

Mr. ~~Rostow~~

*Pres file*

60

April 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Secretary Freeman forwards a letter from  
Willard W. Cochrane, University of Minnesota

Secretary Freeman thought you might find Willard Cochrane's report of the situation in India of interest. Cochrane was impressed with the public works and school feeding programs in Bihar, but found that the distribution pipeline is stretched terribly thin, with no reserve stocks in northern India. He hopes that the U. S. can proceed with the next 3 million tons without delay. He concludes by pointing out that the next possible crop in the drought area will not be harvested until November.

Cochrane was active in the 1960 campaign and served as Director of Agricultural Economics in the Department of Agriculture in 1961 through 1963. Secretary Freeman gives him high rating as an accurate observer.

W. W. Rostow



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

1215  
600  
April 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM

To: The President  
The White House

From: Orville L. Freeman  
Secretary of Agriculture

Subject: India

The writer of the enclosed letter you will remember I'm sure. He was active in the 1960 campaign. He served as Director of Agricultural Economics in the Department of Agriculture from 1961 through 1963. I would rate his accuracy as an observer high.

I thought you might find this intelligence of interest.

Enclosure

Office of the Dean

X April 3, 1967

Secretary Orville L. Freeman  
Room 200, Administration Building  
U.S. Department of Agriculture  
Washington, D.C. 20250

Dear Secretary Freeman:

As you know, I recently returned from India where I served as a Ford Foundation consultant for three weeks. Because of poor winter rains in Northern India, the food situation in India continues to tighten for the 1966-67 crop year. The attached estimates prepared by our old colleague, Nathan Koffsky, make this clear. The crop production figure for food grains of 77 million tons could easily go up or down by 2 million tons. But a figure of 77 million tons, with imports of 10 million tons, means that per capita supplies will fall to 170 kilograms for 1966-67.

I visited Bihar, in the heart of the drought area, where there has not been a crop in two years. I was impressed with the Public Works and the School Feeding programs in operation there. The villagers are working, and receiving rations that are keeping them alive. There is very little actual famine in the drought area at present. But the distribution pipe line is stretched terribly thin; there are no reserve stocks in Northern India. Grain is unloaded in Calcutta, moved directly to the drought area, and distributed immediately upon its arrival there. If there is a serious stoppage in the arrival of grain shipments in Calcutta, there will be starvation in the drought area. Thus, I trust that the United States will make certain that there is no delay in scheduling grain shipments to India under the second commitment of 3.0 million tons.

As you are aware, the next possible crop in the drought area, is the monsoon paddy crop, which will be harvested next November. We have no choice, but to keep the grain shipments moving up to that time.

Sincerely,



Willard W. Cochrane  
Dean

dlj

XERO  
COPYXERO  
COPYXERO  
COPY

## Koffsky Estimates for India

FOOD GRAIN SUPPLY

<u>SUPPLY</u>	<u>1964-65</u> <u>mil tons</u>	<u>1965-66</u> <u>mil tons</u>	<u>1966-67</u> <u>mil tons</u>
Production	89	72	77
Movement in(-) or out(+) of stocks	<u>- 4</u>	<u>+ 4</u>	<u>- 0</u>
Domestic Supply	85	76	77
Imports	<u>7</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>10*</u>
Gross supply available	92	87	87
Kg. per capita	190	175	170**

\* Present expectations, including 3 million tons from U.S. in second half of year.

\*\* 12 1/2 million tons imports needed if per capita supply were to be maintained at 175 Kg.

NMK:mb  
March 16, 1967

XERO  
COPYXERO  
COPYXERO  
COPY

Friday, April 21, 1967, 5:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a  
congratulatory message to Canadian  
Prime Minister Pearson. He will be 70  
Sunday (April 23)

Francis M. Bator

Approve  \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

FMB:mst

61a

*Mr. Rosten*

*1 sup  
2 Pres. file*

MESSAGE TO CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Mrs. Johnson and I send you our congratulations and warm best wishes on your birthday. Once again, we are pleasantly reminded of your great personal contributions to the strength and prosperity of Canada, the Americas and the world. We are proud to join your millions of friends and admirers in wishing you the most pleasant and happy of birthdays.

Sincerely,

62  
Mr. Rostow

1. ~~copy~~  
2. Pres file

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 21, 1967

SUBJECT: Letter to President Bourguiba

President Bourguiba suffered a heart attack on 15 March. Shortly after, we arranged for General Mattingly, formerly of Walter Reed Hospital, to fly to Tunis for consultation with Bourguiba's doctors. This gesture was extremely well received in Tunisia.

Doctors tell us President Bourguiba stands an excellent chance of making a complete recovery but he must have absolute rest for some time. His doctors feel that he should not come to Washington for his planned visit in June. However, they have not yet told him he must postpone his visit. He is anxious to see you and may want to try to come anyway. Therefore, his doctors and the top officials of the Tunisian government hope you might suggest postponing.

Since this visit has already been put off for nine months, another few won't make any difference. From your point of view receiving him in the fall when there are not so many visitors lined up as we have for June would be better anyway. We can give him better attention then. State is tentatively considering a State visit the last half of September for planning purposes, but we will be back to you later on that. There is no need to be that specific in this letter.

If you approve this tack, we would send the attached message telegraphically. It would be nice to get it off before you see Bourguiba, Jr. at the funeral next week since he has asked us informally for this help in slowing his father down.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guide Lines Feb. 24, 1983  
By mg, NDA, Date 5-2-91

62a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Message from President to President Bourguiba:

Dear Mr. President:

I have been relieved to learn of your strong and steady recovery from your recent heart attack. General Mattingly has reported that you are receiving excellent care and that you can look forward to resuming work with your well-known vigor. We are deeply grateful to the Almighty for this.

Having undergone a similar experience some years ago, I know how anxious you will be to get back to a full schedule. But I also know that your doctors will insist on a prolonged rest. I hope you will follow their advice, difficult as I know that will be for an active and dedicated man.

I have been looking forward to your visit in June. But I would not want you to feel under any pressure to come before your doctors feel you are ready again for such a strenuous journey. I want to assure you that we would be delighted to have you come for a State visit next fall if you would be more comfortable not traveling so soon.

I pray that the Almighty will keep you in His care, and that we shall have the pleasure of seeing you again in Washington fully restored in health and strength.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Habib Bourguiba  
President of the Republic of Tunisia  
Tunis

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 18, NARA, Date 5-2-91

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, April 21, 1967; 5:00 PM


~~SECRET~~  
Mr. President:

At Tab A is a letter I propose to send to Congressmen Landrum and Dorn in response to two letters they have recently written me on textiles. (I have already talked to them on the telephone.) Their letters are at Tab B; I don't think you need to bother with them -- the line has not changed since the Congressmen's session with you.

My proposed reply is essentially a very polite stonewall. Until we know the shape of a possible bargain in Geneva, we can't make any commitments on textiles. (Although we can't say so yet, my own guess is that we will end up withdrawing a substantial part of our offers on synthetics and reducing our offers on cotton textiles. We haven't offered anything much on woolens.)

At Tab C is an amusing example of my attempts to keep our fences mended with these gentlemen.

I have also sent copies of the proposed reply to Harry McPherson and Henry Wilson.

  
Francis M. Bator

Approve sending reply \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-415  
By sig, NARA, Date 4-23-93

63a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Gentlemen:

Thank you for your good letters of April 18 and 21.

In reply, I would like first to assure you that the President has taken steps to keep himself fully informed on developments in the textile industry. He has also taken measures to assure accurate estimates of the effects of United States actions in the Kennedy Round upon all American industries, including the textile industry. No major decisions have been or will be taken by our representatives in Geneva without a decision by the President, following a full review of the issues and choices and consultation with his advisers.

On the specific question of the renewal of the Long-Term Arrangement for cotton textiles, the Administration fully shares your view that a 5-year extension would be preferable to a 3-year renewal. Our negotiators made a major effort to get agreement on five years, but found it impossible to move in that direction without offering much larger tariff cuts on textiles than we were willing to contemplate. There was considerable resistance among several of the countries involved even to a 3-year extension.

On the question of possible tariff cuts on textiles, you will understand that it would be inappropriate for me to comment at this time. Our bargainers in Geneva are in the final stages of exploring the shape of a possible overall Kennedy Round bargain, involving both industry and agriculture. The results of this exploration will then be presented to the President in great detail and in the context of the entire range of United States commercial and economic interests -- the interests of all our industries and of our agricultural community. I can assure you that the possible consequences for the textile industry as well as your own views and those of other members of the Congress will be an important part of that presentation. Then, and only then, will it be possible for the President to give Ambassador Roth his final instructions.

Let me say that the President is fully familiar with your concerns -- quite apart from the Kennedy Round -- with respect to man-made fibers

and wool and worsted textile products. I will make certain, also, that your second letter concerning man-made staple fiber filaments and filament yarn will be taken fully into account.

I have, of course, shown both of your letters to the President.

If I can be of any further help, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Francis M. Bator  
Deputy Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Honorable Phil M. Landrum  
Honorable William Jennings Bryan Dorn  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

PHIL M. LANDRUM  
9TH DISTRICT, GEORGIA

636  
HOME ADDRESS  
JASPER, GEORGIA

COMMITTEE:  
WAYS AND MEANS

OFFICE ADDRESS:  
2308 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, D.C.**

April 18, 1967

The Honorable Francis M. Bator  
Deputy Special Assistant to the President  
White House Office  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Dr. Bator:

On March 23rd when we were conferring with the President and with you relative to certain urgent matters affecting the domestic textile industry, it is my understanding that the President suggested an immediate inquiry into this rapidly deteriorating situation, and to confer with us, and then to report back to him with your recommendations.

Before this meeting we conferred on March 22nd. Upon both occasions we sought to impress upon the President and to impress upon you that time was of the essence and that from the best information available to us it appeared that certain executive decisions and actions were on the eve of being arrived at and taken which will result in serious harm to the domestic textile industry and that segment of our economy dependent upon it for its livelihood.

In developing this situation for the information and guidance of the President we sought to demonstrate the desirability of the U. S. seeking a five-year renewal of the Long Term Cotton Textile Arrangement. In spite of combined efforts of the Congress and of the domestic industry to demonstrate the wisdom of this action, the Office of the Special Representative For Trade

The Honorable Francis M. Bator  
Page 2  
April 18, 1967

Negotiations on behalf of the U. S. has sought a three-year rather than a five-year extension of the LTA. This we believe to be an error which shall return to embarrass the President in the future.

Again the best information available to us indicates that the Office of the Special Representative For Trade Negotiations in the Kennedy Round tariff negotiations is offering on behalf of the U. S. to cut tariffs on textile products. In view of the textile import situation and trend over the past five years, as well as the foreseeable trend in the immediate future, this would be a tragic mistake. If the Special Representative For Trade Negotiations commits the U. S. to such action, the realities of diplomatic dealings are such that the hands of the President would for all intents and purposes be tied and he will be deprived of the flexibility to take desirable actions which the facts of an independent and impartial evaluation of the situation will demonstrate the need for. Once tariff cuts on textile products have been agreed to in Geneva, a report to the President on this subject becomes academic.

In addition to the above two matters: a request for the extension of LTA for five years and no tariff cuts on textile products in the Kennedy Round, there were two other subjects directly related to these two which merit immediate attention. The man-made textile fiber products imports into the U. S. tend to mount at an alarming rate. The same may be said for woolen and worsted textile products imported into our country.

It is urgent that imports of man-made fiber and wool and worsted textile products be brought under control.

Since in our judgment and that of our colleagues in Congress one error has already been committed by

The Honorable Francis M. Bator

Page 3

April 18, 1967


renegotiating the LTA for three rather than five years, it is our sincere hope that the same branch of the Executive Office of the President will not commit the President to a position in international bargaining which will deprive him of the flexibility of independent action for which the need has been clearly demonstrated.

In view of the fact that international trade in textile products is an all-fiber, interlocking and interdependent subject, it cannot be broken down into its component fiber divisions and treated on a piecemeal fiber basis. The subject of international trade in man-made fiber and wool and worsted textile products has been in contemplation by the 29 nations signatory to the LTA and to all those nations party to GATT in their deliberations on the Kennedy Round tariff cuts.


We urge that it be reported to the President immediately that it is undesirable in the best interest of the U. S. to cut tariffs on any textile products and that immediate steps should be taken to bring under control imports of man-made fiber and wool and worsted textile products into the U.S.

We would appreciate knowing when you propose to make a report to the President and what your recommendations will be. It is our hope your report will set forth the facts as we have made them known to you and that your recommendations will be based upon these fully supported facts, so that it will not be necessary to burden the President with a detailed discussion of this subject again at this time.

Sincerely,



Phil M. Landrum, Chairman  
House Textile Committee Group



William Jennings Bryan Horn, Secretary  
House Textile Committee Group

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, D.C. 20515**

April 21, 1967

The Honorable Francis M. Bator  
Deputy Special Assistant to the President  
White House Office  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Dr. Bator:

In rereading our letter of April 18, we both came to the conclusion that we might not have made it sufficiently clear that we intended in that letter to include in the products which should be reserved from reduction in duty in the Kennedy Round man-made staple fiber, filaments, and filament yarn as well as the spun yarn, fabric, and apparel which are oftentimes referred to as "textile products."

As we in effect said in that letter, international trade in textiles is an all-fiber, interlocking, interdependent subject. It cannot be treated piecemeal on a single fiber basis; it would be most disruptive to take any action that would isolate the man-made fiber producing sector from the rest of the business. The man-made fiber producers have contributed in great measure through research and development to the textile product innovations which have stimulated the growth of the textile business in recent years and the increase in textile employment, including the production of man-made fibers, to today's 2,240,000 jobs.

To enable you to appreciate the seriousness of the import problem in the man-made staple fiber, filament, and filament yarn area, we need only to refer you to the fact that our Nation has slipped from a favorable balance of trade of 88.6 million pounds in 1962 to an absolute deficit of 11.2 million pounds in 1966. Moreover, when imports of all man-

Honorable Francis M. Bator

Page 2

April 21, 1967


made fibers and man-made fiber textile products are reduced to a pound equivalent basis (as by the Department of Agriculture), the total quantity of man-made fibers received in the United States from foreign countries in 1966 reached an all-time record level of 311 million pounds - equivalent to 9 per cent of domestic consumption of man-made fibers in that year.

You will appreciate that this degree of market penetration considerably exceeds that which existed in cotton textiles when the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement was put into force, and is approximately the same as the present level of import penetration in cotton textiles which has properly led to so much concern on the part of our Government.


Finally, as is now widely recognized, there is very serious overcapacity for the production of man-made fibers throughout the world. Already at existing rates of duties the major U. S. fiber producers, companies like du Pont, Monsanto, and Beaunit Mills, have reported a serious impact on their earnings as a result of the combined effect of overcapacity and burgeoning imports.

This would be the worst possible time for the Government to make a further reduction in duties on man-made staple fiber, filaments, and filament yarn.

Sincerely,



Phil M. Landrum, Chairman  
House Textile Committee Group



Wm. Jennings Bryan Dorn, Sec.  
House Textile Committee Group

WM. JENNINGS BRYAN DORN  
THIRD DISTRICT, SOUTH CAROLINA

HOME ADDRESS:  
R.F.D. NO. 1, GREENWOOD, S.C.

63-2  
COMMITTEES:  
VETERANS' AFFAIRS  
PUBLIC WORKS

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

April 17, 1967

Dr. Francis M. Bator  
Deputy Special Assistant  
to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.


Dear ~~Mr. Bator~~ *Francis*,

Your kindness and courtesy last Friday is deeply appreciated by me personally and by the political science class from the University of South Carolina. It was the highlight for them of a week's study of the national government.

Your talk to them was superb and will bear fruit, as many of these young people expressed the desire to go into politics and government service.

The White House tour was wonderful also. With a million thanks and warmest personal regards, I am

Sincerely,



Wm. Jennings Bryan Dorn  
Member of Congress

D/pj

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 21, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Greek Coup as of 9 a. m.

Reports are still fragmentary. Ambassador Talbot is of the view that a small army group triggered the coup. But the State Department specialists suspect the King was in on it from the beginning. However it was started, the King, High Command and coup group together are actively planning next steps. Principal political figures have been arrested, including Prime Minister Kanellopoulos and the King's arch-enemy, Andreas Papandreu.

They have reaffirmed loyalty to NATO, so no change in foreign policy appears imminent.

Bill of rights type provisions of the Constitution have been suspended, and Talbot is urging military leaders not to liquidate those political opponents they now hold in custody.

The immediate question is what we say. At some point soon, I feel we should express regret--even if softly--that democratic processes have been suspended. I fear that our posture before the Greek Americans and the Greek people will look weak-kneed if we completely avoid judgment. Greek democracy is something all the world cherishes, and we have made a strong effort through Ambassador Talbot to stave this off. However, State logically argues that we should hold off on any substantive comment this morning lest we encourage violence against the coup government. We will be in touch with George Christian.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-36  
By iss, NARA Date 11-10-97

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~1. [unclear]~~  
2. Pres file

Friday, April 21, 1967  
7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Gaud reports  
some useful contribution by the  
private business community to  
hunger.

W. W. Rostow

65a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON

APR 21 1967

OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. Business in the War on Hunger

I thought you'd be interested in some recent efforts to stimulate increased private investment in the agricultural sector of the less developed world.

We have just produced the attached brochure -- The War on Hunger - A Challenge to Business -- aimed at the U. S. agribusiness community. It spells out the food needs of the developing world and lets the businessman know how he can help. It also makes it clear to the businessman that the A.I.D. program stands ready to help him get started through a variety of carefully developed incentive programs. We are giving this brochure wide distribution.

There is encouraging evidence that U. S. agribusiness is increasingly aware of the important role it must play if we are to win the War on Hunger. Last week's conference in New York -- called "The World Food Problem: Private Investment and Government Cooperation" -- is a good example of this awareness.

The conference was privately sponsored by a group including H. J. Heinz, II, David Rockefeller, Hal Dean, Pete Collado, the Agricultural Research Council and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. It brought senior executives of forty agribusiness firms (representing \$40 billion in assets) together for two days of intensive working discussions with A.I.D. and USDA officials. Dr. Ivan Bennett represented the White House.

We helped plan the conference and provided some funds. The brochure mentioned above was distributed at the conference. It was very well received.

This conference marked a significant step forward in Government-business communications. It resulted in general agreement that the climate for effective cooperation is excellent and a firm commitment by business to work out long-range solutions to the world food problem.

The conference decided to set up a special committee to work with Government on immediate problems and to establish a permanent high-level organization, perhaps a National Agribusiness Council. A.I.D.'s new Offices of Private Resources and the War on Hunger -- which you mentioned in your Foreign Aid Message to the Congress -- will work with the agribusiness committee to move forward on the opportunities now available.

/s/ WSG

William S. Gaud

Attachment

66  
Mr. Rostow

~~1. sup~~  
2. Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Announcing the Nepalese Visit

The King of Nepal has accepted your invitation --recommended by Ambassador Bunker--to pay a state visit later this year. Ambassador Laise is ready to announce this in Nepal on 25 April--the twentieth anniversary of US-Nepal relations. You will recall that you sent messages to the King and the Prime Minister to be used in the celebrations of that anniversary. This announcement will be the climax.

Announcing on the 25th is less convenient for us because of your unexpected trip, but I think we ought to stick to that date. It means a lot to Nepal, but the announcement won't be a big one for us. George Christian says the mechanics are manageable--either by posting the announcement on the bulletin board here or by putting it out in Bonn.

State proposes the usual terse announcement:

"The President of the United States has extended to their Majesties King Mahendra and Queen Ratna an invitation to pay a State visit to the United States. Their Majesties have graciously accepted the President's kind invitation. The exact date of the visit will be fixed later."

If you approve, George will arrange.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By hgy, NARA, Date 4-30-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Rostow

67

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 21, 1967

SUBJECT: The Greek Situation as of 6:30 p. m.

As the day's events become clearer, it looks more and more as if a small group of middle and lower grade officers triggered the coup and forced it on the King and the High Command. The King told Phil Talbot a couple of hours ago: "Incredibly stupid ultra-rightwing bastards, having gained control of tanks, have brought disaster to Greece." We had earlier thought the King probably was in on the coup all along, but his interview with Talbot sounds like the real thing.

He also asked: (a) whether there's any possibility we could land Marines if necessary to help him and his generals reassert their control over the armed forces; (b) whether we could urge the new government to take his orders; (c) whether Sixth Fleet helicopters could evacuate his family if necessary.

The line now being worked out in State--Secretary Rusk will focus on it shortly--is to continue saying nothing publicly but to use our influence privately to help the King get on top of this government. But we want him to know that this is his job and that we aren't going to move the Marines in to bail him out. We still don't know enough about how the forces line up to take sides publicly; a mis-step could encourage dissatisfied military to strike back, and the fighting could get out of hand.

Since the situation is far less clear than we had originally thought, I think we will do best to avoid all public comment tomorrow unless the situation is radically different in the morning.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-36  
By iss, NARA Date 11-10-97

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Friday, April 21, 1967 -- 7:30 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith a recommendation from  
Nick that you receive former Chancellor  
Erhard on July 12-14. I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit of Former FRG Chancellor  
Ludwig Erhard

Recommendation:

That you invite former Chancellor Erhard to the  
White House, July 12-14,

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion

Former FRG Chancellor Ludwig Erhard plans to visit the United States July 12-14 to receive an honorary doctorate from the University of Michigan. He will make a speech in Ann Arbor on the occasion of the University's 150th Anniversary.

The Embassy considers it highly desirable to arrange a visit to Washington including a courtesy call on you. I agree that such a visit would be highly desirable because of your close association with Dr. Erhard during his term as Chancellor and the frequent public suggestions coming from Germany that the United States did not perhaps fully appreciate Erhard's friendship.

Erhard has asked to see you in Bonn. I suggest you extend the invitation during your meeting with him in Bonn.

*Robert L. Kahn*  
Under Secretary

*Pres file*

Friday, April 21, 1967 -- 5:10 pm

Mr. President:

You received yesterday from Geoffrey de Freitas, member of the British Parliament and President of the Council of Europe Assembly, an invitation to speak on Wednesday, April 26, in Strasbourg. The attached State Department paper -- concurred in by Sec. Rusk -- explains why it would be unwise to accept. Although tempted, I agree.

W. W. Rostow

Telegram approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

69a

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Invitation to the President to  
Speak Before the Council of  
Europe Assembly

Geoffrey de Freitas, member of the British Parliament and President of the Council of Europe Assembly in Strasbourg, has sent the President the enclosed telegram inviting him to speak at the regular session of the Assembly next week which, among other things, will commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the Marshall Plan.

The Department strongly recommends that the President not accept this invitation. In the first place, the President's trip is to attend the funeral of Adenauer and this gathering does not justify widening it to other obligations. A stop at any other place not connected with the funeral would detract from the purpose of the trip, which is to pay final respects to Konrad Adenauer. The principal European-organized commemoration of the Marshall Plan anniversary will be in the OECD on June 5, 1967. Secondly, the likelihood of demonstrations or other incidents cannot be ruled out were he to go to Strasbourg.

A suggested telegram to the American Embassy in London with instructions to respond to Mr. de Freitas' invitation is enclosed.

*Secretary Rush concurs!*

*BHR*

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Suggested telegram.
2. Telegram from Mr. de Freitas.

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED TELEGRAM

TO: Amembassy LONDON

SUBJECT: Invitation to President to Speak Before Council  
Europe Assembly

1. Geoffrey de Freitas, President of Council of Europe Assembly, has sent the President the following telegram:

QTE. Council of Europe in regular session next week commemorating twentieth anniversary Marshall Plan. Would be honored by speech from you Wednesday, 26th, or Thursday, 27th. At our last three sessions we had speeches respectively by Secretary General U Thant, Danish Prime Minister Krag, and British Prime Minister Wilson. UNQTE.

2. Embassy requested to tell de Freitas that the President appreciates his kind invitation to speak, especially so since it would be on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of Marshall Plan. Please tell de Freitas that the President regrets that he cannot accept the invitation since his trip to Europe is only to attend the funeral of former Chancellor Adenauer. Time does not permit him to accept other engagements at this time.

Friday, April 21, 1967 -- 5:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

I trust you will forgive me for being late to the White House reception tonight, because we are mounting the first session of the new Viet Nam Committee at 5:30 p.m. I shall join Elspeth and my colleagues at the reception as soon as I can possibly get away.

W. W. Rostow

Friday, April 21, 1967  
5:20 p.m.

*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

3.3(b)(1)

This [REDACTED] indicates the underlying uneasiness of Kiesinger and a good many Germans about our policy and intentions.

It is clear that you will have to refer to certain of the key issues under negotiation with the Germans -- Kennedy Round, troops, money, etc. I am increasingly clear that what Kiesinger most needs from you is a sense of how seriously you take the continued unity of the West; how little you trust Soviet intentions; how much responsibility he, Kiesinger, has, to make it possible to maintain the kind of secure Western base that Germany, the U. S., and everyone else needs if we are to have any chance whatsoever of moving things in Moscow and Eastern Europe.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-67  
By ms, NARA, Date 12-22-03

~~SECRET~~

71a

Friday, April 21, 1967

[REDACTED] 3.3(b)(1)

SUBJECT: Chancellor Kiesinger's Remarks on American Policy

At a meeting of the West German Cabinet on April 19, 1967, which was primarily occupied with a discussion of the German position on the Non-proliferation Treaty, Chancellor Kiesinger engaged in a rather rambling discourse on American policy. Kiesinger said that he was disturbed over American tactics in dealing with German-American problems. He cited Washington's insistence on the Non-proliferation Treaty and plans to withdraw troops from Germany.

Kiesinger concluded his remarks by saying that he was unable at this point to determine whether there has been a real change in U. S. policy toward Europe or whether the tribulations in German-American relations result from President Johnson having allowed the day-to-day control over such matters to slip out of Presidential hands because of his preoccupation with Vietnam and domestic political difficulties stemming from the Vietnam war.

Kiesinger told the Cabinet that he had been informed by someone who was recently in Washington that nearly everyone in the upper levels of the U. S. Government is against Germany in spirit. This person, whom Kiesinger did not identify, said that U. S. officials are inclined to argue that Germany should accommodate itself at whatever cost to the overriding need for Washington to reach some kind of understanding with Moscow.

Following Kiesinger's remarks there was a good bit of mildly anti-American comment about Germany's difficult position. During the course of these comments the argument that there has been a basic change in American policy toward Europe was supported more or less by Interior Minister Paul Luecke, Refugee Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel, Family Minister Bruno Heck, and Bundesrat Minister Carlo Schmid.

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 04-33

By isl, NARA, Date 3-2-06

~~SECRET~~

Friday, April 21, 1967  
5:25 p. m.

*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Lodge's interview with Thieu.

It looks as though he has the Presidential bug also; but I am inclined to agree that in some mysterious way, he and Ky will work it out as his assurances on page 3 suggest.

W. W. R.

SECRET/NO DIS attachment

(Saigon 23667 4/21/67)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ag, NARA, Date 4-29-91

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Friday, April 21, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-413

By ijg, NARA, Date 1-8-92

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY FROM LODGE (Saigon 23667)

Your 179529 and 179530 arrived one-half hour before the appointment which I had made with Thieu in pursuance to your 178636. I, therefore, was able to make good use of them. Thieu is recovering from his appendix operation and received me at his dwelling. By his wish, we spoke in French.

I began by saying that I had asked for this appointment because I had detected a certain unease in Vietnam because no decision had been reached on who the so-called military candidate was to be. I recognized that there are times when it was wise to temporize, but I thought the time had arrived when a decision should be made. I stressed that, of course, the U. S. was not undertaking any way to decide who should be the candidate, which would be most improper, but we were concerned by the unsettling effect of this prolonged uncertainty, particularly having in mind that Election Day was on September 6 and four months was none too long a time in which to get ready and conduct the election.

He said, in effect, "Well, let me tell you how I look at it," and then spoke broadly as follows:

A meeting of the Directorate was held shortly before the promulgation of the Constitution on April 1. At that meeting, the question of Thieu's running for President arose. Thieu had said to the group that he would never shirk his public duty, that when he went into the Army, he had committed himself always to do his duty. But before deciding on the question of whether to be available for the Presidency, he wished to ask each one of them whether they favored him for the Presidency because they thought it was a great responsibility or because they thought it was a great honor or was a device to get rid of him. Most of them said that it was because it was a great responsibility. Some of them gave no answers at all, and some gave evasive answers. Thieu then said to them if they were sincere that it was a responsibility and sincere to the point that they would get solidly in back of him, then he would agree to be available.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

I interrupted to ask how he would know whether they were sincere or not.

Thieu said he would have no trouble telling. He knew them all well and he could tell by their conversation and by the look on their faces.

Therefore, Thieu went on to say, if he gets the proper assurances -- and he expects that he will -- he will become available and will make his final decision on the day the Election Law is promulgated, which he expects to be the first of May.

I said, "Well, it looks to me then as though you have decided to be available, subject to confirmation on the first of May," and he said that was right.

I asked who had taken part in this conversation and listed the following: Ky, Vien, the Chief of Staff; Vien, the Minister of Security; Loan; Chief; Trib Lhang, and the Commanding Generals of Second, Third and Fourth Corps, the First Corps Commander being in Hue, making ten in all.

Comment: At first glance, this contradicts Ky's statement to me that Thieu was "undecided" because how could Ky say this if he was present in the room when in effect Thieu had made up his mind to be a candidate subject to later confirmation. On further thought, however, this may not necessarily be the case. Thieu may have thought all of this and not have made his position as clear to the ten men in the room as he did to me. End comment.

With considerable apparent conviction, Thieu said that there might after all be no military candidate at all if a sound civilian candidate emerged. That way it would be much better to have a civilian President if he had the ability.

When I pressed him, he, in effect, said that no civilian with the required qualities had emerged and probably this would not happen until the next elections -- after those of 1971.

Thieu said that he did not think it would be necessary to have a runoff election. He thought that even with the five who were now officially running, one would receive at least 40 percent of the vote.

Then I read him verbatim paragraph 3 of 179529 and he said: "Tell the President not to worry. We are not going to fight among each other. We will support the political progress now in train. We will support the proper conduct of the election: and we will rally around the elected government. Remember all the stories that the Generals and the Constituent Assembly would fight. Well, we didn't. We agreed."

I then congratulated him on the splendid results as regards national reconciliation -- particularly the way in which he and the Government of Vietnam had taken this idea and made it their own, presenting it in a very persuasive and dramatic way. I said there was another matter which preoccupied us greatly and that was the critical importance we attached to revamping and remotivating the ARVN for pacification. I cited the pertinent parts of your 179530.

As I have reported in the past, he feels just as strongly about this as you do and he approved everything in your message.

Comment: We now have absolutely categorical assurances from Thieu and Ky that they are not going to have a clash. I reported on Thursday, April 20, that I was sure Ky meant what he said on the subject, and I am equally sure Thieu means what he says. I really don't think you have to worry.

I have kept Porter in the picture right straight along and believe he can handle the situation in the time which will elapse between my departure and Bunker's arrival, which I understand will be less than a week. On previous occasions, Porter has handled the situation for longer than that. My departure is already announced in the Vietnamese press and I do not think it would be wise for me to put it off. End comment.

Friday, April 21, 1967  
5:20 p. m.

*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith George McGhee's view of appropriate  
talking points with Chancellor Kiesinger.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-413  
By ing, NARA, Date 1-8-92

Friday, April 21, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR McGHEE (Bonn, 12575)

SUBJECT: Proposed Talking Points -- The President's Meeting  
with Chancellor Kiesinger

The following suggestions are made with regard to the general approach and talking points for the President in his discussion with Chancellor Kiesinger on April 25. If, as anticipated, these discussions occupy approximately one hour, the effective time, considering opening pleasantries and translation of Kiesinger's remarks from German into English (he will probably not request interpretation of the President's English), will be only approximately one-half hour. Kiesinger may request, as he did in the case of Vice President Humphrey, that the meeting be between himself and the President alone, with an interpreter on each side. In such case, I recommend that this be accepted. Indeed, the President may wish to propose this himself. Otherwise, I recommend that the American side be held to the President, the Secretary of State, and myself.

In view of Kiesinger's strong desire to have a full-dress meeting with the President at an early date, in any event before his meeting with General deGaulle in early July, it is believed that the impression should not be given that this talk is a substitute. For this reason, as well as limitations of time, there should be no attempt at a comprehensive review of U. S. - German relations. Rather, this conversation should be basically for the purpose of letting the President and the Chancellor get to know each other personally, to feel each other out as individuals and to lay the basis for a subsequent meeting. Indeed, the question of the meeting itself and when and where it will take place will obviously be a principal topic.

The Chancellor will be under a certain restraint, since he will not wish through his political talks to depart from the solemn purpose of the event which has brought the leaders together. From our own point of view, we shall not wish to give the impression of seizing this occasion to solve various specific outstanding issues between Germany and the U. S. I do not believe, however, these limitations will prejudice the purpose of the meeting. On the contrary, the lack of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

agenda and the absence of pressure to come to solutions should contribute to a free exchange of views from which better understanding grows. It seems to me that the recent exchange of correspondence between the President and the Chancellor should form the framework of the conversation. We know that the Chancellor appreciated the effort made in the President's letter to set U.S. policy in the broad perspective of long-range U.S. objectives. The President may wish to amplify these -- both in terms of domestic and foreign policy.

Despite his oft-stated hope for a meeting with the President, and what is believed to be a basic desire to establish a close working relationship with the U.S. Government, there is current evidence that Kiesinger entertains certain doubts and suspicions about American policy. Apparently somewhat suspicious by nature, Kiesinger comes to office without a full background in the details of the issues currently under discussion. In the case of the Non-proliferation Treaty, and now the proposed <sup>American</sup> troop rotation plan, he appears to suspect American motives and to resent American tactics. He appears to have a feeling that the U.S., in pursuit of its detente policy with the Soviet Union, is willing to place our desire for improving relations with the Soviets ahead of the interest of Germany and our other European allies.

In particular, Kiesinger does not seem to find in our explanations of why we support a Non-proliferation Treaty, as a means of avoiding the risks of nuclear war through proliferation, an adequate justification of our pressing the Non-proliferation Treaty so vigorously at this particular time. This is apparently why he has so frequently emphasized his desire for broad-ranging discussion with the U.S., so as to establish a conceptual frame within which the Non-proliferation Treaty and other issues affecting the Alliance, such as trilateral troop study, can be placed. He seems to need reassurance that the U.S. still assigns a high priority to Europe and to our NATO obligations as a part of our overall policy.

The basic objective of the President should be to establish a feeling on Kiesinger's part, of confidence in himself personally and in U.S. policy. Although the President will wish to reiterate our determination to see the war in Vietnam to an honorable conclusion, he should reaffirm our continuing strong interest in Europe and the high priority we attach to European security as a basis for American security.

While fulfilling its obligations in Vietnam the U.S. has not, in fact, reduced its efforts in support of NATO, or the principle of integration as its basis for organization. The President and other high U.S. officials still spend a great deal of their time on European problems, and in receiving European, and particularly German, visitors.

Because of historical, security and economic ties, which we hope to see strengthened through the Atlantic partnership concept, Europe remains the one most important area in our world considerations. We will continue to support the basic German objective of seeking the reunification of their divided country, and in maintaining the integrity and security of Berlin.

In the important field of East-West relations, we are convinced that German and American policy are directed toward the same objectives. We see great opportunities in bridging the gap between Eastern and Western Europe, which we have approached from the standpoint of constructive involvement, as outlined in the President's speech of last October 7. We support strongly German efforts to increase trade and other contacts with the Eastern European countries and to establish diplomatic relations with them. We will support German efforts in this regard in every appropriate way. We recognize the special position of East Germany, and the position of the Federal Republic of Germany as the only government which can represent all of the German people.

The particular issues which have in recent months caused differences between us, are on their way to resolution. We hope that the next meeting of the Trilateral Commission will solve once and for all the troublesome offset problem, and will establish a strictly security basis for the future consideration of force levels. We feel that the nuclear planning group has proven its ability to provide our Alliance partners, including Germany, with an adequate means of influencing nuclear decisions within the Alliance. With the successful conclusion of the current Kennedy Round negotiations, for which Germany and the U.S. are equally desirous, a new era in expanded and more liberal trade between Europe and the U.S. -- as well as with the underdeveloped world -- will be opened up.

Although it would not be appropriate to go into the particular points of difference which now separate the U.S. and Germany on the successful conclusion of the Non-proliferation Treaty, the President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

should stress the importance of the stated objectives of the Treaty. It is the objective of preventing further proliferation and not any desire to compensate the Soviet Union for assistance in terminating the Vietnamese war, which has led us to support the Non-proliferation Treaty so strongly. We hope that our German friends, who because of their exposed position would be immediately threatened by the outbreak of nuclear war, should share with us these positive objectives. The U. S. will go to great lengths, consistent with our desire to achieve a Non-proliferation Treaty, to meet specific German questions.

The President can perhaps close on the note that he hopes that this meeting will be the first of many with the Chancellor. He hopes that through such meetings, and the day-to-day conduct of our relations through diplomatic channels, in the NATO and other multilateral bodies, that we will be able to continue the same close, friendly and fruitful cooperation which has existed between our two countries during the post-war period.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, April 21, 1967  
5:20 p.m.

*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the German Defense Council reaction to our proposed troop and aircraft withdrawal scheme.

As you can see, it's the aircraft that really hurt. As you can see from their interpretation, they're suspicious of our denuclearizing Europe.

I predict that the aircraft problem will give us trouble.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Cia report "German Defense Council Decision on Proposed American Military Reductions")

Friday, April 21, 1967  
5:15 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a most serious and thoughtful response  
to our approach to Ne Win, even though he proposes  
no immediate action.

His assessment of the men in Hanoi is, in my  
judgment, essentially sound.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/DAFFODIL~~ attachment  
(Rangoon 1339)

*Pres file*

Friday - April 21, 1967

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Several Latin American Presidents have asked whether you would object to their making public the letters you sent them before leaving Punta del Este.

W. W. Rostow

They may release      ☐

Prefer they not release      ☐

Same      ☐

~~SECRET~~

Friday - April 21, 1967

*from file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Latin American Trip for Lynda Bird

Lynda Bird wants to visit these places in Latin America:

- |                             |   |                                                           |
|-----------------------------|---|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| Cartagena, Colombia         | - | hospital ship "HOPE".                                     |
| Lima, Peru                  | - | sightsee.                                                 |
| Chiclayo, Peru              | - | visit Peace Corps projects and interview girl volunteers. |
| Cuzco and Machu Pichu, Peru | - | visit Colonial buildings and Inca ruins.                  |
| Santiago, Chile             | - | stop en route to Temuco for plane connections.            |
| Temuco, Chile               | - | interview 2 nurses working with Church World Service.     |

A map tracing the route is attached.

E.O. 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

estimate of the security situation at each place is as follows:

Cartagena, Colombia: Security information is incomplete.

on-the-spot investigation. Results are due April 22.

Lima, Peru: no serious security prob-

lems. Investigation-police would assign an escort as they did with Chief Justice Warren. Civil Guard would handle building security. If the exact Lima tour is not published in advance, the proposed activities could be carried out without serious embarrassment.

Chiclayo, Peru: Security is good. No problems exist or are anticipated. Both the Civil Guard and the Peruvian Investigations

~~SECRET~~

E.O. 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

E.O. 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Police have sizeable units there, and their full cooperation can be expected.

Cuzco-Machu Pichu, Peru: Same as for Lima.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

Santiago, Chile: [REDACTED] no unusual security risks. Chilean Communist Party, the Socialists and other extreme leftists are likely to limit themselves to propaganda attacks and possible street whistling and jeering.

Temuco, Chile: The security situation is good. Closest probable trouble spot is Concepcion -- 310 kilometers away. Political climate is good with only the PADENA party (small independent party associated with Socialist-Communist Front) as a possible -- but highly unlikely -- source of trouble.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

April 21, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Korean Election

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By sig, NARA, Date 4-23-93

You asked to be kept informed of developments in the Korean election.

This is a brief situation report.

President Pak made his first formal campaign appearance on April 17 at a rally in Taejon. Good turnout (about 100,000). Speech well received.

Opposition candidate Yun P-sun is concentrating on larger cities (Pusan, Taegu) after an early start in the provinces.

Pak's main lines have been:

- shallowness of opposition's promises;
- determination to move against corruption;
- remarkable economic progress of Korea under his administration;
- pledge to continue vigorously Korea's economic growth and modernization.

Press coverage has been balanced thus far.

No troop movements related to politics have been reported.

There are reports one or two splinter candidates may pull out of the race in favor of the opposition candidate.

Embassy prediction that Pak will be re-elected by a majority stands unchanged.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres. file*

Friday, April 21, 1967  
9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

This is a thoughtful portrait of President Costa e Silva's first thirty days in office, giving the flavor of his economic, political, and psychological relaxation of the country, its advantages and dangers.

W. W. Rostow

Rio de Janeiro 10277

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 661-6-81

By rgl/jp, NARA, Date 5-1-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

79a

Friday, April 21, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM RIO DE JANEIRO (10277)

SUBJECT: Thirty Days of Costa e Silva

On his thirtieth day in office, President Costa e Silva basked in the post-Summit euphoria manufactured by his entourage and the Brazilian press, secure in the belief that Brazil had voiced the sentiments of all Latin America at Punta del Este and thus resumed its rightful place as an almost equal co-leader of the hemisphere. Costa e Silva returned from Uruguay accepted by the people of Brazil as their President, with his prestige raised several notches by his reported (and credited) performance at the Summit.

The kudos for his sojourn there were received against a solid background of domestic popularity won by his efforts to charm and disarm Brazilian society across board, by his quick if facile decisions on urgent matters, and by his avoidance of issues which might require solutions displeasing to some sectors of society. Thus, both by design and profiting from the Summit, which came fortuitously early in his term, Costa e Silva has disarmed his potential critics and seems well launched in his new role of Chief Executive.

While there is little new in specific action re foreign policy, the Government's emphasis upon "independent foreign policy" while rather vague in implications, favors approach. Of concrete measures, the Government has indicated against the Inter-American Peace Force and has promised greater stress on the commercial aspect of foreign relations as an element of internal economic development (the implication here as in "independent" foreign policy is less dependence on the USA).

In contrast to Costa e Silva's public performance, the Ministries seem in some instances slow to develop policy lines and draw up concrete programs of execution. Appearances to a certain extent may be deceiving as some Ministers are deeply involved in surveying assets and trying to form a notion of their use and limitations. The public has forgotten

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-70

By is, NARA Date 10-30-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED

that the slow start is attributable at least in part to the administrative reform decreed the last few days of the Castello Branco administration which changed the Government structure radically in some instances.

The experience of the first 30 days in office indicates that the Costa e Silva Government is different in two basic ways from the Castello Branco Government. In the first place, Costa e Silva has changed Brazil's conduct of foreign policy to emphasize "independence" i. e., independence presumably from the U. S. This policy change pervades decision making in many other areas of the Government. Nevertheless, Embassy officers and I have had close and cooperative relations with important high officials in the Government indicating a mild case of apparent schizophrenia as between relations with the Embassy and public posture. The answer is that basically Costa e Silva wants to work closely with the U. S., well aware of the need for assistance, if for no other reason, while retaining a posture of growing maturity, less dependence on the U. S. and more concern for Brazilian national interests, contrasting with the past regime. The President has also instituted a change in the economic policy of the Government toward "humanization." In practice, this policy has meant easing up on rent increases, delaying the increase of certain taxes, lifting the level of exempt incomes, and most important, making economic development the prime Government objective and moving the fight against inflation to a lower priority.

The second fundamental difference in the two administrations is in the method and style of operation. Whereas, under Castello Branco the administration operated with a coherent, comprehensive plan of the Government coordinating all its activities, Costa e Silva has delegated to his Ministers greater authority and independence. It remains to be seen whether a coherent, comprehensive pattern of government will result. In fact, first indications are that the dispersion of authority may bring with it uncoordinated policies resulting from centrifugal forces set up by a number of strong-willed able, but personally ambitious, Ministers, e. g. Magalhaes Pinto, Passarinho, Andreazza, Albuquerque Lima.

Some fear of a return to the irresponsible economics which so aggravated Brazilian inflation during the late fifties and early sixties has been registered by the press and by various public figures. Speaking in Rio on the occasion of his 50th birthday dinner, Roberto Campos very

effectively articulated this fear, cautioning the Government against consumer subsidies, uncompensated tax cuts, and inflationary wage adjustments. The displeasure of the new administration with this type of criticism quickly was made known by the Foreign Minister in terms tending to aggravate the cleavage in philosophy and action between the two governments.

The foregoing obviously impinges on the political balance to the extent that an important part of the military and civilian elite will be looking closely over his shoulder for signs of a general loosening of the stringent controls instituted by Castello Branco in political and economic fields which they fear might lead to a return of the atmosphere and substance of the late fifties and early sixties. For the moment at least the real opposition to Costa e Silva is centered in this group for which Roberto Campos has been made spokesman. If the Magalhaes Pinto rebuttal was authorized, as seems likely, the administration apparently is prepared to accept the challenge counting on a base of popular support engendered by the actions detailed above and apparently secure in the conviction that the general public still holds the Castello Branco government in low esteem.

These are the first indications of more important forces in motion around a new administration still in the formative stage with the prospect that accommodations are likely to reduce misunderstandings.

~~SECRET~~

April 20, 1967

## Memorandum of Conversation with Walther Casper, Thursday, April 20, 1967

Mr. Walther Casper, a German industrialist, CDU, pro-American, and well known to me, came in briefly to make three points (aside from expressing his great satisfaction that the President will be going to Germany).

1. Kiesinger's personality and how to handle him

Kiesinger is a complicated man with many layers who likes to discuss matters deeply and at length before coming to a firm decision. He speaks excellent English. He hopes the President will seek to establish with him a relation of personal confidence. He does not like to be pressed or hurried; but his basic judgments lead him in support of U. S. positions. He was greatly impressed by the President's letter; and Casper believes this kind of exchange should continue. He hopes that the President will use such communications to make Kiesinger feel he is a partner with whom the President is prepared to share information and ideas before he reads about them in the newspaper.

He hopes the President will not regard the meeting in Bonn as a substitute for Kiesinger's coming to Washington sometime between the Party elections of May 22-23 and Kiesinger's regularly scheduled visit with de Gaulle, July 4. Sometime in June, not too close to July 4, would be best.

He expressed the hope that in Bonn the President would be willing to talk alone and at length with Kiesinger on fundamental matters.

2. The position inside the Cabinet

On the surface the coalition is operating and permitting Germany to move out of the stalemate in which it found itself in the latter days of Erhard. Kiesinger works well with Wehner and Brandt. There is, of course, the Schroeder/Strauss rivalry; but the fundamental fact in the Cabinet is that great tension exists between Kiesinger and Strauss -- much greater than is apparent or even generally believed.

Strauss is trying to get out of the government for two reasons: his job is difficult; and he is limited in what he can say publicly. In Casper's view, Strauss is a pure opportunist, but not to be taken lightly because he has an appeal to younger Germans.

Within the CSU they wish to keep Strauss in the Cabinet and are trying to develop new leadership.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-69  
By 10, NARA Date 11-2-99

4/20/67

His recommendation is that the President treat Strauss with courtesy, perhaps even invite him to the United States, and minimize the possibility that any slight by the President could be used as an excuse for him to move in the direction in which he is inclined to move.

Kiesinger is wholly conscious of Strauss' objectives. In Casper's judgment, our problem is to strengthen Kiesinger so he can deal with Strauss.

In this connection Kiesinger's rather complex thinking about de Gaulle is that because the Russians and Eastern Europeans know that de Gaulle is against a German nuclear role, de Gaulle's support for Germany's policy in the East is of help to Germany.

The Germans regard de Gaulle as having been somewhat weakened and limited in his maneuverability by the elections.

Kiesinger has been greatly impressed by the moderation of President Johnson's public posture towards de Gaulle, which helps the Germans avoid a sharp and open choice between Paris and Washington.

### 3. Non-Proliferation

In great confidence, Casper told me that Kiesinger has decided to sign the non-proliferation treaty. He must go slowly to avoid being trapped by Strauss in a posture of appearing to "kowtow" to the Americans. At the moment he is focusing (confirmed by independent intelligence sources) on the idea of pressing to have a time limit written into the treaty; say, 10 years. Casper regards as the most important aspect of the President's discussion with Kiesinger persuading him that the present language of the treaty (which permits withdrawal if the individual country decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized the supreme interest of the country) is a stronger and better position.

W. W. R.

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 20, 1967 --4:10 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARVIN WATSON

SUBJECT: Manifest for Bonn Trip

1. Delegates. State recommends, having confirmed that 6 is maximum:

Secretary of State \_\_\_\_\_

Mr. John J. McCloy \_\_\_\_\_

General Lucius Clay \_\_\_\_\_

Mr. Allen Dulles \_\_\_\_\_

Ambassador George C. McGhee \_\_\_\_\_

Note: Sec. Acheson prefers not to be included because of health.

If Allen Dulles is unable because of health, they suggest

Mrs. Janet Dulles, widow of John Foster Dulles \_\_\_\_\_.

2. The German Ambassador. State recommends that we permit Ambassador Knappstein to fly with us to Bonn, because Knappstein wishes to help persuade Kiesinger and Brandt towards positive position on the NPT. I concur in this recommendation.

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

3. Your Staff.

Marvin Watson \_\_\_\_\_

George Christian \_\_\_\_\_

Harry McPherson \_\_\_\_\_

James Symington \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By rip, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Jim Jones \_\_\_\_\_

Francis Bator\* \_\_\_\_\_

W. W. Rostow \_\_\_\_\_

\*Francis might be helpful in preparing materials for talks with Germans and with respect to other bilaterals, should they be organized; on the other hand, these days may be absolutely critical for the Kennedy Round negotiations; and Francis is a key figure in the Task Force we have working in Washington to handle what may be a fast moving situation.

3. Mrs. Eleanor Dulles tells us that the Germans have, at their expense, invited her to go to the funeral. Should we give her a ride?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

4. Should we invite Mr. and Mrs. Volkmar Wentzel (she is Kiesinger's daughter) to go on the back-up plane?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Thursday  
Saturday, April 14, 1967 -- 3:15pm

2. Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. 100th Birthday Gift to Canada

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-415  
By WIP, NARA, Date 4-23-93

Shortly before the Latin American trip you asked for a report on the background to the Canadian gift. A detailed chronology is at Tab A. The facts, in brief, are:

- In November 1965, State asked for approval to give a 100th birthday gift to Canada, and to talk to Steuben Glass about its manufacture.
- You approved the State request later in the month (Tab B).
- Steuben agreed to do the job for \$5,000, although they knew it would cost much more (they had previously committed themselves to do the work for this amount, and felt they could not now raise the price). State then asked the White House for the \$5,000, but was told they would have to use their own funds, or get Steuben to do the work for nothing.
- State came up with the money and Steuben was commissioned to do the work.

After looking over the record, my own recommendation is that we go ahead with the gift as planned. Both State and Steuben have, so far as I can determine, acted in good faith. Steuben, in fact, has agreed not to publicize the fact that it was commissioned to do the job (Tab D).

If we decide at this stage not to give the gift, the story could easily leak (too many people -- both in Washington and at Steuben -- already know what we were planning to do).

If you decide we can go ahead, you may want to consider making the presentation yourself at a small ceremony here in Washington. We can arrange it for late April, at about the time EXPO - 67 opens.

W. W. Rostow

1. OK to give gift ☒ 4/21/67  
No ☐  
Speak to me ☐
2. Set up presentation ceremony for me in late April ☐  
No ☐  
Speak to me ☐

FMR/LSF/vmr

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## CHRONOLOGY

1. On November 8, 1965, a State memorandum from Read to Bundy asked for approval in principal of a gift to Canada during her Centennial Year (1967). The memo also reported that informal contacts with Steuben Glass indicated that the Company was prepared to manufacture the gift, and asked for permission to pursue the idea with Steuben. (Tab B).

2. The President approved the proposal with the comment, "OK. Give gift." (Tab C).

3. State then went to Steuben, and was told that the Company was prepared to do the job. The estimated cost was approximately \$5,000.

4. It soon became apparent that the \$5,000 figure was unrealistically low. Mr. Arthur Houghton, President of Steuben, indicated that he was interested in accepting a commission to do the work anyway. He said that since the \$5,000 figure had been mentioned earlier, the Company would not ask for more than that sum.

5. On December 21, 1965, the State Department informed Bundy by memo that Steuben had agreed to do the work for \$5,000. The Department also asked if the White House could come up with the money. (Tab D).

6. On January 6, 1966, Bundy's staff informed State by telephone that: 1) there was no objection to having Steuben do the work; 2) Steuben should do it without charge; 3) if that were not possible, then State would have to find the money.

7. Later in January, John Leddy (Assistant Secretary for European Affairs) asked Under Secretary Crockett if he could find the necessary money. Leddy also recommended that -- if the money could be found -- Steuben be commissioned to do the job. Crockett agreed to make the funds available.

8. On January 25, 1966, State commissioned Steuben to do the work. The letter of commission stated that the cost to the U. S. Government "must not exceed \$5,000", that the final design was subject to approval, and that no publicity would be made of the fact of the commission. Steuben agreed to these terms by letter on February 7, 1966. (Tab E).

9. On March 14, 1966, State approved the Steuben design and told the Company to go ahead with the work.

## CHRONOLOGY

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9. On March 14, 1966, State approved the Steuben design and told the Company to go ahead with the work.

*Rec'd Bundy  
11-23-65  
3:00p*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
RECEIVED  
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

November 8, 1965

*Informal Label 5/5  
11/29/65 11:20 P.M.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1965 NOV 9 AM 10 33

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

*Give a gift*

Subject: Canada's 100th Anniversary

In 1967, Canada will celebrate the 100th anniversary of its birth as a sovereign nation. The Canadians will undoubtedly expect a considerable contribution to the anniversary ceremonies from their closest neighbors. A US pavilion at EXPO '67, Montreal, has already been arranged and issuance of a commemorative stamp is probable. In addition we expect that a number of American officials will visit Canada in 1967.

The Department believes that it would be a fitting gesture to present a gift to Canada. As documented in the enclosure to this memorandum ample precedent exists for such a gift.

We believe that the gift should be durable, visible, and both unique and uniquely American. We might also wish to consider other things as well--e.g., university scholarships in US/Canadian relations, and so on--but primary consideration ought, in our view, be given to a work of American art.

As a further virtue, its unveiling by a high level U.S. official would constitute a memorable event in the celebration of this important Canadian anniversary.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-413  
By *sig*, NARA, Date 1-8-92

PRESERVATION COPY


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Of the number of specific ideas for a gift we have so far considered, a specially designed and massive work in Steuben Glass was thought to be particularly suitable. We have informally approached Ambassador Murphy, now Chairman of the Board for Corning Glass International, to inquire whether Steuben Glass, a subsidiary of Corning, would be interested in exploring the possibility of producing such a work.

Ambassador Murphy replied that the response of Steuben's President, Arthur A. Houghton, Jr., was "immediate and enthusiastic".

I would appreciate knowing whether the general idea of a gift to Canada is acceptable, and, if it is, whether there would be any objection to pursuing the dialogue with Steuben.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Examples of Gifts.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY



20500

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

December 21, 1965

RECEIVED  
BUNDY'S OFFICE

1965 DEC 22 AM 10 02

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Gift to Canada on Its 100th  
Anniversary

Subsequent to my November 8 memorandum to you (copy enclosed) and White House approval in principle of the suggestion contained in the memorandum that the United States present a gift to Canada during 1967, the centennial year of Canadian sovereignty, an official of the Department has had an exploratory conversation with the Vice President of Steuben Glass. He said his firm would indeed be proud to execute a suitable work on a bare cost basis should the Government wish to commission Steuben to do so.

We envisage that the gift ultimately chosen would be unveiled and presented to Canada, on behalf of the people of the United States, by a United States official of suitable rank in the US Pavilion at EXPO '67, Montreal, probably on the yet to be determined United States Day. The work Steuben tentatively has in mind would suit both the place and the occasion admirably. It would consist of several pieces which together with a suitable base would constitute a thematic whole. The work would thus be massive enough so that it would not be overwhelmed by the some-180 ft. of space above it within the Pavilion but would not be large enough to dominate the meticulous engraving that is Steuben's hallmark.

The United States Government would have complete control over the theme of the work and publicity, if any, resulting from the commission. Department officials would be in frequent consultation with Steuben craftsmen during the creation of the design and, if you so desire, the final drawings would be submitted to the White House for approval.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12556, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-413

By ing, NARA, Date 1-8-92


PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -2

The work would remain in the US Pavilion until EXPO '67 closed, at which time it would be transported by the Government of Canada to a site of its own choosing, presumably the National Gallery in Ottawa.

Other ideas for a suitable gift have been considered, and the Department will be pleased to consider them further if that is desired, but, given the beauty and the uniquely American character of Steuben's craftsmanship, the Department recommends that Steuben be commissioned to execute a work for the occasion, provided, of course, that the design Steuben would create is acceptable and that the funds -- not to exceed \$5000 -- are available in the White House.

I would appreciate your consideration of this recommendation.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Copy of November 8 Memo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

COPY

January 25, 1966

Dear Mr. Thurston:

Should the terms set forth below be acceptable to you, this letter will constitute a commission to Steuben Glass to design and execute a work for the Government of the United States to present, on behalf of all Americans, to the Government and People of Canada during Canada's Centenary Year, 1967.

1. The ultimate design must be acceptable to this Department.
2. The work should be completed as soon as possible, preferably by April 1, 1967.
3. The total cost of designing, executing, and delivering the gift to the point designated by the United States Government must not exceed \$5,000.00, the exact amount to be determined after approval of the design.
4. No publicity will be made of the fact of this commission, except by the Department of State.
5. Any reproduction of the work, or of any part of the work, will be subject to the Department's approval.

These conditions were, I am informed, the ones tentatively agreed to in December 1965 by you and Mr. Charles A. Kiselyak of this Department. If they are acceptable, Mr. Kiselyak, who will be the Department's spokesman in this matter, would be prepared to come to New York in the near future to begin discussion of the design itself.

Sincerely,

Robert E. Peck  
Acting Director,  
Office of Operations

Mr. James Thurston,  
Vice President,  
Steuben Glass,  
Fifth Avenue at 56th,  
New York.

82f



# STEBEN GLASS

February 7, 1966

*Noted  
Paul*

Mr. Robert E. Peck  
Acting Director  
Office of Operations  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Peck:

It is with much pleasure that we accept the commission outlined in your letter of January 25, in accordance with your terms and conditions.

We sincerely appreciate the privilege afforded by this commission and the opportunity to participate in this very important event.

As you probably know, we are already in touch with Mr. Charles Kiselyak and look forward to his visit next Wednesday.

Sincerely yours,

STEBEN GLASS

*Ann Pittendrigh*  
Ann Pittendrigh

*Please send to for file.*

AP:php

*Pres file*

Thursday - April 20, 1967

Mr. President:


You wanted all the friendly editorials collected and a good speech written for insertion in the record.

I find that Bob Hardesty's people have been at work on this project since Monday. They have already sent up 7 statements, together with 23 editorials or commentaries. Mike Mansfield spoke on April 14 to insert the full text of your Summit speech. He took the floor again yesterday with a longer statement and inserted five favorable editorials.

Copies of all this material is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

  
2. Per fileLIMITED OFFICIAL USE

April 20, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Message to President Nasser

You and Mrs. Johnson will remember having received President Nasser's daughter and son-in-law last September. She has just given birth to a son.

This is Nasser's second grand child but first grandson. In the Moslem world the birth of the first grandson is an important event. State recommends the following personal message:

"I was delighted to learn of the birth of your first grandson on April 17. Mrs. Johnson and I remember with great pleasure the visit of Lt. and Mrs. Marwan at the White House last September. We hope shortly to achieve the same distinction of being grandparents. Our heartiest congratulations to you and your family and our best wishes to the mother and her new baby."

Since our political relationship is so difficult, it is useful to seize on any opportunity like this to keep the personal lines open.

W. W. Rostow

Approve 

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~SECRET~~  
EXDIS

*Pres file*

Thursday, April 20, 1967  
8:05 p. m.

Mr. President:

This telegram from Tommy Thompson will interest you, notably the last paragraph.

You were one jump ahead of your reigning Soviet expert.

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 4491, April 19, 1967

~~SECRET~~-- EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 18, NARA, Date 4-29-91

85a

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

4491  
Moscow, April 19, 1967

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-413  
By ing, NARA, Date 1-8-92

Exchange of views with George Brown prompts following. I suggest we should consider whether in present circumstances our continuing campaign of Vietnam peace moves really serves to further the possibility of peace negotiations. Apart from our basic objective of peace, I assume we wish to influence U.S. and world opinion generally, and the Soviet Union, North Vietnam and the Vietcong in particular, the Chicoms being impervious to moves of this sort.

I am not able to judge effect of further moves on U.S. public opinion but would have thought that any additional initiatives could add little to force of the long list of efforts we have made in recent months.

So far as Soviet Union is concerned, I would not deny that our initiatives have had some favorable effect on Soviets despite coincidence in many cases with escalation of bombing of North Vietnam. In present circumstances, however, I believe that initiatives that Soviets know and know that we know have only a remote chance of success may be positively harmful as adding to Soviet suspicions of our sincerity. This is particularly true of our efforts to involve them. From my talk with Kosygin I would judge that he is aware that British are at least in part motivated by domestic political considerations and he is likely to question any British peace efforts. Soviets could, of course, bring some pressure on North Vietnam by threatening to cut off supplies or by actually doing so. This could, however, risk throwing North Vietnam into arms of Chicoms which would defeat one of the primary Soviet objectives in this area. A more effective Soviet action could be to guarantee North Vietnam against any Chinese takeover but the Soviets are unlikely to take on any such commitment.

It is in respect of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front, however, that our continued peace moves must surely be counter-productive. We have made it abundantly clear that at any time they are ready to move toward either settlement or de-escalation we will agree to almost any time, place or channel. While they may regard further initiatives on our part as merely a propaganda exercise, it seems more likely that we are giving them the impression of desperation and that this, combined with demonstrations and speeches such as Fulbright's, have convinced them that we will not stay the course. Until recently I believe Soviets had better judgement of our situation, but British

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

Ambassador who has recently had occasion for many contacts with high Soviet officials suggested that reason for Dobrynin's return for consultation might be to get his views on whether we could carry on in Vietnam.

Despite foregoing, I do not believe escalation of bombing in North Vietnam is any answer either. In fact, I believe that at least in the short run each step-up in bombing reduces the chances of the other side agreeing to negotiate. No government would want to enter negotiations directly connected with the increased use of force against it and North Vietnam has, in addition, the problem of Chinese pressure, their own brand of Communist pride, and heavy investment they have made in the affair. They will surely not wish to jeopardize their post settlement position in South Vietnam by moving toward peace before the Viet Cong are ready.

I suggest consideration be given to a Presidential statement listing all of our recent moves combined with a resolute declaration that while we will always be prepared to move to the conference table, since the other side seems determined upon achieving a military victory, we have no course open to us but to step up our operations in South Vietnam and to continue to use our bombers to hold down infiltration from the North. If we could persuade some of our critics to come out in support of our actions in view of the completely negative attitude of the other side, this would of course be most helpful.

If we could make some dramatic announcement, such as a substantial increase in our forces in the South and combine it with an indication that we were leveling off our bombing in the North or even better confining it to the infiltration routes, we could make the outlook for the Viet Cong very dark and at the same time, reduce the risk of increased Soviet support of North Vietnam. Such a course might, it seems to me, reduce some of the criticism at home and thus the hope of North Vietnam that we will be forced by our own public opinion to withdraw.

I is against the foregoing background that I would suggest that rather than have George Brown continue to make peace noises when he comes to Moscow, he should convey to the Soviets a sense of our determination to see this affair through.

*Pres file*~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Thursday, April 20, 1967  
8:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

A North African herewith reports, in a quite credible way, on a visit to Communist China. We know so little about how they think that I thought you might like to read it.

W. W. Rostow

USUN 4921

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By AG, NARA, Date 4-29-81

Thursuay, April 20, 1967

86a

USUN 4921

SUBJECT: Malley Visit to China

Malley freely spoke to Pedersen and Thacher yesterday for over an hour about his recent visit to Communist China and said he would be willing to answer further questions. Detailed report pouched Department (Sisco-10, Bundy-Fe and S-Walsh) Highlights as follows:

Visit lasted 18 days. The highlight was a 2 1/2 discussion with Chou En-Lai on March 28.

Chou and other leaders constantly spoke of U.S. - USSR collusion and spoke more about USSR than U.S. They traced collusion back to Khrushchev's 1958 refusal to reaffirm that an attack on China would be considered an attack on the USSR.

Chou thought U.S. would move to attack China when we were sure it would not affect the stability of the Soviet Government. U.S. action against China would involve Chinese reaction against all bases of attack, specifically mentioning Japan, Philippines, Laos, and Thailand.

Chou said he was considering the termination of Warsaw talks because they were being exploited by the USSR.

Malley thought the Chinese wanted to enter the Vietnamese War. Chou had reiterated China prepared to send volunteers to North Vietnam a day after North Vietnam requests them.

North Vietnam representative in Peking confirmed the offer and said North Vietnam (a) Did not want Chinese and (b) Would have to accept Eastern Europe volunteers if they took the Chinese with consequent political problems for themselves.

North Vietnam representative said, however, Chinese and North Vietnamese were then discussing on contingency basis, terms and

**DECLASSIFIED****E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6****NLJ 99-70****By is, NARA Date 10-30-99**~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

conditions under which volunteers would be accepted if a decision was made.

Chou said North Vietnam's proposal to talk to U.S. if we stopped bombing had been cleared with him by Pham Van Dong. Said he had warned him U.S. would then stiffen its position, and that Hanoi would be stuck with its offer. Said he had been right.

Chou identified Liu Shao Chi with Soviets from time of his assumption of office. Said Central Committee had voted against Liu on March 26, but Malley had the impression that legal quorum was not present.

Malley concluded that Mao Forces would clearly win and said Chou is confident of this also. Chou said the Government fully controlled 8 provinces. Army Chief of Staff admitted there had been revisionists in the army but denied any split.

In chance meeting with North Vietnamese Colonel Van Lau, who had gone to Burma to talk to U Thant, Van Lau heaped abuse on U Thant and said he had rejected U Thant's ceasefire idea in Burma. He expected US to exploit Thant's proposal.

Van Lau said North Vietnam expected U.S. invasion for purposes of seizing and holding enclave (which it could probably do) and for purpose of holding them to trade against withdrawal of North Vietnam's presence in South Vietnam.

Van Lau said North Vietnam had released an exchange between President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh because U.S. constantly was implying it in meaningful contact with Hanoi and they wished to make clear no meaningful discussion is going on.

Malley concluded Mao was defied in China to the extent that group rallying around his name are certain to be successful. But thought he was far removed from day-to-day conduct of government. He also felt adulation attached to him could not be transferred to others and that if he died succession would be difficult question. He thought Chou En-Lai had no power base and could be easily removed at will by those now holding the power.

Chou told Malley, in context Soviet untrustworthiness, that he had received a message from the Embassy in Cairo reporting Nasser's anger at finding Gromyko had come to Cairo to urge United Arab Republic to go slowly in South Arabia.

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 20, 1967  
8:07 p.m.

*Pres. file*

Mr. President:

This report on Kiesinger and  
advice from a reliable German friend  
will interest you.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By RG, NARA, Date 4-29-91

~~SECRET~~

April 20, 1967

## Memorandum of Conversation with Walther Casper, Thursday, April 20, 1967

Mr. Walther Casper, a German industrialist, CDU, pro-American, and well known to me, came in briefly to make three points (aside from expressing his great satisfaction that the President will be going to Germany).

1. Kiesinger's personality and how to handle him

Kiesinger is a complicated man with many layers who likes to discuss matters deeply and at length before coming to a firm decision. He speaks excellent English. He hopes the President will seek to establish with him a relation of personal confidence. He does not like to be pressed or hurried; but his basic judgments lead him in support of U. S. positions. He was greatly impressed by the President's letter; and Casper believes this kind of exchange should continue. He hopes that the President will use such communications to make Kiesinger feel he is a partner with whom the President is prepared to share information and ideas before he reads about them in the newspaper.

He hopes the President will not regard the meeting in Bonn as a substitute for Kiesinger's coming to Washington sometime between the Party elections of May 22-23 and Kiesinger's regularly scheduled visit with de Gaulle, July 4. Sometime in June, not too close to July 4, would be best.

He expressed the hope that in Bonn the President would be willing to talk alone and at length with Kiesinger on fundamental matters.

2. The position inside the Cabinet

On the surface the coalition is operating and permitting Germany to move out of the stalemate in which it found itself in the latter days of Erhard. Kiesinger works well with Wehner and Brandt. There is, of course, the Schroeder/Strauss rivalry; but the fundamental fact in the Cabinet is that great tension exists between Kiesinger and Strauss -- much greater than is apparent or even generally believed.

Strauss is trying to get out of the government for two reasons: his job is difficult; and he is limited in what he can say publicly. In Casper's view, Strauss is a pure opportunist, but not to be taken lightly because he has an appeal to younger Germans.

Within the CSU they wish to keep Strauss in the Cabinet and are trying to develop new leadership.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-69

By is, NARA Date 11-2-99~~SECRET~~

4/20/67

His recommendation is that the President treat Strauss with courtesy, perhaps even invite him to the United States, and minimize the possibility that any slight by the President could be used as an excuse for him to move in the direction in which he is inclined to move.

Kiesinger is wholly conscious of Strauss' objectives. In Casper's judgment, our problem is to strengthen Kiesinger so he can deal with Strauss.

In this connection Kiesinger's rather complex thinking about de Gaulle is that because the Russians and Eastern Europeans know that de Gaulle is against a German nuclear role, de Gaulle's support for Germany's policy in the East is of help to Germany.

The Germans regard de Gaulle as having been somewhat weakened and limited in his maneuverability by the elections.

Kiesinger has been greatly impressed by the moderation of President Johnson's public posture towards de Gaulle, which helps the Germans avoid a sharp and open choice between Paris and Washington.

### 3. Non-Proliferation

In great confidence, Casper told me that Kiesinger has decided to sign the non-proliferation treaty. He must go slowly to avoid being trapped by Strauss in a posture of appearing to "kowtow" to the Americans. At the moment he is focusing (confirmed by independent intelligence sources) on the idea of pressing to have a time limit written into the treaty; say, 10 years. Casper regards as the most important aspect of the President's discussion with Kiesinger persuading him that the present language of the treaty (which permits withdrawal if the individual country decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized the supreme interest of the country) is a stronger and better position.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 20, 1967

VIA CAS CHANNEL

TO AMBASSADOR LODGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

I read your last weekly telegram with mixed feelings. Few Presidents can have been so well served by an Ambassador; and your weekly telegrams to me have been a regular reminder of that fact -- as well as an indispensable source of the feel only those on the spot can develop.

I shall be finding soon the occasion to respond to your letter of resignation; but, as I read this late at night, I wished to tell you how grateful I am for your help in the past and how much I shall look to you in the future.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 10354,  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY RF ON 5-2-91

*Pres file*

April 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Ambassador Hart in Turkey

The attached letter expresses Pete Hart's deep thanks to you and Mrs. Johnson for making the visit of President Sunay such a success. He was personally particularly grateful for the opportunity to meet with you and your family "at home."

He reports President Sunay's deep satisfaction over his talks with you, particularly your assurances of friendship. He concludes by pointing out that President Sunay "is a steady and serious man who, I believe, will cherish these sentiments in dignity without seeking to take unfair advantage of them."

The attached letter would be a useful reply.

W. W. Rostow

89a

April 22, 1967

Dear Pete:

Thank you for your good letter of April 13. We, too, enjoyed having you and the Sunays with us. We were sorry your wife couldn't be here too. I'm glad the visit went so well -- due in no small measure to your efforts and those of your associates in the Department of State.

When you see President Sunay next, please give him my personal regards. Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending best wishes.

Sincerely,



The Honorable  
Parker T. Hart  
United States Ambassador to Turkey  
American Embassy  
Ankara

89b

Ankara, Turkey

April 13, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President and Mrs. Johnson:

Having returned to my post in order to await the arrival of President Sunay and his party at Esenboga airport, I wish to lose no time in stating the great satisfaction which I felt over the Sunay visit to the United States and the most gracious and cordial way in which the Washington phase was conducted. The reverberations in Turkey are very positive and even the opposition, which seeks for special reasons to find something wrong with the visit, have been unable to fasten on much that can stick. I feel that after giving so much of yourselves to these visitors on April 3 and 4 you have every reason to be gratified by the impact which was made on public opinion here as well as on President and Mrs. Sunay and their party.

For myself, this was the first opportunity to be invited to a state occasion at the White House and I am deeply grateful for it, particularly for the informal hour in the Gold Room, during which I had the honor of seeing you "at home" and meeting your two lovely daughters. My own two girls have quizzed me energetically on all the details since my return. The warmth of this reception of the Sunay, Çağlayanlı and Esenbel families during that hour set the mood of informal cordiality and high enjoyment which marked the dinner as for the operetta. I know the Turks greatly enjoyed it all, but especially the rendition in Turkish of the final chorus.

On the departure of the Sunay party April 5, I learned from Mr. Çağlayanlı of President Sunay's deep satisfaction over his final talk with you, Mr. President, and particularly over the assurances you gave to him of your friendship for him and his country. He is a steady and serious man who, I believe, will cherish these sentiments in dignity without seeking to take unfair advantage of them.

Respectfully yours,

Parker T. Hart

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
OF NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12958  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY RG ON 5-2-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Meeting with the President  
April 20, 1967 5:30 p.m.

90  
90  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-69  
By is, NARA Date 11-2-99

Agenda

1. U.S. -Soviet assurances to non-nuclear powers - (Sect. Rusk)  
Discussion of Soviet formula as relayed by Indians.
2. Aid to Israel - (Sect. Rusk)
  - a. You have a State memorandum on aid which was sent you as a basis for your discussion with Mr. Feinberg.
  - b. Sects. Rusk and McNamara have been asked for their views on the Israeli policy paper which I sent to them this morning. You have my views on the paper.
  - c. A new Israeli proposal: US engines for a French fighter (Sect. McNamara)
3. U.S. Engines for French Planes - (Sect. McNamara)  
Sect. McNamara wants your guidance on whether to issue a license to sell Pratt-Whitney engines to France.
4. AP Luncheon on Monday, April 24  
Is this possible in light of departure time for Germany?  
Sect. McNamara is against your speaking.
5. Viet Nam
  - a. General Westmoreland  
Gen. Westmoreland arrives in West Point Friday. If you wish, he could come to Washington to see you tomorrow.  
Westmoreland speaks in New York on Monday and comes to Washington for the remainder of the week. He will be here, I believe, Thursday and Friday.
  - b. Instructions to Lodge on final Saigon interviews - (Sect. Rusk)  
Revised draft telegram will be brought to the meeting by Sect. Rusk.

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 20, 1967

c. North Viet Nam targets

- (1) Report on strikes against Haiphong thermal plants.
- (2) Future targets - Rolling Thunder 55 (?): Hanoi power plant.

d. Viet Nam troop increase issue (Sect. McNamara)

e. Organization of Viet Nam Policy Committee (Sects. Rusk and McNamara)

6. Report on Svetlana Stalin - (Sect. Rusk)

7. Rusk Committee on CIA Activities - (Sect. Rusk)

Sect. Rusk wishes your guidance on whether the Committee's terms of reference are to be broad or narrow.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Thursday, April 20, 1967  
8:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Jorden's report  
of the follow-on from your discussion  
with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister  
yesterday.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *RJ*, NARA, Date *4-29-91*

MEMORANDU

91a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, April 20, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Vietnamese Politics

I just talked with Ambassador Diem. He sent the message last night. He also sent a similar message to a close friend in the Prime Minister's office. The latter answered immediately that things were "going smoothly." He indicated there was some uneasiness in the Directorate, but "so far, so good."

Diem will be talking with PM Ky by phone later tonight. He will relay the result to me.

The Ambassador is quite certain that both Ky and Thieu are reasonable men and will not let things get out of hand. He recalled Ky's pledge at Guam and is certain that Ky will keep that pledge, "even if it means personal sacrifice." He is a man of honor and will keep his word to the President. He recognizes the vital importance of maintaining the stability of the armed forces.

I will keep you informed as things develop.

Bill  
William J. Jorden

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-415  
By ig, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

72  
Thursday, April 20, 1967

*Free file*

Mr. President:

*12:00 noon*  
In your meeting with Admiral Sharp today, I would suggest that you concentrate on "out-of-country" operations for which he is uniquely responsible. In-country problems could be left to discussions with General Westmoreland next week.

Suggested topics:

- Air campaign against North Vietnam
- Naval operations against North Vietnam (Admiral Sharp might take this opportunity to urge the use of battleships against North Vietnam)
- Situation in Laos
- Situation in Thailand
- Overview of the war's prospects -- ways of improving these prospects?

A major issue which will have to be faced in the near future is that of force requirements. I would suggest that you not go into this too deeply at this time since neither the JCS nor Secretary McNamara have completed their review of recommendations made by General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:RNG:amc

Pres file

Thursday, April 20, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Holyoake Visit

You have agreed to see New Zealand Prime Minister Keith Holyoake at 1:00 p.m. today.

You last saw the Prime Minister at the Manila conference, except for yesterday's brief meeting in the Cabinet room.

Since Manila, the Holyoake Government won its election and announced it was increasing its contributions in Viet-Nam. The New Zealand artillery battery, which numbered about 150, has been more than doubled. A 16-member medical team has been sent to Binh Dinh province.

New Zealanders are worried by the downturn in their balance of payments position since December. The primary cause has been a reduction in wool prices on the world market. Holyoake recently imposed several austerity measures in an effort to reduce the gap between earnings and external spending.

We have been told that the Prime Minister has no plans to raise any serious business, though he may refer to his economic troubles.

The main purpose of his visit is to renew the bonds of friendship that were established by your visit to New Zealand.

Biographic notes are attached.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By inf, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Thursday, April 20, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Holyoake Visit (Addendum)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-415  
By sig, NARA, Date 4-23-93

Prime Minister Holyoake may comment on his economic problems, especially declining prices on farm exports. He may note New Zealand dissatisfaction with the Kennedy Round. He may mention Secretary Freeman's action aimed at cutting dairy imports through a Tariff Commission study beginning May 15.

Suggested Replies

On the Kennedy Round, you may wish to note the United States has made several offers of interest to New Zealand. Two -- on lamb and frozen cream -- were in specific response to New Zealand requests. If New Zealand decides to leave the Round, we will probably have to withdraw these offers.

On dairy products generally, we have a tough domestic problem. Nevertheless, we have tried to give sympathetic consideration to New Zealand's proposals.

On dairy products, our legislation provides price supports for dairy farmers. It also requires cutbacks on imports when they undermine the price support program. Income of dairy farmers is down. Many blame imports. Many bills proposing severe restrictions have been introduced. The Tariff Commission study -- on which the President will determine if quotas are needed and in what amount -- may reduce pressures for more far-reaching legislative backed by some United States farm groups.

You may also wish to note that New Zealand sales to the United States are increasing (35 per cent higher in 1966 than in 1965) while New Zealand purchases of United States goods went down 4.5 per cent last year.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*

Limited Official Use

Thursday - April 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Nicaraguan Presidential Inaugural

Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza will be inaugurated President of Nicaragua on May 1. We have been invited to send a Special Delegation of four persons.

For Head of the Delegation (select one)

Yes   No

State recommends:

Louisiana Governor McKeithen (Tab A)

\_\_\_   \_\_\_

Doug Nobles suggests:

Corbin J. Robertson of Houston, Texas  
(Tab B)

\_\_\_   \_\_\_

From Congress (select two)

State suggests:

Silvio Conte (R-Mass.)

\_\_\_   \_\_\_

Dante Fascoll (D-Fla.)

\_\_\_   \_\_\_

Charles Goodell (R-N. Y.)

\_\_\_   \_\_\_

Donald Irwin (D-Conn.)

\_\_\_   \_\_\_

John Moss (D-Cal.)

\_\_\_   \_\_\_

Henry Wilson recommends:

Armistead Selden (D-Ala.)

\_\_\_   \_\_\_

Henry Reuss (D-Wis.)

\_\_\_   \_\_\_

William Poage (D-Tex.)

\_\_\_   \_\_\_

The Nicaraguan Government sent a special invitation to Congressman Pepper and he has accepted. You might want to include him as one of the two Congressional members.

Yes \_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_.

Public Member (select one)

State recommends:

Mayor King High of Miami

\_\_\_\_

Mr. Charles H. Earl,  
Attorney-at-Law,  
Little Rock, Arkansas.

Cliff Alexander suggests:

Roy Wilkins, NAACP Executive Secretary

\_\_\_\_

I recommend that our Ambassador in Managua -- Aaron Brown -- also be included on the delegation.

Yes \_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments:

Tab A - on Governor McKeithen

Tab B - on Mr. Robertson of Houston.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Meeting with the President  
April 20, 1967 5:30 p.m.

Agenda

1. U. S. -Soviet assurances to non-nuclear powers - (Sect. Rusk)  
Discussion of Soviet formula as relayed by Indians.
2. Aid to Israel - (Sect. Rusk)
  - a. You have a State memorandum on aid which was sent you as a basis for your discussion with Mr. Feinberg.
  - b. Sects. Rusk and McNamara have been asked for their views on the Israeli policy paper which I sent to them this morning. You have my views on the paper.
  - c. A new Israeli proposal: US engines for a French fighter (Sect. McNamara)
3. U. S. Engines for French Planes - (Sect. McNamara)  
Sect. McNamara wants your guidance on whether to issue a license to sell Pratt-Whitney engines to France.
4. AP Luncheon on Monday, April 24  
Is this possible in light of departure time for Germany?  
Sect. McNamara is against your speaking.
5. Viet Nam
  - a. General Westmoreland  
Gen. Westmoreland arrives in West Point Friday. If you wish, he could come to Washington to see you tomorrow.  
Westmoreland speaks in New York on Monday and comes to Washington for the remainder of the week. He will be here, I believe, Thursday and Friday.
  - b. Instructions to Lodge on final Saigon interviews - (Sect. Rusk)  
Revised draft telegram will be brought to the meeting by Sect. Rusk.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-69  
By g/lis, NARA Date 12/14/01

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 20, 1967

c. North Viet Nam targets

- (1) Report on strikes against Haiphong thermal plants.
- (2) Future targets - Rolling Thunder 55 (?): Hanoi power plant.

d. Viet Nam troop increase issue (Sect. McNamara)

e. Organization of Viet Nam Policy Committee (Sects. Rusk and McNamara)

6. Report on Svetlana Stalin - (Sect. Rusk)

7. Rusk Committee on CIA Activities - (Sect. Rusk)

Sect. Rusk wishes your guidance on whether the Committee's terms of reference are to be broad or narrow.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-415  
By sig, NARA, Date 4-23-93

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, April 19, 1967 -- 4:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith George McGhee, for understandable reasons, urges you to stay at the Embassy residence.

I have now checked with all those who have a right to advise you in this matter. They agree the DCM's home in the American compound would be better for reasons of:

- security;
- communications;
- availability of helicopter pad; and
- access to your staff.

The problem with the Embassy residence is that it is in the middle of the town, some distance from the Embassy, as well as some distance from the quarters available for your staff.

Incidentally, George McGhee is simply delighted that you are going and believes that it could be a most constructive occasion at a critical time.

W. W. Rostow

Will stay at the Ambassador's residence \_\_\_\_\_

Will stay at DCM's residence in American compound \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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LIMDIS

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

PASS WHITE HOUSE

IN MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1411 FOR THE PRESIDENT SENT FROM BERLIN,  
I EXPRESSED THE HOPE AND ASSUMPTION THAT HE WOULD STAY WITH ME IN  
THE EMBASSY RESIDENCE, CECILIA BEING FOR THE MOMENT IN THE  
UNITED STATES. IT IS MY INTENTION TO MOVE TO THE THIRD FLOOR  
LEAVING THE SECOND FLOOR WITH THREE BEDROOMS AND SITTING ROOM  
ENTIRELY FOR THE PRESIDENT. **BEFORE** ANY OTHER ARRANGEMENTS ARE  
MADE, I SHOULD LIKE THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE A PERSONAL DECISION ON  
THIS QUESTION. MCGHEE  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-413

By ing, NARA, Date 1-8-92

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*1. sent  
2. file*

Wednesday - April 19, 1967

Mr. President:

I recommend that you send the attached letter of appreciation to Mr. Deming of the Miami Heart Institute for sending a team of doctors, technicians and nurses to attend Luis Somoza.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

April 20, 1967

Dear Mr. Deming:

I deeply appreciate your action in releasing Dr. William C. Phillips and the other doctors, nurses and laboratory technicians of the Miami Heart Institute who went to Nicaragua to help care for former President Luis Ruiz Somoza.

By rushing to Managua and doing all that could be done to save his life, they left a deep impression on the Nicaraguan Government and people and rendered a not-to-be-forgotten service to their own country.

President-elect Anastasio Somoza, in asking our Ambassador to transmit to me his personal appreciation and that of all his family, expressed the feeling that everything humanly possible had been done for his brother.

Please convey to Dr. Phillips, and to the other members of the medical team which he headed, my thanks for their tireless efforts under what I know must have been difficult conditions.

Sincerely,

/s/

Mr. Casner Deming  
President, Miami Heart Institute  
4701 North Meridian Avenue  
Miami Beach, Florida 33140

LBJ/WGBowdler:mmm  
April 19, 1967

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Wednesday, April 19, 1967 -- 8:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

A supplementary check with the FBI indicates that Yuri Zhukov is seeking to see, in addition to those already indicated, Senators Church and Mansfield and Congressman Daddario from Connecticut.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-73  
By is, NARA Date 1-11-00

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

100

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 19, 1967 -- 8:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the last of Lodge's distinguished series of cables to you. I am sure you will wish to read it all.

The last paragraph raises the question of the timing of your release of your letter to him and whether you wish to send a personal note by the back channel along the following lines:

"I read your last weekly telegram with mixed feelings. Few Presidents can have been so well served by an Ambassador; and your weekly telegrams to me have been a regular reminder of that fact -- as well as an indispensable source of the feel only those on the spot can develop.

"I shall be finding soon the occasion to respond to your letter of resignation; but, as I read this late at night, I wished to tell you how grateful I am for your help in the past and how much I shall look to you in the future."

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 23485

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rlh, NARA, Date 4-29-91

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Wednesday, April 19, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE (Saigon, 23485)

Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. National Reconciliation

100-a  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-413  
By isp, NARA, Date 1-8-92

The long-awaited National Reconciliation Proclamation was issued today. Prime Minister Ky went on the radio this morning with a brief message on the occasion of Hung Vuong, or Ancestor's Day. He referred to Vietnamese history and traditions and regretted that the Communists have seen fit to reject the Government's proposals for peace discussions. He then said that in preparation for the election of a President of the Republic, a new policy of "Great National Solidarity" would be carried out. He read the Proclamation itself on radio and TV this afternoon.

The Proclamation is substantially the same as the text which was given to us, and represents significant progress in the effort to undercut the Viet Cong with an offer of genuine national reconciliation. The Proclamation promises that those who leave the Communist ranks will be "welcomed as citizens with full dignity and protected and provided with means by the Government for the building of a new life." This is spelled out to include such things as the right to vote and run for office and the right to be "protected by the law with regard to freedom and life." Those who have "committed crimes because of Communist coercion or deception" will enjoy all the Constitutional guarantees, and "the nation will be extremely lenient so that these citizens can have an opportunity to use their ability and will to serve the nation and to atone for their mistakes of the past." All the specific changes we advocated are included.

This generous offer to the Viet Cong is not easy for the Government to make or for the people of Vietnam to accept. It is not in accord with historic tradition here. They have suffered greatly from Viet Cong terror and the long war caused by Communist

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

PRESERVATION COPY

aggression. They know that the enemy would never be so generous. Nevertheless, they are making the effort, they have put it in a proper Vietnamese context by choosing this day for it, they seem to have some faith in it and there seems to be some reason to hope that it will be carried out.

#### B. Political

The situation as regards the military picking a favorite for President is still obscure. Yesterday, I reported a conversation which Ky had with Lansdale indicating that the military had expressed preference for Ky, and that Thang was to inform Thieu. Today, we learn that Thang has not yet been able to inform Thieu and, because it is a holiday, we are unable to get confirmation in time for this telegram.

But Ky evidently thinks there is a good chance he may run. He is planning actions in the general field of economics, with the obvious aim of making a showing on election day. Some of these actions involve the sale of shares in publicly owned corporations to the poor, including military widows; wage increases and free distribution of rice; buying rice in the Delta to show the Government's interest in insuring adequate rice for the people in the cities; giving, in effect, an ultimatum to Esso on the question of Esso building a refinery for the Government; telling the U. S. military banking facilities that they are subject to inspection by the Vietnamese authorities; greater efforts to expedite movement of goods out of the Port; and a personal word by the Prime Minister to all concerned that there be no increases in the next four months in the prices of such critical items as sugar, rice, pork, and flour.

When I first came here almost four years ago, I frequently reported to Washington about the "bureaucratic lassitude" in the Government of Vietnam. There was appalling lack of ambition and gumption. So, it's wonderful what elections can do and the progress they can stimulate.

Both Tran Van Huong and Ha Thuc Ky are now officially candidates for the Presidency. They have not yet announced their commitments, and the Saigon press is pairing them with a variety of other politicians. One or both may later decide against running -- either because of taking the Vice Presidential nomination on

someone else's ticket or because of stepping aside in favor of someone else. At the moment, however, it looks as though there will be at least five candidates on the ballot: Suu, Huong, Nguyen Dinh Quat, Ha Thuc Ky, and Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky.

Phan Khac Suu was re-elected Chairman of the Assembly by a wide margin, but most of the other officers are new. The Assembly has just begun to work in committees on the first drafts of the various laws it will enact. Some optimistic Deputies are saying that the first draft of the Electoral Laws will be complete in a week's time, but we are inclined to think it will be early May before the draft even appears on the floor of the Assembly.

Local elections were held for the third successive Sunday, on April 16. The voter turnout was again very good, totaling 597,585 or 81.3 percent of the registered voters. This can be compared with the 81.1 percent in the previous two Sunday elections. The total number who have voted to date is 1,697,868 in 715 villages.

The Viet Cong made direct attempts to disrupt the election last Sunday in seven provinces; in Quang Nam, where there was a flurry of Viet Cong anti-election activity, the voter turnout was only 76 percent. Two more candidates were assassinated and one more kidnapped, bringing the toll among candidates to six dead and 23 kidnapped. (Some of the kidnapped have been allowed to return to their villages, after intensive Viet Cong indoctrination.) The terrorism is probably no greater than what the Government expected.

#### C. Hanoi's "Permanent Struggle"

The East Asia expert, Professor John K. Fairbank of Harvard, is reported in the Christian Science Monitor as saying that "Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues are committed to permanent revolutionary struggle rather than to an interlude of war terminated by a formal peace." In other words, whereas we want peace, they want conquest. We and they, therefore, are not having a misunderstanding which can be dispelled by the good offices of third parties. There is no misunderstanding and the war will not be ended by pretending that there is.

How, then, do we persuade them to end the war? One way, surely, is to convince them by action (not by argumentation) that they face certain defeat.

Inside South Vietnam the most persuasive action might be destruction of the so-called "guerrilla infrastructure" -- the terrorist inner circle. This "infrastructure" makes Hanoi think it can still win. It assures the guerrillas everything they used for survival and paralyzes those charged with law and order. If destroyed, the impressment of young Vietnamese into the Viet Cong army would largely stop and a body blow would be struck at infiltration from North Vietnam which now finds an indispensable haven among the guerrillas.

Outside of Vietnam, I surmise, the greatest single factor which makes Hanoi think it can win is the success of Communist propaganda in promoting disunity in the U.S. It was this propaganda which made it seem perfectly reasonable for the Viet Cong to ask us to stop the bombing -- in other words, give up our trump card -- while they did nothing in return. And it may the next time lead them to ask for their kind of a so-called "cease-fire" whereby they can continue to terrorize (which is often done without firearms) but our side is forbidden to keep order. Or to ask for their kind of a "standstill" which we would obey and they wouldn't, with the result that no village in Vietnam would be safe. And, in any case, never to agree to any workable inspection system which actually should be first on any agenda, and which alone can make any of the above propositions honest and workable.

Such are the bones which they can toss at us, thinking that we will snarl at each other because of them.

Everything I can learn from Hanoi tells me that our appearance of disunity impels Hanoi to believe in eventual victory and thus to continue the war. The event which would thus do the most to shorten the war might well be the appearance of unity in the United States.

Your decision to resume the bombing, therefore, while wise from several other viewpoints, had the added merit of showing Hanoi that their propaganda did not work and of ending one source of divisive dispute in America.

It is prudent to assume that there will be other opportunities to frustrate their attempts at division by being ready to bare the one-sided character of their "cease-fire" and "standstill" proposals. When they make them.

#### D. Military

Increased enemy activity in Quang Tri and Thua Thien, the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam, has had a bad effect on morale there. There is a rumor that the U.S. is planning to cede those provinces to Hanoi as part of a peace settlement. The stepped-up Viet Cong campaign along Route One has reduced the flow of commodities to Hue and Quang Tri, driving up prices and creating sporadic shortages. Gasoline, in particular, is scarce for civilians. Some of the richer residents of Hue are said to have offered their houses for sale with the intention of moving further south. The Buddhist "struggle" faction has not been able to capitalize on this situation so far, but they can be expected to try.

The decision to go ahead with a system of strong points and an obstacle should restore confidence.

We have also acted to meet the new immediate threat by deploying additional forces to the First Corps. The Third Brigade of the 25th Division will move from Chu Lai to southern Quang Ngai, and Marine units now in southern Quang Ngai will join units further north to operate against North Vietnam Army forces.

#### E. Vietnamese Killed

Herewith the figures on those Vietnamese civilian casualties for the week ending April 15, which are officially reported and are thus known to our representatives in the provinces. They do not, of course, purport to be a complete statement of all civilian casualties. The figures show that the Viet Cong killed 81 civilians, wounded 117, and kidnapped 63. Among the dead were 10 Revolutionary Development workers, 2 Village Council Chairmen, and one Chieu Hoi returnee.

The Viet Cong recently singled out Revolutionary Development workers as a special target. The most spectacular incident was an April 15 attack on the village of Soui Chan in Long Khanh province. The village was overrun and set afire. Relief forces discovered five Revolutionary Development workers, including three women, tied to poles and shot through the head. I wonder whether photos of their bodies were published at home. Local elections were scheduled in Soui Chan on the following day.

Another spectacular attack on Revolutionary Development workers took place April 17 when an unknown enemy force killed 16 and wounded 11 Revolutionary Development workers about 7 kilometers from Hue. This activity may be in response to an April 3 Viet Cong radio broadcast of an order from the Viet Cong Armed Forces Command. The order was, in effect, an official Viet Cong call for the assassination of Revolutionary Development workers. The broadcast included the announcement of an individual award system for "good performance in destroying pacification groups."

Since April 8, the following typical terror attacks were reported to me:

Terrorists rolled two Russian-made fragmentation grenades down the sidewalk toward a group of U. S. servicemen waiting for a bus near a BOQ in Cholon at 6:10 a.m. on April 17. A sentry shouted a warning, but the grenade exploded before the men could take cover. Ten were wounded. Later, a claymore mine was located and deactivated near the bus stop.

Between 2 and 4 a.m. on April 16, the Viet Cong attacked in Dien Ban and Hieu Nhon districts of Quang Nam province. Hieu Nhon district received small arms fire and 23 mortar rounds fell in Hoi An city. One round landed in the Cat Dai refugee camp, killing four civilians and wounding three others. Another round landed in the Cam Pho Temple. A third round landed near the National Police Headquarters, killing three civilians.

At midnight, April 16, the Viet Cong blew up the house of the Hamlet Chief of Thanh Duc hamlet in Tay Ninh province. The Hamlet Chief's house collapsed and five civilians were killed, including the Hamlet Chief, one Chieu Hoi returnee and three others.

On April 8, an unknown number of Viet Cong entered Le Son hamlet, Quang Nam province, and indiscriminately tossed grenades. Eight civilians were killed and 16 others wounded.

On April 11, the Viet Cong entered Care Lau hamlet, Quang Nam province and killed four Village Council candidates who reportedly had been abducted along with other candidates on April 2 and had managed to escape from Viet Cong custody on April 7.

Ky fears that the Viet Cong terror raids are undertaken so as to stampede the Government into taking police-type actions with the populations, restricting movement of civilians and perhaps repressive measures to prevent riots -- actions which Communists could exploit to the disadvantage of our side.

#### F. Chieu Hoi

The number of returnees for the week ending April 7 was 1,005. This is the seventh consecutive week in which returnees have numbered 1,000 or more. The weekly average is now 839.4, and the total for 1967 to date is 11,751. Last year's overall total was 20,242; thus, the 1967 total to date is 58.1 percent of last year's total.

#### G. Economic

Prices declined slightly this week. The Saigon Retail Price Index now stands at 258, as compared with 261 last week and 260 the preceding week. This is well below the all-time high of 284 and six percent under the level of last month. Prices of imported goods also dropped, the Index now being 228 as compared with last week's 236. Included in the downward price trend was top-grade rice. Imports probably fell because of the expectation of the arrival of fresh stocks.

U.S. and No. 1/25 rice prices remained stable at VN\$1,600 and VN\$2,400 respectively per 100 kilograms. Delta deliveries averaged 640 metric tons per day April 8 -- a decline from the March average of over 1,000 metric tons. The decline may be due to the lower price of paddy now prevailing.

American rice continues to arrive at a high rate, and security stocks are accumulating. The Government plans to remill U. S. long-grain rice and sell it at a higher price to compete directly with Vietnamese rice, the profits to accrue to the Government of Vietnam and not to private merchants.

For the last several weeks, reports have accumulated of widespread deterioration in the condition of rubber trees in the Third Corps. Leaves have been turning brown and falling, and plantations have stopped tapping operations. Some 3,000 rubber workers are reported on half-pay or dismissed. The problem is said to affect about 20,000 hectares. The cause is not yet positively identified, but the possibility that U. S. military herbicide operations may be involved has led to suspension of such operations near plantations, pending outcome of tests underway.

#### H. My Last Weekly

This is my last Weekly Telegram to you. A week from today, I hope to be home. Once again let me express my warm and respectful thanks for your trust in me, for your never-failing backing and for your leadership so full of insight.

Wednesday, April 19, 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith General Wheeler reports the condition of the targets authorized by you on Feb. 22 and March 22. I shall try to get an independent check; But it looks to me as though they made a good dent in electric power and on that steel complex which they have been hacking up yard by yard.

This degree of damage to four electric power plants raises the premium on the two Haiphong plants, plus the Hanoi plant which is not now on the target list.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment (log 1302 CM-2249-67 cy 1 of 6 copies Rolling Thunder  
54 Target Status)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By ing, NARA, Date 4-23-93

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Informal Reception

For SEATO Council Members

The White House, April 19, 1967, 5:00 P.M.

Proposed Participants

Host: The President

Australian Delegation

The Right Honorable Paul Hasluck, M. P., Minister for External Affairs

The Honorable John Keith Waller, C. B. E., Ambassador to U. S.

New Zealand Delegation

The Right Honorable Keith J. Holyoake, Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs

His Excellency Sir Stephen Weir, KBE, CB, CBE, DSO,  
Ambassador to Thailand

Pakistan Delegation

The Honorable Agha Hilaly, Ambassador to the United States

The Honorable P. M. Chaudhri, Ambassador to Thailand

Philippine Delegation

The Honorable Narciso Ramos, Secretary for Foreign Affairs

Dr. Jose F. Imperial, Charge d'Affairs ad interim to the U. S.

Thailand Delegation

His Excellency Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Sukich Nimmanheminda, Ambassador of Thailand

United Kingdom Delegation

The Right Honorable George Brown, M.P., Secretary of  
State for Foreign Affairs

Sir Patrick Dean, GCMG, Ambassador to the United States

Viet-Nam Observer Delegation

His Excellency Tran Van Do, Minister of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Bui Diem, Ambassador to the United States

SEATO Secretary General Jesus Vargas

United States Delegation

The Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State

The Honorable Graham A. Martin, American Ambassador  
to Thailand

The Honorable William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of  
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Mr. Rostow

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*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 19, 1967

SUBJECT: A Memorandum from Secretary Freeman on the Next  
Food Shipment to India

Secretary Freeman feels that we should announce another 3-million ton allocation for India at the end of April. The attached memo is not for decision. He will join in an action memo now being drafted with AID and State but wanted you to have his fuller views to think about.

As he sees it, widespread rains in the dry wheat areas of the U.S. have improved output prospects. The prompt announcement of a 3-million ton allocation would help hold U.S. prices steady over the coming months. Unless food starts moving by early May, uncertainty regarding India's supply position for July will create additional difficulties in India.

AID and Agriculture are preparing a joint analysis of consortium contributions and India's food needs. They will look at the relative merits of two possible approaches:

--Authorizing 1.5 million now as our response to the good performance of other donors at the Paris Consortium and holding the second half until after the April 25 debt roll-over meeting here.

--Holding off entirely until after the meeting, and then going for the full three million tons, if matching permits.

W. W. Rostow



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

April 17, 1967

MEMORANDUM

To: The President  
The White House

From: Orville L. Freeman *OLF*  
Secretary of Agriculture

Subject: Farm Price and Domestic Production Problems in Relation  
to Action to Match Consortium Pledges in Accord with  
the India Resolution

On March 24, in a memorandum entitled "Preview of Some Farm Price Problems and Forward Programming of Food for Freedom Exports," I reported on crop and price prospects for U.S. farmers, and recommended that insofar as possible our Food for Freedom commitments be announced in such a manner as to promote price stability and to minimize farm discontent arising from instability.

Three circumstances indicated that we should take a step in furtherance of that goal by the end of this month:

1. It seems likely that by April 25 the other members of Aid to India Consortium will have firmed up their offers to match in value our conditional offer of 3 million more tons of grain.
2. As the result of widespread rains last week in the dry wheat areas of Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas, wheat crop prospects have improved, and prices have declined. Announcement within the next few weeks of the programming of 3 million tons of grain could have a very important stabilizing effect over the coming summer months.
3. The current schedule of shipments of grain from all sources to India forecasts the arrival of some 1.1 million tons in June and a little over .6 million tons in July. Thus something needs to be done by early May to insure against a faltering pipeline. The pipeline is a "ship to mouth" operation that needs to be maintained very carefully.

In view of these circumstances, and assuming that the expected matching amounts will be firmed up by April 25, I recommend that you give the green light to interdepartmental action to prepare a proposed Food for Freedom agreement with India for the rest of this calendar year involving our full share -- 3 million tons -- of the amount contemplated in the

2--The President

India resolution. This would include about 1 million tons of grain remaining from the 1967 fiscal year allocation, and 2 million tons from the 1968 fiscal year allocation.

The state of our grain stocks at the present time indicates that we should program a higher percentage of wheat in relation to sorghum in shipments to be made during the next few months. The 60-40 or 3-2 wheat-sorghum ratio we used a few months ago cannot be sustained now, and I recommend a 3-1 ratio for the year ahead with most of the sorghum to be shipped after August this year.

The President might wish to make an appropriate announcement of this to insure:

1. maximum impact on the significance of multilateral sharing of food aid;
2. maximum impact on domestic agriculture that would highlight the price sustaining effect of the U.S. Government purchase of substantial quantities of grain for food aid.

SENT  
WHCA

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FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASH DC

TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON

ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CAS CHANNEL CITE CAP67309

EMBASSY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE FROM WALT ROSTOW

MAY I QUICKLY HAVE FULL TEXT OF DOCUMENT SUMMARIZED

IN YOUR A-416 OF JAN. 27, 1967. LOG - 01 - 3398 - 66.

THANKS

63

87 APR 19 PM 4:47

WEDNESDAY

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NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-415

By sig, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, April 19, 1967 -- 4:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

George Brown has told us that the UK plans to announce:

- a cut of its Asian forces by 50%, by 1970-71;
- getting out of bases on the Asian mainland by the mid-1970's.

The Australians have protested.

Bill Bundy thinks the cut by 50% is not too serious; but it is unnecessary, unwise, and unhelpful for them to announce now their present intentions about the 1970's.

Many things could happen between now and then -- including a damage in British government and an improved financial situation.

It may be important that he not leave Washington with our silence taken as indication of assent.

Therefore, you may wish to say:

- you have been informed of UK intentions in Asia;
- you would hope that they could forego announcing their complete withdrawal from the Asian mainland by the mid-1970's.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-69  
By is, NARA Date 11-2-99

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

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~~SECRET~~

*For file*

Wednesday, April 19, 1967  
2:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

I assume you know of the  
forthcoming Braden article on the  
CIA in the Saturday Evening Post.

Here is the story from Dick  
Helms.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 12, NARA, Date 4-29-91

151  
Wednesday, April 19, 1967  
1:00 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have marked up for easy reading this detailed CIA report based mainly on captured VC documents.

It shows:

1. In early 1966 they reaffirmed their policy of pursuing the main force offensive despite the defeats they suffered in the second half of 1965.

2. Late in 1966 or early 1967 they accepted the fact that their goals for 1966 had not been achieved and have adjusted through a limited fallback. The essence of that fallback is to shift in degree from main force combat to maintaining the guerrilla effort.

3. Although this paper does not put the matter in precisely this way, it is consistent with my own view, which is:

-- They are using the DMZ forces to draw the Marines and others away from pacification;

-- They are trying desperately to disrupt and slow down the pacification effort which, if successful, could be a mortal blow.

In short, these documents underline the progress we have made from 1965 -- when we were on the defensive; to 1966, when the main force offensive was defeated; to 1967, where they are in a defensive posture strategically and trying to buy time while preventing the collapse of the VC infrastructure.

These documents reaffirm that the VC infrastructure has been damaged; but it is by no means yet destroyed.

W. W. R.

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**SANTITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 99-72**  
**By cb, NARA Date 6-30-00**

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

TEXT OF A C.I.A. REPORT [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Viet Cong Status and Prospects - 1966-67

### PREFACE

Information derived from a large number of enemy documents captured in recent months, especially during Operation CEDAR FALLS, has provided new insights into past and present Viet Cong military and political strategy. Combined with prisoner interrogation reports and with reporting from Vietnamese intelligence and security services, these documents begin to give a picture of the present status of the Viet Cong and their future prospects. Based on this evidence, it is possible to speculate with greater confidence than heretofore on future Viet Cong strategy and its likelihood of success. This paper is an attempt to place these various elements into perspective and derive conclusions as to the present and future prospects of the Viet Cong.

While the number of significant captured documents is not as extensive from other parts of South Vietnam as from Viet Cong Military Region Four, and the War Zone C area, where the Central Office for South Vietnam has been located, the captured documents, with the reporting of Vietnamese intelligence and security services, strongly indicate that the conditions described in this paper are fairly general throughout South Vietnam.

#### I. Viet Cong Military and Political Strategy in 1966

##### A. Resolutions 11 and 12 of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee

The present Viet Cong war strategy can be traced back to the 12th Conference of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee in Hanoi in mid-March 1966. The Resolutions (11th and 12th) adopted by the Conference and concurred in by the Fourth Congress of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) in April 1966 analyzed the new situation in South Vietnam brought about by the large-scale commitment of American troops in 1965. In addition, the resolutions outlined the political and

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military strategy to be followed in conducting the war in South Vietnam.

Two recently captured documents provide insight into what happened at those meetings. One is a letter by Le Duan, Secretary General of the Lao Dong Party, to COSVN written after the 12th Conference of the Lao Dong Party. The other is a notebook belonging to an unidentified COSVN-level cadre which contains records of speeches delivered at the Fourth Congress of COSVN by Anh Sau and Vinh (believed to be Generals Nguyen Chi Thanh, Commander of the VC Army, Nguyen Van Vinh, Chief of North Vietnam's Central Reunification Committee).

In his letter, Le Duan analyzed the war in early 1966 as having undergone a change in character, but with the Communists still retaining the strategic and tactical initiative vis-a-vis the Allies. This was due to what he called the essentially defensive nature of the American objectives in South Vietnam. These objectives involved providing "support to the puppet government and army which serves as a shield in the pursuit of their /neo-colonialist/ aims."

Militarily, Le Duan said, the introduction of large numbers of American troops had not really altered the fundamental balance of forces since "the reserve source of manpower in South Vietnam is in North Vietnam."

Therefore, he continued, although the hope for an imminent Communist victory which looked so close in late 1964 and 1965 had evaporated, the Party had no need to change its basic strategy. This was to build up the Main Forces and militarily defeat the Allies as a prelude to a political settlement which would result in an American withdrawal. The solution of the political problems in South Vietnam in accordance with the program of the so-called National Liberation Front would then follow.

Le Duan described "the strategy of the protracted war" as "the guideline for the war in South Vietnam." But, at the same time, there was a massive effort to bring all forces to bear "to gain final victory within the shortest possible time." According to Le Duan, the party was on the offensive, and "should be able to achieve decisive victory in a relatively short period of time. 3.. This period of time, according to Vinh's speech was, as set forth in the 12th Resolution, two to three years. Vinh added that the time of victory could not be determined exactly, but should be limited. A protracted struggle, he said, "cannot be defined or unlimited."

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In his speech, Anh Sau was even more sanguine. He stated that "we will manage in such a manner that the U.S. expeditionary forces (300,000 or 400,000) cannot withstand for two years." Victory was to come militarily, politically and diplomatically.

The question of negotiation, as described by Vinh, was dealt with in the 11th Resolution, which stated that "it is possible to gain victory by fighting and negotiating simultaneously." The situation then, however, was not yet favorable for negotiations. According to Vinh, "When the war is in an equal stage we can both fight and negotiate." This time was to be decided by the Politburo in Hanoi. Once negotiations began, the Party was to concentrate all its efforts "to attack the enemy."

The most important party objectives for 1966, as indicated by Le Duan, were largely military, "and involved achieving a military success over the Allies. But this military actions had to be conducted in close conjunction with the political struggle." An all-out effort was called for, mobilization, according to the resolution adopted by the Fourth Congress of COSVN in April 1966, of the entire Party, army and population to defeat the Americans politically militarily, both in South Vietnam and in North Vietnam."

Vinh, in his speech, outlined specific objectives as follows:

- (a) Demoralize the Americans by destroying a large part of their military force.
- (b) Destroy the Government of Vietnam's armed forces.
- (c) Step up Guerrilla warfare and expand and develop all forms of local armed forces.
- (d) Carry out intensive military and civilian proselying among the Government of Vietnam forces.

For 1966, according to Anh Sau, COSVN planned to destroy 50,000 U.S. soldiers, killing 20,000, and kill or wound approximately 100,000 Government of Vietnam Regular Forces. To accomplish this, the party was to maintain a strength of 100,000 Party members and 100,000 Group (Party Youth Organization) members at all times, plus several million Front members. An irregular military force of 300,000 guerrillas and 300,000 militia was to be built up from an irregular force in being of 180,000 guerrillas and 150,000 militia. In addition, "the concentrated forces from district to higher echelons" were to have the same strength as guerrilla and militia units, 300,000, and a total of 100,000 men in

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Main Forces was to be maintained at all times, giving a grand total of 1,000,000 men in the Party's armed forces.

Thus, the Party decided in early 1966 to continue the war on a high scale despite the intervention of U.S. troops, believing that conditions were favorable for military victory within two to three years, which would lay the groundwork for eventual total political victory.

#### B. Reasons Behind the Resolutions

The reasons that led the Party to its optimistic conclusion are not totally clear, particularly in light of the military setbacks that had been inflicted on them in late 1965 and early 1966. However, there are two possible contributing causes.

In his book, "The Resistance Will Win", Truong Chinh, the leading Lao Dong Party Theoretician, states that initiative "is the essential principle of tactics in general, and of guerrilla and mobile warfare in particular." The war situation as viewed from Hanoi and COSVN in late 1965 and early 1966 must have appeared to be a major test of this thesis. The war by mid-1965 had progressed to the point where, had it not been for the large-scale commitment of American troops, the Government of Vietnam would probably have succumbed within another year. Certainly the leadership of the Party was convinced that it was rapidly approaching victory and because of this certain deviations had been made from past Viet Cong practices.

In area under Viet Cong control, the velvet glove of Party political civilian proselyting techniques was increasingly replaced by greater degrees of coercion, especially in the areas of taxes and recruiting. This deviation was undertaken in the belief that the long-term political risks of such a move could safely be taken in order to rapidly expand the military forces, because of the imminence of the forthcoming victory. Therefore, the Party gambled on achieving its triumph before the political reverberations these measures entailed could begin to be heard.

By early 1966, it must have appeared that although the war would be prolonged as a result of the American intervention, the Party was in the process of successfully building up its military units to a point where the numerical balance of forces would not be significantly changed. The alternative to not using these forces would be, in effect, to surrender the strategic initiative with the concomitant handicap of having to face the

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increasingly ominous political consequences that their measures were provoking among their subject populations.

The second possible reason for Hanoi's optimism involves the Viet Cong bureaucracy and its reporting procedures. It has been noted for some time that the Party's lower echelons paint a false picture of the true situation at the local level. Examples of exaggerated after-action reports to higher echelons are numerous. Some of the most blatant were captured during operation CEDAR FALLS. A report from the military staff of Military Region IV, dated November 12, 1966, and covering the time period February 1 - September 20, 1966; claimed that the Viet Cong put out of action 8,114 U.S. personnel, including 5,754 killed. Another report from the same staff, dated December 10, 1966, states that during the first 11 months of 1966, the Viet Cong armed forces in Military Region Four put out of action 31,507 U.S., South Vietnamese and Korean troops, including 10,245 Americans killed. Twelve documents captured in other parts of South Vietnam also display the same tendency of exaggerating Allied losses. This practice is not confined to military units, but applies to political agencies as well. A village-level political cadre who recently defected stated that he was compelled to falsify reports on the effects of Government of Vietnam leaflet drops. If he told the truth, the District Party Committee would criticize him. He also stated that the Village Party Secretary would instruct him to make false reports to higher echelons on the people's morale.

Although the full extent and the degree of influence of false reporting is not yet known, it does seem to have had some influence on the deliberations of the higher levels of the Party. COSVN, in commenting on the Le Duan letter, claimed 70,000 enemy casualties and great victories "without using all our available forces." Anh Sau claimed kill ratios which favored the Viet Cong by two-to-one (Plei Me), twenty-to-one (Cu Chi), and seven-to-one (Long An and Quang Ngai). He concluded that the Viet Cong destroyed 10,000 U.S. soldiers with very few Viet Cong killed or wounded. This was not a propaganda speech, but was meant to be a tightly reasoned analysis of the true political and military situation in South Vietnam, reflecting the thinking of the highest levels of the Party.

Consequently, COSVN and Hanoi may not have had an accurate picture of the state of affairs in South Vietnam. Viewed against this background, the Party's decision to carry on the war at an increased pace is not surprising. It should also be noted that at the time this decision was reached the Government of Vietnam was faced with the Buddhist crisis and there was considerable U.S. domestic political unrest engendered by the war. These factors undoubtedly affected Hanoi's decision.

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## II. Results of Viet Cong 1966 Plans

### A. Political and Military Failures

Although the Viet Cong made some progress in 1966 especially in expanding their urban organizations and operations, their fundamental objectives probably were not met. Viet Cong documents now available show increasing problems and weaknesses in the political and military fields as a result of allied military pressure and the expanding pacification program.

The Viet Cong suffered two major strategic set-backs in 1966. These were a general loss of popular confidence in the Viet Cong and their prospects, and a general decline in the morale of Viet Cong cadres, especially at the local level, leading to a decline in the effectiveness of Party leadership.

Evidence now available indicates a Viet Cong realization that their control over the population slipped seriously in 1966. According to a captured notebook belonging to an unidentified COSVN-level cadre and dated late 1966, the Viet Cong lost control of one million people during the year--

"A comparison with 1965 shows a decrease of 1,000,000 people in the rural areas due to the presence of U.S. troops. This reflects poor leadership on our part".

This decline in popular support can be attributed to the Party's failure to provide security to the population under their control and to effects and fears engendered by a seemingly endless war. A captured COSVN resolution dated December 15, 1966, carries out the theme of popular disassociation from the Viet Cong. It states that the people fear the destruction of the war and that many of them wish for peace. It notes that many also have left their homes to look for work in the cities, which are controlled by the Allies and places this number at 440,000 for the first ten months of 1966. The emigration of some 20,000 persons from the Cu Chi area, near Saigon, it admitted, caused difficulties in Viet Cong supply, production, and recruitment of civilian laborers.

The loss of significant numbers of people from their manpower base and the erosion of popular support caused significant difficulties for the Viet Cong in meeting their recruitment goals. While overall figures are not available from document sources, recruitment failures have been noted in captured documents from a number of different areas and it is safe to assume that the Viet Cong did not reach their stated goal of a million-man force

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during 1966 (including Main Force, Local Force, and Irregulars.) Moreover, the Viet Cong suffered a decline in the quality of recruits during 1966. - Recently captured documents refer to semi-trained and poorly motivated personnel, and to more women serving with Viet Cong units. In Quang Tin province, the Viet Cong were reportedly conducting a campaign during January 1967 to enlist boys as young as 14 and assign them to Viet Cong units at every level -- from hamlet guerrillas to Main Force units.

#### B. Present Viet Cong Morale

The actual state of morale of Party cadres and Viet Cong troops and its influence on Party policy is probably the most difficult factor to assess accurately. However, based on documentary evidence it can be safely stated that moral has at least declined to the point where it is causing concern at the highest levels in the Party and is a constant subject in Party reports and directives at all levels throughout South Vietnam.

The decline in morale is almost always attributed to the fear of a long war, the hardships, the troops and cadres must suffer, and the increasing feeling that the ferocity of Allied military pressure makes it very unlikely that the Viet Cong can survive a "protracted war". When actually engaged in combat, Viet Cong military units continue to display as much courage and skill as in previous years. But the cumulative effects of many years of war and the bleak prospects for the immediate future are steadily eroding the will to continue.

This attitude is most prevalent at the village and hamlet level. The village-level Party cadres have been the greatest source of political strength for the Viet Cong. These elements are closest to the people and have, in the past, successfully motivated them to enlist in the armed forces, pay taxes, provide intelligence, and protect the cadres. Captured documents and clandestine reports indicate that the morale of this element may now be rapidly deteriorating in many areas of South Vietnam. This is reflected in increasing defections and desertions and the decline in effectiveness of local Party leadership, which is contributing to the alienation of the population from the Viet Cong.

A COSVN Current Affairs Bureau resolution concerning the situation in rural areas during the second half of 1966, states that Party activities are "weak". "Popular" organizations did not operate and did not pay

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monthly dues. "From 70-80 percent of Party chapters separated themselves from the people," the resolution continued, and "there was a tendency among higher echelon cadres to stay away from the people." Other reports complain of lethargy and lack of aggressiveness on the part of formerly enthusiastic cadres.

A directive from the Military Region Four Party Committee, dated October 8, 1966, admitted that Chieu Hoi activities were partially successful because they capitalized on Viet Cong weaknesses which were described as fear of sacrifice, protracted war, and hardships. According to a COSVN resolution dated December 15, 1966, civilian organizations were disintegrated, and cadres were overconcerned with family and personal affairs. Combat aggressiveness, as a consequence suffered.

### III. The Party's Response

#### A. Indoctrination and Reorganization

The Party's initial response to the deteriorating situation in 1966 was to increase the number of reindoctrination courses and emulation campaigns for its cadres. Such activities are a standard Party technique and did not represent any radical departure from normal practice.

These courses took place throughout South Vietnam and on their completion, the cadres were to return to their normal areas of operation to in turn reassure the local population. However, these standard programs did not produce long-lasting effects. A directive from the Military Region Four Military Affairs Committee down to various districts and subordinate units, dated September 1966, called for Party chapters to intensify ideological training and to improve management of units and agencies to prevent defection. A recapitulation report by a District Party Committee in Binh Duong province, dated August 1966, cites a certain effectiveness of indoctrination courses, but admits that weakness still exists in leadership, and, therefore, "the status of desertion always prevails."

#### B. Boundary and Administrative Changes

One of the results of these shortcomings has been a series of boundary, administrative and personnel changes that recently have been put into effect. These appear to encompass almost the entire Party structure in South Vietnam. Some changes were initiated as early as July 1966 and may be regarded as standard Party efforts to improve adminis-

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trative efficiency. However, beginning in early November 1966, a series of boundary changes has resulted in the merging and consolidation of many Party villages, districts and provinces with accompanying changes in personnel. To date (March 1967) such reports have been received from the following Government of Vietnam provinces in South Vietnam -- Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, Kontum, Binh Thuan, Ninh Thuan, Phuoc Tuy, Bien Hoa, Long Khanh, Binh Duong, Gia Dinh, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Kien Phong, Kien Hoa, Kin Giang, and An Xuyen.

In a directive from the COSVN Current Affairs Bureau, issued in late July 1966, general Party principles concerning reorganization were set forth:

- a) Reorganization is aimed at perpetuating the resistance.
- b) The scope of activities and mission at local areas should depend on the local situation.
- c) The mission and scope of activities in each agency should be varied.
- d) The population of liberated areas should be taken into account.
- e) The reassignment of cadres should be based on the talent and initiative shown by cadre members.

Another directive issued by COSVN on August 18, 1966 asked all regions and provinces to develop Party chapters in such a way that "they can operate without waiting for orders and guidance from higher echelons."

The first provincial reorganization on which definite information was obtained took place on November 1, 1966. This involved the merger of Viet Cong Binh Duong and Phuoc Thanh provinces into the new Tru Dau Mot province. The actual decision to reorganize was made September 13. The reasons given for this reorganization were as follows:

- a) "To concentrate attack capabilities by rearranging zones of combat operations."
- b) "To increase combat forces by reducing staff agencies."
- c) "To comply with directives from COSVN Military Party Committee and from the Military Region Headquarters."

No enemy documents have yet been received which indicated that either this or other reorganizations were undertaken from reasons other than those listed in this document. However, numerous clandestine reports have been received which state that these changes were, in part, an attempt

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by the Party to weed out unreliable elements in its command structure and streamline the basic organization. A fairly typical example of this type of report comes from Viet Cong My Tho province. Dated January 1967, it states that COSVN has directed that old and weak cadres will be sent to secret zones to perform minor tasks or to other provinces where they will create their own legal conditions. They cannot be allowed to remain in battle areas that may be pacified by the Government of Vietnam because they will become a burden to other Viet Cong Cadres during combat.

The Party also appears particularly concerned over those Party cadres who still maintain relations with relatives who either work or live in Government of Vietnam areas. Very stringent regulations have been instituted governing the methods by which these cadres can make contact with their relatives.

A most significant development in these changes is the reported introduction of ethnic North Vietnamese political cadres to take over some functions of local administration. Reports of this have been received from several provinces. The exact mission of these cadres or the extent to which this is taking place is not yet clear. No apparent pattern has yet appeared in these reports, and it is doubtful that this practice is being carried out to any great extent.

One development from this replacement practice, and from the influx of North Vietnamese Army troops in the South, is an increase in friction between the Northerners and Southerners. This phenomenon is not new nor does it probably have too much significance as yet. However, it has apparently reached sufficient proportions to have inspired high-level Party directives and reports, discussing the problem and ordering it to cease. For example, a directive issued in the name of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam by the Military Region Three Headquarters dated November 1966, calls to light "regrettable matters" where cadres and soldiers, "by selfish motives, or by regressive thoughts, discriminate between Southern, Central, and North Vietnamese." The directive calls for solidarity and the elimination of this type of personal hatred. A diary of a district-level cadre in Kien Hoa, presumably a Southerner, has an item dated late 1966 which states that the reason soldiers desert or rally is the regional relationships between Northerners, Southerners, and Central Vietnamese. The Central and North Vietnamese, according to the diary, criticize and despise the Southerners in all aspects, and during battles the Northerners either stayed far away from the battlefield, or withdrew first.

The picture that emerges from these disparate pieces of information

on changes is one of general Party retrenchment and tightening up in both organization and personnel. This does not amount to a "purge" in the traditional sense of the word. However, these moves have sparked resentments among the cadres who have been removed or demoted and have aggravated discord within the ranks. Coupled with the declining fortunes of the Viet Cong, this policy can only induce further strains into the local Party organization.

#### IV. Viet Cong Plans for 1967

##### A. Party Goals

On December 20, 1966, Nguyen Huu Tho, Chairman of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, defined the vital missions to be achieved during 1967 as follows:

- a) "Evoke a better spirit of solidarity between all parites, regions and races within the country, regardless of individual political antecedents."
- b) "More efforts to extinguish the enemy's vital forces by development of guerrilla activities both in intensity and extent"
- c) "A determination to defend and expand the liberated area, to frustrate the pacification plan, and accelerate production growth."
- d) "A positive development of political potential, coupled with efforts to promote political contention in cities as well as in enemy-controlled rural areas."
- e) "An intensification of military and civilian proselyting activities with emphasis to be placed on American and satellite troops, and on organizaing Republic of Vietnam military and government structures."

An analysis of Party goals and plans for 1967 from recently captured documents does not deviate significantly from the goals as outlined by Tho. As of this date (March 1967), no evidence has been received which indicates a fundamental change in strategy. In this regard it is well to remember that Party planning leaves a great deal of leeway for lower echelon chapters to achieve Party goals. Although guidelines and directives are continuously sent down to lower echelons, the actual methods used to fulfill these directives is, to a large extent, up to the local Party organization. Consequently, military activity is not necessarily a foolproof

gauge of the party's political success or failure.

The Party's decision in March 1966 to push for victorious battles by Main Force units has not, as yet, been abandoned. There are continued preparations for, and actual initiation of, large battles by enemy regimental- and division-size units along the Demilitarized Zone and in the First and Second Corps area.

#### B. Emphasis on Guerrilla Warfare and Political Action

What has changed and is borne out in captured documents is the degree of emphasis to be placed on Main Force Units. These units are no longer to be developed at the expense of the local guerrillas. More frequently than not, their mission is described in terms of countering Allied sweep operations and defending base areas, rather than in mounting offensive operations and defending base areas, rather than in mounting offensive operations designed to "annihilate" ARVN or "destroy" large American units. The emphasis for 1967 appears to be on political and guerrilla activities.

A Military Region Four Party Committee resolution dated late 1966, stresses "armed activities" used "to support political struggles." An undated document, probably prepared by the Current Affairs Section of Military Region Six sets down the activity plan for the first six months of 1967 as follows:

- a) Continue to expand and control the people in rural and disputed areas.
- b) Employ military proselyting activities on Government of Vietnam soldiers to isolate and destroy the Americans.
- c) Strengthen and protect base areas.

The basic tactic to be used in the coming year is the "three-pronged attack." This comprises political struggle, military attacks, and military proselyting. These tactics are to be used in combination, with the emphasis placed on political activities, as stated in a resolution by the Military Region Four Party Committee for the fourth quarter of 1966 and the first quarter of 1967. The resolution calls for a winter-spring campaign, 1966-67, which will "continue to attack the enemy in the political, military and economic fields, develop the war of attrition, use guerrilla and Local Force units to annihilate the enemy.." Above all,

the resolution states "military activities must be designed to support the political, military and troop proselyting movements."

C. Forced Breakup of Main Force Units in Military Region Four

An increasingly large effort is to be dedicated to countering the pacification program. Coincident with this is the decision (at least in Military Region Four) to, in effect, downgrade the Regional Main Force units for use as replacements or to be subordinated to lower echelon Party commands. Evidence indicated that Group A 189 (A regiment) was dispersed and the cadres assigned to lower echelons to increase their strength or to staff organizations of higher headquarters. The reason given for this action was that the concentration of forces in Military Region Four was not considered feasible. The 165A Regiment, which was the Main Force Unit of Military Region Four and consisted of eight battalions, was dispersed, with six of its battalions assigned to the various districts within Military Region Four. The same document implied that these units may be broken down even further in the future.

V. Conclusions

A. Viet Cong Strategic Error in 1966

The party leadership committed a major strategic error in early 1966 when it decided to push forward for a military victory over the Allied forces. The military results envisaged by the build-up of the Main Forces simply were not achieved. Instead the Viet Cong Military structure suffered heavy losses which have, in turn, seriously affected Viet Cong morale.

The Party leadership now finds itself in a dilemma. Continuation of the present policy will lead to increasingly serious military defeats. These defeats are having disastrous political and morale effects upon the local Party structure throughout South Vietnam.

On the other hand, a sharp change in strategy to either negotiations or a reversion to pure guerrilla warfare would be a tacit admission of failure by the Party leadership, and the local Party apparatus in South Vietnam may not be able to survive such a blow to its already-shaky morale. Le Xuan Chuyen, former Assistant Chief of Staff to the Viet Cong Fifth Division, has stated that the Viet Cong Hanoi leadership

realize that a reduction in the tempo of the war means a military failure and would dash their hopes of winning the political struggle, force serious contradictions within the Party leadership, lower the morale of cadres and soldiers, and lead to the gradual defeat of guerrilla warfare. The Viet Cong, Hanoi, and Peking would be faced with serious political failure, according to Chuyen, because the concept of the "people's war". In the underdeveloped countries would become hopeless. This is undoubtedly an exaggeration of the immediate effects of such a move, but the effects in the short run could only debilitate the Viet Cong cause.

#### B. Likely Future Viet Cong Development

Party policy for the coming year will probably not change drastically, but the Party will be forced to continue the present gradual change in emphasis. The role of the Main Force units in most areas of the country will, in effect, be downgraded. The overall military effort will more effectively be brought into balance with political and economic efforts. The increased use of Local Forces and guerrillas will be attempted in an effort to wear down and harass Allied units and counter Government of Vietnam pacification plans and political development.

Main Force units will continue to be maintained where feasible. They will probably remain largely intact in the Demilitarized Zone border, where they can depend upon nearby sanctuaries and adequate logistical support. However, the break-up of large Main Force units into battalion-- or company-size elements, as has already occurred in Military Region Four will probably be forced in other parts of the country in 1967. Only under the most favorable conditions will these forces be able to mount large-scale attacks on major Allied units.

#### C. Strains on the Party Structure

This continuance of a sort of Phase Two-Phase Three combination-type warfare, however, poses other problems for the party. In the long run, it is no real solution for the Party's present impasse. The greatest danger that can befall a revolutionary movement has, in effect, taken place for the Viet Cong they have lost the political and military initiative. Their plans for 1967, as revealed in captured documents, are much more defensive in tone than those of previous years. They are as much concerned with countering Government of Vietnam programs, especially pacification, and defending their preset positions as in advancing their own political

control by "expanding the liberated areas."

Even given a moderate downshifting of strategy the local Party infrastructure will still be under enormous military and political pressure. This pressure is slowly but surely eroding the Party at the local level. Cracks are beginning to appear in the Party structure. Regional jealousies are beginning to be magnified. War weariness and continuous defeats have resulted in an accelerating decline in morale among both the military and political agencies, especially at the village and hamlet level. As the pressures upon the local cadres increase, the general Vietnamese tendency towards political fragmentation and regionalism may well result in further splits in the Party structure.

Arguments over local policy and implementation of directives from higher headquarters in the face of a worsening situation can be expected to continue and grow worse. The removal of many Party cadres in the current reorganization can only exaggerate these frictions, as will any further replacement of Southerners by Northerners.

In additions, the popular base of the Party will continue to be eroded as more territory is secured by the Allied forces and as more peasants abandon Viet Cong for Government of Vietnam areas. This trend will continue as Allied operations continue to deprive the Party of security in its long-held sanctuaries and as the pacification effort begins to apply more pressure directly upon these already sorely-tried local cadres.

Two major external factors have pushed the Viet Cong to their present state. These are: (a) The constant, relentless Allied military pressure that has blunted the Viet Cong military thrust with defeat after defeat and has ravaged the formerly-secure Viet Cong safe areas, and (b) The revived political effectiveness of the Government of Vietnam as evidenced in the successful elections for the Constituent Assembly and the promise of continued progress toward a representative, popularly-based government.

Assuming continued or increased Allied military pressure and continued successful Government of Vietnam political development, coupled with at least a moderately successful pacification program, the tendency toward disintegration of the mass political and military apparatus of the Viet Cong may well become irreversible in the next six to twelve months. The injunction to continue the struggle to the bitter end or for the next 20 years is

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falling upon increasingly deaf ears as the Chieu Hoi statistics graphically point out -- 8,559 Hoi Chanh from January 1 to March 18, 1967, as compared with 4,698 for the same period of 1966. The degree of fanaticism that such an injunction requires simply does not exist in sufficient numbers of cadre to permit the continued existence of a mass Party organization in South Vietnam.

#### D. The Threat of the Hard-Core Cadres

While the future looks black for the Viet Cong, it must be stressed that, at this point, the Party still retains the support of enough hard-core cadres who have the resiliency and skill to make good their political losses if given the opportunity. A series of Allied military defeats, significant intervention by their Chinese or Russian allies, renewal of Government of Vietnam political instability or a reversal in American political or military policy--any one of these events either individually or in combination -- could effectively enable the Party to recoup its losses.

Even if the recent trend continues, the hard-core, dedicated, determined element within the Party will remain impervious to either military pressure or political blandishments; this dedication was well expressed in the speech by Anh Sau in March 1966:

"If we do not gain decisive achievements even though we have succeeded in destroying the enemy as it has been mentioned above, we will continue to prolong the war until many years to come."

The size of this hard-core is impossible to estimate at this time, but would probably include a substantial majority of the Party members from district level and above. These people have dedicated their lives to achieving a Communist Revolution in South Vietnam and came very close to success on two occasions (1954 and 1965). Given the breakup of the mass Viet Cong organization, they will probably continue their struggle clandestinely. They may eventually be effectively prevented from interfering with the normal development of South Vietnam either through political or military methods, but it will be a long, slow process.

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WWR 108  
Pres file

Wednesday, April 19, 1967 - 11:00 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Emperor Haile Selassie is coming back April 22 - 26 (next Saturday through Wednesday) to speak at Charter Day celebrations at UCLA. He will not stop in Washington during this trip or engage in any official activity.

Joe Palmer and Ed Korry suggest we might make two gestures to the Emperor to show him we still care and to take some of the curse off our recent refusal to give him more arms:

- (1) a personal message of welcome from you, and
- (2) a Presidential offer to send a plane to fly him from Bermuda to Los Angeles on Saturday, and from Los Angeles to Vancouver the following Wednesday. (He will make a state visit to Canada after he leaves California. His transportation is taken care of beyond Vancouver.)

The text of the suggested message is at Tab A. I think you should send it. The plan is another matter. There is no question that the Emperor would very much appreciate such a gesture. We would definitely make some points with him. However, I do not know what your other needs for aircraft may be. Thus, I would only venture a mild second of the Palmer-Korry suggestion that you offer to send a plane.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message \_\_\_\_\_

Approve offer of plane \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

EKHamilton/vmr

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE

I am very pleased to welcome Your Majesty back to the United States to participate in the Charter Day celebrations of the University of California, Los Angeles. Your gracious willingness to make this long journey symbolizes the warmth and closeness of the relations between our two countries. I only wish it might be possible for me to join you in Los Angeles.

Mrs. Johnson and I wish Your Majesty a most pleasant stay in the United States.

Sincerely,

Mr. Rostow

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*Pres file*

April 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message for the Tunisian Exhibition

The Smithsonian has arranged for a loan of Roman-Tunisian art objects from the second and third centuries for exhibition here beginning 7 June. After leaving Washington the exhibition will tour the United States for the next two years.

President Bourguiba was scheduled to open the exhibit here, but because of his heart attack will not be able to. However, he is sending a message to be printed as a foreword to the exhibition catalog. Our custom in such cases has been for you to provide a matching message.

Attached is for your signature if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

*April 22, 1967*

**Our knowledge of early civilizations comes largely from the study of monuments, artifacts and objects of art which survive. Tunisia, standing between the Eastern and Western Mediterranean and at the meeting point of ancient Rome and Africa, is a treasure house of antiquity.**

**We are grateful to the Tunisian Government for sharing with us this unique collection of mosaics and other art objects from that past. For a young people like ours, it is a rich experience to view products of man's creativity like these which reach back over many hundreds of years. This exhibition will enable thousands of Americans over the next two years to gain a deeper insight into one of the civilizations which are modern Tunisia's heritage.**

*/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson*

**LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 4/19/67**

Wednesday, April 19, 1967  
9:30 a. m.

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*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Subject to later refinement, here is a check-list of U. S. follow-up actions on the Summit.

I shall be working out a parallel scenario of Latin American, Inter-American Bank, CIAP, etc., follow-up actions which we should monitor and seek to influence.

W. W. R.

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, April 19, 1967  
8:00 am

NOTE FOR WALT ROSTOW

Attached is a list of follow-up actions on the meeting of American Presidents and what is being done -- or should be done -- on each.

I will be discussing the list with Line Gordon today to see what refinements he wishes to make.

I will then circulate it and use it as a basis for bird-dogging those with action responsibility.

WGB

William G. Bowdler

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rh, NARA, Date 4-30-91

LIST OF OAS SUMMIT FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS

A. <u>United States: Internal</u>	<u>Action Responsibility &amp; Timing</u>
1. Congressional briefings on Summit results --	State (Macomber) arranging for this week in advance of AID hearings.
2. <u>Public media</u>	
- Sec. Rusk - "Meet the Press".	April 15.
- Amb. Linowitz - "Today" Show.	April 19.
- Amb. Linowitz - National Press Club.	April 21.
3. <u>Special Publications and Movies</u>	
- State: Illustrated booklet (in English) comparable to Asia trip pamphlet.	Early May.
- USIA: Illustrated pamphlet (in Spanish).	Early May.
- Color documentary movie (15 min.)	Early June.
- TV wrap-up (30 min.)	This week.
4. <u>Congressional Action</u>	
- Budget amendment transferring \$100 million from contingencies to Alliance for Progress.	BOB has completed paper work and has asked AID to prepare Presidential message -- pegged to Summit -- to accompany amendment.
- Authorization request and budget amendment requesting appropriation of \$300 million for IDB/FSO.	Treasury and BOB will handle during the first week in May following the IDB Board of Governors meeting.
- Consultation on untying of capital project lending and related technical assistance.	State (Gordon) consulting with Treasury, prior to immediate initiation of consultations.

B. United States: Bilateral

<u>Country</u>	<u>Commitment</u>	<u>Action Responsibility &amp; Timing</u>
<u>Dominican Republic:</u>	President said that sympathetic consideration would be given to Balaguer's desire for a higher sugar allocation when the amount of the deficits became known.	Solomon and Gordon to review sugar deficit allocations in May and make recommendation to the President.
	True Davis to look into IDB financing for dam projects, at least the smaller dams at Jigüey and Aguacate.	Davis, in consultation with Gordon, to prepare memo on what can be said to Balaguer -- April 29.
	Tony Solomon to look into preferential treatment for Dominican vegetables in Puerto Rico.	Solomon, in consultation with Gordon, to prepare memo on what can be said to Balaguer -- April 29.
<u>Ecuador:</u>	President promised he would see to it that Ecuadorean loans were processed at the maximum possible speed.	Gordon and Bronheim to review and submit memorandum to WWR by April 24.
<u>Panama :</u>	President said he would ask the US negotiators to review the civil jurisdiction issue in order to find some mutually satisfactory solution. He would also ask our negotiators to speed up the negotiations.	Bowdler to draft a letter from the President to Ambassador Anderson enclosing Johnson-Robles memcon and asking that he act on Presidential commitments.
<u>Paraguay:</u>	President said that the memo left with him by Stroessner would be carefully considered.	State (Gordon) to have shopping list memo carefully reviewed and a response prepared (by April 26) for Presidential review before being sent to Ambassador Snow for transmittal.

Trinidad:

President asked Solomon to look into possibility of TWA or other airline buying out the BOAC holding in the Trinidad-based West Indies airline.

Solomon is preparing memo on response which might be given to Prime Minister Williams.

Venezuela:

President said he wanted to do three things with respect to the petroleum question:

- 1) See what we can do to get sulphur out of Venezuelan oil so that we can use it for our cities in a way that will not aggravate air pollution problem.
- 2) See if we can get Canada to reduce its oil export to the US.
- 3) See if we can increase our purchases of asphalt at low prices so we can put in roads for some of our poor farmers.

Memo to the President recommending establishment of a Cabinet-level Committee by HEW Secretary Gardner to coordinate research activities will be forwarded by BOB in next few days. HEW would make available \$2.7 million from FY 1968 contingency funds to finance research, including desulphurization of petroleum.

State (Solomon) in meeting with Canadians April 17 broke news that we want reduction.

Sec. Udall April 13 issued announcement exempting asphalt from import restrictions. Solomon has his staff following up on implementation of increased asphalt purchases.

On arms purchases and deliveries, the President said we will carefully go over Venezuela's needs. If the equipment is available to sell, we will do everything we can to help, including speeding up deliveries.

MILGROUP is already reviewing Venezuela's equipment requirements. By April 24, DOD will have a special team in Venezuela to work out priority of items, delivery schedules and possible deferral of some items in the current program.

C. Multilateral

1. Latin American Economic Integration

State (Gordon & Bronheim) to consider ways in which we can discreetly help LAFTA staff make studies essential for Common Market decisions.

2. Multinational Projects

State and Treasury to prepare memo on specific steps US should take to accelerate preparation and financing of priority projects through IDB.

3. Earth Stations for Satellite Communications

Ex-Im already prepared to give favorable consideration to loan applications for sound projects.

4. Loans to International Coffee Diversification and Development Fund

State/AID will confer with IBRD within next week on setting up of Fund.

5. World-wide Tariff Cuts for LDCs

State (Solomon) to continue consultations with Congress, business, labor and other developed countries.\*\*

6. Screw-worm Eradication Program

Agriculture and State to continue negotiations with Mexico on extension of the barrier to Tehuantepec, and explore with Central Americans an eradication program extending to the Isthmus. Agriculture to develop plans for eradication in South America.

7. Modernization of Agriculture and Education

State/AID at Mission Directors meeting next week will outline what Directors should do on their return to stimulate sector projects.

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\*\* US Representative on the OECD Special Group on Trade with LDCs will immediately explore the possibility of a generally acceptable proposal to be incorporated in the Special Group's report to be completed in July for consideration by the OECD Ministers in November. Consensus in OECD would then provide the basis for joint DC presentation at UNCTAD-II in New Delhi in Feb-March 1968.

8. ETV Training Center in Colombia; Pilot Project in Central America; Technical and Financial Assistance in ETV. Bronheim to obtain views of AID Mission Directors at their Washington meeting next week and develop scenario on how to proceed with implementation.
9. Alliance for Progress Centers in US Colleges and Universities HEW (Commissioner Howe) to prepare detailed proposals for establishment of these centers.
10. Inter-American Foundation for Science and Technology State and Dr. Hornig to develop the structure and program of the Foundation preparatory to bilateral discussion; based on reactions, we can decide on presentation to the next meeting of the Inter-American Council for Education, Science and Culture.
11. Regional Program of Marine Science and Technology Marine Science Council has already started to develop a regional program for presentation to an OAS Symposium to be held sometime in 1968.
12. Latin American Regional Program on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy State (Owen and Gordon), with help of AEC and Dr. Hornig, is developing an action program for LA. Based on the program developed, a decision will be made whether to work through the existing Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission or use a new vehicle.
13. Increased Food for Freedom Programs in Latin America Over a Five-Year Period Bronheim is making a review of individual country programs preparatory to recommending where and by how much the program should be increased.
14. Fish Protein Concentrate Demonstration Center for Latin America. AID (Gaud) to direct his staff to accelerate staff work on where center should be located preparatory to negotiations with country selected.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By ing, NARA, Date 4-23-93 *Pres file*

Wednesday, April 19, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with SEATO Ministers

You have agreed to meet with the SEATO Council Ministers at 5:00 p.m. today. I sent you a suggested statement last night.

In connection with any informal discussions with the Ministers, the following background may be useful:

-- For several years, the Thai and Filipinos have been concerned that we would let the foot-dragging of France and, to a lesser extent, of Pakistan and the UK sap SEATO's vitality.

-- France, for the first time, refused to send even an observer to the current meetings, but has not given any sign of an intent to withdraw or stop paying its dues.

-- The UK declined to send any military forces to Viet-Nam and has taken an increasingly restrictive attitude toward many SEATO activities.

-- Pakistan has stopped active participation in SEATO military planning and intelligence work, but it continues to pay its share of the budget.

-- The Thai have increasingly questioned the usefulness of participation in SEATO by those who will not assume real responsibility, notably France, the UK and Pakistan.

With the exception of Korean forces, the only military contributions to Viet-Nam have come from four SEATO partners (Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines).

If you meet the Ministers and one other delegate from each country in the Mansion, you might:

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- (1) welcome each one personally;
- (2) make a few remarks (text submitted last night; alternatively, express your general feelings about Viet Nam, rather than SEATO.
- (3) talk briefly with each of the ministers.

If the meeting is in the Cabinet room, you might:

- (1) let Sec. Rusk introduce you to each of the ministers, going around the table;
- (2) ask Sec. Rusk to bring you up to date on the SEATO meeting itself;
- (3) ask for comments by each senior minister present;
- (4) either talk along the lines of the text submitted last night or simply express your general view and feelings about Viet Nam. *(I prefer the latter.)*

I personally recommend the former procedure because:

- the informal setting will be more congenial;
- the hospitality of the President in his home will be appreciated by the members more than a more formal gathering;
- these men will have been sitting around a conference table for most of two days, and a more personal contact with the President will mean more to them.

W. W. Rostow

Arrange for informal reception in the Mansion \_\_\_\_\_

Arrange meeting in the Cabinet Room \_\_\_\_\_

Invite two members per delegation  
(total 17) (present situation) \_\_\_\_\_

Invite three members per delegation (total 24) \_\_\_\_\_

Wed., April 19, 1967  
9:15 a.m.

*Free file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

I had this CIA evaluation of the Huk resurgence in the Philippines especially prepared.

It shows a modest increase in Huk capabilities; grave political weakness in Central Luzon political life; promising political and security counter-measures, inadequately followed through.

W. W. R..

~~SECRET~~ attachment (NO. 0631/67)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority CIA letter 6-19-78

By 12/1/90, NARA, Date 5-1-91

No. 0631/67

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
18 April 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Huk Resurgence in the Philippines

1. The resurgence of the Hukbong Magpapalaya Sa Bayan--commonly known as the Huks--could cause President Marcos serious political difficulties, although so far the resurgence poses no major threat to his government. He has made eradication of the Huk movement, mainly based in Central Luzon, a major goal of his administration.

2. During the past 20 months, both the strength and the activities of the Huks have shown a marked increase. The number of armed cadre has grown from an estimated 37 to possibly 300-400, and the US Embassy in Manila estimates that the mass base support has increased by five to eight percent to about 28-29,000 persons, roughly one percent of the population in the affected provinces. The number of assassinations and kidnappings jumped abruptly from a total of 17 in 1965 to 71 in the first eight months of 1966. Although later figures are not available, the higher level of activity appears to be continuing. The most flagrant act of terror was the murder in July 1966 of Mayor Anastasio Gallardo of Candaba, chairman of the anti-Huk Mayors' League of Pampanga, while he was on his

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates.

No Foreign Dissem

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority CIA ltr 2-23-79  
By sg/np, NARA, Date 5-1-91

~~SECRET~~

No Foreign Dissem

way to a meeting with President Marcos. The league has since become dormant, its members fearing Huk reprisals.

3. Originally the paramilitary arm of the illegal Philippine Communist Party (PKP), the Huks over the years have taken on the appearance of marauding bandits and extortionists, rather than of revolutionaries motivated by Communist ideology. Although there have been recent indications that recruits are again receiving Marxist indoctrination, among the peasantry the Huks maintain a "Robin Hood" image of assisting the poor. In fact, the Huks' separate system of justice in the areas they influence, chiefly in the rice-producing provinces of Central Luzon, appears to be more efficient than the government's slow-moving and often corrupt judicial system. The Huks' decisions, which do not always favor the peasant, seem to be accepted by many landlords as well.

4. The Huks' present ties with the PKP are vague and contradictory. The terrorism that sustains Huk power is not in keeping with the party's purported abandonment of terror for the "parliamentary struggle." Links between the leadership of the two groups appear tenuous. Pedro Taruc, until recently the Huk chieftain, is one of a three-man committee that reportedly has taken over the functions of imprisoned PKP secretary general Jesus Lava. According to a recent report, however, Taruc has relinquished Huk leadership to Faustino del Mundo, whose Communist leanings are believed none too firm. Other reports suggest that the imprisoned former party leaders may retain control through intermediaries of both the party and the Huks.

5. Marcos moved quickly to meet the revived Huk threat. Last June he launched Operation Central Luzon, later renamed the Central Luzon Development Program. The immediate mission of this plan was to implement the land reform code in critical areas of eastern Pampanga Province, Central Luzon, and eventually to construct roads, schools, and irrigation projects, and to improve agricultural methods. So far, results have been modest. To improve security conditions, Marcos has requested funds in the FY-1968 budget to expand and improve the Philippine constabulary.

6. A major stumbling block to reducing Huk influence is the continuing collaboration of local politicians seeking the votes the Huks can deliver. With the approach

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of off-year elections this November, there appears to have been an increase in this collaboration. In Pampanga, the Huks seem to enjoy the support of the governor. More critical, however, is the evident acquiescence of much of the peasantry. This attitude can be expected to continue as long as local landlords block reform efforts, as corruption by officials diverts funds from development projects, and as legal redress remains slow and one-sided.

7. A manifest failure by Marcos to reduce Huk influence could contribute to his future defeat at the polls. Over the long run, if not effectively dealt with, the Huk movement could again develop into a major insurgent threat.

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No Foreign Dissem

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, April 18, 1967  
7:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for your meeting with L. K. Jha, Wednesday, 11 a.m.

L. K. Jha is seeking parallel US and Soviet assurances so India can justify signing the NPT to domestic opponents. Jha believes the Russians would make a declaration to deter nuclear states from nuclear blackmail or nuclear attack against non-nuclear states like India provided the U. S. makes a parallel declaration.

You may wish to:

- (a) thank Mrs. Gandhi for her kind letter and for sending L. K. Jha to report on his Moscow visit;
- (b) hear him describe Moscow's new position on assurances;
- (c) indicate we are much interested in the possibility of such declarations, that we will study very carefully any Indian or Soviet texts which may be supplied to us and that we look forward to early discussions leading towards possible agreement on parallel declarations. (see attached memo from Sects. Rusk and McNamara).
- (d) thank Mrs. Gandhi for her invitation to come to New Delhi. Without committing yourself, you may (or may not) wish to indicate that sometime next year might be feasible.

If Jha shares his worries on the resumption of the sale of military spares to Pakistan, you may want to say:

- (a) we carefully examined all possible alternatives;
- (b) we felt India did not recognize that Pakistan lacked a defense industry like India's and a source of arms aid like the USSR,
- (c) you -- and the Congress -- take seriously the need to restrain defense expenditures;
- (d) what steps can the GOI, the much larger party, take to make it politically easier for President Ayub to enter into across-the-board negotiations to normalize Indo-Pak relations?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-69

By is, NARA Date 11-2-99

~~SECRET~~

*Wam* Rostow

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: **L. K. Jha Visit**

Mr. L. K. Jha, Secretary to the Indian Prime Minister, is in Washington following a visit to Moscow. His mission is to obtain agreement in principle from both the Soviet Union and the United States that, when the non-proliferation treaty is signed, the two governments will issue separate but similar declarations designed to deter nuclear weapons states from attempting either nuclear blackmail or nuclear attack against non-nuclear weapons states like India. Mr. Jha believes he already has from Gromyko such an agreement in principle--contingent on our taking parallel action.

**We believe that Jha should be told that the United States Government is much interested in the possibility of such declarations, that we will study very carefully any Indian or Soviet texts which may be supplied to us and that we look forward to early discussions leading towards possible agreement on parallel declarations.**

We would appreciate your authorization to Secretary Rusk to convey the foregoing message to Mr. Jha when he calls on him tomorrow afternoon, April 19. Furthermore, we believe that, because of the importance of possible implications of the Jha visit, it would be most helpful if you could make time tomorrow to have a brief chat with Mr. Jha yourself and hear what he has to say.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-413

By ing NARA, Date 1-8-92

*Pres file*

Tuesday, April 18, 1967 -- 7:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft statement for tomorrow's SEATO meeting.

In fact, informal chat, with drinks, in the Mansion would be better, as I told Jake tonight.

But we shall file in the morning a scenario for a session in the Cabinet Room, if you re-affirm.

W. W. Rostow

DRAFTREMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT TO SEATO COUNCIL  
REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. Prime Minister:

Ministers and Ambassadors:

Friends of SEATO:

I am happy to have this chance to meet with you.

We are allies who share common goals and common responsibilities in a very troubled but exciting part of the world.

Last year, I had the pleasure of visiting four of your countries -- and of stopping over in Viet-Nam to see some of our brave men.

Those visits have been a source of strength to me -- and a source of inspiration. I shall never forget the warmth of the reception that your people and your governments extended to us.

I came back from that trip with renewed confidence that we do indeed have the same goals. I also returned with deep admiration for the vitality and imagination with which the countries of Asia and the Pacific are working together to achieve their goals -- to make their dreams and hopes reality.

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was one of the first clear expressions of these goals and of our common determination to work toward them together.

Our first objective, of course, was to deter aggression -- and to be prepared to defeat it if it came.

But with SEATO, other seeds were also planted -- seeds of regional cooperation. And those seeds have put down strong roots and are beginning to flower.

The continuing aggression in Viet-Nam has been a central item in your deliberations here. Five members of SEATO are fighting side-by-side with the gallant Vietnamese. We are moving forward -- and we shall persist until the people of Viet-Nam can live in peace and in their own chosen way.

You have been concerned with other threats to peace -- especially in Laos and Thailand.

I will not dwell at length on these problems. For I am confident you know the importance we attach to these common efforts. And you know that the United States is fully determined to play its part in convincing those who have not abandoned aggression that they will not, they cannot succeed.

This is the 12th annual meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers.

I devoutly hope that the day may not be too far off when these meetings will be able to focus more on the constructive needs of men and nations -- less on the threats to peace.

For each of us, and all of us, would much prefer to wage war on hunger and on disease, on illiteracy and poverty. That is the war we really want to fight.

None of us can know when we shall have reconciliation instead of conflict among nations of differing ideologies.

But we do know that it is only by remaining firm in our resolve to resist aggression that we can hasten the day when men can live in peace and cooperate fully for progress.

Meantime, I would remind you of the words of the American Secretary of State at the first meeting of this group:

"I am confident of one thing" he said, "--the way of the aggressor has been made harder. The independence of the treaty countries and the liberty of the people of the treaty area are more assured now than they were before we came."

Pre-file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, April 18, 1967  
7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an evening with Yuri Zhukov.

I checked with the FBI. Here are those  
with whom he sought appointments in Washington:

- Senators Fulbright, Javits, R. Kennedy.
- Drew Pearson and Walter Lippmann.
- Snyder of the Quakers and Dagmar Wilson  
of the Peace movement.

(a preliminary report)

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 99-73  
By is, NARA Date 1-11-20

WWRostow:rla

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

115a  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-415  
By ing, NARA, Date 4-23-93

Tuesday, April 18, 1967  
12:30 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

I met Yuri Zhukov last night at the home of Adelbert de Segonzac. Others present included Senator Jackson and Tom Hughes. It will be recalled that before Zhukov left Moscow, he had lunch with Ambassador Thompson and warned of an increasing Soviet role in the war in Viet Nam; and, I gather, this has been a central theme in his talks in Washington.

The main points that arose were as follows:

1. He repeated that the Soviet Union would engage more fully in North Viet Nam. He drew back, however, on the question of volunteers. (He allowed himself the observation that the presence of foreign troops destroyed the independence of countries; but quickly realized he was trapped when Senator Jackson asked: "All countries?"). He would not be drawn out on types of increased Soviet aid; but confined himself to indicating that the stories in the press of the new Soviet/Chinese Communist agreement about transit across China might be true. At one point -- when, for about the fifth time, he had made this warning and referred to a "long, hot summer" -- I observed that this sounded a bit like Mr. Khrushchev talking to President Kennedy in Vienna. Again he drew back, saying that the aid that would be given North Viet Nam would be simply to protect the borders of North Viet Nam. That was the limit of the Soviet commitment.

2. On negotiations he urged that we unconditionally stop bombing and that then Hanoi would negotiate. When pressed for a Soviet guarantee that this would be the case, he repeated: "We are not intermediaries." When asked if that meant that infiltration would continue after we had stopped bombing, his reply was: "Secretary McNamara has said that bombing can't stop infiltration."

3. With respect to the fate of the NLF in the South, he said they controlled the bulk of the territory. When it was observed that territory doesn't vote, and that if they wished to settle the matter with a free supervised election we were agreeable, he replied that Mr. William Bundy had told him that we would insist on all those in the South -- even Southerners who had been trained in the North -- returning to the North. I said that he should not be drawn off by details in this matter; that we were prepared to take our chances on the future of South Viet Nam on the basis of a free, supervised election, without coercion, rooted in the principle of one man, one vote. If the Viet Cong were confident that they represent the people, this was their chance.

4. Zhukov went out of his way to say that in his articles for Pravda he had made it clear that those protesting U. S. policy in Viet Nam were in the minority and that the President had a majority with him in support of his Viet Nam policy. When asked whether this was understood in Hanoi, his reply was: "Perhaps it would be good if they had correspondents in the United States."

5. With respect to European policy, about which he was questioned by Segonzac, he said that perhaps progress on the German question would be possible after the Germans had signed a non-proliferation treaty. He said he understood that for political reasons the Germans had to keep alive the question of the Eastern boundaries; but the Germans were, in his judgment, increasingly inclined to be "realistic." He did not go as far as to say that the West Germans would recognize the East Germans. When asked by Senator Jackson about mutual troop withdrawals from Europe, he said this was an old Soviet idea; but that it was very difficult for them to agree to mutual troop withdrawal from Europe during the Viet Nam war when we might send forces thus released to Viet Nam.

6. Assessing the whole evening, my judgment is that he is here for three purposes:

- To make an independent assessment of opinion in Washington and New York;

- To press the line that negotiations are possible with Hanoi if we stop bombing. (Weintal, who was present, reports that Zhukov told him when they were alone that if we stopped bombing and Hanoi did not negotiate, "the Socialist nations" would turn against Hanoi; but he did not repeat this to Senator Jackson, Hughes, and me. We all concluded he was shooting for an item in "Periscope," not for a communication to the U. S. Government.)

- To spread the word that Soviet aid to North Viet Nam would increase and thus (as can be seen in Lippmann's column of today) increase the pressure in the U. S. for negotiation on Hanoi's terms.

7. Tom Hughes adds the following items picked up when I was not engaged in conversation:

- Zhukov said we should bear in mind that there were hawks and doves in Moscow as well as in Washington;

- He opined that the internal problems of Communist China were such that Moscow did not expect them to break out across their borders;

- He asked when Kiesinger would be coming to Washington.


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

8. Throughout my conversation and in a quiet summary at the end I tried to leave two firm impressions for him to take back:

-- We remember vividly the Soviet responsibilities under the Geneva Accords of 1962 -- including Pushkin's assurance to Harriman -- and believe that Moscow has a responsibility for the present stage of the war and a responsibility actively to bring peace;

-- As for the bombing pause at Tet and the communications at that time, we feel that we had worked since mid-November to give Hanoi a wide range of options for ending the war if it wished to: secret talks to achieve a complete settlement; mutual de-escalation to create an environment for negotiation; Ky's proposal for a cease-fire negotiated at the DMZ; or any other serious proposal Hanoi might make. We are in good conscience and convinced that no extension of the bombing pause would have altered the clear, negative response from Hanoi.

 W. W. R.

114  
*Pres. file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, April 18, 1967 -- 6:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith talking points for your session  
with George Brown, gotten up by Francis Bator.

Sec. Rusk says that you need not spend  
more than fifteen minutes with him.

He pressed Sec. Rusk that we not bomb  
certain targets while he is in Washington; but  
the Secretary got him off that.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By ing, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

116a

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-415

By ing, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POSSIBLE TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH  
GEORGE BROWN

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The following are the two issues besides Vietnam that Brown will raise:

1. UK/EEC Brown will probably report that on May 4 the Cabinet will make a decision on whether to apply for EEC membership. The decision will almost certainly be positive. An announcement of the decision will be made shortly thereafter -- no later than May 8. (Note: We will probably ask that the announcement be held up until the 8th in order to avoid complicating the Kennedy Round talks.)

The President's line should be:

- We support the UK application for membership and wish them good luck.
- Decisions with respect to strategy and tactics are for HMG to make. We don't feel we are close enough to the situation to offer advice.

2. East-of-Suez Brown will probably say that the Government is now working toward a July Cabinet decision on East-of-Suez. The elements of the decision will be: (1) withdrawal from the mainland (Malaysia and Singapore, but not Hong Kong) by the mid-1970s; (2) a somewhat faster draw-down during 1967-70 than had been originally planned (from the present 80,000 civilians and troops to 40,000 by 1970). Brown will say that balance of payments/unemployment pressures are such that this decision simply cannot be longer delayed.

The President's answer should be:


- We recognize they have a real money problem, but we also have problems.
- We certainly hope that, so long as Vietnam continues, Britain will do nothing that will foreshadow a pullout or any lessening of their political commitment to Malaysia and Singapore.

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- 2 -

- For the longer term, we will face a real problem in deciding how to fill the vacuum that would be created by a British withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia.
- Before we can comment further we will have to know the details of the UK plan.
- We are grateful for British willingness to consult with us in the past, and hope that before any decisions on this issue are taken they will talk to us in detail.

  
Francis M. Bator

FMB:djw  
April 18, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415

By io, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 18, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Goldberg Call

Ambassador Goldberg is scheduled to see you tomorrow (Wednesday) at 12:30. He will want to talk about:

- South West Africa (the main agenda item at the Special General Assembly).
- Peacekeeping (the second major item on the GA agenda).
- The Outer Space Treaty.
- Perhaps Vietnam.
- A few personal matters.

South West Africa: The South West Africa Committee has failed to agree on any substantive recommendation. We are unwilling to go beyond the terms of the US-Canadian-Italian proposal, and we oppose Security Council action, sanctions, or a UN police force. We would like the issue pushed off until the next regular General Assembly.

Peacekeeping and the UN Deficit: The fact that Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov is coming to the session may indicate Russian willingness to pay a voluntary contribution. The guessing is that it will be about \$7 million -- which we would regard as a small offer.

We have been considering the possibility of some American financial gesture if the Russians do make a substantial contribution. One idea would be to forgive \$5 million worth of unpaid bills owed to the Department of Defense for airlift and other services in the Congo operation. Another would be to forgive another \$9 million which should have been credited to the U.S. from surplus accounts (if all countries had paid their obligation for peacekeeping in full, there would have been a surplus of \$20 million). Ambassador Goldberg might raise these possibilities on a tentative basis. The State Department tends to take a slightly tougher attitude than Goldberg on the matter, largely because of concern over Congressional reaction.

As for future peacekeeping arrangements, there is not much chance for progress. The Russians would like to defer the issue. They might be interested in a

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trade-off -- deferring both Peacekeeping and South West Africa after a week or two of general debate. Our strategy is to let others take the lead, as we won't be able to do much about peacekeeping in any case without a broader consensus than we now have.

Space: Ambassador Goldberg will report on the Outer Space Treaty which comes to the Senate floor next Monday. The Foreign Relations Committee reported it favorably, 18 to 0 (Williams of Delaware not voting). Church is floor manager and Symington has promised to backstop him. Clinton Anderson has said that he will speak in support of the treaty. Anderson has written the State Department asking if the treaty will interfere with present or planned U.S. activities in outer space (including reconnaissance satellites) and has received an unequivocal "no". Senator Gore's questions have been answered, and Wheeler's and Vance's excellent testimony answered concerns about verification. Tower and a few others may oppose the treaty, but a large majority seems likely.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:ND:gg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

April 18, 1967

Mr. President:

Bob Komer and I agree that a cable like this to Lodge might be helpful.

It fits his thought and ours; but he is only likely to be forceful if he receives guidance from you.

If you approve in principle, I will check it out with Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara.

W. W. Rostow

Check it out with Sec. Rusk  
and Sec. McNamara \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By sig, NARA, Date 4-23-93

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DRAFT

18 April 1967

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AmEmbassy SAIGON

EXDIS

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR LODGE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By lig, NARA, Date 4-23-93

As you prepare to pay your final calls, I have been mulling over your recent cables. Two problems stand out.

First is the critical importance of revamping and re-motivating the Vietnamese armed forces for the vital task of pacification. The urgency of this matter is all the more in the forefront of my thinking as we discuss proposals to send more US forces.

Second is the equally essential task of doing all we can to ensure that the Vietnamese military stay united among themselves and loyally support the transition to an elected government.

You and your colleagues have done much over the last 20 months in moving the GVN forward in these directions. It strikes me that, unless you deem this inappropriate, these fundamentals would be useful parting shots for your farewell calls on Ky and Thieu. You could stress to them my own deep feeling that neither they nor we can afford to let Vietnam become too much of an American war. You might also hint at some misgivings among top US officials over whether the ARVN is pulling enough of its own weight in our joint endeavor.

If Ky has now drawn ahead of Thieu as the military candidate, this underlines the special importance of motivating Thieu to turn his attention to revamping ARVN-- a task more than challenging enough for any one man.

I leave the stress you place on these matters entirely to your judgment, as you know them far better than we here.

~~SECRET~~

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DE WTE 711

SENT  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP67308

1967 APR 18 19 08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADMIRAL SHARP IS BACK FOR ROUTINE CONSULTATION WITH  
THE JOINT CHIEFS. YOU MAY WISH TO SEE HIM FOR A FEW MINUTES  
PRIOR TO HIS RETURN TO HONOLULU NEXT SATURDAY.

THE CASE FOR:

A. THE RANKING MILITARY OFFICER IN THE PACIFIC SHOULD BE  
PUBLICLY IDENTIFIED AS HAVING REPORTED TO YOU EVEN THOUGH YOU  
HAVE SEEN HIM AS RECENTLY AS THE GUAM CONFERENCE.

B. HIS REPORTING TO YOU COULD SERVE AS A USEFUL BACKDROP TO  
WESTMORELAND'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES.

----- HAVE MARVIN WATSON WORK OUT A TIME

----- NO NEED TO SEE HIM THIS TRIP

DTG: 181802Z APRIL 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 4-29-91

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1967 APR 18 18 53

FROM WALT BOSTON  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP67307

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By 108, NARA, Date 4-28-73

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: PROPOSED LETTER OF REPLY TO CEYLON'S PRIME MINISTER  
SENANYAKE

THE STATE DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDS YOU SEND BY WIRE TODAY THE FOLLOWING LETTER, REPLYING TO PRIME MINISTER SENANYAKE'S LETTER TO YOU OF APRIL 12, WHICH REACHED US LAST THURSDAY. IT DETAILED CEYLON'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND ASKED THE US AND OTHER DONORS TO DOUBLE OUR AID THIS YEAR BECAUSE OF AN UNEXPECTED AND SHARPLY ADVERSE PLUNGE IN WORLD TEA PRICES. WE ARE AWARE THE DONORS' CLUB AID LEVEL IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO GET THE PLACE MOVING. BUT WE WANT TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO SUSTAIN THIS GOVERNMENT'S MODERATION AND HELPFULNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN BUDDHIST AFFAIRS, AND SENANYAKE NEEDS WHATEVER ENCOURAGEMENT WE CAN GIVE HIM.

THE TOKYO AID MEETING IS NOW UNDER WAY. IF WE COULD GET THIS OFF PROMPTLY, IT WOULD REASSURE SENANYAKE OF YOUR PERSONAL INTEREST EVEN THOUGH WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO DO MORE THAN WE DID LAST YEAR.

I RECOMMEND YOU APPROVE TELEGRAPHING THE FOLLOWING LETTER:  
"THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 12. I AM GLAD  
OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN HELPFUL TO YOU.

"I APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL EVALUATION OF THE  
ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES CEYLON HAS EXPERIENCED IN THE PAST YEAR AS WELL  
AS YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED.

"OUR EXPERTS AT THE MEETING OF THE AID GROUP IN TOKYO  
ARE NOW DISCUSSING CEYLON'S ECONOMIC SITUATION AND  
ITS AID REQUIREMENTS. THIS IS A DIFFICULT YEAR IN THE FIELD OF AID.  
IN MANY PLACES, INCLUDING CEYLON, WE ARE UNABLE TO DO ALL  
WE WOULD LIKE TO DO. HOWEVER, I AM HOPEFUL THAT BY CLOSER  
CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE BANK, YOUR GOVERNMENT AND ALL THE DONORS,  
IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO ACCELERATE THE FLOW OF ASSISTANCE  
ALREADY COMMITTED, SO THAT MORE REAL RESOURCES WILL IN  
FACT BE AVAILABLE THIS COMING YEAR. WE INTEND TO CONTINUE OUR  
SUPPORT OF CEYLON'S DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO THE  
WISHES OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS.

"YOU HAVE MY BEST WISHES FOR YOUR CONTINUED SUCCESS."

DTG 181822Z APRIL 1967

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1967 APR 18 17 25

EEA945  
00 NTE10  
DE WTE 707

FROM WALT ROSTON  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE WH70198

UNCLAS

SUBJECT: LATEST NEWS FROM BONN ON ADENAUER'S CONDITION

BONN, GERMANY (AP) FORMER CHANCELLOR KONRAD ADENAUER GREN WEAKER TODAY AFTER PASSING A QUIET NIGHT AT HIS HOME IN THE VILLAGE OF RHOENDORF.

A MEDICAL BULLETIN SAID THE 91-YEAR-OLD STATESMAN'S "OVERALL CONDITION AND THAT OF HIS LUNGS HAS WEAKENED."

THE REFERENCE TO THE WEAKENING OF THE LUNGS RAISED SPECULATION THAT ADENAUER'S ILLNESS--FLU AND BRONCHITIS--HAD PROGRESSED INTO PNEUMONIA. HE BECAME ILL LAST WEDNESDAY.

INFORMANTS SAID THERE IS GRAVE CONCERN FOR HIS LIFE.

DTG 181651Z APRIL 1967

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1967 APR 18 16 49

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OO WTE10  
DE WTE 705

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP67306

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REFERENCE YESTERDAY'S AP 170.  
HEREWITH BILL JORDEN'S ACCOUNT OF HIS AND JOHN ROCHE'S  
EXCHANGE WITH NORMAN COUSINS.

IN THE APRIL 1 SATURDAY REVIEW, NORMAN COUSINS HAD AN  
EDITORIAL ON VIET-NAM, WITH EMPHASIS ON "LOST" PEACE  
CHANCES. MANY OF HIS FACTS WERE WRONG. HIS SLANT WAS  
THE EXPECTABLE: MILITARY ACTIONS INTERFERE WITH MOVES  
TOWARD PEACE.

JOHN ROCHE CALLED COUSINS, NOTED HE WAS WRONG ON SOME  
COUNTS, AND INVITED HIM TO WASHINGTON FOR A CHAT. HE  
CAME HERE ON APRIL 6. JOHN INVITED ME TO SIT IN AND HELP  
GIVE COUSINS A CLEARER PICTURE OF SOME OF THE ELEMENTS HE  
WROTE ABOUT, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE PHONY PEACE  
GESTURE THROUGH THE INDIANS EARLY IN JANUARY.

WE SPENT AN HOUR AND A HALF WITH COUSINS. WE MADE IT CLEAR  
AT THE OUTSET THAT WE WANTED TO BE AS FRANK AS POSSIBLE WITH  
HIM AND THAT AS LONG AS THE TALK WAS "IN THE ROOM," WE COULD  
AND WOULD BE. THUS HIS WRITING AN ARTICLE IS A VERY CLEAR  
BREACH OF ETHICS, BUT HE WROTE IT.

SECOND POINT, HE TOOK NO NOTES DURING THE ENTIRE 90 MINUTES  
AND IS THEREFORE RELYING ON HIS MEMORY WHICH, AS IT TURNS OUT  
IS FALLIBLE.

THIRD, I HAVE NOT SEEN THE ORIGINAL REVIEW PIECE, BUT IF  
THE QUOTES PICKED OUT BY AP ARE REPRESENTATIVE, HE HAS BOTH  
MISQUOTED AND MISINTERPRETED.

I WILL SEE HOW BAD THE PIECE IS IN THE REVIEW (WHICH COMES  
OUT TOMORROW) AND GIVE YOU MY THOUGHTS ON WHETHER ANY KIND  
OF RESPONSE IS DESIRABLE OR NECESSARY. RIGHT NOW, I WOULD  
THINK NOT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 181605Z APRIL 1967

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DLG 85-291

By 4/29/91, NARA, Date 4/29/91

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

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(orig. to P)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

Tuesday, April 18, 1967

12:30 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NEJ 91-415

By inf, NARA, Date 4-23-93

cc: Sec Def

SS

Jordan

Bator

Harriman

Davis

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

I met Yuri Zhukov last night at the home of Adelbert de Segonzac. Others present included Senator Jackson and Tom Hughes. It will be recalled that before Zhukov left Moscow, he had lunch with Ambassador Thompson and warned of an increasing Soviet role in the war in Viet Nam; and, I gather, this has been a central theme in his talks in Washington.

The main points that arose were as follows:

1. He repeated that the Soviet Union would engage more fully in North Viet Nam. He drew back, however, on the question of volunteers. (He allowed himself the observation that the presence of foreign troops destroyed the independence of countries; but quickly realized he was trapped when Senator Jackson asked: "All countries?"). He would not be drawn out on types of increased Soviet aid; but confined himself to indicating that the stories in the press of the new Soviet/Chinese Communist agreement about transit across China might be true. At one point -- when, for about the fifth time, he had made this warning and referred to a "long, hot summer" -- I observed that this sounded a bit like Mr. Khrushchev talking to President Kennedy in Vienna. Again he drew back, saying that the aid that would be given North Viet Nam would be simply to protect the borders of North Viet Nam. That was the limit of the Soviet commitment.

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3. With respect to the fate of the NLF in the South, he said they controlled the bulk of the territory. When it was observed that territory doesn't vote, and that if they wished to settle the matter with a free supervised election we were agreeable, he replied that Mr. William Bundy had told him that we would insist on all those in the South -- even Southerners who had been trained in the North -- returning to the North. I said that he should not be drawn off by details in this matter; that we were prepared to take our chances on the future of South Viet Nam on the basis of a free, supervised election, without coercion, rooted in the principle of one man, one vote. If the Viet Cong were confident that they represent the people, this was their chance.

4. Zhukov went out of his way to say that in his articles for Pravda he had made it clear that those protesting U. S. policy in Viet Nam were in the minority and that the President had a majority with him in support of his Viet Nam policy. When asked whether this was understood in Hanoi, his reply was: "Perhaps it would be good if they had correspondents in the United States. "

5. With respect to European policy, about which he was questioned by Segonzac, he said that perhaps progress on the German question would be possible after the Germans had signed a non-proliferation treaty. He said he understood that for political reasons the Germans had to keep alive the question of the Eastern boundaries; but the Germans were, in his judgment, increasingly inclined to be "realistic. " He did not go as far as to say that the West Germans would recognize the East Germans. When asked by Senator Jackson about mutual troop withdrawals from Europe, he said this was an old Soviet idea; but that it was very difficult for them to agree to mutual troop withdrawal from Europe during the Viet Nam war when we might send forces thus released to Viet Nam.

6. Assessing the whole evening, my judgment is that he is here for three purposes:

-- To make an independent assessment of opinion in Washington and New York;

-- To press the line that negotiations are possible with Hanoi if we stop bombing. (Weintal, who was present, reports that Zhukov told him when they were alone that if we stopped bombing and Hanoi did not negotiate, "the Socialist nations" would turn against Hanoi; but he did not repeat this to Senator Jackson, Hughes, and me. We all concluded he was shooting for an item in "Periscope," not for a communication to the U. S. Government.)

-- To spread the word that Soviet aid to North Viet Nam would increase and thus (as can be seen in Lippmann's column of today) increase the pressure in the U. S. for negotiation on Hanoi's terms.

7. Tom Hughes adds the following items picked up when I was not engaged in conversation:

-- Zhukov said we should bear in mind that there were hawks and doves in Moscow as well as in Washington;

-- He opined that the internal problems of Communist China were such that Moscow did not expect them to break out across their borders;

-- He asked when Kiesinger would be coming to Washington.

8. Throughout my conversation and in a quiet summary at the end I tried to leave two firm impressions for him to take back:

-- We remember vividly the Soviet responsibilities under the Geneva Accords of 1962 -- including Pushkin's assurance to Harriman -- and believe that Moscow has a responsibility for the present stage of the war and a responsibility actively to bring peace;

-- As for the bombing pause at Tet and the communications at that time, we feel that we had worked since mid-November to give Hanoi a wide range of options for ending the war if it wished to: secret talks to achieve a complete settlement; mutual de-escalation to create an environment for negotiation; Ky's proposal for a cease-fire negotiated at the DMZ; or any other serious proposal Hanoi might make. We are in good conscience and convinced that no extension of the bombing pause would have altered the clear, negative response from Hanoi.

W. W. R.

Tuesday, April 18, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

John Scali, ABC News, came in for a general review of the situation in Viet Nam. He reported a feeling that there had been a decline in "optimism" in recent weeks. I described the tactics being pursued by the enemy in putting pressure on I Corps in diverting U. S. military resources from pacification. But I also pointed to favorable trends in other parts of the country; evidence of problems with the VC cadres; progress in the political life of South Viet Nam; etc. I tried to give him a balanced picture in which things were generally moving favorably but there was no sign of either a break in the VC structure or a likelihood of early successful negotiations.

After clearance with George Christian, I had a long background interview with Isami Suzukawa, editor of the largest paper in Japan, Asahi Shimbun, and Kinji Kawamura, chief of the Washington bureau. I covered the basic aspects of our policy in Viet Nam and in Asia, including the great potential of Japan's role in Asian regional economic development.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

Monday, April 17, 1967  
4:00 p.m.

125

MR. PRESIDENT:

I asked Bill Jorden to compare the  
earlier Quayle poll in Viet Nam with the  
later CBS poll.

By and large, they show a similar portrait  
of public opinion which will interest you.

W. W. R.

Attachment

*Pres file*

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Limited Official Use

April 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The Quayle and CBS Vietnam Opinion Surveys Compared

You asked for a comparative analysis of the Quayle and CBS opinion surveys in South Vietnam.

The Quayle data were analyzed independently by the "Lazarfield Committee," composed of Paul F. Lazarfield, James Coleman, Louis Harris and Warren Miller. Their major findings, reported in March, 1966, are given below and constitute the base for comparing the CBS survey's conclusions. Questions posed were not identical, but their approximation is close enough to draw meaningful conclusions.

Quayle/Lazarfield found that the Viet Cong are rejected by the people of South Vietnam.

CBS confirms this in several related conclusions:

- People disapprove of the VC mainly for their terrorism, sabotage and atrocities.
- Half say there is nothing they like about the VC; one in six likes or admires something about them.
- An overwhelming majority considers life easier under the GVN than under the VC.
- In postwar Vietnam, nearly three-fourths would prefer a government excluding VC participation.

Quayle/Lazarfield found the GVN meeting popular reception, ranging from moderately high for village and national governments to relatively low for provincial and district. Respondents wanted reforms made and problems solved in such areas as inflation, education, corruption.

Limited Official Use

CBS found over half the people completely approving the Ky government, with one in ten critical in some way. Others generally approving the GVN still believed it could do better, citing among problem areas inflation, corruption and education -- mirroring Quayle's findings.

Quayle/Lazarfield concluded that more informed and higher occupation groups are more opposed to their government than lower income groups.

CBS confirms this. People expressing some criticism are more likely to live in Saigon than elsewhere, to be men, to read newspapers, to have a relatively high degree of formal education.

Quayle/Lazarfield decided that data on attitudes toward the U.S. and Americans were inconclusive. On bombing, the implication is the VC are blamed for inviting them, and Americans for conducting them.

CBS similarly found the bombing issue divisive.

- Half thought the U.S. should stop, even though it is necessary to pursue the war.
- Just over a third approved continuing the bombing.
- One in six gave no answer.
- The blame for continuing the war is fixed on the VC (31%), North Vietnam (12%), Red China (19%), U.S. (2%).

Methodology. It is clear that the CBS survey, conducted independently from the mechanism and personnel used by Quayle, supports the latter's earlier findings in significant areas. These comments on methodology in each survey are worth noting:

Lazarfield on Quayle

- Considering the absence of any census, remarkable coverage was accomplished. But it was limited to that 75% of the population under GVN control.

- Interviewing was generally handled expertly and ingeniously, but with some identification of surveyors with the GVN -- a critical dimension. The degree of bias introduced cannot be assessed precisely, but such reservations do not invalidate the major findings.
- The questionnaire was strongest in measuring attitudes toward the VC and the GVN; attitudes toward the U.S. role were not a central focus; attitudes toward the war were not fully documented.

CBS on CBS (Opinion Research Corporation and the Center for Vietnamese Studies)

- Rather than accepting the findings as a literal representation of what the South Vietnamese are thinking, data should be interpreted comparatively (whether datum is meaningful depends in part on support found in other parts of the survey).
- The findings can yield considerable insight into popular feelings -- providing information on the whole population within broad tolerance limits.

Attached you will find a chart comparing major findings in the two surveys.

*Bill*  
William J. Jorden

Att.

125-b

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE OLIVER QUAYLE AND CBS  
PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

This breakdown compares the key results of the Quayle opinion sampling in South Vietnam in October-December 1965 with a similar CBS survey slightly more than a year later -- November 1966 to February 1967. Questions in the two polls are not identical, but there are reasonably close approximations.

	<u>QUAYLE</u>	<u>CBS</u>
	<u>Methodology</u>	
<u>Time Frame:</u>	October 17, 1965 - December 23, 1965	- November 24, 1966 - February 1, 1967
<u>Sample:</u>	1,000 - All provinces, secure areas, urban and rural sub-samples.	- 1,545 - All provinces, secure areas, urban and rural sub-samples.
<u>Mechanism:</u>	Oliver Quayle Associates - direct hire and training of Vietnamese.	- Opinion Research Corporation - - working through the indigenous Center for Vietnamese Studies, Mr. Nguyen-khoa Phon-anh director.

	<u>War Apathy</u>	
Apathetic	30%	Given three wishes, what would you wish?
Interested	70%	
		Peace 81%
		Security 3%
		Victory over Communism 4%
		Nothing to wish for 2%
		Other 10%

QUAYLECBSCommunism

There are 43 points in the questionnaire where pro-Communist sentiments could be expressed. Anyone making three or more such statements was labelled "pro-Communist."

Pro-Communist	19%
Anti and Non-Communist	81%

The NLF profile rating:

Positive	9%
Negative	91%

/N.B. Quayle established that the VC and NLF are considered one and the same. This was not analyzed in the CBS survey. /

What do you dislike about the Viet Cong?

Terrorism and sabotage	58%
Exploitation, heavy taxes	36%
No freedom under Communism	10%

What do you like about the Viet Cong?

Nothing	49%
Skillful propaganda	10%
No opinion	34%

Life easier under Viet Cong or GVN?

Better off with VC	0%
Better off with GVN	90%
No difference	3%
No opinion	7%

NLF/VC Participation in the Government

In a national election would vote for:

Present government	88%
NLF	2%
Not sure	7%
Refused to answer	3%

When war is over do you want NLF in the government?

Yes	6%
No	73%
No opinion	21%

QUAYLE

CBS

Weighting the VC-controlled unpolled  
25% of the country:

Present government	64%
NLF	29%
Not sure	5%
Refused to answer	2%

The American Presence

Strongly anti-American	21%
Very slightly anti-American	25%
Pro-American	54%

"It is just an American war"

Agree	15%
Disagree	62%
Not sure	23%

"The Americans should get out  
of Vietnam"

Agree	18%
Disagree	53%
Not sure	29%

Why do Americans fight in Vietnam?

Contain Communism	39%
Restore peace in Vietnam	8%
To "save face, " defend weak nations, as a duty.	7%
For later selfish interests	7%
Vietnam's strategic location	6%
At GVN request	3%
Other answers	9%
No opinion, not reported	34%

13%

Will Americans leave when war is over?

Yes, will leave	46%
No, will not leave	13%
No opinion, not reported	41%

QUAYLE

"The Americans will not leave Vietnam  
when the war is over."

Agree	18%
Disagree	48%
Not sure	34%

"The Americans should stop their  
bombing."

Agree	25%
Disagree	46%
Not sure	29%

CBS

Should bombing of villages continue when necessary?

Continue when necessary	37%
Stop bombing and burning	46%
No opinion, not reported	17%

Should Americans concentrate more on negotiations  
with or military <sup>action</sup> against North Vietnam?

More negotiation	63%
More military action	15%
No opinion, not reported	22%

What should American forces do in the South?

Go on fighting	39%
Stop fighting, stay as advisors	21%
Stop fighting, go home	10%
No opinion, not reported	30%

What do you like about Americans?

Social welfare assistance	28%
Military aid	22%
Personal qualities	20%
Unspecified aid	15%
Nothing	4%
Other answers	9%

QUAYLE

CBS

What do you dislike about Americans?

Dislike nothing	35%
Public misdemeanors, lack discipline	6%
Indiscriminate killing, bombing	8%
Colonialist attitudes	6%
Cause of moral decline	3%
Cause of rising prices	4%
No opinion, not reported	41%

The Ky Government

The GVN's rating:

Excellent	14%
Pretty good	29%
Only Fair	26%
Poor	7%
Not sure	24%
Favorable:	57%
Unfavorable:	43%

Are you satisfied with the Ky Government or do you want some changes?

Satisfied	53%
Would like changes	11%
No opinion, not reported	36%

What changes do you want?

Dismiss arrogant, corrupt civil servants	3%
Lower prices, control inflation	3%
Try to understand legitimate popular aspirations	2%
End injustice in draft and other areas	1%
Reduce red tape	1%

QUAYLE

National issues ratings:

	<u>Favorable</u>	<u>Unfavorable</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
Economic problems	96%	118%	82%
War problems	38%	38%	30%
Transportation	21%	24%	13%
Education	15%	15%	9%
Better government	12%	16%	8%
Health	7%	8%	8%
Electricity	6%	9%	3%
Control robbery, prostitution, hooliganism	5%	7%	2%
Need for more water	3%	2%	4%

CBS

What changes do you want? (continued)

End discrimination between Northerners/ Southerners, military and civil servants	1%
Greater press freedom, no illegal arrests	1%
Educational changes	1%
Other answers	3%

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Monday, Apr 17, 1967  
4:00 p.m.

126

MR. PRESIDENT:

This picture of Ky becoming a political  
animal may interest you.

*photo*

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS attachment  
(Saigon 23234)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By bg, NARA, Date 4-29-91

126a

~~SECRET/NOBIS~~

Monday, April 17, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Saigon, 23234)

After my conversation with Prime Minister Ky about strong points in the Demilitarized Zone, he and I had a little talk about politics.

I began by saying in response to a request he had made to me at our last meeting that we expected before September 1 that an additional 1,500 television receivers would be on hand from the United States. In fact, 500 of these are now enroute and the remaining 1,000 have been requested on a priority basis. I added that construction of the new television studios in Saigon and Can Tho is about to begin with final completion before September 1. I said that also the U.S. Mission would be dealing directly with the Ministry of Information as regards procurement of a mobile unit for flexibility in covering news-worthy events. We are also looking into the matter of wide screens for installation in market places and other points where the public could watch.

Ky was appreciative and I took advantage of the opportunity to stress the importance of being absolutely certain that all candidates were treated fairly as regards television time. It just would not be good if it were to be said that he was using his official position to give himself more than his share of television time with an election coming up as soon as September 1. I pointed out that giving television time to other candidates was not necessarily a disadvantage to him, since it was so easy to make mistakes and made a bad impression on television.

He seemed to take all this in good spirit and I went on to stress the importance of being totally fair all the time. I had heard a rumor that other candidates were being denied the right to publish a newspaper. If true, this was a mistake. In the first place, people should be treated fairly and it would be damaging to be accused of unfairness. In the second place, another way to get into trouble politically is by publishing one's own newspaper.

~~SECRET/NOBIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-413  
By WJ, NARA, Date 1-8-92

Also I said it was important that no one be given any real grounds for complaining that there had been any abuse of the police power. I thought I knew Vietnamese people well enough to say that they resent abuse of police power. And that this was perhaps the greatest single factor in the wave of public emotion against Diem and Nhu in 1963.

Ky agreed. He said: "I often tell General Loan, 'You talk too much. You are not an air man anymore. An air man can talk all he wants to, but a Chief of Police has to be very careful.'" Ky added that he was absolutely sure that there could be no abuse of police power without his knowing about and he would not allow it.

Comment: His attitude with me was the way it has always been ever since the day almost two years ago when we started working together. He listens carefully and he thinks about it, and he often agrees. End comment.

At a previous meeting, we discussed the question of public opinion polls in Vietnam and how hard it was to tell who was popular and who wasn't. Ky said that since our last talk, he had heard of a poll that has been taken which gave him 75 percent of the vote, with the remaining 25 percent split up among different candidates. He had also heard of another poll on who was the best known. Fifty-three percent had heard of him and thirteen percent of General Thieu.

Still continuing political conversation, I said that I had been talking with a friend about his promise to increase the income of the Vietnamese military personnel by providing free rice to their dependents. This had suggested to me the possibility that it would be very difficult to distribute the rice and also I was afraid that some of the officers in the ARVN would graft on it and get it into the black market. Any politician who made a promise of this kind so soon before election, and it miscarried in practice, could suffer very serious political damage.

Ky said he had picked just the man to administer such a program, and he didn't worry at all about honesty. He had had the matter of ARVN graft on his mind and he thought he was well protected against it.

But he did agree that the distribution of rice was a serious problem. Therefore, he had decided to pay half in rice and half in piasters.

I made this report "NoDis" because nothing could be more damaging to our close relations with Ky than to have such an intimate conversation get out to the press. I am sure you will know who should see these very interesting and, I believe, reassuring comments by Ky.

127

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 17, 1967

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Today marks the beginning of the third decade of diplomatic relations between Nepal and the United States. For twenty years we have maintained the friendliest of relations and have cooperated in the development of Nepal.

I extend to you and your colleagues in the Government of Nepal warm greetings and the hope that the same friendly spirit of cooperation that we celebrate today will continue in the decades to come. The American people join me in wishing you success in your endeavors to promote the welfare of the Nepalese people.

With best regards,

Sincerely,



His Excellency  
Surya Bahadur Thapa  
Prime Minister of Nepal  
Kathmandu

*Being sent as  
telegram on April*

*Pres file*~~SECRET~~

April 17, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Afghan PL 480 Agreement

Secretary Freeman is ready to go ahead with the \$4.4 million wheat and oil agreement you mentioned to Prime Minister Maiwandwal. Sharply rising food prices have triggered demonstrations in Afghanistan over the past two weeks, and Ambassador Neumann recommends we go ahead as soon as possible. Maiwandwal has just returned and can make good political use of a go-ahead to dampen fears of shortages.

His one comment under pressure at the Press Club remains an isolated incident. His public statements on the rest of his tour were quite moderate. Now that a couple of weeks have elapsed, we should probably go ahead now unless you are strongly opposed.

Charlie Schultze's economic analysis is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By ing, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

128a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

APR 15 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed P. L. 480 Agreement with Afghanistan

In the attached memo, Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your authority to negotiate a Title I P. L. 480 sales agreement with Afghanistan to provide 40,000 tons of wheat and 4,000 tons of vegetable oil valued at \$4.4 million. This brings the total for the year to \$8.1 million compared to an average of \$24 million per year for the past three years. Almost all of the previous P. L. 480 programs have been on a grant basis (Title II). This agreement's 40 year terms are now essentially the same as the terms on our AID loans to Afghanistan.

A serious drought reduced last summer's harvest about 220,000 tons, roughly 10 per cent, below normal levels. Wheat prices have risen 30 per cent since November; in some urban areas, 100 per cent, resulting in great political pressures on the government. The drought also resulted in animal deaths which sharply reduced the supply of edible fats.

Our strategy in the agricultural sector is to help Afghanistan achieve its goal of wheat self-sufficiency by 1972. To this end we anticipate reducing concessional P. L. 480 wheat by about 20,000 tons per year as we press increasingly hard on self-help.

Self-help

With a strong push from Secretary Freeman last summer, Afghanistan has undertaken some encouraging self-help steps:

- . The third five year plan allocates 30 per cent of the government budget to agriculture vs. 17 per cent in the second plan.
- . The FY 1967 agricultural development budget was increased 69 per cent over the 1966 budget.
- . Fertilizer imports were raised from a 1960-65 average of 4,000 tons to 10,000 in FY 1967 with 15,000 expected in FY 1968.
- . 825 tons of improved seeds under the AID program are being planted this year to improve wheat yields.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By sig, NARA, Date 4-23-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

While an encouraging start has been made, other steps will be needed. The U. S. agricultural assistance team which was discussed by the Prime Minister and Secretary Freeman is now being assembled and will leave in early summer. Their recommendations will further clarify what needs to be done.

In view of the pressing need for wheat and oil in Afghanistan and considering the concrete first steps taken toward raising agricultural production, I recommend that you authorize negotiation of the proposed agreement.

(signed) Charles L. Schultze  
Charles L. Schultze  
**Director**

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1284

APR 7 1967

To: The President

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Afghanistan

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 agreement with Afghanistan to provide approximately 40,000 tons of wheat and 4,000 tons of vegetable oil, of which the current market value is \$4.4 million. Payment would be made in convertible local currency over 40 years with 1 percent interest during the 10-year grace period and 2½ percent thereafter. The Department of State concurs in this recommendation, as does the Treasury Department.

Afghanistan's Food Situation

Afghanistan is experiencing seriously reduced food supplies, especially in the urban sector, as a result of drought last summer. Precipitation in the mountains during the winter was late and inadequate, and the outlook for grain production this year is uncertain. The wheat crop harvested last summer was approximately 10 percent below the normal 2.2 million ton level. In the urban sector market supplies of wheat decreased to about 10,000 tons per month beginning last October, as compared with the normal average level of 11,000 tons monthly. Wheat prices country-wide have risen 30 percent since November, and in some urban areas these prices have doubled since last year.

Domestic production of animal and vegetable oils does not meet present market demand. The supply of edible animal fats has decreased because of the loss of animals resulting from drought conditions during the past two years. Consumer demand is also shifting to edible vegetable oils as a result of experience with U.S. oils imported under the 1965 sales agreement.

Self-Help

In 1965 the Afghan Government initiated an accelerated agricultural production program designed to achieve self-sufficiency in wheat by 1972. In supporting this program the Government has taken some important steps in the past year. It increased the Agriculture Ministry's FY 1967 development budget by 69 percent and tentatively approved a 25-30 percent shift of development resources during the Third Plan from agricultural capital projects to production programs. Additional budget funds were provided to support 43 agricultural students abroad during the next five years and to train in Afghanistan 250 additional extension workers.

Following last August's discussions with Secretary Freeman on the need for increasing production, an intensified wheat growing program was

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLJ

91-412

By *ing*, NARA, Date 3-2-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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
launched with the object of rapidly boosting production in FY's 1967 and 1968. In carrying out this program the Ministry of Agriculture has imported 620 tons of improved seeds from Pakistan and Mexico and has obtained authority to import an additional 225 tons under an existing U.S. loan. 6,660 acres were planted with improved varieties last fall for seed harvest this summer. Fertilizer is a vital part of this program and last fall over 800 wheat/fertilizer demonstrations were made on farmers' lands. The Government has imported 10,500 tons of fertilizer for use during the 1966-67 planting season and is ordering 10,000 tons for use during next fall's planting. This contrasts with average annual fertilizer imports of only 4,000 tons from 1960 through 1965.


In this agreement we will require that the Government of Afghanistan:

- (1) Give highest priority to the development of agriculture during the Third Five Year Plan;
- (2) Continue the accelerated wheat production program which is designed to achieve self-sufficiency by 1972;
- (3) Give special attention to the findings of the proposed U.S. Agricultural Survey Team;
- (4) Press ahead in expanding adaptive research in the application of fertilizers and in the use of improved seeds;
- (5) Give special attention to the forthcoming recommendations of the TVA fertilizer survey team concerning use and distribution of fertilizer and consider ways of rapidly expanding domestic fertilizer consumption as preparation for the full exploitation of planned fertilizer production facilities;
- (6) Take steps to significantly increase the number and quality of students in agriculture at Kabul University;
- (7) Continue its present program to become self-sufficient in edible oil production by 1970.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 sales agreement as described above.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Administrator  
Agency for International Development

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Secretary  
Department of Agriculture

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 17, 1967

Your Majesty:


I am pleased to send to Your Majesty and to your people my heartfelt greetings and those of the American people on this twentieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries.

The spirit of friendship has governed relations between Nepal and the United States through these years. Together we have worked for the development of Nepal and the fulfillment of the aspirations of Your Majesty and the Nepalese people.

I sincerely hope that this spirit of friendly cooperation will continue to grow.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,



His Majesty  
Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva  
King of Nepal

130

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/17/67

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

Herewith Frei's report to Dungan on his  
Punte del Este impressions.

(quote Santiago 2548)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By AG, NARA, Date 4-29-91

Monday, April 17, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached chart showing the desertion rate from the South Vietnamese Armed Forces per 1,000 troop strength indicates a favorable downward trend recently.

In general, the number of desertions seems to reflect changes in the military and political situation. They are normally highest during the first quarter, primarily because of the Vietnamese holidays during that period.

During 1965 they reached a high at TET, then remained numerous throughout the year and until the spring of 1966 when the stability of the Ky Government and impact of U.S. operations began to have an effect. Since May 1966, the trend has been rapidly downward. Some of the drop was probably also due to the government's effort to curb desertions through increased incentives and better discipline.

Whatever the reasons, it is heartening to see such a drastic drop and especially to see it continue during the TET 1967 period.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-415  
By mg, NARA, Date 4-23-93

W. W. Rostow

AMcCafferty:jjs

~~SECRET~~