

*Pres file* 131

Wednesday, March 22, 1967  
7:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a summary of Sec. Rusk's back-  
grounder of last evening.

I think the State Dept should take on  
Sen. Kennedy's criticism today, pointing out  
that his hypothesis was given a thorough test:

-- Preliminary contacts before Ted  
suggested that our stand down of bombing might  
be the occasion for mutual efforts at de-  
escalation;

-- During Tet we did unilaterally stand  
down our bombing and naval action in North  
Vietnamese waters;

-- Our letter gave Hanoi a full opportunity  
to make alternative suggestions of a positive  
character.

He doesn't have a leg to stand on if the  
situation at that time is clearly presented.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

131

March 21, 1967

In a background briefing for twenty-three U.S. and foreign newsmen today, Secretary Rusk said President Johnson's letter to Ho Chi Minh was a real effort to put something on the table to get the violence stopped in Viet Nam.

Referring to a chart he provided to newsmen, the Secretary said this illustrated the contacts we had had in an effort to bring the war in Viet Nam to the peace table. Contacts with Hanoi were omitted, in view of Hanoi's penchant for secrecy.

We do not know why Hanoi chose at this time to release Ho Chi Minh's exchange of letters with President Johnson. There is nothing in our bilateral traffic to indicate why they did this, and there are no developments on our side to justify this action. For our part, we did not release the exchange before, even though it was quite favorable to us, because our problem is not just public opinion; we are seeking to end the war.

The proposals contained in President Johnson's letter were specific. They related to the bombing, infiltration, and augmentation of forces. But this would have opened up if the other side had agreed to discuss these proposals. President Johnson's letter was intended only as a beginning.

If the two letters are compared, it is clear that the President's letter does not contain a word of polemics, not a rude word. But the operational paragraph of Ho's reply is almost identical with the operational portion of Ho's letter of February 13 to the Pope. At the time this letter was made public, we didn't know if this was intended as an answer to the President's letter, or if an answer would be forthcoming. But it indicated that any reply to the President's proposals would be negative.

It was made clear to the other side that the offer contained in the President's letter did not terminate with the end of TET. This has continued to be the case; it is still open. But publication of the correspondence apparently indicates that there will be no further response.

Wilson and Kosygin were aware of our position and our proposals concerning bombing, infiltration, and augmentation, at the time they met in London. Kosygin endorsed the statements reported in the Burchette interview, but this was not good enough for us, because Hanoi would not indicate what it was prepared to do to end the war.

Admittedly Ho's letter to the Pope was a factor in our decision to resume bombing after TET; we had no indication that Hanoi was prepared to do anything if the bombing pause were prolonged any further. Ho had several choices in responding to the President's proposals; he could have made counter-proposals, he could have cautiously replied. But instead he appeared to slam the door.

It is clear that this is not a favorable

Although Hanoi has used different language from time to time, it has consistently demanded that the bombing be ended unconditionally and permanently. We held off bombing for two days after TET, but we saw hundreds of ships, trucks, and barges moving into the South as soon as the holiday began. But Hanoi did not have its Ambassadors alerted to work for peace during this period. Hanoi was prepared for military action, but not for diplomatic action; and we concluded that they were not prepared to move toward a peaceful settlement.

With regard to Senator Robert Kennedy's statement today, he is again forgetting that Hanoi demands permanent and unconditional cessation of the bombing. If he had spoken in the same way at the beginning of TET his argument could have been put to a good test. There is a serious operational question involved here - there are three North Vietnamese divisions in and around the DMZ. If we are to stop the bombing permanently and unconditionally, we want someone to at least whisper to us that these divisions will not move against our troops. Our position has not hardened on this since the President's February 2 press conference statement that almost any sign would be acceptable to us. There has not been one word from the other side.

We do not want to assume that Hanoi's action in publicizing the exchange of letters and apparently rejecting the President's proposals signifies a virtual collapse of peace hopes. As far as we are concerned, any time is ripe for a peaceful settlement.

We have never publicly said we were prepared to deal with the NLF. The President's statement of July 1965, which is part of the Fourteen Points, remains our policy on this question. We have made it clear in our contacts through various channels that we are willing to discuss this.

This is the first time the President has addressed a letter to Ho. (He certainly would not correspond with any one else in Hanoi.) It does not in any way imply recognition, which is a matter of intent. Hanoi released the English text of the President's letter. Ho's letter was transmitted to us in French. We will have to check further to determine precisely when the President's letter was written. It may have been on February 6 or 7, or earlier. It was received by the North Vietnamese in Moscow on February 10, but Moscow may have had to inquire from Hanoi as to whether the letter should be accepted.

Hanoi's publication of the exchange of letters was most extraordinary. It is not normal diplomatic practice to publicize communications of this nature between heads of state, particularly across ideological lines.

In Guam, discussions concentrated on the civilian side. There was a review of the military situation, but no consideration of troop levels or military measures. The only step needed before promulgation of the new Constitution is approval by the armed forces council - and Ky made it clear that this is more or less a formality.

P/ON:CEBartch

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 22, 1967

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Linowitz reports on:

-- What the businessmen have  
been doing on the Hill for the  
Resolution;

-- The state of play in the  
House and the Senate.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By ng, NARA, Date 4-16-91

WWRostow:rlh

132a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 21, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Council for Latin America --  
Joint Congressional Summit  
Resolution

I have been keeping in touch with the Council for Latin America and the efforts they are making to further the progress of the Joint Resolution.

Although a number of the members of the Board of Trustees of the Council have communicated in one way or another with various members of the Senate, the following reports are of particular interest:

Senator Fulbright -- Mr. Harper, President of Alcoa, has twice talked to Senator Fulbright and will do so again. I understand that Harper has told Fulbright in strong and forthright terms that he believes his position is inimical to our best interests in Latin America.

Senator Lausche -- Ray Firestone, Chairman of Firestone, has been talking to Senator Lausche and is planning to do so again. He seems to be sanguine about having Lausche support the Resolution.

Senator Williams -- Messrs. Carpenter and Lenher, both Vice Presidents of duPont, have been talking to Senator Williams. The report is that Williams is willing to go along with the Resolution "if it is clear that no fixed amount of money is involved".

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12958,  
SEC. 1.1(a)


BY 46 ON 4-17-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Senator Hickenlooper -- Mr. Olmstead of Texas Oil has been working rather closely with Senator Hickenlooper and has been asked to assist in the formulation of some new language. He will keep us informed.

With respect to the further hearings by the Senate Committee, I've been in touch with David Rockefeller, who is willing to appear as a witness if this seems desirable. I've asked him to hold himself in readiness and that we would then advise him whether it would be a good move for him to plan to be on hand April 3rd when the Committee reconvenes for further hearings.



Sol M. Linowitz

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Joint Congressional Resolution Regarding the  
Summit

House of Representatives

This afternoon the Resolution, with the language as approved by you, will be coming up in the House. The latest head-count from Bill Macomber indicates the following, based on personal contacts made either with Congressmen or with members of their staff:

Yes	174
Probably Yes	52
No	9
Probably No	33
Absent	25
No Commitment	<u>123</u>
Total	416

Amendments will probably be offered by Congressmen Gross, Derwinski and Adair, but I have been keeping in touch with Mailliard and Selden, and they report the prospects for dealing with them as very good.

Senate

At the hearing yesterday Senators Gore, Church and

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INFORMATION, E. O. 12958  
SEC. 1.1(a)


BY by ON 4-17-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Symington were particularly strong in their opposition to the Resolution, and Morse was especially forceful in his response. Senators Mansfield and Hickenlooper were also very helpful, but it is quite clear that Senators Fulbright, Gore, Church and Symington are reacting emotionally in their opposition.

It would probably have been possible to have the Resolution voted out of the Committee yesterday, but a number of changes would probably have been made - with the approval of Senators Aiken, Hickenlooper and other supporters of the Resolution. I have been talking over the situation with Vice President Humphrey, Senator Mansfield and Senator Morse, and based on their appraisal, it is my recommendation that the whole situation be permitted to cool off until after the Recess. You might perhaps then want to invite Senators Morse and Hickenlooper and the four dissidents - Fulbright, Church, Gore and Symington - to meet with you and talk over the situation. If, as a result of such a meeting, it is not going to be possible to work out an acceptable solution, then a real effort would be made to vote the Resolution out of the Committee at the earliest moment. I have, of course, been working closely with Nick Katzenbach and Bill Macomber on this, and this recommendation is also in accord with their view.

  
Sol M. Linowitz

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



*Pres file*

Wednesday  
March 22, 1967 -- 4:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Merck leans on Frelinghuysen.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE  
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

WW R 133a

FYI

WAR


March 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM BOWDLER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Joint Congressional Resolution on the Summit

After my talk with the Council for Latin America Trustees last Thursday, various of them undertook to get in touch with their Congressmen and to express their support for the Joint Congressional Resolution on Latin America.

Typical of the response is the enclosed letter from Dr. Knoppers, President of Merck Sharp & Dohme International.

  
Sol M. Linowitz

Enclosure:

Letter of March 16 to Amb. Linowitz  
from Dr. Antonie T. Knoppers

MAR 20 1967

CABLE: MERCK NEWYORK

1336

For: S. M. L.

# MERCK SHARP & DOHME INTERNATIONAL

DIVISION OF MERCK & CO., INC.

100 CHURCH STREET, NEW YORK 7, N. Y., U. S. A.

DR. ANTONIE T. KNOPPERS  
PRESIDENT

March 16, 1967

The Honorable Sol Linowitz  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ambassador Linowitz:

As a follow-up of our meeting yesterday morning, I can inform you that through our domestic operations we will inform Congressman Frelinghuysen that Merck & Co., Inc. supports the Latin American resolutions of the President. We will ask Congressman Frelinghuysen to go as far as he can in using the strongest language possible.

Through another channel, we will contact Senator Symington and we will continue to explore other alleys as well.

Sincerely yours,

*Antonie T. Knoppers*

ATK:GMC

Pres file

~~SECRET~~~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

Wednesday, March 22, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Warheads to Support NATO Forces  
of the Federal Republic of Germany

The Department of Defense, with the concurrence of the Department of State and Atomic Energy Commission, has requested authority to disperse ☐ additional SERGEANT nuclear warheads, Mk 52, Y1 and Y2, to West Germany to support the

The first two battalions are scheduled to have a nuclear capability in June 1967 and the batteries of the last named battalion are scheduled to have a nuclear capability in January 1968. This is the request for specific dispersal authorization of the actual weapons. You previously approved the dispersal of these weapons in general terms for planning purposes (NSAM 334).

All of these weapons will be equipped with permissive link installation (PAL) in accordance with NSAM 160. Approval of this request will not involve any increase in the area total of nuclear weapons proposed for dispersal to West Germany over the dispersal ceiling established by NSAM 334.

Your approval of the attached is recommended. If you approve, I will sign the attached memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

W. W. Rostow

\_\_\_\_ Approved

\_\_\_\_ Disapproved

\_\_\_\_ See me

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-142 and NLS 99-82

By ius, NARA, Date 5-12-04~~SECRET - FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY,  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Warheads to Support NATO Forces  
of the Federal Republic of Germany

1.5(a)  
3.4(b)(6)

Reference is made to your memorandum for the President of March 21, 1967, requesting that authority be granted for the dispersal of ☐ additional SERGEANT nuclear warheads, Mk 52 Y1 and Y2, to West Germany to support NATO forces of the FRG. It was noted that the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission concur in the requested dispersal.

The requested authority has been approved with the understanding that all weapons to be dispersed under this authority are programmed for permissive link installation in accordance with NSAM 160. It has been noted that U. S. unilateral communications to the U. S. custodial detachment will be operational prior to weapon dispersal and that all other requirements for custodial facilities, personnel, security and communications will be completed prior to the dispersal of these additional weapons. It has further been noted that this approval will not require any increase in the area total of nuclear weapons proposed for dispersal to West Germany in FY 1966 (over those authorized for planning purposes in NSAM 334).

W. W. Rostow

cc: Dr. Glenn Seaborg, AEC

~~SECRET - FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~



~~SECRET~~

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

701  
1346  
SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-83  
By CB, NARA Date 6-30-00

21 MAR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Warheads to Support NATO Forces  
of the Federal Republic of Germany

The Department of Defense requests authority to disperse ☐ additional SERGEANT nuclear warheads, Mk 52 Y1 and Y2, in support of FRG units. The additional dispersals are consistent with NSAM 334 and current U.S. plans for nuclear warhead support of non-U.S. NATO delivery systems.

Authority now exists to disperse ☐ SERGEANT nuclear warheads in support of FRG units. For planning purposes, NSAM 334 authorized the dispersal of ☐ SERGEANT nuclear warheads in support of FRG units. Therefore, the dispersal of ☐ additional SERGEANT nuclear warheads in support of FRG units is consistent with NSAM 334.

The ☐ additional SERGEANT warheads will be for the support of the

☐ The first two battalions are scheduled to have a nuclear capability in June 1967. The batteries of the last named battalion are scheduled to have a nuclear capability in January 1968. In order to meet operational requirements of these units, ☐ warheads are to be dispersed prior to May 1967 and the remainder prior to December 1967.

Installation of permissive action links (PAL) will be completed before the weapons are dispersed. U.S. unilateral communications to the U.S.

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~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

Handle as Restricted Data - General Dissemination  
Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
RECLASSIFICATION  
DATE NOT YET

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-

1734

~~SECRET~~

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custodial detachment will be operational prior to weapon dispersal. All other requirements for custodial facilities, personnel, security and communications will be completed prior to dispersal.

The Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission have concurred in this dispersal action.

*Cyrus Vance*

~~SECRET~~

~~FORMERLY PROTECTED DATA~~

Handle as Restricted Data - No Dissem.  
Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

*Pres file*

March 22, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith the Guam talking  
points which you requested at lunch  
today.

W. W. Rostow

Main Talking Points for the President  
in Meetings with Vietnamese Leaders  
(3/19/67)(revised)

WWRostow:rlh



Main Talking Points for the President  
in Meetings with Vietnamese Leaders

Monday

1. Military Effort and Shift to Pacification

We will keep up our military effort and provide whatever is needed to assure its effectiveness; I am confident that this will also be true on the Vietnamese side and that the ARVN will soon be making its weight felt in pacification work so that security can spread rapidly among the villages.

2. Intensify Pacification

We have thoroughly reorganized the American staff working in support of your pacification program. One improvement we hope this will bring to our joint effort is the closest coordination of military and civil plans. Military clear-and-hold is the key to pacification. RD teams must be able to work behind a security shield. Then the hard-won gains of military men must be consolidated by effective and prompt civil follow-up.

3. National Reconciliation

To match the military effort we strongly urge early announcement of the government's national reconciliation program, and proclamation of a decree which will give it vigorous effect. The right kind of program might help sap the strength of the Viet Cong even more effectively than direct military action.

4. Importance of Successful Elections

Congratulations on your constitution and on the forthcoming village and hamlet elections--all signs of your steady progress toward representative

government. Congratulations also on your recognition of the fundamental need for civilians and military to work together and for broadening the participation in your government to include ever wider groups in the population. We are confident that next September 11, if that is indeed to be the date of your presidential elections, will share the luster of that date in 1966 when the world saw free, fair, and open elections conducted scrupulously amidst conditions of war and terror.

5. Importance of Military Unity

We are counting on the Vietnamese military staying united. They have done a wonderful job over the past year. In a country like Viet Nam, unity of the military is the basis not merely for the defense of the nation and civil order but the constitutional process itself. You are counting on them.

6. Long Term Planning of Vietnamese Development

We have come through a great deal in the last six years. If victory is not in sight, it is on the way. Thus we must now set our sights high; work hard for a breakthrough, whether on the battlefield or in diplomacy; and look to the future of a democratic, modern South Viet Nam. That is why you attach such importance to the work of Dr. Thuc's team and are so grateful that Mr. Lilienthal--who is the best we have--are working with such enthusiasm.

7. Land Reform

We strongly support your new emphasis on speeding up land reform--this essential element of your social revolution must move forward.

Villagers should know--particularly those again coming under government authority--that their government brings progress and not a return to social ills like absentee landlordism.

8. Control Inflation

We cannot again run the risks of the early months of 1966 when inflation threatened to undermine all that had been accomplished. However painful the controls on spending--and we know as well as you the discipline this requires--they must be strictly applied; we must expedite Saigon port clearance as our lifeline, and step up in every possible way domestic production of foodstuffs in Viet Nam so that adequate food can be brought to the market and\* reach the people.

9. Foreign Exchange Ceiling

We appreciate the GVN's interim action to keep its foreign exchange accumulations within the agreed \$250 million level. But we estimate that GVN reserves will still keep rising so count on Ky's expressed determination to reach a more definitive solution soon. I'm asking Mr. Komer to keep working with you on this.

10. Consultation in Preparing for Negotiations

The press today is full of rumors and reports of peace initiatives. As you know, some of these reach us and we try in every reasonable case to make a reasonable response. All of us want peace, of course. But we know that to date there has been no indication that Hanoi means to seek peace sincerely.

\*underscored portion has been added to this draft

Our two governments will, as in the past, remain in constant touch on these matters. I know that you will be as ready as we to respond as soon as there is a prospect for peace which assures all the people of South Viet Nam freedom and the chance to decide their own future.

###

~~TOP SECRET~~  
-- SENSITIVE

Wednesday - March 22, 1967

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this monthly CIA-DIA report on Cuba's military posture as it pertains to strategic weapons.

The increase in Soviet shipments of arms to Cuba during the past six months have been carefully looked at by USIB. In their report of March 2, 1967, USIB had this to say about the shipments:

"Soviet provision of military equipment to Cuba is no longer large in volume, particularly in comparison with the high levels reached in 1962 and 1963. Some step-up in deliveries began in the last quarter of 1966, however, and continued in early 1967. We believe this is a phase of a continuing Soviet replacement and resupply program, designed to replenish the stocks used up and worn out by the Cubans. In a few cases, the new items are more advanced than those which were already in Cuba, and the result will be to strengthen some Cuban units . . . . . Further replenishments and some other new items will probably be delivered over the next two years; indeed, the rate of resupply may pick up slightly because a number of items in the Cuban inventory have reached or are approaching a nonoperational condition . . . . .".

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

CIA-DIA report  
of 21 March 1967

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

~~TOP SECRET~~  
-- SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday - March 22, 1967 *Pres file*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: OAS Summit Preparations**

These are the highlights of what has taken place on the security front and in our efforts to stimulate Latin American Presidents to make positive, public statements on the Summit.

**Security Picture**

The Uruguayans continue to work on their security plans for Punta del Este, based on three concentric security zones. [REDACTED] while the planning is sound, the Uruguayans have not yet had "dry-runs" to test their effectiveness in carrying them out. The police in Punta del Este have been conducting a house-to-house nose count preparatory to determine who will be permitted to enter the various security zones.

The Communists continue to plan disruptive actions but so far have done little to implement them. They have started an anti-Summit poster and sign-painting campaign. But Uruguayan authorities quickly organized crews to tear the city taking these down almost as fast as they go up. The quick counter-action has not been lost on the Communists.

Ambassador Hoyt has spoken to President Gestido about giving the Communists a "no nonsense" warning. He reacted favorably as described in the attached telegram. Hoyt notes that the President continues concerned over the security outlook and is following preparations closely.

Elsewhere in the hemisphere there is still no discernible coordinated Communist plan to mount a hemisphere-wide campaign against the Summit. CIA thinks the Commies may be holding their fire until later on.

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Summit Statements by Latin American Presidents

Our Ambassadors have not had much success so far in getting Latin American Presidents to make public statements on the Summit. Robles (Panama), Trejos (Costa Rica) and Guerrero (Nicaragua) have spoken up positively. The Presidents of Argentina, Mexico, Guatemala and Peru are expected to do so in the near future.

USIS is following hemisphere press treatment of the Summit and reports that coverage is picking up -- most of it favorable. The worst press was in Montevideo early last week, where reporters picked up negative comments on your message to Congress from low-ranking members of delegations to the Summit preparatory talks. But Linc did a good job of turning the press around. Our Embassy's reports for the past several days show that the Montevideo dailies, except for the Communist organ, are back on a positive track and expanding their coverage of pre-Summit preparations.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

137a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR HOYT IN MONTEVIDEO (2213,  
dated March 21, 1967)

SUBJECT: The Summit.

1. I delivered the President's letter to President Gestido last night.(responding to his thank you letter for your inaugural gift).
2. Communist activity in Connection with the Summit.

I reviewed with the President and Foreign Minister the activities to date of the Communists, their plans for continued attacks against the Summit, and the fact that this is an international communist plan, as evidenced by the recent activity in Colombia. I provided the President with the specifics on the PCU (Uruguayan Communist Party) plans, facilities and threats, which have already been given to the Minister of Interior and the Chief of Police. I told the President that we are concerned that the communists might be able to get a head start, which would make it difficult for the Government of Uruguay to undo and be able to carry out its own plans for constructive support for the Summit. The President and Foreign Minister listened carefully, and it was obvious that the President had been in close contact with the Minister of Interior and was aware of the many problems. He stated that the Government of Uruguay already was trying to step up newspaper and television coverage on the Conference and that the Minister of Interior would be calling on the top communist leaders in the near future. The Foreign Minister confirmed that he was meeting with student and labor leaders early next week.

The President then turned to the Foreign Minister and told him that he should call in the Soviet Ambassador and make it plain to him that trouble at the time of the Summit might well have effect on matters in which the USSR might be interested. The Foreign Minister said he did not believe it wise to "call in" the Soviet Ambassador, but that he would seek him out and get the message to him at an early opportunity.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By cl, NARA, Date 10-21-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



3. Attendance of Mrs. Johnson

I told the President that our latest information was that Mrs. Johnson would not be accompanying our President. Gestido made no comment, but the Foreign Minister repeated, as he has to me on other occasions, and as he did to Assistant Secretary Gordon the other night, that he hoped Mrs. Johnson would come. He thought the presence of the Ladies would be helpful in bringing out the chivalry of the Latin Americans and would reduce any disorders or anti-Summit activities. (Our Secret Service does not agree with this last opinion.)

4. The USS Wright.

I informed the President that it now appeared the communications ship USS Wright would be coming to Punta del Este. The Foreign Minister repeated the statement he made to the pre-advance White House group that the presence of the vessel posed no problem whatsoever for the Uruguayans and reiterated that the ship would be anchored between the harbor and Gorriti Island in plain view where naval ships of other nations always anchor. It is obvious that the Foreign Minister particularly believes that the ship should be in view of the public and that no attempt should be made to hide its presence here.

5. The Summit in General

We discussed preparations for the Summit and the desire of the Uruguayans for helicopters. Both President Gestido and the Foreign Minister stressed that it would be most helpful if arrangements could be made to provide helicopters through the OAS to the Government of Uruguay.

On overall preparations, they seemed to believe that things were going well; that while there were details yet to be worked out, they are optimistic they can put on a good performance. Gestido is still concerned over security preparations, and apparently is following them closely.

March 22, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached is a brief note to President Senghor, of Senegal, expressing your relief that he was not harmed in this morning's attempt on his life. This is not strictly required by international protocol, but I agree with State that it is a good idea.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

EKH:djw

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SENGHOR  
OF SENEGAL

I want you to know how profoundly relieved I was to hear that you had escaped injury this morning. The news of the attempt on your life was a blow to me and to all Americans. We join your millions of friends and admirers around the world in rejoicing that Senegal and all of Africa will continue to have the benefit of your wise and courageous leadership.

Accept, Mr. President, my deep personal regards and best wishes.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Wednesday, March 22, 1967 -- 7:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Kenneth Fox, Kansas City Star, came in for one of his periodic deep backgrounders. We talked almost exclusively about Viet Nam, his questions being:

- The nature and usefulness of the Guam conference;
- The probable pace of pacification in South Viet Nam;
- The reasons for the publication of the exchange with Ho;
- The possibilities of Communist China getting into the war.

I explained the nature and gave him the main results of the conference; that we were making progress but could not judge the pace in Viet Nam; I explained clearly my ignorance as to why Hanoi published the letters; and said that although there was no rational reason for Communist China to get into the war, we watched carefully because they were not behaving in a highly rational way these days.

Max Frankel, The New York Times, telephoned to ask if we planned to reveal more of our secret contacts, looking towards peace. He said he would be delighted to be the channel for the revelation. I said that at the moment we took the view that two wrongs didn't make a right. We had taken considerable domestic criticism in this matter for our wooden and unimaginative approaches; but our position was not to deal with domestic criticism but to get peace at the earliest time. Therefore, we had some reservation about revealing everything we had been trying to do.

Tom Lambert, Los Angeles Times, telephoned and asked the same question as Frankel. I gave him the same answer.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Wednesday, March 22, 1967  
7:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Unless you rule to the contrary,  
Bill Gaud reports he is going on leave  
for a week, beginning Monday, March 27.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

139a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

March 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Unless you see some reason why I should not do so, I plan to go on leave for the week beginning Monday, March 27. The Congress will be away, my daughter will be on vacation from college, and I did not get away last summer. We plan to go to Puerto Rico where I can be reached by phone and from where I can return in a few hours if necessary.

I hope we will soon be able to settle on a new Assistant Administrator for Africa. That position has been vacant since January 1. We have taken a good look at Michael Iovenko as you suggested, but, as I believe you will soon hear from John Macy, I feel quite strongly that he is not the man for this assignment. If you have reservations about Peter Straus - whose name I sent up to you for the job through John Macy - please let me know and I will come up with another suggestion.

*William S. Gaud*

William S. Gaud

~~SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

Wednesday, March 22, 1967  
4:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's proposed  
interim reply to Wilson from you.

W. W. Rostow

Approved ✓

Approved as amended \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~ --- EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rq, NARA, Date 4-18-91

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-374  
By ju, NARA, Date 1-24-93

March 22, 1967

963

1402

SECRET - EYES ONLY

SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER FROM THE  
PRESIDENT

I need not tell you that I shall be happy to see Pat Dean upon his return and to go over with him any misunderstanding which might have arisen.

We had a good meeting at Guam. The press tried to turn it into a meeting which we told them from the beginning it would not be and the same press turned around and complained because we did not do what we told them in Washington we had no intention of doing. Specifically, we did not take up such questions as troop levels or specific military measures or matters of that sort.

One by-product of the Guam meeting was the conclusion of the new Constitution in Viet-Nam and its approval both by the Constituent Assembly and the Military Directorate. If the South Vietnamese succeed, as I am beginning to believe they will, in establishing an elected constitutional government in the midst of all the violence, it will be a most extraordinary performance. The Viet Cong will bitterly oppose the process and there will be many cynics in other parts of the world. We anticipate elections for village councils

SECRET - EYES ONLY



SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2-

in early April and for hamlet chiefs running into June; a President and a Senate will be elected at the end of August or early September followed by elections a month later for the Lower House.

We do not have a very clear view as to just why Ho Chi Minh made public our exchange of letters. It's possible that the action was taken as a part of the Moscow-Peking debate, because of some differences of view within Hanoi's own leadership, because of rumors which might be affecting the morale of the National Liberation Front or for still some other reason. I'll be glad to hear anything which your people pick up as to Ho Chi Minh's motivation. My impression is that he will not respond constructively to U Thant and we have seen no indications of anything of interest developing on any bilateral contact with us or between Hanoi and Saigon.

As to your concluding question, the offers we made during your meeting with Kosygin remain open.

I am glad that the Vice President will have a chance to visit London in the course of his European trip. I think you would find him helpful in talking to some of your people in the House of Commons.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Wednesday, March 22, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Thai Bases Announcement

Secretary Rusk wants to add to the luncheon agenda the matter of our acknowledgement of the Thai decision to permit U.S. use of the U-Tapao base.

Facts:

The Thai have made the basic announcement this morning; it has moved on all wires and been carried on the radio;

Our announcement would simply be a follow-up acknowledgement; its purpose is mainly to express our gratitude for the cooperation the Thai are offering in the Viet-Nam effort;

The Thai dropped their suggestion that a special Presidential emissary be sent to Bangkok for this purpose on the understanding that the White House would be making a statement after the Thai announcement.

My own feeling is that the U-Tapao decision was not an easy one for the Thai. It is going to open them up to strong attack from the Communists. The kind of warm reception by us of their decision that has been proposed is not out of order. If we handle the matter otherwise, we can expect trouble from Foreign Minister Thanat at the Troop Contributors meeting here next month.

We may want to take another look at the proposed full text. But I see no overwhelming reason for us to back away from the understanding Ambassador Martin reached with the Thai Prime Minister and his Government. I suggest that George Christian make the statement this afternoon along the general lines proposed.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By CG, NARA, Date 10-21-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

162

Pres file

Wednesday, March 22, 1967 -- 11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

As you are undoubtedly aware, Gen. Westmoreland's presentation at Guam was, evidently, designed to be conservative and non-promissory -- which, given his responsibilities, is understandable.

He repeated the infiltration estimate of 7,000 per month.

You may be interested in the attached table prepared for Guam by the Department of Defense, as of 1 March 1967.

Although the figures are uncertain -- and subject to backward up-dating as evidence flows in -- you will see that one can only arrive at such a figure by:

- averaging over the twelve months of 1966 the maximum total of confirmed, probable, and possible;
- projecting forward at a rate which ignores the downward trend in quarterly totals since the first quarter of 1966.

The main-force problem right now is not the high over-all rate of infiltration so much as the 3-4 divisions harassing us from sanctuary along the DMZ and the 2 divisions harassing us from the sanctuary in Cambodia.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 47

By ies, NARS, Date 10-29-84

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OASD/ISA  
17 March 1967

142a

NORTH VIETNAMESE INFILTRATION INTO SOUTH VIETNAM

A. Personnel

1. Accepted infiltration (as of 1 March 1967) during CY 1966 was 50,400 personnel with an additional 29,200 listed as possible.

	<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Accepted Total</u>	<u>Possible</u>	<u>Total</u>
1965					
Oct-Dec.	9,600	600	10,200	1,500	11,700
1966					
Jan-Mar	21,700	5,500	27,200	8,700	35,900
Apr-June	11,000	3,900	14,900	4,800	19,700
Jul-Sept	7,200	500	7,700	9,400	17,100
Oct-Dec.	100	500	600	6,300	6,900
TOTAL	40,000	10,400	50,400	29,200	79,600
1967					
Jan-Feb	-----	----	----	700	700

2. ~~Since these figures~~ are constantly subject to substantial revision, due to new information as late as 13 months after the month of infiltration, ~~it is not possible to project a trend.~~

3. Infiltration routes have not changed in the past year. However, since June 1966 infiltration through the center of the DMZ has substantially increased.

B. Equipment and Supplies

1. No reliable estimates exist on the tons of supplies infiltrated from North Vietnam to South Vietnam, nor the full impact of U.S. interdiction efforts.

2. Roughly 9,800 trucks have been destroyed or damaged in North Vietnam and Laos, plus about 14,400 waterborne craft, and 2,700 railroad cars and equipment.

3. The North Vietnamese have diverted approximately 300,000 personnel to maintenance of lines of communication.

4. Anti-infiltration operations have severely complicated and slowed the infiltration of supplies into South Vietnam. It may be that shortages are beginning to appear in certain enemy areas in SVN because of these efforts. There is, however, no evidence yet available which can substantiate any overall critical shortages of supply that would severely limit the VC/NVA force structure presently in SVN.

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Authority NLS-CBS 5  
By is, NARS, Date 8-27-84

~~SECRET~~

~~Top SECRET~~

Lunch Meeting with the President  
Wednesday, March 22, 1967, 12:30 p.m.

AGENDA

1. Follow-On From Ho's Caper: An Hour TV program for Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara?
2. India-Pak Military Supply Policy (Tab A) -- Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara
3. Prime Minister Wilson and "Communications Breakdown"  
Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara (Int B)
4. Abbott Washburn Proposals, including bipartisan public committee in support of our Viet Nam Policy -- Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara  
(Int C)

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By kg, NARA, Date 4-18-91

~~Top SECRET~~



Wednesday, March 22, 1967  
7:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a summary of Sec. Rusk's back-  
grounder of last evening.

I think the State Dept should take on  
Sen. Kennedy's criticism today, pointing out  
that his hypothesis was given a thorough test:

-- Preliminary contacts before Ted  
suggested that our stand down of bombing might  
be the occasion for mutual efforts at de-  
escalation;

-- During Tet we did unilaterally stand  
down our bombing and naval action in North  
Vietnamese waters;

-- Our letter gave Hanoi a full opportunity  
to make alternative suggestions of a positive  
character.

He doesn't have a leg to stand on if the  
situation at that time is clearly presented.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

March 21, 1967

In a background briefing for twenty-three U.S. and foreign newsmen today, Secretary Rusk said President Johnson's letter to Ho Chi Minh was a real effort to put something on the table to get the violence stopped in Viet Nam.

Referring to a chart he provided to newsmen, the Secretary said this illustrated the contacts we had had in an effort to bring the war in Viet Nam to the peace table. Contacts with Hanoi were omitted, in view of Hanoi's penchant for secrecy.

We do not know why Hanoi chose at this time to release Ho Chi Minh's exchange of letters with President Johnson. There is nothing in our bilateral traffic to indicate why they did this, and there are no developments on our side to justify this action. For our part, we did not release the exchange before, even though it was quite favorable to us, because our problem is not just public opinion; we are seeking to end the war.

The proposals contained in President Johnson's letter were specific. They related to the bombing, infiltration, and augmentation of forces. But this would have opened up if the other side had agreed to discuss these proposals. President Johnson's letter was intended only as a beginning.

If the two letters are compared, it is clear that the President's letter does not contain a word of polemics, not a rude word. But the operational paragraph of Ho's reply is almost identical with the operational portion of Ho's letter of February 13 to the Pope. At the time this letter was made public, we didn't know if this was intended as an answer to the President's letter, or if an answer would be forthcoming. But it indicated that any reply to the President's proposals would be negative.

It was made clear to the other side that the offer contained in the President's letter did not terminate with the end of TET. This has continued to be the case; it is still open. But publication of the correspondence apparently indicates that there will be no further response.

Wilson and Kosygin were aware of our position and our proposals concerning bombing, infiltration, and augmentation, at the time they met in London. Kosygin endorsed the statements reported in the Burchette interview, but this was not good enough for us, because Hanoi would not indicate what it was prepared to do to end the war.

Admittedly Ho's letter to the Pope was a factor in our decision to resume bombing after TET; we had no indication that Hanoi was prepared to do anything if the bombing pause were prolonged any further. Ho had several choices in responding to the President's proposals; he could have made counter-proposals, he could have cautiously replied. But instead he appeared to slam the door.

It is clear that this is not a neutral position.

Although Hanoi has used different language from time to time, it has consistently demanded that the bombing be ended unconditionally and permanently. We held off bombing for two days after TET, but we saw hundreds of ships, trucks, and barges moving into the South as soon as the holiday began. But Hanoi did not have its Ambassadors alerted to work for peace during this period. Hanoi was prepared for military action, but not for diplomatic action; and we concluded that they were not prepared to move toward a peaceful settlement.

With regard to Senator Robert Kennedy's statement today, he is again forgetting that Hanoi demands permanent and unconditional cessation of the bombing. If he had spoken in the same way at the beginning of TET his argument could have been put to a good test. There is a serious operational question involved here - there are three North Vietnamese divisions in and around the DMZ. If we are to stop the bombing permanently and unconditionally, we want someone to at least whisper to us that these divisions will not move against our troops. Our position has not hardened on this since the President's February 2 press conference statement that almost any sign would be acceptable to us. There has not been one word from the other side.

We do not want to assume that Hanoi's action in publicizing the exchange of letters and apparently rejecting the President's proposals signifies a virtual collapse of peace hopes. As far as we are concerned, any time is ripe for a peaceful settlement.

We have never publicly said we were prepared to deal with the NLF. The President's statement of July 1965, which is part of the Fourteen Points, remains our policy on this question. We have made it clear in our contacts through various channels that we are willing to discuss this.

This is the first time the President has addressed a letter to Ho. (He certainly would not correspond with any one else in Hanoi.) It does not in any way imply recognition, which is a matter of intent. Hanoi released the English text of the President's letter. Ho's letter was transmitted to us in French. We will have to check further to determine precisely when the President's letter was written. It may have been on February 6 or 7, or earlier. It was received by the North Vietnamese in Moscow on February 10, but Moscow may have had to inquire from Hanoi as to whether the letter should be accepted.

Hanoi's publication of the exchange of letters was most extraordinary. It is not normal diplomatic practice to publicize communications of this nature between heads of state, particularly across ideological lines.

In Guam, discussions concentrated on the civilian side. There was a review of the military situation, but no consideration of troop levels or military measures. The only step needed before promulgation of the new Constitution is approval by the armed forces council - and Ky made it clear that this is more or less a formality.

P/ON:CEBartch



148

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NJ 91-374**  
By ju, NARA, Date 1-29-93

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Tuesday, March 21, 1967 -- 8:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith talking points for the leadership meeting at 9:00 a.m. tomorrow, Wednesday, March 22, 1967.

1. Guam.

The conference at Guam was, as I said before we left, a regular meeting between those bearing responsibility in Washington and those in Saigon for our military, economic, social, and political operations in Viet Nam. We have had such meetings every six months or so.

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara will have more to tell you about our sessions there. But four points stand out in my mind.

-- The presence of the new and the old teams -- working and talking and being briefed together -- assured a smooth transition.

-- There was remarkable unity among the Vietnamese and U.S. teams on the main tasks ahead. The press seized on and distorted a paragraph in which Prime Minister Ky asked some rhetorical questions; but the bulk of his speech was devoted to precisely the issues which we also regard as of critical importance: the shift to constitutional government; pacification; the reconciliation program that will be announced when the new constitution is promulgated; the planning of Vietnamese economic development.

-- Gen. Westmoreland's firm assurance that our troops are in great heart, well supplied, well fed, and doing a magnificent job.

-- Above all, perhaps, the presentation to us of the new Vietnamese Constitution. Apparently the meeting at Guam stimulated both the Constituent Assembly and the Directorate to see the job through to the end. It wasn't easy. There were compromises to make. But they came with the job done: a great tribute to the Vietnamese, and a tribute to us -- in the sense that they all know we place a high priority on their making a successful transition to constitutional government.

Now Sec. Rusk for an account of the civil side of the conference.

(Sec. Rusk)

Now Sec. McNamara for an account of the military side of the conference.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

2. The Exchange of Letters with Ho Chi Minh

As I said last night, our initiative in writing to Ho Chi Minh was only one of many initiatives we have taken in pursuit of an honorable peace, and his rigid response only one of many such responses from Hanoi. But every American should read carefully his fanatical letter to understand better the kind of adversary we face in this war.

Now, Sec. Rusk, who will tell you more of our experience in seeking to find a way to an honorable, negotiated settlement.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, March 21, 1967  
9:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sol Linowitz' report  
on the state of the Joint Congressional  
Resolution regarding the Latin  
American Summit.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 18, NARA, Date 4-18-91

WWRostow:rlh

950

146a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Joint Congressional Resolution Regarding the  
Summit

House of Representatives

After Friday's 24 to 3 vote by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in favor of the Resolution, we have been making a check of House support for the Resolution. The indications are favorable and every effort will be made to have an exact head-count by Wednesday, when it is scheduled to be brought to the Floor.

Senate

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee met in Executive Session, and - according to later reports from Senators Mansfield and Morse - a difficult and sometimes bitter debate erupted about the Resolution. Senators Fulbright, Gore, Church and Symington strongly opposed the Resolution and said they particularly objected to the speed with which they were being asked to act. Senator Fulbright then proposed that the Committee hold further hearings on Thursday to hear Senator Gruening and Mr. Danielian, both of whom have asked to testify. Senators Morse and Mansfield opposed the delay until Thursday and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356  
SEC. 1.1(a).

BY 18 ON 4-17-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


-2-

called for a vote overruling the Chairman and scheduled the hearing for Tuesday afternoon. They won by a vote of 10 to 5. In the course of the discussion there were various suggested changes of language mentioned, but no specific wording was formulated. Senator Mansfield believes, however, that it is quite likely that some changes in wording will be put forward by the Committee.

The main burden of the argument of Senators Fulbright, Gore and Church is that this is a "Tonkin Bay" type of resolution and they apparently persist in this despite the vigorous arguments of Senators Morse, Mansfield and Hickenlooper, and others.

It was the recommendation of both Senators Mansfield and Morse that we should not propose special witnesses such as David Rockefeller, Milton Eisenhower, et al, since this would only delay the hearings further and would make almost impossible action before the recess on Thursday.

I telephoned the Vice President in order to consult with him as to the course we were following, and he felt that the best plan was to follow the guidance of Senators Mansfield, Morse and Hickenlooper in their efforts to get the Resolution out of the Committee. He thought that Arthur Goldberg might have particular influence with Senator Church and suggested that I call Ambassador Goldberg and ask him to get in touch with Senator Church. I did so and Ambassador Goldberg agreed that he would talk to Senator Church about the matter and try to obtain his cooperation.

  
Sol M. Linowitz

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday, March 21, 1967 7:50

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Former Prime Minister Kishi of Japan

You have agreed to receive former Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi at noon on Wednesday, March 22. His purpose is to pay a short courtesy call on you.

Mr. Kishi was most cooperative during his tenure as Prime Minister (1956-1960). His leadership was particularly important in working out the revised Security Treaty in 1960.

Though he now holds no official position -- except his seat in the parliament -- he remains one of the most influential men in Japanese political life. He is the brother of Prime Minister Sato. One of his followers, Finance Minister Fukuda, is probably the most likely candidate to succeed Sato.

Kishi's influence continues to be of great potential help to us -- regarding our security relations and support for our position in Vietnam. He will be seeing Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

He is travelling in a private capacity, and is not likely to raise any specific problems. You may wish to:

- Discuss briefly your views on the present situation in Vietnam. Kishi is basically very sympathetic with our position.
- Express your admiration for Japanese contribution to regional Asian cooperation in various fields, including political, banking, and agricultural areas, and for the substantial aid which Japan is giving to less developed Asian countries.

W. W. Rostow

AJenkins:mm

CONFIDENTIAL



Mr. Rostow

148

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-374  
By pw, NARA, Date 1-29-93

1. Pres file  
2. Pres file

SECRET

March 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Visit for Tony Taylor to Jordan

You will remember that your brother-in-law went to Jordan about a year and a half ago to advise on the development of handicraft industry there. Now his project has reached a point where he should go back. Because the press last time noted his relationship to you and tabbed him as some kind of arms merchant, AID wants to be doubly careful not to embarrass you. Therefore, they are asking whether we have any objections.

My own feeling is that we should let him go about his business. Tourism is Jordan's main resource, and the Jordanians are doing a remarkably good job of developing it. Secretary Udall's recent visit was a conspicuous boost, and now it is time for men like Taylor to move in and help with the followup details. These are projects we can be proud to be associated with, and everyone feels that Taylor can do an excellent job. State agrees that we should go ahead as economics dictate and stand our ground against any possible press reaction.

Therefore, unless you have any personal reason for wanting to see this delayed, I propose to tell AID we have no objections to their going ahead according to their own schedule.

15/  
W. W. Rostow

No objection \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_ ✓

3/22/67

SECRET

*Guam*

Monday, March 20, 1967

MR. PRESIDENT:

As I see it, there are four things that ought to be done between now and the time we leave.

1. Decide precisely the way you wish to organize pacification.
2. Communicate your decision to the new team and the old with the most powerful injunction possible that:
  - the transition be made without a break;
  - and that you expect them to work like brothers in this complex and decisive military-civilian problem.
3. Listen to briefings on the military side by Westy; and by Lodge on the civil side, a day in court which he deserves as outgoing Ambassador.
4. Give the whole American team a powerful pep talk that the clock is ticking; a maximum effort is necessary for a radical improvement in the situation and, if possible, a clean breakthrough.

The attached brief paper covers in a rough way the Westmoreland/Lodge briefing and a closing statement by you.

The concluding remarks were written by Bill Jorden after we had talked; and they are good. My feeling is that if you simply speak to your men from the heart, it will be even better.

In designing tomorrow's work, however, I need guidance from you as to when you want to budget for settling and telling your advisers how you wish pacification organized; and if this rough scenario is otherwise agreeable.

My own recommendation is that you have a very small meeting of the most senior people at 9 o'clock tomorrow to settle the pacification matter; that the larger meeting begin at 10:00 and follow roughly the script indicated in the attached paper.

W. W. R.

\_\_\_\_\_ Organize small meeting on pacification  
organization at 9:00 a.m.

\_\_\_\_\_ Scenario 10 - 12 acceptable.

\_\_\_\_\_ See me



150  
Monday, March 20, 1967

*Guam*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the four major points for you to make in private session tonight with Thieu and Ky.

1. The Military Must Remain United.

This is critical for our total effort -- military and civil. You are counting on these two great patriots to do the job. The war itself; the transition to constitutional government; the future of South Viet Nam as a nation; the capacity of the U. S. to sustain the war -- all these depend on unity among the Vietnamese military.

2. The Village and National Elections.

Success in these elections is as important as all the military operations we shall conduct in 1967. They must be honest; the vote must be the maximum.

3. Pacification.

We are beginning to make a dent in the VC infrastructure and beginning to have some success in pacification. Now we must drive at full speed, seeking a breakthrough. This must be primarily a task for Vietnamese military and civilians. It is the highest priority task in the war. Drive, drive, drive, on this.

4. The NLF and National Reconciliation.

You have put a half million men in Southeast Asia. You intend to see this through. You are not going to sell out the people of South Viet Nam. And remember this: the U. S. has been through many crises; our friends have emerged well -- from Greece and Berlin to South Korea. We are shedding blood with them on their soil. We do not intend to give away the fruits of our effort at the conference table. They should do their job with confidence. On the basis of that confidence they must reach out to draw those with the VC into the society under the constitution. It is much cheaper to defect a VC than to kill him. Put the best brains and imaginations to work on this.

*W. R.*

Main Talking Points for the President  
in Meetings with Vietnamese Leaders

(3/19/67) 151  
(revised)

Monday

1. Military Effort and Shift to Pacification

We will keep up our military effort and provide whatever is needed to assure its effectiveness; I am confident that this will also be true on the Vietnamese side and that the ARVN will soon be making its weight felt in pacification work so that security can spread rapidly among the villages.

2. Intensify Pacification

We have thoroughly reorganized the American staff working in support of your pacification program. One improvement we hope this will bring to our joint effort is the closest coordination of military and civil plans. Military clear-and-hold is the key to pacification. RD teams must be able to work behind a security shield. Then the hard-won gains of military men must be consolidated by effective and prompt civil follow-up.

3. National Reconciliation

To match the military effort we strongly urge early announcement of the government's national reconciliation program, and proclamation of a decree which will give it vigorous effect. The right kind of program might help sap the strength of the Viet Cong even more effectively than direct military action.

4. Importance of Successful Elections

Congratulations on your constitution and on the forthcoming village and hamlet elections -- all signs of your steady progress toward representative

government. Congratulations also on your recognition of the fundamental need for civilians and military to work together and for broadening the participation in your government to include ever wider groups in the population. We are confident that next September 11, if that is indeed to be the date of your presidential elections, will share the luster of that date in 1966 when the world saw free, fair, and open elections conducted scrupulously amidst conditions of war and terror.

5. Importance of Military Unity

We are counting on the Vietnamese military staying united. They have done a wonderful job over the past year. In a country like Viet Nam, unity of the military is the basis not merely for the defense of the nation and civil order but the constitutional process itself. You are counting on them.

6. Long Term Planning of Vietnamese Development

We have come through a great deal in the last six years. If victory is not in sight, it is on the way. Thus we must now set our sights high; work hard for a breakthrough, whether on the battlefield or in diplomacy; and look to the future of a democratic, modern South Viet Nam. That is why you attach such importance to the work of Dr. Thuc's team and are so grateful that Mr. Lillenthal -- who is the best we have -- are working with such enthusiasm.

7. Land Reform

We strongly support your new emphasis on speeding up land reform -- this essential element of your social revolution must move forward.

Villagers should know -- particularly those again coming under government authority -- that their government brings progress and not a return to social ills like absentee landlordism.

#### 8. Control Inflation

We cannot again run the risks of the early months of 1966 when inflation threatened to undermine all that had been accomplished. However painful the controls on spending -- and we know as well as you the discipline this requires -- they must be strictly applied; we must expedite Saigon port clearance as our lifeline, and step up in every possible way domestic production of foodstuffs in Viet Nam so that adequate food can be brought to the market and\* reach the people.

#### 9. Foreign Exchange Ceiling

We appreciate the GVN's interim action to keep its foreign exchange accumulations within the agreed \$250 million level. But we estimate that GVN reserves will still keep rising so count on Ky's expressed determination to reach a more definitive solution soon. I'm asking Mr. Komer to keep working with you on this.

#### 10. Consultation in Preparing for Negotiations

The press today is full of rumors and reports of peace initiatives. As you know, some of these reach us and we try in every reasonable case to make a reasonable response. All of us want peace, of course. But we know that to date there has been no indication that Hanoi means to seek peace sincerely.

\*underscored portion has been added to this draft

Our two governments will, as in the past, remain in constant touch on these matters. I know that you will be as ready as we to respond as soon as there is a prospect for peace which assures all the people of South Viet Nam freedom and the chance to decide their own future.

###

*Pres file*

Saturday, March 18, 1967  
6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

You wanted to sign this  
letter to Sen. Mansfield before  
you left on your Guam trip.

W. W. Rostow

March 18, 1967

Dear Mike:

Thank you for your March 17 letter regarding your interest in visiting the USSR, Mongolia and Communist China. I frankly doubt that the Chinese will admit you at the present time. However, if you are able to carry out your plans, your trip could prove most useful in terms of the subjects of your interest.

I would appreciate the opportunity to talking to you before you complete your plans, as would Secretary Rusk.

Sincerely,



Honorable Mike Mansfield  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:State:WWRostow:rlh

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1967

S  
H  
EA  
H  
Env

1526  
S/S-DO  
Mr. Brown

Mr. Secretary:

The President wishes to sign a reply 4827  
before he leaves for Guam. Would you  
be good enough to draft for his signature  
urgently.

W. A. Rostow

EA Drafting reply due in S/S-S by  
COB 3/17/67

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1967

The President wishes to sign a reply  
before he leaves for Guam. Would you  
be good enough to draft for his signature  
urgently.

W. A. Rostow



United States Senate  
Office of the Majority Leader  
Washington, D.C.

March 17, 1967

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

You may recall my mentioning to you some time ago that, if arrangements could be made, I had in mind visiting certain capitals in Eastern Europe and Asia. I have given the matter additional consideration and I am thinking of the possibility of travelling to the following cities some time later this year:

Moscow  
Ulan Bator  
Peking, and possibly certain other Chinese cities

I do not anticipate, of course, any problems in connection with a visit to the Soviet Union. There may be some difficulties in entering Outer Mongolia, although I know of none at this time. In the case of Peking and other Chinese cities, however, I have no indication whatsoever at this point that such a visit is possible since I have not yet explored the channels which may be open to me.

The purpose of the journey, if I make it, would be to inform myself as far as possible on the following:

1. the state of Soviet-Chinese relations and possible trends in connection therewith;
2. the actions and objectives of China and the Soviet Union respecting Viet Nam, and the implications for us of the two positions as well as of any interplay between them;
3. what is transpiring inside China and the meaning, if any, of these great political upheavals to our future relations with this giant nation of Asia.

March 17, 1967

It would be appreciated if I might have your reactions to any undertaking of this kind. If it is desirable, of course, I would make very explicit in public that the trip is strictly my own idea. I would expect only the normal courtesies from Executive Branch employees where they may be available abroad. As to the China segment, so far as I am aware, the Executive Departments would not be able, in any event, to help, so I would proceed on my own in trying to secure entry and in making arrangements.

I have no particular date in mind. But before exploring the matter further, however, it seemed to me desirable to have your reactions.

Respectfully,

*Mike Mansfield*

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, March 18, 1967  
4:15 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

There are all sorts of elaborate agenda being organized, but I want to set down for you what I think are the few major themes you should leave firmly in the minds of Thieu and Ky:

1. We are counting on the Vietnamese military staying united. They have done a wonderful job over the past year or so. In a country like Viet Nam, in its present circumstances, the unity of the military is the basis not merely for the defense of the nation and civil order but the constitutional process itself. You are counting on them.
2. They can count on you not to let Viet Nam down should negotiations come about. They and we must think increasingly about negotiating positions and think together.
3. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of a really successful Presidential election in South Viet Nam. Its impact on Hanoi, on the Viet Cong, on support for Viet Nam in the United States, on support for Viet Nam in the rest of the world will be enormous.
4. We on our side will be working out ways of improving the effectiveness of our contribution to pacification in South Viet Nam. At its heart it involves the most intense military/civil cooperation -- from top to bottom, from Saigon to the smallest hamlet. But pacification must be mainly a Vietnamese job: we can only help. Therefore, we are counting on the Vietnamese to work out the same kind of intense military/civil cooperation. By doing the pacification job well, the Vietnamese military will also be building the foundation for the kind of modern civil-minded military they will require in their country in the years ahead.
5. The two key <sup>ideas</sup> ~~words~~ in Vietnamese/U.S. relations are:
  - confidence in the future;
  - confidence in one another.

We have come through a great deal in the last six years and especially in the last two years. If victory is not in sight, it is on the way. We must set our sights high; work hard for a breakthrough, whether on the battlefield or in diplomacy; and look to the future of a democratic, modern South Viet Nam. That is why you attach such importance to the work of Dr. Thuc's team and are so grateful that Mr. Lilienthal -- who is the best we have -- will be working with such enthusiasm.

DECLASSIFIED

W. W. R.

Auth: State 4-7-78; NSC 12-14-78  
By kg/imp, WJMA, Date 4-19-91

154  
EYES ONLY THE PRESIDENT

Saturday, March 18, 1967 -- 12:00 noon

Mr. President:

I have talked at great length with Bob Komer.

As I guessed on the phone yesterday, Bob will be just the kind of soldier you want him to be.

His one legitimate concern is that when we have sorted out the organization of pacification, Bob's role be defined clearly and with the status necessary to do the job you want him to do.

Since both Bunker and Locke will be new to Saigon, Bob will be, in my judgment, a critically important member of the new team.

He will also be invaluable in helping design the transfer of responsibilities in the operation of pacification to the military if we go that route at Guam.

Given the talk in the press, I recommend that he be treated at Guam in the first rank.

I recommend, if at all possible, that you have a word with him before we get on the plane.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

EYES ONLY THE PRESIDENT

**SECRET**

Saturday, March 18, 1967  
2:15 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Secretary Rusk's redraft of a message to U Thant after your telephone conversation with him. I have gone over it with General Taylor.

Our preferred position would be that we not now make a substantive reply to the Secretary General because we have not in fact thought through the problems of a general cessation of hostilities and because some of the language in this message could rise up to haunt us; for example, "standstill truce."

On the other hand, Secretary Rusk's argument for a prompt response is quite strong; and Saigon will, apparently, be filing its response in any case.

At the minimum, General Taylor and I have indicated in pencil the changes we would make in this draft.

Our minimum changes reflect two substantive problems:

1. "Any place" could mean Hanoi or some other point of embarrassment. We ran into this problem in the Korean truce talks.

2. "Standstill truce" has overtones of freezing the sovereignty and limiting the police powers of Saigon which "cessation of hostilities" avoids. We are clear that any serious negotiation of a cessation of hostilities might involve, as part of a process, the reservation of certain areas for VC forces which would not be attacked; but that is a quite different thing from giving them the chance to define territorial control, which might be the basis for later political claims via a "standstill truce." In fact, the heart of a truce or cessation of hostilities negotiation is a political negotiation about the place of the VC in South Vietnamese society under the constitution. We should leave flexibility for that process and, in our judgment, not get frozen into the possibly dangerous "standstill" language of the Secretary General.

To give you an idea of the issues that are in fact involved, if we move towards a cessation of hostilities, I attach a memorandum done by General Taylor after conversations yesterday. Whether or not we go forward with an answer to the Secretary General, I hope we shall budget some time during the Guam trip for talk about this matter.

W. W. R.



*Pres file*

Saturday - March 18, 1967  
2:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to the Fifth Inter-American Savings and Loan Conference

In the memorandum at Tab B, Bill Gaud recommends that you send a message to the Fifth Inter-American Savings and Loan Conference which will meet at Buenos Aires from March 28 to April 2, 1967.

This organization continues to be one of the success stories in our efforts to develop institutions in Latin America and, at the same time, get at the housing problem. During the past year, the accumulated savings of the member associations has grown from \$100 million to \$165 million, and the number of homes financed from 37,000 to 56,500.

The Conference is expected to include 400 delegates from Latin America, as well as 125 from the United States. You sent a message to the Conference last year which was warmly received and greatly appreciated.

I recommend that you approve the message which Bill Gaud proposes, Tab B.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒ \_\_\_\_\_  
Disapprove ☐ \_\_\_\_\_  
Speak to me ☐ \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments - Tabs A & B.

cc - Bill Shoemaker - WH.

tab 15/6

Proposed Message by the President to the Fifth Inter-American  
Savings and Loan Conference  
in Buenos Aires,  
(March 28 - April 2, 1967)

It is with great pleasure that I extend my warmest greetings to the participants of the Fifth Inter-American Savings and Loan Conference. I wish you every success in your deliberations designed to promote the principles of thrift and home ownership in the hemisphere.

The accumulation of private savings to finance long-term home mortgages is a major objective of the Alliance for Progress. The dynamic growth of the savings and loan system in Latin America over the past few years represents a significant step toward achievement of that objective.

Six short years ago the first two savings and loan associations commenced their operations. Today there are 91 associations in nine Latin American countries with a total membership of 470,000 persons. These associations have accumulated savings in excess of \$165 million and have financed more than 56,500 homes.

I salute this magnificent exercise in "self-help." You may be justly proud of your great success thus far. However, you must prepare

yourselves for the additional efforts required to provide suitable shelter for increasing numbers of inadequately housed families. Let us, both governments and private enterprise alike, continue to work together to provide a better place to live for all of our people.



C o p y

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Agency for International Development  
Washington, D. C. 20523

C o p y

ad 17  
1566

Office of  
The Administrator

28 FEB 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Message to the Fifth Inter-American Savings and Loan Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina, March 28 to April 2, 1967

Last year, in your message to the Fourth Inter-American Savings and Loan Conference, you noted that \$100 million in savings had been accumulated by savings and loan associations in Latin America and that 37,000 homes had been financed. Accumulated savings now exceed \$165 million and more than 56,500 homes have been financed. This dynamic growth exceeds anything we could have hoped for six years ago when two small associations commenced their operations.

To help maintain this momentum, the Fifth Inter-American Savings and Loan Conference will be held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, from March 28 to April 2, 1967. As in the past, the Conference will be jointly sponsored by this Agency, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Inter-American Savings and Loan Union and the National League of Insured Savings Associations. The President of the National League this year is Mr. Rex Baker, who is known to you as the President of Southwestern Savings and Loan Association, Houston, Texas. Interest in the Conference has reached sizable proportions. Last year about 300 persons attended from the U.S. and Latin America. This year, it is expected that over 400 Latin American delegates will attend as well as 125 savings and loan executives from the United States.

Your message last year was warmly received and greatly appreciated. Your interest in the progress of the savings and loan system has been an inspiration to all those who are intimately involved in its development. A message from you to the Fifth Conference would be most welcome.

A proposed message is enclosed.

*Original to President*

/s/ William S. Gaud  
William S. Gaud

Enclosure

Limited Official Use

Saturday - March 18, 1967  
4:15 p.m.

*Presfile*

Mr. President:

Next week the OAS Council will begin work on the program for the Summit. The plan it develops will be ad referendum the Presidents.

For planning purposes, Bill Bowdler and Bob Sayre have developed the attached program. If it meets with your general approval, Sol Linowitz would use it as guidance in the Council discussions.

You will note that the schedule provides for two speech-making sessions. Our soundings show that most Presidents want and expect to make a public statement. The trick will be to keep them short -- not more than 10 minutes each. Yours could run a little longer (15-20 minutes) without creating problems.

The schedule for Friday, April 14 is necessarily flexible. If agreement on the Summit declaration and communique can be reached by Thursday night, the closing ceremony can be held Friday morning. My hunch is that a full working session will be necessary on Friday, which would push the closing into the afternoon or evening.

W. W. Rostow

Approve schedule  
for planning purposes \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_.

Attachment - Proposed Summit Tentative Schedule

## Tentative Schedule for Summit Meeting

Wednesday,  
April 12

- 12:00 noon - Call on President Gestido by visiting Presidents.
- 1:00-2:30 - Informal lunch for the Presidents.
- 2:45-4:30 - Informal working session.
- 5:30 - 7:30 - Formal inaugural session:
- President Gestido welcoming address.  
Statements by Latin American Presidents  
(limited to 10 minutes each).
- 9:00 - - Reception by President Gestido.

Thursday,  
April 13

- 10:00 am  
- 12:00 noon - Formal session to complete statements.  
(Foreign Ministers meet at same time to work on  
final documents.)
- 12:30 - Lunch.
- 4:00 - 6:30 - Working session.
- 8:00 - Return reception by visiting Presidents.

Friday,  
April 14

- 10:00 a.m. - Working session (if necessary).
- 3:00 pm - Closing session.

SECRET

Saturday, March 18, 1967  
4:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

There are all sorts of elaborate agenda being organized, but I want to set down for you what I think are the few major themes you should leave firmly in the minds of Thieu and Ky:

1. We are counting on the Vietnamese military staying united. They have done a wonderful job over the past year or so. In a country like Viet Nam, in its present circumstances, the unity of the military is the basis not merely for the defense of the nation and civil order but the constitutional process itself. You are counting on them.
2. They can count on you not to let Viet Nam down should negotiations come about. They and we must think increasingly about negotiating positions and think together.
3. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of a really successful Presidential election in South Viet Nam. Its impact on Hanoi, on the Viet Cong, on support for Viet Nam in the United States, on support for Viet Nam in the rest of the world will be enormous.
4. We on our side will be working out ways of improving the effectiveness of our contribution to pacification in South Viet Nam. At its heart it involves the most intense military/civil cooperation -- from top to bottom, from Saigon to the smallest hamlet. But pacification must be mainly a Vietnamese job: we can only help. Therefore, we are counting on the Vietnamese to work out the same kind of intense military/civil cooperation. By doing the pacification job well, the Vietnamese military will also be building the foundation for the kind of modern civil-minded military they will require in their country in the years ahead.
5. The two key <sup>idea</sup>~~words~~ in Vietnamese/U. S. relations are:
  - confidence in the future;
  - confidence in one another.

We have come through a great deal in the last six years and especially in the last two years. If victory is not in sight, it is on the way. We must set our sights high; work hard for a breakthrough, whether on the battlefield or in diplomacy; and look to the future of a democratic, modern South Viet Nam. That is why you attach such importance to the work of Dr. Thuc's team and are so grateful that Mr. Lilienthal -- who is the best we have -- will be working with such enthusiasm.

DECLASSIFIED

W. W. R.

Authority: State 4-7-78 NSC ltr 12-14-78

By eg/lip, NARA, Date 4/19/91

Pres file

Saturday, March 18, 1967  
12:00 noon

Mr. President:

Uruguayan President Gestido has sent you the attached letter thanking you for your inaugural gift — a desk set with mounted eight-day clock in recognition of Gestido's former career as an Air Force General and his continuing interest in education.

W.W.Rostow

PRESIDENT OF THE ORIENTAL REPUBLIC OF URUGUAY

Montevideo, March 8, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to give you my warmest thanks for the beautiful inkstand you had the kindness to send me on the occasion of my inauguration to the Presidency of the Republic.

This inkstand will be on my desk as a permanent proof of the friendship and the cordial and warm relations that have always existed between our two nations, whose strengthening will be one of the objectives of my future actions.

Thanking you again, I take advantage of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration and special esteem.

To His Excellency

Lyndon B. Johnson

President of the United States of America

Washington, D.C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The conference table for the U.S. -Vietnamese meetings in Guam seats 20 persons.

For your approval there follows a recommended listing of the U.S. officials who will occupy the ten seats allocated to us.

The President  
Secretary Rusk  
Secretary McNamara  
General Wheeler  
Ambassador Lodge  
Ambassador Bunker  
General Westmoreland  
Governor Harriman  
Admiral Sharp  
Mr. Gaud

Other U.S. officials will be seated in the room but not at the table and could appropriately be invited to sit at the table when subjects of primary concern to them are under discussion. These include Mr. Lillenthal, General Taylor, Mr. Helms and Ambassador Locke.

Members of your staff will also be in the room--Mr. Rostow, Mr. Christian, Mr. Komer, Mr. Jacobsen and Mr. McPherson.

W. W. Rostow

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve  
\_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove  
\_\_\_\_\_ See me

WWR:BKS:amc

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ag, NARA, Date 4-18-91



*Pres file*~~SECRET~~

Saturday, March 18, 1967 -- 9:22 a.m.

Mr. President:

Your general assessment of the good sense of Ky and company is vindicated in this morning's cables.

1. Our invitation to them to come to Guam has forced the <sup>ce</sup>past of work by the Constituent Assembly and the Directorate. It now seems quite possible they will complete the Constitution before Guam; and we may have -- although it is not certain -- two representatives of the Constituent Assembly along.

2. Ky believes that Saigon should reply to the Secretary General quite independently of us. Their draft reply, attached, includes the proposal that there be military discussions by representatives "of the high command of the Hanoi government forces and those of the Republic of Vietnam armed forces ... at the demilitarized zone, or at any other place the Hanoi government may choose." Those of us who have worked on this subject, including General Taylor, have long believed that if there ever were a ceasefire it should start not with some big conference, including intermediaries, but with the military men in the field.

3. I do not have State's reaction to Ky's proposal; but letting Saigon speak for itself in this temperate and sensible way makes sense to me and would go a long way to solving the problem we talked about on the telephone last night. Incidentally, I conveyed to Nick twice last night -- in Sec. Rusk's absence -- your general view in this matter.

*also just talked to Sec Rusk*

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 20715

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 4-7-78, NSC 12-14-78By lg/lcj, NARA, Date 4-19-91~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Saigon 20715, March 18, 1967

Following is text of South Viet Nam reply to U Thant.

The Government of South Viet Nam has carefully examined the aide memoire which was handed by His Excellency U Thant, Secretary General, to Ambassador Nguyen Duy Lien, observer of the Government of South Viet Nam to the United Nations.

The Government of South Viet Nam is thankful to His Excellency U Thant for his untiring search for an early end to the conflict in Vietnam and appreciate the constructive spirit in which the Secretary General's proposal were made.

The Government of South Viet Nam agrees in principle with the main points of the Secretary's proposals, but in order that these proposals could be more easily implemented, the Government of the RVN (South Viet Nam) submits the following:

1. A military truce cannot be effective without control. Therefore, in order to discuss the details of the truce, the Government of South Viet Nam proposes that representatives of the High Command of the Hanoi Government forces and those of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces should meet at the demilitarized zone, or at any other place the Hanoi government may choose.

If the government of North Vietnam agrees to this proposal, the representatives of the High Command of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces will be ready to meet with them within a week's notice.

2. The Government of South Vietnam is in full agreement with the Secretary General when he states that an international conference is necessary to find a permanent political solution to the Vietnamese problem. But, in order to gain time and thus achieve an earlier settlement, the Government of South Vietnam proposes that, instead of holding preliminary talks prior to the full-fledged conference, a Geneva-type international conference be held as soon as possible after the truce is effectively enforced. Such a conference should have the participation of all interested governments. This, however, does not preclude the holding of preliminary talks as provided for in the Secretary General's aide-memoire if these should prove necessary. These preliminary talks shall include the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Government of North Vietnam, the Government of the United States among other interested governments.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec 3/1979  
By 13/10/91, NARA, Date 4/19/91

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-374  
By ju, NARA, Date 1-29-93

162  
Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, March 18, 1967 -- 10:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

Having examined the state of the track on the Secretary General's proposals, it is the recommendation of Sec. Rusk -- and I urged him to call you directly -- that we:

-- Agree that Saigon should file its own reply before Guam;

-- File today our own reply to the Secretary General (attached) with Goldberg making orally the following supplementary points:

1. We have made many diplomatic approaches to Hanoi without success;
2. They have failed to agree to discussions without preconditions;
3. Our willingness to be forthcoming in respect to his proposals does not indicate our willingness to acquiesce in further preconditions which Hanoi might seek to impose; and
4. We are prepared to accept his proposals but do not intend to negotiate down from them.

W. W. Rostow

State Circular 158034

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

March 18, 1967

Following is extract from State outgoing circular, 158034:

We have redrafted our suggested reply to U Thant to meet "points" raised by Embassy Saigon, as well as comments made by other addressees.

Following is redraft.

"The U.S. accepts the three step proposal in the aide memoire of the Secretary General of 14 March 1967 envisaging: (A) A general stand-still truce; (B) Preliminary talks; (C) Reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

"The United States believes it would be desirable and contributory to serious negotiations if an effective stand-still truce, as the first element in the three-point proposal, could be established promptly.

"It would, therefore, be essential that the details of such a general stand-still truce be first discussed directly by both sides, or through the Secretary-General, the Geneva Conference Co-Chairman or otherwise as may be agreed. The U.S. is prepared to enter into such discussions promptly and constructively.

"The U.S. is also prepared to take the next steps in any of the forms suggested by the Secretary General to enter into preliminary talks leading to agreement as to the modalities for reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

"Of course, the government of South Vietnam will have to be appropriately involved throughout this entire process.

The interests and views of our Allies would also have to be taken fully into account.

"The Secretary -General can be assured, as President Johnson has frequently said, that the U. S. will go more than half way to achieve peace in Vietnam.

"The U.S. again expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his untiring efforts to help bring about a peaceful settlement and an end to the conflict in Vietnam."

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-376  
By sig, NARA, Date 4-6-92

Friday, March 17, 1967 -- 2:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk says the Commander in Chief must visit the base and tip his hat to those flying and servicing the planes.

Sec. McNamara thinks you should go to the base.

I agree with both.

If you visit and give medals just before you leave, there should be relatively little publicity because there are no filing facilities at the Air Force Base for the press.

W. W. Rostow

Approve departure and citation awards at Air Force Base\_\_\_\_\_

Bring men in to Naval Base\_\_\_\_\_

Bring men in to Nimitz Hill\_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved\_\_\_\_\_

See me\_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rln

Friday, March 17, 1967 -- 8:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

It was a great performance last night on the Latin American resolution.

The method of putting the contestants in Jack Valenti's old office and running your appointment a bit late is worth remembering. The room is too small to be anything but congenial and try to find agreement.

We did.

Incidentally, the troops are all organized to hit the Hill with the new formula at 9:00 a.m. sharp.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Friday, March 17, 1967  
10:30 a.m.

165  
cys LDK'd  
to Rusk,  
McNamara  
cy picked up  
for Van Dyke

MR. PRESIDENT:

After consultation with Secretary McNamara and State, here are the guidelines for this afternoon's three background briefing sessions by Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and myself.

1. The Guam conference is essentially a regular consultation on Viet Nam policy between those who bear responsibility in the field and those in Washington. Six months is not too frequent for such consultations, given the character and the importance of the problems. It should be regarded as a kind of NSC meeting on Viet Nam.

2. The meeting has a special importance at this time because Ambassadors Lodge and Porter will be coming out sometime in the weeks ahead. This is wholly natural. We have known for some time that these two men, who have served so well, felt that their tours should end soon. Saigon is a most exacting post. They have both served with great distinction. The Guam meeting, involving both the old team and the new, should insure a smooth transition, which will be phased over the next weeks and not be instantaneous. Ambassador Bunker will be coming back for hearings and briefings.

3. As for Mr. Komer and the organization of pacification, details will be settled at Guam.

4. On the military side, we anticipate no major decisions. We would wish to hear from Westmoreland his evaluation of how military operations are proceeding.

5. The principal issues for discussion at Guam will be on the civilian side.

6. It is an important time in Viet Nam, as the Vietnamese move towards the creation of a constitution and the holding of elections.

7. It is their constitution and their elections -- not ours. Our aim is simply to support the whole process and to be as helpful as we can be.

8. Mr. Lilienthal and his Vietnamese opposite number, the distinguished Dr. Thuc, will be there. In the spirit of the President's Baltimore speech, we think the time has come to begin to look forward to the long-term economic and social development of Viet Nam. Again, it will be for the Vietnamese to set their targets; but we are delighted that so distinguished an American as



Mr. Lillienthal has been accepted by the Vietnamese as a working colleague in this task.

9. As for the presence of Ky, Thieu, and the other Vietnamese, we felt that, with the new team present so relatively close at hand, they might wish to join in the gathering. With 400,000 of our men in their country, we are very closely involved with one another. On the other hand, we understood that they might have other preoccupations at the moment and so we invited them, giving them the option. We are delighted that they have accepted this occasion for talk about issues of bilateral importance.

10. We are also extremely conscious that there are other countries who have put their men to fight in South Viet Nam alongside the Vietnamese and ourselves. We shall be holding consideration of issues involving us all to the meeting of troop contributors on April 20-21 in Washington.

W. W. R.

Approved ✓

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

166

Friday, March 17, 1967  
11:00 a.m.

*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith two cables which bear on Guam.

1. Vietnamese anxieties about U Thant's proposal. It will be critical that we discuss this at Guam and that they emerge confident on two points:

- We shall not let down the constitutional process;
- They shall be active participants in any negotiations.

2. Bui Diem's discussion of Ky's and Thieu's political ambitions. We shall certainly wish to talk about this deeply among the Americans at Guam. It is even conceivable that the matter might come up with the Vietnamese -- although unlikely. In any case, sorting this out is fundamental to the success of the next six months.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachments



1462

SECRET

Friday, March 17, 1967

TEXT OF CIA REPORT TDCS DB-315/00852-67

SUBJECT: Remarks of Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States, Bui Diem

During a discussion on March 9, 1967 with one of Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky's advisors, Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States Bui Diem expressed the belief that it was by no means certain that Ky would beat out Chief of State Lt. General Nguyen Van Thieu for the nomination as the military's candidate for the Presidency. Diem noted that Thieu is very actively seeking support among high-ranking officers, Corps, division, and naval commanders, among political groupings, and among the Hoa Hao and other religious groups, for example, Catholic refugees. Diem said he believes that if Thieu succeeds in convoking the Military Council he will win out over Ky and be named the military candidate.

Diem agreed with the advisor that Ky underestimates Thieu's ambition and that Ky must find a way to discourage Thieu by persuading him his political activities will be to no avail. Diem said that Ky must announce his own manifesto as soon as possible and that the manifesto must carry the signature not only of Ky but also of several other prominent personalities so as to discourage Thieu and other possible candidates.

In that connection, Diem thought it necessary to move fast towards forming a united front to back Ky. Diem felt Ky should have no problem in getting the support of the VNQDD in Central Vietnam and said that, for his part, he had already talked with Dang Van Sung in an effort to persuade Sung to deal with politicians in Saigon. (Field comment: Sung, now a Deputy in the Constituent Assembly, is a prominent Saigon politician and a member of the Revolutionary Dai Viet party.)

Diem noted that Ky had told him he (Ky) expected the support of an "anti-Communist front." Diem expressed distaste for the name and said that a better name would be "All-Viet Front," with the "Viet" denoting both people and territory.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority CIA LEO 5/19/78  
By ag/kip, NARA, Date 4-19-91

Diem said that in a talk with Ky on March 7, Ky had said he (Ky) would like to have a Southern Catholic personality as his Vice-Presidential candidate, specifically, Nguyen Van Huyen, a lawyer and civiliam member of the Directorate. Diem quoted Ky as saying that since he (Ky) is a Northern Buddhist, a Southern Catholic would make for a balanced ticket and would help to neutralize the Northern refugee Catholics. According to Diem, Ky considers the Northern Catholic refugees to be a destructive force.

Diem also stated that Ky has in mind picking Dr. Phan Quang Dan as Prime Minister in the event of his winning the Presidency. Diem explained that the reasons behind this choice are that Dan is popular in Saigon among the common people although very unpopular with politicians and intellectuals, and that Dan is well known to foreign observers, and that since Dan has always led the opposition, his acceptance of the Premiership would represent an act of submission. (Source comment: Dan is a lone wolf who cannot get along with anyone. If he became Prime Minister, the Cabinet could not be effective and Ky would have to dismiss him after a few months.)

Turning to some of the personalities around Ky, Diem said he believes Minister of Information Nguyen Bao Tri is working for Thieu but that General Cao Van Vien, Minister of Defense and Chief of the Joint General Staff, and Lt. General Le Nguyen Khang, Third Corps Commander, are more for Ky than for Thieu. As for Director General of National Police Brigadier General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, Diem said Loan must be loyal to Ky, since he cannot get more power and benefits than he already has. Diem expressed the belief that Loan realizes he has reached the apogee of his career.

166b

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Friday, March 17, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE  
TO SECRETARY RUSK (Saigon, 20591)

SUBJECT: U. N. Secretary General Proposal on Vietnam

It is obvious that U Thant's proposal contains implications which, if not properly handled, could undermine the existence of the Government of Vietnam and its present leadership. I recognize the absolute importance of examining sympathetically and carefully any new efforts to bring about an acceptable settlement in Vietnam. I am sure you agree, however, that our investment of men, money and political support in South Vietnam and specifically in the present development of a Constitution and representative government here should not be sacrificed in the process.

You will have noted the hopes expressed by Bui Diem that the U. S. reply would be a matter of discussion between our heads of government at Guam before it is dispatched. I urge most strongly that this be done, recognizing that the Government of Vietnam leadership probably considers that its entire future may be at stake in terms of the outcome.

Although we will be forwarding additional comment, I wish at this time to express my strong hope that we will not become engaged in a so-called stand-still which does not take satisfactory account of the many pertinent questions you have outlined. Specifically, the implications of the following sentence should be fully considered: "Moreover, we would wish to make sure that any stand-still did not interfere with the South Vietnamese Government's authority to pursue normal government activities without interference throughout South Vietnam." One immediate and vital question is the effect of any stand-still on the present Constitutional process. We must not, under any circumstances, accept any condition which can limit the Government of Vietnam's ability to hold elections throughout South Vietnam in the months ahead, at the village and hamlet level, for the Presidency, and for the National Assembly.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

NLJ 99-62

By is, NARA Date 10-30-99

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Another important point is obviously the role of the Government of Vietnam in any preliminary discussions and in the arrangements that may flow from them. I am sure the Government of Vietnam will consider that it has a vital interest in taking part in some way in such talks and we should take this into account.

I plan to have a talk with Prime Minister Ky on this and other subjects for Guam before my departure Sunday. I shall be reporting on this conversation and I hope that final formulation of the U. S. reply to U Thant will await this report and the talks at Guam.

Friday, March 17, 1967  
9:00 a.m.

167

MR. PRESIDENT:

This idea of Henry Owen's may  
well make sense.

I am sending copies to Harry, Joe,  
and John Gardner.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

*Pres file*

167a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-376

SUBJECT: Youth

By ing NARA. Date 4-6-92

1. Proposal: The President should announce that he is asking HEW's Office of Education to arrange with the academic community for the appointment of six Youth Advisory Panels, to advise key US agencies in whose work young people have a special interest:

- HEW, HUD, and OEO, on the domestic side;
- State, Defense, and AID, on the foreign policy side.

The panels would be made up of students who had been elected to their positions by other students, e.g., presidents of student bodies and heads of campus newspapers. They would not be hand-picked by the Government or the Universities.

The panels would meet twice a year. Each panel would hear about the program of the agency it was advising from top officials of that agency, and would share with these officials the panel members' own views about that program. The panels would be small enough (12 members each) to permit intimate discourse.

It would be essential that the top agency officials spend a fair amount of time with the panels, in frank exchange of views. If panel members felt that they were getting either a brush-off or a hard sell, the operation could be counterproductive.

After these panel meetings with individual agencies, the chairmen and vice chairmen of all six panels would meet with the President - to share with him the impressions and ideas that they had formed in earlier agency meetings.

2. Rationale:

(a) This would help to meet a key concern of many young people: that they're "frozen out" of the vast establishment which shapes domestic and foreign policy. Better ties between the administration and youth would thus be created.

(b) Views might be elicited from young people that could be helpful to the Executive Branch.

(c) The students might get a more realistic view of what the Government is up to.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100  
Henry Owen



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 17, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Travel to Guam on Presidential aircraft of Vietnamese  
Cabinet Minister, General Thang

General Thang, Vietnamese Minister for revolutionary development, arrives in Washington today from Brazil where he was attending the inauguration ceremonies. He is on route back to Siagon.

All agree that it would be helpful if he could go to Guam, attend the Conference and then procede on to Siagon.

I recommend that we be authorized to offer him a place on one of the two Presidential planes.

WALT W. ROSTOW

O.K. to offer him a lift to Guam \_\_\_\_\_

Prefer he go commercial \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By My, NARA, Date 4-7-91

Friday, March 17, 1967  
9:15 a. m.

169

*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith, Abbott Washburn, an old Republican friend, suggests:

- regular television reports to the nation on Viet Nam;
- regional visits;
- a National Committee in support of our policy in Viet Nam, headed, perhaps, by Cabot Lodge.

The latter idea, in particular, is worth your attention.

W. W. R.

(cc: Mr. Kintner)



1672

WASHBURN, STRINGER ASSOCIATES, INC.

701 WASHINGTON BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005

ME 8-6446

ABBOTT WASHBURN

CALLE RIO SENA NO.63-A  
MEXICO 5, D. F., MEXICO  
PHONE: 14-55-21

March 15, 1967


Dear Walt,

The attached, per our discussion. It may be a little long. If so, let me know.

What is an Eisenhower Republican doing writing this? The issue transcends party; I feel this deeply. I am sure Cabot Lodge does too. Cabot, by the way, would make an ideal Chairman or Co-Chairman of the proposed national committee (unless he is going to be an active candidate for something in 1968 -- which seems unlikely). The other Co-Chairman should be a Democrat. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower would most certainly agree to serve as Honorary Chairmen. I have some additional notions about other people who would be glad to help.

If he wishes, I would be happy to talk with the President; I worked with him on USIA matters when he was Majority Leader.

Yours,



Mr. Walt W. Rostow,  
The White House,  
Washington D.C.

1696  
March 15, 1967

Subject: Public Opinion and Vietnam

Per our conversation on Friday, I am convinced that public opinion can be mobilized behind U.S. policy on Vietnam. Having just reviewed the 1916-18 experience, I am all the more certain. That, too, was an unpopular war at the outset.

What would be the steps? Three are suggested below. Two of them involve the President directly.

I. Television

Ignoring the press with its unbalanced emphasis on the negative, the Lippmann attacks, the Schlesinger sniping, and all the rest, the President would go to the people. In weekly 10-minute TV fireside chats from the White House, he would report directly and personally to the families of America. By summarizing the latest advices he had received that week from the U.S. Ambassador, from General Westmoreland, from Hanoi and elsewhere -- he would invest those few minutes with a high factor of immediacy, a you-are-in-on-it-from-where-I-sit quality. Faithfully and honestly he would assess: how its going in Vietnam rightnow, what your sons and brothers and husbands are accomplishing, what the hopeful signs are, what the negative ones.

Each week the President would reiterate why we are there, spelling out our limited aims: to stop the infiltration and aggression from the North, to prevent a wider war in Asia. "We have no wish to destroy North Vietnam." Also he would stress, over and over, the historical imperatives for what we are doing: the stopping of the Communist guerrillas in Greece, the Huks in the Philippines, the North Korean and Red Chinese invaders in South Korea, the attempts to starve us out of Berlin, the effort to mount missiles in Cuba et al.

There would be maximum use of first-hand evidence. Frequently the President would present returned servicemen, from generals to privates, who would report on what they had seen and done, describe the terror tactics of the Vietcong. Captured films would be used, to document the intent of the aggressors. Similarly, items of Communist military equipment and artifacts of terror would be exhibited. Defectors could speak via film.

From time to time U.S. Government officials, of various echelons, would appear with the President -- to give concise and reasoned explanations of U.S. policy, and to talk from their particular expertise.

One time it would be Secretary Rusk, then Secretary McNamara, or Undersecretary Katzenbach, Ambassador Harriman, Ambassador Bunker, Walt Rostow, William Gaud, Henry Owen, Zbigniew Brzezinski, et al. (Several of the latter served as superb spokesmen at last week's two-day National Foreign Policy Conference at the Department of State, before an audience of several hundred representatives of non-governmental organizations. These officers so clearly know what they are doing, are so articulate about it, that the effect was one of great reassurance and confidence. As one member of the audience said, going down in the elevator: "My faith in our leadership has been renewed. I am terribly glad I came. It's too bad the whole country couldn't have heard this.") For example, Bill Gaud -- after being introduced by the President -- in four or five minutes could give a clear and convincing picture of what we are trying to accomplish in the pacification program. Using films of Americans at work on the program, he would outline what has been done, what remains to be done.

When the President is out of the country or ill, Vice President Humphrey would fill in. In case both the President and Vice President are unavailable, the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense would fill in. The very essence of the whole thing is that it is the President's own personal progress report to the people. Nevertheless, continuity and repetition are so important in the making of public opinion that the program should be seen even when the President can not himself present it.

At least one item of hard news weekly would be timed so that the President could break it on his TV report. For example, the first public word of the Communist films recently captured during Operation Junction City might come on the President's program, with a showing of some of the footage. Secretary McNamara would appear with the President that evening to comment on the significance of these films and the statement made by the North Vietnamese generals.

On the inaugural program, the President would stress his conviction that our people should be kept just as up-to-date on the conflict as their President. "I'd like for all of you to get a better idea of the view from the Oval Room -- I intend to continue these reports as long as the Vietnam emergency exists -- There will be no 'summer replacement' for me!"

## II Regional Vists

Tremendous though the impact of television is, the President would also go to the people in person -- with visits to different parts of the country for the express purpose of exchanging views on Vietnam with the opinion-forming leaders. In each case it would be

a two-way exchange with a bi-partisan group of 75 to 100 leaders drawn from all different fields of endeavor. The content of the President's own remarks at these sessions would be much the same as on his television reports. The leaders would respond by giving him their comments, suggestions, and questions. He would emphasize: "I need to have this personal contact with those in leadership positions throughout the country."

One or two of the U.S. officials mentioned earlier in this memorandum would accompany him on these trips. Each regional conference would be televised. Since those in attendance would all be responsible leaders of various organizations, there would be no discourtesy. A few pointed questions would undoubtedly be asked; but none which could not be fielded readily. (At the State Department conference last week, a member of the clergy asked, with deep emotion: "To end the bloodshed, Mr. Secretary, why don't we take the risk? Why don't we stop the bombing unilaterally?" Secretary Rusk then reviewed the exact facts of Hanoi's position and our own; and the over-whelming majority of the audience clearly agreed with present U.S. policy.)

On these trips the President would have a dinner or luncheon with returned veterans of the Vietnam fighting. And he would also visit with the families of others who have given their lives in the conflict. Always he would emphasize that they made the sacrifice in America's continuing effort to achieve a world community of nations in which peoples can live together in peace and freedom. In this long struggle we are the leaders. It would be easy to give up, as Chamberlain did with Hitler. But if we abandon our leadership role now, the regional groupings of free nations will fall into disarray or dissolve. Many sacrifices of the past would then have been in vain. It is our national destiny to shoulder this prodigious task. By our response history will judge us.

### III. A National Committee in Support of our Policy in Vietnam

Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt were well served by formal information bodies: the George Creel Committee and Elmer Davis' OWI. But those were times of declared war .. in a different context. Today, a non-governmental grouping of concerned citizens, which could serve as a focus of articulate spokesmanship, would be of value. With a bi-partisan membership of the same high calibre as the old "Committee on the Present Danger", it could supply effective speakers for public meetings and television programs, distribute literature, issue statements, author articles, and vigorously deal with irresponsible accusations such as Schlesinger's "the U.S. does

not want peace now." Operating on a miniscule budget (mostly printing and mailing), it could have important impact. Its very existence would have a useful effect. It would help, among other things, to counterbalance the headline-hungry voices of minority criticism.

An alert and imaginative body of public affairs experts -- made up, in part, of former Army, Navy, Air Force, and USIA information officers -- could readily be recruited to contribute time to this effort as a patriotic service. In my own work I talk with these professionals in different parts of the country. Like myself, many of them are disturbed and angry at the negative attitude of elements in their communities toward the sacrifices of our men in Vietnam. It would not be difficult to envisage one such man, contributing some of his time, in each of the 54 major population centers of the country.\* Each of these communities would have a number of its leading citizens on the governing board of the national committee. These are the leaders with whom he would work at the local level.

  
-- Abbott Washburn

\* List attached.

1614

54 Key Metropolitan Centers

in 10 Regional Groupings

1. Detroit

Pittsburgh  
Cleveland  
Cincinnati  
Toledo  
Dayton

6. Chicago

Milwaukee  
Minneapolis  
St. Paul  
Des Moines  
Indianapolis

2. Houston

Dallas  
Fort Worth  
San Antonio  
El Paso  
Oklahoma City  
Tulsa

7. Kansas City

St. Louis  
Topeka  
Wichita  
Omaha  
Little Rock  
Memphis

3. Atlanta

Miami  
Jacksonville  
Birmingham  
New Orleans

8. Boston

Portland, Me.  
Worcester

4. Washington, D.C.

Baltimore  
Richmond  
Charlotte

9. Los Angeles

San Francisco  
San Diego  
Tucson  
Phoenix

5. New York

Philadelphia  
Newark  
Buffalo  
Albany  
Rochester

10. Seattle

Portland, Oregon  
Spokane  
Denver  
Salt Lake City

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - March 17, 1967  
7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

State recommends that you send a congratulatory message to President-elect Fidel Sanchez of ~~SE~~ El Salvador now that his election has been certified. I recommend that you approve the attached text for oral transmission by Ambassador Castro.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By g, NARA, Date 4-17-91

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Suggested Presidential Message of Congratulations to President-Elect  
Fidel Sanchez of El Salvador**

---

I extend warmest congratulations on your election as President of El Salvador in a free and peaceful electoral process of which your people can be justifiably proud. I look forward to a continuation of the friendly relations between our governments, based on our mutual concern for the welfare and progress of our peoples, on the special ties which unite us within the Americas, and on our common dedication to the goals of the Alliance for Progress.

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By kg, NARA, Date 4-17-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*

Friday, March 17, 1967  
8:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk and  
Amb. Goldberg's recommendations  
for our delegation to the Special  
Session of the General Assembly  
which will deal with the sensitive  
issue of Southwest Africa, along  
with two other items.

W. W. Rostow

569  
171a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: U. S. Delegation to the Fifth Special Session  
of the United Nations General Assembly

Recommendation:

That you approve the following to represent the United States at the Fifth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly scheduled to begin April 21, 1967.

Representatives

Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg  
Ambassador William B. Buffum  
Ambassador Richard F. Pedersen  
Ambassador Eugenie M. Anderson  
Ambassador William P. Rogers

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

A Special Session of the General Assembly is scheduled for April 21 to deal with (a) further steps which the United Nations might take on the South West Africa situation; (b) United Nations peacekeeping arrangements and financing; and (c) resetting of the timing of a U.N. Conference on Outer Space from 1967 to 1968. These are the only items on the agenda, and the Assembly should not run longer than a few weeks at the most.

As in the case of a regular session of the Assembly, it will be necessary to submit a delegation for approval by the Senate. Ambassador Goldberg and I have discussed this matter and agree that in view of the brevity of the

Session the work can be done by Goldberg's regular staff of Ambassadors on the U.S. Mission staff and only a small delegation need be named. The only exception is Ambassador William P. Rogers. He is former Attorney General in the Eisenhower Administration whom you named this past January as the U. S. Representative on the Committee on South West Africa. We feel it would be desirable to include him in the delegation since he has been so heavily involved in the preparatory work.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Dean Rusk", with a stylized, cursive script.

Dean Rusk

Friday, March 17, 1967 -- 4:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

I count on your confidence in me to say no if this is not feasible.

From Wednesday, March 22 until after Easter there is a brief interval when Elspeth and both of our children will be on vacation. The children have been short changed a bit on seeing their father; and Elspeth could use a bit of change of scene.

If you are going to the Ranch for Easter would it be possible for us to fly out with you to San Antonio; rent a car; see something of Texas for a few days; and then fly back. I don't think we could keep grandmother from going along on the venture.

Again, I would not put this to you if I were not now sure that you trust me enough to say no if it is in any way awkward or inconvenient for Mrs. Johnson and yourself.

W. W. Rostow

yes —  
no —

WWRostow:rlh

173

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-374  
By JW, NARA, Date 1-29-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - March 17, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Supporting Assistance for the Summit Meeting

During the recent pre-advance party trip to Uruguay, the Foreign Minister told Jim Jones that it would be impossible for Uruguay to provide the necessary air transportation from Montevideo to Punta del Este for the Latin American Presidents. He asked for the loan of US helicopters which could be repainted with Uruguayan insignias. As a counter suggestion, the team proposed that several Latin American governments, in addition to the United States, be asked to provide air transportation under OAS auspices. The Foreign Minister accepted this suggestion.

It is doubtful that the Latin American countries will be in a position to provide helicopters. Colonel Cross tells me that he has three unmarked Huey's that can be made available subject to your authorization, as soon as the appropriate OAS request reaches him via State and Defense. The helicopters can be painted with the OAS insignia and flown by our crews in civilian clothes.

The USS Wright Communications Command Ship will be leaving Norfolk on March 25 for Punta del Este to provide world-wide communications for you. Colonel Cross wants to put the helicopters on the ship. Incidentally, the stationing of the ship off Punta del Este was discussed with the Uruguayan Foreign Minister and he gave his approval.

I recommend that you approve our lending three helicopters to the OAS subject to the Secretary General's making a formal request for such assistance. State concurs.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_.

cc - Colonel Cross

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, March 17, 1967  
9:30 a.m.

*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Over at the Planning Council, I put Henry Owen to work brooding about the analogy between our position and that of Lincoln in 1864.

Herewith he comes through with a first-class memorandum in which he points out that it was the fall of Atlanta in September 1864 that saved Lincoln and the election.

In short, the analogy would call for our pouring it on in Viet Nam so that our people can see clearly the end of the road in 1968, even if the end is not fully achieved by November.

W. W. R.



177a

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: 1864 - 1967

Our present situation in Vietnam is sometimes compared to the last year of the Civil War. This memo treats two neglected but interesting aspects of this comparison:

1. Attitudes on the Losing Side.

(a) 1864. Most Confederate leaders realized, from late 1863 on, that there was no longer any hope of military victory. They pinned their hopes almost wholly on Northern war-weariness.

The forthcoming 1864 Presidential election played a vital part in their calculations. They expected Lincoln to be beaten by a peace candidate.

General Stephan Ramseur of North Carolina wrote to his wife: "If our armies can hold their own, suffer no crushing disaster before the next election, we may reasonably expect a termination of this war... We learn from gentlemen from the North that the Peace party is growing rapidly - that McClellan will be elected and that his election will bring peace - provided always that we continue to hold our own against the Yankee armies."

The various peace probes that Northern doves (Greeley, Jacquess, Gilmore) made during this period were doomed by this widely shared Southern expectation. In response to these probes, President Davis made clear to each and all that he would not compromise his basic demands.

(b) 1967. May not Hanoi and the VC, too, hope that they will be saved by the next US Presidential election, if they can hang on till then? May they not expect that the "peace" issue will figure prominently in that election, and that whichever Presidential candidate wins will lose his freedom of action as a result?

If so, they will be no more inclined than President Davis was to seek a compromise peace before the election. There may be negotiations, but these will be designed to gain a respite from military pressure, not to reach an agreement that would enable the people of South Vietnam to decide their own future.

If this analogy has merit, only a reduction in their

physical capability to prosecute the war holds promise of ending or curtailing the war's scope before 1968.

## 2. Attitudes on the Winning Side.

(a) 1864. In the North, too, the expectation that Lincoln would be defeated was widespread. In August 1864, as casualties piled up and the war ground on, the Chairman of the Republican National Committee wrote Lincoln that "the tide is setting strongly against us..." Later that month, the President committed to writing his expectation that he would be defeated and that the new President would be unable to continue the war because of peace promises made during the election.

What saved Lincoln was not his eloquence (he made few campaign speeches), or Grant's slow and murderous progress in the Wilderness, or the good sense of the voters. All these were present in August, when Lincoln expected to lose.

What saved Lincoln was a dramatic military event in early September: the fall of Atlanta.

Overnight, as Thomas records, "the favorable turn of military events brought a scurry to Lincoln's bandwagon". The Richmond Examiner perceptively spoke of "disaster at Atlanta in the very nick of time, when a victory alone could save the party of Lincoln from irretrievable ruin". Secretary of State Seward said that Sherman had "knocked the bottom out of the Chicago (Democratic peace) platform".

Although Atlanta had strategic importance, its fall was not a decisive military event. For Sherman had failed in his primary purpose - to break up Hood's army. What the city's fall did was to dramatize the way the war was going: The Union had been winning before Atlanta, but the process was hard to perceive. The fact of Union armies occupying a large city in the heart of the Confederacy threw a spotlight on what was happening. After Atlanta, none doubted the outcome.

(b) 1967. The war in Vietnam, too, is being won. The need in the next eighteen months is to find some way of bringing this fact home to our people. This will be harder to do than in the Civil War, for evident reasons. The purpose of this memo is not to suggest how to do it but to underline the importance of the need. If Civil War experience is relevant, it is one to which military operations should now be geared.

<sup>10</sup>  
Henry Owen

March 14, 1967

175  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

March 17, 1967

Mr. President:

This draft cable is being delivered to you in accordance with instructions from Mr. Walt Rostow.

*Carroll Brown*  
for Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Amembassy BONN IMMEDIATE  
Amembassy LONDON IMMEDIATE  
Amembassy ROME IMMEDIATE  
Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-376  
By ing NARA. Date 8-24-92

NODIS/HANNAH

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE ACTING  
SECRETARY

Taking account of your various comments and in the  
light of further consideration here we have concluded that  
Vice-Presidential trip within time frame March 27-April 8  
should be laid on if at all possible but on basis of revised  
itinerary set forth below.

You requested consult host governments ASAP in order to  
determine whether a visit at the times indicated would be  
acceptable to them, having in view a public announcement of  
the trip as early as possible next week.

FOR BONN: View fact that universities will be closed  
would like you to arrange other suitable forum for major  
speech in Federal Republic having in mind considerations  
referred to in Leddy-Hillenbrand telecon.

FOR ROME: We note that Fanfani will not return Rome  
until afternoon March 30. If it is possible to schedule  
meetings with Saragat and Moro on March 29, with Pope  
on morning of March 30 and with Fanfani afternoon March 30

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

this should meet problem referred to in Rome's 4811.

REVISED SCHEDULE:

Mon, March 27 - Daytime travel from Washington (overnight in FRG)  
Tues, " 28 - Bonn -- Open CM meeting, no business with FRG  
(overnight in Rome)  
Wed, " 29 - Rome  
Thurs, " 30 - Rome (overnight in Paris)  
Fri, " 31 - Paris  
Sat, April 1 - Paris  
Sun, " 2 - Paris or London (rest)  
Mon, " 3 - London  
Tues, " 4 - London (overnight London)  
Wed, " 5 - Bonn - Berlin  
Thurs, " 6 - Bonn - Berlin  
Fri, " 7 - Bonn  
Sat, " 8 - Travel Washington.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 91-374  
By ju, NARA, Date 1-29-93

WWR 176

1-29-93  
2 P. 10-1-66

~~TOP SECRET~~ = NODIS

March 17, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Draft Instruction to Ambassador Thompson on US-Soviet  
Strategic Weapons Talks

Attached for your approval is the draft instruction to Tommy Thompson on the strategic weapons talks with the Soviets. Thompson is instructed to propose to Gromyko that the talks begin on April 12 and to give him the statement of our position at para 3 through 8 of the attached. You will want to read the entire instruction since it establishes our approach to this difficult and important problem.

The instruction attempts to define a practical way to proceed with these discussions in the absence of agreement within the government as to the hoped for outcome. At a meeting on Tuesday the Principals did not agree upon a proposed ACDA-State position paper which set forth a detailed over-all freeze proposal. There was also a difference as to the basic approach to the discussions. Bob McNamara argues that the talks should establish a dialogue that would help remove uncertainties that could lead to unnecessary escalation in the arms race. Adrian Fisher and Foy Kohler contend that we must have something specific to propose if we expect the talks to get anywhere.

The attached instruction seeks to combine these two approaches by stating the McNamara approach but also indicating willingness to discuss specific proposals. The proposals, however, are formulated in a manner to give the Chiefs the least problem and kept sufficiently vague to give us full flexibility on the ABM deployment question. The instruction has been cleared by Katzenbach, Kohler, McNamara, Fisher, and the Director of Joint Staff for the JCS.

I recommend that you approve this instruction.

W. W. Rostow

Send Instruction \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

SKeeny/LSEagleburger:djw:3/17/67

WWR 176a

DRAFT TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

STATE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-376  
By sig NARA. Date 4-6-92

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Strategic Weapons Talks

1. On basis Principals' discussion and your 3928, we have decided to proceed by your presenting paper transmitted by this telegram, calling for talks to begin on April 12. For such talks we contemplate sending small team of senior officials to assist you.
2. Text of Oral Statement to be delivered to Gromyko, copy of which you may leave, follows (paras 3 through 8 below):
3. QUOTE The US Government has carefully studied Chairman Kosygin's letter to President Johnson of February 28 and your statement to me on that same date. Despite some differences in approach, we see a common interest in ensuring the security of each side, without jeopardy to the security of the other, by avoiding a further costly and possibly dangerous spiral of the strategic arms race, and by creating the basis for reductions in existing forces. Accordingly, we believe it possible and desirable to proceed promptly with discussions between our two governments.
4. "US Government shares the desire of the Soviet Government not merely to prevent possible disruption of the strategic balance, but to move beyond this to reductions of existing forces. We see the forthcoming discussions as the best means to work together to increase the mutual understanding that is necessary to make progress toward this common goal.

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~



5. "While the US Government hopes that it will be possible to move rapidly toward agreement on strategic arms reductions, it may be feasible in the interim to find a way to 'level-off' strategic offensive and defensive forces. We agree that measures for this purpose would have to be designed to ensure the security of each side rather than attempting to solidify the precise current correlation of forces or to freeze an advantage to one or the other side. In other words, we recognize that some appropriate adjustments in the present forces of each side might be necessary and would still be consistent with our common objective of providing assurance to both sides that their security will be maintained or enhanced, while at the same time avoiding the possibly disruptive effects and the great costs of continuation of a strategic arms race. It will of course be necessary to discuss the respective strategic weapons systems of both sides in order to reach agreement on precisely which systems would be involved, and what undertakings with respect to them would be agreed. The United States is prepared to consider the possibilities of placing maximum reliance on unilateral means of verification of limitations on deployment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems. With all of these considerations in view, we suggest that measures of agreed limitation should apply to all strategic offensive missile systems (launchers) and to all defensive strategic missile systems (launchers and radars) having a significant anti-ballistic missile capability. We can see now how stationary systems can be part of such an arrangement, but we will need to work out a way to include mobile systems.
6. "We continue to believe that it would be premature to consider the form in which agreements or understandings between us might be expressed--treaty or otherwise. The form would depend upon the content and nature of the understanding.

7. "The United States Government believes that a thorough and frank discussion of the general problem will in itself be of great value to both sides. Increased understanding should not only assist us in reaching agreements to limit and to reduce strategic forces, but can also assist in dispelling uncertainties which lead each side to hedge against doubts by acquiring larger forces than it might otherwise do. This in turn triggers the other side to do the same, activating a spiral in the arms race.

8. "In view of the complexity of this general question, the US does not believe that a formal agenda should be fixed. The US would welcome the comments of the Soviet Government. The US Government is prepared to send appropriate senior officials from Washington to support Ambassador Thompson in these discussions. It proposes that the discussions begin in Moscow on April 12, and it hopes that the Soviet Government will find it possible to agree to that date. END QUOTE.

9. FYI. It has been decided to open the discussions without presentation at this time of a detailed US proposal. (The draft position paper pouched to you has not yet been agreed upon.) As a result of our discussions, it has been concluded that our proposal in the first instance should be limited to elements outlined in paragraph 5 above. We hope it will be possible on this basis to engage in the dialogue necessary before we can settle on a specific proposal. At the same time, we recognize the reserved and suspicious attitude taken by the Soviet Government toward discussions of the strategic balance. We hope that the positive reference to the long-term possibilities of agreements on reductions, as well as the broad and loose framework for possible mid-term "leveling-off" agreements, will provide a context in which it will be possible to introduce a more sophisticated

approach to the whole problem than the Soviet Government has hitherto displayed. With respect to the short term, we hope that it will be possible to establish a dialogue in which we can, for example, demonstrate to the Soviets that it would be in their interest not to preserve secrecy with respect to the mission and performance capabilities of the Tallinn system, which results only in the need for the US to assume the worst in planning our own force programs. The dialogue may assist each side to make better unilateral decisions and to hold down the arms race, even if no agreements are reached. (We recognize that care must be taken to avoid the impression of an intelligence fishing expedition.) Increased understanding of the current and prospective strategic situation could lead to unilateral slowdowns in specific areas pending broader and perhaps more formal bilateral agreements.

10. Our flexibility is designed not only to leave open the possibility for an agreement under which the Soviets would be permitted, for example, to keep their current Moscow ABM and their current ICBM deployments, which we are virtually certain they will insist upon doing, but also to permit us to hold open the option for a limited ABM deployment.

11. At your discretion, you may wish to indicate to the Soviets the level of representation from Washington in your support in forthcoming talks. It will be from State, DOD, and ACDA -- probably McNaughton, Garthoff, Fisher or another ACDA official, a representative of the Joint Staff, and a scientist. END FYI.

END

177

*Rus file*

Thursday, March 16, 1967  
2:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft statement  
should the Senate today approve the  
ratification of the Consular Convention  
with the USSR.

W. W. Rostow

cc: George Christian

WWRostow:rlh

March 16, 1967

STATEMENT FOR THE PRESIDENT  
ON SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT TO THE  
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSULAR CONVENTION  
WITH THE USSR

In giving its advice and consent to the ratification of the Consular Convention today, the Senate acted in the best tradition of American government. The impressive vote for ratification was the product, not only of strong bipartisan leadership, but also of responsible action by the membership.

The Convention will provide important measures to protect Americans traveling in the Soviet Union. Last year more than 18,000 of our citizens visited the USSR. These measures will become applicable as soon as the treaty enters into force.

I hope the Soviet Government will now move promptly to ratify the Convention and that arrangements will be made for its early entry into force.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-61

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

By is, NARA Date 10-30-99

March 16, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Final Courtesy Call of Ambassador Laraki of Morocco, 12 noon

After a year and a half here, he is returning home to become Foreign Minister. Since this should last no longer than five or ten minutes, there should be chance for little more than such courtesies as:

- (1) You welcome his elevation to the Foreign Ministry, but regret he is leaving us.
- (2) You recall with pleasure the King's visit and send him your best personal regards.
- (3) You wish the Foreign Minister well in his new responsibilities and hope he can continue to work constructively toward cementing Moroccan-U.S. relations.

In case Laraki brings up one of the following points, these observations may be helpful:

- (1) On the PL 480 167,000 tons, instructions are now in our Embassy in Morocco and negotiations should start promptly.
- (2) On the military package, instructions have also gone to our Embassy.
- (3) The King recently asked U Thant to set up a commission to inspect the arms buildup in North Africa and prevent an arms race. However, the King published the letter when he sent it to U Thant, suggesting that he wanted to make political points at home and abroad rather than make real progress on arms limitation. Our position has been that we welcome any measure to limit arms, but we are awaiting with interest how U Thant will react before we ourselves have anything to say.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:HW:lw

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, March 16, 1967  
6:15 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Stew Udall's recommendation may be feasible in the afternoon of the second day at Guam.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Will decide at Guam \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rlh



179a



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR  
WASHINGTON

March 16, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

If you can work it into your Guam schedule, I strongly recommend that you spend 20 or 30 minutes with High Commissioner Bill Norwood of the Trust Territory and a group of leaders from the Congress of Micronesia. Micronesian leaders are most anxious to visit with you for a few minutes and they will be delighted to come to Guam for the conference. As I noted earlier, it is likely that a UN supervised plebiscite will take place in the Trust Territory within the next two years. Consequently, such a visit would be an excellent investment of your time -- and would constitute a powerful demonstration of your interest in their future.

Stewart L. Udall  
Secretary of the Interior

*File*

March 16, 1967

Mr. President:

This telegram from Tony Freeman describes how President Diaz Ordaz responded to your Summit message.

W. W. Rostow

P.S. State has asked Tony Freeman to check with Carrillo Flores on the possibility of advancing President Diaz Ordaz's statement to at least next Monday.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 15, 1967

From: Ambassador, American Embassy, Mexico

For: Secretary

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-376  
By ing NARA, Date 4-6-92

I saw President Diaz Ordaz Tuesday evening alone for 40 minutes and left with him copies of President Johnson's message of March 13 (in Spanish) and Joint Resolution (in English).

Following my presentation, Diaz Ordaz requested I pass following to Secretary:

- a. Deeply appreciated Secretary's request I take up matter personally with him and fact I had personally transmitted copies message and Joint Resolution.
- b. Felt selection of Punta Del Este for Summit Meeting highly appropriate because it was birthplace of Alianza.
- c. Failure of Summit Meeting would not be failure of one person or one country, but rather of all members of Alianza -- therefore must not and cannot fail.
- d. Brilliant step of President Johnson first to approach Congress with such forcefulness. Will add tremendously to his influence and detract from possibilities Communist propaganda to denigrate meeting.
- e. He is thinking of making strong statement along same general lines as President Johnson's message, probably in conjunction with request to Congress for permission to leave Mexico and attend Punta del Este meeting. Thinking out loud, he opined this week too early to prepare appropriate remarks, but that next week (Holy Week) such statement would draw far more attention in press because of customary paucity of political news. Will therefore plan for March 22 or 23.
- f. So far no indication in Mexico of coordinated Commie campaign against Summit Meeting. "They can of course be counted on to refer to US as Majordomo and all LA's as Lackeys, but we're used to this and know how to handle it".
- g. Finally, he volunteered his sincere desire to do anything within his power before, during or after Summit Meeting to assure its success.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

He specifically requested that President Johnson or Secretary Rusk communicate with him through any appropriate channel at any time that it is felt Mexico or he personally may be of help in achieving objectives of Punta del Este meeting.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Thursday, March 16, 1967  
4:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is the resolution reaffirming US policy in support of inter-American cooperation introduced in the Senate on August 8, 1960, by Senator Mansfield.

In your phrase, it was a Rotary Club resolution, which was not passed but became preambular language to the authorization act.

*Walt R.*

Attachment

the policies by which this Government has sought to stimulate the flow of private capital into Latin America. We have got to face the fact that Latin Americans do not necessarily always see the ingress of foreign capital as an unmixed blessing, and that such capital is not infrequently one of the primary targets of revolutions in those nations. It seems to me that in the year ahead private capital will perform its greatest service on behalf of its own long-range interests and the total interests of this Nation by integrating its foreign investments and operations as rapidly as possible into the other American nations. In short, U.S. private capital should nationalize itself, in the sense of immersing itself in the life of the nations in which it operates. If it does so, the constant threat of involuntary nationalization may decline. There are instrumentalities and techniques for achieving this end, and some of the most farsighted U.S. companies are already putting them into practice in Latin America. They do so by mixing U.S. capital with local capital, by choosing their managers—and their families—for Latin America on the basis of their suitability to live as well as to work in other nations, by rapid transfer of skills through extensive training programs of local inhabitants, and by maximum use of local employees on the basis of equality with its home employees in the management of enterprise. It seems to me that even as this Government seeks, as it now does, by its actions and policies which commit us all, to aid U.S. business in Latin America, it must also act to stimulate the incorporation of progressive practices into U.S. business in Latin America since their absence affects us all.

Mr. President, I have already suggested that the broad and vast interests of this Nation in inter-American relations cannot be served by unilateral military intervention in the internal affairs of any American nation. Yet I do not believe that the doctrine of nonintervention, as it now stands, is adequate to the present and the future needs of the Americas. There are acts which can be committed by a government which grossly outrage the conscience of the Americas. There are policies which can be pursued by one nation in this hemisphere which gravely jeopardize the security of all the American nations. When these acts occur, when these policies are pursued, the doctrine of nonintervention, in my opinion, is not adequate to the need. The American nations have already moved and should continue to move in the direction of new concept of hemispheric political cooperation. Call it the Doctrine of Hemispheric Concern, if you will. What is implicit in it, however, is the need of the American nations to act in common against any member government which grossly outrages the conscience of the hemisphere by its behavior or actions or which clearly endangers the security of the hemisphere by its policies. To take this step, Mr. President, to modify the doctrine of nonintervention is a most serious matter but these are most serious times. I, for one, am persuaded that the nations of this hemisphere are pre-

pared to take it in their common interest and I am persuaded that, with the proper safeguards in the OAS system, a Doctrine of Hemispheric Concern will be invoked neither lightly nor inequitably.

#### NEW ADMINISTRATIVE METHODS

Finally, Mr. President, I should like to turn to the needs of administration within our own Government, in terms of inter-American relations. Regardless of the adequacy of our concepts with respect to these relations, regardless of our willingness to revamp our policies, we are not likely to do what needs to be done, given the present administrative structure for the conduct of these relations. Apart from a serious lack of outstanding citizens dedicated and skilled in inter-American affairs, we are seeking to act through a creaky, confused, and jumbled machinery of administration. In Latin American affairs, as in others, the State Department, under the President, has theoretical responsibility; it is there to blame if things go wrong. But in inter-American affairs, as in others, policies are determined or influenced not only by the President and the Secretary of State, but also by various other sources of power in the executive branch, from the National Security Council on down, without adequate central control and direction.

The first need in the administration of inter-American affairs is to make certain that policies originate and flow from the President through the Secretary of State and that these policies are carried out by all agencies concerned under State Department and ambassadorial control. To that end, all bilateral aid activities, and all informational and exchange activities with respect to Latin America should be made subject to full and decisive control of the Secretary of State. Furthermore the U.S. representatives on the International Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the various United Nations agencies, and all other agencies with a greater or lesser degree of influence on the course of inter-American relations should be fully responsive to the effective guidance of the Secretary of State.

Second, to reinforce this line of authority, it seems to me most desirable that any new funds appropriated by the Congress for economic and related purposes in Latin America should be appropriated to and through the Department of State.

Third, it should be our policy and part of our essential initiative to make every effort to strengthen the OAS and its subordinate agencies by stimulating common American action through that organization and by encouraging personnel policies which will equip that organization for new and heavier responsibilities.

Mr. President, it is true that any President should have a large measure of discretion in the administrative structure through which he seeks to conduct the foreign relations of the Nation. But Congress, which provides for this establishment and influences the nature of it by legislation, cannot remain indifferent when that structure gets out of hand, when it tends by its very nature to dis-

sipate and waste the resources of the people by duplication, inadequate coordination, and a confusion of responsibility.

It is a truism that men are more important than machinery in effective foreign relations. It may be that the suggestions I have made, which look to the concentration of authority as well as responsibility in inter-American affairs in the Department of State, will not act to increase effectiveness. But if they do not, at least we shall know where to begin to look for the difficulty and where to make the adjustments. As it is now, the administrative structure defies an honest fixing of responsibility, no matter how much the Secretary of State may be held responsible, and no matter how often—and often unjustly—he may be berated for the failures.

It is my hope that the next President will act promptly on this problem. I, for one, as chairman of the relevant Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee intend to bring this problem to the attention of the committee; and I would welcome an opportunity to cooperate with the administration on any necessary legislation to deal with it.

#### CONCLUDING COMMENTS

I do not desire to detain the Senate much longer. It is my intention to take up other aspects of the international situation and our policies before the session closes. My purpose in these remarks today is to bring to the fore the question of inter-American relations as it is interwoven with the Cuban dispute and aid programs. These questions cannot be sidetracked by either silence or slogans until next January. They will be very much with us in the immediate days ahead. We need to face them now. We need to turn the light of discussion on them now, to the end that we may lay the basis for the kind of action which must come with the next administration, the kind of action appropriate to these times, the kind of action which will inspire the American Republics to proceed together to a rededication to the common security and progress of this hemisphere.

Mr. President, I send to the desk a resolution calling for intensification of cooperation in Latin-American relations; and I ask that the resolution be read and be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The resolution (S. Res. 353) reaffirming U.S. policy in support of inter-American cooperation for the welfare and progress of the Western Hemisphere, submitted by Mr. MANSFIELD, was read, and was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, as follows:

Whereas the United States shares with the other American Republics a common interest in the freedom, tranquility, welfare, and progress of the Western Hemisphere, and

Whereas the safeguarding of this interest requires an increase in inter-American cooperation and more effective use of the instrumentalities of hemispheric solidarity: Therefore be it

*Resolved*, That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States in support of inter-American cooperation for the common benefit of the peoples of the Western Hemisphere and that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that this Government by



its constitutional processes should pursue, particularly, in its relations with the other American Republics:

(1) The development of agreements, setting forth specific plans of action designed to foster economic progress and improvements in the welfare and level of living of all the peoples of the Western Hemisphere on the basis of joint aid, mutual effort, and common sacrifice.

(2) The development of long-range agreements to facilitate the marketing and to insure an equitable price for the principal commodities entering into trade among the nations of the Western Hemisphere and, further, to encourage the gradual emergence of a common market among the American Republics.

(3) The development of uniform standards and practices with respect to the operation, rights, and responsibilities of private capital which flows across national boundaries within the Western Hemisphere.

(4) The consolidation of the public institutions and agencies of inter-American cooperation, insofar as feasible, within the structure of the Organization of American States and the strengthening of the personnel, resources, and authority of the Organization in order that it may play a role of increasing importance in all aspects of hemispheric cooperation.

(5) The development of a more accurate and sympathetic understanding among the peoples of the Western Hemisphere through a greater interchange of persons, ideas, techniques, and educational, scientific, and cultural achievements.

(6) The safeguarding of the tranquillity of the hemisphere by joint action by due process in the Organization of the American States to foreclose the establishment of military bases in this hemisphere by any nation not of this hemisphere and to curb by all necessary means any American nation whose policies and actions grossly outrage the conscience or threaten the security of the Americas.

#### EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York Herald Tribune,  
July 15, 1960]

#### MONROE DOCTRINE: WHAT IT SAYS

The statement of U.S. policy, known as the Monroe Doctrine, was enunciated by President James Monroe in his message to Congress, December 2, 1823, in which he declared:

"\* \* \* The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.

"In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected.

"We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it \* \* \* we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition to the United States.

"It is impossible that the allied [European] powers should extend their political

system to any portion of either [American] continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference."

#### EXHIBIT 2

RIO DE JANEIRO CONFERENCE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY, AUGUST 15-SEPTEMBER 2, 1947

#### INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE<sup>1</sup>

In the name of their Peoples, the Governments represented at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, desirous of consolidating and strengthening their relations of friendship and good neighborliness, and Considering:

That Resolution VIII of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, which met in Mexico City, recommended the conclusion of a treaty to prevent and repeal threats and acts of aggression against any of the countries of America;

That the High Contracting Parties reiterate their will to remain united in an inter-American system consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and reaffirm the existence of the agreement which they have concluded concerning those matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which are appropriate for regional action;

That the High Contracting Parties reaffirm their adherence to the principles of inter-American solidarity and cooperation, and especially to those set forth in the preamble and declarations of the Act of Chapultepec, all of which should be understood to be accepted as standards of their mutual relations and as the juridical basis of the Inter-American System;

That the American States propose, in order to improve the procedures for the pacific settlement of their controversies, to conclude the treaty concerning the "Inter-American Peace System" envisaged in Resolutions IX and XXXIX of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace.

That the obligation of mutual assistance and common defense of the American Republics is essentially related to their democratic ideals and to their will to cooperate permanently in the fulfillment of the principles and purposes of a policy of peace;

That the American regional community affirms as a manifest truth that juridical organization is a necessary prerequisite of security and peace, and that peace is founded on justice and moral order and, consequently, on the international recognition and protection of human rights and freedoms, on the indispensable well-being of the people, and on the effectiveness of democracy for the international realization of justice and security,

Have resolved, in conformity with the objectives stated above, to conclude the following Treaty, in order to assure peace, through adequate means, to provide for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks against any American State, and in order to deal with threats of aggression against any of them:

Article 1. The High Contracting Parties formally condemn war and undertake in

<sup>1</sup> Department of State Bulletin of Sept. 21, 1947, pp. 565-567, 572. Senate document, Ex. II, 80th Cong., 1st sess. The treaty was ratified by the President on behalf of the United States December 19, 1947, and the instrument of ratification was deposited with the Pan American Union in Washington on Dec. 30, 1947.

their international relations not to resort to the threat or the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or of this Treaty.

Article 2. As a consequence of the principle set forth in the preceding Article, the High Contracting Parties undertake to submit every controversy which may arise between them to methods of peaceful settlement and to endeavor to settle any such controversy among themselves by means of the procedures in force in the Inter-American System before referring it to the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations.

#### Article 3:

1. The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. On the request of the State or States directly attacked and until the decision of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System, each one of the Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures which it may individually take in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding paragraph and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity. The Organ of Consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining those measures and agreeing upon the measures of a collective character that should be taken.

3. The provisions of this Article shall be applied in case of any armed attack which takes place within the region described in Article 4 or within the territory of an American State. When the attack takes place outside of the said areas, the provisions of Article 6 shall be applied.

4. Measures of self-defense provided for under this Article may be taken until the Security Council of the United Nations has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Article 4. The region to which this Treaty refers is bounded as follows: beginning at the North Pole; thence due south to a point 74 degrees north latitude, 10 degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 47 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, 50 degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 35 degrees north latitude, 60 degrees west longitude; thence due south to a point in 20 degrees north latitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 5 degrees north latitude, 24 degrees west longitude; thence due south to the South Pole; thence due north to a point 30 degrees south latitude, 90 degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point on the Equator at 97 degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 15 degrees north latitude, 120 degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 50 degrees north latitude, 170 degrees east longitude; thence due north to a point in 54 degrees north latitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 65 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, 168 degrees 58 minutes 5 seconds west longitude; thence due north to the North Pole.

Article 5. The High Contracting Parties shall immediately send to the Security Council of the United Nations, in conformity with Articles 51 and 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, complete information concerning the activities undertaken or in contemplation in the exercise of the right of self-defense or for the purpose of maintaining inter-American peace and security.

Article 6. If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which



~~SECRET~~

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EYES ONLY

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1967 MAR 16 22 33

~~SECRET~~ LITERALLY EYES ONLY  
FROM THE PRESIDENT  
FOR DEPUTY AMBASSADOR WILLIAM C PORTER

AS YOU KNOW, IN SPEAKING ON WEDNESDAY AT NASHVILLE I ANNOUNCED THE CHANGES I AM MAKING IN THE LEADERSHIP OF OUR MISSION IN VIET-NAM. SINCE YOU WILL BE RELINQUISHING YOUR POST IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR WISHES, I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OCCASION TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR DEDICATED SERVICE AS DEPUTY TO AMBASSADOR LODGE OVER THE LAST 18 MONTHS. I WAS GRATEFUL TO YOU IN AUGUST, 1965 FOR AGREEING TO ACCEPT THIS EXACTING ASSIGNMENT AND I AM DOUBLY GRATEFUL FOR THE EXCEPTIONAL JOB YOU HAVE DONE IN VIET-NAM SINCE THAT APPOINTMENT. AS YOU KNOW FROM OUR CONVERSATIONS I CONSIDER "THE OTHER WAR" IN VIET-NAM TO BE JUST AS IMPORTANT TO OUR POLICY GOALS AS THE MILITARY EFFORT ITSELF. I AM ENCOURAGED THAT THE PROGRAM OF PACIFICATION AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IS SHOWING GOOD PROGRESS DUE, AS FAR AS AMERICAN SUPPORT IS CONCERNED, IN LARGE MEASURE TO YOUR AND YOUR TEAM'S EXCELLENT EFFORTS. THE NATION OWES YOU A DEBT FOR THIS DEDICATED SERVICE AND I PERSONALLY WISH TO RECORD MY APPRECIATION FOR YOUR HELP.

I DO HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR ANOTHER IMPORTANT POST SOON. SEC. RUSK AND I WILL BE TALKING ABOUT THIS WITH YOU UPON YOUR RETURN. IN UTMOST PERSONAL CONFIDENCE, YOU SHOULD KNOW WE HAVE IN MIND KOREA OR SOME EQUALLY CRITICAL ASSIGNMENT.

270

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

SANITIZED  
Authority NLS 019-014-3-7  
By 9, NARA, Date 12/13/01

Thursday, March 16, 1967, 4:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

At your Press Conference on March 9, 1967, the following exchange took place:

"Q. Mr. President, there are reports that Ambassador Lodge would like to be relieved of his post and that you are looking for a successor. Is there any truth to these reports?

"The President. No, there is no truth that I am looking for a successor."

Your instruction to Secretary Rusk to ask Ambassador Bunker to serve in Saigon was dated March 2. Copy attached.

Secretary Rusk saw Ambassador Bunker on March 4 and carried out your instructions.

W. W. Rostow

Thursday, March 16, 1967  
11:30 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts on March 15

Neil Sheehan, The New York Times, came in to see me about a "mood" piece they are doing on Bob McNamara after 6 years in office. I gave him background information.

Newbold Noyes, The Evening Star, telephoned to say he was thinking of asking Joe Califano, George Christian and me to form a panel to discuss the working of the White House staff at the meeting of the American Newspaper Society, April 20-22, here in Washington. He said he had discussed this some with Joe. I told him to have Joe check it out and get your approval.

Hugh Sidey came in. I hit him hard on the Time piece on the February 6 interview with Senator RFK. I gave him the facts. He agreed they were badly off-base; apologized; and promised to inform the high brass of Time.

Hugh Sidey, Murrey Marder, and Chuck Bailey telephoned about the new team in Saigon. All of them commented favorably and thought it would be a good team.

W. W. R.

*W. W. Rostow*

*4-10-67  
2 Pres file*

March 16, 1967

Mr. President:

Uruguayan President Gestido has sent you a telegram expressing pleasure over having the Summit in Uruguay and the opportunity it will give him to meet you personally (Tab A).

I recommend that you reply along the lines of the draft at Tab B.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓ *2/10/67*  
Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
See me \_\_\_\_\_

tab A 115

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM PRESIDENT GESTIDO  
of URUGUAY

March 10, 1967

His Excellency

The President of the United States of North America,

Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson,

Washington, D. C.

I have the honor to address Your Excellency in order to express to you my sincere pleasure over the resolution adopted at the Eleventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, selecting Punta del Este as the meeting place for the Chiefs of State of the Inter-American System, which will give me the opportunity and great honor of personally presenting to you my most distinguished greetings.

General Oscar D. Gestido,  
President of the Republic of Uruguay

1956

SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL REPLY TO MESSAGE FROM  
PRESIDENT GESTIDO  
(OF URUGUAY)

His Excellency

Oscar D. Gestido

President of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay

I am most grateful for your thoughtful message of March 10.

The hemisphere is indebted to Uruguay for opening its doors to the Meeting of Presidents. It is highly appropriate that we should gather at the birthplace of the Alliance for Progress to review what has been accomplished under the Alliance and what new efforts must be made.

I also look forward to meeting you personally and visiting your country.

Lyndon B. Johnson

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, March 16, 1967, 6:10 P.M.

Mr. President:

Counselor McPherson, Bill Bowdler, and I met to find compromise language, as instructed, between:

- supports the allocation of
- and
- recognizes the need for and anticipates the allocation of

Our compromise:

- confirms the need for and anticipates making available.

If you don't like "anticipates":

- confirms the need for and intends to make available.

If these don't help, let us know.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:amc

CONFIDENTIAL

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958  
SEC. 1.2 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 19. 1968

BY 196 ON 4-18-91

re H.J. Res. 428  
March 13, 1967  
Joint Resolution  
to assist the other  
American Republics in a  
historic new phase of the  
Alliance for Progress



Thursday, March 16, 1967 -- 9:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

I am informed by Marv Watson that our advance man in Guam has put the following questions:

- After landing at Guam, should you taxi to the civilian terminal?
- Make anshort arrival statement to the local people who will, in any case, be out to see you?
- Be greeted by Lodge, Westmoreland and others who have already arrived?
- Motorcade through the town to Nimitz Hill (the natural route)?
- Depart via Anderson Field where the B-52's fly, where you would give citations to 6 wings who have earned them well on their long milk runs?
- Finally, should our Vietnamese guests be located on Nimitz Hill or somewhere else?

My recommendations are as follows.

1. You should taxi to the civilian terminal and make an arrival statement, because that statement could define for the country and the world the shape and the limitation of the conference. Your statements in Hawaii were invaluable in setting the right tone for the whole trip to Asia. Moreover, your arrival will be the one occasion on which you will have a chance to meet the local population.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

2. I am sure that Lodge and Westy would wish to be out to greet you; and it is right that they should.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

3. As indicated, through the town is the natural route for going from the Naval Air Base to Nimitz Hill.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

4. I understand well that you would wish to avoid the conference projecting you as a big bomber man; but those men are serving their country well; the press on Guam will not for one moment be unaware of the round-the-clock B-52 activity; therefore, I believe you should give the citations and I recommend departure from the Air Force Base. The fact that this will happen at the end rather than at the beginning of the conference will somewhat diminish the attention given to the B-52 activity. An alternative would be to bring the B-52 Wing Commanders in to the Naval Air Base or even up to Nimitz Hill for the ceremony. In that case, you would not inspect the B-52 base.

Approve departure and citation awards at Air Force Base \_\_\_\_\_

Bring men in to Naval Base \_\_\_\_\_

Bring men in to Nimitz Hill \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

5. Since the conference will be short and there are facilities for the Vietnamese on Nimitz Hill, I believe they should be located there close to your own party. It should be a rather family affair.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Thursday, March 16, 1967 -- 6:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Juan Trippe's report on his interview with Senators Symington and Russell concerning the SST.

Symington. He spent 3 hours with Stu, who cancelled dinner to talk with him. He made 3 points which appeared new to the Senator:

-- Having decided to configure the SST for efficient overseas operations, its cost per seat mile would run 28% less than the Concord and, therefore it could be a going concern.

-- 25% of the total risk capital would be private capital.

-- The commercial future of the aircraft hinged on what governments around the world thought the U. S. would do; competing foreign airlines which might be purchasers were owned by governments; the ambassadors and embassies here were watching very closely what positions were taken by senior Senators like Symington and Russell; therefore, their position might affect the future prospects and market for the SST.

Symington ended by saying to Trippe that: He would make no promises; he was 90% with him; and he asked Trippe to draft a speech for him to use in the Senate in support.

*too many men* Russell, Senator Russell was more difficult. He began by saying ~~to me he would be~~ talking to him, and he was resistant. Trippe then took him through the same 3 points he had made to Symington. He seemed somewhat impressed and asked: How will Stu Symington vote? If Stu goes with it, you will have no trouble with me.

With Senator Russell Trippe went into more detail about the financing pointing out that:

- The world market by 1985 would be 400 to 500 aircraft;
- The government would get back its money when we sold 200;
- If we sold 400 by 1985, we would get back our money plus 4% interest.

Russell thought this was a much more favorable prospect than he had previously envisaged.

With respect to the exemption order passed by the Senate but not by the House in 1966, Trippe urged that you see Senator Magnuson as soon as possible. I transmitted that message to Jim Jones in Marvin Watson's absence, but took no further action.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

*Pres file*

Thursday, March 16, 1967 -- 1:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Amb. Ed. Ritchie called with some chagrin and reported that it is now impossible for Prime Minister Pearson to come in the days after Easter; and he does not wish to request, even, that you see him between your return from Guam and Easter.

Therefore, unless you wish urgently to see him, his visit is off.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, March 16, 1967  
2:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here is a draft message from  
you to Deputy Ambassador William C.  
Porter, plus a copy of the message  
which Sec. Rusk sent to him last  
night.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By Ng, NARA, Date 4-17-91

130a

**DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT  
FOR DEPUTY AMBASSADOR WILLIAM C. PORTER**

As you know, in speaking on Wednesday at Nashville I announced the changes I am making in the leadership of our Mission in Viet-Nam. Since you will be relinquishing your post in accordance with your wishes, I would like to take this occasion to thank you for your dedicated service as Deputy to Ambassador Lodge over the last 18 months. I was grateful to you in August, 1965 for agreeing to accept this exacting assignment and I am doubly grateful for the exceptional job you have done in Viet-Nam since that appointment. As you know from our conversations I consider "the other war" in Viet-Nam to be just as important to our policy goals as the military effort itself. I am encouraged that the program of pacification and revolutionary development is showing good progress due, as far as American support is concerned, in large measure to your and your team's excellent efforts. The nation owes you a debt for this dedicated service and I personally wish to record my appreciation for your help.

## PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR PORTER FROM THE SECRETARY

Dear Bill: You will have noted from the President's announcements concerning new leadership in Saigon, made in the course of his Nashville speech, that we have taken into account the desire you expressed to bring your services in Viet-Nam to an end.

I would not want to let this occasion go by without telling you how deeply appreciative I am of the outstanding services you have rendered you country and the Foreign Service in Viet-Nam. The personal sacrifice entitled in your carrying out this assignment is deeply appreciated and I regret that we will be losing your help in that exceedingly difficult but most important post.



*Pres file*

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- MARIGOLD/SUNFLOWER PLUS

Thursday, March 16, 1967 -- 3:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a message to you from Prime Minister Wilson.

To refresh your memory, I attach the account of my talk with him in which he was concerned about the "breakdown in communications" during Kosygin week. (Para. A, sidelined in yellow.)

What he wants from us, I believe, is full and complete information about negotiations. He also asks if our final formulation during Kosygin week still stands.

He wants you to talk about this with Pat Dean.

I believe we can deal with this after Guam.

W. W. Rostow

Tab A -- Message from Prime Minister Wilson

Tab B -- Rostow talk with Wilson

Tab C -- U. S. formulation

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-468  
By CLG, NARA, Date 4-4-95

WWRostow:rln

~~TOP SECRET~~

191a

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

Thursday, March 16, 1967

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

I sent you on February 21 a fairly full account of my impression from the Koyugin talks and from the talks George Brown and I had with the German Government in Bonn.

But as you will have known from the messages I sent you during the Kosygin visit and from what David Bruce will have told you then, I was worried during and after the visit about a deeper, underlying problem. I did not go into this in my message of the 21st because Walt Rostow was due here and I wanted first to discuss the whole issue with him. He will have reported to you about our lengthy task and the anxieties I expressed to him. I found this talk very helpful. But it did not resolve these anxieties, which continue to cause me serious concern.

I have now discussed all this very fully with Pat Dean. In the light of that and of my talk with Walt, I believe that there is still an unresolved problem between us. I will not take up your time now by seeking to discuss this in greater detail. But when Pat Dean returns to Washington at the end of this month, I should be grateful if you could arrange for him to call on you to discuss the problem as I see it and to examine what can be done to resolve the misunderstanding that arose between us and to make sure that there is no question of a similar situation arising in the future. I am, of course, most grateful for the invitation conveyed by Walt Rostow to visit you in Washington around the end of May and I much look forward to this. But it is still some way ahead and much can happen between now and then. This is why I think it would be useful for you to have a word with Pat Dean on his return, as I have suggested.

Meanwhile, I should be grateful also for your confirmation of one point. Could you please let me know whether, in your view, the message which you sent me to hand to Kosygin late on the night of February 12, still represents the position as you see it, however dark immediate prospects may look?

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

Authority RAC 19490

By infics, NARA, Date 3-30-98



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

191-b

3

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

OO RUEHC  
DE RUDICR 6394C 0561427  
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Info

O 251348Z FEB 67  
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STATE GRNC  
BT

2 3 3 8 7

Feb. 25, 10:03AM

~~TOP SECRET~~ LONDON 6894

NODIS MARIGOLD-SUNFLOWER PLUS

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

REF: LONDON 6893

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 95-351

By ing, NARA, Date 1-16-96

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE FROM WALT ROSTOW

1. HERewith A BRIEF WRAP-UP, STARTING AT THE END, WITH TWO HOURS WITH WILSON, WHICH BEGAN, AS WITH BROWN, WITH EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION. BRITISH EFFORTS FOR PEACE DURING KOSYGIN VISIT.

A. THE MAIN POINT OF HIS INTERVIEW WITH ME WAS TO GET OFF HIS CHEST HIS FRUSTRATIONS WITH THE WEEK WITH KOSYGIN. HIS VIEW IS THAT THERE WAS A "BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATIONS." WE DID NOT REACT NEGATIVELY TO HIS TUESDAY A-B FORMULATION AND THEN OVERTOOK HIS FRIDAY PROPOSAL. THE FINAL EFFORT TO REDRESS THE SITUATION INEVITABLY ASSUMED THE FORM OF AN ULTIMATUM." HE SAID WE MUST CLEAR UP THIS PROBLEM OF "COMMUNICATION" BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

B. I EXPLAINED THAT ON FRIDAY WE HAD EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT NO MESSAGE WOULD BE DELIVERED UNTIL WE RESPONDED. BUT, IN GENERAL, I DID NOT DEBATE DETAILS OR REACT STRONGLY. I LET HIM USE MY PRESENCE TO UNLOAD HIS FEELINGS RATHER THAN PUT THEM ON PAPER TO WASHINGTON, ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE WAS PLANNING TO SEND MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT.

C. BENEATH IT ALL WAS A RANKLING THAT WE DID NOT CUT HIM IN FULLY ON THE DIRECT CHANNEL. HE ASKED IF WE HAD HEARD ANYTHING ON THAT CHANNEL AND IF IT WAS STILL ACTIVE. I REPLIED THAT WE HAD THE SAME LANGUAGE AS IN THE MESSAGE TO THE POPE AND THE CHANNEL WAS "NOT NOW ACTIVE."

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- LONDON 6894 NODIS MARIGOLD-SUNFLOWER PLUS

D. WHEN I PUT THE GENERAL POSITION THAT HANOI COULD HAVE RESPONDED IN ANY ONE OF A NUMBER OF WAYS OVER PREVIOUS WEEKS IF IT WISHED TO END THE WAR AND THAT THERE WAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT IT WISHED TO DO SO AT THIS STAGE, HE SAID THAT RAPACKI ALSO TOOK THE VIEW THAT HANOI NOW REGARDED NEGOTIATIONS AS "DEFEAT" AND WAS NOT READY. WHEN I SAID HANOI MIGHT BE LOOKING TO KEEPING THE WAR GOING UNTIL 1968, AGAIN HE SAID RAPACKI TOOK A SIMILAR VIEW, BUT HE RETURNS TO THE POSITION THAT DURING THE WEEK IN LONDON KOSYGIN FOR THE FIRST TIME "WAS READY TO MOVE."

E. INCIDENTALLY, RAPACKI GAVE THE BRITISH AN ACCOUNT OF MARIGOLD THAT THEY WISH TO CHECK OUT WITH US.

F. WILSON DID NOT REFER TO THE NEW ACTIONS I HAD COMMUNICATED TO BROWN FROM STATE 143029; ALTHOUGH WILSON WAS IMMEDIATELY INFORMED. BUT HIS PROBLEM WITH VIET-NAM IS CLEAR: HE HAS A QUITE STRONG ANTI-VIET-NAM WING IN THE LABOR PARTY; BOMBING THE NORTH IS MORE WIDELY UNPOPULAR IN BRITAIN; AND WILSON FEELS HE MUST KEEP MOVING IN A PEACE POSTURE OR THE BASIS FOR OVER-ALL SUPPORT OF THE U.S. POSITION WILL SLIP AWAY FROM HIM. WE SHALL BE HEARING FROM HIM ABOUT HIS PROBLEMS WITH "ESCALATION," I WOULD GUESS.

G. I LEFT PRETTY INDELIBLY THESE THREE POINTS:

(1) THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSIBILITIES TO OUR 500,000 MEN AND OUR FIGHTING ALLIES;

(2) THE DANGER TO OUR POLITICAL BASE AT HOME OF PEACE HOPES THAT FAIL;

(3) THE DANGER OF PANMUNJOM-TYPE NEGOTIATIONS, UNDERLINING FROM THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE THAT WE SAW NO "SERIOUS" WILL TO END THE WAR: THAT, RATHER THAN TALK FOR ITS OWN SAKE WAS OUR OBJECTIVE. (INCIDENTALLY, HE SAID HE TALKED TO RAPACKI ABOUT U.S. MEMORIES OF PANMUNJOM.)

H. ASIDE FROM VIET-NAM, ~~IT IS EUROPE WHICH IS, OF COURSE, ON THE MINDS OF THE BRITISH.~~ DESPITE BRAVE WORDS FROM WILSON AND BROWN ON THEIR FEELING THAT THE GENERAL WILL NOT VETO UK ENTRANCE INTO THE COMMON MARKET ~~THERE IS A SENSE OF POTENTIAL MAJOR CRISIS IN EUROPEAN AND ATLANTIC AFFAIRS JUST BENEATH THE SURFACE~~ STEMMING FROM THE CHARACTER OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND THE ROLE OF STRAUSS. SPECIFICALLY, IT IS FOCUSED ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- LONDON 6894 NODIS MARIGOLD-SUNFLOWER PLUS

(1) THE OFFSET NEGOTIATIONS WILL FAIL, THEY WILL THEN CERTAINLY PULL OUT TROOPS, AND THE MILITARY ALLIANCE WILL UNRAVEL;

(2) THE GERMANS WILL NOT FIGHT THE FRENCH HARD ENOUGH TO SAVE ANYTHING FROM THE KENNEDY ROUND;

(3) THE NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUE WILL EITHER YIELD A FAILURE OR AN ATMOSPHERE WHERE THEIR ENTRANCE INTO EUROPE WILL BE EASIER FOR DE GAULLE TO FRUSTRATE, AND THE KENNEDY ROUND EASIER TO ABORT.

I. IF THE BRITISH HAVE ANY HOPE IN THIS SITUATION IT CENTERS ABOUT A WEAKENING OF DE GAULLE VIA THE FORTHCOMING FRENCH ELECTIONS, ALTHOUGH SOBERLY DISCUSSED THE EVIDENCE THEY HAVE DOES NOT SUGGEST RADICAL CHANGE IN DE GAULLE'S POLITICAL BASE.

J. BOTH HEALEY AND WILSON INTRODUCED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEIR FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND RELATED DOMESTIC SITUATION MAY REQUIRE THEM TO RAISE AGAIN THE EAST OF SUEZ PROBLEM.

K. I CONCLUDE THAT WE SHALL NEED AN ENTERPRISING EUROPEAN POLICY IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD TO HOLD THE SHOW TOGETHER; AND THE KEY LIES IN OUR ULTIMATE RELATIONS TO AND LEVERAGE IN BONN.

L. PHIL KAISER WILL BE FILING A FULL REPORT OF CONVERSATIONS WITH BROWN, HEALEY AND TREND. (EMBTTEL 6893).

GP-3. KAISER  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

February 12, 1967

U.S. Formula

If you can get a North Vietnamese assurance -- communicated either direct to the U.S. or through you -- before 10:00 a.m. British time tomorrow that all movement of troops and supplies into South Viet Nam will stop at that time, I will get an assurance from the U.S. that they will not resume bombing of North Viet Nam from that time. Of course the U.S. build up would also then stop within a matter of days.

This would then give you and me the opportunity to try to consolidate and build on what has been achieved by bringing the parties together and promoting further balanced measures of de-escalation.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-374  
By ju, NARA, Date 1-29-93

~~SECRET~~

Limited Official Use

Thursday - March 16, 1967

192  
Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Participation of Other Presidents at the Summit

You asked me to keep a watch on the intention of other Presidents to attend the Summit to insure maximum participation.

This is how the picture looks today:

- Belaunde (Peru), who last week was doubtful, is back in the positive column.
- Arosemena (Ecuador) wants to come in the worst way but has domestic political problems: who will serve as President while he is away and whether he can survive politically if he does not raise the border dispute with Peru at the Summit. He is in the doubtful column.
- Duvalier (Haiti) has not said what he would do, but our Embassy continues to believe he will not go. His presence is not sufficiently important for us to push. Haiti did not send a representative to the Preparatory Committee which is now meeting in Montevideo.
- Barrientos (Bolivia) continues to paint himself deeper and deeper into the negative column. He did not send a representative to Montevideo. He stubbornly maintains that if the Summit does not take up his bilateral problem with Chile on access to the sea, he will not attend. Short of getting you personally involved -- which I do not recommend -- there is nothing more that we can do.
- Rivera (El Salvador), a lame duck President, has conditioned his attendance on major overhaul of the International Coffee Agreement. But he has avoided digging the hole as deep as Barrientos. In any event, President-elect Sanchez will attend.
- The remaining Presidents are expected to attend.

W. W. Rostow



~~SECRET~~

193

Meetings with the President  
March 18-21

Agenda

Necessarily Pre-Guam

1. Positions to be taken with Thieu-Ky (Sec. Rusk)
  - cease-fire position and negotiations generally
  - how to play Thieu-Ky problem at Guam
2. Preliminary talks on Organization of Pacification  
(Secretaries Rusk and McNamara; Mr. Komer: possibly, Messrs. Gaud and Helms) It is understood that final talks await discussion with Ambassadors Lodge, Bunker, Locke, and General Westmoreland
3. Review of Agendas for Meetings (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)
  - Thieu-Ky, Monday afternoon
  - Restricted session post-dinner Monday evening
  - U.S. session Tuesday morning
  - restricted session, post-Tuesday lunch

Anytime that is convenient

4. India-Pak Military Supply Policy  
(Secretaries Rusk and McNamara: Amb. Locke should be present)
5. Prime Minister Wilson and "Communications Break-down"  
(Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)
6. Abbott Washburn Proposals, including bipartisan public committee in support of our Viet-nam policy (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara).
7. Foreign Exchange Agreement with GVN.  
Needs only one minute of support for position which Komer has taken, which is that Ky should live up to his agreement with us.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By Ly, NARA, Date 4-17-91