

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[1 of 10]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>open 5-10-93 NLJ 92-4</i>	6/12/67	A
1a cable	Paris 20073 exempt NLJ 92-6 S 2 pp. <i>Open 5/11/00 NLJ 99-301</i>	6/12/67	A
5 memo	Smith to the Pres. re USSR <i>open 10-20-99</i> C 1 p. [duplicate of #2, NSF, NSC History, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 5, "sanitized NLJ 82-184]	6/12/67	A
13 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re USSR <i>open 5-10-93 NLJ 92-4</i> S 1 p.	6/10/67	A
18 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re USSR " S 1 p. <i>(Duplicate of #174, NSF, CF, Canada, Vol 5, Box 167)</i>	6/9/67	A
18a memcon	between Ritchie, Kohler <i>open 6-1-92</i> S 1 p. <i>NLJ 92-6</i>	6/8/67	A
18b cable	from Moscow (not US cable) <i>exempt NLJ 92-6</i> PCI 4 pp. <i>Open 7/24/00 NLJ 99-301</i> <i>(Duplicate of #174b, NSF, CF, Canada, Vol 5)</i>	6/8/67	A
18c cable	from Moscow (not US cable) <i>exempt NLJ 92-6</i> PCI 2 pp. <i>Open 7/24/00 NLJ 99-301</i> <i>(Duplicate of #174b, NSF, CF, Canada, Vol 5)</i>	6/8/67	A
20 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>open 5-10-93 NLJ 92-4</i>	6/9/67	A
20a draft	Letter to "Mr. Chairman" " S 3 pp.	6/9/67	A
24 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East <i>open 10-20-99</i> C 1 p. [duplicate of #101, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 4," sanitized NLJ 82-152]	6/9/67	A
25 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam <i>open 5-10-93</i> TS 1 p. <i>NLJ 92-4</i>	6/9/67	A
25a report	Weekly Report #11 TS 1 p. <i>open 5-15-92 NLJ 92-5</i>	undated	A
25b map	Vietnam " PCI 1 p.	undated	A
29g cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 pp. <i>sanitized 1-13-93 NLJ 92-2</i>	6/8/67	A

FILE LOCATION

Same sanitization 9/13/01 NSJL 99-247
NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, "Volume 30,
June 1 - 12, 1967," Box 17

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
29h cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>exempt per RAC 3/04</i> S 1 p. exempt 1-13-93 NLJ 92-2 <i>Exempt 4/13/01 NS/RAC 99-247</i>	6/8/67	A
31 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>sanitized 12-3-93 NLJ 92-3</i>	6/9/67	A
31a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 4 pp. <i>sanitized 1-13-93 NLJ 92-2</i> <i>same sanitization 4/13/01 NS/RAC 99-247</i>	6/8/67	A
32 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Greece C 1 p. <i>open 5-10-93 NLJ 92-4</i>	6/9/67	A
35 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re VP's stop in Tokyo " S 1 p.	6/9/67	A
39b cable	from CIA <i>sanitized 1-24-01 NLJ 99-302</i> S 1 p. [duplicate of #84b, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 4," sanitized NLJ 82-156]	6/8/67	A
43a cable	Vientiane 7599 <i>open 6-1-92 NLJ 92-6</i> TS 3 pp.	6/7/67	A
44a	Duplicate of #43a <i>open 10-20-99 NLJ 92-6</i>		
45a message	Kosygin to the Pres. <i>open 10-20-99</i> PCI 1 p. <i>exempt 5-28-92 NLJ 92-4</i>	6/8/67	A
49 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re USSR <i>open 5-10-93 NLJ 92-4</i> C 1 p. [duplicate of #4, NSF, Country File, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 4," exempted NLJ 84-125]	6/8/67	A
49a cable	Algiers 3980 <i>sanitized 6-1-92 NLJ 92-6</i> C 2 pp. <i>Sanitized 6/1/00 NLJ 99-301</i> [duplicate of #4, NSF, Country File, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 4," exempted NLJ 84-121]	6/7/67	A
50 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>sanitized 12-3-93 NLJ 92-3</i>	6/8/67	A
50a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 pp. exempt 1-13-93 NLJ 92-2 <i>Exempt 4/13/01 NS 99-247</i> <i>exempt per RAC 3/04</i>	6/7/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
52a cable	USUN 5654 Sanitized 5/1/00 NLS 99-301 C 3 pp. [duplicate of #150, NSF, Country File, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 4," sanitized NLJ 84-119]	undated	A
52e cable	report sanitized 1-13-93 NLS 92-2 S 1 p. Same Sanitization 9/13/01 NLS 99-247	6/7/67	A
52f cable	from CIA sanitized 1-13-93 NLS 92-2 S 1 p. sanitized 2-5-01 NLS/RAC 99-226 same	6/8/67	A
54 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Philippines S 2 pp. open 5-10-93 NLS 92-4	6/8/67	A
54a memo	Rusk to the Pres. S 3 pp. open 8-26-92 NLS 92-6	6/5/67	A
54b letter	Pres. to Pres. of Philippines PCI 4 pp. open 5-10-93 NLS 92-4	6/8/67	A
62a memo	Rusk to the Pres. re Banda open 6-1-92 C 2 pp. NLS 92-6	6/7/67	A
62b report	for Pres. meeting with Banda of Malawi " C 3 pp.	undated	A
63a	Duplicate of #62a. open 10-20-99 NLS 92-6		
63b	Duplicate of #62b. open 10-20-99 NLS 92-6		
64 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Afghanistan open 5-10-93 NLS 92-4 C 1 p. Dup. #44, NSF, Files of Wriggins, "Afghanistan" Box/	6/7/67	A
64a memo	Schultze to the Pres. open 5-10-93 NLS 92-4 C 2 pp. Dup. #46, Wriggins as above	5/29/67	A
64b memo	Gaud to the Pres. open 1-24-92 C 2 pp. NLS 92-1	5/12/67	A
67 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Korea S 1 p. open 5-10-93 NLS 92-4	6/7/67	A
67a cable	Seoul 6635 open 6-1-92 S 3 pp. NLS 92-6	6/7/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
69 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East <i>Open 7/26/00 NS 99-303</i> S 3 pp. [duplicate of #53, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 4," sanitized NLJ 82-159]	6/7/67	A
73 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re VP's trip to Asia S 2 pp. <i>open 5-10-93 NLJ 92-4</i>	6/7/67	A
75 letter	to "Mr. Chairman" " PCI 1 p.	6/7/67	A
77 cable	Pres. to Chairman Kosygin " PCI 1 p.	6/6/67	A
78	Duplicate of #77 "		
79 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Nigeria " PCI 1 p.	6/6/67	A
79a message	Pres. reply to Gen. Gowon of Nigeria " PCI 1 p.	undated	A
79b cable	Gowon to the Pres. <i>Open 7/26/00 NS 99-303</i> PCI 2 pp. <i>exempt 5-28-92 NLJ 92-4</i>	5/30/67	A
82 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>sanitized 12-3-93 NLJ 92-3</i>	6/6/67	A
82a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 pp. <i>sanitized 1-13-93 NLJ 92-2</i> <i>Same sanitized 9/13/01 NS/RAC 99-247</i>	6/5/67	A
87 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East C 1 p. <i>open 5-10-93 NLJ 92-4</i>	6/6/67	A
95 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East <i>Exempt 2-5-01 NLJ 99-304</i> S 1 p. <i>exempt 6-10-93 NLJ 92-3</i> <i>up # 102, NSF, CF, Middle East Crisis NSC Cable Box 106</i>	6/6/67	A
95a cable	Tel Aviv 3937 <i>Open 5/1/00 NS 99-301</i> S 2 pp. <i>exempt NLJ 92-6</i> <i>dup # 102a as above</i>	6/5/67	A
96 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. <i>open 5-10-93 NLJ 92-4</i>	6/5/67	A
96a cable	Paris 19869 <i>open 6-1-92</i> S 2 pp. <i>NLJ 92-6</i>	6/5/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
97 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. open 5-10-93 NLJ 92-4	6/5/67	A
98	Duplicate of #95 Exempt 25-01 NLJ 99-304 open 3-26-09 NLJ 08-16 (6/02)		
98a	Duplicate of #95a Open 5/1/00 NLJ 99-307		
101 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Mexico C 1 p. open 5-10-93 NLJ 92-4	6/5/67	A
102 message	PM Wilson to Gen. Gowon of Nigeria open 10-20-99 PCI 1 p. exempt 5-28-92 NLJ 92-4	6/5/65	A
103 memo	Rostow to the Pres. S 1 p. Sanitized 12-3-93 NLJ 92-3	6/4/67	A
103a cable	Paris 19766 Open 5/1/00 NLJ 99-301 S 1 p. exempt NLJ 92-6	6/2/67	A
103b cable	Paris 19767 Open 5/1/00 NLJ 99-301 S 1 p. exempt NLJ 92-6	6/2/67	A
103c cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 pp. Sanitized 1-13-93 NLJ 92-2 NS/RAC 99-247	6/3/67	A
103d cable	Vientiane 7477 C 1 p. open 6-1-92 NLJ 92-6	6/2/67	A
104a memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 6 pp. open 5-10-93 NLJ 92-4 [Duplicate of #69, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 3," exempted NLJ 83-160]	6/4/67	A
105 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re USSR S 1 p. Sanitized 12-3-93 NLJ 92-3 (dup # 234, NSF, CF, Middle East Crisis Vol 3 Cable Box 106)	6/3/67	A
105a cable	Intelligence Information Cable exempt per RAC 3/04 S 3 pp. exempt 1-13-93 NLJ 92-2 (dup # 234a as above) Exempt 9/13/01 NS/RAC 99-247	6/2/67	A
106 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. Sanitized 12-3-93 NLJ 92-3	6/3/67	A
106a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 pp. exempt 1-13-93 NLJ 92-2 Exempt 9/13/01 NS/RAC 99-247 exempt per RAC 3/04	6/2/67	A
-107b draft	letter Pres. to PM of Israel S 2 pp. Sanitized 8/23/01 NLJ 99-303 same sanitization 8-3-11 NLJ 11-82	undated	A

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108 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re USSR TS 1 p. open 5-10-93 NLJ 92-6	6/3/67	A
108a cable	to General Meyer TS 1 p. open 5-15-92 NLJ 92-5	6/2/67	A
113a cable	Paris 19764 Open 5/1/00 NLJ 99-301 S 2 pp. exempt NLJ 92-6	6/2/67	A
114a cable	Paris 19661 Open 5/1/00 NLJ 99-301 S 1 p. exempt NLJ 92-6	6/1/67	A
114b cable	Paris 19662 Open 5/1/00 NLJ 99-301 S 2 pp. exempt NLJ 92-6	6/1/67	A
114c cable	Paris 19660 Open 5/1/00 NLJ 99-301 S 2 pp. exempt NLJ 92-6	6/1/67	A
115a cable	Deptel to Tel Aviv, sanitized 2-5-01 NLJ 99-304 same S 5 pp. [duplicate of #57a, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, vol. 3," sanitized NLJ 83-160] + 35b, NSF, Country file, ME Crisis Vol. 3 (memos + Mex)	6/2/67	A
118 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. Open 5/25/01 NS/RAC 00-131 [duplicate of #48, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 3," exempted NLJ 83-162] exempt 6-18-93 NLJ 92-3 Exempt 2-5-01 NLJ 99-304	6/2/67	A
118a memo	Helms to the Pres. S 3 pp. exempt 1-13-93 NLJ 92-2 Exempt 1-24-01 NLJ 99-302 [partial duplicate of #48a, NSF, NSC History, + dup # 70 b as above) "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 3," exempted NLJ 83-163]	6/2/67	A
118b report	re Middle East S 2 pp. exempt 1-13-93 NLJ 92-2 Exempt 1-24-01 NLJ 99-302 [partial duplicate of #48a, NSF, NSC History, + dup # 70 b as above) "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 3," exempted NLJ 83-163]	6/2/67	A
119a cable	Djakarta 5855 exempt NLJ 92-6 S 3 pp. sanitized 1/17/00 NLJ/RAC 99-247	6/2/67	A
120 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East Open 10-20-99 S 1 p. exempt 5-28-92 NLJ 92-4	6/2/67	A
122a cable	Lisbon 1517 TS 5 pp. open 10-20-99 [duplicate of #44, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 3," sanitized NLJ 82-173]	6/2/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
123a cable	Cairo 8349 Sanitized 5/1/00 NLJ 99-301 S 4 pp. Open 5/18/01 NS 00-299 [duplicate of #41a, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 3," sanitized NLJ 83-166] dup #88a, NSF, CF, Middle East Crisis Vol 3 memos + min Box 107	6/2/67	A
133 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re UK C 1 p. exempt 5-28-92 NLJ 92-4 [duplicate in UK Visit File, 6/1/67] OPEN 3.27.98 STATE GUIDELINES	6/1/67	A
134 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. Open 5-10-93 NLJ 92-4 [duplicate of #22, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 3," exempted NLJ 83-160]	6/1/67	A
136 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. Open 7/26/00 NS 99-303 [duplicate of #20, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 3," sanitized NLJ 83-160] dup #95, NSF, CF, Middle East Crisis Vol 3 memos + min. Box 107	6/1/67	A
136a cable	Damascus 1224 Open 6-1-92 NLJ 92-6 S 2 pp. [duplicate of #20a, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 3," exempted NLJ 82-172]	6/1/67	A
136b cable	Cairo 8313 S 1 p. Open 5/1/00 NLJ 99-301 [duplicate of #20b, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 3," sanitized NLJ 81-146] dup #95b, NSF, CF, Middle East Crisis Vol 3 memos + min. Box 107	6/1/67	A
138a cable	New Delhi 17606 S 3 pp. Open 5/1/00 NS 99-301 [duplicate of #18a, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 3," sanitized 1983] dup #98a as above	6/1/67	A
140 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. Sanitized 12-3-93 NLJ 92-3	6/1/67	A
145 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Panama Open 5-10-93 NLJ 92-4 C 1 p. [duplicate of #132, NSF, Country File, Panama, Vol. 9]	6/1/67	A
145a memo	Rusk to the Pres. re Panama Open 6-1-92 NLJ 92-6 C 2 pp. [duplicate of #132b NSF, Country File, Panama, Vol. 9]	5/31/67	A
148 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Latin America C 1 p. Open 5-10-93 NLJ 92-4	6/1/67	A

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149 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Colombia C 2 pp. <i>sanitized 12-3-93 NLJ92-3</i>	6/1/67	A
151 memo	Rostow to the Pres. C 1 p. <i>open 5-10-93 NLJ92-4</i>	6/1/67	A

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#104 memo	Walt Rostow to the President 1:15 p.m. Sanitized, 6/10/91 1 p	6/4/67	C
#12 memo	Walt Rostow to the President 5:05 p.m. TS 1 p <i>OPEN 22403 NLJ/RAC 04-49</i>	6/10/67	A
#23 memo	Walt Rostow to the President 1:05 p.m. TS 1 p <i>EXUMPT 3-11-05 NLJ/RAC 04-51</i>	6/9/67	A
#23a rpt	Intelligence report TS 3 pp <i>Exempt 9-12-07 NLJ/RAC 04-52</i>	6/7/67	A
#29 memo	Walt Rostow to the President S 1 p (duplicate of #88, National Security File, NSC History, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 5, Sanitized, NLJ 82-161)	6/9/67	A
#29a cable	Intelligence report TS 1 p <i>exempt RAC 5103</i>	6/9/67	A
#29b cable	Intelligence report TS 1 p <i>exempt RAC 5103</i>	6/9/67	A
#29c cable	Intelligence report S 6 pp <i>exempt RAC 5103</i>	6/8/67	A
#29d cable	Intelligence report S 3 pp <i>exempt RAC 5103</i>	6/8/67	A
#29e cable	Intelligence report S 2 pp <i>exempt RAC 5103</i>	6/8/67	A
#29f cable	Intelligence report S 1 p <i>exempt RAC 5103</i>	6/8/67	A
#42 memo	Walt Rostow to the President 1:05 p.m. S 1 p <i>Sanitized 2-24-04 NLJ/RAC 04-49</i>	6/8/67	A
#42a memo	Intelligence report S 1 p <i>Exempt 6-22-04 NLJ/RAC 04-50</i>	6/8/67	A
#48 memo	Walt Rostow to the President 10:10 a.m. TS 1 p <i>Sanitized 2-24-04 NLJ/RAC 04-49</i>	6/8/67	A
#48a cable	Intelligence report TS 1 p <i>Exempt 6-22-04 NLJ/RAC 04-50</i>	6/8/67	A

FILE IN National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 30,
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#52 memo	Walt Rostow to the President 9:15 am TS 1 p <i>Sanitized 3-11-05 NW/RAC 04-49</i>	6/8/67	A
#52b cable	Intelligence report TS 1 p <i>exempt RAC 5103</i>	6/8/67	A
#52c cable	Intelligence report TS 1 p <i>exempt RAC 5103</i>	6/8/67	A
#52d cable	Intelligence report TS 1 p <i>exempt RAC 5103</i>	6/6/67	A
#71 memo	Walt Rostow to the President TS 1 p <i>Sanitized 2-24-04 NW/RAC 04-49</i>	6/7/67	A
#71a cable	Intelligence report S 1 p <i>exempt RAC 5103</i>	6/7/67	A
#71b cable	Intelligence report S 1 p <i>exempt RAC 5103</i>	6/7/67	A
#79a memo	W. W. Marshall for the record S 1 p <i>exempt RAC 1/06</i>	5/26/67	A
#92 memo	Walt Rostow to the President 11:10 a.m. TS 1 p <i>exempt RAC 5103</i>	5/26/67	A
#92b memo	Thomas Hughes to Secretary of State TS 3 pp <i>exempt RAC 5103</i>	5/26/67	A
#117 memo	Walt Rostow to the President 5:30 p.m. TS 1 p <i>Open 3-11-05 NW/RAC 04-49</i>	6/2/67	A

National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 30,
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Pres file

Monday, June 12, 1967
9:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

This is a quite interesting cable from the French on the Communist failure to generate much public opinion heat against us because of our Hanoi-Haiphong attacks of recent months. The French conclude that we are awfully clever.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 20073

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4
By rip, NARA, Date 4-9-93

WWRostow:rlh

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

WH
12 6

~~SECRET~~

Action CONTROL : 10214
RECD : JUNE 12, 1967 12:38 PM

Info

RR RUEHCR
DE RUFNCR 20073 1631545
ZNY SSSSS
R 121219Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ PARIS 20073

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-301
By id, NARA Date 4-24-00

NODIS MARIA THREE

SUBJECT: FRENCH COMMENT RE BOMBARDMENT OF HANOI.

QUAI TELEGRAM DATED JUNE 5 FROM HANOI SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE HANOI SIDRE WIRED THAT SINCE IT HAD BEEN 15 DAYS SINCE THE BOMBING OF HANOI, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO EXAMINE THE IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS, WHICH COULD BE SUMMARIZED AS UNDERLINING THE WEAKNESS OF INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO NEW US BOMBING POLICY.

HE STATED THAT FROM THE 19TH THRU THE 21ST OF MAY TWO ECHELONS OF US AIRCRAFT HAD DELIBERATELY ATTACKED A PURELY ECONOMIC TARGET, THE CENTRAL ELECTRICITY PLANT. HE STATED THAT ONE YEAR AGO THE EVENT WOULD HAVE BEEN PROTESTED BY THE ENTIRE WORLD WITH CONSIDERABLE EMOTION BUT THAT NOW IT MUST BE SAID THAT WORLD OPINION DID NOT SEEM TO BE VERY CONCERNED.

WHEREAS THE HANOI PRESS HAD PRINTED ENTIRE PAGES OF WORLD PROTESTS,

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 20073 ~~SECRET~~
ON EXAMINATION THEY WERE SHOWN TO EMANATE FROM MASS PRO-COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS.

THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE STATED THAT DIPLOMATIC REACTIONS HAD BEEN VERY SPARCE. FOUR COMMUNIST STATES HAD SPECIFICALLY AND OFFICIALLY PROTESTED THE ELECTRICITY PLANT BOMBARDMENT. THESE WERE CHINA AND NORTH KOREA ON MAY 21, EAST GERMANY ON MAY 22 AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON MAY 26. THREE OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES HAD MADE SEMI-OFFICIAL PROTESTS: POLAND THROUGH US CHARGE AT WARSAW, HUNGARY THROUGH THE

~~SECRET~~

20
PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 20073, JUNE 12.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMISSION, AND MONGOLIA. ALL OTHER COMMUNIST STATES HAD BEEN QUIET.

THE FOREGOING PROVED THE LACK OF UNITY AND ACTION WITHIN THE SO-CALLED "SOCIALIST CAMP". THE USSR HAD ABSTAINED FROM COMMENT, ACCORDING TO HANOI PRESS. SOVIET SILENCE HAD BEEN EVEN MORE NOTICEABLE IN VIEW OF ITS FAILURE ALSO TO ENTER WITH MORE VIGOR IN THE NEAR EAST WAR. RUMANIA HAD ALSO BEEN SILENT WHICH WAS EQUALLY SURPRISING SINCE THEIR EMBASSY HAD BEEN DAMAGED, LIKE THAT OF NORTH KOREA, BY US ROCKETS. THE RUMANIAN AMBASSADOR SHOWED CONSIDERABLE EMBARRASSMENT IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE AND CLAIMED THAT, DESPITE HIS BEST EFFORTS, HIS ADVICE HAD BEEN DISREGARDED IN BUCHAREST.

THE ABSENCE OF COMPLAINTS FROM THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD WAS EVEN MORE ASTONISHING, PARTICULARLY REACTIONS FROM FRANCE. LE MONDE HAD PRINTED

PAGE 3 RUFNCR 20073 ~~SECRET~~

A DOZEN LINES AND THE AFP MADE ONLY THE BRIEFEST REFERENCE TO THE HANOI BOMBINGS. THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE INDICATED THAT THIS WORLD-WIDE APATHY, FORMERLY INCONCEIVABLE, WAS DUE TO: A) WORLD PRE-OCCUPATION WITH THE NEAR EAST WAR; B) THE INDECISION OF THE SOVIET UNION WHICH HAD REPERCUSSIONS ON ITS COMMUNIST FRIENDS, C) THE EXCESSES AND MALADROITNESS OF HANOI PROGAPANDA, WHICH WAS KNOWN TO THE WORLD PRESS AS HAVING SACRIFICED OBJECTIVITY FOR RHETORIC, AND LASTLY D) THE ABSENCE OF NON-COMMUNIST JOURNALISTS WHO WERE NECESSARY TO ATTRACT THE SERIOUS WORLD PRESS.

SIDRE CONCLUDED THAT IF THE SITUATION CONTINUED IT COULD ONLY WORK IN THE FAVOR OF THE US IN LESSENING THE EMOTION AND INTERNATIONAL PROTESTS ON WHICH HANOI COUNTS. THE US GOVERNMENT WAS EMPLOYING "SALAMI TACTICS" (GRINNOTAGE) AS WELL AS "ESCALATION". THE US HAS THUS BEEN ABLE TO BOMB HAIPHONG, ATTACK AIRPORTS, VIOLATE THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, DESTROY ENTIRE CITIES AND ECONOMIC PLANTS OVER A THREE-MONTH PERIOD. THEY ARE ALLOWED HENCEFORTH TO DO WHAT THEY DID NOT DARE DO ONE YEAR AGO.

BOHLEN

~~SECRET~~

PRELIMINARY COPY

Monday, June 12, 1967
6:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I assume from earlier conversation that Mac Bundy will be along at lunch tomorrow (Tuesday), with Secretary McNamara and Nick Katzenbach.

Mac suggests that Tommy Thompson might be invited, if we wish to discuss the possibility of stimulating a meeting between Sect. Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko. I have since learned that Gromyko is probably coming to the U. N. this week and so, presumably, we can fix a meeting if he is willing and we wish it.

W. W. R.

Invite Tommy Thompson also _____

MEMORANDUM

3

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 12, 1967
6:00 p. m.

Lunch with the President
Tuesday, June 13, 1967, 1 P. M.

Agenda

1. Middle East Issues not dealt with Monday, June 12 (Mr. McGeorge Bundy)
2. Compatriot (Sect. McNamara)
3. Bombing Policy (Sect. McNamara)
4. A Rusk-Gromyko Meeting in New York (Under Sect. Katzenbach)
5. Secretary McNamara's Trip to Viet Nam (Sect. McNamara)
6. Other

Walt R.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By kg, NARA, Date 5-23-91

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Monday, June 12, 1967
5:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

I am informed that the First Lady is so modest about her trips that she would not make available to you this file. I can report from a day with her that her trip deeply moved the Vermonters -- whose feelings are not easily set in motion.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file 5

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, June 12, 1967, 4:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Soviets to ask for Emergency UN General Assembly Session.

The Italian ambassador in Moscow has told us that the Russians are planning to ask for an extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly to meet immediately to discuss:

- a. Situation in the Middle East
- b. Withdrawal of aggressors from occupied territory to armistice lines
- c. Liquidation of the consequences of the aggression

Although our Charge in Moscow has not been given this information by the Soviet government, he has been requested to obtain clearances for the flight of a Soviet plane to New York on June 14 or 15, details of the delegation to be provided later. When asked if Foreign Minister Gromyko would be coming, the Soviet officer said he didn't know yet.

In this connection, the press is reporting Prime Minister Eshkol as having told his legislature that Israel wanted to negotiate directly and bi-laterally with the Arab countries rather than in the United Nations.

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

CONFIDENTIAL

6

Monday, June 12, 1967, 11:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a
pleasant farewell message to
President Banda of Malawi.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐

EKH:mst

6a
—

DRAFT FAREWELL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BANDA

Your Excellency:

As you leave the United States, I want you to know how much I enjoyed this all-too-brief renewal of our friendship. Your understanding and support are particularly comforting to me in these troubled times.

trust
I ~~hope~~ I made clear our continuing interest in the strides the people of Malawi are making to further their economic development. No enterprise is more important to the future of mankind -- nor closer to my own heart -- than the effort of the developing nations to realize their economic potential. Malawi, and its distinguished President, occupy a place of honor in this historic undertaking.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in wishing you a safe and happy voyage home.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda
President of the Republic of Malawi
U. S. Embassy
London

~~Mr. Rostow~~ 7

Pres file

CONFIDENTIAL

June 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to King Hussein

One of the simple gestures we could make toward Hussein without any policy cost would be a private thank-you for his help in evacuating our people. This was the toughest of the evacuation jobs because of the heavy damage to Jordanian airports. We recommend the following:

appreciate
"I am ~~deeply~~ *appreciate* of the magnificent support you and your security forces have given to ensure the safe evacuation of Americans and other members of the international community from Jordan. No government could have done more. I am ~~profoundly~~ grateful."

"With warm personal regards."

Mac Bundy concurs.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NY 82-122
By sg/ios, NARA, Date 6-4-91

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, June 12, 1967

⁸
Pre file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

On the foreign visitor schedule which you approved for the last half of 1967, the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, was slated for December. Our Ambassador reports that the Prime Minister would like to schedule the visit earlier -- primarily because he wants to avoid the cold weather season (he has a sinus problem), and he foresees a possible conflict with a London visit planned for December.

We have checked your and Mrs. Johnson's schedules and find that October 17 is open and would be agreeable to the Prime Minister.

If you approve October 17, we will inform the Prime Minister and arrange for a simultaneous announcement, which George Christian will confirm with you later.

OK to shift to October 17 _____

See me _____

I suggest the following program for the visit:

- greeting on the lawn
- meeting in your office for an hour
- black tie dinner

Approve program _____

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

cc: Jorden

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E.O. 12356, Sec 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb 24, 1983
E: RF, NARA, Date 6-4-91

9
1

Monday, June 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Appointment with Ambassador Thompson at noon,
June 13**

Although Ambassador Thompson has discussed with you in various meetings during the past week Soviet attitudes toward the Middle East crisis, he is hopeful that during his private meeting with you he can discuss other and broader aspects of US-USSR relations.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:BKS:amc

10
Pres file

Monday, June 12, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. Delegation for Korean President's Inauguration

President Park will be inaugurated on July 1, 1967. The Korean Government has invited the United States to send a special mission to the inaugural ceremonies, and has suggested the group be composed of no more than five persons.

Vice President Humphrey will lead the delegation. The mission should also include George S. Newman, Charge d'Affaires of our Embassy in Seoul.

As additional members, the State Department recommends:

-- a Member of Congress (State suggests Senator Church who was helpful in dealing with the Korean item on the last UN General Assembly);

-- a state governor (State proposes Connally of Texas, or, if a bipartisan group is desired, Governor Rockefeller of New York);

-- if additional official representation is desired, State suggests Assistant Secretary Bundy;

-- from outside the U.S. Government, State suggests at least one of the following:

Eugene Black (well-known in Korea);

Robert B. Anderson (former Secretary of the Treasury);

Richard Patterson (Chairman of Far East-American Council);

Stanley Marcus (President of Nieman-Marcus);

Cyril Magnin (of Joseph Magnin, Inc., San Francisco).

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)

WHI: [unclear], Feb. 24, 1983

By h8, NASA, Date 6-4-91

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Approve:	Senator Church	_____
	Other Senator	_____
	Governor Connally	_____
	Governor Rockefeller	_____
	Other Governor	_____
	Congressman	_____
	Bill Bundy	_____
	Eugene Black	_____
	Robert B. Anderson	_____
	Stanley Marcus	_____
	Cyril Magnin	_____
	Others	_____
	See me	_____

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

11
Pres file

Sunday, June 11, 1967 -- 10:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

One thought about the Viet Nam problem in the light of our recent Middle East experience.

It was again demonstrated that the Soviet government, on balance -- to put it mildly -- does not wish us well. I suppose the moderates in the Soviet government were strengthened by the failure of the Soviet Middle East adventure as they were temporarily strengthened by failure in the Cuba missile gambit. And I do think that in this 50th anniversary year the Soviet Union would prefer not to have a major direct confrontation with the U. S. Nevertheless, we must not count on their taking us off the hook in Viet Nam cheaply or easily.

Therefore, if we undertake a peace gambit with the USSR on Viet Nam in the days ahead, as I would be inclined to do, we must do it against the background that some time during July we may have to up the ante in Viet Nam: with respect to troops and, even, with respect to bombing.

I tried to suggest this in the drafting of the proposed message to Kosygin.

To make this more credible, we might this week open some kind of conversation on Viet Nam with the Russians, either through a note from you to Kosygin, Secretary Rusk meeting Gromyko in Geneva after NATO, or both.

Then about mid-month Bob McNamara and Bus Wheeler would go to Viet Nam; and it should not be too deeply concealed that they are assessing what may be required to push the war forward hard if we cannot get a diplomatic break soon. In short, without giving the Soviets anything like an ultimatum, they ought to get the feeling that, unless they want to face quite a lot more pressure in Viet Nam, including, quite possibly, increased risks of a confrontation with us in Southeast Asia, they had better try to get more active in Hanoi.

Incidentally, I talked with Sec. Rusk about the Asian Chiefs of State meeting around the 19th. He had had the impression that Holt had thought we had better wait until after the Vietnamese election. He himself thinks it would be unfortunate until Ky and Thieu straighten themselves out; and he believes there are some scheduling problems. In any case, I shall be following through on this tomorrow, Monday, June 12.

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Authority NSC 68 2/14/11 (NLJ 81-101)

By lg/lhw NARA, Date 6-4-91
WW Rostow:rlm

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Saturday, June 10, 1967
5:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

These intercepts -- showing some honest ambiguity about the ship after the attack -- suggest that there may have been a breakdown of communications on the Israeli side; that is, the tactical base which first received word that the ship was American may not have flashed that information to other air force and naval units.

We shall, of course, analyze this affair further.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

SS 137-67

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-49
By SJ, NARA, Date 2-11-04

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, June 10, 1967
5:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith State Department's account of Soviet references to you during your Presidency.

The problem is complicated because in the summer of 1965 Amb. Dobrynin persuaded them to lay off personal references. Therefore, they have included in this some of Federenko's less gracious observations about "the White House."

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4
By ing, NARA, Date 4-9-93

Log 2235

~~SECRET~~

~~LOG 2235~~

~~LOG 2235~~

WWRostow:rln

W.J.R. 14
Presfile

June 10, 1967; 12:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Prime Minister of Iceland.

At Tab A, for your approval, is a warm note to the Prime Minister of Iceland thanking him for:

- his letter on the 20th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan (Tab B);
- Iceland's \$50,000 gift to the Thor Thors Fund for Icelandic-U.S. educational and cultural exchanges (Thors was a long-time Ambassador to the U.S.). The ~~gift~~ was made in commemoration of the Marshall Plan.

I suggest we not release your letter here, but tell the Icelanders they can do so if they wish.

Francis M. Bator

1. OK to send message ✓

No _____

Speak to me _____

2. Tell Icelanders they can release text ✓

No _____

SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER OF ICELAND

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your very kind message on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Marshall Plan. I should also like to thank you, ~~and~~ the Government and people of Iceland for the generous grant to the Thor Thors Fund. This gift is a fine expression of the warm friendship and understanding between our two peoples which Ambassador Thors did so much to strengthen.

Lyndon B. Johnson

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF ICELAND

The President

The White House, Washington, D. C.

On the occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Marshall Plan

I wish to assure you, Mr. President, that the generous American aid and imaginative leadership for post-war European recovery is still warmly cherished by the Icelandic people.

Bjarni Benediktsson
Prime Minister

15

~~SECRET~~

Friday, June 9, 1967

8:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

This survey of Soviet attitudes toward the Middle East conflict is, in one sense, clearly out of date. But it does provide a run down on how other people look at their interests in the world. If you have time, you may want to look through it.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

INR memo to Sec State, June 6, 1967

"International Reactions to Mid-East Hostilities." log 9729

DECLASSIFIED
WH (Guideline 2) 2/24/83
E.O. 12356 sec. 3.4(b)
Authority _____
By reg, NARA, Date 6-4-91

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, June 9, 1967
8:45 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Eshkol's offer for
retribution with respect to the
families of the men on the LIBERTY.

We shall have to establish what
normal practice is in these circum-
stances. It may involve also
retribution for physical damage.

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356 Sec 3 (b)
White House Guidelines Feb 24, 1983
By MS, NARA, Date 6-10-91

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

162

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

51
Action

55
Info

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RR RUEHC
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ZNY CCCCC
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TEL AVIV 4028

LIMDIS

PRIME MINISTER ASKS THAT USG BE INFORMED THAT GOI
WILLING TO MAKE RETRIBUTION TO THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS
OF THE LIBERTY NAVAL INCIDENT AND TO INQUIRE WHETHER SUCH
RETRIBUTION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. PLEASE ADVISE. BARBOUR
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State Dec 8-8-78
By 129/109, NARA, Date 6-10-81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, June 9, 1967 -- 8:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Bob Anderson called me this afternoon to tell me the following:

-- The negotiation is now at the wire. He hopes to wind it up at a meeting starting at 10:00 a.m. tomorrow with Panamanian negotiators.

-- On the gut issue of financing, they will keep the 90¢ toll, which leaves 25¢ left over above costs. He would first propose a division of 17¢ for Panama; 8¢ for the U.S. His fallback is 20¢ for Panama, 5¢ for the U.S. This means that Panamanians might fetch up with between \$15 and \$20 million a year, depending on traffic. This compares with the \$80 million a year they sought.

-- We would permit Panamanian jurisdiction over certain criminal cases in the Zone for personnel not associated with the Canal; tourists, etc.

-- The lock canal treaty would terminate in the year 2000 except if we were actually in the process of building a new sea-level canal at that time, in which case the treaty would run on to the year 2010.

-- The treaty governing the sea-level canal would run 60 years from the time it became operational.

-- Compensation to be paid Panama under a sea-level canal treaty would be decided at the time of the financing and in the light of the financing method. (Bob Anderson cleared this position, which varied from his initial instructions, with Bob McNamara and Covey Oliver.)

-- We will give up to the Panamanians certain territories which we have agreed with the JCS; but two antenna fields would have to be moved at some future time, involving an estimated cost of \$6 million.

-- We would also surrender an area in which we have military quarters, which are desirable but not necessary to the defense arrangements.

-- We would surrender some piers for which they would be able to earn some money.

-- We would surrender one area containing houses now occupied by Panamanians, on the stipulation that the occupants would keep their present houses.

-- The Panamanians will accept without change a standard status forces agreement, approved by the JCS.

As noted, the only variation from instructions which have been cleared with you and on the Hill, is the question of a compensation formula for the sea-level canal. Although Bob McNamara gave his assent, there appears to be some concern among the military that ambiguity about the compensation formula will weaken our option on the sea-level canal and might leave us at the turn of the century without military base rights. I am now checking into the seriousness of this point. You may wish to talk directly tonight with Bob Anderson about it.

Finally, Bob Anderson notes that we have come to a strategic psychological moment. He thinks he can clinch the deal tomorrow; and that the deal is viable on the Hill. He cannot vouch for its viability in Panamanian politics.

If he gets your go ahead, they will make a firm decision tomorrow morning that they have a treaty and then take a few days getting the details on paper.

I recommend that you talk to Bob Anderson this evening, directly.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Friday, June 9, 1967 -- 6:30 pm

Mr. President:

It is really worth reading these two accounts of Soviet attitudes on May 31 -- before hostilities -- and Monday, June 5.

Kuznetsov, in the second telegram, is one of the ablest Soviet diplomats. His account of the three Soviet miscalculations is probably as good as historians will be able to produce.

The third telegram, of May 19, is less interesting.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4
By sig, NARA, Date 4-9-93

~~SECRET~~

FDK
G:Foy D. Kohler : fc

(Drafting Office and Officer)

6/8/67

Approved in S/S by Mr. Read

6/8/67

~~SECRET~~ ~~EXDIS~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

9941

6

18a

Capt 7 To Bundy

DATE: June 8, 1967

SUBJECT: Communication From Canadian Ambassador

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador A. Edgar Ritchie, Ambassador of Canada
Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary

COPIES TO:

White House - Mr. Rostow, Mr. Bundy

S, U, M

EUR - Mr. Leddy

NEA - Mr. Battle

IO - Mr. Sisco

INR - Mr. Hughes

CIA - Mr. Helms

SECDEF - Sec. McNamara

Moscow Amembassy - Minister Guthrie

Tel Aviv Amembassy - Amb. Barbour

The Canadian Ambassador asked to see me on an urgent basis and called at 5:45 p.m. this afternoon. He gave me the attached telegram of today's date from the Canadian Ambassador in Moscow relating to Soviet attitudes and policies in the current Middle East crisis. He also added a telegram referred to in the first one, summarizing a conversation between the Canadian Ambassador in Moscow and Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev on May 20.

(Russian)

The "neutral European Ambassador", and that Ambassador's Russian source are recognizable. The source is a well-informed Russian middle grade official authorized to associate with selected diplomats in Moscow.

Attachments:
As stated

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-6

By 410 NARA. Date 5-21-92

~~SECRET~~ ~~EXDIS~~

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186

- ①. AMBASSADOR
2. MR KIDD
3. MR BEAULNE
4. REGISTRY
5. COMMUNICATIONS

FM MCOW JUN8/67 SECRET LTD DISTR

TO TT EXTER 1631 IMMED DE LDN

INFO LDN TT NATOPARIS EMBPARIS WASHDC PERMISNY DE LDN

USSR AND MIDEAST CRISIS

NEUTRAL EUROPEAN AMBASSADOR IN WHOM I HAVE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE CALLED THIS MORNING TO PASS ON FOLLOWING INFO WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN HIM BY RUSSIANS AND WHICH HE FEELS CERTAIN WAS INTENDED FOR WESTERN EARS. IN VIEW OF ABSENCE OF USA AMBASSADOR THOMPSON HE DECIDED I WAS APPROPRIATE RECIPIENT. I THINK INFO IS OF VERY CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE. IT HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN GIVEN TO ANY OTHER DIPLO HERE. REPORT IS PARAPHRASED FROM HIS TELS TO HIS GOVT.

2. ON MAY31 AMBASSADOR RECEIVED A CALL FROM HIS WELL PLACED SOVIET CONTACT TO DISCUSS CRISIS. LATTER STARTED OUT BY SAYING THAT IT WAS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF SOVIET POLICY TO SUPPORT FORMER COLONIAL COUNTRIES IN ANY CONFLICT AGAINST IMPERIALISM. IN CASE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO NON-COMMITTED COUNTRIES THEY WOULD SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AS IN CASE OF INDIA AND PAK. IF THIS HAD FAILED THEY WOULD HAVE SUPPORTED INDIA BECAUSE OF PAKS DE FACTO ALLIANCE WITH CHINA. 3. GETTING ON TO MIDEAST HE SAID IT WAS NOT RPT NOT TRUE THAT USSR HAD INCITED EGYPTIANS TO STAGE CRISIS BUT ON OTHER HAND THEY HAD NOT RPT NOT RESTRAINED THEM AND THEY SAW NO RPT NO REASON WHY THEY SHOULD (SEE ALSO MY CONVERSATION WITH ILICHEV MYTEL 1291 MAY20 CONFIRMING THIS ATTITUDE). HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT RUSSIANS COULD ONLY WIN AND ADDED CYNICALLY THAT IT WAS PURE POWER POLITICS. NO RPT NO MATTER HOW IT WENT, AND WHETHER OR NOT RPT NOT THERE WAS AN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-301

By cb, NARA Date 7-18-00

...2

PAGE TWO 1631 SECRET LTD DISTR

ISRAELI-ARAB WAR, USA WOULD SUFFER A DISASTROUS BLOW TO ITS PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE.

4. ELABORATING ON THIS HE SAID THAT IF USA ACCEPTED CLOSING OF GULF OF AWABA IT WOULD EXPERIENCE A MAJOR LOSS OF PRESTIGE THROUGHOUT ENTIRE WORLD. IF USA ATTEMPTED TO USE FORCE TO OPEN GULF IT WOULD LOSE ALL RPT ALL ITS PRESTIGE WITH ARABS AND NON-COMMITTED.

5. INFORMANT WENT ON THAT MILITARY INTERVENTION BY USA IN MIDEAST WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE A WALK-OVER. USSR HAD ITSELF MADE SUCH A MIS-CALCULATION AS IN WINTER WAR AGAINST FINLAND. EGYPTIAN FORCES WERE WELL EQUIPPED AND TRAINED AND IF USA WANTED ANOTHER VIETNAM THIS IS WHAT THEY WOULD GET. USSR WOULD NOT RPT NOT ENTER WAR BUT WOULD GIVE ARABS SUPPORT IN EVERY OTHER WAY. IT WOULD BECOME ANOTHER LONG DRAWN OUT GUERILLA STRUGGLE.

6. FINALLY HE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT RPT NOT TRUE THAT USSR HAD REJECTED FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A FOUR-POWER MTG BUT HAD SIMPLY SAID MOMENT WAS NOT RPT NOT RIGHT. IN MEANTIME SECURITY COUNCIL WAS BODY TO DEAL WITH CRISIS. HE CONCLUDED BY STATING SOLEMNLY THAT THESE WERE VIEWS OF HIS QUOTE HIGH FRIENDS UNQUOTE IN SOVIET GOVT. AMBASSADOR ALMOST HAD IMPRESSION HE WAS RECITING FROM A BRIEF.

7. ON JUNE FIRST DEPUTY FM KUZNETSOV SUDDENLY ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO LUNCH ALONE WHICH HAD BEEN EXTENDED BY AMBASSADOR CASUALLY SEVERAL WEEKS BEFORE WITHOUT SPECIFYING A DATE. HE SPENT TWO AND A HALF HOURS WITH AMBASSADOR AND FOLLOWING IS ACCOUNT OF CONVERSATION.

...3

PAGE THREE 1631 SECRET LTD DISTR

8. KUZNETSOV SAID WHEN HE ARRIVED AT OFFICE MON AM HE WAS TAKEN TOTALLY BY SURPRISE AT NEWS OF OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING PARTICULARLY AS THEY HAD BEEN WELL ON THEIR WAY TO FINDING AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO QUESTION OF PASSAGE OF GULF OF AGAZA. HE COULD HARDLY BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE THAT ISRAELIS HAD ATTACKED ARABS WITHOUT ASSURANCES FROM A CERTAIN QUARTER.

9. QUESTION HOWEVER WAS TO FIND A QUICK SETTLEMENT AND HE HOPED SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD REQUEST CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL. HE BELIEVED FRENCH AND UK AGREED AND PROBABLY USA. USSR WISHED TO AVOID USE OF UN TROOPS TO MAINTAIN PEACE IN AREA BUT WAS IN FAVOUR OF REVIVAL OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND SOME FORM OF ENFORCEMENT.

10. KUZNETSOV SHOWED NO RPT NO SIGN OF NERVOUSNESS AND STRESSED THAT HE HOPED QUOTE THIS UNFORTUNATE MATTER WOULD NOT RPT NOT IMPEDE GENERAL PROGRESS TOWARDS DETENTE UNQUOTE.

11. YESTERDAY AMBASSADORS SOVIET CONTACT SOUGHT HIM OUT AGAIN, REFERR-ED TO MTG WITH KUZNETSOV, AND PROCEEDED TO TALK ALONG FOLLOWING LINES. HIS MOOD WAS OF EXTREME DEPRESSION AND NERVOUSNESS.

12. HE SAID USSR HAD MADE THREE SERIOUS MISCALCULATIONS. FIRST WAS BELIEF THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT RPT NOT LAUNCH WAR AGAINST UNITED ARAB WORLD SUPPORTED BY USSR. NOR DID THEY BELIEVE ISRAELIS CAPABLE OF FIGHTING. HE SAID SOVIET LEADERS MISTAKENLY STILL THOUGHT OF ISRAELIS IN TERMS OF SOVIET JEWS-DOWNTRODDEN, INTELLECTUALS, ARTISTS, ETC. OBVIOUSLY THEY WERE WILDLY MISTAKEN.

13. SECOND MISCALCULATION WAS ABOUT EGYPTIANS. HE SAID EGYPTIANS WERE

...4

PAGE FOUR 1631 SECRET LTD DISTR

WELL ARMED WITH BEST WEAPONS AND WELL TRAINED. HE COULD NOT RPT NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT HAPPENED BUT AGAIN OBVIOUSLY THEY HAD AS SERIOUSLY OVER-ESTIMATED EGYPTIAN FIGHTING ABILITY AS THEY HAD UNDER-ESTIMATED ISRAELIS.

14. THIRD MISCALCULATION WAS ABOUT USA WHICH THEY FULLY EXPECTED WOULD INTERVENE ON BEHALF OF ISRAEL. BUT DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY HAD TAKEN SOVIET GOVT COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE, AND WHOLE SOVIET OBJECTIVE IN EXERCISE HAD BADLY MISFIRED. HE SAID THAT RUSSIANS DID NOT RPT NOT TAKE SERIOUSLY ARAB ACCUSATIONS OF USA AND BRIT AIR SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL.

15. INFORMANT WENT ON TO SAY THAT THIS HAD NOW TO BE CONSIDERED A MAJOR DEFEAT FOR SOVIET POLICY AND ALL THEIR CLEVER PLANS HAD FAILED. THEY HAD THOUGHT THEY HAD ANALYZED ALL ASPECTS OF SITUATION RIGHTLY AND NO RPT NO MATTER WHAT HAPPENED USA WOULD LOSE AND USSR GAIN PREDOMINANT POSITION IN MIDEAST.

16. HE ENDED UP BY SAYING THAT FIGHTING MUST BE FINISHED QUICKLY AND A PERM SOLUTION FOUND. USSR HAD AGREED TO ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE OF ISRAEL AND THEY WERE NOT RPT NOT AGAINST IT AS SUCH. HE THOUGHT PEACE WAS POSSIBLE BUT RECURRENT CRISES IN MIDEAST COULD NOT RPT NOT BE PERMITTED. THERE WAS ONLY ONE WAY THIS COULD BE DONE AND THAT WAS ON A FOUR-POWER BASIS.

17. AMEMBASSADOR SAID HIS INFORMANT SEEMED ALMOST IN A STATE OF SHOCK AND ADOPTED ATTITUDE THROUGHOUT INTERVIEW THAT IT WAS USSR WHICH HAD LOST PRESTIGE, AND WAS ON DEFENSIVE

FORD

Bc

FM MCOV MAY20/67 CONF

TO TT EXTERL 1291 IMMED

INFO LDN TT NATOPARIS EMBPARIS CAIRO WASHDC PERMISNY DE LDN

TT TAVIV DE PARIS

BAG ANKRA ATHNS BERUT DE PARIS BGRAD DE LDN

REF MYTEL 1289 MAY15

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-301
By cl, NARA Date 7-18-00

SOVIET VIEWS ON MID-EAST CRISIS

DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ILICHEV CAME TO DINNER LAST NIGHT. WE DISCUSSED DEVELOPMENTS IN MID-EAST. AS REGARDS ORIGINS OF CRISIS, HE CLAIMED INTERNAL SITUATION IN ISRAEL DEMANDED AN EXTERL THREAT BUT WHEN I SAID SAME EASILY APPLIED TO SYRIA AND PROBABLY UAR AS WELL HE SAID THAT WAS NOT RPT NOT IMPROBABLE. FOR REST HE PARROTED USUAL SOVIET LINE ABOUT ISRAELI ROLE AS ADVANCE GUARD OF WESTERN IMPERIALISM OPPOSED TO QUOTE PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL REGIMES UNQUOTE IN UAR SYRIA, IRAG AND YEMEN.

2. WE GOT ONTO MORE PRODUCTIVE MATTERS - QUESTION OF UNEF. I SAID IT SEEMED ABSURD THAT UNEF AFTER EXISTING FOR ELEVEN YEARS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN AT MOMENT FOR WHICH IT WAS FORMED. ILICHEV SAID FRANKLY HE COULD NOT RPT NOT UNDERSTAND WHY UAR HAD CHOSEN THIS PARTICULAR CRISIS TO ASK FOR WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF. UAR WAS CERTAINLY NOT RPT NOT READY FOR HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL WHEN BEST OF ITS ARMY WAS IN YEMEN. I HAD IMPRESSION HE DID NOT RPT NOT APPROVE UAR ACTION.

3. AS REGARDS QUESTION OF LEGALITY OF UARS RIGHT TO DEMAND WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF, AND OF U THANTS RIGHT TO DECIDE THIS ON HIS OWN, ILICHEV SAID IT WAS HIS OPINION UAR WAS IN ITS RIGHTS. HE WAS NOT RPT NOT SURE ABOUT U THANT. I SAID IT SEEMED PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SECURITY COUNCIL TO BE CONVOKED TO DECIDE MATTER. HE REPLIED QUOTE

PAGE TWO 1291 CONF

1967 JUN 8 PM 7 58

ABSOLUTELY NOT RPT NOT UNQUOTE.DECISION TO FORM UNEF WAS TAKEN BY GA AND IF ANY BODY WERE ENTITLED TO DISCUSS QUESTION IT SHOULD BE LATTER THOUGH PERSONALLY,ON REFLECTION,HE THOUGHT SECGEN COULD DO IT.HE ADDED THAT THIS WAS PERHAPS AN UNFORTUNATE MOMENT TO BRING UP QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF.EGYPTIANS NEVER WANTED IT, HOWEVER,SO PERHAPS IT HAD BETTER GO.

4.I SAID HE WAS NOT RPT NOT WELL INFORMED ON THIS.NASSER HAD TOLD ME SEVERAL TIMES HE RECOGNIZED VALUE OF UNEF,AND OF CDN PARTICIPATION IN IT,AND DID NOT RPT NOT WANT IT WITHDRAWN OR REDUCED.ILICHEV THEN ADMITTED THAT IN FACT NASSER HAD AGREED TO UNEF AND A CERTAIN LIMITATION ON UAR SOVEREIGNTY,BUT ONE WHICH COULD BE TERMINATED WHEN UAR WANTED.HE RPTD THAT THIS SEEMED A SINGULARLY UNFORTUNATE MOMENT TO DO SO,BUT IF UAR FELT UNEF COULD NO RPT NO LONGER PLAY A ROLE,THOSE IN UN RESPONSIBLE FOR PUTTING IT THERE WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT THIS DECISION.

5.ILICHEV IS NOT RPT NOT DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR NEAR EAST AFFAIRS (HE IS IN CHARGE OF RELATIONS WITH EASTEUROPE)BUT BECAUSE OF HIS PREVIOUS IMPORTANCE IN PARTY SECRETARIAT HE IS PROBABLY STILL CLOSE TO THINKING ON MATTERS OUTSIDE HIS IMMED PURVIEW.HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO TALK WITH CONSIDERABLE AUTHORITY

FORD

Friday, June 9, 1967 -- 5:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

This is the way Mac Bundy and I have arranged to cover Saturday to Monday.

Mac will be away Saturday but be back mid-afternoon Sunday.

I shall join Mrs. Johnson, leaving about noon Sunday and be back with her from Middlebury on Monday.

Therefore, except for a few hours early Sunday afternoon, one or the other of us will be minding the Mid-East store.

Brom and my other boys will steadily look after the rest ^{on} of the day. I am away. I shall, of course, not go at all if things go really critical.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Friday, June 9, 1967
5:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

I am sending copies of this to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Tommy Thompson, and to Mac Bundy. If you agreed to some such message, it would be sent promptly after the next attack on the Hanoi TPP. Bus Wheeler says weather looks pretty good tonight.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-4
By sig, NARA, Date 4-9-93

202

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-4

By sig, NARA, Date 4-7-93

Draft -- June 9, 1967 -- 5:15 p.m.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Middle East is moving -- more slowly than either of us would wish -- toward the end of hostilities. I believe we can both take a measure of satisfaction that our two peoples and the world have been spared more bloodshed and wider hostilities because we have been in communication and understood one another during these difficult days.

Although the governments and peoples of the Middle East will mainly have to forge their own solutions and make their own destiny in the days and months ahead, I hope that your policy and ours can contribute to stable peace in the area -- notably in our policies of arms supply, about which I have instructed our representatives to contact yours.

As I look back over these days, my mind returns to the proposition about Viet Nam which I put to you in my letters of December 6, 1966, and May 19, 1967. I urged that, in your responsibilities as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conferences, you might help in bringing the conflict in Southeast Asia to a close

I have had a further thought as to how this might be done. As I understand the position of the Soviet Government, you are prepared to recognize the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. This would mean that we both recognize the legitimacy of the 17th parallel as an international line of demarcation, leaving the question of the unification of North and South Viet Nam to some future agreed peaceful process.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

The heart of the matter then becomes how those now fighting against the Government of South Viet Nam can be persuaded to pursue their political aims in peace by constitutional means. You should know we have been using our influence with the Government of South Viet Nam to pursue policies of reconciliation with the South Vietnamese fighting against them. The objective of the U. S. within South Viet Nam has been and remains, simply, that the people of South Viet Nam have a chance to settle their own political future in peace, without external pressure or coercion.

I would assume that those now fighting against the Government of South Viet Nam would wish to have guarantees for their safety and their political rights, if they were to move from conflict to peaceful politics. We have been and are prepared further to urge the Government of South Viet Nam to offer such guarantees and to make them credible.

I would be interested to know if you believe that, with your assistance, the government in Hanoi might be persuaded to permit the war to be brought to an end by a negotiation among South Vietnamese, designed to transfer the present bloody conflict from the battlefield to the ballot box. International negotiations might then reestablish and ensure the effectiveness of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

I have also thought it might be easier for this process to be brought about if there were some mutual de-escalation of the hostilities. We are coming to a phase in our bombing of North Viet Nam where it would be logical, before proceeding, to pause in our air campaign in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. I have, therefore, ordered our bombing to cease for the time being in a circle 30 miles around Hanoi and 10 miles around Haiphong. As you can verify from your own analysts of American political life, the pressures upon me here are to use more, rather than less, of our military power against North Viet Nam. But I shall resist that pressure to provide an interval in which Hanoi can undertake parallel and equivalent de-escalatory action and decide to engage in a serious negotiating process to end the war. It would be particularly helpful if the forces of North Viet Nam were to cease violating the demilitarized zone.

I shall be looking for prompt evidence of an interest in Hanoi in pursuing negotiations and of equivalent de-escalatory action.

I would greatly appreciate your thoughts on this approach to peace in Southeast Asia or any other based on even-handed principles.

~~SECRET~~

21
Pres file

Friday, June 9, 1967, 4:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

You recently invited Italian President Saragat here for an informal visit between September 18-20. (He will go to Canada for a state visit and EXPO '67 on September 13.)

President Saragat has now sent word that he prefers September 18 -- a Monday. I know you do not like to schedule visits on Mondays. Should we ask the Italians to put the visit back to the 19th or 20th (these two days are clear on Mrs. Johnson's and your calendars), or tell them the 18th is all right?

Stay with 18th _____

Put off to 19th _____ 20th _____

I suggest the following as the program for the visit:

- greeting on the lawn;
- meeting in your office for an hour;
- black tie dinner.

Above program OK _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

If you approve, we will work out a mutually agreeable date for a simultaneous announcement, which George Christian will confirm with you later.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:LSE:mst

Friday, June 9, 1967
2:30 p.m.

22

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Eban weighs in with a personal letter, including an apology.

W. W. R.

Attachment

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON



שגרירות ישראל
ושינפטון

22a


June 9
1967

Dear Walt,

I should be most grateful
to you if you could bring to the
President's attention the en-
closed letter from Foreign Minister
Abba Eban.

With personal regards,

Sincerely,


Ephraim Evron

The Honorable
Walt Rostow,
The White House
Washington, D.C.

22-b

June 8, 1967

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States

Dear Mr. President:

The few days that I have been here have been spent mostly at the United Nations in an effort to explain ourselves to America and the world. But I have kept in touch with your thinking through Ambassador Goldberg, Mr. Bundy and others.

We have passed through many dangers. But even victory has many problems which we would like to face in frank consultation with the United States. I cannot leave without saying how deeply we have understood your own reactions and policies during this crucial week. Mr. Eshkol and I believe that your

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personal statesmanship is destined to contribute much to the building of a new future for Israel and other nations in the Middle East. This impression has been greatly strengthened by your own forward looking statements and by our contacts with those who speak for you.

I am deeply mortified and grieved by the tragic accident involving the lives and safety of Americans in Middle Eastern waters.

With respectful wishes,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Abba Eban'.

Abba Eban

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, June 9, 1967 -- 12:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

After reading the UPI 080A ticker, Evron asked to come in. He said that he and Harman were as deeply troubles as you must be and as I clearly was, by what he called "this nonsense." He said that there were three ways in which it might be turned to some advantage:

-- as further evidence to the Arabs and Moscow that there was no collusion between the U. S. and Israel; and

-- as the occasion for the Israeli Embassy and Government to work even harder on the Jewish community here to explain that President Johnson's policy has been correct and fundamentally helpful to Israel. He said that Finance Minister Sapir has been working on the West coast to this end.

Following your instructions, I was passive and simply reiterated your concern -- which I had expressed yesterday -- that there was great danger in Israel overplaying its hand, talking too much, and permitting the emotions of victory in the field to prevent them from doing what was wise for their own long-term interests.

He said that he had persuaded Eban to go back and go to work on planning the future settlement, including refugees, rather than stay in New York and enjoy the glory of the television cameras.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

WWRostow:rlh

UPI
080A

ESHKOL 6/9 NX
WITH MIDEAST

TEL AVIV (UPI)--PREMIER LEVI ESHKOL SAID THURSDAY NIGHT THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON "PROMISED GREAT THINGS" BUT IN THE END ISRAEL STOOD VIRTUALLY ALONE IN HER CONFRONTATION WITH THE ARAB WORLD.

ESHKOL TALKED OF ISRAEL'S PLIGHT IN THE CRISIS THAT LED TO WAR IN A SPEECH TO HIS PARTY'S OFFICIALS.

DISCUSSING THE 21 DAYS BEFORE THE WAR BROKE OUT, HE SAID, "WE WERE FIRST ASKED TO WAIT TWO DAYS," APPARENTLY BEFORE TAKING ANY ACTION AGAINST THE ARABS MOBILIZED AROUND ISRAEL.

"THEN WE SENT (FOREIGN MINISTER) ABBA EBAN TO THE UNITED STATES-- AND WERE ASKED TO WAIT A FURTHER FORTNIGHT. PRESIDENT JOHNSON PROMISED GREAT THINGS.

"THEY TOLD US THAT 40 TO 50 MARITIME POWERS WOULD SIGN A GUARANTEE FOR FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE TIRAN STRAITS" WHICH THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC HAD BLOCKADED AGAINST ISRAELI SHIPPING.

"WE EXAMINED THE SITUATION AND FOUND THAT IT REALLY CAME DOWN TO A DOZEN AND FINALLY TO ONLY TWO COUNTRIES AND THEN, PERHAPS, TO ONLY ONE -- ISRAEL," HE SAID.

"I ONCE TOLD PRESIDENT JOHNSON THAT IT IS LIKELY THAT (WHEN) WE ARE ATTACKED YOU WILL BE VERY BUSY WITH OTHER MATTERS AND THAT THE NATURE OF THE (AMERICAN) GUARANTEE IS UNCLEAR," THE PREMIER SAID.

HIS REMARKS TENDED TO CONFIRM REPORTS THAT WASHINGTON, AS WELL AS BRITAIN AND OTHER NATIONS, STRONGLY URGED THE ISRAELI

Text broken at this point.

24a

~~TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY~~

Pres file

Friday, June 9, 1967
12:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the latest weekly report
on Project COMPATRIOT.

You may wish to recall that a
decision to extend this operation into
North Viet Nam is before you and -- at
least to my knowledge -- has not yet
been made.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4
By ing, NARA, Date 4-9-93

WWRostow:rlm

25a
W
~~TOP SECRET~~ "EYES ONLY"

PROJECT COMPATRIOT (TS)

WEEKLY REPORT #11

A. Period of Report: 26 May - 1 June 1967

B. General: Seeding activity increased during the period with this weeks usage being the second highest of the year.

C. Intelligence Summary: Several washouts on Route 110B and C were observed and logs were being used in particularly muddy sections. Deep ruts on Route 165D were reported by a FAC. Route 91C was interdicted for 300 meters by slides and craters. On 30 and 31 May Routes 911E and 911-2 were reported closed with a section of 911E having standing water and mud slides. Routes 23 and 911 were reported to have suffered considerable deterioration with water standing on 40 to 60 percent of the road. On 29 May, Route 8E and 81A were reported as very muddy and impassable in places. Numerous seedings along Routes 96D and E resulted in considerably increased rainfall which caused flooding and no reported traffic. FACs reported that the entire length of Route 96 was very muddy with no signs of traffic following heavy precipitation on 25 May. Routes 96A and B were blocked by several slides and standing water was observed in the existing ruts with no signs of traffic.

Forecast for next week: Anticipate continued increase in munitions usage and seeding effort.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-5
By yw, NARA, Date 5-15-92

~~TOP SECRET~~ "EYES ONLY"

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-5
By xw, NARA, Date 5-15-92

26

Friday, June 9, 1967 -- 12:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Lillienfeld reports the following volunteered from Bonn.

1. Kiesinger would be pleased -- if you and Mrs. Johnson so wished -- to visit the Ranch, but believes the business part of the trip would best be conducted in Washington. The dates are July 7-8.

2. They understand our preoccupation with the Middle East crisis, but would like to know soon what White House occasion -- if any -- is planned; for example, a lunch or dinner.

W. W. Rostow

Plan for some time at Ranch _____

All Washington _____

Lunch _____

Dinner _____

See me _____

cc: Mr. Bator

WWRostow:rlh

Friday, June 9, 1967
10:45 a.m.

29

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the file of MOLINK messages
you requested.

W. W. R.

SECRET attachment

~~SECRET~~

Friday, June 9, 1967
9:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an interesting account from our China watcher, which again suggests friction between Peiping and Hanoi, which might conceivably help set the stage for a negotiation.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

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Authority State Ltr 7-5 X

By g/ky, NARA, Date 6-10-91

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

272
June 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The Cultural Revolution

Recent Developments:

1. The Army's influence has grown rapidly. In an increasing list of areas Army control has become evident in public security work, press and radio, basic community services, and in the organization of both agricultural and industrial production.
2. The extension of Army control has been generally unpopular, especially with "revolutionary rebels" whom the Army has frequently suppressed, but also with the average citizen.
3. Despite increased Army control, public order has suffered further setbacks during the past week. Sufficient trouble has broken out both north of Shanghai and south of that city to cause transportation difficulties. Letter intercepts speak of growing lawlessness.
4. A thinly veiled, sharp personal attack on Mao, recently published in a North Vietnamese Party journal, suggests the probability of new friction between Peking and Hanoi. Even if the Vietnamese were severely provoked by some recent Chinese action, this article is still a remarkable affront coming from a small nation so dependent upon Chinese largesse. It is also another index of the low state of Mao's prestige out of the country.

The course of the Cultural Revolution has made attempted time tables hazardous. However, it seems to me there are a number of indicators which point to a likely crucial stage within a very few months. It is possible that by September there will have been fairly significant developments. As of now, the fortunes of Maoism continue slowly to sink.

Alfred Jenkins
Alfred Jenkins

cc: Mr. Jorden

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State for 7-5-78
By regis, NARA, Date 6-10-91

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SANITIZED

SANITIZE

Friday, June 9, 1967 -- 8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith some intelligence materials of this morning which give us considerable insight into both the past and the present.

Tab 1. [REDACTED]

I shall talk to Mac and he will make sure that we actually go to the Soviets on the arms business today, if we have not already done so.

Tab 2. [REDACTED]

The Soviets almost certainly hold Nasser responsible for pushing on to Aqaba and otherwise pressing their luck to the point of triggering the Israeli attack.

Tabs 3, 4 and 5 [REDACTED]

Tab 6. [REDACTED]

In addition, Tab 7 [REDACTED]

W. Rostow

SANITIZED

Authority NLS 82-161 appealBy iso, 144NS, Date 10-23-84

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 84809

299

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO AID
EXO DD/1 CSI AEC USIA ONE ORR DCS CGS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

CITE [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

DIST 8 JUNE 1967


COUNTRY - NORTH VIETNAM

DCI: MARCH 1967

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON THE EFFECTS OF US AIR STRIKES, MISSILE
LAUNCHINGS, TRANSPORTATION DIFFICULTIES, AND FOOD
AND DRUG SHORTAGES IN NORTH VIETNAM

SOURCE:

3.4(b)(1)



1. A CHINESE [REDACTED] FROM NORTH VIETNAM WHO FLED
TO CHINA IN MARCH 1967, TOLD [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THAT WHILE HE WAS STILL LIVING IN HAIPHONG, NEITHER HE
NOR HIS CIRCLE OF ACQUAINTANCES [REDACTED] HAD EVER SEEN THE ACTUAL SHOOT-
DOWN OF ATTACKING UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT. AS A RESULT, [REDACTED]
HE NOR OTHERS BELIEVED THE GOVERNMENT'S STATISTICS ON THE NUMBERS
OF U.S. AIRCRAFT DOWNED IN THE AIR WAR.

3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-247
By SJ, NARA, Date 9-10-01

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~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem. controls)

2. IN CONNECTION WITH THE AIR STRIKES, [REDACTED] 3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] NORTH VIETNAM'S SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES WERE NOT EFFECTIVE AGAINST ATTACKING AIRCRAFT; IN FACT, THESE MISSILES MANY TIMES WENT AWRY AND CAUSED EXTENSIVE CASUALTIES AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. IF A MISSILE BEHAVED PROPERLY WHEN LAUNCHED, THE SOUND OF TWO EXPLOSIONS, ONE IMMEDIATELY BEHIND THE OTHER, WAS HEARD. HOWEVER, AND THIS WAS MORE OFTEN THE CASE, IF ONLY ONE EXPLOSION WAS HEARD, THIS MEANT THE MISSILE HAD FAILED TO EXPLODE IN THE AIR AND WAS HURDLING BACK TO EARTH.

3. [REDACTED] IN LEAVING NORTH VIETNAM IT TOOK 3.4(b)(1) HIM FOUR DAYS TO TRAVEL FROM HANOI TO LANG SON, A DISTANCE WHICH HE HAD TO WALK. HE STATED THAT HE WAS LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT GREAT DAMAGE TO NORTH VIETNAM'S INSTALLATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS HAD BEEN WROUGHT BY THE AMERICANS; PORT FACILITIES, INDUSTRIAL SITES, MILITARY, GOVERNMENT, AND PRIVATE STRUCTURES, BRIDGES, RAIL LINES, WATER WAYS, AND MOTOR ROUTES HAD ALL BEEN HARD HIT.

4. [REDACTED] THE FOLLOWING PRICES FOR 3.4(b)(1) FOOD WERE BEING ASKED IN THE BLACK MARKET IN HAIPHONG: PORK,

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

18 TO 22 DONGS PER KILO, AS COMPARED TO THE OFFICIAL PRICE OF 3.5 DONGS PER KILO WHICH WAS LIMITED TO 200 GRAMS PER PERSON MONTHLY; RICE, 2.5 TO 3 DONGS PER KILO AND BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO FIND; AND FRESH VEGETABLES, 4 TO 5 DONGS PER KILO. AS FOR PHARMACEUTICALS, IT WAS DIFFICULT EVEN IN STATE DRUG OUTLETS TO FIND SUCH SIMPLE PREPARATIONS AS THOSE USED TO TREAT HEADACHES, STOMACH DISORDERS, FEVER, AND DIARRHEA.

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC

[REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

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~~1. Susp~~
2. Pres file

Friday, June 9, 1967 -- 7:10 pm

Mr. President:

I believe you will be interested in these two supplementary memoranda from Amb. Telles, on problems along the border.

W. W. Rostow

300

Office of the Chairman, U.S. Section
U.S.-Mexico Border Development Commission
Room 800
1800 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

June 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: U.S.-Mexico Border Development Commission

I sent to you on June 5 a brief and general report on my recent fact finding trip along our U.S. border with Mexico, and if you so desire, I will be very glad to discuss it with you at your convenience.

I am herewith enclosing two other memoranda which are not part of the above report, but which I believe could be classified as "special subjects" of particular interest to you and President Johnson.

1. Uneasiness of United States Organized Labor
in the Area Bordering Mexico
2. Attitudes Among Mexican-Americans in the Southwest

I will also be happy to discuss these two memoranda, if you so desire, at your convenience.

Raymond Telles

Enclosures:
Two Memoranda.

June 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Uneasiness of United States
Organized Labor in the Area
Bordering Mexico

During my visit April 6 - May 25 along the United States border with Mexico from Brownsville, Texas, to San Diego, I made it a point to visit and converse with representative officials of organized labor, in order to inform myself of their problems and concerns.

Also, at the termination of my trip, I made a special point to return by way of Austin, Texas, to meet and converse with the following Texas State officials of the AFL-CIO:

1. H.S. (Hank) Brown, President;
2. Roy R. Evans, Secretary-Treasurer;
3. Henry Munoz, Jr., Director, Equal Opportunity Department;
4. Representatives, from all over Texas, of the Texas AFL-CIO Permanent Committee on Latin American Affairs.

Also, on June 8, I met with high officials of AFL-CIO Headquarters here in Washington to discuss again the objectives of this Commission, but most important to obtain their thinking, views, and suggestions on problems of concern to organized labor along the border area.

The following are some of the matters about which they are considerably disturbed:

1. Mexico's plan to industrialize its side of the border by encouraging the establishment of United States industries there. It was labor's impression that the United States Government was encouraging United States industries to establish in Mexico.

2. The possible establishment of bi-national industrial parks along the border.
3. Commuters - Mexican citizens (holding United States alien resident "green" cards) who work in the United States but reside in Mexico. Organized labor believes that commuters are important contributors to two of its major problems.
 - A. Unemployment - In some areas, notably the Imperial Valley of California and the lower Rio Grande Valley in Texas, the level of unemployment is much higher than the national average. While recognizing that other factors, such as the slow-down in construction, are involved, organized labor claims that many of its members are displaced from jobs by the commuters, who offer their services at lower wages.
 - B. Depressed Wages - The cause is widely ascribed to the fact that the Mexican commuters are willing to work at salaries below standard or below the union wage on the United States side. Labor also complains that commuters are used as strikebreakers, to replace members of organized labor on strike.

I propose to take the following actions:

1. Talk to the Department of Labor about the situation and about the possibility of conducting a detailed study of the unemployment problem in the border area.
2. Present the labor problem to the other members of our Commission for their consideration and recommendations.

In a subsequent, more detailed, report on the border problems and programs, I will cover the labor situation more thoroughly and will offer recommendations for specific actions.

NOTE: In my contacts with labor representatives in the field, at the Texas State level, and here in Washington, it was mentioned that their concerns, as listed in this memorandum, may possibly be important factors which may influence their political action in 1968.

Raymond Telles

June 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Attitudes Among Mexican-Americans
in the Southwest

During my trip along the United States border with Mexico, from Brownsville, Texas, to San Diego, California, I talked to members of the many Mexican-American civic groups (MAPA, LULACS, G.I. FORUM, IMPACT, VIDA, PASO). I found some discontent, uneasiness, and concern due to the following:

1. General and widespread poverty in the area among the Mexican-Americans.
2. Unemployment.
3. Need for better education for their children.
4. What they consider a lack of opportunity for advancement.
5. Need for a more extensive poverty program, better keyed to the special peculiarities of the border.
6. Racial discrimination in a few areas.
7. Belief that they are the forgotten people of our Washington Government. They say they need a reliable channel of communication to the President; that they want someone in whom they have full confidence near the President, someone who understands them and their problems, who has the ear of the President, and who, in turn, can act as their own ear to listen to what the President wants to say to them.
8. Resentment of what they consider the overemphasis of our Government on Negro problems. They believe that Negro demonstrations and disorders lead to large government programs, whereas restraint on the part of equally disadvantaged Mexican-Americans results in the Government's ignoring of their problem.

9. The use of Texas Rangers to obstruct strike efforts in the melon fields.
10. Resentment against the Mexican citizen who lives in Mexico and commutes to the United States to work.

I made every effort to counteract this uneasiness by stating at every opportunity that the President is sincerely interested in the Mexican-Americans' problems. I said that my visit to the border area was only one evidence of the President's concern.

In my opinion, the Mexican-Americans will be better organized politically and much more active in the future than they have been in the past. Partisan political activity is on the upswing by both major parties. The young, active, better educated Mexican-American professionals are providing the leadership, and they appear inclined to support whichever party gives more evidence of its effective concern for their problems. They say that this fact was very much in evidence during the General Election in November 1966. It has been estimated conservatively that there are approximately five million Mexican-Americans in the southwest, from Texas to California; and even though their potential voting power is not accurately known, it could be, for example, a deciding factor in a close political race in Texas.

Raymond Telles

31

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Friday, June 9, 1967
8:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

This is an interesting and relatively new theme which could be important: The North Vietnamese may be beginning to blame the Chinese Communists for their hardships and the continuation of the war. When I talked with Sec. Rusk, he noted that Chen I, the Chinese Foreign Minister, recently appeared to take a somewhat relaxed view towards the possibilities of Hanoi negotiating peace.

A suggestion about a new approach to the USSR on Viet Nam is forming up in my mind and I will put it on paper very soon.

W. W. Rostow

[Redacted]

1.3 (a) (4)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-3
By lig, NARA, Date 11-17-93

WWRostow:rla

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

IN-84850

31a

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO AID
USIA ONE ORR DCS CGS
EXO, DDI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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081428Z

CITE

DIST 8 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM
DCI: LATE 1966 EARLY 1967

SUBJECT: GROWING ANTI-CHINESE COMMUNIST SENTIMENT AMONG THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE POPULATION

ACQ:

SOURCE:

1. C SUMMARY. A CHINESE [] FROM NORTH VIETNAM
WHO FLED TO CHINA IN MARCH 1967, TOLD []
[] THAT THERE WAS A GROWING ANTI-CHINESE COMMUNIST
SENTIMENT, AS YET NOT OPENLY MANIFESTED, AMONG THE VIETNAMESE
POPULATION. [] THIS ATTITUDE WAS A FAIRLY
RECENT DEVELOPMENT, BEING DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE INTEN-
SIFICATION OF UNITED STATES AIR ATTACKS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM AND
THE SPREAD OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION TO NORTH VIETNAM.

2. AS A RESULT OF DAILY AIR BOMBARDMENT AND THE NEW WAVE

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 92-2/NLJ/RAC 99-247
By S, NARA, Date 9-7-01

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

OF DESTRUCTION AND FEAR WHICH RESULTED, THERE DEVELOPED A FEELING AMONG THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WERE IN PART RESPONSIBLE FOR NORTH VIETNAM'S WORSENING SITUATION BECAUSE OF THE CHINESE HARD-LINE POLICY TOWARDS THE CONFLICT AND EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE TO FIGHT.

3. FURTHER INFLUENCING THIS VIEW WAS THE INTRODUCTION INTO NORTH VIETNAM IN 1966 OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, WHICH WAS INITIATED AND NURTURED AMONG THE OVERSEAS CHINESE LIVING IN NORTH VIETNAM. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT WAS NOT OFFICIALLY IDENTIFIED WITH THIS MOVEMENT, BUT IT WAS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNIST AIDED AND ABETTED IT THROUGH LOCAL POLITICAL SUPPORTERS. THE TEACHERS IN THE OVERSEAS CHINESE SCHOOLS LED THE PROSELYTING, INDOCTRINATING THEIR STUDENTS IN MAO'S THOUGHTS AND THE PRACTICES AND AIMS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. THE MOVEMENT THEN SPREAD THROUGH THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE CONVERSION OF CHINESE LABORERS AND GOVERNMENT CADRES; CHINESE YOUTH AND LABOR SEEMED MOST AFFECTED. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT (DRV) WAS COGNIZANT OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, BUT WAS NOT OPPOSED TO IT, UNTIL TRACTS APPEARED ATTACKING THE

1.3(a)(4)

(classification) (dissem controls)

SOVIETS AND THEIR REVISIONISTIC POLICIES. THE DRV THEN SENT OUT WORD THAT ITS RUSSIAN ALLIES WERE NOT TO BE SUBJECTED TO ANY CRITICISM; THE CHINESE COMMUNIST EMBASSY, FOLLOWING THIS LINE, OFFICIALLY ADVISED ITS SUPPORTERS IN THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES TO DO NOTHING TO ANTAGONIZE THE DRV.

4. THE OUTGROWTH OF CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITICAL AGITATION, IN TURN, LED TO A SHARPENING OF VIETNAMESE DISTRUST OF THE CHINESE. IT WAS HELD THAT NOT ONLY WERE THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ATTEMPTING TO UNDERCUT NORTH VIETNAM'S SOVIET ALLIES, BUT ALSO THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WERE QUIETLY BUT EARNESTLY ATTEMPTING TO SPREAD MAO'S THOUGHTS AND POLICIES AMONG THE VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES. THESE SYMPTOMS WERE PERHAPS FIRST REVEALED, IN AN OCCURRENCE WHICH TOOK PLACE JUST PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM NORTH VIETNAM. A WIDE-SPREAD RUMOR WAS IN CIRCULATION THAT CURRENT FOOD SHORTAGES WERE THE RESULT OF DIVERSION OF THESE PROVISIONS TO CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOPS STATIONED IN NORTH VIETNAM. THE OFFICIAL REACTION TO THIS CHARGE WAS THAT IT WAS A LIE BEING SPREAD BY HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE AGENTS. THE POPULATION ALSO REALIZED THAT THE REPORT WAS A SHEER FABRICATION, BUT WHEN THE MATTER WAS DISCUSSED AMONG THE VIETNAMESE THERE WAS A GENERAL TENDENCY,

1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

CONTRARY TO LOGIC, TO BELIEVE THE REPORT.

5. [] [] ALSO STATED THAT HE AS WELL AS OTHER CHINESE REFUGEES FLEEING TO CHINA DID SO NOT ONLY TO ESCAPE THE BOMBINGS BUT ALSO BECAUSE THEY FEARED THAT ONE DAY THE GOVERNMENT AND NORTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, IN SEEKING AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THEREFORE BECOMING REVISIONISTIC, WOULD SEEK TO REVENGE THEIR DEFEAT ON THE LOCAL CHINESE COMMUNITY, MUCH IN THE WAY THE INDONESIANS, IN GETTING EVEN WITH THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, RETALIATED AGAINST THE LOCAL CHINESE COMMUNITIES.

6. [] [] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC
PACAF []

1.3(a)(4)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment with Ambassador Talbot

Phil Talbot will be here from Athens on consultations on 13 - 15 June.

Although the Middle East crisis has almost blotted the Greek coup from our minds, it is still one of those problems which arouses substantial domestic interest. When attention shifts back from the Arab-Israeli borders, it will be apparent that the coup government is not moving as quickly as a lot of liberals would like to restore constitutional government, though the new government has made some promises.

It might be worth your hearing from Phil first hand what the situation there is and what we can expect over the next months.

W. W. Rostow

I'll see him ✓No

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4
By lig, NARA, Date 4-9-93

Att: File #2219

Friday, June 9, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

Bob Anderson called and asked me to inform you of the following.

1. He is coming to the crunch in the Panama negotiation.
2. He has been pressed by the U.S. Army to nail down the Panama compensation formula for a sea-level canal. He believes it is literally impossible to develop a rational formula now when we know neither the technology nor the financing method.
3. Therefore, he thinks it wiser to agree with the Panamanians that compensation will be an "integral part of the financing" and will be agreed upon at the time of the financing. With this formula, he believes he will be able to get a more conservative compensation formula from the Panamanians with respect to the lock canal. As you know, this is the gut issue in the present negotiation.
4. I said it made sense to me, but he should immediately check it out with Bob McNamara and Covey Oliver and I would inform you. He will be back to me after his soundings.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

34

Pres file

Friday, June 9, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk asks your permission to curtail his participation at the NATO Ministerial meeting in Luxembourg next week.

He proposes to be gone only from 8:00 a.m. Monday, June 12, to mid-afternoon, Wednesday, June 14.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rlh

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

2227

34a

June 9, 1967

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: NATO Ministerial Meeting

In view of the Middle East situation, I think I should curtail my participation in the NATO Ministerial meeting which will take place in Luxembourg next week. The Middle East crisis itself underlines the importance of my presence for at least a portion of the meeting, since it will be a major issue for discussion. I plan to leave Washington Monday morning, June 12, 8:00 a.m., and would be back the middle of Wednesday afternoon, June 14.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

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RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1967 JUN 9 AM 10 58

Pres file

Friday, June 9, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vice President's Stop in Tokyo

You asked about the possibility of unfriendly demonstrations against the Vice President during his proposed stopover there.

We have sounded out the Embassy. Alex Johnson does not regard this as a serious problem. The Japanese authorities say there is no reason to expect demonstrations of a size or character that would substantially affect the Vice President's visit.

Bill Jorden, who is an old Japan hand, says we can expect some demonstrations -- Japan Communist Party, left-wing Socialists, some labor unions -- criticizing our Viet-Nam policy. But the Japanese police should be able to keep them in hand. Many Japanese will not want the Vice President's reception in Tokyo to compare too unfavorably with the very warm reception the Vice President can expect in Seoul.

W. W. Rostow

Penned note: I predict very substantial demonstrations -- kept under control -- but very substantial headlines. What they did for an obscure State Dept. planner they are likely to do for our Vice President -- in spades.

/s/ Walt

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4
By Wig, NARA, Date 4-9-93

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 8, 1967
8:30 p.m.

34
Pne file

Mr. President:

Senator Mundt wrote to you some months ago, leaving it open -- in the next to last paragraph -- whether you should respond. Due to an error in my shop -- for which I assume full responsibility -- no reply was prepared. I submit herewith a draft.

W. W. Rostow

36a

June 8, 1967

Dear Karl:

Despite my preoccupation with the Middle East crisis, I wish to answer your good letter of April 17, to which I have given a good deal of thought.

First, I am grateful for your generous remarks about my part in the Punta del Este meeting.

It was a valuable conference. We set the course for the Alliance for Progress for the next decade. There was a clear realization by my Latin American colleagues that the task of development is largely theirs, and that our help can only supplement what they must do with their own resources.

But we do have our share of responsibility. If our neighbors are prepared to carry the major burden, we must be prepared to help where we can. I hope I can count on your help in seeing that we do our share.

I have considered at some length your views on world trade and the war in Viet Nam. Your letter reflects a deep and sincere concern for the success of our effort in Viet Nam and the safety of our troops -- concerns which, you know, I fully share.

I know it is difficult to see how we can trade with Communist countries when they are supporting our enemies in Viet Nam. But the conflict in Viet Nam itself makes it important that we try to maintain a balanced policy in our relations with the Soviet Union and the Communist states of Eastern Europe -- a balance that may yet see us through the Middle East crisis without engaging American forces.

Nothing would be worse than to have the conflict in Southeast Asia spread to other areas of the world. We must do what we can to avoid a direct confrontation between ourselves and

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the Soviets, while surrendering no vital interests of the United States. More important, we must strive to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on measures which will -- in the long run -- increase, even a little, the hopes for peace.

We have, thus far, been at least partially successful. There has been no missile rattling, despite Viet Nam -- not even, thus far, in the Middle East crisis. We both remember such rattling in 1956 and 1958. Our Consular Agreement with the USSR makes it possible for us more easily to protect American citizens in the Soviet Union. And we have been able to get the Soviets to commit themselves not to station weapons in outer space.

Perhaps these advances -- taken singly -- are of only limited significance. But, together, they show some progress toward the end we all seek -- world peace.

All these agreements are two-way understandings; we gain as well as the Soviet Union. There is no surrender of U.S. interests.


Increased trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union -- in non-strategic items -- should be looked at in the same light. The daily contact with American businessmen -- and the products they sell -- is a real challenge to those in the Communist world who try to paint a false picture of what America really is. Further, as we help to fill the great unmet needs of the average Eastern European for consumer goods, we increase his appetite for more. This may well become an appetite that his leaders cannot ignore. In short, trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union does us no harm, and may do us, in time, significant good.

There is no question of strategic trade -- it is carefully controlled by arrangements with our allies and by our own restrictions. If I believed that our trade with Communist countries had caused -- or would cause -- the death of one American, I would move to stop it. In my view, this is not the case.

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We must, of course, continue to secure peace in Viet Nam. We must also pursue a long-range policy aimed at improving relations with the Communist world. To do less would be to fail in the greatest responsibility we face -- the gradual elimination of the hatred and fear that now divide our world.

Sincerely,



The Honorable
Karl E. Mundt
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

LJ:RMM:WWR:rlh

PRESERVATION COPY

KARL E. MUNDT
MADISON, SOUTH DAKOTA

R. L. MCCAUGHEY
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
ABERDEEN, SOUTH DAKOTA

ROBERTA VAN BEEK
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ABERDEEN, SOUTH DAKOTA

WALTER C. CONAHAN
PRESS SECRETARY
LEOLA, SOUTH DAKOTA

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 17, 1967

MEMBER:

APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE

SENATE INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

36-b

Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Lyndon:

clipping
Inasmuch as I have at times been forced to differ from you on international policies of late, I want to take this opportunity to congratulate you on what I thought was a splendid performance down at Punta del Este. I heard some of your speech on television, read about your activities in the newspaper, and I am convinced you did an unusually constructive and useful job in representing the United States in a rather ticklish situation. I am delighted that the Summit Meeting was so successful.

mm
Undoubtedly you have staff people who clip out and put in those big brown envelopes which you carry up to bed every night, all pertinent news clippings, but in all events I enclose an item in a column from one whom I do not personally know. It appeared in today's edition of the Washington News and stressed specifically what I consider to be the major triumph of your mission to Punta del Este; with malice toward none you pointed out the great significance and importance of our Latin American friends developing some self help practices and procedures which assisted by our aid and cooperation should enable them to get off from dead center in making the kind of progress hoped for when the Alliance for Progress was initially announced. I think it is a masterful job of getting across this point without offending any of our neighbors and I applaud you for it.

Your performance at Punta del Este causes me to express the wish that you would reread the personal letter I wrote you within days after you first took the oath of office following the assassination in Dallas. I stressed then -- and I reaffirm now -- that I believe you have the ability and capability to call a Free World Trade Aid Conference here in Washington to discuss the inconsistencies and the impossibilities involved in a situation where this country provides the money, men, and material to fight a war in Vietnam for the over-all cause of world freedom while our friends and associates in other countries continue to ship supplies in increasing amounts for expanding profits to Cuba, Red China and through Russia and the eastern European satellites direct to our fighting enemy in Hanoi. I simply have to believe that you could impress upon the delegates to such a conference the fact that the United States cannot do this job alone while our friends who will benefit as much as we from any successes we have in Vietnam make our job more difficult and costly both in treasure and in lives by continuing to aid the enemy.

PRESERVATION COPY

April 17, 1967

As you know, I just do not believe that our following the bad practices of our associates by increasingly permitting shipments of our own supplies to Russia and the Communist satellites provides an appropriate answer. I cannot escape the conviction in fact, that this followship instead of leadership on our part is completely self defeating. My reason for opposing the ratification of the Consular Treaty was directly associated to my long standing opposition to any form of trading with the enemy while our American servicemen are being killed by the supplies provided by the enemy. From where I sit it would seem that your normal Texas sense of realism could force you to the same conclusions and I am unable to understand how you reconcile your admirable leadership in insisting that we do not accept defeat in the Vietnam War with trade policies which inevitably must make our success either more costly or more improbable. While you have not asked for my counsel on this matter, I again offer it as a sincere act of friendship and in what I firmly believe is in our country's interest.

As you know, despite the fact that my junior colleague from South Dakota has been a persistent, active and vociferous critic of our war effort in Vietnam by urging cessation of bombing, one sided negotiations, elimination of the draft, and a cut back in defense expenditures, I have steadfastly supported your leadership of the war in the conviction which you share, that regardless of how and why we got into the situation and whether or not it was wise to move in extensive troops as was done by your immediate predecessor, the blunt fact stands out like a path to the county school house that after we have been in a war for five years this country simply cannot accept defeat, suffer a humiliating blow to our power and prestige and pull out of Vietnam as a loser in a war for the first time in history. Unhappily, Lyndon, many of us who share your conviction on that score are finding it increasingly difficult to avoid creating impressions abroad of even greater dissensions in this country by persistently and openly criticizing the self defeating aspects involved in trading with our enemy.

I note that the Senate is going to start public hearings on East-West Trade and rightfully or wrongfully, our journalists report this is being done at your behest. If the hearings do occur, that of course, will put the fat in the fire. In peacetime, or with some Communist country which is not actively, openly, and increasingly supplying the bulk of the weapons required by Hanoi to prolong the war and increase our casualties, such East-West Trade might have had some merit, but I simply cannot reconcile it with the ugly facts of war as they are now known to all and your highly commendable determination not to surrender to the enemy in Vietnam. My own mail and the growing reactions from the audiences which I address indicate to me that there is a feeling across the country which is

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April 17, 1967


adamantly opposed even to such assistance to Russia as you made available in your Executive Order of last October 12 and which is going to boil over into vast new areas of criticism of our war effort should a determined effort be made to expand such trade. Because I think this would be highly injurious to our country (I am sure you share my conviction that the dissensions among our citizens and colleagues already apparent in our war effort are in large part responsible for the curious reluctance of Hanoi to accept your invitation to negotiate even when the other side must be convinced it cannot win), and because I do not like to see an old and valued friend like you move in a direction which I believe is certain to tarnish your reputation and weaken your leadership, I again call your attention to my suggestion to a Free World Trade Aid Conference, or at worst, a public expression by you supported by actions designed to decrease rather than increase American supplies going to Communist countries which relieve pressures on their economy so that they can increase rather than decrease the war supplies we are sending to our enemy in Vietnam. I just do not want to see you get in a position of a juggler who tries to keep just one too many balls in the air at the same time until they all come tumbling down for the ruination of us all.

You may be sure that this is not a letter which I shall release to the press but I do feel that as an old personal friend of yours who has stood by your side in support of your determined effort to bring this war to an early and successful conclusion, I should not at least refrain from writing you this unsolicited counsel before we move so deeply into a national debate over questionable trade policies with a country and a creed now providing well over three-fourths of the major war equipment needed by the Communists in North Vietnam to continue the fight that we can no longer retreat gracefully from what I believe to be an untenable position.

While congratulating you upon a job well done in Punta del Este, I hope you will at least tuck this letter in one of your big brown envelopes and read it personally whether you feel you should respond to it or not.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Cordially yours,



Karl E. Mundt, U.S.S.

KEM:vb

PRESERVATION COPY

A Turning Point

By Virginia Prewett



IN the long history of inter-American meetings, the Punta del Este summit conference must take high place as a turning-point. For no matter what the fleeting judgments of the more-or-less qualified pundits who covered it in force, this meeting accomplished something long needed in hemisphere relations.

President Johnson before, during and at the close of the meeting took and held the position that Latin American self-help, and not U.S. efforts, will make the difference in Latin American

development.

His point was the stronger because he could emphasize that his administration has increased aid to Latin America by 35 per cent — no small increase. It was strong also against the background of his effort to get the U.S. Senate to indorse in advance a promise of new help for Latin America.

Ecuador's President Otto Arosemena, like the recalcitrant Sen. J. William Fulbright, may have unwittingly aided President Johnson to put across and nail down the new position, one of simple U.S. partnership. For the Ecuadorian president's drive to get his sharp demands on the U.S. written into the final document were overwhelmingly defeated by the other Latin American presidents.

* * *

THESE other presidents should get due credit for accepting and indorsing the principle of self-help. In a world where every other

region is bitterly divided, the Western Hemisphere has once again demonstrated a high degree of unity.

The U.S. insistence on Latin American self-help is extremely functional. For as we learn more of the complexities of directed development thru the workings of the Alliance for Progress, the need for it is starkly defined.

This can be simply illustrated in three key areas. First, Latin Americans, and not the U.S., are the only ones who can fight today's great enemy of their progress — their brain drain. This will require deep changes in attitude among Latin Americans.

* * *

SECOND, and of tremendous significance, Latin American economist-technicians have done very poorly in their efforts to check inflation without hurting most the poorest people. In many instances, they simply have not made the effort.

Finally, neither Latin American governments nor the Latin Americans who run their economic communities are doing enough to stop the capital drain.

Even as an Arosemena chides the U.S. people for not aiding his area with enough money, Latin Americans themselves channel a strong flow of their assets to overseas investments and safety-deposit boxes.

It was high time the U.S. acted to check the Latin American tendency to become self-intoxicated on the hope that Washington will solve their problems. And it is immensely encouraging that the Latin American presidents, in an overwhelmingly majority, have accepted and even welcomed the new principle of U.S. partnership.

Thursday, June 8, 1967
8:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Evron took the hint which I wove
into conversation on other matters
and apparently passed it along to
Harman.

W. W. Rostow

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

376
שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

June 8
1967


Dear Mr. President,

My Government and Ambassador Harman have already conveyed to the United States Government their sincere sorrow and apologies for the tragic error made by our armed forces when they bombed the USS Liberty. I hope, Mr. President, that it will not be inappropriate for me to address a few personal lines to you.

I know what an awesome burden you bear these days, and how deep and sincere is your concern for my country's security and well-being. This makes today's accident all the more tragic. I grieve with you over the lives that were lost, and share in the sorrow of the parents, wives and children of the men who died in this cruel twist of fate.

With renewed respect and friendship, I remain, Sir,

Sincerely yours,


Ephraim Evron

The Honorable
Lyndon Baines Johnson,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

376
שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

June 8
1967

Dear Mr. President,


I hope it is not presumptuous of me to convey to you this expression of my heartfelt sorrow at the tragic accident to the USS Liberty for which my countrymen were responsible and which has caused the loss of so many lives.

I would express my deep condolences to you as the Commander-in-Chief of the brave men who fell and my earnest prayer to God that the many who have been wounded may speedily recover.

I write to you in desolation over what has occurred.

Please accept the renewed expression of my highest regard and respect.

Sincerely yours,


Avraham Harman
Ambassador

The Honorable
Lyndon Baines Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, June 8, 1967, 7:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached is the paper you
asked Joe Palmer to prepare
(by tonight) concerning an aid
project in Malawi.


W. W. Rostow

MALAWIVipya Pulpwood ProjectAims of the Project:

-- to make available by the year 1975 an annual sustained yield of pine pulpwood logs in the Vipya Plateau in the Northern Region of Malawi, amounting to a minimum quantity of 18.5 million cubic feet per annum corresponding to a daily production of 1,500 tons of green pulp logs sufficient for the production of a minimum daily quantity of 300 tons of air-dry bleached kraft pulp.

-- to establish a paper or pulp mill which will produce a paper product at competitive world market prices.

Planting Program:

Malawi has now under cultivation, 22,928 acres of pine forest. The Malawi Department of Forestry has projected plans to place under cultivation 88,000 acres of forest land by 1975. This year, 10,000 acres will be planted. Each year hereafter 8,500 will be planted. By 1975 5,000 acres will be ready for harvesting and replanting.

Paper-Pulp Mill:

Estimated (by St. Regis Paper Company) investment for a mill producing bleached kraft pulp and paper is \$51 million exclusive of the planting program and infrastructure cost of access roads, main roads, and transportation to seaports.

AID has been assisting the Malawi Government find U.S. investors to build and operate a mill. Chase International expressed an interest and contacted the St. Regis Paper Company, who sent their international marketing manager to make an on-the-spot evaluation. He concluded that the mill was not an economically viable project and not a feasible commercial venture. Cost of transportation and remoteness from world markets would not make the product competitive based on projected world prices in 1975. St. Regis has withdrawn its interest in this project.

Other Investors:

AID, because of its interest in assisting Malawi and of Dr. Banda's special interest in developing the Northern Region of his country, has informed the following investment firms of the project: First National Bank of Chicago, A. G. Becker, Glore Forgan, William Blair, New York Securities and Eastman Dillon.

Investment Climate in Malawi:

(1) Malawi has established a Development Corporation to encourage and assist foreign investment. Investors are given tax concessions, allowances on premiums paid for patents, trade marks and expenditures incurred on research. A rebate on undistributed profits tax is allowed if the profits are ploughed back into the company. Company law is based on British legislation.

(2) An Investment Guaranty Agreement with the U.S. has been negotiated but we are still waiting for final approval from the Malawi Government. The investment guaranty agreement is for protection against the specific risks of inconvertibility, expropriation, and war, and extended risks covering business losses. Under the new African aid policy, an investment guaranty would appear to be all that the U.S. Government can do to assist in this project.

Thursday, June 8, 1967
6:15 p.m.

39

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith two cables which will interest you.

The Bundy committee will develop a recommendation on Hussein's proposition.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET AND TOP SECRET~~ attachments

TDCS-314/08242-67(Advance) and RABAT 5439

FLASH

~~TOP SECRET~~ NODIS

RECEIVED
WHCA WHCA

39a

1967 JUN 8 21 20 03

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DE RUEHC 7973 1592100

ZNY TTTT ZFH2

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FM AMEMBASSY RABAT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2091

STATE BRNC

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ RABAT 5439

NODIS

FOR PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY ONLY

1. EVENING JUNE 8 KING REQUESTED ME PASS FOLLOWING TO YOU:
2. NASSER AND OTHER ARAB LEADERS WOULD LIKE SEND BOUMEDIENE TO PARIS AND MOSCOW AND HASSAN II TO WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS NEXT STEPS IN ARAB-ISRAEL CRISIS. PURPOSE OF VISITS WILL BE TO DETERMINE WHETHER US AND USSR PRIMARILY (AND HE NOTED ARAB LEADERS WERE PUTTING BOTH GOVERNMENTS IN SAME CATEGORY) ARE SERIOUS ABOUT SEEKING A REAL SOLUTION TO ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM.
3. I MENTIONED CABINET COMMITTEE PRESIDENT HAD SET UP WITH MACGEORGE BUNDY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. KING STATED HE IMPRESSED WITH THIS AS INDICATION US SERIOUSNESS.
4. KING SAID HE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN QUESTION OF REFUGEES

PAGE 2 RUDKBT 5439 ~~TOP SECRET~~
IN ANY SETTLEMENT.

5. I ASKED KING WHETHER HIS REMARKS MEANT THAT A CEASE FIRE WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY NASSER AND OTHERS PRIOR TO PROPOSED VISITS. KING REPLIED VISITS WOULD MAKE NO SENSE IF THIS NOT THE CASE.
6. KING SAID HE HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO ACCEPT THIS MISSION OTHER ARAB LEADERS WISHED HIM UNDERTAKE. HE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT ACCEPT IT IF HE WERE NOT ABLE TO REPORT BACK SOMETHING OF SUBSTANTIVE IMPORTANCE TO OTHER ARAB LEADERS, BECAUSE FAILURE OF HIS MISSION COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO MOROCCAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS.
7. KING FURTHER STATED THAT IF HE CAME TO WASHINGTON HE WOULD WISH PRESIDENT SEND SPECIAL PLANE AS HE DID NOT REPEAT NOT FEEL HE COULD TAKE RISKS INVOLVED IN TRAVELING COMMERCIALY IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

GP-1 TASCA
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 5-15-78
By reg/dch, NARA, Date 6-4-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

NODIS

DL5227
00 YEKADS
DE YEKADL 6679R 1591950
ZKZX 00 ZSL DE
O 031912Z ZYH
FM CIA
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
CNO (OF922Y)
AFSSO USAF
DIA/ISIC
NIC
STATE (RCI)
SSO ARLINGTON HALL STATION
JCS
SSO ACSI DA
DIRNSA COMMAND CENTER
CIA-OCI
ZEM

3916

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-302
By cb, NARA Date 10-23-00

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: AUG 2000

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~ TDCS-314/08242-67 (ADVANCED)
COUNTRY USSR/UAR/ISRAEL
DOI JUNE 67
SUBJECT SOVIET OFFICIAL'S COMMENTS ON SOVIET POLICY ON THE
MIDDLE EASTERN WAR.

Restow

ACQ
SOURCE

MEDIUM LEVEL SOVIET

A
OFFICIAL

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

1. THE SOVIET TOLD [REDACTED] THERE HAD BEEN "MISCALCULATIONS" BY THE SOVIETS AND BY THE ARABS. THE SOVIETS OVERESTIMATED THE ARABS' ABILITY TO EMPLOY THEIR SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY STRENGTH AGAINST THE ISRAELIS WHILE THE ARABS OVERRATED THEIR OWN STRENGTH AND UNDERRATED THE ISRAELI MILITARY CAPABILITY AND DETERMINATION TO WIN. WHEN SOURCE ASKED IF THAT MEANT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ENCOURAGED THE ARABS IN THEIR HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARD ISRAEL, THE SOVIET REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY, STATING THAT THE USSR HAD WANTED TO CREATE ANOTHER TROUBLE SPOT FOR THE UNITED STATES IN ADDITION TO THAT ALREADY EXISTING IN VIETNAM. THE SOVIET AIM WAS TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH THE US WOULD BECOME SERIOUSLY INVOLVED, ECONOMICALLY, POLITICALLY, AND POSSIBLY EVEN MILITARILY AND IN WHICH THE US WOULD SUFFER SERIOUS POLITICAL REVERSES AS A RESULT OF ITS SIDING AGAINST THE ARABS. THIS GRAND DESIGN, WHICH ENVISAGED A LONG WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST, MISFIRED BECAUSE THE ARABS FAILED COMPLETELY AND THE ISRAELI BLITZKRIEG WAS SO DECISIVE. FACED WITH THIS SITUATION THE SOVIETS HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO BACK DOWN AS QUICKLY AND GRACEFULLY AS POSSIBLE SO AS NOT TO APPEAR THE VILLAINS OF THE CONFLICT.

2. THE SOVIET THOUGHT THAT NASSER "MUST GO" AND THAT HE WOULD "MOST PROBABLY" BE ASSASSINATED IN THE NEAR FUTURE BY HIS OWN DISILLUSIONED PEOPLE. HE SAID THAT NASSER'S CHARGE THAT US AND BRITISH AIRCRAFT HAD AIDED THE ISRAELI FORCES WAS A DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO SAVE FACE IN THE ARAB WORLD AFTER SUFFERING A HUMILIATING MILITARY DEFEAT AND THAT NO ONE, CERTAINLY NOT THE USSR, BELIEVE THE CHARGE. IN A FINAL COMMENT, THE SOVIET SAID THE WAR HAS SHOWN THAT THE ARABS ARE INCAPABLE OF UNITY EVEN WHEN THEIR VITAL INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

3. DISSEM: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~
PRESERVATION COPY

40

Pres file

Thursday, June 8, 1967
5:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here are two draft responses to
Mayor Cavanagh and to Congressman
Taylor.

W. W. Rostow

Dear Mr. Mayor: June 8, 1967

I very much appreciate your thoughtful letter of June 1.

We are hopeful that the resolution adopted last night by the Security Council will lead us away from greater dangers in the Middle East. The resolution was only a first step, however, and there are many difficult problems still ahead of us.

The knowledge of your support is a source of comfort to me as we continue our efforts for peace and progress in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

The Honorable
Jerome P. Cavanagh
Mayor of Detroit
Detroit, Michigan

LBJ:RMM:cjf

cc: Cliff Alexander

Dear Congressman: June 10, 1967

I greatly appreciated your telegram supporting my position on the Gulf of Aqaba.

It is my hope that an effective cease-fire may now be achieved, and that our efforts can be directed toward a lasting solution of underlying problems such as the Gulf of Aqaba. In this way, we may be able to bring about an era of peace and progress for the peoples of the Middle East.

Sincerely,

The Honorable
Roy A. Taylor
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:RMM:cjf

666 R-41

*1. encls
2. Pres file*

Thursday, June 8, 1967, 4:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

At Tab A, for your signature, is a warm note to Austrian Chancellor Josef Klaus, who wrote you a very nice letter (Tab B) on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Marshall Plan.

I suggest we not release your letter here, but tell the Austrians they can do so if they wish.

Francis M. Bator

Tell the Austrians they can release the letter ✓

No _____

Speak to me _____

FMB:LSE:mst

4/12

June 9, 1967

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I should like to thank you, on behalf of all Americans, for your generous words on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Marshall Plan.

The assistance we gave to Austria was more than matched by the skill, energy and courage of the Austrian people. They have, under difficult circumstances and at great sacrifice, built a free and prosperous nation from the ruins of war. We are proud that we were able to help, but the achievement is Austria's.

With warmest best wishes.

Sincerely,

LBJ

His Excellency
Josef Klaus
Chancellor of the Austrian Federal Republic
Vienna

FILED

LBX:FMB:MST
June 8, 1967

Mr. President:

The 20th anniversary of the day on which Secretary of State Marshall in his historic speech at Harvard University announced the U.S. Government's intention to give Europe in its economic reconstruction a generous assistance unparalleled in history affords a welcome opportunity to recall the importance of this aid for Austria.

Not only did the Marshall Plan lead to a rapid recovery from the grave economic consequences of the war, but it also laid the foundations of the long period of economic prosperity which essentially is still continuing in Europe, a fact that is of great significance for Austria, whose economic development is very largely dependent on the economic situation in the neighbouring countries.

Without the help of the U.S. Government it would have been impossible to assure the supply of food to the population in the postwar years, to develop the country's basic and processing industries, to normalise the currency situation, and to establish an efficient credit system. Today, long after the end of Marshall Plan aid, the counterpart funds of the aid received by Austria continue to be a valuable source of capital for the financing of important investments and of aid to developing countries.

May I avail myself of this occasion to assure you, Mr. President, that the people of Austria are conscious of the importance of this unique and generous American assistance, and that they remember it with gratitude.

With assurances of my highest personal esteem,
I am

Sincerely yours,

(Dr. Josef Klaus)

~~SECRET~~ ~~SAVIN~~

Thursday, June 8, 1967
1:05 p.m.

Mr. President:



3.3(b)(1),(3)

It is not definitive. The occasion need not necessarily be the Middle East crisis. Nevertheless, I thought you would like to know of this piece of intelligence.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-49
By SJ, NARA, Date 2-11-04

Thursday, June 8, 1967
1:00 p.m.

43

MR. PRESIDENT:

I believe this Soviet Ambassador's interpretation of Kosygin's position in London is nearer the truth than Wilson's.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment (Vientiane 7599)

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

00 RUEHC RUEHC
DE RUMJFS 7599 1531235
ZNY TTTT

CONTROL : 6805
RECD : June 7, 1967, 9:42 a.m.

Info

O P 071220Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
ZEN/AMEMBASSY SAIGON UNN
STATE GRNC
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 7599

NODIS

REF: A) VIENTIANE 7477
B) STATE 207976
C) STATE 208400
D) STATE 208755

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-6
By ing NARA. Date 5-21-92

1. I SPENT ONE HOUR AND A HALF WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR KIRNASOVSKY TODAY IN EFFORT CLARIFY HIS REMARKS REPORTED REF A) AND TO SEEK INFORMATION REQUESTED REF B). ESSENTIALLY, CONVERSATION OPENED NO RPT NO NEW AVENUES, INDICATED NO RPT NO NEW INSTRUCTIONS, AND TERMINATED WITHOUT PROSPECT FOR PROGRESS. IT WAS HOWEVER, SUEFUL IN UNCOVERING ONE POINT OF APPARENT DIFFERNECE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON AS REGARDS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANT OF

PAGE TWO RUMJFS 7599 ~~TOP SECRET~~
"KOSYGIN INITIATIVE" OF LAST FEBRUARY.

2. ACCORDING TO KIRNASOVSKY, "INITIATIVE" TO WHICH HE REFERRED IN OUR PREVIOUS CONVERSATION WAS ORIGINAL PROPOSAL WHICH KOSYGIN LAID BEFORE WILSON AT OUTSET THEIR FEBRUARY TALKS IN LONDON, AND WHICH REFLECTED "UNDERSTANDINGS" WITH HANOI. IT ESSENTIALLY WAS RESTATEMENT OF HANOI'S WELL KNOWN POSITION.

3. SUBSTANCE OF MESSAGE CONTAINED IN PARA 2 RLF C WAS DESCRIBED BY KIRNASOVSKY AS AN "AMERICAN INITIATIVE" PASSED TO KOSYGIN THROUGH THE BRITISH. ON THE FACE OF IT, IT WAS "UNACCEPTABLE" TO SOVIETS. ALTHOUGH KOSYGIN PASSED THIS PROPOSAL ON TO HANOI "FOR INFORMATION", HE DID NOT RPT NOT PUT IT FORWARD AS A SUGGESTION FOR HANOI TO CONSIDER AND TO WHICH HE EXPECTED A REPLY. HE TOLD THE BRITISH THAT IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE AND THEY SHOULD NOT RPT NOT HAVE EXPECTED ANYTHING FURTHER FROM IT. KOSYGIN WAS NOT

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- TOP SECRET VIENTIANE 7599 CN 6805

A NEGOTIATOR ON BEHALF OF HANOI. HE ONLY BROUGHT THE SENSE OF THEIR POSITION WITH HIM TO LONDON. WE SHOULD HAVE FOLLOWED UP THAT POSITION WHICH WAS VALID THEN AND STILL IS NOW.

4. I SAID I THOUGHT THIS REVELATION WOULD COME AS CONSIDERABLE SURPRISE TO WASHINGTON, WHICH WAS UNDER IMPRESSION KOSYGIN'S PARTICIPATION IN THIS EXERCISE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLY LESS PASSIVE.

PAGE THREE RUMJFS 7599 ~~TOP SECRET~~
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5. WE THEN COVERED QUITE A BIT OF OTHER GROUND, NONE OF WHICH IS VERY NEW IN THIS DIALOGUE, BUT WHICH PROVIDES ANSWERS TO SEVERAL QUESTIONS ASKED IN REF B).

A) IT IS DOUBTFUL KIRNASOVSKY WAS SPEAKING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS IN OUR FIRST ENCOUNTER, SINCE HIS EXPLANATION OF "KOSYGIN INITIATIVE" SEEMS TO REMOVE MOST OF SIGNIFICANCE FROM HIS TALK.

B) HE HAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE HANOI WOULD CONSIDER SOME RECIPROCAL MILITARY ACTION IF WE STOP BOMBING, BUT HE DOES NOT RPT NOT RULE IT OUT. HOWEVER, WE CAN NOT RPT NOT EXPECT THEM TO ALTER THEIR PUBLIC POSITION THAT BOMBING HALT WILL BE UNRECIPROCATED, EXCEPT THAT IT MIGHT LEAD TO NEGOTIATIONS. HE SUGGESTS WE PURSUE IDEA OF "DISCREET" MILITARY RECIPROCATION IN TALKS DIRECTLY WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE. DESPITE MY COMPLAINT THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE REFUSED TO TALK WITH US, HE FELT TALKS WERE STILL POSSIBLE.

PAGE FOUR RUMJFS 7599 ~~TOP SECRET~~
C) HE DID NOT RPT NOT REITERATE WORD "SUSPEND" WITH RESPECT TO BOMBING. IN FACT, HE USED THE WORD "TERMINATE", I DID NOT PRESS TO MAKE A DISTINCTION, BUT DID STRESS TENSION THAT WOULD ARISE IF BOMBING HALT LED TO NO RPT NO PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE OR IF IT LED TO USE BY HANOI FOR MILITARY ADVANTAGE. KIRNASOVSKY RATHER AIRILY LABELED THAT AS "A PROBLEM BETWEEN YOUR PRESIDENT AND YOUR HAWKS."

D) AS FOR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON NATURE OF FINAL SETTLEMENT, SOVIETS FELT WE SHOULD DISCUSS THIS DIRECTLY WITH HANOI, AND WITH LIBERATION FRONT. THEY CONSIDERED THAT VIEWS REFLECTED IN WELL-KNOWN TRINH INTERVIEW WITH WILFRED BURCHETT OFFERED US AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SUCH TALKS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- TOP SECRET VIENTIANE 7599 CN 6805 JUNE 7

6. COMMENT: IT DOES NOT ESCAPE MY OBSERVATION THAT KIRNASSOVSKY'S FIRST CONVERSATION WITH ME WAS CARRIED ON IN PRESENCE INDIAN ICC CHAIRMAN. HIS USE OF SUCH PHRASES AS "KOSYGIN INITIATIVE" AND "SUSPENSION" OF BOMBING WERE OBVIOUSLY CALCULATED TO PUT BEST LIGHT ON SOVIET POSITION IN INDIAN EYES. SINCE INDIANS WOULD ACCEPT "KOSYGIN INITIATIVE" IN LIGHT USUALLY DESCRIBED IN WORLD PRESS, SOVIET POSITION WOULD LOOK RATHER FLEXIBLE TO THEM.

7. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, IT SEEMS TO BE THIS QUESTION OF

PAGE FIVE RUMJFS 7599 ~~TOP SECRET~~

KOSYGIN'S ACTION IN LONDON NEEDS SOME CLARIFICATION. IF HE ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH, OR PASSED ON PROPOSAL TO HANOI FOR ACTION (AS REF C) SUGGESTS) THEN IT MAY BE THAT THE SOVIET APPARATUS IS COVERING UP FOR A TACTICAL BLUNDER ON THE PART OF THEIR BOSS. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, (AND MORE CHARACTERISTICALLY) HE CLASSIFIED WILSON PROPOSAL AS "UNACCEPTABLE" AND MERELY PASSED IT TO HANOI "FOR INFORMATION", THEN DEPT'S UNDERSTANDING OF THIS EPISODE MAY BE SOMEWHAT DISTORTED BY THE REFRACTION OF WILSON'S WISHFUL THINKING OR GEORGE BORN'S EBULLIENCE.

8. IN ANY EVENT, I SEEM TO HAVE COME TO A DEAD END HERE, UNLESS DEPT WISHES ME TO PICK UP THE RATHER FRAYED THREAD OF TODAY'S TALK OR UNLESS KIRNASSOVSKY COMES BACK WITH SOME RIPOSTE UNDER IMPULSE FROM MOSCOW. PLEASE INSTRUCT. SULLIVAN
BT

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, June 8, 1967
1:00 p.m.

44

MR. PRESIDENT:

I believe this Soviet Ambassador's interpretation of Kosygin's position in London is nearer the truth than Wilson's.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment (Viehtiane 7599)

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

00 RUEHC RUEHCR
DE RUMJFS 7599 1531235
ZNY TTTT

CONTROL : 6805

RECD : June 7, 1967, 9:42 a.m.

Info

O P 071220Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
ZEN/AMEMBASSY SAIGON UNN
STATE GRNC

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 7599

NODIS

REF: A) VIENTIANE 7477

B) STATE 207976

C) STATE 208400

D) STATE 208755

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 92-6

By gwl/ep NARA, Date 9-24-99

1. I SPENT ONE HOUR AND A HALF WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR KIRNASOVSKY TODAY IN EFFORT CLARIFY HIS REMARKS REPORTED REF A) AND TO SEEK INFORMATION REQUESTED REF B). ESSENTIALLY, CONVERSATION OPENED NO RPT NO NEW AVENUES, INDICATED NO RPT NO NEW INSTRUCTIONS, AND TERMINATED WITHOUT PROSPECT FOR PROGRESS. IT WAS HOWEVER, SUEFUL IN UNCOVERING ONE POINT OF APPARENT DIFFERNECE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON AS REGARDS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANT OF

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~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- TOP SECRET VIENTIANE 7599 CN 6805

A NEGOTIATOR ON BEHALF OF HANOI. HE ONLY BROUGHT THE SENSE OF THEIR POSITION WITH HIM TO LONDON. WE SHOULD HAVE FOLLOWED UP THAT POSITION WHICH WAS VALID THEN AND STILL IS NOW.

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PAGE FOUR RUMJFS 7599 ~~TOP SECRET~~

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PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- TOP SECRET VIENTIANE 7599 CN 6805 JNNE 7

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PAGE FIVE RUMJFS 7599 ~~TOP SECRET~~

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BT

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

4/5

Thursday, June 8, 1967
12:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Our message on the ship incident and Kosygin's prompt response (attached) is one reason the link was created: to avoid misinterpretation of military moves and incidents during an intense crisis.

W. W. Rostow

45a

June 8, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Your telegram concerning the incident with the American Liberty-type ship torpedoed near Port Said has been received and immediately transmitted for information to President Nasser.

Kosygin

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 9-24-99

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 8, 1967
12:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gov. Harriman
agrees with our effort to find a
long-term solution in the Middle
East out of the wreckage of this
crisis.

W. W. Rostow

Brussels 6577

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356 Sec 3.4(h)
NSC 9-9-80
White House Guidelines Feb. 27, 1983
By 129, NARA, Date 5-29-91

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

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DE RUEHC 7711 1591605
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE
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BT

~~SECRET~~ FOLLOWING SENT ACTPON DEPT FROM BRUSSELS
JUNE 8:

QUOTE

BRUSSELS 6577

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN

IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT BOTH THE SHAH AND BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HARMEL UNDERLINED THE NECESSITY TO SEIZE PRESENT SITUATION TO ACHIEVE LONG-TERM SOLUTION MIDDLE EAST. SHAH CONVINCED THAT NASSER MUST BE ELIMINATED AS OTHERWISE HE CAN AGAIN INFLAME ARAB SENTIMENTS AS HE HAS SO DRAMATICALLY DONE IN RECENT DAYS. EVEN HIS BITTER ENEMIES, SUCH AS FAISAL, HAD TO SUPPORT HIM.

I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT NO QUICK PALLIATIVE SOLUTION BE ACCEPTED AT THIS TIME. IN MY JUDGMENT, WE WILL NEVER HAVE ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY AS PROPITIOUS TO DEAL WITH UNDERLYING PROBLEMS IN THIS TURBULENT AREA SO VITAL TO OUR OWN AND WESTERN EUROPE'S SECURITY.

GP-1.
SIGNED MANFULL.

UNQUOTE RUSK
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-121

By Rg/lis, NARA, Date 6-7-91

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

NNNN

PRESERVATION COPY

462

*Reston No DIS
MADE
cy to Bundy*

47

Thursday, June 8, 1967
10:15 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

The LIBERTY is listing badly
to starboard.

W. W. Rostow

Thursday, June 8, 1967 -- 10:15 a.m.

LIBERTY ship

The report from CINCEUR gives the location at 33°25"E, 31°23"N.
The Saratoga forwarded the report that the LIBERTY was under attack.
Did not say by whom. Reported that they had been hit by a torpedo.
Listing badly to starboard. The Saratoga has launched 4 - A4's and
- A1's. A ship of this type usually carries 6 officers and 114 enlisted
men.

Thurs., June 8, 1967

48

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ 10:10 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:



3.3(b)(1),(3)

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ attachment

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-49
By sj, NARA, Date 2.11.04

Pres file~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 8, 1967
10:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a Soviet diplomat
takes a somewhat different view than
one we have had before.

It is conceivable that it reflects
a split within the Soviet government
which is not notably singleminded.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4
By sig, NARA, Date 4-9-93

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 49a

49a

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-301
By is, NARA Date 4-24-00

1. LEV NESKOV, FIRST SECRETARY SOVIET EMBASSY, CONTACTED EMBASSY TODAY ABOUT NOON "IN ORDER TO HAVE TALK ON NEUTRAL TERRITORY." (NESKOV WAS FORMERLY STATIONED RABAT AND IS

2. AT BEGINNING NESKOV MENTIONED TWO VERY RECENT NEWS REPORTS: DECISION OF JORDAN TO CEASE MILITARY ACTION AND

3. ON ME, NESKOV COMMENTED MOST URGENT PRIORITY WAS TO STOP FIGHTING. SOVIET UNION HAD AGREED TO UNSC RESOLUTION DESPITE FACT ARAB STATES UNHAPPY ABOUT IT. EMBOFF MENTIONED REPORTS COMING YRINCIPALLY FROM CAIRO CHRGING US WITH MILITARY INVOLVEMENT ON ISRAELI SIDE AND SPELLED OUT IN DETAIL CATEGORIC DENIALS WHICH WASHINGTON HAD ISSUED. NESKOV REPLIED HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT BELIEVE REPORTS FROM CAIRO AND OTHER REASONES HE MENTIONED AMMAN) AND TERMED THEM ARAB PROPAGANDA. HE SEEMED YARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ASSURANCES US NOT INVOLVED MILITARILY AND FACT WE HAD CONVEYED WORD IMMEDIATELY TO KING HUSSEIN TO THIS EFFECT.

PAGE 3 RUFNOR 3980 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 NEED TO DIRECT ALL PRESENT EFFORTS TO OBTAINING CEASEFIRE.

5. NESKOV EXPRESSED VIEW ARAB SIDE HAD STARTED FIGHTING. EIBOFF SAID HE HAD NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION AND IN PRESENT CONFUSION IT WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE FACTS. NESKOV THEN COMMENTED SITUATION COULD NOT BE SOLVED UNLESS

ARABS RECONCILED THEMSELVES TO ISRAEL'S CONTINUED EXISTENCE AS STATE. NESKOV SOUGHT GIVE IMPRESSION USSR SUPPORTED THIS AND ALSO OYPOSED TO ARAB ACTIONHDD SIGNED AT ELIMINATING ISRAEL. RECALLED USSR ONE OF FIRST NATIONS TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL.

6. IN RESPONSE TO QUERY A975 175743 \$3;3)90.3,5, NESKOV EXPRESSED VIEW ISRAEL WOULD NOT LEAVE ITS PRESENT POSITIONS UNTIL IT OBTAINED GUARANTEES FROM GREAT POWERS AND UN FOR ISRAEL'S CONTINUED EXISTENCE AND SECURITY. EMBOFF NOTED THAT IN CERTAIN KEY ARAB COUNTRIES - UAR, SYRIA AND ALGERIA - USSR ENJOYED SIGNIFICANTLY MORE INFLUENCE THAN US AND SOVIETS COULD USE THIS INFLUENCE TO OBTAIN ARAB AGREEMENT TO MORE LONG-RANGE SETTLEMENT. NESKOV DENIED SOVIET INFLUENCE THESE

PAGE 4 RUFNCR 3930BB ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
COUNTRIES ALL THAT STRONG BECAUSE IN ALL OF THEM THERE WERE IMPORTANT CHINESE INFLUENCES TRYING TO DEPICT USSR AS REACTIONARY SIDING WITH US. HOWEVER, USSR WOULD BE EXERTING CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT PEACE.

7. NESKOV ALSO GREATLY INTERESTED IN WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NOW BETWEEN ALGERIA AND US. EMBOFF GAVE HIM FACTUAL ACCOUNT OF HOW GOA HAD INFORMED US OF ITS DECISION TO BREAK RELATIONS AND POINTED OUT WE WRE WAITING FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH GOA TO SEE WHERE WE WOULD GO FROM HERE. EMBOFF MADE IT CLEAR THAT IN ALL INSTANCES INITIATIVE TO BREAK RELATIONS HAD COME FIRST FROM CAIRO, THEN FOLLOWED BY ULGIERS AND OTHERS.

8. NESKOV PROBED ABOUT US FOREKNOWLEDGE OF ACTUAL OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. EMBOFF STRESSED THAT ALTHOUGH WE HAD BEEN QUITE AWARE OF BUILD-UP OF PRESSURES AND TENSIONS, ACTUAL OUTBREAK OF HOSTILTITES HAD TAKEN US BY SURPRISE AND WE HAD HAD NO FOREKNOWLEDGE. EMOFF ALSO GAVE NESKOV SUMMARY OF US POSITION AND ATTITUDE BASED ON MOST RECENT

PAGE 3 RUFNCR 3980BB ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INSTRUCTIONS FROM DEPT.

9. COMMENT EMBOFF HAD MET NESKOV AT DIPLOMATIC RECEPTION ABOUT 10 DAYS AGO AND HAD EXCHANGED CALLING CARDS. TODAY WAS HIS FIRST APPROACH. HE SEEMED TO BE TRYING CONVEY IMPRESSION: (1) USSR WANTS TO STAY NEUTRAL AND HOPES US WILL DO SAME; (2) ARABS NOT UNITED; (3) UAR INTERNALLY WEAK; (4) ARABS STARTED FIGHTING; (5) ISRAEL HAS ALREADY GAINED MILITARY VICTORY; AND (6) USSR STILL COMMITTED EXISTENCE ISRAEL AS STATE. SOME-OF-WHAT NESKOV SAID IS OBVIOUSLY AT VARIANCE WITH OFFICIAL MOSCOW LINE BUT PERHAPS HIS REMARKS MAY CONVEY ADDITIONAL MEANING IN CONTEXT. REPORTS WASHINGTON RECEIVING FROM ELSEWHERE. ON DEPARTING, NESKOV ASSERTED IT WOULD BE GOOD TO STAY IN TOUCH OVER NEXT FEW DAYS.

JERNEBAN
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thurs., June 8, 1967
10:00 a. m.

50

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] but, clearly, once Hanoi decides
to end the war and accept the 17th parallel
the crucial question is elections.

1.3
(a)(4,5)

And, if Hanoi is serious, it would not wish U. S.
forces out quickly, because it needs a counter
to Chinese Communist pressure if they make
peace, which the Russians cannot supply.

Either these men are speculating (most likely)
or reflecting some new thoughts in Hanoi (possible).

We shall follow up.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment [REDACTED]

1.3 (a)(4)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-3
By ig, NARA, Date 11-17-93

51

Thursday, June 8, 1967 -- 9:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

We have a flash report from the Joint Reconnaissance Center indicating that a U. S. elint (electronics intelligence) ship, the LIBERTY, has been torpedoed in the Mediterranean. The ship is located 60-100 miles north of Egypt.

Reconnaissance aircraft are out from the 6th fleet.

We have no knowledge of the submarine or surface vessel which committed this act.

We shall keep you informed.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority CIA 9-20-79, NSA 10-31-79
By kg/dch, NARA, Date 6-4-91

Pres file
52

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, June 8, 1967 -- 9:15 am

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this roundup of gossip and attitudes in the UN, which, taken together, gives quite a good feel for the situation. [REDACTED]

Also, two less authoritative reports, one from a [REDACTED] talking about Soviet further aid to Egypt and revealing that we used the hot line; and a Soviet [REDACTED] saying they would ditch Nasser and not get involved in a war on their 50th anniversary.

W. W. Rostow

USUN 5654

Bravo "Crayon" 1248

Bravo "Crayon" 1219

Bravo "Crayon" WS 9973-9982

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-49
By is, NARA, Date 11-18-04

WWRostow:rlh

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USUN 5654

52a
SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-301
By ie, NARA Date 4-19-05

REACTIONS TO ME CRISIS IN UN CIRCLES

FOL IS ROUND-UP OF REACTIONS TO OR INTERPRETATIONS OF LONG-TERM SIGNIFICANCE OF PRESENT ME CONFLICT AS EXPRESSED TO MISOFFS IN INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BY VARIOUS UN DELS OVER PAST TWO DAYS:

1. SADI (JORDAN) EXPRESSED VIEWS AS FOLS:

A) ARABS ARE DISGUSTED WITH THE SOVS FOR SUPPORTING CEASE-FIRE ONLY RES OF JUNE 6, MYSTIFIED AT SOV SPONSORSHIP OF JUNE 7 FOLLOW-UP RES, AND UNABLE DEFINE SOV MOTIVATION. SAID JORDAN NOT CONSULTED BY SOVS IN ADVANCE, AND BELIEVED OTHER ARABS NOT CONSULTED EITHER. EXPRESSED VIEW THAT SOV SUPPORT OF ARABS ONE OF WORDS ONLY.

B) RE FUTURE, HIS PRIMARY CONCERN IS FUTURE US POSTURE TOWARD ARAB WORLD, STATING ARABS LESS CONCERNED NOW ABOUT STRAIT OF TIRAN THAN THEIR OWN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. ASKED IF US STILL HAS POLICY TO RESPECT TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL STATES IN AREA AND SAID ARABS HAD COMMENTED ON ABSENCE SUCH STATEMENT FROM GOLDBERG SPEECHES SINCE JUNE 5. WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT GOLDBERG HAD REITERATED THIS POLICY ON JUNE 6, SADI EXPRESSED HOPE US COULD STATE THIS MORE CLEARLY.

C) JORDAN NOT BEING CRITICIZED BY OTHER ARABS HERE FOR SEEKING CEASE-FIRE. ALL RECOGNIZED THAT JAA HAD DONE MOST AND BEST FIGHTING ON ARAB SIDE, HAD TAKEN BRUNT OF CASUALTIES AND HAD FOUGHT WITH GREATEST DISTINCTION WHEN CHIPS DOWN. BY CONTRAST, UAR HAD PERFORMED MISERABLY; SYRIANS HAD DONE LITTLE; IRAQ WAS FAR AWAY AND COST OF SENDING A FEW PLANES AND MEN MINIMAL.

2. SAUDI DEP PERMREP EXPRESSED FOL VIEWS:

A) ARABS EXTREMELY DISAPPOINTED WITH USSR FOR TWO REASONS: SOV REFUSAL TO TAKE POSITION LAST WEEK ON MERITS OF ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE; FAILURE TO HELP ARABS WITH ANYTHING BUT WORDS. UAR CLAIMS RE US-UK INVOLVEMENT IN AERIAL WARFARE WERE CONVINCING TO MANY ARABS WHO QUITE NATURALLY WONDERED WHY SOVS HAD NOT TAKEN CONCRETE COUNTER STEPS.

B) HUSSEIN HAD OUTSMARTED NASSER THIS TIME. LATTER COUNTED ON LACK OF COOPERATION FROM HUSSEIN AND FEISAL, WHICH WOULD HAVE ENABLED HIM TO UNDERMINE CONSERVATIVE ARAB REGIMES, AS WELL AS POINT TO INTRA-ARAB SPLIT AS REASON FOR NOT CARRYING THROUGH AGAINST ISRAEL. BY COMING TO CAIRO AND SIGNING TREATY, HOWEVER, HUSSEIN HAD UNDERCUT NASSER.

C) ISRAELI MILITARY VICTORY WOULD LEAVE SURROUNDING ARAB POPULACE MORE BATTERED THAN EVER AND DOES NOT BODE WELL FOR FUTURE PEACE OF AREA.

D) FAILURE OF IRAQI ARMY TO ADVANCE

PRESERVATION COPY

C) ISRAELI MILITARY VICTORY WOULD LEAVE SURROUNDING ARAB POPULACE MORE EMBITTERED THAN EVER AND DOES NOT BODE WELL FOR FUTURE PEACE OF AREA.

D) FAILURE OF IRAQI ARMY PLAY GREATER ROLE SOURCE OF GREAT CONCERN AMONG ARABS. WITH BEST ARMY OF ALL ARABS AND GOOD AIR FORCE, ACTIVE IRAQI ROLE COULD MAKE GREAT DIFFERENCE.

3. REACTIONS OF SEVERAL ASIAN DEL MEMBERS (JAPAN, MALAYSIA, CEYLON, THAILAND, INDONESIA, BURMA, PHILIPPINES) REVEALED FOL COMMON ELEMENTS:

A) NASSER AND RADICAL ARAB GOVTS HAVE SUFFERED GRIEVOUS LOSS OF FACE AND PRESTIGE AT HOME AND ABROAD. EVEN THOUGH THIS IN LARGE PART DUE TO NASSER'S OWN MISJUDGMENT RE MOOD AND STRENGTH OF ISRAEL, IT WILL HAVE RESULTS, BOTH SHORT AND LONG-TERM, SATISFACTORY TO VERY FEW, E.G., DOMESTIC INSTABILITY IN ARAB STATES (ESPECIALLY JORDAN), INTENSIFICATION OF ARAB DESIRE FOR REVENGE AGAINST ISRAEL (ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS IN CASE OF SYRIA), HAND ABRUPT DECLINE IN US INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT ARAB WORLD.

B) UAR CHARGES RE US-UK INVOLVEMENT IN AERIAL WAR NEITHER CREDIBLE NOR GENERALLY BELIEVED, EVEN AMONG ARABS AT UN. CHARGES PROBABLY RESULT FROM COMBINATION OF UAR NEED FOR SCAPEGOAT FOR MISERABLE MILITARY PERFORMANCE PLUS WILD HOPE THERE WAS STILL CHANCE OF GETTING SOVS TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATELY EQUIPMENT TO HELP IN AIR DEFENSE OF ARABS.

C) US CLAIM TO BE NEUTRAL IN THOUGHT, DEED AND WORD DID NOT RING QUITE TRUE. WHILE US WAS CONSISTENT (ONCE FIGHTING BROKE OUT) IN URGING SIMPLE CEASEFIRE, GENERAL ASSUMPTION IS THAT US WOULD HAVE TAKEN DIFFERENT STAND (I.E., INSIST UPON CEASEFIRE PLUS WITHDRAWAL) IF COURSE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS HAD GONE AGAINST ISRAEL. MOREOVER US POSITION IN THIS CASE NOT CONSISTENT WITH POSITION US TOOK AT TIME OF INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT IN 1965.

D) GENERAL FEELING IS THAT US, WHILE IT DID NOT ENCOURAGE ISRAELIS TO TAKE TO ARMS, IS NOT AVERSE TO TAKING ADVANTAGE OF ISRAELI MILITARY SUCCESS TO SECURE SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS RE STRAIT OF TIRAN. MOREOVER, THERE IS UNDERCURRENT OF SUSPICION US AWARE OF AND DID NOTHING TO PREVENT ISRAELI RESORT TO ARMS.

E) ONCE MISERABLE MILITARY PERFORMANCE OF ARABS CLEAR, SOVS WERE FACED WITH VERY UNATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVES; THEY COULD EITHER WORK TO STOP ISRAELI ADVANCE THROUGH UN, OR TAKE SOME CONCRETE AND DIRECT ACTION TO BOLSTER UAR DEFENSES. LATTER ALTERNATIVE RULED OUT PARTLY BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN THROWING GOOD MONEY AFTER BAD, EVEN MORE BECAUSE OF SOV CONCERN IT WOULD GENERATE COUNTER STEPS BY US AND UK.

F) WHILE THERE IS RELIEF THAT SOVS MADE CHOICE THEY DID, IT IS FELT SOVS HAVE THEREBY DONE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THEIR OWN PRESTIGE AND RELIABILITY AS "PROTECTOR" IN EYES OF ARABS AND MANY AFRICANS; SOVS HAVE ONLY INTENSIFIED THIS DAMAGE BY THEIR LOUD TALK ABOUT THE CONFLICT BEING ISRAELI AGGRESSION, ENCOURAGED BY IMPERIALISTS.

4. ACCORDING [REDACTED] EBAN (ISRAEL) HE EXPRESSED VIEW TO [REDACTED] THAT SOV HASTE IN DEMANDING CEASE-FIRE BASED ON USSR DECISION SCUTTLE NASSER AND PIN HOPES ON SYRIA AS LEADER ARAB WORLD. EBAN REPORTEDLY SAID SYRIA ONLY ARAB STATE AT MOMENT ENJOYING RELATIVELY FAVORABLE MILITARY POSITION AND RAPID CEASEFIRE MIGHT PREVENT SYRIA FROM SUFFERING DEFEAT EQUAL TO UAR'S. [REDACTED] THOUGHT SOVS HAD DECIDED THEY HAD BACKED WRONG HORSE AND WANTED CUT THEIR LOSSES. REISCH [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD HEARD THEORIES SIMILAR TO EBAN'S

PRESERVATION COPY

IMPERIALISTS.

4. ACCORDING [REDACTED] EBAN (ISRAEL) EXPRESSED VIEW TO [REDACTED] THAT SOV HASTE IN DEMANDING CEASE-FIRE BASED ON USSR DECISION SCUTTLE NASSER AND PIN HOPES ON SYRIA AS LEADER ARAB WORLD. EBAN REPORTEDLY SAID SYRIA ONLY ARAB STATE AT MOMENT ENJOYING RELATIVELY FAVORABLE MILITARY POSITION AND RAPID CEASEFIRE MIGHT PREVENT SYRIA FROM SUFFERING DEFEAT EQUAL TO UAR'S. [REDACTED] THOUGHT SOVS HAD DECIDED THEY HAD BACKED WRONG HORSE AND WANTED CUT THEIR LOSSES. REISCH (AUSTRIA) SAID HE HAD HEARD THEORIES SIMILAR TO EBAN'S. MOREOVER, HE GATHERED FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH ARAB AND EE DELEGATES THAT SOVS HAD DISCUSSED THEIR INTENTION REQUEST RAPID CEASEFIRE ONLY CASUALLY WITH UAR AND OTHER ARABS, BUT QUITE FULLY WITH SYRIA.

5. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN GREAT DEAL OF SPECULATION AMONG SCATTERED LAS AND EUROPEANS, AS WELL AS VAKIL OF IRAN, THAT NASSER HAS SUFFERED SERIOUS DEFEAT, HAS RESULT OF WHICH ENTIRE ME BALANCE HAS SHIFTED AWAY FROM HIM. CREMIN (IRELAND) THOUGHT SOVS HAVE LOST MAJOR ROUND IN DIPLOMATIC BOUT; JOURNALISTS HEARD TO COMMENT ON WHOPPING SOV ERRORS OVER PAST YEARS (E.G., CUBA, INDONESIA AND NOW UAR) AND TO WONDER WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF US COMMITTED SUCH BLOOPERS.

6. INDICATIVE OF REACTION MORE INTELLIGENT "PROGRESSIVE" ARAB SPOKESMEN HERE WAS FACT THAT AMB BOUATTOURA (ALG) STOPPED USUN OFFICER EVENING JUNE 7 TO SAY HE HOPED RECENT OCCURRENCES WOULD NOT MEAN END OF CONTACT WITH USUN (OBVIOUSLY ALLUDING TO ALGERIAN BREAK IN RELS WITH US). WHEN ASSURED THAT HE COULD COUNT ON CONTINUING CONTACT BUT THAT US REGRETTED ALG GOVT HAD ACTED ON BASIS WHOLLY ERRONEOUS INFO, BOUATTOURA HEDGED BY SAYING THAT ALG DECISION BASED ON "OBJECTIVE" (IN MARXIST SENSE) ALIGNMENT US ON SIDE OF ISRAEL. ALTHOUGH HAMAD (ARAB LEAGUE) BEWAILED PLUMMETTING US CREDIBILITY AMONG ARABS IN WAKE ISRAELI MOVE AND APPEARED ACCEPT YARN ABOUT US PLANS, BOUATTOURA POINTEDLY REFRAINED FROM ASSOCIATING HIMSELF WITH THIS ARGUMENT.

GP-3.

GOLDBERG
BT

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

SECRET
TDCS-314/08090-67

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY: UAR/USSR

DOI: 7 JUNE 1967

SUBJECT: 1. POSSIBLE SOVIET MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE UAR
2. SOVIET CLAIMS OF SIGHTING OF UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT
OVER ISMAILIA.

DATE AND PLACE ACQ: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INQUIRED AS TO WHAT [REDACTED] ASSESSMENT WAS OF THE CURRENT ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT AND THE SOVIET REACTION TO WHAT APPEARED TO BE A STRING OF ISRAELI VICTORIES. [REDACTED] REPLIED "WE WILL INTERVENE". WHEN [REDACTED] POINTED OUT THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM THIS MOVE, [REDACTED] REPLIED "WE HAVE NO OTHER CHOICE". AS TO WHAT [REDACTED] MEANT BY INTERVENTION HE STATED THE UAR HAS LOST MANY PLANES BUT THE PILOTS ARE STILL ALIVE AND CAN FLY OTHER PLANES. [REDACTED] COMMENTED IF THE SOVIET UNION PLANNED TO INTERVENE BY PROVIDING ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT IT WOULD HAVE TO ACT SOON FOR THERE WERE REPORTS THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE IN POSITION TO THREATEN PORT SAID WITHIN A DAY. [REDACTED] REPLIED, YES, ACTION WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN WITHIN THE NEXT FEW HOURS.

2. IN REPLY TO [REDACTED] QUERY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A MORE RATIONAL APPROACH THROUGH ENFORCING THE UNITED NATIONS CALL FOR A CEASE FIRE, [REDACTED] REPLIED THAT PRESIDENT NASIR COULD NOT ACCEPT A CEASE FIRE FOR IT WOULD MEAN DEFEAT AND HE WOULD BE FINISHED. [REDACTED] NOTED ASSOCIATED PRESS REPORT THAT JORDAN HAD ACCEPTED THE CEASE FIRE AND [REDACTED] REPLIED THAT ALL OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES COULD ACCEPT THE CEASE FIRE BUT UAR WOULD NOT.

3. [REDACTED] ASKED [REDACTED] IF THE UAR ARMY COULD HOLD AT SUEZ, WHAT COUNTRY COULD HOLD OUT THE LONGEST. [REDACTED] REPLIED BOTH WOULD BE IN ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY. [REDACTED] THEN CONTINUED BY STATING THE ISRAELIS COULD NOT SUSTAIN A LENGTHY WAR AND IF THE UAR COULD HOLD AT SUEZ, THE UAR WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO COUNTER-ATTACK AFTER A PERIOD OF TIME. WHEN [REDACTED] ASKED IF THIS WOULD BE AFTER SOVIET ASSISTANCE, [REDACTED] REPLIED, YES.

4. WHEN [REDACTED] ASKED WHAT EVIDENCE HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO PROVE UNITED STATES PLANES WERE PROVIDING AIR COVER FOR THE ISRAELIS. [REDACTED] REPLIED THERE HAD BEEN "REPORTS" THAT UNITED STATES PLANES PROVIDED AIR COVER OVER ISRAELI CITIES TO ALLOW ALL ISRAELI PLANES TO BE UTILIZED IN THE FIRST SURPRISE STRIKE AT THE ARABS. IN REPLY TO [REDACTED] ASSURANCES THAT NO UNITED STATES AIRCRAFTS HAD BEEN INVOLVED, [REDACTED] SAID RUSSIANS AT ISMAILIA HAD SEEN UNITED STATES PLANES. [REDACTED] CONTINUED BY STATING IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT ISRAELIS MAY HAVE USED UNITED STATES MANUFACTURED AIRCRAFT AND ADDED UNITED STATES MARKINGS. [REDACTED] GAVE AN AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER TO [REDACTED] SPECIFIC QUESTION IF THE RUSSIANS HAD SEEN UNITED STATES MARKINGS ON THE AIRCRAFT SEEN OVER ISMAILIA.

5. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO THE UAR, [REDACTED] STATED HE HAD HEARD EGYPTIANS ARE QUITE DISAPPOINTED OVER THE LACK OF SOVIET SUPPORT DURING THE PRESENT CONFLICT. [REDACTED] REPLIED THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE DISAPPOINTED BUT HOPEFULLY NOT FOR LONG.

6. TO [REDACTED] COMMENT THAT A MORE SENSIBLE APPROACH WOULD BE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO WORK WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE UNITED NATIONS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM, IVANOVSKIY ANSWERED BY STATING PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PREMIER KOSYGIN

52e
3.4(b)(1)

3.4(b)(1)

3.4(b)(1)

3.4(b)(1)

3.4(b)(1)

3.4(b)(1)

3.4(b)(1)

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-247
By SJ, NARA, Date 7-10-04

52f

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WHCA

1967 JUN 8 01 06

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-226
By cb, NARA Date 1-24-01

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~ CONTROLLED DISSEM

(ADVANCE)

COUNTRY: USSR/UAR/ISRAEL

DOI: 7 JUNE 1967

SUBJECT: SOVIET [REDACTED] NON-INTERVENTION IN MIDDLE
EAST CONFLICT

ACQ:
SOURCE:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yr
(C)

1. THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE THEIR SUPPORT OF THE ARAB STATES
BUT THEIR POLICY IS NOW TO GET RID OF NASSER. THERE IS NO DANGER
OF SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yr
(C)

2. ([REDACTED]) COMMENT: [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yr
(C)

[REDACTED] THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT INTERVENE
IN A FOREIGN WAR IN ANY SITUATION SHORT OF AN ACTUAL VIOLATION OF
SOVIET TERRITORY. [REDACTED] THESE FACTORS SHOULD BE
BORN IN MIND IN ASSESSING ALL SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yr
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Limited Official Use

Thursday - June 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: United States Mexico Commission on Border Development

Ambassador Telles has completed a two-month survey of border communities and prepared the attached interim report to you on his findings.

In the report he identifies problem areas that the United States Commission might study with a view to developing joint action programs. He will convene his Commission soon to start the staff work.

Telles reports that the Mexicans are far behind us in the staffing arrangements of their Commission. This coincides with indications from Tony Carrillo Flores that they are looking to us for ideas and drive in making the Commission function.

Telles suggests that one way to give the Mexicans a push is for you to meet with the United States Commission and formally announce its composition. Ambassador Margain might be invited to attend, as well as our border congressmen. The publicity on such a meeting would also help you with our Mexican-American community.

Telles' suggestion has merit, but I would like to carry it a step further to encourage faster action by the Mexicans. Perhaps we could arrange for Diaz Ordaz to meet with his Commission at the same time that you receive ours and both of you make a joint announcement. If you concur, I will have Tony Freeman sound out Carrillo Flores. State likes the idea.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Approve

☒

Disapprove

☐

Speak to me

☐

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June 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S.-Mexico Border Development Commission

On March 31, 1967, I sent a report (Tab A) to Mr. Rostow detailing activities and plans with respect to the new Commission.

From April 6 to May 25, I made an intensive tour of the border by automobile from Brownsville to San Diego, stopping at the capital of each border state and at 25 border towns and cities. Accompanied by a staff assistant and two consultants, I spoke with:

- State Governors
- Mayors
- County Officials
- Federal Government Officials
- Labor Union Officers
- School Boards
- University faculties
- Churchmen
- Chambers of Commerce
- Farmers
- Businessmen
- Representatives of Mexican-American Civic Organizations
- Officials of "Poverty" programs (many of which I visited personally)
- Other community leaders

I also attended the hearings on the commuter worker problem, held by Congressman Tunney in El Centro, California, May 13.

A great number of those with whom I spoke expressed deep appreciation that the special problems of the border area had been recognized by the President and that a Commission had been formed to study means for improving the border area. There was a consensus that the border is a very special region with its own peculiar characteristics, and that often its

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problems and needs are not taken into account when national or even state policies and programs are formulated.

It was quite apparent to me that the border area requires special attention. Following are some of the problems encountered along the United States side of the border.

1. Unemployment is far in excess of the national average in many parts of the area.
2. Agriculture is in trouble, often because remoteness from markets tends to depress prices at the farm, and United States domiciled workers object to substandard wages, either for themselves or for Mexican domiciled workers.
3. Farmers complain of seasonal labor shortages.
4. The average level of education of Mexican-Americans is far below the national average. There are too few opportunities for technical-vocational education, as opposed to purely academic education which fails to meet the felt needs of many of the people in the area.
5. A strong and general feeling that industrial enterprises should be given more encouragement to locate in the area.
6. Increased narcotics and marijuana smuggling.
7. Insufficient and inadequate housing.
8. Inadequate sewage and water systems in many areas.
9. A very serious language problem among the children of Mexican-American parents.
10. Disease rates above the national average (e.g., TB, rabies, infant diarrhea).
11. Shortages of doctors and nurses in some areas.
12. Discontent among some sectors of organized labor, focussed on:
 - (a) Commuter problem (Mexican citizens working in the United States and living in Mexico)

- (b) Unemployment
- (c) Depressed wages
- (d) Strikebreakers (Workers from Mexico being employed at industries on strike)
- (e) Industrialization of Mexican side of border by United States enterprises

Problems caused by United States action and which concern many Mexicans are:

- (a) Restrictions on liquor importation from Mexico;
- (b) Bonded warehouses in the United States selling for exportation to Mexico against Mexican law;
- (c) Inadequate staffing and short hours at several United States ports of entry.

In spite of several international problems that could generate agitation and unfriendly attitudes, I found relations generally good between residents of opposite sides of the border. On the other hand, there are signs of some animosity and unrest among residents of the United States side in several areas, due, I think, to the scarcity of diversified job opportunities and to low wage scales, as well as to efforts toward and resistance to the organization of labor.

During my tour, I had two meetings with my Mexican counterpart, Mr. Jose Vivanco. Through these visits and frequent telephone contact we have already found the Commission useful as a channel for cooperative border efforts between the two countries, (e.g., we were able quickly to arrange for coordinated freight terminal construction at the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez port of entry, at considerable savings to both Governments). Nevertheless, I have observed that Mexico has proceeded, thus far, more slowly than we have in such matters as the naming of commissioners, the establishment of a staff, and the institution of studies. For these and other reasons cited in my March 31 memorandum to Mr. Rostow, I respectfully recommend that you call the United States Commissioners to the White House and announce their designation. Mexican Ambassador Margain's presence at such a ceremony, together with pictures and press releases to be distributed along the border and in Mexico City, would reinforce the Mexican Government's appreciation of the importance and urgency which the United States attaches to the new

Commission. It would also help to focus the attention of pertinent United States federal agencies on border matters of concern to the new Commission.

In the very near future, and preferably after you have announced the designation of the other United States Commissioners, if the above meets with your approval, I plan to call them to a meeting to discuss in detail the findings of my recent study mission and to present proposals for the Commission's future activities.

After the United States Section has selected its proposals and determined priorities I will meet with my Mexican counterpart. We will consult on the acceptability of the United States proposals as far as Mexico is concerned. We will then make preliminary arrangements for the first meeting of the Joint U.S.-Mexico Commission, the purpose of which will be to ratify proposals for joint action.

The foregoing is merely a summary of my familiarization tour of the border and a brief interim report of my activities toward getting the Commission moving. After the first meeting of the United States Section, I will submit to you more detailed findings and more specific recommendations.

Raymond Telles, Ambassador
Chairman, United States Section
Border Development Commission

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Page 3
Border Union

March 31, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Border Development Commission

In accordance with our conversation March 28, I will send you memoranda from time to time to keep you informed of developments concerning the new Commission.

While in Mexico prior to my arrival in Washington, I held discussions with my Mexican counterpart, Mr. José Vivanco, and with the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Carrillo Flores. Although they had no fixed ideas on the Commission's scope and structure (and seemed to be awaiting U.S. initiatives), the Secretary said that President Diaz Ordaz is ascribing great importance to this matter. In his meeting at some future date with the President of Guatemala he plans to suggest the formation of a similar Commission between Mexico and Guatemala. Furthermore, he has issued instructions to several Cabinet Secretariats to appoint a high level official to the Commission. My counterpart is a former Governor of the State of Nuevo Leon, a former Senator, and present Director of Mexico's National Frontier Program (PRONAF).

In Mexico City I also discussed the Commission on three occasions with Ambassador Freeman and his staff.

I arrived in Washington March 15 to take up my duties as Chairman of the U.S. Section of the Commission. After completing debriefing sessions with respect to my previous

assignment in Costa Rica I began a series of discussions with officials concerned with the border area. To date, I have held discussions with the following:

1. Senator Paul F. Fannin (R. Arizona)
2. Senator Carl Hayden (D. Arizona)
3. Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R. Iowa)
4. Senator Mike Mansfield (D. Montana)
5. Senator Ralph Yarborough (D. Texas)
6. Congressman E. (Kika) de la Garza (D. Texas)
7. Congressman O. C. Fisher (D. Texas)
8. Congressman Abraham Kazen (D. Texas)
9. Congressman Thomas G. Morris (D. New Mexico)
10. Congressman Armistead I. Selden, Jr. (D. Alabama)
11. Congressman John V. Tunney (D. California)
12. Congressman Morris K. Udall (D. Arizona)
13. Congressman James B. Utt (R. California)
14. Congressman Lionel Van Deerlin (D. California)
15. Congressman Johnny Walker (D. New Mexico)
16. Congressman Richard C. White (D. Texas)
17. Pat M. Holt, Asst. Chief of Staff, Committee on Foreign Relations
18. John W. Macy, Special Asst. to the President
19. Walt W. Rostow, Special Asst. to the President
20. Marvin Watson, Special Asst. to the President
21. Robert C. Weaver, Secretary of HUD
22. Sargent Shriver, Director of OEO
23. Ambassador Hugo B. Margain, Ambassador of Mexico
24. Lisle Carter, Asst. Secretary, HEW
25. Stanley H. Ruttenberg, Asst. Secretary of Labor
26. William Crook, Asst. Director, OEO
27. Robert Perrin, Asst. Director for Interagency Relations, OEO
28. Ambassador John M. Steeves, Director General of the Foreign Service
29. Don Hummel, Assistant Secretary, HUD
30. Robert M. Sayre, Deputy Asst. Secretary of State
31. Thomas W. Harvey, Deputy Asst. Secretary for Economic Development (Commerce)
32. John W. Bowser, Deputy Asst. Commissioner, Inspections, INS
33. Rodger C. Abraham, Deputy Asst. Secretary of State
34. Richard Scammon, Chairman, Select Committee on Western Hemisphere Migration

35. N. T. Powers, Counsel for Conference on Mexican-American Problems
36. Melbourne L. Spector, Member of the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, Department of State

Still to be seen are:

1. Senator George D. Aiken (R. Vermont)
2. Senator Clinton P. Anderson (D. New Mexico)
3. Senator J. W. Fulbright (D. Arkansas)
4. Senator Thomas H. Kuchel (R. California)
5. Senator Joseph M. Montoya (D. New Mexico)
6. Senator Wayne Morse (D. Oregon)
7. Senator George Murphy (R. California)
8. Senator John G. Tower (R. Texas)
9. Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez (D. Texas)
10. Congressman Chet Holifield (D. California)
11. Congressman William S. Mailliard (R. California)
12. Congressman Bob Wilson (R. California)
13. W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor
14. Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
15. Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz, U.S. Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States
16. Dr. C. E. Bishop, Executive Director, National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty

The U.S. legislators thus far contacted have welcomed the creation of the Commission, although they have no definitive ideas as to what its precise functions ought to be. The border problems uppermost in the minds of most of them are: (1) the so-called "green card commuter problem", (2) the restrictions on liquor imports across the border, and (3) the duty-free import allowance restrictions on returning tourists.

Some of the Executive Branch officials contacted are also concerned about these same problems. However, these officials are generally more inclined to recognize that these matters are not strictly within the purview of the Commission, which is, at present, authorized only to study the means of cooperative action between the two countries which might be

used to raise living standards along the border. Thus, there appears to be a dichotomy of attitudes toward the Commission. On the one hand is the idea that it should function as a sort of ombudsman, to hear and hopefully resolve complaints heard along the border. On the other hand are those who seem to envision extensive public programs and intensive industrial promotion throughout the area.

I intend to complete my initial Washington contacts about April 5. Immediately thereafter I plan to make an extensive tour of the border area, from Brownsville to San Diego. My purpose is to listen to local leaders, including governors, mayors, county officials, labor leaders and others. Mr. Robert N. Allen, a Foreign Service Officer assigned to the Embassy in Mexico City and currently detailed as Staff Assistant to the U.S. Section of the Commission, will accompany me. I am also thinking of taking along an economist and an industrial engineer, who would be expected to come up with preliminary thinking on economic development projects.


The U.S. Section, in addition to myself, is now composed as follows:

1. Assistant Secretary of State - Lincoln Gordon
2. Assistant Secretary of Labor - Stanley Ruttenberg
3. Assistant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare - Lisle C. Carter, Jr.
4. Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development - Don Hummel
5. Assistant Director, Office of Economic Opportunity - William H. Crook

Recommendations:

1. No official announcement of the appointment of the other Commissioners has been made. I think it would be well to call them to the White House and ask the President to announce their designation. Possibly a picture should be taken, which would be publicized along the border. Such a gesture would go a long way toward giving the Commissioners, as well as the general public in the border area and the Mexican Government, an appreciation of the importance being ascribed to the Commission. Mexican Ambassador Hugo B. Margain might also be invited to this ceremony.

2. The question of whether Commission headquarters should be in the respective capitals or in one or another of the border cities has many ramifications. I think that no decision should be made on this question for the time being.



Raymond Telles, Ambassador
Chairman, U.S. Section
Border Development Commission

cc: Mr. Gordon-ARA
Mr. Shriver - OEO
Mr. Bowdler-White House

A.M.A.
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-4

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By WJ, NARA, Date 4-9-92 Thursday, June 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Equipment for Five Additional Engineer Battalions (Philippines)

You will recall that we are supplying equipment for five engineer construction battalions for the Philippines. This was in response to President Marcos' request made during his visit last Fall. The equipment is all to be delivered by the end of this month.

At the same time, you agreed to consider supplying equipment for a second five battalions in Fiscal 1968. As you know, nothing ranks higher on President Marcos' list of priorities than equipping these 10 battalions for vital civic action work -- road building, irrigation, etc. Reports from Manila indicate the Filipinos are beginning to use effectively the equipment thus far provided.

There is no doubt that failure on our part to carry through on the second five would be read by Marcos -- and by his political enemies -- in this election year as clear evidence of unwillingness to back him on an important program to which he is publicly committed. On the other hand, the political and psychological advantages of our moving forward -- even before he pushes us on the matter -- would be great.

State and Defense recommend that we promise the additional equipment (see attached memo from Secretary Rusk). I heartily concur. The Bureau of the Budget supports the recommendation.

Defense has made available an additional \$4.4 million from overall FY 1967 MAP. This will take care of more than 2-1/2 battalions. The additional \$4 million required can be acquired by cutting some lower priority items from FY 1968 Philippine MAP.

While promising to supply the equipment, we would not give a firm pledge on timing of deliveries. However, I am assured that every effort will be made to complete delivery in CY 1968 and possibly in FY 1968. This will depend, in part, on the timing of Congressional action on FY 1968 MAP appropriations.

All concerned believe that this action will have a favorable effect in easing some of the tensions that have developed in U.S. -Philippine relations. It is recommended that President Marcos be informed of your decision in a personal letter from you.

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This letter also should cover the main elements in our current relations and should open a new and constructive dialogue between you and President Marcos. A proposed text is attached. We would telegraph the text and pouch the signed original.

Secretary Rusk asks that you authorize him and Secretary McNamara to inform Congressional leaders on both sides and the chairmen of key committees that you propose to make this commitment. They do not anticipate any objections. You may, however, wish them to carry out this consultation on the Hill before the letter to Marcos is sent.

W. W. Rostow

Atts.

Supply of equipment approved

☒

Disapproved

☐

Letter to Marcos approved

☒

Disapproved

☐

Have Rusk and McNamara consult
Congressional leaders

☒

Send letter immediately

☐

Hold letter pending
consultations on Hill

☒

See me

☐

6/9/67

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 5, 1967

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-6

By ijg NARA. Date 8-24-92

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Commitment to Equip Five Additional
Engineering Battalions for Philippines

Recommendation:

That you approve a commitment, subject to the availability of appropriated funds, to supply equipment (with no specific delivery commitment) for the second five engineer construction battalions, referred to in paragraph 15 of the Presidential Joint Communique issued during President Marcos' visit last September; that President Marcos be informed of this in your letter to him on the state of our relations (draft letter attached). Secretary McNamara concurs with this recommendation. AID also concurs.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Ever since he took office, Marcos has repeatedly made it clear that his highest priority for US assistance is equipment for ten Philippine Army engineer construction battalions. In the Joint Communique of September 15, 1966 you agreed that in accordance with his program to expand the Army's civic action capability the United States would provide in FY67 equipment for five battalions to be engaged in civic action projects contributing to internal security and would consider furnishing equipment for five more such battalions in FY68.

Marcos' road construction program which depends heavily on the use of the Army engineer battalions is one of the few bright spots so far in his administration's record. The engineer battalions have demonstrated their capability to use effectively the equipment we have provided as well as their capability of absorbing and effectively utilizing additional equipment.

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Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

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While you only promised to "consider" equipping five more battalions in FY68, Marcos and his administration fully expect that we will do so. Their success in using the equipment already provided reinforces this expectation.

There is no question that roads, both major and feeder, are vitally needed and are one of the keys to a successful socio-economic program in the Philippines. The irrigation work being performed by the construction battalions will be of immeasurable help to increasing food production. On the other hand, to deny Marcos equipment for his additional five battalions in FY68 would add to irritations in our relations and cause political repercussions in the Philippines. It would be interpreted by Marcos and his political enemies in this election year that we are not willing to support him in an important program he is publicly committed to, even when the program is successful and of vital necessity to the Philippines.

The Defense Department now has made available to the FY67 Philippine MAP an additional \$4.4 million from within the overall FY67 MAP, which is sufficient to provide equipment for slightly over 2 1/2 of the second five battalions. An additional approximately \$4.0 million, sufficient to fund equipment for the remaining 2 - 2 1/2 battalions, can be realized from the FY68 Philippine MAP account through deviations of some other presently planned items of a lesser priority. Subject to your approval, Secretary McNamara and I have reached agreement that this additional approximately \$4.0 million will be drawn from the planned \$22 million FY68 Philippine MAP, subject, of course, to the availability of appropriated funds. We would not, of course, guarantee a Philippine FY68 MAP of even \$22 million as that is subject to Congressional action on the total MAP.

It is highly desirable to assure Marcos now that we will provide equipment for his additional five battalions. We would not undertake, however, a commitment on timing of deliveries. While slightly less than half of the funds required to provide the equipment would come from the FY68 MAP appropriation, we do not think we should wait for final Congressional action on the FY68 MAP appropriation to tell Marcos that we will provide equipment for the second five battalions, assuming fund availability. This would probably require a delay of another six months, which would reduce considerably the political usefulness of our commitment to Marcos, and the credit and good will we would earn from it in the Philippines. Conversely, a commitment

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-3-

on these battalions made now, before Marcos feels compelled to begin hectoring us about it, would provide a badly needed lift to Marcos and would maximize the psychological benefits to the United States of this undertaking.

At the request of Defense, we have agreed to instruct Ambassador Blair to make clear to President Marcos that though we will fund the additional equipment in FY68, we are not undertaking to deliver all of the equipment in FY68. Defense feels this oral statement is necessary to offset the commitment in the Joint Communique that we would consider furnishing (i.e. delivering) the equipment in FY68.

If you approve this action, I further believe that you should authorize me to work with Secretary McNamara in informing the Congressional Leadership on both sides and the chairmen of key committees that you are proposing to make this commitment. I do not anticipate that you will encounter any objections, but I think it will help to prevent any bad feeling or recrimination. I will assume that your approval of this action will require me to do this before you dispatch the letter, unless you indicate otherwise.



Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Draft letter.

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4
By sig, NARA, Date 4-9-93

Dear Mr. President:

I still think often and warmly of your and Mrs. Marcos' visit to Washington last year, and of our later meetings in your capital during the Manila conference. And I read with close attention reports from your country, especially those which describe your courageous struggle to meet the urgent problems that confront you.

Some of these reports have caused me to give a good deal of thought in recent weeks to the relations between our two countries. From a remark you made some weeks ago to an American reporter -- that our relations "are in a vexing and irritating period of readjustment" -- I know that this question is very much on your mind, too.

I think it would be useful, therefore, if you and I could exchange views on this important subject. I believe we should explore together what can be done to strengthen and deepen our relations, and to remove, or at least reduce, such irritants as exist.

At the outset, I must say that I have no doubt whatsoever that our relations rest on a solid foundation. Our shared history and common values are important parts of this foundation. In the long run, of course, durable and harmonious relations between nations depend on their national interests, but here, too, I find no cause for anxiety.

Your national interests and ours are on parallel courses. Our two countries are cooperating toward the goal of peace in the Pacific. Our military presence in the Philippines contributes to your security and enables you to concentrate your resources more fully on social and economic development.

At the same time, our presence permits us to fulfill our heavy responsibilities in the area as a whole.

You and your administration are making strenuous efforts to build a strong and expanding economy, one that will give your people more jobs, improved housing, a higher standard of living, broader education, and better health. I know that you are pushing ahead to expand internal savings, both public and private, to finance these efforts. We ardently hope that you will succeed.

I know very well the difficult problems you face in these efforts to produce effective programs and convert them into actions. I assure you that we are anxious and ready to help.

At the same time, we both realize that irritations exist. During your visit to Washington, and since, you and I have cleared up many of these matters which had been pending too long.

Our governments signed a new agreement on base tenure. We have supplied high-speed boats to help in your anti-smuggling campaign. We have taken action in veterans' claims and benefits. We reached general agreement on the first two projects under the Special Fund for Education, and are moving ahead on the Cultural Center proposal and other projects. Our A.I.D. program is going forward in promising new directions, particularly in rural development. We are ready to begin discussion of the concept of our trade relations after the expiration of the Laurel-Langley Agreement.

Your program to raise rice production is among the most hopeful in Asia today.

We agreed last September to equip five engineer battalions which, in addition to their military mission, are performing vital civil action activities. I am assured this equipment will be delivered by the end of this fiscal year. I have read encouraging reports on the potential of those battalions and the key role they are beginning to play in your economic and social development effort.

I have considered providing equipment for the second five battalions, as I promised to do. I am happy to tell you that we will be able to provide equipment for these additional

battalions, subject, of course, to the availability of appropriated funds. The equipment for these battalions will be financed in part from this year's funds, and the balance from new appropriations. Some of these funds represent additional assistance, but some will have to come from within planned military assistance levels with engineer equipment replacing items of a lesser priority. I hope that you will treat this undertaking as wholly private between us. I believe we should consult closely as to the appropriate timing and form of an announcement, and I would appreciate your views on this at your early convenience.

Sometimes we cannot meet requests from your Government. The turnover of Sangley is an example. That base serves important security and defense purposes -- ours, yours, and those of our allies. When we studied the matter, we saw no feasible way of shifting the operations elsewhere.

I assure you that I will do everything in my power to help you in every way I can. I am deeply desirous of doing all possible to reduce irritations. I know the presence of American military personnel in the Philippines is bound to produce some strains. But I am sure you will agree that mutual understanding and mutual sensitivity can keep those strains within bounds.

Our common problems cannot be solved only by the actions of one or the other of us. And I must confess candidly that I am troubled by the chorus of extreme criticism from some Filipinos directed against our military presence. For surely it must be clear that the presence serves not only American interests.

I am troubled, also, by signs of increased hostility toward foreign investment, a matter that is being discussed extensively now in American business circles.

As you know, foreign capital played an enormous role in the economic development of the United States. It could do the same in the Philippines. But it is not likely to be attracted if it is regarded with suspicion and distrust.

I realize you are doing what you can to keep these matters in true perspective for your countrymen. I hope the report by the special committee on Philippine-American relations of your Congress will provide a better and deeper understanding of what is involved in our relations and what needs to be done to further improve them.

I have written to you as I can only to a friend, knowing that you have given these matters a great deal of thought. I would deeply value your views on what we each can do to serve better our common interests and our shared purposes. You know how much I value your friendship and advice, and how much I believe in the close and continuing cooperation of our two countries and peoples.

Sincerely,

(S) Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Ferdinand E. Marcos
President of the Republic
of the Philippines
Manila

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 7, 1967
8:12 p.m.

55
Pres file

Mr. President:

This is a quite mature assessment
of the mood and prospects in Cairo,
with recommendations much along the
lines of our own thought.

W. W. Rostow

Cairo 8670

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356 Sec 13.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb 24, 1983
By *ry*, NARA, Date *6-7-91*

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State letter 6-23-81

By RG/ing, NARA, Date 6-7-91

EXDIS

1. AS THE SCALE OF THE DEBACLE BECOMES APPARENT, AND ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT INTERVENE MILITARILY, THAT A CEASE FIRE COMES INTO BEING SOON, AND THAT IT BECOMES CLEAR AN IMMENSE MILITARY DEFEAT HAS BEEN INFLICTED ON UARG AND THE ARABS GENERALLY, THE FOLLOWING FORWARD THOUGHTS ARE OFFERED FOR CONSIDERATION:
2. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE TRUTH ABOUT US NON-INVOLVEMENT AND THE HOLLOWNESS OF NASSER'S MILITARY POSTURING WILL SOON BE APPARENT TO ALL ARABS. SEEMS LIKELY TOO, THEREFORE, THAT THERE WILL BE A GENERAL REVULSION AGAINST NASSER FOR HAVING CONNED THE ARABS INTO WAR VERSUS A TOO-READY FOE AND INTO STRIKING AT US INTERESTS WITH DAMAGE MAINLY TO THEMSELVES. THIS REVULSION SEEMS LIKELY EVEN IN EGYPT,

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 8670B ~~SECRET~~
EVEN IN THE BASIS OF NASSER'S RULE HERE, THE ARMY. LIKE FAROUK BEFORE HIM IN 1948, NASSER MAY WELL HAVE GENERATED IN HIS SOLDIERS THE SAME BITTERNESS HE HIMSELF FELT IN 1948: "WE HAVE BEEN DUPED, PUSHED INTO A BATTLE FOR WHICH WE WERE UNPREPARED...AND LEFT HERE WITHOUT WEAPONS UNDER FIRE." SURVIVAL OF NASSER REGIME AT HOME IS IN QUESTION AS WELL AS THE ALLEGIANCE OF OTHER ARAB STATES. MANY OF OUR DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES CONCUR IN THIS ESTIMATE.

3. IN INTERESTS OF PRESERVING OR RESTORING SOME US SWAY IN AREA, SUGGEST US SHOW READINESS SUPPLY MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO WAR CASUALTIES, PERHAPS THROUGH THIRD PARTY, AND REITERATION THEME THAT US HAS ABIDING INTEREST IN ARAB- EGYPTIAN PEOPLE, EVEN THOUGH IT DOES NOT SEEM POSSIBLE HAVE ANY FURTHER DIPLOMATIC DEALINGS WITH PRESENT UAR REGIME. (NOTE DANGER TO ONGOING PERSONNEL HERE OF SPECIFIC ATTACK ON NASSER GOVERNMENT.) ON SUCH A BASIS, IF NASSER DUMPED, WAY MIGHT BE OPEN FOR REESTABLISHMENT RELATIONS, RESURRECTION US INTERESTS.
4. AT SAME TIME, NECESSARY TO RECOGNIZE VERY REAL PASSION

PRESERVATION COPY

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 8670B ~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 8670B ~~SECRET~~

MOBILIZED IN WHOLE AREA BY NASSER ON PALESTINE ISSUE. PRESENT DEFEAT WOULD ONLY MAKE THAT "ANGER OF INFERIORITY" ALL THE MORE READY A FEW YEARS HENCE FOR THE NEXT HERO. BELIEVE VITAL FOR US UTILIZE PRESENT SITUATION FOR FULL AND FAIR REVIEW OF WHOLE PROBLEM. MAYBE NOW, ON BASIS OF NEW SECURITY, ISRAEL CAN BE MADE TO SEE WISDOM OF SETTLEMENT ALONG LESS ONE-SIDED LINES. IMPARTIAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE US ROLE HERE COULD GO FAR TOWARD REVERSING UNIVERSAL LOSS OF RESPECT FOR AND INFLUENCE OF US IN WHOLE ARAB WORLD.

5. IN SHORT, BELIEVE US SHOULD SHOW SYMPATHY FOR ARABS, MERCY FOR VICTIMS OF FIGHTING, AND CONCERN TO FASHION JUST SETTLEMENT OF PALESTINE ISSUE.

7. WE ARE RECOMMENDING SEPARATELY THAT THIS TOP MISSION STAFF WITH SO MUCH EXPERIENCE AND SO MANY FRIENDS AND CONTACTS HERE BE KEPT LARGELY INTACT FOR REINTRODUCTION INTO CAIRO - HOPEFULLY IN NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE.

NOLTE
BT

~~SECRET~~

EX-105

NNNN

PRESERVATION COPY

1. sup
2. Pres file

Wednesday, June 7, 1967
6:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft response
to Senator Case.

W. W. Rostow

56a

June 10, 1967

Dear Cliff:

Thank you for your warm letter of June 2.

With the adoption of the Security Council resolution, we have now made a start toward peace with justice and honor for all nations of the Middle East. An essential element in this settlement will be the protection of the vital interest of the international community in the free, innocent passage of the Gulf of Aqaba.

Sincerely,

LBJ

The Honorable
Clifford P. Case
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:RMM:cjf

57

~~1. 200~~
2. Pres file

Wednesday, June 7, 1967
6:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft response to
Cardinal Ritter.

W. W. Rostow

57a

June 6, 1967

Dear Cardinal Ritter:

I fully share your distress and concern over the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East.

Your prayers and support in this grave hour are a source of strength and comfort to me.

Sincerely,

His Eminence
Joseph Cardinal Ritter
Archbishop of St. Louis
St. Louis, Missouri

LBJ:RMM:cjf

57

~~4-10-67~~
2. Pres file

Wednesday, June 7, 1967
6:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft response to
Congressman Findley.

W. W. Rostow

June 10, 1967

Dear Congressman:

I was pleased to receive your views on the crisis in the Middle East.

As I stated on May 23, the right of free, innocent passage of the Gulf of Aqaba, is a matter of grave importance and of vital interest to the international community.

The cease-fire resolution adopted by the Security Council is a first step toward a lasting peace in the area. As we move forward from this beginning, I will bear in mind the suggestions which you have made.

Sincerely,

LBJ

The Honorable
Paul Findley
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:RMM:cjf

6/13/91

Processing Note: There is no document #59 in this folder.

60

Pres. file

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 7, 1967
6:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker's weekly telegram.

Incidentally, he asked me to ascertain whether this is the form in which you would like his weekly report -- with a general summary at the front, followed by greater detail; or would you like less detail; or any other changes? He is anxious to make this as helpful to you as he can.

W. W. Rostow

More detail _____

Less detail _____

Guide Amb. Bunker as follows _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 6-10-91

60a

SECRET/NODIS

Wednesday, June 7, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon, 27781)

Herewith my sixth weekly telegram:

A. General

The papers which I mentioned in my message last week as having requested Ambassador Locke, General Westmoreland and Ambassador Komer to submit - i.e. on the optimum use of manpower by Ambassador Locke; on the reorientation of the mission of the Vietnamese Armed Forces and their revitalization with emphasis on improvement and quality by General Westmoreland; and on an action program for stepping up revolutionary development by Ambassador Komer are in course of preparation. I hope to be able to report on the substance of these and our conclusions as to what ought to be done on these priority matters in the near future.

Both here and on field trips, Bob Komer has explained to our entire organization engaged in revolutionary development the new organizational setup and how we expect it to work. I am sure this has been effective in removing any lingering apprehension on the part of the civilian elements of the organization that they were being submerged in the military. I am satisfied that we shall have a better and harder-hitting organization for our advisory and supporting role in revolutionary development with this merging of the civilian-military elements and the consequent concentration of responsibility envisaged in the single management concept we have adopted.

In a series of splendidly executed offensive operations undertaken by General Westmoreland since late April in which a total of over 11,000 of the enemy have been killed in action, the enemy has been kept off balance and his time schedule has been disrupted. Captured documents, reports by returnees and others indicate that the main effort of the enemy to achieve his summer campaign objectives has been postponed from May to June or July.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
Authenticity 7129/CBS 10
By 12/10/1, NARA, Date 6-10-91

While the enemy's offensive thrust has been blunted, it has not been eliminated. Enemy pressure (from two and possibly three divisions) continues along the Demilitarized Zone. Infiltration through Laos also continues and during the past three weeks enemy activity in the Central Highlands has stepped up significantly. General Westmoreland's strategy of anticipating enemy threats and of keeping him off balance has paid off handsomely, and is one which he intends to continue in view of what he foresees as an intensification of enemy attempts to achieve his summer campaign objectives.

An encouraging element of these recent operations has been evidence of the increased effectiveness of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. In a number of heavy engagements throughout the country ARVN units have responded well to the challenges placed upon them. They contributed materially to the success of the initial operations in the Demilitarized Zone, killing 342 enemy with a loss of only 31 of their own forces. In a total of 14 other operations in the First Corps area during the past six weeks, ARVN units accounted for 1,400 enemy killed in action. On my trip to the Second Corps area yesterday, General Larsen told me that the ARVN units under General Vinh Loc's command were giving a good account of themselves. I believe that where the ARVN is weakest, however, is in their pacification role where motivation and performance still leave much to be desired. Here, of course, the regional and Popular Forces are also important elements and all are getting increased attention.

The Thieu-Ky rivalry which I shall refer to later in more detail still continues, but efforts are being made by the Vietnamese, with our prodding, to try to work out the problem themselves. I reported on the talk I had had last Saturday with Ambassador Bui Diem (Saigon, 27480) who has been actively pursuing the matter and who has been working with Thieu's brother, Kieu, to prepare the ground for a meeting between Thieu and Ky. We are reporting today on our latest talks with Kieu (Saigon, 27753). I also expect to see Bui Diem today or tomorrow and will report

on any further developments. I think it is highly desirable that the two principals, with the help of their colleagues, should settle this problem themselves, if at all possible through a genuine and full understanding. I will, of course, continue to encourage them to do so, but am not especially sanguine. I am keeping a close watch on the problem to determine if and when more active intervention on my part is required.

Bui Diem and General Thieu's brother, Nguyen Van Kieu, are continuing their efforts to bring Thieu and Ky together, and they are still hopeful that a mutually satisfactory compromise can be worked out between them if the ground is carefully prepared before they meet. They may succeed, and certainly that would be the best solution, but I have the growing feeling that time is running against this effort and that the political temperature is again going up rather than down. I mentioned that I had spoken with Bui Diem on June 3, about his efforts to work out a compromise between Ky and Thieu (Saigon, 27480). He said that the effort to bring them together at a dinner on May 31, had failed because Thieu did not want to see Ky in the presence of the other Generals. However, Thieu let it be known that he would like to see Ky alone, and Ky agreed to this. Bui Diem understood from Kieu that Thieu might be willing to take the Presidency of the Senate or the top position in the Armed Forces under certain circumstances. Diem also thinks that the chief motive behind Thieu's present actions is the feeling that he has not been treated fairly by the other generals. If this is true, it might be possible to overcome Thieu's bitterness and offer him a position that he can accept. However, Bui Diem has evidently not yet succeeded in bring Ky and Thieu together. A conversation on June 6, with Thieu's brother, Nguyen Van Kieu, while confirming generally Diem's account, indicates that the differences in view point between Thieu and Ky remain substantial.

The assembly was drawn into the Thieu - Ky conflict last week and it is now involved in a bitter fight over the issue of the election dates. From recent remarks by both Thieu and Huong supporters, I judge that Thieu is considering throwing his weight behind Huong, a move which if taken prematurely would almost certainly preclude any amicable settlement between Thieu and Ky. I hope that a face-to-face talk between Thieu and Ky will be arranged before any public decisions of this sort are made, however.

The Thieu - Ky rivalry was reflected in the assembly in the handling of the rather confused issue of the 30 "introductions" required of presidential candidates. Thieu went on the public record on May 11, in opposition to the requirement, terming it "unconstitutional and undemocratic". The assembly ignored his opposition and voted the requirement into the Electoral Law. At Thieu's request, the Directorate on May 24, agreed to ask the assembly to drop this provision in the Electoral Law.

Ky reportedly went along with the decision in the directorate meeting. His supporters in the assembly continued to press for the "introduction" clause, however, and Ky himself was quoted in Vietnam press on June 1, as saying that the requirement, "Doesn't matter for those who have the ability to run". At the same time we had a number of reports that indicated Ky's supporters were actively rounding up provincial councilors to "introduce" Ky. These tactics were apparently aimed at two objectives: to embarrass Thieu publicly by having the assembly again reject his views; and to create the impression of a groundswell of support for Ky by having a large number of provincial councilors flock to "introduce" his candidacy.

On June 2, the assembly voted 45 to 39 in favor of retaining the requirement for 30 "introductions". This vote fell short of the majority which is required under Article 45 of the Constitution to override a "request for reconsideration" by the Executive. It is not clear whether this Article applies in this interim period, however.

The question of the 30 "introductions" has thus become a matter of interpretation of the Constitution. The assembly avoided making any constitutional interpretation by simply reporting its vote to the Directorate. Thieu supporters are known to believe that the Directorate is now free to promulgate the law without the controversial "introduction" provision, but it is by no means certain that Ky and his supporters will go along with that interpretation.

The confused issue of the 30 "introductions" has become further snarled and political tension somewhat heightened by the related issue of the dates of the elections. The Armed Forces Council

decided when it accepted the Constitution in late March that the elections for the Presidency and the Senate should be held on September 1 and the elections for the Lower House on October 1. General Thieu announced this decision in promulgating the Constitution on April 1. However, the assembly subsequently voted to set the Presidential elections for September 3, (which is a Sunday, as required in the Constitution) and the Senate on December 17. The assembly has so far set no date for the Lower House elections. One motive for setting the Senate elections on December 17, may have been that to do so prolongs the life of the present assembly. Another, probably more important motive is the fact that moving the Senate election back to December would permit defeated Presidential candidates to file and run for the Senate.

In the same letter which requested that the assembly reconsider the "introduction" provision, the Directorate asked the assembly to change the election dates back to "early September" for the President and the Senate and "early October" for the Lower House. The assembly voted June 3, against the Directorate's request on the election dates. The leader of the pro-government Democratic Alliance Bloc, Le Phuoc Sang, proposed that a final vote not be taken for several days. When his proposal was voted down, he and about 35 of the Bloc's members walked out of the assembly. The final vote against the Directorate request was taken after the walk-out.

Sang explained in the assembly session of June 6, that the walk-out was to protest the way in which the voting had been conducted; he wanted a roll call vote, not a secret ballot. Sang is scheduled to hold a Press Conference today on the matter. He and about 35 of his Bloc of approximately 55 deputies are at least temporarily boycotting assembly sessions, though he said yesterday that his Bloc would return to the assembly at a "favorable time", and I understand from reports today that they will attend the next session. In counter action, about 8 of Sang's Bloc announced their withdrawal from the Bloc in protest against Sang's moves.

While the question of the 30 "introductions" has become an issue between Thieu and Ky, and their rivalry has thus been projected into the assembly, the question of the election dates appears to be primarily a matter of pro-government versus "opposition". From

the point of view of the military, the matter involves the question of "face" because the dates were set by the Armed Forces Council. We have had several reports that indicate the Directorate is both united and determined on the election dates issue. A letter from General Thieu was delivered to the assembly June 6, in which he urges speedy dispatch of the Senate Election Law to the Directorate so that the Presidential and the Senate laws can be promulgated together. There would be no strong reason to promulgate them together unless the Presidential and Senate elections were held on the same day as proposed by the Directorate. The Thieu letter therefore probably reflects continued government determination to maintain the original dates for the elections. The walk-out of pro-government deputies and Sang's Press Conference today may be designed to justify the Directorate's amending the Electoral Laws.

The Assembly voted final approval of the Senate law June 6, without the participation of about 35 of Sang's Democratic Alliance Bloc. Presumably the law will be sent at once to the Directorate. We understand from members of the Directorate staff that a meeting will be held soon to decide government action on the two laws. It could be a difficult session. Assembly reactions to any changes which the Directorate may make in the laws could also cause more friction between the government and "opposition" deputies.

In addition to the maneuvers of Ky's supporters in the Assembly, we have also noted that some of Thieu's remarks have been censored from the local press. Even though Thieu's remarks seemed quite unexceptional, an interview between Thieu and a Japanese correspondent on the question of the candidacies of Ky and Thieu and the effect on the unity of the armed forces was heavily cut from the weekend papers. Thieu will, of course, be aware of this censoring of his comments, and it will not be likely to improve the chances of his coming to some agreement with Ky. Ky has also stated publicly his intention to continue censorship during the campaign. He said in a June 4 interview with Vietnam press that "all press articles and reports at home and news dispatches from foreign press concerning the presidential election to be held in September will be censored if they sow dissent and confusion among the national ranks. . . the government cannot allow the press to publish articles which criticize the candidates personally. . . our country has been divided and we should not deepen this division."

I should also report that Thieu told Harry McPherson on June 2 that he thought it would be very good for the country if Tran Van Huong were elected President. He said that the country is tired of military rule, and he added that if a civilian is elected President he will work, whatever his position, to assure the President the full support of the armed forces and to prevent coups. He again implied several times that he is not very hopeful of winning the presidency himself. This, together with past remarks and some hints we have had from one of Huong's supporters suggests to me that Thieu may be thinking his best bet is to back Huong. His hope in this case would be to eliminate Ky as his major power rival by engineering Ky's defeat in the coming election, or to use this possibility as bargaining leverage to bring Ky around to a compromise.

Although I now fear that the chances of a Thieu-Ky agreement are not very encouraging, as I have said I think we must continue to press for such an agreement as the best possible solution. If in a week or so it becomes clear that there is little or no chance of a Thieu-Ky compromise, we should consider how we might act to resolve the conflict in such a way as to give the least possible jolt to the political health of the nation and the least damage to our freedom of action here.

I think, also, we should urge on all candidates the need for post-election cooperation and widest possible participation in the new government.

The situation in I Corps has not changed greatly since last week. The May 29 mortar and sapper attack on Hue indicates some decline in the people's confidence in the ability of the government to provide security. Partially as a result of political rivalries in the coming elections, citizen "committees for defense" have not been successfully established in either Quang Tri or Thua Thien provinces. Although government officials told us they were moving to set up such committees in an effort to rally the population against the common threat, no effective action has been taken. There were numerous Viet Cong incidents in Thua Thien Province, but Quang Tri for the second week in a row had almost no minings or assassinations. Prices are stable, and interest in the coming national elections is on the increase.

On May 28 the fourth of five elections for hamlet chiefs and assistant hamlet chiefs was carried out in 771 hamlets in 34 provinces. Some 369,545 voters went to the polls, a turnout of 78 per cent of the registered voters in those areas. The ratio of candidates to seats was again quite good: 2.3 candidates for every seat. There were several reported instances of Viet Cong anti-election activity. In Thua Thien Province two incidents were reported, and elections in one hamlet were postponed as a result. In Phuoc Tuy a grenade attack on a polling station seriously wounded two soldiers. In Kien Hoa Province, the Government of Viet Nam troops clashed with a band of Viet Cong engaged in anti-election activity, killing four Viet Cong.

C. Economic

Prices moved up for the third week in a row, with the Saigon retail price index now standing at 278. This is about eight percent

above the level of one month ago and 62 percent above the level at this time last year. Rice prices were steady or even down a little, but pork and vegetables increased and drove up the general price level. Imported commodities also went up somewhat this week, with the index moving from 219 to 221. This compares with the level of 217 at the same time last month.

The US AID emergency plague control mobile team concept is now in effect. Within four hours after being notified of plague at Phuoc Long, a team was on its way with equipment, insecticides, and health education materials to nip the epidemic in the bud. Follow-up operations will include live trapping and follow-up dusting. Americans participated in this operation only where technical assistance was necessary.

D. Chieu Hoi

The number of returnees was down again this week, from 538 to 528. This week's figure may be compared with that for the same period last year: 247. The total to date for 1967 is 15,700; last year at this time a total of 8,268 returnees had come in to the Chieu Hoi centers. The returnee total for 1967 is now 77.6 per cent of the entire 1966 total of 20,242. Permanent construction to double the capacity of all Chieu Hoi centers in Vietnam is now getting under way.

E. Americans and Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending June 3, the enemy killed 94 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 143, and kidnapped 66. The dead included one hamlet chief, ten policemen, and five revolutionary development workers. These figures may be compared with the Vietnamese civilian dead for the past six weeks: 38, 126, 44, 85, 80, 67. During the reporting period, the enemy killed 235 Vietnamese military personnel. If we add the Vietnamese civilian and military dead, we get a total of 329 Vietnamese killed by the enemy during the reporting period. This may be compared with 174 Americans killed by the enemy and 2412 enemy killed in action in the same period.

F. II Corps

On June 6 I visited U.S., Vietnamese and Korean military forces and pacification teams in the II Corps area. The Corps commander, Lt. General Vinh Loc who has done a good job with the ARVN and his staff gave me a comprehensive briefing on ARVN operations and the security situation on II Corps. In the course of it he told me that 83 percent of the population in II Corps was under Government of Vietnam control and 82 percent of the roads were open. U.S. commanders, who are also optimistic, did not disagree but hastened to point out that these high percentages are subject to many interpretations and did not mean that "around the clock" security in II Corps was that good. I think General Vinh Loc was probably over-optimistic on the security situation in II Corps.

I visited each of the major units of the 4th Infantry Division (US) now stationed along the Cambodian border area west of Pleiku City. These fine troops are doing very well both militarily and in extensive civic action programs. Again, I was impressed with the quality of both officers and men. Their morale is very high, their only complaint being the Communist forces' use of the sanctuary of Cambodia.

In order to deny food, labor and intelligence to the North Vietnamese Army units, the Government of Vietnam, with much U.S. assistance, is moving some 12,000 Montagnards from scattered villages along the Cambodian border, to a resettlement area inside the 4th Division perimeter. Montagnards (who in some respects resemble our Indian tribes of 100 years ago) usually resist any change from their normal pattern of semi-nomadic existence. However, this project provides land, schooling, medical care, help with their crops, and in other ways, and seemed to be well planned. I was told that there was little resistance to the resettlement and that most of the people were glad to be out of the combat zone.

My visit to the Korean forces was particularly interesting. The two Republic of Korea infantry divisions and one marine brigade have proven to be an exceptionally effective fighting force.

During the first four months of 1967, the Republic of Korea forces have conducted almost half as many large unit operations as they conducted during the period February-December 1966. This increased activity, coupled with the demonstrated effectiveness of operations in terms of enemy killed, points to increased security along the east central coast.

During the period February-December 1966, Republic of Korea forces were credited with killing 2,947 enemy and they had a kill ration of 6.4 to 1 in their favor. During the first four months of 1967, they have killed 2,435 enemy and attained a favorable kill ration of 10 to 1. (One unit I visited, the 28th regiment of the then 0th division, claimed a favorable kill ration of 22 to 1.)

During the same eleven month period of 1966, Republic of Korea forces averaged capturing 67 enemy weapons per month during the period January-April 1967. They have averaged over 300 enemy weapons captured per month.

In the sum, the Korean forces have proven themselves to be a highly effective fighting force, without which, the Vietnamese Armed Forces (South) and other free world forces would be severely pressed to maintain control of this important part of the eastern coastal plains.

In three different areas the Republic of Korea forces are conducting an experiment in which they send a ten man liaison team to a selected village. These soldiers assist in military training of the regional and popular forces and support the RD teams. This may result in improved Vietnamese performance, not only because of the additional training, but because of the example the Koreans hopefully will set.

G. Congressional Visits

During the past week we have had our quota of Congressional representatives here. Congressman Dow of New York is here on a fact-finding tour financed, according to him, by some 800 of his constituents. He is seeing a wide cut of Vietnamese from all walks of life and of all political persuasions. A second group, headed by Congressman Ichord of Missouri and including Bray of Indiana and Long of Louisiana, is here particularly to look into military matters. The final pair are Congressmen Clark of Pennsylvania and Ruppe of Michigan who are particularly interested in Coast Guard activities.

Bunker

Wednesday, June 7, 1967 -- 6:00 pm

Mr. President:

I am sending this back up
because it is not checked.

Perhaps that's the way you want
it -- in which case I won't send it
back up again.

W. W. Rostow

Sending trip to Latin America

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 7, 1967 -- 5:45 PM

62
Pres. file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, President of the Republic of Malawi
(Thursday, June 8, 1967)

Schedule

12:25	Arrival Ceremony on South Lawn
12:30 - 1:00	Alone, advisers standing by in Cabinet Room
1:00	Lunch

General Picture

Secretary Rusk's memorandum to you on the visit is at Tab A. State's suggested talking points are at Tab B.

This is a courtesy visit. Banda has told us he plans to raise no particular issues with you. There are no questions of any significance now outstanding between the U.S. and Malawi, other than the general black/white problems of southern Africa in which Malawi is a very minor and ambivalent participant. The specific issues which may come up are summarized below.

Banda's presence, however, does present us with a delicate political problem. He is regarded by many of his colleagues in black Africa as a traitor to the common racial cause because he deals freely and publicly with the white regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa. Malawi's economic situation demands that he do so, but he has been rather more noisy about it than his neighbors, particularly the Zambians, would like. Thus, although we lose nothing by being correct and genial, we should avoid identification with Banda on African issues. We should also be careful not to present Banda as a great leader of African thought. The draft public statements Bob Kintner will get to you are consistent with these constraints, and we have carefully tailored the lunch guest list to guard against an incident inspired by Banda's unpopularity in the U. S. negro community.

Specific Issues

You might open by asking Banda about economic progress in Malawi. The country is now totally dependent on U.K. aid to make ends meet. The outlook is for phasing out British help over the next 3-5 years. The critical question for Banda is how to fill the gap.

Beyond this, the following are the questions he seems most likely to raise:

1. Vietnam Banda is one of our very few outspoken supporters in Africa. You will want to thank him for his statements and fill him in on recent developments. He would be flattered if you asked for his views on how to get the Vietnam message across in the developing world.
2. Middle East Banda has made no public statements on either side. Our information suggests that he leans toward Israel. He will probably ask you when a cease-fire can be negotiated and what the terms of an ultimate settlement might be. Again, you may wish to turn the tables by soliciting his views.
3. Rhodesia, South West Africa, etc. Banda will probably be bright enough to avoid this subject. If he does raise it, he will explain to you why he has no choice but to deal with the white supremacist regimes. You may wish to hear him out, and then to reaffirm our own commitment to self-determination in southern Africa. You may wish to add that we understand the realities and that racial questions always take time to resolve, but that our moral position is clear.
4. U.S. Aid to Malawi We have about 160 Peace Corps volunteers in Malawi, along with some small AID technical assistance programs, mainly in agriculture. Banda may bring up two capital projects he wrote you about last summer -- a road along the shores of Lake Malawi and a wood pulp project. If you want to get into details, the answer on the road is that final engineering has been completed and we are ready to consider financing construction. The pulp project is now being studied by American investors -- with the USG as honest broker -- and there is a fair chance they will decide to finance it.

Wad. Rostow

2197
62a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

June 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of President H. Kamuzu Banda
of the Republic of Malawi

I enclose material for your use when you receive President Banda at 12:30 P.M. on Thursday, June 8.

President Banda is on a private visit to the United States to receive an honorary degree from the University of Massachusetts and to visit Independence, Missouri, twin city to Blantyre, Malawi's principal city. At your invitation, he is coming to Washington from Independence on June 8. Following his call on you, he will be your guest at luncheon. Dr. Banda is being given the normal protocol courtesies extended to a friendly chief of state on a private visit, but on a somewhat subdued level. He and his party will stay at Blair House for one night.

Dr. Banda rules his small, poor country with paternal firmness. Although some African leaders still remember his strong support for African nationalism in pre-independence days, his outspoken pragmatic approach to emotional African issues has made him the target of much criticism in Black Africa.

Dr. Banda is very appreciative of this opportunity to meet with you again (he called on you in December, 1964). He considers this strictly a courtesy call and has informed us he does not intend to raise substantive issues. He may wish to discuss with you his support of U.S. policy on Vietnam and Malawi's approach to the problems of southern Africa. We see this meeting as an occasion to reaffirm our close relationship with President Banda and demonstrate our continued interest in Malawi. Due to the sensitivities

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3-year intervals;
declassified after 12 years.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-6
By ing, NARA, Date 5-21-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

of African leaders and some of their more aggressive American supporters, we wish to play Dr. Banda's visit in muted tones.

Ambassador Symington will accompany President Banda from Andrews Air Force Base to the Ellipse. At the White House, I will be present to assist with the informal greetings, accompanied by the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Joseph Palmer 2nd, and the Country Director for Southeastern Africa, Thomas W. McElhiney.

A suggested welcoming statement, a suggested toast for you to deliver at the luncheon for President Banda, a suggested press guidance paper, and biographies of President Banda and the members of his party have previously been furnished Mr. Rostow's office for use in connection with the visit.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Schedule.
2. Background Paper and Talking Points.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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BACKGROUND PAPER AND TALKING POINTS FOR THE
PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BANDA OF MALAWI

Malawi is a small country with a low educational level, underdeveloped agriculture, no mineral resources currently commercially exploitable, and a high population density. The country depends on outside assistance, primarily from the United Kingdom, for its operating budget as well as for limited capital development. Migratory Malawi workers in southern Africa provide the country with substantial income. Under President Banda's firm leadership, the country is making some progress toward achieving a balanced budget without drastic cuts in social services.

In foreign affairs, President Banda has pursued a policy based on what he considers to be realism. Banda has supported U.S. policy in Vietnam. He has opposed the African stand on Southern Rhodesia and other southern African problems to such a degree that he has isolated himself from most of Black Africa. Banda's action in turning to South Africa and Portugal for financial and technical assistance has not been well received in African circles.

U.S. assistance to Malawi since independence has totalled a little over \$10 million. The current year program is \$1.6 million, concentrated primarily in the agricultural, educational and transportation fields. Bilateral aid to Malawi is being phased out under our new AID policy. In spite of a few unpleasant incidents in the past, a 160-volunteer Peace Corps group is working smoothly in health and education projects. Our modest assistance programs have aided Ambassador Jones in maintaining close personal contact with President Banda.

TALKING POINTS:

1. Vietnam

Since Dr. Banda spoke out publicly last December in strong support of U.S. policy in Vietnam, it is likely he

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-6

By ing NARA, Date 5-21-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

will raise this subject with you. He stated then that it is not the Americans who stand in the way of peace in Vietnam but the Communist Chinese and the North Vietnamese.

Suggested Response

In your response you may wish to take account of a New Year's message delivered to "President Banda from President Johnson", which read in part: "Your recent remarks on the problems of South East Asia will be deeply appreciated by all freedom loving peoples."

2. Southern Africa

While Dr. Banda is fundamentally opposed to denial of self-determination to Africans by white minorities, he approaches the problems of South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa with a brand of realism that irritates many of his fellow African leaders farther north. He is convinced nothing practical can be done by the Africans to solve these problems by force. In addition, he sees the economic necessity of dealing with the white regimes, and he does so. He may discuss his views.

Suggested Response

You may wish to reiterate your support for the principle of self-determination expressed in your May 26, 1966 speech to the Ambassadors from the OAU. You may wish to add that you also advocate peaceful solutions to southern African problems. On South West Africa, we would like to see a dialogue established with South Africa.

3. Aid to Malawi

Although unlikely, Dr. Banda may bring up the subject of U.S. assistance to Malawi. His pet projects are a road

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- 3 -

along the shores of Lake Malawi and the development of a wood pulp project at Vipya.

Suggested Response

You may wish to say that the road project has progressed since you last wrote him in August. Now that the final engineering plans and specifications are to be completed, you hope that we will be able to consider financing the final construction phase. You may wish to say you understand some American investors are studying the pulp project, and you hope that an acceptable arrangement may be worked out.

4. Points You May Wish to Raise

In order to concentrate more of the conversation on internal Malawi affairs,

a. you may wish to congratulate Dr. Banda on the fine job he has been doing in fostering economic development in his country.

b. you may wish to express your confidence in Ambassador Jones in Malawi and the hope that Dr. Banda will continue the frank and free relationship which he has established with the Ambassador.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 7, 1967 -- 5:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, President of the Republic of Malawi
(Thursday, June 8, 1967)

Schedule

12:25	Arrival Ceremony on South Lawn
12:30 - 1:00	Alone, advisers standing by in Cabinet Room
1:00	Lunch

General Picture

Secretary Rusk's memorandum to you on the visit is at Tab A. State's suggested talking points are at Tab B.

This is a courtesy visit. Banda has told us he plans to raise no particular issues with you. There are no questions of any significance now outstanding between the U.S. and Malawi, other than the general black/white problems of southern Africa in which Malawi is a very minor and ambivalent participant. The specific issues which may come up are summarized below.

Banda's presence, however, does present us with a delicate political problem. He is regarded by many of his colleagues in black Africa as a traitor to the common racial cause because he deals freely and publicly with the white regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa. Malawi's economic situation demands that he do so, but he has been rather more noisy about it than his neighbors, particularly the Zambians, would like. Thus, although we lose nothing by being correct and genial, we should avoid identification with Banda on African issues. We should also be careful not to present Banda as a great leader of African thought. The draft public statements Bob Kintner will get to you are consistent with these constraints, and we have carefully tailored the lunch guest list to guard against an incident inspired by Banda's unpopularity in the U. S. negro community.

Specific Issues

You might open by asking Banda about economic progress in Malawi. The country is now totally dependent on U.K. aid to make ends meet. The outlook is for phasing out British help over the next 3-5 years. The critical question for Banda is how to fill the gap.

Beyond this, the following are the questions he seems most likely to raise:

1. Vietnam Banda is one of our very few outspoken supporters in Africa. You will want to thank him for his statements and fill him in on recent developments. He would be flattered if you asked for his views on how to get the Vietnam message across in the developing world.
2. Middle East Banda has made no public statements on either side. Our information suggests that he leans toward Israel. He will probably ask you when a cease-fire can be negotiated and what the terms of an ultimate settlement might be. Again, you may wish to turn the tables by soliciting his views.
3. Rhodesia, South West Africa, etc. Banda will probably be bright enough to avoid this subject. If he does raise it, he will explain to you why he has no choice but to deal with the white supremacist regimes. You may wish to hear him out, and then to reaffirm our own commitment to self-determination in southern Africa. You may wish to add that we understand the realities and that racial questions always take time to resolve, but that our moral position is clear.
4. U.S. Aid to Malawi We have about 160 Peace Corps volunteers in Malawi, along with some small AID technical assistance programs, mainly in agriculture. Banda may bring up two capital projects he wrote you about last summer -- a road along the shores of Lake Malawi and a wood pulp project. If you want to get into details, the answer on the road is that final engineering has been completed and we are ready to consider financing construction. The pulp project is now being studied by American investors -- with the USG as honest broker -- and there is a fair chance they will decide to finance it.

Walt Rostow

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

June 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of President H. Kamuzu Banda
of the Republic of Malawi

I enclose material for your use when you receive President Banda at 12:30 P.M. on Thursday, June 8.

President Banda is on a private visit to the United States to receive an honorary degree from the University of Massachusetts and to visit Independence, Missouri, twin city to Blantyre, Malawi's principal city. At your invitation, he is coming to Washington from Independence on June 8. Following his call on you, he will be your guest at luncheon. Dr. Banda is being given the normal protocol courtesies extended to a friendly chief of state on a private visit, but on a somewhat subdued level. He and his party will stay at Blair House for one night.

Dr. Banda rules his small, poor country with paternal firmness. Although some African leaders still remember his strong support for African nationalism in pre-independence days, his outspoken pragmatic approach to emotional African issues has made him the target of much criticism in Black Africa.

Dr. Banda is very appreciative of this opportunity to meet with you again (he called on you in December, 1964). He considers this strictly a courtesy call and has informed us he does not intend to raise substantive issues. He may wish to discuss with you his support of U.S. policy on Vietnam and Malawi's approach to the problems of southern Africa. We see this meeting as an occasion to reaffirm our close relationship with President Banda and demonstrate our continued interest in Malawi. Due to the sensitivities

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GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3-year intervals;
declassified after 12 years.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWJ 92-6
By Julian, NARA, Date 9-24-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Authority NLS 92-6
By gwl/imp NARA, Date 9-24-99

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-2-

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Suggested Response

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- 3 -

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-4

By 1-8, NARA, Date 4-9-93~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Afghanistan - Loan for Kajakai Hydroelectric Plant

Here is the request for your formal approval of a \$12 million loan to Afghanistan to finance the installation of additional generating equipment at the Kajakai dam in the Helmand Valley, with which we've been associated for many years. When Ambassador Maiwandwal was here in early April, you advised him we would decide on the loan within thirty days, but AID has given it a most thorough going over.

After careful review, they concur that it is economically sound. If you approve this loan, actual construction will not be started until satisfactory progress is made toward improving accounting procedures, the rate structure and the collection of payments in their electrical industry.

Secretary Fowler agrees the balance of payments effects of the loan are minimal.

It would create a political problem if we turned it down now. We have done three feasibility studies and already in 1965 told them we "agreed in principle" to finance it.

Charlie Schultz agrees with Bill Gaud we should go ahead. I recommend you approve.

Approve Kajakai _____ Disapprove _____ See me ✓ 6/8/67

AID has also been holding off on a \$4.5 million equipment loan for earth-moving machinery to be used in building irrigation works in the Helmand Valley. This small a loan would not normally come to you, but AID has held it up ever since you put a freeze on all Afghan aid. They would like to go ahead now. I recommend we proceed.

Yes on small loan _____ Disapprove _____ See me ✓ 6/8/67

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

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OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4

MAY 29 1967

By 108, NARA, Date 4-9-93

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Afghanistan - Loan for Kajakai Hydroelectric Plant

Attached for your consideration is a request from Bill Gaud that you approve a \$12 million power project loan in Afghanistan. The project involves installation of generating equipment at an existing dam and the associated transmission system.

The project would supply power to the Helmand Valley, where the U.S. has invested over \$60 million since 1950. So far we have little to show for our investment. AID is hopeful, however, that agricultural output in the Valley can be increased over the next ten years by two to four times present levels.

The Kajakai loan has a long history. Since 1964, the U.S. has done three feasibility studies, all of which concluded that the project is feasible. In 1965, AID informed the Afghanistan Government that it "agreed in principle" to financing the project. You advised Prime Minister Maiwandwal last month that we would decide on this loan in about thirty days.

In AID's judgment, this loan is economically sound. There were some serious problems with the project which had to be cleared up:

- The feasibility of the project depends upon substantial increases in per capita power consumption and decided improvement in collections.
- The Afghans have only limited ability to staff, maintain, and operate complex projects.
- The Afghan Electric Authority has a very poor performance record, receiving payment for only about half of the power they generate.

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As part of the proposed loan, therefore, AID will finance technical training to develop local management and operating skills. In addition, AID has agreed that construction will not be started until satisfactory progress is made towards accounting improvements, adequate rates, and a collection system which assures costs will be met from revenues.

Domestic Revenue Problems

The World Bank, AID, and the IMF have pointed out the need for greater domestic revenues if Afghanistan's development goals are to be realized. In order to assure that this power project will not draw resources from other important programs, AID has agreed to negotiate for measures to increase revenues in order to assure domestic financing of an increasing share of development expenditures.

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The funds will be used to purchase goods and services in the U.S. Secretary Fowler agrees that the balance of payments effects of the loan will be minimal.

There would be a serious political problem in turning this project down. The history of the U.S. involvement in this project and in the Helmand Valley and the 1965 agreement "in principle" to finance the project have given it special significance in our relations with Afghanistan.

In view of

- . the political problem involved in rejecting the loan,
- . the fact that AID will condition the project on the Afghans taking the steps necessary to make the project pay off, and
- . the project's contribution to meeting the long-run growth in power demand,

I recommend that you authorize the loan as set forth above.

Charles L. Schultze

Charles L. Schultze
Director

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-1

By inf, NARA, Date 1-21-92

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

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OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MAY 12 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Afghanistan - \$12 Million Kajakai Hydroelectric Project Loan

Recommendation: That you authorize us to inform the Royal Government of Afghanistan that we are prepared to negotiate a \$12 million Development Loan to finance the foreign exchange costs of the Kajakai Hydroelectric Project.

Background: During Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal's recent visit, you informed him that our review of the proposal was nearing completion and that his Government could expect our decision in approximately thirty days.

We have completed the necessary review and find the project to be economically feasible. There is an unsatisfied and growing demand in the Helmand Valley for power. Present power facilities are inadequate to meet this demand and the installation of generating equipment in the existing Kajakai Dam would provide adequate amounts of dependable and economic power for the first time.

The Project: The loan will finance the foreign exchange costs for the construction of a two 16,500 Kilowatt units hydroelectric generating plant, other attendant physical facilities in the Kandahar-Girishk area of the Helmand Valley, and the furnishing of technical, supervisory and training services for the Afghan electric authorities responsible for the construction and operation of the Project. Repayment terms of our loan will be 40 years; with a 10 years grace period; and with interest at one percent during the grace period and two and one-half percent thereafter.

U.S. Interest in the Helmand Valley: U.S. involvement in the Valley began in the early 1950's with Export-Import Bank assistance totaling \$39.5 million and was supplemented with U.S. technical assistance commencing in 1953. Afghan and U.S. investment in the Valley now totals about \$115 million which have been expended for an extensive irrigation and drainage system, dams, agricultural institutions, roads, and other related facilities. The objectives of the Afghan and U.S. governments in this region are to increase benefits from existing investments, accelerate agricultural production, and encourage development of industry.

Balance of Payments Effect: These loan funds will be used to finance commodities and services from the United States. Exports financed under this loan are additional to commercial exports for which Afghanistan authorizes foreign exchange.

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Self-Help Criteria: The U.S. is pressing to maximize the commitment of Afghan resources to the overall development program outlined in the proposed Third Five Year Plan (1967-71), which is now in the final stages of preparation. Commitments to electric power development in the Third Plan total 3.0 billion afghanis (\$40 million equivalent) or approximately 10 percent of the Plan total.

The Kajakai project has been assigned a high priority within the Helmand Valley section of the Plan. The Afghan government has allocated \$3.4 million equivalent to cover local costs of this power facility, the input to be made through annual budgets over a three-four year period. We will require evidence of the amount of funds appropriated for the initial year of the project and will monitor the Afghan government's annual commitment to see that sufficient funds are budgeted in subsequent fiscal years to carry out the project.

We will also require the Afghan government to establish a competently staffed regulatory and administrative agency. To this end, we propose to require satisfactory evidence that an effective rate schedule will be developed, an appropriate time schedule for the introduction of the new rates will be prepared and approved by the Afghan government, and improved revenue collection and accounting procedures will be installed in a timely manner. Further, we will specify that a portion of the loan will be used to contract with a U.S. public utility or private firm for advisory services to the national regulatory agency in the areas of utility regulation, management and fiscal responsibility.

Trained Afghan management and operating personnel are vital to the success of the project. To safeguard this major investment, we will specify that the U.S. contract will include provision for the necessary training and supervision of adequate numbers of Afghan personnel to operate the completed facility.

The Department of State concurs in this recommendation.

Action Requested: That you authorize negotiation of the \$12 million Development Loan for Kajakai Hydroelectric Project.

William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud

Approved: _____

Disapproved: _____

Date: _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, June 5, 1967 - 5:15 PM

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2. Pres file

Mr. President:

In the attached, Joe Barr and Bill Gaud report to you the Congressional prospects for our Latin American aid package. These are information memos; no Presidential decision is required now.

As you know, the package has two elements in two separate bills:

- a \$50 million increase in our annual contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank. (This would bring our contribution to \$300 million a year; the Administration's bill provides for a 3-year authorization at that level.)
- a \$100 million increase in bilateral U. S. aid to Latin America. (This is part of the regular Foreign Aid bill.)

It looks now as though the IDB bill will come to the House floor next week. Barr expects a very tough fight. The Republicans are pushing an amendment to hold our contribution to the present \$250 million level. On balance, Joe still expects to win. Along with a summary of what he is doing to generate support, his memo (Tab A) suggests arguments you may wish to use if you have an opportunity to do any personal persuading.

The Foreign Aid bill probably will not hit the House floor for several more weeks. Gaud's memorandum^(Tab B) explains the timing and the steps he is taking to round up votes. I should add that he is no more optimistic about the bill's prospects than the rest of us, but he is working hard to build up as much support as he possibly can.

F.
Francis M. Bator

OK
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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

JUN 2 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Inter American Development Bank

The Inter American Development Bank authorizing legislation will probably be on the floor of the House sometime during the week of June 11-17. It may also be considered by the Senate at about that time. The bill has been reported by the House Banking and Currency Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will probably vote to report on or about June 6. We are in for a very difficult fight.

The Republicans in the House have moved to hold the authorization at the current rate of \$250 million per year, for three years, instead of the \$300 million that we have recommended and which forms part of an agreed package with the Latin Americans. In spite of a very favorable majority report, our beginning headcount in the House shows trouble. We have now talked to 92 Democrats. Roughly 60 will stay with the Committee; the other 32 are opposed to the increase or are very doubtful. They cite the looming deficit and the cutback in domestic social programs as their principal reasons.

Our beginning count in the Senate looks better, but we are not far enough along to be very certain.

Nick Katzenbach, Bill Gaud, and I have had a working group operating on all the international agencies since the first of the year. We met recently and decided on the IDB as follows:

--To alert you to the fight we faced.

--To get the AFL-CIO going. (This has been done -- they are extremely interested in Latin America.)

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- 2 -

--To enlist the support of David Rockefeller and his Latin American business group.

--To attempt to enlist the help of General Eisenhower through the good offices of Dr. Milton Eisenhower.

--To enlist the support of former Secretaries Anderson and Dillon and other prominent Republicans who originated this proposal.

--To try to complete our headcounts by Wednesday, June 7.


This memorandum is designed to alert you to the problem and to give you an opportunity to discuss the issue with the leadership and any Congressional delegations with whom you may be visiting. You can use these arguments for the increase in the proposed spending level:

- 1) The Latin Americans have roughly doubled their contributions to this special fund, more than complying with your "self-help" guidelines.
- 2) The Bank is taking steps to improve safeguards to to our balance of payments.
- 3) The IDB was a Republican proposal put together in 1958 at a time when the United States was running the largest peace-time deficit in its history. We as Democrats supported the original proposal and have continued our support over the years of what has basically been a very good idea.
- 4) The increased spending level is important in showing our Latin neighbors our willingness to help them in the crucial areas of education, agriculture, and regional projects, and in relation to your meeting with the Latin Presidents. NOTE: We can supply you with more detailed talking papers if you wish them.

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- 3 -

It is impossible to separate our success or failure on the IDB legislation from the additional \$100 million for Latin America that Bill Gaud is seeking in his AID bill. The IDB bill will be on the floor first, but obviously the two issues cannot be separated, and Gaud and I intend to coordinate our efforts completely.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Joe Barr". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large loop at the beginning and a long, sweeping tail that extends to the right.

Joseph W. Barr

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

June 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status of the Aid Bill

As Joe Barr says in his memorandum concerning the IDB authorizing legislation, it is impossible to separate the issues on that bill from those in the regular Aid bill. However, while he has an immediate problem, ours will not come to a head for some time.

At Punta del Este the U. S. undertook to do two things that are pertinent here: (1) increase from \$250 million to \$300 million the annual contribution to the IDB, and (2) provide an additional \$100 million this year under the Alliance for Progress for agriculture and education.

The first of these (the \$50 million increase to the IDB) is now before the Congress in the IDB authorization bill, and is in trouble as Joe Barr's memo points out. The second (the \$100 million increase in Alliance funds) is before the Congress as part of the regular Aid bill.

With luck, this additional \$100 million will become an issue only in the A.I.D. appropriations bill. This is so because the Alliance already has a \$750 million authorization for FY 1968 as a result of the three-year authorization for the Alliance that was passed last year. This \$750 million authorization is more than enough to cover our original Alliance request for \$543 million plus this additional \$100 million. There is always the chance, however, that either the House or the Senate will want to cut the existing \$750 million authorization. In that event we will have to fight to keep them from cutting it below the post-Summit appropriation request of \$643 million.

Whether this matter comes up only in the appropriation stage or in both the authorization and appropriation stages, we will have trouble with it. Our original \$2.53 billion appropriation request for FY 1968 was \$400 million above the actual appropriation for FY 1967. The addition of another \$100 million is not going to make things any easier.

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Joe Barr's memorandum outlines what is being done to get support for the IDB authorizing legislation. We in A.I.D. are engaged in an active and broad-scale effort to enlist as much support for the Aid bill as we can from business, the universities, the churches, labor and other private groups. We are particularly doing our best to persuade friendly and influential businessmen to talk to Congressmen with whom they might have some influence - particularly Republican Congressmen. We have working for us on this David Rockefeller, Rudy Peterson of California, David Kennedy of Chicago, and a number of members of either the Business Council or the Council for Latin America.


You might be interested to know where we stand on hearings on the Aid bill.

Scheduled hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee ended on May 18. However, the Republicans (who have been complaining throughout the session about the way Committee business is handled) asked for further hearings, stating that they wish to go in greater detail into individual country programs. These additional hearings will be held on June 5, 6, and 7. Mark-up is now scheduled for immediately thereafter, but this may well slip.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee plans to hold two days of open hearings during the week of June 5. Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and I are the only witnesses scheduled. I understand that the Chairman plans no further hearings. He proposes to mark up the bill after the House has passed an authorization bill.

Hearings before the Passman Subcommittee on the appropriation bill are virtually complete. It is most unlikely that they will mark up until after an authorization bill has been passed.

In accordance with its usual custom, the Senate Appropriations Committee plans to hold no hearings until after the House has acted on appropriations. I expect the Senate hearings to be brief, as usual.



William S. Gaud

66

Wednesday, June 7, 1967
3:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a plea from Mrs. Krim.

When I talked to Abe Feinberg and gave him your points, his response was much the same: he couldn't be more loyal, but the average U.S. Zionist doesn't understand.

One thing to consider is letting it be known how intensively you worked on the Russians. Without going into any details whatsoever -- and never mentioning the hot line -- I suggested the importance of your role in the outcome to: Max Frankel, Joe Kraft, and Joe Alsop today.

Lord knows what they'll say tomorrow!!

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

6/7/67

664

Mrs. Arthur Krim thinks Mr. Rostow should know the following (although she said she had left same message with Mr. Watson's office earlier today), and she thinks it is important to the President.

She doesn't think the President evaluates correctly the resentment still lingering after the McCloskey statement several days ago. There are reports of very strong anti-American feelings in Israel -- that the Israelis feel they have won the war not with the U.S., but despite the U.S. In the Jewish community it is very difficult to explain the coincidence of the statement and the beginning of hostilities. The Jews are a people with a persecution complex, and they understood the statement of the State Dept. to mean that in an hour of gravest danger to them -- before they knew the Israeli army would be victorious and therefore at a time when they thought they would be exterminated by Nasser -- that this country disengaged itself, and the Jews and Israelis looked at Nasser like at a second Hitler.

That is why they reacted so violently when the neutrality statement came out. Many people, including Mr. Krim, have been trying to reach representatives of the Jewish community to explain the reason behind the statement, but it seems to have little effect. The man in the street still resents it.

There is great danger that the Jewish rally to be held tomorrow in Lafayette Square here, will be an anti-Johnson, rather than a pro-Israel, demonstration. And even Minister Evron, who understands the reasons behind the statement and is trying to prevent its turning into an anti-Johnson demonstration -- even he says things are going out of hand because there is not enough time.

Therefore, Mrs. Krim, her husband, and other people they have talked to, feel the situation can still be salvaged for the President provided he makes very soon -- possibly even today -- a very strong statement which can express sympathy and friendship to the Arab people, but which should say the following: that the US will not resume relations with the government headed by Mr. Nasser because he is responsible for useless and deplorable bloodshed, and because of his cynical and irresponsible accusations of the US, and his attempts to provoke a major conflagration.

Secondly, the President should say that he believes that now that these tragic events have occurred, the time has come for the convening of a peace conference that would establish lasting peace based on the recognition of Israel by the Arab nations as a member of the community of nations in the Middle East, living in peace and harmony with its neighbors. She said nobody can be against peace -- even the Russians -- and they can't say anything against such a statement. She said a lasting peace, not just an armistice or truce, since the Israelis have been waiting for it for the last 19 years -- they want a fundamental solution to the problem. Therefore this would be extremely welcomed by all Israelis and American Jews; and Pres. Johnson can regain the sympathy he lost because of the State Dept announcement. Further, it would reaffirm the President's former position in very clear terms, and even go further...

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 7, 1967
3:25 p.m.

67
Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a wise observation on how we might approach Korea for additional troops -- with perhaps a bit more iron than he suggests.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 6635

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4
By mg, NARA, Date 4-9-93

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

Action

RR RUEHC
DE RUALOS 8635E 1580920
ZNY SSSSS

CONTROL: 6691
RECD: JUNE 7, 1967
6:52 A.M.

Info

R 070841Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 6635

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-6

By *ing* NARA, Date 5-21-92

NODIS

FOR SECRETARY AND BUNDY FROM AMBASSADOR

SUBJECT: TACTICS AND CONSIDERATIONS ON ANY NEW REQUEST FOR FURTHER TROOPS FOR VIETNAM

1. BEFORE LEAVING THIS POST, I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU MY THOUGHTS IN THE EVENT WE DECIDE TO ASK FOR A FURTHER CONTRIBUTION OF KOREAN FORCES TO SOUTH VIETNAM IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
2. IF WE PLAN TO MAKE SUCH A REQUEST, THE MANNER IN WHICH THE QUESTION IS RAISED WITH PRESIDENT PAK WILL BE OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE.
3. I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT WE DO NOT CONFRONT HIM WITH A FORMAL REQUEST FOR MORE FORCES AS THE FIRST STEP. RATHER, WE SHOULD GO TO THE PRESIDENT AND TELL HIM THAT WE

PAGE 2 RUALOS 6635E ~~SECRET~~

WISH TO CONSULT WITH HIM ABOUT A COMMON PROBLEM. WE SHOULD EXPLAIN TO HIM IN DETAIL OUR ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THE STRATEGY WHICH WE PROPOSE TO FOLLOW IN THE LONG AND SHORT TERM, HOW WE WOULD PROPOSE TO CARRY IT OUT, WHAT FORCES WE THINK WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DO SO, WHAT WE ARE PLANNING TO DO OURSELVES. RECALLING THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND HE BOTH AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH OF THEM TO BRING THE AFFAIR TO SOME SORT OF SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE, WE SHOULD THEN ASK HIM WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT KOREA WOULD BE ABLE TO ASSIST.

4. THIS WOULD AVOID CONFRONTING HIM WITH A FORMAL REQUEST, TO WHICH HE WOULD HAVE TO ANSWER YES OR NO. HE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SEOUL 6635, JUNE 7

IS PROBABLY EXPECTING A DIRECT REQUEST. HAVING THE MATTER PRESENTED TO HIM IN THE FORM OF CONSULTATION ABOUT A COMMON PROBLEM WITH A VIEW TO PLANNING COMMON ACTION WOULD PROVIDE HIM GREATER ROOM FOR MANEUVER IN HANDLING HIS DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AND WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED. IT WOULD ENABLE HIM, IF HE FELT THAT HE COULD RESPOND IN SOME DEGREE, TO DO SO IN THE FORM OF A VOLUNTARY, SELF INITIATED

PAGE 3 RUALOS 6635E ~~SECRET~~
OFFER OF COOPERATION. IT WOULD MAKE CLEAR OUR UNDERSTANDING OF AND CONSIDERATION FOR THE PROBLEMS WHICH HE PERSONALLY WILL FACE, AND I THINK WOULD BE THE APPROACH BEST CALCULATED TO PUT HIM IN A RESPONSIVE FRAME OF MIND.

5. PRESIDENT PAK'S PERSONAL ATTITUDE IS, OF COURSE, THE MOST CRUCIAL SINGLE FACTOR IN THE WHOLE SITUATION.

6. SECONDLY, I HAVE ALREADY MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE WILL HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO PAY A SUBSTANTIAL PRICE FOR A FURTHER CONTRIBUTION. I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT WE BE GENEROUSLY FORTHCOMING AT THE OUTSET AND NOT ADOPT A BARGAINING APPROACH. THIS ALSO WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROPER FRAME OF MIND ON THE KOREAN SIDE AND WILL HELP PRESIDENT PAK IN HIS PROBLEMS WITH THE ASSEMBLY AND THE PUBLIC. REGRETTABLY, MANY KOREANS, INCLUDING HIGH OFFICIALS, DO NOT FEEL THAT WE HAVE YET ADEQUATELY FULFILLED OUR COMMITMENTS FOR THE LAST TROOP DISPATCH AND CONSIDER OUR ATTITUDE AS BEING FAR FROM GENEROUS OR UNDERSTANDING. THE PRICE THAT WE SHOULD BE READY TO OFFER SHOULD INCLUDE SOMETHING VERY DRAMATIC, EVEN THOUGH THIS MIGHT NOT BE STRICTLY APPROPRIATE OR NECESSARY FOR MILITARY OR ECONOMIC REASONS. BUT SOMETHING

PAGE 4 RUALOS 6635E ~~SECRET~~
OF THIS KIND, CALCULATED TO APPEAL TO KOREAN PRIDE, TO REFLECT A NOTICEABLE GAIN OR ADVANTAGE TO THE NATION, AND TO PROVIDE A REASSURANCE TO KOREAN PUBLIC OPINION, WOULD BE A REAL AND PERHAPS NECESSARY ELEMENT FOR AN AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE.

7. LASTLY, I MUST REITERATE THAT SECURING A FURTHER ROK TROOP CONTRIBUTION WILL BE DIFFICULT UNDER THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT SUCCESS IS BY NO MEANS A CERTAINTY. IF WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLATING SUCH A MOVE WE SHOULD NOW BE PREPARING THE GROUND AGAINST THAT TIME BY DOING THE RELATIVELY SMALL THINGS THAT BENEFIT THE ROK,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SEOUL 6635, JUNE 7

REFLECTING OUR GENEROSITY AND UNDERSTANDING TOWARD A STEADFAST FRIEND AND ALLY. OUR CURRENT ATTITUDES AND POSITIONS ON A NUMBER OF ITEMS UNDER DISCUSSION BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE ROKS, E.G., ROK CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM PACIFICATION PROGRAM, TROOP STRENGTH LEVELS, THE KOREAN COMBAT RATION, AND PROCUREMENT IN KOREA, WHILE QUITE JUSTIFIED IF TAKEN IN ISOLATION, ARE NOT HELPING TO CREATE A FRAME OF MIND THAT WOULD MAKE THEM RESPOND INSTINCTIVELY IN A COOPERATIVE AND FRIENDLY MANNER.

8. IN ALL THIS, WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT, IN RESPONSE

PAGE 5 RUALOS 6635E ~~SECRET~~

TO OPPOSITION CHARGES DURING CURRENT ELECTION CAMPAIGN, PRESIDENT PAK HAS CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAS NO INTENTION OF SENDING ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO VIETNAM. IF ADDITIONAL TROOPS ARE TO BE SENT, HE WOULD HAVE A VERY REAL PRACTICAL PROBLEM IN OBTAINING THE REQUIRED AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION FROM THE ASSEMBLY. THE ASSEMBLY AND THE PUBLIC WOULD HAVE TO BE PERSUADED THAT CIRCUMSTANCES MAKE IT NECESSARY FOR THE PRESIDENT TO DO WHAT HE HAS PUBLICLY SAID HE HAS NO INTENTION OF DOING AND THAT THIS WILL BE TO THE CLEAR ADVANTAGE OF KOREA. THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF MUST BE GIVEN SOLID GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING THAT HE CAN ACCEDE TO OUR REQUEST WITHOUT SERIOUSLY DAMAGING HIS OWN POLITICAL POSITION. BROWN

~~SECRET~~

68

June 7, 1967 (11:00 a.m.)

Mr. Chairman:

We are instructing our Ambassador at the United Nations to agree to an immediate meeting of the Security Council when one is suggested by your Ambassador.

Our Ambassador reports that the Security Council was informed last evening by Foreign Minister Eban that Israel would accept a cease-fire, while noting that he did not know of the reaction of the Arab side. He also reported that the Arab Ambassadors were silent on this point. At the time of this message, we ourselves are not clear as to their attitude, with the possible exception of Jordan.

We are taking steps to see that the Resolution of the Security Council is implemented by all concerned. We are prepared to work with all others to establish a lasting peace in the region.

The wholly false reports and invented charges that United States aircraft participated in attacks on Egypt have resulted in mob action against American Embassies and Consulates and a break in diplomatic relations by seven Arab countries with the United States. This despicable act on their part and failure to give adequate protection to American officials and private citizens in Arab countries will lead to a very serious deterioration in the situation. I repeat the hope that you will be able to counsel moderation where it is needed.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr 10-22-79
By sp/isp, NARA, Date 6-10-91

~~SECRET~~

69
Pres file

Wednesday, June 7, 1967 -- 9:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith some thoughts as of this morning.

I. The Israeli Situation and Bargaining Position. It looks as though, with the assistance of Arab delay in implementing the Security Council resolution, the Israelis will end up controlling the west bank of the Jordan river, the whole Jerusalem area, and the whole of the Sinai Peninsula, including the east bank of the Suez Canal. They will also have in their hands the administrative control of perhaps two-thirds of the Arab refugees, depending on how many flee the west bank. Depending a bit -- but not much -- on whether and how fast the Soviet Union is prepared to replace Arab aircraft and tank losses, the Israelis for the moment are in a position to dominate militarily the region, including a capacity, if necessary, to move across the Suez Canal to the west bank.

II. The Arab Situation. The Arabs initially decided to turn down the Security Council cease-fire resolution. It is unclear exactly what they have in mind. It is possible that they may accept it shortly and are merely trying to appear for the moment not excessively eager or hasty. But it is also possible that they may be trying to maintain Arab unity on the Baghdad pledge of the oil-producing powers; that is, to deny pro-Israel western nations mid-East oil. Having lost in the field, Nasser may be trying to preserve something of his position and leadership by using the leverage of oil, pressure on other Western economic interests, and possibly the use of the Suez Canal.

III. The Central Issue. The struggle now moving from the battlefield to economic pressure and politics is probably this: whether the settlement of this war shall be on the basis of armistice arrangements, which leave the Arabs in the posture of hostilities towards Israel, keeping alive the Israel issue in Arab political life as a unifying force, and affording the Soviet Union a handle on the Arab world; or whether a settlement emerges in which Israel is accepted as a Middle Eastern state with rights of passage through the Suez Canal, etc.

IV. U.S. Objective. The U.S. objective is evidently to try to move from the present situation to as stable and definitive a peace as is possible. This will require Israeli concessions -- as well as important moves by others -- on the refugee issue. It also involves:

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-303
By CB, NARA Date 7-11-00

~~SECRET~~

-2-

- A transition from the present Arab radical mood towards that of Arab moderates.
- Probably a larger Middle Eastern role for Turkey and Iran.
- Regional arms control arrangements, optimally to be worked out within the region itself.
- The beginnings, at least, of systematic regional cooperation in economic development, including, perhaps, a regional plan for development of water resources.
- The emergence of a spirit of regional pride and self-reliance to supplant the sense of defeat and humiliation engendered in the Arab world in the wake of the failure of Nasser, his strategy, and his ideological rhetoric.

V. First Tactical Moves. It is obvious that if the result we wish to achieve is to be brought about, by definition it requires the U. S. to be in a position of quietly stimulating and encouraging the Middle Eastern forces which might wish to move in this direction but not appearing to dominate or dictate the solution. In an only slightly lesser degree, this is also true for the United Nations. The UN role should be to set a framework within which these things become possible but not to become excessively involved in detail. U. S. -USSR understandings, quietly achieved, could play an important role in this outcome; but, as during these days, it is clear that the outcome in our interest is directly contrary to Soviet strategy over the past years; they have suffered a setback of the first order of magnitude; and they will only react in ways consistent with our interests if the political forces on the spot, as well as the military situation, leave them all other realistic alternative.

In the light of this assessment, here are some initial possible tactical moves:

- Quiet discussions with the Israelis about the concept of a definitive Middle Eastern settlement along the lines in paragraph III, above.
- Quiet approaches to, say, President Sunay, the Shah, the King of Morocco, President Bourguiba, suggesting this approach.

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-3-

-- Quiet beginnings of discussions with moderate Arabs along these lines, as opportunity offers. In this connection, men like Eugene Black, Robert Anderson, Raymond Hare, Kermit Roosevelt might be helpful.

-- Encouragement of arrangements which tend to split the Arab world; e. g., a Jordan-Israeli cease-fire; the revival of U. S. diplomatic relations with one or another Arab state to break the solidity of the bloc; efforts to break one or another Arab oil-producing state out of the Baghdad understanding; etc.

-- A willingness to broaden the mandate of Jack Valenti's mission to the whole field of water in the Middle East -- or the assignment of, say, Eugene Black to some such enterprise as a supplement to Jack's present mission.

At the heart of this approach, however, is a broad and imaginative movement by Israel on the question of refugees. The Johnson plan is a good initial base; but they, we, and others ought to get at this fast. They will -- and should -- make acceptance of these arrangements contingent on a general peace settlement; but they should move quickly, from their present position of strength and political unity in Israel, to an explicit willingness to play their part in a refugee settlement.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Sec. Rusk
Sec. McNamara
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Clark Clifford

Hol Saunders

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

Wednesday, June 7, 1967
9:00 a.m.

70

MR. PRESIDENT:

These reports are interesting.

Bob Ginsburgh, on the eve of becoming a general, remarked: "Yes, I've always warned about Col. Nasser. Until a man becomes a general officer, he's not truly responsible."

If Nasser goes, we indeed do have a new ball game.

W. W. R.

Attachments (Reuters June 7)

70a

MIDEAST--PAPERS .

LONDON, JUNE 7 (REUTERS)--TWO LONDON NEWSPAPERS SAID TODAY THAT EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT GAMAL ABDEL NASSER'S PERSONAL POSITION WAS THREATENED BY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAR.

THE EVENING STANDARD'S MIDDLE EAST EXPERT JON KIMCHE SAID THAT MAJ. GEN. ABDEL MURJAJI COMMANDER OF EGYPTIAN FORCES ON THE ISRAEL FRONT, HAD TAKEN COMMAND OVER ALL EGYPT'S ARMED FORCES.

KIMCHE SAID GENERAL MURTAJI HAD BEEN STRONGLY OPPOSED TO PRESIDENT NASSER'S POLICY DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS.

HE ADDED THAT THE GENERAL'S TAKE-OVER "INDICATES THAT PRESIDENT NASSER HAS BEEN DEPRIVED OF HIS AUTHORITY OVER THE EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES, AND SUGGESTS THAT A FULL-SCALE MILITARY COUP MAY HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN CAIRO LAST NIGHT."

THE LONDON EVENING NEWS IN A REPORT HEADLINED "SOVIET CLIMB-DOWN MAY TOPPLE NASSER," SAID RUSSIA'S AGREEMENT TO A U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE "SEEMS TO SPELL THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR PRESIDENT NASSER IN THIS WAR, AND PERHAPS FOR HIS ULTIMATE LEADERSHIP OF THE ARAB NATIONS."

(MORE) HAA 7:45A

PRESERVATION COPY

FIRST ADD LONDON MIDEAST PAPERS X X X NATIONS.

THE EVENING NEWS REPORT, BY POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT JOHN DICKINSON, WENT ON: "IT ALSO SEEMS TO SIGNAL ONE OF THE BIGGEST DIPLOMATIC DEFEATS RUSSIA HAS SUSTAINED IN HER CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE WEST SINCE CUBA."

KIMCHE'S REPORT IN THE EVENING STANDARD, WHICH GAVE NO SOURCES, SAID GENERAL JURTAJI HAD ORDERED THE IMMEDIATE EVACUATION OF EGYPTIAN TROOPS FROM THE YEMEN. SOME SPECIALIST UNITS, INCLUDING PARATROOPS, WERE ALREADY BEING AIRLIFTED DIRECT TO CAIRO.

"IT IS ASSUMED THEY ARE TO BE USED FOR INTERNAL SECURITY PURPOSES," HE ADDED.

RP 7:49A

FIRST ADD PARIS MIDEAST--CEASE FIRE (7:16A) X X X
CEASEFIRE.

ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN PARIS WALTER EYTAN TOLD REPORTERS: "IF IT IS TRUE THAT EGYPT HAS REJECTED THE CEASEFIRE, THIS IS A BAD OMEN.

"THE REAL SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS CAN ONLY BE FOUND THROUGH A FRANK AND DIRECT NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND ISRAEL."

EYTAN ADDED: "PERSONALLY, I DO NOT BELIEVE IN SOLUTIONS IMPOSED BY THE BIG POWERS AND SUPER-POWERS. THE PARTIES CONCERNED MUST AGREE BETWEEN THEMSELVES."

RP 7:50A

PRESERVATION COPY


Pres file 21

TOP SECRET/TRINE

Wednesday, June 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

3.3(b)(1),(3)



SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC04-49
By SJ, NARA, Date 2.11.04

W. W. Rostow

TOP SECRET/TRINE

72

Pres. file

Wednesday, June 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to President Marcos on Philippine Independence Day

June 12 is Independence Day in the Philippines.

Attached is a proposed text of a message from you to President Marcos.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Text approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

72a

DRAFT

INDEPENDENCE DAY MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MARCOS

Dear Mr. President:

All Americans join with me in sending to you and the Philippine people our warmest greetings and felicitations on the occasion of Philippine Independence Day, June 12.

Americans are justly proud of the long association and the close friendship that exists between our countries. We admire the growth and accomplishments of the Philippine Republic under your leadership.

This year we pass the twenty-fifth anniversary of a period of great trials for both our countries, a time to reflect on the sacrifices we have made for the principles we share. And today, as aggression imperils the freedom and independence of friends, we are proud that Filipinos and Americans again stand together in the defense of justice, liberty and human dignity.

I take this opportunity to express to you, Mr. President, my personal wish for your continued health and well-being, and for your success in meeting the challenges of the year ahead.

Sincerely,

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vice President's Trip to Asia

73
Pres file
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-4

By sig, NARA, Date 4-9-93

Plans are going forward for the Vice President's trip to Asia and the Pacific, beginning with his attendance as the chief U. S. delegate at the inauguration of President Park.

The tentative itinerary looks as follows:

Seoul (6/30 - 7/2)
Tokyo (7/2-4)
Manila (7/4-5)
Kuala Lumpur (7/5-6)
Jakarta (7/6 - 8)
Canberra (7/8 - 12)
Wellington (7/12 - 14)
Honolulu (7/13 - 14)
Washington (7/14)

Bangkok is omitted because the King and Queen will have just been here. Also, the Asian and Pacific Council will be meeting in Bangkok at the time.

Another omission is Viet-Nam. State believes it is preferable to give this trip an over-all Asian and Pacific image rather than to give it a Viet-Nam war coloration. I am inclined to agree, but would like your guidance.

I would note:

-- it is likely that other high U.S. officials will have been in Saigon about this time;

-- the security problems would be huge;

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-- putting a Viet-Nam cast on the trip could affect the Vice President's reception in Tokyo and Jakarta, both of which are most important.

W. W. Rostow

Omit Viet-Nam from itinerary _____

Include Viet-Nam _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~

74
June 7, 1967

Mr. President:

I have added one sentence at the end of the first paragraph, in an effort to set a tone of hope and to give a slightly broader focus to your own view of the Middle East. It doesn't commit anyone to anything and I think there will be a favorable response to the notion of looking ahead and not back. At Abe Fortas' suggestion I've kept the first responsibility on the peoples and government in the area. I agree with him. I've also cleared with Dean Rusk's people and with Walt.

McGeorge Bundy

6/7/67

Draft statement of the President for the NSC Meeting

The United Nations Security Council has called for a cease-fire in the Middle East. This first clear step toward lasting peace has the strongest support of the United States. We have worked as hard as we could to avoid hostilities and now to end them. But the fighting came, and the road forward to real peace and progress will not be easy. Still there is now a real chance for all to turn from the frustrations of the past to the hopes of a peaceful future. While the first responsibility falls to the peoples and governments in the area, we must all do our best to that end, both inside and outside the United Nations.

The continuing crisis and the effort to help build a new peace will require the most careful coordination of the work of our government. To ensure this coordination I am today establishing a Special Committee of the National Security Council. I shall work directly with this Committee, and in my absence its Chairman will be the Secretary of State. Its other members will include the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Ambassador to the United Nations (when his other duties permit), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of CIA, the Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and Mr. Walt Rostow. I have asked Mr. McGeorge Bundy to serve as a Special Consultant to the President and to be Executive Secretary of the Committee. Mr. Bundy has asked his Board of Trustees at the Ford Foundation for a temporary leave of absence, and he is already at work. I am asking all agencies of the government to assist him with such staff support as he may request for the Special Committee. The Committee will meet regularly at the White House.

Draft statement of the President for the NSC Meeting

746

The United Nations Security Council has called for a cease-fire in the Middle East. This first clear step toward lasting peace has the strongest support of the United States. We have worked as hard as we could to avoid hostilities and now to end them. But the fighting came, and the road forward to real peace and progress will not be easy. Still there is now a real chance for all to turn from the frustrations of the past to the hopes of a peaceful future. While the first responsibility falls to the peoples and governments in the area, we must all do our best to that end, both inside and outside the United Nations.

The continuing crisis and the effort to help build a new peace will require the most careful coordination of the work of our government. To ensure this coordination I am today establishing a Special Committee of the National Security Council. I shall work directly with this Committee, and in my absence its Chairman will be the Secretary of State. Its other members will include the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Ambassador to the United Nations (when his other duties permit), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of CIA, the Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and Mr. Walt Rostow. I have asked Mr. McGeorge Bundy to serve as a Special Consultant to the President and to be Executive Secretary of the Committee. Mr. Bundy has asked his Board of Trustees at the Ford Foundation for a temporary leave of absence, and he is already at work. I am asking all agencies of the government to assist him with such staff support as he may request for the Special Committee. The Committee will meet regularly at the White House.

Secy Rusk
10:10
draft
75

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-4

June 7, 1967

Mr. Chairman: By W.D., NARA, Date 4-9-93

We shall, of course, instruct our Ambassador at the United Nations to agree to an immediate meeting of the Security Council if one is suggested by your Ambassador.

The problem of an immediate cease-fire appears at the moment to lie with the Arab side. Foreign Minister Eban last evening informed the Security Council that Israel would accept a cease-fire, and noted that he did not know of the reaction of the Arab side. At the time of this message, we ourselves are not clear as to their attitude, with the possible exception of Jordan.

We shall do everything we can to see that the Resolution of the Security Council is implemented. We are prepared to work with others to establish a lasting peace in the region.

Permit me to refer once again to the wholly false reports spread by Cairo that United States aircraft participated in attacks on Egypt. The result of this charge has been mob action against American Embassies and Consulates and a break in diplomatic relations by six Arab countries with the United States. Such action on their part, and any failure to give adequate protection to American officials and private citizens in Arab countries can lead to a very serious deterioration in the situation. I repeat the hope that you will be able to counsel moderation where it is needed.

June 6, 1967 -- 9:30 p.m.

Governor George Romney
Lansing, Michigan

I have received today both your statement calling on the United States to avoid charting a "one-country course" and your later addendum that we insure that the state of Israel be preserved. As I have repeatedly said -- and as you must have observed in my statement of May 23 -- our objective in the Middle East has been and remains the territorial integrity of all the nations of the region. It was in pursuit of this policy that we have worked with others to bring about the cease-fire vote of the Security Council tonight -- a policy which shall continue to govern us as we strive to achieve "settled peace and progress for all the peoples of the Middle East."

Lyndon B. Johnson

wwrostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED

0700197

TO CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN
FROM PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, LYNDON B. JOHNSON
06 JUNE 7:45 PM EDT

OUR TWO AMBASSADORS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE CONSULTATION THROUGHOUT THE DAY. WE UNDERSTAND THAT OUR AMBASSADORS AGREED TO A VERY SHORT RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A CEASE-FIRE AS A FIRST STEP. WE AUTHORIZED OUR REPRESENTATIVE TO AGREE ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS JUST ADOPTED THIS RESOLUTION UNANIMOUSLY. WE SHALL DO OUR BEST TO ASSIST THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S FURTHER EFFORTS TO RESTORE PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST ON A LASTING BASIS.

I TRUST WE CAN WORK TOGETHER IN THE DAYS AHEAD TO HELP SOV EEE SOLVE THE PROBLEMS BEFORE US IN THE NEAR EAST AND ELSEWHERE.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4
By sig, NARA, Date 4-9-93

DECLASSIFIED

78

June 6, 1967 - 7:45 p.m.

Our ~~two~~ Ambassadors in the Security Council have ~~been in~~ close consultation throughout the day. We understand that our Ambassadors agreed to a very short resolution calling for a cease-fire as a first step. We authorized our Representative to agree on ~~behalf~~ of the United States Government. The Security Council has just ~~adopted~~ this resolution unanimously. We shall do our best to assist ~~the~~ Security Council's further efforts to restore peace in the Near East on a lasting basis.

I trust we can work together in the days ahead to help solve the ~~problems~~ before us in the Near East and elsewhere.

Sent to Chairman Kosygin

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4
By ing, NARA, Date 4-9-93

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2. Pres file

Tuesday, June 6, 1967 - 4:15 PM

Mr. President:

At Tab A, for your approval, is a brief reply to a message from General Gowon of Nigeria. Gowon wired you and many other heads of government urging against recognition of the newly-proclaimed Republic of Biafra -- formerly the eastern region of Nigeria. The incoming message is at Tab B.

None of your advisers would recommend recognition of Biafra until the Nigerian situation is clarified. However, we did hope to avoid answering this message so as to not appear to favor either the Central Government of the Biafrans. (How we handle the recognition question will greatly affect the tone of our relations with these states in whatever configuration emerges.)

However, Harold Wilson has now responded to Gowon's message to him with a non-committal hope that Nigeria can find her way out of her present difficulties. (A copy of the Wilson response is at Tab C.) If we don't say at least this much, we will probably wear out some of our welcome with the Central government. Thus, the proposed reply takes very much the same non-committal line.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐

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NEJ 92-4
By lip, NARA, Date 4-9-93

EKH/vmr

PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO GENERAL GOWON OF NIGERIA

I have read with deep concern your message of May 30 regarding the grave problems now besetting Nigeria. While fully recognizing the seriousness of the situation which confronts your country, my Government and the American people fervently continue to hope that these problems may be resolved by peaceful means.

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Nigeria

THE PRESIDENT

WHITEHOUSE

M83 YOU ARE NO DOUBT AWARE OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH NIGERIA HAS
FACED SINCE THE EVENTS OF 1966 I HAVE COMMUNICATED WITH YOU
IN THE PAST OF THE EFFORTS WHICH MY GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING TO
ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THESE PROBLEMS UNFORTUNATELY
OUR EFFORTS HAVE NOT RESULTED IN THE SUCCESS THAT WE ALL HOPED
FOR AS A RESULT OF THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR

OF EASTERN NIGERIA LT-COL ODUMEGWU OJUKWU ALL THE CONCESSIONS
I HAVE MADE HAVE BEEN REBUFFED THE FINAL EFFORT WAS THAT OF
THE CONCILIATION COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF EMINENT NIGERIANS FROM
ALL PARTS OF THE COUNTRY WHICH SUBMITTED RECOMMENDATIONS AFTER
CONSULTING THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF EASTERN NIGERIA AND MYSELF
I HAD NO HESITATION IN ACCEPTING THE COMMITTEES RECOMMENDATIONS
AND PUTTING THEM INTO EFFECT IN THE EXPECTATION THAT THE EASTERN
GOVERNOR WOULD RECIPROCATE IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATION LT COL
OJUKWUS INTRANSIGENCE HAS CULMINATED IN HIS DECLARATION OF THE
SO-CALLED INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA UNDER THE PRESENT

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-303
By cb, NARA Date 7-18-00

CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA SUCH DECLARATION IS ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL IT IS OF NO EFFECT AND CAN ONLY BE REGARDED AS AN ACT OF REBELLION MY GOVERNMENT IS THEREFORE TAKING STEPS TO CONTAIN THIS REBELLION MAY I REPEAT MY APPEAL TO YOU TO REFRAIN FROM DOING ANYTHING THAT WILL IMPAIR THE CORPORATE EXISTENCE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERGRITY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA I HARDLY NEED TO ADD THAT ANY ATTEMPT AT RECOGNITION OF THE SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA AS SOVEIEIGN STATE WILL AMOUNT TO INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF MY COUNTRY AND WILL BE REGARDED AS AN UNFRIENDLY ACT I TRUST THAT IN

FURTHERANCE OF THE VERY GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES I CAN RELY ON YOUR MAJESTY/EXCELLENCY'S CONTINUED COOPERATION AND SYMPATHY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION

LT COL YAKUBU GOWON HEAD OF THE FEDERAL MILITARY

GOVERNMENT COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES

OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA