

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[1 of 13]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1a memo	Rusk to the Pres. re Belgium <i>open 2-6-92 NLS 91-446</i> C 1 p.	5/8/67	A
2a memo	Rusk to the Pres. " C 2 pp.	5/2/67	A
2b list	Proposed Schedule of Visitors " C 2 pp.	undated	A
2c list	Current Status of Approved Visits C 1 p. <i>open 8-8-91</i>	undated	A
2e biography	Pres. Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia C 1 p. <i>open 2-6-92 NLS 91-446</i>	undated	A
2f biography	Pres. Hamani Diori of Niger " C 1 p.	undated	A
2g biography	Pres. Giuseppe Saragat of Italy " C 1 p.	undated	A
2h biography	Pres. Diaz Ordaz of Mexico " C 1 p.	undated	A
2i biography	Pres. J. D. Mobutu of Dem. Rep. of the Congo " C 1 p.	undated	A
2j biography	King Mahendra of Nepal " C 1 p.	undated	A
2k biography	Prime Minister Eisaku of Japan " C 1 p.	undated	A
2l biography	Crown Prince Vong Savang of Laos <i>open 4-22-99</i> C 1 p. <i>sanitized 2-6-92 NLS 91-446</i>	undated	A
2m biography	President Frei of Chile <i>open 2-6-92 NLS 91-446</i> C 1 p.	undated	A
2n biography	Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore <i>open 4-22-99</i> C 1 p. <i>sanitized 2-6-92 NLS 91-446</i>	undated	A
2o biography	President Helou of Lebanon <i>open 2-6-92 NLS 91-446</i> C 1 p.	undated	A
2p	Duplicate of document #2c <i>open 2-13-92 per DCH</i>		

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Volume 27
May 1-15, 1967," Box 16

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
3 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Germany S 1 p. <i>open 1-20-93 NLS 91-442</i>	5/1/67	A
4 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Israel C 1 p. <i>sanitized 1-20-93 NLS 91-442</i> <i>Open 5/26/00 NLS 91-161</i>	5/15/67	A
5 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Israel S 2 pp. <i>exempt 3-16-92 NLS 91-442</i> <i>OPEN FRHS VOL 18 DOC 415</i>	5/8/67	A
5a list	Israeli Aid Package <i>sanitized 2-2-01 NLS/RAC 99-86</i> <i>same sanitization for NLS 91-442</i> S 1 p. <i>sanitized 1-20-93 NLS 91-442</i> <i>DUPLICATES IN NSF COUNTRY FILE "ISRAELI AID" BOX 145 Doc #s 13, 14, 16, 18, 20a</i>	5/8/67	A <i>7/10/82</i>
5b memo	Katzenbach to the Pres. re Israel <i>open 2-6-92 NLS 91-446</i> S 3 pp.	5/5/67	A
5c memo	Goldberg to the Pres. re Israel " S 3 pp.	5/1/67	A
5d memo	Katzenbach to the Pres. re Israel <i>open 3-24-00 NLS 00-5</i> S 4 pp. <i>sanitized 2-6-92 NLS 91-446</i>	5/1/67	A
8 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Sea of Japan C 1 p. <i>open 1-20-93 NLS 91-442</i>	5/15/67	A
8a memo	Davis to Rostow and Bator " C 1 p.	5/15/67	A
8b cable	CTG 704 re Sea of Japan C 2 pp. <i>open 11-5-91 NLS 91-445</i>	5/15/67	A
9 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Germany <i>exempt NLS 91-442</i> <i>sanitized 2-2-01 NLS/RAC 99-86</i> S 1 p. <i>Dup of #106, NSF, CF, Germany, Vol 13</i>	5/15/67	A
9a memo	Mapother to the Pres. <i>dup of #106a, NSF, CF, Germany</i> S 4 pp. <i>exempt NLS 91-442</i> <i>Vol 13</i>	5/10/67	A
9b memo	Rostow and Helmut Schmidt <i>dup of #106b, NSF, CF, Germany</i> C 1 p. <i>exempt 3-16-92 NLS 91-442</i> <i>Vol 13</i> <i>Open 2-2-01 NLS/RAC 99-86</i>	5/15/67	A
10 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam TS 2 pp. <i>open 4-7-93 NLS 91-452</i>	5/15/67	A
10a cable	Intelligence Information Cable C 2 pp. <i>sanitized 9-8-92 NLS 91-440</i> <i>sanitized 2-5-01 NLS/RAC 91-87 (same sani)</i>	5/14/67	A
11a cable	Canberra 5561 S 1 p. <i>open 2-6-92 NLS 91-446</i>	5/15/67	A

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NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Volume 27,
May 1-15, 1967," Box 16

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
14a memo	Henry Owen re Vietnam <i>open 2-6-92 NLJ 91-446</i> S 1 p.	5/12/67	A
15a memo	Rusk to the Pres. re personnel " C 1 p.	5/13/67	A
15b report	Thailand " C 2 pp.	undated	A
15d memo	Rimestad to Sec. State re personnel C 1 p.	3/3/67	A & C
19 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>open 7/24/96 NY 91-441</i>	5/13/67	A
19a memo	Ginsburgh to Rostow re Vietnam S 2 pp. <i>open 7/24/96 NY 91-441</i>	5/12/67	A
19b report	Manpower, Morale, Evacuation S 3 pp. <i>sanitized 9-8-92 NLJ 91-440</i> <i>sanitized 2-5-01 NLJ/RAC 99-87 (same)</i>	undated	A
19c report	Economic <i>sanitized 9-8-92 NLJ 91-440</i> S 2 pp. <i>sanitized 2-5-01 NLJ/RAC 99-87 (same)</i>	undated	A
19d report	Food <i>sanitized 9-8-92 NLJ 91-440</i> S 2 pp. <i>sanitized 2-5-01 NLJ/RAC 99-87 (same)</i>	undated	A
19e report	Transportation <i>sanitized 9-8-92 NLJ 91-440</i> S 2 pp. <i>sanitized 2-5-01 NLJ/RAC 99-87 (same)</i>	undated	A
19f report	Ports <i>sanitized 9-8-92 NLJ 91-440</i> S 1 p. <i>sanitized 2-5-01 NLJ/RAC 99-87 (same)</i>	undated	A
19g cable	Paris 18162 <i>exempt 2-6-92 NLJ 91-446</i> S 1 p. <i>open 2-9-00 NLJ 99-171</i>	5/12/67	A
20 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re USSR C 1 p. <i>open 1-20-93 NLJ 91-442</i>	5/13/67	A
20a cable	Moscow 4896 <i>open 2-6-92 NLJ 91-446</i> C 1 p.	undated	A
22a cable	Prime Minister to the President S 1 p. <i>open 1-20-93 NLJ 91-442</i>	5/12/67	A
23 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Sea of Japan " C 1 p.	5/12/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
23a report	Sea of Japan Incidents C 2 pp. <i>open 1-20-93 NLJ 91-442</i>	4/12/67	A
32a memo	Henry Owen re Presidential Meetings C 3 pp. <i>open 2-6-92 NLJ 91-446</i>	5/11/67	A
32a memo	Bator to the Pres. re USSR S 1 p. <i>open 1-20-93 NLJ 91-442</i>	5/12/67	A
33b report	Proposed Changes in Regulations S 1 p. <i>except 5-16-92 NLJ 91-442</i> <i>open 10-14-94 NLJ 92-78</i>	undated	A
35 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Panama C 1 p. <i>open 1-20-93 NLJ 91-442</i>	5/12/67	A
36 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Latin America S 1 p. <i>Sanitized 5-4-95 NLJ 91-441</i> <i>Sanitized 2-2-01 NLJ/RAC 99-86 same</i>	5/12/67	A
38b memo	Dixon Donnelley to Read <i>open 2-6-92 NLJ 91-446</i> C 4 pp.	5/11/67	A
40 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Africa C 2 pp. <i>open 1-20-93 NLJ 91-442</i> <i>(Dup. in diary Backup-5/12/67)</i>	5/11/67	A
41a memo	Maxwell Taylor to the Pres. re Vietnam S 2 pp. <i>open 1-20-93 NLJ 91-442</i>	5/11/67	A
43a cable	Saigon 25255 <i>open 2-6-92 NLJ 91-446</i> C 2 pp.	5/11/67	A
46 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Amb. Gronouski S 1 p. <i>open 1-20-93 NLJ 91-442</i>	5/11/67	A
47 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re USSR <i>Sanitized 2-2-01 NLJ/RAC 99-86 same</i> S 1 p. <i>Sanitized 5-4-95 NLJ 91-441</i>	5/11/67	A
47a cable	Report <i>Sanitized 9-8-92 NLJ 91-440</i> S 1 p. <i>Sanitized 2-5-01 NLJ/RAC 99-87 same</i>	5/10/67	A
48 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. <i>open 1-20-93 NLJ 91-442</i>	5/11/67	A
48a memo	Katzenbach to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. <i>open 2-6-92 NLJ 91-446</i>	5/10/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
49a memo	Rusk to Rostow <i>open 2-6-92 NLS 91-446</i> C 1 p.	5/10/67	A
51a message	from the Pres. for the Prime Minister S 1 p. <i>open 1-20-93 NLS 91-442</i>	5/11/67	A
52a memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Panama " C 1 p.	5/11/67	A
54a memo	Schultze to the Pres. re Ghana " C 2 pp.	5/8/67	A
54b memo	Gaud to the Pres. re Ghana C 5 pp. <i>open 3-4-92 NLS 91-443</i>	4/24/67	A
55	Duplicate of document #51a <i>open 1-20-93 NLS 91-442</i>		
56	Duplicate of document #51a "		
57 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Dominican Republic C 2 pp. <i>open 1-20-93 NLS 91-442</i>	5/11/67	A
59 memo	Rusk to the Pres. re Dominican Republic C 4 pp. <i>open 2-6-92 NLS 91-446</i>	5/8/67	A
62 memo <i>Aug # 11a</i> <i>Bolivia, vol 4, Box 8</i>	Rostow to the Pres. re Latin America S 1 p. <i>Sanitized 2-24-93 NLS 91-32</i> <i>Sanitized 2-2-01 NLS/RAC 99-86</i>	5/11/67	A
65 memo <i>open 8-11-04</i> <i>NLS/RAC 99-88</i>	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>Sanitized 1-20-93 NLS 91-442</i>	5/11/67	A
66 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam <i>open 4-7-93</i> TS 1 p. <i>NLS 91-452</i>	5/10/67	A
68a cable	Saigon 25083 <i>open 2-6-92 NLS 91-446</i> S 2 pp.	5/10/67	A
68b cable	Saigon 25233 " S 3 pp.	5/10/67	A
69 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re India C 1 p. <i>open 1-20-93 NLS 91-442</i>	5/10/67	A
70 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Egypt S 1 p. <i>Sanitized 2-2-01 NLS/RAC 99-86</i>	5/10/67	A

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72 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 2 pp. <i>open 1-20-93 NLJ 91-442</i> <i>[Duplicate of #289, Papers of Warrick, 'MONTN II', Box 2]</i>	5/10/67	A
72a list	SVN Troop Deployments... TS 1 p. <i>open 3-17-93 NLJ 91-444</i>	5/4/67	A
72b list	Population and Troop Strengths S 1 p. <i>open 1-20-93 NLJ 91-442</i>	5/1/67	A
73 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam " S 1 p.	5/9/67	A
73a memo	Ginsburgh to Rostow re Vietnam " S 2 pp.	5/8/67	A
74 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Yugoslavia " S 1 p.	5/9/67	A
77 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Uruguay " C 1 p.	5/9/67	A
77b cable	Montevideo 2954 <i>open 2-6-92 NLJ 91-446</i> C 1 p.	5/9/67	A
78 memo	Bator to the Pres. re Kennedy Round S 1 p. <i>open 1-20-93 NLJ 91-442</i>	5/9/67	A
79 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam <i>open 4-7-93 NLJ 91-452</i> TS 2 p. <i>Dupe in Files of WWR, Box 4, Vietnam - WWR #19 Doc #55</i>	5/9/67	A
81 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re India S 2 pp. <i>open 4-7-93 NLJ 91-452</i>	5/9/67	A
81a letter	LBJ to P.M. Gandhi " PCI 3 pp.	5/9/67	A
84 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam <i>exempt NLJ 91-444</i> TS 2 pp. <i>Dupe in Files of WWR, Box 4, Vietnam - WWR #19 Sanitized 1-19-96 NLJ 94-461 Dated 11-4-99 NLJ 98-270</i>	5/9/67	A
89 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>open 4-7-93 NLJ 91-452</i>	5/8/67	A
90 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Germany " S 1 p.	5/8/67	A
90a memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Germany " S 1 p.	5/8/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
93 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 pp. 5-4-95 NLJ 91-441 <i>open</i>	5/8/67	A
93a memo	for the Director S 7 pp. open 9-8-92 NLJ 91-440	5/3/67	A
94a memo	Rostow to the Pres. re China S 3 pp. [duplicate of #7a, NSF, Country File, China, "Visit of C.K. Yen, VP of China," sanitized 1979]	5/8/67	A
96 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Dominican Rep. & Trinidad C 2 pp. open 4-7-93 NLJ 91-452	5/8/67	A
97a letter	LBJ to Pres. of Republic of Honduras " PCI 1 p.	5/9/67	A
99	Duplicate of document #94a		
99a memo	Rusk to the Pres. re China <i>open 2-6-92 NLJ 91-446</i> S 2 pp.	5/5/67	A
99b report	Additional Points which Yen may raise S 3 pp. <i>sanitized 2-6-92 NLJ 91-446</i> <i>sanitized 2-5-01 NLJ 91-446 same</i>	undated	A
100	Duplicate of document #96 <i>open 4-22-99</i>		
101 cable	CAP67413 re Vietnam <i>open 2-6-92 NLJ 91-446</i> S 3 pp.	5/8/67	A
102 cable	CAP67411 re Vietnam <i>open 4-7-93 NLJ 91-452</i> S 1 p.	5/8/67	A
103 cable	CAP67398 re Vietnam NLJ 85-167 TS 4 pp. <i>OPEN 9/29/92</i>	5/6/67	A
104 cable	CAP67407 re Vietnam S 3 pp. <i>open 4-7-93 NLJ 91-452</i>	5/7/67	A
106	Duplicate of document #104 "		
108 cable	CAP67399 re Latin America " C 1 p.	5/6/67	A
109a cable	to foreign office C 1 p. exempt 2-6-92 NLJ 91-446 <i>Open 5/26/00 NLJ 91-446</i>	5/11/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
110 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam C 1 p. open 4-7-93 NLS 91-452	5/6/67	A
112 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Mexico " " C 1 p.	5/5/67	A
114 cable	CAP67373 re foreign relations S 1 p. open 2-6-92 NLS 91-446	5/4/67	A
115 cable	CAP67372 re Korea open 4-7-93 NLS 91-452 C 2 pp.	5/4/67	A
117	Duplicate of document #112. " "		
118 cable	CAP67376 re heads of government meeting S 1 pp. exempt 5-16-92 NLS 91-452 Open 5/26/00 NLS 99-161	5/5/67	A
119 cable	CAP67377 re Vietnam S 4 pp. sanitized 5-4-95 NLS 91-441 sanitized 1-30-01 NLS 99-162 same sani	5/5/67	A
121 cable	CAP67386 re Mexico open 4-7-93 NLS 91-452 C 1 p.	5/5/67	A
122 cable	CAP67378 re USSR open 9-6-95 NLS 91-441 S 9 pp.	5/5/67	A
123 cable	CAP67383 re PM Holt open 4-7-93 NLS 91-452 C 1 p.	5/5/67	A
126 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Lynda's Trip sanitized S 2 pp. same sanitization 4-7-93 NLS 91-452 2-2-01 NLS/RAC 99-86	5/5/67	A
128	Duplicate of document #126		
129 message	Pres. to PM Holt open 4-7-93 NLS 91-452 S 1 p.	5/5/67	A
130 cable	Rostow to Bunker and Komer sanitized 4-7-93 IS 2 pp. sanitized 1-30-01 NLS 99-162 (same sani) Downgraded to Secret per NLS 91-452	5/5/67	A
135a cable	Bonn 13162 open 2-6-92 NLS 91-446 C 2 pp.	5/4/67	A
136 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re USSR open 4-7-93 S 1 p. NLS 91-452	5/4/67	A
137	Duplicate of document #115 open 2-5-99 NLS 91-452		

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138 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Lynda's trip C 1 p. open 8-5-91	5/4/67	A
139 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Israel open 4-22-99 C 1 p. [duplicate of #94a, NSF Country File, "Israel, Vol. 6," sanitized 1981]	5/4/67	A
139a memo	Katzenbach to the Pres. re Israel C 2 pp. open 2-6-92 NLS 91-446 [duplicate of #94b, NSF Country File, "Israel, Vol. 6," exempted 1981]	5/2/67	A
140 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Dominican Republic C 1 p. open 4-7-93 NLS 91-452	5/4/67	A
140a memo	Schultze to the Pres. re Dominican Republic " C 2 pp.	4/24/67	A
140b memo	Gaud to the Pres. re Dominican Republic open C 2 pp. 4-22-99	4/14/67	A
141 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Laos & Vietnam TS 2 pp. open 4-7-93 NLS 91-452	5/4/67	A
145b report	re USSR example NLS 91-440 S 2 pp. sanitized 2-5-01 NLS/RAC 99-87	5/3/67	A
152 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Panama S 1 p. open 4-7-93 NLS 91-452	5/3/67	A
153 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re PM Holt PCI 1 p.	5/3/67	A
153a letter	Holt to LBJ exempt 3-16-92 NLS 91-452 S 4 pp. Open 11/6/00 NLS 99-161	5/3/67	A
155 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. open 4-7-93 NLS 91-452	5/2/67	A
155a report	Possible Recourse to United Nations on Vietnam S 5 pp. open 8-22-92 NLS 91-446	undated	A
155b letter	Goldberg to the Pres. open 2-6-92 NLS 91-446 S 2 pp.	undated	A

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155c report	United Nations Security Council PCI 2 pp. <i>open 8-8-91</i>	undated	A
157a report	re Vietnam TS 2 pp. <i>open 3-17-93 NLJ 91-444</i>	4/67	A
157b map	Vietnam " TS 1 p.	undated	A
159a cable	Wriggins to Rostow <i>open 5-1-99</i> S 2 pp. [duplicate of #98a, NSF Country File, "India, Vol. 9," sanitized 1979]	5/2/67	A
160a letter	LBJ to Pope Paul VI PCI 2 pp. <i>open 4-7-93 NLJ 91-452</i>	5/2/67	A
160b message	from Vatican City <i>exempt 3-16-92 NLJ 91-452</i> PCI 2 pp. <i>Open 5/26/00 NLJ 99-161</i>	4/1/67	A
162a memo	to Pres. re China <i>open 2-6-92 NLJ 91-446</i> S 8 pp. [duplicate of #81a, NSF Country File, "China, Vol. 9"]	5/1/67	A
167 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re India & Pakistan C 1 p. <i>open 4-7-93 NLJ 91-452</i>	5/2/67	A
167a cable	Rawalpindi 4116 " C 1 p.	5/2/67	A
170	Duplicate of document #160a <i>Open 2-5-99 NLJ 91-452</i>		
176a memo	re Vietnam <i>open 9-8-92 NLJ 91-440</i> S 21 pp.	4/19/67	A
184a cable	Djakarta 5171 <i>exempted 2-6-92 NLJ 91-446</i> S 2 p. [duplicate of #6a, NSF Country File, "Indonesia, vol. 7," exempted 1979] <i>open 4-22-99</i>	4/30/67	A
185 memcon	Karl Schiller and Rostow S 2 pp. <i>open 4-7-93 NLJ 91-452</i>	5/1/67	A
186a	Duplicate of document #184a <i>open 4-22-99</i>		

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190 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Korea <i>open 4-7-93</i> C 2 pp. <i>NLS 91-452</i>	5/1/67	A
190a memo	Schultze to the Pres. re Korea " <i>"</i> C 2 pp.	4/21/67	A
192a cable	Mexico City 6060 <i>open 2-6-92 NLS 91-446</i> C 2 pp. [duplicate of #79a, NSF Country File, "Mexico, Vol. 3," exempted 1978]	5/1/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Volume 27,
May 1-15, 1967," Box 16

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[12 of 13]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#25 memo	Rostow to the President - open 4/3/03 NW/RAC 99-181 Top Secret - 1 p [Sanitized, NLJ CBS 19, 10/84]	5/12/67	A
#25a memo	Robert Ginsburgh to Rostow - open 10-23-09 TS 1 p [Sanitized, NLJ/CBS 19, 6/84]	5/12/67	A
#25b map	re Vietnam - open 10-23-09 S 1 p	n.d.	A
#25c cover	cover page open 10-23-09 1 p	5/11/67	A
#116 memo	Rostow to the President - TS 1 p open 3.10.05 NW/RAC 04.3	5/5/67	A
#116a report	intelligence report - TS Sanitized 3.10.05 NW/RAC 04.4 2 p	[5/67]	A
#142 memo	Rostow to the President - TS Sanitized 3.10.05 NW/RAC 04.3 1 p	5/4/67	A
#142a rpt	intelligence report - TS Sanitized 3.10.05 NW/RAC 04.4 2 p	5/4/67	A
#145 memo	Rostow to the President - TS SANITIZED 8.3.05 NLJ/RAC 04.5 1 p	5/3/67	A
#145a rpt	Intelligence report - TS Per 2-12-08 NLJ/RAC 04.6 1 p	5/3/67	A
#149 memo	Rostow to the President - TS SANITIZED 7.28.05 NLJ/RAC 04.5 1 p	5/3/67	A
#172 memo	Rostow to the President - TS open 2.23.04 NW/RAC 04.5 1 p	5/1/67	A

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Walt Rostow

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Volume 27, Mau 1-15, 1967
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#172a cable	intelligence report - TS exempt 2-23-04 NW/RAC 04.6 1 p	5/1/67	A
#179 memo	Rostow to the President - C - Opun 2-23-04 NW/RAC 04.5 1 p	5/1/67	A
#179a rpt	Intelligence report - C Sam 3-30-07 NW/RAC 04.6 1 p	5/1/67	A
#180 memo	Rostow to the President - TS Sanitized 2-23-04 NW/RAC 04.5 1 p	5/1/67	A
#180a rpt	Intelligence report - TS Sanitized 2-23-04 NW/RAC 04.6 2 p exempt	5/1/67	A

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NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Walt Rostow, Memos to the President, Vol. 27
May 1 -15, 1967 Box 16

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added to file 9/11/11
132 B

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
65a memo	Cyrus Vance to the President - S 1 p	5/9/67	A
65b rpt	Enclosure to 65a - S 2 pp	n.d.	A
65c map	Enclosure to 65a - S 1 p	5/1/67	A
65c map	Enclosure to 65a - S 1 p	5/1/67	A
65e map	Enclosure to 65a - S 1 p	5/1/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 27, May 1-15, 1967, Box 16

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May 9, 1967; 7:30 PM

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Mr. President:

Attached is a memo from Secretary Rusk -- with a personal note asking that you agree to see Belgian Vice Prime Minister de Clercq for a few moments on May 17 or 18.

I think the Secretary is right.

Francis M. Bator

Marvin to set up short appointment for
May 17 _____ or May 18 _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 17, 1:00 pm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By lg, NARA, Date 5-6-91

notified s/s, Barbara Young
5/15 12:00 am
notified Bator's of, Doris

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1a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment for Belgian
Vice Prime Minister

Recommendation

That you receive Belgian Vice Prime Minister Willy de Clercq
for a brief 15 minute courtesy call on May 17 or 18.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion

Willy de Clercq, Vice Prime Minister of Belgium, will be in
Washington May 17 and 18 after visiting EXPO '67. The first Belgian
Fulbright grantee to gain cabinet rank, this bright, articulate and
pro-American leader is, at 39, the youngest Vice Prime Minister in
Belgian history. He is also Minister of the Budget and the ranking
Liberal Party member of the Belgian Government.

Mr. de Clercq hopes very much to have the opportunity to meet
you and the Belgian Embassy supports his request.

At considerable political risk, the Belgian Government forthrightly
agreed last year to accept the relocated SHAPE and North Atlantic Council.
Vice President Humphrey in Brussels earlier this month thanked Belgian
officials, including de Clercq, for Belgium's willingness to stand up
and be counted. A brief meeting with de Clercq would provide an occasion
for your personal expression of admiration and gratitude for this action,
and would certainly be very warmly received by our Belgian friends.

*HH was received by all the top Belgians. I'm afraid
reciprocity requires 15 minutes.*

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-446
By *mg* NARA, Date 2-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday, May 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have received Secretary Rusk's recommendations (Tab A) for foreign visitors during the last half of 1967. I believe it is a good schedule.

The core of the proposed schedule is eight visits which you had earlier approved in principle, but which we have not yet been able to schedule. Some others, which you had also approved previously, still cannot be scheduled and are not proposed at this time. In addition, few new visits have been added, but enough flexibility retained to allow for some essential UN General Assembly and EXPO 67 visitors. The question of a Kiesinger visit can be considered separately.

The overall schedule calls for twelve visits. Eight of these would be informal (arrival ceremony, office call, and luncheon or dinner), and four are state visits (greeting, parade, two office meetings, dinner, and attendance at a return reception).

I recommend you approve the entire schedule, subject to a final review of specific dates. But, it is particularly important that you approve the scheduling of those visits which have been carried over. In most instances, invitations have been extended to them with the understanding that specific dates would be worked out later.

The proposed schedule would look like this (carry-over visits are underscored):

<u>August</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
President Houphouet-Boigny, (Informal) Ivory Coast	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>

He is visiting EXPO 67.

<u>September</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
<u>President Bourguiba, Tunisia (State)</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>

Twice postponed -- most recently,
because of his heart attack.

President Diori, Niger	(Informal)	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 5-28-91

<u>September (continued)</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
<u>President Saragat, Italy</u> (Informal)	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>

We had hoped to schedule this in July, but the Italians asked if it could be set to coincide with Saragat's visit to EXPO 67 in Sept.

October

<u>President Diaz Ordaz, Mexico</u> (State)	<u>✓</u> October 27-28	
---	------------------------	--

<u>President Mobutu, Congo</u> (Informal)	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>
---	----------	---------------

An EXPO 67 visitor.

November

<u>King Mahendra, Nepal</u> (State)	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>
-------------------------------------	----------	---------------

Ellsworth Bunker discussed this with you; and the invitation has been accepted. Dates will be set later.

<u>Prime Minister Sato, Japan</u> (Informal)	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>
--	----------	---------------

He has accepted in principle. The question of dates remains.

<u>Crown Prince Vong Savang, Laos</u> (Informal)	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>
--	----------	---------------

December

<u>President Frei, Chile</u> (State)	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>
--------------------------------------	----------	---------------

He cannot come until after Chilean Congress recesses in September.

<u>Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore</u> (Informal)	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>
--	----------	---------------

The possibility of a visit has been discussed with him, and he wants to come.

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- 2 -

<u>December (continued)</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
<u>President Helou, Lebanon</u> (Informal)	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>

His internal politics have delayed this visit, but State believes it is time to try again.

For your information, a schedule of the visits already on the calendar is attached (Tab B).

W. W. Rostow

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 2, 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested Schedule of Visits for
Chiefs of State and Heads of
Government During the Last Part
of 1967

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-446

By WJ NARA, Date 2-3-92

Recommendation:

That you approve the enclosed schedule of suggested visits of Chiefs of State and Heads of Government during the last five months of 1967.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Enclosed is a suggested schedule of visits for August through December of this year. The list includes twelve persons, eight of whom you had approved earlier. Three of these have accepted in principle. Although I believe it would be useful to proceed with arrangements for the visits of these twelve persons, I do not believe that all will be able to fit in visits during the period we are considering.

Seven Chiefs of State whose visits you approved earlier have not been scheduled for one reason or another. They are Kings Baudouin, Olav and Constantine, and Presidents Lleras, Belaunde, Tubman and Obote. We prefer to leave their visits pending for the time being.

Chancellor Kiesinger is not listed on the enclosed schedule but we believe his visit can be included if this proves desirable.

We have attempted to limit the number of suggestions

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Group 3

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-2-

for visits during the months of September and October because of the United Nations General Assembly Session which will probably generate a few visits by Chiefs of State and Heads of Government whom we may wish to suggest you see.

Three of the visitors suggested will be in North America in connection with EXPO '67. The Canadians now expect 17 Heads of State, 11 Heads of Government and 15 lesser heads of delegations to attend EXPO; and there probably will be more. I can assure you that we will be most selective and restrained in recommending which of these leaders you should see.

Your participation in the eight informal visits will be limited to greeting the visitor on arrival, seeing him for an office call, and entertaining him at lunch or dinner.

The four state visits will involve your greeting the visitor on arrival, accompanying him on a parade, meeting with him twice at the White House, giving one State dinner, and attending a return reception.

Besides the schedule, there are enclosed a justification or status report for each of the suggested visits and a calendar of visits now scheduled.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

As stated.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-446

By ~~48~~ NARA. Date 2-3-92

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PROPOSED SCHEDULE OF VISITORS
AUGUST-DECEMBER 1967

<u>Visitor</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Visit</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
<u>AUGUST</u>					
President Houphouet-Boigny*	Ivory Coast	Informal (L)			
<u>SEPTEMBER</u>					
President Bourguiba	Tunisia	State	Approved; invited	___	___
President Diori	Niger	Informal (D)		___	___
President Saragat*	Italy	Informal (D)	Approved	___	___
<u>OCTOBER</u>					
President Diaz Ordaz	Mexico	State	Approved; invited; accepted; no firm dates	___	___
President Mobutu*	Congo	Informal (L)		___	___
<u>NOVEMBER</u>					
King Manendra	Nepal	State	Approved; invited; accepted; no firm dates	___	___

* In connection with EXPO visit.

(L) Lunch

(D) Dinner

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<u>Visitor</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Visit</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
<u>NOVEMBER (Cont.)</u>					
Prime Minister Sato	Japan	Informal (D)	Approved; invited; accepted	___	___
Crown Prince Vong Savang	Laos	Informal (L)		___	___

DECEMBER

President Frei	Chile	State	Approved; invited; postponed	___	___
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew	Singapore	Informal (L)	Approved; invited	___	___
President Helou	Lebanon	Informal (D)	Approved for '66; postponed	___	___

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CURRENT STATUS OF APPROVED VISITS

<u>Visitor</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Visit</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Date</u>
<u>MAY</u>				
Vice President Yen	China	Informal	Announced	May 9
<u>JUNE</u>				
Prime Minister Holt	Australia	Informal	Announced	June 1
Prime Minister Wilson	UK	Informal	Announced	June 2
President Banda	Malawi	Private	Announced	June 8
Shah of Iran	Iran	Informal	Announced	June 12
King Bhumibol	Thailand	Informal	To be announced first week May	June 27
<u>JULY</u>				
President Asgiersson	Iceland	Informal	To be announced after June 11	July 18

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NEEDED FOR
INFORMATION 10036,
SEC. 1.1(c)
BY DCJ 8-8-91

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President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast

Since its independence in 1960, Ivory Coast under President Houphouet-Boigny has been the principal force in the regional Council of the Entente and has provided effective moderate leadership in OCAM (Afro-Malagasy Common Organization), the grouping of fourteen francophone African states. Houphouet-Boigny has consistently backed United States position in the United Nations and in other world and African forums. He has branded the Communist Chinese as a serious threat to Africa and used his influence to marshal African support for Western anti-Communist initiatives, including the action in Viet-Nam. His recent decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union seems to have been based partly on the belief that Ivory Coast should provide other African countries with an example of a restrained relationship with the East. By inviting Houphouet for a visit, the United States would be demonstrating its approval and support for the Western-oriented and pro-US line which Houphouet-Boigny has long and effectively defended in Africa.

Houphouet-Boigny is the driving force behind the astonishing modernization of Ivory Coast. In this country of four million people, which has avoided the political instability that has plagued much of Africa, economic growth has averaged about 9% a year; per capita GNP has passed the \$200 mark, near the top for tropical Africa. Second in the world in tropical wood exports and fourth in coffee and cocoa production, Ivory Coast is engaged in a massive agricultural diversification program. Its liberal investment policies have attracted nearly \$400 million in foreign private capital and fostered the growth of light industry. Ivory Coast is subsidizing development in four of its less-favored neighbor countries.

President Houphouet-Boigny made a State Visit to the United States in May 1962. It has recently been ascertained that he will be visiting Expo 67 this August; thus the time will be particularly opportune for him to make an informal visit to the United States which will give him the opportunity to meet and exchange views with President Johnson.

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President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia

President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia was invited in April 1966 to visit the United States. He accepted in principle, but because of timing and other difficulties it was not feasible to schedule the visit before the end of the year. It was deferred to 1967 by mutual agreement, and June 6 and 7 were chosen for the Washington portion. Unfortunately, President Bourguiba's heart attack on March 15 made it necessary to further postpone his trip. His doctors have expressed the opinion that he will be fully recovered and able to make a visit during the second half of September, at which time he is likely to attend the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. A State Visit to the United States could, therefore, take place between September 15 and 30.

The United States has no more courageously outspoken friend in Africa or the Arab world than President Bourguiba, whose effectiveness is enhanced because he speaks from conviction as a "non-aligned" statesman. His support of the U.S. position in Viet-Nam and on the Communist Chinese menace has been particularly helpful, as has his position on the Palestine problem as well as on African questions. U.S.-Tunisian relations are close and friendly. Tunisia has been a model in the less developed world of political stability and economic growth, based on maximum self-help and effective utilization of foreign aid, of which we have been a major contributor.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-446
By ing NARA, Date 2-3-92

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PRESIDENT HAMANI DIORI OF NIGER

I recommend that you extend an invitation for an official visit to President Hamani Diori of the Republic of Niger as an expression of American appreciation for the responsible policies his Government pursues and of our friendship for the larger groupings of African nations over which he currently presides.

Under his leadership, Niger has consistently maintained pro-Western and pro-American positions on most international issues. President Diori has condemned Chinese Communist subversion in Africa and supported our policies in the Congo and Viet-Nam.

Within Niger, he has pursued a courageous program of austerity and freed the country from dependence upon French budgetary support.

Your invitation to Diori would demonstrate our interest in the two important moderate African groups of nations of which he is currently President, the five-nation Council of the Entente and the fourteen-member OCAM (The African and Malagasy Common Organization).

Diori has been President of Niger since 1960 and has never visited the United States. No other African Chief of State and Head of Government has held office this long in recent years without being officially invited to this country.

President Diori is able to converse in English. I am sure you would find him and his charming wife agreeable and interesting guests.

It would be desirable to have this visit before the November, 1967 meeting of OCAM, when Diori's term as President of the organization will expire.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-446
By ing NARA, Date 2-3-92

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President Giuseppe Saragat of Italy

Last fall you approved in principle an invitation to President Saragat to make a State visit to Washington in July, 1967. Because of the uncertainties of timing we have not been able to schedule dates. However, in view of the warm reception given Vice President Humphrey on his recent trip to Rome, and indications that an invitation to President Saragat to come to Washington in September in connection with his visit to Expo '67 would be most welcome, we recommend that an invitation be extended for an informal visit in mid-September. The early arrangement of the visit would demonstrate the continuing closeness of United States-Italian relations and might well contribute to greater Italian support and understanding for our policies on the non-proliferation treaty, the Kennedy Round trade negotiations and Viet-Nam.

President Saragat will be in Canada on September 11-16 and will then visit Japan, Australia and Iran before returning to Rome. He has not visited the United States since becoming President. He last visited Washington in January, 1964, when, as Foreign Minister, he accompanied President Segni. The last Italian to make an official visit was Prime Minister Moro in April, 1965.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-446
By ug NARA, Date 2-3-92

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President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico

During your conversation with President Diaz Ordaz at Punta del Este, April 12, he accepted your invitation to visit the United States as soon as Mexico completes its bridge construction at the Chamizal, which he thought would be either late September or October. You told him that any date was acceptable to you.

The upcoming visit by Diaz Ordaz in effect will be in return for your visits to Mexico City on April 15, 1966 and to Ciudad Acuna on December 3, 1966 and will reinforce the close understanding and cordial relationship you now have with the Mexican President. The visit also offers the opportunity for both of you to participate in the formal transfer of the Chamizal tract.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-446
By ig, NARA, Date 2-3-92

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President Joseph Desire Mobutu of
The Democratic Republic of the Congo

I recommend that you invite President Joseph Desire Mobutu of Congo (K) to make an official visit to Washington during the last three months of 1967. Such a visit could be linked to his expected trip to Expo 67, probably in October. This visit is of particular importance for the following reasons: He would be the first Congolese Chief of State to visit the United States; his country because of its geographic location, size and economic potential is the key country from a strategic standpoint in Central Africa; Mobutu and his country are playing an increasingly important role in inter-African politics as evidenced by their persuading the OAU to hold its next Chiefs of State meeting at Kinshasa; the Congo has been named one of the countries of concentration under our new aid criteria; Mobutu has closely identified the national interests of the Congo and the fortunes of his regime with the United States and, within his personal limitations, can be a key factor in helping advance US interests in Central Africa and beyond.

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NJ 91-446
By sig NARA, Date 2-3-92

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King Mahendra of Nepal

King Mahendra and Queen Ratna of Nepal have accepted your invitation to pay a State Visit to the United States this fall. Nepal is a country of strategic importance to India and to us, for it occupies over 500 miles of the military frontier of the subcontinent bordering Communist Chinese-held Tibet. Sandwiched between two great neighbors, Nepal has sought to maintain its independence of both. Ruler of virtually an absolute monarchy, King Mahendra is a unifying and stabilizing force in this underdeveloped country. With our assistance he has taken cautious steps to give Nepal a kind of "basic democracy." The United States has had good relations over the years with Nepal, and this visit should show clearly to the King our continuing interest in him as the principal political force in Nepal. The visit will also give needed encouragement to his and Nepalese determination to maintain independence from external pressures, particularly those exerted by Communist China.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-446
By 48 NARA, Date 2-3-92

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Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan

An invitation to Prime Minister Sato for a brief, informal visit to Washington is recommended for several reasons.

First, Japan has in the past few years increasingly exercised a constructive leadership role in Asia compatible with its very considerable power potential. Recently, the Japanese Government has become increasingly interested in the Pacific Community concept in which the Japanese see themselves aligned with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States in promoting economic assistance and technical development to Southeast Asia. A visit to Washington by Sato can be important in reinforcing an identity of purpose and parallelism of action in Asia between ourselves and the Japanese as well as in stimulating even broader efforts by Japan in the area.

Second, our alliance relationship with Japan in Asia is assuming an importance comparable to our relationships with our key partners in Europe, the UK and Germany. Personal talks with the Japanese at the highest level are essential to the vitality of this relationship. The Prime Minister has not been here since he visited in January 1965, and a visit by the Prime Minister during 1967 is desirable.

Finally, the Prime Minister has just been re-elected in his own right after having replaced the ailing Prime Minister Ikeda in November 1964. The January elections can be considered approval of his policies by the Japanese public and afford the Prime Minister more freedom to push more vigorously the basic policy lines he has pursued in the past. Thus, a visit after Sato's election victory with renewed popular support would be most timely.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-446
By up NARA, Date 2-3-92

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Crown Prince Vong Savang of Laos

I recommend that you invite the Crown Prince and Princess to visit the United States informally this fall. The visit would bring Prince Vong Savang to this country for the first time and provide Washington officials an opportunity to know at first-hand the future ruler of this strategically important Southeast Asian kingdom.

The 35-year old Crown Prince's participation in Lao domestic and foreign affairs has markedly broadened in the last two years. He is attracting increasingly favorable attention, particularly among the young elements that will form the nation's future leadership. He has paid official visits to Japan, Australia and India, and his friendliness and good sense made a favorable impression, particularly on his Australian hosts.

Though publicly committed to neutrality for Laos, both the Crown Prince and the King have openly condemned North Vietnam's aggression in Laos in violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements. Privately, both the King and Crown Prince have warmly endorsed United States policy and operations in both Laos and Vietnam.

With an appropriate itinerary through the United States, the Crown Prince's visit would strengthen the good relations we now enjoy with the Lao Royal Family and Souvanna Phouma's government, reemphasize our support of Lao resistance to North Vietnamese aggression, and earn considerable good-will for the United States.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By fw, NARA, Date 4-22-99

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President Frei of Chile

You will recall that President Frei was forced to postpone his February visit when the Chilean Senate in a surprise move denied him permission to leave Chile. At that time you wrote him that the invitation was still open for a mutually convenient date later this year. He has stated that he will not accept the Senate rejection as final and that he will find a Constitutionally acceptable means to make the visit.

A liberal democrat and a strong supporter of the principles of the Alliance for Progress, Frei is most anxious to discuss with you his reform program and to show appreciation for U.S. moral and financial support.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-446
By inf NARA, Date 2-3-92

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Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore

I recommend that you authorize us to schedule an informal visit to the United States this year for Prime Minister Lee. Meetings with senior American officials would assist in convincing Lee that we are interested in Singapore's welfare, a fact which he has tended to doubt because of Singapore's small size and primarily Chinese population. The effect of such meetings on Lee's thinking has already been demonstrated by his more friendly stance toward the United States following his discussions with Assistant Secretary Bundy in February 1966.

An invitation to visit the United States and meetings with senior officials would undoubtedly play upon Lee's considerable egoism. The gain for us in this case would probably be more favorable treatment of the United States in Lee's rather frequent public comments on such key matters as Communist China, Viet-Nam and Afro-Asian affairs.

Additionally, an invitation to the United States and the concomitant increase in prestige and confidence in Lee as a leader could strengthen the position of the non-Communist forces in Singapore. This seems particularly necessary at this time when Singapore is facing a period of economic stress marked by severe unemployment.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 4-22-99

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Helou of Lebanon

On May 16, 1966, you approved in principle an informal working visit of President Charles Helou of Lebanon. For internal Lebanese political and economic reasons, President Helou has been unable so far to agree on an exact time for the visit. But we believe it would be useful to extend the invitation again and think he may accept this time.

President Helou, now almost half way through his six-year term, has successfully carried through major portions of a precedent-setting administrative reform program; has pursued Lebanon's traditional role as a moderator in inter-Arab affairs; and has built up his public image as a farsighted statesman of unquestioned integrity.

A visit by President Helou during the last quarter of 1967 would be an appropriate way for the United States to demonstrate its support of a democratic Lebanon and its interest in bolstering the forces of moderation in the area during a period when the Western position in the Middle East is likely to be under mounting pressure.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-446
By 48 NARA, Date 2-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2p

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CURRENT STATUS OF APPROVED VISITS

<u>Visitor</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Visit</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Date</u>
<u>MAY</u>				
Vice President Yen	China	Informal	Announced	May 9
<u>JUNE</u>				
Prime Minister Holt	Australia	Informal	Announced	June 1
Prime Minister Wilson	UK	Informal	Announced	June 2
President Banda	Malawi	Private	Announced	June 8
Shah of Iran	Iran	Informal	Announced	June 12
King Bhumibol	Thailand	Informal	To be announced first week May	June 27
<u>JULY</u>				
President Asgiersson	Iceland	Informal	To be announced after June 11	July 18

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY W. P. DCH ON 2-13-92

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-442
By JW, NARA, Date 1-13-93

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 1, 1967 -- 1:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk turned the conversation with Schiller on money over to me last Wednesday morning.

To clarify a somewhat obscure reporting cable from Bonn, I am making this memo available to Joe Fowler, etc.

I thought it might interest you -- quite hopeful.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

Monday, May 15, 1967
7:15 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Messrs. Feinberg and Ginsburg

I am attaching two memos on the Israeli aid package for your reference. The first (Tab A) is the full description of the package. The second (Tab B) is a note describing the disadvantages of urging the Israelis to buy the Italian-made version of our APC.

You will know how far you want to go in discussing this package with them. Ambassador Harman has simply been told that the package "will substantially meet their requests."

I have put to Gene the question of sending the Vice President to Israel and Egypt. Luke Battle thinks it's a good idea, but Secretary Rusk may not agree. However, we cannot decide until the Egyptians come through on their promise to get our AID fellows out of jail in Yemen and until the threat of war between Israel and Syria lessens.

In hearing their report on their trip to Israel, you may want to ask whether they have any feeling for Eshkol's intention to attack Syria. Border tension mounted sharply over the weekend after Eshkol and the Israeli Chief of Staff threatened an attack if terrorist raids from Syria into Israel continue. The UAR has ostentatiously put its forces on alert.

We sympathize with Eshkol's need to stop these raids and reluctantly admit that a limited attack may be his only answer. However, without preaching, you would be justified in letting these gentlemen know that a miscalculation causing a Mid-East blow-up right now would make life awfully hard for you. We want to make Eshkol think twice without giving him cause to blame us for holding him back if events later prove that a limited attack now would have been the best answer.

W. W. R.

Attachments (tabs A and B)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-161
By JSH, NARA Date 5-22-00

1. map
2. Pres file

SECRET/SENSITIVE

May 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israeli Aid Package

We now know enough informally about the AEC's inspection of Dimona to wrap up the Israeli aid package. Secretaries McNamara and Katzenbach have acquiesced (Tab A) in most of Arthur Goldberg's proposals (Tab B). I have outlined the resulting package on the attached chart. It gives the Israelis almost everything they want, except on APC's.

The one major difference between Arthur's recommendation and the Secretaries' indicates the Secretaries' continuing concern over providing APC's. They propose only that we license sale of 100 APC's for cash, while Arthur recommends credit sale on non-concessional terms.

The main issue remains how closely we should identify ourselves with Israel in view of its unclear nuclear intentions and our interests in the Arab world. I understand--and share--your desire to do everything we can to help the Israelis. On the other hand, we know that every request they make is not only a request for help but part of an effort to maneuver us into closer and closer identification. They feel they've made a breakthrough in the tank and plane sales and are pushing hard to exploit it.

The AEC team found no evidence that Israel is using Dimona to produce material for use in nuclear weapons. While this conclusion is encouraging, it can't tell us one way or the other whether Israel may be pressing a clandestine weapons program elsewhere. Secretary Katzenbach concludes (Tab C) that Israel is carefully preserving its option to produce nuclear weapons on short notice if it needs to. Our intelligence proves nothing, but there are enough unanswered questions to make us want to avoid getting locked in too closely with Israel.

In addition, State and Defense worry about our substantial interests in the Arab world. I know you are keenly aware of our oil interests (\$2.75 billion investment, \$750 million in yearly profits in production alone plus downstream operations) and of our obligations to our Arab friends. Our greatest single liability there--and one of the USSR's greatest assets--is the sincere Arab belief that the "Zionists exercise a veto on US policy."

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ FR45 64-68, Vol. 18 Doc. 415
By JPW, NARA Date 7-21-00

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 2 -

These important concerns account for the rough passage this package has had. The alternative to selling APC's now would be to tell the Israelis that our agreement to their full requests for credit on military spares (\$14 million) is all we can do this year but that we'll consider the APC's along with other requests they've already made for the next generation of Israeli weapons. In fact, that \$14 million alone is a substantial concession--larger than the whole cost of the Jordan package (\$12 million) including airlift costs. If you approve APC's, we will need to control publicity.

I've set up the attached chart as your decision document. We might gain some points by giving the Israelis our decision before their Independence Day (15 May), especially if we don't go to their parade. Secretary Katzenbach will send a separate memo on desalting.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

May 8, 1967

ISRAELI AID PACKAGE

ISRAELI REQUEST

KATZENBACH-McNAMARA-GOLDBERG
PROPOSAL

YOUR DECISION

1. Military grant
 - a. \$7.4 million for 200 APC's
 - b. \$2 million for tank spares.

1. No grant; sell 100 APC's (\$3.7 million)
 - a. Katzenbach recommends cash sale. Goldberg, non-concessional credit.
 - b. No grant.

1. a. No APC's now _____
Sell 100 for cash _____
Sell 100 for credit _____
b. Approve _____

2. Military credit: \$14 million
in Hawk and tank spares.

2. \$14 million on 3.5% terms of original
deal (Alternative: current terms, 5-6%).

2. Approve 3.5% _____
Current terms _____

3. Food: \$27.6 million; local
currency (or some dollar
sales--20 years at 2.5%).

3. \$26.5 million; 50% dollar, 20 years at
2.5% interest. (Alternative: 3.5-4.5%)

3. Approve proposal _____
3.5% interest _____

4. AID Loans: \$20 million.

4. No AID loans; up to \$20 million Ex-Im.
(Goldberg suggests \$10 million in AID
but is not adamant.)

4. Approve Ex-Im _____
\$10 million AID _____

3.4(b)(1)

5.

5. Approve _____

6. Hawk missile maintenance--
administrative clearance.

6. Agree.

6. Approve _____

7. Off-shore procurement for
US aid programs.

7. Agree for 12 months.

7. Approve _____

TOTAL - \$76 million.

TOTAL - \$65.5 - 69.2 million.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-4
By SJ NARA, Date 6-27-02

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5b

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

91-446

By ig NARA, Date 2-3-92

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Military and Economic Assistance to Israel

In accordance with your latest request, I submit the following recommendations for responding to Israel's assistance requests:

I. MILITARY

A. We agree to sell for cash, rather than grant, 100 M-113 A1 armored personnel carriers. This is half the number Israel requested from us on a grant basis. The value of this is about \$3.7 million. Israel should be requested to limit or avoid publicity on the transaction. Key Congressmen should be briefed, using modernization needs as the basic justification for licensing the sale.

B. We will do our utmost to assure delivery on schedule in December 1967 of the four Skyhawk A-4H aircraft Israel is buying from us. Delivery of the balance of the order will be made as the aircraft are available. It is not possible to provide eight planes in December.

C. We agree to Israel's request to establish "fifth echelon" facilities for the Hawk missile system insofar as such facilities relate to maintenance rather than production or resale of missiles.

D. We agree, as a one-time exception to policy, to provide \$4 million credit for Hawk missile spare parts and \$10 million for Patton tank spare parts. The terms should

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

be the terms of the original contracts: i.e., a 3-1/2 percent interest rate and a repayment period of 10 years. To overcome the objection that this would establish a precedent in a supplementary credit deal, the original contracts could be re-written to make this credit part of the original commitments.

E. We must defer consideration of Israel's April 17, 1967 request to purchase 400 United States-made Continental diesel engines to modernize its fleet of 385 British-made Centurion tanks, pending a study of our own programming requirements.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

II. ECONOMIC

A. We cannot agree to Israel's request for development loans of \$20 million. (This would be over and above the \$6 million already authorized for FY 1967 out of reprogrammed FY 1963 funds.) We invite Israel, however, to discuss its development financing requirements with the Export-Import Bank. We should assure Israel that we will urge the Export-Import Bank to consider promptly and favorably loan requests of up to \$20 million.

B. We agree to Israel's request for permission to bid on AID supporting assistance purchases of potash and phosphate fertilizers primarily for South Viet Nam and South Korea for a period not to exceed 12 months. This is also to our advantage since it involves Israel further in aid to South Viet Nam.

C. We agree to provide Food-for-Freedom program commodities, excluding wheat, up to \$26.5 million provided this will result in no displacement of usual marketings and subject to availability of commodities in the U.S. and the capacity of Israel to import such commodities within the term of the agreement. Israel's request is for \$27-28 million in commodities; the original request for \$35-36 million included wheat valued at about \$8 million, but Israel withdrew the wheat request because of a favorable

~~SECRET~~

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- 3 -

crop forecast. Financing terms should be somewhat harder than last year. (We are thinking of the same 20 year repayment period and the same 2-1/2 percent interest rate as in last year's agreement, but of a 50-50 split between local currency and dollar credits rather than last year's 75 percent local currency and 25 percent dollar credit sales.)

D. We will give sympathetic consideration to further support of Israel's assistance programs in Africa along the lines of past support for programs which indirectly benefit us (Central African Republic, Chad, and Dahomey), within the limitations imposed by the revised strategy for United States aid to Africa.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

I will forward a recommendation on the continuation of the American-Israel Joint Desalting project in a separate memorandum.


Under Secretary

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

YURC 6-2424

May 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
The White House

Military and Economic Assistance to Israel

As requested I have reviewed the recommendations from the Department and it is my own recommendation that you respond to Israel's request as follows:

I. Military

A. You authorize the sale rather than grant of 100 APC's to Israel, half the number Israel has requested on a grant basis -- on current non-concessional credit terms. The delivery schedule should be based simply on availability rather than stretched-out delivery. Israel should be requested to limit or avoid publicity on the transaction. Key congressmen should be briefed, using modernization needs as the basic justification for the sale. In my view there will be no difficulty with the Congress on this point. This is in essence the fallback recommendation of the Department except for the delivery schedule which the Department would stretch out and which in my view is unnecessarily harsh on Israel.

B. I agree with the Department's recommendation that if manufacturing facilities for the Skyhawk A-4H aircraft make a speed up impossible, we will not be able to grant this request. It should be recalled, however, that at the time of the Jordan proceedings in the Security Council we did commit ourselves to a expedited schedule for delivery of these airplanes.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-446

By up NARA, Date 2-3-92

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~~SECRET~~

-2-

C. I agree with the Department's recommendation that we agree to Israel's request to establish "fifth echelon" facilities for the Hawk missile system insofar as such facilities relate to maintenance rather than production or resale of missiles.

D. I recommend that we agree, as a one time exception to policy, to provide \$4 million credit for Hawk spare parts and \$10 million for tank spare parts, this latter figure being the figure mentioned in the original deal. The Department's fallback position calls for a \$9 million credit. I believe we can meet Israel's request for an additional \$5 million credit, since a credit rather than a grant is involved and the difference is relatively small. The terms should not be the more onerous terms proposed by the Department but rather the terms of the original deal; i.e., a 3½% interest rate and a pay back period of 10 years. To overcome the objection that this would establish a precedent in a supplementary credit deal, the original contract could be re-written to make this credit part of the original commitment.

II. Economic

A. Israel has requested development loans of \$20 million. The Department would deny this request and refer Israel to the Export-Import Bank. I recognize the difficulties involved ~~here~~ but perhaps we could consider settling this request, as was ~~done~~ last year, by a \$10 million development loan and by a \$10 million export-import bank loan, or if this is not possible, by assuring prompt and favorable consideration of the \$20 million loan by the Bank.

B. I agree with the Department's recommendation that we agree to Israel's request for permission to bid on AID supporting assistance purchases of potash and phosphate fertilizers primarily for South Viet Nam and South Korea for a period not to exceed 12 months. This is also to our advantage since it involves Israel in aid to South Viet Nam.

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PRESERVATION COPY

C. I recommend that we agree to Israel's request for commodities under the Food-for-Freedom Program by providing commodities, excluding wheat, of 26.5 million on the basis of Israel's requirements and our own availabilities. Israel has asked for \$35-36 million including wheat. The Department recommends a range of \$19 to \$23.5 million. I believe the figure I suggest \$26.5 million is a good compromise. The Department's proposals, moreover, are too severe with respect to payment and Israel's are too liberal. I suggest a compromise, i.e., 50% local currency and 50% dollar credit sales to be paid over twenty years but at the same interest rate as last year, i.e., 2½%.


D. I agree with the Department's proposal that we give sympathetic consideration to further support of Israel's assistance programs in Africa along the lines of past support for programs which indirectly benefit us (Central African Republic, Chad, and Dahomey), within the limitations imposed by the revised strategy for United States aid to Africa.

General Comment:

What I have suggested, in my view, is a reasonable compromise which will be acceptable to the Israelis and to American public opinion and would not prejudice our relations with Arabic states.

Finally, I should like to suggest as a replacement for Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker as your representative on the American-Israel Joint Nuclear Desalinization project that you consider the appointment of Jack Valenti. This would follow the tradition of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower who appointed Jack's predecessor at the Motion Picture Association, Eric Johnston, as a special Ambassador in this area. Jack Valenti shares your concern, vision and foresight in this vital area and would bring a practical rather than a bureaucratic approach to the solution of the problems involved. This, I know, would be a highly agreeable appointment to all concerned.

Respectfully submitted,


Arthur J. Goldberg

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5d

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-5
By is, NARA Date 2-2-00

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 1, 1967

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Arab-Israel Arms Race and Status
of U.S. Arms Control Efforts

Conventional Forces. Israel has a safe margin of superiority over any combination of Arab forces likely to attack it and can be expected to maintain that position for at least the next five years. Arab numerical force superiority is more than matched by Israel's superiority in training, leadership, military doctrine and maintenance of equipment. Moreover, the Arab states have made little progress in military coordination among themselves. Recent border clashes have demonstrated that short of general hostilities, or Israeli occupation of Arab territory, the Arab states will not rush to one another's assistance. In practical terms, therefore, Israel's security must be measured by its ability to maintain military superiority over the UAR, the strongest single Arab state that can challenge Israel.

Nuclear Weapons. Concerned that over the long run the Arabs will achieve superiority in conventional forces, Israel is carefully preserving its option to acquire sophisticated weapons, including, we believe, nuclear weapons. We have no evidence that Israel is actually making a bomb, but we believe Israel intends to keep itself in a position to do so at reasonably short notice should the need arise. The Israeli reactor at Dimona is capable of producing enough plutonium to make one or two bombs a year, but thus far our periodic inspections of this facility (most recently on April 22, 1967) have uncovered no evidence of weapons activity. Our inspectors emphasize, however, that their visits cover only the Dimona site and there can be no assurance that the Israelis are not pursuing a clandestine weapons program elsewhere. Our suspicions that we do not know the full story have been heightened by the Israelis' unwillingness to

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic downgrading
and declassification.

✓

tell us what happened to 80-100 tons of unsafeguarded uranium concentrate that they bought from Argentina 4 years ago. We have also had reports that Israel has acquired a nuclear chemical separation plant, which - if true - would be a significant step toward a weapons capability. These reports are being urgently investigated.

On the Arab side, no state is anywhere near a nuclear weapons capability. The UAR has a small 2-megawatt research reactor which cannot produce significant amounts of plutonium.

Both Eshkol and Nasser are on record as saying that their countries will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. Beyond this, however, neither the Egyptians nor the Israelis have accepted IAEA safeguards over their entire nuclear programs, in spite of our urging them to do so. The UAR's position is that so far they have nothing that requires safeguarding whereas Israel does and should therefore be the one that takes the first step. Israel's position is more complex. Israelis have stressed to us their concern that information obtained by IAEA inspectors, which might be available to the UAR, could aid the latter in planning a military or sabotage operation against Dimona. In terms of their long-range security the Israelis may also have decided that they will not accept limitations upon their sophisticated weapon option in the absence of Arab arms control undertakings in the conventional field.

Ballistic Missiles. Israel has contracted with the French firm of Dassault to purchase an unknown quantity of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. These missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads and would not be militarily cost-effective unless so used. The missile (designated the MD-620) is now being flight-tested by the French. None have apparently been delivered to Israel as yet, but initial deliveries could take place sometime in 1968. Latest evidence indicates that, despite some difficulties with the guidance system, the MD-620 program is moving forward. Israel is also pursuing an indigenous SSM R&D program.

The UAR's SSM program, though widely advertised for many years, has reached a virtual standstill. Most of the West German scientists who were assisting this effort have departed. Flight testing of the UAR missiles has been suspended, and it is estimated that the missile program, at its present level of activity, could not be successfully completed within the next decade.

Soviet Policy. Although the Soviets have gained much from their large sales of conventional weapons to certain Arab countries, we believe it unlikely that they will help any Arab state toward a nuclear weapons capability. There is similarly no hard evidence of Soviet assistance on the UAR's missile program.

U.S. Initiatives. The coming months may well offer our best opportunity in years to press for our arms control objectives because of two possible forms of additional leverage -- first, a non-proliferation treaty, and second, U.S. willingness to finance desalting plants in the area. We plan to pursue our objectives along the following lines.

1. Safeguards and the NPT. We hope the non-proliferation treaty will prove to be a vehicle to help us get both Israel and the UAR to accept safeguards over their nuclear programs. Much will depend on whether the treaty emerges with a strong safeguards clause. As soon as the U.S. is ready to table a draft treaty at the ENDC, we plan to discuss it with the Israelis and the UAR. We are also exploring ways of overcoming Israel's suspicions of the IAEA, including the possibility of getting Israel a seat on the IAEA Board of Governors.

2. Ballistic Missiles. In May last year we raised with Eshkol our concern over Israel's plans to acquire ballistic missiles. Eshkol said Israel would not acquire SSM's "for two, maybe three years". He indicated that if Nasser "abandoned" his missile program, Israel would do likewise. Since the UAR's program has remained inactive in the intervening year, we plan to raise this again with Eshkol in the near future. Our objective is to try to achieve a tacit understanding with the Israelis and Egyptians for mutual forbearance in the further development of their SSM programs. If Eshkol is receptive, we are prepared to approach Nasser.

3. Talks with the Soviets. Our probes of the Soviets concerning arms control in the Arab-Israel context have elicited little show of interest thus far. We do not expect that the Soviets will be receptive to an approach on controlling the supply of conventional weapons. However, depending on the course of U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty, we may have a renewed opportunity to take up the problem of nuclear weapons and missiles in the Near East.

4. Put More Punch Into Our Arms Control Discussions with the Israelis. We are disappointed not only in the lack of progress of our arms control discussions with the Israelis but in the lack of Israeli candor that has characterized them. There is a large area of Israeli activity and planning that is a closed book to us. During the coming year we would like to see arms control results linked more directly to Israel's requests for military and economic aid.

Continuing Intelligence Surveillance. While our inspections of Dimona can reassure us concerning activities there, they leave open the possibility of Israeli weapons activity somewhere else in Israel. For this reason continuing surveillance of Israel by every means at our disposal must remain a high priority intelligence requirement. We intend also to keep a watch on Israeli efforts to acquire in other countries equipment and technology related to nuclear weapon and missile programs.


Under Secretary

Monday, May 15, 1967, 5:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

In the attached, Henry Brandon asks if you can spend a few minutes this week with Frank Giles, Deputy Editor of The Sunday Times.

I ~~well~~ recall your admonition that we keep down requests from foreign newsmen, but am nonetheless ready to put my head on the block once more. Brandon is a good friend of the Administration, and Giles has influence.

Francis M. Bator

Marvin to set up a short meeting with Giles _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

FMB:mst

Forwarded without
comment.
WP

Pres. saw
5/18 & 5/19

Pres file

Monday, May 15, 1967 -- 7:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

By coincidence, I had Dave Bronheim to lunch at noon today, and the Vice President's attached memorandum arrived this evening.

Bronheim is leaving, weary of the bureaucratic battle for limited Latin American autonomy in the AID field.

The problem is less Bill Gaud than his bureaucrats who find ways to make it clear they don't like the arrangement.

I agree with the Vice President's judgment that:

- the arrangement you made with Tom Mann is sound;
- it should be reaffirmed strongly when the new Assistant Secretary is chosen.

I would add that a vigorous follow-through on the Summit decisions requires this kind of unified drive by the new Assistant Secretary and his AID man for Latin America.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



72
THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

May 8, 1967
6:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM

TO : Walt Rostow

FROM: The Vice President *W.H.*

It has come to my attention that the system which the President initiated in December of 1963 whereby the Latin American Bureaus in State and AID were fused under one man and enjoyed a certain autonomy, has suffered a certain erosion in recent months. This is particularly true in regard to the relationship of the Latin American Bureau in AID and the Central AID administration. There is some concern felt in the Congress about this and I thought I would pass this on in case you might want to inform the President.

It is my impression that the system has worked well. It is one of the principal reasons why the United States machinery for implementing the Alliance for Progress has functioned more smoothly and effectively than prior to 1963. I have been told that the arrangement worked out between Tom Mann and Dave Bell

has been called into question in recent months, and that considerable efforts have been made to impose agency-wide regulations upon the Latin American Bureau of AID. This has created considerable difficulty in the operation of the Latin American Bureau. One of the consequences is the impending departure of the Deputy United States Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, Mr. David Bronheim (who was one of the Fleming Award winners in 1966) who is said to be leaving principally for this reason.

As always, such special arrangements tend to slide unless periodically reaffirmed. With the appointment of a new Assistant Secretary and United States Coordinator anticipated shortly, it might be worthwhile to reaffirm the Presidential commitment to the special arrangements which were announced in 1963. The autonomy and flexibility which have resulted from this arrangement are essential if the commitments made by our Government at Punta del Este are to be effectively implemented.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, May 15, 1967
7:12 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Nat Davis reports
on the latest "near-miss" in the
Sea of Japan.

Our ships exit about 10:00 p. m.
tonight Washington time.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlm

8
Pres file
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-442
By *ju*, NARA, Date 1-13-93

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

May 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. W.W. ROSTOW
MR. F.M. BATOR

SUBJECT: Task Force in the Sea of Japan

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-442
By , NARA, Date 1-13-93

As you know, the Korean press has reported another "near-miss" between a Soviet destroyer and our vessels in the Sea of Japan.

Our Navy's account is briefly this: During joint maneuvers between Korean naval vessels and ours, a Soviet destroyer once again began to harass our ships. The Soviet destroyer started belching black and white smoke, indicating a real or simulated engine difficulty, and hoisted a signal saying they were having trouble. Under the rules of the road, this requires other ships to keep out of their way. Nevertheless, the Soviet ship resumed its harassing operation at a 25-knot clip while still flying its trouble signal. It approached our submarines and the destroyer posted with it. In the maneuvering which followed, our destroyer developed real engine trouble. Nobody touched. Our Admiral reports, incidentally, that the Soviets are using highly-sophisticated photographic equipment when shadowing our vessels.

The Navy reports that our joint maneuvers with the Koreans will be completed by 10:00 p.m. tonight Washington time. Our Task Force will then steam toward the Port of Sasebo, Japan, expecting to arrive at about 5:00 p.m. Washington time tomorrow.


Nathaniel Davis

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVAL MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT

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COMNAVAFRAC
COMCRUDESPAC
COMDESRON ELEVEN
USS EVANS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-445
By ijg, NARA, Date 10-30-91

~~BATOR~~
~~BOWEN~~
~~BUDGET~~
~~LAWS~~
~~GINSBERG~~
~~HAMILTON~~
~~JESUP~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~JORDAN~~
~~KEENE~~
~~KELLEY~~
~~MOYERS~~
~~TAYLOR~~
~~WHIGGINS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOVIET HARASSMENT OF COMBINED ASW EXERCISES DURING SEA F JAPAN
TRANSIT (C)

1. ON 14 MAY 1967 USS EVANS, USS RAZORBACK, ROKN KYONG NAM AND ROKN CHUNG NAM WERE CONDUCTING COORDINATED TACTICAL EXERCISES IN THE VICINITY OF 38-33, 132-22. SOVIET DD-074 JOINED THE GROUP IN COLUMN AND THEN PROCEEDED UP THE STARBOARD SIDE OF THE COLUMN AT 500 YARDS DISTANCE. AT 1027(1) DD-074 EMITTED HEAVY BLACK AND WHITE SMOKE, WENT DEAD IN THE WATER, AND DISPLAYED ONE BLACK BALL FROM THE PORT YARD ARM. AT 1529(1) DD-074 ATTEMPTED TO ENTER THE EXERCISE AREA AT 20 KNOTS, EVANS INTERPOSED BETWEEN DD-074 AND RAZORBACK (ON THE SURFACE). DD-074 SLOWED, APPEARED TO HAVE ANOTHER ENGINEERING CASUALTY, WENT DEAD IN THE WATER AND DISPLAYED ONE BLACK BALL FROM HER PORT YARD ARM. RAZORBACK REQUESTED EXERCISE BE DELAYED WHILE DD-074 WAS IN THE AREA. RAZORBACK PROCEEDED AWAY FROM DD-074 AND EMITTING HEAVY SMOKE. EVANS REMAINED BETWEEN RAZORBACK AND DD-074. AT 1657(1) DD-074 AGAIN ATTEMPTED TO CLOSE RAZORBACK. DD-074 WITH INCREASED SPEED AND MANEUVERED TO PASS ASTERN OF EVANS AND CLOSE THE SUBMERGED RAZORBACK. EVANS ATTAINED 25 KNOTS WHILE PREVENTING DD-074 FROM CLOSING RAZORBACK. DD-074 STILL DISPLAYING THE SINGLE BLACK BALL AT HER PORT YARD ARM. AFTER A PERIOD OF HEAVY MANEUVERING DD-074 CROSSED EVANS STERN WITH A CP OF 50 FEET. EVANS PARALLELED

33(8) ACT

02702A

04(4) 00(2) 09(1) 09B(1) 03(1) 31(2) 32(4) 34(2) 05(7)
50(16) 51(1) 60(3) 61(2) 94(15) 95(4) 96(2) 007(8) FP(5)
5FR(1) NCSH(16) OPA(1) + 92 IP

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AT 650 YARDS UNTIL DD-074 INCREASED SPEED TO OVER 28 KNOTS AND MADE A HIGH SPEED END AROUND MANEUVER. AT 1818(1) EVANS EXPERIENCED A CASUALTY TO HER NUMBER ONE BOILER AND COULD MAKE ONLY 20 KNOTS. RAZORBACK SURFACED AT 1820(1) AND DD-074 CONTINUED HER HIGH SPEED RUN TOWARD RAZORBACK. EVANS CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN STATION BETWEEN DD-074 AND RAZORBACK. AT 1833(1) DD-074 AND EVANS BEGAN SLOWING UNTIL AT 1845(1) THEY WERE AT 2 KNOTS.

2. THE APPEARANCE OF PROFESSIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT ABOARD DD-074 AND ITS CONTINUED USE THROUGHOUT THIS AND OTHER ENCOUNTERS LENDS CREDENCE TO THE SUPPOSITION THAT THESE "INCIDENTS" PLANNED, HARASSMENT INTERFERRED WITH CONDUCTING THIS COMBINED ASW EXERCISE.

CP 3

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-86
By cb, NARA Date 2-2-01

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 15, 1967
7:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith two accounts of
conversations with Helmut Schmidt,
Parliamentary leader of the German
Socialists:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

-- a discussion with me.

Walt. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ /CAC 99-86
By cb, NARA Date 1-4-01

Helmut Schmidt, Parliamentary leader of the Social Democrats in Germany, called on me on Friday, May 12. The following points emerged.

1. He thinks the Germans have made much too much fuss about the NPT. They should ask for no more concessions and sign it. He believes it is much more important and difficult for the Indians than the Germans.

2. He said that 90% or 95% of all Germans in Parliament believe that a strong alliance with the U.S. and a strong Atlantic are essential. This even includes such pseudo-Gaullists as Gutenberg. He said that they would wish to do whatever they could to help the U.S. He asked what do you want Germany to do in the year ahead? I went through the follow-on from the tripartite discussions; monetary matters; NPT; and aid problems, including especially assistance in dealing with the world food-population problem. I cited Germany's not very satisfactory position on Indian food.

He said he had never heard of this and asked with whom the issue had been raised when E. V. Rostow was in Germany. I said I believed it had been raised with the Foreign Office but subsequently it had gone all the way up to Chancellor Kiesinger.

3. His greatest anxiety concerns further troop and aircraft withdrawals. He said we must find a way to stabilize the troop levels for everyone in the Alliance over the coming years so the Germans would not feel they were on a slippery slope. He said it is bad for Germany's relations to both East and West Europe to have a falling away of British, U.S., Belgian, etc. conventional forces.

4. His most interesting point was this: Before the coalition each party could count on a quite disciplined ^{working behavior by} choice of members of the German Parliament. Now there is developing a relation between the government and the Parliament more like that in the U.S. Increasingly, members of Parliament will take positions different from their leaders in the coalition. This will be essential in the Social Democrats because they feel they have thus far lost out -- and Kiesinger has gained -- from the coalition. Therefore, he recommends that our Embassy, if it wishes to follow and influence German politics and policy, spend much more time than they now do with Parliamentary leaders.

Present - sp/stata Dept.
F. B. B. B.
S. K. K.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452

Monday, May 15, 1967
6:45 p. m.

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT: By *ing*, NARA, Date 3-17-93

With respect to the Hanoi TPP:

1. Sect. McNamara is anxious that we permit attack by the four aircraft with WALLEYE at the earliest possible time. He fears that if we don't conduct the attack immediately, we will get into George Brown's visit to Moscow on May 18, then Buddha's birthday; etc. As you know, he is quite prepared for a cutback in our targeting pattern; but he feels that it will be very difficult to hold unless the Hanoi TPP is out, and he can claim with the JCS that all the truly significant targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area have been hit.

2. I do not know what position Sect. Rusk will take, but I do know they have been trying in the State Department to work up a way of using our cutback in targets to put some kind of direct or indirect pressure on the Russians to move us towards a settlement of the war. Such an effort does not necessarily imply that we should hold attack on the Hanoi TPP; but there could be argument that we hold that target as a "hostage." Therefore, we face tomorrow two decisions:

-- Should we attack the Hanoi TPP immediately?

-- What, if anything, do we tell the Russians -- and when -- about our proposed change in bombing pattern?

3. If we take out the Hanoi TPP, there would be some virtue in discussing with them our proposed change in bombing pattern soon thereafter, if we talk to them at all. The reason: so they read it correctly as the end of one phase of our attack on North Viet Nam and not as a symbol of a new round of escalation. Dobrynin, incidentally, is not expected back until the end of the week at the earliest.

4. The central problem in talking with the Russians is that if we tell them that we've run out of good targets and are going to stand down, generally speaking, to the 20th parallel, they may simply heave a sigh of relief that some of the pressure is off them and go about their business. They will also tell Hanoi -- which is having a quite rough time -- and they will also relax (see attached report). What the Russians are afraid of is a confrontation that might arise from mining Haiphong or other operations in the North that would increase the pressure on them from Hanoi and from the demonstration of their relative impotence to defend a Communist country.

~~TOP SECRET~~

5/15/67

5. If we say anything to them, it might be that we propose to do this for a while. We obviously cannot stop bombing unconditionally and permanently, given what is happening across the DMZ; but they have a certain amount of time in hand in which to demonstrate what they can do to bring peace without serious bombing in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. We will be watching their efforts with interest.

In any case, I wanted you to have some feel for the issue that will be before you tomorrow at lunch.

W. W. R.

SANITIZED

10a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE
IN 66827

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE DEPT DIA JCS ARMY NAVY AIR CIA/NMCC NIC NSA CCR SOO AID
USIA ONE ORR DCS CGB

EXO

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. and the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

12958

141603Z CITE

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIST 14 MAY 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM


EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

DOI

SUBJECT MEASURES TO CONSERVE ELECTRICITY IN HANOI; REROUTING
OF BRIDGE TRAFFIC; DEFENSE MEASURE TO PROTECT DIKES.

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON

SOURCE



1. HANOI AUTHORITIES ON 10 MAY INSTITUTED A SERIES OF MEASURES TO CONSERVE ELECTRIC POWER IN THE CITY. ON A DAILY BASIS, AUTHORITIES HAVE ORDERED THAT POWER MUST BE REDUCED IN VARIOUS SECTIONS OF THE CITY FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR. SECTIONS WILL BE ROTATED BUT EACH MUST REDUCE POWER WHEN ITS TIME COMES. PRIVATE DWELLINGS HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO USE ONLY BULBS OF 25 WATTS. GOVERNMENT BUREAUS HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED TO USE ONLY 60 WATT BULBS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 99-87

By cb, NARA Date 1-21-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(classification) (dissem controls)

2. AS OF 12 MAY, NO RAIL OR MOTOR TRAFFIC WAS MOVING ACROSS THE PONT DES RAPIDES. HOWEVER, MOTOR TRAFFIC WAS NOW BEING CARRIED ON PONTOON BRIDGES PARALLEL TO THE PONT DES RAPIDES. ON 11 MAY PAUL DOUMER BRIDGE WAS CLOSED TO TRAFFIC, WHICH WAS REROUTED TO A PONTOON BRIDGE DOWN STREAM. TWO NEW PONTOON BRIDGES ARE BEING PREPARED SOUTH OF DOUMER BRIDGE.

3. HANOI AUTHORITIES HAVE ESTABLISHED HEAVY AAA AND MISSILE SITES AT UNSPECIFIED POINTS ALONG THE DIKES NORTH OF THE CITY. THE RED RIVER HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO RISE AND AUTHORITIES FEAR USAF BOMBINGS OF THE DIKES DURING THE HIGH WATER PERIOD.

4. DURING THE 5 AM ALERT TWO MISSILES WERE FIRED IN A SOUTHWEST DIRECTION FROM THE CITY. THE SOUND MADE BY THESE TWO MISSILES WERE NOT THE SAME AS THE SOUND MADE BY SAMs. FROM THE EVENING OF 5 MAY UNTIL THE EVENING OF 12 MAY ONLY THREE ALERTS TOOK PLACE, ONE IN THE AFTERNOON OF 11 MAY.

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE 525TH MIG DIST 50/031 CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [REDACTED]~~GP-1~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, May 15, 1967
5:30 p. m.

11

MR. PRESIDENT:

Ed Clark advises us herewith that his man,
as well as Pak, wants another Summit
Conference -- but not in Seoul.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Canberra 5561 5/15/67)

~~SECRET~~

Copy of CANBERRA 5561, May 15, 1967

1. As Department is aware, Prime Minister Holt will urge on President consideration of proposed Summit Meeting during his visit to Washington June 1. Department may note that there is probability of Australian Senate elections in late November or early December. Holt may well have in mind returning directly from Summit conference in October or early November and entering election campaign with enhanced prestige.

2. As far as site for proposed meeting is concerned, we believe Holt would probably prefer it be held either in Washington or elsewhere on American territory, since it would be difficult to single out one or another country for President Johnson to visit without setting precedent for rotation of such conferences. Therefore, we believe Holt may mention possibility of such a meeting at Honolulu, Guam, or even Okinawa.

Clark

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-446
By ing NARA, Date 2-3-92

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 15, 1967

Lunch with the President
Tuesday, May 16, 1967, 1:00 p.m.

Agenda

1. Hanoi TPP (Sects. Rusk and McNamara)
2. Kennedy Round (Sect. Rusk)
Status report, briefing schedule, etc.
3. Personnel Problems (Sect. Rusk)
4. Other

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 5-6-91

Saturday, May 13, 1967 -- 5:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

I am committed -- after checking with you many months ago -- to give the graduation address at Middlebury College on June 12.

I thought I might talk a bit about the New Asia -- mentioning, but not dwelling on, Viet Nam.

But I'm prepared to take on Viet Nam directly -- or talk about some wholly non-controversial subject.

Graduation speeches by bureaucrats are not earth-shaking events; but I would wish to do what you judge most helpful, not least because the First Lady will be present.

W. W. Rostow

New Asia _____

Viet Nam _____

Something less controversial _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, May 13, 1967
4:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

This is an interesting -- but
dynamite-laden -- suggestion of
Henry Owen's.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By df, NARA, Date 5-6-91

14a

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

May 12, 1967

SUBJECT: Vietnam

1. Problem: The notion **is being** spread about that **only a change** of administration can end the war. This could **inject** the war issue into the 1968 campaign in **a way that** could be bad for the country and for both **political** parties.

2. Proposal: We should discreetly spray around the **counter-notion** (which is closer to the truth) that a **change** of administration would (unlike 1952) prolong, **rather** than shorten, the war. And we should spell **out the** reasons why:

(a) The Communists **are** probably **sustained**, at **this point**, largely by the hope that US public opinion will eventually force the US Government to change course.

(b) If the administration is returned to power, **the Communists** will be disillusioned in this hope; they may **then** see no advantage in continuing the war.

(c) If a new administration were elected, **the Communists** might (however misguidedly) consider **it** less committed to the war than this administration; they **might** thus be confirmed in their hope and be moved by **that hope** to continue the fighting. **It** might take quite a lot of time and a fair amount of **fighting** to convince them that they had misinterpreted the election.

600
Henry Owen

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.1
NLJ 91-446
By ing NARA, Date 2-3-92

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Saturday, May 13, 1967
4:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith in writing, as requested, Sec. Rusk's recommendation that we send Unger to Thailand with Habib as his replacement in the State Department. You will note Sec. Rusk's recommendation about the timing of Graham Martin's replacement.

Also attached is the Secretary's proposed press release on the new post for Brown and his replacement in Seoul by Porter.

Sec. Rusk has already asked for the Korean agreement which should be available on Monday.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: Mr John Macy

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
COPYING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 13526,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 10, 1983.

BY 29 ON 5-6-91

1837
15A

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with our May 12 luncheon discussion I am submitting with this memorandum for your final approval the papers designating Ambassador Leonard Unger as Ambassador to Thailand and my recommendation that we designate Philip C. Habib as Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs to replace Unger.

Graham Martin has returned to Thailand from his recent consultations in Washington, and I think it would be desirable to let him remain at his post until about July 15 so that he can accompany the King of Thailand on his scheduled visit to the United States from June 6 to 29.

If this is agreeable with you, we would have Unger arrive in Bangkok about August 15. The Deputy Chief of Mission is sufficiently experienced to bridge this gap.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Unger for Thailand

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Timing July 15 _____

Other _____

Habib to replace Unger

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Thailand Country Situation Paper
Biographic Data on Unger
Photograph of Unger
Security Summary of Unger

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-446
By *up* NARA, Date 2-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THAILAND

GOVERNMENT: Monarchy, politically dominated by Army leadership

ORIENTATION: Closely aligned with the United States, an alignment that can be expected to continue as long as Thai leadership remains convinced that the U.S. can and will provide security against the advance of communist power in South East Asia

POLITICAL SITUATION: Stable; though there may be changes at the top, Army leadership is likely to continue to predominate for the foreseeable future

ECONOMIC SITUATION: Agriculturally-based, but diversifying and developing rapidly; relies largely on private enterprise

U.S. OBJECTIVES:

- Maintenance of Thai confidence and the close alliance with the U.S.
- Development of adequate internal security measures
- Steady economic growth
- Broadening of the political base
- Growth of Asian regional cooperation, with Thailand playing a leading role

U.S. PROGRAMS:

- Grant aid will be about \$39 millions in FY 67. AID staff includes some 350 persons
- Military assistance will be about \$60 millions in FY 67. JUSMAG complement includes approximately 2200 Americans. There are also about 30,000 American military personnel in the country.
- USIA employs 60 Americans

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-446
By ing NARA, Date 2-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

SUGGESTED QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE CHIEF OF MISSION:

- Ability to establish and maintain a relationship based on mutual confidence with the top military and civilian leadership
- Executive ability, to successfully lead the large and complicated U.S. Mission and to ensure that military operations are in accord with political realities
- Asian experience
- Quiet competence and a friendly, dignified manner

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNGER, Leonard

49 yrs. (born December 17,
1917, San Diego, California)

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

PRESENT POSITION

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs

EDUCATION

1939 A.B., Harvard University

FAMILY DATA

Married, with five children

PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE

1941-46	Divisional Assistant and Agricultural Geographer, Department of State
1946-48	Assistant Chief, Division of Southern European Affairs
1948-49	Acting Chief, Division of Southeast European Affairs
1950-52	Political Officer, Trieste
1952-53	Political Officer, Naples (NATO Southern Command)
1953-57	Officer-in-Charge, Politico-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs
1957-58	Attended National War College
1958-62	Deputy Chief of Mission, Bangkok
1962-65	Ambassador to Laos
1965-	Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs

DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

President Johnson announced today his intention to nominate William J. Porter of Massachusetts, a Career Minister in the Foreign Service, to be Ambassador to Korea. Mr. Porter has served until recently as Deputy Ambassador at Saigon.

He will succeed Winthrop G. Brown, also a Career Minister, who has been in Korea since August 1964. Ambassador Brown will become Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, with responsibility for liaison with the Governors of the various States.

Born on September 1, 1914 at Staleybridge, England, Mr. Porter became an American citizen in 1936. In 1936 and 1937, he served as private secretary to the American Minister at Budapest and joined the Foreign Service in the latter year. His early assignments included tours of duty at Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Jerusalem.

In 1948, Mr. Porter became Principal Officer of the American Consulate at Nicosia, Cyprus. During 1950 and 1951, he was detailed to the Voice of America in New York. Later assignments included tours in the Department of State as Greek Desk Officer and Director of North African Affairs, and in Morocco as Principal Officer at Rabat.

Mr. Porter was named Consul General at Algiers in 1961 and when Algeria became independent, he became the first American Ambassador to that country. He served in that

capacity until 1965 when he was appointed Deputy Ambassador, with the personal rank of Ambassador, in Viet Nam.

Ambassador Porter is married, and the couple have a daughter and a son, twins.

Pres file

Saturday, May 13, 1967 -- 2:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

I don't know whether you have looked lately at the official figures for VC and North Viet Nam strength and number of maneuver battalions.

Their decline suggests one reason the North Vietnamese are applying pressure across the DMZ: to prevent further rapid erosion of VC strength in the South: down 10% from the peak of 67.1 thousand in September 1966.

(See attached table - yellow marks)

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

16a
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW


The attached charts show the growth trends for VC and NVA combat units in South Vietnam since 1965. They are broken down by personnel strength and number of battalions. They show figures for only those units and troops who would be actually involved in combat and do not include administrative and support personnel or units, nor VC irregulars.

I am also attaching a statistical breakdown by month giving the figures from which these charts were made.


Art McCafferty



VC/NVA CONFIRMED COMBAT STRENGTH

(3 MONTH RUNNING AVERAGE)



VC/NVA MANEUVER BATTALION GROWTH (CONFIRMED)

(3 MONTH RUNNING AVERAGE)



VC/NVA Confirmed Combat Battalions and Strength in South Vietnam

162

		1965												1966												1967													
		1964 Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	
BATTALIONS																																							
North Vietnamese																																							
Confirmed	- Infantry	4	7	11	11	14	14	14	14	14	17	27	33	33	36	45	48	51	50	62	65	65	68	68	68	68	65	65	65	65									
	- Other Maneuver																		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1									
Viet Cong - Main/Local Forces																																							
Confirmed	- Infantry	66	66	67	73	75	79	81	81	83	83	84	86	87	87	87	85	84	83	83	83	83	81	81	81	81	81	81	81	81									
	- Other Maneuver	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	3	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5									
STRENGTH (Thousands)																																							
North Vietnamese																																							
Confirmed	- Confirmed	2.4	4.4	6.2	6.2	8.8	8.8	8.8	9.1	9.8	14.3	20.6	24.7	26.2	28.1	34.3	36.7	38.5	38.7	49.6	51.1	52.3	53.3	51.3	47.9	48.4	47.3	46.4	46.3	46.3									
Viet Cong																																							
Main/Local Forces - Confirmed																																							
		49.3	50.1	49.3	51.5	52.1	56.4	57.2	57.2	58.3	59.3	59.6	60.7	61.7	65.2	65.2	65.6	66.7	66.2	66.2	67	67.0	67.2	69.0	63.8	64.3	63.5	62.4	61.7										

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, May 13, 1967
1:00 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith a report on Lynda's activities yesterday. She seems to have changed her mind and will be returning tomorrow rather than today.

- "1. Miss Johnson left the Embassy residence for the airport at 0750 hours on May 12. She departed Santiago at 0850 and arrived at Temuco at 1025 hours.
- "2. Only four policemen, no reporters, no onlookers except for other passengers at Temuco airport. She proceeded directly to Baptist School without incident. She talked to ~~teacher~~ teachers and students until about 1215 and proceeded to home of one of the teachers for lunch.
- "3. She rested during the afternoon and went out to dinner at a local hotel with the Director of the School and four young teachers. The day proceeded without incident.
- "4. Understand that she will now definitely adhere to her original schedule. She is thinking of visiting Villarica Volcano tomorrow (Saturday) but might be dissuaded because of bad weather and roads."

W.W.Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 188, NARA, Date 5-7-81

18
18

Monday, May 15, 1967
11:30 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Rowland Evans came in today. He began, aiming to shock, by saying, "What are you going to do now that your policy has failed?" I said, "What policy?" He said, "The policy of forcing Hanoi to negotiate by bombing. It's worse than the Bay of Pigs."

I then explained to him that in the 14 months I have been over here, I have never heard anyone put the proposition to the President that bombing alone would end the war. I explained that the President had put U. S. forces into the South in 1965 in order to deal with a major offensive which had come to a dangerous point. As we had got the main force units under better control, we had pushed forward with all the dimensions of what we call pacification. Our bombing was aimed at making it more difficult to infiltrate the South and to imposing a cost on the North -- military and civil -- for continuing the offensive.

I then described the present strategy in the South and the manner in which they were using the operations across the DMZ to divert us.

He then said that he had been talking to military men in the Pentagon who had expressed their high hopes of forcing the North to cave in by bombing. He said they now were advocating that we blockade the harbor in Haiphong.

I repeated that I could not vouch for what some men in the Pentagon might have thought; but I could tell him that, so far as I knew, the bombing operations in the North were not promised by anyone as a means of quickly ending the war. He then pushed me on closing the Haiphong harbor. I said that only the President would decide, but it seemed extremely difficult to conceive of operations which would close off imports from abroad to North Viet Nam.

He then turned to the barrier and wanted to know what its technology would be. I said I could not talk about its technology, but it was possible that some such operations might in the future increase the cost and difficulty of infiltration. He asked whether we would, despite Souvanna Phouma, extend the barrier into Laos.

I said I would not discuss details about the barrier.

I then took him through the charts which I have in my office on the shape and progress of the war. He said that on his last trip to South Viet Nam, for the first time he saw signs of some erosion of the VC infrastructure.

He ended by urging us to make extracts from Douglas Pike's book on the VC, and spread them about widely. He said it is the best book there is on the Viet Cong (he is right). But it is difficult to read. Nevertheless, he feels the message in the book on the nature of our enemy should be gotten across.

He closed by expressing great sympathy with me and those who bear responsibility at this difficult time in Viet Nam. I said that I, at least, deserve no sympathy. The times are difficult; but that is why it is worth serving.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~*Pres. file*

Saturday, May 13, 1967 -- 11:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

I asked Bob Ginsburgh to collect the specific recent reports we have on the effect of the bombing of North Viet Nam. He has done so in a useful way. First, by presenting an extract from CIA-DIA appraisals and then giving the actual raw reports in summary. I would agree with his net judgment:

- a. "that the bombing is having a greater impact than the CIA-DIA appraisal would indicate";
- b. "the 'objective' truth lies somewhere in between the CIA-DIA appraisal and the on-the-ground reports";
- c. "despite increasing indications of strain, there is still no objective basis for predicting that the North Vietnamese are near the end of their rope -- though they might be."

In any case, I believe you should get a personal feel for the raw evidence, including the cable which arrived this morning. (Tab B)

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-441
By 49, NARA, Date 6-17-96

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 51-441

By 48, NARA, Date 6-17-96

12 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: On-the-Ground Appraisals of the Bombing of North Vietnam

1. In the inclosure I have extracted a series of summary statements from the April CIA-DIA Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam. These are compared with extracts from miscellaneous reports from observers on the ground. (Nature and date of sources are indicated.)

2. In general, the reports from observers on the ground support the over-all CIA-DIA appraisal. This is to be expected since the on-the-spot reports are available for use in the over-all evaluation. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the tone of the ground reporters indicates that the bombing is having a greater impact than the CIA-DIA appraisal would indicate.

3. I would suggest that there are several reasons for this difference:

- In some cases, the ground reports are **more** recent.
- The ground reports tend to be more vividly descriptive because of their subjectivity. They are not required to maintain the cold objectivity of the responsible intelligence analyst.
- On-the-scene reports frequently **contradict** each other as well as other intelligence sources.
- Any large interagency evaluation **tends** to become watered down.
- An overemphasis (in my opinion) in trying to "measure" the impact of the bombing tends to discount subjective evaluations which simply are not measurable.

4. My own conclusions are that:

- The CIA-DIA appraisal **continues to underestimate** the 1/synergistic impact of the bombing -- although less than previously.

1/synergism: The combined action of two or **more** agents **that is** greater than the sum of the action of one of the agents used alone." In short, it means: cumulative, including secondary effects.

This is what comes of having a General with a Ph.D. I had to look up the word.

~~SECRET~~

Wes
PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

~~- The "objective" truth lies somewhere in between the CIA-DIA appraisal and the on-the-ground reports.~~

~~- Despite increasing indications of strain, there is still no objective basis for predicting that the North-Vietnamese are near the end of their rope -- though they might be.~~

g

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

19B

MANPOWER, MORALE, EVACUATION

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI/RAC 99-87

By CB, NARA Date 1-21-01

Extracts from CIA-DIA Appraisals

There has been no evidence to indicate that Hanoi's determination to pursue the war has declined. Likewise, there is no evidence that the morale of the populace has decreased. However, the increasing hardships being borne by the people have resulted in instances of skepticism of the regime's propaganda line.

There has also been continued emphasis on evacuation from urban areas.

Although the role of women in certain activities is to be expanded, North Vietnam does not appear to be suffering from a general manpower shortage.

On-The-Spot Reports

The mobilization of the entire population for national defense is producing serious labor difficulties. [REDACTED]

The Vietnamese authorities have decided to evacuate a great portion of civilian population residing in the eastern section of Hanoi near Paul Doumer Bridge and near the electric power station. [REDACTED]

Evacuation from Haiphong since American bombing began has reduced the population from 400,000 to 250,000 people. The labor force in Haiphong is predominately women. [REDACTED]

If it is excluded that Hanoi will not capitulate before American force, fatigue, and anxiety are also no less real. [REDACTED]

The streets are deserted between 0900 and 1700. [REDACTED]

Increased U. S. Air Force activity in the Hanoi area is causing a deterioration of morale in the city. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

Manpower, Morale, Evacuation (continued)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

During the night alerts, citizens could be seen running wildly toward shelters. There is a definite breakdown in order and the air raid wardens had difficulty in controlling the people. For the first time, it could be noted that people were making no attempt to hide their fear or fatigue. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The severity of raid (29 Apr near Gia Lam) struck observers who did not hide their pessimism. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

On clear days air activities were virtually continual from 0630 to 1900 daily. The constant series of alerts seriously inhibited school, repair work, and agriculture; alerts followed all-clears incessantly. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

In early April, the people of Haiphong seemed much more confident than they appeared in September 1966. There appeared to be no shortages of consumer items at this time (no queues were seen and no complaints were heard from the people). This is in contrast to September 1966 when there were shortages of consumer items -- mostly soap, for which there were always queues. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Some villagers in the coastal areas of the North Vietnamese provinces between the 17th and 20th parallels hold the view that if the North Vietnamese government stopped infiltration of troops and supplies into South Vietnam then American bombing of their villages would stop. They state that they are becoming less impressed with their government's claim that attacking aircraft are being shot down, since few have witnessed the downing of any planes. Consequently, they are beginning to doubt seriously the Hanoi regime's boast of inevitable victory. . . . Villagers living in frequently bombed areas are especially terrified of the air strikes and limit their daytime activities to the minimum. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

It seemed surprising, none the less the fact, that none of the people in Haiphong took the North Vietnamese government's propaganda seriously, particularly the claims of the number of U. S. planes shot down or the claims of the size and number of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in the south. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The villagers expressed resentment at having to repair bomb damage and dig defense trenches without compensation. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Manpower, Morale, Evacuation (continued)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The morale of the North Vietnamese has been dealt a severe blow by the realization that the war is not only lost economically but also militarily. They now know that Soviet missiles are not capable of stopping air raids. They also fear that the MIG-21 cannot cope with the technical superiority of the American planes. . . . Hanoi cannot possibly continue the war for another two years, and even during that period its efforts would be reduced to sporadic raids of sabotage against installations.

[REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Overflight of the capital did not cause any damage to Hanoi except that all activities were interrupted nine times. However, this war on nerves begins to affect morale of the Vietnamese who are known for their high morale. Some think that this is precisely one of the U. S. objectives.

[REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

All schools have been evacuated from Hanoi and Haiphong. Only people required to man the essential services remain in the two cities. . . . The morale of the North Vietnamese was at the lowest in late January 67. Food has become scarce since the advent of the bombing and the North Vietnamese live miserably. The conclusion reached from talking to the people is that they would like to see the war end as soon as possible.

[REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The general level of morale has suffered lately by the continuous U. S. aerial bombardments. The people no longer believe in a victory, but nevertheless continue to support the regime.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

19C

ECONOMIC

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-87
By cb, NARA Date 1-21-01

Extracts from CIA-DIA Appraisals

Damage inflicted on the North Vietnamese economy by air strikes increased significantly and will have unfavorable repercussions throughout much of the industrial sector. The most telling damage resulted from the strikes against electric power plants.

Despite the increased disruption of economic activity, the North Vietnamese gave no indication of abandoning their programs to expand small scale industry and to plan for post-war economic development.

On-The-Spot Reports

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The bombardment continues to diminish daily, the industrial potential of the country. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

If industry is subjected to new blows, one certain consequence will be that Hanoi will become more dependent on the Chinese, on whom they are already dependent for their food supply. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The main cement plant has been so severely damaged that work has halted. [REDACTED]

The supply of electricity (in Haiphong) appeared to be just adequate. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Between Phu Ly and Thanh Hoa, an area in which he spent ten days, the traveler saw electric lights on two occasions only. He saw no piped functioning water supply in any town or village area. The main streets of Thanh Hoa had been almost entirely destroyed. Shops open were selling little more than oil, cloth, and occasionally cigarettes. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Economic (continued)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The incessant bombing by American aviation has paralyzed the economy of North Vietnam and has closed off the 17th parallel, thus, preventing the passage of troops in number toward the south.

[REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

U. S. bombings have caused considerable damage to military installations, factories, and several bridges, both in Hanoi and in the countryside of North Vietnam. . . . Business in Haiphong and Hanoi is practically at a standstill. . . . Firms are manned by only a director and one or two assistants. Most of the factories, military as well as light industry, have been evacuated to the countryside.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FOOD

19d

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-87

By cb, NARA Date 1-21-01

Extracts from CIA=DIA Appraisals

The bombing continues to have a disrupted influence on agriculture and fishing. Reports on the food supply are conflicting. Some reports indicate serious shortages while others suggest that supplies are adequate. In no case, however, have there been reports of severe hunger or starvation or any indication at the present time that the North Vietnamese will not be able to maintain at least the minimum consumption levels.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

On-The-Spot Reports

The next harvest of rice will be mediocre. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Unless immediate action is taken, insects will destroy the spring rice crop. [REDACTED]

Irrigation systems must be improved in order to prevent drought and spoilage of rice. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

There did not seem to be much food in the stores and in the restaurants. Outside Hanoi there was only a little meat. [REDACTED]

There was an indication of food shortage in Haiphong. As coolies worked with a cargo of soya beans, they were pilfering the beans and eating them raw. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Ships carrying food stuffs to North Vietnam received preferential treatment. One merchant ship carrying such a cargo completed discharge in about four days after arrival. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

A port guard said that soya beans had become a staple in the diet in North Vietnam, and that while the young working population received sufficient quantities of food the older people were rationed to a subsistence level. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Food (continued)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The diet of the Youth Volunteers who have some responsibility for repair work consists of 22 kilos of rice, vegetables, soya nuts, and bananas. In spite of this adequate but limited subsistence, which is of course lower for noncadres, the bombing, and the monotonous work, the traveler was impressed by the health, determination, and high spirits of the population as a whole. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Because the air strikes are affecting the North Vietnamese economy, the fishermen admitted often selling part of their catch on the black market in order to make ends meet, yet avoid serving as coastal shipping laborers despite monetary incentive because of the danger of air strikes. [REDACTED]

(Note that for the first four months of 1967, rice is being imported at a rate which would compensate for the estimated shortage of 300,000 tons in the 1966 rice crop.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

192

TRANSPORTATION

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-87
By cb, NARA Date 1-21-01

Extracts from CIA-DIA Appraisals

The cumulative effects of the air strikes have severely reduced the throughput capacity of the rail line south of Hanoi. The turn-around time for equipment has increased and the use of equipment is less efficient.

The road network directly related to the military logistics support effort has been maintained in relatively good condition with truck traffic possible on nearly all routes.

The wide dispersal of vehicles and the inefficient operating condition imposed by the air campaign in the southern part of the country are believed to be taxing present truck transport capability.

The Hanoi-Haiphong and Hanoi-Dong Day lines remained fully operational.

The Hanoi-Vinh line was probably closed for through service . . . however, limited operations were possible between major point of interdiction.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

On-The-Spot Reports

The pont des rapides north of Hanoi is no longer usable and rail traffic has ceased. [REDACTED]

There are only five vehicles in Haiphong and the lack of trucks makes it necessary to haul material by bicycle and foot. The rail line between Hanoi and Communist China has been disassembled by the Chinese following destruction of the tracks by the bombing. Temporary and constantly shifted steel ponton bridges are used for river crossings between Haiphong and Hanoi. Since rails and bridges have been damaged by the bombings, transportation has become practically paralyzed. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Transportation (continued)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Civil transportation seemed to operate on a very restricted supply of gasoline and only military vehicles seemed to have enough fuel. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

There was as a result of the bombing only one undamaged bridge between Hanoi and Thanh Hoa. All the others had been damaged or destroyed, but subsequently repaired by teams on permanent standby. The journey to the place was by convoys under dim lights. On 12 March, the journey took five and one-half hours (90 miles), on 28 March it took seven hours. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Attacks against main road communications have frequently been at least temporarily successful and accurate, but subsidiary roads were usually taken without excessive delays. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

In Thanh Hoa, because of damage to the roads, bicycles played a larger role in transportation than did lorries; each bicycle being modified to carry a load of 440 pounds; but a large cause of delay is the time taken (two hours) in reassembling the ponton bridges at dusk and then being regularly disassembled at dawn. [REDACTED]

ChiCom Charge' admitted bombing bothered communications and transportation between China and DRV. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PORTS

19f

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/KAC 99-87

By cb, NARA Date 1-21-01

Extracts from CIA-DIA Appraisals

There was no significant increase in the average time in port for either tankers or dry cargo ships during February or March, despite the record high levels of import.

On-The-Spot Reports

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

In the late March early April 1967 period, port congestion in Haiphong continued with merchant ships waiting two and three weeks before unloading cargo. [REDACTED]

Quantities of building tools and materials, tractors, and forklifts, both crated and uncrated, were stored in the open in the streets and parks near the wharves. There was an obvious lack of storage space. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Heavy bomb attacks on Cam Pha and its port facilities on 15 February destroyed the greater part of the town and many citizens lost their homes. A Soviet ships officer expressed fears that bottom mining of the waterways leading into Cam Pha and Hai Phong ports would render impossible the delivery of aid material by sea to North Vietnam. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The efficiency of handling cargo, particularly coal exports, at the Haiphong ports, including Hon Gai and Can Pha, has decreased by about 45% since the bombing began in August 64. As a result of the numerous air alerts, the bombing damage outside the city, and the many difficulties encountered by longshoremen in reaching their places of employment, the workers of the ports now have to spend much more time commuting between their home and places of work, since the evacuation of so many of them from the city. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

USSR missiles and fuel are coming to North Vietnam by ships. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

199
INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

Action

DE RUFNCR 18162 1321715

ZNY SSSSS

R 121530Z MAY 67

1 2 5 8 6

Info

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

MAY 12, 1967--12:23 PM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 18162

NODIS MARIA THREE

SUBJECT: DRV ADVICE TO DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS HANOI.

FOLLOWING IS PART OF A TELEGRAM DATED MAY 4 RECEIVED AT QUAI
FROM ITS DELEGATION IN HANOI:

"THE (DRV) 'SECTION OF ASSISTANCE TO DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS'
HAS JUST SENT THIS DELEGATION DIRECTIVES ON (STEPS TO BE TAKEN)
ON ACCOUNT OF AGGRAVATION OF DANGER THREATENING HANOI. THE DRV
(1) RECOMMENDS ECONOMIZING ELECTRIC POWER AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE
BY REDUCING CONSUMPTION TO MINIMUM; (2) IN EXPECTATION OF FLOOD-
ING CAUSED BY BREAK IN DIKES, SUGGESTS THAT DELEGATION OBTAIN
SMALL BOAT AND ALSO BUILD UP FOOD STOCKS FOR AT LEAST ONE WEEK;
(3) REQUESTS THAT DELEGATION MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO HAVE AVAILABLE
PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR CLEARING AWAY RUBBLE.

SOME OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN GIVEN LAST YEAR,
BUT AT THAT TIME THEY WERE COUCHED IN TENOR OF ADVICE. THE
MORE IMPERATIVE TENOR VIETNAMESE DIRECTIVE IS EASILY EXPLAINED
UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE AMERICAN AIR FORCE IS BOMBING
POWER STATIONS, COMMUNICATION LINES, RESIDENTIAL AREAS AND MIGHT
BOMB THE DIKES."

GP-1. BOHLEN.

BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-171
By is, NARA Date 12-29-99

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-442
By ju, NARA, Date 1-13-93

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, May 13, 1967 -- 11:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith summary of Soviet statements
given to Tommy today.

The heart of it is an attempt to get us to
diminish classic high seas doctrine by recognizing
vaguely defined "proximity to Soviet shores."

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 4896

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

REF: STATE 192984

1. AT 10 A.M. TODAY I WAS CALLED IN BY DEP FONMIN SEMENOV WHO GAVE ME STATEMENT SOV GOVT RE SHIP INCIDENTS IN SEA OF JAPAN. STATEMENT, TEXT OF WHICH TRANSMITTED SEPTEL, PLACES RESPONSIBILITY FOR INCIDENTS ON US SHIPS AND ASSERTS THAT EXERCISE "IN PROXIMITY SOV SHORES" WAS DELIBERATE PROVOCATIVE MILITARY DEMONSTRATION.

2. POINTING OUT I HAD ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED DISCUSS INCIDENTS TODAY, AND DRAWING ON REFTEL, I MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) WHILE SOV STATEMENT ASSERTS OUR SHIPS APPROACHED TO SHORT DISTANCE FROM SOV SHORES, FACT IS THAT TASK FORCE WAS ON HIGH SEAS, QUITE A DISTANCE FROM SOV TERRITORIAL WATERS; MY UNDERSTAND

~~PAGE TWO RUENCR 4896FD CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAS THAT THAT DISTANCE WAS SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES.

(B) US ATTACHES, AND WE ASSUME SOVS ALSO, ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO MAINTENANCE FREEDOM OF HIGH SEAS, WHERE OUR VESSELS FREE CONDUCT EXERCISES.

(C) EXERCISE INVOLVED NO THREAT, AND NO THREAT WAS INTENDED.

(D) I WAS INSTRUCTED ASK THAT OV NAVAL COMMANDERS BE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS CEASE HARASSMENT AND PREVENT DANGEROUS INCIDENTS. AFTER REVIEWING INCIDENTS PER STATE 191984 AND 192783, I SAID THAT WHATEVER THE TECHNICAL FACTS, SOV SHIPS WERE HARASSING OUR TASK FORCE, AND THIS OUR MAIN CONCERN. IT CLEAR THAT SOV SHIPS WERE FOLLOWING OUR TASK FORCE AND NOT VICE VERSA.

(E) I SAID I WOULD TRANSMIT SOV STATEMENT TO WASHINGTON AND EXPRESSED HOPE THERE WOULD BE NO MORE SUCH INCIDENTS.

3. SEMENOV ASSERTED THAT FROM INFO GIVEN TO SOV EMBASSY, IT CLEAR MY REMARKS BASED ON INACCURATE INFO, AND HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THEM AS BEING OBJECTIVE. SOV STATEMENT CONSTITUTES RESPONSE TO US ALLEGATIONS; IT BASED ON FACTS AND CORRECTS INACCURACIES. THEREFORE, HE HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO IT. SOV GOVT HAS REPEATEDLY DRAWN ATTENTION US GOVT TO DANGEROUS ACTIONS BY US VESSELS WITH RESPECT SOV VESSELS ON HIGH SEAS, AND INSISTS THAT SUCH PROVOCATIVE AND DANGEROUS ACTS CEASE. SOV GOVT CONCERNED THAT RULES OF ROAD

~~PAGE THREE RUENCR 4896FD CONFIDENTIAL~~

BEING VIOLATED. ALSO, EXERCISE IN PROXIMITY SOV SHORES CAN BE REGARDED ONLY AS DELIBERATE AND DANGEROUS PROVOCATION. HE HOPED US WOULD GIVE DUE ATTENTION TO SOV STATEMENT AND FACTS CONTAINED THEREIN, AND THAT IT WOULD TAKE STEPS REQUESTED BY SOV GOVT.

4. I REPEATED STATEMENT WOULD BE TRANSMITTED WASHINGTON. HOWEVER, I MADE CLEAR THAT OUR INFO DIFFERENT AND THAT I DID NOT ACCEPT SOV ALLEGATIONS, PARTICULARLY THAT EXERCISE IN THE SEA OF JAPAN, WHICH HAD BEEN PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED, WAS PROVOCATIVE.

GP-3. THOMPSON

BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-446

By lip NARA, Date 2-3-92

Mr. Rostow
21

Pres file

Saturday, May 13, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Walt Rostow

SUBJECT: Visit with Keyes Beech

You agreed to see Keyes (rhymes with PRIZE) Beech of the Chicago Daily News at 2:00 p.m. today.

He has been reporting from Asia for nearly 20 years. He has covered every major event in Asia during that period, including the Korean War and the war in Viet-Nam. He knows Asia as few men do. He ~~is~~ experienced, thoughtful and intelligent.

He has just returned from Asia. He is strongly in favor of our policy in Viet-Nam. He believes our commitment is vital to our own position as well as to the security and future of Asia.

He is taking a leave of absence to write a book about the new Asia and the role of U.S. policy there. His thesis: a new Asia has been born and it was American actions that made it possible.

I would suggest that you:

-- note that Mr. Beech's reporting is well-read and highly appreciated here;

-- ask how he thinks things are going in Viet-Nam and whether our actions are really understood in the rest of Asia;

-- ask for his assessment of U.S. public opinion on Viet-Nam (he has travelled widely in the last three weeks -- West Coast, Chicago, Tennessee) and what can be done to improve understanding of our policy.

He will want to get your views on the meaning of Viet-Nam and what you see as the American role in Asia.

He talked with Walt Rostow yesterday and has seen Secretary Rusk.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 11350,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1963.

William J. Jorden

BY RG ON 5 7-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 12, 1967
7:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the Prime Minister
reassures you -- a little.

W. W. Rostow

T. 125/67

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 129, NARA, Date 5-7-91

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

PMUK 001/13
0020 ZULU MAY 13, 1967
FROM PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT
~~SECRET~~
T.125/67
MESSAGE BEGINS

1967 MAY 12 23 21

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE. AS I TOLD YOU WHEN WE SAW
EACH OTHER IN BONN, WE SHALL TAKE NO FINAL DECISION
UNTIL YOU AND I HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS ALL
THIS ON JUNE 2. I TOO GREATLY LOOK FORWARD TO THAT
MEETING.

MESSAGE ENDS

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-442
By ju, NARA, Date 1-13-93

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-442
By gW, NARA, Date 1-13-93

23

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, May 12, 1967 -- 6:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

I asked our Nat Davis for a clear account and his best explanation of the Sea of Japan naval incidents.

Here it is; and it's rather interesting.

It's probably like the Black Sea affair rather than linked to Viet Nam. They are trying to limit the freedom of the seas doctrine in the Black Sea and the Sea of Japan and make them into Caribbeans.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-442

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By ju, NARA, Date 1-13-93

April 12, 1967

THE SEA OF JAPAN INCIDENTS

What Happened

A U.S. carrier, screening destroyers and two submarines are holding the maneuvers. Japanese and Korean vessels are involved in them, but only the U.S. ships were at the scene of the incidents. Japanese observers were on our carrier. The maneuvers are scheduled to last until May 16th, and are proceeding as planned. The task force is presently steaming south further away from Soviet territory and will pass out of the Sea of Japan through the Sushima Strait.

It is normal for Soviet ships to try to break through our destroyer screen and shadow our principal vessels from inside our formation. For some years, the Navy has been operating under standing instructions to try to shoulder the Soviet ships away. In such games of naval chicken, the ships often come uncomfortably close.

In the May 10 collision, the Soviet ship was overtaking the WALKER and scraped the WALKER's antenna and a small boat on the Soviet destroyer. In the second collision the WALKER was overtaking the Soviet ship, which turned, cut across the WALKER's bow, and slowed. They knocked small holes in each other's hull above the water line. At first glance, it would seem that their and our roles were reversed in the two collisions. Our naval authorities say, however, that we were in the right both times. The first time we had the right of way because they were the overtaking vessel which should stay clear. The second time the Soviets broke the rules of the road by slowing down when they are supposed to maintain course and speed. Our suspicion is that the Soviets deliberately tried to maneuver a second collision with reversed roles. Not only did they cut speed, but they also sent us a message in English immediately after the collision, that must have been prepared beforehand, saying we violated the rules of the road.

Today there are five Soviet naval vessels in the vicinity of our task force. However, it is foggy, and they are not interfering, and in fact seem to be staying clear.

Soviet Motives

Correspondents have been asking whether the incidents might be linked to Vietnam, their supply route to Hanoi, or our buzzing of their ships. We doubt this. It is true that the Soviet Charge remarked to us that his Government had repeatedly protested harassment and buzzing of Soviet

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

merchant vessels without getting satisfaction. He said he was talking without instructions, and it probably was too soon to have gotten them from Moscow. The Charge is their ex-press Counselor, and it is possible that he is inspiring the American press inquiries about buzzing, Viet Nam, etc.

The Soviet Charge also remarked that the Sea of Japan washes the coast of the USSR and is important to their security. There is no question that the Soviets are very sensitive to U.S. air and naval action close to their shores. In this regard it is interesting that the first Soviet broadcast alleging U.S. naval "provocation" was their Turkish language service -- and their concerns in the Black Sea are similar to those in the Sea of Japan. Some people are speculating that the present incidents are designed in large part to make the Japanese think twice.

The Soviet Charge also remarked that Soviet naval vessels do not venture near the shores of the U.S. Technically this is true, as they don't have carriers nor a world-wide navy. However, their electronic trawlers patrol our coasts immediately beyond the three-mile limit.

There is a long history of this kind of harassment. The U.S.S. BANNER collided with a Soviet vessel in somewhat similar circumstances off Vladivostok last year. In last year's maneuvers in the Sea of Japan, the Soviets tried the same tactics, with similar harassment (except for the actual collisions). Some of the same ships were involved on both sides. The chances are that the present incidents are aggravated cases in this long and continuing pattern, and not a sharp policy shift related to Vietnam.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Friday, May 12, 1967 -- 4:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

I recommend press and communications leaders from all over the country be invited for Holt's dinner, because we need to have it said over and over again that our commitment to Viet Nam has been critical to the birth of the promising New Asia that is emerging.

We're going to need this theme in a big way in 1968. And no one is more credible than Holt in putting it across.

W. W. Rostow

Add Press _____

Keep it private _____

See me _____

cc to Bess Abell

WWRostow:rlh

Pres file~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Friday, May 12, 1967 -- 4:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

I attach two memoranda which I commend to you:

1. Col. Ginsburgh's response to my request for an evaluation of what kind of an attack the Communists are planning against Con Thieu for 30 May.
2. An analysis of what the North Vietnamese are trying to do by applying pressure across the DMZ (especially the summary on pages 1-2).

The direct pressure across the DMZ is, in part, a product of the success of our counterinfiltration efforts in Laos and elsewhere. They are applying pressure to divert our resources to the North away from operations in II and III Corps which help pacification. As this memorandum also points out, they are continuing to impose casualties on us, helping to create in the minds of our people the picture of an endless stalemate.

In fact, so far as ultimate victory is concerned, it is better for us to fight them up in I Corps rather than down in the critical population centers of II, III and IV Corps.

A winning strategy must block or defeat this draining effort across the DMZ while mobilizing all our efforts to roll up the VC infrastructure -- or seduce it -- in II, III and IV Corps.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-181
By abm, NARA, Date 3-17-03

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

12 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Possible Attack on Con Thieu

You asked for my personal evaluation of the intercepted NVA messages indicating that some kind of attack is planned against Con Thieu for 30 May. The planned action could run the gamut from a mortar barrage to a combined guerrilla, infantry, and artillery action of regimental size or more.

Indications of a large scale attack:

- More than 30 days of advance planning.
- Defector reports of a large campaign scheduled to begin by June.
- COMINT, captured documents, and POW reports indicating that elements of at least three NVA regiments (2-4 battalions plus support) are active in the Con Thieu area.
- General increase of enemy forces in DMZ area and indications of increased infiltration.

Indications of a small scale attack:

- Enemy is known to plan even the smallest actions in meticulous detail.
- Only two messages intercepted -- between units thought to be artillery (possibly mortar).
- Information passed sounds like artillery or mortar targets.
- No collateral intelligence specifically relating infantry units or guerrilla actions to the 30th of May.
- Previous attacks in the area had the limited objective of attacking command post and artillery.

My conclusions:


- This particular action will be a local action of limited objective of not more than three battalions (a regimental equivalent) plus supporting artillery.
- It will be related to a general increase in activity in the northern provinces.
- If this particular action is directly related to a coordinated simultaneous attack on a large scale, additional indicators will be forthcoming in the next two weeks.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 141.020.032/2
By *jc*, NARA, Date 10-23-09

24
ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~TRINE~~

CODEWORD MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE
11 May 67 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map



66574 5-67 CIA

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 141-020.032/2
By J. NARA, Date 10-23-09

256

252
~~Top Secret~~



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

*The Communist Build-up in South Vietnam's
Northern I Corps*

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NLS 141.020.032/3
By: jc, NARA, Date: 10-23-09

Handle via Comint Channels.

~~Top Secret~~

3

SC No. 01393/67
11 May 1967

Pres file

Friday, May 12, 1967
3:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached are:

1. My suggested notes for your conversation this afternoon at 5:30 p.m. with Roberts and Kilpatrick.
2. An account of my May 11 conversation with the Washington Post people.
3. Pentagon memoranda of conversation.
4. Materials you asked me this morning to collect, indicating the range of your activities in foreign policy beyond South Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

Friday, May 12, 1967
3:00 p.m.

~~Handwritten~~
2 Pms file

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk forwards a note of commendation from Alexis Johnson concerning the successful negotiation of a fisheries agreement with Japan by Ambassador McKernan.

As you well know, in the negotiating field nothing is tougher than fish.

W. W. Rostow

7794

1757

272

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 8, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

I take pleasure in enclosing a letter from Ambassador Johnson about the excellent work of Ambassador McKernan in the recent fisheries negotiations with Japan. They have been prolonged and difficult - and most important to the continuity of our relations with Japan. In accordance with his political instructions, Ambassador McKernan has accomplished another solid and most commendable job of negotiation.

Yours faithfully,

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure

The President,
The White House.

RECEIVED
KOSTOW'S OFFICE

1967 MAY 9 AM 9 29



EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
UNCLASSIFIED

2-76
April 28, 1967

The Honorable
Eugene V. Rostow
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.


Dear Gene:

As you will have seen, our fishery negotiations with the Japanese seem to be successfully concluded. This was the one immediate cloud in our relations that was giving me real concern, as it was very hard to see how what was essentially irreconcilable could be reconciled.

The purpose of this note is simply to tell you that, in my opinion, Don McKernan did a perfectly superb job, both in negotiating with the industry on his own side and with the Japanese. He was tough with the Japanese, as he had to be, but managed to do this without creating any resentments. His opposite numbers on the Foreign Office side have taken the initiative to tell me of their respect and admiration for him.

I greatly appreciate what he did here and think we are fortunate to have him.

Sincerely,


U. Alexis Johnson

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Lunch With the President
Friday, May 12, 1967, 1:00 P.M.

Agenda

1. Viet Nam: Bombing Policy (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)
Recommendations
2. Viet Nam Manpower Policy (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)
 - Tightening up inside South Viet Nam
 - Troop expansion from outside South Viet Nam
 - Situation report on steps thus far taken
3. Visits (Secretary Rusk)
 - Kiesinger (Secretary Rusk will bring memorandum)
 - Pak's Inaugural, July 1 - President
 - Pak wants either the Vice President or Secretary Rusk
4. M-16 Rifle - Your request for information from Secretary McNamara
5. Free World Aid to Communist China's Advanced Weapons Technology
(Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)

What, if anything, can we and should we do about it?

6. Personnel (Secretary Rusk)
7. Other.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 189, NARA, Date 5-16-91

29

Friday, May 12, 1967
11:00 a.m.

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

I asked Francis Bator to staff out the idea of your making a speech in the United States on the June 5 anniversary of George Marshall's famous Harvard speech, which could go to Europe via Telestar.

If we get a successful Kennedy Round negotiation this week, it could be the occasion not merely to recall the past, but to:

- indicate recent Atlantic progress: tripartite negotiations; Kennedy Round; nuclear committee; etc.
- look forward with hope and confidence to next generation's work in partnership; East-West; food-population, etc.

In general, it would underline achievements, continuity of policy, and your general vision of the future on the world scene -- pulling the Europeans, hopefully, a bit out of their isolationist mood.

W. W. R.

Let me see results of staff work _____

Call off staff work _____

See me _____

Friday, May 12, 1967 -- 10:45 AM

Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached is a message to
Dr. Theophilus E. Donges, President-
elect of South Africa, who was hospita-
lized last night with a brain hemorrhage.

W. W. Rostow

Approved ✓

Disapproved

Speak to me

EKH/vmr

Proposed Message from President to President-elect of South Africa

Dear Dr. Donges:

I am greatly distressed to learn of your illness.

My best wishes for a speedy recovery.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, May 12, 1967, 9:10 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agenda for Your Meeting with the Barr/Multer
Group from the Hill (11:30 AM today)

The main purpose of this meeting is to allow the Congressmen to report to you on their recent trip to Africa. You may wish to proceed as follows:

1. Short statement by the President:
 - welcome;
 - appreciate the delegation's interest in what we are trying to do to help the African countries help themselves;
 - especially want to congratulate Banking and currency Committee for its prompt and favorable action on the Inter-American Bank Bill; (Reported out favorably Wednesday.)
 - summary of Punta del Este (if you can spare the time).
2. Short statement by Joe Barr. (Joe will describe the purpose of the African trip.)
3. Statements by Congressmen, beginning with Multer.
4. Questions by the President. The operational question immediately before us is how to help the African Development Bank, which this delegation visited. Any bill authorizing a U.S. contribution would be handled by the Committees these people represent. You may want to sound them out on what kind of contribution they consider appropriate, and what next steps -- a bill this session or negotiations with the Africans before we have a bill -- they would recommend.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, May 12, 1967 -- 8:15 a.m.

Mr. President

Herewith Henry Owen comes up with a planning idea of some interest.

I would emphasize not merely what we might do post-Viet Nam but the extent to which your policy is already at grips with key issues of the 1970's -- at home and abroad -- as in the Leeds speech.

Nevertheless, a memo worth your reading.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 5-7-91

321
May 11, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Presidential Long-Term Planning Meetings

1. Problem: We need to take actions which will both:

(a) identify the administration with long-term goals that lie beyond the war in Vietnam; and

(b) pave the way for later effective action to achieve these goals.

This memorandum proposes actions to this end which are intended to complement, not substitute for, the appointment of a National Commission suggested in my April 18 memo.

2. Proposal:

(a) The President should announce that he is asking key agencies to establish small high level task forces (including both officials and outside experts) specifically to develop plans for long-range (post-Vietnam) programs on cities, welfare, the war on poverty, tax sharing with states and cities, and the war on hunger and underdevelopment abroad, etc.

(b) After these task forces have gotten deep into their work, the President should meet with each of them before they have reached hard and fast conclusions - to hear what they have to say and give them guidance about further work. The fact of these meetings would be made public.

(c) Some part of each of these meetings might be on nationwide TV. For example, assuming that the meetings occupied dinner and the early evening, the last half hour or so might be televised. Alternatively, the President might, soon after the meeting with each task force, discuss the long range needs which had been covered in that meeting on TV with one or two thoughtful press types (e.g., Reston, Severeid, Howard K. Smith).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLI 91-446

By up NARA, Date 2-3-92

PRESERVATION COPY

3. Rationale: Messrs. Bartlett and Weintal have lately been beating us about the ears for not devoting enough high level time to forward planning; their remedy is to return to the NSC format of the Eisenhower administration. We should do better; we should experiment with new techniques which will:

- encompass domestic, as well as foreign issues, since the two are increasingly closely related;
- blend governmental and private insights, in view of widening expertise in universities, research centers, etc.;
- serve to educate the country, as well as to provide a basis for decisions in the executive branch.

The proposal in para 2 is directed to these ends. It was triggered by a suggestion which James Reston made recently to the Policy Planning Council that the President hold a series of informal TV discussions of major policy issues with outside experts. He said that the President appears to good advantage in such informal discussions, and that they would be a more effective way of educating the country about upcoming issues than pre-set speeches.

4. Problems:

(a) Would the meetings turn out to be great bores? There would be something wrong with the participants if they did. These are subjects of great interest, on which a lot of hard and important issues remain to be thought through.

(b) Would people dismiss the whole thing as a public relations gimmick? This would depend on our intent. If the meetings were serious in purpose, this would show.

(c) Would the President be compelled to commit himself prematurely on the issues in question? No more than he needs to in NSC or any other type of planning meeting. His role would be to pose the issues, listen to the task

force's thinking and single out certain issues and ideas for further study. On TV, he would also emphasize the importance of the needs which the Task Force is addressing, and find occasion to dwell on how much the administration is already doing in these areas.

(d) Would the outside members of the task forces feel that they were being "used" to help improve the administration's image? On the contrary; if they were serious people, they would be anxious to see the needs which they were studying aired before the President - and also before a large audience on TV. This would clearly enhance the chances of success for whatever proposals the Task Force finally comes up with.

5. Conclusion: This exercise would:

(a) help the executive branch to plan effectively and at a high level for post-Vietnam needs;

(b) dramatize the President's interest in these longer range issues;

(c) educate the Congress and public about them (in anticipation of eventual larger post-Vietnam expenditures in these fields);

(d) get the American press and public to thinking about something besides their short-term miseries;

(e) help to build bridges at the highest level between the administration and the academic community (which would be represented on the panels).

⁶⁰
Henry Owen

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 12, 1967

Mr. President:

The Russians last gave us a prod on this two or three days ago. Nevertheless, we would hold up on consultation until it is clear that the game of naval "chicken" in the Japan Sea does not show a pattern.

Francis M. Bator

W.H.R. 33

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, May 12, 1967, 1:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Port Restrictions on Soviet Ships

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-442

By fw, NARA, Date 1-13-93

The Russians are once again putting pressure on us (Kosygin - Thompson) to reduce our present tough restrictions on access by Soviet ships to U.S. ports. On the face of it, they have a beef. They treat U.S. ships on a par with others. We keep them out of all but 12 of our ports, and put them through a lot of red tape, frisking, etc. before we let them in anywhere -- restrictions which we do not apply to non-communist nations. The result is that they almost never use our ports. Our ships don't much use theirs either, but that is by choice.

On the basis of an interagency staff level recommendation, Nick Katzenbach suggests that we explore with key labor people (Meany, Gleason, et al) -- and then on the Hill -- the possibility of some careful easing of the restrictions. A brief summary of the kind of easing we have in mind is at Tab A. It would be designed to forestall a row with Moscow, without any risk to the security of our ports. (The present arrangements were designed to keep the Russians from sneaking nuclear weapons into U.S. big-city harbors. This made some sense in the mid-50s before the Russians developed intercontinental missiles with hydrogen warheads. It makes little sense now. In any case, we would maintain enough control to hedge our bets.)

In any case, we must proceed carefully. This is the sort of thing that could cause a rapid rise of George Meany's temperature. And he would have plenty of allies among the more edgy of our security people, who tend to think there is a communist under every bed.

The recommendation to consult comes from Katzenbach and has the support of the appropriate people in the other agencies, including Defense and the Chiefs. If you approve, we would go ahead only after it is clear that the current game of naval chicken in the Sea of Japan does not develop into a pattern. And after taking soundings, we would lay out for you the choices for final decision.

fw
Francis M. Bator

OK for Katzenbach, Wirtz/George Weaver, et al, to take soundings with Meany/Gleason and then on the Hill _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

*I would hold this for the present
W*

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

TAB A

PROPOSED CHANGES IN REGULATIONSPorts of Call:

At present 12 American ports are open to Soviet and Eastern European ships.

The proposal is to increase this number to about 50 -- opening no ports which the Joint Chiefs of Staff say are near sensitive areas.

Boarding, Search and Surveillance:

At present, classified regulations require boarding, search and surveillance of all Soviet bloc ships.

The proposal is to provide boarding, search and surveillance on a selective, spot check basis, as the Coast Guard says it does not have the staff or men to guarantee full coverage in every case. We would have full coverage whenever there are any suspicious circumstances, and often enough to prevent the visiting ships from thinking they might not be inspected.

Advance Notification:

At present we require 30 days advance notification of any visit.

The proposal would be to reduce advance notification to 7 days -- although visa requirements would remain unchanged and would continue to require longer notice. (Soviet freighters calling at Canadian ports are getting private U.S. orders for merchandise at the last minute and want to be able to swing down to a U.S. port on shorter notice.)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-78
By cb, NARA, Date 10-14-94

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Friday - May 12, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith, a report on Lynda's activities yesterday:

"1. Miss Johnson departed Cuzco at 1040 a.m., 11 May, and arrived Lima at 1245. She met briefly with the local press and went to the residence where she had lunch with the Ambassador and DCM and his wife. Following lunch she met at the residence with girls from the Peace Corps. She left for the airport about 6:00 p.m. and departed at 6:55 for Santiago.

2. Miss Johnson landed at Pudabuel airport in Santiago at 10:55 p.m., May 11. She was greeted at the plane by some 25 well behaved reporters/photographers who accompanied her in walking from the airplane through the airport concourse (as would any other passenger) into the car. She graciously paused to permit photographers to snap a total of about 40 photos and spoke several words, smiling all the way. She entered the car some four minutes after disembarking from the plane. About 40 other people, mostly passengers and people waiting for passengers, were on hand. The arrival was pleasant and without incident.

3. Miss Johnson proceeded quickly and quietly to the Ambassador's residence, arriving there at 11:30 p.m. without incident. The residence was secured for the night with police protection exactly as requested.

4. Easy and quiet arrival was facilitated by the fact the local press has carried no advance word or speculation about Miss Johnson's proposed trip to Chile except for an isolated "Ultima Hora" item of 8 May.

I understand that she has decided to shorten her trip by one day. She is expected to depart Chile for the US tomorrow rather than Sunday.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 5-7-91

Profile

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - May 12, 1967

Mr. President:

Yesterday's negotiating session between Bob Anderson and Eleta focused on the compensation question. It was largely a sparring session.

Eleta presented a new compensation proposal which would provide a fixed royalty for Panama. The US would not received a fixed payment but would take all of any surplus in Canal revenues.

The amount of the Panamanian royalty was initially left blank. Later Eleta said they were thinking of 45-50 cents a ton royalty for Panama as opposed to 12.5 cents per ton in our compensation formula. Anderson expressed willingness to raise the ante to 15 cents per ton for each side.

Behind these figures lie these considerations:

- The Panamanians want at least \$30 million per year. Their 50 cents per ton figure would bring them about \$37 million based on 1965 tonnage figures.
- Our calculations are that after the Canal Administration spins off the present unprofitable business enterprises, the resulting surplus would permit a 35 cents per ton dividend without raising tolls. This is why we started off offering 12.5 cents per ton for each side, with the possibility of moving up to 17.5 cents for each country, or some combination of 35 cents, such as 20 cents for Panama and 15 cents for the US. The lower figure for us would make necessary a longer duration of the treaty so that we could recover the unamortized portion of our investment.

At the end of yesterday's meeting, both sides agreed to work on new variants of a compensation formula and resume talks this afternoon. We do not have a report yet on today's session.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pass file

~~SECRET~~

Friday - May 12, 1967

Mr. President:

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The Venezuelan security forces [REDACTED] have captured a guerrilla infiltration force coming from Cuba.

[REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED] If the information is fully borne out, there will be a strong -- if not stronger case -- for OAS action against Cuba than there was following the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela in 1963. The 1963 incident led to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers in July 1964 which applied diplomatic and economic sanctions against Castro.

The resolution of the Foreign Ministers also contained this warning:

"To warn the Government of Cuba that if it should persist in carrying out acts that possess characteristics of aggression and intervention against one or more of the member states of the Organization, the member states shall preserve their essential rights as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either individual or collective form, which could go so far as resort to armed force, until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere."

If the case is an airtight one, we may find the Venezuelans moving in the OAS for action pursuant to this warning.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Rostow ³⁷

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 12, 1967

SUBJECT: Visit by Mrs. Gandhi's Deputy

Morarji Desai, Indian Deputy Prime Minister, plans a trip to Latin America 20-25 September.

We have a low-key feeler from the Indian embassy asking whether you might see him if he came to the US too. He could come either before or after his Latin American visit. He probably would not come here at all if there were no chance to see you.

We all think this would be well worth your time. We're counting on him to put some toughness into the Gandhi administration, but he may be a little more conservative than we'd like on fiscal policy and on improving relations with Pakistan. But so far he has seemed ready to listen to reason. We don't think Mrs. Gandhi would resent your seeing him, even though he has been a rival.

I realize it's early to commit you to specific dates. However, if you would like to see him, I propose saying that you are willing in principle and that we would consider setting a date when we get a more formal suggestion from them.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7129 5451
By glsip, NARA, Date 5-7-81

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, May 11, 1967
7:30 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith -- late -- State's
account of its conversations with
Washington Post people on govern-
mental organization.

W. W. Rostow

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 11, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE
WALT W. ROSTOW

I saw Chalmers Roberts and Murrey Marder in connection with a story which they are doing in the decision-making process in Washington. They raised two principal questions with me:

(1) Whether Viet-Nam was such a preoccupation that we were neglecting other matters of importance. I went over the entire range of major questions with them and tried to probe them for a convincing example of neglect. My impression was that they were reasonably convinced that neglect of Europe or Latin America or Africa was not involved.

(2) Whether McNamara was a dove and I was a hawk. I hit this very hard and recalled McNamara's own public references to the different types of questions which the two of us get. Further, I pointed out that McNamara is in charge of the military, to whom the middle position appears doveish and I am in charge of the diplomats, to whom the middle position may appear hawkish at times. I also reminded them that there never has been a period in our postwar history when there have been such close working relationships between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and even the press has not been able to kick up any feuds between us over a period of six years.

DR (cas)
Dean Rusk

CONFIDENTIAL

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY Dut ON 5-30-91

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

May 11, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: S/S - Mr. Read

FROM : Dixon Donnelley *DD*

Ben:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-446
By *WJ* NARA, Date *2-3-92*

Over the past few weeks, Murrey Marder, with Chalmers Roberts or Phillip Geyelin, has talked on background in preparation for a story the "Washington Post" will carry on how high-level decisions are made concerning Viet-Nam.

They informed Robert McCloskey and Harold Kaplan, both Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State for Public Affairs, that their interest in the "decision-making" process was piqued by a "Fortune" article last month by Walter Guzzardi on how the war is managed. They said their interest was almost entirely in the principals involved in Viet-Nam: The President, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and Walt Rostow, and with the supposition that with so much high-level attention being devoted to a single matter, other matters were not receiving sufficient high-level attention. They said they wanted to define the respective roles of the agencies involved. How did State arrive at a specific position on an issue of great moment -- one worthy of Presidential interest? How was this position presented to the President? What was the relative weight of each agency's, or each Secretary's, advice? As the President was faced with the problem of resuming bombing after a pause, how did he get the advice of his principal Cabinet officers? Were there regular meetings? Did the NSC get involved? They also stated they are interested in

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the decision-making process within each Agency.

The "Post" reporters saw the following:

Foy Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary -- He told them that he was not normally involved in day-to-day operations, but followed longer-range political and military developments. Asked about his contact with the President, he said he participated in White House meetings. Asked about his general responsibilities, Mr. Kohler said he became involved in general political subjects which concerned DOD, CIA, NASA, AEC, or had military, intelligence or scientific aspects; and he occasionally refereed disputes between Agencies. Queried on ultimate Soviet goals in Viet-Nam, Mr. Kohler said he did not think the Soviets wanted to become involved in a real way in that part of the world, pointing out that the logistical problems for them would be severe. He also stated that the Soviets were very concerned about the Chinese entering the hostilities, since this would pose real problems for them in terms of their commitments to the Chinese.

William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs -- He reports that the "Post" writers appeared to be focusing on whether there had been disagreement within the Government on bombing policy, and specifically on the December 13 and 14 attacks near Haiphong -- possibly to be used as a peg on which to hang the story. Mr. Bundy told them that all senior officers of the Government were aware at all times of where the bombing stood, so, although there were naturally individual differences of view within the top level, these were thrashed out, and

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- 3 -

in the end there has been throughout the Government basic agreement on the President's policy at all levels down through the Assistant Secretary.

Asked about George Ball's former role, Mr. Bundy cited Mr. Ball as typical of officials who might differ with others but who fully accepted eventual decisions. One question they hammered was whether Ambassador Goldberg was clued in. Mr. Bundy emphasized that he was, very much so. Asked about procedures, Mr. Bundy said the President had several groups to consult with on any decision, citing the Tuesday lunches, a slightly wider group, or the NSC. On major decisions, Mr. Bundy told them the President usually called a series of meetings with different groups, and also sought private counsel. Mr. Bundy stressed that the whole procedure was deliberately kept fluid so that the President had the advice he wanted and got it in the way he wanted it.

As to lower-level groups, Mr. Bundy confirmed the weekly meetings held by Governor Averell Harriman to explore all negotiating possibilities. Finally, he stressed that the Secretaries of State and Defense stayed in close personal touch, and that at his level he was in day-to-day touch with John McNaughton.

Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern and Pacific Affairs -- Both the questions put to him and the replies he gave closely paralleled the experience of Mr. Bundy.

Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs -- The reporters questioned him regarding the development of Viet-Nam policy, the role of the Harriman Committee, and how Ambassador Goldberg is kept informed. From the questioning it was apparent that they are testing two principal notions: that there is an over-preoccupation with the

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- 4 -

Viet-Nam problem to the detriment of other aspects of policy; and there is insufficient coordination between our political and military moves. He stressed that other aspects of policy are not being neglected, and that he had access to the Secretary and Under Secretary on any matters he felt were important. Regarding Ambassador Goldberg, he said there was close telephonic consultation with the Department at least a dozen times a day, and with the Secretary and the President whenever desirable. Moreover, Ambassador Goldberg is frequently in Washington. With respect to the Harriman Committee, he said that the Governor's mandate was to pursue whatever possibilities there were for a peaceful settlement, and that he participated as a member. He resisted being drawn out on the details regarding the Polish episode of last December. The sharpest question asked was by Roberts: "Is it possible that decisions are being taken at the upper levels of a military character and precisely timed to kill off certain steps being taken to achieve a peaceful solution?" Mr. Sisco said he did not believe this; that we are pursuing a two-pronged policy: one on the military front, one on the political front; and that with the hundreds of propaganda feelers from the other side we could not be expected to halt or slow down our military operations based on unfulfilled vague promises.

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Memo for the Record

On March 24, 2005, it was discovered that document #38c had been inadvertently mis-numbered as document #38a at the time this folder was processed in 1991. The Memorandum of Conversation between Read, Geyelin, and Marder should be cited as document #38c.

Shannon Jarrett
Archivist

May 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Benjamin H. Read
Phil Geyelin
Murray Marder

Phil Geyelin made an appointment to come in in the afternoon of May 4 and arrived with Murray Marder following their lunch with Bill Bundy.

Geyelin and Marder told me they were doing an extensive piece on the USG decision-making process with particular emphasis on how Viet-Nam decisions were made and on what attention was given to other area problems.

1. Viet-Nam

On Viet-Nam Geyelin asked for comment on the "conventional image" they were receiving in their discussions of Secretary Rusk and Walt Rostow as the principal "hawks" in the Viet-Nam situation and Secretary McNamara as the leading Administration "dove". I told them that the image they sketched was sophomoric and did injustice to all three of the principals concerned; that each had been exceptionally discreet at all times in not divulging his own views and advice to the President on Viet-Nam. I stated that anyone in the Department who purported to tell them what Secretary Rusk actually told the President on Viet-Nam or any other subject, was talking through his hat, because the Secretary always kept his counsel completely to himself in this regard. I noted that the differences between the President's three principal foreign policy advisers were few and far between to knowledge.

2. Non-Viet-Nam Subjects

It was quite plain that one of the themes Geyelin and Marder were developing in writing the article was that Viet-Nam forced us to neglect other subjects, and they pressed me to tell them if the Tuesday luncheon discussions didn't reflect this point. I told them that I could not remember a luncheon agenda in 3½ years which had been limited exclusively to Viet-Nam; that usually there were some six to twelve items on the list, of which only one or two of which dealt with SEA

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problems, although they were admittedly usually matters of considerable importance. I mentioned non-proliferation, strategic weapons (ABMs), Punta del Este preparations and followup as other far-reaching items which had been the subject of much discussion lately. They pressed me for a typical recent agenda but I told them they would have to discuss such a request with George Christian or Walt Rostow.

NOTE: (About May 10 Geyelin phoned to say that they had come to the view that the importance of the Tuesday luncheon decision-making process could be over-emphasized, and I agreed.)

I received the impression in the original and later phone conversation, however, that they were convinced of the validity of the opinion that non-Viet-Nam items were suffering from neglect, and that no one had not been able to dissuade them from this view.

Thursday, May 11, 1967
6:45 p.m.

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is an account of my conversation with Kilpatrick, Marder, and Chalmers Roberts. I recommend that you make these points to them:

1. In making your decisions in national security affairs, you must look in many directions at the same time: to your Secretaries of State and Defense; to the JCS; to the Congress; to tides of thought and opinion inside our country; to the problems and views of other governments; and, in the end, to the position of our country in the world and in the sweep of its history.

2. In carrying forward your task, you have been blessed by two remarkable Cabinet officers in Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. They not only are competent and dedicated to the country and to the President, but also immensely loyal to each other.

3. The actual machinery for receiving advice and permitting you to make decisions is complex but in good working order: there is the Tuesday lunch and many other meetings, including formal NSC meetings; there is the telephone; there is an orderly flow of paper coming to you which engages many hours in the night.

4. Despite the burdens of Viet Nam, you believe that we have been able to carry on not only a successful domestic policy, with many new innovations which you believe will stand in history, but also a global foreign policy which is perhaps less well understood than it might be because of public concern and attention with Viet Nam.

5. Specifically, we have been building strength and new elements of partnership in the major regions of the world: Western Europe; the new Asia that is emerging behind our defense of Viet Nam; in Latin America; and, we hope, in Africa, where things will move slower.

6. You have tried to move as fast as it is possible to ease things between East and West, and there have been some results. You hope for more.

7. The organization of the government -- while not perfect -- and it never will be -- permits you to follow what is happening in the world; to get a feel for major issues as they emerge and before they come for final decision; to consult flexibly ~~the~~ *with a* wide range of opinion; and then, at

the right time, to move.

8. In short, the problems you face and which concern you are primarily real problems rather than problems of organization; although, despite Viet Nam, you have an underlying sense of confidence in the way the world is moving; confidence that we have been able to make important constructive contributions in recent years to that movement; and confidence in the sense of direction, durability, and good sense of the American people.

W. W. R.

Thursday, May 11, 1967
6:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

As you may recall, we had a word on the phone just as I was about to see the three men from the Washington Post on government organization, and you instructed me to make clear to them that our foreign policy was not overwhelmed by Viet Nam.

I made this point quite vividly by getting out the file of Tuesday lunch meetings and, without giving anything away, indicated the extraordinary range of issues that are dealt with at that lunch.

I also gave them some sense of how the meeting is organized and how it proceeds.

Beyond that, I made these fundamental points:

-- The whole national security machinery is, must be, and always will be organized to serve the particular needs of a particular President. There is no single, correct formula; but only what helps a President do his job the way he wants it done.

-- In the case of President Johnson, a great deal of business is done through orderly paper work flowing to him for decision. In fact, 90% of the job of our staff is to make sure that we are an effective and reliable means of communication two ways: to the President and from the President.

-- Beyond that, the President relies on a number of different types of meetings with the senior advisors to assess problems and to make decisions: the Tuesday lunch; special ad hoc meetings on particular subjects (tripartite negotiations, Punta Del Este, India food, balance of payments, etc.); and NSC meetings of the anticipatory type we are now regularly mounting.

-- I then described the particularly close relation between the President and his two senior advisors -- Sect. Rusk and Sect. McNamara. I noted that we had only rarely in our experience -- if ever -- so close and confident relations among the three men at the apex of national security affairs.

-- In response to their questions, I explained at some length the job we do here and drew a sharp distinction between the task of a Cabinet officer who has to run one of the great departments and deal with the Congress, present himself before the country and the world, and a White House aide.

-- In response to specific questions, I said there was no sharp split in the government on Viet Nam policy or bombing: we all looked at the facts together; listened to each other's arguments, and then carried out as a team the President's decision.

-- When further questioned about my own views, I said that I had no very special views to press, contrary to those of my senior colleagues; but that if anyone tried to use the post I now hold for lobbying, he would soon be out of his job -- and properly so.

-- I took some pains to emphasize by concrete example what you have been able to accomplish in foreign affairs in Asia, Latin America, Western Europe, Africa, and East-West affairs, despite the heavy burdens of Viet Nam.

W. W. R.

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, May 11, 1967 -- 6:05 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with the Barr/Multer group of congressmen
who recently visited Africa (11:30 AM, Friday, May 12)

Attached is Joe Barr's briefing material for your meeting tomorrow
with the Congressional delegation he took to Africa:

Tab A -- List of invitees. (Joe has added Senators Fulbright and
Hickenlooper, plus a few senior Congressmen, to the
group which made the trip.)

Tab B -- Short opening statement by the President, congratulating
the Banking and Currency Committee for prompt and favor-
able action on the Inter-American Bank bill. (They reported
on it Tuesday, recommending passage 28-5.)

Tab C -- Short, innocuous statement by Joe, to follow yours.

Tab D -- Copy of the delegation's draft report to you on the trip.

The Barr/Multer group went to Africa for two purposes: to inspect
IDA projects and to get a feel for the substance and prospects of the new
African Development Bank. Their draft report (Tab D) was ghost-written
by Treasury and circulated by Multer. It does not have the specific approval
of each man, but there have been no outcries against it thus far. Essentially,
it is very favorable to IDA and cautiously favorable to the African Bank. On
the specific question of whether the U.S. should make a contribution to the
Special Fund the African Bank is now trying to form, the report praises the
idea in principle, but recommends that we know the precise financial arrange-
ments before we ask the Congress for any formal authorization.

The African Bank has asked us to chip in about 70% of a \$215 million
Special soft-loan Fund for projects and countries which aren't appropriate
for the Bank's regular capital. (All the regular capital is supplied by African
countries.) Your Foreign Aid Message said only that we would try to find a
way to help. We have done quite a lot of staff work on various ways and means,
and will be ready soon to come to you for a decision on the substance. (Nobody
will recommend that we agree to the Bank's proposal; the proposal will prob-
ably involve \$80-100 million spread over five years and offered on the condition
that it be no more than 40-50% of the total.)

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- 2 -

However, in sounding out these people, you should know that there is a split among your advisers on the legislative strategy we use for this proposal:

- Gaud, Katzenbach, and Joe Palmer strongly believe that we should make every effort to send up an authorizing bill this session, even if we don't know precisely what is possible in terms of other contributions, procurement rules, etc. (We could do this by proposing ceilings on the percentage U.S. share, offshore procurement, etc. This is what we are doing with respect to the Asian Bank's Special Fund.) If we are to make our new African policy credible, State/AID argues that we must move soon to help the African Bank. They also maintain that other donors will not join in the new Fund unless we take the first step.
- Joe Barr believes we should not send up a bill until we have all the specifics worked out. He points out that we are already committed to put three development bank bills before the Congress this session; we shouldn't add to it -- and certainly not unless and until we have a very specific package to sell.

The point I would make here is that, assuming we want to try to help the Bank, your choice is not between consulting the Congress this session or next session. If we want the political and economic benefits of aiding the African Bank -- and if we want other donors to join us -- we must do a good deal of the missionary work ourselves. We cannot do that without some notion of what size contribution we might be willing to make, given appropriate action by others. If I understood your thinking correctly when we faced this problem on the other banks, you want to have a very clear reading of Congressional viewpoints on money before you authorize anyone to talk to foreigners about any specific amount.

Therefore, it seems to me that the real choice which should be in the back of your mind tomorrow is whether we should:

- go for a non-specific authorization bill this year, or
- go through a full informal consultation with these and other interested parties on the Hill to get informal agreement on a ballpark number.

Either way, we will be putting much the same question -- though in the second instance less formally -- to the same people.

W. W. Rostow

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Thursday, May 11, 1967
5:45 p.m.

~~to say~~
2. Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith General Taylor volunteers in his own way views close to those now emerging from your other advisers.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

re Viet Nam

41a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-442

By fw, NARA, Date 1-13-93

~~SECRET~~

May 11, 1967

Mr. President:

I seem to sense a new wave of pessimism regarding Viet-Nam pervading official circles in Washington, apparently arising from renewed doubts about the bombing of the North and increased concern over future troop requirements to carry on the ground war in the South. For what they are worth, in this paper I would like to give you my current thoughts on the bombing.

I gather that some of your advisors, like Rice in Hong Kong, are beginning to feel that we are dangerously close to a collision with Peking or Moscow or both as a result of the escalation of our bombing. At the same time, while these risks are being run, we see no sign of "give" on the part of our opponents in Hanoi. Hence, they ask--where are we going with our bombing and where do we come out in the end?

These are, of course, old questions and old fears but always valid ones. Final answers are never possible since they must be based on estimates of future events and are inevitably influenced by subjective attitudes and biases. I have a lot of the latter and, hence, hold strong views on the subject.

We tend to forget our own words used in the past when we express doubts about the justification of our bombing of the North. We have said repeatedly that we have never expected the bombing to stop infiltration, only to limit it--yet in our private councils I hear the results criticized on the score that infiltration continues in spite of all our efforts and, hence, that the game really is not worth the risks and international heat which it generates.

As for the effectiveness of the bombing in restraining infiltration, I rest the case on the pictures of the Tet logistic activity showing the feverish efforts in North Viet-Nam to take advantage of a lull in the bombing. These pictures show what our bombing holds back. I do not see for the life of me how we could be justified in relaxing this brake which restrains the forces which can be brought against our men in the South. We should remind ourselves that General Westmoreland's requirement for troops assumes a continuation of the bombing and would undoubtedly increase if the bombing stopped without a compensatory reduction of enemy action.

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- 2 -

Having defended the need for continuing the bombing, I must say that I would be cautious in extending the target system much farther. Some of our bombing advocates still think in terms of World War II and forget another fact conceded in past discussions--that there is really no industrial target system in North Viet-Nam worthy of the name and no war-supporting industry which, if destroyed, will bear importantly on the outcome of the war. Similarly, the transportation system, though subject to intermittent interruption, can never be damaged to such a point that the minimum supply requirements of combat can not reach the South.

Under these conditions, I do not think that it is worth the lives of our pilots, the loss of our planes or such political risk as may be entailed to enter heavily defended areas and strike or restrike targets which do not have a clear relationship to our bombing objectives. It would be most timely to decide what targets are truly of that class and, hence, need to be put out of action and kept out of action.

But first we have to know our objectives. I assume them still to be the restraint of infiltration and the imposition of a mounting cost on Hanoi for the continuation of the aggression in the South. But while adhering to these objectives, rather than run unreasonable political risks and accept mounting losses in pilots and planes, I would be inclined to remain at about the present level of effort and seek to increase the pressure on the enemy more by the implacable duration of the pain rather than by raising its momentary intensity. One can "escalate" in a variety of ways--expansion of targets, employment of new weapons and tactics, the accumulative increased effect of repetition. The latter form is the one I favor as we run out of clearly remunerative targets--remunerative in the sense that they contribute to our objectives without too great a cost in men and planes.

In summary, I suggest a review of all targets, those struck and those still untouched, to determine which clearly contribute to our bombing objectives as defined above--then I would direct our efforts to this remunerative target system without further thought of pausing, relenting or turning back. We must pass this test of persistence--if we do not, we will be expected to give way at every other point on every other front in this conflict. It is concession which will make the enemy tougher--not the bombing, as some of the critics allege. If we yield on the bombing issue, we can be quite sure of no future "give" by Hanoi on any important point.

Maxwell D. Taylor

SECRET

Thursday, May 11, 1967 -- 5:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sheldon Cohen, who has been in Panama reviewing our technical assistance in tax collection in Latin America, was called in by President Robles and asked to communicate the two following messages to you:

1. He (Robles) is anxious that we force the pace of treaty negotiations, since he will become a lame duck and begin to lose his influence from about September when the election campaign begins.
2. He wishes to keep the present AID Director, Jim Megellas, for the rest of his (Robles') term.

Sheldon added that Robles had apparently fallen in love with Megellas who appears to know everyone in Panama from cabinet ministers to peasants by their first names.

I told Sheldon to pass the message about Megellas to Linc Gordon and Dave Bronhelm, which he will do.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Pres file

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, May 11, 1967
5:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

The attached report of some of
Amb. Bunker's initial diplomatic
conversations in Saigon will, I believe,
interest you.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 5-7-91

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NJ 91-446
By ing NARA, Date 2-3-92

Thursday, May 11, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon, 25255)

Ambassador Locke and I called the morning of May 10 upon Korean Ambassador Shin Sang Chul and Chinese Ambassador General Hu Lien.

Korean Ambassador, who has been here over four years, remarked that the situation in South Vietnam was far better than it was two years ago. He stated that at that time the public generally, including even officials of South Vietnamese Government, believed the Viet Cong would win and had lost hope. People were afraid to speak out against Communists. The improvement in the military situation has now convinced Vietnamese people that the Viet Cong cannot win, bringing stability to the Government and enabling Prime Minister Ky to retain firm control. One evidence of change is that recently Tam Chau, moderate Buddhist leader, has spoken several times against Communists, which he formerly feared to do. The Korean Ambassador believes that the turning point was spring of 1966, when radical Buddhist movement of Tri Quang was subdued.

I complimented the Korean Ambassador on performance of Korean troops. He said that Korean troops were able to do a good job of pacification in villages and hamlets because the customs of the Vietnamese were almost the same as those of the Koreans, both being based on old Chinese Confucian influence and belief in strength and security of the family. Korean troops make an effort to be polite, have special respect for the dead (refraining from disturbing graves in building of camps, for example), show special respect to elderly people (consulting them and providing refreshments to them after entering villages) and respect customs of the elders in dealing with youth (by refusing cigarettes to youth, for example, as elders do not believe youth should smoke).

The Chinese Ambassador, who has been here about two years, remarked that situation in South Vietnam was far better than two years ago. He suggested that we give priority to finding young Vietnamese leaders to work for the villages on pacification and development, and that they be adequately paid.

Chinese Ambassador does not believe that Mao Tse-tung will be able to oust Liu Shao-Chi. He said that Liu not only has the support of the anti-Mao faction among the Communists but also of a large number of Chinese anti-Communists who back Liu as an alternative to Mao. He said the

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-2-

Armed Forces are split down the middle, and that although Mao has tried to use them against Liu faction, he had been unsuccessful.

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Thursday, May 11, 1967
4:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Bob Ginsburgh furnished me
this forthright extract from remarks
of J. P. McConnell to a group of
new Air Force generals.

W. W. Rostow

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Pres file

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Extract of Remarks by General J. P. McConnell, Chief of Staff, USAF,
New General Officer Orientation, Headquarters, USAF, Tuesday,
2 May 1967:

In regard to the expansion of the target list in North Vietnam, you are doubtless aware that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently advocated stronger air attacks on North Vietnam. Permission to bomb the vital industrial and military targets in North Vietnam has been slow in coming because the President has been hoping that North Vietnam's leaders would show enough common sense to halt their aggression in the South and thus eliminate the need for bombing the current group of targets. There are, of course, many non-military factors that must be considered by the President along with the JCS recommendations.

This is a unique war, because its political, economic, and social considerations are often more significant than the military ones. Therefore, the decisions which must be made (and which are made) at the highest levels of government in regard to Vietnam are extremely complex.

I want to make sure you understand that the opinions and recommendations of the JCS are being fully considered by the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the President. National policy is not being made in ignorance of JCS recommendations. But once the President has made his decision, it is our duty to carry it out to the best of our ability. Either support it or turn in your suit.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Thursday, May 11, 1967
4:30 p.m.

45

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

In the course of dinner last night, Eric Sevareid spoke to me as follows:

He was greatly impressed with his evening with you on the eve of your departure for Bonn. He has been wrestling with the problem of how to convey to our people the sense of conviction, warmth, and depth which you conveyed on that private occasion. Although I may sound like a lobbyist, he has come up with the same idea I have put to you several times; namely, in this case, that you permit him to tape a long interview with you and then edit it down as you desire.

W. W. R.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-442
By ju, NARA, Date 1-13-93

46
Press file
May 11, 1967
4:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for Ambassador Gronouski

John Gronouski is asking for a few minutes with you, any time before May 22. He would like to talk about:

--The atmospherics of our discussions with the Poles on Vietnam. Gronouski believes the Poles can play a useful role, and wants to discuss whether we should make them a channel in the future. He has some comments on the Hightower story.

--East-West issues before the Congress. Gronouski wants to urge you to push the East-West Trade bill. He also wants to talk about appropriations for our new English-language program in Poland, the Informational Media Guaranty bill, and the sharp cut in cultural exchange appropriations. Gronouski has already talked to some Congressmen and will talk to many more. He is convinced that it is good politics to maintain the thrust of our balanced policy in Eastern Europe and South East Asia.

I recommend that you make the time to see Gronouski if you can. It will be a good opportunity to review Eastern European developments, and Gronouski can do some valuable contact work on the Hill after he has seen you.

W. W. Rostow

Marvin, set up appointment _____

Disapproved _____

See Me _____

~~SECRET~~

ND:jk

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Thursday, May 11, 1967
4:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the more pacific noise out
of the Russians, which I mentioned on
the telephone.

There have been other indications
that they don't want us to over-react
to their tough talk; but we shall see
when Dobrynin talks with Sec. Rusk.

W. W. Rostow

[REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-87
By cb, NARA Date 1-21-01

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 10, 1967

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

TEXT OF CIA REPORT

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Ivan Ivanovich Kovalenko, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet-Japan Friendship Society who is now visiting Japan [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] on May 4, 1967, that "the American bombing of Haiphong will not increase the danger to Soviet ships. I am absolutely positive that the Americans will not bomb the Soviet ships by error. Therefore, the recent American bombing of Haiphong will not become a cause for greater tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union will not be provoked by such American military operations as the Haiphong bombings." The Japanese word used for bombings can be translated as "accidental bombing or error in bombing."

Kovalenko also expressed his belief that there will be no quick solution to the Vietnam War and that the Soviet Union expects the war to continue for many years, perhaps ten or even twenty. He said that the Soviet Union will continue to help the Vietnamese as long as help is needed.

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Pres file

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Thursday, May 11, 1967
3:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick Katzenbach joins
in recommending Jack Valenti to take
on the desalting negotiations with
Israel and the UAR.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-442
By ju, NARA, Date 1-13-93

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment of a New United States
Coordinator on Israeli and United
Arab Republic Desalting Plants to
Succeed Ambassador Bunker

In addition to my April 19 recommendation of Robert R. Bowie as one eminently qualified to become United States Coordinator on Israeli and United Arab Republic desalting plants, I would add the name of Jack Valenti. I believe that Mr. Valenti's demonstrated capability and the high regard in which he is held by all would make his participation as Coordinator of this important matter very appropriate.

Richard L. Kohn
Under Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-446
By *ing* NARA, Date 2.3.92

~~SECRET~~
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals
not automatically declassified

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, May 11, 1967
3:55 p.m.

L. Rusk
v. Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk presents his
response to the question you raised
about Erhard's visit with you.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 68, NARA, Date 5-7-91

1746
49a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE
WALT W. ROSTOW

On balance, I would advise against the President's asking Ludwig Erhard to spend the night in the White House prior to his luncheon. It might create sensitivities with Kiesinger and it could also raise problems of precedent for other personalities such as Wilson, Holt, or anyone who would feel some pressure toward demonstrating that they have a very close relationship with the President.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-446
By ing NARA, Date 2-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, May 11, 1967
3:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker's weekly
telegram.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 25260

~~SECRET~~

TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: W. W. ROSTOW
SUBJECT: SECURITY
REF: EXEC. ORDER 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY DCH ON 12-1-83

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Wednesday, May 10, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon, 25260)

Herewith my second weekly telegram:

A. General

With the arrival of Bob Komer and General Abrams, the past week has been one of further consolidation of the Mission organization. General Westmoreland has informed me that he proposes to have General Abrams devote a major part of his time and energies to working with the Vietnamese Armed Forces. I think this is a wise decision and I am sure it will bear fruit.

In my most recent talks with both Thieu and Ky, each has indicated certain dissatisfactions with the leadership and performance of ARVN and this in itself is a hopeful sign. Consequently, I think General Abrams can anticipate a cooperative attitude on the part of the Government of Vietnam.

After thoroughgoing discussions with General Westmoreland and Bob Komer, I have come to the conclusion that we can most efficiently and effectively perform our role in support of pacification through a merging of the civil and military organizations under a single manager concept as embodied in NSAM 362 which you have approved. With the responsibility for the program placed in COMUSMACV, and with Bob Komer as Deputy for Pacification, I think we should have a first rate team and should be able to achieve a maximum utilization of resources. I intend to announce these changes tomorrow and it will make it clear that I regard all official Americans in Vietnam as part of one team and not as part of competing civilian and military establishments; that the integrity of OCO will be maintained; and that I intend to see that the civilian part of the U.S. effort is not buried under the military. In many instances, soldiers will be working for civilians as well as the reverse; and that I intend to keep fully informed personally about all developments in this field and to hold frequent meetings with General Westmoreland and Ambassador Komer for the purpose of formulating policy.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/NODIS~~Authority NLS/CBS 10By me, NARS, Date 11-28-83

PRESERVATION COPY

On the political scene tensions had continued to build up. Because of the developing strain in relations between Thieu and Ky, I felt that the time had come when we might have to move into the situation in a more definite way than simply by insisting on the absolute necessity for unity among the Armed Forces. In this connection, as a preliminary, I asked General Westmoreland to see Thieu last Sunday. He had a very good talk with Thieu and in the meantime over the weekend leaders of the Armed Forces had moved into the situation themselves. As a result, the Minister of Defense, General Vien, made an announcement to the press last Monday stating that the Armed Forces were not a political party and would have no Presidential candidate. In talks which I subsequently had with both Thieu and Ky, each expressed himself as highly pleased with the announcement. Ky took the further step, apparently on General Vien's advice, of talking to Thieu and telling him of his intention to become a candidate. These events have served to lower tensions and if the position stated by General Vien is adhered to and respected, hopefully could prove a constructive development. On the other hand, as I shall point out in more detail, it does not guarantee that we are out of the woods. The situation will have to be carefully watched and nursed.

B. Political

As I have mentioned the past week saw a rapid crystalization of the question of a military candidate for President and the related problem of the future political role of the Vietnamese military. It had become apparent that the rivalry between Thieu and Ky was undermining the unity and stability of the Armed Forces and a group of leading generals decided that the issue had to be rapidly settled. An attempt to get General Thieu to withdraw was not successful and the leading generals, including Ky but not Thieu, decided that the ARVN should not put forward a military candidate as such, for the Presidency.

This decision was announced by General Vien, the Chief of the Joint General Staff, on May 8. In a conversation with me on May 9, General Thieu affirmed his support for General Vien's statement. Later that day, General Ky described to me a long and frank talk that he had had the same morning with General Thieu which seems to have cleared the air somewhat. Thieu was obviously concerned about his position among "the generals" but Ky said he reassured him of their loyalty should Thieu choose to return to a military career. Ky assured me once again that there would be no split among the military, and if the conversation with Thieu went as described, we can perhaps be more hopeful that this will not occur.

Ky made clear that he will be a candidate and that he will attempt a "social revolution" for Vietnam, which he considers vital to its future. He is obviously confident that he can win and thinks that it will be by a very respectable mandate. His comments about civilian candidates and the civilian role were not encouraging, however, since he made clear his already known skepticism regarding their motivation and capabilities. I reiterated the importance of having strong civilian representation in any slate in order to increase the votes, and provide a broader mandate particularly from the viewpoint of world opinion, and he said that he was giving this serious thought. Despite his obvious feeling about civilian candidates, I am sure he got my point.

In trying to assess these fast-moving developments in a preliminary way, I think we can draw certain satisfaction from them. We must, however, recognize that there are many problems ahead and many potential pitfalls in the situation. The decision against having a "military" candidate represented a face-saving formula for Thieu and a means for Ky to announce his candidacy. It also without doubt represented a genuine desire on the part of some of the leading generals to keep the Army detached from the political struggle so that it can pursue its own extremely important and urgent goals. The whole sequence of events is still, to a degree, a papering-over process, however, and good will on the part of both Thieu and Ky, and their supporters, will be required to make it last. It is naturally my hope that Thieu will find satisfaction in a primarily military role in the future, but he has reserved his final position and it cannot be excluded that he may decide to team up with a civilian candidate.

I will be following this situation very closely and using my influence as needed to avoid serious splits either among the military or between the military and civilian elements. If we can, in fact, achieve a truly apolitical role for the Armed Forces during this critical period ahead, it will represent a major and positive achievement. But we must bear in mind that the biggest prize is at stake, and reason and moderation have not been the primary qualities of Vietnamese leaders in the recent past. I am always conscious of the vital importance you place on a satisfactory political outcome here and will, of course, continue to keep you closely informed as developments occur.

In general terms, political tension in Saigon rose during the past week, with the question of the military candidate threatening divisions in the Armed Forces and relations between the government and the Assembly strained by several key issues in the Electoral Law. The uncertainty of

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

PRESERVATION COPY

the political situation has been increased by efforts of the militant An Quang Buddhists to exploit the peace issue.

The fluidity of the political situation would be cause for grave concern if it were not that virtually all of the political activity is focused on one objective -- the coming elections -- and also that most if not quite all of the activity is taking place roughly within the bounds of the legal Constitutional framework. The new institutions are fragile, but they are already working to the extent that they are giving direction and limits to current political activity.

Containing political conflict within a legal frame is a basic problem here. It was the absence of such a legal frame which caused much if not most of the political instability after the fall of Diem. His government was based on a complex system of personal relationships. When the top was cut off that governmental pyramid, the whole pyramid collapsed. In our situation, in case of a similar catastrophe, our governmental structure remains intact because it is based on solid and essentially impersonal institutions; here the whole government disappears until a new complex of personal relationships can be painfully constructed -- and tested -- over a period of time. We have here now the beginning of a governmental structure that must be made capable of surviving such disasters as the death of a Chief of State.

This past week saw perhaps the bitterest debate yet on the floor of the Assembly. The issue which provoked the most emotion was the question of a run-off election. With four or five major candidates in the lists, it is entirely possible that the winner in a single election will not have a large enough per cent of the vote to be able to claim a genuine popular mandate. For this reason we have urged provision for a run-off election if the winning candidate gets less than 40 percent of the vote.

Unfortunately, the question of a run-off election bears directly on the chances of the so-called "military" candidate. As matters now stand, it seems most likely that a single "military" candidate, Prime Minister Ky, will run against three or more civilian candidates, although we cannot exclude the possibility that another "military" man may join a civilian candidate's ticket. The vote for civilian tickets would therefore be split, and in a single election, this would improve the chances of the "military" candidate. If there is to be a second round, however, it would most likely pit one civilian candidate against one military man, thus materially improving the chances that a civilian could be elected.

Deputies have told us that they were subject to intense government pressure on this issue, and attendance in the Assembly was low during the crucial sessions. Tempers flared, and one Deputy offered to fight another on the floor of the Assembly. After the vote, which was 44 to 34 against a run-off election, the southern renaissance Deputies walked out in protest and Chairman Suu -- a leading civilian candidate with a large personal stake in the matter -- admonished the Assembly that those who had voted against the run-off "bear responsibility before history." The renaissance Deputies came back. However, and more important, government pressures on the Assembly seem to have been within the bounds of normal democratic process. There were no more dud grenades delivered with threatening letters, and we are aware of no more physical threats to the security of those who opposed the government on this issue. As you know, I raised this matter twice with Ky in recent days and he was not surprising non-committal. I also raised it with Thieu, who said he favored a run-off which is also not surprising if he is entertaining the possibility of teaming up eventually with a civilian candidate.

Other issues which sparked hot debate also revolved around the effect various provisions of the Law are likely to have on the chances of the "military" candidate. These included the question of campaign expenses and the proposal that those candidates holding high office be compelled to resign from office before running for election. On the first issue, campaign expenses, the Assembly roughly doubled the amount which individual candidates may spend, to about ten million piasters. While this is still well below the 20 to 50 million which knowledgeable Vietnamese estimate will be required for a national campaign, it is more realistic and more equitable than the previous figure. Supporters of civilian candidates favored a higher allowance, while government supporters evidently felt the government candidate would have a better chance if the figure were held low.

A compromise basically favorable to government candidates was reached on the question of requiring resignations before running for election. Civil servants and military personnel must go on leave without pay from the day they file their candidacy. However, there is no provision that persons holding high office must leave that office in order to Ky or Thieu may run for President without leaving the government, but they will have to go on leave without pay from the military service. Assembly Chairman (and Presidential candidate) Suu underscored his feeling on this subject by announcing that regardless of the provisions of the Law he will resign his position as Chairman of the Assembly two months before the campaign begins.

The press campaign is to some extent already under way. The government is permitting, perhaps encouraging, press sniping at the civilian candidates. Recent newspaper items have attacked Suu, for example, for allegedly saying that he chose Dr. Dan as his running mate because Dan has the money required for a campaign. A recent cartoon depicts a candidate riding a bicycle to work with a sweating coolie running alongside holding an umbrella over him. This is a slam against Huong, who is famous for having gone to work on a bicycle when he was Premier. In Bien Hoa on May 5, Ky took direct aim at the civilian candidates by saying that it is "almost certain that the French will support a certain candidate financially in the Presidential elections." The comment was printed in the official Vietnam press.

There is little or no criticism of Thieu or Ky in the press. The question of a press voice for opposition candidates has already come up in the Assembly, however. A proposal that each candidate be allowed to open a newspaper was voted down, but the Assembly did provide that reporting on election campaigns should not be subject to censorship unless national security, personal honor, or good morals are threatened. The issue is likely to be raised again when the Assembly begins work on a Press Law. (We are studying the whole problem of press censorship here. For the moment we are taking the line with both government and opposition supporters that one-sided press criticism of the civilian candidates is likely to hurt the government candidate more than the civilians; however, we may decide to try to persuade the government and the Assembly to take some concrete actions to increase press freedom and equalize the chances of all candidates to get a fair hearing in the press.)

Ky is also campaigning in the economic field. The government is now planning to give military personnel and civil servants a cash "rice" bonus based on the cost of 12 kilograms of rice per person per month. The Prime Minister has also indicated that he wants all possible steps to be taken to ensure that prices do not increase over the next four months, particularly for such popular items as rice, pork, sugar, and flour. This is evidently in response to popular opinion which we have observed to be increasingly critical of what is regarded as government failure to do anything about high prices. Other economic moves by the Prime Minister which can be interpreted as being at least partly motivated by political considerations are plans to sell shares in public corporations to the poorer classes plus recent efforts to control speculation in cement, buy rice in the Delta, expedite movement of goods out of the Port of Saigon, build a refinery in Vietnam, and force U.S. military banking facilities to submit to Government of Vietnam inspection and regulations.

The militant An Quang Buddhists are evidently going to make the "peace issue" a basic part of their continuing effort to discredit the United States and oust the Ky regime. Militant Buddhist students joined with Bui Luong's labor group to stage a small May Day meet in which they called for an end to the war and "indiscriminate bombing." Several small meetings of "strugglers" have also been held recently in Hue to demand an end to the war. The An Quang group is calling for a week of prayers for peace to precede the Buddha's Birthday truce; some sources report that they intend to use the prayer meetings to spark demonstrations and riots.

In an An Quang document issued for Buddha's Birthday, the militants link the peace theme with the American presence: "The war becomes more and more bloody. The countryside is in ruins, our society and our spiritual heritage are sinking into decay. We want peace, but we cannot have peace without independence. In reality, what do we see at present? We become more and more dependent in every field: military, political, diplomatic and economic. It is a blatant dependence that nothing can cover up. An American freighter transporting rice fails to arrive on time, and the price of rice visibly increases!"

The efforts of the militant Buddhists to generate demonstrations and political unrest have had little effect so far. We judge that either there will be no serious demonstrations in connection with Buddha's Birthday or that they will be fairly small and easily controlled by the authorities. However, there is no denying the potential appeal of the "peace issue." The Vietnamese people deeply desire peace -- though they certainly are not willing to accept Communist domination to get it -- and they are to some degree vulnerable to efforts to use "peace" against the government and us.

We anticipate that peace will figure as an issue in the Presidential campaign, that the civilian candidates will at least make general statements to the effect that they can and will make peace and that they will do it better and faster than the present government. The government has already ostentatiously taken several peace initiatives. The major candidates will probably be restrained in their use of this issue by the knowledge that they will need the post-election cooperation as well as the election day votes of powerful groups -- especially the military and the refugee Catholics -- who will insist that peace be defined as victory over the Communists.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

PRESERVATION COPY

In the First Corps, there is further improvement in morale this week. Soundings in Quang Tri, Thua Thien and Quang Tin indicate that the previously fatalistic attitude of part of the population is fading; there is no longer widespread belief that a heavy and successful Viet Cong attack is inevitable. Efforts to improve supplies in Hue and Danang have resulted in steadier prices while increased psychological operations by the Government of Vietnam and by U.S. are beginning to be felt.

Enemy propaganda continues at a high pitch, however, and the militant Buddhists are trying to take advantage of the situation as noted above. Much of the Viet Cong propaganda is now directed at the population in Quang Tri which will be affected by the relocation required for the establishment of the strongpoint-obstacle system to be constructed just south of the Demilitarized Zone. The effect of this propaganda cannot yet be assessed.

C. Military

There was heavy military action this week, particularly in the First Corps. A major battle was fought around Khe Sanh, with 551 enemy killed to date in that action. The ARVN is acquitting itself quite well in the First Corps, especially in Quang Nam province within the last few days. In the Second Corps the enemy continued to pose a threat with units poised across the border. Intelligence reports indicate that elements of three regiments near western Pleiku may be preparing to attack Plei Me and Duc Co. Third Corps activity was characterized by enemy mortar and harassing attacks, while in the Fourth Corps the Viet Cong continued small scale attacks and terrorist activity.

Revolutionary Development workers continue to be a special target for enemy attack. In 1967 as of April 30, 218 were killed, 299 wounded and 40 missing or captured. This can be compared with last year's overall total of 593 Revolutionary Development workers killed by the enemy. The Revolutionary Development Ministry is now placing emphasis on communications systems to allow Revolutionary Development teams to call in reaction forces and fire support when attacked by the Viet Cong.

D. Economic

The Saigon Retail Price Index went up slightly this week from 254 to 260. The chief reason for the increase was somewhat higher prices

for rice and vegetables. Imported goods inched down again, however, moving from last week's Index of 218 to 217.

As noted above, the government is planning a cash "rice bonus" for civil servants and military personnel. We calculate that the inflationary impact of this plan will be in the neighborhood of five billion piasters annually.

E. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending May 6, the enemy killed 44 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 165, and kidnapped 57. The dead included one Hamlet Chief, two National Policemen, and two Chieu Hoi returnees. These figures can be compared with the dead for the past six weeks: 83, 40, 56, 81, 38, 126. During the same period the enemy killed 212 Vietnamese military personnel. If we add the Vietnamese civilian and military dead, we get a total of 256 Vietnamese killed by the enemy during this reporting period.

F. Chieu Hoi

The number of Chieu Hoi returnees declined again this week, the number of returnees in the period April 23-29 being 465. During the same period last year, only 265 Chieu Hoi came in to the returnee centers. However, the figure of 465 is well below the 1,000 or more that came in for seven consecutive weeks in March and April of this year. The current decline in the enemy defection rate is attributed partly to increased enemy action against the Chieu Hoi effort. We know from captured enemy documents that the enemy sees the Chieu Hoi program as an important threat and that he has recently called for stepped-up measures to combat the appeal of the Chieu Hoi operations. The Viet Cong have also stepped up their terrorist attacks against Chieu Hoi centers and the returnees themselves.

Chieu Hoi psychological operations continue at an intensive level, and we hope that two developments will contribute to an up-turn in the defection rates: (1) implementation of the national reconciliation program, and (2) improvement of Chieu Hoi centers, funds for which were finally released to provinces by the Government of Vietnam in April after a long delay due to cumbersome fiscal procedures.

A document captured on April 2 in the "Iron Triangle" area north of Saigon notes: "...the security protection of the units' defense of our revolutionary forces against the enemy's psywar, "Chieu Hoi" and "appeal to surrender" attempts at present, and in the future, constitute the most important and urgent mission." It admits these create "schisms on our side" and calls for "drastic action to grab the ideological outlook." More and firmer discipline over Viet Cong soldiers is also demanded.

The total number of Chieu Hoi in 1967 is now 13,551. Last year at this time, the total was 7,031. The overall total for 1966 was 20,242.

G. Visit to Second Field Force Headquarters

Ambassador Locke and I visited General Palmer's headquarters at Long Binh on May 5. General Palmer gave us an excellent briefing and described to us in some detail Operation JUNCTION CITY and Operation MANHATTAN. After having lunch with General Palmer, General Weyand, and members of the staff, General Palmer took us by helicopter to fire support base Oscar where we met Major General Hay, Commander of the First Division, and some of his officers and men. We were taken around the perimeter of the base and had a good opportunity to see some of the impressive equipment stationed there. I have been a great admirer of General Palmer ever since I served with him in the Dominican Republic. This present experience served to increase my admiration. It was evident that he had a thorough grasp of the situation and the problems confronting him and was flexible in his approach to them and in devising new ways to meet them. The organization as well as the spirit and morale of officers and men was impressive.

Note from Situation Room: This cable was delayed in transmission.

51

Pres file

Thursday, May 11, 1967
3:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith proposed message from
you to Prime Minister Wilson, as
outlined by Sec. Rusk at lunch.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 5-7-91

51a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-442
By gw, NARA, Date 1-13-93

~~SECRET~~

May 11, 1967

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Dean Rusk has reported to me his exchange with George Brown and Bob McNamara his exchange with Denis Healey on your cast of Suez problem.

It is of the utmost importance that you not decide finally in this matter until we have had an opportunity to talk early in June.

I look forward to seeing you.

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, May 11, 1967
3:30 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

In a subsequent telephone conversation,
Bob told me the compensation issue is now
the critical issue; and it is tough.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - May 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Panama Negotiations

Ambassador Anderson met with Foreign Minister Eleta in New York yesterday.

Eleta told him that he was here to negotiate until the three treaties were wrapped up. Eleta outlined the four issues which are still pending:

- civil jurisdiction;
- land areas;
- compensation; and
- duration of the lock canal treaty.

The discussion on civil jurisdiction revealed that this might no longer be a problem. On land areas it was decided to start discussions next week here in Washington after our Joint Chiefs had formulated their views on the latest Panamanian proposals. Eleta said that he would like to concentrate discussions on the compensation issue, since this was the most important of the four. He indicated that Panama had a new formula which they would present at today's meeting. On treaty duration, it was agreed to postpone discussion until all other issues were resolved.

The talks seem to be off to a good start. It would not surprise me if the points to be resolved fall into place rather quickly now that Eleta and Anderson are carrying the ball.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Lunch with the President
Thursday, May 11, 1967, 1:00 p.m.

Agenda

1. Viet Nam: Bombing Policy (Sects. Rusk and McNamara)
 - Mining harbors?
 - Hanoi power?
 - Other JCS Hanoi-Haiphong targets?
 - Route Packages I, II, and III?
 - Announcement or no announcement of new policy?
2. Viet Nam Manpower Policy (Sects. Rusk and McNamara)
 - Tightening up inside South Viet Nam.
 - Troop expansion from outside South Viet Nam.
 - Situation report on steps thus far taken.
3. Visits, etc. (Sect. Rusk)
 - Saragat?
 - Klesinger?
 - Pak's Inaugural, July 1. President Pak wants either the Vice President or Sect. Rusk.
4. Free World Aid to Communist China's Advanced Weapons Technology
(Sects. Rusk and McNamara)

What, if anything, can we and should we do about it?
5. Sect. McNamara's Trip to Europe (Sect. McNamara)

A report.
6. Personnel (Sect. Rusk)

Sect. Rusk wishes to raise several problems with you.
7. Other.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 5-14-81~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr. Rostow 54
Pres file

Thursday, May 11, 1967, 10:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

In the attached, Messrs. Gaud, Schultze and Fowler recommend that you approve \$35 million in AID loans to Ghana during this calendar year. This would be the U. S. share (about one-third) of a multilateral effort to help the post-Nkrumah government pull itself out of the economic chaos left by Nkrumah.

Charlie Schultze's memorandum (Tab A) is a good short summary of the case for the loan and the Ghanaian self-help record. Bill Gaud's memorandum (Tab B) provides more detail. Joe Fowler has signed off on the measures we would take to minimize the impact on the balance of payments.

The new Ghanaian government has taken really impressive measures to put a very disorderly house into some reasonable economic order. In terms of short-term politics, this government is very pro-American and it is very much in our interests to help it along. In the broader sweep, helping Nkrumah's successors to clear away the wreckage will go down very well in Africa and throughout the less developed world.

On the donor side, we would be providing no more than our fair share in a 9-country donor club which also includes the World Bank, the OECD, and the UN Development Program. In my view, this is a textbook example of the right way our new emphasis on multilateralism should work.

I strongly second the recommendation that you approve the loan.

W. W. Rostow

Approve loan ☒

Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐

EKH:mst

54a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

MAY 8 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: \$20 million Program Loan for Ghana

Bill Gaud requests your approval to negotiate a \$20 million program loan for Ghana for calendar year 1967. This would be the first loan AID has made to Ghana since the \$82 million provided in 1962 for the Volta River project. It will initiate large-scale United States assistance to the Ankrah regime which ousted Nkruma a year ago.

The new military government was faced with major economic and financial problems.

- . Large scale capital expenditures had been financed by short-term borrowing and by drawing down reserves.
- . Costly new state enterprises had been created and were badly administered.
- . Budget deficits had increased to one-third of expenditures, and prices were rising at 23 percent per year.

To cope with these problems, the government arranged for the rescheduling of \$150 million in foreign debt payments due in 1966-1968 and embarked on a stringent stabilization program with the support of the IMF.

- . Government expenditures were cut drastically.
- . Several government enterprises were sold to the private sector.
- . Imports were cut back 25 percent.

This program, started early last year, has been successful in holding down prices and strengthening Ghana's financial position:

Last month the IMF sponsored a meeting of aid donor nations and the IBRD to review prospects and requirements for 1967 and 1968. In order to carry out the stabilization program and meet minimum development requirements, at least \$100 million of additional balance of payments aid will be needed both this year and next.

Bill Gaud recommends the U. S. provide a total of \$35 million, of which \$20 million would be the program loan. Already approved P. L. 480 agreements provide \$7 million and up to \$8 million in additional P. L. 480 aid

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-442

By ju, NARA, Date 1-13-93

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2

is planned for approval early in the Fall. Other countries, including the U. K. and Germany, and the World Bank, may be expected to provide \$34-\$45 million.

Thus, under Gaud's proposal, the U. S. would be providing close to one-half of the expected combined aid from these sources, normally included in arriving at the U. S. share. In addition, the IMF would provide \$25 million under its regular short-term standby credit. Including IMF funds, Gaud points out our aid in 1967 would be about one-third of the total.

Self-help Provisions

The \$20 million program loan would be arranged in two tranches. The first \$10 million would be provided now to meet urgent financial requirements, while negotiations are in progress with other donors and the IMF. The second tranche would be provided in the Fall, only after a review of Ghana's adherence to a new IMF standby--which includes their budget for 1967-1968--and on reviewing the contributions from other donors.

The loan agreement will also provide for joint programming of the proceeds of the loan for mutually agreed development programs, with special emphasis on agriculture.

U.S. BHJ
The loan will be used to finance goods purchased in the United States. Secretary Fowler agrees that the arrangements proposed for selection of commodities to be financed under the loan will serve to minimize the impact on the U. S. balance of payments.

While this proposal represents a relatively large new U. S. commitment in Africa, the prospects for successful economic growth and the political interests served by assisting the new regime in Ghana strongly support the proposal.

I recommend you authorize negotiations to conclude the proposed loan.

Attachment

Charles L. Schultz

Charles L. Schultz
Director

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

APR 24 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: \$20 Million Program Loan for Ghana

I request your authorization to conclude with the Government of Ghana a Program Loan for \$20 million to finance essential imports in calendar year 1967.

Ghana is important to U.S. foreign policy objectives because of its determined efforts since the coup last year to establish itself as a responsible and constructive member of the Free World community. These efforts are of particular significance because those in power have been conscientiously seeking to liberate themselves from their past dependence upon the Eastern Bloc and Communist Chinese. The Nkrumah regime under Soviet and Chinese influence introduced extreme authoritarian measures, severely restricting free enterprise and undermining the relatively sound structure of the economy. At the same time, the Nkrumah government was deeply involved in the subversion of other African governments and a leader of the radical wing of Pan Africanism which was vehemently anti-American in its political expressions. With the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime in February 1966, there is now an opportunity to eliminate the destructive influences of that government and enable Ghana--one of the best endowed countries in Middle Africa--to realize its potentials for economic growth, sound government, and constructive leadership in Africa.

The Ghanaian leaders and people are trying to establish Ghana as a responsible member of the international community by setting their own house in order first. Their hope for peacefully handing over power to a popularly elected government during the next two-three years can be realized only if the economy is stabilized and measured development stimulated. Should Ghana succeed, the United States will be identified throughout Africa as having befriended an important African country in its effort to rebuild a shattered economy and to replace a totalitarian regime with a more representative government. Moreover, Ghana is one of the countries of development concentration as specified in United States assistance policy, and provides good prospects for advancing the principles of multi-lateralism and regionalism.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-443

By inf NARA, Date 3-2-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1
Declassified following 4/2/68

In his two letters to you of June 13 and August 24, General Ankrah, Chairman of the National Liberation Council expressed his hope for U.S. assistance in Ghana's efforts to rebuild its economy. He also stated his full agreement with United States policy on promoting regional cooperation and expressed his country's willingness to make every effort to encourage such cooperative relationships. At the same time he stressed his recognition of the important self-help measures the country itself must undertake.

Self-Help Measures: Since the coup, the Ghana Government has:

- negotiated and obtained a \$36 million standby credit from IMF and a compensatory financing credit of \$17 million.
- effectively dealt with an emergency food shortage and restored some stability in basic food prices.
- undertaken a rigorous and comprehensive review with the assistance of the IBRD of all government expenditures, eliminating unnecessary and wasteful items and reducing expenditure levels by 10%.
- taken steps to examine the 55 state corporations established by Nkrumah and wherever possible to transfer them to the private sector. Over a dozen have been offered to private investors.
- abandoned the Nkrumah Government's Seven-Year Development Plan and designated the two years from July 1, 1966 as a "review period" during which the main objective of the government is to restore a healthy economic base from which to inaugurate a new development plan in late 1968 or early 1969.
- obtained agreement from Western creditor countries to defer about \$150 million of medium term debt payments due during the period July 1966 - December 1968. Some rescheduling of Eastern Bloc credits had already been negotiated in December 1965.
- undertaken a review of its bilateral and barter trade agreements with the Eastern Bloc to remove harmful and discriminatory trade arrangements.
- undertaken an extensive review of its agriculture programs and adopted plans which call for a shift in emphasis from state farms to private farms and to greater attention to the use of fertilizer and insecticides, seed multiplication, farm-to-market roads, produce transport, agriculture training and credit. Recently, for example, Ghana has initiated a crash program to intensify the production of corn and sorghum. By encouraging each farmer to grow at

least one-half acre more than last year; the land allocated for these two crops may be increased by 100,000 acres each during 1967-68.

- taken several steps to improve its economic and financial planning and external aid coordination. Several sector studies are in the process of being launched in the fields of agriculture, education, health, industry, transportation and communications.
- shown interest in family planning and has formed the Ghana Family Planning Association.
- appointed a constitutional and electoral commission to plan the return of government control to civilians in two or three years time.

Justification of \$20 Million Program Loan: Ghana's outstanding problem is a disrupted economy inherited from the extravagance and mismanagement of the Nkrumah administration. One manifestation is a serious balance of payments deficit caused by heavy debt servicing requirements and by the need to restore a minimum inflow of essential commodities which had to be curtailed because foreign exchange reserves were depleted.

After taking into account the benefits in CY 1967 of debt rescheduling, in effect a form of aid largely from European countries, particularly the UK and Germany, there remains a deficit of about \$119 million. Possible additional aid amounting to \$60-\$70 million may be provided by West Germany, UK, Canada, France, Japan, Italy, plus the IMF and IBRD. Denmark has already committed \$3.0 million for imports through a 25-year interest free loan.

The \$20 million Program Loan along with a P.L. 480 program of about \$12-\$15 million would make it possible for Ghana to come reasonably close to meeting its basic import requirements in 1967.

Without commodity assistance from the United States and other donors, Ghana would be forced to:

- a. cut back its imports sharply with the concomitant debilitating effects of unused productive capacity, increased unemployment, inflation and critical shortages of essential consumer goods.

- b. return to short and medium-term credits which will only exacerbate the difficulties which Ghana is struggling to overcome.
- c. consider seriously a return to barter and other bilateral trading arrangements which would have adverse implications for U.S. foreign policy and long-term commercial interests in Ghana.

It is our objective that aid from the United States, including PL 480 equal no more than one-third of total external assistance to Ghana, and we intend to press the Ghanaians and other donors to this end. It is proposed to release the loan in tranches: one tranche of \$10 million immediately after signing the loan agreement, and the second tranche of \$10 million contingent upon a review of the general situation in Ghana to ascertain progress made toward the one-third-two-thirds objective, Ghana's self-help performance and other relevant factors. The self-help factors are those associated with the IMF standby agreement, namely, curtailment of budgetary expenditures through limitation on government borrowing, imposition of ceilings on Bank of Ghana and commercial bank credit and elimination of new supplier's credits without IMF approval.

The loan agreement will also provide that the local currency equivalent of the Program Loan be deposited in a Special Account. These funds will be jointly programmed by the United States and Ghana Governments for development programs within Ghana's development budget and for budgetary support purposes as may be required in support of the stabilization program. Special emphasis will be given to local currency requirements for agricultural programs and for support of other U.S.-assisted activities.

The provision of U.S. assistance, the encouragement of other aid, the identification of self-help measures and the review of Ghana's policies and performance will be closely integrated through the mechanism of the IMF-led External Aid Meetings. At the first meeting held in Paris on April 11-12, the participating countries (US, UK, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, plus IBRD, UNDP and OECD) agreed that the 1967 foreign exchange gap is in the range of \$119-\$133 million; that because of timing and other factors it may not be possible to achieve the total imports envisaged; that each representative should raise the question of new assistance with his government; and that Ghana's fiscal and monetary and other self-help measures should continue. Several delegations felt that future meetings of the group would be useful.

196?
Effects on U.S. Balance of Payments: Commodities financed under this loan will be restricted to U.S. source and origin. Imports from the U.S. since 1967 have varied from \$12-\$39 million a year. The A.I.D. Mission in Accra will establish working arrangements with the GOG to ensure that imports financed by the program loan will be additive to a reasonable, normal level of commercial imports from the U.S. In this connection, the two categories of imports most directly affected - manufactured goods and machinery and transport equipment - have shown increases in recent years attributable to the drawdown of the U.S. loans for the Volta Dam and Valco smelter projects.

It is anticipated that such imports will be greatly reduced in 1967, a reduction which will be caused by the completion of the projects rather than the displacement of commercial imports by the Program loan. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the displacement of cash sales by commodities to be financed under this loan will be insignificant. Moreover, there are several ways by which additional imports from the U.S. will be encouraged:


(i) Ineligibility of ocean freight procurement under the DL. Ocean freight will be financed from the GOG's own resources, and operation of the U.S. 50/50 rule for cargo preference will require the GOG to direct 50% of its self-financed shipping payments to U.S. flag carriers.

(ii) Emphasis on public sector imports. Government purchases would otherwise be made with GOG resources or under bilateral trading agreements from other than U.S. sources.

(iii) Continuance of disengagement from bilateral (bloc) trading agreements. The U.S., together with international agencies and other countries, will continue to support GOG efforts toward early termination of the discriminatory bilateral trading arrangements established by the Nkrumah regime. Once these arrangements are liquidated, Ghana's imports will once again be very largely of U.S. and Western European source.

This proposal has been discussed with Congressman O'Hara, the staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Recommendation: That you authorize me to approve this loan. The Department of State concurs.


William S. Gaud

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-442
By ju, NARA, Date 1-13-93

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

Sent 3:55 PM

1967 MAY 12 19 59

PRUS001/11
1905 12 MAY 67
FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO PRIME MINISTER
~~SECRET~~
CAP67418

MAY 11, 1967

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

DEAN RUSK HAS REPORTED TO ME HIS EXCHANGE WITH GEORGE BROWN AND BOB MCNAMARA HIS EXCHANGE WITH DENIS HEALEY ON YOUR EAST OF SUEZ PROBLEM.

IT IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK BEFORE DECISION IS FINALLY MADE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU EARLY IN JUNE.

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~

END

FRIDAY

67 MAY 11 11 4:07

XEROX FROM BULK COPY

56

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-442
By ju, NARA, Date 1-13-93

sent 5/12/67

SECRET

May 11, 1967

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Dean Rusk has reported to me his exchange with George Brown and Bob McNamara his exchange with Denis Healey on your east of Suez problem.

It is of the utmost importance that ^{we} you not ~~decide finally in this~~
~~matter until we have had an opportunity to talk~~ ^{before decision is finally made.} ~~early in June.~~

I look forward to seeing you ^{early in June.}

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - May 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Special Sugar Quota for the Dominican Republic

1. Rusk
2. P. no file

In the attached memorandum (Tab A) Secretary Rusk asks you:

1. to authorize a special deficit allocation of sugar to the DR of about 105,000 tons, provided Balaguer agrees to set aside at least 1-1/2 cents per pound for mutually-agreed programs to improve the efficiency of the Dominican sugar industry.
2. to sign the directive to Secretary Freeman at Tab B, to be implemented if Balaguer accepts the condition.

The considerations in favor are:

- Balaguer badly needs the added dollars to help his balance of payments position.
- The added income from sugar should reduce the need for supporting assistance from us.
- The special allocation translates itself into US political support which is a stabilizing influence in the DR.
- Balaguer has made a good start in improving the efficiency of the state-owned sugar industry by reducing production costs by two cents a pound, and the special fund will advance this effort.
- The legislative history of the Sugar Act mentions the possibility of a substantial increase in the Dominican quota through the reallocation of deficits.
- It permits you to be forthcoming on Balaguer's principal request at Punta del Este.

The considerations against Secretary Rusk's proposals are:

- It discriminates against other Latin American sugar producers, who want the full deficit pro-rated, and they may protest.
- Conditioning the entry of additional Dominican sugar on setting up the special fund is technically inconsistent with our GATT commitments.

Mitigating against the adverse aspects are these considerations

- Even with the special allocation for the DR, the other Latin American sugar producers will receive slightly larger quotas than they did last year.
- There was no hue and cry last year when you gave the DR a special allocation, and none is expected this year.
- Secretary Rusk does not think that the inconsistency with GATT will lead to any objections.

I have consulted Secretary Freeman on this proposal and it is fine with him.

I favor your:

1. Approving Secretary Rusk's recommendation

Approve	<u>✓</u>
Disapprove	<u> </u>
See me	<u> </u>

2. Signing the directive to Secretary Freeman at Tab B.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Rusk memorandum.

Tab B - Directive to Secretary Freeman.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

SUBJECT: Finding Pursuant to Section 204 (a) of the Sugar Act of 1948, as Amended by the Sugar Act Amendments of 1965

IN VIEW of the restoration of stable political conditions in the Dominican Republic and the establishment of a democratically-elected Government,

IN ACCORDANCE with the recommendation of the Conference Report on the Sugar Act Amendments of 1965, that the President use his authority to assign deficits to provide additional quota for the Dominican Republic if the political situation in that Republic warrants such action, and

PURSUANT TO Section 204 (a) of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended by the Sugar Act Amendments of 1965,

I HEREBY DETERMINE that in view of the unique and heavy burden of rehabilitation expenditure on the Government of the Dominican Republic in 1967 it would be in the national interest to give the Dominican Republic a special allocation of about 105,000 short tons of sugar from the unused Philippine share of the Puerto Rican and Virgin Island deficits and ~~their~~ ^{it} pro rata share of the balance of those deficits and of any other deficits that might be declared in 1967.

You are directed to take the necessary steps to allocate deficits in accordance with this finding.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

1758
59

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 8, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-446
By LS NARA, Date 2-3-92

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Recommendation for a Special Sugar Quota
Allocation to the Dominican Republic

Recommendations:

1) That you authorize me to instruct our Embassy at Santo Domingo to obtain assurances from the Government of the Dominican Republic that, if the United States makes a special deficit allocation to the Dominican Republic of about 105,000 short tons, that Government will set aside a minimum of 1½ cents per pound from the proceeds of the sale of this sugar to be spent on mutually agreed programs to improve the efficiency of the Dominican sugar industry or to assist in diverting excess sugar lands into the production of food or other crops.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2) That you sign the attached directive to Secretary Freeman, to be implemented as soon as our Embassy at Santo Domingo reports Dominican agreement to the conditions we are establishing for assignment of the special allocation.

Background:

During your conversations with President Balaguer at Punta del Este last month he asked you to assign the Dominican Republic a special deficit allocation in order to raise the Dominican sugar quota in the United States market to at least 600,000 tons this year. President Balaguer was reflecting a request previously made by the Dominican Government for an annual quota of 600,000 tons for the next five

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

years. Last year the Dominican Republic received a special allocation of 123,000 tons from the Philippine and Panamanian share of the Puerto Rican deficit. Its total quota for 1966 was 603,000 tons.

We believe it would be in the national interest to assign the Dominican Republic a substantial special allocation again this year, but not to meet its request in full. We recommend a special allocation of about 105,000 tons, which will raise the Dominican quota to 590,000 tons. This figure will be well above the quota of any other Latin American supplier, evidencing our continuing support for the Balaguer Government and our satisfaction with the progress it has made in the past year toward solution of the sugar industry's problems. At the same time it will establish our intent gradually to phase out preferential treatment for the Dominican Republic in assigning sugar quotas. This will serve the dual purpose of (1) reassuring other Latin American suppliers that we are not neglectful of their interest in an expanded market in the United States and (2) place additional pressure on the Dominican sugar industry to reduce costs and become competitive in world markets.

The Dominican Government has been making vigorous and politically courageous efforts to improve the efficiency of the state-owned sector of the sugar industry and to diversify out of sugar production. In this first year of President Balaguer's administration, production costs in the state sugar industry have been cut by somewhat more than two cents a pound. To continue this program, the State Sugar Council is contracting for the services of American consultant firms to draw up a detailed program of rationalization and diversification that will be eligible for international financing.

We do not believe that a special allocation should be granted unconditionally. Rather, we should take the opportunity to further developmental activities - while at the same time decreasing somewhat the potential requirement for AID assistance - through promoting rationalization of the sugar industry and diverting excess sugar lands to the production of food and other crops.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

To this end we propose that a part of the proceeds of the sale of this sugar be set aside in a special fund for mutually agreed programs. We will try to reach agreement with the Dominican Government to set aside 2 cents a pound, which would provide a fund of about \$4.2 million. At a minimum we would require a set-aside of 1½ cents a pound, for a prospective fund of about \$3.2 million. While small in terms of total financing required for the projects to be developed, the proposed fund would assure that, when approved, the projects could be started promptly.

Several other Latin American countries have asked for preferential treatment this year in reallocation of the Puerto Rican deficit. These countries will be disappointed if the Dominican Republic alone receives a special allocation. Furthermore, all countries in the Western Hemisphere will receive smaller allocations than they had anticipated if preferential treatment is accorded the Dominican Republic. We may expect protests from some. However, we would be able to cite the recommendation by the CIAP subcommittee on the Dominican Republic that special treatment be given that country in sugar deficit allocations this year. Moreover, since the Philippines have turned back their share of the deficits, other Western Hemisphere countries will receive slightly larger quotas in the United States market than they did in 1966, even if the Dominican Republic receives a special allocation of about 105,000 tons.

While the language of the proposed directive provides for a special allocation of about 105,000 tons, the practical effect of such an allocation would be to give the Dominican Republic about 85,000 tons more than it would have received in the absence of such an allocation. The use of the higher figure in the proposed directive results from the complicated formula which the Department of Agriculture is required to use in administering the Sugar Act.

No other country in the Hemisphere is as dependent as the Dominican Republic on finding a satisfactory market for its sugar. Furthermore, there is mention in the legislative history of the Sugar Act of the possibility of a substantial

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

increase in the Dominican quota through reallocation of deficits. It should be noted that imposing conditions on the entry of Dominican sugar that are not imposed on other countries could be considered technically inconsistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Nevertheless, we do not anticipate any objections on GATT grounds.

I believe, therefore, that the granting of a special allocation of about 105,000 tons would be in the national interest and would be consistent with the legislative history of the Sugar Act.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Directive to the Secretary of Agriculture.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

60

May 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

SUBJECT: Finding Pursuant to Section 204(a) of the Sugar Act of 1948, as Amended by the Sugar Act Amendments of 1965

IN VIEW of the restoration of stable political conditions in the Dominican Republic and the establishment of a democratically-elected Government,

IN ACCORDANCE with the recommendation of the Conference Report on the Sugar Act Amendments of 1965, that the President use his authority to assign deficits to provide additional quota for the Dominican Republic if the political situation in that Republic warrants such action, and

PURSUANT to Section 204(a) of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended by the Sugar Act Amendments of 1965,

I HEREBY DETERMINE that in view of the unique and heavy burden of rehabilitation expenditure on the Government of the Dominican Republic in 1967 it would be in the national interest to give the Dominican Republic a special allocation of about 105,000 short tons of sugar from the unused Philippine share of the Puerto Rican and Virgin Island deficits and its pro rata share of the balance of those deficits and of any other deficits that might be declared in 1967.

You are directed to take the necessary steps to allocate deficits in accordance with this finding.

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

LBJ/WGBowler:mm

Pres. file 61

Thursday, May 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Playground Equipment for LBJ Village in Malaysia

When you were in Malaysia last October, you visited a village. It was renamed Kampong LBJ in your honor.

Ambassador Bell thought it appropriate to do something that would reflect our appreciation for this gesture of goodwill. He set aside funds to purchase playground equipment. The latter is being manufactured in Malaysia and will be ready around the end of the month.

The Ambassador would like to present the equipment to the village in your name, but wanted to be sure there were no objections. It sounds like a good idea to me.

W. W. Rostow

No objection

☒

Disapprove

☐

See me

☐

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-86
By CB, NARA Date 1-21-01

Pres file
62

~~SECRET~~

Thursday - May 11, 1967

Mr. President:

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED] the first credible report that "Che" Guevara is alive and operating in South America.

[REDACTED]

We need more evidence before concluding that Guevara is operational -- and not dead, as the intelligence community, with the passage of time, has been more and more inclined to believe.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED]

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

WWR
Pres file

Thursday, May 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President has submitted for your approval a recommendation of the new National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development that the United States undertake an initiative to establish international marine preserves in the South Pacific.

Initially these preserves would consist of one example of each major type of marine habitat -- (the Kermadec-Tonga Trench, the Capricorn undersea tablemount, and Rose Island (an uninhabited coral atoll in American Samoa)).

The recommendation carries the unanimous endorsement of the agencies that comprise the Council -- State, Navy, Interior, Commerce, Health Education and Welfare, Transportation, Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Science Foundation. In addition the proposal has been endorsed by NASA, the Smithsonian Institution, AID, the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Office of Science and Technology. The recommendation is based on proposals by your Science Advisory Committee and the Smithsonian Institution.

I recommend that you approve this recommendation and so indicate your action on the memorandum to you from the Vice President attached hereto.

W. W. Rostow

CEJ:em

~~SECRET~~

Thursday - May 11, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith the report on Lynda Bird's activities in Peru yesterday. She will be returning to Lima during the course of the day and departing for Santiago, Chile tonight:

- "1. Miss Johnson visited Machu Pichu May 10, travelling in a private railway autocar. She returned to Cuzco at 1800 hours, having thoroughly enjoyed the excursion. She returned to her hotel and retired early.
2. There were no incidents of any kind. The Cuzco press was very friendly and made no effort to intrude upon her privacy. The Lima press play is still not heavy, there is nothing unfavorable concerning Miss Johnson, but the press is still annoyed at the tight security. Miss Johnson plans to have a statement handed out to the local press when she returns to Lima at noon, May 11. The statement has been coordinated with the Embassy. She will also permit photo coverage of her return. This will improve local press play considerably."

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
by 79, NARA, Date 6-3-91

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

65

Pres file

May 11, 1967

Mr. President:

In the attached memorandum, Cy Vance proposes continuing the B-52 airborne alert at the rate of four per day. We would seek renewal of the Canadian approval for 20 flights a day -- which would permit expansion to 1/8 of the B-52 force, if required.

Last year when you approved the program, the level of four sorties represented a compromise between Secretary McNamara's willingness to eliminate the airborne alert and the JCS desire not to cut below four.

This year the issue has not been raised.

I recommend that you approve continuation of the current program.

W. W. Rostow

Yes ☒
No ☐
See Me ☐


DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 99-88
By ind, NARA, Date 6-10-04

~~SECRET~~

650




NARA, Date 04-15-2013



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NJ 12-216

by LUCIA NARA, Date 04-15-2013



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 17-216

By UW NARA, Date 04-15-2013

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By WJ, NARA, Date 3-17-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 10, 1967 -- 7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

I have not been able to get Cy Vance; but, if I were to summarize what I believe to be the consensus among Vance, W. Bundy, and myself, it would be that you decide tomorrow:

1. We shall not attack the import system of North Viet Nam; that is, the ports and lines of communication from China.
2. The technical feasibility, costs, benefits, and risks of attacking the import system be systematically studied on an interdepartmental basis.
3. A tactical plan for attacking the Hanoi thermal power station be submitted to you with a clear statement of the risks of doing civil damage.
4. You be presented as soon as possible with:

--- An assessment of damage achieved and re-attack requirements on JCS targets already approved;

--- An assessment of the advantages and costs of attacking the other JCS targets recommended but not yet attacked.

After this review, you will be in a position to assess the weight of attack you wish to have mounted in the weeks ahead in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

5. Attack in Route Packages I, II and III should be expanded and rendered as efficient as possible in the light of the latest studies (a possibly important study has just been completed).

6. Attacks on airfields should be held in abeyance until we can assess the weight of attack we will be carrying forward in the Hanoi-Haiphong area after the review suggested in paragraph 3, above.

I will check this with Cy Vance in the morning.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~

67

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 10, 1967
5:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bob McNamara
wrestles valiantly, but not to great
effect, with Healey.

W. W. Rostow

London 9326, 2 sections

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

NARA, Date 5-6-91

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 10, 1967
11:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith interviews with
Ky -- about to go 100% political --
and Thieu.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 25083
Saigon 25233

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By mg, NARA, Date 5-6-91

68a

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Wednesday, May 10, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-446
By WJ NARA, Date 2-3-92

Text of Cable from Ambassador Bunker (Saigon 25083)

Following are the main points of my talk with General Thieu on May 9 when I called on him to introduce Ambassador Locke:

Thieu spoke along the same general lines of his conversation with General Westmoreland May 7 regarding the Presidential election. He affirmed his backing for General Vien's statement indicating that the ARVN would not back a military man as its candidate for President.

In discussing the elections Thieu expressed a preference for a civilian President, someone who is respected and has the confidence of the people, and that the Prime Minister should be a top administrator.

When I mentioned the desirability of the President receiving a respectable percentage of the vote, and suggested the desirability of a runoff election, he expressed himself as being in agreement, but it is my impression that he probably will do nothing specific about this issue. He considers that the most important consideration is stability for the country, and the army and the government must therefore cooperate with each other.

In elaborating on this latter point he stated that in his view the armed forces should be divorced from politics because a) This would make a more efficient military organization, i.e., promotion would be based on professional rather than political grounds and corruption would be reduced, and b) It is necessary to establish a political base in the country so as to counter the Viet Cong and their political base. This is not a military job, and is something they are incapable of doing.

In this connection he expressed himself as highly pleased with the statement of General Vien that the armed forces have no candidate for President and said that he had told General Vien he would expect him to follow through on his determination to keep the army out of politics and to exercise their proper role in support of the government and as the stabilizing element in the country.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

On the military side he expressed the conviction that we are winning, but he felt that pacification remained the most important task. If it is not undertaken properly and carried through successfully, the Viet Cong, which is already organized as a political entity, will endeavor to take over the Government of Vietnam from within and may well succeed. In his opinion, the most critical element of the pacification program is the political element. The economic and social aspects can be satisfactorily handled.

In talking about national reconciliation and Chieu Hoi, Thieu said Hoi Chanh come in because either (a) They lose hope or (b) They are not really Communist and wish to return to their villages. He thought the recent increase in ralliers was because military pressure had (a) Caused loss of hope and (b) Caused greater fragmentation of military units, enabling greater opportunity for escape, as small units, are less controlled than large ones. In addition, pacification of increasing numbers of villages would open up possibilities for ralliers to return to their own villages once they believe they can do so without great risk of Viet Cong action or Government of Vietnam retaliation.

In Thieu's opinion, military pressure and progress on pacification are the keys to destroying Viet Cong hope which Hanoi tries to bolster with stories of military successes and claims that the U.S. will not stick it out. Thieu believes the Hanoi leaders probably recognize U.S. determination but exploit criticism in the U.S. and elsewhere to mislead their own forces.

Thieu added that pacification will require not only technicians in the revolutionary development teams but the high-level guidance of the military, who must have responsibility, motivation, and competence. He says that he continually expresses this fact to the leadership of the armed forces.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

Wednesday, May 10, 1967

NLJ 91-446

By NARA, Date 2-3-92

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon, 25233)

I took Ambassador Locke and Mr. Komer to call on Prime Minister Ky on May 9. Ky was in an expansive mood. In the course of an hour's candid discussion we covered a number of important points.

Perhaps most important, when I complimented the Prime Minister on General Vien's announcement the Armed Forces as a group would not nominate any military man, Ky acknowledged that this was the only correct course. However, he said that because of his own conviction of the need for a social revolution in South Vietnam and his belief that he could most effectively serve his country by guiding it, he had decided to run for the Presidency.

He then described a long and frank talk with General Thieu that morning. Ky told Thieu that he intended to run, and then asked Thieu for "unity of the military," Ky said that General Thieu agreed that the Armed Forces should remain united. According to Ky, Thieu did not know whether he would return to the Army or simply retire. Thieu was a bit concerned about whether "the Generals" would work with them if he returned to active duty in some capacity. Thieu thought that the Generals were "suspicious" of him. Ky said he assured Thieu that the Generals would work loyally with him should he choose a return to a military career, adding that Thieu was too young to retire. Ky ended by assuring me again that there would be no split among the military.

Ky then discussed his own election chances in a very confident tone. He noted that the politicians and intellectuals in Saigon talked a lot about the strength of civilian candidates, but they were not really known in the countryside where most of the voters were. Ky proudly cited the poll which indicated that 52 percent of the people in the Delta knew that he was Prime Minister. He dismissed several of the civilian candidates as unimportant. They would take the 10 million piasters allotted to each candidate, spend 1 million of it, and pocket the rest. When asked if Suu and Huong were not more formidable candidates, he said that they didn't have a chance against him. Suu and Dan were "finished." Suu was much too old and couldn't make up his mind. If elected, he would become a figurehead for others behind him, and the result would be another coup. Huong was too sick and would not be able to run an effective government.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

I pointed out that from the standpoint of popular backing and international opinion, it was important that the winning candidate receive a high proportion of the vote. A run-off would be the best way to assure such a vote. Ky did not respond. I then asked whether the Assembly had decided on a specific minimum percentage of the vote required for election. He opined that the Assembly might shortly decide on 33 or 37 percent, "my age" as the minimum. He seemed clearly to feel that he would get a more substantial vote than this, and assured me that in any case this would not be a problem.

Next I noted that strong civilian representation in any slate was important in terms of getting a large vote and impressing world opinion. I asked if he had made any choice of running mate? He said no, since he had just decided to run. However, he was actively thinking about this problem. He mentioned that Vo Long Trieu and other southerners around Huong had approached him to team up with Huong (it was not clear whether their most recent suggestion was the Ky run on Huong's ticket or vice versa). Ky indicated he had told them he would accept Huong as Vice-President. He said, however, Huong would not be able to do much as Vice-President. He could have a big house in Saigon, but wouldn't be able to contribute much to running the government. Ky did not mention any other possibilities, though he clearly got my implication that including able civilians in his slate would be advantageous to him.

At the outset of our conversation, I asked the Prime Minister about the situation in the First Corps. Commenting that he had just been there, he professed confidence that it was under control. He described his visit at some length, especially his trip to the marketplace in Hue. This led him into describing his views on the importance of improving the economic life of the people and conducting a real social revolution. This was the most important task of any future government. Ky then said that he expected to visit Quang Ngai shortly. He noted that on the advice of an old and very wise confidant, he was going to sack the civilian province chief of Quang Ngia. This man had also lied about Revolutionary Development progress in the province, as General Thang had confirmed.

I told him of our strong interest in the revamping of the ARVN to support pacification, and asked him if he was satisfied with the present ARVN commanders in the field. He responded by ticking off his views on most of them. The Four Corps commanders were now good men, with the

possible exception of General Manh who seemed rather weak but was of course new in his job. The division commanders in Fourth Corps were good. In Third Corps around Saigon, however, they were much worse. The commander of the 18th Division was very young and had not done too well. General Tuan of the 5th Division was poor and was going to be changed soon. Besides, General Tuan was too interested in his own personal affairs, an obvious allusion to corruption. General Chinh of the 25th was a very interesting case which Ky described at length. He clearly did not think Chinh a very competent commander. The two division commanders in Second Corps were good men. In First Corps, General Truong of the First Division was outstanding. The 2nd Division Commander was good too. In response to Komer's query, he said that General Thi of the 9th Division was unhappy because he had expected to become Corps Commander. But Thi was coming around.

Ky then stressed leadership of the Arvn as the most critical problem. He and General Vien would do all they could to improve leadership, especially at the battalion and regimental level. The Command and General Staff School at Dalat was no good, hence Ky and Vien were determined to improve it. Top notch province chiefs were also essential, and there were deficiencies here. Ky was planning a two-week course for all province chiefs at Nha Trang. Top officials of the government would brief them on what needed to be done.

As instructed, I gave Ky copies of the Pope's letter to the President and the President's reply, noting that the President wanted him to have these and hoped that he would of course hold them very closely. Ky expressed his appreciation.

While the above seemed to me to be his most significant comments, Ky went on at some length about his lack of personal ambition and willingness to return to a military career. At the same time he stressed his conviction that only he could offer the people the kind of social revolution that Vietnam so badly needed at this point in time.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-442
By ju, NARA, Date 1-13-93

Mr. Rostow 69

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congratulating the New Indian President

The election of Mrs. Gandhi's candidate as President of India at least eliminates one possible further source of political instability. Zakir Husain's election does not necessarily increase Mrs. Gandhi's prestige in the Congress Party, but his defeat would certainly have diminished her influence.

While Husain will not wield great influence within the government, his will be a voice of reason on Pakistan. Though his job is largely ceremonial, he could be the key in a political crisis.

I suggest the following message:

"Dear Mr. President: I extend hearty congratulations and warm best wishes on your election to the Presidency of the Republic of India. May you long continue to serve India with the devotion and distinction which have marked your career. I hope that together we may share the satisfaction of watching the continued growth of affection and fruitful cooperation between the peoples of our two great democracies."

W. W. Rostow

Approve

Disapprove

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/KAC 99-86
By CB, NARA Date 1-21-01

Mr. Rostow

70

May 10, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Our Latest Brush with Nasser

Nasser's Foreign Minister promises that our two AID men in Yemen will be out of jail by 15 May. We've evacuated all but a skeleton crew there. If we get these two out safely, our main loss will be [REDACTED] material the Egyptians filched from one of the safes left behind when our people were dragged off.

We don't think Nasser staged the incident in Yemen to get us out. However, once Egyptian mishandling on the scene created an opening, Cairo gave vent to its emotions and played it out for its full propaganda and intelligence advantage. Their readiness to see us humiliated and their duplicity illustrate the bitterness they feel toward us, while their willingness to set limits against harm to our people suggests they want to stop short of an open break.

Nasser summed up the reason for this bitterness in his 2 May speech: "... you do not consider us your friends." To him, our cutting back food aid is the final evidence that we are working against him and want to see him crushed under his economic burdens.

[REDACTED] he admitted he is a "suspicious man." [REDACTED] E.O. 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)
It was natural for him to see a sinister hand behind AID's roadbuilding work in southern Yemen [REDACTED]

We've held our tempers so far, but getting our men out of jail may take the lid off strong pent-up desire to wash our hands of Nasser. The Egyptians have maddeningly violated every code of diplomatic practice--despite Secretary Rusk's strong statement on the "rights of legation"--and they've used more poison gas in Yemen. Yet on the constructive side, they have reached agreement with the IMF, entertained American businessmen, are negotiating with another American oil company and are trying to avoid defaulting on debt repayments to us. While the temptation to break will be greater than ever, cooler heads will probably prevail. With the South Arabian problem reaching center stage, we'll badly need someone on the scene in Cairo.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday - May 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Lynda Bird's Trip

Herewith a report on Lynda Bird's activities yesterday. All continues to go well:

- "1. Miss Johnson departed Lima on schedule May 9 and arrived in Cuzco at 1030 hours. She checked into Hotel Savoy and spent the rest of the day going from cathedral to cathedral, and from ruin to ruin, interspersed with shopping. The very high altitude has not bothered her or slowed her down. She had dinner at the hotel and retired shortly after 2300 hours.
2. There were no incidents of any kind during the day. Arequipa press was very favorable, but the Lima press continues to complain about tight security, and press play is picking up in quantity. There was nothing unfavorable about Miss Johnson."

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 18, NARA, Date 5-7-91

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-442
By ju, NARA, Date 1-13-93

1. ~~copy~~
2. Pres file

~~SECRET~~ -- (TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT)

May 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vietnam Force Level Sharing Formulas

1. Secretary McNamara has made available to me the chart which he gave you showing South Vietnam troop deployments in relation to population (Tab A).

2. Bill Leonhart has been working on a comparable set of numbers relating Vietnam deployments to the level of each contributor's armed forces. This approach may be more realistic and negotiable because it would require no country to increase its total armed forces in order to send troops to Vietnam.

3. The following table shows that, if each country sent the same percentage of its total armed forces to Vietnam as we have done (about 14 per cent), we would now have an additional 70.0 thousand troops in Vietnam:

<u>Country</u>	(Thousand Troops)
Korea	42.2*
Australia	3.5
New Zealand	1.3
Thailand	18.8
Philippines	<u>4.2</u>
TOTAL	70.0

*The reason for the high Korean share is that its total armed forces are larger relative to its population than those of other countries (see Tab B).

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(TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT)

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4. If we were to take the present situation as a base and ask each country to contribute an increment, to match an additional U. S. 100,000, and if these increments were to represent the same percentage of each country's total armed forces, the result would look like this:

<u>Country</u>	(Thousand Troops)
United States	100.0
Korea	18.7
Australia	2.0
New Zealand	.4
Thailand	4.0
Philippines	<u>1.3</u>
TOTAL	126.4

5. Tab B shows population, armed forces levels, and Vietnam troop commitments for the countries in question as absolute figures and percentages.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

(TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tab A

~~SENSITIVE~~

ATTACHMENT V
(5/4/67)

SVN TROOP DEPLOYMENTS IN RELATION TO POPULATION
(Population in Millions; Troops in Thousands)

	<u>Population</u>	<u>Current or Approved Strength in SVN No.</u>	<u>Per Million of Population</u>	<u>Increase Required To Meet US Ratio</u>	<u>"Allocable" Share Per 100,000 US Troops b/</u>
US	200	470 a/	2.35	--	100.0
Korea	29.1	45.8	1.57	22.6	14.5
Australia	11.7	6.1	0.52	21.4	5.8
New Zealand	2.7	0.5	0.18	5.8	1.3
Philippines	33.5	2.1	0.06	76.6	16.7
Thailand	33.4	0.3	0.01	78.2	16.7
Indonesia	106.9	--	--	251.2	53.4
Rep of China	13.2	--	--	31.0	6.6
Malaysia	9.8	--	--	23.0	4.9
	440.3	524.8		509.7	219.9

a/ Excludes naval forces in South China Sea and US forces in Thailand.

b/ 100,000 troops represents 500 per 1,000,000 of US population. "Allocable" shares for other nations are calculated on this basis.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-444

By 1-8, NARA, Date 3-12-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-442
By gwl, NARA, Date 11-13-93

72.5

SECRET

TAB B

POPULATION AND TROOP STRENGTHS
(Estimates as of 5/1/67)

<u>Country</u>	<u>A</u> <u>Population</u> <u>(millions)</u>	<u>B</u> <u>Total</u> <u>Armed Forces</u> <u>(thousands)</u>	<u>C</u> <u>Armed Forces</u> <u>in Vietnam</u> <u>(thousands)</u>	<u>B as a</u> <u>Percentage</u> <u>of A</u>	<u>C as a</u> <u>Percentage</u> <u>of B</u>
United States	200.0	3380.0	470.0	1.7	13.9
Korea	29.1	631.0	45.8	2.2	7.3
Australia	11.7	68.5	6.1	0.6	8.9
New Zealand	2.7	12.9	0.5	0.5	3.9
Thailand	33.4	136.0	0.3	0.4	0.2
Philippines	<u>33.5</u>	<u>45.0</u>	<u>2.1</u>	0.1	4.7
TOTAL	310.4	4273.4	524.8		

SECRET

Tuesday, May 9, 1967
7:30 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

In the midst of all the debate about bombing, there is a simpler way to look at it indicated in the attached memo to me from my Colonel, Bob Ginsburgh.

In effect, if we don't try to "close the top of the funnel," and respect certain other existing limitations, there are only 15 JCS targets left in North Viet Nam:

-- One is truly important: Hanoi TPP.

-- 7 are judged by the JCS as "important"; but of these two are in heavily built-up areas.

-- 7 are judged by the JCS as "less significant"; but at least two of these could be dropped.

If you decided to make no dramatic change in policy you could proceed with some of these -- perhaps on a spaced schedule -- and gradually phase down as we run out of targets.

The gut decisions are, therefore:

-- Hanoi power;

-- deciding whether to close the ports and China rail lines.

The rest can be handled without great drama or debate, I believe -- if that is what you wish.

W. W. R.

SECRET attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-442
By ju, NARA, Date 13-93

73a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-442
By ju, NARA, Date 1-13-93

8 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

1. Under the present strategy, we have almost run out of JCS targets. There are only 56 JCS targets which are not yet authorized for attack.
2. The Joint Staff classifies 15 of these as "not valid under current concepts":
 - 7 locks
 - 3 radio communications
 - 5 minor industrial
3. If ports, naval bases, and mineable approaches are not authorized, 11 more targets are eliminated from consideration.
4. Airfields account for 5 targets.
5. Observance of the ChiCom buffer zone eliminates 10 targets:
 - 7 bridges (5 are 13 NM or more away from border)
 - 3 electric power

6. ~~The remaining 15 targets are as follows:~~

	<u>Target Nr</u>	<u>Strike a/c</u>
a. "Primary" targets		
Hanoi TPP	81	4
b. "Important" targets:		
Hanoi RR/Hwy Br Red R	12	34
Hanoi RR Yd/Shops	21	22
Hanoi ADD Hq	30 in built-up area	8
Hanoi MND/MZ Hq	57 in built-up area	78
Son Tay Bks SW	35	48
Hanoi Supply Depot S	58	28
Hanoi Supply Depot N	59	30

~~SECRET~~

	<u>Target Nr</u>	<u>Strike a/c</u>
c. "Less significant" targets:		
Kep Ha Bks NE	39.29	60
Trai Thon Bks	39.33	24
Ngoc Thi Bks/Supply Depot	39.41	18
Son Dong Bks/School	39.42	42
Nam Son Bks	39.51	4
Phu Ly TPP	82.19	1200 KW supplies local sugar refinery
Lang Chi HPP	82.25	construction 8 halted
Total Strike Aircraft		412

2

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-442
By ju, NARA, Date 1-13-93

Pres file 74
May 9, 1967
5:45 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Yugoslav Ambassador's Farewell Call

Ambassador Veljko Micunovic will make a very brief farewell call tomorrow at 12:30.

Assuming Micunovic opens with pleasantries, you may wish to make the following points:

- Emphasize our policy of friendship to Yugoslavia.
- Say we remain firm supporters of Yugoslavia's economic reform.
- As you said in your signing message on the Food for Freedom Act, you regret the Congressional amendments which make it impossible, for the present, to sell PL 480 wheat and other products to Yugoslavia. However, the Commodity Credit Corporation has approved commercial financing for wheat sales to meet Yugoslavia's needs.
- You are concerned that the perpetrators of the bombings of Yugoslav offices be brought to justice as soon as the FBI can get adequate evidence.
- You know the importance of Ambassador Micunovic's future work as head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Yugoslav Federal Parliament, and you wish him well in his new job.

Ambassador Micunovic will be accompanied by Walter Stoessel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and Nathaniel Davis of my staff.

W. W. Rostow

W.W.R. 75

~~1. Corp~~
2. Pres file

Tuesday, May 9, 1967, 8:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is contingency press guidance for George Christian in case he gets any questions on the Bundy trip to Europe. Once Mac arrives in Moscow it will be hard to keep it a secret. (Business Week has already found out that he is going.) A low-key statement by George -- in answer to questions -- would probably help avoid speculation that he is in Moscow for other purposes.

Francis M. Bator

George may use contingency press
guidance if asked about Bundy trip_____

No_____

Speak to me_____

FMB:LSE:mst

Contingency Press Guidance -- Bundy Trip to Europe (May 13-June 3)

Last December the President asked Mr. Bundy to act as his personal representative to explore the possibility of establishing an international center for studies of the common problems of advanced societies. At that time, the President told Mr. Bundy that he wanted him to talk over the idea with interested governments and private groups, both in East and West Europe and elsewhere.

Over the past few months Mr. Bundy has talked with many interested Americans, in and out of government, about the ideas involved in this exploration. He has also made some low-key soundings in Western Europe. He believes that he has found sufficient interest to justify further exploration in Western Europe and the Soviet Union. Mr. Bundy's trip to Moscow and several Western European capitals (London, Paris, Bonn and Rome) is for this purpose.

Mr. Bundy will be accompanied in Moscow by Dr. Carl Kaysen, Director of the Institute for Advanced Study, and in Moscow and Western Europe by Mr. Eugene Staples of the Ford Foundation.

Tuesday, May 9, 1967
5:45 p. m.

Pres file

174

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Sect. Freeman requests your approval
for an African trip from about July 10 to August 1.

He states his substantive case for the journey
and his estimate that the timing is good in terms
of Congressional and other matters.

W. W. R.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

May 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM

To: The President
The White House

From: Orville L. Freeman *OLF*
Secretary of Agriculture

Subject: African Trip - Reference my memorandum of February 9,
1967

You will recall in my memorandum of February 9, I speculated on the usefulness of a trip to a number of African countries. Since that date I have given a good deal of thought to this possibility. It is my conclusion that such a journey would be constructive and useful. Accordingly, I would like to ask your permission to plan a trip from about the tenth of July until approximately the first of August. Final route decisions have not been made subject to your approval of the overall proposal, but I tentatively plan to make an exclusively African tour traveling into Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana, Liberia and also possibly one of the West African Francophonic countries where the African desk at State advises me a visit would be important for political and trade reasons.

There are a number of reasons why I have concluded such a trip would be important in addition to my personal interest and need to deepen my understanding and commitment.

1. No American Secretary of Agriculture, I am informed, has ever made an official visit to Africa. Agriculture is, of course, the No. 1 problem in building a viable economy in each of these countries. I am advised that it would be a stimulant to their own concentration on agriculture (which tends to lag in the execution) as well as an important recognition of their importance if the United States Secretary of Agriculture, a Member of your Cabinet, made such a visit.
2. More specifically, increasing questions about African Agriculture come to the USDA and to my desk for decision.
 - A. Since January 1, 1967, the United States has entered into P.L. 480 Agreements with 4 African Countries. Thirteen countries were involved last year. The new self-help requirements of P.L. 480 will require more understanding of the agricultural potential and efforts of African countries than in the past. At the moment we are rather thin in agricultural expertise on Africa.

PRESERVATION COPY

2--The President

- B. Increasingly, the U. S. Department of Agriculture is called upon by AID to advise and pass judgment on the agricultural segment of the development plans for the African countries in which AID has a program.
- C. African countries in the future will be asking the United States and its agricultural leaders more and more for advice and guidance, whether we have a P.L. 480 arrangement or an AID program or not.

I would propose in each of the African countries I visit to review our agricultural relations covering policy, trade, attaché representation, technical assistance and research, and of course Food for Freedom.

I would plan to take a small professional team with me including international agricultural development staff specialists, research scientists, and agricultural economists. In addition, adequate press and media specialists so we would be in a position to get the maximum favorable national and international media attention would be included.

As nearly as I can estimate, July would be the best time for me to be out of the country this year. Agricultural legislation and budgets before the Congress should have been settled by that date. The Kennedy Round will have been resolved. John Schnittker will, of course, be in Washington and competent to meet any problem which might arise during my absence.

I believe such a journey will be useful and constructive, and ask your permission for same.

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-442
By ju, NARA, Date 1-13-93

Pres file

Tuesday, May 9, 1967 -- 4:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

I think you will enjoy reading of the rather stylish performance of the Uruguayan Foreign Minister in dealing with Bertrand Russell as well as with a soft-minded Rector of Montevideo University.

W. W. Rostow

Montevideo 2951
Montevideo 2954

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

77a

Tuesday, May 9, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR HOYT (Montevideo, 2951)

SUBJECT: University Invitation to Russell Tribunal

The following is an Embassy translation (which may differ slightly from the version distributed abroad by the Uruguayan Embassies) of the text of the Foreign Minister's May 6 letter to Bertrand Russell as reported by La Manana on May 7:

"Dear Professor Russell:

"You perhaps do not remember a young Uruguayan graduate who studied law at St. John's and who attended your classes when the London School of Economics was evacuated to Cambridge during the war.

"My happy memories of those classes and my admiration for your contributions to science, especially in the field of mathematics, enhance my motivation in writing to you today.

"My duty to my country and the responsibilities of my office make me an instrument of interference with the reported plans for your visit to Uruguay together with some persons whom I believe are with you at this time in Sweden.

"You will always be welcome to visit Uruguay in your role as a leading figure in the world of science, but I believe that I must state to you that in Uruguay we only recognize those courts of justice which are created by the laws prescribed by our Parliament.

"In defense of the sovereignty of Uruguay, I must stand for respect for the Uruguayan courts, and I feel that I should beg your attention to the fact that the self-assumption of the functions of the courts constitutes an action that is not permitted in our territory.

"I cherish the hope that your scientific activities will someday bring you to this part of the world, a happy occasion to which I look forward with pleasure.

"Sincerely and admiringly yours,
"Hector Luisi, O. B. E. "

PRESERVATION COPY

776

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, May 9, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR HOYT (Montevideo, 2954)

SUBJECT: University Invitation to Russell Tribunal

I wish to point out that the action taken by the Foreign Minister in writing a personal letter to Russell is a very effective way of undermining the rector of the University. The Foreign Minister coordinated his actions very closely with me and informed me that the rector had asked for an appointment with the Foreign Minister this morning. Luisi, therefore, wanted to have his letter to Russell in the press before the rector called.

This morning's paper indicates that the Council of Ministers today will support Luisi's initiative and oppose any holding of the "Tribunal" here. The leftist Minister of Culture had argued that this was a matter for the University rather than for the Government of Uruguay but apparently will vote with the majority on the Council of Ministers in order to present a solid political front.

The Foreign Minister took personal delight in writing this letter and hopes it will be given publicity in the U.S.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLI 91-446
RV 448 NARA. Date 2-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

W.W.R. 18

Pres file

Tuesday, May 9, 1967, 4:20 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-442
By ju, NARA, Date 1-3-93

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Scheduling Kennedy Round Decisions

We are in a last two-day pause in Geneva; the Common Market negotiator is in Brussels for instructions. The final negotiating will begin early Friday morning, with a make or break deadline set for Sunday evening. We will have to give Bill Roth his final instructions by Thursday afternoon (our time).

I will have a paper for you late tomorrow with a map of the situation and a posing of the remaining choices. (This paper will reflect the results of a meeting of our "Command Group" with Messrs. Rusk, Freeman and Wirtz tomorrow morning.) On Thursday morning, we will need about 30-60 minutes of your time to go over the strategy and get your instructions on possible last-minute Congressional consultation. (Vice President, Rusk, Gene Rostow, Solomon; Freeman; Wirtz; Trowbridge; Bator)

If you approve the above schedule, I will ask Marvin to block out an hour on Thursday morning.

Francis M. Bator

O. K. to schedule meeting _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

FMB:mst

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

79
Tuesday, May 9, 1967
11:00 a.m.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452

MR. PRESIDENT: By WJP, NARA, Date 3-17-93

Pres file

MTG. W/
MATZ.
9-1-67

This is an interim report on the meeting yesterday afternoon of the Katzenbach group. We considered policy towards bombing the North.

1. I will be sending up to you later today papers by Cy Vance and Bill Bundy. You already received at the Ranch the paper I filed with this group. The objective of submitting the three papers will be to let you get a feeling for thought on the bombing problem as a preliminary to receiving definitive recommendations from Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.
2. All three papers reject mining Haiphong and the other harbors at this time as well as systematic attacks on the supply lines to China. All also recommend an increased concentration on Route Packages 1, 2 and 3 -- the latter included because of its relevance to Communist supply routes to Laos. All three papers recommend that we keep open the option of bombing in the Hanoi/Haiphong area -- and continue some bombing there -- but let the weight of that attack be determined by careful damage assessment of the targets we have already attacked, plus information on repair, etc.
3. All, I believe, will recommend that we strike the Hanoi electric power plant.
4. All address in one way or another the problem of making this shift in emphasis and the relative weight of our attack acceptable to our own public and the world; but I do not believe we have yet developed for you the best scenario.
5. Drawing back from these particular views, I believe what has happened is something like this:

-- We expanded our target lists in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. CINCPAC, feeling a general go-ahead, began to propose targets which had two characteristics: they were either increasingly unimportant in relation to the losses sustained, or they began to foreshadow the mining of the ports and the cutting of supplies from China.

-- Sect. Rusk began to worry about the Soviet and Chinese Communist reaction to what was happening and, especially, to what was projected;

~~TOP SECRET~~

5/9/67

-- Sect. McNamara, who does not feel bombing in Hanoi/Haiphong relates directly to the war in the South, became increasingly uneasy and felt that rational control over targeting was getting out of his hands.

6. At bottom, the problem is the limited number of first-class targets in the North unless we go for a blockade of the harbors and the attempt to cut the railroad lines to China.

7. As I say, the weight of opinion outside the JCS is that we now draw a line on going forward on the CINCPAC list; but that we do so without abandoning attacks in the Hanoi/Haiphong area except as part of a compensated deal. I believe there is also agreement that we apply tougher criteria to such attacks in the future if for no other reason than because we lose about five times as many pilots and planes per 1000 sorties in that area as we do in the southern part of North Viet Nam.

8. As for the turn-around, it can be done slowly or sharply: we could continue to hit a good many targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area without "escalating," or markedly cut-back. But, I repeat, I don't think we have yet provided you with the best rationale and scenario for a shift from one bombing posture in the North to another. We will all be giving further thought to that in the days ahead.

9. One further thought: there is just enough suggestion that they might be hurting badly in the North that I have asked Dick Helms to answer the question: If we cut back now, would we be relieving pressure which, if sustained, might force a decision in a matter of weeks? I suspect the answer will be "no"; but, within the limits of objective intelligence, I would wish us to be sure.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Pres file

Tuesday, May 9, 1967 -- 10:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

With Bunker announcing the reorganization of pacification in Saigon tomorrow, it will be important to have available and signed by you the relevant NSAM which is, I believe, on your desk for signature.

The reason: We shall wish to give the bureaucracy simultaneous authoritative guidance here as to how they will be organized to back-stop the new set up. There is already some questioning and uneasiness in the wake of Joe Alsop's story yesterday, May 8, on the reorganization.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Pres file

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-452

By ing, NARA, Date 3-17-93~~SECRET~~

May 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Mrs. Gandhi

Attached is a suggested reply to the letter which L. K. Jha brought. It was another in the series of chatty exchanges Mrs. Gandhi initiated after her visit last year. She made these points:

- She is grateful for food and development aid.
- The important outcome of India's election was not the Congress setback but India's reaffirmation of democracy.
- She will try to reach an understanding with Pakistan that would permit her to reduce defense spending but so far has met only rebuffs.
- China's emergence as a nuclear power creates pressures on India to build nuclear weapons, and she must know how India can find security without doing so.
- She renews her invitation for you to visit India.

In drafting your reply, we have:

1. Tried to focus her attention on India's continuing responsibility for mustering international food and economic aid. (The letter we've drafted says you'll be releasing more wheat soon. I am expecting a Freeman-Gaud-Schultze memo momentarily. In short, we believe the consortium performance on matching has been good enough to warrant our releasing at least another 1.5 million tons.)
2. Urged her to cut defense spending to improve the climate for talks with Pakistan. (We have already instructed Bowles to go in hard on this, and George Woods is pressing the same line. We are also cranking up the major consortium members to make similar approaches.)
3. Shown keen interest in Jha's proposal for US and Soviet assurances against nuclear blackmail and attack. (Secretary Rusk will shortly be considering his lawyers' study of constitutional issues raised

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

by Jha's proposal. When he has their views, he will then consider a response to Jha.)

4. Said it's unlikely you can come to India soon but hope a trip may be possible later.

For your signature, if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

8/a

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-452

By ing, NARA, Date 3-17-93

May 9, 1967

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

The frankness and informality of your letter and of my recent meeting with Mr. L. K. Jha recall the warmth of our talks during your visit here a year ago. I agree wholeheartedly that there is no substitute for these personal exchanges.

This is why I am especially tempted by your gracious invitation to visit India again. No journey could give me greater pleasure, for Mrs. Johnson and I treasure memories of our last visit. Regrettably, I think it unlikely that we shall be able to make this trip in the months immediately ahead. As we look a bit further into the future, however, I hope it may be possible.

The year since your visit has been exceedingly busy for us both. We have each had our share of satisfactions and disappointments. These are inevitable given the problems we face.

Your letter suggests that perhaps your greatest satisfaction these past twelve months has been the mature, responsible way in which so many million Indians demonstrated the strength and vitality of Indian democracy by participating in India's fourth general election. You have a right to be proud, especially in view of the natural calamity which has afflicted many regions of India. I know the drought has added greatly to your burdens and caused you great personal sorrow.

All friends of India share both your pride and your grief.

I continue to follow closely your food situation. The Consortium meeting in Paris was an important step in meeting both the short range and longer term aspects of this problem. While you still have much to do in encouraging other governments to participate fully in both the food and

the economic aid programs, I believe you have started down a new path which offers hope. We will continue to work at your side and expect soon to release additional wheat now that others have taken substantial steps toward matching our effort.

You must also find satisfaction in the measures your government has taken during the past year to give greater emphasis to agriculture, to carry out massive country-wide family planning programs, to liberalize imports and to relax controls over industrial investment and production. I am confident that pressing along the course set by these new policies can bring India to its goal of a self-reliant economy and a rising standard of living.

My government will continue to do its share in the international effort to support India. But I am sure you know that our ability to help will depend in considerable measure on whether both India and Pakistan can contain--and even reduce--military spending. Further increases in defense spending by your government and Pakistan's would make it far more difficult for me to mobilize support for economic development in either country. I know you want to hold down defense spending, and I believe President Ayub is motivated by a similar resolve.

On my side, I think that my greatest satisfaction recently has come from those signs which hold out the possibility of a relaxation of world tensions--even a slight relaxation. We have concluded the Outer Space Treaty and made some progress in negotiating a non-proliferation treaty. In this great effort--which will help determine the kind of world in which our children and grandchildren will live--we welcome the constructive support of India.

That is why we were especially glad to see Mr. Jha at this time. As you know, I have long been aware of India's security problems vis-a-vis hostile China. Obviously, your country's concern has increased since October 1964.

when the Chinese exploded their first atomic device. I stated publicly then that the United States is willing to extend its strong support to any country which has chosen not to use its nuclear technology to build weapons if that country should be threatened with nuclear weapons. I can understand why you have raised the question with the major nuclear weapons states of making clear their concern and intentions in this connection.

As I told Mr. Jha, I am deeply interested in the trend of his discussions in Moscow, including the illustrative text of a possible Soviet declaration on nuclear assurances. My advisers and I are carefully exploring the possibilities in this approach, and we will be in touch with you.

Our great and continuing disappointment in this past year is that the relentless efforts we have made to find a peaceful and honorable resolution of the Vietnam conflict have thus far failed to evoke a corresponding response from the other side. The United States stands for peace and justice with honor, and I shall continue to pursue peace. A just solution, of course, cannot be one which denies the right of our Vietnamese friends to independence and self-determination, without external coercion. I would hope that those nations which share a stake in these precious principles would support my country's efforts to find an honorable peace.

With warmest good wishes,

Sincerely,

LBJ

Her Excellency
Indira Gandhi
Prime Minister of India
New Delhi

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 5/9/67

Tuesday - May 9, 1967

Mr. President:

You asked that a nice letter of thanks be written to Ambassador Hoyt for his letter on your performance at Punta del Este.

I recommend the attached draft.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

MAY 10 1967

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I am most grateful for your letter concerning the Meeting of Presidents.

It was a good conference -- for the decisions taken and the personal contacts made. The many favorable comments from this country and Latin America which I have received since returning to Washington confirm this assessment.

Punta del Este represents only the beginning. Now comes the hard task of translating the decisions into action. I am counting on you and your colleagues in the other Latin American countries to work with imagination and energy in helping the governments to which you are accredited to get the job done.

The smoothness with which the Meeting of Presidents was conducted is a tribute to the hard work which went into the preparations. I know how diligently you, your deputy John Topping and all the members of the Embassy staff worked to make the meeting a success. In expressing my personal thanks to you, I ask that you also convey it to each of them.

Sincerely,

LBJ

The Honorable
Henry A. Hoyt
United States Ambassador
American Embassy
Montevideo

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm
May 9, 1967

Tuesday - May 9, 1967

Mr. President:

I recommend that you send the attached reply to Peter Grace's highly commendatory letter on your performance at Punta del Este.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

83a

May 9, 1967

Dear Peter:

Your letter of May 1 was heartening. I am grateful for your taking the time to write.

The Punta del Este conference was a useful meeting. The decisions taken can open a dynamic new phase in Latin American development. All depends on the imagination and vigor with which the decisions are carried out. History will judge Punta del Este by that yardstick.

Private enterprise -- domestic and foreign -- will have an important role in the development effort agreed to by the Presidents. I am sure your United States colleagues and Latin American counterparts will wish to consider how best you can contribute to that effort.

I appreciate the support which you and other members of the Council for Latin America gave me on the Summit program prior to the meeting. Your continued assistance will be necessary in obtaining public and Congressional support for what we should do to match Latin American self-help efforts. I will count on your backing.

Sincerely,

LBJ

Mr. Peter Grace
President
W. R. Grace & Co.
7 Hanover Square
New York, N. Y. 10005

LBJ:WGB:WWR:mz

84

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-270
By cb, NARA Date 10-14-99

Pres file
Tuesday, May 9, 1967

~~TOP SECRET (SENSITIVE)~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT (Literally Eyes Only)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Des Fitzgerald [REDACTED] of CIA came in over the weekend to report on [REDACTED] efforts to open useful channels to the Liberation Front. I thought you should be aware of these developments.

[REDACTED] just returned from Saigon. He and his men have succeeded in making contact with a number of Vietnamese [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

It is possible, through these channels, to get into contact with members of the Front. The goal would be to break as many as possible away from the Front. This will not be possible, it is believed, unless those approached;

-- can be reasonably sure of their safety;

-- are convinced that they can have an honorable role in society; in their professions and skills;

-- believe they can play an active role in the political life of Viet-Nam.

Hard-core communists are not likely to be attracted by any efforts, at least as long as they retain some hope of success. The effort above would be aimed mainly at non-communist but politically motivated members of the Front.

The first step would be to set up a non-partisan Council (for study of democratic institutions, or similar general terminology). This would provide an outlet and organization for the people already contacted and others. It would also provide a respectable base for any Front officials who decided to move over.

Later, this would be converted into a political movement and a basis for political action and opposition. This process could not move

~~TOP SECRET (SENSITIVE)~~

~~TOP SECRET (SENSITIVE)~~

forward in advance of the coming elections in September, but the Council could begin to take shape sooner.

At some early time, this will have to be discussed with the GVN authorities for much will depend on their cooperation and full understanding.

I can provide additional details, but I thought you should know that this program has moved and next steps are under active consideration.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET (SENSITIVE)~~

Tuesday - May 9, 1967

Mr. President:

Jorge Frei -- 19 year old son of the Chilean President -- will be in Washington May 18-20. He is in the United States on an Operation Amigo project sponsored by the Copley, Knight and Scripps Howard papers.

Do you want to ask him to drop in for a short chat while he is here?

Yes _____

Prefer not _____

See me _____.

W. W. Rostow

P.S. Perhaps Lynda Bird, just back from Latin America, might chat with him?

Yes _____

No _____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

86
Pres file
Tuesday, May 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Joint Statement on Vice President Yen's Visit

The proposed joint statement concerning Vice President Yen's visit is attached. Yen and his party, as well as State, have approved it. There was no difficulty in reaching agreement.

The Statement should be well received in Taiwan and should give us no problems here. It reconfirms our long-standing defense commitments to the Government of the Republic of China and expresses our support for its position in the United Nations. Our options for the future concerning a possible seat for Peking are left open. The Statement makes no new commitments, except for announcement of your offer of a Hornig mission to Taiwan. No aid figures are mentioned.

If you approve the Statement, the plan is to release it to the press tomorrow, May 10th, at 4:00 p.m.

I recommend that you approve the statement.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See Me _____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Visit of Vice President Yen Chia-kan
of the Republic of China
May 9-10, 1967

JOINT STATEMENT

His excellency Yen Chia-kan, Vice President and Prime Minister of the Republic of China, has concluded a two-day visit to Washington at the invitation of President Johnson. Vice President Yen met with President Johnson to discuss matters of common concern on May 9. Also present were Ambassador Chow Shu-kai, Minister of Economic Affairs Li Kwoh-ting, Ambassador to the United Nations Liu Chieh, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Samson C. Shen, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Ambassador to China Walter P. McCaughy, and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William P. Bundy. Director of the Information Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Lai Chia-chiu was present as recorder for the Chinese side.

The President welcomed the opportunity to reaffirm to the Vice President the solemn commitment of the United States as provided for in the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. Vice President Yen noted that the Chinese Communists pose a continuing threat, and the President reassured the Vice President that the United States intends to continue to furnish military aid to the Republic of China in accordance with the provisions of the Military Assistance Agreement of 1951.

The President and Vice President reviewed the international situation, with particular reference to the current situation in East Asia.

They exchanged information and views on conditions on the Chinese mainland resulting from the Cultural Revolution. They agreed that the struggle for power is far from over and that developments on the Chinese mainland are closely related to the peace and security of Asia. They further agreed to consult on future developments on the Chinese mainland.

The President and the Vice President reviewed the Free World effort to halt Communist aggression against the Republic of Vietnam. President Johnson and Vice President Yen agreed that unless the aggression is stopped, peace and security cannot prevail in Asia and the Pacific region. The President expressed his gratification with the Republic of China's contributions to the development of Vietnam's economy, noting especially the work of Chinese technicians in assisting the Republic of Vietnam to increase her food production. The Vice President expressed the strong support of the Republic of China for the United States policy in Vietnam and the hope that the Republic of China would find it possible further to strengthen her economic and technical cooperation with the Republic of Vietnam.

It was agreed that periodic consultations between the United States and the Republic of China on problems of common concern in East Asia had been fruitful and should be continued.

The President and the Vice President discussed the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. They noted the favorable

outcome of the 21st General Assembly when efforts to expel the Republic of China from the United Nations and seat the Chinese Communists were decisively defeated. The President reaffirmed that the United States firmly supports the Republic of China's seat in the United Nations. The President and the Vice President agreed that their Governments would continue to consult closely on the best means for achieving their common objectives in the United Nations.

The President expressed admiration for the continuing progress made by the Republic of China in developing Taiwan's economy since the conclusion of the US economic aid program in 1965. He also noted the sharp contrast between economic conditions in Taiwan and on the Chinese mainland.

The President congratulated Vice President Yen on the remarkable success of the Republic of China's technical cooperation programs in friendly countries, particularly in the field of agriculture, and noted that the Republic of China is making a most significant contribution to the collective War on Hunger.

In the course of their conversation President Johnson and Vice President Yen also reviewed programs intended to develop cooperation among Asian nations. The President and Vice President noted the potentialities of the Asian and Pacific Council and the Asian Development Bank to promote peace and prosperity in Asia and the Pacific region.

Vice President Yen spoke of the need to strengthen science in the Republic of China. He welcomed the President's offer to have his Science Adviser, Dr. Hornig, lead a team of experts to Taiwan to survey scientific assets and needs in the Republic of China. Dr. Hornig will also advise on ways by which more career opportunities might be provided in Taiwan for Chinese scientists now teaching and working outside China.

President Johnson and Vice President Yen reaffirmed the strong ties between the United States and the Republic of China founded on the historic friendship between the Chinese and American peoples.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 9, 1967

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO.

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Responsibility for U. S. Role in Pacification
 (Revolutionary Development)

U. S. civil/military responsibility for support of Pacification (Revolutionary Development) in Viet Nam will be integrated under a single manager concept to provide added thrust forward in this critical field.

Because the bulk of the people and resources involved are military, COMUSMACV will be charged with this responsibility in Viet Nam, under the overall authority of the Ambassador.

To carry out these responsibilities, under COMUSMACV, Mr. Robert W. Komer will be appointed Deputy for Pacification (Revolutionary Development) with personal rank of ambassador.

To this end the present functions and personnel of the Office of Civil Operations of the U. S. Mission will become a part of MACV. For the time being its civilian components will continue to be supported with funds, personnel, and other requirements by the civil agencies involved, such as State, AID, USIA, CIA, and Department of Agriculture. COMUSMACV is expected to call on these agencies, as well as the relevant military agencies, for all resources needed for accomplishment of his mission. I hereby charge all U. S. departments and agencies with meeting these requirements promptly and effectively.

One purpose of unifying responsibility for Pacification (RD) under COMUSMACV is to permit logistic and administrative economies through consolidation and cross-servicing. I expect sensible steps to be taken in this direction. Any inter-agency jurisdictional or other issues which may arise in country will be referred to the U. S. Ambassador.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F8200772 - NSCBy reg/isp, NARA, Date 5-24-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Ambassador William Leonhart will assume from Mr. Komer the Washington supervisory responsibilities already assigned in NSAM 343, and will be appointed Special Assistant to the President for this purpose.

This new organizational arrangement represents an unprecedented melding of civil and military responsibilities to meet the overriding requirements of Viet Nam. Therefore, I count on all concerned -- in Washington and in Viet Nam -- to pull together in the national interest to make this arrangement work.



LBJ:RWK:WWR:mz

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday - May 9, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith the report on Lynda Bird's activities yesterday:

1. The morning of 8 May, Miss Johnson visited several grade school classrooms in the slum area of Arequipa, saw a Peace Corps project for handicapped children, and toured the central part of the city on foot, sightseeing and shopping. She lunched at the home of Mr. Williams, where she was staying, and departed Arequipa about one hour late. She arrived in Lima about 1635 hours and went shopping before going to the Ambassador's residence, where she dined and retired for the evening.

2. No incidents of any kind on May 8. The growing annoyance of the local Lima press with efforts of the Secret Service to protect Miss Johnson's privacy from invasion by overenthusiastic newspapermen was eased by a more cooperative and understanding attitude on the part of newsmen. Coverage is still light and favorable to Miss Johnson.

W. W. ROSTOW

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By Ng, NARA, Date 5-7-91

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 8, 1967 -- 7:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith State's essentially negative response to the possibility of introducing more GRC personnel into South Viet Nam.

On the economic side, the Vietnamese don't really want more Chinese around, although we are willing. On the military side, neither the Vietnamese nor the people want Chinese forces in South Viet Nam.

Behind all this is the basic negative attitude of the Vietnamese toward Chinese, heightened by the large relatively wealthy Chinese population in Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By WJ, NARA, Date 3-17-93

~~SECRET~~

90

Pres. file

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 8, 1967
7:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

It looks as though Strauss has forced Klessinger into a reasonably tight position on the time limit for the NPT.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By ing, NARA, Date 3-17-93

attachment: Memo of Conversation with Georg von Lilienfeld with WWRostow

WWRostow:rlh

Monday, May 8, 1967

5:00 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Georg von Lilienfeld came in to report the following:

1. Chancellor Kiesinger has come to the conclusion that it is politically dangerous for him to submit the non-proliferation treaty to the German parliament and to the country unless a time limit is permitted in one of two forms:

-- the treaty itself runs for, say, 20 years; or

-- signators could accede to the treaty for a limited period of time.

2. Specifically, what he fears is that Franz Josef Strauss will make this an issue of his resignation; destroy the present coalition; and force a general election. Lilienfeld implied that Strauss' intent would be to have the CDU returned with a majority, with Strauss as Foreign Minister.

3. Lilienfeld, in further explanation of the Chancellor's political position, said that in pursuing his policy to the east, he would have to give away, probably, the Oder-Neisse line and accept de facto contacts at high levels with the East German government. If, in addition, he had to stand before the parliament and the country on a non-proliferation treaty without a time limit, he would be facing, in his judgment, more than he could handle.

4. Lilienfeld then asked if the President would be "surprised" by this position. I said that, to the best of my knowledge, the President had listened carefully to Chancellor Kiesinger's discussion of his problems with the NPT; had explained that we were not sure that we had a treaty acceptable to the Soviet Union; but had made the case for a treaty without time limit. He said that also was his understanding.

5. I promised to report his conversation. He told me that Gutenberg would be in to see me soon with a more elaborate account of the German government's position with respect to the time limit.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By 4-8, NARA, Date 3-17-93

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 8, 1967 -- 4:50 pm

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith David Bruce puts
British application for EEC member-
ship in a grand perspective and urges
our support and patience.

W. W. Rostow

London 9217

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines Feb. 24, 1983
By *rg*, NARA, Date 5-17-91

~~SECRET~~

May 8, 1967

Copy of LONDON 9217

For Secretary from Bruce

1. I have talked lengthily during the past two days in London with Jean Monnet about the British decision to apply for membership in the Common Market. He believes their formal application to do so will be regarded as a famous moment in European history, and is remaining here to attend the 3-day debate on it in the House of Commons.

2. In his view, this decision (made under more auspicious circumstances than prevailed throughout the earlier unsuccessful negotiations by Macmillan's government) marks another development in a political movement which commenced when he (although he modestly gives Robert Schumann credit for it) laid the foundation stone of the coal and steel community, as a base for a European house of nations, large enough to accommodate Britain, whose tenancy he has always deemed essential.

3. Heath is gallantly supporting, as are the liberals, the Prime Minister's initiative, and thereby assures what promises to be an overwhelming majority for approval in the House of Commons.

4. I am presently in the minority here who think President de Gaulle will not face the British proposal with a brutal and rapid rejection. On the contrary, I suspect he will protract negotiations on particulars, especially over financial matters, including the maintenance of Sterling as a reserve currency, in order to delay a probably inevitable event.

5. For almost twenty years, the idea of submerging certain attributes of national sovereignty in a partnership designed to concentrate in the common European interest many of the resources of member states, has engendered a tremendous popular and political enthusiasm. Monnet has always insisted that it could not come to full fruition unless Great Britain became a willing participant in the enterprise.

6. If this scheme becomes actuality, I am convinced that, far from being injured by the existence of a cohesive and united Europe, the final extent and power of which we cannot yet predict and foresee, the United States will derive massive and fortunate benefits from it.

7. We will be able to continue our bilateral transactions, when appropriate, with the constituent states, but, on matters where they speak with a single voice, their influence, coupled with our own, should serve for generations to come as the most practicable connection available to induce order and peace.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State to 7/26/78
By 12/1/80 NARA, Date 5-17-91

~~SECRET~~

-2-

(LONDON 9217)

8. Neither Britain nor ourselves would lose anything substantial from this potential regrouping. The so-called Anglo-American special relationship is now little more than sentimental terminology, although the underground waters of it will flow with a deep current. The entry of the UK into Europe, via common institutions, should strengthen, not impair, our easy intercourse with it and its new associates.

9. I trust that in the welter of controversy certain to rage in the wake of the imminent formal British application, we will continue the policy, to which we have thus far wisely adhered, of applauding progress toward further unity in Europe, without prescribing on what terms it might best be realized.

BRUCE

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~~SECRET~~

for file

SECRET

Monday, May 8, 1967 -- 4:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

If you have time and would like to get a feel for the political process in South Korea, here is Win Brown's analysis of the presidential campaign before the votes were counted.

It shows much progress between 1963 and 1967 in a working democracy.

W. W. Rostow

Letter 5/2/67 to William Bundy
from Winthrop G. Brown, Seoul.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By mg, NARA, Date 5-7-91

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 8, 1967 -- 4:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

I asked Dick Helms for a listing of Soviet and Chinese Communist military actions that might be undertaken in connection with Viet Nam, beyond those in which they are now engaged. I asked that they be arrayed with respect to the degree of risk involved from the Soviet and Chinese Communist side as they might see them.

A thoughtful, professional military officer (Richard Collins) on the Board of National Estimates, produced this paper.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-441
By ing, NARA, Date 4-24-95

ONE, 3 May 1967
Memo for the Director
Subject: Soviet and Chicom Military Actions

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

67-2095

93

1543

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

3 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Soviet and Chicom Military Actions

I. GENERAL

1. What military actions could the Soviets or the Chicoms take against us in the Vietnamese war? In Vietnam, one might expect actions against those elements of US military power with which the North Vietnamese/Vietcong are less prepared or unable to cope and which are causing them the most trouble. Actions elsewhere would be in the nature of diversions intended to increase the manpower and material needs of US forces.

2. At the present level of combat, the Communists in North Vietnam are particularly concerned to find ways to counter our carrier based aircraft, land based aircraft, naval bombardment, and our inshore anti-shipping patrols and mining.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-440
By 108, NARA, Date 9-1-92

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

3. In South Vietnam and Laos, the Communists are hurt most by our ground mobility and fire power, airborne mobility and fire power, and our practically unrestricted use of sea and air routes for logistic purposes.

4. For the future, the Communists may be apprehensive that the US will widen the list of targets taken under attack in North Vietnam, take steps (mining or blockade) to cut off access to North Vietnam by ocean and coastal shipping, substantially increase its forces in South Vietnam, or invade North Vietnam.

II. THE SOVIET UNION

5. The USSR is separated from Southeast Asia by great distances and the land, sea, and air routes thence are not subject to its control. Its military actions would, therefore, be restricted to provision of specialized manpower and materiel for specific tasks. Whether or not the Soviets would undertake a specific action would depend upon their estimate of the risks of becoming involved directly in war with the US. It is unlikely that the Soviets would go to war with the US over Vietnam.

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6. Soviet actions involving lesser degrees of risk could be:

- a. To provide and man SAM units and interceptors.
- b. To provide and man coastal defense guns and cruise missiles.
- c. To provide and man patrol craft and guided missile patrol craft for inshore use.
- d. To provide naval mines and technicians with sweeping gear for use in coastal waters.
- e. To provide and man FROGS, cruise missiles, or MRBMs, with HE warheads, for harassment of airfields, bases and other installations in South Vietnam and Thailand.
- f. To get the North Koreans to heighten tensions along the Korean Demilitarized Zone in order to prevent further transfer of forces from South Korea.

7. Soviet actions involving greater degrees of risk could be:

- a. To establish a naval task force in the South China Sea including mine laying, torpedo attack, and cruise missile submarines to harass our naval forces and increase our ship requirements.

- 3 -

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- b. To mine covertly our fleet operating areas in Gulf of Tonkin or the sea approaches to South Vietnam using submarines.

III. COMMUNIST CHINA

8. In contrast to the Soviet Union, Communist China is adjacent to Southeast Asia and not far distant from such important US support areas as Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines. China is capable of bringing significant ground and air forces to bear in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. Like the USSR, China's actions would be influenced by its estimate of the risks of war with the US. The current estimate is that China would intervene in Vietnam if North Vietnam were invaded or if the Communist regime there seemed about to collapse.

9. The Chicoms have already taken military action against us in the Vietnamese war. Chinese AAA units in North Vietnam participate in the defense of the northern lines of communication. Chinese interceptors from Chinese bases have occasionally attacked our aircraft in the border areas. Chinese airfields have sheltered North Vietnamese aircraft.

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10. Other Chinese actions involving lesser degrees of risk could be:

- a. To provide additional AAA units.
- b. To extend the area in which approaching US aircraft are attacked, as allegedly posing a threat to China.
- c. To provide and man interceptors to operate from North Vietnamese airfields.
- d. To reinforce the South Sea Fleet and participate in defense of North Vietnamese inshore waters with motor torpedo boats and guided missile patrol craft.
- e. To conduct mining and mine sweeping operations in North Vietnamese coastal waters.
- f. To provide and man artillery units to support North Vietnamese Army operations in northern South Vietnam.
- g. To increase naval activity in Taiwan Strait and threaten the offshore islands by actual troop concentration or deception measures, in order to increase US ship and manpower requirements in the Far East.

- 5 -

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11. Chicom actions involving a greater degree of risk could be:

- a. To permit use of Chinese airfields for operations by the North Vietnamese Air Force.
- b. To defend North Vietnamese air space with the Chicom Air Force from Chinese bases.
- c. To operate the South Sea Fleet, with submarines, in such a way as to harass our naval forces in the Gulf of Tonkin and increase our ship requirements.
- d. To conduct covert submarine mining operations in the Gulf of Tonkin and on the approaches to South Vietnamese ports.
- e. To create a threat to our naval forces by flying Chicom Naval Air Force jet light bombers into the Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea.
- f. To extend ground operations in Laos into the Plaine des Jarres, establish a base, and threaten Luang Prabang, Vientiane and US bases in northeast Thailand in order to place another military burden on the US.

12. If, for whatever reason, the Chicoms decided to enter the war, they could take actions which would greatly increase US

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force requirements in Asia. Such actions could include:

- a. Movement into Southeast Asia on a broad front with substantial forces, over running Laos, and threatening Thailand and South Vietnam.
- b. An attack on Quemoy and other Chinat offshore islands.
- c. Utilization of jet light bombers with fighter support against our naval forces in the Gulf of Tonkin and the Taiwan Strait.
- d. The use of guided missile patrol craft and submarines against our naval forces in the Gulf of Tonkin and the Taiwan Straits.

13. The lists of actions are not exhaustive, but represent the sorts of things that should be thought about. Some of the capabilities have yet to be proved -- Chinese submarine operations, for example. But even the appearance of an intent to exercise a capability may be sufficient to create a diversion requiring the deployment of more men and materiel from the US.

Richard Collins

RICHARD COLLINS
Board of National Estimates

- 7 -

~~SECRET~~

APR 11 1964

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 8, 1967 -- 3:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a general talking paper for
Vice President Yen's visit, 12:00 noon, Tuesday,
May 9.

In addition:

-- I am having the welcoming statement
and luncheon toast improved and put on cards.

-- I shall be sending up a special paper
from State on the possibilities and advisability of
putting more GRC manpower into Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 2-3-78, NSC 8-14-78

By ag/led, NARA, Date 5-2-91

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, May 8, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Vice President YEN Chia-kan at 12:00 Noon on May 9

Our Purposes

We seek through this visit:

-- to reassure the Republic of China that our efforts to reduce tensions with the Chinese Communist regime in no way detract from our support of the Republic of China;

-- to strengthen Yen's image as a statesman, beyond that of an able administrator and an eminent economist.

Yen's Nature

Yen is intelligent and sophisticated, soft spoken but articulate. He is renowned as a skillful conciliator. He is a man of moderate and pragmatic policies, and is the constitutional successor to Chiang Kai-shek.

Private Portion of Talk

We hear from Taipei that Yen approaches this visit with trepidation. He fears that expectations of results from the visit may be unrealistically high at home, and that his personal position may suffer as a result.

It would raise Yen's stature if, in initial conversation with him alone, you:

-- placed main emphasis on developments in East Asia in the broad, strategic context of our policies as directed toward ultimate stability and security. It would be useful if some of your observations in this vein were couched in terms of a personal message to Chiang which Yen could convey.

-- indicated appreciation for exchanges of correspondence with President Chiang and the care with which you considered his opinions. The two most important exchanges are at Tab A. At Tab B is a list of recent exchanges, followed by the more significant remaining correspondence.

-- perhaps mentioned to Yen alone, one of two more sensitive aspects of Vietnam policy or developments;

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 95-201

By ij, NARA, Date 10-17-95~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

-- ascertained whether Yen has any other subject best suited for private discussion.

(Yen will also wish to give his appraisal of mainland developments, and may bear a letter to you from Chiang on the subject.)

Larger Meeting (if you desire)

At this time you may wish to:

-- outline more broadly our thinking on military and political strategy in Vietnam. In doing so you might thank Yen for his Government's assistance to Vietnam's economy and for our use of airbase facilities in Taiwan.

-- reiterate firm commitment to our treaty obligation to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores, stressing that our power is a reliable deterrent to any possible communist military threat, including nuclear.

-- assure Yen that we will use our efforts and influence to support the Republic of China's seat in the United Nations. We both must be flexible in our tactics and remain in close consultation.

-- praise the remarkable economic "success story" of Free China, in which Yen was the key architect.

-- express your hope that Dr. Hornig's visit will lead to useful results in promoting further scientific and industrial development.

Other Possible Subjects

In general the Chinese will be looking for tangible evidence of our continuing interest and support, and Yen may:

-- suggest that we assist the Republic of China to undertake new regional programs.

You may wish to reply:

-- we are confident that the Asian and Pacific Council and the Asian Development Bank will make major contributions to prosperity in Asia. It would also be appropriate to say that we look forward to cooperation in the War on

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- 3 -

Hunger through the furnishing of P. L. 480 commodities to finance expansion of Vanguard -- the Chinese agricultural assistance program. Yen will not wish to discuss this in detail, however, in view of his hope to keep his talk with you on a "strategy" level.

Yen may:

-- urge that the U.S. not recognize Mongolia, saying that this is a question of China's territorial integrity.

You may wish to say:

-- the question is under review, but no final decision made. Recognition might have important advantages, including intelligence benefits.

While most unlikely in view of your reply to Chiang's request through Goldberg, Yen may:

-- request U.S. logistical support for return to the mainland.

You may wish to

-- reiterate your position taken in the reply to Chiang, Tab A.

Walt Rostow

Secretary Rusk's memo, the bulk of which is already incorporated in these notes, is attached at Tab C.

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 8, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Lao National Day Message

State recommends, and I concur, that the following longer-than-usual National Day message be sent by you to the King of Laos on May 11.

W. W. Rostow

_____ Approve

_____ Disapprove

_____ See Me

WWR:BKS:amc

75a

Draft message from the President to the King on occasion of Lao National Day, May 11.

QUOTE: Your Majesty, on behalf of the citizens of the United States, I extend our warmest best wishes to you and all the people of Laos on the National Day of the Kingdom of Laos.

We welcome this opportunity to express our congratulations and admiration for the efforts of the Lao under your leadership to preserve their constitution and their nation during twenty turbulent years. We sympathize with the long-standing desire of Laos to secure a life of peace, independence, and neutrality and we firmly support the efforts of the Royal Lao Government to gain these goals as formally agreed in the 1962 Geneva accords.

I believe, Your Majesty, that you and your people can be proud today of the progress made in building the nation and its economy despite flood and external aggression.

On this occasion, I assure you that we will continue to support the efforts your Government is making to bring to the people of Laos an increasing measure of that prosperity and progress we wish for them today.

With personal regards,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

96
Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By sig, NARA, Date 3-17-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - May 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Summit Follow-up: Dominican Republic and Trinidad

Tony Solomon has followed up on assignments you gave him stemming from your bilateral talks with President Balaguer and Prime Minister Williams.

This is what he reports:

Dominican Republic

Balaguer asked for preferential tariff treatment on selected agricultural products, such as peppers and okra.

Tony Solomon finds that the prospects for being helpful are not good. Granting preferential treatment would undercut our efforts to persuade the UK and the EEC to phase out their existing preferential systems. The growing season between Mexico (another supplier) and the DR is the same, so there is no possibility of giving the DR "out-of-season" favorable treatment. The best bet is action pursuant to a favorable Kennedy Round and post-KR temporary multilateral preferences by the industrialized countries for the LDC's.

As I reported to you earlier, Tony Solomon and Linc Gordon have agreed to recommend that you give the DR a substantial portion of the Philippine sugar short-fall. In the short run, this is much more helpful to the Dominicans.

Ambassador Crimmins will give Balaguer the bad news on vegetables at the same time he gives him the good word on sugar.

Trinidad and Tobago

Williams asked your help in encouraging TWA to buy an interest in British West Indies Airways (BWIA).

Tony Solomon has discussed the request with TWA and the Trinidadian Ambassador. Exploratory talks between TWA and the Ambassador have

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-2-

begun. A major sticking point is that Trinidad wants TWA to buy into the company but still retain control over the management of the airline. TWA is not interested in such an arrangement.

Another important aspect is to get the other former British West Indies governments to make BWIA a regional carrier. It was designed to be this before the British effort to establish a British West Indies Federation in the Caribbean collapsed.

Tony notes that it will take some time to sort out this complicated problem. In the meantime, Trinidad and TWA are talking.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 8 1967

Mr. President:

President Lopez of Honduras has sent you a memorandum via Linc Gordon asking for financial assistance for a series of projects: pulp and paper mill, roads, agrarian reform, etc.

I recommend that you send a reply along the lines of the attached, suggesting that he initially discuss his proposals with Ambassador Jova and our AID Mission.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Suggested Presidential letter
to Honduran President Lopez

WGB:mmm
May 5, 1967

John F. Kennedy

97a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By ing, NARA, Date 3-17-93

May 8, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

I appreciate the telegram you sent me following your return to Tegucigalpa. I enjoyed the opportunity of meeting with you and your fellow Central American Presidents during the conference at Punta del Este. I am much impressed with the progress that you are making toward regional integration, and I believe all of Latin America can profit from Central America's experience.

We are studying the memorandum that you sent me through Assistant Secretary Gordon. I suggest that your Ministers discuss the proposals in detail with Ambassador Jova and officers of our AID Mission in Tegucigalpa. We will, I assure you, give your requests the most serious consideration.

I am convinced that the decisions taken at Punta del Este will bring nearer the achievement of the goals of the Alliance for Progress. I look forward to cooperating with you in carrying out those decisions.

Sincerely,

LBJ

His Excellency
Oswaldo Lopez Arellano
President of the Republic of Honduras
Tegucigalpa.

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm
May 5, 1967

Monday, May 8, 1967

98
Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Lao National Day Message

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W. W. Rostow

☒ Approve
☐ Disapprove
☐ See Me

WWR:BKS:amc

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QUOTE: Your Majesty, on behalf of the citizens of the United States, I extend our warmest best wishes to you and all the people of Laos on the National Day of the Kingdom of Laos.

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I believe, Your Majesty, that you and your people can be proud today of the progress made in building the nation and its economy despite flood and external aggression.

On this occasion, I assure you that we will continue to support the efforts your Government is making to bring to the people of Laos an increasing measure of that prosperity and progress we wish for them today.

With personal regards,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

99

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 95-201

Mr. Rostow
Pres file

~~SECRET~~

By *iso*, NARA, Date 10-17-95 Monday, May 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Vice President YEN Chia-kan at 12:00 Noon on May 9

Our Purposes

We seek through this visit:

-- to reassure the Republic of China that our efforts to reduce tensions with the Chinese Communist regime in no way detract from our support of the Republic of China;

-- to strengthen Yen's image as a statesman, beyond that of an able administrator and an eminent economist.

Yen's Nature

Yen is intelligent and sophisticated, soft spoken but articulate. He is renowned as a skillful conciliator. He is a man of moderate and pragmatic policies, and is the constitutional successor to Chiang Kai-shek.

Private Portion of Talk

We hear from Taipei that Yen approaches this visit with trepidation. He fears that expectations of results from the visit may be unrealistically high at home, and that his personal position may suffer as a result.

It would raise Yen's stature if, in initial conversation with him alone, you:

-- placed main emphasis on developments in East Asia in the broad, strategic context of our policies as directed toward ultimate stability and security. It would be useful if some of your observations in this vein were couched in terms of a personal message to Chiang which Yen could convey.

-- indicated appreciation for exchanges of correspondence with President Chiang and the care with which you considered his opinions. The two most important exchanges are at Tab A. At Tab B is a list of recent exchanges, followed by the more significant remaining correspondence.

-- perhaps mentioned to Yen alone, one or two more sensitive aspects of Vietnam policy or developments;

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- 2 -

-- ascertained whether Yen has any other subject best suited for private discussion.

(Yen will also wish to give his appraisal of mainland developments, and may bear a letter to you from Chiang on the subject.)

Larger Meeting

At this time you may wish to:

-- outline more broadly our thinking on military and political strategy in Vietnam. In doing so you might thank Yen for his Government's assistance to Vietnam's economy and for our use of airbase facilities in Taiwan.

-- reiterate firm commitment to our treaty obligation to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores, stressing that our power is a reliable deterrent to any possible communist military threat, including nuclear.

-- assure Yen that we will use our efforts and influence to support the Republic of China's seat in the United Nations. We both must be flexible in our tactics and remain in close consultation.

-- praise the remarkable economic "success story" of Free China, in which Yen was the key architect.

-- express your hope that Dr. Hornig's visit will lead to useful results in promoting further scientific and industrial development.

Other Possible Subjects

In general the Chinese will be looking for tangible evidence of our continuing interest and support, and Yen may:

-- suggest that we assist the Republic of China to undertake new regional programs.

You may wish to reply:

-- we are confident that the Asian and Pacific Council and the Asian Development Bank will make major contributions to prosperity in Asia. It would also be appropriate to say that we look forward to cooperation in the War on

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- 3 -

Hunger through the furnishing of P. L. 480 commodities to finance expansion of Vanguard -- the Chinese agricultural assistance program. Yen will not wish to discuss this in detail, however, in view of his hope to keep his talk with you on a "strategy" level.

Yen may:

-- urge that the U. S. not recognize Mongolia, saying that this is a question of China's territorial integrity.

You may wish to say:

-- the question is under review, but no final decision made. Recognition might have important advantages, including intelligence benefits.

While most unlikely in view of your reply to Chiang's request through Goldberg, Yen may:

-- request U. S. logistical support for return to the mainland.

You may wish to

-- reiterate your position taken in the reply to Chiang, Tab A.

W. W. Rostow

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99a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Vice President
Yen Chia-kan of the Republic of
China

In inviting Yen here we seek to reassure the Republic of China that the U.S. long-term objective of seeking conditions for a reconciliation with Communist China detracts in no way from our support of the Republic of China.

Yen is a man of moderate policies and the constitutional successor to Chiang Kai-shek. We hope this visit will enhance his position at home.

The following points may be helpful in setting the tone of our future relationship with the Republic of China:

a) The United States remains firmly committed to its Treaty obligation to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores. U.S. military power is a reliable and effective deterrent to any possible Communist military threat, including employment of nuclear weapons.

b) We will use our efforts and influence to support the Republic of China's seat in the United Nations. In order to achieve our common objectives in the United Nations, we both must be flexible in our tactics on Chinese representation and remain in close and continuing consultation.

c) Yen

~~SECRET~~
GROUP 1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLI 91-446
By MP NARA, Date 2-3-92

Excluded from automatic downgrading
and declassification.

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-2-

c) Yen would appreciate your outlining for him our thinking on military and political strategy in Vietnam. In doing so you might thank Yen for the assistance his Government has rendered Vietnam's economy and for the cooperation the Chinese have extended us in the use of airbase facilities in Taiwan.

d) Yen will want to give you his Government's interpretation of recent internal developments in mainland China (he may bring you a letter from President Chiang touching on the subject).

The Chinese will be looking for tangible evidence of our continuing interest and support, and Yen may suggest that we assist the Republic of China to undertake new regional programs. You might tell Yen that we are confident that the Asian and Pacific Council and the Asian Development Bank will make major contributions to prosperity in Asia. It would be appropriate to tell Yen that we look forward to cooperation with his Government in the War on Hunger through the furnishing of P.L.-480 commodities to finance expansion of Vanguard--the Chinese agricultural assistance program.

You might also tell Yen of your hope that Dr. Hornig's visit to Taiwan will lead to useful results in promoting further scientific and intellectual development in the Republic of China.

I am enclosing additional points which Yen may raise, with suggested replies.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Paper on additional points

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SANTIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-87

By cb, NARA Date 1-21-01

ADDITIONAL POINTS WHICH VICE PRESIDENT YEN MAY RAISE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

U.S. Statement Opposing Admission of Communist China to the U.N.

Anticipated Chinese Position:

A strong U.S. statement at a high level opposing the seating of Communist China in the U.N. would be the best way of assuring continued support for our common position on Chinese representation.

Suggested Reply

A high-level public statement at this time by the United States opposing seating Communist China could limit our tactical flexibility and might hamper our efforts to defeat the Albanian resolution. We would be prepared to say something along this line: so long as the Chinese Communists follow their present course, it is extremely difficult to see how their entry into the United Nations could be justified.

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EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958
3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

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-2-

U.S. Assistance for a Regional Scientific Institute in Taiwan

Anticipated Chinese Position:

Only 5%-10% of Chinese who go to the United States for study return to Taiwan. The Republic of China would welcome United States assistance in founding a scientific institute which could serve a regional function in East Asia while providing opportunities which would attract some Chinese scientists back to Taiwan.

Suggested Reply

Until the character and potential role of the proposed institute has been more fully explored, it would not be possible to say in what ways, if at all, the United States might assist financially in its establishment. Dr. Hornig would be happy to look into the feasibility of the proposal when he visits Taiwan.

Need for More Military Assistance

Anticipated Chinese Position:

Levels of U.S. military assistance have been declining while the Chinese Communist threat, including an incipient nuclear capability, has been increasing.

Suggested Reply

Total appropriations for military assistance have declined in recent years. While levels of U.S. military assistance may change, we stand squarely behind the commitments in our Mutual Defense Treaty and intend to continue to furnish military aid needed for defense by the Republic of China.

U.S. Recognition of Mongolia

Anticipated Chinese Position:

Yen may be under instructions to urge that the United States not recognize Mongolia. He may say that this is a

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-3-

question of China's territorial integrity and that U.S. recognition of Mongolia would undermine his Government's basic position.

Suggested Reply

The United States has the question of recognition of Mongolia under review, but has not made a final decision. Recognition of Mongolia might have important advantages,

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

Procurement for Vietnam

Anticipated Chinese Position:

The Republic of China has been excluded from iron and steel procurement under the Commercial Import Program for Vietnam. Exclusion from procurement of additional items could affect Taiwan's economy adversely.

Suggested Reply

Restriction of procurement of certain items to U.S. suppliers is designed to assist our balance of payments. We will not discriminate against the Republic of China, which should continue to benefit substantially from procurement for Vietnam.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - May 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Summit Follow-up: Dominican Republic and Trinidad

Tony Solomon has followed up on assignments you gave him stemming from your bilateral talks with President Balaguer and Prime Minister Williams.

This is what he reports:

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-2-

begun. A major sticking point is that Trinidad wants TWA to buy into the company but still retain control over the management of the airline. TWA is not interested in such an arrangement.

Another important aspect is to get the other former British West Indies governments to make BWIA a regional carrier. It was designed to be this before the British effort to establish a British West Indies Federation in the Caribbean collapsed.

Tony notes that it will take some time to sort out this complicated problem. In the meantime, Trinidad and TWA are talking.

W. W. Rostow

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1967 MAY 8

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67413

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-446

By up, NARA, Date 2-3-92~~SECRET~~ NOBIS

HERewith PROPOSED TEXT OF BUNKER ANNOUNCEMENT FOR YOUR
CLEARANCE:
QUOTE

1. FURTHER TO MY SAIGON 25028, I PROPOSED TO ISSUE
THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PACIFICATION SHIFT AT A
PRESS CONFERENCE ON WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY AFTERNOON:
BEGIN QUOTE: SINCE BEING APPOINTED U.S. AMBASSADOR
TO VIET-NAM I HAVE GIVEN A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO HOW TO
ORGANIZE MOST EFFECTIVELY THE U.S. ADVISORY ROLE IN SUPPORT
OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT'S REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
EFFORT. LIKE MY PREDECESSOR, I REGARD REVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENT--OFTEN TERMED PACIFICATION--AS CLOSE TO THE
HEART OF THE MATTER IN VIET-NAM.

SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT HAS SEEMED TO
ME AND MY SENIOR COLLEAGUES TO BE NEITHER EXCLUSIVELY A
CIVILIAN NOR EXCLUSIVELY A MILITARY FUNCTION, BUT TO BE
ESSENTIALLY CIVIL/MILITARY IN CHARACTER. IT INVOLVES BOTH THE
PROVISION OF CONTINUOUS LOCAL SECURITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE--
NECESSARILY A PRIMARILY MILITARY TASK AND THE CONSTRUCTIVE
PROGRAMS CONDUCTED BY THE MINISTRY OF REVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENT, LARGELY THROUGH ITS 59-MEMBER RD TEAMS.
THE GOVERNMENT OF VIET-NAM HAS RECOGNIZED THE DUAL CIVIL/
MILITARY NATURE OF THE RD PROCESS BY ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY
FOR ITS EXECUTION TO THE CORPS/REGION COMMANDERS AND BY
DECIDING TO ASSIGN THE BULK OF THE REGULAR ARVN, AS WELL AS
THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES, TO PROVIDE THE INDISPENSABLE
SECURITY SO THAT RD CAN PROCEED IN THE COUNTRYSIDE.
AS SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL IN VIET-NAM, I HAVE CON-
CLUDED THAT THE U.S. ADVISORY AND SUPPORTING ROLE IN
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CAN BE MADE MORE EFFECTIVE BY
UNIFYING ITS CIVIL AND MILITARY ASPECTS UNDER A SINGLE MANAGE-
MENT CONCEPT. UNIFIED MANAGEMENT, A SINGLE CHAIN OF COMMAND,
AND A MORE CLOSELY DOVETAILED ADVISORY EFFORT WILL IN MY
OPINION GREATLY IMPROVE U.S. SUPPORT OF THE VITAL RD PROGRAM.
THEREFORE, I AM GIVING GENERAL WESTMORELAND THE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF OUR U.S. MISSION FIELD

PROGRAMS IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION OR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT. TO ASSIST HIM IN PERFORMING THIS FUNCTION, I AM ASSIGNING MR. ROBERT KOMER TO HIS HEADQUARTERS TO BE DESIGNATED AS A DEPUTY TO COMUSMACV WITH PERSONAL RANK OF AMBASSADOR.

I HAVE TWO BASIC REASONS FOR GIVING THIS RESPONSIBILITY TO GENERAL WESTMORELAND. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE INDISPENSABLE FIRST STAGE OF PACIFICATION IS PROVIDING CONTINUOUS LOCAL SECURITY, A FUNCTION PRIMARILY OF RVNAF, IN WHICH MACV PERFORMS A SUPPORTING ADVISORY ROLE. IN THE SECOND PLACE, THE GREATER PART OF THE U.S. ADVISORY AND LOGISTIC ASSETS INVOLVED IN SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT BELONG TO MACV. IF UNIFIED MANAGEMENT OF U.S. MISSION ASSETS IN SUPPORT OF THE VIETNAMESE PROGRAM IS DESIRABLE, COMUSMACV IS THE LOGICAL CHOICE.

I HAVE DIRECTED THAT A SINGLE CHAIN OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADVICE AND SUPPORT OF THE VIETNAMESE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM BE INSTITUTED FROM SAIGON DOWN TO DISTRICT LEVEL. JUST AS MR. KOMER WILL SUPERVISE THE U.S. ADVISORY ROLE AT THE SAIGON LEVEL AS DEPUTY TO GENERAL WESTMORELAND, SO WILL THE PRESENT OCO REGIONAL DIRECTORS SERVE AS DEPUTIES TO U.S. FIELD FORCE COMMANDERS.

AT THE PROVINCE LEVEL, A SENIOR ADVISOR WILL BE DESIGNATED, EITHER CIVILIAN OR MILITARY, FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF THE LOCAL SITUATION.

WHILE MANAGEMENT WILL THUS BE UNIFIED, THE INTEGRITY OF THE OFFICE OF CIVIL OPERATIONS WILL BE PRESERVED. IT WILL CONTINUE TO PERFORM THE SAME FUNCTIONS AS BEFORE, AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE DIRECT COMMUNICATION ON TECHNICAL MATTERS WITH ITS FIELD ECHELONS. THE PRESENT REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT DIVISION OF MACV WILL BE INTEGRATED INTO OCO, AND ITS CHIEF WILL SERVE AS DEPUTY TO THE DIRECTOR OF OCO. SUCH A UNIFIED CIVIL/MILITARY U.S. ADVISORY EFFORT IN THE VITAL FIELD OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IS UNPRECEDENTED. BUT SO TOO IS THE SITUATION WHICH WE CONFRONT. RD IS IN MY VIEW NEITHER CIVIL NOR MILITARY BUT A UNIQUE MERGING OF BOTH TO MEET A UNIQUE WARTIME NEED. THUS MY RESOLUTION IS TO HAVE U.S. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS WORK TOGETHER AS ONE TEAM IN ORDER MORE EFFECTIVELY TO SUPPORT OUR VIETNAMESE ALLIES. MANY FURTHER DETAILS WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT, AND VARIOUS DIFFICULTIES WILL DOUBTLESS BE ENCOUNTERED, BUT I AM CONFIDENT THAT THIS REALIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES IS A SOUND MANAGEMENT STEP AND I COUNT ON ALL U.S. OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS CONCERNED TO MAKE IT WORK EFFECTIVELY IN PRACTICE. END QUOTE.

2. BESIDES THE ABOVE ANNOUNCEMENT, I INTEND TO STRESS THE FOLLOWING BASIC POINTS IN ANSWER TO PRESS QUESTIONS OR IN BACKGROUNDING: (A) I MADE THIS DECISION NOT BECAUSE I THINK THAT U.S. CIVILIAN SUPPORT OF RD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY-- ON THE CONTRARY I AM PLEASED WITH PROGRESS TO DATE--BUT BECAUSE I THINK IT IS ESSENTIAL TO BRING THE US MILITARY MORE FULLY INTO THE RD ADVISORY EFFORT AND TO POOL OUR CIVIL/MILITARY

RESOURCES TO GET OPTIMUM RESULTS; (B) INDEED I REGARD ALL OFFICIAL AMERICANS IN VIET-NAM AS PART OF ONE TEAM, NOT AS PART OF COMPETING CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS; (C) AS SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL IN VIET-NAM, I INTEND TO KEEP A CLOSE EYE ON ALL U.S. ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING PACIFICATION--I AM NOT ABDICATING ANY OF MY RESPONSIBILITIES BUT RATHER AM HAVING THE ENTIRE U.S. PACIFICATION ADVISORY EFFORT REPORT TO ME THROUGH GENERAL WESTMORELAND RATHER THAN THROUGH TWO CHANNELS AS IN THE PAST; (D) DURING 34 YEARS IN THE BUSINESS WORLD I HAVE LEARNED THAT UNIFIED MANAGEMENT WITH CLEAR LINES OF AUTHORITY IS THE WAY TO GET THE MOST OUT OF LARGE SCALE AND HIGHLY DIVERSIFIED PROGRAMS; (E) SINCE CONTINUOUS LOCAL SECURITY, WHICH RVNAF MUST PRIMARILY PROVIDE, IS THE INDISPENSABLE FIRST STAGE OF THE PACIFICATION PROCESS, THE MACV CHAIN OF COMMAND CAN OBVIOUSLY BE HELPFUL TO THE RVNAF; AND (F) I INTEND TO SEE THAT THE CIVILIAN ELEMENT OF THE U.S. EFFORT IS NOT BURIED UNDER THE MILITARY--IN MANY INSTANCES SOLDIERS WILL END UP WORKING FOR CIVILIANS AS WELL AS THE REVERSE--IN FACT AMBASSADOR KOMER WILL BE GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT FOR THIS FUNCTION WHILE GENERAL KNOBLTON WILL BE DEPUTY TO MR. LATHRAM OF OCO. I INTEND TO KEEP FULLY INFORMED PERSONALLY ABOUT ALL DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS FIELD AND TO HOLD FREQUENT MEETINGS WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND AMBASSADOR KOMER FOR THE PURPOSE OF FORMULATING POLICY.

3. WE WILL FURTHER DEVELOP SOME OF THESE POINTS ON BACKGROUND, AS NEEDED, AND MAKE CLEAR THAT MANY OF THE OPERATING DETAILS WILL BE WORKED OUT LATER. I ASSUME THAT WASHINGTON WILL ALSO BACKGROUND AS NEEDED ALONG THE ABOVE LINES.

4. IF THERE ARE ANY OTHER POINTS YOU WISH ME TO INCLUDE, PLEASE ADVISE BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. BUNKER

UNQUOTE

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00 WTE 10
DE WTE 925

FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67411

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-452

By *inf*, NARA, Date 3-17-93

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

MAY 8, 1967

HEREWITH AMB. BUNKER'S SCENARIO FOR A LOW-KEY ANNOUNCEMENT
ON WEDNESDAY (OUR TIME) OF THE REORGANIZATION OF PACIFICATION
AND BOB KOMER'S ROLE.

(QUOTE SAIGON 25028, ATTACHED)

1. AFTER DISCUSSION WITH WESTMORELAND AND KOMER AS
REQUESTED DEPTTEL 184979, I AM PREPARED PROCEED SOONEST
ON BASIS LAID OUT IN DRAFT PLAN WHICH I UNDERSTAND CONCURRED
IN BY YOU.
2. HENCE I PLAN ASSIGN KOMER TO WESTMORELAND AS HIS DEPUTY
FOR PACIFICATION, WITH PERSONAL RANK OF AMBASSADOR, TO SUPER-
VISE BOTH THE CIVIL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR
PACIFICATION (RD).
3. I FURTHER PLAN TO PUT THE OFFICE OF CIVIL OPERATIONS AS A
UNIT UNDER MACV. OCO AS AN ENTITY WILL RETAIN, AT LEAST IN
THE INITIAL PHASE, ITS FULL INTEGRITY. THE PRESENT REVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT DIVISION OF MACV WILL BE INTEGRATED WITHIN
OCO, AND ITS CHIEF, B.G. KNOWLTON, WILL BECOME DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF OCO.
4. THE THIRD STEP I PLAN TO INSTITUTE IS A SINGLE U.S. CHAIN
OF COMMAND ON PACIFICATION MATTERS FROM SAIGON TO CORPS
TO THE PROVINCE/SECTOR ADVISORS. JUST AS KOMER WILL BE
WESTMORELAND'S DEPUTY, THE CIVILIAN REGIONAL DIRECTORS WILL
BECOME DEPUTIES TO THE U.S. FIELD FORCE COMMANDERS/CORPS
SENIOR ADVISORS. AT PROVINCE/SECTOR LEVEL HE WILL CHOOSE
THE BEST QUALIFIED MAN -- CIVILIAN OR MILITARY -- TO BE SENIOR
PACIFICATION ADVISOR.
5. TO AVOID FURTHER SPECULATION ABOUT THE RESPECTIVE ROLES
OF THE NEW TEAM, I PROPOSE TO ANNOUNCE THE CHANGES IN LOW
KEY NO LATER THAN NEXT WEDNESDAY (THURSDAY). THE DEVICE I PLAN
TO USE IS TO HAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE AT WHICH I WILL ALSO ANNOUNCE
A NUMBER OF OTHER PERSONNEL MATTERS SUCH AS WEHRLE'S REPLACE-
MENT BY COOPER, AND THAT ZORTHIAN AND LANSDALE STAYING ON FOR
THE TIME BEING, MY PROPOSED STATEMENT, AND THE RATIONALE I
INTEND TO USE IN EXPLAINING THE SHIFT IN PACIFICATION RESPONSIBILITY.
WILL FOLLOW IN SEPTEL.
6. I WILL NOTIFY KY AND THIEU OF THE CHANGES, BUT ON THE SAME
DAY AS THEY ARE LATER ANNOUNCED IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE THE
RISK OF LEAK. MY ANNOUNCEMENT WILL OF COURSE HIGHLIGHT
THE GVN'S PRIMARY ROLE IN PACIFICATION. BUNKER

DTG 081527Z MAY 1967

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

5/8/67
12:00 PM - Jim Jones telephoned
to say President said
"low key announcement for
Wednesday okay by me."
102
9 PM 12:00
ZUOAY LN