

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-166

By is, NARA Date 1-7-00

SENT
WHCA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VZCZCEEA034
CO WTE10
DE WTE 1046

MAY 27 21 58

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67454

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 27, 1967

ED RITCHIE CALLED AND DISCUSSED AT LENGTH THE PROBLEM
RAISED IN U.S. - CANADIAN RELATIONS BY THE PRESS LEAKS;
PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION OF YOUR VIEWS; ETC.

HE SAID HE IS DEEPLY DISTURBED BECAUSE LITERALLY IN
THE NEXT DAYS THE CLOSEST AND MOST CONFIDENT COLLABORATION
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT MAKE
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

HE IS ANXIOUS TO FIND A WAY FOR YOU TO INDICATE THAT
THE INCIDENT IS PASSED AND YOU ARE READY TO DO NORMAL BUS-
INESS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

HE LATER DECIDED TO PUT HIS SIDE OF THE CONVERSATION IN
A PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL LETTER TO ME, WHICH FOLLOWS.

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 27, 1967

WALT:

HERE IS A RECAP OF MY SIDE OF OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
THIS MORNING IN CASE IT MAY BE OF ANY USE TO YOU:

1. NEITHER OF THEM CAN REALLY AFFORD TO LEAVE THINGS
WHERE THEY NOW ARE. IT WOULD BE A PITY TO LOSE
ANY OF THE VALUE OF THE GOOD TALK WHICH THEY HAD
AT HARRINGTON LAKE. IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY IF
ANYTHING WERE TO STAND IN THE WAY OF FULLY EFFECTIVE
COLLABORATION BETWEEN THEM. THERE MAY NOT BE MUCH
TIME TO TRY TO SET THINGS STRAIGHT.

- THE PRESS IS BEGINNING TO DETECT SOME
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM AS EVIDENCED
BY STORIES IN THE PAPER THIS MORNING.
- THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER
MAY HAVE TO COLLABORATE VERY SOON, EVEN
BEFORE THIS WEEKEND IS OUT.

REPROX FROM QUICK COPY

2. SO FAR AS THE RECORD IS CONCERNED

(A) WE WERE NOT THE ONES WHO MADE THE VISIT SO RUSHED THAT SOME LOOSE ENDS WERE INEVITABLY LEFT WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO MISUNDERSTANDING. THE UNAVOIDABLE RUSHED NATURE OF THE VISIT ALSO MEANT THAT PRESS ARRANGEMENTS WERE LESS THAN IDEAL AND IN PARTICULAR THAT THERE WAS LITTLE TIME TO PREPARE ANY JOINT COMMUNIQUE.

(B) ON THE NIGHT BEFORE THE VISIT

- THE FIRST LEAK DID NOT COME FROM US. (APART FROM ANYTHING ELSE WE KNEW NOTHING OF THE HELICOPTERS MENTIONED IN THAT FIRST STORY.)

- WHEN A STORY APPEARED WHICH YOU THOUGHT SHOULD BE QUALIFIED BY SOME INDICATION FROM US THAT THE VISIT WAS NOT DEFINITE

- WE GOT IN TOUCH WITH UPI AND OTHER BUREAUS. THIS WAS NOT WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE EMBARRASSMENT FOR US SINCE THE PRESS WERE BOUND TO THINK THE NEXT DAY THAT WE HAD MISLED THEM WHEN THEY WERE SUMMONED HASTILY TO GET TO THE AIRPORT.

- DURING THE NIGHT WE GOT A MESSAGE BACK TO THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM FOR YOU AND THE PRESIDENT.

(C) AFTER THE VISIT, WHEN THE FIRST TROUBLESOME STORY CAME OUT ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S ALLEGED INTENTION TO PROPOSE A QUADRIPARTITE MEETING, THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE ISSUED A DENIAL WHICH, I UNDERSTAND, WAS CHECKED OUT WITH THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE. (EVEN THE FIRST STORIES OUT OF OTTAWA EMPHASIZED THAT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE.)

(D) IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE HE ANSWERED QUESTIONS AND HE SEEMED TO ME TO CONFINE HIMSELF PRETTY WELL TO EITHER WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID PUBLICLY A FEW DAYS BEFORE (RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE) OR WHAT SEEMED MOST NATURAL IN THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION (U.N. ASPECT). (WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER SPOKE ABOUT "AGREEMENT" HE SEEMS PRETTY CLEARLY TO HAVE MEANT SIMPLY AGREEMENT OF VIEWS AND NOT OF COURSE ANY FORMAL AGREEMENT.)

3. IT MIGHT BE HOPED THAT IN VIEW OF ALL THAT'S INVOLVED THE PRESIDENT MIGHT FIND THAT AFTER READING THE ACTUAL TEXT OF THE EXCHANGE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THINGS NOW LOOK RATHER DIFFERENT.

ED RITCHIE

SINCE THE CANADIANS MAY BE KEY AT BOTH THE UN AND IN THE MARITIME BUSINESS, YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER A CALL TO HIM AT SOME STAGE, SIMPLY ASKING HIS VIEWS ON WHAT'S GOING ON IN NEW YORK -- OR WHATEVER.

DTG: 2-2053ZZ MAY 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GPS: 840 IM 840

REFROM QUICK COPY

SENT
WHCA

~~SECRET~~

VZCZCEEA033 /
CO WTE10
DE WTE 1245

1967 MAY 27 21 29

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67453

~~SECRET~~

MAY 27, 1967

187 MAY 27 PM 5:30

SATURDAY

HEREWITH TWO SITUATIONS OF WHICH YOU SHOULD BE AWARE
AND WHICH MAY REQUIRE YOUR DECISION IN THE TIME AHEAD.

1. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT BUNCHE AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL, AT
SECRETARIAT INITIATIVE, WILL:

--ASCERTAIN AS MATTER OF FACT THAT NO ISRAELI FLAG SHIPS
ARE EXPECTED IN THE GULF FOR THREE WEEKS;

--ON THE BASIS OF THAT INFORMATION, THEY WILL ASK THE
UAR TO AGREE THAT ALL OTHER VESSELS SHOULD CONTINUE TO
TRANSIT THE GULF, EXCEPT WHEN CARRYING "STRATEGIC MATERIALS."
IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THAT WOULD INCLUDE TANKERS.

THERE IS SOME PRESSURE, IN NEW YORK, THAT A QUICK DEAL
BE MADE WITH EGYPT THAT ALL SHIPS, EXCEPT THOSE WITH ISRAELI
FLAGS, BE PERMITTED TO TRANSIT THE GULF. SEC. RUSK OPPOSED
THIS IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR CLEAR STATEMENTS TO EBAN LAST
NIGHT. IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT THIS
SECOND-CLASS-CITIZEN STATUS IN THE GULF. THE SECRETARIAT
PROPOSAL DOES NOT REPEAT NOT INVOLVE THAT PRINCIPLE;
ALTHOUGH ISRAELIS MAY WELL FEAR THREE WEEKS MORATORIUM
COULD STRETCH INTO DE FACTO SETTLEMENT.

2. A U.S. VESSEL, THE USS GREEN ISLAND, LOADED WITH ARMS FOR
JORDAN, WAS HEADING FOR THE GULF AND THE JORDANIAN
PORT OF AQABA.

IT HAS NOW BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SIT QUIETLY IN THE WATER UNTIL YOU HAVE AVAILABLE TO YOU THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, WHICH ARE BEING ORGANIZED. THE FACT THAT WE WOULD BE MAKING A TEST WITHOUT PREPARATION AND THAT IS CARGO IS, IN PART, ARMS FOR JORDAN LEAD SOME TO ARGUE AGAINST ITS PROCEEDING AT THIS TIME.

OUR AMBASSADOR IN JORDAN RECOMMENDS THAT THE CARGO COME THROUGH, BECAUSE OF THE ADVERSE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT ON THE JORDANIANS OF NOT PRECEEDING.

THE ARAB RADIO IS NOW TRUMPETING THAT WE HAVE DIVERTED THE SHIP BECAUSE IT IS CARRYING ARMS FOR THE JORDANIANS.

EO 17958
3A(DIC)-75Yrs
(C)

4. THE UAR NOW REQUESTS SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TONIGHT ON "ISRAELI AGGRESSIVE POLICY" WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT TAKE PLACE.

5. ACHESON AND BLACK ARE NOW WORKING ON THEIR MEMORANDA.

6. TASK FORCE AT WORK AS DIRECTED. DUTCH FIRST ABOARD WITH BOTH SUPPORT FOR MARITIME DECLARATIONS AND SHIPS REPEAT SHIPS.

DTG: 272233Z MAY 67

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

73

~~TOP SECRET~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

VZCZCEEA031

OO VTE10

DE VTE 1041

1967 MAY 27 20 35

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67A50

81 MAY 27 PM 4:43
SATURDAY

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

HEREWITH THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION AT ABOUT MID-DAY.

1. U THANT'S REPORT, ISSUED IN NEW YORK THIS MORNING, IS ESSENTIALLY AN APPEAL FOR A BREATHING SPELL, DURING WHICH VARIOUS MOVES TO EASE THE BASIC SITUATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED. INITIAL PRESS REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT MOST OF HIS PROPOSALS ENVISAGE THE REVIVAL OF IDEAS OR UN MECHANISMS THAT FAILED PREVIOUSLY. NONE OF THIS WILL BE RECEIVED WITH MUCH INTEREST BY THE ISRAELIS. AS FOR THE EGYPTIANS, U THANT SAID HE HAD BEEN ASSURED BY NASIR AND FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD THAT THE UAR "WOULD NOT INITIATE OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL."

2. THE ARABS ARE TRYING TO EXPLOIT DE GAULLE'S POSITION IN THE CRISIS.

3. ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN, IN PARIS EN ROUTE BACK TO ISRAEL, IS REPORTED BY THE PRESS TO HAVE SAID HE RECEIVED STRONG SUPPORT FROM THE US GOVERNMENT FOR FREE ACCESS TO THE STRAIT OF TIRAN.

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 04-51

By us, NARA, Date 11-30-04

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

4.

IT IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE SHIP IN QUESTION WAS IN FACT HEADING FOR THE GULF OF AQABA OR THE GULF OF SUEZ. NO LIBERIAN FLAG SHIPS WERE SCHEDULED TO APPEAR IN THE GULF OF AQABA AT THIS TIME. TWO WEST GERMAN SHIPS WHICH THE EGYPTIANS CLAIM TO HAVE INSPECTED WERE HANDLED AT SUEZ RATHER THAN TIRAN.

5. THERE HAVE BEEN NO MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS WHICH WOULD ALTER THE FINDINGS OF THE 26 MAY SPECIAL REPORT OF THE WATCH COMMITTEE. SPECIFICALLY, THERE IS NO NEW INFORMATION WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT EGYPT INTENDS TO ATTACK. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ISRAELI POSITION IS NOT KNOWN TO HAVE CHANGED, AND THE ISRAELIS COULD ATTACK WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING IF THEY DECIDE TO DO SO.

6.

7.

DTG: 271930Z MAY 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

VZCZCEEA030
CO WTE10
DE WTE 1043

~~SECRET~~

SENT
WHCA

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67452

1967 MAY 27 20 26

~~SECRET~~

MAY 27, 1967

87 MAY 27 PM 4:42

SATURDAY

HERE WITH GOLDBERG EXPRESSES SOME SENSE OF PAIN ABOUT
TOMORROW'S CABINET MEETING. DISCUSSIONS ARE GOING FORWARD IN
NEW YORK TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE RECOMMENDED SECURITY COUNCIL
MEETING CAN TAKE PLACE TODAY.

~~SECRET~~ USUN 5495

FOR SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT

AS INDICATED TELEPHONICALLY, I WISH RECORD TO SHOW
I FEAR ISRAELIS LIKELY MAKE DECISION THIS WEEKEND TO
STRIKE. MAIN HOPE I SEE OF AVOIDING SUCH DECISION IS FOR
IMMEDIATE INTERIM ACTION WHICH WILL BUY TIME. IT WAS FOR
THIS REASON I HAVE SUGGESTED TELEPHONICALLY CERTAIN STEPS
BE PUT IN TRAIN TO URGE ADDITIONAL RESTRAINT ON PARTIES
CONCERNED.

IT IS ALSO FOR THIS PURPOSE THAT I HAVE PROPOSED
IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS AND THE SYG
IN HOPE OF GETTING RAPID SC ACTION ON BRIEF RES SUPPORTING SYG'S
APPEAL TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED TO EXERCISE SPECIAL RESTRAINT,
TO FOREGO BELLIGERINCE AND TO AVOID ALL OTHER ACTIONS WHICH
COULD INCREASE TENSION.

GOLDBERG

~~SECRET~~

DTG 271930Z MAY 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-522
By ing, NARA, Date 3-2-93

PRESERVATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VZCZCEAA030
PP WTE10
DE WTE 1039

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67448

1967 MAY 27 20 21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 27, 1967

67 MAY 27 PM 4:19

SATURDAY

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

ATTACHED IS A SUGGESTED REPLY TO PRIME MINISTER HOLT
IN ANSWER TO HIS LETTER TO YOU OF MAY 24 CONCERNING PLANS TO
VISIT YOU AT THE RANCH ON HIS RETURN FROM LONDON.

IF YOU APPROVE THE LETTER, WHICH WE WOULD PROPOSE TO SEND
BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM, YOU MAY WISH TO AUTHORIZE A SPECIAL PLANE
TO FLY THE PRIME MINISTER FROM NEW YORK TO THE RANCH ON JUNE 17
AND FROM THE RANCH TO LOS ANGELES AT THE END OF THE VISIT.

W.W. ROSTOW

APPROVE LETTER-----
DISAPPROVE LETTER-----
APPROVE PLANE-----
DISAPPROVE PLANE-----
SEE ME-----

SUGGESTED REPLY

DEAR HAROLD:

THE PLANS YOU OUTLINED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME OF MAY 24
REGARDING YOUR VISIT TO THE RANCH OVER THE WEEKEND OF JUNE 17-
18 SOUND VERY GOOD. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO THE OCCASION,
AND WE CAN TALK ABOUT IT IN GREATER DETAIL NEXT THURSDAY
WHEN YOU ARE HERE.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR KIND COMMENTS ABOUT THE
KENNEDY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS. I AM SURE THE AGREEMENT WILL
PROVE TO BE TO THE BENEFIT OF ALL.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE RIGHT HONORABLE,
HAROLD E. HOLT,
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA,
CANBERRA.

PRESERVATION COPY

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

24TH MAY, 1967

DEAR LYNDON,

I APPRECIATE VERY MUCH THE ARRANGEMENTS YOU AND YOUR PEOPLE ARE MAKING FOR MY VISIT NEXT WEEK. I HAD WORD THROUGH KEITH WALLER, AND ALSO ED CLARK, THAT YOU HAD INVITED ME TO THE RANCH DURING THIS COMING WEEK. AS NO DOUBT ED HAS TOLD YOU THIS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT CANCELLATION OF LOS ANGELES FUNCTIONS PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED, INCLUDING A SPEECH TO THE LOS ANGELES WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL AT WHICH I HOPE TO SAY SOMETHING HELPFUL TO OUR COMMON CAUSE IN VIETNAM. I HAVE GATHERED FROM ED THAT YOU WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE US AT THE RANCH OVER THE WEEKEND OF OUR RETURN JOURNEY. THIS WOULD BE IN THE WEEKEND OF 17TH/18TH JUNE. ON THIS ASSUMPTION, I AM ARRANGING OUR ITINERARY SO THAT WHEN WE LEAVE LONDON ON 17TH JUNE, WE WILL FLY TO NEW YORK AND CONTINUE ON TO TEXAS SO AS TO ARRIVE AT THE RANCH LATER THAT DAY AND, IF CONVENIENT FOR YOU, SPEND THE SUNDAY WITH YOU, LEAVING FOR LOS ANGELES ON THE MONDAY MORNING. IF ANYTHING TURNS UP WHICH REQUIRES YOU TO BE ELSEWHERE, I WILL, OF COURSE, FULLY UNDERSTAND.

I CERTAINLY HOPE THAT THE VISIT WILL EVENTUATE. I MUST SAY A WORD OF APPRECIATION TO YOU, ALSO, ABOUT THE KENNEDY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS. TAKING THE RESULTS AS A WHOLE, THERE ARE GROUNDS FOR SOME SATISFACTION, BUT ALSO ONE OR TWO ASPECTS WHICH CAN OPERATE ADVERSELY. BUT THE MATTER WHICH MOST CONCERNED US AT THE TIME WAS THE STATE OF THE WHEAT NEGOTIATIONS. TOWARDS THE END, I SENT A PERSONAL MESSAGE THROUGH YOUR EMBASSY HERE ON THE "BASING POINTS" ELEMENT WHICH WAS LITERALLY A BREAKING POINT FOR US. WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAIL, WE REQUIRED TO BE MET ON BASING POINTS SO AS TO MAINTAIN OUR COMPETITIVE POSITION IN ASIA AND IN THIS AREA OF THE WORLD GENERALLY. WITHOUT A REASONABLE ARRANGEMENT ON THIS PARTICULAR MATTER, WE JUST COULD NOT HAVE SIGNED. MY COLLEAGUE, JOHN MCEWEN, REPORTED TO ME FROM GENEVA THAT UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT BY YOUR PEOPLE IN THE VERY LAST STAGES HELPED TO RESOLVE THIS IN A MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO US. I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU PERSONALLY FOR THIS

MY WARM REGARDS.

HAROLD

DTG 271851Z MAY 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~SENT
WHCA

1967 MAY 27 20 11

VZCZCEEA028
OG WTE10
DE WTE 1044FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67449~~SECRET~~

MAY 27, 1967

B. K. NEHRU HAS NOW REPORTED THAT THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT AGREES TO PLACE HALF OF ITS REMAINING COMMERCIAL GRAIN ORDERS IN THE US. GENE FEELS THAT IN VIEW OF OUR 50-50 DIVISION OF SHARES IN THE CONSORTIUM, THIS IS A FAIR DEAL FOR US. I WILL BE SENDING YOU A FORMAL MEMO ASKING APPROVAL TO RELEASE OF 1.5 MILLION TONS OF GRAIN WHEN YOU RETURN. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THIS AGREEMENT, WE WOULD LIKE TO AUTHORIZE AGRICULTURE TO BEGIN ISSUING REIMBURSEABLE ADVANCED AND PURCHASE AUTHORIZATIONS FIRST THING MONDAY MORNING. INDIAN SUPPLIES ARE GETTING TIGHT AND IT WILL BE SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE WE CAN WRAP UP THE NECESSARY PL480 AGREEMENT IN DELHI. SINCE IT IS IN OUR INTEREST AS WELL AS THEIRS TO MOVE GRAIN, I RECOMMEND THIS INTERIM MOVE TO GET THE INDIANS INTO THE MARKET.

APPROVE-----

CALL ME-----

DTG: 271931 MAY 67

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr 3-13-78, NSC 11-30-78By sg/lp, NARA, Date 5-17-91

XEROX FROM QUOTE COPY

SATURDAY

87 MAY 27 PM 4 18

SENT
WHCA

77

1967 MAY 27 20 03

VZCZCEEA326
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1038

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70278

UNCLAS

MAY 27, 1967

HEREWITH U THANT'S REPORT. AN EVALUATION WILL BE SENT
LATER THIS AFTERNOON.

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. IN MY REPORT OF 19 MAY 1967 (S/7896), WHICH I
SUBMITTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOLLOWING THE RECEIPT
ON 18 MAY 1967 OF THE OFFICIAL REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE
UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF), I DESCRIBED THE
GENERAL SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST AT PRESENT AS "MORE
DISTURBING, INDEED ... MORE MENACING, THAN AT ANY TIME
SINCE THE FALL OF 1956". I CAN ONLY REITERATE THIS
ASSESSMENT.

2. IT HAS BEEN ALLEGED IN SOME QUARTERS THAT THE
PROMPT COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUEST FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF
THE FORCE IS A PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE PRESENT CRISIS IN THE
NEAR EAST. THIS IGNORES THE FACT THAT THE UNDERLYING BASIS
FOR THIS AND OTHER CRISIS SITUATIONS IN THE NEAR EAST IS
THE CONTINUING ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT WHICH HAS BEEN PRESENT
ALL ALONG, AND OF WHICH THE CRISIS SITUATION CREATED BY
THE UNEXPECTED REQUEST FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF IS THE
LATEST EXPRESSION. IN MY SPECIAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY (A/6669), IN PARAGRAPH 12, I GAVE THE MAIN
REASONS FOR THE POSITION THAT I HAVE TAKEN ON THIS
ISSUE. IN MY REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 19 MAY
1967 (S/7896), I RESTATED THE BASIS FOR MY DECISION AND
POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS A "WIDESPREAD MISUNDERSTANDING
ABOUT THE NATURE OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPER-
ATIONS IN GENERAL AND UNEF IN PARTICULAR". IN VIEW OF THE
EVIDENT PERSISTENCE OF THIS MISUNDERSTANDING AND OF VARIOUS
RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY SOME RESPONSIBLE LEADERS,
I FEEL OBLIGED ONCE AGAIN, BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH MY
REPORT, TO RESTATE BRIEFLY THE GROUNDS FOR THE POSITION
WHICH I HAVE TAKEN ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF.

PRESERVATION COPY

87 MAY 27 PM 4:14

SATURDAY

3. UNEF WAS INTRODUCED INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC ON THE BASIS OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PRESIDENT OF EGYPT. THE CONSENT OF THE HOST COUNTRY, IN THIS AS IN OTHER PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS, WAS THE BASIS FOR ITS PRESENCE ON THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC. WHEN THAT CONSENT WAS WITHDRAWN, THE ESSENTIAL PART OF THE BASIS OF UNEF'S PRESENCE CEASED TO EXIST.

4. AS STATED IN MY SPECIAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (A/6669), I CONSULTED WITH THE UNEF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 13 MAY 1967. THE COMMITTEE DID NOT MOVE, AS IT WAS ITS RIGHT TO DO UNDER THE TERMS OF PARAGRAPH 9 OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1001 (ES-I), TO REQUEST THE CONVENING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE SITUATION WHICH HAD ARISEN. IT WAS AFTER THIS MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, ON THE EVENING OF 13 MAY, THAT I TRANSMITTED MY REPLY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC CONCERNING THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF.

5. MY DECISION IN THIS MATTER WAS BASED UPON BOTH LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. IT IS A PRACTICAL FACT THAT NEITHER UNEF NOR ANY OTHER UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION COULD FUNCTION OR EVEN EXIST WITHOUT THE CONTINUING CONSENT AND COOPERATION OF THE HOST COUNTRY. ONCE THE CONSENT OF THE HOST COUNTRY WAS WITHDRAWN AND IT WAS NO LONGER WELCOME, ITS USEFULNESS WAS ENDED. IN FACT, THE MOVEMENT OF UAR FORCES UP TO THE LINE IN SINAI EVEN BEFORE THE REQUEST FOR WITHDRAWAL WAS RECEIVED BY ME HAD ALREADY MADE THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF UNEF IMPOSSIBLE. I MAY SAY THAT THE REQUEST RECEIVED BY ME ON 13 MAY WAS THE ONLY REQUEST RECEIVED FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, SINCE THE CRYPTIC LETTER TO MAJOR-GENERAL RIKHYE FROM GENERAL FAWZI ON 16 MAY WAS BOTH UNCLEAR AND UNACCEPTABLE. FURTHERMORE, I HAD VERY GOOD REASON TO BE CONVINCED OF THE EARNESTNESS AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC IN REQUESTING THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF. IT WAS THEREFORE OBVIOUS TO ME THAT THE POSITION OF THE PERSONNEL OF UNEF WOULD SOON BECOME EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, AND EVEN DANGEROUS, IF THE DECISION FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCE WAS DELAYED, WHILE THE POSSIBILITY FOR ITS EFFECTIVE ACTION HAD ALREADY BEEN VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED. MOREOVER, IF THE REQUEST WERE NOT PROMPTLY COMPLIED WITH, THE FORCE WOULD QUICKLY DISINTEGRATE DUE TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF INDIVIDUAL CONTINGENTS.

6. IT MAY BE RELEVANT TO NOTE HERE THAT UNEF FUNCTIONED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC SIDE OF THE LINE IN A ZONE FROM WHICH THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC HAD VOLUNTARILY STAYED AWAY FOR OVER TEN YEARS. IT WAS THIS ARRANGEMENT WHICH ALLOWED UNEF TO FUNCTION AS A BUFFER AND AS A RESTRAINT ON INFILTRATION. WHEN THIS ARRANGEMENT LAPSED UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC TROOPS MOVED UP TO THE LINE AS THEY HAD EVERY RIGHT TO DO.

7. IF UNEF HAD BEEN DEPLOYED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE LINE AS ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED IN PURSUANCE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION, ITS BUFFER FUNCTION WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE ENDED. HOWEVER, ITS PRESENCE ON THE ISRAEL SIDE OF THE LINE HAS NEVER BEEN PERMITTED. THE FACT THAT UNEF WAS NOT STATIONED ON THE ISRAEL SIDE OF THE LINE WAS A RECOGNITION OF THE UNQUESTIONED SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO WITHHOLD ITS CONSENT FOR THE STATIONING OF THE FORCE. THE ACQUIESCENCE IN THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCE AFTER TEN AND A HALF YEARS ON UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC SOIL WAS LIKEWISE A RECOGNITION OF THE SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC. IN NO OFFICIAL DOCUMENT RELATING TO UNEF HAS THERE BEEN ANY SUGGESTION OF A LIMITATION OF THIS SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY.

8. IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, AND ESPECIALLY IN ORDER TO EXAMINE WITH THAT GOVERNMENT THE SITUATION CREATED BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF, I DECIDED TO ADVANCE THE DATE OF A VISIT TO CAIRO WHICH I HAD PLANNED SOME TIME AGO FOR THE BEGINNING OF JULY. I ARRIVED IN CAIRO ON THE AFTERNOON OF 23 MAY AND LEFT CAIRO ON THE EARLY AFTERNOON OF 25 MAY TO RETURN TO UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS.

9. DURING MY STAY IN CAIRO I HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT GAMAL ABDEL NASSER AND MR. MAHMOUD RIAH, THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THEY EXPLAINED TO ME THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, WHICH IS SUBSTANTIALLY AS SET FORTH IN THE SPEECH GIVEN BY PRESIDENT NASSER TO THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AIR FORCE ADVANCE COMMAND ON 22 MAY 1967 WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED FULLY IN THE PRESS. PRESIDENT NASSER AND FOREIGN MINISTER RIAH ASSURED ME THAT THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC WOULD NOT INITIATE OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL. THEIR GENERAL AIM, AS STATED TO ME, WAS FOR A RETURN TO THE CONDITIONS PREVAILING PRIOR TO 1956 AND TO FULL OBSERVANCE BY BOTH PARTIES OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

10. THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC TO RESTRICT SHIPPING THE STRAIT OF TIRAN, OF WHICH I LEARNED WHILE EN ROUTE TO CAIRO, HAS CREATED A NEW SITUATION. FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAIT IS ONE OF THE QUESTIONS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL CONSIDERS MOST VITAL TO HER INTERESTS. THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC IS THAT THE STRAIT IS TERRITORIAL WATERS IN WHICH IT HAS A RIGHT TO CONTROL SHIPPING.

THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL CONTESTS THIS POSITION AND ASSERTS THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAIT. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS FURTHER DECLARED THAT ISRAEL WILL REGARD THE CLOSING OF THE STRAIT OF TIRAN TO ISRAEL FLAGSHIPS AND ANY RESTRICTION ON CARGOES OF SHIPS OF OTHER FLAGS PROCEEDING TO ISRAEL AS A CASUS BELLI. WHILE IN CAIRO, I CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH COULD ENSUE FROM RESTRICTING INNOCENT PASSAGE OF SHIPS IN THE STRAIT OF TIRAN. I EXPRESSED MY DEEP CONCERN IN THIS REGARD AND MY HOPE THAT NO PRECIPITATE ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN.

11. A LEGAL CONTROVERSY EXISTED PRIOR TO 1956 AS TO THE EXTENT OF THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE BY COMMERCIAL VESSELS THROUGH THE STRAIT OF TIRAN AND THE GULF OF AQABA. SINCE MARCH 1957, WHEN UNEF FORCES WERE STATIONED AT SHARM EL SHEIKH AND RAS HASRANI AT THE MOUTH OF THE GULF OF AQABA, THERE HAS BEEN NO INTERFERENCE WITH SHIPPING IN THE STRAIT OF TIRAN.

12. IT IS NOT MY PURPOSE HERE TO GO INTO THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THIS CONTROVERSY OR TO ENTER INTO THE MERITS OF THE CASE. AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE I FEEL THAT MY MAJOR CONCERN MUST BE TO TRY TO GAIN TIME IN ORDER TO LAY THE BASIS FOR A DETENTE. THE IMPORTANT IMMEDIATE FACT IS THAT, IN VIEW OF THE CONFLICTING STANDS TAKEN BY THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND ISRAEL, THE SITUATION IN THE STRAIT OF TIRAN REPRESENTS A VERY SERIOUS POTENTIAL THREAT TO PEACE. I GREATLY FEAR THAT A CLASH BETWEEN THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND ISRAEL OVER THIS ISSUE, IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WILL INEVITABLY SET OFF A GENERAL CONFLICT IN THE NEAR EAST.

13. THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH THE STRAIT OF TIRAN IS NOT, HOWEVER, THE ONLY IMMEDIATE ISSUE WHICH IS ENDANGERING PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST. OTHER PROBLEMS, SUCH AS SABOTAGE AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND RIGHTS OF CULTIVATION IN DISPUTED AREAS IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, WILL, UNLESS CONTROLLED, ALMOST SURELY LEAD TO FURTHER SERIOUS FIGHTING.

14. IN MY VIEW, A PEACEFUL OUTCOME TO THE PRESENT CRISIS WILL DEPEND UPON A BREATHING SPELL WHICH WILL ALLOW TENSION TO SUBSIDE FROM ITS PRESENT EXPLOSIVE LEVEL. I THEREFORE URGE ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO EXERCISE SPECIAL RESTRAINT, TO FOREGO BELLIGERENCE AND TO AVOID ALL OTHER ACTIONS WHICH COULD INCREASE TENSION, TO ALLOW THE COUNCIL TO DEAL WITH THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE PRESENT CRISIS AND TO SEEK SOLUTIONS.

15. THERE ARE OTHER POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION WHICH MIGHT CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE REDUCTION OF TENSION IN THE AREA. IN PARAGRAPH 16 OF MY REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 19 MAY (S/7896) I REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE EGYPT-ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION (EIMAC) PROVIDING A LIMITED FORM OF UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN THE AREA. IN THAT REPORT I STATED THAT "IT WOULD MOST CERTAINLY BE HELPFUL IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WERE TO RECONSIDER ITS POSITION AND RESUME ITS PARTICIPATION IN EIMAC". I SUGGEST THAT THE COUNCIL CONSIDER THIS APPROACH ALSO DURING ITS SEARCH FOR WAYS

OUT OF THE PRESENT CRISIS. THIS FORM OF UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE COULD TO SOME EXTENT FILL THE VACUUM LEFT BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF.

16. IN PARAGRAPH 17 OF MY PREVIOUS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL I ALSO SUGGESTED THAT "IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF QUIET ALONG THE ISRAEL-SYRIA LINE IF THE TWO PARTIES WOULD RESUME THEIR PARTICIPATION IN ISMAC, BOTH IN THE CURRENT EMERGENCY SESSION AND IN THE REGULAR SESSIONS", AND I WOULD WISH ON THIS OCCASION TO REPEAT THAT SUGGESTION.

17. IT ALSO WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE COUNCIL TO RECALL THAT, BY ITS RESOLUTION 73 (1949) OF 11 AUGUST 1949, THE COUNCIL FOUND THAT: "...THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT PEACE IN PALESTINE..." AND REAFFIRMED: "...THE ORDER CONTAINED IN ITS RESOLUTION 54 (1948) TO THE GOVERNMENTS AND AUTHORITIES CONCERNED, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 40 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, TO OBSERVE AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASE-FIRE AND, BEARING IN MIND THAT THE SEVERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS INCLUDE FIRM PLEDGES AGAINST FURTHER ACTS OF HOSTILITY BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND ALSO PROVIDE FOR THEIR SUPERVISION BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES, RELIES UPON THE PARTIES TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED APPLICATION AND OBSERVANCE OF THESE AGREEMENTS..."

18. IN MY DISCUSSION WITH OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND ISRAEL I HAVE MENTIONED POSSIBLE STEPS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN BY MUTUAL CONSENT AND WHICH WOULD HELP TO REDUCE TENSION. I SHALL OF COURSE CONTINUE TO MAKE ALL POSSIBLE EFFORTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT CRISIS. THE PROBLEMS TO BE FACED ARE COMPLEX AND THE OBSTACLES ARE FORMIDABLE. I DO NOT BELIEVE HOWEVER THAT WE CAN ALLOW OURSELVES TO DESPAIR.

19. IT SHOULD BE KEPT ALWAYS IN MIND THAT IN SPITE OF THE EXTREME DIFFICULTIES OF THE SITUATION, THE UNITED NATIONS HAS PLAYED AN ESSENTIAL AND IMPORTANT ROLE FOR MORE THAN EIGHTEEN YEARS IN MAINTAINING AT LEAST SOME MEASURES OF PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST. IN THAT TASK IT HAS ENCOUNTERED MANY SETBACKS, FRUSTRATIONS, CRISES, CONFLICTS AND EVEN WAR, BUT THE EFFORT CONTINUES UNABATED. WE ARE NOW CONFRONTED WITH NEW AND THREATENING CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT I STILL BELIEVE THAT WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN PARTICULAR, MUST CONTINUE TO SEEK, AND EVENTUALLY FIND, REASONABLE, PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTIONS.

DTG 27/1743Z MAY 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

78
Pres file
Saturday, May 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested Reply to Prime Minister Holt Concerning
Ranch Visit

Attached is a suggested reply to Prime Minister Holt (Tab A) in answer to his letter to you of May 24 (Tab B) concerning plans to visit with you at the Ranch on his return from London.

If you approve the letter, which we would propose to send by immediate telegram, you may wish to authorize a special plane to fly the Prime Minister from New York to the Ranch on June 17 and from the Ranch to Los Angeles at the end of the visit.

W. W. Rostow

Approve letter ✓

5/27/67

Disapprove letter _____

Approve plane _____

Disapprove plane _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-1-99

AJ:mmm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

78a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-1-99

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Harold:

The plans you outlined in your letter to me of May 24 regarding your visit to the ranch over the weekend of June 17-18 sound very good. I am looking forward to the occasion, and we can talk about it in greater detail next Thursday when you are here.

Thank you very much for your kind comments about the Kennedy Round negotiations. I am sure the agreement will prove to be to the benefit of all.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

The Right Honorable,
Harold E. Holt,
Prime Minister of Australia,
Canberra.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



AUS ALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

786

24th May, 1967

9102

DECLASSIFIED - NL 999-166
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju/i NARA, Date 12-11-99

Dear Lyndon,

I appreciate very much the arrangements you and your people are making for my visit next week. I had word through Keith Waller, and also Ed Clark, that you had invited me to the Ranch during this coming week. As no doubt Ed has told you this would not have been possible without cancellation of Los Angeles functions previously arranged, including a speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council at which I hope to say something helpful to our common cause in Vietnam. I have gathered from Ed that you would be glad to have us at the Ranch over the weekend of our return journey. This would be in the weekend of 17th/18th June. On this assumption, I am arranging our itinerary so that when we leave London on 17th June, we will fly to New York and continue on to Texas so as to arrive at the Ranch later that day and, if convenient for you, spend the Sunday with you, leaving for Los Angeles on the Monday morning. If anything turns up which requires you to be elsewhere, I will, of course, fully understand.

I certainly hope that the visit will eventuate.

I must say a word of appreciation to you, also, about the Kennedy Round negotiations. Taking the results as a whole, there are grounds for some satisfaction, but also one or two aspects which can operate adversely. But the matter which most concerned us at the time was the state of the wheat negotiations. Towards the end, I sent a personal message through your Embassy here on the "basing points" element which was literally a breaking point for us.

Without going into detail, we required to be met on basing points so as to maintain our competitive position in Asia and in this area of the world generally. Without a reasonable arrangement on this particular matter, we just could not have signed. My colleague, John McEwen, reported to me from Geneva that understanding and support by your people in the very last stages helped to resolve this in a manner acceptable to us. I would like to thank you personally for this.

My warm regards.

Harold

DECLASSIFIED

Pres file

SECRET

Friday, May 26, 1967
10:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here is the report of the Chicom
border penetration you requested
earlier today.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By W per DCJ NARA, Date 9-25-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, May 26, 1967
7:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO: Jim Jones

There is little question this is the group to see if the President is going to see any group from the Jewish community.

The risks of seeing anyone are: (a) that the President will be pressed to say more than he can honestly say at this point; (b) that they will therefore go away more dissatisfied than if they hadn't come; and (c) that the President will be misquoted after the meeting. These are serious domestic and foreign policy risks.

It is possible that simply hearing firsthand how concerned and deeply involved the President is would in itself be reassuring -- no matter what we can or can't say.

I believe the President, after seeing Foreign Minister Eban, will have a better feel for how convincing he can make our position sound.

I personally would rather not have to talk with anyone until we know better where we're going, but this is a judgment only he can make.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment: cy of telegram from Dr. Joachim Prinz

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESSING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 11652,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAY 10, 1963.

BY RG ON 5-21-91

8/20

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR
WALT ROSTOW:

Walt, may I have your recommendation on the attached request for an appointment with the President.

Both John Roche and Jake Jacobsen have told me that this conference is the most important group among the Jewish community and if we were to see anyone, this would be the group to see.

I will await your recommendation before presenting anything to the President for Night Reading.


James R. Jones

Attachment

806

1967 MAY 23 10 20

WA1486 PD

NMC NEW YORK NY MAY 23 732P EDT

JAMES JONES, APPOINTMENT SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS
REPRESENTING AT LEAST 95-0/0 OF ORGANIZED JEWISH COMMUNITY
OF THE UNITED STATES URGENTLY REQUESTS PRIVILEGE OF PRIVATE
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO DISCUSS GRAVE CRISIS IN
MIDEAST. MEETING WOULD ALLAY DEEP ANXIETY AND APPREHENSION
OF AMERICAN JEWRY. GROUP WOULD CONSIST OF HALF A DOZEN

PRESIDENTS OF NATIONAL JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS. WILL SEND YOU
NAMES OF DELEGATION TOMORROW

OR JOACHIM PRINZ PRESIDENT CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR
JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS.

PRESERVATION COPY

Friday, May 26, 1967
7:00 p.m.

SANTIZED
E.O. 12958; Sec. 3.6
NLJ / RAC 99-91
By Cb, NARA Date 10-19-00

1. ~~page~~
2. ~~page~~
81

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is another fellow -- the leader of the
Palestinian liberation organization -- who
thinks it's U. S. wheat that Nasser is after.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment



1.3(a)(4)
(c)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 26, 1967
5:40 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

These cables are interesting and,
on the whole, hopeful about the complex
political process in Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 26779
Saigon 26790

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Ray, NARA, Date 5-14-91

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

82a
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-520

Friday, May 26, 1967

By ju, NARA, Date 4-30-92

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon, 26779)

Bui Diem spent three hours the afternoon of May 25 with General Thieu and then had supper with Ky. The following are the impressions he gave us after these talks.

Thieu described in great detail the entire history of what had happened as seen by him. He said the difficulty had its origin in the meeting among the generals on March 31, which he had described to Ambassador Lodge. He had interpreted that meeting as indicating general support for his candidacy, whereas, according to Bui Diem, the other generals were trying in a polite way to let Thieu know they were not supporting him. Diem concluded it had all been to subtle and to Vietnamese and the result was a very basic misunderstanding among all concerned. Thieu said that Thong's subsequent visit on April 18 to inform him of the generals' support for Ky, came as a complete shock and surprise to him.

Diem believes Thieu is now deeply bitter and feels isolated and without support. (Diem said only General P. X. Chieu and General Dang Van Quang remain close to him.) Thieu told Diem he did not believe he could win the Presidency but his personal prestige gave him no alternative but to stay in the race. He described to Diem his meeting with General Westmoreland on May 7 and expressed doubt that the other generals would in any case accept him as Chief of JGS, since feelings have become so deeply aroused on both sides.

Diem said that Thieu was also bitter about the American press which he felt had sought to find and widen differences among the generals by playing up various off-the-cuff reactions and statements. He told Diem that when he returns to Washington he can reassure the President once more that he (Thieu) is a true Vietnamese patriot and will not permit these differences to split the Armed Forces or the country.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

PRESERVATION COPY

Diem talked later to Ky and the latter told him he was ready to do whatever might be necessary to reassure Thieu of the generals' support for him, including an apology on behalf of all of them if this were called for. According to Diem, Ky considers that the role as head of the Armed Forces is vitally important and he hoped Thieu would come to see it this way.

Diem said that following these two conversations he was persuaded that personal relations between Thieu and Ky were not seriously damaged but he feared this was not the case for relations between Thieu and the other top generals. Diem concluded that there is about a month before a final decision would have to be announced if Thieu is to run for the Presidency and he thought Thieu had not yet really made this decision. He hoped that time and restraint on all sides, particularly with respect to interviews and statements to the press, would perhaps heal the situation sufficiently to allow the principal parties to work out a mutually satisfactory solution. Diem said he counseled Ky not to press the matter unduly and to restrain the other generals from stirring it up unnecessarily. He thought Thieu and Ky could still get together and discuss the question rationally between themselves but this should not be done too quickly and must be done with some framework of a solution in mind.

first class idea W

Diem elaborated somewhat more on his and Ky's belief in the importance of understandings among the chief Presidential candidates to assure broad civilian-military cooperation after the election. Referring to the Huong-Ky talk, Diem said he believed that the final Cabinet selected by the winner should seek to include important positions for candidates running on losing tickets. Diem thought Ky might, in fact, make some statement along these general lines in the near future.

With respect to the Electoral Law and the Constitutional Assembly, Diem said Ky had intervened to prevent the Directorate from taking an unduly hard position in its letter to the Constitutional Assembly about the desired changes in the Law. He had instructed that the letter be phrased in a conciliatory tone and had been busy May 25 seeing key Constitutional Assembly members to prepare the way for it. According to Diem, Ky considered it vital to elicit Constitutional Assembly cooperation and work out an acceptable understanding with them. He was confident that this could be done.

SECRET/EXDIS

Comment: It is evident that Bui Diem has been able to play a useful mediating role and remains one of the few influential persons who can talk frankly and intimately with both Thieu and Ky. His comments and his description of Ky's views on a possible solution clearly indicate Ky's continuing intention to run and to win. If this remains the case, as we believe, Ky will be eager to find a solution for Thieu which is acceptable to him and to the other generals, and which will not split Ky's potential support, both military and civilian.

Diem's remarks about future civilian-military cooperation are encouraging, but a public statement by Ky along these lines will clearly be more in his interest than in those of the civilian candidates. It might also serve to undercut somewhat the effect of any effort by Thieu to throw his weight behind a civilian candidate or join with one.

I believe that we should continue to let the Vietnamese carry the ball in trying to resolve this problem. I am seeing both Thieu and Ky and will get into these matters in a general way, as instructed, but will not seek to intervene directly in terms of a solution unless this should appear necessary at a later date.

SECRET/EXDIS

PRESERVATION COPY

826

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~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-520

By W, NARA, Date 4-30-92

Friday, May 26, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon, 26790)

In the course of a one-hour conversation with General Thieu the morning of May 26, I noted the recent press reports regarding his possible candidacy for President. I said I was sure that he was aware of our concern about not undermining military unity and stability in Vietnam. I referred to the talks which he and General Ky had had with the President at Guam and the assurances that both had given to the President that neither of them would engage in any action which would endanger this unity.

Thieu said that I could reassure the President on this score and then went into a lengthy description of his own view of what had happened, very much along the lines of Bui Diem's account last evening. He reiterated his assurances that he was a true patriot and that he himself would never do anything which would create division within the military or the country. He added that even if he ran he did not believe that he could win, but he did not feel that his running would split the Armed Forces. If he decided to run, it would be out of a sense of responsibility to the country and if he lost, the fact that a presumed loss of face might be involved would not bother him. If the Armed Forces had maintained their integrity, he would return to the service and, if not, he would retire to private life. He said that he supported whole heartedly the statement made by General Vien that the Army should not be involved in the political process and had reiterated to Vien that as Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff it was his responsibility to make this

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

policy stick. Thieu said that he would do everything he could on his part to make this a reality, he intimated some efforts to involve elements of the military had already been made by others. He then said with some emotion, "You can count on me to be a patriot. The people do not want another strongman government. They do not want another Diem. They want a freely elected President and a Congress and they want the Armed Forces to stay out of politics and to support the government."

Thieu said that the electoral law was being returned to the assembly with recommendations. He commented that in addition to all the other elections - village, hamlet, presidential and congressional - the country could not stand another election which a runoff would involve. There were already too many elections in the midst of war. He felt it was important, however, to restore the dates which had originally been proposed by the Directorate and to get the new assembly installed as quickly as possible. He characterized the present assembly as among the poorest elected in Vietnam, that out of 177 members, as a rule only 60 or 70 attended sessions, the rest neglecting their duties but drawing their salaries, and the sooner it was replaced, the better.

COMMENT:

Thieu seemed sincere in his statement but he did not give any indication of what his final decision might be. While it is difficult to judge what Thieu's real views and motives are, his reassurances to me and to Bui Diem give reason to hope that he will not seek to aggravate the feelings that have already been aroused. As I have said, I believe we should continue to observe the situation among the generals closely but not intervene further unless this seems clearly indicated by a deterioration in the situation.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

-3-

I also asked for an appointment to see Ky but he is out of Saigon today and as I shall be in I Corps tomorrow, I may not be able to see him until Sunday or Monday.

BUNKER

SECRET/EXDIS

PRESERVATION COPY

Friday, May 26, 1967 -- 5:30 p.m.

hus file

Mr. President:

You may wish to know that David Ginsburg made the attached suggestion which I promised to "pass along" for staffing.

W. W. Rostow

83c

DAVID GINSBURG
MYER FELDMAN
TYLER ABELL
ALVIN FRIEDMAN
ROBERT M. HAUSMAN
LEE R. MARKS
ROBERT N. MISER
JOHN H. ZENTAY

LIONEL C. EPSTEIN
J. W. ROSENTHAL
COUNSEL

LAW OFFICES
GINSBURG AND FELDMAN
1700 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

TELEPHONE
(202) 223-3800
CABLE ADDRESS
"LEGIS"

May 26, 1967

The Honorable
Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to
the President
The White House

Dear Walt:


A moment ago I called to say that I thought it would be unwise for the U. S. to refrain from exercising its peaceful rights at a time when the UAR is taking hostile action. All possible steps should certainly be taken through the UN but even while the UN is considering the matter the U. S. should not regard itself as immobilized. I suggested the possibility of, say, two merchant ships or tankers, one headed for Elath in Israel and the other for Aqaba in Jordan. The cargo could be food; in the case of Elath oil would be more relevant. The vessels would be unarmed.

You said that you'd pass this along but I fear that you and others have almost certainly thought of this and a good many other approaches. It's hard to know when an idea strikes whether it should be recorded and sent, or aborted on the assumption that others have already given it birth.

I've not seen or spoken with Eban, nor have I spoken about this with anyone in the Israeli Embassy. I don't know therefore what their reaction would be.

Kindest regards.

Sincerely,



David Ginsburg

SECRET

Meeting on the Middle East

Friday, May 26

1:30 pm

Agenda

I. Purpose of meeting (The President)

Before meeting Eban, you wish patiently to walk around the problem of the Middle East in an open-minded way -- to see all the angles, all the elements.

Specifically, you wish to hear:

- an evaluation of the Arab point of view -- or views -- and, especially, Nasser's intentions;
- an evaluation of the Israeli point of view -- and their intentions.

On the basis of these statements, you wish to solicit comments from all sides.

Finally, you wish to hear the recommendations for U. S. policy -- and for talking to Eban -- from the Secretary of State.

II. Nasser and the Arabs (Mr. Battle)

(You may wish to make sure these elements are covered:

- reaction to 1956 defeat and prior real or believed humiliations, and deprivation of Arab rights;
- serious domestic economic and political situation;
- disarray in Arab world and Nasser's desire for prestige, leadership, and overthrow of moderates in Arab world;
- desire to milk U. S. -U. S. S. R. rivalry to maximum, both ways, and deep suspicion of ultimate U. S. intent to get him.)

III. The Israelis (Mr. Sisco)

(Elements to be checked:

- belief that existence is threatened; this is their last chance in history; terrorism can only be stopped by force;
- philosophy of pre-emptive strike due to their geography, and military role of tactical air supremacy over the battlefield;
- consciousness of U. S. past commitments; their leverage over U. S.; and fact that, in the end, we are only power capable of maintaining continued existence of Israel.

DECLASSIFIED

Auth: NL 9 82-168

By Ag/ics, NARA, Date 5-16-91

5/26/67

- fear that balance of political power in U. N. is against them;
- Arab's consolidating military and diplomatic position with every passing day;
- simple question to U. S. : what can you offer right now better than a pre-emptive strike?
- second question: what will U. S. do over the longer term to guarantee Israeli security if the Israelis do not now initiate war and exhaust diplomatic possibilities?

IV. Discussion

You may then wish to go round the table and ask two questions:

- are there any elements in the situation not covered?
- what do you recommend?

V. Summary and Proposed U. S. Course of Action (Sect. Rusk)

You may wish to leave Sect. Rusk free to make his final detailed recommendations to you after the meeting -- in private; but it would be appropriate for him to outline for the group his thoughts in the light of the general exchange.

VI. Conclusion

You might finally thank the group; warn them on the security of the meeting; and ask Sects. Rusk and McNamara -- and, perhaps, the Vice President -- to join you in your office.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 26, 1967
1:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to see how the
message to the UAR Ambassador
was handled last night.

W. W. Rostow

State 202587, May 26, 1967

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 129, NARA, Date 5-14-91

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

202587

DATE: ☐ COLLECT
TO

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

85a

Origin
55
Info

ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO FLASH
" LONDON "
" TEL AVIV "
" MOSCOW "
USUN "

MAY 26 12 43 AM '67

EXDLS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-520

STATE

202587

By ju, NARA, Date 4-30-92

On instructions Undersecretary Rostow called in UAR Ambassador at 10 p.m. to transmit the following message:
QUOTE Your adversaries believe that a surprise attack by UAR from Egypt and Syria is imminent from moment to moment. We know this is unthinkable. We cannot repeat cannot believe the government of the UAR would be so reckless. Such a course would obviously have the most serious possible consequences. Therefore we are continuing to advise restraint on the part of GOI. UNQUOTE. We do not repeat not wish you to follow this up directly, but you must know about the message if the issue is raised.

Rostow explained that we were transmitting this rumor, which we believed and hoped was not true, as a friendly act.

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
M. E. Rostow:emb 5/25/67	5284	M - Eugene V. Rostow

S/S - Mr. Walsh

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FORM DS-321
8-65

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

Ambassador replied that he too believed the rumor to be untrue, but would transmit it immediately as a precautionary measure. He thought our announcement about withdrawing dependents was probably interpreted in the Middle East as a signal that war was coming, and might well be the source of the rumor. He knew that for us such steps were routine in troubled times. But it was probably interpreted otherwise in Cairo.

FYI: The basis of this warning is an urgent report transmitted this afternoon by Foulin Eban to the Secretary. The answer to the Israelis is being considered. President will see him tomorrow. Meanwhile, we felt it indispensable to transmit this warning. End FYI.

~~SECRET~~

END RUSK

GP-3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 26, 1967
12:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to get the flavor
of the perspective of our Embassy
in Cairo.

W. W. Rostow

Cairo 8007
Cairo 8003

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 5-14-91

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-520

By , NARA, Date 4-30-92

Postow

EXDIS

REF: STATE 202589

1. NEITHER I, DCM NOR PARKER SHARE ASSESSMENT THAT UAR WOULD NOT RPT NOT FACE UP TO NAVAL PATROL BY "MARITIME POWERS" SHOULD SUCH DEVICE BE CREATED WHICH WE ALSO DOUBT AS REALISTIC OPTION. HISTORY ABORTIVE SUEZ CANAL USERS ASSOCIATION 1956 SUGGESTIVE.

2. WE BELIEVE UAR WILL MILITARILY CONTEST ANY ATTEMPT BY ANYONE TO BREAK AQABA BLOCKADE UNLESS FACED BY OVERWHELMING MILITARY FORCE AND THAT THEY HAVE LITTLE OR ANYTHING TO LOSE BY SUCH CONFRONTATION. THEY WOULD HAVE SOLID SUPPORT SOVIET BLOC AND ENTIRE AFR-ASIAN WORLD AS WELL AS ALL ARABS. US USE OF FORCE COULD HARDLY FAIL TO INVOLVE USSR ON A SERIOUS LEVEL.

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 8007B ~~SECRET~~ CAIRO

3. ALSO WOULD POINT OUT ISRAEL MISINFORMED IN BELIEF "WORLD PUBLIC OPINION" SUPPORTS VIEW CLOSING OF STRAITS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION. WE BELIEVE BRITISH AND A FEW OTHERS MAY HOLD THIS VIEW BUT WOULD ESTIMATE GREAT MAJORITY IN MEMBERS

4. IT WOULD BE MOST DANGEROUS FOR US AND ISRAELI PROCEED ON WRONG ASSUMPTIONS AT THIS CRITICAL TIME.

5. DEPARTMENT PASS TEL AVIV, LONDON. USUN.

~~NOLTE~~
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Cy Saunders
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-520

By JW, NARA, Date 4-30-92

Roston

EXDIS/NOFORN

REF: AMMAN'S 3775 AND CAIRO'S 7956

1. DCM, PARKER AND I IMPRESSED BY COGENCY OF KING HUSSEIN'S MESSAGE TO US REFTEL (AMMAN'S 3775).
2. WE AGREE THAT OUR EFFORTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARD DISSOCIATION FROM APPEARANCES OF SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL VERSUS ARABS AND STRICTLY TOWARD UAR-ISRAEL CONFRONTATION. WE SHOULD REMAIN NEUTRAL IN THIS CONFRONTATION STEPPING IN ONLY IF HOSTILITIES ERUPT AND THEN AS PEACEMAKER.
3. OTHERWISE, WE FORESEE HEAVY COST TO US IN TERMS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND OTHER RELATIONSHIPS IN ARAB WORLD, AND IT TERMS COLD WAR BALANCE OF POWER. EQUALLY, SEE LITTLE CHANCE VIABLE FUTURE FOR ISRAEL SAVE AS ARMED BEACHHEAD, GUARANTEED

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 8003B ~~SECRET~~
BY US (CAIRO 7956).

4. DEPARTMENT PASS AMMAN, BIEURT, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, TELAVIV.

NOLTE
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~~SECRET NOFORN~~

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PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 26, 1967 -- 12:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to note Amb. Goldberg's views on Sec. Rusk's recommendations for your conversation with Eban. They were conveyed through Joe Sisco.

1. He believes the first sentence of paragraph 3 (p. 4) goes too far. He prefers: "Our intention is to pursue appropriate measures that the Straits and Gulf remain open. . . ."

2. He notes that the timing of the U.K. proposed declaration between Maritime powers in relation to Security Council action is not clear:

-- If it is simply a declaration in support of the innocent right of passage, it could be made concurrently with the Security Council deliberations;

-- If it involves a commitment to enforce the right of innocent passage, it should await Security Council failure to achieve that result.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 8352

By reg/lis, NARA, Date 5-21-91

WWRostow:rlh

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, May 26, 1967, 12:20 P.M.

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Secretary McNamara's Talk with Eban

A quick readout indicates that Eban covered the following points:

1. The U.S. has an unequivocal unilateral commitment to keep open the Gulf of Aqaba. He read from an Eisenhower-Dulles statement of 26 February 1957 (which we are searching).
2. He came here to begin joint planning. If Israel is going to be attacked, Israel must know what the U.S. will do. The U.S. commitment doesn't mean anything if the U.S. just plans to stand by and see what happens.
3. His government knows there will be a combined UAR-Syrian-Jordanian attack. This is not just an intelligence estimate; it is "knowledge."
4. We should dispose of the UN route once and for all.
5. The balloon will go up next week if he takes nothing back to Tel Aviv with him.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:HS:amc

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-168
By CB, NARA Date 1-24-01

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 26, 1967 -- 12:07 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's proposed talking points for your conversation with Eban.

It follows the lines you suggested to me earlier but lacks an answer to the questions:

- Who would join the British party;
- What would ^{be}/consequences of this approach in Arab world and elsewhere.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLG 83-52
By 100, NARA, Date 5-21-91

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

89a

~~SECRET~~

May 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Conversation with the
Israeli Foreign Minister

As you know, the Israelis have told us their intelligence indicates that an Egyptian and Syrian attack is imminent. They have therefore requested a U.S. public statement of assurance and support to Israel against such aggression. Our intelligence does not confirm this Israeli estimate. Foreign Minister Eban, in his conversation with me last evening, indicated that he would not press this Israeli view and request. He said the telegram would not have been written as it was had he been there. He seems satisfied on this point with the precautionary message we gave the Egyptian Ambassador. He also agreed that improved cooperative arrangements with our intelligence were urgently needed.

In our conversations with Eban last night, he made clear that Ambassador Barbour's intervention on May 23 held off a preemptive strike. Barbour was authorized to float the British idea of a maritime group, which could effectively protect maritime rights in the Gulf of Aqaba if UN action failed. That idea gave the Israelis hope for the first time that there might be a third choice for them, apart from surrender or war. Eban is here to find out whether this alternative is feasible. Their Ambassador describes the visit as "a fateful mission".

You have two basic options now:

(1) to let the Israelis decide how best to protect their own national interests, in the light of the advice we have given them: i.e., to "unleash" them.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-167

By is, NARA Date 12-29-99

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PRESERVATION COPY

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-2-

We recommend strongly against this option.

(2) To take a positive position, but not a final commitment, on the British proposal. The British Cabinet meets on the plan tomorrow.

We recommend this policy, as our best hope of preventing a war which could gravely damage many American national interests.

Leaving aside detail, the essence of the plan that we have in mind following our talks with George Thomson is this:

(a) a short, energetic effort in the Security Council;

(b) a public declaration by the maritime powers, which would be made as soon as possible, preferably while the Security Council was in session; and

(c) a contingency plan for an international naval presence in the area of the Gulf. That plan is now being drafted by British and American experts. If the governments reached agreement on the program as a whole, the naval force would be assembled as soon as the scheme was approved. It would not become operational for a time. And hopefully, its presence would itself deter UAR from an attack on shipping.

(d) at the same time, we should prepare the way to propose in the U.N. that a U.N. presence between Israel and Egypt take a position along both sides of the Israeli UAR frontier. If Egypt refuses, we can ask Israel to accept. Such a force could prevent hostilities along that frontier, if both sides pulled back, as Eshkol has proposed.

Eban's preliminary reaction to the British idea is hopeful, provided we can be positive enough about our commitment to it to justify Israel in not going to war at once. He now thoroughly and I think sympathetically understands your political and constitutional problem. What he wants is as specific and definite a statement as you can make under the

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- 3 -

circumstances that we are seriously considering joining with other maritime nations at the end of the U.N. road in the plan for an international naval presence.

We put the case against preemptive strikes to Eban very hard last night, both from the military and the political points of view. I pointed out to him that we have lived with this issue a long time in connection with the Soviet Union, and come down definitively against the idea.

Despite this, Eban still believes, I think, that in the context of Israel's problem, surrounded by menacing concentrations (armed among other things, with nerve gas), he needs something pretty solid to hold the line against his hawks.

They have absolutely no faith in the possibility of anything useful coming out of the U.N.

Continuing informal consultations with Congress indicate support for an international approach and caution regarding U.S. unilateral commitments and action. We will have a draft joint resolution for your consideration by the end of the day.

We would suggest that you make the following principal points to Foreign Minister Eban:

1. We do not disagree with the Israeli assessment of the unlikelihood that the Security Council will be able to adopt a resolution which would be effective in assuring free and innocent passage through the Straits and the Gulf. However, we do believe that an attempt must be made even if only to demonstrate that the United Nations is unable to act in this situation. The proposals which are presently being discussed in New York are: a resolution assuring the free and innocent passage of vessels in the Straits and the Gulf; the resumption of full implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement; and a possible UN naval patrol comprised of such

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- 4 -

middle powers as Canada, the Scandinavian countries and others. Moreover, the Secretary General is apt to come up with some other ideas, but his report is not expected before Saturday of this week. These matters being discussed in New York will have to be dealt with even though it is unlikely that formal Security Council action will result.

2. We believe that the UK proposal for a declaration on the part of the principal maritime powers in support of freedom of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba should move forward, after appropriate consultations with Congress and concurrently with the UN consideration. We would then be prepared to encourage maritime powers to join in such a Declaration which would be presented to the Security Council, not for formal approval, but for inclusion in the record of proceedings. Several governments have already made or have under consideration statements to this effect.

3. Our intention is to see to it that the Straits and Gulf remain open to free and innocent passage of vessels of all nations. We cannot, at this time, see all the steps that would be required to achieve this objective. To this end, we are examining thoroughly and carefully the UK proposal calling for the creation of an international naval force to escort merchant vessels safely through the Strait of Tiran. We assure the Israeli Government of our positive interest in this proposal.

4. We will consult with the Israeli Government at every step of the way, and we expect the Israelis to reciprocate. We know and appreciate that in light of the difficulties which have developed as a result of Nasser's unilateral steps, it is difficult for Israel to be patient and prudent in circumstances where its vital interests could be adversely affected. Nevertheless, we can proceed only on the assumption that Israel will make no military move that would precipitate hostilities in the area. Preemptive action by Israel would cause extreme

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- 5 -

difficulty for the United States. In our position of world leadership, the American people would do what has to be done if "the fault is on the other side and there is no other alternative". Therefore, the question of responsibility for the initiation of hostilities is a major problem for us. Of course if we had information that the other side was moving this would be a matter of great concern.

5. The fundamental guiding principles of the U. S. are the preservation of international peace and security and the preservation of the political independence and territorial integrity of states of the Near East. We have opposed aggression from any source in the past and will continue to do so.

6. We recognize the stresses and the economic cost to which the current situation is subjecting Israel. Bearing this in mind, the United States is prepared to discuss with Israel means of relieving the economic impact of current special burdens on the Israeli economy. We will continue to review the military supply requirements in light of the changing situation.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

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Friday, May 26, 1967
11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Tommy Thompson's
assessment of the Middle Eastern
crisis as seen from Moscow.

The interesting Moroccan
reference cable is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 5125
USUN 5422

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By My, NARA, Date 5-14-91

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *ju*, NARA, Date 5-1-99 *NLS 91-520*

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1. FROM THE WAY THE SOVIETS ARE HANDLING THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, I CONCLUDE THAT THEY WERE WELL AWARE OF EGYPTIAN PLANS AND PROBABLY NOT AVERSE TO THE EGYPTIAN ACTION IN STIRRING UP THIS AFFAIR. I HAVE CONSIDERABLE DOUBTS HOWEVER THAT THIS INCLUDED THE CLOSING OF THE GULF OF AQABA. THE OMISSION OF REFERENCE TO THIS ACTION IN THE OFFICIAL SOVIET STATEMENT, THE FACT THAT A HIGH FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL ALLEGED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW OF IT AT 11/00 A.M. ON TUESDAY, AND THE FACT THAT THAT THIS WOULD NOT FIT IN WITH WHAT I WOULD CONCEIVE TO BE SOVIET STRATEGY, LEAD TO THIS CONCLUSION. I AM CONVINCED THAT

PAGE 2 RUEHCR 548FD ~~SECRET~~

THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT WANT TO BECOME MILITARILY PHYSICALLY INVOLVED IN A MIDDLE EAST WAR. IF WE AND THE BRITISH AND PERHAPS OTHERS FORCE THE OPENING OF THE GULF, THE CONSEQUENT DAMAGE TO NASSER'S PRESTIGE, AS WELL AS THE DEMONSTRATION OF SOVIET IMPOTENCE TO RENDER OTHER THAN MORAL SUPPORT, MAKE THIS A STUPID MOVE FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW UNLESS, OF COURSE, THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT NASSER CAN GET AWAY WITH IT. ON THE OTHER HAND, I DO NOT THINK THAT IF WAR HAD STARTED WITHOUT THIS MOVE THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE BEEN TOO CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO STAY CLEAR AND YET MAKE APPROPRIATE NOISES WHICH THEY COULD EXPLOIT WHENEVER A SETTLEMENT WAS REACHED. EVEN IF THE ISRAELIS SHOULD CLOBBER THEIR ARAB NEIGHBORS, THE SOVIETS MIGHT CALCULATE THAT THE HATRED THIS WOULD ENGENDER FOR THE WEST WOULD ENABLE THEM TO REESTABLISH THEIR POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD.

2. UNLESS NASSER IS HELL BENT UPON HAVING A FIGHT, IT SEEMS NATURAL TO SUPPOSE THAT HE HAS SOME DEMAND WHICH HE HOPES TO ACHIEVE IN RETURN FOR A RETREAT ON THE GULF, AND IN THIS CONNECTION THE THESIS PUT FORWARD BY THE MOROCCAN AMBASSADOR

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 - MOSCOW 5125 5/25/67

PAGE 3 RUEHCR 548FD ~~SECRET~~
(USUN 5422) WOULD SEEM TO BE MOST PLAUSIBLE. WITH UN TROOPS
ON THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN BORDER, NASSER WOULD ACHIEVE SOME PRO-
TECTION FOR SYRIA WHICH IS IN HIS AND SOVIET INTERESTS, BUT
ALSO WOULD REDUCE THIS POSSIBILITY OF THE SYRIANS STIRRING
UP A CRISIS AT A TIME WHICH MIGHT BE INCONVENIENT TO HIM.

GP-3
THOMPSON
BT

Note: Copies sent S/S-0

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TELEGRAM Department of State

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E.O. 12958, Sec 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By W, NARA, Date 5-1-99

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USUN 5422

SUBJECT: MOROCCAN VIEWS ON ME

DURING CHANCE MTG MAY 23 WITH MISOFF, MOROCCAN AMB BENHIMA EXPRESSED VIEW THAT DESPITE STATEMENT ON AQABA SHIPPING, NASSER HAS NO INTENTION GO TO WAR WITH ISRAEL. HE THOUGHT RECENT UAR INITIATIVES IN ME AIMED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY AT GIVING UAR FREE HAND IN ADEN AND YEMEN. NASSER'S PLAN, ACCORDING BENHIMA, IS TO DISCRED UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN PALESTINE THUS INSURING THAT UN WILL NOT SEND SIMILAR FORCE TO ADEN AS UK PULLS OUT. NASSER HAS CAREFULLY WORDED HIS REJECTION OF UNEF TO INCLUDE ONLY UAR TERRITORY AND INTENDS, IN ADDITION TO PERMITTING ISRAELI SHIPPING TO TRANSIT AQABA, TO ALLOW UN FORCES TO STAY IN GAZA AND TO BE STATIONED ALONG ISRAELI-SYRIAN BORDER. FOR HIS AGREEMENT "RETREAT" ON AQABA, NASSER EXPECTS ISRAEL TO AGREE TO STATIONING UN FORCES WITHIN ITS BORDERS. WHILE NASSER WORRIED IMPULSIVE SYRIANS MIGHT UPSET HIS PLANS, HE KNOWS THAT EXISTENCE ISRAEL HIS CHIEF LEVER OVER SYRIA AND IRAQ.

BENHIMA BELIEVES FRANCE AND USSR FOR OWN REASONS SUPPORTING NASSER'S DESIGNS. FRENCH, THROUGH AFP DISPATCHES, PEDDLING LINE THAT UAR HAS LEGAL RIGHT DEMAND UNEF WITHDRAWAL AND THAT ISRAELI 1956 REFUSAL ALLOW UNEF TROOPS ON OWN TERRITORY NOW BEARING BITTER FRUIT. ALGERIAN BELLICOSE STATEMENTS SUPPORTING NASSER PROBABLY INSPIRED BY PARIS. WHILE FRENCH HAVE AND WISH RETAIN CLOSE TIES WITH ISRAEL, THEY ALSO SEEKING REPLACE UK INFLUENCE WITH ARABS AND COUNTER GROWING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN ME. THIS REASON FRENCH REMAINING IN FRENCH SOMALILAND, HAVING REJECTED FIRST, GIVING FS TO ETHIOPIA BECAUSE OF ITS CLOSE TIES WITH US AND THEN, TO SOMALIA, BECAUSE OF INCREASING SOVIET INFLUENCE THERE. FRENCH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- USUN 5422, DTG 240154Z

WANT OIL AND PREPARED DO ALMOST ANYTHING PLACATE ALGERIANS, INCLUDING SITTING IDLY BY WHEN ONE DAY LIBYAN KING DIES AND UAR AND ALGERIA DIVIDE LIBYA.

AS FOR RUSSIANS, THEY TRYING SECURE HEGEMONY IN RED SEA AREA USING UAR AS CHANNEL. DESTRUCTION SAUDI AND JORDANIAN MONARCHIES TO BENEFIT UAR COULD ONLY IN LONG RUN BENEFIT SOVIETS, AS WOULD UAR CONSOLIDATION ITS POSITION IN YEMEN AND ADEN.

COMMENT: WHILE BENHIMA'S PRESENTATION OF FRENCH AND SOVIET ROLE APPEARS COLORED BY ARABIC TENDENCY PERCEIVE DARK, DEEP DESIGNS EVERYWHERE, HIS COMMENTS ON NASSER'S OBJECTIVES INTERESTING.

GP-4.

GOLDBERG

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

Frid , May 26, 1967
11:30 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I delivered to Evron your two points:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By fw, NARA, Date 5-1-99

- appointment late, if not tomorrow;
- your anxiety about the pressure and drama building up around the meeting.

Evron said he was grateful for my candor. The truth is that since Eban came here, he has been trying to dodge, not encourage, press, TV, etc. For example, at the dinner last night in the State Department, he came in through the basement to avoid the cameras and newspapermen swarming in the C Street lobby. On returning home, he had to go up one flight over his suite to avoid the reporters.

When he landed in New York, the press crowd was the largest he had ever encountered in his public career. The networks are pressing him for statements, which he has steadily refused to make.

In short, Evron wishes us to know that what we face here is not an Israeli tactic, but a situation in which their interest -- like ours -- is for sober talk and not for inflammatory drama.

Moreover, Evron added, the Israelis know President Johnson well enough -- and trust him so deeply -- that they understand it is counter-productive to try to force his hand or push him.

He went on to say that he hopes we also understand -- although it must be hard at this distance -- the sense of crisis and tension in Israel. Prime Minister Eshkol has sent another message to Eban which he will raise with you today. He underlined that it was not hysteria or fear in Israel -- nor a lack of confidence -- but simply a sense of urgency.

I told Evron that we are at an intermediate stage in the crisis with one very important piece of the puzzle missing; namely, the Secretary General's report to the Security Council. It is not a situation in which final decisions can be made.

Evron said that he understands this. What Eban wants are not rhetorical declarations but, within the real limits, practical results to take back to Israel.

He concluded by saying that, of course, they will await your decision about seeing Evron and the time; but it would be better for Eban to see you today -- no matter how late -- rather than tomorrow.

W. W. R.

1967 MAY 26 13 09

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*Cap
Jaworski*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-169
By is, NARA Date 2-29-00

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SECRET/NOFORN/JOPREP/STRIKE/MEAFSA/SITREP/031/261200Z (U)

1. (C) OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES. NO OPERATIONS
OR EXERCISES ARE SCHEDULED WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN BLOC
REACTION.

2. (S/NF) ISRAELI/ARAB CONFRONTATION.

A. OPERATIONAL SITUATION.

USS VALCOUR AT JIZAN TO DEPART 27 MAY FOR MASSAWA

USS FISKE AT MASSAWA

USS KENNEDY ENROUTE ADEN TO ARRIVE 29 MAY.

B. INTELLIGENCE SITUATION.

(1) THE LATEST ASSESSMENT FROM OUR ATTACHES

Roston

PAGE 2 RUEDPSA2637 ~~SECRET NOFORN~~

IN TEL AVIV, WHICH COINCIDES WITH OUR BELIEF, IS THAT
ISRAEL IS APPROACHING A DECISION IN FAVOR OF A PRE-
EMPTIVE ATTACK. THE IDF IS READY AND PRESSING FOR SUCH
A DECISION. HAVING LOST STRATEGIC SURPRISE, ON WHICH
SO MUCH OF THEIR PLANNING IS BASED, THEY FEEL THAT
THEIR CAPABILITY IS BEING REDUCED AS TIME PASSES. THE
AIR FORCE, IN PARTICULAR, DOUBTS THAT THEY CAN GAIN
THE NECESSARY AIR SUPERIORITY ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT
UNLESS THEY STRIKE FIRST. THE DESTRUCTION OF EGYPTIAN
ARMOR IS ALSO VITAL IN ORDER TO PREVENT A POSSIBLE UAR
INVASION OR BLUNT A COUNTERATTACK.

(2) LEBANON IS RELIABLY REPORTED TO BE AT
A VERY LOW LEVEL OF ALERT, WITH ITS AIR FORCE ALMOST
COMPLETELY UNREADY FOR COMBAT.

CP-3

BT

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

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PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 26, 1967
11:08 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith further Swedish and
French reports on the bombing of
North Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

Hong Kong 8185
Paris 18991

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 5-15-91

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-520

By , NARA, Date 4-30-92

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

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SUBJECT: SWEDISH NEWSMAN'S VISIT TO NORTH VIETNAM

CIA

1. SVEN OSTE, HONG KONG-BASED CORRESPONDENT OF STOCKHOLM DAILY "DAGENS NYHETER", VISITED NORTH VIETNAM MAY 5-19. IN CONVERSATION WITH CONGEN OFFICER HE MADE FOLLOWING POINTS (DETAILED REPORT FOLLOWS BY A-674).

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2. CAPTURE OF PILOTS AND PLANE: DURING NIGHT HOURS AFTER MAY 14 AFTERNOON AIR ATTACK ON BRIDGE NEAR THANH HOA, OSTE WAS TAKEN TO COASTAL SITE OF DOWNED PLANE, AN F-4B WITH ITS BELLY HALF SUBMERGED IN WATER. HIS FLASH PHOTO OF PLANE SHOWS IT APPARENTLY INTACT. CAMOUFLAGE WORK HAD ALREADY BEGUN TO PREVENT PLANE'S DESTRUCTION BY BOMBING. LOCAL VILLAGERS RELATED STORY (WHICH OSTE BELIEVED GENUINE) OF CAPTURE OF PLANE'S TWO CREWMEN EARLIER THAT DAY, BUT HE NOT PERMITTED CONTACT MEN. DETAILS AND PHOTO FORWARDED TO DOD VIA MILITARY CHANNELS.

3. POLITICAL SETTLEMENT: ONLY PROMINENT OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED BY OSTE WAS HEAD OF NLF MISSION HANOI. THROUGHOUT LONG GIVE-AND-TAKE CONVERSATION (WHICH TOOK PLACE ON UNDERSTANDING IT NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION), NLF REPRESENTATIVE DISPLAYED FLEXIBILITY ON ALL BUT TWO POINTS: (1) NLF MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS "AUTHORITATIVE" SPOKESMAN FOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND (2) BOMBING OF NVN MUST STOP. OSTE GAINED IMPRESSION THAT U. S. WITHDRAWAL FROM SVN NOT A PRE-CONDITION BUT AN AIM OF PEACE TALKS.

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4. EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBING: IN GENERAL, HE FELT THAT ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF BOMBING MORE THAN OFFSET BY HEIGHTENED UNITY AND ENTHUSIASM FOR WAR TASKS AMONG POPULACE AS RESULT OF BOMBING. IN SUPPORT THIS VIEW-POINT, HE REPORTED MEETING CONVOYS OF 300 TRUCKS AT NIGHT ON ROADS BETWEEN HANOI AND THANH HOA (WHERE HE SPENT ONE WEEK). FEW DELAYS WERE EXPERIENCED BECAUSE OF ROAD DAMAGE. MOST SIGNS OF DAMAGE WERE NEAR VILLAGES OR BRIDGES, WHILE LONG STRETCHES OF ASPHALT REMAINED INTACT THROUGH RICE PADDIES PERMITTING SPEEDS OF 40-50 MILES PER HOUR. HE BELIEVES DEFENSE AND REPAIR OF ROADS EASIER AT BRIDGES WHERE ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS CONCENTRATED AND AROUND VILLAGES WHERE LABOR AVAILABLE AND DETOURS MORE EASILY CONSTRUCTED. FURTHER, HE REPORTED THAT HANOI ELECTRICITY SUPPLY HAD NOT BEEN INTERRUPTED BY MAY 19 RAID, AT LEAST NOT AS OF HIS EARLY EVENING DEPARTURE FROM CITY FOR PHNOM PENH.

5. PEKING-HANOI RELATIONS: ACCORDING OSIE, VIETNAMESE REACTION TO CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION WAS "TO LAUGH AT IT." AUDIENCE ATTENDING CHICOM DOCUMENTARY FILM OF PEKING NATIONAL DAY 1966 FOUND SPECTACLE OF CHINESE WAVING LITTLE RED BOOKS AND RECITING MAO QUOTES IN UNISON SO FUNNY THAT THEY "SPL IT THEIR SIDES."

DECON: 1/1/70

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 5-1-99

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1967 MAY 24 PM 5 18

Roston

SUBJ: FRENCH VIEWS ON EFFECTIVENESS US BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

1. IN MEETING MAY 23, QUAI'S CHIEF INDOCHINA AFFAIRS (BRETHES) READ TO EMBOFF EXCERPTS OF DETAILED REPORT DATED MAY 10 RECEIVED FROM FRENCH DELEGATION HANOI EVALUATING EFFECT RECENT US BOMBINGS ON NORTH VIETNAM. FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS OF THIS REPORT:

A. COMPARING US AND DRV STATISTICE WITH EYEWITNESS REPORTS RE NUMBER OF US PLANES SHOT DOWN OVER NORTH VIETNAM, FRENCH DELEGATION HANOI INCLINED BELIEVE US FIGURES TOO LOW AND DRV FIGURES CLOSER TO THE TRUTH. TO DOCUMENT THIS CONCLUSION, FRENCH REPORT CITES FOLLOWING EXAMPLES:

(1) US RAID ON HAIPHONG CEMENT FACTORY, US

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ANNOUNCED LOSS OF 2 PLANES, WHILE NORTH VIETNAMESE CLAIMED 7. FRENCH DELEGATION STAFF MEMBER WHO HAPPENED BE HAIPHONG ON THAT DAY SAW HIMSELF 4 US PLANES GO DOWN IN FLAMES. (2) APRIL 25 US ADJITTED LOSING 2 PLANES WHILE HANOI CLAIMED 12. EMPLOYEE FRENCH DELEGATION ACTUALLY SAW 4 PLANES BEING HIT WITHIN MINUTES. (3) IN APRIL 26 RAID ON YEN VIEN, US CLAIMED NO LOSSES WHILE HANOI ANNOUNCED 2 PLANES SHOT DOWN. FRENCH DELEGATION MEMBER SAW AT LEAST ONE PLANE SHOT DOWN. (4) IN MAY 5 AFTERNOON RAID ON HANOI, NORTH VIETNAMESE CLAIMED 7 PLANES DOWNED WHILE US GAVE NO FIGURES. ACCORDING TO INFO GIVEN FRENCH DELEGATION MEMBERS BY EYEWITNESSES, AT LEAST 2 US PLANES WERE DESTROYED ON THAT AFTERNOON.

B. ON BASIS DRV STATICS, FRENCH DELEGATION HANOI CONCLUDES THAT US PLANE LOSSES, INCLUDING HELICOPTERS,

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-2- PARIS 18991, May 24

HAVE CONSIDERABLY INCREASED SINCE MID-APRIL. TO DOCUMENT THIS COCLUSION FRENCH REPORT CITES FOLLOWING DRV FIGURES:

FEBRUARY 15-28	- 14 US PLANES DOWNED;
MARCH 1-15	- 25 US PLANES DOWNED;
MARCH 16-30	- 15 US PLANES DOWNED;
MARCH 31-APRIL 18	- 15 US PLANES DOWNED.

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THUS, DRV CLAIMS 69 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN LITTLE MORE THAN TWO MONTHS. ON OTHER HAND, DRV CLAIMS THAT IN MUCH SHORTER PERIOD- APRIL 19 TO MAY 8 - 107 US AIRCRAFT (INCLUDING HELICOPTERS) WERE SHOT DOWN. FROM THESE FIGURES FRENCH CONCLUDE THAT US PLANE LOSSES HAVE INCREASED RASTICALLY - MAYBE AS MUCH AS FIVEFOLD - SINCE MID-APRIL WHEN US STEPPED UP BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM.

C. REPORT INCLUDES DATA ON DAMAGE CAUSED BY US BOMBINGS: (1) US ASSERTION THAT AAI NGUYEN STEEL MILL WAS DESTROYED BY APRIL 18 BOMBING IS ACCURATE; FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES, THIS INDUSTRIAL CENTER IS COMPLETELY DESTROYED. (2) BRIDGE OVER RIVER DUONG 7 TO 8 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF HANOI APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN HIT IN APRIL 29 RAID. (3) ON BASIS WHAT DELEGATION MEMBERS HAVE SEEN OF BOMBINGS A HANOI SUBURBS, THERE IS NO REASON TO SERIOUSLY DOUBT ACCURACY OF DRV CIVILIAN CASUALTY FIGURES.

D. REPORT DRAWS FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS RE EFFECTIVENESS OF US BOMBING: 1(1) US HAS BEEN UNABLE TO DESTROY NORTH VIETNAMESE TRANSPORTATION NETWORK. DESPITE DIRECT HITS ON RAILROAD STATIONS, BRIDGES, AND ROLLING STOCK REPAIR FACILITIES, NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE SUCCESSFULLY FOUND MAKE-SHIFT SOLUTIONS WHICH PERMIT TRANSPORTATION NETWORK FUNCTION AFTER BRIEF DELAY.

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FRENCH DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT "EQUILIBRIUM" (PROBABLY STALEMATE IS MORE DESCRIPTIVE TERM) HAS BEEN ATTAINED BETWEEN WHAT US DESTROYS IN FIELD OF TRANSPORTATION AND DRV'S ABILITY TO RECONSTRUCT DAMAGES INCURRED:

FRENCH FEEL THAT DRV CAN MAINTAIN THIS DEADLOCK FOR A LONG TIME. (2) AMOUNT OF ROLLING STOCK, SUCH AS RAILROAD CARS OR TRUCKS, ALSO NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED BY US BOMBINGS. WHILE US DESTROYS

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-3- PARIS 18991, May 24

CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF RAILROAD CARS AND TRUCKS, THEY ARE "CONSTANTLY BEING REPLACED BY NEW EQUIPMENT FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES". (3) US IS SUCCESSFUL IN DESTRUCTION OF DRV INDUSTRIAL CENTERS AND UNLIKE MOVABLE ITEMS DESTROYED, THESE INDUSTRIAL SITES CANNOT BE READILY REPLACED BY OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE. INDUSTRIAL CITIES SUCH AS TAI NGUYEN, VIET TRI AND NAM DINH HAVE, FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES, BEEN DESTROYED. HOWEVER, DESTRUCTION OF DRV INDUSTRY DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT NORTH VIETNAMESE WAR EFFORT. IT MERELY MEANS THAT NORTH VIETNAM MUST DEPEND MORE ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FOR ITEMS FORMERLY MANUFACTURED LOCALLY.

(4) BOMBINGS HAVE SO FAR NOT YET SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. FRENCH DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY, WITH HELP FROM CHICOMS, CAN CONTINUE TO FEED NORTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION "ON SUBSISTENCE LEVEL".

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Pres. file

Friday, May 26, 1967
10:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a most thoughtful
report from Amb. Bunker who
appears to be forming his own clear
picture of the problems and priorities
in Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 26566

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12856, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Gidd. Eves, Feb. 24, 1983
By lg, NARA, Date 5-15-91

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Thursday, May 25, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon, 26566)

Herewith my fourth weekly telegram:

A. General

The matter of chief concern to us during the past week has been the threat of growing rivalry between Thieu and Ky which threatened to become more acute over the weekend. In a long interview with Robert Shaplen of the New Yorker last Friday, Thieu informed him that he intended to become a candidate. Later that evening he made a similar statement to the correspondent of Agence France Presse who filed his story. The press on Sunday carried headlines stating that Thieu would be a candidate, but without any explanatory text which leads me to believe the text may have been censored. In the meantime, General Loan, Director General of the National Police, informed an embassy office that if Thieu decided to run, Ky and the other generals participating in the government would resign on the ground that Thieu could not win the election and his defeat would cast discredit on the Armed Forces. Subsequently, however, the matter was apparently discussed at a meeting Ky held with some of his military supporters at Bien Hoa on Saturday at which he stated that he had no intention of withdrawing. It is, of course, apparent that this situation is bound to have a disquieting effect on the political climate here and regardless of what protestations may be made to the contrary, it will have a divisive effect on the Armed Forces.

While Thieu has thus come closer to announcing his candidacy, he has stopped short of a formal declaration and thus continues to play his cards close to his chest. In fact, what we are seeing now is a situation dating back to last January which has developed because of the unwillingness of either Thieu or Ky to talk

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out the problem between themselves. On the one hand, Thieu's natural reticence and secretiveness, his desire to determine the strength of the support he could muster, and his effort to find civilian allies probably have been factors in his disinclination to talk with Ky, while, on the other hand, Ky has gone about developing support and building an organization before announcing his candidacy. Thieu also, I think has had doubts about his position in the Armed Forces should he not succeed to the Presidency. He intimated this to General Westmoreland in the talk which he had with him early this month. While I shall discuss this problem in some detail in the political section of this message, I simply want to say here that I am following the matter closely and do not propose to let it get out of hand.

I had a long talk with Ambassador Bui Diem yesterday who clearly understands the implications of the situation and the importance we attach to it, thanks to his talk with you. I pointed out to him that I consider that we are at a turning point in Vietnamese history and that the interests of the country must obviously come ahead of either Thieu or Ky. He agreed entirely and replied that this was a problem which the Vietnamese themselves must resolve. He suggested that I hold off talking with Thieu and Ky for a day or two to see whether this could not be worked out satisfactorily between them. He has had a long talk with Ky and is to see Thieu today, after which he promised to get in touch with me and to let me know the outcome of his conversations. It would, of course, be preferable to have the Vietnamese resolve the problem themselves and I, therefore, intend to wait another day until he has talked with Thieu and Ky. In the meantime, General Westmoreland is to see General Vien, the Minister of Defense, and will try to get a reading on the views of the military.

If it is necessary to move in, I intend to make it very clear to both Thieu and Ky that political maneuvers which may split the Armed Forces and further fragment the competing political groups in this country are entirely unacceptable. I will make it plain that

the welfare of the country must come ahead of personal rivalries and that we cannot have our enormous investment of men, money and world prestige put at risk by such rivalries.

We are taking steps to put additional steam behind the land reform and Chieu Hoi programs as you have requested. This brings up another matter not only in connection with these programs but also in relation to our total effort here. I am attempting, with the excellent assistance of Gene Locke and Bob Komer, to tighten up and to make more efficient our whole organization here. This is a big job and will take a little time, but I think we are on the way.

This brings me to another point on which I shall want to report to you in the near future. This has to do with Vietnamese capabilities. It seems to me that we are facing here a problem which we find in all of the developing countries, but in a more acute stage because here we find a small country engaged in a bitter struggle and at the same time trying to carry on a political and social revolution. Our advisory and supporting role, both military and in every other way, is obviously indispensable. Yet a large part of the job has to be done by the Vietnamese themselves. What we run up against is the fact that here, as in the less developed countries generally, there is a relatively thin crust of managerial talent. Indispensable additional personnel have to be trained as we go along. But this fact also means, I believe, that we have to be selective and assign priorities to those things which we deem to be most important of accomplishment.

In this connection there are a number of things which my present thinking would lead me to believe should receive top priority. These are:

1. carrying the country through to elections with the establishment of a stable constitutional government.
2. the pacification program, winning the allegiance and the hearts and minds of the Viet Cong.
3. the revamping and restructuring of the Vietnamese military forces, something which seems to me an

indispensable element in the successful completion of the pacification program.

4. the determination of the optimum use of available manpower.

1 and 2 above seem to me equally as important as the military effort in winning the war. If we can succeed in establishing a stable constitutional government here, it will speak louder than anything we can say or do to demonstrate to the Viet Cong and to North Vietnam that South Vietnam is here to stay. And if we succeed in pacification there will be nothing left for the North Vietnamese to support here, we simply cut the ground from under their feet.

B. Political

During the past week, General Thieu edged closer to announcing his candidacy but stopped short of a formal declaration. He has told a number of people, including several reporters, that he intends to run. At one point a Thieu aide offered the Voice of America an exclusive story on General Thieu's formal announcement. On May 21, the Vietnam press carried an item which said that Thieu had decided to run, and "he will officially announce his decision at a convenient date." Ky meanwhile continues his active campaign with "official" trips to the provinces and a May 17 announcement on radio and TV of the cash "rice bonus" for civil servants and military personnel.

Thus I must report that as of today Thieu and Ky have not resolved their differences. As I have said, I would not want to minimize the possible consequences if they continue this potentially destructive rivalry. Military unity, military discipline, the conduct of the war, pacification, and future political stability can all be mortgaged if this situation is not resolved. I believe, however, that there is still reason to hope that Thieu and Ky can be led to an acceptable compromise. Both are aware that if they both run the chances of either being elected are greatly reduced, if not eliminated. They also know the dangers inherent in a fight which splits the military, although they may underestimate their probability.

Thieu's present strategy is still unclear. He may hope that his not quite official announcement will force Ky to make good on such declarations as the May 15 statement to Vietnam press in which Ky said that "he would never oppose another member of the Armed Forces because this would jeopardize the unity of the Armed Forces." Ky's withdrawal in favor of Thieu would obviously be the best possible solution from Thieu's point of view, and he may believe that there is still a chance of maneuvering Ky into taking such an action. At the

same time Thieu has left the option of backing or joining a civilian ticket open, if he so chooses. One hint that he may be considering such an eventual move is the fact that he is apparently trying to have the electoral law amended to include a provision for a run-off election (a run-off election would appear to benefit the civilian candidates much more than either Ky or Thieu). If this is Thieu's intention, he may be hoping to remove Ky as his chief power rival by engineering Ky's defeat in the coming elections. Thieu may calculate that he can thus place the new civilian president in heavy debt to himself and also retain control of the military establishment.

I suspect that Thieu has not in fact made up his mind on his future course. It seems probable that he would like to be president, but we have the impression that he does not relish the prospect of an election campaign. He is not the kind of man who enjoys the rough public give-and-take of a campaign. Throughout his tenure as Chief of State, he has remained in the background, leaving the limelight to Ky. Given this temperament plus the fact that Ky is evidently determined to run, I think that Thieu is more likely to decide in the end against becoming a presidential candidate.

If Thieu has not in fact made up his mind, there is reason to hope that he and Ky can compose their differences in a way which preserves military unity. I shall, of course, continue to urge them to do this and we have been keeping in touch with a number of men close to both of them.

Although we have a number of reports that indicate Ky is trying to persuade Huong to run as his Vice President, Huong has apparently decided against such an alliance, at least at this time. He told an Embassy officer on Sunday that he intends to make his formal announcement this week. The Thieu-Ky split no doubt encourages him to think that he can win. From his point of view, it probably also reduces the necessity for any immediate accommodation with the military, although Ambassador Bui Diem told me that Ky and Huong had talked for two hours at Vung Tau last week and had come to a friendly understanding. There was a fairly strong inference in what Bui Diem said that it may have gone to the extent that the winner would appoint his opponent to the Prime Ministership.

Huong declined to name his Vice Presidential running mate, but there are indications that it will be Mai Tho Truyen, the 63 year old leader of the Southern Buddhist Studies Association. Huong seems likely to base his campaign on the issues of corruption and peace, although recognizing the difficulties inherent in this latter question. Both he and Truyen are popularly regarded as men of integrity, and they will probably count heavily on this reputation in appealing to the voters. Both are also southerners, and the ticket will therefore lack regional balance unless he designated a Prime Minister in advance who comes from another region.

Bunker

Ky has evidently caused the Hoa Hao to move toward a settlement of their long-simmering internal struggle for control of the Hoa Hao organization. On May 16, Ky took one of the two principal Hoa Hao contenders, Tran Van Tuoi, to An Giang province where Tuoi met with the other chief Hoa Hao leader, Luong Trong Tuong, and the Hoa Hao Holy Mother. This face-to-face confrontation plus Ky's behind-the-scenes efforts resulted in an agreement to make Tuoi the head of a temporary secretariat. Tuoi is likely to reciprocate by doing his best to throw the Hoa Hao behind Ky in the coming elections. As Tuong is also a Ky supporter, it is probable that Ky can count on a large chunk of the estimated 601,000 votes controlled by the Hoa Hao.

In the opening sessions on the Senate Electoral Law, the Assembly decided on a body of 60 members, to be elected on ten-man lists. They also set the Senate election date for December 17. This would be a change from the announcement by General Thieu on April 1 that the Presidential and Senatorial elections would be held on the same day in September.

The Presidential Election Law meanwhile is being discussed today by the Directorate. The civilian members of the Directorate plus Generals Tri and Chieu met Monday to consider the Presidential Law, and they reportedly agreed to ask the Assembly to make a few changes, the most important of which would be the inclusion of a provision for a run-off election in case no candidate gets a certain minimum percentage of the vote. The preliminary meeting on Monday was evidently arranged by General Thieu's supporters. Whether Ky and his men will agree to request a run-off remains to be seen and this Directorate meeting may be an important episode in the Ky-Thieu rivalry.

The handling of the Electoral Law is rather confused because the Constitution merely specifies that it is to be written and approved by the Assembly. There is no reference to any required action by the Directorate, and a strict interpretation could mean that the Directorate has no power to veto or amend the Law. Directorate requests for changes in the Law will therefore be subject to negotiation with the Assembly; if the Directorate is split between Ky and Thieu supporters, the chances that the Assembly will agree to amend the Law will be substantially reduced.

A prominent member of the Assembly, Dr. Dang Van Sung, submitted his resignation from the Assembly on May 17. Sung resigned to protest the Assembly's failure to include a provision for a run-off election in the Presidential Electoral Law. The Chairman of the Assembly, Phan Khac Suu, has not acknowledged the resignation, and there has been no mention of it on the floor of the Assembly. If the Law is amended as a result of a request from the Directorate, it is possible that Sung will withdraw his resignation and return to the Assembly.

As anticipated, the May 16 mortaring of Hue had a negative effect on morale there, which had been on the upswing, and people are reported building shelters against further attacks. The enemy continues heavy military activity, with repeated mortar, rocket and artillery attacks on friendly military installations in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. Our forces launched a coordinated move into the Demilitarized Zone on May 18 which resulted in 616 enemy killed as of May 22. MACV reports continued indications that the enemy is preparing for an offensive in the northern part of the First Corps. This intense military activity has probably encouraged the militant Buddhists to hope that they can make difficulties for the Government, and there were reports of plans for immolations on Buddha's Birthday. No immolations have so far taken place, however, and local authorities apparently have the "strugglers" well under control. (The police are reportedly under instructions from Ky to handle the "strugglers" firmly but carefully because Ky "does not want to lose one vote, not even among the struggle Buddhists.")

Surveys made in Quang Tri City and two adjoining districts in mid-May among 170 sample residents reveal that the city residents were confident that the city was safe from further direct attacks by the Viet Cong, but they expect continued harassing attacks, which they consider a normal hazard of war. In contrast, the majority in Hai Lang District feel the Viet Cong may occupy the district; and in Trieu Phong, half the people feel the Viet Cong may capture Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. Only a very small minority of the urbanites felt that the Viet Cong could capture or that we would trade off the two northern provinces.

We continue our special psywar and logistic support effort to counter the enemy pressure in the First Corps. A sudden refugee influx caused by our operations in the Demilitarized Zone taxed facilities to the limit, but Government of Vietnam agencies working with our help

generally met the challenge. Television came to Hue this week, and the first public sets in operation was a great attraction.

Local elections for Hamlet Chiefs and Assistant Hamlet Chiefs continued this week with the second of five Sunday elections being carried out successfully. 1,261 hamlets were involved in 40 provinces and 921,942 persons went to the polls. The turnout was 78 percent of the registered voters, down from last week's 80 percent largely because of a low turnout in Gia Dinh province near Saigon. The ratio of candidates to offices was again a healthy 2.4 to 1.

Buddha's Birthday passed without important incidents. Following the self-immolation of Phan Thi Mai, the militant Buddhists were apparently unable to generate demonstrations or even significant interest among the populace. Thich Tam Chau's government-approved ceremonies and processions attracted large but orderly crowds, whereas there was almost no visible activity at the militant headquarters at An Quang Pagoda. Supreme Patriarch Thich Tinh Khiet, long in Tri Quang's camp, actually took part in Tam Chau's ceremonies at the National Pagoda May 23. The opening phase of the militants' "peace campaign" against the Government and the United States was not successful, however, and it appears that their capacity for mischief is quite limited even when they attempt to use such an appealing issue as peace.

C. Economic

The Saigon Retail Price Index moved up to 266 this week, mostly because of an increase in the price of rice. The present level remains well under the TET high of 284, however. The Index of imports held steady at 216.

The situation in the Port of Saigon continues to improve. During the past month, all ships transporting U.S.-financed cargo have been allocated berth or buoy space in the Port within one day of their arrival at Cap St. Jacques. A few ships carrying Government of Vietnam-financed cargo, generally procured from non-U.S. sources, have declined berths available to them, preferring to wait for a berth of their choice.

Average amount of commercial cargo which cleared Saigon Port daily during April 11 - May 10 was 8,146 tons, as contrasted to a daily average of 4,842 tons for the period March 1 - April 11.

On May 10, only 332 barges were under load with commercial cargo not customs cleared. This represents a reduction from 772 barges on March 31.

Members of a special USAID task force have made some 6,000 personal calls on nearly 1,000 importers over the past five months to assist importers in an effort to assure prompt cargo clearance. The work of this USAID task force has been an important factor in improved efficiency in Port operations.

D. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending May 20, the enemy killed 80 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 109 and kidnapped 98. The dead included three Hamlet Chiefs, one Village Councilor, six Revolutionary Development workers, and three Chieu Hoi returnees. These figures can be compared with the Vietnamese civilian dead for the past six weeks: 56, 81, 38, 126, 44, 85.

E. Chieu Hoi

The number of returnees increased again this week, up from 492 to 591. While this figure is well under the previous highs for the year, it is almost twice the rate of the same period last year. The total for 1967 is now 14,634 as compared with last year's overall total of 20,242, and the weekly average this year is about 770. Our Chieu Hoi personnel hope to see an increase in the number of returnees as vocational training, new construction at the centers, and increased military actions begin to take effect.

F. Military

The level of military activity during the truce (midnight May 22 through midnight May 23) declined markedly. Except for two company-size engagements of several hours duration which took place in southern First Corps, all reported violations and incidents were of an isolated nature, short duration, and involved comparatively insignificant

military contact. Except for two reports of unusually heavy sampan traffic in the Third Corps, MACV has received no reports of overt resupply or re-positioning by the enemy during the truce. Casualties are as follows:

Killed: 18 friendly (12 U.S.)
Wounded: 98 friendly (16 U.S.)

There were 51 enemy killed.

Outside the truce period, there was heavy military activity this week, with large engagements in the First, Second, Third Corps. The enemy kept up heavy pressure in the First Corps with repeated artillery, mortar, and rocket attacks on friendly positions. We launched a multi-battalion operation into the Demilitarized Zone and made strong contact at several points. An elaborate enemy bunker complex believed to be the Command Post of a Fourth Vietnam Division was uncovered in the Demilitarized Zone. In the Second Corps heavy fighting broke out along the Cambodian border, and in Pleiku an estimated enemy battalion was encountered. In the Third Corps an enemy battalion hit the ARVN compound north of Tan Ansun, Long An province.

G. Visitors

Senator Case left last Saturday, Senator Dominick on Monday, and Governor Love yesterday. All three expressed themselves as being well pleased with the arrangements made for them here and I believe that their visits will prove to have been useful.

Senator Case described himself as being neither hawk or dove and I have the impression that he thinks we are pretty much on the right track although he said it was difficult for him to see the end of the tunnel. I believe Senator Dominick holds somewhat similar views. I saw a good deal of Governor Love who stayed with me and he saw a great deal of our activities here. I have the impression that you will find him a strong supporter of our policy, of what we are doing here and the way in which we are doing it, but that it will take time and will require patience and determination. I believe he would welcome an opportunity to discuss his impressions with you.

May 26, 1967

mem to
~~CABLE FROM~~ AMBASSADOR BATTLE

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Pres file

Extent of U. S. assurances to Israel in 1957 with reference to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai

1. With reference to the question of extent of US assurances to Israel at the time of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in 1957, the following replies made by Secretary Dulles to questions asked at a news conference on March 5, 1957 are pertinent:

"The position of the US with reference to these matters (US commitments to Israel prior to Israel's withdrawal from Egypt) has been fully and totally set forth in the public documents in the case. Those are primarily the Aide Memoire of February 11, the President's speech of February 20, the statement of Ambassador Lodge on March 1, and the letter of the President to Prime Minister Ben Gurion, that I referred to of March 2. (All of these are public documents). There are no private assurances to anyone which go beyond or which are different from what is set forth in those public documents. . . . For the most part, they are statements of what we believe the international law of the case is, and certainly, as regards the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. What we state there is a view which we have always held with respect to that being a passage to an international body of water. . . . It is a restatement of our position, what we consider to be the international law of the case."

"I do not think that the President's letter (of March 2) should be read as endorsing every detail of everything that was said (by the Israeli Foreign Minister in her statement of March 1). The President's letter referred to the fact that statements were made by the Foreign Minister of Israel and by others with relation to their hopes and expectations. . . . The President's letter, I think, referred generally to the hopes and expectations for a better future for the area and should not be interpreted as necessarily an endorsement of everything that was said."

2. Also relevant are the assurances furnished by Secretary Dulles on March 1 to the representatives of the Arab states. According to a Department of State Press Release of March 1, 1957, Secretary Dulles

stated that this Israeli withdrawal (from Sinai) would involve no promises or concessions whatsoever to Israel by the US but would be predicated wholly on the prior decisions of the United Nations General Assembly and the reports of the Secretary General and the public position of the US, notably the position compounded by President Eisenhower in his address of February 20.

3. The operative paragraph of President Eisenhower's address to the nation of February 20, 1967 (and one which I always understood was the nearest thing to a public commitment from the US Government during this crisis) is as follows:

"We should not assume that, if Israel withdraws, Egypt will prevent Israeli shipping from using the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba. If, unhappily, Egypt does hereafter violate the Armistice Agreement, or other international obligations, then this should be dealt with firmly by the society of nations."

The foregoing of course raises the basic question of the current validity of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement, and Israel's attitude thereto.

Pres file

Friday - May 26, 1967

Mr. President:

I understand from George Christian that you want to send copies of the brochure on the Punta del Este meeting to your fellow Presidents and the Latin American Ambassadors to the White House and the OAS. This involves some 55 persons.

There are three ways to handle the mechanics:

- 1. for you to send the brochure under cover of a short letter.
- 2. to put the name of the recipient in script and your signature on the cover, with transmission handled by our Ambassadors to the Presidents and by Jim Symington to the Latin American Ambassadors in Washington.
- 3. to put the name of the recipient in script and your signature on one of your cards and glue it to the inside cover, with transmission the same as in alternative no. 2.

The attached copy of the brochure has samples of the three alternatives for you to choose from.

From the recipients' standpoint, my hunch is that they would like the brochure with the dedication on the cover (alternative no. 2).

W. W. Rostow

Prafer alternative 1	_____
" " 2	<u>✓</u> 5/27/67
" " 3	_____
See me	_____

Attachment

17
Friday - May 26, 1967

Mr. President:

Covey Oliver is in town.

Would you like for him to come to the 12:00 noon appointment
you have with the five US Ambassadors to Latin American coun-
tries?

Yes _____

No _____

See me _____.

W. W. Rostow

Friday, May 26, 1967

Mr. President:

As requested, herewith a proposed telegram to Eric Leinsdorf.

W. W. Rostow

98
Pres file

7/12
May 26, 1967

Erich Leinsdorf

Brookline, Massachusetts (tel: 734-3667)

I am most grateful for your kind offer of support.
We will certainly feel free to call on you. We hope you
may return to the Israel Philharmonic in calmer and
more secure days.

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, May 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Request for Appointment for Mr. E. G. Whitlam, Leader
of the Australian Labor Party

Mr. E. G. Whitlam, the leader in Parliament of the opposition Australian Labor Party, plans to visit Washington June 12-15. Our Embassy in Canberra informs us that he would greatly value a brief call on you.

Mr. Whitlam is making his first extensive overseas tour as leader of the Australian Labor Party. He recently succeeded Arthur Calwell as leader of the Party. (You met both Calwell and Whitlam last fall in Canberra.)

Unlike Mr. Calwell, who violently opposes Australian participation in Vietnam, Whitlam takes a more realistic view of the situation in Southeast Asia. However, he faces serious obstacles within his own Party in his attempt to reorient the direction of the Party's foreign policy. Mr. Whitlam needs the advantage of face-to-face contact with the American point of view expressed at the highest levels to reinforce his moderate viewpoint in dealing with his colleagues.

Secretary Rusk believes it would strengthen Whitlam's position in Australia and benefit our policy objectives there if he is able to spend a few minutes with you. I also recommend that you receive him.

The Australian Embassy here believes Prime Minister Holt will urge you to receive Whitlam, when you see Holt on June 1.

Biographic data are attached.

Wait until Holt confirms it's a good idea W. W. Rostow

Arrange appointment _____

No appointment _____

See me _____

AJ:mm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-522
By WJ, NARA, Date 3-2-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

99a/87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITLAM, E. G.

AUSTRALIA

Federal Leader, Australian Labour Party

E. Gough Whitlam was elected federal leader of the Australian Labour Party in February 1967. He had been deputy leader of the party since March 1960 and a member of Parliament since 1952. Whitlam is a barrister with a family and educational background more typical of the Liberal than the Labour Party, and this has cost him the support of some old guard Labour Party members of Parliament and trade unionists. Whitlam and former leader Arthur Calwell had become increasingly estranged both politically and as individuals, and the year prior to Calwell's retirement, and Whitlam's succession to the leadership was marked by a bitter rivalry between the two men which occasionally found its way into the public view and which has left scars in the party. Whitlam, unlike many of the trade union and more traditional elements of the Labour Party, tends to take a moderate and pragmatic approach to questions both in domestic and foreign policy. His flexibility and unwillingness to adhere to traditional socialist slogans and battlecries have caused him to be suspect in the eyes of the more militant ALP members. His first few months as leader indicate his resolve to modernize the structure and image of his party which has suffered successive defeats nationally since 1949.

Whitlam was born in Kew, Victoria in 1916. His early education was in Canberra and he studied law at Sydney University. From 1941 to 1945 he served in the RAAF. On his return to civilian life he was admitted to both the New South Wales and federal bar. In 1952 he was elected to federal Parliament for the seat of Werriwa, New South Wales, the seat he still holds.

Whitlam's views on foreign policy tend to put him in the forefront of the moderate wing of the Australian Labour Party. He rejects approaches based on obsolete socialist dogma and usually examines a problem in the context of its practical effect on Australia. Like many others in the Labour Party, however, he carries a strong support for the UN to somewhat of an extreme. This is often a reflection of a lack of concrete alternative policy to suggest in place of the government's position on many items which he must oppose in Parliament.

Whitlam is an exceptionally tall man who looks younger than his 50 years and who makes a good public impression in person and on television. His wife, Margaret, who is the daughter of Australian Justice W. R. Dovey, was an Australian swimming champion. The Whitlams have four children.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-521

By ju, NARA, Date 10-29-93

May 26, 1967

CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BOHLEN

Paris 19201 flak

Pursuant to telephone call today, following is our current assessment of French attitude:

1. French deny that Russians have "refused" four power get together. While this may not be completely true, French position continues to maintain it in order to avoid consequence of further reassessment of French position in event of Soviet genuine refusal.
2. The French continue to believe that an important element in present situation is avoidance of any actions which would tend to aggravate situation, i. e., movement of Israeli ships into Gulf of Aqaba, public statements or declarations of principles not accepted universally, such as linking Vietnam situation with current developments in Middle East.
3. De Gaulle's policy still remains one of disengagement from what he regards as extreme position of support of Israel taken by Fourth Republic. De Gaulle is attempting to keep a delicate balance between Israel and Arabs.
4. De Gaulle also in pursuit of General policy for avoiding any semblance of tripartite Western solidarity vis-a-vis Russian, which he regards as smacking of "cold war." De Gaulle's position will obviously have to be considerably reexamined in the event that Soviets definitely refuse quadripartite consultation with the three Western powers. In such event De Gaulle will have to consider whether or not he wishes to try and maintain uneasy neutral balance or line up with Great Britain and U. S. in defense of Western interests.
5. As is so often the case in regard to current French policy, it will have to await De Gaulle's decision based upon situation as it appears to him at that moment.
6. I believe that statement following Cabinet Ministers meeting last Wednesday, May 24, represents accurate summary of French position at that moment which up to the present has not changed.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-520
By *jw*, NARA, Date *4-30-92*

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Thursday, May 25, 1967
9:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

This line of chatter from the
Soviet Charge with one of our staff
will, I believe, interest you.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)
White House Guidelines Feb. 24, 1983
By *rg/dch* NARA, Date *5-21-91*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, May 26, 1967

Profile

Mr. President:

I have a memorandum of conversation, October 12, 1966, between Nasser and Mr. James E. Birdsall of New York, a lawyer and friend of Arthur Krim's.

Also he called on me and reported directly his impression that Nasser desperately needed a food loan and that we should comply. You will recall this was a view conveyed to us by a number of transient businessmen late last year. At that time Mr. Birdsall's contact with Nasser came through a Mr. Siddiqui, of ALCO Products, Inc., and Ali Hafiz, member of the Egyptian National Assembly.

Against this background, I report the following:

At 4:10 p.m. today, Friday, May 26, 1967, Mr. James E. Birdsall telephoned the following message:

"I have this message, conveyed from Nasser. I don't vouch for it. I am just the conduit.

"Earlier Siddiqui visited Cairo and had a visit with Nasser. Nasser told him he would still like to be friendly with the U. S. and would like to see Siddiqui again after May 20. On May 20 Siddiqui cabled Ali Hafiz in Cairo and inquired whether visit still desired. Less than 24 hours had reply that emphatically Nasser wanted to see him. On May 24 he visited Nasser.

"This is the message from Nasser: 'Now is the time when all Arab people are waiting to see an act of friendship on the part of the USA. His urgent request is that the U.S. undertake no direct military action in the form of landings, shifting of naval fleet, or otherwise. Nasser assured Siddiqui that the UAR had no intention of fighting. What they are doing is returning to the 1956 frontier. He assured Saddiqui that this matter would soon be terminated without any fighting. He informed Saddiqui that his current actions were intended only to prove to the Arab world that Saudi Arabia and Jordan are false friends. And the Arabs should follow Nasser who is their friend. He also wishes to prove that President Johnson is impartial as between the Arabs and Israel and that he will not take any sides in the present war of nerves. If President Johnson can grant Nasser's request, he can be assured that Nasser will place his entire services at President Johnson's disposal. '

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Authority 76g.8352
By SP-100, NARA, Date 5-21-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

"If, after President Johnson's consideration, there is any good news to convey to Cairo, Nasser requests that he (Birdsall said he assumed it would be from him (Birdsall) to Saddiqui to Ali Hafiz to Nasser) cable to arrange another meeting at an early date."

Mr. Birdsall ended by saying he would like a telephone call as to whether message given to President Johnson, so he can notify Nasser.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Friday - May 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appraisal of the Guatemalan Security Situation

Our Embassy in Guatemala has made an appraisal of the Communist insurgency threat over the past six months. These are the highlights:

1. The threat has been considerably reduced, but not eliminated.
2. Increased efficiency and greater aggressiveness of the security forces has resulted in the death or capture of several key members of the rural guerrilla and urban terrorist apparatus. The insurgents are now on the defensive.
3. The success of the security forces has made them look like "winners" and the population has responded by being increasingly helpful in providing information. .
4. With the approval of President Montenegro and his party's top leadership, the security forces have conducted a counter-terrorism campaign against the Communists.
5. Despite rumors of military plotting, there are no significant indications that the armed forces are planning to overthrow President Mendez Montenegro.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-522
By sig, NARA, Date 3-2-92

~~SECRET~~

May 25, 1967

Mr. Kuchin

1032

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Luncheon Conversation with Yuri N. Tcherniakov, Charge d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy

Near East. Tcherniakov either had or feigned very little understanding of the economic importance of Eilat to Israel. I mentioned the transformation of the port in the past ten years (since Suez was closed to Israel), the pipeline, etc. I said this helped explain why Israel would regard a blockade as an attempt at strangulation. Besides, such a blockade could serve no UAR interest except that of ultimately driving the Israeli into the sea.

Tcherniakov's reaction was to say he thought Nasser had only threatened to blockade the port, and was not yet actually blockading it. He suggested it might be better not to require some sort of declaration from Nasser that he will not blockade the port, but simply to facilitate his not doing so. I pointed out that ships were on their way. Tcherniakov suggested it was possible Nasser might not stop them. Tcherniakov talked from an assumption the blockade might not now be in force -- although it is hard to know his reasons for doing so. I asked if he knew whether the straits were mined. He said he did not know.

Tcherniakov said the important thing was to get a cooling-off of the situation, and to exert our influence to calm things down. I said this struck me as a good idea -- assuming Nasser wasn't trying to seal off the Gulf while we were doing so. I said my understanding was that the Gulf and terrorist raids from Syria were the most explosive issues, with the Gulf the more immediate one. Tcherniakov said he had found a certain similarity in the Soviet and American statements on the crisis, and he found this reassuring. He also observed that both we and they were sensitive to the question of navigation -- not just in the Gulf of Aqaba. I acknowledged that this was an issue which had ramifications elsewhere. Tcherniakov went on to make a reference to our naval vessels in the Black Sea.

I asked what Federenko had meant by his references to the Sixth Fleet. I wondered if anything was particularly bothering the Soviet Government in this regard, adding that they surely didn't expect us to turn and sail straight out of the Mediterranean. Tcherniakov said that nothing was particularly bothering them at present and they had not noticed any naval movements which particularly concerned them. He said it was what we might do that bothered them. Tcherniakov made it pretty clear he regarded Federenko's statement as in the nature of a warning.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-1-99

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In this connection, Tcherniakov digressed to express concern about the new military regime in Greece. He went on to say that his Bulgarian colleague was also worrying. I said I could understand Bulgarian concern, considering the history between Bulgaria and Greece, but this was hardly a strategic threat to Bulgaria or anybody else, and certainly not something to worry about in these terms. Tcherniakov acknowledged this was so.

Returning to the Near East crisis, we talked about the importance of all the great powers restraining their friends. Tcherniakov said it wasn't so easy -- "as these days we are surprised to act as neighbors, not as those who call the tune." He laughed and said he would tell me a story about a conversation he had had recently with a representative of some small Eastern European country. The man from this country told him they had decided to establish relations with a certain non-Communist state -- Tcherniakov hoped I would excuse him if he didn't mention which one. He had answered that the USSR had thought about doing the same thing. The representative of the small socialist state then said: "It will be nice when you, too, can be independent." Tcherniakov said it seems that France is the only one in that enviable position these days. (Tcherniakov might have been talking about Romania's interest in establishing relations with Spain -- or some Latin American country.) I commented that the problems which went for his country as a great power, also go for us.

Far East. Tcherniakov, who is the senior Far East expert at the Soviet Embassy, said his personal opinion was that the Vietnam War will be decided in the South. He said that the setting-up of a new government this October will be very important. The final settlement must come from inside South Vietnam and from talks held there between the South Vietnamese themselves -- Viet Cong and Government.

Tcherniakov said we Americans tend to oversimplify the relationship between Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese and China. He said that our own figures for the number of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops in the South show there is still a heavy preponderance of Viet Cong.

Tcherniakov made a flat statement that he sees no prospects for a solution of the Vietnam War on the international level. He said that the triangle of the U.S., the USSR and China just won't allow a solution.

According to Tcherniakov, rumors of a U.S. landing in the North or the blockade of Haiphong was the talk of Moscow a week or two ago. He said that it caused very great concern. His impression now was, however, that these rumors were dying away -- perhaps because of the Near East crisis.

I said I couldn't speak for the President or what he might think was necessary for the future, but I knew of no Presidential decision to land in North

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Vietnam or blockade Haiphong. I suggested Tcherniakov look at the press reports he was talking about, as I doubted he would find any direct link in timing between the eruption of the Near East crisis and the trend of speculation.

Tcherniakov then said there was speculation that the President was being pressed to act decisively in Vietnam before the 1968 elections. I said I was confident the President would not decide these matters on the basis of electoral politics. I went on to say that I personally thought there was a kind of sea change in public attitude with more understanding of the President's position -- even though the heavier pressures still seemed to come from the hawks. I also thought that Nixon's reportedly improved prospects for the Republican nomination might affect this. Tcherniakov seemed surprised that Nixon appeared to be improving his chances and made an unflattering remark.

Bilateral and Other Issues. Tcherniakov did not have any information about prospects for ratification of the Consular Convention.

We mentioned the dates under consideration for the deposit of Outer Space Treaty ratifications, but he had no answer on that.

On Dobrynin's return, he said he expected the Ambassador by the end of the month. He said some inspectors here had seen Dobrynin a few days ago in Moscow. Dobrynin had told them: "I'll see you in Washington." As they are returning to the USSR some time during the very first days of June, Tcherniakov assumes that's the timing. He said he had no official word. He went on to say, however, that there was no reason to conclude that any extended absence was in the wind. If Dobrynin was not here by the end of the month, he was sure he would come shortly thereafter.

On Non-Proliferation, Tcherniakov said he was very disappointed at what he regarded as the fast-dimming prospects for a treaty. He said Kiesinger had shown himself altogether too skillful in pushing us around -- using flexibility as a ploy. He went on to say that Germany's new, flexibility policy toward Eastern Europe had also made a lot of trouble among the socialist states.


Tcherniakov said he was sure West Germany was the villain of the Article III trouble. I questioned this, pointing out that France's attitude was not entirely clear as regards her reaction if her EURATOM partners go under IAEA safeguards. I also said that the EURATOM leadership in Brussels and the other members were by no means convinced. Tcherniakov's reaction was that the USSR doesn't care whether Italy and the others sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty or not. It is West Germany that counts. He went on: "Here we have negotiated an important accord, embodied in Article I, and you seem to be letting the whole thing fall to the ground because you are letting West Germany tell you what to do."

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4

I asked Tcherniakov about ABMs and whether we were likely to get an answer any time soon. His reply was that this question needs a calm atmosphere -- it is too delicate, important, and intimate a question to be negotiated just any time. I asked him if he meant that we should wait for the end of the Non-Proliferation talks. He said yes, but also the Near East crisis and Vietnam -- particularly those rumors of new escalation. At this point it is better to have no answer than the wrong answer.

Tcherniakov was interested in knowing what the National Security Council staff was. I told him briefly, including the difference between the Eisenhower OCB/NSC staff system and the much smaller staff groups under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.


Nathaniel Davis

cc: Mr. Rostow/Mr. Smith
Mr. Bator
Mr. Ash
Mr. Toon, EUR/SOV (State)
Mr. Sonnenfeldt, INR/RSB (State)
S/S - State

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~~SECRET~~

104

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-168
By cb, NARA Date 1-22-01

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, May 25, 1967
9:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

This is one of the first reports we have that the bombings of Hanoi have adversely affected the morale and vision of victory of the political leaders in Hanoi.

W. W. Rostow



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY

IN 74616

104a

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCA SDO AID
USIA ONE ORR DCS CGS

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM



THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

CITE TDCS -314/07362-67

DIST 25 MAY 1967

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM


DOI: MAY 1967

SUBJECT: CLAIM THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS ARE DAUNTED BY
BOMBINGS.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

ACQ:

SOURCE:



EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

1.

ALTHOUGH THE MORALE OF NORTH
VIETNAMESE LEADERS IS STILL HIGH, THEY HAVE BEEN STRONGLY SHOCKED
BY THE BOMBINGS OF NORTH VIETNAM, PARTICULARLY RECENT BOMBINGS NEAR
HANOI. THE LEADERS ARE STILL DETERMINED TO FIGHT, BUT THEIR VISION
OF VICTORY IS LESS CLEAR.

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-170

By cb NARA Date 1-24-01

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
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TDCS-314/07362-67

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

OBSERVERS

PREVIOUSLY HAD STATED THAT THE BOMBINGS WERE
CONSOLIDATING THE DETERMINATION OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO FIGHT ON.)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

2. [REDACTED] HEARD IN HANOI THAT A UNITED STATES
ROCKET HAD HIT IN FRONT OF THE EAST GERMAN EMBASSY AND KILLED A
VIETNAMESE MAN.

3. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP-1

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

PRESERVATION COPY

Thursday, May 25, 1967
9 pm

~~1. 104~~
2. Pres file

105

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

This analysis of the Arab-Israeli crisis, [REDACTED] is interesting. It makes Nasser out to be shrewd, but not mad. As it points out, he is gambling on the Israelis going to the UN rather than attacking.

3.4(b)(1)

It fits with a report I've just received on the telephone from Phil Potter (and gave to Secretary Rusk). Potter says there will be an 11:30 a.m. press briefing at the UAR Embassy tomorrow. The Press Attache says its purpose will be to try to present the UAR position on Aqaba in moderate terms and to diminish the sense in the U. S. that Nasser is endangering U. S. interests.

Potter said to the Attache, "Would I be correct in thinking the purpose will be 'low key'?" The Press Attache answered that that was a correct presupposition.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET NOFORN~~ attachment

[REDACTED]

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-244
By ns, NARA, Date 7-17-83

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1967 MAY 25 7 51

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-242
By us, NARA, Date 10-17-03

SECRET NOFORN CONTROLLED DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

TDCS-815/01755-67 (ADVANCE)

COUNTRY: ARAB STATES/ISRAEL

DOI: MAY 1967

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] THE CURRENT

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

ACQ:
SOURCE:

ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS

FIELD NO. [REDACTED]

1. THE CLOSING OF THE GULF OF AQABA TO SHIPS FLYING AN ISRAELI FLAG OR CARRYING STRATEGIC MATERIAL TO ISRAEL PROVES THAT UAR PRESIDENT NASIR'S INTENTIONS ARE VERY SERIOUS. HE FEELS SECURE ENOUGH TO TAKE SUCH A STEP FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

- A. HE IS CONFIDENT OF SOVIET SUPPORT;
- B. HE BELIEVES THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE NO ACTION;
- C. HE WILL GAIN TIME ENOUGH TO SOLIDIFY HIS DEFENSES IN SINAI; AND
- D. HE IS CONVINCED THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL SEEK UNITED NATIONS INTERCESSION ON THE AQABA ISSUE RATHER THAN ATTACK.

2. NASIR IS GAMBLING WITH POSSIBLE HOSTILITIES IN THE HOPE OF EXACTING HEAVY CONCESSIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES AS THE PRICE OF HIS KEEPING THE PEACE. HE WILL TRY TO OBTAIN BOTH WHEAT AND MONEY FROM THE UNITED STATES AS THE PRICE FOR HIS AVOIDING WAR WITH ISRAEL. IN THE MEANTIME, HE FEELS SECURE WITH REGARD TO YEMEN, BECAUSE HE BELIEVES THAT NEITHER SAUDI ARABIA NOR JORDAN WILL DARE TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST HIM THERE WHILE THE UAR IS ENGAGED IN A CLOSE DISPUTE WITH ISRAEL. HE WILL NOT ATTACK, BUT WILL ATTEMPT TO PLACE ISRAEL IN THE POSITION OF AN AGGRESSOR. IN THE MEANTIME HE WILL PUSH AS HARD AS HE CAN TO OBTAIN THE PRICE HE WANTS FOR AVOIDING CONFLICT. HIS BELIEF THAT ISRAEL WILL GO TO THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE AQABA GULF ISSUE, AND WILL NOT ATTACK, IS THE MAIN ELEMENT OF HIS GAMBLE.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCMEAFSA [REDACTED]

Pres file
106

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, May 25, 1967
6:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a direct report from Wilson --
more full than that we received in Canada this
afternoon.

Sec. Rusk is reading it; and you will no
doubt wish to discuss it with him.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 5-15-91

WWRostow:rlh

001/25

MAY 25, 1967

FROM PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-166
By is, NARA Date 1-7-00

106a

MESSAGE BEGINS

I HAVE NOT BEEN IN TOUCH WITH YOU DIRECT SO FAR ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION BECAUSE OUR PEOPLE HAVE BEEN IN SUCH CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS TOUCH AND PARTICULARLY BECAUSE GEORGE THOMSON HAS HIMSELF BEEN IN WASHINGTON DISCUSSING ALL THIS WITH DEAN RUSK. BUT WE HAVE TAKEN STOCK TODAY IN THE CABINET IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT WE HAVE HEARD FROM GEORGE BROWN IN MOSCOW - (WHICH I AM BOUND TO SAY, IS NOT SO FAR PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING ON THIS FRONT): OF GEORGE THOMSON'S REPORT: OF MY OWN TALK YESTERDAY WITH EBAN (YOU WILL HAVE HAD AN ACCOUNT OF THIS VIA GEORGE THOMSON): AND, FINALLY, IN THE LIGHT OF DE GAULLE'S PROPOSAL THAT THIS SHOULD BE HANDLED, AT LEAST INITIALLY, ON A FOUR POWER BASIS.

THE FRENCH HAVE TOLD US - AND NO DOUBT YOURSELVES - THAT THEY ARE THINKING IN THE FIRST INSTANCE OF A MEETING OF THE FOUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK. THEIR APPROACH RESTS AS YOU KNOW ON THE BASIC PROPOSITION THAT, IF ANY GOOD IS TO COME OUT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IT CAN ONLY RESULT FROM SOME FOUR POWER UNDERSTANDING. IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR TO ME HOW FAR DE GAULLE HAS THOUGHT THROUGH THIS PROPOSITION. HIS POLITICAL PURPOSES ARE, OF COURSE, FAIRLY TRANSPARENT IN TERMS OF FRENCH INFLUENCE AND OF SEEKING TO AVOID FRENCH INVOLVEMENT IN ANY EXCLUSIVELY WESTERN APPROACH. EBAN TOLD ME THAT DE GAULLE ADVISED HIM STRONGLY NOT TO GET TOO CLOSELY INVOLVED IN ANY EXCLUSIVELY WESTERN (TIE-UP).

BUT THE FACT THAT THIS APPROACH MAY BE DESIGNED TO ENHANCE FRENCH STANDING AND, PERHAPS, TO CUT DOWN TO SIZE SOME OF THE GENERALLY WESTERN ALLIES, NEED NOT, IN MY VIEW, PREVENT OUR RECOGNISING ITS INTRINSIC MERITS. IT SEEMS TO US TO HAVE TWO POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES. FIRST, IF WE CAN GET THE RUSSIANS INTO A FOUR POWER DISCUSSION - AND AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED I WOULD BE GLAD FOR THIS TO HAPPEN EITHER AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL IN NEW YORK AS AT PRESENT SUGGESTED BY THE FRENCH, OR EVENTUALLY AT A MUCH HIGHER LEVEL SOMEWHERE ELSE (SUMMIT IF NECESSARY) IN VIEW OF THE TERRIBLE DANGERS INVOLVED - THIS COULD MEAN THAT THEY ARE CLEAR-HEADED ENOUGH TO SEE THE IMMENSE DANGERS OF A MAJOR CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST IN A PART OF THE WORLD WHERE NEITHER SIDE CAN CONFIDENTLY EXPECT TO CONTROL THE PASSIONS OR REACTIONS OF THE LOCAL PARTICIPANTS. IN THAT SITUATION, THERE MIGHT BE A PROSPECT OF REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THEM. SECONDLY, IF THE FRENCH INITIATIVE PETERS OUT BECAUSE THE RUSSIANS WILL HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT, THE FRENCH CAN HARDLY THEN JUST FOLD THEIR HANDS AND PLAY NO FURTHER PART. THE PROSPECT OF DRAWING THEM INTO A WIDER WESTERN OPERATION SHOULD BE SOMEWHAT ENHANCED. EITHER WAY, THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE SHOULD BE A LITTLE BRIGHTER.

PRESERVATION COPY

THEY ARE CLEAR-HEADED ENOUGH TO SEE THE IMMINENT DANGERS OF A MAJOR CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST IN A PART OF THE WORLD WHERE NEITHER SIDE CAN CONFIDENTLY EXPECT TO CONTROL THE PASSIONS OR REACTIONS OF THE LOCAL PARTICIPANTS. IN THAT SITUATION, THERE MIGHT BE A PROSPECT OF REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THEM. SECONDLY, IF THE FRENCH INITIATIVE PETERS OUT BECAUSE THE RUSSIANS WILL HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT, THE FRENCH CAN HARDLY THEN JUST FOLD THEIR HANDS AND PLAY NO FURTHER PART. THE PROSPECT OF DRAWING THEM INTO A WIDER WESTERN OPERATION SHOULD BE SOMEWHAT ENHANCED. EITHER WAY, THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE SHOULD BE A LITTLE BRIGHTER.

THESE ARE THE REASONS WHY WE DECIDED TODAY TO ANNOUNCE OUR SUPPORT FOR THE FRENCH PROPOSAL - AND I DARE SAY THAT IN AUTHORIZING ARTHUR GOLDBERGS STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA, WHICH I SAW LAST NIGHT, YOUR GOVERNMENT HAD THE SAME KIND OF CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND.

MEANWHILE, WE HAVE, AS YOU WILL HAVE HEARD, AGREED THAT GEORGE THOMSON SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK OUT WITH DEAN RUSK THE TERMS OF ANYEVENTUAL APPROACH TO THE OTHER MARITIME POWERS AND OF THE DRAFT DECLARATION FOR WHICH WE MIGHT CANVASS THEIR SUPPORT. WHEN THE CABINET DISCUSSED THIS THIS MORNING, IT WAS CLEAR TO US, FROM THE REPORTS ALREADY RECEIVED FROM OUR AMBASSADORS IN A NUMBER OF KEY MARITIME COUNTRIES, THAT WE SHOULD NOT GET THE KIND OF SUPPOT THAT IS REQUIRED FOR ANY SUCH DECLARATION UNTIL ALL EFFORTS TO GET SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE OUT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE DEMONSTRABLY FAILED. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND GIVEN THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF THE FRENCH PROPOSAL ANYWAY, WE FELT THAT BEFORE WE COULD FINALLY DECIDE ON THE TERMS AND METHOD OF PROPOSING THE JOINT APPROACH TO THE MARITIME POWERS, WE MUST GIVE THE FRENCH FOUR-POWER APPROACH A CHANCE TO PROVE ITSELF,

AS I WRITE THIS, I LEARN THAT BY THE TIME IT REACHES YOU, YOU WILL PROBABLY HAVE TALKED WITH MIKE PEARSON. I NEED NOT SAY HOW MUCH I WELCOME THIS MEETING. CANADA HAS A KEY ROLE TOPLAY IN ALL THIS AND WE SHALL OF COURSE BE KEEPING IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH THEM TOO. THIS IS INDEED A FURTHER REASON WHY I AM VERY GLAD THAT I SHALL BE ABLE NEXT WEEK TO SEE BOTH MIKE AND YOURSELF. CLEARLY WE SHALL HAVE TO GIVE A GOOD DEAL OF TIME TO THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. I HOPE THINGS THERE WILL BE A BIT CLEARER BY THE TIME WE MEET - AND I HOPE EVEN MORE THAT THERE WILL NOT HAVE BEEN A MAJOR EXPLOSION THERE - BUT I AM SURE YOU SHARE MY OWN DESIRE THAT, OVERSHADOWED AS EVENTS MAY BE FOR THE TIME BEING BY THE ARAB-ISRAEL CRISIS, WE SHALL BE ABLE TO HAVE A GOOD TALK ABOUT THE OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES ON OUR AGENDA. IF, MEANWHILE, YOU CAN LET ME KNOW HOW YOU SEE THINGS, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR TALK WITH MIKE, I SHALL WELCOME THIS.

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE ENDS

PRESERVATION COPY

LWE
107
2 Pres. file

Thursday, May 25, 1967, 12:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a message of sympathy to the King of Belgium on the flash department store fire that killed more than 300 people. (There is speculation that the fire was set in protest against a sale of American goods.)

Queen Elizabeth, de Gaulle, Saragat, etc., are also sending messages.

Francis M. Bator

Approve ✓

Disapprove

Speak to me

*Do we need to check
with State?
L*

FMB:EKH:mst

107a

MESSAGE TO THE KING OF BELGIUM

Your Majesty:

I was most distressed to learn of the tragic loss of life in Monday's disastrous fire in Brussels. On behalf of the American people, I would like to extend to you and to the bereaved families my deepest sympathy and condolences.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-522
By ing, NARA, Date 3-2-93

Profile

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, May 25, 1967 -- 8:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

The following are talking points for your meeting with Prime Minister Pearson. There are no bilateral subjects which you need to take up with the Prime Minister.

You will probably want to spend most of your time discussing the Middle East, and possibly Vietnam.

(1) The Middle East

(The latest situation report will be ready for you before your departure from Montreal. A background paper is at Tab A.)

(2) Vietnam.

Given the criticism we have gotten recently from some top-level Canadians, you may want to review our efforts to get to the negotiating table. At Tab B is a short background paper on Paul Martin's four-point Vietnam proposal of last April.)

Subjects Pearson May Raise.

(1) NATO. Pearson may say that he

- is concerned about the redeployment of American troops from Germany;
- hopes we will consult in the full NATO Council before any further decisions are made.

You may wish to say that

- troops and planes deployed from Germany will remain committed to NATO;
- we have no plans for further redeployments;
- we will continue to consult fully in NATO on force levels.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-2-

(2) NORAD and ABM's. The Prime Minister may

- say that he is worried about the future of the North American air defense system;
- ask about the status of our talks with the Soviets on missile limitations.

You may wish to say that

- there has been no decision to deploy ABM's;
- we still hope for positive results from the U.S. - Soviet talks;
- we will remain in close touch with Canada on ^{developments} ~~deployments~~;
- the need for a joint defense against the manned bomber is still with us;
- the air defense agreement with Canada (which expires next year) can be renewed without regard to decisions on the ABM question.

(3) Economic Affairs.

(If Pearson raises any economic matters, you might tell him that Secretary Rusk and other Cabinet members will be ready to discuss these problems at the annual joint Cabinet meeting from June 20-22.)

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LSEagleburger:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 25, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Pakistan as an Aid Model

Attached is a memorandum by Dick Gilbert, one of the American economists who deserve much credit for Pakistan's economic performance. While he's a partisan in the cause of Pakistani development, his credentials are excellent.

I pass this along because he feels strongly that we are on the verge of a major development breakthrough in Pakistan (and even in India though it will come more slowly). He says this is true across the board but particularly in agriculture as the new seeds pay off. He knows we badly need a resounding success as a boost to our whole aid program and sees it shaping up here.

He sees the rapid spread of the new seeds quadrupling yields and producing the highest agricultural growth rates ever achieved anywhere. Next year he sees a wheat crop 30-50% higher than this year's. The extent of the breakthrough that could follow is indicated by these figures: 8 million acres of irrigated land now produce 80% of Pakistan's wheat crop; last year only 3-400,000 of those acres were planted with the new seeds; in the coming year he expects some 2 million acres to be so planted; in the following year it could be as much as 4 or 5 million acres. Each acre so planted produces 4-6 times as much as when planted with old seeds. That spread explains the basis for his projections.

On the industrial front he recalls that production grew about 15% a year before the India-Pak war--one of the highest rates in any developing country. He sees Pakistan doing even better with proper help now. Exports have been growing at 12-13% during the past two years. Increased rates of production in agriculture and industry will increase export earnings even further. The faster this happens the sooner Pakistan will be able to finance its own self-sustaining growth.

He urges that we turn ourselves inside out to reap the payoff our past investment entitles us to. To do this he recommends we make two exceptions to our current practice:

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-522

By 4-8, NARA, Date 3-2-93~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5/25/67

1. Timing our aid. He believes we ought to make a pledge at the consortium meeting next week. He feels a definite amount offered now would boost Pak imports early in the fiscal year. Current practice would dictate delaying until after the Congress appropriates funds.

2. Amount of aid. He believes we should include Export Import Bank program lending in our pledge to raise it. So far Harold Linder has refused to do even the \$25 million Bill Gaud asked him for to support Pakistan's impressive agricultural program (fertilizer). The Paks have delayed their steel mill in order to give higher priority to agriculture so Ex-Im should have the money it had set aside for that.

I will be sending you shortly the Gaud-Freeman recommendation on the position we should take at the Pak consortium meeting in London next week. And these issues may arise then; but I did wish you to have available the views of a knowledgeable optimist -- perhaps a bit over-hopeful, but perceptive.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 9, 1967

THE AID PROGRAM

1. There is an impression that the aid program means another generation of the frustration of recent years--high costs and little return. This is a mistake.

South Asia, which I know intimately, stands on the brink of a breakthrough in rates of growth in agriculture and industry, which, in a few years, will not only make it self-sufficient in foods, but diminish the need for external assistance generally. These developments will prove U.S. investment in South Asia wise as well as generous, and should change attitudes in Congress, reviving support for aid.

2. The breakthrough is, however, contingent upon adequate support now. Unfortunately, even if the Europeans contribute a fair share, as they will, the aid appropriation for next year will almost certainly provide less than for this. The President should make use of Ex-Im resources to bridge the gap until Congressional attitudes change, much as Roosevelt used the RFC during the New Deal. Ex-Im should be directed to make loans against commodities, which are the critical requirement.

PAKISTAN

Pakistan, during the Second Plan made remarkable progress in agriculture and industry, under wise and pragmatic free market policies, but based on strong U.S. support. In spite of the setback due to the war and stoppage of aid, all experts are agreed that unparalleled growth rates for a developing country lie within its grasp.

In agriculture a combination of excellent policies: incentive support prices for farmers, subsidies on fertilizers and pesticides, energetic support for rapid multiplication of small private tube wells; and the rapid spread of new high-yielding seeds (Mexican wheat, dwarf rice developed by the International Rice Research Institute, high-yielding hybrids of corn and sorghum) quadrupling yields, promises the highest growth rates in agriculture ever achieved anywhere. The wheat crop this year is likely to be at an all time high in spite of the drought. Next year a wheat crop a third to a half greater than this year's is a strong possibility. Pakistan's performance by next spring may provide a model for developing countries.

In industry, in the 15 years before the set-back, production grew at about 15 per cent per annum, doubling every five years--the highest rate of industrial growth in any developing country. This rate can be resumed and, indeed, exceeded.

Finally, Pakistan's export performance has been excellent, exports growing at 7.5 per cent per annum during the Second Plan and at 12-13 per cent per annum during the past two years. This has made it possible for Pakistan to increase rapidly the proportion of the resources required for development provided from its own resources. The increased rates of production in agriculture and industry will increase export earnings still further, increasing Pakistan's own contribution to its development and diminishing, in a very short time, the past dependence on external support.

The United States has, over the years, provided up to two-thirds and never less than half of the external resources that have made Pakistan's development possible. The interruption of aid, mostly from the U.S., checked the dynamism of the economy. It would be ironic if the U.S. were to withhold adequate support from a program it nourished so long, which is on the verge of producing such rich returns, and which can provide precisely the model of free market policies we need for the developing world.

INDIA

Indian performance during the Third Plan was very disappointing, but all experts agree that there were four reasons for this:

- (1) Bad agricultural policies.
- (2) Overvaluation of the currency and messy foreign exchange control management which discouraged exports.
- (3) An investment program that channeled resources into new plant at the cost of denying raw materials to existing capacity, severely restricting the growth of industrial production.
- (4) Inadequate external assistance, which on a per capita basis was less than half that provided Pakistan. While India, with abundant industrial raw materials and a large capital goods industry, both of which Pakistan lacks, needs less external aid than Pakistan per capita, there is no doubt that it was under-supported.

The critical policies have now been changed. In agriculture, while it will take several years before these policies can produce the results they are now producing in Pakistan, there are already clear signs of rapid improvement. Fertilizer is being imported in quantity. Tube wells are multiplying at heartening rates and, most important, the new seeds, with four-fold increases of yields, are spreading rapidly. A normal monsoon next year should produce a radical increase in the crop. The spread of better seed and the rise of fertilizer and water use should, within 2 or 3 years, completely alter the Indian agricultural picture, even if it does not quite produce self-sufficiency.

All experts agree that India has an excellent industrial plant that could produce growth rates of production and exports comparable to those of Pakistan. The policies which really prevented this have been changed, but full implementation waits upon assurance that the resources will be provided.

As in the case of Pakistan, the U. S. has a large investment in India. Now that India, under U. S. persuasion, has adopted policies which have produced such excellent results in Pakistan, there is a double reason for providing the necessary support.

Richard V. Gilbert

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, May 25, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith the same message Eban
transmitted to Secretary Rusk as it
was received and evaluated by
Ambassador Barbour.

WWR

Mr. Rostow

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Pres file

PRESERVATION COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

1102

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action CONTROL : 26941
RECD : MAY 25, 1967, 8:05PM
Info FROM : TELAVIV
ACTION: SECSTATE FLASH

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DE RUQMV L 3785 1452310
ZNY TTTTT
Z 252240Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH
STATE GRNC
BT

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-179
By is, NARA Date 2-8-00

~~TOP SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 3785

NODIS

1. FONOF DIRECTOR GENERAL LEVAVI ACCOMPANIED BY ARGOV OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT CAME TO NA HOUSE 2300 YOURS THIS EVENING. LEVAVI SAID THEY CALLED AT MOMENT OF GRAVE PERIL FOR ISRAEL. INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN SENT TO HARMAN FOR EBAN, WHO SHOULD BE CONSULTING WITH HIGHEST U.S. LEVELS WITHIN HOURS, TO SAY THAT ATTACK BY EGYPT AND SYRIA APPEARED IMMINENT AND THAT IT ESSENTIAL FOR U.S. TO DECLARE ITS INTENTION ABIDE BY ITS COMMITMENTS AND TO IMPLEMENT DECLARATION BY APPROPRIATE MOVEMENT U.S. FORCES TO ISRAEL'S SUPPORT.

2. INFORMATION ON WHICH THIS CONCLUSION OF EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN INTENTIONS BASED IS: (1) EGYPT HAS HELD ESTABLISHMENT OF SECOND ARMY GROUP IN SINAI TO REINFORCE DIVISIONS ALREADY THERE AND HAS ORDERED ARMORED BRIGADE FROM YEMEN TO JOIN SUCH GROUP. IT

PAGE 2 RUQMV L 3785 ~~TOP SECRET~~
HAS INCREASED TANKS IN SINAI TO TOTAL OF 800 RPT 800. IT HAS REVERSED NAVAL FORCES PROCEEDING TO AQABA AND ORDERED THEM RETURNED TO MEDITERRANEAN. IT HAS SENT CABINET MINISTER TO MOSCOW TO COORDINATE OPERATIONS BETWEEN EGYPTIANS AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS. IL SYRIA IS TO RECEIVE IRAQI TROOPS BY AIRLIFT AND HAS INCREASED OFFENSIVE POSTURE ITS FORCES ALREADY ON FRONTIER. (3) JORDANIANS HAVE ANNOUNCED WILLINGNESS ACCEPT IRAQI AND SAUDI ARABIAN TROOPS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 3785 FROM TELAVIV (NODIS)

3. IN ADDITION TO FOREGOING EGYPT HAS STARTED FABRICATING INCIDENTS WITH ISRAELIS SUCH AS ALLEGED CLASH WITH BORDER PATROL

4. ALL THIS INDICATES THAT EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS NO LONGER CONCERNED WITH AQABA BUT PREPARED LAUNCH FULL SCALE ATTACK AGAINST ISRAELI EXISTENCE.

5. I NOTED THERE APPEARED DOUBT THAT IN FACT JORDANIANS ANTICIPATE ANY IRAQI OR SAUDI TROOPS THERE TO WHICH LEVAVI RESPONDED JORDANIANS NOT IMPORTANT. THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION IS EGYPT AND SYRIA AND HE REITERATED THAT THESE DEVELOPMENTS MOST PERILOUS FOR ISRAEL.

6. WHILE IT OBVIOUS THIS FURTHER ATTEMPT STRENGTHEN FOREIGN MINIVER DAN'S HAND IN DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON, I AM CONFIDENT

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 3785 ~~TOP SECRET~~ 5025X(1)
34(b)(1)
THAT ISRAELI APPREHENSIONS ARE TO THEM MOST GENUINE. AS
INDICATED IN MORE DETAIL IN REPORT
EARLIER TODAY INFORMATION REPEATED TO ME TONIGHT AS TO EGYPTIAN
MOVES IS IN LARGE PART RESULT HARD INTELLIGENCE AND THERE EVERY
COLLATERAL INDICATION EGYPTIAN BELLIGERENCE UNABATED.

7. I TOLD LEVAVI THAT SINCE EBAN HAD DEPARTED FOR WASHINGTON I DID NOT HAVE FURTHER INFORMATION IN ADDITION TO THAT I HAD PASSED ON ON TUESDAY BUT THAT IT MY IMPRESSION THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN U.S. DETERMINATION AS I HAD EXPRESSED IT TO THEM AT THAT TIME.

GP-1. PARBOUR
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-522
By W8, NARA, Date 3-2-93

111
Long
2. Profile

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - May 25, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your 11:30 Appointment with Five US Ambassadors to Latin America

The visit of the five Ambassadors is a courtesy call. The Ambassadors are:

John W. Tuthill	-	Brazil
Raul H. Castro	-	El Salvador
Claude G. Ross	-	Haiti
J. Wesley Jones	-	Peru
Maurice M. Bernbaum	-	Venezuela.

Brief biographic sketches are attached.

If you have the time, you might ask all of them how the OAS Summit meeting looked from their capitals. You might also ask the following specific questions:

1. Tuthill: There have been some indications that we may have more difficulty dealing with Brazil during the Costa e Silva administration. Does the Ambassador think this is true and, if so, what kind of problems does he foresee?

2. Castro: President-elect Sanchez takes office on July 1. What are the prospects of his giving Salvador stability and what will be the thrust of his administration?

3. Ross: Since he is going to Haiti to replace Ambassador Timmons, you might express your concern about trends in Haiti and your desire for timely information and recommendations prior to an explosion rather than after the event as in the DR.

4. Jones: Ask him about the chances of President Belaunde meeting the conditions of the \$40 million program loan which Linc Gordon and Bill Gaud have recommended that you approve.

5. Bernbaum: Ask him about the status of Venezuelan consultations on their case against Cuba for supporting guerrillas.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment - Biographic sketches.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1112
May 25, 1967

Biographic Sketches

John W. Tuthill - Ambassador to Brazil

A Foreign Service Career Minister, John W. ("Jack") Tuthill has been Ambassador to Brazil since June 1966. Prior to this he was our Ambassador to the European Economic Communities in Brussels and had served in European assignments for most of his twenty-seven years in the Foreign Service.

Born in Montclair, New Jersey, he considers Illinois his home now. Energetic and having worked hard to establish good relations with key Brazilian figures, Ambassador Tuthill has gotten off to a good start in Brazil. He met with you in the White House before, most recently on January 26, 1967, during President Costa e Silva's visit to Washington.

Raul H. Castro - Ambassador to El Salvador

Ambassador Castro, who has been in El Salvador since December 1964, is a Mexican-born, naturalized American. Following five years of service as a clerk in the American Consulate in Agua Prieta, he worked his way through Law School at the University of Arizona by teaching Spanish. Castro then practiced law and was thereafter elected District Attorney, Judge of the Superior Court and Juvenile Court Judge. He left the bench to accept appointment as Ambassador. Through the years the Ambassador has been active in legal, civic and Mexican-American groups.

Maurice M. Bernbaum - Ambassador to Venezuela

A career officer who has spent most of his career in Latin America, Ambassador Bernbaum ("Maurie"), 57, has been at the Embassy in Caracas since February 1965. Before that he was Ambassador to Ecuador from 1960 to 1965. He has also served as Minister Counselor in Buenos Aires and Director of South American Affairs in the Department of State. He is a native of Illinois.

Claude G. Ross - Ambassador to Haiti

Claude G. ("Tony") Ross, 49, is a career Foreign Service Officer with 28 years of experience. He has recently returned from a four-year

DETERM'NED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY gww per DCH ON 9-25-91

assignment as Ambassador to the Central African Republic. He is scheduled to be sworn in as Ambassador to Haiti by Secretary Rusk just prior to his meeting with you.

Ross was born in Chicago, moved to California at an early age, and attended the University of Southern California. He served an aggregate of eight months as Charge d'Affaires in Guinea during the difficult days of 1960-61, and was also responsible for much of the evacuation operation during the Stanleyville crisis in 1964.

J. Wesley Jones - Ambassador to Peru

Ambassador Jones ("Johnny") is a career Foreign Service Officer. He was appointed Ambassador to Libya in 1958 and since 1963 has served in Peru. Prior to this, Ambassador Jones had served in 10 overseas posts and had numerous tours in Washington. He is 59 years old and a graduate of George Washington University.

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*t. simp
2 Pers file*

Monday - May 22, 1967

Mr. President:

Linc Gordon requests the opportunity
to pay you a farewell call before he
leaves his job on June 2.

Should I set up an appointment?

Yes ☒

No ☐

See me ☐

Wed May 31 1:15pm

W. W. Rostow

cc - Jim Jones