

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, June 6, 1967
4:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Nat Davis' report on the situation in New York.

If the Israelis go fast enough, and the Soviets get worried enough, a simple cease-fire might be the best answer.

This would mean that we could use the de facto situation on the ground to try to negotiate not a return to armistice lines but a definitive peace in the Middle East.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr 9-9-80

By lg/dch, NARA, Date 6-4-91

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 6, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The Situation in New York -- Tuesday, June 6, 1:15 p.m.

Ambassador Goldberg met with friendly Security Council members this morning and then with Fedorenko. He found Fedorenko wanted a resolution which called for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal behind the Armistice line -- but without our language: "without prejudice to respective rights, claims or the position of anyone," and without our language about refraining from acts of force regardless of their nature (which the Russians interpret as an attempt to undo the blockade of the Straits of Tiran).

Fedorenko has now gone back to Moscow for further instructions and the next Goldberg-Fedorenko meeting is scheduled for 3:00 or 3:30. Tabor hopes to be in a position to reconvene the Security Council by 4:30, but there is no assurance of that. (The Ticker has a story it will not be before 6:00 p.m.)

Gideon Rafael, the Israeli Representative, has made clear he takes exception to some of our resolution language, and his Government will maintain a "frigid attitude" toward it. What Israel wants is a simple cease-fire. (This was our original position yesterday -- and obviously in Israeli interest in light of their gains.)

Fedorenko saw Seydoux, the French Representative, after talking with Goldberg. Foreign Minister Eban of Israel is expected in New York this afternoon.

The continuing delay in convening the Security Council is very much in Israel's interest so long as Israeli forces continue their spectacular military success. We shall undoubtedly be accused of stalling. In point of fact we are not, and the Russians are contributing to the delay more than we are. The Russians suffer a genuine disadvantage in having slower and more distant communications than we do. They have shown signs of trying to adjust their position to the changing situation on the ground in the Mid-East, but their adjustments have not caught up with the deteriorating position of their allies -- as of the moment at least. The result is that the hours go by. The delay serves Israel, damages the Soviet position and still further discredits the United Nations.

Nathanial Davis

cc: Mr. Saunders

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 769-83-155
By reg/ies, NARA, Date 6-4-91

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Luncheon with the President
Tuesday, June 6, 1967, 1:00 p. m.

Agenda

I. Middle East (Sects. Rusk and McNamara)

- a. Jordan
- b. Oil
- c. Forward planning and strategy

II. Viet Nam (Sects. Rusk and McNamara)

Targets

III. Other, including personnel problems

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 18, NARA, Date 6-3-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

82
Pres file

Tuesday, June 6, 1967
12:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith information that the
North Vietnamese government,
excepting National Defense and Foreign
Affairs, are evacuating Hanoi.

W. W. Rostow



1.3 (a) (4)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NY 92-3
By ig, NARA, Date 11-17-93

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE 82a
IN 82066

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR
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This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE

DIST 5 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM
DOI MAY 1967
SUBJECT EVACUATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
OFFICES FROM HANOI

ACQ

SOURCE

1. PORTIONS OF THE STAFFS OF CERTAIN NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES HAVE BEEN EVACUTED FROM HANOI TO THE COUNTRYSIDE. AMONG THESE ARE THE MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN TRADE AND EDUCATION AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POLICE OR SECURITY ELEMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREIGNERS. COMMENT: THIS POLICE ELEMENT MAY BE PART OF THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY.)

THE MINISTRIES WHICH HAVE EVACUATED LEAVE SKELETON CLERICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAFFS IN HANOI, HOWEVER, OFFICIALS OF AUTHORITY WITHIN THESE MINISTRIES

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 92-2/NLJ/RAC 99-247
By sj, NARA, Date 9-7-01

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN EVACUATED. [] AN INDICATION OF THIS IS THAT THE IMPORT LICENSES HAVE BEEN DELAYED RECENTLY BECAUSE THEY HAD TO BE SENT OUTSIDE OF HANOI FOR APPROVAL.)

2. [] THE MINISTRIES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS REMAIN IN FULL STRENGTH IN HANOI. []

[] THE STAFF OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS LIVE IN DORMITORIES ATTACHED TO THEIR OFFICES AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF A DECREASE IN THEIR PERSONNEL.)

3. THE NEW LOCATIONS OF THE EVACUATED OFFICES ARE NOT KNOWN. IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT SOME OF THEM MAY BE LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 80 KILOMETERS WEST OF HANOI IN AN AREA ORIGINALLY INTENDED FOR RELOCATING THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS.

[] TWO SITES ORIGINALLY WERE INTENDED FOR THE RELOCATION OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS, THE ONE MENTIONED ABOVE AND ANOTHER APPROXIMATELY 50 KILOMETERS NORTH OF HANOI. THE LATTER SITE HAS BEEN DAMAGED BY BOMBING.)

4. [] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, J-2) CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP AND POLAD)

Tuesday, June 6, 1967
11:50 a.m.

83

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Ambassador Harriman's
second interview with the Shah.
As you see, he feels he must return
to his country.

We can leave a formal announcement
of this postponement to be worked out
by State with the Shah.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Paris 19914)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 68 2-9-80
By yl/wsp, NARA, Date 6-7-91

RECEIVED
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~~SECRET~~ PARIS 19914

EXDIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM HARRIMAN.

(DEPT PASS TEHRAN EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR MEYER)

REF STATE 208338.

CALLED ON SHAH THIS MORNING AND CONVEYED MESSAGE IN REFTEL.
HE IS REMAINING IN PARIS TODAY FOR TALK AND LUNCHEON WITH DEGAULLE,
THEN RETURNING TO TEHRAN TOMORROW, WEDNESDAY JUNE 7. HE REGRETS
NOT HAVING OPPORTUNITY FOR TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND HOPES
TO COME TO WASHINGTON AT A LATER DATE. HE AGREED TO INFORM OUR

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 19914 ~~SECRET~~
AMBASSADOR MEYER FULLY ON HIS TALKS WITH DEGAULLE AND HIS ANALYSIS
OF WHERE DEGAULLE IS HEADING IN MIDDLE EAST.

SHAH EXPRESSED EARNEST DESIRE TO CONTINUE CLOSE EXCHANGE OF
VIEWS ON DEVELOPEMENTS. HE BELIEVES NASSER'S CLAIM OF
INTERVENTION BY US AND BRITISH PLANES IS TO HAVE FUTURE BASIS
THAT HIS FORCES WERE NOT DEFEATED BY ISRAEL ALONE.

THE SHAH HOPES THE SOVIETS WILL NOT INTERVENE MILITARILY ON
PRETEXT TO OFFSET US ACTION. I TOLD HIM THAT OUR CONTACTS WITH
SOVIET GOVERNMENT LED US TO BELIEVE SOVIETS WOULD NOT INTERVENE
AND HAD INDICATED THAT ALL SHOULD WORK FOR CEASE FIRE AND
RETURN TO OLD POSITIONS. I ALSO SAID WE UNDERSTAND ISRAEL
HAD NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS, ONLY ASSURANCE OF FREE PASSAGE
TO GULF OF AQABA.

SHAH URGED THAT WE SHOULD NOW CONSIDER LONG RANGE PROBLEM OF
NASSER. WE COULD NOT TOLERATE FLARE-UPS EVERY FEW YEARS. HE SAID
NASSER'S AGRESSIVE PLANS MUST BE STOPPED.

SHAH RAISED QUESTION OF HIS INITIATIVE REGARDING VIETNAM WHICH
I WILL REPORT IN REPTTEL.

BOHLEN
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Letter 6-23-81
By pg/np, NARA, Date 6-17-91

PRESERVATION COPY

84

Tuesday, June 6, 1967
11:00 a. m.

Per file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Arthur Goldberg called this morning to tell me he had received a telephone call from Jerusalem from Chief Justice Agramat. (They entered the Chicago bar the same year.) The message is via Goldberg to you from Prime Minister Eshkol. There are two points.

1. Eshkol "hopes you understand" the action taken by Israel; that it resulted from a judgment that their security situation had so deteriorated that their national existence was imperiled.

2. Eshkol strongly hopes that we will take no action that would limit Israeli action in achieving freedom of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. They understand your difficulties in achieving this result; and are prepared to handle the matter themselves.

I shall, of course, make this message available to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. We should be back with a recommendation about the second point later in the day.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 74g 82-104

By rs/dch, NARA, Date 6-4-91

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, June 6, 1967
10:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

This is a rather good draft
message from you to King Faisal.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 6-3-91

~~SECRET~~

85a
June 6, 1967

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO KING FAISAL

Your Majesty:

In the light of my own high regard for Your Majesty, as well as the long-standing close and cordial relations between our two governments, I want to assure that you are fully informed regarding the views and policies of my government at this delicate juncture in the history of the Near East.

The United States Government had been engaged for several weeks in strenuous attempts to reduce tensions in the Near East when, despite our best efforts, hostilities broke out on June 5 on a broad front. We had been in close touch with the parties and had received no indication that such fighting was in prospect. It is not clear to us how it started.

In this situation, the policy of the United States must be to seek urgently for concerted action through the United Nations to bring about an end to the current hostilities. We are bending all our efforts to this end. Far from seeking to become involved in this new conflict, we are doing our best to stop it. In so doing, we will strive to steer an even-handed course. Our sole endeavor will be to seek the earliest feasible return to peaceful conditions so that the underlying problems of the region can be addressed in relative calm.

As the situation evolves, I realize that we may not always see eye to eye on every issue. I recognize the imperatives of your position, just as I hope you will recognize those that govern our own. We continue to support the integrity and independence of all states involved in the current hostilities. We are opposed to efforts to change frontiers or resolve problems by force of arms. But this is not favoritism for any single state in the region, it is simple realism. The purpose of the United States Government

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 83-155
By reg/has, NARA, Date 6-4-91

SECRET

-2-

must remain the prevention and limitation of hostilities which otherwise might well expand outside the Near East. Such has been our settled policy under four Administrations of both political parties since the end of World War II.

At the same time I want to assure Your Majesty that it will be my firm determination that events in the present crisis not be permitted to affect the long-standing interest of the United States Government in the closest possible relations with the Government of Saudi Arabia. I hope that Your Majesty will understand and appreciate the current efforts of the United States for peace within this unchanging context. It would be tragic if misunderstandings between us, or ill-conceived efforts on the part of others, were to weaken the enduring relationship between our two countries from which both have derived such benefit for so long.

As a continuation of our cordial talks in Washington a year ago, I will of course consider most carefully any views which you may wish to send me on the current situation. Meanwhile, Ambassador Ells, in whom I have the fullest confidence, has been instructed to remain in particularly close contact with your government throughout the present crisis. If God wills, the fighting will soon stop to permit us to address the underlying problems of peace and development in a more normal atmosphere.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

SECRET

86
June 6, 1967

The cease-fire vote of the Security Council opens a hopeful path away from danger in the Middle East. It reflects responsible concern for peace on the part of all who voted for it. The United States has warmly supported this resolution. We hope the parties directly concerned will promptly act upon it. We believe a cease-fire is the necessary "first step," in the words of the resolution itself -- a first step toward what we all must hope will be a new time of settled peace and progress for all the peoples of the Middle East.

It is towards this end that we shall now strive.

Mr. Rostow

87

free file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with Ambassador Meyer, Tuesday,
June 6, at ~~1 p.m.~~ *12:00 noon*

Ambassador Armin Meyer is in town laying the groundwork for the Shah's visit on June 12th. (So far as we know, he is still coming, despite the war in the Middle East.) You have agreed to see Armin to have an advance personal briefing, additional to the usual briefing material.

You may want to sound him out on the following questions:

- (1) the Shah's view of Nasser;
- (2) Iran's relations with the Soviet Union;
- (3) Iran's relations with Pakistan, particularly regarding the transfer of military equipment;
- (4) evolving views of Israel, and how far the Shah can go in supporting Israel;
- (5) problems created for the Shah by the present conflict in the Middle East;
- (6) future of US relations with the Shah now that AID is finished and military assistance is on a credit sales basis.
- (7) assuming Nasser's set back or overthrow, would the Shah, in private understanding with the Israelis, call for the Middle Eastern nations to take the leadership in settling and organizing their affairs, including a refugee settlement; common understanding about borders; a regional economic development bank; etc. W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4
By ijp, NARA, Date 4-9-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday,
June 6, 1967

Mr. President:

Here is a thoughtful letter
of support from Governor
Agnew on the Middle East
crisis.

W. W. R.

1. *Pres file*
2. *supp.*
Pres file

87-
/

June 7, 1967

Dear Ted:

I appreciate your thoughtful letter of June 3.

Although disappointed by the developments of the past few days in the Middle East, we shall now strive, as I said Tuesday evening, to achieve settled peace and progress for all the peoples of that area.

The knowledge of your support in this undertaking is a great comfort to me.

Sincerely,

LBJ

The Honorable
Spiro T. Agnew
Governor of Maryland
Annapolis, Maryland 21404

LBJ:RMM:WWR:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 5, 1967 -- 9:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

I thought you might want to take one more look at this letter. I changed the first paragraph so that we did not put flatly into the record a judgment that Israel had kicked this off from a standing start.

I hope I introduced the other two themes as you would wish them.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 709 82-154
By sp/ics, NARA, Date 6-4-91

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

Draft -- June 5, 1967

897

Dear Harold:

I appreciate your comments on the unfortunate developments in the Near East. We had feared that the Israelis might feel compelled to strike, but we had had no advance indication from them that they had actually taken a decision to do so in the face of what they judged to be further Arab provocations. We believed, in fact, we had at least a clean week for diplomacy.

Arthur Goldberg has had a difficult time in the Security Council. Like you, we had hoped for a quick cease-fire resolution. But we have had to deal with a determined effort to have the Council call for a withdrawal of forces in terms which would legitimize Nasser's action at the Strait of Tiran -- a subject on which we have both taken unequivocal positions.

We have done everything we could to get an even-handed Security Council pronouncement. We shall work with your people in New York to encourage helpful UN action. If the Soviets, and the French, are more forthcoming than they have been, both of us will want to build on that development to work toward a satisfactory settlement.

Meanwhile, I hope we can keep in closest touch as the military situation develops and put the best minds available to both of us to work on the contingencies that may arise and the constructive possibilities that may unfold.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 76982-154

By g/vis, NARA, Date 6-4-91

~~SECRET~~

-2-

I think you know the deep satisfaction I derived from our discussions.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

90

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 5, 1967
9:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the account, with a
map, of the first day's turkey shoot.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By reg/dep NARA, Date 6-3-91

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 5, 1967
5:45 p.m.

91

MR. PRESIDENT:

Our first thought is that the key to ending the war is how well the Israelis do -- or don't do -- on the ground. Up to a point this is correct; but it is not wholly correct because what the Israelis are after is not some abstract military victory, but a settlement which, if possible, insures that this will not happen again in another 10 years. Therefore, our behind-the-scenes work with the Russians and others should consist not merely in negotiating a cease-fire; because a cease-fire will not answer the fundamental questions in the minds of the Israelis until they have acquired so much real estate and destroyed so many Egyptian planes and tanks that they are absolutely sure of their bargaining position.

Therefore, we should begin in New York or elsewhere, talking with the Russians and, if possible, with the Egyptians and others about the terms of a settlement:

- Eilat open to oil;
- observers on both sides of the line;
- a Soviet commitment to work with us to damp down the arms race;
- a turn in the road on refugees;
- a Middle East development bank that would bring the Iranians and Turks into the diplomacy of the area; etc.

So long as the war is roughly moving in Israeli's favor, I believe we can shorten it by getting at the substance of a settlement at the earliest possible time.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 712 82-154
By ag/ies, NARA, Date 6-4-91

Monday
June 5 1967 - 4:55pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested reply to a greeting sent
to you from the Maharajah of Bhutan
via Dillon Ripley

When Dillon Ripley was looking at birds
up against the Tibetan border, he saw the
King, who asked him to send his best wishes
to you, in the attached message.

The State Department suggests the
following simple reply, which would be sent
by telegram.

W. W. Rostow

*This is to prove your little
bureaucracy downstairs never
falters - war or peace!
/s/ W.*

Att: File #2157

92a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Reply

Your Highness:

You were most kind to have thought to send me your personal good wishes which Secretary S. Dillon Ripley of the Smithsonian Institution has conveyed to me. I appreciate very much your thoughtfulness and wish you and your people happiness and success.

Sincerely,

His Highness
The Druk Gyalpo of Bhutan

Monday, June 5 1967
4:40 p.m.

93

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an eye-witness AP account confirming the Eshkol claim that there was bombardment across the Israeli border before their air strike.

The location fits the names of the three towns in Eshkol's letter. Whatever the truth of the matter, this dispatch gives them a better propaganda case.

W. W. R.

Attachments (AP 121 - 124)

BATTLE EYEWITNESS

WITH ISRAELI FORCES (AP)-CRACK ISRAELI TROOPS SLICED INTO THE SOUTHERN GAZA STRIP TODAY, CAPTURING THE STRATEGIC TOWN OF KHAN YUNIS IN AN ATTEMPT TO PARALYZE HEAVY ARAB CONCENTRATIONS.

THE BATTLE ERUPTED WHEN EGYPTIAN MORTAR BATTERIES LAID A BARRAGE OF FIRE ON FOUR ISRAELI KIBUTZ--OR FARM--SETTLEMENTS STRUNG OUT ALONG THE GAZA BORDER ABOUT 50 MILES SOUTH OF TEL AVIV.

SHELLS BEGAN RAINING INTO BARNs AND COWSHEDS AT 4 A.M., KILLING LIVESTOCK AND BURNING WHEAT FIELDS, WITHOUT CAUSING HUMAN CASUALTIES.

ISRAELI ARTILLERY, QUICKLY DEPLOYED OPPOSITE THE EGYPTIANS, RETURNED THE FIRE AND ARMOR MOVED WESTWARD TOWARD THE MEDITERRANEAN COAST, FOLLOWED BY INFANTRY.

THE SWIFT STRIKE APPARENTLY CAUGHT THE EGYPTIANS ON THEIR FLANK AND FORESTALLED A POSSIBLE ENEMY SWEEP AT BEERSHEBA IN THE ISRAELI NEGEV DESERT ABOUT 25 MILES EAST OF THE STRIP.

JC250PED JUNE 5

0200 G-17
The earliest
hour yet.
If true, this
establishes
ground action
four hours before
the Israeli
air attacks
Hail

WITH ISRAELI FORCES--ADD EYEWITNESS (121)

AN ISRAELI COMMANDER IN CHARGE OF THE NAHAL OZ SECTOR REPORTED THE CAPTURE OF KHAN YUNIS, AN EGYPTIAN TOWN SOUTH OF GAZA, TWO MILES ACROSS THE BORDER.

WITH KHAN YUNIS FALLEN TO THE ISRAELI ATTACK, ARMOR AND INFANTRY STOOD READY TO TAKE ON GAZA AND THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY STRUNG OUT TO SHEIKH ALINUNTAR.

SHEIKH ALINUNTAR LOOMED OVER THE WESTERN HORIZON, DARKENED BY PLUMES OF SMOKE AS LIGHT AND HEAVY ISRAELI MORTARS BLANKETED EGYPTIAN GUN POSITIONS.

CAMOUFLAGED TANKS, PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND TRUCKS WAITED FOR THE ORDER TO ATTACK FROM ORCHARDS AND WOODS. KHAKI-UNIFORMED INFANTRYMEN, LUGGING BAZOOKAS AND MACHINE GUNS, ROSE STIFF-LEGGED FROM A BRIEF REST IN THE DUST AND STAMPED OUT CIGARETTE BUTTS TO MOVE WEST IN DRAWN OUT SINGLE FILE.

JC253PED JUNE 5

P.S. This would
also undercut
the importance
of Nolte's
report on
MP's in
Cairo at 0500,
but heighten
the importance
of his report
on the UAA
commercial
pilot at
Cairo
airport at
0130.

WITH ISRAELI FORCES--ADD EYEWITNESS (122)

TRANSPORT PLANES WITH SCREAMING MYSTERE JET FIGHTER ESCORTS DRONED OUT OF A NEARBY AIRFIELD, APPARENTLY CARRYING AIRBORNE TROOPS OR PARATROOPERS INTO ACTION.

EGYPTIAN BATTERIES OPPOSITE NAHAL OZ AND KFAR AZA FELL SILENT ONE BY ONE AFTER ABOUT FIVE HOURS, FIRING WHICH IN THE WORDS OF THE LOCAL FARM SECURITY CHIEF "WAS MORE WASTE THAN EFFECTIVE WAR."

"WE KNEW IT WOULD BE COMING ONE OF THESE DAYS," HE SAID. "THE FIRST SHELLS HAD BARELY EXPLODED ON THE VILLAGE OUTSKIRTS WHEN WE RUSHED THE CHILDREN AND NONCOMBATANTS TO THE SHELTERS WHILE OUR BOYS MANNED THE DEFENSE PERIMETER."

JC255PED JUNE 5

WASHINGTON--ADD LBJ--MIDDLE EAST (97)

THERE WAS HECTIC DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY HERE EARLY AS STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS MET WITH AMBASSADORS FROM ARAB STATES, FRANCE AND BRITAIN, AND THE ISRAELI CHARGE D'AFFAIRES.

"IN THESE MEETINGS, MCCLOSKEY SAID, "IT HAS BEEN EMPHASIZED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS DONE ITS UTMOST WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS TO FORESTALL THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

"WE DEEPLY REGRET THAT THE HOSTILITIES HAVE BROKEN OUT."

HE ADDED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT DID NOT KNOW WHICH SIDE STARTED THE SHOOTING.

MCCLOSKEY ALSO REPORTED OUTBREAKS OF ANTI-AMERICAN VIOLENCE IN SOME ARAB STATES.

"FRAGMENTARY AND INCOMPLETE" REPORTS, HE SAID, LISTED AN ATTACK ON SOME AMERICAN AIRMEN IN TRIPOLI, LIBYA, WHERE THE UNITED STATES OPERATES THE GIANT WHEELUS AIRBASE; DEMONSTRATIONS AND DAMAGE TO U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES IN TRIPOLI AND BENGHAZI, LIBYA, AND BAGHDAD AND BASRA, IRAQ; DAMAGE TO UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY FACILITIES IN BENGHAZI, LIBYA, AND DAMASCUS, SYRIA; AND OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS IN KHARTOUM, SUDAN, SANAA, YEMEN, AND TUNIS, TUNISIA.

JC258PED JUNE 5

Pres file
94

Monday, June 5, 1967 -- 4:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

1. My brother Gene called with the following message: Irving Engel called from New York, on behalf of himself, Morris Abram, Lewis Strauss, and Jacob Blaustein -- leaders of the Jewish community. -- He requested a meeting with the President either tonight or tomorrow.

Yes _____

No _____

See me _____

2. As you can see from the attached telegram, 25 leaders of the American Arab community wish to see you Wednesday or Thursday of this week.

We have solicited a State Department recommendation on the question of the Arabs seeing you.

Yes _____

No _____

See me _____

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

94a
Sent S/S for
communication
B.C.S

1967 JUN 3 PM 8 35

WD058 DL PD

NEW YORK NY E 203P EDT

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

25 LEADERS OF AMERICAN ARAB COMMUNITY REPRESENTING ONE MILLION
AMERICAN ARABS WISH TO MEET WITH YOU TO DISCUSS MIDEAST CRISIS
AMERICAN ARABS ARE COMING TO WASHINGTON WEDNESDAY AND
THURSDAY 7TH AND 8TH JUNE FOR MEETINGS AND ALLIES
WE WANT MEETING WITH YOU PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF REPORTS
THAT ZIONIST JEWISH LEADERS PLAN MEETING YOU WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY

DR M T MEHDI SECRETARY GENERAL THE ACTION COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN
ARAB RELATIONS 441 LEXINGTON AVE NEW YORK NY.

PRESERVATION COPY

Monday, Jun 11, 1967
11:10 a.m.

95

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Gen. Amit (senior intelligence officer recently here) briefs Harry McPherson and Amb. Barbour.

His key defense of Israel's air attack is consistent with Eshkol's:

-- artillery fire on three Israeli villages;

-- U. A. R. air incursions.

Then they "punched all the buttons."
At least that's his story.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

W. W. R.

(Tel Aviv 3937)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 08-16 (#102)
By nl, NARA, Date 2-9-09

Pres file

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1604
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~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 3937

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-301
By is, NARA Date 4-24-20

EXDIS

1. GENERAL AMIT GAVE BRNQB

D TWELVE O'CLOCK FOR MCPHERSON
AND HE. HE REHERSED THE HISTORY OF THE LAST THREE WEEKS AS
NOW SEEN BY ISRAELIS. HE REGARDED NASSER AS HAVING LARGELY
PLAYED HIS BUILD-UP BY EAR AND HAVING ACHIEVED MOMENTUM TO
AN EXTENT THAT HE COULD NOT STOP. AMIT DESCRIBED NASSER'S
ACTION IN FOUR STEPS. FIRST, A THREE-WAY DEAL BETWEEN THE
SYRIANS, THE EGYPTIANS AND THE USSR ON BASIS OF WHICH
NASSER WOULD MAKE A SHOW OF FORCE IN SINAI TO INCREASE HIS
PRESTIGE AND IN RETURN THE SYRIANS WOULD STOP SABOTAGE AND
INFILTRATION. STEP TWO DEVELOPED WHEN HE ASKED UNEF TO MOVE
BACK FROM STRONG POINTS ON BORDER AND INSTEAD SYG INSISTED
UNEF'S POSITION WOULD BE TO REMAIN IN PLACE OR MOVE ENTIRELY.

PAGE 2 RUEHIX 3937 ~~SECRET~~

IN CIRCUMSTANCES NASSER HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO ASK THEM TO
WITHDRAW COMPLETELY. STEP THREE WAS THE CLOSING OF THE
STRAITS ON MAY 23, WHICH PROBABLY HAD NOT BEEN CONSIDERED
IN ADVANCE BUT RESULTED FROM HIS SEEING OPPORTUNITY. STEP FOUR,
WHICH IS DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAST 48 HOURS, INCLUDED THE MOVE-
MENT OF THE FOURTH ARMORED DIVISION AND THE CRACK SHASLI BRIGADE
WHICH TOGETHER INCLUDED 400 TANKS TO ENCIRCLE AND CUT OFF
EILAT, THUS LINKING UP WITH JORDAN. IN ADDITION, THERE WERE
HASTY WITHDRAWALS FROM THE YEMEN, TWO BRIGADES HAVING MOVED
FROM THE YEMEN INTO THE SINAI YESTERDAY WITHOUT EVEN PAUSING
IN EGYPT PROPER. AMIT ADDED THAT EVIDENCE THEY HAD OF MAJOR
DEVELOPMENTS IN JORDAN CORROBORATED THIS EGYPTIAN PLAN. AN
EGYPTIAN GENERAL TOOK CHARGE OF THE JORDANIAN FORCES, ISRAEL
INTERCEPTED EGYPTIAN OPERATIONS ORDERS TO MOVE TROOPS TO THE
WEST BANK. THE EGYPTIAN GENERAL ASKED FOR EGYPTIAN FORCES
IN JORDAN ON THE GROUNDS THE IRAQIS WERE TOO SLOW IN ARRIVING.
ORDERS WERE ALSO ISSUED FOR EGYPTIAN COMMANDOS IN JORDAN
TO CAPTURE ISRAELI AIR FIELDS. FURTHER, MORE THAN A FULL
IRAQI DIVISION ARRIVED IN JORLIZZRJHDMTRDAY AND TWO SQUADRONS
OF MIGS FROM IRAQ ARRIVED AT MAFRAQ AND ONE AN H-3.

PRESERVATION COPY

ALSO, ORL

BY

GPST GIVEN FOR FEDEYEEN RAIDS QUOTE WHEN WAR
BEGINS UNQUOTE.

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FRONTIER.

3. AMIT ADDED THAT AFTER HAVING EXERCISED MAXIMUM RESTRAINT,
WHICH IN HIS VIEW MAY HAVE ITSELF ENCOURAGED NASSER IN HIS
PROGRESSION FROM THE MERE SHOW OF FORCE TO WHAT ISRAELIS
ARE NOW CONVINCED IS A MASTER PLAN TO DISMEMBER ISRAEL,
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AGGRESSION ISRAEL WOULD PUNCH ALL THE BUTTONS UNQUOTE.
THIS HE DESCRIBED AS ESSENTIAL FOR SELF-DEFENSE.

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POSSIBILITY OF LEBANESE PARLEY WITH NASSER, INDICATIONS THAT
FAISAL WAS GOING TO CAIRO AND ORDER OF THE DAY FROM THE
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TO FIGHT THE HOLY WAR, AND NASSER'S SPEECH LAST NIGHT AS
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PAGE 4 RUQMVL 3937-~~SECRET~~

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BE UNDER GREAT SOVIET PRESSURE TO SIDE WITH THE ARABS. HOPE-
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MATTERS ON A MORE STABLE BASIS.

5. SPEAKING WITH ENTIRE CANDOR, AMIT SAID THAT US EFFORTS
TO RESTRAIN ISRAEL TO THIS LATE STAGE HAD ASSISTED NASSER AT
LEAST TO SOME EXTENT IN FORGING HIS ENCIRCLEMENT AND
WOULD MAKE ISRAEL'S TASK MUCH MORE DIFFICULT NOW THAN IF
HOSTILITIES HAD OCCURRED EARLIER. AS TO WHAT ISRAEL SEEKS
FROM THE US AT THIS JUNCTURE, HE CONCLUDED THAT ISRAEL DOES
NOT YET WANT SOLDIERS YET REQUESTS THAT IT BE PROVIDED
THE MEANS FOR THE CONFLICT, THAT IS MONEY AND WEAPONS, THAT
THE US ISOLATE THE SOVIETS FROM THE AREA, AND THAT ISRAEL
HAVE CURRENT POLITICAL BACKING.

6. SOME OF THESE LATTER COMMENTS AMIT SAID HE APPRECIATED
WERE IN THE POLITICAL FIELD AND ABOVE HIS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.
HOWEVER, HE STRESSED THAT HIS VIEWS REFLECTED THE UNANIMOUS
OPINION OF THE UNIFORMED ISRAEL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT.

GP-2. BARBOUR
BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~
PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, June 5, 1967
3:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Averell talks to the Shah who:

- is quite steady on oil;
- may not be able to come;
- is in an I-told-you-so mood about Nasser.

Walt
W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4
By 1-8, NARA, Date 4-9-93

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-6
By ing NARA. Date 5-21-92

EXDIS

DEPT PASS AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM HARRIMAN.

(TEHRAN EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR MEYER).

I HAD A LONG TALK ALONE WITH SHAH AT NOON TODAY, INTERRUPTED ONLY BY NEWS DESPATCHES OF ARAB-ISRAEL FIGHTING. I GAVE HIM AFP DESPATCH FROM MOSCOW TO THE EFFECT THAT RUSSIAN POSITION WOULD DEPEND ON THAT TAKEN BY THE US, WHICH HE SAID WAS MOST IMPORTANT.

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 19869 ~~SECRET~~

THE SHAH LISTENED TO MY EXPLANATION OF OUR ATTEMPTS TO RESTRAIN ISRAEL AND ARABS, POSSIBLE SOVIET ENCOURAGEMENT OF DAMASCUS AND CAIRO BELLIGERENCE, BUT OUR BELIEF SOVIETS DID NOT NOW WANT MILITARY ACTION AND THEIR SURPRISE OVER NASSER'S CLOSING OF GULF OF AKEBA. FURTHERMORE, THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED SHAH'S INTEREST WAS TO REMAIN AS ALOOF AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT INTERRUPTION OIL SHIPMENTS AND THAT HE HOPED SHAH WOULD USE HIS INFLUENCE, PARTICULARLY WITH FAISAL. I SAID THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN GETTING THE SHAH'S OPINIONS AND JUDGMENT.

HE REPLIED THAT PERHAPS WE SHOULD NOT TALK ABOUT THE PAST, BUT ONLY THE FUTURE. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE MUST LEARN FROM PAST MISTAKES. HE WENT OVER THE FAMILIAR GROUND OF OUR ASSISTING NASSER, NOT ACCEPTING THE INEVITABILITY OF HIS AGGRESSIVE POLICIES. WE HAD MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO STOP NASSER OVER OTHER ISSUES IN THE PAST, OVER YEMEN, AND SUCH OUTRAGEOUS ACTIONS AS USE OF GAS. NOW THINGS WERE DIFFICULT SINCE ON THE ISSUE OF CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL ALL ARABS WOULD BE UNITED. HIS AMBASSADOR HAD SEEN FAISAL WHO, ALTHOUGH CONCERNED OVER NASSER AND OTHER ISSUES, STATED HE WOULD GIVE FULL SUPPORT TO NASSER AGAINST ISRAEL.

HE REPORTED THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD CALLED ON HIM THIS MORNING. AMBASSADOR STATED THAT HOSTILITIES SHOULD BE STOPPED, AND IN THIS THE FRENCH MIGHT BE USEFUL. SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION SHOULD BE

PAGE 3 RUFNCR 19869 ~~SECRET~~

SOUGHT.

THE SHAH EMPHASIZED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE LONG RANGE PROBLEM WAS HOW TO STOP NASSER IN FUTURE. SOME OTHER ISSUE THAN ISRAEL MUST BE FOUND. ALTHOUGH HE CONTINUED TO CONSIDER NASSER A DANGEROUS AND AGGRESSIVE DICTATOR, INTERESTED ONLY IN HIS AGGRANDIZEMENT, THE SHAH COULD NOT OPPOSE A MOSLEM CAUSE. HE WOULD, THEREFORE, HAVE TO GIVE "LIP SERVICE" SUPPORT, SPECIFICALLY REFERRING TO EARLIER UN RESOLUTIONS. THE SHAH SUGGESTED WE SHOULD GIVE THE IMPRESSION WE WANTED TO STOP THE FIGHTING, BUT IMPLIED THAT HE HOPED NASSER'S FORCES WOULD BE HUMILIATED. HE CONSIDERED OUR LONG RANGE MAJOR OBJECTIVE WAS "HOW NASSER COULD BE DESTROYED".

ALTHOUGH HE LOOKED FORWARD KEENLY TO SEEING THE PRESIDENT IN WASHINGTON, HE FEELS HE PROBABLY MUST RETURN HOME AS HIS PEOPLE WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND HIS TRAVELING IN PARIS AND VISITING THE FAIR IN CANADA.

HE REHEARSED AGAIN, AS HE HAD DONE WHEN I SAW HIM LAST NOVEMBER, HIS BELIEF THAT IRAN MUST BE MILITARILY STRONG ENOUGH TO DEAL WITH NASSER AND IRAQ WITHOUT US INTERVENTION. HE AGAIN EXPRESSED REGRET THAT WE HAD NOT DONE MORE TO STRENGTHEN IRAN MILITARILY, REFERRING PARTICULARLY TO OUR EXTENSIVE AID TO TURKEY.

I OF COURSE WENT OVER THE FAMILIAR GROUND OF TURKEY'S NATO MEMBERSHIP, ETC.

PAGE 4 RUFNCR 19869 ~~SECRET~~

HE SEEMED RELIEVED WHEN I OFFERED TO CALL ON HIM TOMORROW IF THERE WERE ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OF IMPORTANCE, AND WHEN I TOLD HIM THAT I FELT SURE WE WOULD CONTINUE TO CONSULT HIM CLOSELY. HE REPEATED NECESSITY THAT HE MUST GIVE LIP SERVICE TO MOSLEM SOLIDARITY, BUT HIS PRIMARY CONCERN WAS HOW NASSER'S INFLUENCE COULD BE REDUCED AND EVENTUALLY DESTROYED. OTHERWISE, THERE COULD BE NO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE INDICATED THAT CURRENTLY OIL SHIPMENTS WOULD CONTINUE WITHOUT INTERRUPTION AS NORMAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, AND THAT HE WOULD IN OTHER WAYS ATTEMPT TO CALM SITUATION.

PLEASE INSTRUCT IF ANY REASON FOR ME TO SEE SHAH AGAIN TOMORROW MORNING.

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PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 5, 1967
1:20 p. m.

97

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

The point I wished to make this morning -- and passed to Sect. Rusk -- is this: if we are pressed by Israel for spare parts, etc., we should go hard to the Russians on their equivalent supply to the Arabs.

The reason is not merely to give us a bit of flexibility, but also to open up one of the truly critical issues of a Middle East settlement; namely, a long-run U. S. -Soviet agreement on arms sales to the region.

Like everything else, of course, the viability of this approach depends on the situation on the ground in the hours and days ahead.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4
By rip, NARA, Date 4-9-93

Monday, June 11, 1967
11:10 a.m.

78

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Gen. Amit (senior intelligence officer recently here) briefs Harry McPherson and Amb. Barbour.

His key defense of Israel's air attack is consistent with Eshkol's:

-- artillery fire on three Israeli villages;

-- U. S. A. R. air incursions.

Then they "punched all the buttons."
At least that's his story.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

W. W. R.

(Tel Aviv 3937)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 08-16 (#102)
By isl NARA, Date 2-9-09

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~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 3937

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-301

By is, NARA Date 4-24-00

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PAGE 2 RUQMVL 3937 ~~SECRET~~

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PAGE4 RUQMVL 3937 ~~SECRET~~

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GP-2. BARBOUR

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~~SECRET~~
PRESERVATION COPY

Monday June 5, 1967
10:40 a.m.

Pres file

99
1

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a message from Eshkol.

He builds his case mainly on the general environment, but refers to bombardment of three Israel towns as the trigger.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

(Tel Aviv 3935)

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1967 JUN 5 14 19

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~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 3935

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ82-149

By g/lis, NARA, Date 6-4-91

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT
HAS JUST BEEN HANDED ME FOR DELIVERY:

QUOTE DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: AFTER WEEKS IN WHICH OUR
PERIL HAS GROWN DAY BY DAY, WE ARE NOW ENGAGED IN
REPELLING THE AGGRESSION WHICH NASSER HAS BEEN BUILDING UP
AGAINST US. ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE AND INTEGRITY HAVE BEEN
ENDANGERED. THE PROVOCATIVE TROOP CONCENTRATIONS IN SINAI,
NOW AMOUNTING TO FIVE INFANTRY AND TWO ARMORED DIVISIONS: THE
PLACING OF MORE THAN 900 TANKS AGAINST OUR SOUTHERN FRONTIER;
THE MASSING OF 400 TANKS OPPOSITE ELATH WITH THE OBJECT OF
SUNDERING THE SOUTHERN NEGEV FROM ISRAEL; THE ILLEGAL BLOCKADE
IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN; THE INSOLENT DEFIANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
AND MARITIME COMMUNITY; THE POLICY OF STRANGLING ENCIRCLEMENT

PAGE TWO RUQMVL 3935 ~~SECRET~~
OF WHICH THE FIRST STAGE WAS THE INTIMIDATION OF JORDAN
AND THE MOST RECENT -- THE PLACING THERE OF IRAQI TROOPS AND
EGYPTIAN COMMANDO REGIMENTS, THE IMMINENT INTRODUCTION OF
MIG 21 AIRCRAFT UNDER IRAQI COMMAND IN MAFRAQ; NASSER'S
ANNOUNCEMENT OF QUOTE TOTAL WAR AGAINST ISRAEL UNQUOTE
AND OF HIS BASIC AIM TO ANNIHILATE ISRAEL; THE ORDER OF THE DAY
BY THE EGYPTIAN COMMANDER GENERAL MURTAGI CALLING ON HIS
TROOPS IN SINAI TO WAGE A WAR OF DESTRUCTION AGAINST ISRAEL;
THE ACTS OF SABOTAGE AND TERRORISM FROM SYRIA AND GAZA; THE
RECENT AIR ENCROACHMENTS CULMINATING IN THIS MORNING'S
ENGAGEMENTS AND THE BOMBARDMENT BY EGYPT OF KISUFIM,
NAHAL OZ AND TSUR MAON IN ISRAEL TERRITORY -- ALL OF THIS
AMOUNTS TO AN EXTRAORDINARY CATALOGUE OF AGGRESSION,
ABHORRED AND CONDEMNED BY WORLD OPINION AND IN YOUR GREAT
COUNTRY AND AMONGST ALL PEACE LOVING NATIONS.

PRESERVATION COPY

AS YOU KNOW, MR. PRESIDENT, NOTHING EFFECTIVE HAD BE
DONE OR ATTEMPTED BY THE UN AGAINST A RUTHLESS DESIGN TO
DESTROY THE STATE OF ISRAEL WHICH EMBODIES THE MEMORIES,
SACRIFICES AND HOPES OF AN ANCIENT PEOPLE, WHICH IN THIS
GENERATION LOST 6 MISSIONS OF ITS PEOPLE BRUTALLY MURDERED

PAGE THREE RUQMVL 3935 ~~SECRET~~
IN A TRAGEDY WITHOUT PARALELL IN HISTROY.

MR. PRESIDENT, I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE FRIENDSHIP
EXPRESSED IN YOUR LETTERS; FOR YOUR APPRECIATION OF OUR
STEADFASTNESS AND CALM; FOR YOUR POLICY OF PROTECTING THE
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ISRAEL AND OTHER NATIONS; FOR YOUR
UNDERTAKING TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE AMERICAN SUPPORT TO PRESERVE
THE PEACE AND FREEDOM OF ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST; AND FOR
YOUR UNDERTAKING TO PURSUE VIGOROUS MEASURS TO KEEP THE
STRAITS OF TIRAN AND THE GULF OF AQABA OPEN AS AN
INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY TO SHIPS OF ALL NATIONS.

THESE ARE IMPRESSIVE COMMITMENTS. YOUR LETTER MENTIONS
THE OBSTACLES WHICH HAVE SO FAR MADE ACTION DIFFICULT. WE RELY
ON THE COURAGE AND DETERMINATION OF OUR SOLDIERS AND CITIZENS.
INDEED MAXIMUM SELF-RELIANCE IS THE CENTRAL AIM OF OUR NATIONAL
REVIVAL. MY INFORMATION IS THAT OUR DEFENSE IS REAPING SUCCESS.
BUT OUR TRIALS ARE NOT OVER AND WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT OUR
SMALL NATION CAN COUNT ON THE FEALTY AND RESOLUTION OF ITS
GREATEST FRIEND.

WE WEEK NOTHING BUT PEACEFUL LIFE WITHIN OUR TERRITORY, AND
THE EXERCISE OF OUR LEGITIMATE MARTIME RIGHTS.

PAGE FOUR RUQMVL 3935 ~~SECRET~~
I HOPE THAT EVERYTHING WILL BE DONE BY THE UNITED STATES
TO PREVENT THE SOVIET UNION FROM EXPLOITING AND ENLARGING
THE CONFLICT. THE HOUR OF DANGER CAN ALSO BE AN HOUR OF
OPPORTUNITY. IT IS POSIBLE TO CREATE CONDITIONS FAVORABLE
TO THE PROMOTION OF PEACE AND THE STRENGTHENING OF FORCES OF
FREEDOM IN THE AREA.

AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT I SHOULD WELCOME THE CLOSEST
CONSULTATION BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS AT ALL LEVELS.

ISRAEL APPEALS, MR. PRESIDENT, TO YOUR FRIENDSHIP, YOUR
FIDELITY AND YOUR LEADERSHIP. UNQUOTE

P-1. BARBOUR
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PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

NNN

102
Pres file

Monday, June 5, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr. Thomas (News of the World)

You have agreed to meet at 5:30 p.m. today with Mr. Noyes Thomas. He represents London's NEWS OF THE WORLD, which has the world's largest mass circulation. We are informed he will wish to discuss the Middle East situation.

He will be accompanied by Pat Hefernan of REUTERS who submitted the request for the meeting. Pat has been favorable to our policy in Viet-Nam and to our general policy goals and actions.

The meeting is to be off-the-record.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 6-3-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - June 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Textile and Fisheries Negotiations with Mexico

During the past few days we have had successful negotiations with the Mexicans on two important issues: cotton textiles and Gulf shrimp fisheries.

Bilateral Cotton Textile Agreement. After months of hard bargaining, we finally came to an understanding on a ceiling for Mexican cotton imports starting May 1, 1967. The aggregate limit for the first year of the four-year agreement is 75 million yards. This amount will increase by 5% in each of the succeeding three years. The agreed ceiling is well below the import level for the year ending April 1967 (157 million sq. yds.). But Mexico's shipments are falling and so far this year they have been running at about 8 million sq. yds. per month.

The Mexicans would have preferred no limitation, but they recognize that the 75 million ceiling is generous. The agreement is likely to be criticized by both the American and Mexican textile industries but it has elements more favorable to each than they expected to emerge from the protracted negotiations. From the standpoint of the U.S. industry, the most important fact is that imports from Mexico will be under control.

Gulf Shrimp Fisheries. Last year the Mexicans extended their exclusive fishing jurisdiction from 9 to 12 miles. Our Gulf fishermen were most concerned.

We tried unsuccessfully to get the Mexicans to make an exception in their legislation covering fishing by foreigners who have traditionally fished in given areas. The Mexican law did provide, however, that under certain conditions foreign fishermen may continue their traditional fishing activities within the 9-12 mile zone for a five-year period starting in 1968.

The recent exploratory talks with the Mexicans centered on gaining this authority for our fishermen. The Mexican negotiators were receptive but did not have authority to sign an agreement. Negotiations toward this end are expected to start next month.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

156
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jw, NARA, Date 9-24-99

June 5, 1967

Following is Prime Minister Wilson's reply to May 30 message from General Gowon of Nigeria:

Thank you for your message. I deeply sympathize with you in the very difficult situation you now face in Nigeria. I can only hope that even at this late stage it will be possible to solve these problems peacefully.

103
Pres. file

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, June 4, 1967
1:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

More on bombing plus a Russian
getting active in Vientiane as he sees
us hunker down for the long pull.

W. W. Rostow



1.3 (c) (4)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-3
By ing, NARA, Date 11-17-93

WWRostow:rlm

103a

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

Info P 021752Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL: 2084
REC'D: Jun 2, 1967
4:52PM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-301
By , NARA Date 4-24-00

~~SECRET~~ MARIA THREE PARIS 19766

SUBJECT: EFFECT OF US BOMBING ON FRENCH DELEGATION HANOI

NO DIS

QUAI RECEIVED FOLLOWING TELEGRAM DATED MAY 29 FROM HANOI:
BEGIN TRANSLATION: QTE: I CALLED ON DIRECTOR OF PROTOCOL MAY 26
IN ORDER TO KNOW THE REACTIONS AND PLANS OF THE MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER THE BOMBINGS OF HANOI. PART OF THIS CONVER-
SATION TOOK PLACE IN AN UNDERGROUND SHELTER SINCE AN ALERT WAS
SOUNDED AT THAT MOMENT.

MR. TRONG-NHU SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICAN AIR
FORCE WOULD RETURN SOONER OR LATER TO BOMB THE ELECTRIC POWER
STATION AND TO ATTACK OTHER TARGETS. HE ALSO FORESAW THE POS-
SIBILITY OF A SYSTEMATIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE CAPITAL TAKING
FOR TARGET THE RESIDENTIAL SECTIONS ONE AFTER ANOTHER.
HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT WILL REMAIN WHATEVER HAPPENS IN HANOI. THE
EVACUATION PLAN TOWARD THE UPPER OR CENTRAL REGION, WHICH AT ONE
POINT HAD BEEN REVEALED TO MR. DE QUIRIELLE, HAS BEEN CANCELED.
I NOTED, MOREOVER, THAT NEW SHELTERS ARE BEING BUILT IN THE GARDEN
OF THE MINISTRY. WHILE REPEATING THAT THE DRVN WILL NEVER YIELD
TO FORCE AND AT THE END WILL VANQUISH, MR. NHU FRANKLY RECOGNIZED
THE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF THE US. HE APPEARS TO EXPECT A PROGRES-
SIVELY MORE DIFFICULT STRUGGLE WHOSE DURATION NOBODY CAN FORSEE,
AND IN WHICH HANOI WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PAY THE PRICE. HE PROMISED
TO HELP THE DELEGATION AS ALL OTHER MISSIONS IN CASE OF A SERIOUS
CRISIS AND PARTICULARLY IF A FOOD SHORTAGE SHOULD TAKE PLACE. HE
ASSURED ME THAT A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF ELECTRIC CURRENT WOULD REMAIN
AVAILABLE IN CASE OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE POWER STATIONS.
HE IS LESS OPTIMISTIC AS FAR AS WATER IS CONCERNED AND HE LIMITED
HIMSELF TO ADVISING ME TO HAVE A WELL DUG WITHIN THE COMPOUND
OF THE DELEGATION.

I AM TAKING STEPS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS ADVISE BUT IT IS APPARENT
THAT THE MEMBERS OF THIS MISSION, ONCE DEPRIVED OF ELECTRICITY,
COULD NOT LIVE THIS WAY IN A CLIMATE OF 40 DEGREES CENTIGRADE.
UNQUOTE. END TRANSLATION.

BOHLEN
BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

1030

#6

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

PP RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 19767 1531320
ZNY SSSSS
P 021753Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL: 2986
RECD: JUNE 2, 1967
5:43 PM

~~SECRET~~ MARIA THREE PARIS 19767

SUBJ: US BOMBING HANOI MAY 27.

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-301
By *id*, NARA Date 4-24-00

QUAI RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE DATED MAY 29 FROM HANOI:

QTE-BEGIN TRANSLATION:

ALTHOUGH THE CITY PROPER WAS NOT BOMBED, HANOI EXPERIENCED ON MAY 27 A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT DAY. THE FIRST ALERT OCCURRED AROUND 8 O'CLOCK AND THE SECOND AROUND 10 O'CLOCK. THE ELECTRIC CURRENT WAS THEN CUT FOR HALF AN HOUR. A THIRD ALERT TOOK PLACE AT 11 O'CLOCK. THE FOURTH ALERT, WHICH TOOK PLACE AROUND NOON, WAS SHORT

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 19767 ~~SECRET~~ MARIA THREE

AND NOISY. THE SUBURBS TO THE NORTH AND WEST WERE BOMBED. ONE SAW SMOKE RISING IN THESE TWO DIRECTIONS. THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS RE-ACTED BY DENSE FIRING BUT WITHOUT HITTING A SINGLE PLANE. FIFTH ALERT WAS GIVEN AROUND 2:30 PM, THE SIXTH AT 4PM COINCIDED WITH A CUT IN ELECTRICITY. FINALLY WITHOUT ANY APPARENT REASON THE CURRENT WAS CUT FOR A THIRD TIME BETWEEN 7 AND 8 IN THE EVENING. THESE SUCCESSIVE CUTS IN ELECTRICITY SHOW THAT THE VIETNAMESE BEGIN TO EXPERIENCE DIFFICULTIES IN SUPPLYING CURRENT TO THE CAPITAL. THE AMERICANS ANNOUNCED THAT THE DAY BEFORE THEY ATTACKED THREE POWER STATIONS. THIS FACT APPEARS TO CONFIRM THE THESIS THAT THE AMERICAN AIR FORCE HAS UNDERTAKEN, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION OF POWER STATIONS. UNQTE END TRANSLATION.

CP-1 BOHLEN

BT

~~SECRET~~

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY 103C
IN 81184

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO
DD/I EXO

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM / CONTROLLED DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT; NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

031628 Z

CITE

3.4(b)(1)

DIST 3 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM
DOI 29 APRIL TO 22 MAY 1967
SUBJECT CASUALTIES AND RESULTS OF BOMB DAMAGE IN AND NEAR HANOI

ACQ

SOURCE

3.4(b)(1)

1. (SUMMARY: DURING THE 19 MAY BOMBING, DAMAGE TO BOTH THE KOREAN AND RUMANIAN EMBASSIES WAS REPORTED. IT IS RUMORED THAT 200 CASUALTIES WERE SUFFERED DURING THE BOMBINGS IN HANOI. IT IS ALSO RUMORED IN HANOI THAT A NUMBER OF SCHOOLS REESTABLISHED IN THE DONG AN AREA INCURRED DAMAGES. THE BOMB DAMAGE IS REPAIRED BY GROUPS OF CIVILIANS, BOTH MEN AND WOMEN, WORKING TOGETHER.)

2. DURING THE 19 MAY BOMBING THE PAVEMENT IN FRONT OF THE KOREAN EMBASSY (APPROXIMATELY WJ874254) ON TRAN PHU STREET WAS DAMAGED. A WIDELY ACCEPTED RUMOR IN HANOI IS THAT A VIETNAMESE WAS DECAPITATED ON THAT DATE IN A SIDEWALK BOMB-SHELTER LOCATED IN FRONT OF THE KOREAN

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM / CONTROLLED DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-247
By 3j NARA, Date 9-10-01

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM / CONTROLLED DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD

(classification)

(dissem controls)

EMBASSY. THE KOREANS THEMSELVES HAVE REPORTED THE BOMB DAMAGE TO THEIR ECONOMIC MISSION ON CAO BA QUAT STREET. [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

3. THE RUMANIAN DIPLOMATS HAVE ALSO REPORTED DAMAGE TO THEIR EMBASSY LOCATED ON TRAN PHU STREET NEAR THE KOREAN EMBASSY, RESULTING FROM THE THREE BOMBINGS OF HANOI. [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

3.4(b)(1)

4. [REDACTED]

IT

IS RUMORED THAT 200 CASUALTIES WERE SUFFERED IN THE 19 TO 22 MAY BOMBINGS. (SOURCE COMMENT: IF THE RUMOR IS TRUE, IT IS CURIOUS THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT OFFICIALLY REPORTED THESE FIGURES.)

5. ANOTHER RUMOR CIRCULATING AMONG VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS IN HANOI IS THAT A NUMBER OF SCHOOLS WHICH WERE EVACUATED FROM HANOI AND REESTABLISHED IN THE DONG AN AREA (PROBABLY AT APPROXIMATELY WJ87335) HAVE ALSO BEEN DAMAGED BY THE BOMBING.

6. THE ATTACK ON THE GIA LAM RAILROAD WORKSHOPS (AT APPROXIMATELY WJ918277) DURING 29 APRIL TO 2 MAY WAS A FINE EXAMPLE OF PIN-POINT BOMBING. THE WORKSHOP AREA WAS LEVELLED WITH NO DAMAGE TO SURROUNDING BUILDINGS. ONE LOCOMOTIVE WAS BLOWN OUT OF THE RAILWAY YARD AND

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3.4(b)(1)

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

3.4(b)(1) DEPOSITED ACROSS THE ROAD. [REDACTED]

7. THE BOMB DAMAGE IN HANOI IS REPAIRED BY GROUPS OF CIVILIANS WORKING TOGETHER. SOMETIMES THESE GROUPS INCLUDE BOTH MEN AND WOMEN, AND SOMETIMES THE GROUPS ARE DIVIDED GROUPS OF YOUNG TO MIDDLE-AGED MEN DRESSED IN A TYPE OF UNIFORM COMPRISING TOPEE AND TAN SHIRTS AND TROUSERS HAVE BEEN OBSERVED WORKING AS UNITS REPAIRING THE BOMB DAMAGE. (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS NOT KNOWN TO WHAT, IF ANY, ORGANIZATION THEY BELONG. THE MANNER OF MOBILIZING SUCH REPAIR PERSONNEL IS NOT KNOWN, HOWEVER, IT IS BELIEVED THAT THESE PEOPLE ARE PAID FOR THEIR WORK SINCE IT WOULD BE HIGHLY ATYPICAL FOR THEM TO WORK ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS.)

3.4(b)(1) 8. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, J-2) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL MOMYER) CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP AND POLAD)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

GROUP 1

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Vientiane 7477, June 2, 1967

103
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-6
By ing NARA, Date 5-21-92

1. Soviet Ambassador Kirnassovsky, who has been rather passive until recently, suddenly seems to have opened a local "peace offensive." Since he is a well disciplined professional, it must be assumed that he is acting under instructions from Moscow.
2. Within the past few days, he has called on Finance Minister Sisoul Na Champassak to express his views (this is first call he has even made on Sisoul): He has spoken at length to the Indian Ambassador and to the British Ambassador. Last evening, he opened up on me. It is perhaps not without interest that he did this in the presence of the Indian International Control Commission Chairman.
3. The thrust of his presentation had only indirectly to do with Laos. It was mostly directed to the question of Vietnam. The essence was that the Soviets had genuine assurances from Hanoi that latter would respond positively if we stopped bombing. We passed up a golden opportunity when we "failed to follow up" Kosygin's discussions with Wilson and Brown in London. However, now, "Americans" were talking of no new possibilities with Hanoi, of "escalating and pacifying," and waiting until we had a military advantage before trying any new moves towards negotiation.
4. This, Kirnassovsky insisted, was a mistake, Hanoi was still available and amenable. We had only to "return to Kosygin initiative" in order to find Hanoi responsive. While it might be true that China had a certain negative influence in Hanoi, this would not affect the positive disposition of Hanoi leaders to begin political negotiations. We should "suspend" (this was word he used) bombing and we would soon see results.
5. I am unable to judge whether Kirnassovsky is operating in context broad instructions received by all Soviet representatives or whether he has some specific instructions for execution here in Vientiane. It may be that party line has been fixed (perhaps rinned in association with mid-East crisis) and that Department is receiving similar indications of Soviet activity from all quarters. If so, I would appreciate analysis and guidance.
6. If, on the other hand, this Soviet activity is localized here in Vientiane, it would seem worthwhile for me to explore it a bit. Our conversation last evening was left on such a note that I could ask Kirnassovsky for an appointment to get greater detail. I could do this on Department instruction or "on my own initiative," whichever seems preferable, or, I could merely let it all pass for the time being and watch for further developments.
7. Please instruct.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SULLIVAN

SECRET

Sunday, June 4, 1967 -- 1:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

1. Herewith a letter McGeorge Bundy is considering sending to the New York Times if you think it wise and helpful.
2. I spoke to Sec. Rusk and he will get Nick Katzenbach aboard, also Macomber.
3. Sec. Rusk saw Bob Anderson for two hours. It turns out his cable was an extremely accurate and sensitive summary of his interview.
4. Also attached is my proposal which I am making available to Sec. Rusk (and Amb. Goldberg) and Sec. McNamara.

I have marked in yellow the critical elements in the proposal.

5.

SANITIZED

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 6-10-91

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 72-4
By ing, NARA, Date 4-9-93

104 a

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, June 4, 1967 -- 11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

The purpose of this memorandum is to lay out a course of action for the coming week (or two weeks) which will maximize the chance that we can: (1) achieve our objectives in the Middle East without an Arab-Israeli war; and (2) should such an Arab-Israeli war come about, produce minimum damage to the U. S. position in the world and to our position in our own country, including continued support for the war in Viet Nam.

I. The Situation.

It is now increasingly clear that the Israelis will wait only about a week to take on themselves the forcing of the blockade at the Gulf of Aqaba. They clearly envisage forcing Nasser to fire the first shot; they will respond on a limited basis in Sinai but be prepared to fight a war against all the Arab forces arrayed against them without external assistance in manpower or other direct application of foreign military force.

The plan for an international regatta to force, say, an oil ship through the Straits is unlikely to get operational support except for four countries: the U. S., the U. K., Australia, and Netherlands.

The moderate Arabs -- and, in fact, virtually all Arabs who fear the rise of Nasser as a result of this crisis -- would prefer to have him cut down by the Israelis rather than by external forces.

Beyond these factors the situation in the Middle East is that the radical nationalism represented by Nasser, while powerful at the moment in the wake of his breakthrough against U Thant, is waning: Arab socialism and other such doctrines have not proved successful; the moderates of the region (Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon) have done better than Egypt, Syria, and Iraq; Nasser's plans for external expansion have not gone well; in short, we are dealing with Nasser not on a rising trend but in somewhat the same as Khrushchev in the Cuba missile crisis; Nasser is trying to achieve a quick fix against an underlying waning position.

Just beneath the surface is the potentiality for a new phase in the Middle East of moderation; a focusing on economic development; regional collaboration; and an acceptance of Israel as part of the Middle East if a solution to the refugee problem can be found. But all this depends on Nasser's being cut down to size.

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-2-

The problem before us is whether this crisis can be surmounted in ways which lead on to that historical transition and which avoid: the destruction of Israel, on the one hand, or the crystallization of a bloc unified only by a hostility to Israel, which would require us to maintain Israel as a kind of Hong Kong enclave in the region.

II. The Israeli Case for Unilateral Action.

The Israelis believe that their long-run future in the area -- including the Arab mentality -- requires that they solve the problem before them on their own. They wish in the end to be part of the Middle East. They feel that dealing with this situation on their own is necessary to achieve not merely self-respect but respect in the region.

They believe taking on the blockade themselves will make it easier for the United States to support them in other ways, short of troops. They believe it easier for the U. S. to honor its commitment of 1957 to recognize the legitimacy of their forcing the blockade than to mobilize on an international basis an effective U. S. and international commitment to use force to break the blockade. Their own diplomatic soundings, like ours, make clear how small the party would be prepared to use force to assert the international interests in the Gulf of Aqaba, including Israeli interests.

They perceive that the USSR is less likely to intervene with military force if they take on Nasser than for U. S. and a few friends to take on Nasser on the Aqaba issue; and they judge it would be better for U. S. - Arab relations in the long run, but also in terms of Western interests in Middle Eastern oil.

III. The Moderate Arab View.

Although there is some conflict of judgment, the bulk of the evidence before us indicates that the moderate Arab view -- as well as the view among our Ambassadors to the Arab world -- is that it would be wiser for the Israelis to deal with the present situation than it would be for us.

IV. The U. S. Interest and Our Task.

-- To open the Gulf of Aqaba to at least oil for Israel -- which has become the test of who wins this trial of will and nerve -- without war if possible.

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-3-

-- To do so in ways which maximize the chance of long-run peace in the area, including movement towards acceptance of Israel as part of the Middle East.

-- In any case, to honor all commitments made in 1957 -- even, if, in the end, an Arab-Israeli war comes about; that is, our commitment to put through a U. S. flagship; to assert the right of free passage for others; and to regard Israeli counteraction to a UAR attempt to close Aqaba by armed force as involving for Israel legitimate rights of self-defense under the UN Charter.

-- To act, in general, in such a way as to unify the political base in the U. S. around our Middle East policy so that we do not weaken the political foundations for our further conduct of the war in Viet Nam.

V. A Possible Scenario.

Here are the main elements in a scenario and their sequence -- required to achieve these objectives.

-- First, we must urgently make it clear to Nasser -- which has not yet been made clear -- that we intend to honor our 1957 commitments. His letter to you completely ignores what happened in 1957. He must be reminded that we undertook our commitments in order to get the Israelis off his neck; and it is a matter of honor and continuity of the American word that these commitments be honored. (In this context, a statement by General Eisenhower, and perhaps even a special visit to Cairo by Cabot Lodge, -- who was personally and directly involved in those events -- may be important, as well as our conversations with Mohieddin and your reply to Nasser's letter.)

In making this point clear, we must also present to him a willingness to move forward with other critical issues in the area where progress is required, if, indeed, the region is to settle down and move towards peace and stability, including: the placement of UN observers on both sides of the borders; Arab refugees; regional economic development; water; and the damping down of the arms race. There is considerable legitimate argument as to whether Nasser is now postured as a Hitler, determined at all costs to exploit temporary Arab unity to crush Israel once and for all, or whether he is a shrewd operator, working off a weak base, willing to settle for as much as he can get from this crisis. If the latter is the case, a package deal of this kind is the best way to smoke him out. If he wants war, the Israelis and we will be in much better shape if we have laid the deal before the world.

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-4-

-- In any case, so far as U. S. public opinion is concerned, opinion in the Middle East, and opinion in the world, we must quickly produce a posture in which the hard-core issue of oil through Aqaba is diluted by the evocation of a larger, more attractive, and more basic objective; namely, to begin to transform the Middle East from its present dangerous, unstable situation into one in which there is the possibility, at least, of movement forwards toward cooperation, development and acceptance of Israel as part of the region.

-- By the time we have transmitted this offer to Nasser, we would also have been able to take stock of the response to the declaration of innocent passage through Aqaba and have some feel for how many countries are willing to escort vessels going through the Gulf to Eilat. The stage would then be set for going to Congress and asking for a resolution. (About, say, Thursday of the coming week.)

-- The resolution for which we would ask in this scenario would have these characteristics: It would recall and state the three 1957 commitments; it would empower us to use force, if necessary, to support the transit of Aqaba by U. S. flagships and those of other nations, except Israel; it would recognize the government of Israel's expressed desire that it handle the question of its own flagships with its own force; but it would recognize that if the transit of such ships was met by armed force, the Israelis had the right of self-defense. The resolution would call for all parties to permit transit of the Gulf on the basis of the situation between 1957 and the present crisis; and it would appeal for movement forward with respect to peace in the area, including action on UN observers, refugees, development, the regional arms race, etc.

-- Behind the scene we would be working for an Aqaba formula in which the oil flow would continue to Eilat; the Israelis would maintain their claim to put flagships through, but not exercise it; the UAR would ignore the fishing trawlers that go in and out of the Gulf; the International Court of Justice would take over the legal controversy involved; the forces in Sinai would demobilize; and, in this interval, we would try to get the Middle East and the world community to go to work on UN observers; refugees; development; etc. (With that kind of resolution and an explicit understanding that we would recognize Israeli rights of self-defense if their vessels were stopped by armed force, it might be possible to hold the Israelis for another week; that is, from Sunday, June 11 (roughly their present D-day) to the 18th of June. In that interval we would have to do two things:

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-5-

bring maximum pressure to bear to get a diplomatic settlement, including maximum pressure on Moscow; and organize a forcing of the blockade in terms of something like the following sequence, designed to fulfill the three U.S. commitments.

-- A U.S. vessel goes through with escort, bearing a civilian non-strategic cargo; although it might contain oil. On present evidence, that vessel would not be fired on, although if it contained oil it might be contested.

-- A non-U.S. flagship (either Israeli-owned or not) would go through with a civil cargo, backed by whomever the naval powers turn out to be;

-- Then, finally, an Israeli vessel would go through and the issue would be put squarely to Nasser to whether he would fire upon it, our having made it clear that we regard Israeli rights of self-defense as legitimate, if armed force were used to stop it; but the background to such Israelis forcing action would be a known formula that if oil were permitted to flow to Eilat, the Israelis were willing to have the whole matter put to the International Court of Justice.

VI. There are several gut questions unresolved in this proposed scenario, among them these:

-- Timing and the Israeli tactical military situation. As we now know, they would prefer to go directly to the test of the Israeli flag, and, in effect, have us stand down on our other commitments, except, of course, our commitment to regard their case as legitimate. Another reason they may wish this to have some element of control over the time which Nasser faces this showdown. If the objective of the exercise is a situation where we achieve oil to Eilat without a war, marching down quite openly to the sequence described above, is a superior scenario. It would also relieve us of a most dangerous problem; namely, of our knowing Israeli plans but holding them secret as did the British and French at the time of Suez, with all the consequent ugly debate and controversy which continued down to the present day. Our interest, and, in fact, the Israeli interest is to do this job like the sheriff in High Noon, rather than through tactical surprise and quiet secret understandings between Tel Aviv and Washington.

-- If we regard the transit of oil as the gut issue here, when should oil be brought in and under whose flag? On this I have no firm judgment but suspect the best auspices would be the most natural situation:

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-6-

a foreign flag backed by the escorting party. But there is some virtue in our taking oil in -- preferably not Iranian oil with the U. S. flag flying.

-- What, precisely, is the formula for Aqaba that Israel would accept? Is it prepared to accept a situation where oil goes through while the issue is taken to the International Court of Justice; trawlers go through with Israeli flag de facto; but, while reserving their legal rights to put Israeli flags through, they do not test that right until the International Court of Justice rules? My inclination would be to use maximum leverage with the Israelis to accept such a deal if Nasser accepts it, demobilizes his forces in Sinai, and accepts the agenda of UN observers; some progress on refugees; development; arms race talks; etc.

VII. USSR.

In the end, whether the outcome is an Arab-Israeli war or a successful transit of the crisis depends a good deal on the USSR. If we move in the way I have indicated, I am moderately optimistic that they will, in the clutch, throw considerable weight on Cairo to accept a pragmatic deal for the following reasons:

-- They would not like to see U. S. and other naval powers actually exercised to force the Gulf of Aqaba for non-Israeli ships.

-- I believe they honestly fear an Arab-Israeli war because they still believe that the Israelis will win it. If they win it after more than 10 years of pouring Soviet arms into the Middle East, the whole Soviet arms game will be profoundly degraded. It has already been substantially degraded by the outcome in Indonesia. If their military men calculate, like ours, that, at considerable cost in blood, the Israelis could now beat the Arabs armed with Soviet MIG-21s and Soviet tanks, they would do a good deal to avoid that demonstration. On reflection, I suspect this factor has played a big role in their anxiety about the Israelis launching an attack.

-- Finally, they have carefully not committed themselves on the question of Aqaba and left it open for them, in the end, to play a kind of Tashkent role.

Therefore, if we move down this track and assert through the Congress our willingness to back our play on all three 1957 commitments, my hunch is that they will move rather fast to come up with their own kind of formula to avoid the war and try to portray their role as frustrating the designs of American imperialists and Israeli lackeys. If it all ends up with oil going to Ellat, the forces demobilized, UN observers, talk about refugees, development, etc., that would be quite okay with us.

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

104/15

Sunday, June 4, 1967

I regret that I must take exception to the letter of my former colleague James Thomson, which appeared in Sunday's New York Times.

I brought Mr. Thomson to the NSC staff with the precise purpose of having available the comments of a qualified student of China whose general cast of mind toward Asia was not my own. This purpose was fulfilled, and Mr. Thomson, like other members of the staff, enjoyed full freedom of expression within the premise that his advice -- like that of all the rest of us -- was for internal use only. Now he writes that other and better courses were available in those years, but he does not say what they were nor does he discuss what their consequences would have been. Thus, in effect, Mr. Thomson has used the authority of his former position to make sweeping assertions which he does not back by a shred of evidence.

Mr. Thomson is a man of honor, and I know he would not have taken so strange a course if he were not driven by a deep concern for the welfare of his country. What he fears, as his letter says, is that we may be on a collision course with Red China. This is a proper concern, and in my own experience, it is one which ~~were~~ all senior members of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations have kept constantly in mind. Mr. Thomson used to write me memoranda about this concern when we both were in Washington. His tendency then -- as tested by events -- was to overestimate the likelihood of such a collision and to underestimate the good sense of others in the Administration. While his memoranda were always

intelligent and useful, his estimates of both Chinese and American behavior were consistently too gloomy. I believe that he is still making the same error, and I am sorry that his fears have driven him to write a letter which requires this comment from a friend and former colleague.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~


Saturday, June 3, 1967
6:10 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You may be interested in this report that the Soviet Union is trying to "cool off" the detente -- and the reasons suggested for this shift.

W. W. Rostow



1.3 (a) (4)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-3
By lip, NARA, Date 11-17-93

106

Saturday, June 3, 1967
2:55 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

[REDACTED]
this is worth reading.

1.3 (a) (4)

[REDACTED]

1.3 (a) (4)

Having advocated the bombing of electric power, I am extremely conscious that my duty is to lean over backwards not to over-estimate the effects. Nevertheless, I have a feeling we have shaken them in Hanoi in a way they have never been shaken before.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

[REDACTED]

1.3
(a) (4)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-3
By rip, NARA, Date 11-17-93

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, June 3, 1967
2:50 p. m.

107

MR. PRESIDENT:

I gathered you wanted to read this once more before it is dispatched by cable, as well as pouched. It may be urgent that we put this letter on record soon.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 128, NARA, Date 6-3-91

SECRET

June 3, 1967

1072

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am grateful for your letter of May 30. I appreciate particularly the steadfastness with which the Government and people of Israel have maintained a posture of resolution and calm in a situation of grave tension. All of us understand how fateful the steps we take may be. I hope we can continue to move firmly and calmly toward a satisfactory solution.

Our position in this crisis rests on two principles which are vital national interests of the United States. The first is that we support the territorial integrity and political independence of all of the countries of the Middle East. This principle has now been affirmed by four American Presidents. The second is our defense of the basic interest of the entire world community in the freedom of the seas. As a leading maritime nation, we have a vital interest in upholding freedom of the seas, and the right of passage through straits of an international character.

As you know, the United States considers the Gulf of Aqaba to be an international waterway and believes that the entire international maritime community has a substantial interest in assuring that the right of passage through the Strait of Tiran and Gulf is maintained.

I am sure that Foreign Minister Eban has reported to you the written statement which I had prepared and from which Ambassador Harman made notes during our meeting of May 26. The full text of that statement is as follows:

"The United States has its own constitutional processes which are basic to its action on matters involving war and peace. The Secretary General has not yet reported to the UN Security Council and the Council has not yet demonstrated what it may or may not be able or willing to do although the United States will press for prompt action in the UN.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Ltr 2-22-82 (NLJ 82-71)
By g/dch, NARA, Date 6-4-91

"I have already publicly stated this week our views on the safety of Israel and on the Strait of Tiran. Regarding the Strait, we plan to pursue vigorously the measures which can be taken by maritime nations to assure that the Strait and Gulf remain open to free and innocent passage of the vessels of all nations.

"I must emphasize the necessity for Israel not to make itself responsible for the initiation of hostilities. Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone. We cannot imagine that it will make this decision."

I explained to Mr. Eban that I want to protect the territorial integrity of Israel and other nations in that area of the world and will provide as effective American support as possible to preserve the peace and freedom of your nation and of the area. I stressed too the need to act in concert with other nations, particularly those with strong maritime interests. As you will understand and as I explained to Mr. Eban, it would be unwise as well as most unproductive for me to act without the full consultation and backing of Congress. We are now in the process of urgently consulting the leaders of our Congress and counseling with its membership.

We are now engaged in doing everything we can through the United Nations. We recognize the difficulties of securing constructive action in the Security Council, but we are convinced that the world organization, which for the past decade has played a major role in the Middle East, must make a real effort to discharge its responsibilities for the maintenance of peace.

We are moving ahead in our diplomatic efforts, in concert with the United Kingdom and with your diplomatic representatives, to secure a declaration by the principal maritime powers asserting the right of passage through the Strait and Gulf. A copy of this declaration has been given to your Ambassador. Such a declaration could be an important step both in relation to the proceedings in the Security Council and also in the event those proceedings do not lead to a successful outcome.

~~SECRET~~

-3-

We are also exploring on an urgent basis the British suggestion for the establishment of an international naval presence in the area of the Strait of Tiran. As I said to Mr. Eban, there is doubt that a number of other maritime powers would be willing to take steps of this nature unless and until United Nations processes have been exhausted. We must continue our efforts to mobilize international support for this effort. Our leadership is unanimous that the United States should not move in isolation.

On the matter of liaison and communication, I believe our relations can be improved. We have completely and fully exchanged views with General Amlt.

We will remain in continuing communication with Ambassador Harman and Minister Evron here in Washington and value greatly the exchanges we are able to have through them with the Government of Israel, as well as through Ambassador Barbour in Tel Aviv.

Sincerely,

15/

His Excellency
Levi Eshkol
Prime Minister of Israel

LBJ:State: WWR:HHS:mz

~~SECRET~~

-3-

107b

We are also exploring on an urgent basis the British suggestion for the establishment of an international naval presence in the area of the Strait of Tiran. As I said to Mr. Eban, there is doubt that a number of other maritime powers would be willing to take steps of this nature unless and until United Nations processes have been exhausted.

We must continue our efforts to mobilize international support for this effort. ^{our leadership is unanimous that} I would not wish the United States ^{should not} to move in isolation.

On the matter of liaison, ^{and communication} [redacted]

respective intelligence agencies. That relationship should include the exchange of information and the joint examination of the evolving situation throughout the Middle East.

I should add that ^{I will} we remain in continuing communication with Ambassador Harman and Minister Evron here in Washington and value greatly the exchanges we are able to have through them with the Government of Israel, as well as through Ambassador Barbour in Tel Aviv.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Levi Eshkol
Prime Minister of Israel

LBJ:State:WWR:ms

I believe our relations can be improved.
Gen. Ainit

I believe our relations can be improved. We have completely and fully exchanged views with General Ainit.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 11-82

By isl NARA, Date 6-3-11

"I have already publicly stated this week our views on the safety of Israel and on the Strait of Tiran. Regarding the Strait, we plan to pursue vigorously the measures which can be taken by maritime nations to assure that the Strait and Gulf remain open to free and innocent passage of the vessels of all nations.

"I must emphasize the necessity for Israel not to make itself responsible for the initiation of hostilities. Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone.

We cannot imagine that it will make this decision."

explained to That I want to protect the territorial integrity of Israel and other nations in that area of the world and will provide as effective American support as possible to preserve the peace and freedom of your nation and of that area.

I told Mr. Eban *I could not foresee then, and I cannot now foresee, the specific steps which may prove desirable and necessary. I explained that I want to do everything I can to provide Israel with effective American support.* I stressed too the need to act in concert with other nations, particularly those with strong maritime interests. *And, as you will understand, I cannot act at all without full backing of Congress.*

and as I explained to Mr. Eban, it would be unwise as well as most unproductive for me to act without the full consultation and backing of Congress.

we are I am now in the process of urgently consulting the leaders of our Congress *and* *consulting with its membership.*

We are now engaged in doing everything we can through the United Nations. We recognize the difficulties of securing constructive action in the Security Council, but we are convinced that the world organization, which for the past decade has played a major role in the Middle East, must make a real effort to discharge its responsibilities for the maintenance of peace.

We are moving ahead in our diplomatic efforts, in concert with the United Kingdom and with your diplomatic representatives, to secure a declaration by the principal maritime powers asserting the right of passage through the Strait and Gulf. A copy of this declaration has been given to your Ambassador. Such a declaration could be an important step both in relation to the proceedings in the Security Council and also in the event those proceedings do not lead to a successful outcome.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, June 3, 1967
9:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

I gather you inquired last night about the Russian ship, TURKESTAN.

Sec. McNamara and Gen. Wheeler are now convinced that what happened is accurately described in this message.

McNamara plans to have a full briefing this morning, on the basis of this message, in the Pentagon. State will handle the Soviet end of it.

For what it is worth, I also find this a persuasive account of what happened.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4
By ing, NARA, Date 4-9-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

cy Sent to Mr Rastow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-5

JUN 2 23 25 '67

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0 By ju, NARA, Date 5-15-92

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~~TOP SECRET~~

+10

FOR GEN MEYER. FOLLOWING MESSAGE BEING TRANSMITTED GENSER CHANNELS:

TURKESTAN INCIDENT (U)

1. TWO FLIGHTS F-105 STRUCK IN THE AREA OF CAM PHA, KINGFISH AND TESTER FLIGHTS. KINGFISH FLIGHT EXPENDED 6 MARK 82S ON AN AUTHORIZED LOC AT 0837Z, COORDINATES 21 DEG 03 MIN N, 107 DEG 21 MIN E ON ROUTE NO. 18. SHIP WAS SEEN BY KINGFISH FLIGHT AND FLIGHT WAS CAUTIONED TO AVOID ATTACKING IT. THERE WAS NO STRAFING BY KINGFISH FLIGHT. BOMBS WERE SEEN VISUALLY IMPACTING ON ROAD SEGMENT BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE FLIGHT.

2. TESTER FLIGHT, AN IRON HAND FLIGHT, WAS THE ONLY OTHER FLIGHT WHICH EXPENDED ORDNANCE IN THE AREA. IT ATTACKED AN 85MM SITE FLAK LOCATED AT 21 DEG 04 MIN N, 107 DEG 21:30 MIN E AT 0847Z WITH 12 MK 82S AND 4 CBU-243. KA 71 FILM CONFIRMS CBU ORDNANCE DETONATING ON FLAK SITES WITH NO DETONATIONS NEAR SHIP. SHIP WAS APPROXIMATELY 3 MILES FROM THE FLAK SITE. TESTER FLIGHT DID NOT ENGAGE IN STRAFING RUNS.

3. BOTH STRIKE FLIGHTS AND OTHER FLIGHTS TRANSITING THE AREA REPORTED INTENSE 37/57/85MM FLAK. THE CAPTAIN OF THE TURKESTAN REPORTS AT 0840 THAT HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY STRAFING AIRCRAFT. IN ALL PROBABILITY, DAMAGE INFLICTED ON SOVIET SHIP AND THE ALLEGED CASUALTIES WERE CAUSED BY DEBRIS FROM THE HEAVY FLAK WHICH WAS BEING FIRED AT U. S. AIRCRAFT THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE PERIOD 0835-0850.

4. TESTER FLIGHT IN ATTACKING FLAK SITE MADE IT PASSES OVER OR NEAR THE SHIP. THEY WERE NO LOWER THAN 9,000 FEET WHEN PASSING OVER THE SHIP.

5. THE CAPTAIN OF THE TURKESTAN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HIS SHIP WAS STRAFED, NOT "BOMBED," AND INDICATED HE HAD BEEN FIRED ON BY HIGH CALIBRE MACHINE GUNS. THE TWO FLIGHTS, KINGFISH AND TESTER, AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, MADE NO STRAFING RUNS. THUS, IT APPEARS THAT THE CASUALTIES SUFFERED ON THE TURKESTAN WERE A RESULT OF THE VERY INTENSE ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE THAT WAS TAKING PLACE DURING THE GENERAL TIME FRAME OF 0835-0850.

6. TG 77.0 021538Z AND 021640Z INDICATED CINCPACFLT FORCES NOT INVOLVED. THIS CONSTITUTES FINAL REPORT.
GP-3

109

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 3, 1967

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am grateful for your letter of May 30. I appreciate particularly the steadfastness with which the Government and people of Israel have maintained a posture of resolution and calm in a situation of grave tension. All of us understand how fateful the steps we take may be. I hope we can continue to move firmly and calmly toward a satisfactory solution.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 2-2282 (NLJ 82-71)

By rg/dd, NARA, Date 6-4-91

"I have already publicly stated this week our views on the safety of Israel and on the Strait of Tiran. Regarding the Strait, we plan to pursue vigorously the measures which can be taken by maritime nations to assure that the Strait and Gulf remain open to free and innocent passage of the vessels of all nations.

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~~SECRET~~

-3-

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On the matter of liaison and communication, I believe our relations can be improved. We have completely and fully exchanged views with General Amit.

We will remain in continuing communication with Ambassador Harman and Minister Evron here in Washington and value greatly the exchanges we are able to have through them with the Government of Israel, as well as through Ambassador Barbour in Tel Aviv.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Lyndon B. Johnson", written in a cursive style.

His Excellency
Levi Eshkol
Prime Minister of Israel

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

110
Pres file

CONFIDENTIAL

June 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Security Council Meeting

In a three-and-a-half hour meeting, the Security Council heard further inconclusive debate. Most notable were Fedorenko's cold-war allegations, ranging from the Bay of Pigs to Vietnam.

Rafael started the session with a defense of the Israeli legal case. Tarabanov of Bulgaria congratulated the Security council on its "attitude of calm", implying a salutary rejection of U. S. efforts to induce action.

Syria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Mali presented pro-Arab arguments. Fedorenko repeated his allegations about the Cuban missile crisis, denounced the "criminal U. S. bombing" of the S. S. Turkestan, and said our actions deprive us of the moral right to come to the Security Council with proposed solutions.

Seydoux of France said there should be no voting on any resolutions while we all seek detente and a unanimously agreed formula.

Goldberg answered Fedorenko on Cuba, the S. S. Turkestan, America's free press, and America's impartiality in the crisis. Ethiopia supported the French proposal.

Fedorenko answered Goldberg again, talking about Cuba, the ~~lost~~ nuclear bomb off Palomares, naval incidents, the Bay of Pigs, the Dominican Republic, U. S. efforts to drown the Vietnamese people in blood, American piratical acts against the S. S. Turkestan, napalm, etc. This speech was the most sarcastic and abusive heard against the U. S. in the current debate.

Goldberg briefly retorted that we would not descend to such a cold-war tactic, and the meeting adjourned -- on stand-by call-- until Monday at 3 p.m.

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 712 83-160

By SP/101, NARA, Date 6-4-91

111
Pres file
6/3/67

Presidential Message to the OECD on the 20th Anniversary
of the Marshall Plan, to be delivered by Governor Harriman

Twenty years ago a great American Secretary of State, George Marshall, started the ~~great~~ peaceful revolution of the Twentieth Century. His proposal that the United States join with Europe in the enormous task of rebuilding that war-ravaged continent marked the beginning of a bold new experiment in international cooperation. "Our policy," he said, "is directed not against any country or doctrine but against poverty, hunger, desperation, and chaos."

Working together, Europe and America defeated these ancient enemies, and laid the foundation for an era of prosperity and growth unmatched in history. Success was not inevitable. It took energy, imagination, and courage on both sides of the Atlantic.

These qualities still abound, both in Europe and America. Our task now is to mobilize them in the battle against the "poverty, hunger, desperation and chaos" that still afflict most of mankind. Today's challenge is more stubborn, more complex and fully as urgent as that of 1947.

We must continue to improve the international economic and financial arrangements which have served us so well and are so important to our continued prosperity.

We must maintain the vitality of the institutions we have created for the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world and the commitments in which they are rooted.

We must continue to work to bridge the gap that still divides East from West.

We must join hands to promote the growth, in peace and freedom, of the developing countries. It is here that the challenge is most urgent and the penalties of failure most painful.

Together we built a new Europe from the ruins of war. Let us now resolve to work together for a world at peace, free of poverty, hunger, and disease.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, June 2, 1967, 5:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

At Tab A, for your approval, is a warm message to the OECD on the 20th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan.

The OECD will sponsor the only official observance of the anniversary by the Marshall Plan countries. Governor Harriman, Paul Hoffman and Bill Foster will represent the U.S. at the June 5 ceremony. If you approve, Harriman will deliver the message for you.

For 2

Francis M. Bator

OK to send message ☒

No ☐

Speak to me ☐

OK
but I'd like
to see some
language indicating
a common
responsibility to
maintain world
order and peace.
The Marshall Plan
would not have
worked without the
Truman Doctrine. Walt

Friday, June 2, 1967, 5:35 p.m.

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Francis M. Bator

OK to send message _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

FMB:LSE:mst

PROPOSED MESSAGE

11/10

Twenty years ago a great American Secretary of State, George Marshall, started the great peaceful revolution of the Twentieth Century. His proposal that the United States join with Europe in the enormous task of rebuilding that war-ravaged continent marked the beginning of a bold new experiment in international cooperation. "Our policy," he said, "is directed not against any country or doctrine but against poverty, hunger, desperation, and chaos."

Working together, Europe and America defeated these ancient enemies, and laid the foundation for an era of prosperity and growth unmatched in history. Success was not inevitable. It took energy, imagination, and courage on both sides of the Atlantic.

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We must continue to improve the international economic and financial arrangements which have served us so well and are so important to our continued prosperity.

We must continue to work to bridge the gap that still divides East from West.

And most important, we must join hands to promote the growth of the developing countries. It is here that the challenge is most urgent and the penalties of failure most painful.

-2-

Together we built a new Europe from the ruins of war. Let us now resolve to work together for a world free of poverty, hunger and disease.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Pres file
112

June 3, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith Nasser's response,
quite uncompromising.

Willing to receive our Vice-
President or send his, Mohieddin,
Anderson's nominee.

Sec. Rusk and I agree we
should proceed to get Mohieddin
here.

WWR

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

003

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~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

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DE RUEIVCR 8397B/1 1532120
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O 022029Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 8397

CONTROL 2987

RECD: JUN 2, 1967
6:20PM

NODIS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT UAR FOREIGN OFFICE "UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION" OF LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM PRESIDENT GAMAL ABDUL NASSER. NYITH REFERENCE PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH, WAS EXPLICITLY ASSURED BY FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD THAT IT WAS UP TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY HERE OR INVITE VICE PRESIDENT MOHIEDDIN TO GO TO WASHINGTON, WITH NO EXPRESSION OF UARG PREFERENCE. WHILE WAITING FOR TYPING TO BE COMPLETED, ENJOYED LONG PLEASANT CONVERSATION FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD ON NON POLITICAL MATTERS. WILL POUCH ORIGINAL LETTER IN ARABIC AND FOREIGN OFFICE TRANSLATION. TEXT FOLLOWS:

2. CAIRO, JUNE 2, 1967. DEAR PRESIDENT,

→ 3. I WELCOME YOUR INITIATIVE IN WRITING TO ME ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE ARAB HOMELAND. FOR, HOWEVER DISTANT THE POINT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN US SEEMS FROM THE SCOPE OF OUR OUTLOOK AT THE PRESENT STAGE, I AM CONVINCED THAT ANY JOINT ENDEAVOR ON OUR PART TO ESTABLISH COMMUNICATION OF THOUGHT, MIGHT AT LEAST CONTRIBUTE TO DISSIPATE PART OF THE ARTIFICIAL CLOUDS INTENDED TO DEPICT THE EXERCISE OF RIGHT AS A SIN AND THE RIGHT OF DEFENSE AS AGGRESSION.

4. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IN THE ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT EVENTS, TO VIEW THEM IN THEIR CHRONOLOGICAL AND LOGICAL ENTITY, TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING AND MAKE A SOUND, REASONABLE, AND FAIR EVALUATION OF THE FACTS WE FACE.

5. HENCE, I SHALL TRY TO SET FORTH A NUMBER OF FACTS WHICH I WOULD TERM AS PRELIMINARY:

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 72982-149
By As/112, NARA, Date 6-4-91

~~SECRET~~

2 CAIRO 8397, SECTION ONE OF TWO, JUNE 2, 1967, NODIS

6. FIRST: IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE GO BACK TO THE FEW DAYS WHICH PRECEDED THE MEASURES WHICH THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC TOOK HJF LATE, AND TO RECALL THE DANGEROUSLY AGGRESSIVE SITUATION CREATED BY THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES VIS-A-VIS THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, THE HOSTILE THREATS PROCLAIMED BY A NUMBER OF ISRAELI LEADERS, AND THE ACCOMPANYING MASS TROOP CONCENTRATIONS ON THE SYRIAN BORDER IN PREPARATION FOR AN IMMINENT AGGRESSION ON SYRIA. IT WAS ONLY NATURAL THEN, THAT THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC SHOULD ASSUME HER RESPONSIBILITIES AND TAKE ALL MEASURES NECESSARY FOR DEFENSE AND TO DETER THE PLANNED AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR COUNTRIES.

7. SECOND: DEFENSE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC MADE IT IMPERATIVE THAT OUR ARMED FORCES MOVE TO THEIR ADVANCED POSITIONS ON THE BORDER TO BE ABLE TO COPE WITH DEVELOPMENTS AND THROUGH THEIR VERY PRESENCE FOIL ISRAEL'S PREMEDITATED INVASION. URGED BY OUR CONCERN FOR THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCES, WE FOUND IT IMPERATIVE THAT THEY SHOULD WITHDRAW: SUCH HAS BECOME OUR FINAL POSITION ON THE MATTER.

8. THIRD: FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNEF, IT WAS ONLY LOGICAL THAT THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC ARMED FORCES SHOULD OCCUPY THEIR POSITIONS, AMONG WHICH WAS THE AREA OF SHARM EL SHEIKH OVERLOOKING THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. IT WAS EQUALLY LOGICAL THAT WE EXERCISE OUR ESTABLISHED SOVEREIGN RIGHTS ON THE STRAITS AND ON OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS IN THE GULF.

9. HERE AGAIN, I WISH TO TAKE YOU A FEW YEARS BACK TO THE TRIPARTITE AGGRESSION ON EGYPT: WE STILL RECALL WITH APPRECIATION, THE FAIR POSITION ADOPTED BY YOUR COUNTRY WITH REGARD TO THAT AGGRESSION.

10. PRIOR TO THE AGGRESSION, THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC EXERCISED ITS ESTABLISHED LEGAL RIGHTS WITH REGARD TO ISRAELI SHIPPING IN THE STRAITS AND THE GULF. THESE RIGHTS ARE INDISPUTABLE. FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCES AND THEIR REPLACEMENT BY OUR ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA, IT WAS UNTHINKABLE THAT ISRAELI SHIPPING OR STRATEGIC MATERIALS DESTINED FOR ISRAEL BE ALLOWED PASSAGE. OUR POSITION THEREON, IN A-

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-3- CAIRO 8397, SECTION ONE OF TWO, JUNE 2, 1967, NODIS

ADDITION TO IT BEING LEGITIMATELY ESTABLISHED, IT INDEED AIMS AT REMOVING THE LAST VESTIGE OF THE TRIPARTITE AGGRESSION, IN CONSONANCE WITH THE MORAL PRINCIPLE WHICH RULES THAT NO AGGRESSOR BE REWARDED FOR HIS AGGRESSION.

11. IN ALL THE MEASURES WE HAVE ADOPTED IN DEFENSE OF OUR LAND AND OUR RIGHTS, WE HAVE UNDERLINED TWO POINTS:

12. FIRST: THAT WE SHALL DEFEND OURSELVES AGAINST ANY AGGRESSION, WITH ALL OUR means and potentialities.

13. SECOND: THAT WE SHALL CONTINUE TO ALLOW INNOCENT PASSAGE OF FOREIGN SHIPPING IN OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS.

14. THESE ARE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE DIRECT POSITION PROCLAIMED BY THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, AND WHICH WE FEEL AFFORD NO GROUND FOR SOME TO CREATE A CLIMATE OF CRISIS OR TO LAUNCH THAT PSYCHOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST US.

15. WHILE THIS CAMPAIGN TAKES ON NEW DIMENSIONS AND FORMS WE NOTICE COMPLETE AND REGRETTABLE OVERLOOKING OF A NUMBER OF OTHER FACTS WHICH I WISH TO TERM AS BASIC. THESE ARE THE VERY FACTS WHICH CARRY FULL WEIGHT ON CURRENT EVENTS AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE THEIR BEARING ON THE FUTURE UNTIL ALL APPRECIATE THEM FULLY AND ASSESS THEIR DIMENSIONS AND ROOTS. HERE I SHALL REFER TO TWO FACTS:

16. FIRST: THE RIGHTS OF THE ARAB PEOPLE OF PALESTINE. IN OUR VIEW, THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT FACT THAT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED. AN AGGRESSIVE ARMED FORCE WAS ABLE TO OUST THAT PEOPLE FROM THEIR COUNTRY AND REDUCE THEM TO REFUGEES ON THE BORDERS OF THEIR HOMELAND.

17. TODAY THE FORCES OF AGGRESSION IMPEDE THE ARAB PEOPLE'S ESTABLISHED RIGHT OF RETURN AND LIFE IN THEIR HOMELAND, DESPITE THE UN RESOLUTIONS, THE LAST OF WHICH WAS ADOPTED LAST YEAR.

18. THE SECOND FACT IS RELATED TO ISRAEL'S POSITION TOWARDS THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS: A POSITION REPRESENTED NOT MERELY BY THE CONSTANT VIOLATION OF THOSE AGREEMENTS, BUT WHICH HAS GONE AS FAR AS TO DENY THEIR PRESENCE AND REFUSE TO ADHERE TO THEM. IT HAS EVEN GONE AS FAR AS TO OCCUPY THE DEMILITARIZED ZONES, OUST THE UN OBSERVERS AND INSULT THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND ITS FLAG.

19. THOSE ARE TWO BASIC FACTS WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE ASSESSMENT OF TODAY'S EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS.

NOLTE
BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

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P 022000Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE CRAC
BT

2 9 8 8

June 2, PM 9:11 '67

8 3 9 7 B 2 CAIRO 8397 SECTION TWO OF TWO

MODIS

20. *In your message you referred to two points:*

21. FIRST: YOU URGE THAT WE PUT THE PAST ASIDE AND ENDEAVOR TO RESCUE THE MIDDLE EAST OR RATHER THE WHOLE HUMAN COMMUNITY THROUGH THE AVOIDANCE OF HOSTILITIES. HERE, ALLOW ME TO REFER TO THE POLICY OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC WHICH DOES NOT RESTRICT HERSELF TO PLACING WORLD PEACE AS AN OBJECTIVE, BUT GOES BEYOND THAT AND ASSUMES A POSITIVE ROLE ON WHICH I DO NOT WISH TO ELABORATE LEST I SHOULD BORDER ON THE AREA OF SELF-GLORIFICATION. AS FOR ENDEAVORS TO AVOID MILITARY OPERATIONS, I HAVE BUT TO EMPHASIZE WHAT I HAVE ALREADY DECLARED THAT THE MEASURES WE HAVE ADOPTED WERE IMPOSED BY THE FORCES OF AGGRESSION AND THEIR CONCEIT AS WELL AS BY THEIR BELIEF THAT THEY HAVE REACHED THE STAGE WHERE THEY COULD IMPOSE THEIR AGGRESSIVE POLICY. YET, OUR FORCES HAVE NOT INITIATED ANY AGGRESSIVE ACT, BUT NO DOUBT, WE SHALL RESIST WITH ALL OUR POTENTIALITIES ANY AGGRESSION LAUNCHED AGAINST US OR AGAINST ANY ARAB STATE.

22. SECOND: YOUR OBSERVATION THAT THE CONFLICTS OF OUR TIME CANNOT BE SOLVED BY THE CROSSINGS OF FRONTIERS WITH ARMS AND ME. HERE, I SHARE YOUR VIEW. YET, WE HAVE TO SEE HOW

PAGE 2 RUEVCR 8397B/2 ~~SECRET~~

THIS PRINCIPLE IS APPLIED TO EVERY CASE. IF YOU ARE REFERRING TO THE CROSSING OF THE DEMARCATION LINES BY SOME INDIVIDUALS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE I WOULD URGE THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSIDERING THIS ASPECT IN THE GENERAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE. HERA ALSO, I MAY ASK HOW FAR ANY GOVERNMENT IS ABLE TO CONTROL THE FEELINGS OF MORE THAN ONE MILLION PALESTINIANS WHO, FOR TWENTY YEARS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -- WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY HEREIN IS INESCAPABLE -- HAS FAILED TO SECURE THEIR RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND. THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, MERELY CONFIRMS THAT RIGHT, AT EVERY SESSION.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2- 8397 SECTION TWO OF TWO FROM CAIRO (NODIS)

THE CROSSING OF THE DEMARCATION LINES BY SOME PALESTINIAN INDIVIDUAL IS, IN POINT OF FACT MERELY A MANIFESTATION OF ANGER BY WHICH THOSE PEOPLE ARE NATURALLY POSSESSED AS THEY MEET WITH THE FULL DENIAL OF THEIR RIGHTS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND BY THE POWERS WHICH SIDE WITH ISRAEL AND ASSIST IT MATERIALLY AND MORALLY.

23. WHATEVER OUR ATTEMPTS TO DIVIDE THE ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM, IT IS IMPERATIVE IN THE END THAT WE RETURN TO ITS ORIGIN AND FUNDAMENTALS, NAMELY THE RIGHT OF

PAGE 3 RUEVOR 8397D/2 ~~SECRET~~
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN SECURING THEM THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.

24. MY LETTER MAY SEEM RATHER LONG IN A WAY: YET, IT WAS MY WISH TO EXPLAIN BRIEFLY SOME OF THE BASIC FEATURES OF THE SITUATION WE NOW FACE IN THE ARAB REGION.

25. FINALLY, I WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE WOULD WELCOME LISTENING TO MR. HUBERT HUMPHREY, THE UNITED STATES VICE PRESIDENT, AT ANY TIME HE MAY CHOOSE TO VISIT THE UAR. WE SHALL PROVIDE HIM WITH A PICTURE OF THE SITUATION AS WE CONCEIVE IT AMIDST THE FUNDAMENTAL EVENTS FACED BY THE ARAB NATION TODAY. I AM READY TO SEND VICE PRESIDENT ZAKAREYA MOHIEDDIN, TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY TO MEET WITH YOU AND EXPOUND OUR VIEWPOINT.

26 PLEASE ACCEPT MY REGARDS AND CONSIDERATIONS.

27. (SGD) (CANAL ABDEL NASSER) PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC.

KOLTE
BT

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

113

June 3, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

This French report of the
impact of our recent Hanoi bombing
is worth pondering.

WWR

WH/113a
6

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

Action

00 RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 19764 1531810
ZNY SSSSS

CONTROL : 2619
RECD : JUNE 2, 1967,
2:50 P.M.

Info

O 021751Z JUNE 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ MARIA THREE PARIS 19764

SUBJ: REACTION OF FOREIGN MISSIONS IN HANOI TO U.S. BOMBINGS.

MODIS

QUAI RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE DATED MAY 26 FROM HANOI:

QTE BEGIN TRANSLATION

I TALKED WITH SEVERAL CHIEFS OF MISSION ABOUT THE NEW SITUATION
CREATED BY THE BOMBINGS OF HANOI. ALL BELIEVE THAT THE
"ESCALATION" WILL HENCEFORTH CONTINUE. OPINIONS MERELY
DIFFER AS TO THE RHYTHM OF ESCALATION AND AS TO THE TYPE OF
TARGETS. PERHAPS THE AMERICANS WILL NOW OBSERVE A FAIRLY LONG

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 19764 ~~SECRET~~ MARIA THREE
PAUSE. BUT IT IS NEARLY CERTAIN THAT AMERICAN AVIATION WILL
RETURN TO BOMB THE ELECTRIC POWER STATION UNTIL IT IS COMPLETELY
DESTROYED. US PLANES WILL ALSO HIT DELIBERATELY OR NOT,
THE WATER PLANT WHICH IS LOCATED NEAR THE POWER STATION. THE
NEXT TARGET MIGHT BE THE DOUMER BRIDGE OR THE RAILROAD
STATION. ACCORDING TO THE MAJORITY OF PEOPLE I TALKED TO,
AIRPORT OF GIA-LAM WOULD ONLY BE ATTACKED AT THE END. ONE CANNOT
MAKE ANY FORECASTS AS TO POSSIBLE ATTACK ON THE DIKES WHICH
IN ANY CASE, WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE MONTH OF JULY.

UNTIL NOW AMERICAN AVIATION APPEARS TO HAVE TAKEN CERTAIN RISKS
IN HANOI IN TRYING TO HIT THE TARGET WHICH WAS ASSIGNED.
IN WHAT ONE MIGHT CALL THE FIRST STAGE OF THE AERIAL OPERATIONS
AGAINST THE CAPITAL (ATTACKING OF SOME WELL DEFINED TARGETS)
THE ONLY RISKS THE POPULATION FACED RESULTED FROM
INEVITABLE "ERRORS".

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-301

By is, NARA Date 4-24-00

~~SECRET~~

RESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS, 19764 CN 2619 JUNE 2, 1967 NODIS MARIA THREE

IF THE AMERICANS PERSIST IN THEIR POLICY OF FORCE THEY COULD LATER PROCEED TO A SECOND PHASE CHARACTERIZED BY THE SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION OF IMPORTANT BUILDINGS LEADING PROGRESSIVELY TO DESTRUCTION OF ENTIRE PARTS OF TOWN. THIS WAS THE CASE FOR NAM DINH AND THANH HOA, SECOND AND FOURTH LARGEST CITIES OF NORTH VIETNAM WHICH ARE NOW MORE THAN HALF DESTROYED.

PAGE 3 RUFNCR 19764 ~~SECRET~~ MARIA THREE

I KNOW FROM A SURE SOURCE THAT EH HANOI AUTHORITIES EXPECT THAT EVENTUALITY. AS FOR THE PRESENT, THE PEOPLE I SPOKE TO ARE PREOCCUPIED ESPECIALLY WITH THE DANGERS WHICH ARE INHERENT IN A POSSIBLE (BREAKDOWN) OF THE WATER SUPPLY, ELECTRICITY AND FOOD SUPPLY. THEY ARE MULTIPLYING STEPS FOR THE PROTECTION AGAINST BOMBINGS AND ARE COMPLAINING ABOUT CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES THESE BOMBINGS CAUSE WORK OF THEIR MISSIONS. HOWEVER, CONCLUSIONS THEY DRAW DIFFER COMPLETELY. THE AMBASSADORS FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES TELL ME THAT, CONFIDENT IN FORESIGHT OF VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES, THEY ARE MERELY WAITING FOR DIRECTIVES FROM THE VIETNAMESE. THE OTHERS, LESS DISCIPLINED ADMIT THAT THEY ARE CONCERNED. THE INDOESIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES WROTE TO DJAKARTA THAT IF BOMBINGS CONTINUE AT THE SAME RATE, HIS WORK WILL NO LONGER BE POSSIBLE. THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE U.A. R. JUST SIMPLY ASKED FOR THE EVACUATION OF HIS POST. THE BRITISH CONSUL LIMITED HIMSELF TO DESCRIBING INSUFFICIENT STEPS TAKEN REGARDING THE WATER PROBLEM. HE FELT THAT THE BREAKDOWN OF THE NORMAL WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM WOULD MAKE LIFE IMPOSSIBLE FOR FOREIGNERS AND MIGHT BECOME DANGEROUS FOR HEALTH REASONS. UNQUOTE END TRANSLATION.

GP-1 BOHLEN

BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

Friday, June 2, 1967
7:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

More on the electric power
bombing in Hanoi -- this time from
the French.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 19661

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By reg, NARA, Date 6-3-91

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

1142
#6

~~SECRET~~

Action

RR RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 19661 1522041
ZNY SSSSS

CONTROL: 1240

RECD: JUNE 1, 1967
5:35 PM

Info

R 011731Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 19661

NODIS MARIA THREE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-301

By *is*, NARA Date *4-24-10* *Reston*

SUBJECT: US BOMBING OF DRV

QUAI RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM HANOI DATED MAY 27:

BEGIN TRANSLATION: HANOI IS STILL PREPARING ITSELF FOR OTHER BOMBINGS BUT NOBODY CAN TELL WHEN THEY WILL TAKE PLACE. I NOTICED YESTERDAY THAT NEW SHELTERS WERE DUG IN THE GARDEN OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IN DIRECTION OF RAILROAD STATION, MANY CEMENT CYLINDERS WERE BEING BUILT AS INDIVIDUAL AIR RAID SHELTERS. THE BOMBINGS CONTINUE ON THE CENTRAL REGIONS OF DRV AND SINCE SEVERAL DAYS AGO ALSO ON THE HAIPHONG.

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 19661 ~~SECRET~~
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PRESS NOTES THEM WITHOUT DESCRIBING THEM, AND IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW WITH PRECISION THEIR EFFECT. AIR ALERTS REMAIN DAILY EVENTS IN HANOI. THERE WAS ONE ON TUESDAY, MAY 23, WHICH WAS A DAY OF TRUCE IN THE SOUTH. A RECONNAISSANCE PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN. THERE WERE FOUR ALERTS THE NEXT DAY, ONE ON THURSDAY THE 25TH, FOUR THE 26TH, AND SIX SINCE THIS MORNING (27TH). AS A RESULT OF THE SECOND BOMBING TODAY THE ELECTRIC CURRENT HAS BEEN CUT. HAIPHONG WAS BOMBED THE 25TH AND 26TH. THE AMERICAN HIGH COMMAND STATES THAT THE POWER STATION HAS BEEN ATTACKED. THE DRV TALKS IN TERMS OF AN ATTACK ON RESIDENTIAL QUARTERS. BOTH STATEMENTS ARE UNDOUBTEDLY CORRECT. THE PRESS THIS MORNING STATES ON THAT OCCASION THAT THE 100TH ENEMY AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN OVER HAIPHONG.

US PLANES ALSO ATTACKED TWO DAYS IN A ROW THE PROVINCE OF HA BAC. I BELIEVE THAT THE TARGET WAS AGAIN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CENTER OF LIEU BAC GIANG WHERE A LARGE ELECTRIC POWER STATION IS LOCATED. PERHAPS THE AMERICANS HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO DESTROY SYSTEMATICALLY ALL POWER STATIONS. END TRANSLATION.

BOULEN
BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

1140

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

6

~~SECRET~~

Action

ag To Jordan

Info

CONTROL: 1238
RECEIVED: JUN 1, 1967 4:36 P.M.

RR RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 19662 1521935
ZNY SSSSS
R 011732Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ PARIS 19662

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-301
By is, NARA Date 4-24-07

NODIS MARIA THREE

SUBJECT: US BOMBING OF HANOI

QUAI RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM HANOI DATED MAY 25:

BEGIN TRANSLATION: MAY 23 WAS DAY OF TRUCE FOR HANOI EXCEPT FOR OVERFLIGHT OF A RECONNAISSANCE PLANE WHICH TRIGGERED OFF BRIEF ALERT AROUND ONE O'CLOCK AND WHICH, ACCORDING TO NEWSPAPERS THIS MORNING, WAS SHOT DOWN.

THE ACTIVITY OF CITY APPEARS TO BE NORMAL. SEVERAL CONVOYS OF MILITARY TRUCKS WENT THROUGH CITY. NON-MILITARY ITEMS SUCH AS FOOD

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 19662 ~~SECRET~~
BEVERAGES, WOOD AND OTHER MATERIALS ARE MOVED BY OXEN DRAWN CARTS, BY CYCLO-POUSSES, BY BICYCLES OR ON FOOT.

IN HANOI'S EMBASSY DISTRICT, THOUSANDS OF CEMENT CYLINDERS AWAIT BEING SUNK INTO GROUND TO BECOME NEW INDIVIDUAL AIR RAID SHELTERS. ON TRANS-PHU-STREET, WORKERS REPAIRED YESTERDAY MORNING DAMAGES CAUSED BY ROCKET ON MAY 21. THERE ARE STILL NUMEROUS METALLIC CONTAINERS ALONG BANKS OF RED RIVER WHICH ARE PROBABLY DESTINED TO STORE GASOLINE AND WHICH WILL BE PLACED UNDERGROUND.

AT THE POWER STATION DAMAGES ARE GREAT AND IT OPERATES ONLY PARTIALLY. OF THE 8 CHIMNEYS, ONE HAS BEEN COMPLETELY DESTROYED, ANOTHER IS LEANING AT A 30 DEGREE ANGLE, BUT SEVERAL OTHERS FUNCTION NORMALLY. I WAS TOLD THAT 2 OF THE 6 BOILERS ARE IN OPERATION.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 19662, JUNE 1, 1967 - NODIS MARIS THREE

THE ELECTRIC CURRENT IS NORMAL AT THE DELEGATION ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME FLUCTUATIONS IN THE CURRENT. CURRENT IS TIGHTLY RATIONED FOR PRIVATE HOMES AND IS CUT ALTOGETHER IN ALTERNATING MANNER IN SEVERAL PARTS OF CAPITAL. I BELIEVE THAT THESE RESTRICTIONS ARE RESULT OF SITUATION AT THE CENTRAL POWER STATION AND AT OTHER GENERATORS.

PAGE 3 RUFNCR 19662-~~SECRET~~

THE CITY WATER PLANT, ABOUT 100 METERS FROM POWER STATION, WAS SLIGHTLY DAMAGED.

THE NORTHERN PART OF TOWN BETWEEN THE BIG LAKE AND DOUMER BRIDGE SUFFERED FROM BOMBINGS. SEVERAL HOUSES, SOME OLD AND PRACTICALLY ABANDONED, HAVE COLLAPSED MERELY FROM BLAST OF THE BOMBING. PART OF THAT AREA HAS BEEN EVACUATED AND ANOTHER AREA IS VACATED EVERY DAY BETWEEN 6 IN THE MORNING AND 6 IN THE EVENING.

THE VIETNAMESE, BY THEMSELVES OR IN GROUPS, ARE CAMPING ON THE SIDEWALK OR ON LAWNS, NOTABLY AROUND SMALL LAKE. SOME OF THE VIETNAMESE STAND AROUND STREET WHERE (FRENCH) DELEGATION IS LOCATED. THEY REMAIN THERE MOTIONLESS, QUIET FOR HOURS AT A TIME AND SQUATTING NEXT TO THEIR INDIVIDUAL SHELTERS.

BOHLEN

BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

006

114C

~~SECRET~~

Cy to Jordan

Action

Info CONTROL: 1239
RECEIVED: JUN 1, 1967 5:03 P.M.

RR RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 19660 1522015
ZNY SSSSS
R 01:732Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 19660

NODIS MARIA THREE

SUBJECT: US BOMBING OF HANOI

QUAI RECEIVED FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM HANOI DATED MAY 23:

BEGIN TRANSLATION: "AS RESULT OF BOMBINGS AND AIR ALERTS WHICH INCREASE IN NUMBERS (FIVE TODAY BETWEEN 3 AND 2:45 HOURS) A CERTAIN CONFUSION EXISTS AMONG SEVERAL DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, INCLUDING THOSE FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. THIS CONFUSION IS AGGRAVATED BY THE ATTITUDE OF VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES WHO REFUSE TO TREAT OBJECTIVELY THE AIR WAR. THUS, THE PRESS THIS MORNING, WHILE ANNOUNCING TRIUMPHANTLY THE DESTRUCTION OF 7 ENEMY AIRCRAFT,

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 19660 ~~SECRET~~
PUBLISHES NO ACCOUNT OF BOMBINGS NOR DAMAGE CAUSED AND MAKES NO MENTION OF ATTACK ON POWER STATION. THIS ATTITUDE IS ABSURD SINCE THE ENTIRE POPULATION DIRECTLY FEELS CONSEQUENCES OF RAIDS. ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL, THIS ATTITUDE CAN ONLY HURT THE DRV BECAUSE IT GIVES OPPORTUNITY TO US SPOKESMAN TO DESCRIBE AS HE SEES FIT INTENSIFICATION OF AIR WAR. FINALLY, AFTER DEPARTURE OF AFP CORRESPONDENT, ONLY COMMUNIST JOURNALISTS REMAIN IN HANOI, WHO CONFINE THEIR REPORTING TO REPRODUCING OR EXAGGERATING THE OFFICIAL INFORMATION.

THE ONLY REACTION FROM VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES WHICH PERMITS ONE TO GAUGE AGGRAVATION OF SITUATION IS TELEPHONE CALL MADE THIS MORNING TO EMBASSIES AND TO THIS DELEGATION FROM SERVICE OF ASSISTANCE TO DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS. THIS SERVICE PROMISES TO

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-301
By *ia*, NARA Date 4-24-00

Postow

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 19660, JUNE 1, 1967, NODIS MARIA THREE

HELP DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN CASE OF SHORTAGES BY MAKING AVAILABLE SUPPLIES FROM ITS SPECIAL STORE. THE SERVICE ALSO ADVISES DIPLOMATS TO HENCEFORTH ECONOMIZE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE ON ELECTRICITY AND WATER, TO STORE WATER AND TO STOP ALL AIR CONDITIONERS. USE OF FANS IS AUTHORIZED. THIS DEMARCHE APPEARS TO BEAR OUT FORECAST OF CERTAIN OF MY FOREIGN COLLEAGUES, ACCORDING TO WHOM

PAGE 3 RUFNCR 19660 ~~SECRET~~

NEW BOMBINGS WILL LEAD, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO A SEVERE RATIONING OF WATER AND ELECTRICITY". END TRANSLATION.

BOHLEN

BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

Friday, June 2, 1967
7:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here is a draft letter to Prime Minister Eshkol. I have indicated in brackets the passages which I would remove and, in ink, what I would substitute where substitution is required.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

115
Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 118, NARA, Date 6-3-91

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE BY CHECKING
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

115a

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

ACTION:

Embassy

TEL AVIV

PRIORITY

SANITIZED

STATE

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-304

NODIS

By cb, NARA Date 1-29-01

Please deliver soonest following message from President
to Prime Minister Eshkol dated

QUOTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am grateful for your letter of May 30. I appreciate
particularly the steadfastness with which the Government and
people of Israel have maintained a posture of resolution and
calm in a situation of grave tension. All of us understand
how fateful the steps we take may be. I hope we can continue
to move firmly and calmly toward a satisfactory solution.

Our position in this crisis rests on two principles which
are vital national interests of the United States. The first
is that we support the territorial integrity and political
independence of all of the countries of the Middle East.

This principle has now been affirmed by four American

Presidents. The second is our defense of the basic interest

TO: LDEattle:jmj 6/2/67

4263

Telegraphic transmittal and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

FROM: L:Maeker

5241

White House

U -
M -

DOD - Mr. Vance

S/S -

~~SECRET~~

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-622

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

of the entire world community in the freedom of the seas. As a leading Maritime nation, we have ^a/vital interest in upholding freedom of the seas, and the right of passage through straits of an international character.

As you know, the United States considers the Gulf of Aqaba to be an international waterway and believes that the entire international ~~maritime~~ maritime community has a ^{substantial} [vital] interest in assuring that the right of passage through the Strait of Tiran and Gulf is maintained.

I am sure that Foreign Minister Eban has reported to you the statement which I had prepared and from which Ambassador ~~written~~/Hartman made notes during our meeting of May 26. The full text of that statement is as follows:

INNER QUOTE The United States has its own constitutional processes which are basic to its action on matters involving war and peace. The Secretary General has not yet reported to the UN Security Council and the Council has not yet demonstrated what it may or may not be able or willing to do although the United States will press for prompt action in the UN.

I have already publicly stated this week our views on the safety of Israel and on the Strait of Tiran. Regarding the Strait, we plan to pursue vigorously the measures which can be taken by maritime nations to assure that the Strait and Gulf remain open to free and innocent passage of the vessels of all nations.

~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

Classification

I must emphasize the necessity for Israel not to make itself responsible for the initiation of hostilities. Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone. We cannot imagine that it will make this decision. END INNERQUOTE

I told Mr. Eban I could not foresee then, and I cannot now foresee, the specific steps which may prove desirable and necessary. I explained that I want to do everything I can to provide Israel with effective American support. I stressed too the need to act in concert with other nations, particularly those with strong maritime interests. And, as you will understand, I cannot act at all without full backing of Congress. I am now in the process of urgently consulting the leaders of our Congress.

We are now engaged in doing everything we can through the United Nations. We recognize the difficulties of ~~SECURITY~~ securing constructive action in the Security Council, but we are convinced that the world organization, which for the past decade has played a major role in the Middle East, must make a real effort to discharge its responsibilities for the maintenance of peace.

We are moving ahead in our diplomatic efforts, in concert with the United Kingdom and with your diplomatic representatives, to secure a declaration by ~~the~~ the principal ~~maritime~~ maritime powers asserting

~~SECRET~~

Classification

~~SECRET~~

Classification

~~XXXXXX~~ the right of passage through the Strait and Gulf. A copy of this declaration has been given to your Ambassador. Such a declaration could be an important step both in relation to the proceedings in the Security Council and also in the event those proceedings do not lead to a successful outcome.

We are also exploring on an urgent basis the British suggestion for the establishment of an international naval presence in the area of the Strait of Tiran. As I said to Mr. Eban, there is doubt that a number of other maritime powers would be willing to take steps of this nature unless and until United Nations processes have been exhausted. We must continue our efforts to mobilize international support for this effort. I would not wish the United States to move in isolation.

On the matter of Haison which is a matter of the utmost importance, we wish to move cautiously, even if complete secrecy could be assured.

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

Classification

Page 5 of telegram to Ambassador TEL AVIV NODIS~~SECRET~~

Classification

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED]

I should add that we remain in continuing communication with Ambassador Harman and Minister Evron here in Washington and value greatly the exchanges we are able to have through them with the Government of Israel, as well as through Ambassador Barbour in Tel Aviv.

END

~~SECRET~~

116
Friday, June 2, 1967
7:00 p.m.

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Because it seemed like a happy occasion to be with you, and because we like the Krims very much, we accepted for the dinner in New York on Saturday night.

Marv tells me that you were good enough to put Elspeth and me on the manifest for the flight.

At the moment, with the Middle East crisis in the state it is -- and with the work that ought to be done over the weekend as a result of the meeting with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara from which I have just come, I have concluded that it would be wiser for me to stay in Washington tomorrow afternoon and evening.

If I could be of any direct assistance to you in New York -- for example, in talks which you may have with people there, or that you want me to have with people there, I will of course gladly go ahead with the present arrangement. But barring my being of some direct help to you, I regretfully conclude I should be in Washington tomorrow afternoon and evening.

W. W. R.

I could use you in New York _____

Stay in Washington _____

See me _____

117

Free file

~~TOP SECRET -- CODEWORD -- SENSITIVE~~

Friday, June 2, 1967 -- 5:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

I believe you will wish to read this attempt to reconstruct the Soviet role in triggering the present crisis.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE~~

RCI-2184

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-49
By ius, NARA, Date 11-18-04

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

118
Pres file

Friday, June 2, 1967
7:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

This is an important picture of the mind of the Chief of the Israeli Intelligence Service. It fits the portrait and the scenario drawn for me today by Evron.

Evron -- like Amit and Dayan -- is a born Israeli. This is one reason he is so much more natural and relaxed than Harman and Eban who must constantly prove their authenticity.

These boys are going to be hard to hold about a week from now.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-131
By cbm, NARA Date 5-14-01

WWRostow:rlh

Friday, Jun 2, 1967
1:05 p.m.

119

MR. PRESIDENT:

You will be interested in this Indonesian
assessment of Hanoi's position and the
recommendations.

W. W. R.

SECRET/NODIS attachment
(Djakarta 5855)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By kg, NARA, Date 6-3-91

119a

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Friday, June 2, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR GREEN (Djakarta, 5855)

Pesik met [redacted] again this morning (June 1) to report his and Colonel Ali Murtopo's briefing of Suharto of previous day concerning recent talks with the North Vietnamese Ambassador Pham Binh. A full account of the briefing will be reported [redacted]

3.4(b)(1)

In their meeting with Suharto, Pesik and Murtopo described in detail the conversations of May 25 and May 29 with Pham Binh. Murtopo then presented the evaluation of the North Vietnamese position on the basis of the Binh talks, primarily as prepared for him by Pesik, as follows:

- (A) North Vietnam is nearing a morale and psychological breakdown.
- (B) Mounting feeling of psychological and political isolation as a result of collaboration with Communist China which is itself isolated, and North Vietnam's fear that Soviets will not provide aid if the Chinese intervene further.
- (C) The most strategic objectives in North Vietnam are destroyed or badly damaged.
- (D) North Vietnam is terrified of further escalation, especially invasion of their territory. In such an event, they fear China will be unable to help in major war effort because of internal strife and vulnerabilities. Yet, any intervention of the Chinese troops in North Vietnam means further destruction of their own territory in the context of its becoming a U.S. - Chinese battleground; and because of the Sino-Soviet struggle, Soviets might abandon them. They especially are fearful that U.S. physical presence in North Vietnam might endanger Hanoi's control over the area due to lagging morale.

Murtopo told Suharto that he believed the latest talks with Binh showed some softening of the North Vietnamese position but it was too early to tell whether this is just another Communist negotiating trick. (As an example, Murtopo said Binh still alleges that the U.S. Government is responsible for the breakdown of Moscow overtures because the U.S.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-247
By SJ, NARA, Date 1-4-02

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

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resumed bombings without waiting for Ho Chi Minh to reply to President Johnson's letter.) Therefore, the U. S. should not be urged to let up on pressure on North Vietnam until there was some real evidence of North Vietnamese change of attitude.

Suharto expressed full agreement with Murtopo's evaluations. He then asked Murtopo/Pesik to ascertain soonest: (a) the U. S. evaluation and reaction to these talks with Binh; (b) the U. S. attitude and Indonesia's role as intermediary; and, (c) the current U. S. attitude, aspirations, and policy position on Vietnam and on means of ending the conflict.

3.4(b)(1) [] told Pesik he is in closest touch with me on these talks, that the results are being immediately forwarded to the highest levels of the U. S. Government, and that naturally official definitive reply to Suharto's questions would have to be obtained from Washington. [] then expressed appreciation for the efforts undertaken by Murtopo/Pesik to shed some light on the evolving North Vietnamese attitudes. He complimented them on the skill and objectivity with which they were pursuing the dialogue with Binh, and expressed appreciation for their evaluations of Binh's reactions. [] emphasized that he was expressing only his personal views but that he knew they were shared by myself. Regarding Indonesia's role as an intermediary, [] gave as entirely his personal view that this channel appeared to offer not only an opportunity to gauge North Vietnam's reactions to the changing situation but also a possible channel for pursuit of negotiations were there to be evidence of good faith on North Vietnam's side. He remarked that our Government had on many occasions indicated its willingness to enter into talks under such conditions and also had welcomed the good offices and mediation efforts of any party or nation which were to undertake such efforts without prejudice and with a realistic recognition of the need for fairness and sincerity on both sides. It appeared from Pesik's account and his evaluations, [] added, that Indonesia could play a useful role. Pesik reiterated that Suharto fully concurred with the Pesik/Murtopo view that, if the Government of Indonesia were to undertake these private mediatory efforts, it should not at this time press for any negotiating concessions from the U. S. Pesik believed that commitments were premature and that probably the present unofficial channel brokered by themselves might offer the best means of continuing a dialogue with Hanoi until some breakthrough might occur.

It was left that we would check with Washington as to its notion to all three points which Suharto raised.

Comment: Any Washington reaction which we could pass back to Suharto/Murtopo/Pesik would be appreciated. I believe it might be useful,

at least from the standpoint of GOI reactions, to emphasize our continuing interest in negotiations under fair and honorable circumstances, our lack of any desire to overthrow North Vietnamese Government or interfere in its affairs (we only ask the same attitude by North Vietnam towards South Vietnam), our reluctance to continue destruction of North Vietnam by bombing or other means except as forced by military necessity to destroy North Vietnam's capability for aggression against the South, and our willingness to consider eventual inclusion of two Vietnams in regional arrangements in Southeast Asia subject to the conclusion of peace talks which would preserve independence and the integrity of both Government of Vietnam and Hanoi regimes.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

EXCLUDED FROM COPY

Friday, J 2, 1967
1:00 p.m.

120

MR. PRESIDENT:

It is my judgment that the Evron conversation should not be shared with Prime Minister Wilson.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~-EYES ONLY attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jw, NARA, Date 9-24-99

Friday, June 2, 1967
12:45 p.m.

121
Pro file

Mr. President:

Herewith Yost's final assessment
of the record and confident mood in
Cairo.

W. W. Rostow

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~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 8362

EXDIS

SECSTATE FOR BATTLE FROM YOST.

USUN FOR GOLDBERG.

1. THERE IS UNANIMITY AMONG OBSERVERS I HAVE SEEN HERE THAT UARG AT THIS POINT CANNOT AND WILL NOT RELAX POSITION ON CLOSURE TIRAN STRAITS EXCEPT AS RESULT OVERWHELMING APPLICATION OF MILITARY FORCE. OPINION IN OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES SEEMS PRACTICALLY UNANIMOUS IN BACKING UAR ON THIS ISSUE.

2. WHILE THIS MAY APPEAR IN US AS "AGGRESSION", IT IS SEEN HERE AS ENTIRELY LEGITIMATE RESTORATION 1956 STATUS QUO WHICH WAS UPSET BY ISRAELI AGGRESSION. IN LIGHT UAR "BELLIGERENCY", MOREOVER, LEGAL CASE IS AT LEAST OPEN TO DOUBT.

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 8362B ~~SECRET~~

3. AS CONSEQUENCE I HAVE RELUCTANTLY COME TO CONCLUSION THAT THERE IS NO RPT NO PROSPECT FOR SUCCESS OUR PRESENT TACTIC OF MOBILIZING MARITIME POWERS TO REOPEN STRAITS, EXCEPT BY EXERCISE MILITARY FORCE WHICH WOULD BE OUT OF PROPORTION TO REAL US INTERESTS AT STAKE AND WOULD HAVE MOST DAMAGING REPERCUSSIONS ON US POSITION THROUGHOUT ARAB WORLD. IF WE PURSUE THIS TACTIC MUCH FURTHER, I AM AFRAID WE MAY FIND OURSELVES IN SAME DEAD END AS BRITISH AND FRENCH IN 1956.

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Authority State la 9-4-81 (NLJ 81-115)

By lg/ldh, NARA, Date 6-7-91

Rostow

4. PROPOSED DECLARATION BY MARITIME POWERS WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON UAR STAND NOR WOULD SHOW OF NAVAL STRENGTH IN NEIGHBORHOOD, THOUGH LATTER WOULD INCREASE ARAB AGITATION, REENFORCE ARAB UNITY AND PROVOKE ANTI-US DEMONSTRATIONS. ACTUAL USE OF SUFFICIENT MILITARY FORCE COULD PRESUMABLY OPEN STRAITS BUT FORCE WOULD HAVE TO BE MAINTAINED THERE INDEFINITELY AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE AS INDICATED ABOVE.

5. KWHILE I REALIZE VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE ISRAEL ATTACHES TO KEEPING STRAITS OPEN, I CANNOT BELIEVE THIS IS VITAL

PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 8362B ~~SECRET~~

TO ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE, EXPECIALLY RECALLING THAT STRAITS WERE CLOSED PRIOR TO 1957. GAIN TO NASSER'S PRESTIGE RESULTING FROM THIS VICTORY WILL BE UNFORTUNATE AND TROUBLESOME BUT POST FACTO ATTEMPTS BY EITHER GREAT POWERS OR ISRAEL TO REVERSE IT ARE MORE LIKELY TO PROLONG THAN TO CURTAIL HIS CURRENTLY RESURRECTED LEADERSHIP OF ARAB WORLD.

6. I WOULD HAVE THOUGHTBXORE PRODUCTIVE TACTIC WOULD BE HENCEFORTH TO CONCENTRATE ON LIMITING DAMAGE, PRIMARILY BY FINDING MEANS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES OF STRENGTHENING UNTSO MACHINERY ALL ALONG ISRAELI FRONTIERS BUT PARTICULARLY ON ISRAEL-UAR LINE. IF SOME ACTION ON TIRAN NECESSARY, COMPLAINT COULD BE PRESENTED TO ICJ AND INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS MADE TO SUPPLY ISRAEL WITH OIL THROUGH OTHER PORTS. I WOULD PRESUME ISRAEL WOULD EXPECT AND SHOULD RECEIVE RENEWED ASSURANCES OF US SUPPORT IN CASE ITS EXISTENCE OR INTEGRITY IS THREATENED.

7. IF STABILITY IS TO BE PRESERVED IN AREA OVER LONG RUN, IT WILL ALSO BE IMPORTANT THAT US ENDEAVOR WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS TO MAINTAIN CONTACT AND SOME MEASURE.

PAGE 4 RUEIVCR 8362B ~~SECRET~~

COOPERATION WITH UAR. PRESSURE TACTICS. SUCH AS FLEET MOVEMENTS OR BLOCKING IMF ACTION AND BANK CREDITS, WILL HAVE PRECISELY CONTRARY EFFECT, THROW UAR EVEN MORE INTO SOVIET ARMS AND MAKE FUTURE AGGRESSIVE ACTION VIS-AVIS ISRAEL MORE LIKELY.

8 THERE CAN BE NO ASSURANCE THAT ARAB APPETITES, WHETTED BY UNEXPECTED AND INTOXICATION SHOW OF UNITY, WILL NOT SOON DEMAND FURTHER SATISFACTION, DESPITE RIAD STATEMENT TO ME UAR HAS NO SUCH PRESENT INTENTION. HOWEVER, I AM CONVINCED WE WOULD HAVE MUCH BETTER PROSPECT OBTAINING WORLD AND PERHAPS EVENSOME ARAB SUPPORT AGAINST MORE OBVIOUS AND BRUTAL THREAT TO ISRAELI SECURITY THAN CLOSURE STRAITS IS GENERALLY CONCEIVED TO BE. EITHER OVERT OR CONVERT SACTIONS ARE AT THIS TIME MORE LIKELY TO PROVOKE THAN TO DISCOURAGE MORE AGGRESSIVE ARAB POLICY.

9. BELIEL I HAVE FELT PULSE HERE AS FULLY AS MAY BE FEASIBLE OR USEFUL IN NEAR FUTURE AND THAT, UNLESS DEPARTMENT WISHE ME TO UNERTAKE SOME NEGOTIATION, I MIGHT PLAN TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON TO REPORT IN TWO OR THREE DAYS. I SHOULD PROBABLY SEE RIAD ONCE MORE BEFORE LEAVING BUT AMBASSADOR NOLTE NOW HAS EASY ACCESS TO HIM AND WILL BE FULLY CAPABLE HENCEFORTH OF CARRYING ON.

NOLTE

BT

~~SECRET~~

EXC

NNNN

122

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

Profile

Friday, June 2, 1967 -- 12:40 p.m

Mr. President:

Herewith Bob Anderson's summary of his talk with Nasser.

It is urgent that we decide whether we should inform the Israelis of this visit. My guess is their intelligence will pick it up. We would be wise to have Sec. Rusk tell Harman.

In the light of this picture of Nasser's mind, we must work out most carefully the scenario for talks with Mohleddin.

W. W. Rostow

Lisbon 1517

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority 77KQ82-153

By ag/ics, NARA, Date 6-4-91

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Authority NLS 91-201

By Julia NARA. Date 9-27-99

Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ LISBON 1517 SECTION ONE OF TWO

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR PRESIDENT AND SECSTATE FROM ROBERT ANDERSON

1. THERE FOLLOWS A SUMMARY OF MY TALK WITH PRESIDENT NASSER. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, I WILL BE TRYING TO EXPRESS HIS POINT OF VIEW TO ME.
2. AFTER EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES, NASSER SAID HE BECAME WORRIED AND AFRAID OF ISRAELI ATTACK BECAUSE OF SPEECHES AND HIS OWN INTELLIGENCE OF MOBILIZATION BY ISRAEL AND THE INTELLIGENCE SHARED WITH SYRIAN GOVT. AS AN EXAMPLE, HE STATED THAT 13 BRIGADES WERE MOBILIZED NEAR SYRIA.
3. NASSER EXPLAINED THAT HE DID NOT WANT REPETITION OF 1956 AFFAIR WHEN HE WAS RELUCTANT TO BELIEVE THAT AN ATTACK HAD BEGUN AND WAS SLOW IN MOVING TROOPS TO SINAI ONLY TO BE CAUGHT BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS IN THE NORTH AND THE BRITISH AT PORT

PAGE 2 RUDKLI 1517 ~~TOP SECRET~~

SAID. HE SAID HE FELT HE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO MOBILIZE AND SEND TROOPS TO SINAI, WHICH HE DID, AND REQUEST THE REMOVAL OF UN FORCES. WHILE HE DID NOT SAY SO, I BELIEVE HE WAS SURPRISED AT THE RAPIDITY OF THE REMOVAL OF UN TROOPS BECAUSE HE SAID THEY WERE ONLY A TOKEN FORCE AND WOULD HAVE CREATED NO REAL OBSTACLE.

4. HE WAS ASKED SPECIFICALLY IF HE INTENDED TO BEGIN ANY CONFLICT AND HE SAID TO PLEASE EXPLAIN TO MY GOVT THAT HE WOULD NOT BEGIN ANY FIGHT BUT WOULD WAIT UNTIL THE ISRAELIS HAD MOVED. THIS WAS QUALIFIED BY SAYING THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE SYRIANS WOULD DO AND HAD WORRIED ALL DAY (WEDNESDAY) FOR FEAR THE SYRIANS MIGHT START SOMETHING OUT OF ANGER BECAUSE OF THE PACT WHICH HE HAD MADE WITH HUSSEIN. HE ALSO STATED THAT, CONTRARY TO MOST PUBLIC OPINION, HE DID NOT HAVE CONTROL OVER THE RADICAL ELEMENTS OF REFUGEE ORGANIZATIONS WHO WERE INTERESTED ONLY IN STARTING A CONFLICT BECAUSE THEY HAD NO REAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS. HE WAS ASKED IF THIS CONFLICT OCCURRED, FOR EXAMPLE, IF SYRIA SHOULD ATTACK AGAINST HIS DESIRES, WHERE HE WOULD

PRESERVATION COPY

5. IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT IF ISRAEL FELT SHE WAS VIRTUALLY ALONE SHE MIGHT BE MOTIVATED TO STRIKE FIRST IN ORDER TO SECURE A STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE AND THAT SO LONG AS SHE FELT SHE HAD FRIENDS SHE MIGHT BE RESTRAINED. NASSER REPLIED THAT THIS WAS A RISK WHICH HE WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT AND THAT HE THOUGHT THE FIRST ISRAELI TARGET AND MAIN THRUST OF ISRAELI OFFENSIVE WOULD BE AGAINST EGYPT AND CAIRO. HE SAID THAT ELABORATE PLANS HAD BEEN MADE FOR INSTANT RETALIATION, AND THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT OF THE OUTCOME OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS.

6. NASSER SAID THAT HUSSEIN REQUESTED A MEETING WITH HIM AND THAT HE AGREED ON THE BASIS THAT IT WOULD BE SECRET UNLESS AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED BETWEEN THEM. NASSER THEN CONSULTED WITH THE GOVTS OF MOROCCO, ALGERIA, IRAQ AND SYRIA. ALL OF THESE AGREED THAT SOME AGREEMENT WITH HUSSEIN WAS DESIRABLE EXCEPT SYRIA WHO WAS OPPOSED TO ANY AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN. HE WAS ASKED IF HE HAD CONSULTED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY THE SAUDI ARABS AND HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD NO CONTACT, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, WITH THE SAUDI ARABS OR FAISAL. HOWEVER, NASSER FELT THAT FAISAL WAS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION AND COULD NOT

~~PAGE 4 RUDKLI 1517 T O P S E C R E T~~
AVOID PARTICIPATION IF FIGHTING BEGAN.

7. WITH REFERENCE TO GULF OF AQABA, NASSER STATED THAT FOR EIGHT YEARS AFTER 1948 THE STRAITS HAD BEEN CLOSED TO ISRAELI SHIPPING AND WAS OPEN ONLY BY THE ILLEGAL ACT OF ISRAEL, FRANCE AND ENGLAND, AND HE PROPOSED MERELY TO RETURN TO THE STATUS OF 1956 WHICH HAD BEEN AT LEAST TOLERATED BY ALL THE NATIONS FOR EIGHT YEARS. HE EXPLAINED THAT EVEN WE HAD DEPLORED AND OPPOSED THE ACT OF THE ISRAELIS, BRITISH AND FRENCH WHICH CHANGED THE STATUS QUO IN 1956. HE STATED THAT THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WERE NAVIGABLE ONLY IN A WIDTH OF THREE MILES WHICH WAS CLEARLY TERRITORIAL WATERS AND THAT HE INTENDED TO MAINTAIN THIS POSITION. HE WAS ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHAT COMMERCE HE WOULD ALLOW THROUGH THE STRAITS UNDER HIS CONCEPT AND HE REPLIED BY SAYING THAT THE EXCLUSIONS WOULD BE 1) ISRAELI SHIPS, 2) OIL OR ANY REFINED PRODUCTS, AND 3) ARMS FOR ISRAEL. HERE HE STATED THAT ALL COUNTRIES CLAIMED TERRITORIAL WATERS TO A GREATER DISTANCE OFFSHORE THAN HE WAS ASSERTING AND FURTHER THAT HE WAS AT WAR WITH ISRAEL AND HAD BEEN SINCE 1948 WITH NOTHING EXISTING BETWEEN THEM EXCEPT AN ARMISTICE, AND THAT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HE WAS ENTITLED TO ASSERT JURISDICTION.

3. HE WAS ASKED IF HE WOULD CONSIDER REFERRING THIS MATTER

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~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY NOBIS

PRESERVATION COPY

AGE 2 RUDKLI 1517 1-07-54 ~~SECRET~~
OF THE STRAITS TO EITHER THE UNITED NATIONS OR THE WORLD COURT,
IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT FOUR COUNTRIES HAD BORDERS IN THE
GULF. HE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD NOT SUBMIT THE QUESTION TO
THE UN BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS NORMALLY TREATED RESOLUTIONS OF THE
UN NOT FAVORABLE TO THEM AS "PIECES OF PAPER". HE SAID THAT
HE DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD COURT
TO ANSWER SPECIFICALLY ABOUT REFERRING THE MATTER TO THE
WORLD COURT FOR DECISION BUT WOULD CONSULT HIS LEGAL ADVISERS.
THIS WAS QUALIFIED BY SAYING THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO UNDERTAKE
ANY COURSE OF ACTION THAT WOULD TAKE "YEARS" TO DECIDE.

9. HE ALSO STATED THAT EVEN IF HE AGREED ON SOME OTHER
COURSE OF ACTION, ANY OTHER COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE STRONGLY
OPPOSED BY ALL ARAB COUNTRIES WHO WERE NOW HIS ALLIES. ON
THIS POINT HE SEEMED ON THE ONE HAND ADAMANT ABOUT THE POSITION
HE HAD TAKEN IN THE STRAITS AND YET HE DID NOT RULE OUT
COMPLETELY POSSIBILITY OF A WORLD COURT REVIEW IF IT COULD
BE DONE SPEEDILY. FOR THE TIME BEING I THINK HE WILL
REMAIN FIRM.

10. HE WAS ASKED IF HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ISRAEL
AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN THOUGH HE MIGHT HAVE EMOTIONAL AND
LEGAL FEELINGS CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUNTRY
IN PALESTINE. NASSER REPLIED BY SAYING THAT HE DID NOT

PAGE 6 RUDKLI 1517 1-07-54 ~~SECRET~~

BELIEVE STABLE AND LASTING PEACE COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT
DISPOSING OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. HE WAS ASKED IF THIS COULD
BE DONE BY COMPENSATION AS WELL AS SOME LIMITED RETURN OF
REFUGEES. HE REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT PRACTICALLY ALL REFUGEES
WOULD RETURN IF PERMITTED AND THAT EVEN IF COMPENSATION WERE
PAID THEY WOULD NOT BE SATISFIED BUT WOULD CONTINUE TO AGITATE
FOR RETURN TO PALESTINE. HE WENT INTO LONG DISCOURSE ON ARAB
MENTALITY AS IT AFFECTS THEIR FEELINGS TOWARD THE PLACE
WHERE THEY WERE BORN AND REARED.

11. NASSER STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN PREPARED TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT
WITH THE MONETARY FUND BUT HAD JUST RECEIVED A LETTER SAYING
THAT THE FUND WISHED TO REVIEW THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH
EGYPT FURTHER. HE THEN STATED HE WAS GLAD HE HAD NOT SIGNED THE
AGREEMENT WITH THE FUND BECAUSE THEY WERE UNREASONABLE AND LEFT
HIM NO FLEXIBILITY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO
BE SUBJECT TO ECONOMIC PRESSURE. IT WAS EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT
NEITHER THE FUND OR LOCAL AMERICAN BANKS WERE IN FACT EXERTING
PRESSURE WHEN THEY DID NOT COMPLY WITH NATIONAL REQUESTS
SINCE THEY WERE ALL GOVERNED BY STRICT RULES THAT LIMITED
THEIR OWN FLEXIBILITY IN MAKING LOANS TO COUNTRIES THAT DID
NOT COMPLY WITH ALL REGULATIONS.

GP-1. WELLMAN
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY NODIS

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PRESERVATION COPY

EYES ONLY FOR PRESIDENT AND SECSTATE FROM ROBERT ANDERSON

12. NASSER EXPRESSED KEEN DESIRE TO HAVE FRIENDSHIP OF AMERICAN PEOPLE AND AMERICAN GOVT EXPLAINING THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WAS HE A COMMUNIST. ON OTHER HAND, HE FELT THAT US POLICY WAS MOTIVATED LARGELY BY THE LARGE JEWISH VOTE IN US AND THAT AMERICAN GOVT WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO OPPOSE THIS VOTING STRENGTH. HE THEN CALLED ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT EISENHOWER HAD TAKEN A STRONG POSITION IN 1956 AGAINST ISRAELI INVASION AND THIS HAD NOT HURT HIM POLITICALLY.

13. HE SEEMED ANXIOUS TO HAVE ZAKARIA MOHIEDDIN EXPLAIN HIS POSITION DIRECTLY TO US GOVT AND SAID HE HOPED WE WOULD TAKE THE LONG VIEW BECAUSE THE ARAB COUNTRIES STRETCHED FROM MOROCCO ON THE WEST TO PAKISTAN ON THE EAST AND THAT

PAGE 2 RUDKLI 1517/2 ~~T O P S E C R E T~~

NOW HE EVEN HAD THE SUPPORT OF PAKISTAN AND INDIA. HE DID NOT SEE HOW A MINORITY IN THE US COULD INFLUENCE US POLICY TO OPPOSE WHAT SUCH A VAST REGION AND SUCH LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE BELIEVED PROPER. IT WAS EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT THE US GOVT WAS NOT MOTIVATED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS BUT WAS CONCERNED ESSENTIALLY IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND THE INTEGRITY OF COUNTRIES.

14. AT THIS TIME NASSER SAID THAT IF THE POLICY WAS FOR ARABS AND ISRAELIS TO LIVE TOGETHER HARMONIOUSLY AND ISRAEL SHOULD ALLOW A MILLION REFUGEES TO COME BACK TO PALESTINE, WHICH WOULD SOLVE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM AND STILL THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE TWO MILLION OF THEIR OWN CITIZENS IN THE SAME COUNTRY, THIS, HE SAID, WOULD BE TRUE "LIVING TOGETHER".

15. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE FELT US WAS TAKING THE LEAD IN PEACE EFFORTS BUT THAT THESE EFFORTS WERE ORIENTED TOWARD ISRAEL AND NOT TOWARD THE ARAB POINT OF VIEW. HE KEPT REASSURING ME THAT HE WAS NOT GOING TO START A WAR BUT THAT HE WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL GROUPS AND THAT HE WOULD INTERVENE IN ANY ACTUAL CONFLICT BEGUN. HE STATED THAT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES JORDANIAN TROOPS, INsofar AS THE ISRAELI PROBLEM WAS CONCERNED, WERE UNDER UAR COMMAND. THIS OF COUSE IS APPLICABLE TO OTHER TROOPS SUCH AS IRAQIS AND ALGERIANS WHO WERE REPORTING FOR DUTY.

16. THIS I THINK SUMMARIZES THE BASIC POINTS OF OUR

NASSER AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE SYRIANS WERE TAKING UNILATERAL ACTION DESIGNED TO FORCE A CONFRONTATION. IT WAS BECAUSE OF HIS CONCERN ON THIS SUBJECT THAT HE WAS ASKED IF HE WOULD INTERVENE EVEN IF THE SYRIANS ACTED AGAINST

PAGE 5 RUDKLI 1517/2 ~~T O P S E C R E T~~
UAR DESIRES AND THE REPLY WAS AFFIRMATIVE.

3P-1. WELLMAN
3T

PRESERVATION COPY

CONVERSATION ON WHICH I WILL ELABORATE FURTHER ON MY RETURN.

17. FOR YOUR GENERAL INFORMATION I SPENT THREE DAYS IN BEIRUT BEFORE GOING TO CAIRO. DURING THIS VISIT I SAW SAUDI ARABS, KUWAITIS AND IRAQIS, AS WELL AS LEBANESE. THEY ARE PEOPLE WHO ARE GENERALLY MODERATE AND HAVE A TENDENCY TO OPPOSE NASSER. AT THIS TIME THEY WERE ALL APPLAUDING NASSER'S ACTION, INSISTING ON THE CLOSING OF THE GULF OF AQABA AND TAKING A POSITION THAT THE US WAS SUPPORTING A MINORITY FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES. I AM IMPRESSED MORE BECAUSE OF THE QUALITY OF THE PEOPLE WHO MADE THESE ASSERTIONS THAN THE FACT THAT THEY WERE MADE. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD SEEM DESIRABLE THAT WHATEVER INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE THOUGHT PROPER IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE INITIATIVE COULD BE TAKEN BY SOME COUNTRY OTHER THAN US AND THAT US BE IN A POSITION OF SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO SECURE PEACE RATHER THAN LEADERSHIP WHICH SEEMS TO BE CONSTRUED AS FAVORING ISRAELI CAUSE.

17. DURING OUR CONVERSATION NASSER WAS RELAXED, IN SPORT CLOTHES, AND SEEMED CONFIDENT BOTH OF HIS INTELLIGENCE AND OF HIS MILITARY CAPABILITY. WE HAD NO DISCUSSION RE SOVIETS EXCEPT HIS ASSERTION THAT HE WAS NOT AND WOULD NOT BE

COMMUNIST. I BELIEVE HE WOULD REGARD ANY EFFORT TO OPEN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AS HOSTILE AND ANY ACT OF AGGRESSION, WHETHER ORIGINATING FROM ISRAEL OR RESULTING FROM ACTIONS IN SYRIA BY THE TERRORIST GROUPS, WOULD BRING RESPONSE. HE STATED THAT HIS TARGET SYSTEM WAS PREPARED AND THAT THIS TIME HE WOULD BE READY.

18. I AM PROCEEDING TO SEND MESSAGE TO CAIRO THROUGH US EMBASSY TO NASSER WHICH WILL RESULT IN ZAKARIA MOHIEDDIN ARRIVING IN NEW YORK PRESUMABLY SUNDAY OR EARLY IN WEEK. I WILL RETURN TO

NEW YORK SATURDAY AFTERNOON AND WILL BE AVAILABLE TO COME TO WASHINGTON SUNDAY OR THEREAFTER. I CAN BE REACHED THROUGH EMBASSY HERE TODAY AND TOMORROW MORNING, IF DESIRED.

19. UPON REREADING THIS TEXT I WANT TO MAKE CLEAR AS I UNDERSTAND IT UAR HAS MILITARY COMMAND OVER ITS OWN TROOPS, THE JORDANIAN TROOPS AS RELATED TO ANY ISRAELI PROBLEM, THE TROOPS COMMITTED BY IRAQ, ALGERIA OR ANY COUNTRY SENDING TROOPS, BUT DOES NOT INCLUDE COMMAND OVER SYRIAN TROOPS. IT IS BECAUSE OF THIS LATTER SITUATION WHICH I THINK BOTHERS NASSER AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE SYRIANS MIGHT UNDERTAKE UNILATERAL ACTION DESIGNED TO FORCE A CONFRONTATION. IT WAS BECAUSE OF HIS CONCERN ON THIS SUBJECT THAT HE WAS ASKED IF HE WOULD INTERVENE EVEN IF THE SYRIANS ACTED AGAINST

GP-1. WELLMAN
BT

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

123

Pres file

Friday, June 2, 1967 -- 9:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

This lucid exchange between Yost and UAR Foreign Minister Riad clarifies the heart of the issue at the moment.

1. Riad says they will let everything through except oil; and that on that basis they are prepared to let Israel submit the issue to the International Court of Justice.

2. Therefore, the question is whether they have nailed their flag to this or they are sending Mohieddin over here to negotiate something for oil.

W. W. Rostow

Cairo 8349 -- 2 sections

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7LCJ 83-160
By Reg/ics, NARA, Date 6-4-91

~~SECRET~~

1967 JUN 2 11 59

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O 020842Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3186
INFO RUEHDT/QS MISSION USUN IMMEDIATE 228
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 299
STATE-GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 8349 SECTION ONE OF TWO

Restow

EXDIS

1. YOST MADE PRIVATE CALL LAST EVENING ON FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD WHO WAS COLLEAGUE IN SYRIA AND AT UN. RIAD HELD FORTH FOR HOUR AND HALF WITH INTENSE AND UNCHARACTERISTIC EMOTION AND BITTERNESS.

2. FIRST HOUR LARGELY DEVOTED TO COMPLAINTS AGAINST US AND ISRAEL. HE SAID HE HAD GIVEN UP HOPE OF US EVER DEALING IMPARTIALLY WITH ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUES AND HAD CONCLUDED POLITICAL PRESSURES INSIDE US WOULD ALWAYS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR USG TO SUPPORT MEASURES IN OR OUT OF THE UN WHICH ISRAEL OPPOSES. HE CITED RECENT STATEMENTS US SENATORS, "PROVOCATIVE" DECLARATIONS COMMANDER SIXTH

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 8349B/1 ~~SECRET~~
FLEET, AND "ONE-SIDED" PRESENTATION US PRESS AS LATEST EVIDENCE SUPPORTING HIS CONCLUSIONS. YOST EXPLAINED CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING US POLICY IN NEAR EAST BUT MADE LITTLE IMPRESSION.

3. RIAD DEALT AT SOME LENGTH WITH ISRAELI REFUSAL TO OBSERVE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS AND REPEATED VIOLATIONS UN RESOLUTIONS, EMPHASIZING PARTICULARLY SEIZURE OF EL AUJA IN 1955, BEN GURION'S DENUNCIATION OF EGYPT-ISRAEL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, OCCUPATION OF DEMILITARIZED ZONES ALONG SYRIAN AND JORDANIAN BORDERS, DISPROPORTIONATE REPRISAL RAIDS AND SO ON. HE SPOKE OF HIS OWN AND OTHER ARAB EFFORTS AT UN TO REVIVE EIMAC AND ALLUDED TO DRAFT RESOLUTION JUST SUBMITTED TO SC BY UAR. HE SAID HE HAD JUST HAD PHONE CALL FROM EL KONY REPORTING OBJECTION SOME SC MEMBERS TO DEROGATORY PREAMBULAR REFERENCES TO ISRAEL AND SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED EL KONY TO DROP ALL SUCH REFERENCES AND LIMIT DRAFT TO TWO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS CALLING FOR REVIVAL EIMAC AND REPORT TO SYG WITHIN TWO WEEKS. HE ADDED HOWEVER THAT HE IS AWARE THIS DRAFT RESOLUTION WILL BE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NEJ 00-299

By cbm, NARA Date 4-4-01

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BT
~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 8349 SECTION TWO OF TWO

EXDIS

11. CONVERSATION CLOSED WITH RIAD SAYING, THAT, WHILE HE IS RECEIVING LENGTHY REPORTS FROM KAMEL, HE IS STILL CONFUSED AS TO US POLICY AND INTENTIONS. HE READS STORIES OF ORGANIZATION OF MARITIME POWERS, LIKE 1956 CANAL USERS ASSOCIATION, TO TAKE FORCIBLE ACTION TO OPEN STRAITS AND OF MOVEMENTS OF SIXTH FLEET AND BRITISH FLEET, ARE WE GOING TO ATTACK UAR, HE INQUIRED. HE EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT THERE CAN BE NO YIELDING ON STRAITS BUT THAT UAR'S INTENTIONS ARE PEACEFUL. HE SAID HE WOULD APPRECIATE FURTHER CLARIFICATION US POLICY. YOST REITERATED OUR VIEWS ON BASIS HIGH LEVEL PUBLIC STATEMENTS BUT SAID IN HIS REPORT TO WASHINGTON HE WOULD EMPHASIZE MINISTER'S CONTINUED UNCERTAINTY

~~PAGE 2 RUEIVGR 8349B/2 SECRET~~
AS TO US POLICY.

12. AT END CONVERSATION YOST EXPRESSED HOPE THERE MIGHT BE EARLY OPPORTUNITY FOR AMBASSADOR NOLTE TO PRESENT CREDENTIALS AND EMPHASIZED DESIRABILITY OF CLOSE DIPLOMATIC CONTACT DURING THIS CRITICAL TIME. RIAD AGREED BUT NOTED THERE ARE SEVEN AMBASSADORS WAITING TO PRESENT CREDENTIALS, THAT PRESIDENT IS EXTREMELY BUSY AND THAT HE COULD GIVE NO ASSURANCE OF EARLY OPPORTUNITY. HE ASKED ME, HOWEVER, TO INFORM AMBASSADOR NOLTE THAT HE SHOULD CARRY ON BUSINESS EXACTLY AS THOUGH HE HAD PRESENTED CREDENTIALS AND SHOULD FEEL FREE TO CALL ON MINISTER AT ANY TIME AND TO SEE ANYONE ELSE WITH WHOM HE WISHED TO DO BUSINESS.

13. CONVERSATION CLOSED WITH MINISTER SUGGESTING ANOTHER MEETING BEFORE YOST DEPARTS. NOLTE
BT

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

NNNN

PREPARATION COPY

PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 8349B/1 ~~SECRET~~

UNACCEPTABLE TO ISRAELAND THAT US WILL THEREFORE, THOUGH IT MAY BE EMBARRASSED, FIND SOME MEANS OF KILLING RESOLUTION.

4. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT, WHILE EGYPT HAS NO QUARREL WITH ISRAEL, HEART OF ARAB-ISRAEL ISSUE IS FATE OF MORE THAN ONE MILLION REFUGEES. THIS CAN NEVER BE FORGOTTEN BY ARABS. TREATMENT OF REFUGEES BY ZIONISTS IS TAUGHT EVERY SCHOOL CHILD AND ISSUE WILL NOT DIE.

5. AS TO PRESENT CRISIS THERE IS EXTRAORDINARILY UNITY AMONG ARABS WHICH WILL NOT BE SHAKEN BY THREATS. UARG UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM ARMY OFFICERS TO TAKE MORE VIGOROUS ACTION. IT IS RESISTING THIS PRESSURE BUT IS MOBILIZING PUBLIC OPINION IN PREPARATION FOR PROBABLE ATTACK BY ISRAEL OR OTHERS. PERHAPS ONLY WAY OUT OF IMPASSE, HE DECLARED AT ONE POINT, MAY BE SHORT WAR, APPEAL TO UNSC, WHICH WOULD THEN CALL FOR CEASE FIRE WITH WHICH UAR WOULD AT ONCE COMPLY. THEREAFTER MORE REALISTIC SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.

6. YOST EXPLAINED OUR APPREHENSION OF CONSEQUENCES AND POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS OF WAR AND OUR SO FAR SUCCESSFUL

PAGE 4 RUEIVCR 8349B/1 ~~SECRET~~

EFFORTS TO PERSUADE ISRAELIS TO HOLD OFF, CITING HOWEVER ISRAELI FEARS OF ARAB MOBILIZATION AGAINST THEM, NASSER'S REFERENCES TO RETURN TO 1948 STATUS QUO, AND ISRAELI CONVICTION OF VITAL INTEREST IN FREE PASSAGE THROUGH TIRAN STRAITS, AS WELL AS US POLICY ON THIS SUBJECT.

7. RIAD STATED IN STRONGEST TERMS, AND REITERATED SEVERAL TIMES DURING CONVERSATION, UARG DETERMINATION NOT TO ALTER ITS DECISION TO CLOSE STRAITS TO ISRAELI SHIPS AND STRATEGIC MATERIALS INCLUDING OIL. HE SAID THAT TWENTY DAYS AGO UAR HAD EVERY EXPECTATION THIS WOULD BE QUIET NORMAL SUMMER. THREATENED ATTACK ON SYRIA HAD TAKEN THEM BY SURPRISE AND THEY HAD HAD TO REACT BY REQUESTING UNEF WITHDRAWAL. HOWEVER, REOCCUPATION OF SHARM EL SHEIKH HAD MADE INEVITABLE RETURN TO STATUS QUO OF 1956 AND CLOSURE OF STRAITS. UAR CERTAINLY HAS SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO MAINTAIN STATE OF WAR AGAINST ISRAEL AND HENCE TO EXERCISE BELLIGERENT RIGHTS IN ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS. MINISTER SAID HE WOULD SEE NO OBJECTION TO ISRAEL PRESENTING COMPLAINT ON THIS ISSUE TO ICJ IF IT SO DESIRED. FIRM PUBLIC POSITION HAS BEEN TAKEN ON CLOSURE

PROSECUTION COPY

PAGE 5 RUEIVCR 8349B/1 ~~SECRET~~

STRAITS AND NASSER'S POSITION IN ARAB WORLD WOULD BE DESTROYED IF HE SHOULD YIELD. UAR HAS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO FIGHT "ANYONE" WHO ENDEAVORS TO FORCE PASSAGE OF STRAITS.

8. ON OTHER HAND, IF OIL IS KEPT AWAY FROM STRAITS, THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM. HE NOTED EFFORTS TO PERSUADE IRAN TO PREVENT OIL SHIPMENTS OVER THIS ROUTE, REFERRED TO PRESIDENT TUBMAN'S "WISE" DECISION CONCERNING LIBERIAN TANKERS AND ADDED, "IF US REALLY WISHES TO BE HELPFUL" IT MIGHT URGE US OIL COMPANIES TO REFRAIN FROM MAKING SHIPMENTS OVER THIS ROUTE. ISRAEL CAN BE OTHERWISE SUPPLIED AND PROBLEM IS NOT ECONOMIC BUT PURELY PSYCHOLOGICAL.

9. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION THIS ISSUE, YOST SAID HE HAD HEARD CONSIDERABLE APPREHENSION EXPRESSED THAT UAR NOT ONLY INSISTS ON CLOSING STRAITS BUT WILL PROCEED TO OTHER DEMANDS ALSO UNACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL. RIAD REPLIED THAT, WHILE AS HE HAD SAID REFUGEE PROBLEM IS UNDERLYING CAUSE OF DIFFICULTIES, UAR HAS NO OTHER DEMANDS. HE BELIEVES VERY STRONGLY IT WOULD BE IN GENERAL INTEREST

PAGE 6 RUEIVCR 8349B/1 ~~SECRET~~

FOR EIMAC TO BE RECONSTITUTED AND UNTSO OBSERVERS REACTIVATED ALONG ISRAEL-UAR FRONTIER. OTHERWISE, INCIDENTS SURE TO OCCUR. HE CITED ISRAEL SEIZURE FIVE MAN UAR PATROL FEW DAYS AGO, FACT PATROL NOT YET RELEASED AND PROBABILITY THAT, IN ABSENCE UNTSO WHICH COULD EFFECT RELEASE, UAR FORCES WILL HAVE TO SEIZE CORRESPONDING ISRAELI PATROL. HOWEVER, HE WAS PRACTICALLY CERTAIN ISRAEL WOULD NOT AGREE TO REVIVAL EIMAC SINCE IT WOULD MEAN THEY WOULD HAVE TO GIVE UP EL AUJA.

10. HE ALSO WARNED THAT UAR COULD NOT TOLERATE FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL AGGRESSIVE ISRAELI ACTIONS ON SYRIAN OR JORDANIAN FRONTIERS SUCH AS ES SAMU RAID OR SHOOTING DOWN SYRIAN PLANES OVER SYRIA AND JORDAN. CONSEQUENCES OF INCIDENTS THIS KIND WOULD BE WAR AND GREAT DESTRUCTION ON BOTH SIDES. NOLTE

BT

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

NNNN

THIS IS A LOANED COPY

June 2, 1967

From the President to Ambassador David Bruce

Would you deliver personally to Lord Harlech the following message:

Mrs. Johnson and I wish to express our deep regret and sympathy at this terrible tragedy.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 2, 1967

125
Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached is a short note from
Secretary Rusk asking that you see
Tommy Thompson while he is in
Washington (June 2-15).

fr

Francis M. Bator

Marvin Watson to set up appt _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

OK
W

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

2135
125a

June 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment for
Ambassador Thompson

Recommendation:

That you receive Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson when he is in Washington on consultation, June 2 - June 15.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Ambassador Thompson will arrive in Washington on the evening of June 2 and plans to be here until June 15, when he will return to Moscow. I believe you would find it useful to talk with him at some time during his stay in the United States. You saw him last in late December 1966.

DR

Dean Rusk

126

~~SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

June 2, 1967

Bob --

The President wanted you to have
a copy of my memorandum of
conversation with Evron.

W. W. Rostow

Secretary McNamara

Memo to the President, Wed., May 31, 1967, 6:45 p.m.
conversation: W. W. Rostow and Minister Evron of Israeli Embassy.

rlh

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By MS, NARA, Date 6-3-91

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

127

Pres file

June 2, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith a shortened redraft done at
State as the basis for a short state-
ment tomorrow.

It adds to May 23 the theme:
don't fire the first shot.

WWR

127a

~~SECRET~~ Enclosures
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

June 2, 1967

EXDIS

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
Mr. Douglas Cater
The White House

This draft presidential statement on the middle east crisis has been approved by Messrs. Katzenbach, E. Rostow, Battle and Sisco. I have not been able to show it to Secretary Rusk, so please let me have any changes to show him in the morning.

Benjamin H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

~~SECRET~~ Enclosures

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

June 2, 1967

I thought it was time to give you another brief report on the crisis in the Middle East, and what we and the other nations are doing to prevent a war there.

Our position with regard to the present crisis rests on two fair and evenhanded principles of general application.

The first is that we support the territorial integrity and political independence of all the countries of the Middle East. We stand firmly against aggression there -- by anyone and in any form -- as we do elsewhere. This has been the policy of the United States under four Presidents -- President Truman, President Eisenhower, President Kennedy and myself.

It is a bipartisan policy which we have applied evenhandedly over the past twenty years.

Our second principle is support of the right of the world community to the free use of the international waters and waterways. As a maritime nation the United States has always had a vital interest in upholding freedom of the seas. Anyone who doubts the depth of our commitment to the principle of freedom of the seas need only look to our history.

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 719 83-160

By reg/ies NARA, Date 6-4-91

PRESERVATION COPY

Our position on the application of this principle to the Strait of Tiran goes back to 1957. President Eisenhower then said:

"With reference to the passage into and through the Gulf of Acaba we expressed the conviction that the Gulf constitutes international waters, and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf. We announced that the United States was prepared to exercise this right itself and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right."

On May 23, I made it clear that the United States continues firmly to support this principle.

At this moment, the central focal point of our quest for a peaceful solution is the United Nations. And the focal point of our efforts in the United Nations is to mobilize support for the Secretary General's recommendation for a breathing spell during which diplomacy would have its chance to work for a lasting settlement that might remove the grim shadow of war.

Such a proposal would not prejudice anyone's rights or legitimate interests. It would ask all parties to comply with the Secretary General's appeal to exercise restraint.

Under such a proposal, the United Arab Republic would not use force to carry out its announced policy of restricting shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba, and Israel would not use force by way of retaliation against the announcement by the United Arab Republic with respect to the Strait of Tiran.

Ships of all flags have been able to sail these waters peacefully for the past eleven years -- without prejudice to any nation. Only a sudden unilateral move backed by the declared intent to use force now threatens to change that situation. Surely it should not be beyond the power of modern diplomacy to find a peaceful solution for a problem in which the vital interests of all nations have been accommodated successfully until so recently.

We and the United Kingdom are consulting with other Maritime powers to secure a Declaration asserting the right of passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

This is the course your government has urged with great earnestness on both sides -- not to fire the first shot. If the first shot can be prevented, then the world has a chance to find a peaceful solution and so to prevent tragic and unnecessary bloodshed.

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

-4-

We must avoid such a tragedy. The world cannot afford it. Common humanity demands that all nations and all peoples work together to prevent it. We earnestly pray that our efforts, in the United Nations and outside it, may lead us to peace in the Middle East.

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

June 2, 1967

I thought it was time to give you another brief report on the crisis in the Middle East, and what we and the other nations are doing to prevent a war there.

Our position with regard to the present crisis rests on two fair and evenhanded principles of general application.

The first is that we support the territorial integrity and political independence of all the countries of the Middle East. We stand firmly against aggression there -- by anyone and in any form -- as we do elsewhere. This has been the policy of the United States under four Presidents -- President Truman, President Eisenhower, President Kennedy and myself.

It is a bipartisan policy which we have applied evenhandedly over the past twenty years.

Our second principle is support of the right of the world community to the free use of the international waters and waterways. As a maritime nation the United States has always had a vital interest in upholding freedom of the seas. Anyone who doubts the depth of our commitment to the principle of freedom of the seas need only look to our history.

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7729 83-160

By 18/101 NARA Date 1-4-9

Our position on the application of this principle to the Strait of Tiran goes back to 1957. President Eisenhower then said:

"With reference to the passage into and through the Gulf of Aqaba, we expressed the conviction that the Gulf constitutes international waters, and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf. We announced that the United States was prepared to exercise this right itself and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right."

On May 23, I made it clear that the United States continues firmly to support this principle.

At this moment, the central focal point of our quest for a peaceful solution is the United Nations. And the focal point of our efforts in the United Nations is to mobilize support for the Secretary General's recommendation for a breathing spell during which diplomacy would have its chance to work for a lasting settlement that might remove the grim shadow of war.

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This is the course your government has urged with great earnestness on both sides -- not to fire the first shot. If the first shot can be prevented, then the world has a chance to find a peaceful solution and so to prevent tragic and unnecessary bloodshed.

SECRET EXDIS

-4-

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SECRET EXDIS

PRESERVATION COPY

June 2, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a
farewell message to Harold Wilson.
If you approve, it will be wired to him
after his departure tomorrow.

Francis M. Bator

OK ✓

No

Speak to me

~~122~~
2. Pres file

103a

PROPOSED MESSAGE

My good friend:

It was very good to see you again. As always, our talks together were most helpful. Your friendship, and that of the British people, is a great comfort in these troubled times.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in wishing you and Mrs. Wilson a pleasant journey home.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 1, 1967
4:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, on behalf of
Sec. Rusk, a preliminary talking
paper for your meeting with
Pachachi.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

129
Free file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 6-3-91

129a

CONFIDENTIAL

June 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi,
June 1, 6:45 P.M.

You have agreed to receive Dr. Adnan Pachachi, Foreign Minister of Iraq on June 1, at 6:45 p.m. Dr. Pachachi has come to the U.S. to explain the Arab point of view in the current Arab-Israeli political crisis.

Dr. Pachachi has been Foreign Minister of Iraq since April, 1966. He had previously been permanent representative of Iraq to the United Nations where he often served as the principal spokesman and negotiator of the Arab bloc in dealing with the United States on Arab-Israeli affairs. Dr. Pachachi received his higher education in the United States, respects American institutions, and has developed good working relationships with U.S. officials. He speaks excellent English. In diplomatic debates he is highly articulate, stubborn but reasonable.

Dr. Pachachi has just been in Cairo and can be expected to give Cairo's views on the current crisis but with more detachment. Iraq maintains close ties with the UAR and attempts to maintain unity of policy with the latter except when this might contradict vital Iraqi national interests. It is possible that Pachachi might attempt to act as the UAR's broker in the present crisis. He will undoubtedly adopt the UAR legal position on the status of the Gulf of Aqaba.

Following are points which you and others may wish to make in your discussions with Dr. Pachachi:

1. The United States is seeking to avoid hostilities and to

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 76983-166
By sp/uc, NARA, Date 6-4-91

achieve a resolution of the crisis through the United Nations if possible. We fully back the Secretary General's efforts to find ways to re-establish peace in the Middle East. We agree with his assessment that the current crisis is more serious than at any time since 1956.

2. We value our relations with the Arab world and realize the mutual danger we could suffer if a peaceful solution by the international community could not be attained.

3. We have urged all members of the Security Council to support the Secretary-General in his efforts to find a peaceful solution to the problem. We believe that a breathing spell not impairing free passage through the Strait of Tiran is needed for diplomatic activities to take place, and for the Council's more deliberate disposition of the underlying issues. We are in favor of a resolution endorsing the Secretary-General's appeal to all parties concerned to exercise special restraint, to forego belligerence, and to avoid all other actions which could increase tensions.

4. In the pursuance of this effort we have dissuaded the Israelis, for the time being, from taking military actions. We now need a conciliatory approach on the part of the Arabs.

5. Our legal position on the Gulf of Aqaba is based on international law and on Article 16, para. 4, of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1958 and was clearly stated by you on May 23. It is important that all concerned understand the depth and firmness of our commitment to free passage through the Strait of Tiran for the ships of all nations.

6. This principle has nothing to do with Israel and the UAR. The second principle on which our position rests is equally important: We support the territorial integrity and political independence of all the countries of the Middle East. This principle has been affirmed by four American Presidents. It

has been invoked to protect Egypt against Israel, in 1956, in the Lebanon crisis of 1958, and in behalf of other Arab governments as well.

We wish all the friendly Arab governments thoroughly to understand this fact, and recall the occasions when the principle was invoked in their behalf.

7. We believe that effective steps must be taken to reaffirm the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement and revitalize the Armistice machinery (we note that the UAR also called for this in the May 29 Security Council meeting).

We will be sending over later accounts of Pachachi's discussions today with Ambassador Goldberg (8:00 a.m.), myself (3:30 p.m.) and Secretary Rusk (5:00 p.m.). We will make certain that Dr. Pachachi agrees to the same conditions of approach and secrecy regarding his conversation with you as in the case of Foreign Minister Eban.

Eugene V. Rostow

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 1, 1967
4:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith is an evenhanded
view from Yost in Cairo.

W. W. Rostow

Cairo 8333

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 123, NARA, Date 6-3-91

1302

SECRET/EXDIS

Thursday, June 1, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM MR. YOST (Cairo, 8333)

Agree that Arab unity is a fragile affair and the present display will not last indefinitely. However, there is agreement among those I have consulted that it has been extremely well orchestrated and has acquired sufficient momentum to carry it for some time, certainly several weeks.

Although a wave of popular enthusiasm is helpful, and can be turned on and off with relative ease, it is not essential, at least in the UAR, to maintain a firm military and political posture. This depends almost wholly on the leaders and armed forces. There is little likelihood of "battle fatigue" among either of these in the near future.

There is little question that the passage of time without a serious challenge to the UAR or Arab positions would create a more flexible situation and less heated atmosphere. However, a continued public challenge to UAR position on Aqaba and reports of maritime powers preparing to break the blockade by force constitute a built-in issue on which to keep tempers at a high pitch and maintain Arab unity at the current or higher level.

I recognize the problem the Department faces in endeavoring to restrain the Israelis from military action by assuring them of alternative means of breaking the blockade. However, as long as the prospect either of Israeli attack or Western use of force in the Straits seems imminent, Arab excitement and unity will probably mount rather than decline.

The crisis could probably be defused if a way could be found to put the Aqaba issue on ice for a few weeks. However, this would presumably require either the UAR temporarily permitting oil to pass or Israel temporarily acquiescing in oil being excluded. We doubt Nasser could tolerate the former without an unacceptable loss of face.

If a crisis could be defused in this respect, we believe, barring accidents or provocations, a modus vivendi governing other elements of the problem, such as UN observers along the UAR-Israeli frontier, could probably be worked out. Under these circumstances, passions would cool off and traditional Arab diversity would be likely to reassert itself.

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SECRET/EXDIS

Authority NLT 82-146

By sp/ics, NARA, Date 6-4-91

This estimate is based on the assumption, which I am inclined to believe is correct but cannot vouch for, that Nasser will be satisfied at this juncture with a substantial restoration of the status quo ante 1956 and will not exploit or be swept along by the present Arab euphoria to claim further gains at Israeli expense. Of course, the longer the crisis continues at the current temperature the greater is the danger the bids might be riased on both sides.

Thursday, June 1, 1967 -- 3:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will recall you said -- some time ago -- that you would see John Oakes after his return from Viet Nam.

Oakes will be back in Washington June 15-16; from about 2:00 p.m. Thursday, 15th, until about 3:00 p.m. Friday, 16th.

W. W. Rostow

Have Marvin set a time _____

Can't see _____

See me _____

~~XXW~~

RLN

Thurs June 1, 1967
3 pm

132

MR. PRESIDENT:

This may have appeared in the Washington Post, but I didn't see it. If you haven't seen it, I felt it would brighten the day.

W. W. R.

Attachment (Art Buchwald column)

ART BUCHWALD

A Dove Who's Lost His Temper

WASHINGTON—This has been a bad week for the doves and the hawks. Nasser's decision to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel has made hawks out of doves and doves out of hawks. The doves of the past want the United States to act immediately, and the hawks of Vietnam want us to cool it in the Middle East.

Even my friend Brinkerhoff, a devout pacifist, was in turmoil. When I saw him this week-end he was sticking a knife into a photograph of Nasser and screaming, "Kill! Kill!"

"Brinkerhoff, how can you talk that way when you've been one of the leading advocates of peace in the world?"

"I'm still for peace in the world, but you'll never have

it with that dirty rat Nasser in the Middle East. Kill!"

"Now, wait a minute, Brinkerhoff. If you're going to be a pacifist, you can't be going around screaming 'kill,' and stabbing photos of Nasser in the newspapers."

"That's how much you know about pacifists."

"Let me ask you this, Brinkerhoff. Would you advocate the use of force to reopen the Gulf of Aqaba to international shipping?"

"Only if we bomb Cairo first," Brinkerhoff said.

"But you're against bombing. Don't you remember, Brinkerhoff?"

"Stop telling me what I WAS against. Ask me what I'm for."

"All right, what are you for?"

"Blowing up the Aswan

Dam, B-52 raids on the Suez Canal and the complete defoliation of Jordan."

"If I didn't know you better, Brinkerhoff, I would think you've become a hawk."

"I'm not a hawk. I'm a dove who's lost his temper. I say there's only one solution to the Middle East crisis, and that's to escalate. Egypt must be made to pay for its aggression."

"But, Brinkerhoff, the hawks in the United States say the matter should be settled peacefully in the United Nations."

"The hawks are chicken. The United Nations can't settle anything. The only thing the Arabs understand is force. We should nuke 'em."

"Nuke 'em?"

"Give 'em a taste of nuclear

weapons and let's see what big shots they are then."

"But, Brinkerhoff, you marched in a parade three weeks ago carrying a sign which said 'Live and let live.'"

"I wasn't talking about Nasser and those Syrians. Besides, the United States has a commitment to Israel and they should honor it."

"Do you think the United States should go it alone if nobody else wants to help?"

"You bet your sweet life they should go it alone. I say bomb them back to the stone age."

"Brinkerhoff, you sound like Barry Goldwater."

"What's wrong with Goldwater? At least he knows what a bunch of dirty double-crossers the Russians are."

"Then you think we should stand up to the Russians on

the question of the Middle East?"

"The hell with standing up to the Russians. Let's nuke 'em."

"I wish you wouldn't keep saying that, Brinkerhoff. It doesn't sound like you."

"You haven't heard anything yet," he said. "You know my son Herbert, the one who said he was going to be a draft dodger?"

"Yes. What about him?"

"Well, he's joining the U.S. Marine Corps. He says if we don't stop the Commies in the Middle East, we'll be fighting on the beaches of Coney Island."

"He said that?"

"Why do you look so surprised?" Brinkerhoff said. "Haven't you ever heard of the Domino Theory?"

Thursday, June 1, 1967
3:15 p. m.

133

~~Confidential~~
MR. PRESIDENT:

Michael Palliser, Prime Minister Wilson's foreign policy aide, made these points in talking to me yesterday about your session with Wilson tomorrow.

1. He recommends you begin with the Middle East. He believes you should hear him on his political problems in the Cabinet: he is sure Wilson wishes to know what your problems are with the Congress and how you propose to handle them.
2. One reason for this judgment is that most of the other items on the agenda are colored by the Near East problem.
3. He wanted me to know the Prime Minister is all stirred up by reporting from Washington about him and his views. When I asked: What now? He said that Henry Brandon reported Wilson was thinking of moving to a more detached "middle" position on Viet Nam. This came up when the Vice President saw him. He feels aggrieved.
4. I limited myself to the observation that the Prime Minister would be talking to a President whose troubles with leaks were likely to outmatch his.

W. W. R.

(cc baton)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 3-27-98

Pres file~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 1, 1967
2:27 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith King Hussein asks
for your neutrality. Our Arab friends
really find it difficult to remember
what President Eisenhower had to do
to get the Israeli troops out of Sinai.

W. W. Rostow

Amman
Joubran 3932

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-4
By 118, NARA, Date 4-9-93

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 1, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMMAN, JORDAN (3932)

During his meeting with the Ambassador, the King said with great earnestness that he wished to propose to the President that he authorize the issuance of a public statement by a White House spokesman clarifying U.S. policy towards the current crisis which would include the following points:

- A. The U.S. Government seeks to be neutral between the parties to this dispute.
- B. The main objective of the U.S. Government is to preserve peace and it is willing to use its good offices to this end.
- C. The U.S. Government will not be responsible for hostilities in the Middle East and will not be a party to them.
- D. The U.S. Government will oppose any party who starts a war.

The King said that he was making this suggestion as an old friend of the U.S. He felt such a statement would be a contribution to peace and consistent with what the Arabs knew were the moral principles of the U.S.

Without such clarification, and however the crisis turned out, said the King, he was concerned that the U.S. could suffer an irretrievable loss among the Arabs.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLJ 82-212
By sp/ics, NARA, Date 6-4-91

~~SECRET~~

135
Pres file

Thursday, June 1, 1967 -- 2:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

This is to confirm the arrangements I made with Marv Watson and Secretary Rusk.

1. Sec. Rusk will see Iraqi Foreign Minister Pachachi at 5:00 p.m. today.
2. He will be here at 6:45 p.m. to report to you what he learned and to give you his recommendations for handling Pachachi.
3. You will see Pachachi after your discussion with Sec. Rusk.
4. Sec. Rusk will set the ground rules for this meeting; as you instructed, and Pachachi will be brought in through the southeast gate.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

134

Profile

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 1, 1967
2:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith:

1. The full flavor and feeling of one of our Arabist Ambassadors (Smythe, in Syria).
2. A shrewd Belgian Ambassador in Cairo who says, in effect, let Israel and Egypt have it out.

I have no recommendation to make; but wish you to have before you as wide a range of perspectives as possible.

W. W. Rostow

Damascus 1224

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-303
By CG, NARA Date 7-18-00

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RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 27
RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 344
RUQTBG/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 251
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 509
RUEIVCR/W EMBASSY CAIRO 353
RUQMJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 256
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 132
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 47
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK 189
RUQMLV/AMEMBASSY TELAVIV 276
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 150
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 104
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 59
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~~SECRET NOFORN~~ DAMASCUS 1224

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-6
By ing, NARA, Date 5-21-92

PAGE 2 RUQMDM 1224 ~~SECRET NOFORN~~
EXDIS
REF: STATE 204952

GRAB ISRAEL CRISIS

1. AFTER CAREFUL REVIEW REFTL, I CAN ONLY CONCUR WITH DISMAY IN CAIRO'S ASSERTION (CAIRO 8093) THAT SHAPE US POLICY TAKING IN PRESENT CRISIS SHARPLY DIVERGENT FROM VIEWS REPORTED AREA POSTS. APPEARS FIELD ASSESSMENTS HAVE PLAYED NO RPT NO ROLE IN POLICY FORMULATION. OUR APPRECIATION SITUATION CONTAINED DAMASCUS 1200. IF FULLY ENDORSE VIEWS BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, AMMAN, JIDDA, CAIRO, KUWAIT, ALGIERS AND OTHERS. NOT NECESSARY AT THIS POINT TO REPEAT ELOQUENT AND CONSISTENT ARGUMENTATION OF LATTER FOR, IN EFFECT, QTE HANDS OFF UNQTE POLICY IN CURRENT ARAB-ISRAEL CONFRONTATION.

2. THERE APPEARS TO BE CONSENSUS BEST MINDS, MOST KNOWLEDGABLE AREA EXPERTS THAT OUTLINE US POLICY TO DATE DIRECTLY OPPOSED SHROT AND ESPECIALLY LONG TERM US NATIONAL INTERESTS IN AREA. POLICY CHARTS COLLISION COURSE WITH MONOLITHIC NASSER-LED ARAB NATION. DETERIORATION US POSITION HAS BEEN SO RAPID THAT I BELIEVE WE FACED WITH FEW ALTERNATIVES BESIDE MOUNTING SALVAGE MISSION. PLAN QTE ISOLATE UAR FROM OUR ME FRIENDS UNQTE FEEBLE

POLICY CHARTS COLLISION COURSE WITH MONOLITHIC NASSER-LED ARAB NATION. DETERIORATION US POSITION HAS BEEN SO RATED THAT I BELIEVE WE FACED WITH FEW ALTERNATIVES BESIDE MOUNTING SALVAGE MISSION. PLAN QTE ISOLATE UAR FROM OUR ME FRIENDS UNQTE FEEBLE

PAGE 3 RUQMDM 1124 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

IF NOT RIDICULOUS HOPE, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT HUSAYN'S DRAMATIC TRIP TO CAIRO AND SOLIDARITY VIEWS ALL ARAB LEADERS WELL-DISPOSED TO US VS. OUR PRESENT POLICY STANCE.

3. US FIRM DETERMINATION KEEP TIRAN STRAITS OPEN EITHER THROUGH UN MECHANISM OR BY JOINT OPERATION MAJOR MARITIME POWERS SEEMS FOREDOOMED. CARDS ALREADY STACKED AGAINST ANY EFFECTIVE UN ACTION THIS SORT IN VIEW INDICATIONS SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT UAR STANCE, AND AMBIVALENCE SC MEMBERS, OTHERS NOT FULLY COMMITTED SUPPORT UAR, ARABS. ACTION BY MARITIME POWERS WOULD BE THINLY VEILED DIRECT US, UK INTERVENTION WHICH DESTINED PRODUCE PERILOUS CONFRONTATION.

4. US QTE EVENHANDED UNQTE ME POLICY IS VIEWED BY ARABS AS FRAUD, AND US ACTION DURING CURRENT CRISIS HAVE CONFIRMED THIS BELIEF. OUR ARAB FRIENDS HAVE PLEADED THAT WE SIMPLY TAKE OUR QTE EVEN-HAND UNQTE OFF. NEBULOUS COMMITMENTS WE HAVE RE TIRAN STRAITS MUST BE WEIGHED IN VIEW AREA CONSEQUENCES IF WE HONOR THEM. CONSENSUS INFORMED OPINION INDICATES DISASTER FOR US IF IT PUSHES TIRAN CLAIM EITHER IN MULTILATERAL GUISE OR UNILATERALLY.

5. MY VIEW OF SITUATION, PERHAPS OVERSIMPLIFIED, IS THAT US

PAGE 4 RUQMDM 1124 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

REAPING FULL HARVEST 20 YEAR AREA POLICY WHICH HAS REGARDED ISRAEL AS FULCRUM, HIGHEST PRIORITY INTEREST. THIS HAS RANKLED ARABS WHO NOW FEEL STRONG ENOUGH TO CHALLENGE US, HOPING JAR IT INTO FULL REALIZATION ITS TOTAL POSITION NOW IN JEOPARDY UNLESS IT REVISES ITS PRIORITIES IN LIGHT OVERALL US NATIONAL INTEREST. FAILING THIS, ARABS DETERMINED SMASH US INFLUENCE IN AREA (IN WHICH THEY EXPECT USSR BACKING). ON SCALES WE HAVE ISRAEL, AN UNVIABLE CLIENT STATE WHOSE TIES, VALUE TO US PRIMARILY EMOTIONAL, BALANCED WITH FULL RANGE VITAL STRATEGIC, POLITICAL, COMMERCIAL/ECONOMIC INTERESTS REPRESENTED BY ARAB STATES. THE FOLLY OF US PURSUING PRESENT POLICY OBVIOUS WITHOUT FURTHER ELABORATION.

GP-1. SMYTHE
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~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 8313

EXDIS

1. BELGIAN AMBASSADOR CARLIER, FORMER COLLEAGUE IN RABAT, EXPRESSED VIEW TO YOST THAT NASSER " WOULD NOT BUDGE AN INCH ON AQABA."

2. HE FELT THAT IT WOULD BE MOST DAMAGING TO WHOLE WESTERN POSITION IN NEAR EAST IF US AND UK ATTEMPTED TO BREAK BLOCKADE BY FORCE. HE ARGUED IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE THAT ISRAEL, IF IT CONSIDERS BLOCKADE INTOLERABLE, TAKE DIRECT MILITARY ACTION AGAINST UAR, RATHER THAN THAT WESTERN POWERS DO SO. HE BELIEVES THAT, IF US AND USSR STAY ON SIDELINES, FIGHTING WOULD BE OF SHORT DURATION, WITH BOTH SIDES GETTING BLOODY NOSE BUT ISRAEL COMING OFF SOMEWHAT BETTER.

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 8313B ~~SECRET~~

3. HE ARGUES RATHER CYNICALLY, AS DO SOME OTHERS HERE WHO ARE FED UP WITH INTERMINABLE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT, THAT ONLY AFTER SUCH BLOODLETTING WILL BOTH SIDES BE PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS NECESSARY TO LONG-TERM COEXISTENCE. OF COURSE HE SOMEWHAT RASHLY ASSUMES CONFLICT COULD BE CIRCUMSCRIBED IN SCOPE AND TIME.

NOLTE
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REPRODUCTION COPY

Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
 NLJ 99-301
 By is, NARA Date 4-24-00

Pres file

Thursday, June 1, 1967
1:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

This speech by Thang to a graduating class of Revolutionary Development cares is heartening for its courage, realism, and doctrine.

W. W. Rostow

TO: The Ambassador
and Members, U. S. Mission Council

137a
DATE: May 20, 1967

FROM: Ed Lansdale *Ed*

SUBJECT: Talk on Revolutionary Development

For your information, attached is a translation of a talk by General Nguyen duc Thang at the graduation of the 1/67 training class, RD Training Center, Vung Tau, on May 18. General Thang made a rough, oral translation while working on his final speech just before the ceremony and I noted it down, as in the attached.

The graduating class was the first one since the VC stepped up their terror campaign against RD teams. The audience (of about 3,000 graduates) was well aware of the terror attacks awaiting them after graduation. Of interest is the way General Thang discussed this subject. Of interest, also, is that a minute of silence was observed to commemorate those killed by the VC, with special mention of two persons. (Comment: Major Nguyen Be, Director of the RD Training Center, told me the next day that instructors and graduates had decided, just after the ceremony, to build a commemorative memorial at the Center for the heroes named in this talk.)

SLO:EGLansdale:rm

Talk by General Nguyen duc Thang
Minister of Revolutionary Development

At Graduation of Class 1/67, Revolutionary
Development Training Center, Vung Tau,
May 18, 1967

Mr. Prime Minister. Gentlemen. I thank the
Prime Minister warmly for being here with us this evening.

In the recent series of seminars, I discussed a very important problem with our cadres throughout the country. The problem is for all of us to be alert to the Viet Cong intent to kill Revolutionary Development cadres. My reason for doing this is because on 15 March 1967, the so-called "High Command of the Liberation of South Viet Nam Armed Forces" issued an order to all their guerrilla, regional, and regular troops. The order had three points. First, to consider the present RD cadres as a type of "puppet armed forces." Second, to try to kill the RD group leader and team leader. Third, to kill an RD cadre was said to be equivalent to killing "an American aggressor."

That order is really an admission by the enemy of his inability to stop us in our nation-building program. That order also is a high compliment to all our cadres throughout the country. I mean by that, that despite the fact that our cadre teams still have weaknesses and despite the fact that there are gaps in our program, the VC have begun to realize the threat to them of becoming isolated from the people, if they let our effort grow strong.

Since the first day of the year until now, the VC have launched many serious attempts aimed at disrupting our program. In this period, they have harassed or attacked our RD teams 324 times. 182 cadres have lost their lives for our noble cause. But, the VC have mistaken us and our resolve. They thought that it was enough to shoot a few rounds at us, to try to scare us into surrender by charging us. They fired at us. We fired back at them. They charged in attack. We defended. 341 VC were lying in the barbed wire around our hamlets afterwards. 35 VC surrendered to us. Ten crew-served and 76 individual weapons were captured by us from them. The RD teams attacked by the VC still remain in the hamlets, undaunted. Their morale, already high, has become higher.

Why did the VC select our teams as a prime target? They cannot tolerate us, because we are determined to bring security, social justice, and happiness to the people of the countryside. In contrast, the VC are determined to give the people nothing but hatred, misery, poverty, and fear. They cannot tolerate us, because we are trying our best to rebuild our suffering country. In contrast, they are determined to destroy our country, to make it suffer even more. They cannot tolerate us, because this year we are expanding our area of control; we are freeing many populous and rich areas that have been used by the VC as their supply bases for many years. They cannot tolerate us, because we are now starting to eat with the people, to fight alongside the people, to live with the people, to build with the people, as their true friends.

Because he was dedicated to our ideals, our comrade Bui van Dat, leader of Quang Ngai Group No. 10, fell on 26 February 1968, after many successive and massive attacks by a VC battalion, when he was protecting the people of Duc Hai Village.

Because she was dedicated to our ideals, our comrade Miss Dang thi Lang, cadre at Phu Chon, Xuan Loc (Long Khanh), was tied to a stake and shot through the head by the VC on 15 April 1967 -- when she distributed medicines to our fellow countrymen and asked them to go to the polls and elect their own Village Council.

We are deeply proud to have such heroes in our ranks. I beg all of you, trainees, instructors, all, to stand up with me and observe one minute of silence -- to commemorate the sublime sacrifice of our comrades Bui van Dat and Dang thi Lang -- and that of the 180 other cadres -- and of the ARVN servicemen who have given their all to Viet Nam in order to rebuild the countryside.

(The minute of silence was observed. Then a choral group sang the new Memorial Song of Revolutionary Development, "Tuong niem Can bo Xay-Dung Nong-Thon." It is a poem by Major Nguyen Be, set to music by a group of RD cadre recently.)

I order every cadre to go on, to be friendly with the peasants, to stay with them, to eat with them, to fight alongside them, and to build a new life with them. That is the right way to have the peasants on our side. That is the right way to make the VC lose the countryside. By doing what I said, you will have the support and cooperation of the people. When you enter a hamlet,

remember that you must respect the old men, love the children, and be very decent towards the women. Pay attention to neatness in your uniform. Pay the right price honestly when you buy anything. Don't kick peasants out of their homes to use the houses yourself. Men cadre have no right to stay with a widows' families. Be friendly with the people. Show them that you like them. The people will then be your friends and like you. Carry out all of your promises. Try to Chieu Hoi or destroy the Communist subversive agents. Eradicate the tyrannical officials. That is the only way that the people will have confidence in you, respect you, admire you, and stand up with you in order to dispel the gloomy life and build a brighter life. That is the only way to change the tears of the past in the countryside into the happy laughter of the future.

I also order all the cadres to cooperate fully with the ARVN units whose responsibility it is to provide security for our teams. Befriend the soldiers. Consider them as brothers in the same family.

Also, I remind you to be alert against the "binh van" (infiltrators, Fifth Columnists). The VC are experts at doing this. Their most successful strategy is the way they use beautiful women for this work.

I now tell you that in the months to come the struggle between our cadres and the VC underground agents will be grimly challenging. I now tell you frankly that you will meet with difficulties once back again in your Province, because the area where you will be operating -- although secured -- is not that safe. If you don't discover the VC subversive agents, to kill them, they will kill you. It will be difficult, too, because you must coordinate your efforts with those of public servants and servicemen in order to accomplish your mission. I know that you are able to overcome such difficulties. I ask you only not to be afraid of difficulties, not to surrender to suffering, not to get discouraged by criticism. Such criticism often comes from people who understand nothing about the countryside, from people who don't really know us, from people who intentionally don't want to accept us as their friends.

Don't forget that our struggle against the Communists is a long struggle. The side that will lose is the one that will get discouraged first. I wish for all of you a good trip back to your Provinces and good energy in your work so you will have good success

in Revolutionary Development. The days just ahead will see great changes for the good of our country. You are a splendid part of this history that is coming now. Be good citizens in it!

Join me now in a cheer, the famous one that every Revolutionary Development cadre is always proud to shout: "Viet Nam Doc-Lap va Thong-Nhat Muon Nam" (Viet Nam Independent and Unified Forever).

(Three thousand cadre and hundreds of spectators joined in this cheer.)

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 1, 1967
1:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bowles reports
Indian attitudes on Near East.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

138

Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 6-3-91

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-301
By ia, NARA Date 4-24-00

138a

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Thursday, June 1, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BOWLES (New Delhi, 17606)

During the last few days I have raised the West Asia issue twice with Morarji Desai and also with Mrs. Gandhi and Chavan as well as in general discussions with a half dozen other Ministers. Their responses reflect the prevailing hypersensitive and uncertain political situation we face here.

In my calls on each of the three principals, I began by stressing the importance the U.S. Government places on restraint by all parties in the present crisis and our regret that India, which might have been able to exert some influence on the UAR, chose to take a one-sided stand. I suggested that India's unbalanced posture might have the effect of encouraging the UAR to be less rather than more responsible in the current perilous confrontation of military forces, and would certainly harden Nasser's uncompromising attitude.

Chavan, whom I saw first, expressed surprise that the situation was as grave as I described it. He seemed to feel that whatever position India adopted would not make much difference. It was clear that he is completely occupied with domestic law and order problems.

When I made my presentation to Mrs. Gandhi on May 29 she stated that India had traditionally supported Nasser and his Arab allies, for the simple reason that India cannot afford to see a unified and antagonistic Muslim block develop in West Asia. Already Pakistan is successfully associating its interests with those of Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, an association which many Indian leaders believe has the backing of the U.S. Government or at least is being encouraged, even if unintentionally, as a result of U.S. policies. More than that, Nasser being closer to the man in the street is likely to grow in influence while Israel will decline, and Israel is only one country and small, whereas the Arab countries are many and count more internationally.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

When I suggested that her latter comment, if applied generally to foreign policy questions, would amount to saying that large nations should be against small, she stated, "We must be realistic." Mrs. Gandhi like Chavan, seemed totally preoccupied with other matters and unable to focus on the implications of the crisis posed by the UAR-Israel confrontation.

Because I knew from private sources that Morarji Desai had sharply dissented from Chagla's position in the recent meeting of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Cabinet and had urged the Government of India adopt a strictly neutral posture, and because I was dissatisfied with the talks with Chavan and the Prime Minister, I called on Morarji on the morning of May 31 for the second time within five days. Speaking to him as an old, personal friend, I urged him to consider the likely consequences of India's apparently unqualified support for Nasser at a moment of crisis. Not only did I fail to see how Indian interests were advanced in West Asia, but perhaps more important, I felt such a position was bound to jeopardize Indian interests in the U.S. Many liberals in Congress who have loyally backed foreign aid legislation are strongly committed to Israel. In the future their response to aid requests for India may be at best one of indifference.

To my surprise, in view of his strong personal support of Israel and his distrust of Nasser, Morarji reacted strongly. "Why," he asked, "don't we Indians have as much right to speak up as you Americans? Should the fact that we urgently need your assistance deprive us of our right to express ourselves?"

I replied that while I was not attempting to pressure him or his Government, I did want to make sure that at least one responsible individual in the Indian Government was aware of the potential consequences of Indian present foreign policy.

At this, Morarji cooled off quickly and in his usual frank and friendly fashion began to share his personal concerns. In the first place, he said, he was not in a position within the Government to have his way on everything. He could to some extent influence foreign policy and in large measure shape economic policy. But his primary task now was to win the full confidence of Mrs. Gandhi without compromising his own convictions. This, he stated, is not an easy task, adding "You Americans wanted Mrs. Gandhi and you supported her."

I observed that it had never been a question of who we wanted as Prime Minister. We had, however, correctly assumed that Mrs. Gandhi would win and when she did, we naturally hoped that she would prove equal to the task. Admittedly, if he were Prime Minister, our tasks would be easier since he and we had a more or less common view of world politics and Indian development. The critical question now, I said, was who in the present setting will provide the sense of direction and priorities which India so urgently requires?

Morarji stated that it is too early to tell, but in the meantime he would continue to do his best to keep the present Government on a constructive course. As for future, a coalition government at center was possible only if ~~some~~ Congress MPs split off, and at the moment this did not seem to be in his cards. If the situation moves in that direction, Morarji felt he could help shape the coalition government that would result.

Comment: As these conversations suggest, we face a difficult and uncertain political situation in the coming months. Most of the leadership is groping in the dark. Desai, the most notable exception, cannot afford to take on too many battles at once.

The hopeful aspect of the current picture is on the economic side. Desai's budget is an excellent document prepared under difficult circumstances; with a decent monsoon, the Indian economy should begin to pick up markedly by the end of the year, which in turn could ease the present political tensions and restore confidence among leaders, press, and public.

I am pouching you a memorandum analyzing the current political and economic situations in greater detail and spelling out some recommendations for U.S. policies geared to this situation.

Thursday, June 1, 1967 - 1 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

139

As instructed, I called on Congressman Celler and Congressman Morgan at noon in the Rayburn Building.

Congressman Celler explained that he and Morgan were working closely together in providing leadership in the House with respect to the Mid East crisis.

They wish me to convey to you the following:

1. The clear majority sentiment in the House of Representatives is pro-Israel. They feel Israel is being "pushed around" by Nasser.
2. They are worried about the effect of the passage of time on Israel with respect to the build-up of Egyptian forces in Sinai and the debilitating consequences for the Israeli economy.
3. They feel we shall, in the end, have to "do something" to open the blockade at Aqaba -- multilaterally or otherwise.
4. They do not believe that the Soviet Union will directly confront us if we so act. They will react indirectly.
5. They wanted it clearly understood that they are "Administration men"; they fully support the President; they fully support your statement of May 23; and they wish to do nothing that you would not regard as helpful.
6. Celler then asked, "Would the President regard it as helpful if we generated a strong statement of support for his position on Aqaba?" He said that without even trying, they got over 100 signatures last week.

I replied that I could not speak for the President. It was my impression that the President might need their support in the days ahead, and it might be wise to await the President's direct guidance. But I could be wrong; and if the President wished them to generate a statement of support, I would let them know.

Celler did most of the speaking; but, at each point, he asked Morgan for confirmation that this was also his view. Morgan explicitly stated his agreement at each point and at the end when I summarized their message to you.

No Congressional statement wanted now _____

W. W. R.

Tell ^{Celler} ~~Celler~~ and Morgan to do the following _____

See me _____

140

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 1, 1967
12:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith:

-- a North Vietnamese estimate that their industries are now producing 40% "below normal" because of the latest U. S. raids;

-- the report of a Soviet [redacted] warning that they would supply volunteers if we bombed the North Vietnamese civil population. [redacted]

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(a)(4)

W. W. Rostow

[redacted]

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(a)(4)

~~SECRET~~

SANTIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-3
By WJ, NARA, Date 11-17-93

W.W.R.
111
1 page
2 files

Thursday, June 1, 1967, 11:50 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

At Tab A, for your signature, is a letter to Mike Blumenthal accepting his resignation as Deputy Trade Negotiator (Mike's earlier letter to you is at Tab B).

As you know, Mike is slated to become President of Bendix International. I just learned that Bendix plans to announce the appointment on Monday, June 5. (Apparently they have internal problems that would make it difficult for them to delay the announcement.)

You may want to have George Christian announce that you have accepted the resignation.

Francis M. Bator

(If you approve, we will need your signature at Tab A.)

George Christian to make brief announcement that you
have accepted resignation _____

George to release text of your letter _____ (His letter should not be released)

Speak to me _____

FMB:LSE:mst

133a
Dear Mike:

It is with deep regret that I accept your resignation. For four years you have played a leading role in a long and difficult negotiation, performing with exceptional skill, energy, intelligence and devotion. The successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round -- and the enormous benefits that will flow from it -- will stand as a continuing memorial of your very fine work.

I appreciate your offer to serve again if needed. It is good to know that I will be able to call on you from time to time for advice and counsel. You leave with my best wishes for the future.

Sincerely,

Honorable W. Michael Blumenthal
Deputy Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations
U. S. Mission
80 Rue de Lausanne
Geneva, Switzerland

LBJ:FMB:LSE:dlb 6/1/67

142
Pres. file

Thursday, June 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Farewell message for Prime Minister Holt

Attached is the proposed text of a farewell message to Prime Minister and Mrs. Holt. It would be delivered to them at their New York hotel tomorrow night.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

142a

TO BE DELIVERED TO

Prime Minister and Mrs. Holt
Waldorf Astoria Hotel
New York, New York (on the evening of June 2)

Lady Bird and I were delighted that you could visit us and we wish you a most pleasant journey as you travel to EXPO 67 and to London.

As always, your presence in Washington was a bright, though all too brief, occasion to remember.

I look forward to sharing your invaluable counsel, in the future as in the past, as we face the difficult problems ahead.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Thursday, June 1, 1967

Mr. President:

As instructed, I told Dr. Joachim Prinz why you felt it inadvisable to receive at the White House any groups of U. S. citizens concerned with the Near East crisis. He immediately said he understood. He added he was sure that it was important that you neither be nor appear to be under pressure and that he was completely confident in your handling of the crisis.

He then asked the following question: Would you be willing to receive him (or a small group of his colleagues, including himself) off the record, without press notice, at the Waldorf Saturday night? He said that because this would not be a White House setting, you might judge that kind of meeting appropriate.

W. W. Rostow

Will receive Prinz off the record at the Waldorf _____

Will receive Prinz and a few colleagues _____

No _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rlh

144

Pres file

Limited Official Use

Thursday - June 1, 1967

Mr. President:

Our Embassy in Mexico reports that ex-President Lopez Mateos suffered a massive cerebral hemorrhage yesterday. His condition is described as very grave. It is doubtful that he will survive.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - June 1, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith Secretary Rusk's report on the status of the Panama negotiations following the first round of the Anderson-Eleta talks in New York.

From this round it is clear that they are close to agreement on all issues except compensation. The Panamanians want \$40-\$50 million annually from tolls as a starter. This would involve a substantial increase in the present toll rates. Anderson has countered with a formula which would give them \$12.5 million. Somewhere between \$25-\$30 million is a likely area of compromise. This will be the principal issue Eleta and Anderson will discuss when they meet again on Monday.

Before recessing their talks on May 24, Anderson said to Eleta: "We are perilously close to agreement". This sums up where we are. The remaining big hurdle is the price tag — *but that's not exactly trivial!*

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Rusk memo to President
of 5/31/67.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4
By sig, NARA, Date 4-9-92

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-6
By isp, NARA, Date 5-21-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 31, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Status of US-Panamanian Canal Treaty
Negotiations

There has been progress in the treaty negotiations in the past three weeks. Ambassadors Anderson and Irwin have been meeting intensively with Panamanian Foreign Minister Eleta and the Panamanian negotiating team in New York. Eleta came here to participate directly in the negotiations in an effort to resolve rapidly the remaining issues. He is leaving New York this week to go to Spain. Ambassador Irwin will meet in Washington next week with the Panamanian negotiators.

Eleta is scheduled to return to New York on June 5, and Ambassadors Anderson and Irwin are scheduled to meet with him on June 6, 7, and 8. They will resume their discussions on June 12 and will continue to meet as often as possible until June 17 when Eleta must return to Panama. He hopes to be able to return with agreement in principle on all the unresolved issues.

The following is a summary of the present status of the negotiations:

1) Lands and Areas: It now appears that agreement can be reached on the boundaries of the new Canal Area and the military reservations, provided we are able to return to Panama a substantial area of land adjacent to Panama City. Ambassador Anderson has identified an area which he believes can be given to Panama and has asked for the views of the Department of Defense. We have already agreed in

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified

principle to return to Panama several areas on the Atlantic side of the Isthmus and some smaller areas on the Pacific side near Panama City.

2) Sea Level Canal Treaty: Panama has presented a new proposed sea level canal treaty draft. They said that the previous United States draft was too detailed and over-emphasized the rights which were being granted to the United States. Although the new Panamanian draft is not completely acceptable to us, it does provide an acceptable basis for negotiation, and Ambassador Irwin will be working on it with the Panamanian negotiators next week.

3) Duration of Treaties: There is not yet agreement on the duration of the new treaties. The question of duration is intimately tied in to the question of compensation and Ambassador Anderson believes the former can be resolved satisfactorily to the United States if the latter can be agreed upon.

4) Jurisdiction: There is no final agreement on the question of criminal jurisdiction within the new Canal Area. Ambassadors Anderson and Irwin believe that a mutually satisfactory solution will be reached.

5) Compensation: No agreement has yet been reached on this issue. Panama has accepted in principle our position that compensation as concerns the lock canal should be determined on a royalty basis to provide annually to Panama and the United States a given number of cents per ton of canal traffic. There is still a substantial difference, however, on the amount of the royalty. If compensation on the lock canal can be agreed upon, Ambassador Anderson believes the Panamanians will accept a US proposal covering compensation in the sea level canal treaty.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Thursday - June 1, 1967

Mr. President:

As a farewell gift to Linc Gordon you might like to autograph a copy of the Summit pamphlet.

A suitable inscription would be:

"To Linc Gordon -

With deep appreciation for your
help in making the Summit a success."

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Pamphlet of Summit

Pres file

Thursday - June 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Memorial Day Message from President Costa e Silva

President Costa e Silva sent the message at Tab B expressing Brazil's sympathy as the United States celebrated Memorial Day.

State suggests that you send the acknowledgement at Tab A.
I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments
Tabs A and B.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

51
10/12

Suggested Presidential Telegraphic Acknowledgement to Memorial Day
Message from Brazilian President Costa e Silva

I deeply appreciate your kind message on the occasion of Memorial Day on which we remember not only our own honored dead, but also our Brazilian comrades in arms who gave their lives to preserve liberty and peace.

Lyndon B. Johnson

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BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT COSTA-e SILVA'S MEMORIAL DAY (1967)
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON

May 30, 1967

"His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America.

On this date when the American nation, in unison, prays for peace and honours their brave dead who sacrificed their lives for the defense of liberty, I wish to convey to Your Excellency on behalf of the people of my country and my government the assurances that Brazil follows with emotion the ceremonies with which the United States of America celebrate another Memorial Day. A

Arthur da Costa e Silva
President of the Republic of Brazil. "

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Thursday - June 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Venezuelan Case Against Cuba

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 72-4

By WJP, NARA, Date 4-9-93

The Venezuelans today asked for an early Meeting of Foreign Ministers (MFM) to consider their complaint against Cuba.

The convocation is under the OAS Charter rather than Rio Treaty. The essential difference is that a Charter MFM is limited to recommendations, while a Rio Treaty MFM normally takes mandatory measures.

Venezuela chose the OAS Charter track because it can count on almost unanimous support for convocation. This is not the case if they moved under the Rio Treaty.

The OAS Council meets on Monday, June 5, to act on the Venezuelan request. The first step will be to convoke the MFM at the ambassadorial level. A Committee will then be appointed to go to Venezuela (and other countries which have cases against Cuba) to examine all the evidence. The MFM at the ministerial level will meet after the Committee completes its report.

Venezuela has no clear picture of what it wants the MFM to recommend. Part of its difficulty is that there is little more that can be done against Castro of an effective nature short of armed force, which is out of the question. Another problem is the general unwillingness of the larger Latin American countries to apply additional economic pressure against countries trading with Cuba.

State is still sorting out what meaningful collective action can be taken. What is needed is a keener sense by the Latin Americans that Cuban subversion is a common problem and that they should be taking the lead in: (1) publicizing Cuban interventionist activities, (2) bringing pressure on the Western Europeans to curtail their trade with Cuba; (3) forcing the Soviet bloc to define its position and (4) strengthening their internal security forces to liquidate the guerrillas at the incipient stage. What is called for, in effect, is a collective security self-help effort by the Latins.

We will be trying to move them in this direction, making clear that they can count on our shield against overt Cuban military action and our support in developing their security capabilities.

W. W. Rostow

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Thursday - June 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Follow-up on Incident Involving Lynda Bird's Security Detail
at Barranquilla, Colombia

You asked that I look into the May 22 AP story from Bogota reporting that El Tiempo editor Enrique Santos had reopened the Barranquilla airport incident and that one of the two Colombian reporters involved plans to press suit against "unknown members" of Lynda's security detail.

From Lynda's security detail, [redacted] and our Embassy, I have pieced together the following account of what took place:

1. At the Secret Service's request, Barranquilla airport authorities cordoned off the ramp area of Lynda's plane to give her the privacy she requested.

2. Despite the plea of the authorities that the local press respect Lynda's wishes and remain behind the barrier, two El Tiempo reporters climbed a fence and the photographer raced toward the aircraft as Lynda and her Secret Service escort were moving down the steps. A local [redacted] man who was present to help the Secret Service detail called to the photographer to halt. When he did not, the [redacted] man literally brought him to the ground with a flying tackle. Meanwhile Lynda continued descending the steps, walked a short distance to her car parked by the aircraft and took off for town.

3. The head of Lynda's Secret Service detail tells me that the [redacted] man was fully justified in moving to stop the unknown intruder. He would have done the same, although his technique would have achieved the same result without the rather drastic tackle.

4. The El Tiempo reporters embellished on the story, saying that they had been beaten and kicked by members of Lynda's Secret Service detail. The camera of the photographer was damaged in the fall. [redacted]

5. After the story broke, the Embassy [redacted] tried to get it played down. Here the details are not precise. I gather that

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(a) (4, 5)

the Embassy spoke to government officials and to El Tiempo. [redacted]
[redacted] Colombian Security Chief General
Leyva's making a public statement that local Colombian security agents
-- not US -- had been involved in the incident. It was on the basis of
this statement that Santos retracted what he had written in his "Behind
the News" column about the Secret Service and Texans.

One aspect I have not been able to clarify: the source of the wire stories
that Lynda, while in Cartagena, had apologized for the incident in which
her Secret Service ^{escort} was involved. I understand Lynda made no such
statement to the press.

Why Santos should have reopened the issue after reversing himself, I
do not know. The AP despatch has him saying that it was triggered by
a Washington Post editorial criticizing El Tiempo. This is not so, al-
though the Post did print a letter to the Editor on May 14 which took
some nasty swipes at El Tiempo. My hunch is that Santos was pressured
into retracting. After Lynda completed her trip and the pressure re-
laxed, he popped off at the first opportunity, using the Post letter as the
peg.

The AP story closes with a reference to the suit in a Barranquilla court
against "unknown members" of Lynda's escort. I doubt whether this
will be pushed, but I have asked Ambassador Carlson to keep a close
watch on the situation and let me know if there are further developments.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Free file

Thursday, June 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Birthday Greetings to King of Malaysia

The King's birthday is June 7. Our Embassy in Kuala Lumpur notes that the King's birthday is a national holiday honoring the King as the embodiment of Malaysian national sovereignty. Given the symbolic character of the day, a message from you would be most appropriate.

A proposed text is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Approved _____
Disapproved _____
See me _____

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

Mrs. Johnson and I wish to extend to your Majesty our greetings and heartiest congratulations on your birthday. We also would like to take this occasion to convey our best wishes for the continued happiness and well being of the Malaysian people.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 1, 1967
4:08 p.m.

Mr. President:

I do not wish to move the
CARE program and the program
loan without your assent.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-4
By sig, NARA, Date 4-9-93