

Wednesday, March 29, 1967 - 7:00 pm

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Two Steps to Help the Balance of Payments

In the attached, Secretary Fowler asks you to approve two ways of using his Exchange Stabilization Fund to help the balance of payments. He proposes to use the Fund:

- to guarantee payment of a German offset obligation we would sell to the U. K. in a complicated, 3-cornered deal designed to shift \$100 million in receipts into the first quarter. (If we do this, we must do it before midnight, Friday, March 31.)
- to buy U. S. Government agency securities and sell them, usually at a discount, to foreign central banks and other official holders.

Fowler has blanket authority to use the Exchange Stabilization Fund for any purpose which will strengthen the dollar. But the law requires that he have the President's approval.

3-Cornered Arrangement

Fowler, Ackley, and the rest of us are very worried that a very large first-quarter payments deficit would produce serious pressure for tight money -- which is just what we don't need. Fowler's proposal would take advantage of an opportunity to shift \$100 million in inflow from the second quarter to the first. This would not solve the problem, but it would help. Basically, Fowler suggests the following:

- we would transfer to the British \$100 million in German offset obligations which will be paid in the second quarter.
- in return, the U. K. would immediately pay us the \$100 million, less the interest we would normally pay on a similar amount in Treasury bills.
- through the Exchange Stabilization Fund, we would guarantee payment of the German obligation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Obviously, we would have to forego \$100 million in anticipated second-quarter receipts, but your advisers are agreed that the first-quarter problem is serious enough to be worth it.

This transaction would not be made public. If it leaked, we could be charged with gimmickery, but Fowler believes he has an effective defense: we are simply trying to keep our balance of payments difficulties from being exaggerated through uneven receipts under the US-FRG offset deal.

Purchases of Securities

This proposal is aimed at the longer term. The market is now so structured that there are relatively few sales of U. S. agency securities to foreign governments and central banks. Fowler's proposal is that the Exchange Stabilization Fund buy these securities at the going rate and sell them to official foreign holders, usually at a slight discount (1/8 - 3/8 of a point). The Exchange Stabilization Fund would take the small losses involved.

Fowler is confident this operation would not cause any trouble on the Hill if it were noticed at all. (The Exchange Stabilization Fund is not audited outside the Treasury and does not require appropriations.) If criticism did develop, he believes we could show that the benefits to the balance of payments far outweigh the cost to the Fund.

Recommendation

I recommend that you approve both proposals. The CEA concurs.

W. W. Rostow

Approve guarantee of German note in 3-cornered deal _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

* * * *

Approve Fund purchases of agency securities _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

EKHamilton/vmr

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

m. Foster 51

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 29,
7:45 P.M. 1967

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk's report of Ambassador Goldberg's conversation with Secretary General U Thant was based on the attached summary of a telephone report from New York. The full memorandum of the conversation is not yet ready but will be available by morning.

Bromley Smith
Bromley Smith

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *ry*, NARA, Date 4-15-91

51a

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS

March 29, 1967

SUBJECT: Hanoi Reply to U Thant's Latest Viet-Nam Peace Proposal

Ambassador Goldberg talked to U Thant today about Hanoi's reply to the Secretary General's latest proposal. The Secretary General said the reply was delivered through Moscow.

The first point of the reply indicated that Hanoi had apparently thought that U Thant would not deliver his proposal to any other party until after Hanoi had replied to him. This was a misunderstanding: U Thant believes that he was told in Rangoon not to make the proposal public before Hanoi made a reply.

The second point made in the reply was that the first step proposed by U Thant (a stand-still truce) equated the aggressor and the victim of aggression and was advantageous to the United States. Hanoi made no comment on the second and third steps proposed by U Thant.

The third point in the reply was an expression of thanks for U Thant's interest in and desire for peace, and an appreciation of his motives. The Secretary General's interpretation of this is that Hanoi does not want him to carry on his efforts. He noted that this is the first written reply Hanoi has ever made to him.

The fourth point was the one made publicly that the U.N. has nothing to do with the Viet-Nam problem.

Ralph Bunche believes that the tone of the reply is friendly.

The U.N. interpretation is that nothing further can be done now, and that things must be allowed to settle down for several months. Ambassador Goldberg agrees.

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 91-376

By CL, NARA, Date 10-21-98

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, March 28, 1967
5:30 p. m.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-375
By ju, NARA, Date 7-21-93

Mr. President:

This collection of facts about Viet Nam manpower problems since the spring of 1966 gives a quite good feel of the strain under which they are progressively operating. CIA's conclusion is lined in yellow on the cover.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Memo for Mr. Bromley Smith from William N. Morell, Jr., 27 Mar 1967 with
Cy 11 RR IM 67-15, March 1967
Intelligence Memorandum: Viet Cong Manpower Problems
(Log 1013)

WWRostow:rlh

Tuesday, March 28, 1968
7:55 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This reflection of Soviet attitudes
towards the non-proliferation treaty
may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 4-15-91

53a

; Tuesday, March 28, 1967
11:00 a. m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

At the Algerian dinner last night, Ambassador Dobrynin asked me how our NPT soundings were going. I told him we were working at it; but it was not easy to create a political environment in which nations appeared to sign on to third-class nuclear status. It required that they find rational answers to their questions about security, technology, and prestige.

This led to a discussion of India.

Dobrynin made two points:

-- the Soviets are explaining to the Indians that signing a non-proliferation treaty would not limit the civil technology available to them;

-- he asked if I thought a Security Council guarantee could meet the Indian security problem.

I confined my response to the latter to : "That's interesting. "

He also said, in general, that the Soviet Union was prepared to meet the "legitimate interests" of the non-nuclear powers; but it was not prepared to pay "a high price" for a treaty, because they believed it was as much in our interest as theirs and they would manage to get along somehow if the NPT failed.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-169
By isa, NARA Date 9.25.98

W. W. R.

Cy sent Stite

Tuesday, March 28, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Islands

You have agreed to receive Mr. Seiho Matsuoka (Mah-tsoo-oh-kah), Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Islands on Wednesday, March 29, at 12:00 noon. He is also President of the Okinawa Democratic Party, which has a slight majority in the Ryukyuan legislature.

Mr. Matsuoka arrives today for a visit of 7-10 days. He is to see Secretary Rusk on April 4.

As you know, the question of Ryukyus reversion to Japan is a hot political issue, both in the Islands and in Japan. Mr. Matsuoka is well disposed toward the United States and understands our basic policy concerning the Ryukyus.

A brief courtesy call is all that is expected. Mr. Matsuoka may, however, make pro forma requests to you for:

-- Some increase in our assistance to the Ryukyus. (An increase is provided in our legislative program for this year and has the Administration's full support.)

-- Continuation of a policy of increased local autonomy in the Ryukyus, looking toward the day when the Islands may be returned to Japanese administration. (This is the publicly-stated policy of the United States -- as security interests permit.)

You may wish to:

-- reiterate the importance we attach to the area, and to the welfare of the people of the Ryukyus;

-- express our hope for cooperation from the Ryukyuan people, and our appreciation of Mr. Matsuoka's efforts in that direction.

We understand from Defense that Mr. Matsuoka will probably bring a small gift for you.

He will probably be accompanied by an interpreter.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

CONFIDENTIAL

Pres file

Tuesday - March 28, 1967

Mr. President:

The OAS Council is discussing the program for the Summit. The program parallels closely what you approved for planning purposes (Tab A).

At today's session there was a sharp division on the question of whether there should be public speeches. About 10 countries want their Presidents to speak. ~~Three~~ were strongly opposed: Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica. The remainder were non-committal.

Tomorrow the debate continues. Given the number who want to speak, I recommend that we continue to support two public sessions in which Presidents who want to do so may make short statements (10 minutes).

Agree

Disagree

Speak to me

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

cc - Jim Jones

~~SECRET~~

55a

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR SUMMIT MEETING

Monday, April 10

11:00 p.m. - Depart Andrews.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 4-22-91

Tuesday, April 11

11:00 a.m. - Arrive Montevideo.

11:00 - 11:45 - Ceremonies (full military honors.)

11:50 - Depart by helicopter for Punta del Este.

12:30 p.m. - Arrive Punta del Este.

- (Afternoon and evening open for talks
with visiting Presidents.)

Wednesday, April 12

10:30 a.m. - Call on President Gestido by visiting Presidents.

11:30 - 12:30 - Private informal working session to:

- 1) get acquainted.
- 2) agree on organization.

1:00 - 2:30 - Open -- Lunch or private talks.

3:00 - 4:30 - Continue informal working session.
(To be largely devoted to discussion of world
affairs, e.g., President could cover Vietnam.
Leoni and Lleras Restrepo would talk about
Cuban subversion.)

5:00 - 7:00 - Formal inaugural session (public).
President Gestido welcoming address.
Statements by Latin American Presidents
(limited to 10 minutes each.)

9:00 - Reception by President Gestido.
(During reception President could have another
round of bilateral talks.)

SECRET

-2-

Thursday, April 13

- 10:00 am - 12:00 - Completion of statements by Latin American Presidents (public - and 10 minutes each).
- President Johnson would speak at this session. (Suggest this be opening speech).
- Foreign Ministers would meet to work on Summit documents while Presidents are speaking.
- 12:00 - 3:30 - Open -- Lunch or private talks, as each President desires.
- 3:30 - 6:30 - Closing^{ed} working session.
- 9:00 - Return reception by visiting Presidents. (President could complete bilateral talks.)

Friday, April 14

- 10:00 - 12:00 noon - Closing session.
- 1:00 - Depart Punta del Este for Montevideo.
- 1:30 - Arrive Montevideo.
- 1:40 - Depart Montevideo for Georgetown.
- 7:20 - Arrive Georgetown.
- 8:20 - Depart Georgetown.

Saturday, April 15

- 12:25 am - Arrive Andrews AFB.
- or 1:00 am - Arrive Randolph AFB.

1. Pres file
2. ~~Pres file~~

Tuesday - March 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with CIAP (Inter-American Committee
on the Alliance for Progress)

This year the members of CIAP are holding their annual meeting in Washington.

Their visits provides an opportunity for you to --

- give your ideas on the Summit;
- ask about Latin American attitudes; and
- question them about CIAP performance and plans.

At Tab A is a scenario paper with talking points. I suggest that you be brief in your remarks and use the meeting to probe their thinking on how CIAP can give impetus to the Alliance by generating high-level enthusiasm, greater public participation and popular mystique. Failure of most of the Latin American Presidents to "talk up" the Summit as you have done is symptomatic of a lack of conviction and drive in promoting the Alliance concept at the highest levels of government.

At Tab B is a list of those attending.

W. W. Rostow

11:30 wed, March 29
1967

Attachments

- Tab A --- Scenario-talking points paper.
- Tab B --- CIAP list of members.

tab A 56a

Scenario for CIAP Meeting

1. Lead off with welcoming statement

- It is timely that you should be meeting on the eve of the OAS Summit meeting.
- It is a pleasure to have you in Washington, which gives me this opportunity to meet with you.
- I offer congratulations to you, Dr. Sanz, on your recent re-election as CIAP Chairman.
- And a special welcome to the recently elected new members of CIAP.

2. Follow with these remarks

- Our attention is focused on the Summit, which I have enthusiastically supported.
- You are probably all familiar with my message to the Congress on March 13 outlining what we are prepared to do to help improve our neighborhood -- the Americas.
- I have always felt a special kinship and responsibility toward our barrio in this troubled world.
- We each have a responsibility to advance the welfare of our own household, but we also have a responsibility to work with equal enthusiasm and each according to his resources in improving the barrio.

- I have always looked upon the Alliance for Progress in this spirit: not as a United States-Latin American aid program but as a community project belonging to all of us.
- I think we have perhaps failed to capture this spirit as we should and to project it into all walks of life in our countries.
- What I want is for the average man in Latin America to feel that he has a personal stake in the Alliance: that a boy helping to make adobes for a school-house or community center financed with local funds in a remote village is as much involved in the Alliance as the Minister of Public Works building a power plant with a loan from the Inter-American Bank.
- We can only create this mystique if the leaders of this hemisphere have this vision of the Alliance and work constantly to pass it down to all levels of government.
- This is not to say, of course, that spirit and enthusiasm are substitutes for technical and administrative expertise.
- This is your primary mission. But as you assume new responsibilities under the Summit decision, I hope that you will also devote time and energy to get Presidents, and cabinet ministers, congressmen and civic leaders to capture the sense of mission which our Alliance needs and to pass it down the line.
- The success of the Summit decision depends in no small part upon how well we advance toward this objective.

3. Pose these questions (Dr. Sanz will serve as spokesman)

- Dr. Sanz, how do you and your colleagues view the prospects for the Summit?
- I wonder how it is regarded by the leaders and the public in your countries?
- What can CIAP do to develop the mystique which we all consider to be so important?

SUGGESTED AGENDA
for
Meeting with the President
at 11:30 a.m.
Wednesday, March 29, 1967

Members of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| Carlos <u>SANZ</u> de Santamaria
(of Colombia) | - | Chairman. |
| Admiral Francisco <u>CASTRO</u>
(of Argentina) | - | Executive Director of Inter-American Development Bank. |
| Jose <u>ROMERO</u> Loza
(of Bolivia) | - | Minister of Finance of Bolivia. |
| Alfredo <u>NAVARRETE</u>
(of Mexico) | - | a Director of Nacional Financiera of Mexico. |
| General <u>JIMENEZ</u>
(of Costa Rica) | - | former Minister of Finance of Costa Rica. |
| Roberto <u>CAMPOS</u>
(of Brazil) | - | ex-Minister for Planning and Economic Coordination of Brazil. |
| Helio <u>BELTRAO</u> | - | current Minister for Planning and Economic Coordination of Brazil. |
| Sol M. Linowitz | - | United States Ambassador. |
|
<u>Others:</u> | | |
| Felipe Herrera | - | President, Inter-American Development Bank |
| Jose Mora | - | Secretary General of the OAS. |
| Carlos Quintana | - | Executive Secretary of the United Nations Commission for Latin America
(attendance uncertain) |
| Jorge del Canto | - | Head of the Latin American Department of the International Monetary Fund |
| Orvis Schmidt | - | Special Assistant to the President of the World Bank. |
| Walter Sedwitz | - | Executive Secretary, CIAP. (United States) |
| Lincoln Gordon | - | Assistant Secretary of State. |

Tuesday, March 28, 1967 -- 9:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Barbara Coleman (Here's Barbara) has asked me to appear on her TV program (live) on Wednesday, May 3, 1967, 10:30-11:00 a.m.

I do not know what she wants me to talk about.

W. W. Rostow

Accept _____

No _____

See me _____

RLN

~~SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

Tuesday, March 28, 1967
9:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

I believe we should be careful about how we announce Abrams' appointment to meet point 1 B in Bob Komer's memo to you of last night. Otherwise, I think you've got the talents assembled.

If we announce here, Bunker should be a central figure.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 21516

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 7-15-81

~~SECRET -- NODIS~~

Saigon 21516, March 28, 1967

Eyes Only for the President from Lodge

1. General Abrams is here, and I have had two long talks with him. I enthusiastically share the opinion of him which you expressed at Guam, and believe that he will do big things here.
2. I would like to make a suggestion, based on the situation here and on what you told me at Guam, recognizing that there are things in Washington which I do not know, as follows:
3. I recommend that you announce his appointment to take charge of pacification, and that you do it as soon as possible. My reasons for this recommendation are:
 - A. His presence here is known to the press and both Alsop and Apple of the New York Times already surmise that he will be given this job.
 - B. I would like to hold a reception in his honor so as to give him the very best send off with all of the Vietnamese and Americans with whom he is going to have to work.
 - C. I would also like to take him to call on Thieu and Ky, which can also mean much in terms of his future effectiveness.
4. I believe that the sooner he can get started, the better.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-376

By WJ NARA. Date 4-6-92

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~*sent via CAS channels*

From the President to Ambassador Lodge EYES ONLY

Re your 21516, the reason no decision was announced at Guam was because no decision had finally been made. I would much prefer to exercise my best judgment after reviewing all the facts and, therefore, hope you will help me keep these decisions that are unmade from being announced in Saigon or, if possible, even speculated upon. No shake-up is imminent, nothing drastic or startling should be expected. Hope the military and civilian contingent in Saigon can play it cool until after your return here where we can quietly and thoughtfully deliberate on our future and make the decisions that are best for our country.

Deeply appreciate your statesmanship and cooperation and hope you will urge all to quit talking and speculating until Bunker reports and is installed and until we finally act here.

Dictated by Pres Johnson

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State let 1/16/78By kg/y, NARA, Date 4/17/91

62

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-374
By pw, NARA, Date 1-29-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - March 28, 1967

Mr. President:

Rutgers University wants to give President Frei an honorary degree on May 31 and has asked State if there would be any objection to their inviting him to the United States.

I doubt that Frei would accept unless he can be sure of congressional permission to leave the country and can combine the trip to Rutgers with the postponed official visit here.

This would present scheduling problems. You could have him here on Monday and Tuesday, May 29 and 30. But this would also mean three state visitors that week because Prime Minister Holt is scheduled for June 1 and Prime Minister Wilson for June 2.

In light of the foregoing, should we discourage Rutgers from extending the invitation?

Yes _____

No _____

Speak to me ____.

If you decide to give Rutgers the green light and Frei accepts their invitation, would you be willing to have Frei come to Washington on May 29 and 30?

Yes _____

No _____

Speak to me ____.

W. W. Rostow

cc - Jim Jones

Tuesday, March , 1967

61
Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Charlie Murphy sent me the attached,
and made the suggestion that a letter
to President Truman might be in order.
I attach a draft.

W. W. R.

Attachment

612

March 28, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

This is just to tell you how grateful I am for the statement you issued when I was in Guam. You know, I am sure, how much your steady support through these hard days has meant.

It appears difficult for the press to understand the importance and usefulness of the kind of meeting we had in Guam. It accomplished everything we hoped it would in bringing together the new and the old Saigon teams, to insure a smooth transition; and also to permit those in Washington and Saigon to take stock together and set priorities for the months ahead.

In addition, we had the unexpected bonus of the Vietnamese producing their Constitution. Once they decided to come, they apparently worked day and night to make the compromises necessary to finish the job. They appeared to understand quite well that the emergence of a legitimate constitutional government in South Viet Nam is as important as the military operations.

My very best wishes to Mrs. Truman and yourself.

Sincerely,

Honorable Harry S. Truman
219 North Delaware
Independence, Missouri 64050

LBJ:WWR:mz

616

HARRY S TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

March 21, 1967

Dear Charlie:

Enclosed, is a copy of the statement which I issued on President Johnson's trip to Guam, as you requested.

I thought you might want to keep a copy in your files.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Harry Truman". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Harry Truman".

Honorable Charles S. Murphy
Chairman
Civil Aeronautics Board
Washington, D. C. 20428

Statement issued by Former President of the United States Harry S Truman, Independence, Missouri, on March 20, 1967.

President Johnson has gone to Guam on a mission of vital importance to the United States. In my opinion, the American people should give him their full support.

We have chosen, under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, as well as under President Johnson, to take a stand against aggression in Vietnam. We have done this because the aggression there was a threat to the liberties of all mankind, including our own. Southeast Asia has become a critical testing ground of our will to support the cause of freedom as well as the cause of peace.

We cannot afford now to falter or to throw away the gains so dearly won.

Lyndon Johnson has met these problems with wisdom and courage and much patience. As President, he alone can bring us to a successful conclusion of this struggle. Our hopes and prayers are with him.

SEND VIA CAS CHANNELS

62

SECRET

From the President to Ambassador Lodge -- EYES ONLY

Re your 21516, the reason no decision was announced at Guam was because no decision had finally been made. I would much prefer to exercise my best judgment after reviewing all the facts and, therefore, hope you will help me keep these decisions that are unmade from being announced in Saigon or, if possible, even speculated upon. No shake-up is imminent, nothing drastic or startling should be expected. Hope the military and civilian contingent in Saigon can play it cool until after your return here where we can quietly and thoughtfully deliberate on our future and make the decisions that are best for our country.

Deeply appreciate your statesmanship and cooperation and hope you will urge all to quit talking and speculating until Bunker reports and is installed and until we finally act here.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State ltr 1/10/78
By g/y, NARA, Date 4/17/91

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, March 28, 1967
11:13 a.m.

Mr. President:

Here is the draft message
to Lodge, as you dictated it.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 29, NARA, Date 4-5-91

63a

~~SECRET~~

From the President to Ambassador Lodge

Re your 21516, the reason no decision was announced at Guam was because no decision had finally been made. I would much prefer to exercise my best judgment after reviewing all the facts and, therefore, hope you will help me keep these decisions that are unmade from being announced in Saigon or, if possible, even speculated upon. No shake-up is imminent, nothing drastic or startling should be expected. Hope you can keep your contingent cool until you return here where we can quietly and thoughtfully deliberate on our future and what is best for our country.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State to 1/10/78

By g/g, NARA, Date 4/17/91

3/28/67

This morning the Secretary General of the United Nations made public the main lines of his new proposal for a general truce and cessation of hostilities in Viet Nam. He presented that proposal to Ambassador Goldberg in New York on March 14.

On March 15 we replied, welcoming the proposal and noting that it contained "constructive and positive elements toward bringing a peaceful settlement of the Viet Nam conflict." We told the Secretary General we would be consulting the Government of South Viet Nam and its allies and that we expected to provide him with a full and prompt reply.

On March 18 we were able to deliver that reply which was positive.

The Government of Viet Nam also responded constructively.

Yesterday radio Hanoi informed the world that, apparently, it was not prepared to accept the Secretary General's proposal. ^{it} ~~and~~ stated that "the Viet Nam problem has no concern with the United Nations and the United Nations has absolutely no right to interfere in any way with the Viet Nam question."

I would hope that the Secretary General was correct this morning when he said that "none of the parties has categorically turned his plan down."

We have seen over the past several years -- and in the past several months -- one effort after another to bring peace to Southeast Asia fail because ^{Hanoi} ~~the other side~~ rejected it.

But we shall persist.

Deep in our history is the memory of what President Lincoln said
to his countrymen^{in 1861:} "Suppose you go to war, you can not fight always; and
when , after much loss on both sides and no gain on either, you cease
fighting, the identical old questions, as to terms of intercourse, are
again upon you." ^{ff} In Southeast Asia the terms ^{for the relations among states} were set in 1954 and 1962
by international accords. In the end, they must be honored. ^{ff} And in the
end the people of South Viet Nam must be given the chance to determine
their destiny without external vidence^{or interference}. All of our power and intelligence
and imagination will be devoted in the future, as it ~~has been~~ in the past,
to bringing that day nearer.

Pres file

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

March 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ratification of the Consular Convention

In putting the US-Soviet Consular Convention into effect, there are two possible occasions for a Presidential ceremony: (1) your signing of the instrument of ratification; and (2) the exchange of instruments with the Russians and your proclamation of the treaty (in a month or two).

- The U.S. instrument of ratification is ready, and can be signed at your convenience. You could invite Senators and Congressmen, but inviting Russians would not be appropriate, as they have not yet ratified. Alternatively you could just invite the White House press or nobody at all. I would recommend you invite the White House press, but save the Congressional, official and foreign involvement for the later ceremony.

George Christian invite the
White House press only _____

Marvin to set up ceremony with
Senators and Congressmen for
this signing _____

Have Hopkins put on signing table _____

Speak to me _____

- The better occasion for a big public ceremony will be the exchange of instruments and your proclamation of the treaty after both we and the Russians have ratified. The Russians are likely to ratify any time from two weeks to a couple of months from now. (It is up to their Presidium; it does not go before the full Legislature.) I shall submit another memo to you when they have ratified, for your consideration of a public ceremony then.

Francis M. Bator

FMB:ND:gg

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Send CAS channels to The Hague

66

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY For the Vice President from Walt Rostow

As seen from here the course of wisdom is to avoid initiating discussions of Viet Nam and keep that issue minimized in press and TV handling of your trip. Apparently there are some anxious to portray your visit to Europe as a running Chautauqua-type debate on Viet Nam; for example, Sandy Vanocur.

Best wishes from us all.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-61
By is, NARA Date 10-30-99

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, March 28, 1967
4:20 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Professor Galbraith
promises Director Helms "to remain
silent."

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By ry, NARA, Date 4-22-91

WWRostow:rla



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

28 March 1967

67a

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

1. This is to thank you most warmly for your interest and help on the trouble caused in New Delhi by former Ambassador Galbraith's article of March 12 in THE WASHINGTON POST.

2. Mr. Galbraith telephoned me Monday morning to say that he understood we had had a problem with his piece. I replied, "It has raised unshirted hell in India and has provided the central point of an acrimonious debate in the Lok Sabha." In short, Mr. Galbraith professed surprise and some dismay at the impact of his article in New Delhi, and readily agreed to remain silent and refrain from further public revelations on

25X1A



25X1A

Richard Helms
Director

SANITIZED
Authority NLT 019-014-3-1
By 9, NARA, Date 12/13/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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March 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ratification of the Consular Convention

In putting the US-Soviet Consular Convention into effect, there are two possible occasions for a Presidential ceremony: (1) your signing of the instrument of ratification; and (2) the exchange of instruments with the Russians and your proclamation of the treaty (in a month or two).

- The U.S. instrument of ratification is ready, and can be signed at your convenience. You could invite Senators and Congressmen, but inviting Russians would not be appropriate, as they have not yet ratified. Alternatively you could just invite the White House press or nobody at all. I would recommend you invite the White House press, but save the Congressional, official and foreign involvement for the later ceremony.

George Christian invite the
White House press only _____

Marvin to set up ceremony with
Senators and Congressmen for
this signing _____

Have Hopkins put on signing table _____

Speak to me _____

- The better occasion for a big public ceremony will be the exchange of instruments and your proclamation of the treaty after both we and the Russians have ratified. The Russians are likely to ratify any time from two weeks to a couple of months from now. (It is up to their Presidium; it does not go before the full Legislature.) I shall submit another memo to you when they have ratified, for your consideration of a public ceremony then.

Francis M. Bator

FMB:ND:gg

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69

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 28, 1967

Dear Mr. President:


This is just to tell you how grateful I am for the statement you issued when I was in Guam. You know, I am sure, how much your steady support through these hard days has meant.

It appears difficult for the press to understand the importance and usefulness of the kind of meeting we had in Guam. It accomplished everything we hoped it would in bringing together the new and the old Saigon teams, to insure a smooth transition; and also to permit those in Washington and Saigon to take stock together and set priorities for the months ahead.

In addition, we had the unexpected bonus of the Vietnamese producing their Constitution. Once they decided to come, they apparently worked day and night to make the compromises necessary to finish the job. They appeared to understand quite well that the emergence of a legitimate constitutional government in South Viet Nam is as important as the military operations.

My very best wishes to Mrs. Truman and yourself.

Sincerely,



Honorable Harry S. Truman
219 North Delaware
Independence, Missouri 64050

Monday, March 27, 1967 at 6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a revised message from you (to be read by the Vice President) to the Berlin House of Representatives. We have taken out any mention of "commitment" but have kept a reference to our hopes for a re-united Berlin and Germany. Ignoring the reunification question would raise questions in Germany.

Francis M. Hator

OK ✓ 3/28/67 L
No _____
Speak to me _____

LS E:djw

PROPOSED MESSAGE

It is a special pleasure to send you, through Vice President Humphrey, my own good wishes and those of the American people as you assume your new responsibilities.

More than five years ago I had the privilege of being with the people of Berlin during a time of crisis. Their courage, which won the admiration and support of free men everywhere, met the challenge of those dark days. Their strength and fortitude since then have kept Berlin a free and thriving city. All Americans look forward to the time when the tragic division of Berlin is ended, and Germany is once again a united country.

My countrymen join me in the hope and expectation that the future will bring you peace and prosperity.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - March 27, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Delegation for the OAS Summit Meeting

It is not too early to do some planning on our Summit delegation.

I recommend that we keep it as small as possible:

- the Latin Americans are planning delegations ranging from 4 to 10 persons.
- each delegation will be allotted only 14 seats on the conference floor.

The persons who in my judgment should be on the delegation are:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Secretary Rusk	_____	_____
Administrator Gaud	_____	_____
Assistant Secretary Gordon	_____	_____
Assistant Secretary Solomon	_____	_____
Ambassador Linowitz	_____	_____
Ambassador Hoyt	_____	_____.

Because of the emphasis on agriculture and education, you might also consider taking:

Secretary Gardner	_____	_____
Secretary Freeman	_____	_____.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ag, NARA, Date 4/17/91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

If you decide to take public members, I suggest:

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
George Meany (AFL-CIO)	_____	_____
David Rockefeller (Chairman, Council for Latin America)	_____	_____
Milton Eisenhower	_____	_____.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

Monday, March 27, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-376

By NARA. Date 4-6-92

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Saigon, 21428)

On Sunday evening, I became anxious because of reports that the Directorate was very dissatisfied with the Constitution. Accordingly, I decided to see General Thieu on Monday (today). As I have previously reported, I had a talk with General Ky about it on Saturday.

Today, a number of tentative appointments which I had with Thieu did not materialize because the Directorate was in continuous session. Finally, I got into see him at 4:45 p.m. and told him of my anxiety because of the reports which I had heard that the generals were against the Constitution.

Thieu said that they had indeed been against the Constitution, and that when they recessed for lunch, he had thought that they might not accept it. But he said lunch, plus "some music and some drink" plus a great deal of very hard reasoning by Thieu and Ky finally brought them around. They had approved the Constitution, and also approved the date of September 1 for election of the President and the Senate and the date of October 1 for the election for the members of the Lower House. Promulgation is to be on Saturday, April 1.

Thieu said that today's session was extremely strenuous. The generals had been willing to accept everything in the Constitution that pertained to the future, but they disapproved of the so-called "transitional period," making the Constituent Assembly the legislative body pending the election of the permanent legislature. They made the point that the Constituent Assembly had not been elected for that purpose, and that it was in effect a fraud on the voter.

They stressed that they were taking Thieu's and Ky's word that the national and international considerations were such as to justify overlooking that defect.

Thieu told me that he said to them that no Constitution was perfect, but there would be opportunities in the future to correct the defects in this Constitution.

As I left, he said, "Tell President Johnson not to worry."

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-374
By JW, NARA, Date 1-29-93

Monday, March 27, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit by Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Islands

Mr. Seiho MATSUOKA (Mah-tsoo-oh-kah) is Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. He is also president of the Okinawa Democratic Party, which has a slight majority in the Ryukyuan legislature.

Mr. Matsuoka will arrive here tomorrow evening for a visit of 7-10 days.

Our people on Okinawa are convinced that it would strengthen the hand of friendly political forces in the Ryukyus and enhance our position there if Mr. Matsuoka could pay a brief courtesy call on you. State and Defense both endorse this recommendation. Representative Spark Matsunaga of Hawaii has recommended such a meeting.

As you know, the question of Ryukyus reversion to Japan is a hot political issue in both the islands and in Japan. High level attention to Mr. Matsuoka will have a beneficial effect in demonstrating our interest in the Ryukyus. It will also enhance the prestige of a friendly Okinawan politician who understands our basic policy.

I recommend, therefore, that you agree to receive Mr. Matsuoka for a brief courtesy call during his Washington visit. *— 10 minutes will do*

A brief biographic sketch is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Set up appointment with
Marvin Watson _____
Make no appointment _____
See me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MATSUOKA, Seiho

Chief Executive, Government of the Ryukyu Islands

Mr. Matsuoka was born in Kin-son on 18 September 1897. He graduated from the Los Angeles High School in 1921, from the Engineering Department of the University of California in 1924 and studied at Indiana University, Columbia University and in the Engineering Department of Tokyo University. He has worked for the Scientific Research Institute in Tokyo in 1932, became chief of Manufacturing Section of the Takasaki Machinery Manufacturing Company, and later chief engineer and manager of the Kadena Sugar Refinery of the Okinawa Sugar Manufacturing Company. After the war, he was a member of the Okinawa Advisory Council, director of Public Works Department of the Okinawa Civil Administration and director of Public Works Department of the Okinawa Gunto Government. He visited the United States under the national leader program at this time. In 1951, he formed and became president of the Matsuoka Construction Company and in 1953 he became president of the Matsuoka Power Distribution Company. He was appointed chief executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands on 31 October 1964 and was elected president of the Democratic Party (DP) on 26 December 1964. He was elected chief executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands under the Presidential Executive Order as amended on 16 March 1966.



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Monday - March 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Message from President-elect Anastasio Somoza

President-elect Somoza has sent you a telegram expressing pleasure at being in New York and sending best wishes to you.

State recommends that you send the attached reply. I concur.

Approve ✓

Disapprove

Speak to me .

You will note that the message states that you look forward to seeing him in Punta del Este. The Nicaraguan Government has indicated that President-elect Somoza will accompany President Guerrero. I think that your seeing Somoza at the conference in two weeks gives you a polite out in not receiving him while he is up here.

On the other hand, there is a "see me" item on Somoza from you in my folder of pending business. The Dean of the Diplomatic Corps has been working over the State Department, General Taylor and Jack Valenti in an effort to get an appointment. If you want to see him, we can arrange it.

Prefer to see him
at Punta del Este

Will see him line

Speak to me .

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

**SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT-ELECT
OF NICARAGUA, ANASTASIO SOMOZA**

His Excellency

General Anastasio Somoza

Waldorf Towers

New York, New York.

Thank you for your message of March 21. I welcome you to the United States and I extend to you my best wishes for a pleasant, fruitful visit. I look forward with pleasure to meeting with you and your distinguished colleagues in Punta del Este.

Lyndon B. Johnson

746

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 52849
T-44/R-IV
Spanish

[TELEGRAM]

VWAO43 PD

UD NEW YORK NY 21 813P EST

THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

VERY HAPPY TO BE IN NEW YORK, WHERE I CAME AT THE INVITATION OF
KIND FRIENDS AND DISTINGUISHED ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS,
PARTICULARLY THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION TO PARTICIPATE IN
THE MEET THE PRESS PROGRAM, I TAKE GREAT PLEASURE IN SENDING YOUR
EXCELLENCY CORDIAL GREETINGS, TOGETHER WITH MY BEST WISHES FOR THE CON-
TINUED SUCCESS OF YOUR ILLUSTRIOUS GOVERNMENT, THE HAPPINESS OF YOUR
FAMILY, AND THE INCREASING PROSPERITY OF YOUR GLORIOUS NATION, THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WHICH STANDS AS A BULWARK OF FREEDOM AND
PEACE IN THE WORLD.

RESPECTFULLY,

ANASTASIO SOMOZA D.

PRESIDENT-ELECT OF NICARAGUA

~~SECRET~~

SENT
WHCA

EXDIS

75

1967 MAR 27 14 59

EAA234
OO WTES
DE WTE 484

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67203

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

MARCH 27, 1967

HEREWITH THE LATEST ON KY'S ELECTION PLANS IN RELATION TO THIEU.

SAIGON 21308

1. PRIME MINSITER KY SPOKE TO ME VERY FRANKLY MARCH 25 ABOUT THE CHOICE OF A MILITARY CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT. NOTHING HE SAID COULD BE TAKEN TO MEAN THAT THE DECISION BETWEEN THIEU AND HIMSELF HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE. HOWEVER, HIS REMARKS SUGGESTED THAT HE MAY BE THINKING SERIOUSLY ABOUT STEPPING ASIDE IN FAVOR OF THIEU.

2. HE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THE ARMED FORCES WILL NOT CHOOSE A CANDIDATE. "THE SITUATION IS VERY SIMPLE," HE SAID, "IF THIEU DECIDES TO RUN, I WILL SUPPORT HIM. HE IS SENIOR AND IT IS UP TO HIM TO HAVE THE FIRST CHANCE AT IT. IF HE DECIDES NOT TO RUN, THEN I WILL RUN."

3. I ASKED HIM WHAT THIEU WAS THINKING, AND HE SAID THIEU WAS "UNDECIDED." I ASKED HOW MUCH TIME THERE WAS IN WHICH TO MAKE UP HIS MIND, AND HE SAID, "NOT MORE THAN TWO WEEKS."

4. I CONGRATULATED KY ON HIS ATTITUDE, WHICH I THOUGHT WAS BOTH CORRECT AND INTELLIGENT. I WOULD BE A DISASTER IF THERE WAS TO BE A CONFLICT BETWEEN HIM AND THIEU, AND IT WAS A FINE THING FOR HIM TO TAKE SUCH A BROAD MINDED ATTITUDE. HE WAS YOUNG; HE COULD WAIT. IN ANY CASE, THERE ARE MANY OTHER THINGS WHICH HE COULD DO BESIDES BEING PRESIDENT.

GP 3 LODGE

DTG : 271426Z MAR 67

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-376

By 1-8 NARA. Date 8-24-92

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

167 MAR 27 AM 10:03

MONDAY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-374
By ju, NARA, Date 1-24-93

76

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, March 27, 1967 -- 2:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Jorden's report on the sentiment in the Congress on the Cambodian Prek Thnot project.

With the House feeling the way it does, none of us can think of anything constructive to do; although we wish we could given the unhappy position in which Tex Goldschmidt will find himself at the April 3 ECAFE meeting in Tokyo (memo also attached).

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

76a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT - 3/25/67

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Congressional Sentiment on Prek Thnot

Here is the more detailed report you requested on Senate and House attitudes toward our helping to finance Prek Thnot.

You know from Ed Hamilton's earlier memo to you that Joe Barr, when taking Senate soundings on replenishing funds for IDA, encountered strong sentiment favoring our financial support for Prek Thnot. This came from Senators Fulbright, Mansfield, Pell and Aiken. They implied the Administration was foot-dragging and should get on with it. Other senators have not been approached, but the views of these four -- all members of the Foreign Relations Committee -- carry significance.

In the House, attitudes are negative. This was clear from the session Rudd Poats and Bob Barnett had on March 21 with Congressman Zablocki's Far East Subcommittee.

Poats and Barnett made a frank and balanced presentation of the legal, political and foreign policy considerations involved. They pointed to the possible damage to regional momentum and the future of the Mekong Committee if the project aborted and Cambodia made good its threat to withdraw from the Mekong Committee.

The reactions of Subcommittee members were generally skeptical and negative on several grounds.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-374
By ju, NARA, Date 1-29-93

1. Despite estimates that Cambodia had not rendered significant aid to North Vietnam in the past year, the VC's ability to use Cambodia as a sanctuary suggested a less-than-aggressive Cambodian effort to prevent this.

2. Sihanouk's marginal interest in Prek Thnot, his stated preference for a smaller scale irrigation project at the site, and doubts that he would agree to proceeding with Prek Thnot, even with our assistance, called into question the sense of urgency.

3. Absence of diplomatic relations with Cambodia and bilateral political problems affecting our role in supporting Prek Thnot suggested the wisdom of delaying our help until international administration was available, possibly through ADB's Special Funds.

4. Pressing Prek Thnot now would likely endanger aid legislation, particularly Congressional authorization for ADB Special Funds.

This was the consensus among Congressmen Zablocki, Fraser, Thomson and Buchanan. Congresswoman Bolton and Congressmen Kelly, Murphy and Whalen were present but inactive participants. Congressman Passman, reached later by telephone, was emphatic in warning that supporting Prek Thnot now would "cause an explosion" in the House. Zablocki and Fraser shared this prediction, although Zablocki personally favored proceeding with U.S. financing.


CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

State has advised Bangkok, Tokyo, Bonn and USUN (message attached) that this clearly negative sentiment precludes our participation in Prek Thnot. The remaining potential options are German and Scandanavian commitments to meet the \$5.8 million foreign exchange shortfall. Efforts are being ^{renewed} ~~renewed~~ in those directions.

There doubtless will be a difficult period ahead in the reactions of ECAFE members to our position. Tex Goldschmidt, as you recognize, will feel the heat of this at the April 3 ECAFE meeting in Tokyo. However, the Japanese were alerted in November to the difficulties we face, and ECAFE and the UN are aware of our aggressive efforts to develop the necessary foreign exchange commitments elsewhere.

Tex's best position at Tokyo might be to stress our efforts to ensure successful Congressional action on the ADB Special Funds, which would provide a framework for reviewing Prek Thnot a year hence. By then, a somewhat different situation may exist in Vietnam and in political considerations affecting Cambodia.


William J. Jorden

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-376

By 128 NARA. Date 8-24-92

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1. AID and State (Poats and Barnett) responded March 21 to Zablocki's request that they testify before ~~the~~ Far East Subcommittee of House Foreign Affairs Committee on Prek Thnot project. They reviewed history of project, identified legal and political considerations underlying USG's decision not to contribute to its financing, and cited damage that might be done to growing momentum towards regional cooperation that might be produced were Cambodia to withdraw from Mekong Coordinating Committee and possibly from ECAFE. They spoke of importance that failure or success in financing Prek Thnot would have upon assessment of US intentions and capabilities that would be made by Asian leaders participating in April 3 meeting of ECAFE in Tokyo and late April meeting of Japanese and Southeast Asian Ministers in Manila.

2. Though personally sympathetic with US financing, Zablocki summed up consensus of Committee in saying that ~~the~~ US financing of Prek Thnot

Drafted by:	EA:RWBarnett/ AID/FE:RPoats:aws	Tel. Ext.	2170	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:	The Under Secretary
Clearance:	3/23/67			CLS, SDI (subs)	
	EUR - Mr. Leddy (draft)			IO - Mr. Sisco	
	M - Mr. Grey (draft)			WH - Mr. Rostow (subs)	
	S/S - Mr. Webb Mr. Thompson			H - Mr. White	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

project would be a hornet's nest that ^{he} would not want to bring on floor. To do so would hurt Administration efforts to get the kind of aid legislation and authorization for Special Funds that it sought. ~~X~~ Congressman Fraser (Minn.) said that to finance Prek Thnot would mean "heading for a lot of trouble." In view of DOD's concern with use of Cambodia as Viet Cong sanctuary, Sihanouk's ambivalence, and fact that Prek Thnot was to be financed not by grants but by loans for which we expected repayment, he advised against a reversal of present US policy. He would rest with status quo until progress had been made with obtaining authorization for Special Funds whose international administration would deprive US help of Mekong projects in Cambodia of sensitive bilateral US-Cambodian difficulties. Congressmen Thompson and Buchanan were negative. Congresswoman Bolton and Congressmen Murphy, Whalley and Kelly were present but not active participants in discussion.

3. There seemed to be a consensus of Subcommittee that Administration should continue to support development activities of Mekong Coordinating Committee and that Administration should explore every possibility for mobilizing funds for Prek Thnot from non-American sources, with Germany being a most promising contributor.

4. Poats subsequently talked with Congressman Passman, who warned that if AID put money now into a Cambodia project it would "cause an explosion" in Congress, jeopardizing President's legal authorities to make waiver determinations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

He also said use of international agency channels would not soften his reaction but only raise questions about Congressional wisdom in supporting aid through ADB, etc.

5. Foregoing expression of views of Congressmen precludes USG contribution of \$5.8 million which would meet full foreign exchange costs (\$22 million) Prek Thnot hydroelectric/irrigation project in Cambodia at this time.

6. Aside from our regret that USG may be regarded by Asians and UN Secretariat as responsible for Cambodian withdrawal from Mekong Committee and possibility some Japanese disenchantment with US as collaborator in supporting regional institutions, USG will also find withdrawal Cambodia from Mekong Committee serious complicating factor as it attempts to obtain from Congress legislation authorizing Special Funds to be assigned ADB, in part for financing future Mekong projects.

7. As suggested above, FRG seems only probable source of last minute offer of financing. Embassy Tokyo should approach GOJ with suggestion make urgent appeal to FRG in Tokyo and Bonn. They should understand many competing demands for limited German aid, budget uncertainties in Bonn in March and April and only moderate German interest in Southeast Asia regional programs. However, German Delegate attended Feb 1-2 Vientiane meetings of Mekong Committee and has feasibility findings of Japanese Australian, Israeli and Committee teams. Committee Executive Director has sought FRG loan tied to power-generating elements of procurement. Untied loans on very liberal terms, channeled through

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADB, probably required. While difficult, if not impossible, for Japanese to work^{cut} with Germans and UN Secretariat before April 3 Tokyo meetings, all details of terms and management arrangements suitable for presentation to ADB management and Cambodian government, a German offer, in principle, would constitute major contribution to (1) whole movement towards Southeast Asia regional cooperation and development, and (2) strengthen hand of US administration in obtaining Congressional approval for \$200 million ADB Special Funds available next year inter alia for Mekong development purposes.

FOR USUN: Request Narasimhan to join in Japanese appeal through all appropriate channels and explore possibilities of approaches to Scandinavian governments.

FOR BANGKOK: Request U-Nyun be advised of continued US difficulties contribute but assure him we are actively helping to interest other countries in contributing \$5.8 million.

Narasimhan
FOR BONN: When Japanese and ~~XXXXXX~~ initiatives have been taken, we hope Under Secretary Rostow can elaborate upon broad strategic interests involved if he has opportunity to do so while he is in Bonn.

GP-3

End.

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

76c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 18, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO THE HONORABLE WALT W. ROSTOW

FROM : Arthur Goldschmidt, USUN *AG*

SUBJECT: Prek Thnot Project in Cambodia

I am particularly concerned with a positive result from the current re-examination of our position on Prek Thnot as in my visit to Tokyo two weeks from now to lead our delegation to ECAFE this project will undoubtedly loom quite large as an indication of U.S. policies.

In the ECAFE area I am known as a person of long familiarity with the Mekong program whose appointment was due to his friendship with the President. If we don't at least make an offer to help with this project, then I don't see how we can avoid being identified with a serious setback to the Mekong program.

I therefore attach considerable importance to our making an offer to help with the project, and have spelled out my reasons in the attached Memorandum. The United States offer, in my opinion, should be a grant of \$5.8 million to the Mekong Committee for Prek Thnot. This offer should be made quickly through UN channels and before the end of this month.

You are familiar with the cables from Graham Martin in which he urges this step as essential to keeping Cambodia in the Mekong Committee and ECAFE. Under Secretary Barr yesterday indicated he was sharply questioned by several senators for our failure to support Prek Thnot. Eugene Black says that much of his recommendation for Asian Bank Special Funds and multilateral programs in Southeast Asia is being "bitched up" by the delay on Prek Thnot. Goldberg has consistently favored the project.

You and I are in good company.

Attachment:
Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-376
By ing NARA, Date 8-24-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUMPrek Thnot Project in Cambodia

The President's important initiative for regional cooperation in Asia and elsewhere and the future of the Mekong Committee are being seriously jeopardized by our position on the Prek Thnot project.

The continuation of the Mekong Committee is important to the United States because:

- (a) We have already made a considerable investment in its projects.
- (b) We are concerned with the prestige of ECAFE and the United Nations in general.
- (c) The Mekong program provides a test of our new emphasis on regionalism and multi-lateralism (vis-a-vis both recipients and burden sharing donors).
- (d) The program provides the best framework for a peaceful development of the Mekong Basin.
- (e) The President's prestige was staked on the importance of the Mekong program in his Baltimore speech and subsequent discussions.

The Prek Thnot project is the key to the continuation of the Mekong Committee because:

- (a) It is essential to keeping Cambodia in the Committee, and no regional development of the Basin is possible without Cambodia anymore than TVA would be possible without Tennessee.
- (b) It is a test of the Committee's cohesiveness despite political differences.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-376

By ig NARA. Date 8-24-92~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

(c) It reflects on US long-term policies: Although the President's Baltimore speech assured assistance to the region without political test, we are not assisting Prek Thnot on essentially political grounds; if we can't find a solution to cooperating with Cambodia, how can we expect to develop the reconciliation suggestion in the Lancaster, Ohio speech and State of the Union message.

Prek Thnot requires a US contribution because:

(a) There is a shortfall of \$5.8 million after intensive efforts to secure the full \$22 million requested by Cambodia.

(b) The Japanese offer one-half the cost was predicated upon complete financing and the friends of the Mekong and of multi-lateral aid in Japan would be seriously embarrassed by failure to finance Prek Thnot.

(c) A United States contribution will permit the United States to assist in the negotiation of the complicated arrangements, including the Asian Development Bank management, which are not likely to be achieved by less experienced donors.

(d) The United States should reaffirm President Johnson's position in order to give meaning to current proposals of post-war assistance as part of our strategy towards the Conference table.

It may be that Cambodia will refuse to accept the Prek Thnot package which would include contributions already pledged by Japan, Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands. But for the sake of U.S. relations with the reparian countries, with Asian countries generally and with other countries favoring multi-lateral cooperation it is important that we be in a position to offer assistance and not be responsible for the breakdown of the Mekong program and its possible effect on multi-lateral assistance in Asia.


Arthur Goldschmidt

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3/27/67

29

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

This is how Thieu and Ky got the Constitution through the Directorate on the last round. The dates are now set, as you can see. And the last line is worth a lot.

(quote attached Saigon 21428)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-374
By ju, NARA, Date 1-29-93

Monday, March 27, 1967 -- 6:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Rowland Evans came in today to ask whether the publication of the Ho letters had changed our attitude towards negotiations and why we thought Hanoi had published.

I said that the President had indicated immediately after the ending of the Tet truce -- when we knew the Hanoi response was negative -- that he would continue to look for an honorable settlement of the war. But it took two to dance; and we would have to see what the opportunities were as time passed.

As for why they published the letters, I said we knew all the theories but had no factual basis on which to select one over another.

Robert Novack came in to discuss his forthcoming trip to both Western and Eastern Europe. On a background basis I marched through the major issues and attitudes in both the Western and Eastern Europe, urging him to take a good look at certain of the economic developments in Eastern Europe.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Pres file 79
March 27, 1967
WH 70125

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

Ambassador Fenoaltea called to urge personally that you attend the reception on Thursday, March 30, for the 10th Anniversary of the Common Market.

He said:

-- since it is a collective affair -- not a national day --
it would set no precedent;

-- it would, at little cost, symbolize your continuing interest in Europe;

-- every European newspaper would report it.

You have Sect. Rusk's memo of March 15 on the subject.

Personally I think it's a good idea -- with non-proliferation, offset, troops, etc., in play.

~~CONFIDENTIAL LIMDIS~~

SENT
WHCA

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-376

By ing NARA. Date 8-24-92

1967 MAR 26 17 22

EAA223
OO WTE5
DE WTE 430

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP57200

~~CONFIDENTIAL LIMDIS~~

HEREWITH KY'S ARGUMENT FOR A ONE-DAY TRUCE MAY 23

SAIGON 21317

SUBJECT: BUDDHIST CALL FOR CEASE-FIRE ON BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY MAY 23

L I M D I S

1. ON THE OCCASION OF A CALL ON PRIME MINISTER KY ON OTHER SUBJECTS, I BROUGHT UP THICH TAM CHAU'S CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE ON BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY (PARA 3 OF REFTEL). KY FELT THAT TAM CHAU DID IN FACT SPEAK FOR A GREAT MANY BUDDHISTS AND CONCLUDED THAT HIS SUGGESTION OF A ONE DAY TRUCE WOULD HAVE SOME APPEAL. WHILE HE HAD NOT YET MADE UP HIS MIND, HE THOUGHT IT WAS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE GVN WOULD AGREE TO THE ONE DAY TRUCE, PARTICULARLY HAVING IN MIND THE FACT THAT THERE HAD BEEN TRUCES AT CHRISTMAS, NEW YEARS, AND THE LUNAR NEW YEAR (TET).

2. WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING THE SITUATION PRESENTED BY THE CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE BY THE AN QUANG MILITANT BUDDHISTS. WE CAN FORESEE THAT THE LATTER MIGHT SEEK TO EXPLOIT THIS ISSUE TO CHARGE THAT THE USG AND GVN ARE ANTI-BUDDHIST. IF WE WERE TO RESPOND FAVORABLY TO THEIR CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE, THEY WOULD PROBABLY PICTURE THIS AS EVIDENCE OF THEIR ABILITY TO MAKE US TAKE ACTION AT THEIR REQUEST.

67 MAR 26 PM 12:30
67 MAR 26 PM 12:30
SUNDAY

3. WE CAN EXPECT THAT THE VIET CONG AND HANOI MAY SEE SOME POTENTIAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE IN ACCEPTING THE CEASE-FIRE APPEAL AND THEN PERHAPS PRESSING FOR AN EXTENSION FOR THE PURPOSES ACHIEVED BY THEM DURING THE TET TRUCE, E.G., RESUPPLY EFFORTS. THEY MIGHT ALSO SEE POSSIBLE PROPAGANDA AND POLITICAL BENEFITS IF THEY RESPOND PROMPTLY AND PUBLICLY TO THE APPEAL.

4. WE ARE, THEREFORE, INCLINED TO AGREE WITH KY'S TENTATIVE THOUGHT TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO MODERATE TAM CHAU'S APPEAL FOR A TRUCE OF SHORT DURATION, SAY, ONE DAY. SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE GVN AND OURSELVES WOULD TAKE THE STING OUT OF ANY CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST BUDDHISM WHICH MIGHT BE MADE BY THE AN QUANG MILITANTS AND IT WOULD TEND TO STRENGTHEN THE MODERATE BUDDHISTS BY GIVING THEM CREDIT FOR THE PROPOSAL.

5. NO MATTER HOW THIS MATTER IS HANDLED, WE CAN ANTICIPATE THAT THERE WILL BE THE USUAL PRESSURES TO EXTEND THE PERIOD OF ANY CEASE-FIRE. IF KY WERE TO SPECIFY THE ONE DAY TIME LIMIT AT THE OUTSET, THIS SOULD HELP TO KEEP THE PRESSURE WITHIN BOUNDS. KY MIGHT ALSO IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES RENEW HIS TET PROPOSAL FOR DISCUSSION OF ANY EXTENSION DIRECTLY BETWEEN THE HANOI AND SAIGON AUTHORITIES.

6. A ONE DAY CEASE-FIRE ON BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY, IF ANNOUNCED BY THE GVN AND OURSELVES PRIOR TO ANY HANOI ACCEPTANCE, MIGHT BRING SOME POLITICAL ADVANTAGE TO US. IF THE DEPARTMENT AGREES, THEREFORE, I WILL RAISE THE MATTER AGAIN WITH KY AND SUGGEST THAT AN EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT ALONG THE ABOVE LINES BE MADE BY THE GVN AND CONCURRED IN BY US.

7. THE FOREGOING HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN SUBSTANCE WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND WHO CONCURS IN THE GENERAL IDEA BUT WOULD PERSONALLY PREFER THAT ANY SUCH CEASE-FIRE BE LIMITED ONLY TO THE DAYLIGHT HOURS ON BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY. I AGREE WITH HIM.
LODGE

DTG 261645Z MAR 67

GPS 540

~~CONFIDENTIAL LIMITS~~

~~1. Summary~~
2. Pres. file

Saturday - March 25, 1967

Mr. President:

The Inter-American Development Bank has sent you a letter transmitting its annual report on the Bank's activities and the general economic and social picture in Latin America (Tab B).

I recommend that you send Dr. Herrera a letter of acknowledgement (Tab A) as you have done in previous years.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments:

Tab A - Letter of acknowledgement.

Tab B - IADB letter transmitting its report.

81a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 27 1967

Dear Dr. Herrera:

I welcome your annual report on the measures taken and progress made by the Latin American member countries of the Inter-American Development Bank toward the goals of accelerated economic and social development in this Hemisphere.

The report places in proper perspective the major overall accomplishments and trends in improving social and economic conditions and in creating the institutions to advance the modernization process. But it is also an encouraging report on what is being done to improve the way of life of millions of people.

I was pleased to see the emphasis placed on increased self-help performance in mobilizing domestic resources and in carrying out the necessary reforms, particularly in agriculture and education. The Bank should be commended for reporting frankly on these matters of overall country performance. For this is the key to the success of our Alliance for Progress.

The forthcoming meeting of American Presidents and Heads of Government will set new directions and provide fresh impetus to our collaboration under the Alliance for Progress. The Bank's role in the field of multinational projects will be increased. My message to the United States Congress on March 13, 1967 makes clear my determination to have the United States support national and regional self-help efforts in Latin America.

It is heartening to observe the increasing role of the "Bank of the Alliance" in dealing with the tasks of Latin

American economic and social development, both on a country and regional basis. I continue to look to the Bank to exercise a significant leadership role.

Sincerely,

LBJ

The Honorable
Felipe Herrera
President
Inter-American Development Bank
Washington, D. C.



EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR OF THE PRESIDENT

INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20577

February 28, 1967

CABLE ADDRESS
INTAMBANC

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to transmit to you, herewith, the Sixth Annual Report of the Social Progress Trust Fund, which has been prepared in accordance with Section 5.04 of the Trust Agreement entered into by the Government of the United States and the Inter-American Development Bank on June 19, 1961, as amended by exchange of letters in October 1966.

This Report describes the progress made by the Latin American members of the Inter-American Development Bank towards achieving the objectives stated in Section 1 of the Act of Bogota and the Charter of Punta del Este, and summarizes the measures adopted by them in pursuance of said objectives. The loan operations authorized under the Fund and the present status of the projects for which disbursements have been made are set forth in the table presented in appendix to the Report, pending the detailed account to be included in the Bank's Annual Report as agreed through the aforementioned exchange of letters.

The issuance of the present Report has been approved by the Board of Executive Directors of the Bank, and its release for publication is planned for the fifteenth of March of this year.

Respectfully yours,

T. Graydon Upton

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

1. memo
2. Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday - March 25, 1967

Mr. President:

It was agreed at the Tuesday lunch two weeks ago that Secretary Rusk and Nick Katzenbach would handle directly with Senator Mansfield his proposal for establishing an Under Secretary for Hemispheric Affairs (Tab B).

Nick tells us that he has spoken to Mansfield about it. I thought you might want to send the Senator the brief note at Tab A to show your continuing attention to his recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments :

- Tab A - Letter to Senator Mansfield
- Tab B - Proposal from Senator Mansfield.

DECLASSIFIED
Authentic State 607-5-58, NSC
By rg/ig, NARA, Date 4-23-91 2-28-79

82a
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 27 1967

Dear Mike:

With respect to your proposal for an Under Secretary for Hemispheric Affairs, I gather Nick Katzenbach has spoken to you about it, explaining some of the problems involved. But you can be sure that we will keep this idea in mind as we look for ways to strengthen our ties with our Latin American neighbors.

Sincerely,

LBJ

Honorable Mike Mansfield
Majority Leader
United States Senate

MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

February 28, 1967

TO: The President

FROM: Mike Mansfield

SUBJECT: Under Secretary of State for Hemispheric Affairs

In April you will be going to the Inter-American Summit Meeting to be held in Punta del Este, Uruguay. You will have many questions and problems to consider in the meantime, and there will be many pressures upon you during the Summit Meeting.

One possibility free from any outside pressure which I would like to call to your attention is that of reorganizing the Department of State. Instead of having an Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs with concurrent responsibility for the Alliance for Progress, it might be worthwhile to consider the creation of an Under Secretary of State for Hemispheric Affairs. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs at the present time has an almost impossibly complex and over-loaded job for one person to handle. His jurisdiction comprises twenty-four separate and independent countries with problems as diverse as those of Haiti and Brazil, Cuba and Colombia, Bolivia and Mexico. He also supervises the work of ten offices--twice the number of his nearest competitor who is Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

The following may be of interest:

1. In the past, various proposals for establishing the position of an Under Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs have been rejected--primarily for fear that pressure from other areas would result in general escalation of all geographical Assistant Secretaries to Under Secretary positions. Moreover, we have apparently been reluctant to treat our hemispheric neighbors to the south in any manner which might be interpreted as "preferential" or "discriminatory;" this despite the fact that our strong participation in the Organization of American States and the Alliance for Progress might well be called both preferential and discriminatory. The time may well have come when our unique relationship with our hemispheric neighbors might well be reorganized by a shift in the organization of the Department of State.

2. It is proposed, therefore, that there be established within the Department of State the position of Under Secretary of State for Hemispheric Affairs. This Under Secretary would in turn be assisted by two Assistant Secretaries--one in charge of South American Affairs and the other responsible for North American Affairs (with the exception, of course, of the United States itself). The breakdown of responsibility might be along the following lines:

Secretary of State

Under Secretary of State

Under Secretary of State for Hemispheric Affairs

A. Assistant Secretary for North American Affairs

1. Office of Canadian Affairs
2. Office of Mexican Affairs
3. Office of Caribbean Affairs
4. Office of Central American Affairs
5. Office of Panamanian Affairs
6. Office of Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

B. Assistant Secretary for South American Affairs

1. Office of Argentine, Paraguayan and Uruguayan Affairs
2. Office of Colombian and Venezuelan Affairs
3. Office of Ecuadorean and Peruvian Affairs
4. Office of Bolivian and Chilean Affairs
5. Office of Brazilian Affairs

3. There might well be those (including perhaps the Canadians themselves) who would object to Canada's being transferred from EUR to ARA. However, Canada is being drawn more and more into inter-hemispheric affairs; there is always the very real possibility that it might become a member of OAS, and its bureaucratic alignment in the above suggested reorganization would appear to be essential for the justification of the new Under Secretaryship. Moreover, the possibility of occasional direct access of their Ambassador in Washington to an Under Secretary specializing in hemispheric affairs, particularly if the incumbent were of the high quality and international reputation of a Harriman or a Bunker, would very likely answer any initial adverse reaction that such a shift might cause.

4. Embodied in this proposal is the integral suggestion that the newly created Under Secretary himself would become the Administrator for the Alliance for Progress. He would of course be backstopped in this position by an Assistant Administrator for the Alliance as at present.

5. If these proposals have merit--and this would be for you to decide--you might wish to consider a public announcement of the establishment of a procedure such as that outlined above. It would be given maximum political advantage if it were to be made public by you at the Inter-American Summit Meeting to be held at Punta del Este in mid-April.

The President

- 3 -

February 28, 1967

6. The above is merely a suggestion which may or may not have merit, and I offer it only as a possibility which might be worthy of your consideration.

83

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-374
By pw, NARA, Date 1-29-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, March 25, 1967 -- 1:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Lodge zeroes in on the critical role of re-training the ARVN in the months ahead and cheers the assignment of Gen. Abrams to that primary task.

That is the gut of the pacification problem; and I agree it should take as near full time for Abrams as we can manage.

The Vietnamese military have moved faster in this direction than we could have hoped: the task now is to make the ARVN a quality pacification force; and that Abrams ought to be able to do.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 21226

WWRostow:rln

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SAIGON 21226

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-376
By lig NARA. Date 4-6-92

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE

As I prepare to leave Saigon, the thought uppermost in my mind is this:

1. If MACV is able to turn ARVN, RF and PF into a first class counter-guerrilla force which, with the Provisional Reconnaissance units, will be expert in small unit and night operations -- and if it can do so quickly -- three things will be accomplished, as follows:

A. ARVN, RF and PF (with the PRU) will fully exploit the fine opportunity for pacification which has been created by MACV's great success against the main force units and army of North Viet Nam;

B. Such exploitation by ARVN, RF and PF (and the PRU) would in turn enable the police, the Revolutionary Development teams and civilian activities generally to get rolling;

C. This would create such a secure condition in the heavily populated part of Viet Nam that it would be virtually impossible for the Main Force and the army of North Viet Nam to reconstitute themselves and make a major attack again.

2. If, on the other hand, ARVN, RF and PF merely dribble along and do not take advantage of the success which MACV has achieved against the main force and the army of North Viet Nam, we must expect that the enemy will lick his wounds, pull himself together and make another attack in 1968, obviously having in mind our own elections.

3. MACV's success (which means the success of the United States and of all of us) will, therefore, willy-nilly, be judged not so much on the brilliant performance of the U. S. troops as on its success in getting ARVN, RF and PF quickly to function as a first-class counter terror, counter-guerrilla force.

4. MACV has been charged with this responsibility ever since I have had anything to do with Viet Nam. May your wise designation of General Abrams to head the American end of pacification lead to its urgent achievement.

5. There can still be sensational results in 1967 and the above is the way to achieve them.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

54
Pres file

Saturday, March 25, 1967
11:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Here is Bill Bundy's conversation
with Dobrynin, about which we talked
this morning on the telephone.

W. W. Rostow

State 162636

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By reg, NARA, Date 4-15-91

TELEGRAM Department of State

162636

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ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW PRIORITY

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STATE 162636

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-376

EXDIS

on evening of March 23 By ing NARA. Date 4-6-92

1. At farewell dinner /for Zinchuk, Bundy had conversation with Dobrynin. After Bundy had reported some of his observations from his Asian trip, he remarked that USG surprised by Hanoi revelation of letters between President and Ho, and asked what Soviets thought Hanoi motivation was. Dobrynin responded that he thought Hanoi had noted considerable speculation in US press, including hints from high quarters of bilateral US/NVN contacts, and might therefore have drawn conclusion that USG was about to publish Moscow exchanges, and had hence decided to make its own disclosure in a fashion that would state their position clearly.
2. Bundy responded that we had had no such intent, and that exchanges, particularly letters, had remained very closely held in USG. He then said that among the many hypotheses we had

WFB Bundy:mk 2/24/67

4235

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

EA - William P. Bundy

S/S -

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-376

By ing, NARA, Date 4-6-92

~~SECRET~~

considered, there was one that disturbed us, that the release might indicate a new and hard Hanoi line reflecting a turning toward Peking and away from Soviets. Dobrynin promptly denied this.

3. Conversation then turned briefly to U Thant proposal, and Dobrynin said that he had just received word, which he would pass on "off the record," to the effect that Hanoi was about to respond in the next day or two rejecting new U Thant formula. He did not give details.

4. In same exchange, Dobrynin stated categorically that U Thant had taken initiative for/^{Burma}~~Burma~~ meeting with NVN representatives, and added that these representatives had responded coldly to U Thant's outline of his later formal proposal at that time.

5. As to the revelation of the exchange of letters, Dobrynin explanation was offered in tentative vein, and strongly suggested-- in line with other indications--that Soviets themselves did not quite know why Hanoi had made the letters public and/^{that Hanoi} had not explained their reasons to Soviets either at the time or subsequently. Dobrynin's almost immediate disclosure of pending Hanoi negative reply to U Thant seemed to be designed to show that Soviets were very much still in Hanoi's confidence and to lend weight to Dobrynin's rejection of hypothesis that revelation of letters showed increased Chirom influence.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Nonetheless, his whole manner conveyed impression Soviets had some uncertainty at present as to their exact relationship with Hanoi and what Hanoi was up to. In balance of conversation, Dobrynin stuck to familiar ~~similar~~/line that Hanoi simply would not repeat not talk in any way unless the bombing stopped completely.

6. Information on pending Hanoi negative reply to U Thant should of course be held closely and not discussed with others until reply disclosed in some fashion by U Thant or otherwise. The implication was that it was about to be delivered to U Thant.

GP-3.

End.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

85

Profile

Saturday, March 25, 1967, 12:45 P.M.

Mr. President:

I believe John Roche is on to a good theme; but I would not put it in terms of "the humility of power." The theme should be that we are-- and shall remain--a major military and economic power in the world; but are using our power increasingly on the basis of multilateral and collective arrangements.

Immediately after the war we had to throw our power in raw--on a national basis--to preserve freedom at certain key points. And our foreign aid programs began in the same way--on a bilateral basis. With the passage of time and the gathering strength of others, we have been able to act multilaterally; for example:

- In the Berlin crisis of 1961-62 via NATO;
- In the Cuba missile and Dominican crises with the support of and in conjunction with the OAS;
- In Viet Nam with our Asian partners who also recognize the need to check the aggression.

Similarly, in foreign aid, while preserving our national programs, they are increasingly woven into multilateral efforts:

- The Alliance for Progress;
- The India and Pak consortia;
- Consultative arrangements with respect to Turkey, Greece, Thailand, Indonesia, etc.;
- And now, beginning with the India resolution, we are beginning to handle the world food problem on a multilateral basis.

In short:

- American power is an indispensable and critical margin in building and sustaining a world community which is at peace and making progress; in using our power for those purposes

we wish to (and are) increasingly working with others and urging them to assume more responsibility and authority in the management of regional and world affairs.

We are not in the world to throw our weight around or to build an American empire. We are playing our part to help build a world community in which the U.S. will be permanently involved --but where the role of the U.S. may diminish as others generate the capacity to play an increasing role in their own security and progress.

In short, American power is being used not for narrow national purposes but to build the kind of world in which our kind of open society--and others--can live in an environment of security and progress--the kind of world described in Article I of the UnN. Charter.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:amc

7-28-67
11200
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

Now that you have cleared the air on Vietnam at Nashville, it seems to me that you ought to give another type of speech which would put American policy in Vietnam into perspective.

To be precise, I think you should address yourself to the growth of American power, its implications, consequences, and its critics. Without naming names, you could emphasize as the key theme of American policy since 1946 "The Humility of Power."

This speech could be given to, say, the Council on Foreign Relations and reprinted in Foreign Affairs.

RL

John P. Roche

3/23/67

TO: Walt Rostow

FROM: Marvin Watson

For your recommendations please.

856
February 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

The New York Times Magazine has asked me to write an article "In Defense of American Power" which would take on obliquely (not by name) all the critics who either:

1) Accuse us of the "arrogance of power, "

or

2) Accuse us of having no master-plan--(which if we had it, would be denounced as "arrogance of power"--by the same critics.)

I would like to tackle this one in my best disembodied scholarly style.

May I have your reaction?

J.L.
John P. Roche

Walt
see me
Q

86
Saturday, March 25, 1967
1:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

The new satellite is now jockeyed pretty nearly into position; its gear is operating; the odds are now high it will be operational by mid-week, with its antennae in the right direction, etc.

W. W. Rostow

WW Rostow:rln

27
PERSONAL

Saturday, March 25, 1967 -- 1:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

I put your generous proposition to Elspeth. A few quiet days in the sun at Cedar House, with a chance for the kids to see that open dry, gallant country, the deer and horses, and, above all, for them to have seen the Ranch -- all this appealed mightily.

But she's a Calvinist girl, with a lot of old-fashioned Baptist in her.

She said we really couldn't justify a Jetstar trip on taxpayer's money. It's one thing to join the President and Mrs. Johnson -- quite a different matter to send the Rostows about the countryside in this way.

And, in fact, she's right.

So we'll put the temptation aside and hope another occasion arises. I'll take off some weekend time with the children.

And, in fact, there are some things coming up to you in the next few days which I ought to keep close to: Komer's proposals after talking with Westy; a State Dept. proposal for another Pen Pal letter on Viet Nam, to Moscow; Summit preparations now that Linc Gordon is back; etc.

But we do wish you and Mrs. Johnson to know how deeply grateful we are for your kind offer.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

88

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, March 25, 1967
2:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the full tape of the second
day at Guam.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

Cy 8 (99 pages)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By kg, NARA, Date 4-15-91

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

-89
Pres file~~SECRET~~

March 25, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Background for Maiwandwal Visit Tuesday, March 28 at 12:00 noon

Our main reason for inviting the Afghan Prime Minister is to reassure him that we're still behind him in his delicate balancing act between the West and the USSR. So far Afghanistan has kept the Western door wide open, even though we've put in less than half the Soviet level of aid. The Afghan King, in a private talk with President Kennedy in 1963, opened his heart on his fear of going completely under Soviet domination. Maiwandwal probably doesn't know this, but it's typical of most Afghan leaders' real sympathies. We want to encourage them.

But staying out of Soviet clutches is an uphill fight. Economically, Afghanistan is increasingly linked with the Soviet economy, and the USSR provides all its military equipment. But we have a near-monopoly of assistance to its whole educational system. PanAm has built its airline and is minority co-owner. Most of the Cabinet is clearly pro-Western. Maiwandwal himself is an old friend and knows the U.S. well, but he has to avoid further criticism that he's in our pocket.

The main thing he wants from his visit is a sense that we're not backing away. He and his colleagues are leery of our increasingly tight approach to aid. (FY 67 \$34 million, FY 68 \$18 million.) We can't make a long-term commitment to his new Five Year Plan, though it's a good one worked up with Bob Nathan. But we are ready to go ahead with several projects (described in Secretary Rusk's memo). We believe these plus your normal warm hospitality will do the job.

I recommend you read Secretary Rusk's memo and the scope paper (General Tabs A and C attached). The economic charts (background Tab B) prepared especially for you suggest the main contours -- low overwhelmingly agricultural GNP, exports growing but going mainly to the USSR, elementary industry growing slowly -- the very first steps of development. Above all, you will be interested in the description of Afghanistan's new experiment with parliamentary government which Maiwandwal is trying to make work (background Tab A). Maiwandwal is running into familiar problems of student unrest, party building, how to make an archaic bureaucracy function rapidly. His bio is at Bio Sketches Tab A, and we'll have talking points for you Monday night.

W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-374

By ju, NARA, Date 1-29-93

PRESERVATION COPY

March 25, 1967.

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a short personal message from you to the Berlin House of Representatives. If you approve, the Vice President will read the message during his brief appearance before the inaugural session of the newly elected House on April 6.

Secretary Rusk has approved the idea of such a message.

Francis M. Bator

OK to deliver message _____

No message _____

Speak to me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 28, NARA, Date 4-15-91

PROPOSED MESSAGE

It is a special pleasure to send you, through Vice President Humphrey, my own good wishes and those of the American people on the day that you assume your new responsibilities.

More than five years ago I had the privilege of being with the courageous people of Berlin during a time of crisis. At that time I pledged to you -- in the words of the American leaders at the birth of our own Republic -- "our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor". That pledge, reaffirming the commitment of the United States to the safety and freedom of Berlin, is as firm today as it was then.

All Americans join me in the hope and expectation that the future will bring happiness, prosperity and peaceful reunion to the people of Berlin and Germany.

Mr. Rostow

91

sent them
Mr. Watson

~~12. 11. 1941~~
2. Nov. 1941

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Signing Ceremony for Indian Food Resolution?

Budget Bureau will have the Joint Resolution ready for your signature by tomorrow. The question is whether you want to sign it routinely, or whether you want to make a show of it as you did last year.

With Congress out of town and a 1 April deadline for signing, we may be limited in the kind of ceremony we could lay on. But we could certainly have the Indians and a few others in if you want. Or you could sign at the Ranch with full press coverage and send Mrs. Gandhi a pen as you did last year. When we know your wishes and your schedule, we'll work from there.

I see definite advantage in making a splash of this. There are several important themes you could hit:

--The India consortium meets 4 April, and you could prod other donors. We've done our share. It's their turn.

--We could also further signal the Indians that the ball is in their court now to show results.

--You can justifiably use this as further evidence that we mean business in the War on Hunger.

--You could emphasize Congress' support and put the key figures on the back.

W. W. Rostow

Ask Marv Watson to set up a ceremony

I'll sign routinely

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

92
Pres file
~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, March 24, 1967
2:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may be interested in this longer
account of exchanges between Bill
Bundy and Dobrynin.

It is pretty much a ping-pong
match which doesn't get anywhere;
but worth reading.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET/SUNFLOWER PLUS~~

Action: Amembassy MOSCOW

State 162643
NODIS/SUNFLOWER PLUS
State 143101

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By leg, NARA, Date 4-15-91

TELEGRAM Department of State

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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Rostow

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ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-376

By 118 NARA. Date 4-6-92

In Bundy/Dobrynin conversation on evening March 23, following discussion reported EXDIS septel concerning Hanoi motives in revealing President/Ho letters and anticipated Hanoi negative reply on U Thant proposal, discussion turned to lengthy review of Moscow exchanges and brief references to December dealings through Poles. Following were highlights:

basic

1. Dobrynin stuck throughout to same ~~xxxxx~~ line as in reftel, that Hanoi simply would not repeat not talk unless we stop the bombing. He repeated argumentation that Hanoi could not possibly accept our insistence on reciprocal action without accepting whole US view of nature of conflict. Bundy responded that Soviets well knew practical reasons why we could not stop bombing and allow Hanoi to pour in additional divisions and equipment.

Dial ed by:

EA: WPBundy:bmm 3/24/67

Clearances:

Tel. Ext.

4235

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

William P. Bundy

S/S- Mr. Bruce

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 2 of telegram to Moscow

~~TOP SECRET~~

2. Conversation then got onto U Thant proposal, as to which Dobrynin had already indicated that Hanoi response would be negative. Bundy remarked that we had supposed Hanoi would find difficulty in working out any major cessation of hostilities, although we ourselves had done our best to make constructive response to SYG.

3. Bundy then said that Hanoi revelation of letters continued to puzzle us very much, as we had formed clear impression that if Hanoi ever wished to move seriously it would do so in some secret and private manner. Hence we were genuinely distressed that Hanoi had damaged, if not destroyed, privacy of Moscow channel. Dobrynin did not respond directly, and did not take possible occasion to indicate any hope Moscow channel could be resumed. (Neither he nor Bundy referred to subsequent NVN refusal to accept contact with Thompson.)

4. Bundy then went on to argue, along lines Secretary had followed in reftel, that if positions were difficult to reconcile on stopping the bombing, and if cessation of hostilities presented similar difficulties, perhaps best way to ~~proceed~~ proceed would be to go back to our message of January 20 in Moscow, offering to talk on full range of topics related to final settlement and in ~~the~~ effect to see "where we would ~~come out~~ come out." Bundy noted that Hanoi had never responded to our

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 3 of telegram to Moscow~~TOP SECRET~~

January 20 message, and that this had been one of major negative factors, together with lack of any response to President's letter, that had led us to go ahead with resumption on February 13. He stressed that discussion of January 20 topics need not be described as "talks" but could simply be exploratory "non-conversations." If we were able to arrive at a clear picture of an agreed final settlement, question of more formal talks and even of stopping the bombing might take on different hue. Dobrynin obviously understood the point, but did not respond in any hopeful way.

5. Bundy then remarked that if Hanoi were so insistent that we stop the bombing before any talks could take place, it was hard to suppose that ^{there} ~~they~~ could have been any substance to what the Poles told us in December about a willingness to meet ~~x~~ in Warsaw. Dobrynin shrugged this off with the perhaps revealing remark that Poles had given Soviets an entirely different picture than the one we had presented of who had taken the initiative for the Warsaw contacts and by ~~imp~~ implication the statement of US position. The inescapable implication was that Poles had represented to Soviets that USG had initiated Lewandowski channel and that USG had either drafted or endorsed Lewandowski formulation and urged that it be presented to Hanoi. Bundy merely said

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 4 of telegram to Moscow

~~TOP SECRET~~

Soviets knew facts as we clearly understood them. In this exchange, Dobrynin returned to theme that our bombing on December 2 and 4 had thrown Rapacki off, and that bombing of December 13-14 had caused clear Hanoi /rejection of Warsaw meeting. Bundy did not attempt to go back over this familiar ground.

6. In commenting on our February 13 resumption, Dobrynin did complain that we had not given additional time for Hanoi response. Bundy responded that Hanoi had given no response whatever to our whole series of proposals, and Dobrynin did not really press the argument, although he did say that our resumption had given impression in Moscow that USG or some elements in it, were impatient and anxious to press forward with military pressures.

7. Dobrynin expressed hope that there would not be "dramatic developments" in USG actions against NVN. Bundy responded that there would undoubtedly be continuing developments, although he did not know whether they could be called "dramatic." Dobrynin specifically inquired on significance of Guam meeting. Bundy responded that President had wished to meet with SVN leaders and to introduce new team, and to have customary periodic review of all elements in situation. No major decision had been anticipated or taken. Dobrynin's inquiries on these matters did not appear to have special note of urgency or alarm.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page ²⁰5 of telegram to Moscow~~TOP SECRET~~

8. Conversation also included brief exchange on situation in China. Bundy noted that there now appeared to be at least temporary settling down in cultural revolution, perhaps related to need to concentrate on planting season. Dobrynin expressed strong agreement that latter was key factor, and stated judgment that resumption of struggle highly likely in view of deep-seated views held by Mao personally.

9. Comment. General Dobrynin mood seemed little if any changed from that evidenced in his February 23 conversation with Secretary (refte). He seemed almost resigned to present state of affairs and present Hanoi position. His recriminations and his references to our military actions were along familiar lines and moderate in tone. While holding out no hope that Hanoi might in fact pick up our January 20 avenue, his prediction of resumed struggle in China might conceivably suggest Moscow is lying low in case Chinese developments should give them another chance to exert influence.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~

Pres file

Friday, March 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: 50th Anniversary of Thailand's Major University

On your visit to Thailand last Fall, your major address was delivered at Chulalongkorn University. On that occasion, the University gave you an honorary degree.

Chulalongkorn celebrates its 50th anniversary this year. The celebrations begin on March 25.

It would be appropriate to send the Rector your congratulations on the University's 50 years of distinguished service to education and to the people of Thailand.

A suggested text is attached.

We will send the message telegraphically.

W. W. Rostow

Message approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

To the Rector of Chulalongkorn University

Greetings from the President of the United States

Founded by one King and named after another, Chulalongkorn University has proved worthy of its royal heritage. For fifty years it has served with distinction the people of Thailand and the cause of truth.

In those fifty years, Chulalongkorn has shown a constant ability to adapt and to meet new needs without sacrificing its traditional values. We are now on the threshold of great achievements in the field of regional education. I have no doubt that Chulalongkorn University and Thailand will play a major role in these achievements, as they have already played in the development of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. My signing of the International Education Act at Chulalongkorn University symbolized American recognition of Chulalongkorn's future potential. I shall always cherish fond memories of my participation with His Majesty on that occasion.

I am proud to be an honorary alumnus of Chulalongkorn University and I am delighted to salute the University, its faculty and its graduates on the beginning of their second half-century of service to Thailand and to mankind.

Friday, March 24, 1967 -- 3:40 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts -- Thursday, March 23, 1967

Ray Crowley, AP, telephoned regarding a story he had heard about Jim Symington and me writing songs during our spare time. I explained this was an old hobby -- not professional and serious.

Jim Marlow, AP, telephoned about Sen. Kennedy's statement that the President had added a new dimension to the cease-fire by demanding an end to infiltration. I explained that the only new dimension was our addition; ~~to~~ "no augmentation."

Marty Schram, NEWSDAY, telephoned saying he had heard the Vice President's trip to Europe was for political reasons: that the Vice President is going to improve his image because he will be doing pre-campaigning. I explained that there were clear and straightforward foreign policy grounds for the trip.

I had a completely off-the-record lunch yesterday with the New York Times Bureau in Washington, including Bernstein and a few others from New York.

There was little questioning about Viet Nam -- a bit on Guam on which I explained the routine character of the meeting and the significance of the Constitution.

They questioned me mainly on:

- The Latin American Summit and why we support integration.
- Our balance of payments policy and why I felt the dollar was "strong."
- How my shop operates on your behalf.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Friday, March 24, 1967 -- 2:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

I had a good session with Howard K. Smith today in which I briefed him in detail on the Guam conference, progress in Viet Nam, etc. He makes one important point for us to consider. He does not believe we should say that we do not see a way out of the problem of Viet Nam. We should not say that we do not have the answer. He honestly believes that we do have the answer; that we are making progress; but we do not know when we shall get a final result. Specifically, he thinks we are making: military progress against the main forces; real but slow progress in pacification; real progress in getting the Vietnamese to produce a legitimate constitutional government; real progress in bringing those under VC control over to the side of the government.

He thinks our main problem in the country is to give to our own people a sense that this kind of progress is being made despite the confusion thrown up by newspaper reporting, television, etc. He thought the Nashville presentation was excellent. He believes that you will have to make other broad policy speeches on Viet Nam; and the objective of these should be to give our people confidence that we are in fact moving with the Vietnamese on all fronts; and that success will surely come in time if we stay with it.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

March 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Tunisians Very Much Appreciate Your Sending
Dr. Mattingly to President Bourguiba's Bedside

Last evening Howard Wriggins of my staff met Ambassador Driss of Tunisia. He expressed his own and his country's deep thanks to you for sending Dr. Mattingly so promptly to President Bourguiba's bedside. Ambassador Driss reported that Dr. Mattingly is of the opinion that President Bourguiba has every chance of fully recovering, but obviously he will need several months of rest.

I thought you would welcome this direct personal word indicating that these gestures are noticed and appreciated.

Walt Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-374
By *fw*, NARA, Date 12-29-93

~~SECRET~~

Friday, March 24, 1967
5:30 p. m.

98

MR. PRESIDENT:

This cable underlines a sensitivity which we shall increasingly have to take into account -- not only in Korea but also in Australia, et al.

Personally, I feel these folk deserve to be listened to more than some of our more assertive advisers in London, New York, Paris, etc.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (SEOUL 5094)

~~SECRET~~

Copy of SEOUL 5094

March 24, 1967

UNGER Visit: UN Peace Move Discussions

98a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-62
By is, NARA Date 10-30-99

1. Unger's meeting with Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yong-Chu on March 23 was devoted to full and searching discussion of U. S. and ROK positions on Johnson/Ho exchange of letters and response to U Thant's proposal, plus ROK desire to be represented at any peace discussions.

2. Peace moves: Unger had carefully reasoned explanation of rationale behind US response to U Thant proposal, and considerations on which US bases its appraisal of Hanoi's intentions. He assured Kim that US will not agree to any truce or cessation of hostilities until we are certain Hanoi really wishes to negotiate, will abide by conditions of truce, and will permit effective supervision. He answered Korean fear that truce would freeze military situation and result in permanent division of South Viet Nam by assuring Koreans we would insist that there be nothing in the truce to derogate authority of Government of Viet Nam over entire country. We view U Thant proposal as "package" and we would not permit ourselves to get bogged down in any one phase: there would have to be evidence of progress or we would give serious consideration to resuming operations.

3. The main points that emerged were: (a) the US Government, for reasons of its domestic and international position, has to respond in an affirmative manner to serious efforts to bring about a peaceful solution in Vietnam, and (b) while ROKG agrees that such public response is advisable, particularly for US, ROKG believes also that allies should frankly recognize within their own councils that the time has not yet been reached when Hanoi will be willing to respond affirmatively to peace overtures. If U Thant proposal is accepted in Hanoi, ROKS feel that military pressure should be maintained on Hanoi during preliminary discussions to determine whether a genuine truce and effective supervision can be effected. ROKS extremely pessimistic on chances of success and are convinced we will learn during this period that we wasted our time.

4. ROKG representation in peace talks: Kim made an eloquent plea for ROK representation at all stages of peace negotiations. He recognized that insofar as real ROK influence on negotiations may be concerned, this best achieved through close consultation among allies, though only one or two conducting negotiations. However, the psychology of the Korean people is such that appearances are much more important than substance, and Korean people would not understand if, after having become so deeply involved in Vietnam, ROKG was not physically represented at peace negotiations.

~~SECRET~~

(SEOUL 5094 3/24/67)

He argued that US should understand the importance of oriental preoccupation with maintenance of face and special psychological considerations in case of Korea. The latter has to be viewed against long history of domination by greater powers, who gave Korea little choice in decisions affecting its vital national interest. Korean people may be overreacting and may be more concerned with form than substance, but this is a political fact of life which guides government actions and policies. There would doubtless be debate on Vietnam when the National Assembly reconvenes, which would focus not on the substance of the Vietnam issue but on whether or not ROKS had been or would be represented at any conferences at which decisions affecting the future of Vietnam are being made. If Korea is not represented, the Assembly might well pass a motion of no-confidence in ROK Cabinet members. As Ambassador Unger departed, Kim again made a point of stressing Korea's desire for representation at all stages of negotiations.

5. Amb. Unger, in response, expressed understanding of Korean position, but carefully avoided any implications or assurances that ROK would be represented at any given stage. He told Koreans he could, for example, envisage a situation in which the US itself would not be directly represented, such as direct talks between Saigon and Hanoi. He assured the Koreans that US concept of possible Geneva Conference with respect to Vietnam was not that of 1954; used example of 1962 Laos conference to illustrate that there is precedent for changes in the list of attendees at Geneva, and said he would inform USG authorities on his return of strength and depth of Korean desire. Comment: Kim's arguments, although along lines reported in reference telegrams, were put in noticeably stronger terms than previously with respect to (a) necessity for continued military pressure, (b) pessimism as to prospects of working out truce that would protect Free World interests, and (c) Korean participation in any peace talks. Kim has undoubtedly had talks with Prime Minister and probably further contact with Blue House since our last interview. We had definite feeling that he was speaking under instructions. Full memcon follows.

BROWN

~~SECRET~~

93

Friday, March 24, 1967
4:50 p.m.

Free file

Mr. President:

Not much we can do, but I
guess you ought to be aware of this.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Copy of memo to Sec Rusk, 24 March 1967,
from Richard Helms

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 4-15-91

100

~~SECRET~~

Friday, March 24, 1967
4:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith latest security
report on Uruguay.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Cy 1, SNIE 98-67, 23 March 1967
"Security Conditions in Uruguay"

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-64
By CL, NARA Date 6-30-00

101

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-374
By ju, NARA, Date 1-29-93

CONFIDENTIAL

March 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Summary and Analysis of a Speech by Senator Brooke
(Representative of Massachusetts)

The Senator began by noting that during last Fall's campaign, he had been critical of the President's foreign policy and of the conduct of the war in Viet-Nam. But, he recalled, his father had told him that "the quality of a man's judgment was no better than the quality of his information." And so the Senator decided to visit Viet-Nam and Asia and see for himself.

First he visited:

-- Japan -- where he found "the grandest success story in all of Asia," a stable democracy, a flourishing economy;

-- Taiwan -- which he described as "a symbol of what our foreign political and economic policies can and should accomplish";

-- Hong Kong -- where he found an incredible mixture of affluence and poverty, the latter largely stemming from the refugee problem;

-- In Hong Kong, he talked with the "China watchers" and concluded: "... Peking's threat to the rest of Asia--at least for the foreseeable future -- has been overestimated." Red China is not likely to enter Viet-Nam unless it feels the regime is in danger or that we threaten China's borders. He favors our present policy on Chinese recognition and China's entry into the UN, but we should be "sensitive to all prospects for future contact."

The Senator then went to Viet-Nam. He talked with Americans and Vietnamese, with officials and private citizens, he visited cities and the countryside, he saw the war and the peaceful side of our common effort.

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

He returned with one view unchanged: "We are involved in a situation of great complexity that challenges the traditional American demand for prompt and clear-cut solutions."

He noted that the United States is often criticized for being "insensitive in its attitude toward other countries and peoples and in its conduct of foreign affairs." He said: "I believe that our present efforts in South Viet-Nam are the best possible defense against this charge."

"I found that anti-American feeling is conspicuously absent in South Viet-Nam."

He said the Vietnamese believe our military efforts prevented a Communist takeover in 1965. Our assistance has permitted "political, social and economic progress which would have been impossible for South Viet-Nam to accomplish alone." Our help is "welcomed and appreciated."

The Senator said debate about Viet-Nam was so surrounded by emotion that "many fundamental considerations tend to get lost or confused in public discussion."

The real stakes are the people of Viet-Nam. "But we must make clear that they are the highest stakes and not merely pawns in some larger contest." He believes "it would be plainly immoral to expect the South Vietnamese to suffer today's violence in order to ward off tomorrow's war somewhere else."

The Senator was impressed by political progress in South Viet-Nam. "The early establishment of a more broadly based civilian government in South Viet-Nam will provide, for the first time, a reasonable confidence that decisions regarding the war effort will reflect popular interests and aspirations."

He believes "the process launched by the new constitution for South Viet-Nam provides the most effective pressure for political settlement of the war."

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- 3 -

"With a new regime visibly supported by a majority of the populace and backed by sufficient force to extend its authority to wider areas of the country, the NLF will have to consider the attractions of political accommodation and the futility of prolonged violence."

He urges: greater emphasis on land reform, drafting and enforcing fair electoral laws, and advancing the election dates. South Viet-Nam should be less reluctant to discuss a political settlement with the Liberation Front.

"Political advancement in South Viet-Nam has been extraordinary."

He attended sessions of the Constituent Assembly and was impressed with the members' "sincerity, integrity and skill."

"It is evident," he said, "that, contrary to much American opinion, their deliberations and decisions have been arrived at independently of political pressures by the military junta which presently rules the country."

He notes the Military Directorate never used Article 20 of the electoral law which would have permitted it to veto the Assembly's recommendations.

"At no time has the Assembly been overruled."

On the question of peace, he said:

"Everything I learned, not only in South Viet-Nam but also in Japan, the Republic of China, the colony of Hong Kong, Cambodia and Thailand, has now convinced me that the enemy is not disposed to participate in meaningful negotiations at this time. It is the overwhelming consensus that the Government of North Viet-Nam and the Viet Cong leadership still doubt that the United States will have the patience or fortitude to see this war to a successful conclusion."

He noted that Americans may differ on details -- stopping the bombing, including the Liberation Front in negotiations, etc.

"But, Mr. President, in the main the American people do not and have not differed on our basic commitment. And let there be no doubt

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- 4 -

in the mind of Ho Chi Minh or anyone else that the American people will persevere in their fundamental support of the South Vietnamese."

He found it possible to believe that "continued military pressure may end the war sooner than we dare to hope."

"The reason for optimism," he said, "is found in the high degree of dedication, morale, and combat efficiency which I observed among our fighting men."

He had hoped that a cessation of bombing in the North would bring about negotiations for peace. But Ho Chi Minh's statements show no intention on his part to talk peace. When he tried to meet with North Vietnamese in Cambodia and was told discussions would serve no useful purpose. Noting Ho's letter to our President, he said it was in essence the same one he had received: "That at this time Hanoi is not interested in negotiations or peace discussions."

"I believe," he said, "the burden of responsibility has shifted from the United States, and shifted clearly to Hanoi." Stopping bombing would not now produce peace talks.

He concludes:

"Since I believe that North Viet-Nam is not prepared to negotiate in a meaningful way at this time, I must reluctantly conclude that the general direction of our present military efforts in Viet-Nam is necessary. This is far from an easy conclusion for me to reach. I know war. I am familiar with its consequences. I like to think of myself as a man who loves and desires peace for all men. But all too frequently what we desire and what reality thrusts upon us are very different."

He does not favor "escalation of our military commitment." He warns against actions that might bring Communist China into the conflict. "I do favor containment of the war within its present limited framework, and I advise patience until the enemy has finally concluded that a negotiated peace is the best and only solution."

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- 5 -

Senator Brooke then spoke about his visit to Cambodia. He was sympathetic to Cambodian wishes for neutrality and hoped for an improvement in our relations. He urged support by the U.S. for the Prek Thnot Dam as part of the Mekong Valley development program as a sign of our friendship for the Cambodian people. He also warned against involving Cambodia in the Viet-Nam war.

He concluded his Asian trip in Thailand. He found American economic aid to Thailand had been "soundly conceived and effectively administered." The Thai are making full use of their own resources. There is political stability, but rising insurgency in the Northeast.

He thought our response to the insurgency was "well designed." The Thai are providing the troops, we are helping with economic aid and advice.

Summarizing, he said:

- each area in Asia has a "strong sense of national identity";
- our policies must recognize their needs and desires;
- our greatest strength is not arms but our "political, economic and technical capability";
- our goal should be to help create institutions and conditions that meet the needs of the people rather than in taking up arms to suppress unrest once it has occurred;
- we must understand the limitations of American capability and responsibility in Asia.

He notes the differences in culture, language, etc., but adds: "whatever the differences, and whatever our policies are to be, I hope and pray that we never lose sight of the fact that we are dealing with millions of human beings preoccupied with the daily joys and burdens of their own lives, and anxious to determine their own destinies."

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Analysis:

I found the Senator's speech a moving and eloquent account of his discovery of some of the realities of Asia. It is also a courageous political document. For, as he notes, he began as a critic of our policies. Yet he had the strength of character to reverse himself after a hard and long first-hand look at truth on the ground as he was able to discover it.

I think he is wrong in saying that the only basis for our fight in Viet-Nam is the people there and their future. But I agree that this basic consideration is all too often ignored in discussions of policy and of power balances. But the very fact that Koreans and Thai, Australians and New Zealanders and Filipinos are fighting and dying at our side and at the side of the Vietnamese shows clearly that the struggle there has implications broader than the piece of territory known as South Viet-Nam.

One most important element that the Senator missed--or perhaps had no time to get into -- is the matter of regional development in Asia, the growing cooperation among the various nations and peoples and governments in such fields as food production, transportation, education and others. And this really is one of the most encouraging new winds that is blowing in that crucial part of the world.

All in all, his speech was a masterpiece of its kind. It will have an important impact on all those who read it. For it comes from a man who took the trouble to see for himself and who speaks with deep and obvious sincerity. We have found a strong new ally.

William J. Jorden

CONFIDENTIAL

102

Pres file

Friday - March 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Last Monday, while we were in Guam, Jamaican Prime Minister Sangster became critically ill. At the request of the Jamaican Government, a special aircraft was sent to Kingston to fly him immediately to the McGill University Hospital in Montreal where he had been treated before.

The State Department tells me that after several days in which he seemed to be holding his own, today he took a serious turn for the worse and is now not expected to live. The diagnosis is a stroke, with continued cerebral bleeding.

There is nothing further that we can do, but I thought you would want to be up to date on the Prime Minister's condition.

W. W. Rostow

Friday, March 24, 1967 -- 5:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts -- Friday, March 24, 1967

Bill Attwood, Cowles Publications, came in today to say that we ought not to break off all U.S. technical assistance and aid contacts with Guinea. There are large U.S. private investments there; and they might be endangered by a complete break. I am having Ed Hamilton look into this.

Hugh Sidey, TIME magazine, came in at George Christian's suggestion to develop a picture of your view of North Viet Nam and of Ho Chi Minh. I explained that we regarded him and his government as made up of determined men who had for long pursued power in the old French colonial empire and had great faith in their ability to deal with major industrial nations by a combination of guerrilla and psychological warfare. At the end of 1961 and early 1965 they had victory very nearly in their grasp. They did not give up easily. They had only slowly learned that the U.S. of the 1960's was not France of the 1950's. On the other hand, you were prepared to offer them a most generous settlement -- your objective being not to destroy North Viet Nam but to get it to behave properly in relation to its Asian neighbors. I also explained that you had contemplated for some weeks a letter to Ho Chi Minh; you had designed the letter personally; and sent it as a climax of an effort, reaching back several months, to convert the opportunity of the Tet truce into a negotiation. In sending it you were not necessarily optimistic but you felt that every possible means to meet an honorable peace was required.

John Loengard, photographer for LIFE, was in a good part of today taking pictures for a series of articles which Theodore H. White is doing for LIFE that will explore the relationship between intellectuals in several worlds -- academic, foundation and in the government itself -- and the whole process by which the U.S. government today reaches out into new fields, makes policy and reaches decisions."

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Friday, March 24, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached is a suggested reply to
Senator Hartke's letter of March 22.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

MAR - 5 1967

MAR 25 1967

Dear Vance:

I am grateful for your comments in your letter of March 22 regarding my message to President Ho Chi Minh and his reply.

You have put your finger on what has been for a long time a major barrier to the achievement of a peaceful settlement, or to significant steps in that direction. That is: the cessation of "acts of war" by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in South Viet-Nam -- against the South Vietnamese, against our forces and against the other allies of the beleaguered Vietnamese people.

For the fact is that Hanoi has never acknowledged that it is involved in South Viet-Nam or that it has carried out "acts of war" against South Viet-Nam or against us. You know, and I know, and the world knows, of course, that Hanoi is involved and that it has carried out aggressive acts. But each time we ask Hanoi, whether openly or in secret, to give us some indication of what they are willing to do in return for a lessening of the level of our actions, we get only the same well-grooved propaganda record: stop the bombing.

It is not so much a question, as you suggest in your letter, of "who stops what first." We have said we are prepared to act first -- provided the other side gives us an assurance of what it will do in response. Indeed, we have stopped bombing, on five separate occasions, in hopes that our initiative would prompt a reasonable response from the other side. As you know, each pause has met only with vituperation and propagandistic charges.

Your suggestion for a limited ceasefire is and has been an element of this Administration's position. We have repeatedly expressed our willingness to undertake reciprocal acts of de-escalation. We have said we are ready to consider a cessation of hostilities either as the first order of business at a formal conference, or as a subject to be dealt with in preliminary discussions.

We have asked the Secretary General to take the initiative in arranging for this kind of effort to lower the level of conflict and to get negotiations started.

The problem is that Hanoi has never shown the slightest interest in reducing the level of its involvement in South Viet-Nam. As the letter from President Ho has made eminently clear, Hanoi is interested only in an end to our actions against the North.

I wrote him in the hope that he might be willing to explore these and all other matters connected with the struggle in Viet-Nam in a serious and meaningful way. I deeply regret that he has chosen not to respond favorably thus far.

But we shall persist in our efforts to get serious talks started. And we stand ready always to consider practical steps to lower the level of violence on both sides.

I have under continuous review measures for probing the manner and degree to which the authorities in Hanoi might be willing to settle or to reduce the level of conflict. You have my renewed assurance that all feasible measures will be explored, including possible initiatives by the Secretary General.

With my personal good wishes,

Sincerely,

LBJ

The Honorable
Vance Hartke
United States Senate

LBJ:WJJ:pas

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-374
By JW, NARA, Date 1-29-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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(Representative of Massachusetts)

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First he visited:

-- Japan -- where he found "the grandest success story in all of Asia," a stable democracy, a flourishing economy;

-- Taiwan -- which he described as "a symbol of what our foreign political and economic policies can and should accomplish";

-- Hong Kong -- where he found an incredible mixture of affluence and poverty, the latter largely stemming from the refugee problem;

-- In Hong Kong, he talked with the "China watchers" and concluded: "... Peking's threat to the rest of Asia--at least for the foreseeable future -- has been overestimated." Red China is not likely to enter Viet-Nam unless it feels the regime is in danger or that we threaten China's borders. He favors our present policy on Chinese recognition and China's entry into the UN, but we should be "sensitive to all prospects for future contact."

The Senator then went to Viet-Nam. He talked with Americans and Vietnamese, with officials and private citizens, he visited cities and the countryside, he saw the war and the peaceful side of our common effort.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

He returned with one view unchanged: "We are involved in a situation of great complexity that challenges the traditional American demand for prompt and clear-cut solutions."

He noted that the United States is often criticized for being "insensitive in its attitude toward other countries and peoples and in its conduct of foreign affairs." He said: "I believe that our present efforts in South Viet-Nam are the best possible defense against this charge."

"I found that anti-American feeling is conspicuously absent in South Viet-Nam."

He said the Vietnamese believe our military efforts prevented a Communist takeover in 1965. Our assistance has permitted "political, social and economic progress which would have been impossible for South Viet-Nam to accomplish alone." Our help is "welcomed and appreciated."

The Senator said debate about Viet-Nam was so surrounded by emotion that "many fundamental considerations tend to get lost or confused in public discussion."

The real stakes are the people of Viet-Nam. "But we must make clear that they are the highest stakes and not merely pawns in some larger contest." He believes "it would be plainly immoral to expect the South Vietnamese to suffer today's violence in order to ward off tomorrow's war somewhere else."

The Senator was impressed by political progress in South Viet-Nam. "The early establishment of a more broadly based civilian government in South Viet-Nam will provide, for the first time, a reasonable confidence that decisions regarding the war effort will reflect popular interests and aspirations."

He believes "the process launched by the new constitution for South Viet-Nam provides the most effective pressure for political settlement of the war."

CONFIDENTIAL

"With a new regime visibly supported by a majority of the populace and backed by sufficient force to extend its authority to wider areas of the country, the NLF will have to consider the attractions of political accommodation and the futility of prolonged violence. "

He urges: greater emphasis on land reform, drafting and enforcing fair electoral laws, and advancing the election dates. South Viet-Nam should be less reluctant to discuss a political settlement with the Liberation Front.

"Political advancement in South Viet-Nam has been extraordinary. "

He attended sessions of the Constituent Assembly and was impressed with the members' "sincerity, integrity and skill. "

"It is evident," he said, "that, contrary to much American opinion, their deliberations and decisions have been arrived at independently of political pressures by the military junta which presently rules the country. "

He notes the Military Directorate never used Article 20 of the electoral law which would have permitted it to veto the Assembly's recommendations.

"At no time has the Assembly been overruled. "

On the question of peace, he said:

"Everything I learned, not only in South Viet-Nam but also in Japan, the Republic of China, the colony of Hong Kong, Cambodia and Thailand, has now convinced me that the enemy is not disposed to participate in meaningful negotiations at this time. It is the overwhelming consensus that the Government of North Viet-Nam and the Viet Cong leadership still doubt that the United States will have the patience or fortitude to see this war to a successful conclusion. "

He noted that Americans may differ on details -- stopping the bombing, including the Liberation Front in negotiations, etc.

"But, Mr. President, in the main the American people do not and have not differed on our basic commitment. And let there be no doubt

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

in the mind of Ho Chi Minh or anyone else that the American people will persevere in their fundamental support of the South Vietnamese."

He found it possible to believe that "continued military pressure may end the war sooner than we dare to hope."

"The reason for optimism," he said, "is found in the high degree of dedication, morale, and combat efficiency which I observed among our fighting men."

He had hoped that a cessation of bombing in the North would bring about negotiations for peace. But Ho Chi Minh's statements show no intention on his part to talk peace. When he tried to meet with North Vietnamese in Cambodia and was told discussions would serve no useful purpose. Noting Ho's letter to our President, he said it was in essence the same one he had received: "That at this time Hanoi is not interested in negotiations or peace discussions."

"I believe," he said, "the burden of responsibility has shifted from the United States, and shifted clearly to Hanoi." Stopping bombing would not now produce peace talks.

He concludes:

"Since I believe that North Viet-Nam is not prepared to negotiate in a meaningful way at this time, I must reluctantly conclude that the general direction of our present military efforts in Viet-Nam is necessary. This is far from an easy conclusion for me to reach. I know war. I am familiar with its consequences. I like to think of myself as a man who loves and desires peace for all men. But all too frequently what we desire and what reality thrusts upon us are very different."

He does not favor "escalation of our military commitment." He warns against actions that might bring Communist China into the conflict. "I do favor containment of the war within its present limited framework, and I advise patience until the enemy has finally concluded that a negotiated peace is the best and only solution."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

Senator Brooke then spoke about his visit to Cambodia. He was sympathetic to Cambodian wishes for neutrality and hoped for an improvement in our relations. He urged support by the U.S. for the Prek Thnot Dam as part of the Mekong Valley development program as a sign of our friendship for the Cambodian people. He also warned against involving Cambodia in the Viet-Nam war.

He concluded his Asian trip in Thailand. He found American economic aid to Thailand had been "soundly conceived and effectively administered." The Thai are making full use of their own resources. There is political stability, but rising insurgency in the Northeast.

He thought our response to the insurgency was "well designed." The Thai are providing the troops, we are helping with economic aid and advice.

Summarizing, he said:

- each area in Asia has a "strong sense of national identity";
- our policies must recognize their needs and desires;
- our greatest strength is not arms but our "political, economic and technical capability";
- our goal should be to help create institutions and conditions that meet the needs of the people rather than in taking up arms to suppress unrest once it has occurred;
- we must understand the limitations of American capability and responsibility in Asia.

He notes the differences in culture, language, etc., but adds: "whatever the differences, and whatever our policies are to be, I hope and pray that we never lose sight of the fact that we are dealing with millions of human beings preoccupied with the daily joys and burdens of their own lives, and anxious to determine their own destinies."

CONFIDENTIAL

Analysis:

I found the Senator's speech a moving and eloquent account of his discovery of some of the realities of Asia. It is also a courageous political document. For, as he notes, he began as a critic of our policies. Yet he had the strength of character to reverse himself after a hard and long first-hand look at truth on the ground as he was able to discover it.

I think he is wrong in saying that the only basis for our fight in Viet-Nam is the people there and their future. But I agree that this basic consideration is all too often ignored in discussions of policy and of power balances. But the very fact that Koreans and Thai, Australians and New Zealanders and Filipinos are fighting and dying at our side and at the side of the Vietnamese shows clearly that the struggle there has implications broader than the piece of territory known as South Viet-Nam.

One most important element that the Senator missed--or perhaps had no time to get into -- is the matter of regional development in Asia, the growing cooperation among the various nations and peoples and governments in such fields as food production, transportation, education and others. And this really is one of the most encouraging new winds that is blowing in that crucial part of the world.

All in all, his speech was a masterpiece of its kind. It will have an important impact on all those who read it. For it comes from a man who took the trouble to see for himself and who speaks with deep and obvious sincerity. We have found a strong new ally.

William J. Jorden

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. memo
2. Pres file

Friday - March 24, 1967

Mr. President:

I recommend that you send the attached reply (Tab A) to Congressman Hanna's letter (Tab B) which Henry Wilson has already acknowledged.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

March 25, 1967

Dear Congressman Hanna:

Thank you for your letter of March 16, 1967, in which you made suggestions as to how the deficit in the Puerto Rican sugar quota, which you project for this year, might be reallocated among some of the Latin American countries. I deeply appreciate the thought which has gone into the proposal and the interest this reflects in a matter of importance to the United States as well as to our Latin American friends.

At such time as Secretary Freeman may make recommendations to me on the disposition of any sugar quota deficits, I will keep your suggestions in mind. At the same time, I want to assure you that I am deeply conscious of the carefully worked out statutory formulae for assigning quotas and reallocating deficits that the Congress has provided in the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended. Given the great care and study that went into this legislation, I would use the discretion to depart from these formulae that the Congress has given me only if I were definitely convinced that such action would be in the national interest.

Sincerely,

LBJ

Honorable Richard T. Hanna
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

cc - Henry Wilson

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm
March 24, 1967



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

RICHARD T. HANNA
CALIFORNIA

1066

March 16, 1967

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

144W Knowing of your proposed meeting with the Latin American countries set soon for Punta del Este, I will take this occasion to make what I hope will be a constructive suggestion.

It appears to some of us that the United States has not used as effectively as might be the sugar quota as a tool in our international relations with the Latin American countries. We understand that there is a projected deficit for the Puerto Rican commitment this year of approximately 400,000 tons. This deficit could be used to have a very broad effect with many of our Latin American neighbors.

Although it is to be expected that the Dominican Republic will ask for all or most of this shortage, we suggest that with all the kinds of assistance now going to that country, it is in our best national interest to apply the shortage to a much broader target. We, therefore, recommend to you for consideration a formula along the following lines with, of course, an appropriate awareness that this is only one of a number of suggestions that will have to be considered.



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

RICHARD T. HANNA
CALIFORNIA

Page 2.

Thousands

Dominican Republic	100
Other large quota countries	
Peru	40
Mexico	40
Brazil	40
Small quota countries	
Argentina	30
Colombia	30
Ecuador	30
El Salvador	30
Venezuela	30
Grand Total	370,000

This would leave a reserve of 30,000 tons which could be distributed as surplus appears in other Latin American countries not set forth herein.

We have found that there is a substantial body of opinion to the effect that increasing our trade and adjusting barriers, as well as utilizing quotas, can in many ways be a more dynamic route of assistance than aid programs, although no approach should exclude full consideration of the benefits of the other.

We appreciate your courtesy and attention in this matter and hope to have your comments.

Respectfully,

Richard T. Hanna
Richard T. Hanna

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - March 24, 1967

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~~Transcript~~
2 files

Mr. President:

Senator Mansfield's memorandum suggesting that you receive a Mexican newsman is at Tab A.

I recommend a reply along the lines of the draft at Tab B.

We have checked on Scherer and find that he is not the most reliable of newsmen. Secretary Rusk ran into difficulties with him last year when he agreed to a background interview.

Scherer is trying to interview all the Presidents before the Summit and is not having much luck -- only Duvalier and Balaguer so far. He knows that an interview with you would open doors elsewhere.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Mansfield memorandum

Tab B - Recommended reply.

DECLASSIFIED 2/28/77
Authority Statute 7/5/78; NSC 66
By rs/yp, NARA, Date 4/23/91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C o p y

C o p y

UNITED STATES SENATE

Office of the Majority Leader

Washington, D. C.

March 17, 1967

TO : The President
FROM : Senator Mansfield
SUBJECT: Julio Scherer

While in Mexico attending the Seventh U.S. - Mexico Interparliamentary Conference, I was approached by several high ranking officials of the Mexican Congress, asking me if it were possible for you to have an interview with Julio Scherer of the newspaper Excelsior.

I was informed that this is the biggest and best paper in Mexico, that M. Scherer is a highly reputable correspondent, and I know last year that he had an interview with me and I believe with the Vice President, Bill Fulbright, one of the Kennedys and perhaps one or two other Senators. I have not seen copies of these interviews. I am calling this to your attention on request, and whatever you decide to do will be acceptable to me.

7-10-B 107-b
MAR 27 1967

Dear Mike:

I have considered the request you relayed that I grant an interview to Julio Scherer of the Mexican newspaper Excelsior.

I am hesitant to receive him, because if I did, many equally meritorious newsmen from prominent Latin American newspapers would also want interviews. Turning them down would undo whatever advantage is gained from the Scherer story.

We are looking into the advisability of a group interview with well-known Latin American newsmen. If this materializes, I will consider adding Mr. Scherer.

Sincerely,

Honorable Mike Mansfield
Majority Leader
United States Senate

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm
March 24, 1967

~~SECRET~~

Friday - March 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of President Diaz Ordaz

1. *[initials]*
2. *Purple*

Des Fitzgerald reports (Tab A) that President Diaz Ordaz would like to firm up the dates for his visit to the United States in September.

In extending the invitation you left the date open pending a determination of whether the relocation of people and property in the Chamizal could be completed in time to have the formal transfer ceremony on September 25. (You will recall that on this day in 1964 you and President Lopez Mateos participated in a symbolic transfer ceremony.) Our thought was that either before or following the Chamizal ceremony, President Diaz Ordaz would come to Washington for a state visit.

Commissioner Friedkin advises that the relocation process is progressing well enough to assure readiness for the transfer by September 25.

I recommend that you authorize me to get word to President Diaz Ordaz that:

1. You would like to set September 25 as the date for the Chamizal transfer ceremony if this is satisfactory with him.

Approve

☒

Disapprove

☐

Speak to me

☐

2. You leave it up to him whether he wants to come to Washington before the transfer ceremony or afterwards.

Approve

☒

Disapprove

☐

Speak to me

☐

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ex 11/30/78

By as/gj, NARA, Date 4/19/91

cc - Jim Jones

Bromley Smith
for W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

108a


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-65 appeal
By cb, NARA Date 1-21-01

22 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President

President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico is anxious to take informal soundings regarding the possibility of his accepting President Johnson's open invitation to visit the U. S. some-time between the 17th and 27th of September 1967. He has a major speaking engagement in Mexico on the 16th and would like to combine his two-day visit to Washington with a trip to Montreal to visit the Exposition there. If this informal sounding receives encouragement, he will, of course, make the formal request through appropriate diplomatic channels.


Desmond Fitzgerald
Deputy Director for Plans

~~SECRET~~

March 24, 1967

Dear Carol:

I do not believe that I have ever received a more moving letter, nor one that gave stronger evidence of the writer's integrity and patriotism than yours does.

I did not select Ellsworth without reluctance -- for I knew how deeply happy his marriage has made him, and I hesitated long before I asked him to assume a duty that would often separate him from you. I chose him because I regard him, as you do, as one of the wisest men America has produced in our time.

I only hope that the sacrifice that I have asked the two of you to make will be fully compensated by the events of coming months -- events which Ellsworth will help to shape.

Your letter warms my heart and strengthens my spirit, exactly as do those I receive from our fighting men in Vietnam. I am so grateful to you for it, and so thankful that you and Ellsworth are serving our country at this hour.

Very truly,



Honorable Carol Laise Bunker
American Ambassador
Nepal

hm
LBJ/HCM/crm

Pres file

Friday, March 24, 1967
2:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

I guess Bill Jorden took
the same course in journalism --
at least he picked up fast and
produced all this himself.

Let me know if we can
improve it.

W. W. Rostow

THE GUAM CONFERENCE

March 20-21, 1967

Who took part?

President Johnson and his principal foreign policy and military advisers--Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Wheeler, CINCPAC Admiral Sharp, AID Administrator Gaud, Ambassador Harriman, Presidential Assistant Rostow and others.

Also: Ambassador Lodge, General Westmoreland, AID Director McDonald, JUSPAO Director Zorthian, Political Counsellor Calhoun from Saigon.

And the "new team": Ambassador Bunker, Ambassador Locke, and Presidential Assistant Bob Komer.

On the Vietnamese side: General Thieu, Prime Minister Ky, Minister of Defense Vien, Foreign Minister Do, Ambassador Bui Diem, and others.

Why was the meeting held?

It was the latest in a continuing series of regular review sessions of Viet-Nam developments in which the President and his advisers study programs and policies and consider plans for the future. They also consider mutual problems and cooperative programs with our Vietnamese

allies. The first such session was held in Honolulu in February 1966; the second was in Manila in October. It is expected similar meetings will be held in the future at roughly six-month intervals.

The meeting provided a most useful opportunity for the President to introduce his "new team" who will be directing our efforts in Viet-Nam to Ambassador Lodge and the "old team" as well as to the current leaders of Viet-Nam.

Why Guam?

It was a convenient and secure setting, close enough to Viet-Nam so that American officials from Saigon and Vietnamese leaders did not have to be away from their action posts for too long a period.

What was discussed?

The Guam sessions reviewed the military situation in Viet-Nam, political developments and progress, and a wide range of economic and social programs. Efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement were also studied.

The main items covered in the two-day conference were:

Pacification -- current status of the effort to bring security to increasing numbers of people in the Vietnamese countryside and the need to intensify present efforts.

Reconciliation -- the Vietnamese program to bring increasing numbers of Vietnamese now serving the Viet Cong into national life and to enlist their energy in building a new nation.

Political Development -- discussion of the new Constitution and Vietnamese plans for local and national elections.

Long-term Economic Planning -- a cooperative effort in which Vietnamese economists and planners, working with American advisers, are beginning to plan for the long-range economic development of their country.

Land Reform -- consideration of existing programs for providing land ownership to working farmers as well as improved systems of farm credit and land development.

Inflation Controls -- ways to control the inflationary effects of the war, including large-scale construction and the disruption of many segments of the economy.

Medical Care -- the health problem in Viet-Nam, with particular attention to the care of civilian casualties of the war.

Peace Efforts -- the current status of efforts to achieve a lowering of the level of conflict and to work out a peaceful settlement and consideration of further steps that might be considered.

Summaries of the main elements in the above categories are attached.

ATTACHMENT APACIFICATION

On the U.S. side, there was discussion of the coordination of the U.S. effort with particular attention to the new Office of Civil Operations (OCO). This office combines under the Mission in Saigon all field elements of existing civil programs of AID, CIA and USIA. OCO works closely with MACV in developing and carrying out programs of Pacification and Revolutionary Development in which the military and civil elements must work closely together.

Field commanders reported on progress made by military units in carrying forward their pacification role.

An essential element in the Pacification program is the role of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. More than 50 ARVN battalions have been retrained in line with their new mission in support of Revolutionary Development. That number is expected to be doubled in the current year. The essential task of these battalions will be to provide a system of local security so that the 59-man RD teams can operate in the villages and hamlets.

Vietnamese leaders explained the RD program and discussed the progress made to date as well as their plans for the future. As of February 1, there were 420 RD teams with more than 22,000 workers in the field. It was agreed that goals for the program in 1966 had been excessively optimistic but that significant progress had been achieved. Emphasis was on realistic goals for the current year. It was noted, however, that approximately one million Vietnamese had moved from Viet Cong to Government control in the past year.

ATTACHMENT B

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

For some time, the Vietnamese Government has been carrying out its Chieu Hoi ("Open Arms") program. It is designed to attract Viet Cong and their followers to the Government side.

In 1966, more than 20,000 Viet Cong defected to the GVN (almost double the 11,000 who defected in 1965). As of March 11, 1967, 7,555 VC had rallied to the Government, compared with 4,276 during the same period last year.

The National Reconciliation program will be a more extensive and elaborate program for winning the loyalty of the Viet Cong and those who support them, often through fear and intimidation.

An important problem will be to provide adequate training facilities for such ralliers so they can take useful jobs in Vietnamese society. Another will be to provide opportunities for higher-level defectors who are to be given jobs commensurate with their training, background and ability.

The Vietnamese authorities said they planned to make public their Reconciliation Program coincident with promulgation of their new Constitution.

ATTACHMENT C

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The Vietnamese leaders brought to the Guam meeting a copy of their new Constitution which had just been approved the previous day by the Directorate. It is a very democratic document, produced by the elected members of the Constituent Assembly. It provides for a strong executive but also effective checks on the President and Prime Minister by a two-house legislature and a new judiciary.

General Thieu and Prime Minister Ky reported on their plans to begin holding village and hamlet elections in April. They expect the presidential election will be in early September. The upper and lower house elections will follow within a month.

It is expected that about 1,300 village councils will be elected in April and that about 5,500 hamlet chiefs will be chosen in May-June.

The new Vietnamese Senate will have 30-60 members; the lower house will contain between 100 and 200 representatives.

There was no discussion of candidates or slates. It was recognized by all that this was a Vietnamese matter to be worked out by them in their own way.

ATTACHMENT DLONG-RANGE ECONOMIC PLANNING

Professor Thuc, a distinguished economist from Saigon University, has been named director of a Vietnamese planning group to work out plans for Viet-Nam's long-range development. A private American group, headed by Mr. David Lilienthal, has contracted with AID to work with the Vietnamese in this effort.

Professor Thuc and Mr. Lilienthal both participated in the Guam discussions; they also met privately outside the regular sessions. A U.S. group has been sent to Saigon to work out with the Vietnamese detailed working arrangements, to study personnel requirements and to lay out a program of studies that must be undertaken immediately.

Meanwhile, a number of development projects are moving forward in Viet-Nam. These include: expansion of Saigon's power supply; provision for an adequate water system in Danang; improvement of several major highways, and increasing the unloading capacity in the port of Saigon.

ATTACHMENT E

LAND REFORM

Vietnamese leaders explained the status of land reform and prospects for the future. American specialists took part in the discussion.

Past expropriations of land are believed to have eliminated any land holdings in excess of 250 acres. The land reform program involves 2,600,000 acres (1.6 million acres arable, and about 1 million abandoned or non-arable). About 260,000 farm families now occupy the arable land and either have received or will receive full titles.

The total acreage under cultivation in South Viet-Nam is estimated at between seven and eight million acres. There are about two million farm families of whom 1,200,000 own part or all of their land.

The land reform program also requires that tenants be given rent contracts. Rents cannot exceed between 15 and 25 per cent of the main crop, depending on the quality of the land.

Tenancy laws were extended in 1965 to cover communally-owned lands that formerly were rented to individual farmers on an auction basis.

In February 1967, more than 50,000 permanent land titles were distributed by the Government. An additional 50,000 have been prepared for distribution.

ATTACHMENT F

ECONOMIC STABILIZATION

It was recognized that South Viet-Nam faces a real and continuing problem in controlling inflation. Last year, prices rose about 70 per cent. However, significant progress was noted in the stabilization effort:

-- consumer prices actually declined by 10 per cent in the last 14 weeks of 1966 from their mid-September peak;

-- blackmarket rates for dollars and gold both declined following devaluation;

-- Government revenues increased 95 per cent in 1966;

-- the money supply, which had increased at an annual rate of more than 60 per cent in the 5-1/2 months before devaluation, increased at an annual rate of only 19 per cent after devaluation.

Consumer prices rose more than 20 per cent in the first weeks of 1967, but it was noted that this reflected the normal heavy buying before the lunar new year holidays (Tet). Rice prices have been increasing because of delayed deliveries from the farms. New import arrivals are bringing the price down.

It was agreed that both the Vietnamese and Americans should apply serious fiscal and monetary discipline in order to check the growth of the money supply and limit price increases to acceptable levels.

ATTACHMENT G

MEDICAL CARE

General Humphreys reported that reliable statistics on Vietnamese civilian casualties were virtually non-existent. A new system of reporting from hospitals has been instituted by the GVN Ministry of Health and the first reports are due at the end of March.

It is estimated, however, that at present levels of Viet Cong terror and of combat activity, about 50,000 civilian casualties will require hospitalization this year. War-related casualties represent about 15 per cent of total hospital admissions.

It was noted that reports of burns inflicted by napalm and other weapons were grossly exaggerated. Dr. Howard Rusk, who recently completed a survey of Vietnamese hospitals and who visited all patients suffering from burns, reported in The New York Times that he saw no single victim of napalm burns. Most burn patients have been victims of fires in their homes and kitchens.

It was recognized that the disruptions of war, the shortage of facilities and medical personnel and the difficulties of getting patients quickly to a hospital from remote areas were problems requiring serious and immediate attention.

Plans are moving forward to provide for improved treatment of civilians and for training increased numbers of Vietnamese doctors and nurses. The support of other nations and of private groups to assist in the medical program is being sought on a high priority basis. The AID budget for medical assistance has risen from \$5 million in 1965 to \$50 million this year.

ATTACHMENT HSEARCH FOR PEACE

There was discussion in both U.S. -Vietnamese and U.S. sessions of recent efforts to move toward a peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nam conflict, or at least to begin to lower the level of hostilities.

Repeated offers have been made to Hanoi to engage in discussions of this matter. We have offered to talk without conditions. We have proposed to engage in reciprocal actions that would lower the level of violence on both sides. Thus far, all these efforts have been rebuffed by the authorities in North Viet-Nam.

For the past year, Hanoi has been engaged in an elaborate propaganda campaign, aided by its Communist friends, to achieve one end: a unilateral and permanent end to the military actions now being carried out against the North. It was agreed that this stand offered no hope for any serious steps toward a resolution of the conflict.

The Vietnamese and American participants agreed they and their governments would remain in close contact and would consult regularly on all moves toward a peaceful settlement. They would also be in touch with the other allies who have an important interest in Viet-Nam and its future.

This matter would be discussed fully at the meeting of Troop Contributor Nations to be held in Washington next month.

Lois:

Adds pages to Guam Memo

WJ

Pres file

Who Spoke?

(First session, March 20, 1967)

- | | | |
|----------------------|---|---|
| President Johnson | - | Welcome and opening remarks; introduction of his "new team" |
| General Thieu | - | Response |
| PM Ky | - | Report on the military and civilian programs in Viet-Nam, welcome to "new team" and thanks to the old |
| The President | - | Response to PM Ky's presentation |
| General Vien | - | Description of the military situation |
| General Westmoreland | - | Comments on military matters |
| The President | - | Discussed major developments, including political progress |
| Mr. Lilienthal | - | Spoke of U.S. cooperation in Viet-Nam's long-range economic development planning |
| Dr. Thuc | - | Described Vietnamese hopes and aspirations for economic development |

(Discussion of Vietnamese economic problems, including inflation and land reform. Principal participants were: the President, PM Ky, Minister Hahn and Mr. Komer).

- | | | |
|---------------|---|------------------|
| General Thieu | - | Closing remarks. |
|---------------|---|------------------|

(Second session, March 21, 1967)

- | | | |
|----------------------|---|--|
| President Johnson | - | Opening remarks |
| General Westmoreland | - | Description of U.S. military programs and problems, including military participation in pacification |
| Admiral Sharp | - | Review of military action against North Viet-Nam |
| Ambassador Lodge | - | Report on non-military programs |
| Mr. MacDonald | - | Agricultural programs, especially land reform |
| General Humphreys | - | medical programs for civilians and treatment of civilian casualties |
| President Johnson | - | Concluding remarks |

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-374
By ju, NARA, Date 1-29-93

Mr. Rostow

112

*sent thru
Mr Watson
+ copy
2. Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

March 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Maiwandwal's Schedule

It is my understanding that your meeting with Prime Minister Maiwandwal has been tentatively set for 12 noon, March 28th, with an official luncheon in the White House set for 1 o'clock. Since the formal reception ceremony will run between 20 and 25 minutes, this will leave less than 40 minutes for an exchange of views. I believe this to be too skimpy.

Prime Minister Maiwandwal is not one of the "Expo" visitors. He was invited by us early last year and was scheduled to come in November; but his visit had to be postponed because of his abdominal surgery in October. His country, though small, is in a highly exposed position on the southern frontier of the Soviet Union. He was Ambassador here for several years, and he and his Government are known to be pro-Western. But his economic ties are inevitably toward Russia.

He needs to be reassured that we do not take him for granted because he and his Ministers are generally pro-U.S.; and he has a number of specific problems to discuss. In order that you will have sufficient time to explore his problems without delaying the 1 o'clock luncheon, I ~~strongly~~ recommend that the reception ceremony begin at 11:30 instead of at 12 noon.

The briefing book will be available tomorrow in case you would like to see it ahead of time.

W. W. Rostow

11:30 O.K. _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, March 23, 1967 -- 4:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

3.3 (b)(1)

I had a good talk with our old friend [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He makes the following points.

1. Kiesinger himself never believed there was much to be gotten from Paris but felt the try was necessary to convince others of the limits of that relationship. There now is more widespread understanding that Paris cannot -- or will not -- advance serious German interests.

2. With respect to openings to the East, the Germans are finding, as might have been predicted, that the going will be long and slow. They will not despair of this policy; but they are increasingly conscious that the problem of German unity will not be solved soon; and that there are great resistances as well as historic opportunities in playing Eastern European nationalism and assertiveness.

3. Therefore, they have pretty well come to the judgment that they must rebuild their tie to the United States as the foundation for their policy over the near and middle future.

4. Kiesinger himself -- and almost certainly others such as Schroeder -- knew this from the beginning but they had to reckon with the pressures from Strauss, with respect to Paris, and Wehner, with respect to the East.

5. The coalition, while tolerably close to a consensus on the above, remains extremely uneasy politically. As we know, Kiesinger is presiding over a cabinet which contains at least three major contenders for the Chancellorship in 1969. He has a great vested interest in making this coalition a success. The others have a primary interest in their own emergence by 1969 and judge the success of the coalition on whether its success will advance or detract from their candidacy.

3.3 (b)(1)

6. [REDACTED] is that we should deal with Kiesinger as a man facing an extremely delicate political problem and not as a normal political leader with an assured domestic base of power. It is his assessment that Kiesinger's general orientation with respect to U. S. interests is good; but he is under pressures from elements in his coalition to make noises which are at best independent soundings, and, at times, almost anti-American. The case for compassion is not sentimental, so far as U. S. interests are

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

3.3
(b)(1)

concerned; it is that the most probable successor to a failure of the coalition, [REDACTED] is Strauss -- not Schroeder or Brandt. In particular, Strauss appears to be picking up support by taking a nationalist line on the non-proliferation treaty; and he hopes to build from his position as Finance Minister the paternity of a new phase of German revival and prosperity.

3.3
(b)(1)

7. [REDACTED] recommends that you do see Kiesinger some time before he is scheduled to see de Gaulle -- in June. (The Franco-German agreement requires that they meet at 6-month intervals.)

3.3
(b)(1)

8. [REDACTED] It is clear that Kiesinger found your letter to him constructive, but he was uncertain whether, in fact, you intended him to come by the end of May or thereabouts.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 23, 1967

114

Pres file
Chen

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Marvin Watson

We have been attempting to work out a mutually acceptable date for the visit of King Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit of Thailand. You approved an invitation to them to visit here in connection with their travel to Expo 67 in Montreal.

Our choice of dates has come down to June 27. Although Mrs. Johnson expects to be in Texas then, she would like to have a White House dinner in their honor in order to reciprocate their hospitality during your visit to Thailand last October. Mrs. Johnson has suggested that Lynda Bird or Mrs. Humphrey stand in for her at the dinner. Accordingly, your approval of the following schedule is requested:

Arrival ceremony (full military honors) --	5 PM
Office meeting --	5:30 PM
Dinner (Black tie) --	8 PM

W. W. Rostow

Approve schedule _____

Alternate hostess:

Lynda Bird _____

Mrs. Humphrey _____

Other _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 18, NARA, Date 4-22-91

Pres file

March 23, 1967

*3/23/67
sent thru
Marvin Watson
with file of corres.*

Dear Harold:

Walt Rostow has reported to me his two conversations with you; and I have read with interest your recommendations.

After your second conversation on February 16 we have assured that your ideas will be carefully staffed out.

May I say how grateful I am that you have taken the trouble to formulate these proposal and make them available to us.

Sincerely,

Honorable Harold E. Stassen
1020 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Building
Philadelphia 9, Pennsylvania

LBJ:WWRostow:rlh

Thurs., March 23, 1967
6:45 p.m.

F 116
—

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a well-based intelligence
report on Ky's attitude towards
negotiating with the NLF.

As usual, he's sensible.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 23, 1967

SUBJECT: Conditions under which Prime Minister Ky would be willing to negotiate with North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front

A South Vietnam official who has been a reliable reporter since mid-1963, obtained the following information from Prime Minister Ky personally:

During the period preceding and immediately following the Guam Conference, Prime Minister Ky made it clear to his closest associates that his position on the question of negotiations consists of six points, on three of which he is not prepared to yield under any circumstances.

The first of these rigid positions is that formation of a coalition government with the National Liberation Front cannot be a condition for any negotiations.

Secondly, the Government of Vietnam must be fully represented at negotiations, be they with North Vietnam or the National Front.

Thirdly, he is fully prepared to offer leading Front officials comparable positions in the Government of Vietnam but only on condition that each such official enters as an individual and not as a Liberation Front representative.

(Source Comment: In that connection, Ky has said that if Front Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho were to defect, he (Ky) would be pleased to have him in the Government and would be prepared to accept him as a thoroughly loyal member thereof. Ky also indicated, however, that he was aware that few Front officials would accept Government positions under those conditions.)

On the more positive side, Ky has indicated that he is definitely prepared to negotiate and to give ground on the question of Front participation, although he is not yet clear in his own mind what conditions he would impose on Front participation other than that North Vietnam would also have to be included in the negotiations.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By CS, NARA, Date 10-21-98

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

-2

The Prime Minister has also expressly indicated that his position on negotiations could become more liberal once the forthcoming national elections have taken place and after the new South Vietnamese Government has been established. His reasoning is that the very existence of a constitutional regime will enable the government to withstand the give-and-take that would be involved in relatively 'unconditional' negotiations.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-374
By pw, NARA, Date 1-29-93

Pres file ¹¹⁷

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, March 23, 1967
6:35 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Wheeler's report on the
state of the targets:

- Of 4 thermal power plants attacked,
only one covered by photography (Hon Gai);
pilot report hits on others.
- Steel plant perhaps 25% destroyed.
- Barracks. Pilots report damage.
- 2 explosives depots. Pilots report damage.
- 3 not yet attacked, not including 2 Haiphong
power plants cleared yesterday at lunch.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

CM-2194-67, 23 March 1967
Memo to the President from Gen. Wheeler
"Rolling Thunder 54 Target Status (U)"

WWRostow:rlh

117a

~~TOP SECRET~~



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CM-2194-67
23 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: ROLLING THUNDER 54 Target Status (U)

1. The following is a summary of the results of air operations against the targets in North Vietnam which you authorized on 22 February. This program consisted of five newly authorized targets and six unstruck targets carried over from previous authorizations.

<u>TGT #</u>	<u>NAME</u>
82.13	Hon Gai Thermal Power Plant
82.16	Thai Nguyen Thermal Power Plant
82.17	Viet Tri Thermal Power Plant
82.26	Bac Giang Thermal Power Plant
76	Thai Nguyen Steel Plant
22	Xuan Mai Barracks, SSW
39.44	Chi Ne Barracks
47.16	Hon Gai Explosives Storage
47.17	Cam Ly Ammunition Depot
47.21	Bac Giang Ammunition Depot
63.14	Son Tay Supply Depot

2. Of the above, the following have not yet been struck:

22	Xuan Mai Barracks, SSW
47.21	Bac Giang Ammunition Depot
63.14	Son Tay Supply Depot

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-373
By ing NARA, Date 3-27-92

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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Page 1 of 3 Pages

~~TOP SECRET~~

3. The status of targets struck through 23 March is shown below:

a. Hon Gai Thermal Power Plant (JCS 82.13) has been struck four times by a total of 15 A6s. The last strike was on 10 March. 11 March bomb damage assessment (BDA) photography (Tab A) indicates transformer and switching building and transformer yard destroyed, and extensive damage and destruction to remaining physical plant. Restoration of the Thermal Power Plant to full capacity is estimated to require about 18 months.

b. Viet Tri Thermal Power Plant (JCS 82.17) was struck twice by a total of 20 F105s and 4 F4s. The last strike was on 19 March. Pilots report the generator hall and boilerhouse burning.

c. Bac Giang Thermal Power Plant (JCS 82.26) has been struck four times by a total of 8 A6s. Pilots report heavy damage to target.

d. Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine (JCS 76.0) has been struck four times by a total of 56 F105s and 9 A6s. Last strike was on 21 March. BDA photography of 10 and 11 March (Tabs B and C) shows damage and destruction to approximately 14 per cent of targeted elements. The steel rolling mill under construction has been moderately damaged and the steampipes outside the generator hall are damaged. The last two strikes against this target have not been covered by photography; however, pilot reports indicate that approximately 25 per cent of the targeted elements have been destroyed.

e. Chi Ne Barracks (JCS 39.44) was struck on 28 February by 2 A6s. Pilots estimate heavy damage.

f. Hon Gai Explosives Storage (JCS 47.16) was struck twice by a total of 21 A4s and 4 F8s. Last strike was on 11 March. BDA photography of 11 March (Tab D) shows extensive damage and destruction to approximately 25 per cent of targeted area.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

g. Cam Ly Ammo Depot (JCS 47.17) was struck on 10 March by 15 A4s and 2 F8s. Pilots report extensive damage and secondary explosions.

h. Thai Nguyen Thermal Power Plant (JCS 82.16) was struck on 19 March by 3 F105s. Pilots report damage to generator hall and boilerhouse.

4. Weather during the period of ROLLING THUNDER 54 has been unusually bad. Of the 110 strikes which have been scheduled against ROLLING THUNDER 54 targets, over 90 have been cancelled or diverted because of bad weather. The Thai Nguyen Steel Plant, for example, was scheduled to be struck 51 times, with 47 weather cancellations or diversions. Moreover, 25 per cent of the sorties flown against ROLLING THUNDER 54 targets have been conducted with A6 aircraft using full or partial all-weather system runs.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET NOFORN DISSEM~~
EXCEPT UK, CAN, AST & NZ

JCS 82.13
NORTH VIETNAM
HON GAI THERMAL POWER PLANT
20 56 28N 107 06 50E



PREPARED BY THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIAAP-9 (3-67-23)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-373

By 118 NARA. Date 3-27-92


~~SECRET NOFORN DISSEM~~
EXCEPT UK, CAN, AST & NZ

1176

~~SECRET NOFORN DISSEM~~
EXCEPT UK, CAN, AST & NZ

JCS 76
NORTH VIETNAM
THAI NGUYEN IRON AND STEEL COMBINE
21 33 42N 105 52 08E

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-373
By Li8 NARA. Date 3-27-92



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DIAAP-9 (3-67-21)

~~SECRET NOFORN DISSEM~~
EXCEPT UK, CAN, AST & NZ

117c

~~SECRET NOFORN DISSEM~~
EXCEPT UK, CAN, AST & NZ
GP 3

JCS 76
NORTH VIETNAM
THAI NGUYEN IRON AND STEEL COMBINE
21 33 42N 105 52 08E




FIRST POST STRIKE



SECOND POST STRIKE



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DIAAP-9 (3-67-23)



MSN: UE, YI 34 11 DATE: 11 MAR 67 FRM: RL, LVN 1-4

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-373
By ing NARA. Date 3-27-92


~~SECRET NOFORN DISSEM~~
EXCEPT UK, CAN, AST & NZ

117-2

~~SECRET NOFORN DISSEM~~
EXCEPT UK, CAN, AST & NZ

JCS 47.16
NORTH VIETNAM
HON GAI EXPLOSIVE STORAGE
20 59 09N 107 06 39E

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-373
By isg NARA. Date 3-27-92



MSN: UE 482 Q DATE: 11 MAR 67 FRM: PAN 12



PREPARED BY THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIAAP-9 (3 67-24)

~~SECRET NOFORN DISSEM~~
EXCEPT UK, CAN, AST & NZ

117-2

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, March 23, 1967
6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith State's intelligence
folk list all the theories but end
up -- like the rest of us -- scratching
their heads.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By ry, NARA, Date 4-22-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECEIVED
 MAR 23 1 00 PM '67
 U.S.C.

Intelligence Note - 231

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

March 22, 1967

To : The Secretary
 Through: S/S
 From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. *H.C.D.*

Rostow

Subject : Why Did Hanoi Release the Johnson-Ho Correspondence?

The DRV Foreign Ministry's release on March 21 of correspondence between President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh is an unusual departure from Hanoi's previous behavior pattern. The motivation for the release probably lies in Hanoi's estimate that political and military control of the situation was slipping away and that something had to be done to redress the balance. Hanoi may have hoped to achieve a bombing cessation, or at least a prolonged bombing pause, in response to the Trinh statement that there could be no talks without a bombing cessation. When this did not materialize, it undoubtedly hoped for an uproar of world opinion against US resumption of the bombing. Instead, there was hardly any reaction. Faced with the likelihood that US military pressures would intensify following the Guam conference, Hanoi felt itself under a variety of compulsions to do something to reverse the situation and put the pressure back on the US.

Guam May Have Prompted Fears of New Escalation

To Hanoi, it may have appeared that the Guam Conference was called to approve great intensification of US war efforts. Hanoi may have been worried because certain new steps (the shelling of the DMZ, the naval shore bombardment, the minings and the bombing of the Thai Nguyen Steel Plant) had taken place before the Guam Conference. What further measures, Hanoi may have asked itself, was the Guam Conference called to approve?

Given its genuine fear, and its obdurate belief that everything it says is ipso facto just -- and anything that the US says is self-evident hypocrisy -- Hanoi may have

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GROUP 1
 Excluded from automatic
 downgrading and

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DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NLJ 91-376
 By *ing* NARA. Date *4-6-92*

released the letters to "prove" the reasonableness of its stand on negotiations, and to arouse world opinion against intensification of the war with a ringing denunciation of all US military actions taken thus far. Hanoi may well be blind to the fact that the actual substance of the notes they have published can improve the US posture in world opinion and hurt their own.

President's Reference to Unopened Note May Have Put Hanoi on the Defensive

The timing of the publication may also have been inspired by the President's reference last week to hitherto unpublished information -- the incident of the American note of May 1965 that Hanoi returned unopened. This revelation undercut the image of reasonableness on the issue of negotiations that Hanoi is now trying so hard to project in order to further its pressure on the US. Hanoi may have been angered by this action and moved to retaliate in kind. It may even have feared further revelations and moved to pre-empt them by providing the basic information on at least this exchange, and by dressing it up in pro-Hanoi clothing. It may be that added pressure was put on Hanoi by the apprehension that some initiative by U Thant might do further damage to the image of Hanoi's "reasonableness."

Pressure From Peking Likely; Shift of Hanoi Alignment Not.

It does not seem likely that this move reflects a shift in Hanoi's ties with Moscow or Peking. This complex triangular relationship, so full of ambiguities and difficulties, changes very slowly and only with considerable reason, if the record of the past years is any guide. In this instance, though it cited Moscow as the location of the note transfer, the Hanoi regime did not actually compromise the Soviet government. Instead, approval of Moscow as a site for exchanging notes is actually implicit in Hanoi's indication that it was prepared to accept the note, open it, and reply to it.

While the Chinese undoubtedly have been exerting considerable pressure upon Hanoi not to negotiate, it is still doubtful whether the release of the correspondence is attributable to any rapid rise in Chinese influence at Soviet expense. The Chinese conceivably have been using a carrot-and-stick technique on Hanoi: as carrot,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a suggestion of modifying the Cultural Revolution and reducing the acerbity of Sino-Soviet polemics,* as stick, a threat that the Chinese might shut off Soviet aid and possibly meddle in DRV internal affairs.** Nevertheless, the North Vietnamese need Russian and Eastern European assistance more than ever, as is shown by the large food shipments over the past three months, added to a high level of other aid. Further, Hanoi has been concerned over the Cultural Revolution, with its irrationalities and potential dangers for the NVN war effort. Though Hanoi's fears have been partially assuaged, the recent respite in China can hardly reassure Hanoi sufficiently to cause it to shift its delicately balanced relationship with Moscow and Peking in favor of the latter. It is evidence of continuing balance that despite Hanoi's harsh language and recent use on March 22 of Chinese-like phrases calling for "unconditional withdrawal," Hanoi has not rescinded the Trinh statement. This statement stands even though the Chinese have kept up a steady barrage condemning peace talks and on February 20 specifically argued that "stopping the bombing is not enough."

Hanoi's current language and its disclosure of the notes thus may have been intended to maintain the balance between Moscow and Peking by moving in form more than in substance toward Peking, so as to redress what the Chinese may have successfully argued was an excessively pro-Soviet leaning.

Hanoi Possibly Worried About Credibility of Will to Persist

Yet another purpose of Hanoi's release of the correspondence may have been fears that the US would attempt to take advantage militarily or politically of Hanoi's new "softer" position put forth in the Trinh interview of January 28. The Trinh position, combined with widespread publicity in the West of captured documents indicating existence of serious VC difficulties may have caused Hanoi to feel that its image as a

*The last Chinese demonstration in front of the Soviet Embassy took place on February 12, about the time that a DRV delegation arrived in Peking.

** We doubt reports such as that made by an Indian that the Chinese had warned that if the DRV proceeded with negotiations there would be a coup in Hanoi. It seems possible, however, that waverers in Hanoi are uneasy on this issue.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

country ready and willing to fight "5, 10, or 20 years" needed sprucing up. This desire may have been reinforced furthermore, by fears that the Trinh position may be undercutting the morale of the extremist Viet Cong cadre.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - March 23, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: OAS Summit: Scheduling your arrival and departure

The Uruguayan Government is firming up the schedule for Presidential arrivals in Montevideo. It has set one-hour periods from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on Monday and Tuesday, April 10 and 11, for arrivals. The Presidents have been asked to indicate their choice. Each President will be met by President Gestido and receive full military honors (45 minute ceremony).

Your best choices are either 12:00 noon or 6:00 p.m. on Tuesday, April 11 (if we stay within the hours set by the Uruguayan Government).

The noon arrival has these advantages:

- We can probably arrange to have prominent Latin American Presidents (e. g., Frei and Diaz Ordaz) bracket your arrival. This will heighten public interest.
- The "controlled" airport crowd will have more pep at this hour than later on.
- It would put you in Punta del Este by 1:30 p.m.; in time to lunch, rest for a couple of hours, and have several bilateral talks with other Presidents which otherwise would have to be crammed into the following two working days.

But the noon arrival has this disadvantage:

- A midnight departure from Washington.

The 6:00 p.m. arrival has these advantages:

- It would allow an early morning departure with an all day-light flight.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- Reduce the amount of time you will be in Punta del Este by half a working day.

But it has these disadvantages:

- You would be the last President to arrive and in some quarters this will be looked upon as the king arriving after all the minions are in place.
- The airport reception ceremonies and crowd will probably be pretty jaded after two full days of activities.
- It would not be possible to bracket your arrival between prominent, democratic Latin American Presidents, although we might arrange for one to arrive before you at 5:00 p.m. (The 4:00 p.m. slot has already been reserved for Argentine President Ongania.)

We need to reserve your arrival time as soon as possible. I recommend that you approve a 12:00 noon arrival on Tuesday, April 11.

Prefer 12:00 noon, April 11 _____

Prefer 6:00 p.m., April 11 _____

Speak to me _____

The alternatives for the return trip are:

- depart from Montevideo with a partial fuel load and stop along the way to refuel (e.g., Surinam, Guyana or Trinidad); or
- Convair from Punta del Este to the Buenos Aires airfield, ^{and} with a full fuel load, ~~and~~ fly non-stop to Andrews or Randolph.

There are no protocol or political problems in your flying from Punta del Este to the Buenos Aires airfield to change planes and take off immediately.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

You might want to consider making a refueling stop in Georgetown, Guyana. Prime Minister Burnham will not be at the OAS Summit. A stop there would return the visit he made to Washington last year. More important, it would give Burnham a political boost he needs vis-a-vis Cheddi Jagan. Getting a crowd out to Atkinson Field (28 miles from Georgetown) will take some doing, but it can probably be accomplished.

If you prefer a refueling stop without ceremonies, Surinam (Dutch Guiana) would be ideal. I do not recommend Trinidad since Prime Minister Williams will be at Punta del Este and he will not be back in his country by the time you make your refueling stop.

Prefer non-stop flight
from Buenos Aires _____

Prefer stop at
Georgetown _____

Prefer stop at Surinam
(no ceremony) _____

Speak to me _____.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

Thursday, March 23, 1967
4:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Prime Minister
Wilson's reply to your message of
yesterday.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12526, Sec. 2.4(b)
White House, OMB, Dec. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 4-16-91

WWRostow:rlm

120a

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

Thursday, March 23, 1967

TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM THE PRIME MINISTER:

Many thanks for your latest message. I shall see Pat Dean again before he returns and am glad that you will be able to have a good talk with him.

I am also glad to have your confirmation that the offers made during our talks with Kosygin remain open. Our people will, of course, be ready to exchange impressions with yours about current North Vietnamese intentions.

I am greatly looking forward to seeing the Vice President. He can rely on receiving a warm welcome here.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By C6, NARA, Date 10-21-98

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

61

Thursday, March 23, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Response to Korean President
Park's Letter

Attached at Tab A is a suggested letter from you to President Park of Korea in response to his letter of March 8, 1967 (Tab B).

The proposed response deals with several specific matters raised in Park's letter to you and discussed more fully during Prime Minister Chung's visit. It responds sympathetically but not definitively, pointing out that our government is now examining these matters and that we shall be in touch when the studies are finished.

I recommend that you sign the letter.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

~~SECRET~~

March 23, 1967

121a

Dear Mr. President:

All of us here were delighted to have the Prime Minister here for a visit, and to talk with him and his colleagues on a variety of subjects in which we have a common interest. We now have a better understanding of your main concerns and problems, and I think the Prime Minister and his party left with a better understanding of ours.

The various departments are now examining the matters which were raised and we shall be in touch with your government when we have finished these studies. As I told the Prime Minister, we cannot help in all respects, but I assure you that we shall do what we can.

In your letter of March 8, you spoke of your desire to do more in the civilian area in Viet Nam and to help in the pacification program. The 120 Korean medical people working in the provinces on health programs are doing excellent work, as are the several thousand Koreans on various contract projects. Specific new projects in which a Korean effort would be both practical and beneficial are under study, and our people will soon be discussing these with your officials and the Vietnamese government. There are certain problems: the South Vietnamese capacity to absorb additional ventures, the inflationary impact of these projects, the shortage of housing, the dollar and piastre resources available to support these projects, et cetera. Still I believe we can work something out.

I fully understand the desire of your men in the field to enjoy familiar rations. That is the way it has always been with soldiers throughout history. Therefore, I have asked Secretary McNamara to work out with your officials a way to meet your request that the Korean forces be supplied with "kimchi."

We have already taken steps to meet your desire to have your forces in Viet Nam supplied with more modern equipment. A Korean-manned helicopter company will be operating in South Viet Nam by this summer. Distribution of the new rifle

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-374

By fw, NARA, Date 1-29-93

to your combat maneuver elements has been authorized and will be completed within the next few months. Secretary McNamara is looking into the other suggestions made to him by your Minister of Defense.

As you know, we have just returned from Guam. The primary purpose of the meeting was to permit our new diplomatic team to become acquainted with those whom they will succeed; for all of us to take stock of the situation, as we periodically do every six months or so; and thus to assure a smooth transition. We informed the Government of Viet Nam that we would be there and told them they would be welcome, if it were convenient, although we would understand if their current pre-occupations made it impossible for them to come. They chose to join us and used the occasion to accelerate the work in the Constituent Assembly and in the Directorate on the constitution. Prime Minister Ky was, therefore, able to present us with a copy of the new constitution.

All of us committed to the defense of South Viet Nam should, I believe, feel a real sense of satisfaction at the evolution of constitutional politics in South Viet Nam. I am told that the constitution reflects elements from the constitution of South Korea; and, even more important, I am sure the leadership in South Viet Nam is inspired by the success of South Korea in moving towards constitutional government since 1961.

It will be a very great achievement, indeed, if our friends in South Viet Nam can carry through successfully the election schedule of the next six months.

As you know, military operations are proceeding with steady success. There is much evidence of pressure on both the main forces and the guerrilla infrastructure. But none of us can state with confidence when the enemy effort will collapse.

We remain ready to respond to any effort that might lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict which safeguards the independence and territorial integrity of South Viet Nam. We have wide support in Asia and elsewhere in what you and we and our allies are doing. Meanwhile, we must continue to maintain the pressure, and we may need to step it up with additional forces.

~~SECRET~~

-3-

We will all have a chance to review these matters together and take stock at the meeting of the troop contributing countries in Washington, April 20-21.

But I would take this occasion to say that your contribution has been a mighty one, for which we are all grateful. You and I know what resolution and courage are needed to make these hard decisions. But we are trying to prevent a third world war. We are trying to create conditions for a durable peace in Asia. We are trying to help the Asian nations and Asian people get for themselves a chance to live in peace and freedom. These are great aims, and they will require a great and sustained effort.

Sincerely,

LBJ

His Excellency
Chung Hee Park
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul

LBJ:State:AJenkins:WWR:mz

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 23, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

All of us here were delighted to have the Prime Minister here for a visit, and to talk with him and his colleagues on a variety of subjects in which we have a common interest. We now have a better understanding of your main concerns and problems, and I think the Prime Minister and his party left with a better understanding of ours.

The various departments are now examining the matters which were raised and we shall be in touch with your government when we have finished these studies. As I told the Prime Minister, we cannot help in all respects, but I assure you that we shall do what we can.

In your letter of March 8, you spoke of your desire to do more in the civilian area in Viet Nam and to help in the pacification program. The 120 Korean medical people working in the provinces on health programs are doing excellent work, as are the several thousand Koreans on various contract projects. Specific new projects in which a Korean effort would be both practical and beneficial are under study, and our people will soon be discussing these with your officials and the Vietnamese government. There are certain problems: the South Vietnamese capacity to absorb additional ventures, the inflationary impact of these projects, the shortage of housing, the dollar and piastre resources available to support these projects, et cetera. Still I believe we can work something out.

I fully understand the desire of your men in the field to enjoy familiar rations. That is the way it has always been with soldiers throughout history. Therefore, I have asked Secretary McNamara to work out with your officials a way to meet your request that the Korean forces be supplied with "kimchi."

We have already taken steps to meet your desire to have your forces in Viet Nam supplied with more modern equipment. A Korean-manned helicopter company will be operating in South Viet Nam by this summer. Distribution of the new rifle

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-374
By fw, NARA, Date 1-29-93

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-2-

to your combat maneuver elements has been authorized and will be completed within the next few months. Secretary McNamara is looking into the other suggestions made to him by your Minister of Defense.

As you know, we have just returned from Guam. The primary purpose of the meeting was to permit our new diplomatic team to become acquainted with those whom they will succeed; for all of us to take stock of the situation, as we periodically do every six months or so; and thus to assure a smooth transition. We informed the Government of Viet Nam that we would be there and told them they would be welcome, if it were convenient, although we would understand if their current pre-occupations made it impossible for them to come. They chose to join us and used the occasion to accelerate the work in the Constituent Assembly and in the Directorate on the constitution. Prime Minister Ky was, therefore, able to present us with a copy of the new constitution.

All of us committed to the defense of South Viet Nam should, I believe, feel a real sense of satisfaction at the evolution of constitutional politics in South Viet Nam. I am told that the constitution reflects elements from the constitution of South Korea; and, even more important, I am sure the leadership in South Viet Nam is inspired by the success of South Korea in moving towards constitutional government since 1961.

It will be a very great achievement, indeed, if our friends in South Viet Nam can carry through successfully the election schedule of the next six months.

As you know, military operations are proceeding with steady success. There is much evidence of pressure on both the main forces and the guerrilla infrastructure. But none of us can state with confidence when the enemy effort will collapse.

We remain ready to respond to any effort that might lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict which safeguards the independence and territorial integrity of South Viet Nam. We have wide support in Asia and elsewhere in what you and we and our allies are doing. Meanwhile, we must continue to maintain the pressure, and we may need to step it up with additional forces.

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
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-3-

We will all have a chance to review these matters together and take stock at the meeting of the troop contributing countries in Washington, April 20-21.

But I would take this occasion to say that your contribution has been a mighty one, for which we are all grateful. You and I know what resolution and courage are needed to make these hard decisions. But we are trying to prevent a third world war. We are trying to create conditions for a durable peace in Asia. We are trying to help the Asian nations and Asian people get for themselves a chance to live in peace and freedom. These are great aims, and they will require a great and sustained effort.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "Lyndon B. Johnson", with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

His Excellency
Chung Hee Park
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul

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Pres. file

Thursday, March 23, 1967
12:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith George Carver's
good notes on Guam.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
Cipola 12-21-75
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *kg*, NARA, Date *4-16-9*

WWRostow:rln



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

1252
SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-65 appeal
By cb, NARA Date 1-21-01

23 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Working Notes

1. Per your request I have transcribed the rough notes I took at the 20 March joint US-Vietnamese session and the 21 March US-only session of the Guam Conference. Since you asked for as complete an account as I could reconstruct, I have fleshed these notes out somewhat from memory, but only where I am positive my memory is accurate.

2. Mr. Helms and I agreed prior to the conference sessions that I would jot down notes on matters of direct or indirect Agency interest so we would be in a position to guide Agency programs to support the President's policies or follow up on any topics on which the Agency could make a contribution. It was never our intent to make a transcript and in making these notes I had no thought of endeavoring to use them in an attempt to reconstruct the full proceedings of the two sessions in question. Thus, while I did of course try to be accurate, I made no effort to be comprehensive. Consequently, though to the best of my belief the attached resumes are accurate, neither one pretends to be complete.

3. In the interests of speed and legibility, I had the corrected version of the transcript I dictated put on mats. Only three copies were made, however, and the mats were then all destroyed. Thus there are only three

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(~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~)

copies of this document now in existence. One is the attached copy for you. The second, at your request, is being sent to Mr. Read with a copy of this covering memorandum. The third is in my personal safe to be seen by no one save me and Mr. Helms.

G. A. Carver, Jr.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

One Copy Only to: Mr. Benjamin Read
Executive Secretary
Department of State

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~~SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Working Notes on First Day's Session
of Guam Conference

TIME : 1500-1730, 20 March 1967

PLACE : Conference Room, COMNAV/Marianas
Headquarters Building

PARTICIPANTS: See attached lists

THE PRESIDENT opened the session by welcoming the Vietnamese delegation and noting that one of the main objectives of the conference was to provide him with the opportunity to introduce to the Vietnamese representatives the new American team which would soon be taking over in Vietnam. He then introduced Ambassador Bunker, Ambassador Locke, and Mr. Robert Komer. During the course of these introductory remarks, THE PRESIDENT expressed high praise for Ambassador Lodge and the work he had done in Vietnam. THE PRESIDENT then stressed the importance of the constitutional process now in train in Vietnam and the drafting work of the Constituent Assembly. He also underlined the importance of the task of preparing for and holding elections which would give SVN a truly democratic government with a popular base. This stress on the constitutional and electoral process of nation-building set the tone and theme for the entire session.

General Thieu (Chairman of the National Leadership Council and South Vietnam's present Chief of State) opened the Vietnamese presentation. He thanked President Johnson warmly for the latter's initial remarks and his support for the cause of Vietnamese independence. General Thieu added that the trend of the war was now running in our favor. The enemy, frustrated in the military field, was shifting his emphasis to the political front. Gen. Thieu felt that in the military area stronger pressure ought to be put on North Vietnam in order to persuade the Hanoi regime to cease its aggression in South Vietnam. Gen. Thieu then turned to

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the substantial results and progress that had been achieved in Vietnam since the Honolulu conference, noting that his remarks would be general and that Prime Minister Ky would provide amplifying details. He called attention to the Constituent Assembly elections held in September 1966 and to the work of that assembly as tangible proof of the kind of progress that had been made. He said the drafting of the constitution had been completed and the constitution would be promulgated within a few weeks. He noted that elections for village and hamlet councils would be held next month (i.e., April), promised that SVN would have a popularly elected government by the fall of 1967, and that "by the end of this year" would be well on the road to constitutional democracy. Gen. Thieu then asked his prime minister, Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, to make a detailed report on the present situation and progress in South Vietnam.

General Ky also expressed his personal pleasure and that of his government at the opportunity to confer with the President of the United States and the President's advisers on the situation in Vietnam. The full text of Ky's remarks is separately available and hence those remarks will not be recapitulated in detail here. Ky spoke of national reconciliation, of Revolutionary Development and constitutional progress, proudly waving a copy of the final draft of the new constitution handed him a few hours before he boarded the plane for Guam. He said that document was "now as good as the law of the land." The theme and principal thrust of Ky's presentation is summarized in his statement, "We are going to do everything possible to make our nation whole again. We are striving to provide an atmosphere in which all our citizens can have respect for himself, his fellow citizen, and his government and its institutions." Taken in context, his comments about the Front (no coalition) and the need to keep pressure on Hanoi contained nothing a potential Vietnamese presidential candidate would not have had to say. They did not--as the press inaccurately reported--strike a jarring note out of harmony with American views. Ky concluded by paying tribute to

the American soldier and by welcoming Ambassador Bunker, Ambassador Locke, and Mr. Komer to Vietnam.

THE PRESIDENT thanked Chairman Thieu and Prime Minister Ky for their fine presentation of the situation in Vietnam and the progress being made there. He welcomed the Vietnamese achievements both in the military field and, particularly, in the field of nation-building. He stressed strongly the US Government's desire to see the pacification effort intensified. THE PRESIDENT also stressed the need for close military and civilian coordination--both US and Vietnamese-- in this all-important pacification effort.

General Cao Van Vien (GVN Minister of National Defense) then gave a briefing on the military situation in South Vietnam. He noted that the Communists were under increased pressure and were suffering battlefield defeats. The Viet Cong, he observed, were trying desperately to regain stature by local initiatives such as the attack made on 15 February in Quang Ngai Province. The Viet Cong were also steadily increasing their use of rockets, mortars, and recoilless rifles in an effort to inflict psychologically impressive damage on Vietnamese and allied forces. General Vien observed that over the ensuing weeks and months the Viet Cong (VC) will probably adopt a three-fold strategy involving:

(1) Increased attacks on Vietnamese and allied base camps and installations in order to increase GVN and allied commitments of troops to static defense duties.

(2) Increased attacks on Revolutionary Development teams because the Communists feel it essential to thwart these teams' effectiveness.

(3) Increased attacks on district and provincial headquarters in order to terrorize local Vietnamese leaders, generate political pressure, and thwart South Vietnamese political development.

General Vien then presented a detailed view of current Republic of Vietnam and Free World armed forces' actions.

Following this, General Vien discussed the Vietnamese Army's wholehearted commitment to the support of the Revolutionary Development (RD) program, emphasizing that the GVN's military leaders completely understood this essential task. General Vien observed that the increasing level of attacks on RD teams proved that the RD effort was hurting the Communist cause and driving the VC to desperate measures.

General Vien stated that the primary mission of the Vietnamese and allied armed forces was three-fold:

- (1) To defeat the enemy's military force
- (2) To surge ahead in Revolutionary Development
- (3) To halt infiltration and the movement of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.

General Vien concluded his remarks with some specific comments on the infiltration problem, observing that the Communists could never be defeated so long as they were able to bring a continuing flow of supplies and manpower into the South. He noted that South Vietnam had a 935-mile border with Cambodia and Laos, a border that was ill-defined and impossible to make secure against infiltration. In order to stop this infiltration, the GVN had a specific proposal they wished to offer for American consideration, namely, that of placing forces along the alignment of Route 9 from the Vietnamese border to the Mekong River. The GVN was not proposing a Maginot Line, but, instead, a series of interlocking strong points created by an aggressive deployment of ground troops. The GVN recognized the political difficulties involved in this proposal and the problem it would create in regard to the 1962 Geneva agreement in Laos. Nevertheless,

the GVN felt that it was a practical plan and noted that the Communists' use of Laotian territory itself constituted a complete violation of the 1962 agreements, and hence, an act of naked aggression which the Communists' opponents were perfectly justified in countering.*

THE PRESIDENT thanked General Vien for his review of the military situation and asked General Westmoreland if the latter had any additional comments to make.**

General Westmoreland added that the Communist enemy unquestionably had increasing problems. There was no evidence that the enemy's strategy was changing but his tactics were modified from time to time. His losses had doubled during the course of the preceding year. The enemy now had 54 maneuver battalions but only half of these were fully combat effective. Vietnamese and allied progress was obvious and was supported by much tangible evidence. For example, 18 percent more of SVN's road net was now open to daily traffic. Out of the entire ARVN, US advisers rate only seven battalions as not being fully combat effective at this time, and General Westmoreland was assured that this number would be reduced to zero in the near future. There was a steady and noticeable improvement in South Vietnamese combat leadership and performance. General Westmoreland also observed that there was a steady improvement

*Subsequent press comment indicated that General Vien was talking in terms of a five-division force, but my notes make no reference to specific numbers of troops and to the best of my recollection no mention of numbers was actually made in this context at the 20 March Joint Session.

**Both my notes and my memory indicate that the Vietnamese Route 9 proposal was not mentioned or discussed by any American speaker at the 20 March Joint Session.

in the pacification situation, particularly in the area immediately around Saigon. There was, in short, much to be encouraged about. What was most needed now was still better positive work on our side coupled with even more pressure on the enemy.

THE PRESIDENT took up the theme of national reconciliation and the Vietnamese Government's program in this all-important sphere. He expressed his gratification at the fact that our Vietnamese allies manifestly felt the same urgency on this matter as did we.

THE PRESIDENT congratulated Chairman Thieu and Prime Minister Ky on Vietnam's constitution and its successful completion. He expressed his personal appreciation at the sense of urgency obviously felt by Chairman Thieu and Prime Minister Ky with regard to constitutional development.

THE PRESIDENT also welcomed the account of South Vietnam's progress toward elections. There followed an exchange of comments during which Ky again promised to move forward on elections with all possible speed, saying that he hoped the presidential and senatorial elections could be held by mid-August. THE PRESIDENT noted that his birthday was on August 27 and said he could ask for no finer birthday present than an elected president and senate in Vietnam.

THE PRESIDENT, again referring by name to the members of his new team, assured the Vietnamese delegation that the best men available in our country would be sent to help the Vietnamese people in their task of building a free nation. He also assured the Vietnamese that General Westmoreland would be given whatever he needed, wanted, and could use in the task of defeating the Communist enemy. The very best men who wore the uniform of the United States would be sent to Vietnam to help the Vietnamese defend their freedom.

THE PRESIDENT noted how fine it was to watch a democracy being built and how anxious the United States was to assist in this exciting task. THE PRESIDENT stressed the need for stability,

complimenting the present Vietnamese leaders on the amount of stability they had brought to Vietnam during their period of trusteeship. He observed jovially that "you seem to be doing a better job of maintaining unity than I am," and used this well-received jest as a means for underlining the paramount importance of the Vietnamese military establishment's remaining unified.

THE PRESIDENT then again praised the work of Ambassador Lodge in helping the Vietnamese along their road to political democracy. He commented that he was going to ask Ambassador Lodge to become his ambassador-at-large so that the Ambassador could explain to the American people the fine things the Vietnamese were doing and so that his counsel would continue to be available.

THE PRESIDENT then turned to the subject of long-term planning, noting that since victory was on the way despite present difficulties, it was urgently important to begin now to make plans for the future. He invited Dr. Lilienthal to speak on what was being done in the post-war planning field.

Dr. Lilienthal stressed the importance of the task. He briefly reviewed the ideas and plans he has blocked out in concert with his Vietnamese colleagues, particularly his counterpart Dr. Vu Quoc Thuc (The GVN's Director of Post-War Planning).

Vu Quoc Thuc replied to Dr. Lilienthal's remarks on behalf of the Vietnamese delegation. He praised Dr. Lilienthal highly and, on behalf of the Vietnamese people and government, thanked The President for making Dr. Lilienthal's assistance available. He noted that he and Dr. Lilienthal had very similar views, which made working together a pleasure. Dr. Thuc explained it was difficult to do post-war planning when one did not know for sure whether to plan in terms of an isolated South Vietnam sealed off from the North or in terms of at least a limited amount of trade and commerce with South Vietnam's northern neighbor. He assured the President that the Vietnamese were working hard to develop responsible programs capable of meeting the needs of the post-war future.

THE PRESIDENT then took up the subject of inflation and the critical need for land reform.

Mr. Komer called attention to the economic agreements recently concluded with the GVN, which would help in the anti-inflation field.

Mr. Hahn (Governor of the National Bank and recently named Minister of Economy and Finance) replied to Mr. Komer's remarks and assured the President of the GVN's continued cooperation in the all-important field.*

Prime Minister Ky assured the President that the GVN was well aware of the importance of land reform and of pressing further in this area as rapidly as possible. He noted that there were a number of complicated administrative problems, including the fact that Vietnamese law required detailed surveys before titles could be issued and in many areas security considerations precluded making the kind of survey the law requires. He said he had decided to cut through the red tape in this sphere and accept certification by hamlet and village councils that peasants owned given plots of land.

Chairman Thieu closed the session by reassuring the President and his colleagues, including General Westmoreland, that the Vietnamese would concentrate on both the military and the civilian side of the conflict and had every confidence in making continued progress. In these closing remarks, Chairman Thieu referred once more to the Route 9 proposal.

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Cautionary Comment: The above resumé of the 20 March Joint Session was based on rough notes I scribbled while the session was in progress, amplified by memory whenever I was certain my memory was accurate. These notes were made solely for my use and that of Mr. Helms in refreshing our memories on the topics covered so we could see how the Agency could best deploy its resources in order to support the President's programs. Though the above resumé is accurate to the best of my recollection and belief, it is not complete. In taking these notes, I never intended for them to be used in an attempt to reconstruct the entire proceedings.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

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JOINT CONFERENCE SESSION
MONDAY, MARCH 20
AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS

AT THE TABLE

1. THE PRESIDENT
2. SECRETARY RUSK
3. SECRETARY MCNAMARA
4. GENERAL WHEELER
5. AMBASSADOR LODGE
6. AMBASSADOR BUNKER
7. GENERAL WESTMORELAND
8. GOVERNOR HARRIMAN
9. ADMIRAL SHARP
10. MR. GAUD

BEHIND THE TABLE

- | | |
|---------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. MR. LILIENTHAL | 14. COLONEL GINSBURGH |
| 2. MR. UNGER | 15. GENERAL HUMPHREYS |
| 3. MR. HELMS | 16. MR. MCGOWAN |
| 4. AMBASSADOR LOCKE | 17. MR. CALHOUN |
| 5. MR. HAEIB | 18. GENERAL MOMYER |
| 6. MR. ROSTOW | 19. MR. READ |
| 7. MR. KOMER | 20. MR. CARVER |
| 8. GENERAL TAYLOR | 21. MR. JORDEN |
| 9. MR. MCNAUGHTON | 22. MR. JONES |
| 10. MR. ZORTHIAN | 23. MR. MCPHERSON |
| 11. MR. LATHRAM | 24. MR. JACOBSEN |
| 12. MR. MACDONALD | 25. GENERAL BROWN |
| 13. MR. CHRISTIAN | 26. LT COLONEL MONTAGUE |

Others to be available on call outside the conference room.

JOINT CONFERENCE SESSION
MONDAY, MARCH 20
VIETNAMESE PARTICIPANTS

AT THE TABLE

1. MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN VAN THIEU, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COUNCIL
2. AIR VICE MARSHAL NGUYEN CAO KY, CHAIRMAN, CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
3. LT GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
4. H.E.M. TRAN VAN DO, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
5. BRIG GENERAL NGUYEN BAO TRI, MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND OPEN ARMS
6. BRIG GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG, MINISTER OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
7. H.E.M. NGUYEN HUU HANH, MINISTER OF ECONOMY AND FINANCE
8. AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM
9. MR. VU QUOC THUC, DIRECTOR OF POST-WAR PLANNING
10. MR. NGUYEN NGOC LINH, GENERAL DIRECTOR VIETNAM PRESS

In the event two members of the Constituent Assembly are included in the Vietnamese party, they would replace Thuc and Linh at the table. Linh and Thuc would then be seated in the chairs behind the table.

BEHIND THE TABLE

1. LE QUANG GIAN, CHIEF OF CABINET, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
2. MAJOR NGUYEN QUOC QUYNH, G-3, JOINT GENERAL STAFF
3. LT COL PHAN VAN MINH, CHIEF, CABINET, PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
4. NGUYEN PHU DUC, DIRECTOR OF PROTOCOL, LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE
5. MAJOR LE NGOC DAU, GENERAL THIEU'S AIDE
6. CAPTAIN NGHIEM XUAN LANH, PREMIERE KY'S AIDE
7. CAPTAIN LAM DUY HAU, GENERAL TRI'S AIDE
8. GENERAL THANG'S AIDE
9. LT QUACH TINH CAN, VIEN'S AIDE

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SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Working Notes on US Delegation Session
of Guam Conference

TIME : 1030-1415, 21 March 1967

PLACE : Conference Room, COMNAV/Marianas
Headquarters Building

PARTICIPANTS: US Delegation only. All US officials
attending the joint session were there,
plus some others whose names I did not
record.

THE PRESIDENT opened the meeting by giving a brief
resumé of the 20 March joint session. "Yesterday," he observed, we had heard the Vietnamese
report on their efforts and progress. "Today,"
we would take stock of our own efforts. THE
PRESIDENT then asked General Westmoreland to give
a report on the US military effort.

General Westmoreland opened by noting that 70 percent
of South Vietnam was covered by jungle or by marsh-
land. Eighty percent of the South Vietnamese
people lived on 40 percent of the country's ter-
ritory, and 40 percent of the country's territory
was virtually unpopulated. All of this meant the
guerrilla enemy had many places to hide and was
able to operate in a terrain environment advanta-
geous to him.

General Westmoreland also noted that the eastern
part of Laos, particularly the eastern part of the
so-called "panhandle," was de facto North Vietnamese
territory through which Hanoi could move troops
and supplies at will. By land through Laos and
across the so-called demilitarized zone, which
was no longer demilitarized, and by sea along the
coast, Hanoi was infiltrating men into the South
at a rate of about 7,000 a month.

The Vietnamese-Cambodian border, undefended and
ill-defined in many places, provided the Communists
with other advantages, including ready availability
of secure sanctuary from which they could sally
forth to harass our forces.

SENSITIVE
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Hanoi, despite the Communists' mounting problems, is still confident of victory, still confident that the Communists can wear down the Free World's will to continue the fight.

General Westmoreland then sketched the Communists' over-all command structure, noting that operational control of Communist military activity in South Vietnam's two northernmost provinces (Quang Tri and Thua Thien) was exercised directly from North Vietnam's Military Region IV headquarters in Vinh, North Vietnam.*

General Westmoreland reviewed the many problems facing Free World forces including that of operational security. He noted that the enemy has infiltrated South Vietnamese ranks on both the military and civilian side to such an extent that it is difficult to keep the Communists unaware of any operational planning or information passed to our Vietnamese allies.

General Westmoreland stressed that the enemy's target was not terrain but people, and that he had the bulk of his forces concentrated in South Vietnam's populated areas.

General Westmoreland then reviewed the enemy's order of battle and present troop deposition, and the deposition of allied forces made to counter various Communist threats. He noted that the enemy presently had an eleven division force and estimated that the Communists were striving to achieve a twelve division force structure.**

*General Westmoreland actually said Military Region III, but this was a slip of the tongue.

**General Wheeler (with whom I rode back from Guam) and I both feel that the eleven division figure was another unintentional slip of the tongue. Both MACV and the Washington intelligence community presently credit the Communists with nine headquarters complexes in or near South Vietnam capable of controlling division-sized operations.

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In his review of Communist troop depositions, General Westmoreland noted that the Communists had seventy-seven base areas in South Vietnam, three in Cambodia, and seven in Laos. The Laotian bases are marginally accessible by ground operations and could be struck by air. The Cambodian bases are not accessible because of political considerations. Several times during his presentation, General Westmoreland directed attention to the fact that two Communist divisions are presently located in Cambodia in secure sanctuary from which they could sally forth and from where they pose a constant threat against which we have to deploy.

General Westmoreland explained the importance of these base areas in Communist strategy and the success Free World forces have had in base clearing operations. He also pointed out the complexity and difficulty of such operations, noting Communist mastery of camouflage and concealment practices, and the extensive use the Communists made of well-hidden tunnel complexes. By way of illustration, he noted that in Operation JUNCTION CITY (which is presently in train) we have run across what was obviously the headquarters of a major COSVN propaganda unit located in a tunnel. This particular tunnel complex included rooms at least half the size of that in which the Guam conference was being held. In one such room, US forces had recently discovered a complete underground broadcasting station.

General Westmoreland then made a corps by corps review of the current situation. He stated we were making progress in the Mekong delta. There are 91 districts in the delta (i.e., in IV Corps); we were making progress in 45, standing still in 42, and losing ground in four (one district in Kien Hoa Province, one in Vinh Binh and two in Sa Dec). There were three South Vietnamese Army divisions in the delta, two of which (the 21st and the 7th) were very good and--by Vietnamese standards--well led.

The III Corps region is the heartland of South Vietnam and is consequently the area where General Westmoreland had placed the greatest concentration

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of US troops. There were serious problems in III Corps, an area in which the enemy had also concentrated great efforts. The three South Vietnamese divisions located in that corps were the poorest in the South Vietnamese Army. To bolster Vietnamese efforts, General Westmoreland was deploying US troops in Gia Dinh and Long An provinces to protect Saigon and to improve security in the immediate vicinity of the capital. General Westmoreland said he was also placing US troops (elements of the 9th Division) in Dinh Tuong Province, where their initial efforts had been both good and effective.*

To meet the Communist threat, new tactics were constantly being devised. For example, General Westmoreland planned to use a "floating brigade" in the Communist stronghold of War Zone C. This brigade would be supplied by parachutes and helicopters, and would keep constantly on the move to harass the Communists and deny them the use of this key base area.

General Westmoreland then reviewed II Corps and his problems in keeping an adequate screen to protect against incursions by the Communist forces presently located in Cambodia.

General Westmoreland used Quang Ngai Province as a concrete illustration of the problems in I Corps. He cited an example of the damage caused by four Communist regiments located in that area, and explained how it could take a full allied division operating in that area for a year to clean it out.

After his detailed review of the situation, General Westmoreland summarized the over-all picture, noting progress and achievement but making the point that unless military pressure causes the

*Dinh Tuong is actually in IV Corps, but General Westmoreland discussed it in the context of his III Corps operations intended to protect the southern approaches to Saigon.

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Viet Cong to crumble and Hanoi to stop its support of southern insurgency, the war in Vietnam could go on indefinitely.

THE PRESIDENT asked General Westmoreland whether he thought the Communists accurately reported their own defeats and losses and hence whether Hanoi had a true picture of the situation in South Vietnam.

General Westmoreland replied that in their reports up the chain of command, the Communists greatly exaggerated their successes and the casualties they inflicted on allied forces.*

Returning to the subject of infiltration, General Westmoreland called attention again to the importance of Communist movement through Laos and suggested the outlines of a plan that would involve recruiting and training tribal elements native to that area (Khas) as forces that could operate in the area and interdict Communist infiltrators.

THE PRESIDENT then initiated a brief discussion of bombing pauses and asked General Westmoreland's opinion about their consequences. General Westmoreland wholeheartedly supported the political wisdom of the pauses ordered to date, but explained the advantage the Communists took of any suspension in the allied aerial interdiction campaign. After some gentle, skillful questioning by the President, General Westmoreland did admit that he hoped these pauses would not become a habit.

THE PRESIDENT thanked General Westmoreland for his fine survey and asked Admiral Sharp to give a report on the aerial campaign against North Vietnam.

*My notes are sketchy here by I believe the point General Westmoreland was making was that the Communists report their own losses with reasonable accuracy but greatly inflate their claims of damage inflicted on allied forces, thus presenting a distorted view of the situation.

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SENSITIVE
~~TOP SECRET~~

Admiral Sharp made a brief summary review during which he noted his belief that our bombing campaign had been successful in light of its limited objectives. It had not stopped infiltration, but no one had ever thought it would. It had made Communist infiltration immensely more difficult and costly for the Communists and also exerted a constant pressure on the North Vietnamese regime.

Admiral Sharp then asked two of his aides (Marine Corps Brigadier General Hutchinson and a Navy commander whose name I did not catch) to present detailed briefings on CINCPAC operational proposals with respect to aerial bombardment and mining operations.

General Hutchingson outlined an extension of the ROLLING THUNDER operation involving six target systems in North Vietnam:

- (1) transportation
- (2) military complexes
- (3) petroleum storage and distribution facilities
- (4) war supporting industries
- (5) electrical power
- (6) port complexes at Haiphong, Hon Gay, and Cam Pha

(Because of the sensitivity of the subject matter I specifically did not take detailed notes on the projected targets. The JCS can almost certainly provide copies of the briefing folders handed the President, Secretary McNamara, and Secretary Rusk. I do recall that the total proposal was presented in the context of an April-October 1967 time frame, involved seven target packages, and a total of 59 targets. It was estimated that the execution of this program would entail 1,715 civilian casualties in the DRV and the loss of 82 US aircraft.)

General Hutchinson then outlined the MIG threat in North Vietnam, the general problems caused by North Vietnamese air defense capabilities and a

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proposal to cope with these threats. (Again, because of the sensitivity of the subject and its lack of relevance to CIA programs, I specifically did not take detailed notes.)

The Navy Commander then reviewed mining operations which have already been executed and offered a plan for mining the harbors of Haiphong, Hon Gay and Cam Pha. (Once more, I specifically avoided taking detailed notes on this sensitive topic which involved matters outside of CIA's concern.)

THE PRESIDENT then turned to Ambassador Lodge for a report on civil activities in Vietnam, particularly in the field of nation-building and pacification.

Ambassador Lodge observed that because of the lateness of the hour he would discuss only the topic of elections and then ask two of his colleagues (Mr. MacDonald and General Humphreys) for short briefings on the important topics of land reform and civilian casualties.

Ambassador Lodge briefly reviewed the four elections coming up in the near future: the village and hamlet councils to be elected in early May, the presidential election tentatively scheduled for 3 September, the upper legislative house (Senate) election scheduled for 4 September, and the lower legislative house (Assembly) scheduled for one month after that.

THE PRESIDENT noted that this was not the same schedule that Prime Minister Ky had presented the previous day.

Ambassador Lodge acknowledged this and pointed out that Ky may have been over-optimistic. The schedule just outlined (according to US Embassy's best information) was the one presently being planned. Ambassador Lodge emphasized the importance of this electoral process and the course of constitutional development presently in train. He explained the role and influence of Vietnam's military establishment in present South Vietnamese politics.

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estimated that if the military could agreed a single candidate, most likely Ky or Thieu, a candidate would probably win. He gave a frank assessment of both Ky and Thieu, and concluded by expressing his belief that the US Government could live and work with either one and should not interfere in the contest now discreetly being waged for the support of the military establishment. Ambassador Lodge pointed out that the constitution drafting process could never have gone so smoothly or been completed so quickly had Ky and Thieu not both genuinely supported the process. Ky's ability to wave the "poonskin constitution" at Guam was a real triumph for Vietnam's present leadership and a profoundly significant indicator of progress.

THE PRESIDENT asked if there were no civilians capable of being serious contenders for the presidency in Vietnam.

Ambassador Lodge explained that the course of recent Vietnamese history had produced a breed of politicians trained in the techniques of plot and conspiracy but ill-suited by background or experience to provide positive political leadership. Ambassador Lodge noted that Tran Van Huong and Pham Khac Suu were probably the two leading civilian figures, but explained that neither was likely to win a national election, and that neither would make a particularly good president, especially Suu.

General Taylor endorsed Ambassador Lodge's assessment of Suu. (Someone--I am not sure who, but I think Secretary Rusk--asked whether the Constituent Assembly had brought forth any new leadership.)

Ambassador Lodge replied that it had produced some potentially promising figures but no one presently capable of winning the office of president.

Secretary Rusk (I think) asked about Dr. Phan Quang Don.

Ambassador Lodge replied that Dan had a certain measure of political skill and some following, and had performed quite credibly in recent months, but was not really presidential timber.

Ambassador Lodge then summarized the course of the electoral and constitutional process, stressed its importance, and the significance of the progress the GVN was making in this vital area. He then asked Mr. MacDonald to give a brief summary of current activity in the field of land reform.

Secretary Rusk interrupted to call everyone's attention to the great sensitivity of the just-completed discussion about possible Vietnamese presidential candidates and the names that had been brought up. The Secretary underlined the importance of protecting the secrecy of the fact that such a discussion was held by the American delegation. Mr. MacDonald (USAID Director) then gave a short resumé of current progress and problems in the field of land reform.

THE PRESIDENT expressed his belief in the great importance of this issue, noting the universal appeal of land ownership and the deep emotions it arouses. THE PRESIDENT asked if more use could not be made of photographs obtained from aerial reconnaissance, photographs which could be given to individual farmers with the borders of their land outlined on the picture. THE PRESIDENT cited examples from his own experience in the early days of the New Deal which showed the impact such photographs could have.

Mr. Komer noted that the technical resources for providing such a photographic service existed and volunteered General Momyer's assets. (General Momyer smiled but did not comment.)

General Humphreys (USAID Medical Director) made a short presentation on the topic of civilian casualties, outlining what was being done to minimize the hardship of war on the civilian population but

noting the difficulty in acquiring valid statistics. He called attention to the fact that--despite press comment and resulting public impressions to the contrary--much of the suffering in Vietnam, including burns, was not war-caused or necessarily war-related.

After this final presentation, the PRESIDENT made a few concluding remarks pulling the conference together and laying renewed stress on the central importance of making progress in the political, nation-building sphere as well as in the military struggle.

* * * * *

Cautionary Comment: The above resumé of the 21 March session was reconstructed from a series of quite sketchy notes. These notes were taken for the private and exclusive use of Mr. Helms and myself to assist us in guiding Agency programs in a manner that would support the President's objectives and policies. The notes were never intended to serve as a basis for a complete reconstruction of the proceedings. These notes were incomplete and hence the above resumé is also incomplete, though to the best of my knowledge and belief it reflects accurately what was said on the points covered.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

1. ~~copy~~
2. Pres file

Thursday, March 23, 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Special Fund Education Projects for the Philippines

The Special Fund for Education was established under a 1963 amendment to Philippine War Damage legislation. The funds are held by Treasury and now amount to about \$28 million.

You and President Marcos agreed last September to speed up use of the Fund for worthwhile projects. The Philippine Government presented two detailed proposals in December. They are:

(1) Classroom Construction Program

This would make possible construction of 2,700 three-room schools and 6,000 two-room schools (a total of 20,100 classrooms) over an 18-month period at a cost of about \$13 million.

(2) Textbook Production Program

This would permit the Filipinos to produce 3,118,868 elementary and secondary school textbooks over an 180month period at a cost of about \$2.6 million.

Secretary ask, in the attached memorandum, strongly urges support of these two projects. Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget approve the procedures. Congressman Zablocki, who authored the Special Fund legislation, is satisfied with the projects.

President Marcos has taken a strong interest in the two proposals and considers them important for his four-year educational development program. There is no doubt that moving ahead on these two matters will help to improve the atmosphere of U.S. - Philippine relations which have been somewhat strained of late.

*Hold for new
amendment for*

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I therefore strongly recommend that you authorize Secretary Rusk to conclude project agreements with the Philippines on these two Special Fund accounts.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Authorization granted _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Special Fund for Education, Classroom
Construction and Textbook Production
Projects

Recommendation

That you authorize me to conclude project agreements with the Philippine Government for the expenditure of money from the Special Fund for Education (PL 88-94) - the Philippine Education Program account - in support of classroom construction and textbook production in the Philippines.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discussion

The Special Fund for Education, now constituted at about \$28 million and held in Treasury in the Philippine Education Program account, was established by a 1963 amendment to Philippine War Damage legislation. The Fund is to be used as jointly determined by the President of the United States and the President of the Philippines to further educational programs to the mutual advantage of both countries.

We have received and carefully scrutinized detailed project proposals for classroom construction and textbook production presented by the Philippine Government. We believe the two projects meet the criteria for support under Special Fund auspices, and fulfill the requirements of the 1963 legislation.

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Funds for these two projects would be disbursed as needed under the guidelines set forth in the understanding between our two Governments of April 26, 1966. This procedure meets with the approval of the Treasury Department and the Bureau of the Budget staff. Congressman Zablocki, author of the Special Fund legislation, has expressed his satisfaction with the projects. We have also touched base with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff on our plans to move ahead on the classroom and textbook projects.

We would expect to commit about \$13 million to the Classroom Construction Program and some \$2.6 million to the Textbook Production Program from the Special Fund over an 18-month period. We are now examining additional Philippine proposals for projects to be funded under the remaining balance of the Special Fund. You authorized conclusion of an agreement with the Philippine Government on Land Reform Education in September 1965. A project of this nature is among those under consideration.

The Philippine Government is particularly anxious to obtain early agreement on the classroom and textbook projects. On March 3, President Marcos personally stressed to Assistant Secretary Bundy the great importance he placed on moving rapidly ahead on these two projects in view of the proximity of the upcoming school year.

In negotiating agreements on these two projects, it is our intention to discuss with the Philippine Government appropriate ways of identifying the classrooms and textbooks as projects jointly approved by the President of the United States and the President of the Republic of the Philippines for financing from the Special Fund for Education.

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Enclosed is a memorandum containing further details on the Classroom Construction and Textbook Production Projects.



Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Background Memorandum

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BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM

Proposals for Classroom Construction
and Textbook Production Under the
Special Fund for Education

1. An amendment to the Philippine War Damage Legislation of 1962, PL 88-94, approved August 12, 1963, established a fund known as the Special Fund for Education to be used "for the purpose of furthering educational exchange and other educational programs to the mutual advantage of the Republic of the Philippines and the United States in such manner as the Presidents of these two Republics shall from time to time determine." The Special Fund is now constituted at about \$28 million.
2. On April 26, 1966, pursuant to authority granted by the President, the two governments exchanged notes constituting the basis for commencement of negotiations on project proposals for financing under the Special Fund. Under the April 26 understanding, disbursements from the Fund will be made in accordance with a schedule of payments to be mutually agreed upon for each project, and deposited by the United States Government in such banking institutions in the Philippines as may be agreed upon by the two governments. The understanding also calls for a status report on each project to be supported by the Fund which will be furnished periodically by the Philippine Government until the funds authorized by the two governments for the support of the projects have been spent.
3. Following agreement of the two Presidents in the Joint Communique of September 15, 1966 to accelerate Special Fund discussions and to move for rapid implementation of projects, the Marcos Government on December 1, 1966 presented detailed Classroom Construction and Textbook Production proposals for support under the Special Fund.

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4. The Classroom Construction proposal would expend ₱51 million (about \$13 million) over eighteen months in fiscal years 1967 and 1968 to construct 2,700 three-room school buildings and 6,000 two-room school buildings -- a total of 20,100 classrooms for public elementary grades throughout the Philippines. The Special Fund Classroom Construction proposal forms a portion of the Philippine Government's four-year school building program to provide 34,600 schools (91,700 classrooms) by 1970 at a cost of ₱258 million (\$65 million).

5. The Textbook Production proposal would expend ₱10 million (about \$2.6 million) over eighteen months in fiscal years 1967 and 1968 to produce 3,118,868 elementary and secondary level textbooks for public school use throughout the Philippines. This proposal follows a successful project which has produced 22,000,000 textbooks. The Philippine Government estimates current needs at more than 11 million textbooks and expects to embark on further textbook projects on completion of this Special Fund project.

6. The Department, in conjunction with representatives of the Agency for International Development and the Bureau of the Budget, has studied carefully the Classroom and Textbook proposals. We believe these projects represent enduring contributions to Philippine education and fulfill the objectives of the 1963 legislation. Implementation of the Classroom and Textbook projects will result in clear and tangible evidence of the President's personal interest as well as that of the President of the Philippines in Philippine education. For the Classroom and Textbook projects a total of \$15.6 million would be spent over an eighteen-month period.

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7. The issue of war damage claims, and the Special Fund, has been a highly emotional one in US-Philippine relations over the past two decades, particularly during the Macapagal Administration. The Marcos Government, in advancing the Classroom Construction and Textbook Production proposals, has given evidence of a new and more businesslike approach to use of the Special Fund. President Marcos has made it clear that he attaches considerable urgency to meeting his country's needs for classrooms and textbooks and has stressed his hope that financing from the Special Fund for these projects be approved as soon as possible.

March 21, 1967

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Thurs., May 23, 1967

125

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Phil Kaiser reports an excellent performance by Bill Bundy in London.

Pres file

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

London 7666

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

125a

Copy of LONDON 7666 March 22, 1967

EXDIS

For the Secretary from Charge

1. Bill Bundy has just completed what I believe is the most effective and useful job of expounding our Viet Nam policy that any visitor has yet done in London. He has spoken to about 40 carefully selected MP's in a series of small private meetings; met with a group of politically important provincial editors; talked with Foreign Secretary Brown and other Ministers and Foreign Office officials; talked with key trade union leaders and the head of BBC Public Affairs; and had a most useful lunch with Hetherington of the Guardian and David Astor of the Observer, two of our toughest newspaper problems. He has also done a taped appearance for a weekly TV feature program which will give him 30 minutes exposure to a 9 million audience all over Britain.

2. That schedule is quite an achievement by itself in 2 days for a man at the end of an arduous trip like his. But the important fact is that he has done a superb job. Even the group of intransigent critic MP's we threw him in with gave him an ovation after a tough 1-1/2 hours for his performance. He has been candid, eloquent, and persuasive. I am sure that he has shaken a lot of the critics and persuaded a lot of the doubtful. I know that the British are extremely pleased, and we are very grateful. I hope you can find an opportunity to say a word to him about his performance.

3. I do think that it would be extremely useful if Bill could spend some time with the Vice President before the latter's trip. It would be valuable to the Vice President in preparing him for some of what he will face in Britain.

KAISER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec 1/24/73
By mg/rq, NARA, Date 4-22-91

Pres file

Thursday, March 23, 1967
9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Here is Bob McNamara's
background briefing.

W. W. Rostow

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

Wednesday, March 22, 1967

Defense spokesman: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

This is the regular Thursday backgrounder on Wednesday. The ground rules are the same as they usually are. No direct quotations please. Attribution to U.S. officials. The reason for this, several of you early this week and in fact before the meeting ever started asked if we could get together with the _____ as soon as he returned. This is as close to as soon as he returned as we could get you together with him.

U. S. OFFICIAL: The real reason is that Chairman Rivers left me off this afternoon. I couldn't think of any better way to pass the time than with you.

QUESTION: Inaudible

U.S. OFFICIAL: I don't know. We'll see tomorrow. I do have some notes on the military discussions at Guam which I'll be happy to summarize for you and then endeavor to answer any questions you may have that bear on that subject. As (name deleted) mentioned a moment ago, this is for non-attribution.

Military operations were reported on during the Guam meetings by Prime Minister Ky, by General Vien, who is Chief of the Joint General Staff of the Vietnamese Military Forces, and by General Westmoreland. They all agreed that the tempo and the intensity of the war had increased in recent weeks. They all pointed out that the VC

had been trying to regain the initiative which they lost last year after our combat forces increased in strength so rapidly. The VC have been trying to regain that initiative by launching an increased number of attacks against our base areas, against the district and the province capitals, and against the rural development teams. As you know, these teams were trained last year and have been assigned in increasing numbers to the countryside as a foundation for the pacification program. In particular, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese forces have greatly increased their use of mortar fire and recoilless rifle fire during the past several weeks, and particularly so since the end of TET. Such fire is now estimated to be at about 3 times the level of last year.

There are some favorable factors that are evident despite this increased tempo and intensity of combat operation. For example, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces have paid a very heavy price for their increased activities. The fatalities they have suffered this year to date are up about 60% over the levels of last year. All three of the individuals who reported to us on military operations indicated that there's evidence of some friction between Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces apparently as a result of a pressure they are facing from allied military forces and the very heavy losses which they are suffering. There is clear indications of shortages of food and ammunition among the enemy forces, and some sign of continued deterioration of morale. We see it, for example, in the number of prisoners and in the increase in the number of defectors. The number of Chieu

Hoi defectors, for example, is up very substantially above the level of last year, almost 100% higher, I believe, for the first 10 weeks of the year.

It is interesting to observe, however, as each of these 3 individuals did that much of the evidence of the failure of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces to make military progress is being withheld from the military and political authorities in Hanoi. We know that because of the intelligence reports which we intercept between the point of origin in South Vietnam and their point of destination in North Vietnam, and we know it also from the intelligence information we receive as to the views of the military and political leaders in the North.

General Westmoreland estimated that field commanders reports to Hanoi are exaggerated, as he said by a factor of from 20 to 40, and it seems quite clear, therefore, that Hanoi is being misled as to the price that their forces, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, are paying in South Vietnam.

In sum, the three individuals -- Prime Minister Ky, Gen. Vien, and General Westmoreland -- agreed that the war could go on indefinitely unless the military pressure being imposed against the enemy forces breaks the will of the North and there is as yet no sign of that.

Now the main emphasis of our military forces in South Vietnam in the months ahead will be on two primary objectives -- first, the

destruction of the enemy's base camps and secondly, the acceleration of the pacification program.

MACV has located a larger number of enemy base camps, I'm not going to give you the specific number reported to us, although it is very large indeed. These must be destroyed one by one. This is difficult. It's costly, it's time consuming, because the camps are booby trapped, frequently located in jungle and heavily forested areas, heavily camouflaged, often tunneled and very difficult to destroy.

Secondly, as I say, a major objective will be the acceleration of the pacification program. This has been proceeding, but proceeding slowly, and we think it's time to accelerate the progress of that program.

You shouldn't overlook the progress to date, even though it has been slow. One way to measure it is the increase in open road mileage in the countryside. Some 18% more road mileage has been opened for traffic, compared to that a year ago. And this is a measure of additional security that has been brought to the countryside.

As I reported to you following General Wheeler's and my visit to Saigon in October, the Prime Minister had stated that he would in order to advance the pacification program, reassign a substantial percentage of the Regular Military units of the South Vietnamese Army to that program. He has done so. Over 50 battalions have been retrained and assigned in the field to this function and still additional battalions will be trained and assigned during the remaining months of this year.

But pacification is a slow tedious process. The progress and accomplishments and achievements will not be dramatic, but they will be fundamental. It's slow and tedious because the troops require time to become familiar with assigned location and require time to absorb the training and develop the experience necessary to be effective in this role. And beyond that, time is required to prove to the people that they are protecting that they are there permanently, that they are not going to withdraw and again expose the people to harassment and pressure from the Viet Cong, and therefore, the people can with security transfer their loyalties from the Viet Cong to the Government forces.

And lastly, a word of comment on questions that were raised of General Westmoreland, he was asked to comment, as he always is, asked to comment by me and by General Wheeler and the President when we meet together upon the condition of American forces--training, morale, equipment, supplies, etc. He stated that the men he is receiving are well trained, the morale is high, much higher than he experienced among troops in WWII and Korea. He attributes this to what he considers to be the excellence of the supply system. He didn't mention, but I myself if I may interpolate a thought, attribute it at least as much to the 12 month tour of duty, which by the way Westmoreland recommended and we strongly support and plan to continue. When men leave this country, they actually carry with them information as to the date which they will be reassigned out of Vietnam at the end

of their tour. I think that has as much to do with the high morale as does their food and high standards of equipment and supply.

Westmoreland was also asked his opinion of the effectiveness of the bombing of NVN. This is not a matter that is entirely under his responsibility. As you know, Adm. Sharp is Commander in Chief of the Pacific is responsible for this since it involves both forces under Westmoreland's direct command and also Naval forces not directly under his command. But any event, Westmoreland was asked his opinion of the bombing in the North, and he said he considered it essential to his operations in the South. That it had been effective, that he believed it did impede the movement of men and supply and he strongly urged that it be continued.

Now I'll be very happy to try to answer your questions.

Q: Did you say it was agreed that the war could be on indefinitely unless military pressure breaks the will of the North, I have a feeling I missed one of your important points?

U.S. Official: No, that is what they reported.

Q: What does it mean? Are you going to put the pressure on to break the will of the North.

U.S. Official: I'm simply reporting to you what they said. I think the meaning is clear that while the forces in the South are suffering very heavy pressure indeed and very heavy losses, that the North is replacing those losses and presumably will continue to replace them until they make a political decision to change their political objective

modify the military program accordingly.

QUESTION: I don't know if you knew at the time you set up the backgrounder but that the Stennis Committee has a report that is for release tomorrow morning, and that in this report they bring up this whole business about the number of troops that Westmoreland likes in addition to allegations shortage of supplies in various categories. They say it is without question that the commanders in the field to want more troops and Defense Department has disapproved these requests. Would you comment on that?

U. S. OFFICIAL: I haven't seen the report, so I can't really comment on it. If its a hold for release, I probably shouldn't anyhow. I will ask Mr. (name deleted) to.

QUESTION: It's for release tomorrow morning, sir.

U. S. OFFICIAL: Well, then I shouldn't be commenting on it now. In any case, I haven't read it, so that's the best reason not to comment on it now. I'll ask Mr. (name deleted) to examine it later today and get some kind of a statement which you can use and associate with it.

There's a long extensive discussion of troop levels in my testimony and in General Wheeler's testimony before the Congressional committees. I'm a little behind in my understanding on exactly how much of that has been released for publication already. Apparently not very much if this subject comes up. But he and I have before all four -- the two Armed Services and the two Appropriations Committees -- testified on this at great length, and I'll ask (name deleted) to extract from that the pertinent thoughts and get them out in connection with that.

I would like to say in passing that as you noticed I didn't make any reference to discussion of troop strength among the subjects having been discussed at Guam, because it wasn't among them other than the President repeated what he said before, what we've all said before. Since July 28, 1965, the policy has been the same, we'll supply what the commanders need. That has been the policy and remains the policy. But there was no discussion of specific troop levels in Guam.

QUESTION: In connection with Mr. Corddry's question, does your statement -- really brings up the point if we are going to increase the pressure, we are going to need more troops to accelerate this pressure.

U. S. OFFICIAL: A, I didn't say we are going to increase the pressure, and B., as far as troop strength is concerned, it remains just exactly what it has been. The policy is very clear. We'll supply what the commanders need.

QUESTION: Has a decision been made on basing B-52s in Guam?

U. S. OFFICIAL: Yes. We will base B-52s on Guam, but what I think what you meant to ask was Thailand. (Laughter). And the decision has also been made about basing B-52s in Thailand. We will do that.

QUESTION: When are we going to do it?

U. S. OFFICIAL: I imagine it will be gradually over a period of time. Certain additional facilities need to be installed, but I think we

probably operate out of Thailand with existing facilities in a matter of perhaps four to eight weeks.

QUESTION: Is there not a contradiction in what you say about the food shortages and ammo and morale being down and yet the war goes on indefinitely? Where are they getting these men from their own citizens, or from China. . .

U. S. OFFICIAL: I don't think there is a contradiction in it, but it's a set of factors that need to be watched very carefully because the military pressure on them is very, very heavy. Their shortages are real. We measure these in terms of the health of the prisoners we take, for example. There is a very high percentage of them with malaria, a very high percentage of beriberi, a very high percentage to indicate that they have faced shortages of food and ammunition.

But at the same time while they are facing these very serious penalties, and while there is indication that morale has been affected and we see this not only in terms of the statements made by the prisoners, but in the captured documents, that we obtain and have obtained in increasing numbers from these raids on the base camps. But still they continue to fight, and what I've said to you is that we think that they continue to fight in the future despite the pressure that we are applying, until such time as their leaders decide that the price they are paying, both in the North and the South, is too high in relation to the accomplishments that lie ahead of them. There is no question but what in mid-1965 they thought they could win a military victory. The heavy influx of American troops in the latter half of 1965 didn't change their

minds in early 1966 because we know from captured documents that as late as early '66, by that I mean January, February, that period of time, they were still hoping for a military victory. More recently it's our impression from the documents and other intelligence that we get that they no longer think in terms of military victory, but they do hope to better the foundation for settlement, whether that settlement be by negotiation or some other process, and that appears to be why they are continuing to fight despite these very heavy pressures and heavy penalties.

QUESTION: Is the number of troops to be provided to MACV more or less directed to a target goal. . . ?

U. S. OFFICIAL: No, no it's a function of a number of factors. MACV has a campaign plan for a period ahead and that develops a troop requirement, I'll call it a basic requirement and that must be met. Then beyond that there might be other considerations that will lead to troop requirements but these must be balanced off other conditions in the economy, particularly the ability of that economy to absorb American troops. Absorb in terms of piastre expenditures for one thing. There has been a very, very heavy inflation, an inflationary pressure in South Vietnam and this destroys the stability of the economy and weakens the whole political structure. We must dampen down those inflationary fires, are adding more troops than is absolutely essential to carry out the campaign plan, stands in the way of that dampening down process. We we have to balance these off and it is

through this balancing process that we arrived at the troop plan.

General Wheeler and I discussed this with General Westmoreland in October. We visited South Vietnam and we agreed upon a figure at that time which he believed (General Westmoreland believed) would be adequate to carry out his campaign plan. This is a subject, as I said, that General Wheeler and I testified on before each of the four committees and its either already been published or will be published. I don't know if this testimony is out or not.

SECOND SPOKESMAN: Three of them I'm sure.

QUESTION: Coming back to some of these apparent contradictions reported from the Guam conference, how do you reconcile this business of the loss of ammunition and food and shortages that they have been suffering with the 60% increase in a year of use of mortar rounds mentioned since TET?

U. S. OFFICIAL: I said that 60% applied to fatalities. The increase in mortar rounds since TET Westmoreland estimated at 300% versus a year ago. I think it indicates their attempt to meet this increasing military pressure from the Allied Forces with heavier fire. You saw at Da Nang, for example, when they use the 140 mm rockets. These are thin stabilized rockets, but they're area destruction rockets rather than weapons that are capable of precise aiming and destruction of heavy pieces of equipment. It is an indication, however, that they are trying to increase their firepower. The number of mortar rounds that

they fired in recent weeks in the First Corps Area is very large for them, it is quite small for us. But I think this is simply their reaction to our force buildup last year.

QUESTION: In view of the slowness of the pacification program, was there a discussion of the American troops playing a greater role in this thing.

U. S. OFFICIAL: Only indirectly in the sense that we all agree, the Vietnamese and the U. S. agree that the pacification program must be carried out primarily by the Vietnamese. Ours is an advisory role.

QUESTION: Does that mean a change in I Corps?

U. S. OFFICIAL: No, the pacification program in the I Corps must be primarily a Vietnamese program. The Marines have played a advisory role there, and no doubt in the future, U. S. forces will play an advisory role that's to a greater degree in other parts of the country than they have in the past. But the basic pacification process is a process of political as well as military action and can only be carried out effectively by the Vietnamese.

QUESTION: With the systematic destruction of base camps, is there any evidence that the type of war that the enemy is fighting is changing? Going to smaller units or . . . ?

U. S. OFFICIAL: None, none so far. I am told that the number of what I call large unit actions carried on by the enemy is relatively unchanged.

Q. Did General Westmoreland and the others who reported suggest how we might go about trying breaking the will of Hanoi?

U S. official: No, there was no discussion of that. I think they--I think there was no discussion because they support the basic strategy we have been following for some time. That we must prove to Hanoi that they can't win in the South while doing so impose penalties on them in the North, and that is essentially what we have been doing and there was no suggestion that that strategy be changed.

Q. Can you say that there will be a major buildup or anything like that in the Delta area? Will you comment on what will happen?

U. S. Official: No, I don't want to predict or comment upon future military operations other than to say that there has been a slow assignment of US forces to the Delta. I think there are 2 or 3 battalions --two battalions, I guess, operating in Long An Province at the present time which is not part of the IV Corps area but is nonetheless south of Saigon and really part of the Delta, and there a few other battalions operating south of Saigon also. It's very slow and I wouldn't anticipate any significant change in it.

Q: Could you clear the confusion on my part, probably I just not heard you correctly. I got the impression that you were saying that captured documents suggested that the Viet Cong and North Vietnam are trying to improve, in effect, you didn't use these words--their bargaining position. This suggests that they have already made up their mind that they are losing and that it's a matter of trying to improve their luck before

either they sitting down to talk or. . .

U.S. Official: I think the words I used did not include bargaining position or trying to improve a foundation for a settlement, but whether that settlement comes from negotiation or from simply a modification of their political objectives and a change in their military strategy is difficult for us to predict. I know of no other reason why they would continue to fight under these very difficult circumstances.

Q: How serious is the credibility gap between the forces in the South and Hanoi? Is this serious enough to mislead them?

U.S. Official: Let's say there isn't a comparable one here. (Laughter) I don't want to be facetious on this because I think it is important. I don't know how serious it is and the reason I don't know is that we have only an imperfect knowledge of their thoughts and their evaluations of their own situation. I think they honestly believe that they shoot down far more airplanes than we lose, for example, in NVN. The reports that they make to their own people are grossly exaggerated. I've forgotten the exact number that the report--something like 1700-- and how many have we actually lost?

2nd U.S. Official: It's close to 500.

U.S. Official: There is a factor of 3 to 1 there. And I suppose that part of that is simply a reporting of the same plane by two or three different people. I'm sure that in WWII we over reported our destruction of enemy aircraft. Pilots sometimes reported planes as destroyed when in fact they were only damaged, or two pilots reporting the same plane destroyed and counting it as two planes destroyed instead

of one and I imagine that is what is happening in the North, So my guess is that they honestly believe that they shot down many more aircraft than we have lost. I think the same thing is happening in the South. That is really what Westmoreland is saying, except the ratio of 3 to 1, he was saying that in his opinion the factor of exaggeration is 20 to 40 to 1.

Q: Do they claim our losses?

U.S. Official: Yes, we have actually in certain instances, we obtained enemy documents indicating how many they lost in an engagement and then enemy reports indicating how many they reported to Hanoi. This doesn't happen very often, but when we have been able to compare the actual losses with the reported losses, we get this kind of an exaggeration. There is no question but what some of the field commanders of the VC and NVN are intentionally understating their losses.

QUESTION: Which figure do you think the Soviets believe?

U. S. OFFICIAL: I don't know. I can't answer the question.

QUESTION: How do they get replacements if they understate their losses?

U. S. OFFICIAL: I think that probably their replacements are less than Hanoi believes them to be in relation to their strength requirements. We have told you that for the last 6 to 9 months the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese strength appears to have leveled off. My guess is that Hanoi believes it has been increasing during that period.

QUESTION: I never heard that until today there was some friction between the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. Could you develop that?

U. S. OFFICIAL: We haven't reported it before, I guess, although we've had some signs of it for several months. Disagreement on tactics, disagreement on allocation of supplies, rice and other items, some difference of feeling as to whether they want to serve one with another, the units have been chewed up and whereas they came in homogeneously manned, the Viet Cong unit manned with Southerners except perhaps for a few Cadremen from the North, the North Vietnamese units manned with Northerners. There has been a mixture of forces develop as the Northern unit was chewed up and replaced with Southerners. Or the Southern unit chewed up and replaced with Northerners, and there has been friction inside these units as a result of this. I don't know how serious this is. I don't want to exaggerate the

importance of it. I want to indicate what I did that despite these penalties and signs of pressures, indications of deterioration of morale, they are continuing to fight. The units aren't running, they aren't withdrawing at the first sign of contact, they aren't turning tail. So, as I say, I don't want to put too much emphasis on it but I think they are signs to watch because they ultimately can be translated both into military and political behavior. I think just one or two more questions.

QUESTION: Do either you or did General Westmoreland say that he believes the present level of pressure is sufficient to confince Hanoi they can't win.

U. S. OFFICIAL: I don't think that either one of us did. What I say was that the strategy we have been following is strategy that the military and political leaders from South Vietnam, both U. S. and Vietnamese, believe in the past and continue to believe in, and there was no suggestion that it be changed. That strategy is basically one of applying sufficient pressure in the South to prove that they can't win there while continuing to apply pressure in the North to exact a heavy price for their continued efforts to win in the South. At some point this is going to balance out to a foundation for a change in political decisions.

QUESTION: You say that Vietnamese leaders agree with you on this, but according to the press conferences that General Ky gave, he completely disagreed and called for greatly stepped up escalation of the war.

U. S. OFFICIAL: I read the transcript of the press conference. I spent two days with him. Beyond that, I read the transcript of the press conference. He didn't say that. What he did was include in his statement a set of rhetorical questions. But they didn't ask for escalation of the war. They did in effect answer those who say why don't we stop the bombing without reciprocal action by the North Vietnamese. That was his purpose in putting that paragraph in. He told us afterwards that he was a little disconcerted that it was interpreted as it was.

QUESTION: I would like to ask you one question on the B-52's before you get away. Have you any idea how this will affect present operations?

U. S. OFFICIAL: It just means that there is a more rapid response time, response capability.

SECOND U. S. OFFICIAL: The 500 figure is just a ballpark figure. ----- has the exact number down there, if you want it.

Thank you very much.

- END -

Thursday, March 23, 1967
10:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Here is Sec. Rusk's
backgrounder of yesterday.

W. W. Rostow

rlh

Pres file

Thursday, March 23, 1967
12:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to see the letter I wrote supporting Brom's nomination for a Rockefeller Service Award.

I am not sure that it is appropriate for the President to weigh in; although it is simply a fact that the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council is, in a special sense, tied to the President.

W. W. Rostow

Your letter sufficient _____

Draft separate letter for me _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rlh

Thursday, March 23, 1967 - 4:00 pm

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a
message of congratulations to President Mba
of Gabon on his reelection.

W. W. Rostow

Approved ☒

Disapproved ☐

Speak to me ☐

EKHamilton/vmr

~~WWR~~ - 129
Hand Copy
Pres file

Proposed Message from the President to the President of Gabon

Dear Mr. President:

My warmest congratulations upon your re-election as President of Gabon. All Americans join me in extending best wishes for the continued peace and prosperity of your country.

130

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 22, 1967
8:00 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Lodge's proposed scenario for the change of command in Saigon.

1. He departs on April 10 leaving Porter in charge until Bunker arrives.

2. Bunker arrives on April 20, overlapping for about 10 days with Porter as DCM.

3. Porter leaves and immediately thereafter Locke and Komer arrive -- about May 1.

His is an intelligent proposal; although my impression is that both Bunker and Locke were thinking of somewhat later dates for taking over.

We may wish to discuss this at lunch today.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 20988

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-374
By fw, NARA, Date 1-29-93

WWRostow:rln

1302

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-376

By sig NARA. Date 4-6-92

~~SECRET~~

Saigon 20988, March 22, 1967, for the Secretary of State

1. For a number of reasons, it is desirable to fix a definite date for my departure. For one thing, the Prime Minister wants to have an occasion "just before" I leave. For another, the Diplomatic Corps wants to give a dinner a "few days before" I leave. Also, the New York Times wants to conduct a panel interview, which they say will publish verbatim, taking at least a full page, and which they have agreed to let me revise. This would be done here and held for publication in the United States after I had left.
2. Having in mind our conversations in Guam, I propose, therefore, subject to your approval, to announce that I will definitely leave on April 10, leaving Porter in charge until Bunker arrives.
3. As you know, Porter had been in charge here for longer periods than that on occasions when I was away for consultation.
4. I also believe that April looks somewhat like a hiatus between the completion of the Constitution and the commencement of intense electoral activity.
5. I also think it would be useful for Bunker to be here for a while with Porter prior to the arrival of Locke so that Bunker could get Porter's very well-informed slant on the Viet Nam problem. Bunker already has had two sessions with me in Guam and, of course, I would plan to see him in the United States when I got back to tell him whatever else he needs to know.
6. It highly desirable that Bunker should be here by April 20. Porter would leave about ten days after Bunker's arrival at which time both Komer and Locke could arrive. I believe Porter should be out of the country before Locke arrives.
7. I fear adverse press comment if Bunker's arrival should be delayed longer than 20th, which is more than one month after the President's announcement. I know you are aware of the intense scrutiny this post receives from about 200 American journalists in Viet Nam and there will be hostile questions about delay. Even with a 20th April arrival, we run certain risks in this respect.
8. After careful thought, this seems the best way to work out the transition.
9. Hope it will be satisfactory to you for me to leave on April 10. Please advise.

LODGE

~~SECRET~~