

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[1049]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
3a cable	Deptel 197663 to New Delhi S 3 pp. <i>open 5-22-92 NLS 91-474</i> [duplicate of #64a, NSF Country File, "India, Vol. 9," exempted 1978]	5/18/67	A
3b cable	New Delhi 17034 <i>Open 2-9-00 NLS 99-163</i> S 2 pp. <i>exempt 5-22-92 NLS 91-474</i>	5/19/67	A
4 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re personnel S 1 p. <i>open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470</i>	5/24/67	A
4a cable	Deptel to Addis Ababa S 1 p. <i>open 5-22-92 NLS 91-474</i>	undated	A
6b cable	Paris 18867 <i>duplicate in Files of WWR, Box 15, NON-VN MARCH-JUNE 67, Doc 346</i> S 1 p. <i>exempt 5-22-92 NLS 91-474 open 1-11-00 NLS 96-28</i>	5/23/67	A
6d cable	Moscow 5101 C 1 p. <i>open 5-22-92 NLS 91-474</i>	5/24/67	A
7a cable	Paris 18921 <i>Open 2-9-00 NLS 99-163</i> S 2 pp. <i>exempt 5-22-92 NLS 91-474</i>	5/24/67	A
7b cable	Paris 18920 <i>Open 2-9-00 NLS 99-163</i> S 1 p. <i>exempt 5-22-92 NLS 91-474</i>	5/24/67	A
8 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Dominican Republic C 1 p. <i>open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470</i>	5/24/67	A
13 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam TS 1 p. <i>open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470</i>	5/23/67	A
13a memo	Hornig to Rostow re Vietnam TS 2 pp. <i>open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470</i>	5/23/67	A
15b cable	Tel Aviv 3648 <i>Open 2-29-00 NLS 99-165</i> S 4 pp. <i>exempt 5-22-92 NLS 91-474</i> [duplicate of #19, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. I," exempted 1983]	5/18/67	A
15c cable	Deptel 19654 to Tel Aviv S 2 pp. <i>open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470</i>	5/17/67	A
16a report	re Vietnam <i>sanitized 5-10-93 NLS 91-472</i> S 5 pp. <i>Sanitized 5/21/01 NS/RAC 95-89</i>	5/23/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Volume 28,
May 16-24, 1967," Box 16

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
18 report	Israeli Aid Package <i>Sanitized 11/6/00 NS 91-164</i> TS 1 p. [duplicate of #6, NSF Country File, Israel, "Israeli Aid 5/67," sanitized 1979]	5/23/67	A
19 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re UAR S 1 p. open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470	5/23/67	A
20 list	President's Decisions TS 1 p. <i>open 9-3-96 NLS 90-27</i> [duplicate of #7, NSF Country File, Israel, "Israeli Aid 5/67," sanitized 1979] <i>ANOTHER DUPE IN FILES OF NWR, BOX 15, NOIN-UN MARCH-JUNE 1967, #3/C</i>	5/23/67	A
23a memo	re Middle East <i>Open 5/21/01 NS/RAC 99109</i> S 2 pp. <i>Sanitized 5-10-93 NLS 91-472</i>	5/23/67	A
24b cable	USUN 5370 C 2 pp. [duplicate of #61b, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. I," sanitized 1984] <i>open 5-1-99</i>	5/19/67	A
24c cable	Deptel 197661 to Moscow S 3 pp. <i>open 5-1-99</i> [duplicate of #61c, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. I," sanitized 1984]	5/18/67	A
25a cable	re Far East S 1 p. <i>open 5-10-93 NLS 91-472</i>	5/22/67	A
28 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam <i>open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470</i> TS 1 p. <i>Dup. #11a, NSF, CE VN. "3P Proj. Completed" Box 88</i>	5/22/67	A
28a memo	Harriman to the Pres. and Sec. State TS 1 p. <i>exempt 5-22-92 NLS 91-474</i> <i>open 5-1-99</i>	5/22/67	A
32a letter	LBJ to Pres. of Rep. of Senegal PCI 1 p. <i>open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470</i>	5/23/67	A
36a cable	re Vietnam <i>open 4-26-99</i> C 1 p. <i>exempt 5-22-92 NLS 91-474</i>	5/22/67	A
40a letter	LBJ to PM of Trinidad and Tobago PCI 1 p. <i>open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470</i>	5/22/67	A
40b letter	Eric Williams to the Pres. PCI 1 p.	5/6/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
41 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Bolivia <i>open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470</i> C 1 p.	5/22/67	A
41a message	<i>dup #6j NSF, Special Study State Correspondence, Bolivia 7/65-2/28/68 Box 5</i> Pres. to Barrientos PCI 1 p. <i>Open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470</i>	5/30/67	A
44a letter	LBJ to Pres. of Rep. of Korea PCI 1 p. <i>open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470</i>	5/22/67	A
44d draft	letter from LBJ to Pres. Park PCI 2 pp.	undated	A
45 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Japan C 1 p. <i>open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470</i>	5/22/67	A
47 memo	Rostow to the Pres. <i>open 2-24-93 NLJ 91-404</i> C 1 p.	5/20/67	A
47a cable	Vientiane 7227 C 1 p. <i>open 5-22-92 NLJ 91-474</i>	5/20/67	A
48 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470</i>	5/20/67	A
48a cable	re Vietnam <i>Sanitized 5/21/01 NS/RAC 99-89</i> S 2 pp. <i>example NLJ 91-472</i>	5/20/67	A
48b cable	Saigon 26231 <i>Sanitized 5/21/01 NS/RAC 99-89</i> S 2 pp. <i>Sanitized 5-22-92 NLJ 91-474</i> <i>[Duplicate of #11, NSF, CF, UN, Vol 71, Box 43]</i>	5/20/67	A
50a memo	McNamara to the Pres. TS 1 p. <i>open 1-6-92 NLJ 91-475</i>	5/20/67	A
51 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re NSAM C 1 p. <i>open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470</i>	5/20/67	A
51a memo	Maxwell Taylor to the Pres. C 2 pp. <i>open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470</i>	5/17/67	A
52 memo	Bator to the Pres. C 2 pp. <i>open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470</i>	5/20/67	A
53 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>DUPE IN FILES OF WWR, Box 4, "VIETNAM" #7</i> <i>open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470</i>	5/20/67	A
53a memo	Rostow to Sec. State re Vietnam S 4 pp. <i>AS ABOVE #7a</i> <i>* NLJ 87-91</i>	11/28/62	A

FILE LOCATION

FROM PAPERS OF WALT ROSTOW, Box 13 "Southeast Asia"

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Volume 28,
May 16-24, 1967," Box 16

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
54 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re UK <i>open 11/2/99 NLS 98-55</i> C 1 p. exempt 5-22-92 NLS 91-470	5/20/67	A
54a memcon	re Wilson Visit <i>Open NLS 98-237 5-17-99</i> C 1 p. exempt 5-22-92 NLS 91-474	5/17/67	A
57a cable	Caracas 6116 C 1 p. <i>open 5-22-92 NLS 91-474</i>	5/18/67	A
58 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Dominican Republic S 2 pp. exempt 5-22-92 NLS 91-470 <i>Sanitized 11/6/00 NLS 99-164</i>	5/19/67	A
58a report	Dominican Republic S 3 pp. exempt 5-22-92 NLS 91-470 <i>Sanitized 11/6/00 NLS 99-164</i>	5/5/67	A
59 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re China S 1 p. <i>open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470</i>	5/20/67	A
61a cable	Bonn 13879 <i>open 5-22-92 NLS 91-474</i> C 1 p.	5/19/67	A
62a draft	letter to Kosygin PCI 3 pp. <i>open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470</i>	5/19/67	A
69 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam TS 1 p. <i>open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470</i>	5/19/67	A
69a cable	Moscow 5009 TS 2 pp. exempt 5-22-92 NLS 91-474 <i>open 5-1-99</i>	5/19/67	A
70a cable	Tel Aviv 3648 <i>open 2-29-00 NLS 99-165</i> S 4 pp. [duplicate of #19, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. I," exempted 1983]	5/18/67	A
71a cable	Deptel 197313 to Hong Kong <i>Open 2-9-00 NLS 99-163</i> TS 1 p. exempt 5-22-92 NLS 91-474	5/18/67	A
72 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re draft letter <i>open 4-26-99</i> S 1 p. <i>open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470</i> <i>NLS 91-470</i>	5/19/67	A
72a	<i>near</i> Duplicate of document #62a		
73 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam TS 1 p. <i>open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470</i>	5/19/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
74 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Peru C 2 pp. <i>open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470</i> [duplicate of #86c, NSF Country File, Peru, Vol. 2]	5/19/67	A
74a memo	Schultze to the Pres. re Peru C 2 pp. <i>open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470</i> [duplicate of #86d, NSF Country File, Peru, Vol. 2]	5/3/67	A
74b memo	Caud to the Pres. re Peru <i>open 5-1-99</i> C 8 pp. <i>AND 1076-95 guidelines</i> [duplicate of #86e, NSF Country File, Peru, Vol. 2]	4/21/67	A
76 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Israel S 1 p. <i>open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470</i>	5/19/67	A
79 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p.	5/18/67	A
80 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam <i>open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470</i> TS 1 p. <i>(Poss dup of #57, file of WR - VN, OK)</i>	5/18/67	A
80a memo	Rostow re Vietnam TS 4 pp. <i>open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470</i>	5/18/67	A
85a cable	Saigon 26055 S 1 p. <i>open 5-22-92 NLJ 91-474</i>	5/18/67	A
86a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 1 p. <i>exempt NLJ 91-472; exempt NLJ 019-016-2</i>	5/15/67	A
86b	Duplicate of document #86a		
87 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam TS 1 p. <i>open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470</i>	5/18/67	A
89a memo	Smith to Rostow re foreign policy C 1 p. <i>open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470</i>	5/17/67	A
90a cable	Canberra 5574 C 1 p. <i>open 5-22-92 NLJ 91-474</i>	5/18/67	A

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NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Volume 28,
May 16-24, 1967," Box 16

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
91 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Israel PCI 1 p. open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470	5/18/67	A
97 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Chile open 8-8-94 NLJ 94-19 C 2 pp. <i>[dup. of #93, NSF, CH, Vol 4]</i>	5/18/67	A
98 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Japan C 1 p. open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470	5/18/67	A
98a biography	Japanese Ambassador to the United States C 2 pp. exempt NLJ 91-472 open 2-9-00 NLJ 99-163	5/12/67	A
101a memo	Rusk to the Pres. re Netherlands C 1 p. open 5-22-92 NLJ 91-474	5/17/67	A
103 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam TS 1 p. open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470	5/17/67	A
104 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam TS 1 p. open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470	5/17/67	A
104a cable	Deptel 192044 to Saigon open 5/21/01 NS/PAC 99-85 S 3 pp. sanitized 5-22-92 NLJ 91-474	5/10/67	A
104b cable	Pres. to Saigon TS 1 p. open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470	5/13/67	A
104c cable	Pres. to Saigon sanitized 10-20-93 NLJ 91-474 TS 1 p. Sanitized 8/21/01 NS/PAC 99-85; ADmi NS 019-010-2 Downgraded to Secret per NLJ 91-474 (12/01)	undated	A
105 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re USSR S 1 p. open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470	5/17/67	A
105a cable	USUN 5231 exempt 5-22-92 NLJ 91-474 S 1 p. open 2-9-00 NLJ 99-163	5/10/67	A
105b cable	Prague 1965 S 1 p. sanitized 5-22-92 NLJ 91-474 open NLJ 99-28	5/16/67	A
105c cable	Sofia 1071 C 2 pp. sanitized 5-22-92 NLJ 91-474 //	5/6/67	A
107a memo	Schultze to the Pres. re Iceland C 1 p. open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470	4/20/67	A
107b memo	Gaud & Freeman to the Pres. re Iceland C 2 pp. open 3-4-92 NLJ 91-473	4/10/67	A

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NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Volume 28,
May 16-24, 1967," Box 16

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
108a memo	Saunders to Rostow re Middle East open 2-29-00 NLJ 99-165 S 5 pp. [duplicate of #46a, NSF Name File, "Saunders Memos," sanitized 1986]	5/16/67	A
109b cable	Hanoi 309 <i>open 4-26-99</i> C 1 p. exempt 5-22-92 NLJ 91-474	5/12/67	A
113 memo	Bator to the Pres. S 1 p. open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470	5/17/67	A
114 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Iran S 1 p. open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470	5/17/67	A
115 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Iran S 2 pp. open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470 [duplicate of #245, NSF Country File, "Iran, Vol. 2"]	5/17/67	A
115a memo	Rusk to the Pres. re Iran open 4-26-99 S 2 pp. [duplicate of #245a, NSF Country File, "Iran, Vol. 2;" #115a sanitized NLJ 87-17]	5/12/67	A
115b report	re Iran <i>open 5-22-92 NLJ 91-474</i> S 7 pp. [duplicate of #245a, NSF Country File, "Iran, Vol. 2]	undated	A
116 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Israel S 1 p. open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470	5/17/67	A
117 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Cuba S 1 p. open 12-18-92 NLJ 91-471	5/17/67	A
117a memo	to the Director <i>Sanitized 5/21/04 NS/RAL 09-89</i> S 2 pp. Sanitized 5-10-93 NLJ 91-472	5/16/67	A
118 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East open 2-29-00 NLJ 99-165 S 1 p. [duplicate of #11, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 1," sanitized 1983]	5/17/67	A
119 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Latin America S 2 pp. open 8-29-95 NLJ 91-470	5/17/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
119a cable	Caracas 6070 - Open 2-9-00 NLS 99-163 C 2 pp. exempt 5-22-92 NLS 91-474	5/17/67	A
119b cable	Caracas 6069 - Open 2-9-00 NLS 99-163 C 2 pp. exempt 5-22-92 NLS 91-474	5/17/67	A
120 memo	Bator to the Pres. C 2 pp. open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470	5/16/67	A
121a memo	Rusk to the Pres. re Latin America C 4 pp. open 10-20-92 NLS 91-474	5/15/67	A
122 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Turkey open 4-27-99 C 1 p. exempt 8-29-95 NLS 91-470	5/16/67	A
124 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Germany C 1 p. open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470	5/16/67	A
124e memo	Rusk to Rostow re Germany C 1 p. open 10-20-92 NLS 91-474	5/10/67	A
124d memo	Rusk to the Pres. re Germany " C 2 pp.	undated	A
124e cable	Suggested Telegram " C 2 pp.	undated	A
125 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re NPT TS 1 p. open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470	5/16/67	A
125a memo	Rusk to the Pres. re NPT open 10-20-92 S 4 pp. NLS 91-474	undated	A
126 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam open 8-29-95 NLS 91-470 TS 1 p. (Dup. of #10, Files of WWR, [VN-Apr-June 1967], Box 6)	5/16/67	A
126a memo	Harriman to the Pres. and Sec. State TS 2 pp. open 10-20-92 NLS 91-474	5/15/67	A

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#6memo	Rostow to the President - <i>exempt RAC 5103</i> TS 1 p	5/24/67	A
#6a cable	Intelligence report - DUPE IN FILES OF WOODR, BOX 15, NON-OTD AREA - DUNE 67, BOX #340 TS <i>exempt 3-3-97 NLJ 96-39</i> 1 p	5/24/67	A
#6c cable	Intelligence report - TS <i>exempt RAC 5103</i> 1 p	5/24/67	A
#23b memo	Intelligence report - TS <i>exempt RAC 5103</i> 1 p	5/23/67	A
#84 memo	Rostow to the President - <i>S</i> <i>SANITIZED 8/8/06 NLJ/RAC 05.53</i> 1 p	5/18/67	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Walt Rostow, Memos to the President, Vol. 28
May 16 - 25, 1967 Box 16

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~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 29, 1967

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

Gene Black came in today to present his impressions and recommendations after being thoroughly briefed by Luke Battle and his people.

1. If we do nothing about Aqaba there will certainly be a war. The Israelis will fight if Nasser seizes their ships. Therefore, he sees no alternative to the kind of plan we are organizing.

2. It is important that we get the declaration of the maritime powers out as soon as possible. Nasser must realize the strength and universality of the principle that is being applied to Aqaba and of the opinion that supports that principle.

3. He talked with U Thant, who was pessimistic about anything helpful happening in the UN. It might buy us two or three weeks; but we can't wait that long for the declaration. It must be agreed by as many maritime countries as possible.

4. The declaration must, of course, be backed by naval and military power. It would be foolish to try to enforce this universal principle by ourselves. We would have trouble with both Congress and the country. On the other hand, he thinks that the Congressional leadership would support us if we were with others.

5. He agrees that a Congressional Resolution will probably be required at some stage. It must be strong -- but not too strong, against the background of the Tonkin Gulf.

6. U Thant reports that Nasser says he will take any ship in Aqaba except a "tanker or one flying an Israeli flag." Black thinks this will be wholly unacceptable to Israel.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 83-52

By g/lis, NARA, Date 5-21-91

5/29/67

7. Ultimately -- down the road -- is this question: How do we get Nasser to go back on his word? What will he do? Is there any way for him to save face? If not, we shall have to face issues like the cancelling of oil contracts; the closing of the Suez Canal; etc.

8. Incidentally, Nasser told U Thant he would "never take" any American wheat.

9. Black also reports U Thant's view that the crisis must be solved, in the end, "through Moscow."

10. Black will keep in touch with the situation and let us have any further thoughts.

FYL. A draft of the proposed declaration will be in your hands tomorrow. If and when you approve it, State has cranked up with the British to seek support fast. It is their hope that more than 20 powers will accept it. The number putting in ships, if required, will, of course, be less.

###

SECRET

Wednesday, May 24, 1967, 2:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Denial of Report that Jordan has Declared
War on Israel

The attached message from our Embassy in
Jordan flatly denies the report received earlier
indicating that Jordan had declared war on Israel.

/s/

Bromley Smith

Wed., May 31, 1967
1:40 p.m.

3

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Sect. Rusk's redoubtable
blow-up, and Bowles' painful reply.

Pres file

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (State 197663)

DECLASSIFIED

3a
197663

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE

SECRET

Classification

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE

STATE 197663

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

MAY 18 9 30 PM '67

Rostow

I have just received a FBIS excerpt (embargoed until morning May 19) for Ho Chi Minh's birthday.. to Ho Chi Minh, reporting a message from Prime Minister, ~~to Ho Chi Minh~~ expressing the hope that QTE the Vietnamese people will have the good fortune of having Ho Chi Minh's wise and dedicated leadership to guide them UNQTE. We cannot, of course, expect India to agree with every view of ours in international affairs. But we do expect, where vital ~~xxxx~~ interests of the US are concerned, that India would at least take a non-aligned position. If Mrs. Gandhi thinks that we are just good guys and will take a lot of reaction, punishment without ~~reaction~~, she is underestimating the mood of the American people while we are carrying such heavy burdens. If she feels that she must slant her QTE non-alignment UNQTE in favor of the Communist world in order to keep her credentials clear with Moscow, she cannot maintain her credentials with the US. The general mood in this country does not permit us to act like an old cow which continues to give milk however often one kicks her in the flanks. No one has spent more time and energy

S/DR sk:ma 5/18/67

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:DR (S)
The Secretary

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E.O. 12356, Ser. 3.4

NLJ 91-474

By ju, NARA, Date 5-19-92

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~~Classification~~

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and political capital in trying to help India than has President Johnson. No one is carrying a greater burden in serving one of India's vital interests, namely, in organizing a durable peace in Southeast Asia, than the President and the young men in this country who are being killed in Viet-Nam.

If Mrs. Gandhi's message to Ho Chi Minh is as I have reported on the basis of preliminary information, I do hope that you will find some way to let her know that the interests of this country are not being served by this kind of cringing and that the US can be just as tough as everybody else in deciding whether relations are to be friendly, ~~friendly~~ correct and cool, or on a basis of active opposition. I hope our early information is wrong. I have met with Congressional groups ~~xxx~~ five times during the first three days of this week trying to carry some of the burdens of such policies as supporting India. Just today I faced in the House Foreign Affairs Committee a demand for a full debate on the floor of the House of Representatives of the exact amounts and terms of our aid to India in the light of India's own policies.

Perhaps my struggle here makes me a bit edgy but I really do think that ~~xxx~~ pretend those who ~~pretend~~ to be non-aligned should in fact be non-aligned and stay away from questions on which they are not prepared to take any serious responsibility.

Mrs. ~~Gandhi~~ Gandhi has no constituency in North Viet-Nam and Ho Chi Minh has no constituency in India but Mrs. Gandhi surely does have a major constituency among the American people and she had better give some thought on how to nurse

~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

~~SECRET~~

Classification

-3-

it from time to time. Her own personal relations with ^{the} President of the US are perhaps the most important single aspect of India's future safety and viability. The President has not spoken to me about this but you and I know that this, too, is something which Mrs. Gandhi should think about.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

Classification

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

⑤ 3.6

W 10

~~SECRET~~

Action 00 RUENC
DE RUSSAE 17034 1391535
ZNY SSSSS
Info 0 191508Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GR950
BT

2 0 3 7 1
1967 May 19, 1:51 PM

~~SECRET~~ NEW DELHI 17034
MODIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR BOWLES

1. LET ME SAY AT THE OUTSET THAT I UNDERSTAND AND APPRECIATE YOUR STRONG REACTION TO MRS. GANDHI'S BIRTHDAY GREETINGS TO HO CHI MINH. WE HAD NOT HEARD OF IT BEFORE YOUR CABLE ARRIVED, ALTHOUGH I UNDERSTAND THERE IS A SMALL ITEM IN THIS MORNING'S PRESS. LIKE THE MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE OF LAST JULY, IT WAS SILLY, STUPID AND MISGUIDED.

2. MY FIRST THOUGHT WAS TO GO DIRECTLY TO MRS. GANDHI. HOWEVER, SHE IS IN SUCH A TENSE MOOD WITH SO MANY PROBLEMS CROWDING IN UPON HER THAT I DECIDED SHE WOULD SIMPLY FREEZE UP. MY NEXT THOUGHT WAS TO GO TO MORARJI DESAI WHO NOT ONLY UNDERSTANDS BUT FULLY SUPPORTS THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION IN VIET-NAM. HE WOULD, I BELIEVE, HAVE REACTED VERY VIGOROUSLY. UNFORTUNATLY, DESAI IS OUT OF TOWN FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS.

3. THEREFORE, I DECIDED TO PRESENT OUR VIEWS TO P.M. HAKSAR, THE EXTREMELY ABLE CIVIL SERVANT WHO HAS TAKEN OVER L.K. JHA'S POSITION AS EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO PRIME MINISTER. I DECIDED THAT MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO UNDERSCORE THE PROBLEM WAS TO SHOW HIM A STERILIZED VERSION OF YOUR CABLE TO ME. ALTHOUGH HAKSAR HAD NOT SEEN MRS. GANDHI'S MESSAGE, HIS FIRST REACTION WAS DEFENSIVE, I.E., IT WAS UNDOUBTEDLY ROUTINE MESSAGE PUT OUT BY PROTOCOL DIVISION TO A HEAD OF STATE, SUCH MESSAGES WERE A MATTER OF FORM, ETC.

4. HOWEVER, WHEN I SHOWED HIM A COPY AND POINTED OUT (A) THAT NO SIMILAR MESSAGE WAS LIKELY TO GO FROM MRS. GANDHI TO PRESIDENT THIEU, (B) THAT AS CHAIRMAN OF ICC, INDIA HAD A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND (C) THAT THE MESSAGE DID NOT REFER TO NORTH VIETNAM BUT TO VIET-NAM ITSELF, HE SHIFTED GEARS. HE SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD YOUR AND MY OWN CONCERN AND DID NOT THINK YOUR PERSONAL REACTION WAS IN ANY SENSE UNREASONABLE.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-163

By is, NARA Date 1-7-00

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- NEW DELHI 17034 (NODIS), May 19.

5. MESSAGE, HE SAID, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENT UNLESS SIMILAR MESSAGE WAS TO GO TO PRESIDENT OF SOUTH VIET-NAM: IF MESSAGE WERE SENT, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN IN DIFFERENT LANGUAGE, AND IN UPY EVENT IT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE PUBLIC. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT MEA IS DISORGANIZED, FILLED WITH PEOPLE WITH A SPECIAL AXE TO GRIND AND HE THOUGHT HE KNEW WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS PARTICULAR PLOY. (ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT MENTION T.N. KAUL, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT HE HAD HIM IN MIND. YOU MAY REMEMBER THAT T.N. KAUL WAS SAID BY L.K. JHA TO HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE LAST JULY.)

6. CLOSING THE DISCUSSION I STATED THAT MAJOR U.S. OBJECTIVE IN ASIA IS TO DEVELOP A POLITICALLY STABLE, ECONOMICALLY VIABLE INDIA READY AND ABLE TO WORK WITH JAPAN AND OTHER NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES TO DEVELOP A CDKINDIGENOUS COUNTERWEIGHT TO COMMUNIST CHINESE. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO NEED EITHER TO LOVE US OR PRAISE US OR TO ALWAYS AGREE WITH US, AN EFFECTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP REQUIRES US BOTH TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER'S PROBLEMS, TO COOPERATE WHEREVER WE CAN, AND ABOVE ALL, TO AVOID EMBARRASSMENT TO ONE ANOTHER.

7. HAKSAR SAID ONCE AGAIN HE TOTALLY AGREED WITH MY VIEW, THOUGHT OUR REACTION WAS REASONABLE AND HOPED THAT AS THINGS SETTLED DOWN, HE COULD PREVENT INCIDENTS OF THIS KIND.

8. LET ME ADD A PERSONAL NOTE: YOU MAY REMBER IN YOUR OFFICE THREE OR FOUR YEARS AGO I URGED YOU TO BE MORE PATIENT WITH INDIA AND YOU REPLID THAT SOMETIMES YOU FELT I WAS MUCH TOO PATIENT. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT IN THE LAST FEW YEARS ON THE FIRING LINE MY PATIENCE HAS OFTEN BEEN STRETCHED TO THE BREAKING POINT. THE INDIANS ARE INEPT IN THEIR DIPLOMACY AND THEIR PUBLIC RELATIONS SENSE IS NON-EXISTENT.

9. ALTHOUGH WE CAN KEEP MANY OF THESE INCIDENTS FROM HAPPENING, AND PROTEST WHEN THEY DO, INEVITABLY THEY WILL COME ALONG NOW AND AGAIN, TRYING MY PATIENCE HERE AS WELL AS YOUR OWN.

10. I CAN ONLY SUGGEST/ONCE AGAIN THAT I DO NOT SEE HOW THERE CAN BE A STABLE ASIA WITHOUT A STABLE INDIA. IF INDIA DISIEGRATES, OR TURNS AGAINST US, OUR MASSIVE INVESTMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WILL LOSE MUCH OF ITS MEANING.

11. I DO WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I APPRECIATE THE SUPPORT THAT YOU HAVE GIVEN OUR EFFORTS HERE. YOU CAN COUNT ON THIS MISSION TO CONTINUE TO KEEP INDIA'S REACTIONS AND POLICIES AS RATIONAL AS POSSIBLE.

GP-1 BOWLES

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-470
By CG, NARA, Date 7-21-95

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 24, 1967
1:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk wishes to have Nick Katzenbach stop in Geneva and replace Arthur Goldberg at the Pacem in Terris conference.

Great pressure is being put on the Secretary by Sen. Pell, as well as by Baggs, to produce a substitute for Goldberg. Nick would read a speech and, hopefully, help prevent the various Congressmen from getting too far off the reservation.

W. W. Rostow

Telegram cleared _____

No _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~

1979 4a

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COMSEC
☐ CHATSEA TO

~~SECRET~~
Classification

ACTION: Anembassy ADDIS ABABA

STATE
NODIS
UNSEC

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-474
By ju, NARA, Date 5-19-92

Rostov
For Clearance

EYES ONLY FOR UNDER SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY

UN Middle East activities will prevent Arthur Goldberg (or SYG) from attending Geneva Pacem in Terris conference as originally planned.

U.S.
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Delegation has now grown somewhat and includes Senators Fulbright, Church, Clark, Gore, McGovern, Brooke, and Percy as well as Justices Black and Douglas.

If it would be feasible from your point of view to drop by at the conference for a day following your stay in Nice, before your return, it might be helpful to have someone who could speak with authority for Administration, ~~XXXXXX~~ As you may know, Do and Thanat both plan to attend.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ If it is possible to stop in Geneva, we can arrange for invitation from this end. Let me know your views.

GP-1

END

Drafted by: S/SYBHRead:sbb	Tel. no. 5381	Telegraphic transmission and classification secured by: The Secretary
--------------------------------------	-------------------------	--

White House -

~~SECRET~~
Classification

Wednesday, May 24, 1967

11:55 a. m.

5

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is most unusual.

Minister Evron called me to say that he fears Israeli diplomats are so busy pressing the U. S. Government that they never take the trouble to thank it.

1. He deeply appreciates -- as does his government -- the final form of the Israeli aid package.

2. He fully understands the "terrible dilemma" which you faced yesterday in making a public statement -- wanting both to reassure Israel and permit quiet diplomacy to work. He thought the final result was "wonderful." He wanted you to know that the Israeli Embassy in Washington was flooded with telephone calls from people we both would respect, who were deeply gratified by your statement.

3. He wanted me to convey to you, if I felt it appropriate, his deep personal gratitude.

W. W. R.

6b

MEMORANDUM Department of State

FRAG40VV KPM024

PP RUEHC
DE RUEKOR 18367 143100
ZNY SSSSS
R 231809Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC

020002

1967 MAY 23 AM 3

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 18367

EXDIS

MIDEAST CRISIS

1. QVAI'S LEVANT AFFAIRS CHIEF TOLD EMBOFF MAY 23
IN UTMOST SECRECY (TO PROTECT HIGH PLACED FRENCH
SOURCES AND MOST DELICATE RELATIONSHIPS) THAT QVAI
QUOTE HAS GOOD REASON BELIEVE UNQUOTE SOVIETS HAVE
INFORMED SYRIANS THAT LATTER CANNOT RPT CANNOT COUNT
ON UNLIMITED SOVIET SUPPORT IN CURRENT MIDEAST CRISIS.

2. COMMENT: IMPERATIVE FOREGOING BE MOST CLOSELY
HELD AND SOURCE PROTECTED.

GP-1. BOHLEN
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-28
By Cb, NARA Date 3-4-97

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED

WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

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RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 43
RUEKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 20
STATE 6RNC
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 5101 May 24, 1967

6d

PAGE 2 RUEHCR 5101 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON SITUATION IN NEAR EAST, PUBLISHED TODAY'S PRAVDA, IS REMARKABLE FOR ITS COMPLETE WHITEWASHING OF ARAB ACTIONS AND FOR ITS CHARGE, BARELY VEILED, THAT IT IS UNITED STATES WHICH BY ITS DIRECT AND INDIRECT SUPPORT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ISRAEL'S AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR. NASSER'S REQUEST FOR WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF JUSTIFIED AS ACTION REQUIRED TO DEPRIVE ISRAEL OF ADVANTAGE IT WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE FOR CONDUCT OF MILITARY PROVOCATIONS AGAINST ARAB STATES, AND NASSER'S BAN ON SHIPPING IN AQABA GULF PASSED OVER IN SILENCE (ALTHOUGH IT IS REPORTED ELSEWHERE IN SAME ISSUE OF PRAVDA).

2. IN LAYING BLAME FOR SITUATION SOLELY ON ISRAEL AND ITS IMPERIALIST SUPPORTERS STATEMENT WARNS THAT "THOSE WHO WOULD ENGAGE IN UNREASHING AGGRESSION IN ME WOULD ENCOUNTER NOT ONLY UNITED FORCE OF ARAB COUNTRIES, BUT ALSO DECISIVE COUNTER-ACTION ON PART OF USSR AND

PAGE 3 RUEHCR 5101 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL PEACE-LOVING STATES." AT SAME TIME, HOWEVER, STATEMENTS SAYS THAT ONLY OIL MONOPOLIES AND IMPERIALISTS INTERESTED IN HAVING CONFLICT IN ME, THAT MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AREA "IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO USSR BORDERS" IS IN SOVIET VITAL INTEREST, AND THAT USSR IS DOING AND WILL DO EVERYTHING TO PREVENT DISTURBANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN ME.

3. KEY QUESTION IS WHICH OF THESE TWO ASPECTS SOVIETS EMPHASIZING WITH ARABS IN PRIVATE. FOR, UNLESS IT IS ACCOMPANIED BY PRIVATE WARNINGS AND COUNSELS OF RESTRAINT, SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT CAN EASILY BE READ BY ARAB LEADERS AS JUSTIFICATION IF NOT SUPPORT FOR COURSE THEY ARE FOLLOWING. ITS MAIN PURPOSE, TO TAKE MOST CHARITABLE VIEW OF IT, WOULD APPEAR TO BE TO EARN FOR SOVIET GOVERNMENT CREDIT WITH THEIR ARAB FRIENDS FOR COMING SQUARELY TO THEIR SIDE AT TIME OF CRISIS AND, ASSUMING WAR AVERTED, TO PUT IT IN POSITION TO CLAIM THAT BY ITS BOLD WARNING TO ISRAEL AND US ALIKE IT HAD HELPED RESTRAIN CONFLICT. ALTHOUGH STATEMENT DECLARES SOVIET

PAGE 4 RUEHCR 5101 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN PRESERVATION OF PEACE, IT DOES NOT DETRACT FROM MAIN PURPOSE OF CURRYING ARAB FAVOR BY ANY STATESMANLIKE APPEAL TO BOTH SIDES TO REFRAIN FROM INFLAMMATORY ACTIONS. GP-4

THOMPSON
BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLI 91-474

By ju, NARA, Date 5-19-92

NNNN

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, May 24, 1967
5:45 p. m.

1 Susp
2 Per file
7

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is how the bombing of Hanoi
looked to the French on the spot --
on the 19th; and then on the 22nd.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (NODIS MARIA THREE PARIS 18921)

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL : 24803
RECD : MAY 24, 1967, 9:44 AM

Info

DE RUFNCR 18921 1441425
ZNY SSSSS
O 241231Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 18921

NODIS MARIA THREE

SUBJECT: QUAI REPORT OF HANOI BOMBING

QUAI RECEIVED FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM HANOI DATED MAY 19:

"AFTER FIVE DAYS OF CLAM, THE HANOI REGION HAS BEEN VIOLENTLY BOMBARDED TODAY THREE TIMES."

"THE FIRST ALERT LASTED FROM 10:00 TO 10:40 HOURS. IT WAS THE FIFTH SINCE THE START OF THE YEAR AND THE THIRTY-SEVENTH SINCE THE NEW ESCALATION BEGAN APRIL 19. IN SPITE OF INTENSE ANTI-AIRCRAFT, THE AMERICAN PLANES ATTACKED THE CAPITAL IN TWO SUCCESSIVE WAVES AND BOMBARDED THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS. A COLUMN OF SMOKE HAS BEEN SEEN IN THE APPROXIMATE AREA OF VAN DIEN, SEVEN OR EIGHT KILOMETERS SOUTH OF OUR OFFICES. THIS AREA WHERE A RAILWAY STATION, BATTERIES OF ARTILLERY AND DOUSTLESS MILITARY DEPOTS ARE STATIONED, HAD ALREADY BEEN BOMBARDED LAST SUNDAY. SHORTLY AFTER THE ALERT, THE LOUDSPEAKERS ANNOUNCED THAT A PLANE HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN AND ITS PILOT CAPTURED. LATER, THEY CLAIMED THREE PLANES DESTROYED."

"A ROCKET FELL IN THE AMBASSADORIAL SECTOR, RUE TRAN PHU. A VIETNAM CIVILIAN WAS KILLED. THE MISSILE WAS RECOVERED IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD HARDLY DAMAGED AND THUS EASILY IDENTIFIABLE."

"SIRENS SOUNDED ONCE AGAIN AT 14:35 HOURS. THE BOMBING EXTENDED TO THE SOUTH AND TO THE WEST OF THE CAPITAL. THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERIES ALL OPENED FIRE FROM EVERYWHERE. AN EMPLOYEE OF THE (FRENCH) DELEGATION SAW WITH HIS OWN EYES AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT HIT IN FLIGHT OVER HANOI. TWO PARACHUTES DESCENDED FROM IT. SEVERAL MISSILES EXPLODED OVER THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS. SMOKE TOWARDS THE WEST FURTHER INDICATED THE DROPPING OF ONE OR MORE BOMBS IN THAT DIRECTION AT A RATHER CLOSE DISTANCE FROM THE CENTER (OF THE CITY). THE END OF THE ALERT CAME AT 15:39 HOURS."

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED - N28 99-163
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By *fw*, NARA, Date *5-1-99*

Rastow

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 18920 CONTROL 24803 NODIS MARIA

"THE THIRD ALERT LASTED FROM 15:30 TO 16:00 HOURS. THE BOMBINGS SEEMED TO HIT THE WESTERN SUBURBS. THE NOISE OF THE BOMBS AND OF THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERIES SOUNDED LIKE THUNDER."

"TODAY THE WEATHER IS OVERCAST AND VERY STORMY. THAT IS TO SAY IT IS NEITHER BETTER NOR WORSE THAN THE PREVIOUS DAYS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE AMERICANS WISHED TO CELEBRATE IN THEIR OWN FASHION THE BIRTHDAY OF PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH WHICH TOOK PLACE THROUGHOUT THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM WITH SPEECHES AND NUMEROUS MANIFESTATIONS. IN ANY CASE, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL JUDGE IN THIS FASHION AND WILL REACT IN A PREDICTABLE WAY."

"ALSO THE FACT THAT A MISSILE FELL IN THE CENTER OF THE AMBASSADORIAL SECTOR WILL BE WIDELY COMMENTED ON."

"THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THESE THREE SUCCESSIVE BOMBINGS ARE NO DOUBT IMPORTANT AND THE DAY OF MAY 19 CAN BE CONSIDERED PARTICULARLY GRAVE." (SIGNED) "SIDRE". BOHLEN.

BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

76
5

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

O 241231Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC / ☐ IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC

CONTROL: 24799
RECD : May 24, 1967, ☐
9:30 AM

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 18920

MODIS MARIA THREE

SUBJ: QUAI REPORT OF HANOI BOMBING

QUAI RECEIVED FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM HANOI DATED MAY 22:
"THE PESSIMISTIC PROGNOSTICATIONS WHICH WERE BEING MADE IN HANOI
AFTER THE THREE BOMBARDMENTS OF MAY 19 HAVE BEEN VERIFIED."
"AFTER SIX ALERTS MAY 20 AND FIVE ALERTS THE MORNING OF THE 21ST
WHICH HAVE SHAKEN MORALE AND DISORGANIZED ALL ACTIVITIES, AMERICAN
AVIATION HAS BOMBARDED ONCE AGAIN THE CAPITAL AND ITS SUBURBS."
"AT 13:10 HOURS A REGION SITUATED FOUR OR FIVE KILOMETERS FROM
THE CAPITAL, NOT FAR FROM THE RED RIVER WAS ATTACKED. AT THREE
POINTS A GRAY AND BLACK SMOKE INDICATING THE COMBUSTION OF MUNITIONS
OR FUEL WAS OBSERVED."

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 18920 ~~SECRET~~

DURING THE SEVENTH ALERT WHICH STARTED AT 14:00 HOURS, THE CENTRAL
ELECTRICITY PLANT WAS BOMBED. PLANES WERE DIRECTED STRAIGHT
TOWARDS THE PLANT, LANCING A SERIES OF ROCKETS. BOMBS SEEN TO
HAVE FALLEN IN AN ADJACENT SECTOR. A VERY HIGH AND THICK BLACK
SMOKE DESCENDED ABOVE THIS AREA. THE CURRENT WAS IMMEDIATELY CUT,
THEREBY NOTABLY DEPRIVING WATER FROM THE CAPITAL. THE NOISE OF
EXPLOSIONS WAS HEARD THEREAFTER WHICH DOUBTLESS CAME FROM THE
BOILERS AND COOLING PIPES."

"ACCESS TO THE NORTHERN DISTRICTS HAS BEEN FORBIDDEN. THE
INTERRUPTION OF CURRENT HAS REDUCED THE SIRENS TO SILENCE EXCEPT
FOR ONE WHICH PROBABLY WAS FED BY AN INDEPENDENT GENERATOR."

(SIGNED) "SIDRE"

BOHLEN.

BT

DECLASSIFIED NL 899-163

E.O. 12958; Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By *fw* NARA DATE 5-1-99

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - May 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Situation

Tensions in the Dominican Republic seem to be relaxing: *for the moment!*

- Unable to pick up much support from respectable elements for an "anti-Trujillista" front against Balaguer, the PRD is backing off from this initiative.
- There are strong indications that the PRD Congressional bloc, which withdrew from the Congress following the attack against a prominent PRD member three weeks ago, is now talking of going back.
- There have been no notorious terrorist acts in recent days.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-470
By cb, NARA, Date 7-21-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Wednesday, May 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Call on You by Australian Governor-General, Richard Lord Casey,
at 5:30 p.m. Thursday, May 25

Why He is Here

Lord and Lady Casey are on a private trip to Washington in the course of an extensive trip around the world. Their visit to Washington is primarily for the purpose of seeing old friends and acquaintances.

Other Scheduled Plans

May 22 -- London to New York, where they saw friends and attended to private business.

May 24 -- special plane to Cape Kennedy for a tour of the installation.

May 25 -- fly to Washington.

May 26 -- lunch with Secretary Rusk.

May 29 -- leave Washington for Australia via San Francisco.

Possible Subjects

Lord Casey may wish to relate his impressions of the current atmosphere in London where he will have seen many prominent British Government officials. He is expected to have no special substantive items to discuss with you other than in this context. His position as Governor-General is primarily ceremonial and he does not directly influence Australian policy decisions.

You may wish to discuss briefly the war in Vietnam and the Near East crisis. Lord Casey's long distinguished background as a diplomat and as Australia's Minister for External Affairs give him a continuing interest in world events.

You last saw Lord Casey during your visit to Australia in October 1966.

Mrs. Johnson received Lady Casey on May 24.

Biographic data are attached.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

AJ:mm

Tuesday, May 23, 1967, 7:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Regular NSC Meeting at Noon, Wednesday, May 24

The regular NSC meeting Wednesday noon was set up to discuss the problems we face in South Arabia. We then thought that Nasser would make his push in this area. He chose, however, to move earlier and against Israel.

I recommend that you use the NSC meeting to discuss the Mid-East crisis. A suggested agenda is attached.

Secretary Rusk is prepared to lead off with a status report on the situation.

Underlying this note is my memorandum and the State Department paper on South Arabia which was scheduled for discussion.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:BKS:amc

~~TOP SECRET~~

11

Lunch with the President
Tuesday, May 23, 1967, 1 P. M.

Agenda

1. The Middle East (Sects. Rusk and McNamara)
 - a. Situation Report
 - b. Proposed statement by the President
 - c. Israel Aid Package
 - d. Other actions today
2. Viet Nam (Sects. Rusk and McNamara)

Targets
3. Canada (The President)
4. Personnel Problems (Sect. Rusk)
 - a. Habib
 - b. Unger
5. Other

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 5-8-91

Tuesday, May 23, 1967
12:45 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

As instructed, I talked this morning with Bob Anderson. He reports as follows.

1. He is going to Beirut on Thursday on business. (The Panamanian Eleta is going on the same day to Spain to see his daughter graduate from school.)

2. From Beirut he goes to Amman in Jordan to see King Hussein. He is going because he has been asked to arrange the lease of the Jordanian Airlines to a U. S. firm, and to help develop potash and phosphates in Jordan.

3. He talked yesterday with Secretary Rusk, who told him to send word to Nasser that he was in Beirut. If Nasser communicates, well and good. He will make no move beyond letting Nasser know he is there, unless instructed.

4. I asked him for any observations on the present scene. He says he doesn't believe the Arab nations want war. Nasser, however, faces a "terrible internal problem." His people are very close to starvation. A month ago when a food ship came into harbor, shopkeepers were instructed to put a sack of flour in front of their shops to prevent food riots. He believes we made a serious mistake in cutting off Nasser without food as we did. He said that he found no obstacle in his conversations in the Senate. When I said that the problem appeared to be in the House, he said: "No one asked me to talk to anyone in the House."

5. Moreover, Nasser feels cut off from the United States. He is an informal rather than formal man, and State Department communications are, for him, no substitute for informal, high-level communications -- Presidential letters and emissaries.

6. Nasser's present action, in Anderson's view, is a reflection of his internal tribulations. They have been made worse by some ill-advised Israeli statements, and Nasser's knowledge that the only thing that can congeal the split Arab world is uniting against Israel.

7. He then made two concrete suggestions:

-- He believes it would be wise to have Marshal Amir, Nasser's #2, come over to the U.S. -- perhaps to the UN. He believes if you could talk with Amir, this would go a long way to settle down the problem. He will arrange this if you wish it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 72-83-05
By 28/10, NARA, Date 5-21-91

~~Secret~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

5/23/67

-- If you wished him to proceed beyond Amman to Cairo, assuming that Nasser did receive him -- he is willing to do that. But he will make no move without your instruction.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 23, 1967
12:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Since he has been deeply involved in the project, I thought you should have the comments of Don Hornig on Project Compatriot, which I sent up last night.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-470
By CB, NARA, Date 7-21-95

WWRostow:rlh

May 23, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-470
By Cb, NARA, Date 7-24-95

SUBJECT: Project Compatriot(TS)

The general situation is accurately described in your memo to the President. However, there are a number of points which I would like to see further clarified.

I. JCS Proposal and its effects

The Song Ca basin is strategically situated and optimistically the operation could have major effects. Nevertheless, as you say, the region is equipped to cope with flood conditions. I have been able to get no definitive information as to whether enough roads are on embankments or dikes to make the region passable or not. Nor do I know whether the diversion of supplies inland would be a nuisance or a major obstacle. In short, if I were the President, I would like to know more about the expected military effect in quantitative terms.

II. Possible Adverse Factors

a) It seems likely to me that continuous flooding would provide a hazard to life, health and sanitation. In particular, the loss of the rice crop, combined with a breakdown in transportation if the operation is effective, is likely to cause food shortages for the very young, the aged and the infirm.

b) Danger of Exposure. The probability of actual leak from those who are knowledgeable is small. Nevertheless, it is my considered judgment that we should consider compromise as a probable eventuality for the following reasons:

~~TOP SECRET~~

Cy / of 2 Copies
page 1 of 2 pages

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

(1) The unusual cloud formations have been repeatedly observed on Saigon weather radars. So far this attention has been diverted by ascribing them to "early monsoon conditions."

(2) The clouds can be observed from weather satellites which are non-classified and may arouse the curiosity of the meteorological community.

(3) The fact that we are going ahead with the Indian program on the basis of apparently flimsy back-up evidence has led to speculation that we "know something" which has not yet appeared.

I believe that some combination of these factors is likely to lead to public knowledge of the effort.

The degree of revulsion to be expected in the domestic and international meteorological circles at the initiation of "weather warfare" should not be underestimated, especially since our highly disaffected general scientific community, at least in the universities, is ready to join in the chorus.

Nor should we underestimate the potential damage to our world position of our being the first to initiate a new form of warfare. Not only because it is in the sequence--atomic bomb, riot gases, defoliation, napalm--but because of the picture it may give of a nation flailing out with every tool at its disposal--particularly if it should prove ineffective.

This has been a quick response. By later in the day I will have brought my information up to date. For example, I believe that the period of the Northeast monsoon, during the winter months, is just as propitious as the summer monsoon, but I must still check my facts.

Don Hornig

Donald F. Hornig
Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

Tuesday, May 23, 1967
12:00 noon

14

MR. PRESIDENT:

For the second time, Congressman Ogden Reid called to say he is ready to be helpful in any way he can -- including messages to the Israelis with whom he has some considerable capital.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 23, 1967 -- 11:30 am

Mr. President:

I was asked to supply to you by 12:00 noon today a readable copy of your May 21 message to Prime Minister Eshkol (Tab A), plus the "history" of the document. Along with the copy, I attach:

- Eshkol's letter to you of May 18 (Tab B);
- Your letter to Eshkol of May 17 (Tab C);
- A compilation of the various relevant statement of U.S. commitments in the Middle East (Tab D).

I hope this is what you want.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24,
By 18, NARA, Date 5-8-91

TELEGRAM Department of State

15a
198955

~~SECRET~~
Classification

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 21 9 02 PM '67

STATE: 198955

NO DIS

Please deliver following reply from President to Prime Minister Eshkol's May 18 letter (Tel Aviv 3648).

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your prompt and detailed reply to my message of May 18.

Ambassador Barbour has informed me of your assurances, conveyed through Mr. Bitan yesterday, that the measures your Government is taking are precautionary in nature and that you will continue to do all you can to avoid further deterioration of the present grave situation on your borders. By continuing to display steady nerves you can, I am convinced, make a major contribution to the avoidance of hostilities.

I fully agree that, for tranquility to return, there is an urgent need for the cessation of terrorism and the ^{reversal} ~~xxxxxxx~~ of military movements of the type we have witnessed during

686
AI: Fred L. Atherton Jr.

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary

NEA - Mr. Battle ^{per R.M.}
S/S - Mr. Carroll Brown
White House - Mr. Walt Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Classification

DECLASSIFIED

PRESERVATION COPY

PRESERVATION COPY

Authority NLJ 83-05
By Ag/les, NARA, Date 5-21-91

~~SECRET~~

Classification

the past week. We and our friends have done all we can to make this amply clear in both Cairo and Damascus.

As you know, we have also been in touch with the Soviet Government and are somewhat encouraged by the tone of their reaction to our approaches. I am confident they are under no illusions about the firmness of our commitment to support appropriate measures in the United Nations, or outside, to counter aggression or the threat of aggression in the Middle East. As you so well know, that commitment was made publicly by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy as well as myself, and by the British, French and United States governments in their Tripartite Declaration in 1950. I can assure you that I hope all parties concerned will act firmly and in unison to meet any challenges to the peace. We have suggested to your Ambassador that you consult, as we are doing, with the other two governments with respect to these assurances.

So far as a United Nations presence on the boundary between Israel and the United Arab Republic is concerned, we strongly objected, as you know, to the Secretary General's decision with regard to the status of the UNEF in Sinai. We continue to regard a United Nations presence in the area as important and desirable.

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~~SECRET~~

Classification

I have been giving serious thought to the question of what further steps we might take to ease the situation and am giving most urgent consideration to your suggestion to Ambassador Barbour that a public statement by me would have a calming effect. In making this decision, I am weighing the possible bearing of such a statement now on Secretary General Thant's visit to Cairo. I am sure you will agree that nothing should be said or done at this time which might complicate or distract attention from the efforts of the Secretary General. In the meantime, the problems discussed in your letter to me are occupying the attention of the highest officials of this Government and will continue to do so until they are resolved.

With personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson
END

GP-3

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

Classification

URGENT TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 19193

RECD: MAY 18, 1967, 4:30PM

OO RUEHC
DE RUQMVL 3648 1381700
ZNY SSSSS
O 181630Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBA SY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 3648

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-165
By is, NARA Date 1-7-00

NODIS

REF: STATE 196541 AND TEL AVIV 3640

1. FONMIN EBAN GAVE ME AT 1700 HRS REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL. EBAN ADDED SERIES AMPLIFYING COMMENTS ON PRIMIN'S BEHALF CONTAINED MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

2. TEXT ESHKOL REPLY AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE:

JERUSALEM, MAY 18, 1967

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE OF MAY 18, 1967.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE SITUATION IS TENSE AND I WELCOME YOUR READINESS FOR CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS CONSULTATION. FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN GAVE DETAILED INFORMATION TO AMABASSADOR BARBOUR TODAY AND YOUR REPRESENTATIVES ARE EXCHANGING IDEAS.

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 3648 ~~SECRET~~
WITH YOURS IN WASHINGTON AND AT UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS.

I SHOULD LIKE TO SUMMARIZE MY MAIN CONCLUSIONS:

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3648 FROM TEL AVIV MAY 18 (NODIS)

FIRST: THE PRIMARY LINK IN THE CHAIN OF TENSION IS THE SYRIAN POLICY OF TERRORIST INFILTRATION AND SABOTAGE. FROM UNDER SECRETARY ROSTOW'S CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR HARMAN, I AM GLAD TO LEARN THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT AND MINE ARE AGREED ON THIS. YOU ARE CORRECT, MR. PRESIDENT, IN STATING THAT WE ARE HAVING OUR PATIENCE TRIED TO THE LIMITS. THERE HAVE BEEN 15 ATTEMPTS AT MURDER AND SABOTAGE IN THE PAST SIX WEEKS. WE HAVE NOT REACTED. THIS IN ITSELF PROVES THAT THERE IS NO LACK OF TEMPERANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY ON OUR PART. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PROBLEM IS NOT SOLVED INDEFINITELY BY INACTION. WE CANNOT ALWAYS RELY ON THE STROKE OF FORTUNE WHICH HAS SO FAR PREVENTED THE TERRORIST ACTS FROM TAKING THE TOLL OF LIFE AND INJURY INTENDED BY THE PERPETRATORS. ALTHOUGH MANY ACTS HAVE BEEN COMMITTED FROM LEBANON AND JORDAN, OUR PRESENT CONVICTION IS THAT SYRIA IS RESPONSIBLE AND IS ATTEMPTING TO EMBROIL OTHER ARAB STATES. WE ARE ALIVE TO THIS STRATAGEM AND SHALL NOT COOPERATE WITH IT.

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 3648 ~~SECRET~~

MY FIRST CONCLUSION, THEREFORE, IS THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO EMPHASIZE, PROCLAIM AND CONDEMN SYRIAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE TERRORIST ACTS, IN ORDER TO DETER THEIR CONTINUATION.

SECOND: THE EGYPTIAN BUILD-UP OF ARMOUR AND INFANTRY IN SINAI, TO THE EXTENT SO FAR OF APPROXIMATELY FOUR DIVISIONS INCLUDING 600 TANKS, IS GREATER THAN EVER BEFORE, AND HAS NO OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION. EGYPT KNOWS THAT THERE IS NO FOUNDATION FOR REPORTS OF TROOP CONCENTRATION AGAINST SYRIA. YET EVEN AFTER RECEIVING INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT FROM U.N. AND OTHER SOURCES, THE UAR HAS INCREASED ITS TROOP CONCENTRATIONS. THIS NATURALLY FORCES ME TO UNDERTAKE PRECAUTIONARY REINFORCEMENT IN THE SOUTH. ONE OF THE DANGERS THAT WE FACE IS THAT THE EGYPTIAN TROOP CONCENTRATION MAY ENCOURAGE SYRIA TO RESUME TERRORISTIC ACTS UNDER THE FALSE IMPRESSION OF IMMUNITY.

THE ONLY WAY OF AVOIDING THE EFFECTS OF AN ESCALATING RECIPROCAL BUILD-UP IS FOR EGYPT TO RETURN TO THE PREVIOUS POSTURE IN SINAI. THIS WOULD IMMEDIATELY AFFECT OUR OWN DECISIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS.

PAGE 4 RUQMVL 3648 ~~SECRET~~

I URGE THE FULL APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE TO SECURE THE END OF ABNORMAL TROOP CONCENTRATIONS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 3648 FROM TEL AVIV MAY 18, (NODIS)

THIRD: IT WOULD BE VERY UNFORTUNATE IF THE U.N. AUTHORITIES WERE TO GIVE AN IMPRESSION OF IRRESOLUTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRESENCE OF THE U.N.E.F. IN SINAI. IT IS NOT THE FUNCTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO MOVE OUT OF THE WAY IN ORDER TO FACILITATE WARLIKE ACTS. I HOPE THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL INSIST THAT HE CANNOT AFFECT THE STATUS QUO CONCERNING THE UN FORCE IN SINAI WITHOUT A MANDATE FROM THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THERE IS AMPLY LEGAL BASIS FOR THIS.

I MUST POINT OUT THAT ISRAEL WAS A PARTY TO THE ARRANGEMENT WHICH LED IN MARCH 1957 TO THE STATIONING OF THE UNEF. AT UNITED STATES INITIATIVE, WE TOOK FAR-REACHING MEASURES IN EXCHANGE FOR THE UNEF ARRANGEMENT.

FOURTH: THERE MAY BE AN IMPRESSION IN CAIRO AND DAMASCUS THAT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR EGYPT AND SYRIA IS ASSURED, AND THAT THEREFORE THEY HAVE NO NEED OF RESTRAINT. THIS FACTOR WOULD BE AN EMPHATIC CLARIFICATION BY THE UNITED STATES TO THE SOVIET UNION OF THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S

PAGE 5 RUQMVL 3648 ~~SECRET~~

INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY AND OF THE AMERICAN WILL AND CAPACITY TO DEFEND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I CAN HARDLY EXAGGERATE THE IMPORTANCE AND URGENCY OF SUCH AN APPROACH TO THE USSR. IT IS ONE OF THE CENTRAL KEYS TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION.

FIVE: IN THIS CONNECTION, MR. PRESIDENT, I AM SOLEMNLY BOUND TO REFER TO THE SPECIFIC AMERICAN COMMITMENT SO OFTEN REITERATED TO US BETWEEN MAY 1961 AND AUGUST 1966. I ESPECIALLY REMEMBER OUR OWN CONVERSATIONS IN JUNE 1964. YOUR NOTE OF MAY 18 DOES NOT EXPLICITLY REFER TO THE COMMITMENT BY THE UNITED STATES TO ACT BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE UN IN SUPPORT OF ISRAEL'S INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU DO NOT WISH TO BE COMMITTED WITHOUT CONSULTATION. BUT WITH A MASSIVE BUILD-UP ON OUR SOUTHERN FRONTIER LINKED WITH A TERRORIST CAMPAIGN FROM THE NORTH AND SOVIET SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TENSION, THERE IS SURELY AN URGENT NEED TO REAFFIRM THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY WITH A VIEW TO ITS IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD THE NEED ARISE.

IN VIEW OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED, I HAVE FELT AT LIBERTY TO SPEAK WITH FRANKNESS ON FIVE PROBLEMS IN ALL

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-4- 3648 FROM TEL AVIV MAY 18 (NODIS)

PAGE 6 RUQMVL 3648 ~~SECRET~~

OF WHICH I BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES IS IN A POSITION TO
MAKE A VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE AVOIDANCE OF DANGERS AND THE
REINFORCEMENT OF PEACE.

SIGNED LEVI ESHKOLE. UNQUOTE

GP-3. BARBOUR

BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

3

196541

TELEGRAM Department of State

TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

Classification

ACHRON: Amembassy TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

MAY 17 1 00 PM '67

STATE 196542

EXEMPT NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-470

By UG, NARA, Date 7-24-95

Please deliver following personal message from President to Prime Minister Eshkol:

" Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am following very closely the tense situation in the Near East and am deeply concerned about the maintenance of peace in that area. We have made known our concern in Damascus and Cairo and are working closely with other countries in the United Nations. Our efforts will continue.

I know that you and your people are having your patience tried to the limits by continuing incidents along your border. In this situation, I would like to emphasize in the strongest terms the need to avoid any action on your side which would add further to the violence and tension in your area. I ~~urge~~ ^{urge} the closest consultation between you and your principal friends. ~~I am sure that you will understand this situation. I emphasize this point because you will surely know~~ that I cannot accept any responsibilities on behalf of

Dated <u>5/17/67</u>	Tel. Ext. <u>X.2107</u>	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <u>DR/BR</u> The Secretary
----------------------	-------------------------	--

NEA - Mr. Batt EB S/S- Mr. Read White House - Mr. Rostow (with changes)

~~SECRET~~

Classification

DS-322

PRESERVATION COPY

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~

Classification

for
the United States/~~xxxx~~ situations which arise as the result of actions
~~which are not consulted~~ on which we are not consulted.

With personal regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson "

RUSK

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PRESERVATION COPY

Statement by President Truman October 24, 1953.

"I stand squarely on the provisions covering Israel in the Democratic platform. . . . So that everyone may be familiar with my position, I set out here the Democratic platform on Israel:

* * * * *

"We pledge full recognition to the State of Israel. We affirm our pride that the United States, under the leadership of President Truman, played a leading role in the adoption of the resolution of November 29, 1947, by the United Nations General Assembly for the creation of a Jewish state.

* * * * *

"We look forward to the admission of the State of Israel to the United Nations and its full participation in the international community of nations. We pledge appropriate aid to the State of Israel in developing its economy and resources.

"We favor the revision of the arms embargo to accord to the State of Israel the right of self-defense."

Speech by President Truman in Madison Square Garden October 23, 1948.

"I wish to speak now upon a subject that has been of great interest to me as your President. It is the subject of Israel. Now, this is a most important subject and must not be resolved as a matter of politics during a political campaign. I have refused consistently to play politics with that question. I have refused, first, because it is my responsibility to see that our policy in Israel fits in with our foreign policy throughout the world; second, it is my desire to help build in Palestine a strong, prosperous, free, and independent democratic state. It must be large enough, free enough, and strong enough to make its people self-supporting and secure."

"Tripartite Declaration" of 1950.

"3. The three Governments /the U.S., U.K. and France/ take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three

Governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation."

Radio Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles June 1, 1953.

"In an effort to calm these contradictory fears the United States joined with Britain and France in a Declaration of May 25, 1950, which stated that "the three Governments, should they find that any of these states (of the Near East) was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation". That Declaration when made did not reassure the Arabs. It must be made clear that the present U.S. Administration stands fully behind that Declaration. We cannot afford to be distrusted by millions who could be sturdy friends of freedom. They must not further swell the ranks of communist dictators.

The leaders in Israel themselves agreed with us that United States policies should be impartial so as to win not only the respect and regard of the Israeli but also of the Arab peoples. We shall seek such policies."

Statement to the Press by President Eisenhower November 9, 1955.

"....I would recommend that the U.S. join informal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors."

Speech by President Eisenhower to Congress January 5, 1957.

"We have shown, so that none can doubt, our dedication to the principle that force shall not be used internationally for any aggressive purposes and that the integrity and independence of the nations of the Middle East should be inviolate..."

Aide Memoire of February 11, 1957 handed by Secretary Dulles to Foreign Minister Eban.

"...With respect to (2) the Gulf of Aqaba and access thereto -- the United States believes that the Gulf comprehends international waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto. We

have in mind not only commercial usage, but the passage of pilgrims on religious missions, which should be fully respected.

In the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary, as by the International Court of Justice, the United States, on behalf of vessels of United States registry, is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right."

President Kennedy's Press Conference Statement May 8, 1963.

"I don't think that the balance of military power has been changed in the Middle East in recent days. Obviously there are political changes in the Middle East which still do not show a precise pattern and on which we are unable to make any final judgments. The United States supports social and economic and political progress in the Middle East. We support the security of both Israel and her neighbors. We seek to limit the Near East arms race which obviously takes resources from an area already poor, and puts them into an increasing race which does not really bring any great security.

We strongly oppose the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East, and we also seek to limit the spread of Communism in the Middle East which would, of course, destroy the independence of the people. This government has been and remains as strongly opposed to the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East. In the event of aggression or preparation for aggression, whether direct or indirect, we would support appropriate measures in the United Nations, adopt other courses of action on our own to prevent or to put a stop to such aggression, which, of course, has been the policy which the United States has followed for some time."

President Johnson's Weizmann Institute Speech February 6, 1964.

"Mr. Stone, Mr. Feinberg, Ladies and Gentlemen: I welcome this opportunity tonight to join in paying tribute to a great son of the Jewish people, and to one of the most exciting creations of the Republic of Israel -- the Weizmann Institute of Science. The great name of Weizmann does not belong to the Jewish people alone. It has enriched the moral treasury of our age.

Our own water problems in this country are not yet solved. We, like Israel, need to find cheap ways of converting salt water to fresh water.

So let us work together. This nation has begun discussions with the representatives of Israel on cooperative research in using nuclear energy to turn salt water into fresh water.

Joint Communiqué Issued by President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol

"He (President Johnson) reiterated to Prime Minister Eshkol U.S. support for the territorial integrity and political independence for all countries in the Near East and emphasized the firm opposition of the U.S. to aggression and the use of force or the threat of force against any country."

Statement made by President Johnson during President Shazar's Visit to US August 2, 1966.

"As our beloved, great, late President, John F. Kennedy, said on May 8, 1963, as a declaration of the leader of this country and as spokesman for this land: 'We support the security of both Israel and her neighbors We strongly oppose the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East'"

"We subscribe to that policy."

Speech by Vice President Humphrey to United Jewish Appeal December 10, 1966.

"We recognize, too, the great potential for conflict which exists in the Middle East. And there, too, our policy is unmistakably clear: We will energetically oppose aggression there which would threaten the peace. As part of that objective, the United States is committed to the integrity of Israel as a free and independent state. That is our position."

Pres file

Tuesday, May 23, 1967
9:25 a. m.

Mr. President:

This is an interesting, if not necessarily well balanced, assessment of morale in Hanoi.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-89
By cbm, NARA Date 5-15-01

16a

Tuesday, May 23, 1967

TEXT OF CIA REPORT

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SUBJECT: General Low Morale of the North Vietnamese Population
and the Factors Contributing to it

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)
(C)


EO 12958 3.4(b)
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-2-



EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Y
rs
(C)

Begin Report:

The people of North Vietnam are on the horns of insoluble dilemma. They secretly hope that the Americans will triumph, but they fear the consequences of the vanquished. Yet, as the war continues, they see only the gradual and complete destruction of their country. Into this vacuum, in turn, will step the Chinese, a threat that has faced North Vietnam for a thousand years. As for a negotiated settlement, they are well aware of the fact that all wars fought in recent history have ended in talks; but, any attempt by the North Vietnamese to talk would, they feel, only result in China's twisting their arm and asking for complete reimbursement for all aid rendered to North Vietnam, and this prospect is viewed with as much dread as a physical occupation by Chinese troops since it would mean complete economic subordination to China for years. They base this fear on the lessons learned by the North Koreans after China came to their aid.

Most of the people hold little hostility towards the Americans for the bombings, for they know that their Government was responsible and continues to be so for this retaliatory act. In fact, the people's only recollection of a true picture of the Americans, and it is a favorable one, goes back to the time near the close of the Indo-China War when the Americans helped with the evacuation of refugees to South Vietnam. American military might, moreover, is held in awe. The people remember the U.S. victory over the Japanese in World War II and the way the Americans could endlessly pump war material and men into the conflict.

U.S. intentions in the conflict are not unknown. The North Vietnamese are cognizant of President Johnson's peace attempts and those of other world leaders and nations. At the time the American President announced the offer of massive economic assistance to all of Southeast Asia, there was a wide-spread but short-lived feeling of

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PRESERVATION COPY

jubilant among the North Vietnamese people. The free world's position does not reach the people in a distorted or second-hand fashion, since there are a considerable number of radio receivers in private hands. The British Broadcasting Corporation daily broadcast in Vietnamese at 6:30 p.m. local time is closely monitored, as is the Voice of America Vietnamese broadcast at 7:00 p.m. No one dares to gather in groups to listen to the radio, or to tune in English language broadcasts, but word is passed by word of mouth through the community about the contents of these daily broadcasts. Most of the radios are old and rely on the local current which is radical. Portable-type radios, therefore, are in great demand, particularly by those who have been evacuated to the countryside. Radios are obtainable; many have been purchased from Vietnamese repatriates who came from Thailand and French Moumea. Chinese radios can also be purchased on the local market, but they are extremely expensive: 800 Dongs.

U.S. propaganda tracts are also read clandestinely, but have had little impact. The thrust of these tracts have called for the understanding and support of the Vietnamese people for the U.S. position: a theme which has had little impact since it stirs up no positive response. (Source comment: The themes of the tracts should attack the leadership of the North Vietnamese by name, citing the excesses of the top cadre, i.e., question the patriotism of those who have sent their immediate families to the Soviet Union and China, while asking the rank and file to stay on and face the bombs of the Americans.)

The following are just some of the specific causal factors behind the low morale and pessimism of the North Vietnamese citizenry:

A. After Ho Chi Minh and his following came to power, they promised happiness for all the people within three years' time. This Utopia was never realized. Again, when the people were asked to mobilize and sacrifice to do battle against the Americans, Ho again promised victory within months. The popular reaction to these and other empty promises have as a result driven the people to despair.

B. Travel and personal restrictions: Each quarter of a community has a police-type organization closely supervising and monitoring the inhabitants' every move. A visit paid by the member of one household to another must be reported to the local committee, citing the times, names, and purpose of the visit. Since there is always a police informant

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-4-

standing by to report on such a visit, the host is almost compelled to leave his guest at the door and run to the authorities in order to beat the informant to the punch. This kind of restraint is strongly resented by the people.

C. During air raid alerts, workers in all types of activities must make up the time lost off the job.

D. In many factories, personnel are not allowed to leave the premises during an air raid attack because the Government requires them to stick by their posts to both defend the installation and fight fires caused by incendiary bombs. The Regime's concern with production and not the life of its citizens reaps enormous ill-will.

E. With the introduction of concrete pipes as individual air raid shelters, replacing trenches which collapsed under concussion, the people were dumbfounded to learn that the pipes were being made available only at a price: 15 Dongs per cement section. Those at factories can purchase the pipes through the factories for installation near by and are allowed to buy pipe on the installment plan, several Dong per month. Pipes used by the households are purchased from the local cement concerns.

F. Holidays are announced, but are not realized because of the "work to defeat" policy. The source's daughter wrote him that everyone worked over the last Tet holidays under this kind of persuasion.

G. Many of the rank and file are disgusted with the Government's policy of putting young, peasant class Vietnamese in managerial positions. These people are inexperienced and largely incapable of doing their jobs properly. Their status comes not from ability but by their proletariat class connections.

H. Medical treatment: Top cadre receive unlimited medical care; the man on the street does not. Under North Vietnam's social medical policy, doctors are only permitted to provide medications in limited quantities to a patient at minimal cost. The influential party members and bureaucrats, on the other hand, are treated in preferential way.


I. Remittances: If a person receives more than twenty to thirty units of a particular drug, he is required to sell at the official

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-5-

rate approximately 90 percent of that amount to the Government. Then, on the money he receives from the Government, he must pay a considerable tax. People resent this practice because, even in the event they do not need the entire amount of medications, they can easily sell the excess on the black market for three times that paid by the Government.



EO 12958 3.4
(C)

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PRESERVATION COPY

Pres file

Tuesday - May 23, 1967

Mr. President:

You have agreed to receive Ambassador J. Wesley Jones, our man in Peru, on Friday, May 26 at 11:30 a.m. This was arranged by Jim Symington.

On that day there will be four other Ambassadors to Latin American countries in town:

Ambassador Bernbaum	-	to Venezuela
Ambassador Castro	-	to El Salvador
Ambassador-designate Ross	-	to Haiti
Ambassador Tuthill	-	to Brazil.

It occurs to me that you may want to receive them all at one time.

W. W. Rostow

Prefer receive Jones alone ____

Include all five at once ____

See me ____

cc - Jim Jones

~~Mr. Rostow~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-470
By CB, NARA, Date 7-21-95

~~1. [unclear]~~
2. Pres file

~~SECRET~~

May 23, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Ambassador Kamel--1:30 p. m. Wednesday,
May 24

We scheduled this farewell call before the current crisis. Kamel has done an earnest job over nine years of trying to build a sound US-UAR relationship. He admits he has failed; he is being pulled out because of it. But he is maintaining his dignity and says he leaves with a clear conscience at having done what he felt was right for our relationship. Your seeing him is just a decent gesture to a man who has always been decent to us.

When I saw Kamel Monday, I found him unusually terse, so you may want to let him have a brief say. However, we have told him this is purely a courtesy call, and since he is not in the main channel of communication with Cairo, you probably won't want to get into the current crisis in any detail. You might make these points:

- You are sorry to see him go. You know he has been a man of good heart and you appreciate his integrity in dealing with us.
- As you wrote President Nasser, you hope our two countries can find ways to work together.
- For the past 2-3 years, our ability to work with the UAR has been limited by suspicion of our motives in Cairo. We are prepared to do anything within reason to remove these doubts.
- In the current crisis, we are committed to no nation in the area. We are firmly committed to oppose aggression from any quarter. This policy has helped the UAR in the past. We are using our influence as widely as possible to help restore calm.

George Christian will emphasize the truth--that this is nothing more than a long-scheduled farewell call. State has discussed cancelling but now recommends going through with the appointment unless something happens tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Israeli Aid Package

	<u>State Recommendation</u>	<u>Approved by the President</u>	
Food	\$23.5 million; 75% dollar sale; 20 years at 4.5%	\$27.6	2-1/2%
Spares	No grant at all because this would start a MAP in Israel	2.0	
Military credit	\$9 million. Defense opposes credit for maintenance items but would go this far to beef up the package.	14.0	5%
APC's	Neither grant nor sell APC's now. Try to maintain a pause in Middle East arms race.	3.7	
Development loans	No development loans, but Ex-Im would receive applications. Fertilizer plant application now ready would run about \$10 million.	20.	Ex-Im

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(S)

Total	<u>\$47.5</u>	<u>\$72.3</u>
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Hawk missile maintenance Agree.
-- administrative clearance.

Approved.

5/23/67

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

President's Decisions
Israeli Aid Package
23 May 1967

APC's	100	\$3.7 million cash	preferably Italian, with U.S. license; if not workable, direct U.S. sale
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Tank spares	2.0	cash <i>sale</i>
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Military credit	14.0	5% <i>10 years</i>
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Food	27.6	2-1/2% <i>50% dollar 50% local currency</i>
------	------	---

EX-IM Loans	20.0	normal
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Special Africa assistance	5.0	
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Hawk Missile maintenance		administrative clearance
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Off-shore procurement for U.S. aid programs		agreed for 12 months
--	--	----------------------

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-27
By sig, NARA Date 8-20-96

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 23, 1967 -- 7:40 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Outer Space Treaty

Attached, for your signature of each copy, are instruments of ratification of the Outer Space Treaty. The Senate gave its advice and consent -- unanimously -- on April 25, 1967.

There are two ceremonies involved:

- signing;
- depositing and proclaiming the treaty.

The State Department suggests that you sign these ratifications without any public ceremony. The Soviets have just ratified, and suggest we deposit instruments in London, Moscow and Washington in mid-June. We are tentatively suggesting June 5, 6, or 7, as Secretary Rusk will be available at that time. (Your calendar also appears free.)

The State Department also recommends a ceremony, in which you would participate, which would combine the deposit of instruments and your proclamation of the treaty. It might be in the East Room with a number of Senators and Congressmen, the Soviet and British Ambassadors, the Ambassadors of the five or six countries which will have ratified by then, and others. The ceremony -- aside from your remarks -- would take less than ten minutes. You might consider a brief reception afterward.

On the other hand, deposit and proclamation could be at State.

We would not make final plans or notify other governments of a White House ceremony until the Mid-East situation becomes clearer.

W. W. Rostow

Make tentative plans for White House ceremony for deposit, etc. _____

Plan to have deposit, etc., ceremony in the State Department _____

See me _____

Limited Official Use

Tuesday - May 23, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: American Army Major Defects to Cuba

You may have seen in the paper over the weekend that the Coast Guard was searching for a missing light aircraft in the Gulf and Florida Straits area. The pilot was reported to be an Army officer with his small son.

The Swiss informed State late this afternoon that the missing officer flew to Cuba and asked for asylum. The Swiss were permitted to interview him today. They say that he defected as a "matter of conscience" and wants asylum either in Cuba or a third country.

The officer's name is Major Richard A. Pearce. We understand he was the Senior Aide to the 4th Army Commander based in San Antonio, Texas.

The foregoing information has been passed on to Cy Vance's office. Defense will be preparing a memorandum on the background to this case and its implications.

W. W. Rostow

Limited Official Use

May 23, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached are two memoranda from
Dick Helms which I understand you
requested this morning.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

23a

23 May 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capabilities

1. The judgment of the intelligence community is that Israeli ground forces "can maintain internal security, defend successfully against simultaneous Arab attacks on all fronts, launch limited attacks simultaneously on all fronts, or hold on any three fronts while mounting successfully a major offensive on the fourth." In the air, the judgment is less clear: the Israelis "probably could defeat the Egyptian air force if Israel's air facilities were not damaged beyond repair."

2. Those judgments rest essentially on the proposition that the quality of Israel's military leadership, its ability to organize operations and maintain its equipment in a high state of readiness, and the high morale and intelligence of the individual Israeli ground soldier will make up for Israel's quantitative inferiority in men and equipment. The Israelis have consistently stressed intensive training, with emphasis on armor, standardization of weapons, rapid and reliable communications, and a very strong tactical intelligence effort. Egyptian capabilities in these areas appear to be inferior.

3. Moreover, in the air, the Israelis have been acutely conscious of the difficulty of defending their air facilities, and have made strenuous efforts to overcome the fact that their bases are very short warning time from the Arab borders. They have "hardened" their fields with dispersed pens, for example. Israeli pilots and tactics are considered superior, and, in terms of operationally assigned fighter aircraft rather than total inventory, Israel has a slight edge--256 to 222.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-89
By cbm, NARA Date 5-15-01

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

4. Israeli planning is based on a short war, conducted by ground forces with air cover. If this assumption should prove wrong, Israel might well be in trouble, since the Arabs quantitative superiority would come into play. At M+48 hours, for example, Israel would have 280,000 men vs. the Arabs' 117,000 deployed in the vicinity of the Israeli borders. But the total strength of the Arab armies is nearly 500,000, vs. the same 280,000 on the Israeli side.

5. This is not to say that the rout of the Egyptians in 1956 will be repeated. The Egyptian forces have improved substantially in the past eleven years, and they have acquired considerable operational know-how by rotating combat units in Yemen. Nevertheless, we consider that the Israeli forces have retained an over-all superiority.

-2-

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

PRESERVATION COPY

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 22, 1967
10:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the three Soviet
contacts.

Pretty slender comfort.

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 5016
USUN 5370
State 197661

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 8305
By ng/ics, NARA, Date 5-20-91

TELEGRAM Department of State

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEWYORK
STATE GRNC

BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 5016

IN BRIEF LUNCHEON DISCUSSION WITH DOBRYNIN TODAY I SAID
WE WERE USING OUR INFLUENCE EVERYWHERE WE COULD TO CALM THE
SITUATION AND HOPED THEY WERE EXERCISING AS MUCH PRESSURE IN
SYRIA AS WE WERE IN ISRAEL. HE REPLIED QUOTE I THINK WE CAN
MATCH YOU UNQUOTE.

GP-3. THOMPSON
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Authority NLJ 82-164

By lgfics, NARA, Date 5-20-91

PRESERVATION COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USUN 5370

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
 State Dept. Guidelines
 By ju, NARA, Date 5-1-99

020813

1967 MAY 19 PM 8 42

RE CRISIS

1. MR GOLDBERG ORIGINALLY SOUGHT WITH FEDORENKO YESTERDAY,
 TOOK PLACE NOON TODAY AT UN. ONLY OTHERS PRESENT SHEVCHENKO
 AND BUFFUM.

PAGE TWO RUENDT 5370 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. GOLDBERG EXPLAINED HE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO EXCHANGE
 VIEWS ON CURRENT RE CRISIS WITH ALL SC MEMBERS AND OTHER IN-
 TERESTED GOVTS. HE EXPLAINED US GRAVELY CONCERNED ABOUT INCREASED
 TENSION STIMULATING FROM LARGE-SCALE TROOP MOVEMENTS,
 WITH REQUEST FOR WITHDRAWAL UNEF AND INFLAMMATORY STATEMENTS
 ON BOTH SIDES. HE SAID SINCE WE BOTH HAVE MAJOR RESPONSIBILITIES
 FOR KEEPING THE PEACE, WE DESIRED FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND
 WLD WELCOME ANY SUGGESTIONS FROM SOUS. GOLDBERG INFORMED
 FEDORENKO WE HAVE EVEN URGED SYG YESTERDAY TO CONVEY MRG
 OF USSR, US, FRANCE AND UK TO CONSIDER MATTER.

3. GOLDBERG SAID HE WISHED AT OUTSET TO LAY TO REST UNFOUNDED
 ALLEGATIONS THAT US INVOLVED IN PLOT WITH JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA,
 ISRAEL AND OTHERS AGAINST SYRIA. BASED ON CAREFUL CHECKS
 WE HAD MADE IN WASH HE CLD SAY FLATLY AND MOST AUTHORITATIVELY
 US NOT ENGAGED IN ANY SUCH PLOT. ON CONTRARY, OUR ENTIRE
 EFFORT DEVOTED TO SEEKING MAINTAIN PEACE IN ME. THIS IS REASON
 WE ARE DISTURBED AT DECISION TO WITHDRAW UNEF. REGARDLESS
 OF OUR VIEWS ON PROPER PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED BY HOST
 COUNTRY IN REQUESTING WITHDRAWAL OF UN FORCE ONCE IT IS THERE,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- USUN 5370 MAY 19 1967

NOW THAT SYG HAS INDICATED "NON-INTERFERENCE" IN UAR REQUEST, WE DO NOT INTEND TAKE PUBLIC ISSUE WITH HIM AND MUST DEVOTE OURSELVES TO PRACTICAL PROBLEM OF WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STRENGTHEN PEACE IN THE ME. IN THIS REGARD GOLDBERG INFORMED FEDORENKO WE HAVE MADE FORMAL DEMARCHES IN ALL CAPITALS INVOLVED, ISRAELI AS WELL AS ARAB, AND URGED RESTRAINT. HE SPECIFICALLY ASKED FEDORENKO IF USSR WLD DO THE SAME IN DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.

A) FEDORENKO ALLEGED HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON SUBJECT ALTHOUGH IT APPEARS TO US HE HAS HAD TIME TO RECEIVE THEM, BUT MADE FULL POINTS IN RESPONSE TO GOLDBERG'S PRESENTATION:

B) HE C'D NO USE FOR QUADRIPARTITE MTG AND CONSIDERED PRESENT BILATERAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN US WAS FULLY ADEQUATE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS.

C) HE DOUBTED ARABS WANTED TO START A WAR.

D) USSR IS "LAST COUNTRY" TO WANT CONFLICT IN ME; OFFICIAL POLICY CALLS FOR PROMOTING PEACE.

E) USSR CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED UN PEACEKEEPING EXCEPT UNDER SE REGIS. THEREFORE, PARTICULARLY SINCE UAR ASKED UNF BE WITHDRAWN, SOV UNION NATURALLY SUPPORTS WITHDRAWAL. HOWEVER, HE ADDED HE DID NOT SEE WHY WITHDRAWAL MUST NECESSARILY TAKE PLACE IMMEDIATELY. (FEDORENKO TOOK OBVIOUS RELISH IN DAMAGE CAUSED TO GA-SPONSORED PEACEKEEPING EFFORT BY UAR REQUEST.)

F) IN RESPONSE GOLDBERG'S DIRECT QUESTION WHETHER USSR WLD USE ITS INFLUENCE IN DAMASCUS AND CAIRO TO PACIFY SITUATION, FEDORENKO SAID AS A DISCIPLINED DIPLOMAT HE WLD FAITHFULLY REPORT CONVERSATION TO MOSCOW AND SEEK INSTRUCTIONS. COMMENT: EXCEPT FOR AFFIRMATION OF LINE TAKEN BY SOV CHARGE IN WASHINGTON YESTERDAY RE SOV PEACEFUL INTENTIONS IN ME AND HINT THAT UNF WITHDRAWAL C'D BE STRETCHED OUT, FEDORENKO COMMENTS OFFERED LITTLE SATISFACTION. HE WAS IN HIS USUAL SMART ALECKY MOOD, TRYING TO SCORE DEBATING POINTS DESPITE SMALLNESS OF GROUP AND ALSO NOTABLY RELUCTANT TO SUGGEST HOW CONTRIBUTION C'D BE MADE TO RESTORING STABILITY IN ME EITHER THROUGH BILATERAL EFFORTS OR THROUGH UN.

GP-2.

GOLDBERG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COUNTRY
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ACTION: Ambassador MOSCOW
INFO: USUN
Ambassador LONDON
Ambassador PARIS
Ambassador TEL AVIV
Ambassador ROME
Ambassador CAIRO

IMMEDIATE

EX 18 5377

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By fw, NARA, Date 5-1-99

WMS
JFK

STATE 197661
BROIS

1. Under Secretary Rostow called in Chargé Tcherniakov this afternoon re Middle Eastern situation. Rostow said we are very concerned about tension between Israel and Syria and hope that this problem can be handled in UN channels to greatest extent possible.
2. Rostow said there was one aspect in particular of situation which he wished to call to attention of Soviet Chargé: We understand Syrian Government is spreading rumors to effect that it has been promised unlimited ^{military} ~~political~~ as well as ^{political} ~~unlimited~~ support from the Soviet Union. We realize this is not consistent with expressed Soviet position and we hope and assume that

Dated by EUR:WJStoessel, Jr.:AMR Clearance	Tel. No. 4224	Telegraphic transmission and distribution covered by: M - Eugene V. Rostow
S/S. Mr. Walsh NEA - Mr. Davies (substantive) NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET		

FORM 65 D5-322

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~~SECRET~~

rumors are not repeat not true. However, such rumors can be most damaging.

3. When Tcherniatkov asked whether Rostow's remarks should be interpreted as warning, request for action, or ~~as~~ as information, Rostow stated that his comments should be regarded simply as information. We certainly were not giving advice on the matter since we were confident Soviets would know how to deal with it.

4. Tcherniatkov said that he was not aware of rumors mentioned by Under Secretary. Soviets also were concerned about situation in Middle East and Soviet Government in past has stressed its desire that this area should remain calm. Of course, he noted, Soviet sympathies were on side of countries "representing liberation movement" and Soviet Government maintained friendly relations with Syria. Tcherniatkov felt, however, that it was unlikely rumors cited by Rostow had any basis in fact. He promised to report Under Secretary's remarks immediately to ~~Moscow~~ Moscow.

5. Under Secretary concluded by saying that we assume there are no grounds for rumors being spread by Syrians but he wished Soviet authorities to know of them since they could be very harmful in present dangerous situation.

~~SECRET~~

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Q. We believe it would be useful in present tense situation to double check by making same point in low key in Moscow.

ALL: We are trying to keep this affair in BW and had planned to have Goldberg make ^{these} ~~same~~ points with Federenko but ^{latter} ~~Goldberg~~ has been avoiding him. END FYI.

END

GP-2

RUSK

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~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 22, 1967
10:10 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a message to you from
Harry McPherson underlining the
urgency of getting ourselves quickly
a first-class ambassador in Manila.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 44, NARA, Date 5-8-91

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~~EYES ONLY~~

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1967 MAY 22 13 14

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OO YEKADS
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O 221159Z ZYH
FM CIA
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
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FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED VIA CIA COMMUNICATIONS
FACILITIES FROM SAIGON

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~ 221159Z

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-472
By sig, NARA, Date 3-30-93

M MCPHERSON 6968

TO THE WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY THE PRESIDENT
CONVERSATIONS WITH EMBASSY OFFICIALS TOKYO,
INCLUDING AMBASSADOR JOHNSON, SUGGEST THAT PHILIPPINE
SITUATION BECOMING INCREASINGLY CRITICAL. DESCRIBED
AS WEAKEST LINK IN CHAIN OF FRIENDLY FAR EAST NATIONS.
IMPORTANCE OF SELECTING RIGHT AMBASSADOR TO SUCCEED
BLAIR IS OBVIOUS. SHOULD BE MAN OF BROAD EXPERIENCE IN
FAR EAST OR IN OTHER UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. URGE
YOU TO CONSIDER MEN LIKE BILL JORDAN, WHO HAS SPENT
DECADE IN FAR EAST AND KNOWS PHILIPPINE SITUATION WELL;
TONY FREEMAN, WHO HAS BOTH ASIAN AND LDC EXPERIENCE;
ACK VAUGHN, WHOSE LATIN AMERICAN AND PEACE CORPS
BACKGROUND WOULD SERVE HIM WELL. THESE MEN UNDERSTAND
PROBLEMS, OPPORTUNITIES AND DANGERS IN SOCIETIES MUCH
LIKE PHILIPPINES, AND WOULD HAVE OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES
OVER MOST FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS OR PRIVATE CITIZENS
UNFAMILIAR WITH UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD.

GPI
150

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

NNNN

PRESERVATION COPY

Pres file

Monday, May 22, 1967 -- 10:05 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith the proposed State Department response to questions about President Nasser's reported announcement. I called Luke and explained that you preferred to play it as quietly as possible in public at this time. He said:

-- Although they will be under tremendous pressure, they could get by for the time being with "no comment." *but not for long*

-- Or we could do without the bracketed sentence.

I believe that without the bracketed sentence the statement is not explosive.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

~~The United States considers that~~ the announcement by President Nasir that he is closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli ships adds a new and extremely grave dimension to the already menacing situation in the Middle East. The Gulf is an international waterway to which ships of all nations are entitled to have access. [We believe that any effort to deny the right of free passage to Israeli ships can only lead to disastrous consequences.] We are seeking immediate clarification from the Government of the UAR and will take the occasion to reiterate our view on freedom of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba. We hope that the SYG of the UN who is now en route to Cairo and who has already characterized the area of the Gulf as extremely sensitive will make this a matter of highest priority in his conversations in Cairo. In the meantime we hope those concerned will show the ~~XX~~ restraint that circumstances fraught with such extreme danger for peace demand.

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 22, 1967 -- 9:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Gene and Luke Battle believe that it would be wise for you to cover your flanks on the message to Nasser by:

- informing Eshkol that you have sent such a letter;
- sending one also to Prime Minister Atazi of Syria.

Without these two flanking messages they feel there is a small chance that Nasser -- to blow up his importance -- might release your message; and, in that case, it would be better if we had parallel messages to Eshkol and Atazi to demonstrate that you were not regarding him as Mr. Big, but appealing to all hands for restraint.

There is some wisdom in this, I believe.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

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Authority 716 2 8 2 7 6 2
By ag/lus, NARA, Date 5-20-91

27a

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

DATE: ☐ CANCEL
CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV
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STATE

~~IMMEDIATE~~ FLASH

Please deliver following soonest to Prime Minister Eshkol
from the President:

QUOTE May 22, 1967

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

You and I have been in constant touch over the last several days through our Ambassadors and through the correspondence between us. You know my deep concern over the very tense and difficult situation in the Middle East and my hope that there can be a peaceful resolution of the difficulties that face us. In order that every possible effort may be made to save the Middle East from the disastrous consequences of war, I am addressing letters to the Prime Minister of Syria and to the President of the United Arab Republic, appealing to them to avoid hostilities. I have also expressed the great hope that the mission of Secretary General U Thant will be a successful one. I have made to each of these key figures in the current

Mr. E. V. Rostow: amb 5/22/67

Tel. No. 5284

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by

Eugene V. Rostow

The White House

~~SECRET~~

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Authority 7162 83-05

By 128/166, NARA, Date 5-20-91

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25-322

Classification

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~

Classification

situation the point I now make to you. Each of you who has the responsibility for leading a nation faces different problems shaped by history, geography, and the deepest feelings of our peoples. Although there are differences between us, we all share an interest in peace and in progress in the Middle East.

I trust that my appeal to these countries will be met by an affirmative response and I know that I may count upon Israel to do its part to avoid chaos at this difficult time.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson QNQUOTE

END

GP-3

~~SECRET~~

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FORM 09-322A
6-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

Classification

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ ROUTE
☐ CHANGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

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ACTION: Amambassy DAMASCUS ~~IMMEDIATE~~ FLASH

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STATE

Authority MLG 83-05

By ag/lcs, NARA, Date 5-10-91

Please deliver following soonest to Prime Minister Atazi

from the President:

QUOTE May 22, 1967

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have addressed letters to the Prime Minister of Israel and to the President of the United Arab Republic over the last days calling upon them to take all steps possible designed to preserve peace in the Middle East. I would like to address the same appeal to you in this critical moment.

The great conflicts of our times are not going to be solved by illegal crossing of frontiers with arms and men-- neither in Asia, the Middle East, Africa or Latin America. I appeal to you to join with other heads of State who seek a peaceful resolution at this troubled moment in history. I trust that I can count upon Syria to assist in working out

Typed on

W. EVROST (emb)

5/23/67

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by

Eugene V. Rostow

White House

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Page 2 of telegram to AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

~~SECRET~~

Classification

a program that will be acceptable and constructive for the countries
of the Middle East.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

END

CP-3

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Classification

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET~~-- NODIS

Monday, May 22, 1967
8:45 p.m.

Herewith Gov. Harriman opts for
a bombing cut-back; informing Moscow;
and giving Moscow time to organize ;
pressure and economic support for
Hanoi.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-470
By cb, NARA, Date 7-21-95

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~-- NODIS

28a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

May 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

Subject: Negotiations - Soviet Union

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jw, NARA, Date 5-1-99

Now that the President has sent a personal letter to Kosygin, I would like to supplement my previous memoranda on considerations for follow through. Much, of course, depends on the Soviet reaction, but we should not be discouraged if it proves to be negative in the first instance. In any event, it would seem timely to define our future course.

With Peking strongly opposed to a settlement, I believe that only if Moscow exerts strong influence can Hanoi be brought to negotiations. To achieve this end, Moscow would probably have to give fairly definite assurance of continuing economic and political support for Hanoi, to offset Red China's possible withdrawal of support. It seems clear that Kosygin and at least some of his colleagues are most anxious to see the fighting stopped. Our problem is to strengthen the hand of this group in the counsels of the Kremlin as well as in Hanoi. On the assumption that a decision is made to proceed with bombing proposal "C", the first step would be to inform Moscow in an appropriate manner of this decision.

The Eastern European countries have given evidence that they would like to see an end to hostilities in order to avoid a possible confrontation between the Soviet Union and ourselves. Therefore, consideration should be given to the manner in which at least several of them should be informed, perhaps beginning with a talk by Gronouski with the Poles. Some of the Eastern European countries might be induced to pressure Moscow to exert influence in Hanoi in return for our bombing restraint. Another objective should be to get Moscow to reduce its lethal shipments.

Consideration should also be given to other countries who might have an influence on Hanoi.

I recommend that the Negotiations Committee be instructed to come up with a plan of action for prompt submission.

Averell
W. Averell Harriman

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

PRESERVATION COPY

Monday, May 22, 1967 -- 7:25 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Tom Morgan came in today in regard to the article he is doing on me for LIFE. I checked with Hugh Sidey who reported he is a bona fide writer and that he is indeed on an assignment to do a piece on me. He is doing several articles. His first such article is on Edward Albee, the playwright, in this week's LIFE. Bob Ginsburgh, whom he interviewed, reports that, unless he (Bob) is excessively naive, Morgan is "friendly," in Air Force jargon. In any case, I repeated the line I gave him earlier on the narrow limits of my job here.

Bill White came in to discuss the Middle East; and Robert Spivack telephoned on the same subject. I gave them a general picture of the problem as it was this afternoon.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

LDX to SS for Be read: urgently for E. V. Rostow, Luke Battle,
and then for clearance by Secy. Rusk.

SENT VIA LDX

22/1925

30

5/22/67

~~SECRET~~
Dear President Nasser:

DECLASSIFIED

I have spent much of these past days thinking of the Middle East,
of the problems you face, and the problems we face in that area.

Various of our common friends, including Ambassador Battle, have
told me of your concern that the United States may have indicated an
unfriendliness toward the UAR. This, I would wish you to know directly,
is far from the truth.

I have watched from a distance your efforts to develop and modernize
your country. I understand, I think, the pride and the aspirations of
your people -- their insistence that they enter as soon as possible the
modern world and take their full part in it. I hope that we can find public
as well as private ways to work more closely together.

I also understand the political forces at work in your region, the ambitions
and tensions, the memories and the hopes.

Right now, of course, your task and mine is not to look back, but to
rescue the Middle East -- and the whole human community -- from a war
I believe no one wants. I do not know what steps Secretary General U Thant
will be proposing to you; but I do urge you to set as your first duty to your
own people, to your region, and to the world community this transcendent
objective: the avoidance of hostilities.

The great conflicts of our time are not going to be solved by the illegal
crossing of frontiers with arms and men -- neither in Asia, the Middle East,

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 68 2/12/81 (NLS 81-101)

By 62/111, NARA, Date 5-20-91

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2-

5/22/67

Africa, or Latin America. But that kind of action has already led to war in Asia, and it threatens the peace elsewhere.

I had expected that I might ask our Vice President to go to the Middle East to talk with you and other Arab leaders, as well as with the leaders of Israel. If we come through these days without hostilities, I would still hope that visit by my most trusted friend could result immediately.

Each of us who has the responsibility for leading a nation faces different problems shaped by history, geography, and the deepest feelings of our peoples. Whatever differences there may be in the outlook and interests of your country and mine, we do share an interest in the independence and progress of the UAR and the peace of the Middle East.

I address you at this critical moment in the hope that you share that assessment and will find it possible to act on it in the hours and days ahead. ~~I look forward to our working out a program that will be acceptable and~~
~~constructive for our respective peoples.~~

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY

START:

NOTES

Please deliver following reply from President to Prime Minister Eshkol's May 18 letter (Tel Aviv 3648).

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your prompt and detailed reply to my message of May 18.

Ambassador Barbour has informed me of your assurances, conveyed through Mr. Bitan yesterday, that the measures your Government is taking are precautionary in nature and that you will continue to do all you can to avoid further deterioration of the present grave situation on your borders. By continuing to display steady nerves you can, I am convinced, make a major contribution to the avoidance of hostilities.

I fully agree that, for tranquility to return, there is an urgent need for the cessation of terrorism and the ^{reversal} of military movements of the type we have witnessed during

*President's clerk
communicated to
E. V. Rostow
22 May, 1967
6:45 P.M.
✓* 31

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7149 82-162; NLS 83-05
By kg/jis, NARA, Date 5-10-91

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

17:05 PM.

the past week. We and our friends have done all we can to make this amply clear in both Cairo and Damascus.

As you know, we have also been in touch ~~and~~ with the Soviet Government and are somewhat encouraged by the tone of their reaction to our approaches. ~~I~~ I am confident they are under no illusions about the firmness of our commitment to support appropriate measures in the ~~United Nations or outside~~ ~~or to take other action on our own~~, to counter

aggression or the threat of aggression ~~in the Middle East~~. As you ~~will~~ know that commitment, ^{was} ~~which has been made~~ ^{made} publicly by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy as well as myself, and by the

British, French and United States governments in their Tripartite Declaration in 1950. ^{particular concern} ~~It definitely includes Israel.~~ ^{meet} I can assure you ~~that we remain firm so far as we are concerned.~~ ^{that we will act firmly and in unison to any challenges} We have suggested to your Ambassador that you consult, as we are doing, with the other two governments with respect to these assurances.

So far as a United Nations presence on the boundary between Israel and the United Arab Republic is concerned, we strongly objected, as you know, to the Secretary General's decision with regard to the status of the UNEF in Sinai. We continue to regard a United Nations presence in the area as important and desirable.

~~SECRET~~

I have been giving serious thought to the question of what further steps we might take to ease the situation and am giving most urgent consideration to your suggestion to Ambassador Barbour that a public statement by me would have a calming effect. In making this decision, I am weighing the possible bearing of such a statement now on Secretary General Thant's visit to Cairo. I am sure you will agree that nothing should be said or done at this time which might complicate or distract attention from the efforts of the Secretary General. In the meantime, the problems discussed in your letter to me are occupying the attention of the highest officials of this Government and will continue to do so until they are resolved.

With personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

END

Monday, May 22, 1967 - 5:30 PM

W R 32

Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached, for your signature, is a reply to President Senghor's letter introducing the President of the Senegal River Basin Commission, who was supposed to visit the United States this month. Unfortunately, his visit had to be postponed.

The proposed reply promises Senghor only that we will give the Commission President a sympathetic hearing when he is able to come.

W. W. Rostow

EKH/vmr

WWR

30.1.

May 23, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

I very much appreciated your letter informing me of the proposed visit to Washington of the President of the Senegal River Basin Commission. I was sorry to hear that his urgent recall to Bamako necessitated postponement of the meetings that had been scheduled for him in the Department of State and the Agency for International Development.

Whenever the President of the Commission is able to re-schedule his visit to Washington, senior officials of my government will be happy to discuss with him the activities of the Commission, the problems confronting it, and the various proposals for implementation of the Senegal River Basin projects through international cooperation. The United States Government fully appreciates the importance of the Commission in developing and utilizing the water resources of the Senegal River to further the economic development of the whole of West Africa.

Thank you, Mr. President, for drawing my attention to the visit of the President of the Commission. I assure you that he will receive every possible consideration.

Best personal regards.

Sincerely,

LBJ

His Excellency
Leopold Sedar Senghor
President of the Republic of Senegal

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-470
By CG, NARA, Date 7-21-95

LBJ:WWR:EKH:mst

May 22, 1967

SECRET

Meeting With the President
Monday, May 22, 1967, 5:00 pm

AGENDA

1. Middle East. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)
 - a. Situation
 - b. U.S. diplomatic actions
 - c. Contingency Plans.
2. Viet Nam (Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)
3. Other

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 14, NARA, Date 5-8-91

~~SECRET~~

Monday, M/ 22, 1967
4:30 p. m.

34

Mr. President:

I dictated this and sent it over to Gene's
Middle East task force this afternoon.

From previous experience I know Nasser
is vulnerable to direct communication
from the President of the United States.

If we are pressed to say something in
public about our Israel commitments,
something along these lines might help
hold the line.

W. W. R.

EYES ONLY attachment

Monday, y 22, 1967
1:15 p. m.

36

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the somewhat aggrieved
U. K. Consul-General in Hanoi reports
on power and water. Some of each
is now available.

Pres file

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

NOFORN

120/IC 360
SAVA
POB

CYPHER/CAT A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE HANOI

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 338

22 MAY 1967

ROUTINE

This information was received from the
US SIC representative
in Washington.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM HANOI.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 338 OF 22 MAY REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND SAIGON.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 337.

WE ALSO OBSERVED PRIVATE HOUSES STRUCK IN TARGET AREA AND SOME HAVE
BEEN REPORTED NEARER THE CENTRE. TARGETS WERE ATTACKED AGAIN THIS
MORNING BUT WE HAVE NOT YET VISITED THEM TODAY.

2. HANOI POWER AND WATER (CLATTER RATIONED) RETURNED TO THIS QUARTER
AT 0900 TODAY. STREET LIGHTING AND GENERATOR-POWERED UNDERTAKINGS
FUNCTIONING LAST NIGHT. MORALE IS ALL RIGHT EXCEPT FOR CHILDREN.
EVERY OTHER TOWN IN NORTH VIET NAM IS IN EVEN WORSE SHAPE AND
BOMBING IS UNLIKELY TO REDUCE INFILTRATION, LET ALONE BRING THIS
PEASANT NATION TO NEGOTIATE. WATER FAILURE WOULD OF COURSE PRODUCE
DISEASE. TEMPERATURE IS 96 DEGREES.

3. SAIGON ONLY. PLEASE SEND ONE GROSS HEAVY DUTY CANDLES, 12 TINS
FLY SPRAY AND 6 4.1/2 GALLON JERRY CANS.

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS WASHINGTON 172

CHANCERY GENERAL
Chancery Action
16/10/17mk

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By fw, NARA, Date 4-26-99

000000

0000 0000

SENT AT 22/12/2007 11:11

Monday, May 22, 1967 -- 11:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

In the past 30 days we have lost in North Viet Nam 46 aircraft:

- 9 to SAMs
- 8 to MIGs
- 28 to ground fire
- 1 to cause unknown

In that period we have destroyed 35 aircraft confirmed, with 4 probable, as follows:

- 29 in the air confirmed
- 4 probable in the air
- 6 on the ground, confirmed

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

38

Pres file

Monday, May 22, 1967 - 11:00 AM

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a proposed reply to two sympathy messages from African heads of state on the recent tornadoes in the mid-west. If you approve, we will send identical replies to President Ahidjo of Cameroon and President Tsiranana of Malagasy.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

EKH/vmr

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENTS OF
CAMEROON AND MALAGASY REPUBLIC

Dear Mr. President:

I am grateful indeed for your kind expression of sympathy following the tornadoes in several of our States. It is most comforting to know that, despite the distance between our lands, your thoughts are with us at this tragic time.

Sincerely,

Pres file

Monday, May 22, 1967 -- 10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Linc Gordon called me over the week end to underline the urgency of appointing his successor.

Aside from the fact his own days here are numbered, there are two specific reasons why a man ought to be in place soon:

-- There will be an important meeting at the Ministerial level about the end of the first week in June, on the question of Venezuela's complaint against Cuba.

-- In mid-June there is a meeting of the Economic and Social Council of the OAS, to follow up the Summit meeting, which is of first-class importance.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Pres file

Monday - May 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Prime Minister Williams of Trinidad

Prime Minister Williams has written you describing steps he is taking to move Trinidad toward Latin American economic integration and full use of its newly acquired OAS membership (Tab B).

I recommend that you send him the brief acknowledgement at Tab A.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

- Tab A -- Proposed letter to Prime Minister Williams
- Tab B -- Letter from Prime Minister.

[Signature] *[Signature]* 402

May 22, 1967

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your cordial letter of May 6. I was glad to learn of the steps you are taking to carry out the decisions of Punta del Este.

In your letter you mentioned that a survey mission from CIAP was coming to Trinidad and Tobago. This is an excellent step as you prepare to enter into full partnership under the Alliance for Progress. I am also pleased that you plan to explore with Venezuela and others how best your country can move toward the goal of a Latin American Common Market.

My advisers have informed me of their talks with you following our meeting at Punta del Este. I understand that the aviation question which you raised with me has been discussed both with you by Ambassador Miner and with Sir Ellis Clarke by officers of the Department of State.

Again I want to say what a pleasure it was to be with you at Punta del Este. I wish you every success.

Sincerely,

LBJ

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-470
By CB, NARA, Date 7-21-95

Dr. The Right Honorable
Eric E. Williams
Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago
Port-of-Spain

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NHJ 91-470
By CB, NARA, Date 7.24.95

Port of Spain, TRINIDAD. I.

6 May, 1967.

Dear Mr. President,

Your kind letter of April 14, 1967, came to my attention after I had written to you on April 21. I now formally acknowledge your letter and thank you for your very kind remarks about Trinidad and Tobago and myself.

As you will have seen from my earlier letter, I did talk to Mr. True Davis, and the first survey mission from the Organization of American States will be arriving in Trinidad on Monday, May 8. I am sure that you will be glad to hear this.

Whilst I was in Punta del Este, I had the opportunity of a valuable discussion with President Leoni, who has now proposed the establishment of a mixed commission of our two countries to study general relations between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago and work on the question of a sub-regional grouping including Venezuela and Colombia. President Leoni's proposal will be considered by our Cabinet next week. In the meantime we are expecting a visit from the Foreign Minister of Guatemala later this month, which will allow us an opportunity of talking about the Central American Common Market.

I was very impressed with the Uruguay Conference, and I agree with you that the result was significant. The whole question depends on, as you put it, our moving forward to our agreed goals, and I wish to assure you that Trinidad and Tobago will play its part in this exercise.

I take this opportunity of thanking you for the very wonderful pictures of our meeting at Punta del Este. I hope you are well and I wish you all success in your ventures.

Yours sincerely,

Eric Williams

Eric Williams

His Excellency Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America.

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - May 22, 1967

Mr. President:

Bolivian President Barrientos celebrates his 48th birthday on May 30. State recommends that you send him greetings.

Barrientos boycotted the OAS Summit because he failed to get satisfaction on the access-to-the-sea problem. Otherwise, he has cooperated closely with us. Now he faces the additional problem of communist-led insurgency and some murmurings among his own military that he hasn't obtained large-scale military assistance which he does not need.

A birthday message from you will show your continuing interest in him and what he is trying to do to solve Bolivia's economic and social problems.

I recommend that you send him the attached birthday message.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Approve

☒

Disapprove

☐

See me

☐

5/23/67

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-470
By CG, NARA, Date 7-21-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Suggested Presidential Birthday Greetings to Bolivian President

Barrientos on May 30, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

I send you warmest congratulations as you celebrate your birthday today. I also wish you continuing success in your efforts to achieve a larger measure of social and economic progress for the Bolivian people.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Rene Barrientos Ortuno
Constitutional President of the
Republic of Bolivia
La Paz.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-470
By CG, NARA, Date 1-21-95

Mr. Rostow

42

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 22, 1967

SUBJECT: Congratulations for King Constantine

Queen Anne Marie of Greece gave birth to a son on Saturday evening. King Constantine has used the occasion to announce a time table for returning Greece to constitutional government--six months to produce a new Constitution and then a Referendum. State recommends you send the following congratulatory message:

"Mrs. Johnson and I send our heartiest congratulations on the birth of your son. The American people join us in extending to you and Queen Anne Marie our warmest wishes on this happy event. "

I recommend you approve. While the monarchy in Greece is a political issue and this is the first male heir to the throne, Constantine is head of State and there is no question about the appropriateness of your sending a message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Monday, May 22, 1967
7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, as requested, a draft,
more responsive to the question put
by Mr. Mosser.

W W. Rostow

43a
May 22, 1967

Dear Harry:

The encouragement and the counsel of longtime friends are always welcome in this house.


As for Viet Nam, we do, indeed, seek a victory; but not a victory which entails the occupation of North Viet Nam or the overthrow of its government. We seek victory over the aggression mounted by Hanoi; the effective application of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, which would protect South Viet Nam, Laos, and Southeast Asia from aggression; and the opportunity for the people of South Viet Nam to enjoy the rights of self-determination.

I value the confidence that you place in this Administration, and I assure you that we are daily working toward a peace with honor -- a peace that will prove your confidence justified.

It is always good to hear from you, and I hope that I may continue to have your advice as well as your support.

With every good wish,

Sincerely,



Mr. Harry J. Mosser
Suite 1315
Bank of the Southwest Building
Houston, Texas 77002

LBJ:WRS:EH:WWR:mz

cc: Juanita Roberts, Will Sparks, Eliska Hasek, Bob Fleming, Mary Hooper

Monday, Mr 22, 1967
2:30 p.m.

44

To: Marvin Watson

From: Walt Rostow

Pres file

Marv,

1. The President should see him.
It was a first-class job.

2. I support the letter, as
amended.

Walt

May 22, 1967

442

Dear Mr. President:

Mr. George Ball has given me a full report of the work of his mission and the results it has yielded so far. He has also informed me of the program he and his colleagues are undertaking to extend the knowledge of investment and trade opportunities in Korea to an even larger circle of American business.

Mr. Ball has described in glowing terms the warm hospitality with which you and your government received his mission, and the careful and thoughtful preparations that had been made to assure each American industrialist the fullest opportunity to explore specific investment opportunities in Korea.

I want to thank you, Mr. President, for the many kindnesses you extended to Mr. Ball and his mission, and to assure you that we shall continue to do everything possible to encourage private investment in your country.

I have already sent you my congratulations on the magnificent vote of confidence which has just been given you. This is, it seems to me, a splendid testimony to your leadership and to the wisdom of the disciplined but creative economic policies you have asked the Korean people to undertake. It shows also that your people fully understand the vital importance of the fight our two countries are making in South Viet Nam to prevent that brave country from being overrun.

I send you my warm wishes for the success of your Government during the next few years.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Chung Hae Park
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-470
By cb, NARA, Date 7-24-95

LBJ:Geo. Ball:WWR:mz

PRESERVATION COPY

Ball

446

Lehman Brothers

*One William Street
New York, N. Y. 10004*

May 17, 1967

Dear Marvin:


I am enclosing a letter to the President, reporting on the mission which he asked me to undertake to Korea. Also enclosed is a draft letter which the President might wish to send to President Park.

As I mentioned to you on the telephone, we have a suggestion from the Korean Minister in charge of investments that it would be helpful to the Korean Government to have a picture of me presenting the report to the President for the local Korean press.

I hate to trouble the President about this, and it is not a matter of great importance. However, if it could conveniently be worked out the Koreans would like it.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,



George W. Ball

The Honorable
Marvin Watson,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

New York · Chicago · Denver · Houston · Los Angeles · San Francisco · Paris

44c

Lehman Brothers

One William Street
New York, N. Y. 10004

May 16, 1967

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

On March 16, you very kindly met with the mission of industrialists and bankers I had organized to explore trade opportunities in South Korea. You asked me at that time to let you know the results we were able to achieve.

Of twenty-three companies other than banks, represented on the mission, seventeen have already taken follow-up steps in Korea or have advised me of their plans to do so; three others said they would increase or begin purchases from Korea but did not intend to manufacture there; two of the remaining three have not yet advised me of their intentions, while only one company has reported definitely that it had no further plans.

We can conclude from this that at least ninety percent of the companies represented on the mission will at least go forward with careful feasibility studies. While it is too early for them to have concluded final investment arrangements we can be reasonably confident that the mission will result in a significant flow of industrial capital into the Korean economy. Experience elsewhere has, of course, shown that such direct investments carry with them valuable training, know how, and managerial guidance.

Quite probably the mission's greatest impact will be the indirect effect on other members of the business community when the banker members of the mission pass on their findings to their customers and the industrialists talk with their friends, for, without exception,

Alma Lombard, Chi.

Ed

48

P. A.

Q T


the members of the mission were greatly impressed by the vitality of the Korean people, the manifest determination of General Park and his government to cut red tape in order to facilitate investment, and the genuine atmosphere of hospitality toward American business which we found at every hand.

We now have plans for extending the knowledge of investment opportunities in Korea to a larger circle of American business. Individual members of the mission have already given a number of speeches and press interviews. I shall myself be giving three speeches in New York, Cleveland and Chicago within the next ten days. Mr. Joel Bernstein, the head of our AID Mission in South Korea, is presently in the United States and a number of speaking engagements have been arranged for him.

It is clear that the mission's success resulted very largely from the impressive preparatory work done by the Korean Government and from the high degree of competence and effectiveness shown by the AID mission under Mr. Bernstein's direction. You will be pleased to know that the industrialists on my mission had nothing but the highest praise for the work of our Embassy and AID representatives.

It was a great privilege for me to have the opportunity of organizing and directing the mission. I am grateful to you for asking me to undertake this, Mr. President, as I am grateful for so many other things.

Sincerely yours,


George W. Ball

GWB:jc

Draft letter from the President of the United States to President Park
of South Korea

Dear Mr. President:

Mr. George Ball has given me a full report of the work of his mission and the results it has yielded so far. He has also informed me of the program he and his colleagues are undertaking to extend the knowledge of investment and trade opportunities in Korea to an even larger circle of American business.

Mr. Ball has described in glowing terms the warm hospitality with which you and your government received his mission and the careful and thoughtful preparations that had been made to assure each American industrialist the fullest opportunity to explore specific investment opportunities in Korea.

I want to thank you, Mr. President, for the many kindnesses you extended to Mr. Ball and his mission and to assure you that we shall continue to do everything possible to encourage private investment in your country.

I have already sent you my congratulations on the magnificent vote of confidence which has just been given you. This is, it seems to me, a splendid testimony to your leadership and to the wisdom of the stern economic policies you have asked the Korean people to undertake. It shows also that your people fully understand the vital importance of

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-470
By 26, NARA, Date 7-21-95

the fight our two countries are making in South Viet-Nam to prevent that brave country from being overrun.

I send you my warm wishes for the success of your Government during the next few years.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, May 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Call on You by Japanese Ambassador

You have agreed to receive Ambassador Ryuji Takeuchi (TAH-KAY-OO-CHEE) today at 12:45 p.m. in a brief farewell call. Takeuchi is not expected to raise any substantive issue.

You may wish to:

-- express your appreciation for the Ambassador's most effective contributions to good and close relations between our two countries during his four years in Washington.

-- inquire about his future plans. (Takeuchi is expected to retire, but we believe this has not been announced.)

-- express the hope that his influence may continue to further understanding of U. S. efforts and policies, as we attempt to bear our world-wide responsibilities with both determination and restraint.

-- reiterate the high value we place on consultations with Japan, not only because of mutually beneficial bilateral relationships, but also because of Japan's interest in and knowledge of world problems in the context of an intimate understanding of East Asia -- an area which today is so crucial to the future of us all.

Takeuchi plans to depart about May 29th.

Biographic data are attached.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-470
By CG, NARA, Date 7-21-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Monday - May 22, 1967

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this report describing Dominican reaction to your decision to give the DR a special sugar quota.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Message from
Ambassador Crimmins
(3622, 5/19/67)

UnclassifiedMessage from Ambassador Crimmins in Santo Domingo
- no. 3622 - dated May 19, 1967

SUBJECT: Reaction to the special sugar quota allocation

1. President Balaguer released a press statement on May 19 describing the United States special sugar allocation as evidence of its friendship with the Dominican Republic and of its intention to implement the cooperation policy with Latin America as expressed at the Punta del Este conference. The statement states that the extra quota will help provide the State Sugar Council with the instruments to modernize and to use its non-cane lands for agricultural diversification. Following is an informal translation of the whole statement:

"President Johnson's decision to grant the Dominican Republic an additional extraordinary quota of 105,000 tons of sugar is not only new evidence of the sympathy and friendship toward our country, but of the United States' intention to implement its policy of cooperation with Latin America as expressed at the historic Punta del Este meeting.

"The extraordinary quota assigned to the Dominican Republic will contribute greatly to the improvement of the national industry and will effectively help our country in the arduous task it is undertaking today to rehabilitate its economy and to initiate, on firm foundations, the process of its economic development.

"The quota with which our country has been favored will permit us to reduce substantially our balance of payments deficit and put into the hands of the State Sugar Council the instruments necessary to undertake an effective modernization program and to diversify our national agriculture through the promotion of new cultivation on the land of the 12 State-controlled mills now not used for cane."

2. As a further expression of the Dominican Republic's gratitude, the May 19 press reported that the lower house of Congress appointed a commission to draft a letter of thanks to President Johnson for the additional quota.

3. The May 19 Listin Diario editorial stated that President Balaguer merits the thanks of the country for his tenacious call for a 600,000 ton U.S. quota, and that the United States deserves praise for recognizing the justice in this request. After noting the usefulness of the extra quota, the editorial states that it is only an alleviation of problems and should not divert the Dominicans from the urgent task of diversifying agricultural production.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Saturday, May 20, 1967
5:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

When Souvanna was installed, we
wouldn't have guessed that he would
be taking quite this line.

You might also be interested in
the comment of the Polish ICC member.

W. W. Rostow

Vientiane 7227

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-404
By up, NARA, Date 2-23-93

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9

Action

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON

RUHHHQA/CINCPAC

RUDKRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIENTIANE 7227

021061

1967 MAY 20 AM 5 28

SUBJ: STRIKE AGAINST HANOI THERMAL PLANT

REF: STATE 197756; 197678

1. IN COURSE CONVERSATION TODAY WITH SOUVANNA ON NUMBER OF TOPICS, I INFORMED HIM OF SUBSTANCE REFEELS. HE WAS ALREADY VERY KNOWLEDGABLE RE LOCATION AND IMPORTANCE THERMAL POWER PLANT AND APPLAUDED OUR DECISION TO TAKE IT OUT.

2. AS USUAL, THE QUESTION OF WIDER DAMAGE THAT MAY RESULT FROM US AIR STRIKES WILL NOT GIVE US ANY PROBLEMS HERE WITH RLG. IN THIS RESPECT, DURING RECENT CONVERSATION, (VIENTIANE 7183) ICC POLISH COMMISSIONER WITEK TOLD ME THAT DURING HIS VISIT TO HANOI HE HAD

PAGE TWO RUMJFS 7227 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BEEN QUITE IMPRESSED BY THE EXTREMELY HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS EMPLOYED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, INCLUDING THE LARGE NUMBERS OF SAM'S LAUNCHED AGAINST US AIR STRIKES. PURPOSE HIS STATEMENTS, OF COURSE, NOT INTENDED SUGGEST THAT SIGNIFICANT CIVILIAN DAMAGE RESULTS FROM NVN DEFENSE MEASURES; DESPITE OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA, HOWEVER, WE ASSUME EVEN COMMIES ARE AWARE THAT WHAT GOES UP COMES DOWN.

GP-3. SULLIVAN

BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-474

By ju, NARA, Date 5-19-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file~~SECRET~~

Saturday, May 20, 1967
4:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

The Thieu-Ky problem is
serious, as these two cables indicate.

We can only count on Bunker --
who is obviously fully engaged.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-470
By CG, NARA, Date 7-24-95

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17 MAY 20 14 19 48a
SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/KAC 99-89
By cdm, NARA Date 5-15-01

HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
(P922Y)
USAF
ISIC

SEC ARLINGTON HALL STATION

SEC ACSI DA
DIRNSA COMMAND CENTER
CIA-OCI
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~~SECRET~~ NOFORN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 20 MAY 1967
SUBJECT INTENTION OF GENERALS IN CABINET TO RESIGN IF
CHIEF OF STATE NGUYEN VAN THIEU ANNOUNCES HIS
CANDIDACY FOR THE PRESIDENCY

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON
SOURCE

Reston
See also attach
Brubaker Comment

1. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DURING AN INTERVIEW [REDACTED] GRANTED TO
A FOREIGN NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENT, BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN
NGOC LOAN, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE AND CHIEF OF
THE MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:
A. HE, GENERAL NGUYEN CAO KY AND THE OTHER GENERALS
IN THE GOVERNMENT (I.E. CABINET) WOULD TENDER THEIR RESIGNATIONS
AS OF THE TIME THIEU MAKES A FIRM DECLARATION OF HIS PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDACY. LOAN SAID THAT BY "OTHER GENERALS" HE MEANT
MINISTER FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN
DUC THANG, MINISTER OF INFORMATION MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN
BAO TRI, MINISTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY MAJOR GENERAL LINH
QUANG VIEN AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN.
THE LATER, HOWEVER, WILL NOT RESIGN AS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
GENERAL STAFF, WHICH POSITION HE HOLDS CONCURRENTLY WITH THE
DEFENSE PORTFOLIO. THE GENERALS WILL TENDER THEIR RESIGNATIONS
WITH THE IDEA THAT THIEU SHOULD REPLACE THEM, AND ONLY IF
HE WERE UNABLE TO DO SO WOULD THEY BE WILLING TO CONTINUE
IN OFFICE, ALTHOUGH PURELY IN A "TECHNICAL CAPACITY."

B. THE RESIGNATION WOULD BE THE RESULT OF THE
GENERALS' BELIEF THAT THIEU CANNOT POSSIBLY WIN THE PRESIDENCY
IN A FAIR ELECTION AND THEIR AVERSION TO BEING IN A POSITION
WHERE THIEU COULD HOLD THEM RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS DEFEAT. THEY
ALL FEEL THAT WHILE IT MUST BE SAID FOR THE BENEFIT OF POLIT

SECRET

CANDIDACY. LOAN SAID THAT BY "OTHER GENERALS" HE MEANT MINISTER FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG, MINISTER OF INFORMATION MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN BAO TRI, MINISTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY MAJOR GENERAL LINH QUANG VIEN AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN. THE LATER, HOWEVER, WILL NOT RESIGN AS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, WHICH POSITION HE HOLDS CONCURRENTLY WITH THE DEFENSE PORTFOLIO. THE GENERALS WILL TENDER THEIR RESIGNATIONS WITH THE IDEA THAT THIEU SHOULD REPLACE THEM, AND ONLY IF HE WERE UNABLE TO DO SO WOULD THEY BE WILLING TO CONTINUE IN OFFICE, ALTHOUGH PURELY IN A "TECHNICAL CAPACITY."

B. THE RESIGNATION WOULD BE THE RESULT OF THE GENERALS' BELIEF THAT THIEU CANNOT POSSIBLY WIN THE PRESIDENCY IN A FAIR ELECTION AND THEIR AVERSION TO BEING IN A POSITION WHERE THIEU COULD HOLD THEM RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS DEFEAT. THEY ALL FEEL THAT WHILE IT MUST BE SAID FOR THE BENEFIT OF PUBLIC OPINION THAT BOTH KY AND THIEU ARE FREE TO RUN AS PRIVATE CITIZENS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRATIC FREEDOM, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE MILITARY CANDIDATE WILL PROFIT FROM MANY ASSETS AT HIS DISPOSAL. THESE INCLUDE THE CIVILIAN SECURITY FORCES, THE ARMED FORCES, THE VIETNAM INFORMATION SERVICE AND THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTAL MACHINERY. THEREFORE, THE GENERALS FEEL THAT AS THE PERSONS CONTROLLING THOSE ASSETS THEY WOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE IF THE MILITARY CANDIDATE, AS THIEU WOULD BE IN FACT EVEN IF NOT IN NAME, WERE TO LOSE.

C. IN THE EVENT OF A THIEU CANDIDACY ANNOUNCEMENT, KY WILL NOT ONLY RESIGN AS PRIME MINISTER BUT WILL ALSO FORMALLY WITHDRAW AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE.

2. LOAN SAID THAT HE HAD TWICE TOLD THIEU TO HIS FACE THAT HE COULD NOT WIN AN ELECTION. ASKED IF HE FELT THIS WOULD BE TRUE ALSO IF THIEU WERE TO FORM AN ALLIANCE AND RUN WITH A POPULAR CIVILIAN CANDIDATE SUCH AS FORMER PRIME MINISTER TRAN VAN HUONG, LOAN REPLIED THAT HUONG HAS ALREADY TURNED DOWN TWO OFFERS FROM THIEU. THE FIRST TIME THIEU ASKED HUONG TO BE HIS VICE PRESIDENTIAL RUNNING MATE. THEN, AFTER HUONG REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL, THIEU REVERSED THE ORDER AND OFFERED TO RUN AS VICE PRESIDENT ON HUONG'S TICKET. HUONG ALSO TURNED DOWN THIS SUGGESTION, SAID LOAN, ON GROUNDS THAT HE AND THIEU DO NOT THINK ALIKE.

3. (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO SAIGON EMBTEL 26200, 19 MAY 1967, FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN VAN DO TOLD THE POLITICAL COUNSELOR ON THE EVENING OF 19 MAY THAT THIEU HAD DEFINITELY DECIDED TO RUN FOR PRESIDENT.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR, AMBASSADOR KOWER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR ONLY) USMACV (GENERAL ESTMORELAND, CHIEF OF STAFF, J-2 ONLY) CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP AND POLAD ONLY)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM GROUP 1

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O 201310Z MAY 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHGX/WHITE HOUSE
RUEHLG/CIA
RUEHJS/DOD
O 201220Z MAY 67 ZFF-3
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 282
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 26231

EXDIS

SUBJECT: THIEU - KY

REF: SAIGON 26200

486
SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-89
By cbm, NARA Date 5-15-01

1. SINCE DISPATCH REFTTEL WE HAVE BEEN SORTING OUT VARIOUS REPORTS OF WHAT HAS AND HAS NOT TRANSPIRED REGARDING THIEU'S CANDIDACY. IT IS CLEAR THAT HE HAS MADE STATEMENTS TO HIS COLLEAGUES AND TO TWO OR MORE JOURNALISTS THAT HE HAS DECIDED TO RUN, BUT HE HAS NOT MADE A FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS CANDIDACY. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHEN HE

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 26231 ~~SECRET~~

MAY MAKE SUCH A DECLARATION OR PERHAPS EVEN THAT HE WILL MAKE IT, ALTHOUGH MOST INDICATIONS SUGGEST THAT HE WILL DO SO AT SOME STAGE. IT REMAINS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT HIS PRESENT MANEUVERS ARE DESIGNED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO BLOCK KY'S PATH AND PERHAPS SECONDARILY TO LAY GROUNDWORK FOR AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND A CIVILIAN CANDIDATE.

2. SINCE THIEU'S ACTUAL INTENTIONS AND KY'S POSSIBLE REACTIONS ARE NOT NOW KNOWN, WE ARE PLANNING TO TAKE A NUMBER OF SOUNDINGS WITH PERSONS CLOSE TO BOTH OF THEM, MAKING EVIDENT OUR GRAVE CONCERN AT THESE MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE EFFECT THEY MAY HAVE ON OUR POSITION HERE AND SUPPORT BACK HOME FOR OUR EFFORT IN VIET-NAM.

3. I HAD MADE AN APPOINTMENT WITH KY FOR SATURDAY MORNING TO PRESENT SENATOR CASE, BUT THIS WAS CANCELLED THE SAME MORNING, AND MY OFFICE WAS INFORMED THAT HE WOULD BE OUT OF TOWN FOR THE DAY. FOLLOWING THESE INITIAL SOUNDINGS, I AM PLANNING TO SEE BOTH THIEU AND KY, EITHER SEPARATELY OR TOGETHER DEPENDING ON WHAT SEEMS BEST AT

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 26231 ~~SECRET~~

THE TIME, TO STATE OUR VIEWS VERY PLAINLY REGARDING THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF PERSONAL POLITICAL MANEUVERS WHICH MAY SPLIT THE ARMED FORCES BEYOND REPAIR AND FURTHER FRAGMENT THE ALREADY DIVIDED AND COMPETING POLITICAL GROUPS IN THIS COUNTRY. I WILL MAKE PLAIN THAT WE CANNOT HAVE OUR ENORMOUS INVESTMENT OF MEN, MONEY, AND WORLD PRESTIGE PUT INTO QUESTION BY SUCH PERSONAL RIVALRY.

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PAGE 3 RUMJIR 26231 ~~SECRET~~

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4. AS A FOOTNOTE TO THESE EVENTS, A CONVERSATION WITH NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR LOAN AT MID-DAY SATURDAY IS PERHAPS WORTH NOTING. IT IS BEING REPORTED IN GREATER DETAIL [REDACTED] IN BRIEF, LOAN SAID THAT, IF THIEU ANNOUNCED HIS CANDIDACY, KY WOULD WITHDRAW, AND HE AND THE PRINCIPAL GENERALS IN THE DIRECTORATE (THANG, TRI, BOTH VIENS, AND KHANG OF II CORPS WERE MENTIONED) WOULD RESIGN ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIEU COULD NOT WIN THE RACE FOR THE PRESIDENCY, AND SUCH A LOSS WOULD BE A SERIOUS AND UNACCEPTABLE LOSS OF PRESTIGE FOR THE ARMED FORCES. WHILE LOAN'S VERSIONS OF EVENTS, BOTH PAST AND FUTURE, MUST ALWAYS BE TAKEN WITH A LARGE GRAIN OF SALT AND THEY ARE NO DOUBT MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE

attached
1.5(cc)
3.4(b)(1)

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 26231 ~~SECRET~~

TO INFLUENCE OUR OWN ACTIONS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SUCH THREATS MIGHT BE CONTEMPLATED BY THIS GROUP. BUNKER
BT

EX-113

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, May 20, 1967 - 4:30 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

General Comment

I have read carefully Bob McNamara's draft memorandum of May 19, 1967. My reactions are these.

1. It appears a reaction against the JCS position as he understands it and projects it -- a reaction that goes a bit too far. It is a strategy further towards the other end of the scale than the one I would recommend.

A Strategy Between the JCS and McNamara's

There is, I believe, a better intermediate strategy, which I shall first state briefly and then argue.

2. Summary.

A. Additional forces for:

- dealing with the DMZ pressure and making the barrier stick;
- beefing up pacification by increased U.S. forces available to operate against provincial main force units.

B. Increased and better coordinated efforts to inhibit all infiltration routes.

C. Continued bombing of the northern part of North Viet Nam on a more selective basis than in the past, unless we get an adequate diplomatic or other return from the other side.

D. Creation of reserve forces to deal with contingencies in 1968, including the possibility of a shallow invasion of North Viet Nam, if that should become necessary and advisable. I would not recommend it now.

E. A political track, inside South Viet Nam like Bob's, but done in ways less likely to crack military unity and South Vietnamese morale.

I cannot assess how many additional men this intermediate strategy would require. We'd have to work this out with Westy, Abrams, and Komer, as well as the JCS. It requires an assessment and a pacification plan -- province by province. But my gut feeling is that it would be somewhat more than we can do without some Reserve call-up -- but less than Westy has requested.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71CJ 83-10
By eg/ics, NARA, Date 5-21-91

5/20/67

3. You know better than any of us the political difficulty of a Reserve call-up. I would only say two things:

- Nothing you could do would more seriously impress Hanoi that the jig was up;
- We owe you a first-class rationale for it, which our people would accept, and which I shall try to outline roughly in the course of this paper.

Argument

4. There are certain aspects of Bob's paper with which I agree:

- I do not believe the best use of our forces is to invade Cambodia or Laos. Nor should we decide now to invade the southern part of North Viet Nam to cut infiltration routes. I would, however, like you to be in a position so that you might have the latter option next year, if necessary; for example, if they bring several more divisions down to the DMZ area.
- I also agree that we should not make our plans on the assumption that we are going to blockade the North Vietnamese ports and try to interdict the rail and road lines to China.
- I agree we should concentrate hard on how to interdict the southern part of North Viet Nam; Laos; and the flows from Cambodia. In particular, we need a special interdiction conference -- perhaps at Honolulu -- to see what the operational people have learned and what we can do better in this field. The reason: each part of the job is in the hands of a somewhat different group. Each group has been improving; but no one has looked at the over-all pattern of infiltration, examined the lessons and possibilities of last year's experience: the naval blockade; straight across the DMZ; Laos; and Cambodia.

5. My view would differ from Bob's in these respects:

- Like him, I do not wish to see progressive and mindless escalation of the bombing in the Hanoi-Haiphong area; but I am anxious that we not take the heat off that area without an adequate return and would, therefore, like to see continuance of a selective attack based on an examination of what we have achieved thus far and a reexamination of targets.

5/20/67

-- I believe we could use more troops in Viet Nam, but for a purpose different from that suggested by the JCS and which Bob does not address. As I understand the problem of pacification, there are two levels: the provision at the hamlet and village level of sustained security -- almost wholly a Vietnamese job; and the destruction of the provincial main force units. It is my impression, from a considerable distance, that where we have done best -- in II and III Corps -- U. S. forces have, in certain provinces, either destroyed or driven into the hills the provincial VC battalions, permitting the South Vietnamese to begin to put pressure on and even mop up guerrillas at the local level.

Before deciding how much extra manpower we needed, I should very much like to ask Westy, Abrams, and Komer how much U. S. military manpower they could use to accelerate the pacification process by expanded attack on these provincial main force units.

I attach (Tab A) a report by General DePuy on Revolutionary Development which makes this point better than I have ever seen it on paper. I commend it to you. DePuy had a distinguished combat record in Viet Nam. The following is his central conclusion:

"It is perfectly clear that progress in Revolutionary Development in large measure can be equated directly to the scope and pace of US/Free World Forces Operations against provincial VC forces contiguous to those areas in which Revolutionary Development activities are in progress. This is not a surprising phenomenon but it is an important one in assessing the prospects for RD progress and in calculating US/Free World Force requirements. The greatest RD progress up to November 1966 was made in Quang Nam Province where the III MAF mounted sustained offensive operations against VC provincial forces as well as main forces; in Binh Dinh Province where ROK Forces have done likewise; in Phu Yen because of operations of the 101st Airborne Brigade; in Binh Thuan Province because of the 1st Division; in Hau Nghia Province because of the 25th Division and in Tay Ninh Province because of the sustained operations of the II Field Force combat elements.

"In those provinces in which Vietnamese forces have had the responsibility for both the security of RD cadre and for sustained offensive operations against VC provincial forces, progress has been very modest or non-existent. In those provinces where US/Free World forces have diminished or discontinued offensive operations against VC provincial forces because of participation in long-term offensive operations against the VC/NVA main forces in the war zones and along the borders, there has been a marked adverse impact on Revolutionary Development."

5/20/67

6. It should also be noted that when U. S. forces operate in a province side by side with the ARVN, the ARVN begins to shape up. It's partly example; partly better logistical assistance; partly a greater willingness to take U. S. advice if we have troops fighting in a province as well as advisers.

7. The other potential use for additional manpower is to get enough men in I Corps so that infiltration across the DMZ and harassing attacks of the kind they are now mounting will not be profitable. When the barrier is in, we may need fewer men to achieve this result. In conception we might look to the creation of an "international peace force" simply to make the 17th parallel stick. I Corps is short of manpower to deal with the DMZ, provincial main forces and pacification. A rough indication of how short is this rough table developed from Bob's Attachment 1.

Proportion Allied Forces to VC/DRV by Corps Areas

I Corps	3.3
II Corps	5.3
III Corps	4.6
IV Corps*	2.2

*There are only 12,000 U. S. forces in IV Corps, and no DRV forces. It is, essentially, a VC-GVN stand-off which might best be resolved politically when we block infiltration better, control the DMZ, and drive forward pacification in III, II, and I Corps.

It would take another 100,000 men in I Corps to provide the 5/1 proportion we roughly now have in II and III Corps.

8. Finally, I think it would be unwise for us to go into the 1967-68 shooting season without some forces in reserve. It would be tempting to try to get men for the purposes I have indicated by opting for the third column in Bob McNamara's attachment 3; that is, scraping together an extra 115,000 without calling Reserves. But the enemy would surely know that we had scraped the barrel up to the call-up limit. They are very conscious of our manpower problem, as the speech by the North Vietnamese Brigadier General I sent up the other day indicated. You may recall he said:

"But it will be an arduous problem when you try to keep the United States of America on a normal peacetime footing while you are fighting a war involving nearly half a million men. Now that the problem cannot be solved with these existing half million troops, the question is whether to bring in more troops or not and if they continue to bring in more and more troops, where will they lead the United States of America? That is the problem to be solved concerning troop strength."

5/20/67

The enemy might, therefore, be tempted to bring down a few extra divisions and increase the strain across the DMZ, if we didn't have reserves available.

9. What has impressed and worried me more than almost anything else in our recent discussions of manpower is the length of time required from Reserve call-up to having effective forces in the field. If you want Reserves in 1968, you must decide soon. Again: I would not envisage using these forces for thrusts into Cambodia or Laos. I would not now recommend an invasion of the southern part of North Viet Nam; but I feel it unwise to fight a war fight up against the manpower ceiling -- with a long delay involved -- if they should try to escalate a notch further.

10. Finally, those thoroughly professional men in Hanoi would, I believe, be profoundly impressed by a call-up. They would know that even if you did not use much of that call-up immediately, you were in a position to deal with whatever manpower requirements emerged.

11. For all these reasons, then, I have a feeling that it would be wise to have some sort of Reserve call-up this summer if you judge it politically possible.

12. A Rationale.

I have been trying to think of how you might present the case for a call-up to, say, a Joint Session of the Congress and to the nation. These are the four elements that would have to be explained, as I see them.

a. The Enemy's Strategy.

In 1964, amidst the political disarray in South Viet Nam, he sought straightforward military victory in South Viet Nam. He began bringing in NVN forces almost a year before we began to bomb the North. Our actions between February 1965 and, say, October 1966 frustrated that offensive which had almost succeeded. We then tried between November 1966 and February 1967 to negotiate an end to the war. He refused and adopted a new strategy. That strategy is to:

-- harass SVN pacification efforts and the drive to Constitutional government;

-- use the DMZ illegally to maintain pressure on us and to limit the forces available for pacification;

-- buy time until the will and capacity of the United States are broken.

5/20/67

b. Their View of the U. S.

Here I would use quotations -- and there are many -- to indicate that, having failed to achieve military victory, they are testing the will and capacity of the U. S. They do not believe we can sustain this kind of grueling war. They are still looking for a French outcome. One of the best quotations is this, referring to Soviet and Eastern European advice:

"Many people in the world are advising us to accept the conditions offered by the Americans. They say that our victories are already more than enough; that it is difficult to knock down the Americans. It is impossible for us to surrender. These people are too subjective. They are afraid of the Americans. They over-estimate the American potential. They over-estimate the American spirit. They are sincere when they advise us. They advise us in good faith. But we know by experience how things really are."

c. Their View of Negotiations.

I would repeat that we have said "yes" 37 times, and they have said "no"; but then go on to explain why they say "no." It is because they still believe in military victory; and they think in the end we will cave. Here is an example of the kind of quotation that might be helpful:

"First of all, what is the basic problem for us? Our basic intention is to win militarily. We use military victories as decisive factors to end the present conflict. We want to end the war through military victories and not peace negotiations.... And what is our concept of peace? To have peace, for us, is to have the Americans withdraw and the National Liberation Front accepted as the only organization which truly represents the /South/ Vietnam people. Someone asked Chairman Ho Chi Minh: 'What do you think of the Saigon Government?' The Chairman's answer is definitive: 'There is no Government in Saigon. There is only a clique of US lackeys in Saigon.' Then, you understand easily that negotiations are not possible."

d. Our Strategy.

We shall:

- reduce to the maximum their illegal infiltration and impose a price for aggression in the North;
- protect the 17th Parallel from invasion;
- support the South Vietnamese pacification effort;
- encourage the movement to Constitutional government;
- encourage the process of reconciliation in the South;

5/20/67

- seek a negotiated end to the war at the earliest date on the principles of the 1954 and 1962 Accords and of South Vietnamese self-determination.

To do these things we need more troops, notably because of their DMZ strategy and the threat that they might put more of their forces into an invasion across the DMZ. We have already had to pull some of our forces from II and III Corps, where they helped provide a security framework for pacification. We want them to know that whatever they choose to do about the DMZ we shall be prepared; and we wish to support pacification.

It should also be recalled that success in other guerrilla wars required the government side to put in the field 10 times as many troops -- or more -- than the guerrillas. That is because the government must build and defend what it has built, whereas the guerrilla only destroys. We are achieving progress at less than 4 to 1 (1092 thousand to 284 thousand) because of our air power, fire power, and mobility. The people of South Viet Nam are doing their part to the full; and they have other allies who (hopefully) are also increasing their contributions of manpower to meet this situation.

In short, the provision of this manpower is a test of the proposition on which the men in Hanoi are ~~losing~~ ^{losing} their calculations; whether the U.S. has the potential and the spirit to see this through.

Not only Hanoi but the emerging New Asia is watching our decision -- hundreds of millions of people whose future hopes and commitments are rooted in the proposition that we shall see it through.

13. Conclusion

In short, like Bob, I believe our basic strategy should be mainly internal to South Viet Nam so far as ground forces are concerned; but

- I would leave more room for bombing the Hanoi-Haiphong area;
- I sense that we need more manpower to support pacification in the provinces and to man the DMZ. To establish whether this is so should be Bus and Bob's main task on their June trip;
- I believe you should go into 1968 with some reserve forces in hand.

W. W. R.

Pres file~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, May 20, 1967 -- 12:10 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Bob McNamara agrees with
Sen. Brooke.

I shall tell Bob of our cables to Bunker
and Ky's response.

I shall also invite Sen. Brooke in early
next week.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1977
By RL, NARA, Date 5-8-91

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

20 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You asked for my comments on Senator Brooks' letter of May 19.

The essence of Senator Brooks' proposal, using his own words, is as follows:

1. "We and our allies [may not have] appreciated the possible advantages we would derive from seeking negotiations exclusively among the South Vietnamese."
2. "For the first time we may be witnessing the emergence of a South Vietnamese government competent enough, and confident enough of its standing in the country to deal politically with the Viet Cong."
3. "I am not proposing an offer of a coalition government." . . . I am suggesting "terms on which [individual] members of the National Liberation Front could take part in the nation's political life. As a mutual face-saving device, perhaps a 'National Reconciliation Front' could be created as a legitimate political organization for former members of the NLF who abandoned guerrilla warfare for political competition. . . . The program might include appointment to important political office of one or more rehabilitated members of the NLF."
4. "The question of the timing [of such a move] is critical. I suspect that the most opportune moment may come after the elections this fall."
5. "Although I am skeptical that anything will come of them, I would favor Saigon extending some hidden feelers to the NLF even before the fall elections."

Brooks' proposals are almost identical to those which I suggested in the Draft Memorandum submitted to you yesterday. In that memorandum I stated we should, following the September elections, "move the newly elected Saigon government well beyond its National Reconciliation Program to a political settlement with the non-communist members of the NLF . . . to try to arrange a cease fire and to reach an accommodation with the large number of South Vietnamese who are under the VC banner; to accept the non-communist members of the NLF as members of an opposition political party and, if necessary, to accept their individual participation in the national government . . . in sum, a settlement to transform the members of the VC from military opponents to political opponents."

Needless to say, although my proposal is almost identical, word for word, with that of Brooks, I have not discussed any part of my paper or any of my ideas with him.


Robert S. McNamara

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-475
By ing, NARA, Date 12-24-91

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

May 19, 1967

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am taking the liberty of writing to you privately about some aspects of the Vietnamese situation which I deem prudent to discuss in confidence. I know that you are often overwhelmed by the volume of advice you receive from all quarters, but I hope you will find it helpful to have the independent views of someone who, having no direct responsibility for current policy or operations, has tried to give some fresh thought to the present circumstances and impending alternatives in Vietnam. It seems to me that an occasional, brief letter, by obliging me to put my thoughts into precise language, may be the most useful and economical way to communicate with you on sensitive matters.

My discussions with many knowledgeable people here and in Southeast Asia have given me the impression that we may be discounting one of the most attractive opportunities to move toward an acceptable settlement. In particular I wonder if we and our allies appreciate the possible advantages we would derive from seeking negotiations exclusively among

the South Vietnamese. Let me explain what I have in mind and review the considerations which lead me to believe we should explore this possibility.

Admitting that no one has a clear notion of how the leaders in Hanoi are thinking, I see no real prospect for satisfactory negotiations with them. (Nor do I have much hope for a resurrected Geneva Conference; the larger issues between ourselves and the Chinese might well swamp such a forum.)

I do not believe that Hanoi will publicly acknowledge its dominant role in the war or accept the humiliation of coming to the conference table in circumstances which appear to signal its defeat. It is not the North Vietnamese's only reason for resisting negotiations, but the fierceness of their pride is certainly one major impediment to a political settlement. They may also be genuinely apprehensive about what the Chinese will do if Hanoi gives signs of abandoning the struggle.

Given this context, and especially the possibility that Hanoi's concern for its prestige is a principal obstacle to settling the war, the best chance for an early and equitable peace may lie in exploiting the existence of the National Liberation Front so as to help Ho Chi Minh and his associates

May 19, 1967

save face. By doing so I believe we can make it relatively easier for the other side to turn off the war.

It is evident that the United States itself cannot make a direct approach to the N.L.F. Since the purpose of any such effort would be to localize and disengage the South Vietnamese issues from the international complications in which they are now submerged, the Saigon government would have to take the initiative. This is a point of view, I may note, for which there is substantial sentiment in the South Vietnamese Constituent Assembly. Moreover, for the first time we may be witnessing the emergence of a South Vietnamese government competent enough, and confident enough of its standing in the country, to deal politically with the Vietcong.

The logic of the case seems compelling:

Assuming that Hanoi completely controls the N.L.F. and hence any negotiations by the Front, it could effectively terminate the hostilities without complete loss of face or betrayal of its own avowed nationalism; from our standpoint such negotiations need not involve a significant legitimization of the N.L.F. if they can be arranged in secret and merely on a de facto basis. On the other hand, if there are elements of the Front which are not totally subservient to Hanoi, any negotia-

tions offer promise of weaning them away from the North Vietnamese; that in its own right would be a major accomplishment for our side and might accelerate progress toward a final settlement.

I recognize that this general sketch leaves unresolved many specific questions concerning such negotiations. Allow me to comment on some of the more important ones.

What kind of inducements should Saigon offer the Front? I am not proposing an offer of a coalition government. It might be sufficient simply to characterize any discussions as an attempt to expand further the policy of national reconciliation. Talks might then center on details of an amnesty agreement and on the terms on which members of the N.L.F. could take part in the nation's political life. As a mutual face-saving device, perhaps a "National Reconciliation Front" could be created as a legitimate political organization for former members of the N.L.F. who abandon guerilla warfare for political competition. A more generous posture on the part of the Saigon regime, still shy of a coalition government, might include appointment to important political office of one or more rehabilitated members of the N.L.F. or some other figures approved by both sides to the discussions. The possible inducements are many. Obviously they would be

the subject of hard bargaining in the negotiations and no one could spell them out definitively ahead of time.

When should Saigon make the proposed approach to the N.L.F.? The question of timing is critical. I suspect that the most opportune moment may come after the elections this fall. A new government in Saigon with a relatively greater popular mandate than its predecessors may be in a position to make a fresh effort to entice the Vietcong away from the battlefield. But this opportunity will be seriously impaired if the election seems only to place a mantle of legitimacy on the junta now in power. The most powerful argument against the presidential candidacy of Premier Ky or General Thieu is that, as symbols of the military emphasis in past policy, their election would deny the new regime a clean start and make it more difficult for the N.L.F. to discuss a compromise peace. Although I do not question the necessity for Ky and other members of the present junta to play important roles in the future government, it would be invaluable for the new president to be a civilian.

However, even if a military man wins the presidency, one may hope for a civilian premier and I imagine that one can count on an assembly more sympathetic than the generals to approaches to the N.L.F. In such a situation it may still

May 19, 1967

be possible for Ky or Thieu, by working through some of the more moderate civilians, to make overtures to the Front; in addition the new president could defend such overtures against the predictable opposition of some military officers by stressing the legislature's pressure for negotiation (and perhaps the fact that the United States agrees with the assembly).

Although I am skeptical that anything will come of them, I would favor Saigon extending some hidden feelers to the N.L.F. even before the fall elections. Some members of the Front may calculate that the elections will be successful in launching a new and stable political system; if so they may see an incentive to get aboard as soon as possible.

They may feel that their bargaining position is better now than it will be after the election. There are dangers in early discussions but I think that we and our South Vietnamese allies should be willing to risk them.

In light of the bitter divisions among the South Vietnamese, how can we persuade the Saigon government to undertake political contacts with the National Liberation Front? I understand the profound hatred between the Front and those with whom we are associated, and I know that it is reciprocated. I am not certain the effort suggested here can be successful.

but I think it should be made. There are potential intermediaries among the Assembly members who might be able to initiate fruitful discussions along the lines I have discussed. I believe we should lend our support to such an enterprise.

We should make clear to the South Vietnamese leaders that the radical changes in the military and political situation justify and demand a willingness to conduct secret negotiations with elements of the Front. An approach to the N.L.F. would be testimony to the strength and self-confidence of the country's developing political structure. With the present American commitment to South Vietnam, and the evolution toward a representative government, there is no longer reason to fear that merely to talk with the N.L.F. will bring the collapse of Saigon. This is not to say that one should advertise such talks. There is an obvious preference for quiet, off-the-record exchanges, in order to avoid arousing undue expectations or generating pressures on the Saigon government to grant drastic concessions.

Now that we have demonstrated that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese will not be permitted to seize power by force, the fundamental need is to experiment with various schemes to help them get off the hook. The fiction of N.L.F. independence may prove valuable in this respect. In pointing this out to the South Vietnamese military, I believe we can


May 19, 1967

properly emphasize that, as measured by the private convictions of Assembly delegates and such other information as the Columbia Broadcasting System's recent poll of South Vietnamese public opinion, popular sentiment in the country would welcome efforts to deal directly with the Front. I have no doubt that Ambassador Bunker could exert very constructive influence on this matter.

I appreciate your readiness to consider these judgments and perspectives on the Vietnamese predicament and I trust you will not think me presumptuous in transmitting my thoughts to you on this grave and pressing problem. Please do not feel obliged to respond in writing or otherwise.

I continue to pray that you will have divine guidance in your awesome duties.

Respectfully yours,



Edward W. Brooke

EWB/np

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-470
By cg, NARA, Date 7-24-95

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, May 20, 1967 -- 11:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Taylor raises a real and serious problem.

We thought we had it solved with the Schelling appointment -- after great delay. But he's bailed out.

Gene tells me he has recommended Franklin Lindsay for the Schelling job; but action apparently awaits Nick's return.

I believe it essential that Sec. Rusk understand your personal concern that NSAM 341 has not been effectively implemented.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

51a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-470

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 17, 1967

By CG, NARA, Date 7-24-95

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Implementation of NSAM-341, dated March 2, 1966

Shortly after my return from Saigon in 1965, you directed me to review all governmental activities in the field of counterinsurgency and to make appropriate recommendations to assure our readiness to cope with other situations similar to that in South Viet-Nam. The principal outcome of this review was the promulgation of NSAM-341 in March, 1966.

The effect of this decision on your part was to assign responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision of overseas interdepartmental activities to the Secretary of State as your agent who was to be assisted by the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) chaired by the Under Secretary of State and including as members the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Administrator, AID, Chairman, JCS, Director, USIA, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The SIG was to absorb the responsibility in the field of counterinsurgency which, since 1962, had been concentrated in the Special Group (CI) and, in addition, was to serve as a focal point for decisions on all important interdepartmental matters arising overseas.

During the past year, I have naturally watched the implementation of this decision with great interest, hoping that the procedures directed by NSAM-341 would bring method and flexibility into the conduct of our overseas business and remove our dependence on the initiative of individual officials or on ad hoc committees which, in the past, have often been improvised to deal with critical overseas issues.

I regret to say that it is my opinion as a bystander that the SIG and the supporting interdepartmental committees at the level of the Assistant Secretaries of State have not fulfilled the hopes which we had for them more than a year ago. Far from being a forum regularly used by senior officials to discharge expeditiously their interrelated overseas problems, the SIG has met with decreasing frequency during the last year. In the last six months of 1966, the SIG met three times and has met only twice in 1967. It is significant that it has taken no part in the conduct of our most serious and complicated overseas operation--Viet-Nam. I find little indication on the agenda of its infrequent meetings of any serious attention to counterinsurgency and matters related to "Wars of Liberation," a task which required almost weekly meetings on the part of the old Special Group (CI). My overall impression is that the intent of NSAM-341 has been only partially fulfilled and that whatever vitality the new system had at the outset is apparently on the decline.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Rather than allow the NSAM concept to die from atrophy as it seems to be doing, I would suggest at least one final look to see whether we should formally abandon it, try again to set it in motion, or seek a better alternative. There are several courses you might consider. (1) One would be to ask the heads of all departments and agencies represented on the SIG to comment to you on the effectiveness of the NSAM-341 concept, the desirability of its retention, and the possibility for improved implementation. (2) Another would be to ask only the Secretary of State to make such a report. (3) A third would be to ask some outsider with government experience to review the situation for you. Personally, I would be inclined to recommend the first course with Walt Rostow charged with getting the views of the SIG members.

I prepared a memorandum for you of this nature in March of this year but withheld it because of information which I had received that Dr. Tom Schelling of Harvard was being sought by State to become an Assistant Secretary with the primary mission of assisting in the implementation of NSAM-341. As I am now informed that Dr. Schelling has declined the position, I would feel remiss in not calling this situation to your attention.

Maxwell D. Taylor

Alternative _____ approved

No action now _____

See me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-470
By clb, NARA, Date 7-24-95

52
WWR
1. summary
2. Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 20, 1967; 11:00 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for your Meeting with Dutch Foreign Minister
Joseph Luns, 12 noon, Monday, May 22.

Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns will call on you at noon on Monday. (He comes to Washington from EXPO '67.) You last saw him in February, 1966. He is a good friend, a strong supporter of NATO, and has often publicly backed us on Vietnam. (A short biographic sketch is attached. As you will recall, he is quite a talker.)

Talking Points

(1) The Vice President's Trip.

- We are grateful for the reception given Vice President Humphrey by Queen Juliana and the Netherlands Government.

(2) Common Market.

- I understand that you will go to the EEC Summit in Rome later this month.
- I want to assure you that we continue our strong support for a more united and broader Europe.
- We welcome the UK application for EEC membership. This is a healthy step that will benefit both the UK and the Common Market. (You may want to ask Luns for his views on de Gaulle's recent press conference and how it will affect the British application.)

(3) Kennedy Round.

- I am pleased with the outcome of the Kennedy Round, and appreciate the very helpful role the Dutch Government played in the councils of the EEC.

(4) International Money.

- This remains an important item on the economic agenda; the negotiations are reaching a critical stage. We must agree on a contingency plan for a new reserve asset by the September Bank-Fund meeting in Rio. We cannot let one or two countries stand

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

in the way. We are grateful for the position the Dutch Government took at the Munich meeting of the EEC Finance Ministers.

(5) Vietnam.

(Mr. President: Luns will see U Thant later in the week. You may, therefore, want to talk to him about our efforts to get to the negotiating table, and thank him for the support he has given us in Holland.)

Points Luns May Raise.

- (1) Nuclear Submarines. (Luns may ask about the long-standing Dutch request for help in their nuclear submarine program.--He has already raised the issue with the Vice President. We have not been able to help because of objections from Rickover and the Joint Committee.)

-- You may wish to say that the Vice President has reported to *you* on the Dutch request. You understand that it is being looked at within the Government, but this is a very difficult problem for us.

- (2) KLM Landing Rights. (The Dutch have asked for additional landing rights in the U.S., although they already get much more out of the US-Dutch air agreement than we do. Luns also raised this issue with the Vice President when he saw him.)

-- You may wish to say that you can't offer much encouragement. To grant the Dutch request would give KLM additional economic benefits without compensating benefits to US companies.

* * * * *

Luns will be accompanied by Dutch Ambassador Schurmann and State's France/Benelux Country Director, Bob Anderson. I will also plan to sit in.

Francis M. Bator

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-470
By cb, NARA, Date 7-24-95

53
Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, May 20, 1967 -- 9:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

You asked that I let you see the memorandum I did for Sec. Rusk on November 28, 1962 when Mikoyan was in town after the Cuba missile crisis.

I also made it available to President Kennedy via Mrs. Lincoln. That was the channel by which he indicated I should communicate directly with him. I did not talk with him personally about it.

Reading it over now makes me a little sad. At that time:

- the infiltration rate was about 500 per month;
- VC main force units totaled only 20,000, as opposed to 62,000 now;
- there were no North Vietnamese military units in the south; and
- above all, as indicated in the last paragraph, we were on a curve of improvement during 1962.

What then happened, of course, was that the political situation deteriorated in the spring of 1963 and continued to fall apart. Hanoi, greatly heartened by this turn of events, decided in 1964 to open the trails into roads; shift over to heavy weapons imported from other Communist countries; increase radically the VC main force units; and bring into South Viet Nam North Vietnamese military units. These things they did in the first half of 1964, yielding a rapid expansion in their military effort and a progressive deterioration in the position of the South Vietnamese.

Then, at the very edge of defeat early in 1965, we had to meet a much bigger threat at a moment just short of defeat against the background of almost two years of political unraveling inside South Viet Nam.

But better late than never.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

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S/P Chow

DECLASSIFIED

COPY NO. 8

of 9 copies

Handwritten notes: 1 - ... 2 - ... 3 - ...

November 28, 1962

~~SECRET~~

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: S/P - W. W. Rostow
SUBJECT: Mikoyan, the Laos Agreement, and Continued Infiltration Into South Viet Nam.

The President's and your conversations with Mikoyan offer an opportunity to raise the question of continued Communist infiltration into South Viet Nam via Laos, as well as the problem of the continued Viet Minh presence in Laos.

You will recall that in the course of the Geneva conference Pushkin agreed with Governor Harriman that the Soviet Union would take responsibility for ending infiltration into Viet Nam via Laos. There is no question but that such infiltration continues. The order of magnitude is debatable; but the most responsible estimate runs at something like the rate of 500 per month.

This is a very significant figure for three reasons.

First, one must multiply by 15 or 20 to measure the burden of each guerrilla on the Viet Nam establishment. Roughly and conservatively speaking, a rate of infiltration of this magnitude sets up a requirement on the Vietnamese side of an extra 7500 soldiers a month, or the equivalent in improved efficiency. Casualties imposed on the Viet Cong can limit this burden, but it should not be regarded as trivial.

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 87-91

By JOW/isp, NARA, Date 8/25/92

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Second, the infiltrators are well trained cadres who form the bone structure of the Viet Cong effort, the bulk of whose membership (perhaps 70%) are recruited in South Viet Nam itself. The infiltrators are, therefore, disproportionately valuable to the Viet Cong.

Third, this continued flow, symbolizing the continued North Vietnamese responsibility and backing for the Viet Cong effort, is an exceedingly important morale factor within the Viet Cong movement.

On the whole, the position in South Viet Nam has been slowly improving; but there is no sign of an early end of the war so long as this illegal burden is accepted.

As many of us have emphasized, more had to be done and has to be done by the South Vietnamese and by ourselves in political, economic, as well as in military terms in order to liquidate the Viet Cong operation which embraces about 20,000 troops; but the continued acceptance of the infiltration burden is capable of prolonging the war for a very long time. It is, in fact, very likely that this is Ho Chi Minh's objective. A recent interview with the men in Hanoi (by Bernard Fall) underlines their faith that the U.S. will wear out in its support of South Viet Nam in time.

Before he left for India Governor Harriman urged us to keep the Viet Minh issue -- and continued Viet Cong infiltration -- at the top of the post-Cuba negotiating agenda with the Russians. In addition to raising the matter with Mikoyan, I believe it important that we begin to plan a serious politico-military scenario designed to force the issue of infiltration. What follows is one possible sequence; and I would emphasize strongly that the virtue of raising the matter with Mikoyan does not depend on the acceptability of this particular scenario.

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-3-

The critical elements in a possible scenario -- aside from raising this matter with Mikoyan -- might be the following:

1. An updating of the Jordan report to take into account more recent evidence of Viet Minh infiltration, Hanoi direction and control of the Viet Cong operation, as well as the continued Viet Minh presence in Laos.
2. Vigorous pressure on the ICC to act in the light of this evidence.
3. A lucid warning to Moscow, Peiping and Hanoi that (a) continued infiltration is in violation of international agreement and unacceptable; (b) that we have no designs whatsoever on North Viet Nam; but (c) we intend to take appropriate countermeasures if infiltration does not cease.
4. Informing our major allies that we are not prepared to accept the continued violation of the Laos agreement and that we intend to impose on North Viet Nam limited, appropriate damage, by air and sea action, if infiltration does not cease.
5. A series of military movements in the Southeast Asia area designed both to signal to the other side and, in fact, to put us in a position to deal with any level of reaction which the Communists might mount in response to our operations in North Viet Nam.
6. Simultaneously: (a) the launching, initially at a modest level, of limited air attack on selected North Vietnamese targets (transport and power stations appear the most appropriate because of the possibility of avoiding civilian casualties); and (b) taking our case to the United Nations.
7. At the United Nations we would present our evidence on the continued violation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords; reassert our willingness to return to the position

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SECRET

-4-

defined by the 1954 Accords in Viet Nam; and the Laos agreement of 1962; but would require quite massive United Nations inspection of infiltration routes to guarantee an ending of infiltration before we would call off our operation.

8. The essence of the matter appears to me to be this:

a. The Soviets are not assuming their responsibilities under the Geneva agreement, after the passage of enough time for us to be clear that this is either a willful act or a lack of capacity to impose their position on Ho Chi Minh;

b. We are continuing to accept on our side of the truce lines of the cold war a serious illegal act at a place where U.S. prestige and interests are heavily committed;

c. Although no such scenario should be set in motion unless we are clear that we are prepared to back our play to the limit, the whole lesson of the cold war, including the recent Cuban crisis, is that the Communists do not escalate in response to our actions taken to preserve our position on our side of the truce lines of the cold war.

9. It is not wholly irrelevant that the President will face a difficult problem in 1964 if some 10,000 U.S. forces are still engaged in Viet Nam with the end of the war not in sight; moreover, it is much better to put pressure on now, against the background of recent Vietnamese progress, than in a waning situation.

SECRET

PRESERVATION COPY

54

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, May 20, 1967
9:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the Counselor of the
British Embassy (John Killick) advises
us as to how to handle Brown and
Wilson: smack between the eyes.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-55
By CG, NARA Date 8-4-99

55

LOU

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres. file

Saturday, May 20, 1967
9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

You may be interested to see how
Amb. Bunker handled this special
backgrounder on May 19.

W. W. Rostow

LOU

6 sections ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 26156

Cy5 54a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

NODIS

DATE: May 17, 1967

SUBJECT: UK East of Suez - Forthcoming Wilson Visit

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. John E. Killick, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Politico-Military Affairs

COPIES TO: S
S/S
EA - Messrs. Bundy/Berger
DOD - Secretary of Defense
White House - Mr. Rostow
G/PM

Embassy London
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 98-237
By is, NARA Date 5-17-99

In a private conversation after dinner at my home last evening, Killick commented that the texts of Secretary Rusk's two recent communications to Foreign Secretary Brown "had now been received by Embassy Washington." Killick said the messages were "damn good," laid the U.S. position "on the line" and, as far as he was concerned, were "absolutely right." He continued that the Foreign Office and MOD were "starting to move" on the professional level to be responsive to the U.S. position. It was essential that the U.S. "not let down anyplace along the line" but critically important that the President "absolutely knock the pants off" Wilson when the PM comes over in June. "No one," he said, seems to know what actually transpired between the President and PM in Bonn so it was "all the more important that the President really hit Wilson hard."

Killick recalled that Embassy Washington had warned George Brown that the Administration felt very strongly about a British presence in the Far East, especially in relation to U.S. problems in Vietnam. However, Brown had gone home from the recent SEATO meeting and said that "the Americans hadn't reacted too strongly" to Brown's announcement of British intentions. "So you see," Killick finished, "you have to hit these guys--who are used to rough and tumble--smack between the eyes."

PRESS RELEASE

May 20, 1967

The United States Delegation to EXPO '67, Montreal, on May 25, United States National Day at EXPO, will be led by The Honorable Lawrence F. O'Brien, Postmaster General, and will include Senator John J. Sparkman, of Alabama; Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, of Iowa; Representative Thomas E. Morgan, of Pennsylvania; Representative Frances P. Bolton, of Ohio; Representative Thaddeus J. Dulski, of New York; Representative Robert J. Corbett, of Pennsylvania; and Representative Silvio O. Conte, of Massachusetts. The United States Ambassador to Canada, The Honorable W. Walton Butterworth; The Honorable Leonard H. Marks, Director of the United States Information Agency; and the United States Commissioner-General to the Canadian World Exhibition, The Honorable Stanley R. Tupper, will also be members of the Delegation.

It should also be noted that the Joint Canada-United States Cabinet Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs will be meeting in Montreal on June 20-22 at the invitation of the Government of Canada. Cabinet members attending that meeting will also visit EXPO '67.

The President would like very much to visit Canada ~~at a time when~~

time when arrangements ~~be~~ will permit.

He will do this at any

*(as changed
by President)*

Pres file~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, May 19, 1967
7:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

This is a nice end to a move
initiated by you at the Latin American
Summit.

W. W. Rostow

Caracas 6116

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 5-9-91

57a

CONFIDENTIAL

Caracas 6116, May 18, 1967

**SUBJECT: U. S. - Venezuela Agreement on Equipment for Venezuelan
Cazadores Battalions**

All letters of offer re Cazadores equipment signed this date by Col. Ordonez, J-4 Ministry of Defense for Government of Venezuela, and Col. Scott, USA, Army Materiel Command, for U. S. Government. Signing went smoothly and Venezuelans continue to applaud swift response of U. S. Government to President Leoni's request for equipment. This fulsome gratitude was made especially manifest at a party given last night by Zapata Luigi, President of Defense Committee, House of Parliament. During this party Gen. Riquez Iribarren, Chairman of Joint Staff, congratulated Chief, U. S. Army Section, Military Group, on splendid job done by all U. S. representatives, both local and those sent from Washington, in expediting swift action to respond to Venezuela's needs. Gen. Riquez has been an outspoken critic of U. S. Military Assistance to Venezuela and has rarely expressed himself positively about anything the U. S. does.

I wish to reiterate my satisfaction previously expressed for a job well done by all U. S. participants and for support both at the Washington and U. S. Southern Command levels. The importance of our successful response to Leoni's request cannot be underestimated and will most surely facilitate U. S. - Venezuelan relations across the board.

Bernbaum

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-474
By ju, NARA, Date 5-19-92

CONFIDENTIAL

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Friday - May 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Situation

This is in response to your concern over how things are going in the Dominican Republic.

The Background

Up until March 21 -- when unknown assailants tried to kill Imbert -- Balaguer was making slow but steady progress in consolidating his political position. Months of relative stability had given the business community a new confidence and the economy was starting to gather some momentum.

Since March, the political and economic climate has changed and Balaguer's position weakened. Failure to solve the Imbert case -- followed by a series of other murders and attempted murders -- has made the public apprehensive. The economic sector is uneasy and cautious. And anti-Balaguer elements on the right and left have launched a campaign to pin the "Trujillista" label on him. As might be expected the PRD is in the forefront of this effort.

Balaguer's Strengths and Weaknesses

Balaguer's situation is not critical, but his hold has been shaken. He still has going for him:

- the support of most Dominicans who long for tranquillity.
- basic military support.
- our strong backing.
- confidence in himself.

Working against him are:

- his vulnerability to the "Trujillista" charge because of certain elements around him.

~~SECRET~~

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-2-

- his lack of political sophistication in dealing with the non-communist opposition.
- the violence which continues to plague the country.
- his inability to delegate authority and the poor management capacity of his administration .
- a difficult balance of payments and fiscal situation.

What we can do

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

I met with the Dominican Review Group (Gordon, Vance, [REDACTED], Kohler and Ambassador Crimmins) two weeks ago to review the situation. We agreed on a set of short-term courses of action (copy attached) which Crimmins is carrying out.

The most important of these is to persuade Balaguer to curb terrorism and restore public confidence. He has taken two steps in this direction:

- a strong public statement that he will not tolerate terrorism and will take energetic measures to stamp it out, and
- appointment of a high level committee to make a thorough investigation of the National Police Force, which is suspect of being involved in some of the terrorism. (Unfortunately, Balaguer did not include distinguished people from outside the government -- another example of his lack of political judgment.

Ambassador Garcia Godoy called on Bill Bowdler Wednesday evening prior to going to Santo Domingo. He too was concerned about trends. He will talk to Balaguer about political strategy in dealing with terrorism. He will also try to persuade the PRD to moderate its opposition. Bill encouraged him to do this. Garcia Godoy said he would give us his impressions as soon as he got back. He expressed deep appreciation for your action on a special sugar quota for the DR. He noted that this strong US support for Balaguer would be a stabilizing factor.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

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Dominican Republic: Short Term Courses of Action

1. Continue to impress upon Balaguer and key leaders of the Government the necessity of an effective, loyal political organization as a base of support for the Government now and in the 1968 elections.

- Assist the PR (preferably in technical terms) in constructing a going-grass-roots political organization.

2. Continue to press Balaguer to enter into reasonable relations with the non-Communist opposition, especially that on the left, recognizing that for political and personal reasons Balaguer will probably want to move cautiously.

- Continue to urge Balaguer to assure that basic political liberties of non-Communist parties and individuals are respected by security forces and to take and to publicize disciplinary actions against violators of this policy .
- Continue to urge Balaguer to establish an effective and highly viable mechanism to receive and evaluate complaints against improper actions by the security forces.
- Continue to urge Balaguer to respond effectively to valid opposition criticisms.
- Continue to urge Balaguer to respond more positively and definitively to the PRSC in its "constructive" opposition.
- Continue to urge Balaguer to explore honestly the possibilities of a reasonable modus vivendi with the PRD.

3. Continue to encourage the PRSC in its position of constructive opposition.

- Encourage the BRUC in its efforts to gain control of the currently Communist-led Student Federation at the University.
- Encourage the PRSC to stand independently in the 1968 elections on a platform of constructive opposition.
- Increase our and AIFLD contacts with CASC (Social Christian Labor Confederation).
- Intensify exchange programs involving PRSC elements.

~~SECRET~~

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-2-

4.

[REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

5.

[REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

6. Assure that all sectors (left, right and military) understand clearly that our basic position is firm support of constitutional government of Balaguer and of firm opposition to attempts to replace it by unconstitutional means.

-- Use appropriate occasions and means (especially economic) to manifest our support of Balaguer.

7. Continue to impress upon Balaguer the desirability of getting rid of negative Trujillista elements in the Government who are liabilities domestically and internationally.

8. Continue to press upon Balaguer the urgent necessity to improve substantially the administrative and technical competence of the Government, particularly in the economic sector, using to the extent possible responsible PRD and PRSC technicians.

9. Continue to provide Balaguer systematically with reliable, unbiased information [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

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~~SECRET~~

-3-

10. Try to keep the Government from pursuing a labor policy which, while designed to reduce Communist influence by increasing Government influence in unions, will alienate non-Communist labor elements and force them into association with extreme left leadership.

May 5, 1967

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-470

~~SECRET~~

By cl, NARA, Date 7-24-95

May 20, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: China Mainland Situation

The political situation throughout the Chinese mainland today is complex and uncertain.

While there is no good evidence that any area is not reasonably well controlled by the central government, Peking press and radio have praised the leadership of only four provinces (Heilungkiang, Shansi, Shantung and Kweichow) and two municipalities (Shanghai and Peking). Peking is pointedly silent about the remaining 22 provinces. Since May 1, Red Guards have reported disorder in five provinces (Szechwan, Tibet, Kansu, Sinkiang and Honan). As a minimum, this suggests that Peking leaders are in serious conflict over the selection of leaders there.

Lurid reports of violence in the provinces, circulated by Red Guards and picked up by the world press, are largely, though by no means entirely, discounted by the intelligence community. Fairly widespread disorder has occurred, but it is suspected that exaggerated reports are issued in order to discredit local officials slated for purge. Communications and transportation services, including those involving the Army, have functioned normally since February, without anomalies attributable to unrest.

The Army has generally responded to central orders since late January, although it has tended to act more in the interest of stability than in support of the Maoists as such.

Mao's "extensive democracy" (turning to the masses for support) has been fairly effective as a weapon of destruction. However, it is at a loss when the time comes to construct a meaningful alternative to the destroyed structure. Unity fostered by targeting conservative "demons" then dissolves into bickering among the leftists over the share of the spoils. Peking has aptly termed this phenomenon "unprincipled 'civil wars.'" The regime has had to resort to increased reliance on the Army and renewed policy emphasis on law and order -- at the expense of Mao's revolutionary objectives. The revolution is in a highly, nervous stalemate.

W. W. Rostow

AJ:mm

~~SECRET~~

60

~~TOP SECRET~~

Meeting With the President
Friday, May 19, 1967, 5:00 p.m.

AGENDA

1. Middle East. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)
 - a. Present situation
 - b. U.S. commitments
 - c. U.S. contingency plans

2. Letter to Kosygin (Sec. Rusk)

Sec. Rusk should have a draft.

3. Bombing Policy. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)
 - a. Hanoi TPP: reattack?
 - b. Alternatives:
 - pause in the North?
 - armed recce?
 - limited fixed targets?
 - c. Diplomacy: What, if anything, to tell the Russians or to negotiate about.

4. Other.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 5-16-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, May 19, 1967
5:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Chancellor Kiesinger
promises a prompt written reply to
your invitation.

W. W. Rostow

Bonn 13879

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Ag, NARA, Date 5-9-91

6/a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Bonn 13879, May 19, 1967, from Amb. McGhee

The Chancellor's office has asked us to communicate to the President the following interim oral message from Kiesinger (in our translation) which it received this morning by telephone call from South Germany:

"The Federal Chancellor thanks the President very much for his letter. He accepts the invitation gladly. He will be happy to visit the United States. As to timing, he asks for understanding that, because intensive preparations for the CDU Party Congress have placed him so much in demand, he cannot definitely express himself at the present moment. He will come to this as quickly as possible and then write a letter to President Johnson."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-474
By ju, NARA, Date 5-19-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, May 19, 1967
3:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the letter to Kosygin,
as revised by Sec. Rusk.

He may have further revisions
at 5:00 p.m.; but he tells me he now
likes it.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 5-9-91

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-470
By cb, NARA, Date 7-24-95

62a

May 19, 1967 -- 2:45 p.m.

DRAFT LETTER TO KOSYGIN

I wish to address you at this time because we appear to be faced by a series of situations which are dangerous in themselves but which, taken together, could seriously impair the interests of our two countries and the attempts which have been made on both sides to improve our relations.

I would wish you to consider if -- whatever our differences -- our common interests do not now require concerted or parallel action to bring these situations under control.

First, Viet Nam. There the increasingly large scale of North Vietnamese forces through the DMZ, the increased use of Laotian territory for the movement of men and arms to the south, and the growing use of Cambodian territory by the forces of North Viet Nam create dangers of widening the already dangerous hostilities in Southeast Asia. Secretary Rusk has recently written Mr. Gromyko about Laos and our desire to see the Accords of 1962 fully carried out. As you know, we have repeatedly affirmed that we consider the Accords of 1964 as an adequate basis for peace insofar as North and South Viet Nam are concerned. Further, we have urged that international action be taken to assist Prince Sihanouk in maintaining the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia. Therefore, I urge you once again, as I did in my letter of Dec. 6, 1966, to lend your help in bringing this conflict to a close by exercising fully your responsibilities as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conferences which yielded those Accords.

Second, the Middle East. The increasing harassment of Israel by elements based in Syria, with attendant reactions within Israel and within the Arab world, has brought the area close to major violence. Your and our ties to nations of the area could bring us into difficulties which I am confident neither of us seeks. It would appear a time for each of us to use our influence to the full in the cause of moderation, including our influence over action by the United Nations.

Third, Cuba. In Venezuela and elsewhere the government of Cuba is engaging in quite open and active support of violent movements, including the illegal transit of international frontiers with men and arms. There is a rising demand in this hemisphere for further action against Cuba. I would hope there is some way in which your influence in Havana could be used to halt these dangerous activities.

Beyond these points of danger and conflict, there are two areas of opportunity where I deeply believe it is our common interest and common duty to humanity to achieve constructive results: the achievement of understandings which would limit our respective deployments of ABM's and ICBM's and the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty. These two enterprises are not explicitly linked; but I am sure you are conscious that our task of persuading the non-nuclear powers to accept a non-proliferation treaty would be greatly eased if you and we could demonstrate concurrently our will and ability to begin to bring the nuclear arms race under better

control. I hope, therefore, your government will find it possible to respond positively to our proposals to enter into serious discussions on the ABM and ICBM problem.

I am aware that neither of our nations fully controls the forces at work in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, or the Caribbean. Indeed, we cannot determine by ourselves whether a non-proliferation treaty will prove acceptable to the governments, parliaments, and peoples of the principal non-nuclear nations. Nevertheless, our influence in these matters remains considerable if it is used in the same or in parallel directions. At this critical moment I believe we must try consciously to overcome the forces drawing us further away from each other and bring to bear our capacity to shape events along paths of moderation and peace.

I welcome your thoughts on these matters.

Friday, May 19, 1967

3:00 p.m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

MR. PRESIDENT:

The bombing issue is item 3 at 5:00 p.m. It is, as you well know, both an emotional and a technical issue. There are dangerously strong feelings in your official family which tend to overwhelm the strictly military factors.

Sentiments

Sect. Rusk feels the diplomatic cost of bombing Hanoi-Haiphong overwhelms whatever the military advantage might be; but has not devised nor can he guarantee -- a diplomatic payoff for moving the bombing pattern to the south.

Sect. McNamara feels the domestic and diplomatic cost is enormous; and believes Hanoi-Haiphong bombing is not cost-effective, if effectiveness is measured against Communist operations in the South. And that is how he thinks it should be measured.

General Wheeler feels a withdrawal from Hanoi-Haiphong bombing would stir deep resentment at home, among our troops, and be regarded by the Communists as an aerial Dien Bien Phu. He argues there is net military advantage in hitting Hanoi-Haiphong targets; but finds it hard to make a firm, lucid case because none of us really knows what the cumulative and indirect effects of the bombing are around Hanoi-Haiphong, except that they are making one hell of a military and political effort to try to make us stop. General Wheeler wants to keep the pressure up via armed recce in the North plus attacks on airfields.

In a curious way, all three are arguing negatively: Sect. Rusk to avoid diplomatic costs; Sect. McNamara to avoid (primarily) domestic political and psychological costs; Gen. Wheeler to avoid a different set of (primarily) domestic political and psychological costs.

Issues

So much for sentiments. The question is what kind of scenario can hold our family together in ways that look after the nation's interests and make military sense.

I propose the following.

~~TOP SECRET~~ - LITERALLY EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 81-101 ME

By rg/ddh, NARA, Date 5-28-91

5/19/67

1. After we have taken out Hanoi TPP, we cut back radically on attacks in the Hanoi/Haiphong area for several weeks.

2. At that time, picking up from Soviet pressure on this issue (illustrated, for example, by Tommy's lunch with Dobrynin, reported in the attached message), we tell Moscow:

-- We shall not be doing Hanoi-Haiphong bombing for a little while, but we must, of course, continue bombing north of the DMZ;

-- We shall enter no commitments about the future; but they have a matter of, say, 2 or 3 weeks to deliver something by way of negotiations.

3. We would do this in greatest confidence with the Soviet Union. At home we might say we are concentrating in support of the DMZ operation; but without attacking airfields, we might continue some armed recce outside the Hanoi-Haiphong circle (which Bus Wheeler is willing to accept), in order to keep down speculation.

4. In this interval we do careful planning and analysis, reexamining all the intelligence, and decide how we should continue to bomb most economically and effectively in the northern part of North Viet Nam, should nothing come of diplomacy in this interval.

5. We should include, in this period of study and reflection, both the mining of the ports (and attack on other import routes) at one extreme; and we should look also at the policy of not resuming attacks in the northern part of North Viet Nam. And, of course, we should also look at all the possibilities in between. At the minimum we must provide for sufficient pressure for them not to shift anti-aircraft South or to rebuild the power grid.

6. By that time we should be close to the period when Bob McNamara and Bus Wheeler return from Viet Nam with whatever manpower recommendations they may then have. We could then reexamine our future bombing policy in the light of the total policy you then adopt towards the next phase of the war in Viet Nam.

7. Comment: This scenario would give:

-- Sect. Rusk and Sect. McNamara a break in what they feel is a dangerous pattern of progressive bombing escalation;

-- Sect. Rusk and the State Department a chance to prove if they can buy anything important to us through diplomacy at this time.

5/19/67

-- General Wheeler would get a temporary rather than a permanent change of bombing pattern, with the opportunity to refine his case and make it to you in, say, a month's time.

8. It is at about that stage -- when both manpower and bombing recommendations might be coming to you -- that you might wish to call in McCloy, Bundy, etc., as you suggested the other day.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, May 19, 1967
3:00 p.m.

1. brief
2. Pres. file
64

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

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I propose the following.

~~TOP SECRET - LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 77CJ 81-101

By ajl/ck, NARA, Date 5-21-91

5/19/67

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5/19/67

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W. W. R.

Friday
May 19, 1967 -- 12:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith our Chuck Johnson
expresses his sense of urgency about
the two key decisions required with
respect to the Water for Peace package.

W. W. Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Walt -


There is still no action on the decisions needed for the Water for Peace package:

- (1) ~~Who will speak, the President or the Vice President?~~
- (2) ~~Approval of the Directive to the Secretary of State creating a Water for Peace office.~~

You sent the whole package up last week and, so far as I know, the matter is still under consideration in the President's office.

The conference opens Tuesday morning, May 23, in the Ball Room of the Sheraton Park Hotel. It has become most urgent that the State Department have a decision on the speaker so that the opening day program can be appropriately adjusted. If the President does not open the conference Tuesday morning (11:00 a.m.), the Vice President will return from Huntsville, Alabama in order to address the conference during the afternoon. I am informed by the Vice President's office that he feels it most important that he keep his appointment in Huntsville.

The decision concerning the Directive to the Secretary of State is an essential part of the follow-through on the conference and the draft Presidential speech has been prepared on the assumption that the Directive to the Secretary of State will have been signed by the time the speech is made. Will Sparks informs me that the President's advance schedule shows time reserved for the speech on Tuesday morning but he does not have any firm information that the President has in fact decided to address the conference.



Charles E. Johnson

Friday, May 19, 1967 -- 9:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk is most enthusiastic about the notion that you might drop in at his businessmen's lunch.

I will send up details; but it is the Council on Latin America, the blue ribbon group chaired by David Rockefeller -- the best and most active advisory group we have in the field of foreign policy.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

Friday, May 19, 1967 -- 10:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Via Marvin Watson

Here are the facts about Sec. Rusk's businessmen's group.

- They have a reception at 12:30 p.m. at the Washington Hilton Hotel.
- They sit down for lunch at 1:00 p.m.
- There are 200 of them, strictly blue ribbon.
- The meeting is off the record.

The Secretary added that he would be simply delighted if he could put his prepared remarks back into his sermon barrel.

W. W. Rostow

P.S. You might take young Jorge Frel along with you, if you go. He is scheduled to see you at 12:30 p.m. today.

W. W. R.

WWRostow:rla

Pres-file 68

Friday, May 19, 1967
8:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

These remarks, forwarded by
Sec. Rusk, will, I believe, please
and sustain you.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

1893
68a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

During my appearance in Scarsdale, New York, on May 7, I shared the speaker's platform with a panel of five young former students of Scarsdale High School. All were, or had been, engaged in some form of public service -- the Peace Corps, VISTA, Volunteers in Harlem, and the United States Navy.

Having been very favorably impressed by the brief statement made by the last of these, Lt. (j.g.) Gordon P. Lewis of the U. S. Navy, I asked his father -- an old friend -- for a copy of Gordon's remarks. I believe you will also enjoy seeing this eloquent statement, and I am therefore enclosing a copy for you.

As his father notes in the accompanying letter, Gordon flew to Hawaii after the Scarsdale ceremony to rejoin his carrier, and he is now again on active duty in the Far East.



Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Remarks by Lt. (j.g.) Gordon P. Lewis.

Remarks by Lt. (j.g.) Gordon P. Lewis at Scarsdale Town Club Convocation
Scarsdale High School - May 7, 1967

Little did I dream, some 17 years ago, as Mr. Rusk tried to mould our Greenacres recreation group into a respectable baseball team, that I would be here to participate in a ceremony such as this. And I am indeed honored to do so. During the intervening years Mr. Rusk has embarked upon the vastly greater task of helping to shape a foreign policy which among other things will preserve our right to speak out as we are doing today. As a Naval officer I am once again a member of Mr. Rusk's team. I trust however, that I am a better aviator than I was a pitcher.

My subject this afternoon is not primarily the international complications in which I am directly involved for it would be presumptuous of me to discuss them on the same platform as our Secretary of State.

Rather, I would like briefly to make three points. I would first like to reflect upon my educational background as a Scarsdalian. The technical skills required of today's jet fliers and of so many occupations in our computerized world can only come from a sound educational foundation. Developing the ability to master these skills starts way back in the primary grades, and I am grateful to be a product of the Scarsdale educational system.

Equally important is the atmosphere of healthy debate which has existed in my memory span in this community since the early fifties and undoubtedly before. As President Johnson remarked last week, "We must guard every man's right to speak, but we must defend every man's right to answer."

During the past few days, I have been in Scarsdale discussing and examining the Vietnam conflict with a number of you. We, as junior members of the armed forces are not unaware of the controversy and protest arising in our home communities over the political aspects of the present crisis. What disturbs me is not the healthy controversy but the attitude of depression and weariness at home. I can assure you that this feeling is not shared by servicemen in Vietnam...or at least not by the men whose thoughts I know. Each man in my squadron believes that by his presence in Vietnam he is helping to protect the things we as Americans have come to value, that he must shoulder the responsibility to protect democracy wherever it is threatened. This knowledge keeps our spirits unremittingly high and makes our losses a bit easier to understand and accept.

Our one great hope and the goal for which we work daily is an honorable peace. My generation is too young to remember Munich and Yalta, but we have read of these conferences and know the dangers of negotiating with an unscrupulous enemy. Our greatest fear is that history may repeat itself, and in an effort to show our benevolence to the world we may surrender some of the ideals we have fought so hard to protect during the past three years. But we trust our government to weigh political and military factors and to arrive at a just conclusion.

My last point is a word to the generation just younger than myself. I have said that I can understand and appreciate protest against a given policy of our government. What I cannot understand is the deliberate defiance of governmental authority. There is a wide difference between protest and anarchy. No one has ever applauded a deserter under fire and a draft-card burner is nothing but a deserter in advance.

At this moment my aircraft carrier is steaming for waters of the South China Sea. A carrier is not a democratic society, it is a tool used by a democracy to protect and defend its national policy. When one thinks of the sacrifices made **by our society** to produce this billion dollar fighting machine it is indeed staggering. **But bear in mind** that there are men on that ship who may give their lives **to protect our national ideals**. All they ask is your support and your courage at home.

69

Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-470

~~TOP SECRET~~

By CL, NARA, Date 7-24-95

Friday, May 19, 1967 -- 8:32 a.m.

Mr. President:

Tommy's response -- including the proposal of a message to Kosygin -- came just after I sent up my draft!

Note the marked sentence. If it means anything, it means we should not sell out Hanoi-- Haiphong bombing for nothing.

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 5009

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

69a

5

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

Info CONTROL : 19617
RECEIVED : MAY 19, 1967 5:27AM

OO RUEHCR
DE RUEHCR 5009FD 1390910
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O 190900Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4527
STATE GRNC

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jn* NARA, Date *5-1-99*

BT
~~TOP SECRET~~ MOSCOW 5009

NODIS

REF: STATE 197662

1. I WARMLY WELCOME PROPOSED PLAN. I ASSUME ANY DECISION TO CONCENTRATE BOMBING SOUTH OF 20TH PARALLEL WILL BE BASED ON JUDGMENT (WHICH I STRONGLY SHARE) THAT SUCCESS IN THE SOUTH IS THE ONE GREAT OBJECTIVE, THAT MILITARY ACTION SHOULD BE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THAT PURPOSE, AND THAT THERE IS MORE TO BE GAINED THAN LOST BY MAKING THIS EMPHASIS PLAIN TO ALL. IF THIS IS THINKING, I BELIEVE EXCEPTIONS NORTH OF 20TH PARALLEL SHOULD BE VERY VEW AND RELATION OF ANY SUCH TARGETS TO WAR IN SOUTH SHOULD BE CLEAR. IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT HERE TO AVOID HANOI AND HAIPHONG. FURTHERMORE ANY MESSAGE TO SOVIETS WILL GAIN IN VALUE AS IT GAINS IN PRECISION.

2. IT SEEMS MOST UNFORTUNATE THAT HITTING PROPOSED TARGET WILL

PAGE TWO RUEHCR 5009FD ~~TOP SECRET~~
COINCIDE WITH BROWN'S VISIT AND THE PEACE MOVES HE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE MAKING REGARDLESS OF THE CAVEATS IN YOUR CORRESPONDENCE WITH HIM. FOR THIS REASON I DO THINK IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO INFORM SOVIETS OF OUR INTENTION CUT BACK ON BOMBING AS OTHERWISE THEY WILL THINK THIS ANOTHER CASE OF OUR USING INITIATIVE FOR PEACE TO COVER ESCALATION. OF COURSE ONCE SOVIETS KNOW OUR PLANS, THE PRESSURE ON THEM TO GET INTO THE PEACE ACT MAY BE LESSENER.

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

2-Page, MOSCOW 5009, May 19, 1967 5:27AM NODIS

3. I AM CONCERNED THAT SOVIETS APPEAR JUST NOW TO BE ON VERGE OF REACHING MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS NOT ONLY RE VIETNAM BUT ON THEIR RELATIONS WITH US ACROSS THE BOARD.

4. I WOULD FAVOR A SHORT LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO KOSYGIN WHICH I COULD HOLD UNTIL POWER PLANT HIT OR DECISION TAKEN NOT TO DO SO. I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THIS TARGET JUSTIFIES THE RISKS AND DISADVANTAGES INVOLVED AND IF IT DOES NOT GO TONIGHT HOPE IT WOULD BE CANCELED IN ORDER THAT WE MIGHT PROCEED PROMPTLY WITH PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE BEFORE SOVIET DECISIONS ARE TAKEN AND POSSIBLY COMMITMENTS MADE TO DRV. SOVIETS ALWAYS REACT ADVERSELY UNDER THREATS OF PRESSURE AND HITTING HANOI PLANT WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THEM AS PRESSURE. ON THE OTHER HAND

PAGE THREE RUEHCR 5009FD ~~TOP SECRET~~

WAITING FOR DUST TO SETTLE BEFORE DELIVERING MESSAGE WOULD BE DANGEROUS.

5. I BELIEVE KOSYGIN IS IN FAVOR OF SETTLEMENT AND THAT MESSAGE TO HIM WILL HELP HIM WITH HIS COLLEAGUES. I WOULD ADVISE AGAINST ANY REVIEW IN MESSAGE OF FACTORS INVOLVED AS THIS ONLY LIKELY STIR UP ARGUMENTS IN POLITBURO REGARDLESS OF WORDING. I BELIEVE SOVIETS WILL WISH AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF COLLUSION WITH US AND URGE THAT MESSAGE BE STATED MERELY IN TERMS OF INFORMATION. IF PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE NOT FEASIBLE, I COULD ASK TO SEE GROMYKO OR KUZNETSOV.

GP-1. THOMPSON

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 19, 1967
8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Eshkol's lucid reply
to your message, asking diplomatic
help in five directions.

W. W. Rostow

Tel Aviv 3648

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 82-162

By ag/ies, NARA, Date 5-20-94

WFF 70a
#4
TELEGRAM Department of State

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 19193

RECD: MAY 18, 1967, 4:30PM

OO RUEHC
DE RUQMVL 3648 1381700
ZNY SSSSS
O 181630Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBA SY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 3648

NODIS

REF: STATE 196541 AND TEL AVIV 3640

1. FONMIN EBAN GAVE ME AT 1700 HRS REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL. EBAN ADDED SERIES AMPLIFYING COMMENTS ON PRIMIN'S BEHALF CONTAINED MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

2. TEXT ESHKOL REPLY AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE:

JERUSALEM, MAY 18, 1967

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE OF MAY 18, 1967.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE SITUATION IS TENSE AND I WELCOME YOUR READINESS FOR CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS CONSULTATION. FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN GAVE DETAILED INFORMATION TO AMABASSADOR BARBOUR TODAY AND YOUR REPRESENTATIVES ARE EXCHANGING IDEAS.

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 3648 ~~SECRET~~
WITH YOURS IN WASHINGTON AND AT UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS.

I SHOULD LIKE TO SUMMARIZE MY MAIN CONCLUSIONS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3648 FROM TEL AVIV MAY 18 (NODIS)

FIRST: THE PRIMARY LINK IN THE CHAIN OF TENSION IS THE SYRIAN POLICY OF TERRORIST INFILTRATION AND SABOTAGE. FROM UNDER SECRETARY ROSTOW'S CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR HARMAN, I AM GLAD TO LEARN THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT AND MINE ARE AGREED ON THIS. YOU ARE CORRECT, MR. PRESIDENT, IN STATING THAT WE ARE HAVING OUR PATIENCE TRIED TO THE LIMITS. THERE HAVE BEEN 15 ATTEMPTS AT MURDER AND SABOTAGE IN THE PAST SIX WEEKS. WE HAVE NOT REACTED. THIS IN ITSELF PROVES THAT THERE IS NO LACK OF TEMPERANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY ON OUR PART. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PROBLEM IS NOT SOLVED INDEFINITELY BY INACTION. WE CANNOT ALWAYS RELY ON THE STROKE OF FORTUNE WHICH HAS SO FAR PREVENTED THE TERRORIST ACTS FROM TAKING THE TOLL OF LIFE AND INJURY INTENDED BY THE PERPETRATORS. ALTHOUGH MANY ACTS HAVE BEEN COMMITTED FROM LEBANON AND JORDAN, OUR PRESENT CONVICTION IS THAT SYRIA IS RESPONSIBLE AND IS ATTEMPTING TO EMBROIL OTHER ARAB STATES. WE ARE ALIVE TO THIS STRATAGEM AND SHALL NOT COOPERATE WITH IT.

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 3648 ~~SECRET~~

MY FIRST CONCLUSION, THEREFORE, IS THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO EMPHASIZE, PROCLAIM AND CONDEMN SYRIAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE TERRORIST ACTS, IN ORDER TO DETER THEIR CONTINUATION.

SECOND: THE EGYPTIAN BUILD-UP OF ARMOUR AND INFANTRY IN SINAI, TO THE EXTENT SO FAR OF APPROXIMATELY FOUR DIVISIONS INCLUDING 600 TANKS, IS GREATER THAN EVER BEFORE, AND HAS NO OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION. EGYPT KNOWS THAT THERE IS NO FOUNDATION FOR REPORTS OF TROOP CONCENTRATION AGAINST SYRIA. YET EVEN AFTER RECEIVING INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT FROM U.N. AND OTHER SOURCES, THE UAR HAS INCREASED ITS TROOP CONCENTRATIONS. THIS NATURALLY FORCES ME TO UNDERTAKE PRECAUTIONARY REINFORCEMENT IN THE SOUTH. ONE OF THE DANGERS THAT WE FACE IS THAT THE EGYPTIAN TROOP CONCENTRATION MAY ENCOURAGE SYRIA TO RESUME TERRORISTIC ACTS UNDER THE FALSE IMPRESSION OF IMMUNITY.

THE ONLY WAY OF AVOIDING THE EFFECTS OF AN ESCALATING RECIPROCAL BUILD-UP IS FOR EGYPT TO RETURN TO THE PREVIOUS POSTURE IN SINAI. THIS WOULD IMMEDIATELY AFFECT OUR OWN DECISIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS.

PAGE 4 RUQMVL 3648 ~~SECRET~~

I URGE THE FULL APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE TO SECURE THE END OF ABNORMAL TROOP CONCENTRATIONS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 3648 FROM TEL AVIV MAY 18, (NODIS)

THIRD: IT WOULD BE VERY UNFORTUNATE IF THE U.N. AUTHORITIES WERE TO GIVE AN IMPRESSION OF IRRESOLUTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRESENCE OF THE U.N.E.F. IN SINAI. IT IS NOT THE FUNCTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO MOVE OUT OF THE WAY IN ORDER TO FACILITATE WARLIKE ACTS. I HOPE THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL INSIST THAT HE CANNOT AFFECT THE STATUS QUO CONCERNING THE UN FORCE IN SINAI WITHOUT A MANDATE FROM THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THERE IS AMPLY LEGAL BASIS FOR THIS.

I MUST POINT OUT THAT ISRAEL WAS A PARTY TO THE ARRANGEMENT WHICH LED IN MARCH 1957 TO THE STATIONING OF THE UNEF. AT UNITED STATES INITIATIVE, WE TOOK FAR-REACHING MEASURES IN EXCHANGE FOR THE UNEF ARRANGEMENT.

FOURTH: THERE MAY BE AN IMPRESSION IN CAIRO AND DAMASCUS THAT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR EGYPT AND SYRIA IS ASSURED, AND THAT THEREFORE THEY HAVE NO NEED OF RESTRAINT. THIS FACTOR WOULD BE AN EMPHATIC CLARIFICATION BY THE UNITED STATES TO THE SOVIET UNION OF THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S

PAGE 5 RUQMVL 3648 ~~SECRET~~

INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY AND OF THE AMERICAN WILL AND CAPACITY TO DEFEND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I CAN HARDLY EXAGGERATE THE IMPORTANCE AND URGENCY OF SUCH AN APPROACH TO THE USSR. IT IS ONE OF THE CENTRAL KEYS TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION.

FIVE: IN THIS CONNECTION, MR. PRESIDENT, I AM SOLEMNLY BOUND TO REFER TO THE SPECIFIC AMERICAN COMMITMENT SO OFTEN REITERATED TO US BETWEEN MAY 1961 AND AUGUST 1966. I ESPECIALLY REMEMBER OUR OWN CONVERSATIONS IN JUNE 1964. YOUR NOTE OF MAY 18 DOES NOT EXPLICITLY REFER TO THE COMMITMENT BY THE UNITED STATES TO ACT BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE UN IN SUPPORT OF ISRAEL'S INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU DO NOT WISH TO BE COMMITTED WITHOUT CONSULTATION. BUT WITH A MASSIVE BUILD-UP ON OUR SOUTHERN FRONTIER LINKED WITH A TERRORIST CAMPAIGN FROM THE NORTH AND SOVIET SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TENSION, THERE IS SURELY AN URGENT NEED TO REAFFIRM THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY WITH A VIEW TO ITS IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD THE NEED ARISE.

IN VIEW OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED, I HAVE FELT AT LIBERTY TO SPEAK WITH FRANKNESS ON FIVE PROBLEMS IN ALL

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4- 3648 FROM TEL AVIV MAY 18 (NODIS)

PAGE 6 RUQMVL 3648 ~~SECRET~~
OF WHICH I BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES IS IN A POSITION TO
MAKE A VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE AVOIDANCE OF DANGERS AND THE
REINFORCEMENT OF PEACE.

SIGNED LEVI ESHKOLE. UNQUOTE

GP-3. BARBOUR
BT

~~SECRET~~

71

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, May 19, 1967
8:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

You should be aware of Sec. Rusk's
formulation of our posture towards Hong
Kong in the wake of the brief discussion
at Tuesday's lunch.

W. W. Rostow

State 197313

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 19
By 109, NARA, Date 5-8-91

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

197313

MAY 10 6 40 PM '67

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amconsul HONG KONG PRIORITY
INFO: Amembassy LONDON

STATE 197313
NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-163
By is, NARA Date 1-7-00

Ref: Hong Kong 7983

EYES ONLY FOR RICE AND BRUCE FROM SECRETARY

1. You should consider problem of Hong Kong in following context:
 - a. We do not know whether Peking will press the British out of Hong Kong; we are inclined to doubt it because of substantial economic losses which would occur but they are fully capable of acting irrationally.
 - b. We do not believe that British themselves would make a major effort to defend Hong Kong against any major Chinese Communist military assault.
 - c. United States would not expect to defend Hong Kong for British, nor do we expect British to ask for this support.
2. You should not intimate in any way readiness to discuss joint military planning.
3. None of above ~~means~~ means we should not be as cooperative with and amenable as possible to British and Hong Kong government suggestions as how we can be helpful, short of involving us in moves that could lead to US military involvement in defense of Hong Kong.

END

RUSK

GP-1

Drafted by: S:DRusk:ma/bmm/aws/evc 5/18/67	Tel. Ext. 2170	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <i>[Signature]</i>	The Secretary <i>[Signature]</i>
Clearances: EA - Mr. Bundy <i>[Signature]</i> EA/ACA - Mr. Jacobson <i>[Signature]</i> EA - Mr. Barnett <i>[Signature]</i>		M - Mr. Rostow <i>[Signature]</i> S/S - Mr. Thompson <i>[Signature]</i> White House - Mr. Jenkins <i>[Signature]</i>	White House <i>[Signature]</i> DEFENSE <i>[Signature]</i> Secretary McNamara <i>[Signature]</i>

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

Classification

72

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 19, 1967 -- 7:45 a.m

Mr. President:

As I awaited the returns on the Hanoi operation and read the cables from the Middle East and elsewhere, starting at about 4:00 o'clock this morning, this draft from you to Kosygin formed in my mind.

Should I show it to Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara?

Or put it away?

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-470
By clg, NARA, Date 7-24-95

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

May 19, 1967

DRAFT LETTER TO KOSYGIN

I wish to address you at this time because we appear to be faced by a series of situations, each dangerous in itself, but, taken together, capable of bringing disaster on our two nations and the human race.

I would wish you to consider if -- whatever our differences -- our common interests do not now require concerted or parallel action to bring these situations under control.

First, Viet Nam. There the gross and systematic violation of the DMZ, as well as the violation of Cambodian territory, by the forces of North Viet Nam, in addition to previous violations of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, create a danger of widening the already dangerous hostilities in Southeast Asia. Again, I urge upon you, as I did in my letter of _____, to seek actively to bring this conflict to a close by exercising fully your responsibilities as co-chairman of the Geneva conferences which yielded those Accords.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines & NWJ 91-470
By W, NARA, Date 4-26-99

Second, the Middle East. The increasingly aggressive harassment of Israel by Syria, ^{as based} with attendant reactions within Israel and within the Arab world, has brought us close to a war in which our respective ties to nations of the area could bring us into a confrontation which I am confident neither of us seeks. It would appear a time for each of us to use our influence to the full in the cause of moderation, including our influence over action ^{by} the United Nations.

Third, Cuba. In Venezuela and elsewhere the government of Cuba is engaging in quite open and active support of insurrectional movements, including the illegal transit of international frontiers with men and arms. There is a rising sentiment in this hemisphere to act against Cuba. I would hope there is some way in which your influence in Havana could be used to halt these dangerous activities.

Beyond these points of danger and conflict, there are two areas of opportunity where I deeply believe it is our common interest and common duty to humanity to achieve constructive results: the achievement of

understandings which would limit our respective deployments of ABM's and ICBM's and the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty. These two enterprises are not explicitly linked; but I am sure you are conscious that our task of persuading the non-nuclear powers to accept a non-proliferation treaty would be greatly eased if you and we could demonstrate concurrently our will and ability to begin to bring the nuclear arms race under better control. I hope, therefore, your government will find it possible to respond positively to our proposals to enter into serious discussions on the ABM and ICBM problem.

I am aware that neither of our nations fully controls the forces at work in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, or the Caribbean. Indeed, we cannot determine by ourselves whether a non-proliferation treaty will prove acceptable to the governments, parliaments, and peoples of the principal non-nuclear nations. Nevertheless, our influence in these matters remains considerable if it is used in the same or in parallel

directions. At this critical moment I believe we must try consciously to overcome the forces drawing us further away -- or into unsought confrontations -- and bring to bear our capacity to shape events along paths of moderation and peace.

I welcome your thoughts on these matters.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, May 19, 1967 -- 7:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a corrected report on Hanoi TPP which we must take as final for the moment. It now appears each aircraft carried only one WALLEYE.

-- Approach to run-in and dive entry disrupted in cases of both WALLEYE strike pilots by intense antiaircraft artillery and SAM activity. Additionally, although cloud cover in vicinity of target generally three tenths scattered, pilots passed through clouds on pop-up and dive entry.

-- Both pilots had missile gate on generator hall at time of release.

-- Both WALLEYES delivered in approximately ten degree dive angle, slant range 7000-8000 feet, no positive lock-on. One missile long, probably in support area of TPP. Second missile thought to have impacted at base of generator hall or just short of it. Detonation not observed. No known collateral damage outside of target area. Both runs west to east as planned.

-- Strike pilots estimate at least twenty SAMS fired while in area.

-- Will obtain photo bomb damage assessment at first opportunity in conjunction with next strike in Hanoi area.

W. W. Rostow

information from operational report

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-470
By cb, NARA, Date 7-24-95

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - May 19, 1967

to strip
2. Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Program Loan for Peru

The attached memoranda contain a request by Bill Gaud for authorization to negotiate a \$40 million program loan with Peru, and concurrences by Charlie Schultze and Joe Fowler.

Need for the Loan. Since he took office in 1963, President Belaunde has pressed a development program targetted largely toward opening the interior of Peru. Public investment has outstripped revenues and led to inflationary pressures and a foreign exchange drain which now threaten financial stability. The program loan -- part of a joint program worked out with the IBRD and the IMF totalling \$175 million -- is designed to permit Belaunde to correct his financial difficulties while continuing a reasonable development effort.

Conditions for the Loan. Belaunde's budgetary deficit for the year starting July 1, 1967 is expected to run up to \$186 million if remedial action is not taken. Exchange reserves dropped nearly \$30 million during the first quarter of 1967.

The proposed loan would be negotiated if:

- The Peruvian Congress authorizes new revenue measures which will net \$116 million.
- the government cuts back expenditures by \$15 million.
- Belaunde turns down the military's bid to spend some \$30 million on supersonic jet aircraft.
- Peru negotiates a satisfactory standby agreement with the IMF.

These conditions involve tough decisions from which Belaunde has until recently shied away. But on May 8 he asked the Congress for authority to raise revenues and cut expenditures in the amounts indicated above. The loan will be contingent on his getting this authority and accepting the other conditions.

The loan would be disbursed in three installments, each contingent on compliance with the terms agreed upon.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Funding the Loan. Funds are presently available from the FY 1967 appropriation to cover the loan. If there is a long delay in the negotiations it will have to be funded in FY 1968.

Other related considerations. Together with Frei, Lleras and Leoni, Belaunde represents a new generation of political leaders of democratic bent, deeply interested in modernizing their countries. We have a stake in seeing Belaunde and his program succeed.

Belaunde has stuck faithfully to his promise not to impair the position of the International Petroleum Company. IPC continues to operate under the same conditions that existed when Belaunde took office. Negotiations between IPC and government continue. Differences have been narrowed, but a final settlement has not been reached.

In the past we have had trouble with Peru over seizure of our tuna boats. There have been no recent incidents. We have proposed negotiations on a conservation agreement and are awaiting Peru's response.

Recommendation

I join Fowler and Schultz in recommending authorization to negotiate the loan subject to the conditions stated and to further consultation with you prior to signature of the loan agreement.

W. W. Rostow

Approve

Disapprove

See me

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

74a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

MAY 3 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Program Loan for Peru

Bill Gaud requests your approval to negotiate a \$40 million program loan with Peru. This loan is part of a joint program that has been worked out with the World Bank (leader of the Consultative Group for Peru) and the IMF totalling \$175 million. It is designed to insure financial stability to Peru without sacrificing continued economic progress.

Peru's economic growth had been confined to only part of the economy. Since taking office in 1963, President Belaunde has been extending economic development throughout the country -- with roads, irrigation, and other public works.

Recently the lack of sufficient tax revenues, in the face of these development expenditures, has led to inflationary pressures and a foreign exchange drain. If these conditions persist, Belaunde's position could be jeopardized with another coup.

The proposed loan would be conditioned on:

- . Passage of \$157 million in new revenue measures by the Peruvian Congress
- . A \$15 million cutback in expenditures
- . Turning down the military's pressure to buy supersonic aircraft

Since the opposition controls the Congress and panders to the military, these are very tough conditions.

Belaunde may turn them down. If he does, the loan will not be made. Installments on the loan would be conditioned on Belaunde keeping to the terms agreed upon.

If he accepts, and pushes the program through the Congress -- with the aid of the U. S., IMF, and World Bank package of \$175 million -- his position and the economic progress of Peru will be greatly strengthened.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-470
By 06, NARA, Date 1-24-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Linc Gordon and Bill Gaud believe that the Belaunde Administration, although it has its shortcomings, is one of the most progressive governments in the Alliance. Even though he may find the terms too tough, Gordon and Gaud believe we should approach Belaunde at this time with the combined AID, IMF, World Bank proposals. There is a risk, of course, that these strong self-help measures we are seeking will be used by Belaunde or others to attack the U. S. Anything less in the way of self-help, however, would not do the job.

Balance of Payments

The funds will be used exclusively to finance imports from the United States. Special financial incentives to importers for selected groups of commodities, designed to increase the U. S. share of the Peruvian market, will be agreed on with the Peruvian authorities. Secretary Fowler agrees that these arrangements will serve to reduce any adverse effect of the proposed loan on our balance of payments.

OK'd
HHT

Recommendation

I recommend that you approve negotiation of the proposed \$40 million program loan for Peru.

Attachment

Charles L. Schultze

Charles L. Schultze
Director

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

748

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

APR 21 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Program Loan for Peru

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AID 10-16-95 Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-1-99

On the recommendation of Assistant Secretary Gordon and Ambassador Jones, I am requesting your authorization to begin negotiations in early May with the Government of Peru for a program loan of \$40 million. Signature and public announcement of the loan and the first disbursement would take place in June, or as soon thereafter as Peru completes the tax and other self-help actions agreed on in the negotiations.

Peru has asked for emergency unconditional economic assistance from the United States. We have replied that we would consider a program loan, but have told the Peruvians that any program assistance would depend on their undertaking some serious and difficult policy measures of a kind we have long been seeking in that country.

Details of a program have now been worked out with the International Bank, leader of the Consultative Group for Peru, and the International Monetary Fund. In late April, the IBRD will begin discussions with the Peruvian authorities on the Bank's own lending program (about \$50 million per year) and the evaluation it will report to other members of the Consultative Group regarding Peru's creditworthiness. Beginning in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

early May and simultaneous with our own negotiations, the International Monetary Fund will attempt to negotiate a standby agreement of up to \$85 million with Peru. The IMF, the IBRD and AID will require the same self-help actions on the part of Peru as a condition for support.

Present Politico-Economic Situation

When Fernando Belaunde became President in 1963, Peru was enjoying a marked degree of stability and rapid economic development led by its dynamic private sector. But this development was highly unbalanced in favor of export industries and an island of prosperity around the capital, Lima. The domestic economy, particularly agriculture, was stagnating and most Peruvians, especially the Indians in the slums around Lima and those remaining in the Andes highlands, were sharing but little in this advance. Despite the high growth rate, the overall goals of the Alliance for Progress were not being achieved in Peru.

Belaunde sought to change this situation by making the Government of Peru an active partner in the development effort. He has pushed the building of roads, dams, and other infrastructure in order to modernize the interior of the country and give the masses a larger share in Peru's prosperity.

Belaunde's ability to act has been limited by a Congress controlled by the opposition, consisting of a coalition between APRA and the Odriistas. The former is Peru's long-time traditional party of the democratic left which is resentful of Belaunde's electoral triumph and determined to limit his success in office; the latter is the right-wing personal following of General Odria, a former dictator.

Belaunde's tactic with the Congress has been to avoid frontal confrontation. To a degree this has been successful, in that he has been able to secure passage for his agrarian reform bill, a municipal elections law, an educational reform bill, and approval for his public works projects. In general, the Congress has supported the President's spending programs, but

not his revenue measures. Moreover, the Congress has brought down many of Belaunde's cabinet ministers by votes of censure and has created an atmosphere of instability on the top level of the executive branch.

Belaunde's public investment program demanded shifting resources from the private to the public sector. This has been particularly difficult because new government revenues depend to an unusual degree on new or increased taxes, and consequently, on legislative approval. Because of the stickiness of both the tax system and the Congress, Belaunde's development program has been financed in large part by government borrowing from the Central Bank and from foreign banks and suppliers. The result has been inflation, pressure on the balance of payments, and damage to Peru's foreign debt structure.

These dangerous financial trends have continued into 1967. In the first quarter, exchange reserves after adjustments have fallen nearly \$30 million; unsound short and medium term foreign borrowing continues to take place.

Peru is nearing a financial crisis. Without remedial action, there is near certainty of accelerated inflation and intolerable losses of foreign exchange reserves.

The Peruvian military support the Belaunde Administration, but their continued support depends on the President's being able to maintain political calm and satisfy military aspirations for force modernization. As explained below, these aspirations contribute to the possibility of a financial crisis which might bring about a military takeover.

The United States Interest in Peru

Peru is a strategically located country making a belated effort to modernize its vast, backward interior. Its popularly elected president is one of the symbols of progressive thinking in Latin America. Peru's business interests also serve as a hopeful sign for the hemisphere in their dynamic and successful efforts to develop a strong

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4

private sector. The country's military have an excellent civic action program and an effective program of vocational and literacy training for conscripts, and they have successfully eliminated Communist-oriented guerilla bands from difficult Andes terrain. Over four hundred American business firms have operations in Peru.

President Belaunde has taken no steps to impair the position of the International Petroleum Company (a Jersey Standard subsidiary) in Peru. Negotiations between the Peruvian Government and IPC regarding the long-disputed status of the company's oil properties remain at a standstill and IPC continues to operate under the same conditions that existed when President Belaunde took office.

The occasional capture and fining by Peru of US-flag tuna boats--seized while fishing outside the 12-mile zone recognized by the United States, but within the 200 miles claimed by Peru--has given rise to public and Congressional criticism in this country. We have proposed negotiations on fisheries conservation and related subjects to the Governments of Peru, Ecuador, Chile, Canada, and Japan in an effort to seek a practical solution to this problem--possibly through recognition of some form of preferred position for Peru and other coastal states with regard to fisheries resources near their coasts. We are awaiting the response of the Peruvian Government.

U.S. interests are served by helping Peru to continue its rapid economic progress, to restore financial stability, and to begin to channel its gains to the millions of Peruvians living a marginal existence. Helping the Belaunde Administration to make this effort gives a greater likelihood of promoting U.S. interests over the long run than any other feasible alternative. Although Belaunde has not proven to be a strong president, is inward-looking, and has generally tried to avoid taking a position on difficult inter-American issues, he has skillfully handled a difficult political situation and there is no substitute in view at the moment who would be more likely to provide leadership for progress.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Economic Assistance Strategy

The key to restoring stability and at the same time permitting a reasonable level of much-needed government investment is an increase in government revenues. For the year beginning July 1, 1967, Peru will have a budgetary deficit now estimated at about 5.0 billion soles (\$186 million) if no remedial action is taken. The program we have worked out with the IBRD and the IMF would require Peru to raise an additional 4.2 billion soles (\$157 million) net from new taxes and improved tax administration and cut expenditures by about 400 million soles (\$15 million). Legislation is pending before the Congress which would earmark 1.1 billion soles (\$41 million) of the revenue increase for military expenditures, leaving a net of 3.1 billion soles (\$116 million) to cover the budget deficit. The U.S. program loan would provide about 1.1 billion soles (\$40 million) and the balance of about 400 million soles (\$15 million) could safely be borrowed from the domestic banking system. Because of the rapid deterioration of the Peruvian financial situation, the IMF and we may discover in the course of negotiations that the fiscal deficit is even more serious than described above. In this case, we would require additional self-help by the Peruvians in either raising revenues, further cutting expenditures, or an appropriate combination of the two.

Because of the pressure over the last two years on the exchange rate, even with the fiscal program proposed and a tight credit policy, Peru may not be able to avoid a devaluation. In order to assure an orderly devaluation if this should become necessary, the International Monetary Fund will include in its standby agreement provisions which will outline the course Peru would follow in the exchange market and also call for additional taxes related to any devaluation. It is possible, although not at this time considered probable, that the IMF will find it necessary to require a devaluation as a precondition for the standby, both as a source of fiscal revenues and for proper balance of payments management.

We want to exercise an influence on the allocation of the investment budget. In order to concentrate resources in specific areas of the effort to modernize agriculture and

education, in addition to the program loan we are considering about \$40 million in project loans for Peru and will forward them for consideration as they become ready. These project loans will form part of an overall strategy for the agriculture and education sectors. We would expect to go forward with those projects which support our strategy in agriculture and education even in the absence of a program loan. However, if the Peruvians do not take the corrective fiscal action necessary for the program loan, we would have to examine the Peruvian Government's ability to make its contribution to public sector projects, especially the \$15 million Villa Rica-Puerto Pachitea Road project.

Passage of tax legislation (which would be a primary condition for our program loan, signature of the IMF standby, and continued eligibility for lending by the IBRD) would be a significant accomplishment on the part of Peru. Additional revenues from these measures and improved tax administration would amount in the next twelve months to 20% of the tax revenues collected in 1966.

The action needed will require President Belaunde to show substantially more political courage in dealing with the opposition. The opposition is expected to put up a stiff fight. Belaunde will know that he has a choice between a drifting situation which could bring down his Government or taking on the opposition on the basis of a sound program. President Belaunde may therefore be persuaded to agree to our conditions, though he will be far from eager to take on this political fight. There is the risk that he may not have the courage and will claim that his troubles stem from our unwillingness to help. Quite apart from Belaunde's own position, we can expect elements in Peru to charge that the international agencies and the U.S. are forcing unpopular actions as a price for aid.

Despite the serious political risks, the conditions we propose for a program loan are the minimum we believe we can ask. A smaller effort on Peru's part would not justify such a large allocation of scarce foreign assistance funds this year; furthermore, it would not be adequate to prevent continuing deterioration in an already serious situation and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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would require even more help in the future. On the other hand, demanding more self-help would mean asking more than Peruvian political realities make it possible for Belaunde to deliver, even with the best possible effort on his part.

The Problem of Military Expenditures

The Peruvian Air Force wishes to buy supersonic jet aircraft valued at about \$30 million and has been in contact with British, French and Swedish suppliers. As you know, we have firmly opposed unnecessary military expenditures and particularly the introduction of supersonic aircraft to Latin America before 1970. Ambassador Jones on Department instructions informed President Belaunde that the United States was unalterably opposed to Peruvian acquisition of such aircraft at this time; Under Secretary Katzenbach called in Peruvian Ambassador Celso Pastor and made the same point. Ambassador Linowitz has discussed the proposed purchase with Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, the Chairman of CIAP. As a result, in Sanz's recent visit to Lima he advised President Belaunde that in his judgment, and he felt confident that it was a well-founded judgment, the purchase of supersonics would rule out any possibility of a program loan.

President Belaunde depends on the military to stay in office. The large political opposition party (APRA) panders to the military in the hope that the armed forces will permit it to take over the executive branch if APRA should win the 1969 presidential elections. Despite all our pressure, it may still be that Peruvian political realities will result in the Air Force purchasing supersonic aircraft at an early date. In this event we will not make a program loan and will so inform the Peruvian Government. If Peru should purchase supersonics during the period of the program loan, we would not envision making further disbursements and will write the loan agreement accordingly.

The share of the budget devoted to military expenditures declined from 25% at the end of the Odria military dictatorship in 1958 to 16.7% in 1966, but has risen to 19.3% in the 1967 budget (this does not include the supersonic aircraft purchase). We cannot continue to support the Peruvian Government if there is an open-ended situation regarding military

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expenditures. Therefore, the negotiating team will seek to eliminate in whole or in part the increase in military expenditures which is being proposed for 1967. It should be recognized that this will be very difficult to achieve. We will seek to have CIAP advise the Peruvians against further increases in the military's share of the budget in later years. The negotiating team will inform the Peruvians that a major consideration for being eligible to draw the final tranche of the program loan will be that military expenditures in the 1968 budget are within the limits advised by CIAP.

United States Balance of Payments

United States assistance dollars will be used exclusively for the purchase of goods and equipment in the United States. Financial incentives for selected groups of commodities will be agreed on with the Peruvian authorities which will make AID dollars especially attractive for importers and will serve to increase the United States share of the Peruvian market.

Recommendation

I recommend that, in accordance with the general framework outlined above, you authorize negotiations with Peru for a program loan of \$40 million out of FY 1967 funds.

William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, May 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have just learned that Larry O'Brien, after announcing the issuance of an EXPO 67 commemorative stamp, was invited to come to Canada on US National Day by his Canadian counterpart. Larry assumed that if the President did not go to Canada, he would be the ranking US official present on National Day. Proceeding on that basis, and unaware of planning here and at State, Larry then invited the ranking majority and minority members of his legislative and appropriation committees to accompany him to Canada -- seven in all. Only three of these -- all from the House -- accepted. They are Dulski, Corbett, and Conte.

The question which now arises is how to handle Larry's three invitees. The alternatives seem to be:

Let O'Brien run his own separate, Post Office-related show and remove him from the official delegation -- I don't think the Congressmen would appreciate this and it would be awkward.

Enlarge the Delegation you have already approved to include O'Brien's three Congressmen -- I think this is the only realistic solution.

Another question has occurred to me -- should someone be designated to head our Delegation? Doing so would simplify organizational and protocol questions. If you do, Larry O'Brien would appear to be the logical choice as he is the only Cabinet officer involved.

Whatever you decide, we need to go ahead with our announcement tomorrow morning since National Day is next week -- Thursday, May 25.

A copy of the announcement approved by you earlier is attached. Appropriate changes would be made to reflect your decisions on this memorandum.

Let O'Brien go it alone _____

Enlarge our Delegation to include Dulski,
Corbett, and Conte _____

*Handwritten
Note by Mr. Rostow:
Sec Rusk
recommends
that Larry
head a combined
delegation
15/5/67*

75
Pres file

O'Brien to head Delegation ✓ *Unless I go*

Delegation led by someone else _____

No head of Delegation _____

W. W. Rostow

Rewrite for Larry.

The United States Delegation to EXPO '67, Montreal, on May 25, United States National Day at EXPO, will include Senator John J. Sparkman, of Alabama; Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, of Iowa; Representative Thomas E. Morgan, of Pennsylvania; and Representative Frances P. Bolton, of Ohio; The Honorable Lawrence F. O'Brien, Postmaster General; the United States Ambassador to Canada, the Honorable W. Walton Butterworth; The Honorable Leonard H. Marks, Director of the USIA; and the United States Commissioner-General to the Canadian World Exhibition, the Honorable Stanley R. Tupper, will also be members of the Delegation.

It should also be noted that the Joint Canada-United States Cabinet Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs will be meeting in Montreal on June 20-22 at the invitation of the Government of Canada. Cabinet members attending that meeting will also visit EXPO '67.

The President would like very much to visit Canada at a time when arrangements here will permit.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-470
By CB, NARA, Date 7-24-95

Mr. ~~Rostow~~ 76

6 map
2. Pres file

~~SECRET~~

May 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Other Israeli Items

In talking with Luke Battle yesterday, Ambassador Harman made the two following points:

1. Prime Minister Eshkol would like to make an official visit to the US. Early October would be particularly convenient because he could stop here in conjunction with a visit to Argentina. He would simply like to discuss future trends in the Middle East. Ambassador Harman noted that this request pre-dates the current crisis. Luke acknowledged the request and said he assumed that the Israelis would not expect an immediate response.

2. He asked whether there were any further progress on the aid package. Luke said we would not have any final answers yet and suggested that now might not be the time for us to go before the world with a large aid commitment to Israel. Harman said that, of course, it could be kept quiet for as long as we wished.

We have had other quiet suggestions from the Israeli Embassy that an answer on the aid package now would be a big boost for morale in Jerusalem. I think, if you want, we could give them answers on everything but the APCs without much harm, provided we asked them to keep it quiet for the moment. They do want to get on with their PL 480 and long range military spares buying.

One new note has been injected into the problem of APCs. The Israelis announced quietly right before their Independence Day Parade that they would be buying some armored cars from France. They probably still want the APCs from us but these French cars are ideal for patrolling, so it looks as if they want the APCs for other purposes. This might provide an added reason for our separating APCs from the rest of the aid package. We could give them the rest of our answers and ask them to explain where these French cars fit into the picture before talking about APCs further.

W. W. Rostow

Go ahead with economic parts of the package and military credit _____
Ask about French armored cars too _____
Don't do anything _____

~~SECRET~~

Mr. V. P. T. J.

27

Friday, May 19, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a friendly 75th birthday greeting to President Tito.

Francis M. Bator

Approve ✓

5/20/67

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

FMB:LSE:gg

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT TITO

Excellency:

**The American people and I extend cordial greetings
and warm congratulations to you and Madame Broz on
your seventy-fifth birthday.**

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

**His Excellency
Marshal Josiph Broz Tito
President of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Belgrade**

FMB:LSE:mst

Thursday, May 18, 1967
7:50 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk, anxious to prevent Wilson and Brown from blowing up and anxious to get Tommy's guidance, proposes two urgent telegrams, one to London and the other to Moscow.

They would commit us:

-- To holding the Hanoi attack, if it does not go tonight, for "at least a week" while Brown is in Moscow and Buddha's birthday is passed;

-- To move us towards a marked lessening -- but not necessarily a cessation -- of attacks in the northern part of North Viet Nam.

Sec. Rusk is extremely anxious to have your judgment and instruction.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, May 18, 1967
7:35 p.m.

Pres file

Targets

Mr. President:

Herewith, as requested, our in-house study of Hanoi-Haiphong targets on a selective basis, on the assumption we wish to keep that option alive and active.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-470
By CB, NARA, Date 7-24-95

~~TOP SECRET~~

May 18, 1967

80a

Selective Air Harassment of Northern North Vietnam

Note: The purpose of this memorandum is to suggest a limited, selective list of targets for attack in the northern part of North Vietnam, on the assumption that we wish to keep that option alive and active.

1. Objectives: The objectives of a selective and economical air harassment of northern North Vietnam might be to:

- Keep Hanoi honest -- that is, prevent them from redeploying air defenses to the south or repairing the electric power plants.
- Maintain pressure against Hanoi in the light of unfolding intelligence so that strains -- if they turn out to be significant -- are not substantially lessened.
- Maintain the Hanoi-Haiphong bombing as a bargaining counter.

2. Exclusions. The terms of reference for such a campaign exclude consideration of:

- Ports (three primary, one less significant).
- Airfields (two primary, three important).
- Locks (seven navigation locks).
- Targets in the ChiCom buffer zone.

3. Target Systems. Thus, the potential targets for consideration can be grouped into five target systems:

- Electric Power (when repair or other new intelligence justifies).
- Military.
- Transportation.
- Industrial.
- Communications.

4. Military Targets. These targets are those most directly related to Hanoi's support of the war in the south. The most lucrative targets in this category are probably the Ministry of National Defense (#57) and Hanoi Air Defense Headquarters (#30). Destruction of these targets would serve to bring the war close to home to the military leaders and would greatly complicate their problems of military command and control. To some extent, however, Hanoi must have taken steps to prepare for

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-470

By CG, NARA, Date 7-24-95

~~TOP SECRET~~

5/18/67

this eventuality in order to lessen the impact. Although the Joint Staff estimates only 50 "civilian casualties," total casualties would probably be considerably higher if the headquarters were fully occupied. Although both targets are well-defined, they are located in built-up areas, and bombing errors could cause high collateral damage -- especially in the attack on the Ministry of Defense involving 78 strike aircraft. Thus, we recommend that attacks on these two targets be deferred for the time being. We also recommend deferral of Hanoi Supply Depot S because of the large number (400) of estimated civilian casualties.

The remaining important military targets on the list for attack are:

	<u>Strike Aircraft</u>	<u>Est Loss Rates</u>	<u>Civilian Casualties</u>
59, Hanoi Supply Depot (N)	30	3%	30
35, Son Tay Barracks (SW)	48	3%	2

There are seven additional targets which are less significant but which might be put on a secondary list. Four consist of barracks complexes representing 3% of pre-strike national capacity. Although the targets are not especially lucrative in themselves, they might be worth attacking in terms of their value when compared with low loss rates and low civilian casualties.

39.29 Kep Ha Barracks (NE)	60	0%	0
39.33 Trai Thon Barracks	24	0%	1
39.41 Ngoc Thi Bks/Supply Depot	18	0%	2
39.42 Son Dong Bks/Mil. School	42	2.5%	0

Three additional targets recommended by CINCPAC are possible candidates even though classified as less significant by the Joint Staff. Decision to strike these targets should be based on proximity to port facilities, loss rates, and civilian casualties -- information which we do not have at present.

(094) Haiphong Warehouse
(1294) Haiphong Military Storage (SE)
(0268) Hanoi Vehicle Repair

~~TOP SECRET~~

5/18/67

5. Transportation. There are only two important transportation targets left outside the port areas, airfields, and the ChiCom buffer zone. Destruction of these targets would have a direct -- but by no means decisive impact -- on Hanoi's transport. Both are subject to reservations. The psychological impact -- especially the destruction of the mile-long Red River Bridge as an important symbol -- should be even greater than the direct military and economic effect. But, unless Walleye would be effective, civilian casualties might be serious despite the 0 estimate. The civilian casualty level also renders JCS 21 marginal.

	<u>Strike Aircraft</u>	<u>Est Loss Rates</u>	<u>Civilian Casualties</u>
12, Hanoi RR/Highway Bridge	34	3%	0
21, Hanoi RR Yard/Shops	22	3%	99

Three additional less significant targets recommended by CINCPAC should be evaluated in terms of proximity to port facilities, loss rates, and civilian casualties:

(2199) Hanoi/Thanh POL
(030) Haiphong RR Yards/Shops
(067) Haiphong RR Yards (W)

6. Industrial. There are no important industrial targets remaining. CINCPAC has proposed eight targets (fertilizer, cement products, construction materials, and chemicals) which the Joint Staff does not consider valid under current concepts. We concur.

CINCPAC has proposed three other industrial targets falling in the Joint Staff's "less significant" category:

(0780) Haiphong Battery Plant
(0260) Hanoi Rubber Products
(0799) Van Dien Battery Plant

These cannot be recommended on any serious criteria at the present time.

5/18/67

7. Communications. Since Communist governments are especially dependent upon communications to maintain control of their population, we feel that three civil radio facilities should be considered for attack. The Joint Staff does not consider these are valid under current concepts because they are not justifiable in terms of any direct military impact on the war in the north or south. Informally, we understand that they would raise no objection if the decision were made to attack on other than military grounds. The facilities are located six to ten miles from Hanoi. In view of the impact on Communist control systems, the psychological effects, and the effect (perhaps temporary) on Hanoi's propaganda effort, we recommend these be considered:

	<u>Strike Aircraft</u>	<u>Est Loss Rates</u>	<u>Civilian Casualties</u>
66, Hanoi International Xmtr	14	3%	2
66.1, Hanoi HF Radio Facility	52	0%	0
67, Hanoi International Radio Rcvr 18		1 - 2%	1

8. Conclusion:

A limited and selective target list for continued attack in the Hanoi-Haiphong area might, then, look something like this:

<u>Essential</u>	-- electric power targets which may emerge.
<u>Major</u>	-- 59, Hanoi Supply Depot (N) -- 35, Son Tay Barracks (SW) -- 12, Hanoi RR/Highway Bridge, if <u>Walleye</u> judged effective
<u>Secondary</u>	-- 39.29 Kep Ha Barracks (NE) -- 39.33 Trai Thon Barracks -- 39.41 Ngoc Thi Bks/Supply Depot -- 39.42 Son Dong Bks/Mil. School -- (094) Haiphong Warehouse* -- (1294) Haiphong Military Storage (SE)* -- (0268) Hanoi Vehicle Repair* -- (2199) Hanoi/Thanh POL* -- (030) Haiphong RR Yards/Shops* -- (067) Haiphong RR Yards (W)* -- 66, Hanoi International Xmtr* -- 66.1, Hanoi HF Radio Facility* -- 67, Hanoi International Radio Rcvr*

*require further staff work

W. W. R.

81
Thursday, May 18, 1967
7:00 p.m.

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Chuck Roberts has just called to report as follows: their Pentagon man tells him that there is a plan before the President to cut back bombing in the northern part of North Viet Nam and to concentrate it in the 60-mile stretch north of the DMZ.

I told him that to my certain knowledge no decisions about the future of bombing policy have been made. I recalled that NEWSWEEK made one mistake in stating what sort of plans had been put before the President, and I urged him to take what I told him in good faith and seriously. He said if, before the end of the week -- say, Saturday -- I could tell him whether such a plan was being considered, he would be grateful.

I said that I could make no such promise. So long as I had been in the White House, targeting discussions had been going on. They would go on in the future. They were a most sensitive kind of war plan. I did not wish to mislead him, nor would I wish to promise to give him information no responsible public servant should give.

He accepted that.

But the fact is that someone in the Pentagon is leaking.

W. W. R.

I have informed Bob Mc Namara

Pres file

Thursday, May 18, 1967 -- 6:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Mr. Thomas Morgan came in to see me on the basis of the attached letter. George Christian and I both believe that I checked this with him; but neither of us has a record. In any case, he has begun working on the story; and I gave him an initial briefing on how our shop is run down here.

He has, I gather, fanned out to the Pentagon and will be, presumably, seeing others.

I don't see any way to stop him -- which I would prefer; but I do wish your guidance on cooperation.

W. W. Rostow

Cooperate fully_____

Let him build his story on his own_____

See me_____

WWRostow:rlh

82a

LIFE

TIME & LIFE BUILDING
ROCKEFELLER CENTER
NEW YORK 10020

(212) JU 6-1212

April 7, 1967

Dear Professor Rostow:

The editors of LIFE have assigned me to write an article for a forthcoming issue that would consist of an exposition of your current thinking about America's role "in the world arena" plus a biographical portrait primarily concerned with the development of your ideas. I hope that this will meet with your approval and that I may visit you in Washington at your earliest convenience.

Perhaps you will recall that we met some years ago just before I left to interview Nehru and cover the Sino-Indian war for LOOK magazine. I was then, as now, a free-lance. You were kind enough to talk to me off-the-record in your office at State. So much has happened since then (and since "The United States in the World Arena," which I am re-reading now), that I am of course looking forward with great anticipation to meeting you again and spending the necessary time for developing an accurate and significant article.

I should very much appreciate the favor of a reply setting an initial time and date suitable for you. My own schedule is completely flexible.

Kindest regards.

Cordially,

Thomas B. Morgan
Thomas B. Morgan

Dr. Walt W. Rostow
Special Adviser to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

OK

PRESERVATION COPY

Pres file

Thursday, May 18, 1967 -- 6:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

As a farmer and a man who has carried on his shoulders the burden of two successive Indian droughts, this article in the London ECONOMIST, of May 13, will interest you.

It discusses the potentialities of the new seeds now being put to work; but underlines the requirement for larger investment in both chemical fertilizers and water to make them wholly effective.

They are no panacea; but they give us some light at the end of the tunnel because they can buy time until population control measures become effective.

The Pakistani are even further ahead than the Indians in this matter.

A success story is building up in Turkey; and another one in the Philippines. I believe it appropriate that, without our claiming credit -- Mexican, Filipino, Indian, and others ^{and} who have a hand in all this -- you might well find an occasion to talk about what is happening in the seed business for two reasons:

- We have in fact played a significant role;
- It would hearten our people to feel that something quite dramatic and hopeful is under way in this ominous food-population field.

W. W. Rostow

Get Agriculture, AID, State to prepare a brief report
on seed successes and possibilities _____

Let it ride _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rln

some opposition leaders relied on to split the Congress vote.

His defeat would certainly have been a blow for Indian secularism. But his victory, curiously, made his religion the least significant thing about him. India will be no more or less secular under a Moslem head of state than it was under his Hindu predecessors. What mattered more, in the short term was that Mrs Indira Gandhi's political judgment had been vindicated as against some of her Congress colleagues who had not favoured Dr Hussain's candidacy; and, in the longer term, that the president would be in harmony with the ruling party.

A president chosen by national consensus might have been ideal. But, failing that, the choice of a Congress nominee was the next best thing, not because Congress is the repository of virtue but for the practical reason that the prime minister and president have to work together. Indian politics may yet demand a more politically active president (though Dr Hussain does not look the man to become one). To choose an opposition president would have been to risk positively inviting the president to take advantage of this possibility.

India's Food

A land of plenty

BY OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

The world's hungriest nation could feed itself and even export food within a few years. Fantasy? Maybe. But not the delusion of wishful-thinking Indian politicians. This one has been dreamed up by cool-eyed scientists who have seen the future of Indian agriculture in the experimental fields of Punjab and know that it can work. The fantasy lies in thinking that it actually will.

What the scientists have seen are fields of wheat and millet which at this moment are yielding up to twice as much as previous record crops. They have been sown with new breeds of grain developed at the Punjab Agricultural University by Dr D. S. Athwal. He leads the world in creating new high-yield varieties of grains through intensive cross-breeding and hybridisation. The first fruits of his work on several thousand acres of Punjab farmland mark the beginnings of what could be an Indian—and world—agricultural revolution.

Dr Athwal's research has already changed cropping patterns in Punjab. Farmers were giving up one of their staple food grains, bajra (pearl millet), and turning to cotton for greater profits. It looked as if bajra acreage was going to be halved, until the spring of 1965 when Dr Athwal released the first known hybrid bajra. It not only yielded twice as much as previous strains but was highly resistant to drought and disease. The first test planting by local farmers was so successful that demand for the new seed soon overwhelmed the supply. Now bajra is threatening to drive cotton out of production.

Yet bajra will not solve India's food problem. For one thing, Indian peasants don't like it. They will use it to make their cake-like chapatis in hard times—bajra is a hardy grain and survives bad seasons, like the last few, when other crops die—but they will prefer wheat any day. So will the farmer, for whom wheat is more profitable if more trouble to tend and riskier. But the farmer might have had a second think, until Dr Athwal resolved his conflict by developing a wheat strain with yield increases almost as phenomenal as the millet.

The miracle wheats began in Mexico where a research team disproved the old assumption that many-seeded plants had to be tall and produced the first dwarf wheat. The main advantage of dwarf wheat over the old tall varieties was that it could take much higher doses of fertiliser without falling over. At the end of 1963, Mexican wheat was brought to India and after field testing was distributed throughout the country. It yielded up to 50 per cent more than the Punjab wheat. But Dr Athwal continued selecting from among the thousands of Mexican breeding lines and came up with another dwarf that averaged 30 per cent higher than the first Mexican import. In the 1966 harvest, the 80 Punjab farmers who had tested this new line, PV18, produced 2.5 to 3 tons an acre, against the Punjab average of 1,100 pounds per acre and the all-India average of 800 pounds.

PV18 was setting records, but it still wasn't India's answer. For PV18 is a red-seeded wheat and the Indian peasant has a centuries-old attachment to amber-coloured chapatis. So one year after the first release of PV18, Dr Athwal found a sister dwarf line which combined the high yield and disease-resistance of PV18 with the amber-coloured seed of the indigenous Punjab wheat and the wide adaptability of hybrid bajra. He named this strain Kalyan 227. Kalyan is his home village. In both Punjabi and Hindi its name means salvation.

Five thousand acres' worth of "salvation" goes out to Punjab farmers for the first time next month. At the same time, 100,000 acres' worth of PV18 will be distributed throughout the state. By the summer of 1968, there will be enough Athwal wheat seed for all the wheat acres in Punjab and some for other states. Within two years, Punjab alone should be giving India well over a million additional tons of wheat.

For Dr Athwal, this is just the first stage. After developing an improved strain of "salvation," he expects to produce a dwarf wheat with extra long heads that should yield up to 12,000 pounds an acre. (The highest world average today, in the rain-drenched Netherlands, is 4,000 pounds an acre and the maximum produced under experimental conditions 8,000). Within ten years, Dr Athwal hopes to have developed a plant that is no longer wheat as we know it, a hybrid produced by crossing wheat with rye and combining the best qualities of each, that could yield up to 17,000 pounds an acre.

Sky-rocketing black market prices and thefts of Athwal seed grains in Punjab



Dr Athwal working miracles

should eliminate any fears about Indian peasant resistance to the new grains. True, Punjab is hardly a typical state: it has the best soils in India and the most irrigation; it has the most ambitious state agriculture department with the most aggressive extension programme; it has the most dynamic and progressive farmers; and it has Dr Athwal. No other states have had the chance yet to try the new Punjab wheats. But intense farmer interest in Mexican wheat and the tremendous and growing demand for fertiliser throughout the country have convinced agriculturalists that the Punjabi farmer is not alone.

But the revolutions in seed-breeding and in farmer attitudes are only half the battle. They have made a dramatic break-through in food production technically possible. Now they require an equally dramatic effort from the government to bring it off. The vital difference between the high-yield grains and the old varieties is that they can—and must—absorb great quantities of fertiliser. Yet domestic fertiliser production has never kept up even with normal demand. Last year India spent almost £100 million on fertiliser imports which accounted for two-thirds of the total supply. And many farmers went begging because there still wasn't enough.

Indian planners now realise that investment is a pre-condition for growth in agriculture as well as industry. 950,000 tons' worth of fertiliser capacity is under construction and another 900,000 tons is under negotiation. Realistic economists estimate that, on current form, only 200,000 tons of this will materialise, resulting in a total capacity of about 1.7 million tons and a likely output of 1.4 million tons by the end of the present plan in 1971. The minimum fertiliser requirement by that time, excluding wide-scale planting of high-yield grains, will be 2.4 million tons. And by 1976, when high-yield grains are in general use, 8 million tons of fertiliser will be needed.

For the next five years, at least, then

India must continue to depend on foreign-aided fertiliser imports as well as foreign-aided food. And unless a decision is taken soon to allot government funds, or admit foreign investment, for building fertiliser plants on a much bigger scale than anyone has considered so far, India will have lost the chance that its scientists have offered.

But even if it should somehow manage to get enough fertiliser—a big if—it will run up against the other limiting factor of water. Although the water requirements for indigenous grains are relatively small, India has not nearly provided the minimum irrigation works necessary to support them. Now along come dwarf breeds. Because dwarfs take up less space, a denser plant population can live on a given area of land. But more plants need more water. Much, much more.

Scientists estimate that India has the water potential not only to support the extensive planting of dwarf grains but, by permitting double and triple cropping, almost to double India's effective cultivated area from 325 million acres today—400

counting double cropping—to 625 million acres. With the new grains producing an average yield of 2 tons per acre per crop, India's grain production could be more than ten times what it is today.

Then India could presumably become a food exporter. But because of the limits on wheat-growing in hot climates, and because as man gets more prosperous he tends to eat more meat and less grain, some far-sighted agriculturalists predict that India's most profitable future lies in exporting coarse grains—like Dr Athwal's bajra and maize and sorghum—for cattle feed.

These are the possibilities. But water, even more than fertiliser, will require massive investments, starting now. Can the Indian government do it? It is a matter of money—including foreign aid—of choice of priorities and of action. The chances are not high. In the best of times, India's bureaucracy provides a formidable obstacle to rapid co-ordinated action. And in India's present political confusion, any decision-making on this scale seems unlikely.

mined opposition with other ousted leaders—the new ruler of Szechuan may be no more reliable an ally for Mao.

The Maoists have denounced the recent eruptions of violence as provoked by the bourgeois reactionaries, of course, but also as symptoms of "anarchism" and a "mountain stronghold mentality" among the rebels. According to the Shanghai *Wen Hui Pao* what happens is that three or five men form themselves into a gang and then "seize a mountain and pose as king." "Do you want to achieve a great alliance?" they say. "Well, my stronghold should be used as centre. If you do not obey me, we will leave you out." Rivalries over the leadership of revolutionary organisations do indeed seem to be the basis of much of the reported faction fighting. But the problem is that just as Mao gives very little concrete guidance about distinguishing between good guys and bad guys, so he has not been much help to the rebels in providing an orthodox means of selecting revolutionary leaders. Mao himself probably believes that true revolutionary leaders will rise to the top in the natural revolutionary order of things. But in the meantime there may be lots of blood in the streets.

Clearly Peking is still pushing in several opposite directions. The May Day rally, when several of the denounced "counter-revolutionaries" came out of the woodwork on to the reviewing stand, was evidently intended as a demonstration of unity and forgiveness at the top—to inspire lower level organisations to allow their strayed cadres back into the fold. But probably none of the resurrected men—Chu Teh, Chen Yun, Tan Chen-lin, Li Hseuh-feng—feels much more secure today than he did before his appearance in the Tienanmen last week. And rightly so.

China

No, I'm the king of the mountain

The more the Chinese talk about unity, the more they seem to be lapsing into another round of chaos. For the past month wall posters, temporarily suppressed, have been coming back and with them reports of "bloody incidents" and "white terror." Last month, Lanshow, the capital of Kansu province, was said to be "smeared with blood" and corpses were thrown into the Yellow River. Last week thousands of students in rival Red Guard factions battled in Tientsin leaving hundreds injured. Last weekend more than 200 "revolutionary rebels" drowned in the Yangtse River near Chungking when their ferry was hit by a boatload of "reactionaries." On Monday, the *Peking Daily* admitted that factions of workers and Red Guards were still warring, even in the newly revolutionised cities, Peking and Shanghai. And on Wednesday, a Red Guard paper announced that the central committee had met last weekend to topple another politburo member after clashes in Szechuan's capital, Chengtu.

More than a thousand were reported injured and four dead in four days of fighting around a Chengtu factory. Two rival workers' organisations, both claiming to be the true Maoists, used hand grenades and machine guns in the struggle which was joined by posses of Red Guards from Peking, and local farmers and soldiers. According to another Red Guard paper, in another part of the city some 4,000 rebels were on hunger strike after being imprisoned by local military leaders late last month.

Chengtu has been a trouble spot since the cultural revolution began. It was cited

place for such plotting since its local boss, Li Ching-chuan, seems to have managed to hold on to his power base longer and stronger than other regional leaders, despite the depredations of Mao and his guards. After the recent violence—the Japanese have put out the incredible figure of 10,000 killed in Szechuan in the last month—Mao must somehow have won the support he needed to get rid of Li. On Saturday, the central committee was said to have issued a decision dismissing Li from his posts of provincial party leader and political commissar of the Chengtu military region and presumably also as first secretary of the party's southwest bureau and member of the politburo. They named in his place, as political commissar of the army and chairman of a preparatory group for a putative Szechuan revolutionary committee, the military commander and party boss of neighbouring Tibet, Chang Kuo-hua.

The displacement of Li should represent a triumph for Mao. But his replacement by Chang Kuo-hua makes the victory less certain. For Chang himself has been repeatedly poster-attacked for "stifling the cultural revolution in Tibet." It may be that this is another case where Red Guard criticisms do not necessarily coincide with the power ratings as determined from above. But it is also possible that Chang agreed to do a deal with Mao at the expense of Li—and for that reason appeared for the first time in Peking on May Day. Like Wang En-mao, the powerful military-political boss in the other sensitive border region of Sinkiang, Chang may have promised to make the right Maoist noises in return for

South Korea

I like Park

In almost every capital of south-east Asia, there is a military ruler who must be envying Park Chung Hee. Last week, the Korean ex-general pulled off for the second time what his neighbours, Ky, Suharto, Thanom and Chiang have not attempted—he submitted himself to elections and won. This time President Park even got himself an absolute majority. He increased his edge over his second-time opponent, the former president Mr Yun Po Sun, from 156,000 votes in 1963 to 1.2 million. And despite opposition charges that the election was "rigged on an unprecedented scale," most observers in Seoul accepted Mr Park's claim that it was probably the "freest and fairest" in Korea's 20-year election history.

Things have so quietened down in South Korea since the Park coup in 1961 that the opposition had a hard time finding issues to stand on. Mr Yun accused the president of denuding Korea's defence by sending

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, May 18, 1967 -- 7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith as requested a brief document on the relation between the NLF and the Lao Dong party in Hanoi.

It is written on an unclassified basis; but you should know that we have [REDACTED] evidence of the most solid and overwhelming kind indicating that, in fact, the NLF is simply a part of the Lao Dong party.

In the attached chart you will note that there is no communications lines between the National Front for Liberation and the region, province, district, village, etc. committees of the NLF. This accurately reflects their role literally as a front for the Communist party unified under Hanoi.

If you are prepared to let Sen. Mansfield be fully briefed by George Carver of the CIA -- the most knowledgeable man in the Government on this matter - [REDACTED] the case can be driven home. Perhaps our greatest credibility problem has arisen because we have not been willing to make that kind of evidence available publicly.

Aside from [REDACTED] there is a mass of captured documents, interrogations, etc. which support the conclusions of this paper, as noted in paragraph 11. Seven samples of such evidence, quickly gathered almost at random, are in the attached folder.

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 05-53
By isl, NARA, Date 8-8-05

E.O. 12958
3.3(b)(1)

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Hanoi, the Lao Dong Party and the Insurgency in South Vietnam

1. To appreciate the relationship between the Lao Dong Communist Party in Hanoi and the insurgency in South Vietnam, it is essential to appreciate the way the Party thinks of its political role and to avoid making the mistake of thinking that Hanoi's involvement in the southern struggle is a simple function of the number of ethnic North Vietnamese fighting in South Vietnam.

2. The Lao Dong views itself as the Communist Party of Vietnam, not just of North Vietnam, and thinks of the DRV as the "rightful" government of all Vietnam, not just that portion lying north of the 17th Parallel. Four key members of the Lao Dong's eleven member Politburo are ethnic southerners, including the Party's Secretary-General (Le Duan), the DRV's Premier (Pham Van Dong), and the overall politico-military field commander of the war in the south (General Nguyen Chi Thanh).

3. The 1954 cease-fire agreements negotiated at Geneva effected a partition that virtually all parties involved thought would only be temporary. The Lao Dong's leaders felt cheated of full victory but believed the "southern half of their country" would soon fall under their control either by elections or, more likely, through collapse of any viable political structure in the south.

4. One of the provisions of the Geneva Agreements provided for a "regroupment of forces." Under this provision the Lao Dong -- which had absolute control over the Viet Minh movement -- brought to North Vietnam about 90,000 ethnic southerners who had fought in or supported the Viet Minh or were members of Viet Minh families. The Lao Dong also left behind in South Vietnam a covert network of Communist cadre.

5. By the summer of 1956 it was obvious that reunification elections were not going to be held and South Vietnam was not going to collapse. The Lao Dong Central Committee accordingly decided to instigate a campaign of political subversion in South Vietnam ("illegal struggle") to generate pressures capable of collapsing the Saigon Government.

6. Two administrative steps were taken to implement this decision. First, the stay-behind cadre network was directed to resume political agitation and organizational activity. Second, the Party Politburo created an entity known as the "Reunification Department" and put it in charge of General Nguyen Van Vinh, an alternate member of the Party's Central Committee and (now) a Deputy Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese Army.

7. General Vinh's Reunification Department was given administrative control over all of the 90,000-odd 1954 regroupes, i. e., the ethnic southerners who had served with the Viet Minh (and their families) and now lived in North Vietnam. These southerners were screened and, in increasing numbers, selected, indoctrinated, trained and returned to South Vietnam to assist in building the Communists' southern organization.


8. In May 1959 the Lao Dong's Central Committee decided to move from "illegal struggle" to intensive armed action -- a war of national liberation, a decision formally ratified at the Third Congress of the Lao Dong in September 1960. The scale of Communist activity in South Vietnam began to take quantum jumps soon thereafter, as did the rate of infiltration.

9. Until late 1963 or early 1964, the infiltrators dispatched from North Vietnam were virtually all ethnic southerners, trained by the Party and subject to Party discipline. These returnees built the Viet Cong organization and still run it today. In their organizational and recruiting work they played on and appealed to genuine local grievances whenever and wherever they could and many whom they brought into the movement were not Communists, but the insurgency itself was under absolute Party control from its inception and remains so today.

10. The organizational structure of the Viet Cong movement is shown on the attached chart. It is run through the so-called People's Revolutionary Party, which is simply the name used by the Lao Dong in South Vietnam. Thus, there is and always has been a direct, vertical Party command line from the Politburo in Hanoi to the smallest hamlet cell in South Vietnam.

11. The above statement of the relationship between Hanoi and the war in the south is based on captured documents, defector and prisoner interrogations, agent reports and information obtained through various sensitive collection methods. We believe the total weight of this evidence proves the above-outlined case beyond any reasonable doubt.

COMMUNIST STRUCTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM



Thurs., Mar 18, 1967
3:35 p.m.

85

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Ky's intelligent, evolutionary approach to VC contacts.

Pres file

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Saigon 26055)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1991

By kg, NARA, Date 5-8-91

85a

SECRET/EXDIS

Thursday, May 18, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon, 26055)

In the course of a conversation Ambassador Komer and I had with Ky, I led into the question of his approach to Viet Cong leadership elements by asking him whether he had anything to report on developments under the National Reconciliation program. He replied that he had instructed his security people to try to develop contacts with Viet Cong leadership elements and to step up psychological operations.

He said that the greater the evidence of stability in the Government became, the greater the progress which could be made. He added that he felt that after the Presidential elections, and with the establishment of stable Constitutional Government, much more headway could be made with the Viet Cong leadership.

The stability which had already been achieved by the Government had been helpful to a degree and enabled him to talk about things today which a year ago he could not mention. He said, for example, that he could now talk about peace without creating suspicion on the part of his own people or the Armed Forces that he was about to sell out to the Communists whereas a year ago this would have been possible. With the establishment of a Constitutional Government, still greater progress could be made.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-474
By , NARA, Date 5-19-92

SECRET/EXDIS

Thursday, May 18, 1967
3:20 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith another intelligence report that the North Vietnamese are hurting due to our attacks in the Hanoi/Haiphong area.

Pres file

It may relate to the forthcoming twice-yearly aid procurement tour in Eastern Europe by Economic Minister Le Thanh Nghi, but the evidence increasingly points in the same direction; although any single piece by itself is not very solid.

W. W. R.

D

~~SECRET~~ attachment (TCS DB-315/01598-67)

Thursday, May 18, 1967
3:00 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

I am informed that the Navy plans to strike the Hanoi thermal power plant (JCS target 81) at 3:00 a. m., Eastern Daylight Time, tomorrow (May 19).

You face two decisions:

-- What, if anything, we tell the Soviet Union (and perhaps the British) once we know the plant has been successfully hit;

-- What kind of bombing policy we conduct in the northern part of North Viet Nam subsequently.

Ideally, we should settle the second question before we tell the USSR and others anything in broad terms about our intentions. But it is possible to define broad language without precise commitment to a follow-on air plan.

Secretary Rusk is considering urgently the question of a communication to Moscow (and perhaps the British); and he should have his recommendations to you this afternoon.

Bob McNamara and Cy Vance are working on their recommendations, with which they desire to associate General Wheeler, on subsequent operations in North Viet Nam. Hopefully, that should be available tomorrow.

Later today, I shall present my own thoughts on the latter problem, which you asked me to develop independently.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NHJ 91-470
By CG, NARA, Date 7-24-95

~~TOP SECRET~~

SPRING MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE

TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM

857 BROADWAY 3rd FLOOR
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10003
212-675-4605

FOUNDING CHAIRMAN

A.J. MUSTE
(1885-1967)

VICE CHAIRMEN

DAVE DELLINGER
ROBERT GREENBLATT
EDWARD KEATING
SIDNEY PECK
CLEVELAND ROBINSON
DAGMAR WILSON

NATIONAL DIRECTOR

JAMES BEVEL

WEST COAST OFFICERS

CHAIRMAN

EDWARD KEATING

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

KIPP DAWSON

May 18, 1967

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

We respectfully extend to you an invitation to speak at the national conference being held here in the Capital this weekend, sponsored by the Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam which organized the massive April 15th demonstrations of dissent on the Vietnam war. The conference will be held at the Hawthorne School, 501 I Street, S.W., on Saturday from 8:30 AM to 11:00 PM and on Sunday from 10 AM to 3:00 PM. We will adjust our agenda and schedule to accomodate your appearance.

Mr. President, you have repeatedly expressed the opinion that dissent on the war must be tolerated, but have implied that such dissent is costing the lives of American servicemen. It is our understanding that the lives of Americans in particular, and of Vietnamese as well, would be saved by the end of U.S. military intervention in Vietnam.

But we are interested above all in saving lives. We extend this invitation sincerely and with open minds in the hope that we can reason together. We respect the extreme press of business on the Chief Executive, but since in your opinion, as well as ours, lives are at stake, we sincerely hope that the time can be found for you to speak to us. Our delegation from the April 15th demonstration and our conference await your reply.

Respectfully,

James Bevel
Rev. James Bevel
National Director

RJB:vg

Spring Mobilization Committee
c/o St. Stephen's & The Incarnation Church
16th and Newton Streets, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20010

387 7374

Pres file

Thursday, May 18, 1967
2:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached herewith is an invitation for you to speak in Washington on Saturday or Sunday, at your convenience.

The invitation was collected by Mr. Richard Moose from a visiting delegation, at about 2:30 p.m. this afternoon, at the northwest gate.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Pres file 89

Thursday, May 18, 1967 -- 10:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

Brom Smith has done a careful job of extracting the most sensitive passages from the galley proofs of Roger Hilsman's book. Brom's own assessment is attached.

Aside from the question of propriety in exposing these highly classified meetings and debates within the Government, the most fundamental error in his analysis is marked in red on the page indicated with a paper clip.

His thesis is that by bombing the North we led Hanoi to put more North Vietnamese battallions into the South.

Every scrap of evidence we have indicates that the decision to introduce massive North Vietnamese forces -- and also to make the trails into roads, expand VC main force units, and shift to imported heavy equipment -- took place in 1964 before we began to bomb the North. It was a fundamental change in their strategy. In my judgment, it was brought about by the disintegration of the GVN position which began early in 1963 (after much progress in 1962). The disintegration, in turn, was caused by the political revolt against Brother Nhu which began in the spring of 1963 and culminated in the killing of Diem and Nhu which, in turn, led to a further very difficult period of political instability.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 17, 1967

89a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-470
By 06, NARA, Date 7-24-95

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Roger Hilsman's History of U. S. Foreign Policy in
the Kennedy Administration

June 9 is the publication date of Roger Hilsman's book, "To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy-Making in the Administration of John F. Kennedy."

This long, detailed book, partly personal memoir and partly "history," will create quite a stir inside as well as outside Government. Hilsman's service as Director of the State Department's Intelligence Office and later, as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, will permit the billing of the book as the real "inside" story.

Hilsman does not make the President a major target. His criticism centers on Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk.

The author's serious security breaches will dishearten those who believe that NSC meetings must be kept private and that certain U. S. actions must not be discussed publicly. Legal action against the author appears doubtful, but Secretary Rusk has State's lawyers looking at the problem.

As a participant in many NSC meetings, Hilsman gives details of the positions various Council members took on Laos, Vietnam, etc. He could only have done so by returning to his office after each meeting to dictate a summary of the discussion.

As an officer charged with implementing certain policies, he is able to give every detail of U. S. operations in Laos and Vietnam, covert as well as overt.

Critics of our Vietnam policy can use the book as a text. The State Department is already at work on a rebuttal of one of Hilsman's theses: President Johnson's decision to bomb North Vietnam was wrong because North Vietnamese army units which had not crossed into South Vietnam did so as soon as the bombing began.

Extracts from the galley proofs of the book are attached to give an idea of the scope and intensity of his criticism of U. S. policy and policy makers.

Bromley
Bromley Smith

PRESERVATION COPY

90

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, May 18, 1967
10:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Clark explains
why a visit by Holt to the Ranch
en route from Los Angeles is prevented
by a speaking engagement.

W. W. Rostow

Canberra 5574

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RLH, NARA, Date 5-8-91

90a

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, May 18, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR CLARK (Canberra 5574)

SUBJECT: Holt Visit

Prime Minister Holt is grateful for the President's suggestion that he go to the LBJ Ranch following his Washington visit and would be delighted to do so but makes the following points:

A. Commitments he has already made in New York and Ottawa following his June 1 visit to Washington unfortunately do not allow the necessary time and cannot be cancelled.

B. The Australian Embassy in Washington had earlier raised the possibility of a visit to the LBJ Ranch en route from Los Angeles to Washington. This possibility must also be ruled out as the Prime Minister has a firm program for a short Los Angeles stay including one public address.

C. I must, therefore, regretfully advise that a visit to the LBJ Ranch on the outward leg of his journey cannot be fitted in.

The Prime Minister came to this decision with great reluctance after an intensive review of his schedule which simply could not be rearranged at this date. He is due to depart from London June 17 and I also know that if the President's schedule permits, the Prime Minister would welcome the possibility of visiting the LBJ Ranch at that time and having discussions with our President which then would include matters discussed with Wilson and Canadian Prime Minister which I think would present a complete background of his meetings and be very helpful to our President and the Prime Minister who would then seek advise and consent on our joint action.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-474
By pw, NARA, Date 5-19-92

CONFIDENTIAL

Pres file

Thursday, May 18, 1967 -- 9:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

I have checked personally with Sec. Rusk on the three Israel questions you posed. His answers follow:

1. On the APC's there is a marginal, but only marginal, advantage in making the deal through the Italians; it is not certain the Italians will accept. But we should go that route first. On the other hand, he would like not to make the APC commitment in the midst of the present tension for fear it might push the Syrians over the edge.

2. He is fully in support of Jack Valenti's taking on the desalting job.

3. He does not believe the Vice President should go either to Israel or to the Arab world until the dust settles a bit.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-470
By cb, NARA, Date 7-24-95

WWRostow:rlh

Thursday, May 18, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Attached Speech by NVA Officer

The transcript is of a speech by Brigadier General Tran Do of the North Vietnamese Army to which I referred at the Tuesday lunch.

He is a member of the NVA Political Directorate, believed to have entered South Viet-Nam in the Spring of 1966. He is also believed to be the author of several political articles in Hoc Tap and other communist publications in Hanoi.

It is likely that this speech was made to a group of high-level military and political cadre in the South, perhaps to the Central Office for South Viet-Nam (COSVN) in Tay Ninh Province or across the border in Cambodia. We picked up the tapes in Operation Cedar Falls.

Internal evidence suggests the speech was made in August or early September 1966.

The whole document is of great interest. But I found four points that stand out sharply:

(1) the reliance on highly inflated U.S. and SVN casualty figures to provide a basis for claims of VC success on the military front (pages 6-9, 18-19);

(2) the close attention to our domestic political situation -- especially to problems of troop mobilization -- shows how intimately they follow every move and how much comfort they take from every evidence of opposition to or criticism of our policy in Viet-Nam (pages 3-6, 16-18);

(3) the inner contradiction between claims of high morale and confidence with the heavy emphasis on the need for "determination" without which, he says, success will not come (pages 1-3, 24-25);

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By ry, NARA, Date 5-8-91

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(4) finally, and perhaps most revealing, is the section on negotiations -- their firm opposition and the recognition that NVN withdrawal and the establishment of peace in the South would mean their defeat (pages 23-24).

I believe we should brief heavily from this document.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

~~SECRET~~

~~KIN~~

92a

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
APO US Forces 96222

TRAN
DO
Speech

MACJ261

7 May 1967

SUBJECT: TRANSLATION REPORT

LOG No.01-3398-67

1. Attached is a full transcription into English of a captured enemy document (10 reels tapes). It is also a product of a joint AFTR-JUSPAO-CDEC document exploitation effort.

2. Capture data:

- a. Title: Speech by 9 Vinh
- b. Date: Unk
- c. Location: Unk (Operation Cedar Falls)
- d. Unit: Unk

e. Synopsis: A political harangue by BG Tran Do on the subject of the Winter-Spring (1966-1967) Campaign. The contents of the voice recording were previously summarized under CDEC Doc Log No.01-3398-67. The full transcription provides a good insight into the Communist reasoning process and interpretation of developments in, or related to the current conflict.

3. Date document received at Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC): Unk

4. In the event the attached translation report is declassified, The "KIN" marking and this cover letter will be removed.

for *Reece W. Barnes*
HENRY AJIMA
LTC, AIS
Dir, US Elm, CDEC

~~KIN~~
"KIN" IS A VERIFICATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY
EQUIVALENT TO CONFIDENTIAL AND WILL
BE HANDLED ACCORDINGLY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988
By *ry* NARA, Date 5-8-91

Speech by 9 Vinh On the 1966-1967 Winter-Spring Task

Concerning the Winter-Spring tasks, I would like to discuss a number of topics with you, Comrades. These should be developed further. First, the study of the enemy's situation and of ours in this Winter-Spring Campaign, Secondly, the enemy's difficulties and ours, Thirdly our concept of operations and determination; thereafter, the requirements of the political task. It is necessary to speak the truth, to clearly analyze each problem, and to go into specific combat assignments which our comrades should later develop.

First, what is the enemy's situation and ours ⁱⁿ this Winter-Spring? On our side, we must first re-assess two important points to fully realize our position. The first is that we scored strategic victories in the 1965-1966 dry season. To wit we have started defeating the enemy's limited war staged by two hundred thousand US troops and five hundred thousand Puppet troops. The major success lies in the fact that we destroyed a large number of enemy troops. In the dry-season alone, we destroyed more than forty thousand US troops, making it impossible for the enemy to turn the tide and to drive us back to guerrilla warfare. Meanwhile, we continued to attack the enemy and to develop more vigorously our political force and movement in towns and cities. We also gained more experience in fighting the Americans through engagements with all types of US units which were equipped with the most modern war materials. In the last dry-season, they introduced into South Vietnam those units which they usually boast of as elite units, such as the Big Red One, 1st Air Cavalry, Marines, not to mention small and large sized howitzers, chemical munitions, B.52 Bombers. However, all these units and support equipment were defeated or destroyed by us. At present, several enemy units, the 25th Division for instance, have not only failed to win a single victory, but also have been constantly encircled. According to a Radio Hanoi recapitulation, this Division has had a total of nineteen battalions annihilated. This proves that we achieved obvious victories in the dry-season. That is the SVN situation. In NVN, we defeated the enemy war of destruction and NVN continued to play an effective role as the large rear area for SVN. To defeat the enemy in NVN means to bring down as many planes as possible. We must repeat the effectiveness of this to our comrades again and again in order that they understand it clearly. We subsequently enlarged upon our victories in the Summer. What about our victory in the Summer? On the enemy's side, he began his preparations to cope with us in April and May. He admitted that he had failed in the counter offensives conducted in the dry season, and believed that we would launch large scale attacks in various areas. Therefore, he strived to cope with us by dispersing his troops everywhere. Because he was unable to increase them he did not have sufficient troops. His material support also decreased. At that time the enemy deployed his troops in three strategic areas as follows: One Eastern Nambo Region; Two Western, Highland Region; and Three, the Delta of MR V. One division was assigned to each Region. Whenever he discovered our forces, he immediately deployed one division to attack. Throughout the rainy season however, the enemy troops achieved no success but were destroyed in great numbers. We have not yet been able to make a recapitulation, of the number of enemy soldiers destroyed during the Summer. However, a large number of enemy troops were killed during the first six months of the year. The total of one hundred sixty two thousand enemy soldiers destroyed is not completely accurate, because our reports are very slow. Actually during

the first six (6) months of the year the enemy suffered at least one hundred eighty to one hundred ninety thousand soldiers destroyed, as later reports will prove. Enemy casualties during the Summer are almost equal to those inflicted on him during the Spring season, because we fought as hard in the Summer as in the Spring. We are still in Summer. Still incomplete reports for July indicate that only about 47% of enemy troops were annihilated but actually the number of enemy soldiers destroyed continues to reveal that one hundred thousand, including forty thousand Americans, were killed. The enemy strived to cope with our attacks, yet he could not avoid being destroyed. He deployed his troops mechanically, and therefore he could not attack us or disrupt our attacks, while we were free to achieve our objective of destroying the enemy. That is one of his problems. During the Summer, we have mounted attacks on the enemy in all zones of operations from South to North. Large scale attacks took place on Highway No.9, Highway No.13, in Tân Uyên, in Saigon Gia Định, and MR II. It is noteworthy that the battles of this year are not so resounding as those in 1965, because 1965 was the first year that we launched resounding attacks. Last year's battles were not as large as those initiated this year because last year was the first year we went to war. We battered the enemy, causing him to become so badly disintegrated and confused that the Puppet elements at Cu Chi fled upon learning of the fall of Đông Xoài. This year, we fight against a bigger and better equipped army. Yet, we have engaged in many big battles in which the ratio of enemy soldiers destroyed increased compared with last year. Last year, our largest and most glorious battle was the battle of Dong Xoai where three (3) regiments were concentrated. We succeeded in surprising the enemy. This year, the conduct of multi (2 or 3) regiment operations is very common. Another surprise for the enemy was the appearance of the Tri Thien [Quảng Trị-Thừa Thiên] zone of operation. The enemy was only aware of three main zones of operation i.e. [Eastern] Nam Bộ, [Western] Highland, and the delta of Central Trung Bộ. He is now talking about sending additional troops to Tri Thien. There is a relationship between these two surprises. Since he is deadlocked in SVN, the enemy strengthens his attacks on NVN. He has escalated almost to the top rung of the ladder. Now there is nothing but escalating to strike dikes, dams, and the cities of Hanoi and Hai Phong. However, he has received a bitter reply. Namely, President Ho's appeal and the order of partial mobilization. In response to the order of partial mobilization, the Tri Thien Zone of Operations appeared. The enemy intended to resort to a trick, political, psychological and military, in an attempt to produce a great effect on our people's will. But no sooner had he resorted to this trick, he found that it failed due to our negative reply. Moreover, our forces expand continually, especially our main force units, both in quality and quantity. As for local and guerrilla forces, they increase in quality, though they decrease slightly in quantity.

Once again we reaffirm that in the dry season, we won significant victories and defeated the limited war staged by two hundred fifty thousand U.S. troops and five hundred thousand Puppet troops. In the Summer we defeated three hundred thousand U.S. troops and five hundred thousand Puppet troops. In the meantime, our forces continued to expand. Only by realizing this, can we completely understand our current position. We see that our old policies and strategy remain intact and valid, that NVN is determined to defeat the US aggressors, and SVN is resolute to fight and win and will certainly defeat the US Expeditionary Corps under any circumstances. We must maintain this position in order to advance. We should not be demoralized. That is, we must have a very firm strategic position. We must continue to increase our force and our attacks. We must improve our tactics and techniques with every passing day. That is our position. The second position is to reaffirm that we are still on the

offensive politically and militarily. Let us review our military position as stated above. We seek the annihilation of the enemy. ~~The latter may do such things as destroying our storage facilities and expanding his area through the pacification program.~~ He is successful in some areas, but he is still on the defensive. Meanwhile, we are successful in promoting favorable conditions for attacks by main forces, local forces and guerrilla units. Our attacks on the political field are even greater. ~~At home, the enemy government is collapsing.~~ Cabot Lodge is using all means to save it. This is the true reason of the Honolulu Conference. The enemy is also worrying about the coming election. He does not know if he will be able to carry it out. On our side, the National Liberation Front is known for its five-point stand. The Government of the Democratic Republic of VN continues to retain its position. Furthermore, it appeals for nation-wide resistance. An order for partial mobilization has been decreed by our Chairman Ho, and the people are eager to respond to our leader's appeal. At home, the enemy political situation is unstable whereas ours grows steadier from day to day. Internationally, the enemy is also politically on the defensive. He is striving to make everyone think that though US viewpoints are divided, the great majority of Americans will ultimately support President Johnson in case the latter advocates attacks on NVN. Therefore, they are staging all kinds of shows, making speeches holding press-conferences etc Due to bitter failures, the enemy has now resorted to psychological warfare, but it is only a preventive and defensive measure. ~~The deadliest blow dealt him came from CIA.~~ Harriman's trip to Cambodia was cancelled due to the recent bombings [on Cambodia territory]. The enemy is very afraid of De Gaulle's visit to Cambodia. Cambodia is preparing to receive the French President. This is a direct attack against the enemy as he does not want this visit to occur, but he is unable to prevent it. It is also noted that French Television has broadcast some news which drew protests from the enemy government. This complaint is futile, for the simple reason that it is not a form of interference in the internal affairs of any country. The enemy has nothing to do with it. Later on he complains that only the Americans' barbarous acts are mentioned. It is the truth, therefore, there is no reason to complain. The thing he fears most is the International Court of Justice where all nations are represented. Some days ago, an editorial brought forth several troubling facts, and it is not known yet when and how the Americans will deal with this affair. The only thing they can do is to prevent Americans from attending this court. How is one to deal with those who are not American citizens but are determined to attend it? The enemy also presents the hypothesis that no one is sure that the opening of this court will have De Gaulle's approval, because this would indicate that the French have a very low opinion of the Americans. He is defending himself in a disorderly manner. His peace argument represents impudent words. According to Radio Hanoi, only the Thais, their lowest lackeys, side with them. The Japanese only give their temporary approval, the English turn a deaf ear to it, whereas the French are openly against it. India is still undecided and Pakistan is against it. Some days ago, Cambodia said ~~blatantly~~ that the key to peace was in the hands of the Liberation Front and not in Hanoi's hands. Now his peace argument has become a bore he will probably have to reexamine it. The meeting of representatives from Asian countries received attention from no one. ~~Consequently, political attacks launched against the Americans at home and abroad caused tremendous difficulties to the enemy.~~ The difficulty is more acute inside the US than abroad, for the reason that those who are against the war come to question the administration. A committee has been formed to meet with the inquisitive persons, but can do nothing because

the latter are also against the committeemen. A demonstration was the result of one meeting. The demonstrators climbed onto the Chairman's desk and at the end the crowd was obliged to disperse. There were other difficulties. The people demonstrated against the wedding of Johnson's daughter. Ky was insulted during his visit to the Philippines. He has encountered difficulties in the political field. He is trying to show that he has everything under control; that in his democratic country, everybody can express any viewpoint he deems suitable, and that popular support remains behind Johnson. To substantiate this, he claims that reports indicate that the number of Johnson's supporters had increased from 46% to 54% following the air attack against Hanoi. It is common knowledge that this President is very fond of this form of testing the people's views. When the bombardment began, he requested the press to proceed immediately to an analysis of the people's opinions. The increase of the President's supporters implied that the majority of Americans just wanted to put an early end to the war. First, one could assume that this fellow, feeling his prestige waning dangerously, thought it necessary to cheat, in order to preserve prestige, but the value of an inquiry is in reality, only relative.

~~Secondly, these supporters are not people who are backing his policy of war policy, but rather people who think that, by bombing, the war can be rapidly ended and peace can be quickly restored. This demonstrates two points.~~ Politically, the enemy is in a critical situation. Militarily, as I said, he is quite embarrassed and does not know how and when to fight properly, even with the present strength of three hundred thousand troops. I will tell you about that more clearly later. Thirdly, our forces are on the offensive, politically and militarily. In addition, our forces are developing new forces, new battlefronts and gaining additional combat experience. Fourthly, our forces have been developed nationally and favorably on all battlefields. In brief; despite the difficulties encountered, thanks to the successes during the dry and monsoon seasons, we are now: One, in a firm strategic position in comparison with the enemy's disorderly situation; Two, we are at war politically and militarily with the enemy; Three, our forces are developing new battlefields and obtaining additional combat experience; Four, our forces are developing logically and satisfactorily. The enemy has to deal with the same problems as we do. His setback during the dry season was a strategic defeat. We are the winners and the enemy the loser. He is unable to maintain a firm grasp on the situation. The setback during the dry season is a strategic defeat, considering that the enemy intended to reverse the tide of the situation and tip the balance of power in his favor during the dry season. The enemy held the balance of power for only a few months even though he had in his hand a sizable buildup running from two hundred thousand to two hundred twenty thousand troops, in addition to modern weapons such as the B.52 stratofortress, heavy artillery, and tanks. This is the most decisive and crucial action of the enemy. He believed the balance of power would be tipped in his favor but ultimately nothing changed. As a result, after the dry season, the enemy sunk more deeply into the quagmire. Previously, only twenty three thousand advisors were bogged down, but now an entire army has been caught in the quicksand. After the dry season, nothing was settled, despite a strength of two hundred and fifty thousand troops, four thousand planes, and the Seventh Fleet. This was a strategic failure. Secondly, during the Summer, the enemy was repeatedly attacked from all sides. Many enemy troops were eliminated and the escalation of war over North Vietnam also failed. The political situation is more disturbed than before. The bogged down situation during the dry season is already critical and appears, at present, to be more critical than after the monsoon season. Previously,

two hundred and fifty thousand troops were caught in the quagmire; now, three hundred thousand troops are suffering the same fate. Nothing has been changed in the overall picture. Therefore, how about the true position of the enemy at present? First, since 1965, the enemy has frequently changed his strategy in the prosecution of the war but his strategies became deadlocked, one after another. Previously, there were twenty five thousand advisors and some supporting forces. At present, the contingent of advisors has been increased with a view to intensifying the war of destruction in NVN, but the situation has not changed and the enemy has come to a new deadlock. There is no way of escape in sight. Why is this so? As I said, the general situation has completely deteriorated despite the influx of US troops into SVN in the hope of bringing the war to an end as quickly as possible. But no quick end is in sight. The enemy wants to conclude the war as early as possible, but the war is expected to be long, very long, and no one knows when it can be brought to an end. Secondly, the enemy hopes to conclude the war with the buildup of two hundred or three hundred thousand troops. To his great discomfort, the enemy has seen no change in the overall picture even if the contingent is increased to three hundred thousand and four hundred thousand troops. This gives rise to a new strategic deadlock over the number of troops to be thrown into the battle to meet the requirements of the war. At present, the enemy has used almost all his potential and is running out of capacity. How many troops and what type of supplies does he want now?

In a broadcast, Hanoi recently reported that Westmoreland could not answer the question of how many more troops he wants for the present war. He was unable to reply to this question, not because of military secrecy but because he is perplexed to the point that he ignores the question of the exact number of troops needed for the conduct of the present war. He gives evasive answers that the buildup of U.S troops depends on the growth of the enemy troops. He cannot determine his strategy and does not know the exact number of troops needed for the conclusion of the war. He is unable to confirm the required number. Now the enemy is speaking of seven hundred and fifty thousand troops. Even with this buildup, there is very little probability that he can win the war within a period of five years. That is why the enemy is now quite embarrassed and does not know the correct number of troops to be thrown into the battle to win the war quickly. He has encountered a deadlock. In fact it is a very arduous task for the Americans to fight a protracted war although they are well-to-do people. We can endure the hardships of a lengthy war but they are unable to endure the hardships of such a war because they are well-to-do people; A poor man can subsist by spending one piaster a day, but a man who is accustomed to living in comfort, is uncomfortable even though he spends 10 piasters a day. With such a spiralling tendency, the enemy is expected to spend 12 billion a month, 12 billion a month, 24 billion every two months, and, so on.

It means that four years of war will cost as much as the entire defense budget of one year. Is such a cost bearable? That is why the following clever scheme has been put into practice. During the past few days the interest rate on savings by soldiers serving in Vietnam has been raised to 10%. These soldiers have been spending their money quite freely here. Now they are encouraged to send their money home. This is to avoid inflation by preventing money from being squandered abroad. The fact that this trick has been used at all proves that although they are stuffed with wealth, they are afraid of protracting the war. How long can they go on at such a pace? Do not say ten years or twenty years. They say so only to promote self confidence, but as a matter of fact, they are actually apprehensive because the Vietnamese have fought continuously for ten years,

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there is no doubt about their concern.

Therefore, they are now in a deadlock. The deadlock is this, on the one hand, the Americans publicly say that they are determined to go on fighting, but on the other hand, they are actually worried and we realize that it is difficult for them to prolong the fighting. Naturally, because they are stubborn by nature, they may be able to carry on in one way or another, depending on this or that factor. This means that they will not let themselves be brought to their knees like the French who only wanted to do away with the fighting once and for all no matter how. Nevertheless, we can see that those Americans can not continue for a long time. They may be able to go on for a short period of time with their stubborn nature. If they intend to continue for five or ten years, they will learn that we are a terribly difficult lot to deal with. That is their deadlock a strategic deadlock which will generate many other strategic deadlocks. However, let's talk only about two major ones. That is, should we accept peace negotiations or go on fighting? For one thing a tremendous amount of money has been spent for no solution at all, and for another thing, four hundred thousand troops have been sent over here with no hope of victory in sight. This second point has in turn engendered a tactical deadlock in their war effort. These include such questions as what types of troops to bring in. He has tried every thing, including the activation of rifle brigades with no heavy armored vehicles, or heavy howitzers. These troops are trained for eight months in jungle warfare to fight us before coming over here. How can they face people with experiences of a ten year war with eight months' training? This is another of their deadlocks. The first units they put in were the most elite units. Such as the Big Red one and the Air Cavalry Division, which is the only air cavalry division in the world. It is the pet brain-child of McNamara. These units were intended to "knock out" their adversary with the first blow. But the fact is we have escaped such a blow and counterattacked with a dangerous blow. Now then, what else do they have to bring in? And how many of them? The fact is that all their experienced units have been beaten and their fighting capacity has decreased. Now they are sending more recently drafted recruits here, which means that the enemy's fighting capacity has decreased and his morale is weakening. The anti-war phenomenon is now present in every regiment. The nature of this phenomenon may not be entirely political in substance. It may be real anti-war feeling. In any case, it denotes a weary and feeble morale. We have fought every one of these units including the Marines and the Big Red One and have forced them to retreat. They are no longer as aggressive as before. They have tried all methods and we have met every challenge. For example, at first we were rather afraid of their B.52 bombers which generate deafening noises. In the first two or three attacks by these bombers we did not know how good they were. But now we have encountered hundreds of such attacks and there is no problem at all. B.52's have ceased to be a terrifying creature. That is why on the military side, when there are more and more battles every day, we become stronger and stronger and become more experienced in bivouacking. We do suffer a little damage but generally speaking such attacks give us more opportunity to draw experience. Therefore, such things cannot be used to threaten us. New divisions may be brought over here, but they will be less efficient than the previous units. Furthermore, the first divisions brought over have suffered casualties and lost their initial strength and must constantly be reinforced with recruits. Since their morale has been so seriously affected, how are they to fight now? That is the deadlock of their war campaigns and tactics. There is a further deadlock which is difficult to explain. It is like this. They are facing a situation into which they have thrown three hundred thousand men without being able to shift the

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balance in their favor. To throw in an additional two hundred thousand men is like putting 20 kilos on one side of the balance scale which also has 20 kilos on the other side. If you add only 10 kilos, the balance will remain lopsided. Now you have seen that with 30 kilos they could not tilt the balance to their advantage, what then do you expect him to achieve if they add only 10 kilos? They know that too. The fact is that they have to bring in one hundred thousand more men, because they know that if they do not do so they will be defeated. They have to do so despite the fact that the added strength does not make any difference. The main question is whether they can bring in more men, say five hundred thousand or six hundred thousand or even seven hundred fifty thousand. That is their main problem. That is why they have to escalate the war in NVN despite the fact that even by doing so they are still facing failure. They cannot budge Hanoi's determination. Again, that is a reason why they have to increase their troop strength and why their conviction in victory has dwindled. So at the same time they have tumbled upon two practical experiences. They thought they could do away with us but they cannot. Therefore, now it will not do them any good if they bring in one hundred thousand more men. ~~Of course, they will gain some temporary advantages by bringing in these additional men. For example, their rear bases are already established; their forces are already marshaled; and, they only have to add the newly arrived men and can be ready for combat action right away.~~ However, from the general strategic standpoint this does not make any difference. That is another of their deadlocks. It is all right to increase troop strength but what is the purpose of increasing it if you do not see how to win and if the more troops you put in the more difficulties you have? They do not know how to fight the VC with [words indistinct]. How could they hope to do so with more men? It is also to be noted that they have brought troops in here under the assumption that there would be only three fronts: The Highlands; the Central Trung Bo Coastal areas; and the Eastern Nam Bo Region. They estimated that with these three fronts, they would have to bring in four hundred thousand men and that for such troop strength they can expect little reinforcement afterwards. Now suppose the enemy only has about three [sic] divisions. One of these must necessarily stay in Highlands, another in the Central Lowlands, then another in the Eastern part. Such deployment will require one hundred eighty thousand or three hundred thousand men. If he has to fight in Western Nam Bo, he will not have enough troops. If he shifts some of his troops to Western Nam Bo, he will have to cut down on troop strength in Eastern Nam Bo. Then, if all of a sudden there is another front such as the Tri Thien Zone of Operations he will have to bring in one more division. Thusly, he may bring in hundreds of thousands of troops but he must spread them out too thinly. Yesterday, Radio Hanoi commented that the number of combat troops brought in represented only a small part of the total troop strength. The reason is the more troops brought in, the more troops are required to protect rear base areas. Thus, when one soldier is fighting, four others are needed to support him. That is why although the enemy has four hundred thousand men only about one hundred thousand at most can fight, with the remaining three hundred thousand men in logistical support at the rear bases. Therefore, his increased troop strength will not amount to any significant number. The fourth matter is the political crisis.

Such is the situation that the Americans have to face in Winter-Spring Campaign. We continue our offensive stand, which is a winning stand. The enemy is in a position of passiveness and confusion with inherent contradiction regarding strategy, campaigns, tactics, and politics. Now this is something to elaborate on. You comrades may ask whether it makes sense to say that an increase from three hundred thousand or two hundred

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fifty thousand or five hundred thousand men is not as significant as an increase from twenty thousand to two hundred fifty thousand, and not as fearsome as an increase from two thousand five hundred to two hundred fifty thousand. Let us return to the example of the balance. Suppose on one side of the balance there are fifty men, on the other forty or on one side five and on the other four. If you kill one man and add three or four men to the forty men side, you can all of a sudden upset the balance. However, if you add three or four men to the four men side while the five men side increased to seven, then it does not make any difference. In other words, when both sides have seven men each, you cannot upset the balance in a sudden manner by adding one or two more men to one side. Therefore the initial position is important. If you are initially strong, you will remain strong even if the enemy adds one hundred more men. It is thus impossible to solve the problem by increasing troop strength. Now let's speak in a more concrete way. How can we explain the fact that the enemy introduced two hundred thousand men in the middle of 1965? First of all, he believes in brute force, in weapons, and in fire power. He believes that the Puppet Troops were defeated because they were short of weapons, fire power, and war planes, and also because they had little fighting experience. The fact is, at that time the Puppet Army already amounted to a few hundred thousand men. To stand in the way of our main forces, the enemy put forward a combined force equivalent to the Puppet Army's strength plus a number of warplanes (such as B.52), the artillery, and armored vehicles. They firmly believed in their weapons, fire power, and armored vehicles. They assumed that such a well armed army would certainly defeat the VC in any direct confrontation. Upon confrontation of our concentrated attacks, they assumed that the time for conventional warfare had come and they said to themselves that the VC would certainly be defeated if they tried to concentrate regular troops to prepare for the fighting. That shows the enemy believes in his infantry's power. Secondly, he believes in his psywar. At that time, he also intensified his psywar efforts. He believes in his divisions, his B.52, his artillery, his armored corps. The third point is that he increased his troop strength in a very sudden manner within a one or two month period. All this is a result of new tactical doctrine devised by the enemy's best brains and considered by him as very shrewd. On our side, although our forces had developed, they were still subject to limitations. Although we found solutions for our problems, our forces were still rather immature. At that time especially, we did not know as yet, how to fight the Americans, although we were pretty good in fighting the Puppet Troops. That was the situation as of last year, when the enemy wanted to upset the balance by increasing their troop strength. The position this year is that the enemy has actually put in three hundred thousand men and all of them are sinking into the mud. They are being spread out very thinly. Thus, you comrades have seen what the enemy's position is like all over the country.

He has three hundred thousand men plus six full strength divisions, but in the coastal areas three divisions must be used to reach all five policy targets. In the Western Highland areas they had one division. They have recently made efforts to bring in another division to make it two. In the Eastern Nam Bo Region there are two divisions. In the Coastal areas there are two divisions. He must disperse these divisions widely but they still have loop-holes, because the Tri Thiên Zone of Operations appeared unexpectedly. He had to scrape the bottom to get all the marines he could in order to meet requirements. Now, even if he increases his troop strength, he still will have to spread them out thinly, especially in case there is an additional front. Thus, he is in a situation where three hundred thousand men are sinking into the mud and are spread out thinly.

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The second point concerns the enemy crack units which were the first to enter into combat actions here. These units have worn out quickly because of their defensive tactics. Their morale as well as their fighting capacity has decreased. Those who have received good training have been wounded or killed or repatriated as invalids. That is why recently their Senate discussed the question of giving President Johnson the power to call up reservists. This is what he wants to avoid because he wants to create the impression that the Americans do not take aggressive action against NVN. ~~[Sic]~~. He wants to show that the war here does not require reservists, that the American people's life is not affected. He wants to avoid fostering unfavorable feelings among the American people. Now he has to do what he has tried to avoid doing at all costs. This means their resources have been seriously reduced. His morale is low. He cannot train men fast enough. He can draft recruits but cannot train them in time. He has to call up reservists in addition to bringing men from Europe over here to constitute their main forces. His divisions in the US have lost all combat effectiveness because they have been used to strengthen those in SVN. Other divisions activate training camps. That is why some of their Senators have warned them quite alarmingly that if they continue to swoop down head-on upon Vietnam like that, they will not be able to cope with another trouble spot flaring up somewhere in the world, because the American army will not be ready to fight. That is another aspect of the problem of calling up reservists. What has been said earlier constitutes the second point of the current situation. Now, the third point is that his command has lost confidence. It is fair to say that last year his commanding officers believed in their power, they actually believed that they could turn the tide. But this year his arguments have become weaker than last year. He now argues in a confusing way just for the sake of having something to say. In reality he does not see any bright prospect. Furthermore, any increase in his troop strength now will be devoid of the surprise effect, especially since new troops are not elite troops. It must also be noted that they will continue to have rear service problems in case of troop strength increase, despite the fact that this year their rear service support has greatly developed. The other day McNamara himself complained before Congress that their rear service support problems continue partially unsolved. He criticized planning and program officers by stating that their plans and programs have gone astray and provided no guidance whatsoever. Now any troop strength increase will create new rear base difficulty. Even presently their rear bases are by no means secure and safe. The wider they become, the more they will encounter our guerrilla belt.

Now you have seen under what circumstances and in what situation they have increased their troop strength. The question now is how their increases in troop strength affect our own side. Moreover, our own forces have greatly increased during the course of this year, as compared to last year. While increasing, all our forces have gained experience in fighting against the Americans, and have engaged in direct combat actions against all their units. We have managed to establish bases to study enemy tactics and techniques. We have been able to withstand their most powerful forces such as massive landing units and columns of tanks. We also have ways and means to face their warships and warplanes no matter how powerful they are. As you have seen we have captured their infantrymen easily. I will not repeat the details mentioned earlier.

The circumstances under which the Americans bring in one hundred thousand more men are obviously favorable to us, considering the enemy's situation, and our own, in this Winter-Spring campaign. We now have more favorable conditions than ever before. Although we do have new difficulties, these are only minor in comparison with the initial difficulties we had to

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face. We enjoy many advantages now while the enemy finds himself in a deadlocked situation with multi-faceted problems. That is why we can make our own valid judgment, that by increasing their troops from two hundred fifty thousand to four hundred thousand the enemy cannot create any major obstacle for us and cannot change the basic situation. Even when our forces were suffering from limitations, the enemy, despite their respectable size, could not change the situation with their additional masses of fully equipped men. Now that our forces have developed in quality as well as quantity, it is no surprise that their three hundred thousand men are sinking in the mud. We can thus see at once that the additional one hundred thousand men they put in will not basically change the situation. That shows why in the first place we had to calculate and think very carefully. We had to take everything into consideration in regards to our tactics, despite our firm determination. But now we can say that we have nothing to worry about on these points. We can stay calm, ready, and prepared because no matter how many more troops they put in, we can fight them. From the points that have just been analysed, one concrete conclusion emerges; in the Winter-Spring campaign of this year we are in a strong position, an offensive one, and we will continue to remain in that position, which is a winning stance. The enemy continues to remain in the losing and passive position. Even though he has increased his troops in a vain attempt to disengage himself from this passive position, he is still sinking in the mud. We need not deal at length with their efforts and tactics. We can see quite clearly from the enemy's position and our own position that, this year, their additional one hundred thousand men will not be able to do anything more significant than what their additional two hundred thousand men did last year. And we have not mentioned our command techniques and our firm determination. Up to now, I have talked primarily about the enemy's position. To sum up, I have described the enemy's position at the threshold of this year's Winter-Spring campaign. I have also showed why an increase of enemy troop strength from two hundred fifty thousand to four hundred thousand men cannot change the situation because of the difference between the enemy's position and ours, under present circumstances.

Now, we are going to consider the difficulties faced by the enemy and by us. This matter was discussed just the other day. Today I am just going to sum it up so that you may have a continuation of ideas. From the strategic and political point of view, the enemy's morale, both at home and abroad, is weak and becomes weaker every day. Thus, they can do nothing to make good. Their big shots, who look at things from the outside, are feeling depressed. Those who are already here can no longer keep their morale high. The third thing that constitutes a very serious difficulty for them is that the strategic forces of the Puppet Army cannot take offensive actions. They become utterly meaningless on the fronts where our main forces are present. They have come to rely on two strategic forces but now on the fronts where we have our main forces, the Americans must do all the work. Internal contradiction becomes sharper, things become more and more confused. Especially the more troops they put in, the sharper the conflict between the American troops and Vietnamese people becomes. This matter is going to be more serious and they can do nothing to overcome it. Another difficulty is the replacement of troops, the rotation of troops, and rear base problems.

Regarding our side, we reviewed the other day three interrelated elements namely rear service, the troops, and the population. We have also seen how we can overcome our problems. We must make every effort to protect our existing bases. We have said that in a revolution, whatever we gain through

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our effort can be considered as a profit. We cannot expect to get rich quickly. Therefore, whatever is in our possession we must hold tight, we must protect it with loving care while trying to exploit all resources. Fighting troops must participate in a positive way in rear base activities. One final measure is to endure. At the time of Dien Bien Phu, the Central Military Affairs [Party] Committee gave us a very interesting slogan which reads like this: "Being able to endure hardship means being able to overcome it." This obviously implies we can fight only when we can endure hardship. Therefore, since we are fighting, we can endure hardship. In other words we may say that we will manage. First of all, the people on all fronts continue to be very sympathetic to the revolution, faithful to it, and ready to die for it. In our present situation we can always get rear service support from the people. It is to be regretted that this becomes more difficult. But we are sure we can do it. Secondly, as we have seen, NVN's determination becomes stronger every day. There are difficulties but surely they will be overcome. Looking at the passive aspect, we must protect [supplies] and economize. We must go step by step in overcoming the difficulties. We do away with part of them first, then, with all of them in the end.

Regarding troop strength, we do have good prospects, although we can not expect this prospect to materialize in two of three months. But we have seen that the problems can be solved. First of all we have greatly improved food and preventive medicines in the units. At one time we had terrible difficulties in this respect. Some units were very short of medicines. For example, at one time in MR VI there was no medicine at all. Generally speaking we can take the 3d Regiment and the 5th Regiment as a good example. When these two regiments first came here from MR II they had a very serious supply crisis, but some time later the personnel of these units gained experience and became very flexible, as they are now.

Even our younger friends are very tough in comparison to those of us who are of middle age and who have been hardened by 9 years of the previous War of Resistance. We do not know them thoroughly yet but apparently they are very tough. Therefore we believe that with such bases, such revolutionary spirit, we can make them good men. That is why our comrades in Cong Truong 7 [NVA Division] do not have anything to worry about. They will get through the crisis period and become hardened by it. It does not mean that things will be very encouraging one or two months from now. It does mean that, according to past experience, our long range prospect will certainly materialize. The reason is that at present thousands of our men are still scattered all over the place. If we gather them together, feed them, and make them stronger, then we will have a sizeable strength after a period of crisis.

The second point is a resolution of COSVN instructing us to develop militiaguerrilla forces. This has been fully implemented in many areas. One example is the campaign promoted by MR IV to project the image of the peasant with a plough in one hand and a rifle in another. The campaign succeeded in activating militiaguerrilla units. We may also have to enlist the service of women. The main thing is to keep the population with us, to fight in the Western Region to retain the population, and to enlarge our liberated zones to facilitate the procurement of replacements.

Another point is that aid [replacements] from North Vietnam does not decrease but grows in size every day. These are the signs that our aims will be achieved. Of course we need time, as well as our own efforts, but conditions are relative. Regarding the population, COSVN has recognized the problems and has given specific instructions to guide our activities.

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~~Although some areas have encountered formidable difficulties, they have~~ fought and prevented the enemy from achieving their aim of seizing and herding our population. The people's life may be quite upset for some time. There is not much one can say about planning for the future because the war is still raging so savagely that no definite decisions can be made. However, we believe firmly that our people who are imbued with good revolutionary traditions will certainly be able to build a stable way of life for themselves after this period of turmoil. Furthermore, with guideline instructions given by COSVN concerning military proselyting activities and development of Village Party Chapters, it is certain that within a period of two to three years the effects of COSVN resolutions will become quite apparent. If a Committee member can morally mobilize the population, there will be young men volunteering for the army, thus we will have our replacements.

To sum up, the immediate difficulties are quite knotty. We will not be able to solve them in a short period of time. Considering our tradition of struggle and our experience, in view of objective conditions regarding the enemy's position and ours, due to the situations in NVN and in SVN, we see that there are many tendencies towards a solution. The world situation becomes more and more favorable. Unrestricted aid is coming from the Socialist Bloc to NVN. If NVN grows stronger, it means that we have a stable rear base and reinforcements for the front line to improve. The general tendencies are towards improvement. If we compare the situation now with that of 1965 or of earlier years, ~~we will see that the present difficulties are no smaller in number but no greater in degree. They are big from strategic point of view. For example, our demands now run to thousands of replacement recruits. The difficulties regarding these demands are larger in scale but they are no more difficult than those we have encountered previously.~~ At the time when you Comrades launched the Campaign of Binh Gia, you did not even have enough ammunition the moment you went to the battlefield. That means you were at a 50% disadvantage. Nevertheless, you decided to fight and to get more ammunition while fighting. Another case concerns last year, when the Americans were pouring in so fiercely. We also decided to fight. Discussions were held between higher and lower echelons of our people before we started fighting so that we became fully aware of the difficulties and the complicated implications. The result is we have gained more experience every day right up to the present. Now, if we look back to 1962 or 1960 we will see that the difficulties we encountered then were much more arduous, though smaller in scale, than those we are facing now. At that time, we were able to endure them and finally to surmount them. The difficulties we have now are therefore no more difficult than those we had before, and that means we have better prospects than before. The difficulties are now larger in scale but the prospects in front of us, behind us, on our right as well as on our left, are obvious. That is why our difficulties are of the type that can be overcome. And particularly, there is a magic way of overcoming them, that is to use our revolutionary spirit, the power of which cannot be measured by the enemy and cannot be foreseen by him. Even we sometimes cannot appraise the power of the people, the majority of our servicemen. Our difficulties are those encountered by a growing nation, difficulties facing a nation on its way to victory. Therefore, our demands are difficult to satisfy and are of tremendous scope. Some time ago our demand was for enough rice to eat. Now our demand has increased and become more exacting. We need strength building medicines and nourishing food. Our difficulties have developed as we developed ourselves with our doctrine. After one year of war our demands become bigger. We have new demands which are difficult to satisfy but we will certainly find solutions. As we come closer to victory, the enemy becomes more furious. The more fierce the enemy becomes, the more determined we

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should be. We have reached this decisive phase after only one year. Therefore, difficulties are inevitable. Obviously our difficulties are those of a growing up phase, the kind of difficulties encountered on the way to victory. If we do not have a sizeable main force, we certainly do not have to worry about replacement personnel. Or if we have a small size main force we will have no worry at all, no rear service problems. Or if we do not initiate big battles, such as those of Quảng Trị, Quảng Nam, Quảng Ngãi, or big artillery shellings requiring hundreds of shells, then we do not have to worry about ammunition at all, there would be no problem if you just fight with whatever amount of ammunition you have. It is precisely because our main forces are strong and big that there are difficulties, which, as I have said, are difficulties inherent in the growing-up process, and peculiar to the moment when we are closer to victory. What then, are the difficulties of the enemy? They are difficulties of the losers, the difficulties of a big deadlock for which no solution can be found. The enemy himself has stated clearly what his program is.

It is not we who sit here and talk about it and attribute it to him. At present he himself is saying that there is no way of deciding how much his troop strength should be increased, etc.. He finds himself in a deadlock, and such difficulty cannot be overcome. Of course the enemy can partially overcome his difficulty concerning rear service support or troop replacements. Such difficulties as conflicting strategic matters, conflicting political matters, internal contradiction, and low morale that becomes progressively worse, cannot be overcome. Looking at our arduous difficulties, then looking at the difficulties of the Americans, we can make a correct assessment of the enemy's and our difficulties. We must, however, discuss and clarify the main directions in which our difficulties lie, and the main directions in which our solutions are to be found. Certainly, each of you has his own ideas on how to overcome difficulties. Our whole population is also making efforts to overcome them. The policy being implemented by Military Region II is a good example; "To fight the enemy you must know him. To overcome difficulties you must know them!" The obvious nature of our difficulties is that they can be overcome. That is why we must emphasize, over and over again, the enemy's difficulties and our difficulties so that you may recognize them clearly. You must adopt a revolutionary spirit, you must look at things in a revolutionary and materialistic way, only then can we see that the difficulties and the weaknesses of the enemy are fundamental while our weakness is only temporary in nature. Our difficulties can be overcome, because they are inherent in the growing-up process. We now come to the third part, concerning our determination and concept of operations.

Before dealing with our determination and concept of operations, I will describe in brief what the Americans are going to do this year. As has been said several times, they can bring their strength to four hundred thousand men. Now they have six fully manned divisions plus two brigades. They may add one Lorean Regiment and from two to three US divisions. But they cannot do that overnight. It will take them from now until the end of this year to bring these two or three divisions here. Presently, the best they can do is to add another division, in addition to the eight thousand men recently brought in. Therefore, at the outset of this campaign, we will fight only three hundred thousand men. This figure will be increased to four hundred thousand only by the end of the year, but of course, by then, the situation will have changed. Our conditions by then will also be different. The question to be asked now is this, suppose from now until September, they increase their strength by one division, will there be any change in the situation of the battle field? The answer is there will not be much change..

It is 90% certain that the additioned division will be sent to Tri Thien. They are still considering the matter. The Highland areas will continue to have the 4th Division, then between the Highland and An Khe they will keep the same pet unit. Down South in Binh Duong, Binh Long, there is the Red One Division, in Tay Ninh and Trang Bang they have a reinforced division but it is as yet unknown. We should deal them another blow and see what happens. But this enemy has rather strong war potential, he is also stubborn. Therefore, it can be assumed that this year he will want to concentrate his forces to launch a dry season offensive, even more powerful than last year, to fight the VC. But, as had been said earlier, they want to concentrate but they cannot solve the problem, because their fighting efficiency has decreased. They want to concentrate to become stronger, but the VC have also doubled their forces in some areas or increased them by half in others. Therefore, the enemy is trying to solve their problems by shifting forces from one place to another without finding a solution. But speaking of this determination and this intention, they will concentrate their forces and try to deal us a blow. Regarding the enemy's aims, there is not much difference in comparison with last year. These are, primarily, a few strategic aims. For example annihilating our main force units, clearing rear bases, linking roads, pacifying certain important areas, etc ... The only difference is that after suffering a defeat last year, the enemy is going into the next phase with a large troop strength. His morale is basically lower than last year. Many signs prove that he is getting prepared for this strategem. His generals and colonels have been visiting, studying, then reporting and investigating. Westmoreland has met with Johnson to discuss thirty six questions - what a tremendous amount of discussion - then he has held press conferences, and made statements concerning this and that in a very confusing way. In reality all this means is that he is getting ready to fight us. I can only speak in a broad way about this matter, which will be dealt with in a more realistic manner later on by Comrade Ba Lang [aka BG Le Trung Tan]. Now, before dealing in detail with our determination, we must review our immediate intentions. First of all, the year 1965 was marked by our determination to defeat the enemy, to gain decisive victory in a war of attrition. We have actually gained victory, and the victory of mid-1965 frightened the Americans. It required them to choose between the alternatives of either giving up or taking over the war directly. They have chosen the second alternative with all its inherent deadlocks and difficulties. As for us, our determination is to defeat the enemy under any and all circumstances. Up to the present, we have defeated him in his first stage, known as a limited war. The enemy has foreseen this, but he has encountered new difficulties and new corruptions in spite of his foreknowledge. Therefore, after analysing every aspect, we can establish the fact that we can defeat the Americans in their limited war of aggression in SVN. That is quite clear, we can prove that we can defeat the Americans under whatever circumstances. Each new situation will create complications and new difficulties which, generally speaking, are like this. If the Americans bring in here as many as six hundred or seven hundred and fifty thousand men, they will encounter a region of conflicting conditions and problems. In any case, they will lose all their prestige. We will mobilize thirty one million people from both SVN and NVN. Our armed forces in NVN will grow stronger, our artillery will be more powerful. If the enemy invades NVN, we will continue to concentrate forces in SVN to fight him there. If our guerrilla warfare in the coming period can achieve what has been set forth by COSVN, the enemy will have to use five hundred thousand, out of the aforementioned seven hundred and fifty thousand men, just to face our guerrillas. That is why, any situation, we shall have sufficient capability to defeat the enemy. Of course it will be increasingly arduous. If the enemy carries the war to NVN, he will certainly not be able.

to intensify the war in SVN and SVN will be more encouraged and fight more fiercely. In NVN, the enemy will confront an army the size of which is unknown even to us - but, according to the enemy it would be about four hundred thousand regular troops plus one and a half million guerrillas and militia forces of all ages, who have been well trained and have fought American warplanes during the past year. But that is a peace loving army. It must be noted that other countries are prepared to send us volunteers. This will be helpful for us to reach an early victory. These volunteers will help us to take advantage of a tremendous strategic position, the equal of which has never been seen. If China sends her volunteers, there would be additional rear service difficulties but we may have five hundred thousand or one million men easily. The Soviet Union has plenty of MIG's and pilots to give us. Just yesterday, in an Air Force Congress, the Soviet Union announced that she has recently built a new type of plane capable of flying 3000 kms an hour. That's not bad. Many other countries are providing [material] aid to us but the trouble is we can not keep up with them so we had to ask those countries to store the material for us. Our strategic intention is tremendously important and great, nothing can prevent its materializing. Now, we only have a force of 31 million men morally and physically supported by the whole [communist] bloc. Strategically, we can establish the fact that in SVN we will make every effort to defeat the enemy under any situation. That judgement is, of course, based only on considerations regarding our potential war making capacity set against the background of objective conditions. We must also foresee difficulties and hardship. We must make more effort if we are to solve the problem. Objectively speaking, the Americans are now no stronger than we. They are very rich but not stronger than we. We do have the capability to defeat them. We have defeated two hundred and fifty thousand troops, in the coming round we will certainly defeat three or four hundred thousand men easily because the whole nation has concentrated her forces here. Having defeated the enemy's campaign of the 1965-1966 dry season, when he had two hundred fifty thousand American troops and five hundred thousand Puppet troops, we are now determined to defeat the enemy's counter-attack of the coming dry season with four hundred thousand American troops and five hundred thousand Puppet troops. We are going to defeat them as planned. To sum-up, what is our determination? ~~It is to defeat the Americans' counter-attack of the coming dry season in a more spectacular way.~~ A few days ago the Military Affairs [Party] Committee [HQ, SVN Liberation Army] together with COSVN, agreed to specify the nature of our general military mission. This mission is to maintain and develop our offensive position on the battle field, effectively stage attacks and counter-attacks, annihilate an important element of the US and Puppet aggressive forces, coordinate closely with the movement as a whole, promote the offensive stand of the revolution, shatter the Americans' second dry season counter-attack, and make every effort to reinforce and build up our forces from all points of view. In any one phase, we will prepare the next phase in order to expeditiously carry out our strategic concept of operations, and to gain greater successes. That is the military mission as set forth here. Some main ideas concerning this mission are to develop our offensive position, maintain the initiative on the battle field, effectively attack and counter-attack in order to annihilate important elements of the American and Puppet troops, and closely co-ordinate common revolutionary movements, which in practical terms, means political propaganda aimed at the soldiers to promote the offensive stand of the revolutionary movement. In other words, we must develop our offensive position, annihilate an element of the aggressors, co-ordinate with the common movement, and intensify the offensive in order to shatter the second dry season counter-attack of the Americans.

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At the same time we must make every effort to reinforce and improve ourselves, so that in any one phase we become positively ready for the next, with the view of implementing our overall strategy and achieving greater and greater successes. That is how our military mission is set forth. You may wish to ask specific questions but I am not trying now to elaborate on physical military assignments, which will ultimately be disseminated to each unit. I am now going directly into the heart of the matter. That is, the how and why, and the meaning of our determination to defeat the coming dry season counter-attack of the enemy. If we can defeat the Americans this time it means that we will have defeated another important step in the escalation of the Americans' limited war. We will have also defeated the Americans' determination to commit aggression and taken advantage of some of their corrupt conditions. This means that this year we are going to fight in that manner, while NVN brings down more planes. And once we have defeated another important step of the Americans' escalation policy of the limited war, once we have struck hard at the Americans' determination to commit aggression, we will see that after the dry season their determination will be badly hurt as even now their morale has become lower. Their determination to commit aggression will be much more severely shaken if this time we are to deal them another blow and annihilate more of their men. Even now their two hundred fifty to three hundred thousand men have come to naught because they have failed in the dry and the rainy season. The enemy generals and colonels no longer believe in their force. Recently, even the American press has complained about this. Nguyen Cao Ky himself no longer has conviction in American victories and the reason why he continues to talk nonsense is because he does not believe that the Americans will win the war. For example, he says that his idea of directly invading NVN is meant as a mockery because he believes that the Americans cannot win and that the longer they go on the more they suffer. The idea is to take the risk. If they win, they win everything. If they lose, it does not really matter for them. So even Ky himself does not believe that the Americans will win. Now if they try to take the offensive again their corruption will become greater and their deterioration worse. That is why it can be said now that their morale is extremely weak. That is why, if we can beat them once again during this dry season, we will have defeated four hundred to five hundred thousand men of the American expeditionary corps and thus pushed the enemy into a more seriously deteriorated position. This has a more meaningful effect because when they first came here their propaganda boasted that they would do wonderwork, they would turn the tide. But, then, after the dry season we dealt them a blow and their cockiness has vanished. They can, of course, use other propaganda themes and then hope that their four hundred to five hundred thousand men can do this or that. But the fact is when we have dealt these masses of men another blow, the enemy will fall into an even more seriously deteriorated position. In view of the foregoing, what conclusion can we draw concerning the American position? The Americans are falling into an unsolvable, self-contradictory position. They want to fight fast to avoid a protracted war but they have continuously sunk more and more deeply into a muddy marsh and thus have to endure protraction. That is why, even Johnson and Westmoreland dare not now speak of victory, especially quick victory. They dare not say the problem will be solved in the near future. Instead, they insist on the American people having to endure a prolonged war. But in reality they are afraid of protraction and only want to go fast. And the faster they try to go, the more deeply they sink. The more men they throw in, the more deeply they sink. It is quite a heavy burden to supply three hundred to four hundred thousand men with everything from water to clothes, weapons, and ammunition. In the face of such failure what can they do? They have to solve the resulting problems. Now put ourselves in their position to see what kind of problems we will have to face. Four hundred thousand men have been brought in.

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Is it advisable to bring in more? That's a thorny question. To bring in more is a knotty question. No really big problem arises when you decide to bring in two hundred thousand men. Then, when you have brought in two hundred thousand men, you continue, little by little, afterwards to increase up to three hundred then four hundred thousand men. That you might consider as still tentatively acceptable. ~~But it will be an arduous problem when you try to keep the United States of America on a normal peace-time footing while you are fighting a war involving nearly half a million men. Now that the problem cannot be solved with these existing half million troops, the question is whether to bring in more troops or not and if they continue to bring in more and more troops, where will they lead the United States of America? That is the problem to be solved concerning troop strength. It may be taken for granted that the enemy must increase his troop strength. The question is by how much, because he is still facing failure despite the fact that he has already from four hundred to five hundred thousand soldiers here. Our force is steadily growing all the time, therefore if he adds about one hundred thousand men to his strength, it will not do him any good. Consequently if the enemy chooses to increase his troop strength, he must increase it by a half or by two thirds of what he presently has. That would mean a tremendous amount of soldiers and again the question is how many more men he should increase is advisable. A specific question is how many more men he should bring in initially in case of such an increase. They are now in a deadlock. Westmoreland really said the truth, really said what he thought deep in his mind when he told newsmen recently that he did not know how many more troops were considered adequate. He really meant what he said and later on, he still feels strongly that he does not know how many more men are adequate. The reason is this. More troops have actually been brought in but these have been defeated during the past period. Hanoi has been bombed and partial mobilization has taken place. When the enemy increases his strength by two hundred thousand men, he realizes that the other side also increases its strength by three thousand or four thousand men each month. When he brings in three hundred thousand men, NVN sends down five or six thousand each month. That is the enemy's headache. By how many more men should he increase his strength to prevent us from increasing our own? He has bombed, he has destroyed storage areas and now he is considering such childish stories as setting up barbed wire fences or controlling the demarcation line to prevent us from infiltrating. What is the use of barbed wire fences when we can penetrate even Tan Son Nhut Air Base? Thus, the enemy has become mentally confused. He has now to think of using strategic psychological warfare against us. Such feeble thinking can only result from his deadlocked position. Now we do not speak in specific, concrete terms, but we can say openly that we certainly have the right and the duty, on a national scale, to help SVN fight the enemy, to help morally and physically. We can say this bluntly and overtly. We can ignore who is coming here [from NVN] or how many men are sent here [from NVN]. But, there is nothing unusual about [NVN] sending personnel to [SVN]. Can we be expected not to bring in our men while the enemy brings in his? Especially when we still have four hundred thousand men available there [in NVN]. (This is in accordance with the enemy assessment, Ba Long has no information on this). Let him increase his strength by two hundred thousand men. We will also increase ours. We have plenty of places to get these four hundred thousand men from. Where would all this lead to? The more they [US] come, the more entangled they become in the deadlock, the more expenses they will incur, the more casualties they will suffer, and conflicting political implications will develop. Such is the natural course of development. To sum up, such are the circumstances which~~

the enemy has to consider. That is one of his problems. Another problem is that he has to make a decision about whether to carry the war to NVN or not. We have discussed this matter previously. He may have to consider such a step. Presently, he has ruled out this possibility but after he has suffered heavy defeat, he may have to reconsider it. He may eventually have to face a potential position like this, if he can not solve the problem with the two aforementioned measures, there will be a stalemate. This stalemate means a protracted war that costs two to three billions monthly with no end in sight. In the meantime the VC dare say truthfully and bluntly that they will fight for five years or ten years. The enemy might not know what we really mean, but he must realize that we have fought the French through nine years and gained victory, and that for the past ten years we have fought increasingly large battles. This means he will have to give up after five or ten more years. Because the enemy cannot solve the problem with a statement status, what then would be the outcome? How much longer can he carry on? Can he go on forever? Can he keep the Puppet administration from disintegrating? The longer he carries on the more disintegrated the Puppet administration will become. Then what will be the outcome? The fore-going is the reason why the success of the coming dry season may very well generate other consecutive successes. These may be repeatedly renewed to bring the Americans to an even bigger deadlock and worsening deterioration. These two situations go hand in hand, i.e. the worse the deterioration, the bigger the deadlock. Where might the aforementioned situation lead? We cannot yet foresee this in a concrete and substantive way, We can speculate that if we gain consecutive successes in the manner described above and if the Americans cannot solve the three problems facing them, then we will be able to change the face of the war and gain a very big victory. Therefore, if our Winter-Spring campaign of 1965-1966 has been a tremendous success for us, the most notable factor of the coming Winter-Spring 1966-1967 is that in this campaign, we will test our will and might against that of the enemy. The Americans only rely on material power and weapons. They are stubborn in character and only want to plunge into a more adventurous course. We maintain our determination to defeat them under any and all circumstances. In the coming Winter-Spring campaign, we will continue to stage bigger and bigger attacks at an increasingly intensive pace and we shall take actions according to two assumptions. The Americans may be annihilated, which means we will have reached the target set forth, based on our past experience. In 1965-1966 Winter-Spring, an estimated number of between seventy and eighty thousand American soldiers was annihilated by us. From now until the end of the coming Winter-Spring campaign, we may fight bigger and more decisive battles and let's assume that we will annihilate another eighty thousand. This means we will have a total of between one hundred and seventy to one hundred and eighty or nearly two hundred thousand American soldiers annihilated. Such a figure does not include the number of sick and fever ridden soldiers that need to be replaced. Such figure includes only the killed and wounded. Furthermore, the number of American planes shot down in NVN will also increase. Next year they will lose possibly 2000 planes because, at present, the number of their lost planes has already reached 1340 and, this, at a rate of one hundred planes every month, but this rate has increased to one hundred every twenty days. There will be ten more months to go from now until next year Summer. By then they will have lost at least two thousand five hundred planes, at the current rate. Let's assume only two thousand. McNamara's estimate is only five hundred for both North and South Vietnam. We estimate that in SVN alone, during the said period, they

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will lose about one thousand five hundred planes shot down from the air or hit on the ground. This estimated figure, if added to the existing figure of three thousand, will total four thousand five hundred to five thousand planes lost in SVN. In NVN, the figure is two thousand which means altogether about seven thousand planes. This is equivalent to the total of planes downed in [North] Korea. Is this right Ba Long? (Ba Long: the [North] Koreans downed 6000 planes and damaged about 5000 others). In Vietnam, we do not count the damaged planes. It is to be noted that the Koreans downed only old fashioned planes like the F-86 but now we are dealing with the fastest ones, such as the F-105 Phantom, etc. Now if we can isolate from three to five Puppet "F" [Division], which is a conservative estimate, because presently from five to seven "F" have been isolated. Such as F.5, F.25, F.10, F.22, F.1 and more. If MR II and MR III can isolate two more "F", then there will be seven "F" isolated among the total of ten. This is quite possible to achieve. The plan is to annihilate some two hundred thousand Puppet troops. And if the people's campaign against conscription prevents the enemy from getting all the replacements he needs and if he can only get about half of that figure, it will mean that his net loss is one hundred thousand men. In other words, he has now about five hundred thousand Puppet soldiers. From now until the next rainy season this figure will have fallen to about three or four hundred thousand men. Further more, if these five "F" are annihilated, what kind of a position then will the Americans have to face? A very serious one indeed, not to mention the political situation which is corrupted. Our movement in the cities will also certainly rise to a higher tempo. Their rear bases continue to be attacked by us. The more troops they send in, the heavier their rear base logistical load. Their rear bases continue to be attacked, their transportation system is more seriously congested. They do not have complete security in their rear areas while the guerrillas grow stronger every day. Thus we have made a calculation of some estimated figures. These figures may be realistic, very realistic and may become realities which will materialize in the near future. From now through Winter-Spring and Summer if we can put out of action eighty thousand Americans and two hundred thousand Puppet troops, this will mean nearly three hundred thousand altogether. Regarding war planes of all kinds, the figure totals six thousand. We do not have, as yet, the figure concerning armored vehicles. This figure during the first six months of the year amounted to nearly one thousand. Let us assume that we will destroy one thousand more. The most significant thing is the loss of American warplanes, the high personnel casualties and the lack of replacements, even though two hundred thousand men were introduced into SVN. Such a situation will lead to a very staggering position for the enemy and bring us nearer to the decisive opportunity of gaining final victory. Now we are planning from the purely theoretical point of view. This theory is based on realities and is materializing. It is not just representational theory. Our forces are now more numerous than before. War tactics are developing in accordance with COSVN resolution. Our estimates are based on standards which prevailed during the course of last year. Therefore, they are very conservative indeed. Now if all the forecasted elements materialize, the situation will be quite different. That is why I can say... I do not know how to say it. It may be said that up to now there have been two elements to open the door, the hinge and the key. I represent the coming Winter-Spring season of 1966-1967 as the key to change the face of the war and to change the balance of forces to bring us nearer to bigger victories, to push them to bigger defeats, to make them more willful and reckless. In the coming summer, they may still persist and want to fight another round against us. Therefore we must be carefully prepared, be alert, and be ready from every aspect.

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However, ~~if our judgment is to be based on prevailing conditions,~~
~~the conclusion must necessarily be that by that time the American~~
~~determination to commit aggression will be seriously reduced if not~~
~~completely defeated.~~ It is to be noted, particularly, that in the
third phase of the war they will carry on by retreating while our
fighting will greatly improve and the Puppet forces may be disintegrated.
I am aware that you expect to see something substantial and concrete
like in 1965. In other words, it is easy and brief to speak of a
decisive victory. The war has developed to a stage where both sides
have tremendous forces. The situation within the communist bloc is
complicated. Therefore we cannot oversimplify the matter to that extent.
We must instead continue to reach individual targets in our overall
plan. For example, we must be determined to annihilate the Americans.
With these relative calculations and figures, we can readily conceive
our favorable position for greater development. If we realize all these
good prospects, all our aims, then the Americans will be crushed,
defeated, or at least their power will be severely damaged. The Puppet
troops and the Puppet Government will be in a serious crisis from which
there will be no way for them to escape or recover. This will be the time
for us to enjoy concrete and favorable conditions, to leap forward,
to sieze the final victory.

So, this Winter-Spring time has, in itself, a meaning for all
of us.

In face of the present situation I have analized for you, with
our present position, with the coming battles, what should cur
political activities be, what should our frame of mind be? At present,
how do you understand the injunction to go forward, to gain continuous
and greater successes? We have to understand it with a determined spirit
to win the war, We have to understand it with a complete comprehension
of our duties. In my opinion, the injunction is very good, We can make
it sound better by saying " the decisive victory is near", instead of
" go forward to gain continuous and greater successes". Nevertheless,
I think that the longer sentence, which does not sound as good as the
short one, has more significance.

Then, for the year 1965, our motto was 'the decisive victory is
near'. This motto was very good, in concordance with the situation at
that time, when we had to ask ourselves, will the Americans send in
their troops and take an active part in the fighting? Then, we considered
the possibility of preventing the Americans from entering this particular
war or landing their troops. That would have been the best for us. At
the same time, we had to prepare ourselves to fight the Americans if
they ever did enter the war. We had to be determined to fight them.

Perhaps we can sum up our position. We must go on and fight the
Americans. We must gain as many successes as possible. We must create
the most favorable conditions for our fighting. We must be prepared to
fight them at any time and win in bigger battles; and defeat them in
the end. When we talk like this, we are not just making speculations.
Rather, we are correct in our thinking since the Americans have self-
imposed limitations in this war which they have admitted is particularly
brutal. What is more, this aggressive war, initiated by neo-colonialists,
relies mainly on the Puppet government. Then, if conditions are
favorable to us, if the Puppet government collapses, if the Americans
continue to suffer heavy casualties, we will see concrete proof of
a total victory over the Americans and the righteousness of our reasoning.

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Therefore, the motto for 1965 was correct in its concept of the struggle and of our duties. The present motto, 'to aim at continuous successes, greater each day, to aim at the final victory', is also as right as the 1965 motto. What are the criteria for this Winter-Spring period? It helps us to understand the situation. It helps us to be more confident in our final victory and the ultimate defeat of the enemy. It helps us to understand why the enemy is building up his forces. It helps us to know the strong and the weak points of the enemy. It helps us to understand why the enemy is building up his forces, although on the losing side, when nothing can save them. It helps us to understand that we are fully capable of defeating the Americans during this Winter-Spring period.

As a vital basis, we have to understand all the Winter-Spring motto has to tell us. Once we understand the important decisions for this Winter-Spring period, once we carry out these resolutions, we will have unshakeable confidence in the final victory. Then, we will be able to make extraordinary efforts, outstanding efforts, to nature a war-like spirit like that which animated our troops at Điện Biên Phủ and helped them to greater successes. And then all the mottos will be realized.

Here, we have to add that we are determined to win more victories to settle the conflict. We are right now making preparations to be more decisive and more firmly resolved to fight better and gain continuous successes. These continuous successes will put us in favorable position to win the decisive battle of this war.

What we have to do is to persevere in our determination to be more aggressive, to gain success after success, to gain ever greater successes regardless of the situation.

The Twelfth Meeting of the Party Central Committee has set two different goals for us to achieve. Seeing that we ^{were} somewhat uncertain about the attitude to adopt in the present circumstances, they have asked us to be determined, firmly decided, on two points. First, we must be determined to gain continuous successes in order to gain the final success. Second, we must be determined to fight better and not to set a time schedule for our fighting.

For the year 1965, the Party gave us the motto 'be determined to achieve successes'. At that time, we were prepared to sustain a long war, we were making preparations for that. We had then to concentrate troops and achieve successes in very short periods of time.

Many of you thought that the 1965 motto concerned only the first phase and this first phase would be only temporary. Some of you were convinced that the first phase would end during the 1965 Winter at the latest. Some of you said that it would end some time in January or February 1966. I think that it is rather too mechanical when you set a time table for our fighting. Besides the fact that you have inadvertently imposed limitations on your activities.

The 1965 motto asked you to 'be determined to fight for a long time' and to 'be determined to achieve repeated successes'. You had to be determined, firmly determined, on both points. These two points are not contradictory at all, since it is we who have to be determined to fight for a very long time and it is we also who have to be determined to achieve repeated successes. If the actual success does not create direct and favorable conditions for us, we have to hope that the following successes will. Success then has to follow success, and we

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have to keep our confidence and our resolution to fight better, and we will have what we want in a short period of time.

But if we have a time table to follow, a schedule to keep, we will be in a rigid frame and our method of reasoning cannot be scientific.

When we are firmly determined to achieve repeated successes and there is no time table to follow, we fight under any conditions. We fight regardless of the number of our troops. We can make extraordinary efforts to gain ever greater successes and we can consequently achieve our goals in a relatively short period of time. If we are not determined to fight for a long time, a situation of uncertainty can occur that can damage our decision to fight for a long time. If we are not determined to fight for a long time and to achieve repeated successes, we can become doubtful. To fight the Americans we can not be doubtful. If we do not fight them, they will look for us and fight us. If we do not defeat them, they will defeat us. Therefore, we have to be determined to gather successes, to crush the enemy continuously while remaining well decided ourselves. Our attitude then will be in conformity with what the Central Party has asked us to take as a goal for our activities: "Be determined to win over the enemy in any situation".

If the conditions are favorable, if the circumstances are good, we have to go ahead, to continue the fighting, to accumulate successes and reach the decisive battle and win it. If the enemy becomes stubborn and escalates the war, we escalate our efforts in concordance with the enemy's moves and win more victories.

Now we are in every good condition, our troops are powerful, the enemy is presently faced with many difficulties. Objectively, we can say that our side is justified in hoping for swift and favorable results. Then it is our duty to make more efforts with the Điên Biên Phủ spirit and win more and more victories on the battlefield. We can take this as a motto for the present time. When our troops were fighting the Điên Biên Phủ Battle, the Central Party promulgated a motto: 'If the enemy is resisting, we have to fight more aggressively; if the enemy is increasing his forces, we are determined to destroy them; if the enemy flees, we are determined to pursue him'. In the same spirit, I think that the motto now can be as follows: 'The enemy can build up his forces as far as he can, we shall destroy them; and the enemy can extend the war as far as he can, we shall continue fighting.' The People's Army Daily [Quân Đội Nhân Dân] said yesterday, 'Beat the Americans hollow' (the audience laughs). Do not do things by halves. The bigger their build up, the more troops they have, the more bitter will be their defeat. Comrades, do you have something new to worry about? Do you want... something? What should our determination be now to win the decisive victory? Will the year of 1965 be our model?

As I told you, we have to be determined to win the final victory. The successes we now have to gain in order to win the final victory, must be greater and greater. In 1965, we had to be determined to gain more and more successes. The good conditions for us to gain more successes were then apparent. We could then make direct and sincere anticipation. We were then determined to win the war, to win the decisive battle, and we were also determined to fight the Americans if they ever came in. Now we are still animated by the same determination, but with a difference. We are determined to fight the Americans, to defeat them in greater and greater battles.

In conclusion, I can say that all of us are determined, to win the decisive victory.

Some comrades have been questioning me about a possible peace negotiation.

Now I will point out some principles.

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- How must we understand the situation?

First of all, what is the basic problem for us? Our basic intention is to win militarily. We use military victories as decisive factors to end the present conflict. We want to end the war through military victories and not peace negotiations. Negotiations are a form of diplomatic struggles. We are military men and we must concern ourselves with military struggles and not consider diplomatic struggles. What is the true nature of diplomatic struggles? Therefore, we must gain military victories before even thinking diplomatic struggles. And even when we are fighting diplomatically, we must go on with our war efforts, we must multiply our military victories if we want to succeed diplomatically.

Thus, we have to fortify our confidence in the ability to employ brute force to accomplish our purposes. I think that I told you once, that on this matter the Americans are more determined to use force to achieve their ends. I do not want to be misunderstood. I do not say that the Americans are more determined than all of us. What I say is that they are more determined than some of our Comrades.

The Americans are talking about diplomacy, about negotiations but what they really do is to cheat us. They talk about diplomacy but they continue to trust to brute force, they continue to increase their forces, they cause more devastation than ever before. They hope to attain peace, by talking about it constantly, while waging a more murderous war and winning military victories. I am convinced that they will maintain this attitude until the situation becomes really unbearable for them, until they are decisively defeated. Now while they continue to cheat us, they will continue to talk about negotiations in order to attain their objectives, which cannot be achieved by military means. The Americans are really stubborn, they are really cunning. They see that they are not able to win by military means, that they can be defeated militarily so they turn to diplomatic maneuvers to obtain what they cannot seize with their forces. Thus, they increase their troops, their brute force, to support their diplomatic moves. They are determined to do so. However, they commit a grave error: They have underestimated us. They think they can cheat us diplomatically and obtain by these maneuvers, what they cannot get with their brute force. They are really stupid on this point. We have to teach them a lesson for that.

All we can say is that the present situation is not favorable for peace talks. We have not yet achieved conditions favorable for negotiations. The Americans talk about the cessation of hostilities. What is American peace, American cessation of hostilities? All that talk only demonstrates their determination. All that means is that we have to withdraw. All that means is that we have to stop fighting, to lay down our weapons. All that means is that we have to let peace lie in the hands of the Puppet Government. Such is the American concept of peace.

And what is our concept of peace? To have peace, for us, is to have the Americans withdraw and the National Liberation Front accepted as the only organization which truly represents the South/Vietnam people. Someone asked Chairman Hồ Chí Minh: "What do you think of the Saigon Government?". The Chairman's answer definitive: "There is no Government in Saigon. There is only a clique of US lackeys in Saigon." Then, you understand easily that negotiations are not possible. If there is something achieved along those lines, it may be through our diplomatic efforts, our diplomatic struggles. As to negotiations to solve the Vietnamese problem, negotiation is not possible at this time and conditions are not right for negotiations. The Americans remain stubborn. They are not yet disposed to yield to our demands. Some of you have heard that they want peace, that they will meet us at the conference table, any time, at any place. They are cheating us. When they talk of the Geneva Accords, when they say they will not remain in Vietnam once peace is restored.

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in the area. When they talk about other promising things, it's only talk. To hear the Americans, you might think that they are compromising. In fact, they still hold the half of the knife in asking for the independence of South Vietnam under the rule of the Puppet Government in Saigon. What is more, we are asked to lay down our weapons, to cease fighting, and let them get all they want. Because of this situation, there can be no conditions for peace talks.

The Americans are more than tricky. They can in fact give up on some point, such as the case in Laos. Such is the coalition government there. Such are their programs of education, medicare, social welfare. If we are to accept such proposals, there can be no durable peace, another fighting period is waiting for us. In Laos, the Pathet are not so powerful, not so strong. Nevertheless they are able to go on fighting. We are far more powerful. Our troops are strong. We have liberated zones everywhere. Why capitulate?

Many people in the world are advising us to accept the conditions offered by the Americans. They say that our victories are already more than enough; that it is difficult to knock down the Americans. It is impossible for us to surrender. These people are too subjective. They are afraid of the Americans. They over-estimate the American potential. They over-estimate the American spirit. They are sincere when they advise us. They advise us in good faith. But we know by experience how things really are. If we accept the American proposals now, we will have to fight again, later on. We can enjoy peace right now, but not for long. We must not be confused. We must be determined to gain military victories. We must not be hypnotized by the peace mirage.

I think I have to tell you one thing that happens in the history of any nation of this world. After any war, there are some negotiations. After the negotiations, there is again war. And if there is some fighting while the negotiations are in progress, there is nothing extraordinary in it, there is nothing astonishing in that.

Since we are military cadre, since we belong to the Army, there is one thing for certain. We cannot wage diplomatic struggles. Therefore, we must maintain our military concepts, be true to our ideal. We must build up our ranks and our power. We must fight more fiercely each day. We must be definitely determined on this point as anyone belonging to the Army should.

Comrade Vinh in NVN told me once that "there could be some kind of diplomatic struggle". However, to fight on the diplomatic front, the Party may need only one hundred people at most, including the drivers, the porters, the photographers. One hundred persons at most. But to wage a war and win the decisive victory, we may need hundreds of thousands of men, all of them very determined to fight. Then, if they need one hundred men or less to fight on the diplomatic front, we will not have to worry about it (the audience bursts out laughing). And we belong to the hundreds of thousands who have to fight with weapons, and all we have to do is to fight, there is nothing else for us to do. If we hear some stories, some reports which can astonish people, do not let ourselves be astonished by them. Do not let them disturb our mind. We have been in the Army for a long time, we have been fighting for the Revolution for a long time, these stories should not puzzle us. If we let ourselves be confounded by these stories, if we let ourselves to be led to think that the proposed negotiation can end the present conflict, this is astonishing. The stories they are spreading do not and cannot effect our determination.

Therefore, we have to reassert our attitude, to be more determined regarding the use of brute force, to avoid any thought about the peace mirage, even to stand firmly against any idea of peace. Negotiation or diplomatic

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struggle is the work of the Central Headquarters [of the Lao-Dong Party] and the politburo, we do not have to worry about them.

In this Winter-Spring campaign, our determination to fight is the ultimate determination. We must also be determined to surmount any difficulty obtain the final victory, and this is one of the basic determinations required from us. We must be determined in our decision to continue the fighting. We must remain so until the final victory. We must win among the people. We must prepare in advance, so that our Army can win among the people. We must prepare in advance, so that our Army can win greater victories. The soldiers have to fight better, to win greater successes in order to seize a durable peace. The soldiers also have to win greater and constant victories among the people.

With the old rules and according to future necessities, we have to prepare the men in our units to understand their present tasks. What is our position and the enemy's basic weakness. We have to let them know what are two forces involved in this collision. Which force is the most powerful? We have to let them know that we shall have the final victory. We have to let them know our motto; 'Leap forward to fight and win continuously greater victories'. The motto in itself has great meaning. It shall lead us to the decisive victory, to the final victory.

I have thus told you about your tasks in this Winter-Spring campaign, about our own political and propaganda activities.

Our comrades in the General Department of Political Affairs [High Command] have sent me a wire on the question. They said that during this Winter-Spring campaign we must accomplish a very simple but essential action: To consolidate our determination, to make it as strong as steel, then we shall have victories on top of victories and defeat the Americans under all circumstances.

Other Comrades [in NVN] also advised us of the same thing: We have to consolidate our determination to fight and win.

I think I have told you what I have to tell, to report to you. Now, maybe I have to add something to all that I have told you.

The problem for us now is to exploit and develop our decision. That was the resolution adopted by the last Conference? Yesterday afternoon, I talked with some of the delegation heads and...

-----END FULL TRANSCRIPTION-----

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