

*Pres file*

Friday, April 7, 1967  
10:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Freeman's  
observations on the administration  
of P. L. 480.

W. W. Rostow



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

98a

April 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM

To: The President  
The White House

From: Orville L. Freeman *OLF*  
Secretary of Agriculture

Subject: Food for Freedom -- P.L. 480 -- Executive Order

We are conducting a careful talent search to find a man to recommend to you as requested. Please give us a little time. This is a tough one. By definition the man to handle such a job will have to be exceptional. On the one hand he will have to command the respect of two Cabinet officers and the Administrator of AID who are involved in decision making on delicate matters involving food, fiber, agriculture and international politics. He will need to be wise and knowledgeable about domestic and international politics, as well as agriculture and international affairs. As you wisely observed, you can't take agriculture out of international relations or international relations out of agriculture.

I would emphasize strongly that until a man of this caliber and acceptability is found that it would be best to operate as we have now for some 10 years with P.L. 480. The new factors which must be considered with the modifications made by Food for Freedom are: (1) forward planning in regard to supply now that surpluses are gone; and (2) strong emphasis on self-help as a criteria in making agreements. Neither of these represents such a change as to require new machinery. This is not to say, of course, that a person of outstanding caliber could not make a contribution by coordinating and harmonizing views and getting decisions agreed upon short of the President.

Finally, may I be presumptuous enough to recommend that such a person ought to serve in a staff capacity and be as anonymous as possible. Within the Government the fact of the President's strong backing will be all that is needed to get results. Outside the Government if such a person is described as a czar and all kinds of actions attributed to him, it will create political problems for the President and will make it much more difficult for the designee to act effectively. Congress

## 2--The President

over the years after long and careful thought with considerable conflict and pulling and tugging has made certain assignments of responsibility. These are felt very keenly. If it can be not only said but demonstrated that this responsibility has been moved from the Cabinet officer held responsible by Congress it will create problems.

So far as the self-help standards are concerned, I believe that we are making progress in working out an efficient system that will get the maximum action out of the receiving country consistent with broad United States objectives in food, agriculture and international goals.

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Friday, April 7, 1967  
12:00 noon

Mr. President:

Herewith an account of the  
Vice President's talk with Kiesinger.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Berlin 1350

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 18, NARA, Date 4-23-91



99a

~~SECRET NODIS~~

Friday, April 7, 1967

TEXT OF MESSAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT

Subject: Summary of Visit to Bonn/Berlin

Berlin 1350  
2 sections  
V1PT0 85

Wednesday, April 5: Mrs. Humphrey and I were received at a very impressive ceremony at the Chancellor's official residence by the Chancellor and Mrs. Kiesinger. There followed a long private meeting with the Chancellor, with only interpreters present. The Chancellor indicated deep concern over the state of US-German relations. There had been misunderstandings in the press. The German press and media are always anxious to find something to play up in terms of tension and disagreement. Kiesinger is well aware of the interpretation of some of his statements and spent a good deal of time apologizing to me for any misunderstanding that his comments might have created. He did not know where he or his country stood. He very much wanted to talk privately and frankly.

He had been most grateful to receive your letter and was quite anxious to meet with you in person at your earliest convenience. I expressed to Kiesinger your very sincere respect of and friendship for the Federal Republic. I explained to him how you had worked with his predecessor and your willingness to work with him. I emphasized the importance of privacy in communication and the dangers in having diplomacy at the level of heads of government finding its way into the press. It was clear that he was deeply concerned with the non-proliferation treaty, and did not fully understand its intent or provisions. Most of all, he did not understand the historic context of our overall efforts in arms control and disarmament. We spoke at some length and the Chancellor seemed satisfied at my explanations as well as relieved.

There followed a luncheon hosted by President Luebke. Luebke was also filled with uncertainty regarding our policies and intentions. He understood that people in our Policy Planning Staff and elsewhere were advocating a deal with the USSR over the heads of our Western European partners. He also was concerned about the NPT. Although his manner was cordial and friendly, it was obvious that this man of deep character had a number of serious concerns about our intent toward Germany.

As with the Chancellor, I gave him our assurances of friendship and support. He too seemed quite pleased to have had a frank and open

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-394

By ing, NARA, Date 3-12-93

~~SECRET NODIS~~

discussion with your representative. Following the luncheon, I met again with the Chancellor, this time accompanied by Vice Chancellor Willy Brandt. We discussed Kennedy Round, international liquidity, the non-proliferation treaty once more, East-West relations and offset. This meeting lasted far beyond the scheduled time. It was in the same spirit as the morning meeting, with a very frank give-and-take throughout.

That evening, at a dinner hosted by the Chancellor and attended by leaders of all three major German parties, Kiesinger made a lengthy and impromptu toast in which he said he had been completely assured and pleased by our discussions.

After our meetings, and after the dinner as well, the Chancellor took me aside privately to express his gratitude and pleasure that our discussions were possible. He said he had many ungrounded fears about US policy which had now been dispelled. "There were clouds before, but now the sky is bright and clear," he said. He expressed his admiration for you and his hope that he could meet with you as soon as it might be convenient. He said he hoped we would not worry about German's friendship with France, that he would do nothing which would in any way jeopardize our close relationship. On at least three occasions he told me that he had explained to De Gaulle that it was in Germany's interest to have a close relationship with the US and that he intended to follow such a policy. I received the strong impression that Kiesinger, who is new in his office and does not have personal acquaintance with many national leaders, has been plagued by feelings of insecurity and apprehension since taking office. This is one of the reasons he is especially eager to know you on a personal basis. I believe this is a man who not only has a brilliant mind, but has a good heart. He will be our good and trusted friend so long as he has reason to believe that we respect German's vital interests. I assured Kiesinger of your desire for a personal working relationship with him and of your basic friendship for the Federal Republic.

Thursday, April 6: Before leaving Bonn, I appeared on the German television version of "Meet the Press." The questioning in this program reflected the same uncertainty and insecurity that was reflected in our official conversations. The show was taped for later broadcast during prime evening time. It will also be shown in several other European countries.

~~SECRET NODIS~~**PRESERVATION COPY**

Enroute to Berlin, Thursday, April 6: Today enroute to Berlin, I followed up on my conversations with Kiesinger by a review with Brandt. I have tried to enlist Brandt's help in particular on the NPT, Kennedy Round and international monetary reform along US lines. In this we have had the help of Wilson and Brown of the UK.

**Berlin:** This visit came at an opportune time. The East German regime has been making things tough for West Berlin. They have cut off the flow of people through the wall and generally have been difficult. The presence of your representative in Berlin reminding them of the long American commitment to this city was enthusiastically received. Street crowds were surprisingly good as we arrived in Berlin, despite overcast and drizzle. We drove through good crowds to the City Hall, where I addressed the opening session of the House of Representatives. There was a good deal of television coverage. I then spoke and visited with the American troops and families stationed in Berlin. There was an overflow crowd. Following this, our party toured some of the renewed areas of Berlin with cheering crowds lining the streets at many points.

In the evening, I attended an official Berlin reception at the Charlottenburg Palace, and a reception held by Axel Springer, Germany's largest publisher.

Summary: Our German allies have always needed reassurance and the closest of consultation. But now, as we move toward a non-proliferation treaty and increasing momentum in East-West relations, this is clearly more necessary than ever. Add to this the dimension of a new German government, and contending political factions within that government, and it is clear that we must pay extra attention -- even beyond what seems reasonable -- in working with the Germans. I found a general willingness toward policies of bridge-building to the East. There was openness to progressive ideas and even an eagerness to come to better terms with the Soviet Union. But there is a feeling that somehow we were going ahead on our own without them. I think an extra investment in time and effort toward the Germans is well worthwhile. If it is made, I am sure that this nation and her leaders will stand firmly with us for years to come.

April 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Mr. Marvin Watson

Attached, for your signature, is a letter appointing Charles G. Mortimer as National Chairman for United Nations Day 1967. Secretary Rusk recommends the appointment (Tab A). Mr. Mortimer is also recommended by Ambassador Goldberg and the Board of the United Nations Association. He is willing to serve. His biography is at Tab B.

15/  
W. W. Rostow

Attachments  
As stated.

WWR:ND:gg

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Dear Mr. Mortimer:

It is heartening to know that you have agreed to serve as United States National Chairman for United Nations Day 1967.

Americans helped to build the United Nations; and we are helping to make it function more effectively. Nevertheless, we should know more about its work. We overwhelmingly support the UN, but we need a better understanding of its purposes and accomplishments.

As National Chairman, I know you will encourage the governors of the states, local officials and private organizations to participate in commemorating the Twenty-second Anniversary of the UN Charter and to bring information about the United Nations to the American people.

I am gratified at your willingness to devote your time, your talents and your demonstrated ability to this important work.

Sincerely,

Mr. Charles G. Mortimer  
Chairman, Executive Committee  
General Foods Corporation  
250 North Avenue  
White Plains, New York

LBJ:ND:gg

101  
Rostow

Thursday, April 6, 1967 - 4:00 pm

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ed Korry

I don't want to poach on John Macy's preserve, but I understand that you recently decided not to make an immediate decision on the future of Ed Korry, our Ambassador to Ethiopia. I thought you ought to know one fact of which Macy may not be aware -- that George Woods has offered Korry a Vice Presidency of the World Bank. My spies tell me that the chances are very good he will take it within the next few days or weeks.

Korry would still much prefer the Belgrade Embassy -- or another ambassadorial post outside Africa -- to the Woods offer or any of the other opportunities open to him. You are familiar with his performance in Ethiopia and the high opinion most of us have of him. With a positive signal that you have something else in mind for him, I think we might keep him from leaving Government service awhile longer. Without such a signal, however, I think Ed will leave very soon. He has no independent means, the World Bank attracts him, and he has been in Ethiopia for four years. Obviously, having him in the World Bank would be of some benefit to us since our policy in the poor countries rests heavily on Bank activities and initiatives. But you may prefer to keep him on your team.

W. W. Rostow

Try to keep Korry; ask Macy to try me again  
on the Belgrade job \_\_\_\_\_

Do nothing to influence Korry's decision \_\_\_\_\_

Gently encourage Korry to take the Bank job \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

EKH/vmr

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12333,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY re ON 4/23/91



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-394

By *ing*, NARA, Date 3-12-93

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

April 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Supply Policy for India and Pakistan

Gene Locke sees Ayub tomorrow morning (midnight tonight our time). Details on the package have been sent to Gene and Chet (Tab A). You will recall our discussions of this with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and Nick. It includes (a) an offer to sell to both Pakistan and India, on a case-by-case basis, spares for lethal equipment originally provided by the U. S.; (b) an end to our previous special arrangement with Pakistan, and withdrawal of our MAAG from Pakistan and USMSMI from India; (c) reopening a limited number of training slots here for India and Pakistani officer; (d) reinstituting credit sales to both countries of non-lethal items only, using remaining balances for this year and no more than \$75 million for next FY year on a case-by-case basis.

And all these steps to be contingent on progress in limiting arms expenditures.

A scenario (Tab B) has also gone out to confirm details worked out with Gene Locke and to give Chet his detailed instructions on how to approach the Indians in step with Gene's approaches in Pindi. Secretary Rusk has also sent a detailed personal cable to buck up Chet (Tab C).

But no action has yet been authorized, pending Congressional consultations. These are now completed. On the House side, State checked it out with Representatives Ford, Zablocki, Bolton, Adair and Albert, and Morgan's staff assistant. In the Senate, Symington and Senators McCarthy, Sparkman and Cooper met together with State representatives yesterday. They had no trouble with this package and were grateful for the consultations. But they had many questions on arms sales policy generally. Bill Macomber saw Senator Dirksen this morning, and he's on board.

We've all been over this one a number of times, and it's the best package we can come up with. Consultations on the Hill have cleared the way there. I recommend we go ahead. We'll have to send it by six o'clock tonight to get to Gene in time.

*Authorization granted*  
Okay to unleash Gene *✓*

W. W. Rostow

See me urgently \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Ambassy NEW DELHI  
RAWALPINDI

STATE

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-67

By is, NARA Date 2-15-00

1. After full consideration of alternatives, we have concluded that the US should follow a policy toward India and Pakistan designed to limit arms acquisition, to restrain military expenditures, to reduce the possibility of military confrontation, and to encourage highest priority allocation of resources to agricultural and economic development. The United States should use all useful leverage at its disposal to further this policy, including its bilateral economic assistance, its participation in the World Bank and in aid consortia, and end-use controls over US military equipment supplied directly or indirectly to third countries.
2. The supply of military equipment by the United States should be governed by this policy. The United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the Soviet Union should be urged to follow similar restraints in their military supply policies toward India and Pakistan.
3. Initial implementation of this policy should include:
  - A. ~~Withdrawal of~~ MAAG (Pakistan) and USMSH, making alternative, limited arrangements for providing such military representation, inspection and

NEA:WJHandley:av 3/14/67 3255

The Secretary

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~U - Mr. Katzenbach  
White House - Mr. Rostow~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

supervision of sales and training as may be required; the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be a party to such arrangements.

B. Steps to prevent the sale by third countries to India and Pakistan of military equipment which (a) includes US technology and components, (b) is produced in the US or (c) is co-produced with the US, except when the US has determined that such sales contribute to arms limitation or reduced defense expenditures.

C. Indicating to India and Pakistan that, although the US remains unwilling to contribute to the augmentation of the military establishment of either country through the sale of lethal military equipment, it is willing to consider on a case by case basis the sale of spare parts for previously supplied lethal equipment ~~and the sale of replacement items of lethal equipment~~ when there is a clearly established critical need and when such sales contribute to arms limitation or reduced military expenditures and the maintenance of a reasonable military balance between the two nations.

D. Indicating to India and Pakistan our willingness to reinstitute training in the US for a limited number of key Indian and Pakistani military personnel under MAP.

E. Disbursement of remaining obligated FY-67 credit sales funds only where such expenditures will contribute to US security interests (e.g. Star Sapphire) or to support of the general policy of arms limitation. Credit sales shall be for non-lethal items only.

4. FY-68 credit sales planning for India and Pakistan should be predicated on the preceding paragraphs. The relevant figure in the 1968 budget should be \$75 million with the following provisions:

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Ambassies NEW DELHI, RAWALPINDI

~~SECRET~~

- A. The figure is to be classified.
- B. It is to be an absolute ceiling, not a target.
- C. It should under no circumstances be communicated to the Governments of India and Pakistan without specific approval of the Secretary of State.
- D. Proposed credits will be reviewed case by case for their contribution to arms limitations.
- 5. After we have consulted with Congress you will be receiving instructions on implementation of this policy, and timing and manner of presentation. We recognize that situation will differ between New Delhi and Rawalpindi and that certain current problems including NPT may have bearing on timing of presentation in New Delhi.

GP-3

END



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

*W. Wriggins* 1026  
*Saunders*  
168709  
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Origin

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Info

ACTION: Amembassy RAWALPINDI  
NEW DELHI

IMMEDIATE  
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INFO: Amembassy LONDON  
TEHRAN  
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STATE

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-67

By 10, NARA Date 2-15-00

REF: State 166539

Subject: Military Supply Policy for India and Pakistan

Following are your instructions covering military supply policy

conveyed by ref tel.

1. We desire implement decision as soon as Congressional consultations, ~~which are now under way, are complete; telegram will inform you of completion. While the consultations are under way, we recognize Ambassador Bowles will need some elbow room on timing of approaches to GOI, there is some urgency for Ambassador Locke to inform GOP. We understand that a meeting with Ayub now set for April 7; we believe GOI should be informed as soon after that as possible~~

~~instructions, requesting appropriate action with respective governments~~

to assure shortest gap possible between presentations. Basic elements of new policy should be communicated as stated ref tel, omitting references to internal USG operations.

2. Both posts should emphasize that new policy reflects intensive review over long period time and with involvement highest levels USG.

Drafted by: NEA/PAT:JWS:pain;LBL:aingen  
NEA/INC:D Heck:atm 3/27/67

Tel. Ext. Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Handley G/PM - Capt. Coward

DOD - Mr. Hoopes

AID - Mr. White

S/S - Mr. Walsh

WHITE HOUSE - Mr. Wriggins

U - Mr. Katzenbach

H - Mr. Macomber

~~SECRET~~

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Both should also insure it clearly understood we do not under foreseeable circumstances intend return to supply relationship we had prior September 1965.

3. Our new policy recognizes that fundamental historical changes have taken place. Our purpose is to establish a new relationship that takes into account legitimate defense requirements both countries but rests primarily on conviction that basic security and economic well being of both countries depends on their finding way to lessen tensions between them and thus to reduce share of their resources going to military expenditures.

FOR RAWALPINDI: 4. In conveying policy package to Ayub you should say we were encouraged by his response to our representations on arms limitation in November (Rawalpindi's 1751). On assumption that that response remains basis for GOP arms policy, we now prepared do following within context of stated policy (i.e., only when such actions will contribute to arms limitation or reduced defense expenditures):

- (a) entertain specific requests for cash purchase in US of lethal spares on case-by-case basis;
- (b) continue to consider requests for credit purchase of non-lethal end items;
- (c) discuss his other problems of military supply, including requests for purchase from third countries of US-controlled equipment, but only within policy context stated refel;
- (d) resume limited grant training program, if GOP so desires;

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5. Before we are able to address Pak request for our concurrence in M-47 tank deal with Germans (Rawalpindi's 3489), we need know: (a) effect of prospective purchases of US tank spares on level operational tanks of US origin; (b) how proposed German deal would further affect tank strength levels; (c) number Pak tanks of Chicom origin; and, (d) effects of foregoing tank strengths on overall armed forces structure.

6. In conveying policy package to Ayub we hope you can get across that we are prepared to help him meet his legitimate security requirements but that manner in which GOP deals in coming weeks and months with recent GOI offer begin talks on arms limitation (State 158121) could have decisive impact on way we are able to respond to GOP requests.

FOR NEW DELHI: 7. We recognize difficult task you face in getting Indians to see that their own interests served by our new policy. There are a number of elements in package designed to help meet your problem (i.e., permanent MAAG withdrawal, credit sales, training). We believe it would be useful to highlight following points:

(a) This decision terminates grant military assistance to Pakistan and substantially results in the end of a military relationship we have had with Pakistan since 1954.

(b) the withdrawal of MAAG from Pakistan (and USMSMI from India) symbolizes this new policy.

(c) need for some degree of flexibility in our sales policy if we are to have any influence on Pak position regarding arms limitation

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(d) fact that military supply is only one element of larger USG policy designed contribute to security, integrity, and economic well being of South Asia as a whole; the record speaks for itself as to what we have done and are ready to do for India, a country that is central to our interests in area;

(e) specific benefits for India include (1) \$17 million on 3 per cent and ten year repayment basis for completion of Star Sapphire project. This is a special concessional rate, no longer available elsewhere and is provided in recognition of importance of completing this project;

(2) authority to continue our credit sales program on case-by-case basis (currently on 5-1/2 per cent and 7 year terms); (3) limited grant training program.

8. We believe it would also be useful for you to reiterate in this context our strong satisfaction over recent Chagla letter to Pirzada on arms limitation talks, adding that we continue believe special burden responsibility rests on India as larger power if progress to be made in such talks.

FOR BOTH POSIS: 9. Para 3 C reftel states policy on replacement items, i.e., the question is not now before us as to replacing an end item of US origin should that item be totally destroyed through accidental loss. That contingency will be considered when it arises.

10. Both GOI and GOP should understand that while we are prepared to discuss arrangements for carrying out our new policy, including handling of any public announcements, decisions of timing and tactics will have to be our own,

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influenced particularly by Congressional requirements. You should stress most strongly that we intend handle this matter in as low key as possible and will look to both Governments for their cooperation. We would prefer for present to avoid any kind of public announcement or comment on new policy but recognize difficulty doing so for very long. FYI: We believe it preferable to make low key announcement which focuses on MAAG and USMSMI withdrawal instead of reacting to leaks. This announcement would be made as soon as possible after Ambassador Bowles talks to GOI and might be followed up with in Washington backgrounder/with selected journalists, possibly including Indians and Paks who resident here. Will keep you informed. END FYI. Contingency press guidance being prepared.

11. If asked about timing MAAG/USMSMI withdrawal, you should say this still being worked out. FYI: We envisage July 1 as target date. END FYI.

12. FYI: We recognize that conflicting approaches GOI (willingness talk with GOP on all subjects but without recognizing existence dispute on Kashmir) and GOP (willingness talk GOI all subjects but only if Kashmir dispute also discussed) will continue complicate our efforts achieve arms limitation. We believe you should continue take every opportunity urge both sides to moderate their preconditions. Meanwhile, we are prepared for time being to see what we can accomplish bilaterally. END FYI.

13. We intend brief Ambassador Hilaly and Charge Bannerjee as soon as we know approaches made to Governments.

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FOR LONDON: 14. As soon as scenario for presentations in Rawalpindi and New Delhi has been worked out, we expect to authorize you to convey new policy to HMG at appropriate level and in closest confidence. In doing so you should say that we will wish consult further on what we might be able to do together to achieve progress toward arms limitation subcontinent.

GP-1

END

RUSK

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FOR OC/T USE ONLY

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

IND. TE. ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

Origin ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI

Info. NODIS

STATE 166136

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-67  
By 10, NARA Date 2-15-00

1. You and Gene Locke should shortly be receiving a statement on our new policy regarding military supplies to India and Pakistan as well as instructions on how this policy should be implemented. On the instructions of the President, Secretary McNamara, AID Administrator Gaud and I, as well as other key officials have given long, serious and careful consideration to all aspects of this new policy. Your views have been taken into account by all concerned.

2. This has not been an easy decision but I am confident that what we are proposing is the right course for the United States to follow in the months ahead. We do not seek a military buildup in the subcontinent. There is too much of that already and India is far from being without blame. In fact our new policy has just the opposite objective. We believe that, together with our diplomatic, economic and food efforts, it is an essential element in our endeavor to divert Indian and Pakistani energies and substance from the arms race and channel them instead towards economic programs which could within a few years substantially improve prospects for

Drafted by: NEA:WJHandley:eae 3/30/67

Tel. Ext. x.3255

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

DR The Secretary

NEA - Mr. Battle  
S/S - Mr. Walsh

NEA/INC - Mr. Heck  
NEA/PAF - Mr. Spain

CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES  
BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room 6243

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy NEW DELHI

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

economic and food self-sufficiency. We realize we cannot by our own actions bring this about. We will therefore enlist the help of the Bank, our allies, and, if at all possible, even the Soviet Bloc.

3. We fully agree with you that our objective in all this is an arms agreement between these two countries. Our efforts should be in that direction and we think we will be more influential in this process if our policy is broad enough to give us a wide range of inducements and incentives, especially with the GOP.

4. We all recognize that our new policy could cause us immediate problems in India, but I urge you not to be defensive with the Indians. There is much in the new policy that should appeal to them. For example:

A. We will be terminating grant military assistance to Pakistan and ending a basic military relationship we have had with that country since 1954.

B. The withdrawal of MAAG from Pakistan (and USMSMI from India) will be publicly announced at an appropriate moment.

C. The package will include funds for completion of Star Sapphire on terms far more concessional than we are offering elsewhere at present as well as a substantial credit sales program for non-lethal equipment.

D. We are in fact reverting to a military relationship with both countries similar to the one we had in the fifties with India (when it was on friendly terms with Communist China and the Soviet Union.)

E. By being in a position to sell military spares to Pakistan, we will have an opportunity of slowing down the re-equipping of Pakistani military forces.

Were we to continue to prevent Pakistan from maintaining for the time being its

Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy NEW DELHI

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*Classification*

American supplied military establishment, we would surely be running the risk of a major, sudden, expensive change-over and modernization process which would almost certainly be detrimental to Indian interests.

The fact is that by this new policy we will be doing no more and indeed less than other suppliers of military equipment to India and Pakistan, i.e. Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Communist China and the Soviet Union. Moreover, we know we will be less forthcoming than other military suppliers because we intend to scrutinize requests more carefully than they do.

5. It seems to me that the GOI should see our new policy in the perspective of our total relationship with India, a relationship in terms of economic, food, political and other support that is clearly based on USG conviction that India is central to our interests in South Asia. Since World War II four US administrations have steadfastly supported the independence of India as well as massive American assistance to India's economic development. In the days immediately ahead we will be moving forward on a number of fronts and these should not be ignored or discounted. They include:

- A. \$25 million total package for voluntary agencies.
- B. A non-project loan of \$132 million.
- C. Project GROMET.
- D. AID level discussions at the Consortium meeting in early April.
- E. Another tranche of PL-480 Title I shortly after the Consortium meeting.
- F. Continued diplomatic efforts to mobilize an international food program for India.

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Page 4 of telegram to Amembassy NEW DELHI

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*Classification*

6. In the light of our changed relationship with Pakistan and considering the totality of our relations with India, I am confident that you can explain our new policy in such a way that the Indians will appreciate our objectives and will not forget the advantages that accrue to them through their overall relationships with the United States.

RUSK

April 6, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a friendly greeting on its 20th Anniversary to the Economic Commission for Europe of the UN. Gene, who is attending the ministerial-level meeting, will read your message to the Commission.

W. W. Rostow

Approved ✓

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

WWR:ND:gg



PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

I congratulate the Economic Commission for Europe on its Twentieth Anniversary.

In 1947 Europe was facing the difficulties of economic recovery and political renewal. Europe's recovery has exceeded anything we could have expected. Western Europe has taken important steps toward unification. Eastern Europe is pursuing economic growth with vigor and determination.

Through technical cooperation, improved economic relations and cultural exchange, we can hasten progress in healing the political and economic divisions of Europe. The Commission is an important forum for member countries with different economic and social systems to consider economic problems of joint concern. The Commission can play a major role in broadening the area of political cooperation among these countries.

The Government of the United States pledges its full support in working toward these objectives.

April 6, 1967

*Per file*

His Excellency Vasco Leita da Cunha  
3007 Whitehaven Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Mrs. Johnson and I are greatly distressed to hear that Mrs. Vasco da Cunha is unwell. Please convey to her our affection and hopes for a quick recovery.

Lyndon B. Johnson

WWRostow:rlh

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*let  
4-6-67 105  
12:40*

Thurs., April 6, 1967  
12:40 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith my proposed briefing notes  
for 4:00 p. m. this afternoon.

*W. W. R.*



Thursday, April 6, 1967

Proposed Briefing Notes for Background on Latin American Summit Conference -- 4:00 p.m., April 6, 1967

1. The Summit Conference began at Latin American initiative; and remains primarily a Latin American show. On April 15 last year in Mexico City, after discussing the matter with President Diaz Ordaz, the President said he would "join with Latin American leaders in exploring the proposal of the President of Argentina"; and that "such a conference should be prepared with the utmost care."

2. The conference has been prepared with great care. The problems were explored, narrowed, and made precise in a series of meetings as follows:

-- In August the President of Colombia held a "little summit meeting" with four of his colleagues to discuss the agenda.

-- The OAS Council organized a committee of experts which met during December and January to prepare agenda items for the Summit.

-- Assistant Secretary Gordon and Ambassador Linowitz traveled to Central America and South America to listen to Latin American ideas about the Summit agenda.

-- The agenda was formally agreed by the Foreign Ministers on February 27.

-- Finally, the Foreign Ministers will be meeting again for two days, April 8-10, just before the Presidents arrive.

3. Therefore, there should be no expectation of dramatic surprises or sensational results. The agenda is known. There is no crisis to be resolved. The Presidents of the hemisphere will be taking stock and looking ahead together over the following headings:

- Economic integration and industrialization.
- Multinational projects.
- Agricultural modernization, with special emphasis on food production.
- The expansion and modernization of education facilities.
- The promotion of Latin American trade.
- The limitation of unnecessary military expenditures.

4. As the President has made clear, he will be going to Punta del Este to listen; to hear directly the views and hopes of his colleagues and then to see how we can be helpful in fulfilling the agreed objectives of our Latin American friends.

It is the essence of this agenda that Latin Americans must take the lead: only they can bring about economic integration; produce workable plans in the field of multinational projects; modernize their agricultural and educational systems; expand trade; and limit their military budgets. Our cooperation can be helpful in the future as in the past. But it is the measure of the progress we have made since the crisis years of 1961-62 that the initiative in the Alliance for Progress has passed to the Latin Americans.

We are -- as we should be -- junior partners in the enterprise.

5. This fact is increasingly recognized by the Latin Americans themselves.

Here I shall quote from recent statements of Frei, Castelo Branco, and others, which are being assembled.

6. The kind of results we can expect from the agenda are as follows:

At this point Bill Bowdler will go over each item in the agenda, indicating where approximately we now stand after all the staff work which has been done over the past year and now pretty well agreed.

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 6, 1967  
10:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the Vice President's  
summary of his London trip which, I  
believe, turned out well.

W. W. Rostow

Bonn 11753

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12355, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ng, NARA, Date 4/23/91

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-394  
By ing, NARA, Date 3-12-93

Thursday, April 6, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT (Bonn, 11753  
Vipto, 62)

The following is a summary of the London Visit, April 2-4, 1967.

I am most pleased with the results of my visit to Great Britain. My talks here have been open and frank, and the atmosphere has been friendly. Street crowds have been warm and enthusiastic, there have been no demonstrators; and I think I have been able to do some good.

After my April 2 arrival Sunday evening, we went to Chequers for a private dinner with Harold Wilson. (You have a detailed summary of this meeting). April 3 began a day with brief remarks to the U. S. Embassy staff, then I gave a background briefing to the traveling press and American press, headquartered in London. I took the occasion of this press back-grounder to inform the group, on a low-key basis, that there was a great deal of feeling among European leaders that media coverage of Vietnam was distorted and one-sided, and was acting to our detriment in Europe.

I met with the Foreign Secretary, George Brown, who briefed me on his coming visit to Rome for WEU Session where he will discuss British initiatives toward the EEC. I filled him in on the reaction I had seen in various European capitals, and provided him with a private memorandum before his departure outlining my impressions regarding this. (I believe you have seen the detailed memorandum of this conversation.)

Following my meeting with Brown, he was host at a luncheon at the Foreign Office. At the luncheon, he specifically gave his thanks to you for our cooperation and understanding on the offset and for our help with the Pound. The atmosphere of the luncheon was cordial and extremely informal. Following the luncheon Brown left immediately for his mission to Europe.

I then taped a half-hour TV show for BBC which was replayed in prime time that evening to an audience of 8 to 11 million. I was interviewed on the show by some 25 university students from throughout Britain, representing all geographic and political interests. Questioning ranged from

~~SECRET/NODIS~~



the Great Society to Vietnam. I then hosted a private reception for British editors and publishers in my hotel suite. I gave them a good fill-in on our domestic programs. Most questioning was about Vietnam. I did my best to clarify our position there and left them with copies of reports of "The Other War" and "The Search for Peace." In the evening the Prime Minister was host at a dinner at 10 Downing Street with most members of the Cabinet and leading members of Parliament present. The atmosphere was cordial and informal.

Tuesday, April 4: My first appointment was with the opposition leader, Ted Heath. (Memorandum of the conversation was already sent.) Heath was most concerned with the effect of the Non-proliferation Treaty on Britain's initiative to enter Europe. He was quite suspicious that not only would it make Britain's path more difficult, but that the Non-proliferation Treaty would inhibit development of peaceful nuclear technology. I explained the purpose of the Treaty to him, and I think I answered some of his questions to his satisfaction. Heath believed chances were good for some food aid arrangement in the Kennedy Round. He was seriously worried that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would go ahead with deployment of ABM systems, thus causing confusion and division in Europe, which would be left without such a system. I explained to him your efforts to avert an ABM arms race.

I then toured a housing development near London of which the Labour Government is most proud. There was considerable photo and TV coverage. Prime Minister Wilson was host at a luncheon with Cabinet Ministers.

Before luncheon, I met private for one-half hour with Wilson. I once more affirmed the hope that he would not vary his Vietnam position, and I believe he got the point. He gave a most optimistic report on the British economy and on prospects for the British Pound. He believed that Europe would accept increased drawing rights in the international monetary discussions, but would not accept a new reserve unit. He pledged Britain's complete support in the monetary discussions. We discussed once more the Non-proliferation Treaty and Britain in Europe, as well as Vietnam, but no new point was covered beyond that already discussed at Chequers Sunday evening.

Following the luncheon, I sat in the Gallery of the House of Commons while the Prime Minister answered questions from back benchers. I then met in the Committee Rooms with more than 250 Labour and Tory members of Parliament. This lasted more than an hour. It was a give-and-take session,

very spirited, in the same tradition as the question period on the floor of the House of Commons. I began by outlining the economic and social progress which had taken place in America, talked about our objectives in the world, and then gave a brief exposition concerning Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Most of the questions concerned Vietnam. They were posed by some of the most vigorous dissenters on the Labour Left. There were also questions concerning disarmament, the technological gap, and domestic matters, but for the most part the discussion was on Vietnam. There was cheering, shouting, and occasional jeering from the members of Parliament. But the favorable reactions seemed to far outweigh the negative. There was a good round of applause at the end of the meeting, and there was a good amount of jeering at some of the arguments given by the Labour Left-wingers.

Last evening, along with the Prime Minister and Mrs. Wilson; Ambassador and Mrs. Bruce; Mrs. Humphrey and I were the guests of the Queen at Windsor Castle. Discussion was informal and cordial. The Queen and Prince Philip are well-informed on Vietnam and they are favorable to your policy.

Summary:

I found a sense of vitality and of youth in Britain, far beyond what I expected. The British economy does seem to be stabilized and healthy again. I sensed in my discussion with everyone that the U.K. will make an honest and all-out effort to join the EEC. Public opinion is now 70-75 percent behind such an effort. The British are our loyal and good friends. I sense that this old country is about to enter a new period of growth and leadership.

In closing, I must report the extraordinary good will and respect in which Ambassador Bruce is held here. He was most helpful during my visit and has obviously rendered service of real statesmanship here as he has in other places.

I will send a cable Thursday night on visits to Bonn and Berlin. Individual memoranda of conversation will be transmitted at close of business each day.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, April 6, 1967 -- 11:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

The enemy thinks we are doing quite well with the Chieu Hoi program.

We ought to give the customer more of what he wants.

The most important technical statement in this report is (p. 2), "Most of the deserters return to their local areas." This means, in effect, that more are deserting back home than are coming over to the Chieu Hoi program. That means, in turn, that the manpower drain they face from casualties, Chieu Hoi, and deserters must now be exceeding their capacity of replacement from the South, which would account for the increasing use of North Vietnamese soldiers in VC main force units.

W. W. Rostow

A-561, March 29, 1967 (State airgram)

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLS-CBS 19  
By ics, NARS, Date 6-22-84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



ORIGIN/ACTION

EA-8

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 27 VIET S  
DEF 1 VIET N  
FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R REP AF

APA EUR FE

NEA CU INR

E P IO

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AGR COM FRB

INT LAB TAR

TR XMB AIR

ARMY CIA NAVY

OSD USIA NSA

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WH/K SFA NSC

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A-561

CONFIDENTIAL

NO.

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : CINCPAC FOR POLAD

FROM : Amembassy SAIGON

DATE: March 29, 1967

SUBJECT : Viet Cong Document on Counter  
Measures to Chieu Hoi Program

REF :

Enclosed is a translation of a captured VC document seized on February 25, 1967 by units of the 25th U.S. Infantry Division during Operation Junction City. It concerns measures instituted by the VC command to counter the Chieu Hoi and other psywar programs. The document is dated only 1966; month and day were unspecified on the original which originated from the VC Armed Forces Political Department.

Noteworthy are the elaborate indoctrination and ideological measures the VC use to combat the Chieu Hoi program. Illustrative of VC awareness of the consequences of U.S./GVN psywar programs and the Chieu Hoi program in particular, was the statement that these programs have "the ability of ruining us politically and ideologically." The urgency of the VC's counter measures is highlighted by the admission that, "Desertion within the ranks of the armed forces is frequent and is rising at an alarming rate." Shortcomings, the document stated, in past VC counter measures resulted in "some losses, disclosure of our combat plans, and erosion of the will to fight; additional manpower shortage, etc."

LODGE

Enclosure: as stated.

(Log No. 03-2646-67-Confidential)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: As Stated in document

By: [Signature], NARA, Date: 4/23/91

Declassified one year after  
date of origin.

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☐ In ☐ Out

FORM DS-323

Drafted by:

POL: JHWeiss:paz 3-29-67

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL: JACalhoun

Clearances:

POL: RFRogers

1967 APR 3 AM 10 41

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Page 1 - Enclosure 1

ATG/ Saigon

SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION ARMY  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

REFERENCE DOCUMENT

on

COUNTER MEASURES AGAINST ENEMY PSYWAR  
AND CHIEU HOI ACTIVITY

THE US IMPERIALISTS ARE WAGING THEIR AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST  
OUR COUNTRY IN LINE WITH THEIR POLICY OF "NEO-COLONIALISM."  
ON THE ONE HAND THEY RESORT TO VIGOROUS MILITARY ACTION,  
WHILE ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY EMPLOY HIGHLY MALICIOUS POLITICAL  
TRICKS TO DESTROY US.

The Chieu Hoi psywar program is a vital activity in this wicked political trick and constitutes the national policy in the neo-colonialist war. The "nature " of the U.S. and their lackeys is "reactionary aggression" and lack of a just cause. For this reason, psywar also reflects this nature. The plots and tricks in the current psywar activity are many. Basically, they are deceptive, demagogic, subversive, and coercive and are intended to deal a blow to our morale, ideology, and ranks.

~~They offer phony national independence to deceive us; they employ money, Women, family ties to subvert us; they resort to violent bombing and they attack to overpower us...These above actions are intended to undermine our fighting spirit, spread the fear of Americans and the rigors of war, foster doubt of our victory, confuse our outlook on friend and foe, and erode our will to fight to the point of causing us to surrender and betray.~~ The Chieu Hoi Psywar program is a manifestly dangerous plot. As a consequence, defense against psywar is a continuing and long-range process to make our army ideologically powerful and highly militant. At the same time, in view of the present critical situation of the Revolution, defense against psywar is a top priority task to insure successful accomplishment by the army of all missions assigned by the Party.

Defense against psywar activities has recently been given added emphasis by all echelons; but the overall picture is one filled with relatively serious shortcomings

We tend to underrate enemy delusive propaganda themes. Many persons commonly listen to enemy radio broadcasts and read enemy publications.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1998  
By NY, NARA, Date 4/23/91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 2 - Enclosure 1

A561 Saigon

We are not fully aware of the dangerous and harmful effects of it [enemy psywar], which are intended to deepen the schools of thought of enjoying life, balking at making sacrifice and enduring hardship. This is attributed to inadequate ideological indoctrination and lax political activity which make some people vulnerable to enemy propaganda.

The unit commanders and [Party] Committee authorities fail to grasp the units' political situation or underrate it. The cadre and men do not fully adhere to security measures, and do close their eyes to some serious violations.

The above deficiencies are due to the failure on the part of some [Party] Committee cadres to properly manage the internal political situation of their units in order to remedy the weak points, make the units politically motivated and ideologically conscious, uncover the bad or doubtful elements, preclude enemy sabotage on the political front. The counter measures will guarantee that our armed forces constitute a sharp instrument of the Party, which never fails to accomplish its missions under any circumstances--even under the most difficult ones.

11 Desertion within the ranks of the armed forces is frequent and is rising at an alarming rate. Most of the deserters return to their local areas. But deserters-traitors are many and exist everywhere. Some cases of desertion are extremely dangerous, such as desertions taking place prior to the launching of an attack. Such desertions adversely affect the outcome of the battle. (Some deserters, prior to going over to the enemy assassinated our cadre and men, stole secret documents, and later led the enemy into our area for destruction.)

The foregoing desertions were motivated by a variety of causes, one of which was the "Chieu Hoi" Psywar influence. Little emphasis has been placed on countering this enemy psywar effort when it was still at the beginning stage.

The above situation is clear evidence of our lack of attention on countering enemy psywar. This shortcoming on our part has resulted in some losses, disclosure of our plans, and erosion of the will to fight; additional manpower shortage, etc...

## II. ENEMY PLOTS IN THE DAYS AHEAD, FRIENDLY COUNTER-MEASURES

We are entering a critical stage of the conflict, which is becoming increasingly violent. The enemy is striving to intensify the war on a large scale, and bolster his activity on every front--military, political, economic, and cultural -- in his attempt to reverse the situation and recover from his humiliating failures. To this end, he is resorting to several plots and tricks which are more deadly and evil than the previous ones. He is furiously embarking on large-scale psychological warfare.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A561 Saigon

In so doing, he is trying to restore the flagging morale of his men on the one hand, and spreading among our ranks the fear of a protracted conflict, of enduring sacrifice, hardships, and on other hand the fear of modern American weapons and technology. He is also trying to delude us by his peace offers. He assumes that he is able to successfully implement this plot by virtue of his increasingly massive build-up. Cabot Lodge and Lansdale together with the "puppet Government" have formulated a fairly elaborate plan for the implementation of this plot.

A US Senator, during his visit to South Vietnam, proposed to invest 25 percent of the total AID funds to the puppet government's psywar efforts.

At this point, it is imperative that our armed forces stand firm in their determination to defeat the enemy (no matter what his tricks are) so as to achieve complete victory since we are scoring several major successes. But the truth is, that several shortcomings with respect to our ideology and organization still exist, and new shortcomings are coming into being as a result of the critical situation. For this reason, it behooves the commanders of all levels to give due consideration to leadership and guidance so as to be able to deal with the enemy's psywar Chieu Hoi plots.

Efforts should be made to heighten the vigilance of military units' members. Cadres and troops must actively struggle against the enemy psywar and Chieu Hoi activities, coordinate indoctrination with leadership in order to frustrate the enemy plan in an efficient manner.

Specific actions:

a. Disseminate the enemy psywar and Open Arms plan and make an analysis for all cadre and troops, especially those in [Party] Committee echelons, to thoroughly understand it.

Point out the dangerous characteristics of the enemy plan which has the ability of ruining us politically and ideologically. It sows among our cadres and soldiers the bad seeds of pleasure-loving, fear of hardships, fear of sacrifice, etc... and digs deep into these erroneous thoughts to try to debase our fighting spirit. This may lead a certain number of persons, who are still politically immature, to abandon the revolutionary ranks, or worse still, to betray the fatherland by serving the interests of the enemy. The class struggle against the enemy psywar and Chieu Hoi campaign is also a class struggle on the ideological and psychological plane. This struggle is a long-range, complicated struggle. It consists of indoctrinating the masses to heighten their class-consciousness, pointing out the enemy's fallacious arguments and building a tight, well-organized ideological leadership within our ranks.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 4 - Enclosure 1

*A561 Saigon*

The more bitter the political and military defeats the enemy suffers, the greater the efforts he will make in the war of espionage and psywar in the spirit of "starting a new game as soon as one loses any game" to delay their inevitable final defeat.

[TN: same idea as--"If at first you don't succeed, try again"]

To be successful, this struggle against the enemy's attempts must be supported by the close leadership of the committee level and unit commanders and must have the wide participation of the people.

b. Conduct regular propaganda and indoctrination activities to heighten the class consciousness and the sense of vigilance of the people; strengthen the fighting spirit of cadre and soldiers, imbed all of them with a high sense of resentment against the enemy and uphold their strong belief in the victory of the revolution.

This is the essential point in the basic problem of helping cadre and soldiers to see the difference between friend and foe and strengthen their viewpoint in combat and their determination to fight.

In order to neutralize the influence of the enemy, it is essential that each individual cadre and soldier must personally build for himself a strong spirit and a high morale. Our party has turned out such heroes at Nguyen Van Troi, Tran Thi Ly, Nguyen Thi Chau with a high revolutionary and heroic spirit, great resentment of the enemy, a noble revolutionary ideal, insubmissive to violence, power, glory, wealth and beauty. We must train our cadre to be able to distinguish right from wrong at any time and in all circumstances. Our cadres and soldiers must be trained to live a collective life to create a collective force. This is one of the most revolutionary, most positive measures in the party policy towards the masses.

When the enemy propaganda themes reach the unit we must on the one hand, gather and study documents concerning these themes, and on the other hand, we must try to lay bare the enemy's deceitful and fallacious arguments before the public. We should never think that their propaganda is not dangerous because, although the enemy propaganda does not exert an immediate disastrous and dangerous influence on the masses, its influence is slow and very penetrating and, under certain conditions it will grow very dangerous.

It gradually produces influence which, in some conditions, will bring about bad consequences. Therefore, we should not be optimistic. We must be vigilant to properly solve the problem and prevent that influence in time.

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Page 5 - Enclosure 1

*A561 Saigon*

Parallel with indoctrination, it is necessary to draft a "thought control" plan in accordance with the current situation, each individual, and each task. In the struggle against enemy psychological warfare and "Chieu Hoi" activities, the ideological leadership must be highly emphasized, especially when the unit encounters much hardship and difficulty in combat and in the performance of missions, or when the fight between ourselves and the enemy becomes fierce or the unit sustains great casualties after a battle.

Closely control the ideology of persons who have a complex political background, or poor political knowledge in order to motivate or help them solve their ideological problems.

When the units operate or bivouac in areas where the political situation is complicated, and enemy psychological warfare and Chieu Hoi activities are being stepped up, cadres are required to constantly examine the enemy psychological effect on our units in an effort to formulate a counter-plan.

c. Intensively indoctrinate cadres and soldiers to be able to properly comply with the regulations concerning the maintenance of security.

Party committees must place due emphasis on the correct implementation of the systems and regulations concerning the prevention and countering of psychological warfare and the "Chieu Hoi" program, such as, the listening to radio broadcasts, or reading books, newspapers, leaflets, documents and enemy information bulletins, the manner of describing the handling of the internal political situation for revolutionary soldiers, the system of recruiting personnel for the Liberation Army, for agencies and important units. This measure is taken to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of our negligence to conduct subversive activities and to detect the effects of psychological warfare in time in order to work out a counter plan.

d. Quickly investigate and study the effects of enemy psychological warfare and "Chieu Hoi" efforts in order to work out an appropriate counter plan in time.

When faced with such problems as the preparation for desertion and for defection, the loss of combat spirit, shirking from duty, self-injury or suicide, etc...we must investigate and study the causes of these problems and find a suitable solution. If these problems are more or less caused by psychological warfare and "Chieu Hoi" activities, efforts should be made to go into the details of each problem to find out the degree, circumstances, causes, effects, etc... The leaders must objectively judge the problems and should not contend that the above problems are mainly caused by homesickness, fear of hardships, difficulties etc...However, we should not mechanically think that all the problems are caused by the enemy psychological warfare and "Chieu Hoi" efforts.

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Page 6 - Enclosure 1

AJ61 Saigon

If our investigation concludes that these problems are caused by psychological warfare and "Chieu Hoi" activities, depending upon the nature of the problems and psychological effects, bring them up to the people to analyze and lay bare the enemy's vicious scheme and its scope. In this way we can promote the people's hatred. It is also necessary to suggest to the people measures to be applied against the enemy schemes.

Party committees and unit commanders need to gain experiences from the problems that have occurred in order to guide the struggle against the enemy schemes.

e. Closely coordinate with local areas in the struggle against enemy psychological warfare and "Chieu Hoi" activities.

Units operating or bivouacking in a given area must closely coordinate with the local party committee or security element to fully understand the enemy psychological warfare and "Chieu Hoi" scheme in the area (including local enemy activities and the problems concerning armed activities). Coordinate with local areas to motivate families with sons working for the revolution, help them realize the glorious duty of their sons, and develop confidence in the revolution, so that they can encourage their sons to resolutely fulfill their duty. Brief them on the enemy schemes of bribing or threatening families [with sons in the revolution] in order to call on their sons to return or infuse them with bad ideas, thereby causing a bad effect on the determination to fight of revolutionary soldiers. It is necessary to strengthen their vigilance against the enemy schemes.

A successful struggle against enemy psychological warfare and the "Chieu Hoi" program will contribute to the strengthening of our armed forces and to the accomplishment of the mission assigned by the Party.

In the face of the enemy schemes of intensifying psychological warfare, and the requirements of strengthening the armed forces, leadership, guidance, and the organization of struggle against enemy psychological warfare schemes must be duly emphasized.

Regarding leadership, we are to properly assess the enemy schemes and the revolutionary masses led by the Party. The masses must be absolutely loyal to the revolution, develop a deep hatred of the enemy and heighten their vigilance against the dangerous enemy of the working class. A few minutes of demoralization before the complex development of the situation can lead to errors. It is incumbent upon us to help everyone see his responsibility, strengthen his conviction, protect the organization, properly comply with regulation concerning the maintenance of secrecy and at the same time prevent and frustrate the effects of the enemy psychological warfare program.

Reproduced from document of b7  
B5/C.921 No. \_\_\_\_\_/N5

Day.....month..... 1966  
Political Staff Department

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, April 6, 1967  
4:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft to the Vice  
President, as requested.

W. W. Rostow

DRAFT

~~confidential~~

April 6, 1967

1082

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

I have read your reports to me -- every line. I want you to know that we think you've done a perfectly wonderful job for the country.

At this moment when things are moving in Europe on so many fronts, your presence there, your political skill, your good will and good humor, have, I believe, helped us turn an important corner in our relations with Europe. I want you to know how grateful I am.

DETERMINED TO BE AN UNCLASSIFIED  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 13526,  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR 16, 1993.

BY ry ON 5-7-91

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 6, 1967 -- 11:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Lodge's weekly telegram which is worth reading in detail.

I must confess that I am greatly impressed by the fact that the Chieu Hoi figures have remained over 1,000 per week for 5 weeks. If that can be sustained for, say, 6 months, I find it hard to believe that the VC infrastructure can hold up.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 22177

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-394  
By sig, NARA, Date 3-12-93

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

Wednesday, April 5, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 22177)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-396  
By           , NARA, Date 5-12-92

A. Constitution

In brief but impressive ceremony at Independence Palace, the Constitution was promulgated on April 1. General Thieu's speech emphasized the need for unity among all factions, military and civil. He made it plain that the military intends to continue to play a major role in the affairs of the nation, but he also stressed the willingness of the military to accept and adjust to a democratic government.

On the eve of promulgation, about 2,500 Catholics belonging to the Catholic Citizens Bloc demonstrated against the deletion of the phrase "supreme being" from the preamble of the Constitution. Both Assembly Chairman Phan Khac Suu and Premier Ky spoke briefly to the demonstrators, and it was clear that the government had sanctioned the demonstration. From the point of view of this particular Catholic organization, the demonstration was a necessary reaction to the show of Buddhist influence when the phrase was deleted -- many Vietnamese believing that it was deleted at Tam Chau's request. From the government point of view, the demonstration was useful as another way of putting the Assembly on notice that it is only a co-pilot and must cooperate with the Directorate. Representatives of all religious groups are scheduled to meet with Assembly Chairman Suu so as to find a formula acceptable to all. There will probably be some kind of statement about respect for religion, which will be adopted by the Assembly as an unofficial addendum to the Constitution.

The vernacular newspapers were virtually unanimous in hailing the Armed Forces Council adoption of the draft Constitution. Sample comments: -- Tien Vang: "...evidence of unity between the Army and the people." -- Dan Tien: "...no political or military event can any

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

longer put off... stability." -- Binh Minh: "A new political outlook is looming." --- Doi Thoai: "South Vietnam has made substantial progress toward restoring stability." -- Chinh Luan: "...the draft Constitution has voiced the inmost aspirations of the people..." Tu Do warned that its adoption would lead to intensified Communist terrorism because the Viet Cong "dread any democratic system which will deny them the right to represent the people."

The well-known and respected public figure, Dr. Phan Quang Dan, who was imprisoned for two years under Diem and Nhu, called on me to say goodbye. He has been very active in the Constitutional Convention and says he actually wrote the preamble himself. Noting that under both the Japanese and the French, the Vietnamese had simply received orders reflecting the desires of the colonial governors, he remarked how completely ~~different~~ the American way had been, saying that we did not give orders, but had genuinely sought to help them and advise them when they wanted help and advice. Citing the Constitution as an example, he said that it was truly a Vietnamese document and not a "dictated" Constitution from the Americans as some critics had alleged. In Dan's opinion, we had been wise not to try to dictate what language should be in the Constitution. He said: "You have not been in evidence; you have not made statements, but you have had great influence." He added that for a country as powerful as the United States, it was better that our influence not be exercised directly.

Dan said that not only had the French given them orders, but the French had also ridiculed and made fun of the Vietnamese and created a great lack of self-confidence among the Vietnamese, which still plagues them. Much of the cynicism which is so common in Saigon was not originally part of the Vietnamese nature but was implanted there by the French as part of their technique of keeping themselves in power. It was similar to the weakening of village government and abolishing the teaching of Chinese characters -- to make them feel like second class citizens having no real culture. Dr. Dan said, "We still lack self-confidence; we are not making the contribution to the war which we should make; we are not yet as well organized as we should be -- but the tide is turning towards self-confidence and towards better performance by us. The tide is also turning against the Viet Cong and towards peace. They are beginning the fade out; which is how I think this war will end."



I mentioned this under the heading "Constitution" because the Constitution is the biggest sign yet of self-confidence, of a spirit of moderation and unity, and of a sense of responsibility for one's actions -- the traits which all tend to be destroyed by colonialism and which assuredly would not be in evidence in Vietnam today without the great decisions which you have made.

B. Presidential Candidates

The Chairman of the Constituent Assembly and former Chief of State Phan Khac Suu announced at a press conference on March 29 that he will run for President. His vice-presidential running mate will be Dr. Dan. Suu has not yet said whom he intends to name as his Prime Minister. Suu appears very confident and is claiming support from every quarter and portraying his probable opposition as very weak. He says he expects the military to be divided, which is certainly his best hope for winning. He discounts Tran Van Huong because of his "colonialist taint." Suu is the second choice of a great many people, and for this reason cannot be counted out. But he has no effective organization and his prestige is not as great as he thinks. He has a rather wide -- and I think deserved -- reputation for weakness and vacillation.

Huong has not yet appeared in Saigon, though he has said he would come here after the promulgation of the Constitution. Now his supporters say he will wait in Vung Tau until the Electoral Law is written. Asked the reason for the delay, his campaign manager recently said that Huong's supporters are worried about his security.

As a matter of fact, the security of presidential candidates is a matter for concern. Despite the clearest sort of evidence that the Viet Cong killed Tran Van Van, there are still lingering suspicions in many circles that the Government was somehow connected with the death of that well-known Assembly Deputy and Southern leader. If the Viet Cong could kill a man like Tran Van Huong and make it appear that the military were responsible. The effect on the political situation here would be very bad. The whole constitutional process could be undermined by such an event. I, therefore, intend to discuss this problem with both Thieu and Ky at the first opportunity. With a view to persuading them to provide all presidential candidates with the most effective security measures they can devise.

There may be reasons other than security for Huong's tardiness in coming to Saigon to start his campaign. His supporters now say he has decided against either Dai Viet or VNQDD figures as his vice-presidential running mate. He now wants a 'non-party' man who can appeal to all factions. This may mean that both VNQDD Leader Phan Khoan and Dai Viet Leader Ha Thuc Ky have rejected Huong's overtures. (Although Huong told an Embassy officer some time ago that Khoan would run with him, Khoan subsequently told the same officer that this was unlikely. We have also heard that Ky has been wooing the VNQDD away from Huong. More recently, Huong's campaign manager said Huong was trying to get Ha Thuc Ky to run with him, but this has apparently also fallen through.)

The local press reports that businessman Nguyen Dinh Quat is formally in the race. Quat ran Against Ngo Dinh Diem in 1961. He is not regarded as a serious candidate by any informed Vietnamese. Quat did not announce his vice-presidential running mate.

The question of the military candidate is still unanswered, but it may be coming to a head. In the evening following the promulgation ceremonies, most of the generals met to discuss this problem. According to incomplete reports of that meeting, Ky took the same line he used with me recently: It is up to Thieu; if Thieu wants to run, Ky will support him. Thieu also is said to have taken a familiar line: He was not volunteering but he would serve if he was drafted. He also said he needs more time to consider the matter. Understandably, the other generals were reluctant to express a choice. They do not want to risk coming down behind the loser. Thus, no decision was taken.

In his speech at the promulgation ceremonies, General Thieu made a reference to the need for a broad national front against Communism, which he said he had often urged. This remark may seek to lay the ground for the formation of a "Front" to support the military candidate. Ky has mentioned such an organization to me, and there are reports indicating that Thieu was thinking along the same lines.

Only today Foreign Minister Tran Van Do told the Political Counselor that he had seen General Thieu yesterday and Thieu had discussed this idea with him. According to Do, Thieu recognized that the Armed Forces Council did not want to be faced with taking the decision on a "military" candidate since this would only array them in opposing ranks and thus create serious division among them. Thieu added that on the other hand, the military were fearful that at the polls the "military" ticket might be defeated and this would be a serious loss of prestige. Therefore, he had concluded that what was needed was the formation of a "Civilian Congress" which would select and support a combined military-civilian ticket which would have a good chance of winning.

While such a front might not at first truly represent anything like all the political groups and factions which it will pretend to cover, it could be a useful device for promoting unity. Moreover, it might ultimately serve as the base for a genuine national political party -- something which is now completely lacking and which could be useful in counteracting Communist political activity after the fighting has stopped.

#### C. Local Elections

On April 2, elections for village councils and hamlet chiefs were held in 219 villages with 80.5% of the eligible voters casting ballots. The ratio of candidates to offices was somewhat less satisfactory than we wished, there being only 1.38 candidates per office.

The chief deterrent to candidates was the security problem. The Viet Cong did not significantly increase their terrorist activity on election day, though there were incidents such as the kidnapping of 12 candidates in Quang Nam Province and in Binh Buong Province 2 candidates were killed prior to the election. The Viet Cong are known to have sent threatening letters to some candidates and in some areas, they made house-to-house calls threatening reprisals against those who participated in the elections. While they apparently did not launch the all-out effort such as that aimed at the September 1966 election, they are certainly trying to disrupt the process of setting up a democratic system at the village-hamlet level which, if successful, would be a mortal threat to them. Their threats un-

doubtedly resulted in considerably fewer candidates turning out than would otherwise have been the case.

Village and hamlet elections will continue to be held every Sunday for the next 9 weeks. The number of villages which will be involved is now set at 1,004 out of a total of 2,526. It now appears that the candidate ratio to the number of offices for all 1,004 villages will be about 1.6. There are some villages where only 1 candidate per seat has stepped forward, and the elections in those villages will be only a formality. In other places, the ratio exceeds 2-to-1.

D. CBS Opinion Study

The Columbia Broadcasting System commissioned Opinion Research Corporation, Research Park, Princeton, New Jersey, to make a study entitled "Attitudes of the Vietnamese Population Towards the War and Other Related Issues." It was finished on March 13.

Answers to the questions "would you be better off with the Vietcong running the government?" or "would you be better off with the present personnel running the government?" gave these results:

Better off with the Viet Cong	0 percent
Better off with the Government of Vietnam	90 percent
Doesn't matter	3 percent
No opinion	7 percent

Two comments are in order. The first is that those who did not like the Government of Vietnam did not choose the Viet Cong. They either said it didn't matter or that they had no opinion. Secondly, any public opinion poll in Vietnam must be taken with caution because of the tendency of people here to tell a questioner what they think he wants to hear. This is partly an individual security measure to avoid trouble and partly a matter of oriental politeness. While, therefore, the importance of this poll should not be exaggerated, it is nonetheless probable that had the poll gone in favor of the Viet Cong, a great outcry would have been raised and many thousands of words would have been written.

E. Chieu Hoi

The number of returnees for the week ending March 25, was 1,187, next to the highest weekly total to date and the fifth consecutive week in which more than 1,000 returnees have come into the Chieu Hoi Centers. The weekly average for this year is now 812.1 and the total for the year stands at 9,746. This should be compared with last year's overall total of 20,242. If the present rate is maintained, total returnees for 1967 would be about 42,000.

Two captured enemy documents reveal that the Viet Cong themselves look upon Chieu Hoi operations as dangerous, deadly, successful and in need of immediate counter-measures.

The longer of the two documents, a confidential "reference paper" entitled "counter measures against enemy psywar and Chieu Hoi activity" and put out by the political department of the so-called Liberation Army, says flatly that in this "critical stage of the conflict," the Chieu Hoi Program "has the ability of ruining us politically and ideologically." It adds that Chieu Hoi "desertions" are not only rising "at an alarming rate," but that (quite correctly) a number of the ex-Viet Cong are using their information to lead South Vietnamese troops back to hitherto secret Viet Cong hideouts and installations.

The Viet Cong paper further demands that some system be devised for countering Government of Vietnam "psychological warfare and the Chieu Hoi Program such as the system of listening to radio broadcasts, of reading books, newspapers, leaflets, documents and enemy information bulletins." (This refers, among other psywar activities, to allied air drops of millions of leaflets over both North and South Vietnam and to the use of low-flying loudspeaker planes broadcasting surrender appeals over Viet Cong areas.)

The following paragraph comments on life under Communism in general and under Vietnamese Communist in particular:

"We are not fully aware of the dangerous and harmful effects of it (Government of Vietnam psywar and Chieu Hoi operations), which are intended to deepen the schools of thought of enjoying life, balking at making sacrifice and enduring hardship. This is attributed to inadequate ideological indoctrination and lax political activity which make some people vulnerable to enemy propaganda."

Though calling for "indoctrination" and "a thought control program," the Liberation Army paper suggest that the Viet Cong have still not worked out a specific counter-program--"We must," it says, "quickly investigate and study the effects of enemy psychological warfare and Chieu Hoi efforts in order to work out an appropriate counter plan in time."

#### F. Military

Fighting was heavy again this week, with what some have called the biggest battle of the war taking place in Tay Ninh Province. The number of enemy killed in action this week was 2,373, a slight decrease from last week's 2,783. There was heavy contact in I Corps



between allied units and elements of the North Vietnam 324B Division. The North Vietnamese units were forced to withdraw into the demilitarized zone. Junction City operation continued, with enemy killed in action to date 2,534, and heavy fighting in War Zone C.

In II Corps, Operation "Summerall" is aimed at expanding the area effectively covered by allied forces so that there will eventually be one continuous secure area from Qui Nhon to Tuy Hoa. This would permit the opening of Highway One and the railway along the entire coastal area of II Corps north of Phan Rang. If the hamlets along the road and railway were also durably pacified, with hard core terrorists eliminated and durable local political institutions in existence, such a continuous free area from Qui Nhon to Tuy Hoa would be very significant.

G. U.S. Troops Around Saigon

For a long time the "Doughnut" area around Saigon has been subjected to Viet Cong harassment. In particular Binh Chan District south of Saigon-Cholon last autumn was dangerously out of Government of Vietnam control; schools were being burned; RF, PF installations were being successfully attacked; the vital Bien Hoa Highway was bracketed by hamlets infiltrated by Viet Cong which in turn endangered Saigon's new water system and electric plant.

Lodge

This was but an intensification of a condition which existed in 1963 -- gun fire at night and many roads going out of Saigon being quite unuseable. It was hard to make the press believe that anything much was happening when, year after year, things were like this in the capital of the nation. We have, however, been reluctant to use American troops in this area.

This reluctance was wisely abandoned and the result was that "Operation FAIRFAX" was launched on December 1.

The stated purpose of this operation was to "destroy the Viet Cong forces, guerrillas and infrastructure," the underlying objective to bring security to the locality where it could be maintained by ARVN, Rural Force, and Popular Force, and the Police. Findings for the period December 1 through February 1 are now at hand. They show:

A. "dramatic" improvement in the security in Binh Chan; "some improvement in security in Tu Duc; with Nha Be (where the oil storage tanks are), having gone from "reasonably secure" to "even more secure."

U. S. troops have gotten along well with the people. The ARVN has performed their security missions well, but "have not readily committed themselves yet to the people."

The Viet Cong infrastructure is still intact everywhere. While furnishing of information by civilians has improved, the population has adopted a "wait and see" attitude. Perhaps they remember the previous entries of the Government of Vietnam, their subsequent withdrawal, and the final retaliation by the Viet Cong.

ARVN and Rural Force performance has improved, attributable largely to the example set by U. S. battalions and by sharing U. S. resources. Rural Force, Popular Force installations have been rebuilt and improved.

The Revolutionary Development plan is in a stronger position than it was in November, with requests for additional worker teams.

All elements, military and civilian, have been pulled together. The three dominant personalities have been the District Chief, the ARVN Commander, and the U. S. Battalion Commander. National Police and Police Field Forces have not really entered into the operation yet.

H. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending April 1, the Viet Cong killed 40 Vietnamese village and hamlet civilians, wounded 102, and kidnapped 103. The dead included two Hamlet Chiefs, six Revolutionary Development workers, five policemen, and one Chieu Hoi returnee.

Terror incidents reported to me this week included a March 26 incident in which the Viet Cong fired 100 rounds of recoilless rifle and mortar shells indiscriminately into Tam Binh District in Vinh Long Province. Four civilians were killed and 30 wounded. Sixty-five homes were destroyed.

I. Economic

Prices held steady this week, with the Saigon Retail Price Index standing at 260 as compared with last week's 261 and the all-time of two weeks ago -- 284. Prices of imported commodities move up from last week's Index of 226 to 229.

The rice situation is improving, but the outlook for pork is not. Rice stocks in Saigon as of March 30 totaled just over 18,000 tons with another 27,500 tons discharging from four ships. The emergency distribution system is operating smoothly. About 16,000 tons were distributed between March 13 and March 28. Of the total, 4,000 tons were distributed to retail outlets in Saigon and the rest to ARVN, the civil service, commissary, and other institutional buyers. The Government of Vietnam will also purchase Delta rice, where about 60,000 tons are in merchant hands. Merchants will be required to sell one-half of their stocks, 30,000 tons, to the office of supply in Saigon at 21 piasters per kilo during the next month or so. The office of supply will warehouse the rice in Saigon and will sell it probably at 23 piasters per kilo. The Government of Vietnam is also moving ahead with plans to import American rice, both short and long grain. Contracts will be placed shortly for remilling of 200 tons a day. Remilled short grain American rice will probably be sold at 19 piasters per kilo.

Investigations of hog productions economics suggests some disquieting trends. Future shortage are anticipated because: (a) hog producers are fleeing combat areas in the Delta; (b) feed costs are high relative to live hog prices since the rice harvest this year appears to be smaller than last year (Vietnamese hog feed is mainly

rice bran); (c) imported frozen pork from Argentina constitutes only a three to five week supply for Saigon. USAID feels that not enough attention has been paid to the needs of the hog producers and that they have suffered from Government of Vietnam attempts to hold down inflation through reliance upon imports, rather than providing production incentives.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, April 6, 1967 -- 3:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the agenda for this afternoon's meeting.

Attached also is the draft Declaration as it emerged from the State Department. Linc Gordon insists that it must follow the structure of the detailed communique because that is the way the representatives of the Presidents had been working.

I insisted that we try to get some headings that had some meaning to people. Thus, we have the 8 underlined headings.

With stylistic improvement they could be converted into something like the Manila Charter.

I recommend, therefore, that you ask Sec. Rusk to see if the Foreign Ministers couldn't agree to produce a lucid, simple, politically viable declaration based, simply, on the 8 headings. In that case, we would have:

- the 8 headings;
- a longer declaration of the kind we have here; and
- a communique of a conventional kind.

That is the way we fetched up at Manila.

I have just learned that Harry McPherson is revising this draft -- which is good.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-394  
By 118, NARA, Date 3-12-93

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

Meeting With the President  
Thursday, April 6, 1967, 5:30 p.m.

AGENDA

1. Viet Nam.

a. Diplomatic Initiatives. Sec. Rusk

- (1) Report from Ambassador Thompson  
(Sec. Rusk may have a cable from Moscow by the time of the meeting)
- (2) Instructions to Saigon
- (a) on GVN-Cambodian relations
- (b) on GVN-VC contacts following announcement on reconciliation  
scheduled for April 19
- (3) Instructions to Amb. Green on Indonesian activity looking toward  
negotiations.

b. North Vietnamese targets for air strikes. Sec. McNamara

(It is my understanding that Sec. McNamara may raise this question.  
We do not have any paper as of now. Col. Ginsburgh is seeking  
additional information on whether this item will be raised.)

2. Trilaterals. Sec. Rusk

- a. Congressional consultations in light of New York Times stories --  
should Senators Mansfield and Russell be briefed?
- b. Consultations with allies -- previously approved schedule will have  
to be stretched out a few days in order to meet German insistence  
on more time for discussions within the Bonn Government.

3. Svetlana. Sec. Rusk

Scenario, including date of arrival, will be brought to the meeting by  
Sec. Rusk.

4. Latin American Summit Meeting. Sec. Rusk

The draft Declaration may be ready for review by time of the meeting.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines Feb. 21, 1988  
By rg, NARA, Date 5-1-91

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5. Cambodia. Sec. Rusk

Sen. Brooke reported today to the President that it was his impression that Cambodia might be prepared to meet bilaterally with us, in some third country, to begin to reestablish diplomatic relations. Alternatively, he suggests we begin talks to this end via the Australian Ambassador in Phnom Penh.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Revised Draft

April 6, 1967

DECLARATION

TO THE PEOPLES OF THE AMERICAS

We, the leaders of the American Republics gathered in Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 12-14, 1967,

RESOLVE to give new and concrete expression to the ideals of Latin American unity and inter-American solidarity that have inspired the men who built our free nations since the earliest days of independence;

DETERMINED to make that vision the reality of our own generation, in keeping with the economic, social, and cultural aspirations of our peoples;

DEDICATED to the principles of the Organization of American States and the Alliance for Progress which guide our cooperative efforts in preserving the peace, maintaining Hemispheric security, and advancing the welfare of our peoples;

Hereby proclaim this declaration of principles and action on which we base our confidence in the future peace and progress of the American continent.

- I. We shall strengthen democratic institutions and accelerate economic and social progress by increasing

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REVIEWED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MATTER. CANCELLED BY THE  
SECRETARY AND APPROVED BY THE  
STATE DEPARTMENT

BY 12 4/23/91

the participation of our peoples in our national efforts.

Freedom and prosperity can be assured only if all of our people participate in development and self-government. The strengthening of genuinely democratic institutions at every level of our societies requires voluntary involvement in local government, cooperatives and free trade unions, professional associations and civic groups. All of our people should contribute to development and benefit from it.

Accordingly, we pledge ourselves to mobilize the will and energy of our people for community action, participation and cooperation that accelerates the process of development and strengthens the exercise of representative democracy.

II. We must accelerate the pace of economic growth if all of our people are to enjoy dignity, well-being, and social justice.

Ours is a Hemisphere of great human and material resources and rich cultural and intellectual traditions which hold the promise of unprecedented achievement. In order to fulfill that promise, the pace of economic growth in Latin

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3.

America must be significantly increased. We must undertake increased individual and collective efforts commensurate with the vast task ahead.

The attainment of these objectives depends fundamentally on the internal effort of each country. Each must shape its economic destiny, based on its traditions, values, and ideas.

Mutual aid and increased external cooperation are an indispensable complement to the harnessing of individual national energies and will be provided within a truly multilateral framework of principles and procedures.

III. Latin America will create a Common Market.

Through accelerated action beginning in 1970, the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central American Common Market will move progressively toward an area-wide common market. The Latin American Common Market will be substantially in operation within 15 years.

Latin American economic integration will reinforce the cultural ties of the Continent and vastly increase trade between our countries. It will promote industrialization, stimulate more efficient production, and open new opportunities for private

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enterprise. It will create millions of new jobs for urban and rural workers and vastly broadened horizons for our people. It will give Latin America a stronger voice in the economic councils of the world.

IV. We shall create through multinational projects the physical basis for Latin American unity.

We shall <sup>conquer</sup> overcome the mountains and deserts, rivers and jungles which have been barriers to cooperation and development. We will mount a major effort through multinational projects to link our countries by land, air, and sea; by pipelines and power grids; and by telecommunications. We shall harness the full potential of our great river basins. Thus, we can open the vast frontiers of the Continent for the present and future generations.

V. We shall work together to improve the conditions of Latin America's international trade.

Our objective is higher and more stable earnings for the Latin American countries from traditional exports and from the promotion of new exports. We shall seek the elimination of discriminatory preferences against Latin American trade and consider possible systems of general preferential treatment for

exports of manufactures from all the developing countries. We shall join our efforts to strengthen existing commodity agreements and explore the possibility of new agreements on basic products of interest to Latin America.

VI. We shall work together to modernize the living conditions of our rural populations and to assure that the Americas will feed our own people and assist in feeding the hungry throughout the world.

We must transform the conditions of life of the rural workers and farmers of Latin America to assure their full participation in economic and social development. This will require intensive programs of agricultural modernization and agrarian reform when essential to this effort.

This Hemisphere's vast capacity for food production places us in a privileged position compared with other areas of the world. This privilege carries with it a dual responsibility: -- To produce the food necessary for the growing needs of our own peoples and to share in the feeding of hungry men, women, and children in other continents less blessed than our own. We pledge our nations to join in the establishment of multilateral programs which contribute to overcoming the scarcity of food in the world.

VII. We shall mount major efforts to provide our people with the education essential to realizing their full potential, to harness science and technology to our needs, and to reduce the scourge of ill health in the Hemisphere.

Education lies at the heart of a person's aspirations and his ability to realize them. So it is with a nation.

We are determined to eradicate illiteracy in our countries. We are equally determined to raise the availability and quality of secondary and higher education so that all our people may have the opportunity to develop their individual interests and skills and their capacity for maximum contribution to their countries' development.

We recognize that existing educational facilities fall far short of the requirements. Consequently, we have agreed on individual and collective measures to modernize our educational systems, to make full use of educational innovations, and to broaden the exchange of teachers and students among our countries.

Science and technology in the 20th Century hold the keys to ~~modernizing~~ modernization. Latin America must become a full participant in the scientific revolutions of our age. We shall set in motion a regional program of science and technology to

multiply the centers of excellence for study and research in Latin America and to increase the flow of scientific and technical information among our countries.

The struggle against disease must be intensified. The lives of our people are unnecessarily shortened and their vitality reduced by disease which modern science can cure or prevent. We shall strengthen our individual and joint efforts to bring the benefits of modern medicine to all of our people.

VIII. We shall insure the security of the continent against direct or indirect aggression without expending precious resources on unnecessary armaments.

It is our duty to defend our nations against subversive elements who seek to block the economic and social advances made under the Alliance for Progress and to undermine and destroy our democratic institutions. We shall remain alert to these threats and act in concert under existing inter-American treaties to protect our individual and collective security. At the same time we shall not allow the needs of our peoples to go unmet by acquiring weapons which are unnecessary for defense requirements.

In order to fulfill these objectives, we have agreed upon the Plan of Action which accompanies this Declaration.

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8.

Our people demand progress. Their voices are raised for social reform and economic development. The alternative is despair and violence. The goals of our peaceful revolution are not easy of attainment. But they are just. Our intellect convinces us of their merit. Our consciences recognize their moral necessity. Our alliance commits us to the task. Our people will struggle and ~~xx~~ sacrifice to assure success. We will not fail them.

This declaration shall be known as the "Pan American Day Proclamation of American Presidents of 1967."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Thurs., April 6, 1967  
3:00 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith, on instruction, Bill Jorden's  
response to your request for a Ne Win  
initiative.

We can discuss it at 5:30 p.m.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~ attachment



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April 6, 1967

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-394  
By sig, NARA, Date 3-12-93

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: A New Initiative Toward Peace in Viet-Nam

We have tried direct approaches to Hanoi. Many third parties have volunteered their services as intermediaries. None of these past efforts has succeeded.

It may be that the best hope lies Not in a direct approach (which Hanoi may suspect is a propaganda gambit), or in trying to use others as arbitrators or mediators (which Hanoi may suspect as meddlers or as posing serious threats of leakage). What other possibilities remain?

It may be that the best hope for progress lies in a third party who would urge both sides to talk, would provide a secure and convenient setting, but would not himself take a direct hand in the discussions.

This channel for contact should be:

-- a chief of state (for highest credibility and to provide maximum security in the government concerned);

-- the head of a government that has relations with both Hanoi and Washington;

-- the head of a government not closely tied -- ideologically, economically or politically -- with either the United States or North Viet-Nam;

-- a leader who is able to act with virtually total freedom in making the necessary arrangements and impose the required security controls, with minimum risk of meddling by others and of information leaks.

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The best candidate for such a role, in my opinion, would be General Ne Win of Burma.

Among other advantages, I would note:

-- he has implied a willingness to help bring the two sides together without attempting to mediate -- just the neutral detachment that is desired;

-- he has the authority and capacity to pick and maintain a secure meeting site, and to strictly limit knowledge within his government of secret talks;

-- Burma's 24-hour visa limitation and restrictions on foreign presence provide near-isolation from the world;

-- no large resident press corps;

-- secure communications and ready air access for both sides.

I would suggest a scenario along the following lines:

1. Instruct our Ambassador in Rangoon to see Ne Win privately. He would tell Ne Win:

-- we sincerely desire to bring the Viet-Nam war to an early and honorable conclusion;

-- we believe the best hope is through direct contact and completely secret talks;

-- we think Hanoi may suspect our direct approaches are insincere or designed for propaganda (though they are wrong) and that Hanoi may also be suspicious of the efforts of other parties to try to mediate;

-- we therefore believe that the best hope for success in achieving peace may be through the offer of a third party to both sides to provide an opportunity and a secure setting for totally secret discussions between representatives of the two sides.

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-- the proposal should make clear that the third party concerned does not desire to play any direct role in the conversations.

2. The Ambassador would inquire whether General Ne Win would be willing to undertake such a role, which we believe might be a major contribution to peace.

3. If so, we would propose that he address private and personal messages (containing the essentials of the above) to both President Johnson and President Ho Chi Minh. We could assure him that this initiative on his part would meet with a prompt acceptance by us.

An alternative would be to have the Ambassador deliver to Ne Win an unopened letter from the President containing the essentials of the above approach.

4. We would suggest that Ne Win's letters to Ho and to President Johnson should be delivered in person to the addressees by trusted couriers of the Burmese leader. This would serve to strictly limit knowledge of the Ne Win proposal within both governments. (Note: it may be that Ho is put on the spot by communications that move through more conventional diplomatic channels, possibly exposing them to pro-Peking elements in the North Vietnamese Government.)

5. We might also want to assure Ne Win privately that if he were agreeable to the above, we would give him our pledge that from the time his message to Ho was dispatched until the answer was received from Hanoi, there would be no air strikes within a reasonable distance of Hanoi (which Hanoi might use as an excuse for rejection).

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If this kind of proposal were made by Ne Win, and if Hanoi accepted, we might be in business. If Ho turned the offer down, it would give us a much better fix on his position and further strengthen our own stand.

William J. Jorden

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~

*Pres file*

Thursday, April 6, 1967 -- 12:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

At your instruction I spoke at some length with Senator Gruening -- to hear his views on birth control legislation.

1. He said you had made a "historic contribution" in talking firmly and openly about the matter.
2. He had had good hearings on the subject.
3. On the other hand, U.S. officials in AID and HEW did not seem to be enthusiastic and effective in carrying out your policy in supporting legislation.
4. The latest Papal encyclical, by sanctioning government policy on birth control, opened the way for effective legislation.
5. Therefore, he seeks Executive Branch guidance as to what kind of legislation will carry out your policy.

I thanked him for making his views available.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-394  
By ing, NARA, Date 3-12-93

*Pres. file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Farewell Message for Prime Minister Maiwandwal

Despite the flurry created by Maiwandwal's Press Club comments last week, we ought to send the usual courtesy message as he leaves this weekend. The following is not overly warm and, I think, fits your instruction not to react one way or another publicly.

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

As you leave the United States, you carry with you our best wishes. Your visit has given me the pleasure of getting to know you and learning more about the progress Afghanistan is making in its economic and political development.

We are confident that Afghanistan will continue to be successful in the effort to move forward in peace and prosperity. Mrs. Johnson joins me in wishing you a safe and pleasant homeward journey.

Lyndon B. Johnson"

We've laid off as you wished. But in a Chicago news conference yesterday, Maiwandwal confined himself to expressing hope for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam and for steps leading to cessation of the hostilities there. He also supported U Thant's efforts to achieve peace. He reviewed Afghanistan's economic and political progress and credited U. S. aid with moving the country ahead in education and agriculture.

I recommend you approve. We will send it to him before his departure Sunday if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Thursday, April 6, 1967  
11:45 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

VIA: Harry McPherson

Mr. Jacques Torczyner, of the Zionist Organization of America, came calling with three requests:

1. Would you accept the Honorary Chairmanship of the National Sponsors for Robert A. Taft Memorial Library, Kfar Silver, Israel? He has already collected a distinguished group of Republican and Democratic sponsors (Tab A). He feels the whole enterprise would be elevated if you would be willing to associate your name with the enterprise as Honorary Chairman.

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ See me \_\_\_\_\_

2. The Zionist Organization of America is holding a convention in Israel, July 19-26. They wish an "important Democratic personality" to come and make a speech. There will be between 1,000 and 1,500 U. S. delegates. They prefer a member of the Cabinet; for example, John Gardner or Stewart Udall. He says it would be good for Udall because he toured the Arab world and received public praise from the Arabs because he didn't stop in Israel. This has hurt him a little in the American Jewish community. Torczyner asks that you use your influence to induce a member of the Cabinet to go and speak in that period.

3. 1967 is the 20th anniversary of the United Nations resolution creating Israel. There will be a dinner in New York on November 12 celebrating the occasion. The guest of honor will be Trygve Lie. The question is: would you be willing to address that dinner?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ See me \_\_\_\_\_

I am filing this through Harry McPherson who will no doubt have some observations on these proposals.

I would only report Torczyner's last words: Please don't give me a "no" on all three.

W. W. R.



Thursday, April 6, 1967  
11:30 a.m.

115

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is a lucid and important exchange on  
the principal issue now shadowing US-  
German relations: the NPT.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Bonn 11806)

115a  
w h  
6  
INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

Action

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CONTROL: 4543  
RECEIVED: APRIL 6, 1967  
12:43 A.M.

~~SECRET~~ BONN 11806

N O D I S  
VIPTO 75

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ

91-396

By *inf*

NARA, Date 8-6-92

PARIS FOR VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT: III: NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

1. IN HIS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, VICE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT THE NPT WAS A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN TO THE US. PRESIDENT JOHNSON PUT A HIGH-PRIORITY ON IT. IT WAS ALSO A MATTER OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES. THIS IS A SUBJECT THAT VICE PRESIDENT HAD EMPHASIZED IN HIS TALKS IN NETHERLANDS, ITALY, BRITAIN AND GENEVA.

2. CHANCELLOR OBSERVED THAT NPT WAS, BEYOND DOUBT, THE SINGLE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM EXISTING BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE U.S. HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE AT OUTSET THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS PROBLEM.

3. CHANCELLOR STATED THAT THE GERMAN POSITION ON THE NPT MIGHT SEEM PARADOXICAL AT FIRST GLANCE. FRG HAD RENOUNCED PRODUCTION OF ABC WEAPONS ON ITS OWN SOIL IN ITS TREATY WITH THE WEU. FRG, INCLUDING HIS OWN GOVERNMENT, HAD DECLARED REPEATEDLY THAT IT DID NOT WANT NATIONAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEY WERE SERIOUS ABOUT THIS MATTER.

4. FRG DID, HOWEVER, WANT TO KEEP OPEN THE SO-CALLED "EUROPEAN OPTION." A UNITED EUROPE SHOULD BE ABLE TO HAVE A MODERN DEFENSE SYSTEM. IT WAS THE CONCERN, NOT JUST OF GERMANY BUT ALSO OF OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, TO KEEP THIS OPTION OPEN. FRANCE DID NOT WANT GERMANY TO HAVE CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR ARMS, WHICH WAS A VIEWPOINT HE COULD UNDERSTAND AND RESPECT.

5. VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT US WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH IDEA OF A EUROPEAN OPTION. THERE SHOULD BE SOME RIGHT OF SUCCESSION TO THE NUCLEAR POTENTIAL NOW HELD BY BRITAIN AND FRANCE, IF A UNITED EUROPE SHOULD EVOLVE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- BONN 11806, APRIL 6.. N O D I S

6. CHANCELLOR COMMENTED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO SAY ON THIS POINT. HE ALSO EXPRESSED HOPE THAT SOLUTIONS COULD BE FOUND FOR QUESTIONS OF RESEARCH, SPIN-OFF, ETC. HIS CABINET WOULD HEAR A REPORT FROM A WORKING GROUP ON THIS PROBLEM TOMORROW.
7. VICE PRESIDENT ASKED CHANCELLOR IF HE HAD SEEN THE LATEST REVISED DRAFT OF THE NPT. REAL PROBLEM WAS ARTICLE III. THIS MIGHT TAKE MORE TIME TO DISCUSS. HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING WHAT FRG CABINET WOULD DECIDE ON THIS MATTER.
8. CHANCELLOR REPLIED THAT NO DECISION COULD BE EXPECTED TOMORROW. AFTER REPORT OF WORKING GROUP, FONMIN BRANDT AND AMB SCHNIPPENKOETTER WOULD HAVE TO GIVE THEIR VIEWS TO THE CABINET.
9. HE WANTED TO ASSURE THE VICE PRESIDENT THAT SOME OF THE GERMAN REACTIONS TO DRAFT TREATY, AS REPORTED BY PRESS, WERE NOT SHARED BY HIMSELF OR BY MOST MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT. SOME PEOPLE HERE CONTENDED THAT TREATY WAS NOT POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE AT ALL. HE AND MOST MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT SHARE THIS VIEW. HE WAS NOT AGAINST THE TREATY AS SUCH, BUT BELIEVED THAT SOME POINTS OF IMPORTANCE WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED FURTHER.
10. THE PRINCIPAL POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR FRG IN CONSIDERING NPT WAS ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SOVIET UNION. FRG WOULD BE TAKING AN OBLIGATION TO A COUNTRY WHICH, FOR YEARS AND WITHOUT ANY REASON HAD ATTACKED, SLANDERED AND THREATENED IT. FRG WAS HONESTLY SEEKING TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION, AND HAD MADE SUGGESTIONS TO THAT END. THE ONLY RESULT HAD BEEN A SOVIET NOTE ACCUSING GERMANY OF NUCLEAR PLOTTING AND REVANCHIST PLANS. KOSYGIN HAD SAID IN LONDON THAT FRG WOULD HAVE TO SIGN THIS TREATY WHETHER IT LIKED IT OR NOT. THE USSR WOULD IF A TREATY WERE SIGNED PARTICIPATE EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY IN CONTROLLING THE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE TREATY.
11. VICE PRESIDENT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS A SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEM. HE SAID THAT THE US WOULD HAVE TO TALK TO THE SOVIETS ABOUT THIS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOVIET NOTE HAD BEEN IMPOLITE, ARROGANT AND FULL OF VITUPERATIONS. MAYBE SUCH STATEMENTS WERE NECESSARY FOR PEOPLE LIKE ULBRICHT WHO NEEDED A PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE FROM TIME TO TIME.
12. FRANK AND STRAIGHT WORDS, VICE PRESIDENT CONTINUED, WERE NEEDED BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND CHANCELLOR AND OTHERS ON MATTER OF SAFEGUARDS. THIS WAS THE CRUX OF ALL THE POLITICAL DEBATE. IF FRG COULD RESOLVE THIS POINT, HE FELT THAT ALL OTHERS WOULD FALL IN LINE. HE HOPED THAT PROBLEM OF SAFEGUARDS COULD BE WORKED OUT.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- BONN 11806, APRIL 6. N O D I S

WITH SOVIETS. ORIGINALLY THEY DID NOT WANT ANY SAFEGUARDS. LATER, THEY APPARENTLY CONCLUDED THAT THIS MIGHT BE A GOOD WAY OF CAUSING TROUBLE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. HE HOPED THAT STANDARDS OF EURATOM COULD BE BROUGHT IN LINE WITH THOSE OF IAEA. MAYBE SOVIETS WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN HAVING US INSPECTORS IN SUCH TERRITORY AS POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY. PERHAPS SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS, SIMILAR TO USING NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES IN UN PEACE KEEPING MISSIONS.

13. ON CIVIL TECHNOLOGY VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE COULD ASSURE CHANCELLOR THAT US WOULD COOPERATE FULLY. US WOULD BE WILLING TO PUT THIS IN AN AGREEMENT, SO THERE WOULD BE NO DOUBT ABOUT IT. SIMILARLY, THE EUROPEAN OPTION MUST BE CLEARLY TIED DOWN.  
MCGHEE

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 6, 1967

Mrs. Johnson:

Herewith:

-- Dick Helms' evaluation of Lynda's proposed trip, stop-by-stop;

-- the trip as now outlined, including a map.

As you see, Helms and his people think it is viable; although if approved in principle we shall wish to work it out with great care, stop-by-stop.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachments

*Pres file*

Thursday, April 6, 1967 -- 9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

I was approached last night by Senator Cooper's assistant. He gave me a copy of the attached Resolution. He said that he believed there were sufficient votes in the Senate to pass this Resolution. There would be a certain amount of fighting but he personally did not believe it would be excessively acrimonious. On the other hand, Senator Cooper did not wish to move unless the President wished him to move. I said that our position was, as he knew, that it was a matter up to the Senate.

He said he understood Senator Mansfield was getting back tomorrow, that is, today, April 6. He expressed the hope on behalf of Senator Cooper that after Senator Mansfield's return, we would permit the Democratic leadership to be active in getting a Resolution along these lines. I said I would report his conversation.

W. W. Rostow

S. J. Res. 60

April 4, 1967

AMENDMENTS (in the nature of a substitute)

to be proposed by Mr. Cooper

a joint resolution to welcome the Latin American summit conference

WWRostow:rlh



117a

Calendar No. 84

90TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# S. J. RES. 60

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 4, 1967

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

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## AMENDMENTS

(IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE)

Intended to be proposed by Mr. COOPER (for himself and Mr. SMATHERS) to S.J. Res. 60, a joint resolution to welcome the Latin American summit conference, and for other purposes, viz:

- 1 Strike out all after the resolving clause and insert in
- 2 lieu thereof the following:
- 3 "That the Congress welcomes the meeting of chiefs of state
- 4 of the members of the Organization of American States to
- 5 be held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 12 to 14, 1967.
- 6 "The Congress supports the concept of a Latin American
- 7 Common Market and, after appropriate steps have been
- 8 taken toward progressive establishment of such market, it
- 9 will give full consideration to providing, through the Inter-

1 American Development Bank, standby resources to be  
2 matched by Latin American countries to facilitate the transi-  
3 tion to a fully functioning Latin American Common Market.

4 "The Congress supports United States participation  
5 with the other members of the Inter-American Development  
6 Bank, in the joint provision of resources to that institution  
7 to be used for financing multinational projects which promote  
8 Latin American economic integration.

9 "The Congress supports individual and joint efforts of  
10 the member states of the Organization of American States  
11 to expand trade on a nondiscriminatory basis, within the  
12 region and with other areas of the world and to mobilize  
13 public and private resources inside and outside the hemi-  
14 sphere to further the development of Latin America.

15 "The Congress recognizes the need for more effective  
16 assistance under the Alliance for Progress for strengthened  
17 programs, including education, agricultural modernization,  
18 and improvement of health, but believes that the nature and  
19 amount of assistance made available by the United States  
20 should be dependent on demonstrated need and adequate  
21 self-help within the recipient countries.

22 "Recognizing the above objectives of the member states  
23 of the Organization of American States and consistent with  
24 the principles of self-help and demonstrated need, the Con-  
25 gress is prepared to support through constitutional processes

1 the allocation of resources for their achievement over a period  
 2 of five years.”

3 Strike out the preamble and insert in lieu thereof the  
 4 following:

“Whereas it has been an historic policy of the United States to  
 work in close harmony with our sister American Republics  
 to promote the well-being and enhance the security of the  
 hemisphere; and

“Whereas the United States has pledged to work with the na-  
 tions and over two hundred million fellow citizens of Latin  
 America in a partnership of good will and vision, dedicated  
 to the common cause of economic progress, equality, justice,  
 freedom, and opportunity; and

“Whereas the meeting of Presidents of the American Republics  
 provides an historic opportunity to set in motion policies  
 and actions toward making the decade of the 1970’s one  
 of Latin American achievement in unity, economic and  
 social progress, and stability: Therefore be it”.

Amend the title so as to read: “Joint resolution to sup-  
 port the other American Republics in a historic new phase  
 of the Alliance for Progress.”

**Amdt. No. 149**

**Calendar No. 84**

**90TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION**

**S. J. RES. 60**

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## **AMENDMENTS**

**(IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE)**

Intended to be proposed by Mr. COOPER (for himself and Mr. SMATHERS) to S.J. Res. 60, a joint resolution to welcome the Latin American summit conference, and for other purposes.

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**APRIL 4, 1967**

**Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed**

118  
*2. Pres. file*

Wednesday, April 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Dr. Haworth, the Director of the National Science Foundation, in the attached letter requests your approval to proceed with the proposal of transferring ANTON BRUUN to India.

The proposal, which was first brought to your attention last year, has been completely checked out with the appropriate Members of Congress and with all pertinent Departments and Agencies of the Government. There has been no objection raised to the transfer. It is the view of the Department of State, the Department of the Navy and all other interested member agencies of the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development that the transfer of ANTON BRUUN to India would be the best utilization of the ship in serving U.S. national interests.

The National Science Foundation estimates that it will cost \$260,000 to overhaul and transfer the ship to India. The National Science Foundation has the necessary authority in the National Science Foundation Act of 1950, and the funds are available in the fiscal year 1967 appropriations.

The Department of State has prepared a scenario of additional actions to be taken if you approve the transfer. It will be necessary to undertake discussions with the Indian Government to reach agreement on the specific terms and conditions of the gift, the participation of U.S. scientists in Indian oceanographic projects, the actual arrangements for the transfer of title and custody, the training of a crew, and the formal transfer ceremonies. When these matters have been arranged, the details of the ceremonial transfer and related publicity can be worked out, including the content and timing of appropriate press releases.

I recommend that you approve the transfer and authorize me to sign the attached memorandum to Dr. Haworth, copies of which would also be made available to the other affected departments and agencies.

W. W. Rostow

\_\_\_\_\_ Approved

\_\_\_\_\_ Disapproved

\_\_\_\_\_ See me

APR 22 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. LELAND J. HAWORTH

The President has approved your recommendation to proceed with the transfer of ANTON BRAUN to India.

The State Department should be requested to initiate with the Indian Government the detailed planning required to effectuate the transfer.

(signed) W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow

cc: The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
Dr. Edward Wenk, Executive Secretary,  
Marine Sciences Council, for the information of the Council.



*Pres file*

Wednesday - April 5, 1967

Mr. President:

Brazilian President Costa e Silva today made his first policy statement since taking office. He had some nice things to say about you, the Alliance for Progress and the forthcoming Summit meeting.

Ambassador Tuthill's cable giving the highlights of the statement is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Message from Ambassador Tuthill  
(Rio's 9696, April 5, 1967)

119a  
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5022  
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UNCLAS RIO DE JANEIRO 9696

1967 APR 5 PM 4:58

WEDNESDAY

CURRENT REACTION, ATTENTION IOP/R, IBS, IPS AND ARA/BR

1. BRASILIA, APRIL 5 -- IN HIS FIRST FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT SINCE TAKING OFFICE 21 DAYS AGO, BRAZIL'S PRESIDENT ARTHUR DA COSTA E SILVA TODAY SAID HIS COUNTRY WILL COOPERATE "INTENSELY" WITH THE UNITED STATES TO ACHIEVE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION THROUGH THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS.

2. THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, BROADCAST LIVE TO THE NATION,

PAGE TWO RUESUA 9696 UNCLAS  
PRAISED THE UNITED STATES FOR CONTRIBUTING FINANCIALLY TO THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF THE HEMISPHERE. HE SAID THE PROBLEMS OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE SUMMIT MEETING IN PUNTA DEL ESTE WILL GIVE A SUBSTANTIAL BOOST TO THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS. THE NEWLY-INAUGURATED PRESIDENT OF LATIN AMERICAN'S LARGEST NATION ALSO EXPRESSED OPTIMISM THAT THE MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATES IN URUGUAY WILL BE SUCCESSFUL.

3. PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA'S PRONOUNCEMENT, MADE IN THE NEW FOREIGN OFFICE PALACE IN BRASILIA, WAS HEARD BY AN AUDIENCE OF DIPLOMATS, MEMBERS OF THE CABINET AND THE ARCHBISHOP OF BRASILIA. MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS WERE ALSO PRESENT. THE PRESIDENT WAS APPLAUDED WHEN INTRODUCED BY FOREIGN MINISTER MAGALHAES PINTO, AND AGAIN AT THE END OF HIS 20-MINUTE ADDRESS.

4. WHILE PRAISING THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS AND PRESIDENT LYNDON JOHNSON FOR SEEKING FINANCING FOR THE CREATING OF A LATIN AMERICAN COMMON MARKET, THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT BRAZIL'S FOREIGN POLICY WILL HAVE A STRONG ECONOMIC FLAVOR.

PRESERVATION COPY

PAGE THREE RUESUA 9696 UNCLAS

5. "I WISH TO MOBILIZE OUR DIPLOMACY ON ECONOMIC TIES IN ORDER TO ASSURE EXTERNAL COLLABORATION NECESSARY FOR THE ACCELERATION OF OUR DEVELOPMENT," PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA SAID.

YU JAPAN WAS SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED BY THE PRESIDENT AS ONE OF THE NATIONS WITH WHICH BRAZIL WILL SEEK EXPANDED TRADE AND TECHNICAL EXCHANGES.

7. CITING THE RECENT PAPAL ENCYCLICAL, PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA STRESSED THAT UNDERDEVELOPMENT IS A THREAT TO WORLD PEACE AND THAT SOCIAL JUSTICE IS INDISPENSABLE IN THIS AGE. PRAISING THE ENCYCLICAL, THE PRESIDENT SAID BRAZIL SHARES POPE PAUL'S OBJECTIVES FOR HUMANITY.

8. IN STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA, PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA VOICED OPTIMISM ON THE POSSIBILITY OF REGIONAL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. HE STATED EMPHATICALLY THAT BRAZIL WILL SUPPORT DISARMAMENT EFFORTS AS A MEANS TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY, THEREBY FREEING RESOURCES NEEDED FOR DEVELOPMENT.

9. CONTINUING HE SAID: "WE SHOULD BE CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT OUR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN THE PANORAMA

PAGE FOUR RUESUA 9696 UNCLAS

WHICH THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION OPENED FOR THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE AGE. IN THIS NEW ERA IN WHICH WE ARE BEGINNING TO LIVE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INCREASINGLY WILL CONDITION NOT ONLY THE PROGRESS AND WELL-BEING OF NATIONS, BUT ALSO THEIR OWN INDEPENDENCE.

10. "BRAZIL AND ALL LATIN AMERICA SHOULD MAKE A CLEAR AND DECISIVE OPTION, ENGAGING IN A RATIONAL AND BOLD PROGRAM OF SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OF THE PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF SCIENCE. IN THIS CONTEXT, NUCLEAR ENERGY REPRESENTS A TRANSCENDENTAL ROLE, AND IT IS WITHOUT DOUBT A POWERFUL RESOURCE THAT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SO AS TO REDUCE THE DISTANCE THAT SEPARATES THEM FROM INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS.

11. "WE ARE CONVINCED THAT PARALLEL WITH THE FORMATION OF A REGIONAL COMMON MARKET WE SHOULD TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO INITIATE THE SECOND PROCESS OF LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION AS REGARDS THE UTILIZATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. THE PURPOSE WOULD BE TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE PEOPLE THE IMPROVED LIVING CONDITIONS WHICH ARE CONTAINED IN THE POWERFUL FORCES WITHIN THE ATOM.

PAGE FIVE RUESUA 9696 UNCLAS

12. "WE REPUDIATE NUCLEAR ARMS AND WE ARE AWARE OF THE GRAVE RISKS THAT THEIR DISSEMINATION WOULD BRING TO HUMANITY. IT IS IMPERATIVE, THEREFORE, THAT NEITHER IMMEDIATE NOR POTENTIAL OBSTACLES SHOULD BE CREATED FOR THE FULL UTILIZATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL MEANS IN OUR COUNTRY. ANYTHING ELSE WOULD MEAN THAT WE WOULD BE ACCEPTING A NEW FORM OF DEPENDENCY CERTAINLY NOT COMPATIBLE WITH OUR ASPIRATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT."

TUTHILL

BT

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

April 5, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Iraqi President Aref

Ambassador Strong will be calling on President Aref tomorrow morning before returning here on consultation and home leave. Since Aref's term as President has just been extended, he would like to deliver personal congratulations from you in the form of the following message:

"I was pleased to learn that the Cabinet and Defense Council have extended your term of office. My sincere congratulations both to you and to the people of Iraq."

I recommend you approve. This would be another in the series of relatively short messages of this kind which you have used to establish a personal relationship with this man who appears to be leading Iraq gradually into a more moderate course. He deeply appreciated your receiving his top generals last December, and this seems an appropriate time for another short message.

We will have to get this out tonight if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
N/A 91-394  
By 128, NWAA, Date 3-12-93

~~SECRET~~

121

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - April 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with President-elect Anastasio Somoza  
of Nicaragua

General Somoza came to the United States earlier this month to refurbish his tarnished image following the pre-electoral disturbances which caused so much bloodshed in Nicaragua.

The visit is a courtesy call. There is no business that you need to take up with him. You might give him some friendly advice on the importance of leaders being responsive to the needs of their people.

State's briefing paper and biographic sketch are attached.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Briefing (talking points) paper  
and biographic sketch.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-394  
By sig, NARA, Date 3-12-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



121a

CONFIDENTIAL

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT SOMOZA OF NICARAGUA  
April 6, 1967

TALKING POINTS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-396  
By ju, NARA, Date 5-12-92

A. The President may wish to:

1. State that he is pleased with General Somoza's statements endorsing democratic government, including (a) his election victory speech in which he said he harbored no enmity toward anyone and would base all his actions on law and his conscience, and (b) his appearance on television on "Meet the Press" March 19, when he said that he would like to see elected governments in all of Latin America (General Somoza on that occasion said he does not think it is good for a country to be ruled by one family for a long period if it uses methods which are not democratic).

2. Congratulate Nicaragua on its soundly managed economy and excellent rate of economic growth, which averaged 8 percent per year between 1960 and 1965, and since then has continued at only a slightly reduced rate.

3. State that he is pleased to know that the Nicaraguan Government has cooperated wholeheartedly in the Alliance for Progress, and that its economic and social development programs are being directed toward obtaining broader participation by the whole population in the benefits of development. The record of self-help has been impressive. The President may wish to refer to the area of community development and local self-help, where many communities have organized themselves to undertake improvement projects. Public investments have gone largely into highways, electric power and ports, but projects are now being given increasing emphasis in the national budget.

B. General Somoza may raise the following topics:

1. He may seek assurance that the U.S. Government does not intend to reduce assistance to Nicaragua. The President may wish to state that we expect to work with General Somoza, as with any other Latin American President, consistent with the spirit and the objectives of the Alliance for Progress.

CONFIDENTIAL



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

2. He may suggest strong OAS action against Fidel Castro, stressing his often repeated statement that he realized the seriousness of the Communist threat in the hemisphere before it was recognized in the U.S. The President may wish to state that we have a continuing concern with the Communist threat and with ways of coping with it. For example, we strongly support the current Venezuelan plan to present their case against Castro to the OAS, and we believe this will provide an excellent opportunity to air the problem once again.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NICARAGUA

General Anastasio Somoza Debayle

President-elect of  
Nicaragua

Ah-nahs-TAH-syo So-MO-sah Day-BY-lay

Elected President of Nicaragua for a five-year term on February 5, 1967, Anastasio Somoza will be inaugurated May 1, 1967. He is the third member of his family to hold that position. His father, Anastasio Somoza García, was a virtual dictator from 1936 until his assassination in 1956, and his older brother, Luis, was President from 1956 to 1963. Their sister is the wife of the Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United States, Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa.

Born December 5, 1925 in León, Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza Debayle was educated at the Instituto Pedagógico in León; St. Leo Preparatory School, Tampa, Florida; and LaSalle Military School, Long Island, New York. He then entered West Point and upon his graduation returned to Nicaragua where he rose rapidly in the armed forces, becoming their undisputed leader after the death of his father in 1956. He resigned from that position July 30, 1966, as was constitutionally required of him as a presidential candidate. However, he is still considered the actual, although not official, head of the armed forces. Somoza is a successful businessman as well as a military chief, who owns interests in several large businesses, including cattle, cotton, sugar, factories and mines. He is a director of the Nicaraguan shipping line, MAMENIC, and president of the Nicaraguan airline, LANICA.

Somoza is a ready conversationalist who can discuss a wide range of topics with conviction. At private and public functions and parties Somoza is affable, poised and approachable, and he mingles with all present. However, heavy security precautions surround him. On occasion he shows overbearing arrogance and emotional immaturity. He can be classed as a social drinker, but at times his drinking habits have been intemperate. He has traveled extensively in Europe and the Far East, as well as the United States, where in 1957 he received the Legion of Merit. He has been a staunch supporter of the U.S.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By CS, NARA, Date 10-21-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Anastasio Somoza is married to the former Hope (she sometimes uses the Spanish "Esperanza") Portocarrero, a U.S. citizen who is his first cousin. The Somozas have five children. A tall (6 feet 2 inches) and heavy-set man, Somoza customarily wears prescription glasses. The President-elect is a Roman Catholic. He speaks fluent English.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Limited Official Use

Wednesday - April 5, 1967

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

State has just informed us that Mrs. Vasco da Cunha this morning suffered a recurrence of a serious heart condition.

You or Mrs. Johnson may want to call the Ambassador to express your concern.

If you would like me to do it on your behalf, I will be glad to do so.

W. W. Rostow

Limited Official Use

103

Wednesday, April 5, 1967  
4:45 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is a pretty good cold turkey assessment.

But it may be that recent noises about the "independence" of the NLF are designed to move towards a situation where the NLF negotiates with Saigon. That fall-back would somewhat save Hanoi's face. And it has always been in the cards, if there is to be a negotiated settlement at all.

As you can see on the ticker today, Ky and Thieu are moving that way; although they can't yet admit the NLF as a talking partner any more than the NLF can yet bring itself to talk with Saigon.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (Saigon 22051)



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

123a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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RR RUEHC RUDTCR  
DE RUMJIR 22051 0940750  
ZNY CCCCC  
R 040550Z APR 67  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
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INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
STATE GRNC  
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1967 APR 4 AM 3 22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SAIGON 22051

LIMDIS/NOFORN

SUBJ: BRITISH REPORT FROM HANOI

1. FOLLOWING REPORT WAS PROVIDED BY CANADIAN ICC DELEGATION (PROTECT SOURCE).

2. QUOTE. BRITISH CONSUL GENERAL COLVIN HAD INTERVIEW MARCH 28 WITH CZECH AMBASSADOR MUCHA WHO RECENTLY RETURNED TO HANOI AFTER TWO AND HALF MONTHS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. MUCHA STATED FOLLOWING:

A) NEGOTIATIONS - THE DRVN ARE NO LONGER INTERESTED IN THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR ATTITUDE NOW IS ONE OF INTRANSIGENCE. DURING JAN AND FEB 67 THEY WERE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE OF THEIR FEAR THAT THE TROUBLES IN CHINA WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE PROVISION OF AID ON WHICH THE DRVN RELY. NOW THAT THE SITUATION IN CHINA HAS IMPROVED THIS FEAR HAS RECEDED AND IN FACT CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE DRVN HAS INCREASED. THE DRVN DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN DEFEAT THE AMERICANS BUT THEY FEEL THAT THEY CAN OUTLAST THEM. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICANS WILL BECOME DISCOURAGED AS A RESULT OF THEIR LACK OF SUCCESS AND WILL EVENTUALLY NEGOTIATE ON DRVN TERMS. NO NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE POSSIBLE UNTIL THE AMERICANS HAVE CEASED BOMBING UNCONDITIONALLY.

B) NFL - THE REASON FOR THE INSTALLATION IN HANOI OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NFLY, WAS TO INCREASE THE INFLUENCE OF THE DRVN WITH THIS ORGANIZATION. THE DRVN ARE WORRIED BY THE EXTENT OF THE CHINESE INFLUENCE WITH THE NFL.

THE NFL ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE CITIES OF THE SOUTH. THIS WILL PROBABLY BRING ABOUT RETALIATORY AMERICAN AIR ATTACKS ON HANOI.

THE NFL ARE LIKELY TO ATTEMPT SHORTLY TO SET UP A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTH. UNQUOTE

LODGE  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-67  
By is, NARA Date 2-15-02

Wednesday, April 5, 1967 -- 7:55 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

I talked by telephone today, as requested, with John Steele, Time; Chuck Roberts, Newsweek; Boyd France, Business Week; and

Jack Sutherland, U.S. News & World Report, and told them my shop is prepared to give them background information on a weekly basis, if they so wished.

Virginia Prewett, The Washington Daily News; Ben Meyer, AP; and Hugh Sidey, Time, telephoned about the Latin American Resolution. I gave them all the basic background information which I had worked up after your instruction of yesterday.

W. W. Rostow

rln



Wednesday, April 5, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to President Marcos

On April 8, ceremonies will be held in the Philippines marking the 25th anniversary of the fall of Bataan. As you know, President Marcos is a veteran of the Bataan-Corregidor campaign and is deeply involved personally in the commemoration ceremonies.

Ambassador Blair has strongly recommended -- and State concurs -- that you send a personal message of greeting to President Marcos. It could be made public at the April 8 ceremony. Ambassador Blair makes clear that President Marcos would greatly appreciate such a message.

You have already sent a personal message to the American defenders group that will be in the Philippines for the anniversary. A message to Marcos and the Filipino defenders would seem desirable.

A suggested text is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Message approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

White House release  
approved on April 8 \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 18, NARA, Date 4/23/91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Proposed Message from President Johnson  
to President Marcos on the Twenty-Fifth  
Anniversary of the Fall of Bataan

Dear Mr. President:

On this Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Fall of Bataan, all Americans join me in saluting you and the other gallant Filipino veterans of that courageous struggle.

Americans and Filipinos have joined hands more than once in the common defense of freedom. And Bataan will live in our memory ~~always~~ as a high point of that defense.

I have been deeply moved to see hundreds of Americans returning to Bataan to share with their Filipino brothers-in-arms the memory of a moment in history when men put aside all other concerns to protect principles and ideals they knew to be central to the survival of liberty everywhere.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency  
Ferdinand E. Marcos,  
President of the Republic of  
the Philippines,  
Manila, Philippines

126  
Wed., April 5, 1967  
6:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This letter of Ambassador Lodge's is worth careful reading. It relates to a subject I have raised before -- the work of the PRU's in getting at the hard core VC on a rifle rather than shotgun basis.

W W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (logx Lodge ltr 3/1/67)

~~SECRET~~

1123

1961

The President  
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

When you were at Guam, I gave you Sam Wilson's report about taking over the town of Long Huu - 11,000 people without anybody being hurt, thanks largely to the political and military working well together under a "Single Manager".

Herewith some more quotations from Sam Wilson about his putting in a 200-man Provincial Reconnaissance Unit as part of a "combing out" process.

As you know, the PRU's were developed and trained by the CIA. They are Vietnamese who really are out fighting in small units at night and who render an absolutely indispensable service.

"The most difficult part of the job of pacification is eliminating the Viet Cong infrastructure, that apparatus of political control that effectively denies us the support of the population even in some areas where our military strength is preponderant and where the Revolutionary Development workers have succeeded in some of their tasks.

"The village of Long Huu in Long An Province, where early this month we and the Vietnamese launched an experimental operation, is an island, between two rivers separated from the rest of Can Duoc district by two canals. This is where we sent in a battalion each of American and Vietnamese troops and sealed off the area. After arrival of our forces we brought in American and Vietnamese civilian workers who, among other things, set up a school and had it functioning within a day.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 2.6

NLS 99-67

By cb, NARA Date 1-21-01

~~SECRET~~

"We began to get reports that the Viet Cong were trying to re-infiltrate the island-village. In order to preserve our gains and to begin softening up the Viet Cong infrastructure in potential target areas adjacent to Long Huu, we then sent in 200 men from the Provincial Reconnaissance Units. - units of from 12 to 15 well-armed and specially trained civilian fighters who operate under the guidance of American civilian advisors.

"After an initial period of intelligence-gathering on the island, they began to operate into areas west and north of Long Huu, using the island as their base. In one of their first operations, on the morning of Palm Sunday, they acted on local intelligence and crossed the canal to the next village where they ambushed a group of Viet Cong guerrillas and killed four. One body was brought back to Long Huu and identified as the leader of the guerrilla platoon in the neighboring village. (His platoon had frequently harassed Long Huu with small arms fire from across the canal.) The district chief sent word to the family of the slain guerrilla, asking that they come and claim the body. When the family arrived, the district chief gave them a small sum of money to transport the body to a burial place. He told the family and the small group of onlookers of his regret that such violence and bloodshed must continue. He added that if only the Viet Cong would give themselves up and rejoin their families and relatives on the government side in a common effort to build a better life, such needless suffering would be ended.

"About 24 hours later, acting again on local intelligence (this time from a Chieu Hoi returnee), the entire 200-man Reconnaissance Unit contingent crossed the river to another adjacent village. They waited until the moon was down and then in motorless sampans drifted with the outgoing tide. Their target was the Viet Cong commissar in this neighboring village. They surrounded the main concentration of houses in the village, and then the PRU commander led a hand-picked element to the hut where the commissar was sleeping and tried to take him alive. He and his comrades resisted, and a fierce gunfight ensued. In all, eight Viet Cong were killed and one was captured. The dead VC included the commissar, two village tax collectors, and the village committee member in charge of education. Two of the VC dead were girl guerrillas who refused calls to surrender and continued to throw hand-grenades. One PRU

member was slightly wounded by grenade fragments.

"The PRU seized three weapons, several grenades, a quantity of ammunition, and about 100 pounds of documents which appear to include the files maintained by the VC tax collectors.

"Once again, the bodies were taken back to Long Huu market place, allegedly for positive identification. We suspect, however, that the district chief in ordering the bodies displayed also had in mind the psychological impact of such a scene.

"We plan to leave the PRU's in the area for some time to comb every hamlet in the village and perhaps to run further raids against the Viet Cong infrastructure in nearby villages. One of those villages lies athwart the road from Long Huu to the district capital. If we can take that village too, both it and Long Huu will have access to the district capital for the first time in two or three years.

"The work of the Provincial Reconnaissance Units in eliminating the Viet Cong infrastructure should prove to be a major factor in the consolidation of our hold on Long Huu and the opening up of adjoining villages."

This is how it looks in one of the very toughest places in Viet-Nam.

Note

a) the importance of small Vietnamese units fighting at night with good intelligence;

b) how quickly the school was brought in; and

c) how much it means to have a "single manager".

With respectful regard.

Faithfully yours,

Henry Cabot Lodge

1967 APR 5 PM 5 20



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1260

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
**REGISTERED**

REGISTRY NUMBER

Nº 281873

OFFICE SYMBOL

AMB

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

The President  
The White House



GPO 16-72044-1  
**TO BE AFFIXED TO COVER**

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 5, 1967 -- 4:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

You will wish to read this intelligence report from a source previously [REDACTED] It suggests:

- Bombing of the North is having its effect; and
- The Soviet Union may be reducing its aid to Hanoi.

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

"1. [REDACTED] point of view on the Vietnamese war remains unchanged; i.e., that North Vietnam alone must try to put an end to the conflict through negotiations. However, officially [REDACTED] will continue to support the North Vietnamese position.

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

"2. In a recent exchange [REDACTED] the North Vietnamese said the [REDACTED] views with regard to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict through negotiations if the United States discontinued bombardment, had been taken into account. The North Vietnamese, however, claimed that every time the United States made some statements in this direction the U.S. also intensified military actions in the field, and as a result a dialogue could not be started.

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

"3. In the same exchange between [REDACTED] the North Vietnamese informed the [REDACTED] that the situation in North Vietnam is becoming increasingly bad, the economy of North Vietnam is destroyed, and the help received from Socialist countries is poor. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has decreased considerably military materiel aid to North Vietnam. In connection with the North Vietnamese accusation that the Soviets have decreased their aid, the [REDACTED] government knows that the Soviet Union has used up all the old stocks of war materiel which she gave as aid to North Vietnam, and that she does not want to give any of the newer materiel and equipment and is using the pretext that the North Vietnamese do not know how to handle and use them."

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 5, 1967  
4:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Marvin Watson

As you know, Mr. Templesman and Mr. Adams came in to visit with me this morning.

We had what was, for me, a most interesting discussion touching mainly on African problems.

Mr. Templesman made some extremely perceptive comments on:

-- The social stability provided by tribalism in the countryside, notably if the primary emphasis on African development in the next generation should be on agriculture; and

-- The need to keep some bilateral aid programs going in order to provide minimal leverage for U. S. Ambassadors in Africa.

With respect to the Congo, we agreed that the situation remains sticky, although better than a few years before; and it was worth buying time.

I thanked Mr. Templesman for his helpful work in the Congo.

I explained to Mr. Templesman and Mr. Adams the tremendous pressure on your schedule in these days before your Latin American trip. They said that they fully understood; but, evidently, they are extremely anxious to see you.

W. W. R.

Wednesday, April 5, 1967  
12:30 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

In the light of the attached -- to me from  
Bill Jordan -- I believe we can wait until  
the 19th for delivery.

I agree with Bob Komer that we should  
weigh in hard if they delay at that time.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 5, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: National Reconciliation

GVN has informed us that plan now is to issue proclamation on National Reconciliation on April 19 -- a Vietnamese holiday honoring Hung Buong, the legendary first king of Viet-Nam.

Two reasons for delay:

(1) we came up with last-minute proposed changes to strengthen the proclamation and make it more specific;

(2) General Thieu and his colleagues decided they did not want to divert public attention from the Constitution, which they (rightly I think) regarded as taking priority.

There is disagreement in the GVN on an adequate Vietnamese translation of "reconciliation." Some Vietnamese think term now used implies readiness to accept the Liberation Front in a coalition government. They are hammering this out. Saigon indicates Vietnamese readiness to accept most of our proposed changes.

Embassy Saigon is obviously pushing hard on this. Another "needle" is not going to help. Part of the blame for delay is on the American side.

*BJP*  
William J. Jorden

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-394  
By sig, NARA, Date 3-12-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

4 April 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

National Reconciliation Proclamation Delayed Again. After promising to issue this at the same time as the Constitution, General Thieu again reneged--ostensibly because we suggested a number of amendments to flesh the proclamation out (and make it real).

I fear that Lodge and the Mission are taking too relaxed a view of this important element of our 1967 political strategy, on which Ky/Thieu made promises to you at Manila and again at Guam.

While hortatory US words may have only limited impact, a gentle reminder from Lodge of your personal interest could help overcome Thieu's stalling. Since Lodge has partly stacked arms, a word from the President himself would best insure the action needed. It would also be a reminder to Cabot you're still watching.

All I propose is a third person cable saying "Highest authority concerned over yet another delay in National Reconciliation announcement. He hopes that you will make known to Thieu, and Ky if necessary, that he sees great promise in this long delayed program, and believes that further delay will tend to offset credibility of GVN's public assertions at Manila and Guam." This does not put you out on any limb, and I'll take it from there.

O. K. \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

*Wait - see me at once*

*Q*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-394  
By *sig*, NARA, Date *3-12-93*

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts -- Tuesday, April 4, 1967

Ben Welles, The New York Times, telephoned about our position on the Latin American Resolution. I followed virtually verbatim the attached guidance I had drafted and sent to State, after your telephone call in the morning.

Alastair Burnet, Brian Beedham, and John Midgley, the London Economist, were in. I briefed them in some detail on Viet Nam in all its dimensions, military and civil, including the historical charts we have developed.

Marilyn Berger, NEWSDAY, came in to discuss how long-range plans and ideas relate to the flow of day-to-day operational business. I took her through the development, under your leadership, of regionalism in Asia, Africa, and Latin America: from the Baltimore speech to the Asian Development Bank; from the OAU Ambassadors speech, the Korry Report, to the change in our African AID programs; from your Mexico City speech to the Punta del Este conference; etc.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



Sent to State via LDX at 041300

130a

April 4, 1967

from Walt Rostow  
Send LDX to Department of State for appropriate distribution:

In discussing the present state of the Latin American resolution with the press and others, the following should be made clear: The President thought that the wise policy, even though it was not constitutionally necessary, was to consult with the Congress before he went to the Latin American Summit. He found the House of Representatives responsive, as are many leaders in the Senate who have individually given the President their best judgment on the course to follow at Punta del Este.

Others in the Senate apparently do not wish to participate in such a consultation and render to the President their advice before the conference. That is their privilege. It is not a matter for debate.

The simple question was whether the Senate wished or did not wish to express a view before the conference.

Therefore, we shall proceed about our business in the Executive Branch and in due time make our recommendations.

1. ~~map~~  
2. Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - April 4, 1967

Mr. President:

Marty Underwood, who is in Montevideo making your arrival arrangements, has asked whether he should proceed with plans to get an airport crowd for your arrival.

The attached memo from Jim Jones to Marvin Watson describes the situation. The reason the Uruguayan Government wants no crowds is their concern with security. Each President will receive full military honors in a 45-minute ceremony which the press will be allowed to cover.

My view is that you should not try to have a popular reception because:

- under the Uruguayan Government's ground rules, other Presidents will not be having a popular reception.
- for you to be the only one to have a crowd would look contrived and be resented.
- It would not be in keeping with your "junior partner" stance at the meeting.

Linc Gordon shares this view.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

I desire popular reception \_\_\_\_\_

I prefer no popular reception ✓

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

cc - Marvin Watson

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By RL, NARA, Date 4-30-91

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 31, 1967

*W. Bondler. 131a*  
*Bill -*  
*get an urgent*  
*response.*  
*[checkmark]*

TO: W. MARVIN WATSON

FROM: JAMES R. JONES

Marty Underwood called from Uruguay today to say he has had extreme difficulty with the local government in his efforts to raise a crowd for the arrival of the President. At the present time, the plans call for the President to arrive at 11 a.m. on Tuesday, April 11, preceded by the President of Mexico at 10 a.m. and possibly the President of Chile at 12 noon. The Uruguayan government has no plans to have any kind of a crowd or popular reception although Marty did talk them in to having bands and colorful flag bearers similar to the reception in Mexico. The only concession Marty could get from the Uruguayan government was that they would allow him to select 2500 - 3000 people to be transported out there especially for the U. S. arrival on about 50 buses. These people would have signs and balloons, etc., but this type of reception would not be granted for any other country. Marty is asking for our guidance on how he should proceed.



*Pres file*  
*cy sent Butler*

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, April 4, 1967 -- 4:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the unofficial German translation into English of Kiesinger's letter to you, delivered by Amb. Knappstein this afternoon.

It is generally warm and responsive with, at first reading, two potential difficulties -- although not necessarily so:

- The go-slow attitude on troop withdrawal or redeployment (p. 4); and
- The reference to Soviet "attacks, accusations, and threats" in the context of the non-proliferation agreement.

Knappstein, in presenting the letter, said that Moscow is making it very difficult for the German government to sign a non-proliferation treaty by its references to the notion that ways and means will be found to force them to sign whether they want to or not. And, in all conscience, the Russians are being difficult and counter-productive in their talks about Germany.

But, on the whole, a good letter.

We will be having more detailed comments on it for you soon.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-394  
By rip, NARA, Date 3-12-93

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Translation

~~SECRET~~

132a

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-66

By is, NARA Date 11-2-99

Dear Mr. President,

I thank you warmly for your letter of 11 March 1967. I very much welcome your proposal for a continuous and comprehensive exchange of views and hope that we shall soon have an opportunity for personal talks.

I was sincerely pleased to hear that you would perhaps be visiting Europe soon and; in doing so, also come to Bonn. If you should not realize this plan, I would gladly take up your suggestion that we meet in the foreseeable future for an exchange of views, where and when you feel this would be useful. Perhaps I shall be able to discuss this question in the next few days with Vice-President Humphrey, whom we are looking forward to receive.

In my statement of policy I referred, as you know, to the great importance of our alliance with the United States. On that occasion I said: "This government will forget none of the major assistance rendered us by the United States in the past two decades. It is aware that its alliance with the United States and the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty is still of vital importance for us today and will remain so in the future we can perceive."

This conviction is shared by the overwhelming majority of the population of this country. In that statement I went on to say that value and cohesion of any alliance were determined by the confidence of its partners that their vital interests are mutually understood and taken into consideration. And I said clearly that this held true both for us and the United States.

This conviction, too, is shared by the German people. Both our countries have their worries and problems which call for mutual under-

standing and, wherever possible, support. It is in this way only that an alliance remains durable and firm in the vicissitudes of history. You can be sure that my great sympathy goes to your own problems and worries, and especially the heavy burden of the Vietnam war.

In the past few weeks I have occasionally expressed my anxiety about the development of relations between our two countries and said that a more intensive and more comprehensive exchange of views and intentions was desirable for the sake of mutual understanding, which is necessary, especially when it comes to taking far-reaching decisions.

I therefore thank you wholeheartedly for your understanding for our anxiety and for the initiatives you have taken. You have strengthened not only my own but also the German people's confidence in the future development of German-American relations. Without unduly overestimating the possibilities open to my country I attach considerable importance to these close and friendly relations, having in mind not only the interests of our two nations.

I should like to say the following with regard to the problems you touched upon:

My government is aware of the great importance of the trilateral talks. It therefore welcomes the fact that these talks, opened on your initiative, are expected soon to be brought to a successful conclusion. I am happy to be able to say that the opinion of the United States, as expounded in your letter, largely concurs with my government's views. I share your opinion that the level and structure of NATO forces should be determined exclusively by common security requirements and not under the influence of temporary financial difficulties.

As you know, the system used so far to offset the foreign exchange costs of US-forces stationed in Germany by German military procurement in the United States has in recent years led to growing difficulties, which at times have strained German-American relations. I therefore very much welcome your proposal to drop this system and replace it by arrangements more apt to meet that problem. I have learned with satisfaction that the negotiations to this end, which the Federal Government supported and which were conducted between the Bundesbank on the one side and the Federal Reserve System and the US-Treasury on the other side, have reached a stage at which an arrangement may enter into force, which is designed to relieve the United States balance of payments.

The German Government realizes that within the trilateral talks special importance attaches to the endeavours to reach a satisfactory offset arrangement with regard to the British forces stationed in Germany. The cooperative attitude of your government has enabled the Federal Government in spite of the tremendous strain on the German budget to make a new offer to the British Government. It was on the basis of that offer that a large measure of agreement could be reached in the trilateral talks held in Washington on 20 and 21 March 1967. I hope that the governments concerned will soon conclude final arrangements.

I realize that many groups in congress and the American public advocate a drastic reduction of US-forces in Europe. All the more do I welcome your own clear attitude in this question.

With interest, I have taken note of the limited rotational exchange plan mentioned by you and explained by Mr. McCloy. I have been informed



that during the trilateral talks held in Washington on 20 and 21 March in preparation of the NATO discussions, it was agreed that a joint German-American group should examine the rotation schedule at present being worked out by the Pentagon.

You know, Mr. President, that the Soviet forces amassed in the other part of Germany, whose combat efficiency has been constantly increased in recent years, give rise to great concern among the German people. The German Government therefore feels that withdrawal or redeployment of allied forces should in principle be related to an appropriate reduction of Soviet forces in the other part of Germany and in Eastern Europe. The German Government therefore considers it important that the alliance not lose sight of the objective of a step-by-step and balanced reduction of force levels in East and West, even if its implementation meets with temporary difficulties. Hence I propose that the study of this question, begun during the trilateral talks, be continued even after their conclusion.

As regards the problem of international liquidity, I understand that the joint discussions in the IMF and in the Group of Ten are taking a favorable course, so that the completion of a contingency plan acceptable to all concerned appears possible in the foreseeable future. In that, the German Government will contribute to the best of its ability. I have given instructions to be kept continuously informed of the progress of these discussions.

I have noted with satisfaction your comments on the question of a non-proliferation treaty, especially your assurance that the consultations will be thorough and that you will allow the necessary time for them with the aim of working out solutions which also the Federal Republic

would find acceptable. As you know, the basic attitude of the Soviet Union towards the Federal Republic and the completely unjustified attacks, accusations, and threats made by Soviet leaders against the policy of the Federal Government constitute a particularly grave problem for us in this connexion. The German people expect their government to make its decision in this most important question according to its own judgement and to the dictate of its own conscience. This means that it gives like consideration to the high aim of international detente and of safeguarding peace, and to the vital interests of our own country. The talks I had recently with Ambassador Foster on this question have, I hope, proved useful for the further course of our deliberations. In the solution of this problem, too, my government bears in mind the continued existence and the durability of our alliance as well as the common interests of our two nations.

I thank you, Mr. President, for your kind wishes to me and my family. My wife and I most cordially reciprocate those good wishes, to yourself, to Mrs. Johnson, and to your family.

Sincerely Yours,

(sgd.) Kurt-Georg Kiesinger

*Pres. file*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-394  
By WIP, NARA, Date 3-12-93

~~SECRET~~

April 4, 1967

## MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Secretary Rusk's Discussion with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil

1. NATO and Western Europe. In vivid language the Secretary reassured the Turks about the depth and seriousness of the US commitment to NATO, to Western Europe, including, of course, Turkey.
2. On the Non-Proliferation Treaty, he outlined in detail all we are doing to meet the problems of such countries as Germany and Italy.
3. On Cyprus, the Turkish Foreign Minister promised to do all he could to prevent armed conflict. They both stressed the instability of the Greek government and agreed on the importance of avoiding any steps which would strengthen the hand of those Greeks increasingly opposed to close relations with the West.
4. Secretary Rusk underlined the responsibility the Turk Government had to bring all other NATO governments up to date on Cyprus.
5. In regard to Pakistan and CENTO, Caglayangil has been trying to get Ayub to come to London. The Secretary stressed the US could not tolerate Pakistan's bringing China into South Asia. They agreed with Bhutto out, Ayub was likely to be more responsible. Caglayangil underlined the utility of the recent CENTO economic meetings.
6. On Vietnam, the Secretary was vivid on the irresponsibility of Western European countries sitting secure and prosperous, not doing their share, while criticizing us. The Turks were at one with us in our policy toward Vietnam. But they faced real political difficulties which would work against the larger interests of this visit if they came out publicly too enthusiastically for our policy in Vietnam.
7. Opium was not discussed.
8. Secretaries Rusk and Caglayangil have more to talk about and will meet at breakfast tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-394

Pres file

~~SECRET~~By WJR, NARA, Date 3-12-93 April 4, 1967

Talking Points for Your Final Discussion with President Sunay  
5 p. m. Tuesday

The Turks were very pleased with yesterday's talks and the warm reception last evening. Secretary Rusk had good talk with Foreign Minister Calyngil this morning, and they are breakfasting tomorrow to continue. The following talking points remain from the agenda we gave you yesterday:

1. Bi-laterals. You don't want to get into details of negotiations on the status of forces agreements. You can assure him that our people will negotiate in the true spirit of allies and equals -- you're sure his people will do the same.
2. Implications of East-West thaw. What are his views on the implications of the East-West thaw for the Alliance and for Turkey?
3. U.S. - Turk Relationship. Despite continuing aid, we recognize our relationship will change. We honor Turkey's desire for greater self-sufficiency, but this needn't change the soundness of relations between sovereign partners.
4. On Economic Growth. As you said last night, you are impressed by Turkish progress. How are Turkish plans developing to be free of special aid by 1973?
5. On opium control, we are impressed by their efforts to control opium poppies; your staff is studying their latest proposal. (Nearly 80% of heroin used here comes from Turkey. They've given us a detailed analysis of how they propose to switch to other crops. But their proposal is very ambitious. Secretary Rusk will discuss the details at breakfast tomorrow, but a word to show your personal interest would help.)
6. On other statesmen. What are his impressions of Kosygin, the Shah and President Ayub? (He saw them this past winter and would welcome a chance to report to you.)
7. On rural Turkey and food. What are his views on Turkey's main agricultural problems? (He grew up in a rural area and knows Turkish farming.)
8. The communique is still being actively worked on (2:30 p. m. ), and should be ironed out by the time you meet.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

135  
Tuesday, April 4, 1967  
2:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Bill Jorden triggered the story  
on pp. 40-42, despite Saigon dateline;  
and was sole source of p. 42.

W. W. Rostow

April 10 issue of U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT

# THE BRIGHTER SIDE OF THE VIETNAM WAR

**Latest battle reports sound optimistic. Red casualties are up. Defections, too. Arms losses are higher. Morale is down.**

**War is by no means over. But it's clear that Communists are being badly shaken as U. S. power continues to grow.**

## SAIGON

On almost every side the reports about war in Vietnam tend to be gloomy—with jungle fighting predicted for the next 5, 10 or even 20 years.

That seems to be the tenor of public speeches, of articles written, of first-hand reports from some correspondents.

Is the situation really as discouraging as that?

It turns out on close examination that there is another side—a much brighter side—to the way war is starting to go in Vietnam.

Problems are not brushed aside, but emphasis in these reports is placed on things that are going well. They are put on the record by U. S. officials in the field as a counterbalance to a steady diet of gloom that Americans have been getting at home.

Here are some facts about that other side of the war.

**Red losses: high.** The Communists are losing 1,500 men killed in battle in an average week—six times as high as Allied losses. That figure takes into account only the known Communist dead, bodies actually counted and verified. During the record week ending March 25, the total actually reached 2,774 Communists killed.

At least an equal number of Reds die of wounds or are so seriously wounded they are put out of action for good. On the battlefield the Communists are being badly mauled.

So far this year, almost 10,000 of the enemy have abandoned their cause and come over to the Government side—mostly deserters from guerrilla ranks, but also from regular units and defectors from political ranks. That is double the rate of a year ago.

Even North Vietnamese regulars are deserting in the South, although the numbers are not great. Diseases are taking a heavy toll of these North Vietnamese—malaria, tuberculosis, leprosy and plague.

Big U. S. military sweeps are breaking up Red strongholds. For the first time, the Communists are being routed from headquarters and base camps, returning later to find them destroyed and under continuous bombing.

Thousands of tons of rice have been captured from Red storage areas.

Hundreds of tons of arms and ammunition have also been captured. Last year the haul included 20,000 Red weapons, at least twice as many as were lost to the enemy.

Communist intelligence is getting poorer and poorer. Information collected by the U. S. and its allies is getting better. Almost 200,000 pages of intelligence documents from Red headquarters, plus 140 reels of motion-picture film, have fallen into the hands of U. S. forces in recent weeks.

Then this: From the start, the Communists were convinced that the Americans never could learn enough to be a

match for guerrillas during the hours of darkness, or in bad weather. The guerrilla was at home, fighting in familiar jungles; the Americans were in a strange land.

Americans, however, have learned to fight in the jungles, just as they did in the Pacific in World War II. They have had scientific help—infrared-ray gun-sights that help to find and kill guerrillas in darkness, radar that picks out men in the jungle, other electronic devices.

Communists so far have shown no sign that they recognize that Americans are now able to fight well against guerrillas. They have not shifted tactics.

As a result, an estimated one tenth of the Viet Cong military establishment has been destroyed so far this year, relying on tactics that are not serving the Reds well. Says a U. S. officer:

"The Viet Cong have lost the momentum they once had. They have problems of recruiting, of storing rice supplies and keeping morale up. It may not be decisive at this point, but there has been a marked change."

**Picture on defections.** Vital to the campaign against the Communists is termination of exactly what damage has been inflicted upon the Viet Cong "infrastructure"—the shadow government that maintains a tight grip over village after village in the countryside. One U. S. authority reports:

"There has been no great number of really hard-core Communists coming over to the side of the Government. So far, we have just been peeling off the soft outer skin. The 'weak sisters' come over first. But you have to peel them off before you can get down to the core."

What is heartening is this: In the past three years, 1 million refugees have fled Communist-controlled areas. U. S. officials say that the Reds now control land with 5 million instead of 6 million people in a country with a total population of 16 million.

The Viet Cong, as a result, are finding it harder to support themselves. Each refugee represents the loss of a producer, laborer, potential soldier or taxpayer. It shows up in recruiting.

**Viet Cong prisoners. With losses mounting daily, Reds now use 14 and 15-year-olds in battle.**

—Wide World Photos







**Communist defectors.** Almost 10,000 Viet Cong have switched allegiance so far this year. Some of these youngsters will end up in South Vietnam's Army.

Red guerrilla strength is estimated at 180,000, far short of the Communist goal of 300,000.

U. S. intelligence has pieced together evidence of the Viet Cong's shifting around of key personnel to shore up collapsing cells. Notes one expert: "Hard-core cadres are being moved down to lower echelons to stiffen the backbone of the people. This is due to a shortage of dependable people. Internal rot may have set in far deeper than we suspect."

To satisfy needs farther north, the Reds have been milking the Mekong Delta so thoroughly that hard-core ranks are depleted and youths of 14 and 15 are being pressed into service. Captured documents indicate a weakened Communist organization in the Delta. Reports one specialist on provincial affairs:

"The people are beginning to believe that the Viet Cong are going to lose. Remember that resistance in Europe during World War II didn't really get moving until it became clear that the Allies were going to lick the Germans. That same psychological reaction is taking place in South Vietnam right now."

**What the Reds want.** To help prevent desertions, the Viet Cong would like a dramatic victory over U. S. forces.

American commanders are aware that the chances of a "massacre" increase as U. S. troops penetrate deeper into Red redoubts. Officers maintain that troops are on guard and that help for a beleaguered unit is never very far away.

Documents captured in recent operations show that the Communists are not deluding themselves or their superiors in Hanoi about their combat losses. The documents give figures that are in general agreement with U. S. estimates.

The Communists do, however, wildly exaggerate the casualties inflicted on U. S. and South Vietnamese troops. Hanoi seemingly is being badly misled on that account.

One reason why Communist command-

ers tell the truth about their own losses, explains a U. S. officer, is this: Field commanders in the South must show cause for demanding heavy replacements.

The infiltration rate for troops from North Vietnam is now 5,000 to 7,000 men a month. Bombing of the North, it is agreed here, is having a decided effect on infiltration. This point is made:

"To guarantee that X number of troops reaches the South, Hanoi must muster and send Y number. With transportation hampered by air strikes, troops must walk hundreds more miles. Fatigue and illness take a greater toll. All this is an additional strain on Hanoi."

One senior U. S. officer insists that "we've reached the turnaround point—that is, the Communists no longer are able to infiltrate from the North and recruit in the South enough troops to make up for their monthly losses."

Once in the South, the North Viet-

namese soldier seems farther from home, in some ways, than the American GI is.

"If our intelligence is correct," says one U. S. officer, "then there is a common feeling among these North Vietnamese youngsters that they have been sent south for one reason—to die. It doesn't appeal to them."

U. S. commanders report considerable friction between North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops when fighting side by side. Says an American colonel: "They operate differently, and neither likes to take orders from the other. That's the reading we get from prisoners and from watching how the Communists operate in the field."

The Northern soldier is not easily assimilated into the tightly knit civilian society in the countryside. Northern troops have problems trying to live off the land, finding villagers reluctant to share food with "outsiders."

The situation for the local Viet Cong troops, as well as for the Northerners, becomes more acute as Allied operations destroy more Communist bases and deny the Reds access to their food caches.

"When the Viet Cong have to scavenge for food, they turn people against them," says a political observer. "The farmer may not argue too much about paying part of his crop in taxes, but when he's hit again and again for food and supplies, he takes a different, and dimmer, view of supporting the Communists."

**Not whipped, but weaker.** What it all adds up to, say experts here, is a deterioration of Communist popularity and a resulting weakening of their organization which depends, above all, on the loyalty of people.

The Viet Cong are by no means whipped. That is agreed. But when assessing the trend of war, U. S. officials find little reason to envy the enemy.



**Americans in battle.** GI's quickly learn to cope with guerrillas in jungle and swamp. Reds lose six dead to every Allied soldier killed in action.

## Ho Keeps Saying No

# TWO YEARS, 45 PEACE FEELERS

*Since 1965—in a two-year period—there have been 45 peace offers made to Communists of North Vietnam. All 45 have been rejected—or ignored. Latest offer-rejection has just occurred. Some of the principal offers and responses follow.*

\* \* \*

**Offer:** U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, on March 14, 1967, proposed a "stand-still truce" in Vietnam.

**Response:** Negative. North Vietnam, on March 27, said the proposal made "no distinction between the aggressors and the victim of aggression."

**Offer:** President Johnson, on Feb. 8, 1967, wrote to President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam, suggested "direct talks" between the U. S. and North Vietnam.

**Response:** Ho, on February 15, rejected the offer.

**Offer:** South Vietnam, on Jan. 17, 1967, asked to discuss an extension of the four-day lunar-new-year truce with representatives of North Vietnam.

**Response:** The National Liberation Front, on January 18, said that even if discussions were in order, they should not be held with the North; and Hanoi radio, on January 21, rejected the offer.

**Offer:** U Thant, on Dec. 30, 1966, urged the cessation of bombing in the North, scaling down of military activity and a start on negotiations. The U. S. reaffirmed willingness to stop bombing as soon as there would be a "reciprocal response" from North Vietnam.

**Response:** North Vietnam's envoy in Paris, on Jan. 5, 1967, said his Government "rejects all intervention by the United Nations in the Vietnam affair."

**Offer:** Britain's Foreign Secretary, George Brown, on Dec. 30, 1966, asked for a meeting between the U. S., North Vietnam and South Vietnam to arrange a cessation of hostilities. President Johnson said the U. S. endorsed such a meeting. Pope Paul VI approved the proposal.

**Response:** Hanoi, on Jan. 3, 1967, called Britain's suggestion "deceitful, shopworn clamor."

**Offer:** The seven Allied nations which met at Manila Oct. 24, 1966, offered a six-point peace plan.

**Response:** Hanoi, on October 28, rejected the offer. Peking denounced it as a "swindle."

**Offer:** Three nations—the United Arab Republic, India and Yugoslavia—meeting Oct. 24, 1966, in New Delhi—proposed an end to bombing, a return to the Geneva Agreements, withdrawal of all foreign troops.

**Response:** Hanoi and the Liberation Front remained silent; Peking, on October 27, attacked India and Yugoslavia for trying to "peddle the peace fraud."

**Offer:** Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, speaking at the U. N. on Sept. 22, 1966, offered a bombing halt, withdrawal of troops, and possible admission of the Viet Cong to peace talks.

**Response:** Hanoi rejected the offer on September 24, took Mr. Goldberg to task for not recognizing the NLF as the "sole legal representative" of South Vietnam.

**Offer:** Foreign Ministers of Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, on Aug. 6, 1966, called on Asian nations for a joint appeal for negotiations in Vietnam.

**Response:** Hanoi rejected the offer on August 8, termed it "a cheap farce staged by third-class henchmen of U. S."

**Offer:** The United States, as part of the Christmas truce in 1965, extended a pause in the bombing for 37 days—until Jan. 31, 1966. In that period, the U. S. sent six presidential envoys to 34 capitals, and communications from the President to many other heads of State. North Vietnam was invited to make a gesture to reduce war activity.

**Response:** North Vietnam used the pause to send more troops and supplies south, called bombing suspension "a large-scale deceptive peace campaign."

**Offer:** Pope Paul VI, on Dec. 19, 1965, appealed for a truce in Vietnam during the holiday season and an effort by all parties to move to the conference table.

**Response:** Ho Chi Minh, in a reply sent to the Pope on December 28, said: "The U. S. leaders want war and not peace," reiterated demands for a U. S. pullout.

**Offer:** The United States, in the period May 13-17, 1965, suspended its bombing operations against North Vietnam, sought a response in kind from the enemy.

**Response:** Hanoi radio, on May 18, called the bombing pause "a trick" meant to cover up acts escalating the war.

**Offer:** Great Britain, in April of 1965, sent former Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon-Walker to visit countries interested in exploring a basis for settling the war.

**Response:** Hanoi declined to receive him; Peking announced April 12: "He is not welcome."

**Offer:** President Johnson, on April 7, 1965, said the U. S. was prepared to enter "unconditional discussions" with Governments concerned in the Vietnam problem.

**Response:** Hanoi, on April 19, labeled the President's words a "smokescreen to cover up the U. S. imperialists' military adventures in Vietnam."

**Offer:** Seventeen nonaligned nations, on April 1, 1965, appealed for a peaceful solution in Vietnam through unconditional negotiations. The U. S. endorsed the initiative.

**Response:** North Vietnam rejected the idea on April 19, termed "inappropriate" any approach other than that based on its own preconditions, including the prior withdrawal of all U. S. forces. Peking condemned the plan for its failure to denounce U. S. as an aggressor.

**Offer:** Britain, on Feb. 20, 1965, proposed to Russia that Russia and Britain together seek a basis for settling the Vietnam war. The U. S. supported this approach.

**Response:** The Soviet Union declined. And a spokesman for the NLF said: "The U. S. imperialists have sabotaged the Geneva Agreements. . . . The U. S. imperialists must withdraw all their troops . . . and let the South Vietnamese people settle themselves their own internal affairs."

Pres file

April 4, 1967

from Walt Rostow  
Send LDX/to Department of State for appropriate distribution:

In discussing the present state of the Latin American resolution with the press and others, the following should be made clear: The President thought that the wise policy, even though it was not constitutionally necessary, was to consult with the Congress before he went to the Latin American Summit. He found the House of Representatives responsive, as are many leaders in the Senate who have individually given the President their best judgment on the course to follow at Punta del Este.

Others in the Senate apparently do not wish to participate in such a consultation and render to the President their advice before the conference. That is their privilege. It is not a matter for debate.

The simple question was whether the Senate wished or did not wish to express a view before the conference.

Therefore, we shall proceed about our business in the Executive Branch and in due time make our recommendations.

~~DRAFT~~:BKS:amc

April 4, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a copy of the resolution introduced by the then Representative Fulbright in May of 1943. It is included in a speech which he made in Constitution Hall on May 10, 1943. The pertinent passages are marked.

Representative Fulbright's defense of the resolution on the floor of the House in September 1943 is also attached.

 W. W. Rostow



"to maintain and defend the sovereignty of the United States paramount to any and all allegiance, sovereignty, or fealty I may owe to any State, county, or country whatsoever." The naturalized immigrant swears, in addition, to "renounce and abjure all allegiance to any foreign state or sovereignty."

Every civil and military official, every legislator, every judge is sworn to defend the Constitution of the United States. Every one of these men and women is therefore sworn to oppose the imposition of a supergovernment on the people of the United States.

### What Can Congress Do Now To Help Win the Peace?

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT

OF ARKANSAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 13, 1943

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following address which I gave at a United Nations Today and Tomorrow meeting in Constitution Hall, May 10, 1943:

After that profound exposition by Senator THOMAS, I think all of us will agree that if we are to win the peace, if we are to prevent a repetition of the egregious mistake of 1919-20, Congress must act now.

To do nothing as we did in 1920 will be a decision in favor of international anarchy. All the world is watching us for signs that American willingness to help win a lasting peace will match American determination to win a total victory. All of our experience indicates that it is absolutely necessary that some positive, affirmative action be taken before the fighting is over, if we are to achieve anything of lasting value from this war.

I think that we are also agreed that the only thing of lasting value we can obtain from this war is some assurance of peace in the world of the future. The principal question for us is, therefore, what kind of action, designed to accomplish this purpose, is the Congress most likely to take now.

In view of the historic caution and timidity of our illustrious Senate with regard to foreign affairs, it is important that it be not frightened with an esoteric or complicated proposal. The House of Representatives is presently so grossly overburdened with war-time legislation, in addition to the usual domestic measures, and is so distracted by the struggle for political power in anticipation of 1944, that the members have neither the serenity nor the inclination, carefully, to analyze and to formulate at this time a detailed plan for international cooperation.

As a matter of fact, in the field of foreign relations, the proper function of the legislative power is to express the broad fundamental policy of the nation. The executive power is better equipped to, and properly should, develop the details of all agreements within the outlines of the fundamental policy, as expressed by the representatives of the people.

For these reasons I think it is highly desirable that any proposal submitted to the Congress at this time should be reduced to the simplest possible terms.

Of all the resolutions so far introduced, I believe House Resolution 200 is the least controversial and the most likely to be acceptable to the Congress now. It consists of only five lines, which I should like to read to you:

"Resolved, That the House of Representatives hereby expresses itself as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to prevent future aggression and to maintain lasting peace and as favoring participation by the United States therein."

I submit that this simple statement is a positive disavowal of the isolationist policy and a definite commitment that this Nation desires to cooperate with the other nations of the world in an effort to create an organization designed to prevent aggressive warfare.

It has been said that this resolution is so general, so innocent, that no rational person can oppose it, but that it really doesn't mean anything. If, in truth, it is so innocent that it is acceptable to the Congress, then it meets the primary requirement of getting action now.

With regard to its significance, I believe that it clearly contains the indispensable minimum upon which our foreign policy must be based. Our immediate and primary purpose is to declare to the world that henceforth this Nation intends to bear its share of the responsibility of bringing order into the hitherto chaotic international arena. In short, that we recognize the impossibility, the futility of withdrawing into an illusory shell of isolationism.

The words "appropriate international machinery" provide for all the commonly accepted governmental institutions—executive, legislative, and judicial—which are essential to the control of force and the maintenance of order.

To attempt to specify the exact composition of these institutions, at this time, would be unwise. There is no such thing as a perfect plan in which laws or constitutions are self-executing. Our ultimate reliance for success must be upon the spirit and intelligence of the people who are responsible for the operation of the institutions of law and order and not upon the mechanical perfection of those institutions. To fill in the details at this time would tend to freeze the pattern and to prevent orderly development in accordance with experience. The initial machinery itself should be organized by the Executive, only after prolonged study and discussion with the other nations. Even then it should not be frozen so that orderly evolutionary change and progress is prevented. In a new undertaking such as this will be, and with limited experience to guide us, great flexibility with regard to details is highly desirable.

The words "power adequate to prevent future aggression" not only envisage some kind of world police force, which is so frightening to 32 of our Senators, but it also includes the power to control the productive capacity of instruments of war. As a matter of fact, the control of the existing personnel and weapons of warfare is not sufficient to prevent the development of powerful armaments. If we boggle over the words "police force," we may well be wasting our time on idle words. The essential element is the supervision, not merely of existing force, but of the productive capacity of heavy armaments, of chemical processes, or of any techniques essential to the production of instruments of aggressive war. It is obvious that the supervision of the latter will be a most difficult task and I think it is impossible to specify at this time how it can be accomplished. Yet, I am convinced that, if the same ingenuity is employed in supervision that was used after the last war in the evasion of restrictions, our end can be accomplished. However difficult these problems may be, this resolution contemplates the control of the sources of aggressive force in all its phases.

If, in spite of the innocent appearance of this resolution, it is objected that it is too

and, too far-reaching, this should not be a serious objection. After all, this is not a grant of power to the Executive; it is simply an expression by our people that we intend to participate. If such a resolution is adopted, the Executive can then negotiate as to the details of the machinery with the assurance that the people are willing to support any reasonable system of collective security. But, as the various components of the system are agreed upon by the different governments, they still must be approved by legislation in the nature of treaties or by joint resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives. If our Executive is unable to develop an organization satisfactory to our legislative body, no damage will have been done and we will have acquired experience of great value in case we have a third opportunity to create a sensible world.

I think that the words "to prevent future aggression and to maintain lasting peace" are restrictive in their meaning. They should be interpreted as a limitation on the purposes of the international machinery, to the control of aggressive force. It is true that dividing lines involving functions and jurisdiction are among the most difficult governmental questions and it is virtually impossible to anticipate and prejudice all the problems that may arise. In any case I do not think that this resolution can fairly be said to contemplate, without further authorization from the Congress, any infringement upon this Nation's independence or sovereignty (whatever that may be) except insofar as it relates to the control of armed force by the cooperative international organization.

The real significance of the action which we want from the Congress now is the assurance that this country desires to make a genuine and honest effort in cooperation with other nations, to put an end to aggressive warfare. This assurance is absolutely essential before our executive can negotiate effectively with other nations. This is not a final acceptance now of any kind of agreements that may be evolved. Even if nothing acceptable results from these negotiations, nevertheless we will have the satisfaction of having tried and cannot in any respect be any worse off than we will be if we do nothing. As Mme. Chiang Kai-shek so wisely said to our Congress: "It is the better part of wisdom not to accept failure ignominiously, but to risk it gloriously."

My principal objection to most of the resolutions so far introduced is not so much to their substance as to their form. Personally, I approve of the objectives of most of them, but I doubt that they can be passed presently or in the immediate future. It is a well-known fact that much of the opposition to any type of legislation centers around details, often trivial, which are offensive to any one of the 531 Senators and Congressmen. With so many diverse interests and characters represented in the Congress, anything short of the Lord's Prayer will arouse some opposition.

The decisive consideration in favor of the simple, but positive resolution, is that it is more likely than any other to be adopted now, without undue delay and controversy. Every word and comma in any measure before the Congress presents a point of attack to the opposition. Therefore, the fewer the words the less vulnerable the bill. I believe that House Resolution 200 will definitely reassure the world that our future course is toward genuine cooperation. If we get less than this, we get nothing. If we ask for more specific provisions, we run the risk of complete failure in obtaining any action because of haggling and misunderstandings over insignificant details.

Let us not forget that it was just such haggling and misunderstandings by the Senate in 1920, over reservations and restrictions, many of them of little importance, that led to our renunciation of any responsibility for world order, and in a very real sense prepared the way for the savage total war of today.



...adopted, the Executive can negotiate to details with assurance that the people are willing to support any reasonable system of collective security. But, as the various components of the system are agreed upon by the different governments, they still must be approved by legislation in the nature of treaties or by joint resolution of the Senate and the House of Representatives. This is not a final acceptance now of any kind of agreements that may be evolved. Even if nothing acceptable results from these negotiations, nevertheless we will have the satisfaction of having tried and cannot in any respect be any worse off than we will be if we do nothing.

This resolution tells the world that the United States recognizes that any organization for peace must be based upon power adequate to enforce peace, and that the United States will share both in supplying that power and in the responsibility for the exercise of that power. One may say that this is a commitment that this Nation undertakes to participate with the other nations of the world in a genuine and bona fide effort to find some reasonable means to solve the international disputes by methods other than by war.

Much has been said about a provision for the use of force. The words "power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace" not only envisage the use of some kind of force, but may also include the power, if necessary, to control the productive capacity of instruments of aggressive warfare. The traditional police force which disturbs so many people may not be nearly so important in the long run as control of strategic materials and productive capacity.

The question of relief and rehabilitation or as some call it an international W. P. A. has little to do with the formulation of a foreign policy or the creation of machinery to keep the peace. It may be that relief in the form of food or other goods has a place in military operations in occupied countries or in the settlement of this particular war. But this war is but a tragic and horrible episode which one of these days must end.

A proper foreign policy, together with the machinery to keep the peace, is continuing in its nature; it does not consist of sporadic instances of emotional altruism or niggardly selfishness. To be successful it will require the assiduous daily attention of the best brains of our country. It is brains and leadership that we must supply, and not merely gifts of bread, and milk, and money, and oil. It is not contemplated that we, the people of the United States, are to give our goods to others, that we are to raise the standards of living of the peoples of the world, or even to give them all a free and democratic government. If we can contribute leadership and our fair share of the force found necessary to make an international system of control effective, that is all the world can or should expect. As a matter of fact, if these total wars can be prevented for a reasonable length of time, most of the peoples of the world probably can work out their own economic and political salvation. I assume, of course, that our influence will always

be on the side of free and democratic processes.

Participation by this Nation in a system designed to prevent war is inspired and justified primarily by the desire to preserve that integrity and freedom of the individual which is the great distinction of our Nation, and the hope of the world. It is, of course, true that in saving our own freedom we will inevitably benefit other peoples of the world. But surely we will not refuse to save ourselves simply because in doing so we may help save others.

Perhaps the most significant thing about this resolution is the fact that it originated in this House of Representatives and is a nonpartisan measure. Both are important. Our foreign policy must be consistent over the years. It must not be a partisan affair, shifting with every election. Further, since the House of Representatives is at all times more nearly reflective of the will of the people than any other body, it should play an important part in the formulation of fundamental policy. Only with congressional sanction can the other nations of the world rely with assurance upon the commitments of our Executive. The adoption of this resolution by the House and the Senate will create a precedent for the further participation by the House of Representatives in the matter of foreign policy and will give that policy stability and force. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the participation of this House in the formulation of basic policy. If we show some intelligence and courage in expressing positively our views on these matters, I am confident they will not be ignored by our own Government or by the governments throughout the world.

Before I close, I should like to read to you part of a letter as an example of many that I have received during the past few months. It is a V-letter of September 6 from Staff Sgt. James Winfield Qualls, 86 Bomb Group D, Sicily:

DEAR CONGRESSMAN FULBRIGHT: After reading Life's full-page editorial on your foreign-policy resolution—it was June issue, I believe—magazines are that late over here, I had to write you my extreme gratification and convey my very best wishes of your inspiring effort.

I think all America realizes that you have taken the all-important first step that must be taken if our country is to live in a future world where peace and freedom can dwell secure. What could be a more fitting way to take this first step (the Chinese proverb says "A journey of a thousand miles begins with a first step") than your simple, cogent one-sentence resolution? By such an official congressional commitment in the midst of global war—especially if both Houses concur by a two-thirds vote at least—the world atmosphere is cleared as it has not been since 1918. If it is America's official, nonpartisan intention to join in post-war international collaboration to preserve peace, then nearly all doubt is swept away about the future.

I can think of nothing that would do more to strengthen the determination of our allies and insure the fruits of our victory than a positive declaration by the United States and by all the United Nations that this time we intend to work

together, in peace as well as in war, to destroy the ruthless and savage forces of aggression.

The people of this country—particularly those at the front fighting the savage Jap and German—want to do something to stop recurrent wars. We Members of the House have an obligation to do everything in our power to see that the children of today's heroes do not have it all to do over again in 20 years.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, much has been said and written about the significance of this resolution. There are those who say it is too strong, that it goes too far; on the other hand, there are those who say it is innocuous and meaningless, that it is too weak. The one thing I gather from this discussion is that it must actually be about halfway between, and therefore about right.

I believe that many have become unduly suspicious of this plain and simple statement of basic principle.

I have no illusions that this resolution is the panacea for all our afflictions. It expresses what I believe the people of this country desire as the fundamental principle for our conduct toward the other nations of the world. It is simply the first small step in the process of building a policy which I hope may have better results than that which we have followed in the past. We now have, throughout the world, ample evidence of the inevitable consequences of that policy. Surely it is worth while to try a new approach to the problem of total war, even though no one can guarantee the success of our efforts. After this first step is taken, it is obvious that many more steps must be taken before an adequate policy can be achieved.

As the editor of the Washington Star said in yesterday's paper:

What we need now is a simple expression of our determination that, having won a global war, we shall live up to our responsibilities of maintaining global peace. This resolution will not settle the future of the world. But if the House gives it united support tomorrow, the representatives of the people will have outlined the pattern of the policy we are to pursue in international collaboration after the war. What most Americans want to see is some agreement among their representatives on where we are going after this war is won. Nonpartisan endorsement of this resolution by a solid House will tell them and tell them what they want to know.

This resolution is not a grant of power to the Executive; it is simply an expression by our people, through their representatives, that we intend to participate sincerely in an effort to bring order into the world. If this resolution



*Per file*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - April 4, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: New Initiatives That You Can Present at the Summit

There follows a description of initiatives you can announce at the Summit. They represent solid, practical proposals in keeping with our Summit approach of helping the Latin Americans help themselves. None are spectacular or dramatic, but they have meaning for the Latin Americans and -- in keeping with our junior partner role -- will not upstage the importance of their decisions.

INTEGRATIONSatellite Communications

The launching of the "Canary Bird" satellite last week brings Latin America within the range of satellite communications. But it cannot avail itself of the facility for lack of ground stations.

At the Summit you could stress the critical importance of better telecommunications as part of the integration process and announce that through the Ex-Im Bank -- World Bank, or Inter-American Bank, if they prefer -- we will be prepared to consider and support loan applications for ground stations where traffic potential is sufficient to make satellite communication an economic proposition. Eight countries now fall into this category: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela.

This announcement represents an important shift in policy for us. Heretofore, we have not been willing to finance government-owned stations because of ITT opposition. We have only recently overcome this opposition.

Financial Implications:

Each ground station costs about \$5 million. Financing will be through loans on commercial rather than concessional terms.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Authority 269 84-242  
By af/np, NARA, Date 4-29-91

Closing of Darien Gap:

We are still hopeful that Colombia will join Panama and us in a Summit announcement that the three governments will work together in completing the engineering and economic studies of the Atrato route as a multinational project, preliminary to construction of the road. (The Atrato route is the shorter, Caribbean route; the Choco or Pacific route is long, expensive and out of the question for us.)

The question of which route the Pan American Highway is to follow in Colombia is wrapped up in domestic politics. Because of this, President Lleras has not yet given us a clear-cut answer.

Financial Implications:

About \$50,000 for the studies. AID has funds available.

EDUCATION, SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY

Educational TV:

You can announce a major US initiative in educational television for Latin America, indicating our willingness to provide technical and financial assistance for:

- establishment of an Inter-American Training Center for Educational Broadcasting;
- organization of a pilot educational demonstration project in Central America;
- construction of ETV facilities in countries interested in this type of educational initiative.

Financial Implications:

The first two proposals would cost around \$5 million for the first year and not in excess of \$20 million for the following four years. AID can probably fund this and is checking. Financing of the third proposal will have to be worked out with the governments concerned and would be largely handled by concessional lending.



Latin American Studies:

HEW is now helping 16 American colleges and universities expand their language training in Spanish and Portuguese and some Indian dialects. It is also helping train teachers in Latin American studies; giving fellowships for advanced graduate study in Latin America; and providing consultants to individual school systems, State education departments and universities in language and Latin American area studies.

Commissioner How proposes that you announce at the Summit that you have directed him to increase Latin American language and area studies in our schools as a contribution to better understanding and cooperation with Latin America.

Financial Implications:

Commissioner Howe states that he can usefully expend \$5 million on the increased program. This would involve seeking an increase of \$5 million in Title IV of the National Defense Education Act, raising the authorized expenditure ceiling from \$18 to \$23 million.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

Inter-American Foundation of Science and Technology:

This is an idea which Dr. Hernig came up with yesterday. The Foundation is designed to coordinate various activities already covered in the draft Summit communique negotiated at Montevideo.

The proposal makes sense, but I do not know how it would fit in with decisions already taken to give the Inter-American Council for Education, Science and Culture similar responsibilities. We are checking this.

TRADE

More than anything our Latino friends want us to give them preferential treatment in our market. This is not in the cards, but you can announce these items in the trade field:

Untying of Aid:

This constitutes a major concession toward Latin America even though it is only a limited modification of tying arrangements in our loan policy. We would permit hemisphere-wide procurement with respect to the money we loan them for capital projects, (not program or local cost).

When this proposal was first presented to you, it was conditioned on the Latinos first taking major steps toward integration. We thought then that these steps would be taken during 1968. At the Buenos Aires and Montevideo meetings the Latin Americans set the "major steps" to begin in 1970. If we were to maintain the condition, the untying offer would not become operative for another three years. The long delay between offer and implementation would rob the proposal of any impact and make it counter-productive.

I recommend that the condition be dropped.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me? \_\_\_\_\_

Loan to International Coffee Diversification and Development Fund (ICDD):

You have already approved Secretary Rusk's proposal for a Summit announcement that we would:

- (1) make a one-shot loan of \$15 million to the ICDD Fund on the condition that the coffee-producing countries agree to contribute \$30-\$50 million per year over the next five years; and
- (2) lend up to \$15 million more to match contributions by other coffee-consuming members of the International Coffee Agreement.



Financial Implications:

Most of the financing will come from Alliance for Progress funds previously approved. Other existing programs will take care of the remainder.

World-Wide Preferences:

Tony Solomon and Francis Bator are preparing a statement on what you might say about our efforts to obtain agreement from the developing countries toward further tariff cuts on a world-wide basis.

This will fall short of what the Latinos want, but should relieve the pressure for regional preferences.

OTHERIncreased Food for Freedom in Latin America:

At your request, AID has developed a program for:

- tripling the present number of pre-school children receiving high protein food assistance over the next five years (from 2 million annually to 5 - 7 million);
- doubling the number of children fed under school lunch programs over the next five years (from 9 million annually to 18 million).

Financial Implications:

These programs would call for about \$50 million increase in PL 480 allotments for Latin America. AID can supply about \$10 million in equipment. I recommend your approval of the increases.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

Food from the Sea :

You might make two announcements in this field:

- (1) our readiness to join in a new multinational program of marine science and technology in Latin America, beginning with a hemisphere-wide symposium in 1968 to establish jointly areas of future cooperation;
- (2) our intention to locate in Latin America (country to be selected later) one of three fish protein concentrates demonstration centers we plan to establish in under-developed areas.

Financial Implications:

The symposium would be under OAS auspices. The resulting programs of collaborative research, fellowships, technical assistance, etc. could make our share of the cost run as high as \$10 million by 1970, but this would depend upon Latin American response.

The cost of the fish protein concentrates demonstration program involves expenditures of almost \$6 million over the next 3 years. AID already has the funds available.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Tuesday, April 4, 1967  
12:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Marvin Watson

SUBJECT: L. L. Colbert

I explained to Mr. Colbert how hard pressed you were, and suggested that I was available to receive his message. He said that he had promised Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Secretary of Defense that he would deliver the message only to the President. He did not feel free to deliver it to anyone else under the circumstances.

He emphasized that the message was "interesting"; "maybe important"; and that he would go anywhere, anytime, to deliver the message to the President.

He said that he would be spending some three weeks in Texas shortly.

I told him that I understood his position; and gently suggested that in the White House family we often have to receive communications for the President; but that I would pass the word upward, making no promises.

W. W. R.

*Pres file*

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Tuesday, April 4, 1967  
12:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the Vice President  
reports his conversation with Wilson --  
hopefully discouraging him from a  
"disassociation" move, page 3.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

London 8004

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ag, NARA, Date 4-30-91

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

1402

Tuesday, April 4, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT (London, 8004)

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Wilson, Chequers, Sunday,  
April 2, 1967

On arrival in London, Sunday evening, I went directly to Chequers for dinner and overnight. After dinner, there was a lengthy conversation in the study. Present on the British side, besides Prime Minister and Mrs. Wilson, were the Lord Chancellor, Lord Gardiner; Mr. Harold Davies, Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister; and Michael Palliser, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister. On the American side, besides Mrs. Humphrey and myself, were Ambassador and Mrs. Bruce, Mr. and Mrs. Dwayne Andreas, and Ted Van Dyk of my staff.

Before dinner, Prime Minister asked me what reactions I had met on the Continent to U.K. initiatives towards the Common Market. I told him that, in the Netherlands, Foreign Minister Luns favored an immediate British initiative without delay, with full acceptance of the Rome Treaty. In Germany, Willy Brandt had made clear German support for U.K. entry, but suggested that, after a declaration of intent now, he favored a series of bilateral contacts until sometime in the fall. In Italy, Moro, Saragat and Nenni had all indicated strong support for U.K. entry and for a united Europe.

Wilson indicated that he was now in the process of consideration of Britain's tactics towards EEC membership.

After dinner, we gathered in the study. After brief preliminaries, Wilson brought up Vietnam and asked for our assessment of the present situation there. I reviewed for him the Guam Conference; the new American diplomatic team; the social, political, and economic programs underway there, and gave him a brief review once more of our peace efforts.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-184

By iss, NARA Date 4-28-79

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Wilson reviewed for me in detail his meeting with Kosygin. He said Kosygin gave him an overwhelming impression of concern over Communist China. Contrary to most other reports, Kosygin believed that Red China wanted to intervene in North Vietnam -- in fact, he talked in terms of some three million Chinese troops. However, the leaders of North Vietnam were struggling to prevent this intervention. He said that Kosygin "spilled all the beans" concerning his fears about China, that it was an obsession. Wilson said Kosygin stated any company selling equipment to China would never get another Soviet order. He criticized U.K. computer and Italian scientific equipment sales to China. When Wilson said these sales were for peaceful purposes, Kosygin said they would be used for military purposes. Kosygin said the U.S. did not take the Chinese threat seriously enough. Wilson feared that we had not continued the last bombing pause for a long enough period of time, that many people in the U.K. believed the decision-making process in Hanoi could not move that quickly.

Harold Davies, who knows Ho Chi Minh well and who had been to North Vietnam and met with several of the leaders there, said that North Vietnam leadership was far less monolithic than we might believe. There were a number of factions. The men in Hanoi were experienced, cultured diplomats -- "real French-trained Elysee men." They were not singled minded, Neanderthal people who acted without reason. Yet, as one prominent physician had told him, they have been fighting for years and were prepared to continue to fight through their lifetimes and those of their children. The North Vietnamese were resolute.

Davies felt that any attempt toward negotiation should be given ample time for development. It was necessary not only for the people in North Vietnam to discuss such a matter fully, among themselves, but it was necessary to consult the NLF representatives all the way down to the lowest cadres. This could not be done overnight.

The discussion then centered on how little was really known about the inside politics in Hanoi and about where and how decisions were really made in Hanoi.

Wilson said Kosygin had encouraged him to do everything he could to work for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. Kosygin told Wilson not to jeopardize his (Wilson's) relationship with Washington.

He had no doubt that Kosygin wanted a negotiated settlement. However, just as we did not understand decision-making processes in North Vietnam, the Soviets did not understand decision-making processes and forces at work in the U. S. Kosygin still saw the possibility of "American workers and peasants" rising up in protest against the war. Wilson explained to Kosygin that President Johnson did have strong support for his Vietnam policies. The opposition was vocal and a minority.

In closing, Wilson indicated that he thought the key to peace lay through the Soviet Union and the key to the Soviet Union lay with Britain. He felt that he had a real opportunity to act as middleman between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. to reach a negotiated settlement. In fact, he had been considering the possibility of moving more toward the middle, between the two nations, on Vietnamese policy. If he did this, he wanted us to understand that he was doing so in the interests of peace and not because of any lack of friendship or loyalty to the U. S.

I replied that such a shift by Wilson would be misunderstood in the U. S. and that, in fact, it might result in increased pressure from "hawks" for unilateral and strong U. S. action to crush North Vietnam. It would be unfortunate if Americans believed Britain was moving away from the U. S. on this issue. The President appreciated Wilson's support and recognized the domestic political pressures upon him. I told Wilson he should thus consider very carefully any change in the U. K. position. I told him he would jeopardize his relationship with the President if he followed any such course. (I repeated this again to him today, urging that he keep in close contact with the President, being mindful of the close relationship between our countries and of the friendship of the President. I believe I made my point.)

There followed a long discussion about British public opinion and Vietnam. The Lord Chancellor, summing up, said that he believed most Britishers were simply appalled by the bloodshed and destruction and did not necessarily recognize the complicated issues involved. They saw the war as being dangerous to them if it expanded. Beyond that, most of the news carried by the media showed only American shooting and killing. It seemed to most people that we were a big country applying a great amount of force against a small country. Also, the Ky government was highly unpopular in Britain and that was harmful to public opinion. Our story has obviously not been effectively told in Europe. TV in particular has been damaging to our image.



I reviewed in detail the progress made under the Ky government and our assessment of that government, as well as the present development toward democratic institutions there.

I closed by suggesting that Wilson and others would do well to apply moral pressure on Hanoi as moral pressure was being applied against the U. S. He indicated that this would be useful and he would see what he could do in discussions with European leaders.

I shall be meeting with him, as well as other members of the British government during the next two days, and will send in a detailed report of my London visit late Tuesday or early Wednesday.

Memoranda of conversation, individual meetings, follow.

April 4, 1967

~~SECRET~~

Meeting with the President  
5:45 p.m. April 4

Agenda

1. Viet Nam Peace Initiatives. (Sect. Rusk)

- via Holt and Sihanouk?
- via Moscow?
- via Saigon?
- others?

2. Call for Cease-Fire on Buddha's Birthday, May 23. (Sect. Rusk)

Shall we clear attached cable (at Tab A)?

3. Trilateral Schedule. (Sects. Rusk and McNamara)

Report on present situation.

4. ABM's. (Sects. Rusk and McNamara)

Is there any initiative we can take to prod a Soviet response?

(Attached at Tab B is a second telegram indicating that Soviet scientists think the Soviet military are the blocking element. In these circumstances a talk between Sect. McNamara and Ambassador Dobrynin makes sense. We may wish to consider at some appropriate stage another letter from the President to Kosygin.)

5. Guidance on Our Position, Including Speech for the President at the Latin American Summit in the Light of the Congressional Position. (The President)

6. Planning Forward

New technology and the future of troop deployments and base structures: a planning project. (Sect. McNamara)

7. Other

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By h8, NARA, Date 5-1-91

W. W. R.

*Pres file*

Monday, April 3, 1967 -- 10:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

I just talked to Gene who called from Paris.

Gene tells me that he assembled his delegation for the Indian Consortium and told them that -- starting with himself -- they would all be hung by their thumbs on return if they didn't find \$190 million to match our India food contribution.

He's tolerably optimistic, since your approval of the India Consortium instructions.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Monday, April 3, 1967  
10:45 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is a summary of an alleged Soviet briefing of Eastern European Communist officials.

The CIA believes it to be accurately reported. It has reservations, however, as to whether the Soviets were telling their bloc associates what they really believe themselves or what they want the Poles, Czechs, etc., to believe.

Nevertheless, the marked passage on page 2 is the most authoritative vindication that we have that our bombing in the North is having a significant effect.

I am puzzled about the Soviets explicitly telling the Eastern Europeans that they might make common cause with Strauss. That sounds to me more like an Eastern European fear of Soviet policy than what a man from Moscow might tell Eastern Europeans. Despite these reservations, I thought you would wish to read the whole report.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-393  
By 118, NARA, Date 6-1-93

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

~~Monday, April 2, 1967~~

Text of CIA Report on Soviet Officials' Views on the Vietnam War and  
the USSR's Aims in Europe

The following information on the Vietnam war and Soviet  
aims in Europe was received from a Soviet Bloc official who attended  
briefings conducted by [REDACTED]

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(S)

The Soviet government believes it is not possible for either  
the National Liberation Front or the USA to win the war in Vietnam,  
although it considers that in the long run the USA has a better chance to  
defeat the NLF than vice versa. The Kremlin considers that the  
North Vietnamese population will find it increasingly difficult to  
continue to wage war due to the increasing gravity of the food supply  
shortage leading to deterioration of health and physical stamina of the  
combat troops and the increasing problems in coping with modern  
weapons of war. In this context, the Soviets cited difficulties the North  
Vietnamese pilots were having in capably handling MIG fighters. The  
NLF and the North Vietnamese government are counting heavily on  
general public apathy and increasing war weariness in the USA plus  
desertions from the South Vietnamese Army to force the American  
government to come to the conference table on North Vietnamese terms.

Concerning Soviet surface-to-air missiles shipped to  
North Vietnam, the Russian officers stated these weapons were  
extensively tested in the USSR and found to have a 1 to 1.05 percent  
strike accuracy. According to them, this ratio in North Vietnam has  
decreased to one to four which is attributable to the lack of North  
Vietnamese sophistication in handling advanced weapons.

After considerable effort the Soviets have recently  
persuaded North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh he cannot rely on  
the Chinese Communist-advocated strategy of "one man equals one  
rifle" but should rather depend on modern weapons technology.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: NOV 1998

~~SECRET~~



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-2-

The Chinese Communists are alleged currently to have 300,000 (Headquarters comment: possibly 30,000 was meant; being checked) men in North Vietnam largely involved in repairs of bombed-out road, rail and bridge facilities. According to the Soviets, the Chinese Communists are planning to increase this number dependent upon escalation of the war by the USA. This increase, however, is dependent upon a commitment by the North Vietnamese combat troops amounting to ten percent of the increase in the Chinese Communists working in North Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese government is increasingly concerned about American action to interdict the Ho Chi Minh trail. This action is cited as the main reason for increasing the infiltration of North Vietnamese troops to the South through the Demilitarized Zone. The Hanoi government considers among its main vulnerabilities the bombing of the Hanoi Power Plants and water works. It is feared the destruction of these two targets would result in the loss of vital electric power and possible widespread epidemics due to contaminated water supplies. For this reason, these two targets are surrounded by the heaviest concentration of SAMs in North Vietnam.

POL products are in increasingly short supply. A plan is now in effect to decentralize the storage of these supplies in small plastic reservoirs manufactured in Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet analysis holds that the USA considers the USSR still to be its main adversary rather than the Communist Chinese and that despite American efforts to convince the Soviets that the USA wants to maintain the status quo vis-a-vis the USSR and to come to some modus vivendi with it, the major American aim is still to destroy international Communism.

One of the major aims of Soviet policy is to dislodge the American military presence and influence in Europe. To this end the Soviets are seeking increased contact at various levels in West Germany and are willing to consider discreet support of and cooperation with West German Finance Minister Franz-Josef Strauss, despite his avowed Nationalist convictions, if in return he is willing to lend his support to this goal. Soviet fears of a revival of German Nationalism are outweighed by the desire to isolate America from Europe. To this end consideration is also being given to inviting West German

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

Chancellor Kiesinger to the USSR at some time in the more distant future. (Headquarters comment: It is not clear that this Soviet sentiment has taken the form of concrete planning, or that it represents a realistic assessment of political possibilities. Strauss may have been identified by the Soviets, as he is elsewhere, as one of the most prominent potential dissenters in the Kiesinger Cabinet, but there is no indication either that he has been approached, or that his response would be encouraging to the Soviets.)

~~SECRET~~

+ copy  
2. Pres file

April 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Telemetric Data Receiving Set for Turkey

We have arranged for you to give President Sunay a receiving set that will enable Turkey to hook up with our Tiros weather satellite system. Since this is a substantial gift (\$40,000), you may want to handle it apart from the personal gifts and call special attention to it.

The attached book contains a picture and short explanation of the equipment and the Weather Satellite System along with several pictures taken of the Turkish area.

Suggested talking points to use in presenting it:

--You are pleased to present to him this Telemetric Data Receiving Set. It will enable Turkey to receive data from our Tiros weather satellite system.

--This book describes the equipment and explains how the weather satellite system works. It also contains a number of pictures taken of the Middle East from our weather satellites.

--Our Air Force Weather Service will be in touch with the Turkish Meteorological Service to arrange details for delivering the equipment and helping to install it.

--You take special pleasure in making this presentation because of your personal role in our space program.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 3, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Wheat and Oil Agreement for Pakistan

Here is the wheat agreement Gene Locke probably mentioned to you. He is paying his farewell calls on Pakistan's senior economic ministers early tomorrow morning and would like to give them an answer then. This would necessitate getting a cable out to him early this evening. If that's cutting it too close, we can get it to him easily--if you approve--for his final call on Ayub Friday.

Charlie Schultze's memo (attached) lays out the figures. In a nutshell, Pakistan has asked us for an added 250,000 tons of wheat now to help break a rapid rise in prices stemming from drought shortages. Freeman and Hall propose 200,000--half to be charged against any FY 1968 US allocation for Pakistan.

I recommend approval. Pakistan has done a sound job in agriculture. Approving this program now would help Ayub with a tough economic-political problem. Even doing this wouldn't take us beyond average past levels (1.5 million tons) for this year.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-394

By WJG, NARA, Date 3-12-93~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7:55pm - Mary Slater  
telephoned to Mary  
Pres. said approved  
for either 200,000 or 250,000,  
I'd give 250,000.  
LN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1456

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

APR 3 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed P. L. 480 Agreement with Pakistan

In the attached memo, Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your authority to negotiate a P. L. 480 sales agreement with Pakistan to provide 200,000 tons of wheat and 50,000 tons of vegetable oil valued at \$26 million. The uses of the currency proceeds of this sale would be the same as those in the recent agreement with India.

Pakistan's Need

Pakistan's wheat production for the current year is down by about 700,000 tons from the recent average, as a result of the same drought which has reduced the Indian crop. However, this agreement would bring our total P. L. 480 assistance this year to only the same amount we have averaged in the past--1.5 million tons. Pakistan is meeting the rest of her wheat deficit through commercial purchases, including 100,000 tons from the U. S. Pressures on her scarce food supplies have boosted Pakistan's wheat prices to an all-time high.

This agreement would bring to 100,000 tons the amount of vegetable oil provided through P. L. 480 this fiscal year. This is approximately half of her total consumption and is about the same as we have provided in the past.

Self-help

Probably the best indicator of Pakistan's recent self-help performance in providing needed agricultural inputs and expanding the land devoted to wheat production is the fact that her 1967-68 crop, which will be harvested in the next few months, is expected to be 10%, or almost 400,000 tons, bigger than the last crop, in spite of the fact that winter rainfall was even less. The proposed agreement will be quite specific regarding requests for additional self-help measures, outlined in detail in the Freeman/Gaud memo. These include:

- . further steps to encourage foreign private investment,
- . improved seed, and increased agricultural credit,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLI 91-354  
By sig, NARA, Date 3-12-93



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

- improved marketing and distribution systems and agricultural research, education and extension, and
- continued emphasis on family planning.

Recommendation

I recommend that you authorize negotiation of the proposed agreement.

*Charles L. Schultze*

Charles L. Schultze  
Director

Attachment

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

145-6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAR 30 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Public Law 480 Wheat and Vegetable Oil for Pakistan -  
Fiscal Year 1967

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with Pakistan a Title I, Public Law 480 sale of 200,000 tons of wheat and 50,000 tons of vegetable oil. Currency allocations would be for U.S. uses 8 percent, loans for private enterprise 5 percent, grants for welfare and family planning 10 percent, loans for economic development 65 percent, and grants for economic development 12 percent. The total of currency to be converted under section 104(b)(1) market development and 104(b)(2) educational and cultural exchange activities of the Act and the amount of Pakistani rupees allocated for sale for dollars to United States citizens and non-profit organizations under section 104(j) will equal 5 percent of the \$26.0 million estimated total market value of this agreement.

Pakistan's Foodgrain Situation

Pakistan has been making good progress toward increasing agricultural output. In contrast with an average annual growth of 1.3 percent in the preceding decade, agricultural output increased to 3.5 percent in the period 1960-1965; however, as a result of the same drought which adversely affected Indian foodgrain production, Pakistan wheat production for 1966-1967 dropped substantially creating a total wheat deficit of 2.2 million tons for the year. To help meet this deficit the United States supplied approximately 1.3 million tons of grain (850,000 tons of wheat and 450,000 tons of coarse grains) under P.L. 480. Most of the remaining deficit was met by the Pakistani through commercial wheat purchases under which the United States supplied 100,000 tons.

With a second drought following last year's drought and the prospect of a poor 1967/68 wheat crop, the Government of Pakistan has requested an additional 250,000 tons of wheat for the remainder of FY 1967 to rebuild depleted stocks and help alleviate rising prices. To help meet this request 200,000 tons of wheat could be programed at this time, 100,000 tons of which would be the remainder of the amount allocated for Pakistan from the 1966/67 U.S. wheat supply. The balance would be counted against any wheat to be allocated for Pakistan from 1967/68 U.S. wheat supplies.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-395

By 28 NARA. Date 3-2-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

#### Pakistan's Vegetable Oil Situation

Pakistan's P.L. 480 vegetable oil import requirement for FY 1967 is estimated to be 100,000 tons. A total of 50,000 tons has already been supplied under earlier P.L. 480 programs.

United States P.L. 480 shipments of vegetable oil have constituted approximately 50 percent of the total per capita consumption of the country and provide the major supply source for the West Pakistan vanaspati (cooking fat) industry.

With the help of P.L. 480 imports the industry which is privately owned has increased its rated capacity from over 36,000 tons in 1961 to about 150,000 tons in 1965.

In cooperation with U.S. private enterprise, Pakistan has in recent years completed the installation of two major bulk oil terminals.

#### Self-help

The proposed sales agreement will state the following self-help measures which the Government of Pakistan will be requested to undertake:

1. Give top priority to agricultural development and to fulfilling the goals of the Third Plan.
2. Attract more foreign private capital and technical and management knowhow in the production and distribution of agricultural inputs. The GOP will issue a statement indicating its attitude towards foreign investment in the agri-business sector. To be most helpful the statement should detail the specific measures already taken and those contemplated to encourage investment. The GOP will seek to speedup negotiations and the pace of plant construction. Particular emphasis should continue to be given to fertilizer, but other agricultural chemicals such as insecticides and fungicides should also be stressed.
3. Continue to give high priority to improved seed, insuring that the combined public and private effort will be sufficient to reach the established targets for food self-sufficiency. In addition, a new seed law--setting up standards for cleanliness, germination, and labeling--should be established.
4. Increase the allocation for credit. It is understood that a substantial increase in agricultural credit is needed to serve the private sector for purchases of modern agricultural inputs

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3

during the Third Plan. The proposed Third Plan allocation of Rs. 83 million for credit agencies appears to be inadequate. Serious consideration should be given to increasing this amount substantially.

5. Maintain price levels for wheat and rice which will encourage production. The government should set the purchase price for wheat and rice at levels which, consistent with the requirements of economic stability, will serve as an effective incentive for production.
6. Give increased attention to improving marketing and distribution systems, with greater emphasis placed on market information, and grades and standards.
7. Improve the quality of agricultural research, education, and extension. This may involve additional increases in budgetary allocations--beyond those outlined in the Third Plan--in improved salaries and facilities. Particular attention should be given to improved research, especially that which will lead to increased yields (such as work on new seed varieties).
8. Continue to give priority to family planning.
9. Within three months after the signing of this statement, the GOP will provide a report informing the U.S. Government of its progress in meeting the above.

March 30 1967

  
Acting Administrator  
Agency for International Development

  
Secretary  
Department of Agriculture

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

146

~~1. Pres~~  
2. Pres file

April 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Japanese Satellite Launching

The Japanese plan to launch their first earth-orbiting satellite on April 6. Previous attempts (on December 20 and September 24) were not successful.

If the attempt is a success, it would be appropriate to send a ~~message~~ message of congratulations to Prime Minister Sato. A suggested text of the message is attached. It will be sent only if the Japanese launching succeeds.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

*= on contingency basis*

Message approved ☒ \_\_\_\_\_

Message disapproved ☐ \_\_\_\_\_



146a

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

On behalf of the American people, I wish to extend our warmest congratulations on the successful launching of the first Japanese earth satellite. Japan's continued achievements are of great significance in the peaceful applications of science for the benefit of mankind. I look forward to future important contributions by your country in the exploration of outer space.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

4/3/67

147  
cy sent  
to Speaker  
McConnell

Having followed closely the development of plans for the Hemispheric Summit conference, and having had two members of the House along with Secretary Rusk at the February meeting of Foreign Ministers, we voted overwhelmingly in support of the President's approach to the Summit Conference as ~~represented~~ presented in his message of March 13 to both Houses. We remain convinced that the President's approach is right and stand by the need of the Congress to state positively its willingness to support additional measures of assistance in the Hemisphere if and when the Latin Americans themselves move forward on the agreed Summit agenda.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-68  
By cl, NARA Date 6-30-00

148  
*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, April 3, 1967 -- 4:55 p. m.

Mr. President:

I hesitate to send this raw report from a North Vietnamese prisoner of war, because it shows a radically worse manpower position than our intelligence authorities would suggest.

But he could know more than we do.

At least we should keep our minds open to the possibility he is right.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(G)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, April 3, 1967

**SANTIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLJ 98-185**

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [REDACTED]

**By CB, NARA Date 8-12-99**

**EO 12958**  
**3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs**  
**(C)**

[REDACTED]

In May 1965 most of the personnel reinforcements for North Vietnamese Regiment 64, Division 320, which was quartered in Dong Phu Village, a suburb of Hanoi, Thanh Tri District, were veterans who were recalled to military service from Hanoi and the provinces of Ha Tay, Hung Yen, Dai Duong and Haiphong. During training, the veterans worried about their families and their morale was low. Throughout May, June and July, a series of desertions occurred involving groups of three or more men who deserted collectively. The largest group to desert together involved two-thirds of the men in one platoon.

Local security agencies could not apprehend all of them, and cadres from the units traveled to the deserters' homes to force them to return to their units. The deserters who returned often deserted again within a few days. By August, 75 percent of the regiment's personnel loss was the result of desertions.

Habitual deserters were court-martialed and sentenced to forced labor at a highland agricultural work site where they were subject to reindoctrination, but most of them preferred this to military service. Lao Dong Party Headquarters, concerned by this epidemic of desertions, ordered the Provincial Committees to investigate and visit the units involved to try to build motivation and morale. One-third of the men in Battalion 9, however, malingered to avoid the indoctrination sessions. Between August 1965 and January 1966, however, the rate of desertions decreased.

The reasons behind the desertions included the veterans' fear of combat, encouragement from families to return home, lack of organized or persuasive indoctrination, disintegration of the co-operatives, and low salaries.

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**APPROVED FOR RELEASE**  
**DATE: NOV 1998**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

In January 1966 when Regiment 64 received orders to infiltrate South Vietnam, sporadic desertions continued to occur, causing considerable difficulties for the rear service unit, since soldiers who deserted frequently had been entrusted with the transport of parts of equipment or components of crew-served weapons which could not be used without these parts. During infiltration, morale continued to deteriorate as a result of food shortages, weariness, homesickness, illness, lack of adequate medical supplies or treatment, and the sight of the terrible destruction caused by bombing along the infiltration route.

In late March 1966 an entire squad deserted from Station 13 in Laos close to the Thua Thien Province border, and another squad was sent to arrest the deserters -- a skirmish occurred between the two units which did not result in any casualties, but the deserting squad succeeded in returning to North Vietnam. Upon arrival in Quang Nam Province, Regiment 64 had had 110 desertions, 13 deaths from illnesses, and 300 hospital cases.

Morale further deteriorated after one infantry company of Regiment 64 was assigned a "test mission" against a U. S. Marine platoon at Ne Hill in which company casualties were 50 killed and 30 missing. After this incident the number of deserters increased -- they escaped to Laos or hid in people's houses to avoid returning to their units because they were afraid of being sent into battle. Regiment 64 had little contact with the enemy, but despite this, morale in the regiment was extremely low.

The assumption that North Vietnam is exhausting its manpower in the war is borne out by the fact that in the general mobilization, veteran cadres of 50 years of age, veteran soldiers of 37 and men with such chronic illness as dysentery and gastric ulcers were called up. (Field comment: presumably the "general mobilization" of 1965 is meant. The new 1965 draft law called for the drafting of those men suffering slight physical impediments and stomach and lung illness as well as of all veterans up to age 45).

Rural areas, which are the traditional reservoirs for manpower, have been drained of healthy young men. As a result, the North Vietnamese Army does not have sufficient manpower for a

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

protracted war. For the past six or seven years, young boys and girls have been forced to labor on road construction and supply transport in both South Vietnam and Laos.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

149

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Monday, April 3, 1967 -- 6:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bob McNamara reports what it was predicted relocation from France would cost; what it actually cost; and what we saved.

He has reason to be proud of doing well the toughest of all operations -- a retreat.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.4(b)  
White House Conference, Feb. 24, 1983  
By g, OADR, Date 4/26/91

NOFORN  
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

3 APR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The relocation of U.S. forces and materiel from France began in April 1966. It is now essentially complete. Of the 70,000 U.S. personnel (including dependents) in France on March 31, 1966, only 6,000 were left on March 31, 1967. These 6,000, remaining with French approval, are associated with property disposal; activities of NATO military headquarters; and the operation of dependent schools until the end of the school year. After June 30, 1967, only 200-300 of the 6,000 personnel are expected to be in France. Of the 820,000 tons of materiel we had in France on March 31, 1966, only 10,000 tons, associated with French-approved activities, were left on March 31, 1967.

Initial Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) studies in mid-1965 estimated that if we relocated from France, we would need to retain all 70,000 U.S. personnel in Europe and that the total one-time relocation cost would probably exceed \$1 billion. A later JCS study in early 1966 estimated the one-time relocation cost at \$800 million. The relocation has been essentially completed at a one-time budgetary cost of \$130-150 million and a one-time foreign exchange cost of \$40-60 million.

Of the 70,000 U.S. personnel previously in France, about 35,000 remain in Europe. The other 35,000, plus about 4,000 U.S. personnel saved in Germany through headquarters mergers, have returned to the U.S. We are hiring only about 4,000 foreign nationals in Europe to replace the 15,000 we employed in France.

The closing of our facilities in France, the more efficient use of our other facilities in Europe, and the personnel economies already mentioned will result in annual budgetary savings of a minimum of \$50-60 million and annual foreign exchange savings of \$110-120 million. These personnel, budget, and foreign exchange savings have been achieved without significantly degrading our military posture in Europe.

The following is a summary of the relocation from France:

	<u>Personnel</u>				
	<u>U.S. Military and Civilian</u>	<u>Dependents</u>	<u>Sub-Total</u>	<u>Foreign Nationals</u>	<u>Total</u>
In France 3/31/66	32,000	38,000	70,000	15,000	85,000
Kept in Europe	16,000	19,000	35,000	4,000	39,000
Savings in France	16,000	19,000	35,000	11,000	46,000
Associated Savings in FRG	2,000	2,000	4,000	--	4,000
Total Savings in Europe	18,000	21,000	39,000	11,000	50,000
<u>Costs and Savings</u> (\$ million)					
		<u>Budgetary</u>		<u>Foreign Exchange</u>	
One Time Costs		\$130-150		\$ 40-60	
Annual Savings		\$ 50-60		\$110-120	

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;

Declassified after 12 years.

DOD Dir. 5200.10

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X-1967

DECLASSIFIED  
Group 4  
Authority: DOD Directive 5200.10  
By: h9, NARA, Date: 4-26-91

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Monday, April 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following excerpts from the last few days' Latin American cable traffic show that you are not alone in working to prepare the way for a successful Summit meeting:

Paraguay

In his annual message to Congress on April 1, President Stroessner expressed confidence that the Summit meeting would "justify the hopes it has aroused in the peoples of America." At the conclusion of his message, Stroessner said:

"In this grave hour for humanity... it is truly encouraging to every Christian spirit to have (this) meeting of American Chiefs of State, designed to have deep moral repercussions of a universal nature."

(Tab A)

Venezuela

In a TV interview, former President Betancourt termed the Summit meeting, "extraordinarily important" and expressed agreement with President Leoni's view that the Summit must come to grips with concrete problems. Betancourt said he believed the U. S. Congress would approve the President's request for extra aid and that these funds would be well-received and utilized in Latin America.

(Tab B)

Mexico-Guatemala

Presidents Diaz Ordaz of Mexico and Mendez Montenegro of Guatemala -- meeting last week in Mexico City -- declared in their joint communique that the two Chiefs of State would attend the Summit meeting:

"...motivated by the highest spirit of Americanism, and in order to seek solutions which will enable economic and social development to be accelerated, especially in those fields where the success of our joint efforts has not been satisfactory, and to advance the economic integration process of Latin America."

(Tab C)

In approving President Diaz Ordaz' request to attend the Summit meeting, the Mexican Joint Congressional Commission stated:

"This Commission is confident that at Punta del Este will be laid firm bases on which, during coming years, may unfold a program which will accelerate the economic integration of our Hemisphere; and by creating prosperity for all, will guarantee progress within a framework of a dynamic peace and political stability which will permit us to leave, as a legacy for future generations, a democratic continent, ever more united and within inexorable principles of social justice."

In a Mexico City press conference, President Mendez Montenegro said that economic integration was "indispensable to the development of Latin American nations" and should be a national objective of each state. He acknowledged the existence of problems arising from different levels of development and different market conditions, but said that steps toward integration should not be put off any longer.

(Tab D)

W. W. Rostow



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SUMMIT

USIA

1. PRESIDENT STROESSNER REFERRED TO SUMMIT AT TWO POINTS

NSC

IN COURSE ANNUAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS DELIVERED APRIL 1.

INR

DURING INTERNATIONAL SECTION ADDRESS HE SAID FOLLOWING:

CIA

"ASPIRATION OF GOVERNMENTS TO PROVIDE THEIR PEOPLES

NSA

WITH IMPROVED STANDARDS OF LIVING, ACCELERATE PROCESS OF

DOD

INTEGRATION, AND STRENGTHEN ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IS TODAY

OIC

CHANNELED IN PREPARATIONS FOR MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE

AID

OF MEMBER COUNTRIES OF ORGANIZATION (OF AMERICAN STATES)

E

IN ORDER TO CONCLUDE, AT HIGHEST LEVEL, AGREEMENTS ON SUCH

O

VITAL AND IMPORTANT SUBJECTS. MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE

SY

WILL TAKE PLACE IN PUNTA DEL ESTE, REPUBLIC OF URUGUAY.

FROM 12 TO 14 APRIL OF THIS YEAR AND WILL JUSTIFY HOPES IT

HAS AROUSED IN PEOPLES OF AMERICA."

RSR

PAGE 2 RUESAS 1376 UNCLAS

2. PRESIDENT RETURNED TO SUMMIT THEME IN PERORATION, CONCLUDING MESSAGE AS FOLLOWS:

"HONORABLE REPRESENTATIVES: AMERICA FINDS ITSELF ON EVE OF TRANSCENDENTAL OCCURRENCE. PRESIDENTS OF ITS PEOPLES WILL MEET IN SISTER REPUBLIC OF URUGUAY TO SEAL ONCE AGAIN UNITY OF CONTINENTAL FAMILY AND CONSIDER SUBJECTS WHICH ARE RELATED TO COMMON INTERESTS OF EACH AND EVERY NATION OF NEW WORLD. IN THIS GRAVE HOUR FOR HUMANITY, GIVEN IMPOSSIBILITY OF ASSURING TO MAN A LOFTY DESTINY, MAINTAINING HIM IN PEACE AND FREE OF VICISSITUDES OF WAR, IT IS TRULY ENCOURAGING TO EVERY CHRISTIAN SPIRIT TO HAVE MEETING OF AMERICAN CHIEFS OF STATE. DESIGNED TO HAVE DEEP MORAL REPERCUSSIONS OF UNIVERSAL NATURE. I SHALL HAVE

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-2- ASUNCION 1376 APRIL 1, 1967

IMMENSE HONOR OF TAKING WITH ME (TO MEETING) NAME AND SOUL OF MY FATHERLAND, TOGETHER WITH (OTHER) CHIEFS OF STATE OF OUR AMERICA. I SHALL TAKE SPIRIT OF THIS HONORABLE CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES, WHERE PEOPLE RAISE THEIR VOICE AND DICTATE THEIR LAWS; THROUGH MEDIUM OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THEIR MANDATE THROUGH BALLOT-BOX. I SHALL TAKE, WITH CLEAR TRADITION WHICH PARAGUAY HAS IN HISTORY OF ITS INTERNATIONAL

PAGE 2 RUESAS 1376 UNCLAS  
RELATIONS, OUR DEDICATION TO PEACE, JUSTICE AND PROGRESS, CONFIRMED BY OUR PRESENT POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION, WHICH WE MENTION WITH PRIDE AS BEST OFFERING WHICH WE MAKE TO BRIGHT FUTURE OF OUR AMERICA.". SNOW

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CARACAS 5106

SUBJECT: BETANCOURT TV TALK

1. IN FIRST OF SERIES OF TV INTERVIEWS FROM ABROAD, DIRECTED TO LATIN AMERICA AND ESPECIALLY TO VENEZUELA, FORMER PRESIDENT BETANCOURT LAST NIGHT DISCUSSED FOUR MAIN SUBJECTS OVER VENEVISION:

(1) HE APPLAUDED REJECTION OF IAPF PROPOSAL AT RECENT MFM MEETING AT BUENOS AIRES. HE STATED SERIOUS RESERVATIONS EXISTED ABOUT ESTABLISHING IN THIS HEMISPHERE A NATO-TYPE ORGANIZATION AT TIME NATO AND WARSAW PACTS WERE UNDER REVISION. OPPOSING LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES BELIEVED THEY COULD HANDLE INDIVIDUALLY COMMUNIST SUBVERSION PROBLEM AND HAD OPTION, IF AN EMERGENCY AROSE, TO REQUEST ASSISTANCE. ALSO, HE ADDED, LOGICAL SUSPICIONS EXISTED REGARDING AN IAPF KIND OF ARRANGEMENT IN THE HEMISPHERE SINCE A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS HAD REACHED POWER DUE TO ARMED MUTINY.

(2) TURNING TO SUMMIT MEETING WHICH HE TERMED "EXTRA-ORDINARILY IMPORTANT," BETANCOURT SAID THAT PRESIDENT LEONI VIEW THAT SUMMIT SHOULD NOT BE HELD UNLESS IT DEALT WITH CONCRETE PROBLEMS WAS COMPLETELY LOGICAL. PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S REQUEST FOR \$1.5 BILLION IN EXTRA AID FOR LATIN AMERICA WOULD, IN HIS OPINION, BE PASSED BY CONGRESS, DESPITE SENATOR FULL-BRIGHT'S RESERVATIONS, AND WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED AND UTILIZED IN LATIN AMERICA. NEVERTHELESS, THESE FUNDS WOULD MEAN LITTLE UNLESS SUMMIT PROVIDED ANSWERS TO LA'S BASIC PROBLEM, THE DECLINING TERMS OF TRADE.

(3) INTEGRATION PROCESS TOWARD WHICH LATIN AMERICA HAD ALREADY TAKEN "POSITIVE STEPS" WOULD ALSO BE PRIORITY TOPIC AT SUMMIT. INTEGRATION WAS NECESSARY NOT ONLY TO INCREASE PACE OF TRADE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION BUT ALSO TO ENBALE LA'S DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND OTHER ECONOMIC BLOCs.

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BOWLER  
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TAYLOR  
WRIGGINS

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PAGE 2 CARACAS 5106

MARCH 31,

(4) IN CLOSING, HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT LEONI WOULD "INSIST" ON CHANGES IN THE U.S. IMPORT POLICY WHICH RESTRICTS VENEZUELAN IMPORTS WHILE GIVING FREE REIN TO CANADA AND MEXICO.

5. COMMENT: AS CAN BE SEEN FROM ABOVE, BETACOURT'S STATEMENTS SUPPORTED THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES AND OFFERED NO NEW VIEWS. HIS REMARKS ON OIL IMPORT RESTRICTIONS MAY SERVE TO STEP UP PRESSURE FOR EARLY RENEWAL OF DISCUSSIONS OF THIS PROBLEM

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SUMMIT

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1. IN JOINT COMMUNIQUE JUST ISSUED, PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ AND PRESIDENT MENDEZ MONTENEGRO MADE FOLLOWING REFERENCE TO SUMMIT MEETING AND PREPARATION FOR IT:

(INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION)

2. QUOTE PRES DIAZ ORDAZ AND PRES MENDEZ MONTENEGRO AFTER EXAMINING THE WORK ACCOMPLISHED BY THE THIRD INTER AMERICAN CONFERENCE RECENTLY COMPLETED IN BUENOS AIRES, WERE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE RESULTS OBTAINED WERE HIGHLY SATISFACTORY SINCE, ON THE ONE HAND, THE FUNDAMENTAL JURIDICO-POLITICAL PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES IS BASED, ARE PRESERVED UNTOUCHED, AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE BOGOTA CHARTER PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COOPERATION WHICH CAME INTO BEING WITH THE SIGNING OF THE CHARTER OF PUNTA DEL ESTE; AND, IN ADDITION STRUCTURAL REFORMS ARE INTRODUCED TO MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE THE ACTIONS OF THE REGIONAL ORGANIZATION.

3. QUOTE WITH RESPECT MEETING OF PRESIDENTS WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE APRIL 12-14 AT PUNTA DEL ESTE, THE TWO CHIEFS OF STATE EXPRESSED THEIR INTENTION OF ATTENDING, MOTIVATED BY HIGHEST SPIRIT OF AMERICANISM, AND IN ORDER TO SEEK SOLUTIONS WHICH WILL ENABLE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT TO BE ACCELERATED, ESPECIALLY IN THOSE FIELDS WHERE THE SUCCESS OF OUR JOINT EFFORTS HAS NOT BEEN SATISFACTORY, AND TO ADVANCE THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION PROCESS OF LATIN AMERICA. UNQUOTE.

FREEMAN

BT

ADVANCE COPY PASSED TO S/S-O, 3/31/67, 10:45 P.M.

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, CIA & USIA, 3/31/67, 10:45 P.M.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1. LOCAL PRESS REPORTS PRESIDENT MENDEZ MADE  
FOLLOWING POINTS ON SUMMIT IN PRESS CONFERENCE  
GIVEN IN MEXICO CITY MARCH 30:

2. SUMMIT MEETING IS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE. AMONG  
TOPICS TO BE DISCUSSED IS LA ECONOMIC INTEGRATION  
WHICH IS MATTER THAT IS "INDISPENSABLE TO DEVELOP-  
MENT OF LA NATIONS." ECONOMIC INTEGRATION SHOULD  
BE A NATIONAL OBJECTIVE OF EACH STATE. WHILE  
THERE ARE PROBLEMS ARISING FROM DIFFERENT LEVELS OF DEVELOP-  
MENT AND DIFFERENT MARKET CONDITIONS, STEPS TOWARD  
INTEGRATION SHOULD NOT BE PUT OFF ANY LONGER. SUCH

PAGE 2 RUESGT 5052CF UNCLAS  
INTEGRATION SHOULD BE BASED ON THE TWO EXISTING  
SYSTEMS, LAFTA AND CACM, THROUGH SUCCESSIVE STEPS  
OF COOPERATION, LINKS AND FINALLY, INTEGRATION.  
MENDEZ SAID HE KNEW OF NO CA RESISTANCE TO THIS  
PROJECT.

3. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, HE SAID HE UNAWARE OF  
PROBLEM TO DISCUSS AT SUMMIT U.S. PARTICIPATION IN  
LA COMMON MARKET, BUT THAT SUCH DISCUSSIONS MIGHT  
BE TOPIC IN FUTURE.

MEIN

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Monday, April 3, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following excerpts from the last few days' Latin American cable traffic show that you are not alone in working to prepare the way for a successful Summit meeting:

Paraguay

In his annual message to Congress on April 1, President Stroessner expressed confidence that the Summit meeting would "justify the hopes it has aroused in the peoples of America." At the conclusion of his message, Stroessner said:

"In this grave hour for humanity... it is truly encouraging to every Christian spirit to have (this) meeting of American Chiefs of State, designed to have deep moral repercussions of a universal nature."

(Tab A)Venezuela

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(Tab B)Mexico-Guatemala

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"... motivated by the highest spirit of Americanism, and in order to seek solutions which will enable economic and social development to be accelerated, especially in those fields where the success of our joint efforts has not been satisfactory, and to advance the economic integration process of Latin America."

(Tab C)

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(Tab D)

W. W. Rostow

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Monday, April 3, 1967

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Paraguay

In his annual message to Congress on April 1, President Stroessner expressed confidence that the Summit meeting would "justify the hopes it has aroused in the peoples of America." At the conclusion of his message, Stroessner said:

"In this grave hour for humanity... it is truly encouraging to every Christian spirit to have (this) meeting of American Chiefs of State, designed to have deep moral repercussions of a universal nature."

(Tab A)Venezuela

In a TV interview, former President Betancourt termed the Summit meeting, "extraordinarily important" and expressed agreement with President Leoni's view that the Summit must come to grips with concrete problems. Betancourt said he believed the U. S. Congress would approve the President's request for extra aid and that these funds would be well-received and utilized in Latin America.

(Tab B)Mexico-Guatemala

Presidents Diaz Ordaz of Mexico and Mendez Montenegro of Guatemala -- meeting last week in Mexico City -- declared in their joint communique that the two Chiefs of State would attend the Summit meeting:

"...motivated by the highest spirit of Americanism, and in order to seek solutions which will enable economic and social development to be accelerated, especially in those fields where the success of our joint efforts has not been satisfactory, and to advance the economic integration process of Latin America."

(Tab C)

In approving President Diaz Ordaz' request to attend the Summit meeting, the Mexican Joint Congressional Commission stated:

"This Commission is confident that at Punta del Este will be laid firm bases on which, during coming years, may unfold a program which will accelerate the economic integration of our Hemisphere; and by creating prosperity for all, will guarantee progress within a framework of a dynamic peace and political stability which will permit us to leave, as a legacy for future generations, a democratic continent, ever more united and within inexorable principles of social justice."

In a Mexico City press conference, President Mendez Montenegro said that economic integration was "indispensable to the development of Latin American nations" and should be a national objective of each state. He acknowledged the existence of problems arising from different levels of development and different market conditions, but said that steps toward integration should not be put off any longer.

(Tab D)

W. W. Rostow



Monday, April 3, 1967 -- 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Pat Dean is back. We promised Wilson that you would see him.

He would like to see you before you go to Punta del Este.

W. W. Rostow

Marvin to arrange time \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, April 3, 1967  
7:00 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here are some elements in the situation and some questions.

1. Linc Gordon talked to Senator Hickenlooper, who says that a recall by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is technically possible; a good idea if we round up the votes; and he is prepared actively to lead in the effort.
2. This procedure is not recommended by Macomber and Manatos. I presume they would prefer a fight on the floor, which Morse and Hickenlooper think is bound to be noisy and counter-productive.
3. We are furnishing Carl Albert and Speaker McCormack with statements.
4. I have talked now to Russ Wiggins and Kay Graham, as well as Johnny Oakes.
5. Senator Mansfield plans to return on Friday, unless you ask him to return. Morse has his proxy. Do you want him back to guide whatever may happen on the floor of the Senate and to play an active part in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in case a recall is attempted?
6. Manatos recommends that you meet with Mansfield, Dirksen, Morse, and Hickenlooper to lay out a strategy.
7. Attached is the line-up in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee indicating the 12 who might conceivably vote for reconsideration. Essentially it involves getting Pell and Aiken aboard, who did not leave a proxy; and also getting Sparkman and McCarthy to reverse their positions.

W. W. R.

Attachment

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
WORKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12352,  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY Ng ON 4-30-91

Vote in Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Nine for Resolution

Fulbright  
Gore  
Symington  
Church  
Mundt  
Williams  
Lausche  
Sparkman  
McCarthy (by proxy)

Eight not Voting

Morse  
Cooper  
Dodd  
Case  
Clark )  
Hickenlooper ) proxies to Morse  
Carlson )  
Mansfield )

-----  
Possible 12 for reconsideration

Morse  
Cooper  
Dodd  
Case  
Clark  
Hickenlooper  
Carlson  
Mansfield  
Pell (absent Monday - no proxy)  
Aiken (absent Monday - no proxy)  
Sparkman ) (would have to reverse position)  
McCarthy )

Monday, April 3, 1967  
6:30 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Holt's interesting impressions  
of Sihanouk -- slowly disengaging from  
Mao and shifting our way -- but slowly.  
He advised that we continue to play  
it cool (p. 2).

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Vientiane 6071 4/3/67)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-404  
By 118, NARA, Date 2-23-93

~~SECRET - Limdis~~

Vientiane, April 3, 1967, 6071

Australian Prime Minister Holt left Vientiane this morning for Hong Kong after a thoroughly successful two day visit. He obviously made a personal hit with the Lao and he and his wife had just the sort of personalities which made their hosts feel comfortable.

His arrival statement was frank in identifying the North Vietnamese as aggressors in Laos and he and Souvanna continued to stress that theme in their several positive calls for neutrality of Laos during the course of the visit. Nevertheless, all Soviet Bloc representatives (Soviets, Poles and Czechs) attended all functions to which invited and maintained cordiality. Chicom and North Vietnamese representatives boycotted visit and did not appear at those occasions when diplomatic corps invited by the Royal Laotian Government.

I chatted with Holt and members of his party on several occasions, but mostly on matters of only passive interest. Most significant subject concerned his visit to Phnom Penh, on which I assume the Department will in due course be briefed in detail.

In essence, Holt and Sihanouk hit it off well (far better than he expected, Holt told me) Sihanouk was quite frank in his discussions and admitted freely that North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were trespassing on some of his territory. He was vigorous in saying that he objected to this violation and, within his capacities, attempted to have his troops rout them out.

Sihanouk also said that he realistically recognized that there would be occasional "bombings and infringements" of Cambodian territory by U. S. forces in heat of battle. He intended protest every one of these vigorously, but Australia should make U. S. understand these protests were "pro forma". However, he could not tolerate "permanent" U. S. occupation of any Cambodian territory and would send his troops to fight any such incursion.



3.4(b)(6)

~~SECRET - Limdis~~

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 99-67**  
**By is, NARA Date 2-15-00**

~~SECRET - Limdis~~

As for the boundary question, it was not raised by Sihanouk or anyone else in Cambodia. Hence, the issue of an Australian declaration on subject did not arise.

Finally, Holt concluded U. S. would be wise to let its relations with Cambodia just simmer along as they are. He felt it would not be wise to try to reestablish diplomatic relations or send negotiating missions to Phnom Penh. He thought Sihanouk would cause us only a minimum of trouble, based on his current attitude.

Comment: foregoing based on talks with Holt and members of his party as well as from reading one of McIntyre's cables which shown to me in confidence. I feel it would be unwise for any addressees to use specific information in these several paragraphs either in discussion with Australians or in U. S. policy formulation until Australians phrase their brief to us in their own terms and with their own special emphasis.

Sullivan

~~SECRET - Limdis~~



*Re. file*

Monday, April 3, 1967 - 1:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Marvin Watson

L. L. (Tex) Colbert, former Chairman of Chrysler Corporation, wants to deliver to you a "message" from Ian Smith. Colbert has just returned from a long hunting trip to Africa during which he became acquainted with a number of Rhodesian officials. He says that Smith asked him to deliver a private message and that he agreed only to try. He did not promise to deliver the message, or that the President would reply.

We made a polite try to get Colbert to give the message to Joe Palmer. He just as politely refused, commenting that Joe is one of the subjects of the message. In any event, he made it clear that he is determined to deliver it directly to you or not at all. We have explained the pressures on your time, and the problems involved in agreeing to direct communication with Smith. Colbert was pleasant, but firm.

It is very doubtful, in my judgment, that Colbert is carrying anything which will have much effect on the Rhodesian situation. Thus, from a foreign policy point of view, there is no strong case for your receiving the message, and there is a marginal risk of some international embarrassment if Colbert leaked the fact that he had delivered it. But your decision should be largely based on what sort of relation you want to maintain with Colbert -- who regards himself as a personal friend. (If you wish, I could certainly call him, explain that your schedule simply won't permit a meeting, and offer to receive the message on your behalf.)

W. W. Rostow

You call Colbert, make my apologies, and offer to receive the message. If he won't play, gently let him know that we will have to do without it \_\_\_\_\_

I will Call Colbert and ask him to give the message to you \_\_\_\_\_

Ask Marvin to set up a short meeting with Colbert \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

Note on copies:

(Colbert is in Detroit -- AC 313; 875-0123)

EKH/vmr

1515  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, April 3, 1967  
12:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Bob McNamara appears to have  
a friend in Moscow!

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 4196

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 26, 1983  
By *ry*, NARA Date 4-29-91

7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Action  
EURCONTROL: 141  
REC'D: APRIL 1, 1967  
3:13 A.M.

~~DATOR~~  
~~BOWDLER~~  
~~BUDGET~~  
~~DAVIS~~  
~~GINSBURGH~~  
~~HAMILTON~~  
~~JESSUP~~  
~~JOHNSON~~  
~~KELLY~~  
~~KOMER~~  
~~MOYERS~~  
~~TAYLOR~~  
~~WRIGGINS~~

Info

SS RR RUEHCR  
 GPM DE RUEHCR 4196FD 0910745  
 SP ZNY CCCCC  
 SC R 013740Z APR 67  
 SAH FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
 L TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
 H STATE GRNC  
 BT  
 SAL ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 4196  
 IO  
 P

USIA 1. ON MARCH 30, VICE PRESIDENT OF US ACADEMY OF SCIENCES DR.  
 NSC GEORGE KISTIAKOWSKY HAD TWO HOUR INFORMAL CONVERSATION WITH  
 INR V.S. YEMEL'YANOV OF SOVIET ACADEMY SCIENCES. SUBJECT OF ABM'S  
 RAISED BY KISTIAKOWSKY.

CIA 2. TO KISTIAKOWSKY'S SURPRISE, YEMEL'YANOV SAID HE AGREED  
 NSA COMPLETELY WITH US SCIENTIST'S VIEW THAT INSTALLATION ABM'S  
 DOD UNDESIRABLE AND UNNECESSARY. NO DEFENSIVE SYSTEM 100 PERCENT  
 NIC EFFECTIVE, AND SAME CERTAINLY TRUE OF ABM'S, WHICH THEREFORE  
 ACDA USELESS SINCE SINGLE THERMONUCLEAR MISSILE WHICH MIGHT GET  
 THROUGH COULD "WIPE OUT MOSCOW".

SCI 3. YEMEL'YANOV NOTED THAT "GENERALS" OF COURSE WANTED ABM'S,  
 AEC BUT THAT THIS WAS HISTORICAL MILITARY ATTITUDE COMMON WORLD OVER.  
 NAS GP-3.  
 OST GUTHRIE

RSR

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
 NJ 91-396  
 By ju, NARA, Date 5-12-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*

April 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Troubles behind the Turkish Embassy

This morning a bomb went off behind the Turkish Embassy, damaging a car but hurting no one.

The State Department is taking the line that it must have been some kind of a nut, an individual with a personal grievance, and we should stick to that.

But this is the Armenian month of mourning, celebrating the Turkish massacre of Armenians 52 years ago. The Armenian press appealed for an Armenian ethnic protest, but we and State together received less than 25 letters -- a pretty poor nationality response; and it would be best to avoid acknowledging their role, by attributing it to an individual

We're in touch with George Christian.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file

April 3, 1967 - 9:30 AM

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a friendly greeting to the Federation of German-American Clubs on their 20th anniversary. Ambassador McGhee is anxious that you send them a message. It will be printed in the Federation's Gazette and read at Friendship Week ceremonies in Germany.

Walt W. Rostow

Att.

Approved ✓

Disapproved       

Speak to me

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

On the Twentieth anniversary of the Federation of German-American Clubs, I congratulate you and wish you well.

Your work is every bit as important today as when your first few clubs were inaugurated two decades ago. As you celebrate German-American Friendship Week this year, I know you will further strengthen the ties of friendship that bind our countries together and will help to build still greater mutual understanding and cooperation between the German and American peoples.

I am grateful for what you have done and confident that the future will bring you continued success.

Lyndon B. Johnson



(27)

April 1, 1967  
4:05pm

Mr. President:

I have communicated to Secretary Rusk your thoughts about dealing with Mansfield, Fulbright, etc. before the Monday morning session.

He would be grateful if you could call him this evening, at your convenience, to permit discussion and your instruction as to exactly what you want done.

*Walt*  
Walt Rostow/yb