

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[1 of 7]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re India C 1 p. <i>open 3-17-93 NLJ 91-522</i>	5/31/67	A
2 cable	CAP67484 re Pakistan " C 4 pp.	5/29/67	A
4 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Iraq " S 1 p.	5/31/67	A
4a memo	Rusk to the Pres. re Iraq C 1 p. <i>open 8-28-92 NLJ 91-520</i>	5/31/67	A
7a cable	Saigon 27204 <i>open NLJ/CBS 10 5-1-99</i> S 12 pp. [sanitized 1983]	5/31/67	A
8 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Nasser <i>open NLJ 09-016-3-1 (12/01)</i> TS C 1 p. <i>sanitized 12-6-93 NLJ 91-523</i> sanitized 11/2/01 NSL 84-91	5/31/67	A
9a memo	Hamilton to Rostow re Nigeria <i>open 2-28-00 NLJ 99-166</i> S 2 pp. <i>sanitized 3-17-93 NLJ 91-522</i>	5/31/67	A
10 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Israel <i>open 2-28-00 NLJ 99-166</i> S 2 pp. <i>sanitized 3-17-93 NLJ 91-522</i>	5/31/67	A
12a memo	George Denney to Sec. State S 3 pp. <i>open 5-1-92 NLJ 91-520</i> [duplicate of #6a, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 3," exempted NLJ 83-166]	5/30/67	A
16a cable	CAP67506 re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>open 3-17-93 NLJ 91-522</i>	5/30/67	A
16b cable	Bunker to Rostow S 1 p. <i>open 6-25-93 NLJ 91-520</i>	5/31/67	A
18 cable	CAP67507 re PM Wilson <i>open 3-17-93 NLJ 91-522</i> S 3 pp. [duplicate of #12b, NSF Country File, "UK, Vol. 11," exempted 1978]	5/30/67	A
19 cable	CAP67509 re foreign affairs <i>open 3-17-93 NLJ 91-522</i> C 1 p. [duplicate of #62, NSF Country File, "UK, Vol. 11," exempted 1978]	5/30/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Volume 29,
May 25-31, 1967," Box 16

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
20a memo	Rusk & McNamara to the Pres. re Middle East S 9 pp. Sanitized 5-1-92 NLJ 91-520 [duplicate of #4b, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 3"]	5/30/67	A
	Open 2-9-00 NLJ 99-167		
21 memo	Bator to the Pres. re Romania C 1 p. Open 3-17-93 NLJ 91-522	5/30/67	A
21a biography	Romanian Ambassador to the United States C 1 p. Open 11-9-93 NLJ 91-521	undated	A
24	Duplicate of document #27 Open 2-28-00		
27 cable	CAP67504 re Middle East Open 2-28-00 NLJ 99-166 S 1 p. exempt 5-22-92 NLJ 91-522 [duplicate of #125, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 2," exempted NLJ 83-52]	5/30/67	A
29 cable	CAP67502 re Vietnam S 1 p. Open 12-6-93 NLJ 91-523	5/30/67	A
30 cable	CAP67503 Open 3-17-93 NLJ 91-522 C 1 p.	5/30/67	A
32 cable	CAP67498 re foreign affairs Open 2-28-00 NLJ 99-166 TS "S" 5 pp. [duplicate of #120, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 2," exempted 1983 and downgraded to S]	5/30/67	A
33 cable	CAP67499 re Vietnam S 1 p. exempt 8-4-93 NLJ 91-523 Sanitized 2-28-00 NLJ 99-166	5/30/67	A
34	Duplicate of document #33		
35 cable	CAP67494 re Vietnam S 3 pp. Open 8-28-92 NLJ 91-520	5/30/67	A
37 cable	CAP67492 re Israel S 1 p. Open 3-17-93 NLJ 91-522	5/30/67	A
41 letter	LBJ to Prime Minister of Israel " PCI 1 p.	5/31/67	A
41b memo	McPherson to the Pres. re Israel " C 1 p.	5/16/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
41c letter	LBJ to Prime Minister of Israel PCI 1 p. <i>open 3-17-93 NLJ 91-522</i>	5/16/67	A
45 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Peru " C 1 p.	5/29/67	A
46 cable	Rostow to Amb., New Delhi C 2 pp. <i>sanitized 3-17-93 NLJ 91-522</i> <i>sanitized 1-30-01 NLJ 99-168 same sani</i>	5/29/67	A
48 cable	CAP67480 re Vietnam S 2 pp. <i>open 3-17-93 NLJ 91-522</i>	5/29/67	A
51 cable	CAP67477 re Iraq " C 1 p.	5/29/67	A
53 cable	CAP67471 re Israel <i>open 2-28-00 NLJ 99-166</i> TS "S" 2 pp. [duplicate of #93, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 2," exempted and downgraded to S, 1983]	5/29/67	A
55 cable	CAP67469 re Israel <i>open 5-1-99</i> S 2 pp. exempt 5-22-92 NLJ 91-522 [duplicate of #88a, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 2," exempted 1983]	5/29/67	A
57 cable	CAP67466 re Middle East S 2 pp. <i>exempt 8-4-93 NLJ 91-523</i> <i>Exempt 1-30-01 NLJ 99-168</i>	5/28/67	A
60 cable	CAP67464 re Vietnam S 2 pp. <i>open 3-17-93 NLJ 91-522</i>	5/28/67	A
61a	<i>NLS</i> Duplicate of document #60 <i>exempt 1-30-01 NLJ 99-168</i>		
62 cable	CAP67462 re Middle East <i>open 2-28-00 NLJ 99-166</i> S 2 pp. exempt 5-22-92 NLJ 91-522 [duplicate of #77a, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 2," exempted 1983]	5/28/67	A
63 cable	CAP67456 re Middle East <i>exempt 1-30-01 NLJ 99-168</i> S 3 pp. <i>exempt 5-22-92 NLJ 91-522</i> [duplicate of #66, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 2]	5/27/67	A
64 cable	CAP67460 re Middle East <i>open 3-17-93</i> S 1 p. <i>NLJ 91-522</i>	5/27/67	A
65a cable	from Amb. Bohlen PCI 1 p. <i>open 5-1-92 NLJ 91-520</i>	5/26/67	A

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May 25-31, 1967," Box 16

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
67 cable	CAP67457 re Middle East <i>open 5-1-99</i> TS "S" 1 p. [duplicate of #74a, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 2," exempted and downgraded to S, 1983]	5/27/67	A
69 cable	CAP67455 re Middle East <i>Open 2-28-00 NLJ 99-166</i> TS 2 pp. [duplicate of #63, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 2," sanitized 1983]	5/27/67	A
70 cable	CAP67454 re Middle East <i>Open 2-28-00 NLJ 99-166</i> C 3 pp. exempt 5-22-92 NLJ 91-523 [Duplicate of #146a, NSF, CF Canada, Vol 5, Box 167]	5/27/67	A
71 cable	CAP67453 re Israel S 2 pp. <i>sanitized 1-30-01 NLJ 99-168 (same)</i> [duplicate of #63, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 2," sanitized 1983]	5/27/67	A
74 cable	CAP67452 re Middle East S 1 p. <i>open 3-17-93 NLJ 91-522</i>	5/27/67	A
75 cable	CAP67448 re PM Holt <i>open 2-28-00 NLJ 99-166</i> C 2 pp. sanitized 3-17-93 NLJ 91-522	5/27/67	A
78	Duplicate of document #75 <i>open 5-1-99</i>		
78a	Duplicate of document #75 <i>open 5-1-99</i>		
78b	Duplicate of document #75 <i>open 2-28-00 NLJ 99-166</i>		
79 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>open 9-25-91</i>	5/26/67	A
81 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. <i>sanitized 12-6-93 NLJ 91-523</i> <i>Sanitized 9/26/01 NSU/RAC 42-91</i>	5/26/67	A
81a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 pp. <i>exempt 4-9-93 NLJ 91-521</i> <i>exempt 2-5-01 NLJ/RAC 99-92</i>	5/26/67	A
82a cable	Saigon 26779 S 3 pp. <i>open 5-1-92 NLJ 91-520</i>	5/26/67	A
82b cable	Saigon 26790 S 3 pp.	5/26/67	A
85a cable	Deptel 202587 to Cairo S 2 pp.	5/26/67	A

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NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Volume 29,
May 25-31, 1967," Box 16

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
86a cable	Cairo 8007 <i>open 5-1-92 NLJ 91-520</i> S 1 pp. [duplicate of #29a, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 2," exempted NLJ 82-167]	5/26/67	A
86b cable	Cairo 8003 <i>open 5-1-92 NLJ 91-520</i> S 1 p.	5/26/67	A
88 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East <i>open 1-30-01</i> TGS 1 p. <i>exempt 5-22-92 NLJ 91-520</i>	5/26/67	A
89a memo	Rusk to the Pres. re Middle East S 5 pp. [duplicate of #21a, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 2," sanitized 1982]	5/26/67	A
90a cable	Moscow 5125 <i>sanitized 5-1-92 NLJ 91-520</i> S 2 pp. <i>open 5-1-99 NLJ 91-520</i>	5/25/67	A
90b cable	USUN 5422 <i>sanitized 5-1-92 NLJ 91-520</i> C 2 pp. <i>open 5-1-99 NLJ 91-520</i>	5/24/67	A
91 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East <i>open 5-1-99</i> S 1 p. [duplicate of #18, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 2," sanitized NLJ 83-52]	5/26/67	A
92a cable	re Middle East <i>exempt NL 191-519</i> S 1 p. <i>open 3-12-00 NLJ 99-169</i>	5/26/67	A
93a cable	Hong Kong 8185 PCI 2 pp. <i>open 5-1-92 NLJ 91-520</i>	5/25/67	A
93b cable	Paris 18991 S 3 pp. <i>sanitized 7-29-92 NLJ 91-520</i> <i>open 5-1-99</i>	5/24/67	A
94a cable	Saigon 26566 S 12 pp. <i>sanitized 11-28-83 NLJ/CRS 10</i> <i>open 5-1-99</i>	5/25/67	A
99 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Australia C 1 p. <i>open 3-17-93 NLJ 91-520</i>	5/26/67	A
99a biography	Federal Leader, Australian Labour Party C 1 p. <i>open 11-9-93 NLJ 91-521</i>	undated	A
100 cable	Paris 19201 PCI 1 p. <i>open 5-1-92 NLJ 91-520</i>	5/26/67	A
102 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Guatemala <i>open 3-17-93 NLJ 91-520</i> S 1 p.	5/26/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
103a memo	N. Davis re foreign affairs <i>open 5-1-99</i> S 4 pp. exempt 5-22-92 NLS 91-522 [duplicate of #102a, NSF Name File, "Davis Memos"]	5/25/67	A
104 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. sanitized 12-6-93 NLS 91-523 <i>sanitized 1-30-01 NLS 99-168 (same)</i>	5/25/67	A
104a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 pp. sanitized 11-9-93 NLS 91-521 <i>sanitized 1-30-01 NLS 99-170 (same)</i> [Dup. # 49a, NSF, CF, VN, Vol. 72, box 43]	5/25/67	A
105 memo <i>same as 7-2503 NW/RAL02244</i>	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. sanitized 1-30-01 NLS 99-168 (same) [duplicate of #11, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 2," sanitized 1983 <i>dup. #88, NSF, "Mideast Crisis, Vol. 2, Memo & Misc, 5/67," b1 100.</i>	5/25/67	A
105a cable <i>same as 2-23-04 NW/RAL02244</i>	re Middle East sanitized 1-30-01 NLS 99-170 S 1 p. [duplicate of #11a, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 2," sanitized 1983	5/25/67	A
106a cable	Prime Minister to the Pres. <i>open 2-28-00 NLS 99-146</i> S 2 pp. exempt 5-22-92 NLS 91-522 <i>(Dup. # 81, NSF, Spec Hqs Corresp, UK, Box 56)</i>	5/25/67	A
108 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re foreign affairs C 2 pp. <i>open 3-17-93 NLS 91-522</i>	5/25/67	A
109 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Pakistan C 2 pp. <i>open 3-17-93 NLS 91-522</i>	5/25/67	A
109a report	The Aid Program PCI 3 pp. <i>open 9-25-91</i>	5/9/67	A
110a cable	Tel Aviv 3785 sanitized 2-24-00 NLS 99-179 TS 2 pp. <i>sanitized 2-24-00 NLS 99-179</i>	5/25/67	A
111 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Latin America C 1 p. <i>open 3-17-93 NLS 91-522</i> [duplicate of #5, NSF Country File, "Latin America, Vol. 5"]	5/25/67	A
111a report	Biographic Sketches C 2 pp. [duplicate of #5, NSF Country File, "Latin America, Vol. 5"] <i>open 9-25-91</i>	5/25/67	A

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NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Volume 29,
May 25-31, 1967," Box 16

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#58 cable	intelligence report - TS <i>Sanitized 6-22-04 NLS/RAC 04-7</i> 3 pp	5/27/67	A
#66 cable	Walt Rostow to the President - TS <i>Sanitized 6-22-04 NLS/RAC 04-7</i> 2 pp	5/27/67	A
#72 cable	Walt Rostow to the President - TS <i>Exempt 6-22-04 NLS/RAC 04-7</i> 2 pp	5/27/67	A
#73 cable	Walt Rostow to the President - TS <i>Sanitized 6-22-04 NLS/RAC 04-7</i> <i>Same sanitization 11-30-04 NLS 04-51</i> <i>[dup # 59, NSLH, "Mid-East Crisis, vol. 2, Tabs 43-59" Box 17]</i> 2 pp	5/27/67	A'

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Walt Rostow, Memos to the President, Vol. 29
May 26-31, 1967 Box 16

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p-8 added to file 9/11/91
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
3 memo	Rostow to the President - <i>sanitized 1-14-08</i> TS+ 2 pp <i>NLS 04-16</i>	5/31/67	A
3a memo	President to the Secretary of Defense - TS 2 pp <i>sanitized 1-14-08 NLS 04-16</i>	5/31/67	A
3b memo	President to the Chairman, AEC - TS 2 pp <i>sanitized 1-14-08 NLS 04-16</i>	5/31/67	A

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NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President , Rostow, Vol. 29, May 25-31, 1967, Box 16

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Wednesday, May 31, 1967 -- 8:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the situation on matching for India food aid.

As you see, we have firm pledges for more than one-half of the \$190 million target. It is the collective judgment of your advisers that this justifies one-half of the food authorized by the Congressional Resolution; that is, 1-1/2 tons. The bulk of the balance hinges on the Germans coming forward with debt relief and thus making possible the IBRD debt relief of \$77 million.

million

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NHJ 91-522
By sig, NARA, Date 3-2-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 29, 1967

Pres file

2
Sent Rostow
via wire
CAP 67484

FOR: The President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-522

FROM: Walt Rostow

By ing, NARA, Date 3-2-93

I am sorry to do this by wire, but the World Bank's Pakistan consortium meets Wednesday morning in London, and I would like to clear our position with you today if possible.

The Freeman-Gaud memo I have recommends: (1) We announce our willingness--subject to Congressional appropriation--to consider providing non-project aid at the same level as last year (\$140 million). (2) We agree to negotiate a loan for \$25 million of that \$140 million now from FY 1967 funds for fertilizer imports. (3) We inform the Government of Pakistan that we are prepared to provide 1 million tons of wheat as an initial agreement against FY 1968 targets.

There is no question that Pakistan's general economic and agricultural performance make it one of the most deserving of our aid recipients. As you read in Dick Gilbert's memo, we're looking for a major breakthrough in grain production in the next year or two. Moreover, Ayub will read our ability to announce a positive response Wednesday as an important signal of your intent to ~~continue~~ continue rebuilding our relationship.

Our \$140 million would be 40-47% of Pakistan's overall requirement for \$300-350 million in non-project aid, which the consortium is expected to endorse. This will support continued

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

import liberalization.

The 1 million tons of wheat would permit Pakistan to import quickly against a projected need for about 2.25 million tons this year. Moving quickly would help undercut price increases. We would take a reading later in the year on Pakistan's remaining needs after its crop is in, but would include now about \$24 million in cotton, oil and tallow.

I recommend your approval of the basic package; Secretary Fowler and Charles Schultze are aboard.

There are two additional issues on which ^{we} need your judgment:

1. Freeman and Gaud recommend that we make clear to the Pak Government that we expect half of Pakistan's remaining FY 1968 commercial wheat purchases to be made in the US. ^{Treasury endorses this recommendation.} State recognizes that we have applied this formula to the huge Indian program but recommends against generalizing this condition to apply to other PL 480 agreements. ^{State's position} Charlie Schultze supports this recommendation because he fears the gain in sales under this small program (at most 250,000 tons or \$15 million) is not worth the risk of being charged with bad faith under the Kennedy round food aid and grain agreement. As you recall, all exporters agreed there not to preempt specified shares of commercial wheat markets as a condition for giving food aid. This was part of the price we paid to get other nations to share the food aid burden.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

My compromise on this would be to let the Paks know our feelings but not tie them to any percentage. I understand your purpose in the Indian case which is so large as to be in a class by itself. But we probably ought to be careful in the smaller programs. They have already placed FY 1968 orders for 200,000 tons here.

Approve your compromise ✓

Approve strict 50% tying _____

Call me _____

2. Bill Gaud tried to get Harold Linder to come in on the consortium offer, at least to the extent of a \$20-25 million non-project loan for added fertilizer imports. Harold refused, so there is no such recommendation before you. But I have been trying at every turn to get the Ex-Im Bank more fully engaged in our more promising less developed countries. Given our hopes of making Pakistan the next success story both for our aid program and for the war on hunger, this seems ^{an excellent} ~~a golden~~ opportunity to bring Ex-Im along. However, at this stage the only way we could do that would be for me to call Harold on your instruction and ask him to reconsider. I would listen to his arguments but try to persuade him. Pakistan ~~itself~~ itself has delayed its steel mill--for which Ex-Im had set aside \$85 million--to concentrate on agriculture. I think using some of that money to help the Pak fertilizer program would be a fair reward for good sense.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

*Can tell him the
President asked
me to inquire?*

You may tell Linder I would like him to offer

\$20-25 million unless there are overriding

arguments against _____

See if you can persuade him; just say I asked you to

inquire _____

Don't press this round _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

WWR
Pres file
3

Wednesday, May 31, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. Defense and AEC have submitted for your approval the FY 1969 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile and certain related adjustments to the FY 1968 stockpile figures approved by you on July 12, 1966. These stockpile figures are based on the forces described in detail in the Five Year Defense Program that is the basis for your military budget request.

6.2
(a)

The principal cause for this reduction has been increased emphasis on conventional air defense weapons, rather than nuclear, and curtailment of further production of the 155mm nuclear shell pending development of a more advanced alternative.

6.2
(a)

4. The new weapons to be produced in FY 1969 are for weapons modernization (MINUTEMAN II) and to provide warheads for the new weapons systems (MINUTEMAN III, FB-111, LANCE). The reductions include some obsolescent weapons (LULU depth charges); those warheads being replaced during modernization actions (MINUTEMAN and tactical missiles); and those weapons whose current inventory can no longer be operationally justified (air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles).

5. The Joint Chiefs have accepted the adjusted FY 1968 and proposed FY 1969 stockpile figures as recommended.

6. The proposed FY 1969 stockpile is within the presently projected availability of special nuclear and by-product materials, and the number of weapons recommended to be produced in FY 1969 is within the capability of the Atomic Energy Commission weapons fabrication system.

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-16
By il, NARA, Date 9-6-07

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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

7. The preliminary AEC estimate of the cost of the weapons to be produced in FY 1969 is approximately \$295 million which excludes the cost of special nuclear materials, equipment and plant amortization. Moreover, this figure does not include the costs of weapon tests (including development of supplemental test sites) and weapons research and development. These latter costs are estimated at \$550 million for FY 1969. Both cost figures are Atomic Energy Commission estimates and do not include any additional expenses incurred by the Department of Defense.

8. In February 1967 you directed the AEC to deliver all finished nuclear weapons and components to the Department of Defense effective April 21, 1967. On May 23 the AEC reported to me that they have completed such deliveries and that this action has resulted in the elimination of custodial positions with a resulting overall saving of \$330,000.

9. The Bureau of the Budget has reviewed this proposal. It has brought to my attention certain differences in the figures contained in the April 3 request and the figures used as the basis for budget projections last fall. This is due to a stretch-out in the retirement of certain obsolete weapons that had been scheduled for retirement in FY 1969. The Bureau of the Budget and I, however, do not recommend that the proposed stockpile action be disapproved. However, in order to minimize these differences and to keep the statistical base uniform for all purposes I will, with your approval, request the Department of Defense to submit next year's stockpile request for your approval by November 15, 1967. This will tie the stockpile approval procedure tightly into the regular budget process.

10. I recommend that you approve the proposed stockpile and sign the attached memoranda to Defense and AEC.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

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CEJ:em

WWR
3a

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


SUBJECT: FY 1969 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

I approve the proposed Nuclear Weapons Stockpile for the end of FY 1969 and the proposed adjusted stockpile composition for the end of FY 1968, submitted to me by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission on April 3, 1967.

6.2
(a)



1.4
(b)



I have also directed the production of the additional weapons required for quality assurance and reliability testing.

I have authorized the Atomic Energy Commission in coordination with the Department of Defense to initiate production of such long lead time nuclear warhead parts as may be necessary to prepare for FY 1970 production of warheads required by the approved Five Year Defense Program.

I authorize you, in coordination with the Atomic Energy Commission, to make such changes in the total stockpile not to exceed $\pm 10\%$ of the specifically stated numbers of nuclear warheads to be produced and retired in FY 1968 and FY 1969 as may be necessary to adjust production schedules to meet AEC material availabilities or production capability.

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-16
By isl, NARA, Date 9-6-07

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

I further authorize you to make minor changes (± 10%) in strategic, tactical, and fleet anti-submarine/anti-air warfare warhead totals that may be required because of adjusted delivery assets or changes in military requirements. Any changes indicative of a major shift in defense policy or AEC production capability will be submitted for my approval.

Lyndon B. Johnson

LBJ:CEJ:em (5/31/67)

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

WWR
38

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

JUN 10 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

SUBJECT: FY 1969 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

I approve the proposed Nuclear Weapons Stockpile for the end of FY 1969 and the proposed adjusted stockpile composition for the end of FY 1968, submitted to me by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission on April 3, 1967.

6.2
(a)

[Redacted]

1.4
(b)

[Redacted]

I also direct the production of the additional weapons required for quality assurance and reliability testing.

I authorize the Atomic Energy Commission in coordination with the Department of Defense to initiate production of such long lead time atomic weapon parts as may be necessary to prepare for FY 1970 production of warheads required by the approved Five Year Defense Program. I authorize such minor variations, not to exceed $\pm 10\%$ from the specifically stated numbers of atomic weapons to be produced and retired in FY 1968 and FY 1969, as the Atomic Energy Commission may determine to be necessary because of changes in the available supply of special nuclear material or the Atomic Energy

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NIJ 04-16
By isl, NARA, Date 9-6-07

~~TOP SECRET~~
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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

Commission production capability, for quality assurance or as otherwise mutually agreed to by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense as a result of changed military requirements.

Any changes indicative of a major shift in defense policy or Atomic Energy Commission production capability will be submitted for my special approval.

(S) Lyndon B. Johnson

LBJ:CEJ:em (5/31/67)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 31, 1967 -- 8:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment With Iraqi Foreign Minister

Attached is Sec. Rusk's recommendation that you see Iraqi Foreign Minister Pachachi. Since he has just been in Cairo and is a responsible man, he could turn out to be one of our better channels to the Arabs.

We shall aim to tie him to the same kind of commitment to secrecy we got from Eban.

Sec. Rusk would see him before you, but Pachachi would probably have to be told before he'd come down from New York that he had an appointment with you.

I believe you should give serious consideration to seeing him. In Arab eyes, we are completely committed to Israel. It would be healthy, if we are to salvage any of our Arab interests from this crisis, if a responsible Arab could carry away an impression of both your resolution and your good will for Arabs who are trying to restore peace.

My recommendation is that he carry away a firm sense of how deeply meant were all aspects of your May 23 speech.

W. W. Rostow

I'll see him _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-522
By mg, NARA, Date 3-2-93

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

4a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 31, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for Dr. Adnan Pachachi,
Foreign Minister of IraqRecommendation:

I recommend that you receive Dr. Adnan Pachachi, Foreign Minister of Iraq, who arrived in New York on May 29 and plans to remain until June 1. Dr. Pachachi has come to the United States for several days in the hope of seeing you in connection with the Arab-Israel crisis.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Background:

Dr. Pachachi is an extremely able and experienced diplomat who, in several past UN General Assembly sessions, has been designated by the Arab states as their principal spokesman and negotiator in dealing with our delegation on Arab-Israel issues. He has the full confidence of the Iraqi Government, and his mission has cabinet approval. He is moderate and reasonable. He has just been in Cairo and wishes to submit the Arab point of view to you, as well as to make whatever other contribution he can toward reducing the current tension. Your reception of an Arab statesman of this caliber would help balance any Arab reaction to the visit of Foreign Minister Eban of Israel.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

*Others of us will have a full round
with him before you see him.*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ

91-520

By *ing*

NARA. Date

8-24-92

Wednesday, May 31, 1967
8:40 p.m.

~~1. say~~
2. Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a proposed response
from you to Elliott Roosevelt, which,
I gather from Marv Watson, is
politically urgent -- If you wish to
meet his request.

W. W. Rostow

President does not want
to sign

5a
/

May 31, 1967

Dear Elliott:

I appreciate your letter of support for our policies in Viet Nam and the Near East.

We do not yet have the stable peace we seek in the world; but we do have the possibility of achieving it. That possibility exists because our nation has met its obligations over the past twenty years. I am determined that we shall continue to do so.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in warm regards.

Sincerely,

The Honorable
Elliott Roosevelt
Mayor of Miami Beach
Miami Beach, Florida

LBJ:WWRostow:rlh



9172

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON


May 29, 1967

2067
56
1 Moose
2 Ret
✓ Saunders
✓ Ret

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Suggested Reply to Elliott Roosevelt's Letter

In accordance with Mr. Moose's request of May 26, I enclose a suggested reply to Mr. Elliott Roosevelt's letter of May 20 to the President.


Benjamin H. Read for
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Mr. Roosevelt's letter.
2. Suggested reply.

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1967 MAY 30 AM 8 41

5c

SUGGESTED LETTER TO ELLIOTT ROOSEVELT

Dear Mr. Roosevelt:

I greatly appreciate your support for our policies in Vietnam and the Middle East, as expressed in your letter of May 20. I assure you I take seriously the necessity for fulfilling the obligations which the United States Government has assumed. The preservation of our security as well as that of the Free World depends on our keeping faith with others to whom we have made promises. I am determined that we shall not be found wanting.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5d

May 26, 1967

9172

FOR: Ben Read

FROM: Dick Moose

Would you please prepare
an appropriate response for the
President's signature.

Elliott Roosevelt

May 20, 1967

Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
President
White House
Washington, D. C.


Dear Mr. President:

I am addressing this personal letter to you because I feel that every citizen should express their complete backing of your strong policy with regard to the obligation of the government of the United States to stand squarely behind the preservation of freedom for the free nations of this world.

At this time, when the State of Israel is being threatened, I know that you will take all steps necessary to insure the preservation of the freedom of this small nation. My father and mother were in the forefront of the fight to create the State of Israel and I know that they would commend you for taking a strong stand to preserve this all important ally of the United States in the Middle East. Please rest assured that the people of the United States will stand solidly behind you in all your acts, both in Viet Nam and Israel.

Kindest personal regards.

Cordially,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Elliott Roosevelt', written over a horizontal line.

ELLIOTT ROOSEVELT

Pos file ⁶

Wednesday, May 31, 1967
8:37 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Jorden's redraft.
I think it is good, and I commend it
to you.

W. W. Rostow

Welcoming State by
President Johnson on the Arrival of
Prime Minister Holt -- 6/1/67

Words: 600

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Holt, Australian friends:

We are glad you are here.

I once told you that "A faithful friend is the medicine of life."

So we all feel a good deal better today -- with you in our midst.

And Mrs. Johnson and I are happy to be able to repay in a small way the overwhelming hospitality that Australia extended to us last Fall.

Since we last met, both of us have travelled through much of Asia. I look forward to sharing our impressions of that most exciting and vital part of the world -- a part of the world where two-thirds of mankind lives -- a part of the world where much of the future of humanity will be shaped.

At the Manila Conference last Fall, we and the leaders of five other nations of Asia and the Pacific proclaimed goals of freedom to which all of our peoples aspire:

-- to be free from aggression;

-- to conquer hunger, illiteracy and disease;

-- to build a region of security, order and progress;

-- to seek reconciliation and peace throughout the region.

We are ready -- Australia and the United States, and all the nations of the Asian and Pacific region -- to pursue those goals with all the strength and determination at our disposal.

We are ready to help re-shape the future of the peaceful and secure Asia that is to be.

Today we fight -- shoulder to shoulder with our Vietnamese, Korean, Thai, Filipino, and New Zealand allies.

We fight not because we like to, but only to insure the right of a small nation to plan and to make its own future.

But tomorrow we shall work just as hard together to build -- to repair what has been broken, to make the harvests larger, to make the future of men brighter.

We shall do it with the power of electricity, not the power of bombs, with tools instead of tanks, with teachers and doctors and technicians.

We know -- you and I -- that it will be done.

For we have done it in our own countries. And our dearest hope is to share with all men the fruits of labor and science and progress.

No country is a better example of what can be done than your great Australia, Mr. Prime Minister.

Your early settlers found a brown and rugged land -- a region that, to many of them, seemed to offer only hard work for bare survival. But look what miracles have been accomplished -- the thriving cities, the booming industries, the rich farms.

And Australia has only begun. Ahead lies the promise of rapid growth and ever increasing prosperity. Each day almost, new sources of wealth are discovered. New buildings rise up in your glowing cities. New factories open to make needed goods and to provide jobs.

And Australia, I know, stands ready -- as does our own United States -- to help others move down the path we have trod -- from simple and hard beginnings, to strength and wealth and independence.

But these things will not come -- they cannot come -- unless there is security and dignity and opportunity.

And ~~se~~curity will not come to Asia unless there are men of courage who are prepared to stand up and resist when the aggressor moves ~~into~~ steal and kill and conquer.

This is what Winston Churchill meant when he said:

"Courage is the first of human qualities, because it is the one quality that guarantees all others."

The brave men who fight today in Viet-Nam have it -- your men and ours, the brave Vietnamese, and our other allies.

They struggle to make all else possible.

And they will succeed.

-5-

I welcome you again to this country and to this city.

I welcome you as a brave leader, a loyal friend, and a wise
statesman.

I repeat: we are glad you are here.

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 31, 1967
8:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker's weekly
with great deal on Ky as a campaigner.

Ky really is a learner.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 27204

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 49, NARA, Date 5-10-91

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

By ju, NARA, Date 5-1-99

7a

Wednesday, May 31, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon, 27204)

Herewith my fifth weekly telegram:

A. General

The rivalry between Thieu and Ky continued last week, but in a somewhat lower and less public key. While the basic problem of the military candidacy and its effects on military unity remain a major preoccupation, I have the impression that the tension has abated somewhat as a result of the efforts of Bui Diem and the brother of General Thieu, Nguyen Van Kieu.

Since my last report, I have had long conversations with both Thieu and Ky which I have reported in some detail in previous telegrams.

It seems to me that although Thieu has made the statement to a number of correspondents that he intends to be a candidate, it is not at all clear that he will eventually decide to run. He said to me that if he did run, he thought that he would not be elected and we have had reports that one of his objectives is to thwart Ky's ambitions. On the other hand, I think there is a possibility that Thieu is playing for position in an effort to secure a commitment for an important and prestigious post in the new administration. This would be in character; he has a reputation for cunning, for playing a waiting game, as he is doing now, and coming up on the right side of every coup.

While it may be true, as Thieu professes to believe, that the Armed Forces could be kept aloof from politics in the event that both he and Ky were candidates, I am inclined to think this would be difficult and that there would be danger of differences developing. I pointed out to both of them that maintenance of the integrity and unity of the Armed Forces was in our opinion absolutely essential. I reminded them again of the assurances they had both given you at Guam in this respect, assurances which had been repeated to me also on every occasion in which I had seen either of them. Both of them replied that they fully understand the dangers of a split in the military.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

When I saw Ky on Monday, I mentioned to him that I thought Thieu was clearly feeling rather isolated and hurt. Ky told me he was aware of Thieu's feelings and that he planned to talk privately with Thieu this week to try to find out what he really wants and to see whether they could not come to some mutually satisfactory arrangement. I encouraged him to do this and will follow developments in this situation closely.

Ky is proceeding with efforts to set up his campaign organization. He confirmed to me that he had had a long talk with Huong at Vung Tau on May 18, in which he claimed they had come to a complete understanding. According to Ky, Huong said he expected Ky to win but thought it was important that he himself should run as a civilian candidate. The net result of their talk was that whoever was the winner would employ the services of the loser. Ky went on to say that if elected, he proposed to ask the cooperation not only of Huong but of other candidates and thus establish a regime representing a broad spectrum of the voters. Ky spoke in a serious vein but exhibited his usual confidence in his ability to win the election and to handle the difficult pre-election problems. As I left him he said, "Don't worry. I know how to handle the situation. It is like a Western movie, it will all come out all right in the end." I trust this will turn out to be a Western without the usual gun play.

If both Thieu and Ky can be as reasonable with one another as they sound when talking with me, the talk between them may still offer hope of opening the way to a mutually acceptable compromise. I cannot be overly sanguine, however, as Vietnamese seem constitutionally incapable of really frank, straightforward talks on such personal and political matters. The date for filing of candidacies is now a little over a month away. As we approach that date, the pressure for some kind of decision will mount, but at the moment the heat of the issue has gone down, and in the next few weeks there should be opportunities for the principles to work out an arrangement. I will do my best to encourage both to move in this direction.

I instituted meetings this week which I intend to make a practice of holding regularly each week with General Westmoreland and Ambassadors Locke and Komer in order to review progress, to formulate policy and plans, and to devise methods for pushing ahead with priority projects. At the meeting this week, I asked that papers be submitted to me on accelerated programs on the following matters:

1. Ambassador Locke: The Optimum Use of Manpower
2. General Westmoreland: The Vietnamese Armed Forces; Reorientation of the Mission of the Forces, and their Revitalization with Increased Emphasis on Improvement and Quality.
3. Ambassador Komer: Development of an Action Program for

Stepping up Revolutionary Development.

4. As my assignment: Evolution Toward a Constitutional Government and Keeping the Political Process on the Track.

What I have in mind is, in effect, to constitute the members of the Mission here as a steering committee to watch over, make plans for, and stimulate matters which are of top priority. I believe it will be useful in bringing better cohesion into our efforts here.

General Westmoreland has submitted to me the detailed plans which he and Bob Komer have worked out for the new Revolutionary Development organization. Intensive thought and work (especially on the part of the steering committee headed by Bob Komer) has gone into the development of the organizational plans. I believe this new setup will give us a more efficient and effective organization for our advisory and supporting role in the Pacification program. We intend to be flexible, of course, and will make changes which experience and practice with the organization may indicate.

B. Political

I understand that the atmosphere of the last Directorate meeting, May 24, was easy and fairly cordial. The Directorate discussed the Presidential Electoral Law at that meeting, and there were areas of disagreement between Ky and Thieu which could have made the meeting very tense. In fact, they seemed to have reached an understanding beforehand, perhaps through their subordinates, and the meeting reportedly went off quite smoothly. Thieu spoke against a run-off election (thus apparently reversing his previous position and placing him in agreement with Ky). The Directorate as a whole sustained Thieu's position on the dates of the elections and the requirement that candidates be "introduced" by 30 Assembly Deputies or Provincial and Municipal Councillors.

The result of this meeting was a letter from Thieu to the assembly suggesting that the assembly (1). drop the "introduction" requirement for candidates, and (2). set the date for the elections about as originally announced by General Thieu when he promulgated the constitution. (The Directorate wants the President and the Senate elected on the same day "in early September" and the lower House one month later. The assembly has set the Presidential election for September 3, the Senate election for December 17, and has made no decision on the date for the election of the lower House.) Debate in the assembly on the latter has been confused, and so far has revolved largely around the procedural questions raised by the Directorate's requests. We are hopeful that the assembly will accept the Directorate's suggestions.

At least among the civilian members of the Directorate there is still some sentiment in favor of a run-off election. With General Thieu's decision to oppose it, however, the question now seems closed. Supporters of the civilian candidates are understandably disappointed, and the failure to provide for a run-off may account, at least in part, for the fact that Tran Van Huong has still not officially declared his candidacy.

Huong told one of our officers on May 21, that he would make his announcement the following week, but all he did was to inform several Western newsmen that he has "decided to run". Thus, like Thieu, he is teetering on the edge but still has not formally announced his intentions. One of his principal supporters, former Youth Minister Vo Long Trieu, May 30, said that Huong is hesitating because his chosen running mate, Mai Tho Truyen, wants to "discuss the matter" with all of his friends before the announcement is made. Trieu also said that if Huong should win by less than a very healthy percent of the vote, he would refuse to serve; under the constitution this would result in another Presidential election within three months. While Huong may not in fact have any such intention, the remark indicates the importance which his supporters attach to the need for a respectable mandate for the new President.

We have been encouraged by reports that Huong and Ky have agreed to cooperate after the election regardless of who wins. Some reports go so far as to suggest that the winner will make the loser his Prime Minister. We know, however, that some of Huong's supporters do not approve of the "agreement", and I believe that the necessary civilian--military partnership may not be easy to construct after the elections. This will be especially true if the campaign is hard fought and the elections close. We are putting emphasis on the need to close ranks after the election, and I am reaffirming to our officers in contact with various political elements that they should stress the idea that the election must unite, not divide, the Vietnamese people. This means broad participation in the new government, including offers of cabinet appointments to some of the more able losers.

Ky continues to campaign harder and more effectively than any other candidate. Judging by first reports from the Provinces, his "rice bonus" has generated good will and approval from civil servants and military personnel. This may not last until September, but it has had its effect as of now. Last week I reported what appeared to be a successful effort by Ky to unite the important Hoa Hao minority behind him (this is a matter of some 600,000 voters). This week he made an impressive bid for the Chinese vote and began the construction of what could be an important "front" to support his candidacy.

You may recall that as part of an assimilation program, Diem dissolved the Chinese "Congregations" and in 1960 took over their properties. The property included schools, hospitals, and other real estate which Ky has now told the Chinese community leaders that he intends to return to them. The Chinese "Congregation", though legally dissolved, have continued in existence, and the Chinese are planning to set up a "Welfare Association" based on the Congregations to receive their property when and if Ky makes good on his promise. The Chinese press has enthusiastically applauded Ky's move, and the leaders of the Chinese community will now

most likely throw their considerable weight behind Ky. There are about 500,000 Chinese voters in South Vietnam (out of a total voting public of something over five million). In addition to their own votes, the economic power of the Chinese is also an element to consider in any election. This episode is only one of many demonstrating the advantages which lie with an imaginative incumbent.

On May 29, Ky held an organizational dinner for leaders of various groups whom he hopes to unite in support of his candidacy. These included important Catholic factions, most notably the Great Solidarity Forces, and Tran Quoc Buu, leader of the CVT, Vietnam's largest labor union. Also present were some representatives of the VNQDD Party and one faction of the Hoa Hao. This gathering is fairly typical of the continuing effort Ky has been making to contact and woo almost all important and many minor political groups. His strategy may be to put together a broad "front" to support his campaign. However, it may be that he will not try to form a single organization, but will allow each group to work for him more or less independently. (This could create the impression of a groundswell of support from all political circles. It would also make it easier for Ky to deal with each group on his own terms.)

While not perhaps strictly speaking a campaign move, I should also mention that Ky this week took another action which should help to rally popular support to his government. He signed into law a decree which prohibits collection of back rents which accrued in areas where the Viet Cong were formerly in control. This means that the old landlords will not be able to go into newly pacified areas and demand the rents they have not been able to collect during the years when the Viet Cong held the area. The same decree prohibits the Vietnamese military from collecting rents on behalf of landowners.

In I Corps the situation remains essentially unchanged. Although enemy activity slackened, with no assassinations or minings in Quang Tri Province last week, Hue was subjected to an attack on May 29, and MACV continues to get reports that the enemy is

preparing a coordinated offensive in I Corps. Our operations in the Demilitarized Zone resulted in 837 killed in action and may have disrupted the enemy's plans. Morale is somewhat improved in the area as a whole but the May 29 attack on Hue will not help matters. The economic situation is about the same, with most commodities in normal or near normal supply.

The attack on Hue was a coordinated mortaring and terror assault. The city received about 65 rounds of mortar fire and a terrorist band blew up the best hotel in Hue. The building, situated on the River, was about 60 percent destroyed. Casualties were four dead (two civilians and two Vietnamese military) and 17 wounded.

The third of five elections for Hamlet Chiefs and Assistant Hamlet Chiefs was carried out May 21 in 1,122 hamlets in 40 provinces. Some 524,000 voters went to the polls, about 78.8 percent of the registered voters in the affected areas. The ratio of candidates to seats was 2.3 to one. The Viet Cong were more active than in last week's election; preliminary reports indicated the enemy killed three candidates and wounded two others.

C. Economic

Prices moved up again this week. The Saigon Retail Price Index rose from 266 to 276 while the Index on Imported Commodities increased from 216 to 219. The increases in the prices of foodstuffs, particularly pork, were in part due to increased demand on the occasion of Buddha's Birthday. However, our economic analysts believe that after three months of relative price stability (marred only by the early March rice panic), Vietnam may now be entering a new cycle of rising prices, particularly for domestically produced commodities. For example, pig deliveries, which traditionally taper off in summer months, may drop more than usual this year, because of premature slaughterings and an unprofitable feed/pork price ratio. Another destabilizing may be the 200-piaster "rice bonus." The market is hypersensitive to increases in Government of Vietnam expenditures and generally anticipates future inflationary tendencies almost immediately.

We are now engaged in our yearly study of the effort to stabilize the economy. Our economic analysts anticipate that prices will increase as much as 45 to 50 percent by the end of the year. The inflationary pressure will be concentrated in the third and fourth quarters after a relatively easy second quarter. If the inflationary pressures develop as expected, they will be near the limit that can be safely tolerated. There will be a continuous threat of acceleration from possible labor unrest and further loss of confidence in the currency. Government of Vietnam civil and military services, fixed income groups, and our own

employees will suffer losses in real income which we will not be able to compensate without further accelerating the inflation.

The damage inflicted by inflation is partly a function of the length of time it continues. We have had more than two years of more or less continuous inflation and face a third. Continuing inflation control will be more important during the next year than ever, and our ability to cope with the problem will be severely tested.

Part of the inflationary picture is the effect of the politically vital elections. The elections have already resulted in pressure on the Government of Vietnam to be responsive to the needs of various segments of the population. Accordingly, benefits have been given to the Government of Vietnam civil service and military which otherwise might have been avoided, including the "rice bonus." In addition, the cost of the elections themselves has imposed a substantial strain on the resources of the Government. The result is that total civilian expenditure is expected to exceed the original budget of 25 billion piasters by fully 10 billion piasters. The most important add-ons are subsidies on rice and fertilizer.

After careful review of the situation and our own programs, we will be studying a set of recommendations aimed at holding our own piaster expenditures to a minimum and in other ways reducing inflationary pressures as much as possible while continuing essential programs.

D. Chieu Hoi

The number of returnees dropped slightly, from 591 last week to 538 this week. This may be compared with 335 for the same period last year. The total to date for 1967 is 15,172 as compared with last year's overall total of 20,242. The weekly average for 1967 is now 768.

We are stepping up efforts to make good use of the returnees. Those from five provinces are now being trained as Revolutionary Development workers in the Vung Tau center. Each of the provinces involved will have a 59-man team composed exclusively of returnees when their training is completed. Recently 32 returnees have also been employed by the refugee commissariat.

A study has been completed of the returnees who came in during the 1967 TET Chieu Hoi drive. The great majority (71 percent) say they joined the Viet Cong because they were drafted. Hard core Viet Cong are still rare, but the years of service among the returnees are up from our last survey. The largest group, 32 percent, joined the Viet Cong prior to 1965. Twenty-six percent joined prior to 1966 and 14 percent joined prior to 1964. The majority were military privates or civilian laborers, and the military proportion dropped from 54 percent in 1966 to 39 percent in 1967. About 13 percent of the 1967 returnees were officers or NCO's.

Principal reasons given for coming in to the Chieu Hoi centers were dissatisfaction with treatment by the Viet Cong (52 percent), hard and abnormal living conditions (46 percent), and fear of American military pressures (38 percent). Thirty-two percent also gave as their reason the Chieu Hoi program. Two-thirds of all the returnees say that someone encouraged or helped them to come in, with family ties continuing to be the most important element. Promises of good treatment under the Chieu Hoi program bulked large in their thinking.

It is also interesting that 56 percent of the returnees said that their unit received little or no support from the people. This is a slight increase over a year ago.

E. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending May 27, the enemy killed 67 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 236 and kidnapped 117. The dead included three candidates for Hamlet Chief, three Chieu Hoi returnees, and two Revolutionary Development workers. These figures can be compared with the Vietnamese civilian dead for the past weeks: 81, 38, 126, 44, 85, and 80.

F. Trip to the First Corps

On Saturday, May 27, I visited the First Corps area, particularly the northern provinces. After a comprehensive briefing on the military and pacification situation throughout the Corps area and on the operations in the DMZ, it seems to me that while we have the situation well in hand at the moment, we can expect further encroachment from the north by sizeable North Vietnamese Army forces plus increased terrorist activities in the heavily populated central area. The pacification effort, while improved, still has a long way to go.

I visited the camp in Quang Tri province in which some 12,000 refugees who were brought out of the DMZ are being cared for. I thought the tent city in which most of them are still housed was well organized, roads had been built, wells drilled, people were lining up for inoculations and others were being treated in the clinic. Permanent housing which the people themselves are building was well under way. A noticeable fact was that the refugees are composed largely of women, children and older men, with males of military age absent, presumably with the Viet Cong. We are making every effort to contact these young men through their families who hopefully can persuade at least some of them to return to their homes.

I visited a Revolutionary Development team in a hamlet in Quang Nam province. The team was new and not up to full strength, but had already begun working there. During my visit, there was sniper fire at the hamlet. I mention this only because this was presumably a "secure" hamlet and the fact of the sniper fire is indicative of the importance of security in the pacification program.

I was particularly interested in the combined action companies established by General Walt and General Lam, and First Corps Commander. This is a program in which one platoon of Popular Forces (35 men) live with and fight with a Marine squad (15 men). These teams are now located in 73 hamlets and 41 more are to be added in 1967. I was told there had been no desertions by these Popular Forces soldiers and that 62 percent of the Marines involved in the program voluntarily extended their tours. In addition to providing security, they are also involved in civic action programs. I talked to the Marines in one of the companies and found them all enthusiastic about the program.

General Westmoreland is experimenting with several forms of combined teams, both in small and large formations with Vietnamese and American units of varying size. It seems to me that this form of organization may prove a fast and effective method of improving the performance of Vietnamese military units. It provides de facto leadership, which is sorely lacking in most Vietnamese formations and equally important, it shows the Vietnamese by example such things as the way in which an officer must care for his men, the support that a soldier should get, particularly artillery and air support, medical evacuation and the like.

I flew along the edge of the Demilitarized Zone where some action was still in progress, the Marines capturing Hill 117 while we were there. I also visited the hospital ship Repose and found this a most moving experience. I found these fine young men, many of them badly wounded, taking their pain and suffering without complaint and with courage and cheerfulness. One man had lost both legs and was blinded but when I spoke a word of gratitude and encouragement to him, he smiled and said, "I'm going home tomorrow. I'll be all right." These things tear at one's heartstrings but I came away with the knowledge that these men were receiving not only the most expert of surgical and medical care but also the healing power of love.

As usual I found the morale, spirit and performance of our officers and men outstanding. I am happy to report, also, that the Vietnam First Corps, under General Lam's command, has been giving a good account of itself, and has had some significant victories in recent weeks. This is especially true of their First Division.

8

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 31, 1967
8:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

This CIA analysis of Nasser's
intentions may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

SC-03518-67, Cy 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

K&X@X

Log 2099

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 019-016-3-1
By SP, NARA, Date 12/14/01

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 31, 1967
7:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a situation report from
Ed Hamilton on Nigeria. It requires
no decision.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 149, NARA, Date 5-10-91

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, May 31, 1967 -- 7:00 PM

~~SECRET~~

WWR:

SUBJECT: Nigeria situation report

9a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-166
By is, NARA Date 1-7-00

1. After eleven months of slow deterioration -- in which we played every card in our limited hand to maintain unity -- the Eastern region declared itself the independent Republic of Biafra yesterday morning.
2. Gowon responded with a public statement that the East had committed an "act of rebellion" which "must be crushed." (He later softened "crushed" to "contained.") He reimposed the economic blockade of the East, and ordered full mobilization of the Federal army. (In practice, mobilization will add little to the 9,000 troops now under Gowon's command; there are no reserves to call up. The Eastern army totals about 7,000 men -- better trained and positioned than Gowon's troops.)
3. Gowon called in the U.S. and British Ambassadors yesterday afternoon. He said that he planned to take action against the East, and asked for military help, apparently implying troops. Both Ambassadors immediately replied that this was out of the question. Gowon retreated to a request for tactical aircraft and a naval presence. Again the Ambassadors refused. As a final shot, Gowon asked what the U.S./British would do if "others" intervened on the side of the East. The Ambassadors replied that this was a hypothetical question which they could not answer.
4. Gowon did indicate in the above conversation that he would cooperate in any evacuation of British and American citizens.
5. Late yesterday afternoon we instructed our Embassies in London and Lagos to approach the British urgently to set in motion our joint evacuation plan for dependents and non-essential personnel. This first stage involves a commercially-operated airlift (PanAm and the British airlines). The instruction reflects our unanimous judgment (Katzenbach included) that we can no longer give reasonable assurance of the safety of more than 7,000 American citizens in Nigeria, and that an evacuation order will not bring on substantially greater instability.
6. HMG (Saville Garner) replied this morning that they can give us no final answer until tomorrow, but that they lean toward the view that the threat is not yet serious enough to justify evacuation. In any event, Garner said, HMG will be heavily influenced by the views of the British Ambassador to Nigeria.

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~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

7. The approach to the British in Lagos was even less fruitful. We have the full text of what the UK Ambassador recommended to London. Essentially, he advised against any evacuation of the whole of Nigeria -- now or in the future -- and against immediate evacuation of the East. His arguments are (1) it isn't clear whether we face a prolonged conflict or a "foray;" (2) evacuation would seriously disrupt the Nigerian economy, particularly in the East, and would bring the British into disfavor with Biafra; (3) many Brits would refuse to leave; and (4) British citizens might well be safe in a successful attack on the East if they followed instructions and "kept their heads down." He summarized that he would not recommend evacuation until "British subjects become a target."
8. At this point, which is about 2:30 this afternoon, the story trails off. We know there are several messages which have been sent from Lagos, but not received. We have received word that our Ambassador has instructed our Consul in the East to advise U.S. dependents to leave that region. We do not know whether he has done the same in the other regions. (This is of great political importance in terms of U.S. even-handedness, which will largely determine the nature of our post-independence relations with Biafra.) Joe Palmer has sent a flash inquiry to find out what is going on. We assume our man is moving forward with a Nigeria-wide evacuation.
9. Whatever the present facts, as I reported to you yesterday we propose to proceed -- with or without the British -- with commercial evacuation of dependents and non-essential personnel from all regions. We shall probably have to let this be known publicly tomorrow if Lagos has not already announced it. I will furnish George Christian with guidance and stand by to help with the briefing if necessary.



Ed Hamilton

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 31, 1967
6:45 p.m.

10

MR. PRESIDENT:

As instructed, I had Evron in this afternoon at 5:30. I explained to him your concern at the language used with respect to the U. S. commitment in Prime Minister Eshkol's message of yesterday. I went over again your talking paper which, I reminded him, was your formal communication to which the rest of what you said was an elaboration. He said he understood what I had told him; but he was deeply concerned.

The reason was this. He went up to New York to meet Minister Sapir, who has just arrived in the U. S. to raise money for Israel. Sapir told him that after Eban reported, the Cabinet voted on war or delay, and split 9 to 9.

The Prime Minister then cabled Harman and asked Harman his and Evron's personal assessment of the President's intentions.

Harman and Evron then said that it was their personal assessment that President Johnson intended to see this through even if, in the end, the United States was the only nation standing beside Israel. They did not for one moment imply that this is what you told Eban. They merely took on their shoulders the "heavy burden" of giving to their government their assessment of the feelings and intentions of the President of the United States.

Evron added that for some reason he -- Evron -- is regarded in Israel as a hawk. Sapir told him that it was this personal assessment which tipped the balance.

Evron wanted me to be extremely clear that:

-- he in no way attributed his judgment to what the President told Eban;

-- he and Harman held themselves alone responsible for making this assessment of President Johnson.

He said he told me this story to understand what the effects might be of a message from Washington which appeared to be a "backing away" from what the President told Eban.

He then asked me: "Has the President's attitude changed since he saw Eban?" I said I did not believe that the President's attitude had changed since that time. What the President was reacting to was language in a communication between Chiefs of Government ~~was~~ which was inexact. The President felt that it was extremely

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-166
By is, NARA Date 1-7-00

5/31/67

important for the Government of Israel fully to understand the constitutional setting in which the President had to make his dispositions. The whole context of the talk with Eban was the limitations which the President had to face in implementing his policy stated on May 23.

He then said, "Am I wrong in assessing the President's personal determination as I did?" I said that, as a government servant, it would be wrong for me to communicate that kind of judgment. I said, "You have known President Johnson for a long time and have a right to make your own assessment."

With tears in his eyes, he said: "So much hinges on that man."

I told him that our reaction to Prime Minister Eshkol's formulation would be conveyed more formally; but that I wished him to understand the kind of difficulty it posed for the President.

He then went on to make three observations:

-- the first soundings taken by their ambassadors in Scandinavia, Canada, etc., were not hopeful, although this may not be the last word;

-- in their contacts with the Congress they believe support is building for a strong stand by the United States not confined to former doves. He said that in this matter Nasser was doing their work for them;

-- finally, he said that Israel expects war. They do not expect to attack, but to be attacked. They are grateful for the swiftness with which the Pentagon is now dealing with the pipeline; but Harman will be in to see the Secretary of State with requests for an additional Hawk battalion for air defense and some other urgent military assistance. He hopes that we shall be able to respond.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 31, 1967
5:15 p. m.

11

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an assessment of the Egyptian economy as it relates to the Near East crisis.

The short-run strains are real but manageable; although they will add to the underlying strains in the Egyptian economy over the next several years.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment (SC #04730/67 cy 03 30 May 67)
"The Egyptian Economy and the Near East Crisis)
(Log 2091)

Wed., May 11, 1967
3:25 p.m.

12

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is an intelligent guess as to
probable Soviet reactions to the Maritime
Nations' Declaration.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS attachment (log 2089)

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

2084
Intelligence

Note - 419 9328 *12a*

May 30, 1967

12

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. *A.C.D.*
Subject: Soviet Reaction to Maritime Nations' Declaration

Roston

Current Soviet Posture. Moscow apparently hopes that, if both sides can be restrained from initiating hostilities, the new situation resulting from Nasser's move can be preserved. Current Soviet diplomacy fits such a strategy. At the same time, the Soviets still remain sufficiently uncertain over the outcome of Nasser's move to close the Gulf to avoid committing themselves to support it publicly (or, so far as we can tell, privately). This reticence may become harder to maintain over time as Western diplomatic moves unfold, the UN debates continue, and the Chinese begin whispering in Cairo's ear.

The Soviets already have a general idea of what we are about, and presumably will be watching our diplomatic efforts carefully to see how well they fare. They may continue to withhold all-out backing for Nasser's position on the Gulf, if we manage to make headway with the declaration, if prominent neutrals can be gotten to support it, and if Moscow sees the maritime powers as preparing eventually to enforce passage to Eilat. But, if the Soviets see our efforts as meeting little support, they will be more likely to dig in publicly in support of Nasser's action.

Not Likely to Join. Moscow almost certainly will not join the declaration, even if large numbers of signatures can be obtained. To do so would appear to

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-520

By *ya*, NARA, Date *4-30-92*

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collude with the US against the Arabs. And whatever the title, the Soviets and their Arab clients will see the maritime powers as the successors of the Canal Users of 1956. Soviet propaganda will doubtless accuse the West of trying to use gunboat diplomacy against the Arabs and may attempt to draw a parallel between American action in the Tonkin Gulf and the threat of intervention in Aqaba in an effort to discourage neutral backing for the maritime nations. In any event, Soviet diplomacy will probably seek to dissuade as many countries as possible from signing on the calculus that the US, if it fails to obtain broad support, will be reluctant to use force.

Consultations with the Soviets. Soviet ability to sabotage the proposed declaration may be inhibited if, after a substantial number of signatories have been obtained but before the document is presented publicly, the Soviets are consulted about it. This procedure would tend to undercut subsequent Soviet allegations that the declaration represents a conspiracy of the US and its allies. It would not, however, make it more likely that the Soviets would support the scheme.

What Solution? The Soviets are undoubtedly interested in a denouement in the Gulf short of the use of force since if force were to be used there they would find it hard indeed to render assistance to the UAR. They may calculate that the maritime powers are not likely to seek a regime that satisfies the totality of Israeli claims and demands and that therefore some sort of a compromise formula will emerge. Among the possible formulas, the Soviets would probably consider a situation satisfactory in which Nasser's claims stand but he desists from the attempt to enforce them until some more propitious

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~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

- 3 -

moment. Although Nasser's failure to achieve his maximum demands would result in Soviet-Arab strains, Moscow would probably calculate that over the long run he and the radical Arabs will remain dependent on Moscow's support.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Luncheon Meeting With the President
Wednesday, May 31, 1967, 1:00 pm

AGENDA

I. Near East Crisis: Next Steps. (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)

Papers will be in your evening reading.

II. Viet Nam. (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)

- a. Bombing policy
- b. Operation COMPATRIOT
- c. Other

III. Other.

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara may have some personnel problems.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 5-16-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 31, 1967 -- 12:00 noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Marvin Watson

SUBJECT: Military Honors for Harold Wilson

Unless you rule to the contrary, we have acceded to the British request that Wilson be given the same treatment on the lawn as Prime Minister Holt. Prime Minister Holt gets full military honors. Therefore, we are now planning for full military honors for Harold Wilson's arrival (this would cause him to arrive at 11:45 a.m. instead of 12 noon).

We will try to keep the ceremony down to 15 minutes by shortening your welcoming statement and Wilson's response.

W. W. Rostow

11:15

OK

cc: Col Cross

LSE:WWRostow:rlh

Wednesday, May 31, 1967, 11:45 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Harold Wilson

I am a bit worried about the short time now scheduled for your substantive talk with Harold Wilson. To avoid any chance of misunderstanding during the next several weeks, you will want to give Wilson the full flavor of your thinking on the Middle East and get him committed hard to an acceptable position in Aqaba. (He, Brown and Healy are pretty solid, but there are strong counter pressures in the Cabinet and the House.) Further, you will wish to push him very hard on East of Suez. I am afraid George Brown chose to misunderstand our light-touch reaction on this when he was here.

Wilson, in turn, will want to give you a full picture of his economic situation, and his troubles with de Gaulle, which lie at the root of his East of Suez problem. I doubt that all this can be done in the one hour now set aside for your meeting. In terms of avoiding future misunderstandings--and keeping Wilson on the right track--a full and leisurely discussion is important. (I dare make this case, even though I know you think I am soft on the British.)

If you agree, we could get Wilson to move his arrival time up from 11:45 to 11:00 or 11:15. The extra 30-45 minutes would, I think, do the job.

Francis M. Bator

Ask Wilson to arrive at 11:00 _____, at 11:15 ✓

Keep arrival at 11:45 _____

Speak to me _____

~~SECRET~~

Wed., Mar 31, 1967
10:15 a.m.

File

16

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith, as instructed, my outgoing
to Bunker, and his response, on
possible Saigon leak on targets.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachments (To Bunker CAP67506 5/30/67
(To WH EO for WWR, 7391 5/31/67)

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 49, NARA, Date 5-10-97

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FM WHITE HOUSE
TO AMEMB SAIGON
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CAS CHANNEL CITE CAP67506

TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER, SAIGON, FROM WALT ROSTOW

PRESIDENT IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT APPARENT SAIGON LEAK
ON TARGET RESTRICTIONS. HE WOULD WISH YOU TO DISCUSS THIS WITH
WESTY AND REPORT SOURCE OF LEAK. HE WISHES TIGHTEST DISCIPLINE
IN SAIGON ON DISCUSSION OF BOMBING AS WELL AS OTHER MILITARY
PLANS AND OPERATIONS, UP TO AND INCLUDING COURT MARSHAL OF
OFFENDERS
090

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-522
By lig, NARA, Date 3-3-93

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~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

166

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FM CIA
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-520
By ju, NARA, Date 6-24-93

FOLLOWING MSG RECEIVED FROM SAIGON VIA CIA COMMUNICATION FACILITIES
~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY 311218Z

FM AMB BUNKER 7391

TO THE WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY WALT ROSTOW

1. I IMMEDIATELY TOOK UP MATTER OF POSSIBLE SAIGON LEAK ON TARGET RESTRICTIONS WITH WESTY. HE WILL MAKE PROMPT INVESTIGATION AND I WILL REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SINCE ARRIVAL, I HAVE CONSTANTLY EMPHASIZED REQUIREMENT FOR TIGHTEST DISCIPLINE TO PREVENT LEAKS REGARDING ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS AND WILL, OF COURSE, ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS AGAIN.
2. AP STORY WITH WASHINGTON DATELINE, MAY 30, APPEARED IN TWO ENGLISH LANGUAGE PAPERS HERE HINTING AT POSSIBLE REDIRECTION IN AIR WAR TO CONCENTRATE ON COMMUNICATION ROUTES FEEDING COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. THIS ASSUMPTION BASED ON FACT AMERICAN PILOTS "ARE REPORTED STAYING CLEAR OF TARGETS IN THE HANOI AND HAIPHONG AREA AFTER A PERIOD OF BOMBING POWER PLANTS, RAILROAD BRIDGES, AND OTHER KEY FACILITIES CLOSE TO BOTH CITIES". THIS IS A DEDUCTION WHICH KNOWLEDGEABLE AND ASTUTE REPORTERS, SOME OF WHICH WE HAVE HERE, COULD MAKE SIMPLY BY FOLLOWING DAILY REPORTS OF AIR STRIKES AND NOTING THEIR LOCATION. REPORTERS MIGHT ALSO BE ABLE TO NOTE FACT THAT, AS GENERAL WESTMORELAND REPORTED TO COUNCIL MEETING MONDAY, THE GREAT BULK OF MIG ATTACKS CAME BETWEEN 10 AND 22 MAY AND THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NONE SINCE.
3. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS IS THE MATTER TO WHICH YOU REFER, BUT I MERELY POINT OUT SPECULATION OF THIS KIND BY SOME OF THE ASTUTE REPORTERS WE HAVE HERE MAY NOT NECESSARILY BE THE RESULT OF LEAKS. IN ANY CASE, PLEASE ASSURE THE PRESIDENT WE SHALL MAKE RENEWED STRENUOUS EFFORTS HERE TO PREVENT LEAKS.

GP-1
240

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 31, 1967

17

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Today's Security Council Meeting

We presented our interim resolution -- calling for Security Council endorsement of Thant's appeal to forego belligerence and for further diplomatic and UN efforts to resolve the crisis. In his speech, Justice Goldberg called on the members of the Security Council to have the courage to exercise their responsibilities and to harmonize their actions to save the world from the scourge of war.

The UAR subsequently presented a resolution essentially calling for a reversion to the situation before 1956. The UAR Representative attacked the 1951 Security Council Resolution (which said that neither side was entitled to belligerent rights). His basis was that some of the states voting for the resolution should have abstained as parties to the dispute and that the resolution was based on the "permanent character" of the Armistice which had been shattered by the 1956 attack.

Federenko maintained a running, sarcastic challenge to Goldberg to explain our naval blockade of Cuba in 1962 in light of our present championing of maritime rights.

Various Arab countries continued their attacks on Israel. Japan supported Thant; India supported the UAR Resolution; Ethiopia made a temporizing down-the-middle statement; and France called for -- and got -- an adjournment until 10:30 a.m. Friday in order to study both resolutions (and, obviously, to get further instructions).

W. W. Rostow

WWR
WWR:MD:gg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *TK 83-160*

By *16/100*, NARA, Date *5-21-91*

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1967 MAY 31 00 47

FROM WALT TOSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67507

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-522
By lig, NARA, Date 3-3-93

~~SECRET~~

MAY 30, 1967

HERewith BRUCE'S EVALUATION OF WILSON'S POSITION AND MOOD
BEFORE WASHINGTON TRIP.

WE WILL SHORTLY KNOW RESULT CABINET MEETING ON NEAR EAST.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS ARE THAT CABINET QUITE SHAKEN BY POSSIBLE
IMPLICATIONS THOMSON PLAN FOR UK OIL REVENUES, ETC. AS YOU
PREDICTED.

1. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL COME TO WASHINGTON FRIDAY EXPECTING
US INTEREST TO FOCUS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; HIS OWN APPROACH
TO THESE PROBLEMS MAY BE LARGELY GOVERNED BY BRITISH DOMESTIC
PREOCCUPATIONS. IMPORTANT AS THE FAR EAST AND MIDDLE EAST ARE,
FOR THE BRITISH THEY ARE LESS COMPELLING THAN DOMESTIC ECONOMICS
AND POLITICS AND THE COMMON MARKET. SINCE THE STERLING CRISIS OF
JULY, 1966 THE PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN PROGRESSIVELY COMMITTING
HIMSELF TO A BOLD POLITICAL GAMBLE--A SET OF POLICY COMMITMENTS
THAT ARE, IN THE SHORT RUN, ECONOMICALLY PAINFUL AND POLITICALLY
DISTASTEFUL TO THE BRITISH PEOPLE--TRUSTING TO LONG-TERM RESULTS
FOR HIS POLITICAL VINDICATION. DEFLATION, TIGHT CONTROL OF WAGES
AND PRICES, RISING UNEMPLOYMENT, DEFENSE AT THE EXPENSE OF SOCIAL
WELFARE--THESE ARE SHORTHAND REMINDERS OF THE HOST OF DOMESTIC
ISSUES THAT NOW BESET HIM. THINGS WILL GET WORSE BEFORE THEY GET
BETTER. THE LATEST (APRIL) INDICATORS SHOW UNEMPLOYMENT STILL
RAISING, PRODUCTION SLUGGISH, AND A FURTHER RISE IN IMPORTS AS
AGAINST EXPORTS. EVEN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE COMMON MARKET BID, IN
THE WAKE OF DEGAULLE'S PUBLIC OPPOSITION, IS SLIPPING ACCORDING TO
THE POLLS.

2. IN THE FACE OF THESE PROBLEMS, THE PRIME MINISTER HAS BET
NEARLY ALL HIS POLITICAL STACK OF CHIPS ON HIS COMMON MARKET
APPLICATION. NOW, HAVING DONE SO, HE FINDS HIMSELF IN TROUBLE BE-
CAUSE OF DEGAULLE'S INTRANSIGENCE, EVEN PERHAPS ON THE QUESTION OF
NEGOTIATIONS.

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3. WHILE WILSON HAS PERSEVERED IN HIS LONG RANGE STRATEGY THROUGH THE WINTER AND THE SPRING, THE POLITICAL COST HAS MOUNTED. LABOR HAS SLIPPED BADLY IN PARLIAMENTARY BY-ELECTIONS AND LOST DISASTROUSLY IN THE NATION WIDE LOCAL ELECTIONS. LABOR'S PUBLIC SUPPORT HAS BEEN STEADILY DECLINING IN THE POLLS; IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OVER THREE YEARS, THE CONSERVATIVES HOLD A LEAD IN PUBLIC FAVOR. EVEN THE PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL POPULARITY IN THE POLLS, ALWAYS HIGHER THAN HIS PARTY'S, IS DOWN.

4. ALONG WITH WIDE SPREAD PUBLIC DISAFFECTION, THERE IS TROUBLE WITHIN THE LABOR PARTY. LARGE SCALE REVOLTS IN THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY ON THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND THE COMMON MARKET APPLICATION HAVE POSED A SERIOUS DISCIPLINARY PROBLEM. WILSON'S TOUGH AND SENSATIONAL LECTURE TO A PARLIAMENTARY PARTY MEETING IN MARCH HAD AT BEST A TEMPORARY EFFECT. WHILE THE TROUBLE IS MAINLY ON THE LEFT, IT SPREADS ACROSS THE PARTY. THE DEFENSE BUDGET, EAST OF SUEZ, THE COMMON MARKET, VIETNAM, AND DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POLICIES EACH HAVE THEIR SPECIAL CRITICS. WHILE THEY MAY NOT ALL UNITE ON ONE ISSUE, THEIR SUM IS A RANGE OF DISCONTENT THAT INFECTS A LARGE SECTION OF THE PARTY. EVEN THE LOYALISTS ARE UNHAPPY OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S FAILURE TO PUNISH LEFTIST REBELS.

5. WILSON HAS SHOWN NO SIGN OF RETREAT ON WHAT HE REGARDS AS THE BASIC ISSUES--THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY AND THE COMMON MARKET--TO PLACATE HIS CRITICS. ON THE CONTRARY, HE CONTINUES TO TAKE A POSITION WELL AHEAD OF HIS PARTY (AND APPARENTLY) OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC, COUNTING ON THE FACT THAT, BETWEEN NOW AND 1971, HE CAN PICK HIS OWN MOST FAVORABLE MOMENT FOR A GENERAL ELECTION.

6. NEVERTHELESS, NO LEADER CAN BE INDIFFERENT TO THE PRESSURES WILSON IS UNDER, AND HE MUST, SO FAR AS POSSIBLE, DO WHAT HE CAN TO IMPROVE HIS PRESENT POLITICAL POSITION. HE IS PUTTING A LOT OF PERSONAL EFFORT INTO REPAIRING HIS INTRA-PARTY FENCES AND TRYING TO DAMP DOWN THE HARMFUL AND PUBLICLY VISIBLE SQUABBLE WITHIN THE LABOR PARTY. MOST IMPORTANT, HE IS UNQUESTIONABLY LOOKING FOR ISSUES ON WHICH, WITHOUT SACRIFICE OF HIS BASIC PURPOSES, HE CAN MAKE SOME CONCESSION TO PUBLIC AND PARTY DISAFFECTION.

7. THERE MAY BE, FOR EXAMPLE, SOME MINOR IMPROVEMENTS IN SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMS IN JULY MINI-BUDGET AND AS WAGE INCREASES ARE REVIEWED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, THERE MAY BE SOME POLITICALLY USEFUL CONCESSIONS THERE (THE GOVERNMENT HAS CONCEDED THAT IT EXPECTS WAGES TO RISE SIX PERCENT DURING THIS CALENDAR YEAR AND SOME POLITICALLY IMPORTANT WAGE CLAIMS ARE PENDING).

8. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE PROPOSED EAST OF SUEZ REDUCTIONS ARE PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT, AN ANNOUNCEMENT IN JULY OF SUBSTANTIAL SAVING IN THAT AREA, LOOKING AHEAD TO WHAT MAY OTHERWISE BE A STORMY LABOR PARTY CONFERENCE IN SEPTEMBER, IS PROBABLY THE JUICIEST BONE HE CAN THROW HIS CRITICS. IN COMMENDS ITSELF IN BOTH BUDGETARY AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVINGS (AT A TIME WHEN NO OTHER SOURCES FOR WELFARE SPENDING AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES ARE IN VIEW) AND IT APPEALS TO THE GROWING NUMBER WHO, FOR DOCTRINAL AND EMOTIONAL REASONS, WANT TO REDUCE BRITAIN'S WORLD ROLE, FURTHERMORE, IT IS THOUGHT BY SOME TO STRENGTHEN THE COMMON MARKET BID.

9. THE PRIME MINISTER IS, THUS, UNDER HEAVY POLITICAL FORTUNE. THERE IS NO SIGN, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS WEAKENING IN HIS LONG-TERM STRATEGY. HE IS DEEPLY COMMITTED ON BOTH DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE COMMON MARKET; IT WOULD PROBABLY BE AS COSTLY TO RETREAT AS TO SEE IT THROUGH (THOUGH WHAT TO DO IF THE COMMON MARKET BID FAILS MUST BE NOW AN UNCOMFORTABLE QUESTION).

10. IN THIS DIFFICULT SITUATION, THE PRIME MINISTER SHOWS EVERY SIGN OF KEEPING HIS NERVE. HE IS VISIBLY SELF-CONFIDENT, RETAINS ALL HIS SKILL AND APLOMB IN PUBLIC PERFORMANCE, AND APPARENTLY CONTINUES HIS MASTERY OVER HIS CABINET AND HIS PARTY. HE IS HELPED, OF COURSE, BY TORY WEAKNESS; THE SWING IN PUBLIC OPINION SEEMS MORE AN EXPRESSION OF DISSATISFACTION WITH LABOR THAN OF SUPPORT FOR THE TORIES. HEATH'S PERSONAL POPULARITY REMAINS AT A LOW LEVEL.

11. WILSON WILL PROBABLY HOLD TO HIS PRESENT COURSE AND HE IS GIVING UP IMPRESSIVE EXHIBITION OF SKILLFUL AND COURAGEOUS LEADERSHIP. BUT ONE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE HIS DIFFICULTIES OR THE STRESSES ON HIM. EVEN WITHIN HIS CABINET, HE IS UNDER REAL PRESSURE TO RETREAT ON ISSUES NOT CENTRAL TO LABOR'S POLITICAL FORTUNES OR TO THE UK ECONOMY BUT OF GREAT INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES--ISSUES LIKE VIET NAM, THE BASIC EAST OF SUEZ POLICY, AND EVEN, PERHAPS, THE UK'S ROLE IN THE PRESENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

12. WHEN I COME TO THE DEPARTMENT ON THURSDAY MORNING I HOPE FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS UNITED KINGDOM'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM.

~~SECRET~~
BRUCE

DTG
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-522

By ig, NARA, Date 3-2-93

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67539

1967 MAY 31 00 36

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 30, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

~~HEREWITH BRUCE'S EVALUATION OF WILSON'S POSITION AND
WOOD BEFORE WASHINGTON TRIP.~~

~~WE WILL SHORTLY KNOW RESULT CABINET MEETING ON NEAR EAST.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS ARE THAT CABINET QUITE SHAKEN BY POSSIBLE
IMPLICATIONS THOMSON PLAN FOR UNITED KINGDOM OIL REVENUES,
Etc. AS YOU PREDICTED.~~

DEBATE CONTINUED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY WITHOUT
IMPORTANT NEW DEVELOPMENTS.

THE DANE HAS NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER HE SHOULD GET OUT
IN FRONT AS THE PROPOSER OF OUR RESOLUTION. (HE BECOMES
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON JUNE 1 AND HOPES TO
PLAY A MEDIATING ROLE IN THAT CAPACITY.) IF THE DANE DECIDES
AGAINST BEING THE PROPOSER, WE SHALL DO SO OURSELVES. THE
RESOLUTION WILL SUPPORT THANT, CALL FOR A COOLING-OFF,
THE FOREGOING OF BELLIGERENCE, AND AVOIDANCE OF OTHER
AGGRAVATIONS TO TENSION. THIS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY
DIPLOMACY AND FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION.

IN THE DEBATE THE LEBANESE, SYRIAN AND UAR (UNITED ARAB
REPUBLIC) REPRESENTATIVES CONTINUED THEIR CHARGES AGAINST
ISRAEL, MENTIONING THE JORDAN RIVER PROJECT AND THE PALESTINE
ARABS AND IMPLYING THAT UNFRIENDLY STATES' OIL INTERESTS IN THE
NEAR EAST WOULD SUFFER. THE UAR REPRESENTATIVE CONTINUED HIS
LEGAL ARGUMENT, SAYING THE 1958 CONVENTION ON TERRITORIAL SEAS
IS IN EFFECT ONLY IN TIME OF PEACE.

GOLDBERG ANSWERED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD EXPLICITLY
STATED IN 1951 THAT NEITHER SIDE IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM BELLIGERENT
RIGHTS. WHAT WE WANT AS A FIRST STEP IS TO RESTORE THE STATUS
QUO BEFORE NASSER ANNOUNCED THE CLOSING THE STRAITS.

DENMARK, NIGERIA AND CHINA SUPPORTED THANT AND HIS REPORT.

THE COUNCIL VOTED TO MEET AGAIN TOMORROW AT 3 P.M. OVER THE
REPORTED OBJECTION OF FOUR MEMBERS (NO DOUBT THE USSR, BULGARIA,
MALI AND PERHAPS INDIA)

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DTG:302332Z MAY 67

PRESERVATION COPY

25

Tuesday, May 30, 1967
6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here is the basic background paper
on the Middle East, for discussion and
decision at lunch tomorrow (Wednesday,
May 31).

W. W. Rostow

secret

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ng, NARA, Date 5-10-91

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200
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 30, 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Arab-Israel Crisis

1. Middle East Scenario

As you know, our scenario on the Middle East situation envisages three steps:

a. Action in and outside the United Nations to head off the imminent threat of Arab-Israeli hostilities and to seek a political settlement of the Gulf of Aqaba question;

b. Formal and public affirmation by the largest possible number of maritime nations of their support for the principle that the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways; and

c. Contingency planning for testing UAR interference with the right of free passage for ships of all nations through the Strait and the Gulf, and contingency planning for the use of force, as necessary, to support that right. Implementing action would be undertaken only after measures in the United Nations had been exhausted and after Congressional approval had been obtained.

2. Handling of Declaration

The debate in the Security Council will probably be long and drawn out; the May 29 session indicated little disposition to agree on any specific resolution at this

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GROUP 3

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NLJ 99-167
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-2-

stage. During Council discussion, there will be substantial opportunity to launch various private negotiations, involving the President of the Council (Denmark, in June); the Secretary General; the British, French and Russians; and the protagonists themselves. These are a part of the UN process which may be of greatest importance in the end. At the proper time, the text of the Joint Declaration should be circulated in the Security Council for the information of UN Members.

a. Preliminary Soundings

The British have already made soundings on the proposed Declaration (without providing a text) with the Italians, Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, Greeks, Panamanians, Liberians, and Japanese. We believe they have also discussed the idea of an international naval task force in the Red Sea with these nations.

We have made informal soundings on the Declaration (also without providing a text) and on the possible use of force, with the French, Belgians, Canadians, Dutch, Indians, Italians, and Norwegians.

b. Reactions to Soundings

The reactions to the soundings have varied. Most nations are prepared to support the principle regarding international waterways, but shy away from considering the use of force to secure adherence to that principle. Apart from the British and the Dutch, only the Canadians have so far indicated a possible willingness to participate in a naval task force; the extent to which the Dutch and particularly the Canadians would be prepared to join with us in the use of force is not yet clear.

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-3-

c. Need to Move on the Declaration

Subject to Congressional consultations, we believe we should move promptly to present the proposed Declaration to the maritime nations, in order that our over-all scenario may move forward. Instructions to our posts on the Declaration (Enclosure 1) indicate the division of responsibility between the British and ourselves for making approaches in selected capitals. The text of the Declaration is at Enclosure 2.

The purpose of these approaches would be to obtain signatures to a Declaration, which reaffirms the principles you set forth in your statement of May 23, but which does not commit the signatories to participate in the use of force. The British and we would inform the Israelis when these approaches are made, and suggest that they back them strongly in certain capitals. We would also at the same time determine whether certain nations would join with us in the use of force, if necessary. These nations should include: Italy, France, Argentina, Brazil, and Japan in the first instance. We have suggested that the British and Dutch approach the Nordic countries.

3. Possible Early Movement of Ships Through the Strait to Eilat

Decisions are desirable on the movement of merchant vessels through the Strait to the Israeli port of Eilat. We have discouraged such tests of UAR intentions thus far, although some ships have gone through to Aqaba, the **Jordanian port**. All such ships have acknowledged the UAR controls, although none has been stopped, so far as we know. Armed force has not been used.

As part of our contingency planning, we are considering the possibility of tailoring the traffic pattern of ships entering the Strait during the next 10 days, in order to

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clarify the limits of the UAR policy of blockade -- e.g., whether they intend to bar Israeli-owned as well as Israeli flag ships, and how they propose to define "strategic goods." We might for example encourage the attempted passage of an Israeli-owned (but non-Israeli-flag) ship carrying clearly nonstrategic cargo to Eilat; and if that passed without interference, we might attempt passage with a more "strategic" cargo (e.g., oil). Within this period, such tests would involve no armed escort and no counteraction in the event passage was refused. The purpose would be to clarify the limits of UAR policy and to build a public case for support of free passage.

A serious program of this kind would require consultation with Congressional leaders and an Israeli promise to accept the possibility of rebuff without retaliation. Tel Aviv may not be able to give such a promise, and the scheme may prove infeasible for other reasons -- e.g., our inability to stage-manage the ownership, flag, and cargo of the shipping headed for Eilat. On the other hand, limited tests appear feasible within the next few days, and we propose to go forward with these where the risks appear acceptable. A Panamanian ship (Israeli-owned) loaded with hides is now heading for the Strait, bound for Eilat. We plan to do nothing to discourage its passage through the Strait.

4. A Military Plan to Deal With the Straits of Tiran Question

A military task force may be required to support, with force, the right of innocent passage, on behalf of the international community, through the Gulf of Aqaba in view of the UAR's announced blockade. The essence of this concept is that an international force could keep the Strait open for all flags, thereby obviating an

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Arab-Israeli war. Such a task force should be composed of as many maritime nations as are prepared to join it in a reasonable time. In practice, only the US, the UK and possibly the Dutch and Canadians are likely to participate.

Conceptually, the task force would consist of two parts. First, a protective force in the northern Red Sea which would provide a protective presence for merchantmen testing the Straits, and an escort if the UAR should turn back or fire on unescorted ships; second, a reinforcing force in the Eastern Mediterranean which would be available for reinforcing support if the UAR fired on merchantmen and their escort.

A limited protective force of four destroyers (two US and two UK), a tactical command ship (US), and a light aircraft carrier (UK) could be assembled in the northern Red Sea in about a week. If the carrier Intrepid, now in the Mediterranean, transits the Suez Canal in the next few days, together with her appropriate escorts, these could be added to the force. Application for transit of the Canal has been filed. Even with these additions, however, such a force would be devoid of adequate self-contained air cover and ASW protection and thus subject to attack and damage by UAR sea and air forces in the area (the reinforcing force could provide some air cover over the Tiran area, but the distances from the Eastern Mediterranean would limit operational effectiveness). A stronger, better balanced protective force -- augmented primarily by US naval units from CONUS -- could be assembled in 25-30 days.

US and UK forces already in the Mediterranean provide a powerful reinforcing force (consisting of 3 US carriers, 1 UK carrier, and numerous other vessels). British air forces in Cyprus may also be available. If the UAR fired on merchantmen and their escorts, aircraft from these Mediterranean forces could, and might have to, intervene

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-6-

in the Tiran area or strike at major air bases and installations in the UAR.

The risks involved in testing the blockade with a limited or even an augmented protective force are not negligible. If Nasser is not deterred, the possibility would exist of wider conflict. This possibility is being urgently studied, both politically and militarily.

5. Congressional Consultation

Much of the Congress is away until Wednesday and some, including Senator Fulbright, will be away longer. We recommend immediate Congressional consultations on the Hill on the Declaration with the leadership, the key Committees (Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs and Commerce), and with senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. This meeting would be for the purpose of: (1) providing an up-to-date briefing on the current situation, and (2) reviewing our general strategy, with specific reference to the proposed Maritime Declaration. We recommend that the formal approaches to other nations regarding the text of the Declaration not be undertaken until after your discussions with the Congressional leaders.

Additionally, we plan to continue our daily efforts to brief other members of the Congress. As in the past few days, however, these briefings will continue to concentrate on current developments, and to avoid speculation about future developments.

In this situation, we believe that a Joint Congressional resolution would be politically necessary before US military forces are used in any way. The timing of a formal request to the Congress for such a resolution should, however, be carefully considered. While it is true that many Congressional doves may be in

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-7-

the process of conversion to hawks, the problem of "Tonkin Gulfitis" remains serious. Thus an effort to get a meaningful resolution from the Congress runs the risk of becoming bogged down in acrimonious debate. We recommend therefore that a formal request for such a resolution be delayed until (1) it has become clear to the Congress that we have exhausted other diplomatic remedies in and outside of the United Nations, and (2) our soundings indicate that such a request will receive prompt and strong support. The text of an appropriate resolution is Enclosure 3.

6. Timing

We hope to complete actions on the Declaration toward the end of this week. We would seek to have the military contingency planning, with the UK at least, well under way by the end of the week of June 5.

7. Recommendations

1. That you approve the draft Declaration of the Maritime nations, at Enclosure 2.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

2. That following Congressional consultations on Wednesday you authorize us to send a telegram substantially in the form of the text at Enclosure 1, instructing our Ambassadors in selected countries to seek commitments from the Governments to which they are accredited to adhere to the Declaration.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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-8-

3. That following Congressional consultations, you authorize us to proceed at once to sound out France, Italy, Argentina, Brazil and Japan on an informal basis about the possibility of their participating with us in the use of force if necessary to secure effective observance of the right of free passage for all nations.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

4. That you authorize us to add the Dutch, the Canadians, and other prospective members of the action party at a later point to form an international planning group which would be built around the British-American naval consultations.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

5. That you approve the enclosed draft Joint Resolution for preliminary discussion late this week, or early next week, with Congressional leaders.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Dean Rusk

Robert S. McNamara

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Enclosures:

1. Telegram of Instructions.
2. Declaration of Maritime Nations.
3. Joint Congressional Resolution.

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SECRET - LIMDIS206

ACTION: CIRCULAR PRIORITY

STATE

LIMDIS

1. To provide helpful support for UN and other efforts resolve current NE crisis, we have been examining with British desirability of issuing joint declaration by maritime nations. Draft text being sent you septel. Action addressees should deliver urgently to host governments, making points set out below and soliciting their prompt support. British will make initial approach in capitals info addressees. All addressees should coordinate with British to ensure most effective mutual support. The Netherlands is prepared to and we believe Canada is disposed to support the proposed course of action and the Government of Israel is to back up with a strong diplomatic effort.

2. In presenting declaration, you should stress following:

a. Current Near East crisis is worst since 1956. Withdrawal UNEF at UAR request has removed essential buffer between UAR and Israel and their two armies now confront each other. Accident or miscalculation could be calamitous.

b. Situation has been made even more acute by announced UAR intention close Gulf of Aqaba both to Israel-flag vessels and to vessels of all other flags carrying "strategic cargoes" to Israel. UAR has thus put forward claim to control Israel's sole seaward access from south. Israel regards such access as essential and considers any interference with it as a threat to Israel's

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very existence. Gravest questions of war and peace accordingly arise. In judgment USG joint action by maritime nations is the only alternative to an almost certain war.

c. It is the view of the USG that Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba constitute international waterway both by test customary usage (innocent passage for all Israeli-bound vessels has been normal for decade) and by general provisions international law which are reflected in 1958 Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea to which 33 states, including USSR, are parties (FYI of Aqaba riparians, only Israel is a party END FYI.) The UAR action clearly poses a test to these recognized rights of navigation through international waterways.

d. Through the efforts of the UNSYG and the current consideration of the problem by the UN Security Council it is hoped that processes can be brought to bear leading to a satisfactory solution of the present critical problem. As part of this general effort, the USG believes it is important for the world's major maritime states clearly and with solidarity to reiterate their views regarding both the general principles involved in this situation and their specific application to the Aqaba case.

e. Issuance of a declaration with such broad support would be most useful at this juncture in supporting current UN efforts and the rule of law with respect to maritime traffic. The USG hopes that host government will be willing to join with other like-minded states who also being approached in

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-3-

in issuing declaration in very near future. The declaration reaffirms position taken by maritime powers in 1957 which was subsequently reflected in the 1958 Geneva Convention.

3. In response to queries you may take following line:

a. If asked re our basic intention, you should respond our aim is to remove present danger to peace and resolve current problem by means of international action through the United Nations.

b. If asked what our intention would be should efforts through the United Nations fail, you should state that we would address questions which would then arise at that time, but we would not now exclude the possibility of protecting maritime rights outside the UN.

c. If asked how far association with joint declaration would commit host governments to further joint action as opposed to consultations, you should give assurance that participation in issuance declaration constitutes a commitment only to the statement of principles contained therein.

d. If asked whether changes can be made in the text you should say that we will of course consider most carefully any suggestions but that many nations are being approached and that the mechanics of substantial redrafting would obviously be difficult.

4. FYI. A number of maritime states publicly supported principle freedom of transit through Gulf of Aqaba in United Nations debates in early 1957 as part general international effort secure Israeli withdrawal from Sinai Peninsula. These included: UK, France, Italy, Canada, Sweden, Belgium, New Zealand and several others. If addressees able ascertain host government

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-4-

took such clear position at that time, point should of course be stressed that what is needed now is merely reaffirmation host government's long-standing position. END FYI.

5. Report reactions priority.

GP-3.

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20c

LIMITED DISTRIBUTIONDECLARATION

The Governments of maritime nations subscribing to this Declaration express their grave concern at recent developments in the Middle East which are currently under consideration in the United Nations Security Council. Our countries, as Members of the United Nations committed to the Purposes and Principles set forth in the Charter, are convinced that scrupulous respect for the principles of international law regarding freedom of navigation on international waterways is indispensable.

In regard to shipping through the waterways that serve ports on the Gulf of Aqaba, our Governments reaffirm the view that the Gulf is an international waterway into and through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage. Our Governments will assert this right on behalf of all shipping sailing under their flags, and our Governments are prepared to cooperate among themselves and to join with others in seeking general recognition of this right.

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The views we express in this Declaration formed the basis on which a settlement of the Near East conflict was achieved in early 1957 -- a settlement that has governed the actions of nations for more than ten years.

These views will guide our policies and action in seeking to assure peace and security in the Near East.

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20d

JOINT RESOLUTION TO SUPPORT THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE
THROUGH THE STRAIT OF TIRAN AND THE GULF OF AQABA

WHEREAS the purpose of the United States in the Middle East is to promote peace and to support the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of the area, in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations; and

WHEREAS adherence to the rule of law is indispensable to the maintenance of peace and good relations among states; and

WHEREAS the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba constitute an international waterway; and

WHEREAS any interference with passage through them would be contrary to international law and would gravely threaten peace and security of the Middle East: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That the United States regards the preservation of the principles of international law regarding freedom of navigation on international waterways as a vital interest

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-2-

of the international community and of the United States and as essential to the maintenance of peace in the Middle East. Consequently the United States will assert the right of passage for its own vessels through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba and is prepared to join with other nations, within and outside the United Nations, in seeking general recognition of this right for the vessels of all nations. The President is authorized to take appropriate action, including use of the Armed Forces of the United States, to secure effective observance of this right in concert with other nations.

SEC. 2. The President shall report to the Congress his action hereunder.

SEC. 3. This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the right of free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran is assured by action of the United Nations or otherwise.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

21

Pres. file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 30, 1967.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Farewell Call by Romanian Ambassador, 5:30 PM, Wednesday, May 31.

Ambassador Petre Balaceanu (Bah-lach-YAN-oo) will make a brief farewell call at 5:30 PM, Wednesday, May 31. A brief biography is at Tab A.

You may wish to say:

- You would like to see continued improvement in relations between the United States and Romania;
- We are pleased that Romania is participating in the Water for Peace Conference (the only Warsaw Pact country to do so). We hope there will be increasingly active exchanges of experience and ideas in all fields.

Balaceanu may ask about prospects for the East-West trade bill (Romania is anxious for MFN).

The Ambassador will be accompanied by Walter Stoessel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. I will be standing by.

FMB

Francis M. Bator

OK

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-522
By ing, NARA, Date 3-2-93

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21a

PETRE BALACEANU
Romanian Ambassador to the United States

Ambassador Balaceanu is an economic expert with previous diplomatic experience in London and Buenos Aires as well as Washington.

Before World War II he was employed by the Romanian National Bank. In the postwar period he held high diplomatic posts as well as important positions in the State Planning Commission, the State Bank, and the Ministry of Finance. In December 1961 he presented his credentials as Minister to the United States. He was accredited as Ambassador in 1964 following the mutual raising of the United States and Romanian Legations to Embassies. He is sixty years old.

Ambassador Balaceanu is personally agreeable and generally avoids controversial topics. He and his wife have two daughters.

Our Embassy in Bucharest reports that Balaceanu will probably head American and Northern European Affairs in the Foreign Ministry after his return to Bucharest.

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NJ 91-521
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May 30, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

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Authority 76 9 83-52

By 18/11/83, NARA, Date 5-21-91

Debate continued in the Security Council today without important new developments.

The Dane has not yet decided whether he should get out in front as the proposer of our resolution. (He becomes President of the Security Council on June 1 and hopes to play a mediating role in that capacity.) If the Dane decides against being the proposer, we shall do so ourselves. The resolution will support Thant, call for a cooling-off, the foregoing of belligerence, and avoidance of other aggravations to tension. This would be followed by diplomacy and further Security Council action.
(United Arab Republic)

In the debate the Lebanese, Syrian and UAR/representatives continued their charges against Israel, mentioning the Jordan river project and the Palestine Arabs and implying that unfriendly states' oil interests in the Near East would suffer. The UAR representative continued his legal argument, saying the 1958 Convention is in effect only in time of peace.

Goldberg answered that the Security Council had explicitly stated in 1951 that neither side is entitled to claim belligerent rights. What we want as a first step is to restore the status quo before Nasser announced the closing of the Straits.

Denmark, Nigeria and China supported Thant and his report.

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-2-

The Council voted to meet again tomorrow at 3 p.m. over the reported objection of four members (no doubt the USSR, Bulgaria, Mali and perhaps India).

May 30, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

Herewith, if you so desire, a draft personal message to David Harlech on Cissy's death.

Dear David: Mrs. Johnson and I were shocked to the core and grieved at Cissy's tragic death. You should know that you have from us -- and from your many other close friends in Washington -- our heartfelt sympathy and affection.

~~SECRET~~

May 30, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-166
By ix, NARA Date 1-7-00

Evron came in to see me at 3:00 p.m. with these points.

1. A message from Eshkol to you will probably come in tomorrow.
2. The Finney story was deeply upsetting in Israel. The government was forced to say: We know of no such proposal; we are against any such proposal.

3. He said you made extremely clear to Eban your political problems and the implications of those problems ^{for} ~~and~~ timing. From letters that came ~~in~~ in the Israeli pouch today, it is clear that they also have acute problems of timing. I asked how long they could sit still before there is a show down on the Aqaba issue. He said about 10 days.

3. As for tests in the Gulf as to which kind of ships Nasser ^{he} would turn back, ~~I~~ felt them extremely dangerous unless we were prepared to back our play promptly. It would be politically and psychologically most disheartening to have a series of tests in which the ships were turned back by the Egyptians. It would also commit Nasser more deeply each time. Therefore, he was against tests until we had mounted ^{the} force to make innocent passage stick as a principle.

4. He said that Prime Minister Eshkol was likely to express to you his "disappointment" that we had not picked up the suggestion of Eban for some sort of military liaison. He said the Israeli record of security in matters of this kind was excellent -- citing a secret visit of the Chief of

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-2-

Staff of the Israeli army to the Sixth Fleet. Such liaison need not be permanent but merely ~~at~~ for the duration of this particular crisis.

Without such liaison, we ^{might} ~~need~~ get into a situation of conflict without even knowing the aircraft signals on both sides which could produce a first-class disaster.

5. I asked him if he thought Nasser was interested in fighting Israel or only in picking up political capital in the Middle East at the expense of Hussein and Feisal. He said for the first time in his life he believes that Nasser on balance wants to fight Israel.

WWRostow:rlh

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May 30, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

You may wish to consider an early session with General Eisenhower to explain our intentions in the Near East.

What we plan is precisely to stand by his 20 February 1957 statement to the American people.

"With reference to the passage into and through the Gulf of Aqaba, we expressed the conviction that the Gulf constitutes international waters, and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf. We announced that the United States was prepared to exercise this right itself and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right."

Andy Goodpaster just told me:

-- he has been keeping the General informed;

-- his view of 1957 is that the right of innocent passage to Israel was, in fact, a "deal" and a "commitment" whatever the form it assumed legally.

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MLJ 83-52
By reg/ies, NARA, Date 5-21-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

26

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1967 MAY 30 22 44

EEA096
PP WIE10
DE WTE 1113

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70296

UNCLAS

MAY 30, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

HEREWITH, IF YOU SO DESIRE, A DRAFT PERSONAL MESSAGE
TO DAVID HARLECH ON CISSY'S DEATH.

DEAR DAVID: MRS. JOHNSON AND I WERE SHOCKED TO THE CORE
AND GRIEVED AT CISSY'S TRAGIC DEATH. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT
YOU HAVE FROM US--AND FROM YOUR MANY OTHER CLOSE FRIENDS IN
WASHINGTON--HEARTFELT SYMPATHY AND AFFECTION

DTG: 302226Z MAY 67

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27

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67504

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1967 MAY 30 21 27

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MAY 30, 1967

EVRON CAME IN TO SEE ME AT 3:20 P.M. WITH THESE POINTS.

1. A MESSAGE FROM ESHKOL TO YOU WILL PROBABLY COME IN TOMORROW.
2. THE FINNEY STORY WAS DEEPLY UPSETTING IN ISRAEL. THE GOVERNMENT WAS FORCED TO SAY: WE KNOW OF NO SUCH PROPOSAL; WE ARE AGAINST ANY SUCH PROPOSAL.
3. HE SAID YOU MADE EXTREMELY CLEAR TO EBAN YOUR POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THOSE PROBLEMS FOR TIMING. FROM LETTERS THAT CAME IN THE ISRAELI POUCH TODAY, IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY ALSO HAVE ACUTE PROBLEMS OF TIMING. I ASKED HOW LONG THEY COULD SIT STILL BEFORE THERE IS A SHOW DOWN ON THE AQABA ISSUE. HE SAID ABOUT 10 DAYS.
4. AS FOR TESTS IN THE GULF AS TO WHICH KIND OF SHIPS NASSER WOULD TURN BACK. HE FELT THEM EXTREMELY DANGEROUS UNLESS WE WERE PREPARED TO BACK OUR PLAY PROMPTLY. IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY MOST DISHEARTENING TO HAVE A SERIES OF TESTS IN WHICH THE SHIPS WERE TURNED BACK BY THE EGYPTIANS. IT WOULD ALSO COMMIT NASSER MORE DEEPLY EACH TIME. THEREFORE, HE WAS AGAINST TESTS UNTIL WE HAD MOUNTED THE FORCE TO MAKE INNOCENT PASSAGE STICK AS A PRINCIPLE.
5. HE SAID THAT PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL WAS LIKELY TO EXPRESS TO YOU HIS "DISAPPOINTMENT" THAT WE HAD NOT PICKED UP THE SUGGESTION OF EBAN FOR SOME SORT OF MILITARY LIAISON. HE SAID THE ISRAELI RECORD OF SECURITY IN MATTERS OF THIS KIND WAS EXCELLENT -- CITING A SECRET VISIT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ISRAELI ARMY TO THE SIXTH FLEET. SUCH LIAISON NEED NOT BE PERMANENT BUT MERELY FOR THE DURATION OF THIS PARTICULAR CRISIS. WITHOUT SUCH LIAISON, WE MIGHT GET INTO A SITUATION OF CONFLICT WITHOUT EVEN KNOWING THE AIRCRAFT SIGNALS ON BOTH SIDES WHICH COULD PRODUCE A FIRST-CLASS DISASTER.
6. I ASKED HIM IF HE THOUGHT NASSER WAS INTERESTED IN FIGHTING ISRAEL OR ONLY IN PICKING UP POLITICAL CAPITAL IN THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE EXPENSE OF MUSSEIN AND FEISAL. HE SAID FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HIS LIFE HE BELIEVES THAT NASSER ON BALANCE WANTS TO FIGHT ISRAEL.

DTG: 302033Z MAY 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-166
By W NARA Date 1-7-00

~~SECRET~~

GPS: 380 IMI 320
VROX FROM [unclear]

28
EEA 092
PP WTE 10
DE WTE 1113

SENT
WHCA

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: WH70294

1967 MAY 30 20 59 V

U N C L A S

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

THE TEXT OF THE ATTACHED MESSAGE WAS TELEPHONED BY THE
BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR AT 2:22 P.M. TODAY, MAY 30, WITH THE
REQUEST THAT IT BE TRANSMITTED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON TODAY.

HE EXPRESSED REGRET THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO SEND IT IN
WRITTEN FORM IMMEDIATELY, BECAUSE HE WAS WITHOUT STAFF ON
THE HOLIDAY, BUT SAID THAT HE WOULD SEND IT IN WRITING
SOON. WHEN IT IS RECEIVED IN OFFICIAL FORM, WE WILL RECOMMEND
AN ANSWER THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS.

MESSAGE TO:

THE HONORABLE
LYNDON B. JOHNSON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON THE DATE IN WHICH THE AMERICAN NATION, ALL UNITED,
PRAYS FOR PEACE AND RENDERS REVERENT TRIBUTE OF REMEM-
BRANCE TO HER BRAVE SONS SACRIFICED IN THE CARRYING OUT
OF THEIR DUTIES IN DEFENSE OF LIBERTY, I WISH TO ASSURE
YOUR EXCELLENCY IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE OF MY COUNTRY
AND IN THE NAME OF MY GOVERNMENT, THAT BRAZIL FOLLOWS
WITH EMOTION THE CEREMONIES WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA CELEBRATES THE PASSAGE OF ONE MORE MEMORIAL
DAY.

SIGNED: ARTHUR DA COSTE E SILVA
PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL

DTG: 30/2014Z MAY 67

GPS: 400 IMI 400

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-523
By ju, NARA, Date 11-5-93

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~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

167 MAY 30 19 27

VZCZCEEA091
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 1110

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67322

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

30 MAY 1967

HEREWITH LATEST CIA ASSESSMENT, HANOI POWERPLANT. IF ITS
OUT, ITS NOT FOR LONG.

1. PHOTOGRAPHY OF 21 MAY, WHICH ARRIVED IN WASHINGTON AFTER
THIS MEMORANDUM WAS PREPARED, SHOWS LIGHT DAMAGE TO THE
BOILER HOUSE AT THE HANOI POWERPLANT. A 26 MAY FIELD ASSESS-
MENT OF 24 MAY PHOTOGRAPHY (NOT YET AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON)
INDICATES LIGHT DAMAGE TO 2 WAREHOUSES, THE MACHINE SHOPS
AND COAL STORAGE FACILITIES AT THE HANOI POWERPLANT. WITH
SUCH LIGHT DAMAGE THE PLANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN RESTORED TO
PARTIAL OPERATION IN A MATTER OF DAYS (PARTIAL OPERATION
WAS REPORTED BY OTHER SOURCES ON 25 MAY). COMPLETE RESTORATION
WITH SOVIET ASSISTANCE (WHICH REPORTEDLY IS BEING PROVIDED)
SHOULD ONLY TAKE A FEW WEEKS.

LTG: 301901Z MAY 67

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32

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1967 MAY 30 19 25

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67503

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 30, 1967

AFTER YOUR CLEARANCE WE DESPATCHED OUR MAN TO PAK CONSORTIUM MEETING IN LONDON WITH APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS. MEETING TAKES PLACE WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY. NORMALLY OUR MAN WOULD STATE THE U.S. POSITION IN AFTERNOON SESSION TOMORROW (SAY, 11:00 A.M. WASHINGTON TIME) AND WOULD LOBBY WITH CANADIANS AND OTHER DONORS TO UP THEIR ANTE ON BASIS FORTHCOMING U.S. POSITION.

THEREFORE, SO FAR AS CONSORTIUM IS CONCERNED, IT IS DESIRABLE TO PROCEED AS PLANNED.

BUT, IF YOU SO DESIRE, WE CAN PUT HOLD ON U.S. POSITION AND LET OUR MAN PERFORM ON THURSDAY. IF HE IS TO DO THIS, HOWEVER, HE MUST MAKE PROMPT ARRANGEMENTS WITH ISRD CHAIRMAN.

GO AHEAD AS NOW SCHEDULED-----✓-----

IMMEDIATELY INSTRUCT U.S. DELEGATE TO HOLD-----

DTG: 301902Z MAY 67

170

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-522

By sig, NARA, Date 3-3-93

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~~SECRET~~SENT
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1967 MAY 30 19 15

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67501~~SECRET~~HEREWITH YOST'S FIRST REPORT OF DEPTH OF NASSER'S COMMITMENT
AND INTENT.

CAIRO 8218

1. I FIND AMBASSADOR AND OTHER TWO SENIOR OFFICERS THIS EMBASSY ARE ALL FIRMLY CONVINCED (1) THAT NASSER HAS PUBLICLY COMMITTED HIMSELF TO COURSE IN THIS CRISIS FROM WHICH HE CANNOT AND WILL NOT RETREAT, (2) THAT HIS COMMITMENT INCLUDES APPLICATION OF AQABA BLOCKADE TO OIL, (3) THAT NASSER WOULD NOT BE DETERRED BY THREATS EXCEPT CLEAR AND CREDIBLE INTENT TO APPLY OVERWHELMING FORCE, FROM WHICH HE WOULD EXPECT TO HARVEST MAJOR POLITICAL VICTORY, AND (4) HE WOULD PROBABLY WELCOME, BUT NOT SEEK, MILITARY SHOWDOWN WITH ISRAEL. SUBSTANTIALLY SAME APPRAISAL HAS BEEN MADE TO ME BY GENERAL RIKHYE AND AMERICAN UNIVERSITY CAIRO BARTLETT.

2. I HAVE BEEN HERE TOO SHORT A TIME MYSELF TO MAKE PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF UAR INTENTIONS, PARTICULARLY WHETHER THERE MAY BE SOME FLEXIBILITY AS TO SCOPE OF BLOCKADE AND EXACTLY HOW THEY WOULD REACT TO ACTION BY SOME MARITIME POWERS TO BREAK IT. I AM HOWEVER IMPRESSED BY QUASI-UNANIMITY WITH WHICH AREA POSTS HAVE EXPRESSED VIEW CONSEQUENCES OUR FOLLOWING COURSE B WOULD GRAVELY UNDERMINE, IF NOT DESTROY, US POSITION THROUGHOUT ARAB WORLD. IF THIS VIEW IS CORRECT, AND FROM MY EXPERIENCE IN AREA I BELIEVE IT IS, PRINCIPAL PROFIT OF OUR FOLLOWING THIS COURSE WOULD ACCRU TO SOVIETS, AND OVER LONGER RUN POSITION OF ISRAEL WOULD BE WEAKENED RATHER THAN REENFORCED

DTG:301835Z MAY 67

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Authority 74983-51

By 19/100 NARA, Date 5-21-91

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1967 MAY 30 19 12

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67498

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-166

By is, NARA Date 1-7-00

~~SECRET NOBIS~~

THESE THREE CABLES GIVE YOU THE FEEL OF SENTIMENT IN CAIRO,
TEL AVIV AND PARIS, RESPECTIVELY.

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 8190

LINDIS

1. GENERAL RIKHYE GAVE YOST FOLLOWING APPRIASAL OF CURRENT
SITUATION MAY 30:

2. KEY QUESTION IS AQABA. UAR OFFICIALS FROM TOP TO BOTTOM
DETERMINED TO RETURN TO STATUS QUO ANTE 1956 AND MAINTAIN
BLOCKADE. THEIR DEFINITION STRATEGIC MATERIALS DEFINITELY
INCLUDES PETROLEUM OF ALL KINDS. ACCORDING TO RIKHYE,
THEY ARE IN SUCH MOOD THAT THEY WOULD ACTUALLY WELCOME
ISRAELI ATTACK BASED ON THIS ISSUE AS TENDING GREATLY TO STRENGTHEN
UAR POSITION AND PRESTIGE THROUGHOUT ARAB WORLD. THEY WOULD
PROBABLY NOT RPT NOT DIRECTLY RESIST ARMED INTERFERENCE
BY MARITIME POWERS TO KEEP AQABA OPEN BUT THERE WOULD BE
WIDESPREAD RETALIATION THROUGHOUT ARAB WORLD AGAINST ALL
PARTICIPATING POWERS. ON OTHER HAND, RIKHYE HAS IMPRESSION
UAR WOULD AGREE TO REFERENCE AQABA ISSUE TO ICJ AS LONG AS
THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO MAINTAIN BLOCKADE PENDING
ADJUDICATION IS NOT DENIED.

3. AS TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION ALONG UAR-ISRAEL FRONTIER,
RIKHYE BELIEVES SITUATION IS LESS CRITICAL. WHILE
HE VERY MUCH DOUBTS ISRAEL WOULD AGREE TO REVIVAL EIMAC,
HE IS HOPEFUL BOTH SIDES MAY COME TO ACCEPT UN MILITARY
OBSERVERS ALONG THIS FRONTIER AND SOME VERY LIMITED PULL BACK
OF TROOPS (HE MENTIONED FIFTY TO FIVE HUNDRED YARDS) TO
GIVE UNMO'S "ELBOW ROOM."

4. RIKHYE SAID WITHDRAWAL CANADIAN UNEF CONTINGENT IS
PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY, THANKS TO EXCELLENT CANADIAN BEHAVIOR
AND SHOULD BE COMPLETED SATURDAY. HE EXPECTS MOST OF REMAINDER
OF FORCE WILL BE WITHDRAWN WITHIN THREE WEEKS AND
HEADQUARTERS CLOSED DOWN BY JUNE 30.

5. ALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION BEING TAKEN OUT BY CONTINGENTS AS THEY WITHDREW, EXCEPT FOR SMALL AMOUNTS OLD AMMUNITION BEING DUMPED IN SEA. SERVICEABLE RADIO EQUIPMENT AND JEEPS USABLE FOR MILITARY PURPOSES WILL BE SHIPPED OUT TO IN STOCKPILES ELSEWHERE. OTHER SUPPLIES WHICH WILL HAVE NO MILITARY VALUE WILL EVENTUALLY BE DISPOSED OF HERE.

6. RIKHYE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THT IN HIS VIEW MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE AT PRESENT SHOULD BE TO GAIN TIME AND PERSUADE ALL CONCERNED TO TAKE NO PERCIPITANT ACTION.

MOLIE

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 3857

MODIS

1. IN HOUR LONG MEETING AT HIS REQUEST EBAN REVIEWED TO ME DEVELOPMENTS TO DATE AND ISRAELI'S CURRENT CONCERNS AND IDEAS AS TO NEXT STEPS.

2. HE SAID CABINET DECISION ON MAY 23 NOT RPT NOT TO GO IT ALONE HAD BEEN TAKEN DECISIVELY IN CLOSELY BALANCED SITUATION LARGELY ON BASIS MESSAGE RECEIVED BY PRIME MINISTER THAT MORNING AND ON HIS (EBAN'S) REPORT HIS CONVERSATIONS WASHINGTON. CABINET FULLY PERSUADED BY HIS REPORT OF WISDOM PLAYING OUT DIPLOMATIC HAND INCLUDING THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNDERSTANDING THAT EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES TO ASSURE ASSERTION OF RIGHT TO FREE AND INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS WOULD BE MARSHALLED DURING SAME PERIOD. THE RELATIVELY FEW ADDITIONAL POLITICIANS SUCH AS THE SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TO WHICH HE HAD ALSO BEEN ABLE TO MAKE HIS CLASSIFIED EXPOSITION HAD ALSO WELCOMED US POSITION. HOWEVER, EBAN SENSED THAT THE WIDESPREAD UNINFORMED PUBLIC HERE IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY UNEASY AS TO JUST WHERE ISRAEL STANDS IN THE DIPLOMATIC ARENA. CONSEQUENTLY, WHILE HE DOES NOT RPT NOT ADVOCATE ANY PUBLIC REVELATION RESULTS HIS WASHINGTON CONVERSATIONS HE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF ANYTHING COULD BE DONE IN THE BACKGROUND, PERHAPS OFF THE RECORD WITH THE PRESS IN THE UNITED STATES, TO RE-EMPHASIZE DETERMINATION DISPLAYED BY PRESIDENTS IN LATTER'S MAY 23 STATEMENT.

3. TURNING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, EBAN SAID HE COULD NOT RPT NOT URGE TOO STRONGLY THAT WE AVOID ANY RESOLUTION ON THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF FREE AND INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS. HE SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG ON HIS WAY BACK TO ISRAEL. IN EBAN'S VIEW, ANY EFFORT DISCUSS SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD INEVITABLY GIVE OPPONENTS OPPORTUNITY TO DELOUD AND WEAKEN ESSENTIAL IMPRESSION OF WORLD SUPPORT SUCH LEGAL RIGHTS. HE STRONGLY URGED THAT INSTEAD WE FOLLOW 1957 GENERAL ASSEMBLY PROCEDURE OF TABLING A DECLARATION BY THOSE POWERS WILLING TO AGREE ON LEGAL VALIDITY OF RIGHTS. HE ADDED A GENERAL RESOLUTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN FAVOR OF PEACE AND TRANQUILITY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE PROVIDED ITS NEGOTIATION DID NOT UNDULY PROTRACT SECURITY COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT SITUATION STILL SO DELICATE THAT TIME IS VERY LIMITED. EBAN SAID HE CONSIDERING GOING TO NEW YORK FOR

FROM 1000000000

SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. HE WOULD LIKE TO PUT ISRAELI CASE PERSONALLY. HOWEVER, HE HAD NOT YET MADE UP HIS MIND. HE FEELS SUCH TRIP MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED HERE PUBLICLY AS SUGGESTING TOO MUCH ISRAELI RELIANCE ON UN WHICH IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD WEAKEN GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL OF INTERNAL SITUATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, IN LINE WITH REQUEST MADE TO HIM IN WASHINGTON THAT GOI USE ITS EFFORTS TO ENLIST SUPPORT OF OLNER, AMBASSADOR COMAY, FORMERLY ISRAELI REP TO UNITED NATIONS, IS EMBARKING ON VISIT SEVERAL COUNTRIES THIS MORNING. HOWEVER, SINCE GOI NOT FULLY INFORMED AS TO EXACT STATE OF PLAY OF CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN US, UK AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND DOES NOT WISH TO CROSS ANY WIRES THEY ARE INSTRUCTING AMBASSADOR HARMAN TO ASCERTAIN IN WASHINGTON OUR IDEAS AS TO WHERE AND HOW COMAY COULD MAKE MOST USEFUL CONTRIBUTION. MEANWHILE, HE IS PROCEEDING TO THE NETHERLANDS SINCE THE NETHERLANDS HAVE ALREADY BEEN IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH GOI.

4. GOI DOES NOT OF COURSE ANTICIPATE THAT SECURITY COUNCIL WILL BE ABLE TO DO ANYTHING EFFECTIVE TO OPEN STRAITS. IT IS RELYING ON US-UK PLAN FOR INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO PROVIDE DECISIVE CAPABILITY.

5. EBAN THEN REMARKED THAT CRUCIAL AS THE STRAITS ISSUE IS, EVEN PERHAPS A MORE DANGEROUS SITUATION EXIST AS A RESULT OF THE CONFRONTATION OF LARGE ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN FORCES IN THE SINAI. INCIDENTS THERE SO FAR HAVE BEEN MINOR BUT A MAJOR CLASH COULD SET OFF A CONFLAGRATION AT ANY TIME. IN VIEW OF GOI BEST HOPE AVOIDING CONFLICT THAT FRONT IS SOVIETS IF THEY COULD PERSUADE NASSER OF NECESSITY DIMINISH TENSION BY THINNING OUT HIS CONCENTRATIONS. GOI WOULD BE MORE THAN HAPPY TO MAKE PARALLEL PULLBACK. EBAN HOPES US GOING TO BAT WITH SOVS TO THIS END.

6. FINALLY, EBAN NOTED, WHILE US AND GOI INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES STILL CONSIDERABLY AT VARIANCE BUT NEVERTHELESS ISRAELIS PREPARED ACCEPT OUR CONCLUSION THAT EGYPTIAN ATTACK NOT IMMINENT, IT IMPOSSIBLE TO RULE OUT COMPLETELY CONTINUED DANGER OF FULL SCALE SURPRISE ATTACK BY NASSER. IT CONSEQUENTLY ESSENTIAL EVERYTHING POSSIBLE BE DONE TO ASSURE OPTIMUM US-ISRAELI POSTURE IN SUCH AN EVENT. US HAD AGREED TO INCREASE LIAISON IN INTELLIGENCE FIELD, WHICH BEING DONE. HE HAD ALSO DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON DESIRABILITY OF DIRECT MILITARY LIAISON FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING PURPOSES AND HE WISHED REITERATE IMPORTANCE GOI ATTACHES TO THIS MATTER.

7. EBAN PRESENTED FOREGOING IN MEASURED NON-EMOTIONAL TERMS. IT WAS REMARKED TO ME LATER BY OFFICIAL ALSO PRESENT THAT OBVIOUSLY PRIME MINISTER AND EBAN HAVE STAKED EVERYTHING ON ASSURANCES OF SUPPORT HE OBTAINED IN WASHINGTON AND THERE IS CONSIDERABLE APPREHENSION HERE THAT THEY MAY BE OPTIMISTIC IN BELIEVING NASSER WILL GIVE US TIME TO FOLLOW SCENARIO ON WHICH WE HAVE EMBARKED. SAME OFFICIAL ALSO COMMENTED HOWEVER THAT DESPITE PERSONAL MISGIVINGS CHIEF OF STAFF RABIN IS DISPLAYING FIRMEST DETERMINATION HOLD THE HAWKS IN LINE AND STRICTLY SUBJECT TO POLITICAL, THAT IS PRIME MINISTER'S, ORDERS.

BARBOUR

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 19362

NODIS

QUAI'S MIDDLE EAST-AFRICAN DIRECTOR LEBEL (PROTECT) OFFERED ON HIGHLY PERSONAL BASIS FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL VIEWS AND STATEMENTS IN COURSE CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF EVENING MAY 28 REPORTED REFTEL:

A. SOVIETS HAD DECLINED FRENCH 4 POWER PROPOSAL IN POLITE TERMS. THEY HAD "HINTED" THAT US INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM PREVENTED THEIR ACCEPTANCE FRENCH PROPOSAL. OFFICIAL REASON THEY ADVANCED FOR REJECTION FRENCH PROPOSAL WAS THAT IT NOT ACCEPTABLE TO ARABS.

B. GOF IN PROCESS CONSIDERING FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION. NO DECISIONS YET TAKEN. ISRAELIS APPARENTLY TAKING SAME OVER-ALL LINE WITH FRENCH AND US. ACCORDING LEBEL, PROBLEM WAS TO GAIN TIME SO AS TO MAKE TALKS POSSIBLE. QUAI OF IMPRESSION NASSER'S "ELOCKADE" POSITION RATHER MORE CIRCUMSCRIBED THAN GENERALLY BELIEVED.

C. RETURN TO GAA HELD ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR BOTH SIDES AND HENCE MIGHT OFFER WAY OUT OF CRISIS. GAA'S WHICH ARABS PROFESS DESIRE SEE FULLY APPLIED, STIPULATE ARMISTICE LINES AND ISRAELI RIGHTS WHICH "APPEAR" IMPLICITLY TO ENCOMPASS FREE ACCESS TO GULF OF AQABA; (HOWEVER LEBEL NOTED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EGYPT-ISRAEL GAA AND JORDAN-ISRAEL GAA RE ISRAEL COASTLINE ON GULF.) ALTHOUGH STRICT APPLICATION GAA'S WOULD DOUBTLESSLY REDOUND TO DISADVANTAGE ISRAEL IN DMZ'S THIS DISADVANTAGE WOULD APPEAR INSIGNIFICANT IF ISRAEL COULD GAIN ARAB ACCEPTANCE OF FREE PASSAGE THROUGH GULF IN EXCHANGE.

D. FRENCH HAVE TOLD ISRAEL ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS OVER THE YEARS THAT GOI COULD COUNT ON FULL FRENCH GOVT SUPPORT FOR RIGHTS STIPULATED GAA'S. WHEREAS FRENCH FULLY CONDEMN TERRORISM, FRENCH HAVE ALSO REPEATEDLY ADVISED THAT THEIR SUPPORT DOES NOT RPT NOT EXTEND TO ISRAEL'S POLICY OF EXPANDING RIGHTS IN DMZ. FRENCH HAVE OFTEN EXPRESSED OWN VIEW TO GOI THAT IT WOULD SEEM SERVE ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS BEST CLEARLY TO "BE THE VICTIM" INsofar AS FRONTIER INCIDENTS CONCERNED.

E. DIRECTOR AVOIDED DISCUSSION SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT ON FRENCH ARMS AID TO ISRAEL CONTAINED PARA 6 DEPTTEL 203967.

FROM 100-100000

F. DIRECTOR RETURNED SEVERAL TIMES TO IMPORTANCE FRENCH CONTINUE TO ATTACH TO US WORKING WITH SOVIETS TO SETTLE CRISIS. HE CLEARLY INDICATED "ALBEIT ON PERSONAL BASIS" FRENCH TAKING VERY DIM VIEW OF UK IDEA FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVAL FORCE TO KEEP TIRAN STRAITS OPEN ON GROUNDS SOVIET PARTICIPATION SUCH A FORCE UNLIKELY AND EXCLUSIVELY WESTERN FORCE EXPECTED MAKE REQUISITE SOVIET COOPERATION IMPOSSIBLE.

G. DIRECTOR STRESSED THAT RESOLUTION OF CRISIS LAY IN BUILDING ON COMMITMENTS CONTAINED IN HIGHEST-LEVEL SOVIET STATEMENT (REFTEL) RATHER THAN PURSUIT OF 3-POINT UK PROPOSALS WHICH AIMED IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION, I.E. DIRECT EAST-WEST CONFRONTION.

H. LEBEL INDICATED THAT GOF NOT PREPARED TO ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRISIS TO ONE SIDE ALONE. DIRECTOR WENT TO SOME LENGTHS TO BALANCE ANY RECOGNITION OF GOI RIGHTS OF FREE PASSAGE WITH LIST OF ANOMALIES IN GOI PRESENCE ON GULF AND HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS FOR CLOSING STRAITS. HE ADDED THAT ISRAELI TROOPS LEFT GAZA AND SHARM-EL-SHEIKH WHEN ASSURED THAT UN WOULD MOVE IN, BUT REFUSED PERMIT UN PRESENCE IN SYRIA DMZ AFTER SYRIAN TROOPS AGREED MOVE OUT. LEBEL ADMITTED THAT GOF POSITION WAS CLOSE TO SYG'S.

I. EMBOFF RETURNED REPEATEDLY TO FACT THAT GOI EQUATED FREE PASSAGE WITH SURVIVAL AND WOULD SO ACT. LEBEL AGREED, BUT HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO ADD RE GOF PLANS OR POSITIONS IN EVENT OF INCIDENTS IN GULF. BOHLEN.

DTG: 301654Z MAY 67

~~SECRET~~
~~NO DIS~~

XEROX FROM [illegible]

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAPS7499

1967 MAY 30 18 47

AS YOU SEE WE ARE FOLLOWING UP THE LEAD IN DJAKARTA.

1. PESIK MET WITH [REDACTED] THIS NOON
TO GIVE FULL ACCOUNT OF TWO HOUR CONVERSATION WHICH MURTOPO,
ASSISTED BY PESIK, WHO TOOK CAREFUL NOTES, HAD YESTERDAY
AFTERNOON WITH NVN AMBASSADOR PHAM BINH. FULL REPORT OF
THIS CONVERSATION WILL BE WIRED WASHINGTON TOMORROW.

2. HIGHLIGHTS OF CONVERSATION WERE, ACCORDING TO PESIK:
(A) BINH'S VISIBLE AND EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER POSSIBILITY
OF TERRITORIAL INVASION OF NVN IF PEACE TALKS NOT HELD SOON;
(B) BINH'S STATEMENT THAT NVN NOT INSISTING ON SVN NECESSARILY
BEING COMMUNIST OR SOCIALIST STATE BUT ONLY ON ITS BEING A
TRULY INDEPENDENT AND NEUTRAL STATE. (HE SUBSEQUENTLY SAID
THAT A GOVERNMENT UNDER KY WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE HE
WOULD CONTINUE TO BE A PUPPET SUPPORTED BY THE U.S.); (C)
BINH NOT INSISTING ON U.S. TROOPS GETTING OUT OF SVN AS PRE-
CONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS; AND (D) BINH'S STATEMENT THAT IF
THE BOMBINGS WERE TO HALT HE WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY WILLING TO
TALK TO AMBASSADOR GREEN.

3. LATTER REMARK WAS IN CONNECTION WITH MURTOPO/PESIK
EXPRESSION OF WILLINGNESS ON INDONESIA'S PART TO BRING THE TWO
PARTIES TOGETHER WERE THERE INDICATIONS OF GOOD FAITH ON
BOTH SIDES. MURTOPO/PESIK POINTED OUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO
SUCH INDICATION OF SINCERITY FROM NORTH VIETNAM'S SIDE.
THEY ADDED THAT U.S. HAD PROMISED TO STOP BOMBING AND
NEGOTIATE IF THERE WAS RECIPROCAL GESTURE FROM NVN AND THEY
PRESSED BINH FOR SUCH A GESTURE. BINH REPLIED THIS WOULD BE
VERY DIFFICULT TO DO BUT HE SAID HE WOULD REPORT THIS CONVER-
SATION BACK TO HIS GOVERNMENT INCLUDING OFFER OF INDONESIAN
GOOD OFFICES. PESIK TOLD BARBIER HE ANTICIPATED ANOTHER MEETING
WITH BINH WITHIN A WEEK'S TIME.

4. IN SUM, BINH REMAINS ADAMANT ON THE CESSATION OF BOMBINGS
AS PRECONDITION FOR MEETING WITH ME OR FOR ANY MEETING
BETWEEN NVN AND U.S. REPS. THIS POSITION LOOKS FIRM. HOWEVER,
PESIK SAYS HE AND MURTOPO BELIEVE THERE IS SOME SLIGHT SOFTENING
IN NVN POSITION BUT THAT USG SHOULD NOT BE OVERLY OPTIMISTIC
ON THAT SCORE AND SHOULD NOT LESSEN PRESSURE ON NVN "UNTIL
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS."

5. ABOVE IS MERELY SUMMARY OF HIGHLIGHTS BASED ON ORAL
CHECKING WITH [REDACTED] PESIK/MURTOPO SEEM TO OFFER GOOD
CHANNEL FOR FURTHER INDIRECT SOUNDING OF NVN POSITION AND
CERTAINLY FOR GAUGING EVOLVING MOOD OF HANOI.

DTG 30/1719Z MAY 67

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-166
By [REDACTED], NARA Date 2-8-00

SENT
WHCA

~~SECRET~~

35

EAA084
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1100

1967 MAY 30 16 49

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67494

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-520

by us NARA, Date 8-24-92

~~SECRET~~

HEREWITH BUNKER AND KY TALK POLITICS.

MAY 30, 1967

61 MAY 30 PM 12:56

TUESDAY

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH PM KY ON MONDAY, I EMPHASIZED THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS AND THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS THROUGH WHICH WE HOPED AND EXPECTED THE FREE WILL OF THE PEOPLE WOULD BE EXPRESSED. I SAID THAT AS I HAD MENTIONED TO HIM BEFORE WE BELIEVED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FREELY ELECTED, STABLE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD BE THE BEST KIND OF DEMONSTRATION TO THE VIET CONG AND NVN THAT SOUTH VIET NAM WAS HERE TO STAY AND WOULD REPRESENT AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR IN THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE STRUGGLE. I ADDED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE ELECTIONS BE CARRIED OUT FAIRLY AND HONESTLY NOT ONLY FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF DOMESTIC REACTION HERE BUT ALSO THAT OF WORLD OPINION AS WELL. IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT ACTS OF REPRESSION AND INDISCRIMINATE USE OF PRESS CENSORSHIP SHOULD BE AVOIDED. A FURTHER ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL FACTOR WAS THE MAINTENANCE OF THE INTEGRITY AND UNITY OF THE ARMED FORCES. I REMINDED THE PM OF THE ASSURANCES BOTH HE AND THIEU HAD GIVEN TO THE PRESIDENT AT GUAM, ASSURANCES WHICH HAD BEEN REPEATED TO ME ALSO ON EVERY OCCASION IN WHICH I HAD SEEN EITHER OF THEM.

2. I SAID THAT I HAD, OF COURSE, SEEN THE REPORTS OF GENERAL THIEU'S POSSIBLE CANDIDACY AND HAD HAD A VERY FRANK TALK WITH GENERAL THIEU LAST FRIDAY ON THE QUESTION OF ARMED FORCES UNITY SHOULD THERE BE TWO MILITARY CANDIDATES. WHILE I CAME AWAY WITH THE IMPRESSION GENERAL THIEU HAD NOT YET DEFINITELY MADE A DECISION TO RUN HE HAD ASSURED ME THAT SHOULD HE DECIDE TO DO SO, HE FELT THAT UNITY OF THE ARMED FORCES WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED AND THAT GENERAL VIEN WOULD BE ABLE TO CARRY THROUGH WITH HIS DETERMINATION TO KEEP THE MILITARY ALOOF FROM POLITICS. I ALSO SAID THAT I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT GENERAL THIEU FELT SOMEWHAT ISOLATED AND THAT HIS FEELINGS HAD BEEN HURT BY WHAT HE CONSIDERED TO BE SOMETHING LESS THAN CONSIDERATE TREATMENT BY SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES.

PRESERVATION COPY

3. KY REPLIED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THIS, BUT THE FACT WAS THAT GENERAL THIEU HAD BEEN UNABLE TO MAKE UP HIS MIND AND BECAUSE OF THIS INABILITY, KY'S COLLEAGUES HAD INSISTED THAT HE COME FORWARD AS A CANDIDATE. HE HAD INFORMED GENERAL THIEU THAT HE PROPOSED TO RUN, AND THIEU HAD INTERPOSED NO OBJECTIONS, HE FELT, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS SOME DANGER THAT WITH TWO MILITARY CANDIDATES IN THE FIELD, THE UNITY OF THE ARMED FORCES MIGHT BE AFFECTED AND THAT THIS, OF COURSE, MUST BE AVOIDED. HE REALIZED THAT THIEU DID FEEL SOMEWHAT ISOLATED AND THAT HIS FEELINGS HAD BEEN HURT AND HE, THEREFORE, PROPOSED TO TALK WITH THIEU THIS WEEK TO TRY TO FIND OUT WHAT HE REALLY WANTED AND SEE WHETHER HE COULD NOT COME TO SOME SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT WITH HIM. I ENCOURAGED KY TO DO THIS AND SAID THAT I FELT IT WOULD BE A MOST CONSTRUCTIVE STEP.

4. I REFERRED AGAIN TO THE IMPORTANCE OF SEEING THAT THE ELECTIONS PROCESS WAS CARRIED OUT FAIRLY FOR ALL CANDIDATES AND THE NEED TO AVOID PRESSURE TACTICS, THE DISCRIMINATORY USE OF CENSORSHIP AND THE MAKING OF ILL CONSIDERED STATEMENTS WHICH COULD BE EASILY MISCONSTRUED SUCH AS THE ONE HE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE MADE THAT HE WOULD USE WHATEVER MEANS HE THOUGHT NECESSARY TO OPPOSE A CIVILIAN CANDIDATE WHOSE POLICIES HE DID NOT AGREE WITH. STATEMENTS SUCH AS THESE COULD GIVE RISE TO CRITICISM IN THE US AS WELL AS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. HE AGREED THAT THIS WAS SO AND SAID THAT HE PROPOSED TO SEE THAT ELECTIONS WERE CONDUCTED FAIRLY. WITH REFERENCE TO THE STATEMENT HE WAS QUOTED AS HAVING MADE, HE SAID SOME CORRESPONDENT ASKED HIM A SILLY QUESTION SUCH AS, WHAT WOULD YOU DO IF A COMMUNIST WAS ELECTED? HE SAID THIS WAS IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS SOMEONE ASKING, WHAT WOULD YOU DO IF MR KOSYGIN WERE ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.?

5. HE REFERRED TO FURTHER MATTERS IN CONNECTION WITH ELECTIONS. THE FIRST WAS IN REGARD TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DIRECTORATE TO THE ASSEMBLY FOR CHANGES IN ARTICLE 18 AND IN REVERTING TO THE DATES ORIGINALLY PROPOSED FOR THE ELECTIONS. HE SAID THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTORATE HAD WANTED TO TAKE A HARD LINE WITH THE ASSEMBLY. HE PERSUADED THEM THAT THIS WOULD BE VERY UNWISE AS IT MIGHT RESULT IN THE RESIGNATION OF THE ASSEMBLY AND THEY WOULD BE BACK WHERE THEY STARTED FROM. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, HE GOT TOGETHER AT LUNCH ON MONDAY WITH ABOUT 70 MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY AND TALKED TO THEM ABOUT THE SUGGESTIONS OF THE DIRECTORATE AND SECURED THEIR AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT THEM.

6. HIS SECOND POINT WAS AN ACCOUNT OF THE LONG TALK HE HAD WITH HUONG AT VUNG TAU ON MAY 18, IN WHICH HE SAID THEY CAME TO A COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING. ACCORDING TO KY, HUONG SAID THAT HE EXPECTED KY TO WIN, BUT THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT HE HIMSELF SHOULD RUN AS A CIVILIAN CANDIDATE. HE WOULD, HOWEVER, AGREE TO COOPERATE WITH KY IN THE GOVERNMENT AFTER THE ELECTIONS. THE NET RESULT OF THEIR TALK WAS THAT WHOEVER WAS THE WINNER WOULD EMPLOY THE SERVICES OF THE LOSER. KY WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF ELECTED HE PROPOSED TO

ASK THE COOPERATION NOT ONLY OF HUONG, BUT OF OTHER CANDIDATES AND THUS HE WOULD BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH A STABLE REGIME REPRESENTING A BROAD SPECTRUM OF THE VOTERS. THIS WAS THE ESSENTIAL THING, WHAT THE COUNTRY NEEDED AND WANTED WAS A STRONG REGIME RATHER THAN A STRONG MAN. HE DISCLAIMED ANY DESIRE TO SET UP ANYTHING RESEMBLING A DICTATORSHIP.

7. AS WE HAD HEARD REPORTS THAT GENERAL THANG WAS AGAIN CONSIDERING GIVING UP DIRECTION OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM IN ORDER TO RUN KY'S CAMPAIGN, I ASKED HIM ABOUT THANG'S PRESENT STATUS. KY SAID THAT THANG HAD AGAIN EXPRESSED SOME DOUBT AS TO HIS ABILITY TO WORK WITH OUR NEW ORGANIZATIONAL SETUP AND AGAIN HAD SUGGESTED THAT HE APPOINT GENERAL VIEN TO HEAD UP THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. I SAID THAT THIS REALLY DIDN'T MAKE SENSE TO ME, IT WOULD BE LIKE MAKING SECRETARY MCNAMARA RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR PART OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. KY AGREED, SAID THAT GENERAL VIEN HAD TOO MUCH ON HIS HANDS ALREADY AND HAD TOLD THANG THAT HE MUST CONTINUE WITH PACIFICATION PROGRAM. IF THANG SHOULD ATTEMPT TO RUN HIS CAMPAIGN, KY WOULD BE ACCUSED OF PUTTING HIS OWN PERSONAL FORTUNES AHEAD OF THE COUNTRY'S INTEREST. I TOLD KY THAT HE SHOULD REASSURE GENERAL THANG THAT I WAS CERTAIN HE WOULD FIND THE NEW ORGANIZATION MORE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE AND EASIER TO WORK WITH. HE ASSURED ME THAT THANG WOULD STAY WITH THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM.

8. AS I LEFT KY SAID, "DON'T WORRY, I KNOW HOW TO HANDLE THE SITUATION. IT IS LIKE A WESTERN MOVIE, IT WILL COME OUT ALL RIGHT IN THE END".

9. COMMENT: KY TALKED IN A SERIOUS VEIN, BUT AS IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH MCPHERSON AND JORDEN, EXHIBITED CONFIDENCE NOT ONLY TO HIS ABILITY TO WIN THE ELECTION BUT ALSO TO HANDLE THE DIFFICULT PRE-ELECTION PROBLEMS. I HOPE HE IS RIGHT AND THAT THE HAPPY ENDING OF THE WESTERN MOVIE WHICH HE ENVISAGES WILL NOT BE PRECEDED BY THE GUN PLAY WHICH IS A NORMAL PART OF EVERY WESTERN. BUNKER

DTG 30/1430Z MAY 67

~~SECRET~~

GROUPS 1,220 IMI 1,220

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1967 MAY 30 15 44

FROM VALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67497

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 30, 1967

YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER AN EARLY SESSION WITH
GENERAL EISENHOWER TO EXPLAIN OUR INTENTIONS IN THE NEAR EAST.

WHAT WE PLAN IS PRECISELY TO STAND BY HIS 20 FEBRUARY 1957
STATEMENT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

"WITH REFERENCE TO THE PASSAGE INTO AND THROUGH THE GULF OF AQABA,
WE EXPRESSED THE CONVICTION THAT THE GULF CONSTITUTES INTERNATIONAL
WATERS, AND THAT NO NATION HAS THE RIGHT TO PREVENT FREE AND INNOCENT
PASSAGE IN THE GULF. WE ANNOUNCED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARED
TO EXERCISE THIS RIGHT ITSELF AND TO JOIN WITH OTHERS TO SECURE
GENERAL RECOGNITION OF THIS RIGHT."

ANDY GOODPASTER JUST TOLD ME:

- HE HAS BEEN KEEPING THE GENERAL INFORMED;
- HIS VIEW OF 1957 IS THAT THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE TO
ISRAEL WAS, IN FACT, A "DEAL" AND A "COMMITMENT" WHATEVER THE
FORM IT ASSUMED LEGALLY.

DTG: 301510Z MAY 1967

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 769 8352

By h3/100, NARA, Date 5-21-91

XEROX FROM ~~SECURITY~~

37

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WHCA

1967 MAY 30 14 22

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DE WTE 1898

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAF67492

~~SECRET~~
TUESDAY
67 MAY 30 AM 10:31

~~SECRET~~

MAY 30, 1967

HEREWITH HARRY ASKS GUIDANCE ON WHETHER TO PROCEED TO ISRAEL. SEC. RUSK'S VIEW IS THAT WITH YOST AND ANDERSON IN CAIRO, IT WOULD NOT BE A BAD IDEA FOR A PRESIDENTIAL AIDE TO TURN UP IF HE DOESN'T GET INTO NEGOTIATIONS. I AGREE, UNLESS YOU THINK HE'D BE MORE USEFUL HOLDING HANDS AROUND HERE.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM MCPHERSON

SINCE THE TROUBLE BEGAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST TEN DAYS AGO, I HAVE ASSUMED THAT MY TRIP TO ISRAEL, PLANNED FOR JUNE 5-8, SHOULD BE CANCELLED AS INTRUDING INTO A VERY DELICATE SITUATION. IT OCCURS TO ME NOW HOWEVER THAT SOME USEFUL PURPOSE MIGHT BE SERVED BY GOING THROUGH WITH IT. I WOULD STILL LIKE TO GO, AND IF YOU THINK IT WOULD BE MORE HELPFUL THAN HARMFUL I WILL GO THERE AS PLANNED. I WILL NEED GUIDANCE IF I DO.

THE PAST WEEK IN VIETNAM HAS BEEN THE MOST INTERESTING PERIOD I HAVE SPENT ANYWHERE, ANYTIME. AT THIS POINT I AM CERTIFIED EXPERT BUT BY THE TIME I LEAVE I MAY BE IGNORANT ONCE AGAIN. BEST TO YOU.

DTG: 301347Z MAY 67

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-522
By lig, NARA, Date 3-2-93

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

EEA072
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1092

SENT
WHCA

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67487

967 MAY 30 01 10

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY COUNCIL HAS JUST ADJOURNED AFTER FOUR-AND-A-HALF HOUR SESSION. GOLDBERG PRESENTED OUR POSITION, INCLUDING INTERPRETATION THAT THANT'S REQUEST TO "FOREGO BELLIGERENCE" MUST MEAN FOREGOING ANY BLOCKADE AND PERMITTING INNOCENT PASSAGE.

UAR REPRESENTATIVE GAVE LONG LEGAL ARGUMENT, SAYING ISRAEL HAD ADVANCED TO GULF OF AQABA "AFTER" ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IN 1949 AND WAS NOT LEGALLY RIPARIAN POWER AT ALL. HE ASSERTED AQABA IS ARAB INLAND WATERWAY AND HISTORIC BAY.

LORD CARADON SUPPORTED ISRAEL'S RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE AND SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT. SEVERAL LA AND AFRICA REPRESENTATIVES VOICED GENERAL SUPPORT OF THANT.

ISRAEL PRESENTED FIVE-POINT PROGRAM WHICH INCLUDED UAR PULL-BACK FROM SINAI, CONTROL OF TERRORISM AND INCURSIONS, AND NON-INTERFERENCE WITH SHIPPING.

INDIA MADE PRO-UAR SPEECH. FEDORENKO, AFTER REFUSING TO ACCEPT 12-MINUTE REST-BREAK FOR FEAR HE WOULDN'T GET FLOOR, MADE ANOTHER STRONG PRO-UAR SPEECH. HE CHARACTERIZED U.S. INTERPRETATION THAT UAR SHOULD ALLOW INNOCENT PASSAGE AS AN "ARTFUL DEFORMATION" OF THANT'S WORDS. HOWEVER, HE AVOIDED TAKING A POSITION ON THE LEGAL ISSUE OF THE STRAITS. HE ALSO CALLED FOR WITHDRAWAL 6TH FLEET, MENTIONED NAVAL INCIDENTS CLOSE TO SOVIET SHORES, AND INSINUATED THAT US HUMANITARIANISM DOESN'T EXTEND TO VIET NAM. HE WARNED OF "FATAL MISCALCULATION" IF ISRAELI MILITARISTS GET UPPER HAND. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING SECURITY COUNCIL MUST CONSIDER NEAR EAST CRISIS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UAR COMPLAINTS AGAINST ISRAEL, WHICH DESERVE PRIORITY IN DEBATE.

REMAINDER OF DEBATE WAS MOSTLY TAKEN UP BY ISRAELI RESPONSE TO CHARGES, COUNTER-CHARGES AND EMOTIONAL AND UNREHEARSED SYRIAN INTERVENTION. THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADJOURNED UNTIL 3 P.M. TOMORROW

DTG: 300027Z MAY 67

330

CONFIDENTIAL

XEROX FROM OFFICE COPY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 83-52

By hplw NARA Date 5-21-91

38
67 MAY 29 PM 9:30
MONDAY

~~SECRET~~SENT
WHCA

1967 MAY 29 23 37

EEA071
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1090FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67486~~SECRET~~

MONDAY, MAY 29, 1967

1967 MAY 29 PM 7:44

MONDAY

GENE BLACK CAME IN TODAY TO PRESENT HIS IMPRESSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AFTER BEING THOROUGHLY BRIEFED BY LUKE BATTLE AND HIS PEOPLE.

1. IF WE DO NOTHING ABOUT AQABA THERE WILL CERTAINLY BE A WAR. THE ISRAELIS WILL FIGHT IF NASSER SEIZES THEIR SHIPS. THEREFORE, HE SEES NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE KIND OF PLAN WE ARE ORGANIZING.
2. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE GET THE DECLARATION OF THE MARITIME POWERS OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. NASSER MUST REALIZE THE STRENGTH AND UNIVERSALITY OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT IS BEING APPLIED TO AQABA AND OF THE OPINION THAT SUPPORTS THAT PRINCIPLE.
3. HE TALKED WITH U THANT, WHO WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT ANYTHING HELPFUL HAPPENING IN THE UN. IT MIGHT BUY US TWO OR THREE WEEKS, BUT WE CAN'T WAIT THAT LONG FOR THE DECLARATION. IT MUST BE AGREED BY AS MANY MARITIME COUNTRIES AS POSSIBLE.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 762 8352By rg/ics, NARA, Date 5-21-91

XEROX FROM MICRO COPY

4. THE DECLARATION MUST, OF COURSE, BE BACKED BY NAVAL AND MILITARY POWER. IT WOULD BE FOOLISH TO TRY TO ENFORCE THIS UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE BY OURSELVES. WE WOULD HAVE TROUBLE WITH BOTH CONGRESS AND THE COUNTRY. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE THINKS THAT THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP WOULD SUPPORT US IF WE WERE WITH OTHERS.

5. HE AGREES THAT A CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION WILL PROBABLY BE REQUIRED AT SOME STAGE. IT MUST BE STRONG -- BUT NOT TOO STRONG -- AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE TONKIN GULF.

6. U THANT REPORTS THAT NASSER SAYS HE WILL TAKE ANY SHIP IN AQABA EXCEPT A "TANKER OR ONE FLYING AN ISRAELI FLAG." BLACK THINKS THIS WILL BE WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL.

7. ULTIMATELY -- DOWN THE ROAD -- IS THIS QUESTION: HOW DO WE GET NASSER TO GO BACK ON HIS WORD? WHAT WILL HE DO? IS THERE ANY WAY FOR HIM TO SAVE FACE? IF NOT, WE SHALL HAVE TO FACE ISSUES LIKE THE CANCELLING OF OIL CONTRACTS; THE CLOSING OF THE SUEZ CANAL; ETC.

8. INCIDENTALLY, NASSER TOLD U THANT HE WOULD "NEVER TAKE" ANY AMERICAN WHEAT.

9. BLACK ALSO REPORTS U THANT'S VIEW THAT THE CRISIS MUST BE SOLVED, IN THE END, "THROUGH MOSCOW."

10. BLACK WILL KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE SITUATION AND LET US HAVE ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS.

FYI. A DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED DECLARATION WILL BE IN YOUR HANDS TOMORROW. IF AND WHEN YOU APPROVE IT, STATE HAS CRANKED UP WITH THE BRITISH TO SEEK SUPPORT FAST. IT IS THEIR HOPE THAT MORE THAN 20 POWERS WILL ACCEPT IT. THE NUMBER PUTTING IN SHIPS, IF REQUIRED, WILL, OF COURSE, BE LESS.

DTG: 29/2248Z MAY 1967

GPS: 460 IMI 460

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, May 29, 1967 -- 1:55 pm

Mr. President:

Harry McPherson left behind a letter he hoped you would sign to Prime Minister Eshkol on the occasion of his arrival there on June 5.

I have modified it to take into account the crisis that has since developed

Harry asked me to get it to you.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 5-10-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

41

May 31, 1967

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am glad that Mr. Harry McPherson, my good friend and colleague, will have a chance on his coming trip to spend some time with you in Israel. I know he will come back -- as have so many of my other friends -- deeply impressed by the progress your nation is making and, above all, by the determination of your people and their love of country. I want Harry to see and feel these things for himself.

I will look forward to talking at length with Harry when he returns. He will want to exchange thoughts with you on the important issues we face together -- in this period of crisis and beyond.

May our God give us strength and courage to protect both liberty and peace.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Levi Eshkol
Prime Minister of Israel
Jerusalem

LBJ:HHS:WWR:mz 5/29/67

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-522
By 118, NARA, Date 3-29-83

Mr. Rostow

4/12

1. Sup
2. file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 16, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY McPHERSON

Hal Saunders has cleared the attached informally with Luke Battle. He will take it upon himself to have talking points in Ambassador Barbour's hands by the time you arrive in Israel on June 5. He has drafted a transmittal memo for your convenience.

15/
W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 5-10-91

416

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 16, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Prime Minister Eshkol

I will not be arriving in Israel until 5 June. However, it would be nice if I could carry with me a signed letter of greeting from you to Prime Minister Eshkol. Walt Rostow suggests making this a general letter which he would then follow up with a telegram of specific talking points right before I get there. We are afraid that a substantive letter written now might be outdated by fast moving events in the next couple of weeks.

Our last policy-level official visitors to Israel were Luke Battle and Hal Saunders of Walt Rostow's staff, who saw the Prime Minister mid-March. At that time--as now--he was deeply concerned by the problem of terrorism on his Syrian border. The problem is even more acute today. That is why we feel it worth highlighting this one general issue in this letter. Above all, Eshkol needs to feel that you understand his problems. If it seems appropriate, I can elaborate on this theme on the basis of whatever talking points you and Walt send me.

Attached for your signature if you approve. Walt has checked it informally with State.

Harry McPherson

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-522
By ing, NARA, Date 3-3-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

410

May 16, 1967

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am glad that Mr. Harry McPherson, my good friend and colleague, will have a chance on his coming trip to spend some time with you in Israel. I know he will come back--as have so many of my other friends--deeply impressed by the progress your nation is making and, above all, by the determination of your people and their love of country. I want Harry to see and feel these things for himself.

It is always helpful to have a firsthand report of your thinking from members of my official family. Mr. Battle and Mr. Saunders brought me your greetings after their meeting with you in March, and I will look forward to talking at length with Harry when he returns. He will want to exchange thoughts with you on the important issues we face together.

I often think, Mr. Prime Minister, of your dilemma and of the agonies you must endure in deciding how to protect the man on the tractor, the child at play or the traveler on the road today--somehow without jeopardizing the ultimate hope of your people to live at peace with their neighbors. I well know how difficult it is to win peace without sacrificing either the right of men, women and children to be free and safe or the highest ideals and hopes of the people I serve. It is some comfort that a few others like yourself know the weight of these burdens too.

May our God give us strength and courage.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Levi Eshkol
Prime Minister of Israel
Jerusalem

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-522
By ing, NARA, Date 3-3-93

LBJ: HHS:tmt 5/16/67

42
Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - May 29, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Date for Formal Transfer of Chamizal Tract

You originally agreed to combine a state visit by President Diaz Ordaz with formal transfer of the Chamizal in a three-day period at the end of September. That month was chosen because September 25 is the third anniversary of the symbolic transfer ceremony in which you participated with President Lopez Mateos.

President Diaz Ordaz subsequently found September inconvenient. He proposed instead that the state visit take place Friday and Saturday, October 27 and 28, and the Chamizal ceremony on Sunday, October 29.

You agreed to the dates for the Washington visit but asked that we find another suitable date for the Chamizal transfer.

After consulting with State and the National Park Service, I find that Friday, December 1, or Friday, December 8, are good alternatives:

- it provides a 5-6 week break between visits.
- facilities on the Mexican and US side of what used to be Cordova Island will be completed by then.
- the Mexicans would like to use these facilities for the ceremony.
- a Friday ceremony will permit you to go on to the Ranch for the weekend if you want.

I recommend that you authorize us to go back to President Diaz Ordaz using December 1 or December 8 for the Chamizal ceremony for planning purposes.

W. W. Rostow

Approve Dec. 1 or 8 _____. Prefer another date _____. See me _____.

cc - Jim Jones

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State la 11-30-78
By ag/lsp, NARA, Date 5-17-91

CONFIDENTIAL 43

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DE WTE 1072

1967 MAY 29 02 33

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67473

1967 MAY 28 PM 10:58

SUNDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEN. JAVITS SAW SECRETARY McNAMARA THIS AFTERNOON. HE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED ASSURANCES THAT WE HAD THE FORCES AVAILABLE TO DEAL WITH BOTH VIET-NAM AND WHATEVER MIGHT NEED TO BE DONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

HE THEN CALLED ON ME AT ABOUT 9 P.M. IN MY OFFICE.

HE ELABORATED HIS PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING WITH "DEEPLY CONCERNED" MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS AS FOLLOWS.

1. IT WOULD CONSIST OF 4-6 MEMBERS OF THE SENATE ORGANIZED BY HIM AND 6-8 MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE ORGANIZED BY MANNY CELLER.

2. THE GROUP WOULD COME NOT LIKE THE LEADERSHIP TO HEAR THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS FOR ACTION BUT TO EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN AND TO HEAR THE PRESIDENT'S GENERAL ATTITUDE. HE SAYS SUCH MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH PARTICULARLY "CONCERNED" MEMBERS HAVE TAKEN PLACE OFTEN IN THE PAST UNDER OTHER PRESIDENTS AND ON MANY ISSUES.

3. THE GROUPS WOULD BE "CONTRIVED" SO AS TO BE BALANCED AS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES AND AS BETWEEN LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES. FOR EXAMPLE HE WOULD HOPE HICKENLOOPER WOULD COME ON THE SENATE DELEGATION. OTHERS MIGHT BE - ASIDE FROM JAVITS - FROM AMONG BROOKE, PERCY, SYMINGTON, COOPER, OR CASE, R.F. KENNEDY, CLARK, PELL, RIBICOFF.

4. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT "STIR UP" A REQUEST FOR SUCH A MEETING. IT SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE PRESIDENT'S SENSE OF TIMING AND APPROPRIATENESS, BUT HE DOES STRONGLY RECOMMEND IT.

5. HE BELIEVES IT WOULD STABILIZE THE U.S. JEWISH COMMUNITY IN THE PROTRACTED EMOTIONAL CRISIS WE FACE IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

6. AS FOR HIMSELF HE WISHES YOU TO KNOW THAT HE BELIEVES POLITICS HAS NO PLACE IN THIS CRISIS; THAT YOU HAVE PUT THE ISSUE PRECISELY RIGHT IN YOUR MAY 23 STATEMENT; IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF SUPPORTING ISRAEL BUT OF SUPPORTING CERTAIN PRINCIPLES WHICH GO TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DTG: 290151Z MAY 1967

Authority NSC Letter 3-15-82

By 19/11/82, NARA, Date 5-17-91

(NLT 81165)

REACH FROM 11/11/82

~~SECRET~~

May 29, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

Pres file

At a meeting early this morning with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara they agreed to recommend to you that we dispatch the carrier INTREPID through the Suez Canal.

As you know, it is slated to take up a position off Viet Nam.

Bob McNamara would feel more comfortable if it were on the other side of the Canal if needed in connection with a crisis at the Gulf of Aqaba. Both Secretaries believe it would be useful to test the Egyptians on the transit of a U. S. warship very soon. They do not expect Nasser to refuse transit.

Whether the INTREPID stayed in the Red Sea or Indian Ocean or proceeded to Viet Nam could be decided after it had transited the Canal and in the light of the situation at that time.

Dispatch INTREPID through Canal _____

Hold in Mediterranean _____

Discuss before decision _____

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr (2-2282) NSC 82-71
By ag/da, NARA, Date 5-21-91

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - May 29, 1967

TO: The President

FROM: W. W. Rostow

Peru Program Loan.

Pres file 45
sent to Ranch
CAP 67481

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-522
By sig, NARA, Date 3-3-93

On May 19 I sent you ^amemorandum^s transmitting a request from Bill Gaud for authorization to negotiate a \$40 million program loan with Peru. The loan is designed to help Belaunde correct inflationary and balance of payments problems while continuing his development efforts. Joe Fowler, Charlie Schultze and I concurred in the request.

The loan was to be tied to four self-help conditions. These conditions represent tough political decisions for Belaunde, but are essential to any stabilization program. I noted that we did not know whether Belaunde would be willing to make these decisions and get Congress to act on additional revenue measures.

You sent the memo back to me inquiring whether Secretary Rusk and Linc Gordon had endorsed Gaud's request. It has the full endorsement of Gordon who originated the authorization request. Since Bill Gaud acts as Secretary Rusk's agent in these matters, the loan authorization was not submitted to him. I am confident, however, that he would go along with the Gaud-Gordon recommendation.

Since I forwarded the memorandums to you, President Belaunde has acted -- successfully -- on one of the four conditions: a cutback in government expenditures. He has had partial success in a second: substantial additional revenues via new import duties and internal taxes.

It is important that we be in a position to tell Belaunde that we are prepared to help him if he is willing to take strong self-help action. He may be unwilling to meet all our conditions or, accepting them, unable to get the Congress to enact new taxes. In either case, the responsibility would be his and not our unwillingness to help as we have in the case of his principal neighbors: Brazil, Chile and Colombia.

With the clarification on Linc Gordon's endorsement of the loan, may we proceed with the negotiations subject to the stipulated conditions?

Yes _____. No _____. See me _____.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-168
By cb, NARA Date 1-22-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1967 MAY 29 18 51

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
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FROM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CITZ CAP67483

MAY 29, 1967

FOR AMBASSADOR BOWLES, NEW DELHI, FROM WALT ROSTOW

THE PRESIDENT WISHED ME TO FORWARD TO YOU THIS SUMMARY
OF LAND REFORM MOVES IN VIET NAM.

YOU SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT IT IS THE UNIVERSAL JUDG-
MENT THAT LAND REFORM IN VIET NAM IS LESS BURNING AN ISSUE
THAN IN MANY OTHER DEVELOPING NATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, WE
ARE PUSHING IT AS HARD AS THE TRAFFIC CAN BEAR IN A SOME-
WHAT DISTRACTED GOVERNMENT.

I. SINCE MANILA CONFERENCE.

A. LAND DISTRIBUTION. A TOTAL OF 673,246 ACRES DISTRIB-
UTED TO WORKING FARMERS SINCE 1957. ALTHOUGH ABOUT 950,000
ACRES MORE ARE HELD BY THE GVN FOR DISTRIBUTION--MUCH OF IT IN
INSECURE AREAS--VIETNAM'S LAND PATTERN TODAY DOES NOT HAVE
THE GREAT DISPARITIES TYPICAL OF MANY UNDERDEVELOPED COUNT-
RIES. IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS THE RATE OF DISTRIBUTION HAS
MARKEDLY INCREASED: 83,555 FARMERS RECEIVED TITLES TO 438,693
ACRES (10/15/66-15/67). BREAKOUT:

1967 MAY 29 PM 2:55

MONDAY

	RECIPIENTS	ACREAGE
SQUATTER LANDS	2,766	4,840
FORMER FRENCH LANDS	2,404	10,157
ORDINANCE 57 LANDS	72,093	384,704
LAND DEVELOPMENT CENTERS	6,292	38,992

83,555 438,693

B. SCHEDULED DISTRIBUTIONS. BY AUGUST, GVN WILL COMPLETE DISTRIBUTION OF 20,000 MORE ACRES (A FORMER FRENCH RICE PLANTATION IN PHONG DINH), AND IS NOW PROCESSING APPLICATIONS FROM 800 FARMERS WORKING THIS LAND.

C. NEW GVN REGULATIONS. A MARCH 1967 GVN DECREE PROHIBITED COLLECTION OF BACK RENTS BY LANDLORDS FOR PERIODS OF VC OCCUPATION AND EXEMPTED THEM FROM TAXES. AN APRIL 1967 JGS ORDER FORBADE ANY USE OF ARVN TROOPS IN RENT COLLECTION MATTERS.

D. AN GIANG PHOTOGRAPHIC SURVEY. THIS TWO YEAR PROJECT NOW BEING ACCELERATED. SEASONAL RAINS HAVE SLOWED RECENT PHOTOGRAPHY RATE. PRELIMINARY TOPOGRAPHIC SURVEYS, CORE SAMPLING, AND FOUNDATION TESTING COMPLETED ON 3,000-ACRE DEMONSTRATION AREA. 24 SURVEYORS AND LAND IDENTIFICATION PERSONNEL NOW WORKING ON BOUNDARY SURVEYS IN AN GIANG VILLAGES. MOSIAC MAPS BASED ON PHOTOGRAMMETRIC TECHNIQUES UNDER WAY FOR ENTIRE PROVINCE.

2. FORWARD MOTION. NEW APPROACH BEING CONSIDERED TO KY SUGGESTING LAND REFORM BE ELEVATED TO MINISTRY LEVEL UNDER RD'S GENERAL THANG AND STRENGTHENING OF EXISTING FARM RENT CONTROL REGULATIONS. HE HAS AUTHORIZED LONG-PENDING VISIT SRI REPRESENTATIVE TO GET LAND DATA SURVEY MOVING; ASKED FOR IBRD'S GETTINGER TO COME OUT AS ADVISER FOR 90-DAYS; DETAILED FIVE OCO FIELD OFFICERS TO WORK ON LAND MATTERS; AND REOPENED US MISSION CONSIDERATION OF JOINING US-GVN LAND POLICY COMMITTEE.

530

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT
WHCAsent

1967 MAY 29 18 13

EEA064
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1082

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70285

UNCLAS

67 MAY 29 PM 2:20

MONDAY

MAY 29, 1967

FOLLOWING MEMORIAL DAY GREETING RECEIVED FROM THIEU.

1. GVN REQUESTS FOLLOWING LETTER DATED MAY 29 BE TRANSMITTED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON. ORIGINAL TEXT FOLLOWS BY POUCH:

QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

ON THE OCCASION OF MEMORIAL DAY, I WISH TO EXPRESS TO YOU, IN THE NAME OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND IN MY OWN NAME, OUR MOST SINCERE GRATITUDE FOR THE VALIANT OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE UNITED STATES WHO HAVE MADE THE SUPREME SACRIFICE OF THEIR LIVES TO DEFEND FREEDOM AND TO ENSURE A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD.

AMERICANS AND VIETNAMESE HAVE TOILED AND STRUGGLED TOGETHER ON THIS SOIL FOR A NOBLE CAUSE. THE SACRIFICES THAT OUR TWO PEOPLES HAVE MADE TOGETHER IN THIS COMMON CAUSE STRENGTHEN EVERY DAY THE BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS. THEY CONSTITUTE THE BULWARK AGAINST TYRANNY, FOR THE PRESERVATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY IN WHICH EAST AND WEST CAN COOPERATE IN HARMONY, IN MUTUAL APPRECIATION AND MUTUAL RESPECT.

WE ARE CONFIDENT OF THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THIS STRUGGLE, AND SHALL DO OUR BEST SO THAT THE SACRIFICES OF THESE BRAVE HEROES WILL NOT BE MADE IN VAIN.

SINCERELY YOURS, LT. GENERAL NGUYEN VAN THIEU UNQUOTE.
BUNKER

DTG: 29/1733Z MAY 67

PRESERVATION

48

SENT
WHCA

~~SECRET~~

1967 MAY 29 16 20

VZCZCEEA061
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1079

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67480

67 MAY 29 PM 12:31

MONDAY

~~SECRET~~

MAY 29, 1967

SECRETARY RUSK WISHES YOU TO CLEAR THE FOLLOWING
DRAFT CABLE TO US MISSION GENEVA BEFORE DISPATCH.

AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO GET FREYMOND --
A VERY SOLID PRO-U.S. SWISS -- TO GET THE ICRC INTO HANOI
IN CONNECTION WITH TREATMENT OF U. S. PRISONERS.

(DRAFT CABLE FOLLOWS)

U.S. MISSION GENEVA

INFO: AMEMBASSY SAIGON
CINCPAC

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-522
By ing, NARA, Date 3-2-93

PRESERVATION COPY

FOR SIEVERTS

1) WE HAVE BEEN GIVING CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT TO THE QUESTION OF SUSPENDING AIR STRIKES IN LIMITED RADIUS OF HANOI AND HAIPHONG IF ICRC REPRESENTATIVES VISIT NORTH VIETNAM IN CONNECTION WITH US PRISONERS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH A COMMITMENT WOULD PROVIDE SOME LEVERAGE FOR FREYMOND IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH HIS EAST EUROPEAN CONTACT. BUT IT IS DIFFICULT, WITHOUT MORE DEFINITE ASSURANCES FROM FREYMOND THAT THE ICRC COULD IN FACT GET TO HANOI TO VISIT OUR POWS, TO MAKE SUCH COMMITMENT AT THIS TIME. AN AGREEMENT NOT TO BOMB THE CITY OF HANOI WHILE THE ICRC IS PRESENT WOULD PROBABLY BE AS FAR AS WE CAN GO NOW.

2) IN ANY CASE YOU SHOULD POINT OUT TO FREYMOND THAT WE COULD NOT UNDERTAKE TO SUSPEND STRIKES AGAINST SUPPLY ROUTES AND MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS, E.G. NORTH OF DMZ, WHERE NVN CONTINUES ACTIVE MILITARY BUILDUP AND SUPPORT ACTIONS.

3) IF AN ICRC GROUP RECEIVES SUFFICIENT ENCOURAGEMENT FROM HANOI TO WARRANT ITS DEPARTURE FOR NORTH VIETNAM, WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO HAVE THE GROUP PROCEED TO HANOI BY WAY OF WASHINGTON.

DTG: 291528Z MAY 67

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

SENT
WHCA

~~SECRET~~

1967 MAY 29 16 09

67 MAY 29 PM 12:17

MONDAY

VZCZCEEA260
O WTE10
DE WTE 1078

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67479

~~SECRET~~

MAY 29, 1967

HEREWITH THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH NASSER CONVEYED HIS INVITATION TO BOB ANDERSON. HIS INSTRUCTION IS TO "LISTEN" ON THE FIRST CONTACT.

1. UAR AMB GHALEB PHONED SECY ANDERSON AT HIS HOTEL IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL. VISITED ANDERSON ON SATURDAY AND INFORMED HIM UAR WISHED KNOW FLIGHT AND TIME ARRIVAL CAIRO. GHALEB KNEW NOTHING FURTHER EXCEPT STATEMENT THAT HE ASSUMED ANDERSON WOULD BE SEEING PRES NASSER. ANDERSON STATED THIS HIS ASSUMPTION ALSO. OTHER CONVERSATION NOT RELATED PRESENT CRISIS.

2. ANDERSON'S CURRENT PLAN FLY CAIRO TUESDAY, MAY 30, MEA 306, ARRIVING 1530. DEPART CAIRO 1000 FOR ROME, THURSDAY, JUNE 1, ALITALIA 493. ROME TO LISBON, JUNE 1, 1530, PAA 119. REQUEST ADVICE IF THIS SCHEDULE MEETS WASHINGTON APPROVAL.
PORTER.

DTG: 29/1528Z MAY 1967

~~SECRET~~

GPS 190 INI 190

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7729 83-51
By 18/ics, NARA, Date 5-21-91

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

SENT
WHCA

~~SECRET~~

VZCZCEEA059
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 1077

1967 MAY 29 16 03

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67478

~~SECRET~~

MAY 29, 1967

AT A MEETING EARLY THIS MORNING WITH SECRETARIES RUSK
AND MCNAMARA THEY AGREED TO RECOMMEND TO YOU THAT WE
DISPATCH THE CARRIER INTREPID THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL.

AS YOU KNOW, IT IS SLATED TO TAKE UP A POSITION OFF
VIET NAM.

BOB MCNAMARA WOULD FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE IF IT WERE
ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE CANAL IF NEEDED IN CONNECTION
WITH A CRISIS AT THE GULF OF AQABA. BOTH SECRETARIES
BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO TEST THE EGYPTIANS ON THE
TRANSIT OF A U.S. WARSHIP VERY SOON. THEY DO NOT EXPECT
NASSER TO REFUSE TRANSIT.

WHETHER THE INTREPID STAYED IN THE RED SEA (OR INDIAN
OCEAN) OR PROCEEDED TO VIET NAM COULD BE DECIDED AFTER
IT HAD TRANSITED THE CANAL AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE SITUATION
AT THAT TIME.

DISPATCH INTREPID THROUGH CANAL -----

HOLD IN MEDITERRANEAN -----

DISCUSS BEFORE DECISION -----

DTG: 29/1528Z MAY 67

GPS: 190 IMI 190

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 68 2-22-82 (NLJ 82-71)
By sg Idch, NARA, Date 5-21-91

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1967 MAY 29 PM 12:17

MONDAY

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1967 MAY 29 13 30

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-522

By ing, NARA, Date 3-2-93

VZCZCEEA058
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1076

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67477

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

67 MAY 29 AM 9:32

MONDAY

MAY 29, 1967

IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT SEC. RUSK WILL RECOMMEND THAT YOU SEE THIS MODERATE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER. ON THE GROUNDS SUGGESTED HERE BY OUR AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD.

BAGHDAD 2018

1. TALKED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER PACHACHI BRIEFLY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. HE REAFFIRMED HIS HOPE PRESIDENT JOHNSON WOULD WISH TO SEE HIM. HE SAID HE WAS GOING TO THE U.S. NOT ONLY TO EXPLAIN ARAB POINTS OF VIEW BUT ALSO TO DO WHATEVER HE COULD TO REVERSE THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION. THE DETERIORATION IS DISTRESSING TO HIM PERSONALLY AS WELL AS OFFICIALLY, HE SAID, BECAUSE HE HAS WORKED HARD OVER LONG PERIOD TO BUILD MORE STABLE CONDITIONS AND BETTER RELATIONS THROUGHOUT THE AREA. HE HOPED THE PRESIDENT WOULD CONSIDER AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS USEFUL.
2. UNDER SEC JAMIL ASKED IF I WOULD KEEP HIM INFORMED OF POSSIBLE PLANS. WISH REAFFIRM RECOMMENDATION THAT ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE IF AT ALL POSSIBLE FOR PACHACHI TO SEE PRESIDENT JOHNSON. AS PACACHI NOTED HE WILL BE ONLY ARAB FOREIGN MINISTER IN UNITED STATES AT THIS JUNCTURE. CALL MAY TEND EASE SOME OF THE CURRENT HYPERSENSITIVITY OF IRAQIS AND PERHAPS THAT OF OTHER ARABS, TO REPORTS OF CONTACTS BETWEEN ISRAELI AND UNITED STATES OFFICIALS. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT PACACHI MAY BE ABLE MAKE CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO UNDERSTANDINGS DESIGNED REDUCE TENSION.
3. PACACHI DEPARTED THIS MORNING AND IS SCHEDULED ARRIVE 7:30 PM NEW YORK TIME EVENING MAY 29. HE EXPECTS STAY SEVERAL DAYS DEPENDING ON CIRCUMSTANCES. WILL APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION AS TO WHETHER CALL CAN BE ARRANGED AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS CONNECTION HIS VISIT. GP-3 DUNCAN

DTG: 29/1304Z MAY 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

Sent 11/13 PM

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1967 MAY 29 03 13

VZCZCEEA054
OO VTE 10
DE VTE 1071

SECRET

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67472

~~SECRET~~

HEREWITH STATE DEPARTMENT SITUATION REPORT.

ARAB-ISRAEL SITUATION REPORT, 6:00 PM EDT, MAY 28, 1967

1. NASSER'S PRESS CONFERENCE AT 10:30 AM EDT IN CAIRO SHOWED NASSER STILL SUPREMELY CONFIDENT ON A POSSIBLE MILITARY OUTCOME, AND UNYIELDING ON TRANSIT OF THE STRAIT OF TIRAN. INTER-ALIA, NASSER SAID: (1) "WE ARE SURPRISED AT CANADA'S ATTITUDE AND MR. PEARSON'S ATTITUDE. WE REGARD CANADA'S ATTITUDE OVER THE LAST TEN DAYS AS HOSTILE TO THE ARABS AND TO THE UAR." (2) "IF WAR BROKE OUT BETWEEN ISRAEL ALONE ON THE ONE HAND AND US ALONE ON THE OTHER, I THINK IT (THE WAR) COULD BE CONFINED TO THE AREA." (3) "PASSAGE THROUGH THE GULF OF AQABA IS IN OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS (AND) A VIOLATION OF OUR SOVEREIGNTY WILL BE AN ACT OF AGGRESSION DIRECTED AGAINST US WHICH WILL BE RESISTED WITH ALL OUR FORCE. I BELIEVE THAT IF THE UNITED STATES INTERFERES IN OUR SOVEREIGNTY, WE SHALL RESIST THIS INTERFERENCE, TOO, WITH ALL OUR FORCE." (4) "THE SUBJECT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF IS ALSO NOT OPEN TO QUESTION." (5) "WE REGARD THE UNITED STATES AS BIASED TOWARD AND AS TAKING THE SIDE OF ISRAEL 100 PER CENT. . . THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE JUST IN ITS TREATMENT TO THE WORLD." (6) "EGYPTIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS EXTEND TO 12 MILES, BUT THE TIRAN STRAIT IS LESS THAN THREE MILES (WIDE). THERE IS ONLY A SMALL PART OF THE STRAIT SUITABLE FOR SHIPPING. THIS PART IS ONE MILE FROM THE COAST OF SINAI. A TOTAL BLOCKADE HAS BEEN IMPOSED THERE. I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT WE ARE NOT BOUND BY ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT REGARDING SHIPPING IN THIS STRAIT." (7) "WE ACCEPT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. WE WILL ACCEPT THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION (EIMAC) IF ISRAEL AGREES TO ITS RESURRECTION. WE ALL KNOW THAT IN (1956) BEN-GURION SAID THAT THE ARMISTICE COMMISSION WAS DEAD AND COULD NOT BE RESURRECTED. IF THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION IS TO CARRY OUT ITS DUTIES, AL-AWJAH MUST BE RETURNED TO THE UNITED NATIONS. ACCORDING TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AL-AWJAH WAS UNDER U.N. SUPERVISION; THERE WERE U.N. FORCES

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 76083-51

By 9/1/86, NARA, Date 5-20-91

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

THERE. ISRAEL DISARMED THESE FORCES AND EXPELLED THEM. IF WE ARE TO IMPLEMENT THE ARMISTICE AND RESTORE THE ARMISTICE COMMISSION, THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT MUST BE RESTORED AS IT WAS. ISRAEL MUST EVACUATE AL-AWJAH AND THE UNITED NATIONS MUST RETURN THERE.

2. EVACUATION - EMBASSY CAIRO REPORTS THAT THROUGH MAY 27, 1500 AMERICANS HAVE LEFT CAIRO. THIS MEANS 400 LEFT ON THE 27TH. CAIRO HAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT ALL OFFICIAL DEPENDENTS WILL HAVE DEPARTED FOR ATHENS BY TODAY (SUNDAY). EMBASSY AMMAN REPORTS 71 AMERICANS LEFT JORDAN MAY 28, MAKING A TOTAL OF 680 TO DATE. OF THESE, 120 WERE OFFICIAL DEPENDENTS. EMBASSY TEL AVIV REPORTED THAT 570 AMERICANS LEFT ISRAEL MAY 27, WHILE ABOUT 1,200 TOURISTS AND ABOUT 1,300 LONG-TERM RESIDENTS WHO MAY WISH TO LEAVE, REMAIN. TEL AVIV ALSO REPORTS 55 DEPENDENTS OF PERSONNEL IN TEL AVIV AND JERUSALEM REMAIN, OF WHICH THREE ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPART MAY 28.

3. VISIT OF IRAQ'S FOREIGN MINISTER - IRAQ'S FOREIGN MINISTER PACHACHI IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN NEW YORK MAY 29. HE HOPES TO SEE PRESIDENT JOHNSON. HE HAS JUST VISITED CAIRO.

4. UAR WAR MINISTER IN MOSCOW - THE UAR EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR IN MOSCOW SAID TO ONE OF OUR EMBASSY OFFICERS THAT UAR WAR MINISTER BADRAN WAS IN MOSCOW TO SEEK "TYPES OF ARMS THE UAR DOES NOT NOW HAVE." BADRAN HAS NOW LEFT.

5. ISRAELIS CAPTURE EGYPTIAN PATROL - EMBASSY TEL AVIV HAS REPORTED THE CAPTURE OF A 5-MAN EGYPTIAN RECONNAISSANCE TEAM ALONG THE GAZA STRIP BOUNDARY. THREE WERE OFFICERS, TWO OF FIELD GRADE.

6. JORDANIAN STATEMENT - PRIME MINISTER JUMA ISSUED AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT WARNING THE UNITED STATES THERE WOULD BE THE "WORST CONSEQUENCES" FOR ARAB-AMERICAN RELATIONS IF THE U.S. THREW ITS SUPPORT TO ISRAEL DURING THE CURRENT CRISIS. JORDAN FELT IT NECESSARY TO ISSUE THE STATEMENT TO REDUCE ITS ISOLATION FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ARAB STATES.

7. MOOD IN ISRAEL - EMBASSY TEL AVIV REPORTS THE MOOD IS GRIM IN ISRAEL AND THE TONE OF EDITORIALS MENACING. SEMI-OFFICIAL NEWSPAPER DAVAR STATES, "U.S. DID NOT PROPOSE EFFECTIVE ACTION TO OPEN UP IMMEDIATELY TIRAN STRAITS." TWO OTHER NEWSPAPERS REPORT THAT AS A REWARD FOR REFRAINING FROM HOSTILITIES FROM UNILATERAL ACTION USG HAS PROMISED TO SUPPLY ISRAEL WITH ITS OIL NEEDS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

8. ESHKOL STATEMENT - ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL MADE A SHORT RADIO STATEMENT TO THE NATION. HE SAID NOTHING NEW. HE STRESSED THE READINESS OF THE ISRAELI NATION FOR THE IMPORTANCE OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF OF AQABA.

9. U THANT SPEECH - U THANT ACCUSED UNNAMED GOVERNMENTS TODAY OF FLOUTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, IN ORDER TO PURSUE THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS. HE CHARGED THEM WITH LEADING THE WORLD TO THE BRINK OF A THIRD WORLD WAR.

SECRET

DTG: 290136Z MAY 67

RECEIVED FROM QUEBEC COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

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1967 MAY 29 01 42

EEA052
CO WTE13
DE WTE 1973

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67471

07 MAY 20 PM 9:41

~~TOP SECRET~~

HERewith BARBOUR'S REPORT ON THE DECISIONS MADE TODAY IN ISRAEL
THE REASONS FOR THEM; THE ANXIETIES; AND GENERAL MOOD.

1. CABINET DECISION THIS AFTERNOON IS TO POSTPONE MILITARY
ACTION FOR FEW WEEKS IN FAVOR OF CONTINUING EFFORT TO ASCERTAIN
WHETHER DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY CAN SOLVE THE CRISIS. KEY FACTORS
THIS DECISION, ACCORDING TO BITAN OF FONOFF, WERE (A) PRESIDENT
LETTER LAST NIGHT SUGGESTING THAT THERE AT LEAST EMBRYO OF
AGREEMENT BETWEEN US AND USSR ON PEACEFUL SOLUTION PROBLEMS;
(B) EBAN REPORT HIS CONVERSATIONS WASHINGTON, LONDON, PARIS, AND
(C) SERIES OF TALKS I HAVE HAD HERE WITH VARIOUS OFFICIALS
MOSTLY ON SATURDAY IN WHICH BITAN SAYS I SAID QUOTE DON'T
SHOOT DOWN DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS. US PREPARED TO TRY TO DO
SOMETHING. ALTERNATIVE OF MILITARY ACTION WOULD LEAD MOST
UNHAPPY CONSEQUENCES UNQUOTE. PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL
WILL MAKE STATEMENT IN KNESSET TOMORROW AFTERNOON, ESSENTIAL
POINT OF WHICH WILL BE AMPLIFY BRIEF COMMENT ALREADY APPEARING
PUBLICLY HERE THAT GOI HAS DECIDED TO EXHAUST POSSIBILITIES OF
DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION.

2. BITAN HAS DRAFT ESHKOL RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT BUT SAYS IT
IMPOSSIBLE, IN CURRENT STATE OF EXHAUSTION OF ALL PRINCIPALS,
TO CLEAR IT TONIGHT AND THAT HE EXPECTS BE ABLE INSTRUCT HARMAN
FROM JERUSALEM TO DELIVER FINAL VERSION SOME TIME TOMORROW.
PROPOSED TEXT PERTINENT SECTIONS ESHKOL SPEECH RELATING TO
FOREIGN, PARTICULARLY US, CONVERSATIONS ARE CONTAINED MY
NEXT FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. CONTRARY TO POSITION MENTIONED
REFTEL ISRAELIS DO NOT REPEAT NOT BELIEVE TEXT NOW NEEDS
SPECIFIC US APPROVAL BUT OF COURSE PREPARE TO CONSIDER ANY
COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-166
By is, NARA Date 1-7-00

REPROX FROM QUICK COPY

3. BITAN EMPHASIZES THAT CRISIS NOT REPEAT NOT YET OVER AN ESSENTIAL TO SOLUTION OF IT WILL BE HOW WELL US AND GOI QUOTE COMMUNICATE UNQUOTE OVER NEXT FEW WEEKS. DIFFICULTY IS NOT ONLY THE STRAITS IN REGARD TO WHICH ISRAELIS PREPARED TO TEXT OUR IDEAS AND SCENARIO. SECOND MAJOR ISSUE IS POSTURE OF NASSER IN SINAI, WHICH MUST BE REDUCED. IF MAJOR TERRORISM IS MOUNTED FROM SINAI OR GAZA STRIP ISRAELIS WILL HAVE TO STOP IT EVENTUALLY. THEY FEEL THEY CAN FINISH NASSER OFF AND IF NO OTHER WAY STOP TERRORISM THEY WILL HAVE TO DO IT. THEY ARE PREPARED WAIT FEW WEEKS BUT ARE MAINTAINING MOBILIZATION AT TOP LEVEL WHICH CANNOT BE DONE INDEFINITELY WITHOUT SERIOUS ECONOMIC AFFECT ISRAEL.

4. ADDITIONALLY, ISRAELIS PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT AND URGE OUR MOST CAREFUL ATTENTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEVELOPMENTS. IF THINGS GO WRONG THERE WHOLE SCENARIO MIGHT BE THEN SHOT TO PIECES OR IMPOSSIBLY DELAYED.

5. FINALLY, AS BACKGROUND TO TODAY'S CABINET DECISION BITAN TOLD ME THAT PRIME MINISTER LAST EVENING HAD MADE EFFORT TO BROADEN CABINET AND OFFERED PLACES FOR FIVE MINISTERS WITHOUT PORTFOLIO. DAYAN AND PERES WOULD HAVE COME FROM RAFI; EGGAN AND PROBABLY REMAULT FROM DAHAL, WITH FIFTH MRS. MEIR. ACCORDING TO BITAN, PERES FIRST OFFERED FORGET ALL PAST POLITICAL DIFFERENCES AND JOIN IN NATIONAL UNITED EFFORT BUT UPON FURTHER DISCUSSION HE INSISTED THAT DAYAN BECOME MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND REHASHED RAFAI-MAPAI DISPUTE ALONG OBVIOUS POLITICAL LINES. RESULT IS NO CABINET ENLARGEMENT NOW ANTICIPATED. IF NOT REPEAT NOT CORRECT, AS PUBLICLY RUMORED, THAT SUGGESTION MADE MRS. MEIR SHOULD REPLACE EGGAN.

DTG: 290029Z MAY 1967 ZFF1

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

REPEX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

EEA051
 CO WTE 10
 DE WTE 1069

SENT
 WHCA

FROM WALT ROSTOW
 TO THE PRESIDENT
 CITE CAP67470

1967 MAY 29 01 31

1967 MAY 28 PM 9:33

SUNDAY

~~SECRET~~

SECRETARY RUSK REQUESTS YOUR URGENT CONCURRENCE IN HIS
 DISPATCHING THIS MESSAGE TO GROMYKO FROM HIM.

DEAR MR. GROMYKO,

FOLLOWING THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS YESTERDAY BETWEEN
 CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON, AND OUR FURTHER
 COMMUNICATION WITH PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL, I AM ENCOURAGED TO
 BELIEVE THAT THERE IS NO BASIS FOR YOUR REPORT THAT
 ISRAEL WILL SOON INITIATE HOSTILITIES.

YOU WILL ALREADY HAVE SEEN THE PRESS STATEMENT OF PRIME
 MINISTER ESHKOL WHICH INDICATES THAT OUR VIGOROUS REPRESENTA-
 TIONS IN ISRAEL HAVE INDEED HAD THE EFFECT WE BOTH HOPED FOR.
 ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAVE BEEN DISMAYED BY THE ALMOST SINUL-
 TANEIOUS PRESS CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENT NASSER COMMITTING HIMSELF
 AGAIN TO THE CLOSING OF THE STRAIT OF TIRAN. THIS IS THE CENTRAL
 POINT AND IT IS ABOUT THIS THAT I WISH TO WRITE YOU AS A SUPPLEMENT
 TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN OF LAST NIGHT.

I SHOULD LIKE TO ADD SOME THOUGHTS TO THE
 PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF YESTERDAY, IN FURTHER RESPONSE TO MR.
 KOSYGIN'S WELCOME APPEAL FOR COOPERATION IN PREVENTING AN
 OUTBREAK OF MILITARY CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

YOUR CHAIRMAN STATES THAT YOU ARE CONVINCED THAT "HOWEVER
 COMPLICATED THE SITUATION MAY BE IN THE REGION OF THE BOUNDARIES
 OF ISRAEL, SYRIA, AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, MEANS MUST
 BE FOUND TO LIQUIDATE THIS CONFLICT AS A MILITARY ONE". WE
 COMPLETELY AGREE.

WE ARE CONCERNED THAT YOUR AND OUR SEPARATE APPEALS FOR
 RESTRAINT WILL BE TO NO AVAIL UNLESS WE ACT DURING THE NEXT
 FEW DAYS TO LIQUIDATE WHAT WE REGARD AS THE PRIMARY POINT
 OF DANGER IN THE SITUATION, PRESIDENT NASSER'S ANNOUNCED
 POLICY OF BLOCKADE AGAINST ISRAELI SHIPPING AND WHAT THE GOVERN-
 MENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC CONSIDERS "STRATEGIC" CARGOS
 BOUND FOR ISRAEL THROUGH THE STRAIT OF TIRAN. ALL OTHER
 ASPECTS OF THE CONTROVERSY SHOULD BE SOLUBLE BY THE USUAL
 PROCEDURES OF NEGOTIATION. ON THIS ONE POINT, WE THINK IT IS
 INDISPENSABLE THAT YOU AND WE REACH AN UNDERSTANDING AS SOON
 AS POSSIBLE.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 769 83-51

By 18/10/01, NARA, Date 5-21-91

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

AS YOU KNOW, WE TAKE THE VIEW THAT THE GULF OF AQABA COMPREHENDS INTERNATIONAL WATERS, AND THAT NO NATION HAS THE RIGHT TO PREVENT FREE AND INNOCENT PASSAGE IN THE GULF OR THROUGH THE STRAIT. AND WE AGREE WITH EARLIER STATEMENTS BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHERS THAT BELLIGERENT RIGHTS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED TO EXIST BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC.

AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS NOT PUBLICLY DISAGREED WITH THIS VIEW, WHICH AFTER ALL CORRESPONDS TO THE POSITION TAKEN IN THE 1958 CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, AND THE CORFU CHANNEL CASE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.

AS A MARITIME NATION, WE AND YOU BOTH REGARD THE PRESERVATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION ON INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AS A VITAL INTEREST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. BEYOND THAT, WE ARE PERSUADED THAT ISRAEL CONSIDERS ITS RIGHT OF TRANSIT THROUGH THE STRAIT OF TIRAN SO FUNDAMENTAL TO HER NATIONAL INTEREST THAT SHE CAN BE FORCED TO TAKE ACTION TO PRESERVE IT. ISRAEL HAS MADE IT CLEAR TO US THAT SHE WOULD CONSIDER ANY INTERFERENCE WITH ISRAELI VESSELS OR WITH ISRAEL BOUND CARGO AN ACT OF AGGRESSION JUSTIFYING ACTION ON HER PART AS A MATTER OF SELF-DEFENSE. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL WILL BACK DOWN ON THIS POINT, NOR THAT SHE SHOULD BE ASKED TO DO SO.

I HAVE NOTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC HAS NOT YET TAKEN ARMED ACTION TO CARRY OUT ITS POLICY OF CLOSING THE STRAIT.

OUR GOVERNMENT SHOULD FAVOR A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WHOSE EFFECT WOULD BE TO CALL FOR A MORATORIUM FOR AT LEAST TWO WEEKS ON THE EXECUTION OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC'S POLICY OF CLOSING THE STRAIT. SUCH A MORATORIUM WOULD PRESERVE THE POSITION AS IT WAS BEFORE PRESIDENT NASSER ANNOUNCED HIS POLICY, AND GIVE US AND OTHERS A CHANCE TO MEDIATE IN THIS SITUATION. I EARNESTLY APPEAL TO YOU TO SUPPORT THIS POSITION, WHICH IN MY JUDGMENT OFFERS US BOTH THE BEST BASIS ON WHICH TO ACHIEVE THE GOAL WE BOTH SEEK IN THE MIDDLE EAST - THE AVOIDANCE OF HOSTILITIES, AND THE RESOLUTION OF ITS COMPLEX PROBLEMS BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

I WOULD WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON THE POINTS RAISED IN THIS LETTER, AND ABOVE ALL ON HOW THE ISSUE OF THE STRAITS CAN BE DEALT WITH CONSISTENTLY WITH ITS CHARACTER AS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY. I SHOULD BE HAPPY TO ACCEPT ANY PROCEDURE YOU DEEM WISE FOR THE FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THESE POINTS BY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS THROUGH CONSULTATIONS HERE, IN MOSCOW, OR THROUGH OUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO THE UN.

SINCERELY YOURS,

DEAN RUSK

DTG: 290025Z MAY 1967 ZFF-1

PRESERVATION COPY



~~SECRET~~

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CO VTE 18
DE VTE 1868

1967 MAY 29 00 22

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67469

1967 MAY 28 PM 8:21

SUNDAY

~~SECRET~~

FOLLOWING JUST RECEIVED FROM AMBASSADOR BARBOUR IS THE LANGUAGE ESHKOL WANTS TO USE IN HIS PARLIAMENT TOMORROW. HE IS ASKING FOR YOUR CLEARANCE. I WANT TO PUT IT IN YOUR HANDS IMMEDIATELY. WILL CALL YOU SHORTLY WITH RECOMMENDATIONS

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT, SUBJECT TO POSSIBLE CHANGES BEFORE PRESENTATION, OF PARAGRAPHS RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS STRAITS OF TIRAN WHICH PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL INTENDS INCLUDE HIS SPEECH TO KNESSET MAY 29.

2. QUOTE THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS RECENTLY CONCLUDED A BRIEF VISIT TO PARIS, LONDON AND WASHINGTON. HE SIT OUT A FEW HOURS AFTER THE EGYPTAIN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE INTENTION PREVENT THE FREE FLOW OF SHIPPING OF ALL FLAGS AND CARGOES THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY OF THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND THE GULF OF ELATH. THE FOREIGN MINISTZR'S PURPOSE WAS TO EXAMINE WHETHER THE POWERS WHICH IN 1947 SOLEMNLY UNDERTOOK TO RESPECT THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE WATERWAY WOULD TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO SECURE THE RIGHTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME COMMUNITY AND TO ENSURE THE PASSAGE OF ISRAEL AND OTHER SHIPPING THE STRAITS AND THE GULF. MR. EBAN EXPLAINED TO THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN THAT THIS WAS ONE OF ISRAEL'S MOST VITAL INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS WHICH SHE WOULD DEFEND AT EVERY COST AND IN ALL CONDITIONS. ALL THREE HEADS OF STATES REPRESENT COUNTRIES WHICH GAVE SOLEMN UNDERTAKINGS IN THE UNGA ON THIS POINT IN MARCH 1957. IT IS CLEAR TO US FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S REPORT THAT ALL OF THEM WISH TO SEE THE MAINTENANCE OF THE STATUS QUO WHICH EXISTED FROM MARCH 1957 UNTIL MAY 1967.

3. THE PRESIDENT OF THE USA AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN MADE PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THIS MATTER DURING THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S VOYAGE. MR. EBAN ALSO HAD FRANK AND DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM.

4. PAREN QUOTES FROM PRES. MAY 23 AND WILSON MAY 24, PUBLIC STATEMENTS WILL PROBABLY BE INSERTED HERE END PAREN.

5. THERE IS A SPECIAL INTEREST IN THE USA POSITION ON THIS POINT, BECAUSE IT WAS THAT GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS THE FIRST TO GIVE EXPLICIT COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL IN 1957 THROUGH DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES, PRESIDENTIAL LETTERS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN THE UN AND ELSEWHERE.

6. WHEN THE GOVERNMENT ON MAY 26 CONSIDERED PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF MAY 23 AND HEARD MR. EBAN'S REPORT OF THIS CONVERSATION IN WASHINGTON, IT WAS STRONGLY IMPRESSED BY THE UNAMBIGUOUS ATTITUDE AND THE FORCEFUL DETERMINATION WHICH PRESIDENT JOHNSON DISPLAYS IN HIS POLICY OF ASSURING FREE PASSAGE IN THESE INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS. A SIMILAR WELCOME IMPRESSION EMERGES FROM THE STATEMENTS AND PRIVATE ASSURANCES OF OTHER MARITIME POWERS, WHO HAVE TOLD US OF THEIR PRACTICAL CONSULTATIONS WHICH EACH OTHER, AND ESPECIALLY WITH USA AND UK ON THIS MATTER.

7. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT THE MARITIME POWERS WHO UPHELD THE DOCTRINE OF FREE PASSAGE WILL CONCERT EFFECTIVE ACTION TO SEE THAT THE STRAITS AND THE GULF ARE OPEN TO FREE AND INNOCENT PASSAGE FOR ISRAEL AND OTHER SHIPPING WITHIN A SHORT TIME. THIS EXPECTATION HAS A STRONG INFLUENCE ON THE GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT ATTITUDE AND POLICY.

DTG: 282354Z MAY 1967

~~SECRET~~

GPS 620

XEROX FROM QUECK COPY

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1967 MAY 28 22 17

VZCZCEEA048
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1067

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70284

UNCLASSIFIED

HEREWITH A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON DECISIONS OF ISRAELI CABINET
FULL REPORT TO KNESSET IS TOMORROW AS YOU KNOW.

ESHKOL STATEMENT

BROADCAST TO NATION BY PRIME MINISTER LEVI ESHKOL

DEAR CITIZENS: THE GOVERNMENT TODAY MET TO DISCUSS THE
SITUATION. AT THE END OF THE DISCUSSIONS, THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTIONS
WERE ADOPTED:

1--THE DANGER THAT THREATENS ISRAEL IN VIEW OF THE CONCEN-
TRATION OF EGYPTIAN FORCES IN SINAI AND IN VIEW OF THE BLOCKADE
OF ISRAELI SHIPPING IN THE RED SEA CONTINUES UNABATED. AS
LONG AS THIS DANGER STILL EXISTS, THE NECESSITY REMAINS TO
COUNTER IT AND TO MAINTAIN OUR MILITARY PREPAREDNESS. THE
GOVERNMENT HAS RECEIVED A REPORT ON THE MEASURES OF
MILITARY PREPAREDNESS WHICH HAVE BEEN ADOPTED AND DECLARES
THAT THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES ARE PROPERLY DEPLOYED TO
DEFEND ISRAEL'S SECURITY. THE GOVERNMENT NOTES WITH SATISFACTION
THE VALIANT SPIRIT OF THE PEOPLE AND THE ISRAELI DEFENSE
FORCES, WHICH ARE EXPRESSION AND A GUARANTEE OF THE STATE'S
STRENGTH.

2--THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL EXPRESSES THE OPINION THAT THE
CLOSING OF THE TIRAN STRAIT TO ISRAELI SHIPPING IS TANTAMOUNT
TO AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST ISRAEL. WE SHALL DEFEND
OURSELVES AGAINST THIS AT THE HOUR OF NEED ON THE STRENGTH
OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE, WHICH IS RESERVED TO EVERY
STATE.

PRESERVATION COPY

67 MAY 28 PM 8 129
SUNDAY

3--THE GOVERNMENT HEARD A REPORT FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON HIS TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE, THE PRIME MINISTER OF BRITAIN, AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND ALSO ABOUT CONTACTS WITH MANY OTHER STATES, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION, AND ON THE GROWING READINESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE TO WORK WITHOUT DELAY FOR THE RAPID LIFTING OF THE BLOCKADE WHICH EGYPT HAS IMPOSED IN THE TIRAN STRAIT.

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE MOBILIZATION OF THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES AND THEIR READINESS TO FACE ANY TEST CONSTITUTED AND STILL CONSTITUTES A DECISIVE FACTOR IN SPEEDING UP INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ACTIVITY. THE GOVERNMENT HAS LAID DOWN GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE CONTINUATION OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE. IT IS DESIGNED TO INDUCE INTERNATIONAL FACTORS TO ADOPT EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE FREEDOM OF INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING IN THE TIRAN STRAIT.

LINES OF ACTION HAVE ALSO BEEN ADOPTED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY CONCENTRATIONS FROM ISRAEL'S SOUTHERN BORDER AND FOR ACTION TO SAFEGUARD OUR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS, OUR SECURITY ALONG THE BORDERS, AND FOR THE PREVENTION OF AGGRESSION, SO THAT WE SHALL NOT HAVE TO ACT IN SELF-DEFENSE WITH OUR MILITARY FORCE.

THE GOVERNMENT DECLARES AND ANNOUNCES THAT THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES ARE STRONG ENOUGH TO DEFEAT ANY AGGRESSOR AND TO INSURE ISRAEL'S SOVEREIGN RIGHTS.

TOMORROW I SHALL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN THE GOVERNMENT'S STAND IN A SPEECH BEFORE THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE KNESSET.

DTG 282058Z MAY 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~

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OO WTE 10
DE WTE 1060

1967 MAY 28 16 53

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67465

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

HEREWITH MORNING INTELLIGENCE MID-EAST SITREP

ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION REPORT
(AS OF 0700)

1. THERE HAVE BEEN NO MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS WHICH WOULD ALTER THE FINDINGS OF THE 25 MAY SPECIAL REPORT OF THE WATCH COMMITTEE. SPECIFICALLY, THERE IS NO NEW INFORMATION WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT EGYPT INTENDS TO ATTACK. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ISRAELIS COULD ATTACK WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING IF THEY DECIDE TO DO SO.

2. ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN HAS ARRIVED BACK IN ISRAEL AND IS TO REPORT TO THE CABINET TODAY ON THE RESULTS OF HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

[REDACTED] IN A REPORT SENT YESTERDAY, HAS CONCLUDED FROM THE LIGHT TRAFFIC OBSERVED ON ROADS IN BOTH THE SOUTH AND NORTH OF ISRAEL THAT THE DESIRED LEVEL OF ISRAELI MOBILIZATION HAS NOW BEEN REACHED. THAT LEVEL IS ABOUT 180,000 TROOPS OR 50 PERCENT OF THE RESERVE CAPACITY, [REDACTED]

3. THE FENICE, FLYING THE PANAMANIAN FLAG AND EXPECTED TO ARRIVE AT EILAT ON 30 OR 31 MAY WITH A LOAD OF

1967 MAY 28 PM 12:56

SUNDAY

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-7
By cbm, NARA, Date 6-14-04

4. CAIRO REITERATED ITS INTENTION TO PREVENT
ISRAELI SHIPS FROM USING THE GULF OF AQABA IN ANOTHER

[REDACTED]

5.

[REDACTED]

6.

[REDACTED]

7.

[REDACTED]

8.

9.

10. POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE "ARAB CAUSE" IS GROWING IN LEBANON. MOSLEM LEADERS ARE CALLING FOR A "HOLY WAR" AND POLITICAL LEADERS ARE MAKING STATEMENTS CALLING FOR ARAB UNITY. SECURITY FORCES HAVE SO FAR BEEN ABLE TO CONTROL DEMONSTRATIONS, BUT TENSION IS INCREASING. LAST NIGHT A BOMB WAS EXPLODED IN BACK OF THE US EMBASSY BREAKING MANY WINDOWS BUT CAUSING NO SERIOUS DAMAGE. THE US AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON FEELS THE SITUATION IS VERY VOLATILE AND GETTING WORSE.

11. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL WILL MEET AT 3:00 P.M. TOMORROW TO CONSIDER THE CRISIS. A RESOLUTION DRAFTED ON 27 MAY CALLS FOR AN EXPRESSION OF CONCERN AT THE INCREASING GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION, URGES ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO ACT WITH SPECIAL RESTRAINT, TO FOREGO BELLIGERENCE AND TO AVOID ALL OTHER ACTIONS WHICH COULD INCREASE TENSION, AND DECIDES TO CONSIDER THE SITUATION FURTHER AS A MATTER OF URGENCY. IN LIGHT OF YESTERDAY'S EGYPTIAN REQUEST FOR A MEETING, THE US IS ATTEMPTING TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR A TOUGHER DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD SPECIFICALLY MENTION THE STRAIT OF TIRAN. MEANWHILE, EGYPT HAS APPARENTLY INTERPRETED CANADA'S LEADING ROLE IN THE COUNCIL LAST WEEK AS ONE OF SUPPORT FOR THE ISRAELIS, AND HAS ORDERED THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT OF UNEF TO LEAVE EGYPT WITHIN 48 HOURS.

DTG: 281613Z MAY 67

~~TOP SECRET~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

VZCZCEEA045X
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 DE WTE 1063

FLASH

SENT
 WHCA

FLASH

FROM WALT ROSTOW
 TO THE PRESIDENT
 CITE CAP67467

SECRET

1967 MAY 28 17 08

7 MAY 28 PM 1:05

SUNDAY

~~SECRET~~

THIS FLASH HAS JUST COME IN. IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THEY HAVE
 DECIDED NOT TO GO TO WAR AT THIS TIME.

1. CABINET MEETING WHICH BEGAN AT 1500 HOURS LOCAL HAS
 RECESSED SUBJECT TO CALL IF NECESSARY. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
 SECURITY COMMITTEE OF KNESSET NOW IN SESSION. P.. ESHKOL
 WILL ADDRESS KNESSET TOMORROW PROBABLY IN AFTERNOON OR
 EARLY EVENING.
2. BITAN OF FONOFF HAS JUST RESPONDED MY INQUIRY WITH ABOVE
 INFO AND HAS ADDED THAT, WHILE QUOTE PROBLEM NOT YET SOLVED,
 OF COURSE UNQUOTE DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN QUOTE ALONG YOUR
 LINE UNQUOTE.
3. HE BUSY DRAFTING DOCUMENTS CONFIRMING THIS POSITION WHICH
 HE HOPES BE ABLE HAND ME FOR TRANSMISSION TO WASHINGTON IN
 NEXT THREE HOURS OR SO.

GP-1. BARBOUR

DTG 28/1653Z MAY 67

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NL J 83-51By 18/105, NARA, Date 5-20-91

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

VZCZCEEA 243
CO WTE 13
DE WTE 1058

SENT
WHCA

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67464

1967 MAY 28 16 11

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-522
By 118, NARA, Date 3-3-93

~~SECRET~~

HEREWITH A LUCID ACCOUNT FROM BILL JORDEN OF AN INTERVIEW
WITH KY.

HARRY MCPHERSON AND I HAD LONG AND VERY CANDID TALK LAST NIGHT
WITH PM KY. HE WAS FRIENDLY AND OPEN. WE MADE STANDARD POINTS ON
FAIR ELECTIONS, CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION. NEED FOR MANDATE, ETC.
HIGHLIGHTS OF KY'S POSITION FOLLOW:

ON POLITICS - HE WILL RUN; EXPECTS TO WIN; GUESSES HE WILL GET
BETWEEN 35 AND 40 PERCENT OF VOTE.

THIEU IS PUZZLE. KY DOESN'T KNOW WHAT HE WANTS. SUGGESTED THIEU
MAY WANT SIMPLY TO CUT INTO KY'S SUPPORT AND MAKE SURE LATER
DOESN'T WIN.

OR HE MAY WANT INCREASE HIS BARGAINING POWER FOR OTHER POST
IN NEW GOVERNMENT. IT NOT CLEAR WHAT JOB HE WANTS.

HUONG AND SUU ARE TOO OLD; CAN'T CUT IT; TOO WEAK FOR REAL
LEADERSHIP. IF SUU ELECTED. THERE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE
MILITARY COUP.

ONLY A MILITARY MAN CAN PROVIDE THE LEADERSHIP THIS COUNTRY
NEEDS NOW TO MOVE FORWARD - AND HE CLEARLY MEANT HIMSELF.

ALL THE CANDIDATES WILL PROBABLY COME UP WITH PROGRAMS, BUT
THEY WILL ALL SOUND ALIKE. QUESTION IS: WHO CAN CONVERT A PROGRAM
INTO ACTION.

ON PROBLEM OF MANDATE, HE EXPECTS GOOD VOTE. IN ADDITION WILL
OFFER MAJOR POSTS TO ALL OTHER CANDIDATES. QUOTE THEN WE WILL HAVE
ONE HUNDRED PERCENT OF THE VOTE REPRESENTED
IN THE GOVERNMENT UNQUOTE.

HE WAS UTTERLY FRANK ON PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION. IT IS REAL;
IT IS SERIOUS; IT IS MAJOR SOURCE OF DISCONTENT. AND MANY PEOPLE
IN HIGH PLACES UNDOUBTEDLY INVOLVED. HE HAS MOVED AGAINST SOME - GENERAL
CO, QUANG, OTHERS. BUT IT TAKES TIME TO GATHER SOLID EVIDENCE.
HE WILL MOVE AGAINST MANY OTHERS WHEN (NOT IF) HE IS ELECTED.

AMERICANS SOMETIMES INCONSISTENT ON THIS QUESTION. THEY WANT
VIETNAMESE TO HAVE DEMOCRACY - AND EQUAL JUSTICE AND NO ARBITRARY
POLICE ACTIONS. BUT WHEN THEY TALK OF CORRUPTION AND GRAFT, THEY
WANT US TO QUOTE MOVE FAST UNQUOTE AND NOT WORRY ABOUT TECHNICALITIES.
WE CAN'T DO BOTH.

QUOTE IF I HAVE HARD FACTS, I AM PREPARED TO MOVE FAST. BUT
WE CAN'T ACT ONLY ON RUMORS AND SUSPICION. UNQUOTE.

I TOLD KY OF A JUDGE IN LONG AN WHO WAS ALLEGEDLY RELEASING
VC SUSPECTS FOR QUOTE LACK OF EVIDENCE UNQUOTE - AFTER RECEIVING
EXTENSIVE BRIBES FROM VC.

PRESERVATION COPY

QUOTE IF I HAVE FACTS, I WILL REMOVE HIM TOMORROW UNQUOTE.
KY DISPLAYED SURPRISING FLEXIBILITY ON MATTER OF NEGOTIATIONS
AND DEALING WITH LIBERATION FRONT.

HE SAID VIETNAMESE GENERALLY WERE NERVOUS ABOUT DEALING WITH THE
FRONT NOW. ARMY ESPECIALLY WAS CONCERNED. AND IF A CIVILIAN TRIED
TO OPEN CONTACT, THERE WOULD BE FEAR OF A QUOTE SELLOUT UNQUOTE -
ESPECIALLY AMONG ARMY MEN.

ONLY A MILITARY MAN COULD UNDERTAKE THIS MATTER BECAUSE HIS
COLLEAGUES IN THE ARMY WOULD KNOW.
HE WOULD NOT GIVE UP SOUTH VIETNAM'S INDEPENDENCE.
KY HAD OPENLY SAID HE WAS READY TO TALK WITH HO. THERE WOULD
HAVE BEEN SERIOUS TROUBLE - AND REALLY WORRY - IF A CIVILIAN HAD
SAID SAME THING.

WITH TIME, MANY THINGS WOULD BE POSSIBLE. IN A YEAR, KY WOULD
BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ALL KINDS OF THINGS THAT NOT POSSIBLE
TO WORK ON NOW - TALKS WITH THE FRONT, COALITION, ETC.

(NOTE: THIS FIRST MENTION OF POSSIBLE COALITION BY ANY VIETNAMESE
LEADER TO MY KNOWLEDGE.)

THERE IS CONCERN THAT NOW VIETNAMESE POLITICS NOT STABLE ENOUGH
TO LET NLF FUNCTION AS POLITICAL GROUP. ALSO IT IS DOMINATED BY
COMMUNISTS.

KY INDICATED HIS READINESS TO CONTACT NON-COMMUNIST FRONT
ELEMENTS AND QUOTE BRING THEM OVER UNQUOTE.

IN ANSWER TO FAIRLY BLUNT QUESTION, KY SAID HE WOULD NOT
CONSIDER SERVING AS VICE PRESIDENT OR PM UNDER A CIVILIAN.

HE NOTED THAT POWER OF PM WAS WEAK. HE COULD NOT GET DONE
THE THINGS HE WANTED TO DO UNLESS HE HAD POWER OF THE PRESIDENCY.

IF CIVILIAN WERE ELECTED, QUOTE I WILL GO BACK TO MY AIRFORCE
UNQUOTE.

I GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT IF HE DID RETURN TO AIR FORCE, A
CIVILIAN PRESIDENT HAD BETTER SANDBAG THE ROOF OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
PALACE.

KY GAVE STRONG ASSURANCES ELECTION WOULD BE FAIR AND HONEST.

HE WAS CONFIDENT OF WIDE SUPPORT. HE SAID PROBLEM WOULD NOT
BE GETTING A LARGE VOTE, BUT PERHAPS IN TRYING TO SEE THAT HIS VOTE
DIDN'T GET TOO HIGH.

THE VOTING WOULD NOT BE RIGGED, BUT IF THE VOTE WAS TOO ONE-SIDED
MANY PEOPLE WOULD JUST ASSUME IT HAD BEEN.

KY SPOKE ELOQUENTLY AND WITH DEEP FEELING ABOUT HIS ROLE
IN VIETNAM.

QUOTE I COULD MAKE A LOT OF MONEY. BUT I HAVEN'T. I COULD GO
OFF AS AMBASSADOR TO PARIS OR MOROCCO AND HAVE A GOOD LIFE. I KNOW
HOW TO ENJOY THINGS AND HOW TO SPEND MONEY. I CAN MAKE MONEY WHEN I
LEAVE THIS JOB. AND I WILL.

REQUOTE BUT NOW MY WORK IS HERE. THIS IS MY COUNTRY; THESE ARE
MY PEOPLE. AND I WANT TO HELP THEM. I WANT THEM TO LIVE WELL, TO
HAVE THE THINGS THEY WANT. THAT IS WHAT IS IMPORTANT TO ME UNQUOTE
HARRY AND I FELT POSITIVE HE MEANT EVERY WORD OF IT.

DTG: 28/1528Z MAY 67

GPS: 880 IMI 880

PRESERVATION COPY



~~SECRET~~

May 28, 1967

TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

Herewith a lucid account from Bill Jorden of an interview with Ky.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By ky, NARA, Date 5-10-91

XEROX FROM QUICHE COPY

EEA941
OO WTE 12
DE WTE 1854

~~SECRET~~
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WHCA

VZCZ 1967 MAY 28 02 22

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67462

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 99-166

By is, NARA Date 1-7-08

(Handwritten signature)

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT,

HEREWITH PRIME MINISTER WILSON WEIGHED IN ON THE MIDDLE EAST
WITH AN ACCEPTABLE PROPOSAL AND A PHRASE NICE TO READ: COUNTRIES,
"WITH THE GUTS TO STAND-UP AND BE COUNTED." LET'S HOLD HIM TO IT.

SIGNED
WWR

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE. I'M GRATEFUL TOO FOR THE
VERY FULL ACCOUNT WE HAVE HAD OF EBANS TALKS WITH YOURSELF
AND OTHERS IN WASHINGTON. I WARMLY WELCOME THE INSISTENCE
WITH WHICH YOU URGED CAUTION ON THE ISRAELIS. BUT I AM
ADDRESSING YOU NOW BECAUSE I FEAR THAT, DESPITE ALL YOUR
EFFORTS AND OURS, THERE MUST BE A SERIOUS LIKELIHOOD THAT,
AFTER THE ISRAELI CABINET HAS MET TOMMORROW (CORRECTION - TODAY)
TO CONSIDER EBANS REPORT, YOU AND WE WILL FIND OURSELVES
CONFRONTED WITH WHAT COULD AMOUNT TO AN ISRAELI ULTIMATUM -
THAT, IF WE DO NOT GIVE THEM EVEN MORE CATEGORICAL ASSURANCES
THAN BOTH OF US HAVE GIVEN SO FAR ABOUT THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE
THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, THEY WILL FEEL OBLIGED TO ASSERT
THOSE RIGHTS BY FORCE, IN WHATEVER MANNER AND AT WHATEVER TIME
SEEM MOST APPROPRIATE TO THEM. THIS IS THE VITAL ISSUE.
CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS IS WHAT NASSER HAS GAINED. IT AFFECTS
A VITAL ISRAELI INTEREST.

GEORGE THOMSON AND YOUR PEOPLE MADE GOOD PROGRESS THIS
WEEK AND NOW THE MILITARY ARE FOLLOWING THIS UP URGENTLY.
IT IS CLEAR THAT WE SHALL SOON HAVE A WORKABLE SCHEME, THOUGH
I KNOW YOU AGREE WITH ME THAT IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE
SHOULD PLAN TO DEVELOP THIS THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, IF
POSSIBLE, AND IN ANY CASE ON THE WIDEST POSSIBLE BASIS OF
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION (EVEN IF YOU AND WE ARE GOING TO
HAVE TO DO MOST OF THE DONKEY WORK). BUT I AM GRAVELY
CONCERNED AT THE TIME FACTOR. AN ISRAELI ULTIMATUM
(OR SOMETHING LIKE IT) ON THE LINES I HAVE SUGGESTED WOULD
OPEN UP A DRAMATIC PROSPECT OF GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION IN
AN AREA WHERE, AS I SAID TO YOU THE OTHER DAY, NONE OF US CAN
HOPE TO CONTROL THE LOCAL COMBATANTS, EXCEPT
PERHAPS BY SUCH DIRECT MILITARY INVOLVEMENTS ON ONE SIDE OR
THE OTHER AS TO CONSTITUTE AN UNAVOIDABLE CHALLENGE TO THE
OTHER SIDE. THE POTENTIAL DANGERS OF THAT HAPPENING ARE SUCH
AS TO MAKE IT ESSENTIAL THAT EVERYTHING IS DONE TO AVOID IT.
I HAVE IN MIND PARTICULARLY THE NEED TO AVOID A SITUATION IN
WHICH IT COULD SEEM TO THE WORLD - AND, EVEN MORE IMPORTANT,
THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE ENABLED TO CLAIM - THAT THE
UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN WERE TAKING SIDES MILITARILY IN THE
ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT. IN FACT WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT OUR
COMMITMENT IS ADDRESSED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF PASSAGE
THROUGH THE STRAITS AS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY: AND, GIVEN

AEROX FROM QUICK COPY

67 MAY 27 PM 10:19

SATURDAY

6.2

A WORKABLE SCHEME, THIS IS WHAT WE SHOULD DO WITH YOU AND ANY OTHERS WE CAN PERSUADE TO JOIN US. BUT, AS I SAID IN MY EARLIER MESSAGE, WE CAN BE UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT WE SHALL EASILY GET THEM TO DO SO UNLESS WE HAVE DEMONSTRABLY EXHAUSTED THE UNITED NATIONS POSSIBILITIES. AND PART OF THIS EFFORT AT THE UNITED NATIONS MUST, I AM CONVINCED, TURN AROUND AN ATTEMPT TO GET THE RUSSIANS INVOLVED ON A FOURPOWER BASIS. WE ARE GOING INTO THIS WITH OUR EYES OPEN, KNOWING FULL WELL THAT FRENCH AND SOVIET ESTIMATES ARE OF THE POSSIBILITIES ARE LIKELY TO BE DIFFERENT FROM OUR OWN. BUT WE BELIEVE THAT WE MUST EXPLOIT THE INTRINSIC MERITS IN THE FOURPOWER APPROACH, WHICH IS TO GET THE RUSSIANS TO FACE UP TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO PREVENT A REALLY DANGEROUS CONFRONTATION. WE MAY NOT SUCCEED: PROBABLY WE SHALL NOT. BUT OUR PUBLIC OPINION WILL NOT, I BELIEVE, UNDERSTAND OR SUPPORT WHAT WE MAY HAVE TO DO HEREAFTER IF WE CANNOT SHOW CONVINCINGLY THAT WE HAVE TRIED.

ACCORDINGLY, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I HAVE TONIGHT SENT A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO KOSYGIN URGING ON HIM THE DANGERS OF THIS SITUATION AND INVITING HIM TO GET FEDERENKO TO JOIN WITH GOLDBERG, SEYDOUX AND CARADON, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TO SEE WHETHER IT REALLY IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO HAMMER OUT SOMETHING WHICH COULD MAKE SENSE IN THIS CRAZY MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION. ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS I HAVE DONE THIS WAS BECAUSE GEORGE BROWN HAD COME BACK FROM MOSCOW CONVINCED THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE BEGINNING TO REALISE THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION FOR WHICH THEY THEMSELVES ARE SO LARGELY RESPONSIBLE AND ARE REALLY CONCERNED TO AVOID AN ESCALATION INTO A MAJOR CONFRONTATION. I AM NOT SO NAIVE AS TO BELIEVE THAT THIS MEANS THAT THEY WILL COOPERATION WITH US AT NEW YORK. BUT I BELIEVE IT IS OUR DUTY TO TRY.

IF WE FAIL AND IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL LIKEWISE FAILS THEN I BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE ENOUGH COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD WITH THE SENSE TO REALISE THAT WORLD PEACE IS MORE IMPORTANT EVEN THAN TRYING TO GO ON WORKING THROUGH AN IMPOTENT UNITED NATIONS, AND WITH THE GUTS TO STAND UP AND BE COUNTED. IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE SHOULD I BELIEVE GET THE BROAD BASIS OF SUPPORT THAT WE WANT FOR OUR DECLARATION AND FOR ANY EVENTUAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION - WHO KNOWS, PERHAPS EVEN FRANCE MIGHT AGREE?

I NEED NOT SAY THAT IN ADDRESSING KOSYGIN I HAVE HAD MUCH IN MIND YOUR OWN RESERVATIONS ABOUT FOURPOWER ACTION OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK: AND I HAVE SAID NOTHING TO HIM ABOUT ANY FOURPOWER ACTIVITY ANYWHERE ELSE OR AT ANY LEVEL.

I AM OF COURSE INFORMING DE GAULLE AS WELL. WE HAVE HEARD TODAY FROM THE FRENCH THAT THEY STILL HAVE NO REPLY FROM THE RUSSIANS. AND THEY SEEM CONTENT SIMPLY TO SIT TIGHT AND WAIT FOR IT TO TURN UP, AS IF DELAY WERE WHAT THEY REALLY WANTED. BUT THE FRENCH CLEARLY CAN HAVE NO OBJECTION TO MY URGING KOSYGIN TO SUPPORT A FRENCH INITIATIVE.

SINCE I WROTE THIS, WE HAVE HEARD FROM PAT DEAN OF THE RUSSIAN APPROACH TO YOU. I NOTE THAT YOU WILL BE SENDING A MESSAGE TO ESHKOL. I DO NOT THINK I NEED SEND HIM ANY FURTHER MESSAGE SINCE OUR AMBASSADOR IN ISRAEL WAS INSTRUCTED THIS AFTERNOON (IN THE LIGHT OF A SOMEWHAT OMINOUS REMARK TO GEORGE THOMSON BY THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR HERE) TO MAKE A FURTHER URGENT APPROACH TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT URGING THEM TO MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT POLICY OF RESTRAINT WHILE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION CONTINUE.

I THINK THIS LATEST NEWS ADDS FORCE TO THE APPROACH I HAVE MADE TO KOSYGIN AS DESCRIBED IN THIS MESSAGE.

MESSAGE ENDS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SENT
WHCA

VZCZCEEA039
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1052

1967 MAY 27 23 18

67 MAY 27 PM 7:14

SATURDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67460

~~SECRET~~

MAY 27, 1967

1. SEC. RUSK DECIDED YOST WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE IN CAIRO THAN HARE BECAUSE WE HAD OFFERED HARE TO THE UAR EARLIER AS A POSSIBLE MEDIATOR IN THE CONFLICT WITH SAUDI ARABIA OVER YEMEN.

THEREFORE, YOST IS GOING TOMMORROW. IT WILL BE EXPLAINED TO NOLTE THAT SINCE HE OBVIOUSLY CANNOT RETURN FOR CONSULTATION, WE THOUGHT IT WISE FOR YOST TO COME AND BRING HIM UP TO DATE.

2. THOMPSON SHOULD BE HERE ABOUT JUNE 2.

DTG 272303Z MAY 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-522
By WJ, NARA, Date 3-2-93

~~SECRET~~

GPS 100 IMI 100

PRESERVATION COPY

Friday, May 7 1967
7:00 p. m.

27

1. ~~Supp~~
2. ~~File~~
Kras Jela

1. ~~File~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Bohlen's report.

W. W. R.

Attachment (cable from Amb. Bohlen 5/26/67)

65a
May 26, 1967

CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BOHLEN

DECLASSIFIED

Pursuant to telephone call today, following is our current assessment of French attitude:

1. French deny that Russians have "refused" four power get together. While this may not be completely true, French position continues to maintain it in order to avoid consequence of further reassessment of French position in event of Soviet genuine refusal.
2. The French continue to believe that an important element in present situation is avoidance of any actions which would tend to aggravate situation, i. e., movement of Israeli ships into Gulf of Aqaba, public statements or declarations of principles not accepted universally, such as linking Vietnam situation with current developments in Middle East.
3. De Gaulle's policy still remains one of disengagement from what he regards as extreme position of support of Israel taken by Fourth Republic. De Gaulle is attempting to keep a delicate balance between Israel and Arabs.
4. De Gaulle also in pursuit of General policy for avoiding any semblance of tripartite Western solidarity vis-a-vis Russian, which he regards as smacking of "cold war." De Gaulle's position will obviously have to be considerably reexamined in the event that Soviets definitely refuse quadripartite consultation with the three Western powers. In such event De Gaulle will have to consider whether or not he wishes to try and maintain uneasy neutral balance or line up with Great Britain and U. S. in defense of Western interests.
5. As is so often the case in regard to current French policy, it will have to await De Gaulle's decision based upon situation as it appears to him at that moment.
6. I believe that statement following Cabinet Ministers meeting last Wednesday, May 24, represents accurate summary of French position at that moment which up to the present has not changed.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-520

By ju, NARA, Date 4-30-92

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

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OO VTE10
DE VTE 1049

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ju NARA, Date 5-1-99

RECEIVED
WHCA

67

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67457

1967 MAY 27 22 58

~~TOP SECRET~~

HEREWITH PROPOSED DRAFT TO KOSYGIN AS CLEARED BY SECTS
RUSK AND MCNAMARA.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I AM REPLYING IMMEDIATELY TO YOUR LETTER OF TODAY
ABOUT THE CRITICAL SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST. SINCE
RECEIVING YOUR MESSAGE, I HAVE SENT A FURTHER COMMUNICATION
TO PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL.

I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT I HAVE BEEN MAKING A MAXIMUM
EFFORT TO COUNSEL MODERATION ON ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORING
ARAB STATES. I AGREE THAT YOU AND WE BOTH MUST DO
EVERYTHING WE CAN TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.
WE WELCOME YOUR ASSURANCES AS TO YOUR EFFORTS IN THIS
DIRECTION.

THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE ARE IN A STATE OF
HIGH TENSION. THEY HAVE HEARD THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS TO THE
CLOSING OF THE STRAIT OF TIRAN. THEY HAVE SEEN THE
WITHDRAWAL OF UN FORCES ALONG THEIR BORDER AND THAT OF
EGYPT AND THEY HEAR DAILY CALLS FOR A "HOLY WAR" ON THE
PART OF THE ARABS TO DESTROY ISRAEL. IT IS IMPORTANT
FOR BOTH OF US TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO REDUCE THE
FURTHER INFLAMMATION OF THE SITUATION.

IT SEEMS TO US OF VITAL IMPORTANCE THAT A PROMPT
SOLUTION BE FOUND TO THE ISSUE OF THE STRAIT OF TIRAN.
YOU AND WE, AS IMPORTANT POWERS, HAVE A LARGE INTEREST
IN INTERNATIONAL PASSAGE THROUGH NARROW WATERS CONNECTING
INTERNATIONAL SEAS. WE URGE YOU TO COUNSEL EGYPT TO
REFRAIN FROM INTERFERING WITH THE PASSAGE OF VESSELS
THROUGH THE STRAIT. WE HOPE THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL
OR THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAN FIND AN EARLY ANSWER BUT I
DO NOT WISH TO UNDERESTIMATE THE GRAVITY OF THIS PARTICULAR
PROBLEM. IF THIS ISSUE CAN BE RESOLVED, I SHOULD THINK
THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR REDUCING THE TENSION AND RESTORING
STABILITY IN THE AREA WOULD BE GREATLY IMPROVED.

I DO HOPE THAT YOUR AND OUR PARRALLEL EFFORTS TO AVOID
HOSTILITIES IN THIS SITUATION WILL SUCCEED.

YOURS FAITHFULLY,
LYNDON B. JOHNSON

67 MAY 27 PM 8:54

SATURDAY

DTG: 272220Z MAY 1967
XEROX FROM QUICOR COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

666

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1967 MAY 27 23 13

~~TOP SECRET~~

VZCZCEEA038
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DE WTE 1050

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67458

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

87 MAY 27 PM 7:21

SATURDAY

ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION REPORT (AS OF 4 P.M. EDT)

1. INITIAL PRESS REACTION FROM ISRAEL TO U THANT'S REPORT IS THAT HIS PROPOSALS DO NOT TOUCH ON THE PRESENT CRISIS, AS THE ISRAELIS SEE IT. THERE HAS BEEN NO CLASSIFIED REPORTING AS YET. THE ISRAELIS PRESUMABLY ARE AWAITING THE RETURN OF FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN BEFORE MAKING FURTHER OFFICIAL STATEMENTS ON THE SITUATION.

2. TEL AVIV SAYS THAT AN ISRAELI ARMY HALF-TRACK WAS BLOWN UP BY A MINE TODAY WHILE ON ROUTINE PATROL IN THE VICINITY OF THE GAZA STRIP. SEVEN ISRAELI SOLDIERS ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN WOUNDED. SUCH INCIDENTS CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE; THEY PROBABLY ARE A RESULT OF AGGRESSIVE ISRAELI PATROLLING.


3. NASIR IS SCHEDULED TO GIVE A PRESS CONFERENCE TOMORROW TO CORRESPONDENTS RETURNING FROM A VISIT TO GAZA. [REDACTED] CAIRO [REDACTED] WAS SOMEWHAT MORE QUIET THAN NORMAL FOR A SATURDAY; PROPAGANDA OUTPUT FOCUSES MORE ON THE US THAN ON ISRAEL. A VERY LARGE PATRIOTIC RALLY IS SCHEDULED FOR NOON CAIRO TIME SUNDAY. BY SUNDAY EVENING THE EMBASSY EXPECTS TO HAVE COMPLETED THE EVACUATION TO AIHENS OF ALL 425 OFFICIAL DEPENDENTS.

4. THE EGYPTIAN MINISTER OF WAR, SHAMS BADRAN, IS STILL IN MOSCOW, CONTINUING HIS "FRIENDLY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS," ACCORDING TO TASS.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-7
By Cbm, NARA, Date 6-14-04

5. EGYPT IS CONTINUING TO RECEIVE PROMISES OF AID FROM OTHER ARAB AND NORTH AFRICAN STATES. IRAQ APPARENTLY HAS ALLOTTED TWO SQUADRONS (32 AIRCRAFT) OF MIG-21S TO SUPPORT EGYPT.



6. IN ALGERIA, THE MILITARY ARE URGING BOUMEDIENNE TO GIVE NASIR MILITARY SUPPORT IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES.



7.



8.



9. LATE ITEM - A MEETING OF EL AL AIRLINE OFFICIALS IN NEW YORK THIS MORNING DECIDED THAT ALL EL AL COCKPIT CREWS ARE TO RETURN TO ISRAEL BEGINNING SUNDAY. THE LATEST ALLOWABLE ARRIVAL DATE IS TO BE MIDNIGHT 28 MAY. ALL EL AL PERSONNEL, EXCEPT FOR A SKELETON FORCE, WILL BE LAID OFF OR FURLOUGHED BY LATE SUNDAY. ALL FOUR EL AL FLIGHTS FOR MONDAY, 29 MAY, HAVE BEEN CANCELLED.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DTG 272222Z MAY 1967

REPRO FROM QUICK COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

SENT
WHCA

67 MAY 27 22 49

67 MAY 27 PM 8:57

SATURDAY

VZCZCEEA036
OO VTE10
DE VTE1051

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67459

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 27, 1967

SEN. JAVITS CALLED TO INQUIRE ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.
I BRIEFED HIM IN VERY GENERAL TERMS.

HE THEN MADE THIS SUGGESTION: IT MIGHT BE REASSURING TO THE
U.S. JEWISH COMMUNITY IF YOU WERE TO HAVE IN SOME MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
WITH SPECIAL INTERESTS IN ISRAEL FOR A BRIEFING.

THERE WILL BE A BIG PRO-ISRAEL RALLY IN NEW YORK. THERE
IS GREAT CONCERN. SUCH A MEETING MIGHT EASE THAT CONCERN.

HE SUGGESTED EARLY NEXT WEEK.

I MADE NO ENCOURAGING NOISE, BUT PROMISED TO INFORM YOU.

I SEE DISADVANTAGES AS WELL AS ADVANTAGES: THIS IS A QUESTION
OF NATIONAL INTEREST. THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP MIGHT BE
THE APPROPRIATE GROUP WHEN AND IF YOU HAD SOMETHING TO REPORT.

BUT I DID WISH YOU TO KNOW OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

DTG: 272229Z MAY 67

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Letter 3-15-82 (NLS 81-165)
By ng/dch, NARA, Date 5-17-91

SENT
WHCA~~TOP SECRET~~VFCZCZEA035
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1047

1967 MAY 27 22 09

FROM VALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67455~~TOP SECRET~~

MAY 27, 1967

87 MAY 27 PM 8:17

SATURDAY

HEREWITH PROPOSED DRAFT TO ESHKOL AS CLEARED BY SECRETARIES
RUSK AND MCNAMARA. THEY WISH YOUR GUIDANCE AS SOON AS POS-
SIBLE BECAUSE THEY WANT TO GET IT TO ESHKOL WELL BEFORE
CABINET MEETING.

A DRAFT FOR KOSYGIN IS BEING FORMULATED AND WILL COME ALONG
-- IN A LITTLE WHILE.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I HAVE JUST THIS AFTERNOON RECEIVED A MOST IMPORTANT
MESSAGE FROM MR. KOSYGIN. I AM SHARING ITS CONTENTS WITH
YOU ON A PERSONAL AND INTIMATE BASIS. IT SHOULD UNDER NO
CIRCUMSTANCES BECOME PUBLIC.

MR. KOSYGIN TELLS ME THAT HE HAS INFORMATION THAT YOU
ARE PREPARING TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST YOUR ARAB
NEIGHBORS, AND PROVOKE A CONFLICT WHICH WOULD BE FRAUGHT
WITH GREAT CONSEQUENCES. HE EMPHASIZES HIS COMMITMENT TO
RESTRAINT ON ALL SIDES AND THE SOVIET VIEW THAT SOLUTIONS
MUST BE FOUND WITHOUT A MILITARY CONFLICT. HE TELLS US THAT
HE KNOWS THAT THE ARABS DO NOT WISH A MILITARY CONFLICT.
HE ADDS, HOWEVER, THAT IF ISRAEL BEGINS MILITARY ACTION,
THE SOVIETS WILL GIVE AID TO THE COUNTRIES ATTACKED. HE
HAS ASKED ME TO TAKE ALL MEASURES TO INSURE THAT THERE BE
NO MILITARY CONFLICT, AND STATES THAT HE WILL UNDERTAKE
MEASURES IN THE SAME DIRECTION.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-166

By is, NARA Date 1-7-00

REPROX FROM QUOTE COPY

MR. EBAN WILL BE REPORTING TO YOU FULLY ON MY TALK WITH HIM AND ON OUR INTEREST IN THE SAFETY AND VITAL CONCERNS OF ISRAEL.

AS YOUR FRIEND, I REPEAT EVEN MORE STRONGLY WHAT I SAID YESTERDAY TO MR. EBAN. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ISRAEL NOT TAKE ANY PREEMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION AND THEREBY MAKE ITSELF RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INITIATION OF HOSTILITIES.

PREEMPTIVE ACTIONS BY ISRAEL WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL TO STAND AT YOUR SIDE.

IN MY REPLY TO MR. KOSYGIN I SHALL OF COURSE TAKE UP YOUR AND OUR COMMON VIEWS ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE STRAITS OF AQABA.

YOURS FAITHFULLY,

DTG: 272132Z MAY 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~

GPS: 390 IMI 390

APPROX FROM QUICK COPY