  
RECEIVED: 13 MAR 1967 5:41

PP RUEHCR  
DE RUEHCR 3880FD 0720945  
ZNY TTTT  
P 130930Z MAR 67  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ MOSCOW 3880.

NODIS/SUNFLOWER PLUS.

REF: STATE 153528.

1. I MAY HAVE CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY APPROACH NEW DRV AMBASSADOR TOMORROW OR WEDNESDAY DURING RECEPTIONS FOR AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR AS AMBASSADOR IS NEAR ME IN DIPLOMATIC LINEUP. IF NOT WILL REQUEST INTERVIEW THROUGH EMBASSY.

2. IN VIEW OUR RECENT ESCALATION BOMBING, THIS STRIKES ME AS A SINGULARLY INAPPROPRIATE TIME MAKE THIS APPROACH. IT WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE REBUFFED BY DRV WHO WILL NOT WISH TO GIVE APPEARANCE OF SUBMITTING TO INCREASED MILITARY PRESSURE. MORE IMPORTANTLY BELIEVE OUR APPROACH AT THIS TIME WILL BE INTERPRETED BY SOVIETS AS CYNICALLY TIMED TO INSURE REFUSAL AND MERELY BUILD UP OUR RECORD OF PEACE EFFORTS. (I AM INCLINED BE SKEPTICAL KULEBIAKIN). MOREOVER, FAILURE ARRANGE DISCUSSION NOW WILL MAKE MORE DIFFICULT APPROACH AT MORE OPPORTUNE TIME. NEVERTHELESS, WILL ENDEAVOR CARRY OUR INSTRUCTIONS UNLESS CANCELLED BY DEPARTMENT.

GP-1.  
THOMPSON  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-361

By ing NARA. Date 5-4-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Pres file* 42

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, March 13, 1967  
12:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read,  
before lunch, Amb. Lodge's views.

W. W. Rostow

Salgon 20198, 2 parts

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By kg, NARA, Date 4-17-91

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

00 RUEHC

DE RUMJIR 20198/1 0720600

ZNY TTTTT

O 130553Z MAR 67

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

STATE GRNC

BT

~~T O P S E C R E T~~ SAIGON 20198 SECTION ONE OF TWO

CONTROL: 11912

RECEIVED: MARCH 13, 1967

2:38 A.M.

Info

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM LODGE

N O D I S

REF: STATE 153548, 153551

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

Am. State In 5/30/78

By slip, NARA, Date 4/17/91

1. PROPOSED AGENDA APPEARS EXCELLENT, I ASSUME YOU WILL LOOK TO WESTMORELAND FOR SESSION 1 TOPICS, AND I WILL BE PREPARED TO HANDLE TOPICS LISTED FOR SESSIONS 2 AND 3. WE WILL PREPARE FULL PAPERS ON ALL TOPICS FOR BACKGROUND USE AND FULLER DETAIL.
2. IN ADDITION TO HABIB, I WOULD LIKE TO BRING LATHRAM FOR ALL TOPICS RELATED TO PACIFICATION. HABIB KNOWS OTHER TOPICS WELL, AND THIS WOULD KEEP STAFF TO MINIMUM FOR INTIMATE DISCUSSION. I DO BELIEVE IT WOULD BE UNWISE FOR BOTH PORTER AND ME TO BE ABSENT AT ONCE, AND LATHRAM IS COMPLETELY FAMILIAR WITH OCO ACTIVITIES.
3. TURNING NOW TO THE QUESTION OF INVITING THIEU AND KY, I FULLY CONCUR IN THE NEED TO ACCELERATE OUR PRESENT RATE OF PROGRESS AND TO DRAMATIZE WHAT HAS BEEN AND SHOULD BE ACHIEVED TO MEET THE HEAVY PRESSURES I KNOW THE PRESIDENT AND YOU ARE UNDER AT HOME. I ALSO AGREE THAT THIS IS GOOD WAY TO BRING NEW AND OLD TEAMS TOGETHER, AND THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO DRAMATIZE POST-WAR PLANNING AND TO TAKE A HARD LOOK AT THE LAND REFORM PROBLEM.
4. NONETHELESS, MY "NET JUDGMENT" ON REFLECTION IS EVEN MORE STRONGLY NEGATIVE ON THIEU AND KY BEING PRESENT THAN MY EARLIER CABLES MAY HAVE SUGGESTED. I HAVE TALKED THOS OVER WITH PORTER AND CALHOUN, AND WE SHARE THE FOLLOWING SURMISES:
  - A. INEVITABLY, THE MEETING WILL APPEAR TO THE VIETNAMESE (AND TO THE WORLD) AS AN AMERICAN SHOW. THE PRESIDENT'S PRESENCE AND THE GUAM LOCATION (TO WHICH I SEE NO ASIAN ALTERNATIVE) WOULD IN THEMSELVES MAKE THIS IMPRESSION INEVITABLE. MOREOVER, THE FORMAT CALLS FOR AMERICAN DISCUSSIONS THE FIRST DAY, WITH THE VIETNAMESE COMING IN ON THE SECOND, AND TO THIS AGAIN I SEE NO ALTERNATIVE IF WE ARE TO HAVE REALLY FRANK AIRING OF PROBLEMS WHICH WE SIMPLY CANNOT DISCUSS AS BLUNTLY WITH THIEU AND KY PRESENT. YET OUR AMERICAN MEETINGS ON THE FIRST DAY MUST INEVITABLY GIVE THE FLAVOR THAT THE AMERICAN SIDE WORKED OUT THE ANSWERS AND THEN GAVE THEM TO THE VIETNAMESE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 20198, MARCH 13. SECTION ONE OF TWO. N O D I S

B. FOR THIEU AND KY TO MEET NOW WITH THE PRESIDENT (AND ON AMERICAN SOIL AT THAT) MUST INEVITABLY CONVEY TO THE VIETNAMESE THAT WE ARE ENDORSING A MILITARY CANDIDACY FOR PRESIDENT OF VIET-NAM IN PRINCIPLE. THESE TWO MEN ARE NOW THE LEADERS OF THEIR COUNTRY, BUT INCREASINGLY THEY MUST BE REGARDED -- AND ARE ACTING -- AS CANDIDATES FOR OFFICE. AS YOU KNOW, I FEEL THAT A MILITARY CANDIDACY IS IN FACT LIKELY, THE PROBABLE WINNER, AND PERHAPS THE BEST ANSWER FOR MANY REASONS. BUT IT IS QUITE DIFFERENT FOR US TO CONFER WHAT MUST APPEAR HERE TO BE A U.S. PRESIDENTIAL BLESSING. TO DO SO COULD DRASTICALLY WEAKEN THE ALREADY NONE-TOO-STRONG BARGAINING POWER OF THE CIVILIANS TO OBTAIN A PROPER PLACE IN THE SLATE AND TO KEEP THE HIGHLY DESIRABLE CIVIL-MILITARY BALANCE AND COOPERATION.

C. MOREOVER, THIEU AND KY ARE POTENTIAL RIVALS TO BE THE MILITARY CANDIDATE. ONLY LAST NIGHT A GROUP OF INFLUENTIAL VIETNAMESE ASKED ME POINTEDLY WHICH THE U.S. WANTED. I, OF COURSE, REPLIED THAT ALL CANDIDATE CHOICES WERE UP TO THEM, AND THAT THE ONLY USG POSITION WAS THAT WE WOULD WORK WITH THE MAN WHO WAS DULY ELECTED. THE POINT IS THAT BOTH THIEU AND KY WILL BE EYEING EVERY GESTURE DURING THE CONFERENCE AS AN INDICATION THAT WE PREFER ONE OR THE OTHER. IN SHORT, HAVING THE TWO PRESENT HAS THE SAME BASIC PROBLEMS THE PRESIDENT AND YOU HAVE ALWAYS BEEN IN A KY VISIT TO THE U.S.

D. THE ABOVE FUNDAMENTAL POINTS BEAR DIRECTLY ON THE KIND OF PUBLICITY THE CONFERENCE WOULD GET IF THIEU AND KY ARE PRESENT. APART FROM THE INEVITABLE CYNICS, I AM AFRAID THAT THE GREAT BULK OF THE PRESS AND TELEVISION PLAY, INCLUDING THE MOST RESPONSIBLE, WOULD SEIZE ON AND PLAY UP THESE POINTS. THE RESULTS COULD WELL DROWN OUT THE THEME WE WANT, OF PRESENT AND FUTURE PROGRESS.

5. IN ADDITION, THE FOLLOWING NEGATIVE FACTORS ALSO OCCUR TO ME:

A. I SIMPLY DO NOT BELIEVE A MEETING OF THIS SORT WILL STIMULATE GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THEIU AND KY AND THE NEW TEAM. ON THE CONTRARY, BRINGING TOP NATIONAL LEADERS TO AMERICAN SOIL TO INTRODUCE THEM TO A NEW AMERICAN TEAM IS CONTRARY TO ALL DIPLOMATIC NORMS AND COULD EVEN VONVEY A STRONG COLONIAL FLAVOR HERE AND IN THE PRESS EVERYWHERE. MOREOVER, THE NEW TEAM WANTS TO START WITH CORRECT AND OFFICIAL RELATIONS TO THIEU AND KY, AND NOT BE COMMITTED PERSONALLY OR UNDULY TO THEM AS INDIVIDUALS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 20198, MARCH 13. SECTION ONE OF TWO. N O D I S

B. AS I NOTED IN MY EARLIER CABLE. THERE ARE NO MAJOR SPECIFIC PROGRAMS ON WHICH WE CAN NOW PUSH THE GVN EFFECTIVELY THROUGH A CONFERENCE OR A COMMUNIQUE. ON THE ELECTIONS, THIEU AND KY ARE FULLY COMMITTED; AND, IF ANYTHING, WANT A FASTER TIME TABLE THAN THE CIVILIANS. ON RECONCILLATION, THEY ARE LIKEWISE COMMITTED TO A MAJOR STEP WHEN THE CONSTITUTION IS PROMULGATED IN MID OR LATE APRIL; IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO SCOOP THIS IN ANY WAY. EVEN ON LAND REFORM, THE TWO ARE VYING WITH EACH OTHER IN SMALL SPECIFIC ACTION. WHILE MUCH NEEDS TO BE STEPPED UP, THERE IS NOW NO SINGLE MAJOR NEW TOPIC TO PUSH AND DRAMATIZE AS THERE WAS BOTH AT HONOLULU AND MANILA. LACKING SUCH A MAJOR NEW MOVE, A Klieg-LIGHT CONFERENCE WITH THE GVN LEADERS COULD EVEN CREATE THE VERY IMPRESSION OF IMPATIENCE THAT WOULD BE MOST COMFORTING TO HANOI AND SOME WHAT DISCOURAGING TO THE MANY HERE WHO CONSTANTLY ASK US FRANKLY WHETHER THE U.S. HAS THE PATIENCE TO SEE THIS THROUGH.

C. ALTHOUGH THE PEACE THEME DOES NOT APPEAR IN YOUR OUTLINE COMMUNIQUE (STATE 153551), I WONDER HOW IN PRACTICE WE COULD LEAVE IT OUT. I SEE NOTHING NEW TO ADD ON IT AND THE EFFECT HERE OF ANY VERBAL STRESS ON PEACE WOULD BE NEGATIVE BECAUSE OF THE CONVICTION THAT HANOI WOULD REGARD IT AS ANOTHER SIGN OF OUR WEAKNESS OF WILL AND WOULD, THEREFORE, BE TOUGHENED IN HER DETERMINATION TO CARRY ON THE WAR. THE RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST SENATOR KENNEDY SHOW HOW SENSITIVE THE MOOD HERE IS NOW, EVEN THOUGH THERE IS ALSO A CONSTRUCTIVE GROWTH IN WILLINGNESS TO LOOK AT THE PROBLEM FROM WHAT IS SEEN HERE AS A GROWING POSITION OF STRENGTH.

6. AS TO WHETHER THIEU AND KY WOULD ACCEPT IF ASKED, I SIMPLY DO NOT KNOW. THE FACTORS I HAVE LISTED CUT BOTH WAYS FROM THEIR PERSONAL AND POLITICAL STANDPOINT. I DO THINK THAT IF THEY DID ACCEPT THEY WOULD DO SO UNEASILY AND WITH SOME EYE TO THEIR OWN PERSONAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH IS JUST WHAT WE DO NOT WANT.

7. ALL THE ABOVE POINTS RELATE PRIMARILY TO HAVING THIEU AND KY COME. I SEE NO SUCH OBJECTIONS TO OUR ASKING THE GVN TO SEND ITS TOP POST-WAR PLANNER (PROFESSOR VU QUOC THUC) AND AN EXPERT ON THE LAND REFORM PROBLEM, AND TO OUR GIVING THESE ISSUES A GOOD PUSH. LODGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

Info

OO RUEHC  
DE RUMJIR 20198/2 0720624  
ZNY TTTT  
O 130553Z MAR 67  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CONTROL: 11913  
RECEIVED: MARCH 13, 1967  
2:18 A.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~ SAIGON 20198 SECTION TWO OF TWO

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM LODGE

N O D I S

8. FINALLY, LET ME REPEAT THAT I WELCOME THE IDEA OF A U.S. CONFERENCE IN GUAM AT THIS POINT. THERE SIMPLY COULD BE NO BETTER PLACE FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND ME TO REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT. WITH THE EXCELLENT AGENDA LAID OUT AND THE NEW TEAM PRESENT, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO DRAMATIZE THE PROGRESS BEING MADE. THE PRESS IMPACT OF SUCH A CONFERENCE SHOULD BE MOST HELPFUL HERE AS WELL AS IN THE U.S. AND IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT IF THE PRESIDENT SHOULD DECIDE TO INVITE THEIU AND KY, I WILL DO ALL I CAN TO MAKE IT A SUCCESS.

9. I PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF WHAT YOUR 153550 CALLS "THE ABSOLUTELY VITAL POLITICAL BASE" IN THE U.S. AND WANT ALWAYS TO BE HELPFUL IN THAT REGARD EVEN WHEN IT INVOLVES DOING THINGS WHICH DO NOT ALWAYS SEEM APPROPRIATE HERE. IN THIS INSTANCE, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THE NEWSMEN WOULD WRITE ABOUT THE POINTS DISCUSSED IN PARAGRAPHS 4A, B, D, D, E, AND F., THAT WE WOULD BE ON THE DEFENSIVE AND THAT THE WHOLE GUAM MEETING COULD TURN OUT TO HAVE DEFEATED ITS OWN PURPOSE.  
LODGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

43

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Lunch with the President

March 13, 1967, 1:00 P.M.

Agenda

1. Ky-Thieu: Should they be invited to Guam for second day or should we accept Lodge's negative advice (Saigon #20198)?  
(Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)
2. Guam Party: Who should go? Answer partly depends on whether Vietnamese are invited and come; but not wholly:

Lilienthal  
Harriman  
Ladejinsky  
Gaud  
Others (AID Mission Director MacDonald)

3. Vietnam Negotiations: Next moves (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)
  - Moscow
  - U Thant
  - Other
4. ABM Discussions with the Russians  
Draft instructions to Ambassador Thompson will propose an agenda and include an offer to send U.S. technical experts to Moscow.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 18, NARA, Date 4/17/91



March 13, 1967

**SANITIZED**

~~SECRET~~ LITERALLY EYES ONLY

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR LOCKE

cc: Bunker

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)  
(C)

We have come to a point in Viet Nam where we must put in the ablest team of Americans we can, to drive forward with a great sense of urgency this war to a satisfactory resolution. The civil side is, as you know, as important as the military; although we are sending at least two of our top generals as additions to Westmoreland's staff. It involves getting momentum in pacification; keeping the Vietnamese economy on even keel; and, above all, seeing through successfully the transition to constitutional government.

There is literally no more important set of tasks now before this nation.

I am drafting Ellsworth Bunker to take over as Ambassador in Saigon succeeding Lodge.

We need you, while maintaining your Ambassadorial rank, to serve as his associate in the Number Two spot as his Deputy. General Maxwell Taylor, while Ambassador to Viet Nam, had as his deputy our present Ambassador to Japan, one of our ablest career men, Alexis Johnson.

We believe you are the best we know for this most important and necessary assignment. I want out there with Ambassador Bunker the ablest and most vigorous and most loyal administrator to keep all the parts of that show running and to help give it the drive it must have in the next few months ahead.

We are also surrendering to Saigon my number one White House

**SANITIZED**

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-57

By cb, NARA Date 1-18-01

~~SECRET~~ LITERALLY EYES ONLY

3/13/67

Assistant on Viet Nam, Bob Komer, who will be specifically charged with pacification.

If you accept, I would wish you to join us in Guam Sunday morning where we shall be gathering for a two-day meeting of all of the new team with Lodge and Westmoreland.

I fully understand that President Ayub will be disappointed if you leave so soon after having made so remarkably good a start. And I shall have to consider most seriously a first-class successor to you. But I want right now the ablest team of Americans I can muster in Saigon; and that is why I am putting this proposition to you.

I have, of course, discussed this with Ellsworth Bunker, who would be delighted to have you serve with him in this capacity.

###

115  
Monday, March 13, 1967  
10:00 a.m.

*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bill Moyers delivered to you through me this morning the attached letter from Harry Guggenheim.

He notes that Mr. Guggenheim has been one of the strongest Viet Nam supporters we have; and he is making this suggestion on his own initiative in an effort to be helpful. He is concerned that the attacks by RFK and Schlesinger have hurt your "peace image." It is against that background that he makes the enclosed proposition.

Bill thinks that this is worth a thoughtful reply from you. I attach a draft of such a reply.

Technically, what we need, to try a gimmick like the one proposed, is to have the government in Saigon prepared to offer, simultaneously, to talk to the VC on a military basis. Any serious planning for a cease-fire approach -- such as that suggested by U Thant -- requires a much higher degree of cooperation between us and Saigon than mutual de-escalation between us and Hanoi; for example, no bombing for no infiltration.

In the weeks ahead we shall have to be moving towards that kind of discussion with Saigon; although the most promising initial approach is, of course, secret talks with Hanoi which look to the shape of the whole settlement and then de-escalation and cease-fire.

If that doesn't work, the best gambit is to have discussions initiated between Saigon and the VC -- and then expanded out to include Hanoi and ourselves.

W. W. R.

45a

Harry F. Guggenheim, President and Editor in Chief

March 9, 1967

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

May I suggest for your consideration a plan for (1) either immediately bringing the fighting to an end in Vietnam or (2) immeasurably improving your position within and without the United States?


No doubt the Pope, if approached privately, again would appeal to the President of the United States and the President of North Vietnam to find a way to end the horrors of war in the fighting zones. This time he might consider it wise to make the specific plea that (1) as of a specified date in the immediate future both sides should agree to an armistice. (2) That coincidentally a group of neutrals be formed to direct the inspection of all belligerents for the purpose of assurance of compliance with the armistice. And (3) that both parties immediately meet for an armistice conference and peace negotiations.

Such a plea if accepted by you and rejected by Ho Chi Minh would give new proof to the world that you are honorably seeking peace, offsetting the effects created recently by some of your detractors.

If the Pope would not be the best conduit perhaps Kosygin would like to be the peace maker, though he probably fears criticism from the communist world. I believe it should be someone other than the President of the United States. Any more direct offers might indicate weakness and encourage Ho Chi Minh to the erroneous conclusion that the busybodies in the United States instead of speaking for a small minority indicate that the United States is war weary and that the President must sue for peace soon because of political pressures both in and out of his party.

May I add a word of admiration for your skillful handling of the press conference today.

Yours respectfully,

  
Harry F. Guggenheim

HFG:H

March 13, 1967

Dear Mr. Guggenheim:

I am grateful that you took the trouble to formulate and make available to me your proposal for an armistice to be negotiated through an intermediary or group of intermediaries.

I respect it all the more because it comes from someone who has supported and helped to explain our Viet Nam policy and all that hinges on the capacity of this nation to see it through to an honorable peace.

As for the proposal itself, you can be assured that it will be carefully staffed out and then given my personal attention.

Although it is hard for some of our people to accept this, the brutal fact is that a very wide and equitable range of possible approaches to peace has been flatly rejected by Hanoi. As nearly as we can make out, right now they intend to pursue the struggle to take over South Viet Nam.

But our own efforts to bring this matter to negotiation have not stopped and will not stop.

You have my gratitude and best wishes.

Sincerely,

Mr. Harry F. Guggenheim  
President and Editor in Chief  
NEWSDAY  
Garden City, Long Island,  
New York 11530

LBJ:WWR:mz

Monday, March 13, 1967 -- 8:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Ambassador Ed Ritchie called to inform us of the vacation plans of Prime Minister Pearson.

The Prime Minister is leaving for vacation now and will be in the Caribbean through the Easter weekend. Ritchie said the Prime Minister in no way wished to press you; but, if it were agreeable, March 28 or 29 would be convenient. I am sure March 30th would also be satisfactory for Pearson.

Should you wish to see him, March 29 or 30th would be better, because we have the Afghan Prime Minister on the 28th.

Amb. Ritchie made it clear that this was a wholly informal sounding; and, if your schedule did not permit seeing Pearson at this time, it would be understood.

W. W. Rostow

March 29 meeting\_\_\_\_\_

March 29 lunch\_\_\_\_\_

March 30 meeting\_\_\_\_\_

March 30 lunch\_\_\_\_\_

No\_\_\_\_\_

See me\_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rlh

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, March 13, 1967

9:30 a.m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

I had a thoroughgoing search of the town conducted yesterday on the results of our bombing attacks in recent days.

All the information we have is on the first two pages of the attached report.

The problem is that weather has been so bad they have not been able to do much post-strike photography.

There is one good post-strike picture of the Hon Gai Thermal Power Plant \* and we shall be getting some now out-of-date post-strike pictures of the steel plant soon.

My impression is that they are chewing away at these targets in a tolerably effective way and are beginning to make them hurt; but we won't know much until we get some pictures.

*Walt*

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

\* in my office : available to you on call.

*W*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Alto 75-78; 1730 2-23-79  
By 2/1-79, NARA, Date 4/14/79

~~TOP SECRET~~





THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

13 March 1967  
0530 EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Analysis of Results of NVN Air Campaign - 22 Feb  
thru 12 Mar 67

1. The attached analysis is provided in response to telephone request of 12 March.
2. Analysis consists of a narrative of events and a summary detailing date and time of attack, number and type of strike aircraft, number and size of ordnance delivered, and photo reconnaissance results. Six tabs are attached to the analysis; these provide additional information.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H. J. Trum", is positioned above the typed name.

H. J. TRUM, III  
REAR ADMIRAL, USN  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR  
OPERATIONS (NMCC)

Attch:  
a/s

Copies to:  
SECDEF  
CJCS

~~TOP SECRET/LIMDIS~~

ANALYSIS OF AIR STRIKES AGAINST FIXED TARGETS IN  
NORTH VIETNAM -- 22 FEBRUARY THROUGH 12 MARCH

1. The following is an analysis of air operations against the program authorized on 22 February. This program consisted of five newly authorized targets and six unstruck targets carried over from previous authorizations:

<u>TGT #</u>	<u>NAME</u>
82.13	Hon Gai Thermal Power Plant
82.16	Thai Nguyen TPP
82.17	Viet Tri TPP
82.26	Bac Giang TPP
76	Thai Nguyen Steel Plant
22	Xuan Mai Barracks, SSW
39.44	Chi Ne Barracks
47.16	Hon Gai Explosives Storage
47.17	Cam Ly Ammunition Depot
47.21	Bac Giang Ammunition Depot
63.14	Son Tay Supply Depot

2. Of the above, the following have not yet been struck:

82.16	Thai Nguyen TPP
22	Xuan Mai Barracks SSW
47.21	Bac Giang Ammunition Depot
63.14	Son Tay Supply Depot

3. Status of targets struck thru 12 March:

a. 82.13, Hon Gai TPP. Target struck on 24 Feb by 3A6s, on 25 Feb by 2A6s, on 1 Mar by 5A6s, and on 10 Mar by 5A6s. Damage assessment based on photography obtained on 6 March (10 March strike not included) indicates that three buildings were destroyed and 10 damaged, one of which was the boiler house (50 percent damaged), a key element of TPPs. Functional analysis to determine if the plant is operating is in progress.

b. 82.17, Viet Tri TPP. Target struck on 12 March by 17 F105s and 4 F4s. Pilots report generator hall and boiler house burning. Post strike photo reconnaissance not yet available. Hanoi radio on 12 March stated that US aircraft rained bombs on an area bordering the Red River inside Hanoi. While this strike correlates in time, our nearest aircraft were four F105s that jettisoned ordnance 20 miles west of the city while avoiding a surface-to-air missile.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 99-59**  
**By 12, NARA Date 10-30-99**

c. 32.26, Bac Giang TPP. Target struck on 24 February by 2A6s, on 25 February by 1A6, and on 10 March by 4A6s. Pilot reports estimate heavy damage to target. Weather has precluded post strike photo reconnaissance.

d. 76.0, Thai Nguyen steel plant. Two strike missions have been flown...on 10 March by 24 F105s and on 11 March by 32 F105s. Field photo interpretations from one day and one night, reconnaissance mission indicates light to moderate damage within several areas of this extensive target complex. Functional analysis to determine exact status will be accomplished upon receipt of photography.

e. 39.44, Chi Ne Barracks. Was struck on 23 February by 2 A6s. Darkness precluded pilot visual observation.

f. 47.16, Hon Gai Explosive Storage. Was struck on 10 March by 15 A4s and 2F8s and on 11 March by 6A4s and 2F8s. Pilots report ordnance on target. No visual observation of damage due to dust and smoke. Poststrike photo reconnaissance not yet available.

g. 47.17, Cam Ly Ammunition Depot. Was struck on 10 March by 17A4s. Pilots report extensive damage to target with secondary explosions in all targeted areas. Poststrike photo reconnaissance not yet available.

See attached summary for list of number and type strike aircraft, ordnance expended and status of post strike photography.

4. Caused by the northeast monsoon the weather in the Hanoi area since 22 February has hampered strike and reconnaissance operations. Except for 10, 11 and 12 March weather has consisted of near continuous cloud cover at the lower levels punctuated by rain and combined with periods of haze and fog.

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 99-58**  
**By cb, NARA Date 6-30-00**

48

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, March 12, 1967 -- 5:30 pm

Mr. President:

We have gotten out a good, strong cable reflecting your instruction to me of this morning.

In that connection, you will be heartened to note [REDACTED] that Ky understands very well the connection between political stability in Viet Nam and the possibility of maintaining support for Viet Nam in the U. S.

You will be interested also in the new Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Diem's assessment of public opinion in the U. S.

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]  
10 March 1967

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

~~SECRET~~

48a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Special Report

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 99-60**

COUNTRY South Vietnam

By CG, NARA Date 6-30-00

DATE OF  
INFO.

DATE 10 March 1967

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

SUBJECT

Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States Bui Diem's assessment of the influence of the anti-war group in the United States, and Prime Minister Ky's reaction that GVN stability is the best guarantee of continued American support

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

SOURCE

[REDACTED]

1. (SUMMARY: At a meeting with Prime Minister Ky Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States Bui Diem reported his impressions after less than two months in Washington. He noted the influence of popular attitudes against American involvement in Vietnam and the possible consequences of that influence. One of Ky's advisors took issue with Diem's fears that the United States might try to "make a deal" with the USSR to force a coalition government of Nationalists and Communists on South Vietnam. While agreeing in general with Diem's analysis, Prime Minister Ky twice stated his conviction that the greatest impact the GVN could hope to have in influencing American foreign policy would be the continued development of the current trend toward stability.)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

2. On [REDACTED] March 1967 Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky met with Bui Diem, South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States, and a small group of advisors. Diem, who has been in Washington for less than two months, reported on the "Peace Movement" in the United States. He said that the Vietnam war is unpopular among the American people and that if the Government of Vietnam (GVN) is unable to continue development of the current trend toward stability, the

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2

United States might decide to abandon the war. He also pointed out that the United States would be faced with an inevitable decision to withdraw if President Johnson is unable to resist peace activities in the United States. One of Ky's advisors who was present took issue with Diem and insisted that the United States could not abandon Vietnam even if President Johnson were not reelected. He said that for 100 years the Far Eastern policy of the United States has been fairly consistent.)

3. Prime Minister Ky was inclined to agree with Diem. He said that without stability in Vietnam, no President could help. Ky said that while the GVN cannot directly affect American public opinion, it can influence that opinion by the way it conducts its affairs. Ky stated his belief that if there should be a reversal of the trend toward stability in South Vietnam, there is a strong possibility that the United States will pull out.

4. Diem said that because of public opinion and the peace controversy, the United States will probably try to "make a deal" with Moscow to form a South Vietnamese coalition government of Nationalists and Communists and that the United States will try to find a "Souvanna Phouma" to head it. In his opinion, Diem said, the United States does not have a real Vietnamese policy but struggles along from day to day. Ky agreed with Diem and said that an anti-peace movement must be organized in South Vietnam to resist any effort to form a coalition government. Some disagreement was expressed by others in the group who felt that the United States has a well planned policy in South Vietnam which Moscow, Hanoi, and Peking regard as detrimental to their interests. Diem waved these objections aside, stating he had been dealing with Americans for 15 years and knew them well. He said that policy makers and strategists make plans but the President alone decides foreign policy.)

5. The Prime Minister reiterated his conviction that the only way the GVN can contribute toward the formulation of a U.S. foreign policy favorable to a continuation of the war is by continued development of the trend toward stable government.

~~SECRET~~

March 12, 1967

*Pres file*

Send LDX to State from Walt Rostow

The President would like the following message sent to New Delhi  
for delivery to Prime Minister Gandhi.



49a

Sunday, March 12, 1967

From the President for Prime Minister Gandhi

I congratulate you on your selection again as Prime Minister.

My heart and my thoughts have been with you through the days of that hard campaign and its aftermath. We both know well what it is to face difficult times. But, in the end, democratic politics is one of man's greatest achievements; and India's commitment to democracy one of our greatest sources of hope for the future.

I look forward to working with you in the days ahead.

Lyndon B Johnson

Dictated over telephone by  
Mr. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Sunday, March 12, 1967  
6:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here is the first hopeful noise in a long while on India's attitude towards reconciliation with Pakistan. We will have to see if this will be pursued as a serious and sustained policy by the new government or whether it is simply noisemaking pleasing to Americans before the India consortium meeting which starts in a few days. Nevertheless, it is a good noise to hear in a naughty world.

W. W. Rostow

New Delhi 12963

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dec 3-13-78, NSC 11-30-78

By 28/ij, N/AHA, Date 4-19-91

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-57  
By is, NARA Date 1-24-00

Friday, March 10, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BOWLES (New Delhi, 12963)

At his request, I called on C.S. Jha yesterday afternoon primarily to discuss Indo-Pak relationships.

Jha first expressed his own conviction and "that of my associates" that every effort must be made to lower tensions between Pakistan and India. The present situation, he said, was costly to everyone concerned.

Jha then reviewed at length India's efforts to broaden its discussions with the Pak Government following Tashkent with emphasis on Swaran Singh's discussions with Pirzada, Pakistan Foreign Minister, at the U.N. in November. The net result was that India has been prepared to discuss all questions including Kashmir; however, Pakistan prefers a piecemeal approach withholding the settlement of most other issues until some "meaningful" concessions are made by India in regard to Kashmir, concessions which Jha stated no Indian Government could make and survive.

C.S. Jha then referred to my discussions with L.K. Jha and others concerning advantages of a ceiling on defense expenditures for the two countries. The Indian Government he said fully agreed with our views and would like to find some means for lessening the military burden on both countries. He then read me a letter written by Chagla to Pirzada which he said had been delivered to Pakistan High Commissioner Husain. The gist of the letter was as follows:

A. The Government of India welcomes the statement by Ayub Khan in late January in which he referred to the need for arms reduction and lowering of tensions between the two nations.

B. The Government of India will be glad to meet with the Pakistan Government at the official level to seek some means of reducing respective arms expenditures.

C. The Government of India will be receptive to any suggestions for setting up a meeting that the Government of Pakistan would care to make.

~~SECRET~~

During a call today to introduce Battle, C.S. Jha again emphasized Indian awareness that relations with Pakistan were the most important single aspect of Indian foreign policy. He stressed the Indian desire to build up its relations with Pakistan to the point that the Kashmir "question" might become adjustable. As with me yesterday, Jha reviewed Indo-Pak developments since Tashkent in considerable detail and cited a recent lead editorial in the Pak Observer urging resumption of trade as an encouraging sign of possible movement in that field. A few weeks ago he had suggested to the Pak High Commissioner that the present deadlock be broken and that air services as well as road, rail and river communications be restored. While there appears to be some hope regarding air services, Jha was not optimistic regarding the restoration of river traffic in general or even Indian river transit of East Pakistan. The Government of India feels it is a question of principles that all communications should be restored.

On Kashmir, speaking as Jha said in the privacy of the room, he stated the Government of India is not adverse to drawing an international boundary along the cease-fire line.

Jha then called for and read to us the text of Chagla letter to Pirzada referred to above. In further discussion, Jha made it clear that the Government of India is not wedded to a specific approach to stabilize the arms race in the Subcontinent. He indicated that reference to a limitation of expenditures on armaments in the letter had been used in a very general sense; whether limitations were based on budgetary figures or on force goals would be completely open to discussion between the two sides. Jha added that there has been no definitive Pak reaction to date.

In closing, Jha stressed again that the Government of India regards good relations with Pakistan as absolutely vital, that they would like to move forward toward complete normalization of relations and that India's intentions toward Pakistan are entirely peaceful.

After the meeting, Bajpai made a point of asking that knowledge of the Chagla letter be closely held as the Government of India did not wish the Paks to have any reservations regarding the sincerity of the proposal.

~~SECRET~~

-3-

Comment: The Indians appear to be making a genuine effort to resolve some of their outstanding issues with Pakistan. The initiative on the critical military budgets question after months of our urging, marks a step in the right direction. The constructive posture of Indian officials, especially in the present, somewhat uncertain political atmosphere, is also encouraging.

~~SECRET~~

The visit you will soon be making to the United States affords an opportunity to give added meaning to that association. It will also serve as a symbol of the importance of the partnership of our two great republics. Mrs. Johnson and I are looking forward to welcoming you and Mrs. Sunay.

52  
Sent LDX to State  
3/11/67 for  
transmittal

March 11, 1967  
Words: 371

DRAFT MESSAGE

TO KING CONSTANTINE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON

20 years ago today, President Harry S. Truman asked the  
American people to help the Greek nation preserve its freedom.

Before a joint session of the Congress, he declared:

"I believe it must be the policy of the United States  
to support free peoples who are resisting attempted  
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

The message and the program he conveyed on that historic  
occasion became known as the Truman Doctrine.

In commemoration of that decisive hour, in thanksgiving for  
his courage and vision, and in celebration of the friendship that  
endures between our peoples, I extend to you and the citizens of  
Greece my warm greetings and best wishes. In this I am joined



by every American who rejoices that Greece is today free and prospering.

President Truman recognized that the security of the United States was intimately related to that of Greece. He warned our people -- who, like yours, had just emerged from a savage conflict with another terrorist aggression -- that

"We shall not realize our objectives unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace

and hence the security of the United States. "

The American people responded to his call for assistance to a people struggling to be free -- and their decision has affected, not only the security of your great nation, but the security of the world for two decades.

I am aware of the sacrifices made by the Greek people in the past 20 years. I am proud of the fact that throughout that period, the United States and Greece have worked together in close partnership toward common goals. I revere the Greek spirit, that for thousands of years has inspired the world, and that has taught men to cherish freedom above all else in life.

Today we mark a moment in man's long quest for freedom. I salute you and your people on this proud anniversary, and I look forward to a future of continued friendship and cooperation between our nations.

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Saturday, March 11, 1967  
9:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this memo to the end.

It attempts to answer a critical question:  
Is there evidence that our main force victories  
are affecting the VC infrastructure?

I have asked for a careful study by the CIA.

What you have here is the raw evidence  
from the field.

The evidence is positive; although it does  
not -- and cannot -- measure the pace of the  
erosion.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 19

By is, NARS, Date 6-22-84

~~SECRET~~



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

10 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT : Transmittal of CAS Saigon Memorandum  
to Ambassador Lodge

1. On 6 March 1967 our Station Chief in Saigon, Mr. John Hart, submitted a memorandum to Ambassador Lodge entitled, "Impact of Friendly Operations on VC Guerrillas and Infrastructure." We are forwarding a copy to you (and the other recipients of this note) because of the intrinsic importance of the subject, and because Ambassador Lodge may refer to this memorandum directly or inferentially in future correspondence.

2. Mr. Hart's memorandum is being circulated among our Headquarters analytic and estimative offices as a field analysis reflecting our Saigon Station's judgments. It will constitute a Station input to the memorandum on erosion of the VC infrastructure which we are now preparing at your request.

*G. A. C. Jr.*

George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

cc: Mr. Komer  
Assistant Secretary Bundy  
Mr. Hughes  
Assistant Secretary McNaughton  
General Carroll

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS/CBS 1  
By is, NARS, Date 5-7-84

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

536

6 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge

FROM : John Hart  
Office of the Special Assistant

SUBJECT : Impact of Friendly Operations on VC Guerrillas  
and Infrastructure

I am sending you this memorandum in response to a request you made at the 27 February Mission Council meeting. It is a summation of certain material which leads me to feel that the overall U.S. effort is having a much greater impact on the overall capabilities of the Viet Cong, including the guerrilla effort, than is commonly realized.

\* \* \* \* \*

1. Unfortunately, there seems to be an impression in many quarters that we are winning the orthodox war but failing in "the other war," as if the two aspects of conflict were somehow wholly separate and unconnected. On the contrary, they are of course intimately interdependent, and our mounting successes in the orthodox phase of the war have profoundly affected the VC guerrilla apparatus and political infrastructure. A striking illustration of this is revealed in a recently captured letter written by a VC Binh Dinh province cadre to his superior on 20 January 1967. It says that since the ARVN-ROK-US sweeps through Phu Cat and Phu My districts in September and early October last year, both the military and political structures in these districts have been in critical condition. It ends with an expression of hope for a future revival of VC influence in the area.

2. The demands of main-force units for an increasing flow of supply and manpower replacements has strained the infrastructure severely, frequently beyond its capacity. Food and manpower are inadequate in many areas and, according to recently captured documents, guerrilla forces are shrinking. Morale is contagious, and the spirit of political and support forces is suffering along with that of the battered main-force troops.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS/CBS 1  
By is, NARS, Date 5-7-84

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3. In conjunction with achievements of friendly armed forces, pacification programs such as Revolutionary Development and Chieu Hoi are making inroads on VC/NFL organization. And, less publicly, improved intelligence and work of the Census Grievance teams, Provincial Reconnaissance Units, and Police Special Branch are increasingly striking direct blows at infrastructure.

4. All of this adds up to an encouraging level of success in "the other war." The enemy is hurting not just in his main-force military effort, but all down the line. This conclusion is supported by a wealth of evidence from recent clandestine reports and captured documents. A sampling of such materials, nearly all received within the past two months, is attached.

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53c

SELECTED EVIDENCE OF SETBACKS SUFFERED  
BY VC GUERRILLAS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

There is not sufficient information available to permit a comprehensive province-by-province, district-by-district survey of problems faced by the VC and their reactions to the many setbacks they have suffered. Clandestine reports acquired and documents captured in the past few months do, however, provide a generous sampling extending to every major region of the country and nearly all levels of VC organization. This attachment consists of a digest of some of the significant reports and documents.

\* \* \* \* \*

I. MORALE

In January 1967, 27 VC and NVA prisoners in the National Interrogation Center were interviewed regarding their views on the ultimate outcome of the war in South Vietnam.<sup>1</sup> Whereas two years ago such a group would almost certainly all have predicted a VC victory, now only 15 of 27 did so. More significantly, fewer than half of 13 party members in the group expected a VC victory.

A 26 October 1966 communique from a VC regional security section complains of a lack of resistance to enemy heliborne raids along Route 1. It says, further, that a common problem among village cadres and guerrillas is fear of these raids; they have become demoralized and dispirited, and their resistance plans are passive.<sup>2</sup> In Quang Nam Province, a VC district-level review of 1966 operations said that of 70 military proselyting agents trained, 36 were captured or exposed, and the rest lacked courage to conduct their mission or were simply passive in attitude. The people, it said, lacked confidence in VC administrative activities.<sup>3</sup> A VC notebook captured in operation CEDAR FALLS says most guerrillas of "ND" (possibly a cover name for a hamlet or village in Cu Chi District of VC Region Four) are demoralized.<sup>4</sup> A quarterly report from a VC village unit in Tay Ninh says fear of death and war hardships have caused civilian inhabitants and even cadres and guerrillas to turn to the enemy. Villagers have begun to believe that U.S. troops were really willing to take care of the welfare of the people.<sup>5</sup>

A political officer of the VC Binh Duong Province Unit said the cadres and people lacked determination to fight and were afraid of U.S. weapons and protracted war. Hamlet guerrillas did not want to be assigned to village units and village guerrillas refused to fight in district units.<sup>6</sup>

DECLASSIFIED.

Authority NLS-CBS 19  
By is, NARS, Date 6-22-84

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- 2 -

## II. DESERTIONS AND DEFECTIONS

In Binh Thuan Province, an emergency VC district-level meeting was held in December 1966 to develop appropriate measures "to stop day-by-day increase in defections and desertions" among demoralized VC cadres.<sup>7</sup> The Kien An Village Guerrilla Unit of Binh Duong Province was inactivated because its members were AWOL, had returned to their families, or surrendered to GVN.<sup>8</sup>

A VC Region Four report of early 1967 says: "During last year, there were deserters from all agencies and units, especially before and after each battle. This is an important problem." The report gives as reasons: (1) inadequate indoctrination; (2) some cadres act arbitrarily; (3) many were demoralized by bombardments, shellings, and fierce attacks; and (4) many were influenced by Chieu Hoi policy. The report implies that those who defected to the GVN were only 14 percent of total deserters.<sup>9</sup>

## III. LOSSES IN POPULATION UNDER VC CONTROL

A VC document dated June 1966 says: "A comparison with early 1965 shows a decrease of one million people in rural areas (under VC control) due to the presence of U.S. troops. This reflects poor leadership on our part." This document gives the mid-1966 division of South Vietnam's population as:

In liberated (i.e., Communist) areas, five million  
In enemy (i.e., GVN) areas /rural/, five million  
In cities and towns, four million<sup>10</sup>

A Phu Yen Province VC document says: "The ratio of the population under our control in the whole province is one-third that of early 1966." It adds that the VC were supposed to recruit 3,000 soldiers in Phu Yen but got only 659.<sup>11</sup>

## IV. DECREASING GUERRILLA STRENGTH

A captured VC notebook says that in some areas guerrilla warfare movements have decreased, combat aggressiveness and continuous attacks against the enemy have ceased to develop, and civilian organizations were disintegrated.<sup>12</sup> A notebook from a regional-level cadre of VC Region Four

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- 3 -

says guerrilla strength in that region declined from a high of 3,559 in 1964 to 3,114 in 1965 and 2,852 in 1966. Losses for the first eleven months of 1966 were given as 541 killed, 707 wounded, 43 captured, and 74 deserted.<sup>13</sup> A document dated June 1966 says, "guerrilla/militia dropped to 180,000. . . decrease of quantity also involved decrease in quality."

## V. RECRUITING PROBLEMS

A captured document says, ". . . We have not, despite our strenuous efforts, accomplished satisfactory results with respect to the recruitment of the civilian labor force, volunteer youth, and draftees."<sup>14</sup> Another says, "The majority of young men in liberated areas were afraid of difficulties, enemy airstrikes, and shellings. They did not want to enlist; thus, during May 1966, all districts /of Binh Duong Province/ succeeded in recruiting only 15 young men."<sup>15</sup> A Cu Chi District report says VC in this area are (late 1966) badly demoralized; replacements cannot be found to fill gaps left by desertion and fatalities.<sup>16</sup> A report from the Military Affairs Sub-Committee of Region Four says, "Due to shortage of recruits for replacement of casualties and development of units, we encountered many difficulties. . ."<sup>17</sup>

## VI. IMPACT OF PACIFICATION PROGRAMS

A late 1966 VC Region Four Party Committee resolution says: "Pacification team operations resulted in the demoralization of the population and an increase in the number of deserters and defectors."<sup>18</sup>

There is ample evidence that this sort of thing is widespread and that the VC are placing high priority on countering Revolutionary Development, Census Grievance, Provincial Reconnaissance, and Police Special Branch activities.<sup>19</sup>

In one district in Phu Yen Province, an RD team succeeded in inducing the defection of an entire VC village organization. In Quang Ngai Province, on 8 and 9 February 1967, another team persuaded 23 VC to rally, including the chief and assistant chief of Hiep Tho Trung Hamlet.

In Phu Yen Province, RD team popularity is such that there is a significant tendency for people to follow the teams. After one RD group started working in a hamlet there, the population grew from 30 families to about 1,200 inhabitants within a month.

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- 4 -

During January 1967 in Binh Duong Province, a single hamlet-level census grievance worker was responsible for the defection of 32 VC guerrillas, soldiers, and cadres. This took place in an area adjacent to the VC's "Iron Triangle" heartland.

The extent to which census grievance activities are hurting the VC is indicated in a Bac Lieu Province VC Security Section report which says: "CG system is rapidly organizing and hard working and is dealing us deadly blows at our weakest points."

Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU's) are also hitting directly at the Communist infrastructure. In one district of Dinh Tuong Province, three PRU workers brought in 17 ralliers in three weeks. Through unilateral PRU actions in January, 72 VC were captured and considerable quantities of weapons, mines, food, and documents were taken. Several VC leadership cadres were killed resisting capture.

Police Security Branch (PSB) operations have also resulted in the capture of numerous VC and a quantity of weapons and equipment. PSB reports in Binh Thuan Province in a ten-day period in February 1967 resulted in the capture of nine VC, including four members of an assassination squad. Elsewhere, PSB information has guided raids which have broken up VC meetings, assemblages of troops, and administrative/supply centers. PSB screening centers have been effective in picking up members of the VC infrastructure. As of 26 February, the Bong Song Screening Center in Binh Dinh Province had processed 716 detainees, of which 32 were classified as POW's and 128 as civil defendants in VC infrastructure.

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SOURCES:

Clandestine Reports are listed by their TDCS number and documents by their Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) numbers.

(1) TDCS 314/02813-67

(2) CDEC 01-2761-67

(3) TDCS 314/02485-67

(4) CDEC 02-1112-67

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- 5 -

- (5) CDEC 01-1598-67
- (6) CDEC 02-1301-67
- (7) TDCS 314/02844-67
- (8) CDEC 02-1440-67
- (9) CDEC 01-2393-67
- (10) CDEC 01-2552-67
- (11) Phu Yen Doc 012/67 (Nha Trang), Translated Locally
- (12) CDEC 01-3465-67
- (13) CDEC 01-3003-67
- (14) CDEC 01-2364-67
- (15) CDEC 02-1276-67
- (16) CDEC 02-1249-67
- (17) CDEC 01-2983-67
- (18) CDEC 01-3239-67
- (19) CDEC 08-1225-66, 01-3465-67, 02-1269-67, TDCS 314/02845,  
TDCS 314/01044-67, Field Report (not separately disseminated  
in Washington)

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Saturday, March 11, 1967  
3:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

The first line on the top of the second page is hopeful -- if there's substance; and it does look as though the KGB man in New York was operating on instructions.

We'll follow through.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ -- USUN 4318, March 10, 1967

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-358  
By lig NARA. Date 3-24-92

WWRostow:rla



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-361

By 48, NARA. Date 5-4-92

~~SECRET~~ -- NODIS -- USUN 4318, March 10, 1967

As instructed, Buffum and Finger met with Kulebiakin (USSR) who brought along Lozinski, and stated following: In response to report from Soviet sources that high dignitary from North Viet Nam like Pham Van Dong might meet with Amb. Thompson and specific questions raised, we consider Thompson very definitely appropriate spokesman insofar as US is concerned, and we are prepared to have Thompson meet with Pham Van Dong if Soviets could arrange private discussions between them.

Kulebiakin backed away from idea that Soviets should arrange meeting but showed continued interest in such meeting occurring in Moscow. He observed that there are contacts between Thompson and North Vietnamese Ambassador from time to time and said Thompson could suggest such talks through North Vietnamese Ambassador. In such case, he considered it likely for Minister Pham Van Dong or some other high official would be prepared to engage in discussions with Thompson in Moscow. Soviets would cooperate in arranging visit by North Vietnamese and would assure privacy and secrecy but would not take initiative and could not be mediator, As in Tashkent. Discussions must be strictly between North Viet Nam and US. He repeated this several times and then added, almost as an after-thought, that NLF was also interested party which must be included in negotiations at some stage.

Buffum made very clear US could not initiate invitation for meeting, but reiterated US prepared have Thompson participate if meeting arranged. Asked Kulebiakin whether he thought this would be good time.

Kulebiakin said spring is always good time. Said further that what is needed from US is not vague pronouncements on willingness to negotiate while escalating military operations but specific offer to Hanoi to negotiate. Recalled Soviet Union, as big power, took initiative to end war with Finland by negotiation though it could have crushed Finland. US, as big power, could afford to take similar initiative without losing prestige, but Hanoi, as small power, would appear to be begging for peace if it made offer. He then stressed that US, as big power, could afford to suspend bombing not just for one week but for months or even a year, since US capable of bringing far more into South Viet Nam than Hanoi.

Buffum noted surprisingly large amount of equipment and personnel transported to South Viet Nam during Tet suspension of bombing and observed US military commander in area could hardly welcome more of same. Queried whether talks might go on even if bombing continued.

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~~SECRET~~

-2-

Kulebiakin, while stressing again virtue of cessation of bombing, indicated private and secret talks could go on if bombing continued. Again emphasized need for specific offer from US to negotiate and stressed this not just his view but that of "all of us." Kulebiakin asked whether US considered Thompson to be best negotiator on Viet Nam. Finger repeated that we considered him appropriate spokesman and would welcome private discussions between Thompson and Pham Van Dong, but this does not exclude possibility of other equally appropriate spokesmen elsewhere.

Comment: While Kulebiakin backed away from any Soviet initiative, it is significant that continued to discuss Moscow as desirable locus and conceded possibility for talks even without cessation of bombing.

7signed/ Buffum

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, March 11, 1967  
3:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

Clearly Cabot Lodge is against  
bringing Ky and Thieu to Guam at this  
stage.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Saigon 20031

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority, State let 327-78 nsc let  
By, reg/imp, NARA, Date 4/17/91  
5-22-79

WWRostow:rlm

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C20

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL : 11161  
RECEIVED: MARCH 10, 1967, 10:10 P.M.

Info

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DE RUMJIR 20031 0700236  
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~~TOP SECRET~~ SAIGON 20031

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr 5-30-78

By sg/lsp, NARA, Date 4/17/91

MODIS

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM LODGE

1. THIS IS AN ATTEMPT TO GIVE HELPFUL ADVICE CONCERNING THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION THIS MORNING BETWEEN UNGER AND BUNDY REGARDING A MEETING IN HONOLULU WITH THIEU AND KY. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS PRESENT THEMSELVES TO ME:

A) HAVING IN MIND THE FORTHCOMING ELECTION IN VIET-NAM, WOULD NOT SUCH A MEETING LOOK LIKE TOO MUCH AMERICAN INFLUENCE -- TOO VISABLE AN ATTEMPT TO SHOW OUR APPROVAL???

B) WOULD IT NOT RAISE AGAIN IN KY'S MIND THE QUESTION OF AN AMERICAN TOUR??? IF HE CAN VISIT ONE STATE OF THE UNION, WHY CANNOT HE VISIT OTHERS???

C) WHAT WOULD BE IN THE COMMUNIQUE???

D) WOULD U.S. PUBLIC OPINION NOT REQUIRE MORE TALK ABOUT PEACE AND NEGOTIATIONS WHICH IS DEFINITELY NOT THE THING TO DO HAVING IN MIND THE REALITIES IN HANOI???

E) MIGHT THERE NOT BE SOME BAD REACTION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION WHICH IS IN ITS CLOSING PHASES, BUT IS NOT YET FINISHED???

F) IF HIGHEST QUARTERS WANTS TO DISCUSS THE SUBSTANCE OF VIET-NAM, WOULD HE NOT GET MUCH BETTER INFORMATION BY TALKING WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND WE???

G) THE FEBRUARY 1966 HONOLULU MEETING WAS USEFUL IN STARTING

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 20031, MARCH 10, 1967

OFF A GREAT MANY PROGRAMS AND IN GIVING THE GUN A PUSH. IS IT NOT TRUE THAT A PUSH IS NOT NEEDED NOW, THAT ALL THE BIG PROGRAMS SUCH AS REVAMPING THE ARVN, NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, CHIEU HOI, ETC., ARE GOING AS HARD AND AS FAST AS THE VIETNAMESE CAN GO???

2. MAYBE THERE ARE GOOD ANSWERS TO ALL THESE QUESTIONS. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE MEETING WOULD BE. ON THE BASIS OF WHAT I KNOW HERE, IT LOOKS LIKE A RISKY THING TO DO WITH THE DANGERS VERY CLEAR, AND THE GAINS NOT EVIDENT.

LODGE

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

57  
*Pres. file*

Limited Official Use

Saturday - March 11, 1967

Mr. President:

In the meeting with the Congressional leadership yesterday, you told them that you would be seeing the business people in the Council for Latin America concerning the proposed joint resolution on the OAS Summit.

With present plans to have your message and the resolution delivered on the Hill by Monday, or Tuesday at the latest, it would be good timing for you to see the Executive Committee of the Latin American Council on Wednesday or Thursday. Following this session, they are prepared to issue a statement supporting your stand at the Summit.

George Meany has told State that he also wants to issue a statement supporting the Resolution after it is submitted. If you are going to see the business people, you should also receive labor representatives. It occurs to me that there are advantages in your receiving both groups at the same time, following which each could issue their respective statements.

W. W. Rostow

Approve scheduling of  
joint business-labor  
leaders

\_\_\_\_\_

Prefer meeting with  
them separately

\_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me

\_\_\_\_\_

cc - Jim Jones

Limited Official Use

Saturday - March 11, 1967

Mr. President:

While the Chief Justice was on his trip to South America, I sent him a message of encouragement as you requested. In it I said that you looked forward to seeing him on his return.

Now that he is back, may I arrange an appointment at a mutually convenient time next week for him to see you.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_

cc - Jim Jones

Limited Official Use

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, March 11, 1967 -- 8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

I've thought further about a short German trip.

What about the anniversary of Marshall's address at Harvard, June 5, for a great speech.

The place: Berlin.

The themes:

- Hold the West together;
- Reconciliation to the East;
- Appeal to Europe to resume its world responsibilities:

food/population

Latin America

Africa

the New Asia.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 18, NARA, Date 4-22-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY~~

Saturday, March 11, 1967  
9:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

Here are two back channel telegrams from Lodge: one the ideal sequence for changing the guard in Saigon; the other responding positively to your suggestions about the care and feeding of itinerant Senators.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By My, NARA, Date 4-22-91



59a

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY (3813) From Lodge to Rostow

1. This is an attempt to give some helpful advice in connection with the subject matter of our recent teletype conversation when I was in Baguio.
2. I thought it might be useful for you to be aware of what looks here like the ideal order in which certain events should take place, as follows:
  - a. The first thing is the completion of the Constitution which should be by March 27 at the latest.
  - b. The second event should be obtaining the agreement of the Government of Viet Nam on the man.
  - c. The third stage should be the public announcement, with release of my letter.
3. I appreciate there is no hard and fast law governing these things and it is possible to change this order. But I believe that the above is the best order.
4. Warm regards.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- From Lodge to Rostow (3814)

Entirely agree about Senator Brooke. I met him at the airport and was able to head off a press conference with questions about his going to Hanoi. I have been giving him as much time as I can. We are having a raft of visitors right now, some of whom cancel plans made long in advance, thereby causing great confusion and loss of time. Specifically, Senator Brooke is meeting his constituents (of whom I am one) today from 5:30 to 7. Highest authority is unquestionably right about this.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-361  
By ing, NARA, Date 3-12-93

60

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 10, 1967

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I very much appreciate the thoughts you expressed to Ambassador McGhee on February 22. The warm friendship between our two countries is a source of great strength, not only for our own peoples but for the entire world community. I want you to know that this Government will extend every effort to maintain a close and confident working relation with you and your associates.

I want to thank you for receiving John McCloy, who has given me a full report of his good talk with you. And thank you also for your kind greetings.

The enterprise in which Messrs. McCloy, Duckwitz and Thomson are engaged is of great importance to the future of the Atlantic Community we have all worked so hard to fashion. It comes at a time when many NATO members are under strong political and economic pressures which could jeopardize the broad objectives of the Atlantic Alliance. I am strongly of the opinion that NATO troop deployments and other security arrangements should only be altered when and if the security situation permits. I hope that each of us will put first things first, and not allow the growth and consolidation of a strong Atlantic Community to be damaged by excessive concern with our own short-term difficulties in disregard of the broader common interest.

This is why the United States position in the trilateral talks has rested on the three interrelated principles which Mr. McCloy has already discussed with you:

First, the level of forces in Europe should be determined by agreement among the Allies on the basis only of security considerations, broadly construed.

Second, it is for the German Government to decide what military procurement it wishes to undertake in the light of its commitments to the Alliance.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 91-358  
By sig NARA. Date 2-24-92

Third, the Allies should deal at the same time with the remaining problem of neutralizing the foreign exchange consequences of troop presence in Germany by cooperation in the management of monetary reserves and other financial arrangements.

We recognize that the simple offset concept -- an advance agreement for military purchases of prescribed amounts to offset the foreign exchange costs of U.S. troops in Germany -- can be superseded by arrangements appropriate to the full range of military and financial relations which form the solid core of the Atlantic Community. It is our strong hope that all of us will be able to move toward a new basis of continuing financial cooperation which will both strengthen the international monetary system and provide a firmer foundation for the troop deployments essential to mutual security. I am encouraged in this respect by the results of preliminary talks between our representatives and those of the Bundesbank.

As you know, the arrangements between the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom regarding the BAOR are also closely related to the constructive handling of our own problem. A major BAOR cut at this time would have damaging consequences for the security of us all. Because of the especially difficult economic circumstances of the U.K., arrangements on the U.S.-F.R.G. pattern would be inadequate. German purchases inevitably play a greater role. In view of your own budgetary problem, your willingness to try to find ways to deal with the British problem is a real contribution to Alliance solidarity. With imaginative efforts all around, I feel we can jointly work out a constructive solution. Mr. McCloy will be communicating our ideas in more detail to Messrs. Duckwitz and Thomson.

Mr. McCloy will also be discussing our views on the question of force levels and deployments. I know you appreciate that I am under great pressure from the Congress and public opinion to reduce our forces in Europe substantially. Some have urged a withdrawal of two divisions and others even more. I am myself determined to hold the line against any steps which would significantly weaken NATO. I am convinced that a limited rotational plan, which Mr. McCloy will explain, can satisfy NATO's security requirements. This, together with a maximum effort by our NATO Allies and a successful outcome of the trilateral talks over-all will greatly help me in handling the pressures here at home.

A second matter is the problem of international liquidity and the current negotiations in the IMF and the Group of Ten. Rapid progress is needed this spring and summer to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion. Specifically, we believe that, by the September meetings of the Bank and Fund, there should be agreement on a contingency plan for the creation of new reserves. We intend to press for such agreement even in the face of some resistance on the part of a few countries. With so much at stake, I hope we can count on your support.

Finally, I would like to mention the question of a non-proliferation treaty. You may be certain that we are examining your comments on the draft text of a treaty with utmost care. As Secretary Rusk assured Vice-Chancellor Brandt, the current draft has not been agreed upon with the Soviet Union, but only reflects our explorations regarding a possible basis of agreement. We have made quite clear to the Soviets our intention to consult with our Allies before reaching any agreement. We intend that these consultations be thorough and are prepared to take the necessary time for the purpose. I hope that the talks which Ambassador Foster has had with your government have been useful in advancing us toward a common viewpoint. You can rest assured that we will make every effort to work out formulas which the Federal Republic and our other Allies will find acceptable.


I know that the non-proliferation issue poses difficult problems for you. However, in my judgment, an equitable treaty would be a most important step toward the larger goal of bringing all nuclear weapons under effective control. In the terms in which you expressed your concern to Ambassador Foster, I think the treaty is indeed imbedded in the common interest of our two nations.

Mr. Chancellor, I hope this letter will be the first of many communications between the two of us. The strong bonds between the United States and the Federal Republic have linked our countries in a broad spectrum of important and complex endeavors. I consider it of great importance that we maintain a frank and open correspondence through which we can exchange views, impressions, and ideas. In particular,

I very much hope that your schedule will permit a meeting with each other on a not too distant date. I know that your burdens are heavy and your time limited, but I hope that we may be able to find agreement on the date, time and place.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in extending our warmest greetings and best wishes to you and your family.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Richard M. Nixon", written over a vertical line that serves as a separator.

His Excellency  
Kurt Georg Kiesinger  
Chancellor of the  
Federal Republic of Germany  
Bonn

Friday, March 10, 1967  
3:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Someone sent me this because of  
its generous reference to me.

What is interesting, however, is  
the thoughtful and sympathetic exposition  
of the problems of dealing with a war like  
Viet Nam, in a democracy, in the  
television age.

You need little instruction on that  
painful problem; but it may be a comfort  
to know someone in the UK understands  
it pretty well.

W. W. Rostow

# The Into-Camera War

President Johnson still hasn't found the best way of explaining Vietnam to the American people

THE trouble with Vietnam is that it is the first war of its kind. President Johnson has still got a solid majority of Americans behind his policy: the latest Gallup poll shows that 67 per cent of them think he is right to go on bombing North Vietnam. His problem is that the minority which opposes the war includes a substantial chunk of the urban middle class from the great cities of the north-eastern part of the United States. No president is comfortable with these people against him. To some extent they are against Mr Johnson precisely because they are north-easterners. In their personal preferences, and their habits of thought, they are Europocentrists; like the European critics of the war, they have not fully grasped that the United States is a two-ocean country, as deeply involved in the future of Asia as it is in the future of Europe. But much more of the opposition to the war springs from the curious nature of the war itself.

It is a new sort of war: an 18th-century war fought with the technology of the 21st century. It is an 18th-century war in the sense that the United States is fighting for a limited objective, and the secret search for a diplomatic settlement runs parallel to the military action; this is not the kind of war that Americans are used to. It is a 21st-century war in the sense that it is the first war fought on television. For the first time in history, a democracy is fighting a war, and asking its people to approve each successive development in it, while it provides them with virtually instantaneous access to what is happening on the battlefield.

It was Kipling's Private Mulvaney who said that there were many things done in war that never got into the papers. Now we have changed all that. War has become the raw material of the mass media. Mulvaney and his like were professional soldiers, and knowledge of the kind of death they might die if caught by Afridi tribesmen on the North-West Frontier did not greatly disturb Victorian England. The American draftee in Vietnam lives and dies on television screens watched by his parents. There has never been anything quite like it. In both of this century's world wars the censors carefully controlled what the people at home could read and see. In Korea television was still too young a medium to get really to grips with the war. In Vietnam the theatre of operations is swarming with cameramen and reporters, and the war they are covering combines the unpleasantness of a regular campaign in difficult country, where there is always enough of death and terror, with the extra unpleasantness of a counter-insurgency operation. This is the material from which television constructs its documentaries on the horrors of war.

But these documentaries are inevitably one-sided. The cameramen and journalists go with the American forces hunting the Vietcong or bombing North Vietnam. In Saigon they see the inevitable misery and social disintegration brought about by war and inflation. At the front they see a modern mechanised army fighting peasant guerrillas. It is easy to put on record the Vietnamese village destroyed, and its inhabitants killed and wounded, by American bombing and artillery fire. It is very unlikely that the TV teams will arrive in a village just after the Vietcong have disembowelled the headman and mutilated his family. Thus objective reporting of the war can merge imperceptibly into a charge-sheet of accusations against one side. When it is only the American troops who are visible on the screen there will be people who say that, but for the American presence, there would be no war in Vietnam at all. Nor would there, now; but there would be a successful conquest of power by a minority of ideologists in arms.

And television hits harder than the printed word; it involves

what Professor Marshall McLuhan, talking about Vietnam, calls the pain of involvement. It is horrible to see a television close-up of a young soldier shot through the head. It is only a short step from the obvious conclusion that all wars are hell to the belief that America should not be fighting this one. Or else the reaction goes the other way. Because Americans are being seen to be killed, the argument is strengthened for doing everything possible to destroy the enemy before more Americans die. For many people in the United States those pictures of slumped figures in jungle green are the best reason for ripping off the gloves and slamming into Hanoi.

Whichever way the emotions swing, it is President Johnson who has to bear the brunt of the criticism. His carefully chosen middle road is simultaneously attacked for leading too far and for leading nowhere. The emotions generated by the Vietnam war under its arc-lamps of publicity make it more and more difficult to pursue a controlled and rational policy. Will the President succeed in keeping his grip on so emotionally explosive a situation?

It is part of a wider question. Can a democracy carry on a war of attrition like Vietnam without its resolve being sapped by war-weariness or artificially inflamed by chauvinism? The United States is in much the same position as Britain was during the 19th century: it is the possessor of global power, and heir to the complicated local involvements that go along with global power. Because it has the air-lift and sea-lift capacity to be on hand whenever a power vacuum develops, it is liable to find itself dragged into the messiest corners of international politics. During Britain's period of similar responsibility public opinion in England never minded very much about professional soldiers being killed. It is different when young Americans are being drafted to do the job, and being killed on camera.

Despite all the publicity and the vicarious proximity of the battlefields in Vietnam, President Johnson would have had fewer critics if he had done a better job of explaining the war to the American people. This kind of war is not explicable in the traditional categories of American foreign policy. It is not a "war to end all war," or a war for "the four freedoms." It is a dirty little war that has fallen to the lot of the only power that is in a position to try to contain the expansion of Asian communism.

It is the successor of the similar operation the United States mounted in Europe at the end of the 1940s, though in Europe the Americans did not have to send their own troops into action. It is based on an idealism that Americans can be counted on to respond to when they understand it. Mr Walt Rostow explained it clearly and convincingly at Leeds on February 23rd; but Mr Rostow is kept busy in the White House, and there are not many men in Mr Johnson's Administration with Mr Rostow's gift for putting things in their context. President Johnson himself talks about Vietnam in a traditional, semi-religious language of absolute right and wrong that dates from an earlier period of American foreign policy. Against this, the images of war on television are a powerful opposition that can lead people either to pacifism or to an increased bellicosity. The President needs to find his own way of describing, in simple language, the aim of American policy in the Far East. If he cannot, the result of the confrontation between policy and publicity will not be a victory for democratic methods of conducting government, or for his attempt to use global power with a mixture of firmness and moderation.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Friday, March 10, 1967 -- 3:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk recommends you see Ellsworth Bunker at your early convenience. The purpose would be to firm up in your mind that he is the man you want so that we can dispatch him to explain it all to Mrs. Bunker in time to appear at Guam.

You should know that, with the prospect of responsibility, he really wants to take unambiguous command of the Embassy in Saigon. (In my judgment this is good.) When the possibility of Gene Locke was raised with him by the Secretary, he wanted assurance that there would be no question of the line of authority.

I agree that you should talk directly with Bunker before your final decision.

W. W. Rostow

Arrange to have Bunker come in late today, Friday\_\_\_\_\_

Have him come in Saturday\_\_\_\_\_

See me\_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-358  
By hij NARA, Date 3-24-92

~~SECRET~~

Friday, March 10, 1967 -- 4:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

David Bruce is in town Monday, Tuesday, and Friday of next week.

You indicated in a letter to him you'd like to see him when he was next in town.

I recommend you follow through, if it's convenient.

W. W. Rostow

Monday, March 13 \_\_\_\_\_

Tuesday, March 14 \_\_\_\_\_

Friday, March 17 \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rlh

*Pres file*

Friday, March 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message from Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand

We have just received the attached personal message from New Zealand's Prime Minister Holyoake. He is planning to announce shortly his Government's decision to send an infantry force of about 210 men to South Viet-Nam that will serve with the 150 man artillery battery as part of the Australian task force.

New Zealand also plans to send a military medical team to work in Binh Dinh province.

I will submit a suggested reply in the next few days.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

64a

TEXT OF MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM  
RT. HON. KEITH HOLYOAKE, PRIME MINISTER  
OF NEW ZEALAND  
DATED 8 MARCH 1967

---

My dear President,

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-358  
By WJ NARA. Date 3-24-92

In my message at the beginning of February I told you that my colleagues and I were examining the possibility of increasing New Zealand's contribution to the collective effort in Vietnam by redeploying elements of the forces we maintain in Malaysia as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. As I said then, we do have a continuing obligation to our Commonwealth partners to keep up our contributions to the Reserve. In the light of the compelling demands of the situation in Vietnam, however, we have decided that an additional effort by New Zealand is called for. I shall therefore be announcing shortly our intention to deploy an infantry force of about 210 men to South Vietnam. Most of the men will come from the New Zealand battalion in Malaysia and will serve, together with our artillery battery, as part of the Australian Task Force.

We have also decided to send another medical team, this time of military personnel, to work among the people in Binh Dinh Province.

I am acutely aware of the disparity between the need and our capacity to help. All of us in New Zealand have cause to admire the resolution and restraint with which the United States is turning back the challenge

/of aggression

2.

of aggression in South Vietnam. We, for our part, are prepared to support with action our belief that small nations throughout the world have the right to choose their own way of life, and to preserve their freedom. These further steps we have decided to take are an expression of our conviction that aggression in Vietnam must be halted and its victims sustained.

Yours sincerely,

KEITH HOLYOAKE

Friday, March 10, 1967 -- 5:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

I am told you are scheduled to see Jonathan Bingham at 1:30 p. m. tomorrow, Saturday, March 11.

The three points he made to Bob Komer on March 6 were:

- You are becoming a prisoner of the hawks.
- Escalation makes negotiations more difficult.
- We should do more backgrounding on "other war" enterprises.

I suggest you:

- Let him talk.
- Emphasize that we tried very hard on negotiations between November and the end of Tet, but all we got was the obviously inequitable no-bombing-for-the-possibility-of-talk formula.
- You do not despair of negotiations and we shall be continuing to explore whether they can move into something more fruitful.
- Meanwhile, we shall continue to use our military power in the North with restraint -- but we shall use it.
- You are watching closely pacification, political development, etc., and are particularly cheered by the prospects for the constitution and David Lilienthal's enterprise.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

cc: Mr. Bator 66

Friday, March 10, 1967  
3:30 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Ambassador Pat Dean called on me today to put to you, on behalf of Prime Minister Wilson, the following question: Would his visit to you be acceptable for Friday, June 2? He could arrive by mid-day; have lunch; and spend as much time after lunch with you as you thought useful. He would depart late in the afternoon.

He would be coming from Ottawa and leaving in his own Comet.

Saturday, June 3, would also be possible for him; but he does not wish to interfere with any weekend plans you may have.

W. W. R.

\_\_\_\_\_ June 2: appointment noon, plus lunch

\_\_\_\_\_ Leave some post-lunch leeway for further talk if necessary

\_\_\_\_\_ June 3: ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

\_\_\_\_\_ See me

(cc: Francis Bator)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ag, NARA, Date 4-22-91



~~SECRET~~

Friday, March 10, 1967  
1:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Mr. Nixon appears to be  
conducting himself well -- perhaps  
for the reason Harlan Cleveland  
cites in the last sentence.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Paris 13794, March 9, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 85-360

By ng/isp, NARA, Date 4/22/91

WWRostow:rlh

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Proctor* 67a  
004

~~SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 9539  
RECEIVED: MARCH 9, 1967, 4:25 P.M.

Info

PP RUEHC  
DE RUEFNCR 13794 0682034  
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P 001930Z MAR 67  
FM ANEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 13794

NODIS

NATUS

PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: FORMER VICE PRESIDENT NIXON

1. AFTER EMBASSY BRIEFING, NIXON VISITED USRO, CALLED ON BROGIO, AND CAME TO LUNCH AT MY HOUSE WITH BROGIO, BELGIAN PERMREP DE STAERCKE, AND DUTCH PERMREP BOON. NIXON WAS ACCOMPANIED BY FORMER CONGRESSMAN ELLSWORTH OF KANSAS.

2. NIXON DESCRIBED HIS TRIP AS FOR ON-THE-SPOT UPDATING ON WORLD AFFAIRS. HE FELT HIS PARTY NOT STRONG ON DETAILED KNOWLEDGE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND HE IS TAKING TWO AND HALF MONTHS TO VISIT EUROPE, ASIA, LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA. HE WAS CORDIAL, OBVIOUSLY IN MOOD TO LISTEN AND LEARN, AND HIS QUESTIONS WERE MOSTLY RELEVANT AND PERCEPTIVE.

3. NIXON REPEATED TO EACH NEW PERSON A JUDGMENT HE SEEMS ALREADY TO HAVE EXPRESSED IN PRESS BACKGROUNDEERS - THAT THERE IS INCREASING TENDENCY TOWARD INWARD LOOKING "ISOLATIONISM", BOTH IN THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND IN THE US. YOUNG PEOPLE AT HOME ARE MOSTLY PREOCCUPIED WITH INTERNAL PROBLEMS, AND, EXCEPT FOR VIET-NAM, ARE NOT THINKING VERY HARD ABOUT REASONS FOR AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE WORLD. ON VIET-NAM, HE THOUGHT MORE THAN 60 PERCENT OF AMERICAN PEOPLE PROBABLY WANTED TO FIGHT HARDER IN VIET-NAM, BUT THIS PROBABLY DID NOT APPLY AS MUCH TO AMERICAN YOUNGSTERS. HE ASSUMED ROBERT KENNEDY'S DECISION TO COME OUT AGAINST BOMBING OF NORTH VIET-NAM WAS BASED ON KNOWLEDGE THAT THIS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7169 85-358  
By Ng/np, NARA, Date 4/22/91

PRESENTED

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 13794, MARCH 9, 1967

WAS NOT CURRENTLY THE MAJORITY VIEW, BUT WAS A LONG TERM BET ON REACTION OF YOUNGER PEOPLE.

4. NIXON ESPECIALLY PRESSED QUESTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

A. DURATION OF THE NEED FOR NATO IN LIGHT OF DETENTE. BRODIO AND I INDEPENDENTLY TOOK THE LINE THAT DETENTE REQUIRED A MORE SOLID SOLIDARITY AMONG ATLANTIC ALLIES, AND THAT SOME FORM OF WESTERN MILITARY ORGANIZATION WOULD DOUBTLESS BE NEEDED NOT ONLY TO GET THE SOVIETS TO TALK ABOUT EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT, BUT TO KEEP THEM TALKING AND TO ENFORCE WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE WITH THEM.

B. TROOP LEVELS. NIXON AND ELLSWORTH SEEMED INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING SOMETHING CLOSE TO EXISTING TROOP LEVELS IN EUROPE, AND WERE QUITE WELL INFORMED ABOUT THE KINDS OF FINANCIAL AND STRATEGIC ISSUES THAT ARE INVOLVED IN TRILATERAL TALKS. WE DESCRIBED THE ISSUES INVOLVED WITHOUT TRYING TO GUESS JUST HOW CURRENT AND FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD COME OUT. BOTH NIXON AND ELLSWORTH ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT CONSULTATION THAT IMPLIED STRONG COMMITMENT TO PRACTICE OF CONSULTING ALLIES.

C. NPT. LINE OF QUESTIONING ON NPT WAS MORE SYMPATHETIC TO EUROPEAN OBJECTIONS THAN TO THE TREATY.

D. GERMANY. NIXON WAS MUCH INTERESTED IN ANALYSIS OF GERMAN MOTIVATIONS AND BEHAVIOR IN ALLIANCE AFFAIRS. DE STAERCKE AND BOON STRESSED THE CURRENT DIFFICULTY OF DETERMINING WHAT THE GERMANS REALLY WANT, AND WERE NOT SYMPATHETIC TO GERMAN OBJECTIONS TO NPT. BRODIO WAS MORE INCLINED TO EXPLAIN WHY GERMANS FELT THE WAY THEY DID ABOUT DISCRIMINATION, ON NUCLEAR AND OTHER ALLIANCE MATTERS, STRESSING THAT ONE OF IMPORTANT FUNCTIONS OF NATO IS THE CREATE A FRAMEWORK OF EQUALITY FOR GERMANY. NIXON CAME BACK SEVERAL TIMES TO PROBABILITY THAT YOUNGER GENERATION IN GERMANY WOULD MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE IN GERMAN POLITICS. HE SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE IN NEO-NAZI BOGEYMAN BUT WONDERED WHETHER THE FUTURE GERMANY WOULD NOT TURN TO CLOSER RELATIONSHIPS WITH USSR IF WE FAILED TO HANDLE THINGS JUST RIGHT.

E. SOVIET INTENTIONS. HE QUESTIONED US ALL, PARTICULARLY BRODIO, ON WHAT THE SOVIETS REALLY HAVE IN MIND. BRODIO

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVED

~~SECRET~~

-3- PARIS 13794, MARCH 9, 1967

TOOK HIS CUSTOMARY HARD LINE ON BASIC SOVIET AMBITIONS REMAINING UNCHANGED WHILE ADAPATING TACTICS TO FACT OF WESTERN STRENGTH AND DETERMINATION. BROSIU AND DE STAERCKE BOTH EMPHASIZED THAT SOVIET AIM FOR EUROPE IS A COALITION OF SMALL, FRAGMENTED, POWERLESS COUNTRIES ("A DUST OF SMALLER NATIONS", AS DE STAERCKE PUT IT), IN WHOSE DESTINY US WOULD LOSE INTEREST AND WHO WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO TURN TO SOVIETS FOR LEADERSHIP AND PROTECTION.

5. ON ALL THESE SUBJECTS NIXON'S QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS WERE STRIKINGLY PARALLEL TO CURRENT ADMINISTRATION POLICY ON EUROPEAN AND ATLANTIC AFFAIRS. NEITHER ON VIET-NAM NOT ON EUROPEAN MATTERS DID HE EVEN IMPLY CRITICISM OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLICIES. IN GENERAL, HE STAYED AWAY FROM PRESCRIBING FOR THE WORLD'S ILLS, AND SEEMED CONTENT TO ASK QUESTIONS AND TO LISTEN TO THE ANSWERS.

6. IN BRIEF LUNCHEON DISCUSSION OF MANCHESTER BOOK, DE STAERCKE AND BOON BOTH EXPRESSED ASTONISHMENT AT NOTION THAT CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSION OF VICE PRESIDENT TO THE PRESIDENCY IN DALLAS THAT DAY WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY TREATED AS FACT OF LIFE BY EVERYONE INVOLVED. NIXON WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO ASSURE MY EUROPEAN GUESTS THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD HANDLED FLAWLESSLY THE TRANSITION FROM VICE PRESIDENCY TO PRESIDENCY. WHEN EUROPEANS ASKED NIXON AND ELLSWORTH WHAT THEY THOUGHT OF CURRENT GARRISON PLOY IN NEW ORLEANS, THEY BOTH SAID IT SEEMED TO BE MOSTLY POLITICAL HEADLINE SEEKING, BUT NIXON WONDERED WHETHER ANYBODY COULD BE SO STUPID AS TO MAKE SUCH ENORMOUS PUBLICITY IF HE COULD BE LATER PROVED WRONG.

7. COMMENT: IF THIS PORTION OF NIXON'S LONG TRIP IS ANY GUIDE, HE REALLY IS DOING WHAT HE SAYS HE IS DOING - TRYING TO SOAK UP AS MUCH EXPERTISE OF CURRENT FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS POSSIBLE. HE MADE NO PARTICULAR EFFORTS TO DRAW PUBLIC ATTENTION TO HIS VISIT, AND ASKED ELLSWORTH TO FOLLOW UP PRIVATELY WITH USRO STAFF ON SOME TECHNICAL ISSUES ESPECIALLY ON NPT. IF HE SAYS IN PUBLIC WHAT HE IS SAYING IN PRIVATE, NET RESULT SHOULD BE TO REINFORCE THE GENERAL LINE OF CURRENT POLICY AS EXPRESSED IN PRESIDENT'S OCTOBER 7 SPEECH, WITH WHICH NIXON SEEMED QUITE FAMILIAR WHEN I REFERRED TO IT.

8. NIXON'S TRIP SEEMS TO BE PART OF LONG-RANGE PLANNING WHICH WOULD INCLUDE YOUR JOB AS WELL AS PRESIDENT'S AMONG HIS FUTURE OPTIONS.

GP-3. CLEVELAND

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVED

Friday, March 10, 1967

Mr. President:

I have double checked with Mike Manatos and he tells me that the following Republican Senators will be present at the briefing:

Kuchel  
Mrs. Smith  
Hickenlooper  
Aiken  
Young (N. D.)  
Javits  
Williams (Del.)

Walt Rostow

Limited Official Use

Thursday - March 9, 1967  
7:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Congressional Leaders  
on the Summit Joint Resolution

Arrangements for your meeting with Congressional leaders  
at 11:00 a.m. tomorrow have been completed.

At Tab A is the list of those invited. The red checks indicate  
those who are away or have declined. Secretary Rusk, Linc  
Gordon and Sol Linowitz will be coming from State.

At Tab B are suggested talking points for use in your present-  
ation to the group.

At Tab C is a copy of the Draft Resolution.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments :

- Tab A - Congressional list.
- Tab B - Suggested talking points.
- Tab C - Draft resolution.

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Members of Senate and House  
Invited to Meeting on Summit Joint Resolution

SENATE

<u>Leadership</u>	<u>Foreign Relations</u>	<u>Appropriations</u>	<u>Banking &amp; Finance</u>
Mansfield	✓ Fulbright	✓ Hayden	Williams (Del) - R
Long	<u>LA SubC.</u>	Pastore	
Byrd(WVa)	Morse	Holland	
✓ Dirksen	Sparkman	Young (NDak) - R	
Wb Kuchel - R	McCarthy	Javits - R	
Mrs. Smith - R	Hickenlooper		
	Aiken		
	✓ Carlson		

HOUSE

<u>Leadership</u>	<u>Foreign Affairs</u>	<u>Appropriations</u>	<u>Banking &amp; Currency</u>	<u>Ways &amp; Means</u>
McCormack	Morgan	Mahon	Patman	Wilbur Mills
Albert	Bolton	Bow	Widnall	John Byrnes
Boggs	Zablocki		Reuss	
Moss	Wayne Hays			
Ford	<u>LA SUBC.</u>	<u>FOR. OPS</u>		
Arends	<u>COMM:</u>	<u>SUBCOMM:</u>		
Laird	Selden	Passman		
	O'Hara	Rooney		
	Fascell	Mrs. Hansen		
	Monaghan	Shriver		
	Royball	Conte		
	Burleson			
	Mailliard			
	Whalley			
	Gross			
	Brad Morse			



Talking Points

for the President's Presentation to Congressional Leaders

The Summit Background

- The Buenos Aires meeting has convinced us that we are on the threshold of a new, important phase in inter-American relations: the establishment of a Latin American Common Market.
- Simon Bolivar dreamed of economic integration, but it foundered on the nationalism of the new republics.
- It has taken close to 150 years to convince the Latin Americans -- and ourselves -- that it is in the mutual interest for them to combine their individual markets into one large common market spanning the Rio Grande to Cape Horn. This involves beginning to open up the interior of South America which requires, in turn, international cooperation in building roads, harnessing rivers, and linking national markets overland.

- This fundamental change in attitude coincides with a realization that the modest growth rates achieved during the first half decade of the Alliance -- satisfying as they may be -- are inadequate when projected against the needs of the 1970's. Latin Americans can not have industrial efficiency in modern industries -- steel, chemicals, automobiles, etc. -- unless they break out of narrow monopolistic national markets.
  
- Thus, there are two forces at work making the Latin Americans rethink past policies and move in new directions. At Buenos Aires Secretary Rusk said the decision to move towards integration is the most important since the liberation of Latin America from European rule, almost a century and a half ago. I share that judgment.
  
- The timeliness of the Summit is that it comes at a time when hard political decisions at the highest level need to

be taken and there is a disposition to do so. This was revealed clearly at the Foreign Ministers' Meeting at Buenos Aires last month.

-- This is the setting for the Punta del Este meeting.

-- I am convinced that while the initiative must be Latin American, we have a special opportunity and responsibility to encourage and assist. The whole history of this Hemisphere -- and our interests -- called for us to be at the side of our Latin American friends if and when they take these historic steps.

-- An integrated, more prosperous Latin America will be a stronger and more equal hemispheric partner and, on the basis of our Canadian, European and Japanese experience, a better customer.

The Summit Package

- We and the Latin Americans agree that the Summit must concentrate on a few, concrete, new actions on which there is prior agreement and which will be of lasting significance to the hemisphere.
  
- These actions would build on proven policies of the Alliance
  - e.g., control of inflation, increased taxes, more liberal trade policies, encouragement of domestic and foreign private investment, administrative reform and improved planning -- which would be reaffirmed.
  
- The new actions include:
  - a determined effort to establish a functioning Latin American common market by 1980.
  
  - a new emphasis on multinational projects (roads, power lines, river basin developments, communications)

which will link countries, promote integration and open inner frontiers of the Continent.

--- cooperation on trade policy, especially in reducing European discrimination against Latin American exports.

--- modernization of rural life and an increase in agricultural productivity, principally food, to meet Latin American requirements and shortages in other areas of the world.

--- modernization of educational systems at all levels, but with special emphasis on science and technology; and intensification of health programs.

--- undertakings, individual or collective, to eliminate unnecessary military expenditures.

-- These are the elements of the Summit package which the Foreign Ministers at Buenos Aires agreed to recommend to their Presidents.

Our Summit Role

- The decisions needed involve Latin Americans and are for them to take. We cannot do it for them. Our role is to encourage sound decisions and support them financially.
- The Latins want and expect our help. They know that our financial assistance is essential for them to do what needs doing, but they do not have their hands out.
- This approach, so clearly reflected in at Buenos Aires, is one sign of growing political maturity and confidence in us: that if they do the right things, they can count on our support.
- We estimate that the Summit package calls for increased United States assistance of around \$1.5 billion over a five-year period. We have arrived at this order of magnitude figure on this tentative basis:

--- integration adjustment assistance:

a fund of approximately \$300 million over five years, probably beginning in FY 1970.

--- increased resources for multinational projects:

raising the annual allocation to the IDB's Fund for Special Operations from \$250 to \$300 million for the next three years with the understanding that the Bank would set aside \$100 million per year for multinational projects.

--- education and agriculture:

an additional \$100 million for FY 1967 and \$200 million per year for the next four years. (This is within the \$750 million per year authorized last fall for the Alliance for Progress. The \$100 million for FY 1968 is already provided for in the budget.)

In all cases there are to be matching self-help contributions and the actual use of our additional funds would be tied to Latin American performance -- not conference resolutions or speeches.



The Joint Resolution

- I consider the amounts described as a sound investment in Latin America, provided they take the decisions we anticipate at the Summit and follow through thereafter.
- Our assistance will, of course, be tied to their performance. They understand this.
- Before making any commitments for additional assistance under the Alliance for Progress, I wanted to consult the Congress and ask you to participate in the decision. This is the purpose of the resolution which you have seen.
- The resolution will signal to our Latin American friends that not only am I behind their crossing the threshold of a new era, but also the American Congress and people are behind it. This will be an added incentive for them to take the hard political decisions required.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOINT RESOLUTION

(Draft of 3-8-67)

To support the other American Republics in a historic new phase  
of the Alliance for Progress

WHEREAS it has been an historic policy of the United States to  
work in close harmony with our sister American Republics  
to promote the well-being and enhance the security of the  
Hemisphere; and

WHEREAS the United States joined with the other American Republics in 1959 in establishing the Inter-American Development Bank and in 1960 in approving the Act of Bogota which called for the launching of a "program for social development", and "prompt action of exceptional breadth in the field of international cooperation and domestic effort" to promote economic development; and

WHEREAS the Congress has strongly supported the Alliance for Progress, enabling the United States to play its full part in the fulfillment of the mutual undertaking as set forth in the Declaration to the Peoples of America and the Charter of Punta del Este, signed on August 17, 1961; and

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY RG ON 4-17-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHEREAS during the first half decade the Alliance for Progress, the cooperative efforts of the American Governments and peoples have stimulated economic growth, encouraged institutional development, broadened the exercise of representative democracy and strengthened the internal security of the Latin American Republics against ~~Control~~ Communist subversion; and

WHEREAS experience has now made clear that in order to achieve self-sustaining growth under conditions of freedom, social justice and broadened opportunity for all and to provide adequate food supplies and productive employment opportunities for growing populations, there must be a significant increase in the rate of economic growth thus far achieved under the Alliance for Progress; and

WHEREAS the achievement of this goal is in great part dependent upon an accelerated movement to integrate the economies of the Latin American countries and a major effort to modernize the education and agricultural sectors, with special emphasis on science and technology and involving substantial increases in the commitment of resources to these purposes and commensurate changes in national policies and practices; and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

WHEREAS, the Governments of Latin America at the recent XI Meeting of Foreign Ministers clearly recognized the need for their countries to take the actions contemplated in the preceding paragraph.

WHEREAS it is also imperative to mobilize the will and energy of Latin America for community action, participation and co-operation to accelerate the process of development so that all people become contributors and beneficiaries of this progress; and

WHEREAS the meeting of Presidents of the American Republic provides an historic opportunity to set in motion policies and actions that will make the decade of the 1970's a decade of singular Latin American achievement in unity, prosperity, stability and impact on the world scene; and

WHEREAS if the leaders of the other American Republics are prepared to assume the commitments to launch this critically important new phase of the Alliance for Progress, the United States should stand ready to support them with substantial resources;

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

Therefore be it

RESOLVED by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled,

That the Congress recommends, in support of the concept of a Latin American Common Market and after appropriate steps have been taken toward progressive establishment of such a Market, that the United States provide through the Inter-American Development Bank standby resources to be matched by Latin American countries to provide integration adjustment assistance to facilitate the transition to a fully functioning Latin American Common Market.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-5-

The Congress further recommends that the United States join with the other members of the Inter-American Development Bank, in the provision of additional resources to that institution to be used for financing multinational projects which promote Latin American economic integration.

Further, the Congress recommends that the United States provide an increase in assistance under the Alliance for Progress for programs of education and agricultural modernization. The nature and amount of such assistance <sup>is</sup> to be dependent on demonstrated need and adequate self-help <sup>within</sup> by the recipient countries.

The Congress recommends that the United States be prepared to make available, in support of the foregoing objectives and in relation to progress by the Latin American countries toward the goals of economic integration and in the mobilization of domestic efforts and resources to advance the purposes of the Alliance for Progress, <sup>substantial new resources</sup> up to ~~\$1.5 billion~~ over a period of five years in addition to continuing financial and technical assistance provided in accordance with the Charter of Punta del Este.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - March 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Brazilian Inaugural Delegation

We still do not have an acceptance from among the four Senators you authorized us to contact to replace Senator Eastland.

In the meantime, State has asked that Ambassador Tuthill be included in the official delegation. They had not originally included his name because the Brazilian Government had restricted the delegation to three members, with the diplomatic corps accredited to Brasilia receiving separate invitations. The Brazilian Government has now informed State that the inclusion of Ambassador Tuthill on the delegation would be welcome.

With your approval, we will do so.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_



1 sup  
2 Pres. file

March 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Messages from you to King Constantine of Greece  
and President Sunay of Turkey on the 20th  
Anniversary of the Truman Doctrine

This Sunday, March 12th, will mark the 20th Anniversary of the Truman Doctrine. The Greeks are planning a series of major events attended by King Constantine and members of the government. A statement by the King and Prime Minister will be read in all the Orthodox churches in Greece, the United States, Canada, and South America.

In view of the major effort the Greek Government is making to commemorate this occasion, it is recommended that you send the attached message to King Constantine.

A parallel message to President Sunay of Turkey is also recommended, even though the Turks are paying less attention to the 20th Anniversary than the Greeks. However, State believes it essential that messages go to both Chiefs of State.

The draft messages are attached for your approval or revision.

W. W. Rostow

DRAFT MESSAGE

TO KING CONSTANTINE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON

It was 20 years ago today that President Harry S. Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress with a message and a program which came to be known historically as the Truman Doctrine. In commemoration of this occasion, it gives me great pleasure to send to you and to the people of Greece my warm and friendly greetings and those of the American people.

The principles set forth by President Truman in his historic message are as valid today as they were 20 years ago. The purpose of the Doctrine, as the President himself aptly expressed it, was to "assist free peoples to work out their destiny in their own way." That the decision to assist Greece was a correct one is amply borne out by the tremendous progress made by your country since 1947. From a nation devastated by war, Greece has today become a land where its citizens can live in peace and prosperity. I am aware of the great sacrifices made by the Greek people to achieve this success and I am proud of the fact that for 20 years the United States and Greece have worked together towards a common goal in a close partnership. This remarkable effort has offered the world an example that inspires admiration.

I look forward with confidence to a continuation of our close relations and friendship.

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MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO PRESIDENT SUNAY

On the twentieth anniversary of the Truman Doctrine I take great pleasure in extending to you and to the Turkish people my good wishes. Then as now, the American people admire the vitality and the passion for freedom of the Turkish people. Then as now, the United States is proud of its association with the forward-looking Turkish nation.

The visit you will soon be making to the United States affords an opportunity to give added meaning to that association. It will also serve as a symbol of the importance of the partnership of our two great republics. Mrs. Johnson and I are looking forward to welcoming you and Mrs. Sunay.

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

Friday, March 10, 1967  
10:40 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Cabot Lodge's  
interesting response to Gen. Taylor's  
useful queries about the role of a  
Military Council in the future politics  
of South Viet Nam.

I am making this available to  
Gen. Taylor.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ -- 3781

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-358  
By ing, NARA. Date 3-24-92

712

~~SECRET -- EYES ONLY~~ 3781, March 10, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-361

By wp, NARA, Date 3-12-93

FROM Amb. Lodge for Rostow

1. Thanks for sending me the interesting memo from General Taylor to the President. Following are my comments on it.
2. I share Max's concern that the military be positively involved in the new government with clearly stated responsibilities and that they not be allowed to become a separate, irresponsible and possibly hostile group on the outside. If the military are not properly employed by the new government, with both military nation-building skills and military loyalties well engaged, they will surely become a destructive element and will place the survival of the future government in jeopardy.
3. With regard to the Military Council which has now been written into the constitution, I see General Taylor's point, and I think it well to keep in mind the unhappy experience of the Huong government. However, I do not think that the Huong experience should cause us to oppose the formation of the body as it is presently envisaged. In the first place, the Council as defined in the constitution now, has somewhat reduced functions from those specified in the Directorate's better. The Assembly has carefully put the Council on the same level as other advisory councils and called it a "Military Council" rather than a "High Council for National Defense and the Armed Forces." The function of the Military Council is to "advise the President in matters relating to the armed forces, especially the promotion, transfer and disciplining of soldiers of all ranks." In this sense it could be a step towards more civilian control.
4. Secondly, I think we are going to have some such body either as a part of the constitutional machinery or outside of it. The military feel the need for an organizational means to act on the political scene, and they will insist on having it. It seems to me that the chances of controlling and limiting the role of such an organization are improved if it is defined and embodied in the formal governmental structure.
5. The body which now plays this role is the Armed Forces Council. It is the organizational base for military-political power. It is also the chief structural means for maintaining military unity. As such, it has proved a major source of whatever stability and progress the Ky regime has realized. Folding this body into an elected constitutional regime will not be easy. A constitutional military council to advise the President seems to us to have the most chance of success, and it is the form which the Assembly has adopted.
6. It seems most likely to us that the winning candidate in the forthcoming elections will be a military man. If this is the case, the transformation of the present armed forces council into a constitutional body will be easier and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

safer. What we hope to see formed is a body which will bring military support and military talents to the regime while at the same time avoiding excessive military domination of the government. This is, of course, the military-civilian partnership which we have discussed in previous messages. At the outset the chances are that the military council will exercise rather more power than the language of the constitution might seem to provide. However, as institutions mature and the nation moves into a peacetime situation, the advice of the Military Council to the President could become a less weighty factor in his decisions.

7. General Taylor fears that the military may wish to move from a position of direct support for the government to a position "alongside it in the manner of the Khanh concept." It is unlikely that any elected government will enjoy the complete military support which a military government can command. But this is a matter of degree. While Huong got virtually no military support, we expect that the future government under the constitution will have considerable military backing, particularly if the winning candidate is a military man. The new government will in effect be sponsored by the military. This was previously not Huong's situation. Constitutional arrangements for a military council should help to keep the military involved in the government rather than "along side it" as a separate and undoubtedly hostile entity.

8. I am in general agreement with General Taylor's estimate of Tran Van Huong as a political leader. He seems to be an honest, courageous man with much to recommend him. Although he is handicapped by poor health and by representational chief of state, leaving the business of government to a Prime Minister who is more vigorous and more capable of compromise. As a practical matter, however, such a formula seems to be ruled out by the fact that the constitution as it is has been written virtually demands that the Chief of State be the effective Chief Executive. The constitution gives the Prime Minister very little power and vests all the important executive functions in the President.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Friday, March 10, 1967  
10:35 a. m.

Mr. President:

Here is a third report -- [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] -- saying  
Chicom aid is critical to Hanoi's  
negotiating position.

Also a Manach-RFK reference.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

WWRostow:rlh

72

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 99-89**  
**By cb, NARA Date 9-25-00**



TOP SECRET TRINE

1. NORTH VIETNAM-UNITED STATES: [REDACTED] comments  
[REDACTED] on various attempts to mediate in  
Vietnam war

[REDACTED]

According to the press, however, the North Vietnamese delegation went to Peking after Kosygin's 13 February departure from London.

[REDACTED]

Note: According to an AFP report from Peking, a North Vietnamese delegation was there during the week of 13 February, and an NFLSV delegation arrived there on about 18 February.

[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET TRINE

Friday, March 10, 1967  
10:30 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You probably see this automatically;  
but it's so reassuring about the  
country's good sense I wished to  
double-check.

W. W. R.

*Per - 10*

# American Opinion Summary<sup>73a</sup>

## Department of State

VIET-NAM  
(March 2-8, 1967)

Most of this week's comment on Viet-Nam has focussed on Senator Robert Kennedy's proposal on bombing and negotiations. Some additional comment on the new military measures in Viet-Nam was also received. Highlights of the week's discussion are:

1. Strong opposition to the Kennedy proposal was registered by the great majority of those commenting on it. Most felt that the U.S. should not give up its bombing leverage unless Hanoi made a move showing serious interest in a settlement.

In this connection some noted the Senate and House resolutions which showed strong majorities for Administration policies on bombing and negotiation.

Some critics of the proposal said it further divides Americans and encourages Hanoi; others found the proposal impractical.

- 2 - The minority, composed of long-time advocates of a bombing-halt, welcomed Sen. Kennedy's speech and his suggested outline for a settlement. These felt that the Administration had acted too brusquely in dismissing the proposal.
- 3 - In the continuing discussion on new military measures in Viet-Nam, editors are divided much more closely than on the Kennedy proposal--with a number opposed to or doubtful about such "escalation," as well as others fully supporting it. Few this week have called for increased military action.

### Kennedy Proposal

Press comment has been much less favorable than unfavorable toward Sen. Robert Kennedy's March 2 proposal to halt the bombing of North Viet-Nam, for a week or so, in order to "test Communist sincerity" about will-

**Bureau of Public Affairs**

ingness to start negotiations--for which the Senator proposed a 3-stage plan.

Out of 23 newspapers around the country noted as commenting on the proposal to date, only 5 were favorable. These, all long-time advocates of a unilateral U.S. bombing halt, were:

Chicago Sun-Times  
Detroit Free Press  
New York Post

New York Times  
St. Louis Post-Dispatch

The Detroit Free Press saw "hope and plain good sense in the senator's speech"; it hoped "these views will convince the nation that there is a responsible alternative to the President's dogged escalation of the war... The risk is that the President will drag out the war and continue to escalate it at the cost of countless more Vietnamese and American lives."

Sens. Fulbright, Mansfield and Javits expressed sympathy for Kennedy's ideas; and Javits felt that the President's speedy reaction did not give them the "consideration they deserve" (also, Edw. P. Morgan on ABC). Carl Rowan wrote that "Kennedy's speech will be recognized as a great public service as time passes." Walter Lippmann--without referring to Sen. Kennedy--continued to urge the Administration to test the sincerity of Kossygin's promise that peace talks would start if we ceased bombing.

The other 18 newspapers voiced, with various degrees of asperity or sympathy, their opposition to the Kennedy proposal. They were:

Atlanta Constitution  
Baltimore Sun  
Chicago Tribune  
Christian Science Monitor  
Dallas News  
Denver Post  
Detroit News  
HEARST papers  
Los Angeles Times

New York News  
N.Y. World Journal Tribune  
Philadelphia Inquirer  
Richmond Times-Dispatch  
St. Louis Globe-Democrat  
Wall Street Journal  
Wash. News (SCRIPPS-HOWARD)  
Washington Star  
Watertown (N.Y.) Times

Most critics of the Kennedy proposal agreed that it was a "one-sided" proposition, under which the U.S. would give up an advan-

tage and receive nothing in return. "Negotiations are not an end in themselves," said the Wall Street Journal, "but merely a means to a settlement. There is no point, and considerable risk, in making concessions to the Communists for nothing more than the dubious pleasure of their company at a negotiating table" (similarly, Phila. Inquirer, Scripps-Howard newspapers).

"We must insist on de-escalation" if we are to stop bombing, said the Denver Post. "De-escalation simply must be a two-way street."

The sincerity of the Communists "has been tested," declared the Dallas News, in the three earlier bombing pauses. Agreeing with Pres. Johnson's letter to Sen. Jackson (D-Wash), the Washington Star maintained that we must persist until the North Vietnamese "are prepared to move seriously to reinstate the Geneva agreements" (similarly, Watertown Times).

A number agreed with Sec. Rusk that there was nothing "substantially new" in the Kennedy proposal (e.g. N.Y. World Journal Tribune, N.Y. News, Chicago Tribune, Balt. Sun, Richard Wilson).

Among political leaders, Richard Nixon said that "Kennedy is wrong, Johnson is right." Sens. Dirksen, Jackson and McGee (D-Wyo) voiced opposition to the Kennedy proposal. U.S. News & World Report pointed out that "another rejection of the position taken by Kennedy came from the House of Representatives," which defeated--372 to 18--a proposal to declare Congress opposed to bombing raids on North Viet-Nam (similarly, Wm. S. White).

Whereas Sen. Kennedy felt that this was "a moment of promise" for negotiations, the Los Angeles Times questioned the judgment of Sen. Kennedy and U Thant in attacking U.S. policies at a time when "contacts with the North Vietnamese are in a very delicate phase."

The Christian Science Monitor, which has been sympathetic to a bombing halt, did not see "any real sign" that a moment of promise had come. "Unhappily for the senator," said the Monitor, "Hanoi's refusal to make any meaningful gesture during (Tet) has led many foreign observers to conclude that North Vietnam is not yet ready to negotiate seriously."

From Paris, Sulzberger reported that the North Vietnamese envoy, Bo, "indicated no interest in the freeze (or military standfast) proposal, only in an end to air attacks" (in N.Y. Times).

In Washington, James Reston reported: "If Washington would stop the bombing, Hanoi would talk; no more than that." Reston felt that this attitude would rule out Kennedy's plan and also "Lippman's argument" that Washington is rejecting a chance for negotiations. In a subsequent column, however, Reston held that debate continues because the "Administration will not make clear its evidence that Hanoi is not 'ready for a negotiated settlement'" (in N.Y. Times).

Some who discussed the substance of Sen. Kennedy's suggestions for the negotiations felt that it is "naïve to think that Hanoi would accept international supervision" of military movements or elections (Richmond Times-Dispatch, Detroit News).

Other Aspects A number of commentators stressed the consequences of the Kennedy proposal for American unity and upon opinion in other nations. Said the Atlanta Constitution: Sen. Kennedy "raises doubts in the minds of foe and friends alike about America's resoluteness...The senator has hurt the nation."

The Christian Science Monitor stressed "heightened domestic tension over the war"; and Wm. R. Hearst Jr. declared that, "at the very least, (the proposal) will divide national unity further by reviving debate on the war."

Time magazine agreed with Rep. Celler (D-NY) that, after "another futile bombing pause," the dashed hopes and frustration could "intensify demands for escalating the war." Mr. Celler thought it "foolhardy to play with the emotions of our people by continued stop-and-go signs."

The embarrassment to the U.S. overseas was stressed by Wm. S. White. In the view of the Chicago Tribune, such proposals "do more to keep the war going than the Communists themselves. They convince Hanoi that the U.S. hasn't the will to see the job thru and is only looking for an excuse to bug out."

Going further, the St. Louis Globe-Democrat asserted: "Kennedy's proposal has lengthened the war by six months. ... (It) puts Kennedy perilously close to giving aid and comfort to the enemy" (somewhat similarly, N.Y. News).



New Military Measures

Doubts and regrets, as well as approval, were expressed in the additional comment received this week on the new measures in Viet-Nam: mine-laying, naval bombardment, and artillery shots across the DMZ. "This additional turn of the screw is disheartening," said the Chicago News. "It seems to forecast more agony, more frustration, when these are already in oversupply."

According to the Boston Globe, "our own unilateral de-escalation, rather than the opposite, would seem to hold more promise of an honorable peace." The Chicago Sun-Times stressed the timing of the action, wishing that "the escalation could have waited until the (diplomatic) efforts were a success or a failure."

"It is the unbroken record of upward progression in the fighting," said Joseph Kraft, "that raises among serious people fears of a wider war and doubts of the President's ability to end the conflict." Said the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot: "Every new aggression narrows dangerously the space in which a little war can be pursued without starting the final big one."

"The actions in themselves," said the Minneapolis Star. "cannot be considered a major intensification of the war." but "the danger is growing that hope for negotiations will ebb and that pressure for a greater military effort to end the war will intensify."

According to the Christian Science Monitor, "the new Washington move is a calculated gamble, at best." It urged "the utmost caution in both Washington and Hanoi before either resorts to a further stepping up of the war."

On the other hand, the Denver Post maintained: "It is only logical for the U.S. to step up the pressure to help persuade Hanoi to listen to the Russians." The Post added: "The present pressure increase seems prudently limited; let's leave it that way." The Houston Post said that the President "has to do whatever the Communists make it necessary for him to do."

"I am convinced," wrote Wm. R. Hearst Jr., "that the only way to get the enemy to talk peace and really mean it is for us to make the going too rough even for him." Mr. Hearst again called for the bombing of air fields.

To the San Diego Union, the recent stepping-up in Viet-Nam was "long overdue" (similarly, Indianapolis Star).



Friday, March 10, 1967

Mr. President:

I have double checked with Mike Manatos and he tells me that the following Republican Senators will be present at the briefing:

Kuchel  
Mrs. Smith  
Hickenlooper  
Aiken  
Young (N. D. )  
Javits  
Williams (Del. )

Walt Rostow

75

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Friday, March 10, 1967  
7:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith two independent  
intelligence reports -- [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] -- indicating the gut of  
Hanoi's problem is its dependence on  
Chinese rice supplies.

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

I'll check this out and consider  
what, if anything, we might do -- or,  
even, quietly offer.

W. W. Rostow

[REDACTED] 9 March 1967  
[REDACTED] 9 March 1967

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

75a  
• ROUTINE

IN 17497

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

EXD DDI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1  
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downgrading and  
declassification

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CITE

EO 12958

DIST 9 MARCH 1967

3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

DOI

NLJ 99-60

SUBJECT REPORT ON SITUATION IN NORTH VIETNAM

By CB, NARA Date 6-30-00

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS OF A REPORT

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

A. SOME U.S. BOMBS LANDED ON THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN HANOI IN DECEMBER. WHILE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE AMERICANS ARE DELIBERATELY BOMBING THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, THE PROXIMITY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION TO MILITARY TARGETS HAS LED TO BOMBING OF

5  
4 CIVILIANS.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

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(dissem controls)

IN 17497

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

~~SECRET~~  
(classification)

B. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THE BOMBING IS HAVING AN IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY OF NORTH VIETNAM. SOME VIETNAMESE ARE BEGINNING TO FEAR THAT NORTH VIETNAM "WILL BE BLASTED BACK INTO THE STONE AGE." THE RICE HARVEST IS ONLY  $4\frac{1}{2}$  MILLION TONS COMPARED TO THE USUAL  $5\frac{1}{2}$  MILLION. CHINA WILL BE CALLED UPON TO MAKE UP THE DEFICIT.

C. HARRISON SALISBURY IS QUOTED AS STATING THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SHOULD NOT BE OVERLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THERE WILL BE SOME EFFECT PROCEEDING FROM HIS VISIT, BECAUSE PRESIDENT JOHNSON WILL ACCEPT NO CRITICISM OF HIS CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM.

D. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE TRYING TO REMAIN ALOOF FROM THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, BUT THEY ARE WELL AWARE THAT 70 PER CENT OF THE AID THEY RECEIVE COMES FROM CHINA.

E. THE SOVIETS HAVE ONLY LIMITED INFLUENCE OVER THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT  
PACAF [REDACTED] CINCMEAFSA

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

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(dissem controls)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN-16603

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDC ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

EXO DDI

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)



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19 23 45Z

CITE

SANITIZED

DIST 9 MARCH 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM/CHINA/France

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

NLJ 99-60

(C)

DOI

By CB, NARA Date 6-30-00

SUBJECT FRENCH VIEW OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF NORTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT CHINA'S APPROVAL BECAUSE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE DEPENDENCE ON CHINA FOR RICE

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

1. SUMMARY. FRENCH OFFICIALS IN HANOI BELIEVE THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT COMMUNIST CHINA'S APPROVAL SINCE NORTH VIETNAM DEPENDS ON CHINA FOR ONE HALF OF HER RICE SUPPLY. THE FRENCH BELIEVE THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS QUITE CONCERNED OVER THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CHINA WHICH COULD RESULT IN DIMINISHED RICE EXPORTS AND BECOME A BLOW TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY, MORE SERIOUS THAN THE AMERICAN BOMBING. THE FRENCH BELIEVE THAT UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES NEGOTIATIONS ARE IMPOSSIBLE AND ARE FURTHER CONVINCED THAT ULTIMATELY THE UNITED STATES MUST BARGAIN WITH CHINA, WHICH THE FRENCH ALSO VIEW AS

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(classification)

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

IN-16603

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

IMPOSSIBLE UNTIL MAO TSE-TUNG DIES OR IS REMOVED FROM POWER.

2. FRENCH OFFICIALS IN HANOI BELIEVE THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS MUCH MORE WORRIED ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA THAN THE AMERICAN BOMBINGS. THE PRIMARY REASON FOR THIS CONCERN IS THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DEPEND HEAVILY ON CHINA FOR THEIR RICE SUPPLY, HALF OF WHICH COMES FROM CHINA. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FEAR THAT A CONTINUATION OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN CHINA MAY RESULT IN DISRUPTION OF NORMAL SUPPLY LINES AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY WITH A CONSEQUENT DIMINISHING OF RICE EXPORTS WHICH COULD BE A SERIOUS, IF NOT CRIPPLING, BLOW TO NORTH VIETNAM. FRENCH OFFICIALS IN HANOI HAVE FOUND THAT THE AMERICAN BOMBINGS HAVE CAUSED UNEXPECTEDLY HEAVY DAMAGE ALTHOUGH THIS HAS NOT MATERIALLY DAMAGED THE WAR EFFORT.

3. FRENCH OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, IF LEFT TO THEIR OWN DECISION, MIGHT BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THEY WON MANY MATERIAL CONCESSIONS FROM THE FRENCH AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE IN 1954. HOWEVER, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF DEPENDENCE ON CHINA FOR ITS FOOD SUPPLY, THERE IS NO CHANCE THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WILL NEGOTIATE WITH THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT CHINESE CONCURRENCE. THEREFORE, SINCE THE FRENCH BELIEVE THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE IMPOSSIBLE, GIVEN CURRENT CHINESE INTRANSIGENCE, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WILL DO NOTHING TO ENCOURAGE NEGOTIATIONS. THE FRENCH ARE ALSO CONVINCED THAT TO NEGOTIATE WITH NORTH VIETNAM, THE UNITED STATES MUST ULTIMATELY BARGAIN WITH CHINA, BUT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND A COMMON GROUND FOR SUCH BARGAINING UNTIL MAO TSE-TUNG DIES OR IS REMOVED FROM POWER.

4. [REDACTED]

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACHAI CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF

PACFLT

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dis)

Friday, May 10, 1967  
9:30 a.m.

76

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Ambassador Goldberg files  
a supplementary report on his Asian  
trip.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (log 777)



777

76a



THE REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS

March 9, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Supplementing my oral report to  
you of yesterday I submit herewith a written  
memorandum on my visit to South Viet Nam,  
Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the Phillippines.

Respectfully,

  
Arthur J. Goldberg

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

777  
766

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-361

SUBJECT: Report on First Leg of Asian Trip By ~~4-8~~, NARA, Date 3-12-93

Because of my responsibilities in connection with the Outer Space Treaty, I was able to visit only five countries on the first leg of the trip to Asia and to spend a shorter time in each one than I would have desired: one day each in Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines, two and a half days in Japan, and three days in South Vietnam.

I. SOUTH VIETNAM

My own interest naturally centered on the situation in Vietnam -- a problem which is consuming an unprecedented volume of the nation's talent, skills and energies, has been the subject of an intense domestic debate on foreign policy, and has affected our relations with the rest of the world, including our position at the UN.

A: Military

I do not feel competent to comment on the military situation in Vietnam; that is within the province of others, such as General Westmoreland.

I do consider it my duty, however, to report that I found no reason to believe -- from my discussions with

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Americans or Vietnamese, civilian or military -- that we can look forward to an end of the conflict with guerrilla-type units in less than several years, despite our obvious and growing success in dealing with the main force units of our adversaries in the South.

I believe more confidence on the ability of the South Vietnamese to deal with guerrilla-type activity would develop, and be more justified, if the South Vietnamese can be encouraged -- and this will involve pushing on our part which will often be resented -- to make more rapid progress in three fields of vital importance: constitutional government, national reconciliation and pacification or revolutionary development (an abbreviated way of describing the process of economic development and bringing social justice to the people in the South).

B: Political, Economic and Social

1. Constitutional Developments. I was heartened by the progress already made toward completing a constitution and by the common determination of both the Government and the Assembly to complete the constitution and proceed with national elections at an early date. I say this despite a

feeling that still more could be done by the South Vietnamese to convey to their own people, as well as to outside world, their determination to proceed apace and their willingness to permit all individuals, including the Viet Cong, to take part in the electoral process.

2. National Reconciliation. It was in the field of national reconciliation that I found the greatest gap between our desires and our accomplishments. My strong impression is that, despite the Manila Communique and the impressive gains recently in the number of Chieu Hoi returnees, the commitment of the South Vietnamese leaders to national reconciliation -- the opening of their arms to their misled countrymen in a Lincolnian spirit of malice toward none and charity for all -- is lukewarm at best, given lip service to mollify us at words. While it would be unrealistic to expect such a spirit to develop quickly, it would be equally unrealistic to expect it to develop without continuing pressure from our side and the willingness to provide supporting resources. The encouragement of such a spirit is, in my view, very much in our national interest: it could substantially weaken the will to continue fighting among our adversaries; this, in turn, could save

American and other allied lives by reducing the severity and length of the guerrilla-type conflict foreseen for the future, a conflict which will certainly require a major input of material resources on our part and will very likely require a continued input of our military manpower.

3. Pacification or Revolutionary Development. There is in this field too a serious gap between our goals and the achievements of the South Vietnamese. While the gap is due to many factors, my impression is that the largest single factor is the failure of some of the Vietnamese military leaders to recognize that the revulsion against corruption, insensitive government officials and economic and social injustices is an important factor in the motivation of the vast majority who join or support the Viet Cong.

Hopefully, the coming elections and move away from military government will ensure more rapid progress in this field. Even so, however, there will be a continued need for constant pressure from us -- though there is the danger that the South Vietnamese will react to such pressure by withdrawing and letting us do the job directly. I observed one example which brought this danger home in a concrete way: an important

bridge destroyed by the Viet Cong on the main road from the delta to Saigon remains unrepaired after several months. This is apparently due in part to a conviction among the Vietnamese that the US will eventually repair the bridge itself, and, in the meantime, import US rice to Saigon to make good the deficiency of rice deliveries from the delta region to which the bridge's destruction has been a contributing factor.

## II Japan

The most interesting aspect of my visit to Japan was the impression the Japanese leaders gave that, despite their abhorrence of the regime in mainland China, they retain a basic respect and sympathy for the Chinese; moreover, they are apparently not so concerned about Communist China's expansionist tendencies (which they seem to doubt can seriously endanger Japan) as they are about the expansionist designs of the Soviets viz-a-viz Asia, including mainland China, and the possibility the Soviets might be tempted to take advantage of developments on the mainland to fulfill some of these designs. Prime Minister Sato, for example, explicitly cautioned against Soviet expansionist designs toward China and against the danger of our trusting the Soviets too much.

While in Japan, I proposed that the US and Japan institute the same type of cabinet-level consultations on UN affairs that we now have with the UK and Canada. While the Japanese reacted favorably to the substance of the proposal, they proved unwilling to have a public announcement of the agreement to such consultations. I attribute this to a combination of their reluctance to assume a role of leadership and their fear of being too closely associated with the US at the UN lest their standing among the Afro-Asians be adversely affected.

### III REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Taiwan)

I found it interesting that the Generalissimo, with whom I spent half a day, expressed fears similar to those of Sato, namely: that the Soviets would choose to take advantage of the ~~disorder~~ on the mainland to fulfill long harbored expansionist designs. In this very limited sense, he seemed to have something in common with the mainland regime.

At the same time he has clearly not renounced hopes of overthrowing that regime. Indeed, the major portion of his discussion with me consisted of the following analysis and request, which he asked specifically be conveyed to you.

Given the serious split between Moscow and Peking, the drain

of Vietnam on Peking's resources, and the serious turmoil on the mainland itself, now is the golden opportunity to rid the mainland of the Communist regime and destroy the Chinese nuclear threat. Unless this is done, the war in Vietnam cannot be ended and will in fact be extended to a wider area. The people on the mainland, while not able to overthrow the Communist regime from within, have now become anti-Mao (in addition to being anti-Communist) and would rally to his cause if he were to return to the mainland with force. All that is needed to set this process in motion is the approval and logistic support -- but not manpower -- of the US.

I, of course, undertook to convey this analysis and request to you and avoided any substantive reply. Nevertheless, feeling it advisable to prepare the way for a rejection of the Generalissimo's request, I did note that US commitments elsewhere were onerous, that the American people were in no mood to increase their involvement in potentially dangerous situations, and that the general American mood was one wanting to reduce rather than create new tension in Asia. I need scarcely add that my own conviction is that the Generalissimo's request should be politely but categorically rejected.



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-8

As requested by the Secretary of State, I raised the question of our recognition of Outer Mongolia leaving further discussion to our Ambassador.

#### IV KOREA

In Korea, I talked to both the President and the Prime Minister with candor about the difficulties of preventing some action within the UN which would denigrate Korea's standing in the international community; I noted that composition of the UN is far different now than it was in the 1950's; that many Afro-Asians were inclined to avoid taking sides in disputes they see as US-Soviet "cold war" disputes; that others are tempted to side with North Korea to encourage its continued movement away from Peking toward Moscow; and, finally, that our intimate connection with Korea can mean that African dissatisfaction with the US on issues vital to them, but quite extraneous to the Korean problem, can adversely affect African support of the joint US-Korean position on the Korean problem.

I believe this explanation, plus assurances I gave that US is not prepared to sacrifice Korean interests in the UN

~~SECRET~~

or elsewhere for the sake of getting along with the Soviets, has helped to dispel suspicion among the Koreans that our doubts about continuing with the same tactics on the Korean question in the UN may stem from a desire to reach a detente with the Soviets and a willingness to sacrifice Korean interests in the process.

V THE PHILIPPINES

My talks with President Marcos and Foreign Secretary Ramos were interesting but contained nothing noteworthy. As requested by Secretary Rusk, I politely repressed their desire to engage in highly publicized but unproductive peace proposals in Vietnam.

While in the Philippines, however, I made the opening presentation to the East Asia Chiefs of Mission Conference in Baguio. I used the presentation to discuss Asian representation at the UN (which, in general, is mediocre), the ineffectiveness of the Asians as a regional bloc, and the reasons that support the US receives from many Asian countries in bilateral diplomacy is frequently not forthcoming in the multilateral diplomacy at the UN.

I was told by many conference participants that my presentation, as well as the question and answer period which

~~SECRET~~

-10

followed, brought some new and very useful perspectives to their thinking.

I have come to the conclusion -- and intend so to recommend to Secretary Rusk -- that arrangements be made in the future to have one ambassador from USUN participate regularly in future chiefs of mission conferences for all regions.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
/ NLJ 91-358  
By inf NARA. Date 3-24-92

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, March 10, 1967 -- 1:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Nick Katzenbach asks your approval to get Tom Schelling for the State Department as a Presidential appointee to drive forward the programming work in foreign affairs. A slot is available.

I strongly recommend that you approve this request for two reasons.

-- The work will simply not be done unless a man like Schelling is brought into the State Department.

-- Schelling is just about the best man I could conceive of for this, if Nick can hook him.

I would recommend to you a condition in granting Nick's request; namely, that you will grant it only if Nick personally guarantees that he will hold a Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) meeting every two weeks at the minimum, and that he will personally assure that the Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRGs) will press forward. My reason is this; and it derives from more than 4 years as a working stiff in the State Department: Unless the Under Secretary will find the time to insure this interdepartmental leadership is exercised from day to day, it won't happen; and if it doesn't happen, the programming effort that Schelling is being brought in for won't be worth a damn.

W. W. Rostow

Approve getting Schelling on proposed basis ✓

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Approve Schelling appointment with SIG-IRG conditions ✓

See me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By CG, NARA, Date 10-21-98

*Walt* Rostow

Approve getting Schelling on proposed basis \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Approve Schelling appointment with SIG-IRG conditions \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

\* Nick had thus far been busy and hasn't given this high enough priority; and the machinery is beginning to rust, with considerable disappointment over your NSAM 341.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Walt*

772  
77-b

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 7, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-361  
By sig, NARA, Date 3-12-93

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Foreign Affairs Management

I thought you might be interested in some observations and recommendations about which I perceive to be some of the management problems which exist among the foreign affairs agencies.

First of all, I am impressed by the number of steps which you and the Secretary have taken to improve the overall management of foreign affairs. The following steps, in particular, seem to me to have been significant:

1. Improvement of communications facilities;
2. The establishment of the Operations Center as part of the Executive Secretariat and the clear benefit it has provided to intragovernmental communication and effectiveness.
3. The Secretary's sound insistence that operational responsibility rest primarily with the Assistant Secretaries;
4. The recent reorganization of P. L. 480 mechanics;
5. The directive which puts ambassadors in charge of all United States governmental operations abroad. (Incidentally, less than 20% of our governmental representatives abroad are otherwise responsible to the State Department or on its payroll);
6. The provisions of NSAM 341 which established the Senior Interdepartmental Group, whose potential I have, as its chairman, come to prize, and the Regional Interdepartmental Groups; and finally

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

7. The study done by the Hitch Committee, at the request of the Secretary, to make recommendations with respect to programming for foreign affairs.

It is with respect to implementing this last recommendation that I call particular attention. I do so for two reasons. The first is because the Secretary directed me personally to take charge of the Hitch Committee effort. The second, more fundamental reason is that we are not yet on top of problems which, fundamentally, stem from the greater overall United States governmental involvement in the post-World War II world.

The Hitch Committee pointed out that there was relatively little benefit to programming foreign policy activities of the Department of State, but potentially great possibilities in programming activities of the government as a whole relating to foreign affairs. This was, I believe, the same concept which led you to issue NSAM 341. The problem is now to implement it fully.

We cannot now do so because we are unable, in sufficient detail, to relate the main programs--AID, P.L. 480, MAP, Peace Corps, CIA, USIA, and others--and our foreign policy objectives in particular countries. We cannot now allocate our resources on the basis of sensible and moderately long-range priorities.

Granting that it would be far more difficult for foreign policy than it has been, for example, in the Department of Defense, I am persuaded that programming can provide a rational framework within which decisions can be more intelligently framed and decided. And I believe such a framework is urgently necessary.

At present, programs tend to be oriented more towards their agencies than towards the countries or regions which they are designed to assist or influence. While the Department of State does coordinate such programs to a greater or lesser extent, I think it fair to say we do not use them sufficiently or efficiently in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives.

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To take one example, a study this fall of eight overseas missions found that, "... even where the Ambassador undertakes seriously to review, criticize, and make recommendations on projected programs and budgets, he must deal with them on a piecemeal basis as they reach him at various times through the year; and their categories prevent effective comparisons and aggregations across agency lines...if PPBS continues and becomes congealed along the agency lines currently pursued, it will serve to weaken the managerial role of the Ambassador and make more difficult the elevation of his role in the future. ..."

In short, we must make greater effort to organize and distribute our resources, not according to agency objectives, but according to overall United States objectives. This is what programming might be expected to accomplish.

I believe the SIG mechanism provides a ready framework under which to undertake programming. Our budget requests include a modest amount (I assume Rooney will give us about \$300,000) to hire a small group of skilled professionals who have experience in the substance of foreign affairs--and who have the technical expertise in programming.

This background is critical, because any such effort will fail unless we are able to do it well enough to involve all bureaus of this Department and all interested and affected government agencies. This will take both superior skill and time.

I have spent considerable time trying to locate the man who would be best equipped to assist the Secretary and myself in this endeavor and I have sought names from many people inside and outside of government. The unanimous view of all those consulted is that the two best men would be Charles Hitch himself or Tom Schelling, now Professor of Economics at Harvard.

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Hitch would not be available, but I believe I could get Schelling to take on this assignment as a part-time consultant from now until June and full time after June. To do so, I would have to act quickly and be in a position to promise him a presidential appointment. You will recall that there is presently a vacant Assistant Secretary position, last used for Administration.

Schelling has remarkably varied foreign policy and inter-agency experience and now simultaneously serves both the Departments of Defense and State. He worked for the-then AID agency from 1948 to 1950 and on the White House staff as an economic adviser to Averell Harriman and Linc Gordon from 1950 to 1953. He taught economics for five years at Yale, spent a year at RAND, and has been a Professor of Economics at Harvard, on the faculty of the Center for International Affairs there since 1958.


Schelling is an expert on military policy, is a member of the Defense Department's Air Force science board, and has held a variety of advisory positions at Defense. I understand Bob McNamara has tried to lure him to Washington several times, without success.

In addition to his AID and Defense background, he also is highly regarded in the Department of State, which he now serves as a member of the Panel of Advisers for European policy, and he has been an adviser to the Disarmament Agency.

Schelling is 45. He was born and raised in California. He has a current security clearance.

I would like your approval to make an offer to Schelling on the above basis. The Secretary concurs in this recommendation.

Respectfully,

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

DR

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*Pres file* 78

Friday, March 10, 1967  
3:45 p. m.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

MR. PRESIDENT:

1. As you instructed, I shall find an occasion to talk with Sec. Rusk about Sec. McNamara's views as expressed in his paper on Senator Kennedy's proposal.

2. Herewith the clearest view I can give you of Sec. McNamara's thought, derived from many conversations over a considerable period of time.

3. First and above all, as I told you on the telephone, he is deeply troubled about the possibility that the war will run on into next year; and then political pressures will arise, in one form or another, that would force us into an unsatisfactory settlement unworthy of what the nation has put into the struggle. Therefore, he is in a great hurry -- as are we all.

4. He is now even willing to contemplate the possibility of forcing a major crisis with the Soviet Union and Communist China by mining the Haiphong harbor and otherwise interdicting supplies from outside North Viet Nam. He has certainly not decided to propose this course of action to you. But he has talked to me about it at least three times as one possibility we should contemplate in the spring, after we have the Vietnamese constitution and the electoral slate settled. Like all of us, he hesitates to recommend this because of the risk of enlarging the war; although he keeps coming back to the CIA intelligence estimate that neither China nor Russia would go to war if we mined Haiphong.

5. But his main thrust is to seek a quick end to the war by action which does not run the risks involved in mining Haiphong. He has some hopes that the present high casualty rates being inflicted on the VC plus high levels of defection will force some kind of crack in the organizational and political structure of the NLF. But he is conscious that we have not sustained these high rates over a long enough period to give him confidence that the war will end in 1967 as a result of casualty and defection rates. He is frustrated but does not know what he can do from here about the slow pace of pacification.

6. Against this background -- of one course of action which may be too dangerous and another which may be too slow -- he is passionately interested in finding a way to negotiate an end to the war:

-- He has pressed (and I have worked with him) to find a way of penetrating and making contact with the NLF. (I recently checked. This operation is being carried forward in a vigorous and imaginative way, although we don't yet have any big fish on the hook.)

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

3/10/67

-- He wants us to push hard on the KGB contact in New York as well as on U Thant's approach.

-- He is, as his memorandum to you of 9 March reveals, willing to cut down bombing in the North if it can induce a negotiation with Hanoi, notably bombing north of the 20th parallel.

7. This judgment, in turn, stems from a view that the positive effect of bombing in the northern part of North Viet Nam is not enough to outweigh its negative effects on public opinion here and abroad and on the leaders in Hanoi. He honestly believes -- without independent evidence -- that our bombing around Hanoi stiffens the resistance of the people in authority there and makes it harder for them to negotiate an end to the war. As his memorandum suggests, he tends to accept the theory that our bombing attacks of December 13-14 were damaging to negotiations.

8. In short, I don't think Bob can be described as a "dove" in this matter. He wants the Viet Nam operation to succeed because of the nation's stake in it; your stake in it; and -- perhaps -- his stake in it. He is afraid it is endangered by the passage of time. He is thrashing about for a short cut. Among the short cuts would be to use our bombing of the North -- especially north of the 20th parallel -- as a negotiating carrot since, in his judgment, it has very limited net value.

9. My main difference with him is that I am not sure his picture of the mind of the men in Hanoi is correct. I agree that they are probably split; but I cannot believe -- until I see hard evidence -- that our bombing in the northern part of Viet Nam is a decisive factor in determining when they would try seriously to get out of the war. Moreover, I do believe that if we are systematic about electric power we can do something significant about their war effort.

10. My advice would be to support Bob in his efforts to ensure that every possible negotiating track is explored; unleash his full energies -- perhaps after the Guam meeting -- at trying to accelerate pacification; but exercise great caution in surrendering prematurely or without adequate compensation our bombing in the North. In addition, you may wish to look hard and afresh at a political-military diplomatic plan for forcing a major crisis some time late in the spring.

W. W. R.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

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3/10/67

P.S. Since dictating this, Bob called and talked at length about the scenario stated briefly in his memo of March 9:

- take out all light power plants and cement in the next two weeks.
- go to the Russians and tell them we're cutting back to the 20th parallel for a while;
- see if the Russians can start secret talks between Tommy and a very high Hanoi official.

W.