

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[1 of 5]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 cable	CAP67290 re world bank <i>sanitized 3-26-93 open 11-17-99</i> C 3 pp. <i>NLS 91-394 NLS 99-66</i>	4/15/67	A
#3 cable	CAP67291 re Soviet Union TS 5 pp. <i>exempt 3-16-92 NLS 91-394 OPEN 10-21-98</i>	4/15/67	A
#7 cable	CAP67288 re Germany S 3 pp. <i>open 3-26-93 NLS 91-394</i>	4/15/67	A
#11 cable	Saigon 22833 <i>open 5-13-92 NLS 91-396</i> S 7 pp.	4/14/67	A
#15a memo	Katzenbach to the Pres. re UK " C 2 pp.	4/10/67	A
#16 memo	Rostow to the Pres. <i>open 3-26-93 NLS 91-394</i> S 1 p.	4/10/67	A
#16a memo	Katzenbach to the Pres. re Panama Canal S 3 pp. <i>open 5-13-92 NLS 91-396</i>	4/9/67	A
#16b report	Illustrative Formula " C 4 pp.	undated	A
#17 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Honduras S 1 p. <i>open 3-17-93 NLS 91-394</i>	4/10/67	A
#21a memo	re Latin America " C 1 p.	4/10/67	A
#23a	Duplicate of #21a		
#29 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Latin America C 1 p. <i>open 3-26-93 NLS 91-394</i>	4/9/67	A
#29a cable	Punta del Este 105 C 2 pp. <i>open 5-13-92 NLS 91-396</i>	4/9/67	A
#31 memo	Rostow the Pres. re Libya S 1 p. <i>open 3-26-93 NLS 91-394</i>	4/8/67	A
#31a memo	Schultze to the Pres. re Libya " S 1 p.	4/7/67	A
#31b	Duplicate of #31a "		

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President,
Walt Rostow, Volume 25, April 1-15, 1967, Box 15

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#31c memo	Gaud to the Pres. re Libya S 2 pp. OPEN 10.21.98	4/6/67	A
#31e letter	Gaud to Schultze S 2 pp. OPEN 10.21.98	4/6/67	A
#32 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam C 1 p. open 3-26-93 NLJ 91-394	4/8/67	A
#32a cable	Colombo 1856 open 5-13-92 NLJ 91-396 G 2 pp.	4/7/67	A
#34 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Latin America C 1 p. open 3-26-93 NLJ 91-394	4/8/67	A
#36a memo	re Vice President's Trip to Europe S 3 pp.	4/8/67	A
#38a cable	Brussels 5149 S 2 pp.	4/8/67	A
#40 memo More info released 2-23-09 NLS/RAC 03-76	Rostow to the Pres. re Israel S 4 pp. panitized 6-2-93 NLJ 91-393 S 4 pp. panitized 6-2-93 NLJ 91-393	4/7/67	A
#40a table	US Assistance to Israel open 3-6-92 NLJ 91-320 S 1 p.	7/18/66	A
#41 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re UK TS 1 p. open 3-26-93 NLJ 91-394	4/7/67	A
#41a cable open 2-1-96 NLJ 95-351	London 6894 (dup. #16, NSF, files 7 walt Rostow, "Margaret Schuler" Box 9) TS 3 pp. panitized 3-26-93 NLJ 91-394 downgraded per NLJ 91-394	2/25/56	A
#41b report	re UK exempt & integrated 3-16-92 NLJ 91-394 TS 1 p. OPEN 3.27.98 STATE GUIDELINES	undated	A
#41c memo	Rostow to the Pres. re UK TS 1 p. exempt & integrated 3-16-92 NLJ 91-394 OPEN 3.27.98 STATE GUIDELINES	2/7/67	A
#41d cable	London 6360 TS 2 pp. panitized & downgraded 5-13-92 NLJ 91-396 OPEN 3.27.98 UK GUIDELINES & 3.27.98 NLJ 91-396	2/7/67	A
#47b memo	Rusk to the Pres. re Latin America C 2 pp. open 5-13-92 NLJ 91-396	4/6/67	A
#48 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Turkey C 1 p. open 3-26-93 NLJ 91-394	4/7/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#49a memo	William Jorden to Rostow <i>open 3-26-93 NLS 91-394</i> C 3 pp.	4/7/67	A
#97 cable	CAP67245 re VP's trip to Europe " C 1 p.	4/6/67	A
#99a cable	message from VP to the Pres. " S 3 pp.	4/7/67	A
#102 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re India & Pakistan " S 1 p. [duplicate of #109 India Country File, Volume 9, exempted 1978]	4/6/67	A
#102a cable	Sec. State to Am. Embassy, New Delhi S 3 pp. <i>sanitized 5-13-92 NLS 91-396</i> <i>Open 2-23-00 NLS 99-67</i>	3/14/67	A
#102b cable	Deptel 168709 to Rawalpindi S 6 pp. <i>sanitized 5-13-92 NLS 91-396</i> [duplicate of #46 India Country File, Volume 9, exempted 1978] <i>Open 2-23-00 NLS 99-67</i>	4/5/67	A
#102c cable	Deptel 166136 to New Delhi S 4 pp. <i>sanitized 5-13-92 NLS 91-396</i> [duplicate of #66 India Country File, Volume 9, exempted 1978] <i>Open 2-23-00 NLS 99-67</i>	3/31/67	A
#106a cable	Bonn 11753, Vipto 62 <i>open 3-26-93 NLS 91-394</i> S 3 pp.	4/6/67	A
#109 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam " S 1 p.	4/6/67	A
#109a cable	Saigon 22177 <i>open 5-13-92 NLS 91-396</i> S 12 pp.	4/5/67	A
#110 memo	Rostow to the Pres. <i>open 3-26-93 NLS 91-394</i> TS 1 p.	4/6/67	A
#111a memo	William Jorden to Rostow " TS 3 pp.	4/6/67	A
#113 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Afghanistan " C 1 p.	4/6/67	A
#115a cable	Bonn 11806 <i>open 8-7-92 NLS 91-396</i> S 3 pp.	4/6/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#120 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Iraq S 1 p. <i>open 3-26-93 NLJ 91-394</i>	4/5/67	A
#121 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Nicaragua <i>open 3-26-93 NLJ 91-394</i> C 1 p. <i>[dup in diary backup 4/6/67]</i>	4/5/67	A
#121a report	Talking Points <i>open 5-13-92 NLJ 91-396</i> C 2 pp.	4/6/67	A
#121b report	re Pres. elect of Nicaragua C 2 pp. <i>exempt 575-92 NLJ 91-392</i> <i>[dup in diary backup 4/6/67]</i> OPEN 102198	undated	A
#123a cable	Saigon 22051 C 1 p. <i>exempt 573-92 NLJ 91-396</i> <i>Open 2-23-00 NLJ 99-67</i>	4/4/67	A
#126a letter	Lodge to the Pres. <i>Open 2-5-01</i> S 3 pp. <i>sanitized 6-2-93 NLJ 91-393</i>	undated	A
#127 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam <i>Sanitized 7/19/00 NLJ 99-104</i> S 1 p. <i>sanitized 6-2-93 NLJ 91-393</i>	4/5/67	A
#129a memo	William Jorden to Rostow <i>open 3-26-93 NLJ 91-394</i> C 1 p.	4/5/67	A
#129b memo	Komer to the Pres. re Vietnam " S 1 p.	4/4/67	A
#132 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Germany " S 1 p. <i>#45 in Bator, 4/1/67-4/15/67</i>	4/4/67	A
#132a letter	from Kiesinger to the Pres. PCI 5 pp. <i>exempt 376-92 NLJ 91-394</i> <i>open 11-17-99 NLJ 99-66</i> <i>Box 5 is a duplicate</i>	undated	A
#133 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Turkey S 1 p. <i>open 3-26-93 NLJ 91-394</i>	4/4/67	A
#134 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Turkey " S 1 p.	4/4/67	A
#140a cable	London 8004 <i>sanitized 3-26-93 NLJ 91-394</i> S 4 pp. OPEN NLJ 98-184 4-28-99 [duplicate of #103a UK Country File, Vol. 11, exempted 1978]	4/4/67	A
#143 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Eastern Europe S 1 p. <i>open 6-2-93 NLJ 91-393</i>	4/3/67	A

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#143a report	re Soviet Union S 3 pp. sanitized 5-15-92 NLS 91-392 sanitized 8-27-99 NLS 98-185	4/3/67	A
#145 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Pakistan C 1 p. open 3-26-93 NLS 91-394	4/3/67	A
#145a memo	Schultze to the Pres. " C 2 pp.	4/3/67	A
#145b memo	Freeman and Hall to the Pres. C 3 pp. open 3-4-92 NLS 91-395	3/30/67	A
#148 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam C 1 p. sanitized 6-2-93 NLS 91-393 Sanitized 7-17-00 NLS 99-68	4/3/67	A
#148a report	re Vietnam sanitized 5-15-92 NLS 91-392 Sanitized 8-27-99 NLS 98-185 C 3 pp.	4/3/67	A
#153 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Sihanouk open 2-24-93 NLS 91-394 S 1 p. Exempt 3-16-92 NLS 91-391	4/3/67	A
#153a cable	Vientiane 6071 S 2 pp. sanitized 5-13-92 NLS 91-396 sanitized 2-23-00 NLS 99-67	4/3/67	A
#155a cable	Moscow 4196 C 1 p. open 5-13-92 NLS 91-396	4/1/67	A

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 15, 1967

Dear Dean:

Just about a year ago we decided to pick up President Illia's idea for a hemispheric summit conference and we stepped off into the dark in Mexico City.

Now that it is behind us, I want you to know how greatly I appreciate the sustained, careful, and imaginative work of you and all your colleagues in bringing about what I regard was a highly successful summit conference.

I know how hard you, Linc Gordon, Sol Linowitz, Dave Bronheim, and many others worked to make it possible for us to have this success. I am grateful also for the quick and flexible support of you and your colleagues in the Department of State for our fast moving operations during the days of the summit conference itself.

I count on the same team to follow through on every aspect of the commitments entered into at Punta del Este; because we all know that this was a conference which will be judged by history, by the follow through.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Richard M. Nixon", written in a cursive style with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

The Honorable
Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-66
By is, NARA Date 11-2-99

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT
WHCA

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OO WTE10.
DE WTE 677

1967 APR 15 18 29

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67290

4/15/67 - 3:40pm
John J. [unclear] telephoned
& said Pres
approved
SATURDAY
APR 15 PM 1:39

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APRIL 15, 1967

WEEKEND ACTION WOULD AVOID A MONDAY RUSH ON THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTION FOR THE WORLD BANK'S CEYLON MEETING TUESDAY IN TOKYO (MONDAY AFTERNOON WASHINGTON TIME.)

WE ARE NOT ASKING YOU NOW TO APPROVE A SPECIFIC PROGRAM. CONGRESS HAS NOT APPROPRIATED OUR FY 1968 AID MONEY, SO WE WILL NOT BE PLEDGING. BUT OUR POSITION WILL BE HALF A PROMISE, AND BILL GAUD WOULD LIKE YOUR BLESSING ON HIS GENERAL PLAN.

HE RECOMMENDS CONTINUING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AT LAST YEAR'S LEVEL--\$15 MILLION IN PL 480 AND AID LOANS. WE WOULD SAY WE PLAN ABOUT \$10 MILLION OF WHEAT FLOUR PROVIDED WE HAVE IT AND CEYLON NEEDS IT AND MEETS ALL REQUIREMENTS. THE BALANCE WOULD BE A SMALL NON-PROJECT LOAN.

THIS WOULD BE A 30 PERCENT U.S. SHARE IN A GROUP EFFORT. A LETTER TO YOU FROM CEYLON'S PRIME MINISTER HAS JUST COME IN URGING THAT THE TARGET REMAIN AT THE \$100 MILLION THE WORLD BANK PROPOSED TWO YEARS AGO, BUT THE DONORS HAVE NEVER MUSTERED MORE THAN \$50 MILLION. AID AND THE BANK ARE COOPERATING AT TOKYO TO ACCELERATE THE FLOW FROM EUROPEAN PIPELINES BECAUSE ADMINISTRATIVE DELAYS HAVE FURTHER CUT EFFECTIVE AID. OUR BEST EFFORT WILL NOT BE ALL THAT CEYLON COULD USE.

OUR MAIN REASON FOR AT LEAST MEETING LAST YEAR'S LEVEL IS TO HELP CEYLON'S GOVERNMENT STAY IN OFFICE. TWO YEARS AGO IT UPSET A LEFTIST GOVERNMENT IN OPEN ELECTIONS. TO STAY IN POWER, IT MUST SHOW CLEAR ECONOMIC RESULTS.

FOR A SMALL COUNTRY, CEYLON HAS DISPROPORTIONATE POTENTIAL INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. AS A RECOGNIZED SPOKESMAN FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN BUDDHISTS, A MODERATE CEYLON CAN HELP AS IT DID LAST FALL IN DAMPING DOWN SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM'S EXTREMIST BUDDHISTS. IN THE LAST FEW DAYS, THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SURFACED A PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATED PEACE IN VIETNAM THAT IS RESPONSIBLE AND WOULD ENGAGE THE GVN DIRECTLY AS A MAJOR RECOGNIZED PARTNER. A FAILURE OF THIS GOVERNMENT WILL BRING BACK AN ANTI-WEST, BUDDHIST ACTIVIST, LEFTIST REGIME.

GOVERNOR HARRINAN FEELS STRONGLY ABOUT THIS. WHEN HE WAS THERE LAST OCTOBER, HE FOUND THE CEYLONESE LEADERS "EXTREMELY UNDERSTANDING OF VIETNAM." HE FEELS THIS SMALL AMOUNT OF MONEY WOULD BE WELL SPENT. INDEED, HE WISHES WE COULD DO BETTER (HIS LETTER TO BILL GAUD PUTS A STRONG POLITICAL CASE).

THIS NEW GOVERNMENT HAS NOT PUT ITS ECONOMIC HOUSE IN ORDER AS QUICKLY AS WE HAD HOPED. HOWEVER, IT COMPENSATED U.S. OWNERS OF OIL PROPERTIES EXPROPRIATED BY ITS PREDECESSOR, AND IT TOOK A NUMBER OF COURAGEOUS STEPS, SUCH AS SWALLOWING SOME IMF MEDICINE AND ELIMINATING A POLITICALLY POPULAR RICE SUBSIDY THAT HAD ALL BUT BANKRUPTED THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF JUDGE ITS PERFORMANCE CREDITABLE, THOUGH ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE NOT IMPROVING RAPIDLY BECAUSE FOREIGN EXCHANGE IS TOO TIGHT. THIS YEAR'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE POSITION HAS BEEN WORSENERED BY A SLIDE IN WORLD TEA PRICES. AID, IMF AND THE BANK ARE WORKING TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE.

CHARLES SCHULTZE IS READY TO GO AHEAD, BUT ON STRICTLY POLITICAL GROUNDS SINCE HE HAS NOT HAD A CHANCE TO REVIEW THE ECONOMIC FACTORS INVOLVED. AGRICULTURE IS ABOARD. YOU WILL HAVE ANOTHER SHOT AT THESE WHEN SPECIFIC PROGRAMS ARE READY FOR NEGOTIATION LATER IN THE YEAR. THIS MAY REQUIRE A FINDLEY WAIVER, BECAUSE CEYLON HAS SOLD SOME \$300,000 IN COCONUT OIL TO CUBA. BUT THIS IS NEGLIGIBLE AND WE WILL HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL THE AGREEMENT IS READY BEFORE WE KNOW WHETHER THE WAIVER IS EVEN NEEDED.

[2]

THE INSTRUCTION READS AS FOLLOWS:

"WE PROPOSE TO INDICATE AT THE MEETING OUR RECOGNITION AND APPRECIATION OF CEYLON'S NEEDS AND OF THE SELF-HELP MEASURES THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT HAS UNDERTAKEN. WE WOULD INDICATE INTENTION TO CONTINUE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THESE EFFORTS. THE GOVERNMENT OF CEYLON UNDERSTANDS, FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST TWO YEARS, THAT WE WILL NOT MAKE A FORMAL PLEDGE OF NEXT YEAR'S DOLLAR AID AT THE MEETING. HOWEVER, WE WOULD PREPARE TO ANNOUNCE THAT FOR THE COMING YEAR WE CONTEMPLATE CONTINUED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AT AN OVERALL LEVEL EQUIVALENT TO THAT WHICH WE PLANNED FOR THE PAST YEAR. THE PROGRAM IS PLANNED TO INCLUDE DEVELOPMENT LENDING FOR PROGRAM IMPORTS, SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, AS WELL AS AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES UNDER FOOD FOR FREEDOM. AS A COMPONENT OF THIS PROGRAM, WE PROPOSE TO ANNOUNCE 100,000 TONS OF WHEAT FLOUR, VALUED AT ABOUT \$10 MILLION, SUBJECT TO U.S. GRAIN AVAILABILITIES, CEYLON'S NEEDS AND USUAL MARKETING REQUIREMENTS.

"WE ALSO INTEND TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVED ADMINISTRATIVE COORDINATION TO SPEED UP THE FLOW OF AID ALREADY PROGRAMMED AS WELL AS FUTURE AID. AND THEREBY INCREASE ITS OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS.

"AT THE MEETING WE WOULD ALSO URGE ON OTHERS CONTINUED AND EXPANDED SUPPORT TO CEYLON'S PROGRAM AND WOULD PARTICULARLY SUGGEST THAT ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF ASSISTANCE BE PURSUED, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY THE WORLD BANK, IDA, THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, AS WELL AS FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT."

I HAVE REVIEWED THE DOCUMENTATION WHICH HAS BEEN CLEARED WITH AID, AGRICULTURE, EX-IM, TREASURY AND BOB. I RECOMMEND YOU APPROVE AID'S REQUEST.

INSTRUCTION APPROVED-----
DISAPPROVED-----
SEE ME-----

DTG 151656Z APRIL 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[3]

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENT
WHCA

EYES ONLY

1967 APR 15 19 58

EEA924
OO WTE10
DE WTE 680

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67291

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW.

APRIL 15, 1967

HEREWITH SEC. MCNAMARA'S ACCOUNT OF HIS TALK WITH DOBRYNIN. IT IS AN IMPORTANT DOCUMENT AND SHOULD HELP THOSE IN MOSCOW WHO ARE SERIOUS ABOUT STOPPING THE ARMS RACE.

YOU WILL ALSO NOTE DOBRYNIN BELIEVES SERIOUS VIET NAM NEGOTIATIONS MUST BEGIN SECRETLY AND WITHOUT THIRD PARTIES.

EARLY IN APRIL, MR. MCGEORGE BUNDY CALLED ME TO SAY THAT DURING A CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, DOBRYNIN HAD SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF HE AND I HAD A CONVERSATION. I MENTIONED MAC'S SUGGESTION TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO DEAN, BOTH OF WHOM URGED ME TO ARRANGE TO SEE DOBRYNIN.

ON APRIL 5, I CALLED DOBRYNIN AND REPORTED TO HIM MAC'S CONVERSATION WITH ME. DOBRYNIN HEDGED A BIT AS TO WHETHER HE OR MAC HAD SUGGESTED WE MEET. IN ANY CASE, HE ACCEPTED MY INVITATION FOR LUNCH ON APRIL 11. I GAVE HIM THE CHOICE OF LUNCHING AT THE PENTAGON OR AT MY HOME. HE CHOSE THE LATTER. WE MET THERE FOR APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS TODAY. AMONG THE SUBJECTS WE DISCUSSED WERE THE FOLLOWING:

1. NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. DOBRYNIN ASKED MY VIEW OF THE PROSPECTS FOR THE TREATY. I STATED I WAS UNCERTAIN OF THE ATTITUDES OF INDIA AND CERTAIN OF THE NON-EUROPEAN POWERS, BUT BELIEVED THAT AFTER POSSIBLE CLARIFICATION OF A FEW POINTS, WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS, EXCLUDING FRANCE, WOULD SUPPORT THE TREATY. HE ASKED WHETHER I BELIEVED THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WAS REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION MAKING A "DEAL" WHICH WOULD ADVANCE THEIR INTERESTS AT THE EXPENSE OF GERMANY. I REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH WE HAD NO INTENTION OF DOING SO, MANY GERMANS FEARED WE WOULD -- THIS WAS A FACTOR WHICH BOTH WE AND THE SOVIETS MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROPOSED TREATY.

2. THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP. DOBRYNIN REFERRED TO A SENTENCE IN THE COMMUNIQUE WHICH STATED THAT SCHROEDER "LED A DISCUSSION ON THE ROLE OF HOST COUNTRIES

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By CB, NARA, Date 10-21-98

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

IN ALLIED ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PLANNING AND USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS." HE ASKED WHETHER WE PLANNED TO DILUTE THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I REPLIED WE HAD NO INTENTION OF DOING SO; UNDER THE LAW WE HAD NO AUTHORITY TO DO SO; WE HAD NO PLAN FOR ASKING FOR A CHANGE IN THE LAW; AND IF WE WERE TO ASK FOR A CHANGE IN THE LAW FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE CONGRESS WOULD PROBABLY NOT ACCEDE TO OUR REQUEST. I ADDED THAT NO MEMBER OF NATO HAD ASKED THAT WE GIVE UP PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY OVER THE USE OR RELEASE OF THE WEAPONS. THE GERMAN INTEREST IN THE ROLE OF HOST COUNTRIES WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THEIR DESIRE FOR DISCUSSION OF A POSSIBLE VETO HOST COUNTRIES OF THE USE OF SUCH WEAPONS. I STATED THAT HERETOFORE SUCH SUBJECTS HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED AMONG THE NATIONS OF NATO --THIS WAS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY THE NON-NUCLEAR POWERS HAD FELT REMOVED FROM THE PLANNING FOR WEAPONS WHICH WERE SO FUNDAMENTAL TO THEIR SECURITY. IT WAS TO MEET THIS PROBLEM THAT THE NUCLEAR PLANNING COMMITTEE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED.

WHILE DISCUSSING THE PRESIDENT'S COMMAND OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, I EMPHASIZED THE STEPS WE HAD TAKEN TO PREVENT ACCIDENTAL OR UNAUTHORIZED USE OF SUCH WEAPONS (THE EMPHASIS ON SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AND THE INTRODUCTION OF SUCH DEVICES AS "PAL") AND I INDICATED OUR UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION HAD GIVEN EQUAL ATTENTION TO THESE MATTERS. ALTHOUGH HE PROFESSED THAT THEY HAD, IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE HIMSELF HAD VERY LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY HAD PROTECTED AGAINST ACCIDENTAL DETONATION OR UNAUTHORIZED USE. I EMPHASIZED THAT AS THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INCREASED IT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT FOR THE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES TO MONITOR THE STEPS THAT THE SCIENTISTS AND MILITARY COMMANDERS HAVE TAKEN TO ASSURE THAT THE WEAPONS WOULD BE USED ONLY WHEN AUTHORIZED BY APPROPRIATE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES.

3. U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS TALKS. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THIS WAS THE PRIMARY SUBJECT IN WHICH DOBRYNIN WAS INTERESTED. HE ASKED HOW WE EXPECTED TO APPROACH THE TALKS. I REPLIED THAT AMBASSADOR THOMPSON HAD OUTLINED A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO GROMYKO ON MARCH 23 AND WE WERE SURPRISED THAT TO DATE WE HAD RECEIVED NO REPLY TO OUR SUGGESTIONS. HE SEEMED SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSED TO HAVE TO JUSTIFY THE DELAY AND HE INDICATED THAT IT REFLECTED SOME DIFFERENCE OF VIEW IN HIS GOVERNMENT AS TO HOW TO PROCEED. HE STATED HE WOULD INDICATE TO HIS COLLEAGUES IN MOSCOW THE IMPORTANCE WE PLACED ON SUCH TALKS AND HIS OWN VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE WISE TO PROCEED WITH THEM.

HE ASKED ON WHAT PHILOSOPHY WE WOULD APPROACH DISCUSSIONS OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS. I REPLIED AS FOLLOWS:

(A) WE BELIEVE WE MUST BE CAPABLE OF DETERRING NUCLEAR OR LARGE-SCALE CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS BY MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT ON ANY NATION OF NATO.

(B) WE CAN BE ASSURED OF HAVING SUCH A DETERRENT POWER ONLY IF WE HAVE A FORCE SO STRONG AS TO BE ABLE TO ABSORB A SURPRISE ATTACK AND SURVIVE WITH SUFFICIENT POWER TO INFLICT UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE ON THE NATIONS OF THE PACT.

(C) WE BELIEVE WE HAVE THAT FORCE TODAY; WE MUST PROVIDE IT IN THE FUTURE; AND THE QUANTITY OF FORCE REQUIRED FOR THE FUTURE WILL DEPEND TO CONSIDERABLE EXTENT UPON THE ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION, I.E., WE WILL REACT TO CHANGES IN THEIR OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE FORCE STRUCTURE.

(D) WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS' REQUIREMENT FOR A DETERRENT IS THE SAME AS OURS. WE BELIEVE THEY HAVE THAT DETERRENT TODAY. WE BELIEVE WE CANNOT PREVENT THEM FROM MAINTAINING IT IN THE FUTURE IF THEY ACT INTELLIGENTLY AND IF THEY ARE WILLING TO USE THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THEM FOR THAT PURPOSE.

(E) BASED ON THIS PHILOSOPHY, WE CONCLUDE THAT IF THEY DEPLOY AN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM, WE MUST REACT TO IT BY ADDING TO OUR OFFENSIVE POWER. WE HAVE ALREADY STARTED TO DO SO. SIMILARLY, IF WE WERE TO DEPLOY AN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM TO PROTECT OUR POPULATION AGAINST A HEAVY SOVIET ATTACK, THEY WOULD REACT BY INCREASING THEIR OFFENSIVE POWER. BECAUSE EACH OF US WOULD BE FACED WITH UNCERTAINTIES, AND WE MORE THAN THEY, IT IS PROBABLE THAT AFTER THE INSTALLATION OF THE DEFENSIVE SYSTEM, WE WOULD NOT ONLY BE WORSE OFF FINANCIALLY BUT THAT OUR SECURITY WOULD BE LESS AS WELL.

(F) FOR THESE REASONS, WE BELIEVE IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A SERIES OF ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EACH SIDE, WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE MILITARY RISKS AND REDUCE THE FINANCIAL COSTS WITHOUT REDUCING THE DETERRENT CAPABILITY OF EITHER PARTY AND WITHOUT CHANGING THE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO.

I GAVE DOBRYNIN A COPY OF GEORGE WILSON'S ARTICLE FROM THE WASHINGTON POST OF APRIL 9 AND TOLD HIM THE ARTICLE WAS BASED ON A "BACKGROUND" CONVERSATION WITH ME ON SATURDAY, APRIL 8. DOBRYNIN PROBED FOR SPECIFIC ACTIONS WE WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE IN RETURN FOR ACTIONS BY THE SOVIET UNION, BUT I REFUSED TO GIVE ANY INDICATION OF ANY PARTICULAR POINTS WE WOULD BE WILLING TO AGREE ON, STATING THAT I BELIEVED EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF THE PHILOSOPHY I HAD OUTLINED ABOVE WOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE WE COULD COME TO ANY POSSIBLE AGREEMENT, FORMAL OR INFORMAL, ON SPECIFIC POINTS.

4. RESUMPTION OF BOMBING FOLLOWING TET AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH VIETNAM. DOBRYNIN ASKED WHY WE DID NOT ALLOW MORE TIME TO ELAPSE BEFORE WE RESUMED BOMBING FOLLOWING KOSYGIN'S TRANSMISSION OF OUR "TET PROPOSALS" TO HANOI. HE STATED WE HAD NOT REALLY ALLOWED SUFFICIENT TIME TO EVEN PERMIT MECHANICAL TRANSMISSION OF OUR PROPOSAL AND OF HANOI'S RESPONSE. I REPLIED THAT THERE APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN MORE THAN ADEQUATE TIME FOR BOTH PHYSICAL COMMUNICATION AND FOR PREPARATION BY HANOI OF A THOUGHTFUL REPLY. WE WERE UNDER SOME PRESSURE TO RESUME THE BOMBING BECAUSE OUR AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE HAD DEMONSTRATED DRAMATICALLY THE EXTENT TO WHICH NORTH VIETNAM WAS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE "PAUSE", AND BECAUSE BOTH DURING THE KOSYGIN-WILSON TALKS AND ON MANY PRIOR OCCASIONS, NORTH VIETNAM HAD GIVEN NO INDICATION WHATSOEVER OF A WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN RESPONSE TO A REDUCTION IN OURS. DOBRYNIN STATED HE BELIEVED HANOI WAS VERY DISTRUSTFUL OF THE U.S. AND HE INDICATED THE SOVIETS ALSO HAD SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR MOTIVES. HE POINTED OUT THAT KOSYGIN BELIEVED OUR BOMBING OF HANOI DURING HIS VISIT IN 1965 HAD BEEN INTENTIONAL. AND THE SOVIETS FOUND IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCEPT OUR STATEMENT THAT THE BOMBING IN AND AROUND HANOI EARLY IN DECEMBER AND ON DECEMBER 13 AND 14, AFTER HANOI HAD AGREED TO SECRET TALKS, HAD NOT BEEN TIMED TO APPLY FURTHER MILITARY PRESSURE AT THE START OF THOSE TALKS; THE SOVIETS BELIEVE WE WERE DETERMINED TO EMPHASIZE TO BOTH HANOI AND MOSCOW THAT WE HAD MILITARY POWER AND WE INTENDED TO USE IT TO ACHIEVE A "MILITARY SOLUTION." HE SAID KOSYGIN INTERPRETED OUR UNWILLINGNESS TO EXTEND THE TET PAUSE, TO ALLOW MORE THOUGHTFUL CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSALS HE FORWARDED TO HANOI, AS A FURTHER INDICATION OF OUR INSISTENCE ON A "MILITARY SOLUTION." DOBRYNIN ADDED THAT OUR BEHAVIOR DURING DECEMBER AND AGAIN DURING KOSYGIN'S LONDON VISIT HAD PLACED THE CHINESE IN A POSITION TO EMPHASIZE TO HANOI THAT THEY HAD BEEN RIGHT (AND THE SOVIETS WRONG) IN BELIEVING THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT INTERESTED IN TRUE NEGOTIATIONS. I REFUTED EACH OF THE POINTS DOBRYNIN RAISED, STRESSING THE FAILURE OF HANOI TO RESPOND TO OUR 37-DAY PAUSE LAST YEAR, AFTER WE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE BY THE SOVIET UNION THAT A PAUSE OF HALF THAT LENGTH WOULD PROBABLY LEAD TO NEGOTIATIONS; AND I EMPHASIZED THE NUMBER OF OCCASIONS ON WHICH WE HAD SOUGHT TO INITIATE SECRET TALKS WITH HANOI, ONLY TO BE REBUFFED TIME AND AGAIN (HE KNEW OF OUR RECENT DELIVERY OF A LETTER TO THE DRV EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AND OF ITS RETURN WITHIN FIVE HOURS). IN PASSING, HE AGREED THAT PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WAS UNLIKELY TO COME THROUGH "OPEN" NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS THESE HAD BEEN PRECEDED BY SECRET TALKS. HE ALSO STATED THE SOVIETS DID NOT BELIEVE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED THROUGH THIRD PARTIES, SUCH AS THE POLES.

5. EVENTS IN CHINA. DOBRYNIN ASKED HOW WE INTERPRETED WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN CHINA. I REPLIED THE SOVIETS UNDOUBTEDLY HAD MORE INFORMATION THAN WE ON WHICH TO INTERPRET THE CHINA SCENE. HE STATED THE SOVIETS BELIEVED CHINA WASTED TO MAINTAIN THE CURRENT LEVEL OF TENSION AND WANTED TO SEE THE CONTINUED INVOLVEMENT OF THE U.S. IN COMBAT OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. IN CONTRAST, THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE CONTROVERSY SETTLED BECAUSE IT CONFLICTED WITH THEIR "WORLDWIDE RELATIONS" WITH THE U.S. I EMPHASIZED TO HIM THE GREAT DANGER TO US AND TO THE SOVIET UNION OF ALLOWING THE CONFLICT TO PROCEED, POINTING OUT THAT HANOI WAS APPARENTLY ILL-INFORMED IN TWO IMPORTANT RESPECTS: CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND OTHER DATA INDICATED TO US THAT THEY WERE BEING MISLED BY THEIR COMMANDERS IN THE SOUTH; INTELLIGENCE SOURCES ALSO INDICATED TO US THAT HANOI MISUNDERSTOOD THE MOOD OF THE PEOPLE OF THE U.S., FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE SUPPORT AMONG THE PEOPLE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM, AND FAILED TO UNDERSTAND THE STRENGTH OF THE SENTIMENT IN THIS COUNTRY FOR THE APPLICATION OF ADDITIONAL MILITARY PRESSURE AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM.

ON THE WAY OUT DOBRYNIN SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR TO ME THAT THEIR DEFENSE MINISTER AND THEIR MILITARY LEADERS ARE NOT MEMBERS OF THE GROUP WHICH MAKES THE POLITICAL DECISIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THEY HAVE LITTLE INFLUENCE ON DECISIONS AFFECTING SUCH MATTERS AS THE LEVELS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE WOULD REPORT OUR CONVERSATION IN MOSCOW UPON HIS ARRIVAL THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW AND HE HOPED HE COULD SEE ME UPON HIS RETURN TO THE U.S. APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS FROM NOW.

ROBERT S. MCNAMARA

DTG 151709Z APRIL 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

GPS 2030 IMI 2030

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1967 APR 15 20 59

Pres file

EEA926
PP WTE10
DE WTE 684

FROM: W. W. ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67293

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SATURDAY, APRIL 15, 1967

MR. PRESIDENT:

SENATOR GORE PLANS TO RELEASE TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE ABM PROBLEM, GIVEN BY THE AEC LABORATORY DIRECTORS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. IF THIS IS DONE, SENATOR PASTORE PLANS TO RELEASE ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY CONCERNING FOREIGN NUCLEAR TESTS, GIVEN BY THE AEC LABORATORY DIRECTORS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY.

CERTAIN PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY COULD BE EMBARRASSING TO THE ADMINISTRATION FOR INTERNATIONAL AS WELL AS DOMESTIC REASONS. THE TROUBLE-SOME REFERENCES HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED ALONG WITH ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF THE TEXT IN RATHER DRASTIC EDITING BY THE DOD WHICH MAY BE HARD TO JUSTIFY AND COULD LEAD TO CHARGES THAT THE ADMINISTRATIONS IS WITHHOLDING INFORMATION.

I WILL INFORM YOU IF THIS APPEARS TO BE DEVELOPING INTO A REAL ISSUE WITH CONGRESS.

WALT ROSTOW

DTG: 15/2026Z APRIL 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 89-150
By ylg, NARA, Date 5-2-91

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

EEA925
OO WTE 10
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SENT
WHCA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

157 APR 15 21 02

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP 67292

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APRIL 15, 1967

SUBJECT: ASIAN CONFERENCES

FOLLOWING IS A RUNDOWN ON THE CONFERENCES NEXT WEEK:
SEATO COUNCIL--

SEVEN NATION (FRENCH NOT ATTENDING; PAKISTAN OBSERVER ONLY) PLUS VIET-NAM (OBSERVER)

HEADS OF DELEGATIONS - FOREIGN MINISTERS (EXCEPT PAKISTAN)

COUNTRIES REPRESENTED -- AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, PAKISTAN (OBSERVER), PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM, U.S.

APRIL 18 - 10:30 A.M. FORMAL OPENING (PUBLIC SESSION)
1:00 P.M. RUSK LUNCHEON
3:00 - 5:00 P.M. CLOSED SESSION
5:30 PRESIDENT RECEIVES LEADING MEMBERS OF COUNCIL DELEGATIONS (ABOUT 25 PEOPLE)
6:30 RUSK RECEPTION (ABOUT 425 PEOPLE)

APRIL 19 - 10:30 A.M. CLOSED SESSION
3:00 P.M. CLOSED SESSION

APRIL 20 - 10:00 A.M. FINAL CLOSED SESSION
12:00 NOON OPEN SESSION; COMMUNIQUE ISSUED

SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE ON VIET-NAM --

SEVEN NATIONS (AUSTRALIA, SOUTH KOREA, NEW ZEALAND, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, U.S., AND VIET-NAM)

HEADS OF DELEGATION - FOREIGN MINISTERS

APRIL 20 - 3:00 - 5:30 P.M. CLOSED SESSION
7:30 P.M. WORKING DINNER GIVEN BY RUSK

APRIL 21 - 9:30 - 11:30 A.M. CLOSED SESSION
11:30 - 12:30 OPEN SESSION; COMMUNIQUE
1:00 P.M. VIETNAMESE EMBASSY LUNCH

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *ng*, NARA, Date 4-23-91

ANZUS COUNCIL

PARTICIPANTS - AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, U.S.

HEADS OF DELEGATIONS - FOREIGN MINISTERS

APRIL 21 - 3:00 - 5:00 P.M. CLOSED SESSION
8:00 P.M. WORKING DINNER HOSTED BY RUSK

APRIL 22 - 10:00 A.M. FINAL SESSION (IF NEEDED)

I SUGGEST THAT YOUR RECEPTION OF THE SEATO CHIEF DELEGATES BE AN INFORMAL AFFAIR IN THE MANSION. THE MAIN POINT HERE WOULD BE TO MAKE A FEW REMARKS ABOUT SEATO TO THE GROUP AND SPEND A LITTLE TIME WITH EACH FOREIGN MINISTER. IS THAT AGREEABLE?

YES-----

NO-----

SEE ME -----

WE HAVE TWO REQUEST FOR SHORT PERSONAL MEETINGS WITH YOU :

1) NEW ZEALAND PRIME MINISTER HOLYOAKE WOULD LIKE TO PAY A COURTESY CALL. HE IS THE ONLY PRIME MINISTER IN THE GROUP (HE IS CONCURRENTLY FOREIGN MINISTER). YOU MAY WISH TO SEE HIM AFTER HIS WARM RECEPTION FOR YOU AND MRS. JOHNSON LAST FALL.

YES -----

NO-----

SEE ME -----

2) UK FOREIGN SECRETARY GEORGE BROWN. THIS REQUEST IS ENDORSED BY STATE AND STRONGLY URGED BY PAT DEAN. IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING TO DO IF YOU CAN SPARE 30 MINUTES OR SO.

YES-----

NO-----

SEE ME-----

DTG:152000Z APR 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GP:580 IMI 580

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6
Pres file
Saturday, April 15, 1967

Mr. President:

Senator Gore plans to release testimony concerning the ABM problem, given by the AEC laboratory directors in Executive Session before the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations. If this is done, Senator Pastore plans to release additional testimony concerning foreign nuclear tests, given by the AEC laboratory directors in Executive Session before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Certain portions of the testimony could be embarrassing to the Administration for international as well as domestic reasons. The troublesome references have been eliminated along with about one-third of the text in rather drastic editing by the DOD which may be hard to justify and could lead to charges that the Administration is withholding information.

I will inform you if this appears to be developing into a real issue with Congress.

W. W. Rostow

SMKeeny:jb:4-14-67

bcc: WWR (2)

CEJ

SMK file&chron

SMK comeback copy

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 89-150

By ylwsp, NARA, Date 5-2-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

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1967 APR 15 17 11

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP67288

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-394

By *inf*, NARA, Date 3-12-93

67 APR 15 PM 25

SATURDAY

~~SECRET~~ STATE 175483

EXDIS

FROM BATOR VIA WALT ROSTOW TO THE PRESIDENT

THE FOLLOWING IS A GOOD PROPOSED LETTER FROM YOU TO CHANCELLOR KIESINGER ON THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. THE CONDITIONAL OFFER TO APPLY INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY SAFEGUARDS TO PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN THE U. S. WILL GREATLY HELP KIESINGER PULL HIS CABINET IN LINE IN SUPPORT OF THE TREATY. (AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE TOUCHED ALL BASES ON THIS OFFER -- THE JCAE, THE INDUSTRY, ETC. SEABORG IS IN LINE.)

BEGIN TEXT. DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR: I WAS GRATEFUL FOR YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 4, WITH ITS CANDID DISCUSSION OF IMPORTANT PROBLEMS WITH WHICH WE MUST DEAL. I ALSO THANK YOU DEEPLY FOR THE PERSONAL MESSAGE WHICH YOU SENT ME THROUGH VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY, AND FOR THE WARMTH AND FRANKNESS WITH WHICH YOU RECEIVED HIM. HE REPORTED TO ME FULLY ON THE THOROUGH DISCUSSIONS YOU HAD TOGETHER. HE WAS GREATLY IMPRESSED WITH THE GENUINE FRIENDLINESS HE ENCOUNTERED AMONG THE GOVERNMENT LEADERS AND PEOPLE EVERYWHERE HE WENT IN GERMANY. HE RETURNS FULL OF ENTHUSIASM AND HIGH HOPES FOR THE FUTURE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES.

I SHARE HIS ENTHUSIASM AND HIGH HOPES. I BELIEVE THAT, WITH THE FIRST EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE TWO OF US, AND WITH THE FRANK AND OPEN DISCUSSIONS THAT YOU AND YOUR VICE CHANCELLOR HAVE NOW HAD WITH VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY, WE ARE LAUNCHED UPON THE CONTINUOUS AND COMPREHENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WE BOTH AGREE IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND THE UNITED STATES.

AS YOU POINTED OUT TO VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY, THE PROPOSED NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IS A MAJOR PROBLEM ON WHICH IT IS STILL NECESSARY TO FIND A COMMON UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. I ASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES SHARES WITH YOU THE OBJECTIVE OF SAFEGUARDING PEACE THROUGH REDUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS, AND OF DOING SO IN A WAY THAT PRESERVES THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE.

PRESERVATION COPY

IN THIS CONTEXT, AS YOU KNOW, OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN CARRYING ON INTENSIVE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE PROPOSED NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY FOR MANY WEEKS. DURING THESE CONSULTATIONS, THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED A NUMBER OF MODIFICATIONS IN THE DRAFT TREATY, AS WELL AS OTHER STEPS, IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH VARIOUS PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE FRG AND OUR OTHER ALLIES. DURING THE PAST WEEK MY REPRESENTATIVES HAVE HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR SCHNIPPENKOETTER, AND HAVE ACHIEVED STILL FURTHER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDINGS.

DURING THESE VARIOUS DISCUSSIONS CONCERNS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED REGARDING THE CONTINUED SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR FUELS BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE EVENT OF A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. THE TREATY OF COURSE WOULD NOT PREVENT IN ANY WAY THE SAFEGUARDED TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR FUELS. I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ASSURE YOU THAT WITHIN THE LIMITS OF OUR CAPABILITIES AND PURSUANT TO THE UNITED STATES-EURATOM AGREEMENT, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO SUPPLY URANIUM ENRICHMENT SERVICES OR PLUTONIUM REQUESTED FOR GERMANY'S DOMESTIC REACTOR PROGRAM, AND ALSO TO SUPPLY SUCH MATERIAL OR SERVICES FOR ANY REACTORS GERMANY MAY WISH TO EXPORT, UNDER APPROPRIATE FUEL SUPPLY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE FINAL CONSUMERS. OF COURSE THESE ASSURANCES ARE SUBJECT TO ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS AND TO OBTAINING THE NECESSARY LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.

THERE IS, TOO, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY COULD HINDER PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAMS. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE TREATY AS NOW PROPOSED WOULD NOT BURDEN THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF ANY SIGNATORY. I HOPE THAT THE MANY TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS OUR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE HAD IN BONN AND IN WASHINGTON HAVE REASSURED YOUR GOVERNMENT ON THIS MATTER.

TO FURTHER HELP THE FRG AND OTHERS DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL ACTION. IF IT WILL HELP ACHIEVE INCLUSION OF AN EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS ARTICLE IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO OFFER TO THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPLY ITS SAFEGUARDS TO ALL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, BOTH GOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE, WITH THE ONLY EXCLUSIONS BEING THOSE FOR MILITARY AND NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS. SUBJECT ONLY TO THESE EXCLUSIONS, THIS OFFER WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, APPLY TO THE FOLLOWING: ALL NUCLEAR REACTORS OWNED BY UTILITIES AND OPERATING FOR THE PRODUCTION OF ELECTRICITY, MECHANICAL POWER OR PROCESS HEAT; ALL EXPERIMENTAL NUCLEAR REACTORS WHICH ARE DESIGNED AND OPERATED TO TEST THE TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF REACTOR CONCEPTS FOR USE IN COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS; ALL FUEL FABRICATION FOR NUCLEAR REACTORS INCLUDED AMONG THE FOREGOING; AND ALL CHEMICAL PROCESSING OR IRRADIATED FUEL FROM THOSE REACTORS.

THIS OFFER WOULD APPLY AT SUCH TIME AS SAFEGUARDS ARE APPLIED IN NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES UNDER AN EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS PROVISION IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

SUCH AN OFFER WOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR CONVICTION THAT THESE SAFEGUARDS WOULD IN NO WAY PUT ANY NATION'S NUCLEAR INDUSTRY AT A COMMERCIAL DISADVANTAGE. IT WOULD ALSO PUT UNITED STATES NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ON AN EQUAL FOOTING IN THIS RESPECT WITH NUCLEAR INDUSTRIES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES WHICH ARE PARTIES TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS PROPOSAL IN GENEVA AFTER THE ENDC CO-CHAIRMAN HAVE TABLED A DRAFT NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY CONTAINING AN EFFECTIVE PROVISION FOR SAFEGUARDS. WE INTEND, OF COURSE, TO INFORM OUR NATO ALLIES OF THIS OFFER.

I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT A DRAFT TREATY BE TABLED BY THE ENDC CO-CHAIRMAN WHEN THE ENDC RECONVENES EARLY IN MAY, SO THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON IT CAN BEGIN IN GENEVA. I WOULD HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT AN UNDERSTANDING CAN BE REACHED AT THE NEXT NAC MEETING TO THE TABLING OF A DRAFT TREATY TEXT AT THE ENDC FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIETS, WITHOUT COMMITTING ANY OF OUR NATO ALLIES TO THAT TEXT. I WOULD ALSO EXPECT THAT OUR CONSULTATIONS ON THE PROPOSED TREATY WOULD CONTINUE IN THE COURSE OF THE ENDC NEGOTIATIONS.

I AM GRATIFIED, MR. CHANCELLOR, THAT WE HAVE ENTERED INTO A FRANK AND INTIMATE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, WHICH IS APPROPRIATE IN THE RELATIONS OF TWO COUNTRIES AS CLOSELY ALLIED AS OURS. I LOOK FORWARD TO ITS CONTINUATION.

MY WIFE AND I SEND OUR BEST WISHES TO YOU, TO MRS. KIESINGER, AND TO YOUR FAMILY.

SINCERELY, LYNDON B. JOHNSON. END TEXT.

DTG: 151607Z APRIL 1967

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1967 APR 15 16 41

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP67289

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM BATOR VIA WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT

FOLLOWING, FOR YOUR APPROVAL, ARE CONDOLENCE MESSAGES FROM YOU TO GERMAN PRESIDENT LUEBKE AND CHANCELLOR KIESINGER. THEY WILL BE SENT IF -- AS NOW APPEARS PROBABLE -- CHANCELLOR ADENAUER DIES WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

FROM PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT LUEBKE

DEAR PRESIDENT LUEBKE:

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, AND ALL MEN OF GOOD WILL, JOIN WITH YOU AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE IN MOURNING THE DEATH OF A GREAT GERMAN AND EUROPEAN -- AND A GOOD FRIEND -- KONRAD ADENAUER. TO ALL WHO ADMIRER HIM, HE WILL REMAIN A SYMBOL OF GREAT LEADERSHIP -- A MAN OF COURAGE IN TIME OF PERIL, RESTRAINT IN MOMENTS OF TRIUMPH, UNFLINCHING IN HIS DEVOTION TO FREEDOM AND JUSTICE.

MR. PRESIDENT, I SEND THE HEARTFELT CONDOLENCES OF MY COUNTRYMEN, MRS. JOHNSON, AND MYSELF TO YOU AND TO THE CHANCELLOR'S FAMILY. WE STAND AT YOUR SIDE IN THIS HOUR OF SORROW.

SINCERELY,

FROM PRESIDENT TO CHANCELLOR KIESINGER

DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR:

MRS. JOHNSON AND I WERE DEEPLY SADDENED AT NEWS OF THE DEATH OF CHANCELLOR ADENAUER. HE WAS, FOR ALL AMERICANS AND FOR FREE MEN EVERYWHERE, A SYMBOL OF THE VITALITY AND COURAGE OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE. THE WORLD WAS HEARTENED BY HIS EXAMPLE, AND STRENGTHENED BY HIS DEDICATION TO THE CAUSE OF LIBERTY. KONRAD ADENAUER WILL BE SORELY MISSED, BUT HIS DAUNTLESS SPIRIT WILL LIVE ON IN THE PARTNERSHIP OF GERMANY, EUROPE AND AMERICA THAT HE DID SO MUCH TO CREATE.

SINCERELY,

DTG 15/1609Z APRIL 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12856, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *mg*, NARA, Date 4-23-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1967 APR 15 14

67 APR 15 AM 9:55

SATURDAY

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP67286

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BATOR

HAROLD WILSON WANTS TO ANNOUNCE BY APRIL 18 THAT -- FOLLOWING
LATE MAY VISIT TO CANADA -- HE AND MRS. WILSON WILL QUOTE TRAVEL
TO WASHINGTON AT THE INVITATION OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON WITH WHOM THE
PRIME MINISTER WILL HAVE INFORMAL TALKS ON JUNE 2. UNQUOTE

IF YOU HAVE NO OBJECTIONS, I WILL TELL PAT DEAN THAT THE ANNOUNCE-
MENT IS OK. I WILL ALSO GET TOGETHER WITH GEORGE CHRISTIAN AND
WORK OUT AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO BE ISSUED SIMULTANEOUSLY, EITHER
HERE OR AT THE RANCH.

DTG 15/1431Z APRIL 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 19, NARA, Date 4-23-91

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FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP67287

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BATOR
INFO: GEORGE CHRISTIAN

FOLLOWING, FOR YOUR APPROVAL, IS A MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS TO
DONALD MICHENER, WHO WILL BE INSTALLED AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF CANADA
ON APRIL 17:

QUOTE YOU HAVE MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST-WISHES
AS YOU ASSUME THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF CANADA. I KNOW
THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THE CLOSE AND
FRIENDLY TIES THAT HAVE MARKED OUR RELATIONS OVER THE PAST CENTURY.

MY COUNTRYMEN JOIN ME IN WISHING YOU AND ALL CANADIANS A
HAPPY AND MEMORABLE CENTENNIAL YEAR. UNQUOTE

IF YOU APPROVE, WE WILL TELL THE CANADIANS WE DO NOT PLAN
TO RELEASE THE MESSAGE HERE, BUT HAVE NO OBJECTION IF THEY WANT TO
DO SO

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DTG:151432Z

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-396
By XW, NARA, Date 5-12-92

*sent via Pouch
4/14/67*

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 22833)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. Congestion in Saigon Port

There have in the past been so many disappointments that I have hesitated before reporting progress to you in reducing congestion at the Port of Saigon. But, the signs are now unmistakable that major progress has been made. Many have helped, as follows:

- a) The U.S. military, who developed successful cargo movement systems and management techniques since they moved into the Saigon Port in strength last July.
- b) We have built millions of dollars worth of Port facilities and the largest of these, upstream from the main Port, is now handling numerous barges, two LST's and two deep-draft ships.
- c) USAID established a task force which rang doorbells, made telephone calls, and was successful in getting the consignees to bring their trucks down to the ships to move goods away expeditiously -- and failure to do this had been a major problem.
- d) Finally, Prime Minister Ky, after many talk sessions with us, made the decision in late December to put a new team of Vietnamese in charge of the Port. This team has worked very effectively and the results can now be seen.

Some results are:

- a) Last summer and through September we seldom had days in which discharge rates in the Port ran much above 10,000 tons per day. At present, discharge is running sometimes as high as 17,000 tons per day.

SECRET/NODIS

b) At the end of December of last year, 300,000 tons of commercial cargo were either waiting for space in the Saigon Port so as to unload or was already being unloaded there. This working and waiting cargo has declined sharply over the first three months of this year and now is less than 100,000 tons. Indeed, in the last week, there have been no U.S. ships with commercial or military cargo waiting to come into the Port. All ships have been able to proceed almost immediately into the Saigon Port and start unloading. This looks here like a dramatic improvement, even though much remains to be done, including clearing up the large backlog of goods on barges and continuing improvement in cargo discharge procedures.

On the Vietnamese side, the Prime Minister deserves to be complimented, and I have done so.

On the American side, in addition to those I have listed above, I express thanks to all those in Washington who have provided timely and indispensable backing. I wish also, particularly, to commend the Economic Counselor of the Embassy, Leroy S. Wehrle, who has been highly creative and effective. Our method with the Vietnamese was to help, to prod, to urge, to persuade, to offer inducements. But we did not try to "take over", to give orders, or to govern. I do not doubt that the way we did it was the most expeditious way.

It is not too much to say that during my tour of duty here, the efforts of Americans in Vietnam -- civil and military -- have deserved the word "superhuman." And this word can assuredly be used to describe our work at the Port.

B. Viet Cong: Local Elections

Viet Cong attempts to disrupt the current local elections by acts of terror, harassment, and intimidation, according to reports from American sources through April 10, show four candidates known to have been killed; one wounded; and twenty-one candidates abducted.

The Viet Cong have also launched a campaign of propaganda against these elections, threatening both those who vote and those who run. There have been 88 incidents related to the election -- 31 acts of terror and 57 instances of anti-election propaganda.

Yet, this number is regarded as slight and the acts of violence against candidates and polling places have thus far failed to disrupt the polling process anywhere. On Sunday, the second of nine scheduled local elections was carried out successfully. The percentage of eligible voters who actually cast ballots was again just over 80 percent. More than 2,300 local officials were elected in 256 villages in this phase of the local elections, bringing the total of local officials elected so far to more than 4,200. In Sunday's election, 58 women and 141 members of ethnic minorities were elected.

Several villages have been forced to postpone elections to a later date. These postponements, of which at least four are known to have occurred, have been due largely to difficulties created by lack of security, but in a few places a low vote is attributed to apathy.

It seems clear that the evident determination of the people to vote is an action of "no confidence" in the Viet Cong. While it is not a national vote in support of any individual, and cynicism born of a generation of suffering and disappointments prevents the kind of enthusiasm which we know at home, the determination to vote may well be a further symptom of a desire to go ahead toward orderly government and generally away from terror and violence. These local elections, therefore, if successfully carried out, can be a sharp blow to the Viet Cong. If the autumn elections for President and for the Assembly are successful, too, the damage to the Viet Cong could be of major proportions.

C. Viet Cong: Revolutionary Development Teams

The Viet Cong's clandestine radio on April 3 spoke of orders being given to stress the "destruction of U.S. rebel pacification groups," which, it says, "are not military or police organizations, but are civilian groups whose mission is to develop a revolution."

In the first three months of 1967, there were 219 "attacks" on Revolutionary Development personnel. Total casualties for the month of March were 231. During 1966, 593 workers were killed.

Clearly, the Revolutionary Development workers are coming under increasing Viet Cong attack, but so far they have been able to hold their own, with the help of the ARVN battalions and the Rural Forces, and Popular Forces. Only one team has been completely overrun this year. Teams

are defending themselves in their hamlets and are staying in place, even though March was a bad month with 101 workers killed.

D. Viet Cong: Propaganda

Our troops on March 10 captured a Viet Cong document dealing with Viet Cong propaganda activities which had been prepared on June 15 by the "Subcommittee for Foreign Activities" of COSVN -- the Viet Cong's highest echelon in South Vietnam.

The most interesting thing about the document is the obvious importance which it attaches to their foreign propaganda and their extremely elaborate and far-reaching plans. This seems to confirm our suspicions and to justify our efforts to bring Hanoi to the conclusion that their propaganda is a failure.

Other highlights of the document are:

a) "At present, the deep dissension between Russia and China and the contradiction in anti-American concepts have ruined the consistency of action of the pro-Vietnamese Socialist Bloc."

b) "In capitalist countries, such as the United States -- we try to motivate youths, intellectuals and religious sects to protest the war of aggression waged by their government in Vietnam -- we motivate families of the U.S. troops dispatches to Vietnam to protest this sending of troops. In addition, we actively support the anti-American movements of U.S. satellite countries which also have troops in South Vietnam, such as the Philippines and South Korea, etc."

c) "A careful study of our past activities revealed that our propaganda themes are still superficial. We have failed to enumerate all the crimes committed by the Americans in South Vietnam -- we have not set off the role and position of the Front to the world and ruined the diplomatic relations between the Saigon puppet government and various nationalist countries...we have failed to conduct a systematic propaganda of our military, political, cultural and economic successes, etc... We have not appropriately fulfilled the carrying out of international obligations (i.e., coordinating their struggle with other Communist movements).

d) "The more the enemy suffers setbacks, the more he widens and escalates the war -- on the one hand, they intensify the war -- on the other hand, they implement their extremely mischievous political schemes in the hope of gaining some influence should a political solution materialize -- they are bound to suffer heavier military and political defeats."

e) "We are fully able to defeat the enemy in the foreseeable future."

f) One thing which is stressed is to "wisely arouse acute internal dissension among the Imperialist countries -- chiefly between France and the United States -- to win the support of France and her supporters. Following the neutrality of England, we must be ready to welcome any of their acts against the U.S. and also we must always be ready to protest and counter any of their Imperialist plans."

E. Assembly

The Assembly is setting up committees to draft laws governing elections, political parties, the press, and the formation of the Inspectorate and the Supreme Court. It says it will set up a committee for "Foreign Affairs and Information", and it has sent a delegation to Quang Tri Province to investigate reported incursions of Communist forces across the Ben Hai River. It will also elect new officers, although probably the present Chairman, Phan Khac Suu, will be re-elected "in order to increase the prestige of the Assembly", and, perhaps, give his candidacy for President a boost.

F. Vietnamese Press Highlights

The newspaper Doi Thoai says that the crossing of the Demilitarized Zone proves that (1) North Vietnam has no liberty of action to settle conflict of their own will; and, (2) the Vietnam war has changed in nature in the sense that the Communists have now publicly admitted that this is a war of aggression through their attacks at the Demilitarized Zone.

The newspaper Tu Do, speaking of U Thant's proposal of a U.S. bombing pause without any reciprocal de-escalation from North Vietnam, said: "We protest against Mr. Thant. If our side unilaterally stops the bombing, the Communists will take advantage of this to build up their rear bases in mainland China and North Vietnam and, at the same time step up their infiltration of men and arms into South Vietnam".

SECRET/NODIS

G. Chieu Hoi

The number of returnees for the week ending April 1 was 1,000. This is the sixth consecutive week in which the returnees have numbered 1,000 or more. The weekly average is now 826.6, and the total for 1967 is 10,746. Last year's overall total was 20,242. Thus, in the first three months of 1967, well over half as many returnees came in as in the entire year of 1966.

The local elections could result in a temporary decline in the Chieu Hoi rate. In the past, the returnee rate dipped at the time of elections because Government of Vietnam attention was concentrated on the election and also because there is an apparent tendency on the part of defectors to wait and see the outcome of the elections (which in September of last year, at least, was read as a contest between the Government and the Viet Cong).

On the broad question of national reconciliation, Ky told me on Tuesday that all of the specific points which we had suggested for inclusion in the forthcoming National Reconciliation Proclamation had been incorporated.

H. Vietnamese Killed

Herewith the figures on those Vietnamese civilian casualties for the week ending April 8, which are officially reported and are thus known to our representatives in the provinces. They do not, of course, purport to be a complete statement of all civilian casualties. The figures show that the Viet Cong killed 56 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 151, and kidnapped 95. Among the dead were one Hamlet chief, three Chieu Hoi returnees, and eight policemen.

I. Military

This week saw an increase in enemy activity against cities in First Corps. The enemy hit the capital of Quang Tri province on the morning of April 9. They attacked the OCO and MACV compounds, released 220 prisoners from the city jail, and hit several U.S. and ARVN posts within the city. Ten Americans were killed, all of them military personnel. One American civilian was slightly wounded, but the American civilian casualties would have been much higher if some of the enemy explosives had not failed to go off. In Hue this week, four persons were assassinated and propaganda leaflets were scattered on the streets by a Viet Cong gang which

penetrated the city late at night.

J. Economic

Prices edged up slightly, with the Saigon Retail Price Index going up one point, to 261 this week. This can be compared with last week's 260 and the all-time high of three weeks ago - 284. Rice prices fell, not only in the lower grades but in better quality grain as well. The reason for the fall in the rice price is the improvement in the rice stock situation, the cumulative effect of sales of American rice on the local market and the upturn in the shipments of Delta rice to Saigon at the end of March.

While rice prices moved down, pork went up in response to a halt in the sale of imported frozen pork. The prices of imported goods rose to an index of 236. This may be compared with last week's 229 and last month's 216.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 129, NARA, Date 4-23-91

Friday, April 14, 1967 - 8:00 pm

12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BATOR

Sent to Ranch

Pres approved 4/15/67

Following, for your approval, are condolence messages from you to German President Luebke and Chancellor Kiesinger. They will be sent if -- as now appears probable -- Chancellor Adenauer dies within the next few days.

FROM PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT LUEBKE

Dear President Luebke:

The American people, and all men of good will, join with you and the German people in mourning the death of a great German and European -- and a good friend -- Konrad Adenauer. To all who admired him, he will remain a symbol of great leadership -- a man of courage in time of peril, restraint in moments of triumph, unflinching in his devotion to freedom and justice.

Mr. President, I send the heartfelt condolences of my countrymen, Mrs. Johnson, and myself to you and to the Chancellor's family. We stand at your side in this hour of sorrow.

Sincerely,

FROM PRESIDENT TO CHANCELLOR KIESINGER

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

Mrs. Johnson and I were deeply saddened at news of the death of Chancellor Adenauer. He was, for all Americans and for free men everywhere, a symbol of the vitality and courage of the German people. The world was heartened by his example, and strengthened by his dedication to the cause of liberty. Konrad Adenauer will be sorely missed, but his dauntless spirit will

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(MORE)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

live on in the partnership of Germany, Europe and America that he did
so much to create.

Sincerely,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 13, 1967

SUBJECT: Messages to the King and Prime Minister of Nepal

Ambassador Laise is arranging a celebration in Nepal of the Twentieth Anniversary of the beginning of US-Nepal relations. In addition to social events by the Embassy and by the Nepalese, she will dedicate several recently completed US projects, run a special program of films and lectures and put out a series of pamphlets and special press features telling the story of US-Nepalese economic and cultural cooperation. She recommends that an exchange of messages between you and the King and the Prime Minister be the focal point of this celebration.

I recommend you approve. This is an inexpensive way to dramatize our independent role in Nepal without upsetting India's position. We want the Indians to retain primary responsibility for Nepal's defense, but the Nepalis distrust their big neighbor and have sought an independent relationship with us. We've gone along with a good but modest aid program, making clear that India must remain out in front. This anniversary celebration is made-to-order for just the sort of show-the-flag operation that bolsters our position without getting us in deeper than we want.

Attached two letters for your signature if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

April 17, 1967

Your Majesty:

I am pleased to send to Your Majesty and to your people my heartfelt greetings and those of the American people on this twentieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries.

The spirit of friendship has governed relations between Nepal and the United States through these years. Together we have worked for the development of Nepal and the fulfillment of the aspirations of Your Majesty and the Nepalese people.

I sincerely hope that this spirit of friendly cooperation will continue to grow.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

LBJ

His Majesty
Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva
King of Nepal

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 4/13/67

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Today marks the beginning of the third decade of diplomatic relations between Nepal and the United States. For twenty years we have maintained the friendliest of relations and have cooperated in the development of Nepal.

I extend to you and your colleagues in the Government of Nepal warm greetings and the hope that the same friendly spirit of cooperation that we celebrate today will continue in the decades to come. The American people join me in wishing you success in your endeavors to promote the welfare of the Nepalese people.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

being sent as telegram

His Excellency
Surya Bahadur Thapa
Prime Minister of Nepal
Kathmandu

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 4/13/67

14

SENT
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DE WTE 603

FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO WALT ROSTOW
CITE WH70167

UNCLASSIFIED

APRIL 11, 1967

TO WALT ROSTOW
FROM BROMLEY SMITH

RECOMMEND YOU OBTAIN PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL AND SEND FROM
THERE OR AUTHORIZE US TO SAY WE WERE ASKED BY PRESIDENT
TO SEND FROM HERE THE FOLLOWING GET-WELL MESSAGE DRAFTED
BY STATE AND CLEARED BY JORDEN:

QUOTE:

HIS EXCELLENCY LIEUTENANT GENERAL NGUYEN VAN THIEU

CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE

REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM

DEAR GENERAL THIEU,

I AM HAPPY TO LEARN THAT YOU ARE RECOVERING FROM A
SUCCESSFUL APPENDECTOMY. I MOST SINCERELY WISH YOU A
SPEEDY RECOVERY AND CONTINUING GOOD HEALTH HENCEFORTH.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON END QUOTE

WE DO NOT PLAN TO RELEASE TO PRESS BUT WOULD TELL SAIGON
NO OBJECTION IF GVN WISH TO RELEASE.

DTG 111754Z APRIL 1967

PRESERVATION COPY

Mr. Kantor 15

~~1. map~~
2. Pres file

Monday, April 10, 1967, 12:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached is a memo from Nick Katzenbach recommending that you see UK Foreign Secretary George Brown sometime between April 18-20. (He will be here for the SEATO Meeting.)

This is no essential -- you saw him last October -- but if you have a spare half-hour it would be a good thing to do.

Francis M. Bator

Marvin to set up appointment _____

appoint set for 6:00pm 4/19/67

No appointment _____

Speak to me _____

Pat Dean urgently
requested you see
him.
15/Walt

1190
15a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-396
By ju, NARA, Date 5-12-92

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request that you see George Brown,
British Foreign Secretary

Recommendation:

That you agree to see George Brown, British Foreign Secretary, sometime in the period April 18-20.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

George Brown, the British Foreign Secretary, will be in Washington from April 18 to 20 to attend the SEATO meeting. He has asked to see you.

You last saw Brown in October, 1966, shortly after he became Foreign Secretary. Since that time, he has taken a leading role in Britain's campaign to gain entry into the Common Market. He is known to favor an early UK bid even though most believe de Gaulle is still opposed to British membership.

Brown has also been instrumental in bringing about a successful outcome to the Trilateral talks. He is a strong NATO man and believes British troops should remain on the Continent. As such, he is a useful counter to those in the Cabinet who put balance of payments considerations first.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
declassified after 12 years.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Brown has been called upon many times in the House of Commons to defend the Wilson Government's policy of support for U.S. objectives in Viet-Nam. He has done this with steadily growing effectiveness and recently, even brilliance.

One area of Brown's thinking is of concern to us. He is not convinced Britain has a meaningful role to play East of Suez. He would probably like to see an accelerated British withdrawal from this area.

Brown has still not lived down his reputation for impulsiveness. He works hard at the job and his very vigor leads him to an occasional false step. One problem we never have with Brown - we are never in doubt as to where he stands.

I recommend you see Brown. His continued support on major policies is important to us. An up-to-date briefing on Viet-Nam would be particularly valuable to him at a time of increasing domestic pressure on the British Government to stop supporting us on this issue. I also believe he should hear from you the high value we place on a continued British presence East of Suez.


Acting Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Per file~~SECRET~~

Monday, April 10, 1967 -- 3:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

As I have reported separately, Amb. Robert Anderson recommends that the proposed formula (p. 2) be modified to read "for the first three years" instead of "for the first five years," as here proposed.

He says that the three year interval would be both more fair and more negotiable. As our responsible man in this matter, I would go with him.

W. W. Rostow

As recommended: 5 years _____

3 years _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-394
By lig, NARA, Date 3-12-93

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-396
By ju, NARA, Date 5-12-92

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

April 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Compensation Issue in Panama Canal
Treaty Negotiations

Recommendation:

That you approve the concept outlined in this memorandum as a basis for further discussions with Panama on the compensation question.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The Panama Review Group met April 6 to consider the question of direct compensation to Panama in the lock canal and sea level canal treaties. This question may prove to be the most difficult in the negotiations.

The Panamanians have proposed a payment to Panama of \$80 million in the first year of operation, increased annually at the rate of 4% until the payment reached \$168.5 million in the 20th year. They cite a study of optimum tolls prepared by Arthur D. Little Company in support of this request but have not tied their compensation proposal directly to tolls and explain that the United States could determine whether to raise tolls or to pay Panama in some other way.

SECRET

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Ambassadors Anderson and Irwin have told the Panamanians the United States cannot guarantee per se a payment to Panama, that any increased payments to Panama must be related to revenues which can be derived from the canal operation and costs of canal operation. Our independent tolls study done by Stanford Research Institute, in contrast to the Arthur D. Little study, concludes that cargo movements are quite sensitive to increases in rates of tolls and that as rates increase cargo movements through the canal will progressively diminish over a 20-year period.

In its review, the Panama Review Group considered three basic questions regarding the lock canal. 1) What, if any, amount should the United States receive out of the revenues of the canal; 2) what amount should be paid to Panama; and 3) what formula should be used as the basis for calculations of tolls and payments to the United States and Panama. It was concluded that the United States should endeavor to obtain a payment sufficient to recover its unrecovered investment in the canal and that an equivalent payment to Panama for its contribution should likewise be made. It was conservatively estimated that sufficient revenues could be provided from the canal for these payments with a modest raise in tolls. An illustrative formula conceived of as a reasonable end position, leaving tactics to the negotiators, is enclosed. This formula would serve as a guideline to permit the negotiators to agree ultimately, if necessary, to a twenty-cent per cargo ton payment annually to each country for the first five years to yield approximately \$17 million annually to each. Thereafter, the new canal Administration could revise the tolls, free of any ceiling, in accordance with the guidelines in the formula.

It was considered by the Panama Review Group that a formula along these lines would be a satisfactory negotiating position with Panama, would meet strong sentiment in some Congressional quarters that the United States investment in the canal be recovered, and would provide reasonably generous funds to Panama for economic development.


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SECRET

- 3 -

It was agreed that it was important to include in the sea level canal treaty a formula that would provide payment to Panama, which might continue the level and the trend of payments that Panama would be receiving at the time that a sea level canal would begin operations, and that would provide for amortization of the construction costs and the other parts of the initial funded indebtedness of the sea level canal.

The importance of continued consultation with Congress was also discussed. Ambassador Irwin and Assistant Secretary Gordon briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the status of treaty negotiations on January 24 and on the same day briefed the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Ambassadors Anderson and Irwin briefed the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on February 28. Appropriate committees of Congress as well as key individual members of Congress will continue to be consulted and informed of developments in the negotiations.


Acting Secretary

Enclosure:
Illustrative formula.

SECRET

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(Illustrative Formula)

ARTICLE _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-396
By gw, NARA, Date 5-12-92

(1) The Administration shall administer and operate the Panama Canal both to provide the Republic of Panama and the United States of America a fair return in the light of their contributions to the creation and maintenance of this interoceanic waterway, and to provide world commerce the advantages of shorter shipping routes with reasonable tolls.

(2) The Administration shall review the tolls structure and upon the assumption of its responsibilities and functions under this Treaty, may establish a new schedule of tolls. Pending establishment of a new schedule of tolls by the Administration, in accordance with the guidelines in paragraph (4) of this Article, the tolls structure in effect on the date this Treaty enters into force shall remain in effect.

(3) The tolls structure established in accordance with paragraph (2) of this Article may be adjusted by the Administration from time to time, but not more often than once every five years.

(4) In establishing or modifying tolls or other charges, the Administration shall adhere to the following principles:

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

(a) Tolls and other charges established and collected by the Administration shall be non-discriminatory, shall be payable in United States dollars and shall be sufficient at least to cover the disbursements required to be made by the Administration pursuant to paragraphs (5)(a) through (e) of this Article;

(b) the Administration shall take into consideration all studies of tolls caused to be made by the Government of the Republic of Panama or of the United States of America; and

(c) the Administration shall give six months notice in advance of any proposed modification of the tolls structure, during which period it shall give due consideration to the views of all interested parties.

(5) The receipts of the Administration from all transactions shall be disbursed for the following purposes, in the order of priority indicated:

(a) Payment of operating and maintenance costs, and establishment of required working capital and reserve funds, including reserves for plant replacements and capital improvements. Operating costs shall include

CONFIDENTIAL

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- 3 -

the annual payment to the Republic of Panama provided for in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph.

(b) payment annually to the Republic of Panama of a sum equivalent to ____¢ per Panama Canal measurement ton of tolls-paying commercial vessels, and ____¢ per each displacement ton of tolls-paying Government vessels, transiting the Canal during the preceding year.

(c) payment of the current cost of any capital improvements or additions required;

(d) payment of any other obligations incurred by or evidences of indebtedness issued by the Administration;

(e) payment annually to the United States of America of a sum equivalent to ____¢ per Panama Canal measurement ton of tolls-paying commercial vessels and ____¢ per each displacement ton of tolls-paying Government vessels, transiting the Canal during the preceding year; and

(f) payment in equal shares to the Republic of Panama and to the United States of America of any surplus remaining each year after the disbursements required by subparagraphs (a) through (e) of this paragraph have been made. During the first five years of operation of the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

Canal by the Joint Administration any planned annual surplus shall be only so large as to assure solvent operations each year.

(6) Payments to the Republic of Panama or to the United States of America as provided for in this Article, or any portion thereof, may be deferred by the Administration with the consent of the Government of the country concerned. The Administration shall not incur any liability for payment of interest on any such deferred payments. Payments due to the Republic of Panama or to the United States of America as provided for in this Article may be applied by the Administration against any amounts owed to it by the Republic of Panama or by the United States of America, respectively.

(7) In carrying out its responsibilities under paragraph (1) of this Article, the Administration shall make every effort to keep operating costs at a minimum, while maintaining efficient services to shipping and providing equitable treatment for its employees.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

Monday - April 10, 1967

Mr. President:

This memorandum from Secretary Rusk is about a small problem for us which looms big in our relations with Honduras -- the disputed claim to the Swan Islands and how to settle it.

The memorandum represents one of the careful pieces of work done by the Latin American IRG group in which Bill Bowdler participated as my representative.

I consider the Secretary's two recommendations to be sound and recommend your approval.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Rusk memorandum of
April 5.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-394
By ing, NARA, Date 3-12-93

~~SECRET~~

*1 copy
2 Pres file*

Monday - April 10, 1967

Mr. President:

I recommend that you send this letter of acknowledgement (at Tab A) to John Horne, Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in response to his letter of April 1 (at Tab B).

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A -- Acknowledgement to John Horne.

Tab B -- John Horne's letter of April 1.

April 10, 1967

Dear John:

It is a pleasure for a President to get a letter like yours full of good news.

What you report about the savings and loan movement is another example of the quiet, steady, institution-building that is going on in Latin America -- and making our Alliance for Progress a success. We know that it represents a solid accomplishment. I wish there were some way to dramatize the story publicly. You might try your hand at it. I was also glad to have your comments on the performances of our Embassies.

Many thanks for taking the time to write me about these things.

Sincerely,

LBJ

Honorable John E. Horne
Chairman
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Washington, D. C.

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm
April 10, 1967.



JOHN E. HORNE
CHAIRMAN

FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20552

101 INDIANA AVENUE, N. W.

FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK SYSTEM
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
INSURANCE CORPORATION
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN SYSTEM

April 1, 1967

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As you know, the Agency for International Development, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and several industry executives, have been working during very recent years to establish a savings and loan industry in South America. While there have been some disappointments in the lack of success in our efforts, I believe that on the whole significant progress has been made.

Each year during the past five years a conference has been held in some Latin American city, attended by delegates and officials from each of the Latin American countries. This year, the conference was held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, March 26-31. The days were set at a time recommended by me since participating savings and loan executives from the United States especially wanted me to attend. I chose a time that I thought I could best afford to be away from my Washington office.

And to take further advantage of going to the conference, I left Washington early enough to meet with both the American embassy officials who are promoting the savings and loan industry, and with my counterpart and other officials of certain Latin American countries that I could visit en route to Buenos Aires. These countries are Ecuador, Peru and Chile. En route home following my speech at the conference in Buenos Aires, I also visited with American and Brazilian officials in Rio de Janeiro.

My purpose in writing this letter is to emphasize at least two points:

(1) We are making headway in building a savings and loan industry in Latin America that has already resulted in substantial savings,


The President
Page Two
April 1, 1967

relatively speaking, and in the construction of several thousand badly needed homes.

(2) I was tremendously impressed by and proud of the dedication and competency of the ambassadors and their staffs in each of the countries that I visited.

Ambassador Coerr of Ecuador, Ambassador Jones of Peru, Ambassador Dungan of Chile, Ambassador Martin of Argentina, and Ambassador Tuthill of Brazil are doing outstanding jobs. In my opinion, you can take deep pride in each of these appointments. Their staff members with whom I visited, including those of the Agency for International Development and others, impressed me as being very able and deeply dedicated. They work long hours, their wives do likewise to assist their husbands, and all in all I left South America with a profound feeling of pride about and confidence in the Americans who are carrying out our responsibilities in those countries I visited.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "John E. Horne".

John E. Horne
Chairman

JEH:jfb

Pres file

Monday, April 10, 1967
2:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

The attached signals that Somoza, President-elect of Nicaragua, will be unable to go to Punta del Este.

The Foreign Minister will act in his place, we believe.

The Ecuadorian President is going.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12586, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ry, NARA, Date 4-23-91

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, April 10, 1967

The following is a translation from Spanish of a commercial cable received by the U. S. delegation in Punta del Este and dated April 10:

Quote: To His Excellency Lyndon B. Johnson

Due to the serious state of health of my brother, Luis, I am forced to cancel definitely my trip to Punta del Este. I regret very much that I am unable to accept the invitation to have breakfast with you, which I would have liked very much to attend.

Your esteemed friend,

Anastasio Somoza,
President-elect of Nicaragua

Unquote

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-394
By ing, NARA, Date 3-12-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


April 10, 1967

Dear John:

It is a pleasure for a President to get a letter like yours full of good news.

What you report about the savings and loan movement is another example of the quiet, steady, institution-building that is going on in Latin America -- and making our Alliance for Progress a success. We know that it represents a solid accomplishment. I wish there were some way to dramatize the story publicly. You might try your hand at it. I was also glad to have your comments on the performances of our Embassies.

Many thanks for taking the time to write me about these things.

Sincerely,


Honorable John E. Horne
Chairman
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Washington, D. C.

Monday, April 10, 1967
2:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

The attached signals that Somoza, President-elect of Nicaragua, will be unable to go to Punta del Este.

The Foreign Minister will act in his place, we believe.

The Ecuadorian President is going.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rf, NARA, Date 4/23/91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Your esteemed friend,

Anastasio Somoza,
President-elect of Nicaragua

Unquote

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-394
By rip, NARA, Date 3-18-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

24
Monday, April 10, 1967

Marv,

Here's the President's copy and
one for you of the President's Summit
Work Scenario. Keep them close to
hand.

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12556, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 12, NARA, Date 4/23/91

Monday, April 10, 1967
5:00 p. m.

25

MR. PRESIDENT:

You know David Rockefeller and his committee -- the best private group we have working in foreign policy.

Heru Harwin

A good group to encourage -- if you have time.

W. W. R.

Monday, April 10, 1967

MR. PRESIDENT:

Leonard Marks has now seen the Cantinflas film.

It is a comedy on a Latin American country, making fun of the rapid turnover in Presidents.

He believes that it would be highly inappropriate for us to show it to Latin Americans at Punta del Este; and it sounds as though he is right.

Also: it's two hours long.

Nevertheless, it will be on the plane and available.

W. W. R.

Monday, April 10, 1967

MR. PRESIDENT:

In addition to raising the point about Jack Irwin, Bob Anderson made these points:

1. You should, as previously recommended, express willingness to accelerate the pace of negotiations, but keep out of details.
2. Avoid any commitment to meet Robles later: leave the negotiation with Bob all the way, at arm's length, so that the heat is more on him, less on you.
3. A point of substance: there is now a committee recommendation that we agree that:
 - each country earn \$17 million a year for five years, raising rates modestly to achieve that result
 - then the new Canal Board would be free to set new rates.

Bob thinks five years is too long a transitional interval: three would be more fair and more negotiable*

W. W. R.

*A separate memo on this point has gone forward to you. I will have a copy with me on the plane.

Sunday, April 9, 1967
7:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

We received today in long-hand
the attached farewell letter to you from
a somewhat chastened and anxious
Malwandwal.

W. W. Rostow

COPY

April 7, 1967
New York

Dear Mr. President,

I received your letter of March 30, 1967, and thank you and Mrs. Johnson for your cordial sentiments. I wish to thank you for your hospitality and your kind offer of an airplane which has made it possible for me to see so much in such a short time.

It was gratifying to find that the friendly relations between our Governments are paralleled by the warm personal relations between the American people and the Afghans.

I was happy to find the opportunity to talk with you on mutual and international subjects and this has left me with increased understanding for the enormous problems which you and your country face. I hope that I also have been able to explain the policies which are most important to us.

Being sure that this visit will further strengthen the friendly relations between our two nations, I thank you once again for your warm reception. I thank you for the thoughtful gifts you presented to me in Washington and express my warmest good wishes for your personal welfare and the further prosperity of your great country.

Sincerely,

/s/ M. H. Malwandwal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Sunday, April 9, 1967 -- 8:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's first contact with the new Brazilian Foreign Minister.

He appears to be moving in well to establish the diplomatic base for a successful conference.

By getting Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina with him, he's got pretty solid control. He already has developed good relations with the Argentine and (of course) Mexican Foreign Ministers.

W. W. Rostow

SECTO 19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-394
By sig, NARA, Date 3-12-93

WWRostow:rlh

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INFO RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 04
RUESUA/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 01
RUESUA/AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO 02
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BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PUNTA DEL ESTE 105

SECTO 19

SUBJECT: BILATERAL CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY AND BRAZILIAN
FOREIGN MINISTER MAGALHAES PINTO

1. SECRETARY MET WITH BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MAGALHAES PINTO
SATURDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 8. MEETING VERY POSITIVE IN TONE.
SECRETARY DELIBERATELY MADE IT A MEETING TO GET ACQUAINTED,
RESERVING SPECIAL BILATERAL POINTS FOR A LATER DISCUSSION.

PAGE 2 RUESPD 105 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. SECRETARY OPENED BY SAYING POZICIES OF TWO LARGEST COUNTRIES HAVE
GREAT EFFECT ON WHAT OCCURS IN HEMISPHERE. TWO COUNTRIES DO NOT HAVE
TO AGREENY EVERYTHING BUT MUST UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER. MAGALHAES
REPLIED HE HOPED DIFFERENCES WOULD BE SMALL AND RELATIONS EVEN MORE
FRUITFUL IN FUTURE THAN IN PAST.

3. SECRETARY SAID PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD VERY MUCH ENJOYED MEETING
PRESIDENT-EZECT COSTA E SILVA IN WASHINGTON AND LOOKED FORWARD SEEING
HIM AGAIN AS PRESIDENT DURING SUMMIT.

4. MAGALHAES SAID IT IMPORTANT THAT SUMMIT HAVE CONCRETE, CONSTRUCTIVE
RESULTS WHICH WOULD GIVE CONFIDENCE TO PEOPLE. SAID BRAZIL HAD NO
SPECIAL REQUEST TO MAKE OF US NOW; IT WAS PLEASED WITH HELP IT WAS
RECEIVING AND WITH NEWS FROM AMBASSADOR TUTHILL OF THREE OR FOUR DAYS
AGO THAT THERE WOULD BE ADDITIONAL SECTORAL HELP IN EDUCATION, AGRI-
CULTURE AND HEALTH. BRAZIL WANTED TO PRESS FORWARD WITH ITS INTERNAL
RECUPERATION EFFORT, TO CONTINUE COOPERATING CLOSELY WITH THE US,
AND TO HAVE CONTINUING US COOPERATION.

5. SECRETARY SAID PUBLIC OPICION ASPECT OF SUMMIT VERY IMPORTAND AND

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-396
By ju, NARA, Date 5-12-92

~~PAGE 3 RUESPD 105 C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

COMPLICATED. LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLE NEED TO HAVE CONFIDENCE US WILL PROVIDE ASSISTANCE. US PEOPLE, WHO ARE UNDER HEAVY TAX BURDEN, MUST FEEL THAT ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IS SUCCEEDING AND THAT AT SUMMIT WE ARE BUILDING ON SUCCESS, NOT JUST AVOIDING DISASTER. ALSO, VERY IMPORTANT TO DRAW ATTENTION OF AMERICAN PEOPLE MORE TO LATIN AMERICA THROUGH SUMMIT MEETING. OUR DIFFICULTIES IN CONGRESS DID NOT RELATE TO MERITS OF LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM, BUT RATHER WERE CAUSED BY PROBLEM OF PROCEDURE UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION AND BY SOME INTRUSION OF VIETNAM ISSUE. SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT IN THIS SESSION OF CONGRESS WE ASKING FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR IDB AND FOR BILATERAL AID UNDER ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS. SAID US WOULD DO ITS PART.

6. SECRETARY CONTINUED THERE VERY CLOSE ATTENTION IN US TO WHAT BRAZIL DOES IN ECONOMIC FIELD BECAUSE SUCH LARGE PART OF OUR ALLIANCE FUNDS GO TO BRAZIL AND BECAUSE OF BRAZIL'S SIZE AND IMPORTANCE. WE ENCOURAGED BY BRAZIL'S ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN LAST THREE YEARS AND GREATLY INTERESTED IN ITS CONTINUING.

7. MAGALHAES SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEMS AND WOULD DO HIS BEST TO EXPLAIN OUR POSITION TO PUBLIC OPINION. BRAZILIAN

~~PAGE 4 RUESPD 105 C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE AN EVER GREATER EFFORT THAN BEFORE UNDER ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IN ORDER TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE OF ITS PEOPLE IN THEIR GOVERNMENT AND TO DEMONSTRATE TO ITS FRIENDS ABROAD THAT THEIR ASSISTANCE IS MERITED.

8. MAGALHAES THEN VOLUNTEERED HE REGRETTED AND DID NOT SHARE OPINIONS EXPRESSED BY ECUADOREAN REPRESENTATIVE IN MORNING FOREIGN MINISTERS SESSION. ~~SUBMEETOWAB~~ REVERTED TO IN PLENARY SESSION HE WOULD SAY SO PUBLICLY. BRAZILIANS DID NOT WANT TO AGGRAVATE US INTERNAL PROBLEMS.

9. SECRETARY SAID HE APPRECIATED MAGALHAES' UNDERSTANDING, REGRETTED ECUADOREAN REPRESENTATIVE HAD NOT SPOKEN TO HIM PRIVATELY RATHER THAN MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENT. SAID US NOT LIKE OLD COW WHICH GIVES MILK WHEN KICKED.

10. MEETING CLOSED WITH SECRETARY'S EXPRESSION OF DESIRE TO HAVE FURTHER BILATERAL TALKS WITH MAGALHAES ZATER.

RUSK
BT

NNNN

*1. Summary
2. Paris file*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Preliminary Report on the Paris Indian Consortium Meetings

The meetings appear to have been highly successful. The Consortium has agreed to include food aid in its planning and pledging; it sustained the non-food requirement of \$900 million foreign exchange aid; and it has already made additional commitments virtually matching our 3 million tons of food.

There are three types of additional assistance: (a) direct food equivalents, now totalling approximately \$70 million; (b) accelerating European pipelines to release real resources this year which normally would not have come forward for a number of years, amounting to roughly \$50 to \$70 million additional; and (c) debt relief, over and above what donors agreed to do to meet the \$900 million foreign exchange requirement. We won't know the exact debt relief figure until April 25th when representatives come to Washington for a wrap-up meeting to make final commitments. This may total some \$139 - 141 million more.

The Paris delegation recommends that we now release 1.5 million of the 3 million additional tons of food approved by the Congressional resolution. They want to hold the second 1.5 million as leverage until after the April meeting firms up debt relief arrangements.

We'll report in greater detail when we've talked to the people who were there, but the preliminary report looks good.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr 3-13-78, RLSC 11-30-78
By rg/ep, NARA, Date 5-1-91

Pres file~~SECRET~~

April 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Presidential Determination: Small Military Aid for Libya

This \$1.9 million grant for Libya is part of our effort to stay on at Wheelus Base. In 1964 when the Libyans were pressing us to leave, we promised to help develop their air force. We thought by sharing some of our facilities there we could give their military a stake in the base.

We're about to sell ten F-5 aircraft for \$43 million in cash from Libya's growing oil revenues. However, we'd like to pick up \$1.9 million in services to help tie this in to Wheelus, and we'll have to fund this from the Military Assistance Program. The Prime Minister's problem is not that he couldn't find the money, but his need to show opponents of the base that Libya gets something in return for having the base there.

We've come a long way from those days at the beginning of your administration when it looked as if we might lose Wheelus. King Idris' decision that he wants us there has been the main reason for improvement. But the Prime Minister has been quite skillful in making this position stick with an unruly Parliament. Therefore, this is cheap at the price, especially when we're making a \$43 million cash sale in the bargain.

Attached determination is for your signature if you approve. Defense would like to get a team off to Libya Monday or Tuesday to conclude this deal.

W. W. Rostow

Attached: P. D. #67-18

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-394
By ig, NARA, Date 3-12-93

~~SECRET~~

31a

~~SECRET~~
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

APR 7 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Military Assistance for Libya

Attached, for your signature, is a determination permitting the furnishing of a total of \$1.9 million of grant MAP, over a five-year period, to Libya.

Libya has asked us to sell 10 F-5 aircraft, on a cash basis, which we have agreed to. Libya will pay \$43.1 million for the aircraft package, -- a modest assist to our balance of payments. However, Libya has also asked us to provide, on a grant basis, \$1.9 million as part of the maintenance services for the planes. State and Defense believe this relatively small grant will facilitate an extension of our rights to use Wheelus after the existing agreement expires in 1971.

The F-5 is designed primarily for external defense. Your determination is required to waive the Foreign Assistance Act limitation that grant military assistance to Africa for internal security and civic action purposes only.

This grant was included in the 1967 program request and has been discussed with members of the Congress.

I recommend that you sign the determination. Walt Rostow concurs.

(signed) Charles L. Schultze
Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-394
By ing, NARA, Date 3-12-93

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

31b

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

APR 7 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Military Assistance for Libya

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I recommend that you sign the determination. Walt Rostow concurs.

Charles L. Schultze

Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-394
By *Wig*, NARA, Date 3.12.93

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

31c

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Washington 25, D. C.

APR 6 1967

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Determination under Section 512 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended ("Act") Permitting Military Assistance to the Government of Libya

I recommend that you make the determination necessary to permit the furnishing to Libya of certain defense services on a grant basis. The defense services to be so provided are a portion of the maintenance services element of a proposed \$51.1 million sales transaction under which Libya, at a cost to it of \$43.1 million, would purchase on a cash basis ten F-5 aircraft, spares, training and a part of the maintenance services not covered by the grant.

Section 512 of the Act provides that grant military assistance may not be furnished to any country in Africa for other than internal security or civic action requirements, unless you so determine. Although the F-5 aircraft included in this sales program also serve Libya's internal security requirements, they will primarily serve to improve Libya's defense capability. Section 512 of the Act is not applicable to the military sales portion of the arrangement, but the requirements which the related grant defense services are designed to meet cannot be distinguished from those met by the aircraft. The determination, therefore, is necessary before the subject grant assistance can be furnished.

The total value of the portion of the maintenance services to be provided by the USAF at no cost to Libya will be approximately \$ 8 million of which \$1.9 million will be chargeable to the military assistance appropriation. This \$1.9 million for grant defense services is not subject to the annual ceiling for grant defense articles contained in Section 512. This amount will be obligated or reserved in Fiscal Year 1967 and will be used to reimburse the USAF as the defense services are provided to Libya over a period of five years. Libya will make available personnel to be trained for operation and maintenance of the aircraft.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority A.I.D. Guidelines, 10-16-95
By Cb, NARA, Date 10-21-98

~~SECRET~~

2

Military assistance programmed for Libya during the period FY 1955-FY 1967 has totaled \$16.8 million. Modest quantities of equipment and training assistance have been provided for Libya's small army and embryonic air force under commitments made in 1962 and 1963. Funding of all materiel requirements under these commitments will be completed with the FY 1968 military assistance program.

Since 1954 we have provided a quid pro quo for our rights to maintain and use Wheelus in the form of cash payments of economic assistance of \$10 million annually from 1954 through 1964 and \$1 million annually since 1965. Formerly funded jointly by AID and USAF, the present \$1 million payment is entirely from USAF funds. From time to time, the Libyans have given indications that they consider the reduced level of this assistance to be an inadequate response to their continued hospitality to Wheelus. Under the present agreement governing U. S. rights at Wheelus the Libyans could terminate those rights upon one year's notice at any time after December 24, 1970. We consider, however, that we will require the use of the base for the foreseeable future and we would like to remain there beyond 1971.

The sale of F-5 aircraft was discussed first with the Government of Libya in 1964. However, the Libyans decided to defer the augmentation of their air force until recently. The Libyan Government of Prime Minister Maaziq now has decided that, owing to unsettled conditions in the area, Wheelus should remain as a United States base and the Libyans consider that for internal political purposes they need convincing evidence of the usefulness to Libya of continued USAF presence.

We believe that the provision of assistance to the Royal Libyan Air Force through the USAF at Wheelus would be a very effective way to promote the USAF tenure at Wheelus at minimum cost to the U. S. The Prime Minister has said he would prefer a grant of aircraft. We are endeavoring, however, to avoid any additional grant of equipment and propose instead to furnish the subject grant maintenance services through the USAF at Wheelus, as evidence of the value to Libya of continued USAF presence at the base.

Accordingly, I recommend that you sign the enclosed memorandum.

William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud

Enclosure:
Proposed Determination

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

31d

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1967

Presidential Determination
No. 67-18

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: Determination Permitting Military Assistance to the
Government of Libya

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of 1967, I hereby determine, pursuant to Section 512 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), that defense services for the program described in your memorandum may be furnished to the Government of Libya on a grant basis for other than internal security or civic action requirements.

You are requested, on my behalf, to give prompt notice of this action pursuant to Section 512 of the Act, to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

1/5/ Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4

By sf, NARA, Date 4/23/91

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

~~SECRET~~

31e

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Washington 25, D. C.

APR 6 1967

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

Honorable Charles L. Schultze
Director, Bureau of the Budget
Washington, D. C. 20503

Dear Charlie:

In forwarding for your consideration the recommendation that the President determine, under Section 512 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, that certain military assistance may be extended to Libya on a grant basis for purposes other than internal security or civic action, I would like to make the following observations.

For several years, the Government of Libya has looked to the United States to supply aircraft for the modernization of the Libyan Air Force. We have indicated on various occasions our willingness to sell Libya aircraft. We have also said that we would be willing to consider assisting in the improvement of Libya's defense capabilities, primarily through sales but not excluding the possibility of grant. We have had a military assistance program in Libya since Fiscal Year 1955.

When in 1966 the Libyans asked for firm costs of F-5 aircraft, our approach was to assume that Libya would make complete payment for the aircraft as well as all related services and facilities, thus avoiding U. S. expenditure of military assistance funds. When, upon receiving the aircraft prices, the Libyans asked how Wheelus might be helpful to them in the expansion of their Air Force, we sought to give this help, without utilizing military assistance, by offering to secure fully reimbursable contracts for the necessary support services, facilities and training. This approach would have lowered the price to Libya substantially.

We arrived at the present sales package, which includes a relatively small element of military assistance for maintenance requirements, after a specific request from the Libyan Prime Minister. His request was couched in terms of justifying continued Libyan hospitality to our

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority A.I.D. Guidelines, 10-16-95

By CB, NARA, Date 10-21-98

~~SECRET~~

2

installation, by pointing in Libyan councils to grant assistance from the U. S. We seek to link our grant maintenance assistance to the Libyan Air Force with the continued operation by the U. S. Air Force of a field level maintenance activity at Wheelus. We believe that this way of using military assistance funds will be very effective in directly promoting our objective of continued tenure at Wheelus.

Other options explored show less promise. Libya does not need economic assistance. Though we were prepared to offer credit assistance to Libya in connection with the sale, the Prime Minister has expressly stated that Libya does not desire credit. An increase in the present \$1 million annual payment would not link the activities of the Libyan Air Force at Wheelus to our own in the manner which both we and the Libyans believe most desirable.

Libya probably will procure equipment from other countries. The introduction of a third country's aircraft, and related technicians, into the Libyan Air Force operation at Wheelus Air Base, would complicate our relations with the Libyans and make for difficulties in USAF operations at Wheelus.

In discussing the future development of Libyan defensive capabilities, we have sought to advise the Libyans that they keep their purchases of military equipment to a level which they can sustain, considering their lack of trained manpower and the desirability of devoting the great preponderance of their resources to development purposes. In doing so, we have recognized that the Libyans intend to build up some independent defensive capability, which they are financially able to do. Their intention takes into account that their defense treaty with the UK will expire in 1973. We have been mindful also that the Libyan King and Government have sought to keep their military establishment small, while meeting the domestic political need for defensive capability. We believe that the high Libyan officials have accepted our advice in the spirit in which it was offered, and have reduced the requests they have made of us to manageable levels.

Finally, both the State and Defense Departments have consulted appropriate Congressional committees concerning our military assistance to Libya.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

William S. Gaud

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~*Pres file*

Saturday, April 8, 1967 -- 9:00 am

Mr. President:

This modest looking cable from Ceylon has an item of great interest: I believe it is the very first time any one has ever reported that Hanoi could conceive of "talks between GVN and National Liberation Front" as a way of ending the war. It may not be true; but, as you know, I have felt for a very long time that, if peace talks ever became serious, they would be in two parts:

- a Saigon-NLF negotiation;
- an international conference to re-establish the 1954 and 1962 Accords.

This should, therefore, be pursued; and, if there turns out to be any life in it, a natural time to bring it to a head would be the Buddhist birthday truce.

I shall follow through.

W. W. Rostow

Colombo 1856

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-394
By inf, NARA, Date 3-12-93

WWRostow:rlh

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

53-42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Action

NNNNVZ CZ CMJB469MJA 837JGA 411

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

EA

RR RUEHC

NLJ 91-396

DE RUMJGM 0508 0971055

By ju, NARA, Date 5-12-92

ZNY CCCCC

Info

R 071050Z APR 67

FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ COLOMBO 1856

006354

1967 APR 7 AM 7 53

SAH
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REF: COLOMBO 1849

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ACDA
AID

1. IN DISCUSSION WITH EMBOFF APRIL 7 ON PM SENANAYAKE'S VIETNAM PEACE PROPOSALS (REFTEL), MEA FOREIGN RELATIONS DIRECTOR WIJEGOONEWARDENA SAID CEYLON HAS BEEN GENUINELY INTERESTED IN DOING WHATEVER IT COULD RE VIETNAM PEACE SETTLEMENT. WHEN PM LEARNED (IN JANUARY OR FEBRUARY) OF THANT'S UPCOMING (APRIL 8-10) VISIT TO CEYLON AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF AREA, HE THOUGHT U THANT VISIT PROVIDED GOOD OCCASION FOR CEYLON TO TRY TO SEE WHAT IT COULD DO RE VIETNAM, WITH A VIEW TO PRESENTING U THANT WITH RESULTS OF EFFORT, IF ANY, AND ALLOWING HIM TO CARRY EFFORT FORWARD IF HE THOUGHT IT WORTHWHILE. WIJEGOONEWARDENA SAID GOC CONSIDERED U THANT BEST OF

PAGE 2 RUMJGM 0508 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL AGENTS IN VIETNAM PEACE SEARCH.

RSR

2. ACCORDINGLY, PM HAD INSTRUCTED CEYLON AMBASSADOR IN PEKING, ROBERT GUNAWARDENA, TO VISIT HANOI AND SOUND OUT NORTH VIETNAMESE ON SENANAYAKE'S TWO-STAGE PROPOSALS (AS REPORTED REFTEL AND COLOMBO 1802). GUNAWARDENA HAD SPENT 10 DAYS IN HANOI AND HAD TALKED WITH NUMBER OF TOP OFFICIALS. WIJEGOONEWARDENA SAID REACTION OF HANOI OFFICIALS TO CEYLONESE PROPOSALS WAS "NOT NEGATIVE" AND OFFICIALS HAD EXPRESSED HANOI'S WILLINGNESS TO USE GOOD OFFICES TO BRING ABOUT TALKS BETWEEN GVN AND NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT; HOWEVER, BOMBING WOULD HAVE TO STOP FIRST. WIJEGOONEWARDENA SAID GOC BELIEVED HANOI'S REACTION SUFFICIENTLY POSITIVE TO PROVIDE BASIS FOR FURTHER ACTION BY U THANT IF LATTER BELIEVES FOLLOW-UP WORTHWHILE. PM WILL INFORM U THANT OF ALL THAT TRANSPIRED AND LEAVE IT TO U THANT TO DECIDE ON NEXT MOVE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- COLOMBO 1856, APRIL 7

3. WIJEGOONEWARDENA STRESSED THAT CEYLON NOT PROPOSING ITSELF AS A MEDIATOR; MERELY WISHED TO BE HELPFUL IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE AND WOULD BE HAPPY MAKE CEYLON

PAGE 3 RUMJGM 0508 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVAILABLE AS SITE OF MEETINGS IF DESIRED.

4. EMBOFF ASKED WIJEGOONEWARDENA WHETHER GOC PROPOSAL LIMITING PARTICIPANTS IN TALKS TO GVN, VIET CONG AND HANOI WAS INTENDED TO EXCLUDE RECONVENING OF GENEVA CONFERENCE. WIJEGOONEWARDENA REPLIED IN NEGATIVE SAYING CEYLON PROPOSAL WAS ONLY RELATED TO PRELIMINARY MEETING; IT WAS FOR VIETNAMESE PARTICIPANTS IN SUCH A MEETING TO DETERMINE WHAT FURTHER STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN.

5. EMBOFF ALSO ASKED WHETHER AMBASSADOR GUNAWARDENA'S ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN PEKING OR ANYTHING HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN TOLD BY CHICOMS HAD BEEN FACTOR IN PM'S PEACE INITIATIVE. WIJEGOONEWARDENA REPLIED: "NO, NOT DIRECTLY; INITIATIVE WAS GEARED TO U THANT'S VISIT; HOWEVER, AMBASSADOR GUNAWARDENA FEELS THAT PEKING WOULD GO ALONG WITH CEYLON PROPOSALS."

6. IN RESPONSE FURTHER QUESTION, WIJEGOONEWARDENA SAID GOC HAD NOT BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT RE ITS PROPOSALS.

7. AMBASSADOR GUNAWARDENA LEFT COLOMBO APRIL 3 FOR RETURN TO PEKING.

GP -3. LYON
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

April 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: PL-480 Agreement with the Republic of China

Agriculture (Secretary Freeman) and AID (Administrator Gaud) request your authorization to negotiate a two-year, local currency agreement with the Republic of China (GRC) under PL-480 (Title I). We would sell the GRC cotton, tobacco and tallow (all in surplus supply) for \$37.5 million. Half the proceeds will be for our use and will help meet increasing costs in Taiwan related to our Vietnam effort. The other half would go to the GRC as a grant to be used in expanding its Project Vanguard (technical assistance to increase food production) in 23 less developed countries, mostly in Africa.

State (Acting Secretary Katzenbach) and Budget (Director Schultze) both strongly endorse this proposal (see attached memos). I concur.

GRC help to other countries in boosting food output is highly useful in:

-- impeding Peking's efforts to gain political and economic footholds in Africa;

-- boosting GRC prestige and strengthening its position in the UN and with other nations;

-- providing a good example of success for our own foreign aid programs by dramatizing Taiwan's progress;

-- increasing Taiwan's involvement and interest in the rest of the world and thereby moving it away from preoccupation with the Mainland.

The propos^a has clear benefits for us;

-- helps the War on Hunger:

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State for 7-5-78
By rg/lsp, NARA, Date 5-1-41

~~SECRET~~

-- helps our balance of payments through the use of local currency in Taiwan.

State and Agriculture have already taken soundings with Fulbright, Ellender, Morgan and Poage, none of whom raised any objection.

If you approve this proposal, Secretary Freeman will notify the two agriculture committees of the proposed agreement. It must then lie before them for 30 days before execution. We will also have to waive the statutory requirement that all foreign currency grants in non-excess currency countries be subject to appropriations.

We hope the 30-day waiting period will expire in time to announce the agreement when GRC Vice President Yen is in Washington (May 9-10).

Upon your approval, other key Congressional members will be consulted (leadership and Appropriations chairmen).

W. W. Rostow

Authorization granted ✓
Denied _____
See me _____

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

APR 8 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Taiwan P.L. 480 Agreement

In the attached memorandum, Secretary Freeman and Administrator Gaud request your authorization to negotiate a two-year local currency sales agreement with Taiwan in the amount of \$37.5 million for cotton, tobacco, and tallow, all of which are in surplus. Fifty per cent of the currency generated by the sale will go for U.S. uses and will help to offset our increased expenditures there related to Vietnam. The other fifty per cent of the currencies will be granted to the Government of Taiwan to expand its technical assistance to increase food production in other countries (Project Vanguard).

The proposal does represent a softening from our past P.L. 480 terms with Taiwan. The last P.L. 480 agreement in December 1964 was for about \$60 million, of which seventy-five per cent is to be repaid in dollars.

However, the proposed agreement supports a special purpose. Project Vanguard provides low cost and effective assistance to agriculture in 23 less developed countries, largely in Africa. This is useful to the Chinese in maintaining the votes they count on in the U.N. More importantly, our participation would help soften the impact of a changing U.S. China policy and keep Taiwan oriented outwardly rather than towards the mainland.

If you approve, Freeman will formally notify the two agriculture committees of the proposed agreement, and the proposal must then lie before these committees for 30 days prior to execution. We will also have to waive the statutory requirement that all foreign currency grants in non-excess currency countries be subject to appropriation.

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Authority OMB ltr 2/2/78

By rg/aj, NARA, Date 5-1-91

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Katzenbach has taken soundings with Senator Fulbright and Chairman Morgan; Freeman has done the same with Ellender and Representative Poage. They do not object. Upon your approval, other key members, including Mansfield, Hayden, Dirksen, McCormick, Mahon, and Ford, will be consulted.

In view of the benefits to the War on Hunger, to our China Policy, and to our balance of payments, I recommend that you approve the negotiation of this agreement with Taiwan.

(signed) Charles L. Schultze
Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachments

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with the Republic of China

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with the Republic of China a P.L. 480 sales agreement for the two years 1967 and 1968, comprising approximately 100,000 bales of cotton, 3,000 metric tons of tobacco, and 10,000 metric tons of tallow for 1967, and 100,000 bales of cotton, 2,300 metric tons of tobacco, and 14,000 metric tons of tallow for 1968. An initial payment of 1% in dollars will be required. Of the local currency received for the \$37,500,000, estimated at current market value, 50% will be reserved for United States uses and 50% used as a grant to enable the United States jointly with the Republic of China to expand technical assistance for agricultural development in other countries.

The Agricultural Commodities to be Programed

About 90% of the financing is allocated for cotton and tobacco which continue in substantial surplus in CCC inventory. U. S. tallow production is increasing and supplies are substantially in excess of normal utilization. Tallow prices have been declining and are now about 37% below the seasonal average of last year. Programing of these commodities together with the commercial import requirements provided in the agreement will make a substantial contribution to our exports of these commodities which are in abundant supply. Of the local currencies received in payment, 50% will be reserved for U. S. uses with dollar reimbursement to CCC.

Taiwan's Food Situation

The Republic of China has made significant progress in increasing agricultural yields in Taiwan over the last 15 years and is now able to meet its food requirements through its own production and commercial imports. For that reason, we have included no foodstuffs in this program.

Support for Chinese Assistance Programs

Since 1961, the Republic of China has conducted assistance programs in 23 friendly underdeveloped countries, primarily in Africa but also in Asia and Latin America, emphasizing demonstration and extension of

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority Agriculture Act 11/4/78
By rg/rs, NARA, Date 5-1-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

modern methods of producing food, particularly rice. The Republic of China's programs have been successful economically, and have been effective tools in maintaining its position in the United Nations. The resources furnished by the Republic of China include the foreign exchange costs of the program, an annual budgetary contribution equal to that expended from its own resources in Fiscal Year 1966, and the necessary trained personnel. The grant funds provided under this agreement will permit China, through mutual agreement with the United States, to expand this program without decreasing the resources available for continued economic development.

U. S. Interest in the Republic of China

The Republic of China is not a recipient of U. S. economic assistance. The 50% local currency reserved for U. S. uses would mean a reduction in the requirement for the purchase of local currency of about \$10 million in each year. No Cooley loans are proposed because: (a) this program is not P.L. 480 assistance to Taiwan; (b) the AID mission needed to administer these loans in Taiwan is phasing out; and (c) the reservation of funds for Cooley loans would deprive us of local currency needed for other purposes or reduce the funds available for increasing agricultural assistance overseas.

The Republic of China's Self-Help Efforts

The Republic of China's self-help efforts in Taiwan are a model of effective use of outside assistance in achieving economic growth. Agricultural production in Taiwan has grown, on an average, by 5.9% a year since the beginning of our economic assistance in 1950, due largely to policies which have made it possible for Taiwan's farmers to benefit from the increased production. Industrial production, particularly that of the private sector, has grown even more rapidly. An effective and purely voluntary family planning program has reduced the rate of population growth from 3.7% in 1956 to 2.7% in 1966.

Congressional Consultations

The Chairmen of the Agriculture and Foreign Affairs Committees of the Congress have been consulted informally on this program and they had no objection to our proceeding with it. When your approval is received, we intend to discuss it with other members of Congress in addition to the formal notification of the Chairmen of the Agriculture Committees.

William L. Sand

Administrator

Agency for International Development

[Signature]

APR 5 1967

Secretary

Department of Agriculture

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Date _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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33

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Public Law 480 Agreement with the Republic of China
Operation Vanguard

Secretary Freeman and AID Administrator Gaud, with my concurrence, are recommending that you authorize us to negotiate with the Republic of China a P. L. 480 Title I Sales Agreement. Their memorandum deals with details.

I would like to reinforce their recommendation with comment on how this agreement supports certain strategic objectives we have had in mind in our relations with the Republic of China.

We believe that, particularly in the African continent, the Republic of China has been a constructive influence in impeding Peking's efforts to gain a significant political and economic foothold. We believe that for the Republic of China to engage in foreign aid programs particularly in the field of agricultural development helps it to gain internationally that respect needed for it to preserve its seat and position in the United Nations. We believe, moreover, that Taiwan's own achievements in moving towards sustained economic growth independent of foreign assistance and its readiness to make contributions of its own to other less developed countries represent by example and performance a significant contribution to our own foreign assistance programs. This P. L. 480 agreement would directly contribute to the foregoing United States interests, and would be useful in giving us more flexibility in our UN China policy.

I am impressed

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Manual 11-22-78, MCL 7-19-79
By g/cap, NARA, Date 5-1-91

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

I am impressed by other features of the P. L. 480 program we propose. It is not economic assistance to Taiwan but instead a joint program which uses our agricultural resources in combination with Chinese talent and administration to further the War on Hunger, in ways that bear out the spirit of the new food act. The program, in addition, will contribute to reducing dollar outflow by generation of hard local currency resources in Taiwan needed to meet our requirement there in support of Viet-Nam and our Taiwan defense commitments.

Last July when the Secretary was in Taiwan, he and Ambassador McConaughy assured members of President Chiang's Government that we would deal favorably with arrangements they sought for what they described as an "exchange of resources" program in which the U.S. would extend P. L. 480 commodity assistance to enable the Republic of China to expand its foreign aid programs. Vice President C. K. Yen will be in Washington on May 9 and 10. I hope that we can have completed negotiations of the desired agreement prior to his arrival.

We have consulted with the Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations and Agriculture Committees and the House Foreign Affairs and Agriculture Committees who have no objection to our moving ahead. If you approve our recommendations we will complete consultations that we intend to have with other selected members of the Senate and House.


Acting Secretary

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday - April 8, 1967

Mr. President:

Venezuelan President Leoni has sent you the letter at Tab B. It describes the topics he wants to discuss with you at Punta del Este. As you might expect, it is all about petroleum.

I suggest that you send him the acknowledgement at Tab A.

I will give you a talking points paper at Punta del Este.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Acknowledgement to President
Leoni's letter of April 4, 1967.

Tab B - Letter from President Leoni.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-394
By lig, NARA, Date 3-12-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APR 9 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Ambassador Tejera Paria has delivered your letter concerning topics which you wish to discuss when we meet at Punta del Este.

I look forward to the Meeting of Presidents. I am reserving time in my schedule for a private talk with you. Hopefully your schedule will permit us to get together during the afternoon of Tuesday, April 11.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Raul Leon
President of the Republic of Venezuela
Caracas, Venezuela

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm
April 8, 1967

35
1. ~~copy~~
2. Pres file

Saturday - April 8, 1967

Mr. President:

Jamaican Prime Minister Sangster, who suffered a stroke last month, is sinking and is not expected to live many more days. His death may come after we leave for Punta del Este.

On a contingency basis I recommend that you --

1. Approve the condolence message at Tab A.

Approve ✓

Disapprove

See me

2. Designate one or both of the following to represent you at the funeral if foreign representatives are invited -- as seems likely:

Senator Edward Brooke ✓

Ex-Ambassador William C. Doherty ✓

We could leave action on both points with Brom Smith subject to a prior phone call to you at the Summit.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment
Tab A.

352

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL CONDOLENCE MESSAGE
(via Embassy Kingston)
TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF JAMAICA SIR CLIFFORD CAMPBELL
ON THE DEATH OF JAMAICAN PRIME MINISTER SANGSTER

"Your Excellency:

I am deeply saddened by the death of the distinguished Prime Minister of Jamaica. Many of us in the United States knew him as a trusted friend and dedicated public servant. His skilled leadership and selfless patriotism will be missed by the people of Jamaica.

Mrs. Johnson and I express fullest sympathy and condolences to the Government and people of Jamaica and to Mr. Sangster's family in their bereavement.

Lyndon B. Johnson "

April 8, 1967.

Mr. President:

Attached is a summary of the Vice President's talks with de Gaulle, Pompidou and Couve de Murville. This will supplement the Vice President's short report to you which we sent up earlier.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989
By OUR, NARA, Date 3-29-93

~~Secret~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

April 8, 1967.

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE.

France (April 7)

Meeting with General de Gaulle

I. East-West Relations.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-394
By ing, NARA, Date 3-12-93

de Gaulle:

- France has no basic conflict of interests either with the U.S. or the Soviet Union.
- The Soviets now appear to be looking for good relations with the West, possibly because of China.
- France wants to take advantage of this opportunity. What France is doing with the USSR has brought harm to no one.
- France favors U.S. efforts to improve relations with the USSR, and has nothing against arrangements (such as the Test Ban Treaty and NPT) we make with them.

Vice President:

- U.S. understands historical background of French-Russian relations.
- We approve and support French efforts to improve relations with the Soviets.
- But, collective defense, as developed by the West, is an essential element in pursuit of detente.

II. Germany and Eastern Europe.

de Gaulle:

- The Germans long thought (in close consultation with the U.S.) that threats might bring the Soviets to agree to reunification.
- They now seem to realize that reunification can only be achieved with Russian agreement.

- They still will have to recognize existing frontiers, give up territorial claims and convince people that Germany is no longer a military menace (which includes renunciation of any nuclear weapons). If they do this, then the USSR may eventually agree to some form of confederation.
- France agrees with the Soviet Union on the terms for German reunification.

III. Algeria.

de Gaulle:

- The French are aware of the extent of Soviet arms deliveries to Algeria, but he (de Gaulle) personally does not think these deliveries very important.
- The U. S. and the USSR seem to be distributing arms liberally throughout the world. A possible area of agreement between the two countries would be an undertaking to limit or abandon arms deliveries (the Vice President agreed with this).

IV. Nonproliferation Treaty.

de Gaulle:

- France is not taking any stand on the attitudes of others toward NPT.
- There are two factors in German adherence to the Treaty that are important to France: 1) NPT would limit the possibility of Germany acquiring nuclear weapons (which France completely supports); 2) NPT creates for the Germans a special and discriminatory position. This can create psychological problems for them.

Meetings with Pompidou and Couve de Murville

I. Kennedy Round.

Pompidou:

- We are entering a difficult period which all have put off as long as possible.

- There are three major problems: 1) U. S. tariffs are either very high or very low, while European tariffs are more uniform; 2) the American Selling Price is a serious problem for the European chemical industry; 3) it will be very difficult to arrive at a satisfactory result in the agricultural area (the Vice President noted here that he thought the results of the agricultural negotiations would make or break the Kennedy Round).

II. Nonproliferation Treaty.

Couve:

- Thought that virtually all major non-nuclear countries (Italy, Germany, Japan and India) would sign the NPT.
- The main problem is how to solve the issue of controls, i. e., the differences between EURATOM and IAEA inspection.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Sat., April 8, .,67
3:00 p.m.

37

MR. PRESIDENT:

The Vice President ends up here with an excellent press in Europe; and the Latin Americans take Fulbright's performance not too badly.

W. W. R.

Attachment "Worldwide Treatment of Current Issues" Wk Ending 4/7/67

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, April 8, 1967
12:00 noon

Pr. file

Mr. President:

Herewith the Vice President's
summary of his visit to Paris.

A more detailed summary of
substantive conversations will be sent
to you shortly.

W. W. Rostow

Brussels 5149

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 4/23/91

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Saturday, April 8, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT (Brussels, 5149
Vipto, 112)

SUBJECT: Summary, Paris Visit -- April 7:

I had a most cordial and frank discussion with General de Gaulle, before, during, and after luncheon at the Elysee.

The General asked me to bring you his best wishes. He knew and appreciated the burdens and responsibility which you bore. He emphasized the overriding basic friendship and common interests between our countries. I responded by saying that you thought highly of him, respected him as a man of great courage who would have his place in history. I pointed out to him that you had never, despite any differences in policy, said an unkind word about him.

I should add that General de Gaulle also expressed his high regard for General Eisenhower. He had come to know General Eisenhower well during World War II. He respected him not only as a man of arms, but as a man of peace.

During the luncheon, the General offered a warm toast to you. I responded by saying that, although we might disagree on details of policy and approach, we were united concerning basic values and objectives in the world. I praised the General for his leadership of France and for his personal greatness. Seated across the table, he was obviously moved. After the luncheon, he drew me aside to say that he very much appreciated our kind words concerning his nation and himself and that he believed it was important that we continue to communicate. I said that, if there were honest differences between us, it was doubly important that we communicate fully and frankly so that there would be no unnecessary misunderstandings.

It is clear that the General has his policies and we have ours, but I was impressed once more with the importance of minimizing the differences and maximizing the common ground lest our traditional French-American relationship be jeopardized in the future.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-394
By lig, NARA, Date 3-12-93

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

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The General's demeanor and approach seemed to me to be the most important aspect of my visit. He was in excellent health and was alert and in good humor.

You undoubtedly have seen press reports of street demonstrations. These were well organized by the Communist Party -- hecklers and chanters were in evidence during ceremonies at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and at the 50th anniversary observance of our entry in World War I. To illustrate the nature of the hecklers, there was heckling by these people during the French national anthem as well as our own. I would emphasize that these demonstrations were unimportant as compared with the warm good will shown us otherwise. All the demonstrations are part of the worldwide communist-led anti-Vietnam propaganda.

~~SECRET - NODIS~~**PRESERVATION COPY**

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to King of Thailand

The King and Queen of Thailand have accepted June 27-28 as the dates of their official visit to Washington.

Because of the strong Thai sense of form and in view of the personal ties between you and the King following your October visit to Bangkok, a formal letter of invitation would be desirable. A suggested text is attached.

We will telegraph the message and send the signed original by pouch.

W. W. Rostow

Message approved _____

Disapproved _____

WJJ:hg

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12812, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Comm. on Int. Affs., Feb. 24, 1983
By lg, NARA, Date 4/23/91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 10, 1967

Your Majesty:

I was delighted to learn that Your Majesties plan to travel to the United States and Canada in June of this year. It is with genuine pleasure that I invite you to visit Washington during this time and to be our official guests here.

I understand that the dates June 27 and 28 would be convenient for such a visit from Your Majesties' point of view. We would be most happy to receive you at that time.

Mrs. Johnson and I will be most appreciative of this opportunity to reciprocate some of the gracious hospitality shown to us during our own visit to Bangkok last October.

Yours sincerely,

LBJ

His Majesty
Bhumibol Adulyadej
King of Thailand
Bangkok

LBJ:WJJ:hg

2. Pres file

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israeli Aid Package

State and Defense now agree on a package. It doesn't give the Israelis everything they asked for and runs lower than last year. However, on all but one item, I think they'd have to admit we've been as responsive as possible given our limitations.

Katzenbach recommends about \$48 million (Israel's requests total \$76 million). We've tried to be as generous as possible in balance of payments type aid because Eshkol faces unemployment after deliberately slowing economic growth to shake out uncompetitive industry, narrow Israel's trade imbalance and get ready for association with the Common Market. The package includes:

- \$23.5 million in PL 480 (feedgrains, oil, maybe tobacco, no wheat). Agriculture is thinking of 75% dollar sale. Last year dollar sale was only 25%. I'd go only to 50% this year.
- \$9 million in credit for tank and Hawk missile spares. Defense opposes credit for normal maintenance items, but would make an exception to beef up the package. I recommend this inconspicuous military help.
- \$5 million in covert aid for Israel's anti-Communist African programs. This is a private request from Eshkol to help with his budget and doubles last year's program. [REDACTED]
- About \$10 million in Ex-Im loans. We can't assign an exact price tag yet because we don't have details on the project. But we'd invite the Israelis to submit a fertilizer project to Ex-Im instead of to AID.
- We'd offer to accept Israeli bids on AID off-shore procurement for 12 months. Though the price tag is relatively small, this is important in helping put unemployed Israelis to work. Defense is also increasing procurement in Israel. Eshkol's Finance Minister has made a strong pitch for this.

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 03-76

By iso, NARA, Date 11-3-03~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

--We'd give the Israelis Hawk missile capability to do all their own maintenance. This costs us nothing but cuts them in on some classified data.

The attached chart shows where this would put us in relation to past years. Since last year's plane sale was unusually high, I think we can justify this FY 1967 level. We still have the desalting project to talk out, and to emphasize that I recommend we move quickly in naming Bunker's successor.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Katzenbach recommends we turn them down on two items:

--They asked for \$20 million in Development Loans on top of the \$6 million you authorized last fall from an old loan. Israel is doing so well that it ought to be using Ex-Im rather than the softer AID loans. Congress is grumbling about adding Israel to the list when it's trying to limit the number of countries receiving aid. Last year we split their request of \$20 million and offered \$10 million each from AID and Ex-Im. I think this is the year to get out of AID lending and refer them entirely to Ex-Im. They'll gripe, but this is reasonable.

Approve _____ Give \$5-10 million _____

--Far tougher to turn down is their request for 200 Armed Personnel Carriers (\$7.4 million). Harman tells us informally that Eshkol is personally interested and that a turndown will trigger a violent reaction from Jerusalem--and by implication from Israel's friends here.

I agree with State and Defense that we can't give these via grant. A grant would amount to starting a Military Assistance Program in Israel, since all previous deals have been credit or commercial sales. This would be a major change in our policy not to be a major arms supplier in the Middle East.

The real issue is whether to offer a credit sale instead. We understand informally they'd settle for that. Katzenbach earlier recommended that we sell 100. Now he agrees with Defense to recommend against supplying APC's on any terms. The argument:

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- We ought to keep the brakes on the Middle East arms race. When we completed the Israeli aircraft deal in March 1965, we told Nasser that sale completed a round of escalation. We said we didn't foresee further sales soon unless the Soviets made more. As far as we know, they haven't, and our December sale to Jordan was too small to affect the balance.
- We don't want to become Israel's sole military supplier, but Israel is trying to maneuver us into that position. In our aircraft deal, we made them agree they'd continue to look to Europe for most of their equipment. Good APC's--unlike the aircraft--are available in Europe at reasonable prices. Israel has 1,000 old ones, and selling even 100 opens the door to our modernizing the whole line.
- We should be tough as long as they play coy on their nuclear position. Eshkol has invited our technicians to visit Dimona on 22 April. It will be more than a year since our last visit. Only when they report will we know whether we should use all our leverage to make them agree to visits every six months.
- We don't think Israel needs APC's urgently. The 1,000 in operation are World War II vintage and will have to be replaced in five years or so. But the Israelis do a remarkable job of keeping equipment running, and the JCS feels that immediate modernization is not essential.
- We shouldn't compensate the Israelis for our Jordan package since that resulted directly from their attack. They won't take seriously our counsel of restraint if we reward them now.

The strongest argument for a turndown in my book is trying to get a grip on the Middle East arms race. The only approach that could work is an understanding with the USSR to stop big shipments. We've probed before, and the Soviets have shown little interest. But in the context of persuading the Israelis to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they might show more. This is a long shot. But if you decide you can stand the heat, a pause in sales might be worth a try. We could stand up to Israel's friends confident that we're not just stalling. If by fall, the NPT has come to naught, then we'd reconsider.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 4 -


I've double-checked with Katzenbach, and he doesn't feel we'd be reneging on a commitment to refuse the APC's. Even so, if you approve a turndown, the way we couch our answer will be important. The spirit of our response should be more "not now" than a flat "no."

My suggestion is to have Katzenbach give them our answer. I can background Abe Feinberg, but the official request came through Katzenbach, and I think we ought to try building him as our sympathetic but firm spokesman to the Israelis. The key problem in US-Israeli relations is that the Israelis like to think they have a special relationship with us, while the State and Defense professionals treat them and the Arabs with the same cool even-handedness. Katzenbach should be warmer and more candid, yet still keep this in official channels.

W. W. Rostow

Approve your formulation for refusing APC's _____
We ought to sell 100 _____
See me _____

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



DECLASSIFIED

FISCAL YEARS

SECRET

Authority, NLS 91-320
 By perip NARA, Date 3-6-92

A.I.D. July 18, 1966

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-394

By ing, NARA, Date 3-12-93

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, April 7, 1967

7:30 A.M.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Ambassador Pat Dean came in today to discuss his call on you, now tentatively scheduled for 10:30 Monday morning.

He is calling under instruction from the Prime Minister. The subject is the alleged "breakdown in communications" during the Kosygin week, about which Wilson talked to me at great length in London (Tab A).

The truth is that Pat believes that Wilson should not be pushing this any further, and he is extremely anxious that his call on you not make things worse.

I have explored with him the precise nature of the "breakdown" and stated it as clearly as I can (Tab B).

I recommend, therefore, that:

-- ~~you let him state his mission;~~

-- ~~regret that the Prime Minister feels there was a breakdown in communications during that week -- a feeling you cannot share since you personally monitored all responsible communications from this Government to the Prime Minister and will do so in the future;~~

-- ~~express your gratitude for the valiant effort of the Prime Minister during that week and for his stand on Viet Nam;~~

-- ~~express the hope that Britain, in its role as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, can make a contribution to the bringing about of peace;~~

-- ~~but explain that, of course, the Prime Minister will understand that none of us know by what route the possibility of peace may be brought about; and you will have to judge that in the light of the opportunities and circumstances which may emerge.~~

I believe that kind of a session will give Pat enough to send a positive cable back and close the incident.

TOP SECRET/SUNFLOWER Attachments

Walt R.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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Feb. 25, 10:03AM

~~TOP SECRET~~ LONDON 6894

MODIS MARIGOLD-SUNFLOWER PLUS

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

REF: LONDON 6893

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE FROM WALT ROSTOW

1. HERewith A BRIEF WRAP-UP, STARTING AT THE END, WITH TWO HOURS WITH WILSON, WHICH BEGAN, AS WITH BROWN, WITH EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION. BRITISH EFFORTS FOR PEACE DURING KOSYGIN VISIT.

A. THE MAIN POINT OF HIS INTERVIEW WITH ME WAS TO GET OFF HIS CHEST HIS FRUSTRATIONS WITH THE WEEK WITH KOSYGIN. HIS VIEW IS THAT THERE WAS A "BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATIONS." WE DID NOT REACT NEGATIVELY TO HIS TUESDAY A-B FORMULATION AND THEN OVERTOOK HIS FRIDAY PROPOSAL. THE FINAL EFFORT TO REDRESS THE SITUATION INEVITABLY ASSUMED THE FORM OF AN ULTIMATUM." HE SAID WE MUST CLEAR UP THIS PROBLEM OF "COMMUNICATION" BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

B. I EXPLAINED THAT ON FRIDAY WE HAD EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT NO MESSAGE WOULD BE DELIVERED UNTIL WE RESPONDED. BUT, IN GENERAL, I DID NOT DEBATE DETAILS OR REACT STRONGLY. I LET HIM USE MY PRESENCE TO UNLOAD HIS FEELINGS RATHER THAN PUT THEM ON PAPER TO WASHINGTON, ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE WAS PLANNING TO SEND MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT.

C. BENEATH IT ALL WAS A RANKLING THAT WE DID NOT CUT HIM IN FULLY ON THE DIRECT CHANNEL. HE ASKED IF WE HAD HEARD ANYTHING ON THAT CHANNEL AND IF IT WAS STILL ACTIVE. I REPLIED THAT WE HAD THE SAME LANGUAGE AS IN THE MESSAGE TO THE POPE AND THE CHANNEL WAS "NOT NOW ACTIVE."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-351

By ing, NARA, Date 1-30-96

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- LONDON 6894 NODIS MARIGOLD-SUNFLOWER PLUS

D. WHEN I PUT THE GENERAL POSITION THAT HANOI COULD HAVE RESPONDED IN ANY ONE OF A NUMBER OF WAYS OVER PREVIOUS WEEKS IF IT WISHED TO END THE WAR AND THAT THERE WAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT IT WISHED TO DO SO AT THIS STAGE, HE SAID THAT RAPACKI ALSO TOOK THE VIEW THAT HANOI NOW REGARDED NEGOTIATIONS AS "DEFEAT" AND WAS NOT READY. WHEN I SAID HANOI MIGHT BE LOOKING TO KEEPING THE WAR GOING UNTIL 1963, AGAIN HE SAID RAPACKI TOOK A SIMILAR VIEW, BUT HE RETURNS TO THE POSITION THAT DURING THE WEEK IN LONDON KOSYGIN FOR THE FIRST TIME "WAS READY TO MOVE."

E. INCIDENTALLY, RAPACKI GAVE THE BRITISH AN ACCOUNT OF MARIGOLD THAT THEY WISH TO CHECK OUT WITH US.

F. WILSON DID NOT REFER TO THE NEW ACTIONS I HAD COMMUNICATED TO BROWN FROM STATE 143029; ALTHOUGH WILSON WAS IMMEDIATELY INFORMED. BUT HIS PROBLEM WITH VIET-NAM IS CLEAR: HE HAS A QUITE STRONG ANTI-VIET-NAM WING IN THE LABOR PARTY; BOMBING THE NORTH IS MORE WIDELY UNPOPULAR IN BRITAIN; AND WILSON FEELS HE MUST KEEP MOVING IN A PEACE POSTURE OR THE BASIS FOR OVER-ALL SUPPORT OF THE U.S. POSITION WILL SLIP AWAY FROM HIM. WE SHALL BE HEARING FROM HIM ABOUT HIS PROBLEMS WITH "ESCALATION," I WOULD GUESS.

G. I LEFT PRETTY INDELIBLY THESE THREE POINTS:

(1) THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSIBILITIES TO OUR 500,000 MEN AND OUR FIGHTING ALLIES;

(2) THE DANGER TO OUR POLITICAL BASE AT HOME OF PEACE HOPES THAT FAIL;

(3) THE DANGER OF PANMUNJOM-TYPE NEGOTIATIONS, UNDERLINING FROM THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE THAT WE SAW NO "SERIOUS" WILL TO END THE WAR; THAT, RATHER THAN TALK FOR ITS OWN SAKE WAS OUR OBJECTIVE. (INCIDENTALLY, HE SAID HE TALKED TO RAPACKI ABOUT U.S. MEMORIES OF PANMUNJOM.)

H. ASIDE FROM VIET-NAM, IT IS EUROPE WHICH IS, OF COURSE, ON THE MINDS OF THE BRITISH. DESPITE BRAVE WORDS FROM WILSON AND BROWN ON THEIR FEELING THAT THE GENERAL WILL NOT VETO UK ENTRANCE INTO THE COMMON MARKET THERE IS A SENSE OF POTENTIAL MAJOR CRISIS IN EUROPEAN AND ATLANTIC AFFAIRS JUST BENEATH THE SURFACE STEMMING FROM THE CHARACTER OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND THE ROLE OF STRAUSS. SPECIFICALLY, IT IS FOCUSSED ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- LONDON 6894 NODIS MARIGOLD-SUNFLOWER PLUS

(1) THE OFFSET NEGOTIATIONS WILL FAIL, THEY WILL THEN CERTAINLY PULL OUT TROOPS, AND THE MILITARY ALLIANCE WILL UNRAVEL;

(2) THE GERMANS WILL NOT FIGHT THE FRENCH HARD ENOUGH TO SAVE ANYTHING FROM THE KENNEDY ROUND;

(3) THE NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUE WILL EITHER YIELD A FAILURE OR AN ATMOSPHERE WHERE THEIR ENTRANCE INTO EUROPE WILL BE EASIER FOR DE GAULLE TO FRUSTRATE, AND THE KENNEDY ROUND EASIER TO ABORT.

I. IF THE BRITISH HAVE ANY HOPE IN THIS SITUATION IT CENTERS ABOUT A WEAKENING OF DE GAULLE VIA THE FORTHCOMING FRENCH ELECTIONS, ALTHOUGH SOBERLY DISCUSSED THE EVIDENCE THEY HAVE DOES NOT SUGGEST RADICAL CHANGE IN DE GAULLE'S POLITICAL BASE.

J. BOTH HEALEY AND WILSON INTRODUCED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEIR FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND RELATED DOMESTIC SITUATION MAY REQUIRE THEM TO RAISE AGAIN THE EAST OF SUEZ PROBLEM.

K. I CONCLUDE THAT WE SHALL NEED AN ENTERPRISING EUROPEAN POLICY IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD TO HOLD THE SHOW TOGETHER; AND THE KEY LIES IN OUR ULTIMATE RELATIONS TO AND LEVERAGE IN BONN.

L. PHIL KAISER WILL BE FILING A FULL REPORT OF CONVERSATIONS WITH BROWN, HEALEY AND TREND. (EMBTel 6893).

GP-3. KAISER
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

41h
TAB B

The Essence of the Breakdown in Communications

1. On the night of February 6 we drafted to London a formula involving "an assured stoppage of infiltration" and also the Ho Chi Minh letter with the "I am assured" language.

2. On Tuesday, February 7, Wilson on his own explored verbally an A - B formula in which we would "recognize the need for a first and visible step...the cessation of bombing." Then there would be simultaneous stopping of infiltration and U. S. troop movements into South Viet Nam. In the attached memorandum I immediately flagged this shift of Wilson to a new position after talking with Secretary Rusk.

3. Since Wilson had said it and there was nothing more to do, we did not go back to him and say what we, perhaps, should have said; namely, that he had moved into this position without our assent.

4. Nothing then happened until the morning of February 10 when Cooper reported that Kosygin had indicated (in Wilson's judgment) some interest in the A - B formula and asked for it in writing. Cooper cabled that "guidance was needed urgently" on this A - B formula, which by that time Wilson had put in writing.

5. We redrafted it and sent it back; but by that time Wilson had already given it to Kosygin and then was put in the embarrassing position of having to give him a different formula, this time vouched for by yourself.

6. In talking with Wilson it was clear to me that he thought that, because Cooper was available for helping to draft the A - B formula of February 7 and 10, he could go ahead.

7. I am convinced in my mind that the weakness in communication here was Wilson's moving ahead on the basis of Cooper's knowledge of the previous character of the A - B formula. And the lesson to be drawn is that we never again deal in such matters unless you personally clear all communications.

8. I told Pat Dean that we honestly did not understand Wilson's position because we had clearly given him the "assured stoppage of infiltration" formula, and if he were to move into any other formulations, surely he should have checked back to you.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jm, NARA, Date 3-27-98

Walt R.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

412
attest to
B

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/SUNFLOWER~~

Tuesday, February 7, 1967 -- 8:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

We have a problem: real but soluble.

The British took our proposal of last night and put it into A -- B form; that is:

- first bombing halt;
- then simultaneous stopping of infiltration and troop movements.

That is not how we stated it last night; or to Hanoi today.

The reason: we gave Wilson and Brown the A -- B formula and told them to peddle it in Moscow and, again, on this occasion.

I talked with Sec. Rusk and he is confident that if they, in fact, buy the A -- B formula we can work it out to protect our interests.

I believe it can be done if we're short on the time-gap between A and B and mighty hard on verification.

If they buy anything, which I doubt, they'll buy the A -- B formula rather than the tougher formula to Hanoi -- where at lunch we virtually reversed the A and B But that's a good initial bargaining position to be in -- if bargaining it gets to be.

Walt. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *JW* NARA, Date 3-27-98

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/SUNFLOWER~~

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/SUNFLOWER

DECLASSIFIED

LONDON 6360 Feb. 7, 1967

Authority UK Guidelines JNLJ 91-396
By fw, NARA, Date 3-27-98

For the Secretary and Harriman from Cooper

1. With Ambassador Bruce went to Downing Street for briefing on afternoon session. Present were Wilson, Burke, Trend, Palliser, and Murray.
2. The earlier part of the afternoon session was devoted to continuation of Soviet-British bilateral issues and only an hour or so devoted to Vietnam. Kosygin did not table a draft message to the President as he said he would do. Rather, he gave a pro-forma restatement of his earlier position on importance of the Vietnamese statements to Burchett.
3. Wilson read from his prepared briefing notes. The exposition of the Phase A - Phase B formula was changed from the version contained in my para. 5 London 6329. It was felt that it would be worth spelling this out in the simplest possible terms. The final text follows:

"Extract from statement by British Prime Minister at meeting with Mr. Kosygin on Feb. 7, 1967

....I am now satisfied that the Americans would now be prepared to move to further actions to strengthen mutual confidence if they were able to secure some assurance that this move would be reciprocated by the other side. For instance, I believe that they are now seeking to get word to Hanoi on the following lines. They recognize the need for a first and visible step. They further recognize that this step must mean the cessation of the bombing. This I believe they would do, and they recognize that it must be presented as being done unconditionally. Therefore we have to use our ingenuity to divorce in presentation the stopping of the bombing from the consequential actions. Yet you and I know that the consequential actions are essential if we are to get the bombing stopped.

The consequential actions are as follows. The United States are willing to stop the build-up of their forces in the South if they are assured that the movement of North Vietnamese forces from the North to the South will stop at the same time. Essentially therefore the two stages are kept apart. But because the United States Government know that the second stages will follow, they will therefore be able first to stop the bombing, even if there is a short period between the first stage and the actions to be taken by both sides in the second stage. There would be balanced concessions in the second stage; the first stage would be carried out by the United States alone; but the United States would only carry out the first stage because they would know that the second stage would follow within a short period of time.

The entry of American reinforcements to Vietnam can be easily observed. Therefore there could be no doubt on the part of the North Vietnamese that the Americans were keeping their part of the bargain.

(London 6360)

The North Vietnamese action in the second stage would be seen as in response to the United States action in the second stage but it would be the result of a prior secret assurance."

4. Kosygin showed considerable interest in this formulation. He evidently had not understood it when Brown presented it to him last November. He asked Wilson to repeat it and then asked Wilson to deliver the text to him in writing this evening. This has been done. The British are virtually certain that Kosygin is going to transmit this to Hanoi. They hope that on Thursday afternoon when talks resume Kosygin will have a reply from Hanoi.

5. I was asked if we were sending a similar message to Hanoi. I said that I could not say for sure, but the implication of the President's communication to the Prime Minister was that such a message would be sent. The British hope that if any questions arise as to differences in the formulation of Phase A and Phase B as worked out today in London, and the formulation forwarded to Hanoi by Washington, Hanoi be told that the British text was authoritative in substance, although there may be stylistic or translation differences from the U.S. version.

Friday, April 7, 1967 at 11 AM

Mr. President:

It might be useful, following your noon meeting with the NATO Defense Ministers to release some "Presidential remarks" to the Ministers.

I would suggest the text at Tab A. It has been cleared by McNamara.

If you approve this release, you will want to use it in your closing remarks to the Ministers.

As an opener, before turning the meeting over to McNamara, you may wish to make a short statement on the following themes:

- Establishment of the Nuclear Planning Group is a big forward step in the organization of the Alliance;
- It demonstrates NATO's will to come to grips with the tough issues of organizing nuclear defense;
- Bob McNamara tells me that your deliberations have been most productive. I look forward to receiving Bob's final report;
- You can be certain of the enthusiastic cooperation of the United States Government in this important venture.

Walt and I will plan to sit in. A list of participants is at Tab B.

Francis M. Bator

Use the release at Tab A _____

No release _____

Speak to me _____

EXCERPTS FROM REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE
NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP

Note: NATO's Nuclear Planning Group consists of the Ministers of Defense of seven countries: Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Secretary General of NATO serves as Chairman.

Gentlemen, the first meeting of the NPG is a landmark in the history of the Atlantic Community. It reflects a cooperative approach to the problem of nuclear deterrence, which recognizes our common interests and responsibilities.

I think this meeting has demonstrated that we are ready to share with you the full range of information and analysis related to nuclear planning. We firmly believe that joint planning is the best guarantee of effective deterrence. If the Atlantic nations can handle this awesome military power intelligently, prudently, responsibly and together, it will continue to be a mighty force for peace.

NATO remains the world's greatest international peacekeeping force -- and its most successful. In Europe and the Atlantic area, it is crystal clear that military aggression cannot pay. The enterprise in which you gentlemen are engaged is a further assurance that it never will pay.

Largely because of NATO's success, it is now possible to push ahead together with the positive works of peace in Europe. We can begin bridges to the East; we can try to lower that ugly line of walls and watchtowers that defaces the map of Europe. We can seek to resolve some of the bitter controversies which have so long divided neighbor from neighbor.

But none of this can or will happen without a strong NATO. Until we have reached the end of the long road to a permanent settlement in Europe, the military strength of the Atlantic Alliance will be a vital link in the security of all free men.

We are very happy to have had you here as our guests this week. We look forward to many further meetings. For, as I said last October, "The Alliance must become a forum, a forum for increasingly close consultations. These should cover the full range of joint concerns -- from East-West relations to crisis management."

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP
April 7, 1967
12 Noon

List of Participants

U.S.

Secretary McNamara

Harlan Cleveland - U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council

NATO

Manlio Brosio, - Secretary General of NATO and Chairman
of the Nuclear Planning Group

CANADA

Edgar Ritchie - Canadian Ambassador to the U.S. and Deputy
Principal Delegate to the Washington NPG Meeting

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Gerhard Schroeder - Minister of Defense

ITALY

Roberto Tremelloni - Minister of Defense

THE NETHERLANDS

Lt. Gen. Willem den Toom - Minister of Defense

TURKEY

Ahmet Topaloglu - Minister of National Defense

UNITED KINGDOM

Denis Healey - Secretary of State for Defense

Friday, April 7, 1967
7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

I gather from Marv that you wanted to take another look at this tonight, in the light of the changes you directed that we make.

W. W. Rostow

April 7, 1967

Mr. Chairman, Fellow Chiefs of State, Ladies and Gentlemen:

We have come to Punta del Este not only as the leaders of twenty-one governments, but as representatives of the more than four hundred million human beings who live in this hemisphere.

Our people are watching what we do here because they know that the decisions we take--or fail to take--will have a direct bearing on their lives in years to come.

Their expectations--and history--place a great responsibility upon us.

We meet as friends and neighbors seeking to advance the common destiny of the Americas--in the equality that true friendship creates.

Since the representatives of our nations met here almost six years ago to sign the Charter of the Alliance for Progress, more than 85 million children have been born in our hemisphere.

By the year 2000--little more than three decades away--the population of our hemisphere is expected to double.

It is primarily for this new generation of Americans--born into the last half of our turbulent century--that we meet here today.

History has cast us in the proud role of architects, but this is also a role which imposes heavy obligations if we are to build

the Americas to our ideals and specifications.

This is why, if you will permit me, I would speak today not only to you, my fellow presidents assembled here, but beyond you to the youth of our countries--to the students in the schools and universities, to the young people on the farms and ^{-the ~~factories~~ *factories*} in the new factories and in the civil service of our governments--to those who are moving into their time of responsibility.

This is the message I bring to them:

All that has been dreamed in the years since this Alliance started--all the promise it offers--will be as nothing unless the fire which lit the hearts of those who launched it warms yours as well.

You grew in a world astir with revolution. Under the age-old crust of indifference, hopes as old as humanity struggled for expression. Men of many lands demanded release from the ancient prisons of poverty and ignorance, disease and despair. Yours was the time, and yours was the world, in which it became clear beyond dispute that those demands would be heard at last.

In some parts of the world revolutions were fought with force and with fire. On an island in this hemisphere, and in jungles half the world away, such revolutions brought with them new and greater tyrannies and evils.

In your countries, the revolution to fill the people's needs and expectations was undertaken with energy and determination, guided by reason and persuasion, not by emotion and terror. This was the fulfillment of democracy's promise--participation in development by every community and every sector of the people, and cooperation beyond national frontiers for the mutual benefit of all people.

In an age of violence, the Alliance for Progress was a bold affirmation of man's ability to do what is right--because it is right, and not because action is forced by guns fired in anger or subversion. It proved what many of us dared to hope--that true revolutions can start and be carried through to completion in peace and freedom.

We who presently hold the reins of executive authority are trustees for this coming generation.' Our challenge is to press forward with this peaceful revolution. The progress achieved so far is written across the face of the hemisphere. It can be seen in new school houses where hundreds of thousands of children, who a decade ago had no place to go, now learn their lessons. It is projected in the statistics of new health protection for tens of millions. Power plants and factories, irrigation for arid lands, and roads across the mountainsides, all testify to our common commitment.

But none knows better than we that the pace is not fast enough.

The work has only begun. Our common task is to:

- establish new and higher goals;
- propose the measures of policy and instruments of administration to achieve them, and
- enlist the active participation of our peoples -- the local communities, the rural cooperatives, the labor unions, the creative talents of our scientists and educators and educators and our writers and artists.

In forging our decisions, we know that there are no magic formulas for economic and social development. Modern nations are not built by slogans or rhetoric or resolutions. There is no substitute for hard decisions and hard work.

But we also know that through a common effort far more can be achieved than by any of us in isolation.

The decisions we can take together involve a web of

- public and private actions at the national level;
- common action among the Latin American nations;
- inter-American cooperation, and
- solidarity among us in world economic policies affecting Latin America's capacity for growth.

I speak to you as only a junior partner in this common effort. The cause of Latin American development is essentially the cause of the citizens and governments of your countries.

I come here as the representative of some 200 million people whose future is linked with yours and who are committed to help in this great enterprise. We are prepared to continue our assistance and to expand it in response to your needs and action. But the assistance of the United States will be of value only as it reinforces the determination of each Latin American nation and the growing unity which infuses our hemisphere.

You will be forging a great new common market in Latin America to expand the base for your industrialization, your greater participation in world trade, and to broaden economic opportunities for your own people.

You will design and join forces to build the great multinational projects which will open up the inner frontiers of Latin America and provide the physical basis for Bolivar's dream of continental unity.

We can--and we will--help in easing the adjustments required to create the common market and in bringing the multinational projects from blueprint to reality. We will work together to improve Latin America's trading opportunities in the world.

But it is your task to see to it that maximum advantage is taken of these opportunities.

Through national and international efforts alike, we stand ready to work with you in massive assaults on illiteracy, disease and poverty. Modern techniques must replace ancient methods on the farm. New methods of education must open the classroom to those who have been denied adequate schooling. Latin America must become a full partner in mankind's greatest adventure, the application of science and technology to the conquest of those material barriers which cripple the individual spirit.

We are your allies in these efforts because the Americas are bound by common history and share a common destiny. In the past our hemisphere was the first to hold aloft the banner of national independence. Today we are linked in a new form of interdependence.

Our discussions and decisions here will inevitably be couched in the technical terms of trade and developmental policies. But behind these impersonal terms stands the reality of individual men, women, and children, whose lives can be transformed by effective, creative innovation.

In the last five years, ten million new jobs were created in Latin America. In the next five years there must be:

1. 15 million more, and better, jobs.
2. Giant strides toward the goal of primary schooling for every child.
3. A doubling of high school and university enrollments.
4. A 30 per cent increase in food output.
5. A lifting of standards of nutrition to meet the needs of the growing population.
6. The creation of an export surplus to help pay for needed imports of machinery and raw materials for growing industries.

Health plans can eradicate the ancient endemic diseases and drastically reduce infant and child mortality; help plan families; educate the young and make them, in body and mind, the most effective citizens their God-given powers would permit them to be.

This is the promise and the challenge of the Alliance for Progress in the years that lie before us.

I have traveled to Punta del Este to pledge my country's support to our joint efforts to achieve these goals. But I have come here as well in the hope that the message of promise contained in our decisions will leap from this city across the mountains and the miles to touch the idealism which lives in the hearts of the youth of all of the Americas.

But none know better than we that the pace is not fast enough. The work has only begun. Our common task is to:

- establish new and higher goals;
- propose the measures of policy and instruments of administration to achieve them, and
- enlist the active participation of our peoples--the local communities, the rural cooperatives, the labor unions, the creative talents of our scientists and educators and our writers and artists.

In forging our decisions, we know that there are no magic formulas for economic and social development. *Modern nations* ~~We know that~~ *are not built by slogans or rhetoric or resolutions.* ~~modern slogans inevitably create illusions followed by disillusion and disaster.~~ There is no substitute for hard decisions and hard work. *g* But we also know that through a common effort far more can be achieved than by any of us in isolation.

The decisions we can take together involve a web of

- public and private actions at the national level;
- common action among the Latin American nations;
- inter-American cooperation, and
- solidarity among us in world economic policies affecting Latin America's capacity for growth.

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in body and mind, the most effective citizens their God-given powers would permit them to be

the young

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


April 8, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Ambassador Tejera Paris has delivered your letter concerning topics which you wish to discuss when we meet at Punta del Este.

I look forward to the Meeting of Presidents. I am reserving time in my schedule for a private talk with you. Hopefully your schedule will permit us to get together during the afternoon of Tuesday, April 11.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Raul Leoni
President of the Republic of Venezuela
Caracas, Venezuela

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, April 7, 1967 -- 10:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk called me last night just before he went to the airport. He asked me to put Bill Gaud's name up to you again. He said that he would have a "major problem" -- unspecified -- if Gaud was not on the Delegation.

When I probed it carefully this morning, it comes to this: Bill Gaud claims that in making his AID presentation, he needs to have the feeling from what transpired from the Summit, which only being present would permit.

I had already spoken to Gaud explaining why you had thought it wiser for him to stay home and work on the Hill during that week.

W. W. Rostow

Put Gaud on Delegation _____

Still no _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rlh

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12812,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR 18, 1983.

BY 146 ON 4-30-91

47
Pres file

47a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, April 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is Secretary Rusk's recommendation concerning the official delegation to the Summit Meeting. Except for the addition of David Bronheim, Deputy Coordinator for the Alliance, the names are the same as we discussed this morning. On the basis of that conversation, our delegation would be:

The President
Secretary Rusk
Ambassador to Uruguay Henry A. Hoyt
US Representative to the Council of the OAS
Sol M. Linowitz
USIA Director Leonard H. Marks
Special Assistant for Science and Technology
Donald F. Hornig
Special Assistant to the President
Walt W. Rostow
Press Secretary to the President
George E. Christian
Assistant Secretary Anthony M. Solomon
Assistant Secretary Lincoln Gordon

Do you also wish to include David Bronheim?

Yes _____ No _____

We should inform the Uruguayan Government and the OAS of the official delegation as soon as possible.

Go ahead _____

Hold up _____

See me _____

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 13526,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY RG ON 4-30-91

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

April 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Delegation for the Inter-American
Summit Meeting

1143
476
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-396

By ju, NARA, Date 5-12-92

RECOMMENDATION

I recommend that in addition to myself your Delegation to the Inter-American Summit Meeting include the following from the Department of State and other government agencies. The delegation is listed in order of precedence:

<u>NAMES</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>
Ambassador to Uruguay Henry A. Hoyt	_____	_____
AID Administrator William S. Gaud	_____	_____
United States Representative to the Council of the OAS Sol M. Linowitz	_____	_____
USIA Director Leonard H. Marks	_____	_____
Special Assistant for Science and Technology Donald F. Hornig	_____	_____
Special Assistant to the President Walt W. Rostow	_____	_____
Press Secretary to the President George E. Christian	_____	_____
Assistant Secretary Anthony M. Solomon	_____	_____

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

NAMES

YES

NO

Assistant Secretary Lincoln Gordon

Deputy Coordinator for the Alliance for
Progress David Bronheim

DISCUSSION

A delegation of twelve including yourself is appropriate in number. The information we have thus far indicates that the Latin American countries are planning officially accredited delegations averaging from six to ten in number. The conference site can accommodate up to fifteen members, including the head of delegation, for each delegation during meetings.



Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~1. Rostow~~
2. Pres file~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Farewell Message to President Sunay To Be Sent
The Morning of April 13

Below is a proposed farewell message for you to send President Sunay the day he leaves. We have substantially warmed up the State Department's original proposal.

"As you take your farewell of our country to return to your own, I want to say again how honored we have been to have had you with us. The accord between our two republics is of long standing. I am sure, nonetheless, that your stay with us has deepened the sense of fellowship between our two peoples. This friendship, I believe, will help sustain us both in whatever may lie ahead.

"For my part, I found our conversations valuable. And I thoroughly enjoyed them. We can now with greater clarity see the problems that Turkey is facing; but we can also see the opportunities. As Turkey charts her course into the future, its people can be sure that they have a dependable friend who deeply respects them and their independence.

"Mrs. Johnson and I have been delighted to know you and Mrs. Sunay personally. Through you we have a clearer appreciation of your great people. After your busy schedule here, we do hope that you will spare a few days of rest for yourselves on your return. Our best wishes go with you both on your homeward journey."

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-394
By inf, NARA, Date 3-12-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4-7
Friday, April 7, 1967
7:00 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You may wish to read Bill Jorden's quite independent evaluation of the Romney speech. Although it is right that we not debate him at this stage, the issues and answers on pages 2 - 3 of this memorandum may be helpful to us if and when the right time comes.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 7, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Romney Speech -- An Analysis

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-394
By ig, NARA, Date 3-12-93

Governor Romney's speech on Viet-Nam is restrained and for the most part supports Administration policy. I do not see any serious problems created by his remarks.

There are numerous positive elements:

- he opposes any withdrawal;
- he urges that the war not be made a political issue;
- he opposes those who would crush the North with massive power;
- he opposes admission of the Liberation Front into a coalition government;
- his warning to Hanoi (page 5) that they should not expect the U.S. to tire and that a Republican Administration would not offer softer peace terms should have a healthy effect.

His description of the kind of settlement that should be our goal -- "peace with amnesty" -- is a reasonable description of what we, in fact, are seeking. On this, as on several other points, he is either ignoring what is happening on the scene in Viet-Nam, or does not know.

I would disagree with all of the five "lessons" that he claims we should have learned from Viet-Nam.

- (1) That a large U.S. commitment produces "an American dependency."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

It didn't in Europe; it didn't in the Occupation of Japan; it didn't in Korea. And I daresay no country has ever preserved as much of its own independence in time of war and with so large a number of foreign troops present as has Viet-Nam.

(2) We should avoid such future "entrapments."

If Viet-Nam is a "trap," what are his arguments for not withdrawing from it? Surely we have more at stake in this matter than simply saving face in an unpleasant situation.

(3) Our commitment has grown "like Topsy."

Our commitment has remained the same -- to help the South Vietnamese to resist aggression and to be able to lead their own lives in their own way. Our involvement has increased as the efforts of our enemy have grown. We are doing what is necessary, not more.

(4) President Eisenhower's decision of 1954 was wise -- not to deploy ground forces.

It is far from clear that a firm and clear commitment 12 years ago might not have avoided the worst events that followed. In any case, if President Eisenhower had faced the situation and the clear threat that existed in the period since 1960 he might very well have done precisely what we have done -- and perhaps more.

(5) He calls for "frank, open and straightforward" counseling with the American people.

He doesn't give any specifics or examples of where this has not been the case. It is hard to recall any situation in the past 20 years that has received more attention, that has been described in more detail for the public or for Congress, or that has been reported more fully in our press and on TV and radio.

Moreover, every dollar spent for every weapon and every program in Viet-Nam has been studied, checked and approved by Congress.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

He argues that our military effort "must succeed." He does not provide any information or suggestions as to how we can better achieve that goal.

He argues that the "other war" must be primarily a Vietnamese effort -- as it is.

And he says our objective must be "a just peace" -- which is a fair description of what we seek. He says nothing about how we can better achieve that goal.

All in all, this is a speech that we can live with -- and for the most part applaud.

B. J.

William J. Jorden

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, April 7, 1967
6:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Freeman's assent
to our going to 250,000 tons for the
Paks.

W. W. Rostow

50a



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM

To: Walt Rostow
The White House

From: The Secretary

Subject: Pakistan

We have examined the question of wheat to Pakistan and concluded that the addition of 50,000 tons of wheat would be in order. We will proceed to negotiate accordingly.

We had some hesitation about this for fear it might inhibit commercial sales, but further investigation led us to the conclusion that they were not likely now in any event. However, we do expect to ask, and have so indicated to the Paks and will follow up that commercial sales during next year at least in an amount equal to the required usual marketing quota which is a little less than 100,000 tons should be made. This is particularly true because last year Pakistan bought 750,000 tons of grain commercially from all sources. One hundred fifty thousand tons bought from the United States during fiscal 1968 would, in our opinion, not be unreasonable. We will proceed accordingly.

51
Pres file

Friday, April 7, 1967 -- 2:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

I haven't been able to get any of the Viet Nam experts on the phone during lunch; but I have now read George Romney's speech and -- while awaiting more authoritative analysis -- here is my view.

1. There are the following positive elements:

--m Like you, he takes a middle course between the full force of our military power and withdrawal, making a quite strong case against radical military escalation.

-- He explicitly excludes this as an issue that will "win the American Presidency."

-- He backs our military effort and says "it must succeed."

-- He calls for a "peace with amnesty" inside South Viet Nam which, by and large, is wholly consistent with the policy of the Saigon government as it is emerging, while opposing a coalition government "forced upon the people of South Vietnam."

-- He asserts that the "other war" must be essentially a Vietnamese job.

-- In a quite powerful statement, which will probably make the headlines, he says:

"The Hanoi leaders may be heolding out in the desperate hope that America will tire of the struggle, that our purpose will falter, that disillusionment and discord here at home will somehow induce us to abandon our friends and dishonor our commitments by pulling back or pulling out.

"That is a false hope -- and I for one will not contribute to it. I have repeatedly said that I will neither give encouragement to Hanoi's aggressive course, nor undermine our President in sincere efforts to bring peace to Vietnam.

"I have even heard that the leaders in Hanoi think a Republican administration might come into power that would settle on their terms.

"For what it is worth, I would like to tell them right now that here is one Republican I can speak for who will not settle on their terms under any circumstances!"

2. On the other hand, he tries to have it both ways to a certain extent, and, while welcoming the general tenor of the speech, we shall have to deal with these items:

-- He draws a distinction between our policy and President Eisenhower's "decision thirteen years ago not to deploy ground troops in Vietnam," implying that our commitment was excessive; but he does not discuss what caused that commitment which was not our policy but an expansion in Communist aggression.

-- He says "our interest has been defined largely by the commitment, rather than the commitment by the interest." On this he should be clobbered. When Eisenhower put the treaty to the Senate, it said that we would act to meet the common danger in the face of armed attack. That was our statement of interest. The commitment was determined by what the Communists did. He should be counterattacked for implying one can enter that kind of commitment and dally with it. Either one meets the common danger in the face of armed attack or one does not.

-- He plays the credibility gap game with the ugly statement: "Vietnam has given rise to a rupture of trust between governors and governed for which it is difficult to find a parallel in American history."

-- Finally, in a lengthy statement involving a long quotation from Abraham Lincoln, he implies that Congress was by-passed in making our commitment to fight in Viet Nam.

3. I propose, therefore, that we welcome his support for your policy and for his perhaps important message to Hanoi; that we take him to task hard on confusing a treaty commitment with what it takes to make good on that treaty commitment without reference to what the other side does to challenge that commitment; that we deal firmly with his credibility gap and constitutional arguments.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Remarks prepared for delivery by

Governor George Romney of Michigan

150th Anniversary Dinner, The Hartford Times, Hartford, Conn.

April 7, 1967

For release: Editions and broadcasts
reaching the public
after 6:00 PM, EST
April 7, 1967.

In the rip tide of today's heated debate on the paramount issue confronting our nation, there is one incontestable truth: it is unthinkable that the United States withdraw from Vietnam.

It is not my purpose tonight either to catalog past mistakes or to prescribe what ought to be done in the next four days, four weeks, or four months in that embattled corner of Southeast Asia that so drastically affects every American hearthstone.

Vietnam is a name that boxes the compass. It presents problems that cannot be resolved by crafty political gamesmanship that seeks to homestead the inside track on an issue that will win the American Presidency.

Vietnam is not just foreign affairs as it might have been called a generation behind us. It cuts across every vital sector of national life -- urban and rural modernization, economic and social welfare, campus environments, church affairs, and the all-encompassing public morality. It affects most poignantly those American boys who are fighting and their families and loved ones at home.

Moreover, every nation around the globe judges what we are doing in Vietnam against the way in which we comport ourselves on this issue at home.

And it is not a test of wills to see which Party will be the peace party - which candidate will be the hawk or dove.

Too often the complex policies involved in South Vietnam are reduced to, "do we bomb" or "do we withdraw." It's not that simple.

Problem is piled on problem in a tangled heap that challenges our intelligence, our stamina and our faith.

When people become frustrated and confusion reigns, the desire for a simple answer increases. We cannot let this desire cloud our thinking or misguide our action.

Although efforts to induce negotiations have not worked up to this point, they should be pursued vigorously. But since they haven't worked yet, demands for a sharp change of course will undoubtedly be intensified.

That change could take the direction of massive military escalation.

Many thoughtful and responsible American leaders are beginning to speak in this vein. Indeed, among the general public there appears a visible groundswell of impatience leading to a mood of "Let's get it over with; let's crush them once and for all."

This simplistic reaction is tempting but wrong.

First, by actions approaching devastation of a non-white Asian people, we would play into the hands of the Communists. They would use this effectively to paint us in their propaganda as ruthless oppressors and militarists - the very opposite of our true role in the world.

Second, from the point of view of stopping the expansion of Communism, we must remember that a devastated Vietnam would not be a buffer. It would be a vacuum.

Third, we must never forget that substantial escalation is still possible on both sides.

Vietnam does not stand by itself in international affairs.

Others who watch the world frontiers of freedom fear a bogdown in Vietnam may make us vulnerable to Communist pressure, intrigue and subversion in Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere. They wonder if America can use effectively our principles, purpose and power for peace and progress around the world.

Before us stretch grief-laden straits that must be navigated with resolute will and genuine - and I repeat genuine - willingness to reach that solution that will lead to a just peace.

Failure to recite a catalog of past mistakes does not mean that the past cannot instruct the present and the future. It is a useful exercise to ask ourselves what are the lessons that emerge from Vietnam.

Korea || One lesson surely is that a commitment of the character and massiveness of ours in a country the size of Vietnam has the inevitable result of turning it into an American dependency.

aggression not interest | This is as unconscionable to our tradition as it is resented by other free nations. We can hardly be happy when our every decision not merely affects but largely directs the intimate daily life of a sister nation.

We must avoid such future entrapments.

Another - and I hope well-learned -- lesson is that we must avoid commitments that grow like Topsy. There has been a failure to decide what the scope and nature of our Vietnam commitments ought to be.

60-20-20 Treaty | We now must acknowledge the wisdom of President Eisenhower's decision thirteen years ago not to deploy ground troops in Vietnam. Starting with a decision in 1954 to afford modest economic support and limited military advice, we now find ourselves totally committed -- with a current force in being approaching half a million men and a direct budgetary outlay of at least \$24 billion yearly, almost one fifth of our national budget.

60-20-20 Treaty | Our interest has been defined largely by the commitment, rather than the commitment by the interest.

54
Langston

no significant
The final major lesson is that any administration must be frank, open, and straightforward in counseling with the American people. "Vietnam has given rise to a rupture of trust between governors and governed for which it is difficult to find a parallel in American history."

Not only has the public thus been largely excluded from its direct sovereign role in decision-making but Congress has been by-passed. There is no excuse here of lack of time, or of the small nature of the emergency. This is the fourth largest war in our history.

On this point, I am going to let Abraham Lincoln speak for all Americans who feel that there is something terribly wrong about this.

Lincoln, confronted with this precise issue, when in Congress, wrote to his law partner, William Herndon:

2
"Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow him to do so whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary for such purpose, and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect, after having given him so much as you propose. If today he should choose to say he thinks it necessary to invade Canada to prevent the British from invading us, how could you stop him? You may say to him, 'I see no probability of the British invading us;' but he will say to you, 'Be silent: I see it, if you don't.'"

Lincoln continued:

"The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons: Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This our convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us. But your view destroys the whole matter, and places our President where kings have always stood."

Adhering to the Constitutional process could prevent similar entrapments in the future.

But where do we stand now?

It is patently clear that the massive build-up in American and allied might has not only made defeat unthinkable, but makes possible the breaking of the spine of enemy main force battalions.

Our military effort must succeed. I believe that we must use military force as necessary to reduce or cut off the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam, to knock out enemy main force units, and to provide a military shield for the South. We must give our gallant fighting men our full support.

Action in the South holds out the promise of a series of conventional military victories.

Obviously this does not mean cessation of guerilla activity. Nor does it portend a significant breakthrough in that "other war" - the pacification program. But it does mean that, with the achievement of military dominance in the traditional sense, we will have reached a decisive moment in the course of the war.

But before that moment is reached, we must ask ourselves once again what is the shape of the peace we seek in Vietnam? What do we hope to leave behind when our task there is done?

We must recognize the danger that substantial military victories could inflate our peace aims. I find this prospect extremely disquieting.

Too often in the tides of history, men have sought to rationalize sacrifices already made by seeking wider goals. We must guard against falling into this pattern in Vietnam.

We must stand immovably against all pressures which would preclude a just peace.

Hopefully, the government of South Vietnam would be willing to negotiate a "peace with amnesty."

In a "peace with amnesty" in South Vietnam, all citizens would be allowed to participate in the political process, provided they abide by the ground rules.

Correct
Specifically, individual members of the National Liberation Front would be permitted to participate freely in the political life of South Vietnam, on condition that it abandon its use of political terrorism, its subservience to any foreign communist organization, and then disband.

This would not mean that a coalition government involving the National Liberation Front would be forced upon the people of South Vietnam. I am opposed to any such coalition government.

It would mean that all the people of South Vietnam would be given an equal opportunity, as individuals, for peaceful participation in shaping the future of their country.

Unless we pursue this proposition or some similar solution, we will face a very lengthy and brutal struggle in winning the "other war."

It would be far wiser and more compassionate to include today's enemies in tomorrow's peace than to court the human suffering to both the South Vietnamese and our own fighting men that a drawn-out "other war" struggle would demand.

Unless "peace with amnesty" can be achieved in South Vietnam, then it would be necessary to break the spine not only of the main force battalions but of the Viet Cong guerillas as well in order to win the "other war."

The United States is the most powerful nation the world has ever seen. But we are not omnipotent.

While there are no limits to what we can destroy, there are limits to what we can build.

The ultimate outcome of this fateful struggle depends on what the South Vietnamese do in rebuilding their own society and communities as well as on what we do in helping them.

The "other war" is primarily their war.

It combines anti-guerilla warfare, political and psychological warfare, social and economic weapons, pacification and civic action programs, and reconciliation programs to win back those Viet Cong members who are more nationalists than communists.

The villages and hamlets, where the majority of the people live, are the very base of South Vietnamese existence, and thus the base for South Vietnam's future -- either Communist or free. The Viet Cong, recognizing this, directs its primary campaign of terror and assassination against them -- not against Saigon.

Our fighting men, not only in battle but in countless individual acts of consideration and concern for the suffering people of Vietnam, have proved they are truly magnificent Americans.

But it would be a tragic error to ask them to take over the "other war" as some have proposed.

Taking on the responsibility for the "other war" would tie down hundreds of thousands of American troops for many years. It would undermine the initiative and capacity of the South Vietnamese to help themselves. It would transform South Vietnam into an American military colony which America neither wants nor needs.

We have already Americanized the shooting war. We should not Americanize the "other war".

The Hanoi leaders may be holding out in the desperate hope that America will tire of the struggle, that our purpose will falter, that disillusionment and discord here at home will somehow induce us to abandon our friends and dishonor our commitments by pulling back or pulling out.

That is a false hope -- and I for one will not contribute to it. I have repeatedly said that I will neither give encouragement to Hanoi's aggressive course, nor undermine our President in sincere efforts to bring peace to Vietnam.

I have even heard that the leaders in Hanoi think a Republican administration might come into power that would settle on their terms.

For what it is worth, I would like to tell them right now that here is one Republican I can speak for who will not settle on their terms under any circumstances!

With our help, the South Vietnamese have made a start toward building a stable, representative, civilian government at the national level. This is encouraging.

America's major objective and contribution must be a just peace.

The political, social and economic development of South Vietnam and of all Southeast Asia cannot really start or eventually take off without peace.

So much remains to be done -- and patiently so.

Let us build stone by stone upon the dreams and concepts that have served this nation from its birth.

Let us get on with the task. Let us be ready to move our dreams and our beliefs in freedom from the drawing boards to the conference table.

Let us pursue with strength the just peace in South Vietnam that our prayers should so earnestly seek, and that may yet be within our grasp.

So doing, we can fulfill our role as "the last, best hope of earth.... The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just."

#

52
Friday, April 7, 1967
3:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a compilation of
Congressional Resolutions bearing
on foreign policy since World War II.

W. W. Rostow



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Major Congressional Foreign
Policy Resolutions

The History of Congressional Resolutions bearing
on foreign policy, which you requested yesterday, is
attached.

This paper covers only the most important resolutions
passed since World War II.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

History of Congressional
Resolutions

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**KEY CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY
SINCE WORLD WAR II**

**Research Project No. 861
April 1967**

**Historical Studies Division
Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs
Department of State**

FREE ENTRY OF JEWS INTO PALESTINE, December 19, 1945, (S. Con.
Res. 44, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.)

Background: On November 13, 1945, the President announced the membership of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to examine the position of Jews in European countries where they had been persecuted, to inquire into measures taken to eliminate discrimination and to permit emigration, and to examine conditions in Palestine bearing on the settlement of refugees there. The Committee was also to make recommendations to the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom for meeting the immediate needs of the Jews in the European countries and of those who emigrated.

Nature of the Resolution: The Senate, taking account of the appointment of the Committee just mentioned, and of the recent request of the President that one hundred thousand additional Jews be allowed to enter Palestine, and noting that the immigration of refugees was resulting in improvement of Palestine's cultural, economic, financial, and hygienic conditions, resolved: 1) to commend the interest of the President in the problem, 2) to urge that the United States use its good offices to persuade the mandatory to allow free entry of Jews into Palestine to the limit of its agricultural and economic potentialities, and 3) to urge that there be full opportunity for colonization so that the Jews might build Palestine as their national home and develop a democratic commonwealth in which all men "regardless of race or creed" shall have equal rights.

Text of the Resolution: See next page.

Vote on the Resolution: Senate, voice
House, voice

December 19, 1945
[S. Con. Res. 44]

FREE ENTRY OF JEWS INTO PALESTINE

42 Stat. 1012.

Whereas the Sixty-seventh Congress of the United States on June 30, 1922, unanimously resolved "That the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected"; and

Whereas the ruthless persecution of the Jewish people in Europe has clearly demonstrated the need for a Jewish homeland as a haven for the large numbers who have become homeless as a result of this persecution; and

Whereas these urgent necessities are evidenced by the President's request for the immediate right of entry into Palestine of one hundred thousand additional Jewish refugees; and

Whereas the influx of Jewish immigration into Palestine is resulting in its improvement in agricultural, financial, hygienic, and general economic conditions; and

Whereas the President and the British Prime Minister have agreed upon the appointment of a "Joint Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry" to examine conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the

problem of Jewish immigration and the Jewish situation in Europe and have requested a report within one hundred and twenty days: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the interest shown by the President in the solution of this problem is hereby commended and that the United States shall use its good offices with the mandatory power to the end that Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country to the maximum of its agricultural and economic potentialities, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization and development, so that they may freely proceed with the upbuilding of Palestine as the Jewish national home and, in association with all elements of the population, establish Palestine as a democratic commonwealth in which all men, regardless of race or creed, shall have equal rights.

Agreed to December 19, 1945.

59

VANDENBERG RESOLUTION, June 11, 1948 (S. Res. 239, 80th Cong.,
2nd Sess.)

Background: Senator Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wanted to consolidate numerous Senate proposals for resolutions to amend the United Nations Charter, and the Department of State wanted to encourage the formation of cooperative self-help institutions among Western European states that needed military and economic assistance in the Cold War.

Nature of the Resolution: Reaffirmed the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations and advised the President of the sense of the Senate that the United States by constitutional process should pursue: 1) agreements to remove the veto from questions relating to settlement of international disputes; 2) development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense; 3) association of the United States with such arrangements as were based upon continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid; 4) the objective of contributing to maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense as provided in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter; 5) maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces; 6) efforts to have the Charter of the United Nations reviewed if necessary.

Text of the Resolution: See next page

Vote on the Resolution: Senate, 64-4

58

20. SENATE RESOLUTION 239 (80TH CONG., 2D SESS.)

REAFFIRMING THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TO ACHIEVE
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY THROUGH THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INDICATING CERTAIN OBJECTIVES TO BE PURSUED

(A)

[On June 11, 1948, the Senate by a vote of 64 to 4 adopted the so-called Vandenberg resolution, or Senate Resolution 239. This resolution had been unanimously approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 19.]

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

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TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION

Whereas peace with justice and the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms require international cooperation through more effective use of the United Nations: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest, and that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that this Government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter:

(1) Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.

(2) Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.

(3) Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

(4) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

(5) Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation.

(6) If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a General Conference called under article 109 or by the General Assembly.

RESOLUTIONS ASKING THE U.N. TO LABEL THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS
AS AGGRESSORS IN KOREA, January 19 and 23, 1951 (H. Res. 77,
82nd Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Res. 35, 82nd Cong., 1st. Sess.)

Background: Massive Chinese Communist forces intervened in the Korean conflict in late 1950. Subsequently the Chinese Communists and North Koreans rejected U.N. ceasefire proposals. The U.N. General Assembly scheduled discussions on a resolution to declare the Chinese Communists to be aggressors.

Nature of the Resolutions: Simple House and Senate resolutions expressing the sense of the two houses that the United Nations should immediately declare Communist China an aggressor in Korea.

Text of the Resolutions: See next page.

Vote on the Resolutions: House, voice vote
Senate, voice vote

38. LABELING THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AS AGGRESSORS IN KOREA: Resolution of the House of Representatives, January 19, 1951 ⁴

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that the United Nations should immediately act and declare the Chinese Communist authorities an aggressor in Korea.

39. LABELING THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AS AGGRESSORS IN KOREA: Resolution of the United States Senate, January 23, 1951 ⁵

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the United Nations should immediately declare Communist China an aggressor in Korea.

¹ U.N. General Assembly, *Official Records, Fifth Session, First Committee Meetings*, p. 500.

² i.e., the principles adopted by the General Assembly's Group on a Cease-Fire in Korea on Jan. 11, 1951; *supra*.

³ See the reply of Jan. 17, 1951, by Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, declining to accept the principles (Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 29, 1951, pp. 165-166) and Secretary Acheson's comments of the same date (*ibid.*, p. 164).

⁴ H. Res. 77, 82d Cong., 1st sess.

⁵ S. Resolution 35, 82d Cong., 1st sess.

61

NON-ADMISSION OF COMMUNIST CHINA TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED
NATIONS, January 23, 1951 (S. Res. 36, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess.)

Background: This action is related to the simple resolutions passed by both houses concerning consideration at the United Nations of aggression in Korea.

Nature of the Resolution: Flatly states that Communist China should not be a member of the United Nations. (Similar resolutions were adopted periodically in subsequent sessions.)

Text of the Resolution: See next page.

Vote on the Resolution: Senate, unanimous

62

**53. SENATE RESOLUTION 36 (82d CONGRESS, 1st SESSION),
JANUARY 23, 1951 ¹**

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the Communist Chinese Government should not be admitted to membership in the United Nations as the representative of China.

63

"TROOPS FOR EUROPE" RESOLUTION, April 4, 1951 (S. Res. 99,
82nd Cong., 1st Sess.)

Background: President Truman had intimated that he would welcome a declaration by the Senate endorsing his intention, announced in September 1950, of substantially increasing "the strength of the United States forces to be stationed in Western Europe in the interest of the defense of that area." Senate Resolution 99 was much amended at every stage before it was finally adopted.

Nature of the Resolution: Expressed the Senate's belief in the necessity to station U.S. troops abroad "to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area". It contained a number of restrictions, the most important of which required further Congressional approval for any ground troops to be sent to Europe in addition to the four divisions authorized.

Text of the Resolution: See next page.

Vote on the Resolution: Senate, 69-21

(Note: On the same day, the Senate adopted a concurrent resolution with similar terms, but the House did not act upon it.)

601

TEXT OF SENATE RESOLUTION 99¹

Resolved, That—

1. the Senate approved the action of the President of the United States in cooperating in the common defensive effort of the North Atlantic Treaty nations by designating, at their unanimous request, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and in placing Armed Forces of the United States in Europe under his command;

2. it is the belief of the Senate that the threat to the security of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners makes it necessary for the United States to station abroad such units of our Armed Forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area;

3. it is the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, before taking action to send units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, should consult the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and that he should likewise consult the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;

4. it is the sense of the Senate that before sending units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty are giving, and have agreed to give full, realistic force and effect to the requirement of article 3 of said treaty that "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" they will "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack," specifically insofar as the creation of combat units is concerned;

5. the Senate herewith approves the understanding that the major contribution to the ground forces under General Eisenhower's command should be made by the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty, and that such units of United States ground forces as may be assigned to the above command shall be so assigned only after the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion such assignment is a necessary step in strengthening the security of the United States; and the certified opinions referred to in paragraph 4 and 5 shall be transmitted by the Secretary of Defense to the President of the United States, and to the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, and to the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services as soon as they are received;

6. it is the sense of the Senate that, in the interests of sound constitutional processes, and of national unity and understanding, congressional approval should be obtained of any policy requiring the assignment of American troops abroad when such assignment is in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and the Senate hereby approves the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground forces to Western Europe, but it is the sense of the Senate that no ground troops in addition to such four divisions should be sent to Western Europe in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty without further congressional approval;

7. it is the sense of the Senate that the President should submit to the Congress at intervals of not more than 6 months reports on the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty, including such information as may be made available for this purpose by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;

8. it is the sense of the Senate that the United States should seek to eliminate all provisions of the existing treaty with Italy which impose limitations upon the military strength of Italy and prevent the performance by Italy of her obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty to contribute to the full extent of her capacity to the defense of Western Europe;

9. it is the sense of the Senate that consideration should be given to the revision of plans for the defense of Europe as soon as possible so as to provide for utilization on a voluntary basis of the military and other resources of Western Germany and Spain, but not exclusive of the military and other resources of other nations.

65

EMBARGO ON SHIPMENTS TO COMMUNIST CHINA, May 15, 1951 (S.
Concurrent Res. 31, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess.)

Background: This action was closely related to the Korean War and especially to a proposal initiated by the United States in the United Nations General Assembly to call on all members not to send arms, ammunition, or other material of war-making potential to Communist China.

Nature of the Resolution: The Congress "requests and urges" General Assembly action leading to the placing of an embargo.

Text of the Resolution: See next page

Vote on the Resolution: House, voice vote (without objection)
Senate, voice vote

66
May 15, 1951
[S. Con. Res. 31]

EMBARGO ON SHIPMENTS TO COMMUNIST CHINA

Whereas the United States has initiated a proposal, under the terms of which the General Assembly of the United Nations would (1) call upon all member nations of the United Nations not to send to Communist China arms, ammunition, or any other material which might add to the war-making potential of Communist China; (2) urge that steps be taken to guard against circumvention or nullification of such embargo through loopholes which might enable the Chinese Communists to acquire the banned materials; and (3)

65 STAT.] CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS—MAY 23, 1951

establish a special committee to receive periodic reports from the complying member nations and to take other measures aimed at making the embargo as effective as possible; and

Whereas Communist China has long since been branded an aggressor by an overwhelming majority of the member nations of the United Nations; and

Whereas more than a dozen member nations are participating directly with the United States in the heroic military action against the common enemy in Korea, and the troops of such nations are being shot at, and killed, by the Chinese Communists; and

Whereas no United Nations soldier should be the target of a bullet manufactured in the free world, or required to fight against troops supplied with materials coming from the free world: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress of the United States hereby requests and urges that the General Assembly of the United Nations take action leading to the placing of an embargo on the shipment to Communist China of arms, ammunition, and all other materials which might add to the war-making potential of Communist China.

Agreed to May 15, 1951.

CONDEMNATION OF THE PERSECUTION OF RELIGIOUS AND RACIAL MINORITY
GROUPS BY THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SATELLITES, February 27,
1953 (S. Res. 84, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.)

Background: Reports of anti-Semitic purges behind the Iron Curtain led to the introduction of a number of resolutions. It was decided to broaden them to condemn the persecution by the Soviet Union of all religious and racial minority groups.

Nature of the Resolution: It expressed the strongest condemnation by the Senate of the vicious and inhuman campaigns conducted by the Soviet Union and its satellites against minority groups, such as the persecution of Greek Orthodox congregations, the imprisonment of Roman Catholic prelates, the harassment of Protestant denominations, the suppression of Moslem communities, and the increasing persecution of the Jews. It asked the President to take appropriate action to protest, particularly in the United Nations General Assembly.

Text of the Resolution: See next page

Vote on the Resolution: Senate, 79-0

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SENATE OF THE
UNITED STATES

February 27, 1953

S. Res. 84, 83rd Congress, 1st Session

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate of the United States that the vicious and inhuman campaigns conducted by the Soviet Government and its puppet governments in satellite states in Europe and Asia against minority groups such as the persecution of Greek orthodox congregations, the imprisonment of Roman Catholic prelates, the harassment of Protestant denominations, the suppression of Moslem communities, the persecution and scattering of ethnic groups in Poland, in the Ukraine, in the Baltic and Balkan States and in many other areas under Soviet domination, and most recently the increasing persecution of the people of the Jewish faith, deserve the strongest condemnation by all peoples who believe that spiritual values are the bases of human progress and freedom.

Resolved further, That the President of the United States is hereby urged to take appropriate action to protest, particularly in the General Assembly of the United Nations, against these outrages, in order that the United Nations shall take such action in opposition to them as may be suitable under its Charter.

Department of State Bulletin

REAFFIRMATION OF THE "CARACAS DECLARATION OF SOLIDARITY", June
29, 1954 (S. Con. Res. 91, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess.)

Background: Increasing communist influence in Guatemala. On March 28, 1954, the 10th International Conference of American States had adopted the Caracas Declaration of Solidarity, which was designed to prevent communist interference in Western Hemisphere affairs.

Nature of Resolution: It called attention to the evidence of Communist intervention in Guatemala, and declared "the sense of the Congress that the United States should reaffirm its support of the Caracas Declaration ... which is designed to prevent interference in Western Hemisphere affairs by the international Communist movement, and take all necessary and proper steps to support the Organization of American States in taking appropriate action to prevent any interference by the international Communist movement in the affairs of the States of the Western Hemisphere."

Text of the Resolution: See next page.

Vote on the Resolution: Senate, 69-1
House, 372-0

CARACAS DECLARATION OF SOLIDARITY,

June 29, 1954
[S. Con. Res. 91]

REAFFIRMATION OF SUPPORT BY UNITED STATES

Whereas for many years it has been the joint policy of the United States and the other States in the Western Hemisphere to act vigorously to prevent external interference in the affairs of the nations of the Western Hemisphere; and

Whereas in the recent past there has come to light strong evidence of intervention by the international Communist movement in the State of Guatemala, whereby government institutions have been infiltrated by Communist agents, weapons of war have been secretly shipped into that country, and the pattern of Communist conquest has become manifest; and

Whereas on Sunday, June 20, 1954, the Soviet Government vetoed in the United Nations Security Council a resolution to refer the matter of the recent outbreak of hostilities in Guatemala to the Organization of American States: Therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that the United States should reaffirm its support of the Caracas Declaration of Solidarity of March 28, 1954, which is designed to prevent interference in Western Hemisphere affairs by the international Communist movement, and take all necessary and proper steps to support the Organization of American States in taking appropriate action to prevent any interference by the international Communist movement in the affairs of the states of the Western Hemisphere.

Agreed to June 29, 1954.

FORMOSA RESOLUTION, January 29, 1955 (H. Joint Res. 159,
84th Cong., 1st Sess.)

Background: On January 24, 1955, President Eisenhower sent a message to Congress requesting a "suitable congressional resolution which would clearly and publicly establish the authority of the President as Commander in Chief to employ the Armed Forces of the Nation promptly and effectively...in situations which are recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries to, an attack (by Communist China) against the main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores."

Nature of the Resolution: It authorized the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions and territories of that area.

Text of the Resolution: See next page.

Vote on the Resolution: House: 409-3
Senate: 85-3

77. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR THE PRESIDENT TO EMPLOY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES TO PROTECT FORMOSA, THE PESCADORES, AND RELATED POSITIONS AND TERRITORIES OF THAT AREA: House Joint Resolution 159 (84th Congress, 1st Session), January 29, 1955¹

Whereas the primary purpose of the United States, in its relations with all other nations, is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and
 Whereas certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China are now under armed attack, and threats and declarations have been and are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores,
 Whereas such armed attack if continued would gravely endanger the peace and security of the West Pacific Area and particularly of Formosa and the Pescadores; and
 Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and

THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

2487

Whereas the President of the United States on January 6, 1955,¹ submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification a Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China,² which recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific area directed against territories, therein described, in the region of Formosa and the Pescadores, would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the parties to the treaty: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.

THE MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION, March 9, 1957 (H. J. Res. 117,
85th Cong., 1st Sess.)

Background: As a result of the critical situation in the Middle East following Egypt's seizure of the Suez Canal, President Eisenhower in a special message to Congress on January 5, 1957, requested authority to employ troops in the Middle East to assist any nation requesting aid against Communist attack. He also requested authorization for the use of mutual security funds without regard to existing limitations.

Nature of the Resolution: The Senate on March 5, 1957, and the House on March 7, 1957, passed a joint resolution which differed from the President's request in that a statement that the United States was prepared to use its Armed Forces, if deemed necessary by the President, was substituted for the specific troop authorization. Economic and military aid programs were authorized, and the President was instructed to make a semi-annual report to Congress of all actions taken under the resolution.

Text of the Resolution: See next page.

Vote on the Resolution: Senate, 72-19
House, 350-60

JOINT RESOLUTION

To promote peace and stability in the Middle East.

March 9, 1957
[H. J. Res. 117]

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

Middle East.
Economic as-
sistance.

SEC. 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: *Provided*, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States.

Military assist-
ance.

SEC. 3. The President is hereby authorized to use during the balance of fiscal year 1957 for economic and military assistance under this

Use of appro-
priations.

PUBLIC LAW 85-8-MAR. 14, 1957

[71 STAT.]

6

joint resolution not to exceed \$200,000,000 from any appropriation now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, in accord with the provisions of such Act: *Provided*, That, whenever the President determines it to be important to the security of the United States, such use may be under the authority of section 401 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended (except that the provisions of section 105 (a) thereof shall not be waived), and without regard to the provisions of section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1957: *Provided further*, That obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes of the first sentence of section 2 of this joint resolution shall be paid only out of appropriations for military assistance, and obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes of the first section of this joint resolution shall be paid only out of appropriations other than those for military assistance. This authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such appropriations. None of the additional authorization contained in this section shall be used until fifteen days after the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives and, when military assistance is involved, the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives have been furnished a report showing the object of the proposed use, the country for the benefit of which such use is intended, and the particular appropriation or appropriations for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, from which the funds are proposed to be derived: *Provided*, That funds available under this section during the balance of fiscal year 1957 shall, in the case of any such report submitted during the last fifteen days of the fiscal year, remain available for use under this section for the purposes stated in such report for a period of twenty days following the date of submission of such report. Nothing contained in this joint resolution shall be construed as itself authorizing the appropriation of additional funds for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the first section or of the first sentence of section 2 of this joint resolution.

68 Stat. 832.
22 USC 1751
note.22 USC 1921,
1815.

70 Stat. 733.

Restriction.
Report to Con-
gressional Com-
mittees.U. N. Emergency
Force.Report to Con-
gress.

Expiration.

SEC. 4. The President should continue to furnish facilities and military assistance, within the provisions of applicable law and established policies, to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, with a view to maintaining the truce in that region.

SEC. 5. The President shall within the months of January and July of each year report to the Congress his action hereunder.

SEC. 6. This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise except that it may be terminated earlier by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress.

Approved March 9, 1957.

RESOLUTION ON HUNGARY, August 6, 1957 (H. Con. Res. 204, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess.)

Background: In October 1956 the Hungarian people rose in revolt, but the uprising was brutally suppressed by Soviet troops. A Special Committee created by the U.N. General Assembly in January 1957 noted long-standing grievances engendered by Communist oppression.

Nature of the Resolution: Expressed the sense of Congress that the United States should seek immediate U.N. consideration of the Special Committee's report and should work towards freedom and independence for the captive nations.

Text of the Resolution: See next page

Vote on the Resolution: House, voice vote
Senate, 86-0

H. Con. Res. 204
August 6, 1957

HUNGARY

Whereas the Hungarian freedom revolution which broke out October 23, 1956, was catastrophic in nature, and subsequent events shocked the conscience of the free peoples of the world; and

Whereas the barbaric action of the Soviet Union in Hungary demonstrates that the Soviet Union is determined to go to any and all lengths to maintain its empire of enslaved peoples by the most brutal forms of armed subjugation and repression; and

Whereas the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, created by the General Assembly of the United Nations under its resolution 1132 (XI) adopted at its six hundred and thirty-sixth plenary meeting on January 10, 1957, has established that what took place in Hungary in the latter part of 1956 was a spontaneous national uprising caused by long-standing grievances engendered by the oppressive way of life under Communist rule and by the state of captivity of Hungary under control of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and

Whereas the crisis and foment created by developments in the satellite nations require a continued reevaluation by the United States and the United Nations of strategic policy to meet changing conditions: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),
That it is the sense of the Congress that the President, through the United States representatives to the United Nations at the forthcoming special reconvening of the General Assembly of the United Nations, should take every appropriate action toward the immediate consideration and adoption of the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary and toward the immediate consideration of other available information on the brutal action of the Soviet Union in Hungary. It is further the sense of the Congress that the President, through such United States representatives, should at such reconvened session join actively in seeking the most effective way of dealing with the report of the United Nations Special Committee in order to advance the objectives of the United Nations regarding the situation in Hungary, to prevent further repressive action by the Soviet Union, and to seek all practical redress of the wrong which has been committed in violation of the principles

of the United Nations and the elemental requirements of humanity..

Sec. 2. It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should implement policies, through the United Nations or in cooperation with the peoples of the free world, that will work toward the freedom and independence of the captive nations, and will effectively utilize the position of the United States through all proper means, to the end that the Hungarian tragedy shall not be repeated anywhere.

Passed August 6, 1957

PEACEFUL EXPLORATION OF OUTER SPACE, July 23, 1958 (H. Con.
Res. 332, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess.)

Background: The launching of "Sputnik" 1 by the Russians aroused intense concern about the possible military use of outer space. The Congress voted to establish the National Aeronautics and Space Administration as a civilian agency and studied possible further actions to avert the military use of outer space.

Nature of the Resolution: The United States should strive through the United Nations and other appropriate means for an international agreement banning the use of outer space for military purposes, providing for joint exploration of outer space, and establishing a method for solving peacefully and legally disputes in relation to outer space.

Text of the Resolution: See next page.

Vote on the Resolution: House, voice vote
Senate, voice vote

July 23, 1958
[H. Con. Res. 332]

PEACEFUL EXPLORATION OF OUTER SPACE

Whereas man is standing upon the threshold of a new era of space exploration; and

Whereas it is the devout wish of all peoples everywhere, in every nation, in every environment, that the exploration of outer space shall be by peaceful means and shall be dedicated to peaceful purposes; and

Whereas the United States as a nation and as a people favors the peaceful solution of all international problems: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),
That the Congress of the United States believes that the nations of the world should join in the establishment of plans for the peaceful exploration of outer space, should ban the use of outer space for military aggrandizement, and should endeavor to broaden man's knowledge of space with the purpose of advancing the good of all mankind rather than for the benefit of one nation or group of nations;

Outer space.
Peaceful ex-
ploration.

That it is the sense of the Congress:

That the United States should strive, through the United Nations or such other means as may be most appropriate, for an international agreement banning the use of outer space for military purposes;

That the United States should seek through the United Nations or such other means as may be most appropriate an international agreement providing for joint exploration of outer space and establishing a method by which disputes which arise in the future in relation to outer space will be solved by legal, peaceful methods, rather than by resort to violence;

That the United States should press for an international agreement providing for joint cooperation in the advancement of scientific developments which can be expected to flow from the exploration of outer space, such as the improvement of communications, the betterment of weather forecasting, and other benefits; and

That the Congress respectfully requests the President to effectuate in every way possible the objectives set forth in this resolution.

Passed July 23, 1958.

77

ESTABLISHING A UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE, August 22,
1958 (S. Con. Res. 109, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.)

Background: Speaking before the U.N. General Assembly on August 13, on the problems of the Middle East, President Eisenhower offered a six-point plan for peace in the area, one of which recommended the establishment of "a standby United Nations Peace Force" to protect the countries of the area against "armed pressure and infiltration coming across their borders".

Nature of the Resolution: Expressed the sense of Congress that the General Assembly of the United Nations should immediately consider the development within its permanent structure of such organization and procedure as would enable the United Nations to employ promptly suitable United Nations forces for observation and patrol in situations threatening peace and security.

Text of the Resolution: See next page

Vote on the Resolution: Senate, 66 to 14
House, 299 to 20

80

UNITED NATIONS

August 22, 1958
[S. Con. Res. 109]

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),
That it is the sense of the Congress that consideration should immediately be given by the General Assembly of the United Nations to the development, within its permanent structure, of such organization and procedures as will enable the United Nations promptly to employ suitable United Nations forces for such purposes as observation and patrol in situations that threaten international peace and security.

United Nations.
Establishing
forces.

Agreed to August 22, 1958.

AUTHORIZATION FOR THE PRESIDENT TO CALL READY RESERVISTS TO
ACTIVE DUTY FOR 12 MONTHS, October 3, 1962 (S. J. Res.
224, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess.)

Background: Threat to the interests of the U.S. and the
free world in areas such as Berlin, Cuba, and Southeast Asia.
Authorization request by President Kennedy, Sept. 7, 1962.

Nature of the Resolution: Authorized the President, until
February 28, 1963, to call up to 150,000 members of the Ready
Reserve to active duty for not more than 12 months.

Text of the Resolution: See next page

Vote on the Resolution: Senate, unanimous

(Note: A somewhat similar resolution had been passed on
August 1, 1961, after the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna
and the intensification of the Berlin crisis.)



Public Law 87-736
87th Congress, S. J. Res. 224
October 3, 1962

Joint Resolution

76 STAT. 710.

To authorize the President to order units and members in the Ready Reserve to active duty for not more than twelve months, and for other purposes.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, notwithstanding any other provision of law, until February 28, 1963, the President may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, or any member, of the Ready Reserve of an armed force to active duty for not more than twelve consecutive months. However, not more than one hundred and fifty thousand members of the Ready Reserve may be on active duty (other than for training), without their consent, under this section at any one time.

Armed Forces.
Ready Reserve,
active duty.

SEC. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, until February 28, 1963, the President may authorize the Secretary of Defense to extend enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, periods of active duty for training, periods of obligated service or other military status, in any component of an armed force or in the National Guard that expire before February 28, 1963, for not more than twelve months. However, if the enlistment of a member of the Ready Reserve who is ordered to active duty under the first section of this Act would expire after February 28, 1963, but before he has served the entire period for which he was so ordered to active duty, his enlistment may be extended until the last day of that period.

Extension of
military serv-
ice.

SEC. 3. No member of the Ready Reserve who was involuntarily ordered to active duty or whose period of active duty was extended under the Act of August 1, 1961, Public Law 87-117 (75 Stat. 242), may be involuntarily ordered to active duty under this Act.

10 USC 263
note.

Approved October 3, 1962.

CUBAN RESOLUTION, October 3, 1962 (S.J. Res. 230, 87th Cong.,
2nd Sess.)

Background: Reports of increased military shipments to
Cuba from Communist countries, especially the U.S.S.R.

Nature of Resolution: Expressed the determination of
the U.S. to prevent the establishment in Cuba of a military
capability endangering the U.S. and the Western Hemisphere.

Text of the Resolution: See next page.

Vote on the Resolution: Senate, 86 to 1
House, 384 to 7



Public Law 87-733
87th Congress, S. J. Res. 230
October 3, 1962

Joint Resolution

76 STAT. 697.

Expressing the determination of the United States with respect to the situation in Cuba.

Whereas President James Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, declared that the United States would consider any attempt on the part of European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety"; and

Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations"; and 62 Stat. 1681.

Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este in January 1962 declared: "The present Government of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine, and accepts military assistance from extracontinental Communist powers, including even the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet Union"; and 59 Stat. 1044.

Whereas the international Communist movement has increasingly extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States is determined—

Cuba.
Congressional
determination.

(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and

(c) to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination.

Approved October 3, 1962.

BERLIN RESOLUTION, October 10, 1962 (H. Con. Res. 570, 87th
Cong., 2nd Sess.)

Background: Difficulties in Berlin over killing of
people attempting to escape through the Wall from East Berlin;
general tension in the Berlin area.

Nature of the Resolution: Expressed the determination of
the U.S. to fight if necessary to exercise its rights in
Berlin and maintain its commitments to the people of Berlin.

Text of the Resolution: See next page.

Vote on the Resolution: House, unanimous
Senate, voice vote

7. Berlin Resolution

Text of House Concurrent Resolution 570, 87th Congress, Passed October 10, 1962

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas the primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations is and has been to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and

Whereas it is the purpose of the United States to encourage and support the establishment of a free, unified, and democratic Germany; and

Whereas in connection with the termination of hostilities in World War II the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union freely entered into binding agreements under which the four powers have the right to remain in Berlin, with the right of ingress and egress, until the conclusion of a final settlement with the Government of Germany; and

Whereas no such final settlement has been concluded by the four powers and the aforementioned agreements continue in force: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

That it is the sense of the Congress—

(a) that the continued exercise of United States, British, and French rights in Berlin constitutes a fundamental political and moral determination;

(b) that the United States would regard as intolerable any violation by the Soviet Union directly or through others of those rights in Berlin, including the right of ingress and egress;

(c) that the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, any violation of those rights by the Soviet Union directly or through others, and to fulfill our commitment to the people of Berlin with respect to their resolve for freedom.

87

THE VIETNAM (TONKIN GULF) RESOLUTION, August 10, 1964 (H.J.
Res. 1145, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess.)

Background: Attacks on U.S. Naval vessels by North Vietnamese naval units. President Johnson requested passage of a resolution on August 5, 1964.

Nature of the Resolution: Expressed Congressional approval and support for the determination of the President to take all necessary measures to repel any further attacks against U.S. forces and to prevent further aggression.

Text of the Resolution: See next page.

Vote on the Resolution: House, 416 to 0
Senate, 88 to 2

8. The Vietnam Resolution

Text of Public Law 88-408, 88th Congress, [H.J. Res. 1145] 78 Stat. 384,
Approved August 10, 1964

A JOINT RESOLUTION To promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

89

UNITED NATIONS PAYMENTS BY MEMBER STATES, August 20, 1964
(H. Con. Res. 343, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess.)

Background: United Nations Financial Crisis caused by failure of the U.S.S.R. and certain other countries to pay assessed costs of the U.N. peacekeeping forces in the Congo and Middle East.

Nature of the Resolution: Expressed the sense of Congress that the President should make it U.S. policy to secure imposition of the penalty provisions of Art. 19 of the U.N. Charter (loss of vote) on those nations which became 2 years delinquent on their U.N. payments.

Text of the Resolution: See next page.

Vote on the Resolution: House, 351-0
Senate, voice vote

90
August 20, 1964
[H. Con. Res. 343]

UNITED NATIONS—PAYMENTS BY MEMBERS

Whereas one hundred and thirteen nations have accepted the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security and have agreed "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace"; and

Whereas the International Court of Justice in an advisory opinion on July 20, 1962, held that expenditures for peacekeeping operations constitute expenses of the Organization which shall be borne by the members as apportioned by the General Assembly under article 17 of the United Nations Charter; and

Whereas the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice was accepted by the General Assembly in a resolution on December 19, 1962, by a vote of seventy-six in favor, seventeen against, and eight abstentions; and

Whereas article 19 of the United Nations Charter provides that a member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years, unless relieved of that penalty by a vote of the General Assembly on the grounds that "the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member"; and

Whereas at the convening of the Nineteenth General Assembly of the United Nations in 1964, certain members of the United Nations which are now in arrears may fall within the purview of the provisions of article 19 of the United Nations Charter; and

Whereas legislation has been enacted expressing the sense of the Congress that "the United Nations should take immediate steps to give effect to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the financial obligations of members of the United Nations in order to assure prompt payment of all assessments, including assessments to cover the cost of operations to maintain or restore international peace and security": Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the President should direct the Permanent United States Delegate to the United Nations to continue efforts toward securing payment by members of the United Nations of their assessments in arrears. It is further the sense of the Congress that if, upon the convening of the Nineteenth General Assembly, the arrears of any member of the United Nations equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it for the preceding two full years, the President should direct the Permanent United States Delegate to make every effort to assure invocation of the penalty provisions of article 19 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Passed August 20, 1964.

91

RESOLUTION ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND INTERVENTION IN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE, September 20, 1965 (H. Res. 560, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess.)

Background: Aftermath of the revolution in the Dominican Republic, and the continuing existence of a Communist regime in Cuba.

Nature of the Resolution: Expressed the sense of the House that subversive activities by forces of international communism contravene the Monroe Doctrine and may, if necessary, be repelled by force by any party to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

Text of the Resolution: See next page

Vote on the Resolution: House, 312 to 52

9. Resolution on Communist Subversion and Intervention in the Western Hemisphere

H. Res. 560, agreed to September 20, 1965

RESOLUTION To express the sense of the House of Representatives declaring the policy of the United States relative to the intervention of the international communistic movement in the Western Hemisphere

Whereas the subversive forces known as international communism, operating secretly and openly, directly and indirectly, threaten the sovereignty and political independence of all the Western Hemisphere nations; and

Whereas the American Continents, by the free and independent positions which they have assumed and maintained, are not subject to colonization or domination by any power; and

Whereas the intervention of international communism, directly or indirectly, however disguised, in any American state, conflicts with the established policy of the American Republics for the protection of the sovereignty of the peoples of such states and the political independence of their governments; and

Whereas such a situation extended to any portions of the Western Hemisphere is dangerous to the peace and safety of the whole of it, including the United States; and

Whereas the ninth meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance recognized that acts possessing characteristics of aggression and intervention carried out against one or more of the member States of the Organization of American States may be responded to in either individual or collective form, which could go as far as resort to armed force, until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that (1) any such subversive domination or threat of it violates the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, and of collective security as set forth in the acts and resolutions heretofore adopted by the American Republics; and

(2) In any such situation any one or more of the high contracting parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance may, in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense, which could go so far as resort to armed force, and in accordance with the declarations and principles above stated, take steps to forestall or combat intervention, domination, control, and colonization in whatever form, by the subversive forces known as international communism and its agencies in the Western Hemisphere.

13

EMERGENCY FOOD RELIEF FOR INDIA, April 19, 1966 (H. J. Res.
997, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess.)

Background: India's worst drought in a century.

Nature of the Resolution: Endorsement of President Johnson's offer to help India meet its pressing food shortages and expand production.

Text of the Resolution: See next page

Vote on the Resolution: House, voice vote
Senate, voice vote

(Note: The Indian drought continued, and on April 1, 1967, a similar resolution endorsing the President's proposal to assist India was passed.)



Public Law 89-406
89th Congress, H. J. Res. 997
April 19, 1966

Joint Resolution

80 STAT. 131

To support United States participation in relieving victims of hunger in India and to enhance India's capacity to meet the nutritional needs of its people.

Whereas the Congress has declared it to be the policy of the United States to make maximum efficient use of this Nation's agricultural abundance in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United States; Whereas the Congress is considering legislation to govern the response of the United States to the mounting world food problem; Whereas critical food shortages in India threatening the health if not the lives of tens of millions of people require an urgent prior response: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress endorses and supports the President's initiative in organizing substantial American participation in an urgent international effort designed to:

(a) Help meet India's pressing food shortages by making available to India under Public Law 480 agricultural commodities to meet India's normal import needs plus added quantities of agricultural commodities as the United States share in the international response to the Indian emergency.

(b) Help combat malnutrition, especially in mothers and children, via a special program;

(c) Encourage and assist those measures which the Government of India is planning to expand India's own agricultural production;

That the Congress urges the President to join India in pressing on other nations the urgency of sharing appropriately in a truly international response to India's critical need.

The Congress urges that to the extent necessary the food made available by this program be distributed in such manner that hungry people without money will be able to obtain food.

Approved April 19, 1966, 6 p.m.

India.
Food aid.

68 Stat. 454.
7 USC 1691
note.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

HOUSE REPORT No. 1408 (Comm on Agriculture).

SENATE REPORT No. 1101 accompanying S.J.Res. 149 (Comm. on Agriculture & Forestry).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 112 (1966):

Apr. 4: Considered and passed House.

Apr. 6: Considered and passed Senate, in lieu of S.J.Res. 149.

NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, May 17, 1966 (S. Res.
179, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess.)

Background: Current negotiations on an international agreement to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

Nature of the Resolution: Support for the efforts of President Johnson to negotiate a nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

Text of the Resolution: See next page.

Vote on the Resolution: Senate, 84-to-0

APPENDIX 13

(S. Res. 179, 89th Cong., 2d sess.)

RESOLUTION

Whereas the spread of nuclear weapons constitutes a grave threat to the security and peace of all nations; and

Whereas the knowledge and ability to design and manufacture nuclear weapons is becoming more universally known; and

Whereas the danger of nuclear war becomes greater as additional nations achieve independent nuclear weapon capability; and

Whereas it is the policy of the United States, as stated by President Johnson, "to seek agreements that will limit the perilous spread of nuclear weapons, and make it possible for all countries to refrain without fear from entering the nuclear arms race"; Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Senate commends the President's serious and urgent efforts to negotiate international agreements limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and supports the principle of additional efforts by the President which are appropriate and necessary in the interest of peace for the solution of nuclear proliferation problems.

97

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THURSDAY

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THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1967
4:30 P.M.

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

I HAVE READ YOUR REPORTS TO ME -- EVERY LINE. I WANT YOU TO
KNOW THAT WE THINK YOU'VE DONE A PERFECTLY WONDERFUL JOB FOR
THE COUNTRY. AT THIS MOMENT WHEN THINGS ARE MOVING IN EUROPE ON
SO MANY FRONTS, YOUR PRESENCE THERE, YOUR POLITICAL SKILL,
YOUR GOOD WILL AND GOOD HUMOR HAVE, I BELIEVE, HELPED US
TURN AN IMPORTANT CORNER IN OUR RELATIONS WITH EUROPE.
I WANT YOU TO KNOW HOW GRATEFUL I AM
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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