

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[10 of 7]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#4a report	<del>Project Compatriot</del> <del>TS</del> 2 pp. <i>open 12-11-91 NLS 91-411</i>	<del>4/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#5a cable	<del>Bonn 13022</del> <i>open 2-5-92 NLS 91-413</i> <del>C</del> 3 pp.	<del>4/29/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#7 memo	<del>Rostow to the Pres. re Israel</del> <i>open 11-17-99</i> <del>C</del> 2 pp. <i>exempt 5-16-92 NLS 91-415 NLS 99-69</i>	<del>4/29/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#9a cable	<del>Saigon 24265</del> <i>open 2-5-92 NLS 91-413</i> <del>S</del> 2 pp.	<del>4/28/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#10a cable	<del>from Saigon</del> " <del>S</del> 3 pp.	<del>4/28/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#12 memo	<del>Rostow to the Pres. re Chile</del> <del>C</del> 1 p. <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i>	<del>4/28/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#13 memo	<del>Rostow to the Pres. re Venezuela</del> " <del>C</del> 1 p.	<del>4/28/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#13a cable	<del>Caracas 5634</del> <del>C</del> 1 p. <i>sanitized 5-28-92 NLS 91-413 OPEN 10-21-98</i>	<del>4/27/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#16 memo	<del>Rostow to the Pres. re Pakistan</del> <i>sanitized 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i> <del>C</del> 1 p. <i>(Dup. of #124, NSF Name File, Rostow memos) open 2-5-96 NLS 91-415</i>	<del>4/28/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#17 memo	<del>Rostow to the Pres. re Panama Canal</del> <del>C</del> 1 p. <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i> [duplicate of #32, NSF Country File, Panama, Volume 8]	<del>4/28/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#17a cable	<del>Panama 3451</del> <i>open 2-5-92 NLS 91-413</i> <del>C</del> 2 pp. [duplicate of #32a, NSF Country File, Panama, Volume 8]	<del>4/17/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#19 memo	<del>Rostow to the Pres. re Latin America</del> <del>S</del> 3 pp. <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i>	<del>4/28/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#20b report	<del>re Vietnam</del> <i>exempt NLS 91-410</i> <del>S</del> 3 pp. <i>Exempt 7/14/00 NLS 99-101 exempt 5/03 RAC</i>	<del>4/27/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#21a cable	<del>Rostow to Latin American Ambassadors</del> <del>S</del> 5 pp. <i>sanitized 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i> <i>Sanitized 7/14/00 NLS 99-101</i> <i>Dale Sani NLT 019-0152-1 (12/01)</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>

## FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President,  
Walt Rostow, Volume 26, April 16-30, 1967, Box 15

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[2 of 7]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#23 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam <del>S</del> 1 p. <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i>	<del>4/27/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#24 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Greece " <del>C</del> 1 p.	<del>4/27/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#25 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Greece " <del>S</del> 1 p.	<del>4/27/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#35 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam " <del>S</del> 3 pp.	<del>4/27/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#36a cable	Deptel 183048 to Saigon " <del>S</del> 1 p.	<del>4/26/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#40 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Colombia " <del>C</del> 1 p.	<del>4/26/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#40a memo	Schultze to the Pres. " <del>C</del> 2 pp.	<del>4/24/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#40b memo	Gaud to the Pres. <del>C</del> 5 pp. <i>OPEN 10.21.98</i>	<del>4/18/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#43 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Germany <del>S</del> 4 pp. <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i>	<del>4/24/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#46 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Germany " <del>S</del> 1 p.	<del>4/22/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#46a cable	WHB002 re Germany " <del>S</del> 2 pp.	<del>4/22/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#46b cable	Bonn 12655 <i>open 2-5-92 NLS 91-413</i> <del>C</del> 1 p.	<del>4/22/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#50 agenda	re meeting with the Pres. <del>TS</del> 1 p. [duplicate of #14, NSF Name File, Rostow Memos", sanitized] <i>OPEN 10.21.98</i>	<del>4/22/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#52 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Latin America S 1 p. <i>sanitized 1-12-93 NLS 91-414</i> <i>Sanitized 7/7/00 NLS 94-71</i>	4/22/67	A
#53	Duplicate of #46 <i>OPEN 10.21.98</i>		
#53a	Duplicate of #46a <i>OPEN 10.21.98</i>		

## FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President,  
Walt Rostow, Volume 26, April 16-30, 1967, Box 15

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[3 of 7]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#53b	Duplicate of #46b <del>OPEN 10-21-98</del>		
#54 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Greece <del>Open 12-4-97 NLT 97-36</del> S 2 pp. <del>sanitized 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</del>	4/22/67	A
#55 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Panama Canal S 1 p. <del>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</del>	4/22/67	A
#56 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Rhodesia C 1 p.	4/22/67	A
#58a memo	William Jordan to Rostow S 1 p.	4/21/67	A
#59 memo	Rostow to Rusk C 1 p.	4/21/67	A
#63 memo	Bator to the Pres. S 1 p.	4/21/67	A
#64 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Greece <del>Open 12-4-97 NLT 97-36</del> C 1 p. <del>sanitized 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</del>	4/21/67	A
#67 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Greece <del>Open NLT 97-36 12-4-97</del> S 1 p. <del>sanitized 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</del>	4/21/67	A
#71 memo CAME SAN 12-23-04 NLS 63-67	Rostow to the Pres. re Germany <del>Sanitized 9/14/00 NLS 99-21</del> S 1 p. <del>sanitized 1-12-93 NLS 91-414</del> Dup. of #116, NSF, CF, Germany, Vol 13	4/21/67	A
#71a report SAN 12-23-04 NLS 63-67	re Germany <del>exempt NLS 91-412</del> S 1 p. <del>Exempt 7/14/00 NLS 99-21; Exempt NLS 019-015-2 (2/02)</del>	4/21/67	A
#72a cable	Saigon 23667 <del>open 2-5-92 NLS 91-413</del> S 3 pp.	4/21/67	A
#73a cable	Bonn 12575 C 4 pp.	4/21/67	A
#74a report dumpt 2-23-04 NLS 03-67	re Germany <del>exempt NLS 91-412</del> S 2 pp. <del>Exempt 7/14/00 NLS 99-21</del> Dup. of #114C, NSF, CF, Germany, Vol 13	4/21/67	A
#75a cable	Rangoon 1339 <del>exempt &amp; downgraded 2-5-92 NLS 91-413</del> TS 4 pp.	4/21/67	A
#77 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Latin America S 2 pp. <del>sanitized 1-12-93 NLS 91-414</del> <del>Sanitized 9/14/00 NLS 99-21</del>	4/21/67	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President,  
Walt Rostow, Volume 26, April 16-30, 1967, Box 15

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[4 of 7]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#78 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Korea <del>C</del> 1 p. <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i>	4/21/67	A
#79a cable	Rio de Janeiro 10277 <i>open 11-10-99 NLS 99-70</i> <del>C</del> 3 pp. [duplicate of #81d, Brazil Country File, Volume 7, sanitized]	4/21/67	A
#80 memcon	With Walther Casper <i>open 11-17-99 NLS 99-69</i> <del>S</del> 2 pp. <i>sanitized 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i> <i>dup. of #132a, NSF, CF, Germany, Vol. 13</i>	4/20/67	A
#81 memo	Rostow to Watson <del>S</del> 2 pp. <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i>	4/20/67	A
#82 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Canada <del>C</del> 1 p. <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i>	4/20/67	A
#82c memo	Benjamin Read to McGeorge Bundy <del>C</del> 2 pp. <i>open 2-5-92 NLS 91-413</i>	11/8/65	A
#82d memo	Benjamin Read to McGeorge Bundy " " <del>C</del> 2 pp.	12/21/65	A
#85a cable	Moscow 4491 <del>S</del> 2 pp.	4/19/67	A
#86a cable	USUN 4921 <i>exempted 2-5-92 NLS 91-413</i> <del>S</del> 3 pp. <i>open 11-10-99 NLS 99-70</i>	4/20/67	A
#87a	Duplicate of #80 <i>open 11-17-99 NLS 99-69</i>		
#90 agenda	re meeting with the Pres <i>open 11-17-99 NLS 99-69</i> <del>TS</del> 2 pp. [sanitized NLS 84-282]	4/20/67	A
#91a memo	William Jorden to Rostow <del>S</del> 1 p. <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i>	4/20/67	A
#93 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re New Zealand " " <del>C</del> 1 p.	4/20/67	A
#94 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re New Zealand <del>C</del> 1 p.	4/20/67	A
#96	Duplicate of #90		

## FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President,  
Walt Rostow, Volume 26, April 16-30, 1967, Box 15

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[50877]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#97 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Germany <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i> <del>C 1 p.</del>	<del>4/19/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#97a cable	Bonn 12501 <i>open 2-5-92 NLS 91-413</i> <del>C 1 p.</del>	<del>4/19/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#99 memo	Rostow to the Pres. <i>Open 1-11-00 NLS 99-73</i> <del>S 1 p. Sanitized 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</del>	<del>4/19/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#100a cable	Saigon 23485 <i>open 2-5-92 NLS 91-413</i> <del>S 8 pp.</del>	<del>4/19/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#101 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam <del>TS 1 p.</del> <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i>	<del>4/19/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#104 cable	CAP67309 Rostow to Lodge <del>C 1 p.</del>	<del>4/19/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#105 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re UK <i>Sanitized 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i> <del>C 1 p.</del> <i>(dup. of #100, NSF, CF, UK, Vol II, Box 11) open 11-17-99 NLS 99-69</i>	<del>4/19/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#106a memo	re article by T. Braden <i>Exempt 7/14/00 NLS 99-102</i> <del>S 2 pp. exempt NLS 91-412 exempt NLS 019-015-2 (2/02)</del>	<del>4/19/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#107a report	re Vietnam <i>Sanitized 8-6-92 NLS 91-410</i> <del>C 16 pp. Sanitized 7/7/00 NLS 99-72</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#111 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re SEATO <del>C 2 pp.</del> <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i>	<del>4/19/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#113 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re India <i>open 11-17-99</i> <del>S 1 p. exempt 3-16-92 NLS 91-415 NLS 99-69</del>	<del>4/18/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#113a memo	re L.K. Jha Visit <i>open 2-5-92 NLS 91-413</i> <del>S 1 p.</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#115 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Soviet Union <i>Sanitized 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i> <del>C 1 p.</del> <i>(dup. of #108, NSF, Name File, Rostow memos) Sanitized 2-5-96 NLS 91-415 appeal same name</i> <i>Open 1-11-00 NLS 99-73</i>	<del>4/18/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#115a memo	re Soviet Union <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i> <del>C 3 pp. (dup. of #108a, NSF, Name File, Rostow memos)</del>	<del>4/18/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#116 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re talking points <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i> <del>C 1 p. 101</del> [duplicate of #116, UK Country File, Volume 11, exempted 1978]	<del>4/18/67</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President,  
Walt Rostow, Volume 26, April 16-30, 1967, Box 15

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[6 of 7]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#116a report</del>	<del>Talking Points for meeting with George Brown</del> <del>C 2 pp.</del> <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i> <i>10ja</i> [duplicate of #116a, UK Country File, Volume 11, exempted 1978]	<del>4/18/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#117 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to the Pres. re Goldberg</del> <del>C 2 pp.</del> <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i>	<del>4/18/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#118 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to the Pres.</del> " <del>S 1 p.</del>	<del>4/18/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#118a cable</del>	<del>from Lodge in Saigon</del> " <del>S 1 p.</del>	<del>4/18/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#120 cable</del>	<del>CAP67307 re Ceylon</del> " <del>C 1 p.</del>	<del>4/18/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#123</del>	<del>Duplicate of #115a</del> "		
<del>#126a cable</del>	<del>Saigon 23234</del> <i>open 2-5-92 NLS 91-413</i> <del>S 3 pp.</del>	<del>4/17/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#128 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to the Pres. re Afghanistan</del> <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i> <del>S 1 p.</del> <i>Dup. #7, NSF Files of Wriggins. 'Afghanistan' Box</i>	<del>4/17/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#128a memo</del>	<del>Schultze to the Pres.</del> <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i> <del>C 2 pp.</del>	<del>4/15/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#128b memo</del>	<del>Gaud &amp; Freeman to the Pres.</del> <del>C 2 pp.</del> <i>open 3-4-92 NLS 91-412</i>	<del>4/7/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#131 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam</del> <del>S 1 p.</del> <i>open 5-14-93 NLS 91-415</i>	<del>4/17/67</del>	<del>A</del>

## FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President,  
Walt Rostow, Volume 26, April 16-30, 1967, Box 15

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[7 of 7]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#4b report	re Vietnam - Top Secret 1 p <i>Sanitized 7/7/00 NS 99-91</i>	4/29/67	A
#20 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam - Top Secret 1 p <i>Sanitized 7/7/00 NS 99-92</i>	4/27/67	A
#20a report	re Vietnam - <del>Exempt 9/27/00 NS 99-93</del> Top Secret 2 pp <i>exempt per RAC 5703</i>	4/27/67	A
#49 memo	Walt Rostow to the President - Top Secret 2 pp <i>Sanitized 9/27/00 NS 99-92</i>	4/22/67	A
#49a report	Intelligence report - Top Secret 1 p <del>Exempt 9/27/00 NS 99-96</del> <i>exempt per RAC 5703</i>	[4/67]	A
#49b report	Intelligence Report - Top Secret - 4 pp <del>Exempt 9/27/00 NS 99-96</del> <i>exempt per RAC 5703</i>	[4/67]	A

## FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 26, April 16-30, 1967  
Box 15

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



1

*Pres file*

Sunday, April 30, 1967 -- 11:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Mansfield UN proposal: Situation Report.

Later today I shall file with you a memorandum for tomorrow's 8:30 a.m. breakfast.

Yesterday I got Nick and Arthur Goldberg together. They agree it's a gimmick. Nick leans against; Arthur for.

Sec. Rusk will be conferring today with Arthur. I will then be in touch with him and file a report with you.

One question is timing: Should we await Dobrynin's return at the end of next week?

He has been talking Viet Nam in Moscow and we may wish to know his current line before launching a Security Council exercise.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



30 APR 67

2

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON*Pres file*

Dear Mr. President,

Secretary Rusk has now read and considered Senator Mansfield's proposals. He has also talked to Ambassador Goldberg.

1 - He is ready to take up in the Security Council Senator Mansfield's proposals.

2 - Senator Mansfield should be clear that this proposal will be opposed by the Secretary General and a number of other members of the Security Council who will not wish to press this proposal because Hanoi has made clear that it does not wish the United Nations to get in a peace-making role in Southeast Asia.

3 - With respect to visit to Communist China, the Secretary of State is strongly opposed. It would be a major intervention in a troubled situation. The Soviet Union would be upset and suspicious. Above all, Senator Mansfield should remember that he is "an officer of the United States Government," as a member of the legislative branch. Therefore there would be great confusion among our friends in free Asia, including the fear that we were about to sell them out.

4 - The Secretary of State believes the proper way to proceed with respect to Communist China is to elevate the Warsaw talks to the Foreign Ministers level. He has been hesitant to propose this until the situation within Communist China has somewhat settled down.

5 - Secretary Rusk does not share Senator Mansfield's conviction that Hanoi is now under the control of Peking, and that therefore the route to peace is through Peking. The evidence remains that they have balanced rather well their position between Moscow and Peking, maintaining a high degree of independence.

6 - In respect to the World Court proposal, the World Court does not have jurisdiction in this problem. It is most doubtful that we can rally more than a few votes for the World Court to accept jurisdiction.

Walt W. Rostow comment:

I'm in general agreement with Secretary Rusk. There may be some advantage in holding up the move in the Security Council, however, until we hear at the end of the week what signals or messages Dobrynin brings back from Moscow.

Signed,

WWR



Saturday, April 29, 1967  
2:35 p.m.

~~Long~~  
2 Rea file

Mr. President:

Herewith draft letter to  
General Eisenhower, which you  
requested that I do.

W. W. Rostow



April 29, 1967

Dear General Eisenhower:

Thank you for your kind note of April 15.

I had the opportunity in Bonn for a few words with General de Gaulle. He was, as always, immensely courteous; but, at the moment, there does not appear to be a great deal of substance that we can constructively say to one another. Nevertheless, I have judged it important for our country and for the Alliance that we minimize public discussion of our differences.

It is my hope and belief that the trip to Germany cleared the air of some misunderstandings and will make easier some of the critical negotiations across the Atlantic which are upon us in the weeks ahead.

I hope you felt--as I did--that General Westmoreland has acquitted himself in New York and Washington in the highest traditions of our military services.

I truly regret you could not be with us on the solemn but memorable occasion of Chancellor Adenauer's funeral. It was a reminder to us all of how much we have accomplished in the days since you received the surrender of the Germans and of how much still we have to do with them and with other Europeans.

Sincerely,

General Dwight D. Eisenhower  
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania 17325

LBJ:WWR:amc



4

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Saturday, April 29, 1967

5:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may be interested and a little amused at the attached technical report, combined with the straightfaced intelligence report marked on page 3.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED  
EO 12355, Sec 3.3  
WH Guidelines, Feb 24, 1983  
DA 12355, Jan 5, 1988  
BY rg NARA, EMO 4-29-91



4a

~~TOP SECRET "EYES ONLY"~~

PROJECT COMPATRIOT (TS)

WEEKLY REPORT #5

W  
GEN BROWN  
J

A. Period Report - 14-20 April 1967

B. General - Procedures were developed to augment seeding efforts by using RF-4Cs. Missions 67-31 and 67-32 each employed one RF-4C. On these missions, the RF-4s used 23 seeding units. The WC-130 crews used an additional 115 units during the period. These increased expenditures of munitions are especially significant although seeding on two missions (27 and 30) was impossible. Mission 67-27 aborted because of mechanical failures in both the primary and backup aircraft. Mission 67-30 encountered extremely unfavorable atmospheric conditions and found no seedable clouds. OL-2 report only 200 seeding units left, as of 22 April. They used 54 of these on 23 April. Unless they are resupplied, the current usage rate will exhaust their supply by the middle of this week. They request 1500 of the LW-1 Loads, and 1000 of the LW-2 Loads. The slow-burning loads are no longer required because of more favorable cloud conditions.

C. Results of Last Week's Activities: Forty-six clouds or cloud groups were seeded. Twenty-five were not observed after seeding. The sharp increase in unobserved clouds is largely due to the RF-4Cs seeding out of WC-130 radar range. Of the remaining twenty-one seedings, twelve are judged successful, for a success rate of 57 percent. Intelligence Summary: Route 23F was reported under water on 15 Apr. Mission 67-25, flown on 13 April, produced a large area of successful targets directly over this area. Although no subsequent seeding occurred in this area, seeding operations probably contributed to the standing water observed. Route 23 and the southern portion of route 96 are reported as deteriorating. Successful seeding operations have occurred in the area of these LOCs on 13, 14 and 16 April.

D. Refined Analysis of Missions 67-19 thru 67-25: Subsequently received radar data have permitted analysis of all of last week's unknown cases. The success rate was recomputed as 15 of 26, or 58 percent, about the same as previously reported. There are no additional intelligence reports to judge effects on LOC's for these missions.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-411  
By WJ, NARA, Date 12-9-91

~~TOP SECRET "EYES ONLY"~~

CJCS

~~TOP SECRET "EYES ONLY"~~

E. Forecast of Next Week's Activities: Missions will continue each day, using both WC-130 and RF-4C aircraft. We expect slightly more favorable atmospheric conditions, permitting a daily expenditure of about 50-60 seeding munitions.

MEMO FOR THE RECORD:

On 22 April 67, 1600 units were dispatched from NOTS. Estimated arrival at Udorn on 25 April.

On 6 May 67, another assorted shipment of 5000 units will be dispatched from NOTS.

~~TOP SECRET "EYES ONLY"~~



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

4b  
SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-91  
By cb, NARA Date 6-30-00

On the night of 22-23 April approximately 80 trucks were reported moving south in the area of the Mu Gia Pass. This is the first significant south-bound convoy spotted in the pass this month, and is far in excess of the average of five trucks a day moving southward through the pass during the first three weeks of April.

Such activity may be a Communist effort to rush additional supplies through the infiltration corridor before the heavy spring rains make some of the Lao-tian roads impassable. The rainy season does not normally hit the panhandle until June but there are indications that it may be early this year--standing water and deep mud have been observed along parts of Route 23 and Route 911. (Map)

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: No significant contact with Communist forces has been reported in South Vietnam since the heavy enemy artillery, rocket, and mortar attacks in northern I Corps on 27 and 28 April. [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(S)

29 Apr 67

3

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, April 29, 1967  
5:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Chancellor Kiesinger expresses his appreciation for your decision on the aircraft and for your visit in general.

I look forward to seeing what he will oblige us on in the near future.

W. W. Rostow

Bonn 13022

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 48, NARA, Date 5-2-91



5a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1967 APR 29 18 23

EHX802  
OO RUEHEX  
DE RUEHC 30230 1191805  
ZNY CCCCC  
O 291740Z APR 67  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEHIA/USIA  
O 291550Z APR 67 ZFF-3  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3850  
STATE GRNC  
BT

*y Bator*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN, 13022

LIMDIS

PASS TO WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: US TROOP DEPLOYMENT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-413  
By *inf*, NARA, Date 1-8-92

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN DEPT'S 183081, I TRANSMITTED TODAY ORALLY TO CHANCELLOR KIESINGER RELEVANT INFORMATION IN DEPT'S 183936 AND 18322 ON US TROOP DEPLOYMENT AND THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL QUESTION. SINCE I WAS UNABLE TO ARRANGE A MEETING WITH EDWIN BRANDT BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FROM BONN, I CONVEYED THE SAME INFORMATION TO HIM OVER THE TELEPHONE. BRANDT MERELY THANKED ME FOR THE INFORMATION GIVEN.

2. IN MY DISCUSSION WITH KIESINGER I EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD, UPON HIS RETURN TO WASHINGTON, MADE THE DECISION TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT TO BE RETURNED UNDER OUR PROPOSED ROTATION PLAN TO 96, WHICH HAD MADE POSSIBLE THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN THE

PAGE 2 REF NO 13022 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
TRILATERAL MEETING HELD IN LONDON ON APRIL 28. THIS DECISION HAD BEEN A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT ONE FOR THE PRESIDENT IN LIGHT OF THE STRONG POLITICAL PRESSURE IN WASHINGTON FOR THE ROTATION OF ALL 144 AIRCRAFT CALLED FOR UNDER OUR ORIGINAL PLAN. THE PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN THIS DECISION IN AN EFFORT TO ALLAY THE CONCERNS KIESINGER HAD EXPRESSED DURING THEIR MEETING IN BONN, AS TO THE PROBABLE REACTION IN GERMANY TO THE FULL WITHDRAWAL.

3. THE PRESIDENT HAD, AT THE SAME TIME, AUTHORIZED MR. MCCLOY, OUR DELEGATE TO THE TRILATERAL MEETING, TO AGREE THAT THE US WOULD STRIVE TO SHORTEN OUR REDEPLOYMENT TO BELOW 30 DAYS FOR TROOPS AND TO BELOW 10 DAYS FOR AIRCRAFT. IN THE MEANTIME, WE COULD NOT COMMIT OURSELVES TO A FIVE DAY REDEPLOYMENT TIME FOR OUR AIRCRAFT.



4. I ALSO CONVEYED OUR VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL AS GIVEN IN REFTEL. IN LIGHT OF THE APPEAL WHICH SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL HAS, BOTH IN GERMANY AND THE UK, WE SHOULD AVOID RAISING FALSE HO

DES WHICH MAY NOT BE FULFILLED.

5. THE CHANCELLOR EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT WHICH HAD RESULTED IN THE AGREEMENT IN LONDON. HE EXPRESSED FULL APPROVAL OF THE FINAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRILATERAL

~~PAGE 3 REFNO 13682 CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKS. THE CHANCELLOR ALSO REAFFIRMED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AND HIS SATISFACTION WITH HIS MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT. HE ASSURED ME OF HIS STRONG DESIRE TO WORK WITH THE PRESIDENT ON THE BASIS OF FULL CONFIDENCE AND CONSULTATIONS. HE WOULD UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO ANY DOUBTS BETWEEN US. IF ANY QUESTION AROSE, HE WOULD TAKE IT UP DIRECTLY WITH THE PRESIDENT. HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE DEGREE OF RAPPORT WHICH HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE PRESIDENT IN THE MEETINGS, AND THE CONSIDERATION WHOWN BY THE PRESIDENT IN DEALING WITH CURRENT ISSUES.

6. I EXPRESSED REGRET TO THE CHANCELLOR AT THE BARTH STORY IN "DIE WELT" OF APRIL 28. WASHINGTON HAD ASSURED ME THAT THERE WAS NOT, AS BARTH HAS STATED, ANY DISSATISFACTION ON THE PART OF THE WHITE HOUSE THAT FINAL AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED ON THE NPT DURING THE BONN MEETINGS. INDEED, THIS HAD NOT BEEN ANTICIPATED. THE CHANCELLOR, IN TURN EXPRESSED REGRET AT THE BINDER STORY IN THE "NEW YORK TIMES" OF APRIL 28. HE HAD IN NO WAY INTENDED TO COMPLAIN TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT US/GERMAN CONSULTATIONS. HE EXPLAINED HIS REFEREND TO "QUALITY" AS MEANING DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE AND DEPTH -- NOT TO THE QUALITY OF THE PERSONNEL

~~PAGE 4 REFNO 13682 CONFIDENTIAL~~

INVOLVED ON THE US SIDE. WE BOTH AGREED THAT EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE IN THE FUTURE TO AVOID SUCH STORIES, WHICH SEEM CALCULATED TO SOW DISSENSION BETWEEN US. FOR OUR PART, WE WILL DENY ERRONEOUS IMPLICATIONS IN THE BARTH STORY.

7. THE CHANCELLOR STATED THAT HE HOPED THE US WOULD MAKE IT VERY CLEAR THAT WE DID NOT APPROVE OF THE STATUS QUO IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND THAT WE WOULD HELP THE GERMANS, BY ANY PEACEFUL MEANS, TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE GERMAN PROBLEM. THIS WOULD SERVE TO STRENGTHEN US/GERMAN RELATIONS. HE INTERPRETED THE CURRENT SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD HIS REGIME AS A REACTION TO THE FACT THAT HE HAD NOT, AS THE SOVIETS HAD HOPED, REPUDIATED GERMANY'S DESIRE FOR REUNIFICATION OR FOR A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE ODER/NIESE QUESTION. ON THE OTHER HAND HE UNDERSTOOD FULLY, AS HE HAD JUST TOLD A MEETING OF REFUGEE REPRESENTATIVES, THAT CONCESSIONS MUST BE MADE IN ANY ULTIMATE GERMAN BOUNDARY SETTLEMENT.



8. I POINTED OUT TO THE CHANCELLOR OUR CONSISTENT SUPPORT OF GERMANY'S REUNIFICATION EFFORTS. WITHOUT QUESTIONING THE SINCERITY OF OTHERS, HE COULD BE ASSURED THAT AMERICANS DID NOT HAVE TWO POLICIES IN THIS REGARD -- A REAL POLICY AND ONE FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION. INDEED, IT WAS WE

~~PAGE 5 - REFNO 13722 - CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHO HAD IN 1961-1962, MADE THE MOST RECENT EFFORTS TO PRECIPITATE NEGOTIATION ON THE GERMAN PROBLEM. AT THE TIME, WE FELT QUITE ALONE AMONG OUR OTHER ALLIES. WE DO NOT LIKE THE STATUS QUO, BUT HAVE SEEN NO OPPORTUNITY TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT BY PEACEFUL MEANS. IF AT ANY TIME THE GERMANS HAVE ANY IDEAS IN THIS REGARD, WE WILL BE GLAD TO CONSIDER THEM.

9. IN CONCLUSION, THE CHANCELLOR WISHED ME TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION TO THE PRESIDENT AGAIN FOR HIS VISIT AND FOR HIS SUBSEQUENT INTERVENTION IN THE AIRCRAFT ROTATION QUESTION.

MC GHEE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

6  
Mr. Rostow

*4-29-67*  
*2. Pres file*

April 29, 1967

MEMO FOR MRS. ROBERTS

After the President has signed this, would you please send it to Bill Hopkins, to have 15 photographic copies made on the White House green letterhead.

Eliska Hasek has arranged with Bill to have those copies sent to her for distribution to Jewish newspapers. Then he can return to me for dispatch in the usual manner.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Eliska Hasek

Att: WWR Memo for the President, 4/29/67  
LBJ Letter to Israeli President Shazar



6a

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

April 29, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israeli Independence Day Message

State recommends that you send the attached congratulatory letter to Israeli President Shazar on Israel's Independence Day, 15 May. We have typed it as a letter rather than as the usual telegraphic message so we can distribute photo copies to the Jewish newspapers here.

Attached for your signature if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Eliska Hasek

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

May 1, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to send warmest congratulations to you and to the people of Israel on the nineteenth anniversary of Israel's independence. We recall with pleasure your visit with us last summer and are gratified by the close friendship and fruitful cooperation that continue to characterize relations between our two nations. We will continue to work together toward a world in which men everywhere can live at peace and prosper.

Sincerely,

LBJ

His Excellency  
Zalman Shazar  
President of Israel  
Jerusalem

LBJ:HHS:tmt 4/29/67

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-69  
By is, NARA Date 11-2-99

Mr. Rostow <sup>7</sup>

*2. Pres. file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 29, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Our Attendance at Israeli Independence Day Parade

We are in the midst of our annual hassle over whether Ambassador Barbour should go to Israel's parade in Jerusalem. He would go if both the French and British ambassadors were going. But London has decided at Cabinet level that its Ambassador should not go this year, and Paris has agreed.

The issue is where we draw the line in lending our presence to ceremonies which further recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital. UN resolutions of 1949-50 recommended that Jerusalem be placed under international administration. We have gone along with this position. Although we do business with Israeli government offices in Jerusalem, we have refused legally to recognize it as Israel's capital and have kept our embassy in Tel Aviv. While the conditions that led to our initial position have changed, we don't believe we should change that position unless in the context of some Arab-Israeli settlement. Doing so otherwise would kick off a tremendous Arab reaction.

State really doesn't feel our presence makes that much legal difference because we've been to other such functions in Jerusalem. But it does fear that the Israelis and Arabs would read great significance if we broke with the British and French on the issue. We could probably get Eshkol to promise not to exploit our presence, but we can't stave off some Arab reaction. The Jordanian Foreign Minister has already formally asked us not to attend. He feels that Jordan is especially vulnerable to Arab criticism because of Jordan's close relationship with us.

The issue is not the parade itself but the fact that the Israeli government uses this kind of thing to nibble away at the Western position. The British have decided--at the Cabinet level after two reviews and considerable Jewish pressure--that they must draw the line somewhere and that this is the place. In 1965, they attended a tattoo in Jerusalem after the Israelis assured them they'd make nothing of it and then six weeks later Eshkol cited British and American

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

presence as a significant step toward Western recognition of Israel's status in Jerusalem. The British were burned up, and there's a good bit of their annoyance in this year's decision.

The Israelis are telling us informally that our refusal to attend will provoke a crisis in our relations. That's nonsense, and we can probably talk them out of that line. But unfortunately they can read our absence as the kind of aloofness that doesn't help you here at home.

Personally, I can't get excited about whether we go to the parade or not, and I think the British may be drawing the line at the wrong place. But they do make one important point. There's no question that every Israeli move like this is calculated "salami tactics." Unhappily, there is no such thing with this tough-minded, always-negotiating government--much as I love the Israelis as people--as just making a nice gesture without having them attach significance to it.

The main issue in this as in the aid package is whether we're now ready to throw open the gates to Israel or whether we're still willing to draw the line somewhere to preserve some balance between our Arab and Israeli policies. They think they've made a breakthrough with you on the tank and planes sales, and they're trying to exploit it to the hilt.

I hate to see something like this cause you trouble, and I think the British have made a wrong decision. But Secretary Katzenbach has decided we ought to go along with them and the French, and if there were no domestic concern, I wouldn't even bother you with this. He has not asked our review, but I asked to put this before you. You can either let his decision stand, or I can ask him to take a second look if you are concerned.

W. W. Rostow

Let the decision stand \_\_\_\_\_

Ask Secretary Katzenbach to review ✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8  
*Loop*  
*2 Pres file*

Saturday, April 29, 1967  
2:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Charlie Schultze's  
recommendations for the administration  
of the Food for Freedom program.

I held the paper until you were  
back from Germany.

W. W. Rostow

8a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

APR 21 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Administration of Food Aid

At your request, I have considered and discussed with you alternative proposals for administering the Food-for-Freedom program. Two main alternatives emerge.

You could appoint a well-known person as a Special Assistant in the White House. However, in the past, we have had little success with similar arrangements. In 1954, President Eisenhower appointed Clarence Francis, former President of General Foods, as his special advisor and chairman of an interagency committee on P. L. 480 matters. President Kennedy appointed George McGovern and later Dick Reuter as Director of the Food-for-Peace program, a function you transferred to the Secretary of State in October 1965. It would probably be difficult to attract a man to this specialized job who could deal effectively with Cabinet officers. Even if we find the right man, he would require time to learn the job and to build the necessary staff.

These considerations lead me to propose the following:

I. You could designate me as your agent to do a tougher review of the self-help and budgetary aspects of the food aid program. There would be four parts to this job:

1. We would continue the new commitments process, where all proposed sales agreements are submitted through the Budget Bureau and Rostow for your approval.
2. We would submit new commitments to you for both P. L. 480 and A.I.D. for the same country at the same time, wherever feasible, to make best use of U. S. resources and to get the most bargaining leverage on our aid.
3. We will establish an early warning information system, in cooperation with other agencies, to keep you better informed of agreements before they get to the final stage. A sample is attached (Tab A).
4. At budget time, we will give the same kind of intensive review to food aid, country by country, as we now give to dollar aid.



II. We propose to drop the first Executive Order setting up both the Cabinet level War on Hunger Policy Committee, and its Executive Committee. However, because food aid is such a key instrument of foreign policy, we still need to fix responsibility for coordinating the food and economic assistance programs, country by country, in the context of U. S. foreign policy.

This could be done simply through a memorandum from you, such as the one attached (Tab B), instructing the Secretary of State to perform this role. This instruction would parallel your general directive in National Security Action Memorandum No. 341, of March 2, 1966, to direct, coordinate and supervise interdepartmental activities of the U. S. Government overseas. The memorandum would leave to the Secretary the establishment of a committee to assist him in the coordination process.

III. We need the second Executive Order making specific delegations to the Secretaries of Agriculture, State and Treasury and the Budget Director (Tab C). Technically, we are now operating under the outdated 1961 Executive Order signed by President Eisenhower. That Executive Order does not cover the new responsibilities added in last year's law, such as applying the more stringent self-help criteria and effecting the transition from soft currency to dollar sales. In addition, there are a host of technical operating responsibilities which need to be handled by operating agencies, such as Agriculture and State.

The proposed order assigns responsibilities to specific agencies for carrying out the many and varied provisions of the Act. It is necessary to orderly administration in an area which is frequently the subject of Congressional and GAO inquiry. I do not believe you should retain the authority and take the heat in a number of these technical, and occasionally controversial matters.

I have not discussed this proposal with Freeman, Katzenbach or Gaud. If you approve, I will check it with them before resubmitting the memorandum and the Executive Order for final approval.

(signed) Charles L. Schultze  
Charles L. Schultze  
Director

#### Attachments

Approve my proposal for check out ✓

Approve White House Special Assistant \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

86



8C

UPCOMING P.L. 480 AGREEMENTS

Based upon discussions in the Interagency Staff Committee (ISC) and information provided by State, AID, and Agriculture, we estimate that the following P.L. 480 agreements will be submitted to you by about June 30, 1967. Of course, there may be changes in the scope and commodity composition of the agreements by the time they are finally submitted for your approval. The wheat component of the anticipated agreements for this fiscal year are all within the requirement and availability estimates which you considered earlier.

We have also attempted to relate upcoming food aid agreements to economic aid proposals expected for these countries through June 30.

	<u>Estimated market value in millions</u>
<u>India:</u> 1.5 million tons of wheat of the three million tons under the joint resolution, based on appropriate matching contributions to date. Future agreements will be submitted when additional contributions from other donors are known.	125
<u>Pakistan:</u> The first portion of our FY 1968 program which may total about \$120 million, about the same as this year. We will be making our economic aid pledge to the Consortium in May and will consider how we can best combine the two programs.	60
<u>Brazil:</u> Our full 1967 program which compares to \$64 million last year. We will also be considering an AID agricultural sector loan in this period.	50
<u>Chile:</u> Our estimated full 1967 program, which is about the size of our last program. We will also be considering an agricultural sector loan during this period and we will see about submitting them to you together.	15
<u>Israel:</u> Our 1967 program, compared to about \$32 million last year.	19
<u>Indonesia:</u> Part of a package of \$85 million of U. S. food and dollar aid for 1967, to be matched two for one by other nations, which you approved earlier for negotiation.	15



<u>Ceylon:</u>	Part of \$14 million in U. S. food and dollar aid this fiscal year to be provided along with aid from a World Bank Consultative group of donors. You have already approved announcement of a combined aid package for FY 1968 at the same level.	6
<u>Jordan:</u>	Balance of this year's \$13 million program - up over last year's \$1.5 million because of a severe drought. We will also be considering AID loans for a potash plant and a thermal power plant in this period.	7
<u>Tunisia:</u>	Some additional cotton to supplement this year's \$25 million program.	2
<u>Morocco:</u>	A part of a total program this year of \$29 million. Because of the drought, this is well above last year's \$6 million program.	4
<u>Ghana:</u>	An add-to this year's \$7 million program to include textile products. We will also be considering \$20 million of AID program assistance during this period.	2
<u>Afghanistan:</u>	The balance of an \$8 million program to add wheat now available to help relieve severe shortage. We will also be considering an AID large power project during this period.	4
<u>Ecuador, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Mali, Lebanon and Iceland:</u>	To meet small but important 1967 requirements.	<u>12</u>
TOTAL:		321

8d

B

Re

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE  
THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR  
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF HUDGET

To provide for the administration of the Food for Freedom program, I have issued a new Executive Order assigning certain responsibilities under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

In carrying out this program, it is essential that food aid and economic assistance are fully coordinated in each country to make best use of both resources and ensure effective self-help effort. I have asked the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture, the Administrator of AID and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, as appropriate, to coordinate the assistance provided under this Act and related programs under the Foreign Assistance Act in the context of our foreign policy.

To supplement existing procedures, I have asked the Budget Director, in cooperation with other agencies, to develop an information system to keep me informed on the progress of the War on Hunger program. In addition, I have asked him to develop procedures to ensure integration of food aid and economic assistance programs in the programming and budgeting process.



8F



89

EXECUTIVE ORDER

THE  
PROVIDING FOR ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE  
DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1954, AS AMENDED

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

PART I - ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES TO AGENCIES

Sec. 101. Department of Agriculture - (a) Except as otherwise provided in this order, the functions conferred upon the President by title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 are delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture.

(b) The functions conferred upon the President by sections 103(c) and 103(i) of the Act shall be exercised by the Secretary of Agriculture with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in this order, the Secretary of Agriculture shall perform such functions as may be necessary in the carrying out of agreements referred to in section 101 of the Act.

(d) The Department of Agriculture shall transmit to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States and to the Committees on Agriculture and Appropriations thereof the reports required by the provisions of paragraph (5) of the Act of August 13, 1957, 71 Stat. 345 (7 U.S.C. 1704a).

Sec. 102. Department of State - (a) The functions of negotiating and entering into agreements with friendly countries, conferred upon the President by section 101 of the Act, are delegated to the Secretary of State.

(b) The functions conferred upon the President by sections 103(j), 103(1), and 103(m) of the Act, and by title II of the Act, are delegated to the Secretary of State.

(c) The function of determining countries which are friendly to the United States, conferred upon the President by section 103(d) of the Act, is delegated to the Secretary of State.

(d) The functions conferred upon the President by sections 103(a), 103(b), 103(g), 103(h), and 109(a) of the Act are delegated to the Secretary of State and shall be exercised with the concurrence of the Secretary of Agriculture.

(e) The Secretary of State shall have responsibility for the utilization of excess currencies under the last proviso to section 104 of the Act and for assuring compliance with the requirements of section 106(b) of the Act, but with respect to the use of such currencies for agricultural development under this provision of section 104, he shall act after consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture.

(f) The provisions of Part II of Executive Order No. 10893 of November 8, 1960, are extended and made applicable to United States agencies and personnel concerned with the administration in foreign countries of the functions provided for in the Act.

(g) All functions under the Act, however vested, delegated, or assigned, shall be subject to the responsibilities of the Secretary of State with respect to the foreign policy of the United States as such policy relates to such functions.

Sec. 103. Joint Delegation - The function conferred upon the President by section 103(k) of the Act is delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of State, to be performed by them jointly.

Sec. 104. Department of the Treasury - (a) The administration on behalf of the United States of the credit provisions of agreements entered into pursuant to title I of the Act (including the receiving of payments under such agreements) shall be performed by the Secretary of the Treasury, or by such other agency or agencies as may be designated by the Secretary of the Treasury.

(b) The functions conferred upon the President by the final sentence of section 105 of the Act are delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall act after consultation with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

Sec. 105. Foreign Currencies - (a)(1) Foreign currencies which accrue under title I of the Act may be used for the purposes set forth in section 104 of the Act in amounts consonant with applicable provisions of law and of sales agreements and loan agreements. Except as may be inconsistent with such laws or agreements, priority shall be accorded to the use of such currencies for purposes for which appropriated funds or other funds are available to reimburse the Commodity Credit Corporation. To such extent as he may deem necessary, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall fix the amounts of such currencies which may be used for the purposes set forth in section 104 of the Act. The Director shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to any amounts so fixed.



(2) The function of waiving the applicability of section 1415 of the Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1953 (31 U.S.C. 724), conferred upon the President by paragraph (2) of the first proviso to section 104 of the Act, is delegated to the Secretary of State in respect of section 104(f) of the Act and to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget in all other respects.

(3) The functions conferred upon the President by paragraph (4) of the first proviso to section 104 of the Act are delegated to the Secretary of State.

(4) The function of determining what manner of use other than loans is in the national interest of the United States, conferred upon the President by section 104(f) of the Act, is delegated to the Secretary of State, who shall act after consultation with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and, in cases involving agricultural development, after consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture.

(5) The functions of establishing procedures and of determining the qualification of local agencies to administer the activities set forth in section 104(h) of the Act, conferred upon the President by that section of the Act, are delegated to the Secretary of State.

(b) The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to prescribe regulations governing the purchase, custody, deposit, transfer, and sale of foreign currencies received under the Act.

(c) The purposes described in the lettered paragraphs of section 104 of the Act shall be carried out, with foreign currencies made available in consonance with law and the provisions of this order, as follows:

(1) Those under section 104(a) of the Act, by the respective agencies of the Government having authority to pay United States obligations abroad.

(2) Those under sections 104(b)(1) and 104(i) of the Act, by the Department of Agriculture.

(3) Those under section 104(b)(2) of the Act, by the Department of State.

(4) Those under section 104(b)(3) of the Act as follows: (i) Those with respect to collecting, collating, translating, abstracting, and disseminating

scientific and technological information, by the National Science Foundation, and by such other agency or agencies as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget may designate. (ii) Those with respect to programs of cultural and educational development, family planning, health, nutrition, and sanitation, by the Department of State or the Smithsonian Institution, as those agencies shall agree, and by such other agency or agencies as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget may designate. (iii) All other, by such agency or agencies as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget may designate.

(5) Those under section 104(b)(4) of the Act, by the Department of State and by such other agency or agencies as the Secretary of State may designate.

(6) Those under section 104(b)(5) of the Act, by the Librarian of Congress.

(7) Those under section 104(c) of the Act, by the Department of Defense, or the Department of State, as those agencies shall agree, or, in the absence of agreement, as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine.

(8) Those under section 104(d), 104(e), 104(f), 104(g), and 104(h), of the Act, by the Department of State.

(9) Those under section 104(j) of the Act, by the Department of the Treasury in cooperation with the Department of State.

(d) The function of making reports to Congress conferred upon the President by the last sentence of Section 104 of the Act, is delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall act after consultation with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

(e) In negotiating international agreements in pursuance of the Act, the Secretary of State shall avoid restrictions which would limit the application of normal budgetary and appropriation controls to the use of those foreign currencies accruing under title I of the Act which are to be available for operations of United States government agencies.

Sec. 107. Reservation of Functions to the President - There are reserved to the President the functions of making findings or determinations regarding the national interest of the United States, conferred upon him by section 103 (d)(3) and 103(d)(4) of the Act, and the functions conferred upon him by sections 109(c), 403 and 408 of the Act.

PART II - GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 103. Definitions - As used in this order, the term "Act" and the term "Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954" mean the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 as amended from time to time, and include, except as may be inappropriate, provisions thereof amending other laws.

Sec. 302. References - Except as may for any reason be inappropriate:

(a) References in this order or in any other Executive Order to (1) the Act, (2) any other act which relates to the subject of Parts I and II of this order, or (3) any provisions thereof, shall be deemed to mean the Act, such other acts, or provisions thereof, respectively, as amended from time to time.

(b) References in any prior Executive Order not superseded by this order to any provisions of any Executive Order so superseded shall hereafter be deemed to be references to the corresponding provisions, if any, of this order.

(c) References in this order or in any other Executive Order to this order or to any provision of this order shall be deemed to include references thereto, respectively, as amended from time to time.



Sec. 303. Superseding and Savings Provisions - (a) Executive Order No. 10900 of January 5, 1961, as amended by Executive Orders No. 10915 of January 24, 1961, No. 10972 of November 3, 1961, No. 11036 of July 11, 1962, and section 403 of No. 11051 of September 27, 1962, is hereby superseded except to the extent necessary to carry out agreements entered into under the Act prior to January 1, 1967, or the parts of such agreements which are not governed by the provisions of the Act of November 11, 1966 (Public Law 89-808).

(b) Except to the extent that they may be inconsistent with this order, all determinations, authorizations, regulations, rulings, certificates, orders, directives, contracts, agreements, and other actions made, issued or entered into with respect to any functions affected by this order and not revoked, superseded, or otherwise made inapplicable before the date of this order, shall continue in full force and effect until amended, modified or terminated by appropriate authority.

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, April 29, 1967  
11:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith our first substantive  
report from Amb. Bunker.

It's good to have Thieu talking  
pacification rather than politics.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 24265

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993

By 16, NARA, Date 4-29-91

Saigon, April 28, 1967, 24265

After presenting my credentials this morning, I had an opportunity to talk for sometime with Chairman Thieu.

After he had made some very cordial remarks about my arrival, I asked him his assessment of the present military situation, particularly in reference to developments in I Corps. He replied that he viewed the pressure from the enemy there as a diversionary tactic with the purpose of tying down and keeping engaged as many allied and ARVN troops as possible. He thought, however, they would be cautious about moving down forces in division strength south of the DMZ because of fear of encirclement. He explained that the terrain was such that should the North Vietnam troops move down in strength, they would be exposed to encirclement by a landing of allied and ARVN troops north of the DMZ. He felt the North Vietnamese would be unwilling to risk this and, therefore, together with the Viet Cong, would continue to adopt a tactic of trying to tie down as large a number of our troops as possible.

He went on to explain the enemy's objective was not the northern provinces but the central highlands and he felt they would attempt to develop and strengthen their positions there during the coming monsoon season. In the central highlands, they had a rear sanctuary in Laos and Cambodia and at the same time had maximum protection from the terrain because of its mountainous character and dense jungle. In the highlands also they were in an ideal position to launch attacks on the coastal plains. He felt that we would see a major effort by the enemy to extend and strengthen their positions there during the coming monsoon season.

I led from here into the problem of pacification and the role of ARVN. I said that it seemed to be that the essence of success was the security of the hamlets and the villages, not only in the initial stage, but as a continuing condition and this was only something which the ARVN could or should do. Thieu replied that he considered pacification essentially a function of the ARVN and that adequate security could only be obtained by the ARVN in cooperation with the regional and popular forces as well as with the RD teams. He admitted that ARVN was not yet fully or properly organized to do the job. He said, "This is not a General's war, it is a Colonel's war, a Major's war, a Captain's war, a

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-413  
By if, NARA, Date 1-8-92

Lieutenant's war." In other words, his view is that ARVN must be so organized and motivated that it will work closely, largely in relatively small units with the RD teams giving the inhabitants of the hamlets and villages assurance that security will be permanent, not transitory. He said that he was continually driving this home to the ARVN commanders and he believed that they were making progress. This was a new concept for them and it took time both to inculcate the idea and provide adequate training.

Although Thieu has had a recent appendectomy, he said he was recovering well and after the ceremony and toasts remained standing talking to me for more than a half hour.

Bunker



~~SECRET~~

Saturday, April 29, 1967  
12:00 noon

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker and Ky chat for  
the first time in their new relationship.

W. W. Rostow

Salgon 24286; April 28, 1967

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By lg, NARA. Date 4-29-91

Saigon, April 28, 1967

I called on Ky this afternoon for what turned out to be general, and I believe helpful, discussion of matters pertaining mainly to pacification and electoral law. He began, in response to my request for his comments on things as he sees them, with some remarks on Vietnamese past experiences under the French, who he said had done their best to weaken the fiber of his people and had failed to prepare them in any way to administer their own affairs. These facts, he continued, were responsible for the problem of corruption with which he had been trying to cope over the past two years. Their past experience made it necessary for the Vietnamese to have a real revolution in order to get rid of social injustices and especially to insure that the lot of the peasants be improved. At present time city dwellers, who are not of much use in repelling the Viet Cong, Ky said, are benefiting from a rising standard of living, and gap between them and rural population is increasing. He stressed in particular problems in educational field as a French legacy. French-trained people at head of Vietnamese educational system are blocking everything that junior elements trained in the United States and other countries want to do.

Ky then turned to subject of pacification in connection with a need to improve things in rural areas. It was clear from his remarks that he is keenly aware of our desire to see ARVN properly motivated because after I reminded him of this he went into some detail about his conversations with General Thang on subject of RD teams. He discussed recent Viet Cong directives to their forces to strike the teams, which he took as evidence of fact that enemy felt RD had now become a real menace. When I mentioned matter of motivating ARVN he agreed entirely with the necessity for doing so but seemed to plead for time. He pointed out the RD itself is only about a year old and he recalled clearly the fact that two months after we began the program, people were announcing that it had "fallen flat on its face." He believes that more time is needed to bring ARVN around to acceptance of its role of protector. Difficulties between the protecting unit and the teams, he said, had a bad effect on the people, but he thought that success in these matters would be achieved just as it had been in other aspects of the RD program. The RD teams, too, the Prime Minister continued, had to understand that once in a village area they were there to stay, though he understood

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-413  
By Wig, NARA, Date 1-8-92

that teams felt themselves in peril because of delayed reaction of ARVN protecting units after a Viet Cong attack had begun. His present view is that RD program is progressing, because Thang had just given him an encouraging report "and Thang does not tell lies." He also believes the program is well under way because the Viet Cong now recognize it as very dangerous to them. I took occasion several times during this part of the conversation to impress upon him our views that pacification was a job for the Vietnamese, with our support, and of need for motivating and training ARVN properly. He accepted the need unequivocally.

I inquired as to his view of election developments as they stand, referring to our interest in avoiding dissension among the military regardless of who might be the candidate. He expressed complete confidence that there would be no disunity among the military, adding that all are agreed that there can be no more coup d'etats. He mentioned that electoral law is in final drafting stage, which provided me with an opening for saying that we are concerned about need for winning candidate to emerge with a sufficiently large vote to enhance his domestic and international stature. Ky replied that he thought that in the present circumstances anyone in this country gaining 40% of the vote cast would be doing very well. In answer to my question whether he favored a run-off election, if the top candidate received a relatively small percentage of overall vote, he hesitated and said that he did not think it would be desirable to have another election because it would give Communists a period in which to conduct all kinds of maneuvers. In any case, he said, it was up to assembly to decide. He said he was thinking in terms of providing five million piasters to each presidential candidate to defray election expenses and that news of this had already caused some unqualified persons to present their names. There would, however, be conditions for making a grant of such a sum of money with a view to controlling matters satisfactorily.

We then had a lengthy discussion concerning enemy intentions in the military field. Ky believes that enemy intends to launch major attacks against Quang Tri City and Hue in the near future. He said the enemy has infiltrated a 450 man assassination and sabotage unit and he does not consider it unlikely that they will attempt to organize a Red Commando raid in Saigon itself with a view to killing key officials

and undermining morale generally. In discussing impact of national elections on the enemy's political position, Ky agreed that they would constitute a major blow and that the enemy would do everything in his power from here on to disrupt them. He saw no sign that Hanoi was ready to negotiate and feels that it will be extremely difficult for Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong to accept negotiations because of terrific loss of face that would involve for them. What is more likely, Ky said, is that present program of the RVN, i. e., elections, pacification and military pressure, will eventually cause them to phase down, reassess their effort over a period of three or four years, and then try again.

During our conversation, Ky confirmed the impression I had gained at Guam. He spoke seriously and was obviously well aware of the problems that concern us. I was encouraged by his frankness and I believe this first official contact augurs well for our relationship during the very difficult period which he said lies ahead.

Bunker

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~



11  
Saturday, April 29, 1967  
11:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a card you may wish to  
keep handy.

W. W. Rostow

11a

Proposed U.S. Personnel Withdrawals From Europe

France

Military	18,000
Civilian	<u>21,000</u>
	39,000

Germany

Military	35,000
Civilian	<u>30-35,000</u>
	65-70,000

TOTAL military 53,000

TOTAL civilian 51-56,000

TOTAL U.S. 104-109,000

French civilians off U.S. payroll 11,000

German civilians off U.S. payroll 5,000

16,000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - April 28, 1967

Mr. President:

Ralph Dungan reports -- after talking with Foreign Minister Valdes -- that it is unlikely that President Frei will travel to the US or anywhere else until after September 18. The Chilean Congress recesses on that date.

Ralph observes that Frei's political situation is complicated and he wants to stay home to consolidate his position.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By WJ, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



*Profile*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - April 28, 1967

Mr. President:

The DOD team that went to Caracas to review Venezuela's military requirements has completed its job and is on its way back. The highly favorable impact of this quick follow-through on your commitment to President Leonl is described in the attached cable.

To insure rapid Pentagon action on delivery of the limited amount of equipment involved, I have asked Cy Vance to make sure that there are no bureaucratic delays from this end.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By ing, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR BERNBAUM IN CARACAS (no. 5634)  
(dated April 27, 1967)

1. I am pleased to report that the special US military team, departing from Caracas today, has successfully completed its work on priority of items and their delivery schedule for Venezuelan equipment requested to supply 10 new Ranger-type battalions. Through various techniques, the details of which will be available at DOD, virtually all Venezuelan requirements will be met in an unusually short time.
2. Venezuelan Ministry of Defense officials, from General Gomez on down, expressed their deepest satisfaction at the rapid and adequate US response to Venezuelan needs. At the President's birthday open-house last night, Gomez pumped my hand enthusiastically and repeated again and again that this had been a most satisfactory negotiation. He stated that the US reaction constituted a demonstration of solidarity with Venezuela. He added, "No one asked me why I wanted this material, or to justify it -- they only asked 'what do you need.'" I have never seen General Gomez so friendly.
3. I want to take this opportunity to commend the DOD team, all appropriate offices in Washington and USCINCSO who made this possible. In our opinion, although the amount of military equipment involved is small, our quick, satisfactory response should facilitate relations across-the-board between US military group and the Venezuelan military.
4. This reaction follows on the heels of the excellent results of the Johnson-Leoni meeting in Punta del Este. At the President's open-house last night, I was again exposed to evidence of the strong effect of the Presidential meeting. A presidential advisor (Solar) told me, with unrestrained enthusiasm, that relations between the United States and Venezuela have never been better. He said that the informal and direct exchange between President Johnson and President Leoni and the friendly, effective cooperation of the entire US delegation had greatly pleased President Leoni and the Venezuelan delegation. Similar opinions were expressed later by Manuel Mantilla, the President's influential Secretary General. In my opinion, these developments illustrate the importance of personal relationships and the President's personal interest. They also serve to demonstrate that in this area it is not only what you do, but how you do it.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By CG, NARA, Date 10-21-98

14  
April 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: General Westmoreland's Speech

You asked for a short summary of the Westmoreland speech before Congress.

He opens with a tribute to the U. S. forces in Vietnam.

He describes the conflict, with emphasis on aggression from the North.

He describes the enemy's tactics and strategy -- with a very effective section on the use of terror in the South. He relates VC methods -- blowing bridges, cutting roads, sabotaging power stations, etc. -- to our response in bombing the North for the same purposes.

He forecasts:

- continuing NVA buildup across the DMZ and through Laos;
- increased use of mortars and artillery;
- heightened attacks on the political structure of the South.

He notes the growing strength of Free World forces. He praises those forces and underlines the growing capability of the GVN forces.

He stresses the buildup of our logistical base, noting that his forces have "lacked for nothing."

He concludes by thanking the Congress and the people for their support. Backed by resolve at home, our struggle will succeed.

If the General is asked questions, they are likely to be:

His attitude toward dissent at home -- is opposition to the war destructive or treasonable?

His attitude toward truces -- with reference to the announcement yesterday that the VC propose a 2-day stand-down on Buddha's birthday. Does he favor such truces?

Should we sharply increase our military actions, North and South, in order to achieve a quick victory?

These, I think, are the most difficult questions he may face.

W. W. Rostow



# NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

HOLD FOR RELEASE  
UNTIL DELIVERY OF ADDRESS  
EXPECTED ABOUT 12:30 P.M. (EST)  
FRIDAY, APRIL 28, 1967

NO. 382-67  
OXford 7-3189. (Copies)  
OXford 7-5331 (Info.)

ADDRESS BY  
GENERAL W. C. WESTMORELAND, USA  
COMMANDER, U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
BEFORE JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS  
FRIDAY, APRIL 28, 1967 - 12:30 P.M. (EST)

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of Congress

I am deeply honored to address the Congress of the United States. I stand in the shadow of military men who have been here before me, but none of them could have had more pride than is mine in representing the gallant men fighting in Vietnam today. Without reservation, I can say that I command the most professional, competent, dedicated and courageous servicemen and women in our military experience. They are sensitive to their mission and, as the record shows, they are unbeatable in carrying out that mission.

As their commander in the field I have seen many of you during the last three years. Without exception you have shown interest, responsibility and concern for the commitment which we have undertaken.

The Republic of Vietnam is fighting to build a strong nation while aggression -- organized, directed and supported from without -- attempts to engulf it. This is an unprecedented challenge for a small nation such as the Republic of Vietnam. But it is a challenge which will confront any nation that is marked as a target for the communist stratagem called "war of national liberation." I can assure you here and now that militarily this stratagem will not succeed in Vietnam.

In three years of close study and daily observation, I have seen no evidence that this is an internal insurrection. And I have seen much evidence to the contrary -- documented by the enemy himself -- that it simply is aggression from the North.

Since 1954, when the Geneva Accords were signed, the North Vietnamese have been sending leaders, political organizers, technicians and experts on terrorism and sabotage into the South. Clandestinely directed from the North, they and their Hanoi-trained southern counterparts have controlled the entire course of the attack against the Republic of South Vietnam.

MORE



More than two years ago, North Vietnamese divisions began to arrive, and the control no longer was as clandestine. Since then, the buildup of enemy forces has been formidable. During the last 22 months, the number of enemy combat battalions in the South has increased significantly, and nearly half of them are North Vietnamese. In the same period, overall enemy strength has nearly doubled in spite of large battle losses.

Enemy commanders are skilled professionals and provide good leadership. In general, their troops are thoroughly indoctrinated, well trained, aggressive and under tight control.

The enemy's logistic system is primitive in many ways. Forced to transport most of his supplies down through Southeastern Laos, he uses combinations of trucks, bicycles, men and animals. But he does this with surprising effectiveness. In South Vietnam, the system is well organized. Many of the caches we have found and destroyed have been stocked with enough supplies and equipment to support months of future operations.

The enemy emphasizes what he calls strategic mobility although his tactics are based on foot mobility, relatively modest firepower, and often primitive means of communications. However, his operational planning is meticulous. He gathers intelligence, makes careful plans, assigns specific tasks in detail and then rehearses the plan of attack until he believes it cannot fail. The enemy impresses local villagers into his service, demanding that they provide food, shelter and laborers to carry supplies and equipment for combat units, and to evacuate the dead and wounded from the battlefield.

When all is ready he moves his large military formations covertly from concealed bases into the operational area. His intent is to launch a surprise attack designed to achieve quick victory by the sudden application of overwhelming power. This tactic has failed because of our firepower and spoiling attacks.

For months now we have been successful in destroying a number of main force units. We will continue to seek out the enemy, catch him off guard, and punish him at every opportunity.

But success against his main forces alone is not enough to insure a swift and decisive end to the conflict.

This enemy also uses terror--murder, mutilation, abduction and the deliberate shelling of innocent men, women and children -- to exercise control through fear. This tactic, which he employs daily, is much harder to counter than his best conventional moves.

During the week ending 22 April Viet Cong terrorists killed 126 innocent civilians, wounded 86 and abducted 100 others. The victims included 27 Revolutionary Development workers, 11 village or hamlet officials or candidates, six policemen, and 13 refugees or defectors from VC control.

---

Last Sunday, terrorists, near Saigon, assassinated a 39-year old village chief. The same day in the delta, they kidnapped 26 civilians assisting in arranging for local elections. The next day the Viet Cong attacked a group of Revolutionary Development workers, killing one and wounding 12 with grenades and machine-gun fire in one area, and in another they opened fire on a small civilian bus and killed three and wounded four of its passengers. These are cases of calculated enemy attack on civilians to extend by fear that which they cannot gain by persuasion.

One hears little of this brutality here at home. What we do hear about is our own serial bombing against North Vietnam, and I would like to address this for a moment.

For years the enemy has been blowing bridges, interrupting traffic, cutting roads, sabotaging power stations, blocking canals and attacking airfields in the South, and he continues to do so. Bombing in the North has been centered on precisely these same kinds of targets and for the same military purposes--to reduce the supply, interdict the movement and impair the effectiveness of enemy military forces.

Within his capabilities the enemy in Vietnam is waging total war all day--every day--everywhere. He believes in force, and his intensification of violence is limited only by his resources and not by any moral inhibitions.

To our forces, a cease fire means just that. Our observance of past truces has been open and subject to public scrutiny. The enemy permits no such observation. He traditionally has exploited cease fire periods when the bombing has been suspended to increase his resupply and infiltration activity.

This is the enemy--this has been the challenge. The only strategy which can defeat such an organization is one of unrelenting military, political and psychological pressure on his whole structure at all levels.

From his capabilities and his recent activities, I believe the enemy's probable course in the months ahead can be forecast.

In order to carry out his battlefield doctrine I foresee that he will continue his buildup across the Demilitarized Zone and through Laos, and he will attack us when he believes he has a chance for a dramatic blow. He will not return exclusively to guerrilla warfare, although he certainly will continue to intensify his guerrilla activities.

I expect the enemy to continue to increase his mortar, artillery, rocket and recoilless rifle attacks on our installations. At the same time he will step up his attacks on hamlet, village and district organizations to intimidate the people, and to thwart the democratic processes now underway in South Vietnam.

Given the nature of the enemy, it seems to me that the strategy we are following at this time is the proper one, and that it is producing results. While he obviously is far from quitting, there are signs that his morale and his military structure are beginning to deteriorate. Their rate of decline will be in proportion to the pressure directed against him.

Faced with this prospect, it is gratifying to note that our forces and those of the other free world allies have grown in strength and profited from experience. In this connection it is well to remember that Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines all have military forces fighting and working with the Vietnamese and Americans in Vietnam. It also is worthy of note that 30 other nations are providing non-combat support, and that all of these free world forces are doing well, whether in combat or in support of nation-building. Their exploits deserve recognition, not only for their direct contributions to the overall effort, but for their symbolic reminder that the whole of free Asia opposes communist expansion.

As the focal point of this struggle in Asia the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces merit special mention.

In 1954 South Vietnam had literally no armed forces in being. There was no tradition of leadership, nor was there an educational system to provide leaders. The requirement to build an army, navy and air force in the face of enemy attack and political subversion seems, in retrospect, an almost impossible task. Yet, in their determination to resist the communists, the Vietnamese have managed to do it.

What I see now in Vietnam is a military force that performs with growing professional skill. During the last six months, Vietnamese troops have scored repeated successes against some of the best Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army Units.

Perhaps more important in this total effort is the support given by the Vietnamese military to the government's nation-building or Revolutionary Development program. Nearly half of the Vietnamese Army now is engaged in or training for this vital program which will improve the lot of the people. This is a difficult role for a military force. Vietnamese are not only defending villages and hamlets, but with spirit and energy they have turned to the task of nation building as well.

In 1952 there were some who doubted that the Republic of Korea would ever have a first rate fighting force. I wish those doubters could see the Korean units in Vietnam today. They rank with the best fighters and the most effective civic action workers in Vietnam. And so today when I hear doubts about the Vietnamese armed forces, I am reminded of that example.

As you know we are fighting a war with no front lines since the enemy hides among the people, in the jungles and mountains, and uses covertly border areas of neutral countries. Therefore one cannot measure the progress of battle by lines on a map. We therefore have to use other means to chart progress. Several indices clearly point to steady and encouraging success:

Two years ago the Republic of Vietnam had fewer than 30 combat ready battalions. Today it has 154.

(MORE)

Then there were three jet-capable runways in South Vietnam. Today there are 14.

In April 1965 there were 15 airfields that could take C-130 transport aircraft. Now there are 89.

Then there was one deep water port for sea-going ships. Now there are seven.

In 1965 ships had to wait weeks to unload. Now we turn them around in as little as one week.

Then there was no long-haul highway transport. Last month alone 161,000 tons of supplies were moved over the highways. During the last year the mileage of essential highways open for our use has risen from about 52% to 80%.

During 1965 the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and its <sup>90% were Vietnamese</sup> allies killed 36,000 of the enemy and lost approximately 12,000 in return. During recent months this three to one ratio in favor of the allies has risen significantly and in some weeks has been as high as ten or twelve to one.

In 1965, 11,000 Viet Cong rallied to the side of the government. In 1966 there were 20,000. In the first three months of 1967 there have been nearly 11,000 ralliers, a figure that equals all of 1965 and more than half of all of 1966.

In 1964 and the first part of 1965 the ratio of weapons captured was two to one in favor of the enemy. The ratio for 1966 and the first three months of this year is two and one-half to one in favor of the Republic of Vietnam and its allies.

Our President and the representatives of the people of the United States, the Congress, have seen to it that our troops in the field have been well supplied and equipped. And when a field commander does not have to look over his shoulder to see whether he is being supported, he can concentrate on the battlefield with much greater assurance of success. I speak for my troops, when I say -- we are thankful for this unprecedented material support.

As I have said before, in evaluating the enemy strategy it is evident to me that he believes our Achilles' heel is our resolve. Your continued strong support is vital to the success of our mission.

Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coastguardsmen in Vietnam are the finest ever fielded by our nation. And in this assessment I include Americans of all races, creeds and colors. Your servicemen in Vietnam are intelligent, skilled, dedicated and courageous. In these qualities no unit, no service, no ethnic group and no national origin can claim priority.

These men understand the conflict and their complex roles as fighters and builders. They believe in what they are doing. They are determined to provide the shield of security behind which the Republic of Vietnam can develop and prosper, for its own sake and for the future and freedom of all Southeast Asia.

*Can develop proper*

(MORE)



6.

Backed at home by resolve, confidence, patience, determination and continued support, we will prevail in Vietnam over communist aggression.

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of Congress --

I am sure you are as proud to represent our men serving their country and the free world in Vietnam as I am to command them.

- E N D -

Friday, April 28, 1967

Mr. President:

You will recall you said you would see John Oakes. I passed that information on to Oakes. He will be in town on Monday, May 1, and would like to see you.

W. W. Rostow

Have Marv arrange time Monday afternoon\_\_\_\_\_

Can't see him\_\_\_\_\_

See me\_\_\_\_\_

rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, April 28, 1967  
10:45 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I leaned quite hard on Ambassador Hilaly about Pak press reaction to our spare parts initiative at the diplomatic reception.

His reply:

-- it was oriental window-dressing and will now quiet down;

-- it was helpful with the Indians.

I have also told State to prepare a cable.

The experts there say that a bad Pak press helps us with the Indians; convinces people at home we must be sensible on arms, since both the Paks and Indians are unhappy; and, in any case, we tend to be quite tight-fisted with the Paks to keep pressure on them for arms limitations.

Query: should we--

Leave it at the verbal message delivered to Hilaly\_\_\_\_\_

Send a cable as planned\_\_\_\_\_

See me\_\_\_\_\_

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 91-415 Appeal  
By cls, NARA Date 1-18-96



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - April 28, 1967

17  
Pres file

Mr. President:

Yesterday Congresswoman Sullivan, who is visiting the Panama Canal Zone, divulged to Canal employees the main elements of the lock canal treaty which is in the final stages of negotiation. She did this after repeated reminders by Jack Irwin that the texts of the draft treaties furnished her were confidential and had not been made public.

In a few hours, what she had told Canal employees appeared in the local press and in the New York Times this morning. President Robles and Foreign Minister Eleta were understandably upset. Their mood yesterday was to have Robles make a speech tomorrow in which he would protect his political flanks at home by divulging more information regarding the treaty provisions.

Ambassador Adair advised them against escalating the incident with public rebuttal and further disclosures on the treaties. (See attached cable.)

Ambassador Arias spoke to Eleta today in the same vein. He reports that both Robles and Eleta have now calmed down.

It remains to be seen whether the Panama press and Robles's opposition permit the Sullivan disclosures to pass without raising a furor. If they do, the incident will blow over. If they stir up a fuss, Robles will probably have to counter-attack. Ambassador Arias has counselled him to let the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Panamanian National Assembly deal with the Sullivan disclosures.

Mrs. Sullivan has broken trust with our negotiating team. This raises the question of whether Bob Anderson and Jack Irwin should continue to brief her on the status of the negotiations. I will talk to them about this next week. We can't afford leaks like this, particularly as we come down to the wire on the final bargaining.

We are keeping a close eye on the situation and will keep you posted on developments.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Message from Ambassador Adair  
in Panama (3451), April 27.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-4/5

By ing, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

17a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8  
Action

55

Info

ESE627SVA271VAA471

028013

1967 APR 27 PM 6 00

RR RUEHC  
DE RUESVA 3451 1172210  
ZNY CCCCC  
R.272140Z APR 67  
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RULPAL/USCINCSO  
RULPAL/GOV PANCANAL  
STATE GRNC

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-413

By ing, NARA, Date 1-8-92

BATOR  
BOWDLER  
BUDGET  
DAVIS  
GINSBURGH  
HAMILTON  
JESSUP  
KIM  
KORNER  
MCCLOSKEY  
TAYLOR  
WRIGGINS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PANAMA 3451

1. THIS MORNING'S STAR & HERALD, BOTH ENGLISH AND SPANISH EDITIONS, CARRIED BANNER HEADLINES RE CONGRESSWOMAN SULLIVAN'S TREATY DISCLOSURES TO CANAL ZONE EMPLOYEES. ARTICLE STATES THAT MRS. SULLIVAN QUOTED DIRECTLY FROM A MARCH 20 DRAFT OF THE NEW TREATY. CLIPPINGS BEING FORWARDED BY MAIL.
2. I HAVE SPOKEN WITH FONMIN ELETA AND FOUND HIM VERY DISTURBED OVER THE DISCLOSURES. PRESIDENT ROBLES WAS UPSET AND HAS TOLD ELETA UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HE WILL HAVE TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING WITH TREATY INFORMATION WITH BOTH PANAMANIAN LEGISLATORS AND PUBLIC. ELETA INFORMS ME THAT PRES ROBLES IS PLANNING TO INCLUDE MORE INFORMATION RE TREATY PROVISIONS IN HIS SPEECH IN DAVID APRIL 29.

PAGE 2 RUESVA 3451 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. I TOLD ELETA THAT SO FAR AS I WAS AWARE SULLIVAN'S DISCLOSURES HAD BEEN MADE ON HER OWN INITIATIVE NOT THAT OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND THAT I HOPED PRESIDENT ROBLES WOULD CONTINUE EXERCISE AS MUCH RESTRAINT AS POSSIBLE IN OFFICIAL STATEMENTS REGARDING TREATY PROVISIONS UNDER NEGOTIATIONS. I POINTED OUT THAT PUBLIC DEBATE AT THIS TIME MIGHT SERVE EFFECTIVELY TO SLOW DOWN THE PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS. ELETA RECOGNIZED THESE CONSIDERATIONS BUT ADDED THAT SULLIVAN'S ACTIONS WOULD HAVE WIDE REPERCUSSIONS. HE EXPECTS, AS WE ALL DO, THAT AFTERNOON PAPERS TODAY WILL BE FULL OF THE MATTER. HE ADDED HIS OPINION THAT SULLIVAN'S ACTIONS WERE VIRTUALLY AN INTERFERENCE IN NATIONAL AFFAIRS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2 - PANAMA 3451 4/27/67

4. WHILE DRAFTING THIS MESSAGE I RECEIVED A REPORT THAT MRS. SULLIVAN HAD HELD A PRIVATE INTERVIEW THIS MORNING WITH GEORGE WESTERMAN AND WENT OVER THE DRAFT OF AN ARTICLE HE PREPARED THEREON FOR SUBMISSION TO THE MIAMI HERALD. IT IS FURTHER REPORTED THAT SULLIVAN HELD AN INTERVIEW IN HER HOTEL ROOM THIS MORNING WITH PANAMENISTA DEPUTIES JACOBO "BABY" SALAS AND MRS. MARIA SANTA MARIA DE MIRANDA, SO WE CAN EXPECT SOMETHING FROM RADIO AEROPUERTO SOON.

PAGE 3 RUESVA 3451 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. MRS. SULLIVAN MADE CLEAR AT OUTSET OF MEETING WITH CANAL ZONE EMPLOYEES HER OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY AND ENCOURAGED EVERYONE TO WRITE TO THEIR CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS TO MAKE KNOWN THEIR OPPOSITION. WHATEVER HER REAL MOTIVES MAY BE, THE EFFECT OF HER ACTIONS CAN BE GREAT DAMAGE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO U. S. - PANAMANIAN RELATIONS. HER INTERVIEW WITH THE PANAMENISTA DEPUTIES WILL CERTAINLY BE LOOKED UPON AS DIRECT INTERFERENCE IN INTERZONAL POLITICS REGARDLESS OF WHAT SHE MAY HAVE SAID DURING THAT INTERVIEW.

6. SULLIVAN'S VISIT WAS TO HAVE BEEN CONFINED ENTIRELY TO THE CANAL ZONE. THE EMBASSY HAD OFFERED TO ASSIST IN ANY APPROPRIATE MANNER. NO REQUESTS FOR OUR ASSISTANCE HAVE BEEN MADE AND SULLIVAN GAVE NO INDICATION OF HER INTENTION TO SPEAK WITH WESTERMAN OR THE PANAMENISTA DEPUTIES.

7. THE EVENTUAL RESULTS OF THE SULLIVAN VISIT ARE UNPREDICTABLE. HER ACTIONS HERE ARE LAMENTABLE. BESIDES ENDANGERING GOOD U. S. - PANAMANIAN RELATIONS WHICH WE HAVE WORKED HARD TO DEVELOP OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS, HER ACTIONS WOULD ALSO APPEAR TO BE A

PAGE 4 RUESVA 3451 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SETBACK TO CONFIDENTIAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE CONGRESS AND THE DEPARTMENT. CERTAINLY A POOR EXAMPLE OF HONORING CONFIDENTIAL CONSULTATION HAS BEEN PRESENTED TO LOCAL LEGISLATORS.

GP-3. ADAIR  
E

NOTE: HANDLED LIMDI PER 5/5-0  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~WWR~~

18  
sent thru  
Henry Wilson

Friday, April 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ratification of the Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, and Amendment of the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries

The Department of State has submitted for your signature three instruments approving three new agreements. These are:

1. An instrument to reassume our membership in the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea.
2. An instrument to ratify the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas.
3. An instrument of ratification of a proposed amendment of the 1954 Convention with Canada on Great Lakes Fisheries.

All of these instruments were initialed by U. S. representatives with your prior approval and the Senate gave its advice and consent to all three agreements on March 1, 1967.

There remaining no further questions with respect to these agreements and all necessary preliminary steps having been taken, I recommend that you sign the agreements.

W. W. Rostow



~~SECRET~~

Friday - April 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status of Follow-Up Actions on the OAS Summit

In the two weeks since the OAS Summit, these follow-up actions have been taken:

Congressional:

- Linc Gordon and Sol Linowitz briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Summit results last Monday.
- Linc Gordon and Joe Barr have started consultations on the AID untying proposal.
- Treasury is sending to the House Banking and Currency Committee today the request for authorizing legislation on replenishment of the Inter-American Bank's Fund for Special Operations.
- AID and BOB are working on a budget amendment transferring \$100 million from Contingencies to the Alliance for Progress for agriculture, education and health. This will go to the Hill on Monday or Tuesday.

Bilateral:

- Venezuela -- A DOD team has completed talks with Venezuelan officials on their requirements for military equipment with highly satisfactory results. I am sending you a separate memo on this.
- Tony Solomon on April 17 told the Canadians that we want them to cut down oil exports to the US.
- Your memorandum of April 21 on Air Pollution, and particularly the directives for increased research on desulphurization of petroleum, carries forward your promise to Leoni.

~~SECRET~~



Dominican Republic    --    Linc Gordon and Tony Solomon have agreed to recommend to you that the DR be given a sugar allocation of 575,000 tons, or 75,000 more than they would receive if deficits were pro-rated. Balaguer wants 600,000 tons.

Panama    --    Jack Irwin has given the Panamanians a new formula on civil jurisdiction and our compensation formula. They have given us their proposals on land areas. Once reactions have been exchanged on these three issues, we will want to confer with you on what the final deal should be.

Chile    --    Linc Gordon met with Chilean Economy Minister Molina this week and agreed that part of our proposed sector loan for agriculture will be used for agrarian reform.

Multilateral

Education & Agriculture    --    AID Mission Directors held their annual meeting in Washington this week. Linc Gordon reviewed Summit results and directed them to develop sector loan programs in education and agriculture and to consider how AID funds might be used to help promote Latin American exports.

Multinational Projects    --    The Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank also met in Washington this week. They agreed to increase the resources of the Fund for Special Operations by \$1.2 billion. In making this decision the Latin Americans accepted a higher ratio in their contribution to ours, from 1:5 to 1:3. A good portion of the increased resources are for multinational projects.

Economic Integration    --    Linc Gordon took advantage of the presence of Finance Ministers for the Inter-American Bank

meeting to discuss how they might organize internally to carry out economic integration. He learned that several key Latin American countries have agreed to meet prior to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council meeting in June to discuss specific steps for proceeding with integration.

Science & --  
Technology

The Inter-American Cultural and Scientific Council will meet on May 15 to select a panel of experts to recommend action on: (1) multinational institutes of science and technology and (2) a regional scientific and technological program. Don Hornig is organizing a task force to develop a realistic integrated program for Latin America in science and technology, including peaceful uses of atomic energy and marine sciences.

W. W. Rostow

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 99-92**  
**By cb, NARA Date 6-30-00**

20

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

*Pres file*

Thursday, April 27, 1967  
5:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith two interesting  
intelligence reports reflecting pretty  
accurately the mood in Hanoi.

They indicate that right now they  
plan to sweat us out and buy time by  
military action.

You will, I believe, wish to  
read them both.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)



1. ~~summary~~  
2. *Pres file*

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

Thursday - April 27, 1967

Mr. President:

I understand that Lynda Bird's trip has been approved and that the Secret Service is making arrangements for her to leave on Wednesday, May 3.

Subject to your approval, I propose to send the attached message to our Embassies in Colombia, Peru and Chile and to inform Linc Gordon. Bill Bowdler prepared the message together with the Secret Service. Lynda has seen it.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Approve sending message \_\_\_\_\_.

Hold up on message, see me \_\_\_\_\_.

**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 4-29-91

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~



~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE TO BE SENT [REDACTED] TO:

Embassies Bogota  
Lima  
Santiago

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

For Ambassador from Walt Rostow.

Miss Lynda Bird Johnson plans to visit Colombia, Peru and Chile on  
journalistic assignment for McCall's magazine.

For Bogota.

In Colombia she will visit hospital ship "Hope" in Cartagena. Her  
tentative in-country itinerary is as follows:

- Wed., May 3 - Arrive Baranquilla 17:35 via Avianca 67F/Y.
  - Motor to Cartagena, going directly to ship.
  - Overnights on ship.
- Thurs., May 4 - Interviews on board ship and possible sightseeing  
Overnights on ship.
- Fri., May 5 - More interviews and sightseeing.
  - Departs Cartagena for Bogota at 17:25 via Avianca 651T.
  - Arrives Bogota 19:40.
  - Overnights at Embassy residence.

~~SANITIZED~~  
Authority NLS 019-015-2-1  
By [Signature], NARA, Date 12/14/01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Sat., May 6 - Departs Bogota for Lima at 07:55 via Varig 811F/Y.

For Lima

In Peru she will interview Peace Corps Volunteers at Arequipa and do some sightseeing in Lima, Cuzco and Machu Pichu. Her tentative in-country itinerary is as follows:

Sat., May 6 - Arrives Lima 10:35 via Varig 811 F/Y.  
- Spends remainder of day sightseeing in city.  
- Overnights at Embassy Residence.

Sun., May 7 - Departs Lima for Arequipa 08:30 via LANSA 503.  
- Arrives Arequipa 10:45.  
- Spends remainder of day visiting PC projects and interviewing PCVs.  
- Overnights Arequipa.

Mond., May 8 - Morning free for more interviews or sightseeing.  
- Departs for Lima at 13:00 via LANSA 504.  
- Arrives Lima 15:15.  
- Overnights Embassy Residence.

Tues., May 9 - Departs Lima 08:15 for Cuzco via Faucett 215T.  
- Arrives Cuzco 10:15.  
- Visits Machu Pichu.  
- Overnights Cuzco.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

- Wed., May 10 - Departs Cuzco for Lima 09:30 via LANSA 502T.  
- Arrives Lima 11:00.  
- Overnights Embassy Residence.  
- Afternoon free.
- Thurs., May 11 - Spends day sightseeing.  
- Departs Lima for Santiago 18:50 via Iberia 987.

For Santiago

In Chile she will visit Church World Service nurses in Temuco.

Her tentative itinerary is as follows:

- Thurs., May 11 - Arrives Santiago 22:50 on Iberia 987.  
- Overnights Embassy Residence.
- Fri., May 12 - Departs Santiago for Temuco 08:30 via LAN-Chile 631T.  
- Arrives Temuco 10:10.  
- Interviews nurses.  
- Overnights Temuco.
- Sat., May 13 - Spends day interviewing and sightseeing.  
- Departs Temuco 17:30 via LAN-Chile 632T.  
- Arrives Santiago 20:00.  
- Overnights Embassy Residence.
- Sund., May 14 - Departs Santiago enroute US 07:30 via Aerolineas Peruanas 98 A.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-

There will be no public announcement prior to her departure and no information released about her itinerary. Embassy should take no repeat no initiative with the press regarding her activities and handle all queries by saying that she is on a private reporting assignment for McCall. She will be travelling alone except for her Secret Service detail of three agents. She

Miss Johnson desires no repeat no official interviews or entertainment. Any offers or requests by local officials should be declined. She does request accommodations at Embassy residence where she has to overnight in capital. Otherwise Secret Service will handle arrangements with help of Embassy escort officer.

Advance Secret Service agents will arrive in your country several days prior her arrival and will coordinate closely with you regarding her activities. You will be notified of their ETA. You should work out with agents best timing for notifying Foreign Office and local security officials. Objective is to keep advance knowledge of her arrival and movements to a minimum consistent with necessary security arrangements. You should place your best escort officer at disposal of Secret Service agent to help with customs and immigration, in-country transportation, accommodations, etc.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-5-

You should use [REDACTED] in communicating with me regarding all aspects of her trip.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Thursday, April 27, 1967 -- 5:20 pm

Mr. President:

You may be interested in these charts which I had gotten up after my little debate the other day with Bob McNamara on the ratio of GVN to U.S. combat casualties. I included -- which I regard as proper -- GVN "missing and captured" in combat.

They do not show any great change in ratio once we put major U.S. forces into the field.

They also show very similar ratios per thousand men in our orders of battle.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 27, 1967


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

As you instructed, while you were away I attempted to put together some charts which would show the relationship between U. S. and GVN casualties.


I have come up with four charts -- attached -- as follows:

1. The first is a simple ratio of GVN to U. S. killed only.
2. In this, I added the missing and captured figures to the killed for the GVN and ran a ratio in relation to U. S. killed only.
3. In the third, I ran a per 1,000 OB rate for GVN killed, missing and captured and for U. S. killed and plotted them separately.
4. In this one, I have refined graph number 3 to show the ratio of the per 1,000 OB rate for GVN killed, missing and captured to U. S. killed.


  
Art McCafferty







RATIO GVN KIA/MIA Cap To US KIA



3


2

1

0

S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M  
1965 1966 1967

G VN KIA/MIA cap To US KIA -- per 1000 OB





23

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By 1-8, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 27, 1967 -- 9:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith suggested agenda for meeting this morning at 10:30 a.m. with General Westmoreland.

It is based on the assumption -- checked with Bob McNamara -- that this is not a meeting at which you will wish to make final decisions. It is designed to hear Westy out; pose some questions which you and your advisors here will wish to ponder in the days ahead.

1. Thank Gen. Westmoreland for his forthright and helpful speech. We have come to a time when all of us -- in the field and at home -- must work as a team as never before to win this war at the earliest possible date.

2. Ask Westmoreland for his evaluation of the current military situation and for his forecast of developments in the months ahead. You may then wish to turn to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara for clarifying questions to Westmoreland. If they don't put the question, you might ask what is his estimate of the VC and North Vietnamese order of battle inside South Viet Nam: has it been increasing or decreasing in the last three months?

3. You may then wish to ask what are his recommendations with respect to ground and air actions for the months ahead. Again, ask the two Secretaries if they have any questions.

4. Finally, you may wish to ask him what U.S. forces he believes will be required and what precisely he plans to use them for: in what areas and for what functions?

5. In addition to the questions from the two Secretaries, you may wish to make sure that this question is put to him: If these forces are sent to Viet Nam, what assurance is there that, barring a gross escalation of the war by the other side, they will be sufficient?

6. What action is he now taking and will he take in the future to assure the ARVN, the regional and popular forces will be increased in their efficiency?

7. I would recommend that he not see the press after this meeting; but that George Christian be instructed to say merely that Gen. Westmoreland has given the President a full report on the combat situation in Viet Nam.

WWRostow:rlm

~~SECRET~~

W. W. Rostow



24  
Mr. Rostow

*Per file*

April 27, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press Conference Statement on Greece

There will be strong domestic reaction if you say nothing about the coup in Greece. On the other hand, Secretary Rusk was initially concerned that we not condemn the new government for fear of setting off a civil war.

Luke Battle recommends a voluntary statement at the press conference but has not been able to get to Secretary Rusk on it.

My own feeling is that State's proposed text (attached) is harmless enough not to cause any trouble. All it does is to endorse the line the King and Prime Minister took publicly in Athens yesterday.

In fact, it's so bland that I have added a sentence (in brackets) to make clear that we don't condone military coups. Phil Talbot asked for a much stronger statement. If we are completely bland, we will undercut his efforts to make the new government realize we're serious about its return to full civil liberties and constitutional government. A bland statement would also arouse all the people here who are concerned about Andreas Papandreou.

If you are uncomfortable with my addition, you may want to hear Secretary Rusk's views.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Dick Moose

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-415  
By ing, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPOSED PRESS CONFERENCE  
VOLUNTARY ON GREECE

We have followed closely the situation in Greece since the military takeover there last Friday. We are, of course, deeply concerned by the serious implications of changing governments by force. /

I am encouraged to see that King Constantine in his first public statement since last Friday has called for an early return to parliamentary government. We are now awaiting concrete evidence that the new Greek Government will make every effort to re-establish the democratic institutions which have been an integral part of Greek political life.

Ambassador Talbot has made unmistakably clear to the new government our concern for the safety of all political prisoners, including the Papandreous. He has received repeated assurances that they are well and that no harm will come to them.

*Pres. file*~~SECRET~~

April 27, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Domestic Concerns in the Greek Situation

Greece is outwardly calm. Rumors of counter-coups are beginning, but so far the current group seems in control. The King originally stayed aloof from the coup group but is gradually moving into a working relationship in hopes of guiding it. We're doing business with the new government, but Phil Talbot has made clear that our cooperation will depend on quick restoration of civil liberties and return to constitutional government as soon as possible. We will want to make a public statement soon.

Our main operational problem is the active campaign here by friends of Andreas Papandreou to get him out of jail. Coupled with this is the feeling of many Greek-Americans that the King and the army are out to stifle Greek democracy. If something happens to Andreas, they're quite likely to blame us for his death and the "rape of Greek democracy."

If anyone approaches you, you can say in good conscience that we've given top priority to Andreas' safety. Talbot has told coup leaders that no harm must come to political prisoners, and they have assured him repeatedly that none would. The fact remains that Andreas is public enemy #1 in the eyes of this government. It saw him rushing Greece into the hands of the Communists and--at the very least--it's fair to say that his blunt political tactics were one of the main factors in precipitating the coup.

We're trying to persuade coup leaders now to let Andreas leave Greece. Everyone agrees that before Greece can return to normal, he must leave the scene. Talbot gives this only an outside chance.

We're doing everything we can to calm people down and get Andreas out. But it may come to a point where we'd have to consider whether to use our military aid as further leverage (we've already suspended major shipments).

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By ing, NARA, Date 4-23-93 W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WTR  
2

Thursday, April 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agreement with the Government of Norway Concerning  
Civil Uses of Atomic Energy

The Atomic Energy Commission, with the concurrence of the Department of State, recommends that you approve an Amendment to the existing Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Norway Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy. The proposed agreement would supersede the Agreement which is due to expire June 9, 1967.

The primary purpose of the proposed agreement is to provide for continued cooperation. It would implement provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 respecting enrichment services and ownership of special nuclear material. The only unusual element is an agreement to assure a supply of fuel on a long term basis for a large power reactor to be begun in 1972, and for such other additional power reactors as might be brought under the agreement by amendment thereto. The proposed agreement guarantees a supply of up to 10,500 kilograms of enriched uranium. It is contemplated that the basic method for the supply of enriched uranium would be through enrichment services although there may be some U. S. material sold to Norway under the agreement.

At the request of Norway, the proposed agreement also contains in Article VIII a provision for transfer to the Government of Norway of special nuclear material for the performance in Norway of conversion or fabrication services and for subsequent transfer to a nation or group of nations with which the United States has an Agreement for Cooperation within the scope of which such subsequent transfer falls.

Safeguards with respect to materials and facilities are the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency under the trilateral arrangement which came into force on September 26, 1966. U. S. safeguards rights are suspended as long as this Agreement remains in effect and would automatically apply if the Agreement should be terminated.

I recommend that you approve this proposed Amendment. If you agree, there is presented herewith a letter to Dr. Seaborg for your signature.



If you sign the letter, the proposed Amendment will be formally executed by appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Norway. In compliance with Section 123c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Amendment will then be placed before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

*April 28, 1967*

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

In accordance with Section 123c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to me by letter dated April 25, 1967, a proposed superseding Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Norway Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy and has recommended that I approve the proposed Agreement, determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution.

Pursuant to the provisions of 123c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and upon the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission, I hereby:

- (a) approve the proposed Agreement and determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States of America;
- (b) authorize the execution of the proposed Agreement on behalf of the Government of the United States of America by appropriate authorities of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,

*/s/ Lyndon B Johnson*

The Honorable  
Glenn T. Seaborg  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington

LBJ:EEJ:em (4/27/67)

cc: ~~W~~/W Rostow  
C:E Johnson



UNITED STATES  
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

25 APR 1967

Dear Mr. President:

The Atomic Energy Commission recommends that you approve the enclosed proposed superseding "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Norway Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy", determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution. The Department of State supports the Commission's recommendation.

The proposed agreement, which has been negotiated by the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, would supersede the Agreement for Cooperation between the United States of America and the Government of Norway which was signed at Washington on February 25, 1957.

The primary purpose of the proposed agreement is to provide for the continuation of the cooperation which has taken place between the United States and Norway under the Agreement for Cooperation which will expire June 9, 1967. The new agreement would implement provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 respecting enrichment services and ownership of special nuclear material which were added by recent legislation and provide for the supply on a long-term basis of enriched uranium to fuel the Skien Fjord reactor on which Norway plans to begin construction in 1972. Norway is also considering the construction of additional nuclear reactor power stations. The framework provided by the agreement will permit long-term assurances of increased quantities of enriched uranium for such additional reactors as might be brought under the agreement by amendment. In order to provide for the Skien Fjord reactor, the proposed agreement would have a term of thirty years and the quantity of enriched uranium which would be made available under the agreement will be established at 10,500 kilograms.

Consistent with the "Private Ownership" legislation of 1964, Article VII of the agreement would permit arrangements to be made between either Party or authorized persons under its jurisdiction and authorized persons under the jurisdiction of the other for transfers of special nuclear material. Such arrangements would be in addition to the government-to-government transactions currently allowed and would be subject to the ceiling limit of 10,500 kilograms of U-235 in enriched uranium which may be transferred to Norway under the agreement.

Pursuant to proposed Article VIII, the basic method for the supply of enriched uranium to which there would be a transfer of title would, after December 31, 1968, be through uranium enrichment services for the account of the Government of Norway. This reflects a change in the Commission's previous policy under which materials were provided principally through sale. Sale would continue to be possible under the proposed agreement at the election of the Commission. In addition, the Commission would be able, at its discretion, to make available to the Government of Norway uranium enriched to more than twenty percent in the isotope U-235 when there is an economic or technical justification for such a transfer. In keeping with stated Commission policy, Article VIII also includes language which assures the comparability of domestic and foreign prices for enriched uranium and services performed, as well as of the advance notice required for delivery.

At the request of Norway, the proposed agreement also contains in Article VIII a provision for transfer to the Government of Norway of special nuclear material for the performance in Norway of conversion or fabrication services and for subsequent transfer to a nation or group of nations with which the United States has an Agreement for Cooperation within the scope of which such subsequent transfer falls.

In accordance with United States' policy, the agreement provides that the International Atomic Energy Agency will be promptly requested to assume responsibility for applying safeguards to materials and facilities which would be subject to safeguards under the agreement. This would be accomplished through an agreement to be negotiated by the United States, Norway, and the Agency. The United States' bilateral safeguards rights would be suspended during the time and to the extent that the Agency safeguards apply to such materials and facilities.

The occasion for considering a superseding agreement also provided an opportunity to incorporate changes in keeping with current practices in other similar agreements respecting the style and formulation of certain provisions.



The President

- 3 -

Following your approval, determination, and authorization, the proposed agreement will be formally executed by appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Norway. In compliance with Section 123c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the agreement will then be submitted to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Respectfully yours,

Chairman

The President  
The White House

Enclosure:  
Proposed Superseding Agreement for  
Cooperation Between the Government  
of the United States of America and  
the Government of Norway

AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN  
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF NORWAY  
CONCERNING CIVIL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Whereas the peaceful uses of atomic energy hold great promise for all mankind; and

Whereas the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Norway desire to cooperate with each other in the development of such peaceful uses of atomic energy; and

Whereas reactors are useful in the production of research quantities of radioisotopes, in medical therapy and in numerous other research and experimental activities and at the same time are a means of affording valuable training and experience in nuclear science and engineering useful in the development of other peaceful uses of atomic energy including civilian nuclear power; and

Whereas the Government of Norway desires to pursue a research and development program looking toward the realization of the peaceful and humanitarian uses of atomic energy, including the design, construction, and operation of power-producing reactors and research reactors, and desires to obtain assistance from the Government of the United States of America and the United States industry with respect to this program; and

Whereas the Government of the United States of America, represented by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, desires to assist the Government of Norway in such a program; and

Whereas the Parties desire this Agreement to supersede the "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Norway Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy" signed on February 25, 1957;

The Parties therefore agree as follows:

#### ARTICLE I

For purposes of this Agreement:

A. "Commission" means the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

B. "Equipment and devices" and "equipment or device" means any instrument, apparatus, or facility and includes any facility, except an atomic weapon, capable of making use of or producing special nuclear material, and component parts thereof.

C. "Person" means any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, government agency, or government corporation but does not include the Parties to this Agreement.

D. "Reactor" means an apparatus, other than an atomic weapon in which a self-supporting fission chain reaction is maintained by utilizing uranium, plutonium, or thorium, or any combination of uranium, plutonium or thorium.

E. "Restricted Data" means all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear materials; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from the category of Restricted Data by the appropriate authority.

F. "Atomic weapon" means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

G. "Special nuclear material" means (1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which the Commission determines to be special nuclear material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing.

H. "Source material" means (1) uranium, thorium, or any other material which is determined by the Government of Norway or the Commission to be source material; or (2) ores containing one or more of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as the Government of Norway or the Commission may determine from time to time.

I. "Parties" means the Government of the United States of America, including the Commission on behalf of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Norway. "Party" means one of the above "Parties".



J. "Safeguards" means a system of controls designed to assure that any materials, equipment or devices committed to the peaceful uses of atomic energy are not used to further any military purpose.

K. "Byproduct material" means any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special nuclear material.

L. "Superseded Agreement" means the Agreement signed by the Parties on February 25, 1957.

## ARTICLE II

The "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Norway Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy" signed on February 25, 1957, is superseded on the date on which this Agreement enters into force.

## ARTICLE III

A. Restricted Data shall not be communicated under this Agreement, and no materials or equipment and devices shall be transferred and no services shall be furnished under this Agreement if the transfer of any such materials or equipment and devices or the furnishing of any such service involves the communication of Restricted Data.

B. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the availability of personnel and material, and the applicable laws,

regulations and license requirements in force in their respective countries, the Parties shall assist each other in the achievement of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

C. This Agreement shall not require the exchange of any information which the Parties are not permitted to communicate.

#### ARTICLE IV

Subject to the provisions of Article III, the Parties shall exchange unclassified information with respect to the application of atomic energy to peaceful uses and the problems of health and safety connected therewith. The exchange of information provided for in this Article shall be accomplished through various means, including reports, conferences, and visits to facilities, and shall include information in the following fields:

(1) Development, design, construction, operation, and use of research, materials testing, experimental, demonstration power, and power reactors, and reactor experiments;

(2) The use of radioactive isotopes and source, special nuclear, and byproduct material in physical and biological research, medicine, agriculture, and industry; and

(3) Health and safety problems related to the foregoing.

#### ARTICLE V

The application or use of any information (including design drawings and specifications) and any material, equipment and devices, exchanged or transferred between the Parties under this

Agreement or the superseded Agreement shall be the responsibility of the Party receiving it, and the other Party does not warrant the accuracy or completeness of such information and does not warrant the suitability of such information, materials, equipment, and devices for any particular use or application.

## ARTICLE VI

A. Materials of interest in connection with the subjects of agreed exchange of information, as provided in Article IV and subject to the provisions of Article III, including source materials, byproduct materials, other radioisotopes, stable isotopes, and special nuclear materials for purposes other than fueling reactors and reactor experiments may be transferred between the Parties for defined applications in such quantities and under such terms and conditions as may be agreed when such materials are not commercially available.

B. Subject to the provisions of Article III, and under such terms and conditions as may be agreed, and to the extent as may be agreed, specialized research facilities and reactor materials testing facilities of the Parties shall be made available for mutual use consistent with the limits of space, facilities, and personnel conveniently available when such facilities are not commercially available.

C. With respect to the subjects of agreed exchange of information as provided in Article IV and subject to the provisions of Article III, equipment and devices may be transferred from one

Party to the other under such terms and conditions as may be agreed. It is recognized that such transfers will be subject to limitations which may arise from shortages of supplies or other circumstances existing at the time.

#### ARTICLE VII

A. With respect to the application of atomic energy to peaceful uses, it is understood that arrangements may be made between either Party or authorized persons under its jurisdiction and authorized persons under the jurisdiction of the other Party for the transfer of materials other than special nuclear material, equipment and devices and for the performance of services.

B. It is understood that arrangements may be made between either Party or authorized persons under its jurisdiction and authorized persons under the jurisdiction of the other Party for the transfer of special nuclear material and for the performance of services with respect thereto for the uses specified in Articles VI and VIII of this Agreement and subject to the limitations of Article IX of this Agreement.

C. The Parties agree that the activities referred to in Paragraphs A and B of this Article shall be subject to the limitations in Article III and to the policies of the Parties with respect to transactions involving the authorized persons referred to in Paragraphs A and B.



## ARTICLE VIII

A. During the period of this Agreement, the Commission will supply to the Government of Norway, under terms and conditions as the Parties may agree, all of Norway's requirements for uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 for use in the power reactor program described in the Appendix to this Agreement, which Appendix, subject to the quantity limitation established in Article IX, may be amended from time to time by mutual consent without modification of this Agreement.

(1) The Commission will supply such enriched uranium by providing after December 31, 1968, for the production or enrichment, or both, in facilities owned by the Commission of enrichment uranium for the account of the Government of Norway. (Upon timely advice that any natural uranium required with respect to any particular delivery of enriched uranium under such service arrangements is not reasonably available to the Government of Norway, the Commission will be prepared to furnish the required natural uranium on terms and conditions to be agreed.)

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph A(1) above, if the Government of Norway so requests, the Commission, at its election, may sell the enriched uranium to the Government of Norway under such terms and conditions as may be agreed by the Parties.

B. As the Parties may agree, the Commission will transfer to the Government of Norway uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 for use in fueling of defined research applications, including research reactors, materials testing reactors, and reactor experiments, subject to the quantity limitations of Article IX. The terms and conditions of each transfer shall be agreed upon by the Parties, it being understood that in the event of transfer of title of enriched uranium, the Commission shall have the option of limiting the arrangements to undertakings such as those described in Paragraph A(1) of this Article.

C. The Commission may also transfer to the Government of Norway under such terms and conditions with respect to each transfer as the Parties may agree, special nuclear material for the performance in Norway of conversion or fabrication services, or both, and for subsequent transfer to a nation or group of nations with which the Government of the United States of America has an Agreement for Cooperation within the scope of which such subsequent transfer falls. It is understood that in the event of transfer of title of enriched uranium to the Government of Norway, the Commission shall have the option of limiting the arrangements to undertakings such as those described in Paragraph A(1) of this Article.

D. With respect to transfers of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 provided for in Paragraphs A, B, and C of this Article, it is understood that:

(1) contracts specifying quantities, enrichments, delivery schedules, and other terms and conditions of supply or services will be executed on a timely basis between the Commission and the Government of Norway; and

(2) prices for uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 sold and charges for enrichment services performed and the advance notice required for delivery will be those in effect at the time of delivery for users in the United States. The Commission may agree to supply enriched uranium or perform enrichment services upon shorter notice, subject to assessment of such surcharge to the usual base price as the Commission may consider reasonable to cover abnormal production costs incurred by the Commission by reason of such shorter notice.

E. It is agreed that, should the total quantity of enriched uranium which the Commission has agreed to provide pursuant to this and other Agreements for Cooperation reach the maximum quantity of enriched uranium which the Commission has available for such purposes, and should the Government of Norway not have executed contracts covering the adjusted net quantity specified in Article IX, the Commission may request, upon appropriate notice, that the Government of Norway execute contracts for all or any part of such enriched uranium as is not then under contract. It is understood that, should the Government of Norway not execute a contract in accordance with a request by the Commission hereunder, the Commission shall be relieved of all obligations to the

Government of Norway with respect to the enriched uranium for which a contract has been so requested.

F. The enriched uranium supplied hereunder may contain up to twenty percent (20%) in the isotope U-235. The Commission, however, may make available a portion of the enriched uranium supplied hereunder as material containing more than 20% in the isotope U-235 when there is a technical or economic justification for such a transfer.

G. Within the limitations contained in Article IX, the quantity of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 transferred by the Commission under this Article and in the custody of the Government of Norway for the fueling of reactors or reactor experiments shall not at any time be in excess of the quantity thereof necessary for the loading of such reactors or reactor experiments, plus such additional quantity as, in the opinion of the Parties, is necessary for the efficient and continuous operation of such reactors or reactor experiments.

H. It is agreed that when any special nuclear material received from the United States of America requires reprocessing, such reprocessing shall be performed at the discretion of the Commission in either Commission facilities or facilities acceptable to the Commission, on terms and conditions to be later agreed; and it is understood, except as may be otherwise agreed, that the form and content of any irradiated fuel elements shall not be altered after their removal from the reactor prior to



delivery to the Commission or the facilities acceptable to the Commission for reprocessing.

I. With respect to all special nuclear material not owned by the Government of the United States of America produced in reactors while fueled with materials obtained from the United States of America by means other than lease, which is in excess of the need of the Government of Norway for such materials in its program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the Government of the United States of America shall have and is hereby granted (a) a first option to purchase such material at prices then prevailing in the United States of America for special nuclear material produced in reactors which are fueled pursuant to the terms of an Agreement for Cooperation with the Government of the United States of America, and (b) the right to approve the transfer of such material to any other nation or group of nations in the event the option to purchase is not exercised.

J. Special nuclear material produced, as a result of irradiation processes, in any part of the fuel leased under this Agreement, or the superseded Agreement, shall be for the account of the Government of Norway and, after reprocessing as provided in Paragraph H of this Article, shall be returned to the Government of Norway, at which time title to such material shall be transferred to that Government, unless the Government of the United States of America shall exercise the option, which is hereby granted, to retain, with a credit to the Government of Norway based on the

prices in the United States of America referred to in Paragraph I of this Article, any such special nuclear material which is in excess of the needs of Norway for such material in its program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

K. Some atomic energy materials which the Government of Norway may request the Commission to provide in accordance with this Agreement, or which have been provided to the Government of Norway under the superseded Agreement, are harmful to persons and property unless handled and used carefully. After delivery of such materials to the Government of Norway, the Government of Norway shall bear all responsibility, insofar as the Government of the United States of America is concerned, for the safe handling and use of such materials. With respect to any special nuclear materials or fuel elements which the Commission may lease pursuant to this Agreement, or may have leased pursuant to the superseded Agreement, to the Government of Norway or to any private organization under its jurisdiction, the Government of Norway shall indemnify and save harmless the Government of the United States of America against any and all liability (including third party liability) for any cause whatsoever arising out of the production or fabrication, the ownership, the lease, and the possession and use of such special nuclear materials or fuel elements after delivery by the Commission to the Government of Norway or to any private individual or private organization under its jurisdiction.

## ARTICLE IX

The adjusted net quantity of U-235 in enriched uranium transferred from the United States of America to Norway under Articles VI, VII or VIII during the period of this Agreement for Cooperation, or under the superseded Agreement, shall not exceed in the aggregate 10,500 kilograms. The following method of computation shall be used in calculating transfers, within the ceiling quantity of 10,500 kilograms of U-235, made under said Articles:

From:

- (1) the quantity of U-235 contained in enriched uranium transferred under said Articles, minus
- (2) the quantity of U-235 contained in an equal quantity of uranium of normal isotopic assay,

Subtract:

- (3) the aggregate of the quantities of U-235 contained in recoverable uranium of United States origin either transferred to the United States of America or to any other nation or group of nations with the approval of the Government of the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement, minus
- (4) the quantity of U-235 contained in an equal quantity of uranium of normal isotopic assay.

## ARTICLE X

A. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Norway emphasize their common interest in assuring that any material, equipment, or device made available to the Government of Norway pursuant to this Agreement, or the superseded Agreement, shall be used solely for civil purposes.

B. Except to the extent that the safeguards provided for in this Agreement are supplanted, by agreement of the Parties as provided in Article XII, by safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Government of the United States of America, notwithstanding any other provisions of this Agreement, shall have the following rights:

(1) With the objective of assuring design and operation for civil purposes and permitting effective application of safeguards to review the design of any

(a) reactor and

(b) other equipment and devices the design of which the Commission determines to be relevant to the effective application of safeguards,

which are to be made available to the Government of Norway or any person under its jurisdiction under this or the superseded Agreement, by the Government of the United States of America or any person under its jurisdiction, or which are to use, fabricate, or process any of the following materials so made available: source material, special nuclear material,

moderator material or other material designa by the  
Commission;

(2) With respect to any source or special nuclear material made available to the Government of Norway or any person under its jurisdiction, under this or the superseded Agreement, by the Government of the United States of America or any person under its jurisdiction and any source or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of any of the following materials, equipment, or devices so made available:

(a) source material, special nuclear material, moderator material, or other material designated by the Commission,

(b) reactors,

(c) any other equipment or device designated by the Commission as an item to be made available on the condition that provision of this subparagraph B(2) will apply,

(i) to require the maintenance and production of operating records and to request and receive reports for the purpose of assisting in ensuring accountability for such materials; and

(ii) to require that any such material in the custody of the Government of Norway or any person under its jurisdiction be subject to all of the



safeguards provided for in this Article and the guaranties set forth in Article XI;

(3) To require the deposit in storage facilities designated by the Commission of any of the special nuclear material referred to in subparagraph B(2) of this Article which is not currently utilized for civil purposes in Norway and which is not purchased or retained by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to Article VIII of this Agreement, transferred pursuant to Article VIII, Paragraph I(b) or otherwise disposed of pursuant to an agreement mutually acceptable to the Parties;

(4) To designate, after consultation with the Government of Norway, personnel who, accompanied, if either Party so requests, by personnel designated by the Government of Norway, shall have access in Norway to all places and data necessary to account for the source and special nuclear materials which are subject to subparagraph B(2) of this Article to determine whether there is compliance with this Agreement and to make such independent measurements as may be deemed necessary;

(5) In the event of non-compliance with the provisions of this Article, or the guarantees set forth in Article XI, or the failure of the Government of Norway to carry out the provisions of this Article within a reasonable time, to suspend or terminate this Agreement and require the return of any materials, equipment; and

(6) To consult with the Government of Norway in the matter of health and safety.

C. The Government of Norway undertakes to facilitate the application of the safeguards provided for in this Article.

#### ARTICLE XI

The Government of Norway guarantees that:

A. Safeguards provided in Article X shall be maintained.

B. No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to the Government of Norway or authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement, or the superseded Agreement, by lease, sale or otherwise, and no special nuclear material produced as a result of such transfer will be used for atomic weapons or for research on or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purposes, and that no such material, including equipment and devices, will be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of Norway except as the Commission may agree to such transfer to another nation or group of nations and then only if in the opinion of the Commission such transfer falls within the scope of an Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the other nation or group of nations.

#### ARTICLE XII

A. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Norway, recognizing the desirability of making use of the facilities and services of the International Atomic Energy

Agency, agree that the Agency will be promptly requested to assume responsibility for applying safeguards to materials and facilities subject to safeguards under this Agreement. It is contemplated that the necessary arrangements will be effected without modification of this Agreement through an agreement to be negotiated between the Parties and the Agency which may include provisions for suspension of the safeguard rights accorded to the Commission by Article X of this Agreement, during the time and to the extent that the Agency's safeguards apply to such materials and facilities.

B. In the event the Parties do not reach a mutually satisfactory agreement on the terms of the trilateral arrangement envisaged in Paragraph A of this Article, either Party may, by notification, terminate this Agreement. Before either Party takes steps to terminate this Agreement, the Parties will carefully consider the economic effects of any such termination. Neither Party will invoke its termination rights until the other Party has been given sufficient advance notice to permit arrangements by the Government of Norway, if it is the other Party, for an alternative source of power and to permit adjustment by the Government of the United States of America, if it is the other Party, of production schedules. In the event of termination by either Party, the Government of Norway shall, at the request of the Government of the United States of America, return to the Government of the United States of America all special nuclear

material received pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement and still in its possession or in the possession of persons under its jurisdiction. The Government of the United States of America will compensate the Government of Norway for its interest in such material so returned at the United States Commission's schedule of prices then in effect domestically.

#### ARTICLE XIII

The rights and obligations of the Parties provided for under this Agreement shall extend, to the extent applicable, to cooperative activities initiated under the superseded Agreement, including, but not limited to, material, equipment, devices, and information transferred thereunder.

#### ARTICLE XIV

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which each Government shall receive from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for the entry into force of such Agreement and shall remain in force for a period of thirty years.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized,  
have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this **twenty-fifth** day  
of **April** , 1967.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:



Mr. William L. Yeomans  
Assistant Director,  
Agreements and Liaison,  
Division of International Affairs,  
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.



Mr. Donovan Q. Zook  
Director, Office of  
Atomic Energy Affairs,  
International Scientific and  
Technological Affairs,  
Department of State.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT <sup>of</sup> NORWAY:



Mr. Olaf Solli  
Counselor of Embassy



## APPENDIX

Norwegian Enriched Uranium Power Reactor Program

<u>Reactor</u>	<u>Power MW Net Electrical</u>	<u>Start of Construc- tion</u>	<u>Criti- cality Date</u>	<u>Total Kgs U-235 Required</u>
A. Skien Fjord	600	1972	1975	10,000

DRAFT LETTER FOR POSSIBLE USE BY THE  
PRESIDENT IN RESPONDING TO  
DR. GLENN T. SEABORG

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

In accordance with Section 123a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to me by letter dated \_\_\_\_\_, 1967, a proposed superseding "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Norway Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy" and has recommended that I approve the proposed agreement, determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution.

Pursuant to the provisions of 123b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and upon the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission, I hereby:

- (a) approve the proposed agreement and determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States of America;

(b) authorize the execution of the proposed agreement on behalf of the Government of the United States of America by appropriate authorities of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg  
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D.C.

(2)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Thursday April 27, 1967 10:45 P.M.

Mr. President:

I have been in touch with Luke Battle. Two Americans at the USAID mission in Yemen have been accused of blowing up the Capital. We are evacuating the AID mission, and only leaving a minimal staff. We have been in touch with the Yemen and U.A.R. ambassadors here. Since they have announced publicly, it's unlikely they will reverse their announced decision about our two men.

The background is that in both Cairo and Yemen, there have been some groups who have wanted to either keep the US connections, or get rid of it. The latter appear to have won.

We shall be announcing tomorrow that the charges are without foundation - which they are. Both State and I will follow closely.

signed,

WWR

*Pres file*

Thursday, April 27, 1967  
7:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith summary of four German  
press reports on April 27.

Three positive. The first not  
necessarily negative -- but not positive.

All thoughtful.

W. W. Rostow



Berlin, 1482, April 27, 1967

SUBJECT: The President's Visit to Bonn - Berlin Press Reaction

Following four days of generally favorable press commentary about President Johnson's attendance at the Adenauer funeral and activities in Bonn, Berlin editorial comment on April 27, was somewhat restrained in tone. Several newspapers noted that the President came face to face with a Bonn Government whose interests, both national and European, might frequently differ from those of the United States.

Der Tagesspiegel (Indep.) noted that some tension could be discerned in U. S. -German relations in recent months which the Johnson-Kiesinger discussions could not suddenly resolve. "Should Johnson have believed he could have stormed and taken the Bonn Fort by assault," the paper commented, "he failed to understand that the German capital has become an outpost of the impregnable fortress of Paris. Should Kiesinger have believed that, even if Johnson had understood this relationship, the President would have refrained from mounting an assault, he misjudged the persistence of the American President." Der Tagesspiegel stated that as the Federal Republic and France move closer together both drift further away from America and, as a result thereof, NATO diminishes in importance in direct proportion to the growth of East-West relationships in Europe.

Spandauer Volksblatt (Indep.) cautioned Bonn against concluding that Washington's attempt to reconcile with the Soviet Union would be at the expense of Germany or Europe as a whole. The paper stated that such a conclusion would be doing the United States a great wrong. "Whatever agreements the United States might reach with the Soviets," Spandauer Volksblatt argued, "the security and freedom of West Europe remains of vital importance and will not be compromised by the United States. The Americans will certainly take this tenet into account as they develop their Eastern European policy."

B. Z. (Indep.) reported that the pleasant atmosphere in Bonn could not conceal the serious fact that Washington has to devise new ways for dealing with the Kiesinger administration. The paper emphasized the importance of close consultations between the two governments in order to obviate future differences such as that which allegedly occurred recently over the Non-Proliferation Treaty. B. Z. affirmed that while Bonn remained a loyal partner of the United States, it expects the United States to respect Germany's national and European interests.

Nachtdepesche (Pro-SPD) noted that U. S. -German relations, which had cooled off considerably in the past, had improved as a result of the Johnson-Kiesinger discussions in Bonn. The paper stated that as a result of the talks the atmosphere for Kiesinger's visit to Washington will be more favorable than it had been for Erhard and that, the basis for successful future cooperation between the two countries seems to have improved.

The East Berlin Communist Press gave very little coverage to the President's visit and concentrated its editorial comments on the alleged advantage the West German Government was supposed to have taken of the President's presence in Bonn to stress its opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Morris:

Thursday, April 27, 1967 -- 5:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here is the transcript of my talk from notes at White Sulphur Springs. I would be grateful for any guidance you may wish to give me on how better to make our case.

(I made the remarks I did at the beginning because the introduction blew up my importance in the Government beyond the facts.)

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

American Association of Advertising Agencies, Friday, April 21, 1967  
White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia

That was as gracious an introduction as I ever received -- and it justifies a word about my job. As I was saying to your Chairman, ~~the President~~, there is in the Executive Branch only two men who have been elected by the people. ~~All~~ the rest of us are, in a real sense, hired hands-- who do not bear that particular and decisive form of responsibility in our country which comes from having submitted yourself to the people and having been elected. I would say of the job I now hold, it is as rewarding as any man could have. To serve a President in whose policies you believe at a difficult time in our country's history is, as I say, as rewarding <sup>and</sup> a privileged position as a man could have. Under a strong President -- it should be fully understood that our President is strong -- we are serving him, and our powers and responsibilities should not be overestimated, ~~because~~ there is only one man, and there should be only one man in the great affairs -- domestic and foreign -- which the President now confronts who makes decisions.

My pleasure at being here is not casually stated. I've had connections with friends in the advertising profession; and I must say I was mildly tempted to convert my talk to you today into a talk of advertising, <sup>in relation to</sup> ~~about~~ the various stages of growth, speculating about the future of advertising in our own country, and <sup>its</sup> ~~the~~ increasing role of ~~it~~ in various parts of the world which are at differing stages of growth. But, I shall forego that subject.

Also, you should know that I never speak, because I try to keep that to a minimum -- unless the President instructs me to speak. And so I am here literally at his instruction, which reflects quite accurately his esteem for you as a group, and as one of the most remarkable collections of creative individuals in our society.

I do not have prepared remarks; but what I did in coming down on the plane this morning was to get out a yellow pad and write down some things on my own mind as notes on a rather clumsy and irregularly-written piece of paper -- because, as you know, the flight here is a bit rocky.

I believe it was President Eisenhower who said that nothing ever comes to the President unless it is extremely difficult. This is quite true. If it is not difficult, it is settled somewhere else in the Government. It is also true that what comes to a President are not broad generalizations, but hard decisions on particular issues where there are conflicting interests and criteria that must be brought to bear. And where quite often the President is forced -- given the nature of the problem<sup>5</sup> thrown up by the course of history -- to choose not necessarily the best course, but the least bad course.

Nevertheless, what struck me as I thought about speaking to you was that, despite the particularity of the decisions the President must make in foreign policy, there is a pattern in our foreign policy. There is a global pattern, and that pattern -- that broad set of directions which constitute our foreign policy -- are, at this stage of history,



somewhat obscured because we have 500,000 of our men engaged in combat -- which naturally engages our attention and our concern.

So, I thought I would talk to you about the broad pattern of our foreign policy, and try to indicate in this brief time that these are not merely generalizations, but I believe it to be the case (although I haven't had a chance fully to check), that virtually every action the President takes in foreign policy, every particular<sup>one</sup> action, falls under one of these four headings.

And I would underline that our policy is now truly a global policy, for the first time in history.

If you look back to the time of President Truman and Secretary Acheson, we had a very active policy toward Western Europe. Eastern Europe was under total control of Stalin, and a rather faceless and undifferentiated part of the world. We had a policy toward the Soviet Union. Japan was under occupation. Africa was under colonial rule -- and many other parts of the world.

And, I remember in the State Department, you would deal on Indonesian questions with the Western European section, or the Northern European section, as I think it was, through The Hague. And you would deal with African problems through the European metropolitan capitals.

But now we live in a world which, literally for the first time in history, is a single global political community with tremendously sensitive inter actions -- even across ~~the~~ what was and still is to some degree -- the Iron Curtain and still is the barrier to mainland

China. Nevertheless, the inter actions between the domestic life and politics of nations around the world is extraordinary and unique. We are moving, as it were, from the time of formal diplomacy to a time, really, of global international politics -- which is something distinctively different.

Now, what are the four headings? First, I'll list them and talk a little about each.

The first is the problem of deterring aggression. By aggression, I mean simply the attempt to change the territorial or the political status quo through the use of external force. And, one major task -- *an* abiding task in our policy -- is to deter aggression defined in that way -- and to deal with it at the minimum level of violence we can, when it is attempted and we are committed.

The second task of foreign policy is to create world environment of economic and social progress.

The third is to try to build as best we can -- and I shall talk about certain dimensions of this -- the institutions for world order and organization. ~~And~~ I shall talk particularly about the emerging regional institutions which, in the present stage of history, are easier to develop than to try immediately for global solutions, although there are many problems that can only be handled on a global basis.

And fourth, there is the task of reconciliation -- of moving as fast as history permits towards bringing the countries under Communist rule into a normal, peaceful relationship with the rest of the world.

So that we can get on with the injunctions of Article I of the United Nations Charter. And, indeed, those four headings all can be traced back to Article I of the United Nations Charter.

Now, first the question of deterrence, and of dealing with external violence.

Obviously, there can be no peace in the world if nations feel free to change the international status quo by the use of external force. Dealing with that problem has led through this first post-war generation to a series of crises which we have seen through. The world community has proved remarkably steady in supporting the deterrence, frustration of aggression -- whether it was in Greece, or Turkey, or Berlin, or Korea, or Quemoy Matsu, or in the Congo, and other places. It is one of the great post-war achievements, which is little remarked upon, that there have been virtually no successful efforts to change the international status quo by external violence. The international scene has indeed changed. It changed remarkably -- and it must change. The status quo has no sanctity. But what we have all learned as an international community is the danger -- a danger driven home to us by the whole tragic history of the world community since 1914. —  
The danger of permitting men to believe that they can successfully change the international scene by external violence. And, of course, the danger of having people believe they can be successfully made the objects of that kind of aggression. But, as I say, that is only the beginning of the job. We're dealing with that kind of a problem in Vietnam -- where the form of the aggression is obscure. It is not as clean cut and

obvious as the crossing of the 38th Parallel in Korea, but it's just as professional a job. And the problem of dealing with it is much more complex than in a conventional war. That obviously is our first concern; but it is not our only concern.

We are concerned to maintain the integrity of NATO in the face of the French withdrawal. We are concerned with the maintenance of an environment through the Rio Treaty in Latin America, in which nations can get on with the real job which is the elevation of the life of their people. We are concerned to maintain the stability of that really most moving success story South Korea -- where to the astonishment of many -- the South Koreans have found their feet politically, moved toward constitutional government, and have found the confidence, resources and the skills to move ahead at an astonishing 8 or 9% a year, and we are committed there. We are committed in Japan. We do many things in the world quietly with others by way of preventive medicine in this field by working with some of our friends in Latin America -- where Castro has not given up his attempt to mount guerrilla warfare on the Latin American mainland. We are working with the Thais to prevent the establishment of a base for guerrilla warfare in the North East. And then to frame this deterrence, we are trying to maintain an effective strategic deterrent in a rapidly evolving technological age. And now we and the Soviet Union face an important moment when we shall see whether it is possible for both sides to find self-denying ordinances in their strategic deterrence which would save

the whole world community, as well as our two countries, the strain of a very heavy additional round in the arms race centered on ABMs and additional ICBMs. <sup>Y</sup> So the job of deterrence is, as it were, a minimum condition for doing what we have to do in the world -- but it is not the task. The task is, of course, to try to build the conditions and maintain them for a stable peace.

The second task is, as I say, to create an environment of economic and social progress. As some of you will recall from history, or through your own experience, we had between the wars -- <sup>the</sup> two great wars -- a tragic failure of coordination of the economic policies among the more advanced nations, which led to the conversion of the recession after 1929 to a catastrophic beggar-thy-neighbor depression which was one of the causes for the emergence of Hitler and one of the triggering mechanisms of the second World War.

I believe we in the Atlantic community have done a remarkably good job by historical standards in working together in trade, in monetary affairs, in coordinating and discussing our domestic and economic policies. However, we are in the face of major decisions right in the weeks ahead -- <sup>the</sup> Kennedy Round trade negotiations and the efforts to produce an agreed formula for monetary reform in a world where gold production is not increasing as fast as the volume of trade <sup>and</sup> international exchanges. We've done on the whole much better than the inter-war generation, but we have a very active agenda.

One of the most important parts of that agenda is, of course, what we and the more advanced part of the world do for the developing nations.



~~And~~ <sup>There</sup> the habits of sharing that burden and of recognizing the responsibility of the more advanced parts of the world community for the less developed is growing. One interesting, and I suppose not widely noticed development in recent weeks, is the formula~~s~~ that the President presented to the Congress and we have been negotiating with the rest of the world in the food-population field. Next to the problem of avoiding a nuclear war it is certainly true that the greatest problem before the human race is the food population problem.

It is one which we cannot handle through our own food surpluses. For one thing, they no longer exist, ~~Nor~~ can it be done simply by feeding the hungry. It requires the most rapid possible increase in agricultural and, especially, food production in the developing nations, and they will need the help of all the world community in getting the resources to do that; which means food surpluses to feed India in a bad harvest year ~~as~~ are in exactly the same status as chemical fertilizers or pesticides, or even foreign exchange.

In recent weeks that principle ~~that~~ we all in the world community -- not simply the food exporting countries -- have a responsibility ~~that~~ has been accepted in principle; and it's a most promising principle, although it must be driven forward now in many parts of the world and as rapidly as we can have it happen. But it is an example of the fact that we have moved in a quiet way in the whole field of aid ~~in the United States~~ towards standards which are quite different from those which may have existed 15 years ago, And they are quite different from those which I think many people have in mind when they contemplate our aid.

programs -- and think of them as some kind of give-away schemes.

We now do not grant aid unless there are the most serious form of self-help measures. And this is not because we are hard-hearted.

*I*t is because we and the most sober people in the developing countries understand that aid is at best marginal. It can help powerfully if a nation is doing with its own resources, within its own borders, the things only it can do to make the nation grow. Self-help is a living and tough criterion, as I say—*Not simply* because our Congress and people demand it -- which is a good and sufficient reason in a democracy -- but also because the most sober economists and those charged with development in the developing countries realize that aid can only be helpful against the background of self-help. Our aid is *now* to a very high degree on a multilateral basis in which we are taking our share in various kinds of -- if you like -- community chest ventures.

The Indian-Pakistan aid is multilateral -- on a consortium basis. Latin American aid, I can attest through my work in CIAP (Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress), is on that kind of basis. Korea, which for a long time we carried pretty much on our own on an aid basis, is now moving into a consortium. And so ~~this~~ all of this is quiet and important, and in the right direction. *These* new criteria of self-help and multilateralism have come about through one dimension of international organization which has come to the fore in our thought and policy in the last 3 years. If I had been talking in 1961, I would have said our policy was to help European unity and build the Atlantic partnership, draw in Japan and other developed nations and help the under-

developed nations.

In these three years, we have had a rather marked shift <sup>of</sup> ~~in the~~ emphasis in our policy and in the world's development, which is more important. ~~Which~~ <sup>you</sup> might put <sup>it</sup> under the heading; the poor are also proud. If you look back to the post war -- you will remember the Europeans looking at their fate and their destiny in the early post-war years, realized that first they needed economic unity and cooperation, in order to make Europe economically efficient and effective.

Secondly, they had an impulse to move together politically so that these countries of 50 million -- <sup>in</sup> the face of the Soviet Union and the United States -- could have a role of greater dignity on the world scene. The European unity movement was not anti-American, but it did contain the element that we in Europe -- if we were to be true to our traditions and possibilities -- had better unite and we ought to deal with the United States from the dignity which the European unity would afford us.

Now, what has happened in these last few years, is that this impulse -- this pattern ~~really~~, which we <sup>can find</sup> ~~say~~ in Western Europe -- is beginning to take hold in Latin American and in Asia.

In Latin America -- at Punta del Este -- it was a remarkable and privileged thing as a member of the American Delegation there to see our Latin American friends rather proudly commit themselves to a course which will be more difficult than that of European economic integration. But to do it, in my judgment, seriously. There are good economic arguments I won't go into <sup>which</sup> ~~which~~ require Latin American economic integration at this stage of history, but also ~~also~~ you could 10

sense the dignity that they felt and foresaw if they themselves could manage the integration of this great southern part of our hemisphere.

And, it is going to be hard work -- and there are many problems. But, there is <sup>an</sup> impulse to do it -- and as I say, it is not an anti-American impulse -- but just as the Western Europeans wanted integration so that they could deal with the United States from a position of greater strength and dignity, I do believe, my friends in Latin America look forward to this dimension of the task, which the Mexican Foreign Minister has described as the greatest decision taken by Latin America since independence came to those countries in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. It is a long road ahead. And as President Johnson said in his farewell statement at Punta del Este, economic and social developments are not a job for sprinters, but for long distance runners.

The impulses that we have seen in Europe are present in Latin America. And just as in Western Europe, we are encouraging them.

Even more dramatic than Latin America is the new mood in Asia.

For the President, and those who bear with him the responsibilities for seeing it through in Vietnam, there is no aspect of that problem which gives the President more comfort or satisfaction, or confidence, than the effects of our commitment in Vietnam on the rest of Asia. For a long time they did not know whether the word of the United States in treaties would be as good in Asia as it was in Europe. When the President committed our forces in mid-1965, there emerged as they proved they could operate in Vietnam, a spirit of confidence on the Asian mainland and throughout Asia. That region had a future -- that there was something

to build. A question deep in their minds was answered. And the response has been for the first time in the history of Asia a movement towards cooperation among the Asian countries.

There are deep-seated reasons why the time was ripe once they had the confidence to begin to fodge something together. But this new Asia that the President has talked about, and which he visited, is not a figure of speech. They have created the Asian Development Bank in which we have only 20% of the capital. The Japanese put up 20% -- the rest of Asia 60%, and 20% from outside the region. They have been meeting and having extremely serious practical regional meetings on education and on agriculture. They met without us in Seoul, Japan, and the Koreans, and 8 others in ASPAC (Asian Pacific Group). The Australians and New Zealanders -- in an historic move -- have committed themselves to join with the Asians to help make this regional cooperation. Very much the same motives are involved here as in Western Europe after the war, and Latin American.

Perhaps the most vivid spokesman for this new movement is a man with whom we have no aid or military relations. He is the Prime Minister of Singapore -- Prime Minister Lee. Who, on answering for some students a question as to whether he supported the American position in Vietnam said, *yes*, I support it. *yes* The Americans are buying time for us. And, if we don't use that time to build something in Asia which will hold up without this kind of American commitment, we don't deserve to be saved. *are simplifying* But ~~the~~ Asians *are simplifying* with extraordinary economic and social vitality -- in Japan and Korea and Taiwan, Thailand



and Malaysia -- and the beginning of a turning elsewhere in Asia <sup>in the sense -- in</sup> and  
Indonesia, and so on. They are determined to make something, and  
it's one of the great achievements thus far of the President's com-  
mitment, and the nation's commitment in Vietnam.

In Africa, it is a much earlier stage, but again, the President  
has thrown our influence in the first speech ever made by an  
American President ~~ever~~ wholly devoted to Africa behind the notion  
that we should build the infrastructure of Africa at this stage in  
history -- the educational systems, communications, and so on, --  
on a regional basis.

In the Middle East, the bases for that kind of regional  
cohesion, of course, have not yet been found.

This new direction in our foreign policy -- or in the way the world is  
going -- has a particular meaning for Americans and our involvement  
in the world. We became a world power after 1945, not because we  
wished to set up an empire, or establish satellites, but because there  
were vacuums to be filled. Because we knew if we didn't pick up the  
burden of the British in Greece and Turkey -- and didn't fill the vacuum  
in Korea, the consequences for ourselves and for liberty in the world  
were too great. We moved into our position to fill vacuums <sup>on a</sup> and bi-  
lateral bases.

As I say, not for positive reasons, but for negative reasons. Having become committed, we have been trying to create the conditions which would permit us not to withdraw from the world because obviously this is not a world whose communications or technology permits the United States to safely withdraw. We have been trying to create a world in which others can take a larger part in their own destiny -- shaped <sup>way</sup> more of their own destiny, and in which we can in degree draw back from always being the leader to being the friend, the partner -- somewhere in the middle of the pack.

This is not rehetoric, it is beginning to happen. As I say, I was privileged when I was in the State Department to have an extra job as the American member, or as I should say for Latin Americans, the North American member of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress. This is the board of directors of the Alliance for Progress. The Chairman is a Latin American. Six out of seven members of the board are Latin American. That is just about the right pattern for the long pull. In the Asian Development Bank we are 20%. So that quite consciously we are trying wherever we can to find the forces of strength and to build them up. The promise for the future <sup>is</sup> a world <sup>where</sup> we can remain intertwined, but in which the relative burden borne by the United States is less. Their responsibilities are greater, <sup>but</sup> and we maintain the essential inter-connections.

Finally, there is the task of reconciliation. We have made some progress in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We have made it --

I would underline -- only in the wake of the demonstration that we could not be defeated. If we have a better set of relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, it is not because we gave away Greece to the guerrillas or turned over control of the Dardenelles to the Soviet Union, or turned over Northern Azerbaijan in 1945, or turned over Berlin when it was blockaded in 1948-49. And it should always be remembered that the turning point in this phase was the Cuban missile crisis. The greatest test of nerve and will -- the most dangerous in the post-war. It was after that, that President Kennedy could give his American University speech and we could open up a set of more constructive relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. And President Johnson has pursued -- and will pursue -- these peace possibilities to the limit, but remembering always that the foundation is a strong and united West which maintains an integrated and effective deterrent until we can devise systems of really reliable arms control.

With respect to Communist China, that nation is going through an enormous, dramatic change in its life -- and as the President has indicated -- we look forward to the day when mainland China will devote its enormous talents and energies to the development and modernization of that society and come to live with its neighbors in Asia and the rest of the world in peace.

One thing I would point out to you, that the headings I have given here -- the four headings -- apply not only in general but they apply to our policy in Vietnam. We are indeed dealing with a very complex form of external aggression in Vietnam, but we are simultaneously,

→ which is part of the task of creating a viable society there, working with them in economic and social development in the cities and in the countryside. ~~And~~ <sup>The</sup> mere act of providing security in building up the countryside is also in part, the act of the beginning of rural economic and social development.

The South Vietnamese are already beginning to join in some of the Asian regional ventures, and we look forward to a future in which they -- and if they so wish the North Vietnamese -- will join in these regional ventures. Including, especially, the development of the Mekong Valley which, tragically in the midst of this war, sits there capable of converting that region into one of the truly great productive regions of the world in agriculture and <sup>in</sup> other ways.

Finally, of course, there must be within South Vietnam -- and to the extent they are willing between South and North Vietnam -- a process of reconciliation. And we who have watched this closely are enormously pleased -- not merely at the rise in the number of defectors coming back to South Vietnam through the Cheiu Hoi or open arms program, but by their announcement on the 19th of this month of new dimensions in their own reconciliation program. Right now for about 6 or 7 weeks, over 1000 a week have been coming back, which is more than half the average level of Viet Cong killed. And this is promising -- although it has a long way to go.

Well as I came down this morning, that's <sup>the way I defined</sup> the job that we are trying to do in the world. It is a hard job. We cannot do it alone. Obviously, we are a great country of 200 million people; <sup>and</sup> <sup>that</sup> but we know better than many nations which assert their sovereignty and nationalism more strongly than we. Even we who at this stage in the history have this enormous strength, cannot deal with the problems of aggression, food-population, the construction of a new institution of order in the regions or in the world, or even the task of reconciliation on our own. We are, however, ~~at~~ the critical margin at this stage in history. It is a margin, as I say, because our powers are real but limited. It is critical because on balance in the world. ~~On balance~~ — ~~The~~ rest of the human race wants roughly -- each in his own way, in his own culture, the kinds of things we want. They want peace. They want confidence that they can bring up their children. They want their children to live better than the parents. They want them not to die unnecessarily. They don't want them to be distorted permanently by not having an adequate diet when they're younger than 6. They want them to have the education that would permit the maximum expression of the talents they were born with. And, these are indeed the interests of the United States in a world which is not interested in building an empire or creating satellites, but doing our part to build a world community and an environment for our own society so it can evolve in loyalty to the best in our own great heritage.



As we who work from day-to-day on these problems look out on the world, despite the pain and difficulties of Vietnam; despite all the capacity of this world community which is going through dramatic changes to create disruption and danger; despite the nuclear <sup>sword</sup> ~~scot~~ of Damocles over our heads, we are in good heart. We are in good heart because we know that so much has been achieved in the first post-war generation. We are in good heart because the trend in the world is not in favor of those who believe that they can change the status quo by external force. The underlying trend in the world is towards men of moderation. And we are confident because we have faith in our country and its capacity to take the burdens of world responsibility -- understand them -- and see them through with patience.

*Pres file*

Thursday, April 27, 1967 -- 4:30 pm

Mr. President:

As you can see, the Swedes are properly churned up on the Russell business.

Honest, Sir, I delivered the message loud and clear. It is just that, as an old State Department hand, I always disliked Memcons where the U.S. official used up all the time showing how wise and tough he was.

I have no trouble at all being tough when I am carrying out your instructions.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

TRIBUNAL (SCHEDULED)

BY SAM HALL

STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN, APRIL 27 (REUTERS)-A MAJOR POLITICAL ROW BEWEGED IN SWEDEN TODAY AS FOREIGN MINISTER TORSTEN NILSSON RE-EXAMINED SWEDEN'S RELUCTANT PERMISSION FOR BRITISH PHILOSOPHER BERTRAND RUSSELL'S VIETNAM "WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL" TO OPEN HERE SATURDAY.

THE 17-MAN TRIBUNAL WILL STUDY PRESS REPORTS, VARIOUS DOCUMENTS AND TESTIMONY FROM INVESTIGATING TEAMS RETURNED FROM NORTH VIETNAM AND CONSIDER WHETHER PRZSIDENT JOHNSON, THE UNITED STATES AND ITS VIETNAM WAR ALLIES SHOULD BE JUDGED WAR CRIMINALS.

NILSSON WENT INTO CONFERENCE TODAY WITH HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY AIDES AND AN AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE SAID THEY "WERE LOOKING CLOSELY AT THE SITUATION AGAIN.

"MR. NILSSON IS VERY AWARE OF THE NEGATIVE REACTION (TO THE TRIBUNAL) IN THE UNITED STATES," THE SOURCE SAID.

SWEDISH PREMIER TAGE ERLANDER SAID MONDAY THAT THE TRIBUNAL, EARLIER BANNED FROM LONDON AND PARIS, WAS NOT WANTED IN SWEDEN.

BUT HE SAID IT COULD GO AHEAD AFTER HE RECEIVED ASSURANCES FGOM SWEDISH ORGANIZERS THAT THE TRIBUNAL WOULD NEITHER ASSUME THE CHARACTER OF A COURTROOM NOR ACCUSE ANY PRIVATE PERSON AND WOULD SIMPLY BE A REPRESENTATION OF THE FACTS.

(MORE) GRB 1:44P

FIRST ADD STOCKHOLM TRIBUNAL X X X FACTS.

THE GOVERNMENT WAS REPORTED TO HWVE HAD SECOND THOUGHTS FOLLOWING STATEMENTS BY THE FIRST TRIBUNAL MEMBER TO ARRIVE HERE, BRITISH TRADE UNIONIST LAWRENCE DALY, WHO SAID WEDNESDAY THAT THE TRIBUNAL WAS A PARALLEL TO THE NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS WHICH FOLLOWED WORLD WAR II.

DALY SAID HE PERSONALLY HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE U.S. WAS A WAR CRIMINAL.

ARGUMENT IN SWEDEN OVER THE TRIBUNAL WAS CENTERED ON LEFTWING AND LABOR UNION GROUPS OPENLY SUPPORTING IT, PATRIOTS MAINTAINING THAT SWEDEN SHOULD NOT VIOLATE ITS TRADITIONS OF NEUTRALITY AND DEMOCRACY BY BANNING THE TRIBUNAL AND OTHERS FEARING HARM TO SWEDEN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS.

SEVERAL GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION LEADERS ISSUED A STATEMENT THURSDAY SAYING THE TRIBUNAL "CANNOTHFURTHER THE AIM OF ACHIEVING PEACE IN VIETNAM."

REGRETTING THAT IT WAS TO BE HELD IN SWEDEN, THEY SAID IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THE SWEDISH LAWS DID NOT PERMIT THEM STOPPING THE TRIBUNAL.

(MORE) GRB 1:48P

SECOND ADD STOCKHOLM TRIBUNAL X X X TRIBUNAL.

CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADER YNGVE (CORRECT) HOLMBERG DEMANDED THE GOVERNMENT DISSOCIATE ITSELF FROM THE TRIBUNAL.

"THERE ARE GREAT RISKS THAT LARGE AREAS OF THE WORLD WILL MISINTERPRET THE NEUTRAL TRADITIONS OF SWEDISH FOREIGN POLICY," HE SAID. "THE GOVERNMENT'S RETREAT BEFORE THE RUTHLESS LEFTIST FORCES SUPPORTING THE TRIBUNAL IS HIGHLY REMARKABLE."

OTHER TRIBUNAL MEMBERS SOUGHT TO STRESS THE INTENDED OBJECTIVITY OF THE TRIBUNAL.

SECOND ADD STOCKHOLM TRIBUNAL X X X TRIBUNAL.

CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADER YNGVE (CORRECT) HOLMBERG DEMANDED THE GOVERNMENT DISSOCIATE ITSELF FROM THE TRIBUNAL.

"THERE ARE GREAT RISKS THAT LARGE AREAS OF THE WORLD WILL MISINTERPRET THE NEUTRAL TRADITIONS OF SWEDISH FOREIGN POLICY," HE SAID. "THE GOVERNMENT'S RETREAT BEFORE THE RUTHLESS LEFTIST FORCES SUPPORTING THE TRIBUNAL IS HIGHLY REMARKABLE."

OTHER TRIBUNAL MEMBERS SOUGHT TO STRESS THE INTENDED OBJECTIVITY OF THE TRIBUNAL.

BERLIN-BORN SWEDISH PLAYWRIGHT PETER WEISS SAID: "WE IN THE SWEDISH COMMITTEE ARE SURE THAT IF DELEGATES OF THE TRIBUNAL . . . HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS COMMITTED WAR CRIMES, THIS IS DEFINITELY NOT THE ATTITUDE OF THE TRIBUNAL ITSELF."

"THE AIMS ARE TO INVESTIGATE THE FACTS REGARDING THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND PRESENT THEM TO WORLD OPINION," HE SAID.

ANOTHER TRIBUNAL MEMBER, 51-YEAR-OLD AMERICAN PACIFIST DAVE DELLINGER SAID: "IF THE TRIBUNAL IS PARTISAN OR UNFAIR IT WILL SIMPLY BE FORGOTTEN."

THE BRITISH SECRETARY OF THE TRIBUNAL, RUSSEL STETLER, DENIED IT WOULD BE A "TRIAL OF JOHNSON, RUSK AND MCNAMARA" AND SAID HE WOULD WELCOME ANY SOUTH VIETNAMESE WITNESSES.

GRB 1:51P

*Pres. file*

April 27, 1967

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

We were so sorry you could not be with us last evening. Mrs. Johnson wanted you to have these flowers from the reception.

I know you must have had an uncomfortable week but hope you are now well on the road to recovery.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Alexander A. Matsas  
Ambassador of Greece  
Ward 8  
Walter Reed General Hospital  
6825 Sixteenth Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:HHS:tmt 4/27/67



32

Thursday, April 27, 1967  
6:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Cabot Lodge will be coming to Washington on Sunday night and reporting for work on Monday morning, May 1. At some stage, I am sure you will wish to see him. There is also the matter of releasing -- if you still wish to do so -- your letter to him.

At the moment Bill Bundy and others are considering two Washington performances by Cabot:

-- a lunch at the National Press Club;

-- a deep backgrounder at the Overseas Press Club.

There is some discussion of the best timing for the National Press Club performance:

-- on the one hand, having him talk there next week when he is fresh is an advantage;

-- on the other hand, we will have just completed Westmoreland Week in Washington. Some recommend that he speak to the National Press Club in about ten days.

You will wish to decide about the timing of this matter, as well as to give Cabot his instructions.

W. W. R.

Next week \_\_\_\_\_

Following week \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

Thursday - April 27, 1967

Mr. President:

Joe Fowler plans to send to the Congress tomorrow a letter with proposed legislation asking authorization to contribute \$900 million to the Inter-American Bank's Fund for Special Operations over the next three years (Tab A).

Next week BOB will have ready a budget amendment transferring \$100 million from Contingencies to the Alliance for Progress for agriculture, education and health.

BOB raises the question whether you wish to forward these items to the Hill with a Presidential message or handle them in the regular manner as Joe Fowler proposes to do with the IDB/FSO replenishment.

Since you made your position clear in your March 13 message, I recommend that the follow-up action be handled by Fowler and Schultze.

W. W. Rostow

Let Fowler and Schultze handle ☒ \_\_\_\_\_.

Prefer Presidential message ☐ \_\_\_\_\_.

See me ☐ \_\_\_\_\_.

Dear Mr. President:

There is transmitted herewith a draft of a proposed bill, "To amend the Inter-American Development Bank Act to authorize the United States to participate in an increase in the resources of the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank."

At the annual meeting of the Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank in April 1967, the Governors unanimously agreed to recommend to their governments that appropriate steps be taken to permit the adoption of a Resolution which would provide for an increase in the resources of the Fund for Special Operations by the equivalent of \$1.2 billion. Of this total \$900 million would be contributed by the United States, and the equivalent of \$300 million by the Latin American members of the Bank. The increase would be paid in three equal and consecutive annual installments beginning December 31, 1967. The U.S. contribution would, of course, be subject to appropriate balance of payments safeguards.

Under a schedule of contributions completed in December, 1966, the United States contributed \$750 million and the Latin Americans contributed the equivalent of \$150 million, for a total of \$900 million. The contribution now proposed, therefore, represents a substantial increase by Latin American countries over their last contributions -- both absolutely and in relation to the U.S. share -- reflecting the determination of all members of the Bank to maximize self-help efforts.

The Inter-American Development Bank was established at the end of 1959 and began operations in the Fall of 1960. As the "Bank of the Alliance," it is providing a major stimulus to economic and social development in this hemisphere, through both its ordinary capital operations and its soft loan resources. By the end of 1966, the Bank had made 386 loan commitments, from both these categories, amounting to the equivalent of \$1905.3 million, and early this year total IDB lending passed the \$2 billion mark. It is now estimated that the funds presently committed to the Fund for Special Operations will allow the Bank to continue lending operations at an adequate rate only through the first few months of calendar year 1968. Early replenishment of these resources is therefore required if the Bank is

to continue to play its leadership role in the financing of economic and social projects, particularly in the areas of agriculture, education and health, and to intensify its efforts in initiating multinational projects. The contribution of the Latin American members of the Bank will double their last contribution to the Fund for Special Operations, reaffirming their faith in the Bank's ability to lead in promoting the development of Latin America, and evidencing their determination to meet fully the self-help requisites embodied in the Alliance.

The draft bill would authorize the U.S. Governor of the Bank to vote in favor of the Resolution for an increase in resources, which has been placed before the Board of Governors for a vote by December 31, 1967. It would also authorize the U.S. Governor, on behalf of the United States, to agree to pay to the Fund for Special Operations over a three-year period, the sum of \$900 million as the U.S. share of the increase, and authorize the appropriation of this sum. I urge the Congress to act favorably on this legislation so that the United States may continue to cooperate with our Alliance partners in the social and economic development of the hemisphere. Subject to approval of the proposed legislation, an appropriation of the first installment of \$300 million will be requested for FY 1968.

The total amount requested for the next three-year period is \$150 million more than for the previous three years. The increase amount will be devoted to carrying forward multinational projects designed to link the Latin American countries. At the recent meeting of American Presidents in Punta del Este it was decided to give priority to the mobilization of financial and technical resources for such projects. The increase responds to this decision.

A special report of the National Advisory Council of International Monetary and Financial Policies related to the proposed increase of FSO resources is being submitted to you and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

It would be appreciated if you would lay this proposed bill before the Senate. An identical bill has been transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Sincerely yours,

Henry H. Fowler

The Honorable  
Hubert H. Humphrey  
President of the Senate

Enclosure

33 b

A BILL

To amend the Inter-American Development Bank Act to authorize the United States to participate in an increase in the resources of the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Inter-American Development Bank Act (22 U.S.C. 283-283k) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"Sec. 15(a) The United States Governor of the Bank is hereby authorized to vote in favor of the resolution entitled 'Increase of \$1,200,000,000 in Resources of Fund for Special Operations' proposed by the Governors at their annual meeting in April 1967 and now pending before the Board of Governors of the Bank. Upon the adoption of such resolution, the United States Governor is authorized to agree, on behalf of the United States, to pay to the Fund for Special Operations of the Bank, the sum of \$900,000,000, in accordance with and subject to the terms and conditions of such resolution.

"(b) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated without fiscal year limitation, for the United States share in the increase in the Resources of the Fund for Special Operations of the Bank, the sum of \$900,000,000."



Thursday, April 27, 1967 - 12 noon

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is  
a proposed message to the Governor-  
General of Canada on the occasion of  
the opening of EXPO '67.

Francis M. Bator

O.K. \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

FMB/vmr

54  
Pres file

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF CANADA

Excellency:

I extend to you and to all the people of Canada my warmest and best wishes on the opening of EXPO '67, Montreal.

EXPO '67 is visible proof of Canada's strength and bright future on the Centenary of its Confederation. EXPO's theme, "Man and His World," fixes the mind on what matters most to all of us -- the health and progress and happiness of human beings.

EXPO '67 also fixes the mind on man's greatest common problem: peace. It is fitting, therefore, that it should open on April 28, the 150th anniversary of the Rush-Bagot Agreement which began the long and honored tradition of an undefended border between our two nations.

All Americans join me in wishing you and your countrymen a most successful Exhibition.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By ing, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 27, 1967 -- 2:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here are some thoughts about the issues before us in Viet Nam, which you may -- or may not -- wish to raise at the 4:30 p.m. meeting today.

This memorandum closes with some suggested questions which, in any case, ought to be raised.

COMMENT:

As I see it, it is difficult to ask for the calling up of reserves if we are to do just a bit more of the same. We would be creating a major political crisis in the U.S. without being able to promise an early or decisive result. Westy's plan, as presented to us, was accurately defined as 'ladling some water out of the bath tub while the tap is still turned on.'

Perhaps that is the best we can do when we consider all the political and military risks.

But, before coming to that decision -- and biting a tough bullet at home -- we should consider whether there are ways of using our military power to turn off the tap at higher -- but acceptable -- risk.

For example, we can mine Haiphong and other harbors, which partially closes off, at least, the tap some distance from the bath tub. We can come nearer the bath tub and partially turn it off by:

-- landing forces north of the DMZ and cleaning out the <sup>three</sup> ~~U.S.~~ divisions which are the principal instrument for diverting and harassing U.S. forces;

-- putting in additional forces to cut the infiltration routes on the ground in Laos just south of the DMZ; or

-- we could mount the landings and clean out the 3 divisions and have them come south to assume these blocking positions south of the DMZ, including Laos.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Before deciding to do this, we would have to look at the risks and be in a position to tell Hanoi, Moscow and Peiping that we have covered those risks and are prepared to face them. The risks are:

- The Chinese Communists coming in force into North Viet Nam.
- The Chinese Communists jumping off against Northern Laos and Thailand.
- The North Koreans putting pressure on South Korea.
- The Russians putting pressure on Berlin and the NATO area.

Moreover, there are problems of weather in Laos and the Northern part of North Viet Nam; of mobilizing requisite U.S. forces; of Souvanna Phouma's attitude; of sending U.S. forces back to Viet Nam which contain many Viet Nam veterans; etc.

I raise this because I feel the American people -- if they are going to be asked for major additional sacrifices of men and money -- in additional risk -- would rather do something big and hopefully decisive rather than something small.

#### QUESTIONS:

ARVN (including regional and popular forces). Before Gen. Westmoreland leaves, it is important to tell him that, whatever we do in Viet Nam in the months ahead, he must give very high priority to accelerating the improvement in the Vietnamese forces and taking pains to brief the press in a persuasive way about the progress of Vietnamese forces. It is most difficult to hold the line if the picture of the Vietnamese forces in the U.S. is one of lethargy, incompetence, corruption, inaction, while U.S. forces and U.S. casualties expand.

On a strictly military basis -- putting aside the political problems objectively involved -- what would be Gen Westmoreland's optimum military plan to win the war in the shortest possible time?

(To Gen. Westler) If we should accept Gen. Westmoreland's proposals of this morning, how soon could we put the forces he wants in the field and what problems would we confront along the way?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

With Bob Komer scheduled to go out to Viet Nam early next week, you may or may not wish to raise at this meeting the question of the timing and substance of the announcement of the new organizational arrangement by Amb. Bunker. (Bob Komer has been working on a possible draft for Bunker that would minimize the image of military take over of the civil side of the pacification effort.)

I believe these are the key issues.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Friday, April 27, 1967 -- 1:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

As you see from the attached, Bob Korner plans to be moving out to Saigon about May 1.

I assume this has been appropriately cleared; and my own recommendation would have been that he get there soon.

This raises the question, however, of when and how you announce his role in relation to Westy, etc.; and release within the government the NSAM you are holding. My suggestion would be that the announcement come from Bunker in Saigon.

But his planned movement next Monday requires that we get up the scenario.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By EG, NARA, Date 4-29-91

36a

183048

2

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHANGE TO

~~SECRET~~

*Rastow*  
APR 26 8 06 PM '67

80  
55  
Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON

STATE 183048

EXDIS

FOR BUNKER AND PORTER FROM KOMER

1. Wish renew my suggestion that you keep up Cabot's practice of a weekly NODIS report to the President. To avoid any break in continuity suggest one for 2 or 3 May. Believe Calhoun knows the drill.

2. Assuming I get top level release, plan catch ride with Westy arriving Clark Field, Philippines around 1700 on 1 May. He overnighting at Clark but I am eager come straight down if T-39 could pick me up at Clark. Will advise 7th AF of arrival time at Clark.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By MB, NARA, Date 4-23-93

KATZENBACH

Drafted by: <b>RWKomer/WhiteHouse/26Apr67</b>	Tel. Ext.: <b>2547</b>	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <b>S/S - John P. Walsh</b>
--	---------------------------	---

Clearances:

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED  
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION  
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

7.1. Roston 37  
Pres file

Thursday, April 27, 1967, 11:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is an austere birthday greeting to Portuguese Prime Minister Salazar, who will be 78 on Friday. Because he is very sensitive, we have treated Salazar as an exception to the multiples-of-five rule on birthday messages. I think it is worth continuing to do so if we keep the message to the minimum.

Francis M. Bator

Approve   /  

Disapprove       

Speak to me       

FMB:EKH:mst

DRAFT BIRTHDAY MESSAGE TO  
PRIME MINISTER SALAZAR

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Please accept my best wishes on the occasion of  
your seventy-eighth birthday.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

April 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Miss Margaret Mead, the distinguished anthropologist -- a pretty hardheaded woman -- telephoned with the following observation.

She has noted what she thinks is a change in the composition of peace marchers. They include an inordinate number of women around 40 years of age. She believes they are there for one reason and one reason only: They are afraid of the draft law provisions for drawing in 19 year olds.

She wasted no words and made no policy recommendations. She thought we might be interested in her observation as a sociologist.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Joseph Califano

WWRostow:rlm



*6 encls  
2 Pres file*

Wednesday, April 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Coral Sea Celebration

Ceremonies will be held next month in Australia and New Zealand marking the 25th anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea. Admiral McDonald will represent the United States at these ceremonies.

It is customary for the U. S. representative to deliver separate Presidential Proclamations to the Prime Ministers of the two countries. Attached for your approval and signature are proclamations for the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers which Admiral McDonald will deliver.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

*approve Proclamations* ☒

*Disapproved* \_\_\_\_\_

*See me* \_\_\_\_\_

PROCLAMATION  
TO BE DELIVERED  
TO THE PRIME MINISTER  
OF NEW ZEALAND

In the Battle of the Coral Sea, the tide of history was turned by a small number of dedicated men who placed justice and freedom ahead of self. On this twenty-fifth anniversary of that battle, I am particularly pleased to extend my personal greetings and those of my fellow Americans to the people of New Zealand in commemorating the devotion and the achievements of those men.

The comradeship shared in those desperate days of May 1942 has steadily grown, until today it spans the entire Pacific Ocean, linking the people of New Zealand and the United States in a true partnership of freedom -- pledged not only in our homelands, but also on distant battlefields -- creating a bond of friendship and self-sacrifice that has become both an example and a hope for other peoples and other nations.

Thus in looking to the future we find our path lighted by the spirit of those whose achievements in the Coral Sea were at once our defense and our inspiration.

PROCLAMATION  
TO BE DELIVERED  
TO THE PRIME MINISTER  
OF AUSTRALIA

On this, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea, it is especially fitting that our two nations join in paying grateful tribute to the brave men whose selfless devotion made such a great contribution toward keeping the lamp of freedom alight for their homelands. I therefore take great pleasure in extending my personal greetings and those of my fellow Americans to the people of Australia in commemorating this memorable occasion.

The Battle of the Coral Sea was more than a military victory; it was the crucible in which a special bond of friendship was forged between the people of our two countries. And that bond -- which has steadily grown stronger and more meaningful -- today links Australia and the United States once again on a distant battlefield, where we share a rededicated alliance in man's continuing struggle against injustice, aggression and want.

Thus our partnership continues to grow as a bulwark of strength and hope, and the spirit which so illuminates the history of the Coral Sea remains the beacon which lights the way to the future, for other nations as well as our own.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

1 APR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Joseph A. Califano, Jr.  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House

It is customary for the United States representative to the Coral Sea celebrations to deliver separate Presidential Proclamations to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand. The attached proclamations have been prepared for such use in the 1967 celebrations. If approved, they will be presented by the official representative of the United States, Admiral David L. McDonald, USN, at appropriate ceremonies in the respective countries in May.

The President's signature on the attached proclamations is recommended.

  
John M. Steadman  
The Special Assistant

Attachments

RECEIVED  
JOE CALIFANO, JR.

1967 APR 1 PM 2 06

~~1 copy~~  
2 Pres. file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - April 26, 1967

Mr. President:

I enclose memoranda from Bill Gaud and Charlie Schultze concerning the \$100 million program loan to Colombia.

The negotiations have been completed and Bill Gaud proposes to sign the loan by the end of this week, unless you indicate otherwise.

The agreement reached with the Colombians is satisfactory on all aspects except exchange and trade policies. Until the balance of payments crisis last November, Colombia was moving toward import and exchange liberalization as we desired. The crisis led President Lleras to impose stringent new controls. The delay in completing the loan negotiations has been due to the long time it has taken the IMF to get Lleras to agree to a program for moving back gradually toward liberalization. The IMF is now satisfied and has agreed to provide standby credit up to \$60 million.

I agree with AID and BOB that we should proceed with signature of the loan agreement and release of the first \$40 million. Further tranches will depend on Colombian performance on self-help conditions and the IMF program.

W. W. Rostow

Enclosure

Approve

✓

Hold up signing,  
see me

—

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-45  
By ing, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

40-a

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-415

By ing, NARA, Date 4-23-93

APR 24 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Result of Negotiations on the Program Loan for Colombia

AID has concluded negotiations, which you approved last November, for a \$100 million program loan to Colombia. Because of changed conditions in Colombia since November, Bill Gaud has sent the attached memorandum, reporting on the outcome of the negotiations. He plans to sign the loan and issue a joint announcement with the Colombians by the end of this week, unless you indicate otherwise.

Outcome of U. S. Negotiations

Negotiations were deferred and their outcome substantially affected by a Colombian balance of payments crisis that developed late last year. A decline in coffee prices, coupled with import liberalization and an inflexible exchange rate policy led to a \$35 million fall in dollar reserves from January to September. The Central Bank was in arrears and foreign banks refused to renew their lines of credit. As a result, the Colombian government imposed stringent new import and foreign exchange controls. This represented a marked reversal of previous policies which had been an integral part of our negotiating objectives.

Last month, the government introduced a fluctuating exchange rate and an import policy satisfactory to the IMF, which has since agreed to provide a standby credit up to \$60 million. Neither AID nor the IMF is entirely satisfied, but they conclude that the current agreement is the best that can be negotiated at this time with President Lleras. They believe the agreement, coupled with strict quarterly reviews, will provide the basis for financial improvement during this year and next, provided coffee prices hold up.

Apart from exchange and trade policies, the negotiations were entirely successful.

- The 1967 budget shows a 15% increase in revenues from new tax measures, and a 30% increase in self-financed investment, including substantial new outlays for education and agriculture.
- An export diversification program has been designed to increase non-coffee exports by 35% in 1967.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

- Agreement was reached to complete a long term agricultural sector plan by June 30.

On balance, the Colombian self-help commitments represent a satisfactory package, and the best AID could negotiate given the political pressures faced by Lleras.

This is the sixth year of substantial program assistance to support the Colombian balance of payments. AID has informed the Colombians of our intention to reduce this type of aid next year. As a result of the delay in negotiations, the proposed loan will finance imports through next March instead of December 1967, as originally proposed.

I see no reason why the loan should not be signed and the first \$40 million released. Subsequent releases of funds will depend on Colombian adherence to stipulated self-help conditions, including the IMF program.

*Charles L. Schultze*

Charles L. Schultze  
Director

Attachment

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Hold signing \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

410

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APR 18 1967

OFFICE OF  
ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Program Loan for Colombia

Pursuant to your approval of the recommendation in my memorandum of October 31, 1966, we have negotiated a \$100 million AID program loan on the basis of firm Colombian commitments to essential self-help measures. I wish to inform you of relevant Colombian developments since my October 31 memorandum and the outcome of the extensive negotiations.

Developments in Colombia

A strong Lleras administration has acted to preserve political stability against extremist student and guerrilla activities. It has obtained basic legislative and administrative reforms. New programs for social and economic modernization are under way, within a democratic framework. The private sector continues to grow.

However, the fall in coffee exports and earnings in the last half of 1966, when world coffee prices declined, coupled with an inflexible exchange rate, resulted in a balance of payments crisis late last year. With very limited liquid foreign exchange reserves and further foreign assistance yet to be arranged, the Colombian authorities considered it necessary beginning November 29, 1966 to impose trade and foreign exchange controls. This action, particularly the controls over imports, represented a marked reversal of Colombia's previous policies. The Colombian crises and actions related thereto also deferred to 1967 the final outcome of negotiations and the effective commencement

GROUP 3  
Downgraded at 12 year  
intervals; not auto-  
matically declassified

DECLASSIFIED

Authority A.I.D. Guidelines, 10-18-95

By CB, NARA, Date 10-21-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

of a program loan. Colombia has now also concluded satisfactory arrangements for a new International Monetary Fund Stand-By-Agreement and has negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding with the International Bank as head of the Consultative Group which outlines other aspects of the program and undertakings by the Government of Colombia.

Outcome of U.S. Negotiations

Our principal initial goals in the negotiations were: fiscal reforms, including additional tax revenue measures; continued ceilings on Central Bank lending to the Government; further import liberalization; exchange rate devaluation to a realistic level; measures to avert further increase in Colombia's coffee surplus and to institute an effective diversification program; increased non-coffee exports; an expanded investment effort and structural changes in agriculture and education.

The results follow:

- a. Colombian fiscal performance during 1966 and 1967 has been good; new tax revenues secured in the past four months alone represent, on an annual basis, an increase of about 15% in total revenue. Colombia has agreed to a satisfactory current account surplus for 1967 and quarterly targets. The investment budget is 58% larger than in 1966 and will be financed by non-inflationary means.
- b. The IMF has negotiated a ceiling on total Central Bank lending, but did not believe it necessary to negotiate a specific ceiling on Central Bank lending to the Government, given the good fiscal performance. We plan to keep this aspect of Central Bank lending under review.
- c. President Lleras has now recommitted his government to import liberalization as a long-term goal and has

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

set a target of 20% to be achieved by the end of the program period; achievement of the target depends partly on coffee earnings. Colombia is also committed to review this target at the end of six months, to determine whether financial developments warrant upward or downward revision.

d. A new fluctuating exchange rate system was introduced on March 22 in which the rate is expected to move with market forces. The rate is now moving, but the extent of movement could be limited by GOC management of import controls.

e. Colombia has given assurances that the coffee sector will be self-financing and that real income to coffee producers will not be increased. It is expanding its pilot diversification program. Colombia strongly favors international agreement on coffee production controls.

f. The Lleras government has agreed to seek a 35% increase in non-coffee exports in 1967. To promote such exports, fiscal incentives have been established.

g. Proposed Government investment in agriculture in 1967 is 70% above last year. A program is underway which concentrates on increased production and marketing of eight basic food crops. The basis for a long-term agricultural sector plan will be completed by June 30.

h. The Central Government's operating budget for education is higher than in 1966. In addition, the Government seeks to decentralize the financing of primary education. For the first time high priority is accorded to extending and improving secondary education. The Government is attempting to rationalize use of the overlapping facilities at the university level.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

Present Colombian import policy is not what we had hoped for or sought. After full discussion of this issue with the Government of Colombia, our senior officials in Bogota are convinced of Colombian appreciation of the merits of liberalization for achieving a more competitive economy and they are confident of President Lleras' desire to take further positive steps at the earliest opportunity to reduce import controls.

On balance, Colombian undertakings are acceptable evidence of its commitment to essential self-help measures. Performance in import liberalization and other fields requires, nevertheless, continuing attention. We will release AID program loan funds subsequent to the first tranche of \$40 million, only after careful quarterly reviews of Colombian progress in carrying out its program.

#### The Loan Level and Time Period

In October, Ambassador Carlson was authorized to inform President Lleras that up to \$100 million might be provided to support a satisfactory Colombian program for 15 months, then expected to be October 1966-December 1967. As a result of the events of late 1966 and the extended negotiations with the IMF, IBRD and the U.S. the Colombian program has now been developed on the basis of the 15 months period ending March 1968.

To induce greater reliance upon the market mechanism governing the exchange rate, the IMF has secured a Colombian commitment to reasonably high import orders through March 1968. Without assurances that program loan financing will be available to cover a portion of the payment obligations which will result from permitting these levels of import orders, Colombia is unlikely to have the confidence necessary to risk allowing market forces to influence the exchange rate during 1967 and to further liberalize imports. It would be prepared to license only a lower level of imports, thereby restricting prospects for growth and economic activity.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-5-

The period of U.S. support also accords well with our intention to reduce program loan assistance to Colombia in Fiscal Year 1968, which Ambassador Carlson conveyed to President Lleras at the outset of the negotiations. By late 1967 and early 1968, AID-financed import orders are planned to be at a monthly level consistent with a reduction in U.S. program lending assistance.

Effect on the U.S. Balance of Payments

U.S. assistance dollars will continue to be used exclusively for the purchase of goods and equipment in the United States. Agreement has also been reached on a list of specific items eligible for AID financing and on special financial incentives to be provided importers who purchase in the United States with AID dollars. I am satisfied that the AID program loan will assist us in our efforts to increase the U.S. share of the Colombian import market.

For the above reasons, and on the recommendations of Ambassador Carlson and Assistant Secretary Gordon, I propose to authorize soon, unless you indicate otherwise, the signing of a program loan agreement of up to \$100 million with the Government of Colombia, in support of a Colombian program extending from January 1, 1967 to March 31, 1968. We are planning simultaneous Colombian and U.S. announcement of the loan during April.

*William S. Gaud*

William S. Gaud

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, April 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Ambassador Sullivan from Laos

William Sullivan, U. S. Ambassador to Laos, will be in town from April 27 to May 4. He is one of several ambassadors who have been recalled to testify before Congressman Zablocki's subcommittee on "Rural Institutional Development in Southeast Asia."

The State Department thought you might find it useful to see him and get his views on recent developments in Laos, particularly in relation to military operations there. You last met him in your office on August 8, 1966.

If you have time, this might be useful, but it is not urgent.

W. W. Rostow

Make appointment \_\_\_\_\_

No appointment \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

*Briggs*

Wednesday, April 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit by Lord and Lady Casey

The Governor-General of Australia, Lord Casey, and Lady Casey will be visiting Washington privately between May 24 and May 29.

We have learned from Ambassador Waller that Lord Casey would like to pay a courtesy call on you during his visit. Lady Casey would like to do the same with Mrs. Johnson.

W. W. Rostow

Arrange appointment \_\_\_\_\_

No appointment \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-415  
By sig, NARA, Date 4-23-93 43

~~SECRET~~

April 24, 1967

MR. PRESIDENT:

The memorandum that follows may be important for your talk with Chancellor Kiesinger on Wednesday.

Here is the story.

At his request I called on Rainer Barzel at 11:00 a.m. this morning. As you know, he is the Majority Floor Leader in the German Parliament. We are good friends. Therefore, I gave him your position as outlined yesterday with the bark off, explaining that you cannot deal with the Mansfield problem unless they stop behaving like children and start behaving like serious partners in the task of preserving the unity of the West.

We then went on to the four specific issues. In his judgment, the withdrawal of aircraft is the most difficult for politicians in Germany to accept.

As we were leaving he said he was going to report immediately to the Chancellor.

I received a message this afternoon that he wished to see me again. I saw him at 6:00 p.m. at the American Embassy. He asked that I report the conversation only to you and that the interpreter destroy his notes.

This is what he said:

- I. Chancellor Kiesinger was greatly impressed with you and your personality this morning.
- II. He wishes on Wednesday to talk to you "extensively and, if possible, alone."
- III. He wishes to discuss the large outlines of your policy rather than the details. This is particularly important after your conversation this morning and after Barzel's report to the Chancellor of what I said to him. (He meant, it turned out, that the Chancellor is pretty clear about what you wish him to do about the four specific issues.)

I then began to probe what he meant by the "large outlines of policy" rather than specifics. I said President Johnson was a man of large ideas and ideals; but he would rather discuss the next step in achieving them rather than to discuss them in abstract, rhetorical terms. (At that point he smiled and said President Johnson is like Adenauer: His last words to his children were not: "Keep the family together"; but "make sure you meet every Christmas.")

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

He then began to explain as follows: There are some people telling the Chancellor that if Germany signs the non-proliferation treaty, Germany is giving in on one of the three things the Soviet Union demands: the other two are the Oder-Neisse line and formal recognition of the East German Government.

They then go on to say that troop levels will be reduced by us but not by the Soviet Union. After that they ask: Will we have any possibility of raising the question of German unity in the future?

The critical question for Kiesinger in the face of this pressure is to be able to tell his cabinet that President Johnson has a concept of policy in which there is a place for German unity.

For example, Barzel said, President Johnson might say: "I am doing everything I can to ease tensions between East and West because the world needs peace. German unity cannot be my first consideration; but out in the process of bringing peace and arms control, German unity will have a place. Non-proliferation will contribute to the process of arms control. That is the kind of world in which German unity has the greatest chance of coming about.

Barzel went on to say that there is no chance for German unity if the world is divided into two big blocs. "We cannot achieve German unity by nuclear war; but if relations between the U. S. and the Soviet Union improve as we achieve progress in a limited way on East/West issues, then we create an environment in which German unity becomes more possible in the future."

He then shifted to a specific, practical point. Chancellor Kiesinger in the Parliament made a Declaration of the Federal Government on Amelioration of Living Conditions in all of Germany. He urged that Germans in East and West Germany be permitted to travel more: that doctors -- specialists -- be permitted to cross from East to West. Kiesinger has spoken movingly in human terms about Germans being allowed to get closer in these matters. Still, the Soviet Union denounced Kiesinger's speech and has flatly refused to move in this direction.

Barzel then said: "Would it not be possible for President Johnson to tell Kiesinger that he will instruct Ambassador Thompson in Moscow to make representations to the Soviet Government that they should respond to this simple human appeal?" He said that nothing would affect Kiesinger and German opinion more than to know that President Johnson -- with his great humanitarian heart -- has considered seriously, among the human problems on this earth, the problem of human relations among Germans and German families divided one from the other.

I explained to Barzel that, while you worked for every reasonable approach to the Soviet Union, you were skeptical of Soviet motives and how fast they would move.

4/24/67

And I came back to my central point in the morning, which was: If we had any chance of making progress in the East, it was on the basis of a strong and united West; and it was not useful for the German Government to have these hopes to the East while it was cutting the ground from under your feet in maintaining the unity of the West. Barzel said that he understood this fully; and he believed Chancellor Kiesinger understood it also.

Before I make my recommendations, I wish to tell you now strongly I was impressed in this conversation that the Germans understand in their hearts -- if not in their pocketbooks or their press relations -- that they depend absolutely on you.

You should also know that: The German cabinet has been meeting in the wake of your talk with Kiesinger; Strauss has asked that I see him, which I shall do tomorrow morning; I have received an invitation to talk with Gutenberg this evening -- the other extreme nationalist in opposition to Kiesinger.

My assessment and recommendations:

- I. Your interview this morning with Kiesinger has had one hell of an effect.
- II. You should agree to talk at length with Kiesinger alone on Wednesday.
- III. Your talking points should be these:
  - Although we have 500,000 men fighting in Southeast Asia, I have not pulled out one fighting man from NATO through this difficult period;
  - I have kept my commitment in Europe because we have a vital security interest in Europe, but also because I am fully aware of the hope for peace in Europe;
  - Working together in unity we have demonstrated in these 20 years since the end of the World War that we can defend ourselves against the Communists, that we can make more economic and social progress than the Communists;
  - And that we can produce in the West societies that are so attractive and successful that Communism is failing as an ideology in the East;
  - The Chancellor should remember that it was only after the Cuba missile crisis that people began to talk of detente and that very small steps -- the atmospheric test ban -- were possible; you have been working for small agreements with the West because you believe that



as Communism becomes weaker, nationalism in the East becomes stronger in each country and more normal relations can fully be developed; so far as the non-proliferation treaty is concerned, you believe: it makes sense for the human race; it makes sense for the free world; and if we stay together it could contribute to arms control -- for example, the avoidance of a major race in ABM and ICBM's;

-- This is the environment in which you believe that movement towards German unity may gradually become possible; of all the American Presidents in this century, you have the closest ties to the German people; you understand the pain felt by every German that the division of their country cuts across families and language and cultures and memory;

-- It is a simple fact that of all the nations in the West, the United States is the only one that honestly wishes to see German unity brought about: neither the British nor the French honestly wish this to happen no matter what they say;

-- The reason the American people want German unity is because they want an end to the Cold War and that requires the drawing together of Germany and all of Europe under conditions of security for everyone. If, however, the West cannot remain united and if we cannot settle sensibly issues of trade and money and troops, then we shall not have detente and movement towards German unity, we shall have danger and crisis again. Therefore, the Chancellor should work with the President to maintain the unity of the West and count on the President -- and on the United States -- to be the strongest supporter he has in taking steps towards German unity.

-- You might then say that we are prepared to take small steps or large, whatever is realistic and possible. For example, you have been informed of the Chancellor's interest in improving the simple human contacts between the people in East and in West Germany. Your men have spoken often to Soviet representatives and told them how unwise it is for them to attack democratic Germany. You have asked Secretary Rusk to arrange that we talk to the Russians about the wisdom of encouraging these human contacts between East and West.

-- I suggest that you should close by saying once again that it is our experience together -- Germans and Americans -- that we have gotten nothing from the Russians through weakness and disunity. It is only if German policy and European policy is rooted in unity and strength in the West, that we have any chance of bringing peace to Europe and unity to the German people.

W. W. R.

Saturday, April 22, 1967 -- 5:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

You should know one effect of your extraordinarily generous spending of time with my mother today.

Our house was picketed by Viet Nam protesters this afternoon. It had worried the good ladies before the event. But, when I called, my mother said that, having met you and seeing what a good man we had as President, nothing troubled her -- she could deal with machine guns, if necessary.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, April 22, 1967  
5:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a useful summary paper  
of various kinds of Latin American  
official reactions to the Summit.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By RG, NARA, Date 4-29-91

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, April 22, 1967 -- 8:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

George Christian and I have slipped our secret weapon, Dick Moose, into Bonn. He gives us a picture of their concerns. It might be helpful if you were to indicate what -- if anything -- you wish to arrange for Monday afternoon and let them know today that we plan to leave Wednesday morning open for a meeting between yourself and Kiesinger.

We have set up a telecon with Bonn today at 11:00 a.m. our time. If you have guidance for us by that time, it would be an appropriate occasion to give Bonn the word and calm them down.

W. W. Rostow

*Also attached: a parallel Mc Sherr cable just arrived.*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By mg, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~SECRET~~

46a

REC  
SENT  
WHCA

WZW002  
OO WTE  
DE WTE 15 002

1967 APR 22 12 22

FROM: DICK MOOSE  
TO : WALT ROSTOW  
CITE: WHB002

~~SECRET~~

I HAVE JUST ATTENDED PLANNING MEETING WITH AMB. MCGHEE, OTHER WHITE HOUSE ADVANCE ELEMENTS AND EMBASSY STAFF. FOLLOWING POINTS EMERGED WHICH REQUIRE SOME THOUGHT AND, IF POSSIBLE, RESOLUTION PRIOR TO SCHEDULED TELECONFERENCE:

1. MONDAY SCHEDULE - THE ALL CONSUMING QUESTION HERE IS "WHAT WILL THE PRESIDENT DO ALL DAY MONDAY?" THOSE OF US FROM WHITE HOUSE HAVE STUCK TO LINE THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE PRESIDENT PLANS TO CONFER WITH KIESINGER AND HAS NO OTHER PLANS FOR BILATERALS. THE PRESS IS PREDICTABLY UNWILLING TO LEAVE IT AT THIS. THE EMBASSY STAFF IS TRYING TO TAKE IT AT FACE VALUE, BUT THEY THEN BEGIN TO ANTICIPATE OTHER ACTIVITIES FOR MONDAY. MANY HERE FEAR A LAST MINUTE DECISION TO VISIT BERLIN.

THEY HAVE DONE NO REPEAT NO PLANNING FOR MONDAY ACTIVITIES, BUT THE FOLLOWING WERE MENTIONED THIS MORNING AS POSSIBILITIES:

- A. MEET WITH EMBASSY STAFF
- B. CALL ON ADENAUER FAMILY
- C. MEET WITH OTHER US AMBASSADORS IN EUROPE, E.G. BRUCE, BOHLEN
- D. MEET WITH US GENERALS - LEMNITZER, BURCHINAL, POLK, OMEARA, ETC (THEY WILL ATTEND SERVICES AS INVITEES OF FRG DEFENSE MINISTRY)
- E. VISIT TROOPS IN FIELD
- F. RECEIVE "DISTINGUISHED NON-OFFICIAL GERMANS", E.G. BIRRENBACH (AMB. MCGHEE, WHILE NOT PUSHING THIS IDEA, FEELS CALLERS COULD BE RECEIVED "WITHOUT ATTRACTING ATTENTION." I DO NOT AT ALL AGREE WITH HIM.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 91-415  
By ig, NARA, Date 4-23-93

H. COURTESY CALL C LUEBKE (IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THIS WILL BE EXPECTED, BUT EMBASSY KNOWS LUEBKE WOULD LIKE IT)

*T. Receive Encl.*  
AMB. MCGHEE BELIEVES WE CAN TAKE CARE OF THE PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT MONDAY BY SAYING THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL CONFER WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND REST FOLLOWING TRIP AND IN ANTICIPATION OF HEAVY SCHEDULE TUESDAY.

QUESTION -- WHAT SHOULD WE SAY OR DO ABOUT MONDAY?

2. DEPARTURE TIME - GEORGE CHRISTIAN'S STATEMENT YESTERDAY, AS REPORTED HERE BY ASSOCIATED PRESS WAS THAT PRESIDENT'S RETURN WOULD BE "EITHER TUESDAY NIGHT OR WEDNESDAY MORNING. IT IS THE STRONG FEELING OF THE EMBASSY (MCGHEE, CLINE, ET AL) THAT THE "TUESDAY NIGHT" PORTION OF THAT REPORT COULD CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE GERNAMS. THE REASON BEING THAT THE GERMANS WILL NOT CONSIDER BILATERAL APPROPRIATE UNTIL AFTER THE FUNERAL. PLANNING HERE HAS BEEN ON THE BASIS THAT LBJ-KIESINGER MEETING WOULD BE WEDNESDAY.

EMBASSY FEELS THAT IF WE APPEAR TOO ARBITRARY OVER SCHEDULE, THAT KIESINGER MIGHT GET HIS BACK UP AND SAY TO HELL WITH A MEETING. THE POINT IS - IF THE WEDNESDAY DEPARTURE IS FIRM, MUCH MISCHIEF CAN BE AVOIDED BY A CLEAR AFFIRMATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ITEM TO COME OUT OF THE MORNING'S MEETING. IF DEPARTURE IS TO BE TUESDAY NIGHT THE EMBASSY NEEDS TIME TO WORK OUT WITH THE GERNAMS THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY EITHER (A) MEETING PRIOR TO FUNERAL, OR (B) MEETING ON TUESDAY EVENING FOLLOWING FUNERAL - A PERIOD WHEN KIESINGER WILL HAVE OBLIGATIONS TO BID FAREWELL TO OTHER HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT.

HMM ABOVE ARE THE MOST CRUCIAL QUESTIONS OF THE MOMENT. I WILL FOLLOW WITH ANOTHER MESSAGE LISTING A SERIES OF GARDEN VARIETY PROBLEMS. WE HAVE ASKED EMBASSY TO HAVE BY TELECON TIME, A MINUTE-BY-MINUTE SCHEDULE FOR ARRIVAL AND FOR TUESDAY. MONDAY IS THE BIG GAP AND MUCH DEPENDS ON WHAT WILL HAPPEN THERE. ONE LAST THOUGHT - THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT ARRIVAL STATEMENTS BY HEADS OF STATE AND NONE ARE NOW PLANNED. IT WILL, OF COURSE BE ALMOST MIDNIGHT, IF SCHEDULE REMAINS AS IT WAS ON MY DEPARTURE. THERE WILL BE HONORS - ONLY A SMALL GUARD WHICH WILL PRESENT ARMS - NO BAND.

EVERYONE HERE IS MOST COOPERATIVE AND A TEAM SPIRIT IS BEGINNING TO TAKE SHAPE. MARTY HILLENBRAND IS THE STRONG REED.

MARTY UNDERWOOD HAS READ ABOVE AND CONCURS

DTG: 221135Z APR 67



00 RUEHEX

DE RUEHC 22578 1121  
ZMMMMNY CCCCC  
P 221229Z APP 67  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEHISA/USIA  
O 221135Z APR 67 ZFF-1  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3743  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 12655

PASS WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-413

By 128, NARA, Date 1-8-92

SUBJ: ADENAUER FUNERAL - THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM FOR APRIL 24

1. IN EMBTEL 12648 WE SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT WISH TO CALL ON ADENAUER FAMILY DURING APRIL 24. HE MIGHT BE ACCOMPANIED DURING SUCH A CALL BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY DURING THE DAY IS A CALL ON THE PRESIDENT BY FORMER CHANCELLOR ERHARD. (SEE BONN 12648). WE WISH TO SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POSSIBILITIES FOR CONSIDERATION.

A. THE SENIOR US MILITARY COMMANDERS IN GERMANY COULD BE ASSEMBLED IN BONN FOR A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. GENERAL LEMNITZER MIGHT ALSO BE INCLUDED IN HIS CAPACITY AS CINCEUR.

B. US AMBASSADORS IN OTHER EUROPEAN CAPITALS SUCH AS PARIS, LONDON AND ROME COULD BE ON HAND FOR CONSULTATION WITH THE PRESIDENT OR THE SECRETARY.

C. THE US COMMANDANT AND THE US MINISTER IN BERLIN COULD BE BROUGHT TO BONN IN THE EVENT THE PRESIDENT OR THE SECRETARY WISHED TO DISCUSS THE BERLIN SITUATION.

ANY OF THE ABOVE THREE PROPOSALS WOULD BE IN LINE WITH THE ANNOUNCED PURPOSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S EARLY ARRIVAL, NAMELY TO CONSULT WITH AMERICAN STAFF MEMBERS.

2. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WOULD BE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO PAY A BRIEF VISIT TO A US MILITARY INSTALLATION IN GERMANY. LOGISTICALLY, THIS WOULD POSE NO SERIOUS PROBLEM. SINCE IT WOULD COME BEFORE THE ADENAUER FUNERAL CEREMONIES. HOWEVER, IT WOULD ALTER SOMEWHAT THE NATURE OF THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP AND COULD DETRACT FROM THE GESTURE OF MAKING THE JOURNEY PRIMARILY TO HONOR ADENAUER.

3. WE HOPE TO OBTAIN THE THINKING OF THE DEPARTMENT AND THE WHITE HOUSE ON A PROGRAM FOR APRIL 24 DURING THE TELECON SCHEDULED FOR 11:00 A.M. WASHINGTON TIME TODAY.

G-4.  
MCGHEE  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

*Pres file*

Saturday -  
April 22, 1967

Mr. President:

"Cantinflas" has sent you the letter at Tab B concerning his new film, "His Excellence", which has not yet been released for commercial exhibition.

I recommend that you send him the acknowledgement at Tab A.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachments**

Tab A - Acknowledgement to "Cantinflas"  
letter of April 1967

Tab B - April 1967 letter from "Cantinflas".

47a

April 22, 1967

Dear Pepe:

I deeply appreciated your thoughtful letter and your heartfelt support of the common goals which brought the Presidents of this hemisphere together at Punta del Este.

I look forward to seeing "Cantinflas" in action in "His Excellence," which I know will further delight your many, many fans.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,



Mr. Mario Moreno  
President  
Posa Films Internacional, S. A.  
Estudios Churubusco  
Calzada de Tlalpam  
Mexico, D. F.

LBJ:WGBowdler:mz  
4/22/67

476

# POSA FILMS INTERNACIONAL, S. A.

ESTUDIOS CHURUBUSCO, CALZADA DE TLALPAM, MEXICO 21, D. F.

MARIO MORENO  
PRESIDENTE

CABLES POSAMEX MEXICO  
TELEFONO 49-30-80

April 1967

Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson,  
President of the United States of  
North America,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.


Dear Mr. Johnson,

In my last film entitled "HIS EXCELLENCE",  
I have wished to be near You and all the  
American Presidents, good friends of mine,  
in the most important meeting in Punta del  
Este, that is transcendental for the future  
of our countries.

With the respect and friendship that conso-  
lidate us, I hope that all the governments  
and countries will find a positive critique  
in defense of human dignity.

Among your highly important jobs and compro-  
mises I do hope you may have a few moments  
to see this film, in which I put all my love  
and convictions as a citizen of our Continent.

Sincerely,

  
MARIO MORENO  
"Cantinflas"

*Profile*

Saturday - April 22, 1967

Mr. President:

Our AID Mission Directors in Latin America are meeting next week in Washington for their regular annual session.

The main topic of discussion this year will be implementation of the Summit decisions.

In the attached memorandum from David Bronheim you are invited to attend a reception on Thursday evening, April 27.

It would be a nice gesture for you to do this. It would be one way of conveying to the Mission Directors your personal interest in their work.

Another possibility -- which would take less time and have more impact -- would be to have the Mission Directors come to the Cabinet Room next Thursday where you could give them a short pep-talk on Summit follow-through. I think a 15-20 minute investment of your time in this fashion would pay long dividends. They would go back <sup>based</sup> to their jobs with a new enthusiasm and sense of commitment/on your sense of urgency to get on with the Alliance for Progress.

W. W. Rostow

Will attend reception \_\_\_\_\_

Prefer meeting in the Cabinet Room \_\_\_\_\_

Prefer no participation \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me: \_\_\_\_\_ .

cc - Jim Jones

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

49

~~1. [redacted]~~  
2. *Pres file*

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Saturday, April 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SANTIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 99-93**  
**By cb, NARA Date 9-25-00**

[redacted]

The following points stand out [redacted]

1. Gromyko appears to be working more closely with Kosygin on the Vietnam problem than Brezhnev;
2. The Soviets feel that in our methods of attempting to establish contact with the North Vietnamese, we are going beyond the recognized limits of a great power in its dealings with a small nation;
3. The Soviets feel that McNamara considers quite strongly that Moscow is the only appropriate place to engage in these conversations and that the Soviets should take on the intermediary role;
4. They feel that the Vietnamese in Moscow have not been as correct in their dealings with us as they should be and plan to establish a system for monitoring and controlling these contacts.

In their direct dealings with North Vietnam, it appears that:

1. They are not satisfied the North Vietnamese have been entirely open with them regarding Vietnamese talks with Peking;

2. [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]



~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Meeting With the President  
Saturday, April 22, 1967, at 2:00 p.m.

AGENDA

As I understand it, the only two items up for our meeting this afternoon are:

1. Targeting -- especially the Hanoi thermal power plant.
2. The German anxiety about the scale of our proposed aircraft redeployment. As instructed, I sent the cable on this matter to Sec. McNamara.

You may wish to use the occasion also to settle the only two substantial issues arising from my telecon with Amb. McGhee and his staff:

- Should you make a brief, solemn departure statement tomorrow morning. Bonn sees no difficulty and some advantage in setting the tone of the occasion and turning it away from the notion we are going for a political summit.
- The Germans now propose firmly a session with Kiesinger running from 10:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. on Wednesday. He urges that you meet their wishes in this matter.
- I have already told Pat Dean, who was in on another piece of business, that we would settle the question of bilaterals in Bonn. I indicated your desire that we do this in very low key. He said the Prime Minister shared your view. He looked forward to seeing you in Bonn. He wanted a few words but Wilson did not believe this would be an occasion to go into matters he wished to discuss with you in June.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By CL, NARA, Date 10-21-98

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, April 22, 1967  
5:10 p.m.

*Lang*  
*2. Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a useful summary paper  
of various kinds of Latin American  
official reactions to the Summit.

*Walt*. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *19*, NARA, Date *4-24-91*

51a

#6790

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Official Latin American Reaction  
to the Summit

Enclosed are three papers on the reaction of Latin American officials to the Meeting of American Chiefs of State at Punta del Este, April 12-14, 1967: (1) an analysis of the public and private statements (confidential); (2) a summary of the public statements (unclassified); and (3) a summary of the private remarks (confidential).

*CB*  
for Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12958,  
SEC. 1.1(a)BY 126 ON 4-30-91

SUMMARIES OF PRIVATE STATEMENTS BY OAS CHIEFS OF  
STATE AND OTHER OFFICIALS ON THE SUMMIT MEETING  
Punta del Este, April 12-14, 1967

Argentina: Foreign Minister Costa Mendez

On April 17 Costa Mendez informed Ambassador Martin that the GOA thought the Summit was successful and that he considered that all that could reasonably be expected was accomplished. He added that the GOA was extremely pleased with the bilateral conversation between President Ongania and President Johnson.

Chile: President Frei

Frei told Ambassador Dungan that in his opinion President Johnson's trip was an unqualified success. He cited the President's "unprepossessing manner and great dignity, his undiverted attention and seriousness with which he approached the issues, and his display of unusual understanding and sensitivity to Latin problems." Frei clearly indicated he was delighted with the relationship that developed between President Johnson and himself, and that he returned from the Summit with a very large measure of renewed confidence in the understanding and support of the President and the United States. The Foreign Office privately reflected the positive attitudes of President Frei. One official told the Embassy that the Summit results were quite good on balance and that several agreements, especially the common market, represented highly important achievements.

El Salvador: President-elect Sanchez

In a private conversation with our Ambassador on April 18, President-elect Sanchez described the Summit as sound and productive rather than spectacular. The free exchange of ideas solidified hemispheric friendship and there was a consensus that Latin Americans had to help themselves before the United States could help them. He said President Johnson won the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 72984-236  
By sg/ics, NARA, Date 4-30-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

the respect and admiration of all present, impressing them as a "man of the people" sincerely concerned about the problems of Latin America.

Honduras: President Lopez

President Lopez commented to Ambassador Jova that he thought the Summit was successful and that there was a new realization among all concerned that Latin America had entered into a new era in which both integration and harder work were prime requirements. He expressed appreciation for the opportunity given to the Central Americans to dine alone with President Johnson and to discuss regional and bilateral matters. While he expected no immediate reply from President Johnson to the four-point memorandum he had left with him, he was gratified by the President's attitude and that of the U.S. delegation to some of the points he had raised. Lopez added that he appreciated the gentlemanly gesture on the part of both President Johnson and Secretary Rusk in taking the initiative in raising the Swan Islands problem and expressing their hopes for a speedy resolution.

The Economy Minister told the Ambassador that it was now up to the Latin Americans to work harder and move toward the Conference goals; at the same time it was gratifying to know that the U.S. was prepared to take a new more sympathetic look at Latin American trade and aid problems. All members of the delegation remarked that the Ecuadorean President had handled himself poorly and that his attacks had backfired.

Panama: President Robles

Ambassador Arias, who was present at the Summit Meeting, told Department officers that he considered the meeting a great success. He described the Ecuadorean President's performance as pathetic and a personal disaster, and contrasted Belaunde's astute handling of the sensitive territorial seas problem with Arosemena's emotional and arrogant approach.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

Arias also said he considered President Johnson's statement that the U.S. would look into the question of special trade preferences as a major indication of a possible future change in basic U.S. trade policy, the most that practically could have been expected at this time.

Venezuela: President Leoni

The Minister of Education told Ambassador Bernbaum that President Leoni returned from the Summit moderately satisfied, primarily as a result of his talks with President Johnson. The Embassy reports that Leoni's measured optimism has been communicated to other GOV officials.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6/10

SUMMARIES OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY OAS CHIEFS OF  
STATE UPON THEIR RETURN FROM SUMMIT MEETING  
Punta del Este, April 12-14, 1967

Brazil: President Costa e Silva

In an April 15 communique, Costa e Silva said that the Summit inaugurated a new era for Latin America, whose common problems will now be approached with the urgency perceived and emphasized by President Johnson. He claimed the Summit was a complete success for Brazil, citing the attention given to agriculture, education, and health and the "particularly Brazilian position" of the LA right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. He was especially grateful to President Johnson for having given U.S. views on this last subject in his speech. Informally, he told the press that the U.S. identification with the common aspirations of the LA countries was one of the Summit's notable successes. Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto told the press that Brazil had achieved a victory for its point of view, and that Latin America would now move from recommendations to action in its search for integration. He added "President Johnson listened attentively to the expositions of the Latin American countries and, at the end, made his exposition which coincided with the previous pronouncements."

Chile: President Frei

Upon his return from Punta del Este, President Frei issued a short statement in which he described the Summit as "extraordinarily positive." He said that honest efforts were exerted there and described the Presidential bilateral talks as very profitable. A few days later, in a signed statement in a leading magazine, Frei said commitment to economic integration was the central event of the conference. He praised the role of President Johnson, stating that "his participation... was fully positive."

Colombia: President Lleras

In a radio-TV address on April 19, President Lleras said "the Presidents' Declaration did not contain all we desire but marks a positive step." He saw no reason to hastily call the Summit a failure; he personally believed it a success. Citing achievements, Lleras pointed out (1) the Common Market goal was set forth in a clear form and time frame; (2) US financial assistance for the Common Market was announced; (3) the multi-lateral character of the Alliance for Progress was demonstrated and given new impulse; (4) person-to-person contacts among Presidents permitted treatment of major topics such as the coffee agreement. In matters of international policy, Lleras observed, changes come slowly, as with the Inter-American Bank concept. He spoke at great length about the Common Market but strongly asserted that this must be complemented by easy access by underdeveloped countries to US and European markets; also financial assistance, including help for Latin America in internal financing, is indispensable for Common Market projects.

Costa Rica: President Trejos

In a brief public statement Trejos remarked that the Presidents' Declaration "contained nothing new". In a subsequent press conference, he explained that he had meant that the signers of the declaration knew beforehand the contents of the document which had been carefully elaborated by experts and reviewed by the Foreign Ministers prior to the conference. He viewed the Summit results with "greatest optimism" and believed the declaration had "enormous value". It contained goals and indicated means to attain them which are of the highest importance for the future of America. He underlined the remarkable identity of views expressed in the speeches of the Presidents, and described President Johnson's speech as "very important and conceptual". Most important, he added, is the realization that Latin America must decide its own destiny - and that the Latins must act on their own behalf. Trejos called this a "positive element".

Dominican Republic: President Balaguer

Balaguer indicated that he was pleased with the specific accomplishments for the Dominican Republic at the Summit. He is quoted by the press as commenting favorably on the sympathetic reception of his request for a 600,000 ton sugar quota. He also denied press reports and critical editorials alleging that in his Summit talks with President Johnson he had praised United States intervention in April 1965. He said he had merely thanked the President for economic assistance.

Ecuador: President Arosemena

To his critics who feared a possible deterioration in relations with the United States, Arosemena declared that he returned from the Summit with the close personal friendship of President Johnson, who, he stated, liked the Ecuadorean's frankness. As evidence of this friendship Arosemena displayed the presents received from President Johnson. In various public statements on the day of his return, Arosemena defended his refusal to sign the final declaration, relating this to his determination to avoid Ecuador's alleged error of 1942 when at the urging of other countries it signed the Rio Protocol on the Ecuador-Peru boundary dispute. He cited Ecuador's grievances toward the United States, including Ecuador's plea for adequate export prices and for preferential access for its products in the U.S. market, a higher level of U.S. assistance, and a revision of allegedly onerous loan terms. In a TV appearance Arosemena said that Ecuador would not be isolated but would be respected for its courage and independence. The Summit's ideas on the Common Market were worth little since inadequate instruments had been created. The chief benefit of the Conference was the opportunity for contacts with hemisphere leaders.

El Salvador: President-elect Sanchez

Sanchez said the Summit was important in bringing further developments in such Central American interests as coffee, the

common market and Alliance for Progress technical and financial programs. The Central Americans, who acted in unison throughout, held a "very satisfying" meeting with President Johnson, who promised to urge the Senate to increase aid in the social and economic fields. Above all, the Alliance is a joint endeavor whose success depends primarily on each nation's efforts. With respect to coffee, the Latin American producers agreed to meet in June to discuss joint actions and set up a marketing fund to stabilize prices. All in all, the Summit was a success.

Guatemala: President Mendez

Mendez told the Guatemalan press that the Summit was a success and resulted in a coordinated plan to spur economic and social development throughout the hemisphere. He characterized hemispheric integration as one of the "most visionary steps taken since Latin American independence" and asserted that the American nations have now begun to direct their steps toward continental unity. He emphasized the value of the face-to-face conversations among Chiefs of State, which brought about a "greater comprehension of our mutual problems." (Foreign Minister ARENALES told the press that while the final declaration of the assembled Presidents did not completely satisfy all the Chiefs of State, it was the result of a consensus. He said that Ecuadorean President Arosemena's refusal to sign the declaration was an indication of the vitality of the Inter-American system. Arenales added that the declaration on economic integration alone would have made the Summit worthwhile.)

Honduras: President Lopez

In a brief airport statement to large crowd on April 17, President Lopez said that he did not go to Punta del Este with his hand out or to see how much would be given, but to discuss, approve and sign a document of great importance to all Latin America. He referred especially to the pledge to seek economic integration and work unitedly for the progress and well-being of the people.

Mexico: President Diaz Ordaz

In a 40-minute radio and TV report Diaz Ordaz stressed Latin American economic independence and self-help and noted that political reality limited the results which could be expected from a Summit Conference. "The economic integration process," he said, "must be exclusively a Latin American effort. The responsibility for development must be based on our own efforts, and external assistance should be accepted only in a proper and complementary way." Integration should benefit Latin American enterprises primarily, rather than international interests. The Conference results "were not overly important, but sufficiently significant." He preferred to settle for attainable benefits rather than return empty-handed. He concluded: "We understand ourselves much better now."

Nicaragua: President Guerrero

In a press interview April 17 Guerrero termed the Summit Meeting of "transcendental importance" and declared that preferential treatment would be accorded those enterprises which contribute most to domestic economies and international trade. The Alliance for Progress had reaffirmed its goal of improving living conditions, and in order to give meaning to the Punta del Este accord Nicaragua would need to look to self-help as well as to external aid. In an allusion to Ecuador, Guerrero said it was false to consider the results of Punta del Este as only rhetoric. He expressed pleasure with his exchanges with President Johnson.

Panama: President Robles

In a brief speech on April 15, Robles concentrated on his meeting with President Johnson on outstanding canal issues. In an "unprecedented" hour-and-a-half meeting with President Johnson, he had raised all the points which the treaty negotiators had not yet resolved. President Johnson had showed great sympathy for resolving these issues, stated that he saw



no insurmountable points in the negotiations and directed the U.S. negotiators to accelerate the pace of the discussions. Robles added that as a result of his meeting with President Johnson he was "very optimistic" about the rapid success of the treaty negotiations.

Peru: President Belaunde

Belaunde referred to the meeting as a "historical act" and an expression of "an optimistic America not a complaining one." Peru expected a great deal of itself but did not expect much from abroad. In its relation with the United States, Peru should enjoy a sense of cooperation and not of help. He described Peru's commercial ties with the U.S. as having historical and geographic roots and rejected the idea of accelerated trade with the Eastern Bloc. Belaunde offered Lima as a site for a conference of government technicians two years after Punta del Este to review Summit results.

Venezuela: President Leoni

Leoni said that positive advances had been made at the Summit in the areas of agriculture, education, public health, and multinational projects, based on commitments by the Chiefs of State. The opportunity to exchange views on common problems with the other Chiefs of State was also a positive point. Leoni stated that President Johnson was "not only receptive but understanding" toward Venezuela's particular interest in petroleum. Only with regard to the problem of terms of trade did he feel the results of the meeting were unsatisfactory.

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL LATIN AMERICAN REACTION TO SUMMIT

Most of the OAS Chiefs of State issued public statements upon their return from Punta del Este. The prevailing theme, with some qualification and variation in intensity, was that the Summit produced positive results. The majority not only commented favorably on the achievements of the Conference itself, but expressed their particular pleasure over their bilateral conversations with President Johnson. The remarks made privately to U.S. officials by the Chiefs of State and other ranking officials generally reflected the same reaction as stated publicly.

Public Statements

The most enthusiastic public comments to date were those of Presidents Frei of Chile, Costa e Silva of Brazil, Mendes of Guatemala and Trejos of Costa Rica.

When the Chiefs of State assigned a relative importance to the various Conference achievements, they most frequently emphasized the impetus given to Latin American integration, which Guatemala's President Mendez termed "one of the most visionary steps taken since Latin American independence." Other areas of success frequently noted were the decisions in the fields of agriculture, education and health.

Many Presidents also stressed that the Summit had served to underscore the need for Latin American initiative and self-help to solve Latin American problems, with foreign assistance essentially a complementary factor. President Trejos said plainly that the future of Latin America depends on Latin American actions rather than external aid, and that recognition of this fact at the Conference was "a positive element." At the same time, there was usually an appreciation that the United States was attentive and sympathetic to Latin American problems and was prepared to support Latin American efforts.

Several Presidents qualified their generally favorable assessments by pointing out areas in which they achieved less than they would have wished. These expressions of disappointment usually concerned trade questions. President Lleras of

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority mg 84-232  
By ry/uc, NARA, Date 4-30-91

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Colombia, for example, asserted that a Latin American Common Market must be complemented by easy access by the underdeveloped countries to the markets of the United States and Europe, a liberalization of trade and the granting of preferences by industrialized countries. The Presidents' Declaration, while not containing all Latin America desired was, he said, " a positive step."

Mexican President Diaz Ordaz commented that the Conference results were "sufficiently significant", and explained that he preferred to settle for attainable benefits rather than return empty-handed. This statement probably stemmed from Mexican disappointment at U.S. refusal to concede special preferences for Latin American products on a non-reciprocal basis and failure of the Conference to produce measures for guaranteeing better and more stable prices for Latin American commodities.

President Leoni of Venezuela also noted that the results with regard to terms of trade were not satisfactory. This disappointment is probably due to the lack of specific actions on petroleum and other commodities in Latin American trade with the industrialized nations, particularly the United States.

In various public statements President Arosemena of Ecuador defended his refusal to sign the final Declaration of the Presidents, using the arguments he advanced at Punta del Este. His negative reaction to the Summit stems from a complex of motivations, including his political ambitions and Ecuadorean frustrations in satisfying self-help requirements of foreign lending agencies. It also reflects Ecuador's disappointment in failing to gain inter-American attention to her border problem with Peru. Nevertheless, Arosemena said that he returned from the Summit with the personal friendship of President Johnson, who, he stated, had liked the Ecuadorean's frankness.

Virtually all the Presidents (including Arosemena) cited the Summit as having provided a valuable opportunity for personal contact between Chiefs of State. Much favorable comment was made upon the bilateral talks with President Johnson.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

President Robles, in expressing great pleasure over the success of his trip to Punta del Este, dwelt almost exclusively on his "unprecedented" hour-and-a-half breakfast discussion with the President, and professed great optimism that the canal treaty negotiations would be successfully completed soon. Many other Presidents also voiced their satisfaction with the attention, courtesy and understanding of Latin problems shown by President Johnson, both in the Meeting sessions and in the bilateral talks. President Frei lauded President Johnson's role at Punta del Este as "fully positive".

Private Remarks

The few reports we have of the private remarks made by the Chiefs of State and other ranking officials are in the same tenor as the public statements. For example, Honduran President Lopez said that following the successful Summit Meetings, Latin America had entered into a new era in which both integration and harder work were the prime requirements. President Ongania expressed his conviction that the results of the meeting would be of "major importance" and called for continued conversations among Hemisphere Presidents. A number of officials privately expressed the view that Arosemena's performance had been poor and probably counterproductive. El Salvador's President-elect Sanchez said the Summit was not spectacular, but sound and productive, and that President Johnson had shown himself to be "a man of the people." All private comments reported included expressions of great satisfaction over the bilateral conversations. President Frei was notably delighted with the relationship which had developed between him and President Johnson and commended the latter for his dignity and seriousness and his "unusual understanding and sensitivity to Latin American problems."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

52

*Pres file*

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-71  
By CB, NARA Date 6-30-00

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, April 22, 1967  
11:00 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Trip by Lynda Bird to Latin America

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

Yesterday afternoon I sent you [REDACTED] of the security situation in each of the places where Lynda Bird would like to stop on her South American trip. I noted that the information on Cartagena, Colombia was incomplete and would be furnished today.

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

This is [REDACTED] assessment for Cartagena:

- a. Under the direction of the Colombian Navy, security forces in Cartagena appear to have enough men to control any disturbances. Historically, subversives have caused few public order problems in Cartagena and the Colombian Communist Party in the area is weak.
- b. [REDACTED]
- c. Citizens of Cartagena by personality are different from other Colombians. They are less violent and are more interested rum, women and song than in demonstrations. Of all Colombian cities, Cartagena is probably the safest.
- d. If Miss Jonson arrives with minimum advance publicity, the likelihood of any serious demonstrations, even by students, would be minimal.

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

W. W. Rostow

53

Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, April 22, 1967 -- 8:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

George Christian and I have slipped our secret weapon, Dick Moose, into Bonn. He gives us a picture of their concerns. It might be helpful if you were to indicate what -- if anything -- you wish to arrange for Monday afternoon and let them know today that we plan to leave Wednesday morning open for a meeting between yourself and Kiesinger.

We have set up a telecon with Bonn today at 11:00 a.m. our time. If you have guidance for us by that time, it would be an appropriate occasion to give Bonn the word and calm them down.

W. Rostow

Also attached: a parallel McGhee cable just arrived.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 91-415

By CB/isp, NARA, Date 10-13-98



~~SECRET~~

53a

REC  
SENT  
WHCA

WZW002  
OO WTE  
DE WTE 15 002

1967 APR 22 12 22

FROM: DICK MOOSE  
TO : WALT ROSTOW  
CITE: WHB002

~~SECRET~~

I HAVE JUST ATTENDED PLANNING MEETING WITH AMB. MCGHEE, OTHER WHITE HOUSE ADVANCE ELEMENTS AND EMBASSY STAFF. FOLLOWING POINTS EMERGED WHICH REQUIRE SOME THOUGHT AND, IF POSSIBLE, RESOLUTION PRIOR TO SCHEDULED TELECONFERENCE:

1. MONDAY SCHEDULE - THE ALL CONSUMING QUESTION HERE IS "WHAT WILL THE PRESIDENT DO ALL DAY MONDAY?" THOSE OF US FROM WHITE HOUSE HAVE STUCK TO LINE THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE PRESIDENT PLANS TO CONFER WITH KIESINGER AND HAS NO OTHER PLANS FOR BILATERALS. THE PRESS IS PREDICTABLY UNWILLING TO LEAVE IT AT THIS. THE EMBASSY STAFF IS TRYING TO TAKE IT AT FACE VALUE, BUT THEY THEN BEGIN TO ANTICIPATE OTHER ACTIVITIES FOR MONDAY. MANY HERE FEAR A LAST MINUTE DECISION TO VISIT BERLIN.

THEY HAVE DONE NO REPEAT NO PLANNING FOR MONDAY ACTIVITIES, BUT THE FOLLOWING WERE MENTIONED THIS MORNING AS POSSIBILITIES:

- A. MEET WITH EMBASSY STAFF
- B. CALL ON ADENAUER FAMILY
- C. MEET WITH OTHER US AMBASSADORS IN EUROPE, E.G. BRUCE, BOHLEN
- D. MEET WITH US GENERALS - LEMNITZER, BURCHINAL, POLK, OMEARA, ETC (THEY WILL ATTEND SERVICES AS INVITEES OF FRG DEFENSE MINISTRY)
- E. VISIT TROOPS IN FIELD
- F. RECEIVE "DISTINGUISHED NON-OFFICIAL GERMANS", E.G. BIRRENBACH (AMB. MCGHEE, WHILE NOT PUSHING THIS IDEA, FEELS CALLERS COULD BE RECEIVED "WITHOUT ATTRACTING ATTENTION." I DO NOT AT ALL AGREE WITH HIM.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 91-415

By cl/lsp, NARA, Date 10-13-98

G. REST

H. COURTESY CALL C LUEBKE (IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THIS WILL BE EXPECTED, BUT EMBASSY KNOWS LUEBKE WOULD LIKE IT)

*I. Receive Erhard.*

AMB. MCGHEE BELIEVES WE CAN TAKE CARE OF THE PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT MONDAY BY SAYING THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL CONFER WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND REST FOLLOWING TRIP AND IN ANTICIPATION OF HEAVY SCHEDULE TUESDAY.

QUESTION -- WHAT SHOULD WE SAY OR DO ABOUT MONDAY?

2. DEPARTURE TIME - GEORGE CHRISTIAN'S STATEMENT YESTERDAY, AS REPORTED HERE BY ASSOCIATED PRESS WAS THAT PRESIDENT'S RETURN WOULD BE "EITHER TUESDAY NIGHT OR WEDNESDAY MORNING. IT IS THE STRONG FEELING OF THE EMBASSY (MCGHEE, CLINE, ET AL) THAT THE "TUESDAY NIGHT" PORTION OF THAT REPORT COULD CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE GERNAMS. THE REASON BEING THAT THE GERMANS WILL NOT CONSIDER BILATERAL APPROPRIATE UNTIL AFTER THE FUNERAL. PLANNING HERE HAS BEEN ON THE BASIS THAT LBJ-KIESINGER MEETING WOULD BE WEDNESDAY.

EMBASSY FEELS THAT IF WE APPEAR TOO ARBITRARY OVER SCHEDULE, THAT KIESINGER MIGHT GET HIS BACK UP AND SAY TO HELL WITH A MEETING. THE POINT IS - IF THE WEDNESDAY DEPARTURE IS FIRM, MUCH MISCHIEF CAN BE AVOIDED BY A CLEAR AFFIRMATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ITEM TO COME OUT OF THE MORNING'S MEETING. IF DEPARTURE IS TO BE TUESDAY NIGHT THE EMBASSY NEEDS TIME TO WORK OUT WITH THE GERNAMS THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY EITHER (A) MEETING PRIOR TO FUNERAL, OR (B) MEETING ON TUESDAY EVENING FOLLOWING FUNERAL - A PERIOD WHEN KIESINGER WILL HAVE OBLIGATIONS TO BID FAREWELL TO OTHER HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT.

HMEM ABOVE ARE THE MOST CRUCIAL QUESTIONS OF THE MOMENT. I WILL FOLLOW WITH ANOTHER MESSAGE LISTING A SERIES OF GARDEN VARIETY PROBLEMS. WE HAVE ASKED EMBASSY TO HAVE BY TELECON TIME, A MINUTE-BY-MINUTE SCHEDULE FOR ARRIVAL AND FOR TUESDAY. MONDAY IS THE BIG GAP AND MUCH DEPENDS ON WHAT WILL HAPPEN THERE. ONE LAST THOUGHT - THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT ARRIVAL STATEMENTS BY HEADS OF STATE AND NONE ARE NOW PLANNED. IT WILL, OF COURSE BE ALMOST MIDNIGHT, IF SCHEDULE REMAINS AS IT WAS ON MY DEPARTURE. THERE WILL BE HONORS - ONLY A SMALL GUARD WHICH WILL PRESENT ARMS - NO BAND.

EVERYONE HERE IS MOST COOPERATIVE AND A TEAM SPIRIT IS BEGINNING TO TAKE SHAPE. MARTY HILLENBRAND IS THE STRONG REED.

MARTY UNDERWOOD HAS READ ABOVE AND CONCURS

DTG: 221135Z APR 67

760

~~SECRET~~



00 RUEHEX

536

DE RUEHC 22578 1121  
ZMVMNY CCCCC  
P 221229Z APR 67  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEHISA/USIA  
O 221135Z APR 67 ZFF-1  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3743  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 12655

PASS WHITE HOUSE

SUBJ: ADENAUER FUNERAL - THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM FOR APRIL 24

1. IN EMBTEL 12648 WE SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT WISH TO CALL ON ADENAUER FAMILY DURING APRIL 24. HE MIGHT BE ACCOMPANIED DURING SUCH A CALL BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY DURING THE DAY IS A CALL ON THE PRESIDENT BY FORMER CHANCELLOR ERHARD. (SEE BONN 12648). WE WISH TO SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POSSIBILITIES FOR CONSIDERATION.

A. THE SENIOR US MILITARY COMMANDERS IN GERMANY COULD BE ASSEMBLED IN BONN FOR A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. GENERAL LEMNITZER MIGHT ALSO BE INCLUDED IN HIS CAPACITY AS CINCEUR.

B. US AMBASSADORS IN OTHER EUROPEAN CAPITALS SUCH AS PARIS, LONDON AND ROME COULD BE ON HAND FOR CONSULTATION WITH THE PRESIDENT OR THE SECRETARY.

C. THE US COMMANDANT AND THE US MINISTER IN BERLIN COULD BE BROUGHT TO BONN IN THE EVENT THE PRESIDENT OR THE SECRETARY WISHED TO DISCUSS THE BERLIN SITUATION.

ANY OF THE ABOVE THREE PROPOSALS WOULD BE IN LINE WITH THE ANNOUNCED PURPOSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S EARLY ARRIVAL, NAMELY TO CONSULT WITH AMERICAN STAFF MEMBERS.

2. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WOULD BE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO PAY A BRIEF VISIT TO A US MILITARY INSTALLATION IN GERMANY. LOGISTICALLY, THIS WOULD POSE NO SERIOUS PROBLEM. SINCE IT WOULD COME BEFORE THE ADENAUER FUNERAL CEREMONIES. HOWEVER, IT WOULD ALTER SOMEWHAT THE NATURE OF THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP AND COULD DETRACT FROM THE GESTURE OF MAKING THE JOURNEY PRIMARILY TO HONOR ADENAUER.

3. WE HOPE TO OBTAIN THE THINKING OF THE DEPARTMENT AND THE WHITE HOUSE ON A PROGRAM FOR APRIL 24 DURING THE TELECON SCHEDULED FOR 11:00 A.M. WASHINGTON TIME TODAY.

GP-4.  
MCGHEE  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 91-415

By Cr/lop, NARA, Date 10-13-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN



~~SECRET~~

54  
Saturday, April 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Our Posture on the Greek Coup

So far we have refrained from comment. Yesterday, this made sense because the situation was so unclear that we feared encouraging loyal military factions to split off from the coup group and start a small civil war. This morning, Phil Talbot and Luke Battle were ready to state mildly, if asked, that the U. S. regrets any change of government by force as a matter of principle. Secretary Rusk overruled them and ordered continued silence.

The main issue is the Administration's posture before the intellectual and liberal communities in the U. S. The problem is sharpened by the fact that the most controversial political prisoner in Athens is Andreas Papandreou, who has a lot of friends in the academic community here. His personal friends have been calling high levels in State all day, asking about his safety. Talbot has won the promise of the top military man in the new government that political prisoners won't be harmed, but he looks like a figurehead, so that doesn't guarantee against accidents.

The argument for a mild statement of regret is that we will end up looking as if we support unconstitutional change of power if we remain silent. Whatever the new government may become will not hide the fact that the coup group took over with a series of deceitful and violent -- though not bloody -- acts. We can't do anything more at the moment to save Andreas, but our silence leaves us open to the charge that we're behind the coup.

The argument for remaining silent is that the new leaders are still trying to flesh out their government and broaden its membership as much as possible. With the situation still in flux, we shouldn't do anything to tip the balance publicly, though privately we are working to restore the influence of the King.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-36

By is, NARA Date 11-10-97

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Secretary Rusk so far believes we should remain silent. He points out that the pressures for an expression of view come from a small group -- the personal friends of Andreas. He is correct.

I would not recommend that we do anything without your talking with the Secretary. However, I did wish you to know that this issue exists in case you wish to discuss it with him.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Saturday - April 22, 1967

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Panama Canal Negotiations

This is to let you know what has been done this week to follow-up on your commitments to President Robles on the Canal negotiations. All concerned are operating with the sense of urgency you promised Robles.

Jurisdiction: Last Thursday Jack Irwin gave the Panamanian negotiators a revised formulation of the civil jurisdiction provisions which comes closer to Panama's desires. The Panamanians asked to study the proposals before commenting.

Compensation: In the meeting scheduled for next Tuesday, Jack Irwin will give the Panamanians our compensation formula, based on Panama sharing in the earnings of the Canal, which you described in general terms in your talk with Robles.

Lands: Last Thursday the Panamanians gave us what they want in the way of land returns. General Porter will be here next week and will review it with Jack Irwin. Deputy Under Secretary of the Army Thad Holt is travelling to Panama this weekend and will obtain the reaction of the Panama Canal Company officials.

In the next week or two we should have Panama's reaction to our latest civil jurisdiction and compensation offers. We will have determined our position on their land return request. This will put us in a position to map out a negotiating deal on the key remaining issues. Ambassador Anderson and the Panama Review Group will want to discuss the deal with you prior to sounding out key Senators and presentation to the Panamanians. At this point, I think the timing for the session with you would be during the first or second week in May.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-445  
By ing, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday, April 22, 1967

5:30 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-415

By ing, NARA, Date 4-23-93

MR. PRESIDENT.

Mr. "Tex" Colbert, former President of Chrysler Corporation, came in to see me with the following report.

1. Touring Africa with his wife, he met a Colonel Paxton-Hall in South Africa. He asked Mr. Colbert if he would like to meet Ian Smith; Colbert said that he had nothing to communicate to Ian Smith but would be glad to meet him. When he arrived in Rhodesia he was introduced first to a Mr. Vander Byl, a young, apparently assertive Deputy Minister of Information. This led to a lunch (about February 20) with a number of Rhodesian Ministers. They inquired if Colbert knew President Johnson; they tried to explain their position; they talked about their bad public relations in the United States. They finally came to the point: is there any chance Ian Smith and President Johnson might meet? Colbert answered he didn't know.
2. Lord Graham, Secretary of Defense, then invited Colbert to his ranch. He explained that they thought their views were not getting through the State Department to the President. They did not believe the President would approve U. S. policy. They said that the United Kingdom can't strangle them, but the U. S. might.
3. Lord Graham then arranged that Colbert meet Ian Smith. Colbert reported to Smith the proposition put by his colleagues to him; namely, that the President and Smith meet. Smith said this was evidently impossible; One could not do it without British knowledge, and the British would oppose it. He did believe it would be helpful if someone other than Ian Smith from Rhodesia could see the President -- someone in the Cabinet. He said he thought his main problem was getting to the President. He regards the President as a great man, but he doesn't understand the Rhodesian problem. Smith suggested that perhaps Lord Graham might come to the U. S. and on that occasion meet the President.
4. In passing, Colbert said that Graham had told him that the problem with Wilson was that Ian Smith was silent in the face of Wilson's proposition; Wilson took his silence for assent; but Wilson's proposition was impossible for Smith because it went beyond what had been agreed in the Rhodesian Cabinet.
5. I told Mr. Colbert that I would report his conversation.

cc: Ed Hamilton

SB for absolutely minimum distribution

Walt R.


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Sat., Apr. 22, 1967  
3:45 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Secretary Rusk's draft of a  
proposed statement for George Christian  
to release at plane side tomorrow morning.

*W. R.*

Approved  \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

D R A F T

4/22/67

The President is glad that he personally is able to go to Germany to take with him the esteem and respect of the American people for Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. This solemn occasion will mark the fact that the democracy of the Federal Republic and its intimate partnership with the free countries of the North Atlantic are permanent memorials to this great man. While in Germany, the President will, of course, call upon the President and Chancellor of the Federal Republic.

###

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Rodlow*  
*to note*

*1-4-67*  
*2-6-67 file*  
Friday, April 21, 1967, 10:45

Mr. President:

In response to your oral message, Premier Ky asked his Ambassador to reassure you he will not break the unity of the Vietnamese military.

Attached is Bill Jorden's report of his conversation with Ambassador Diem who had talked to Ky.

Bromley Smith

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 21, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Message to Ky

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By lig, NARA, Date 4-23-93

Ambassador Diem has just talked personally with General Ky.

The Prime Minister sends his deep respect and warm greetings to the President.

He understands fully the President's message and the concern reflected therein.

He is deeply aware of the problems raised. He is putting the stability and the unity of the armed forces above everything. Nothing must be permitted to shatter the unity of the ARVN.

A majority of the generals would like him to be the Presidential candidate. He is considering this. If he can be the candidate without causing a break in armed forces stability, he will do it. But if his being a candidate will break the unity of the Army, he will not do it.

Nothing must be permitted to happen to the unity of the army and this is the uppermost consideration in his mind.

Regarding the I Corps situation, he realizes that the picture has been created that the Americans are rushing in to fight, but nothing is said of the Vietnamese forces. He recognizes this can be a source of criticism for the President, and for him and his people.

ARVN units have been moved into areas now being vacated by those U.S. forces moving north to I Corps. He will try to do more. It is a problem for us both.

At the end, he repeated his deep respect for President Johnson. He recalled the pledge he made at Guam and he will live up to it. Nothing can happen to the unity of the Vietnamese armed forces; it must not be permitted.

*Bill*

William J. Jorden

~~SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

59  
April 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUSK

SUBJECT: Inter-Oceanic Canal Study

I enclose a copy of a letter which Ambassador Anderson has sent to the President describing the Canal Study Commission's conclusions about the sea-level canal route through Nicaragua and how the Commission proposes to handle the matter in its July 31 public report.

I would appreciate having your views on the Commission's decision so that I may advise the President.

W. W. Rostow

Enclosure

April 20 letter to the President  
from Ambassador Robert Anderson

(NOTE - IDENTICAL, BUT SEPARATE, MEMO SENT TO SECRETARY RESOR.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-415  
By ing, NARA, Date 4-23-93