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 DE WTE 901

FROM WALT ROSTOW
 TO THE PRESIDENT
 CITE CAP67398

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~-LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

MAY 6, 1967

HEREWITH BUS WHEELER'S RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ARISING
 FROM MAC BUNDY'S LETTER.

*Info A+B
 not sent*

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: THE TARGET SYSTEM IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. THIS MEMORANDUM RESPONDS TO A REQUEST BY SECRETARY
 MCNAMARA THAT I PROVIDE YOU WITH ANSWERS TO TWO QUESTIONS:

A. WHAT MILITARY BENEFITS HAVE DERIVED FROM OUR AIR
 STRIKES AGAINST HAIPHONG THERMAL POWER PLANT EAST AND HAIPHONG
 THERMAL POWER PLANT WEST; AND

B. WHAT ADDITIONAL MILITARY BENEFITS WOULD BE DERIVED
 BY DESTROYING THE HANOI THERMAL POWER PLANT?

SECRETARY MCNAMARA PROVIDED ME WITH A COPY OF THE
 MEMORANDUM (ATTACHED HERETO AT TAB B) WHICH CAUSED YOU TO
 POSE THE ABOVE QUESTIONS. WHILE I WILL NOT REPLY TO ALL OF
 THE POINTS RAISED IN THAT MEMORANDUM, I THINK IT NECESSARY
 TO ADDRESS CERTAIN ISSUES IN ORDER TO PLACE MY ANSWERS TO
 THE TWO QUESTIONS IN A PROPER AND SOMEWHAT BROADER CONTEXT.

2. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE STATEMENT IN THE MEMORANDUM
 AS TO THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE BOMBING IS TOO NARROW; IT IS
 SET FORTH THAT THE JUSTIFICATION WAS TWO-FOLD:

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 85-167

By JDW/ip, NARA, Date 9-29-92

"...ITS VALUE FOR SOUTHERN MORALE AT A MOMENT OF GREAT DANGER, AND ITS RELATION TO NORTHERN INFILTRATION."

THERE WAS A THIRD IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE STATED AT THE TIME, AND ADHERED TO SINCE BY ALL ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN, OF CAUSING NORTH VIETNAM TO PAY A PRICE FOR ITS CONTINUED AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM. IMPLICIT IN THIS THIRD OBJECTIVE IS MILITARY PRESSURE AGAINST THE POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC FABRIC OF NORTH VIETNAM. THE MEMORANDUM STATES CORRECTLY THAT NONE OF US EXPECTED OUR AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM, OF ITSELF, WOULD CAUSE THE HANOI LEADERSHIP TO CHANGE ITS POLICY AND GO TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, I BELIEVE THAT THE OBJECTIVES WE SET OURSELVES WERE VALID AT THE TIME AND ARE VALID NOW.

3. AS YOU KNOW, THE OBJECTIVE OF OUR AIR ATTACKS ON THE THERMAL ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM IN NORTH VIETNAM WAS NOT, AS STATED IN THE MEMORANDUM, TO TURN THE LIGHTS OFF IN MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS, BUT WAS DESIGNED TO DEPRIVE THE ENEMY OF A BASIC POWER SOURCE NEEDED TO OPERATE CERTAIN WAR SUPPORTING FACILITIES AND INDUSTRIES. YOU WILL RECALL THAT NINE THERMAL POWER PLANTS WERE TIED TOGETHER, PRINCIPALLY THROUGH THE HANOI TRANSFORMER STATION, IN AN ELECTRIC POWER GRID IN THE INDUSTRIAL AND POPULATION COMPLEX IN NORTHEASTERN NORTH VIETNAM (SEE TAB A). THESE NINE THERMAL POWER PLANTS PROVIDED ELECTRIC POWER NEEDED TO OPERATE A CEMENT PLANT, A STEEL PLANT, A CHEMICAL PLANT, A FERTILIZER PLANT, A MACHINE TOOL PLANT, AN EXPLOSIVES PLANT, A TEXTILE PLANT, THE PORTS OF HAIPHONG AND HON GAI, MAJOR MILITARY INSTALLATIONS SUCH AS AIRFIELDS, ETC. THE POWER GRID REFERRED TO ABOVE TIED IN THE NINE INDIVIDUAL THERMAL ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS AND PERMITTED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO SWITCH KILOWATTAGE AS REQUIRED AMONG THE SEVERAL CONSUMERS. ALL OF THE FACTORIES AND FACILITIES LISTED ABOVE CONTRIBUTE IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER AND IN VARYING DEGREES TO THE WAR EFFORT IN NORTH VIETNAM. FOR EXAMPLE, THE STEEL PLANT FABRICATED POL TANKS TO SUPPLEMENT OR REPLACE FIXED POL STORAGE, METAL PONTOONS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF FLOATING BRIDGES, METAL BARGES TO AUGMENT INFILTRATION CAPACITY, ETC.; THE CEMENT PLANT PRODUCED SOME 600,000 METRIC TONS OF CEMENT ANNUALLY WHICH HAS BEEN USED IN THE REHABILITATION OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

4. THE SPECIFIC MILITARY BENEFITS DERIVED FROM THE AIR ATTACKS ON HAIPHONG THERMAL POWER PLANT EAST AND HAIPHONG THERMAL POWER PLANT WEST ARE THESE:

THE TWO POWER PLANTS IN HAIPHONG HAD A TOTAL CAPACITY OF 17,000 KILOWATTS, SOME 9 PERCENT OF THE PRE-STRIKE NATIONAL ELECTRIC POWER CAPACITY. BETWEEN THEM THEY SUPPLIED POWER FOR THE CEMENT PLANT, A CHEMICAL PLANT, KIEN AN AIRFIELD, CAT BI AIRFIELD, THE NAVAL BASE AND REPAIR FACILITIES, THE HAIPHONG SHIPYARD REPAIR FACILITIES AND THE ELECTRIC POWER GENERATED BY THESE TWO PLANTS COULD BE DIVERTED THROUGH THE ELECTRIC GRID, MENTIONED ABOVE, TO OTHER METROPOLITAN AND INDUSTRIAL AREAS THROUGH THE HANOI TRANSFORMER STATION. ALL OF THE AFOREMENTIONED INDUSTRIAL, REPAIR, AIRBASE, AND PORT FACILITIES CONTRIBUTE TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WAR EFFORT AND, IN THEIR TOTALITY, THIS SUPPORT IS SUBSTANTIAL.

5. THE ADDITIONAL MILITARY BENEFITS EXPECTED TO DERIVE FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HANOI THERMAL POWER PLANT ARE THESE:

THE HANOI THERMAL POWER PLANT HAS A 32,500 KILOWATT CAPACITY COMPRISING 17 PER CENT OF THE PRE-STRIKE ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTION. MAJOR FACILITIES WHICH WOULD BE AFFECTED BY ITS DESTRUCTION ARE THE HANOI PORT FACILITY, THE HANOI SUPPLY DEPOT, A MACHINE TOOL PLANT, A RUBBER PLANT, A LEAD DEPOT, AN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SITE, AN INTERNATIONAL RADIO TRANSMITTER RECEIVER SITE, THE BAC MAI AIRFIELD, AND THE NATIONAL MILITARY DEFENSE COMMAND CENTER. ALL OF THESE FACILITIES CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WAR EFFORT. IN ADDITION, IT SHOULD BE NOTED A 35-KILOVOLT DIRECT TRANSMISSION LINE RUNS FROM THE HANOI THERMAL POWER PLANT TO HAIPHONG AND NAM DINH. WE BELIEVE THAT, SINCE THE TWO HAIPHONG THERMAL POWER PLANTS WERE DAMAGED, THE HANOI THERMAL POWER PLANT HAS BEEN SUPPLYING 3,000 KILOWATTS OF POWER TO HAIPHONG OVER THIS DIRECT TRANSMISSION LINE; THIS QUANTITY IS SUFFICIENT TO MEET ABOUT 10 PER CENT OF HAIPHONG'S ELECTRIC POWER REQUIREMENTS.

6. I CONSIDER THAT THE SUM OF THE BENEFITS LISTED IN THE TWO FOREGOING PARAGRAPHS SUPPORTS THE THESIS WE HAVE DERIVED DIRECT MILITARY BENEFITS FROM THE ATTACKS ON THE TWO HAIPHONG THERMAL POWER PLANTS AND WILL DERIVE ADDITIONAL MILITARY BENEFITS FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HANOI THERMAL POWER PLANT. MOREOVER, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HANOI AND HAIPHONG THERMAL POWER PLANTS IS CLEARLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR STATED POLICY OF APPLYING MILITARY PRESSURE AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM.

7. HOWEVER, I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO GO A STEP BEYOND ANSWERING THE QUESTIONS YOU POSED AND TO POINT OUT A MAJOR INCONSISTENCY IN LOGIC WITHIN THE MEMORANDUM AT TAB B. IN THE PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH THE MEMORANDUM STATES,

"TACTICAL BOMBING OF COMMUNICATIONS AND OF TROOP CONCENTRATIONS -- AND OF AIRFIELDS AS NECESSARY-- SEEMS TO ME SENSIBLE AND PRACTICAL."

YET THE AUTHOR IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE SAME PARAGRAPH STATES,

"...I THINK IT CLEAR THAT THE CASE AGAINST GOING AFTER HAIPHONG HARBOR IS SO STRONG THAT A MAJORITY WOULD BACK THE GOVERNMENT IN REJECTING THAT COURSE."

AS A MATTER OF COLD FACT, THE HAIPHONG PORT IS THE SINGLE MOST VULNERABLE AND IMPORTANT POINT IN THE LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM OF NORTH VIETNAM. DURING THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1967 GENERAL CARGO DELIVERIES THROUGH HAIPHONG HAVE SET NEW RECORDS. IN MARCH 142,700 METRIC TONS OF CARGO PASSED THROUGH THE PORT; DURING THE MONTH OF APRIL THERE WAS A SLIGHT DECLINE TO 132,000 METRIC TONS. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT IN APRIL 31,900 METRIC TONS OF BULK FOODSTUFFS PASSED THROUGH THE PORT BRINGING THE TOTAL OF FOODSTUFFS DELIVERED IN THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF 1967 TO 100,680 METRIC TONS AS COMPARED TO 77,100 METRIC TONS OF FOOD RECEIVED DURING ALL OF CALENDAR 1966. THESE TONNAGES UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PORT OF HAIPHONG TO THE WAR EFFORT OF NORTH VIETNAM AND SUPPORT MY STATEMENT THAT HAIPHONG IS THE MOST IMPORTANT POINT IN THE ENTIRE NORTH VIETNAMESE LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM. UNLESS AND UNTIL WE FIND SOME MEANS OF OBSTRUCTING AND REDUCING THE FLOW OF WAR SUPPORTING MATERIAL THROUGH HAIPHONG, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL CONTINUE TO BE ABLE TO SUPPORT THEIR WAR EFFORT BOTH IN NORTH VIETNAM AND IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

WITH GREAT RESPECT,

S/T EARLE G. WHEELER
CHAIRMAN
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DTG: 06/1612Z MAY 1967

GFS 1480 IMI 1480

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

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~~SECRET NODIS EYES ONLY~~

1967 MAY 7 20 07

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-452

By ing, NARA, Date 3-12-93

EEA012
00 WTE 10
DE WTE 918

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67407

167 MAY 7 PM 4:23

SUNDAY

~~SECRET NODIS (LITERALLY) EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT~~

YOU WILL BE INTERESTED IN THE FOLLOWING NODIS FROM SAIGON WHICH DESCRIBES THE LATEST ON THE POLITICAL FRONT. WE WILL UNDERLINE AGAIN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MILITARY STAYING TOGETHER.

O 071320Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 24952

NODIS

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2. THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN ANOTHER MEETING AMONG A NUMBER OF TOP GENERALS ON FRIDAY, MAY 5, AT WHICH IT WAS DECIDED THAT GENERAL THANG SHOULD ASK GENERAL THIEU TO AGREE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE. THANG SAW THIEU AND THE LATTER REFUSED SIMPLY TO WITHDRAW AND SAID HE WOULD MAKE HIS FINAL DECISION AT SOME TIME CLOSER TO THE DEADLINE PROVIDED FOR THE FINAL SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, I.E. EARLY JULY. THERE HAD BEEN EARLIER REPORTS FROM GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN THAT THE CANDIDACY QUESTION WAS NOT APPROACHING RESOLUTION AND THAT TENSIONS WERE RISING AMONG THE TOP MILITARY LEADERS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES AND DESTROY MILITARY UNITY BEYOND REPAIR.

PRESERVATION COPY

3. FOLLOWING THE THIEU-THANG MEETING THE LATTER FLEW TO DA NANG ON MAY 6 TO JOIN NUMBER OF OTHER GENERALS (PRESUMABLY INCLUDING THOSE PRESENT ON MAY 5) AND TO REPORT ON HIS TALK. FROM OUR INFORMATION AT LEAST THE FOLLOWING GENERALS WERE PRESENT AT THE DA NANG MEETING: KY, THANG, TRI, BOTH VIENS (C/S AND SECURITY), LAM (I CORPS) AND VINH LOC (II CORPS). AFTER LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION A DECISION WAS REACHED TO ANNOUNCE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MILITARY CANDIDATE AS SUCH FOR THE PRESIDENCY AND THE MILITARY WOULD ESCHEW PARTICIPATION IN THE PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS AS A UNIFIED BLOC BEHIND A CANDIDATE OR CANDIDATES. EACH MILITARY MAN WOULD VOTE AS HE SAW FIT AND THE MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE WOULD NOT BE EMPLOYED FOR DIRECT POLITICAL PURPOSES. C/S VIEN WAS REPORTEDLY CHARGED WITH FORMULATING AND ANNOUNCING THIS DECISION.

4. AT THE SAME MEETING. WITH THIS DECISION IN HAND AND WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THIEU'S REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW FROM THE RACE PRIME MINISTER KY MADE KNOWN HIS INTENTION TO PRESENT HIMSELF AS CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT AND TO ANNOUNCE HIS CANDIDACY PROMPTLY.

5. AT MY REQUEST GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAD A LENGTHY CONVERSATION SUNDAY MORNING, MAY 7, WITH GENERAL THIEU. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION OF HIS TRIP TO THE US AND OF THE IMPORTANT TASKS THAT LAY AHEAD, GENERAL WESTMORELAND SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY THE VITAL IMPORTANCE PLACED BY AMERICAN OPINION IN THE CONTINUATION OF THE POLITICAL PROGRESS ALREADY ACHIEVED AND OF THE STABILITY THAT VIETNAM HAD EXPERIENCED FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS. HE ADDED THAT A SECOND VITAL NEED IN THE FUTURE, FROM BOTH AN AMERICAN AND VIETNAMESE VIEWPOINT, WAS THE TRAINING AND DIRECTION OF THE ARVN TO CARRY ON THE MANY MAJOR TASKS THAT IT MUST SUCCESSFULLY EXECUTE IN PROVIDING SECURITY AND CONTINUING PROGRESS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT FIELD. WESTMORELAND SAID VIETNAM NEEDED ITS BEST MILITARY LEADER AT THE HEAD OF THE ARVN FOR THESE PURPOSES AND ADDED THAT IN HIS OPINION THIEU WAS THE MAN. THIEU SAID HE AGREED.

6. THIEU THEN ELABORATED AT SOME LENGTH ON HOW HE SAW THINGS DURING THE CRITICAL MONTHS AHEAD. HE CONSIDERED NATIONAL UNITY AND COMMON PURPOSE AS THE PRIMARY REQUIREMENTS AND HE THOUGHT REGIONAL DIFFERENCES SHOULD BE PUT INTO THE BACKGROUND. HE BELIEVED THAT TO MEET THESE PURPOSES A CIVILIAN PRESIDENT PROBABLY WAS NEEDED. HE BELIEVED TRAN VAN HUONG WAS THE STRONGEST CANDIDATE AND THE ONE WHO COULD BEST PULL THE COUNTRY TOGETHER, SINCE HE WAS A SOUTHERNER AND A RESPECTED LEADER. THIEU DID NOT DISCUSS HIS OWN ROLE SPECIFICALLY BEYOND HIS EARLIER AGREEMENT THAT HE WAS THE GENERAL BEST QUALIFIED TO LEAD THE ARMED FORCES.

7. COMMENT: IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP HAD BEEN UNABLE TO FIND A WAY TO BREAK THE IMPASSE BETWEEN KY AND THIEU EXCEPT BY TRYING TO GET THIEU TO WITHDRAW. THEY FEARED THAT FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE MATTER WOULD LEAD TO EVEN MORE BITTER RIVALRY AND MIGHT RAPIDLY UNDERMINE MILITARY UNITY AND MORALE FATALLY. FACED WITH THIEU'S REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW AND KY'S OBVIOUS INTENTION TO RUN, A DECISION THAT THE MILITARY FORCES SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE AS A UNIFIED BLOC IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS AHEAD SEEMED THE BEST WAY OUT. IT PROVIDED A FACE-SAVING FORMULA FOR THIEU NOT TO HAVE TO TAKE A PUBLIC DECISION AT THIS TIME AND FOR KY TO ANNOUNCE HIS CANDIDACY. ON THE PART OF CERTAIN OF THE GENERALS IT NO DOUBT REPRESENTED A GENUINE DESIRE TO KEEP THE ARMY FREE FROM THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND FREE TO PURSUE ITS OWN IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES.

8. THE ACTUAL EFFECT OF THIS PAPERING-OVER PROCESS REMAINS TO BE SEEN. IT MAY ONLY PUT OFF THE DAY WHEN THE POLITICAL RIVALRY BETWEEN THIEU AND KY WILL HAVE TO BE FACED AND WHEN THE UNITY OF THE ARMED FORCES MAY AGAIN BE SUBJECTED TO SEVERE STRAIN. FOR EXAMPLE, IF KY MOUNTS AN EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN, AS HE IS ALREADY DOING, AND ALLIES HIMSELF WITH SOME POWERFUL CIVILIAN SUPPORT, THIEU MAY THEN DECIDE THAT HE SHOULD ALIGN HIMSELF WITH A CIVILIAN CANDIDATE OR EVEN DECLARE HIMSELF AS A CANDIDATE. IN EITHER CASE THE MILITARY WILL BE FACED WITH A CHOICE AND MAY BE DIVIDED INTO COMPETING FACTIONS ONCE AGAIN.

9. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF GENERAL VIEN CAN EFFECTIVELY PREVENT THE MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE FROM BECOMING DEEPLY ENGAGED IN THE ELECTION PROCESS AND IF THE PROVINCE CHIEF-DISTRICT CHIEF MILITARY HIERARCHY CAN BE POLITICALLY STERILIZED IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, THEN IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE MILITARY FROM BECOMING DIRECTLY ENGAGED. RECENT VIETNAMESE POLITICAL HISTORY DOES NOT INSPIRE MUCH CONFIDENCE THAT SUCH A POWERFUL POLITICAL ELEMENT AS THE ARMED FORCES CAN BE MADE APOLITICAL AT A TIME WHEN THE BIGGEST PRIZE IS AT STAKE. IF THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT NULLIFYING THE IMPORTANT STABILIZING ROLE WHICH THE MILITARY HAS PLAYED AND MUST CONTINUE TO PLAY, IT WOULD BE A HIGHLY DESIRABLE GOAL. IN ANY CASE THESE MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS SHOULD GIVE US SOME TIME TO SEE HOW THE PICTURE IS MOST LIKELY TO EMERGE AND WHAT ROLE WE SHOULD PLAY IN IT. BUNKER
BT

DTG: 071823Z MAY 67

~~SECRET~~ ~~NO DISSEMINATION~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

22GPS: 1100 IMI 1100

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May 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WATSON

SUBJECT: Yugoslav Ambassador's Farewell Call

Ambassador Veljko Micunovic is returning to Yugoslavia next Friday to become head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Yugoslav Federal Parliament. He has been here since 1962, and is anxious to pay a farewell call on the President any time Monday through Thursday.

Both Protocol and the European Bureau in State urge that a very brief appointment be arranged if at all possible. We have still not solved the bombing of their Embassy and Consulates; we have been obliged by the Findley/Belcher amendments to cut off PL 480 sales; and we are reducing assistance. A farewell call would help us show the Yugoslavs we are not deliberately changing our overall policy toward them.

W. W. Rostow

NDavis:mm

*saw Pres 12:30pm
5/10/67*

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~~SECRET~~ NODIS

ONLY

1967 MAY 7 20 07

Sent 4:07 PM

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EEA012
OO WTE10
DE WTE 918

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67407

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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By 48, NARA, Date 3-17-93

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DTG: 071823Z MAY 67

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~~EYES ONLY~~

&GPS: 1100 IMI 1100

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

107
Saturday, May 6, 1967
3 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith thoughts on the alternatives that face us in Viet Nam. First, a word about our general strategy:

I. U. S. strategy in Viet Nam

We have been seeking to frustrate the effort by the Communists to take over South Viet Nam by defeating their main force units; attacking the guerrilla infrastructure; and building a South Vietnamese governmental and security structure -- rural and urban -- strong enough to stand on its feet as a reputable, independent nation.

To hasten the decision in Hanoi to abandon the aggression, we have been trying to do two other things:

- (i) to limit and harass infiltration; and
- (ii) to impose on the North sufficient military and civil cost to make them decide to get out of the war earlier rather than later.

We have never held the view that bombing could stop infiltration. We have never held the view that bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area alone would lead them to abandon the effort in the South. We have never held the view that bombing Hanoi-Haiphong would directly cut back infiltration. We have held the view that the degree of military and civilian cost felt in the North and the diversion of resources to deal with our bombing could contribute marginally -- and perhaps significantly -- to the timing of a decision to end the war. But it was no substitute for making progress in the South.

II. What we agree upon

At the moment only a limited part of that strategy is subject to debate. We all appear to agree:

-- We must use maximum influence to achieve a smooth transition to constitutional government in South Viet Nam;

-- We must continue to constrict and harass all the lines of infiltration of men and supplies;

-- We must encourage the South Vietnamese to the most forthcoming posture possible towards those fighting with the Viet Cong in the South and look to reconciliation and, ultimately, negotiation among the South Vietnamese to help settle the war.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 81-101

By sgl/ck, NARA, Date 5-21-91

5/6/67

-- We must carry forward pacification at the maximum possible pace, including especially the improvement in the quality of South Vietnamese efforts in this field.

III. Policy decisions in the area where we agree

In this agreed area of policy, our task is to do what we have been doing better and faster than in the past. In effect, this is the assignment we have given the new team of Bunker-Locke-Abrams-Komer.

So far as Washington is concerned, we face:

-- The question of enlarging our own military manpower in Viet Nam and deciding, with the Saigon team, how best it should be disposed;

-- Enlarging the contribution of military manpower from others;

-- Taking a fresh high-level, coordinated look at all our measures to inhibit or harass interdiction, with an eye to making them more efficient; bombing in Route Packages 1 and 2; inhibiting infiltration of manpower in the western part of the DMZ; enlarging and making more efficient our efforts against the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos; doing more about the flow of supplies from Cambodia; improving, if possible, the naval blockade;

-- Pressing Ky to seek to defect high-level Viet Cong figures, and to consider more explicit offers about future political possibilities for those now fighting with the Viet Cong, within the framework of the constitution, both in the rural areas and in national politics.

IV. Policy issues in contention: Choices in bombing the North

Essentially there are three strategies we might pursue in bombing the North. I shall try to assess in each case the advantages and the risks:

A. Closing the top of the funnel

Under this strategy we would mine the major harbors and, perhaps, bomb port facilities and even consider blockade. In addition, we would attack systematically the rail lines between Hanoi and mainland China. At the moment the total import capacity into North Viet Nam is about 17,200 tons per day. Even with expanded import requirements due to the food shortage, imports are, in fact, coming in at about 5700 tons per day. It is possible with a concerted and determined effort that we could cut back import capacity somewhat below the level of requirements; but this is not sure. On the other hand, it would require

5/6/67

a difficult and sustained effort by North Viet Nam and its allies to prevent a reduction in total imports below requirements if we did all these things.

The costs would be these:

-- The Soviet Union would have ^{to} permit a radical increase in Hanoi's dependence upon Communist China, or introduce minesweepers, etc., to keep its supplies coming into Hanoi by sea;

-- The Chinese Communists would probably introduce many more engineering and anti-aircraft forces along the roads and rail lines between Hanoi and China in order to keep the supplies moving;

-- To maintain its prestige, in case it could not or would not open up Hanoi-Haiphong in the face of mines, the Soviet Union might contemplate creating a Berlin crisis. With respect to a Berlin crisis, they would have to weigh the possible split between the U. S. and its Western European allies under this pressure against damage to the atmosphere of detente in Europe which is working in favor of the French Communist Party and providing the Soviet Union with generally enlarged influence in Western Europe.

I myself do not believe that the Soviet Union would go to war with us over Viet Nam unless we sought to occupy North Viet Nam; and, even then, a military response from Moscow would not be certain.

With respect to Communist China, it always has the option of invading Laos and Thailand; but this would not be a rational response to naval and air operations designed to strangle Hanoi. A war throughout Southeast Asia would not help Hanoi; although I do believe Communist China would fight us if we invaded the northern part of North Viet Nam.

One can always take the view that, given the turmoil inside Communist China, an irrational act by Peiping is possible. And such irrationality cannot be ruled out.

I conclude that if we try to close the top of the funnel, tension between ourselves and the Soviet Union and Communist China would increase; if we were very determined, we could impose additional burdens on Hanoi and its allies; we might cut capacity below requirements; and the outcome is less likely to be a general war than more likely.

B. Attacking what is inside the funnel

This is what we have been doing in the Hanoi-Haiphong area for some weeks. I do not agree with the view that the attacks on Hanoi-Haiphong have

5/6/67

no bearing on the war in the South. They divert massive amounts of resources, energies, and attention to keeping the civil and military establishment going. They impose general economic, political, and psychological difficulties on the North which have been complicated this year by a bad harvest and food shortages. I do not believe that they "harden the will of the North." In my judgment, up to this point, our bombing of the North has been a painful additional cost they have thus far been willing to bear to pursue their efforts in the South.

On the other hand:

-- There is no direct, immediate connection between ~~the~~ bombing the Hanoi-Haiphong area and the battle in the South;

-- If we complete the attack on electric power by taking out the Hanoi station -- which constitutes about 80% of the electric power supply of the country now operating -- we will have hit most of the targets whose destruction imposes serious military-civil costs on the North.

-- With respect to risk, it is unclear whether Soviet warnings about our bombing Hanoi-Haiphong represent decisions already taken or decisions which might be taken if we persist in banging away in that area.

It is my judgment that the Soviet reaction will continue to be addressed to the problem imposed on Hanoi by us; that is, they might introduce Soviet pilots as they did in the Korean War; they might bring ground-to-ground missiles into North Viet Nam with the object of attacking our vessels at sea and our airfields in the Danang area.

I do not believe that the continuation of attacks at about the level we have been conducting them in the Hanoi-Haiphong area will lead to pressure on Berlin or a general war with the Soviet Union. In fact, carefully read, what the Soviets have been trying to signal is: Keep away from our ships; we may counter-escalate to some degree; but we do not want a nuclear confrontation over Viet Nam.

C. Concentration in Route Packages 1 and 2

The advantages of concentrating virtually all our attacks in this area are three:

-- We would cut our loss rate in pilots and planes;

-- We would somewhat improve our harassment of infiltration of South Viet Nam;

5/6/67

-- We would diminish the risks of counter-escalatory action by the Soviet Union and Communist China, as compared with courses A and B.

B. Recommendations

I do not recommend at this time course A: closing the top of the funnel. The returns do not, on present evidence, seem high enough to justify the risks of Soviet and Chinese countermeasures and heightened world tensions. On the other hand, I do not believe it would lead to general war; and in this judgment I believe I am supported by the conclusions of the intelligence community.

It is a course of action which, if undertaken, should be pursued with great determination and against a background of highly mobilized U. S. strength so that Moscow and Peiping would be forced to decide whether it wished to take on total U. S. strength or bring about an early end to the war. While, as I say, I would not recommend it, it is a line of policy which deserves the most careful and professional staffing out in the government, perhaps for later application.

With respect to course B, I believe we have achieved greater results in ~~increasing~~ increasing the pressure on Hanoi and raising the cost of their continuing to conduct the aggression in the South than some of my most respected colleagues would agree. I do not believe we should lightly abandon what we have accomplished; and specifically, I believe we should mount the most economical and careful attack on the Hanoi power station our air tacticians can devise. Moreover, I believe we should keep open the option of coming back to the Hanoi-Haiphong area, depending upon what we learn of their repair operations; and what Moscow's and Peiping's reactions are, especially when we understand better ~~what~~ what effects we have and have not achieved thus far.

I believe the Soviet Union may well have taken certain counter-steps addressed to the more effective protection of the Hanoi-Haiphong area and may have decided -- or could shortly decide -- to introduce into North Viet Nam some surface-to-surface missiles.

With respect to option C, I believe we should, while keeping open the B option, concentrate our attacks to the maximum in Route Packages 1 and 2; and, in conducting Hanoi-Haiphong attacks, we should do so only when the targets make sense. I do not expect dramatic results from increasing the weight of attack in Route Packages 1 and 2; but I believe we are wasting a good many pilots in the Hanoi-Haiphong area without commensurate results. The major objectives of maintaining the B option can be achieved at lower cost.

The turn-around in policy can be managed, over a period of some weeks, in the context of Buddha's birthday, etc., fairly easily; but if we get no diplomatic response in that period -- and I do not expect one -- and if we ~~wait~~ ~~side~~

5/6/67

option A (closing the top of the funnel), we shall have to devise a way of presenting our total policy in Viet Nam in a manner which is consistent with diminished attacks in the Hanoi-Haiphong area; which is honest; and which is acceptable to our own people. Surfacing the concept of the barrier may be critical to that turn-around, as will be other measures to tighten infiltration, an improved ARVN effort in pacification, and the provision of additional allied forces to permit Westy to get on with our limited but real role in pacification -- notably, with the defense of I Corps and the hounding of provincial main force units.

Air field attacks are only appropriate to the kind of sustained operations in the Hanoi-Haiphong area associated with option A.

W. W. Rostow

108

Sub 2:56 PM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6 18 56

EEA998
CO WTE10
DE WTE 904

FROM W W ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO LEM JOHNS
CITE CAP67399

67 MAY 6 PM 3:12

SATURDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 6, 1967

BILL BOWDLER TALKED WITH THE COLMBIAN AMBASSADOR AT NOON SATURDAY, MAY 6. HE DESCRIBED THE EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF WHAT TOOK PLACE AT BARRANQUILLA AIRPORT. HE REVIEWED YOUR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS AND THE ASSISTANCE RECEIVED BY COLOMBIA DURING THE PAST THREE YEARS. AND HE RECALLED HOW GOVERNOR CONALLY AND THE PEOPLE OF SAN ANTONIO HAD OPENED UP THEIR DOORS AND HEARTS TO THE LATIN AMERICAN AMBASSADORS DURING THEIR RECENT VISIT TO TEXAS.

AMBASSADOR ECHEVARRIA EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE FACTS ON THE INCIDENT, NOTING WITH SURPRISE THE GROSS DISTORTION BETWEEN WHAT THE PRESS REPORTED AND WHAT ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE. HE DESCRIBED THE STEPS HE HAD TAKEN WITH HIS OWN STAFF TO INSURE AGAINST PREMATURE LEAKS OF HER TRAVEL PLANS. HE SAID ALL THOUGHTFULL PEOPLE KNOW WHAT YOU HAVE DONE FOR THE ALLIANCE AND ABOUT THE WARMTH AND HOSPITALITY OF THE PEOPLE OF TEXAS. HE WAS WILLING TO BET THAT THE EDITOR OF EL TIEMPO WHO SIGNED THE EDITORIAL WAS EDUARDO SANTOS, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS A "COMMUNIST FELLOW-TRAVELER". HE ASKED THAT WE CONVEY TO YOU HIS DEEP REGRET OVER THE INCIDENT AND HOW IT HAD BEEN PLAYED.

DTG 061819Z MAY 67

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By ijg, NARA, Date 3-17-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

1967 MAY 6 14 59

ZEV 1453ZVZCZCEE994
OO WTE10
DE WTE 899

FROM W.W. ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO LEM JOHNS
CITE CAP67396

~~SECRET~~

MAY 6, 1967

SUBJECT: LYNDA BIRD'S TRIP

THERE FOLLOWS THE REPORT ON LYNDA'S ACTIVITIES YESTERDAY.
ALL WENT SMOOTHLY.

A. DEPARTED SS HOPE AT 0930 HOURS AND SPENT TWO HOURS
AT SANTA CLARA HOSPITAL INTERVIEWING PERSONNEL. SHE HELD
BRIEF PRESS CONFERENCE THERE AND SEVERAL PICTURES WERE
TAKEN.

B. FROM SANTA CLARA HOSPITAL SHE WENT TO INQUISITION
PALACE AND THEN WENT TO GIFT SHOP.

C. SHE RETURNED TO SS HOPE FOR LUNCH AND AT 1430 HOURS
SHE LEFT SHIP AND VISITED SAN FELIPE FORTRESS AND LA POPA
MONASTERY.

D. SHE THEN WENT DIRECTLY TO AIRPORT AND DEPARTED
CARTAGENA AT 1730 HOURS. NO REPORTERS WERE AT CARTAGENA
AIRPORT.

E. MISS JOHNSON ARRIVED BOGOTA AIRPORT AT 1940 HOURS
WHERE SHE WAS RECEIVED BY AMBASSADOR AND MRS. CARLSON AND
AMBASSADOR MANRIQUE, CHIEF OF PROTOCOL OF FOREIGN MINISTRY.
MISS JOHNSON POSED FOR SEVERAL PHOTOGRAPHS AND SHE MADE VERY
FAVORABLE IMPRESSION ON LOCAL PRESS. NO INCIDENTS AT AIRPORT.

F. SHE ARRIVED AT EMBASSY RESIDENCE AT 2010 HOURS
WITHOUT INCIDENT. AT RESIDENCE, WHERE SHE WILL SPEND
NIGHT, SHE WAS GREETED BY MRS. GERMAN ZEA, WIFE OF FOREIGN
MINISTER, MRS. MANRIQUE, WIFE OF CHIEF OF PROTOCOL.

~~SECRET~~

DTG 061423Z MAY 67

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By Ng, NARA, Date 5-7-91

XEROX FROM J-10K COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- NOFORN

TO FOREIGN OFFICE, 11 May 1967, Telno 306

Livesey has been told by Fairly reliable source that in Hanoi non-cadres and lower cadres had received 25 per cent of May rice ration in flour, and 1 litre of kerosene per household per 4 months since 20 March. No-cadres have received 150 grammes of fat monthly since Tet but no meat, and lower cadres (their children under 20 little or no meat. There is once more no petrol at civil supply point but we have small reserve now.

This is not decisively worse than previous crises in Hanoi which is even now better off than the provinces.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-161
By JS4, NARA Date 5-22-00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 6, 1967

1110
not sent - Mr. Lister
told on telephone
to President

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

1. Last evening I got to both Arthur Goldberg and Secretary Rusk, conveying your reserve about Arthur's going to Geneva. They both said they understood. Secretary Rusk said he would talk to Goldberg in the morning.
2. Arthur has just called me back to say that after talking to Secretary Rusk, they recommend that we not, repeat not, call off Arthur's engagement in Geneva. The reasons:
 - It would inflate the whole matter, since after the Thursday lunch Goldberg was given a "go ahead" by Secretary Rusk, informed Hutchins, who released the news in California, which Goldberg's office confirmed in New York.
 - Arthur will not be debating; he will simply be talking at a lunch.
 - He goes on Face The Nation tomorrow, and proposes, in response to questions, to say that this is merely another speaking engagement, and that talk of negotiating with North Vietnamese is nonsense (in fact, he believes that no North Vietnamese will be present).
3. Should an authentic emergency arise which would keep him here, he could, of course, cancel at the last minute on legitimate grounds.
4. Secretary Rusk concurs in the judgment that turning Arthur off at this stage would cause us some pain than getting him in and out of Geneva on this basis.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By 128, NARA, Date 3-17-93

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

May 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WATSON

SUBJECT: Yugoslav Ambassador's Farewell Call

Ambassador Veljko Micunovic is returning to Yugoslavia next Friday to become head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Yugoslav Federal Parliament. He has been here since 1962, and is anxious to pay a farewell call on the President any time Monday through Thursday.

Both Protocol and the European Bureau in State urge that a very brief appointment be arranged if at all possible. We have still not solved the bombing of their Embassy and Consulates; we have been obliged by the Findley/Belcher amendments to cut off PL 480 sales; and we are reducing assistance. A farewell call would help us show the Yugoslavs we are not deliberately changing our overall policy toward them.

W. W. Rostow

NDavis:mm

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

112

*sent to Ranch
via wire*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - May 5, 1967

To: The President
From: W. W. Rostow
Subject: Visit by President Diaz Ordaz

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By 128, NARA, Date 3-17-93

President Diaz Ordaz asks whether it would be convenient for him to make his state visit to Washington on Friday and Saturday, October 27 and 28. He plans to fly to Canada for Expo 67 first (October 25 is Mexican Day at the Fair) and come here on Thursday, October 26, the hour depending on whether he flies directly from Canada or stops off in New York to address the UN General Assembly.

He proposes that on Sunday, October 29, you both go to El Paso for the ceremony transferring the Chamizal tract. Since it is customary for our Latin American friends to hold public ceremonies on Sunday, I am sure President Diaz Ordaz thinks it is quite appropriate to do this on the Sabbath.

If you don't want to do the Chamizal ceremony on Sunday, you have these options:

- have state visit on October 27 and 28 but do Chamizal some other time.
- work out other dates for trip permitting the combination of a Washington visit and the Chamizal.

Should we advise him:

1. Dates he proposes for state visit and Chamizal are satisfactory _____.
2. Dates for Washington visit are okay, but see if Diaz Ordaz would agree to another date for Chamizal ceremony _____.
3. Ask Diaz Ordaz if another date could be found for combining the Washington visit and Chamizal ceremony _____.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - May 5, 1967

*sent via
wire to Ranch*

To: Jim Jones
From: WGBowdler

Pursuant your request I spoke to Hector Garcia. I find that
Congressman Young asked State to prepare similar message.

Suggest President might send following:

"The Chairman
Comite Fiesta Cinco de Mayo
The Coliseum
Corpus Christi, Texas.

Please convey following message to Mexican Presidential
representative Lic. Carlos Gonzalez Parrodi:

'My warmest congratulations to you and
to the people of Mexico whom you repre-
sent on this historic anniversary of the
Battle of Puebla. We appreciate your
presence tonight in Corpus Christi as
the personal representative of President
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz. This occasion is
another tribute to the friendship and mutual
respect which our two peoples share toward
each other.

Lyndon B. Johnson."

Rostow concurs.

Suggest telegram be repeated to Mr. Hector Garcia, 1315 Bright
Street, Corpus Christi to ~~have~~ ^{assure} its delivery.

RE A963
PP WTE10
DE WTE 866

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67373

1967 MAY 5 00 34

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-446

By inf NARA, Date 2-3-92

67 MAY 4 PM 8:50

114
~~SECRET~~
THURSDAY

~~SECRET~~

HERewith STATE DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES REPORT FOR TODAY,
MAY 4, 1967

1. SFRC HEARINGS - WHILE REGRETTING THAT IT WILL NOT BE A PUBLIC SESSION, SENATOR FULBRIGHT HAS WRITTEN THAT THE COMMITTEE WILL HEAR THE SECRETARY IN EXECUTIVE SESSION ON MAY 16.

2. KY AIDE ARRIVES - GENERAL LOAN ARRIVED HERE THIS MORNING ON A TRIP, THE FULL PURPOSES OF WHICH ARE NOT ALTOGETHER CLEAR TO US. HE PROBABLY WILL STAY UNTIL SATURDAY OR SUNDAY AND MAKE BRIEF STOPS IN EUROPE ON HIS WAY HOME. LOAN WILL BE SEEING STATE, CIA, AID AND AIR FORCE OFFICIALS. WE HAVE URGED ALL WASHINGTON AGENCIES TO CONFINE CONTACTS WITH HIM TO THOSE RELATED TO HIS SPECIFIC GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND TO AVOID ANY TREATMENT AS A POLITICAL PERSONALITY. IN CONVERSATIONS THUS FAR TODAY HE WAS URGED BY HELMS AND UNGER TO WORK HARD ON THE DEFECTION OF SIGNIFICANT VC/NLF PERSONALITIES. THE LATTER ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE HERE AND ABROAD OF (1) THE COMING SEPTEMBER ELECTIONS BEING CONDUCTED SCRUPULOUSLY, (2) THE ADOPTION OF A RUN-OFF OR OTHER APPROPRIATE DEVICE TO ASSURE THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT ENJOYS WIDE SUPPORT, AND (3) CLOSE MILITARY-CIVILIAN COOPERATION. IF QUERIED BY THE PRESS WE SHALL REFER QUESTIONS ON HIS TRIP TO THE VIETNAMESE EMBASSY. IF ASKED, WE SHALL ACKNOWLEDGE THAT HE IS SEEING VARIOUS OFFICIALS IN CONNECTION WITH HIS GVN RESPONSIBILITIES. WHILE LOAN HAS MADE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STABILITY OF THE KY GOVERNMENT, HIS IMPULSIVENESS HAS REPRESENTED A CONSTANT HAZARD, PARTICULARLY HIS OVERZEALOUS WORK IN SUPPORT OF KY'S CANDIDACY TO THE DETRIMENT OF THIEU AND CIVILIAN HOPEFULS.

3. FRENCH VIEWS - IN A TALK WITH GENE ROSTOW TODAY MICHEL D'ORNANO, A NEWLY-ELECTED MEMBER OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND A MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL HOPE AND BELIEF THAT THE UK WOULD SUCCEED IN ITS BID TO ENTER THE COMMON MARKET. HE SAID THIS WAS ALSO THE POSITION OF THE 42-MEMBER INDEPENDENT REPUBLICAN GROUP, HEADED BY FORMER FINANCE MINISTER GISCARD D'ESTAING, TO WHICH HE BELONGS.

4. PRESS - WASHINGTON POST REPORTERS HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKING A LONG SURVEY ON DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES AT THE WASHINGTON END OF THE VIET-NAM PROBLEM. THEY MAY TRY TO SHOW THAT THE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION GIVEN VIET-NAM SACRIFICES THAT NECESSARY ON OTHER PROBLEMS.

DTG 042334Z MAY 1967

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

115

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1967 MAY 5 00 04

EEA961
PP WIE10
DE WTE 865

FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67372

67 MAY 4 PM 8:08

THURSDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 4, 1967

HEREWITH DRAFT TELEGRAMS FOR PRESIDENT PARK, AS INSTRUCTED: ONE A MESSAGE WHICH MIGHT BE PUBLISHED; THE SECOND, CONFIDENTIAL. IF YOU APPROVE WE WILL CABLE THE MESSAGE TO SEOUL FOR DELIVERY BY AMBASSADOR BROWN WHEN THE OFFICIAL RETURNS ARE IN.

PUBLIC MESSAGE:

"YOUR EFFORTS TO SET THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ON A NEW COURSE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS BASED ON DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS, HAVE WON YOU AN IMPRESSIVE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN YOUR OWN COUNTRY. THE FREE DEBATE DURING THE CAMPAIGN AND THE LARGE TURNOUT OF VOTERS ARE EVIDENCE OF THE DEVOTION OF YOUR COUNTRY TO DEMOCRACY.

"THE CONDUCT OF THIS ELECTION BY YOUR PEOPLE CONFIRMS THE STRONG IMPRESSION OF CONFIDENCE AND VITALITY I FELT DURING MY VISIT TO KOREA.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-452

By 128, NARA, Date 3-17-93

PRESERVATION COPY

"I KNOW HOW MUCH IS OWED TO YOU NOT ONLY BY THE PEOPLE OF KOREA BUT BY THE PEOPLES OF ASIA AND BY FREE MEN EVERYWHERE.

"YOU HAVE MY WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS. MAY YOUR NEXT TERM OF OFFICE BRING TO YOU AND YOUR PEOPLE CONTINUED PROGRESS IN EVERY FIELD. SINCERELY."

~~CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE:~~

"AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE JUST HAD GENERAL WESTMORELAND WITH US FOR AN INTENSIVE REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN VIET NAM. WE SHALL BE FACING IMPORTANT DECISIONS IN THE WEEKS AHEAD ABOUT WHICH I SHALL WISH TO CONSULT YOU AND THE LEADERS OF THE OTHER FIGHTING ALLIES. BUT RIGHT NOW I WOULD SIMPLY WISH YOU TO KNOW HOW TRULY PLEASED I AM THAT YOUR COURAGEOUS AND WISE POLICIES HAVE BEEN REWARDED BY YOUR REELECTION."

MESSAGES APPROVED

DISAPPROVED

SEE ME

DTG 042316Z MAY 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

Se. of time
~~TOP SECRET RUMPT TRINE~~

May 5, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

116
Sent to Rostow
via wire
5/5/67
CR P67379

Herewith a summary of a major USIB appraisal of Communist
China's military policy and non-nuclear forces.

I thought you would wish to read it over the weekend.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC-04-3
By us, NARA, Date 9-3-04

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.3 1
(b)(1)

← COMMUNIST CHINA'S MILITARY
POLICY AND ITS GENERAL PUR-
POSE AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES

THE PROBLEM

To assess Communist China's general military policy and to estimate the strength and capabilities of the Chinese Communist general purpose and air defense forces through 1969.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Whatever the outcome of the current political crisis, any Chinese leadership will probably continue to work towards a dominant position in Asia and great power status on the world scene. It will probably continue to be concerned by the danger of conflict with the US, and possibly with the USSR. Thus China will almost certainly continue to give high priority to improving its military capabilities.

B. Although the threat of force and its actual use beyond China's borders are significant elements in Peking's outlook, Chinese military strategy places primary emphasis on defense. With the possible exception of their nuclear/missile activities, we do not see in train the general programs, the development or deployment of forces, or the doctrinal discussions which would suggest a more forward strategy. At least for the short term, the high priority nuclear program is probably viewed by the Chinese as primarily for deterrence, though Peking's successes in this field bring substantial prestige and political influence, particularly in Asia.

C. In our view, Chinese forces are capable of providing a strong defense of the mainland and launching significant offensive operations in neighboring areas. Thus far the political turmoil does not seem to have affected these Chinese capabilities or military production programs in any significant way.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-4
By isa, NARA, Date 9-3-04

3.3 (b)(1)

D. Under a broad policy of modernization, Peking is pursuing the following programs and objectives:

1. *The Army.* Improvement of firepower, mainly by supplying new tanks and heavier artillery. The army's organization and size has remained static: about 2.4 million men in 118 combat divisions of uneven quality and strength.

2. *Air Defense.* A growing inventory of fighters (Mig-19s), addition of better radars, and preparations for production of the SA-2, probably as part of a point defense system for key target areas. Production of the Mig-19 continues (20-25 a month) and production of the Mig-21 is expected.

3. *The Navy.* Five R-class submarines have been produced and about 10 more will probably be built by 1970. A construction program for guided missile patrol boats began in 1966 and is proceeding at an estimated rate of 10 per year. The South China Fleet is being strengthened by deployment of patrol and torpedo boats and by expansion of shipbuilding and shore installations in South China.

E. Nevertheless, the limitations and demands on China's economic and technological capacities are such that conventional forces will remain deficient in modern equipment at least into the early 1970's. There is little prospect for a significant increase in the mobility of Chinese ground forces; the air defense system will still be unable to cope with a major air attack; fighters will be at least a generation behind the US and USSR. Naval capabilities will still be mainly limited to offshore patrol and escort.

F. The current modernization programs for conventional forces plus even a modest effort to produce and deploy advanced weapons systems will, in our view, put pressures on an already strained economy. Thus China will face an increasingly difficult problem in allocating scarce economic resources between civilian and military needs and within the military sector. Resolution of these problems may be a cause of continued dispute, both within the military and at the top level of national decision-making.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117 Rostow

Sent: 7:34 PM

EEA984
PP WTE10
DE WTE 889

1967 MAY 5 23 34

FROM: W W ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67368

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NY 91-452

By 120, NARA, Date 3-12-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 5, 1967

SUBJECT: VISIT BY PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ

PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ ASKS WHETHER IT WOULD BE CONVENIENT FOR HIM TO MAKE HIS STATE VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON FRIDAY AND SATURDAY, OCTOBER 27 AND 28. HE PLANS TO FLY TO CANADA FOR EXPO 67 FIRST (OCTOBER 25 IS MEXICAN DAY AT THE FAIR) AND COME HERE ON THURSDAY, OCTOBER 26, THE HOUR DEPENDING ON WHETHER HE FLIES DIRECTLY FROM CANADA OR STOPS OFF IN NEW YORK TO ADDRESS THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

HE PROPOSES THAT ON SUNDAY, OCTOBER 29, YOU BOTH GO TO EL PASO FOR THE CEREMONY TRANSFERRING THE CHAMIZAL TRACT. SINCE IT IS CUSTOMARY FOR OUR LATIN AMERICAN FRIENDS TO HOLD PUBLIC CEREMONIES ON SUNDAY, I AM SURE PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ THINKS IT IS QUITE APPROPRIATE TO DO THIS ON THE SABBATH.

IF YOU DON'T WANT TO DO THE CHAMIZAL CEREMONY ON SUNDAY, YOU HAVE THESE OPTIONS:

- HAVE STATE VISIT ON OCTOBER 27 AND 28 BUT DO CHAMIZAL SOME OTHER TIME.
- WORK OUT OTHER DATES FOR THE TRIP PERMITTING THE COMBINATION OF A WASHINGTON VISIT AND THE CHAMIZAL.

SHOULD WE ADVISE HIM:

1. DATES HE PROPOSES FOR STATE VISIT AND CHAMIZAL ARE SATISFACTORY. -----
2. DATES FOR WASHINGTON VISIT ARE OKAY, BUT SEE IF DIAZ ORDAZ WOULD AGREE TO ANOTHER DATE FOR CHAMIZAL CEREMONY. -----
3. ASK DIAZ ORDAZ IF ANOTHER DATE COULD BE FOUND FOR COMBINING THE WASHINGTON VISIT AND CHAMIZAL CEREMONY. -----

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 052247Z MAY 67

67 MAY 5 PM 7:52

FRIDAY

REPRODUCTION COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *ju* NARA Date 4-22-99

~~SECRET~~

1967 MAY 5 12 33

VZCZGEEA967
OO WTE12
DE WTE 871

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67376

~~SECRET~~

HEREWITH HOLT PROPOSES A SECOND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING -- LIKE MANILA -- AFTER THE ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIET NAM.

QUOTE DEAR LYNDON, THERE IS ONE MATTER WHICH PERHAPS TAKES ON A HEIGHTENED SIGNIFICANCE HAVING REGARD TO THESE OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, AND THAT IS THE QUESTION OF ANOTHER SUMMIT MEETING OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT REPRESENTED AT THE MANILA CONFERENCE. HASLUCK REPORTED FROM WASHINGTON THAT, AT THE PRIVATE MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTING FORCES TO VIET-NAM, THE KOREAN REPRESENTATIVE PROPOSED FROM HIS GOVERNMENT THAT ANOTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING BE HELD, AND EXTENDED AN INVITATION FOR IT TO BE HELD IN KOREA AS EARLY AS CONVENIENT. IN CONVERSATION WITH ME, HOLYOAKE, PARK AND KY HAVE ALL SAID HOW MUCH THEY WOULD FAVOUR ANOTHER MEETING TOGETHER, EVEN IF LIMITED IN TIME TO MUCH THE SAME PERIOD WE SPENT AT MANILA. WE DID SOME GOOD WORK THERE, GOT SOME FINE STATEMENTS OUT PUBLICLY AND SOME GOOD DECISIONS ON THE RECORD. THOSE OF US WHO HAVE DISCUSSED THIS TOGETHER FEEL THAT THE MOMENTUM SHOULD BE MAINTAINED, AND THAT WE SHOULD AGAIN BE POOLING OUR KNOWLEDGE AND THINKING ABOUT SOUTH VIET-NAM. NOTHING IS MORE EFFECTIVE FOR THIS PURPOSE THAN OUR MEETING TOGETHER. NO DOUBT YOU WILL HAVE ALREADY GIVEN SOME THOUGHT YOURSELF TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER MEETING AND ITS TIMING. I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT A DATE AFTER THE ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM, AND WHICH MET YOUR OWN CONVENIENCE, WOULD NEED TO BE LOOKED TO. BUT THE DECISION AS TO WHETHER A MEETING SHALL BE HELD REALLY RESTS WITH YOU. IT WOULD BE FUTILE TO HOLD IT WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES. ON THE OTHER HAND, I AM SURE THAT IF YOU DECIDED THAT A MEETING WAS DESIRABLE, THE REST OF US COULD SO ADJUST MATTERS AS TO ASSEMBLE TOGETHER AT A TIME AND PLACE WHICH SUITED YOU. YOURS SINCERELY, HAROLD HOLT UNQUOTE.
CLARK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NLI 99-167
By JSN NARA Date 5-22-99

~~SECRET~~

DTG 051147Z MAY 67

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-162
By UG, NARA Date 1-22-01

~~SECRET~~

119

VZCZCEEA968
OO WTE12
DE WTE 872

1967 MAY 5 13 41

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67377

~~SECRET~~

WE HAVE FOR THE FIRST TIME THREE REPORTS FROM THE GROUND
ON THE EFFECTS OF THE RECENT BOMBING OF HANOI - HAIPHONG.

DATE OF INFORMATION - APRIL 1967

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SUBJECT - MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS ON CONDITIONS IN HANOI

ACQUIRED - [REDACTED]

SOURCE - [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

1. ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS ARE LOCATED ON THE ROOFS OF MOST
CIVILIAN AND ALL GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS IN HANOI. EVERYONE
HAS A RIFLE INCLUDING THE WAITRESSES, WHO RUSH TO THE
ROOF TOPS WHEN AN AIR RAID ALERT IS SOUNDED.

2. WORK BEGINS WHEN THE SHOPS AND OFFICES OPEN AT 0500.
HOWEVER MOST OF THEM CLOSE BY 0900. THE STREETS ARE
DESERTED BETWEEN 0900 AND 1700.

3. THERE DID NOT SEEM TO BE MUCH FOOD IN THE STORES AND
IN THE RESTAURANTS. OUTSIDE HANOI THERE WAS ONLY A LITTLE
MEAT. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

WHILE THE STORES WERE STOCKED WITH SMALL AMOUNTS OF MOST
GOODS, THESE GOODS APPEAR TO BE CHIEFLY FOR WINDOW DRESSING.

DATE OF INFORMATION - [REDACTED] APRIL - [REDACTED] MAY 1967

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SUBJECT - EFFECTS OF AMERICAN BOMBING ON MORALE OF HANOI
POPULACE; DAMAGE TO GIA-LAM RAILWAY DEPOT AND HAIPHONG
CEMENT PLANT

ACQUIRED - [REDACTED]

SOURCE - [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

1. [REDACTED]

CONCERNING

THE EFFECTS OF AMERICAN BOMBING IN HANOI AND HAIPHONG:
A. INCREASED U.S. AIR FORCE ACTIVITY IN THE HANOI AREA IS CAUSING A DETERIORATION OF MORALE IN THE CITY. THERE HAVE BEEN 14 AIR RAID ALERTS FROM 29 APRIL TO 2 MAY, SEVERAL OF THEM AT NIGHT. DURING THE NIGHT ALERTS, CITIZENS COULD BE SEEN RUNNING WILDLY TOWARD SHELTERS. THERE IS A DEFINITE BREAKDOWN IN ORDER AND THE AIR RAID WARDENS HAD DIFFICULTY IN CONTROLLING THE PEOPLE. FOR THE FIRST TIME, IT COULD BE NOTED THAT PEOPLE WERE MAKING NO ATTEMPT TO HIDE THEIR FEAR OR FATIGUE.
B. THE GIA LAM RAILWAY DEPOT WAS 100 PERCENT DESTROYED DURING A RECENT RAID. ONE FREIGHT CAR WAS BLOWN OVER THE WALL SURROUNDING THE RAIL YARD. ONE BOMB FELL ON THE ROAD LEADING PAST THE YARD AND IT IS NOW NECESSARY TO MAKE A DETOUR IN GOING FROM HANOI TO GIA LAM. THERE IS NO ELECTRIC POWER IN THE AREA FROM GIA LAM RAILWAY DEPOT TO DOUMER BRIDGE. THE BOMBING WAS VERY ACCURATE AND ALMOST NO BOMBS FELL ON CIVILIAN HOUSES IN THE AREA.
C. THE PONT DES RAPIDES NORTH OF HANOI IS NO LONGER USABLE AND RAIL TRAFFIC HAS CEASED.


D. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] THE MAIN CEMENT PLANT HAS BEEN SO SEVERELY DAMAGED THAT WORK HAS HALTED. [REDACTED] SEVERAL BOMBS HAD FALLEN ON CIVILIAN HOUSING NEAR THE FACTORY.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)





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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

1967 MAY 5 22 00

120
Sent 6:00 PM

EEA982
PP WTE10
DE WTE 888

FROM: VALT ROSTOV
TO : THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. JOHNSON
INFO: LEM JOHNS
CITE: CAP67387

~~SECRET~~

MAY 5, 1967

1. ON 4 MAY FOLLOWING HER ARRIVAL IN CARTAGENA FROM BARRANQUILLA, MISS JOHNSON SPENT REST OF MORNING ABOARD SS HOPE INTERVIEWING HOSPITAL PERSONNEL. SHE HAD LUNCH ABOARD SHIP.

2. IN AFTERNOON MISS JOHNSON INTERVIEWED DOCTORS AND NURSES ABOARD SS HOPE.

3. AT 2000 HOURS LOCAL TIME MISS JOHNSON, ACCOMPANIED BY A FEW MEMBERS OF SS HOPE HOSPITAL STAFF HAD DINNER AT RESTAURANT CALLED LA CAPILLA DEL MAR AFTER WHICH SHE RETURNED TO SHIP.

4. NO INCIDENTS DURING DAY OR EVENING.

DTG: 05/2138Z MAY 67

GRPS: 200 IMI 200

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 14, NARA, Date 5-7-91

~~SECRET~~

87 MAY 5 PM 6:11

FRIDAY

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121

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EEA981
PP WIE10
DE WIE 886

FROM W. W. ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67386

1967 MAY 5 20 39

JK

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MAY 5, 1967

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: W. W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: MEXICO AND COTTON TEXTILES

CARRILLO FLORES HAS INFORMED TONY FREEMAN THAT PRESIDENT DIAZ HAS DECIDED TO PROCEED WITH NEGOTIATION OF A COTTON TEXTILE AGREEMENT WITH US ON THE BASIS OF OUR GENEROUS OFFER.

CARRILLO FLORES IS NOT SURE WHETHER THE MEXICAN INDUSTRY, WHICH IS OPPOSED TO AN AGREEMENT, WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THEY WILL PROCEED WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS ANYWAY.

TALKS WILL OPEN BETWEEN MAY 11 AND 15.

DTG: 85/1951Z MAY 67

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By 128, NARA, Date 3-17-93

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122

1967 MAY 5 17 50

VZCZCEEA976
PP WTE10
DE WTE 873

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67378

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-441
By ig, NARA, Date 8-14-95

~~SECRET~~

MAY 5, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

YOU RECEIVED A SUMMARY THIS MORNING OF THIS THOUGHTFUL REPORT AGREED BY THE WHOLE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. IN VIEW OF THE ISSUES BEFORE YOU, I THOUGHT YOU SHOULD HAVE THE FULL TEXT AVAILABLE.

I. SOVIET POLICY

1. THE USSR'S INITIAL POST-KHRUSHCHEV COMMITMENT TO NORTH VIETNAM IN LATE 1964 WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY BASED ON WHAT PROVED TO BE A MISCALCULATION: IN ALL PROBABILITY, THE SOVIET LEADERS DID NOT THEN EXPECT THE US TO STEP UP ITS INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT AND THEY FORESAW A RELATIVELY QUICK AND EASY COMMUNIST VICTORY IN THE SOUTH. THEY WANTED TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THAT VICTORY AND—MORE CONCERNED THAN KHRUSHCHEV WITH THE PROBLEMS AND ISSUES OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD--WERE ESPECIALLY ANXIOUS TO DISPROVE CHINESE CHARGES THAT THEY WERE SOFT ON IMPERIALISM. INITIATION OF THE US AIR CAMPAIGN IN FEBRUARY 1965 CAUGHT THEM BY SURPRISE (AND KOSYGIN IN HANOI), AND THEIR ACTIONS EVER SINCE HAVE REFLECTED THEIR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THEIR COMMITMENT TO HANOI, BUT AT THE SAME TIME TO CONTROL THE RISKS OF DOING SO, ESPECIALLY VIS-A-VIS THE US.

2. THERE IS WITHIN THIS BROAD CONTEXT A WIDE AREA OF UNCERTAINTY IN THE USSR'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR. THE SOVIETS SURELY SEE THE WAR AS ADVANTAGEOUS TO THEM IN MANY WAYS. IT DIVERTS US POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ATTENTION AWAY FROM AREAS OF PRIMARY INTEREST TO THE USSR, IT IMPOSES BURDENS ON US RESOURCES, AND IT EMPLOYS A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF US MILITARY FORCES-IN-BEING. MOREOVER, IT HAS DEEPLY TROUBLED MANY US ALLIES AND ASSOCIATES, ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE, AND IT IS A DIVISIVE FACTOR WITHIN THE US ITSELF. FINALLY, THE WAR--AND THEIR IMPORTANT ROLE IN IT--ALLOWS THE SOVIETS TO SCORE FURTHER GAINS AGAINST THE CHINESE, BOTH IN HANOI AND IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AS A WHOLE.

PRESERVED 1/7

3. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CONFLICT, AS SEEN FROM MOSCOW, HAS ITS ADVERSE ASPECTS AS WELL. THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM CONSTITUTES A CONTINUING REPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION, UNABLE AS IT IS TO PROTECT A SMALL ALLY. THE WAR IS TAKING PLACE FAR FROM THE USSR AND IS BEING WAGED BY A STATE WHICH IS UNWILLING TO ACCEPT SOVIET POLITICAL GUIDANCE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND IS SUSPICIOUS EVEN OF SOVIET COUNSEL. THE BUILDUP OF US FORCES, AND THEIR ENGAGEMENT IN COMBAT, INCREASES PRESSURES ON THE SOVIET LEADERS TO EXPAND THEIR OWN FORCES, AND THIS, IN TURN, MAY IMPOSE SOME ADDITIONAL STRAINS ON THE ECONOMY AND FURTHER COMPLICATE LONG-RANGE ECONOMIC PLANNING. PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, THE US MAY UNDERTAKE NEW COURSES OF ACTION WHICH WOULD FORCE THE SOVIETS TO CHOOSE BETWEEN CONFRONTING THE US OR BACKING DOWN. MOSCOW IS ALSO ALMOST CERTAINLY CONCERNED THAT A KOREAN TYPE WAR COULD DEVELOP, LEADING TO CHINESE INVOLVEMENT AND ALL THE COMPLICATIONS AND DANGERS WHICH THE USSR DESIRES TO AVOID.

4. THE PRO'S AND CON'S OF THIS SITUATION TEND TO MAKE ALTERNATIVE SOVIET OPTIONS UNPROMISING OR HAZARDOUS. IF THEY ATTEMPTED TO FORCE HANOI INTO NEGOTIATIONS -- E.G., BY THREATENING TO STOP SUPPLIES -- THEY MIGHT FAIL, FOR HANOI, EVEN WITHOUT SOVIET AID, COULD FIGHT ON IF IT WISHED, THOUGH THE NATURE AND THE LEVEL OF THE CONFLICT WOULD NECESSARILY CHANGE. SUCH A FAILURE WOULD EFFECTIVELY END SOVIET INFLUENCE IN HANOI, THROW NORTH VIETNAM ENTIRELY BACK ON CHINA, AND DIMINISH SOVIET PRESTIGE IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD AS WELL AS IN MANY "UNCOMMITTED" COUNTRIES. THE SAME CALAMITIES WOULD FOLLOW IF MOSCOW SIMPLY WITHDREW ITS SUPPORT OF HANOI IN ORDER TO ESCAPE THE RISKS OF DEEPER INVOLVEMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, MOSCOW CANNOT FEASIBLY UNDERTAKE ANY SERIOUS MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR, WITH ITS OWN COMBAT FORCES, FAR FROM THE SOURCES OF SOVIET POWER, AND AT THE END OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION PASSING THROUGH THE DUBIOUSLY FRIENDLY TERRITORY OF CHINA OR RISKING US COUNTERACTION AT SEA. FINALLY, IF MOSCOW TRIED TO INFLUENCE THE US BY HEAVY PRESSURES ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD, IT WOULD RISK PROVOKING A PARTIAL US MOBILIZATION AND A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CRISIS.

5. AS FOR THE WAR ITSELF, THE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE PROBABLY CONCLUDED THAT A MILITARY VICTORY BY THE VIET CONG AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IS NOT POSSIBLE. THEY PROBABLY ALSO BELIEVE THAT A CLEAR-CUT MILITARY VICTORY BY THE US-VIETNAMESE FORCES IS ALSO IMPOSSIBLE, UNLESS THE US STEPS UP ITS WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM TO A VERY SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OR IS PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN A LONG AND COSTLY STRUGGLE. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE PROBABLY CONCLUDED, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE EVENTS OF THE PAST TWO TO THREE MONTHS, THAT THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF MOVEMENT TOWARD A POLITICAL SOLUTION, AT LEAST BY NEGOTIATION, FOR SEVERAL MONTHS AT BEST. ESPECIALLY SINCE KOSYGIN'S VISIT TO LONDON IN FEBRUARY, IT MUST APPEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT BOTH SIDES ARE DETERMINED NOT TO ACCEPT THE OTHER'S TERMS FOR THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIET LEADERS THUS APPEAR TO HAVE CONCLUDED THAT FOR A TIME THEY HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO HELP HANOI TO CARRY ON THE WAR, HOPING THAT CHANGES OF ATTITUDE IN EITHER HANOI OR WASHINGTON, OR BOTH, WILL MAKE A POLITICAL SOLUTION POSSIBLE LATER.

6. THE SOVIET LEADERS PROBABLY RECOGNIZE THAT A SUBSTANTIAL MAJORITY IN THE US SUPPORTS THE PRESIDENT IN HIS WISH TO TERMINATE THE WAR BY A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND THAT US WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT MEANINGFUL CONCESSIONS FROM THE COMMUNISTS IN VIETNAM IS AN UNREALISTIC HOPE. BUT THEY FEAR THAT, IN ITS ANXIETY TO GET THE WAR OVER AND FINISHED, THE US WILL ESCALATE THE CONFLICT IN A WAY WHICH WOULD POSE THOSE SERIOUS DANGERS WE HAVE NOTED ABOVE.

7. IN ITS EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE US FROM ESCALATING THE CONFLICT AND TO ACCEPT TERMS ALSO ACCEPTABLE TO HANOI FOR MOVING TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, THE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE ENGAGED IN A VARIETY OF STRATEGEMS. FOR A PERIOD THEY SOUGHT TO WARN THE US OF THE HARMFUL EFFECT UPON US-SOVIET RELATIONS OF THE CONTINUED RISE IN THE US COMMITMENT. ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO PURSUE THIS THEME, THEY HAVE SINCE LAST SUMMER ALSO USED ANOTHER ROUTE; THEY PERMITTED SOME TANGIBLE PROGRESS IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS, PARTLY IN ORDER TO PERSUADE THE US THAT SUCH PROGRESS SHOULD NOT BE JEOPARDIZED BY NEW US ACTIONS IN VIETNAM. FINALLY, THEY TOOK STEPS, WHICH CULMINATED IN THE WILSON-KOSYGIN TALKS, DESIGNED TO CONVINCE THE US LEADERS THAT THERE WAS A REAL PROSPECT FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. AT THE MOMENT, BECAUSE OF THEIR FEAR OF IMMINENT ESCALATION, THEY ARE TRYING TO CONVINCE THE US OF THE HAZARDS OF ESCALATION, THIS TIME BY STRESSING THAT THEY INTEND TO MEET US MOVES WITH EVEN MORE VIGOROUS SUPPORT OF NORTH VIETNAM.

II. SOVIET REACTIONS TO ESCALATION

8. WE BELIEVE THAT BOTH HANOI AND MOSCOW HAVE EXPECTED A HIGHER LEVEL OF US MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM, AND IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WILL RESPOND TO THE CURRENT EXPANDED-BOMBING PROGRAM BY PROVIDING ADDITIONAL QUANTITIES AND PERHAPS NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT. INDEED, THEY MAY ALREADY HAVE DECIDED TO DO SO.

9. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ATTITUDE OF CHINA WILL NOT POSE SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO THE CONTINUED TRANSIT OF SOVIET MILITARY SUPPLIES. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT SHIPMENTS HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY DISRUPTED IN THE PAST, DESPITE SOVIET CHARGES TO THE CONTRARY AND DESPITE SOME DEGREE OF CHINESE HARASSMENT. EARLY THIS YEAR, AT THE HEIGHT OF THE ANTI-SOVIET DEMONSTRATIONS IN PEKING, THE SOVIETS AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE APPARENTLY MADE SOME NEW ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WHICH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD ACCEPT SOVIET CARGO AT THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER AND ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS ONWARD MOVEMENT. (A CRITICAL CHANGE IN CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS, SHOULD IT COME, COULD OF COURSE SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER EXISTING TRANSIT ARRANGEMENTS.) SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD LESSEN STILL FURTHER THE CHANCES OF CHINESE MEDDLING WITH SOVIET SUPPLIES, BUT IT WOULD SEEM TO HAVE LITTLE BEARING ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. THESE RELATIONS REMAIN FUNDAMENTALLY HOSTILE, AND CHINESE AND SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD MAJOR ISSUES OF WAR AND PEACE IN VIETNAM WILL CONTINUE TO DIFFER PROFOUNDLY.

10. IN GENERAL, WE BELIEVE THAT THE TYPES OF WEAPONRY THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO SUPPLY DURING THE COMING MONTHS WILL BE INTENDED TO STRENGTHEN THE AIR AND COASTAL DEFENSES OF NORTH VIETNAM AND TO INCREASE THE FIREPOWER OF BOTH THE REGULAR NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND THE COMMUNIST FORCES FIGHTING IN THE SOUTH. (SEE ANNEX FOR THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED WEAPONS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS.) TO BOLSTER AIR DEFENSE, THE SOVIETS WILL PROBABLY SUPPLY MORE JET FIGHTERS WITH AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES, MORE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES, AND IMPROVED ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY (E.G., THE ZU-23). WE THINK IT SOMEWHAT LESS LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD INTRODUCE AN IMPROVED SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM WITH A SOMEWHAT BETTER CAPABILITY AGAINST LOW ALTITUDE ATTACKS THAN THE SA-2'S NOW IN NORTH VIETNAM. TO MEET US NAVAL ATTACKS ON COASTAL SHIPPING, THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL PROVIDE COASTAL DEFENSE MISSILES WITH CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS (THE SAMLET AND PERHAPS EVEN THE COASTAL DEFENSE VERSION OF THE SHADDOCK). THEY WILL ALSO PROBABLY SUPPLY MORE PATROL BOATS, PERHAPS EVEN THE KOMAR OR OSA GUIDED-MISSILE PATROL BOATS. FOR THE GROUND FORCES, THE SOVIETS WILL PROBABLY PROVIDE ADDITIONAL MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS, HEAVIER ARTILLERY AND MORTARS, BETTER ANTIAIRCRAFT AND ANTITANK WEAPONS, AND A VARIETY OF ANTIPERSONNEL DEVICES. SOME OF THE LIGHTER, MORE MOBILE EQUIPMENT WOULD BE SENT FORWARD BY HANOI TO SOUTH VIETNAM FOR USE AGAINST US PERSONNEL AND BASES. INDEED, SOME HAS ALREADY APPEARED THERE.

11. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD PROBABLY AT SOME POINT PRESS THE SOVIETS FOR MORE SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT, AND THIS WOULD POSE A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE SOVIETS. THEY MIGHT BELIEVE THEY HAD TO RESPOND TO SUCH PRESSURE, ESPECIALLY IF HARD PRESSED BY NORTH VIETNAM AND IF NO BREAK APPEARED ON THE POLITICAL HORIZON. THEY MIGHT PROVIDE NONNUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH ADDITIONAL RANGE AND FIREPOWER, HOPING THAT THE NEW MILITARY SITUATION THUS CREATED WOULD BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN THE US POSITION. BUT THE SOVIETS WOULD ALSO BE CONCERNED THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS AND ESPECIALLY THEIR USE IN SOUTH VIETNAM WOULD PROVOKE FURTHER US RETALIATION, WHICH THEY WOULD LIKE TO AVOID, OR EVEN CREATE A SITUATION WHICH WOULD INVITE A US INVASION OF NORTH VIETNAM. WE BELIEVE NEVERTHELESS THAT THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT THEY WOULD PROVIDE SOME OF THESE WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

12. IF THE SOVIETS DID DECIDE TO EMBARK ON THIS COURSE, SOME OF THE WEAPONS INVOLVED MIGHT BE THE SALISH SHORT-RANGE GROUND-SUPPORT CRUISE MISSILE OR THE FROG TACTICAL ROCKET. BOTH ARE ROAD MOBILE, REQUIRE LITTLE IN THE WAY OF PERMANENT SUPPORT FACILITIES, AND WOULD NOT PRESENT A READY TARGET FOR US BOMBING. VIETNAMESE COULD BE TRAINED TO MAN THEM IN A FEW MONTHS. THEY COULD BE USED FROM SITES IN NORTH VIETNAM AGAINST US FORCES IN THE DMZ AREA, BUT PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE TRANSPORTED SOUTH. THE 150 N.M. SCUD AND THE 300 N.M. SHADDOCK WOULD ALSO MEET THESE GENERAL CRITERIA FOR MOBILITY AND VIETNAMESE MANNING. THE LATTER HOWEVER, IS A RELATIVELY NEW AND COMPLEX SYSTEM NEVER DEPLOYED OUTSIDE THE USSR, AND, IN ANY CASE, BOTH THE SCUD AND SHADDOCK ARE TOO CUMBERSOME AND COMPLICATED FOR USE IN THE SOUTH. IF THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO PROVIDE A WEAPON FOR ATTACKS UPON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION OR US BASES, THEY MIGHT CONSIDER MRBM'S WITH CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS. SUCH WEAPONS WOULD CREATE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS AND HAVE MARGINAL MILITARY VALUE; IF

PROVIDED, THEIR USE WOULD BE PRIMARILY FOR POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS. IN ANY EVENT, THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY BELIEVE THAT THE EMPLACEMENT OF SUCH WEAPONS WOULD PROVOKE AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF US RETALIATION, AND WE CONSIDER THEIR PROVISION UNLIKELY.

13. BEYOND SUPPLYING EQUIPMENT, THE SOVIETS COULD TAKE CERTAIN OTHER ACTIONS TO BOLSTER THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND WARN THE US. THEY MIGHT BELIEVE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE PROVISION OF LIMITED NUMBERS OF VOLUNTEERS, OR OF CREWS FOR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT OR POSSIBLY AIRCRAFT, WOULD SERVE AS A WARNING WITHOUT LEADING TO A SERIOUS CONFRONTATION.

14. IN ANY EVENT, A STEADY INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF COMBAT AND ESPECIALLY IN THE LEVEL OF US AIR ATTACKS WOULD MAKE THE SOVIET LEADERS INCREASINGLY NERVOUS, AND EACH NEW STEP WOULD BRING THEM CLOSE TO RESPONSES WHICH WOULD SERIOUSLY IMPAIR US-SOVIET RELATIONS. THEY MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, BREAK OFF VARIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTACTS WITH THE US, AND PERHAPS SUSPEND CERTAIN AGREEMENTS OF RECENT MONTHS. WE CANNOT SAY PRECISELY WHAT WOULD BE THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO PARTICULAR ACTIONS. MUCH WOULD DEPEND UPON WHAT HAD GONE BEFORE AND HOW DANGEROUS THE SITUATION OF NORTH VIETNAM HAD BECOME. BUT WE ARE PERSUADED THAT AT SOME POINT THE USSR WOULD CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF HEIGHTENED TENSION WITH THE US.

15. THE MINING OR THE BLOCKADE OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COAST WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO PRODUCE THIS RESULT, SINCE SUCH ACTION WOULD CONSTITUTE A DIRECT CHALLENGE TO THE SOVIETS. AT A MINIMUM THEY WOULD TRY TO MOBILIZE WORLD OPINION AGAINST THE US ON THIS ISSUE, AND, DEPENDING ON THE ATTITUDE OF NORTH VIETNAM, WOULD CONSIDER TAKING THE MATTER TO THE UN.

16. THERE IS LITTLE THAT THE SOVIETS COULD DO ON THE SCENE IF CONFRONTED WITH THIS KIND OF SITUATION. THEY DO NOT HAVE THE STRENGTH IN THE AREA TO FORCE A BLOCKADE OR TO CONFRONT THE US WITH A MAJOR MILITARY CHALLENGE, AND WE DO NOT BELIEVE THEY WOULD WISH TO RUN LARGE RISKS SIMPLY IN ORDER TO HARASS US FORCES OR GAIN TEMPORARY RESPITE. IN THE CASE OF MINING, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS COULD TRY TO REOPEN SHIPPING ROUTES BY BRINGING IN MINESWEEPERS, OTHER NAVAL SHIPS FOR PROTECTION, AND AIR COVER FROM NORTH VIETNAM. BUT THIS WOULD BE A HAZARDOUS VENTURE, SINCE THE US COULD CONTINUE TO SOW MINES BY AIR AND THE SOVIETS COULD NOT PREVENT IT UNLESS THEY WERE PREPARED TO BEGIN A MAJOR NAVAL AND AIR WAR. WE BELIEVE THEY WOULD NOT RISK THEIR SHIPPING IN MINED WATERS AND WOULD ATTEMPT THE NECESSARY SUPPLY BY OTHER MEANS, E.G., THROUGH CHINA OR BY LIGHTERAGE. MOST IMPORTANT, WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO RESORT TO STRONG AND DIRECT THREATS OF GENERAL WAR AS A MEANS TO PROTECT NORTH VIETNAM OR PRESERVE SOVIET FACE.

17. REGARDLESS OF THE PRECISE ACTION TAKEN BY THE US, THE SOVIETS MIGHT AT SOME POINT EXERT PRESSURES ON THE US OUTSIDE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. HEIGHTENED TENSIONS IN KOREA, NEW TROUBLES IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE POSSIBILITIES. BUT BERLIN IS THE MOST PLAUSIBLE PRESSURE POINT; US INTERESTS THERE ARE DIRECTLY ENGAGED AND VULNERABLE AND THE USSR COULD BE Surer OF CONTROLLING THE ACTION. THEY MIGHT CONSIDER THAT ONLY MINOR PRESSURE ON ACCESS ROUTES WOULD BE ENOUGH TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION OF AN IMPENDING CRISIS. BUT WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD WANT TO TAKE THE RISK OF PROVOKING BY SUCH PRESSURES A MAJOR AND GENERALIZED CRISIS WHICH WOULD NOT ONLY UNDERCUT THEIR POLICIES IN WESTERN EUROPE BUT COULD ALSO LEAD TO A US-SOVIET CONFRONTATION.

18. THERE WOULD BE A GOOD CHANCE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD AT SOME JUNCTURE EXERT STRONG EFFORTS TOWARD A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM. THEY WOULD HAVE TO WEIGH THE RISKS OF SOME LEVEL OF CONFRONTATION WITH THE US AGAINST THEIR RELUCTANCE TO PUT REAL PRESSURE ON HANOI FOR SUCH A SOLUTION. THEY WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY URGE THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATION MORE VIGOROUSLY THAN THEY HAVE HERETOFORE. BUT THEY WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE WILLING TO MAKE HANOI'S ACCEPTANCE OF TALKS AN EXPLICIT CONDITION OF CONTINUED MATERIAL SUPPORT. IF NEGOTIATIONS DID GET UNDERWAY, THEY WOULD, OF COURSE, STILL BEND EVERY EFFORT TO OBTAIN TERMS WHICH GAVE HANOI HOPE OF EVENTUALLY ACHIEVING ITS AIMS.

ANNEX

CHARACTERISTICS OF CERTAIN SOVIET WEAPONS MENTIONED IN THE TEXT

I. GROUND FORCES

SCUD A OR B (SS-1B OF C)

TYPE: SINGLE-STAGE, TACTICAL BALLISTIC WITH STORABLE LIQUID PROPELLANT

RANGE: 150 N.M.

WARHEAD: 1,500 TO 2,000 LBS. HE OR CW (INTENDED PRIMARILY FOR NUCLEAR OPTION)

ACCURACY: 0.5 N.M. CEP

REFIRE TIME: 1 1/2 TO 2 1/2 HOURS

REMARKS: THE SCUD LAUNCHER IS MOUNTED ON A MODIFIED TANK CHASSIS; IT HAS BEEN DEPLOYED IN THE USSR AND SOME EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

SALISH (SSC-2A)

[6]

TYPE: SURFACE-TO-SURFACE VERSION OF THE KENNEL AIR-TO-SURFACE, TURBO-JET CRUISE MISSILE

RANGE: 60 N.M.

WARHEAD: 2,220 LBS. HE (NUCLEAR POSSIBLE)

ACCURACY: 300-500 FEET CEP

REFIRE TIME: UNKNOWN

REMARKS: THE SALISH IS TRANSPORTED ON A WHEELED LAUNCHER; IT IS DEPLOYED IN THE USSR, CUBA, AND WITH SOVIET FORCES IN EAST GERMANY

SHADDOCK (SSC-1A)

TYPE: TACTICAL GROUND FORCES VERSION OF THE SS-N-3 NAVAL CRUISE MISSILE

RANGE: 300 N.M.

WARHEAD: 1,000 TO 2,000 LBS. HE (NUCLEAR OPTION)

ACCURACY: 0.5 N.M. AT 150 N.M. RANGE

REFIRE TIME: UNKNOWN

REMARKS: THE SHADDOCK IS TRANSPORTED IN A LAUNCH TUBE ON A WHEELED VEHICLE; IT HAS NOT BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO NON-SOVIET FORCES

FROG

TYPE: SOLID PROPELLANT, SURFACE-TO-SURFACE, UNGUIDED ROCKET AVAILABLE IN SEVERAL VERSIONS

RANGE: 18 TO 37 N.M. WITH CONVENTIONAL WARHEAD

WARHEAD: 820 TO 1,300 LBS. HE (NUCLEAR OPTION)

ACCURACY: 500-800 METER CEP AT 2/3 MAXIMUM RANGE

REACTION TIME: 15-30 MINUTES

REMARKS: THE FROG IS MOUNTED ON A LIGHT TANK CHASSIS AND CAN SUPPORT GROUND FORCES IN A VARIETY OF CLIMATIC AND TERRAIN CONDITIONS; VARIANTS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED IN THE USSR, EAST EUROPE, AND CUBA

[7]

II. COSTAL DEFENSE

SAMLET (SSC-2B)

TYPE: COASTAL DEFENSE VERSION OF THE KENNEL AIR-TO-SURFACE, TURBO-JET CRUISE MISSILE

RANGE: 45 N.M.

WARHEAD: 2,200 LBS. HE OR CW

OVERALL SYSTEM

RELIABILITY: 60-70 PERCENT

REFIRE TIME: 15 MINUTES

REMARKS: TWO, WHEELED SAMLET LAUNCHERS ARE DEPLOYED PER LAUNCH SITE; THE SYSTEM HAS BEEN DEPLOYED IN THE USSR CUBA, COMMUNIST CHINA, NORTH KOREA, AND EAST EUROPE

SHADDOCK (SSC-1B)

TYPE: COASTAL DEFENSE VERSION OF THE SSC-1A GROUND FORCES CRUISE MISSILE

RANGE: 270 N.M.

WARHEAD: 1,000 TO 2,000 LBS. HE OR CW (NUCLEAR OPTION)

OVERALL SYSTEM

RELIABILITY: 60 PERCENT

REFIRE TIME: NO REFIRE

REMARKS: THE SHADDOCK HAS NOT BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO NON-SOVIET FORCES

STYX (SS-N-2)

TYPE: LIQUID-FUEL, ANTISHIP CRUISE MISSILE LAUNCHED FROM OSA AND KOMAR-CLASS GUIDED MISSILE PATROL BOATS

RANGE: 200 N.M.

WARHEAD: 500-2,000 LBS. HE

OVERALL SYSTEM RELIABILITY: 50 TO 75 PERCENT DEPENDING ON HOMING MODE

REFIRE TIME: NO REFIRE

REMARKS: CARRIED BY KOMAR (2 LAUNCHERS) AND OSA-CLASS (4 LAUNCHERS) GUIDED MISSILE PATROL BOATS; DEPLOYED IN THE USSR, CUBA, CHINA, NORTH KOREA, EGYPT, INDONESIA, ALGERIA, AND EAST EUROPE

[8]

III. ANTIAIRCRAFT

ZU-23

TYPE: 23 MM TWIN ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS MOUNTED ON A TOWED,
TWO-WHEEL CHASSIS

RANGE: 8,200 YARDS HORIZONTAL; 19,000 FEET VERTICAL;
6,600 FEET EFFECTIVE ANTIAIRCRAFT RANGE

RATE OF FIRE: 60 ROUNDS PER MINUTE PER GUN

MUZZLE VELOCITY: 3,050

WEIGHT: 2,260 LBS. OVERALL

REMARKS: THE ZU-23 IS A DUAL-PURPOSE WEAPON SUITABLE FOR
AA USE AS WELL AS DIRECT-FIRE GROUND USE AGAINST PERSONNEL
AND LIGHT ARMOR; IT IS STANDARD ISSUE IN THE USSR AND HAS
BEEN DELIVERED TO SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES

IV. MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES

SHYSTER (SS-3)

TYPE: SINGLE STAGE MRBM EMPLOYING RADIO-INERTIAL GUIDANCE
AND NONSTORABLE LIQUID PROPELLANT

RANGE: 630 N.M.

WARHEAD: 2,700 LBS. NUCLEAR (CONVENTIONAL POSSIBLE)

ACCURACY: 1.0 TO 1.75 N.M. CEP

REFIRE TIME: 2 TO 5 HOURS

REMARKS: THE SS-3 IS NOW OBSOLETE; IT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEPLOYED OUTSIDE THE USSR

SANDAL (SS-4)

TYPE: SINGLE STAGE MRBM EMPLOYING INERTIAL GUIDANCE
AND STORABLE LIQUID PROPELLANT

RANGE: 1,020 N.M.

WARHEAD: 1,900-2,500 LBS. NUCLEAR (CONVENTIONAL POSSIBLE)

ACCURACY: 1.25 N.M. CEP

REFIRE TIME: 2 TO 4 HOURS

REMARKS: THE SS-4 IS DEPLOYED IN BOTH SOFT AND HARD SITES,
PRIMARILY IN THE EUROPEAN USSR; A MUCH LARGER CONVENTIONAL
WARHEAD COULD BE DELIVERED TO SHORTER RANGES (E.G., 4,000 LBS.
TO ABOUT 800 N.M.); THIS SYSTEM WAS DEPLOYED TO CUBA
AND WITHDRAWN IN 1962.

VZCZGEEA977
PP WTE10
DE WTE 881

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67383

123
1967 MAY 5 17 20

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 25, 1967

HEREWITH PROPOSED REPLY TO HOLT. HAS BEEN CLEARED WITH STATE.
TO PRIME MINISTER HOLT FROM THE PRESIDENT

I HAVE LONG SINCE LEARNED TO EXPECT CONSTRUCTIVE HELP
FROM YOU. I FOUND YOUR SUGGESTION INTERESTING AND I LOOK
FORWARD TO EXPLORING IT WITH YOU IN DETAIL WHEN YOU ARE
HERE ON JUNE 1.

WE ARE SPRUCING UP BLAIR HOUSE AND LOOK FORWARD WITH
RARE PLEASURE TO SEEING YOU BOTH.

APPROVED-----

DISAPPROVED-----

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 051703Z MAY 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By lig, NARA, Date 3-17-93

PRESERVATION COPY

124

May 5, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

CA WH 70255
via wire
to Ranch

You may be interested -- and a little cheered -- by the USIA
summary of European press reaction to the shenanigans in Stockholm.

THE RUSSELL TRIBUNAL

Most free world comment on the Russell tribunal viewed it as a publicity-seeking "farce" without status as a legitimate forum. The opening session in Stockholm drew moderate and generally disparaging coverage in most areas.

Prague radio charged that the U.S. Government had exerted strong diplomatic and political pressures on the Swedish Government to ban the meetings. It said the tribunal had been "very warmly welcomed" in Sweden, although some "reactionary" Swedish papers had attacked it.

Major British papers Wednesday carried stories on the opening session. London's conservative Daily Telegraph, under the heading "Mocking Justice," called the tribunal a "macabre, distasteful and puerile exercise..." sponsored by "a bunch of left-wing litterateurs, pamphleteers and propagandists who are manifestly engaged in what is nothing more than another anti-American demonstration." The paper continued:

"The imperfect imitation of judicial procedures is only for show. The 'tribunal' is neither authoritative nor impartial and lacks the professional skill needed to make its conclusions anything more serious than gratuitous impertinences. Even so, the Swedish government might have been expected to follow France's example by banning the performance."

The paper said the reputations of American leaders would "not suffer unduly, but Lord Russell's reputation among many admirers may prove more vulnerable. The acknowledged master of English prose is presented as the author of a diatribe couched in cliché-ridden journalese; the great logician is seen as a vehicle of commonplace political invective. It is this which lends a touch of sadness to an occasion which might otherwise inspire only contempt."

In contrast, the liberal Guardian, a consistent critic of U.S. Vietnam policy, thought that even though the findings were "predictable,"

there was "no reason why it should be either condemned or applauded." The paper added: "It is a body of private citizens collecting information for their own purposes. If it breaks laws it can be prosecuted. If it unearths facts not hitherto known it will have added to our knowledge."

The paper maintained that the tribunal fell into "that category of events about which it is not necessary to have an opinion, but for those with opinions there are remedies at hand. Those who do not like the tribunal can hold a mock trial of Ralph Schoenman," Lord Russell's secretary, "on charges of their own choice."

Tuesday's London Times carried a Stockholm correspondent's report declaring that "startling new information about American war techniques" was promised by the tribunal organizers. He wrote that "more than 20 crates of documents" had arrived from Paris and London, and that "eyewitness accounts of raids on North Vietnam villages, a four-hour film of the raids, examples of American weaponry... and recorded interviews with North Vietnam villagers" would be presented.

Reuters carried a dispatch Wednesday which said that "gruesome photographs depicting mutilated civilians after alleged American bomb raids over North Vietnam shocked onlookers" at the tribunal. The report stated that the tribunal had entered its second day "with an array of compelling testimony."

The French news agency AFP, in an account of the inaugural session, said that Lord Russell had accused the French government of "hypocrisy and frailty" for refusing to allow the sessions to be held in France.

In Paris, Thierry Maulnier, of the Academie Francaise, writing in Tuesday's conservative Figaro, asserted that the purpose of the meeting was to "discredit" American actions in Vietnam: "For this, collecting signatures and heralding famous voices is not enough. It has already been done. A tribunal is something different. It is imposing in itself,-- even more so an international tribunal.... It is a matter of creating in the public mind a parallel between the tribunal which condemned the Nazi war crimes and the one which is to condemn the American 'war crimes'. Using the word tribunal forces one to recognize an analogy of the actions and of the guilt."

The writer said Egypt's army had "occupied a good part" of Yemen and its air force had dropped napalm bombs on guerrilla villages there. Yet, he said, "I have never heard that this affair interested the Russell-Sartre tribunal. Thus it is not the intervention which is condemned, but the sides taken. It is a question of creating a certain confusion in the spectator's mind. The fight is carried on with propaganda weapons on the side of the national liberation front and North Vietnam..."

Today's Radical-Liberal Ekstrabladet of Copenhagen carried a full-page reprint of Russell's opening statement. Commentaries in other Danish papers branded the tribunal a "farce" (conservative Berlingske Tidende), and "a political action staged as a dramatic trial" (independent Information).

Mexico City papers had front-page stories under disparaging headlines: "Gathering of Demagogues to 'Judge' U.S." (conservative El Sol de Mexico), and "Decrepit Russell Farce Begins" (moderately conservative Ultimas Noticias).

Friday, May 5, 1967
6:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the draft letter you
requested.

As instructed, I sent a copy
of Borchgrave's letter to Bob McNamara
for comment.

W. W. Rostow

May 6, 1967

Dear Mr. de Borchgrave:

I am grateful that you took the trouble to share your thought and experience with me in your letter of April 28. We have been examining possibilities of action similar to that which you propose, and I would wish you to know that I am asking those responsible in the government to take into account fully your suggestions.

Sincerely,

Mr. Arnaud de Borchgrave
Chief Foreign Correspondent
NEWSWEEK
444 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10022

LBJ:WWR:mz

PRESERVATION COPY

125 b

32

444 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022
HA 1-1234

Newsweek

April 28, 1967

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have hesitated for some time before writing this letter, because I feel that a man in my position would be very presumptuous indeed to offer unsolicited advice to the President of the United States.

I have been a foreign correspondent for the last twenty years, seventeen of them for NEWSWEEK. My present assignment is chief foreign correspondent. I have been covering Vietnam on-and-off since 1952. I have been a strong supporter of our commitment, and my admiration is boundless for your unwavering determination and courage in seeing it through. After writing "A Dissent from the Dissenters" last June, I received letters from Vice President Humphrey and Secretary Rusk thanking me for my stand. More recently, after yet another assignment in Vietnam, I wrote "Seeing It Through." The foregoing information is mentioned only by way of presenting my credentials for writing this letter.

After much thought and careful study, I have come to the conclusion that the only way of seeing our commitment through and ending the war is to adopt General Harold Johnson's barrier concept from the South China Sea along Route 9 to Savannaket on the Mekong on the Thai-Laotian border. You know much more about the pros and cons than I do, but I have been intrigued by captured documents that indicate that if we ever went through with the idea, Hanoi would have to mount a major effort to prevent its construction. There is no doubt in my mind that such a barrier would effectively cut North Vietnam off from the war of aggression that Hanoi is prosecuting in the south.

I know that it would require a substantial increment of troop strength, especially during the construction phase, but if you could announce to the

The President

- 2 -


4/28/67

world at the same time that as soon as the barrier is operational we will cease all bombing raids against the north (as they would then become unnecessary), the unpleasant news of more men and money would be more than compensated by the feeling that major de-escalation is finally in sight.

You have doubtless been told that the barrier France built along the Algerian-Tunisian border was very effective indeed. I have frequently discussed this point with Algerian leaders, and they readily concede in private they were defeated militarily by the French, and that the barrier was a major factor in their defeat.

I am quite confident that if this barrier were built, along with automated alarm systems and automatic artillery fire and air strikes whenever a breach is signaled, the Vietcong would shrivel on the vine in a matter of months. It would be comparable to the impact that Yugoslavia's closing of the Greek border had on the Greek guerrillas; it would cut off the Ho Chi Minh trails and access through Laos and Cambodia. The most tempting of all, of course, is the opportunity it would give us to announce in advance when all bombing would stop, thus reminding the world that our only interest is South Vietnam.

Respectfully yours,


Arnaud de Borchgrave
Chief Foreign Correspondent

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

Friday - May 5, 1967

~~SECRET~~*via wire to Ranch*
CAP 67380

To: The President
From: W. W. Rostow
Subject: Lynda's Trip

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-86
By CB, NARA Date 1-21-01

In view of discrepancy over whether ^a Secret Service agent was involved in ^{the} minor incident when Lynda Bird arrived in Barranquilla, I asked Ambassador Carlson for a full eyewitness account of what took place. Both the New York Times and the Washington Post this morning play the incident in low key on inside. This is a

1. FOLLOWING IS EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF INCIDENT

FROM [REDACTED] WHO WAS PRESENT AT BARRANQUILLA AIRPORT WHEN MISS JOHNSON ARRIVED. CHIEF OF SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE PLANNING GROUP, RICHARD KEISER, HAD REQUESTED AIRPORT AUTHORITIES TO DENY REPORTERS AND PHOTOGRAPHERS ACCESS TO LANDING RAMP BECAUSE MISS JOHNSON DID NOT WANT ANY PUBLICITY SINCE TRIP WAS A McCALL MAGAZINE WRITING ASSIGNMENT AND NOT AN OFFICIAL VISIT. AIRPORT AUTHORITIES AGREED TO COLLABORATE. ALL SPECTATORS STAYED BEHIND BARRIER APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED FIFTY FEET FROM AIRCRAFT EXCEPT A FEW REPORTERS AND PHOTOGRAPHERS WHO CLIMBED A FENCE AND GOT OUT BEYOND BARRIER AND ONTO LANDING RAMP. TWO DAS DETECTIVES WHO WERE HELPING SECRET SERVICE DETAIL WITH SECURITY AT AIRPORT STOPPED PHOTOGRAPHERS AND REPORTERS AND PLEADED WITH THEM TO COOPERATE AND RESPECT MISS

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1) > 25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

JOHNSON'S WISHES OF NO PUBLICITY. ONE PERSON BROKE AWAY FROM THIS GROUP AND ON A DEAD RUN APPROACHED RAMP AS MISS JOHNSON BEGAN TO DEPLANE. THIS PERSON CARRIED AN UNIDENTIFIED OBJECT WHICH HE CONCEALED WITH HIS HAND ON HIS CHEST. ONE OF U.S. ESCORT OFFICERS, NOT BEING ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE RUNNER NOR THE OBJECT HE CARRIED, SHOUTED TO HIM TO STOP. WHEN PERSON REFUSED TO STOP, HE RAN AFTER HIM AND BLOCKED HIM ABOUT TEN FEET FROM RAMP. THE RUNNER WAS SUBSEQUENTLY IDENTIFIED AS A PHOTOGRAPHER FOR EL TIEMPO AND EL NACIONAL. IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT PHOTOGRAPHER WAS NOT KICKED NOR CAMERA TOUCHED BY ESCORT OFFICER AS CLAIMED IN SOME PRESS ARTICLES. AT MOMENT PHOTOGRAPHER WAS BLOCKED, MISS JOHNSON GOT INTO HER CAR WHICH WAS WAITING AT BOTTOM OF RAMP. IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, ESCORT OFFICER GOT INTO ESCORT CAR AND PARTY DEPARTED AIRPORT. [REDACTED] WHO LATER ASKED DAS DETECTIVES FOR DETAILS, LEARNED THAT CAMERA WAS DAMAGED WHEN IT HIT PAVEMENT. CHIEF OF SECRET SERVICE DETAIL COMMENDED ESCORT OFFICER FOR HIS QUICK ACTION IN BLOCKING ONRUSHING POSSIBLE ATTACKER. J

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Limited Official Use

Friday - May 5, 1967

*Pres file
sent to Ranch
via wire*

To: The President

From: W. W. Rostow

SUBJECT: Mexico and Cotton Textiles

Carrillo Flores has informed Tony Freeman that President Diaz has decided to proceed with negotiation of a cotton textile agreement with us on the basis of our generous offer.

Carrillo Flores is not sure whether the Mexican industry, which is opposed to an agreement, will participate in the negotiations, but they will proceed with the negotiations anyway.

Talks will open between May 11 and 15.

Limited Official Use

~~SECRET~~

Send LDX to S/S

May 5, 1967

Please send following message to Canberra, from the President
to Prime Minister Holt. (Reference Canberra 5405)

I have long since learned to expect constructive help from you.
I found your suggestion interesting and I look forward to exploring it
with you in detail when you are here on June 1.

We are sprucing up Blair House and look forward eagerly to
seeing you both.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By ing, NARA, Date 3-17-93

~~SECRET~~

VIA [REDACTED]

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-162
By cb, NARA Date 1-22-01

130
CAP 67385

~~TOP SECRET~~ LITERALLY EYES ONLY

May 5, 1967

To Ambassador Bunker and Robert Komer from Walt Rostow

The President wishes me to share thoughts which will be moving or have moved over parallel military channels at his instruction.

He wishes US military requirements to be recalculated by Westy after a most exhaustive effort to exploit fully the Vietnamese manpower pool. This includes not only engaging as many of those released from military services as can be induced to stay in functions relevant to total military manpower but also an examination of the possibilities of using Vietnamese and other non-Americans in functions which might release US military for combat tasks. This review should include all possible GVN military manpower policy revisions including age lowering, tour duty extensions, more effective draft system and further deserter reductions.

In this thorough comb-out you should engage the best manpower expert we can find, who may well be Ray Male. You will understand that, before a case can be made for additional US manpower, we must have an iron-clad case that the use of Vietnamese manpower is screwed up to the maximum.

Against this background you should also know that the President is thinking in terms of asking our present fighting allies for increments in manpower on a basis proportional to population, to the extent that such an approach is realistic. Paramilitary and supply functions might enter into this community chest calculus.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

In addition, he is thinking of approaching the Malaysians, Indonesians, and even the GRC. In the latter case, of course, we would be seeking men for functions which would be least inflammatory. Through this channel and on a completely private basis, we would be interested in your observations on this approach and, in particular, what kinds of GRC manpower might conceivably be introduced in a way not merely acceptable to the GVN but with minimum noise in the international system.

Bill Leonhardt is with me as I draft and fully informed.

More generally, you should know that, as he faces the months ahead, the President is counting primarily on the stability of the political track and palpable progress in pacification to do the trick.

New subject. The President just called and asked if Ambassador Bunker would get to Ky and tell him he, the President, would be grateful if Ky would not repeat not discuss in public additional manpower requirements for Viet Nam.

~~TOP SECRET~~

131
Sent 6:07 PM
CONFIDENTIAL

VZCZCEEA257
PP VTE18
DE WTE 858

1967 MAY 4 22 04

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT AND MRS JOHNSON
CITE CAP67368

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 4, 1967

AP CARRIES A STORY FROM BOGOTA, COLOMBIA, REPORTING AN INCIDENT BETWEEN LYNDIA BIRD'S SECURITY DETAIL AND A COUPLE OF LOCAL NEWSPAPERMEN AT THE AIRPORT AT BARRANQUILLA YESTERDAY. THE LOCAL PRESS ACCOUNTS -- ON WHICH THE AP STORY IS BASED -- SAY THAT MEMBERS OF LYNDIA'S PARTY HIT AND KICKED THEM.

THE EMBASSY REPORTS THAT THE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE BUT THE STORIES ARE OVERDRAMATIZED. WHAT HAPPENED WAS THAT A PHOTOGRAPHER FROM "EL TIEMPO" (A HIGHLY RESPECTED BOGOTA DAILY) BROKE THROUGH A BARRICADE SET UP BY COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES AT THE AIRPORT TO RESTRAIN THE PRESS. A SECRET SERVICE AGENT TACKLED HIM AND ONE OF THE COLOMBIAN AGENTS KICKED HIS CAMERA AWAY. ORDER WAS QUICKLY RESTORED.

THE EMBASSY SAYS THAT LYNDIA HAS CONSENTED TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED BY THE PRESS UNDER ORDERLY CONDITIONS WHEN SHE ARRIVES IN BOGOTA TOMORROW NIGHT. THE EMBASSY DOES NOT ANTICIPATE FURTHER TROUBLES, ALTHOUGH "EL TIEMPO" MAY CONTINUE TO BLOW UP THE INCIDENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

DTG 042138Z MAY 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 129, NARA, Date 5-7-91

XEROX FROM THICK COPY

132

Sent 5:59 PM

1967 MAY 4 21 59

VZCZCEEA255
PP WTE16
DE WTE 859

FROM W. W. ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70251

UNCLAS

SUBJECT: ERHARD'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

SECRETARY RUSK THINKS IT WOULD BE FINE FOR YOU TO GIVE
A LUNCHEON FOR FORMER CHANCELLOR ERHARD DURING HIS VISIT TO
WASHINGTON. THE BEST DATE WOULD BE THURSDAY, JULY 13.
HOWEVER, JULY 14 WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

I RECOMMEND THAT YOU PLAN THE LUNCHEON FOR JULY 13 AND
APPROVE THE FOLLOWING DRAFT MESSAGE INFORMING THE FORMER
CHANCELLOR.

DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR:

I WAS DELIGHTED TO HEAR THAT YOU ARE COMING TO THE
UNITED STATES IN CONNECTION WITH THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN. I HOPE YOU WILL HAVE
LUNCH WITH ME ON JULY 13. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING
YOU IN WASHINGTON.

SINCERELY,

DTG: 042130Z MAY 1967

PRESERVATION COPY

67 MAY 4 PM 6:07

THURSDAY

~~TOP SECRET~~

May 4, 1967

Lunch with the President
Thursday, May 4, 1:00 p.m.

Agenda

1. Sensitive Targets (Sects. Rusk and McNamara)

Go or no go.

2. Follow-On Target Planning (Sects. Rusk and McNamara)

Possible preparation of staff work to define precisely what would be involved in the cut-back as discussed at previous meeting, including timing.

3. Pacem in Terris II (Sect. Rusk)

Should we field Mac Bundy; Ambassador Goldberg; no one?

4. Kennedy Round (Sect. Rusk)

Report on status of negotiations, including possible meeting of Foreign Ministers.

5. Other

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By h9, NARA, Date 5-7-81

Thursday, May 4, 1967
12:00 noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press Contact

1. As you know, I had dinner on Tuesday night (May 2) at the home of Charles Bartlett, with the following others present: Stewart Alsop, Hugh Sidey, Ted Weintal, Peter Lisagor, and Robert Lucas. In a long evening of rambling discussion, there were three main topics:

-- I initiated an exposition of what had been accomplished in the last year in foreign policy, outside Viet Nam: in Latin America, Africa, Europe and Asia;

-- Viet Nam, and especially its effect on U. S. politics;

-- To my surprise, and at their initiation, how to get across effectively to our people the qualities of President Johnson.

2. With respect to Viet Nam, they pushed me on whether I thought the war could be ended between now and the election in 1968. I explained at some length why I thought that things were moving in the right direction, but no one could confidently predict when the war would end or peter out. They tried to press me on troop increases and the future of our bombing policy; but I was able to turn them aside. There was considerable talk -- led by Peter Lisagor -- about the need to rally the whole nation in a major push in support of Viet Nam. He suggested that the country was not sufficiently involved. Perhaps the declaration of a state of emergency and mobilization would do it. He noted that even when families had sons out in Viet Nam, they tended to think of the war as some special queer event, not a national enterprise and commitment. There was some agreement among the others to this proposition, although not universally. (Weintal, in particular, is simply against the Viet Nam war on typical European grounds.)

3. After I had told them something of my experiences over the last year working here, and explained to them, as I understand it, your view of your historical mission as President, there followed a rather remarkable discussion in which they said, in effect, "We believe you; we believe President Johnson is a great President governing his actions by the highest historical standards; but how can he get this across to the people?" At one point, they turned on me and said, "This is your greatest duty to the President: to figure out how it can be done, and then persuading the President to do it."

4. I know that these are men who do not all reflect in their writings this kind of attitude; but I know them too long and too well (except Lucas) for them to dissemble with me. Their underlying respect and feeling of warmth towards you is greater than I would have credited.

5. As for the challenge they put to me, the answer will lie, in part, in the campaign of 1968; I am already turning my mind over on ideas for the campaign. But I do return to a suggestion I had made before; namely, that you tape perhaps two hours of quite relaxed and uninhibited talk with, say, a group of newspaper men like these; and then edit out an hour for presentation. There is no doubt at all in my mind that what you stand for and are trying to do comes through best when you talk informally without talking papers prepared by your industrious staff. For example, as you did to the SEATO Ministers and, I gather, to the Parliamentarians. No one comes away from such meetings without a new three-dimensional picture of the President: his objectives, motives, and the depth of his thought and feeling.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, May 4, 1967
11:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith George McGhee's
assessment of German public reaction
to the Bonn trip.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Bonn 13162

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ry, NARA, Date 5-7-91

135a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Thursday, May 4, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR McGHEE (Bonn, 13162)

SUBJECT: Assessment of the German Public Reaction to President's Visit

In assessing the broad reaction to the President's visit, we have sought to obtain the comments and impressions of the Germans whom we see in the normal course of business in order to supplement the media coverage. Each of the Consulates General has done the same. The present message is based on all of these sources.

We find that throughout the Federable Republic of Germany there is general gratification and appreciation that the President journeyed to Bonn to honor Chancellor Adenauer. This was widely seen as an honor also for the Federal Republic and -- as Munich reports -- as renewed evidence of America's commitment to Europe. In the judgment of our Consulate General in Hamburg, this aspect of the visit impressed the people more than the substantive talks with Kiesinger, which were regarded as a by-product of the main purpose of the visit.

Naturally, interest in the meetings with the Chancellor was strongest in Bonn. There was initially some skepticism evident as to whether anything substantial had been accomplished. There were also rumors that the President and Kiesinger had not hit it off. As a result of more mature reflection, aided by background briefings by the German side and in Washington and by the Embassy, these doubts have largely evaporated. We have found the politicians on the whole less inclined to take a wait-and-see attitude than the press. Political observers locally have commented on the importance of the direct rapport established between the President and the Chancellor, quite apart from the substance of what they had to say to each other. The main achievement is that they had succeeded in getting across to each other their special concerns. Munich also has found a feeling of "satisfaction" -- and a touch of relief -- that the President and the Chancellor have apparently established the basis for a friendly and fruitful relationship.

Frankfurt notes many comments that "the new leaf to be turned on consultations is most welcome." Munich has also observed

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 2.4

NI 91-446

at 112 MARA Date 2-3-92

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-2-

that the President's pledge on "constant, complete and full consultation" between the two governments is regarded as the essential basis for a more harmonious relationship in the future. Stuttgart found this pledge well, but somewhat skeptically, received.

In sum, the President's visit -- and particularly the promptness of his decision to come -- was much appreciated by all Germans. The meetings between the Chancellor and the President were considered to have had a successful outcome. They were clearly viewed by Germans as laying a needed basis for a reinvigoration of political cooperation between Germany and the U.S. Although it was recognized that certain difficult issues of substance remain to be resolved (in particular the Non-proliferation Treaty), the meetings aroused hopes and expectations that both countries will in the future show greater understanding for each other's special difficulties. Above all, the fact of the President's presence in Germany provided fresh assurance of the warmth of American friendship toward Germany, and appreciation of the Federal Republic as a close ally.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~May 4, 1967
11:00 am

MR. PRESIDENT -

You know Hammer--multi-millionaire, art connoisseur, donor of the Campobello International Park, cattle-raiser, petroleum magnate. As a man who knew Lenin and Mikoyan in the 1920s, Hammer has had good contacts among the Russian leaders. However, these contacts are somewhat less close now than in the Khrushchev era. There is a thick and mixed FBI file on Hammer, mostly concerned with Communist connections as a young man.

Hammer's description of his "mission" in 1961 for President Kennedy and Luther Hodges is genuine--but he somewhat exaggerates its importance and official character. If you give Hammer a go-ahead, he will probably magnify his mandate.

His idea is to tell the Soviets, in effect, that we will give them a lot of fertilizer plants to solve their food problem if they will settle the Vietnam war. (He himself has been trying to sell them fertilizer plants.) The Russians are not about to trade their Vietnam policy for some American plants--which they can buy anyway if they put a high enough foreign-exchange priority on such purchases. Hammer also exaggerates when he says the Russians 'may find themselves facing a famine.'

It would do no harm to encourage Hammer to renew his Soviet contacts and keep his ears open. However, I think you may want any such encouragement to be low-key, avoiding the implication that Hammer is a Presidential emissary.

W.W. Rostow

Attach. Memo Watson to President 5/1/67 re Hammer
w/attachments frm Hammer

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By sig, NARA, Date 3-17-93

May 4, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 91-452
By us, NARA, Date 2-5-99

Herewith draft telegrams for President Park, as instructed: One a message which might be published; the second, confidential. If you approve we will cable the message to Seoul for delivery by Ambassador Brown when the official returns are in.

Public message:

"Your efforts to set the Republic of Korea on a new course of economic and social progress based on democratic traditions, have won you an impressive vote of confidence in your own country. The free debate during the campaign and the large turnout of voters are evidence of the devotion of your country to democracy.

"The conduct of this election by your people confirms the strong impression of confidence and vitality I felt during my visit to Korea.

"I know how much is owed to you not only by the people of Korea but by the peoples of Asia and by free men everywhere.

"You have my warmest congratulations. May your next term of office bring to you and your people continued progress in every field. Sincerely."

Confidential message:

"As you know, we have just had General Westmoreland with us for an intensive review of the situation in Viet Nam. We shall be facing important decisions in the weeks ahead about which I shall wish to consult you and the leaders of the other fighting allies. But right now I would simply wish you to know how truly pleased I am that your courageous and wise policies have been rewarded by your reelection."

Messages approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - May 4, 1967

To: The President
From: W. W. Rostow

*sent to Rostow
by wire*

AP carries a story from Bogota, Colombia, reporting an incident between Lynda Bird's security detail and a couple of local newspapermen at the airport at Barranquilla. The local press accounts -- on which the AP story is based -- say that members of Lynda's party hit and kicked them.

The Embassy reports that the incident took place but the stories are overdramatized. What happened was that a photographer from El Tiempo (a highly respected Bogota daily) broke through a barricade set up by Colombian security forces at the airport to restrain the press. A Secret Service agent tackled him and one of the Colombian agents kicked his camera away. Order was quickly restored.

The Embassy says that Lynda has consented to be photographed by the press under orderly conditions when she arrives in Bogota tomorrow night. The Embassy does not anticipate further troubles, although El Tiempo may continue to blow up the incident.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 5-7-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 4-22-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 4, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israel's Independence Day Parade

Attached is Nick Katzenbach's second look at whether Ambassador Barbour should attend the 15 May parade in Jerusalem. This is his own concise memo, so I won't summarize here. He still comes out against attending.

The one point he doesn't make is the long-term one that any change in the status of Jerusalem can only come in the context of a larger Arab-Israeli settlement. We want to withhold formal recognition of Israel's position in Jerusalem as leverage for that day--should it ever come.

His memo makes sense. While we don't feel as strongly on this issue as the British, we don't think the Israelis are right in blowing this up as a major issue either. In fact, Wally Barbour reports that some Israeli newspaper editorials are already advising the government to relax. One even suggests that the Foreign Office tailor its invitations so as not to put us on the spot.

If you agree with Nick, I would suggest reading this line back to the Israelis in a low-key way:

- We do not feel this is a major issue and certainly intend no affront by it. Our relationship is based on far more important things.
- While we had hoped we might attend, a wide range of interests have led us on balance to a negative decision. They understand what these interests are.
- We hope they will not make an issue of this. One measure of a genuine two-way relationship is understanding of the other fellow's problems. Given the dimensions of our joint problems in the Middle East today, we just can't see having a fuss over this one and hope they'll agree.

W. W. Rostow

Approve Katzenbach's recommendation _____
See me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1474
139a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 2, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: US Attendance at Israel's Independence
Day Parade in Jerusalem

Israel plans to hold its Independence Day Parade in Jerusalem on May 15, and has requested that the United States be represented. The British have asked us and the French to agree not to send official representation to the ceremonies. They feel that in spite of the Israeli announcement that the parade will be "within the framework of the General Armistice Agreement," Western attendance would lend support to the Israeli claim that Jerusalem is their capital, thereby weakening the Western position on the international status of the city. The French take a similar position, and also fear political repercussions in Jordan. The Jordanians have protested the Israeli intention in a letter to U Thant on the grounds that it would violate the General Armistice Agreement, and have strongly urged us not to attend.

We found it difficult to justify non-attendance on the grounds argued by the British and French, since our people attended the Independence Day Ceremonies in Jerusalem in 1965 (the parade was held elsewhere) and the Knesset Inauguration there in 1966 without significant effect on our basic position. We therefore tried hard to get them to change their minds, proposing instead that we all attend the parade but on an understanding with the Israelis that this represented no change in our policy and on condition that the parade would not violate the terms of the General Armistice Agreement. They stand firm on their decision and have again urged us not to attend.

Under these circumstances, I do not think the United States should be officially represented. Our attendance would appear as a breach of solidarity with the other Western powers and would isolate us in the eyes of the Arabs just

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-446
By inf NARA, Date 2-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

when we are trying to hold the lid on the situation in Yemen and when the Lebanese are worried about their public's reaction to the visit of the Sixth Fleet scheduled for May 26.

RECOMMENDATION:

That I be authorized to inform the Israeli Government that the United States will not be officially represented at the Independence Day Parade in Jerusalem on May 15.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____



Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

139a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 2, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

VII 91-446

By *up* NARA, Dec 2-3-92

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

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RECOMMENDATION:

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APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____



Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~1. a. g.~~
2. Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - May 4, 1967

Mr. President:

The attached memoranda from Bill Gaud and Charlie Schultze recommend that you approve a \$5 million Supporting Assistance loan to finance an emergency urban development program in Santo Domingo. Linc Gordon and Ambassador Crimmins are the originators of the request.

The loan is designed to buy some insurance against social unrest and political tensions in Santo Domingo by generating employment for some 3,000 people through city improvement projects.

I do not agree with Charlie Schultze's comment that Balaguer is not as concerned about potential unrest in Santo Domingo as we are and is unwilling to spend his own money. He shares our concern over the danger of the disgruntled urban unemployed. John Crimmins is convinced that if Balaguer had the funds to spend on this program, he would do so. But he does not and would welcome our assistance. Where we differ with Balaguer is that he looks upon the urban program essentially as a means of reducing his security problem, while we think that by demonstrating the interest of the central government in the urban poor, he can build up political support which he very much needs.

The funds for the loan are available. While I would like to see us get away from Supporting Assistance in the Dominican Republic, I think it is in our interest to make this small investment to head off a potential source of trouble.

I recommend you approve the loan.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-452
By Wig, NARA, Date 3-17-93

W. W. Rostow

Approve loan ✓
Disapprove loan _____
See me _____

Attachments

- 4/24/67 Schultze to President memo
- 4/14/67 Gaud to President memo.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1472

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-452

By ing, NARA, Date 3-17-93

APR 24 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed \$5 million Supporting Assistance Loan
for the Dominican Republic

Bill Gaud has asked you to approve a \$5 million Supporting Assistance loan to finance an emergency urban development program in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. This will be in addition to the \$40 million Supporting Assistance loan authorized last June to finance investment expenditures in the Dominican budget. The final part of that loan was released last month and is fully committed to high priority programs in the rural sector.

AID Supporting Assistance funds for FY 1967 have been fully programmed, but the \$5 million requested for this emergency loan is available from the Contingency Fund.

The justification for this loan is purely political. Ambassador Crimmins reports that growing unemployment in Santo Domingo and increasing radical activity by the leftist opposition have created political tensions which threaten the stability of the Balaguer regime. The purpose of the loan is to reduce the possibility of a political explosion in Santo Domingo.

In January 1967 the city's budget situation forced the firing of 2,700 people. The emergency program to be financed by the loan will generate employment for 3,000 people on street and sewage projects, initiate an urban community development program, and expand loans to small businesses.

Unfortunately, President Balaguer does not regard the problem in Santo Domingo as seriously as does Ambassador Crimmins. Balaguer's position is as follows:

1. He views the problem as basically one of security.
2. He is not willing to spend his own funds for this program.
3. He is not convinced that this kind of program will improve his position in Santo Domingo, where opposition elements dominate the city.

In view of Balaguer's position, and the lack of self-help provisions, I would normally be reluctant to recommend this loan for your approval.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

But I do not feel in a position, in the case of a small \$5 million loan, to go against the judgment of Linc Gordon, Bill Gaud, and the CIA, all of whom agree with Ambassador Crimmins' assessment of the situation. The loan will be made from the Supporting Assistance appropriation which authorizes funds to promote political stability with no specific requirement for self-help as is required for development loans.

Bill Gaud, Linc Gordon, and Ambassador Crimmins agree that any future assistance to the Dominican Republic for urban programs should require greater self-help and be provided as a development loan.

Balance of Payments

The dollars made available under this loan will be tied to U. S. procurement. We, Treasury, and AID believe that the existing arrangements for the use of aid funds in the Dominican Republic could be improved to further protect our balance of payments. While there are political problems in doing so, AID is attempting to work out improved procedures with the Dominicans. Secretary Fowler concurs in authorizing this loan at this time.

Recommendation

We recommend that you authorize this loan with the understanding that every effort will be made to assure appropriate self-help efforts by the Balaguer regime in connection with any future assistance for urban programs.

(signed) ~~Charles L. Schultz~~
~~Charles L. Schultz~~
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1000

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Washington 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APR 14 1967

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority A10 10-16-95 guidelines

By JW, NARA, Date 4-22-99

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed \$5 million loan for emergency urban program in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

Loan Proposed

The Embassy/USAID in the Dominican Republic has requested immediate authorization of a \$5 million Supporting Assistance loan to finance an emergency program in the city of Santo Domingo.

(1) \$4 million of the loan will initiate employment-generating activities such as construction, reconstruction, and maintenance of streets, sewage systems and sidewalks in the poorest sections of Santo Domingo, giving one year's employment to an estimated 3,000 people.

(2) \$500,000 of the loan will sustain an urban community development program through 1967 and early 1968 when development lending will be possible.

(3) \$300,000 will expand an Artisan's Fund for loans to small business enterprises.

(4) \$200,000 will be used for small projects involving substantial community self-help.

Necessity for the Loan

The depressed conditions in Santo Domingo offer potentially explosive situations which can be exploited by leftist-oriented elements of the city. This urban concentration constitutes the major source of instability for the Balaguer government. To make matters worse, the fiscal problem of the city government is such that 2,300 city employees had to be dismissed in January 1967, and the city government has no resources for employment activities to relieve the situation within the next year. The Ambassador considers it essential to begin immediately a program to relieve the potentially dangerous political pressures which have been

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

increasing within the capital city in the last few months.

The Country Team intends to use this \$5 million program as a first step toward long-term urban development. A development loan will be prepared as a follow-up. However, the risk which exists right now in Santo Domingo will not wait for the preparation of a long-range project, which may take several months.

No one can guarantee that the \$5 million loan will prevent political difficulties in Santo Domingo. However, the employment-giving activities it will finance, the contribution to the urban community development program, and loans to small businesses will demonstrate to volatile elements in Santo Domingo that the Dominican Government is concerned about their welfare. Since the United States is deeply committed to safeguarding the political stability of the constitutional regime in the Dominican Republic, I believe that it is in the United States interest to follow the recommendations of the Ambassador. The Department of State concurs in this recommendation.

This loan will be used to finance local currency costs in the Dominican Republic. The dollars made available by this loan will be tied to purchases in the United States through special letters of credit under procedures which the Embassy is now attempting to improve, in cooperation with the Dominican Government, so as to assure a maximum increase of imports from the United States.

Recommendation

That you approve the authorization of this loan.

William D. Hall
acting for
William S. Gaud

Approved: _____

Disapproved: _____

Date: _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, May 4, 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Laos and Viet-Nam

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By kg, NARA, Date 3-17-93

Ambassador Bill Sullivan came in to see me Tuesday, and we had a good talk.

He noted the improvement in the general situation in Laos over the past few years. The attached maps show part of the story -- though we must always have reservations about this kind of graphic representation. The contrast between 1962 and the present is striking. Areas formerly under communist control have been cleared (especially north of Vientiane and eastward) and some formerly controlled are not at least disputed.

The Lao Army has pulled up its socks and, says Sullivan, is giving a good account of itself.

The best military element is the Meo irregulars under General Vang Phao, who is a real thorn in the side of the Communists.

Sullivan admits, however, that the Communists -- with the North Vietnamese in the vanguard -- could move westward pretty much at will if they chose to. Right now, they are focussed on South Viet-Nam.

The Ambassador described in detail the steps that have been taken to interdict NVN truck traffic moving south with supplies -- especially along the road net that has been developed just west of the 17th parallel's junction with the Laos border.

Road watch teams (40 at a time) are deployed along the road net at all times. Areas along the net have been cleared by bombing and defoliation. With improved radio equipment, the teams can call in strikes against trucks as they enter cleared areas. The reaction time is about 14 minutes average.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

He says more than 450 trucks have been destroyed in this fashion in the last year. He is convinced that with more intensive efforts we can block off most of the supplies along this route.

He notes that other main supply channels into South Viet-Nam are further south, along the Sihanouk trail, through Cambodia, and still further south in the Delta area from Cambodia.

He also notes that General Westmoreland now has authority to move strike forces into a zone about 20-kilometers wide along the Laos-South Viet-Nam border -- to hit enemy base areas and supply caches. This effort, Sullivan thinks, could be stepped up, too.

He is against any proposal to move large numbers of American troops into Laos as part of a barrier system.

He thinks:

- (1) it would change the nature of the war and arouse further international criticism;
- (2) justify Hanoi in taking a much more open role in Laos;
- (3) require huge numbers of men in blocking positions when aerial interdiction of supplies is effective and less costly;
- (4) be bitterly opposed by Souvanna who would probably condemn our action and/or leave for France -- in which case, Laos would be thrown into chaos.

Further on Laos, he notes:

- the political situation is reasonably stable;
- the king is a strong force for unity and confidence;
- Souvanna is dealing well with the military;
- the prospects for an improved economic situation are promising -- with a possibility of an exportable surplus of rice in five years.

This summarizes his report. I told him I would relay it to you.

W. W. Rostow

Atts.

~~TOP SECRET~~

PROCESSING NOTE (2/18/11)

Memos, vol. 27, May 1-15, 1967

Document #141

The original memo and the maps mentioned in the second paragraph are found in the NSF related oversize collection. Item number S-58. *A COPY IS ATTACHED.*

SERVICE SET

141

Thursday, May 4, 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Laos and Viet-Nam

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-452

By ~~1-8~~ NARA, Date 3-17-93

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27 fdb 3 of 4
Memos Vol ~~2~~
Box 16

~~TOP SECRET~~

Walt:

Re-write this --put on plain paper, cut your name off, cut off "memo to the President," classify it "top secret," and just say:
Memo, Subject: Laos and VietNam, Here is Bill Sullivan's report. Give it to Mike Manatos and have him take it to Mansfield and show it to him.

LBJ/mf
5-4-67
10:00p

The President's wishes relayed to ROSDW & B. JORDAN

by Jim Jones

MAY ~~1~~ 5, 1967
10 pm am

from the LBJ Ranch

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, May 4, 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~

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SUBJECT: Laos and Viet-Nam

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Sullivan admits, however, that the Communists -- with the North Vietnamese in the vanguard -- could move westward pretty much at will if they chose to. Right now, they are focussed on South Viet-Nam.

The Ambassador described in detail the steps that have been taken to interdict NVN truck traffic moving south with supplies -- especially along the road net that has been developed just west of the 17th parallel's junction with the Laos border.

Road watch teams (40 at a time) are deployed along the road net at all times. Areas along the net have been cleared by bombing and defoliation. With improved radio equipment, the teams can call in strikes against trucks as they enter cleared areas. The reaction time is about 14 minutes average.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NLJ 91-452
By: JOW/180 BIL/100 10-22-03

~~TOP SECRET~~

He says more than 450 trucks have been destroyed in this fashion in the last year. He is convinced that with more intensive efforts we can block off most of the supplies along this route.

He notes that other main supply channels into South Viet-Nam are further south, along the Sihanouk trail, through Cambodia, and still further south in the Delta area from Cambodia.

He also notes that General Westmoreland now has authority to move strike forces into a zone about 20-kilometers wide along the Laos-South Viet-Nam border -- to hit enemy base areas and supply caches. This effort, Sullivan thinks, could be stepped up, too.

He is against any proposal to move large numbers of American troops into Laos as part of a barrier system.

He thinks:

(1) it would change the nature of the war and arouse further international criticism;

(2) justify Hanoi in taking a much more open role in Laos;

(3) require huge numbers of men in blocking positions when aerial interdiction of supplies is effective and less costly;

(4) be bitterly opposed by Souvanna who would probably condemn our action and/or leave for France -- in which case, Laos would be thrown into chaos.

Further on Laos, he notes:


- the political situation is reasonably stable;
- the king is a strong force for unity and confidence;
- Souvanna is dealing well with the military;
- the prospects for an improved economic situation are promising -- with a possibility of an exportable surplus of rice in five years.


This summarizes his report. I told him I would relay it to you.

Walt. Rostow

Atts.

~~TOP SECRET~~





142

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] 3.3(b)(1)

Pres file

Thursday, May 4, 1967

Mr. President:

I am leaning pretty heavily on the intelligence community to be alert about next moves by the Soviet Union or Communist China. On the Chinese front there is nothing beyond the aircraft responses already reported to you.

On the Soviet front there is talk of surface-to-surface missiles. As you can see from this CIA summary, We have nothing clear yet.

But I did think you would want to follow this rather closely.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] 3.3(b)(1)

Possibility of New Soviet-type Weapons Being Introduced into the Vietnam War

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-3
By lis, NARA, Date 9-3-04

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Thursday, May 4, 1967

TEXT OF CIA REPORT

SUBJECT: Possibility of New Soviet-type Weapons Being Introduced into the Vietnam War

A continuing review of all available intelligence --
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] has provided no evidence that offensive missile systems are in or en route to North Vietnam.

Reports of Soviet Offensive Missiles for North Vietnam

We have several reports, however, alleging that the Soviets might provide North Vietnam with surface-to-surface missiles.

A. One report [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] have been prone to exaggerate and often have been unreliable on particular details.

B. The second report is from a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and the information he provides is suspect.

C. Apart from these two reports, we have others which, though less specific, have stated or implied that new levels and probably some new forms of military aid would be given to North Vietnam. These reports, together with the meetings in Moscow in early April between Pham Van Dong and senior Soviet officials, indicate that a new military aid agreement may have been concluded.

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-4
By isa, NARA, Date 9-3-04

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

The SS-3 is a ballistic missile which uses non-storable liquid propellants, is 67 feet long, and weighs some 60,000 pounds. It can carry a nuclear or conventional warhead of about 3,000 pounds to a range of approximately 650 nm with a CEP of 1.0 to 1.75 nm. This weapon, with its cryogenic non-storable propellant, would appear to be a particularly difficult weapon system to supply, maintain and operate in the environment of North Vietnam.

We note that the two sources [REDACTED] referred to surface-to-surface missiles only in general terms, which might cover the smaller, less sophisticated weapons systems. If the Soviets have, in fact, decided to supply surface-to-surface missiles to North Vietnam, the more likely candidates would include the 150nm Scud ballistic missile, the 300-nm Shaddock cruise missile, or the 45-nm Samlet coastal defense cruise missile. All of these are less complex, more mobile, and easier to conceal than the SS-3.

Surface-to-surface missiles, including the more complex medium range systems, if not detected in transit, might be difficult to discover promptly in North Vietnam [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Individual pieces of ground support equipment, as such, if not seen with the missiles or if not seen together in a pattern characteristic of a unit, could be misidentified.

Wednesday, May 3, 1967 -- 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will recall on the Bonn trip that you raised with me the problem of organizing the shop when Francis leaves. I told you then that I planned both to give Ed Hamilton more responsibility and see if I could get Ed Fried to come over here from the Department of State.

I am pleased to report that Ed Fried has agreed to come; and we shall plan to have him over here for some overlap with Francis, about August 15.

I made it clear to Ed Fried, however, that I could not invite him finally until I brought the matter back to you.

I should add that Francis, Ed Hamilton, and I -- all of who^m know Fried well -- believe he is just about the best we could get.

W. W. Rostow

Complete the deal _____

No _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rln

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 3, 1967; 5:50 PM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: New Canadian Invitation to EXPO-67.

Attached is the text of a note from the new Canadian Governor General renewing the invitation for you and Mrs. Johnson to visit Canada.

You will recall that you accepted an earlier Canadian invitation, and instructed us to explore May 23-25 as possible dates for the visit (May 25 is United States National Day at EXPO-67). The Canadians agreed to those dates, but we have never told them specifically when you would **be** coming. This letter is their latest attempt to pin us down to a **specific date**.

The renewed invitation gives you an opportunity to set a firm date, or to tell the Canadians that you and Mrs. Johnson will not **be able** to go to Canada this year. I personally recommend that you go (even if **only** to EXPO-67 for U.S. Day, without a side trip to Ottawa), but recognize that you may feel that this is not the time to make the trip.

Depending on your decision, I will draft either a letter of acceptance or regret.

Francis
Francis M. Bator

Prepare letter of acceptance _____

Prepare letter of regret _____

Speak to me _____

*I gave Ed Feltine
the negative message
as instructed
Walt (May 4)*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. President — SEC. RUSK MAY RAISE
THIS ISSUE WITH YOU TOMORROW

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By kg, NARA, Date 5-21-91

COPY

Dear President Johnson,

One of my first and most pleasant acts as the new Governor General of Canada is to renew the invitation which my late and lamented predecessor has extended to you and to Mrs. Johnson to visit Canada during our Centennial Year. I need hardly tell you that all Canadians, and my wife and I in particular, are looking forward to welcoming you both here. For me it will be a pleasure to renew the personal association begun some years ago at the NATO Parliamentary Association meetings in Paris, and to meet again one who has played such a momentous role since those days.

We promise you a most cordial reception in Ottawa, and I know that you will enjoy your visit to EXPO '67, to which the United States is making such a superlative contribution. Canadians value highly the warm friendship between our two countries, and your presence here at this significant moment in our history will strengthen and reinforce the many bonds which unite us.

Yours sincerely,

Roland Michener

Wednesday, May 3, 1967
12:15 p.m.

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

You will recall that I raised yesterday at lunch the likelihood that we would get noises from the Communists before they moved radically in Viet Nam.

[REDACTED]

3.3
(b)(1)(3)

into North Viet Nam. You will recall that [REDACTED] were used during the Korean war.

I suspect we will get a more authoritative message from Dobrynin.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET/SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-5
By isl, NARA, Date 8-3-05

145a

~~SECRET~~

3.3(b)(1)(9)

SOVIET COMMENTS ON AID TO NVN:

In conversation last week [redacted] asserted that US expansion of Vietnamese war has forced USSR to reassess its assistance program for North Viet Nam. According to Soviet, Dobrynin has been an advocate of US-Soviet detente, but Soviet military are insisting that all steps toward detente be halted. He said that results of increased aid to Vietnam would be apparent in two or three weeks and Saigon itself "might feel the effects." Also said Soviet pilots were eager to assist in defense of Hanoi.

3.3
(b)(1)(9)

[redacted] indicated USSR would have no choice but to furnish surface-to-surface missiles to North Viet Nam if so requested. [redacted] because North Viet Nam pilots have proven to be "physically unsuitable," Soviet and Chinese pilots disguised as North Vietnamese might be used in future.

Above remarks, consistent with frequently heard pronouncements of Soviet leaders of increasing aid to North Viet Nam, probably represent current Soviet military thinking.

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-6
By isl, NARA, Date 1-18-08

excerpted from OPS-INT SUMMARY 105-67
3 May 1967

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-87
By cb, NARA Date 1-21-01

145 b

Wednesday, May 3, 1967

TEXT OF CIA [REDACTED] REPORT (DB-315/01444-67) EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Nikolay Andrianovich Fokin, Section Chief in the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, said on April 25, 1967 that if Hanoi asks the Soviets for surface-to-surface missiles now, in light of the most recent escalation of the air war by the United States, the Soviets will have no choice but to furnish them. (Comment: Fokin has been ambiguous on this point [REDACTED] but source believes present unambiguity intended as warning to the U.S.) He added that in the event the Soviets did give the North Vietnamese surface-to-surface missiles, it would not be an escalation of the war by the Soviets but simply a response to recent U.S. escalation. The Soviet policy to avoid nuclear confrontation with the United States has not changed, he said. (Headquarters Comment: Other reporting indicates that Communist delegations to the UN reportedly are talking about the use of surface-to-surface missiles.) EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)>25Y (C)

Fokin stated that in a conversation with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V. Kuznetsov circa April 21, 1967, he had asked Kuznetsov whether the Soviets had arrived at a formal agreement with the Chinese Communists for ferrying Soviet military equipment, destined for North Vietnam, across Mainland China. (Headquarters Comment: Kuznetsov is attending the Fifth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly.) Kuznetsov replied that he was not sure concerning the terms of such an agreement but that he had the impression that the People's Liberation Army of China and the Soviet Armed Services had executed an agreement covering the transport of Soviet military equipment across China. Kuznetsov said that under the terms of this agreement, North Vietnam would assume custodial responsibility for the equipment when it crosses the Sino-Soviet border. Fokin remarked that this procedure should eliminate Sino-Soviet friction on this matter.

Fokin also stated that North Vietnamese pilots have proven to be "physically unsuitable" for any form of sustained combat in jet aircraft.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Because of this deficiency it is possible that Soviet and Chinese pilots, disguised as North Vietnamese, might be used in the future. He added that the Soviets are still pressing the Chinese to permit them to station Soviet planes in South China, but that the Chinese remain reluctant to grant such permission.

~~SECRET~~

Wed., May 3, 1967
5:15 p.m.

146

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

I asked for -- and promptly received -- this special report for you on the bloody and gallant Marine engagement at Hills 861 and 881.

Somehow I think it is an important event, although I can't tell you why.

W. W. R.

Attachment

1400

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS AT HILLS 861 AND 881 IN THE KHE SANH AREA

24 APRIL - 3 MAY

KHE SANH is a Marine outpost located approximately 9 miles from the Laotian border on Route #9. It is normally occupied by a reinforced Marine rifle company with the mission of conducting reconnaissance and surveillance operations on the north-west flank of QUANG TRI Province.

For some time this area had been relatively quiet but during the last two weeks of April there was an increase in contacts by reconnaissance units - particularly in the north. Sightings of several groups of enemy, with strengths up to 40 were made; these groups were taken under fire by supporting arms.

On April 24th, a reconnaissance observation post located on the lower slopes of Hill 861 (3 miles NW of KHE SANH) made contact with an enemy force of unknown size. In order to exploit this contact, made by recon elements, a platoon from KHE SANH moved into the area. Heavy contact was made almost immediately and continued throughout the day; an additional platoon was committed. The ferocity of this initial contact is indicated by casualties suffered by the Marine units - 13 KIA and 17 WIA.

As a result of this contact and increased sightings of enemy units, a battalion command group (3rd Battalion 3rd Marines) and a company (K/3/3) were moved from the ROCK PILE (15 miles to the east) to the point of contact by helicopter on 25 April. Reinforcing the company normally located at Khe Sanh, an attack was commenced against Hill 861. The attack was met by heavy fire from the well - entrenched enemy in very rugged terrain.

On the 26th of April, the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Marines (the Special Landing Force) which had landed on the coast to the east of QUANG TRI City in Operation BEACON STAR was lifted by air to KHE SANH. This battalion was moved to the scene of action to reinforce the attack.

Because of the large number of caves, bunkers and trenches in which the enemy was located, the attacking elements pulled back from Hill 861 in order to permit saturation of the area by artillery, Marine air and 2 B-52 strikes. After the heavy strikes by supporting arms, the Marines continued the attack

on 28 April. By 1700, the Marines occupied Hill 861. Night defensive positions were established and preparations were made to attack Hills 881 North and South which were an extension of the ridge leading to Hill 861. The intensity of the combat for Hill 861 is indicated by the 26 KIA and 53 WIA the Marines suffered. Only 16 enemy bodies were found but there were indications that the enemy carried away his dead when he withdrew from Hill 861.

On April 29th, the attacks continued against Hill 881 (North) by the 2nd Battalion 3rd Marines and against Hill 881 (South) by the 3rd Battalion 3rd Marines.

In the attack against the southern hill; both assault companies were heavily engaged. Close air support and artillery were employed. The enemy took advantage of the rugged terrain and extensive entrenchments. The hill was secured on the 30th of April.

Concurrently, at Hill 881 N, the Marines reached the summit on the 30th but the enemy resisted strongly. A total of 180 confirmed enemy were killed in the attacks against both Hills 881 N & S. The attack on Hill 881 N continued for three days with extensive use of artillery and Marine close air support.

Early on the morning of 3 May, the enemy attacked against the 2nd Battalion 3d Marines then occupying Hill 881 N. The enemy force was estimated at two companies (plus) and supported by intensive mortar fire. The enemy counterattack was repulsed by 1000 with 40 enemy confirmed killed.

As an indication of the extensive use of close air support (night and day), the First Marine Aircraft Wing flew 107 close air support missions on 1 May, dropping 184 tons of bombs..

Throughout the action, the enemy was well disciplined and made excellent use of rough terrain and supporting mortar fire; he fought from well entrenched, heavily fortified defensive positions. This required close coordination between Marine maneuver elements and their supporting arms. Without this coordination and heavy use of supporting arms, air and artillery, Marine casualties would undoubtedly have been much higher.

Total Marine casualties since 24 April are:

119 KIA
300 WIA

Enemy casualties are 455 enemy confirmed killed and an additional 450 probable.

PRESERVATION COPY

The Commandant of the Marine Corps talked with General Walt this morning in regard to the action at KHE SANH. General Walt had just returned from the KHE SANH area. The following information was obtained from General Walt:

It appears that the enemy was making preparations for an eventual attack against the KHE SANH outpost. Three badly wounded PW's were captured who are being interrogated; their parent unit has not been identified. The battalion commander estimates that at least a regiment of the enemy, if not more, had been occupying Hills 861 and 881. The enemy is expected to make additional counterattacks but the situation is well under control.

General Walt, based on his personal observations, described the bunkers and caves. Stated there were "hundreds" and that they were covered with 8 layers of logs and 2 to 3 feet of dirt. Artillery fire was ineffective against the caves and bunkers. They were knocked out by aircraft of the First Marine Aircraft Wing using 1,000 and 2,000 pound bombs with delay fuzes.

General Walt was most laudatory in describing the actions of the troops who fought and defeated a tenacious enemy who had taken advantage of neutral territory, to infiltrate troops in order to achieve local numerical superiority, and rugged terrain in the hopes of inflicting a psychological defeat on the Marines. Instead the enemy suffered a stinging defeat.

PRESERVATION COPY

Wednesday, May 3, 1967
4:30 p. m.

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Ambassador Bunker's first report.

His orderly, judicious mind, plus the spirit
in the last paragraph will, I believe, hearten
you.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET/NO DIS attachment~~

(Saigon 24624)

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Wednesday, May 3, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon, 24624)

Herewith my first weekly telegram:

A. General

I have spent the major part of my first week here in on the job training trying to familiarize myself with organization and the activities of the Mission, getting briefed by members of the Council on the status of our major programs, and trying to get a feel for the situation here. In this connection, I have found that Ambassador Porter's willingness to continue on here until May 5 is of inestimable value. His vast store of knowledge about the situation here which includes the work of the Mission both here and in the field, personnel, and his personal relationships with members of the Vietnamese government have been of inestimable value. Ambassador Locke, who arrived May 1, will be working closely with Ambassador Porter also until the latter's departure May 5.

General Westmoreland arrived yesterday and reported to me today on his talks in Washington, and we had a preliminary talk about organization of the pacification program, about which I shall report separately after Bob Komer's arrival and I have had an opportunity to talk further with him and General Westmoreland. In this connection, I have reported separately statements made by both Thieu and Ky relative to their views on pacification. Both have said the right words, and it remains to be seen whether deeds will match the words. I have no doubt of their intentions, but I am sure that they and others engaged in the program which has to be primarily a Vietnamese effort will need the most effective and efficient support we can render.

B. Political

The political scene is mixed. To summarize: Elections for Village Councils have now been successfully completed, with an over-all turnout of 2,511,455 or 77 percent. Although the Viet Cong killed 12

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS/CBS 10By ics, NARS, Date 11-28-83

candidates and kidnapped 31, they were not able to disrupt or discredit the elections. At the nation level, the critical question of the military candidacy remains unresolved, with some signs of tension increasing among certain of the military. The Electoral Law is nearing completion as the Assembly discusses the draft law in plenary session. While in general the draft appears to be a satisfactory document from our point of view, provisions to ensure that the winner has a respectable mandate and provisions to ensure equal means for all candidates are weaker than we had hoped. Moreover, relations between the government and the Assembly are uncertain, with resentments and suspicions continuing on both sides. In the First Corps, morale has improved since the additional American forces arrived, but there is still much anxiety there over the possibility of a major enemy thrust. The militant Buddhists so far have proved unable to find either the issue or the allies to make trouble. May Day was marked by orderly meetings, and the effort to turn the meetings into anti-government and anti-American demonstrations failed completely. The rebel Montagnard leader, Y Bham, finally came to Banmethout to meet with Government of Vietnam representatives, and a preliminary agreement was reached.

The Military Candidacy

The rivalry between Thieu and Ky for the military candidacy continues, and it now seems likely that this vital question will not be resolved until after the Electoral Law is completed. So far as we can determine, the stance of both men remains essentially unchanged from the last reports sent in by Ambassador Lodge. Ky says that he is waiting for Thieu to make up his mind, that Thieu's vacillation has tended to discredit him, and that opinion polls show that Thieu is a weaker candidate than Ky himself. Ky is also planning various measures to develop popular support. Thieu takes the line that he asked all of the generals for their support at the meeting just prior to the promulgation of the Constitution, and that he then made it clear that he wants to run. However, he also indicated that his decision will not be final until after the Electoral Law is completed. In a talk May 2 with Foreign Minister Do, which the latter reported to us, Thieu reaffirmed this position and also his earlier idea to organize some kind of popular civilian "convention" to support him. He also intimated to Do that if the Americans wanted a civilian, he would be willing to step aside. It seems to me that this may be a tacit admission that he realizes that his position has weakened and that such a maneuver might eliminate Ky and insure for himself a top position such as Prime Minister or head of the Armed Forces.

Both Ky and Thieu assured Ambassador Lodge that they would not engage in a conflict which would endanger military unity. When I called on Ky April 28 he told me he was confident that there would be unity among the military and no coups. He is reliably reported to believe that he can persuade Thieu to step aside, without rancor. However, General Thang told Lansdale on April 29 that he now fears the matter has dragged on so long that neither Ky nor Thieu can hope to muster wholehearted support from the other. Thang said that he and some of the other generals are discouraged.

I will be giving careful thought to how we should now proceed on this delicate and crucial question. I will, of course, have constantly in mind our two basic principles: preventing serious division within the military and achieving maximum national unity between the military and the civilian elements.

Local Elections

The fifth and last Sunday election for Village Councils was held April 30. The total number of Village Councils elected was 984 out of approximately 2,500 villages in South Vietnam, with 12,719 candidates competing for 8,948 seats. This is a ratio of 1.4 candidates for each seat or ten candidates for every seven seats. The number of people voting was 2,511,455, considerably more than the Government of Vietnam predicted. This indicates that perhaps 6,500,000 people, or 50 percent of the estimated rural population, live in villages where security is sufficient to allow the establishment of elected village governments. This is encouraging, although not inconsistent with our previous estimates of security in the countryside. The reason for the Government of Vietnam's underestimation is their tendency to be conservative in predicting election successes plus the lack of readily available and accurate statistics. If one adds to this rural population, the population of the urban centers, it is apparent that a substantial percentage of the population of South Vietnam is under the control of the Vietnamese Government.

The second phase of village elections will begin July 1 and continue indefinitely. The second round is for those villages where security was judged inadequate during the first phase but subsequently improved. The Government of Vietnam has tentatively scheduled more than 200 such additional elections for this year, which would mean elections in slightly less than one-half of the villages in the country.

Elections for Hamlet Chiefs will now be held on five successive Sundays, beginning May 14. Some 4,500 Hamlets out of a total of about 11,000 will hold elections.

Although the Viet Cong were not able to disrupt the village elections, they were undoubtedly a major consideration behind the relatively low ratio of candidates to seats, 1.4 to one. Threats against candidates included statements that successful candidates would be killed after their elections. Thus, the security of elected village officials remains an important continuing problem: although we have no reports as yet of assassinations of these new officials.

Coupled with recent increases in attacks on Revolutionary Development cadre, the continuing Viet Cong effort to intimidate elected village officials may be taken as evidence of their respect for the current Government of Vietnam political offensive which is based on free elections. If we and the ARVN can step up our efforts to provide protection for these officials and for the Revolutionary Development teams, I think the Viet Cong's use of terror against this basic political reformation will do much to discredit them with the population generally.

The Assembly is now considering the draft Presidential Election Law in plenary session. It closely resembled the law prepared for the Assembly elections of last year, and in general appears to be an adequate document. However, there is no provision for a run-off election and the budget allotted to Presidential candidates is too small.

The failure to provide for a run-off means that the winner may not have a respectable mandate: in the expected field of at least four serious contenders, the winner could conceivably squeak into office with as little as 26 percent of the vote. The Government is known to oppose provision for a run-off, probably because the military believe that in a single election the "civilian vote" will be scattered among a number of candidates, thus giving a military candidate a better chance. Ky was unresponsive to my suggestion that there should be a requirement for the winning candidate to receive some minimum percentage of the vote in order to enhance his domestic and international stature and that in the event of a failure to receive such a percentage, a run-off election would be desirable.

The Law does provide against a plethora of candidates, however. Presidential candidates must be "introduced" either by 30 Assembly Deputies or by 30 Municipal or Provincial Council members. This provision is not likely to bar any of the serious contenders, but it probably will keep the total down to about four.

The Electoral Law provides that candidates will be able legally to spend only about five million piasters for their campaign. This is considerably below the minimum figure of 20 to 50 million which most politicians say is required to finance an adequate national campaign. In practice we expect that most of the candidates will spend more than the legal limit. Vietnamese generally believe this provision favors the Government candidate because they expect the Government candidate to be able to use some military personnel and civil servants as campaign workers. The Government candidate will also have certain advantages available to an incumbent in office, e.g., he can make radio and TV speeches which are "non-political" and he can take well publicized actions and tours in the course of his official duties.

First Corps Situation

Although morale has recovered somewhat in the First Corps from the low point immediately after the attack on Quang Tri, there still seems to be a general feeling in Hue that the city will be hit sooner or later. There is also a current rumor that Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces will be written off by the Allied forces, and the Viet Cong allowed to take over there. The movement of additional American troops into the area plus an improvement in the supply situation in Hue has tended to ease but not entirely erase these fears.

Enemy intentions are not clear. There are a number of reports which indicate that the enemy intends to make a major effort to get control of all or part of the area. The enemy may calculate that a spectacular victory of some sort in the First Corps is needed either to bolster enemy morale or as the prelude to negotiations. For this reason, we are inclined to take the threat seriously though we do not believe the enemy has the capability to take and hold any large area now under Allied control. The enemy may reason, for example, that the occupation of Quang Tri City or Hue for even a few hours could be exploited psychologically as a major victory thus undermining morale. I have reported Ky's view that the enemy intends to launch major attacks against Quang Tri City and Hue in the near future and that he has infiltrated a 450-man assassination/sabotage team into the area.

While the population remains apprehensive, our personnel in the First Corps report that there is no panic. A few people have left, but the majority are digging in. We are working closely with the Government of Vietnam on measures to improve the situation. On

our side we are stepping up our psyops effort in Quang Tri and Thua Thien as well as increasing military forces there. A U.S. Armed Forces television station is expected to be operational in Hue by May 15. The problem in the First Corps remains basically military, however. When the population is convinced that the forces on hand can protect them and prevent any major enemy victory, morale will return to normal.

While it is evident that the enemy is now concentrating on northern First Corps, it may be that the enemy will try a major thrust in the western highlands rather than the First Corps. If this is the enemy strategy, then the present effort in the First Corps is diversionary. Thieu is very definitely of this opinion. He feels that the central highlands are the enemy's main objective and that he will attempt to develop and strengthen his position there during the coming monsoon season. His reasoning is that here they have a rear sanctuary in Laos and Cambodia, maximum protection from the terrain, and an ideal position from which to launch attacks from the central plains.

Montagnard Rebels Reach Preliminary Agreement with GVN

After many false starts and complete failure to appear at the designated rendezvous on April 15, rebel Montagnard leader Y Bham finally came out of his forest retreat in Cambodia and met with Vietnamese Government representatives on May 1 and 2. The two sides agreed on a joint communique which commits the forces organized under Fulro to come out of Cambodia and "return wholly to the national ranks" after the Government meets their request for special legislation on Montagnard rights and facilities. The special legislation is to be drawn up by a Congress of Montagnard tribes convened for the purpose.

Y Bham first met May 1 with Government of Vietnam and American representatives in a jungle clearing near the Cambodian border. Y Bham was given written guarantees of his safety signed by Prime Minister Ky, General Vinh Loc, and Ambassador Lodge. After some discussion with the Darlac Province Chief and an Embassy officer, he agreed to come to Banmethout to meet with General Vinh Loc.

The discussions in Banmethout consisted mostly of lectures by Vinh Loc, but it became evident that Y Bham was interested only in one point, the special legislation covering Montagnard rights known as the Statut Particulier. The Government of Vietnam is willing to cede that point even though Government leaders believe that the guarantee for ethnic minorities in the Constitution are quite adequate. Thus,

agreement was reached, and though Y Bham returned to his refuge in Cambodia, there is now reason to hope that the Fulro problem may be near a final political settlement. Although it will probably be generations before all the social and cultural problems of this backward minority can be resolved, such an agreement could mean that the threat of further armed Montagnard revolts such as those of 1964 and 1965 will be ended in the near future.

C. Chieu Hoi

The number of returnees for the weeks ending April 14 and 21 were 693 and 642, respectively. This represents a sharp decrease from the seven previous weeks when the total was 1,000 or more every week. It was expected, however, that the rate would fall at least temporarily during the period of local elections. The end of the TET campaign and the step-up in enemy activity in the First Corps may have been additional factors contributing to the decline.

The figures for the past two weeks are still well above the comparable levels last year. Those figures were 314 and 385, respectively. The total number of returnees so far this year is 13,086, which can be compared with last year's overall total of 20,242.

D. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending April 22, the enemy killed 126 civilians, wounded 86 and kidnapped 100. In the week ending April 29 the enemy killed 38 civilians, wounded 56 and kidnapped 46. The dead included 13 Revolutionary Development workers, three Hamlet Chiefs, two candidates for Village Council, and four Chieu Hoi returnees.

E. Economic

Prices were down again in the past two weeks, with the Saigon Retail moving downward to 252 and now standing at 254, as compared with the last previous report of 258. This level should be compared with the recent all-time high of 284. Prices of imported goods also fell, the Index for the past two weeks being 224 and 218. This compares with the last previous report of 228.

Leading the recent decline in prices is rice. The Saigon rice stocks are up, and deliveries are good. While rice prices are now moving downward, farmers in the Delta apparently profited

from the recent high levels. Merchants in Bac Lieu, for example, report increased sales to farmers of pumps, boat motors, sewing machines and radios, the increased sales are attributed directly to higher paddy prices this year.

F. Visit to Port Area

As part of continuing orientation, I visited the Saigon Port on Saturday, April 29, and was pleased to see significant progress being made. An extensive tour of both new Port and Saigon Port areas by automobile, boat and helicopter shows a busy but orderly port. It is obvious that there is first rate cooperation between GVN/US Army and USAID officials. I discussed the situation with Vietnamese at management level and was impressed with their capability and willingness to accept advice. I am already convinced that the key to most of our problems here (not only in the Port) is motivation toward better performance on the Vietnamese side and the generation of real Vietnamese desire to solve problems. When this occurs as in the case of the Port, then the results are most encouraging. Indeed, I think what has been accomplished in the case of the Port is a near miracle, and those responsible for this achievement deserve great credit.

As an example for progress at Saigon Port, in November of 1966, 1600 barges were under load with one thousand of them thirty days or older. At the time of my visit only 581 were under load with 359 over thirty days old and this due primarily to failure of importers to get their goods rather than problems related to unloading. Perhaps most significant example of progress is that in January 1967, 35 ships with 200,000 tons of commodities were waiting at the mouth of the river to get into the Port. At present, there is no waiting time and ships move directly to berth for unloading.

Although there are still improvements to be made in administration and operation, I believe past problems relative to congestion and confusion in the Port area are things of the past.

G. Return of Wives to Saigon

I find that the matter of wives returning to Saigon is more complex than I had thought and am not yet prepared to make a recommendation. I believe there are important advantages in permitting

wives to return in the effect this would have on morale and in making possible longer tours of duty. This especially important in this part of the world in view of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of Westerners being able to cope with the subtleties of the Asian mind in a brief period of 18 months. The result is that many people leave just as they are beginning to become effective. This is especially true on the civilian side as the military has the advantage of speaking a more common language.

On the other hand, there are very real problems involved such as housing facilities and services. Wives would no doubt accept almost any conditions initially (such as sharing a house with one or two others), but there might be pressures over the long haul to achieve a manner of living commensurate with that of the normal post. Also, while the morale of those officers permitted to bring their wives would no doubt improve, there is concern among some in the Mission regarding possible adverse effects on officers not able to do so, such as those unable or unwilling to be separated from their children and those stationed in the provinces where in most cases, lack of housing and security would make an untenable situation for dependents.

Perhaps some alternative solution may prove more acceptable such as permitting wives additional visits here on holidays or establishing a quota for each Agency and authorizing wives to return during second tours as an inducement for especially good officers to remain.

I am studying this problem and will expect to make a recommendation shortly.

H. Conclusion

During all of the talks which I have had over this past week, in my briefings, and in the many contacts I have had with both our civilian and military personnel, some things have impressed me deeply. I have found on the part of everyone with whom I have come in contact a universal spirit of cooperation, of dedication to the great effort in which we are engaged here, an awareness of its vital importance and a determination that we shall succeed. This is a heartening thing to experience and I wish that all our people at home could see and feel it. We have ability and talent here, we have conviction, and I have faith that we shall come through.

Wednesday, May 3, 1967, 12:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NSC Discussion of European Problems

Leonard Marks hopes that there will be time in the NSC discussion of European problems for him to raise the difficulties USIA is encountering in Europe. He would like to give you a summary of what is being done to overcome the increasing difficulty of communicating with Europeans.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:BKS:amc

Wed., May 3, 1967
10:30 a.m.

149

MR. PRESIDENT:

As Art McCafferty notes to me,
this is a heartening report on the
South Vietnamese air force (see
last paragraph for conclusion).

If we are patient we shall see, I believe,
a similar maturing in their ground
forces.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET/TRINE~~-attachment

*Supplement
South Vietnamese Air Force --
a maturing fighting arm
3 May 67
DIA Intelligence Summary*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-5
By isl, NARA, Date 7-28-05

Wednesday, May 3, 1967
10:15 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Ambassador Ed Ritchie called to say he is going to New York Friday noon, where he will meet his Prime Minister.

He would be grateful if he could bear at that time some message on "the President's travel plans in May" with respect to EXPO-67.

I confined myself strictly to receiving his message.

W. W. R.

Wednesday, May 3, 1967 -- 8:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

I am seeing Axel Springer, the well-known German journalist, at 11:00 a.m. this morning.

Do you wish to see him?

Do you wish to await a report from me on his general attitude and mood before deciding?

W. W. Rostow

Arrange appointment with Marvin _____

Will not see him _____

Report and I will then decide _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday - May 3, 1967

Mr. President :

The Panama negotiating team informed Jack Irwin this afternoon that Foreign Minister Eleta is coming to New York next Monday, May 8.

Bob Anderson will meet with him on Wednesday, May 10, and on following days, as necessary.

The outstanding issues continue to be compensation, jurisdiction, land areas and duration of the lock canal treaty. Jack Irwin has narrowed the gap on jurisdiction and compensation since the Summit meeting. The key to the final solution continues to be compensation. The Panamanians accept our formula tied to income from Canal tolls but disagree on the amount. They want much more than the traffic will bear in terms of toll increases.

Bob Anderson will be pressing Eleta for a settlement of pending issues as rapidly as possible. We are not sure whether Eleta will try to maneuver for a meeting between you and President Robles to gain advantage on compensation. Our strategy will be to press Eleta for agreement, ad referendum, on all questions, leaving how you and Robles announce a successful conclusion of negotiations for subsequent decision.

I will keep you posted on the progress of the Anderson-Eleta talks -- although I imagine Bob Anderson will probably be reporting to you directly.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By lig, NARA, Date 3-17-93

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Personal Message from
Prime Minister Holt

Handwritten:
~~Long~~
2 (over) 12

Australian Ambassador Waller hand delivered the attached letter to you from Prime Minister Holt which is principally concerned with his reaction to British proposals involving withdrawal of their military forces from east of Suez.

We are engaged in drafting a reply for your consideration.

We have sent a copy to Secretary Rusk.

Handwritten: 151

W. W. Rostow

WWR:BKS:amc

~~Secret~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By ing, NARA, Date 3-17-93

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-161
By cb, NARA Date 10-19-00

3rd May, 1967

Dear Lyndon,

First I must thank you for your invitation to talk with you in Washington on 1st June - and my thanks also for your kind offer of an aircraft and accommodation for myself and party at Blair House.

I greatly look forward to our meeting, because there is much of common interest to discuss, and it will be most timely to canvass the implications of British intentions East of Suez before the talks both you and I will be having with Harold Wilson.

I gather from his messages that Paul Hasluck has kept Dean Rusk fully informed about the views I have been putting to Harold Wilson and to the Heads of Government in New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. We have greatly appreciated the robust attitude taken by Dean Rusk. I shall not go over the ground in detail now.

You will know how troubled we have been to learn of the British proposals leading to withdrawal by the mid-seventies, and how strongly I have expressed myself in relation to them. We had such firm assurances individually from Wilson, Stewart, Healey and Bowden - quite apart from those in the British Defence papers of February, 1966, and February, 1967 - that, although we retained some doubts about their resolution, we were unprepared for the suddenness with which an entirely different picture was presented and the tone of finality in its presentation by Brown in Washington and Healey in Malaysia and Singapore. I hope that George Brown has reported back the strength and identity of feeling shown by the United States, Australian and New Zealand spokesmen in Washington.

Harold Wilson replied to my message giving me an assurance that no final decisions will be taken until he and I have an opportunity for full discussion when I meet him in London in June. Reading the messages which have come from various sources, I cannot close my eyes to the possibility that the British Cabinet has discussed its situation fully and is far advanced towards final decisions of a particular kind. But I nevertheless propose to trade heavily on Wilson's assurance that there are not yet any final decisions, and that there is to be full consultation with me and consideration by their Ministers of our views before they come to decisions. Australia and New Zealand are both deeply involved with Britain in the existing Commonwealth Defence arrangements which have persisted over a period of time, as indeed are the host countries of Malaysia and Singapore. I will be at pains therefore to bring home the responsibilities of partnership and to argue, and to sustain the argument, that the partners, other than Britain, have earned the right to consultation and concerted examination with Britain on these matters. I am not thinking merely of discussing aspects of timing, troop dispositions, base facilities, and so on. What I want to do is look ahead to preserving or developing with Britain and the other Commonwealth partners, concepts to ensure the security and stability of the area. What I want to do also is to find out if there are some British Ministers who would like to see Britain stand by its traditional role and who would like to resist the new fallacies, and if so, I will try to add my support to their view, since I regard it as the realistic view. I have asked Wilson that whatever decisions his Government makes as to reduction of military forces East of Suez, in no circumstances should it be presented as a final withdrawal - he should both publicly and privately keep some options open.

The Governments of Singapore and Malaysia have reacted much more mildly in public than their real feelings would have warranted. They have made known to us their apprehension that a more dramatic reaction would touch off a chain of unfavourable consequences for them, resulting, among other things, in loss of confidence in their future by investors, industrialists and others who could be playing a helpful part in their development, and even weakening their security. The very mildness of this public reaction makes it, of course, the more difficult for Australia and New Zealand to press our own views publicly as vigorously as we feel them.

Just as I hope to trade on the assurance of no decision as yet, so I hope that you also can and will. The course which Britain appears to have set must cause you great concern - not necessarily so much in the matter of the loss of defence potential, but in matters such as the stability and confidence of Asia, your own presence in Asia and, in fact, British/American cooperation in the wider world sphere. I would have thought that we, for our part, but also you particularly, must seek to persuade Britain back into a full role in world affairs.

There is much hard thinking to be done about the implications and the possibilities before June, and I am putting my own people to work on these as well as doing some hard thinking about them myself.

What Britain has done in the past in South-East Asia has been large and significant by any standard. I value greatly their contribution to the peace and stability of the area, and I do this quite apart from considerations of our own ties of kinship which have been the source of our

own history and our own response to Britain's call in two world wars. Britain, with Australia and New Zealand, but principally Britain herself, has foiled two separate attempts to introduce Communist strength, both politically and militarily, into the Malaysian region.

It is, I feel, a great disadvantage that none of the leading figures in the British Cabinet has that realistic awareness of Asia which can only be produced by personal contact with the countries and their peoples. None of them has felt, as you and I have, the stir of change there, and the interest - even excitement - they are finding in their social, political and industrial development. It saddened me, during my own most recent tour of Cambodia, Laos, Taiwan and South Korea, to find no reference in any country to Great Britain or the part it could play. It was as though England was, in substance, turning its back on three-fifths of mankind, with its role and influence rapidly diminishing in this area of the world. If Harold Wilson succeeds in taking Great Britain into the E.E.C., there will be a further diminution of British influence and interest in the area, and of the interest of others out here in Great Britain.

We shall all be better informed about these matters by the time we meet, and I greatly look forward to the opportunity of exchanging thoughts with you.

Yours sincerely,

Harold Holt.

Pur file

May 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Brief Interview with Indian Boy, 12:15 p.m.,
Thursday, 4 May

George Koshy, a 17-year old Indian from Kerala state, came to the U. S. with the aid of Detroit and New York clergymen for an operation on a rheumatic heart by Dr. De Bakey. Happily, Dr. De Bakey has decided that no operation is necessary and that the boy can go home with a prescription for a normal life. He and his father are coming in "to thank the President of such a generous people."

The boy's father will be with him. He is a Communist turned Christian and regards his son's new lease on life as a miracle worked by the combined hand of God and the Americans.

The only purpose of the call is for them to say, "Thank you," and for you to express your personal interest in Indians as individuals. This will help project you as a man who cares about individuals even while grappling with Vietnam, huge budgets, Indian famine, The Great Society, etc. In response to their thanks, you might make these brief points:

-- Human need cuts across national boundaries. You are pleased that the help of individual Americans has made it possible for us to share our medical science with individual Indians such as he.

-- You rejoice with him if he returns to India with renewed hope for a full life. You would like him to take back to his friends the warm good wishes of his new friends here.

George Christian is arranging suitable publicity so your meeting will receive full play in India.

W. W. Rostow

cc: George Christian

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Tuesday, May 2, 1967
7:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Your breakfast meeting tomorrow morning
at 8:30 a.m. with Senators Mansfield and Morse.

Herewith Nick Katzenbach's statement of
the pros and cons of going to the UN at this time
on Viet Nam. I have marked an important passage
on page 4 bearing on timing.

As you gathered at today's lunch, Sec. Rusk
thinks, on balance, we can go ahead, but play it
low key and try to make it appear credible.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By ing, NARA, Date 3-17-93

~~SECRET - LIMDIS~~Possible Recourse to United Nations on VietnamThe Proposal

1. The United States would request an early meeting of the Security Council in Geneva to consider the following proposal:

(a) A call by the Security Council for immediate discussions among the interested parties to discuss the Vietnam conflict and proposals for a solution.

(b) A Security Council invitation to the Governments of North and South Vietnam, Communist China, our troop contributor allies, and the ICC powers to participate in the Security Council debate.

(c) An indication by the United States that we would be willing to have the Security Council hear the views of a representative of the NLF under Rule 39.*

Arguments in Favor

1. It would help demonstrate that the United States is determined to pursue every possible method which might lead to a peaceful and honorable settlement. Senators Mansfield's and Morse's endorsement of the proposal could help obtain broad public support.

* "The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence."

DECLASSIFIED**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6****NLJ 97-97**~~SECRET - LIMDIS~~**By is, NARA Date 6-9-97**

~~SECRET - LINDIS~~

- 2 -

2. It would indicate that we take seriously our responsibilities as a UN member, and that we are again pressing the United Nations, despite its reluctance to face up to its responsibilities, to grapple with situations endangering peace.

3. It would underscore the willingness of the United States to submit to the collective judgment of the appropriate international deliberative body its position regarding the problem of Vietnam.

4. If nine affirmative votes can be obtained in favor of adoption of the agenda, the SC debate might possibly open some new diplomatic avenue towards a peaceful settlement. At the very least, direct contact with Hanoi, the Viet Cong, Peking, the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, and the members of the International Control Commission, if it could be achieved, might put into train some new dialogue.

5. If the Security Council agreed to inscribe the matter, it is highly unlikely that the other side would consent to participate in the United Nations debate nor act within the UN context. If this should happen, they would bear a substantial part of the onus for the collapse of the initiative.

6. In the past we have sought to avoid putting the Soviets on the spot unduly in hopes they would press Hanoi towards a peaceful solution. Since the Soviets are not being helpful to this end at this time, we need not hesitate in putting them in the docket.

Arguments Against

1. It is unlikely we can get the nine required votes in favor of adoption of the agenda. We squeaked through in January 1966, with a ninth vote to get the agenda adopted

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~~SECRET - LINDIS~~

- 3 -

by applying maximum pressure on Jordan. The present composition of the Security Council is not as good as a year ago. The likely vote would be:

For adoption of agenda:	(7)	Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Japan, UK, US
Against:	(5)	Bulgaria, France, India, Mali, USSR
Abstain:	(3)	Denmark, Ethiopia, Nigeria

Maximum pressure would have to be applied on Denmark, Ethiopia, and Nigeria.

2. Since it is very doubtful that nine affirmative votes could be secured for adoption of the Security Council's agenda, this failure would be construed as defeat for the United States and lack of support in the world for our Vietnam policy. Even limited consultations to explore possibilities will become known and have an adverse effect if we stop consultations in midstream for lack of support.

3. A number of Americans do not today understand why the UN has been unable to act in this critical peace and war issue; an abortive attempt to get the SC convened would contribute to further deterioration in the support of the UN in this country.

4. The United States would be pressed to make concessions. The pressure would be on us to suspend unilaterally the bombing of North Vietnam. While we could probably prevent adoption of such a proposal, we would be on the defensive on this key issue. (The vote in favor of unilateral cessation of bombing could go as high as to include the following: Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Ethiopia, India, Mali, Nigeria, USSR and even possibly Canada.)

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~~SECRET - LIMDIS~~

- 4 -

5. Since the proposal comes at a time of intensified military activity and in the context of well known Communist opposition to UN involvement, the Soviets, many of the nonaligned, and even some of the friendly countries will interpret our move as a cynical ploy. Such a proposal regrettably would not be taken as a credible one on our part. It therefore would not win broad international support and clearly place the onus on the other side as we would wish.

6. If the SC decided to take up the case, there would be pressure on us at least while the SC deliberations were in train to refrain from stepping up military operations. We risk serious criticism if we raised the ante on the battle field while we talked at the United Nations, or as a minimum we would be on the defensive.

7. Hanoi is likely to see this move as a sign of weakness and irresolution despite our military successes, and its position would be bolstered internationally if it successfully blocked SC consideration by its opposition.

8. Our troop contributor allies, including South Vietnam, will tend to interpret this move as a nervous reaction motivated primarily by domestic considerations. Saigon will have to be pressed to acquiesce in a proposal which would permit the Viet Cong to be heard in the SC, even in a lesser status than governments.

Timing

The timing of any SC consideration should be weighed carefully in relationship to our military operations; undertaking such a move in a period of intensified military activities would increase our problem in the UN and make the move appear less credible. In any event, China is President of the SC in May which makes for added special problems. If any move is made in the SC, it should await the assumption of the Presidency by Denmark in the month of June.

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~~SECRET - LIMDIS~~

- 5 -

Scenario:

1. The US would consult with: (a) the UK; (b) our troop contributor allies, including Saigon; (c) other key members of the SC (France, Japan, Canada, Brazil, etc.); and (d) SYG Thant.

2. Assuming reactions are generally favorable, Ambassador Goldberg would transmit the attached letter (Tab A) to the SC President, as well as the resolution (Tab B).

3. On the day the SC is convened, the US would lead off the debate in favor of adoption of the agenda and organize supporting speeches and votes to this end.

4. If the agenda is adopted and Hanoi and Peking refuse to participate, as is likely, some possible further developments in lieu of further SC debate are: (a) a summary statement by the SC president which would reiterate a peaceful solution as the objective; and (b) a further letter from the US to the SC spelling out our "peace aims" along the lines of the fourteen points.

5. If would be theoretically possible, of course, to seek a special session of the General Assembly. However, the Assembly is a very unmanageable and cumbersome body and the risks to us would be considerable. Before any serious consideration should be given to the General Assembly, the opportunities and limitations of the Security Council route should be explored fully.

~~SECRET - LIMDIS~~



UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

DECLASSIFIED

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
New York, N. Y. 10017

WFO 6-23-66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Mr. President:

In February of 1966 the Security Council discussed the situation in Vietnam, a matter which today remains on its agenda. I request that the Security Council be convened promptly in Geneva to renew its discussion of the Vietnam problem with a view to achieving a peaceful and honorable settlement acceptable to all concerned.

The United States is willing to discuss all proposals with respect to the conflict in Vietnam, without conditions and with appropriate participation by all interested parties. We believe that the Security Council, under the Charter, has both an opportunity and a responsibility to insure that every possible step is taken to initiate discussions looking toward an end to the war and a peaceful solution.

For this purpose, the United States proposes that the Security Council invite to its discussions the Governments of North and South Vietnam, the Peoples Republic of China, representatives of those governments with military forces in Vietnam, and member governments of the International Control Commission. The United States also proposes that a representative of the National Liberation Front be invited to participate in the discussion in accordance with Rule 39 of the Council's Rules of Procedure.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-446

By WJ NARA, Date 2-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
- 2 -

It is our hope that the Council will address itself promptly and energetically to the problem.

I am attaching a draft resolution for consideration by the Security Council.

Sincerely,

Arthur J. Goldberg

Enclosure:

Draft Resolution.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
PRESERVATION COPY

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

Draft Resolution of the United States

The Security Council

Deeply concerned at the continuation and intensification of hostilities in Vietnam;

Conscious of the danger which these hostilities pose for the maintenance of international peace and security in general;

Mindful of its responsibilities for dealing with breaches of the peace, and for the settlement of the international disputes which cause them;

Desirous of contributing to a peaceful and honorable settlement of the conflict in Vietnam;

Recalling its decision of February 2, 1966 placing on its agenda the question of the situation in Vietnam;

1. Decides to discuss the question of Vietnam, in all its aspects, with a view to arriving at a peaceful and honorable settlement;

2. Invites the Governments of North and South Vietnam, Government of the Peoples Republic of China, the Governments of states whose military forces are engaged in Vietnam, and the member government of the ICC not a member of the Security Council to participate in the discussions;

3. Invites the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam to participate in the discussions in accordance with Rule 39;

4. Calls on all concerned to lend their best efforts to the constructive implementation of this resolution;

5. Requests the Secretary General to assist as appropriate in the implementation of this resolution.

Tuesday, May 2, 1967
7:00 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Re Bill Baggs and Pacem in Terris II.

Sect. Rusk and I agreed Mac Bundy would be a good representative -- if we wanted to have one. (George Ball doesn't want to do it.)

I sounded out Mac. He will be in Europe exploring the East-West Management Institute. He feels it inappropriate for him to speak as a private citizen while on a Presidential mission. But he will do the job, if you ask him to.

Sect. Rusk does not recommend a government official.

W. W. R.

Ask Mac to do it _____

Goldberg _____

The Vice President _____

Leave as it is and rely on Sen. Brooke _____

See me _____

Pres file

Tuesday, May 2, 1967

6:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

**After the war you'd better
put these fellows to work in Texas!**

W. W. Rostow

~~*Top Secret - Eyes Only*~~ attachment

~~TOP SECRET "EYES ONLY"~~

PROJECT COMPATRIOT (TS)
WEEKLY REPORT #6

157-2
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-444

By inf, NARA, Date 3-12-93

A. Period Report - 21-27 April 1967.

B. General - The WC-130 crews expended 184 seeding units and the RF-4C crews an additional 104 units on six missions, for a total of 288 units, more than double the expenditure of any previous week. Last week's munitions problem was alleviated by modifying some other types of munitions to perform as desired. An additional 1700 units were received at OL-2 on 30 Apr 67, relieving the munitions problem. Results: Fifty-six clouds or cloud groups were seeded, of which twenty-seven were unobserved after seeding. Of the observed cases, nineteen are judged successful for a success rate of sixty-six percent.

Intelligence Summary: FAC Reports on 20 and 21 Apr indicate deterioration on Route 96 and adjacent routes between Routes 923 and 165. Mud holes at numerous locations necessitated repair. Several large areas of successful seeding occurred on Missions 67-32 and 33 roughly over and to the east of these routes. Successful seedings occurred in the vicinity of Route 8 in Delta sector on Missions 67-31 and 33. On 21 Apr, FACS reported that the road had numerous water filled craters in it. Poor weather on 22 Apr hampered intell operations especially in STEEL TIGER north. On 23 Apr numerous reports cited water on the major LOCs and extremely muddy conditions primarily between 16-45N, 105-45E and 17-20N, 106-10E. Route 23G was in very poor condition and almost flooded out. What little truck traffic that had passed appeared to have "Churned through". Standing water and mud were reported on portions of Routes 911 and 912. Mission 67-34 produced an extensive area of seeding between 17-30N and 16-20N over most of echo sector. Route 96 was reported rutted with standing water on 23 Apr. Mission 67-34 produced successful seeding parallel to and east of the route and Mission 67-35 produced successful seeding over the northern portion of the route. On 24 Apr, Routes 23F and 23G were still in poor condition but the other major LOCs throughout the panhandle were open with few signs of deterioration. Several successful seedings occurred primarily east of the LOC network. No effects of the runoff have been observed as yet.

C. Refined Analysis of Missions 67-26 thru 67-32 Data received since last week's report permitted analysis of one unknown case as successful for a success rate of thirteen of twenty-two or 59 percent. Intelligence Summary: Heavy Rain was reported by a roadwatch team in Mu Gia pass throughout the night of 17 Apr. Mission 67-29 produced a large area of successful seeding 20NM Northwest of the pass. Light westerly flow may have moved these

~~TOP SECRET "EYES ONLY"~~

targets into the pass area over night. Standing water was observed by FACS on Routes 23 and 91. A target was seeded in the same vicinity on Mission 67-29 but no results were observed. Significant effects were correlated with Mission 67-31 and 32 and were discussed in Section B.

D. Forecast of next week's activities: Missions will continue each day, using both WC-130 and RF-4C aircraft. Frequency of seedable clouds should continue to increase with the expenditure of munitions to remain at over forty per day.

~~TOP SECRET "EYES ONLY"~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET "EYES ONLY"~~

1576

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS OF AFFECT
OF COMPATRIOT ON LOCS

21 Apr Water filled craters

17 Apr Rain all night

17 Apr Standing water

23 Apr Standing water and mud

17 Apr Standing water

3 Apr-Numerous reports
water on major
LOCs

24 Apr Poor conditions

23 Apr Very poor condition almost
flooded out

20-21 Apr Deterioration, numerous mud
holes requiring repair

23 Apr Rutted, standing water

~~TOP SECRET "EYES ONLY"~~

Tuesday, May 2, 1967
6:30 p. m.

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a memorandum from brother Gene on where we stand in finding the extra \$190 million. The answer is -- as indicated in attached table -- he has rounded up \$255 million with the possibility of some additional debt relief from Germany, Britain and others.

Of this increment, \$186 million is "hard": the grain from consortium members; food production resources; expected non-consortium grain; and the additional IBRD loan.

Some part of the pipeline speed-up is incremental; and debt relief is very helpful if not truly "hard." Thus, depending on the outcome of the debt relief business, I think we shall be able to make a pretty good case on the Hill despite the Rube Goldberg character of the arrangements.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

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cy to [unclear]
May 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow

SUBJECT: India Food

Walt:

I am rather cross. The official memo proposing a new allocation of food for India has been creeping slowly from agency to agency. We are trying to jar it loose today.

(We really do need that Executive Order.)

While waiting for this state paper, which contains the latest version of the Indian food picture, I attach my reporting cable, Paris 15623 of April 6th, which still stands, albeit with some nibbling at the figures (which was to have been expected!)

As you will recall, the Consortium agreed on a target of \$1,300 million, a figure which includes \$900 million as normal development aid, and \$400 million for food aid; our 3 million tons, worth \$190 million; the Canadian wheat valued at \$50 million; \$25 million in estimated contributions by non-Consortium members; and a balancing figure of \$115 million from the Consortium, to achieve full matching of our \$190 million for food aid.

We have two objectives in this exercise in food matching. First, we sought acceptance by the Consortium of the principle that food aid is an integral part of the Consortium's work and a legitimate goal for concerted international action; and second, for the second half of this calendar year, we sought additive food matching for our 3 million ton contribution. We were seeking pledges to match our offer either in food or in resources which released money to buy food, without reducing the resources available to India for other urgent import needs.

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Authority State ltr 10-10-78

By rg/ip, NARA, Date 5-7-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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We have achieved our first objective and we are well on the way to the second.

As you can see in the following table, a total of \$97.6 million has been firmly pledged so far in the form of food or food producing items, which we believe are in addition to regular aid programs. And a further amount of at least \$60 million should be made available through the utilization this year of older appropriations which for a number of reasons the Indians had been unable to use in the past. Both the French and the Italians have liberalized their lists, and will make fertilizer and other food-linked commodities of high import urgency available from the pipe-line. The use of such funds, of course, involves each government in actual new expenditures but not in new appropriations legislation. At a heads-of-delegation meeting, I asked for firm, realistic assurances of amounts that could actually be delivered from this source. The answer was that \$60 million of these unused and often unuseable funds will be mobilized. It will probably be sometime before we know to what extent this effort to speed up the pipe-line will in fact release funds with which the Indian Government can buy food.

In addition, the IBRD has offered to make a new loan in the form of a debt standstill of \$77 million. This sum is additional to the Bank's expected pledge to the Consortium, i.e., it raises the total amount available to India. This loan is contingent on commensurate action on debt relief by other major creditors. Germany is the key factor here, and we have had indications that affirmative action on debt relief by Germany is likely around the middle of May. Since this bank loan is clearly additional to normal Consortium targets, its availability would make it possible for other Consortium members to make further contributions to food aid, largely in the form of debt relief, without reducing the foreign exchange resources available to India to support its development and import liberalization programs.

We also expect additional grain contributions later in the year from non-Consortium countries such as Australia, the Soviet Union and possibly others, which may total as much as \$20 million.


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One further item: the UK has offered \$33 million in debt relief, contingent on the same sort of commensurate action by others as the World Bank loan. A substantial portion of this may also turn out to be additional, but this will depend on the final figures for the UK total aid contribution for this calendar year.

The real test of the success of this food matching exercise will be whether India is able to meet its 10 million ton import need without sacrificing the resources it requires for its other urgent development requirements. In this respect, India has already made commercial orders and received, or is expecting, gifts from non-US sources assuring it of about 2.2 million tons of grain against the target of 3.4 million tons from others. Since India has indicated it will spend another \$50 million on grain as soon as the World Bank loan can be drawn upon, at this point in time, it does seem that imports will reach 10 million tons this year.



Eugene V. Rostow

Attachments:

1. Paris 15623
2. Table

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Food Aid Offers
(\$1 million)

	<u>Grain or Other Food</u>	<u>Food Production Resources</u>	<u>Firm Debt Relief</u>	<u>Total</u>
Austria	1.0	--	0.4	1.4
Canada	52.0	10.0	1.9	63.9
France	4.1	--	--	4.1
Japan	--	7.0	6.2	13.2
Germany	--	10.0	--	10.0
Scandinavia	--	5.0	--	5.0
	<u>57.1</u>	<u>32.0</u>	<u>8.5</u>	<u>97.6</u>

Non Consortium (expected)				20.0
---------------------------	--	--	--	------

Pipe Line Speed Up

Italy	30	
France	17	
Netherlands	3	
U.K.	<u>10 *</u>	<u>60.0</u>
		177.6

IBRD Bank Loan (Additional) (Contingent)	<u>77.0</u>
	254.6

* This figure understates the
U.K. contribution - See above.

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Authority State ltr 10-10-78By rglip, NARA, Date 5-7-91

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 15623

From EUR

SUBJECT: MATCHING THE U.S. FOOD AID OFFER

1. THE CONSORTIUM MEETING AGREED ON A PLANNING TARGET FOR THE YEAR OF \$1,300 MILLION, A FIGURE WHICH INCLUDES A NORMAL AID GOAL OF \$900 MILLION AND A FOOD AID COMPONENT CONSISTING FOR: (A) OUR THREE MILLION TON PLEDGE, (B) THE CANADIAN PLEDGE, (C) \$25 MILLION IN ESTIMATED CONTRIBUTIONS BY NON-CONSORTIUM MEMBERS AND (D) A BALANCING FIGURE OF \$120 MILLION FOR THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CONSORTIUM.

2. OF THE TARGET OF \$1,300 MILLION, \$400 MILLION WOULD BE IN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS RELIEF, IN A FORM EQUIVALENT TO CASH, TO BE MADE AVAILABLE EITHER BY NEW LOANS, THE RESCHEDULING

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 15623 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OF LOANS, OR OTHER DEVICES WHICH WOULD RELIEVE THE INDIAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF CASH OBLIGATIONS DURING THIS YEAR, AND THUS MEET THE INDIAN DEBT PROBLEM.

3. I STRESSED AT THE MEETING THAT OUR OBJECTIVE WAS TO ASSURE THAT INDIAN FOOD NEEDS BE MET WITHOUT REDUCING THE FLOW OF REAL RESOURCES NEEDED TO MAINTAIN THE RHYTHM OF INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. IN THIS CONTEXT, TWO SPECIFIC WAYS OF MATCHING OUR EMERGENCY OFFER OF 3 MILLION TONS OF ADDITIONAL DELIVERIES THIS YEAR EMERGED: (A) NEW PLEDGES, CLEARLY ADDITIONAL TO NORMAL AID PROGRAMS; AND (B) CRASH EFFORTS TO UTILIZE APPROPRIATIONS FROM PREVIOUS YEARS IN ORDER TO INCREASE ACTUAL DELIVERIES OF FERTILIZERS, PESTICIDES, AND SO ON DURING THIS CALENDAR YEAR. SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS SAID THEY WOULD REVIEW THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES URGENTLY TO THIS END, AND THE ITALIANS ARE HAVING A SPECIAL MEETING IN NEW DELHI FOR THIS PURPOSE LATER THIS MONTH. THEY HAVE ALREADY BROUGHT THEIR PIPE-LINE DOWN FROM MORE THAN \$100 MILLION AT THE TIME OF MY VISIT TO ROME DOWN TO \$74 MILLION AT THIS POINT. THE BRITISH INSTITUTED SUCH A SPEED-UP SEVERAL

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Authority State 10-10-78
By Ng/ep, NARA, Date 5-7-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- PARIS 15623 APRIL 6, 1967

PAGE 3 RUFNCR 15623 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

YEARS AGO, AND HAVE ACCOMPLISHED A GREAT DEAL BY DOING SO. THE USE OF SUCH FUNDS OF COURSE INVOLVES EACH GOVERNMENT IN ACTUAL NEW EXPENDITURES, BUT NOT IN NEW APPROPRIATION LEGISLATION.

4. THE RECAPITULATION OF RESULTS TO THIS POINT IS AS FOLLOWS: ITEM (A) FOR EACH COUNTRY REPRESENTS AN ADDITIONAL SPECIFIC EXPENDITURE OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS REPORTED AT THE MEETING AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR MATCHING EFFORT, ITEM (B) ADDITIVE DELIVERIES REPORTED AS "REALISTIC ESTIMATES" AT THE HEADS OF DELEGATIONS MEETING THIS MORNING, TO BE PROCURED BY SPEED-UP FROM THE USE OF APPROPRIATIONS OF PREVIOUS YEARS. AUSTRIA, (A) \$1. MIL; CANADA, (A) \$46 MIL; FRANCE, (A) \$4 MIL, (B) \$17 MIL; GERMANY, (A) \$11 MIL; JAPAN, (A) \$7 MIL; U.K., (A) AND (B) 41/\$51; ITALY, (B) QUOTE AT LEAST \$30 MIL UNQUOTE; BELGIUM, WILL REPORT SOON, POSITIVE RESPONSE ASSURED; NETHERLANDS, (B) \$3-4 MILLION, TOTAL (A) \$69 MIL, (B) /\$91 - 102 MILLION. THE TARGET OF FULL MATCHING UNDER THE RESOLUTION IS \$190, A FIGURE WHICH SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE AN ESTIMATE OF AT LEAST \$25 MILLION FROM AUSTRALIA, THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER NON-CONSORTIUM SOURCES.

IBRD PROGRAM OF INCREASING ITS AVERAGE LEVEL OF LOANS TO

PAGE 4 RUDNCR 15623 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INDIA FROM \$600 TO \$685 MILLION IS CLEARLY ADDITIONAL AS WELL FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF OUR PROBLEM UNDER THE RESOLUTION. IF COUNTED AS PART OF THE \$900 MILLION BASE OF THE \$1,300 MILLION AID TARGET FOR THE YEAR, IT WOULD ENABLE CONSORTIUM MEMBERS TO MEET MORE EASILY FROM THEIR PROJECTED APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE 1967/68 FISCAL YEAR THE ADDITIVE, FOOD- MATCHING PART OF THE TOTAL. THAT IS, IF WE LOOK AT THE OVERALL POSITION, THE BANK'S DECISION SHOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE OVERALL TARGET OF \$1,300 MILLION TO BE MET WITHIN THE PROJECTED PATTERN OF APPROPRIATIONS, WITH THE SPEED-UP TOTALS PROBABLY ASSURING AN OVERALL SURPLUS. IN ADDITION, SOME COUNTRY DEBT RELIEF MAY TURN OUT TO BE ADDITIVE AS WELL, I.E., IF ACCOMPLISHED BY CENTRAL BANK LOANS. IN SHORT, THROUGH BUDGET ALLOCATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE EFFORTS, OUR CONSORTIUM PARTNERS AS A GROUP ARE MAKING A STRENOUS SERIOUS AND COMMENDABLE EFFORT TO MATCH OUR FOOD AID PROPOSAL. THEIR DECISION TO ADHERE TO THE FULL \$900 MILLION GOAL FOR REGULAR AID, DESPITE THE INCREASE IN THE BANK'S LOAN, IS IN EFFECT A DECISION ALSO TO ACCEPT THE CHALLENGE OF OUR MATCHING FOOD OFFER.

BOHLEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, May 2, 1967
5:15 p.m.

154

MR. PRESIDENT:

Our visitor in New Delhi reports on some
Indian matters which may interest you.

W. W. R.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By AG, NARA, Date 5-7-91

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-1-99

Tuesday, May 2, 1967

Text of Cable Sent to Walt Rostow from Howard Wriggins of the NSC Staff

The Regime

All hands agree Mrs. Ghandi has personal courage and seeks to free Congress and India from the old Congress shibboleths. But she lacks political leadership qualities and much, therefore, rests on Desai, tough minded but hardly supple. Apart from Bengal, all opposition state leaders, including the Communists in Kerala, are acting responsibly and working well with the Center Ministers and officials, though important cruxy issues, such as investment allocations, are still to be faced. Food supplies are so scarce no responsible Chief Minister dares do away with Zonal Barriers, though the Southern "surplus" states are supplying Kerala and the Northern states are contributing to Bihar (attempting to get hard data on how much).

PL 480

Arrivals fell substantially below the advice given to the President in December that 900,000 tons a month could arrive during the first quarter if Presidential decisions made on the schedule were actually adopted. According to data supplied by AID, actual arrivals of all sources was as follows: January, 540 thousand tons; February, 755 thousand tons; March, 820 thousand tons; probables: April, 805 thousand tons; May, 845 thousand tons; June, 905 thousand tons; now expected for July only 665 thousand tons; August, 200 thousand tons.

Lower arrivals during the first quarter are contributing to the present difficulties in Bihar, though even a full 900,000 tons monthly would not have avoided serious hardships. The monsoons starting in June or July will complicate local distribution and adversely affect rations as the food shortage reaches its peak in August/September. However, it is still urgent to authorize full PL 480 negotiations as near to 3 million tons as matching permits soonest. Hope you can expedite.

Indo-Pak Relations and Arms Race

I will reserve major comment on Indo-Pak relations until after my Pakistan visit is completed. Officials in Delhi say they fear

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that the new defense policy has again raised Pak hopes of forcing a change in Kashmir when they profess to believe Paks had about given up at last. Public reaction to our policy is substantially less than expected in part because of public Pakistani criticism of the new policy. When Lokh Sabha reopens next month, intense reaction is expected, depending somewhat on the rate and magnitude of spares decisions and arrivals in Pakistan.

On defense budgets, critical decisions are now pending in both countries. There are now some hopes Desai may be able to hold the budget 5 per cent below last year which, in view of devaluation and price rise, is more than that in real terms. Such restraint is likely to be contingent upon the subsequent Pak defense budget which comes in June, though our arms policy is said by some Indian officials to make such restraint more difficult, depending somewhat on the pace and publicity of our implementation.

Tuesday May 2, 1967
4:45 p.m.

160

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your signature is
the letter to Pope Paul, as
approved at lunch today.

W. W. R.

Attachment

May 2, 1967

Your Holiness:

Vice President Humphrey has informed me of your gracious and helpful audience with him, and I have carefully studied your message on the pursuit of peace in Viet Nam.

As you know, no subject has weighed more heavily on my mind than how to bring about a peaceful, humane and honorable settlement to this tragic war. For that reason, I deeply appreciated your comments on our acceptance of the Secretary General's most recent proposal for peace.

You asked particularly if we could not restudy the possibility of halting the bombing over North Viet Nam. As you know, we have three times suspended our bombing in an effort to explore the readiness of the other side to make a constructive move toward peace. Each time we have not only received a negative response, but Hanoi has utilized these periods to accelerate the dispatch of men and supplies to the South.

Nevertheless, I wish to reaffirm that my Government is prepared to take this first step toward peace as soon as we receive any reasonable assurance, private or otherwise, that our action is being met by an appropriate reduction in hostilities by North Viet Nam.

My Government and the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam have most recently endorsed and expanded a suggestion by the Canadian Government that both sides in Viet Nam withdraw their forces from and cease all hostilities in the Demilitarized Zone and areas extending ten miles north and south of the Zone, subject to International Control Commission (ICC) supervision. Statements made in Saigon and Washington indicated we would be prepared to take even further and much more significant mutual steps to de-escalate and end the conflict.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By ijg, NARA, Date 3-17-93

Unfortunately, Hanoi's initial reaction to this proposal has been harshly negative. Nevertheless, this offer and other proposals we have endorsed to bring about a peaceful settlement remain open, and we continue to hope that the North Vietnamese will reconsider their position.

I very much appreciate the efforts Your Holiness has undertaken toward finding a solution to the conflict in Viet Nam. We too will continue to explore every avenue toward a negotiated settlement of this tragic conflict. I look forward to continuing to receive your comments or suggestions and assure you they will receive our most serious consideration.

With great respect,

Sincerely,

His Holiness
Pope Paul VI
The Vatican

LBJ:WJJ:WWR:mz

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/93, State Dept. Guidelines
By W, NARA, Date 4-22-99

The visit of the Hon. Hubert Humphrey, Vice President of the United States of America, is truly appreciated by His Holiness Who expresses His gratitude for this courtesy.

The Hon. Mr. Humphrey is asked to transmit to the President of the United States of America the respectful greetings of His Holiness, Who follows with interest and sympathy the initiatives and the efforts of Mr. Johnson to set in motion negotiations for peace in Viet-Nam.

All know how much His Holiness desires an end to the conflict in Viet-Nam, which for many years has been the cause of mourning and indescribable suffering for the people there.

Aware of the danger that a continuation and extension of the war present, the Holy Father has made use of various means to favor the attempts to establish, between the belligerent parties or those in some way interested, a preliminary understanding which prepares the way for positive negotiations for peace. To that end, with telegrams addressed to Heads of State, with public appeals to world opinion, in personal meetings, diplomatic contacts and initiatives intended to remove difficulties and privations, in economic, social and religious fields, the Pope has sought to favor a climate of mutual understanding and confidence for that hoped-for meeting of the parties.

It is for this that His Holiness has learned with satisfaction and hope of the acceptance, on the part of the United States and the Government of Saigon, of the recent proposals for peace presented by the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Such proof of good will confirms the desire of the Government of the United States for an honorable and just resolution of the conflict.

There is no doubt that, in the same spirit, in accord with the authorities of South Viet-Nam, every other eventual initiative designed to favor such a most desired goal will be given consideration.

In particular, His Holiness cannot refrain from asking anew and with vigor the authorities of the United States to restudy the possibility of halting the bombing of the territory of North Viet-Nam, both because of the gravity of the bombings and because of the very unfavorable opinion which has been created in the whole world in this regard, and which now in fact prejudices in the conscience of a great part of humanity the moral position of the United States.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 99-161
By JSH, NARA Date 5-22-00

notwithstanding its military demands and its lofty intentions.

Such a gesture would gain for the United States gratitude and sympathy, and would contribute to paving the way for negotiations.

The United States has a grand moral and social mission to fulfil in this modern international society; it should continue to enjoy universal esteem and confidence, not only because of its power, but likewise because of its capacity to represent and to promote the ideas of progress, of peace and brotherhood in the world.

In this regard, His Holiness is pleased with the program of assistance which the United States already sponsors in favor of people in the stage of development, and in the name of Christ, He encourages such generous undertakings.

Vatican City, April 1, 1967

PRESERVATION COPY

Tuesday, May 2, 1967 -- 4:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

The Speaker says he will talk to Mrs. Sullivan if you wish him to. His problem: He's not sure whether she'll hit the ceiling and we'd all be worse off than before.

He wants you to understand that he will do whatever you wish and will be as tactful as he can be.

W. W. Rostow

Tell the Speaker to go ahead _____

Let Mrs. Sullivan be _____

See me _____

Pres. file

Tuesday, May 2, 1967
4:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

You saw a short account of this conversation of a North African with Chinese and North Vietnamese, but our information is so thin and this rings so true that I thought you would like to read the whole thing.

W. W. Rostow

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Authority State ltr 7-5-78

By reg/lip, NARA, Date 5-7-91

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Correspondent Simon Malley Visit to Communist China

In an hour long conversation on April 18, Mr. Malley freely (even eagerly) discussed his recent visit to Communist China with Ambassador Pedersen and Mr. Thatcher of the USUN Mission.

DISCUSSION WITH CHOU EN LAI (With a Mixture of Some Comments from Others)

The most important aspect of his trip was a two and a half hour discussion with Chou En-Lai on March 28. He had applied earlier but received no reply until he was fetched at 8 a. m. at his hotel and driven to Chou's office.

Soviet-U. S. -China Relations Chou emphasized the perfidy of the USSR and wanted to talk much more about the USSR than the US. He and all other leaders Malley spoke to repeatedly accused the Soviets of working in collusion with the US (and Malley was convinced they thoroughly believed what they said). Chou said this collusion dated back to Khrushchev's visit to Peking in late summer 1958 when, after arriving (he thought deliberately) an insulting day late, Khrushchev refused in a meeting attended by a number of officials to reaffirm the Soviet pledge that a US attack against China would be treated as an attack against the USSR. (The context of the period was one of possible Chinese moves against Quemoy and Matsu.) Chou En-Lai reviewed this to show the depth of Soviet perfidy in its relations with China. Since that discussion he said it had become clear to the Chinese that the USSR could no longer be counted upon as an ally. He felt it also marked the start of a new period of stiffened US attitudes to Communist China because the USSR let us realize the consequences of this decision. Subsequent events, such as the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, were described by Chou as no more than Soviet "scenarios" designed to show to the Soviet and Eastern European

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-446
By isp NARA, Date 2-3-92

people that US strength made it necessary to reach an understanding with the US and justified cooperation with the West; these events were nothing more than shams designed to build a base for a political posture of collaboration with the US. He accused the USSR of having abandoned its revolutionary zeal and support of the peoples of Africa and Asia and of having tacitly turned these areas over to the US as our problem.

Chou En-Lai accepted the "probability" of military confrontation with the USSR in the border regions but viewed this as a more or less permanent fixture in the relationship between China and the USSR, a confrontation involving conventional weapons and localized conflict only. In response to a question about Chinese territorial claims he said it was not in China's interest to have border frictions with the USSR, but it was in Soviet interest. He felt neither the Soviet nor Chinese people would tolerate a major attack of one on the other but that the Soviets would continue border harrassment.

US Relations During a discussion of Vietnam, Chou accepted Malley's remark to the effect that the entry of Chinese volunteers into fighting in Vietnam would lead to a major military confrontation with the US and that the US would not tolerate "sanctuaries" on the China mainland. He also seemed to accept the inevitability of ultimate war with the US. He said the US would be prepared to move in this direction once we were sure of the "stability" of the Soviet government, i. e., that such a move would not result in its replacement by one which would be hostile to the US. He expected that in the event of US-Chinese hostilities the US would start with contentional bombing but also foresaw that the US would eventually go to nuclear attacks as well. Contemplating this event he said the Americans know the Chinese likewise would tolerate no sancturaries and that Chinese troops -- which today number 4 million but which could be immediately increased to 50 million -- would move against all sources of attacks against China. Chou specifically mentioned Thailand, Laos, Japan and the Philippines. Asked by Malley if this would also include places more to the west (meaning India) Chou said that whatever the source of attack it would not be free from Chinese attack. Malley asked if Chou accepted the consequences of nuclear attack on China. Chou replied that the Chinese were not worried because they also had nuclear weapons. Malley asked if they had delivery systems. Chou asked if Malley was trying to learn their secrets, but went on to say that they were not worried about their ability to deliver nuclear weapons.

Chou En-Lai also said he had been considering whether or not to continue the Warsaw talks. Chou said he was inclined to break them off since their existence was exploited by Moscow's incessant propaganda as indicating US-Chinese collusion, but stressed that no decision had been taken.

Vietnam Malley said he had a strong impression that the Chinese would like to enter the Vietnamese war. When he asked Chou why China did not send volunteers in addition to military equipment Chou said he should ask the North Vietnamese and said China would send volunteers the day after they were requested. Chou added that the Vietnamese preferred for reasons of patriotism and national pride to handle the war with the US on their own. Chou credited them for commendable motivation but indicated skepticism that Hanoi could handle the US and made clear that while they were free to act as they saw fit, he thought it would be preferable for the Vietnamese to ask for Chinese volunteers. Chou also said he had told the Vietnamese not to accept Soviet military personnel since they would be "nothing more than CIA agents" and he acknowledged that one reason the Vietnamese were reluctant to call for Chinese volunteers was that Vietnamese and Chinese policies were not entirely coincidental.

Malley said the North Vietnamese Representative in Peking had confirmed that a Chinese offer of volunteers had been made. To Malley's query why North Vietnam did not take Chinese volunteers he had replied (a) they did not want Chinese, (b) that if they took Chinese volunteers, they would also have to take Soviet and Eastern European volunteers with resulting political complications for North Vietnam. He added, however, that "contingency" planning was then under way on the terms and conditions of the entry of Chinese volunteers into North Vietnam should such a decision be made.

Chou said he had also warned the North Vietnamese about the difficulties of dealing with the US. He told Malley the Pham Van Dong had cleared with him the North Vietnamese proposal to enter into talks with the US after a bombing cessation. "He was sitting right in the chair you are in," he told Malley. Chou said he told Pham Van Dong it was up to him to decide but had warned that any sign of compromise would be met by a stiffening of the US position and Hanoi would then be stuck with what it had offered. Nonetheless, they persisted and the US response showed the Chinese advice had been sound.

Chou En-Lai said it was not true that China was creating difficulties for the Soviet Union on the question of supplies to Vietnam and that this issue had been resolved. Chou explained that the USSR had built a false propaganda case to the effect that the Chinese were preventing transshipments to Vietnam but he acknowledged that these calumnies had the effect that the Soviets desired, particularly in Asia and Africa. Thereupon the Chinese had told Hanoi that it was up to them to make the Soviets stop this propaganda maneuver and Hanoi had sent a delegation to Moscow with the result that this matter was resolved. Chou did not believe that it would again be a problem. Malley said he had referred to a conversation between Chou and Ben Bella in Algeria in which Chou had said China was insisting on having full knowledge about Soviet shipments across China to Vietnam as indicating China had been interfering with the shipments. Chou replied that these were different matters and that his statement had not meant interference.

Status of Liu Shao Chi Both Chou (and to a greater degree Chen Po Ta) told Malley that the "Revisionists" started their work of undermining Mao Tse-tung in the late '50's. The election of Liu Shao Chi was cited as the first step by those who were willing to collaborate with the USSR in their long-term effort to replace Mao Tse-tung. Chou specifically linked him to the Soviet Union. Chen Po Ta responded to Malley's disbelief that Liu Shao Chi could have been guilty of treasonable actions by remarking that sometimes it was not until after a person was dead that one knew where his real sympathies lay and said that as long as Stalin was alive he was too powerful for his enemies but when he was "murdered" they revealed themselves. Similarly, Mao Tse-tung was too strong for his enemies and so they worked to groom their candidate, Liu Shao Chi, as a man who would be ready to replace him at the proper time.

Chou told Malley that only two days before (Sunday, March 26) had they (meaning the supporters of Mao) succeeded for the first time in isolating Liu Shao Chi in a meeting of the Central Committee. Earlier Liu had delayed a showdown on the grounds that it would be illegal to vote in the Central Committee because many members, principally his supporters, were not present. Chou indicated that meetings of the Central Committee had started on March 17. Liu was finally told to bring whomever he wished of his supporters to the Sunday meeting at which the vote was taken. But he gave the impression to Malley that many were still absent. (Malley commented that he believed a vote was taken,

but from Chou's remarks Malley doubted a legal quorum was present and he thought Liu would take the position that the vote was illegal.) Malley asked Chou why they did not simply take Liu away and get rid of him. Chou replied that while this might be the appropriate way to handle this kind of problem where Malley came from (meaning Africa), the Chinese would not handle it in this fashion since it was imperative to them to make every effort to persuade those who strayed from the path of righteousness to correct their ways and accept their responsibility and also because it was imperative to persuade those who were infected with the spirit of revisionism to cleanse themselves and return to the fold.

Malley said he was uncertain about the purported 6-5 vote against Liu in the Politbureau, but said one had to be cautious about Japanese newspaper accounts. He noted that pro-Liu posters still were appearing on Chinese walls (but never cast in anti-Mao terms) and that the Central Committee action of March 26 was not one to oust him from the Presidency so that the decisive vote still lay in the future.

Cultural Revolution Malley asked Chou if he did not think that the cultural revolution was harmful to China's influence abroad. Chou replied that they accepted the fact that their influence abroad was harmed by the cultural revolution, but it was necessary and time would tell. He said he had also been concerned by the attitudes of some of their foreign representatives and the manner in which they portrayed events at home to foreign audiences. The degree to which the revisionists had infiltrated the government was such that Peking had found it necessary to call home all of their diplomats, since they could not be sure where their loyalties lay. They were in the process of screening these diplomats and shortly those who were loyal would be returned to their posts.

Chou expressed confidence the cultural revolution would succeed. He said the process of persuasion had to continue, noting Liu had caused considerable confusion when he had sent out his working groups. He indicated that the government (Mao forces) fully controlled eight provinces, and seemed unconcerned that it was not a larger number. He seemed entirely confident of a Mao victory, a conclusion which Malley shared.

To either Chou or Chen Po Ta, Malley asked whether a victory of Mao over the revisionists would lead to a stiffening of the Chinese foreign policy. The reply was that the relationship with the US was foreordained for a generation and Chinese policy towards the US would not be affected by the outcome of this struggle.

If the revisionists were to win, however, it would lead to an improvement of relations with Moscow. This would start China down the path of compromise and after about one generation, Chinese relations with the US would be transformed into something resembling the present relations between the USSR and the US. This was seen as an undesirable, hypothetical and totally unlikely outcome but one which had to be acknowledged in view of the strength with which the revisionists had dug themselves into the Chinese power structure. In the more likely event that Mao was victorious over the revisionists, Chinese policy vis-a-vis the USSR would remain precisely what it is now, a matter in which no compromise is possible.

With similar candidness, the Chief of Staff (with whom Malley had a brief interview) admitted the presence of revisionists in the military ranks as an accepted fact of life and a problem in which he was fully engaged. He said some had already been removed but denied there was any "split" in Army ranks.

United Nations Chou said that once the immutable condition of the removal of Formosa was met China would take its place at the UN and would struggle for the reform of the UN from what it has become, an organization strictly controlled by the US and USSR. China would work to build its relations with Asian-African States. As one of many examples of Soviet perfidy he said the Chinese had information indicating that during the last General Assembly session, the USSR approached eleven different countries to try to persuade them not to support Peking's entry. He said their difficulties in the UN were currently more ascribable to the USSR than to the US.

MEETING WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVE - Colonel Van Lau

While flying from Canton to Shanghai via Peking, Malley was told that North Vietnamese Colonel Van Lau, who had met U Thant in Burma, was on the plane and he introduced himself. (Malley had the impression he had just entered China through Nanning.) Van Lau talked freely about his meeting in Rangoon with U Thant and heaped abuse upon U Thant (as did Chou En-Lai) as a man who was under the influence of the US and USSR and whose policies are set by his determination to do nothing which both the US and USSR do not agree to.

Van Lau called U Thant "an S.O.B." for the March 14 publication of his new proposals. He angrily asserted that he had made it completely clear to U Thant in Burma that North Vietnam could not accept his proposal for a mutual standdown. He speculated Ralph Bunche was responsible for the pressure on U Thant to make it public. He also complained about the proposal having been put in writing at all. Malley told him the US had probably insisted on this because it usually wanted to see things precisely. Van Lau complained that the US would now wave this paper around all the time to support its own position. Van Lau said they had made clear to U Thant that because of the nature of the Vietnamese struggle, a guerrilla warfare situation like that in Algeria, there could be no concessions and no truces until the outcome was clear. U Thant had been along in these talks and the North Vietnamese side had taken notes so they were certain of what had been said.

On the question of why Hanoi published the Johnson correspondence, Van Lau explained that so long as it remained secret the existence of the correspondence could be alluded to by the US in their deceitful claim to be having a meaningful dialogue with Hanoi. This worked to the advantage of the US, all the more so since there was nothing new or worthy in the Johnson correspondence. Hanoi, therefore, was compelled to publish the correspondence so as to disprove the American contention that there was any sort of meaningful communication underway. He said that if there had been a meaningful dialogue underway they would have preserved its secrecy.

Van Lau said that they had recently learned of the likelihood of a US invasion of North Vietnam. He thought this could result in the creation of an enclave in the North from which it might prove impossible to drive the Americans. In this eventuality they expected the American purpose in doing this would be to be able to trade off their presence in the North against a withdrawal of the Northern presence in South Vietnam.

STATUS OF MAO TSE TUNG

Malley had not been able to see Mao Tse-tung. From his African interpreter (who had accompanied the Mauritanian Prime Minister several weeks earlier when he talked with Mao) Malley got the strong impression of Mao as an elderly, detached man who talked only in terms

of the overall scene and who was never drawn into a conversation about more immediate subjects. For example, the Mauritanian had introduced the subject of the cultural revolution hoping to hear Mao's views on this subject, but instead Mao turned to Chou and asked how much aid China was giving to Mauritania. (Chou replied something equivalent to about 1 million dollars to which Mao said that this was not enough and that more should be given even though Chou noted that Mauritania had not yet requested more.) Whether this was due to senility or whether it was because this was his chosen role, Malley was persuaded that Mao does not exercise the power which he represents as a result of being deified throughout the length and breadth of China. (He noted the omnipresence of Mao pictures, statues, quotations, etc.) He said the power was in the hands of Lin Piao, Chen Po Ta and Mao's wife, and is exercised by them in Mao's name. Malley saw no answer to the problem of successorship if Mao died. His deification was not transferrable and Malley thought that in light of recent events it would be foolhardy for any official now to identify himself with one or the other of the lieutenants who are serving Mao. He did not view Chou En-Lai as being in the power elite and felt that if those who held the power in Mao's name were to move against Chou, he would disappear without a struggle. Malley was convinced that Mao and his supporters would inevitably and unquestionably emerge victorious over Liu Shao Chi and the revisionists. (In Moscow, he talked with Kuznetsov and Jacob Malik and found them professing to be well-informed about current events in China; they showed little interest in his opinions. All Soviet officials with whom he talked exuded confidence that Liu Shao Chi would win in the long run.)

In discussing Mao, Malley said he was reminded of the resemblance to Ho Chi Minh who likewise remains aloof and talks only in a most general fashion.

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Tuesday, May 2, 1967
3:30 p. m.

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bill Bowdler has discussed his future plans with me. He is torn between continuing his service here and resuming his Foreign Service career with an assignment overseas.

Were it not for career and financial considerations, he would be willing to stay here for another year or two. He has been on the staff for two years.

The factors leading him to consider returning to State are:

- He has been in Washington going into his seventh year: a longer than normal tour for a Foreign Service Officer.
- The Foreign Service Promotion Boards have passed him over while promoting some of his contemporaries, leading him to think that the Boards place greater stock on commanding troops either in State or in an Embassy abroad than doing a staff job over here.
- His family is reaching the age where financial demands begin to pinch, and income overseas is somewhat higher because of special allowances not paid to FSO's in Washington.

My personal judgment is that his departure would be a great loss to us.

He is a rare public servant: technically first rate, imaginative and courageous; a superb Foreign Service officer who fully understands the special needs and requirements of the President.

He has put in two busy years here, beginning with the Dominican Crisis (where he spent three months getting the OAS and IAPF operations organized and working with Martin, Bundy and Bunker in the settlement efforts) and going through the OAS Summit.

If you decide to ask him to stay, we must make sure that his service here does not work against him in the performance evaluation process in State.

If you decide not to stand in his way on an overseas assignment, I would like your authority to find him a good post.

Ask him to stay and take necessary action in State _____

W. W. R.

OK for him to go, and find him a good assignment _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

Lunch Meeting With the President
Tuesday, May 2, 1967, 1:00 p.m.

AGENDA

1. Viet Nam Targets. (Sec. McNamara)
 - a. Permission to re-strike Haiphong TPS?
 - b. Permission to strike Hanoi TPS?
2. Bombing Strategy After Power Taken out. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)

As you know, Sec. McNamara has proposed that after the power system is out, we stand down to a line south of Hanoi-Haiphong, without committing ourselves not to go back. If we do so, we ~~meet~~ need a diplomatic scenario to accompany that position and make the most of it.
3. Viet Nam: Negotiating Moves. (Sec. Rusk)
4. Other.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 5-16-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 2, 1967 -- 12:30 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You asked about Robert Kleiman's article, "Making the Next Vietnam Pause Work," from the New York Times of May 1, 1967, reproduced yesterday in the Congressional Record.

Kleiman's critical argument is that during the 37-day pause we set no conditions: President Johnson "was prepared to open negotiations first, then ask assurances that Hanoi would not obtain a military advantage from further prolongation of the bombing pause."

The fact of the matter is that during the 37-day pause we asked for "a serious contribution toward peace" and sought "reciprocal actions." The latter relating to infiltration, the level of military activity and terrorism in the South, or withdrawal of regular North Vietnamese units from the South.

In short, the view that we were willing in the 37-day pause to trade a permanent cessation of bombing simply for talk, is not borne out by the record, attached: see especially marked pages in red.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

Tuesday, May 2, 1967 - 12:20 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

I find Francis Bator's talking points for your meeting with the Anglo-American Parliamentarians at 5:30 p.m. today, Tuesday, May 2, a bit too bland. *(You may want it that way. But here's a bit of substance.)*

1. With respect to Latin America, I would underline specifically that Britain -- and Europe -- could and ought to give Latin America more help in the three critical areas agreed at Punta del Este:

- integration;
- food production;
- education.

Latin America is the most advanced of the developing regions. By the end of this century its population may be around 600 million. We of the Atlantic Community have a duty now to work constructively with Latin America so that it is a partner at that time and not a source of disruption on the world scene. Europe's interest is almost as great as that of the U.S.

2. With respect to Africa, you should underline our view that, although things will go more slowly there than in Latin America, we all have a duty to help. The Europeans ought to continue to take the major share in assistance; although we are prepared to do our part. Specifically, we feel that all of us, working with the World Bank and African institutions, should be trying to build the communications, educational, and electric power infrastructure of Africa on a regional and subregional basis. The countries of Africa are simply too small to be modernized without a larger framework.

3. In this connection, it may be worth the group's discussing -- since they are considering both Latin America and Africa -- the relevance to Africa of the experience of the Central American Common Market. That experiment has demonstrated that it is profitable for countries at relatively low levels of development to form common market arrangements. It had previously been thought this was useful only in the case of advanced nations. Arrangements like the Central American Common Market might help to transform East Africa and important parts of West Africa.

W. W. Rostow

cc: F. Bator

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Tuesday, May 2, 1967 -- 11:40 am

Mr. President:

Howard Wriggins, of our staff, is now quietly visiting India and Pakistan, primarily to explore a subject on which he is one of the best experts in the government; namely, the possibilities of India-Pak normalization of relations.

I instructed him to get out into the field and see whether there is any substance in the possibility of an agricultural revolution based on the use of seeds, plus increased water and fertilizer. Here is his first report. The question is: How fast can they distribute the seed, mobilize the fertilizer and water? I am confident that we will see quite revolutionary results in Pakistan within the next 2 or 3 years if the monsoons are reasonably good: in India over the next 5 years.

The reason is that the farmers are now extremely receptive and, at long last, the governments take agriculture seriously.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Rawalpindi 4116

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By ing, NARA, Date 3-17-93

WWRostow:rlm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, May 2, 1967

Text of Cable Sent to Walt Rostow from Howard Wriggins of the NSC Staff
(Rawalpindi, 4116)

Subject: The "Agricultural Revolution in India"

In a rural visit on April 28 in the Delhi district, I talked with ten different farmers, three prearranged. A traditional farmer with a small holding of some 10 acres, using improved, though not the best, punjabi strains, a little fertilizer and dependent completely upon a rainfall which was poor, produced 730 pounds of wheat per acre. A large farmer, using the best Mexican strain, selected in India to remove color and harden casings, with optimum water and fertilizer, produced 5700 pounds per acre.

One village of small farmers, with none owning over 15 acres, this year replaced their bullock-driven Persian water wheels with modern pumps by loans from the Agricultural Department to irrigate its full 1200 acres. With new seeds and adequate fertilizer, they are now producing 3,000 pounds instead of their previous 800 pounds per acre.

It is impressive how clearly the farmers knew the different wheat strains. Only one didn't seem to care. The others were trying different strains. Some had heard of Mexican wheat and had not been able to get it this year. They had seen demonstration plots and expected to plant part of their acreage in it for next year. They realized they would need more frequent watering (six times per crop season instead of twice) and would also require substantially more fertilizer, which, in this instance at least, they seem to feel they could count on.

While this is too close to Delhi to be typical, this apparently is not unrepresentative of the changes which have already taken place or are imminent.

State Ministers are said to be now committed to building stocks if the next crop is good, unlike earlier years under S. K. Patil, though it will be difficult to acquire local supplies for State reserves in view of empty private reserves.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-452
By 118, NARA, Date 3-17-93

Tuesday, May 2, 1967 - 11:00 AM

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval,
is a farewell message to Emperor
Haile Selassie following his private
visit to Los Angeles.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐

EKH/vmr

*Log out
5/2*

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1624

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE

Your Majesty's warm and thoughtful messages of April 23 and 26 were very much appreciated. Mrs. Johnson and I hope your visit to California was most enjoyable and that you will soon return to the United States. You are always most welcome. I am only disappointed I was not able to see you on this most recent visit and again to have the benefit of your wise counsel.

Tuesday, May 2, 1967 -- 10:30 am

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval,
is a message of birthday greetings to
King Moshoeshoe II of Lesotho.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐

EKH/vmr

Handwritten notes:
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(...)
2. Pres file

10/12

Message from President to King of Lesotho

On behalf of the American people, I take this opportunity to send congratulations to you on the occasion of your birthday and to extend to you and your countrymen greetings and best wishes.

Sincerely,

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 2, 1967

Your Holiness:

Vice President Humphrey has informed me of your gracious and helpful audience with him, and I have carefully studied your message on the pursuit of peace in Viet Nam.

As you know, no subject has weighed more heavily on my mind than how to bring about a peaceful, humane and honorable settlement to this tragic war. For that reason, I deeply appreciated your comments on our acceptance of the Secretary General's most recent proposal for peace.

You asked particularly if we could not restudy the possibility of halting the bombing over North Viet Nam. As you know, we have three times suspended our bombing in an effort to explore the readiness of the other side to make a constructive move toward peace. Each time we have not only received a negative response, but Hanoi has utilized these periods to accelerate the dispatch of men and supplies to the South.

Nevertheless, I wish to reaffirm that my Government is prepared to take this first step toward peace as soon as we receive any reasonable assurance, private or otherwise, that our action is being met by an appropriate reduction in hostilities by North Viet Nam.

My Government and the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam have most recently endorsed and expanded a suggestion by the Canadian Government that both sides in Viet Nam withdraw their forces from and cease all hostilities in the Demilitarized Zone and areas extending ten miles north and south of the Zone, subject to International Control Commission (ICC) supervision. Statements made in Saigon and Washington indicated we would be prepared to take even further and much more significant mutual steps to de-escalate and end the conflict.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 91-452
By isa, NARA, Date 2-5-99

Unfortunately, Hanoi's initial reaction to this proposal has been harshly negative. Nevertheless, this offer and other proposals we have endorsed to bring about a peaceful settlement remain open, and we continue to hope that the North Vietnamese will reconsider their position.

I very much appreciate the efforts Your Holiness has undertaken toward finding a solution to the conflict in Viet Nam. We too will continue to explore every avenue toward a negotiated settlement of this tragic conflict. I look forward to continuing to receive your comments or suggestions and assure you they will receive our most serious consideration.

With great respect,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Paul VI', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

His Holiness
Pope Paul VI
The Vatican

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday, May 2, 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The invitation to Prime Minister Holt, which you approved on February 21, included an office visit and working luncheon. Holt has accepted, and will be here June 1.

Mrs. Johnson has suggested the desirability of having a dinner rather than a luncheon for the Holts. (Mrs. Holt will be accompanying the Prime Minister). This thought is based on the Holts' hospitality when you were in Australia, coupled with the fact that the last two times Holt was here, you gave luncheons for him.

While a dinner is not required, either by protocol or the terms of the invitation, it would be a nice gesture for a good friend and ally.

On the day following the Holt visit (June 2), you are scheduled to give a luncheon for Prime Minister Wilson. Wilson will be staying in Washington overnight June 2. (Mrs. Wilson will be accompanying the Prime Minister).

Should you wish to have a dinner for Holt, comparison might be made of your offering a dinner for Holt and a luncheon for Wilson. (I believe that dinners for both would be too great a burden and would break the pattern of our treatment of EXPO 67 visitors). While equal treatment would be the easiest course, possible British sensitivity can be avoided by the explanation that you are returning earlier Australian hospitality. Further, a small stag working luncheon for Wilson could be made a particularly personal occasion. He would probably respond very favorably. Mrs. Johnson might give a woman's tea for Mrs. Wilson.

Thus, you can have it either way. If you want to give a dinner for Holt we should tell the Australian Embassy as soon as possible so they can make the necessary adjustment in their own arrangements.

If you will indicate your preference, we'll do the necessary.

Leave the schedule as is -- luncheons for Holt and Wilson _____

Dinner for Holt _____

Dinners for both Holt and Wilson _____

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 19, NARA, Date 5-7-91

W. W. Rostow

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Monday, May 1, 1967
6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Fenoaltea seems to be quite a character.

It appears he is filing his resignation in the wake of a one-sided statement in the Italian Senate by Fanfani.

No confirmation. And there may be other factors involved. But interesting.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-5
By Sj, NARA, Date 1-7-04

Monday, May 1, 1967 -- 5:07 p.m.

Mr. President:

Bill Baggs came in with the following plea.

1. There is a meeting in Geneva of Pacem in Terris II, May 28-31, 1967. As you can see from pages 8-9 of the attached, there is a most impressive group of political and intellectual characters committed to go -- East and West.

U. S. participants in the panels are now scheduled to be Senator Fulbright and Professor Galbraith. In addition, Sen. Brooke has now agreed to be a participant.

Bill says, correctly, that we cannot evade this being a quite important forum; and we ought to have a U. S. spokesman who puts our case in foreign policy strongly and without apology.

2. Bill has the impression that the Vice President would be willing to take on this role. The Soviet Union will decide its spokesman on the basis of whom we field, but it is certain they will look after the presentation of their case in the forum.

I am checking out Sec. Rusk's view which may be that it would be wiser to have someone outside the Government, like George Ball or Mac Bundy, undertake the mission. I will let you know his views as soon as I have them.

3. If we were to go for someone inside the Government, Arthur Goldberg might be effective and willing.

W. W. Rostow

The Vice President _____

Arthur Goldberg _____

George Ball _____

Mac Bundy _____

E. V. Rostow _____

See me

W. W. Rostow:rlh

MEMBERS OF THE AUDIENCE

At the time of going to press the following individuals have accepted invitations to attend the Convocation and participate in the discussions.

German Arciniegas
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia

Anton Atallah
President YMCA, Jerusalem, Jordan

I. S. Audu
Vice-Chancellor, Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria

Bechir Ben Yahmed
Director of Jeune Afrique, France

H. M. Benstead
Chairman, Executive Committee,
Western Publishing Co., United States

R. Bierzanek
Professor of Law; Member of Polish Legislature

Kaj Björck
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden

Rolf Björnerstedt
International Institute for
Peace and Conflict Research, Sweden

Jozsef Bogнар
Chairman,
Institute for Cultural Relations, Hungary

Lord Boyd Orr
Nobel Laureate; Scientist, Scotland

Hugo Boyko
President, World Academy of Art and Science

Silviu Brucan
Former Rumanian Ambassador to the United States;
Professor, University of Bucharest

Ralph J. Bunche
Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs,
United Nations

Jacob Burckhardt
President, Swiss Institute of Technology

K. A. Busia
Chairman, Police Commission of
the National Liberation Council, Ghana

Lord Campbell of Eskan
Booker Brothers McConnell Co. Ltd., England

Gonzalo Castillo-Cardenas
Theologian, Colombia

Carl Q. Christol
Professor of International Law,
University of Southern California

Joseph S. Clark
United States Senator from Pennsylvania

Michael S. Comay
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

Norman Cousins
Editor, *Saturday Review*

Sir Geoffrey De Frietas
Member of Parliament, United Kingdom;
President, Assembly of the Council of Europe

Leslie Dewart
Professor of Philosophy,
St. Michael's College, University of Toronto

Alioune Diop
Société Africaine de Culture, France

Marian Dobrosielski
Former Counselor of the Polish Embassy
in the United States

Arnold Edinborough
Editor,
Saturday Night Publications Ltd., Canada

A. E. Enahoro
Former Member of Parliament, Nigeria

Orhan Eralp
Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations

James Farmer
Former Director, Congress of Racial Equality

Giangiacomo Feltrinelli
Publisher, Italy

José Figueres
Former President of Costa Rica

Manouchehr Ganji
Professor of Law, University of Tehran

Gunnar Garbo
Member of the Storting, Norway

Ragnar Gerholm
Associate Professor of Physics,
University of Stockholm

Robert Gordis
Rabbi; Professor, Jewish Theological Seminary

Albert Gore
United States Senator from Tennessee

Theodore L. Goudvis
Businessman, United States

Jo Grimond
Member of Parliament, United Kingdom

Kasim Gülek
Member of Parliament, Turkey

Louis J. Halle
Professor of International Politics,
Graduate Institute of International Studies,
Switzerland

Edvard Hambro
Permanent Representative of Norway
to the United Nations

Clodomiro Henriquez
Attorney, Dominican Republic

Hudson Hoagland
American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Ahmed Houman
Faculty of Agriculture, University of Tehran

François Houtart
Director, Centre de Recherches
Socio-Religieuses, Belgium

John P. Humphrey
Professor of Law, McGill University

Leopold Infeld
Physicist, Poland

Kadhim Khalaf
Permanent Representative of Iraq
to the United Nations

Mwai Kibaki
Minister of Commerce and Industry, Kenya

Pumla E. Kisasonkole
Uganda

Henry A. Kissinger
Professor of Government and
International Relations, Harvard University

Otto Klineberg
Director, International Center
for Intergroup Relations, France

Jürgen Kuczynski
Professor, Humboldt University,
German Democratic Republic

Antoine M. B. Lacassagne
Institut du Radium (Institut Pasteur), France

a temporary political settlement. But the overt military intervention by the United States on one side, and the logistical and political involvement of both the U.S.S.R. and China on the other, require that any permanent resolution of the conflict must be more broadly based.

This discussion, therefore, is directed beyond the immediate problems of a Vietnamese settlement to the larger pattern of which it is an inescapable part: consideration of ways and means of neutralizing the whole of Southeast Asia. According to present plans, all the members of this panel will be from the coun-

tries of Southeast Asia, including the two Vietnams. One purpose of this representation is to give ~~these~~ directly concerned an opportunity to set forth ~~their~~ views to a world audience without direct involve-ment of the great powers.

Neutralization of Southeast Asia would, at a minimum, require the end of the present intervention in Vietnam, and some guarantees against a repetition of such intervention from great powers of either the East or the West. Matters concerning the reconstruction of war damage and of regional economic and technological development would be relevant to the

Manfred Lachs
Judge, International Court of Justice

Arthur Larson
Director, Rule of Law Research Center,
Duke University

Peter Latuihamalla
Member of Parliament, Republic of Indonesia

George Lemos
Businessman, Greece

Prince Hans Adam von Liechtenstein
Liechtenstein

Luigi Ligutti
Permanent Observer of the Holy See
to FAO, Vatican City

M. S. Lokanathan
National Council of
Applied Economic Research, India

Séan Macbride
International Commission of Jurists

Porter McKeever
United Nations Association of the United States

Marya Mannes
Author, United States

Candido Antonio Mendes de Almeida
Director, Institute of Political and
Economic Sciences of Rio de Janeiro

Hans J. Morgenthau
Director, Center for the Study of
American Foreign and Military Policy,
University of Chicago

Neil Morrison
Secretary, Royal Commission
on Biculturalism and Biracialism, Canada

Musa Nasir
Principal, Bir-Zeit College, Jordan

Sushila Nayar
Ministry of Health of India

Pietro Nenni
Deputy Prime Minister of Italy

Martin Niemöller
Theologian, Federal Republic of Germany

Nicos A. Nissiotis
World Council of Churches

Daniel Oduber
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica

L. E. Oliphant
Professor of Physics,
Australian National University

Adnan Pachachi
Foreign Minister of Iraq

Lak-Goon G. Paik
President Emeritus, Yonsei University, Korea

Pietro Pavan
Lateran University, Italy

Claiborne Pell
United States Senator from Rhode Island

Max Petitpierre
Former Federal Councillor, Switzerland

André Philip
Former Minister of Finance, France

Prince Phouangkiou Phanareth
Chairman, Mekong Delta Committee, Laos

I. I. Rabi
Nobel Laureate; Higgins Professor of Physics,
Columbia University

Robert H. Reno
Businessman, United States

Charles S. Rhyne
Attorney, United States

Otto Roegele
Professor of Journalism, University of Munich

José Rolz-Bennett
Under-Secretary for Public Information,
United Nations

Joseph Rotblat
Professor of Physics, University of London

Paul Ruegger
Former President,
International Committee of the Red Cross

Jean Rodolphe de Salis
Swiss Institute of Technology

Adam Schaff
Polish Academy of Sciences;
Polish United Workers' Party

E. F. Schumacher
Economist, England

W. W. Schütz
Member of Präsidium, Ungeteilbares Deutschland,
Federal Republic of Germany

Gertruda Sehaninova
Member of National Assembly, Czechoslovakia

Farhan Shubeilat
Ambassador of Jordan to the United States

T. B. Simatupang
Chairman, Department of Social Responsibility,
National Council of Churches,
Republic of Indonesia

Laxmi Singhvi
Member of Parliament, India

Edgar Snow
Author, United States

Hardjomidojo Soekartono
Businessman, Republic of Indonesia

Louis B. Sohn
Professor of International Law,
Harvard University

Kenzo Takayanagi
Chairman, Japanese Cabinet Commission
on the Constitution

Manintal Tamono
Commissioner of Minorities, Philippines

Hans Thirring
Professor of Physics, University of Vienna

Jan Tinbergen
Professor, Netherlands Economic Institute

Leopold Ungar
Theologian; President of Caritas Austria

E. Ustor
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary

Paul Verghese
World Council of Churches

Egbert de Vries
Visiting Professor of International Development,
School of Public and International Affairs,
University of Pittsburgh

Mrs. F. Champion Ward
United States

Heikki Waris
Vice-Rector and Professor of Social Policy,
University of Helsinki

Morris L. West
Author

Jerome B. Wiesner
Dean of Science,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

- discussion as conditions of stability necessary to maintain the neutralized zone.

While agreement need not be sought, it is believed that this discussion can shed important light on the necessary terms of a durable settlement.

TUESDAY MORNING:

Confrontation: The Case of Germany

Twenty years after the end of the war that conquered Nazi Germany, the former German capital is literally divided by a wall that also symbolizes the

separation of the country into two halves, each supported by a great power. Major U.S. and U.S.S.R. (and token British and French) forces still stand combat-ready, facing each other across a demilitarized zone. These armies are aptly designated "triggers," with the primary mission of guaranteeing automatic great power entry if there is an attempt to use force to terminate the division of Germany and the complex *de facto* political arrangements it has produced.

The German problem has many facets beyond the immediate fact of confrontation of American and

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Pres file

Monday, May 1, 1967, 3:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Satire on NSC Staff Meeting

The attached article satirizing the National Security Council Staff is contained in the May issue of Atlantic Monthly.

It was written by James C. Thomson, Jr., who served temporarily on the NSC Staff until last September when he resigned to accept a position teaching Far Eastern history at Harvard.

Prior to publication, the article was circulated with actual names, but without being identified as having been written by Thomson. (Copy Attached) The names have been partially disguised in the published version.

This is Mr. Thomson's second effort in this line. His first was an imaginary account of an NSC meeting on Laos which was used by Arthur Schlesinger in his book and is reprinted in Roger Hilsman's forthcoming book.

Because there is nothing really effective to do about all this, we will limit our response to pointing out that people have differing ideas about what is "funny."

Walt Rostow

WWR:BKS:amc

1742

viewpoint

Minutes of a White House Meeting, Summer 1967

by James C. Thomson, Jr.

The following record of a meeting yet to be held is printed here to advance public understanding of the great issues of our time. Mr. Thomson, who now teaches history at Harvard, writes this projection out of a background of experience in the White House and Department of State during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.

Scene: Situation Room

Cast: National Security Council Staff

Hon. Herman Melville Breslau, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Hon. Charles Homer, Special Assistant to the President for Peaceful Reconstruction in Vietnam

Hon. Frederick Ulan, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for European and International Economic Affairs

Hon. Charles Rentner, Special Assistant to the President for Public Image Affairs

Mr. Brown (South Asia)

Colonel Black (Pentagon)

Mr. Blue (Latin America)

Mr. White (Africa)

Mr. Gray (Miscellany)

Mr. Rose (Far East)

Mr. Gold (China Watcher)

Mr. Green (White House Fellow)

Mr. Breslau opened the meeting with a commentary on the latest reports from Vietnam. In general, he felt, the events of the previous day were a wholesome and not unexpected phase in South Vietnam's growth toward political maturity and economic viability. The fall of Saigon to the Viet Cong meant that the enemy was now confronted with a challenge of unprecedented proportions for which it was totally unprepared: the administration of a major city. If we could dump rice and airlift pigs at Hue and Danang, he was pretty sure that the other side would soon cave. He cautioned, however, that this was merely a hunch. "It is not the kind of smell you can hang your hat on."

Mr. Homer said that Mr. Breslau was full of crap; Mr. Breslau had never understood Vietnam and should stop trying. Things were very, very bad, but they would get infinitely worse if we dumped rice and pigs.

Mr. Breslau suggested that we move around the table rapidly so that we could all get back to work. Did Mr. Ulan have business to raise?

(The white telephone rang, and Mr. Breslau answered it. It was a test ring.)

Mr. Ulan said that he had spent the previous day with the German financial mission, and of course could not go into detail, but might short-hand some of the considerations which involved, on the one hand, a reading of what the electoral situation would be after Braunschweig

(which was itself quite sticky), and on the other hand, a close calculation of the odds if we didn't (or, conversely, if they didn't), and on the third hand, a pretty shrewd look at the long-term consequences of any action at all when you factor out the balance of payments curve.

Mr. Breslau commented that the Germans were a fascinating bunch. He hoped that Mr. Ulan had taken a good hard look at the real numbers involved. He had always felt that numbers were important. Mr. Ulan said yes.

Mr. Rentner hoped that Mr. Breslau wouldn't mind his reporting to the staff the President's deep pleasure and pride in Mr. Breslau's performance the previous Sunday on the *What's My Line?* show. The President's regard for Mr. Breslau and the entire staff had never been higher. The President was also very pleased with the new Harris poll, due out on Monday, which indicated that 86 percent of the people approved his recently announced decision to make foreign policy decisions on the basis of Harris poll findings.

Mr. Brown said that the reports of imminent mass starvation in India were more serious than we had expected; a presidential decision might be required this week.

Mr. Rentner said that it would take a good three weeks to set up and test-run a Harris poll on that kind of question.

Mr. Breslau said he hoped the Indians would take a good hard

look at the development of chemical fertilizers. He asked Mr. Brown to ride herd on this one.

Mr. Homer noted that neither Mr. Breslau nor Mr. Brown knew a god-damn thing about Indian agriculture.

Colonel Black explained the previous night's raids on North Vietnam. We had knocked out 78 percent of North Vietnam's petroleum reserves; since we had knocked out 86 percent three days ago, and 92 percent last week, we were doing exceptionally well.

Mr. Breslau asked about the weather over North Vietnam. His Air Force experience in World War II had taught him, he said, the importance of weather.

Colonel Black said that it didn't look good for the next few days.

Mr. Breslau said this was too bad since some people might think we were having a pause.

Mr. Ulan wondered if maybe it wasn't time for another pause.

Mr. Breslau said that a pause was clearly out of the question now that the 12,000 student leaders and 3 million housewives had once again called for a pause. The President did not like to be crowded, especially now that Hanoi was hurting.

Mr. Ulan wondered if Hanoi was really hurting.

Mr. Breslau suggested that we move along since he had another meeting coming up.

Mr. Blue reported the execution by the new Brazilian government of all the nation's university rectors.

Mr. Breslau commented that the new government had, nonetheless, really done its homework in the

economic field; the overall view was very promising.

Mr. White reported that the Rhodesia thing might come unstuck over the weekend. The Zambians were wobbly and could use some massaging. The President might call in their ambassador and pump up his tires.

Mr. Breslau said we should probably lie low on this until the new task force report on Africa was completed. In any event, the President didn't like to be crowded by foreigners. Perhaps the Potomac River *Sequoia* cruise for black African ambassadors would take care of the problem.

Mr. Homer said that if the African *Sequoia* trip was anything like the Middle Eastern one, we were due to lose another thirty countries and 200 million people. The Turkish ambassador had had to sit through the film *A President's Country* seven times now and was requesting transfer to another post.

Mr. Rentner expressed doubt that such reactions were widespread. The President was very fond of that film. Furthermore, USIA audience surveys in Korea, Taiwan, and South Vietnam had shown overwhelmingly favorable response to it.

Mr. Gray said that the inter-agency nuclear desalinization package was moving forward and might go for a decision this week if we could get the AEC, the ICC, the IFC, AID, State, DOD, BOB, and NASA aboard. Agriculture, he added, was playing it cool and might need a needle.

Mr. Breslau asked Mr. Gray to ride herd on this one. He hoped that they would take a good hard look at the real numbers involved.

Mr. Breslau announced that the ban on having NSC staff members talk to the press was causing some

serious problems since the press had decided that the staff was no longer significant. The President would now like all staff members to talk to the press as much as possible, stressing the significance of the staff. They must be careful, however, to avoid talking substance to the press.

Mr. Rentner agreed that this was a good move and the staff should increase its visibility. He added that staff members should scrupulously avoid contacts, however, with Joseph Kraft, Joseph Alsop, Walter Lippmann, Max Frankel, Douglas Kiker, the New York *Times* people, and the Washington *Post* people. These contacts would be handled by Mr. Breslau and himself.

Mr. Rose said that he was quite worried about the public relations aspect of the fall of Saigon.

Mr. Breslau said he thought we could live with that one. He was very much reminded, he added, of one of his favorite scenes from *Hellzapoppin'*. What fascinated him more than Saigon was the reported purge of the assistant managing editor of the *Hankow People's Daily*; in writing his book on Communist China in 1953, he had concluded that the assistant managing editors of river-port newspapers were often the key indicators of policy shifts. Did Mr. Gold have a comment?

Mr. Gold said he would certainly look into this.

Mr. Breslau said that he had received Mr. Green's long study of the Vatican's relations with San Marino; he only wished the entire staff could read it. Mr. Green said thank you.

Mr. Homer noted that neither Mr. Breslau nor Mr. Green knew a god-damn thing about Italian politics.

(The white telephone rang, and Mr. Breslau answered it. It was Mrs. Breslau. The meeting was adjourned.)

Eyes only

174b

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF
SPRING 1967

Mr. Rostow opened the meeting with a commentary on the latest reports from Vietnam. In general, he felt, the events of the previous day were a wholesome and not unexpected phase in South Vietnam's growth toward political maturity and economic viability. The fall of Saigon to the Vietcong meant that the enemy was now confronted with a challenge of unprecedented proportions for which it was totally unprepared: the administration of a major city. If we could dump rice and airlift pigs at Hue and Danang, he was pretty sure that the other side would soon cave. He cautioned, however, that this was merely a hunch; "not the kind of smell you can hang your hat on," he said.

Mr. Komer said that Mr. Rostow's views were bullshit; Mr. Rostow had never understood Vietnam and should stop trying. Things were very very bad, but they would get infinitely worse if we dumped rice and pigs.

Mr. Rostow suggested that we move around the table rapidly so that we could all get back to work. Did Mr. Bator have business to raise?

(The white telephone rang, and Mr. Rostow answered it. It was a test ring.)

Mr. Bator said that he had spent the previous day with the German financial mission and of course could not go into detail but might shorthand some of the considerations which involved, on the one hand, a reading of what the electoral situation would be after Braunschweig (which was itself quite sticky) and, on the other hand, a close calculation of the odds if we didn't (or, conversely, if they didn't), and, on the third hand, a pretty shrewd look at the long-term consequences of any action at all when you factor out the balance of payments curve.

Mr. Rostow commented that the Germans were a fascinating bunch. He hoped that Mr. Bator had taken a good hard look at the real numbers involved. He had always felt that numbers were important. Mr. Bator said yes.

Mr. Kintner hoped that Mr. Rostow wouldn't mind his reporting to the staff the President's deep pleasure and pride in Mr. Rostow's performance the previous Thursday on the "What's My Line" Show. The President's regard for Mr. Rostow and the entire staff had never been higher. The President was also very pleased with the new Harris poll, due out on Monday, which indicated that 86 percent of the people approved his recently announced decision to make foreign policy decisions on the basis of Harris poll findings.

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Mr. Wriggins said that the reports of imminent mass starvation in India were more serious than we had expected; a Presidential decision might be required this week.

Mr. Kintner said that it would take a good three weeks to set up and test-run a Harris poll on that kind of question.

Mr. Rostow said he hoped the Indians would take a good hard look at the development of chemical fertilizers. He asked Mr. Wriggins to ride herd on this one.

Mr. Komer noted that neither Mr. Rostow nor Mr. Wriggins knew a goddam thing about Indian agriculture.

Colonel Bowman explained the previous night's raids on North Vietnam. We had knocked out 78 percent of North Vietnam's POL reserves; since we had knocked out 86 percent three days ago, and 92 percent last week, we were doing exceptionally well.

Mr. Bowdler reported the execution by the new Brazilian Government of all the nation's university rectors.

Mr. Rostow commented that the new Government had really done its homework in the economic field; the overall curve was very promising.

Mr. Charles Johnson said that the interagency nuclear de-salinization package was moving forward and might go for a decision this week if we can get the AEC, the ICC, the IFC,

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AID, State, DOD, BOB, and NASA aboard. Agriculture, he added, was playing it cool and might need a needle.

Mr. Rostow asked Mr. Johnson to ride herd on this one. He hoped that they would take a good hard look at the real numbers involved.

Mr. Jorden said that he was quite worried about the public relations aspect of the fall of Saigon.

Mr. Rostow said he thought we could live with that one. He was very much reminded, he added, of one of his favorite scenes from Hellzapoppin. What fascinated him more than Saigon was the reported purge of the Assistant Managing Editor of the Hankow Peoples Daily; in writing his book on Communist China in 1953 he had concluded that the assistant managing editors of river-port newspapers were often the key indicators of policy shifts. Did Mr. Jenkins have a comment?

Mr. Jenkins said he would certainly look into this.

Mr. Rostow said that he had received Mr. DeLuca's long study of the Vatican's relations with San Marino; he only wished the entire staff could read it. Mr. DeLuca said thank you.

(The white telephone rang, and Mr. Rostow answered it. It was Mrs. Rostow. The meeting was adjourned.)

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Monday, May 1, 1967 -- 1:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Your 5:30 p. m. appointment with Amb. Lodge.

1. Cabot tells me you spoke to him at Guam about "the job you want him to do."

2. After doing his Press Club speech (on this Thursday, I believe), he wishes to take a bit of vacation. He says this was also cleared with you in Guam.

3. You may wish to outline the kind of schedule and themes you want him to pursue in his public appearances. I believe it important that he emphasize: the seriousness of their military effort and of their effort to create a constitutional government.

4. You may -- or may not -- wish to deliver the attached letter to Amb. Lodge on this occasion.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Monday, Mar 1, 1967
12:00 noon

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MR. PRESIDENT:

This is probably as good an evaluation
of the state of, and prospects for,
South Vietnamese politics as we can
get in Washington.

1. sus
2. Pres file

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (log 1379 21 pp "Nation in Ferment: National Elections
and Political Permutations in South Vietnam")

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1379
176a

19 April 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Nation in Ferment: National Elections
and Political Permutations in South
Vietnam

Summary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-440
By ing, NARA, Date 9-1-92

The development of a much-needed political base for the Vietnamese government is slowly gaining momentum. The movement toward representative and effective governmental institutions has been complicated by divisive political and social influences and an absence of unifying traditions or institutions, as well as by intensified Communist political and military efforts. Having stabilized the situation, Vietnam's military leadership remains largely unified in its reluctance to relinquish its dominant position, but recognizes the need to share power with civilian elements in order to gain the popular support needed to counter the disciplined Communist political threat.

Since its inception the Ky government has been consciously moving toward a transition to at least ostensible civilian rule along the Korean pattern. Because of their dominant position, the leaders of the military establishment have considerable assets to assist in accomplishing their aims, including funds, patronage, and the only non-Communist organization reaching down to the grass roots. To bolster their prospects, the military are attempting to form a loose political front composed of representatives of various religious and political groups which will sponsor GVN-endorsed candidates in the forthcoming elections.

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If the military establishment can agree on a single slate and a single presidential candidate to support, none of the potential civilian candidates appears likely to develop the organization and broad spectrum of support necessary to seriously contest the military establishment's choice. This is particularly true if, as seems certain to be the case, the opposition to the military's choice is divided among two or more slates. Both the Suu and Huong tickets seem destined to split the important southern vote. None of the other candidates seems likely to muster more than nominal regional support.

Major issues in the elections are likely to stem largely from opposition to the concept of continued military control of the government. The opposition probably will focus on the related issues of corruption, inflation, and inefficiency of the military establishment, and may label Ky a U.S. puppet. The themes of peace and neutrality may also be espoused by the opposition, whose position would thus take on significant anti-American undertones. Despite this, it seems unlikely that the campaign will get too far off the track, although the possibility of flashes of violence cannot be ruled out completely. Other potential pitfalls include the danger that the military, unduly concerned over their prospects for victory, may attempt to repress the opposition or to rig the results. These also seem unlikely, and we expect the military, under Ky's leadership, to make a realistic endeavor to put the best possible face on its efforts to forge a genuine coalition with civilian elements.

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On balance, the odds favor the election coming out reasonably well for both the GVN and the U.S., particularly if the U.S. provides active, discreet advice and counsel within the context of Vietnamese political realities. The military establishment appears almost certain to score a smashing electoral victory. The best hope is that, in doing so, it will facilitate the development of a broad political coalition comprising something approaching a majority of the electorate. Such a coalition could provide the basis for ultimate development of a genuine, cohesive, national party which would foster stability and provide a strong popular base for the GVN.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Since its independence in 1954, South Vietnam has been in the throes of political evolution, the course of which has been erratic and often convulsive. In particular, the pace of political activity quickened following the overthrow of the Diem regime, although such activity occurred in extra-legal channels more than in legal ones. Under the present military regime, however, politics have tended to shift from the streets and backrooms toward more conventional political modes and forums. To have come this far is no mean achievement, given the country's political history, and represents more progress than anyone expected when the military assumed control in June 1965.

2. But the crucial question is what happens next? South Vietnam has poor clay with which to build a national political structure. Endemic political fragmentation is still the rule, and politics tend to be dominated by narrow-based, usually contentious, factions reflecting regional, religious, or, simply personal loyalties with little consideration for broader national interests. Not only is there nothing resembling a national party, but even the political fragments are badly splintered. Thus, the upcoming presidential and legislative elections will test the

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ability of the Vietnamese to form a government that is both reasonably effective and relatively representative; that is, a government that reflects, and is cognizant of, the necessity for balancing personal liberty and national order. There can be no assurance that this goal will be realized; the attempt itself might once again plunge the country into political paroxysms.

3. In any event, the divisive nature of Vietnamese politics will have to be attenuated, and eventually subsumed, by a broader political framework if continued political progress is to be realized. Encouragingly, there are indications that broader political groupings are in the process of developing. The outcome is of great significance for Vietnam and for the US because, if handled well, politics in South Vietnam could begin to normalize and stability should increase. The following paragraphs will assess these developments in greater detail.

II. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT*

A. General

4. Since assuming control, the military establishment has displayed a remarkable degree of cohesion. This cohesion derives in large measure from similar backgrounds--regional, religious, military, education and experience--and an acute awareness and understanding of the political realities in Vietnam. As a result, there is a willingness to

* The term "military establishment" includes Ky and Thieu and their immediate military colleagues and advisors. The key political figures in the military establishment are Generals Ky (Premier), Thieu (Chief of State), Loan (National Police Director and Chief of the Military Security Services), Chieu (Secretary-General of the Directorate), Tri (Information and Chieu Hoi Minister and Head of the Armed Forces Political Directorate), Thang (Revolutionary Development Minister), Khang (III Corps and Capital Military District Commander), and, to a lesser extent, Vien (Minister of Defense).

subordinate personal ambitions to the collective interests of the military and an apparent consensus among the military hierarchy concerning the major policy issues facing Vietnam. Considering the dismal performance of the civilians in the past, the military has no confidence in the ability of the civilian politicians to administer effectively, to maintain national cohesion, to pursue the war vigorously, or to refrain from interference in professional military matters. Specifically, the military leaders share a common aspiration for political stability, which they interpret as requiring military dominance in any government in the near future.

5. At the same time, however, the military leaders appear willing to accept a wider civilian role in the government. This is in part because of US urging and in part because of the military's own desire to obtain a popular and legal mandate for its continued exercise of authority. While not willing to surrender its control of the levers of real political power, the military establishment has made concessions and adjustments to accommodate the civilian elements. And it has responded to popular aspirations for an elected government.

B. Political Strategy and Assets

6. For over a year, the military establishment has been quietly exploring means to create a political apparatus with which to insure continued military domination within a constitutional and representative system. To this end, the GVN has sought and received advice from the South Koreans, and, to a lesser extent from the Chinese Nationalists (who have advisers in the GVN's political warfare department). The ROK CIA has sponsored trips to Korea by Chieu, Loan, and Vien; Nguyen Van Kieu (General Thieu's brother and an assistant of General Chieu) had a "special assignment" to Seoul to study how the ROK military formed its political party. We do not know how much direct assistance the Koreans are providing to the GVN's political efforts, but we are reasonably confident that the ROK CIA is in contact with Loan and Chieu and probably with Ky as well. In any event, the manner in which the Korean military has succeeded in legitimizing its control of political power is an obvious model for the Vietnamese military.

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7. The military establishment has substantial political assets at its disposal. It controls the financial coffers of the country; it is the dispenser of governmental favors, jobs and sinecures; it has the organization, manpower, and trucks to see that the voters get to the polls. In short, the military is the only (non-Communist) body whose power and sway extends throughout the country, and this gives it tremendous advantages in organizing grass roots support. In particular, the revolutionary development program and cadre provide the regime with a formidable political instrument with which to get to the people. The RD teams were used for political purposes to get out the vote for the Constituent Assembly elections last September, and they will undoubtedly be even more active for the presidential and legislative contests this fall.

8. In addition to the RD cadre, the military hierarchy can count on the support of most of the armed forces, the civil administrative apparatus, and provincial and district officials (most of whom are military). These groups not only have a vested interest in the present system, but they are susceptible to persuasion and pressure from the government. Thus as election day approaches, it can be assumed that considerable emphasis will be placed on these groups delivering the vote; officials whose response appears less than enthusiastic will run the risk of being replaced.* It is probable that the hamlet and village elections will constitute a dry run for testing the ability of the regime's political organization. Loan is apparently taking steps to keep close tabs on the local candidates as well as the actions of provincial and district officials during the elections. The election of hamlet and village officials who are sympathetic or beholden to the GVN would further enhance the position of the military's candidate; in many instances, the local villagers rather docilely vote the way the village headman instructs them.

* In the very important Saigon area, for example, Loan and the Mayor of Saigon, Loan's brother-in-law, are increasing the number of wards and selecting new ward chiefs who would be expected to get out a large vote for the military's candidate.

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C. Civilian Support

9. In addition to the substantial assets the military has from its own resources, the establishment leaders will probably be at least moderately successful in garnering support for its presidential candidate from a number of the traditional civilian political factions. This development will probably take the form of a political front. It is generally accepted in Vietnam that military support is essential for the survival of any government, and many believe that at this time the only way to insure military support is to have a military man in the top executive post. Moreover, the military's support of a faction's legislative ticket could be decisive. Such considerations, plus the fact that most Vietnamese observers believe that the military will win anyway, tend to provide considerable incentive to cooperate with the military and thereby get on the bandwagon and share the rewards and spoils of victory.

10. The military's efforts to forge a political base with civilian support have been handled primarily by Generals Loan, Chieu, and Tri, although others, including Ky and Thieu, have also been active. For example, over a year ago Chieu was given the responsibility for developing a political base for the Directorate. He has been involved in the ROK CIA effort in South Vietnam (as has Loan). Loan, Chieu and Tri have also been active in the GVN's dealings with the Constituent Assembly. Loan, who has increasingly assumed a major role in the GVN's political activities, financed the election campaigns of an unknown (but presumably substantial) number of candidates for the Assembly and will probably play a similar role in the legislative contests later this year. Tri, a protege of General Thieu, was instrumental in the formation of the Greater People's Bloc in the Assembly, and when the Revolutionary Dai Viet leadership of the bloc proved recalcitrant, Tri brought about the bloc's disintegration. Chieu's role is less clear, but he has been the GVN's spokesman in several confrontations with the Assembly.

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11. The general outline of a possible GVN front can be described. It would probably include the following groups.

a. The Hoa Hao Sect. In the delta, the Hoa Hao religious organization, which carries more political weight than the sect's small political parties, appears to favor backing the military's candidate. Such clerical leaders as Van Phu and Le Phuoc Sang, once a special assistant to Ky and now the leader of the Democratic-Alliance Bloc in the CA, probably see more to gain in aligning the sect with the military than in following southern regionalist sentiments and backing a candidate such as Tran Van Huong or Phan Khac Suu. In fact, the sect's strength as a southern faction gives it particular appeal to the GVN, which is weakest in this area.

b. The Cao Dai Sect. No longer much of a political force outside of certain enclaves such as Tay Ninh Province, the Cao Dai Sect has been amenable to GVN persuasion in the past. The presidential candidacy of Phan Khac Suu (a Cao Dai member) notwithstanding, we believe the odds are slightly better than even that most of the Cao Dai leaders will follow the GVN's lead.

c. The VNQDD Party. Truly a many splintered thing, some of the VNQDD factions, whose strength is primarily in I Corps area of central Vietnam, will back the military; to do otherwise would risk having the military opt to work exclusively with the Dai Viets, the VNQDD's arch rivals in I Corps. During the "struggle" movement last year, the VNQDD leaders apparently cooperated with the GVN. Ky, has been in frequent contact with VNQDD leaders and other military leaders have probably had similar contacts.

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d. Northern Catholics. Plunged into disarray following Diem's ouster, the large (almost one million) northern Catholic element has steadily re-asserted itself as a strong and cohesive political force that must be reckoned with in the nation's political future. Sharing very similar goals with the military, many of whom are northern Catholics, the northern Catholics have had cordial relations with the military regime. In particular, the northern Catholics favor the military's policy of a vigorous prosecution of the war. The candidacy of Tran Van Huong, however, might draw some support from the northern Catholics because of his anti-Buddhist background, but the southern regionalism that Huong also personifies would work against him. Moreover, the northern Catholics were undoubtedly more impressed by the military's forthright squashing of the militant Buddhists last year than they were by Huong's overthrow by the Buddhists. In any event, we believe that the bulk of northern Catholic support will go to the military establishment's candidate, and the odds are about even that their political organization, the Greater Solidarity Forces, will formally endorse the military's ticket.

e. Northern Buddhists. The northern refugee Buddhists are led by Thich Tam Chau and are strongest in and near Saigon. Following the open break between Chau and militant Buddhist Thich Tri Quang in the wake of the "struggle movement" last year, Chau has been cooperating with the military government, with General Loan serving as the regime's principal contact. The regime has been aiding Chau in his efforts, as yet unsuccessful, to create a national Buddhist organization free from the influence of Tri Quang. In return, Chau will probably be expected to back the military's presidential candidate, and although he might not formally endorse the candidate, we believe that he will deliver the vote. Indeed, if Tran Van

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Huong is the main civilian candidate, or if Tri Quang takes an active role in the election, we believe the odds are fairly good that Chau will openly back the military's choice.

f. Labor. Tran Quoc Buu, prominent leader of Vietnam's major labor organization, appears to have switched his allegiance from Tran Van Huong to Premier Ky. The labor vote in Vietnam is not large but in the Saigon area it is of some consequence. Buu, who aspires to be a political force, has apparently concluded that no civilian candidate can hope to win and that it is smart politics to back a winner. Buu claims to be working with Dang Van Sung, an old-line Dai Viet, and Hoa Hao leader Le Phuoc Sang in forming a front to back Ky.*

g. The Veterans' League. Under the leadership of General Chieu, the Veterans' League, which has limited political potential, should be solidly in the military's camp. The League plans to run about 30 candidates for the legislature and will probably receive governmental support for this endeavor. Apart from the general value of organized support, the League gives the military establishment some organized support in the south--the weakest link in the military's chain of

* Although we have only the sketchiest of information on the subject, it may also be that former premier Phan Huy Quat and former deputy premier Tran Van Tuyen are involved in this effort. There had been earlier indications that Quat, Tuyen, and Buu were planning to create a political front, and Tuyen has intimated that it would be quite possible that the front would favor a military candidate.

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support, and the area from which the major opposition to the GVN will come.

12. It should be stressed that endorsement of a candidate by a political faction does not mean that the candidate will receive full support from the faction's adherents. There is such a mishmash of conflicting interests within the many political groups that some seepage is inevitable. Indeed, some groups will attempt to be involved to some extent in each of the contending camps so as to insure their interests no matter how the election comes out. Furthermore, the political give and take over the next few months and the specific civilian candidates and their vice-presidential choices who finally contest the election will affect the final composition of a pro-establishment front. For example, there is a fair chance that the Revolutionary Dai Viet Party* may eventually align itself with the GVN's candidate.

III. THE CIVILIAN OPPOSITION

13. Phan Khac Suu. Chairman of the Constituent Assembly and former chief of state (October 1964 - June 1965), Phan Khac Suu apparently has decided to stand for the presidency with Phan Quang Dan, CA member and president of the Gia Dinh Provincial Council, as his vice-presidential running mate. Suu has had a long, if not particularly distinguished, political career in South Vietnam. And although his age (62) and lack of dynamism are considered liabilities by some, he is known nationally and may even be something of a "father image" in a country where veneration of the elderly is a common and strong emotion. In any event, Suu, who is a southerner, would run strongest in the delta area and might also get some support from VNQDD elements in central Vietnam. The presence of Dan on the slate would draw votes in the populous Saigon area. The Suu-Dan ticket makes some attempt at a regional balance, but unless a centrist is added as the prime ministerial choice, it does not seem likely to obtain significant support outside

* See paragraph 19.

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of southern region. Unless it does obtain such support, its chances of seriously challenging the military's candidate are very small.

14. Dan, and perhaps Suu as well, recognize the odds against their ticket. Indeed, Dan has indicated that he believes the military will win the election, and there were indications that he was trying to persuade Suu not to run for the presidency but to head up a legislative slate. We do not know what lies behind Suu's decision. He may feel that his time is running out to play an important role in Vietnamese politics, and he would prefer to play it in the main arena not in a legislative sideshow. Or he may feel that, whatever his chances are, he has something to contribute to a presidential campaign and the country's political future. In any event, Suu's presence in the race will have the effect of splitting southern strength, and there is a possibility that the GVN had a surreptitious hand in persuading Suu to run.

15. Tran Van Huong. The strongest civilian candidate is Tran Van Huong, who, despite not having yet openly declared his candidacy, is almost certain to run. Huong, unlike Suu, is both forceful and determined. He has not forgotten his past difficulties with the military and the Buddhists who were instrumental in his ouster as premier in January 1965. As a result, he harbors much distrust for both. Thus while Huong gives lip service to the need for military-civilian cooperation, compromise with the military would tend to be difficult for him. Huong believes in a strong executive and is frankly of the belief that the majority of the Vietnamese people are not ready for democracy and do not necessarily need or want it. US officials have stated that Huong, who has expressed admiration for Diem's "good qualities," appears to have some of the late dictator's characteristics, namely honesty, courage, a sense of mission, a capacity for stubbornness, and a basically confucian-mandarinale view of government and society.

16. Huong, a southerner, is a staunch champion of southern regionalist sentiments and would draw heavy support from this area. Even some southern-born military officers (e.g., Ranger commander Tran

Van Hai) have expressed interest in Huong's candidacy. Former youth minister Vo Long Trieu, who was one of the dissident southern ministers that resigned in last October's "cabinet crisis," is currently acting as Huong's campaign manager and is a member of a "brain trust" that is plotting Huong's political strategy. Trieu is the acknowledged leader of the Movement for the Renaissance of the South, a militantly southern separatist group, which is solidly in Huong's camp, although its strength outside the CA is questionable. More important, Trieu, leader of the younger progressive wing of the 1500-member Southern Alumni Association, is attempting to wrest control away from the Association's founder, retired General Tran Van Don.* If Trieu is successful, the Association would undoubtedly become more active and militant in political affairs and would back Huong. (If Don retains control, the Association would be less likely to play a meaningful political role since Don and his more "conservative" wing appear to be sympathetic to Ky.) Finally, Huong would probably obtain the bulk of southern Catholic and Buddhist support since these politically inchoate groups generally follow the lead of the southern political organizations; he would also pull some votes in the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai areas.

17. Huong realizes that if he is to have a real chance of challenging the military's candidate he must broaden his political base outside the southern region. Initially, Huong appeared to favor an alignment with the VNQDD. But since the military (or more specifically, Ky) seems to have gained a rather secure lock on VNQDD support, Huong is now exploring the possibility of an alliance with Revolutionary Dai Viet Party (RDVP) leader Ha Thuc Ky, who at the moment claims to be running for the presidency himself.

* Don's hopes of running for the presidency have been dashed by the constitution's disqualifying anyone holding French citizenship from the presidency.

18. Huong would probably garner some northern Catholic votes because of his previous strong stand against the Buddhist Institute. Trieu is one of the key leaders of the Catholic Liaison Office in Saigon, which has played an important role in promoting Catholic cohesion, and can be expected to lobby for Huong in this group. Trieu has also said that Tri Quang's militant Buddhist following in central Vietnam would not oppose Huong's candidacy. Indeed, it is not at all out of the question that Tri Quang might enter into an open alliance with the southern regionalists in support of Huong, especially if Huong should take a strong stand against the military and a somewhat anti-US tack.

19. Ha Thuc Ky. Although RDVP* leader Ky has made no secret of his presidential candidacy, we believe that he is really fishing for a deal in which he "withdraws" and throws his support to another candidate in return for the vice-presidential slot or some other prestigious position in the new government for himself and his party. It remains to be seen whether Ky will forge an alliance with Huong. Indeed, we are inclined to believe that the odds are as good or slightly better that the military establishment can win the RDVP over to its side. We note that many of the military leaders have a Dai Viet background, e.g., Thieu, Tri, and Vien, and that Thieu's brother, Kieu, was an influential Dai Viet leader, and that two of Ky's closest advisors, Dinh Trinh Chinh, and Bui Diem, were connected with the party. Finally, of course, Ha Thuc Ky may not be able to make a deal with anyone; if so, he would almost certainly remain in the race despite his negligible chances.

* The plans of the other smaller Dai Viet off-shots such as the New Dai Viet Party are unknown. Generals Thieu and Loan apparently have some contact with them, and the French may also be involved with some segments.

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20. Others. There will probably be some other presidential aspirants. They may run for the sheer fun of it or, more seriously, they may calculate that even an unsuccessful race will gain them national prominence and publicity which may be useful in the future and which could help their group's legislative ticket. In any event, we do not expect many minor candidates to run, and the major effect of those that do run will probably be to fuzz slightly the factional line-ups behind the major contestants.

IV. THE ELECTIONS: ISSUES, PITFALLS, AND PROSPECTS

21. Issues. As electioneering picks up steam, we anticipate a rising chorus of criticism against the military establishment and its performance in office. This could become particularly bitter if the civilian candidates decide that their only hope of rallying the people is to pull out all the stops in attacking the military. The military establishment will be charged with attempting to perpetuate itself in power and thereby flaunting the people's "desire" for a civilian government. General Loan, long a target of southern civilian ire, will almost certainly be bitterly assailed and accused of intimidating and suppressing civilian opposition to the military regime. And as is usually the case in politically underdeveloped states, the "outs" will be predisposed to charge that the "ins" have rigged the elections.

22. The civilian opposition will undoubtedly hammer away consistently at the themes of inefficiency and corruption within the military establishment. The GVN is vulnerable on the score of corruption and is itself embarked on anti-corruption crusade; nonetheless, the opposition will get some mileage from this issue. The military (and the US) will also be blamed for the increased cost of living, inflation, and other deprivations occasioned by the war. Finally, the military will almost certainly not escape being labelled as a "US-puppet."

23. Beyond these issues, such potentially explosive questions as peace and the US role in Vietnam are likely to be broached during the election campaign. We believe that the positions on these

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subjects will not be overly extreme. Nonetheless, we are somewhat apprehensive that the opposition groups, feeling themselves in dire need of some emotionally dramatic issues to offset the military's advantageous position, may come out for peace and neutrality and will attack the US presence in Vietnam. It is worth noting that the southern groups, reflecting in part their closer affinity and contact with the French, have generally taken a more compromising attitude toward ending the war and have tended to be more vocal about the allegedly deleterious effects of the US presence on the country's economic, social, and moral fibre. Moreover, should Tri Quang align himself with the southern opposition elements and actively participate in the election, he would certainly attempt to exploit anti-US and peace sentiment.* In any event, we expect that there will at least be significant undertones if not blatant overtones, of anti-US and neutralist sentiments in the campaigning.

24. The military establishment's candidate will more or less run on the regime's record and accomplishments. We would expect a generally moderate position on most issues with the exception of the question of negotiations. Here, the military is on record as being opposed to any talk of a coalition government and any direct discussions with the NLF or Viet Cong, though the GVN's military leaders have indicated some willingness to talk with their Hanoi counterparts. The military candidate may also engage in some anti-US baiting, in part to undercut the opposition and in part to assert his independence

* The recent militant Buddhist request, later seconded by Tam Chau, for a cease-fire on Buddha's birthday may mark the opening round of an attempt by the militant faction to make political capital by exploiting the peace theme. Tri Quang still has the remnants of the "struggle movement" at his disposal, and it is now becoming clear that the militant Buddhists are attempting to revive the movement. If the opportunity arose or could be manufactured, it is likely that Tri Quang would be quite willing to take to the streets again.

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from the US. Although the military establishment is aware of the need to avoid exacerbating regional differences and civilian-military animosities, pressure from the hard-line "Baby Turk" wing of the military could lead to some unfortunate developments in these areas.

25. Potential Pitfalls. The most obvious pitfall, of course, is that the electoral process will somehow set off forces which destroy the substantial, but as yet fragile, progress made thus far. This could come about in a number of ways, e.g., a serious split in the military establishment that resulted in a military coup, or a situation in which the campaign became so bitter that the security of the country was so threatened by demonstration, riots, and the like that the military felt compelled to suspend the elections and resort to suppressive measures. We consider both of these possibilities unlikely at the present time, though this estimate will obviously have to be kept under continuing review.

26. Somewhat more likely, but still considerably less than even, is the possibility that the military will rig the elections or at least engage in such flagrant activities as to destroy their usefulness and integrity. Unlike the CA election where the main task was merely to get out the vote, this time the military must get out votes for the right man, and this calls for more sophisticated tactics. We know, for example, that the military has considered the possibility of having to resort to illegal tactics. General Loan, in his capacity as the eyes and ears of the regime, appears to be the man who would be in charge of such a move should the military deem it necessary. We do not believe that the military will think it necessary to resort to blatant political chicanery, but there is a possibility that Loan and others will act unilaterally or else bend their instructions in such a way as to lend credence to charges of fraud.*

* Lest this paragraph give a wrong impression of Loan, it should be pointed out that on balance he is more of an asset than a liability--albeit an asset that bears close scrutiny. Loan's position as the chief security officer of the country and his very close relationship with Ky make him a natural choice for running the regime's covert activities. Thus far at least, Loan has not grossly exceeded his jurisdiction and his role in support of the government has been considerable, e.g., Loan played a major role in the GVN's victory over Tri Quang and the "struggle movement" last year.

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27. Yet another potential pitfall lies in the danger that the military, confident of its ability to win and govern in any case, will not be particularly concerned to make an effort to include a significant civilian element in the new government. Some in the military may not sufficiently realize the need for the new government to look like something new, or at least to avoid having it look as if the political process now in train has been designed only to give a constitutional and electoral veneer to the same old political arrangements. This is important for both the domestic and international image of the new government. On balance, however, we believe that the top leadership in the military is aware of the importance of the coupling of the military and civilian elements in the government, and that they will be receptive to US advice in this direction. Thus, we estimate that the odds are better than even that the new government will contain enough of a civilian aura to give credibility to its being a real step forward.

28. Summary and Prospects. Considering the assets that the military establishment already possesses and the potential support that it may gain through political deals, it is almost certain that if the military remains unified, whomever it supports for the presidency will win handily. This is not because the elections will necessarily be rigged, but because no opposition group can rival the nationwide apparatus and potential Tammany-like influence that can be utilized by the military establishment.

29. This fact of Vietnamese political life will affect the campaigns of the opposition candidates and could, perhaps, lead to a particularly bitter contest in which a number of issues may be raised which will be particularly abrasive and which will involve the US. Furthermore, there is a danger that the military in the heat of the campaign will resort to illegal means, even if unnecessary, to guarantee the victory of the GVN's candidate and thereby destroy the value of the election. This is not to say that these potentially disastrous events will occur or that the country will be torn apart by the elections, but to point out the dangers that could arise and to underline the critical importance

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of the election and the pre-election period. Our estimate is that the odds favor the election coming out reasonably well for both Vietnam and the US, particularly if the US assists by providing active, but discreet, advice and counsel within the context of Vietnamese political realities.

V. BEYOND THE ELECTIONS

30. Time is too short, the divisive forces too strong, for true national political parties to emerge before the elections this year. About the most that can be realistically expected is loose coalitions of disparate groups. Nevertheless, if such coalitions are formed, there is likely to be a substantial carryover effect in the new government. Assuming the military's candidate wins, we believe there is a slightly better than even chance that the legislature will be organized around a "government bloc" and one or two "opposition blocs." Initially at least, such blocs would not be particularly cohesive, and some re-alignment of individuals and groups would be likely to occur sooner or later.

31. Politics in the new government would generally resemble the present situation. Most of the same problems would still exist, and the government would still be faced with the same vulnerabilities. The civilian-military relationship in general, and regionalism in particular would continue to be the major stumbling blocks. Regardless of the extent of civilian participation in the new administration, there are certain to be strains and stresses in executive-legislative relations. Compromise and political give and take are not firmly rooted in Vietnamese political life, and the disparity of power between the civilians and military tends to result in the civilians being over-sensitive to real or imagined faults of the military while some of the military leaders tend to take a rather cavalier attitude toward the civilians and the need to cooperate with them. Because of the fragile nature of the system, judgments concerning longer range developments must be highly tentative. There will be crises, any of which could prove to be the ultimate undoing of the whole system.

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32. Thus, although the successful holding of national elections would be an important and essential political achievement, it would not automatically insure that continued progress was in store for Vietnam. The formation of a large political coalition that comprised something approaching a majority of the electorate would be a promising development and one that should be encouraged, though such a coalition would not be a panacea. Initially, a coalition of this type would not be very cohesive, but it would promote political stability, particularly by forcing the special interest groups to find some common ground through which they could win a national election. Furthermore, such a coalition would help to lay the groundwork for the eventual creation of a real, cohesive national party.

33. Actually, South Vietnam is slowly, often agonizingly so in US eyes, moving in this very direction. And although there will by many a slip between cup and lip, we are cautiously hopeful that the trend line will remain on the plus side. The military establishment is aware of the need to create a national political base, and within limits it is receptive to advice on how to go about it. On its own, it has sought advice from the Koreans, whose rulers have faced problems similar to those now faced by the Vietnamese. One obstacle to the military's effort to create a stable base is its lack of solid support in the southern region. Ultimately, if it is to succeed, it must incorporate some sizable southern element not now included among its assets. In any event, it must at all costs refrain from aggravating the potential for regional strife.

34. Over the longer run, the government must of necessity also adopt a revolutionary stance. Without this, it will probably be unable to motivate and sustain a viable national base. This means that insofar as possible, the government must strive to maintain a maximum of independence from the vested commercial and landed interests, so that it can justify the support of the people by satisfying their needs for social and economic change. To be free of its ties to the vested interests requires financial

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support from other sources, which in this case means the US in one way or another.

VI. THE US ROLE

35. The US is inextricably embroiled in the political life of South Vietnam and wields considerable political power there. Most Vietnamese tend to believe that the US calls most of the shots in South Vietnam, and they identify the US with the military regime. Indeed, a US policy of non-interference is not realistic; even if the US attempted to stay out of the political picture, the Vietnamese would see such restraint only as a clever strategem to get what the US really wanted. There are, however, limits to US power. The US, for example, can probably influence the GVN in putting a more civilian cast on the government, its institutions, and its day-to-day operations. But the military leaders are not going to turn real and full power over to the civilians, and it is quite clear that whatever the government may be, the influences of the military will be controlling for some time to come. This is a fact of Vietnamese political life that no US desire or action is likely to change.

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 1 1967
12:00 noon

177

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Al Jenkins' evaluation of the
current stalemate in Chinese mainland
politics -- confirmed from other sources.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

177a
April 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Mao's Power and the Waiting Game

The costly game of power measurement continues in China with no clearly discernible and significant shift in power realities so far as pro- and anti-Mao elements are concerned. Recently exacerbated differences within the Maoist camp, however, may presage a further drop in Mao's fortunes. The most noteworthy fact in the top leadership struggle is that not a single person of prominence in the opposition has defected to the Maoists. The opposition is serving by standing remarkably firm and waiting long.

Almost three-fourths of the members of the Central Committee has come under serious attack during various phases of the Cultural Revolution. For all practical purposes the Party in the capital has become Mao and a small group of his subordinates.

The most significant change in the scene during the past month has been the rapid growth of power in the hands of the Army. The Army has not yet clearly indicated its support of either major faction. Mao's immediate coterie, however, clearly regards the Army as having contributed to the "adverse current" in the Cultural Revolution.

The vaunted "three way alliances" (Army, revolutionary rebels and good cadres) are an attempt to cover up the fact that the Army controls the country. The not very successful attempt ever since January 23 to use the Army against the opposition causes the Revolution to take on more of the aspect of an attempted military coup by a minority in the Party against the majority rather than of a manifestation of the revolutionary militancy of the masses in attacking the bourgeoisie, which is the way the regime has attempted to portray the Revolution.

Meanwhile the Army has its own problems. Two of its most powerful and respected old-timers are in disrepute. Hsu Hsiang-chien, Vice Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee and head of the Army's Cultural Revolution Committee, has apparently been relieved of both posts, and Yeh Chien-ying, also a member of the Military Affairs Committee, has been excoriated in a poster reporting that a recent meeting of the Committee

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Letter 7-5-78

By rglip, NARA, Date 5-7-91

SECRET


- 2 -

broke up without deciding issues it meant to deal with. Even Madame Mao's perceptivity was equal to observing "the situation in the Army is hardly understandable."

There has been a recent upsurge of Red Guard sanctimonious hooliganism in Peking, along with reports of serious dissension within their ranks. Military control in Peking, however, is much tighter than when the Red Guards ran riot in January and there have been expressions of resentment that the Army's curbing of them is interfering with the Revolution.

Chou En-lai's prestige has again risen with reports that he heads a six-man "presidium" of the Communist Party. The role of this organization is not yet clear but it probably will be charged with continuing efforts to eliminate Chief of State Liu Shao-chi, Party Secretary Teng Hsiao-ping, and former Propaganda Chief Tao Chu. Lin Piao remains technically the heir apparent, but his chances are still not very apparent to me.

Barring a palace coup or sudden crumbling of the support of either faction, Mao's great struggle to retain power will primarily be determined by the manner and success of the Army's application of power and the performance of the economy, particularly in the agricultural realm. The former will be chiefly affected by a reading of Peking power realities and the reaction of the masses of Chinese citizens to the Army's exercise of power. The latter, of course, depends largely upon weather (so far better than average) and peasant-worker application, about which we simply know too little as yet. At the moment all we can say is that Mao's opposition has little cause to believe that they are losing by playing the waiting game.


Alfred Jenkins

cc: Mr. Jorden
Mr. Ropa

SECRET

Monday, May 1, 1967
10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a cheerful progress report
from Don Hornig on one of your Summit
proposals.

W. W. Rostow

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

178a

Friday, April 28, 1967
7:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR


THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Development of the Inter-American Foundation for Science
and Technology--Punta del Este Follow-up

Your proposal for the creation of an Inter-American Foundation for Science and Technology is arousing a great deal of interest in Latin America. It can be a solid and enduring monument to the Summit Conference.

We are proceeding to take the steps necessary to establish the Foundation, and Lincoln Gordon and I have agreed on the next moves. One of the most important is to set up a task force to work out the details and to secure the help of a senior scientist who is experienced in international affairs to head it. We hope that Dr. T. Keith Glennan, who is first-rate in every way, can be persuaded to take on the planning job and later to represent us on the group of experts set up under OAS.

AID is requesting the House Appropriations Committee to authorize \$5 million for the planning and initial operations of the Foundation.


Donald F. Hornig

~~CONFIDENTIAL TRINE~~

Monday, May 1, 1967
9:10 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Here is the first reflection of
our bombing power of electric power and
and other targets in Halphong.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL TRINE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ / RAC 04-5
By Sj, NARA, Date 1-7-04

179a

3.3(b)(1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EVACUATION OF HAIPHONG: Czech news services in North Viet Nam reported on 28 April that Haiphong authorities had ordered "complete evacuation of the port." City officials have reportedly urged all "non-essential" personnel to leave, and are allowing only military personnel and those essential to "most important branches of the economy" to remain in the city. News report said that production in several industrial plants had already stopped and that many production facilities would be transferred outside the city. (Limited evacuation of Haiphong was initiated as early as 1966 but, like Hanoi, local authorities have never been able to accomplish anything like "wholesale evacuation.")

1 May 1967
CPS-INT SUMMARY 103-67

xxx

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3.3(b)(1)

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-6
By Sj, NARA, Date 3-28-07

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Monday, May 1, 1967
9:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

I wanted you to see a quite independent evaluation of the recent intercepts from

3.3(b)(1),(3)

It fits our evaluation here; but adds a few interesting elements.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Gamma Controlled Info

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-5
By Sj, NARA, Date 1-7-04

Monday, May 1, 1967 -- 8:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

This is one of the three books I brought with me to Washington in 1961. A copy is still at my elbow.

It was published first in 1908 in Cambridge, England, arising from the battle between the young scientists against the reigning classicists in the University.

Its style is a bit out-of date; but hardly a day goes by in our great bureaucracy when I am not reminded of the definition of propaganda (p. vii); the Young Man in a Hurry (pp. 9-11); the analysis of Political Motive (p. 25); The Principle of the Dangerous Precedent (pp. 31-32); The Principle of Unripe Time (pp. 33-34); etc.

I hope you recognize something of your almost four decades in another -- more important -- line of politics.

W. W. Rostow

Microcosmographia Academica Being a Guide for the Young Academic Politician
by F. M. Cornford

WWRostow:rln

182

Pres file

Monday, May 1, 1967 -- 8:15a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

At a social occasion Joe Alsop drew me aside and said: I know Gen. Westmoreland has asked for 2-1/3 extra divisions; will the President give them to him?

I said that was a matter I was not prepared to discuss even on an off-the-record basis.

After showing his usual annoyance at not being told everything he would like to be told, Joe then said: I am afraid Westy's withdrawals from II and III Corps to protect I Corps will slow down the momentum of pacification. I don't care what he does with the 9th division in the Delta. That was a bad move. We should leave the Delta for the end after cleaning up and pacifying I, II and III Corps. I think Westy needs another division fast so that in protecting against the 3 divisions across the DMZ, he doesn't set back the progress that was being made when I was out there in II and III Corps. What do you think of that?

I said that it was his privilege to express his views as he saw them and on the basis of his information.

He also pushed me very hard on this question: Does Westy believe the 3 divisions will attack I Corps across the DMZ or not?

I said I did not know Westy's view on this point but I could understand a commander moving forces into position to deal with that kind of threat.

I believe we can expect Joe to write something soon along the lines indicated.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Cy sent LPH to see Mr. Newman

CONFIDENTIAL

May 1, 1967

183
Pres file
sent thru
Dr. Hornig

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Scientific Survey Mission to Taiwan

I believe that we should respond favorably to a long-standing Chinese desire -- made known last year both to Secretary Rusk and to Mr. Black -- for a scientific mission to Taiwan. State hopes that you will approve Dr. Hornig's heading such a mission. I believe this would be in our interests.

The Government of the Republic of China hopes that such a mission might lead to the establishment in Taiwan of a regional institute for science and technology. AID has expressed tentative coolness to the institute. This does not reflect a lack of interest in its value, but rather an anxiety about involvement which might imply readiness to resume AID financing of a project in Taiwan so soon after boasting of a termination of aid.

The possibility of partial AID financing might later be reconsidered on the strength of:

- Hornig's assessment of the situation;
- Taipei's success in drawing up a concrete project; and
- a good showing, if it can be made, that the institute has a major contribution to make to U. S. interests in fostering regional cooperation in the field of economic and social development processes.

Quite apart from the institute concept, Hornig's advice would be highly valued in connection with Taiwan's concern in finding ways to deal with its brain drain problem.

State is strongly in favor of our sending a survey mission. We have an interest in fostering academic, intellectual and scientific achievement and development in Taiwan in order to strengthen moderate and cooperative elements in building up Taiwan as a "torch bearer" of Chinese culture. Additionally, we believe that this tends to draw GRC interests to some extent away from military concerns.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 2-3-78, NSC 814-78
By reg/led, NARA, Date 5-7-91

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

It would be useful if Dr. Hornig and his mission could visit Taiwan this summer at a time when Professor Wu Ta'you of the State University of New York will be in Taiwan. Professor Wu has recently been appointed by President Chiang to head a new supervisory committee on scientific development and to coordinate such activities in Taiwan.

Your approval of the Hornig mission would be a very useful item to include in the joint statement in connection with Vice President C. K. Yen's visit.

You should be aware, however, that a visit under White House auspices of Hornig and a group of high-level experts is certain to give rise to expectations on the part of the Chinese that more will result than just advice. Some form of follow-up designed to strengthen science, as well as industrial and agricultural technology, within Taiwan and help reduce the brain drain may well be necessary. The range of possibilities will be worked out within the government before Dr. Hornig makes his trip.

I recommend that you approve the idea of Dr. Hornig's heading a mission to Taiwan at a suitable time within the next three months.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

cc: Mr. Jorden

AJenkins:mm

CONFIDENTIAL

Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, May 1, 1967

Mr. President

We have enlisted in Malik a shrewd Asian whose judgement is just about like ours in the marked passages.

You may wish to read this to Sen. Mansfield at breakfast -- but perhaps not.)

Walt Rostow

~~Secret~~ attachment

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

184a

~~SECRET~~

Action

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Info

VZCZCMJA131JBA022
 PP RUEHC
 DE RUMJBT 5171 1200905
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 300900Z APR 67
 FM AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
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~~SECRET~~ T DJAKARTA 5171

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EXDIS

REF: A. DJAKARTA'S 4914
 B. DJAKARTA'S 5143
 C. STATE'S 184899

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
 State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 4-22-99

1. FONMIN MALIK TOLD AMB LOCKE AND ME DURING OUR CALL TODAY THAT HE HAS HAD NO FURTHER RESPONSE FROM HANOI'S SIDE RE HIS PROPOSED MEETING BETWEEN NVN REP AND BUNKER. LAST CONTACT WITH PHAM BINH WAS AT SYRIAN NATIONAL DAY (REF A). MALIK, HOWEVER, HOPEFUL THAT NUGROHO POSTING IN HANOI, WHICH HE EXPECTS WILL OCCUR MID-MAY, WILL PROVE USEFUL IN PROBINGS OF HANOI'S POSITION. THIS WILL NOT LIMIT GOI OR MALIK PERSONALLY IN EXPLORING OTHER POSSIBLE WAYS OF ASSISTANCE IN PROMOTING SETTLEMENT.
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-2- DJAKARTA 5171, 300900Z APR 67

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GP-2
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~~SECRET~~

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

(orig to Pres) P. File
cc F. Bateson 185
Secy Fowler
SS

~~SECRET~~

May 1, 1967 **DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-452

By ing, NARA, Date 3-17-93

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Karl Schiller, Economic Minister, Germany
W. W. Rostow

The following is designed to supplement the account in Bonn's 12850 of the April 27, 1967, exchange between Schiller and myself on the Munich money agreement.

1. The reporting cable suggests accurately the line of Schiller's justification. It was basically political. He had brought the French along some distance. He felt the non-repayability provision would not apply to the U. S. The transferability provision might not be wholly satisfactory, nor clear; but it was a move in the right direction. On the other points of interest to us, there was evidently more work for them to do. The Munich agreement was incomplete.

2. He suggested strongly that this was a negotiating position in which we should bear in mind two factors:

-- the substance of what emerged from Europe would depend on what could be negotiated for Europe by way of a larger voice in the IMF;

-- in the minutes of the meeting it was agreed that the Six would have to reconvene if no agreement with the Americans was reached.

He claimed they had set in motion a process of movement in Europe towards the U. S. position. The movement was incomplete. But he felt there was time in hand because the German agreement on gold provided the U. S. security and the state of the U. S. balance of payments provided the world liquidity. We could continue to run a balance of payments deficit for some time without fear of a U. S. crisis or a world liquidity crisis. He was strongly urging us, in effect, to negotiate a drawing-rights scheme which met our requirements (non-repayment, transferability, etc.) rather than make a rigid stance on a new medium of payment at this time.

My reply to him was that, while we respected the diplomatic achievement of bringing the French along and getting the beginnings of a European position that was not in total confrontation with our interests, we did not face a diplomatic problem but a technical problem; namely, that if we did not solve this question properly, we might have "a traumatic event" in the field

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-2-

of international money which could have grave consequences. I recalled the inter-war years. Whatever solution we reached had to meet certain technical criteria or the problem would not be solved, however elegant the diplomacy. He knew as well as I the difference between finding a supplement to gold as a reserve instrument and enlarging, on a conditional basis, IMF credit facilities.

Afterwards, on the lawn, when the President and Chancellor Kiesinger were briefing the press on their private exchanges, Schiller sought me out and said: "I know where we have to end up in this monetary matter. Please tell your people not to be too rigid: We must do this by stages. We know you are not going to change the price of gold. We are supporting the dollar with our commitment on gold in the tripartite negotiations. We can make much further progress beyond Munich on a drawing-rights basis." Then he repeated his hope we would not be excessively rigid. I indicated no concessions whatever in our present proposal.

We exchanged sentiments of satisfaction at being able to discuss this matter so directly, as old friends, given our common work in 1962-64 on the Berlin viability.

W. Rostow

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Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, May 1, 1967

Mr. President

We have enlisted in Malik a shrewd Asian
whose judgement is just about like ours
in the marked passages.

(You may wish to read this to Sen. Mansfield
at breakfast -- but perhaps not.)

W. Rostow
W. Rostow

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

186a

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Action

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Info

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
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GP-2
GREEN

~~SECRET~~

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Monday - May 1, 1967

Mr. President:

General Anastasio Somoza is being sworn in as President of Nicaragua today.

Following the customary procedure of extending congratulations on such occasions, State recommends that you send him the attached message.

I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

See me ☐

Attachment

Limited Official Use

18.22

SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS
TO PRESIDENT SOMOZA OF NICARAGUA

His Excellency
Anastasio Somoza Debayle
President of the Republic of Nicaragua
Managua

I extend congratulations on your inauguration as President of Nicaragua and wish you every success. The Government of the United States looks forward to a continuation of the friendly relations between our two sovereign nations, and is confident that our mutual efforts will bring further advances toward the social and economic goals of the Alliance for Progress to which both our countries are dedicated.

Lyndon B. Johnson

122
DRAFT -- May 1, 1967 *sent to
Chas. McGee
to put into
John's language*

Dear Bob:

I suspect that only I know fully with what loyalty, competence, and energy you have served your country in your six years in the White House. You have formulated and courageously stated your views to the President day in and day out. Your advice -- and your integrity -- have been invaluable.

I could only release you from service in the White House because of the absolutely critical importance of pacification in Viet Nam. Under Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland I am counting on you to bring to bear on this problem all your knowledge and talent and drive.

You have demonstrated many times that you were not afraid to walk up to a tough problem, address yourself to it, and find ways of dealing with it. Our country needs precisely those qualities in the crucial days and months ahead in Viet Nam.

As you take up this work, I want you to know how grateful I am for what you have done in the past and how confident I am that you will help to fulfill our national objectives in Viet Nam.

-2-

Please give Gerry my thanks for being such a good soldier, and
tell her of the affection Mrs. Johnson and I feel for her.

Sincerely,

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Pres. file

Monday - May 1, 1967

Mr, President:

The Council on Latin America and the Pan American Society of the United States have approached me on the possibility of your attending one of their meetings in the near future.

The Council for Latin America will convene in Washington on May 19 and would like to have you drop in during their luncheon at the F Street Club.

The Pan American Society wants to organize a dinner in your honor in New York at which you could speak on the OAS Summit.

I recommend against your accepting either invitation:

- Accepting one and not the other could cause injured feelings; and doing both is too much.
- You have clearly defined your Latin America policy in three major statements during the past 8 months: the Alliance anniversary speech on August 17, 1966, your March 13 message to the Congress on the Summit program, and the Punta del Este speech.
- There is little new or different you could say in a public speech.
- The utility in your accepting the invitations is marginal.

I am in favor of your resting on your Summit laurels for the time being.

W. W. Rostow

Will accept both invitations ____.

Will accept one invitation:

Pan American Society ____.

Latin American Council ____.

Politely decline both invitations ____.

Speak to me ____.

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~~to [unclear]~~
2. Pres file
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By ing, NARA, Date 3-17-93

Monday, May 1, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Loans to Korea for Power Development

AID (Administrator Gaud) asks your approval to make two development loans to South Korea. They would finance the foreign exchange costs in improvements of the country's electric power system. The total of the two loans is \$34.7 million:

-- \$22 million to finance a new thermal power plant in southeast Korea, the nation's fastest-growing industrial area;

-- \$12.7 million for improvements in Korea's electric transmission and distribution system.

You will recall that in May 1965, a commitment was made to President Park that we would provide Korea with \$150 million in assistance this year. With the two proposed loans, we will have fulfilled that commitment up to \$142 million. AID is considering additional loans of \$8 million and expects to fulfill the commitment to Park completely by this summer.

Under our urging, the Koreans have boosted electricity rates by 24 per cent. The new loans will carry the requirement for another 10 per cent raise. Other requirements are aimed at enabling the Korean power company to meet its own future needs for capital investment.

Korea's need for additional power resources is urgent if the country is to maintain its encouraging high rate of growth. Demand has increased 19 per cent a year since 1964.

The loans would be used solely to finance purchase of United States equipment and services. Secretary Fowler agrees they will have a minimum adverse impact on our balance of payments. The Budget Bureau (Director Schultze) supports AID's proposal.


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I recommend that you approve these loans.

Embassy Seoul has strongly urged that announcement of the loans be held until after the presidential election (May 3). Their judgment is that announcement just in advance would do President Park more harm than good. Announcement after will strengthen his party in the up-coming legislative elections.

W. W. Rostow

Loans approved



Disapproved

See me

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

190a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

APR 21 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Power project loans for Korea

AID requests your approval to make two development loans totaling \$34.7 million to finance the foreign exchange costs of expanding and improving the power system of Korea.

- . \$22.0 million will finance the 200-megawatt Yongnam thermal power plant at Ulsan City on Korea's southeast coast - the heart of Korea's fastest growing industrial area.
- . \$12.7 million will finance additions to and improvements in Korea's nationwide, integrated electric transmission and distribution system.

As required by the terms of our most recent power project loan, the Koreans have increased electric rates by 24 percent and have taken steps to improve the operations and management of the Korea Electric Company (KECO) which is the sole source of central station power in Korea. AID plans to condition these two new loans on a further increase in rates of at least 10 percent no later than January 1, 1968. As an additional condition for the Yongnam loan, the Koreans will be required to establish a system that will result in regular power rate increases in the future sufficient to rationalize KECO's financial structure and provide funds to meet an increased portion of future capital investment requirements from KECO's own resources.

Because power is critical to Korean economic development -- and since the South was left with only 10 percent of existing power capacity when the more industrialized North was split off -- AID has long emphasized power in its economic assistance programs. From 1959 through 1966, the United States financed five power projects with loans totaling \$63.3 million. As the Koreans themselves increasingly assign higher priority to power within the total development picture, and as alternative sources of financing become available, we will be discussing with AID the advantages of shifting out emphasis into other sectors in which the United States is more competitive, thus providing more real resources per dollar of aid. This would also provide

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-452
By 128, NARA, Date 3-17-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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a better basis for development of long-term markets for U. S. products. Japan and Germany, in particular, are showing increased interest in financing Korean power projects.

Assistance to Korea under your \$150 million commitment to President Park in May 1965 stands at \$142 million, including these two loans. AID has under consideration additional loans totaling \$8 million and expects to fulfill the commitment completely by this Summer. We plan to make further development loans to Korea in the future, in line with Korea's development needs and the additional commitments made by the United States when the Koreans sent additional troops to Vietnam in 1966.

These loans will be used solely to finance the purchase of U. S. goods and services. Secretary Fowler agrees that these loans will have a minimum adverse impact on the U. S. balance of payments.

Recommendation:

(S P H H T)

President Park is anxious to announce authorization of these loans prior to the upcoming presidential election on May 3. These loans represent a solid investment in Korea's future. I recommend your approval.

Attachments

Charles L. Schultze

Charles L. Schultze
Director

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 4

1906
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

DECLASSIFIED

APR 15 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: New Project Approvals: Korea Development Loans

I request that you authorize me to make two development loans totalling \$34.7 million to the Republic of Korea to finance the foreign exchange costs of expanding and improving the facilities of the Korea Electric Company, the country's sole supplier of central station power. The loans are:

\$22.0 million for construction of the Yongnam Thermal Power Plant at Ulsan City;

\$12.7 million for expanding and improving electric transmission and distribution facilities (this would be the second A.I.D. loan for this purpose).

Korea's performance in promoting industrial and overall economic growth has been so good that demand for power is increasing at an unexpectedly high rate. In real terms, gross national product grew 8% annually in 1964 and 1965, 11.9% in 1966. Power demand has increased an average of 19% annually over the past 2 years and is projected to continue at the same or higher rate for several more years. Adequate and ample power must be made available or the momentum of Korea's industrial development will be lost.

The Yongnam Power Plant will provide 200 megawatts of power by 1971 for the growing industrial communities of southeast Korea. The facility will provide about 11% of the installed capacity in the entire system at that time. The transmission and distribution project will provide the major share of the essential links to be added through 1969 between generating stations and power users.

These loans are in further partial fulfillment of your \$150 million development loan commitment made to President Park in May, 1965. Thus far, we have authorized \$107 million for 13 loans. The two new loans will bring the total under the commitment to \$141.7 million. In addition, we are considering three small loans totalling \$11 million and we expect to complete the \$150 million by the end of this fiscal year or

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intervals; declassified
after 12 years

Authority Group 4
By DW, NARA, Date 5-30-91

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after 12 years

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

- 2 -

early in fiscal year 1968. As you have already stated to President Park, the completion of this commitment will not end our development lending in Korea although we have made no further quantified promises

Korean self-help measures in the power field stem in large part from the recommendations of the October, 1965 report of a survey team assembled by the Edison Electric Institute. These include a 24% rate increase required under a December, 1965 power plant loan. The pending loans will require other financial and managerial reforms designed to adjust Korea Electric Company's structure to the explosive demand for electric service in Korea. They include the installation of a new annual procedure for revaluation of the rate base and a further increase, by January 1, 1968, in charges for electricity reflecting the 1967 revalued base. The rate increase will enable Korea Electric to meet the power survey team's recommendations for self-financing of future expansions despite the accelerated demand for power in Korea. The company will provide about half of the \$15 million equivalent in local funds needed for the two projects; the Korean Government will lend the balance on concessional terms.

The A.I.D. loan terms to the Korean Government will be the same as those in other loans under the 1965 commitment: ten-year grace, plus thirty years amortization, with interest at 1% during the grace period and 2% thereafter. Korea Electric Company will repay the Korean Government over 20 years with interest at 6%.

Procurement of goods and services under both loans will be limited to the United States and thus will finance American exports. If A.I.D. does not finance these projects (the EX-IM Bank does not wish to), Korea will seek non-U.S. sources of financing, probably on harder terms and tied to procurement from the lending country. In addition, completion of the projects would be delayed, and Korea's economic progress would suffer.

The timing of the approval of these loans is politically important in Korea. During his March visit to Washington, Prime Minister Chung Il Kwon made two points to Secretary Rusk. First, he feared that delay in approving the loans would lead the Koreans to seek other sources of financing at a time when they desire to expand imports from the United States. Second, Korean elections are due very soon. The Presidential election is scheduled for May 3 and the National Assembly elections will follow a month thereafter. Therefore, the Department of State recommends that these loan authorizations be announced before the May 3 election.

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after 12 years

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intervals; declassified
after 12 years

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

- 3 -

Recommendation: That you authorize me to proceed promptly with these loans.

William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud

CONFIDENTIAL

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intervals; declassified
after 12 years

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 1, 1967

191

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Scientific Survey Mission to Taiwan

I believe that we should respond favorably to a long-standing Chinese desire -- made known last year both to Secretary Rusk and to Mr. Black -- for a scientific mission to Taiwan. State hopes that you will approve Dr. Hornig's heading such a mission. I believe this would be in our interests.

The Government of the Republic of China hopes that such a mission might lead to the establishment in Taiwan of a regional institute for science and technology. AID has expressed tentative coolness to the institute. This does not reflect a lack of interest in its value, but rather an anxiety about involvement which might imply readiness to resume AID financing of a project in Taiwan so soon after boasting of a termination of aid.

The possibility of partial AID financing might later be reconsidered on the strength of:

- Hornig's assessment of the situation;
- Taipei's success in drawing up a concrete project; and
- a good showing, if it can be made, that the institute has a major contribution to make to U. S. interests in fostering regional cooperation in the field of economic and social development processes.

Quite apart from the institute concept, Hornig's advice would be highly valued in connection with Taiwan's concern in finding ways to deal with its brain drain problem.

State is strongly in favor of our sending a survey mission. We have an interest in fostering academic, intellectual and scientific achievement and development in Taiwan in order to strengthen moderate and cooperative elements in building up Taiwan as a "torch bearer" of Chinese culture. Additionally, we believe that this tends to draw GRC interests to some extent away from military concerns.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Authority State 2-3-78, NSC 8-104-78
By 18/led, NARA, Date 5-7-91

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

It would be useful if Dr. Hornig and his mission could visit Taiwan this summer at a time when Professor Wu Ta'you of the State University of New York will be in Taiwan. Professor Wu has recently been appointed by President Chiang to head a new supervisory committee on scientific development and to coordinate such activities in Taiwan.

Your approval of the Hornig mission would be a very useful item to include in the joint statement in connection with Vice President C. K. Yen's visit.

You should be aware, however, that a visit under White House auspices of Hornig and a group of high-level experts is certain to give rise to expectations on the part of the Chinese that more will result than just advice. Some form of follow-up designed to strengthen science, as well as industrial and agricultural technology, within Taiwan and help reduce the brain drain may well be necessary. The range of possibilities will be worked out within the government before Dr. Hornig makes his trip.

I recommend that you approve the idea of Dr. Hornig's heading a mission to Taiwan at a suitable time within the next three months.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

See me ✓

cc: Mr. Jorden

AJenkins:mm

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, May 1, 1967
1:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

The returns on the Latin American
Summit keep quietly coming in.

W. W. Rostow

192a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, May 1, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM EMBASSY MEXICO CITY (6060)

SUBJECT: Mexican Reaction to Summit Meeting

In Carrillo Flores' words, President Diaz Ordaz was in a state of "euphoria" when he departed from Punta del Este. The reasons were principally the following:

A. The treatment accorded Diaz Ordaz by President Johnson was much warmer, considerate, grateful and "affectuoso" than he had any reason to expect in the presence of practically all the Chiefs of State. Diaz Ordaz was deeply touched when President Johnson informed him in complete privacy that from now on he hoped Diaz Ordaz would be his - Johnson's - lawyer insofar as problems in Latin America were concerned.

B. Diaz Ordaz felt he had been partially responsible for "saving" the meeting in two respects:

(1) by answering Arosemena's charges immediately and forcefully and thus helping to isolate Ecuador from other Latin Americans who might otherwise have been tempted to side, at least lukewarmly, with Arosemena; and,

(2) by insisting that all sessions be strictly devoted to approved agenda items, thus avoiding highly controversial issues with resulting divisive effects. (I did not fail to point that the U.S. had also been highly cooperative in this respect which Carrillo readily and gratefully acknowledged.)

C. While Diaz Ordaz was "somewhat disappointed" that the U.S. had been unable to go farther on questions of Latin American trade preferences and concrete assurances of additional aid, he understood President Johnson's position perfectly and felt assured that the latter would do everything in his power to convince Congress and the American people of the necessity of backing up the Summit's decisions with acts.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-446
By mg NARA, Date 2-3-92

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D. Probably the greatest asset of the Summit, from Mexico's point of view, was a feeling of even closer personal friendship with President Johnson -- something which cannot but have "vast impact" on future Mexican-U.S. relations.

FREEMAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~